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The non-fighting forces of the United Nations: An instrument for the pacific settlement of disputes.

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Title:
The non-fighting forces of the United Nations: An instrument for the pacific settlement of disputes.
Alternate title:
Instrument for the pacific settlement of disputes
Creator:
Carver, Joan Sacknitz, 1931-
Publication Date:
Language:
English
Physical Description:
xi, 503 leaves. : ; 28 cm.

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Subjects / Keywords:
Civil wars ( jstor )
Covert operations ( jstor )
Logistics ( jstor )
Military operations ( jstor )
National politics ( jstor )
Peace ( jstor )
Peace keeping forces ( jstor )
Principal place of business ( jstor )
United Nations ( jstor )
Voting ( jstor )
Dissertations, Academic -- Political Science -- UF ( lcsh )
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ( unbist )
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS ( unbist )
Peace ( lcsh )
Political Science thesis Ph. D ( lcsh )
Security, International ( lcsh )
TRUCE SUPERVISION ( unbist )
City of Jacksonville ( local )
Genre:
bibliography ( marcgt )
theses ( marcgt )
non-fiction ( marcgt )

Notes

Thesis:
Thesis--University of Florida.
Bibliography:
Bibliography: leaves 465-501.
Additional Physical Form:
Also available online.
General Note:
Manuscript copy.
General Note:
Vita.
Statement of Responsibility:
Joan Sacknitz Carver

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University of Florida
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University of Florida
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Copyright Joan Sacknitz Carver. Permission granted to the University of Florida to digitize, archive and distribute this item for non-profit research and educational purposes. Any reuse of this item in excess of fair use or other copyright exemptions requires permission of the copyright holder.
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0022438464 ( ALEPH )

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Full Text









THE NON-FIGHTING FORCES OF THE

UNITED NATIONS: AN INSTRUMENT FOR THE

PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES


















By
JOAN SACKNITZ CARVER










A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE COUNCIL OF
THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY











UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA December, 1965

















DEDI CATION



To Jay and. Jimmy













ACKNOWLEDGMENTS


When one comes to the end of a graduate program and tbe completion of a dissertation, there are many persons to whom a debt of gratitude is owed. To all those who guided me in my graduate courses and who assisted me with this study, I express my sincere thanks.

I am particularly indebted to Dr. Frederick Hartmarn. Not only did Dr. Hartmann stimulate my interest in the field of international relations, but he also directed my attention to the subject of peace-keeping groups. His perceptive comments and constant encouragement have been invaluable to this study. I am deeply grateful for his generous assistance.

fMy thanks go too to Dr. Arnold Heidenheimer for his valued instruction and guidance arid for his useful suggestions in connection with this study. I wish to express as well my gratitude to Dr. Manning Dauer for his assistance and for his unfailing ability to resolve administrative crises with dispatch and kindness.

i wo ild like to thank the University of F lorida for the financial aid which made possible my graduate studies and the preparation of this dissertation. I am grateful to the staff of the library of the University of Florida for its assistance and to Mrs. Thyra Johnston for typing the manuscript.
iii














TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ACKNOWLEDGENTS . . . . . . . . . iii

IST i ABL S . . . . . . . . . x

LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . xi

Chapter

I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . 1

II. PEACE-Ki(EIN, iG TBiROUGH OBSER VATI ON-A FORMATIVE
STAGE: THE TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION IN
PALH; N E 11 1 B . . . . . . . . . 17

Introduction. . . . I... . 17

Conditions for Creation of the Truce
Organization .... .. . . 18

The United Nations involvement . . . 20 The crisis area: internal conditions . 21 The precedents for peace-keeping . . 22

Establishment of the United. Nations Truce
Supervision Organization . ...... 29 The establishment . . ....... . .. 29

The legal foundations . . . . 33 The mandate . . . . . . 55

Characteristics of the Truce Organization 38

Leadership . . . . .. 38

Support for the Truce Organization . 41

Men for the Truce Organization. . . 41 iv










Ch peter Page

Money: the financial base . . 52 M aerial: the logistic base. . . 56

The legal status of the Truce Supervision.
Organization ....... .. . . 60

The Truce Supervision Organization in Action 65

The role of the Truce Supervision
Organization . . . . . . 65

Organization for action . . . . 6 The functioning of the observers. . 70

Conclusions. . . . . . 74

II, PE -KWING THRON( UGH OBSERVATION-AN
ESTABLISHED INSTRUMENT: THE UNITED NATIONS
OBSERVATION GROUP IN LEBANON . . . 80 Introduction . . . . . 80

Conditions for Creation of UNOGIL. . . 85

The crisis area: internal conditions in
Lebanon.. . . . . . ...... 85

The United Nations involvement. . . 86 The precedents for peace-keeping. ..... 87

The Establishment of the Observation Group 88

The establishment . . . 88 The legal foundations ....... 92 The mandate . ... ..... 94

Characteristics of UNOGIL. . . . . 104

Leadership of UNOGIL ... . . . 104 Support for UNOGIL . . . ... 110

v










Chapter Psge

Men for UNOGIL . . . . . 110

Money: the financial base of UNOGIL. 115 Material: the logistic base of UNOGIL,. 118

The legal status of UNOGIL. . . 119

UNOGIL in Action . . . . 122

The role of the observers . 122 The organization of UNOGIL, . . 124 The functioning of UNOGIL . . . 126

Phase I . . . . . 126

Phase II .... . ... . 136

Conclusions. . . .. . . . .. 141

IV, BEYOND fTHiE OBSERVERS: THE UNITED NATIONS
EMERGENCY FORCE. .. ...... . . 146

Introduction . . . . . ... 146

Conditions for Creation of UNEF . . . 147

The crisis area . . .. . . 147

The United Nations involvement . . 148

The Establishment of UNEF. .. . . 155

The establishment . . . 155 The legal foundations of UNEF . .... 163 The mandate . . . . . . . 170

Characteristics of UNEF . . .. . 177

Leadership of UNEF. . . . . . 178

Support for UNEF. ........... 184


vi










Chapter Page

Hen for UNEF . . . . . 18

Money: the financial base of UNEF. . 190 Material: the logistic base of UNEF. 207

The legal status of UNEF. . . . .. 212

UNEF in Action . . . . . . . 216

The role of tbhe Force . . . . . 216 The organization of UNEF. . . . . 218 The functioning of UNEF . . . . 222

Phase 1: the withdrawal. . . . 222

Phase II: the stabilization of the
area. . . . .. . . 229

Conclusions ....... .. . . . 237

V. AN EXPANSION OF PEACE-KEEPING: THE UNITED
NATIONS FORCE IN THE CONGO-ITS ORIGINS . 242 Introduction . . . . . . . 242

Conditions for Creation of the United
Nations Force . . . . . . 244

The crisis area: internal conditions in
the Congo. . . . . . 244

The United Nations involvement . 249

The Establishment of the United Nations
Force . . . . . . . 251

The establishment . . . . . . 251

The legal foundations of the United
Nations Force. .. . . . . .. 255

The mandate of the United Nations Force 264

Conclusions. . . . . . . .. 284

vii









Chapter Page

VI. THE UNITED NATIONS FORCE IN THE CONGO: THE
OUTER LIMITS OF PEACE-KEEPING? . . . 287 Characteristics of the United Nations Force. 287

Leadership of ONUC. . . . . . 287

Support for ONUC. . . . . . . 293

Men for the United Nations Force . 293

Money: the financial basis of the
Force . .. . . . . . 298

Material: the logistic base of the
Force . . 12

The legal status of the United Nations
Force . . . . . 19

ONUC in Action . . . . . . 323

The role of ONUC. . . . . . . 325

The organization of the Force . . . 330

The functioning of the United Nations
Force. . . . . . . . . 334

Phase I. . . . . . . 354

Phase II . . . . . . 338

Phase III. . . . . . 343

Phase IV . . . . . . 351

Conclusions. . . . . . . 378

VII. THE NON-FIGHTING FORCE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. . . . . . . 389

Recent Uses of the Non-Fighting Force . .. 389

The Non-Fighting Force: Its
Institutionalized Side. . 394 viii









Chapter Page

ln sti;u:ionalization of a philosophy of
action . . . . . . . . 398

instit;ut;ionalizat;ion of a philosophy of
force composition. . . . . . 408

Institutionalization of a methodology 4, 12

institutiona:lization of a Force
bureaucracy. . . . . .... 417

The significance of ins, titut;ionalization. 420

The Nonl-F.;ighting Force: Its NonInstitutional.i zed Side . . . . 421

Conclusions . . . . . . . -31

VIII, TiiHE P iRF)MANCCE AND POTENTIAL OF THE NONFIGHTING FORCE . . . . . . ..

APPENDIES .. . . . . . . . ... 454

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . ......... . 465

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH . . . . . . . 502






















ix













LIST OF TABLES

Table Page

1. The Growth of UNOGIL: The Increase in
Observers Over the Months . . . .. 114

2. The Scope of Observational Activity by
UNOGIL from June through October, 1958. . . 138

3. Source of Troops for ONUC . . . . . 297

A-1. Record of Critical Votes in the Security Council on the Establishment and Support of
Peace-Keeping Groups. . . . . . . 455

A-2,. Selected Critical Votes in the General Assembly on the Establishment and Support of
Peace-Keeping Groups. .. . . . . 456

B-1. The National Composition of UNTSO . . .. 458 B-2. The National Composition of UNOGIL.. ..... 459 B-3. The National Composition of UNEF Over the Years . . . ............. .. 460

B-4. The National Composition of ONUC at Selected Times . . . . . . . . 461

B-5. The National Composition of the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) . . . 463 C-1. A Comparison of Peace-Keeping Expenses and Regular United Nations Expenses in Selected
Years and Selected Periods. . 464













LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Page

1. Organization chrt; oF Uni ted Nations Truce
Supervision OrganizRation .. . . 65

2. OrganizatJion chart of Uni.t;ed. Nations
Observation Group in Lebanon . .... 125

3. The relationship of the Force's power to its
responsibilities over time . . . 326

4, (Orgn n:i.zation chart of United Nations
operation in the Congo . . . . . 331






























xi
















1 NTRODUCTI ON


The blue berets of the United Nations military men who do not fight serve as a symbol of the world's concern for peace. In mid-1964 the "blue berets" watched over the peace of the world in remote and scattered areas: in the hot deserts of Sinai and the Gaza Strip; in mountainous and barren Yemen; in the borderland of Kashmir; in the lovely, troubled isle of Cyprus. In the past they have served in Greece, Indonesia, Lebanon, the Congo, and West New Guinea.

In this study it is proposed to examine the development and use by the United Nations of the military presence as an instrument of pacific settlement. The non-fighting
1
force, as we will term the military presence, is an international military contingent which is neither equipped for real hostilities nor intended really to fight. Called into being not for purposes of collective security, but for those of pacific settlement, it is injected into a situation of tension, instability, and potential violence to prevent or


INon-fighting force is used in this study to mean
both military observer groups nnd military forces like UNEF. Some authors restrict its application to the military forces. The term is used by Lincoln Bloomfield in The United. Nations and U.S. Foreign Po]icy (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1960),
1









2

halt thUra violence through the mere fact of its presence. It represents in tangible form the concern of the world. community that fi. ghting be prevented. t1; serves as a human truce line, powerful nob in and of itself, but powerful. because of what it represents.

The n.o-fighting force is one of the most significant innovations in the realm of pacific settlement made by the United Nations. It is both a reflection of the challenges which have confronted that body and a commentary on United Nations efforts to meet those challenges. The world with which b e United Nations has had to cope has been a complex and difficult one, Problems are many and hardly made more simple by the setting within which they occur: one of a world complicated by its division into conflicting power blocs; by the recent rise of a number of turbulent, disconten-ted, newly-independent states; and by the awesome destructive power of nuclear weapons. In this difficult and uneasy world outbreaks of violence have been frequent, particularly in the areas just emerging from colonial status. The solutions to the problems causing the violence are not easy to find. In most cases the issues have not been black or white--neither the identity of one "aggressor," who might be dealt with handily by sanctions, nor just and acceptable solutions have always been clearly evident. Yet for tihe United Nations to do nothing in a crisis merely








3

because a solution was not obvious would not only be an indictment of its effectiveness but dangerous and irresponsible. The possibility of small conflicts expanding into large, of brush-fire wars becoming world wars, is omnipresent.

The non-fighting force is one of the answers of the United Nations to this sort of challenge. The non-fighting force is injected into the problem area as a means of holding the situation in abeyance, while a peaceful solution is sought. The non-fighting force is a "manifestation of the view that an organization which is incapable of providing collective security may yet contribute significantly to peace and security if it concentrates on helping states to avoid drifting too near the brink of war, and not on rescuing them from the brink itself."2
We have referred to the non-fighting force as a

significant innovation of the United Nations. This statement should be qualified. The non-fighting force as a pacific settlement technique is primarily, but not entirely, a United Nations product. There are forerunners of the non-fighting force in pre-United Nations days--though these are few in number and apparently influenced United Nations


2Inis Claude, "The United Nations and the Use of
Force," International Conciliation, No. 532 (March, 1961), p. 375.








/4.

efforts little.3 Under the League of Nations there were two cases, Vilna and the Saar, in which an international police force was brought into existence. The two main League experiments with a force were both connected with ensuring that plebiscites conducted by the League would be fair. It should be noted that such an international police force differs in basic conception from the collective security military force. The police force is designed more to keep order by its presence than t.o restore the peace by its action.. The police force usually operates on the basis of consent ad has limited powers as well as limited functions.

The first effort of t;he League to establish an internationai police force came in connection with the Vilna situation. After the Polish-led occupation of Vilna in 1920 the League set up an international force to ensure a fair and impartial vote in a plebiscite to determine Vilna's future. Under a League Council resolution of November, 1920, a force was authorized which was to consist of 1,500 to 1,800 men from eight states (Belgium, Britain, Spain, France, Denmnark, Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden). Plans


1Despite the similarities of the non-fighting forces
u1;nod by the L.eague and those set up under the United Nations, there is lii;ile or no evidence that those responsible for the Un j.it;ed Nations forces took much account of or were very luclh i influenced by the League experience. There was no mention, for example, in the establishment of UNEF of the League experience. See Gabriella Rosner, The United Nations 1mn.erency Force (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), p. 222








5

for financing the force were laid and its functions defined. The nations contributing the men were to supply their contingents with equipment, pay their regular salaries, and advance funds for their transportation and maintenance. All expenses over and above those normal to maintain the troops in their home state would be repaid by the League, with reimbursement of the League by Poland and Lithuania. This project was abandoned, however, before it could come to fruition when it became apparent that it could be executed only with great difficulty. There was too much opposition and too little real support for the League action. Poland and Lithuania accepted in theory the idea of the plebiscite guaranteed by an international force, but in practice cooperated but little. Opposition by the Soviet Union may have delivered the final blow to the plan, for the states contributing to the force were not anxious to send their troops in when a neighboring great power objected.4

The second effort to establish'an international force, again to maintain conditions for a fair plebiscite, was more successful. In 1934 the League Council created an international force which operated with French and German consent to ensure order before, during,and after the Saar plebiscite.


4William Frye, A United Nations Peace Force. (New York: Oceana for The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1957), p. 50.








6

The Saar force had a function similar to that of the United Nations non-fighting forces--to exercise by its presence a restraint on the use of force.

There are parallels not only in purpose but in structure, legal regulation, and control between the Saar force and those forces used-by the United Nations in Suez, the Congo, and Cyprus. The Saar force was composed of 3,300 men supplied by four nations: Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden. It was under the command of a Britishappointed Commander-in-Chief who directed the staff officers of each national unit. The consent of the parties concerned was a prerequisite to the formation of the force; while an advisory committee composed of three members appointed by the Council and assisted by a sub-committee of the states contributing to the force had wide latitude in making plans for the creation and direction of the force.. Financial arrangements were based on the principle that the League would bear expenses exceeding those normally made by the contributing states to maintain their contingents. Out of these administrative and financial arrangements came an organization able to execute its functions with ease and efficiency and without the use of arms.5


5The use of an international force at Letitia is
sometimes cited as a precedent for the non-fighting forces of the United Nations. See, for example, ibid., p. 51. In this case the force was not really very international however. In a conflict between Peru and Colombia over the










Despite the success of the Saar experiment, there was no consideration at the United Nations preparatory conferences or at the San Francisco Conference in 1945 of the establishment of a permanent non-fighting force. The importance that this sort of force could have in stabilizing crisis situations was evidently not foreseen. All efforts to create an international military force were concentrated on the establishment of a fighting force under Article 43 of the Charter.

Thus, there were only a few precedents either

theoretical or actual for the United Nations use of military men for peace-keeping purposes. The history of the nonfighting force is short; for all practical purposes the evolution of the non-fighting force from tentative beginnings in observer groups to small armies occurs within the lifetime of the United Nations.

If the uses by the United Nations of the military

presence were placed on a continuum, running from the least to the most ambitious in size and scope, they would fall into three broad groups. At one end of the continuum would be the small, multi-national observer groups used.primarily


Colombian settlement of Letitia, the League Council resolved the issue by placing Letitia under the administration of a League Commission for one year. The Commission was assisted by an "international force." The international force was, in fact, composed only of Colombian soldiers deputized by the Lague of Nations and wearing special arm-bands.











early in the history of the Unit;ed Nations. The larger observer groups, such as the one used in Palestine, would fall in the middle. At the Far end of the range would be the small armies established by the United. Nations to keep the peace. Some characteristics common to all these groups can be observed. In each case the situation which brought in the United Nations was one in which fighting had occurred and was liable to break out again; in which emotions over the issues were high and agreement not readily reached. iost involved nations which had gained their independence since the Second World War. The purpose of the observers was to quiet the situation not through forceful means--for they were few in number and unarmed--but through the moral and psychological effect conveyed by their presence. The purpose and means of the peace-keeping force were similar to those of the observers though a limited use of arms was possible to them.

The small observer groups might be considered as the prototype of the military presence. The small observer group technique has been used by the United Nations in three situations: in Greece from 194 .8 to 1954; in Indonesia from 1947 to 1951; and in Kashmir from 1949 to the present. In Greece observation was carried out along a 500 mile border by between 30 and 40 military observers operating in teams









9

of six,. The personnel, as well as the equipment necessary

for the mission at the outset;, came from eight states-Australia, Brazil., China, France, Mexico, the Netherlands,

the Un:i;ed Kingdom, and the United States--all of which

were members of the Special Committee on the Balkans.8 In

Indonesia approximately 68 observers served, selected from

the same countries that were members of the Consular

Commission: Australia, Belgium, China, France, the United

Kingdom, and the United States. In Kashmir, observers have

been on duty since early 194.9 to aid in maintaining the

cease-fire between India and Pakistan. The observers have

numbered about sixty over the years. The initial seconding

states were Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark,

Norway, and Sweden. In all these cases the observer teams

were under the direction, at least initially, of the special


HU.N. Doc. A/955, pp. 21-22
7Establishment and maintenance of the observers raised s7 rio ns f inanc ial que t;ion because the initial appropriation for the Special Committee on the Balkans did not include a sumi large enough to cover observer costs. A request to the Secretary-General for additional funds received a negative response. Thus, the Special Committee decided to accept offers of equipment with the recommendation that the donors be r:eimlrrsed a.t the next General Assembly session. Later udgets did include an appropriation to cover the observer costs. U.N. Doc. A/574, P. 3.
8
Pakistan was also a member of the Special Committee on the Balkans, but apparently sent no observers. Seats on the Special Committee were open for Poland and the Soviet Union but; were never taken. Had they taken their seats presu mably they might also have participated in the observer group's activity. This might have been precedent-setting.
U.N. Doc. A/574, p. 2.









10

commissions established by the General Assembly or the Security Council to work out a solution to the problems at

issue. In at least two instances the initiative in the

use of the military observers came from the field organization. The number of observers used in these situations was

small, and the scope of the mission was correspondingly

limited. Their primary function was to patrol and to observe. The value of the observer groups has been attested

to repeatedly, however, both by statement and by the practice i10
of using them for long periods of time.

A second level of United Nations peace-keeping

activity can be detected in the ambitious observer group,

as represented by the United Nations Truce Supervision

Organization in Palestine, the United Nations Observation

Group in Lebanon, and, to a lesser extent, the United Nations


I n Greece the observers operated under the United Nations Speci.al Committee on the Balkans until the end of 1951. w rl under t;he Balkan Sub-Commission of the Peace Observ~b, ion Commission from 1952 to 1.954-; in Kashmir under the Unit-;ed Nations Commission for India and. akistan; and in Indoneia under -the Consular Commission and the Good Offices Committee.
1OFor example the Third Interim Report of the IndiaP'kistat Commission had this to say about the observers: "Althou ;h a number of minor incidents took place during the first six and one-half months before the cea.e-fire line was .finally demarcated, observer teams, composed of officers from Bel.gium, Canada, Mexico, Norway, and the United States headed by Commission's military adviser, in close cooperation with military authorities on both sides, greatly contributed to preventing the development of any of those into major breaches of the cease-fire." U.N. Doc. S/4350, Rev. 1i, p. 51.











0bts:rvnation Hission in Yemen. These groups have been cons:i.(erably larger and more expensive than the prorbotype observer teams. They ha ve ranged in size from 200 to 600 men nd have been supplied with a substantial amount of communic ations and reconnaissance equipment. Their mission is correspondingly expanded. It may include investigation as well as observation. World opinion may be mobilized to supplement the observer presence as a deterrant to aggression. Such groups move the United Nations a step closer to use of a full-fledged military force. Both the Palestine and Lebanon endeavors were ambitious enough to qualify as miniature armed forces. Their experience is directly relevant to the emergence of the technique of the peace-keeping force.

This emergence of the full-fledged military force

takes place with the creation of the United Nations Emergency Force, a force of some 6,000 men, to cope with the Suez crisis in 1956. It was followed by the United Nations Force in the Congo, created in 1960 and ranging in size from 15,000 to 20,000 men, and the Force in Cyprus, set up in 1964I and numbering about 7,000. These forces represent the furthest extension of -the United Nations development of peace-keeping techniques. Not only were they far larger in size and more expensive than the observer groups, but they also had somewhat broader powers at their disposal. Although








12

in theory and in most cases the powers of the peace-keeping force are only slightly greater than those of the observer group, in practice considerably greater powers have been exercised at times, particularly by the Force in the Congo.

This study will examine comparatively and in depth the non-fighting force technique as utilized in four cases: the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine, the United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon, the United Nations Emergency Force, and the United Nations Force in the Congo, Reference will be made as well to the recent uses of this technique in Yemen and Cyprus.

There are striking differences in the characteristics of these four groups: differences first in the size of the contingents, which range from the 689 man maximum of the Palestine group to the 19,707 man maximum force used in the Congo; differences too in the situation which called the units into being. In Palestine the organization was there primarily to maintain a truce imposed on Jews and Arabs by the United Nations. In Lebanon the organization was stationed at Lebanese borders to observe and stop infiltration from without by spotting it. In Suez the force was to stabilize the international relationships of the states involved by making possible the withdrawal of British, French, and Israeli forces from Egypt and ensuring against a resumption of hostilities between Egypt and Israel. In the








13

Congo the United Nations Force was to help establish internal order in the newly independent nation, thereby bringing about the withdrawal of Belgian forces brought in because of post-independence turbulence, preventing the intervention of outside powers, and aiding the Congo to become a viable state. Both the Lebanese and Congo situations were complicated by overtones of civil war.

Despite the admittedly significant differences between the groups, they can be considered as a unit because of all. they share. All are composed of military men; all are used. in situations of tension, instability, actual or potential fighting. All initially have a common purpose, to promote peaceful settlement by curbing violence through the effect of their organized and disciplined. presence as representatives of the United Nations. Although they may be armed, they are backed by the prestige and power of the organization rather than primarily by the power of weapons. At the same time, the discipline of the personnel makes them capable of quick and effective response on. behalf of the organization within a context where the use of force is or may become prevalent.

The study is divided into two main parts. In the

first section case studies of the four peace-keeping groups are presented. In each case an examination is undertaken of the origins, characteristics, and operation of the group.











Political, legal, financial, and administrative factors are taken into account. An effort has been made to make each of the cases parallel the others as closely as possible in order to facilitate generalization. The second part of the study is devoted to an analysis of the technique of the non-fighting force, based on the material developed in the

case studies.

The objectives of this analysis of the non-fighting force technique as an instrument of peaceful settlement are two-fold. The first aim is to determine the nature of the instrument which has been developed. We are particularly concerned, with the degree to which an institutionalized technique, readily available in recognizable form for use in crises, has emerged and the degree to which each force is unique. Going beyond the question of extent of institutionalization is that of the reasons and significance of the institutionalization which has occurred. The analysis of the nature of the non-fighting force as an instrument of peaceful settlement leads more or less directly to the second central purpose of the study: the evaluation of the performance and potential of the non-fighting force. The conditions which determine the effectiveness of the nonfighting force as an instrument of peaceful settlement are hypothesized on the 'basis of the experience thus far with them. On the framework of the evaluation, first, of the









15

instrument as it exists and, second, of the conditions of its effective use, some tentative conclusions are put forth as to the potential for the future of the non-fighting force.

The justification for a study such as this one rests in the past and potential significance of the non-fighting force as a technique for pacific settlement and in the dearth of comparative studies on the force itself.

Almost all the studies of the peace-keeping groups done thus far have concentrated on a particular use of the force rather than on the force, considered abstractly, as an instrument of peaceful settlement. It is hoped that by using a comparative case study approach, some conclusions can be reached with regard to both the nature of the force and to the conditions under which it may be used successfully. These conclusions might then serve as the hypotheses of later studies, enabling us to refine and elaborate our knowledge of peace-keeping endeavors.

To go beyond what has been done in analyzing the nonfighting force as a peace-keeping instrument seems important not only for scholarly but also for practical reasons. The force is being used more and more often. Proposals for the creation of ad hoc forces to meet new crises come with increasing frequency as do those for a permanent force of some sort. As early as 1948 Trygve Lie, then Secretary-General, proposed a guard force of 1,000 to 5,000 men--a proposal









16

unenthusiastically received and so emasculated as to be transformed into a resolution to establish a small field service. Not much was said about non-fighting forces in the early 1950's, perhaps because fighting forces were still too much in the forefront. From 1956 forward, however, under the impetus of the successes of the United Nations Emergency Force, proposals for a permanent force have come forth steadily, seriously, and at times with impressive origins. In general, these proposals have originated less often with members of the United Nations Secretariat than with individual statesmen, United Nations delegations, Governments, and non-governmental organizations. One of the most persistent advocates of some sort of permanent force has been Lester Pearson of Canada; among the most influential advocates were Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy.

In the face of these efforts to make more and more extensive use of the non-fighting force as an arm of the United Nations, it seems that it is time to evaluate on the basis of past experience the merits and usefulness of the non-fighting force.













CHAPTER II

PEACE-KEEPING THROUGH OBSERVATION-A FORMATIVE STAGE:
THE TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION IN PALESTINE


Introduction


In Palestine in May, 1948, violent fighting erupted

between Israeli and Arab. A truce supervision organization, created by the United Nations to help still that violence, stands as one of the pioneering ventures in the field of peacekeeping through theyluse of the military man in a non-fighting capacity.

In the first decade of the United Nations there were other uses of military observers--in Greece, in Indonesia, in Kashmir, for example. Yet the Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine differs from these truce observation teams. The difference lies primarily in the extensiveness and scope of the operation, but this difference is so great as to be almost one of kind, not merely size.

In Palestine the Truce Supervision Organization

reached a total size of over 600 men and had at its disposal twelve airplanes, 150 jeeps and trucks, and four ships with their crews. It had extensive communications equipment



17











and its own communications system. It; was, in short, almost a little army--albeit a little army without guns.1

Many of the rudiments of the military force are found in the Palestine group. In the problems faced and solved, in the accumulation of precedents and personnel experienced in the use of the military, there are links, direct as well as indirect, between the Palestine experience and the later use of the non-fighting force in more ambitious endeavors. The Palestine venture moves the United Nations a step forward in the employment of the non-fighting force to carry through its objectives.

To fully understand the place of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in the development of the non-fighting force as a technique of pacific settlement, it is necessary to briefly review the history of the Organization: its origins, characteristics, and functioning.


Conditions for Creation of the Truce Organization


Th.e United Nations Truce Supervision Organization


Comments from various sources noted the resemblance of the T:ruce Organization to an international force. Dr. Ralph Bunc'he, Acting Mediator, said that the operation by the fall of 1948 had grown into both a diplomatic and a miliary one, involving reconnaissance on land, sea, and
air. It amounted to an unarmed army of occupation in close contact with United Nations Headquarters. General Assembly, Official Record, 3rd. Session, Fifth Committee, 157th meeting (November 5, 194L8), p. 649. See also The New York Times, June 14, 1948.









19

(U'TSO) was designed to symbolize in concrete fashion t;he Uni:lted Nations concern -that fighting be halted in Palestine, while a permanent solution was sought to the problems at issue. In other problem areas fighting had occurred without evoking such a strong United Nations response. What were the conditions which led to the use in this case of a contingent of military men to represent the United. Nations presence?

Several elements contributed to bringing the Truce Organization into existence. First, the United Nations had special responsibilities with respect to the Palestine problem stemming from its prior involvement in the situation coupled with its failure either to find a solution acceptable to all parties or to win. agreement of the United Nations members to the imposition of a solution. Second, the fact of open and heavy fighting between Jew and Arab in the Holy Land made apparent the urgent need for some sort of action. Finally, the variety of solutions and the proposals for a United Nations enforced. peace put forth in early 194.8 as well as the tentative experimentation with a truce commission prepared the way, at least in part, for establishment of a peace-keeping group to quell the violence and to facilitate the search for a permanent solution.









20
The United Nations involvement

United Nations involvement with Palestine dates from the spring of 1947 when the United Kingdom, despairing of finding a means to resolve Jewish demands for a national state in Palestine with Arab opposition to such demands, turned the entire complex, explosive problem over to the United Nations. The solution which the United Nations devised was for the partition of Palestine into an Arab state and a Jewish state with economic union and the internationalization of Jerusalem.2

Although reached only after lengthy investigations

by a Special Committee on Palestine and extensive debate in the General Assembly, this solution, which was embodied in the resolution of November 29, 1947, was adopted with little enthusiasm. The deficiencies,in the solution were all too evident. Most serious of these was the lack of provision for implementation by the United Nations in the face of the Arab hostility to the plan and the announced unwillingness of Britain, the mandatory power, to cooperate in implementing a plan unacceptable to either of the principals.


2The plan was based on the majority recommendations of the eleven member United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, set up in the spring of 1947 by a Special Session of the General Assembly to make recommendations on Palestine. The majority plan was recommended by Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, and Uruguay. A threenation minority of India, Iran, and Yugoslavia recommended a bi-national federation, while the eleventh member, Australia, abstained. For the report of the Committee see U.N. Doc. A/364.









21

The problem of implementation was discussed in the Assembly and some of the smaller powers went so far as to put forward proposals for forceful implementation. These remained only proposals. The majority of states, including the major powers, showed a marked reluctance to commit themselves to forceful action in Palestine. Thus, the United Nations was in the anomalous position of recommending a solution which might require force to implement it, while being unwilling to apply such means. The crisis area:- internal conditions

A second important element in the Palestine situation was the fact of fighting. After the passage of the partition resolution in November, 1947, the situation in the Holy Land rapidly deteriorated. Fighting increased in scale and intensity: the convoy battles and bomb outrages which characterized the first months after the passage of the resolution became steady skirmishes by March and full-scale war by May, 1948.


Guatemala proposed an international police force of contingents contributed on a proportional basis by states other than the permanent members of the Security Council. New Zealand suggested that it be agreed that if violence occurred in Palestine, a united effort to suppress it would be made by an international force to which each country would contribute proportionate to its strength. Larry Leonard, "The United Nations and Palestine," International Conciliation, No. 454 (October, 1949), p. 646.
4For a description of the various phases of the war see Edgar O'Ballance, The Arab-Israeli War (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957).









22

The e..recedents for peace-keepin

The United Nations could hardly ignore a situation becoming ever more violent with which it was directly involved. Proposals, plans, and limited, measures of United Nations peace-keeping tumbled one after another between November, 1947, and May, 1948. Although these proposals set few concrete precedents for the Truce Supervision Organization, they probably contributed to creation of an atmosphere conducive to decisive action ultimately by the United Nations.

The General Assembly had made virtually no initial provision for implementation of the partition decision beyond setting up a five-nation Palestine Commission to administer the territory in the interim period. between the Mandatory Power's departure and the establishment of the Arab and Israeli states. The Security Council was instruc ted to give all necessary aid and guidance to the Commission and to take the necessary measures for implementation of the plan. It was soon apparent that the Commission would need help to fulfill its mission. Two major efforts in the spring of 1948 to provide such assistance can be delineated: the call for a force for Palestine and the establishment of a truce commission.

In January and February, 191-8, both Secretary-General Trygve Lie and the Palestine Commission struggled with the








23

double problem of executing the partition decision and of smothering the violence already aflame in the Holy Land. Both put forward, more or less openly, proposals for forceful action by the United Nations. The proposals were received with little enthusiasm and less action.

The Secret ary-General, who "put the full weight of (his) office consistently behind the organization's decision from the time it was first taken," took two approaches.5 On. the one hand, he quietly set in motion Secretariat studies of the possibilities of creating an

international police force and inaugurated exploratory conversations with some of the smaller nations on their willingness to supply a force to execute the Palestine decisions. On the other hand, in. public statements he tried to impress the Security Council members with their responsibility for enforcing the resolution.

The Palestine Commission was more direct in its

proposals. The Commission found it impossible to assume its responsibilities due to violence in Palestine and a lack of cooperation by Britain, the mandatory power. It therefore confronted the Security Council with a special report in which it contended that an armed force was necessary to bring an end to fighting in Palestine and to enable


Trygve Lie, In the Cause of Peace (New York: The Macmillan Company, 19 5), p. I











it to take the steps preparatory to partition. The force

which the Commission recommended was not an army under

Chapter VII of the Charter, but an international police

force to maintain law and order in a territory for which

international society was responsible.6 The report of the

Commission said, in part:

It is the considered view of the Commission that
the security forces of the Mandatory Power, which
at the present time prevent the situation from
deteriorating completely into open warfare on an organized basis, must be replaced by an adequate
non-Palestinian force which will assist law-abiding
elements in both the Arab and Jewish communities,
organized under the general direction of the Commission, in maintaining order and security in Palestine, and thereby enabling the Commission to carry out the recommendations of the General Assembly. Otherwise, the period immediately following the termination of the Mandate will be a period of uncontrolled, widespread strife and bloodshed in Palestine, including the City of Jerusalem. This would be a catastrophic
conclusion to an era of international concern for
that territory.?

The Security Council's response to the Palestine

Commission's request for troops was negative. The reluctance to implement forcefully the Palestine decision was

not due solely to a lack of will. There were real legal

and practical complications involved in implementing the

partition resolution. For example, Ambassador Austin,

representative of the United States, suggested that the


6U.N. Doc. A/AC 21/13, p. 23.
7U.N. Doc. A/AC 21/9, pp. 18-19. Cited in Larry Leonard, op. cit., pp. 656-67.








25

Security Council authority to use force to cope with threats to and breaches of the peace did. not extend to the use of such force to implement a recommendation by the General Assembly.8 In the face of doubts on the legal soundness of the forceful action and the unwillingness of the major powers to alienate either side, the practical problem of where to get troops for a force loomed large.

Yet, the report of the Palestine Commission was not without significance. It triggered reconsideration of the entire Palestine issue, first in the Security Council from February through April, 19/18; then in the Second Special Session of the General Assembly, meeting from April 16 to Nay 14, 1948. The search for an alternative political solution to partition was not fruitful.9 Reconsideration did lead, however, to a separation of the problems of fighting and of the future of Palestine. As it became increasingly apparent that a political solution would not be found quickly or easily and as the fighting intensified, efforts were concentrated on halting the Arab-Israeli conflict.

8Security Council, Official Records, 3rd Year, 253rd meeting (February 24, 1948T, p. 267'.
9The United States delegation raised the possibility of a temporary trusteeship for Palestine and even indicated willingness to supply some soldiers for the purpose of establishing such a trusteeship. The idea was not accepted by the majority of the United Nations members however. The United States main purpose in calling for a special General Assembly session was to get consideration for the trusteeship proposal.








26

The Security Council attempted to quiet the Palestine situation through a series of cease-fire calls, running from

April. 1 through the end of Pay, and by creation of a Truce Commission. The cease-fire resolutions called. in varying terms for a halt in the fighting, and until the Hay 29 resolution all were virtually ignored. Yet the Security Council activity in the period prior to the effective truce had an influence on the truce which was finally established and on the organization set up to maintain it.

Establishment of the Truce Commission can be singled out as of particular importance to later developments. The Commission was created by a resolution of April 25 to assist the Security Council in implementing the cease-fire calls and to report to the Council on the situation in Palestine. The experience of the Truce Commission revealed the need for an expanded truce supervisory organization, thereby stimulating the creation of such an organization. It also provided a formula for determining the national composition of the organization, once established. (By suggestion of the United States, the Commission was composed of representatives of the members of the Security Council that had consular representatives in Jerusalem with the exception of Syria. Under this formula the Commission was composed of representatives of the United States, Belgium, and France.)10

The justification for this method of selection was








27

The Truce Commission drew the Security Council's

attention to the problem of truce supervision with requests for more assistance. First, in connection with a proposal to demilitarize Jerusalem, the Commission queried the Security Council in early May on the possibility of obtaining a fifty-man force to provide the guarantees necessary to both sides if the truce were to be upheld. Second, in a cable of May 21 the Commission indicated its need for a small body of competent military observers to assist it in carrying through its functions. In the same cable the Commission expressed the conviction that the only effective means to bring a cessation of hostilities was through employment of a neutral force, sufficiently large and powerful to impose its will on one or both parties, created under Article 41 or Article 42 of the Charter.11 The


that use of representatives already in Palestine would be a prompt, effective, and. simple way of providing the Security Council with an arm in Palestine to report to it and to help execute its decisions. Significantly, in the light of later developments, objections to this method of selection were voiced by the delegates of the Soviet Union and of the 1Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, both of whom abstained on the resolution establishing the Commission. Security Council, Official Records, 3rd Year, 287th meeting (April 23, 1948), p. _.J
U.N. Doc. S/762, p. 3.








28

Security Council was markedly unresponsive to these calls for men.12

The Commission may have further stimulated the

establishment of a military organization to supervise the truce by its own ineffectiveness. Lacking assistance and confined closely to quarters by the fighting in Jerusalem, the Commission found it difficult to fulfill the functions assigned to it. Complaints about .the lack of information coming from the Truce Commission were frequent and vociferous in the Security Council.

This then was the situation in the spring of 1948: the mandate was drawing to an end, tensions were heightening, and fighting increasing. The partition plan, which the United Nations had devised as the answer to the Palestine question, seemed to have little chance of implementation. The United Nations, aware of the critical nature of the situation, was unable to settle on an alternative solution.


12Some delegates raised practical objections to sending officers into Palestine: the Canadian representative felt New York was too distant from Palestine to serve as a source of control officers; the Argentinian, that Palestine was too dangerous. The Soviet delegate contended that since no functions of a purely police nature were initially assigned to the Truce Commission, the Council could not decide that the Commission, created for another purpose, should now undertake control, and police functions. Security Council, Official Records, 3rd Year, 291st meeting (May 12,
1948), pp. 9, 13, 16, and 17.








29

Establishment of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization

The establishment

Actual establishment of the Truce Supervision

Organization came in direct response to a marked intensification of the Palestine crisis. Full-scale fighting broke out in mid-May with the proclamation of the state of Israel, the ending of the British mandate, and the invasion of Arab armies. Necessity spurred the United Nations to positive action. Efforts to halt the fighting intensified. Out of these efforts came an effective truce and the organization to supervise it.

There were, to be precise, two truce organizations, one created for the first four week truce, in effect from June 11 to July 9, 1948, and a second more extensive and permanent organization to maintain the Second Truce, effective from July 18, 1948. Although the truce was replaced in August, 1949, by an armistice based on agreements between Israel and Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria respectively, a skeleton truce organization continued in existence to assist the parties to maintain the armistice and to ensure observance of the cease-fire.

The First Truce and its organization were based on a General Assembly resolution of May 15 and a Security Council








50


resolution of Hay 29.15 The foundation provided for the Truce Supervision Organization by the Assembly and the Council was skeletal. Neither the resolutions themselves nor the debate accompanying them laid down precise guidelines as to what the Organization was to be. The unwillingness of the United Nations members to draw definitive lines for the truce group suggests a resistance to heavy involvement and limits to support for the truce.

The General Assembly resolution called for a truce and established a mediator, to be selected by a committee of the General Assembly--the committee designated was composed of the five permanent members of the Security Council. The Mediator's principal functions were to arrange a truce in Palestine and to promote a peaceful settlement between Arabs and Jews. The provision which provided the basis for a truce organization merely stated "that the SecretaryGeneral shall provide the Mediator with an adequate staff."14

The Security Council resolution was also vague on

details of the Truce Organization. Its provisions instructed the Mediator, in cooperation with the Truce Commission, to supervise the truce and decided that a sufficient number of military observers should be provided. That was all.


13The May 15, 1948, General Assembly resolution was
resolution 186 (S-II). The Security Council resolution was passed at the 310th meeting of the Council and can be found in U.N. Doc. S/801.
14General Assembly resolution 186 (S-II).











Debate on the nature of the Truce Supervision Organization was almost non-exi,tent. The General Assembly resolution which established the position of Mediator had received little discussion before passage. The resolution was proposed. by the United States in a sub-commission set up originally to consider a provisional regime for Palestine, but diverted in the face of fighting (and inability to agree on any provisional regime) to the problem of violence in the Holy Land. The Mediator proposal was put forth on May 13, the next to last day of the Special Session., with the statement that despite its late introduction, the provision represented, not something new, but merely the consensus of views which had been expressed in the sub-committee. The discussion of the resolution in the plenary session centered on whether the position of Mediator should be established at all, not on the proper scope of responsibilities of the Mediator.

Debate in the Security Council did little more to

clarify the role and nature of the proposed Truce Organization. At the time of passage of the May 29 resolution attention was focused not on the role of the Mediator and the Truce Organization but on the question of whether mediation or coercion should be used to solve the crisis.

The extent of unwillingness of the Security Council to commit itself on the Truce Organization is suggested by








32

the failure of any Security Council members to come forth with substantive suggestions at a session of the Council convened for the express purpose of formulating instructions

for the Mediator in establishing the Truce Organization. The French delegate apparently expressed the view of the Council when he suggested that confidence along with wide powers to implement the resolution should be given the ediator.15

The votes in the General Assembly and. Security
Council on the truce resolutions suggest substantial support for the truce and its organization. The vote on the May 14 General Assembly resolution establishing the truce was 31 in favor, 7 against, and 16 abstentions.16 The opposition cane from the Communist bloc nations and. Cuba. The expressed reason for Soviet disfavor was that the truce operation represented a Western maneuver to prevent partition from becoming effective.17 That Soviet opposition was designed

Security Council, Official Records, 3rd Year, 313th meel;in g (June 5, 1948), p. 28.
16The states which abstained were the Arab members of the United Nations, joined by some Latin American states and Australia, Siam, and Greece. General Assembly, Official 2Records, 2nd pecial Session, 135th plenary meeting E a7ny 14, 1-) T7-pp. 44-45. See Appendix A for a complete listing of this vote.
17In fact, the opposition to the Truce Supervision
Organ.ization fits the pattern of Soviet thinking about the United Nations during this period, with its general hostility to any sort of United Nations police system on the basis it infringed national- sovereignty and its insistence








55


merely to voice disapproval and not to kill all action is suggested by the fact that the Soviet Union and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic abstained on the critical votes in the Security Council. The legal foundations

The legal foundation for the establishment and

functioning of the Truce Supervision Organization rested on the General Assembly resolution of May 14, 1948, and the Security Council resolutions of May 29 and July 15, 1948. The authority under which the position of the Mediator was created and an organization to aid him authorized was not specified in the resolution. However, there was no challenge raised as to the power of the General Assembly to create a subsidiary organ under Article 22 of the Charter to assist it in performing its functions.

More question could be raised as to the provisions of the Charter under which the Security Council called for an end to hostilities, The Security Council calls for a ceasefire prior to the May 29 call had been clearly taken under Chapter VI of the Charter. Apparently the May 29 and July 15 cease-fire resolutions were also taken under Chapter VI,


on the veto and on keeping important decisions in the Security Council where they were subject to the veto. For further discussion of the Soviet position see Alexander Dallin, The Soviet Union at the United Nations (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962).








34


but each made reference to Chapter VII and seemed to move progressively closer to actual invocation of enforcement measures.

In the debate in the Security Council on the May 29 resolution two schools of thought emerged. One, including the Soviet Union and the United States among its proponents, called for action under the enforcement provisions of Chapter VII, apparently feeling that stronger action than 18
had been taken in the past was necessary. The other school of opinion, including among its adherents Belgium and Britain, called for action under Chapter VI, viewing invocation of Chapter VII as a serious and uncertain step. There was feeling that invocation of Chapter VII without assurance of effective application of measures of coercion and without knowledge of all the potential consequences of such action was a serious step, not to be lightly taken.19

The May 29 resolution did refer to Chapter VII, however, and the July 15 resolution made even greater use of that section of the Charter. In the July 15 resolution the parties were for the first time ordered to comply with the measures specified by the Council under Article 40 of the


For the Soviet statement see Security Council,
Official Records, 3rd Year, 309th meeting (May 29, 1948), p.
2. For the United States statement see Security Council, Official Records, 3rd Year, 308th meeting (May 28, 1948), pp.

19
Security Council, Official Records, 3rd Year, 309th meeting (May 29, 1948), pp.-7l-T7.







35

Charter. Article 140 refers to provisional measures and remains a step away from the enforcement action envisioned under Article -2. Nonetheless, the reference to action under Chapter VII was potentially significant. In theory at least such a resolution opened the way to forceful action by the United Nations in the event of failure by the parties to comply with the cease-fire order or of truce violations. In fact, however, strong action was not taken by the United Nations when truce violations of a serious nature did occur. Although some question remains as to the precise provisions of the Charter under which the United Nations was acting, it would appear that the potential authority embodied in the July 15 resolution was greater than the authority actually invoked under that resolution. It may be suggested that political rather than legal factors explain the limited response of the United Nations to some serious breeches of the cease-fire.


The mandate

The truce supervisors' mandate was based on the May 29 and July 15 resolutions calling for a truce and on the terms of the truce itself. The resolutions and the debate accompanying them provided only the most general guidelines as to the functions of the observers and the conditions under which they were to operate. The resolutions called







56


for an end to hostilities, banned the introduction of military men or materials into the belligerent area, and enjoined the protection of Holy Places and shrines. None of the resolutions specified precisely what the role of the observers was to be in ensuring that the truce terms would be carried through. It was left largely to the Mediator to spell out the role of the truce observers--the responsibilities they should bear and the policies they should follow in meeting these responsibilities.

The mandate of the observers, as defined by the

Mediator on the basis of the relevant resolutions, limited the role the observers could play in the Palestine crisis. It is true, however, that the Mediator initially interpreted the responsibilities of the observers in relatively broad fashion. Their primary purpose, in his view, was to prevent a renewal of large-scale fighting during the truce and to preserve the equitability of the truce. The phrase "to prevent" might have opened the door to a widening of the authority of the observers. The door which was opened was quickly slammed shut. Potential disagreement among the members on the preventive functions of the observers was forestalled by the Secretary-General's firm declaration that the Truce Supervision Organization had no preventive











authority and could not take any preventive measures in advance.20

Moreover, the conditions under which the observers were to function were narrowly drawn. First, the observer was to be "completely objective in his attitude and judgment" and to "maintain a thorough neutrality as regards political issues in the Palestine situation."21 Such a requirement was probably necessary for success in a delicate mission. Second, the power available to the observer to meet his responsibilities was quite limited. He had, for example, no enforcement power and was denied arms of any sort. The decision on arms was made by the Mediator. That it corresponded with the desires of a majority of member states was indicated by the rejection by the members of later efforts of the Mediator to broaden the powers of a few of the observers by arming them for especially difficult tasks. Although the invocation of Chapter VII of the Charter in the July 15 cease-fire call might have justified such a broadening of the observers' mandate, no effort was made to use the resolution for this purpose.


20L.M. Bloomfield, Egypt, Israel and the Gulf of Aqaba (Toronto: The Carswell Company, Ltd., 1957), p. 70.
21U.N. Doc. S/928, p. 1.








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Characteristics of the Truce Organization


The creation of a non-fighting military unit to help restore and maintain peace represents only the first stage of United Nations action in a crisis. The group must not only be created; it must also operate effectively in the field to achieve its objectives. It may be suggested that the ability of the group to carry through its charge will depend on the balance of the equation of its responsibilities and its powers. Intimately related to the power of the force are the characteristics of the force itself. Three aspects of the force seem particularly relevant to the determination of its effectiveness: a) its leadership; b) its size and character; and c) its support at headquarters and in the field. Support in turn takes several forms. At United Nations headquarters it can be read in terms of votes, finances, logistics, and manpower. In the field cooperation and non-cooperation are indicative of the attitude of those with whom the force deals. Leadership

The Security Council resolution calling for establishment of a mediator to supervise the truce provided that he should be appointed by the permanent members of the Security Council. On the advice of Secretary-General Trygve Lie the permanent members selected Count Folke Bernadotte of Sweden










as Mediator. Count Bernadotte served as Mediator until his assassination by Jewish terrorists in September, 1948. At

that time the Secretary-General appointed Bernadotte's principal assistant, Dr. Ralph Bunche, as Acting Mediator.22

The Mediator was vested with both great powers and great responsibilities in the creation of a truce supervision organization. With few precedents to follow and little guidance from the Security Council or the Assembly, the Mediator made the crucial decisions which gave shape and

form to the Truce Organization and, incidentally, set a pattern for the future. According to the United States

representative on the Security Council, the Truce Organization was not the product of the Council or the Assembly but of the Mediator who had built it from the staff of the Truce Commission and the staff assembled by the Secretary-General.25

However, it would be misleading to suggest that the Mediator was unfettered in his determinations regarding the shape and character of the Truce Organization. In fact, the Truce Supervision Organization seems to have evolved from a mix of the Mediator's decisions, the situation itself, and


It might be noted. that although the resolution calls for selection of the Mediator by the permanent members of the Security Council, Bunche served as Acting Mediator for nearly a year on the basis of the appointment by the Secretary-General. The appointment was ratified by the Security
Council.
25Security Council, Official Records, 4th Year, 437th meeting (August 11, 1949), p. 7.








40

the influence of the Secretariat and of certain of the national delegations, particularly the United States.

The relationship between the Mediator and the

Secretary-General appears to have been one of close collaboration. Although the critical decisions seem to have been made by the Mediator, there is evidence that the SecretaryGeneral's role in -the decision-making process went beyond
24
merely implementing the requests of the Mediator. Several things suggest an important part for the Secretary-General in the Palestine operation: first, the Secretary-General's role in selecting the Mediator, for it was Lie who proposed Bernadotte as Mediator and who appointed Bunche Acting Mediator; second, the close personal friendship between the Secretary-General and both Bernadotte and Bunche; and third, the fact of direct and evidently much-used communications between Lake Success and the Mediator's headquarters at Rhodes.

What was the relationship of the Mediator to the Security Council and particularly to those nations which were most concerned with the Palestine question because of


According to Stephen Schwebel, the United Nations effort in Palestine might be classified as a joint fieldheadquarters endeavor in which the Mediator and the SecretaryGeneral collaborated in indispensably interdependent fashion. Stephen Schwebel, The Secretary-General of the United Nations: His Political Powers and Practice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 115.








41


membership on the Truce Commission and consequently participation in the Truce Supervision Organization? These national representatives exerted. little day-to-day influence on the decisions and actions of the Mediator, but they did hold an ultimate check. If his decisions were not regarded favorably, pressures could be exerted to alter them or to prevent their implementation. Thus, the Mediator's decisions on both the composition and the size of the truce group were modified under the pressure of the national delegations, acting not openly through Security Council rejection of proposals, but through inaction and behind-thescenes pressures.

It is not without significance that both Trygve Lie and Count Bernadotte were activists, desiring strong United Nations action to resolve the Palestine issue. While they gave vigorous leadership to the Truce Organization, their more ambitious objectives were curbed by the caution of the Security Council. The scope and limits of the Mediator's powers will become clearer with an examination of the decisions made on such crucial aspects of the truce group as its proper composition and size, Support for the Truce Organization

Men for the Truce Organization.-One of the most significant decisions made with respect to the Truce








42

Organization regarded its composition. Bernadotte's initial thought was that the Truce Organization should be composed of representatives of the major powers on the Security Council. Accordingly, on May 30, the Mediator contacted the French, British, American, and Soviet military attaches in Cairo inquiring as to the units which they could contribute to a truce control organization. Within days the Mediator's basis of selection of members of the Truce Organization shifted. On June 5 it was made known that, aside from some Swedish officers, only representatives of countries on the Truce Commission, that is, the United States, France, and Belgium, would be used in the Truce Organization.

The reasons.for the Mediator's shift remain-obscure. Bernadotte suggests at least two. On the one hand, in his memoirs he hints that a United States official exercised some discreet pressure in suggesting only members of the Truce Commission take part in truce supervision.25 On the other hand, in a July 13 statement to the Security Council Bernadotte suggested another reason for changing the basis of selection of observers. He said:

-~C
25According to Bernadotte on June 2 the American charge d'affaires, calling to inform him unofficially that the United States was willing to contribute twenty-one officers to act as observers and the necessary staff and-aircraft, also suggested only members of the Truce Commission participate. Folke Bernadotte, To Jerusalem (London: Hodder and Stoughton,.
.1951), p. 45.











Eowever, in continuing my negotiations with the
two parties, I was told by the representative of the
Provisional Jewish Government that they could not accept having British observers. They felt that,
since the British had been there during the period
of the Mandate, it would not be a very happy solution
to have them coming back as observers.
I then had to change the basis for the selection
of the observers and, instead of using the five great
powers as countries to provide me with these observers, I had to find another solution. I then thought of the
Truce Commission in Jerusalem, appointed by the Security Council, in which Belgium, France and the
United States were represented; and I asked that my 26
observers should be taken from these three countries.

Whatever the reasons for the change in formula for participation, the change did bring the Truce Supervision Organization in line with a kind of rough rule-of-thumb being followed in staffing observer groups at that time: exclusion of the Soviet Union from participation and use of the most convenient national representatives (i.e. those with some prior involvement with the question or area).

The formula developed to determine who should participate in the Truce Organization had two limitations. First, it restricted participation in the Truce Organization to a narrow base. Second, the exclusion of the Soviet Union from the unit became a source of criticism of the supervision effort by the Communist bloc.

The issue of the composition of the Truce Organization recurs throughout all Security Council discussion of


26 ,
Security Council, Official Records, 3rd Year, 333rd meeting (July 13, 1948), p. 4.








44


the Mediator's work in Palestine. The Soviet delegate repeatedly protested the make-up of the Truce Organization

and found in it the explanation for any and all failures of
27
the Organization. The Soviet Union felt Security Council

membership should be the basis for participation. They

held that the Truce Organization was an American operation.

This charge had some foundation, Most of the auxiliary

personnel, over one-half the observers, and most of the

guard force were American. A broadening of the basis of

participation might well have given the group a strengthened

mandate as well as a more independent position.28


The Soviet representative had protested vigorously
from June 7 forward the discretion given the Mediator in determining the make-up of the Truce Organization. The argument of the Soviet delegate spread over several meetings ran somewhat as follows. The Soviet representative contended that the decision as to which countries should send observers and how these observers should be made available was one for the Security Council, not the Mediator, The connection between the Truce Commission and the observers was rejected on the grounds that nothing in the May 29 resolution indicated that only Truce Commission members should supply military observers. Finally, the Soviet representative expressed inability to understand why the Soviet Union could not send even five observers when the United States was sending twentyone observers as well as ships and, planes. The Soviets pushed their objection to a vote in a draft resolution with two significant features: it would have limited the size of the Truce Organization to a maximum of fifty members and it would have allowed any member o the Security Council except Syria to participate. See Security Council, Official Records, 3rd Year, 314th meeting (June 7, 1941-8), pp. 3, 6, and 7Ed3 517th meeting (June 10, 1948), pp. 41-45.
28There was a suggestion in the press that the Mediator may have considered including Russian observers in the organization for the Second Truce. A member of the Mediator's staff indicated that only 200 of 300 contemplated observer positions would be filled by nations of the Truce







45

Yet there is no proof that other staffing arrangements would have been feasible or more desirable. On the one hand, the United States contention, apparently supported by other states, was that opening the door to inclusion of even a few Russian observers would complicate the situation and would provide the Russians a toe-hold making more likely Russian participation in any military force which it might be necessary to send into the Middle East.29

On the other hand, a limited effort in 1948 to supplement the seconded observers with a truly international group of fifty United Nations guards proved inauspicious. In midJune the Mediator, finding the sixty-three observers initially called for inadequate to the task, requested a force of fifty men from the Secretary-General. Within three days the fifty men, gathered from the United Nations Guard and the Secretariat, left New York for Palestine, outfitted and ready for active duty. The Force, composed of men from seven nations, was hailed as the prototype of a real international police force.30 The experiment evidently did not


Commission, thereby leaving room for the inclusion of observers from other nations. But if such a suggestion actually was considered, it was considered only fleetingly, for when arrangements were made for the Second Truce Organization only the original participants were included. The New York Times, July 17, 1948.
T~he New York Times, June 6, 1948.
30Although the majority of members of the force were American there were also two Frenchmen, one Australian, one








46

meet expectations, however, for only seven of the fifty men

remained after the First Truce. Moreover, disappointment

in the group was voiced by Bernadotte and by others.31

Had this experiment in international action been successful,

it might have advanced substantially the evolution of the

peace-keeping technique.

As it was, a change in the pattern of recruitment to

a broader and, in our opinion, firmer base did not come

until 1953. At that time the composition of the group was

broadened with the inclusion of observers from nine states

(Australia, Canada, Denmark, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden


Swede, one Norwegian, one Dane, and one Chinese. In the three days of preparation the men were outfitted in tropical uniforms (slate grey shorts, blouse, and pith helmet) and given such necessities as medical kit, flashlight, whistle, and standard police arms. (Ammunition was not supplied for the arms, for the final decision as to whether the force was to be armed was left to the Mediator.) The New York Times, June 18, 1948, and June 20, 1948.
310n the one hand, the venture was termed by The New York Times as the first international police force. The New York Times, June 20, 1948. On the other hand, severe criticisms were made by those in charge. Bernadotte said, "Originally there had been 50 guards on duty in Palestine. But some had declared they wanted to go home to the U.S.A. They went--though they can hardly be described as returning heroes. In newspaper interviews some complained loudly firstly of the dangers they had been exposed to, secondly of the bad food they had had. Neither had the regulations about an eight-hour working day been adhered to. In their own eyes they were poor little boys deserving of all the pity the American public could give them. It is true, of course, that these guards had been hastily and haphazardly recruited in response to our urgent request." Folke Bernadotte, op. cit., p. 198. See also Paul Mohn, "Problems of Truce Supervision," International Conciliation, No. 478 (February, 1952), pp. 70-71.











as well as the original three--Belgium, France, and the United States). The truce by then had been replaced. by an armistice and. the Truce Supervision Organization reduced in size and role.

A second man power question of critical importance from the outset to the Organization was that of size. How many men should be committed to the Palestine venture? This decision did not remain fixed. It was a product of the demands of the situation and the willingness of the countries involved to contribute. The Mediator's requests for more men were frequently ignored or met only slowly and reluctantly. The needs of an effective truce organization and the desire of participating states to avoid undue involvement in the situation came into conflict at times.

A kind of pattern emerges with respect to the size

of the Truce Supervision Organization, a pattern which falls into three major phases--growth, stability, reduction. The Organization's period of growth, the most significant of the phases, extends from its origins in June through September, 194-8. Within this growth period there is a break between the First and Second Truces.

During the period of the First Truce the Mediator expanded his force in three directions from its original nucleus of sixty-three observers. To supplement the original observers, he requested, first, the fifty guards from the Secretariat and, second, thirty more observers, ten from each








48

of the participating states. These men did not arrive so quickly as had the original contingents; in fact, the last ones appeared only three days before the end of the First Truce. Third, Bernadotte asked the United States for technical help, acquiring approximately seventy persons to serve in such capacities as medical personnel, aircraft pilots, and maintenance men. Thus, by the end of the First Truce the Organization had roughly 250 persons directly connected with it. (This figure does not include those persons connected more loosely with the operation who operated the four vessels at United Nations disposal.) An organization of this size was not planned initially; it just grew--under the pressure of its responsibilities.

A sharp increase in size occurs with the Second

Truce, which commenced in mid-July. Influenced by the deficiencies of the Organization in the First Truce and by the nature of the July 15 resolution, which ordered a truce under Chapter VII and had no time limits attached to it, it was determined that a larger and more professional Truce Supervision Organization was necessary. The observer staff was more than tripled and additional auxiliary personnel were brought in. Bernadotte requested that the United States, France, and Belgium supply 300 officers to act as observers and 300 enlisted soldiers to handle tasks not








49

suitable for officers.32 The Swedish contingent which served as a command group under Bernadotte, was increased from five to ten members. And once again the United States was asked to supply approximately 100 auxiliary personnel.

The Second Truce Organization was not, in fact, as large nor as rapidly established as the Mediator desired. The maximum size Bernadotte formally called for was 600 observers (officers and enlisted men) plus the auxiliary units. In fact, there were never more than 500 observers; the French quota was not filled. Moreover, there were exploratory requests for additional forces which were simply never acted on. It would appear that the Mediator had more ambitious plans for the Truce Supervision Organization than the Security Council was willing to support. For example, in July Bernadotte proposed a 1,000 man force for a demilitarized Jerusalem and received French, Belgian, and American commitments to supply one-third of the force each. Yet the first steps to bring such a force into being were never taken.33 In August Bernadotte requested a small armed force of around forty men to guard the Latrum pumping station.

320f the 300 soldiers in each category the United States was to supply 125, France 125, and Belgium 50.
33Considerable confusion surrounded this question. At one point it was reported that the Mediator thought the Secretariat was recruiting the force from the Truce Commission members, while the national delegations were under the impression the recruiting was being done outside the United Nations framework. If results are indicative, apparently no one was recruiting. The New York Times, July 18, 1948.








50

The men never arrived and as a consequence the station was blown up by Arab irregulars. In the same month Bernadotte and Frank Begley, United Nations Security Chief, considered a 6,000 man force, armed, for Jerusalem. This too did not get beyond the talking stage.

Not only were the Mediator's more ambitious requests for men ignored, but there was a marked slowness in filling some of his more routine requests. There was greater speed in getting men out to Palestine during the First than the Second Truce. And in neither case were observers present in more than symbolic numbers in the important first days of the truce. During the Second Truce the Mediator had particular difficulty with the United States, which bore a large part of the burden of supplying the Organization with men.34 While the United States attributed its delay in seconding men to such technical factors as being unsure what sort of personnel was desired,35 the Mediator attributed delay to political factors and particularly to the United

States fear of military involvement in Palestine. Such involvement might complicate relations with the Soviet Union and if anything happened to American soldiers in Palestine,


3The mediator made his initial request for 300 observers on July 16; by August 1 only 120 of the 300 had yet arrived, only 30 of whom were from the United States. The United States was also slow in meeting a request for enlisted men to act as auxiliary personnel.
35The New York Times, August 4, 1948.










it might have repercussions on the upcoming presidential election.36

By the end of September most of the delays and difficulties had been resolved and the Truce Organization had attained its maximum size--500 observers and 179 auxiliary and Secretariat personnel. The Truce Supervision Organization remained at roughly this size through the first quarter of 1949. At that point scaled reductions began to be effected by the Acting Mediator because of the transition which was taking place from the truce to the armistice and the parallel decline in incidents. By August, 1949, when the truce was replaced by the armistice, the observers numbered only 79.

The replacement of the truce by the armistice did not end the life of the Truce Supervision Organization completely. A small organization, ranging in size from 30 to 40 observers plus auxiliary personnel, was retained to help maintain the armistice and cease-fire. In 1956, under the pressure of increasing tensions in the area, the size of the observer group was expanded to 57 men. By 1959 the number of observers had been stabilized at around 120 with a supporting staff of approximately 150 persons.57


6Bernadotte, O2. cit., p. 193.
37David Brook, The United Nations and the Arab-Israel Armistice System 1949-59 (Columbia University doctoral dissertation, 161) ,pp. 117 and 189.








52


Money: the financial base.-The Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine was more expensive than any previous observer group. The 1948 cost of the operation to the United Nations was $3,581,600 and the 1949 charge $3,147,063. The resolution authorizing a mediator and staff made no provision for financial support. Yet despite the high costs and the absence of specific financial arrangements, financing proved no real problem. The expenses of UNTSO were included in the regular budget, and the SecretaryGeneral was allowed great freedom in spending for the group.

In providing for the support of the Truce Supervision Organization the Secretary-General followed a precedent set in the financing of earlier, more limited observer groups. He drew on the authority of an annual resolution authorizing him to enter into commitments not exceeding two million dollars to meet unforeseen and extraordinary expenses related to the maintenance of peace and security.38 Since the Truce Organization's commitments exceeded the maximum, it was necessary for the Secretary-General to obtain the concurrence of the Advisory Committee to raise the ceiling to four million dollars9 This was accomplished with little

difficulty.


The specific resolution the Secretary-General was acting under was resolution 166, adopted by the General Assembly on November 20, 1947. General Assembly, Official Records, 2nd Session, 121st meeting (November 20, 1947-),p.
U.N. Doc. A/678, p. 248.








53

The Secretary-General defended successfully his discretionary powers in a brief discussion of the financing question at the General Assembly meeting establishing the position of Mediator. The point was raised by the representative of Yugoslavia that a General Assembly rule of procedure required all resolutions involving expenditure of funds to be accompanied by a statement of the budgetary implications drawn up by the Secretary-General and approved by the Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (the Fifth Committee). The contention was brushed aside as inapplicable to the situation. The Secretary-General noted, first, that no precise figure could be given since neither the contemplated size of the Mediator's staff nor the duration of his activities was clearly known and, second, that the Secretary-General had authority under resolution 166 to provide funds for the Mediator without prior reference to the Fifth Committee.0

The Secretary-General's view of the situation seems realistic in retrospect. The innovating nature of the mission made it difficult to set up any over-all plans with respect to expenditures or to estimate accurately the total costs. In May the Secretary-General ventured a tentative cost estimate of $100,000 for the first year;41 actual costs


General Assembly, Official Records, 2nd Special
Session, First Committee, 141st meeting (May 14, 1948), p. 260.
Ibid., p. 260.








54


to the United Nations exceeded three million dollars. In a situation as fluid as that in Palestine tight monetary controls would have made establishment of an effective mission far more complicated.

The Secretary-General used his discretion to support generously the Truce Supervision Organization. The emphasis was on meeting the needs of the Organization, rather than on narrow budgetary considerations. The Secretary-General reportedly hesitated to respond negatively to the almost daily requests of the Mediator for fear of prejudicing the truce efforts.42 (It might be noted that the SecretaryGeneral's discretion may, thereby, have been the Mediator's in fact.) Commitments were made with little consideration of the financial implications. For example, Ralph Bunche indicated that as far as he could remember no definite arrangements regarding the final apportionment of costs with respect to the observers had been worked out fully when the request for observers was made.45

Despite the unexpectedly high expenditures and the

experimental quality of the operation, the General Assembly seemed satisfied in the fall of 1948 with the activities of


42
General Assembly, Official Records, 3rd Session,
Fifth Committee, 158th meeting (November 6, 1948), p. 658.
43General Assembly, Official Records, 3rd Session, Fifth Committee, 157th meeting (November 5, 1948), pp.
651-52.








55


the Mediator and the Secretary-General. Little effort was made to exert tighter controls over the mission. The budgetary requests evoked few comments and fewer changes. The request for supplementary funds to cover the cost of the 1948 operation was passed with only a little complaining about being asked to approve a fait accompli. The estimates for 1949 were approved as modified by the Advisory Committee with just a few critical comments about the high costs. (The Advisory Committee had reduced the Secretary-General's estimates from $4,092,000 to $3,330,000 for the first ten months of 1949.) The Soviet representative, reiterating his usual criticism of UNTSO, did express the view that the narrow geographic base of the organization was prejudicial to the effective control of expenditures. This narrow base, in his opinion, contributed to the high level of expenditure on transport, travel expenses, and subsistence. He suggested, therefore, that the nations providing the observers should shoulder a part of the cost of travel and subsistence.44 A few such discordant notes notwithstanding, when the debate' and voting were concluded, the Palestine mission had won a vote of confidence. A precedent had been set for the discretion of the Secretary-General.


44General Assembly, Official Records, 3rd Session,
Fifth Committee, 158th meeting (Nv_ ermb-5, 1948), p. 657.








56


It should be noted that the financing of UNTSO might well have raised more difficulties if the United Nations had, in fact, underwritten all the costs of the operation. The dollars and cents expenditures for the Truce Supervision Organization reflected only a fraction of the total cost. A large share of the equipment was received on loan, primarily from the United States and the United Kingdom, the salaries of the observers were paid by the seconding states, and miscellaneous services were performed for the organization free of charge by member states, particularly the United States. Thus, a few states bore a relatively large proportion of the costs of the Truce Organization.

Material: the logistic base.-The logistics problems confronting those responsible for the organization and operation of UNTSO were formidable. The United Nations had little experience with an operation of such magnitude. There were few precedents which could be followed. There was little or no equipment on hand. Decisions had to be made about almost every aspect of the organization. And it was necessary to do more than make decisions: equipment, supplies, men had to be acquired and transported to the area.

The nature of the Truce Supervision Organization's assignment, to observe and report, made transportation and communications equipment essential. In the initial stages of the operation the problem of getting essential equipment








57

on the scene rapidly was eased by the expedient of borrowing. Thus, for the First Truce the United States and the United Kingdom supplied eight airplanes, over sixty motor vehicles, and most of the needed communications equipment. Moreover, the United States placed three destroyers with their crews and the French one corvette with crew at the disposal of the Mediator for observation work. The United States made additional vessels available for special activities such as the withdrawal of observers at the end of the First Truce and the movement of equipment.45

Despite these considerable contributions, the Mediator found the amount and quality of equipment available during the First Truce inadequate for an effective job of truce supervision.

In a report to the Security Council Bernadotte concluded that all aspects of truce supervision had been hampered, first, by a lack of communications and, second, by inadequate motor transport and airplanes. Since commercial telecommunications available for the mission were almost non-existent, reliance for communications had to be placed almost entirely on used British and American field equipment operated by slow speed radio operators. It was with difficulty that even limited facilities were maintained


4The New York Times, July 9, 194-8, and U.N. Doc. S/1025, p. 5.









58

in the area. The consequent deficiencies in communication caused serious delays, often prevented the maintenance of security of operation, and hampered exercise of operational

control of observer groups along fronts.

The situation with respect to transport facilities was little better. Both the quantity and the quality of vehicles and planes available left much to be desired. At' the outset of the truce no means of transport were available, and it was only slowly that needed items were acquired.. Even then many were in a bad state of repair; by the end of the First Truce some 50 per cent of all vehicles were inoperative because of lack of proper maintenance facilities and spare parts. Performance of the functions of patrolling, air reconnaissance, and rapid transport of observers to the scene of incidents suffered correspondingly.

Only in the field of naval reconnaissance did the Mediator find the facilities adequate to the requirements of the task. And here the mission was handled, not by seconded personnel with used equipment, but by the regular crews of vessels placed at the service of the United Nations by the United States and France.46

During the Second Truce an effort was made to remedy these deficiencies. More equipment was acquired and a


46U.N. Doc. S/1025, p. 11.








59


larger proportion of it was chartered or purchased outright. Thus, the number of motor vehicles more than doubled, reaching over 150. Eight airplanes were chartered for a total in service of twelve and important communications equipment was purchased.

An examination of the annual budget of UNTSO provides insight into the needs of the observers in the field. The 1948 budget reveals that the $3,581,600 outlay went primarily for three categories of expenditures: personnel, transportation, and communications.47

The costs of personnel were primarily for subsistence and travel. A fifteen dollar per day subsistence allowance was granted all personnel in Palestine. Although some of the delegates found this exorbitant, the Acting Mediator pointed to the hardships, risks, and wartime conditions as justification for the outlay. (It might be noted that these costs were substantially reduced in later peace-keeping operations.) Salaries were paid to Secretariat personnel and certain technicians and locally hired personnel.

The transportation costs were mainly for the charter of planes and the maintenance and operation of planes and motor vehicles lent to the Organization. Communications


47U.N. Doc. A/C.5/247/Rev. 1, November 15, 1948, pp. 107-110.








60


expenditures included a considerable outlay for equipment because the United Nations found it necessary to set up its own private communications system in view of the deficiencies of the commercial communications in the area and the absolute necessity of good communications to the operation.

The logistics problems of the operation (as well as the total costs) were undoubtedly compounded by the absence of effective communications, the shortage of food supplies in the area, the extensiveness of the mission with observers covering a 150 mile front and policing coastlines, ports, and airfields, and the necessity of reconstructing the Truce Organization for the Second Truce.48


The legal status of the Truce Supervision Organization

The legal status of the observers within Palestine and the Arab states was based upon those sections of the resolutions of July 15 and August 19 calling on all concerned to cooperate fully with the Mediator. The resolutions were assumed to guarantee by implication the rights and privileges necessary to the observers to execute their mission.

This base contrasts in two significant ways with the negotiated agreement between the United Nations and the host

48The reconstruction of the truce was necessary since all observers were withdrawn from the area at the end of the First Truce. See the statement of Assistant SecretaryGeneral Price in this connection, General Assembly, Official Records 3rd Session, Fifth Committee, 157th meeting (November
lL, p. 647.








61

states upon which the status of later peace-keeping groups rested. First, the status of the observers was established not by negotiation but by United Nations fiat. Second, the rights and privileges specifically guaranteed the observers were not spelled out initially in any formal agreement or official document. It is true, however, that the first instructions from the Mediatbor to the observers enunciated certain basic rights the observers were assumed to have. These included the rights to access, safe-conduct, and free movement.49

The position of the observers in Palestine became an issue in the fall of 1948 following the assassination of Count Bernadotte. The Acting Mediator pointed to "the disturbing tendency on the part of both Arabs and Jews to withhold cooperation from the Truce Supervision Organization and to place obstacles in the way of its effective operation."50 Accordingly, he requested the Security Council to give special emphasis to the obligations and liabilities of the parties with regard to the Truce Supervision Organization. In response to this plea and to a growing number of incidents involving the observers, the Security Council spelled out the duty of Governments and authorities vis-avis the Truce Organization in the resolution of October 19,


U.N. Doc. S/928, p. 2.
50U.N. Doc. S/1022, p. 46.








62

1948. According to the terms of the resolution, the host

authority had the following responsibilities:

(a) To allow duly accredited United Nations observers and other Truce Supervision personnel bearing
proper credentials, on official notification, ready
access to all places where their duties require them
to go including airfields, ports, truce lines and
strategic points and areas;
(b) To facilitate the freedom of movement of Truce
Supervision personnel and transport by simplifying
procedures on United Nations aircraft now in effect,
and by assurance of safe-conduct for all United Nations
aircraft and other means of transport;
(c) To co-operate fully with the Truce Supervision
personnel in their conduct of investigations into
incidents involving alleged breaches of the truce, including the making available of witnesses, testimony
and other evidence on request;
(d) To implement fully by appropriate and prompt
instructions to the commanders in the field all agreements entered into through the good offices of the
Mediator or his representatives;
(e) To take all reasonable measures to ensure the
safety and safe-conduct of the Truce Supervision
personnel and the representatives of the Mediator,
their aircraft and vehicles, while in territory under
their control;
(f) To make every effort to apprehend and promptly
punish any and all persons within their jurisdictions
guilty of any assault upon or other aggressive act
against the Truce Supervision personnel or the representatives of the Mediator.51

The precise statement of the rights and privileges

of the observers contributed to somewhat more co-operative

relationships between the observers and the parties. It

did not eliminate all problems. Reports continued through

the winter of 1948-49 of difficulties confronted by the

observers, particularly difficulties involving freedom of


51U.N. Doc. S/105, p. 68.








65


movement. As long as the parties viewed it in their interest to block the observers' activity, some interferences seemed bound to occur. Thus, the real improvement in the position of the observers came later with the improvement of the situation generally in Palestine and the negotiation of the armistice agreements.


The Truce Supervision Organization in Action


The role of the Truce Supervision Organization

From the practical standpoint of effects on world stability that which is most significant about any peacekeeping group is what it actually accomplishes in the field-what its mission is and how well it fulfills that mission.

The role of the observers in Palestine was delineated by the Mediator in his directives to the men in the field. He was, of course, guided in his determination of functions by the major terms of the truce. The responsibilities of the observers, as laid out by the Mediator, were several. First, the primary function of the observers was to supervise observance of the truce terms to ensure that the terms were not violated and that neither side benefitted during the truce by increasing its strength. In this connection they were to reconnoiter land, sea, and air for incoming ships and planes that might be used to introduce war material and fighting personnel. Second, they were to observe











investigate, and report; acts contrary to the letter and spirit of the truce. Third, the men in the field were to serve in a watchdog role preventing incidents when possible. In this connection, they were to try to eliminate sources of friction between conflicting parties, acting when the occasion called for it as mediators and conciliators. In addition, they were empowered to order a halt to action posing a real threat to the truce,52 although they had no

power to enforce such an order. Organization for action

The organizational structure of UNTSO reflected both the role and character of that group. Control was loose as befits a multi-national organization in which initiative and resourcefulness rather than close direction are required.53 The basic organizational arrangements of the Truce Organization in the field are shown in Figure 1.

The Mediator was in charge of the entire truce supervision mission. However, the actual working direction of the system of observation was in the hands of the Chief of Staff. It is indicative of the close working relationship between the Mediator and the Chief of Staff that a Swedish


2U.N. Doc. S/928.
53U.N. Doc. S/888, p. 53.














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66


officers held this post while Bernadotte was Mediator and that when Ralph Bunche, an American, became Acting Mediator, the Senior United States Observer became Chief of Staff.54 The Chief of Staff was responsible for the assignment and direction of the observers and of the auxiliary personnel, for the formulation of detailed plans for land, sea, and air observation, and for the definition on a map of the positions of the respective armed forces in the fighting sectors at the beginning of the truce. Questions of principle relating to the interpretation of the truce were referred to the Mediator for decision.55

The power of the Chief of Staff was limited by the

multi-national character of the Truce Supervision Organization. Although the mixed teams of military observers and the auxiliary services of the Organization (motor transport, aircraft services, naval vessels, and radio communications) were directly under the Chief of Staff, the senior national observers were not. Thus, when Brigadier-General Riley of the United States was Chief of Staff, the Senior French and Senior Belgian observers were directly under the Mediator. Moreover, a special institutional device, a Truce Supervision Board composed of the Senior Belgian, French, and


24The significance of this change in the Chief of Staff with the change in the Mediator is pointed. out by Leonard in his study of the truce. See Leonard, o. cit., p. 703.
55U.N. Doc. S/928, p. 6.








67


America Observers, a political adviser, and the Chief of Staff, was built into the structure of the Organization in

the Second Truce to channel advice on the administration of the truce to the Chief of Staff.

The observers were divided into mixed teams, each of which was under the charge of the senior observer for the particular area. The responsibilities of the commanding officer were many and varied. They included securing detailed information about the Israeli or Arab army or army group to which he was assigned; assigning the observers to various units and important bridges, airfields, etc.; supplementing the observers' general instructions with special instructions geared to local requirements; and taking decisions within his competence on questions referred to him from below and referring those he was unable to solve to Truce Supervision Headquarters.56

Working with the observer groups, though completely outside the formal structure of the Organization, were the liaison officers. These officers were assigned by the Arab and Israeli Army Commands to the observers to aid and protect them in their mission. They performed a variety of duties for the observers: interpreting for them, removing obstacles from their path, sometimes protecting them.


56Tbid.. p. 4.








68

Unfortunately, liaison officers also attempted to "manage." their observers at times, controlling what they saw and heard.57

The observers were deployed somewhat differently

during the First and Second Truces. During the First Truce assignment of the observers was based on geographic areas. Observers were stationed in Palestine and in the Arab states and were sent from time to time to Cyprus to supervise Jewish immigration. In Palestine the observers were assigned to one of five sectors into which the country had been divided. Headquarters and observation posts were located in each. Responsibility for commanding the sectors was distributed among representatives of the national groups contributing to the observation mission: the Northern area was under the senior Belgian officer, the Southern area under the senior French officer, the Western area under the senior American officer, and the Central area and Jerusalem under Swedish officers. Assignment.in the Arab states was more fluid: observers were in Beirut and Damascus most of the time and were sent periodically to such places as Baghdad and the Egyptian ports and airfields.58

During the Second Truce assignment was on a functional basis. Observers were divided into groups with one group of,


Mohn, O. cit., p. 80.
58U.N. Doc. S/1025, p. 7.








69

observers assigned to each Arab and Israeli Army Group. There was also one group of observers for the coast, one for the control of convoys between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, and one for the airfields. Deployment of the observers was flexible throughout, however, and they were moved to the spots most needed.

The shift in deployment practice in the Second Truce was for the purpose of making it possible to observe both armies in combat, the better to detect violations of the truce and to investigate complaints. Although in theory the truce area included not only Palestine but the seven Arab states involved in the conflict, in practice most of the observers were located in the Palestine area in view of the concentration of hostilities there and the limited number of observers. Obviously more observers could have done a more thorough job of surveillance.

The organization of the observers may not have been

the most efficient when evaluated on the basis of concentration of responsibility. It seemed, however, to fit a situation in which national sensibilities had to be taken


Illustrative of how the deployment in the Second Truce worked out in practice is the deployment of the 300 officer observers at the end of August, 1948. The dispersal on August 23 was as follows: 66 in Jerusalem; 24 with Tel Aviv convoys; 355 supervising airports in Middle Eastern countries; 22 supervising coasts and seaports; 113 assigned to ground control; and 40 stationed at headquarters. The New York Times, August 23, 1948.









70

into account and in which it was desirable to allow considerable discretion to those in the field.


The functioning of the observers

In supervising the truce and preventing advantage

accruing to either side, the observers' functions centered around two sorts of activities. First, they dealt with violence and threats of violence. They observed (if possible), investigated, and reported on outbreaks and complaints of outbreaks of fighting. Fighting could vary in its dimensions from isolated sniper fire to attacks on convoys or even villages. It was the observers' responsibility to impress on the involved parties the seriousness of truce violation. In the less important situations the observers often settled the matter in the field themselves. In addition to dealing with actual truce violations, the observers attempted to create conditions which would reduce the violations to a minimum. To this end, they negotiated no-man's lands, established provisional armistice lines, arranged harvesting agreements.

The second area of observer activity was that of

ensuring the fairness of the truce. The observers had the responsibility of seeing, on the one hand, that military goods and personnel were not introduced into any of the belligerent nations during the truce and, on the other,








71

that necessary supplies reached isolated settlements. In order to prevent the influx of material the observers checked on incoming goods at the main ports and airfields. Preventing the augmentation of the forces of either side by men of military age posed more problems. During the First Truce all men of military age coming into Palestine were placed in camps. During the Second Truce such persons were checked on periodically to ensure that they were not in military training.60 To ensure that essential supplies were delivered to Jerusalem and to remote outposts the observers engaged in convoy escort duty.

The observers in Palestine found their work complicated by the belligerency of the parties in dispute. A truce organization is small; it is unarmed; it cannot alone enforce the decisions made. If its will is to be executed, the parties involved must cooperate with it. They may cooperate either because it is to their positive advantage to do so or because they find it too disadvantageous not to cooperate. Thus, the kind of relationship the truce organization has with those it supervises and the kind of backing it gets from its parent body (which may have the means to ensure compliance) are of crucial importance.

In Palestine relations between the truce observers

and those they observed were not good. The tension between


60U.N. Doc. A/648, p. 41.









72

the parties in Palestine and the feeling by one or both that the truce was beneficial to the other meant that the truce was maintained only with difficulty, with many incidents, and with considerable bitterness.

As the truce lengthened, the situation became more serious, The long truce brought with it the strains of accumulated irritations from daily incidents, war nerves, and the economic burden of maintaining large armies. By the fall of 1948 these strains were expressed in the increasingly uncooperative and hostile attitude by the belligerents, and particularly by the Israelis, toward the observers. Acting Mediator Bunche said in this respect that a serious situation existed with regard to the "authority, prestige and even safety of personnel engaged in truce work."61 All sorts of interferences were made with the legitimate activities of the observers, ranging from refusal of access to certain ports and strategic areas to burdensome requirements on the movements of the observers.

The Truce Supervision Organization needed strong

backing from the United Nations in view of the unfavorable situation in Palestine--what they received much of the time was lukewarm support. The support reflected the political atmosphere in the United Nations in respect to the Palestine situation--an atmosphere which might be defined as one in


61The New York Times, October 2, 1948.








73


which the Palestine problem was considered "too hot to handle." Few, if any, states wanted to take action on the problem which would be likely to alienate Jews or Arabs. Nonetheless, there was concern to keep the truce intact until a way out of the impasse could be found.

As a consequence of the desire to keep the truce

alive, support was extended to the Truce Supervision Organization by the Security Council at several critical points in the life of that Organization. After the expiration of the First Truce the Security Council took a strong stand to obtain agreement by the parties involved to the Second Truce. In the July 15 Security Council resolution which provided the basis for the Second Truce, the Security Council invoked Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter in ordering governments and authorities to desist from further military action. The declaration that failure to comply would bring consideration by the Security Council of further action under Chapter VII placed an implied sanction behind the order.

A most significant example of Security Council bulwarking of the observers' position came in October, 1948. The situation in Palestine was fast deteriorating. Heavy fighting had broken out, first in Southern Palestine, then in the North. Calls for a cease-fire by both the Chief of Staff and the Mediator were ignored. The Security Council then intervened. At the urging of the Mediator, the Council








74

called, by unanimous vote, for an immediate cease-fire in Palestine.62 It is true that a part of the force of this action was blunted by a certain vagueness in the resolution. The resolution did not order, but merely called for a ceasefire. It did not include an effective cease-fire date nor specific provisions for enforcing the cease-fire. Yet, in November, following the elections in the United States, the Council moved still more positively to bring an end to hostilities by instructing the Mediator to arrange for an armistice.

Thus, the parent body of the Truce Supervision

Organization gave the Organization essential support. The Council helped prevent the failure of the truce supervision mission even though they denied the Organization all the power it might, in theory, have had to execute its mandate.

Conclusions


The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization

was significant not only because of its role in preserving a condition of relative non-fighting while an armistice was sought and instituted, but also because it set a pattern for United Nations peace-keeping activities. The Truce Organization itself, in somewhat modified and reduced form,


62Security Council, Official Records, 3rd Year, 367th meeting (October 19, 1948), p. 38.








75

continued in existence after the truce to help preserve the armistice. The initial organization and its successor have provided experience, precedents, and personnel that have eased the establishment of succeeding missions.

The experience with the Truce Supervision Organization contributes to our understanding, as well, of the factors which are important, first, to stimulating creation of a peace-keeping group and, second, to the effective functioning of that group once in being.

The creation of UNTSO was in many ways a minimal

response by the United Nations to a crisis situation. Three factors seem to be of particular significance in the origins of the Truce Supervision Organization. First, an imminent threat to the peace was presented when full-scale war broke out in Palestine in mid-May, 1948, with Israel's proclamation of independent status and the consequent Arab invasion. Second, the United Nations had clear responsibility for the Palestine situation. It had taken jurisdiction from Britain; it had been seeking an acceptable solution for the future of Palestine for more than a year. Third, the United Nations had direct involvement as well as some precedents to follow in Palestine through the actions of the Truce Commission which was attempting to impose a cease-fire. Crisis, responsibility, and involvement led to United Nations action--not the boldest nor most dramatic action possible,








76

but the strongest action acceptable to the cautious members of the United Nations.

A second question which is of major concern relates to the capability of the Truce Supervision Organization to fulfill its mandate. Was the Organization equipped to maintain peaceful conditions in Palestine?

The Truce Supervision Organization represents a

classic example of the organization that grows in response to challenge. Not only the emergence, but also the development, of the Organization was a product of the situation and its necessities. There was little discussion of what UNTSO should be at the time it was established, though it seems to have been assumed that it would be modest in character. Starting modestly, the Organization expanded in size and scope of activities to meet its responsibilities.

Expansion to meet new challenges was possible because strong leadership in the shaping of the Truce Organization came from the Mediator, supported by the Secretary-General. The political mileau in which the Truce Organization functioned was such that the Mediator had freedom in shaping and guiding the Truce Supervision Organization as long as he did not go too far. The Palestine issue was explosive and difficult and most of the representatives were willing, and perhaps believed it administratively necessary, to delegate responsibility in the matter to a subordinate unit.








77


Yet, the very explosiveness of the Palestine question also limited the Mediator's freedom in strengthening the Truce Supervision Organization. The Security Council and the participating delegations checked his more controversial or ambitious plans. Thus, when the Mediator suggested the permanent members of the Security Council as seconding states for UNTSO, the suggestion was gently vetoed in favor of more limited participation by the members of the Truce Commission: when the Mediator tried to include a small armed force in the operation, the powers above balked. This was more ambitious--perhaps more risky--than they wanted. In addition, support for the mission tended to be bland and passive. Members of the United Nations were cautious about over-involvement in the volatile Palestine situation. Nonetheless, at critical junctures in the life of the Truce Supervision Organization, the Security Council tendered the support necessary to keep the mission alive.

Related to the question of the capabilities of the

Truce Organization is that of its actual success or failure in fulfilling its mission. The evidence is mixed and the answer depends at least in part on how one interprets the role of the observers. Were they merely to observe and report on the truce--were they to prevent major truce violations--were they to guarantee that the truce was maintained inviolate?








78

it is quite clear that UNTSO did not prevent all outbreaks of violence, or even all major outbreaks. Jerusalem

was the scene of hostilities and continuous light fighting

through the early months of the Second Truce. In October,

1948 the entire truce almost broke down with heavy fighting

in both the North and South of Palestine and a marked slowness in the belligerents' responses to the calls for a halt

in the fighting. Nor did the observers prevent the introduction of at least some men and equipment into Palestine

during the truce.63 The effectiveness of the Truce Supervision Organization in both reporting and preventing incidents was undoubtedly hampered by some discrepancy between

the formidable responsibilities of the Organization and its

qualifications to meet those responsibilities.


3Estimates on the extent of this violation vary. The Mediator in a report to the General Assembly stated, "Unquestionably, if more personnel and equipment had been available, closer supervision could have been maintained in Palestine as well as in the seven Arab states, but I am convinced that if the two opposing forces did in fact manage to obtain war materials by clandestine methods, the amount would have been so limited as to have made no substantial difference to the relative strength of the two sides." U.N. Doc. A/648, p. 34. In the same vein Paul Mohn concludes that the Truce Supervision Organization knew that the clandestine entry of arms was occurring, but -they could only contain it in reasonable limits. See Mohn, o. cit., p. 76. A more critical view of the truce violations is presented by Edgar O'Ballance in his study of the Arab-Israeli war. He contends that the truce periods, and particularly the First Truce period, were used by both sides, but especially by the Israelis, to acquire aircraft, armor, artillery, ammunition, and even some ships. Edgar O'Ballance, o. cit.,
pp. 138-39.








79

onetheless, the Truce Supervision Organization did maintain the truce more or less intact for over a year, while negotiations for an armistice were undertaken and successfully completed. Few would deny that the situation was not improved by the observers. By concrete action--investigating, patrolling, negotiating--they reduced tensions, helping to keep the situation below the boiling point most of the time. And, perhaps even more important, by their very presence the observers served to symbolize the United Nations concern that the truce should not be violated. In the words of Count Bernadotte, "The value of the operation was to be found mainly in the moral and psychological effect, and in the restraining influences that the mere presence of the observers in Palestine would have on the opposing parties.,64

















4U.N. Doc. S/1025, p. 10.













CHAPTER III

PEACE-KEEPING THROUGH OBSERVATION-N ESTABLISI{ED INSTRUMENT:
THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVATION GROUP IN LEBANON


Introduction


Almost ten years to the day after the establishment of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine, a second observation group came into being. The United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon1 was established on June 11, 1958. The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization had been a new and unique experiment, coming into being and functioning in uncharted areas; in contrast, U1NOGIL had the experience of several United Nations endeavors on which to build. UNOGIL was affected not only by the precedents established by the initial Palestine venture, but also by the precedents of the evolving Truce Organization, which in modified form was still in existence, and of the United Nations Emergency Force. Thus, UNOGIL represented an advanced application of the non-fighting

force technique.

The 1948 Palestine Truce Supervision Organization and the 1958 Lebanon Observation Group were separated not merely


1The United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon will hereafter be referred to as UNOGIL.
80








81

by years and precedents but also by the changes which had taken place over time in the shape and character of the United Nations itself.

One of the most crucial of these changes related to membership in the Organization. Prior to 1955 few new members were admitted to the United Nations because of an East-West deadlock on the entry of new states. In 1955 a package deal involving the entry of sixteen new members broke the deadlock. The reopening of the doors of the United Nations combined with the emergence of a number of new states into the world community meant that not only was the total number of states in the United Nations increased but also that the character of the membership changed. The patterns of interest and influence within the world organization were correspondingly modified. The influence of the Western states declined and that of the Afro-Asians climbed. With the new Afro-Asian states came an intensified interest in and sensitivity to questions of colonialism, imperialism, and under-developed areas. This then constituted one significant cluster of changes that differentiate the period of the Palestine and Lebanon organizations.

A second relevant development in the ten years was

the growth in importance of the office of Secretary-General. Trygve Lie, the first Secretary-General, had believed in an









82

active role for the Secretary-General. Although Dag Hammarskjold's style as Secretary-General differed from Lie's, Hammarskjold shared Lie's faith in the importance of the office and continued to strengthen it. By the time of the Lebanese crisis the development of the office of the Secretary-General had been carried forward to the point that a doctrine of implied powers could be enunciated. According to Hammarskjold, "...it is in keeping with the philosophy of the Charter that the Secretary-General should also be expected to act without any guidance from the Assembly or the Security Council should this appear to him necessary towards helping to fill any vacuum that may appear in the systems which the Charter and traditional diplomacy provide for the safeguarding of peace and security."2

All this is by way of saying that while UNOGIL was influenced by UNTSO precedents and by the similarity in their functions, it was also separated from the earlier organization by the changes which had occurred in both the United Nations and the world environments.

It is the purpose of this chapter to examine UNOGIL

with some care to determine its significance in the development of the non-fighting force as an instrument of pacific


Security Council, Official Records, 13th Year, 837th meeting (July 22, 1958), pp. -4.









83

settlement, In the study of UNOGIL the same elements which were considered with respect to the Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine are isolated for analysis in order that comparisons between the two may be drawn. The chapter is divided into three main sections. The first deals with the creation of UNOGIL, focusing on the situation which brought it into being and upon the political aspects of its establishment and maintenance. The second part describes the characteristics of the group, emphasizing the role of the Secretary-General in its molding. The third section is concerned with functioning of the unit in the field.


Conditions for Creation of UNOGIL


The crisis area: internal conditions in Lebanon

A starting point for consideration of the Observation Group in Lebanon is the situation which called the group into being.

The immediate cause for the establishment of the

United Nations Observation Group was the outbreak of a small scale civil war in Lebanon in May, 1958. Lebanon brought the question before the Security Council in a complaint charging that the war was primarily a product of the intervention of the United Arab Republic in the internal affairs of Lebanon and contending that its continuance would








84

endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.3 In fact, the nature and cause of the violence were confused.

Behind the Lebanese complaint was a situation of

considerable complexity in the Middle East as a whole and within Lebanon in particular. Although it is beyond the scope of this study to probe deeply the internal events of the Middle East, some note must be taken of a number of significant developments in that area in the spring of 1958.

A dominant factor in the Middle East situation at this time was the strength of Arab nationalism and of the pan-Arab movement. Both had gained impetus from the merger of Syria and Egypt in February, 1958, to form a single Arab state, the United Arab Republic. They were stimulated further by the strong propaganda campaign conducted by the United Arab Republic against the governments of the nonaligned Arab states.

This nationalist fervor had significant implications for Lebanon due to its demographic characteristics and to the internal conditions in Lebanon. Demographically, Lebanon is divided almost evenly between Muslims and Christians. Prior to 1958 the potential communal problems that this division harbored had been kept to a minimum by the practice dividing government and parliamentary offices


3Yearbook of the United Nations 1958, p. 36.









85

proportionately between the major groups in the country and by the promises on each side not to alter the status quo. The Arabs agreed not to join a larger Arab state and the Christians not to enlist aid from the outside against any Arab state.

In the spring of 1958 the harmony within Lebanon steadily disintegrated. Dissatisfaction with Lebanon's Christian and pro-Western government under President Camille Chamoun was rampant. This dissatisfaction arose from several factors. First, actions by the Chamoun government in both the domestic and international spheres seemed to threaten the delicate Muslim-Christian balance on which the stability of the Lebanese government rested. Elections in 1957 had been rigged apparently to the disadvantage of many leading opposition (primarily Muslim) politicians. Rumors were persistent that President Chamoun intended to have the Constitution amended to allow his re-election as president. Adherence by the Chamoun government to the Eisenhower Doctrine was deemed incompatible by many with the national compromise calling for non-alignment in international affairs. Second, internal economic and social conditions within Lebanon were badly in need of reform. There were great inequalities in wealth in the Lebanese society with the Muslims, by and large, on the lower half of the socio-economic scale. Add to these internal conditions inflammatory broad-









86

casts from outside against the government and an appealing movement to Arab unity--the result is tension.

In May, 1958, dissatisfaction and unrest took an ugly turn. The assassination of an opposition journalist converted the potential violence into civil war. The war was notable, however, for its moderation. There were few casualties. The army under General Fuad Chehab, a moderate, acted more as an umpire than as a government agent in war. (The General felt that the army should not get involved in disputes between politicians, lest it to be rent with factionalism.) Moderate or not, fighting was underway and outside powers were at least indirectly involved. At this point the question was brought before the Security Council. The United Nations involvement

The United Nations had no direct involvement in the situation in Lebanon prior to that country's complaint to the Security Council in May, 1958. Thus, the United Nations did not bear the special responsibility in this situation that it seemed to in the Palestine and Suez crises. In the latter cases the United Nations had had the questions at issue under prior consideration--the failure to devise any solution seemed to carry with it at least a moral commitment to halt the overt violence which emerged. Such a commitment was not present in the Lebanese situation.









87

Nor did the situation in Lebanon pose a clear challenge to the United Nations when measured by the criteria of a threat to international peace and. security. In the Palestine and Suez cases open fighting was occurring between the armies of the states involved at the time the United Nations intervened. Although the locus of aggression might be ambiguous, the threat to international peace and security seemed clear. In contrast, the immediate crisis in Lebanon was primarily internal. Real questions could be raised as to the degree to which the internal crisis could, on the one hand be attributed to international factors and, on the other, affect international peace.


The Dreced.ents for peace-keepinAt the time of the Lebanese crisis the United Nations had had experience with two important peace-keeping operations in the Middle East. It maintained a nucleus of

observers in Palestine and a substantial force in the Suez area. The technique of peace-keeping was familiar and usable. Some personnel and equipment were in a position to be transferred into Lebanon. Successful past experience in peace-keeping made it easier presumably, from practical and psychological standpoints, to establish a new United Nations presence.









88

It may be hypothesized that there is an inverse

relationship between experience with peace-keeping groups and readiness to establish new groups. Successful experience would tend to contribute to United Nations willingness to establish a new presence even in a less serious case.


The Establishment of the Observation Group The establishment

The situation in Lebanon was confused. Violence there was most assuredly. Less clear were the roots of the disturbances and the implications they held for international peace and security. The Security Council made no immediate judgment on the validity of the Lebanese charges. Drawing on past experience, the Council responded to Lebanon's plea for aid by injection of a United Nations Observation Group into the area. This positive response by the United Nations to a somewhat ambiguous challenge suggests a growing familiarity with and consequent willingness to use the United Nations presence as a peace-keeping device. A brief review of the establishment of the Observation Group gives insight into the responses available to the United Nations and the reasons for selection of this particular one.

The Security Council met on the initial Lebanese
4
complaint from June 6 to June 11. At the June 6 Security

4The Lebanese complaint was placed before the Security Council on May 22, but was not considered until June









89

Council meeting the Lebanese Foreign Minister opened the discussion by presenting three major claims for his Government. According to Foreign Minister Charles Malik:

The first is there has been, and there still is,
massive, illegal and unprovoked intervention in the affairs of Lebanon by the United Arab Republic. The second is that this intervention aims at undermining,
and does in fact threaten, the independence of
Lebanon. The third is that the situation created by this intervention which threatens the independence of
Lebanon is likely, if continued, to endanger the5
maintenance of international peace and security.

Lebanon specifically charged the United Arab Republic with, among other things, supplying arms to subversive Lebanese elements, participation in subversive and terrorist acts in Lebanon, and conducting a violent press and radio campaign against Lebanon.

The Lebanese representative did not spell out publicly what action Lebanon wished the Security Council to take on the complaint. It was merely stated that, "We want only that the intervention in all its aspects stop."6 Privately and unofficially Lebanese officials mentioned the possibilities both of an observation group and of a police force similar to the United Nations Emergency Force.7


6 The delay was for the purpose of giving the Arab League a chance to try to reach. a solution first. The Arab League considered the issue from May 31 to June 5, but was unable to reach a decision acceptable to all parties.
5Security Council, Official Records, 13th Year, 823rd meeting (June 6, 1958), p. 4.
6Ibid., p. 22.
7The New York Times, June 14, 1958.




Full Text
350
Tlie United Nations efforts proved successful. The
parliament met from July 22 to August 2. On August 1 they
selected Cyrille Adoula to be Prime Minister by a vote of
200 out of 221 possible'votes. Adoula was a moderate,
connected with no particular tribal or political faction.
His selection was viewed as a victory for the United Nations
and a good omen for the Congo.
With the establishment of a legally recognized
central government for the Congo, what should be the United
Nations role? The position of ONUC seemed much strengthened
and the situationwithin the Congo much improved. The
United Nations had an official Congolese government with
which to deal; situations likely to lead to civil war had
been stilled, at least for the moment; and the Force itself
was both materially and morally stronger, having regained
some of its lost numbers and lost prestige. There was talk
in August, 1961, as there had been talk in August, I960,
of ending the military phase of the Congo operation in the
near future.
ONUC sealed off the central section of the University from
the outside. Members of the Parliament were to meet in the
auditorium of the University and to sleep in dormitories on
the campus. They were not to leave during the session of
Parliament, while access to the area was granted only to
accredited persons. Inside 45 United Nations Security
Guards had been detailed to help the secretariat of the
Congolese Parliament. United Nations Review, Vol. 8, No.
8 (August, 1961), p. 5.


62
19^8. According to the berms of bhe resolution, the host
authority had the following responsibilities:
(a) To allow duly accredited United Nations ob
servers and other Truce Supervision personnel bearing
proper credentials, on official notification, ready
access to all places where their duties require them
to go including airfields, ports, truce lines and
strategic points and areas;
(b) To facilitate the freedom of movement of Truce
Supervision personnel and transport by simplifying
procedures on United Nations aircraft now in effect,
and by assurance of safe-conduct for all United Nations
aircraft and other means of transport;
(c) To co-operate fully with the Truce Supervision
pei'sonnel in their conduct of investigations into
incidents involving alleged breaches of the truce, in
cluding the making available of witnesses, testimony
and other evidence on request;
(d) To implement fully by appropriate and prompt
instructions to the commanders in the field all agree
ments entered into through the good offices of the
Mediator or his representatives;
(e) To take all reasonable measures to ensure the
safety and safe-conduct of the Truce Supervision
personnel and the representatives of the Mediator,
their aircraft and vehicles, while in territory under
their control;
(f) To make every effort to apprehend and promptly
punish any and all persons within their jurisdictions
guilty of any assault upon or other aggressive act
against the Truce Supervision personnel or the repre
sentatives of the Mediator.51
The precise statement of the rights and privileges
of the observers contributed to somewhat more co-operative
relationships between the observers and the parties. It
did not eliminate all problems. Reports continued through
the winter of 1948-49 of difficulties confronted by the
observers, particularly difficulties involving freedom of
91
U.N, Doc. S/1045, p. 68.


67
American Observers, a political adviser, and the Chief of
Staff, was built into the structure of the Organization in
the Second Truce to channel advice on the administration of
the truce to the Chief of Staff.
The observers were divided into mixed teams, each of
which was under the charge of the senior observer for the
particular area. The responsibilities of the commanding
officer were many and varied. They included securing de
tailed information about the Israeli or Arab army or army
group to which he was assigned; assigning the observers to
various units and important bridges, airfields, etc.; sup
plementing the observers* general instructions with special
instructions geared to local requirements; and taking de
cisions within his competence on questions referred to him
from below and referring those he was unable to solve to
rr
Truce Supervision Headquarters, '
Working with the observer groups, though completely
outside the formal structure of the Organization, were the
liaison officers. These officers were assigned by the Arab
and Israeli Army Commands to the observers to aid and pro
tect them in their mission. They performed a variety of
duties for the observers: interpreting for them, removing
obstacles from their path, sometimes protecting them.
^Ibid. p. 4.


182
Although, final political control of UNEF was vested
in the Secretary-General, many of the routine decisions on
its operations were, of necessity, the responsibility of the
Commander of the Force, assisted by a United Nations Command.
The November 5 resolution creating the UNEF Command had
designated Major-General E.L.M, Burns, a Canadian, as the
first Commander. (He was later succeeded by Lieutenant-
General P.S. Gyani of India who served in the post four
years. He in turn was succeeded on January 1, 1964, by
Major-General Carlos Flores Paiva Chaves of Brazil.) Burns
was well-qualified for the position. At the time of his
appointment he was serving as Chief of the United Nations
Truce Supervision Organization. Thus, he had some aware
ness of the problems of the Middle East and of the politi
cal and geographic conditions under which the Force would
operate. In addition, he had long demonstrated his interest
in the activities of the United Nations, serving, for
example, as an alternate member of the Canadian delegation
to the General Assembly in 1949 and as national president
of the United Nations Association in Canada in 1953 and
1954.
The responsibilities of the Commander were not
spelled out in the General Assembly resolutions establish
ing the Command and the Force itself. Nor was the Commander
given a precise description of his mission prior to assuming


47
as well as the original threeBelgium, France, and the
United States), The truce by then had been replaced by an
armistice and the Truce Supervision Organization reduced in
size and role.
A second man power question of critical importance
from the outset to the Organization was that of size. How
many men should be committed to the Palestine venture?
This decision did not remain fixed. It was a product of
the demands of the situation, and the willingness of the
countries involved to contribute. The Mediator's requests
for more men were frequently ignored or met only slowly and
reluctantly. The needs of an effective truce organization
and the desire of participating states to avoid undue in
volvement in the situation came into conflict at times,
A kind of pattern emerges with respect to the size
of the Truce Supervision Organization, a pattern which falls
into three major phasesgrowth, stability, reduction. The
Organization's period of growth, the most significant of the
phases, extends from its origins in June through September,
1948. Within this growth period there is a break between
the First and Second Truces.
During the period of the First Truce the Mediator
expanded his force in three directions from its original
nucleus of sixty-three observers. To supplement the original
observers, he requested, first, the fifty guards from the
Secretariat and, second, thirty more observers, ten from each


372
The United Nations paralleled the plan of economic
sanctions with a program designed to strengthen its military
position in the Congo. A detailed plan of military opera
tions, designed to achieve freedom of movement for ONUC
throughout Katanga and to ensure the elimination of the
mercenaries, was drawn up in late October. The military
plan of operations was backed up by reinforcements of
material and manpower. This build-up was intensified in
74-
mid-December. By then it was clear, first, that Tshombe
would not voluntarily accede to U Thant's Plan of National
Reconciliation or negotiate seriously with the Central
Government, and second, that the plan to use economic
pressure to force such agreement would fail for lack of
cooperation by certain members of the United Nations.
rvDr. Ralph Bunche describes the plan in the following
words: "A plan of operations to achieve freedom of movement
for ONUC throughout Katanga in the event of a continued
denial of this freedom by Katangese authorities, which would
also ensure the elimination of mercenaries and assist
national unity was devised in the course of consultations
involving Mr. Gardiner, the Force Commander, General Prem
Chand, and myself during my visit to Leopoldville in October
of last year. That plan was subsequently approved by you
for ultimate execution, if all non-military efforts finally
failed.
The first phase of that plan had unexpectedly been
activated on 28 December. U.N. Doc. S/5053? Add. 14,
Annex 3^s p. 5^*
^The United Nations strengthened the Force in several
respects. At least 1,000 troops from Indonesia and Norway
joined the Force in December. Anti-aircraft defenses were
expanded and some 20 jet fighters, obtained from Sweden,
Italy, and the Philippines, x^ere added to the United Nations
air force. The United States provided the transportation to


277
In summary? it can be observed that there was a dif
ference of opinion among Security Council members as to
precisely what they were authorizing when they passed the
February 21 resolution. While the Western powers held that
the mandate was only slightly broadened, the Afro-Asians
were convinced that a much clearer and stronger mandate
had been set forth.
The opinion of the Secretary-General, who had primary
responsibility for implementing the resolution, was close
to that of the Western delegates. On the question of the
new powers of the Force the Secretary-General said that:
I strongly welcome the first three-Power resolution
adopted today by the Council as giving a stronger
and more clear framework for United Nations action
although, as so often before, it does not provide a
wider legal basis or new means for implementation. 6
The Force's mandate seemed to be further strengthened
by a second February resolution, even though that resolution
was defeated. The resolution, proposed by Ceylon, Liberia,
and the United Arab Republic, noted and condemned the out
rages and atrocities in South Kasai, Leopoldville, and
Katanga and authorized the United Nations to use force if
necessary to prevent their recurrence. No objection was
York: Frederick A. Praeger for the Center of International
Studies, Princeton University, 1963), p. 75. The statement
was made in the 94-1 st meeting of the Security Council.
46
Security Council, Official Records, 16th Year,
942nd meeting (February 20, 1961), p. 40.


274
specifically excluded the use of force from his request
for additional powers for ONUC.) The heart of the resolu
tion was Part A, Section 1 which reads:
Urges that the United Nations take immediately
all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence
of civil war in the Congo, including arrangements
for cease-fires, the halting of all military opera
tions, the prevention of- clashes and the use of
force, if necessary, in the last resort.^2
Support for the resolution seemed substantial. On
February 21 it was passed by the Council by a vote of 9 to
0, with two abstentions (France and the Soviet Union).
Passage of the resolution had proved easy. There
was, however, considerably less unanimity on the meaning and
implications of the resolution. While the resolution was
widely interpreted as constituting a new mandate for ONUC,
there was little agreement on the nature of the new man
date. Nor was there any agreement or even real considera
tion as to whether the legal basis under which the Force
was operating was thereby altered.
In the statements made in the Security Council at
the time the February 21 resolution was under consideration
two main points of view with respect to the use-of-force
paragraph were apparent.
One interpretation of the resolution viewed the new
mandate as a very limited one, not too different from the
45
U.N. Doc. S/4741, p. 147


446
more difficult the situation into which it is injected, the
more generous will its powers have to be for success. If
the powers of a peace-keeping group are commensurate with
its responsibilities, it can be assumed that it will be
able to carry through its mission of maintaining a state of
non-fighting.
We do not wish to imply, however, that the power-
responsibility equation is the only consideration affecting
the desirability of establishing and continuing a peace
keeping group. The long-range effects of the United Nations
mission, successful though it may be in maintaining a
condition of non-fighting, must be taken into account in
judging the ultimate value of a peace-keeping unit.
What, on the one hand, are the costs of achieving
a balance of power and responsibilities? Conceivably, a
peace-keeping group could be too expensive the costs of
achieving a favorable balance could be so great as to en
danger the political and financial stability of the world
organization. What, on the other hand, are the political
consequences of United Nations action? It is possible that
a peace-keeping unit while maintaining a non-fighting condi
tion in an area might actually militate against a permanent
political solution to a crisis. The very presence of the
United Nations troops, preventing overt violence, might
remove from the parties involved any pressure to negotiate.


United Nations Mediator
Truce
Supervision
Board
Political Adviser
to Chief of Staff
Chief of Staff of Senior Fr. Legal
U. N. Observers U. N, Military Officer
(Senior U. S. Observer
Observer)
Senior Belg.
Military Obs.
Motor
Transport
Assignment
of Vehicles
Maintenance
Naval Vessels
on Patrol Duty
Aircraft
Services
Mixed teams of
Military Obser
vers in charge
of Senior
observer for an
area
Source: U. N, Doc. A/701, p. 305,
Figure 1
Organization chart of United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
Chief
Admin,
Officer
Finance
Officer
1
Radio
Communi
cations

vn


size and equipping of UNOGIL was initially inadequate to
the task assigned. The fact that relatively few observers
were on the scene in the early phases of the operation cast
a shadow on the authority of the early reports of UNOGIL.
Second, the civil war situation made it difficult for the
Group to establish cooperative relations with both factions.
Establishment of necessary working relations with the rebels
aroused the hostility of the Government of Lebanon to the
observers. Moreover, the divisions within Lebanon were
reflected in the United Nations. Thus, almost any move by
the observers in Lebanon brought a loss of support from
some faction at United Nations headquarters. Finally, the
mandate of the observersto observe onlyrestricted the
observers, to a limited role in the crisis from the outset.
Many of the difficulties confronted by UNOGIL in
carrying through its mission were not foreseen or provided
for by the Security Council at the time the Group was
established. This suggests one of the problems of too
rapid an establishment of a peace-keeping group. The group
may be thrust into a situation beyond its capacities. Ease
in the creation of a force provides no assurance that the
force, once in the field, will find it equally easy to cope
effectively with the crisis.


404
Unfortunately, political neutrality is another well-
established principle of the non-fighting force which is '
more applicable to some situations than to others. In
particular, difficult philosophic and practical questions
develop when the force is injected into civil war situ
ations and most of the recent missions of the United
Uations contingents have involved elements of civil war.
for example, can the force remain neutral between the
central government and rebel factions? The central govern
ment is the legal government of the state. It has consented
to the entry of the United nations force and agreed to co
operate with that force. The problems involved are suggested
by the United Nations experience in Lebanon and in the Congo.
In Lebanon the observers entered at the request of the
central government. To operate effectively the observers
found it necessary, however, to negotiate and develop good
relations with rebels who held much of the border territory.
The United Nations representatives found little evidence of
the infiltration of arms and men from without that the
Lebanese Government had charged was occurring. Although
the Force tried to remain neutral, it was criticized for
its findings by both the Lebanese Government and some
members of the United Nations. The difficulties were re
solved before becoming too sticky by the internal reconcili
ation of the Lebanese factions. What would have happened,


TABLE B~4 Continued
Contributing
States
July, 1960a
Officers and Men
Sept., 1960k April, 1961
Contributed
c June, 196le
Feb. 1962d
Feb., 1963
Pakistan
546
551
546
671
709
Philippines
77
Sierra Leone
111
117
Sudan
398
1
Sweden
623
670
642
838
876
1102
Switzerland
22
Tunisia
2151
2633
3160
JU
A
548
1039
United Arab
Republic
519
Yugoslavia
20
Total
11155
19341
17941
16663
16672
19798
*A 3159 man Tunisian contingent has not been included in this table since it was withdrawn almost immediately
after the compilation was made.
Source: Compiled from the following U, N. Documents:
aU. N. Doc. S/4389/Add 6, p. 29.
^U. N. Doc. S/4531/Annex 1, p. 201-2.
cYearbook of the United Nations, 1960, p. 108.
^Yearbook of the United Nations, 1961, p. 82.
eA. G. Mezerik (edit.) "Congo and the United Nations," Parts 2 and 3 International Review
Service, Vol. 7, No. 65 and Vol. 9, No. 77, p. 105.


139
The reduction of infiltration was reflected first in
the third report of the observers. They concluded:
As will be seen from the observations made in the
report, the situation in regard to the possible
infiltration of personnel and the smuggling of arms
from across the border is that, while there may have
been a limited importation of arms into some areas
prior to the presidential election on 3 July, any
such movement has since markedly diminished. A
virtual truce has prevailed since about that time in
most of the disturbed areas.50
The fourth report of the observers found "that no
cases of infiltration have been detected and that, if any
infiltration is still taking place, its extent must be re-
51
garded as insignificant." In fact, examples not of
infiltration but of "exfiltration" (the departure from
Lebanon of persons who had presumably entered for illegal
52
purposeswere noted in the fourth and fifth reports of
UNOGIL.
There is a seeming paradox in the continued augmen
tation of the Observation Groups activities long after
significant infiltration was observed. Why, for example,
double the number of observers and the amount of patrolling
in October when the issue appeared resolved? It may be
hypothesized that the strengthening of the Group after the
^U.N. Doc. S/4085, p. 137.
51U.U. Doc. S/4100, p. 168.
52U.N. Doc. S/4114, p. 11.


298
Not only political problems but the very length of
the Forces life complicated the task of maintaining ONUC
at strength. The states upon which the United Nations re
lied primarily for men had neither large armies nor great
wealth. Financial or military circumstances at home made
it necessary for several states to pull out their troops
during the course of the operation. For example, Chinese
attacks on Indian territory in 1962 and 1963 made India
anxious to recall the bulk of its large contingent in the
Force. Thus, the longer a mission exists, the more likely
it is that difficulty will develop in keeping that mission
at full strength. .
Money: the financial basis of the Force.-One of the
most perplexing and persistent problems connected with ONUC
was that of adequate financing. The problem grew out of the
high costs of the Force, the controversial nature of the
program, and the unwillingness of the member states, whether
for monetary or political reasons, to contribute to the
support of the operation. The Force was on shaky financial
foundations from the outset.
The costs were indeed high; they averaged $10 million
a month for almost four years. Annual ONUC costs far ex
ceeded not only the costs of UNEF but also the regular
expenses of the Organization itself. For example, in 1961
the UNEF budget was $19 million; the regular budget of the
United Nations $71,649,300; and the ONUC budget $120,000,000.


288
impressed with the need to adhere to the principles under
which the Force commenced operations than with the impor
tance of bringing the mission to a successful termination.
It was under U Thant's leadership that the Force departed
most drastically from the initial conception of the non
fighting force. Faced with a choice of indefinite stale
mate or some military initiative in the Congo by the Force,
U Thant chose the latter alternative. He gave strong
leadership to the Force in military initiatives taken in
December, 1961, and December, 1962, which led to the
eviction of the mercenaries and the re-establishment of
control by the central government over the entire state.
Both Hammarskjold and Thant shared the responsibili
ties of leadership of the Force with an informal group of
close advisers from the Secretariat and with a Congo Ad
visory Committee. Both groups came into being at the
initiative of Secretary-General Hammarskjold and seemed
designed, first, to assist in decision-making and, second,
to broaden the base of support for the decisions.
The Secretariat advisers, known informally as the
"Congo Club," served principally to aid the Secretary-General
in decision-making. According to at least one observer,
certain members of the group were considerably more
important than others during Hammarskjold's tenure of


o
The Saar force had a function similar to that of the United
Nations non-fighting forcesto exercise by its presence a
restraint on the use of force.
There are parallels not only in purpose but in struc
ture, legal regulation, and control between the Saar force
and those forces used by the United Nations in Suez, the
Congo, and Cyprus. The Saar force was composed of 5>300
men supplied by four nations: Britain, Italy, the Nether
lands, and Sweden. It was under the command of a British-
appointed Commander-in-Chief who directed the staff officers
of each national unit. The consent of the parties concerned
was a prerequisite to the formation of the force; while an
advisory committee composed of three members appointed by
the Council and assisted by a sub-committee of the states
contributing to the force had wide latitude in making plans
for the creation and direction of the force.. Financial
arrangements were based on the principle that the League
would bear expenses exceeding those normally made by the
contributing states to maintain their contingents. Out of
these administrative and financial arrangements came an
organization able to execute its functions with ease and
efficiency and without the use of arms.^
^The use of an international force at Letxtia is
sometimes cited as a precedent for the non-fighting forces
of the United Nations. See, for example, ibid., p. 51.
In this case the force was not really very international
however. In a conflict between Peru and Colombia over the


291
tlie administrators in the United Nations, with little day-
to-day guidance or control from the political organs. The
political organs were apparently chary of involvement be
cause of the controversial nature of the Force.
Not all important decisions were made at headquarters
however. A number of highly significant moves had their
origin in the field. An examination of the field leader
ship of the Force reveals that most of the hey figures in
the initial phases of the operation had had experience with
other peace-keeping missions. The United Nations was able
to depend both in the field and at headquarters on personnel
knowledgeable in the ways of peace-keeping. Of necessity
this personnel was primarily Western or Indian in the begin
ning in contrast to the composition of the Force which was
primarily African. African leaders experienced in this
sort of endeavor simply were not available.
Heading up the entire United Nations operation in
the Congo in the early months was the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General. (After May 25, 1961, the top
official in the' Congo was termed the Officer-in-Charge.)
The first Special Representative was Ur. Ralph Sunche, who
may have had more experience with peace-keeping operations
than any other single individual in the United Nations.
His efforts date back to the Palestine crisis in 1948. It
is suggestive of the difficulties of the Congolese mission


35
Charter, Article 40 refers to provisional measures and re
mains a step away from the enforcement action envisioned
under Article 42, Nonetheless, the reference to action
under Chapter VII was potentially significant. In theory
at least such a resolution opened the way to forceful action
hy the United Nations in the event of failure by the parties
to comply with the cease-fire order or of truce violations.
In fact, however, strong action was not taken by the United
Nations when truce violations of a serious nature did occur.
Although some question remains as to the precise provisions
of the Charter under which the United Nations was acting,
it would appear that the potential authority embodied in
the July 15 resolution was greater than the authority
actually invoked under that resolution. It may be suggested
that political rather than legal factors explain the limited
response of the United Nations to some serious breeches of
the cease-fire.
The mandate
The truce supervisors' mandate was based on the Uay
29 and July 15 resolutions calling for a truce and on the
terms of the truce itself. The resolutions and the debate
accompanying them provided only the most general guidelines
as to the functions of the observers and the conditions
under which they were to operate. The resolutions called


193
assessments for UNEF and the related practical problem of
how compliance with a legal obligation might be ensured.
The formula which has been developed, partly by trial
and error, for financing the Force has four main elements:
a) that the costs should be financed outside the regular
budget of the United Nations; b) that the regular scale of
assessments should serve as the basis for apportioning UNEF
costs; c) that certain modifications should be injected
into the UNEF scale of assessments to take account of
special circumstances; and d) that the expenses for UNEF
are expenses of the organization and obligatory upon all.
The decision that all of the costs of the Force borne
by the United Nations should be financed outside the regu
lar budget was one of the earliest and most crucial made by
the Secretary-General on the financing of the Force. It
was briefly alluded to in the Secretary-General's November
62
6 report on UNEF. On November 21 Hammarskjold followed
up the earlier suggestion with the recommendation that a
63
Special Account be established to handle UNEF finances.
The General Assembly approved the Secretary-General's pro-
54
posal for a Special Account on November 26. Only the
Communist states opposed the establishment of the Special
6.N. Doc. A/3302, p. 21.
65U.N. Doc. A/3383, p. 14.
64
General Assembly, Official Records, 11th Session,
.596th plenary meeting (November 26, 1956), P* 343


n
TABLE 2
THE SCOPE OF OBSERVATIONAL ACTIVITY BY UNOGIL FROM JUNE THROUGH OCTOBER, 1958
Type of Activity
June
July
August
September
Mid-October
End-October
Average No. of Hours Spent
on Ground Patrol Daily
X.
A
140
219
491
932
No. of Air Sorties Per
Month
15
160
210
317
305
No. of Hours Per Month
Flying Time
23
360
494
775
767
No. of Stations and Sub-
Stations in Service
11
17
*
33
49
*Figures not available
Source: Compiled from data in U. N. Doc. S/4040, pp. 6 and 11; U. N. Doc. S/4069, p. 83; U. N. Doc. S/4114,
pp. 159-60; "United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon--a mission completed," United Nations
Review, Vol. 5, No. 7 (January, 1959), p. 80.
138


267
rules set out in the Secretary-General's 1958 report to the
51
General Assembly on UNEF and on the conclusions drawn
from previous experience in the field. In the course of
the Congo operation these principles, cited as basic to the
operation of a non-fighting force, became stretched and
tarnished, as did the original mandate itself.
The first of the central principles of the Force's
operation was that it should act only in self-defense. To
act only in self-defense meant that OITUC should not take
the initiative in the use of armed force. It could, how
ever, respond with force to an armed attack, including an
52
attempt to make it withdraw from its positions. ONUC
adhered fairly strictly to this principle in the first
months of the operation, but the principle proved ill-
suited to the Congo situation. Acceptance of it placed
the Force in dangerous and awkward positions and may have
contributed to the limited effectiveness of the mission in
55
its early months. Although never formally renunciated,
this principle was departed from on at least three impor
tant occasions -in the Congo.
^U.iL Doc. A/3943.
52U.h. Doc. S/4389, pp. 19-20.
^As critics pointed out, respect was not engendered
for the Force by its standing idly by while measures of
great violence occurred. See, for example, the statement
of Sir Claude Corea of Ceylon, Security Council, Official
Records, 15th Year, 917th meeting (December 10, i960), pp.
6-7.


24-3
a peace force or whether it merely provides the groundwork
for more ambitious ventures.
By I960 the United Nations had accumulated con
siderable experience in the use of the military man as an
international presence. With a record of success in the
use of this technique, a backlog of experience, and units
of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization and
the United Nations Emergency Eorce actually in the field
at the time, it was not unnatural for the United Nations
to turn to a non-fighting force to restore peace and calm
to the newly independent Republic of the Congo.
Although the Secretary-General admitted that prob
lems, difficulties, and even risks were involved in sending
2
a force to the Congo, he clearly felt that the problems
were surmountable, the game worth the stakes. It is
probable that no one, Secretary-General included, foresaw
the extent of those problems, difficulties, and risks. It
is unlikely that the United Nations Eorce for the Congo
would have been in the field little more than forty-eight
hours after the receipt of the request for aid if the
members of the Security Council had known that the mission
would raise bitter controversy both in and out of the
United Nations, that it would bring the Organization to
2
Security Council, Official Records, 15th Year,
873rd meeting (July 13/14-, I960), p. 5


368
On December 18 the fighting ended with a hold-fire
which was put into effect after President Tshombe expressed
a desire to negotiate with Prime Minister Adoula on the
Congo problem. Talks were held between Tshombe and Adoula
at Kitona. Out of the Kitona meeting came an eight-point
pact which seemed, in effect, to mark the end of Katanga's
secession. Tshombe promised, among other things, to accept
the application of the hoi fondamentale, to recognize the
indissoluble unity of the Congo with Kasa-Vubu as head of
state, and to recognize the authority of the Central Govern-
70
ment over all parts of the Congo.
If we assume that the function of the peace force is
to create conditions by its presence for peaceful settlement
of disputess it might be contended that this in a rather
ambitious form was what the Force was doing in December.
The United Nations Force did not actually impose a solution,
rather it placed Tshombe in a position in which he had
little choice but to give up his resistance and accept, at
least temporarily, the terms of the Central Government.
^ Other provisions of the Kitona Agreement included
participation of Katangese representatives in the government
commission to be convened to study the draft for the future
constitution; Katangese representation in the Parliament;
placement of the gendarmerie under the authority of the
President of the Republic. In addition, Tshombe promised
to ensure respect for the resolutions of the General Assembly
and the Security Council. U.N. Doc. S/4940, Annexes I and
II, pp. 9-11.


26
The Security Council attempted to quiet the Palestine
situation through a series of cease-fire calls, running from
April 1 through the end of May, and by creation of a Truce
Commission, The cease-fire resolutions called in varying
terms for a halt in the fighting, and until the May 29
resolution all were virtually ignored. Yet the Security
Council activity in the period prior to the effective truce
had an influence on the truce which was finally established
and on the organization set up to maintain it.
Establishment of the Truce Commission can be singled
out as of particular importance to later developments. The
Commission was created by a resolution of April 23 to assist
the Security Council in implementing the cease-fire calls
and to report to the Council on the situation in Palestine.
The experience of the Truce Commission revealed the need for
an expanded truce supervisory organization, thereby stimu
lating the creation of such an organization. It also pro
vided a formula for determining the national composition
of the organization, once established, (By suggestion of
the United States, the Commission was composed of repre
sentatives of the members of the Security Council that had
consular representatives in Jerusalem with the exception of
Syria. Under this formula the Commission was composed of
representatives of the United States, Belgium, and France.
The justification for this method of selection was


the Mediator's work in Palestine. The Soviet delegate re
peatedly protested the make-up of the Truce Organization
and found in it the explanation for any and all failures of
27
the Organization. The Soviet Union felt Security Council
membership should be the basis for participation. They
held that the Truce Organization was an American operation.
This charge had some foundation. Most of the auxiliary
personnel, over one-half the observers, and most of the
guard force were American. A broadening of the basis of
participation might well have given the group a strengthened
28
mandate as well as a more independent position.
27
'The Soviet representative had protested vigorously
from June 7 forward the discretion given the Mediator in de
termining the make-up of the Truce Organization. The argu
ment of the Soviet delegate spread over several meetings
ran somewhat as follows. The Soviet representative contended
that the decision as to which countries should send observers
and how these observers should be made available was one for
the Security Council, not the Mediator, The connection be
tween the Truce Commission and the observers was rejected on
the grounds that nothing in the May 29 resolution indicated
that only Truce Commission members should supply military
observers. Finally, the Soviet representative expressed in
ability to understand why the Soviet Union could not send
even five observers when the United States was sending twenty-
one observers as well as ships and planes. The Soviets
pushed their objection to a vote in a draft resolution with
two significant features: it would have limited the size of
the Truce Organization to a maximum of fifty members and it
would have allowed any member of the Security Council except
Syria to participate. See Security Council, Official Re
cords 3rd Tear, 31^'th meeting (June 7, 19^8), pj 3 6, and
7 and 37'th meeting (June 10, 1948), pp. 41-45-
QO
There was a suggestion in the press that the Mediator
may have considered including Russian observers in the
organization for the Second Truce. A member of the Medi
ator's staff indicated that only 200 of 300 contemplated
observer positions would be filled by nations of the Truce


81
by years and precedents but also by the changes which had
taken place over time in the shape and character of the
'united Nations itself.
One of the most crucial of these changes related to
membership in the Organization. Prior to 1955 few new
members were admitted to the United Nations because of an
East-Vest deadlock on the entry of new states. In 1955 a
package deal involving the entry of sixteen new members
broke the deadlock. The reopening of the doors of the
United Nations combined with the emergence of a number of
new states into the world community meant that not only
vas the total number of states in the United Nations in
creased but also that the character of the membership
changed. The patterns of interest and influence within the
world organisation viere correspondingly modified. The in
fluence of the Western states declined and that of the
Afro-Asians climbed. With the new Afro-Asian states came
an intensified interest in and sensitivity to questions of
colonialism, imperialism, and under-developed areas. This
then constituted one significant cluster of changes that
differentiate the period of the Palestine and Lebanon
organizations.
A second relevant development in the ten years was
the growth in importance of the office of Secretary-General.
Trygve Lie, the first Secretary-General, had believed in an


65
movement. As long as the parties viewed it in their inter
est to block the observers' activity, some interferences
seemed bound to occur. Thus, the real improvement in the
position of the observers came later with the improvement of
the situation generally in Palestine and the negotiation of
the armistice agreements.
The Truce Supervision Organization in Action
The role of the Truce Supervision Organisation
Prom the practical standpoint of effects on world
stability that which is most significant about any peace
keeping group is what it actually accomplishes in the field
what its mission is and how well it fulfills that mission.
The role of the observers in Palestine was delineated
by the Mediator in his directives to the men in the field.
He vas, of course, guided in his determination of functions
by the major terms of the truce. The responsibilities of
the observers, as laid out by the Mediator, were several.
Pirst, the primary function of the observers was to super
vise observance of the truce terms to ensure that the terms
were not violated and that neither side benefitted during
the truce by increasing its strength. In this connection
they were to reconnoiter land, sea, and air for incoming
ships and planes that might be used to introduce war ma
terial and fighting personnel. Second, they were to observe


CHAPTER V
AH EXPANSION OP PEACE-KEEPING: THE UNITED
NATIONS FORCE IN THE CONGO-ITS ORIGINS
Introduction
The United Nations Force in the Congo provides a
test of the non-fighting force technique*, The United
Nations Force was able to draw upon the experience of
earlier missions for guidance in its establishment and
operation*, Yet*, it went beyond the earlier uses of the
force, being by far the most ambitious. It was the
largest force in terms of both men and equipment, and the
most expensive. It had a multi-lingual base and over
twice as many nationalities serving in it as had served
with the United Nations Emergency Force. And it had a far
more difficult and complicated task. Thus, a comparison
of the United Nations Force with earlier non-fighting units
sheds light on the conditions which determine the effective
ness of a non-fighting force. An examination of the diffi
culties confronted by the Force and the controversy aroused
by it may help determine whether the United Nations operation
in the Congo (ONUC)1 marks the outer limitsor beyondof
The United Nations operation in the Congo is re
ferred to as ONUC from its French title, Operation des
Nations Unies au Congo.
242


21
The problem of implementation was discussed in tiie
Assembly and some of the smaller powers went so far as to
put forward proposals for forceful implementation. These
x
remained only proposals. The majority of states, in
cluding the major powers, showed a marked reluctance to
commit themselves to forceful action in Palestine. Thus,
the United Nations was in the anomalous position of
recommending a solution which might require force to
implement it, while being unwilling to apply such means.
The crisis area: internal conditions
A second important element in the Palestine situation
was the fact of fighting. After the passage of the parti
tion resolution in November, 1947, the situation in the Holy
Land rapidly deteriorated. Pighting increased in scale and
intensity: the convoy battles and bomb outrages which
characterized the first months after the passage of the
resolution became steady skirmishes by March and full-scale
war by May, 1948.^
x
^Guatemala proposed an international police force of
contingents contributed on a proportional basis by states
other than the permanent members of the Security Council.
New Zealand suggested that it be agreed that if violence
occurred in Palestine, a united effort to suppress it would
be made by an international force to which each country
xtfould contribute proportionate to its strength. Larry
Leonard, "The United Nations and Palestine," International
Conciliation, No. 454- (October, 1949), p. 646.
4
Por a description of the various phases of the war
see Edgar O'Ballance, The Arab-Israeli War (New York:
Prederick A. Praeger, 1957)


279
From November 11 to November 24 the Security Council
considered ONUC's role in the Congo. The consideration, in
view of the Force's military ventures in September of that
year and the subsequent confusion as to its direction, was
over-due. Out of the consideration came support for a
strong role for the Force. The resolution adopted at the
November 24 Security Council meeting extended the power of
the Force beyond that granted in the February 21 resolution.
The most significant provisions of the November
resolution are found in paragraphs 4, 5, 8, and 9. Para
graphs 4 and 5 recognize the problem of the mercenaries
and strengthen the hand of ONTJC in dealing with it. Para
graphs 8 and 9 confront the problem of secession itself,
affirming United Nations support for the Central Government
and a unified Congo. The relevant paragraphs follow:
4. Authorizes the Secretary-General to take
vigorous action, including the use of requisite
measure of force, if necessary, for the immediate
apprehension, detention pending legal action and/or
deportation of all foreign military and paramilitary
personnel and political advisers not under the
United Nations Command, and mercenaries as laid down
in paragraph A.2 of the Security Council resolution
of February 21st, 1961.
5. Further requests the Secretary-General to take
all necessary measures to prevent the entry or re
turn of such elements under whatever guise and also
of arms, equipment or other material in support of
such activities;
8. Declares that all secessionist activities
against the Republic of the Congo are contrary to
the Loi fondamentale and Security Council decisions
and specifically demands that such activities which
are now taking place in Katanga shall cease forthwith;


162
Secretary-General's second report on the Force in which
Hammarskjold1s basic plans for a force were presented. The
Assembly accepted the Hammarskjold proposals virtually with
out change. The adoption of the resolution embodying the
plans for the Force by a vote of 64 in favor, none against,
and 12 abstentions constituted a resounding vote of confi
dence in the Secretary-General and his plans. Only the
members of the Communist bloc, South Africa, Egypt, and
Israel abstained.
The Secretary-General, working with members of the
Secretariat, with representatives of participating delega
tions, and with Major-General E.L.M. Burns, the first
commander of UHEF, had developed relatively detailed plans
25
for a force in a remarkably short time. ^ But the Secretary-
General was not only the chief architect of the Force, but
24
also the chief administrative and executive officer. It
was under Hammarskjold's hand that the skeletal plans for a
force were converted into the reality of a force operating
in the field.
^It might, be noted that the Secretary-General asked
Burns for his recommendations on the type of force to set
up. Burns proposed a much more ambitious force than
actually came into being. He suggested a force of division
size with air and tank detachments. Burns, 0£. cit., p. 188.
24
Rosner, op. cit., p. 132.


TABLE A-l
4-55
RECORD OF CRITICAL VOTES IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE ESTABLISHMENT AND SUPPORT OF PEACE-KEEPING GROUPS
UNTSO Votes
UNOGIL
Voces
ONUC Votes
UNY0M Votes
UNFICYP Votes
Security Council
Members8
Estab
lish
ing
UNTSO-
First
Truceb
Estab
lish
ing
UNTSO-
Second
Trucec
Re
affirm
ing
Trucod
Estab
lish
ing
UN0GILe
Swedish
Re
solu
tion
to end
UN0G1L£
U. S.
Re
solu
tion
to
broaden
UNOGIL8
Japanese
Com
promise*1
To
Estab-
blish
ONUC1
To
Condemn
Belgian
Aggres
sion J
To
Strengthen
0NUC-Feb.k
To
Strengthen
ONUC-Nov.1
To
Establish
UNYOrf"
Authority
to
Secretary-
General
for
Arrange
ments"
To
Establish
..'NFICYP0
China
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Abs.
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
France
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Abs.
No
Abs.
Ab6.
Yet
United Kingdom
Union of Soviet Social-
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Abs.
No
Yes
Abs.
Yes
Yes
Yes
1st Republics
Abs.
Abs.
Yes
Ab6.
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Abs.
Yes
Abs.
Abs.
Yes
United States
YeB
Yes
Ye*
Yes.
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes.
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Argentina
Yes
Abs.
Yes
.
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
Belgium
Yes
Yes
Yes
-
-
-
-
Yes
No
-
-
-
_
.
Bolivia
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Yes
Yes
Brazil
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Yes
Yes
Yes
Canada
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Ceylon
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
-
-
-
Chile
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Yes
YC6
-
-
-
Colombia
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
-
-
-
-
-
-
_
Czechoslovakia
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
_
.
.
AbB.
Yes
Ecuador
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Yes
Abs.
Yes
Yo6
-
-
_
Ghana
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Yes
-
_
Iraq
-
-
-
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Italy
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Yes
No
-
-
-
-
-
Ivory Coast
-
-
-
-
-
' -
-
-
-
-
-
-
Yes
Yes
Japan
-
-
-
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Liberia
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Yes
Yes
-
-
-
Morocco
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Yes
Yes
Yes
Norway
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Yes
Ye6
Yes
Panama
-
-
-
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Philippines
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Yes
-
-
Poland
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Yes
Yes
-
-
-
-
-
Sweden
-
-
-
Yes
Yes
Abs.
Yes
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Syria
Yes
No
Yes
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Tunisia
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Yes
Abs.
-
-
-
-
.
Turkey
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Yes
Yes
-
-
-
Ukrainian Soviet
Socialist
Republic
Abs.
Abs.
Yes
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
United Arab
Republic
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Yes
Yes
-
-
-
Venezuela
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Yes
-
-
In Favor
9
7
11
10
2
9
10
8
2
9
9
10
c
11
Against
0
1
0
0
9
1 (Ve
to)
1 (Veto)
0
7
0
0
0
0
0
Abstain
2
3
0
1
0
1
0
3
2
2
2
1
3
0
aA dash (-) indicates that a state was not a member of the Security Council at the time the vote was taken,
'Security Council resolution of May 29, 1948, U. N. Doc. S/801. (Vote on paragraph instructing the Mediator to supervise the observance of the truce provisions.
Security Council, Official Records, Third Year, 310th meeting (May 20, 1948)^ p. 54.)
cSecurity Council resolution of July 15, 1948, U. N. Doc. S/902.
^Security Council resolution of October 19, 1948, U. N. Doc. S/1044. (Vote on the first part of paragraph 18 of the resolution calling for a cease-fire,
Security Council, Official Records, Third Year, 367th meeting (October 19, 1948), p. 38.).
eSecurlty Council resolution of June 11, 1958, U. N. Doc. S/4022.
*U. N. Doc. S/4054. (This draft resolution was voted on at the 834th Security Council meeting on July 18, 1958.)
8U. N. Doc. S/4050/Rev. 1. (This draft resolution was voted on at the 834th Security Council meeting on July 18,
bU. N. Doc. S/4055, Rev. 1. (This draft resolution was voted on at the 837th Security Council meeting on July 22
'Security Council resolution of July 13/14, 1960, U. N. Doc. S/4387.
^U. N. Doc. S/4386. (These amendments were voted on at the 873rd Security Council Meeting on July 13/14, 1960.)
^Security Council r&solution of February 21, 1961, U. N. Doc. S/4741.
''Security Council resolution of November 24, 1961, U. N, Doc. S/5002.
mSecurity Council resolution of June 11, 1963, U. N. Doc. S/5331.
"Security Council resolution of March 4, 1964, U. N. Doc. S/5575, Paragraph 4.
Security Council resolution of March 4, 1964, U. N. Doc, S/5575.
1958.)
, 1958.)


388
A rather different sort of problem that confronts
the fighting peace-keeping force is the calibre of its
soldiers. A fighting peace force requires rather different
capabilities and contributions by the men participating
than does a non-fighting force, The fighting effectiveness
of the United Nations Force in the Congo was apparently
hampered by the lack of a clear mandate defining for the
men the purpose of their fighting; the shortage of well-
trained fighting men in the Force; and the frictions
between the different national units composing the Force.
All of this suggests that a fighting peace-keeping
force presents problems of a different and more difficult
order than those posed by a non-fighting force. The moral
here would seem to be that the United Nations ought to
consider long and hard the implications of its military
involvement in a crisis situation before undertaking any
such involvement.


88
It may be hypothesized that there is an inverse
relationship between experience with peace-keeping groups
and readiness to establish new groups. Successful experi
ence would tend to contribute to United Nations willingness
to establish a new presence even in a less serious case.
The Establishment of the Observation Group
The establishment
The situation in Lebanon was confused. Violence there
was most assuredly. Less clear were the roots of the dis
turbances and the implications they held for international
peace and security. The Security Council made no immediate
judgment on the validity of the Lebanese charges. Drawing
on past experience, the Council responded to Lebanon's plea
for aid by injection of a United Nations Observation Group
into the area. This positive response by the United Nations
to a somewhat ambiguous challenge suggests a growing famili
arity with and consequent willingness to use the United
Nations presence as a peace-keeping device. A brief review
of the establishment of the Observation Group gives insight
into the responses available to the United Nations and the
reasons for selection of this particular one.
The Security Council met on the initial Lebanese
complaint from June 6 to June 11. At the dune 6 Security
Zf
The Lebanese complaint was placed before the Se
curity Council on Nay 22, but was not considered until June


280
9. Declares full and firm support for the Central
Government of the Congo, and the determination to
assist that Government in accordance with the de
cisions of the United Nations to maintain lav; and
order and national integrity, to provide technical
assistance and to implement those decisions;...50
The resolution passed 9 to 0, with only the United
Kingdom and Prance abstaining. Once again, however, the
discussions preceding passage of the resolution revealed
that the long-standing differences of opinion among Se
curity Council members on the role of the Force were still
in existence. Now, however, the dominant approach was one
which emphasized the importance of reaffirming and if neces
sary enlarging the powers of the Force to meet the problems
confronting it. This approach was taken by most of the
Afro-Asian states, the Communist bloc, the Congo itself,
91
and, with some reservations, the United States. The ideas
5U.N. Doc. S/5002, p. 149.
81
y The United States representative supported the reso
lution and the need for forceful action to end secessionist
activities in particular. This stand marked a change in
United States policy from the preceding February when
Ambassador Stevenson had stressed the limitations on the
Force. The United States had shifted away from the position
of its NATO allies toward that of the Afro-Asian bloc. How
ever, the United States stressed the importance of applying
the terms of the resolution to all areas where secessionist
activities were taking place. (Behind the United States
stand was a concern that Orintale province might become a
headquarters for communist activities in the Congo.) To
cope with these grave situations the United States went be
yond support of forceful action to end the problem of
mercenaries and proposed an amendment to the draft resolu
tion which would have authorized the Secretary-General to
remove or prevent the use for military purposes of aircraft


CHAPTER VII.
THE NON-FIGHTING FORCE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT
Recent Uses of the Non-Fighting Force
THe objective of the foregoing examination in depth
of the establishment and operation of four non-fighting
military organizations has been to determine the nature
and potential of this instrument of United Nations peace
keeping. The pattern has proved a popular one: a new
presence has been established in each of the last three
years. In 1962 a force of a little over 1,500 men eased
the transition of governmental authority from the Nether
lands to Indonesia in West New Guinea; in 1965 an observer
group was set up to oversee an arrangement for the dis
engagement of the United Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia
from the civil war situation in Temen; and in 1964 a peace
keeping force was sent to Cyprus in its time of troubles.
These too must bear on our final evaluation of the non
fighting force as an instrument of peaceful settlement.
In West New Guinea a United Nations Security Force
gave a mantle of legality to the transfer of sovereignty
from the Dutch to the Indonesians in late 1962 and early
389


142
situation and virtually full-scale war was taking place.
Even in this critical situation the United Nations response
was slow and minimal. By 1958 the United Nations was far
more ready to use the peace-keeping technique. In Lebanon
the United Nations responsibilities were less apparent than
in Palestine and the situation more confused, involving
both internal and international dimensions. Yet it was
actually easier to win acceptance for the Observation Group
in Lebanon. It might well be that the United Nations
presence would not have been injected into the murky Leba
nese situation if the Group had not been relatively easy to
call into being because of the groundwork laid for it by
earlier United Nations ventures.
It was also easier administratively to field an
observation group by 1958. Experience again eased the way.
It had taken nearly two weeks to get the first observers
into action in Palestine; it took less than two days in
Lebanon. Technical and administrative problems connected
with the Observation Group posed fewer difficulties than
they had with UNTSO. Questions relating to personnel,
equipment, financing which had loomed so large in the
Palestine venture were quickly answered on the basis of
precedent and the advise of experienced observers on the
scene to help organize the Group. Thus, past successful
experience with peace-keeping groups had laid a base of


134-
Apparently the Lebanese Government and some of the states
supporting establishment of an observation group had assumed
that it would act on behalf of the official government.
Relations between UROGIL and the Government of
Lebanon had been cool from the early days of the operation.
Although the Government of Lebanon had set up a five-man
commission "to take all necessary measures to facilitate
the task of the United Rations Observation Group, to supply
said Group with all information coming to the knowledge of
the Lebcmese Government about the infiltration of arms and
armed men and other material from across the Lebanese
border, and to assure the contact between the various
4-5
sections of the Lebanese Administration and [the] Group," y
cooperation of the two seems to have been limited in practice,
friction arose over interrogation of accused Syrian infil
trators by the observers, over the scope of the observers'
activity, and, most of all, over their findings.
The Government of Lebanon responded publicly to the
observers' first report with the circulation of a formal
commentary on it as well as with statements in the Security
Council which purported to show first, that the report was
not based on sufficiently complete observation to be
authoritative; and second, that what had been observed
ZT5
.N. Doc. S/4-029, p. 73


173
areas* It should "be capable of maintaining peace while a
basic solution to questions at issue was sought. It should
remain in the area until that solution was reached and
implemented. The Israeli position was supported by the
United Kingdom, Norway, Canada, and New Zealand, among
others, A statement by Lester Pearson is typical of this
approach:
While the political climate of the Middle East is
maturing towards the time when conditions will be more
appropriate for a comprehensive settlement, it is
essential, I think, for the countries of the region,
and indeed for us all, that there should be no return
to the former state of strife and tension and conflict
on the borders; that security should be maintained and,
indeed, guaranteed. I suggest that for this purpose
there will be a continuing need, during the period
until a political settlement is achieved for the
stabilizing international influence that the Emergency
Force.is now exercising. And this essential stabilizing
role might well require the continuing presence of a
United Nations force along the boundary of Egypt and
Israel; perhaps also for a time in the Gaza Strip and,
with the consent of the States involved, along the
borders between Israel and its Arab neighbours, though
that of course would require further resolution from
the United Nations Assembly.
In direct opposition to the approach of Israel and
its friends was that of the Communist and Arab blocs. In
their opinion the primary purpose of the Force was to end
the aggression committed against Egypt and to secure the
withdrawal of the invading forces. The emphasis was on the
Zfo
A statement by Lester Pearson to the Canadian
Parliament which was quoted by the Australian representa
tive to the United Nations in the 639th meeting. General
Assembly, Official Records, 11th Session, 639th plenary
'meeting (January" 17, 19*577, P 904.


340
clear* where the constitutional authority in the Congo rested.
It was clear that no authority in Leopoldville exercised
either de facto or de ,jure control over the country as a
whole. Provinces were in secession. Congolese troops were
out of control. The United Nations Force, directed to co
operate with the Government but not to affect the political
situation, found that almost any action which it took or
which it did not take had an impact on the internal situation.
Secondly, not only did the situation within the Congo
become much less favorable to the successful operation of
the Force after September, but the support for ONUC at
United Nations Headquarters also drained away with increasing
rapidity. As early as August signs of disaffection with the
Force had appeared among certain of the African and the
Communist delegates. These signs of discontent became overt
and noisy in September. The African states of the Casa
blanca Group and the Communist states had been sympathetic
to Prime Minister Lumumba. The actions of the United Nations
which seemed to favor the Kasa-Vubu faction during the
governmental crisis alienated much support at Headquarters
for the Force.
Faced with a lack of support at United Nations Head
quarters and an unimaginably confused and complex internal
situation, the Force was in a situation in which its
responsibilities seemed far in excess of its powers. In


Secretary~General
Three Man Group
Chief of Staff

Chief Military Observer
i
Deputy Chief of Staff
Personnel Operations
Evaluation Logistics
Tripoli* Baalbek* Chtaura* Marjayoun* Saida* Air
Squadron
*Sub~stations and observation and traffic check posts were set up under the main stations.
Source: U. N. Doc. S/4100, p. 170.
Figure 2
Organization chart of United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon
t-*
rv>
Vn


245
The immediate cause of difficulty was the confused
and violent conditions created by the riotous and disobedi
ent acts of the Congolese soldiers. The soldiers' mutiny
began on July 5 with disobedience to white officers and
demands for pay raises and promotions. It quickly took an
uglier turn, involving widespread rebellion and uncon
trolled attacks on Belgians. Disorder in the country was
intensified by the breakdown of services caused by the
flight of white persons from the Congo.^
A second dimension was added to the situation with
the intervention of Belgian troops to restore order on
4
July 10. The intervention by the Belgians was unilateral.
The Congolese had not requested Belgian aid in bringing
the situation under control and vociferously protested
Belgian action charging that it was an act of aggression
and a violation of the treaty of friendship between Belgium
5
and the Republic of the Congo.
^For a description of the situation in the Congo
preceding United Nations intervention see U.N. Doc. S/4551,
pp. 176-204.
4
A part of these troops were stationed in the Congo
at the bases of Kamina and Kitona at the time of the dis
orders and a part (approximately 1,200 paracommandos) were
flown in from Belgium on July 9.
The Belgians did not attempt to justify the inter
vention on the basis of treaty rights. Rather they argued
later in the Security Council that intervention rested on a
higher obligation than lawthe obligation of a nation to
protect its nationals. They also suggested that the inter
vention could not constitute aggression since it was limited
in scope and time, being conceived as a temporary measure


221
responsible to the Commander-in-Chief for the proper
functioning and discipline of his unit.
Problems of coordination and control loom large in
an army as loosely-structured as was this one. A number of
steps were taken to minimize the potential difficulties.
First, contingents supplying units for more than one
functional task usually designated one over-all contingent
commander. Second, reliance for most administrative and
support functions was placed on the Canadians and Indians
in order to minimize the necessity of coordinating several
national units at this level. Finally, liaison officers
were designated by some of the governments to serve as a
link between the contributing government and the Force.
These arrangements, while practical and workable,
suggest the limits and dilemmas of UEEF as an international
force. First, it was not an integrated international force,
for the national units remained almost entirely separate.
Second, the limits on the Commander's control over subordi
nate units, which caused no particular difficulty in the
TJ3F operation,, could prove serious in different circum
stances. It might be hypothesized from the experience of
UNEF and of succeeding peace-keeping missions that the
deeper the involvement of the United Nations force, the more
TO
U.N. Doc. A/394-3, p. 18


57
on tlie scene rapidly was eased by the expedient of borrow
ing. Thus, for the First, Truce the United States and the
United Kingdom supplied eight airplanes, over sixty motor
vehicles, and most of the needed communications equipment.
Moreover, the United States placed three destroyers with
their crews and the French one corvette with crew at the
disposal of the Mediator for observation work. The United
States made additional vessels available for special acti
vities such as the withdrawal of observers at the end of
45
the First Truce and the movement of equipment.
Despite these considerable contributions, the Medi
ator found the amount and quality of equipment available
during the First Truce inadequate for an effective job of
truce supervision.
In a report to the Security Council Bernadotte con
cluded that all aspects of truce supervision had been
hampered, first, by a lack of communications and, second,
by inadequate motor transport and airplanes. Since com
mercial telecommunications available for the mission were
almost non-existent, reliance for communications had to be
placed almost entirely on used British and American field
equipment operated by slow speed radio operators. It was
with difficulty that even limited facilities were maintained
^The New York Times, July 9, 1948, and U.N. Doc,
S/1025, p. 5.


5
for financing the force were laid and its functions defined.
The nations contributing the men were to supply their con
tingents with equipment, pay their regular salaries, and
advance.funds for their transportation and maintenance. All
expenses over and above those normal to maintain the troops
in their home state would be repaid by the League, with re
imbursement of the League by Poland and Lithuania. This
project was abandoned, however, before it could come to
fruition when it became apparent that it could be executed
only with great difficulty. There was too much opposition
and too little real support for the League action. Poland
and Lithuania accepted in theory the idea of the plebiscite
guaranteed by an international force, but in practice co
operated but little. Opposition by the Soviet Union may
have delivered the final blow to the plan, for the states
contributing to the force were not anxious to send their
4
troops in when a neighboring great power objected.
The second effort to establish' an international force,
again to maintain conditions for a fair plebiscite, was more
successful. In 193^ the League Council created an inter
national force which operated with French and German consent
to ensure order before, during, and after the Saar plebiscite.
William Frye, A United Nations Peace Force. (New
York: Oceana for The Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 1957), p. 50.


38
Characteristics of the Truce Organization
The creation of a non-fighting military unit to help
restore and maintain peace represents only the first stage
of United Nations action in a crisis. The group must not
only be created; it must also operate effectively in the
field to achieve its objectives. It may be suggested that
the ability of the group to carry through its charge will
depend on the balance of the equation of its responsibili
ties and its powers. Intimately related to the power of
the force are the characteristics of the force itself.
Three aspects of the force seem particularly relevant to
the determination of its effectiveness: a) its leadership;
b) its size and character; and c) its support at head
quarters and in the field. Support in turn takes several
forms. At United Nations headquarters it can be read in
terms of votes, finances, logistics, and manpower. In the
field cooperation and non-cooperation are indicative of the
attitude of those with whom the force deals.
Leadership
The Security Council resolution calling for establish
ment of a mediator to supervise the truce provided that he
should be appointed by the permanent members of the Security
Council. On the advice of Secretary-General Trygve Lie the
permanent members selected Count Folke Bernadotte of Sweden


290
between the Secretary-General and the members of the United
Nations on the Congo question. Little evidence and few
records are available as to the precise role and importance
of the Advisory Committee. Nevertheless, in his reports
in 1961 and 1962 to the Security Council, the Secretary-
General stressed his consultations with the Advisory Com-
p
mittee prxor to making an important decision.
Secretary-General Eammarskjold attempted to secure
additional assistance and support in his direction of the
Congo mission. As the criticism of the Congo operation
mounted in late I960, the Secretary-General repeatedly re
quested the Security Council or the General Assembly to
set up some sort of advisory group to help make, and take
responsibility for, important decisions. (Apparently he
felt a group created by the Assembly or the Council would
have more power and prestige than an advisory committee
designated by the Secretary-General. Neither body took
action on the Secretary-General's requests. It must be con
cluded that the important decisions on ONUC were made by
o
According.to Lieutenant-Colonel G.C. Bowitz the
Secretary-General chose to present all important decisions
and questions of principle to the Committee and to keep it
informed about current developments in the Congo, In
Bowitz's view the Committee grew to be a significant politi
cal body which played an important role in policy formulation.
Lieutenant-Colonel G.C. Bowitz, "The Central Political and
Military Administration of the United Nations Forces," Paper
prepared for the Conference on the United Nations Security
Forces, Oslo, Norway, February, 1964 (mimeographed), p. 8.


463
TABLE B-5
THE NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF THE UNITED NATIONS FORCE
IN CYPRUS (UNFICYP)
Contributing
States
Officers and
April 30, 1964a
Military Police Total
Men Contributed
June
Military
8, 1964b
Police
Total
Australia
40
40
Austria
10
28
38
55
33
88
Canada
1087
1087
1122
1122
Denmark
676
40
716
Finland
1000
1000
1000
1000
Ireland
636
636
639
639
New Zealand
20
20
Sweden
889
889
954
40
994
United
Kingdom
2719
2719
1792
1792
Total
6341
28
6369
6328
173
6411
Source: aU. N. Doc. S/5679; bU. N. Doc. S/5764.


227
resolution called on Israel to withdraw behind the armistice
demarcation line without further delay. On the other hand,
both the February 2 resolution and statements by the
Secretary-General seemed to recognize at least in part the
Israeli contention that withdrawal presupposed a viable
107
United Nations Force.
The actual withdrawal of the Israeli forces, announced
on March 1, 1957, raised the question of what precisely the
future role of UNSF should be. The Israeli Government made
it clear that the withdrawals were being made on the basis
of certain assumptions with respect to the role of the
United Nations Force. In withdrawing from Sharm-el-Shaikh
they assumed that the Force would be stationed in the
Straits of Tiran to protect free and innocent passage and
that any withdrawals of the Force would be preceded by
consultations with the Advisory Committee. In withdrawing
from the Gaza Strip they expected that UNSF would be de
ployed there, that the transfer of military and civilian
control from the Israelis would be exclusively to UNEF, and
10^The February 2 resolution recognized that the main
tenance of the Armistice required placing UNSF on the armi
stice demarcation line and implementation of the other
measures, still undefined, proposed in the Secretary-General's
report. In addition, a February 22 statement by the
Secretary-General indicated that "it is the desire of the
Government of Sgypt that the take-over of Gaza from the
military and civilian control of Israel in the first instance
would be exclusively by the United Nations Energency Force."
General Assembly, Official Records, 11th Session, 659th
plenary meeting (February 22, 1997), p. 1192.


159
Once planted., the idea of a force grew and matured
quickly. The Pearson proposal met a felt need. In the
words of the United States representative Henry Cahot Lodge,
"We are looking for something that will meet the immediate
crisis which is in front of us, as well as something that
will go to the causes and into the more long-range sub-
j ects. "'L^
The need for a means of meeting the immediate crisis
was made more apparent by the failure of the invaders to
heed the General Assembly's cease-fire call. Impetus was
given to the establishment of a United Nations force by the
announced willingness of the British and Prench to halt
military operations on the condition that the Israelis and
Egyptians accept a cease-fire and that an effective inter
national force be set up. Although such a force would not
go to the roots of the conflict, it would provide time to
seek solutions to the basic problems.
The period of maturation for the idea of the force
was brief. The transformation of the idea into detailed
19
plans for a force came within ninety-six hours. By the
' ~ Th
General Assembly, Official Records, first Emergency
Special Session, 563rd plenary meeting (November 3? 1956),
p. 55.
^The rough outlines of a plan for an emergency force
were apparently sketched out at a luncheon meeting held
November 2 between Lester Pearson, Secretary-General
Hammarskjold, and key Hammarskjold aide, Andrew Cordier. It
was at this luncheon that Pearson is supposed to have sold
Hammarskjold on the merits of the peace force idea. See
Lash, o¡>. cit., p. 85.


29
Establishment of the United Nations Truce Supervision
Organization
Th e establishment
Actual establishment of the Truce Supervision
Organization came in direct response to a marked intensifi
cation of the Palestine crisis. Full-scale fighting broke
out in mid-May with the proclamation of the state of Israel,
the ending of the British mandate, and the invasion of Arab
armies. Necessity spurred the United Nations to positive
action. Efforts to halt the fighting intensified. Out of
these efforts came an effective truce and the organization
to supervise it.
There were, to be precise, two truce organizations,
one created for the first four week truce, in effect from
June II to July 9S 194-8, and a second more extensive and
permanent organization to maintain the Second Truce, effec
tive from July 18, 194-8. Although the truce was replaced
in August, 194-9, by an armistice based on agreements between
Israel and Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria respectively, a
skeleton truce organization continued in existence to assist
the parties to maintain the armistice and to ensure obser
vance of the cease-fire.
The First Truce and its organization were based on a
General Assembly resolution of May 15 and a Security Council


Security Council, Official Records, Fourth Year, S/1430/Rev.
1} March 22, 1950, "United Nations Commission for India
and Pakistan: third interim report." Special Supple
ment No. 7.
Security Council, Official Records, Thirteenth Year (1958),
Supplements for 1958.
S/4023, June 11, 1958, "Resolution adopted by the
Security Council at its 825th meeting on 11 June 1958,
concerning the complaint of Lebanon."
S/4029, June 16, 1958, "First report by the Secretary-
General on the implementation of the resolution adopted
by the Security Council on 11 June 1958."
3/4038, June 28, 1958, "Second report by the Secretary-
General on the implementation of the resolution adopted
by the Security Council on 11 June 1958."
S/4040 and Add. 1, July 1, 1958, "First report of the
United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon."
S/4043, July 8, 1958, "Letter dated 8 July 1958 from
the representative of Lebanon to the Secretary-General
transmitting the official comments of the Government
of Lebanon on the first report of the United Nations
Observation Group in Lebanon."
S/4050/Rev. 1, July 17, 1958, "United States of
America: revised draft resolution."
S/4051, July 15, 1958, "Interim report of the United
Nations Observation Group in Lebanon."
S/4052, July 17, 1958, "Second interim report of the
United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon."
S/4055/Rev. 1, July 21, 1958, "Japan: revised draft
resolution."
S/4069, July 25, 1958, "Second report of the United
Nations Observation Group in Lebanon."
S/4085, August 12, 1958, "Third report of the United
Nations Observation Group in Lebanon."
S/4100, Sept. 25, 1958, "Fourth report of the United
Nations Observation Group in Lebanon."


398
practices have Deen developed. Finally, a nucleus of
personnel experienced in peace-keeping work has emerged. A
closer examination of the developed side of the non-fighting
force may cast some light on the reasons for the institu
tionalization of certain aspects of the force hut not of
others.
Institutionalization of a philosophy of action
The fundamental principle around which the observer
groups and the peace-keeping forces have heen organized is
that they shall not fight. This principle, from which
there has heen no departure in theory, is central to the
very nature of these groups. Translated into practical
terms, the non-fighting principle has meant that the ob
server groups have gone unarmed, while in most cases the
peace-keeping forces have heen equipped with no more than
light arms and instructed to fire only in self-defense. The
non-fighting nature of these groups is now well-established,
hut initially this was not the case. The question of arming
some or all the truce observers was raised in connection with
the Palestine Truce Supervision Organization and answered
negatively. The establishment of IWEF brought to the fore
the issue of the use which the troops might make of their
arms. A restricted interpretation of the Forces powers was
given. Men of TMEF were to shoot only in self-defense. (To


485
S/46403 Jan. 26, 1961,' "Report by the Secretary-
General on the intended withdrawals of certain con
tingents from the United Rations Force in the Congo."
S/4643, Jan. 29, 1961, "Exchange of communications
between the President of the Republic of the Congo
(Leopoldville) and the Secretary-General."
S/4668 and Add. 1, Feb. 1, 1961, "Telegram from the
Secretary-General to H.M. the King of Morocco and ex
change of communications between the Secretary-General
and the Representative of Morocco."
S/4688 and Add. 1 and 2, Feb. 12, 1961, "Report to the
Secretary-General from his Special Representative in
the Congo on the subject of Mr. Patrice Lumumba."
S/4691 and Add. 1 and 2, Feb. 12, 1961, "Report to the
Secretary-General from his Special Representative in
the Congo concerning recent developments in Korth
Katanga."
S/4725 and Add. 1, Feb. 18, 1961, "Communications from
the President of the Republic of Ghana to the Secretary-
General ."
S/4727 and Add. 1-3, Feb. 18, 1961, "Report to the
Secretary-General from his Special Representative in
the Congo concerning the arrest and deportation of
political personalities."
S/4741, Feb. 21, 1961, "Resolution adopted by the
Security Council on 21 February 1961 (942nd meeting)
concerning the situation in the Republic of the Congo
(Leopoldville)."
S/4743, Feb. 22, 1961, "Telegram dated 22 February
1961 from the President of the Republic of the Congo
(Leopoldville) to the President of the Security Council."
S/4745 and Add. 1, Feb. 22, 1961, "Report to the
Secretary-General from his Special Representative in
the Congo on the situation in Oriental and Kivu
Provinces."
S/4750 and Add. 1-7, Feb. 25, 1961, "Report to the
Secretary-General from his Special Representative in
the Congo on the situation in the three main sectors
of the Congo."


98
from a coup d'etat on July 14- in neighboring Iraq. The coup
had resulted in the bloody overthrow of the monarchy and the
establishment of a republic.) One implication of Lebanon's
call for aid from the United States was that the assistance
being provided by the United Nations was inadequate to the
situation. Thus, the key issue before both the Security
Council and the General Assembly meetings was whether the
Observation Group should be retained as the United Nations
presence or whether it should be supplemented or supplanted
by a police force.
The Security Council met from July 16 to July 23 on
the Lebanese question at the request of the United States.
Four different proposals with respect to the United Nations
role in Lebanon came before the Council; none won acceptance.
A brief review of the nature of the proposals is suggestive,
however, of thinking about the Observation Group and support
for it.
A negative approach to the United Nations role in
Lebanon was apparent in the Swedish and Russian resolutions.
The Swedish representative, who had proposed the Observation
Group initially, suggested a suspension of all observer
activities because of the presence of United States marines.
Swedish reasoning was that the situation had been altered
by the arrival of the marines, for the functioning side by
side of observers and American marines would taint the


4-13
Transport of men quickly to the scene of operations
from their home countries could he a real problem in view
of the United Nations lack of any extensive transport
facilities. In fact, the willingness of the United States
Air Force to provide transport when needed has made this
problem quite manageable. The Air Force efforts are sup
plemented with charter flights and with transport donated
by states contributing contingents to the force. During
the establishment of UNEF the prohibition against great
power involvement was interpreted to prohibit United States
flights of men and equipment into Egypt itself. Charter
flights carried the men from the staging areas into Egypt.
In subsequent situations the prohibition on great power
participation was not interpreted so as to block United
States flights into the host country. In fact, in the
latter stages of the Congo operation American planes were
flying men and equipment around within the Congo which
would seem to be stretching the ground rules a bit. Al
though the United States willingness to contribute exten
sively to the United Nations transport needs has led to the
practical institutionalization of its services, it is not
entirely healthy for the United Nations to be so dependent
on one member state, however reliable, for a critical peace
keeping service.


161
Requests, as a matter of priority, the Secretary-
General to submit to it within forty-eight hours a
plan for the setting up, with the consent of the
nations concerned, of an emergency international
United Nations Force to secure and supervise the
cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the
terms of the aforementioned resolution,
Within seven hours the Secretary-General had returned
to the General Assembly with his first report.
The second resolution laid out the command structure
of the Force. The resolution provided for the appointment
of Major-General E.L.M. Burns, who was serving in the area
as Chief of the Truce Supervision Organization, as Chief of
Command. It further authorized Burns to organize a small
staff by a) recruitment from the Truce Supervision Organi
zation of a limited number of observers drawn from countries
which were not permanent members of the Security Council
and b) recruitment directly from member states of the addi
tional number of officers needed. The resolution (1000
(ES-I)) was based on recommendations set forth in the
Secretary-General's first report. The resolution passed
with relatively little discussion or opposition by a vote
of 57 in favor to none opposed, with 19 abstentions.
The third resolution brought the Force into being
and laid out the guiding principles for its organization
and operation. The resolution followed directly out of the
22
General Assembly resolution 998 (ES-I)


412
retain the right to determine whether their forces will he
used for any particular mission.1^ Nonetheless, if the
precedent of earmarking units for United Nations service is
widely followed by other nations, the United Nations would
seem to be on the way to a more secure base for its peace
keeping activities.
Institutionalization of a methodology
Institutionalization comes not alone at the level of
principle. A methodology of peace-keeping has been developed
out of experience over the years: a methodology which eases
both the establishment and operation of the peace-keeping
group.
The United Nations Secretariat faced a myriad of
problems with the establishment of the United Nations Truce
Supervision Organization, the first large observer group,
and the United Nations Emergency Force, the first truly
international force. Almost every decision, no matter how
prosaic, was precedent-setting, Basic questions on trans
port, equipment, insurance, allowances had to be resolved.
Although each new venture in the peace-keeping field brings
new questions aplenty, main guidelines on the routine ques
tions have been set. Let us give just a few examples.
^Per Haekkerup, "Scandinavia's Peace-Keeping Forces
for U.N,," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 42, No. 4 (July, 1964),
677-678.


CHAPTER III
PEACE-KEEPING THROUGH OBSERVATION-AN ESTABLISHED INSTRUMENT:
THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVATION GROUP IN LEBANON
Introduction
Almost ten years to the day after the establishment
of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in
Palestine, a second observation group carne into being. The
United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon^ was established
on June 11, 1958. The United Nations Truce Supervision
Organization had been a new and unique experiment, coming
into being and functioning in uncharted areas; in contrast,
UNOGIL had the experience of several United Nations
endeavors on which to build. UNOGIL was affected not only
by the precedents established by the initial Palestine
venture, but also by the precedents of the evolving Truce
Organization, which in modified form was still in existence,
and of the United Nations Emergency Force. Thus, UNOGIL
represented an advanced application of the non-fighting
force technique.
The 19A8 Palestine Truce Supervision Organization and
the 1958 Lebanon Observation Group were separated not merely
1The United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon will
hereafter be referred to as UNOGIL.


4-33
and it becomes more skilled in its operations. Yet the
real questions about how a non-fighting force operates and
the real criteria of its success are again political. It
can be assumed that the institutionalization of the admini
strative and technical aspects of the force can improve its
efficiency and effectiveness to a degree but only to a
degree. In the following chapter we will explore the
question of the determinants of the effective operation of
the non-fighting force further.


It might he noted that consent seems to he somewhat
more important if the force is set up h7 the General Assembly
rather than hy the Security Council. For example, the
principle of consent was not emphasized in connection with
the Palestine Truce Supervision Organization. In fact,
threats to invoice enforcement action under Chapter VII were
made to encourage the parties to the truce to fulfill its
terms. Nor was the United Nations Force in the Congo, whose
legal basis vas never very clearly specified, as dependent
on the consent of all as the General Assembly-created UNEF.
The legal status of a force within the host country
is determined by agreement between the host and the United
Nations. Prior to 1955 relatively little heed was paid to
the question of the status of the observers perhaps be
cause most of the early observer groups were small in size
and not highly controversial. However, with the stationing
of UNEF on Egyptian territory a status-of-force agreement was
negotiated between Egypt and the United Nations. This agree
ment has served as the model for succeeding agreements. The
status-of-force agreement is usually negotiated in the early
days of the operation. The Congo provided an exception to
this rule: collapse of the Central Government and chaotic
internal conditions delayed the detailed agreement over
sixteen months. The status-of-force agreements have been
noteworthy for allowing the force freedom of movement and


117
expenditures of $3,800,000: first, appropriations could be
included in a regular or special section of the 1958 budget;
or second, they could be carried in authorized special
accounts for which funds would be appropriated and assessed
in accordance with the scale of contributions approved for
1959 for regular budgetary expenditures. For the possible
1959 outlay the Secretary-General suggested either that a
provisional appropriation be made in the 1959 budget or that
the Secretary-General use his authority to incur expenses
31
relating to peace and security.
The Fifth Committee of the General Assembly deter
mined, in accordance with the advice of the Advisory Com
mittee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, that the
expenses for both 1958 and 1959 should be included in the
regular budget. The inclusion of the items in the regular
budget thereby avoided the difficulties of non-payment of
special assessments which had developed in connection with
the financing of UNEF, In view of the difficulties which
had already emerged in connection with the UNEF approach
to financing peace-keeping, it is rather surprising that
the Secretary-General indicated no preference as to the
mode of financing UNOGIL.
->~U.ir. Doc. A/C.5/783 (November 14, 1958), p. 25.


5
because a solution, was not obvious would not only be an
indictment of its effectiveness but dangerous and irrespon
sible. Tbe possibility of small conflicts expanding into
large, of brush-fire wars becoming world wars, is omnipresent.
The non-fighting force is one of the answers of the
United Nations to this sort of challenge. The non-fighting
force is injected into the problem area as a means of
holding the situation in abeyance, while a peaceful solu
tion is sought. The non-fighting force is a "manifestation
of the view that an organization which is incapable of
providing collective security may yet contribute signifi
cantly to peace and security if it concentrates on helping
states to avoid drifting too near the brink: of war, and not
2
on rescuing them from the brink itself."
We have referred to the non-fighting force as a
significant innovation of the United Nations. This state
ment should be qualified. The non-fighting force as a
pacific settlement technique is primarily, but not entirely,
a United Nations product. There are forerunners of the
non-fighting force in pre-United Nations daysthough these
are few in number and apparently influenced United Nations
_____
Inis Claude, "The United Nations and the Use of
Force," International Conciliation, No. 532 (March, 1961),
p. 375.


S/856 and Add* 1 and 2, June 25, 194-8, "Cablegram dated
25 June 194-8 from the United Nations Mediator to the
Secretary-General concerning the incident of Negba in
the Negeb."
S/860, June 50, 194-8, "Cablegram dated 30 June 194-8
from the United Nations Mediator to the Secretary-
General concerning suggestions for the peaceful adjust
ment of the future situation in Palestine,"
S/861, June 30? 194-8, "Cablegram dated 30 June 194-8
from the United Nations Mediator to the Secretary-
General concerning the LST Altalena incident."
S/863, June 28, 194-8, "Text of suggestions presented
by the United Nations Mediator on Palestine to the two
parties on June 28, 194-8."
S/865, July 5, 194-8, "Cablegram dated 5 July 194-8 from
the United Nations Mediator to the Secretary-General
concerning the prolongation of the truce in Palestine."
S/888, July 12, 194-8, "Eeport of the United Nations
Mediator on Palestine to the Security Council."
S/902, July 15, 194-8, "Resolution adopted at the 358th
meeting of the Security Council concerning the Palestine
question."
S/907, July 16, 194-8, "Cablegram dated 16 July 194-8
from the United Nations Mediator to the Arab States and
to the Provisional Government of Israel concerning the
Security Council resolution of '15 July; and their
replies thereto."
S/915, July 11, 194-8, "Cablegrams dated 11, 12, 15 and
17 July 194-8 from the Chairman of the Palestine Truce
Commission to the President of the Security Council
concerning Jerusalem."
S/920, July 13, 194-8, "Cablegrams dated 13, 15, 16 and
18 July 194-8 to the President of the Security Council
from the President of the Palestine Truce Commission .
concerning Jerusalem."
S/928, July 28, 194-8, "Cablegrams from the United
Nations Mediator dated 22 and 27 July 194-8 to the
Secretary-General containing instructions given to
Observers and Plans of Organization of Truce Super
vision. "


236
concerned with it, he likely to result in a recur
rence of dangerous border disturbances and violence.
It also continues to be true that any substantial
reduction in strength below its present level would
make it impossible for the Force to carry out ade
quately its existing responsibilities.
The comment about the importance of maintaining the
Force in the area suggests not only the Force's accomplish
ments, but also what it did not accomplish. The Force has
been able to do no more than maintain quiet. It has not
been able to bring a resolution of the basic issues tor
menting the Middle East; it has not brought the Egyptians
and the Israelis any closer to a political solution of the
outstanding issues dividing them. Some have criticized the
United Nations role in the Sues crisis arguing that the
political issues should not have been avoided. Their
reasoning goes something as follows. The United Nations was
in a position of some power in the Middle East in early 1957
vis-a-vis the belligerents. The leverage which the United
Nations then had should have been used to force negotiations.
Political neutrality in this case prevented the United
Nations from playing as effective and vital role as it might
have.
The arguments that the Force should have taken a
more positive role are good in theory, but they begin to
break apart under practical considerations. It can be held
118U.N. Doc. A/4486, p. 13.


175
(a) The United Nations cannot condone a change of the
status .juris resulting from military action contrary
to the provisions of the Charter. The Organization
must, therefore, maintain that the status juris
existing prior to such military action be re-estab
lished by a withdrawal of troops, and by the re
linquishment or nullification of rights asserted in
territories covered by the military action and
depending upon it.
(b) The use of military force by the United Nations
other than under Chapter VII of the Charter requires
the consent of the States in which the Force is to
operate. Moreover, such use must be undertaken and
developed in a manner consistent with the principles
mentioned under (a) above. It must, furthermore, be
impartial, in the sense that it does not serve as a
means to force settlement, in the interest of one
party, of political conflicts or legal issues recog
nized as controversial.^2
The Secretary-General went on to specify that deploy
ment of UNEF in Gaza would have to be on the same basis as
its deployment along the armistice line in the Sinai
Peninsula. Any widening of its functions would require the
consent of Egypt. With respect to Sharm-el-Shaikh he said:
Israel troops, on their withdrawal from the Sharm-
el-Shaikh area, would be followed by the United Nations
Emergency Force in the same way as in other parts of
Sinai. The duties of the Force in respect of the
cease-fire and the withdrawal will determine its move
ments. However, if it is recognized that there is a
need for such an arrangement, it may be agreed that
units of the Force (or special representatives in the
nature of observers) would assist in maintaining quiet
in the area beyond what follows from this general
principle. In accordance with the general legal
principles, recognized as decisive for the deployment
of the United Nations Emergency Force, the Force should
not be used so as to prejudge the solution of the con
troversial questions involved. The UNEF, thus, is not
42
U.N. Doc. A/5512, p. 47


151
Tne deterioration of relations "between Israel and
Egypt quickened in the period after 1955. This quickening
was reflected in an increasing number of violent incidents.
The peace-keeping machinery seemed less and less equipped
to cope with the situation confronting it. On the one hand,
Egyptians expressed hostility to the very existence of
Israel in the most bitter terms. Their hostility took
concrete forms as well: an economic boycott was imposed on
Israel and her shipping was blockaded from use of either the
Suez Canal or the Gulf of Aqaba. And from 1955 forward there
were fedayeen raids from across the Egyptian border into
Israel.^ The Israelis responded to the fedayeen raids with
a policy of retaliatory raids. The seriousness of the
situation by the beginning of 1956 is suggested by the
following comment from the diary of the Chief of the Truce
Organization:
The year ends with uncertainty as to what is ahead.
I feel that unless a positive move is made towards a
peace settlement there will be dangers of hostilities
on a larger scale. These may begin with Jisr Banat
Yakub Canal projector may be precipitated by a small
- scale action near Gaza or el Auja.
o
'The fedayeen \tfere Palestinian agents whom Israelis
charged were organized by the Egyptians and sent into Israel
to carry out attacks on the populace and to destroy prop
erty. Although the Egyptians denied any official connection
with the fedayeen, the evidence pointed to some official
backing. Ibid., p. 86.
.. 8Ibid., p. 123.


41
membership on the Truce Commission and consequently partici
pation in the Truce Supervision Organization? These
national representatives exerted little day-to-day influence
on the decisions and actions of the Mediator, but they did
hold an ultimate check. If his decisions were not regarded
favorably, pressures could be exerted to alter them or to
prevent their implementation. Thus, the Mediator's de
cisions on both the composition and the size of the truce
group were modified under the pressure of the national
delegations, acting not openly through Security Council re
jection of proposals, but through inaction and behind-the-
scenes pressures.
It is not without significance that both Trygve Lie
and Count Bernadotte were activists, desiring strong United
Nations action to resolve the Palestine issue. While they
gave vigorous leadership to the Truce Organization, their
more ambitious objectives were curbed by the caution of the
Security Council. The scope and limits of the Mediator's
powers will become clearer with an examination of the de
cisions made on such crucial aspects of the truce group as
its proper composition and size.
Support for the Truce Organization
Men for the Truce Organization.-One of the most
significant decisions made with respect to the Truce


380
up 0NUC Among the principles which governed the Force
in its operations were the following: the Force should
take no military initiative; the Force should not intervene
in the internal affairs of the Congo; the Force was in the
Congo at the request and with the consent of the Congolese
Government. In many ways the Force in its initial con
ception was not very different from an over-grown, well-
armed observation group. To carry through the mission
assigned to it by the Security Council, the Force would rely
primarily on its presence in the crisis area, a presence
made strong by its prestige and its support among the United
Nations members.
Yet this conception of a peace-keeping force proved
singularly inappropriate to the Congo situation. The Force
did not command the same respect or moral authority in the
Congo that it had in Suez. Moreover, the internal situation
was far more chaotic in the Congo and engendered divisions
within the ranks of the United Nations itself. Once the
Central Government of the Congo collapsed, the responsibili
ties of the United Nations Force exceeded its capabilities.
The February, 1961, Security Council resolution
opened the way to a basic modification in the character of
the Force, transforming it at least potentially from a non
intervening to an intervening force, able to take positive,
forceful action when necessary. From February forward the


Unfortunately, liaison officers also attempted to "manage"
their observers at 'times, controlling what they saw and
57
heard. '
The observers were deployed somewhat differently
during the First and Second Truces. During the First Truce
assignment of the observers was based on geographic areas.
Observers were stationed in Palestine and in the Arab
states and were sent from time to time to Cyprus to super
vise Jewish immigration. In Palestine the observers were
assigned to one of five sectors into which the country had
been divided. Headquarters and observation posts were
located in each. Responsibility for commanding the sectors
was distributed among representatives of the national groups
contributing to the observation mission: the Northern area
was under the senior Belgian officer, the Southern area
under the senior French officer, the Western area under the
senior American officer, and the Central area and Jerusalem
under Swedish officers. Assignment in the Arab states was
more fluid: observers were in Beirut and Damascus most of
the time and were sent periodically to such places as
, CO
Baghdad and the Egyptian ports and airfields.
During the Second Truce assignment was on a functional
basis. Observers were divided into groups with one group of
y
^ Mohn, 0£. cit., p, 80.
58U.N. Doc. S/1025, p. 7.


301
representatives of Western states recognized the deficiencies
inherent in the special account and attempted, without suc
cess, to have ONUC finances handled as regular budget items.)
The question of the nature of the expenses of the
peace-keeping force centered on the issue of whether or not
ONUC expenses should be considered as part of the expenses
of the Organization under Article 17 of the Charter or as
special expenses. The significance of this question was
considerable. If the expenses of ONUC were deemed to be
expenses of the Organization within the meaning of Article
17, all members of the Organization would appear to have a
moral and a legal obligation to pay for ONUC. If they did
not pay their assessments, it might be assumed that Article
19 would come into play. (Article 19 provides that "a
member of the United Nations which is in arrears in the
payment of its financial contributions to the Organization
shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of
arrears equals or exceeds the amount of contributions due
from it for the preceding two full years.")
The importance of this question was reflected in its
lengthy consideration: it was debated in the Fifth Committee
in numerous meetings, studied by a Working Group of fifteen
and an Expanded Group of twenty-one, voted on directly on
several occasions, and, finally, presented to the Inter
national Court of Justice for an advisory opinion.


member states, either for political or economic reasons,
to contribute their share. In fact, the Congo operation
could hardly have continued without the substantial contri
butions made to the mission by the United States. Yet,
the generosity of a few states is a frail financial support
for peace-keeping missions. Thus, new and more satisfactory
methods of financing peace-keeping forces must be sought.
A danger of commitments as extensive as those in
volved in the Congo operation is that undue influence may
be wielded by those with the men and money to keep the
operation afloat. Threats to cut off. contributions or pull
out troops may give certain states a disproportionate voice
in United Nations decisions. (On the other hand, this may,
on occasion, be a healthy counter to the one state-one
vote situation.) For example, a question may be raised as
to whether the United Nations found its policies tied too
closely to the policies of the United States because of the
large iknerican contributions to the United Nations mission
in the Congo. From November, 1961, forward the United
States apparently played an active role in shaping United
Nations policy.
Once the mandate of the United Nations Force was
changed and its role expanded not only did the problems of
men and money become more difficult, but new problems arose.
A fighting peace-keeping force has problems which are
peculiar to it. Two of the most difficult in the case of


214
principle meant, among other things, that United Nations
premises were inviolable and subject to the exclusive con
trol and authority of the Commander; that members of the
UNEP Command, Porce, and Staff enjoyed to varying degrees
the privileges and immunities; that provision was made for
appropriate display of the United Nations flag, for a pre
scribed uniform, and for distinctive identification of
United Nations equipment.
A basis for cooperation between the Force and Egypt
rested in a second important principlefreedom of movement.
92
Within the "area of operations" of the Porce and to and
from points of access members of the Porce were to have
complete freedom of movement, an important prerequisite for
an effective force. In its turn the United Nations acknow
ledged the obligation of the members of the Porce to respect
the lav/s and regulations of Egypt and to refrain from actions
incompatible with their international status.
One of the note-worthy and potentially troubling
provisions of the February Agreement, one which set a rather
unfortunate precedent, was that respecting criminal juris
diction. The UNEP arrangement was a unique one, revealing
much about the nature of UNEP. It provided that members of
^ "Area of operations" was deemed to include areas
where UNEP was deployed, its installations and premises,
and its lines of communication and supply. Ibid., p. 53.


?2
the parties in Palestine and the feeling by one or both, that
the truce was beneficial to the other meant that the truce
was maintained only with difficulty, with many incidents,
and wTit.h considerable bitterness.
As the truce lengthened, the situation became more
serious. The long truce brought with it the strains of
accumulated irritations from daily incidents, war nerves,
and the economic burden of maintaining large armies. By the
fall of 1948 these strains were expressed in the increasingly
uncooperative and hostile attitude by the belligerents, and
particularly by the Israelis, toward the observers. Acting
Mediator Bunche said in this respect that a serious situation
existed with regard to the "authority, prestige and even
safety of personnel engaged in truce work."^ Ail sorts of
interferences were made with the legitimate activities of
the observers, ranging from refusal of access to certain
ports and strategic areas to burdensome requirements on the
movements of the observers.
The Truce Supervision. Organization needed strong
backing from the United Nations in view of the unfavorable
situation in Palestinewhat they received much of the time
was lukewarm support. The support reflected the political
atmosphere in the United Nations in respect to the Palestine
situationan atmosphere which might be defined as one in
Qi~The New York Times, October 2, 1948.


339
In a situation obviously containing explosive po
tential the United Nations moved in to try to safeguard its
own position and to stabilize conditions. To do this the
United Nations force took two highly significant and contro
versial emergency measures. It closed the airport to all
traffic except that of the United Nations and it shut down
the radio station. These actions were taken on the basis
of decisions made on the spot by Assistant Secretary-
General Andrew Cordier rather than on the orders of Head
quarters in New York. While the United Nations disavowed
all intentions of intervening in an internal political
dispute, the effect of the United Nations action was to
favor the Kasa-Yubu position, for it was Lumumba who might
have benefited from use both of airfields and radio.
The direct and indirect effects of the constitutional
crisis had a very great impact on the power of the Force to
carry through its mission in succeeding months. Although
neither the official mandate of the Force nor the powers
granted it under the operative resolutions were changed,
the actual power base of the Force shrunk considerably.
The shrinkage was the consequence of two factors primarily.
First, the internal situation of the Congo after
the September government crisis was difficult in the extreme.
The Force was to cooperate with the Government of the Congo
in restoring order, but after September it wras not entirely


4-59
TABLE B-2
THE NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF UNOGIL
Contributing Country
No. of Men Contributed
July, 1958
Burma
5
Canada
11
Chile
3
Denmark
15
Finland
8
India
5
Ireland
5
Italy
15
Nepal
5
Netherlands
9
New Zealand
1
Norway3
11
Peru
5
Sweden3
10
Total
108
aSweden also sent 12 pilots and aircrew members and Norway 8 pilots and
aircrew members.
Source: The New York Times, July 17, 1958


292
that both Dr. Burche and his experienced successor, Dr,
Rajeshwar Layal, came under bitter attack by Congolese
authorities and were ultimately forced to resign.
The first military leaders were also experienced in
peace-keeping operations. The Secretary-General selected
Major-General Carl von Horn as Supreme Commander of the
Force. Von Horn had served since 1958 as the Chief of Staff
of UHTSO. He was to be assisted by a small personal staff
of officers drawn from under his command in Jerusalem. The
Secretary-General selected as his military adviser on Congo
problems General Indarjit Rikhye, who had formerly served
as Chief of Staff of UNEF.
The character of the Force's leadership began to
shift in 1961 in such a way as to place more Africans and
Asians in key positions. This shift was possible once the
Force was well-established because experienced personnel
were less necessary and because ONTJC was developing its
own cadre of trained leaders. It was desirable because of
mounting attacks on the Force by Africans and Asians, some
of whom charged' it with being Western-dominated. In the
face of these charges it seemed expedient to bring more
Africans into leadership positions.
By 1962 not only had the leadership of the Force in
the field shifted toward more Afro-Asian participation, but
^Dayal served in 1958 as one of the three members of
the United Rations Observation Group in Lebanon.


152
The United Nations officials intensified their
efforts to cope with the situation. A proposal for a United
Nations force to he imposed between Egypt and Israel was
briefly considered, then dropped. In April and May, 1956,
the Secretary-General, under instructions from the Security
Council, traveled through the area. He sought to break the
chain of action and reaction which was leading the Middle
East toward catastrophe by placing the cease-fire provision
of the armistice agreements in a privileged position. His
mission was of limited success.
The Middle Eastern picture was complicated by the
injection of the second dimension. On July 26, 1956,
Egyptian President Nasser announced the nationalization of
the Suez Canal, an event which, in the words of Anthony Eden,
q
transformed everything in the Middle East.
Britain and France reacted violently to the announce
ment of nationalization. Even before nationalization, the
Governments of both countries had viewed Nasser with sus
picion and some hostility. The nationalization seemed to
confirm their suspicions. It threatened Anglo-French
national interests directly and significantly. First, both
the British Government and French nationals had substantial
investments in the Canal Company. Moreover, vital commerce
:q
Joseph Lash, Dag Hammarskjold: Custodian of the
Brushfire Peace (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., Inc.,
I^Tjr PT7£7~~


4-08
Institutionalization of a philosophy of force composition
Out of the years of experience with peace-keeping
groups a core of principles has been developed as to the
proper composition of the non-fighting military presence.
The initial groups had to feel their way through uncharted
areas. Decisions on the character of the force were made on
the spot on the basis of expediency. Availability of
military men and the closing out of Russian participation
seemed to be the primary rules of the participation formulas
set up for the early observer units.
The move to a multilateralization of the peace
keeping group came first in the Truce Supervision Organi
zation overseeing the armistice agreements in Palestine.
In 1953 the composition of this Organization was broadened
from its Belgian-French-United States base with a number of
additional countries being called upon for observers.
The development of a formula for participation in
peace-keeping groups was furthered with the establishment
of the United Rations Emergency Force in 1956. A pattern
was provided around which succeeding groups have been
fashioned. First, the principle of wide participation was
affirmed. (It has been followed in every succeeding peace
keeping unit with the exception of the United Rations
Security Force used in West Rew Guinea. The use of Pakistan
troops entirely for that Force was apparently an adaptation


496
Elliot, Lieutenant Colonel H.C.F. "Organization and Training
of the Stand-by Battalion," Transcript of Speech to the
Meeting of Military Experts to Consider the Technical
Aspects of U.N. Peace-Keeping Operations, Ottawa,
Canada, November, 1964.
Evenson, Jens. "Opening of Debate on Legal Aspects of U.N.
Security Forces," Paper prepared for the Conference on
the United Nations Security Forces, Oslo, Norway,
February, 1964, pp. 1-5.
Franck, Thomas M. "United Nations Lav; in Africa: The Congo
Operation as a Case Study," Law and Contemporary
Problems, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Autumn, 1962), pp. 632-52.
Gardner, Richard N., "The Development of the Peace-Keeping
Capacity of the United Nations," Proceedings of the
American Society of International Lav;, 5?th Annual
Meeting (April 25-27, 1963), pp. 224-54.
Good, Robert C. "U.N.E.F.," School of Advanced International
Studies, Vol. 3 (Spring, 1959"), pp. 17-23.
Goodrich, Leland and Rosner,: Gabriella. "The United Nations
Emergency Force," International Organization, Vol. 11,
No. 3 (Summer, 1957), pp. 413-30.
Gross, Leo. "Expenses of the UN for Peace Keeping Operations,
Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice,"
International Organization, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Vinter,
1963), PP. 1-35.
Haekkerup, Per. "Scandinavia's Peace-Keeping Forces for
U.N.," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 42, No. 4 (July, 1964),
pp. 675-81.
Halderman, John. "Legal Basis for United Nations Armed
Forces," The American Journal of International Law,
Vol. 56, No. 4 (October, 1962), pp. 971-96.
Hammarskjold, Dag. "The Vital Role of the United Nations in
a Diplomacy of Reconciliation," United Nations Review,
Vol. 4, No. 11 (May, 1958), pp. 6-10.
Harris, Major H.E.O. "Operation Sarsfield: The Irish Army
in the Congo," Military Review, Vol. 42 (May, 1962),
pp. 63-72.


382
in the Congo Statements by the Secretary-General have
de-emphasized the importance of the fighting undertaken by
cn
the Force and stressed the fact that it was a peace force.0
We would contend that, in fact, the Force had undergone a
fundamental transformation in its approach and its capa
bilities between July, I960, and January, 1963.
It was necessary not only to change the mandate of
the Force to achieve success in the Congo operation, but
also to pour large numbers of men and substantial sums of
money into the Congo. The United Nations may well have
been over-committed in the Congothe commitments required
for success were very great. A peace-keeping force that
fires in self-defense only can be expensive and controversial,
but not nearly so controversial nor difficult to maintain as
a peace-keeping force that takes military initiatives.
Seeping sufficient numbers of men in the field for
the four-year period was a major challenge. Fifteen to
twenty thousand men Is a large number for an international
organization to acquire from the member states for a long
duration. This, is particularly true when the major powers
are not among the acceptable contributors. The difficulties
v/ere compounded, first, by political differences over the
role of the United Nations Force which caused some states
' SlU.N. Doc. S/5240, pp. 102-103.


85
proportionately between the major groups in the country and.
by the promises on each side not to alter the status quo.
The Arabs agreed not to join a larger Arab state and the
Christians not to enlist aid from the outside against any
Arab state.
In the spring of 1958 the harmony within Lebanon
steadily disintegrated. Dissatisfaction with Lebanon's
Christian and pro-Western government under President Camille
Chamoun was rampant. This dissatisfaction arose from
several factors. First, actions by the Chamoun government
in both the domestic and international spheres seemed to
threaten the delicate Muslim-Christian balance on which the
stability of the Lebanese government rested. Elections in
1957 had been rigged apparently to the disadvantage of many
leading opposition (primarily Muslim) politicians. Rumors
were persistent that President Chamoun intended to have the
Constitution amended to allow his re-election as president.
Adherence by the Chamoun government to the Eisenhower Doc
trine was deemed incompatible by many with the national
compromise calling for non-alignment in international
affairs. Second, internal economic and social conditions
within Lebanon were badly in need of reform. There were
great Inequalities in wealth in the Lebanese society with the
Muslims, by and large, on the lower half of the socio-economic
scale. Add to these internal conditions inflammatory broad-


.DEDICATION
To Jay and Jimmy


437
be required to win trie necessary consent. Illustrative of
the latter situation xvould be the Israeli consent to the
United Nations entry to the Gaza area.
A third factor affecting the likelihood of use of
a United Nations force in a crisis is the nature of the
parties involved in the question at issue. The force is
most likely to be used in disputes or conflicts involving
the newly independent nations of the world. In every one
of its uses since World War II, in fact, at least one of
the parties has been a newly independent nation. The
instability of these states and the host of problems
associated with their entry into the society of nations
makes them likely subjects for United Nations intervention.
Not only are the new nations more crisis-prone than some of
the older states, they are also more ready to turn to the
United Nations for assistance in coping with the problems.
With the increasing number of new nations in the United
Nations, there has also been a growing use of the non
fighting force. Thus, a principal function of the non
fighting force has been to dampen down crises in the new
nations and to insulate them from East-West conflict.
If the peace-keeping group is likely to be used in
the new nations to stabilize volatile situations, it is not
likely to be used in either intra-bloc disputes or East-
West engagements. In view of the competition and frictions


Chapter Page
VI THE UNITED NATIONS FORCE IN THE CONGO: THE
OUTER LIMITS OF PEACE-KEEPING? 287
Characteristics of the United. Nations Force. 287
Leadership of ONUC 287
Support for ONUC. 293
Men for the United Nations Force . 293
Money: the financial basis of the
Force 298
Material: the logistic base of the
Force 312
The legal status of the United Nations
Force. ................ 319
ONUC in Action 323
The role of ONUC 325
The organization of the Force 330
The functioning of the United Nations
Force. 334-
Phase I. 334-
Phase II 338
Phase III 34-3
Phase IV 351
Conclusions, ........ ... 378
VII. THE NON-FIGHTING FORCE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. ....... 389
Recent Uses of the Non-Fighting Force. . 389
The Non-Fighting Force: Its
Institutionalized Side. 394-
viii


59
larger proportion of it was chartered or purchased outright.
Thus, the number of motor vehicles more than doubled,
reaching over 150. Eight airplanes were chartered for a
total in service of twelve and important communications
equipment was purchased.
An examination of the annual budget of UNTSO pro
vides insight into the needs of the observers in the field.
The 1948 budget reveals that the $3,581,600 outlay went
primarily for three categories of expenditures: personnel,
47
transportation, and communications.
The costs of personnel were primarily for subsist
ence and travel. A fifteen dollar per day subsistence
allowance was granted all personnel in Palestine. Although
some of the delegates found this exorbitant, the Acting
Mediator pointed to the hardships, risks, and wartime con
ditions as justification for the outlay. (It might be
noted that these costs were substantially reduced in later
peace-keeping operations.) Salaries were paid to Secretariat
personnel and certain technicians and locally hired person
nel.
The transportation costs were mainly for the charter
of planes and the maintenance and operation of planes and
motor vehicles lent to the Organization. Communications
'^U.N. Doc. A/C.5/247/Rev. 1, November 15 19^8, pp.
107-110.


127
the headquarters and the stations and sub-stations set up
in the countryside as near to the border and infiltration
routes as possible. The nature of the operation in its
first days is described in a report from the Secretary-
General to the Security Council.
The United Nations observers, in vehicles painted
white with United Nations insignia, began active recon
naissance on the morning of 13 June in Beirut and its
environs. Officials of the Group in Beirut, from the
beginning, requested of the Lebanese authorities that
the United Nations observer teams be accorded complete
freedom of movement throughout government-held areas.
Beirut Headquarters informs us that in a few initial
trips "of uncertain and dangerous nature," pilot jeeps
manned by Lebanese troops have been used to check roads
half an hour in advance of the United Nations teams and
half an hour behind them. The observer teams have in
each subsequent instance proceeded without pilot
vehicles. We are also advised that the initial purpose
of the patrols and road reconnaissances was to have
United Nations observers and vehicles appear in as many
areas as possible as soon as possible. In consequence,
the observer teams have covered most main road areas
in government-held regions, and have reached and entered
areas not held by government forces. The observer teams
are now working according to a schedule, and the plan
being followed is to have them probe further each day
in the direction of the frontier. Their observation
task in connexion with any "illegal infiltration of
personnel or supply of arms or other materiel across the
Lebanese borders" is greatly complicated by the fact
that, as reported by Observation Group headquarters in
Beirut, only a small part of the total frontier appears
to be controlled by government forces. The observer
teams are composed of two observers, each with a radio-
equipped vehicle, and one radio officer with a communi
cation jeep. The three members of the team in their
vehicles operate in a convoy at safe intervals and keep
in constant communication with each other.
5fcU.N. Loc. S/4029, p. 71.


206
with tiie symptoms of tlie problem but with the problem itself.
In December, 1961, the General Assembly requested, an advisory
opinion from the International Court of Justice on the
question of whether the expenses of a peace-keeping force
constituted an obligation under Article 17 of the Charter.
Although the financing of the peace forces was basically a
political issue, the debate was couched in legal terms.
The decision would help settle the legal questions at issue.
The Courts opinion, handed down in July, 1962, was that the
expenses were expenses of the Organization within the mean-
or)
ing of Article 17. The opinion was' accepted by the General
81
Assembly on December 19, 1962.
Despite the denial by a few states of the validity or
significance of the International Court decision, it did
strengthen the financial position of the two peace-keeping
forces. Yet, it has also served to illustrate that the
financing problem is more political than legal. Even with
legal authority behind him, the Secretary-General has not
considered'it wise to finance recent peace-keeping ventures
as regular expenses of the Organization.
PIT-
International Court of Justice, Certain Expenses of
the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2 of the Charter),
Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962: I.C.J*. Reports, 19&2, pp.
179-80.
81
A number of states which had abstained on the issue
of referring the question to the Court accepted the decision
once handed down. The vote on referring the question to the
Court was 52-11-32. The vote bn acceptance was 75-17-14.
See U.N. Doc. A/5380, p. 7.


333
and. headquarters in the Congo and Headquarters in Hew York
were cut, illustrated that the problems of effective control
had not been solved near the end of the mission.
Problems of organizational arrangements and control
were not confined to the relations between Hew York and
Leopoldville. There were difficulties aplenty within the
Congo. On the one hand, the division of top leadership in
the Congo between a civilian representative of the Secretary-
General and a military commander apparently caused some
friction. The thinking of the top men and communication
between them was not always in harmony. On the other hand,
the relative autonomy of the national units coupled with
the great distances in the Congo and the primitive communi
cations system made it difficult for those in control in
the Congo to keep all the units under them moving in the
37
same direction at the same rime.
In short, the nature of a peace-keeping force, com
posed of national units giving up little of their national
consciousness, coupled with the nature of the Force's
assignment in the remote and primitive Congo made problems
of direction and control particularly severe at every level
^There is some evidence that occasionally national
units, differing from the U.H. Commander on the goals or
means'of the operation, either went beyond or did not ful
fill the orders issued. For example, see Conor Cruise
O'Brien's question about Swedish participation in the
August, 1961, effort to end Katanga's secession. O'Brien,
op. cit., pp. 253-255-


S/53319 June 11, 1963s ''Resolution adopted by the
Security Council at its 1059th meeting concerning the
situation in Yemen,"
S/5^12? Sept, 4-, 1963? "Report by the Secretary-General
to the Security Council on the Functioning to Date of
the United Rations Yemen Observation Mission and the
Implementation of the Terms of Disengagement."
S/54-28, Sept, 17, 1963, "Report by the Secretary-General
on the Question of Military Disengagement in the Congo.
Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council
on certain activities of former members of the Katanga
gendarmerie."
S/54-4-7 and Add. 1 and 2, Oct, 28, 1963, "Report by the
Secretary-General to the Security Council on the
functioning of the Yemen Observation Mission and the
implementation of the terms of disengagement."
Security Council, Official Records, Eighteenth Session
(1964-), Supplements for 19~&4-
S/5501, Jan. 2, 1964-, "Report by the Secretary-General
to the Security Council on the functioning of the
United Rations Yemen Observation Mission and -the
implementation of the terms of disengagement, covering
the period from 29 October 1963 to 2 January 1964-."
S/5569, Keb. 29, 1964-, "Report of the Secretary-General
to the Security Council concerning the situation in
Cyprus."
S/5572 and Add. 1, March 5, 1964-, "Report by the
Secretary-General to the Security Council on the
functioning of the United Rations Yemen Observation
Mission and implementation of the terms of disengage
ment, covering the period from 5 January to 3 March
1964-, "
S/5575, March-4-, 1964-, "Resolution adopted by the
Security Council at its 1102nd meeting on 4- March
1964."
S/5579, March 6, 1964-, "Report by the Secretary-General
on the organization and operation of the United Rations
Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus."
S/5593, March 12, 1964-, Add. 1-3, "Report by the
Secretary-General on the organization and operation
of the United Rations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus."


70
into account and in which it was desirable to allow con
siderable discretion to those in the field.
The functioning; of the observers
In supervising the truce and preventing advantage
accruing to either side, the observers' functions centered
around two sorts of activities. First, they dealt with
violence and threats of violence. They observed (if
possible), investigated, and reported on outbreaks and
complaints of outbreaks of fighting. Fighting could vary
in its dimensions from isolated sniper fire to attacks on
convoys or even villages. It was the observers' responsi
bility to impress on the involved parties the seriousness
of truce violation. In the less important situations the
observers often settled the matter in the field themselves.
In addition to dealing with actual truce violations, the
observers attempted to create conditions which would reduce
the violations to a minimum. To this end, they negotiated
no-man's lands, established provisional armistice lines,
arranged harvesting agreements.
The second area of observer activity was that of
ensuring the fairness of the truce. The observers had the
responsibility of seeing, on the one hand, that military
goods and personnel were not introduced into any of the
belligerent nations during the truce and, on the other,


CHAPTER VI
THE UNITED NATIONS FORCE IN THE COHC-O: THE OUTER
LIMITS OF PEACE-KEEPING?
Characteristics of the United Nations Force
Leadership of QNUC
Strong leadership in bringing ONUC into being and in
directing it was exercised by Secretary-General Hammarskjold
and, following his death in September, 1961, by Secretary-
General U Thant. These two men, more than any others, were
responsible for the shape and role of the United Nations
Force. It was they as well who bore the heavy burden of
responsibility for the successes and failures of the
operation.
The leadership of Secretaries-General Hammarskjold
and Thant differed in style and content. Hammarskjold was
firmly committed to the principles of the non-fighting
force which he had enunciated at the outset of the Congo
mission. He never really departed from these principles.
He was highly sensitive to the political and legal re
straints on the Force's action. He did not want ONUC in
volved in aggressive fighting or in the internal politics
of the Congo. On the other hand, U Thant appeared less
287


356
Almost from the time that the fighting started,
efforts were underway by the United Nations to obtain a
cease-fire. It was on a journey to meet Tshombe to negoti
ate such an agreement that the Secretary-General met death
in a plane crash. Despite Hammarskjold's death negotiations
continued and a cease-fire was agreed to on September 21. '
The September military engagement-its origins and
its failure-raised bitter questions as to the precise
intentions of the United Nations in the fighting and the
locus of decision-making and responsibility for the action.
Official United Nations sources contend that ONUC
was acting only in self-defense in Katanga, responding to
attacks on it by the Katanga gendarmerie. According to
these sources, fighting broke out more or less spontane
ously after fire occurred in the United Nations garage and
while the United Nations was attempting simply to evacuate
foreign personnel under the authority of the February 21
60
resolution and Ordinance 70. Other versions suggest that
59
^'The cease-fire agreement provided for a cease-fire;
a joint commission of four members to supervise the appli
cation of the agreement, to seek ways to place the relations
of the United Nations and Katanga on a basis of mutual
understanding and harmony, and to fix the respective posi
tions of the troops; and for an exchange of prisoners. It
also prohibited the movement of troops to reinforce a
garrison or position. U.N. Doc. S/A940/Add. 7* pp. 119-120.
60
The official account of the origins of the fighting
read as follows: "In the early hours of.13 September, the
United Nations Force therefore took security precautions
similar to those applied on 28 August and deemed necessary
to prevent inflammatory broadcasts or other threats to the


163
Three days after passage of the November 7 resolution
formally establishing the Force, the first UNEF troops
arrived at the staging area in Capodichino, Italy. They
awaited only the consent of the Egyptian Government to de
part for Egypt. On November 15 the first United Nations
troops landed in Egypt. Advance units from UNTSO had been
in Egypt even earlier.
The legal foundations of UNSF
The character of the United Nations Emergency Force
was shaped in part by its legal foundations. The fact that
the Force was established by the General Assembly had signi
ficant implications with respect to the scope of powers of
the Force. It automatically lifted the Force out of the
realm of the enforcement action which may be instituted by
the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter. As
an organ established by the Assembly, the existence and
operations of the Force would, of necessity, be based on the
consent of the states involved rather than on any obliga
tory basis.
The resolution establishing the Force made no refer
ence to the legal basis of the Force. Nor was this question
touched on in Assembly debate. There was, however, no
question raised as to the authority of the Assembly to
undertake such action. The Secretary-General in reports


495
Benton, Wilbourn. "United Nations Action in the Suez
Crisis," in Tulane Studies in Political Science, Vol.
IV, International Law and the Middle East Crisis, New
Orleans: Tulane University, 1957.
Bloomfield, Lincoln. "Headquarters-Field Relations: Some
Notes on the Beginning and End of ONUC," International
Organization, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Spring, 1965), pp. 577-69.
Bowitz, Lieutennt-Colonel G. C. "The Central Political and
Military Administration of the United Nations Forces,"
Paper prepared for the Conference on the United Nations
Security Forces, Oslo, Norway, February, 1965, pp. 1-15.
Bowman, Edward and Fanning, James. "The Logistics Problems
of a UN Military Force," International Organization,
Vol. 17, No. 2 (Spring, 1965), pp. 555-76.
Castleberry, H. Paul. "Conflict Resolution and the Cyprus
Problem," The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 17,
No. 5 (September, 1964-')', Supplement, pp. 118-50.
Claude, Inis L. "The Management of Power in the Changing
United Nations," International Organization, Vol. 15,
No. 2 (Spring, 1961), pp. 219-55.
. "The United Nations and the Use of Force," Inter
national Conciliation, No. 552 (March, 1961), pp. 525-84.
. "United Nations Use of Military Force," The
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 7, No. '2""'(June
IT6577PP. 117-29.
Cohen, Maxwell. "The United Nations Emergency Force: A Pre
liminary View," International Journal, Vol. 12, No. 2
(Spring, 1957), pp. 109-27.
Corbett, Percy E. "Power and Law in Suez," International
Journal, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Winter, 1956-57), pp. 1-12.
Dicks, Henry V. "National Loyalty, Identity, and the Inter
national Soldier," International Organization, Vol. 17,
No. 2 (Spring, 1965), pp. '4-25-4-5*.
Egge, Bjrn. "Regional Command of the U.N. Forces," Paper
prepared for the Conference on the United Nations
Security Forces, Oslo, Norway, February, 1964, pp. 1-5.
Eide, Asbjorn and Midgaard, Knut. "U.N. Security Forces: Some
General Problems," Paper prepared for the Conference on
the United Nations Security Forces, Oslo, Norway, Febru
ary, 1964, pp._ 1-28.


201
After all the debate, the Fifth Committee accepted
the Secretary-Generals recommendation that the initial $10
million authorized for the UNSF account he apportioned on
the basis of the scale used for the regular budget. The
n-z
vote v/as 57 in favor, 8 opposed, with 9 abstentions. ^
Only the members of the Communist bloc voiced outright
opposition.
Despite the large vote in favor of the resolution on
UNEF financing, the pattern of financing set forth in that
resolution v/as not embraced with enthusiasm. Acceptance
was hedged with qualifications. Most important of these
was the specification that the decision v/as not to be con
sidered as establishing a precedent. Thus, the resolution
indicated that the General Assembly:
Decides that the expenses of the United Nations
Emergency Force, other than for such pay, equipment,
supplies and services as may be furnished without
charge by Member Governments, shall be borne by the
United Nations and shall be apportioned among the
Member States to the extent of $10 million, in ac
cordance with the scale of assessments adopted by the
General Assembly for contributions to the annual bud
get of the organizations for the financial year 1957.
Decides further that this decision shall be with
out prejudice to the subsequent apportionment of any
expenses in excess of $10 million which be incurred
in connexion with UNEF.7^
?%.N. Doc. A/3560, p. 69.
^Ibid., p. 70. This became General Assembly resolu
tion -1089 Cxi).


475
General Assembly, Official Records, Sixteenth Session (1961-
62), Annexes
A/4857, Aug. 50, 1961, "United Nations Emergency Eorce.
Report of the Secretary-General."
A/4951, Oct. 20, 1961, "Report of the Secretary-
General ."
A/4945, Oct. 26, 1961, "Interim report of the Fifth
Committee."
A/4971, Nov. 15, 1961, "Report of the Working Group
of Fifteen."
A/5019, Dec, 8, 1961, "Report of the Advisory Commit
tee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions."
A/5066, Dec. 19, 1961, "Report of the Fifth Committee."
A/C.5/904, Dec. 7, 1961, "Report of the Secretary-
General ."
General Assembly, Official Records, Seventeenth Session
(1962), Annexes
A/5172, Aug. 22, 1962, "United Nations Emergency
Force. Report of the Secretary-General."
A/5187, Sept. 15, 1962, "United Nations Emergency
Force. Cost estimates for the maintenance of the Force
report of the Secretary-General."
A/5274, Nov. 2, 1962, "United Nations Emergency Force.
Fourteenth Report of the Advisory Committee on Admini
strative and Budgetary Questions."
A/5352, Dec. 15, 1962, "United Nations Operation in
the Congo., Cost estimates and financing: report of the
Secretary-General."
A/5393, Dec. 19, 1962, "Report of the Fifth Committee."
General Assembly, Official Records, Fourth Special Session
(1963), Annexes
A/5407, March 29, 1963, "Financing of United Nations
.Peace-Keeping Operations: report of the Working Group
on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary
Procedures of the United Nations."


330
Thus, it must "be concluded that, on the one hand, the
United Nations Force in the Congo had very broad responsi
bilitiesbroader than those assigned to any earlier peace
troops or observation units. On the other hand, the
prestige and good will on which the non-fighting force must
depend were in short supply. The Force was not able to
meet its responsibilities until the change in atmosphere
and leadership at United Nations Headquarters added to the
means available to it. The February 21, 1961, and November
24-, 1961, resolutions opened the way for the use of force
by the United Nations troops when necessary to restore order.
This authority had to be utilized before the United Nations
could accomplish its mission.
The organization of the Force
The organization of the United Nations Force in the
Congo was based on the principle of civilian supremacy and
on clear lines of command from the top down. Figure 4-
indicates the organizational arrangements.
As is apparent from Figure 4-, the first in command
in the Congo was a civilian, the Secretary-General's
Special Representative. The Commander of the Force had
operational authority over the troops, but he did not hold
the final power of decision as to the circumstances in
which the troops might act and the nature of the action
that they might take. The troops were organized so that


338
Despite the difficulties under which the Force
operated, there were some early signs of improvement in
internal Congolese conditions. There was hope at the end
of August, for example, that the United Nations Force might
be withdrawn from the Congo in the near future.
Phase II.-Quick resolution of the military problems
of the Congo was not to be, however. From September, I960,
through January, 1961, the situation in the Congo grew ever
more chaotic and the position of ONUC steadily deteriorated.
All that the Force could do during this period was to try
to maintain minimal conditions of order and help to pre
serve the fiction of a viable central government in the
Congo.
The Congo situation was turned topsy turvy and made
doubly difficult in September by a power struggle for con
trol of the Congolese Government between President Kasa-Vubu
and Prime Minister Lumumba.
members of the ANC laid down their arms as the Tunisians
took over. This limited program of disarmament came to an
abrupt halt when the Congolese Government complained that
the United Nations was disarming the Congolese so as to
leave them defenseless before the Belgians. The decision
to halt the disarmament program was severely criticized as
damaging the ability of the Force to fulfill its mission.
One of the military men in the Congo who spoke against the
order was Major-General Alexander. Alexander felt the UN
Force would be in a hopeless position unless the Congolese
troops were disarmed and the Force given some initiative
in the use of arms. U.N. Doc. ? PP- 101-02.


492
Bloomfield, Lincoln. International Military Force-":; The
Question of Peacekeeping in an Armed and Disarming
World. New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1964.
Bloomfield, Lincoln. The united Nations and U.S. P _ign
Policy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, I960.
Brook, David. The United Nations and the Arab-Israel
Armistice System, 19~49-59. unpublished doctoral
dissertation. Hew York: Columbia University, 1961.
Burns, Arthur Lee and Heathcote, Hina. Peace-Keeping by
UN. Forces: Prom Suez to the Congo. New York:
Frederick A. Praeger for the Center of International
Studies, Princeton University, 1965.
Burns, Lieutenant-General E.L.M. Between Arab and Israeli.
New York: Ivan Obolensky, Inc., 19&2.
Calvocoressi, Peter. World Order and New States: Problems
of Keeping the Peace. New York: Frederick A. Praeger
for the Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1962.
Commission to Study the Organization of Peace. Strengthening
the United Nations. Arthur Holcombe, Chairman of Com
mission. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957*
Dallin, Alexander. (The Soviet Union at the United Nations.
New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 19S2*
Eden, Sir Anthony. The Memoirs of Anthony Eden. Full Circle.
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., I960.
Finer, Herman. Dulles over Suez. The Theory and Practice of
his Diplomacy. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964.
Franck, Thomas and Carey, John. The Hole of the United
Nations in the Congo: The Legal Aspects of the United
Nations Action in the Congo. Dobbs Ferry, New York:
Oceana Publications, Inc., for the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York, 1965.
Frye, William R. A United Nations Peace Force. New York:
Oceana Publications, Inc., for the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, 1957.
Garcia-Granados, Jorge. The Birth of Israel. New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1948.


179
the UNEF operation increased both the authority and the
responsibilities of the office of the Secretary-General.
The justification for vesting such broad powers in the
executive officer of the United Nations was the need for
speed. Undoubtedly, the difficulty of reaching agreement
in the Assembly, in view of the member states' different
approaches to the Force and its role, was also a factor in
the issuance of broad instructions.
The Secretary-General gave policy guidance to the
Force both at United Nations headquarters and in the field.
Final authority for organizational, administrative, and
financial operations of the Force was vested in the Secretary-
General. Although the Commander of the Force was appointed
by the General Assembly, he was an agent of the Secretary-
General in fact. For example, the Commander was directed
to take decisions relating to the organization of the Force
and to recruitment only in consultation with the Secretary-
General. Authority to issue regulations and supplemental
instructions for the Force was vested in the Secretary-
General.
The Secretary-General in directing the Force was
himself ultimately responsible to the General Assembly. Two
advisory groups of rather different nature assisted him in
carrying through his functions, though they apparently
exercised relatively little control over his decisions.


130
Tlie first factor limiting the observers' activities
vas confined primarily to the early phases of the operation
and vas probably unavoidable given the lack of a stand-by
peace-keeping group. In the early days of the operation
there vms a shortage of both men and equipment in terms of
the demands of the mission. Both had to be assembled and
brought to the scene rapidly. The first estimate of 100
observers as necessary for the mission had to be revised
upward in early July to a figure double the original. Equip
ment requirements were corresondingiy increased.
A limited number of observers and concern for their
safety (perhaps occasioned in part by the problems raised
when nationals are killed in a United Nations peace-keeping
mission) contributed to a second limitation on the effec
tiveness of the observers' activities during the early weeks
of the operationthe failure to patrol at night or in many
frontier areas. Although consideration was given to under
taking night patrols and patrols without safe conduct
agreements, it vas determined that such patrols were too
dangerous to use except in rare instances. Yet common sense,
as well as the reports of the observers themselves, suggest
that if infiltration was occurring, it would be most likely
to take place at night.
they were taking place. The first report must be understood
as reflecting what the Observation Group was able to see
nothing more. Pahim Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon (Washington,
D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1 yol) p. UvJT


503
present time site has held the position of instructor in
government at Jacksonville University.
In September, I960, Mrs. Carver began work toward the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Plorida.
Prom I960 until 1963 she was a student in the Department of
Political Science and a graduate fellow.
Mrs. Carver is married to Jay Randall Carver, Jr.,
and is the mother of one son. She is a member of Pi Sigma
Alpha, Phi Beta Kappa, the American Political Science
Association, the Southern Political Science Association,
and the American Association of University Professors.


39?
non-fighting force, the difficulties and decision-making
connected with establishment of an early group like the Truce
Supervision Organization in Palestine might be compared with
the more recent experience of the United Nations in calling
a military presence into being. The United Nations Emergency
Force in the Middle East drew on the experience of the ob
servers in Palestine and Kashmir; the United Nations Obser
vation Group in Lebanon built on UNEF; the United Nations
Force in the Congo built on the precedents of both UNEF and
UNOGIL. The United Nations Force in Cyprus has followed
the pattern laid down by the earlier groups.
Nonetheless, it must be stressed that the non-fighting
force technique has been only partly institutionalized. A
somewhat different mix of men, material, money, and principles
has been developed for each major use of the non-fighting
group. An examination of the degree and scope of institu
tionalization of the various aspects of the force suggests
an inverse relationship between degree of institutionaliza
tion and the political importance and sensitivity of the
questions involved.
There has grown up in connection with the non-fighting
force a philosophy, a methodology, and a bureaucracy. A
group of principles have been established firmly as guides to
the force's creation and operation. Techniques of bringing
the force quickly into being as well as efficient operating


254
had been actively involved with all previous major non-
fighting military groups, was in the Congo and in a position
to serve as director of the operation and temporary comman
der of the Force. The man appointed commander, General Carl
von Horn, had been Chief of the United Nations Truce Super
vision Organization since 1958. Within the Secretariat
Headquarters persons like David Vaughan and Andrew Cordier,
who had taken a decisive part in setting up UNEF, could be
tapped.
In the second place, the Secretary-General had
expedited the establishment of ONUC by laying the founda
tions for it prior to its creation. On the day of July 15
the Secretary-General not only prepared the way for Security
Council action, but he also laid the groundwork for the
operation itself. Plans were made for staging the operation,
for setting up communications, and for transporting troops
to the Congo, and obtaining food supplies. Patterns of
troop recruitment were decided on and certain African states
were contacted about supplying men to the United Nations
Force. Before the resolution establishing the Force was
even passed, the Secretary-General had troop commitments
from Ghana, Guinea, Morocco, and Tunisia.
In the early morning hours of July 14, following
passage of the resolution, the plans were put to good use.
Action moved in a number of directions at once. P.equests


73
which the Palestine problem was considered "too hot to
handle." Pew, if any, states wanted to take action on the
problem which would be likely to alienate Jews or Arabs.
Nonetheless, there was concern to keep the truce intact
until a way out of the impasse could be found.
As a consequence of the desire to keep the truce
alive, support was extended to the Truce Supervision Organi
zation by the Security Council at several critical points
in the life of that Organization. After the expiration of
the First Truce the Security Council took a strong stand to
obtain agreement by the parties involved to the Second Truce.
In the July 15 Security Council resolution which provided
the basis for the Second Truce, the Security Council invoked
Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter in ordering governments
and authorities to desist from further military action. The
declaration that failure to comply would bring consideration
by the Security Council of further action under Chapter VII
placed an implied sanction behind the order.
A most significant example of Security Council bul
warking of the observers' position came in October, 1948.
The situation in Palestine was fast deteriorating. Heavy
fighting had broken out, first in Southern Palestine, then
in the North. Calls for a cease-fire by both the Chief of
Staff and the Mediator were ignored. The Security Council
then intervened. At the urging of the Mediator, the Council


239
Tlie character of UNEP, as well as of those succeed
ing peace-keeping groups modeled upon it, was shaped by the
original conception of the Porce as international and para
military The Secretary-General laid down the basic
principles of the Force's composition and operation at the
outset. The principles of composition reflect UNEP's
international and neutral status. The Porce was to be
politically and regionally balanced, with a cross-section
of the states in the United Nations participating. To help
guarantee neutrality the permanent members of the Security
Council and states with a special interest in the question
were disbarred from participation. In its functioning the
Porce was to operate as a para-military force, using arms
in self-defense only and relying on its presence and its
prestige to stabilize the situation. A condition of its
operation was the prior consent of ail parties directly
involved. These principles worked well in the Suez situa
tion, were frequently cited as ideal for a non-fighting
force, and were invoked when new forces were established.
The principles and practices of peace-keeping laid
down by UNEP were, however, the principles of limited action
and limited commitment. The Secretary-General and the
majority of the members of the United Nations chose to give
the narrowest of possible interpretations to the powers and
functions of the Porce. It was only to preserve quiet, not


103
In practice if not in theory the Security Council
action in July reaffirmed and strengthened the initial
mandate.
The issue of the United Nations role in Lebanon was
re-opened in the Third Emergency Special Session of the
General Assembly from August 8 to 21, 1958. The session
was convened by the Security Council under the "Uniting for
Peace" resolution. Again, no basic changes were made in the
United Nations role in Lebanon.
Action took place during the General Assembly session
at two levels: that of general debate in the Assembly and of
intensive behind-the-scenes negotiations. Broad programs
for the alleviation of tensions in the Middle East were put
forward in the general debate by both the Secretary-General
and the President of the United States. Concern among the
member states appeared to be focused not on the deep-rooted
problems, however, but on the presence of United States
troops in the region and the action which might be taken to
bring their withdrawal. Although the issue of sending a
police force to, Lebanon was alive publicly, in fact, private
negotiations centered on the Observation Group and on the
means of bringing about the withdrawal of the foreign troops.
Negotiations for a resolution to achieve this end bogged
dox-m on the desire of the Soviet bloc and some Afro-Asian
states to condemn the United States presence in Lebanon.


132
government and the opposition. What should its position
besupport for the established government which permitted
entry of the United Nations mission or strict neutrality
between the established government and those seeking to
overthrow it? This is not an easy question to answer either
in theory or in the field. It was not an easy question to
answer in Lebanon.
The questions of observer access to the frontier
areas and the observer role vis-a-vis government and oppo
sition were intertwined in Lebanon. On arrival in Lebanon
the observers found that in most areas they could not reach
the frontier to check on infiltration because over 90 per
cent of the frontier was under the control of the opposition.
To gain access to many of the frontier regions the observers
had to deal directly with opposition leaders. Thus, sound
relations with both government and opposition seemed
essential.
In what was-a crucial, if little stressed, decision
for the development of UNOC-IL activity, the Secretary-
General determined that the observers should hold themselves
neutral in the struggle within Lebanon. The reasoning be
hind this decision is suggested in the first report of
UNOGIL in which it is stated:
The existence of a state of conflict between opposing
armed forces in a territory to which an independent
body of observers seeks free access throughout imposes


186
^7 Egypt; were out also despite the Secretary-General's con
tention that the composition of the Force \fas not subject
to agreement by the parties involved.^ The question of
the host country's veto raises a difficult problem. In
theory, a force to be entirely impartial should not be
shaped, even in part, by the parties to the dispute. In
practice, since a force must operate with the consent of the
host country, inclusion of troops to which that state
strongly objects would seem to complicate the task of the
force unnecessarily.
v^There is some debate as to Egypt's precise role in
relation to the composition of UHEF. Canadian combat troops
and Pakistani troops were recipients of an Egyptian veto.
The Egyptian explanation for rejecting the Canadian troops
was that the Canadian soldiers were dressed like British
soldiers and were subjects of the same Queen. Ordinary
Egyptians would not understand the difference and there
might be unfortunate incidents. See Burns, on. cit., p. 198.
In her study of UHEF Gabriella Rosner questions the signifi
cance of the Egyptian voice in the determination of the
Force's make-up, considering it simply one factor among
many which the Secretary-General took into account. Rosner
points out that with respect to Canada, Commander Burns
actually needed reconnaissance, air, transport, administra
tion, signal, engineering, and medical units as well as foot
soldiers. (In fact, these units were in shorter supply than
the foot soldiers.) She also notes that by September, 1957,
the Canadian contingent was the largest single national
group participating in the Force. Her view is expressed in
the following quotation, "While the attitude of the Egyptian
Government in these two cases was, undoubtedly, a factor
influencing the Secretary-General's decision, his position
would appear to have been that with many more offers made
than were needed, it was unwise to accept an offer which
might Jeopardize the success of the whole operation unless
it was the only way of meeting a particular need." Rosner,
op. cit., pp. 120-121.


342
closest to withdrawal and ignominious failure. The gap
"between the responsibilities of the United Nations opera
tion and its ability to meet those responsibilities had
never loomed so large.
The mandate of the force was inappropriate to the
situation. The prestige of the Force was low and it was
further depressed by the apparent inability of the Force to
42
cope with the situations confronting it.
The position of ONUC was growing weaker not only in
terms of such intangibles as world support and prestige
but also in terms of such tangible factors as numbers of
men available to the Force. The bitter controversy over
the Force and its role was reflected in the decision of
four of the important Afro-Asian contributors to withdraw
their troops from ONUC in protest against the policies being
43
pursued by it.
^The transfer of Lumumba by the Leopoldville Govern
ment from Thysville Prison to Katanga Province into the hands
of his most bitter enemy, Moise Tshombe, illustrates the
dilemma confronting the Force. The Force was bitterly criti
cized by supporters of Lumumba for failing to stop the trans
fer and for standing by and talcing no action wiien they ob
served Lumumba and his two companions being treated with
considerable brutality at Slizabethville Airport. Yet under
the Force's mandate, as the Secretary-General pointed out,
it !,had neither the power nor the right to liberate by force.1'
The New York Times, February 16, 1961, p. 13.
"^During the month of January, 1961, the United Arab
Republic, Mali, Morocco, and Indonesia announced that their
troop contingents would be withdrawn by February 1, 1961.
Approximately 2,500 men were involved.


379
answered, about the desirable and attainable mission and
character for a peace force. Nonetheless, some tentative
conclusions with respect to peace-keeping forces can be
drawn from the Congo venture.
We may begin by askingwas the United Nations Force
in the Congo a success? To some extent the answer depends
on one's definition of success. The United Nations had not
created a stable nation in the Congo by the time the Force
withdrew in 1964. It had carried out the major responsi
bilities assigned to it: the Belgian and foreign mercenaries
were out of the Congo; some semblance of law and order had
been established; a central government with jurisdiction
over the entire state had been set up; the reorganization
and retraining of the Congolese army had been undertaken,
though certainly not completed. The United Nations had
done about as much as it could do, legally and practically,
in the time given it. The rest was up to the Congolese
themselves. The Congolese failure in maintaining a viable
state can hardly be attributed to a failure of the United
Nations.
In order to succeed in the Congo, the United Nations
Force had to modify drastically its initial character. The
Force in the Congo was modeled on the Emergency Force in
Suez, The Secretary-General followed the precedents which
had been developed by the experience with UNEF in setting


4-22
gressed in terms of the establishment of a secure financial
base for such activities. The early observer groups ex
penses were included in the regular budget. Even though the
Soviet Union complained about the composition of the Truce
Supervision Organization and, on occasion, about its
functioning, that nation continued to pay its entire assess
ment for the regular budget, including the portion which
would go for the support of the observers. Since 1963, the
Soviet Union has deducted from its regular contribution,
the proportion of its assessment which would go for support
of peace-keeping activities it does not approve.
With UNEP came the concept of the special account for
peace-keeping expenses along with that of the collective
responsibility of all members for these expenses. The two
concepts proved somewhat incompatible in practice. The
application of the forward-looking collective responsibility
principle was undermined, at least to a degree, by the
operation of the special account. It is true that the
members were assessed for the special account on the basis
of the scale for the regular budget and that the Secretary-
General and a number of the national representatives con
tended that the special account carried the same obligation
to pay as did the regular account. Despite this the
special account gave legal and moral support to those who
argued that there was no obligation to contribute. (In view
of the difficulties connected with the special account, it


273
earlier request by suggesting several measures to this end
for passage by the Council. In his view provisions should
be made for a) an international investigation of the circum
stances around Lumumba's death; b) protection of the
civilian population against attacks from armed units; c)
reorganization and withdrawal from politics of the Congo
lese army; d) elimination of the Belgian element from the
Congo; and e) use of all means short of force, including
negotiating neutral zones and cease-fire arrangements, to
41
forestall clashes of armed units. In fact, the proposals
involved little real departure from what the Force was al
ready authorized to do, yet their potential value as a
reaffirmation of support for OUUC was substantial.
The Afro-Asian members of the Security Council
followed Hammarskjold's lead. A resolution to strengthen
the Force was drawn up by Liberia, the United Arab Republic,
and Ceylon. Inspired by and modeled on the proposals made
by the Secretary-General, the resolution went beyond the
Secretary-General's suggestions in its most critical aspect.
Provision was made for the use of force by OUUC for purposes
other than self-defense! (The Secretary-General had
strations. The Kennedy Administration moved toward a more
activist policy on the Congo question.
^Security Council, Official Records, 16th Year,
935th meeting (February 15, 1961), p. 9


231
In order to carry through, its functions the Force
has developed an extensive patrolling and observation system.
At the same time emphasis has been placed on maintaining
working arrangements with Egyptian authorities. Let us
briefly consider how the Force operates. The methods of
observation used vary with the sensitivity of the area.
Along the armistice demarcation line coverage is by means of
observation posts by day and patrols by night. There are
over 70 observation posts on the line which are in all cases
intervisible. Thus, movement at any point along the line
can be detected. These posts are staffed during the day by
two men each, while a mobile reserve is maintained at company
or platoon headquarters to provide support for the observa
tion posts when needed. These reserves are organized so
that they are able to reach any trouble spot within ten to
fifteen minutes. At night the men in the observation posts
are withdrawn and numerous patrols are sent out. Reserves
at headquarters and a system of flare signals enable the
observers to call help when necessary.
Less extensive observation is required on the inter
national frontier. Here rough terrain limits the infiltra
tion in many sectors. The Force follows a policy of
patrolling certain sensitive areas daily by vehicle; other
and Yugoslav reconnaissance units held responsibility in
sectors 1 and 2 respectively. It might be noted that this
deployment was virtually the same over the years. U.N. Doc.
A/5494, pp. 3-4.


194-
Fund. However, there were great differences of opinion
among the member states as to the implications of the
Special Fund, particularly with respect to the nature of the
obligations that it imposed on member states. There is no
question, however, that the fact that UHEF was financed
through a special account cast a shadow of ambiguity on the
entire issue and served as support for those who would deny
any obligation to pay for the Force.
Why did the Secretary-General make the decision to
finance UHEF's initial expenses on an aa hoc and special
basis rather than as a part of the regular budget? Why
depart from the precedent set by the observer groups of
financing through the regular budget? Insight into the
Secretary-General's reasoning is found in his 1958 Summary
Study of U1TEF experience. In that document the Secretary-
General reveals that two sorts of considerations influenced
him. First, the Secretary-General wished to avoid the delay
in getting the Force in the field which almost surely would
have occurred if the attempt had been made to resolve the
questions of financial responsibility before the Force
commenced to function. The Secretary-General was aware
apparently that there was little unanimity in the Assembly
as to the proper means to finance the Force. In the second
place, the uncertainty about UNEF seemed to argue against
including its expenses in the regular budget. There was


is rather surprising that the Secretary-General suggested
its use for both the Observation Group in Lebanon and the
Force in the Congo. The expenses of the observers were
included in the regular budget, but a special account was
established for OUUC.)
The failure of a number of states to pay their
assessments for UNEF and ONUC threw the United Nations into
financial crisis. Ultimately, an Advisory Opinion was asked
of the International Court of Justice with respect to the
obligation of the member states to pay for peace-keeping
operations set up in special accounts. The Court, upholding
the view put forward consistently by the Secretary-General,
ruled that these expenses did not differ basically from
those included in the regular budget and were expenses of
the organization within the meaning of Article 17 (2) of the
Charter.
A court decision could not resolve the basic political
problem posed by the members' failure to come forth with
financial support however. The only sanction available to
the United Nations against those who refuse to pay is depri
vation of their vote in the General Assembly. Members of
the United Nations have been reluctant to impose this
sanction, for the consequences of lifting the right to vote
of such states as France and the Soviet.Union cannot be
foreseen. The cure might well be more disastrous for the


50
Tlie men never arrived and as a consequence the station was
blown up by Arab irregulars. In the same month Bernadotte
and Frank Begley, United Nations Security Chief, considered
a 6,000 man force, armed, for Jerusalem. This too did not
get beyond the talking stage.
Not only were the Mediator's more ambitious requests
for men ignored, but there was a marked slowness in filling
some of his more routine requests. There was greater speed
in getting men out to Palestine during the First than the
Second Truce. And in neither case were observers present
in more than symbolic numbers in the important first days
of the truce. During the Second Truce the Mediator had
particular difficulty with the United States, which bore a
large part of the burden of supplying the Organization with
men.^ While the United States attributed its delay in
seconding men to such technical factors as being unsure what
-56
sort of personnel was desired, the Mediator attributed
delay to political factors and particularly to the United
States fear of military involvement in Palestine. Such in
volvement might complicate relations with the Soviet Union
and if anything happened to American soldiers in Palestine,
*'"The Mediator made his initial request for 300 ob
servers on July 16; by August 1 only 120 of the 300 had yet
arrived, only 30 of whom were from the United States. The
United States was also slow in meeting a request for enlisted
men to act as auxiliary personnel.
^Tlie New York Times, August 4, 1948.


3io
The provision for assessment was modified in two
important ways. First, the original and all succeeding
resolutions provided for the reduction of the assessments
of those least able to pay. In the I960 budget it was
provided that assessments should be reduced by up to 50
per cent for states receiving assistance under the Expanded
Programme of Technical Assistance, commencing with those
assessed at the minimum percentage of .04. Reduction was
tied to receipt of voluntary contributions to cover the
16
amount of the reduction. In succeeding resolutions the
reduction of the assessment of those least able to pay was
larger (75 and then 80 per cent of the assessment), and it
was not made dependent on being covered by voluntary
contributions.
Second, the theory of special responsibility for the
costs of the Congo operation was at least recognized in the
resolutions providing for the financing of the Force. All
resolutions called on Belgium to make a substantial contri
bution to the support of the Force and all except the first
resolution called on the permanent members of the Security
Council for sizable additional contributions.
The assessment method of financing vas relied on
until mid-1962. While theoretically adequate, the method
Tb
U.N. Doc. A/4676, pp. 10-11


4-67
Indicative of the growing awareness of the importance of
this peace-keeping technique are the flock of materials
which have keen published in the last two years on the
subject. Among the more useful of the secondary studies
on the peace-keeping groups are the following: Larry
Leonard's International Conciliation study, "The United
Nations and Palestine," which concentrates on the establish
ment and operation of the Palestine Truce Supervision
Organization; Gabriella Posner's The United nations Emergency
Force, a thorough and detailed study of the emergence and
operation of this particular force; William Frye's study
. United Nations Peace Force, which deals with the United
Nations Emergency Force and with the potentialities of a
peace force; Arthur Lee Burns and Nina Heathcote's Peace-
Keeping by U.N. Forces, a study which, despite the title,
concentrates on the United Nations Force in the Congo; and
Lincoln Bloomfield's International Military Forces, which
includes a symposium on international forces.


374
Frora January i to January 4 United Nations troops
moved rapidly along the Elizabethville-Jadotville road and,
in what was deemed a brilliant military engagement, took
control of Jadotville. The Jadotville victory, however,
presents a strange, two-sided picture of a brilliant mili
tary manuever on one hand and of tangled and unsatisfactory
controls and communication between the field unit and
75
headquarters on the other. v Successful as it was, Jadot
ville raised some serious questions about the United Nations
operation for it was undertaken in the face of orders from
United Nations Headquarters to halt. Moreover, Headquarters
lost contact completely with its troops for a number of
hours. Since this particular engagement is of significance
in illuminating the relationship between the field units
and headquarters both in Leopoldville and New York, it
seems worthwhile to briefly review the sequence of events.
With the Slizabethville success the United Nations
Command had apparently decided to halt the military initia
tive in order to give Tshombe an opportunity to come to
terms and perhaps to try to preserve ONUC's reputation as
a peace force. In line with this approach a cable was sent
to the Force on December 30 specifying that any further
military action, other than that required in self-defense,
would be taken only with headquarters clearance.^
^U.N. Doc. S/5053, Add. 14, Annex 33, PP. 52-53
76U.N. Doc. S/5053, Add. 14, Annex 34, p. 57.


439
readiness to create new groups. Thus, the success of the
United Nations Emergency Force and the institutionalization
of certain aspects of the force made the instrument more
available than it had been in earlier years. Efforts to
call a United Nations force into being in Palestine in 194-8,
for example, and to strengthen the United Nations Truce
Supervision Organization in succeeding years with sizable
contingents had failed there were no precedents for a
force and the crises were not grave enough to warrant
establishment of a new precedent.
The very availability of the technique of the peace
keeping force raises certain difficulties however. Once the
precedents are set, there is the danger that new forces may
be created for emergencies without adequate consideration of
all the implications of the action and of all the factors
necessary for the successful completion of a mission. The
Congo case might well be cited as one in which a force was
created with limited consideration of the consequences. It
may be healthy for the United Nations to consider carefully,
as it has since the Congo difficulties, precisely what is
involved before a peace-keeping mission is initiated. This
comment suggests that extensive institutionalization of the
force before the conditions for its successful operation
are established may be a disadvantage on occasion, leading
the United Nations into situations beyond its capabilities.


143
psychological and administrative preparedness for the
peace-keeping mission.
In the Lebanese situation it proved' easier to estab
lish the Observation Group than to ensure its effective
operation once in the field. Prior experience did not re
solve the substantive difficulties UNGGIL encountered. The
civil war in Lebanon posed practical and philosophic
problems for the observers. It was not clear from the
resolution creating the Group precisely what its mission
was to be or what its relations should be vis-a-vis the
Government and the opposition in Lebanon. The Secretary-
General, who took initiative in establishment and direction
of UNOGIL, determined first, that the observers should be
neutral between the opposing parties in Lebanon; and second,
that their mission should be confined to observation. The
consequence was that the UNOGIL role was rather passive.
Whereas the Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine
actively tried to reduce tensionsinvestigating, inspecting,
resolving disputes in the fieldthe Observation Group con
fined itself to, simply being on the scene. It was by the
mere fact of their presence that they were, first, to dis
courage infiltration and, second, to help insulate the area
from the conflicts of the major powers.
The observers confronted a variety of difficulties
in carrying through their mission in the field. First, the


405
however, if the civil war had grown worse with the Lebanese
Government on one side, supported by the United States and
its allies, and the rebels on the other, supported by the
United Arab Republic, the Soviet Union, and their allies?
In all likelihood, the observers would be caught in the
middle, subject to at least verbal attack by one or both
sides.
In the Congo situation the United Rations Force
experienced all the difficulties which may be connected
with a position of neutrality in a civil war situation.
The United Nations firmly proclaimed the neutrality of the
Force with respect to any political disputes within the
Congo. It stood aloof initially from the conflicts between
the central government and the secessionist provinces and
rival governments. But in the chaotic Congo every action
the Force took or refused to take was interpreted as favor
ing some faction. The Force found itself involved in
political controversy no matter what it did. In addition,
it discovered that there was little hope of resolving the
Congos problems and withdrawing the United Nations units
until a viable central government was established. Without
admitting officially that it was backing away from the
principle of political neutrality, the Force did, in fact,
throw its aid to the central government finally.


271
well as official) or to quell all violence by the force of
its presence alone. As the Congo crisis lengthened and
deepened, the role of the Force in the Congo was steadily
broadened, by both resolution and interpretation, until
ONUC did have the authority and power to quell the violence
and evict the foreign troops.
The first serious efforts to strengthen the Force's
position were made in December, I960, in the face of clear
evidence of the inability of ONUC to cope with the violent
situation in the Congo. The efforts ended in failure, re
vealing deep division within the United Nations over the
Force, The only point upon which agreement could be reached
in the Assembly was on reaffirmation of the previous resolu
tions on the question. And debate had revealed that there
was little agreement as to the meaning of the prior
resolutions.
In early 1961 the first steps to breaking the stale
mate on the Congo were, taken with the passage of the Febru
ary 21 Security Council resolution. This resolution, which
significantly strengthened the powers of the Force, marked
a turning point in both the character and fortunes of the
United Nations Force. It provided for the use of force by
the United Nations troops to prevent civil war. In so do
ing the resolution initiated the transition of ONUC from a
non-intervening, peaceful force to an intervening force,
able and willing to take the initiative militarily when
necessary.


493
Gavshon, Arthur A. The Mysterious Death of Dag; Hammarsk,iold,
New York: Walker and Company, 1962.
Goodrich, L. M. and Simons, A. P. The United Nations and
the Maintenance of International Peace and Security.
Washington, D. C.": Brookings Institution, 1955
Gordon, King. The United Nations in the Congo; A Q,uest for
Peace. New York: Carnegie Endowment 'for'International
Peace, 1962.
Hempstone, Smith. Rebels, Mercenaries, and Dividends. New
York: Frederick A. Praeger, 19&2.
Hovet, Thomas, Jr. Bloc Politics in the United Nations.
Cambridge: Harvard niversity Press, i960.
Hutchison, E. H. Violent Truce. New York: The Devin-Adair
Co., 1956.
Lash, Joseph. Bag Hammarsktiold: Custodian of the Brushfire
Peace. Garden City, New York': 'Doubleday and Co., Inc.,
1961.
Legum, Colin. Congo Disaster. Harmondsworth, Middlesex:
Penguin Books, T96I7
Lie, Trygve. In the Cause of Peace. New York: The Macmillan
Company, 7954.
Martin, Damon Howell. The pLole of the Secretary-General in
the Creation of United Nations Forces. Unpublished
doctoral dissertation. New York':"'"New York University,
June, 1962.
McDonald, James G. My Mission in Israel. New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1951-
Mendlovitz, Saul H. Legal and Political Problems of World
Order. New York: The Fund for Education Concerning
World Peace through World Law, 1962.
Miller, Richard. Dag Hammer sk,j old and Crisis Diplomacy.
New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 19617"*
Murphy, Robert. Diplomat among Warriors. Garden City, New
York: Doubleday, 19647
0Ballance, Edgar. The Arab-Israeli War, 1948. New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1957.


109
Second, in making his decisions the Secretary-General
had a number of sources of advice, both technical and poli
tical, upon which to draw. The observers themselves,
particularly the experienced observers borrowed from the
Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine, channeled to
the Secretary-General both information and recommendations
that influenced the shaping of the organization. In a sense
they fitted the group to the situation. The presence in the
region at crucial times of close Secretariat advisers Ralph
Sunche and Andrew Cordier suggests an important role for
27
them in the evolution of the Observation Group. Finally,
the Secretary-General consulted actively if informally with
the national delegations. Consultations between the
Secretary-General and the representatives of Sweden, the
United States, the United Kingdom, the United Arab Republic,
and Lebanon were reported both before and following passage
of the June 11 resolution.
Third, an advisory committee was established by the
Secretary-General on July 18. On that date Hammarskjold
moved to supplement the informal channels of communication
by establishing a formal channel in the form of a seven-man
'Bunche was placed in charge of activities in Lebanon
in the Secretariat sometime in July and appeared in Lebanon
during the tense period in late July for consultations and
to look over the operation. The New York Times, September
10, 1958.


296
but did not withdraw completely.) The Casablanca powers
had constituted the backbone of the Force initially.6
The withdrawals altered the character of the Force.
The moderate African states of Nigeria and Ethiopia re-
placed Tunisia, Morocco, Ghana, and Guinea as the leading
African contributors, while Asian troops, especially

Indians, took up much of the slack left by the African
withdrawals. The following table suggests the changes in
the composition of the Force over the years. The Western
states supplied about 15 per cent of the men for the Force
throughout the mission. The African states, which had
initially contributed almost 90 per cent of the manpower
provided only a little over a third of the troops from the
middle of 1961 forward. On the other hand, Asian states
lifted their share from 15 to almost 50 per cent, helping
to fill the void created by the African departures.
The African withdrawals considerably weakened the
Force until replacements could be found. This weakening
occurred in the early months of 1961 at the very time the
Force was given a somewhat broadened authority under the
February 21, 1961, resolution.
The Casablanca powers included Algeria, Morocco,
the United Arab Republic, Guinea, Mali, and Ghana. See
Thomas Hovet, Jr., "United Nations Diplomacy," Journal of
International Affairs, Yol. 17, No, 1 (1962) for a table
showing the membership of- caucusing blocs and groups in
the United Nations as of December, 1962, p.' 56.


212
some forty different types and makes among the approximately
1,000 self-propelled vehicles in use by the Force. The bulk
of these were contingent owned. By 1959 there were 585
88
UNEF-owned vehicles as compared to 315 contingent owned.0
By 1963 out of 907 self-propelled vehicles only three were
89
contingent owned. These figures suggest the trend to
acquisition and standardization of equipment by the Force
as it developed experience with its needs in the field and
as the operation settled into semi-permanency. Thus, experi
ence was gained over the years in the efficient feeding and
equipping of an international force. The logistic base grew
stronger.
The legal status of UNEF
The precise legal relations between UNEF and the
Government of Egypt were laid out in two documents: an aide-
memoire on the basis for the presence and functioning of
UNEF in Egypt drawn up on November 20, 1956, after a meeting
between Secretary-General Hammarskjold and Egyptian offi
cials, and an exchange of letters in February, 1957? which
spelled out in detail the status of the Force in Egypt.
The aide-rndmoire constitutes the basic foundation of
UNEF-Egyptian relations and serves as the model for suc
ceeding agreements between peace-keeping forces and the host
U.N. Doc. A/4160, p. 5.
89U.N. Doc. A/5495, p. 12.


135
upon that body an attitude of discretion and restraint
if the express or tacit acceptance of its presence is
to be obtained from those exercising authority or
effective control on different sides in the conflict.
The Observation Group is fully conscious of the fact
that its methods of observation and its use of the
information it receives must duly reflect the indepen
dent character of its status and its complete ob
tivity and impartiality to the present conflict.
The observers, with patience and persistence, gained
access to first one part and then another of the frontier
so that by mid-July they were able to report that admission
L\.L\.
had been gained to all areas. As access was gained to
new areas, new stations and sub-stations closer to the
frontier could be established and more complete surveillance
achieved.
Although establishment of working relations with the
opposition and of a position of neutrality in Lebanon's
civil war solved some of the problems of. UNOGIL in estab
lishing effective surveillance, it raised new difficulties.
A peace-keeping group relies on its presence and prestige
in situations of violence to restore calm. It needs co
operation with the parties involved and support from United
Nations headquarters. Both cooperation with the Government
of Lebanon and support from the members of the United
Nations were shaken by the UNOGIL position of neutrality.
^U.N. Doc. S/404-0 and Ada. 1, p. 5.
44
The arrival of the United States marines causea a
temporary renewal of restrictions in some areas.


416
recognized. Although, the unit in being is far less ambiti
ous than those usually proposed, it represents the begin
nings of preparedness.
Outside the formal structure of the United Nations
those member states most concerned with United Nations
peace-keeping have undertaken some joint consultations with
a view to furthering the readiness of the United Nations to
meet new challenges. In 1964 two conferences were held on
United Nations peace-keeping: the Oslo Conference in Febru
ary at which fifteen nations were represented and the Ottawa
Meeting of Military Experts in November at which twenty-
three nations were represented. The Ottawa Conference,
which was restricted to delegates from nations which had
provided troops for peace-keeping efforts, was devoted to a
consideration of the technical aspects of peace-keeping
18
operations. The presence of the Military Adviser of the
Secretary-General at both meetings in an advisory capacity
made possible some dialogue between the United Nations
Secretariat and the member states on past and potential
19
technical problems of peace-keeping operations. y Such
The states which were represented at the Ottawa Con
ference were: Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland,
Ghana, India, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Liberia, Malaysia,
Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway,
Pakistan, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sweden, Tunisia, and the
United Arab Republic. The Secretary-General's Military Ad
viser was in attendance as an Observer.
19
The future of conferences such as that held in
Ottawa is somewhat clouded due to the strong protests made


CHAPTER II
PEACE-KEEPING THROUGH OBSERVATION-A FORMATIVE STAGE:
THE TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION IN PALESTINE
Introduction
In Palestine in May, 19V8, violent fighting erupted
between Israeli and. Arab. A truce supervision organization,
created by the United Nations to help still that violence,
stands as one of the pioneering ventures in the field of
peace-keeping through the¡use of the military man in a
non-fighting capacity.
In the first decade of the United Nations there were
other uses of military observersin Greece, in Indonesia,
in Kashmir, for example. Yet the Truce Supervision Organi
zation in Palestine differs from these truce observation
teams. The difference lies primarily in the extensiveness
and scope of the operation, but this difference is so great
as to be almost one of kind, not merely size.
In Palestine the Truce Supervision Organization
reached a total size of over 600 men and had at its dispo
sal twelve airplanes, 150 jeeps and trucks, and four ships
with their crews. It had extensive communications equipment
17


215
the Force should be under the exclusive jurisdiction of their
respective national states with respect to criminal offenses
committed in Egypt. The principle was justified by the
Secretary-General as a means of preserving the independence
of the Force and of facilitating contributions by member
states to the Force. Although the provision apparently
caused no great great difficulty with respect to UNEF-
Egyptian relations, perhaps because of the relatively few
incidents, both the Secretary-General and certain of the
delegates recognized that the principle could give rise to
legal problems. Thus, in his 1958 Summary Study of UNEF
Hammarskjold indicated that he had requested the partici-
95
pating states to review the position under their laws. ^
The problem of balancing the independence of the Force
against the potential jurisdictional vacuum has not yet been
resolved.
The members of the Force are not so far outside
Egyptian law on civil matters. Although they enjoy immunity
from civil process for an official action, they can be sub
ject to Egyptian jurisdiction under certain safeguards for
their personal actions.
These provisions on the status of UNEF reveal that
it had extraordinary rights and privileges in Egypt. They
point up the unique quality of the non-fighting force.
95
U.N. Doc. A/39^3, p. 26


300
immediately obvious that $2 million, would hardly suffice
for the Congo operation, the Secretary-General requested
the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary
Questions to set an upper limit on expenditures of, first,
$15 million and, later, $40 million. This was done.
In a series of meetings in December, I960, the Fifth
Committee of the General Assembly began what was to be a
long drawn-out struggle with the problems of financing ONUC.
In the decisions taken by the Committee at this time, how
ever, the pattern for the financing of ONUC was set. The
methods used to finance ONUC paralleled the methods used
for UNEF. Once more the special account was used for the
Force. Again assessments were set on the basis of assess
ments for the regular budget with modifications for cause.
The application of the UNEF precedents to ONUC is somewhat
ironic in that the UNEF account was some $20 million in
arrears at the time the Congo operation was established.
Handling the ONUC expenses through a special account
left doubt surrounding the same two issues that had plagued
the achievement of a firm financial basis for UNEF: a) what
was the nature of the expenses and consequently of the legal
obligation of the members to contribute to the ONUC special
account, and b) on what basis should the expenses of the
Force be apportioned among the member states. (It might be
noted that the Secretary-General and a number of the


71
that necessary supplies reached isolated settlements. In
order to prevent the influx of material the observers
checked on incoming goods at the main ports and airfields.
Preventing the augmentation of the forces of either side by
men of military age posed more problems. During the First
Truce all men of military age coming into Palestine were
placed in camps. During the Second Truce such persons were
checked on periodically to ensure that they were not in
60
military training. To ensure that essential supplies were
delivered to Jerusalem and to remote outposts the observers
engaged in convoy escort duty.
The observers in Palestine found their work compli
cated by the belligerency of the parties in dispute. A
truce organization is small; it is unarmed; it cannot alone
enforce the decisions made. If its will is to be executed,
the parties involved must cooperate with it. They may co
operate either because it is to their positive advantage to
do so or because they find it too disadvantageous not to
cooperate. Thus, the kind of relationship the truce organi
zation has with those it supervises and the kind of backing
it gets from its parent body (which may have the means to
ensure compliance) are of crucial importance.
In Palestine relations between the truce observers
and those they observed were not good. The tension between
60
.N. Doc. A/64-8, p. 41.


unenthusiastically received and so emasculated as to be
transformed into a resolution to establish a small field
service. Not much was said about non-fighting forces in the
early 1950's, perhaps because fighting forces were still too
much in the forefront. From 1956 forward, however, under
the impetus of the successes of the United Nations Emergency
Force, proposals for a permanent force have come forth
steadily, seriously, and at times with impressive origins.
In general, these proposals have originated less often with
members of the United Nations Secretariat than with indi
vidual statesmen, United Nations delegations, Governments,
and non-governmental organizations. One of the most per
sistent advocates of some sort of permanent force has been
Lester Pearson of Canada; among the most influential advocates
were Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy.
In the face of these efforts to make more and more
extensive use of the non-fighting force as an arm of the
United Nations, it seems that it is time to evaluate on the
basis of past experience the merits and usefulness of the
non-fighting force.


312
Security Council members Prance, China, and the Soviet
Union* Pone of these paid their regular assessments to
ONUC, much less made voluntary contributions to it. On the
basis of who paid, responsibility rested largely with the
United States, whose contributions to ONUC averaged about
4-8 per cent of the total costs, and with the middle-sized,
"fire brigade", nations who paid their assessments for ONUC
, 18
wnen due.
The problem of financing ONUC was unresolved at the
time of the mission's termination on June 30, 1964-, The
Congo operation had put the United Nations deeply in debt.
Failure to find a way to cover the costs of the Force helped
to bring the premature dismantlement of the mission. How
premature the withdrawal was, was revealed in the violence
that erupted following the departure of ONUC.
Material: the logistic base of the Force.-The
logistic challenge presented by ONUC was unparalleled in
earlier operations. The size and duration of the mission
and the nature and extent of the Congolese territory posed
problems of organization and maintenance of the Force of
19
far greater difficulty than any previously confronted.
1 18
At the end of 1961, for example, only 19 nations had
completely paid their I960 and 1961 assessments. They were:
Australia, Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Ceylon, Burma, Japan, India,
Thailand, Turkey, Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Liberia, and the
United States.
19
General Rikhye pointed out that the geographical


66
officers held this post while Bernadotte was Mediator and
that when Ralph Bunche, an American, became Acting Mediator,
the Senior United States Observer became Chief of Staff.
The Chief of Staff was responsible for the assignment and
direction of the observers and of the auxiliary personnel,
for the formulation of detailed plans for land, sea, and
air observation, and for the definition on a map of the posi
tions of the respective armed forces in the fighting sectors
at the beginning of the truce. Questions of principle re
lating to the interpretation of the truce were referred to
cc
the Mediator for decision.
The power of the Chief of Staff was limited by the
multi-national character of the Truce Supervision Organiza
tion. Although the mixed teams of military observers and
the auxiliary services of the Organization (motor transport,
aircraft services, naval vessels, and radio communications)
were directly under the Chief of Staff, the senior national
observers were not. Thus, when Brigadier-General Riley of
the United States was Chief of Staff, the Senior French and
Senior Belgian observers were directly under the Mediator.
Moreover, a special institutional device, a Truce Super
vision Board composed of the Senior Belgian, French, and
£~j~
^ The significance of this change in the Chief of Staff
with the change in the Mediator is pointed out by Leonard in
his study of the truce. See Leonard, op. cit., p. 70J.
55U.U. Doc. S/928, p. 6.


54
to the United Nations exceeded three million dollars. In a
situation as fluid as that in Palestine tight monetary con
trols would have made establishment of an effective mission
far more complicated.
The Secretary-General used his discretion to support
generously the Truce Supervision Organization. The emphasis
was on meeting the needs of the Organization, rather than
on narrow budgetary considerations. The Secretary-General
reportedly hesitated to respond negatively to the almost
daily requests of the Mediator for fear of prejudicing the
ip ,
truce efforts. (It might be noted that the Secretary-
General's discretion may, thereby, have been the Mediator's
in fact.) Commitments were made with little consideration
of the financial implications. For example, Ralph Bunche
indicated that as far as he could remember no definite
arrangements regarding the final apportionment of costs
with respect to the observers had been worked out fully when
45
the request for observers was made.
Despite the unexpectedly high expenditures and the
experimental quality of the operation, the General Assembly
seemed satisfied in the fall of 1948 with the activities of
^"General Assembly, Official Records, 3rd Session,
Fifth Committee, 158th meeting (November 6, 1948), p. 658.
L3¡
^General Assembly, Official Records, 3rd Session,
Fifth Committee, 157th meeting (November5 1948), pp.
651-52.


128
The observers issued two reports covering t'neir
findings to July 15, 1958, They described the many
difficulties under which their mission was operating and
gave a region-by-region report of the evidences of infil
tration found. In neither report was evidence of massive
infiltration given. In the first report the observers
concluded:
The patrols of the Group have reported substantial
movements of armed men within the country and concen
trations at various places....
The arms that were seen consisted mostly of a
varied assortment of rifles of British, French and
Italian makes. Some hand grenades were also seen at
various places. Occasionally, opposition elements
have been found armed with machine guns, Mines seen
near the Baalbek area were of British and French makes.
It has not been possible to establish from where these
arms were acquired; but, in this connexion the remarks
contained in paragraph 11 of the present report should
also be borne in mind. [Paragraph 11 notes that the
peoples of the border areas have traditionally borne
arms and possession of arms is a common practice.]
For was it possible to establish if any of the armed
men observed had infiltrated from outside; there is
little doubt, however, that the vast majority was in
any case Lebanese.39
In the second report there are suggestions of some
sort of nefarious activities occurring, but only on a
limited scale and in a few places. Some truck and mule
convoys were observed under suspicious circumstances, while
in certain areas the movement forward of the observers was
blocked by such obstructive tactics as mines and sniper fire
^U.N. Doc, S/4040 and Add. 1, pp. 8-9.
40U.F. Doc. S/4069, pp. 86-89.
40


258
As the Congolese Government became more difficult
to deal with and the situation in the Congo more chaotic,
the Secretary-General mentioned less and less the request
of the Congolese and emphasized more and more the right of
the United Nations to act under Articles 39 and 40 of the
Charter., The Secretary-General said in this respect:
The resolutions ox the Security Council of July 14
(S/4387) and July 22 (S/4405) were not explicitly
adopted under Chapter VII, but they were passed on
the basis of an initiative under Article 99. For
that reason I have felt entitled to quote these
articles under Chapter VII...the problem facing the
Congo is one of war or peace and not only in the
Congo.13
At a later Security Council meeting the Secretary-General
indicated that in his view the resolution might be con
sidered as implicitly taken under Article 40 based on an
19
implicit finding under Article 39.
What was the significance of concluding that ONUC
was based on Articles 39 and 40 and not solely on Chapter
VI of the Charter? On the one hand, this apparently made
the Force less dependent on the consent of the host state
and of the participating states than would have been the
case if the action had been based solely on Chapter VI. The
~s o
Security Council, Official Records, 15th Year,
884th meeting (August 8, i960)p.
"^Security Council, Official Records, 15th Year,
920th meeting (December 13714, T9B), p. 19.


18
and its own communications system. It was, in short, almost
a little armyalbeit a little army without guns.1
Many of the rudiments of the military force are found
in the Palestine group. In the problems faced and solved,
in the accumulation of precedents and personnel experienced
in the use of the military, there are links, direct as well
as indirect, between the Palestine experience and the later
use of the non-fighting force in more ambitious endeavors.
The Palestine venture moves the United Nations a step for
ward in the employment of the non-fighting force to carry
through its objectives.
To fully understand the place of the United Nations
Truce Supervision Organization in the development of the
non-fighting force as a technique of pacific settlement, it
is necessary to briefly review the history of the Organiza
tion: its origins, characteristics, and functioning.
Conditions for Creation of the Truce Organization
The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
"'Comments from, various sources noted the resemblance
of the Truce Organization to an international force. Dr.
Ralph Bunc'he, Acting Mediator, said that the operation by
the fall of 19A8 had grown into both a diplomatic and a
military one, involving reconnaissance on land, sea, and
air. It amounted to an unarmed army of occupation in close
contact with United Nations Headquarters. General Assembly,
0ff1cial Records, 3rd Session, Fifth Committee, 157th meet-
ing (November 3, 19|-8) P* 6A9. See also The New York
Times, June 1A, 198.


87
Nor did the situation in Lebanon pose a clear chal
lenge to the United Nations when measured by the criteria
of a threat to international peace and security. In the
Palestine and Suez cases open fighting was occurring between
the armies of the states involved at the time the United
Nations intervened. Although the locus of aggression might
be ambiguous, the threat to international peace and security
seemed clear. In contrast, the immediate crisis in Lebanon
was primarily internal. Real questions could be raised as
to the degree to which the internal crisis could, on the one
hand, be attributed to international factors and, on the
other, affect international peace.
The precedents for peace-keeping
At the time of the Lebanese crisis the United Nations
had had experience with two important peace-keeping opera
tions in the Middle East. It maintained a nucleus of
observers in Palestine and a substantial force in the Suez
area. The technique of peace-keeping was familiar and
usable. Some personnel and equipment were in a position to
be transferred into Lebanon. Successful past experience in
peace-keeping made it easier presumably, from practical and
psychological standpoints, to establish a new United Nations
presence


229
an understanding with, the Secretary-General .'l0^ (The Force
turned control over to the Egyptians without question for
the Secretary-General held that action by the Force on
territory under Egypt's ownership or control required
Egyptian consent.)11^ However, Egyptians brought no mili
tary men into the region initially and have kept the mili
tary force in the area limited in size. A restoration of
Egyptian civil control has not meant a resumption of attacks
on Israel.
Phase II: the stabilization of the area.-In the eight
years since the withdrawal of the Israeli Army from its last
outposts on Egyptian territory, UNEF has preserved relative
quiet on the Egyptian-Israeli borders. The responsibili
ties of the Force in this period were defined by resolution
109
There is considerable confusion,surrounding any in
formal commitment the Egyptian President might have made
with the Secretary-General concerning the Egyptian return to
Gaza. The only formal commitment by the Egyptian Government
was that the take-over from Israel would be exclusively.by
UNEF in the first instance. Apparently there was a general
expectation among the Secretary-General's field representa
tives that the United Nations occupation would be of longer
duration. SeeBurns, op. cit., pp. 269-70 and Henry Mason,
"The United Nations Emergency Force," in International haw
and the Middle East Crisis: A Symposium, Tulane Studies in
Political Science, Yol. IV (New Orleans: Tulane University,
1957), p...43.
^^In early March Ralph Burche was reported to have
pointed out that the United Nations had never questioned
Egypt's legal rights in Gaza and denied that the United
Nations had undertaken to internationalize the Strip. The
New York Times, March 12, 1957*


458
TABLE B-l
THE NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF UNTSOa
Men Contributed
First Truce, June, 1948
Men Contributed
Second Truce, Sept.,
1948
Contributing
States
Officers
Officers
Other
Ranks
Total
Belgium
31
50
50
100
France
31
125
125
250
United States
31
125
125
250
Sweden
5
10
-
10
UN Headquarters
International
Contingent
50
7
7
Total
148
317
300
617
aIncludes only observers and military personnel. It does not include
auxiliary personnel.
Source: L. Larry Leonard, "The United Nations and Palestine,"
International Conciliation No. 454 (October, 1949) and The
New York Times, July 17, 1948.


299
Tlie unwillingness or inability of a large number of
member states to contribute to the support of ONUC brought
the operation and the United Nations itself close to
financial disaster and threatened the viability of both.
The same kind of financial problems had arisen with UNSF,
but because total expenses were smaller and fewer nations
in arrears, the problem did not assume such serious pro
portions.
The question of financing ONUC did not come before
the G-eneral Assembly until the operation had been in ex
istence several months and had already incurred obligations
in the range of $40 million as well as the wrath of a
number of delegations. Perhaps the financial path of ONUC
would have been easier if some of the key decisions on
financing had been taken while the first blush of enthusi
asm for the operation was on.
Expenditures for the first six months of the mission
were made by the Secretary-General under the familiar
authority of a resolution authorizing him to enter into
commitments not exceeding $2 million to meet unforeseen and
extraordinary expenses for the maintenance of peace and
security.^ (This resolution was almost identical to those
under which the initial expenditures for the Palestine and
Lebanon observation groups were made.) Since it was
'General Assembly resolution 1444 (XiV).


120
Groups position in Lebanon were set forth. First, the
Secretary-General suggested that the Lebanese Government
extend to the Observation Group (the three senior members,
the military observers, and the Secretariat members) over
and above the status they enjoyed under the Convention on
the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations the
privileges and immunities, exemptions and facilities which
are enjoyed by diplomatic envoys in accordance with inter
national law. Secondly, the Secretary-General stated that
the privileges and immunities necessary for the observer to
fulfill his functions included: "freedom of entry, without
delay or hindrance, of property, equipment and spare parts;
freedom of movement of personnel, equipment and transport;
the use of United Nations vehicle registration plates; the
right to fly the United Nations flag on premises, observa
tion posts and vehicles; and the right of unrestricted com
munication by radio, both within the area of operations and
to connect with the United Nations radio network, as well
as by telephone, telegraph or other means." Finally, the
Secretary-General indicated his expectation that the Leba
nese Government would provide at its own expense all
^For an enumeration of the privileges and immunities
of the members of the United Nations see, "Convention on the
Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations," United
Nations Textbook, Compiled by the "Professor Telders Study
Group for International Law at Leyden University, assisted
by F.M. Baron von Asbeck and J.H.W. Verzijl (Leiden: Leiden
University Press, 1958), pp. 210-215.


566
occurred. Heavy fighting took place from December 5 to
December 18, 1961. The December action differed signifi
cantly from the September engagement in the amount of
support it engendered and in its execution. Its results
were still inconclusive in the long run.
The United Nations was better prepared to fight in
December than it had been in the preceding September. With
better preparation and a new attitude at United Nations
Headquarters, ONUC was able to wage a more aggressive and
successful campaign than had been the case earlier. Most
significant in terms of better preparation was the provi
sion of an air arm to the Force in Katanga. In the
September fighting Katanga controlled the air with two
Fouga jets and caused considerable havoc by bombing and
strafing. In the period between September and December
steps were taken to overcome this deficiency in the equip
ping of ONUC by providing fifteen jets from India and
Sweden. In December the United Nations gained control of
the air, thereby preventing Katangese attacks on their
positions and making possible reinforcements. In addition
to more and better equipment, there were substantially more
United Nations troops in Katanga (d,000 as compared to
1,200) or potentially available.^
^Control of the air and the contribution by the
United States of four troop transports gave the United
Nations flexibility in moving troops into areas of greatest
need.


91
States military aid under the Eisenhower Doctrine to cope
with the problem of intervention. The reports were not
stilled by statements by Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles to the effect that the United States would honor its
commitments in Lebanon.)
Standing between the states supporting Lebanons
complaint and receptive to sending a peace force on the
scale of UNEP into the area (the United States, the United
Kingdom, France, and Iraq) and the states rejecting Lebanon's
charges, was a third group of states whose representatives
either did not commit themselves on the issues or expressed
difficulty in determining the facts in the situation. Out
of this group, which included Sweden, Japan, and Panama,
came leadership for Council action.
A resolution proposing that an observation group be
set up to ensure against illegal infiltration of arms and
personnel into Lebanon was presented to the Security Council
by the representative of Sweden. (It is not entirely clear
where the initial push for the observation group began.
Some attribute the origins of the resolution to the Secretary-
General, suggesting that at a minimum there was collaboration
between Secretary-General Hamraarskjold and the Swedish
representative in drawing up the resolution.)^
^ Richard Miller, Da^ Kammarskjold and Crisis Diplomacy
(New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1961), p. 167.


486
S/4752 and Add., 1-4, Feb. 27, 1961, "Report of the
Secretary-General on certain steps tahen in regard
to the implementation of Security Council resolution
S/4741 of 21 February 1961."
S/4755, Feb. 27, 1961, "Report dated 27 February 1961
to the Secretary-General from his Special Representa
tive in the Congo on incidents in Leopoldville
involving United Rations personnel."
S/4757 and Add. 1, March 2, 1961, "Report dated 2
March 1961 to the Secretary-General from his Special
Representative in the Congo on the subject of United
Rations protected areas."
S/4758 and Add. 1, March 5, 1961, "Report by the
Secretary-General to the Security Council concerning
recent events in the province of Leopoldville."
S/4761, March 8, 1961, "Report dated 8 March 1961 to
the Secretary-General from his Special Representative
in the Congo on the incidents at Moanda, Banana, and
Matadi."
S/4768 and Add. 1 and 2, March 14, 1961, "Exchange of
communications between the representative of Belgium
and the Secretary-General and report addressed to the
Secretary-General by his Special Representative in the
Congo."
S/4771 and Add. 1-3, March 20, 1961, "Report of the
Secretary-General on the implementation of part A,
operative paragraph 4, of Security Council resolution
S/4741 of 21 February 1961."
S/4775, March 30, 1961, "Exchange of correspondence be
tween the Secretary-General and the President of the
Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville) concerning
Matadi."
S/4790, April 14, 1961, "Report to the Secretary-
General from his Acting Special Representative in the
Congo concerning the interrogation of 30 mercenaries
apprehended in Kabalo on 7 April 1961."
S/4791, April 15, 1961, "Report to the Secretary-
General from his Acting Special Representative in the
Congo on the Civil War Situation in Katanga and on
United Rations Action in implementation of the Security
Council resolution of 21 February 1961."


efforts little. Under the League of Nations there were two
cases, Vilna and the Saar, in which an international police
force was brought into existence. The two main League
experiments with a force were both connected with ensuring
that plebiscites conducted by the League would be fair. It
should be noted that such an international police force
differs in basic conception from the collective security
military force. The police force is designed more to keep
order by its presence than to restore the peace by its
action. The police force usually operates on the basis of
consent and has limited powers as well as limited functions.
The first effort of the League to establish an inter
national police force came in connection with the Vilna
situation. After the Polish-led occupation of Vilna in
1920 the League set up an international force to ensure a
fair and impartial vote in a plebiscite to determine Vilna's
future. Under a League Council resolution of November,
1920, a force was authorized which was to consist of 1,500
to 1,800 men from eight' states (Belgium, Britain, Spain,
France, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden). Plans
-r_
'Despite the similarities of the non-fighting forces
used by the League and those set up under the United Nations,
there is little or no evidence that those responsible for
the United Nations forces took much account of or were very
much influenced by the League experience. There was no
mention, for example, in the establishment of UNEP of the
League experience. See Gahriella Rosner, The United
Nations .Emergency Force (New Yorks Columbia University
Press, 1.98*5)p. 282.


23
double problem of executing the partition decision and of
smothering the violence already aflame in the Holy Land.
Both put forward, more or less openly, proposals for
forceful action by the United Nations. The proposals were
received with little enthusiasm and less action.
The Secretary-General, who "put the full weight of
(his) office consistently behind the organization's de
cision from the time it was first taken," took two
approaches. On the one hand, he quietly set in motion
Secretariat studies of the possibilities of creating an
international police force and inaugurated exploratory
conversations with some of the smaller nations on their
willingness to supply a force to execute the Palestine
decisions. On the other hand, in public statements he
tried to impress the Security Council members with their
responsibility for enforcing the resolution.
The Palestine Commission was more direct in its
proposals. The Commission found it impossible to assume
its responsibilities due to violence in Palestine and a
lack of cooperation by Britain, the mandatory power. It
therefore confronted the Security Council with a special
report in which it contended that an armed force was neces
sary to bring an end to fighting in Palestine and to enable
^Trygve Lie, In the Cause of Peace (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 195^), P* IbS.


272
A combination of factors account for the positive
action by the United Nations. First, the conditions in
the Congo were growing steadily more chaotic, the Force
weaker. Rumors of civil war were rife.^8 Continued in
action seemed to spell ignominious failure for the mission.
Second, the murder of Patrice Lumumba in early February
sent a wave of shock over the United Nations and provided
an immediate stimulus to moves already underway at the
United Nations Headquarters to find a solution to the Congo
39
problem. Finally, under the impetus of these events the
position of some of the delegations and of the Secretary-
General apparently shifted to acceptance of a stronger
40
mandate for the Force.
Leadership in widening the Force's mandate was taken
by Secretary-General Hammarskgold and by the Afro-Asian
members of the Security Council. On February 1, 1961, the
Secretary-General requested a strengthening of the Force
without indicating precisely how the strengthening should
be accomplished. On February 15 Hammarskjold clarified the
38
^ See The New York Times, January 1, 1961, January 17,
1961, and January '23, 1^615
39
^ Lumumba had been captured by troops under President
Kasa-Vubu and transferred later to the control of President
Tshombe of Katanga. It was generally assumed at United
Nations headquarters that Lumumba had been murdered on the
orders of his captor, President Tshombe. See in this con
nection the report of the Commission of Investigation, U.N.
Doc. A/4964.
400f particular significance was the modification of
United States policy with the change in government admini-


491
United Nations. Yearbook of the United Nations, 1948-1963.
New York:: Columbia University Press in cooperation
with the United Nations.
United Nations Office of Public Information. The United
Nations and the Congo. Some Salient Facts. February,
United States Documents
U.S. House of Representatives. Committee on Foreign
Affairs. Staff Memorandum on the Republic of the
Congo. Printed for the use of the Committee on
Foreign Affairs. August 24, I960. 86th Cong., 2nd
Sess.
U.S. House of Representatives. Subcommittee on Inter
national Organizations and Movements of the Committee
on Foreign Affairs. Hearings: United Nations Emergency
Force. July 24 eand 25, 1958. 85th Cong., 2nd Sess.
U.S. President. United States Participation in the United
Nations: Report by the President to the Congress, 1958-
1965. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing- Office.
U.S. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations and U.S. House
of Representatives. Committee on Foreign Affairs.
Information on the Operations and Financing of the
United Nations. February 6, 19"5h B?th Cong., 2nd
Sess.
U.S. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Hearings on
S. 2678. Purchase of United Nations Bonds. February
Books
Bernadotte, Folke. go Jerusalem. Translated by Joan Bulman.
London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1951*
Bloomfield, L. M. Egypt, Israel and the Gulf of Aqaba in
International Law. Toronto: The Carswell Company, Ltd.,
1 wr.


TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS iii
LIST OF TABLES x
LIST OF FIGURES xi
Chapter
I. INTRODUCTION 1
II. PEACE-KEEPING THROUGH OBSERVATION-A FORMATIVE
STAGE; THE TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION IN
PALESTINE 17
Introduction 17
Conditions for Creation of the Truce
Organization 18
The United Nations involvement 20
The crisis area: internal conditions ... 21
The precedents for peace-keeping 22
Establishment of the United Nations Truce
Supervision Organization . 29
The establishment 29
The legal foundations. 53
The mandate. 35
Characteristics of the Truce Organization . 38
Leadership 38
Support for the Truce Organization .... hi
Men for the Truce Organization hi
iv


266
28
withdrawal. It was under this interpretation of the
mandate that the Force functioned in the early months of
the Congo operation.
On the other hand, there was a dissenting position.
The Congolese leaders, hacked up hy Poland and the Soviet
Union, held that the principal concern of the Force should
he the elimination of the Belgian aggressors from the
Congo. The Force should serve as an arm of the Congolese
29
Government. The two Afro-Asian members of the Security
Council, Tunisia and Ceylon, appeared to he closer to the
Congolese position than to that of the Secretary-General.
(They indicated that they had not called for outright con
demnation of Belgium as an aggressor only because they
wanted to ensure passage of the resolution authorizing
assistance to the Congo,The dissenting position gained
strength as the Force, operating within a narrow mandate,
proved less and less capable of coping with the situation
in the Congo.
The principles under which the Force was to operate
in carrying through its mission were also laid down hy the
Secretary-General in the early stages of the Force's life.
The initial ONUC operating principles were based on the
po
Security Council Official Records, 15th Year,
873rd meeting (July 13/14, I960), p. 5^
^^Ibid., pp. 19-21 and 3,1.
^Ihid., pp. 12 and 39.


13
Congo the United Nations Force was to help establish
internal order in the newly independent nation, thereby
bringing about the withdrawal o.f Belgian forces brought in
because of post-independence turbulence, preventing the
intervention of outside powers, and aiding the Congo to
become a viable state. Both the Lebanese and Congo situations
were complicated by overtones of civil war.
Despite the admittedly significant differences be
tween the groups, they can be considered as a unit because
of all they share. All are composed of military men; all
are used in situations of tension, instability, actual or
potential fighting. All initially have a common purpose, to
promote peaceful settlement by curbing violence through the
effect of their organized and disciplined presence as repre
sentatives of the United Nations. Although they may be
armed, they are backed by the prestige and power of the
organization rather than primarily by the power of weapons.
At the same time, the discipline of the personnel makes them
capable of quick and effective response on behalf of the
organization within a context where the use of force is or
may become prevalent.
The study is divided into two main parts. In the
first section case studies of the four peace-keeping groups
are presented. In each case an examination is undertaken of
the origins, characteristics, and operation of the group.


TABLE 1
THE GROWTH OF UNOGIL: THE INCREASE IN OBSERVERS OVER THE MONTHS
Classification
of Observers
July, 1958
Number of Observers on
August, 1958
Duty in Selected Months
September, 1958
November, 1958
Ground Observers
113
166
214
469
Air Personnel
24
73
90
Ground Non-
Commissioned Officers
32
Total Observers on
Duty
113
190
287
591
Source: U. N. Doc. S/4069
; U. N. Doc.
S/4085; U. N. Doc. S/4100;
U. N. Doc. S/4114.
fill


183
Ms duties. In this connection Burns states:
Arrangements had been made for me to leave in the
late afternoon of November 19 to return to Egypt and
take over command of the force. At the meeting of
the Advisory Committee no confidential conversation
with the Secretary-General was possible. He, Mr.
Cordier, Dr. Sunche, and I had lunch together, but
there was no chance for the unhurried talk I should
have liked in order to clear my mind as to my task
and general responsibilities. It is the practice,
when a commander is sent out with a military expedi
tionary force, to provide him with a general instruc
tion as to what he is expected to achieve, what his
relations should be with allies or authorities of the
country in which he is to operate, and other guiding
principles for his action. Of course, in the circum
stances, it was impossible for such a document to be
drawn up by the UN Secretariat, since so many matters
relating to UNEF were improvised, and so much was
dependent on political conditions, which were fluid
and in the course of development. I understood this,
but my difficulties were increased by the absence of
a definite instruction as to how it was intended that
the force would be constituted and would function, and
its relations to the Egyptian authorities.2
The responsibilities to be assumed by the Commander
were defined formally, though still in rather general terms,
51
in the Secretary-General's report of November 21, 1956.
The Commander would, as a matter of course, exercise full
command responsibility over the Force: all orders to the
Force \tfould be -issued by him and responsibility for the
performance by the Force of its functions and for its good
order would be vested in him. He was given complete charge
as well over such matters as billeting, the provision of
^Burns, op. cit., p. 218.
51U.N. Doc. a/3383, pp. 13-14.


252
Nations. At the same time intensive efforts were made by
the Secretary-General and his aides to ensure that suffi
cient support to pass the resolution would be forthcoming
12
in the Security Council.
The resolution itself was intentionally imprecise to
avoid arguments which might delay action by the United
15
Nations, The imprecision had disadvantages. Debate in
the Security Council revealed considerable difference in
opinion as to precisely what was being authorized and fore
shadowed future difficulties over the role of the Force.
The preparations for quick Security Council action
were, however, imminently successful. The Security Council
passed the resolution providing the base for establishment
of a United Nations Force at the July 15 meeting (the first
formal meeting on the Congo question). The vote was 8 in
qb
During the day of the 15th the Secretary-General was
the focal point of intensive consultations on the question
of United Nations action in the Congo. On the morning of
the 15th the Secretary-General consulted with Tunisian dele
gate Slim and with African leaders. At noon an informal
luncheon was held by the Secretary-General for members of
the Security Council. During the afternoon there were more
consultations, including one with the Soviet representative
to persuade him to act favorably on the resolution. At the
same time Slim consulted actively with delegations as well
as with Secretariat members. The African and Asian blocs
caucused to resolve their positions on the issue. Lash, op.
cit., pp. 226-228. See also Colin Legum, Congo Disaster
(parmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1^61), pp. 127-129
and The New York Times, July 14-, 1961 and July 16, 1961.
15
Security Council, Official Records, 15th Year,
875rd meeting (July 15/14-, I960), p. 59"


429
under criticism,, There is little evidence that the Commit
tee did anything once established. Again, in August, I960,
when the United Nations Force in the Congo began to come
under pressure, the Secretary-General created an Advisory
Committee. This time it was composed of representatives of
the nations contributing troops to the Force.
In the Congo crisis the Secretary-General pleaded
with both the General Assembly and the Security Council to
set up a subsidiary body to aid him in decision-making and
to assume some of the responsibility for the highly contro
versial decisions which had to be made. The pleas were
ignored, perhaps because there was little consensus on the
proper composition or role of such a group. As the ONUC
mission became more and more controversial, the Secretary-
General emphasized his consultations with the Advisory
Committee in arriving at decisions. Although the Advisory
Committee's precise operation and role is again clouded in
ambiguity, evidence suggests that it did not play a very
significant role as an advisory or decision-making body.
Its main use was as a sounding board and prop for the
Secretary-General.
The failure to establish any control agent over the
Secretary-General with respect to the Force in Cyprus
emphasizes the problem of devising adequate controls and
aids to the Secretary-General. At the time that the dis
cussions of the establishment of a peace-keeping force for


of the participating states. These men did not arrive so
quickly as had the original contingents; in fact, the last
ones appeared only three days before the end of the First
Truce. Third, Bernadotte asked the United States for
technical help, acquiring approximately seventy persons to
serve in such capacities as medical personnel, aircraft
pilots, and maintenance men. Thus, by the end of the First
Truce the Organization had roughly 250 persons directly con
nected with it. (This figure does not include those persons
connected more loosely with the operation who operated the
four vessels at United Nations disposal.) An organization
of this size was not planned initially; it Just grewunder
the pressure of its responsibilities.
A sharp increase in size occurs with the Second
Truce, which commenced in mid-July. Influenced by the de
ficiencies of the Organization in the First Truce and by
the nature of the July 15 resolution, which ordered a truce
under Chapter VII and had no time limits attached to it, it
was determined that a larger and more professional Truce
Supervision Organization was necessary. The observer staff
was more than tripled and additional auxiliary personnel
were brought in. Bernadotte requested that the United
States, France, and Belgium supply 500 officers to act as
observers and 500 enlisted soldiers to handle tasks not


150
4
to be of permanent duration. Yet, the political settlement
which was designed to end the armistice did not come. Arabs
and Israelis proved too deeply divided by bitterness,
suspicion, and nationalism to be able to resolve their out-
15
standing problems. The extension of an armistice never
designed to be permanent into semi-permanency was accompanied
by a deterioration over the years in the relations between
Israel and its Arab neighbors. Lieutenant-General E.L.M.
Burns, Chairman of the Truce Supervision Organization and
later the first head of UNEF, wrote in this connection:
...the armistice agreements were drawn up envisaging
that peace would be made after not too long a period
of negotiation between the parties. When this did not
happen, and hostility hardened as time went on, and
positions became less and less reconcilable, there was
a break-down in many respects of the armistice machinery
which had been set upon the assumption that there would
be mutual goodwill and that the parties would move in
the direction of peace.
h
Thus, the first article in each of the General
Armistice Agreements begins, "With a view to promoting the
return to permanent peace in Palestine..." and goes on to
say, "The establishment of an armistice between the armed
forces of the two parties is accepted as an indispensable
step towards... the restoration of peace in Palestine."
Quoted in Lieutenant-General E.L.M. Burns, Between Arab and
Israeli (Mew York: Ivan Obolensky, Inc., 1962), p. 2b.
^Among the outstanding problems were a) the Arab
refugees, some 900,000 had left Israel during the Arab-
Israeli war and now desired to return; b) the Israeli
boundaries which the Arabs held should follow those set out
in the General Assembly partition plan; c) the future status
of Jerusalem; d) the compensation for Arabs with property in
Israel.
6
Burns, 0£. cit., p. 28.


conferences and informal consultations among member states
can help to compensate for deficiencies in planning at
United Nations headquarters.
Institutionalization of a Force bureaucracy
As important to the perfection of the peace-keeping
device as the development of principles and practices of
peace-keeping has been the growth of a United Nations
bureaucracy experienced in this sort of activity. A corps
of military and civilian leaders skilled in establishing
and guiding the non-fighting force is growing up. On the
one hand, there is a group of Secretariat officials who have
been assigned responsibilities with a number of the peace
keeping missions. For example, Ralph Bunche has played a
prominent role in the establishment and/or operation of
every major United Nations peace-keeping activity since
Palestine. Although Secretariat officials may not be know
ledgeable as to the conditions in an area to which a peace
keeping group is assigned, their knowledge of the ins and
by the Soviet Union to the Conference and to the presence
of the Secretary-General's military adviser in particular.
The Soviet Union held that the Conference envisaged the
"creation of a military apparatus on a collective basis by
a number of states members of military blocs with the aim
of conducting military operations in the interests of this
group of states under the cover of the United Nations flag.
See Paul Martin, "Peace Keeping: Some Prospects and Perspec
tives," Text of a Speech to the McGill Conference on Vorld
Affairs, November 21, 1964-, Statements and Speeches, Infor
mation Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa,
Canada.


451
community is a community in only a limited sense, the
actions which can he taken in the name of that community
are also limited. The developments which must occur before
the United Nations can follow the ambitious approach to
peace-keeping have been suggested by Secretary-General
U Thant:
The very existence of such a force would imply, if the
force is to be used effectively, a very considerable
surrender of sovereignty by nations, which in its turn
would require the acceptance by public opinion of new
and radical political principles. Very considerable
progress in disarmament would also be a necessary pre
requisite. The direction of such a force, its basis
in international law, its composition, the rules for
its use and the evolution of an accepted body of
international law upon the basis on which it would
operate are all delicate processes which cannot and
should not be hurried, although they should be the
object of the most serious attention by governments
and by institutions and individuals, for, clearly,
some such development must be the ultimate aim. An
other necessary condition would be a far wider
acceptance than now exists of the impartiality and
objectivity of international servants both civilian
and military, for without this recognition the force
would lack an essential element of moral authority and
status.2
The third line of development is one which stresses
flexibility in both the development and use of the non
fighting force. The flexible approach is the one which we
expect to be followed in the immediate future. If the world
is not yet ready for a permanent force, neither is it willing
-
U Thant, "Strengthening of the United Nations," UN
Monthly Chronicle, Vol. 1, No. 1 (May, 1964), p. 82.


129
The reaction to the observers first reports was
strong and not entirely favorable. The conclusion that there
was no massive infiltration was not popular with those who
had been most eager to see the Observation Group created.
The difficulties of UNOGIL were thereby compounded. On the
one hand, the reliability of the reports and of the mission
itself was questioned. It was suggested that the sub
stantial limitations the observers functioned under cast
mi
doubt on their findings.' On the other hand, the basis
of support for the operation within Lebanon and the United
Nations was considerably weakened for a time.
There is little question but that the observers did
operate initially under considerable handicaps. It is more
difficult to determine the precise effect these limitations
4.9
had on the work of the observers. It may be noted that
over the months efforts were made by the observers to remove
or lower the barriers to a complete surveillance.
n
United States sources, for example, suggested that
the reports by the observers were inconclusive. The New
York Times, July 6, 1958. See also the comment of the French
delegate in the' Security Council. Security Council, Official
Seconds, 13th Year, S28th meeting (July 15* 1958), p. 2.
zip
Great emphasis is placed on the weaknesses of UNOGIL
in Qubain's study of the Lebanese crisis. With respect to
the UNOGIL role in the first phase of operations he con
cludes: "It is rather difficult to arrive at any conclusion
other than that, because of the lack of adequate number of
observers and equipment and because of the extremely diffi
cult circumstances under which it operated, UNOGIL was,
during this period, hardly in a position to be able to de
tect infiltration of men and smuggling of arms, if indeed


100
protect the territorial integrity and independence of
Lebanon and to ensure that there is no illegal infil
tration of personnel or supply of arms or other
material across the Lebanese borders;...^0
In making this proposal publicly the United States
was bringing into the open an undercurrent associated with
the Observation Group from the beginning. Both the United
States and Lebanon had indicated unofficially in the pre
ceding weeks that they considered a force on the order of
21
NEF necessary to cope with the situation. The Secretary-
General had never responded favorably to the idea. The
Council debate suggests that most of the members of the
Security Council as well had less enthusiasm for the police
force proposal than had the United States. Nonetheless,
the proposal was defeated only by a Soviet veto with
Swedish abstention on the question.
A fourth proposal was a compromise measure put forth
by the representative of Japan following the defeat of the
other draft resolutions. It merely extended the life of the
observers and by implication made possible an increase in
their numbers. The operative sentence of the resolution
read as follows:
U.N. Doc. SA050, Rev. 1, p. 32.
21
Although .Lebanon had not submitted a formal request
for a force, they repeatedly spoke out for some sort of
force. For example, on June 25 Lebanon asked the United
Nations to seal its land and sea frontiers with armed force
and requested a United Nations emergency force similar to
'that on the Sgyptian-Israeli border. See The New York


2-4-9
The United Nations involvement
The immediate cause for the United Nations inter
vention was the request of the Congolese Government for
military assistance from the United Nations in the face of
the triple problems of internal disorder, Belgian inter
vention, and secession by the richest province in the state.
Congolese authorities dispatched a series of notes
to the Secretary-General on July 11 and July 12, I960, re
questing military aid. The Congolese had some difficulty
Q
deciding to what ends assistance should be given. In the
first note they requested help in restoring the discipline
of the Congolese army. In two succeeding notes, however,
they asked military aid for the purpose of bringing with
drawal of Belgian solders from Congolese territory and
specifically excluded questions of internal order from the
9
jurisdiction of the United Nations troops. The inconstancy
reflected in the early requests might have served as a
warning of what was to come.
The initiative in turning to the United Nations for
assistance may not have been entirely Congolese. The
^The Congolese also had some difficulty deciding who
should assist them. A request was directed on July 11 to
the United States by Yice-Premier Gizenga. The United
States was asked to cooperate with the Belgians and loyal
Congolese troops in restoring order. Ibid., p. 7 and The
New York Times, July 13? 1961.
^U.N. Doc. S/4-382, pp. 11-12 and The New York Times,
July 12, 1961, and July 13, 19&1.


74
called, by unanimous vote, for an immediate cease-fire in
Palestine. It is true that a part of the force of this
action was blunted by a certain vagueness in the resolution.
The resolution did not order, but merely called for a cease
fire. It did not include an effective cease-fire date nor
specific provisions for enforcing the cease-fire. Yet, in
November, following the elections in the United States, the
Council moved still more positively to bring an end to
hostilities by instructing the Mediator to arrange for an
armistice.
Thus, the parent body of the Truce Supervision
Organization gave the Organization essential support. The
Council helped prevent the failure of the truce supervision
mission even though they denied the Organization all the
power it might, in theory, have had to execute its mandate.
Conclusions
The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
was significant not only because of its role in preserving
a'condition of relative non-fighting while an armistice was
sought and instituted, but also because it set a pattern
for United Nations peace-keeping activities. The Truce
Organization itself, in somewhat modified and reduced form,
^ Security Council, Official Records, 3rd Year, 367th
meeting (October 19? 1948), p. 38.


4-31
the peace-keeping operation. It would seem desirable if not
essential that some more effective form of political control
and guidance be instituted between the Secretary-General
and the Security Council and/or General Assembly.
Finally, neither the legal basis nor the exact extent
of the powers of the force have been spelled out. In view
of the lack of agreement on how the force should be financed,
controlled, and operated, the ambiguity of the forces legal
foundations is not surprising. To tie the force too closely
to particular articles of the Charter would be to define its
character and nature more precisely than warranted by the
consensus on the force. A vague legal foundation corres
ponds with a lack of unanimity on the exact nature of the
force.
Conclusions
A survey of those aspects of the non-fighting military
presence which are at least semi-institutionalized and those
aspects which remain non-institutionalized leads us to two
questions: first, why is there a difference in extent of
institutionalization and, second, what is the significance
of this difference?
A consideration of the difference in character be
tween the institutionalized and non-institutionalized
elements of the non-fighting force suggests that political


84
endanger the maintenance of international peace and se-
5
curity. In fact, the nature and cause of the violence were
confused.
Behind the Lebanese complaint was a situation of
considerable complexity in the Middle East 'as a whole and
within Lebanon in particular. Although it is beyond the
scope of this study to probe deeply the internal events of
the Middle East, some note must be taken of a number of
significant developments in that area in the spring of 1958.
A dominant factor in the Middle East situation at
this time was the strength of Arab nationalism and of the
pan-Arab movement. Both had gained impetus from the merger
of Syria and Egypt in February, 1958, to form a single Arab
state, the United Arab Republic. They were stimulated
further by the strong propaganda campaign conducted by the
United Arab Republic against the governments of the non-
aligned Arab states.
This nationalist fervor had significant implications
for Lebanon due to its demographic characteristics and to
the internal conditions in Lebanon. Demographically,
Lebanon is divided almost evenly between Muslims and
Christians. Prior to 1958 the potential communal problems
that this division harbored had been kept to a minimum by
the practice dividing government and parliamentary offices
^Yearbook of the United Nations 1958, p. 36.


9
t |p)
of six. The personnel, as well as the equipment necessary
7
for1 the mission at the outset, came from, eight states
Australia, Brazil, China, France, Mexico, the Netherlands,
the United Kingdom, and the United Statesall of which
were members of the Special Committee on the Balkans.^ In
Indonesia approximately 68 observers served, selected from
the same countries that were members of the Consular
Commission: Australia, Belgium, China, France, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. In Kashmir, observers have
been on duty since early 19^9 to aid in maintaining the
cease-fire between India and Pakistan. The observers have
numbered about sixty over the years. The initial seconding
states were Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark,
Norway, and Sweden. In all these cases the observer teams
were under the direction, at least initially, of the special
U.N. Doc. A/935 pp. 21-22,
7
Establishment and maintenance of the observers raised
serious financial questions because the initial appropriation
for the Special Committee on the Balkans did not include a
sum large enough to cover observer costs. A request to the
Secretary-General for additional funds received a negative
response. Thus, the Special Committee decided to accept
offers of equipment with the recommendation that the donors
be reimbursed, at the next General Assembly session. Later
budgets did include an appropriation to cover the observer
costs. U.N. Doc. A/57'i-, p. 3
8
Pakistan was also a member of the Special Committee
on the Balkans, but apparently sent no observers. Seats on
the Special Committee were open for Poland and the Soviet
Union but were never taken. Had they taken their seats
presumably they might also have participated in the observer
group's activity. This might have been precedent-setting.
.N. Doc. A/57'1, p. 2.


263
extended to justify not only action under Articles 39 and
40 of Chapter VII hut also under the enforcement,articles,
41, 42, and 43. The fact that this was never done may
suggest the weakness of such a legal base.
Whether for political or legal reasons Chapter VII
was never invoked as a justification for the positive action
by ONUC in the Congo. The Secretary-General clung to the
view that the Force was acting only under Articles 39 and
40. He stressed the defensive nature of all United Nations
military engagements. For example, in explaining the
December, 1961, fighting in Katanga, Secretary-General U
Thant said:
This military action was undertaken with the great
est reluctance, and only when it became obvious that
there was no use in continued negotiations, which were
marked by repeated instances of bad faith and failure
to implement agreed measures on the part of the politi
cal leaders of Katanga....
The purpose of the present military operations is
to regain and assure our freedom of movement, to re
store law and order, and to ensure that for the future
the United Nations forces and officials in Katanga are
not subjected to such attacks; and meanwhile to react
vigorously in self-defense to every assault on our
present positions, by all means available to us.26
Thus, the Force placed in a position where practical
p
necessities and legal niceties were in conflict reconciled
them by the expedient of ignoring the conflict. The Force
took the necessary military initiatives without admitting
26
"The Congo... a. move toward reconciliation," United
Nations Review, Vol. 9, No. 1 (January, 1962), p, 7.


BIBLIOGRAPHY
The primary materials used in the research for this
study were the official records of the United Nations. Of
particular relevance were the reports, prepared sometimes
by the officer-in-charge in the field and sometimes by the
Secretary-General, on the organization and functioning of
the individual peace-keeping groups. The records of the
debate in the Security Council, the General Assembly, and
the Fifth Committee of the Assembly shed considerable light
on the positions of the various delegations on the United
Nations peace-keeping endeavors.
The records of two conferences held in 1964 on United
Nations peace-keeping forces the Oslo Conference on
United Nations Security Forces and the Ottawa Meeting of
Military Experts to Consider the Technical Aspects of United
Nations Peace-Keeping Operations were most useful. The
papers prepared for the conferences covered a number of
aspects of peace-keeping. An interview with Major-General
I.J. Rikhye provided invaluable information and insights.
Use was made of newspapers, and particularly of The
New York Times, to supplement and, in some cases, to clarify
the material gleaned from the United Nations records.
Periodicals and journals also provided helpful interpretative
465


303
and practical arguments in support of their position. The
principle of collective responsibility to maintain inter
national peace and security was cited, and it was noted
that the sovereign equality of members should extend to
duties as well as to privileges. Middle-sized powers like
Sweden and Canada seemed especially concerned that all
nations accept their responsibilities in the Organization
in order to prevent the United Nations being dominated by
8
a few great powers.
Practical considerations were also cited by this
group* They sought a method of financing ONUC that would
provide it with the funds needed. The delegate of Canada
pointed out in this connection that in order to preserve
the ONUC peace-keeping machinery, the mistakes made in
financing UNEP had to be avoided at all costs. Noting that
many states had not contributed to the UNEP special account
because they did not feel obligated to contribute, he
argued that to adopt a similar system for the Congo was to
9
court failure.
The strongest opposition to acceptance of the costs
of peace-keeping operations as regular expenses of the
Organization came from the Communist states, supported by
U.N. Doc. A/4-971 Annex II (November 15, 1961), pp.
14 and 17.
^General Assembly, Official Records, 15th Session,
Pifth Committee, 808th meeting (December 5? I960), p. 270.


New York
331
Security Council
Chief Administrative Officer (CAO)
Supply
Transport
Purchasing
Finance
Security
Personnel 1
Billeting
*Officer-in-Charge since May 25, 1961.
Source: U. N. Doc. S/4417, Table 1, p. 66.
Figure 4
Organization chart of United Nations operation in the Congo


33
merely to voice disapproval and not to kill all action is
suggested by the fact that the Soviet Union and the
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic abstained on the criti
cal votes in the Security Council-
The legal foundations
The legal foundation for the establishment and
functioning of the Truce Supervision Organization rested on
the General Assembly resolution of Flay 14, 1948, and the
Security Council resolutions of May 29 and July 15 1948.
The authority under which the position of the Mediator was
created and an organization, to aid him authorized was not
specified in the resolution. However, there was no chal
lenge raised as to the power of the General Assembly to
create a subsidiary organ under Article 22 of the Charter
to assist it in performing its functions.
More question could be raised as to the provisions of
the Charter under which the Security Council called for an
end to hostilities. The Security Council calls for a cease
fire prior to the May 29 call had been clearly taken under
Chapter VI of the Charter. Apparently the May 29 and July
15 cease-fire resolutions were also taken under Chapter VI,
on the veto and on keeping important decisions in the Se
curity Council where they were subject to the veto. For
further discussion of the Soviet position see Alexander
Dallin, The Soviet Union at the United Nations (New York:;
Frederick A. Praeger, VJG2T~.


268
The second principie which the Secretary-General
determined ONTJC should follow was that of non-intervention
in internal conflicts in the host country.^ This position
was well-established in the Lebanon situation, in which the
military observers maintained a neutral position between
the government and opposition elements within the country.
The United Nations Force was not to exercise authority in
the Congo in cooperation or in competition with the host
government or with the representatives of any other
governments. Nor was the Force to be used to promote any
specific political solution to pending problems. The
Secretary-General suggested that deviation from this
principle would tend to rip the operation itself apart,
causing nations who disagreed to pull out their support.
The principle of non-intervention in internal questions is
undoubtedly the safest and, in most cases, the wisest to
pursue. If it could have been followed in the Congo, ONUC
might have been spared some bitter attacks. But in the
Congo the internal situation was so chaotic it became
virtually impossible for the Force to remain aloof from
domestic issues. Even with the best intentions and the
most conscientious efforts to stand aloof, the Force in
fluenced the political balance within the Congo.
3K.N. Doc. S/4589, p. 19.
^Ibid., p. 19 and U.N. Doc. S/4417, pp. 52-53.


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
When one comes to the end of a graduate program and
the completion of a dissertation, there are many persons to
whom a debt of gratitude is owed. To all those who guided
me in my graduate courses and who assisted me with this
study, I express my sincere thanks.
I am particularly indebted to Dr. Frederick Hartmann.
Not only did Dr. Hartmann stimulate my interest in the field
of international relations, but he also directed ray attention
to the subject of peace-keeping groups. His perceptive
comments and constant encouragement have been invaluable bo
this study, I am deeply grateful for his generous assistance.
My thanks go too to Dr. Arnold Heidenheimer for bis
valued instruction and guidance and for his useful sug
gestions in connection with, this study. I wish to express
as well my gratitude to Dr. Manning Dauer for his assistance
and for his unfailing ability to resolve administrative
crises with dispatch and kindness.
I would like to thank the University of Florida for
the financial aid which made possible my graduate studies
and the preparation of this dissertation. I am grateful to
the staff of the library of the University of Florida for its
assistance and to Mrs. Tbyra Johnston for typing the manu
script.
iii


378
itself for an extension of the life of the Force led the
Secretary-General to give the question to the General
Assembly for a decision. After special financing arrange
ments were worked out, the Assembly approved a resolution
to maintain a Force of approximately 6,000 men in the Congo
80
until June 30, 1964. The resolution included a proviso
that the life of the Force should not be extended beyond
the June 30 cut-off date. The purpose of the provision
was to force the Congolese to assume responsibility for
their affairs and to prevent the United Nations from being
committed indefinitely in the Congo.
With the Force's departure the Congo sank once again
into chaos and civil war. The job of retraining the Congo
lese so that they could maintain order when the United
Nations troops departed was apparently not successfully
accomplished.
Conclusions
We have now reviewed the complicated and sometimes
confusing history of the United Nations Force in the Congo.
The Congo posed immense challenges for the United Nations.
The United Nations victory in the Congo, if it could be
termed a victory, was reached at heavy costs. The Congo
experience in many ways raised as many questions as it
-
These special arrangements included donations of
SI.3 million by the United States and other Western nations.


585
the United Nations Force in the Congo were, first, main
taining political controls over the military operations in
the field without unduly hampering the military, and,
second, acquiring and maintaining an effective fighting
force, with emphasis on the fighting.
The question of political control was never effec
tively resolved in the Congo operation. The problem
existed at two levels. On the one hand, the General Assembly
and the Security Council were reluctant to take policy
leadership, leaving a great deal of discretion to the
Secretariat. Hammarskjold, especially after the September,
I960, crisis, made a practice of going to the Security
Council for new instructionsinstructions which they were
hesitant to give. U Thant as Secretary-General consulted
less with the Security Council. In fact, the Council did
not meet on the Congo question after November, 1961. Thus,
there was no consideration by the Council of the implica
tions and desirability of either the December, 1961, or
the December, 1962, fighting. It can be assumed that the
fact of not meeting implied tacit support for the policies
of the Secretary-General. Nonetheless, clearer policy
guidance would seem desirable.
The role of the Advisory Committee in giving policy
guidance to the Secretary-General needs further investiga
tion. It would seem possible for this body, composed of


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This interpretation of the observers' second role
would seem to be confirmed by the timing of their withdrawal
from Lebanon. It was shortly after the departure of the
United States marines that the liquidation of UNOGIL
commenced.
Conclusions
The Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine and
the Observation Group in Lebanon represent the most ambitious'
observation organizations established by the United Nations.
A comparison of the similarities and differences of the two
missions is revealing of the nature and development of this
peace-keeping technique.
An examination of the circumstances surrounding the
establishment of the Lebanon and Palestine groups suggests
that it was far easier to bring the later group into
existenceeasier both politically and administratively.
In 1948 the peace-keeping group represented a new,
little-used technique; only the gravest emergency could call
it into being. The United Nations responsibility to act in
the Palestine crisis in May, 1948, was clear: the United
Nations had prior involvement and commitments in the
Group] only after the threat of international war became
dangerously realwith the landing of American troops in
Lebanon, the landing of British troops in Jordan, the coup
in Iraq and the threats of the Soviet Union." He suggests
a correlation between the increase in patrolling and the
increase in international tension. Qubain, 0£. cit., p. 151.


424
world organization than the disease. Thus, when the
Nineteenth Session of the General Assembly convened in the
winter of 1964 the long-anticipated show-down over finances
was sidestepped (by the expedient of avoiding virtually all
roll-call votes) in favor of continued efforts to find a
solution to the financial crisis acceptable to all.
The essentially political nature of the financial
question is reflected as well in the United Nations retreat
from the concept of collective responsibility. Despite the
Courts opinion that all members are responsible for a
peace-keeping action voted by the Assembly or the Security
Council, other and extraordinary methods of financing have
been sought in the subsequent peace-keeping missions. In
the West New Guinea and Yemen cases the parties directly
involved were required to cover the costs of the United
Nations action. In the Cyprus situation the Secretary-
General returned to the precedents of the Korean War. Those
states contributing men to the United Nations Force were
asked to bear the costs of the operation. Voluntary contri
butions to make up any deficits were also invited. This
approach, too, has had discouraging results.
In its early peace-keeping activities the United
Nations established the observer group or force, got it
operating in the area of crisis, then worried about how to
pay for it. In the face of severe financial problems, this


1958 lias had civil war elements. Communal strife, racial
strafe, tribal strife all are likely in the new nations;
it is also likely that the United Nations will be involved
in some of these situations.
The duration of a crisis and the likelihood of a
solution will also affect the nature of a non-fighting
force's mission. The force is by definition a temporary
expedient designed to maintain the status quo while a politi
cal solution is sought to the underlying problems at issue.
If the final solutions prove illusive and the force's
temporary stay is prolonged as a consequence to semi
permanency, the problems of the force tend to be compounded.
Not only is it difficult over a long period of time to
maintain cooperative relationships in the field, but support
for the force at United Nations headquarters may ebb as well.
The force itself may be associated with the failure to re
solve the issues to the detriment of its prestige. To the
extent that the position of the force is undermined, its
ability to bring a successful resolution of the issues will
be weakened. At the same time the United Nations may find
its resources tied down to a crisis without end; its flexi
bility to meet new challenges reduced.
When the United Nations becomes involved in a less
than ideal situation, the gap between responsibility and
power widens. If the United Nations peace-keeping missions


15
instrument as it exists and, second, of the conditions of
its effective use, some tentative conclusions are put forth
as to the potential for the future of the non-fighting force.
The justification for a study such as this one rests
in the past and potential significance of the non-fighting
force as a technique for pacific settlement and in the
dearth of comparative studies on the force itself.
Almost all the studies of the peace-keeping groups
done thus far have concentrated on a particular use of the
force rather than on the force, considered Abstractly, as
an instrument of peaceful settlement. It is hoped that by
using a comparative case study approach, some conclusions
can be reached with regard to both the nature of the force
and to the conditions under which it may be used successfully.
These conclusions might then serve as the hypotheses of later
studies, enabling us to refine and elaborate our knowledge
of peace-keeping endeavors.
To go beyond what has been done in analyzing the non
fighting force as a peace-keeping instrument seems important
not only for scholarly but also for practical reasons. The
force is being used more and more often. Proposals for the
creation of ad hoc forces to meet new crises come with in
creasing frequency as do those for a permanent force of some
sort. As early as 19^8 Trygve Lie, then Secretary-General,
proposed a guard force of 1,000 to 5,000 mena proposal


55
The Secretary-General defended successfully his dis
cretionary powers in a brief discussion of the financing
question at the General Assembly meeting establishing the
position of Mediator. The point was raised by the repre
sentative of Yugoslavia that a General Assembly rule of
procedure required all resolutions involving expenditure of
funds to be accompanied by a statement of the budgetary
implications drawn up by the Secretary-General and approved
by the Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
(the Fifth Committee). The contention was brushed aside as
inapplicable to the situation. The Secretary-General noted,
first, that no precise figure could be given since neither
the contemplated size of the Mediator's staff nor the
duration of his activities was clearly known and, second,
that the Secretary-General had authority under resolution
166 to provide funds for the Mediator without prior reference
AO
to the Fifth Committee.
The Secretary-General's view of the situation seems
realistic in retrospect. The innovating nature of the
mission made it difficult to set up any over-all plans with
respect to expenditures or to estimate accurately the total
costs. In May the Secretary-General ventured a tentative
A1
cost estimate of $100,000 for the first year; actual costs
AO
Session,
260.
41
General Assembly, Official Records, 2nd Special
First Committee, 141st meeting (May 14, 1948),
P.
Ibid., p. 260


3^7
important, the United Nations, under the impact of several
serious incidents between the ONUC and the Congolese troops,
had negotiated a general agreement with the Congolese
Government which laid the basis for future cooperation as
equals. In this general agreement the Government of the
Congo accepted the February 21 resolution, while the United
Nations reaffirmed its respect for the sovereignty of the
Republic of the Congo in the implementation of the resolution.
The United Nations concentrated on accomplishing two
objectives in the February to August, 1961, period: halting
the fighting which threatened to plunge the Congo into civil
war, and restoring constitutional government to the Congo.
Civil war situations existed in a number of loca
tions in the Congo in early 1961. The United Nations
engaged in patient and persistent activities to prevent the
development of military operations and the outbreak of
hostilities. Using a combination of threats, persuasion,
and negotiation the Force moved quickly into situations of
potential violence and acted to restore the situation to as
much normalcy as possible. They encouraged meetings by
opposing sides, the establishment of neutral zones, the
withdrawal of invading forces, and disarmament.
The one sector in the Congo where United Nations
diplomacy had the least effect was Katanga. It might be
^United Nations Review, Vol. 8, No. 6 (June, 1961), p.
13.


250
request apparently stemmed at least in part from discussions
held "between Congolese leaders and Dr. Ralph. Bunche, the
Secretary-C-eneral' s representative in the Congo at the time
the crisis erupted,10
The communications to the Secretary-General fell upon
receptive ground, Secretary-General Hammarskjold was con
vinced that the United Nations had a responsibility to help
African states assume their place in the world community.
This concern for Africa was concretely expressed in the case
of the Congo even before the crisis erupted by' the presence
in the area of Dr, Bunche, Bunche had represented the
Secretary-General at the independence ceremonies and re
mained to discuss the kinds of assistance needed by the new
nation.
After the disorders the general concern for Congo
lese development was coupled with fear that the chaotic
internal situation would create a political vacuum tempting
great power intervention, posing dangers for the Congo and
the world. Injection of a peace-keeping force into the
area was one means of forestalling these dangers. Yet the
peacekeeping mission in the Congo differed in an essential
respect from its predecessors. It was designed to deal not
with an external threat to the Congo, not with an inter
national crisis involving two or more states, but with an.
A"Joseph Lash, Sag Hammarskjold: Custodian of the
Brushfire Peace (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., Inc.,
I96IX5 P 226".


281
of the Afro-Asians, which had been in the minority in
December, I960, had become majority opinion by November,
1961.
The consensus of opinion seemed to be that the United
Nations should aid in unifying the Congo and bringing an end
to the secessionist activities. It was reasoned that such
assistance would not constitute intervention in the internal
affairs of the Congo since the secession was foreign-
inspired and supported. The form which it was assumed that
United Nations assistance might take was the eviction of
mercenaries and political advisers and the stoppage of goods
and equipment sent to the secessionist state. If the
United Nations had to use force to achieve these ends, then
52
it would have to use force.
and other weapons of war which have entered any region of
the Congo contrary to the laws of the Congo and United
Nations resolutions. The amendment which had far-reaching
implications did not receive the seven votes necessary for
passage. Security Council, Official Records, 16th Year,
978th meeting (November 21, 1961), p. 4.
52
v Although the November 24 resolution provided specifi
cally for the use of force only in the elimination of the
mercenaries, some of the delegates seemed to feel that force
might be used to end the secession of Katanga if necessary.
Por example, Mr. Malalasekeva of Ceylon said, "The draft
resolution does not authorize the Secretary-General to go to
war but it does give him authority and initiative to apply
a requisite measure of force." The representative of
Ceylon had confidence that the Secretary-General could de
cide what was a requisite measure of force. Security
Council, Official Records, 16th Year, 975th meeting
(November-Tc^ 37561),'p. 4', In the same vein the representa
tive of the United Arab Republic noted that the resolution
deprecated the secessionist activities illegally carried
out by the Katanga administration and authorized the


295
of his awareness of the sensitivity of these new nations
and of his conviction that they could be helped best by
helping themselves.
Becruitment for ONUC was easy in the early stages of
the operation. A number of African and Asian states res
ponded enthusiastically and promptly to the Secretary-
General's request for troops. Contingents from such
perennial supporters of peace-keeping as Canada, Norway,
Sweden, and Ireland rounded out the representativeness of
the Force and tempered the principle of regional solidarity
and self-help with that of universality.
The period of abundance of manpower soon ended, how
ever, and the maintenance of the Force at even minimal
strength to accomplish its mission became a major problem.
As the operation became more controversial and as its life
extended over months, then years, enthusiasm waned. And
so correspondingly did troop contributions to the Force.
The plans of the Secretary-General to draw heavily
on the African states for the Force were shattered early by
the decision of'a number of African states to withdraw their
troops from ONUC. All of the African states belonging to
the Casablanca Group except Ghana withdrew their men in
late i960 and early 1961 because of dissatisfaction with
the policies the United Nations was pursuing in the Congo.
(Ghana substantially reduced its contribution to the Force,


7A
but each, made reference to Chapter VII and seemed to move
progressively closer to actual invocation of enforcement
measures.
In the debate in the Security Council on the Nay 29
resolution two schools of thought emerged. One, including
the Soviet Union and the United States among its proponents,
called for action under the enforcement provisions of
Chapter VII, apparently feeling that stronger action than
18
had been taken in the past was necessary. The other
school of opinion, including among its adherents Belgium
and Britain, called for action under Chapter VI, viewing
invocation of Chapter VII as a serious and uncertain step.
There was feeling that invocation of Chapter VII without
assurance of effective application of measures of coercion
and without knowledge of all the potential consequences of
19
such action was a serious step, not to be lightly taken.
The Nay 29 resolution did refer to Chapter VII, how
ever, and the July 15 resolution made even greater use of
that section of the Charter. In the July 15 resolution the
parties were for the first time ordered to comply with the
measures specified by the Council vmder Article 40 of the
rin- Vi i i M g rl
For the Soviet statement see Security Council,
Official Records, 3rd Year, 309th meeting (Nay 29, 1948), p.
2 For the "United States statement see Security Council,
Official Records, 3rd Year, 308th meeting (Nay 28, 1948), pp.
^Security Council, Official Records, 3rd Year, 309th
meeting (Nay 29, 19^8), ppT 10-14'.


346
Finally, the situation of the Force in the Congo was
made more tenable by an improvement in relations between
the United Nations and the Central Government, In January
and February tension between United Nations Headquarters in
Leopoldville and Congolese officials was high; relations
were marked by personal antipathies and frictions. The
United Nations Command apparently seldom consulted the
Congolese Government on its moves, while the Congolese
Government, in its turn, cooperated little with ONUC. By
April there had been a significant change in United Nations-
48
Congolese relations. Mr. Dayal, the controversial repre
sentative of the Secretary-General, had been replaced by a
more amenable representative, Mr. Mekki Abbas. More
rg- "-j -- lr~r"~'"l,r
It is true that before the position of the United
Nations vis-a-vis the Congolese leaders grew better, it
first grew worse. The Congolese officials of all factions
met the announcement of the February 21 resolution with
fear and bitterness at the outset. The United Nations
officials had apparently done little to explain the reso
lution to the Congolese or to reassure them as to the
safety and sanctity of their independence. The Congolese
feared that the aim of the resolution was to disarm their
soldiers and to convert the Congo into some sort of
trusteeship. Thus, a series of incidents involving physi
cal and verbal attacks on the ONUC took place in the period
immediately following passage of the resolution. The most
serious of thesethe Banana-Matadi incident in which the
Congolese troops forced the United Nations Ghanaian units
to withdraw from the areawas a blessing in disguise. It
led to the first serious consultation between the United
Nations and the Congolese Government following passage of
the February 21 resolution. These consultations were the
opening wedge for the negotiation of a general agreement
between the United Nations and the Government of the Congo,


477
Security Council, Official Records, Third Tear (1948),
Supplements for 1948
A/AC.21/13, Feb. 9 1948, "Relations between the United
Rations Palestine Commission and the Security Council."
S/?14, April 1, 1948, "Resolutions adopted at the 277th
meeting of the Security Council concerning the
Palestinian question."
S/723, April 16, 1948, "Resolution adopted at the 283rd
meeting of the Security Council concerning a truce in
Palestine."
S/732, April 30, 1948, "Cablegram from the Chairman of
the Palestine Truce Commission to the President of the
Security Council."
S/762, May 21, 1948, "Cablegram received on 21 May
1948 from the Chairman of the Security Council Truce
Commission for Palestine addressed to the President of
the Security Council."
S/773? May 22, 1948, "Resolution adopted at the 302nd
meeting concerning the Palestine question."
S/801, May 29, 1948, "Resolution adopted at the 310th
meeting concerning the Palestine question."
S/823, June 4, 1948, "Cablegram dated 4 June 1948 from
the United Rations Mediator in Palestine to the
Secretary-General."
S/829, June 7, 1948, "Cablegram from the United Rations
Mediator in Palestine to the Secretary-General."
S/834, June 10, 1948, "Letter dated 10 June 1948 from
the acting representative of the Provisional Government
of Israel addressed to the Secretary-General transmit
ting the reply of the Provisional Government of Israel
to the cease-fire and truce proposals of the United
Rations Mediator."
S/838, June 9, 1948, "Replies received from the
Governments of Yemen, Iraq and Transjordan in response
to the cease-fire and truce proposals of the United
Rations Mediator."
S/839, June 15, 1948, "Cablegram dated 15 June 1948
from the United Rations Mediator to the Secretary-
General ."


497
Heathcote, Nina. "American Policy Towards the U.N. Operation
in the Congo," Australian Outlook, Vol. 18, No. 1
(April, 1964), pp. 77-97.
Hoffmann, Stanley. "In Search of a Thread: The UN in the
Congo Labyrinth," International Organization, Vol. 16,
No. 2 (Spring, 1962), pp. 331-361.
. "Sisyphus and the Avalanche: The United Nations,
Egypt, and Hungary," International Organization, Yol.
11, No. 3 (Summer, 1957), pp. 446-69.'
Hogg, James Pergusson. "Peace-Keeping Costs and Charter
ObligationsImplications of the International Court
of Justice Decision on Certain Expenses of the United
Nations," Columbia Law Review, Vol. 62, No. 7 (November,
1962), pp. 1230-63.
Holmes, John. "The Political and Philosophic Aspects of U.N.
Security Eorces," Paper prepared for the Conference on
the United Nations Security Eorces, Oslo, Norway,
February, 1964, pp. 1-15.
Hottinger, Arnold. "Zu'ama1 and Parties in the Lebanese
Crisis of 1958," The Middle East Journal, Vol. 15, No.
2 (Spring, 1961), pp. 127-40.
Hovet, Thomas, Jr. "United Nations Diplomacy," Journal of
International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 1 (1963), pp. 29-41.
"How the United Nations Runs a War." US News and World
Report, Vol. 50, No. 12 (March 20, I9"6X), pp. 44-46.
Jackson, Elmore. "Constitutional Developments of the United
Nations: The Growth of.Its Executive Capacity," Pro
ceedings of the American Society of International Lav/,
55th Annual Meeting (April 27-29, 1961), pp. 78-88.
Jackson, John H. "The Legal Framework of United Nations
Financing: Peace Keeping and Penury," California Law
Review, Vol. 51, Ho. 1 (March, 1963), pp. 794127'.
James, Alan. "U.N. Action for Peace: I. Barrier Forces,"
World Today, Vol. 18, No. 11 (November, 1962), pp. 478-
86.
. "U.N. Action for Peace: II. Law and Order Forces,"
World Today, Vol. 18, No. 12 (December, 1962), pp. 504-13.
Karabus, Alan. "United Nations Activities in the Congo,"
Proceedings of the American Society of International
Lav;, 55th"Annual Meeting (April 27-28, 1961), pp. 30-38.


36
for an end to hostilities, banned the introduction of mili
tary men or materials into the belligerent anea, and
enjoined the protection of Holy Places and shrines. None
of the resolutions specified precisely what the role of the
observers was to be in ensuring that the truce terms would
be carried through. It was left largely to the Mediator to
spell out the role of the truce observersthe responsi
bilities they should bear and the policies they should
follow in meeting these responsibilities.
The mandate of the observers, as defined by the
Mediator or the basis of the relevant resolutions, limited
the role the observers could play in the Palestine crisis.
It is true, however, that the Mediator initially interpre
ted the responsibilities of the observers in relatively
broad fashion. Their primary purpose, in his view, was to
prevent a renewal of large-scale fighting during the truce
and to preserve the equitability of the truce. The phrase
"to prevent" might have opened the door to a widening of
the authority of the observers. The door which was opened
was quickly slammed shut. Potential disagreement among the
membei's on the preventive functions of the observers was
forestalled by the Secretary-General's firm declaration
that the Truce Supervision Organization had no preventive


year to authorize the Secretary-General to spend for UUEF
and accepted the formula for assessing expenses set forth
hy the Fifth Committee. On the other hand, a great many
states did not pay or were slow in paying their share.
UUSF fell steadily deeper in debt. The scope of the
problem is suggested by looking at the status of the Special
Account for selected periods. On October 7, 1957? after the
Force had been in existence nearly a year the Secretary-
General reported receipts of only $5?74-3,644- of the initial
no
$10 million assessed.' By the end of 1961 the account
arrears was over $26 million and 73 states were behind in
their payments to the account. By mid-1965, $27,34-9,581
was due for the 1957-1962 period. Forty-eight states had
paid their assessments in full, while fifty-six states were
in arrears. Of the latter twenty-seven had paid nothing at
all on the UTEF assessments, while eight states had paid
79
less than one-fourth the amount due.
An examination of who paid and who did not suggests
where the hard support for the Force rested. The strongest
support came from the United States and those middle-sized
European and English-speaking states which had given the
Force strong backing in the debates. Hot surprisingly, the
least material support came from those most opposed to the
78U.U. Doc. A/3694-? p. 9*
^U.U. Doc. A/C.5/974- (May 14-, 1965) (mimeograph)
Annex III, pp. 1-4-.


353
concrete and controversial expression in the August-
September military encounters between ONUC and the Katanga
gendarmerie. The experience suggested the dangers of in
creasing involvement without increasing capabilities cor
respondingly.
On August 28 in pursuance of the February 21 resolu
tion and Ordinance 70,^ the United Nations Force in
Katanga took positive steps to assist the Adoula Government
in eliminating the foreign mercenaries. In the early
morning hours ONUC began operation "Rumpunch," which was
designed to apprehend all foreign officers.
The United Nations moves, executed with swiftness
and surprise, succeeded admirably. Key installations were
occupied. Evacuation measures were undertaken. Virtually
no opposition was met.
Government if they used forceful means to achieve that unity.
On August 26, Conor Cruise O'Brien, the United Nations
Representative in Katanga indicated that the United Nations
was ready to help Adoula end Katanga's independence by
military force if necessary. (United Nations sources in New
York disassociated themselves from O'Brien's statement,
expressing some doubt that it had ever been made.) Burns
and Heathcote, op. cit., pp. 96-99.
^United Nations officials considered that Ordinance
70 calling for the expulsion of all non-Congolese officers
and mercenaries along with the request to the United Nations
for assistance in executing the Ordinance gave the United
Nations legal rights within the Congo corresponding to the
terms of the February 21, 1961, resolution. U.N. Doc.
S/WO, pp. 99-100.


LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
1. Tbe Growth of UNOGIL: The Increase in
Observers Over the Months 114
2. The Scope of Observational Activity by
UNOGIL from June through October, 1958 158
5. Source of Troops for ONUC . 297
A-l. Record, of Critical Votes in the Security
Council on the Establishment and Support of
Peace-Keeping Groups. 455
A-2V. Selected Critical Votes in the General
Assembly on the Establishment and Support of
Peace-Keeping Groups 456
B-l. The National Composition of UNTSO 458
B-2. The National Composition of UNOGIL 459
B-3. The National Composition of UNEE Over the
Years ..................... 460
B-4. The National Composition of ONUC at Selected
Times 461
B-5. The National Composition of the United
Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYF) 463
C-l. A Comparison of Peace-Keeping Expenses and
Regular United Nations Expenses in Selected
Years and Selected Periods. 464


293
so also had leadership at United Nations Headquarters.
U Thant of Burma was Secretary-General. Afro-Asians ap
parently played a more important role in the direction of
the Congo operation. Their increased number and stature
in the United Nations as a whole was reflected in miniature
in the Congo. It is not without significance that the
direction of the Force's role changed simultaneously toward
greater activisma shift long desired by a majority of
Afro-Asian members.
Support for ONUC
Men for the United Nations Force.-The composition
of the United Nations Force, like that of earlier peace
keeping missions, was largely determined by the Secretary-
General. Hammarskjold followed the principles of regional
solidarity, universality, and exclusion of permanent
members of the Security Council in his selection of troops
4
for the Force.
l
'Two challenges to the Secretary-General's position
on the composition of the Force were raised, unsuccessfully,
in the initial Security Council debate on the Force. France
voiced the opinion that only troops from completely uncom
mitted states, states with no interest in the Congo should
be used. This might be interpreted as a suggestion that
African states should not supply troops for ONUC. However,
France did not elaborate upon nor press this position to a
vote. Security Council, Official Records, 16th Year,
873- meeting (July 13/14-? p. 25. An almost dia
metrically opposed stand was taken by the Soviet Union.
They brought to a vote a resolution which would have dis
carded the principle of universality by providing that only


to circumstances At the time the United Nations was heavily
committed, if not over-committed, in men and money for
peace-keeping)
Second, with UNEN the precedent was set that the
permanent members of the Security Council should not con
tribute men to a peace-keeping group. This principle
reflects a major function of the group to isolate dis
putes from the conflicts of the major powers. There was a
departure from this principle in the formation of the
United Nations Eorce in Cyprus. Again, the departure was
a result of special circumstances. The fact that the
United Kingdom had several thousand troops on Cyprus,
equipped, trained, and acquainted with the terrain and the
problems, combined with the reluctance of member states to
contribute men to the Eorce made it desirable if not
essential to include British troops in the Eorce. The sub
sequent treatment of the British members of the United
Nations Eorce by the Cypriotes and the suspicion engendered
by their presence suggests the wisdom of the original
principle.
Finally, under the NEE pattern those states with
any special interests, actual or potential, in an area were
also exempt from participation in the peace-keeping force.
Thus, no Middle Eastern states participated in UNEE. In the
Congo this principle was modified in favor of that of


119
As with the Palestine organization the nature of the
mission made transportation and communication items the main
requirements. The operational expenses of UNOGIL were
$15600,000. The hulk of this sum, approximately 80 per
cent, went for the purchase or rental of equipment. The
scope of the operation and something of its character is
suggested in the breakdown of these expenses: 59.7 per cent
was devoted to transportation equipment; 16.3 per cent to
communications equipment; 7.7 per cent to field equipment;
and .5 per cent to supplies and services.Another 5.0
per cent or $90,000 went to the rental and maintenance of
the premises.
The legal status of UNQGIL
In the decisions on composition, size, and financing
the foundation of the UNOGIL personality was laid. The
organizations legal personality was also set in the early
days of the organization. The legal position of the Obser
vation Group in Lebanon was based on a letter of June 13,
1958?from the Secretary-General to the Foreign Minister of
34
Lebanon.
In the aforementioned letter, constituting an agree
ment, three main propositions with respect to the Observation
^U.N. Doc. A/C.5/763? Annex I (November 14, 1958),
pp. 26-27. Another $2,200,000 was spent on personnel costs:
travel, subsistence, and some salaries.
54U.N. Doc. S/4029.


354
Temporary precautionary measures (for example, the
house arrest of the Minister of Interior of Katanga and the
occupation of the radio station) were lifted on the same
day instituted, with Tshombe's promise to cooperate fully
with the United Nations, to dismiss all foreign officers,
and to announce on the radio his acquiescence to the United
Nations action. The Belgian Consul volunteered to take
responsibility for ensuring the surrender, repatriation,
and travel of all persons required to be evacuated. On the
assumption that the troops would be evacuated, the United
Nations halted its apprehension of foreign military person
nel. For a time there was great enthusiasm over the blood
less success of "Rumpunch." It was considered by some to
mark the end of Katanga's secession.
The success of "Rumpunch" proved of short duration.
Neither the immediate objective of eliminating the mercen
aries or the more basic aim of ending Katanga's secession
was achieved.^
In the days following the August 28 maneuver tensions
rose in Katanga. Threatening acts by the political police,
^By September 9, the deadline set for the evacuation
of foreign military personnel, only 273 foreign officers and
mercenaries had been repatriated with an additional 65 await
ing repatriation. Perhaps more serious was evidence that a
number of foreign officers.were returning and reinfiltrating
the gendarmerie. Ibid., p, 102.


75
continued in existence after the truce to help preserve the
armistice. The initial organization and its successor have
provided experience, precedents, and personnel that have
eased the establishment of succeeding missions.
The experience with the Truce Supervision Organization
contributes to our understanding, as well, of the factors
which are important, first, to stimulating creation of a
peace-keeping group and, second, to the effective functioning
of that group once in being.
The creation of UNTSO was in many ways a minimal
response by the United Nations to a crisis situation. Three
factors seem to be of particular significance in the origins
of the Truce Supervision Organization. First, an imminent
threat to the peace was presented when full-scale war broke
out in Palestine in mid-May, 19/-t-8, with Israels proclama
tion of independent status and the consequent Arab invasion.
Second, the United Nations had clear responsibility for the
Palestine situation. It had taken jurisdiction from
Britain; it had been seeking an acceptable solution for the
future of Palestine for more than a year. Third, the United
Nations had direct involvement as well as some precedents
to follow in Palestine through the actions of the Truce
Commission which was attempting to impose a cease-fire.
Crisis, responsibility, and involvement led to United Nations
actionnot the boldest nor roost dramatic action possible,


261
the mandate of the Force too narrowly, specifically sepa
rated Article 4-0 from the enforcement side of Chapter VII,
saying:
Has the Council...ever given the Secretary-General or
the Force the meansI mean now the legal meanshy
which we could carry out the wider mandate you believe
has been given to the Force? And if so...could the
Council have given such means to the Force, through
the Secretary-General, without acting against the
clear injunctions of the Charter? May I remind you
that it is even doubtful if the Council has ever
acted under chapter VII. The very most that can be
said is that the Council's actions may have been taken
under Article 4-0 of the Charter.24-
In the Secretary-General's view the United Nations
Force could not be deemed to be acting under the enforcement
articles unless a specific finding to that effect was made.
And he suggests in the above statement that such a finding
might well be ultra vires of the Charter. A majority of the
Security Council members, as well as of the International
Court of Justice, upheld this interpretation. The Inter
national Court of Justice stated explicitly that "the
operations known as UNEF and ONUC were not enforcement
25
actions within the compass of Chapter VII of the Charter. ..
Security Council, Official Records, 15th Year,
915th meeting (December 8/9, i95)',""p~2?.
^International Court of Justice, Certain Expenses'
of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2 of the
CharterJT Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962: I.C.J. Heports,
X9"62! p. 166.


be attributed to several things: the strengthened mandate
provided by the February 21 resolution; the increased sup
port given to the Force in its activities; the improved
relationships between the Force and the Central Government
of the Congo. All helped to close the gap between the power
and responsibilities of the Forcethe gap which had become
so wide by the end of I960.
'The February 21 resolution clarified and strengthened
the charge to the Force to prevent civil war, to bring about
the withdrawal of Belgian and other foreign military and
para-military personnel and political advisers, and to assis
in the re-establishment of a constitutional government and
45
in the reorganization and control of Congolese army units.
If the Force were to regard the February resolution as
embodying instructions to it from the Security Council, it
would have to conclude that there had been no drastic
alteration in its objectives but that it had been given
some discretion to use new means to achieve its ends. The
use-of-force provision, that provision which empowered OFUC
to use force to. prevent civil war, seemed to widen to some
indeterminate amount the power of the United Rations Force.
The Secretary-General interpreted narrowly the so-
called new mandate. Thus, actual instances of ONUC talcing
the initiative in using force to halt civil strife were few
U.R. Doc. S/4741, pp. 147-148.


383
to withdraw their men; and, second, by the dangers and hard
ships to which the Force was exposed which led both to
withdrawal of troops and reluctance to contribute. In
addition, certain states, such as India, resented the fact
that their men were endangered because they fought under
restrictions as a peace-keeping force and attempted to have
these limiting rules modified or eliminated.
To fight successfully not only men but material are
necessary. A fighting force needs substantially more and
different equipment from a non-fighting force; jet planes,
heavier weapons, more ammunition, more troop transport may
be required. In September, 1961, the United Nations Force
was not adequately equipped for the fighting' in which it
engaged. Despite U Thant's contention that ONUC had only
defensive weapons throughout its mission, many new items
such as jets were placed at the disposal of the Force prior
to the December, 1961, and December, 1962, fighting. For
reasons of cost and politics the United Nations relied
primarily on the contributions of member states for this
equipment.
The need for large numbers of men and equally large
amounts of equipment in the Congo contributed to the serious
financial crisis which grew out of this peace-keeping venture.
The costs of the operation were difficult for the United
Nations to bear in view of the unwillingness of a number of


361
the United Nations leadership shrank from the use of very
much initiative or very much force. The Secretary-General
might stretch his principles with respect to international
military forces to allow the use of a little force, hut he
was less ready to see ONUC involved in a bloody battle to
impose a solution to the Congo question.
It appeared that the United Nations Force could not
fulfill its mandate and still maintain its position as a
non-intervening force, yet there was reluctance to alter
the rules of the game. The need was for a clear decision
on what the goals and means of the Force were to be. Yet,
the death of the Secretary-General left ONUC at least
temporarily without the strong leadership necessary to make
such a basic organization-shaping decision.
The Force was weakened not only by confusion over
its role but also by a decline once again in its material
strength and prestige. The September fray, whether or not
it was, in fact, a military defeat for ONUC, was so in
terpreted, and this interpretation undercut the prestige
of the Force. Moreover, a reduction in troop strength was
cutting into the capabilities of the Force. Withdrawal of
contingents from Ghana, Tunisia, and Liberia reduced the
troop strength from 19,825 in July, 1961, to 15,500 in
October with the expectation that further withdrawals would
cut the Force to around 14,400 by December.


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Nations. London: Stevens and Sons, Ltd., I960.
Telders, Professor-Study Group (compiled by), United Nations
Textbook. Leiden: Leiden University Press, 1958*
Articles
"Assembly's Efforts to Overcome Serious Financial Diffi
culties," United Nations Review, Vol. 9 No. 1 (Janu
ary, 1962), pp. 24-26.
Bishop, Peter. "Katanga: United Nations Crucible," Q.ueen' s
Quarterly, Vol. 69 (Spring, 1962), pp. 113-2?.


435
that a force might have operated effectively to dampen down
a crisis if it had been possible to create the force
initially.
It may be. concluded that there are four clusters
of factors which are significant in determining whether a
non-fighting military presence will be established.
A first and minimum requirement for the establishment
of a force is that there be at least passive acquiescence to
such establishment by all the major powers or, alterna
tively, fairly wide support among the members of the Organi
zation. The acquiescence of the permanent members of the
Security Council is, of course, necessary if the force is
to be created by the Council where the veto is omnipresent.
If the agreement necessary for Security Council action is
missing, the General Assembly can act under the "Uniting
for Peace" resolution. Although there has been much popular
comment linking this resolution to the peace-keeping forces,
every group except the United Nations Emergency Force and
the Security Force for West New Guinea, which was rather
special in character, has been created by the Security
Council. It would appear that in the area of peace-keeping
the Security Council has not been superceded by the General
Assembly. Nonetheless, one may assume that the "Uniting for
Peace" resolution acts as a prod to the Security Council.
Since the General Assembly can move into areas where the


7
Despite the success of the Saar experiment, there
was no consideration at the United Nations preparatory-
conferences or at the San Francisco Conference in 194-5 of
the establishment of a permanent non-fighting force. The
importance that this sort of force could have in stabilizing
crisis situations was evidently not foreseen. All efforts
to create an international military force were concentrated
on the establishment of a fighting force under Article 4-3
of the Charter.
Thus, there were only a few precedents either
theoretical or actual for the United Nations use of military
men for peace-keeping purposes. The history of the non
fighting force is short; for all practical purposes the
evolution of the non-fighting force from tentative begin
nings in observer groups to small armies occurs within the
lifetime of the United Nations.
If the uses by the United Nations of the military
presence were placed on a continuum, running from the least
to the most ambitious in size and scope, they would fall
into three broad groups. At one end of the continuum would
be the small, multi-national observer groups used primarily
Colombian settlement of Letitia, the League Council resolved
the issue by placing Letitia under the administration of a
League Commission for one year. The Commission was assisted
by an "international force." The international force was,
in fact, composed only of Colombian soldiers deputized by
the League of Nations and wearing special arm-bands.


108
executive agent, for example, tlie Mediator in Palestine),
It has been difficult to reconcile the need for discretion
by the executive with the need for ultimate control by the
political organs of the United Nations. In the Lebanese
case, as in others, the Security Council and the Assembly
tended virtually to abdicate their powers and responsibili
ties to the Secretary-General.
The Secretary-General's power to create and mold a
peace-keeping group is, of course, never unlimited even
when the formal controls of the Council are very loose. In
the case of the Observation Group in Lebanon there were at
least three sorts of restraints on Hammarskjold, One of
these, the Advisory Group, has considerable potential for
development as an effective instrument of over-all guidance.
Pirst, the Secretary-General operated within the
framework of precedents set during the lifetime of the
United Nations with respect to similar types of organiza
tions, He did not create the Observation Group in a void.
The precedents established and the experience gained in
setting up truce organizations in Indonesia, Kashmir, and
Palestine and an emergency force in Suez undoubtedly in
fluenced many of the decisions which Hammarskjold had to
make with respect to the group in Lebanondecisions, for
example, on the composition of the group, on its relations
with the host state, on the scope of authority.


427
arms is that the precise shape and nature of the endeavor
is determined in large part by decisions made by the
Secretary-General, The peace-keeping group in being is in
good part a reflection of the Secretary-General's conception
of what it should be. Thus, under Hammarskjold there was
great emphasis on the principles of the operation, caution
in any expansion of the activities of the force, and avoid
ance if at all possible of military engagement. Both
Trygve Lie and U Thant seem less concerned about principle
than about operating success. Their groups would apparently
have a potentially broader mandate than Hammarskjold deemed
acceptable. As Secretary-General, Lie stood at the fore
front of United Nations opinion, recommending both a standing
United Nations guard and an armed force to enforce the
decisions of the world organization with respect to Palestine.
U Thant has been more reluctant to commit the United Nations
to new peace-keeping activities than was his predecessor,
but once committed he appears more willing to breach the
principles of non-fighting and neutrality if this is neces
sary to the success of the mission.
The responsibilities for peace-keeping assumed by the
Secretary-General have strengthened that office. But those
same responsibilities have destructive potential. If the
mission errs, if the force becomes controversial, blame
falls on the Secretary-General.


357
the Porce was acting not merely in self-defense but was
taking an initiative to try to achieve a political settle
ment. According to Conor Cruise O'Brien, the United Nations
Representative in Katanga, the September 15 action, the so-
called "Operation Morthar," was carefully planned with the
objective of ending the secession of Katanga once and for
all and by force if necessary. Under his interpretation
it was basically enforcement action by the United Nations.
A central question about the decision-making which
remains unanswered is whether the military action was
ordered from United Nations Headquarters with the full know
ledge and approval of the Secretary-General or whether it
was decided upon by those in the field with limited, if any,
prior consultations with the Secretary-General. Either
interpretation raises some serious questions about the
international military operation.
maintenance of law and order, while the United Nations re
sumed carrying out its task of apprehending and evacuating
foreign military and para-military personnel. At this
point an alert was set since arson was discovered at the
ONUC garage. As the United Nations troops were proceeding
towards the garage premises, fire was opened on them from
the building where a number of foreign officers are known
to be staying. [In the first version of the report "the
building" read 'Belgian Consulate.'] United Nations troops
were subsequently also resisted and fired at as they were
deploying towards key points or while they were guarding
installations in the city. United Nations troops returned
the fire." See U.N. Doc. S/4940, p, 103.
^Conor Cruise O'Brien describes the plans for Opera
tion Morthar in some detail in his account of his experience
in United Nations service in Katanga. See O'Brien, op. cit.,
pp. 247-53.


306
Thirdly, it follows that [such] expenses are not
"expenses of the Organization" within the meaning of
Article 17 (2).
The Mexican representative supported his conclusion that the
San Francisco Conference had intended to exclude expenses
resulting from operations under Article 43 from the penalty
provision hy citing the official records of the Conference
and hy interpreting the terms of Articles 43 and 106. He
then went on to argue that expenses of the Congo operation
could not he classified as "expenses of the Organization,"
either, saying:
...if the obligationsand these ,of course include,
the expensesconnected with the use of armed forces
in accordance with the provisions of Article 43 (the
only Article of the Charter which lays down methods
for the establishment and maintenance of such forces)
were deliberately and intentionally excluded by the
San Francisco Conference from the application of the
penalty provided for in Article 19 and thus ioso
facto from the "expenses of the Organization" within
the meaning of Article 17 (2) of the Charter...then
expenses arising out of military operations not
explicitly provided for in the Charter, operations
which can only be considered admissible by implica
tion, by analogy, and as a result of valid decisions
by the competent body, must a fortiori be excluded
from the application of that, penalty; it follows.that
such expenses cannot be regarded as "expenses of the
Organization" within the meaning of Article 17 (2).^2
The reasoning of the Mexican representative seems
fragile and tortured. Even assuming that expenses under
Doc. A/C. 5/868 (April 26, 1961) (mimeographed),
p. 1. Statement made by the representative of Mexico at the
845th meeting of the Fifth Committee on April 20, 1961.
Ibid., p 4.


241
which, have failed for economic or political reasons to pay
their assessment. The Force has not been equally dependent
on all; it has relied heavily on a few staunch supporters.
The success of UNEF can be credited to a harmonious
balance of the Force's powers and responsibilities. Al
though the Force's powers were restricted and the commit-
s
ments of the members of the United Nations to it limited,
UNEF's responsibilities were also narrowly defined. In
addition, the Force operated in a highly favorable political
milieu. It had the consent and cooperation of the parties
involved and considerable moral support at United Nations
headquarters for its activities.
With the benefit of hindsight and of the experience
of the recent peace-keeping forces, it can be concluded
that the principles of UNEFwhich are the principles of a
limited forceare not equally applicable to all peace
keeping operations. Consent, cooperation, and limited
responsibilities seem almost essential concomitants of a
UNEF-type operation. Without the latter conditions, the
likelihood is either a failure of mission or-a redefinition
of the Force.


40
the influence of the Secretariat and of certain of the
national delegations, particularly the United States.
The relationship between the Mediator and the
SecretaryGeneral appears to have been one of close collabo
ration. Although the critical decisions seem to have been
made by the Mediator, there is evidence that the Secretary-
General's role in the decision-making process went beyond
24
merely implementing the requests of the Mediator. Several
things suggest an important part for the Secretary-General
in the Palestine operation: first, the Secretary-General's
role in selecting the Mediator, for it was Lie who proposed
Bernadotte as Mediator and who appointed Bunche Acting
Mediator; second, the close personal friendship between the
Secretary-General and both Bernadotte and Bunche; and third,
the fact of direct and evidently much-used communications
between Lake Success and the Mediator's headquarters at
Rhodes.
What was the relationship of the Mediator to the
Security Council and particularly to those nations which
were most concerned with the Palestine question because of
According to Stephen Schwebel, the United Nations
effort in Palestine might be classified as a joint field-
headquarters endeavor in which the Mediator and the Secretary-
General collaborated in indispensably interdependent fashion.
Stephen Schwebel, The Secretary-General of the United Nations:
His Political Powers and Practice (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 19525, p. 11U*


289
office." In the period between Hammarskjold's death and U
Thant's assumption of the reins of leadership, the "Congo
Club" directed the Congo operation without apparent diffi
culty.
Despite its name the Congo Advisory Committee appears
to have been designed less to provide guidance to the
Secretary-General than to win support for the Force. The
Committee, modeled after the UHEF Advisory Committee, was
composed of representatives of states contributing troops
to the Force. (Despite the fact that several of the states
pulled their troops out of the Force in early 1961, they
continued to hold membership on the Advisory Committee.)
The Secretary-General announced creation of the Advisory
Committee in late August, I960. At the time both he and
the Force were coming under increasingly heavy attack and
pressure was mounting from the Congolese and Soviet repre
sentatives for an Afro-Asian Observer Group to oversee the
Congo operation. The Advisory Committee served to widen
the formal channels of communication and consultation
_ :
Singled out for their influence were the American
members of the group, Dr. Ralph Sunche, Dr. Heinz Viesch-
hoff, and Mr. Andrew Cornier. Other members of the Congo
Club included C.V. Harasimhan, Sir Alexander MacFarquhar,
General Indarjit Rikhye, Frances Uwokedi, Robert Gardiner
and Taieb Sahbani. Conor Cruise O'Brien, To Katanga and
Back: A HR Case History (London: Hutchinson, 1962), pp.
50-51.


78
It Is quite clear that UNTSO did not prevent all out
breaks of violence, or even all major outbreaks. Jerusalem
was the scene of hostilities and continuous light fighting
through the early months of the Second Truce. In October,
19-4-85 the entire truce almost broke down with heavy fighting
in both the North and South of Palestine and a marked slow
ness in the belligerents' responses to the calls for a halt
in the fighting. Nor did the observers prevent the intro
duction of at least some men and equipment into Palestine
65
during the truce. The effectiveness of the Truce Super
vision Organization in both reporting and preventing inci
dents was undoubtedly hampered by some discrepancy between
the formidable responsibilities of the Organization and its
qualifications to meet those responsibilities.
6 5
Estimates on the extent of this violation vary. The
Mediator in a report to the General Assembly stated, "Un
questionably if more personnel and equipment had been
available, closer supervision could have been maintained in
Palestine as well as in the seven Arab states, but I am
convinced that if the two opposing forces did in fact manage
to obtain war materials by clandestine methods, the amount
would have been so limited as to have made no substantial
difference to the relative strength of the two sides." U.N.
Doc. A/64-8, p. 34, In the same vein Paul Mohn concludes
that the Truce Supervision Organization knew that the
clandestine entry of arms was occurring, but they could
only contain it in reasonable limits. See Mohn, op. cit.,
p. 76. A more critical view of the truce violations is pre
sented by Edgar O'Ballance in his study of the Arab-Israeli
war. Ee contends that the truce periods, and particularly
the Pirst Truce period, were used by both sides, but especi
ally by the Israelis, to acquire aircraft, armor, artillery,
ammunition, and even some ships. Edgar O'Ballance, 0£. cit.,
pp. 138-59.


360
Force in the field. It is perhaps significant that a key-
figure in the September operation, M, Khiary, was a
Tunisian and that the Afro-Asian approach favored a more
positive role by ONUC to end the secession of Katanga.
The United Nations Force was in an unenviable posi
tion from the time that the September cease-fire agreement
was signed until the end of November. The Force, whose
position had been considerably strengthened and its ability
to carry through its mission improved in the spring and
summer of 1961, once again lost ground. The gap between
the responsibilities confronting the Force and its ability
to handle those responsibilities was widening.
A number of factors contributed to the deteriorating
position of ONUC. Perhaps the most significant was the
lack of a clear sense of identity. The role of the Force
in the Congo was in confusion. The United Nations Force
had tried for months to succeed in the Congo as a non
intervening forceto bring order and tranquillity by its
presence alone. It proved unable to resolve the Congo
crisis by this means. In February its mandate was strength'
ened to allow it to use force in the last resort to prevent
civil war. In September the Force applied the new mandate
and tried at being an intervening force. ONUC took the
initiative to end Katanga's secession and bring unity to
the Congoand this effort failed too. It failed because


lio
group to consult on plans for the development of UNOGIL. It
is revealing that the Advisory Committee was not established
until the Observation Group had been in operation over a
month and at a time when it faced a kind of crisis of confi
dence both within the United Nations and Lebanon. Moreover,
those asked to serve on the Committee were the same persons
serving on the UNEF Advisory Committee which suggests a
precipitous creation for the device. The establishment of
the Advisory Committee reflected the crisis which confronted
the Observation Group at that time with the entry of United
States marines into the area and the weakening of support
for the Group. The Advisory Committee, once established,
was apparently used very little in connection with the
Observation Group; the only references made to it are to
its establishment. Its creation was designed to stimulate
and demonstrate support for UNOGIL in a period of crisis.
Nonetheless, the Advisory Committee device has a potential
as a control instrument as well which could be further
eorplored.
Support for UNOGIL
ilen for UNOGIL.-The size and composition of the peace
keeping group has a direct bearing on the effectiveness of
that group in carrying through its mandate.
A rough theory of ideal composition for peace-keeping
missions, which had emerged in the period between establish-


83
settlement. In the study of UNOGIL the same elements which
were considered with respect to the Truce Supervision
Organization in Palestine are isolated for analysis in
order that comparisons between the two may be drawn. The
chapter is divided into three main sections. The first deals
with the creation of UNOGIL, focusing on the situation which
brought it into being and upon the political aspects of its
establishment and maintenance. The second part describes
the characteristics of the group, emphasizing the role of
the Secretary-General in its molding. The third section is
concerned with functioning of the unit in the field.
Conditions for Creation of UNOGIL
The crisis area: internal conditions in Lebanon
A starting point for consideration of the Observation
Group in Lebanon is the situation which called the group
into being.
The immediate cause for the establishment of the
United Nations Observation Group was the outbreak of a small
scale civil war in Lebanon in May, 1958. Lebanon brought
the question before the Security Council in a complaint
charging that the war was primarily a product of the inter
vention of the United Arab Republic in the internal affairs
of Lebanon and contending that its continuance would


246
In addition to external intervention and internal
turmoil there \ situationpotential civil war or disintegration of the
Congo The threat was raised by the secession of the
province of Katanga from the Republic of the Congo on July
11, one day after Belgian intervention Although the
Belgian Government had blocked efforts of Katanga to gain
an autonomous position in the Congo prior to independence,
its position was less clear after the disorders in the
Congo The Belgian Government refused to grant formal
recognition to Katanga as an independent state, nonethe
less, in succeeding months the Belgian Government gave at
least passive support to Katanga's position, while Belgian
business interests and residents in Katanga sympathized
with and sometimes actively supported the pretensions of
the province to independence. (It might be noted that the
Belgians had a particular interest in Katanga because of
the large number of Belgian residents and Belgian invest
ments concentrated in the province.)
Rioting troops, moves to secession, and foreign
intervention pose a considerable challenge to a world
organization. In fact, the challenge was more difficult
than these elements suggest. In a sense, these were merely
for the humanitarian purpose of protecting Belgians. Se
curity Council, Official Records, 15th Year, 877th meeting
(July 20/21, I960;, p. 30.


228
that the administration of Gaza would remain in United
Nations hands until definite agreement was reached on the
future of the Strip.
The assumptions were never recognized as conditions
of xtfithdrawal by the Secretary-General. Despite some
earlier concessions to the Israeli view of an active force,
the Secretary-General considered that the Israeli withdrawal
must be unconditional.
The role taken by UNSF with the Israeli withdrawal
from the area and the UNEP entry was neither as active as
the Israelis had hoped nor as passive as they had feared.
Although the assumptions on which Israel had based its
withdrawal failed in large part to come to pass, the situ
ation did not return to its pre-Suez status. First, UNEF
has remained on patrol in the Sharm-al-Shaikh area allowing
Israeli shipping to move freely through the Straits of Tiran.
Second, the Gaza Strip has not reverted to its earlier
position as an armed base for fedayeen attacks. It is true
that the United Nations Force did not maintain control in
Gaza for an indefinite period as the Israelis had hoped they
would. In fact, only one week after the United Nations
assumed responsibility for the region, Egyptian civilian
authorities returned to the area, possibly in violation of
T7T£
General Assembly, Official Records, 11th Session,
666th plenary meeting (March 1, l9t7)> P* 1276.


376
dangerous either to withdraw across the river or to remain
in an exposed bridgehead since night was coming on. (One
might also assume that it would be risky to move forward
as well though the official reports make no note of this
risk.) The decision was made by the field commander to
move ahead despite contrary orders from Headquarters.
United Nations Headquarters lost contact with the company
of troops as they marched forward to take Jadotville with
little difficulty.
Despite the success of the venture, the advance of
United Nations troops to Jadotville while the Secretary-
General was reaffirming the peaceful intentions and limited
aims of the United Nations was embarrassing. The loss of
contact with and control over the men in the field was
dismaying and disturbing.
The "disconcerting picture on communication to and
no
from the field" and control from Headquarters was appar
ently not the result of insubordination on the part of those
in the field, but of an unfortunate combination of circum
stances: confusing orders from United Nations Headquarters
(reflecting the inherent confusion experienced by a peace
force fighting); poor communications between the field
and headquarters; and a rapidly changing and unanticipated
military situation.
^Ibid., p. 56.


185
The Secretary-General had what might seem on first
view to he "an embarrassment of riches" from which to choose
in selecting those who would participate in UNEF. Twenty-
55
four nations in all offered to contribute men to the Force,
The riches were, in fact, not so great when account was
taken by the Secretary-General of political and military
factors in determining the final composition of the Force.
Hammarskjold immediately eliminated a number of
states from consideration as contributors for political
reasons. First, participation by the permanent members of
the Security Gouncil was ruled out, both to keep the Cold
War out of an already difficult situation and to make quite
clear that the United Nations was not casting a mantle of
legality over the Anglo-French action. Second, states
likely to have a special interest in the problem were ex
cluded from participation. This eliminated the Arab states
and states tied closely to either bloc, such as the East
54.
European states. Finally, apparently states objected to
-^The twenty-four states offering to contribute
military men to' UNEF were: Afghanistan, Brazil, Burma,
Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark,
Ecuador, Ethiopia, Finland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Laos,
New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Rumania,
Sweden, and Yugoslavia. U.N. Doc, A/5302/Add. 1 to 30 and.
U.N. Doc. A/3302, Annexes 1 to 6.
yi"It might be noted that Czechoslovakia offered at
least twice to contribute a battalion of troops and to
provide the transport to their destination. The offers
were not accepted. Ibid., Add. 19.


178
difficult because the United Nations was ill-prepared for
such activity: its administrative superstructure was in
adequate to the heavy responsibilities a peace-keeping force
imposed, while intelligence activities and advance military
planning were nil. The enthusiasm the member states ex
pressed for the concept of a force was not matched with a
comparable willingness to support, in both material and
non-material terms, a strong force. Despite these handicaps
a force was constructed which worked.
Leadership of UN5F
The leadership and influence exerted by the Secretary-
General over the creation, shaping, and operation of UNEF
was great. The General Assembly gave the Secretary-General
the responsibility for developing, with virtually no formal
guidance from the Assembly, the initial plans for the Force
and for implementing these plans. The Assembly accepted
without objection Hammarskjold's contention in his second
report on the Force that
If the force is to come into being with all the
speed indispensable to its success, a margin of
confidence must be left to those who will carry
the responsibility for putting the decisions of
the General Assembly into effect. 5
The generality of the Assembly action and the degree
of discretion vested in the Secretary-General was unusual;
55
U.N. Doc. A/3302, p. 22


517
were used as well. Some serious weaknesses emerged in the
intra-Congo transport system. On the one hand, ONUC had
difficulty finding flight and technical ground crews able
to run and maintain its planes properly. (The same comment
could be made with respect to ground transport.) On the
other hand, the costly commercial flights, over which the
United Nations apparently exerted insufficient control,
were considered neither safe nor reliable. ^ At critical
periods in the Force's history the United Nations intra-
Congo transport system was bolstered by United States trans
port flights. Although some question might be raised as to
the propriety of this degree of participation by a permanent
member of the Security Council, little question could be
raised as to the value of the assistance.
A third logistic problem of significance developed
when the Force shifted from its non-fighting to its fighting
role. In its first major encounter with Katanga forces in
September, 1961, the Force suffered severely from a shortage,
if not complete absence, of heavy weapons and military
planes. The acquisition of such equipment could have posed
^Ibid., p. 365. See also Lincoln Bloomfield, "Head
quarters-Field delations: Some Notes on the Beginning and
End of ONUC," International Organization, Vol. 17, No. 2
(Spring, 1963)7~pT-3HJ¡ See also Major-General Indarjit
Eikhye, "Preparation and Training of United Nations Peace-
Keeping Forces," Paper prepared for Conference on the
United Nations Security Forces, Oslo, Norway, February,
1964, pp. 12-14.


154-
States had chosen to use the United Nations as a means of
resolving the crisis and forcing Prance and Britain to re
treat from a policy the United States strongly disapproved.
Lending impetus to the moves by the United Nations was the
fear of Russian intervention in the crisis which was viewed
as a real possibility at the time.11
If the need for United Nations action in the crisis
was clear, far less clear was the form which that action
should take. It seemed unlikely that the parties would
respond positively to mere requests that they withdraw from
the area. Yet, there was little desire to invoke enforce
ment measures to bring a cease-fire in Suez. Pew were
willing to condemn the Anglo-Prench-Israeli attack as
unqualified aggression. There was recognition that what
12
had happened had emerged from "a murky background."
It was out of this confused and dangerous situation
that UNEP emerged as the solution that trod the middle
ground. UNEP seemed to provide an answer that was both
IB
feasible and promising of results.
~Ibid., pp. 390-1. See also Herman Finer, Dulles
over Suez. The Theory and Practice of his Diplomacy
(Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 196-1), p. 421.
12
General Assembly, Official Records, First Emergency
Special Session, 561st plenary meeting "'(November 1, 1956),
p. 10.
13
vFor analyses of UNEP that emphasize its character as
a solution between pure coercion and pure conciliation see
Stanley Hoffmann, "Sisyphus and the Avalanche: The United
Nations, Egypt, and Hungary," International Organization, Vol.
11 (1957) p. 4-52, and Rosner, 0£. cit., p. 21.


56
It should be noted that the financing of UNT80 might
well have raised more difficulties if the United Nations
had, in fact, underwritten all the costs of the operation.
The dollars and cents expenditures for the Truce Supervision
Organization reflected only a fraction of the total cost.
A large share of the equipment was received on loan, pri
marily from the United States and the United Kingdom, the
salaries of the observers were paid by the seconding
states, and miscellaneous services were performed for the
organization free of charge by member states, particularly
the United States, Thus, a few states bore a relatively
large proportion of the costs of the Truce Organization.
Material: the logistic base.-The logistics problems
confronting those responsible for the organization and
operation of UNTSO were formidable. The United Nations had
little experience with an operation of such magnitude.
There were few precedents which could be followed. There
was little or no equipment on hand. Decisions had to be
made about almost every aspect of the organization. And
it was necessary to do more than make decisions: equipment,
supplies, men had to be acquired and transported to the area.
The nature of the Truce Supervision Organization's
assignment, to observe and report, made transportation and
communications equipment essential. In the initial stages
of the operation the problem of getting essential equipment


401
military force, or at least the consensus on disputes not
involving Chapter VII, that is, aggression, is generally
missing.
An explanation of the United Nations preference for
the non-fighting force does not answer the question of
whether the United Nations can stick to this sort of force
without drastically limiting the kind of situation it will
enter. The Congo and Cyprus experiences suggest the need
either for modification of the force's mandate or for less
difficult assignments for the force in future.
A second principle which is well established with
respect to the non-fighting force is that it acts with the
consent of all parties concerned. The principle of consent
has both a practical and a legal side. On the one hand,
consent is the corollary of the non-fighting nature of the
force. A small force, unarmed or lightly armed, can hardly
impose its will on a nation, on dissident elements within a
nation, or on two nations in conflict. Nor example, it
cannot force the withdrawal of invading armies; it can only
oversee the voluntary withdrawal of those troops. On the
other hand, since the use of the non-fighting force has not
been considered as enforcement action under Chapter VII of
the Charter, a principal legal justification for the force's
presence within a nation is the consent of that nation.


332
national contingents remained relatively autonomous and
served as a unit. In case of conflict between the goals of
the United Nations and of an individual nation, the loyalty
of the troops was committed, at least theoretically, to the
United Nations.
If a mission is of short duration, relatively non-
controversial, and engaged only in observation, its pattern
of organization will probably not be of primary significance.
As the Force became more and more active, moving beyond
observation, and correspondingly more controversial, the
organization of ONUC assumed considerable importance.
The lines of control from Headquarters to the field
and from the field headquarters to the individual contin
gents appear clear-cut in the organization chart. In fact,
organizational arrangements proved wanting when tested
under fire. Effective direction and control from the top
broke down in the most critical phases of the operation.
In three important military operations in which ONUC took
some initiative, communications with United Nations Head
quarters in New York broke down and fundamentally important
political-military decisions were made in the field. The
first break came in September, I960, when the Force took a
part in the Kasa-Yubu-Lumumba struggle for leadership by
closing the airports and radio stations. The last break,
coming in December, 1962, when contacts between field units


325
were too great for the power which the United nations Force
had at hand to meet those responsibilities. Figure 3
suggests graphically the relationship of power and
responsibility.
The role of ONUC
Before examining precisely what the Force did in
the Congo, let us see why the gap between power and res
ponsibility existed in the early phases of the operation.
In the first place responsibilities were very great
and were not laid out in clear and precise terms. The
responsibilities which the Force undertook when it went
into the Congo were fourfold: to ensure the speedy evacu
ation of all Belgians; to assist in maintaining law and
order by deployment of United Nations units in various parts
of the country; to help maintain essential services and
bring back normal activities; and to regroup the army in
31
camps to start its training and reorganization.
These were broad goals which needed translation into
specific programs and policies before constituting an ade
quate guide for action to men in the field. Yet, in the
early months of the Congo operation such a translation was
xT
^ These objectives were enunciated in the first report
of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General
Rajeshwar Dayal. U.N. Doc. S/4531 p. 177.


199
The capacity of each member to contribute should be one
determinant of the scale of assessment.6^
In contrast to the aforementioned states, which
accepted the principle of collective responsibility, were
those states which denied that the expenses of TJKfEF consti
tuted an obligatory charge on the member states without,
however, denying the legality of the Force. In their
opinion Articles 17 and 19 were inapplicable. This opinion
with variation was held by a number of the Latin American
and Arab states. If the Force were not to be supported by
obligatory assessments, how then was it to be maintained?
The Latin American states suggested in effect that the bulk
of funds come from voluntary contributions. They proposed
that assessment of member states be limited to an amount
equal one-tenth of the regular budget. They also expressed
agreement with the Spanish contention that the permanent
members of the Security Council bore a special responsibility
for financing the Force since Article 27 assigned them a
preponderant role in the maintenance of international peace
70
and security. The Arab states coupled the special
go
'See, for example, the position of India, General
Assembly, Official Records, 11th Session, Fifth Committee,
54-7th meeting (December 10, 1956), p. 82.
^6The representative of El Salvador spoke on behalf of
the Latin American delegations. General Assembly, Official
Records, 11th Session, Fifth Committee, -547th meeting.
'(December 10, 1956), p. 81. For the Spanish position see
General Assembly, Official Records, 11th Session, Fifth
Committee, 545th meeting (December 6, 1956), p. 71#


TABLE B4
THE NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF ONUC AT SELECTED TIMES
Contributing
States
July, 1960a
Officers and Men Contributed
Sept., 1960d April, 1961c June, 1961e
Feb., 1962d
Feb., 1963e
Argentina
10
24
26
16
13
Austria
48
5
48
26
Brazil
9
29
20
55
36
Burma
9
Canada
260
284
280
318
318
Ceylon
9
8
8
13
Congo (Leopold-
ville)
615
Denmark
30
70
76
89
281
Ecuador
2
Ethiopia
1860
2572
2485
3095
3051
2986
Ghana'
2412
2291
1644
1123
650
702
Greece
21
25
Guinea
741
1349
-
-
-
-
India
620
4016
5617
5772
5613
Indonesia
1152
1139
-
1774
Iran
45
Ireland
678
1383
671
969
729
868
Italy
90
128
151
132
53
Liberia
225
234
236
456
238
240
Malaya
621
981
1418
1514
783
Mali
577
Morocco
2465
3257
8
Netherlands
6
6
6
6
6
New Zealand
1
Nigeria
1678
1878
1703
1908
Norway
53
111
124
132
487
T9i7


4-6
meet expectations, however, for only seven of the fifty men
remained after the First Truce. Moreover, disappointment
51
m the group was voiced by Bernadotte and by others.
Had this experiment in international action been successful,
it might have advanced substantially the evolution of the
peace-keeping technique.
As it was, a change in the pattern of recruitment to
a broader and, in our opinion, firmer base did not come
until 1953 At that time the composition of the group was
broadened with the inclusion of observers from nine states
(Australia, Canada, Denmark, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden
Swede, one Norwegian, one Dane, and one Chinese. In the
three days of preparation the men were outfitted in tropical
uniforms (slate grey shorts, blouse, and pith helmet) and
given such necessities as medical kit, flashlight, whistle,
and standard police arms. (Ammunition was not supplied for
the arms, for the final decision as to whether the force was
to be armed was left to the Mediator.) The New York Times,
June 18, 194-8, and June 20, 194-8.
51
y0n the one hand, the venture was termed by The New
York Times as the first international police force. The
New York Times, June 20, 194-8. On the other hand, severe
criticisms were made by those in charge. Bernadotte said,
"Originally there had been 50 guards on duty in Palestine.
But some had declared they wanted to go home to the U.S.A.
They wentthough they can hardly be described as returning
heroes. In newspaper interviews some complained loudly
firstly of the dangers they had been exposed to, secondly
of the bad food they had had. Neither had the regulations
about an eight-hour working day been adhered to. In their
own eyes they were poor little boys deserving of all the
pity the American public could give them. It is true, of
course, that these guards had been hastily and haphazardly
recruited in response to our urgent request." Folke Berna
dotte, 0£. cit., p. 198. See also Paul Mohn, "Problems of
Truce Supervision," International Conciliation, No. 4-78
(February, 1952), pp. ?0-7l.


181
In addition to the formal Advisory Committee, an
informal group composed of the military representatives of
the states contributing contingents to the Force was set up.
(A United States representative also met. with the group,
W
apparently because,of the extensive logistic support the
I I O
United States was providing UNEF.) This group worked
closely with Ralph Sunche, the United Nations Under-Secretary
in charge of UNEF questions, on the logistical and opera
tional problems confronting the newly-established force.
The problems of the committee in working out the operational
details for the Force were many. For example, they had
relatively little information available on which to base
\
their plans. A comprehensive list of questions, covering
such matters as general organization of the Force, suita
bility of the equipment of the contingents, accommodations
available in the area, legal status of the Force, etc., was
submitted to Major-General Burns. Burns had little specific
information of the sort needed by, the committee, however,
and confined his response to his views on the desirable
organization of the Force and to how in principle admini-
J.Q
strative problems should be met. in fact, the problems
tended to be dealt with ad hoc. They were met when they
became sufficiently pressing to demand attention.
'8Frye, on. cit., p. 25.
A9
Burns, op. cit., p. 209. See also note 36 on p.
307 for the questions submitted to Burns by the Committee.


37
authority find, could not take any preventive measures in
advance,20
Moreover, the conditions under which the observers
were to function were narrowly drawn. First, the observer
was to be "completely objective in his attitude and judg
ment" and to "maintain a thorough neutrality as regards
21
political issues in the Palestine situation." Such a
requirement was probably necessary for success in a delicate
mission. Second, the power available to the observer to
meet his responsibilities vas quite limited. He had, for
example, no enforcement power and was denied arms of any
sort. The decision on arms was made by the Mediator. That
it corresponded with the desires of a majority of member
states was indicated by the rejection by the members of later
efforts of the Mediator to broaden the powers of a few of the
observers by arming them for especially difficult tasks.
Although the invocation of Chapter VII of the Charter in the
July 15 cease-fire call might have justified such a broaden
ing of the observers' mandate, no effort was made to use
the resolution for this purpose.

L.M. Bloomfield, Egypt, Israel and the Gulf of Aqaba
(Toronto: The Carswell Company, Ltd.,' 17J57)V P. 70.
21U.N. Doc. S/928, p. 1.


4-38
between the major powers, neither wants to drag its family
disputes into the world organization. It is deemed
preferable to resolve such issues within the bloc if
possible, rather than getting them entangled in the world
organization. The case of Cyprus demonstrates that this is
not always possible. (It is significant that the United
Kingdom and the United States attempted to keep the issue
out of the halls of the United Nations. The early proposals
were for a force composed of troops from the NATO powers,
tied loosely to the United Nations, rather than for a United
Nations force. Only the intransigence of the Cypriote
Government forced the issue into the United Nations.) Nor
is the non-fighting force deemed a suitable instrument for
the resolution of East-West differences. The dangers to
the United Nations of getting caught in the cross-fire be
tween East and West are well-recognized. Proposals to
establish units for duty in such conflicts have come to
naught. Thus, the United States suggestion in 1964- that a
United Nations force be sent to Laos was received with
coolness and little action.
Finally, the degree of institutionalization of the
force and the extent and nature of United Nations experience
with peace-keeping forces bears on the ease of establish
ment. Successful and extensive experience in peace-keeping
contributes to both the psychological and the material


319
thereby entailing long supply lines, or purchased locally
at high prices; there was heavy spoilage due to the absence
of refrigeration and storage facilities; and, in addition,
the different dietary requirements of over twenty national
contingents had to be taken into account. Despite all this,
the initial cost of rations per man at $1.60, though high,
was substantially lower than UNEF's initial per man cost of
26
$2.30. The United Nations Force faced logistics problems
similar to those confronted by earlier peace-keeping groups,
but it faced them on a bigger scale. That the United
Nations met these problems as effectively as it did may
well be attributed to the accumulated peace-keeping experi
ence behind it.
The legal status of the United Nations Force
To function effectively a peace-keeping force must
enjoy certain basic rights and privileges within the host
state. By I960 not only was there recognition of the
importance of guaranteeing the legal status of a force, but
there was also ,a guideline as to precisely what rights and
privileges should be accorded a force.
The legal status of the United Nations Force in the
Congo was set forth in two documents: the Agreement of July
29, I960, and the Agreement of November 27, 1961. The
2&Ibid. ~p. 4.


The organization of uTfOGIL
The organization of UNOGIL, like that of UNTSO, was
loose. Control from above was limited. The chain of
command ran from the Secretary-General to the Executive
Member of the three-man observation group, who was designated
the Chief of Staff. Under the Chief of Staff was the Chief
Military Observer, an experienced observer on loan from
UNTSO. The main observation stations came directly under
the control of the Chief of Staff rather than under the
Chief Military Observer. The observation stations were
manned by multi-national observer groups. Thus, there was
more integration of units in the Observation Group than was
possible in a peace-keeping force.
In the early weeks of the operation, the organization
was highly decentralized with the maximum number of obser
vers in the field and a skeleton headquarters organization,
consisting only of an operations branch staffed with a few
evaluation officers. As the Group expanded in size, the
headquarters organization increased in complexity and
specialization of functions was inaugurated. By August the
headquarters was organized on full military lines with a
deputy chief of staff and four section chiefs to deal
respectively with personnel, evaluation of information,
operations, and logistics. Figure 2 summarizes the organi
zation of the Group.


286
Finally, practical factors contributed to the will
ingness and ability of the United Nations to bring a force
for the Congo into being. The presence of Ralph Bunche in
the Congo, able to serve as a link between headquarters
and the Congolese Government and to get the operation under
way, was important. The willingness of the member states
contacted to supply troops and transport immediately was
important. The experience accumulated and the personnel
trained in earlier ventures of this sort contributed to
the ease of establishment and to the confidence with which
the United Nations undertook the assignment.
No one seems to have stopped to ask some serious
questions about how similar the Congo situation was, in
fact, to the earlier situations in which military men had
been used or about the costs the mission might entail and
the problems it might create for the world organization.
Perhaps the very ease with which the Force was established
blurred the difficulties which the situation in the Congo
posed for a non-fighting force.


S/4-114, Nov. 14, 1958, "Fifth, report of the United
Nations Observation Group in Lebanon."
Security Council, Official Records, Fifteenth Year (I960),
Supplements for l9~6"0.
S/4582, July 13, I960, "Telegrams dated 12 and 13 July
I960 from the President and the Prime Minister of the
Republic of the Congo to the Secretary-General."
S/4387, July 14, I960, "Resolution adopted by the
Security Council on 14 July I960 (873rd meeting) con
cerning the situation in the Republic of the Congo."
S/4389 and Add. 1-6, July 18, I960, "First report of
the Secretary-General on the implementation of
Security Council resolution S/4387 of 14 July I960."
S/4398, July 19, I960, "Letter dated 19 July I960 from
the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics to the Secretary-General."
S/4400, July 20, I960, "Letter dated 20 July I960 from
the representative of the United States of America to
the Secretary-General. A report of United States
activities in support of July 14 resolution."
S/4405, July 22, I960, "Resolution adopted by the
Security Council on 22 July I960 (879th meeting) con
cerning the situation in the Republic of the Congo."
S/4415, August 1, I960, "Letter dated 1 August i960
from the representative of Ghana to the Secretary-
General ."
S/4417, and Add. 1-9, August 6, I960, "Second report
of the Secretary-General on the implementation of
Security Council resolutions S/4387 of 14 July I960 and
S/4405 of 22 July I960."
S/4419, August 6, I960, "Letter dated 6 August I960
from the representative of Belgium to the President of
the Security Council."
S/4420, August 6, I960, "Note verbale dated 6 August
I960 from the representative of Ghana to the Security
Council."


209
supplies and equipment needed for the first few days of
84
operation. The effort was commendable, but not entirely
successful. Not all the troops came adequately provisioned,
and ad hoc arrangements had to be made. For example, Egypt
provided cooking stoves, tents, and some light equipment for
some of the inadequately provisioned units.^
The difficult problems relating to transportation,
communications, equipment, and supplies for the Force were
intensified by the general lack of information at United
Nations headquarters about both the terrain and climate of
the area and the supply and equipment requirements of the
various national contingents.
The difficulties of acquiring supplies needed for
the Force were greatly eased by the assistance of the United
States and the United Kingdom. The United States made
available to the United Nations for compensation equipment
and supplies from its stores in Southern Europe. Some prob
lems apparently developed in the handling of the transac
tions, yet the availability of the supplies was a boon to
the operation. The United Kingdom provided ground transport
which it had in the area to the Force, thereby easing the
problems caused by an initial shortage ,of vehicles.
The contingents were asked to bring personal side-
arms, tents, essential light equipment, and a 10-day
supply of rations.
Q [T
^Burns, on. cit., p. 206.


220
rank of officers serving in it. A colonel was to serve
as Chief-of-Staff and lieutenant-colonels as branch heads.
Within each branch were to be from three to six majors
and captains. The reasoning behind the creation of a strong
staff was, first, that the Force was in the process of
organization and, second, that the international character
of the Force would complicate staff work. For example,
nine subordinate units rather than the usual three to five
98
were under headquarters control.
The chain of command of UNEF ran directly from the
Commander to the commanding officers of each of the national
contingents. The by-passing of intermediate command
officers occurred because the national contingents served
in the Force as self-contained units. Each had its own
commander who could not be changed without consultation be
tween the Commander of UNEF and the contributing government.
Although the Commander of each national unit was militarily
subordinate to the Commander of UNEF, he was permitted to
communicate with his government on questions concerning his
contingent, The national unit commander was subject to
orders and instructions, however, only from the Commander
QO
and through him the Secretary-General, y He in turn was
y Ibid., p. 221. Experienced civilian United Nations
personnel handled procurement of stores and equipment,
questions of finance and general administration, and public
relations.
"u.N. Doc. A/3694, p. 3.


165
enforcement action. In the second place, a fairly wide
interpretation has been given to the General Assembly's
27
power to create subsidiary organs. In the third place,
the functions performed by the Force can be considered as
"reasonably necessary for effective exercise of the proper
powers of the Assembly, and in particular, its power under
Article 11, 'to make recommendations' with regard to
questions relating to the maintenance of international peace
28
and security." For example, investigation of a situation
by UNEF could well be essential to recommendations made by
the Assembly; patrolling activities might be just as impor
tant to implementation of.the recommendations,
On occasion the Secretary-General also invoked the
"Uniting for Peace" resolution as a source of authority for
creation of UNEF, In his second report on the Force
Eammarskjold referred to the decision reached by the Assembly
on the basis of the "Uniting for Peace" resolution (resolu
tion 557 (Y)) without elaborating on the precise relationship
of the resolution and the Force. The "Uniting for Peace"
'Julius Stone, "begai Bases for the Establishment of
Forces Performing Security Functions," Paper prepared for
the Conference on the United Nations Security Forces, Oslo,
Norway, February, 1964- (mimeographed), p. 10. Stone noted
that in a case involving the Administrative Tribunal the
International Court majority advised that "the General
Assembly had power to create this organ, as involved in per
forming effectively the Assembly's power under Article 101
to make regulations for United Nations staff, even though it
could itself not perform this judicial function."
28Ibid., p. 15.


456
TABLE A-2
SELECTED CRITICAL VOTES IN TILE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE ESTABLISHMENT AND SUPPORT OF PEACE-KEEPING GROUPS
UNTSO
UNEF
-
ONUC
Member States11
Vote Authorizing
Mediator'5
Vote
Authorizing
Plan
for Force0
Vote
Approving
Force0
Vote on
Finaneing
Force
Vote
Approving
ONUCf
Vote on
Financing
I960
Vote on
Financing
1961h
Vote
to Accept
I. C. J.
Opinion1
Afghanistan
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Abs.
Abs.
Yes
Albania
-
Abs.
Abs.
No
Ab6.
No
No
No
Algeria
-
_
_
Abs.
Argentina
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Australia
Abe.
Ab6.
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Austria
-
Abs.
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Belgium
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Abs.
No
Abs.
Bolivia
Yes
Yes
Yes
Abs.
-
Yes
_
Yes
Brazil
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Bulgaria
-
Abs.
Abs.
No
Abs.
No
No
No
Burma
-
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Burundi
-
-
_
_
Yes
Byelorussian Soviet
Socialist Republic
No
Abs.
Ab s.
No
Abs.
No
No
No
Cambodia
-
Yes
Yes
Abs.
Yes
Abs.
Abs.
Yes
Cameroon
-
-
-
-
-
Abs.
Yes
Yes
Canada
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Central African Republic
-
-
-
-
-
-
Yes
Ceylon
-
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Abs.
Yes
Yes
Chad
-
-
-
-
-
Abs
-
Abs.
Chile
Abs.
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Abs.
. Yes
Yes
China
Yea
Yes
Yqq
Ycb
Yob
Abo.
Abo.
Yoo
Colombia
Abs.
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Abs.
Yes
Yes
Congo (Brazzaville)
-
-
-
-
Yes
-
Yes
Congo (Leopoldville)
-
-
-
-
Yes
Yes
Yes
Costa Rica
-
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Abs.
Yes
Yes
Cuba
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Abs.
-
No
Cyprus
-
-
-
-
- .
Yes
Yes
Yes
Czechoslovakia
No
Abs.
Abs.
No
Abs.
No
No
No
Dahomey
-
-
-
-
-
Yes
-
Yes
Denmark
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Dominican Republic
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
-
-
Yes
Ecuador
Abs.
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
El Salvador
-
Yes
Yes'
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Ethiopia
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
-
Yes
Yes
Federation of Malaya
-
-
-
-
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Finland
-
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
France
Yes
Abs.
Yes
Yes
Abs.
Abs.
Abs.
No
Ghana
-
-
-
-
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Greece
Abs.
Yes
Yes
Abs.
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Guatemala
Yes
Yes
Yes '
Yes
Yes
Abs.
Yes
Yes
Guinea
-
-
-
-
Yes
Abs.
-
-
Haiti
Abs,
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
-
Yes
Honduras
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Abs.
Yes
Yes
Yes
Hungary
-
Abs.
Abs.
-
Yes
No
No
No
Iceland
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
-
-
Yes
India
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Abs.
Yes
Yes
Indonesia
-
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Abs.
Yes
Yes
Iran
YC6
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Iraq
Abs.
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Abs.
Abs.
Ireland.
-
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Israel
-
Abs.
Abs.
Abs.
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Italy
-
Yes
Yes
Abs.
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Jamaica
.
.
_
_
_
Yes
Japan
-
-
-
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Jordan
-
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
-
-
No
Laos
-
Abs.
Yes
Yes
-
-
Yes
Lebanon
Abs.
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Liberia
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Libya
-
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
-
-
Yes
Luxembourg
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Madagascar
-
*
-
- '
-
Abs.
-
Yes
Mali
-
-
-
-
-
-
Yes
-
Mexico
Abs.
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Abs.
Yes
Yes
Mongolia
-
-
-
-
-
-
No
No
Morocco
-
-
-
-
Yes
Abs.
Yes
-
Nepal
-
Yes
Yes
-
Yes
-
Yes
Yes
The Netherlands
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
New Zealand
Yes
Abs.
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Nicaragua
Yes
Yes
Yes
-
Yes
-
-
Yes
Niger
-
-
-
-
-
Yes
-
Yes
Nigeria
-
-
-
-
-
Yes
Yes
Yes
Norway
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes


269
A third principle of operation, which was embodied
in the resolution itself, was that the Force should act in
consultation with the Congolese Government. This too be
came the subject of controversy, with the Secretary-General
and the Congolese leaders differing sharply on what was
implied by the phrase "in consultation." Did "in consulta
tion" mean that ONUC was at the disposal of the Congolese
Government to do with as it would, as the Congolese Govern
ment seemed to think? Did it mean that the consent of the
Congolese Government was necessary to any important moves
56
by the Force?^ Or did it merely mean that the Congolese
Government should be informed before decisive moves were
undertaken by the Force?
The Secretary-General and the Congolese Government
were at odds almost immediately over the proper use of the
Force. In his first report on the implementation of the
resolution the Secretary-General tried to clarify the re
lationship of the Force to the Congolese authorities by
differentiating between consent and control. According to
Hammarskjold ONUC was in the Congo at the request of and
^This seemed to be the position taken by at least
one delegation in the initial debate. The representative
of Ecuador indicated that the Congolese Government should
give their consent to the presence of United Nations forces,
the length of time they would remain in the Congo, and other
key questions. Security Council, Official Records, 15th
Year, 873rd meeting (July 13/14, I960), pp. 32-337


411
in airportability and peace-keeping tasks.^ The Secretary-
General's Military Adviser has suggested informally to
countries with stand-by forces that these units receive
special instruction in the following areas: a) the history
of United Nations peace-keeping operations; b) methods to
aid civilian authorities to maintain law and order; c)
methods to assist civilian authorities to keep public
services in operation; and, d) fire control, that is,
holding one's gunfire even when exposed to danger and
14
provocations.
The stand-by units are still far removed from a full-
fledged permanent force. On the one hand, it has been
impossible to regularize the offers of stand-by units. The
Secretary-General has no authority to discuss or take
account of such offers officially. Thus, the Secretary-
General's involvement with the stand-by units has, of neces
sity, been outside the scope of his official duties. On the
other hand, the stand-by forces do not respond automatically
to a United Nations call for men; the seconding governments
. -y-7 '
^Colonel V.A. Milroy, "The Organization and Role of
the Canadian Army to Support Peacekeeping Operations,"
Transcript of the Presentation of Colonel Milroy to the
Meeting of Military Experts to Consider the Technical Aspects
of U.N. Peace-Keeping Operations, Ottawa, Canada, November,
1964, p. 3.
^Conversation with Major-General I.J. Rikhye, Military
Adviser to the Secretary-General, Black Mountain, North
Carolina, July, 1965.


l?2
However, the reference to the cease-fire resolution raised
as many questions as it answered with respect to the mission
of UNEF. Debate sxtfirled around the phrase "all the terms
of the General Assembly resolution." The question of the
precise responsibilities of the Force was left unanswered
at the time UNEF was established. It was raised again, more
insistently, in January and February, 1957 because of the
difficulties confronting the Force in the field.
Major debate over the proper functions of UNEF was
triggered in January, 1957, by the Israeli refusal to with
draw from the Sharm-el-Shaikh area at the Gulf of Aqaba or
from the Gaza Strip. In Israeli opinion these areas were
bound inextricably to its security. Thus, in Israel's
view withdrawal had to be tied to effective guarantees for
39
Israeli security. y
The Israeli position raised the question of the
proper role for UNEF before and after Israeli withdrawal.
Debate in the Assembly revealed little consensus among the
United Nations members on the functions of the Force.
The Israelis visualized an important role for the
Force. UNEF should take over from the Israelis in disputed
~~
The fedayeen attacks had been mounted from the Gaza
region, while control of the Sharm-el-Shaikh area had been
used to prevent Israeli shipping from using the Gulf of
Aqaba. Israel held these acts were contrary to international
law and to the armistice agreements, and that their re
sumption should be prevented.
39
^ General Assembly, Official Records, 11th Session,
658th plenary meeting (January 17 T957)'7""P 889.


A second principal function which the Force served
was the separation of the armed forces of the opposing sides
by the physical interposition of UNEF betxveen them. The
separation of the belligerents, designed to prevent hostile
acts, was quite successful in achieving that end. Shortly
after the first UNEF contingents had arrived in Egypt,
units of the Danish-Norwegian battalion were deployed between
Egyptian and Allied Forces in the Port Said area. As the
Allied forces withdrew, the United Nations troops moved
forward, keeping themselves between the two parties. In the
final stages of the evacuation the Allied forces were
separated from the Egyptians by a barbed wire fence and a
neutral zone, occupied by United Nations troops and pro
hibited to Egyptians, military or civilian. The same type
procedure was used in connection with the Israeli withdrawal
through the Sinai.
Third, the United Nations men took over some admini
strative and security responsibilities in both regions.
(These responsibilities were more extensive in the Suez
Canal area than in the sparsely-populated Sinai desert.)
In the plans drawn up by the UNEF and Allied commanders a
steady broadening of the responsibilities assigned the
Force wras envisaged. For example, initially the Force was
charged with securing peaceful conditions, in cooperation
with local authorities, in assigned areas in Port Said and


211
Three areas in which marked improvements were made
in operating efficiency and economy can he singled out.
First, there was a general tightening of the TJNEF organi
zation over the years. Some of the support troops were
dropped; some were replaced with local personnel. Second,
the cost of rations for the Force was sharply reduced over
the years. In the early months the cost of food supplies
was high, a fact attributed to the necessity of giving
special attention to the dietetic requirements of the vari
ous national groups and to the necessity of importing the
bulk of provisions. Improved procurement practices, estab
lishment of a revised rations scale, and better methods of
control issuance and usage made it possible to reduce the
on
per man cost from the original $2.30 to 67 cents by 1962. '
Third, the policy was established of standardizing
the equipment and bringing it under United Nations rather
than contingent ownership. At the outset there was great
variety in the equipment of the various contingents;
operating under an emergency and on the assumption of a
temporary force-, little effort had been made at standardiza
tion. Some items were contingent owned; others were pur
chased by the United Nations from a variety of sources. To
illustrate, in the early months of the operation there were
'uTTdoc. A/3694-, Annex A, p. 15 and U.N. Doc.
A/54-95, p. 23.


investigate, and report acts contrary to the letter and
spirit of the truce. Third, the men in the field were to
serve in a watchdog role preventing incidents when possible.
In this connection, they were to try to eliminate sources
of friction between conflicting parties, acting when the
occasion called for it as mediators and conciliators. In
addition, they were empowered to order a halt to action
52
posing a real threat to the truce, although, they had no
power to enforce such an order.
Organization for action
The organizational structure of UNT30 reflected both
the role and character of that group. Control was loose as
befits a multi-national organization in which initiative
and resourcefulness rather than close direction are re-
55
quired. The basic organizational arrangements of the
Truce Organization in the field are shown in Figure 1.
The Mediator was in charge of the entire truce super
vision mission. However, the actual working direction of
the system of observation was in the hands of the Chief of
Staff. It is indicative of the close working relationship
between the Mediator and the Chief of Staff that a Swedish
^U.N. Doc. S/928.
55U.N. Doc. S/888, p. 55.


260
emphasized rather more than the United Nations
22
to consult the Congolese
obligation
Not only was the United Nations Force less dependent
on the host government than UNEF had been, but it also took
a stronger position vis-a-vis the participating states.
Decisions by the Security Council on the Congo were regarded
as more than recommendations, Member states were considered
to have an obligation under Articles 25 and 49 to execute
them. In fact, the Force seems to have been in practically
the same position as UNEF with respect to contributing
states: it was dependent on their voluntary cooperation.
On the other hand, invocation of Articles 39 and 40
of the Charter in support of ONUC action did not mean that
the Force was acting under Chapter VII of the Charter in
the sense of being empowered to take enforcement action.
Although Articles 39 and 40 are in Chapter VII, they were
23
not considered as enforcement provisions. The Secretary-
General, arguing against the charge that he had interpreted
The obligation of the Congolese was based on its
responsibilities under Articles 25 and 49 of the Charter
to carry out the decisions of the Security Council, This
obligation was bolstered by the specific commitment to be
guided by good faith with respect to the Force made by the
Congo in a July, I960, agreement between the United Nations
and the Congolese Government, See U.N. Doc. S/4389/Add. 5.
^See, for example, the comments of Thomas Franck
and Ernest Gross on this point in Franck and Carey, op.
ext., p 66,


important the limitations will become. Yet the means of
eliminating the limitations are not in easy reach. Until
some sort of stand-by international force exists, it is
almost mandatory in an emergency that self-contained units
be provided by participating states. To join together
small groups of different nationalities would involve a
loss of time and efficiency that could be critical.
The functioning of UNBF
Phase I: the withdrawal.-In the first phase of
operations the Force's responsibility was to facilitate the
withdrawal of the Anglo-French and Israeli forces from
Egyptian territory with as much expedition and as little
bloodshed as possible.
The Anglo-French withdrawal took place in mid-
December. The Israeli withdrawal, scheduled to be handled
expeditiously and in one move, was actually carried out in
four stages: December 3, 1956; January 7-8, 1957; January
15-22; and March 6-12, 1957. The bulk of United Nations
troops viere concentrated in the Suez Canal area from the
10xIn the Suez crisis both the Secretary-General and
the Commander expressed the view that during the first
period at least the Force would have to be composed of a
few units of battalion strength, drawn from such countries
as could provide these units without delay. In the event,
the United Nations did not get as large or as self-contained
units as desired. U.N. Doc. A/3502, p. 21 and Burns, op.
cit., p. 188.


S/4-571, and Add. 1, Dec. 5, I960, "Rote by the Secre
tary-General transmitting a report from his Special
Representative in the Congo regarding certain actions
taken against Mr. Patrice Lumumba."
S/4-573, Dec. 6, I960, "Statement dated 6 December I960
by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics concerning the situation in the Republic of
the Congo."
S/4-585, Dec. 7, I960, "Rote by the Secretary-General
transmitting a note verbale dated 7 December I960 from
the Permanent Mission of Belgium to the United Rations
addressed to the Secretary-General."
S/4-590, Dec. 9, I960, Rote by the Secretary-General
transmitting a report from his Special Representative
in the Congo on the current situation in Stanleyville."
S/4-601, Dec. 21, I960, "Rote by the Secretary-General
transmitting a report from his Special Representative
in the Congo concerning incidents at Bukavu."
Security Council, Official Records, Sixteenth Tear (1961),
Supplements for 1961.
S/4-606 and Add. 1, Jan. 1, 1961, "Rotes by the
Secretary-General transmitting documents concerning
the landing of the Armee nationale congolaise at
Usumbura (Ruanda-UrudiJ."
S/4-622, Jan. 12, 1961, "Letter dated 11 January 1961
from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics to the Security Council."
S/4-626, Jan. 13, 1961, "Letter dated 12 January 1961
from the President of the Republic of Ghana to the
Secretary-General, transmitting a Declaration con
cerning the situation in the Congo, adopted by the
Conference of Independent African. States."
S/4-630, Jan. 16, 1961, "Exchange of communications be
tween the President of the Republic of the Congo
(Leopoldville) and the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General in the Congo."
S/4-637 and Add. 1, Jan. 23, 1961, "Rote by the Secretary
General transmitting communications concerning Mr.
Patrice Lumumba and other related subjects."


49
xp
suitable for officers," The Swedish contingent which
served as a command group under Bernadotte, was increased
from five to ten members. And once again the United States
was asked to supply approximately 100 auxiliary personnel.
The Second Truce Organization was not, in fact, as
large nor as rapidly established as the Mediator desired.
The maximum size Bernadette formally called for was 600
observers (officers and enlisted men) plus the auxiliary
units. In fact, there were never more than 500 observers;
the French quota, was not filled. Moreover, there were
exploratory requests for additional forces which were simply
never acted on. It would appear that the Mediator had more
ambitious plans for the Truce Supervision Organization than
the Security Council was willing to support. For example,
in July Bernadotte proposed a 1,000 man force for a demili
tarized Jerusalem and received French, Belgian, and American
commitments to supply one-third of the force each. Yet the
first steps to bring such a force into being were never
XX
taken. In August Bernadotte requested a small armed force
of around forty men to guard the Latrum pumping station.
________
^ Of the 500 soldiers in each category the United
States was to supply 125, France 125, and Belgium 50.
XX
"^Considerable confusion sui'rounded this question. At
one point it was reported that the Mediator thought the
Secretariat was recruiting the force from the Truce Commis
sion members, while the national delegations were under the
impression the recruiting was being done outside the United
Rations framework. If results are indicative, apparently no
one was recruiting. The New York Times, July 18, 1948.


118
Material: the logistic base of UNOGIL.-An observation
group, however capable, balanced geographically, adequate
in number, and well-financed, needs adequate equipment to
carry through its mission. Just as the observers themselves
seemed to have been assembled in Beirut with few of the
uncertainties tied to the early days of the Palestine opera
tion, so also was the necessary equipment collected rapidly
and with apparent ease. The experience gained in the
Palestine and Suez operations contributed to the efficiency
demonstrated in organizing the United Nations operation in
Lebanon.
The acquisition of equipment in the Lebanon case
differed in two significant ways from the earlier Palestine
venture. First, the existence in the area of the Truce
Supervision Organization and UNEP gave the United Nations
its own organizations from which equipment could be borrowed
and made readily available. Second, the difficulties the
Palestine group had experienced arising from the borrowing
of much equipment from member states were avoided by pur-
32
chasing or renting nearly all items needed.
TO
Over $500,000 worth of equipment, including jeeps,
planes, helicoptors, automotive equipment, and field sup
plies, was made available to UNOGIL on a cost reimbursable
basis by the United States Government. This was equipment
similar to that being provided UNEP. See U.S. Participation
in the _UN, Report by the President to the Congress for the
Year 1935 (Washington: Government Printing Oifice, 1959)
p. 240.


259
dependence of the Force on Congolese consent seemed related,
hoi^ever, not only to legal factors but also to the gravity
of the spoliation* At the outset of the mission much
emphasis was placed on ONUC-Congolese consultation and co-
20
operation* Under the pressure of events in the Congo less
and less stress was placed on the consensual elements. It
became clear that the Force was not, in fact, going to be
bound by the requirement of consent of the Congolese Govern
ment to its actions. A number of moves were made without
the approval of that Government and sometimes in outright
21
defiance of its wishes. The obligation of the Congolese
Government to carry out the decisions of the Force was
uThe resolution authorizing the Force referred to
assistance given in consultation with the Congolese Govern
ment. In the first Security Council meeting on the Congo
several representatives indicated that the consent of the
Congolese Government was necessary to the determination of
the duration and assignment of the Force. In his first
report on the implementation of the July 14 resolution the
Secretary-General stated that the Force was to be regarded
as a temporary security force in the Congo with the consent
of the Government for the time and purpose indicated. U.R.
Doc. S/4339s pp. 17-18.
pi
For example, the Secretary-General ignored demands
from the Congolese that the Ghana units of the Force with
draw. Also ignored were demands that Dayal be replaced as
the Secretary-General's Special Representative. This might
be compared with the strict adherence to the requirement of
consent in connection with TJNEF which was held to be action
entirely under Chapter YI. In this connection see, Thomas
Franck and John Carey, The Legal Aspects of the United
Rations Role in the Congo (Dobbs Ferry, R.Y.: Oceana Publi-
, Inc. l9ooTij ppT 62-65.
cannons


Despite its experience in the Congo, the United
Nations has not discarded or reinterpreted the principle of
political neutrality. The principle was proclaimed in
connection with United Nations activities in Yemen and
Cyprus.While it is rather doubtful that the principle
can be made completely viable in civil war situations,
there are few preferable alternatives to it. For ex
ample, in their study of United Nations peace-keeping
forces Burns and Heathcote set forth two possible alterna
tives to the political neutrality approach, yet their
12
alternatives have their own disadvantages. On the one
hand, they suggest that the United Nations might determine
the political ends of the force at the time that the force
\as created. This could lead to the negation of the
principle of political neutrality in disputes followed by
the force, at least in theory, heretofore. How would this
work? If applied to the Cyprus situation, it might be de
termined at the outset that the force would support the
establishment of firm control over the island by President
Makarios. Yet there are theoretical and practical diffi
culties with this course of action. First, it would seem
11U.N. Doc. S/5298, p. 3^; U.N. Doc. S/5593/Add.3;
and U.N, Doc. S/5788.
1 p
Arthur Lee Burns and Nina Heathcote, Peace-Keeping
b?/1 U.N. Forces: From Suez to the Congo (New York: Frederick
A. Praeger for the Center of International Studies,
.Princeton University, 1963), pp. 166-167-


255
for troops were made to the states of Liberia and Ethiopia
and, to balance the Force, to Ireland and Sweden. The
problem of transporting the troops was handled by what had
become the usual expedient of requesting assistance from
the United States Air Force. Arrangements viere made with
Britain to use Kano, Nigeria, as a staging area. Orders
went out for the equipment the Force would need.
There were, of course, problems. Many stemmed from
the speed itself, the ambitious dimensions of the operation,
and the lack of basic information about the Congo.^ The
Congo was' more remote than other locales to which United
Nations forces had been sent. The great dispatch with
which the Force was organized made the shortage of informa
tion especially difficult to remedy. But, all things
considered, it was rather remarkable to have 4,000 troops
in the Congo and beginning to function by July 18.
The legal foundations of the United Nations Force
The legal bases of the peace-keeping groups preceding
the Force in the Congo viere rather vague. Such vagueness
undoubtedly had a purpose: it left room for flexibility in
interpretation and avoided troublesome and delaying legal
arguments at the. time the group vas set up. The United
qV
Edward Bowman and James Fanning, "The Logistics
Problems of a UN Military Force," International Organiza
tion, Yol. 17, No. 2 (Spring, 1963),p. 561.'


396
To the extent that the force remains non-institu-
tionalized generalization becomes difficult and of limited
reliability. Has the United nations, as some aver, been
unable to make any real progress in institutionalizing the
United Nations" modest capabilities based on present
g
powers? It is. a contention of this study that this is
too strong a conclusion, and that there has been a partial
institutionalization of the non-fighting military presence.
The United Nations no longer faces the situation it did
with the first peace-keeping groups when everything had
to be improvised, when there was no precedent for making
units available, no administrative and financial procedure,
and no organization to which the Secretary-General could
turn in the task given him by the Assembly of putting a
United Nations force into a dangerous and delicate
9
situation."
The military presence used by the United Nations today
is not entirely or even primarily an ad hoc creation tailored
anew for each particular crisis. The United Nations has
drawn on the past in creating its military forces. As evi
dence of the institutionalization of the technique of the
3
Lincoln Bloomfield, International Military Torces:
The Q.uestion of Peacekeeping in an Armed and Disarming World.
(New York: Little, Brown and'Company,. 1964), p. 73.
9
'Lester B. Pearson, "Force for U.N.," Foreign
Affairs, Yol. 35s Ho. 3 (April, 1957)9 p. 402.


Chapter Page
Institutionalization of a philosophy of
action . 398
Institutionalization of a philosophy of
force composition 108
Institutionalization of a methodology . 112
Institutionalization of a Force
bureaucracy 117
The significance of institutionalization. 120
The Non-Fighting' Force: Its Non-
Institutionaized Side 121
Conclusions ..... 131
VIII, THE PERFORMANCE AND POTENTIAL OF THE NON
FIGHTING FORCE 131
APPENDIXES ..... 151
BIBLIOGRAPHY 165
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 502
ix


377
In the days following the Jadotville victory the
United Nations troops moved rapidly, taking control of
major centers in Katanga with ease. On January 15, 1963,
in letters to Prime Minister Adoula and Secretary-General
Thant, Tshombe announced:
I em ready to proclaim immediately before the world
that Katanga*s secession is ended, to grant the
United Nations troops liberty of movement throughout
Katanga, and to return to Elizabethville to direct
the means of applying the U Thant plan.7^
On January 21 United Nations troops entered Kolwezi,
Tshombe*s last major stronghold, peacefully. After twenty-
four days of military operations, the United Nations was in
virtual control of all Katanga.
So ended the secession of Katanga and the fighting
by the United Nations peace-keeping force. All that was
left to the Force was to carry out the original mission
of retraining Congolese soldiers and helping to maintain
law and order. That these were not easy tasks is suggested
by the fact that the Force still remained in the Congo a
year and a half after the last round of fighting in Katanga.
The Secretary-General announced in mid-1963 that
ONUC would be withdrawn by the end of 1963 when the money
appropriated for the operation would be gone. Pressure
from the Afro-Asian states, the United States, and the Congo
/?3urns and Heathcote, op. cit., p. 218.


171
The mission of UNEF was defined on the basis of the
cease-fire resolution of November 2 (resolution 997 (ES-I))
passed by the General Assembly at the outset of the Suez
crisis The mandate was further elaborated in early 1957.
The terms of the cease-fire resolution of November 2
were highly significant in the development of UNEF. What,
then, were these terms? To meet the immediate crisis the
resolution called for a cease-fire, a halt in the movement
of military forces and arms into the area, and withdrawal
of the parties involved behind the armistice lines. To
meet the more fundamental problems, all parties to the
armistice agreement were urged to desist from raids across
the armistice lines into neighboring territory and to ob
serve the armistice agreements. It was urged further that
steps be taken to re-open the Suez Canal and to restore
secure freedom of navigation.
The November 4 resolution establishing UNEF referred
to the November 2 resolution in defining the role of the
Force. Thus, operative paragraph 1 of the former resolution
read:
Establishes a United Nations Command for an emergency
international Force to secure and supervise the cessation
of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of
General Assembly resolution, 997 (ES-I) of 2 November
1956;...37
37
General Assembly, Resolution 1000 (ES-I).


425
method has been discarded. In the three most recent peace
keeping operations the Secretary-General has attempted to
make an assured financial base a condition for the estab
lishment of the mission. What this has meant in effect is
that the interested parties, interested because they are
directly involved as in West Neitf Guinea or Yemen or inter
ested because they want to see peace and stability promoted
by the United Nations as in Cyprus, have been given the
responsibility of paying for the peace-keeping. Yet this
hardly seems a definitive answer, it is true that those
states which really want to see an operation succeed can
help ensure that success by covering its costs. However,
an undue reliance and, in the case of ambitious endeavors,
perhaps an unacceptable burden is placed on a few states.
The important principle of collective responsibility is
undermined in the process.
One other financial alternative which has been pro
posed by students of the United Nations should be noted.
What of independent sources of revenue for the United
20
Nations? If the United Nations had an independent income,
could it not undertake these missions with impunity, worrying
little about whether individual nations were willing to
contribute to the support of peace-keeping? Theoretically
-p-Q-
See, for example, John G. Stoessinger, financing the
United Nations System (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
.Institution, 194)s pp. 265-292.


of the operation* There is little evidence that a solution
to the dilemma had been found by the time the mission
terminated* In all likelihood a real solution, one that
would hold up in emergency situations, would require sub
stantial movement to a more integrated forcea truly
international rather than multi-national force* A clearer
enunciation of the goals of the operation and of the methods
to be used to achieve these aims could substantially con
tribute to the coordination and control of the mission by
purpose.
The functioning of the United Nations Force
Let us now turn to the question of what the Force
actually did in the Congo to achieve the objectives of the
United Nations,
Phase I,-The first stage of the Force's activities
in the Congo ran from July, I960, to early September, I960.
In this period the Force moved in very quickly to restore
order and to enable the Belgians to withdraw. The ONUC
mandate was narrow: it could not use force to accomplish
its ends. However, ONUC had substantial support at United
Nations Headquarters behind it and a fair amount of co
operation from Congolese authorities. It seemed initially
that responsibilities and powers might not be too far apart.


219
96
Nations Truce Supervision Organization. The availability
of the experienced personnel from UNTSO was important to
the rapid establishment of the Force; a nucleus of officers
with experience both in the geographic area and in a re
lated phase of peace-keeping were immediately available to
help organize the operation. Once the Force was fully
established, the improvised staff was replaced by officers
from each of the contingents composing the Force. Selection
in practice seems to have been by the Commander and the
national contingents, acting in cooperation. At the Com
mander's request the nations contributing troops to UNEF
were asked to submit names of officers suitable for staff
service. (Suitability included staff training and experi-
.97
ence and a good working knowledge of English.) '
The permanent headquarters organization adopted was
a three-branch organization: personnel; operations and in
telligence; and logistics. In establishing the permanent
staff organization for UNEF a conscious effort was made to
create a staff exceptionally strong in both the number and
'The officers from UNTSO who made up the first UNEF
staff included an operations officer (Norwegian), an admini
strative officer (Swedish) and three liaison and intelli
gence officers (Dutch, Swedish, and Americanthe latter
despite the fact that the resolution establishing the Com
mand specifically excluded participation by the permanent
members of the Security Council). Burns, o£. cit., p. 30?.
97Ibid. pp. 210-211.


466
material on one or more of the forces. International
Organization might he cited as a particularly rich source
on this subject.
Of value in gaining insight in depth into particular
phases of the peace-keeping groups are the biographies,
autobiographies, and diaries by or about participants which
have been published. Unfortunately, these accounts are
still relatively few in number. They can be most en
lightening. Among the more useful in this study were Count
Folke Bernadotte's To Jerusalem, treating his experience as
Mediator in Palestine, and Lieutenant-General E.L.M. Burns'
Between Arab and Israeli, dealing with his service as Chair
man of the Truce Supervision Organization and Commander of
the United Nations Emergency Force. A provocative if some
what emotional account of his experience with the United
Nations operation in the Congo is given by Conor Cruise
O'Brien in To Katanga and Back. O'Brien served as the
Secretary-General's Special Representative in Katanga for a
time. Of less direct relevance but of some value were the
various biographies and autobiographies of Secretaries-
General Lie and Hammarskjold.
Finally, a number of secondary materials books,
monographs, and articles were consulted. At the time this
particular study was undertaken, only a few scattered articles
had been written on the non-fighting military presence.


213
90 x
country. In the aide-memoire the Government of Egypt
declared that
...when exercising its sovereign rights on any
matter concerning the presence and functioning
of UNEF, it will he guided in good faith by its
acceptance of General Assembly resolution 1000
(ES-I) of 5 November.
In turn the United Nations officials stated that
...the activities of UNEF will be guided, in good
faith, by the task established for the Force in
the aforementioned resolutions; in particular, the
United Nations, understanding this to correspond
to the wishes of the Government of Egypt, reaffirms
its willingness to maintain UNEF until its task is
completed.
The February agreement on the status of UNEF, which
was a follow-up to the aide-memoire, was also highly signi
ficant not only by its impact on UNEF-Egyptian relations
but also because it enunciated a number of guiding principles
91
for host country peace-keeping force relations.
A central principle of the February Agreement was
that as a subsidiary organ of the United Nations, UNEF was
entitled to the privileges and immunities necessary for the
achievement of its purposes. The legal status of the Force
was based on the principle that complete independence from
local authority was necessary for UNEF to perform its inter
national functions. Translated into concrete terms the
9U.N. Doc. A/3375.
91U.N. Doc. A/3526.


45
Yet there is no proof that other staffing arrange
ments would have been feasible or more desirable On the
one hand, the United States contention, apparently sup
ported by other states, was that opening the door to
inclusion of even a few Russian observers would complicate
the situation and would provide the Russians a toe-hold
making more likely Russian participation in any military
force which it might be necessary to send into the Middle
East.29
On the other hand, a limited effort in 1948 to supple
ment the seconded observers with a truly international group
of fifty United Rations guards proved inauspicious. In mid-
June the Mediator, finding the sixty-three observers
initially called for inadequate to the task, requested a
force of fifty men from the Secretary-General. Within three
days the fifty men, gathered from the United Rations Guard
and the Secretariat, left Rew York for Palestine, outfitted
and ready for active duty. The Force, composed of men from
seven nations, was hailed as the prototype of a real inter-
80
national police force. The experiment evidently did not
Commission, thereby leaving room for the inclusion of ob
servers from other nations. But if such a suggestion
actually was considered, it was considered only fleetingly,
for when arrangements were made for the Second Truce Organi
zation only the original participants were included. The
Rew York Times, July 17, 1948.
9The Rew York Times, June 6, 1948.
9^A1though the majority of members of the force were
American there were also two Frenchmen, one Australian, one


216
Inherent in such an agreement is the assumption of coopera
tion and relative good will between the force and the host
state.
UNEF in Action
The role of the Force
Of all the uses by the United Nations of non-fighting
units in a peace-keeping capacity, ranging from the missions
involving a handful of observers to those encompassing
thousands of soldiers, the most praised and the least criti
cized has been UNEF. It has served as the prototype and
inspiration for those peace-keeping missions which have been
established in its wake. To fully understand the basis for
the success of the Force, it is necessary to look beyond
its origins and characteristics. The ultimate test of the
Force rests in its functioning once in being. UNEF managed
successfully the difficult role of being part observer
group and part military force. An examination of UNEF in
the field can offer insight into how this has been accomp
lished and what' factors affect the success of peace-keeping
missions,
The United Nations Emergency Force has played a dual
role in the Middle East. In the first phase of its opera
tions in the period preceding and coinciding with the with
drawal of British, French, and Israeli forces from Egypt,


498
Leonard, L. Larry. "The United Nations and Palestine,"
International Conciliation, No. 454 (October, 1949),pp.
607-786.
Lupton, Captain V. "Organization and Role of the Royal
Canadian Air Force to Support Peace Keeping Operations,"
Transcript of a Speech at the Meeting of Military
Experts to Consider the Technical Aspects of U.N.
Peace-Keeping Operations, Ottawa, Canada, November,
1964.
Marcum, John. "Unilateral Intervention in the Congo and its
Political Consequences," Proceedings of the American
Society of International Law, 55th Annual Meeting
(April 27-29ri961) pp. 27-50.
Martin, Paul. "Peace-Keeping and the United Nations,"
International Affairs, Vol. 40, No. 2 (April, 1964), pp.
T9T-204";
Martin, Paul. "Peace Keeping: Some Prospects and Perspec
tives," Text of a Speech to the McGill Conference on
World Affairs, November 21, 1964, Statements and
Speeches, Information Division, Department of External
Affairs,' Ottawa, Canada.
Martin, Paul. Text of a Speech (untitled) to the Meeting of
Military Experts to Consider the Technical Aspects of
U.N. Peace-Keeping Operations, Ottawa, Canada, November,
1964.
Martin, Paul. "The United Nations in an Era of Limited
Peace," Speech given to the Empire Club, Toronto, April
2, 1964, Statements and Speeches Information Division,
Department of External Affairs,Ottawa, Canada.
Mason, Henry L. "The United Nations Emergency Force," in
Tulane Studies in Political Science, Vol. IV, Inter
national Law and the Middle East Crisis, New Orleans:
Tulane University, 1967, PP. 25-485
Mezerik, A. G. (edit), "Congo and the United Nations," Parts
1-3, International Review Service, Vol. 7, Ho. 61 and
65 (1960-61)," and Vol. '9No. ?? (1963).
Miller, E. M. "Legal Aspects of the United Nations Action
in the Congo," American Journal of International Law,
Vol. 55 (January, 1961), pp^ :i-2B7


318
great difficulty. The United Nations had neither the
available funds nor the transport necessary to quickly
introduce such equipment into the area. In fact, the
dilemma was resolved, if not fully at least adequately, by
the loan and contribution of equipment by those states most
interested in seeing the mission succeed. Substantial
quantities of military goods were put into the hands of
United Nations troops before both the December, 1961, and
24
the December, 1962, engagements. (The United States, in
particular, played a central role in supplying equipment to
the Force.) This aid was probably a critical element in
the successful (if temporary) pacification of the Congo.
There were many problems connected with just the
routine support of ONUC. Feeding, equipping, and housing
the Force became less than routine in the face of the
difficulties posed by the characteristicsphysical and
politicalof the Congo and by the size and national di
versity of the Force itself. Providing the Force with
accommodations was a challenge. In many cases suitable
facilities were not available and extensive alterations or
25
construction work were necessary. Feeding the Force was
complicated: food either had to be brought in from outside,
'Bowitz, on. cit., p. 7.
^General Assembly, Official Records, 15th Session
Fifth Committee, 825th meeting (March 24, 1961), p. 4.


471
A/3302 and Add. 1 to 16, Nov. 6, 1956, "Second and final
report of the Secretary-General on the plan for an
emergency international United Nations Force requested
in resolution 998 (ES-I), adopted hy the General
Assembly on 4 November 1956."
A/3310, Nov. 7, 1956, "Aide-memoire dated 5 November
1956 from the Secretary-General, addressed to the
Governments of France and the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland."
A/3317, Nov, 8, 1956, "Confirmation of the appointment
of Major-General E.L.M. Burns as Chief of the United
Nations Command for the emergency international force."
General Assembly, Official Records, Eleventh Session (1956-7),
Annexes
A/3375, Nov. 20, 1956, "Report of the Secretary-General
on basic points for the presence and functioning in
Egypt of the United Nations Emergency Force."
A/3383 and Rev. 1, Nov. 21, 1956, "Report of the
Secretary-General on administrative and financial
arrangements for the United Nations Emergency Force."
A/3384 and Add. 1 and 2, Nov. 21, 1956, "Report of the
Secretary-General on compliance with General Assembly
resolutions 997 (ES-I) and 1002 (ES-I)."
A/3402, Nov, 30, 1956, "Twenty-second report of the
Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary
Questions: administrative and financial arrangements
for the United Nations Emergency Force."
A/3456, Dec. 14, 1956, "Thirty-fifth report of the
Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary
Questions: possible claims in respect of death or
disability attributable to service in the United Nations
Emergency Force."
A/3500 and Add. 1, Jan. 15, 1957, "Report by the
Secretary-General on compliance with General Assembly
resolutions calling for withdrawal of troops and other
measures."
A/3511, Jan. 24, 1957,J'Note by the Secretary-General
transmitting an aide-memoire on the Israel position on
the Sharm el-Sheikh area'and the Gaza Strip."


392
of a 117-man Yugoslav reconnaissance unit transferred from
UNEU, a 50-man Canadian air arm, and six multi-national
observers to watch the border withdrawals. The functions
were narrowly defined: the observers were to observe only.
They were neither to investigate nor to issue orders or
directives.
The expenses of the observer group, averaging
$200,000 a month, were to be borne by the two parties in-
1
volved, the United Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia.' The
period for which support for the group was promised initially
was two months. In September and again in November, 1963,
the life of the group was extended for additional two-month
periods with the promise of continuing financial support.
At the end of 1963 the character and size of the group were
changed. There was recognition that little progress had
been made in improving the situation and that the observers,
few in number and restricted in mandate, could do little to
accelerate the rate of progress. Therefore, the observer
group was reduced sharply in size and the military commander
who had served as the chief of the mission was replaced by a
%.N. Doc. S/5321, p. 4-7.
rIn his initial report (U.N. Doc. S/5298) the Secretary-
General suggested the group be financed under General Assembly
resolution 1862 (XVII) providing for use of the peace and se
curity contingency fund available to the Secretary-General.
Subsequently, the plan for U.A.R.-Saudi Arabian financing was
agreed upon. See U.N, Doc. S/5325, p. 50.


95
nor the accompanying debate indicated precisely what the
mandate of the Observation Group was supposed to be. What,
for example, was meant by "to ensure that there is no
illegal infiltration of personnel or arms"? This prescrip
tion might lend itself readily to varying interpretations
and, in fact, became the subject of later controversy with
respect to the functioning of the Observation Group.
Only the representative of Panama attempted to
clarify the mandate given the observers at the time the
June 11 resolution was passed. His interpretation was narrow.
In the Panamanian view the terminology of the resolution
drew a clear distinction between an observation group and an
investigating group. The Observation Group should not in
quire into or pass judgment on past events or situations.
The principal and sole function of the Group would be to
observe in order to ensure that there was no infiltration.
(This interpretation left open the question of how observa
tion alone could halt infiltration, if observed.) In the
words of the delegate of Panama:
In my delegation's view, such an observation group
would not have the authority to undertake an inquiry
into causes and past incidents to find out whether such
infiltration has already taken place. This is the
essential distinction between an observation committee
and a committee of investigation. An observation com
mittee is concerned with the observation of future
events. An investigating committee, on the other hand,
is concerned with discovering the truth about what has
happened.


which the
except in self-defense. These principles,
Secretary-General had set forth in his July 13, I960,
statement to the Security Council and which had been rein
forced in later statements and in the August 9, I960,
resolution, were stressed in the directives to the troops
in the field.
The main weapon which is available to a non-fighting,
non-interventionist force to accomplish its ends is its
prestige; its principal means, its presence on the scene.
Since the observation groups and UNEF had functioned suc
cessfully without the use of arms and with reliance on
simply being in the crisis area, it was assumed that the
same means would prove effective in the Congo.
There are certain conditions, however, that must be
met if a force is to accomplish its objectives by means of
its presence alone. First, some cooperation and mutual
trust between the United Nations and the host state and the
states directly involved in the situation is required.
(This need was implicitly recognized in the July 1?, I960,
Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of
X L
the Congo.; The Congolese Government was uncooperative
and at times openly hostile to the United Nations Force,
berating it, criticizing it, launching bitter attacks on
its actions and its aims in the Congo. To make matters
^rU.N, Doc. S/4*389s Add. 5, pp. 27-28.


ev
er
July
1960
Responsibility
weapons
prestige
Sept. Feb. Sept. Dec. Dec.
1960 1961 1961 1961 1962
Figure 3
The relationship of the Force's power to
its responsibilities over time


450
The ambitious approach is at the other end of the
spectrum of possibilities in peace-keeping. It envisages
a situation similar to that desired by advocates of a
permanent United Nations peace-keeping force. A peace
keeping force would be on hand, backed by moral and material
support, for injection into ail serious crises. There would
be wide use, in theory, of such a group. The powers avail
able to it would be extensive and use of force when necessary
would not be precluded.
The limitations on the ambitious approach are both
practical and political and stem from the very nature of
the international community today. There is, in fact, no
real hope of the imminent creation of a permanent standing
force. Past difficulties in ensuring financial support,
men, and equipment for ad hoc forces indicate that members
of the international organization are not yet ready to assume
permanent commitments for the support of a force. Nations
measure United Nations action against their national
interests. Those judged to be against their interest win
little or no support. To undertake advance commitments for
a standing force would be tantamount to releasing some of
the controls over the force. Even those states which have
most staunchly supported the non-fighting force and have
earmarked troops for United Nations service have retained a
veto on the use of their men. Because the international


365
All of the United Nations responsibilities flow
ing from past resolutions on the Congo continue with
new emphasis, since those resolutions have all been
reaffirmed in the action just taken. Assistance must
be given to the Central Government in the maintenance
of law and order. Everything possible must be done to
avert civil xiar, even by the employment of force,
should this prove necessary as a last resort. This,
I believe, necessarily implies a sympathetic attitude
on the part of ONUC toward the efforts of the Govern
ment to suppress all armed activities against the
Central Government and secessionist activities.
Supporting the territorial integrity of the country,
the United Nations position, it seems to me, is
automatically against all armed activities against
the Central Government and against secessionist
forces.66
Thus, a new Security Council resolution and a new
Acting Secretary-General opened the way to new initiatives
by ONUC to end the secession of Katanga and resolve the
crisis of the Congo. Neither the resolution nor the Secre
tary-General said that force would be used for the specific
purpose of ending Katanga's secession. However, if para
graph 4- of the resolution, referring to the use of force,
were taken in conjunction with paragraph 8, demanding an
end to Katanga's secession, it might be reasoned that ONUC
had power not only to eliminate the mercenaries but also
to end the secession by forceful means.
It was only shortly after the passage of the November
24 resolution that the second major military encounter
between the forces of Katanga and of the United Nations
DSecurity Council, Official Records, 16th Year,
.982nd meeting (November 24 1961), p. 20.


191
expensive peace-keeping operation the United Nations had
engaged in prior to UNEF had been in Palestine, and the
costs of the Truce Supervision Organization there never
exceeded $5*5 million. In fact, the actual UNEP costs viere
greater than indicated by the budget. Generous contribu
tions of men, material, and transport facilities from member
61
states reduced substantially the initial outlay.
Although the costs of UNEP have been reduced over
the years, it has remained an expensive undertaking for the
United Nations. Costs have been stabilized at around $19
million annually. (The costs of a peace-keeping group are
almost always largest in the first phase of operations be
cause of several factors: the initial costs of getting a
force in being and underway; the somewhat greater responsi
bilities of a force in its first phase of operations; and
the inexperience of those responsible for the operation.)
Providing the financial support to maintain a Force
of adequate size in the field has been one of the most
61
Examples of the contributions are numerous.
Countries sending contingents not only covered the ordinary
expenses (such as salaries of their men), but also provided
much equipment without charge. Transport of troops and
equipment from home base to staging area valued at $2.25
million was provided by the United States. The Canadians
transported their men to the area of operations at a cost
to them of $772,131. The Swiss Government picked up a
$390,000 bill for the initial costs of commercial air trans
port from the staging area to Egypt. The Scandinavians
arranged regular air transport service to and from Naples.


w
butions reveals that the core of support has rested with a
group of middle-sized states Canada, Denmark, India,
Norway, Finland, New Zealand, and Sweden, among others
and with the United States. The latter power has provided
the great power assistance needed. On the one hand,
transport and supplies have been provided in the early
stages of the operation. On the other hand, power and in
fluence have been exercised by the United States on behalf
of the force and its endeavors. Such backing is, on
occasion, indispensable for a non-fighting force, for it
has limited means of its own to enforce decisions of the
international organization. However, the importance of the
United States support raises the question, directly, of the
chances of success of a peace-keeping effort which the
United States did not regard as being in its national
interest and, indirectly, of the dangers of reliance for
support on too few powers. (It might be noted that some of
the most enthusiastic support for the peace-keeping force
has come from the United States. Not only has the United
States been at -the head of the list of supporters of estab
lished forces, it has also been among the first to propose
new forces. Thus, the United States advocated a force for
the Palestine situation in 1948, for the Lebanese crisis in
1958, and for Laos in 1964.) United States support or no,
it would seem essential for a force to have support which


United Kingdom apparently had the broadest view of the legal
base of the observers' powers. Both indicated that the
'Essentials of Peace" resolution, adopted by the General
ld
Assembly in 19^9, calling on members "to refrain from any
threats or acts, direct or indirect, aimed at impairing the
freedom, independence and integrity of any State, or at
fomenting civil strife and subverting the will of the people
in any State," supplemented the Charter authority of the
Council and supported an active role by the Security Council
and its agent in the Lebanese situation.^
Thus, the ambiguity of the Groups legal foundations
allowed for flexibility and variation in determination not
only of the precise Charter provisions the observers were
acting under hut, more important, of the powers they had at
their disposal.
The mandate
The June 11 resolution provided in broad terms for
the establishment of the Observation Group and defined
loosely the functions of the Group. Neither the resolution
"TT* '
General Assembly resolution 290 (IV).
^fhe united Kingdom representative also cited reso
lution 111 (II), adopted unanimously at the Second Session
of the General Assembly, as being relevant to the question
at issue. Security Council, Official Secords, 13th Year,
82Ath meeting (June 11, 1938) ,""p. 32^


348
noted that the Katanga gendarmerie was more effective, and
better disciplined, equipped, and led than any other unit
in the Congo. The authorities in Katanga were estimated to
have at their disposal 5,000 Congolese soldiers and some
400 non-Congolese officers and non-commissioned officers.^
In April this gendarmerie was embarked on an offensive
military operation in North. Katanga. Efforts by the United
Nations to bring a halt to the fighting had little success.
Officers in the field refused even to meet with United
Nations officials while Tshombe's promises were broken as
fast as they were made. With the failure of both persuasion
and threats to bring a halt to the aggressive moves by
Katanga, the use-of-force provision in the Eebruary 21
resolution was applied for the first time, and applied with
success.
By the end of April "a mixture of UNE presence, in
formal staffwork, and military diplomacy" and, on rare
occasion, force had ended any immediate threat of civil war
in the Congo.^
5U.N. Doc. S/4691, p. 102. The New York Times points
out that Tshombes army differed from others in that it was
the only part of the pre-independence force which made the
transition from pre-independence to independence in more or
less orderly fashion. The difference is attributed to the
fact that the Belgian officers gave the force continuity
elsewhere all foreign officers were lost and those men who
had only been sergeants before had difficulty acting effec-_
tively as generals. The New York Times, April 3, 1961, p. 6.
^Arthur Lee Burns and Nina Heathcote, Peace-Keeping
by U.N. Forces: Erom Suez to the Congo (New York: Frederick
A. Praeger for the Center of International Studies, Prince
ton University, 1963), p. 86.


218
mentation of other measures as proposed in the Secretary-
95
General's report." y Again, the "other measures" were not
spelled out. The ambiguity remained.
The organization of UNE?
The Chief of Command of UNEF was given full responsi
bility for the functioning of the Force. The Commander had,
in fact, a dual role to perform: he was to serve both as
leader of the Force and as representative of the United
Nations in the area. Political, military, and administra
tive responsibilities devolved upon him. He was to direct
the over-all operation, to supervise the day-by-day
activities of the Force, to represent the Secretary-General.
The Commander was assisted in carrying this heavy
burden of duties by the United Nations Command, a military
staff organization under a Chief of Staff. The Chief of
Staff served as second in command in the operation. The
Command itself was composed of officers designated by the
Commander in consultation with the Secretary-General.
The first improvised UNEF staff, set up in Cairo on
November 12, 1956, was composed of officers from the United
^Ibid., p. 16.


outs of such, missions should enable them to move forward
with considerably more assurance than was the case a decade
cl 05 0 *
On the other hand, the military men experienced in
this sort of undertaking serve as a nucleus-on-hand to which
the United Nations can turn in establishing a new mission.
The original field commanders of each of the observation
groups and the peace forces since UNEF have had prior
United Nations peace-keeping experience. To illustrate,
UNEP was organized by Major-General E.L.M. Burns, who was
serving at the time as Chief of UNTSO, and by a small group
of observers Burns brought with him from the Truce Organiza
tion. The organization of the Observation Group in Lebanon
was handled by a group of observers on loan from UNTSO. The
first commander of the United Nations Force in the Congo was
Major-General Carl von Horn, who came from service as Chief
of the Truce Supervision Organization. He too was assisted
in his initial duties by some truce observers as well as by
some units from UNEP. Von Horn served also as the first
chief of the Yemen Observation Mission, a mission which was
composed almost entirely of units transferred from UNEP.
The first chief of the United Nations Force in Cyprus was
Lieutenant-General P.S. Gyani, who had just completed four
years service as Commander of UNSF.


temporary and limited nature of the Force; its stay in the
Middle East was viewed as entirely dependent on Egyptian
consent. For example, in the opinion of the Soviet dele
gate, it would be a flagrant contradiction of the Charter
and of the Forces original purpose for UNEF to occupy Gaza
4-1
or the Straits.
The bulk of Assembly opinion fell somewhere between
these two poles with respect to the role of the Force.
Hammarskjold1s opinion, characteristic of the majority, was
set forth in reports and statements to the Assembly from
January through Aprils 1957* The Secretary-General and a
number of the delegates were willing to recognize at least
the possibility of a role for the Force in bringing a
solution to the outstanding issues in the Middle East, but
they indicated that first the Israelis must withdraw.
Hammarskjold stressed again and again that the United
Eations could not condone a change in the situation result
ing from military action contrary to the provisions of the
Charter, Uor could the Force take any action to impose a
political settlement in the interest of one party. It must
be neutral. Thus, in his report of January 24- the Secretary-
General said:
^General Assembly, Official Records, 11th Session,
64-6th plenary meeting (January 29, "1^57'Tj"*"P 1002.


282
Tile Afro-Asian states did not view the November 2d
resolution as a new departure but merely as a clarification
and reaffirmation of powers vested in the Secretary-C-enerai
by the February 21 resolution.^ Under this interpretation
the new resolution lay within the framework of the Febru
ary 21 resolution and merely recommended methods of imple
mentation of that resolution.
Opposition to the course being taken by the Security
Council was again voiced by the representatives of the
Western European nations. Supporters of their position had
steadily dwindled over the months however. France and the
United Kingdom, as members of the Council, and Sweden and
Belgium, non-members but interested parties, ail spoke out
against the tenor of the new resolution. The French dele
gate pointed out that France had adhered to three principles
throughout the Congo affair: the sovereignty of the Congo;
the unity of the Congo; and non-interference in Congolese
Secretary-General to take vigorous action to end the seces
sion. Security Council, Official Records, 16th Year, 974-th
meeting (November 15, 1961), p. T25 The representative of
India, Krishna Menon, argued that force should be used if
necessary to terminate the war against the United Nations
because the prestige and authority of the Organization was
dependent on its success. Security Council, Official Records,
16th Year, 976th meeting (November 17, 1961), p. 2j
58
- For example, the representative of the United Arab
Republic contended that if the February 21 resolution had
been fully implemented, it would have been unnecessary to
deal again with the Congolese question. Security Council,
Official Records, 16th Year, 974-th meeting (November 15,
. rgsrjT p.t^:


90
The representative of Lebanon presented his countrys
case forcefully, citing evidence to support the charges made.
The delegate of the United Arab Republic responded to the
Lebanese charges by denying any intervention in Lebanese
affairs or any desire to undermine Lebanese independence.
In his view Lebanon was merely trying to give an inter-
Q
national cast to essentially domestic difficulties.
The situation was complicated by the apparent in
jection of the dimension of East-West rivalry into it. The
immediate responses of the United States and of the Soviet
Union to the issues seemed more a consequence of cold war
rivalries and alliances than of the Security Council argu
ments. The United States, the United Kingdom, and France,
suspicious of President Nasser's intentions and his friend
ship with the Soviet Union, unequivocally supported Lebanon's
charges. On the other hand, the Soviet delegate indicated,
first, that Lebanon had not proved its charges against the
United Arab Republic in his estimation; and second, that he
considered such charges merely an excuse to call in foreign
troops (that is-, United States troops) to put down a domestic
q
rebellion. (The latter charge was a reflection of wide
spread reports that Lebanon was considering asking United
^Security Council, Official Records, 13th Year,
823rd meeting (June 6, 195^), pr~23*
''Security Council, Official Records, 13th Year,
. 824-th meeting (June 10, 195S), pp. 28~12~9.


22J
time of their arrival in Egypt until the departure of the
last British and French troops from Port Said on December
102
22, 1956. As soon as the Anglo-French troops were out,
almost all UNEF men were deployed to the Sinai area.
The cease-fire, the withdrawal, and the presence of
the United Nations Emergency Force were linked in the view
of the invading states. What did the Force actually do to
ease the transition from occupation to withdrawal?
The Force undertook a variety of responsibilities.
In the initial stages of the operation before UNEF had been
built up to strength and before evacuation details had been
completed, the mere presence of the Force was considered
helpful to the situation. Patrols were sent out for the
purpose of showing UNEF colors. Burns comments in this
respect:
Up to that time they [a Norwegian company camped
in a park in Port Said] had no specific responsi
bilities in keeping order, but their presence had
been welcomed by the people, and doubtless had an
influence for good. Above all, it showed both the
Allies and the population that UNEF was a reality,
and that when it was built up in strength it could
perform its allotted task of interposing between the
combatants and "helping to maintain peaceful con
ditions. "105
: T7T7
ince the first stage of the Israeli withdrawal
from Sinai took place simultaneously, the only unit avail
able to follow up the Israeli withdrawal was a Yugoslav
reconnaissance unit. Burns, op. cit., p. 235*
105Ibid., p. 225.


283
internal affairs. His stress was placed on the latter
principle and on the dangers of intervening in any internal
conflicts or using force to reintegrate Katanga into the
5 4.
Congo. The delegate of the United Kingdom joined his
Trench colleague in deploring the use of force and con
tending that lasting unity would he brought only by peace
ful, constitutional means. In his view the ways of force
were not the ways of the United Nations and the consequences
so incalculable and so dangerous that it would be irrespon
sible of the United Nations to adopt such policies. One
of the incalculable consequences the United Kingdom feared
was the creation of a dangerous precedent for the future;
there would be no end to the responsibility the United
Nations would be undertaking. It would be at the beck and
5 S
call of any state with a dissident minority on its hands.
Thus, the United Nations Torce had commenced its
mission under a mandate which, although vague, was inter
preted as confining its responsibilities to creation of
some sort of internal stability in the Congo through its
presence so that the Belgians could withdraw. In achieving
its ends ONUC was neither to use force (except in self-
defense) nor to interfere in the internal affairs of the
Congo. By November, 1961, the Torce's mandate, though still
^Ibid. up. 15-16.
65
^'Security Council, Official Records, 16th Year,
976th meeting (November 17, 1961), pp. 33-3^.


371
financial situation of the United Nations was grave. By
October, 1962, tlie Organization was deeply in debt, and it
was questionable whether it could indefinitely bear a $10
million a month commitment to the Congo operation. In
addition, the United Nations faced the imminent loss of the
backbone of the force. India, confronted with aggressive
Chinese moves, expressed a desire to withdraw the approxi
mately 5500 troops it had in the Congo. Thus, if the
United Nations were to be in a position to back up its
demands on Katanga with force, it would be necessary to
act before the Indians and the money were gone.
Desirable as it might be to end Katanga's secession,
the problem of how this might be accomplished remaihed.
Negotiations had not proven fruitful; the alternative
seemed to be to force Tshombe to negotiate a settlement or
to impose a solution. In either case some sort of coercion
would have to be applied to Katanga to bring them to heel.
Pressure seemed to be an essential adjunct to talking.
In November, 1962, the Secretary-General marked the
shift in tactics in dealing with Tshombe with the announce
ment of a proposed program of economic sanctions. However,
the European states in a position to best implement such a
plan responded unenthusiastically, making the outlook for
effective sanctions dim.
influenced government being installed in Leopoldville if
Adoula was ousted. The New York Times, April 29, 1962, and
July 29, 1962.


262
Before the Congo operation was over, some of ONUCs
moves
did, in fact,
look
like
parric
ularly true o
f the
mili'
1961,
and December,
1962,
In
Idition, the February 21 and
November 15, 1961, resolutions strengthening the Force's
mandate by allowing a limited use of force for specified
purposes seemed to be moving close to, if not into, the
enforcement area without admitting to a shift in the legal
foundations of the Force.
'The initial legal foundations of the Force were
difficult to reconcile, on occasion, with the mandate and
actions of the Force in its later stages. The difficulty
stemmed from the very nature of the OFCJC mission. The
Forces primary purpose was to restore order within the
Congo by pacifying elements within that state. To bring
peace and stability to the Congo as instructed, the Force
found it necessary to become involved in internal questions
in the Congo and to take the initiative in the use of force,
Theoretically, the primary justification for such actions
would be in pursuance of Chapter VII, Yet the very nature
of the Force's mission-to restore peace within the Congo
made it difficult to invoke Charter provisions referring to
international peace and security. Conceivably the Secretary'
General's findings of an implicit threat to the peace,
arising from potential outside intervention, might have been


Council is blocked by veto, there may be little to gain by
a veto (assuming support for action in the Assembly) except
disparagement of the Security Council an end not desired
by the Soviet Union, its supporters, and many of the major
powers. (The role of the communist states,.as reflected in
the votes establishing the forces, is interesting. Although
they have voted in the General Assembly against establish
ing, financing, or strengthening such groups, they have not
voted in the negative in the Security Council where such a
vote would doom the proposed operation.) It may be that
the peace-keeping forces have helped not only to expand the
powers of the Secretary-General, but to revitalize the
Security Council as well.
A second requirement for the creation of the force is
the consent of the parties directly involved in the dispute
at issue. The very nature of the non-fighting force pre
cludes a force not based on consent. The force is to enter
a situation of actual or potential conflict and help restore
peace by its presence alone. This necessarily calls for
the consent of the parties involved to the force's entry.
Whether such consent will be forthcoming would seem to de
pend in large part on whether the nations involved judge
that the force would serve, or at a minimum would not injure,
their national interests. If those involved do not view the
force as useful to them, it is likely that some pressure will


200
responsibility of the permanent members of the Security
Council with the special responsibility for the situation
71
oi the aggressors.
Holding the most extreme position on the negative
end of the continuum were the members of the Communist bloc.
Although they had abstained on the resolution establishing
UKTEF, they contended that the decision to establish UNSF
was illegal. The establishment of United Nations armed
forces was exclusively within the competence of the Security
Council under Chapter YII of the Charter. Any financial
arrangements respecting the Force should be made under
Article 43 of the Charter. The Communist representatives
did not distinguish between a fighting force created by the
Security Council under Chapter VII and a non-fighting force
created under some other section of the Charter. They con
tended that they could not participate in financing an
illegal force and voted no on all resolutions related to
72
UNEF financing.
ni
Egypt suggested, for example, that the expenses be
met primarily by those states whose actions made the opera
tion necessary and by the permanent Security Council members.
General Assembly, Official Records, 11th Session, Fifth
Committee, 545th meeting (December 6, 1956), p. 70,
'^Despite the Soviet contention that the Force was
illegal, they did have a suggestion for its financing. The
aggressors, Israel, France, and the United Kingdom, should
pay for it. General Assembly, Official Records, 11th
Session, Fifth Committee, 555th meeting '(December 18, 1956),
p. 129.


11
Ob8o.rva.tion Mission in Yemen. These groups have been con
siderably larger and more expensive than the prototype
observer teams. They have ranged in size from 200 to 600
men and have been supplied with a substantial amount of
communications and reconnaissance equipment. Their mission
is correspondingly expanded. It may include investigation
as well as observation. World opinion may be mobilized to
supplement the observer presence as a deterrent to aggres
sion. Such groups move the United Nations a step closer to
use of a full-fledged military force. Both the Palestine
and Lebanon endeavors were ambitious enough to qualify as
miniature armed forces. Their experience is directly rele
vant to the emergence of the technique of the peace-keeping
force.
This emergence of the full-fledged military force
talces place with the creation of the United Nations Emergency
Force, a force of some 6,000 men, to cope with the Suez
crisis in 1956. It was followed by the United Nations Force
in the Congo, created in I960 and ranging in size from
15,000 to 20,000 men, and the Force in Cyprus, set up in
1964- and numbering about 7*000. These forces represent the
furthest extension of the United Nations development of
peace-keeping techniques. Not only were they far larger in
size and more expensive than the observer groups, hut they
also had somewhat broad.er powers at their disposal. Although


96
My delegation therefore considers that the limits
within which the group is to carry out its task of
observation should be clearly established in order to
ensure that it does not have powers of the kind
attributed to it in this morning's local Press and
does not have more authority than it should have as an
observation group, which should in no circumstances be
regarded as a court of inquiry.
It was the Secretary-General's interpretation of the
June 11 resolution that was decisive in fixing the mandate
of the Observation Group. In a press conference held the
day following passage of the resolution, the Secretary-
General described his conception of the Observation Group
in the following terms:
First...they are there as an observer team, the
presence of which has been considered essential and
useful as a contribution to the preventing of
possible illegal traffic.
There is a distinction obviously, between regarding
an observer activity as in general terms useful for
the purpose and regarding these people as people who
are supposed to intervene through direct action.^7
The Secretary-General's interpretation did not change
basically in succeeding months, Hammarskjold interpreted
the resolution rather narrowly. He found in it neither the
authority to expand the operational area of the observers
beyond Lebanon's borders nor the scope of the activity be
yond observation. Sti-ongly and repeatedly he indicated that
Security Council, Official Records, 13th Year,
825th meeting (June 11, 1958)pp. 3-4.
"^The New York Times, June 13, 1958.


225
Port Fuad and with guarding certain vulnerable points, such.
as the electric generating plant, the water pumping stations,
the sewage installations, and the food warehouses. By the
time the evacuation reached its final stages UWEF had taken
over responsibility for all vulnerable points outside the
narrow zone to which the Allied forces had withdrawn and,
in cooperation with local authorities, for the general
104-
maintenance of peaceful conditions. The Force was con
cerned not only with public order but also with civilian
welfare. It assumed some administrative functions with
respect to public services and utilities, and it arranged
for provisioning of the local population with foodstuffs.
With the entry of Egyptian authorities UNEF turned control
over to them. In general, UNEF duties were varied, includ
ing such other functions as repairing damaged roads, clear
ing minefields, engaging in investigation, and arranging
105
and carrying out the exchange of prisoners.
The question of the responsibilities of the Force
vis-a-vis the withdrawal of the invading states was raised
TTyT
The term law and order was avoided due to Egyptian
insistence that the maintenance of law and order was the
prerogative of the Egyptian authorities and their apparent
suspicion that IMEF maintenance of law and order might be
the onening wedge for IMEF occupation of their territory.
Ibid/, p. 228.
10^It might be noted that in the Egyptian-Israeli
exchange Israel exchanged 6,000 Egyptians for three
Israelis. Ibid., p. 246.


99
IQ
observers."uo Tills resolution was defeated by a vote of
nine to two, with, only the Soviet Union and Sweden voting
affirmatively. Most of the delegates appeared to feel that
a worsening of the situation in Lebanon hardly provided a
propitious time for United Nations withdrawal.
The Soviet resolution called for the immediate with
drawal of all United States troops from Lebanon. The
American troops constituted the real problem in the Russian
19
view. Only the Soviet Union voted in favor of this pro
posal although Sweden and Japan abstained.
Neither the Soviet nor the Swedish resolutions were
seriously considered. The real debate in the Council was
over whether to establish a peace force to aid or even re
place the observers. The United States draft resolution
proposed a peace force. Under its terms the Security Council
would do the following:
Invite the United Nations Observation Group in
Lebanon to continue to develop its activities pur
suant to the Security Council resolution of 11 June
1958;
Requests, the Secretary-General immediately to
consult the Government of Lebanon and other Member
States as appropriate with a view to making arrange
ments for additional measures, including the contri
bution and use of contingents, as may be necessary to
18
Security Council, Official Records, 15th Year,
850th meeting (July 16, 1958), "p5 9 and 855th meeting (July
21, 1958), p. 10.
19
'Security Council, Official Records, 15th Year,
' 827th meeting (July 15, 1958),"p. "19.


113
circumstances. There is probably little question that the
Group was under-strength to meet its responsibilities fully,
particularly in the early phases of the operation. The
initial estimate, made by experienced observers from UUTSO
on the scene, was that approximately 100 observers would be
needed. By the end of June the one hundred men were on duty.
A second spurt of growth occurred after July 15,
1958. This growth was a response to the Observation Group's
assessment that additional observers and equipment were re
quired to adequately perform their mission. The observers'
request for nearly a hundred additional observers, almost
double the number in the field, and for non-commissioned
officers to handle routine tasks was given impetus by the
arrival of the United States marines and the Secretary-
General's judgment that the Observation Group was more im
portant than ever.
A third period of growth came in late September and
early October when the organization again doubled in size,
a somewhat peculiar time to so greatly strengthen the
organization since the problem of infiltration seemed
virtually over. The civil war was, to all intents and pur
poses, ended. In less than two months the entire mission
would be liquidated.
The pattern of growth in the Observation Group is
indicated in Table 1, showing the number of observers at


vine to insignificance. In the words of U Thant:
,..if the United Nations is to justify the hopes
of its founders and of the peoples of the world,
it must develop into an active and effective agency
for peace and international conciliation by
responding to the challenges which face it. May we
have the courage, the faith, and the wisdom to make
it so.3
^U Thant, "A United Nations Stand-By Peace Force,
Address at Cambridge, Massachusetts, June 13, 1963. U.N
Press Release SG/1520, June 12, 1963, p. 10.


234-
in self-defense or, at the outside limits, to resist demands
that it move from its positions. Early in the history of
TOTEE the Commander in the field requested authority to use
force to stop infiltration if necessary. Specifically, he
asked that permission be granted to fire at persons in the
prohibited zone who refused to halt in the hours of darkness.
His request was based on the following reasoning:
Infiltration usually took place by night, and if one
of our posts or patrols saw the infiltrators they
could call upon them to halt; but it was unlikely
that such a command would be obeyed, especially as it
would not be given in Arabic (or Hebrew). In the
past unauthorized persons moving about in this area
in the dark had done so at their peril, and might be
fired upon before being challenged. If TOTEF could
only challenge, and not fire, this would soon become
known, and our presence would have little deterrent
effect.115
The question was discussed with the Secretary-General and
the Advisory Committee without results. They instructed
that the Force should not fire on infiltrators or become
embroiled in hostilities with either side. The representa
tives of the nations contributing troops were particularly
opposed to the involvement of the Force in any serious
military action.
The second major limitation on the Force has been its
failure to complete its deployment. The Israelis have
steadily refused to allow the Force to be stationed on their
115
Burns, 0£. cit,
p. 272.


S/5625, March 26, 1964, "Report by the Secretary-General
on the organization and operation of the United Nations
Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus.
S/5634, March 31, 1964, "Report by the Secretary-General
on the organization and operation of the United Nations
Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus."
S/5653, April 11, 1964, "Note by the Secretary-General.
Aide-memoire concerning some questions relating to the
functions and operation of the United Nations Peace-
Keeping Force in Cyprus.
S/5671, April 29, 1964, "Report by the Secretary-
General to the Security Council on the operations of
the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus."
S/5679, May 2, 1964, "Report by the Secretary-General
on the organization and operations of the United Nations
Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus."
S/5681, May 4, 1964, "Report by the Secretary-General
to the Security Council on the functioning of the
United Nations Yemen Observation Mission and the imple
mentation of the terms of disengagement covering the
period from 3 March to 3 May 1964."
S/5691, May 11, 1964, "Report by the Secretary-General
to the Security Council on the operation of the United
Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus."
S/5764, June 15, 1964, "Report by the Secretary-General
to the Security Council on the United Nations operation
in Cyprus, for the period 26 April to 8 June 1964,"
S/5784, June 29, 1964, "Report by the Secretary-General
on the withdrawal of the United Nations Force in the
Congo and on other aspects of the United Nations opera
tion there."
S/5794, July 2, 1964, "Report by the Secretary-General
to the Security Council on the functioning of the
United Nations Yemen Observation Mission and the imple
mentation of the terms of disengagement covering the
period from 4 May to 4 July 1964."
S/5950 and Add. 1 and 2, Sept, 10, 1964, "Report of
the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation
in Cyprus."


351
llie Congo problem could hardly be considered solved,
however, until the issue of Katanga v/as resolved. And
Katanga was to mean for the United Nations Force that it
was not entering its last days but rather a new and decis
ive phase of its historya phase in which its whole
character was to be modified.
Phase IV.-The fourth phase in the Force's history
ran from late August, 1961, to June, 1964. During this
period the character and role of the United Nations Force
in the Congo was fundamentally altered. The United Nations
recognized the gap in the power-responsibility equation
and movedspasmodically and with some hesitancy it is
trueto close the gap. By the end of 1962 the United
Nations had brought power and responsibility into relative
balance by changing the principles under which the Force
was functioning and altering the nature of the Force itself.
The non-fighting force found it necessary to fight to carry
its mission to a successful conclusion.
The inauguration of the Adoula Government, hailed as
a move toward stability for the Congo, raised the issue of
the proper role for the United Nations Force. The Adoula
Government took as one of its initial objectives the ending
of the Katanga secession and the restoration of Congolese
unity. In line with this objective Adoula asked United
Nations assistance in putting an end to the aggressive


358
If it is assumed that United Nations Headquarters
was informed and in accord with the plans for Morthar, it
can he argued that once decided upon, the plans should have
been carried through forthrightly and decisively if at all
possible. This in turn raises questions about why the
United Nations was not better prepared to undertake a
strong role if that role was fully authorized beforehand.
Finally, if the action was, in fact, taken in pursuance of
the February 21 resolution providing for the use of force
to prevent civil war, why not recognize this as the legal
and moral justification for the action rather than disguise
it as self-defense? The official United Nations report of
events provides support for the former justification when
it makes reference to conditions in Katanga prior to the
September 13 fighting as "likely to lead to tribal and
62
civil war."
Even more serious questions respecting control and
communications in the Congo operation are raised if it is
assumed that this significant and potentially explosive
action was taken in the field by officials of ONUC without
63
the authorization of the Secretary-General. ^ In fact, the
2U.N. Doc. S/WO, p. 101.
63
vThere seems a good bit of circumstantial evidence
to suggest that, in fact, the Secretary-General was not
fully aware of what was being planned, of the full scope
and intent of Morthar. Throughout the Congo affair
Hammarskjold1s approach had been restrained. He had laid
great stress on the danger both to the mission and to the


A/35129 Jan 24, 1957? Report of the Secretary-General
in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 1123 (XI).
A/3526, Feb. 9 1957, "Report of the Secretary-General
on arrangements concerning the status of the United
Rations Emergency Force in Egypt."
A/3527? Feb. 11, 1957? Report of the Secretary-General
in pursuance of General Assembly resolutions 1124 (XI)
and 1125 (XI).
A/3552, Feb. 21, 1957? "Regulations for the United
Rations Emergency Force" (ST/SGB/UNEF/1).
A/3560 and Add. 1, Feb. 25, 1957? "Report of the Fifth
Committee.
A/3563? Feb. 26, 1957? "Note by the Secretary-General."
A/3568, March 8, 1957, "Second report of the Secretary-
General in pursuance of General Assembly resolutions
1124 (XI) and 1125 (XI).
General Assembly, Official Records, Twelfth Session (1957),
Annexes
A/3694 and Add. 1, Report of the Secretary-General."
A/3761, Dec. 3? 1957, "Twenty-sixth report of the
Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary
Questions."
A/3790, Dec. 12, 1957? "Report of the Fifth Committee."
General Assembly, Official Records, Thirteenth Session
(1958), A/3823^ Budget Estimates for the Period 1
January to 31 December, 1958." Supplement No, 5A.
General Assembly, Official Records, Thirteenth Session
(1958), Annexes
A/3839, July 3? 1958, "Second report of the Advisory
Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions.
Budget estimates for the period 1 January to 31
December 1958."
A/3899, Aug. 27, 1958, "Report of the Secretary-General.
A/3943, Oct. 9, 1958, "Summary study of the experience
derived from the establishment and operation of the
Force: report of the Secretary-General."


for the concept of the positive, intervening force. The
move to close the gap between power and responsibilities
of the Force by giving the Force an added increment of
power begun hesitantly in August had been made.
The leadership of U Thant, the new Acting Secretary-
General, may have been of more direct and immediate signifi
cance than the November resolution in broadening the scope
and increasing the flexibility of the United Nations Force.
Both in his initial statements on the Congo to the Security
Council and in his actions U Thant revealed himself to be
more concerned with results in the Congo than with principles.
The new Secretary-General did not share Hammarskjold's pre
occupation with preserving the impartiality of the Force and
ensuring against military initiatives by it. An indication
of the approach he would take to the problems of the Congo
was given in his statement to the Security Council at the
conclusion of its November discussion on the Congo. He
said in part:
The subject of the activities of mercenaries in
Katanga is one on which we are all entitled to have
strong views, for it is intolerable that efforts to
achieve reconciliation in the Congo should be per
sistently obstructed and thwarted by professional
adventurers who fight and kill for money. I intend,
therefore, to discharge the responsibilities entrusted
to me in paragraphs d and 5 of the resolution with
determination and vigor. It will be my purpose to
employ toward that end, and to the best advantage, as
much as possible of the total resources available to
the United Nations Operation in the Congo.


208
able to inform the Government of Egypt that a force composed
of units from Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, Norway,
and Sweden could be constituted without delay. When Presi
dent Nasser hesitated in consenting to the entry of the
Force, it was decided to bring the Force together at a
staging area close to Egypt. Such a move would place
pressure on the Egyptian Government to assent to the Force
and would expedite the entry of the troops once consent
came.
Italy offered the airfield at Capodichino near Naples
as a staging area. The United States, Canada, and Italy
contributed transport services. (The United States con
tributed the lion's sharetransport services valued at
$2.25 million.) Arrangements were made for Swissair to
convey the troops from Capodichino to Egypt on a commercial
basis since the November 7 resolution was interpreted as
prohibiting the entry of American planes or pilots into
Egypt.
An effort was made to reduce the logistic responsi
bilities immediately confronting the United Nations by
requesting that national troop contingents carry from home
-'One of the side effects of the Swissair arrangement
was that much of the heavy equipment of the national con
tingents, brought to the staging area in United States Air
Force flying boxcars, had to be left atCapodichino because
Swissair did not have planes large enough to fly it into
Egypt.


400
Cypriotes have not been amenable to the orders of the Force.
They have engaged in the practice of shooting at each other
and, on occasion, at members of the United Nations Force.
The dilemma that the United Nations faced in the Congo is
being repeated in Cyprus. It may be difficult if not im
possible for the Force to carry out its mandate in Cyprus
while shooting in self-defense only. Yet to depart from
the non-fighting principle presents its own special prob
lems. The Secretary-General expressed early in the Cyprus
mission the opinion that it "would be incongruous, even a
little insane" to shoot Cypriotes in order to maintain the
10
peace.
In many ways what the United Nations peace-keeping
force most represents is an over-size observer group. The
use of the Force in the Congo marked a move toward the true
military force. However, the United Nations has shown no
desire to widen or even to repeat that move. The members
of the United Nations do not really want to field an army
which fights. Such armies bring with them a whole host of
problems. The troops need to be better trained, equipped,
and supplied when they engage in combat. Moreover, a
fighting force tends to be highly controversial. And here
is the crux of the United Nations failure to broaden the
Force: the consensus among the members necessary to field a
10U.N. Doc. S/5671, P. 3.


373
The military build-up did not prove superfluous.
Fighting broke out on the 28th of December between Katangese
gendarmerie and the United Nations Force. As had been the
case in the two prior military engagements, the actual
hostilities were preceded by groxvLng tension and increasing
numbers of incidents. Strong pressures by the United Nations
on Iiatanga and rumors that forceful action was imminent
resulted almost inevitably in violent and bitter attacks
by Tshombe on ONUC and subsequent physical attacks on the
Force by members of the gendarmerie and the populace at
large.
The December, 1962-January, 1963, military action by
the United Nations proved far more effective than the
United Nations military efforts in September and December,
1961. The United Nations Force moved forward with determi
nation and Katangese resistance seemed to melt away before
the onslaught. The United Nations air arm quickly obtained
supremacy of the air, destroying Katanga's air force on the
ground. By December 31? the United Nations Force in
Elizabethville,-composed of Indian, Irish, and Ethiopian
troops, had taken control of that city and the area around
it. At the same time Swedish and Ghanaian ONUC troops had
taken over Kamina with some light resistance but no
casualties.
move men and supplies into and within the Congo and itself
contributed substantial amounts of equipment to the opera
tion. Burns and Keathcote, op. cit., p. 203.


184
adequate food and supplies, and transportation arrangements.
However, decisions on the selection of his staff and on the
inclusion in the force of such supporting units as might he
found necessary were to be taken in consultation with the
Secretary-General.
Thus, responsibilities for leading the force were
divided between Secretary-General Hammarskjold at United
Hations Headquarters and Major-General Burns at field head
quarters. The leadership exercised by both seems to have
been strong and effective.
Support for UNEf
Men for UNEf.-Decisions had to be taken not only on
the direction of the force but also on its composition. It
was decided at the very outset that UNEf should be a truly
international force, not a national group acting under
52
United Nations colors.
52
An international force was contrasted by Hammarskjold
with two other possibilities: the Korean model in which the
United Nations might charge a country or group of countries
to provide independently for an emergency international force
for purposes determined by the United Nations or alterna
tively the model in which an emergency international force
might be set up by agreement among a group of nations, later
to be brought into an appropriate relationship with the
United Nations. If the United Nations had deputized france
and the United Kingdom to act as its agent this would ap
parently constitute an example of the last sort. The inter
national model put heavy responsibilities on the United
Nations for the organization and maintenance of the force,
but it also gave the United Nations the greatest degree of
direct control over the force. In the Suez situation it was
probably the only feasible alternative. U.N. Doc. A/5302, p.
20.


since the Congo mission to retrench and re-think the United
Nations military role have been only partially successful.
Crises in Yemen and Cyprus thrust themselves on the United
Nations and demanded international attention. At the same
time there have been a rising number of proposals at all
levels governmental, scholarly, and popular for the
creation of some sort of permanent or semi-permanent peace
force, capable of rapid dispatch to areas of crisis. For
example, the United States came forward with the suggestion
of a United Nations peace force in connection with its 1961
proposal for "General and Complete Disarmament" and on
occasion has seemed to advocate the establishment of a small
police force preliminary to the completion of disarmament
arrangements. In the summer of 1964 the Soviet Union, whose
attitude to peace-keeping forces has tended to be cool,
called for a permanent force. Both the practice and the
proposals reveal a common belief that "international anarchy
carries increasingly intolerable risks due to the dangers of
self-help in a thermonuclear world.
Assuming- then the value of the non-fighting force
technique, there are in our view three possible lines of
development that the use of peace-keeping groups may take in
"^Stanley Hoffmann, "Erewhon or Lilliput?A Critical
View of the Problem," in Lincoln Bloomfield, International
Military Forces (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1964), p.
196.


313
Despite this5 supplying the Force proved less troublesome
for those responsible than staffing and financing it. It
may be suggested that in the area of logistics the politi
cal considerations loomed less large and the experience of
earlier missions proved more directly relevant.
The United Rations had precedents, experience, and
some equipment to draw on in getting ORUC set up and in
maintaining it. This is not to imply that there were no
gaps in the United Rations peace-keeping preparedness.
There were. Both the intellectual and material bases
could well have been strengthened. For example, a unit
undertaking planning and intelligence activities on a con
tinuing basis would have been of great use. Substantially
more operational equipment on hand would have been of help.
Yet, there were at least the beginnings of logistic prepa
ration for peace-keeping.
The logistic problems of ORUC were many; the most
serious can be divided into four broad groups. First,
there were the problems connected with getting the Force
into the field .quickly with adequate equipment to function.
A second mao or concern was to provide a communications-
problem was one of the greatest burdens to the Force. The
area of the Congo was immense and the problem of distances
was aggravated by the equatorial climate with its torrential
rains and by the difficult terrain with impenetrable jungles
and swamps and high mountains. General Assembly, Official
Records, 16th Session, Fifth Committee, 825th meeting (March
2bi-, 1961), pp. 2-3.


5^9
Civil war might he quelled and temporary caira re
stored in the Congo by ONUC efforts, hut to establish any
sort of permanent order and terminate successfully the
United Nations mission a government able to exercise de
facto and de jure control over all the Congo seemed essential,
Thus, a second principal drive by the United Nations officials
dulling the spring and summer of 1961 was directed at bringing
about the restoration of constitutional government.
The United Nations officials both prodded and assisted
the Leopoldville authorities to convene a national parliament
in which all factions in the Congo would be represented and
52
at which a legal government might be established. Repre
sentatives of the United Nations encouraged the various
Congolese factions to meet and assisted in the planning and
preparations for the legislative assembly. The ONUC assumed
all responsibility for the elaborate security arrangements
55
for the parliamentary meeting.
C 9
y'~Two important conferences should be noted that stand
out in the movement to establish a national government in
the Congo, The Tannarive Conference in March was dominated
by Tshombe and put forth plans for a confederal Congolese
state. The Coquilhatville Conference prepared the way for
the convocation of parliament. At this Conference a new
constitution was drawn up under which the Congo was to be a
federation with a strong central government. Neither Tshombe
nor Gizenga participated in this conference.
-^Security arrangements were extensive. Throughout
early July the ONUC transported deputies from their home
areas to Lovanium University, near Leopoldville, where the
meeting was to be held. At the University itself a 1,600
man combat, military police, and administrative group from


335
As in earlier peace-keeping missions the immediate
aim was to make the presence of ONUC felt by getting it on
the scene and seen. Almost immediately on arrival in
Leopoldville the various national contingents of the Force
were deployed to key locations within the Congo.
The first moves of the Force beyond simply circula
ting in the countryside to make its presence felt were
directed at establishing control of important installations
within the Congo in order to guarantee the viability of the
Force as an operating unit as well as to help restore
essential services and normal activities in the country.
It was particularly important that control of communications
facilities be assured. Thus, United Nations units took
over Ndjili and Ndolo airports and the port city of Matadi.
They were also deployed to vital installations throughout
39
the country.
Once established on the scene, the Force turned its
attention to fulfilling the responsibilities laid out for
it. First among these was encouraging the withdrawal of
Belgian military units. Except in the province of Katanga
^The Special Representative of the Secretary-General
suggested in his first report that merely having the United
Nations troops on the scene had a favorable influence on the
situation. U.N. Doc. S/4-531 P* 194-.
^For example, United Nations troops were deployed to
the power station, the reactor, and the textile mill in
Leopoldville. U.N. Doc. S/4-389, Add. 9-, pp. 26-27.


386
representatives of nations contributing men to the United
Nations Force, to exercise rather close political super
vision over the actions of the Secretary-General. In fact,
indications are that the Advisory Committeethough use-
op
fuldid not play a decisive role in decision-making.
On the other hand, the problem of control and communi
cations existed also with respect to the relations between
United Nations personnel in the field and those at Head
quarters. In virtually every military engagement in which
the United Nations Force was involved, difficulties emerged
in maintaining control from the center. There seem to be
at least four factors contributing to the problem of
control: 1) the difficulty of keeping tight control over
military forces faced with a crisis and the need for
emergency decisions which do not leave time for consulta
tions with Headquarters; 2) the highly sensitive nature of
United Nations involvement and the importance of political
considerations to every move the United Nations makes; 3)
the vagueness of the United Nations mandate in crises be
cause of the difficulty of reconciling the peace force
GO
On the other hand, there is evidence that the
Advisory Committee was of value as a kind of sounding board.
Secretary-General U Thant held that the Congo experience
demonstrated the great utility of the advisory committee
arrangement in the conduct of a highly complex and politi
cally sensitive activity. In his view the Advisory Com
mittee had been indispensable in the Congo operation,
providing a means to test proposed lines of action, exchange
.viewpoints, and obtain sound guidance. Ibid., p. 10A.


284
vague, was interpreted in such a way as to permit it to
take positive action for the removal of Belgian mercenaries
and the reintegration of the Congoand the positive action
permissible included the use of force in something more
than self-defense. ONUC had acquired the means to carry
through a difficult mission, but it had acquired them at
the cost of a strict interpretation of the Charter. The
use of force in something other than self-defense without
invocation of the enforcement provisions of the Charter
praced the action on questionable legal foundations.
That this was, in fact, recognized by the United Nations is
suggested by the failure of that body to cite the November
resolution as justification for its military initiatives.
The military actions continued instead to be labeled as
defensive.
Conclusions
Let us step back a moment and evaluate what was done
by the United Nations in the first days of the Congo crisis.
A*turbulent situation, even one with international implica
tions, and a request for assistance do not automatically
bring forth a positive response from the United Nations.
What were the ingredients which brought such a response, and
brought it rapidly, to the Congolese situation?
~~
^ See the comments in this connection by Burns and
Heathcote, on. cit., p. 127.


399
shoot in self-defense meant that they might respond to
direct attacks or attempts to force them from positions
which they had a right and a responsibility to hold.)
The non-fighting principle was strained and stretched
in the Congo. The Congo experiment seemed to take the Force
one step beyond a non-fighting status. In September and
December, 1961, and December, 1962, ONUC did take military
initiatives to bring a resolution of the crises which
plagued the Congo. The use of military force opened the
way for a broader definition of the role of a peace-keeping
force. However, the United Nations demonstrated little
desire to use the Congo experience as a wedge to more
ambitious action. The United Nations approach is illustra
ted by the Secretary-General's vehement denials that United
Nations troops in the Congo ever took a military initia
tive in his view they were acting in self-defense at all
times.
Thus, in principle the non-fighting pattern has never
been breached. The strength of this pattern was reaffirmed
when it was used as the basis for defining the powers of the
observers in Yemen and the troops in Cyprus. Yet the
strength of the principle and its applicability to all
situations are not always equal. For example, the newest
force, operating in Cyprus under the non-fighting principle,
has faced great problems. In Cyprus Greek and Turkish


55
the Mediator and the Secretary-General. Little effort was
made to exert tighter controls over the mission. The
budgetary requests evoked few comments and fewer changes.
The request for supplementary funds to cover the cost of
the 1948 operation was passed with only a little complaining
about being asked to approve a fait accompli. The estimates
for 19^-9 were approved as modified by the Advisory Committee
with just a few critical comments about the high costs.
(The Advisory Committee had reduced the Secretary-General's
estimates from $4,092,000 to $3,330,000 for the first ten
months of 1949.) The Soviet representative, reiterating
his usual criticism of UNTSO, did express the view that the
narrow geographic base of the organization was prejudicial
to the effective control of expenditures. This narrow base,
in his opinion, contributed to the high level of expendi
ture on transport, travel expenses, and subsistence. He
suggested, therefore, that the nations providing the ob
servers should shoulder a part of the cost of travel and
subsistence. A few such discordant notes notwithstanding,
when the debate' and voting were concluded, the Palestine
mission had won a vote of confidence. A precedent had been
set for the discretion of the Secretary-General.
^General Assembly, Official Records, 3rd Session,
Fifth Committee, 158th meeting ^November 6, 1948), p. 657*


12
in theory and in most cases the powers of the peace-keeping
force are only slightly greater than those of the observer
group, in practice considerably greater powers have been
exercised at times, particularly by the Force in the Congo.
This study will examine comparatively and in depth
the non-fighting force technique as utilized in four cases:
the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in
Palestine, the United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon,
the United Nations Emergency Force, and the United Nations
Force in the Congo. Reference will be made as well to the
recent uses of this technique in Yemen and Cyprus.
There are striking differences in the characteristics
of these four groups: differences first in the size of the
contingents, which range from the 689 man maximum of the
Palestine group to the 19,707 man maximum force used in the
Congo; differences too in the situation which called the
units into being. In Palestine the organization was there
primarily to maintain a truce imposed on Jews and Arabs by
the United Nations. In Lebanon the organization was
stationed at Lebanese borders to observe and stop infiltra
tion from without by spotting it. In Suez the force was to
stabilize the international relationships of the states in
volved by making possible the withdrawal of British, French,
and Israeli forces from Egypt and ensuring against a re
sumption of hostilities between Egypt and Israel. In the


82
active role for the Secretary-General. Although Dag
Hammarskj old' s style as Secretary-General differed from
Lie's, Hammarskjold shared Lies faith in the importance
of the office and continued to strengthen it. By the time
of the Lebanese crisis the development of the office of the
Secretary-General had been carried forward to the point
that a doctrine of implied powers could be enunciated.
According to Eammarskjold, "...it is in keeping with the
philosophy of the Charter that the Secretary-General should
also be expected to act without any guidance from the
Assembly or the Security Council should this appear to him
necessary towards helping to fill any vacuum that may appear
in the systems which the Charter and traditional diplomacy
2
provide for the safeguarding of peace and security."
All this is by way of saying that while UNOGIL was
influenced by UNTSO precedents and by the similarity in
their functions, it was also separated from the earlier
organization by the changes which had occurred in both the
United nations and the world environments.
It is the purpose of this chapter to examine UUOGIL
with some care to determine its significance in the develop
ment of the non-fighting force as an instrument of pacific
~ o
Security Council, Official Records, 13th Year,
837th meeting (July 22, 1938), pp. 3-^.


500
Schachter, Oscar. Preventing the Internationalization of
Internal Conflict: A Legal Analysis of the U.N. Congo
Experience," Proceedings of the American Society of
International Law, 57th Annual Meeting (April 25-27,
1963), pp. 216-24.
Seyersted, Pinn. "United Nations Forces: Some Legal Prob
lems," The British Year Book of International Law,
1961, London: Oxford University Press, 1962, pp. 351-
4757
Sohn, Louis. "The Authority of the United Nations to Estab
lish and Maintain a Permanent United Nations Force,"
American Jo'urnal of International Law, Vol. 52 (April,
TOlp. 329-40.
"The Role of the United Nations in Civil Wars,"
Proceedings of the American Society of International
Law, 57th Annual Meeting (April 25-27, 1963), pp." 08-
15.
Spry, Graham. "Canada, the UNEF and the Commonwealth,"
International Affairs, Yol. 33 (July, 1957), PP. 289-300.
Stoessinger, John G. "Financing the United Nations,"
International Conciliation, No. 535 (November, 1961), pp.
3^727
Stoessinger, John G. "Financing Peace-Keeping Operations,"
in Power and Order: 6 Cases in World Politics (John
Stoessinger and Alan Vestin, edit.), New York:
Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1964, pp. 140-78.
Stokke, Olav. "United Nations' Security Forces: A Discussion
of the Problems Involved," Paper prepared for the Con
ference on the United Nations Security Forces, Oslo,
Norway, February, 1964, pp. 1-60.
Stone, Julius. "Legal Bases for the Establishment of Forces
performing United Nations Security Functions," Paper
prepared for the Conference on the United Nations
Security Forces, Oslo, Norway, February, 1964, pp. 1-25.
Thant, U. "A United Nations Stand-By Peace Force," Address
at Cambridge, Massachusetts, June 13, 1963 U.N. Press
Release SG/1520, June 12, 1963.
. Text.of Address to Joint Meeting of Both Houses of
Canadian Parliament, May 26, 1964, U.N. Press Release
SG/SM/76, May 26, 1964.


32
tiie failure of any Security Council members to come forth
with substantive suggestions at a session of the Council
convened for the express purpose of formulabing instructions
for the Mediator in establishing bhe Truce Organization.
The French delegate apparently expressed the view of the
Council when he suggested that confidence along with wide
powers to implement the resolution should be given the
Mediator.^
The votes in the General Assembly and Security
Council on the truce resolutions suggest substantial support
for the truce and its organization. The vote on the May 14
General Assembly resolution establishing the truce was 31 in
16
favor, 7 against, and 16 abstentions. The opposition came
from the Communist bloc nations and Cuba, The expressed
reason for Soviet disfavor was that the truce operation
represented a Western maneuver to prevent partition from
17
becoming effective. That Soviet opposition was designed
-"Security Council, Official Records, 3rd Year, 313th
meeting (June 3* 1948), p. 28.
16
The states which abstained were the Arab members of
the United Nations, joined by some Latin American states and
Australia, Siam, and Greece. General Assembly, Official
Records, 2nd Special Session, 135th plenary meeting (May 14,
Tots), 'pp, 44-43. See Appendix A for a complete listing
of this vote.
17
In fact, the opposition to the Truce Supervision
Organization fits the pattern of Soviet thinking about the
United Nations during this period, with its general hos
tility to any sort of United Rations police system on the
basis it infringed national sovereignty and its insistence


APPENDIXES


14-7
p
methods. UNEF has been judged a successful innovation;
it did contribute to the maintenance of peace. Although
the Secretary-General was unwilling to conclude from the
UNEF experience that a stand-by force should be estab-
lished, UNEP did lay a foundation of experience, rules,
and principle which would make it easier to establish
future peace-keeping forces.
Conditions for Creation of UNEF
The crisis area
The immediate cause for the establishment of the
United Nations Emergency Force was the outbreak of hostili
ties in the Middle East. The area had been potentially
explosive for years; Arab-Israeli bitterness had intensified
rather than dissipated in the period since the armistice
agreements had been signed in 19^9. On October 29, 1950
the situation exploded. Israeli forces invaded Egypt,
moving first into the Sinai Peninsula, then across Gaza and
into' Egypt proper. The avowed aim of the Israeli move was
defensive: to forestall aggression by Egyptian-trained
fedaveen bands and to open the Suez Canal and the Gulf of
Aqaba to Israeli shipping.
2
The Secretary-General in reports on UNEF and the
national representatives in statements on UNEF have praised
the Force as a useful instrument to stabilize the area. See
Gabriella Rosner, The United Nations Emergency Force (New
York: Columbia University Press, 19^5), p. 106.
5U.N. Doc. A/394-3, pp. 27-28.


391
In June, 1963, an observer group of approximately
200 men was established, to serve in Yemen, In the Yemeni
situation a local conflict had developed regional overtones
with even more serious repercussions possible. In the fall
of 1962 civil war had broken out in Yemen when rebels over
threw the Iman and set up a republican government. The
republicans met resistance from royalist, tribesmen and
fighting continued in the mountainous terrain. Complica
ting the situation, the United Arab Republic sent troops to
Yemen to bolster the republican forces, while Saudi Arabia
channeled aid to royalist forces.
In the spring of 1963 the United States and the
United Nations cooperated to prevent a regional conflict
from developing. The peripatetic Mr. Bunker again negoti
ated an agreement, this one providing for the disengagement
of the United Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia. Under the
terms of the agreement the Government of the United Arab
Republic agreed to withdraw its troops, some 30,000 in
number; and Saudi Arabia agreed to halt the aid being
2
furnished the royalists.
An observer group of 200 men was set up to oversee
the compliance with the agreement. The group was composed
in Vest Irian: A Critique," International Organization, Vol.
18, No. 1 (Vinter, 1964), pp. 56-73.
2U.N. Doc. S/5298, pp. 33-34.


302
A review of the positions of the member states on
the nature of the ONUC expenses reveals much about both the
Force's financial support and its financial difficulties.
The positions on this question taken by the delegations at
the outset changed relatively little before the 1962 opinion
of the International Court of Justice. (The opinion of the
Court apparently influenced some member states to accept,
at least in theory, the ONUC expenses as regular expenses
of the Organization.)
An analysis of the debate and votes reveals that the
staunchest support for the view that ONUC expenses were
expenses of the Organization within the meaning of Article
17 came from the Secretary-General, the United States, most
of the Western European states (excepting France, Spain,
Belgium, and Portugal), and such Commonwealth members as
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. On the other hand, the
Communist states held unswervingly to the view that the
expenses did not fall within the purview of Article 17.
The Afro-Asian and Latin American nations were less steady
in their course. There was division within the blocs and
shifting of positions over time.
Let us briefly examine the reasoning behind the
major positions taken on the nature of the ONUC expenses.
Those who contended that peace-keeping expenses were regu
lar expenses of the Organization marshalled both theoretical


359
September fighting raises several questions about control
from the top in an international military organization.
Both in their initiation of hostilities in Katanga and in
their desire to carry the action to a successful conclusion,
the men in the field appeared to be considerably more
aggressive than those at Headquarters. How can control be
imposed on military men in the field who feel that a solu
tion to a problem is essential and are in a position to
bring about that solution? The difficulty arises out of
the fact that the military men tend to be unconcerned with
the political ramifications of their action and the prece
dents they may be setting. This problem of control may be
particularly acute when differences of opinion as to the
proper scope of action for the force exist at United Nations
Headquarters. These differences may percolate down to the
world organization of taking the initiative in the use of
force and in the imposition of political solutions. There
is little evidence to suggest that Hammarskjold considered
that the February 21 resolution provided a mandate for the
use of force to end Katanga's secession. Hammarskjold's
full approval would seem to represent a reversal of his
previous policies. Other evidence of his separation from
Morthar is found in his subordinates' desire to have the
fighting occur when the Secretary-General was not present
and in his reaction to the fighting in Elizabethville.
Hammarskjold's emphasis was on ending the fighting as
quickly as possible, not on achieving victory. In his note
to Tshombe regarding a cease-fire Hammarskjold said, "...the
United Nations desires without reservation to avoid hostili
ties and the shedding of blood." U.N. Doc. S/h9^0/Add. 4,
p. 12. For a discussion of his subordinates' actions see
Burns and Heathcote, ojd. cit. pp. 103-106.


257
Charter mentioned in any of the resolutions relating to
Force were Articles 25 and 4-9, which merely called on t
member states to comply with Security Council decisions
there was room for debate.
the
he
Three main positions were taken with respect to the
legal authority for the Security Council action. Some
viewed it as action under Chapter VI and entirely dependent
on the consent of the parties involved. Othersparticularly
the Communist members-saw it as enforcement action under
Articles 4-2 and 4-5 of the Charter. A third group regarded
it as action taken under Articles 59 and 4-0 of the Charter.;
thereby standing between peaceful settlement and enforcement
action in terms of United Nations power. Some provisional
measures might be invoked under the latter interpretation.
This was the prevailing viewit was also the view put
forth in modified form by the Secretary-General. Hammarskjold
held that the United Nations action was based on two pegs:
the request of the Congolese Government for military assist
ance and an implicit finding of a threat to peace and se-
17
curity under Articles 39 and 4-0 of the Charter. The
threat to peace and security apparently stemmed from the
possibility that a vacuum in the Congo would lead to the
intervention of outside powers.
i n _
'Security Council., Official Records, 15th Year,
873md meeting (July 13/14-, I960), p, 4- and 920th meeting
(December 13/14-, I960), p. 19.


CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The blue berets of the United Nations military men
who do not fight serve as a symbol of the world's concern
for peace. In mid-196d the "blue berets" watched over the
peace of the world in remote and scattered areas: in the
hot deserts of Sinai and the Gaza Strip; in mountainous and
barren Yemen; in the borderland of Kashmir; in the lovely,
troubled isle of Cyprus. In the past they have served in
Greece, Indonesia, Lebanon, the Congo, and West New Guinea.
In this study it is proposed to examine the develop
ment and use by the United Nations of the military presence
as an Instrument of pacific settlement. The non-fighting
force,1 as we will term the military presence, is an inter
national military contingent which is neither equipped for
real hostilities nor intended really to fight. Called into
being not for purposes of collective security, but for those
of pacific settlement, it is injected into a situation of
tension, instability, and potential violence to prevent or
Non-fighting force is used in this study to mean
both military observer groups and military forces like UNEF.
Some authors restrict its application to the military forces.
The term is used by Lincoln Bloomfield in The United Nations
and U.S. Foreign Policy (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., !9b(J),
p. 66.
1


230
1125 (XI) providing for "the placing of the United Nations
Emergency Force on the Egyptian-Israel armistice demarca
tion line and the implementation of other measures as
proposed in the Secretary-General's report." In fact, the
Force has done little with respect to the nebulous "other
measures."
Interposed between the armed forces of Egypt and
Israel, UNEF has concentrated on maintaining quiet through
deployment and patrolling. The major deployment of the
United Nations troops has been along the Egypt-Israel
armistice demarcation line and along the international
frontiers south of the Gaza Stripa length of 273 km. in
rugged terrain.In addition, the Force has a "watching
interest" over the coastline of the Sinai Peninsula from
the northern end of the Gulf of Aqaba to the Straits of
Tiran, a distance of 187 km. The deployment along the
lines is by national units; there is no effort to create
an international force with multi-national units and assign-
. 112
ments.
^The perimeter of the Gaza Strip, from the Mediter
ranean Sea in the north to the international frontier in the
south is 60 km, long, while the international frontier ex
tending from the sea southward to the Gulf of Aqaba is 213
km.
"^The deployment, to illustrate the pattern followed,
was as foilows in September, 1963: on the armistice demarca
tion line, which had been divided into four sectors, were a
Danish-Norwegian battalion (sector 1); a Swedish battalion
(sector 2); an Indian battalion (sector 3); and a Brazilian
battalion (sector 4-); on the international frontier Canadian


86
casts from outside against the government and an appealing
movement to Arab unitythe result is tension.
In ilaj^, 1958., dissatisfaction and unrest took an ugly
turn. The assassination of an opposition journalist con
verted the potential violence into civil war. The war was
notable, however, for its moderation. There were few
casualties. The army under General Fuad Chehab, a moderate,
acted more as an umpire than as a government agent in war.
(The General felt that the army should not get involved in
disputes between politicians, lest it to be rent with
factionalism.) Moderate or not, fighting was underway and
outside powers were at least indirectly involved. At this
point the question was brought before the Security Council.
The "united Nations involvement
The United Nations had no direct involvement in the
situation in Lebanon prior to that country's complaint to
the Security Council in May, 1958. Thus, the United Nations
did not bear the special responsibility in this situation
that it seemed to in the Palestine and Suez crises. In the
latter cases the United Nations had had the questions at
issue under prior considerationthe failure to devise any
solution seemed to carry with it at least a moral commitment
to halt the overt violence which emerged. Such a commitment
was not present in the Lebanese situation.


4-20
The significance of institutionalization
The United Nations is developing skills in peace
keeping: principles, practices, and personnel upon which it
can rely for each new venture are being built. What is the
extent and significance of this institutionalization? First,
the institutionalization is not complete; what are perhaps
the most critical areas for the successful creation and
operation of a force are still in a state of limbo. Arrange
ments for financing and political controls are not fixed.
Second, the growth in institutionalization which has occurred
does not necessarily bring a corresponding increase in either
willingness to establish peace-keeping missions or in their
success. The United Nations has undertaken its most recent
assignments only with reluctance, while no force has re
ceived the unvarnished praise of the first, TJNEF.
It may be hypothesized that incomplete institutionali
zation and qualified success grow out of the same cause: a
basic lack of political consensus. The states that compose
the United Nations are unwilling to support in advance and
unreservedly United Nations efforts to keep the peace. Each
situation must be examined on its merits. The United Nations
endeavor must be matched against the national interest of the
state. In each of the past peace-keeping missions there has
been a continuum of opinion among members ranging from
passive opposition to limited acceptance to active support.


TABLE 3
SOURCE OF TROOPS FOR ONUC
Area of Origin
July
1960
Percentage of
Sept
1960
Troops from la j or
April
1961
Areas at Selected
June
1961
Periods
Feb.
1962
Feb.
1963
Latin America
.1
.3
.3
.4
.2
Asia
15.3
37.3
45.6
47.8
45.5
Africa
88.4
71.5
51.3
39.3
37.8
38.4
Europe,
N. America
11.6
13.1
11.1
14.8
14.0
15.9
Total Number of Men
11,155
19,341
17,941
16,663
16,672
19,798
aThe placement of states into areas of origin was based on a classification by Thomas Hovet. See Thomas
Hovet, Jr.j "United Nations Diplomacy," Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 1 (1963), 36. The
states included in each area for the above table were as follows: Latin America: Argentina, Brazil,
Ecuador; Asia: Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Iran, Pakistan, Philippines, and Malaya; Africa: Congo
(Leopoldville), Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Sierre Leone, Sudan, Tunisia,
and the United Arab Republic; Europe and North America: Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Greece, Ire~
land, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Yugoslavia.
Source: See Appendix B for the table of national contributions to ONUC from which the above data was
compiled.


460
TABLE B-3
THE NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF UNEF OVER THE YEARS
Contributing
States
1957a
Officers and Men
1958b
Contributed
1960c
1962d
Brazil
545
635
632
630
Canada
1,172
975
932
945
Colombia
522
492
-
-
Denmark
424
459
565
562
Finland
255
-
-
-
India
957
1,167
1,246
1,249
Indonesia
582
-
-
-
Norway
498
538
601
613
Sweden
349
505
656
424
Yugoslavia
673
674
709
710
Total
5,977
5,445
5,341
5,133
Source: aU. N. Doc. A/3694; bU. N. Doc. A/3899; CU. N. Doc. A/4486; and
dU. N. Doc. A/5172.


238
There can be little question but that the United
Rations Emergency Force does represent a significant
pioneering effort in the evolution of methods of peace
keeping. UEEF's pioneering character coupled with its
success have served to make it both the inspiration and the
model for succeeding forces. The experience with UREF
seemed to quicken the use not only of forces but of observer
groups as well. Failure by the Force might well have stop
ped this "noble experiment" before it had been given the
opportunity of being fully tested.
The description of UREF as a pioneering effort should
be qualified. The Emergency Force was built on the founda
tions of the truce organizations. Their personnel and
principles, even their failures, had relevance for the first
peace-keeping Force. The failures of the Truce Supervision
Organization in Palestine had long suggested the need for a
stronger peace-keeping organization in the Middle East. The
experience of the same organization eased many of the
administrative problems of establishing a force. It should
be noted, however, that even though the establishment of
UREF was encouraged and eased by the precedents and practices
of the preceding observer groups, these alone could not bring
the Force into being, A crisis was needed to jolt the
members of the United Rations into undertaking a signifi
cantly more ambitious and original endeavor.


480
S/10805 Nov. 16, 1948, "Resolution adopted "by the
Security Council at the 381st meeting concerning the
Palestine question."
S/1152, Dec. 25, 1948, "Cablegram dated 25 December
1948 from the United Nations Acting Mediator on
Palestine to the President of the Security Council
transmitting a report concerning fighting in the Negeb."
S/1153 and Corr. 1, Dec. 27, 1948, "Cablegram dated 27
December 1948 from the United Nations Acting Mediator
on Palestine to the President of the Security Council
transmitting an additional report regarding the
fighting in the Negeb."
Security Council, Official Records, Fourth Year (1949),
Supplements for 1949
S/1269, March 1, 1949, "Cablegram dated 1 March 1949
from the United Nations Acting Mediator on Palestine
to the Secretary-General concerning evacuation of
Egyptian troops from A1 Faluja."
S/1285, March 11, 1949, "Cablegram dated 11 March 1949
from the United Nations Acting Mediator on Palestine
to the President of the Security Council concerning
alleged military operations by Israeli forces in the
Southern Negeb."
S/1286, March 13, 1949, "Cablegram dated 13 March 1949
from the United Nations Acting Mediator on Palestine
to the President of the Security Council concerning
alleged military operations by Israeli forces in the
Southern Negeb."
S/1295 and Corr. 1, March 22, 1949, "Cablegram dated
22 March 1949 from the United Nations Acting Mediator
on Palestine to the Secretary-General transmitting a
supplementary report on the situation in the Southern
Negeb."
S/1357, July 21, 1949, "Letter dated 21 July 1949 from
the United Nations Acting Mediator on Palestine to the
Secretary-General transmitting a report on the present
status of the armistice negotiations and the truce in
Palestine."


3) tiie means of action available to the Force to
carry through its mandate;
J-) the internal situation in the Congo;
5) the situation at Headquarters in Hew York vis-a-vis
the entire Congo operation,, with particular rele
vance to the degree of support engendered for the
operation.
In terms of this relationship the history of the
Force in the Congo falls more or less naturally into four
phases. The first two periods, which comprise the time
from the establishment of the Force to the passage of the
February 21, 1961, resolution strengthening the mandate of
the Force, are characterized by a great gap between power
and responsibility. During what we term the third phase of
the Force's operations, running from February 21, 1961, to
August, 1961, the gap was closed slightly by a widened
mandate given to the Force. In the last period, from
September, 1961, forward, the gap between power and responsi
bility first widened and then, following the death of
Secretary-General Hammarskjold, was closed or almost closed.
It is the thesis of this section of the study of ONTJC that
power and responsibility were seriously out of balance for
the United nations Force in all except the last phase of
its operations. The responsibilities, either assigned or
assumed in the field out of the necessities of the situation,


A/54-16, May 8, 1965, "United Nations Operation in the
Congo. Cost estimates for 1965: report of the Secretary-
General ."
A/54-58, June 26, 1965, "Report of the Fifth Committee."
A/C.5/974-, May 14-, 1965, "United Nations Financial
Position and Prospects: report of the Secretary-
General ."
A/AC.115/2?, Feb. 1, 1965, "Criteria for the sharing
of the costs of peace-keeping operations. Statement
by the Secretariat."
General Assembly, Official Records, Eighteenth Session
(1965), Annexes
A/54-90 and Add. 1-4-, Sept. 17, 1965, "Report of the
Secretary-General on his consultations concerning the
desirability and feasibility of establishing a peace
fund."
A/54-94-, Sept. 12, 1965, "United Nations Emergency
Force. Report of the Secretary-General."
A/54-95, Sept. 16, 1965, "United Nations Emergency Force
Cost estimates for the maintenance of the Force: report
of the Secretary-General."
A/5567, Oct. 14-, 1965, "Report of the Fifth Committee."
A/564-2, Dec. 5, 1965, "Report of the Advisory Committee
on Administrative and Budgetary Questions."
A/5680, Dec. 16, 1965, "Report of the Fifth Committee."
General Assembly, Official Records, A/AC. 121/4-, May 51,
1965, "Report of the Secretary-General and the Presi
dent of the General-Assembly. Special Committee on
Peace-Keeping Operations."
International Court of Justice. Certain Expenses of the
United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2 of the Cha~rter)
Advisory Opinion of'""20 July 1962: I.C.J. Reports, 1962.
Security Council, Official Records, Third Year (194-8),
Fourth Year (l'949")T Thirteenth Year (1958), Fifteenth
Year through Eighteenth Year (1960-1964).


107
designated executive officer in charge of observers by the
Secretary-General. The three appointees were instructed to
go immediately to Beirut. There the first meeting of the
group was held on June 19 with the Secretary-General present
to provide a liaison with the Secretariat and generally to
get the operation under way.
Thus, less than ten days after the passage of the
June 11 resolution, the necessary steps to bring a full-
fledged operational observation group into being had been
taken, while a rudimentary group had been functioning for
nearly a week. This speed contrasts with the time taken to
get the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization under
way in 19^8 and suggests the usefulness of experience and
precedents in the early stages of a peace-keeping operation.
The Secretary-General played an important role not
only in the initiation of the Observation Group, but also
in the guidance of the Group during its existence. He
seems to have been far more important than the three-man
observation group in providing leadership. It was he who
made the important decisions on the composition, financing,
and range of activities of the observers.
One of the perennial problems arising out of the
Secretary-General's strong leadership and wide discretion
in peace-keeping operations is that of United Nations con
trol over the Secretary-General (or over any other responsible


14
Political, legal., financial, and administrative factors are
taken into account. An effort has "been made to make each of
the cases parallel the others as closely as possible in
order to facilitate generalization. The second part of the
study is devoted to an analysis of the technique of the
non-fighting force, based on the material developed in the
case studies.
The objectives of this analysis of the non-fighting
force technique as an instrument of peaceful settlement are
two-fold. The first aim is to determine the nature of the
instrument which has been developed. We are particularly
concerned with the degree to which an institutionalized
technique, readily available in. recognizable form for use
in crises, has emerged and the degree to which each force
is unique. Going beyond the question of extent of institu
tionalization is that of the reasons and significance of
the institutionalization which has occurred. The analysis
of the nature of the non-fighting force as an instrument of
peaceful settlement leads more or less directly to the
second central purpose of the study: the evaluation of the
performance and potential of the non-fighting force. The
conditions which determine the effectiveness of the non-
fighting force as an instrument of peaceful settlement are
hypothesized on the basis of the experience thus far with
them. On. the framework of the evaluation., first, of the


148
The initial Israeli attack was followed by the
issuance of an Anglo-French ultimatum to Israel and Egypt
calling for the cessation of fighting in twelve hours, the
withdrawal of all troops within a ten-mile radius of the
Suez Canal area, and the temporary British and French
occupation of positions at Port Said, Ismailia, and Suez.
The British and French justified their move as an effort to
act in a crisis situation to protect the Canal and to stop
Israeli-Egyptian fighting on behalf of a world community
too paralyzed to act. In fact, one must interpret the
Anglo-French moves in the light of the nationalization of
the Suez Canal by the Government of Egypt and the failure
of the British and French to negotiate an agreement with
President Nasser of Egypt on the Canal. The Anglo-French
aims seemed designed not only to protect the Canal, but
also to force an acceptable solution on the Canal question
and perhaps, hopefully, to bring the downfall of President
Nasser. The ultimatum, which was rejected by Egypt, was
followed by an Anglo-French air attack on military targets
in Egypt, commencing on October 31 1956.
The United Nations involvement
Serious as was the threat to world peace posed by
this crisis, one must understand something of the background
of the Suez problem to comprehend fully why the United
Nations was compelled to act.


CHAPTER IV
BEYOND THE OBSERVERS: THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY EORCE
Introduction
The observer group represents one kind of military
presence utilized by the United Nations; the peace-keeping
force represents a related but more ambitious use of the
military man to promote peaceful settlement. The first of
the peace-keeping forces came into being in November, 1956.
More than 5?000 men drawn from ten nations were sent into
Egypt in the wake of the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion.
They were not to fight. Their mission was to stabilize
the situation and to guarantee that peace, however uneasy,
would be maintained in the area.
1
The United Nations Emergency Force, hailed as a new
and unique instrument in the arsenal of United Nations
peace-keeping devices, was in part new and in part an ex
tension of the observer group technique. The Force was
para-military. More than an observer group, it was also
less than a military force with military objectives and
"^The United Nations Emergency Force will hereafter
be referred to as UNEF.
146


276
that force should, be used only to prevent a clash, between
hostile Congolese troops. There could be no question of
empowering the United Nations to use force to impose a
LlLl
political settlement.
In contrast to the Western uneasiness about the use-
of-force provision, the Afro-Asian members seemed uncon
cerned about the hypothetical problems raised by the
provision. They were less worried about the United Nations
overstepping its mandate than about it getting the 0""0 done.
This difference in attitude is important in view of the
later shift in leadership of ONUC toward the Afro-Asians.
The statement of Mr. Hasan of Pakistan illustrates this
approach:
The weakness of the current operation, as it has
been conceived in this Council so far, is that it
alternately faces and refuses to face, the fact
that the United Nations, by the very instigation of
this operation, has assumed a jurisdiction over the
Congo which exceeds the provisions of the Charter
if too legalistically interpreted...a consensus has
already emerged that the situation in the Congo is
incapable of correction through means which are con
ventionally within the Charter...we believed that the
solution of the problem created by the present situa
tion can be, sought only in the administration of the
country by United Nations assistance, to the end
that, in the resulting conditions of peace and sta
bility, the Congolese people may be enabled to achieve
their own political settlement, unhampered by outside
interference, military or politicaland both are
important.^5
_______________
'Security Council, Official Records, 16th Year,
9^2nd meeting (February 20, l96l), p. E~.
ll 5
Quoted in Arthur Lee Burns and Nina Heathcote,
Peace-Keeping by U.N. Forces: From Suez to the Congo (New


153
and oil supplies necessary to tlie French, and British
economies passed through the Canal.
In view of past provocations and the serious impli
cations of nationalization, the immediate response of
Britain and France was toward forceful action to cope with
the situation.However, the United States placed res
traints on the. French and the British. From July through
October a solution by compromise and conference was sought.
Conferences in London and efforts to negotiate with Nasser
proved unsuccessful. In October the issue came before the
Security Council; here too a solution was elusive. (Brought
before the Council by Britain and France, the aim may have
been to demonstrate that every expedient had been tried.)
The failure of the United Nations to resolve the Suez prob
lem seemed to give it a special responsibility for the
pacification of the situation after it exploded.
In addition to the moral challenge posed to the
United Nations by the Middle East crisis because of the
organization's long concern with the region, political
factors also pushed the United Nations toward an active role
in the crisis. A majority of states in the United Nations
by 1956 were non-European and anti-colonial. Their reaction
to the Anglo-French action was strong. Too, the United
^Robert Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors (Garden City:
Doubleday and Co., Inc., 19 64)p. JSO.


321
28
a year. Until November 27, 1961, the legal position of
the Force rested on the simple terms of the July 29 Agree
ment. Once negotiated, however, the November 27 Agreement
was retroactive to the date of arrival of the first ele
ments of the Force.
The terms of the November 27 Agreement parallel
29
closely the terms of the UNEF status of force agreement.
Virtually the same rights and privileges (in practically
the same terminology) were guaranteed to members of the two
Forces. Once again the Force was granted, among other
things, freedom of movement within the Congo, exemption
from local taxation, exemption from passport and visa regu
lations, immunity from every form of legal process, freedom
of communications, and the right to display the United
Nations flag and insignia. It might be noted that a po
tentially troublesome provision in the UNEF agreement giving
the respective national governments exclusive jurisdiction
over their nationals in criminal cases was repeated as well
in the United Nations-Congo agreement. In the Congo situa
tion the defects of the provision became apparent with the
failure of several governments to prosecute nationals
During early September, I960, a draft agreement had
been submitted on the status of the United Nations in the
Congo. However, negotiations on the agreement were halted
by the constitutional crisis. U.N. Doc. 5A531, p. 181.
29U.N. Doc. A/3526 and U.N. Doc. A/4-986.


308
Although the opinion of the Court was accepted by
the Fifth Committee by a vote of 75 to 17, with 1A absten
tions, the decision of the Court did not resolve the
financial crisis and immediately persuade those in arrears
to contribute. As those who had objected to presenting
the question to the International Court of Justice had con
tended, the question was not purely legal.
Closely related to the issue of the nature of peace
keeping expenses was the second major issue of financing
01TUChow the Force should be paid for. The methods pro
posed by member states for financing the operation can be
classified into four main groups on the basis of where
1A
responsibility for support of the Force was to rest:
(1) The expenses should be borne by all the member
states and apportioned in accordance with the scale of
assessments for the regular budget or by a special scale of
assessment. In this group some held that the expenses
should be included in the regular budget; others would
enter them in a special account. Some would soften the
impact of the assessments on those least able to pay by
allowing voluntary contributions to be applied to the re
duction of the assessments. This position was held by
those states which viewed'ONUC expenses as expenses of the
Organization under Article 17.
T5
'U.N. Doc. A/4276, p. 3


265
provide the Government with such military assistance, as
may he necessary, until, through the efforts of the Congo
lese Government with the technical assistance of the
United Nations, the national security forces may he able,
in the opinion of the Government, to meet fully their
27
tasks.11 The looseness of the mandate conferred in the
resolution was initially a reflection and subsequently a
source of conflicting interpretations as to the proper role
of the Force in the Congo.
The opening debate in the Security Council regarding
the Force's role in the Congo centered on the goals the
Force was to pursue in the Congo: was it to be primarily
concerned with quelling the violence in the Congo or with
the eviction of the Belgians and the restoration of the
authority of the Central Government over the whole of the
Congo.
On the one hand, the Secretary-General, supported by
the Western nations on the Security Council, conceived of a
role for the United Nations Force patterned on that played
by UNEF. Hammarskjold held that the Force should assist
the Congolese troops in maintaining order within the Congo,
thereby creating the conditions that would make possible
the withdrawal of Belgian troops. He did not foresee di
rect action by the United Nations Force to bring Belgian
27
U.N. Doc. SA587, p. 16.


419
Not only is a corps of leaders being developed to
guide United Nations peace-keeping missions, but the number
of experienced men for the rank-and-file positions is also
growing. Although the tour of duty for most of the United
Nations soldiers is short, re-enlistments occur. The
simultaneous operation of several peace-keeping operations
in recent years has made possible the transfer of experienced
soldiers and observers from a well-established mission to
one in the process of establishment, thereby easing the first
stages of such an endeavor. Such transferred troops can get
on the scene quickly with some idea of what should be done
once there. In the Congo crisis Swedish contingents were
transferred from UNEN for temporary duty with ONUC during
its first days. In the Yemen mission over one-half of the
initial observers came directly from service with UNEP. In
the case of Cyprus it was reported that the Irish contingent
would be composed largely of volunteers with service in the
Congo. In addition, as noted earlier, some states are ear
marking and training military units specifically for United
Nations duty, while in 1965 Sweden inaugurated a staff course
open to all Scandinavian officers to be sent on United
Nations observer duty. An expanded staff program is planned
for the summer of 1966. All of this is still far from a
standing force of trained units, but it does represent an
improvement over the completely inexperienced force, used of
necessity in the earliest missions.


121
necessary premises for the observers (including office space
and areas for observation posts and field centres, which
would be inviolable and subject to exclusive control and
authority of the Observation Group) as well as necessary
means of transportation and communication.^
There appear to have been no difficulties in the
implementation of the provisions respecting the extension
of privileges and immunities to the observers. The pro
visions regarding Lebanese responsibility for the expenses
of the premises and of the means of transportation and
communication evidently raised more difficulty. It is not
clear from the letter exactly what share of the costs
Lebanon was to bear; a major part of the operating expenses
went for rental of premises and the purchase, rental, and
operation of transportation and communications equipment.
Did the Secretary-General propose that all these costs were
to be borne by Lebanon? If not all, what share of responsi
bility was to be their*s? These details were apparently to
be resolved in consultations between representatives of the
Government of Lebanon and of the Secretariat. Seemingly,
the consultations did not result in Lebanon assuming any of
these costs, for the budget estimates include charges for
both transportation and communications items and for the
rental of headquarters premises in Beirut and of out-
stations. Although a budget notation indicated that
56TJ.N. Doc. S/4-029 s pp. 73-74


197
the costs of the operation he divided among the members,
and b) what was the nature of the obligation of the members
to pay for the Force. Opinion ran from total support for
use of the regular scale of assessment and for the concept
of obligatory assessments to total rejection of this
approach. The positions taken in the early debate were held
by the states with relatively little modification over the
years.
At the positive end of a continuum of opinion running
from support to non-support for the principle of collective
responsibility for the Force stood such states as Australia,
Canada, Few Zealand, the United Kingdom, the United States
and most of the Western European nations. These states con
curred in the opinion of the Secretary-General that "since
the General Assembly had established the Force as a United
Nations instrument for the accomplishment of certain stated
purposes, the logical consequence appeared to be that the
United Nations must itself assume full and final responsi
bility for its effective functioning, including responsi-
67
bility for the financial and other obligations involved."
In general, they held that the expenses of the Force
(excepting those which individual governments might elect
to bear) should be considered as United Nations expenses
within the scope and spirit of Article 17 of the Charter.
'General Assembly, Official Records, 11th Session,
Fifth Committee, 541st meeting (December 3, 1956), p. 47.


105
Group, Although he operated within the framework of Se
curity Council and General Assembly resolutions, the
Secretary-General made the crucial decisions with regard to
the Group, As the Mediator had been given great leeway with
UNTSO in Palestine, so also was the Secretary-General left
wide discretion in shaping UNOGIL. It was the Secretary-
General who determined the size, character, and mission of
the observers,
Hammarskjold moved in several directions in bringing
UNOGIL into being. His first action, a preparatory step,
was to arrange with Lieutenant-General E.L.M. Burns, Chief
of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, to
secure a small number of military observers who could be
20
sent immediately to Beirut. It was a great aid to the
organization of the Lebanese mission to have at least a few
experienced observers readily available. The observers were
able to make the United Nations presence felt at once and,
at the same time, to assess for the Secretary-General the
needs of the situation. On the basis of the recommendations
made by these experienced observers, the Secretary-General
was able to report to the Security Council on June 18 that
The first five observers arrived June 12; the second
five on the 13th; and five more a few days later. These
observers were under the charge of Lieutenant-Colonel W.M.
Brown of New Zealand, who served as senior observer for the
duration of the mission.


93
with UNOGIL. No question was raised as to the Security
Council's competence to send an observation group into
Lebanon. However, neither the June 11 resolution nor the
sponsor of that resolution indicated the specific authority
under which the Council was acting in creating the Observa
tion Group.
In the debate on the establishment of the Observation
Group several interpretations of the legal foundations of
that Group were set forth. The delegate of Panama stressed
that the basis for Security Council action rested in Article
292 which gives the Security Council authority to "establish
such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the perfor
mance of its functions," and not in Article 34, which allows
creation of an instrument for investigatory purposes. Con
sequently, in his view the observers should confine their
activities to observation alone; they had no authority either
12
to investigate or recommend. In contrast, the Swedish
representative contended, without citing specific Charter
provisions, that the Council had authority to arrange to
observe or to investigate in order to clarify the situation
and perhaps incidentally to contribute to a lessening of
1 o
tension. The representatives of the United States and the
"Security Council, Official Records, 13th Year,
825th meeting (June 11, 1958) pp. 2"-53
15
Security Council, Official Records, 13th Year,
824th meeting (June 10, 1958), p. 23.


92
Tlie resolution vas presented to the Council late on
June 10 It was adopted the following day by a vote of ten
in favor and one abstention. Although the Soviet Union
denied the need for Security Council action, it abstained
on the vote since neither the United Arab Republic nor
Lebanon objected to an observation group.
The operative sections of the resolution authorizing
UNOGIL read:
The Security Council
0 o
Decides to dispatch urgently an observation group
to proceed to Lebanon so as to ensure that there is
no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms
or other material across the Lebanese borders;
Authorizes the Secretary-General to take the neces-
ary steps to that end....-^
The United Nations had taken positive if restrained
action on the Lebanese question. In all probability this
was the strongest action open to the Council in view of the
ambiguity of the situation and the divisions within the
Council on Lebanon's complaint.
The legal foundations
The Security Council and the General Assembly have
tended to be vague about the specific Charter provisions
under which peace-keeping action is taken. This was the case
^"'Yearbook of the United Nations 1998, p. 4-9.


410
regional solidarity; it was deemed important for the African
states to assume a responsibility for African problems. The
Congo experience indicates that the principle of selection
of troops from non-involved nations has much to recommend it.
The United Nations has been forced to throw most of
its peace-keeping groups together hurriedly. Few conform
to all the principles developed by peace-keeping experience,
let alone to an ideal model. What would seem to be an ideal
toward which the United Nations might work and is, in fact,
working is a balanced force composed of units earmarked and
trained for service with the United Nations by the middle-
sized neutral Asian, African, and Western nations.
In 1959 the Secretary-General queried a number of
the middle-sized and smaller nations on the possibility of
setting aside troops for United Nations peace-keeping duties.
The nations were evasive and little was done for years.
However, by early 1965 some concrete steps had been taken
toward a semi-institutionalized force-in-being with the ear
marking of units for United Nations use by Canada, Iran, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, and the Scandinavian states. In
some of these states the stand-by unit receives special
training for United Nations duty. In Canada, for example,
a normal Regular Infantry Battalion of 650 men is nominated
as United Nations Stand-by Battalion and receives training


131
The terrain and tlie demographic character of the area
also created difficulties for the observers. The areas in
which the likelihood of infiltration was greatest were also
most inaccessible-mountainous, barren, traversed by few
roads fit for vehicular traffic. To further complicate the
situation in these areas the population was composed largely
of tribesmen accustomed both to moving freely back and forth
across the border between Lebanon and Syria and to bearing
arms. Distinguishing infiltrator and local resident was
most difficult under these circumstances. It was not until
well along in the mission that adequate surveillance of
these areas was possible.
The internal situation in Lebanon further compounded
the problems of the observers, while raising provocative
questions regarding the proper role of a United Nations
peace-keeping group in a civil war situation. The use of
the peace-keeping group in a civil war situation such as
that found in Lebanon poses practical and philosophic
dilemmas. The peace-keeping group enters the host country
at the invitation or at a minimum with consent of the
government. The government may assume that the peace-keep
ing group is there to assist it in its difficulties. Yet
in order to carry through its mission, the group must deal
with and perhaps tacitly recognize rebel elements. The
peace-keeping group may thereby be caught between the


123
and second, that reports by the observers of illegal move
ment from outside would bring moral, perhaps stronger,
pressure from United Nations headquarters for a cessation
of such nefarious activities.
From mid-July forward the primary function of the
Observation G-roup seemed to undergo a de facto change.
Related to this change were changes in the environment in
which the observers operatedchanges brought about by an
improvement in the internal situation in Lebanon and by the
entry of United States troops. While in theory the main
role of the observer was still to ensure against infiltra
tion, in fact their main function seemed to be to serve as
an international presence to enable the American troops to
withdraw from the area gracefully.
The broad terms of the June 11 resolution and of
later resolutions were never translated into explicit
instructions for the observers. The Lebanon operation was
put into effect by a group of experienced observers from
the Truce Supervision Organization who apparently drew on
their experience rather than on explicit directives from
headquarters to determine precisely how the organization
should function to carry through its mission.


202
Despite tlie disclaimer, the resolution on UNSF
financing did, in fact, set a pattern for the financing of
peace-keeping operations which was followed not only for
UNEF hut also for the United Nations Force in the Congo. In
theory, the regular scale of assessments determined all
contributions. In practice, the principle of collective
responsibility was tempered. A modified scale emerged with
the incorporation of the principles of voluntary contribu
tions and of reduced assessments for cause.
The first modification introduced was that of the
voluntary contribution. In February, 1957? at the Secretary-
General's request the General Assembly authorized him to
incur expenditures of up to $16.5 million, $6.5 million more
than initially authorized and provided for in the December
resolution assessing members for the expenses of UNSF. The
resolution invited member states to contribute voluntarily
the additional $6.5 million. The expedient of relying
completely on voluntary contributions for authorized expen-
75
ditures proved unsatisfactory. Voluntary contributions
were not used again as the sole support of obligations in
curred. But, the use of voluntary contributions was not
cast out completely. Thus, from 1957 to 1962 twenty-two
"""^The United Nations had pledges of $3,800,550 almost
immediately, but cash received by October, 1957, totaled
only $586,500. The Secretary-General termed the voluntary
aporoach an inadequate and insecure method of financing.
U.. Doc. A/3694, p. 12.


4- 70
General Assembly, Official Records, Fifth Session (1950)?
A/1256, "Financial Report and Accounts for the year
ended 31 December 194-9." Supplement No. 6.
General Assembly, Official Records, First Emergency Special
Session (1956"), Annexes
A/3267, Nov. 3? 1956, "Report of the Secretary-General
submitted in pursuance of resolution 997 (ES-I), par*
5, adopted by the General Assembly on 2 November 1956."
A/3268, Nov. 3, 1956, "Letter dated 3 November 1956
from the Alternate Permanent Representative of France,
addressed to the Secretary-General."
A/3270, Nov. 3, 1956, "Communication dated 3 November
1956 from the Permanent Representative of Egypt,
addressed to the President of the General Assembly and
to the Secretary-General."
A/32795 Nov. 4-, 1956, "Aide-memoire dated 3 November
1956 from the Permanent Representative of Israel,
addressed to the Secretary-General."
A/3284-, Nov. 4, 1956, "Second report of the Secretary-
General submitted in pursuance of resolution 997
(ES-I), par. 5, adopted by the General Assembly on
2 November 1956."
A/3287, Nov. 4-, 1956, "Report of the Secretary-General
on communications with the Governments of France,
Egypt, Israel and the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland concerning implementation of
General Assembly resolution 997 (ES-I) and 999 (ES-I)
dated 2 and 4- November 1956."
A/3289, Nov. 4-, 1956, "First report of the Secretary-
General on the plan for an emergency international
United Nations Force requested in resolution 998
(ES-I) adopted by the General Assembly on 4- November
1956."
A/3296, Nov. 5, 1956, "Ihird report of the Secretary-
General submitted in pursuance of resolution 997 (ES-I),
par. 5, adopted by the General Assembly on 2 November
1956."


232
less accessible areas are covered by air reconnaissance a
few times a week. At especially sensitive points camps and
observation posts are set up. Mobile reserves and a system
of communications are maintained here, linking reconnais
sance units and aircraft.
Tbe Force's operations bave been facilitated by the
arrangements, worked out on an informal basis, for coopera
tion between United Nations and Egyptian authorities. A
working paper prepared by tbe Commander of UNEF outlining
tbe conditions deemed necessary for tbe successful function-
113
ing of UNEF served as a basis for these arrangements.
One of tbe areas for wbicb a joint plan of action was pre
pared vas tbe baiting of infiltration. Tbe Egyptian
authorities agreed to prevent infiltration across tbe
armistice demarcation line by tbe inhabitants of tbe Gaza
Strip or by others and to give this policy ample publicity
among tbe local population. Tbe penalties against infiltra
tion in force when Egypt bad previously been in control of
tbe Strip would be reinstated. TJNEF was to bave tbe right
to assist in preventing infiltration, and tbe local populace
was to be fully informed of this right. Tbe Force was given
authority to take infiltrators into custody in a zone ex
tending back 750 meters from tbe armistice demarcation line,
although those taken were to be turned over to Egyptian
U3
Burns, ojo. cit. pp. 273-27^


CHAPTER VIII
THE PERFORMANCE AND THE POTENTIAL OP THE NON-FIGHTING FORCE
The non-fighting military presence has been called
into more and more frequent use. It is at least partially
institutionalised with proposals for further institutionali
zation common. Discussions of establishing some sort of
permanent international force are made with increasing
frequency. In view of the important role in international
politics of the non-fighting force, it is incumbent on us
to develop some sort of framework for evaluating the
performance past and potential of this newest
instrument of peace-keeping.
On the basis of the experience the United Nations
has had thus far with peace-keeping groups, it is possible
to outline in rough and tentative fashion the conditions
under which the peace-keeping group is likely to be brought
into being and to be used effectively. Since no permanent
force has been created yet, establishment and effective
operation pose separate, though related, problems and must
be examined individually. A peace-keeping group might be
brought into being quickly and then fail to operate
effectively because of the particular conjunction of circum
stances. Or it is possible, if less easily demonstrated,


164
and statements cited at various times two sources of power
for the establishment of UNSF: Article 22 of the Charter
and the "Uniting for Peace" resolution.
In discussing the legal foundations of UNEP,
Secretary-General Hammarskjold referred most frequently to
Article 22 of the Charter, viewing the Force as a subsidiary
25
organ of the General Assembly. Legal debate has centered
on the question of whether the terms of Article 22,
authorizing the General Assembly to establish such subsidi
ary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its
functions are broad enough to encompass a subsidiary organ
as ambitious and unprecedented as UNEF. A strong case can
be made for an affirmative answer. In the first place, the
General Assembly has created over 100 subsidiary organs,
varying greatly in character, under this provision.^
Whether viewed merely as an expanded observer group or as a
para-military force, UNEF does not seem so different from
the other subsidiary organs as to be beyond the pale. This
is especially true since UNEP's dependence on consent and
its non-fighting character clearly distinguish it from
yt
y0n occasion the Secretary-General also referred to
the Force as a subsidiary organ of the United Nations. For
example, in a February, 1957, agreement with Egypt on the
status of the Force, UNEF is referred to as an organ estab
lished in accordance with Article 22 of the Charter. Yet
in the UNSF Staff Regulations UNEP is referred to as a sub
sidiary organ of the United Nations.
oc.
uRosner, 0£. cit., p. 40.


Ill
ment of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in
Palestine and the setting up of the Observation Group in
Lebanon, was applied in organizing UNOGIL. Experience and
Secretary-General Hammarskjold were primarily responsible
for the development of the theory.
In the early truce supervision organizations the
primary determinant of composition seemed to be expediency
who was available in the area to serve. Participation
tended to be narrow. (A principal rule of composition
followed was exclusion of the Soviet Union from participa
tion.) By 1958 the organization of the peace-keeping group
had become more sophisticated. The principles of composi
tion followed in determining the composition of UNOGIL were
three-fold. First, there should be no participation in the
peace-keeping operations by the five permanent members of
the Security Council. In fact, one of the functions of such
groups had come to be the isolation of explosive situations
from the great power conflicts. Second, there should be
exclusion of representatives from states which might have a
direct interest in the situation. Thus, no Middle Eastern
nations were invited to contribute to UNOGIL. Finally,
there should be a wide geographic base for the Group.
Application of this principle could first be observed in the


157
Tlie General Assembly did not consider the question
of a force until its second day of meetings. The first
sessions were devoted to debate on a United States draft
resolution calling for a cease-fire. Members of the world
organization were impressed with, the need to bring a bait
in the fighting before anything else was attempted.
Debate on the resolution revealed that United Nations
thinking on the Suez question fell on a continuum. At one
end was the view, held by the Arab bloc and the Communis,t
states, that the British-French-Israeli action was overt,
unmitigated aggression and that the General Assembly should
act accordingly. At the other extreme was the acceptance,
by such states as New Zealand and Australia, of the Anglo-
French justification of their action and the consequent
reluctance to place pressure, not to mention sanctions, on
those states. The bulk of Assembly opinion lay between the
two extremes. Most members discounted the possibility of
attributing blame for the events solely to one side, con
sidering that behind the invasion was a complex pattern of
provocations and counter-provocations. Nonetheless, there
was wide disapproval of the Anglo-French-Israeli action and
acceptance of the need to halt the invasion.
The United States cease-fire resolution was passed
in the early morning hours of November 2 by a vote of 6h
in favor, 5 against, and 5 abstentions. Voting against the


170
Commander of the Force pointed out, it would have "been
virtually impossible for a Force like UNEF to function
56
effectively against Egyptian will.
The importance of the condition of Egyptian consent
is indicated by the fact that the entry of UNEF units was
delayed for a few days following the passage of the resolu
tion formally establishing the Force until specific
Egyptian consent could be obtained to their entry. The
delay occurred despite the fact that the prior acceptance
by the Egyptian Government of the resolution setting up
the LWSF Command was considered to constitute acceptance
of the Force.
The mandate
The mandate under which a peace-keeping group operates
has a bearing on the effectiveness of the group. The neces
sities of getting the force established initially may
conflict with the necessities of a strong, effective force.
The tendency may be to define the mandate in broad, non-
controversiai terms in order to field the force as quickly
as possible. If the terms of the mandate prove too limiting
to the force in the field, it will either have to narrow
its objectives or widen its mandate (either with or without
formal approval).
r~ T'r nj'p-
^Burns, 0£. cit., p. 207.


internal Congolese problem. Despite the Belgian inter
vention and the potential great power involvement, the
essential mission of the United Nations in the Congo was to
restore order between the Congolese.
'The Establishment of the United Nations Force
The establishment
As we examine the actual creation of the United
Nations Force in the Congo, two things stand out: the speed
with which the Force was brought into being and the impor
tance of the Secretary-General and of the Afro-Asian states
in the establishment of the Force.
The Secretary-General responded almost immediately
to the Congolese requests for help. Under his powers under
Article 99 of the Charter Hammarskjold called a Security
11
Council meeting for the evening of July 13, I960. In the
hours preceding the meeting, the way xras prepared for posi
tive United Nations action. A resolution calling for the
withdrawal of Belgian troops and authorizing military aid
to the Congolese Government was prepared by Tunisian
representative Mongi Slim. The resolution was a product of
Slims consultations with the Secretary-General, key
Secretariat aides, and Afro-Asian members of the United
Article 99 states that the "Secretary-General may
bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter
which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of inter
national peace and security."


25
Security Council authority to use force to cope with
threats to and. breaches of the peace did. not extend to the
use of such force to implement a recommendation by the
General Assembly, In the face of doubts on the legal
soundness of the forceful action and the unwillingness of
the major powers to alienate either side, the practical
problem of where to get troops for a force loomed large.
Yet, the report of the Palestine Commission was not
without significance. It triggered reconsideration of the
entire Palestine issue, first in the Security Council from
February through April, 19'*8; then in the Second Special
Session of the General Assembly, meeting from April 16 to
May 14, 1948. The search for an alternative political
q
solution to partition was not fruitful. Reconsideration
did lead, however, to a separation of the problems of
fighting and of the future of Palestine. As it became in
creasingly apparent that a political solution would not be
found quickly or easily and as the fighting intensified,
efforts wei'e concentrated on halting the Arab-Israeli
conflict,
^Security Council, Official Records, 3rd Year, 253rd
meeting (February 24, 1948) 'p." 267.
9
'The United States delegation raised the possibility
of a temporary trusteeship for Palestine and even indicated
willingness to supply some soldiers for the purpose of estab
lishing such a trusteeship. The idea was not accepted by the
majority of the United Nations members however. The United
States main purpose in calling for a special General Assembly
session was to get consideration for the trusteeship proposal.


270
with the consent of the Congolese Government for the express
purpose of assisting that Government in maintaining order
and protecting life. Nonetheless, the Force was still
under the exclusive command of the United Nations, vested
in the Secretary-General acting under the instructions of
the Security Council. It was up to the Secretary-General
to define the Force's mission. Moreover, despite the fact
that the Force was theoretically an arm of the central
government, it was still prohibited from being a party to
37
any internal conflict. If the dilemmas posed by a force
serving as an arm of government but enjoined from aiding
that government in struggles against it were not immediately
apparent, they soon became so. By the end of its tour of
duty ONUC came very close to serving as an instrumentality
of the central government.
The principles of operation which had worked well
in previous peace-keeping operations were less easily
applied in the Congo. Before the mission could be success
fully completed, both mandate and principles had to be
altered to fit the Congolese situation.
The initial mandate of the Force along with the very
restrictive conditions of its operation became more and
more inappropriate to the situation. ONUC was unable to
bring the withdrawal of all foreign troops (mercenary as
^7U.N. Doc. S/4389, p. 18.


the number range from 40 to 200) were not well-equipped to
mold the country into a nation. Most of the so-called
parties were simply loose organizations based on the
personal following of a particular leader or leaders or on
tribal affinity. Only three of the parties had any sort
7
of national basis' Nor was there any strong, dynamic
leader to tie the country together. Patrice Lumumba came
closest to filling this role, and he may have actually
divided more than he united.
The leadership in the Congo lacked the ability to
smooth the transition from dependence to independence. The
two top government positions, those of President and Prime
Minister, were held by political rivals Patrice Lumumba and
Joseph Kasa-Vubu.
Thus, the situation in the Congo into which the
United Nations presence was injected was complex and diffi
cult in the extreme. The complexity, confusion, disunity,
and violence were to have their effects on the United
Nations operation.
^The three parties closest to being national parties
were the Mouvement National Congolais led by Lumumba; the
Mouvement National Congolais led by Kalenji; and the Parti
National du Progres, a nation-wide coalition of parties in
fact. Staff Memorandum on the Republic of the Congo, op.
cit., pp. 41-427


136
Phase II,-Tie operations of the Observation Group
after mid-July reflect a new phase of its mission. By then
the foundations of the organization had been laidstations
had been and were being established progressively closer to
the frontier while access to almost all parts of the country
had been secured. This meant that much more thorough
patrolling was possible. Moreover, internal developments
in Lebanon, particularly the election of the neutralist
General Fuad Chehab to succeed President Chamoun in
September, took much of the drive out of the civil war and
reduced the hostility toward the observers at the same time.
Finally, the presence of United States marines added a
complicating note to an already complex situation. The
observers attempted to keep the complications to a minimum
by emphasizing the complete independence of their mission
and that of the troops and by refusing to have any contact
Ur Q
with the troops.
In the period from July 15 forward there was a steady
growth in the size and complexity of the Observation Group
and in the intensiveness of its activities. There was, at
the same time, a decline in all evidences of infiltration.
'^Rather interesting are the conflicting statements
with respect to the relations of United States forces and
United Rations observers. United States Ambassador Lodge
announced that the marines had been instructed to cooperate
helpfully and establish and maintain liaison with the ob
servers. The United Nations observers announced that they
saw no basis for establishing any contact or working rela
tionship with non-Lebanese forces. The New York Times, July
17, 1958.


160
time the Assembly convened on the evening of November 3
much of the preparatory work for the force had been done.
Egypt had been consulted, while Pearson had been in touch
with members of the Commonwealth. (Apparently Israel was
not among those consulted on the force.) Representatives
of several of the important blocs in the United Nations had
21
been drawn into the planning stages. Several delegations
were sounded out on supplying troops. Active lobbying to
win support for the force was undertaken. The United States
delegation apparently played an important role behind the
scenes in building sufficient support for the concept of a
force to bring such a force into being.
Three important resolutions were passed between
November 3 and November 6 relating to the Force. These
resolutions, along with the November 2 cease-fire resolution,
constitute the basis for the establishment and operation of
UNEE. In the first resolution, proposed by the representa
tive of Canada and passed by the Assembly in the early
morning hours of November h, the Secretary-General was called
upon to submit a plan for an international force within
forty-eight hours. The operative paragraph read:
Po
General Assembly, Official Records, First Emergency
Special Session, 565th plenary meeting (November d, 1956), p.
83. pi
Included in the early planning were Hans Engen of
Norway, Arthur Lall of India, Francisco Urrutia of Colombia,
and Lester Pearson of Canada.


355
inflammatory propaganda on Radio Katanga, and widespread
rumors caused panic among the Baluba population. (Some
35*000 refugees came to the ONUC for protection.The
ONUC itself was directly threatened both by demonstrations
against it and by terroristic conspiracies and activities.88
Negotiations between United Nations officials and Tshombe
to bring a reduction of tensions and assurance of evacuation
of foreign mercenaries were without success.
On the morning of September 13 a small eight-day war
between Katanga and the United Nations broke outa skir
mish which culminated in virtual defeat for the United
Nations and death for Secretary-General Hammarskjold. The
September fighting is extremely important because the non
fighting force was at this point transformed into a fighting
force seeking political objectives.
Although the origins of the fighting were clouded in
mystery, the outcome was clearly unfavorable to the United
Nations. The United Nations Force in Katanga was ill-
prepared for major military engagements, being limited in
size and having, little heavy equipment and no air arm.
57Ibid., p. 102.
88The United Nations Headquarters in Katanga had in
formation that terroristic groups planned to introduce
plastic bombs into its headquarters, that guerrilla groups
were being organized among the gendarmerie, presumably to
attack the Force, and that plans had been made for an
attack on the United Nations garage and vehicles. Ibid.,
pp. 101-02.


469
General Assembly, Official Records, Third. Session (1948),
A/648, "Progress report of the United Nations Mediator
on Palestine." Supplement No. 11.
General Assembly, Official Records, Third Session (1948),
Annexes to the Summary Records of the plenary meetings.
A/656, Sept. 28, 1948, "Report of the Secretary-General."
A/678, Oct. 14, 1948, "Advances from the Working Capital
Pund."
A/692, Oct. 25, 1948, "Third interim report of the
United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans."
A/701, Nov. 3, 1948, "Seventh report of 1948 of Advisory
Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions."
A/728 and A/728/Corr. 1 and 2, Nov, 18, 1948, "Report
of the First Committee."
A/736, Nov. 25, 1948, "Financial implications of the
draft resolution proposed by the First Committee."
A/786, Dec. 9, 1948, "Financial implications of the -
draft resolution proposed by the First Committee."
General Assembly, Official Records, Third Session (1948),
Annexes to Fifth Committee, A/C.5/247/Rev. 1, Nov.
15, 1948, "Report by the Secretary-General."
A/C.5/284, Dec. 7, 1948, "Financial implications of
the draft resolution adopted by the First Committee
on the progress report of the United Nations Mediator
on Palestine (A/776): report by the Secretary-General."
General Assembly, Official Records, Fourth Session (1949),
A/930, "Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the
Work of the Organization 1 July 1948-30 June 1949."
Supplement No. 1.
A/935, August, 1949, "Report of the United Nations
Special Committee on the Balkans." Supplement No. 8.
A/945, "Report of the Security Council to the General
Assembly." Supplement No. 2.
A/959, Oct. 10, 1949, "United Nations Field Service:
Report of the Special Committee on a United Nations
Guard." Supplement No. 13.


336
this vas relatively easy for the firm establishment of a
United Nations presence in an area brought the subsequent
withdrawal of the Belgian units.
Katanga created special problems for the Porce. The
difficulty in Katanga was that the Belgians would not with
draw until Ol'TUC entered, and President Tshombe of Katanga
refused the United Nations entry. In the face of Tshombes
"determination to resist by every means" a United Nations
presence, the Secretary-General postponed entry of the
troops and requested further instructions from the Security
Council. There was no effort on the Secretary-Generals
part to change the character of the Porce to enable it to
enter Katanga forcefully, a move he considered neither
desirable nor feasible. Rather the aim was to win Tshombe*s
consent to the United Nations presence by reassuring him
that the Porce would not be used to influence internal
political settlements. The move was successful. On August
12 the first United Nations troops entered Katanga without
incident. Two Swedish companies, dramatically led by the
Secretary-General, broke the path.
By mid-September ail official Belgian troops were
out of the Congo. The withdrawal of Belgian troops did
not end the problem of foreign intervention however. Re
placing the official troops were former Belgian officers,
non-commissioned officers, and paid mercenaries. They


79
Nonetheless, the Truce Supervision Organization did
maintain the truce more or less intact for over a year,
while negotiations for an armistice were undertaken and
successfully completed. Few would deny that the situation
was not improved by the observers. By concrete actionin
vestigating, patrolling, negotiatingthey reduced tensions,
helping to keep the situation below the boiling point most
of the time. And, perhaps even more important, by their
very presence the observers served to symbolize the United
Nations concern that the truce should not be violated. In
the words of Count Bernadotte, "The value of the operation
was to be found mainly in the moral and psychological effect,
and in the restraining influences that the mere presence
of the observers in Palestine would have on the opposing
, 6h
parties.
jir
J.N. hoc. S/1025, p. 10.


27
The Truce Commission drew the Security Council's
attention to the problem of truce supervision with requests
for more assistance. First, in connection with a proposal
to demilitarize Jerusalem, the Commission queried the
Security Council in early May on the possibility of obtain
ing a fifty-man force to provide the guarantees necessary
to both sides if the truce were to be upheld. Second, in
a cable of May 21 the Commission indicated its need for a
small body of competent military observers to assist it in
carrying through its functions. In the same cable the
Commission expressed the conviction that the only effective
means to bring a cessation of hostilities was through
employment of a neutral force, sufficiently large and
powerful to impose its will on one or both parties, created
under Article hi or Article h2 of the Charter.^ The
that use of representatives already in Palestine would be
a prompt, effective, and simple way of providing the Se-
curity Council with an arm in Palestine to report to it and
to help execute its decisions. Significantly, in the light
of later developments, objections to this method of selec
tion were voiced by the delegates of the Soviet Union and of
the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, both of whom ab
stained on the resolution establishing the Commission,
Security Council, Official Records, 3rd Year, 287th meeting
(April 23, 19h8), p. 5.
UU.N. Doc. S/762, p. 3.


320
first of these, initialed, shortly after the Force's arrival,
defined in broad terms the relationship of GNUC and the
Government of the Republic of the Congo. The document was
brief. The Government of the Congo promised to ensure the
freedom of movement of the Force and to accord the requisite
privileges and immunities to personnel associated with the
Forcethese rights were similar to those granted both UNEF
and UNOGIL by their respective host states. In addition,
the Congolese Government stated that in exercising its
sovereign rights with respect to the presence and function
ing of the Force, it would "be guided, in good faith, by
the fact that it has requested military assistance from the
United Nations and by its acceptance of the resolutions of
the Security Council of 14 and 22 July 1960."^ In its
turn, the United Nations promised that the activities of
the Force would be guided by the task assigned to the Force
in the resolutions and indicated its willingness to maintain
the Force in the Congo until its task was fully completed.
It was intended that the July 29 Agreement should be
almost immediately supplemented with an additional agree
ment, spelling out the status of the Force in detail. In
fact, the collapse of the Central Government in September,
I960, delayed the negotiations of that second agreement over
27
U.N. Doc. S/4389/Add. 5, PP- 27-28.


203
governments made contributions totaling over $26 million,
almost 20 per cent of UNEF's cost.7^
A second modification, tbe principle of reduced
assessment, was adopted in I960. A resolution sponsored by
Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and
Yugoslavia provided that contributions pledged before
December 31? 1959? should be applied as a credit to reduce
by 50 per cent the contributions of as many governments as
77
possible, beginning with those assessed at .04- per cent.
The same type of formula with a more generous maximum re
duction for those least able to pay was included in each
UNEF budget after I960.
The critical problem relating to UNEF financing was
not simply one of working out an acceptable financing
formula. It was also one of getting money enough to run the
Force. Differences among the member states as to the kind
of obligation members had to support UNEF were reflected
concretely in the paid or unpaid assessments for the Force.
On the one hand, an overwhelming majority voted year after
7^The United States contributed approximately $23
million, the United Kingdom $2.5 million, and France $400,000.
Nineteen other states contributed amounts varying from
$310,000 to $1,000. The contributing states were Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, The Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark,
Norway, Italy, Belgium, Iceland, Greece, Austria, Japan,
Mexico, Ceylon, Pakistan, Liberia, Burma and the Dominican
Republic. John G. Stoessinger, Financing the United Nations
System (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1964), p. 112.
77U.N. Doc. A/4335, p. 32.


104-
Through intensive private consultations a moderate resolu
tion, proposed initially by Hans Engen of Norway, won the
unanimous recommendation of the Arab bloc and thereby the
unanimous support of the Assembly.
The resolution which was passed constituted a vote
of confidence in the Secretary-General's handling of the
Lebanon crisis. All arrangements implementing the resolu
tion were left to his discretion. The operative section
of the resolution requested Hammarskjold:
...to make forthwith, in consultation with the
Governments concerned and in accordance with the
Charter, and having in mind Section I of this reso
lution, such practical arrangements as would ade
quately help in upholding the purposes and principles
of the Charter in relation to Lebanon and Jordan in
the present circumstances, and thereby to facilitate
the early withdrawal of the foreign troops from the
two countries.25
Thus, the Security Council and the General Assembly
had each reviewed intensively and reaffirmed the initial
decision to establish an observation group in Lebanon and
the Secretary-General's implementation of that decision.
Characteristics of UNOGiL
Leadership of UNOGIL
Secretary-General Hammarskjold exerted strong leader
ship both in the establishment and guidance of the Observation
-'General Assembly resolution 1237 (ES-III), Yearbook
of the United Nations 1938, p. 50.


intervention, so "basic cooperation was ensured. Tile lines
of conflict were clearly drawn. The mandate of the force
was, at least in its restricted form, clear-cut.
Unfortunately, the conditions of operation of the
United Nations non-fighting force are frequently far from
ideal. Responsibilities become heavier as conditions be
come less ideal. Situations involving civil or communal
strife are particularly likely to pose difficult problems
for the United Nations. To operate effectively the United
Nations force needs to have the consent and cooperation of
all parties. To win such cooperation the group must be
neutral between all factions. Yet it is not easy for the
force to appear neutral in a civil war situation. Coopera
tion with the legitimate government is often necessary to
the mission; yet such cooperation is likely to be interpre
ted as favoritism. In fact, even the most rigorous efforts
to be neutral may fail to establish the force's impartiality.
Laying aside any question of United Nations neutrality,
those involved in civil conflict may simply be unwilling or
unable to ensure that all their adherents cooperate fully
and in good faith with the peace-keeping mission. It is
unfortunate in view of the difficulties that a civil war
situation poses for the United Nations that the most
probable future uses of the force will be in just this sort
of situation. Every use of the peace-keeping device since


19
(UNTSO) was designed bo symbolize in concrete fashion the
United Nations concern that fighting he halted in Palestine,
while a permanent solution was sought to the problems at
issue. In other problem areas fighting had occurred with
out evoking such a strong United Nations response. What
were the conditions which led to the use in this case of
a contingent of military men to represent the United Nations
presence?
Several elements contributed to bringing the Truce
Organization into existence. First, the United Nations
had special responsibilities with respect to the Palestine
problem stemming from its prior involvement in the situation
coupled with its failure either to find a solution ac
ceptable to all parties or to win agreement of the United
Nations members to the imposition of a solution. Second,
the fact of open and heavy fighting between Jew and Arab
in the Holy Land made apparent the urgent need for some
sort of action. Finally, the variety of solutions and the
proposals for a United Nations enforced peace put forth in
early 19^-8 as well as the tentative experimentation with a
truce commission prepared the way, at least in part, for
establishment of a peace-keeping group to quell the vio
lence and to facilitate the search for a permanent solution.


52
Money: the financial bane,-The Truce Supervision
Organization in Palestine was more expensive than any
previous observer group. The 1948 cost of the operation to
the United Nations was $3581600 and the 1949 charge
$3,14-7,063. The resolution authorizing a mediator and staff
made no provision for financial support. Yet despite the
high costs and the absence of specific financial arrange
ments, financing proved no real problem. The expenses of
UNTSO were included in the regular budget, and the Secretary-
General was allowed great freedom in spending for the group.
In providing for the support of the Truce Supervision
Organization the Secretary-General followed a precedent set
in the financing of earlier, more limited observer groups.
He drew on the authority of an annual resolution authorizing
him to enter into commitments not exceeding two million
dollars to meet unforeseen and extraordinary expenses re-
58
lated to the maintenance of peace and security. Since the
Truce Organization's commitments exceeded the maximum, it
was necessary for the Secretary-General to obtain the con
currence of the Advisory Committee to raise the ceiling to
59
four million dollars. This was accomplished with little
difficulty.
--
^ The specific resolution the Secretary-General was
acting under was resolution 166, adopted by the General
Assembly on November 20, 1947. General Assembly, Official
Records, 2nd Session, 121st meeting (November 20, 1947), p.
1213. ZQ
pyU.N. Doc. A/678, p. 248.


188
The Force initially had approximately 6,000 men; in 1964-
it numbered a little over 5)100. Of the original ten
seconding states, seven continue to supply all the men for
the Forcethe Finnish and Indonesian units were withdrawn
in 1957 and the Colombian unit departed in 1958. Canada and
the Scandinavian states have contributed approximately one-
half of the troops over the years, while the Afro-Asians
have provided about one-fourth. India, the largest single
contributor, took up much of the slack left by the with
drawal of the other Afro-Asian participant, Indonesia.
The Secretary-General may have been less successful
in achieving military balance than he was in establishing
geographic and political balance. Major-General Burns, as
the Commander, criticized the initial military weakness of
the Force, pointing particularly to its odd size units and
58
its over-balance of infantry units.
Moreover, only about one-half the total force in the
area, less than 3,500 out of 6,000 men, were available for
59
patrol and guard duties. The remaining units were engaged
in vital support functions and were neither suitable nor
available for active duty. Throughout the life of the Force
around half of the men have been engaged in support activi
ties. In report after report on the Force the Secretary-
General pointed out that the deployment of the Force for
58
y Burns, op. cit., p. 190.
59U.N. Doc. A/3694-, p. 3.


180
The resolution establishing UNEF set up an Advisory
Committee composed of representatives from Brazil, Canada,
Ceylon, Colombia, Norway, and Pakistan and chaired by the
Secretary-General. The Committee was directed to undertake
the development of "those aspects of the planning for the
Force and its operation.not already dealt with by the
General Assembly and which do not fall in the area of the
LlO.
direct responsibility of the Chief of the Command." It
was also empowered to request the convening of the General
Assembly and to report to the Assembly whenever matters
arose which were of such urgency and importance as to re
quire consideration by the General Assembly itself. No
official records or reports were ever issued by the Com
mittee. Apparently its influence in the shaping of UNEF
was minimal. Its primary use seems to have been as a device
to ratify and rally support for the policies made by the
Secretary-General. Thus, the period of the Advisory Com
mittee's greatest importance was in early 1957 when the
crisis over Israeli withdrawal made additional support for
47
the Secretary-General desirable.
JTf.
General Assembly, Resolution 1001 (ES-I).
47
Maxwell Cohen, "The United Nations Emergency Force:
A Preliminary View," International Journal, Vol. 12, No. 2
(Spring, 1957)5 P 125. Eor comments on the Advisory Com
mittee that view it as an important innovation and as a link
between the Secretariat and the main body of Assembly opinion
see G. S. Murray, "United Nations Peace-Keeping and Problems
of Political Control," International Journal, Vol. 18, No. 4
(Autumn, 1963), pp. 449-450.


106
an estimated 100 observers would be needed. Fourteen nations
were requested to provide these observers.
The second direction in which Hammarskjold moved was
to set up a control structure for the Observation Group.
The resolution authorizing the Group did not indicate what
sort of arrangements should be made for the leadership of
the organization; apparently it was to be the Secretary-
General's responsibility. The Secretary-General set up a
three-man observation group and appointed the members of it.
Although a three-man group had been used before, for example,
in connection with the Indonesian question, there is a
significant difference between the position of the Lebanese
group and most earlier ones. The previous commissions had
been created and their members appointed by the Security
Council or the General Assembly; they were thereby directly
responsible to the parent body. In the case of UNOGIL the
three-man observation group resulted from the action of the
Secretary-General and was thereby responsible to him rather
than to the Security Council directly. Those selected by
the Secretary-General for the observation group were Galo
Plaza of Ecuador, elected chairman by his colleagues;
Rajeshwar Dayal of India; and Major-General Odd Bull of
Norway. The appointees represented geographically three
major contributing areas to peace-keeping groups. Bull,
who was Air Commander of the Norwegian Royal Air Force, was


BI OGBAPHI cal sketch
Joan Sacknitz Carver was born on January 22, 1931?
at Spokane, Washington In June, 19^9? she was graduated
from Lewis and Clark High School, Spokane. In 19^9 she was
awarded a Seven College Conference National Scholarship to
Barnard College. In June, 1953? Mrs. Carver received the
degree of Bachelor of Arts, magna cum laude, from Barnard
College.
From 1953 until 1955 Mrs. Carver was employed as the
personal secretary to the Iranian Ambassador to the United
Nations. From September, 1955? until September, 1956, she
was a research assistant with the Institute for Research in
the Social Sciences and a graduate student in the Department
of Political Science of the University of North Carolina.
In August, 1957? she received the degree of Master of Arts
from the University of North Carolina.
Mrs. Carver taught history at the Lake Shore Junior
High School in Jacksonville, Florida in 1957-1958. In the
following year she served as office manager at Bartram
School in Jacksonville. In 1958 Mrs. Carver was appointed
a lecturer in government and social science at Jacksonville
University. From 1959 until i960 and from 1963 until the
502


97
expansion to police-type functions could not be done with
out additional authority from the Security Council. He did,
however, find authority later to substantially increase the
size if not the scope of the operation. Although there is
no evidence that the Secretary-General received guidance
from the Security Council in making his interpretation, he
certainly took into account the political realities of the
situation.
There was reconsideration in July and August, first
by the Security Council and then by the Second Emergency
Special Session of the General Assembly, of the proper role
of the United Nations in the Lebanese crisis. The results
of the meetings did not alter the decisions made by the
Secretary-General with respect to UN0G1L. In both the Se
curity Council and the General Assembly the action taken
(or not taken) amounted to a confirmation of the original
resolution and of the Secretary-General's interpretation of
that resolution.
Reconsideration of the question of the observers'
role in Lebanon was triggered by the arrival of 15,000
American marines and supporting troops on the shores of
Lebanon in mid-July. The American force came at the request
of President Camille Chamoun for the announced purpose of
preserving Lebanon's independence and integrity. (The sense
of danger that led to the request for American troops arose


The precedents for peace-keeping
The United Nations could hardly ignore a situation
becoming ever more violent with which it was directly in
volved. Proposals, plans, and limited measures of United
Nations peace-keeping tumbled one after another between
November, 19171 and Hay, 1918. Although these proposals
set few concrete precedents for the Truce Supervision
Organization, they probably contributed to creation of an
atmosphere conducive to decisive action ultimately by the
United Nations.
The General Assembly had made virtually no initial
provision for implementation of the partition decision
beyond setting up a five-nation Palestine Commission to
administer the territory in the interim period between the
Mandatory Power's departure and the establishment of the
Arab and Israeli states. The Security Council was in
structed to give all necessary aid and guidance to the
Commission and to take the necessary measures for implemen
tation of the plan. It was soon apparent that the Commis
sion would need help to fulfill its mission. Two major
efforts in the spring of 1918 to provide such assistance
can be delineated: the call for a force for Palestine and
the establishment of a truce commission.
In January and February, 1918, both Secretary-General
Trygve Lie and the Palestine Commission struggled with the


237
that one of the reasons UNEF has been so successful is that
it has taken a limited role which has enabled it to maintain
the cooperation of all parties. A more positive role could
easily have lost it this cooperation. What would be the
implications of a loss of cooperation? Could the Force have
occupied Egyptian territory in opposition to the Egyptian
will? Could they have controlled effectively in the midst
of a hostile populace? Would the necessary support have
been forthcoming from members of the United Nations if the
Force were involved in fighting? It seems doubtful that
these questions could be answered affirmatively in view of
the size of the Force, the unwillingness of the states
contributing men to have their forces involved in fighting,
and the lack of consensus on a solution to the Middle East
problems.
The Force has served, and served well, as a preserver
of the quiet which is indispensable to the removal of the
major obstacles to peace in the Middle East. But the Force,
by its very nature, is unable to remove those obstacles
itself.
Conclusions
Having examined the character and functioning of the
United Nations Emergency Force, an effort must now be made
to evaluate our findings. What can be concluded about the
Forceabout its nature and its effectiveness?


363
Instead, of flaunting themselves in., uniform they now
serve in civilian garb and are correspondingly diffi
cult to identify and apprehend. There is also good
reason to believe that they have taken cover in
various forms of civilian employ, real or otherwise.
It has also been established that a considerable
number of para-military personnel who carried arms
during the recent hostilities were European residents
of the Congo otherwise regularly employed. Finally,
some persons previously evacuated by ONUC under the
terms of paragraph A-2 are reliably reported to have
returned to Katanga or to be active in the neighboring
areas.&5
The possibility of civil war once more reared its
head. War between the Central Government and both Katanga
and a Stanleyville group threatened. In late October and
early November fighting did break out between the forces
of the Central Government and of Katanga in the Kasai-
Katanga border area. In addition to factional fighting and
threats of secession, the undisciplined and undependable
troops of the Congo were acting up againrioting, terrori
zing, raping.
The period of self-evaluation and uncertainty as to
direction ended for ONUC in November, 1961, with the se
lection of U Thant as Acting Secretary-General and the
passage of the November 24- Security Council resolution de
signed to clarify the mandate of the Force. The resolution
reaffirmed the power granted in the February 21 resolution
and extended that power slightly. It constituted a victory
65
'U.N. Doc. S/4-94-0/Add. 12, p. 15


226
in more urgent and controversial form with respect to the
Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. The Israelis refused to
complete their withdrawal until some assurance was given
that UUEF would he competent to restore peace and security
in the area.
The refusal to withdraw raised, first, the question
of the power and competency of the Force to negotiate a
withdrawal. Early negotiations on this issue were left
largely in the hands of the field commander. He had little
success in persuading the Israelis to depart, for he had
limited bargaining power to oblige acceptance of United
Nations terms. The sanctions which might normally be
available to a military commander (particularly the threat
of resumed hostilities) were not his. Nor were political
sanctions at the disposal of the Force.
Before the impasse created by the Israeli refusal to
withdraw could be broken, extensive activity at United
nations headquarters involving both pressures and conces
sions was necessary. On the one hand, talk of sanctions
against Israel .increased,'1'0& The February 2 General Assembly
The U.S, Secretary of State indicated American will
ingness to cooperate in imposing sanctions on Israel in
discussions of this question. The United States was already
imposing sanctions in the sense of having cut off all
government aid to Israel. For a critical discussion of
United States policy see Finer, op. cit., pp. 4-70-7^,
A77-82.


189
its task was quite thin and emphasized the need for main
taining TJNiSF at its initial strength if it was to perform
its assigned duties. Despite the warnings, a reduction in
size of the Force did occur over the years so that by 1964
it was about five-sixths its original size. No correspon
ding reduction in its effectiveness seems to have occurred.
The practices followed regarding rotation of troops
have not eased the problem of having an adequate number of
trained men on hand. Initially it had been anticipated
that units would be rotated no oftener than once a year.
In fact, all units except the Canadian and Indian have been
rotated semi-annually. As dates of conscription of volun
teer service drew to a close, it was necessary to return
contingents to their home states. Too, the nature of the
climate and terrain and the monotony of the duties led to
the conclusion that frequent rotations were desirable.
Nevertheless, the semi-annual rotation would seem to impose
an unnecessarily high cost on the Force, both in terms of
transport and of frequent personnel turnover.
The status of the troops in the various contingents
has varied. In some cases they have been professional
soldiers, drawn from the regular army; in others, volunteers
or conscripts, enrolled for a specific term of service.
(Most of the officers came from the ranks of the profes
sional soldiers.) Although the various contingents were


Material: the logistic base of UNEF.-The logistic
problems which, confronted the Force can be divided into two
categories: those which concerned the establishment of UNEF
and those related to the maintenance of the Force in the
field.
The initial logistic problems had to be solved in an
atmosphere of emergency, under the stresses imposed by the
need for speed and improvisation. The scope of the United
Nations endeavor is suggested if one considers that a force
had to be created, transported to the field -of duty, uni
formed or in some way made identifiable, fed, equipped and
suppliedall within a few days time and with virtually no
, ... 82
advance prepar.auion.
One of the first logistic problems to be met was that
of getting the troops into Egypt. To meet this problem a
staging area and transport facilities were needed. Convinced
of the importance of having troops immediately available to
move into Egypt, Hammarskjold undertook negotiations for
troop contributions even before formal passage of the reso
lution creating the Force. As a consequence immediately
after passage of that resolution, the Secretary-General was
For a discussion of logistic problems encountered
in the early stages of the operation see William Frye, op.
cit. pp. 22-31 and P. 0. Donovan, "How the United Nations
Troops Were Mobilized," The Reporter, Yol. 16, No. 1
(January 10, 1957), pp."30-3"h


43
However, in continuing my negotiations with the
two parties, I was told by the representative of the
Provisional Jewish Government that they could not
accept having British observers. They felt that,
since the British had been there during the period
of the Mandate, it would not be a very happy solution
to have them coming back as observers.
I then had to change the basis for the selection
of the observers and, instead of using the five great
powers as countries to provide me with these observers,
I had to find another solution. I then thought of the
Truce Commission in Jerusalem, appointed by the Se
curity Council, in which Belgium, Prance and the
United States were represented; and I asked that my 25
observers should be taken from these three countries.
Whatever the reasons for the change in formula for
participation, the change did bring the Truce Supervision
Organisation in line with a kind of rough rule-of-thumb
being followed in staffing observer groups at that time:
exclusion of the Soviet Union from participation and use of
the most convenient national representatives (i.e. those
with some prior involvement with the question or area).
The formula developed to determine who should parti
cipate in the Truce Organization had two limitations. First,
it restricted participation in the Truce Organization to a
narrow base. Second, the exclusion of the Soviet Union from
the unit became- a source of criticism of the supervision
effort by the Communist bloc.
The issue of the composition of the Truce Organiza
tion recurs throughout all Security Council discussion of
Security Council, Official Becords,
meeting (July 13, 1948), p. 4.
3rd Year, 333rd


Some effort has been made to spread at least slightly
the burden of peace-keeping responsibility borne by the
Secretary-General. The principal institutional device used
for this purpose is the Advisory Committee. The Advisory
Committee technique was inaugurated with the United Nations
Emergency Force. The General Assembly called for a commit
tee of representatives of seven states, reflecting a cross-
section of United Nations membership, to assist the
Secretary-General. The Advisory Committee seems to have
played a limited role in actual decision-making. Its value
rested rather in backing up the Secretary-General8s de
cisions, conveying the impression that controversial
decisions were the product of the organization as a whole
and not merely of its executive head. Thus, the UNEF
Advisory Committee came into most prominence in connection
with a dispute over the United Nations role at the time of
the Israeli departure from the Gaza Strip.
Advisory Committees were created as adjuncts to the
Observation Group in Lebanon and the Force in the Congo.
The origins and' operation of the committees in these two
situations lends credence to the conclusion that their main
purpose is to provide moral support for the decisions made
by the Secretary-General. Thus, the Advisory Committee for
the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon was created
by the Secretary-General in mid-July, over a month after
the mission was inaugurated but at a time that it was coming


Chapter Page
Money: the financial base, 52
Materials the logistic base, . 56
The legal status of the Truce Supervision
Organization 60
The Truce Supervision Organization in Action 65
The role of the Truce Supervision
Organization 65
Organization for action , 64
The functioning of the observers. .... 70
Conclusions 74
III. PEACE-KEEPING THROUGH OBSERVATION-AN
ESTABLISHED INSTRUMENT: THE UNITED NATIONS
OBSERVATION GROUP IN LEBANON 80
Introduction 80
Conditions for Creation of UNOGIL 85
The crisis area: internal conditions in
Lebanon 85
The United Nations involvement 86
The precedents for peace-keeping. .... 87
The Establishment of the Observation Group 88
The establishment ...... 88
The legal foundations .......... 92
The mandate ......... 94
Characteristics of UNOGIL 104
Leadership of UNOGIL 104-
Support for UNOGIL 110
v


176
to be deployed in such a way as to protect any special
position on these questions, although, at least
transitionally, it may function in support of mutual
restraint in accordance with the foregoing.43
The debate in the spring of 1957 about the proper
mission of the Force was never definitively resolved. The
February 2 General Assembly resolution recognized that the
maintenance of the armistice required placing UNEF on the
Armistice Demarcation Line and implementation of "other
measures" proposed in the Secretary-General's reportbut
the so-called "other measures" were never spelled out. The
role the Force came to play in the area was dictated by
circumstances and expediency. UNEF has not withdrawn from
the area, but neither has it taken responsibility for
policing or policy enforcement. UNEF's primary function
has been to serve as a symbolic presence. It has served
to observe and to calm by its presence. It has been able
to do little to resolve the basic conflict in the Middle
East.
Not all have viewed with favor the limited role of
the para-military force. Thus, one critic caustically
comments that:
If, as the Secretary-General thinks, this is "a para
military organization," its para-military functions
seem to be limited to that of a buffer between the
withdrawn belligerents, a United-Nations symbol
approaching no nearer to a military function than the
43
Ibid., p. 50.


the brink of financial collapse, and that it would cost the
life of one Secretary-General.
Following the format used in the examination of the
other United Nations military groups, we will review the
origins, characteristics, and functioning of the United
Nations Force in the Gongo. We shall he particularly con
cerned with the question of how the use of the non-fighting
force in the Congo both differed from and resembled previ
ous uses of a military unit.
Conditions for Creation of the United Nations Force
The crisis area: internal conditions in the Congo
The United Nations Force for the Congo came into
being to deal with a crisis situation which had developed
in the Republic of the Congo immediately following the
proclamation of Congolese independence on June 30, i960.
Superficially, the situation bore resemblance to both the
Suez and Lebanon situations. There was intervention by an
outside power and there were elements of civil war. In
fact, the Congo' case was more notable for its differences
from than for its similarities to the earlier crises. Far
more complex, far more volatile, it posed problems of a
different order from those connected with earlier uses of
military men in a peace-keeping capacity.


192
challenging and controversial problems faced by the United
Nations in connection with UNEF. The problem of financing
posed no real barrier to the establishment of the Force
probably in part because of the Secretary-General's consci
ous decision to avoid the hard financial issues at the out
set. Financing has, however, threatened the continued
existence of an effective force. The members of the United
Nations have been deeply divided over the question of
financing UNEF and.the peace-keeping force which followed
it in the Congo. Argument on the financing of the Force
has been couched largely in legal or economic terms, yet
it is political factors which seem to be most determinative
of the positions of member states on the issue. Extensive
debate and intensive study by working groups as well as
legal advisory opinion have not served to resolve with
finality the issue of financing. It can be argued that
this is so because the basic political consensus on which
important decisions must rest is missing.
The issue of financing UNEF was, in fact, not one
single issue but three related ones. The outstanding
financial questions posed by UNEF were: a) the inclusion
in or exclusion from the regular budget of the costs of
UNEF; b) the scale of assessments to be used to apportion
the charges for UNEF among the member states; and c) the
nature of the legal obligation of member states to meet


393
non-military man, Pier Spinelli, head of the United Nations
European office.'7 The non-fighting military presence was
in the process of being converted to a diplomatic presence.
In September, 1964-, the mission was withdrawn completely in
the face of continued frustration in resolving the crisis and
in the wake of the refusal of the Saudi Arabian government
to extend further its support of the United Nations mission.
The most recent resort to the United Nations military
presence has been the most ambitious of the three. In
March, 1964-, a United Nations Force was established for de
ployment on Cyprus. Under the terms of the initial resolu
tion the Force was to use its best efforts to prevent a
recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to
the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return
to normal conditions.The decision to use a United Nations
Force in that troubled island came only after efforts to
install a NATO Force linked loosely to the United Nations
failed. The authorization for the Force came after lengthy,
hard negotiations on the terms under which the Force would
serve and on its character. After all the negotiations were
over, the Force bore a strong resemblance to those used in
the Middle East and in the Congo.
%.N. Doc. S/5501, p. 2. (Mimeograph)
6
U.N. Doc. S/5575 The resolution was passed at the
1102nd meeting of the Security Council on March 4-, 1964-.


190
not so well-trained as initially desired, the calibre of
men was generally high and the nature of duties undertaken
by the Force such that the lack of training posed no seri
ous problems for the operation of the Force.^
The combination of frequent rotations and volunteer
troops with relatively little training would seem to pose
particular difficulties for an international force faced
with more challenging responsibilities than those con
fronted in Gaza or Sinai. If the United Nations forces
are to undertake many missions like those of the Congo and
Cyprus, some re-thinking on training and rotation seems
necessary.
Money: the financial base of UNEF.-The success of
a peace-keeping group is determined at least in part by the
adequacy of the resources which undergird it. The more
costly the venture, the greater is likely to be the problem
of material support.
UNEF was expensive in terms of the general level of
United Nations expenses at that time. In the first year the
Forces operational costs were $23,920,500its total obli
gations taking account of reimbursements came to about
$30,000,000. This sum was approximately one-third of the
regular budget for the Organization for 1957 The most
Burns, 00. cit., p. 189.


122
negotiations were underway in the fall of 1958 with Lebanon
for a possible reimbursement of rental costs, a perusal of
latex* financial records gives no indication that such
57
reimbursement was ever made.
UNOGIL in Action
The role of the observers
We come now to the central question with respect to
an observation group or a peace forcewhat did it do, in
fact, to promote peaceful settlement?
The role of the observers in Lebanon was defined
initially by the June 11 resolution which instructed them
"to ensure that there is no illegal infiltration of person
nel or supply of arms or other materiel across the Lebanese
borders." It was apparently tacitly assumed that the
observers would not only determine if illegal infiltration
was occurring but would also help prevent or halt such
illegal activities. The observers would accomplish their
objectives by patrolling and observation; they were to have
no enforcement powers nor were they to intervene directly
in any situation. It was assumed, first, that the mere
presence of the observers would have a restraining effect
on infiltration if such infiltration were occurring in fact;
^7U.N. Doc. A/G.5/765 (November 14, 1958).


135
tended to corroborate rather than discredit the Lebanese
46
charges. Privately the officials questioned both the
objectivity and the activity of the observers, A statement
attributed to the President of Lebanon and widely circula
ted, though later denied officially, suggests the feeling
of Lebanon's leaders toward the observers.
It is difficult for me to comment on the activities
of the observers because they appear to be doing
nothing. As far as I can see, they spend their time
at the new Aero Club in Beirut and on beaches and up
at the mountain resort.
#
The observers contented themselves with quick
picnics in certain Lebanese areas and at banquets
given in their honour here and there.^7
The enthusiasm for the Observation Group declined
sharply in the early weeks of the operation among some of
its strongest initial supporters. Unofficial statements by
officials in both the United States and British Governments
tended to throw doubt on the value of the observers' reports
by indicating that their own sources of information bore out
48
the Lebanese claims rather than the findings of UUOGIL.
rbThe Hew York Times, July 9, 1958, and U.H. Doc.
S/4043.
47
Security Council, Official Records, 13th Year,
828th meeting (July 15, 1958), p. 6. Some dissatisfaction
with UNOGIL among Lebanese officials had been reported
earlier as well. See The Hew York Times, June 23, 1958.
r^The Hew York Times, July 7, 1958, and The Hew York
Times, July 13, 1*955.


329
more difficult, Belgian cooperation with, the United Nations
Force appears to have been more formal than real.
Secondly, reliance hy a military unit on its presence
alone to accomplish its ends presupposes that the presence
is embodied with an aura of prestige and authority. The
United Nations Force did not call forth the sort of respect
in the Congo that UNEP had in the Middle East.^
Finally, if a force is to avoid internal inter
ference, a relatively stable internal situation would seem
important. The United Nations Force was placed in an almost
impossible situation with respect to intervention. Pro
hibited from intervening by the Charter generally and by
the August 9, I960, resolution specifically, the Force found
it difficult not to intervene. The mandate of ONUC, to
help the national security forces restore order, juxtaposed
domestic and foreign issues from the beginning. When the
constitutional government disintegrated into competing
factions in early September, I960, the actions undertaken
by the United Nations became "a bone of contention with one
36
group or another." Even to do nothing was to affect the
political balance and arouse the ire of some groups.
-^Sounding a note of bitterness after several weeks
experience as the head of the United Nations presence in the
Congo, Dr. Ralph Bunche summarized the situation saying that
the Force had been dropped in the midst of a country and of
a people totally unprepared by experience and psychology to
understand it and to appreciate its functions and its real
worth. U.N. Doc. S/4451, p. 113.
i6U.N. Doc. S/4531, p. 180.


264-
to enforcement action.
Drought into line with i
action on occasion of at
The force's actual powers were
ts responsibilities. The cost was
least questionable legality and
the establishment of a potentially dangerous precedent
of
military initiatives and internal involvement
Chapter VII
outside
The mandate of the United Nations Force
The basic mandate of the United Nations Three was
laid down in the July 14-s I960, Security Council resolution
authorising establishment of the Torce The principles
under which the Torce was to function in carrying through
its mandate were enunciated in the opening statement of the
Secretary-General to the Security Council on the Congo
question. The initial mandate and operative principles were
clarified and widened in the Security Council resolutions
of February 21, 1961, and November 24-, 1961, and by in
terpretation.
The role which the Force was to play in the Congo
situation at the outset of the mission was set by the
Secretary-General8s interpretation of the July 14- resolu
tion. The terms of that resolution were broad. The para
graph relevant to the role of the Force authorized "the
Secretary-General to take the necessary steps, in consulta
tion with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to


440
If mere establishment of a peace-keeping force does
not guarantee its successful operation, what are the basic
conditions for its success in the field? The powers of the
force must be roughly in balance with its responsibilities
for it to operate effectively. Although this seems an
obvious prior condition, one of the major elements in the
failures of past peace-keeping efforts has been an imbalance
of responsibilities as compared to powers.
The responsibilities of the peace-keeping group are
(with variations cued to the particular circumstances) to
help maintain a condition of non-fighting, while political
solutions are sought.to the basic issues in dispute. The
peace-keeping group may observe, patrol, investigate, and,
rarely, use arms to maintain tenuous stability in an area
of crisis.
Under relatively ideal conditions the non-fighting
force works very well indeed. An ideal situation might be
defined as one in which a) the functions of the force are
clear-cut and well-defined; b) the parties involved co
operate fully with the United Nations, group, view the United
Nations presence as in their national interest, and can
control their population; and c) the United Nations mission
has strong support from members of the world organization.
Such an ideal situation was approximated in Suez. None of
the parties directly involved opposed the United Nations


158
resolution were the United Kingdom, France, Israel, New
Zealand, and Australia. Abstaining were South Africa,
Canada, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Laos.
Almost immediately after passage of the cease-fire
resolution which set forth the United Nations objectives in
the Suez crisis came the first direct proposal for a peace
keeping force. Lester Pearson of Canada suggested a United
Nations force large enough to keep the borders at peace,
while a political settlement was worked out as a means of
remedying, at least in part, the deficiencies of the cease
fire resolution. Pearson explained that Canada had ab
stained on the cease-fire resolution because it provided
neither for the steps to a peace settlement nor for the
ensuring of compliance with the cease-fire and withdrawal
provisions. In Pearson's words:
The armed forces of Israel and of Egypt are to with
draw or, if you like, to return to the armistice lines,
where presumably, if this is done, they will once again
face each other in fear and hatred. What then? What
then, six months from now? Are we to go through all
this again? Are we to return to the status quo? Such
a return would not be to a position of security, or
even a tolerable position, but would be a return to
terror, bloodshed, strife, incidents, charges and
counter-charges, and ultimately another explosion which
the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization would
be powerless to prevent and possibly even to investi
gate. 17
i o
'General Assembly, Official Records, Errst Emergency
Special Session, 582nd plenary meeting (November 1, 1956),
p. 56.


4-30
Cyprus were under way, it was reported that the Secretary-
General's plans envisioned a four-man committee as the
directorate of the Force. The committee would he composed
of the Secretary-General and three representatives from the
21
Security Council. The proposal was lost in the shuffle.
The only direct control placed on the Secretary-General in
connection with his role in bringing the United Nations
Force in Cyprus into being was the requirement that he re
port periodically to the Security Council.
It must not be assumed, however, that the Secretary-
General has been without guidance as to the attitude of the
member states with respect to any of the peace-keeping
forces. The Secretary-General has engaged in intensive
private consultations with the major powers in the United
Nations in connection with all the peace-keeping groups.
Though little stressed publicly, such private discussions
are a significant supplement to Advisory Committee consulta
tions .
Although the various Secretaries-General have demon
strated great skill in organizing and directing peace
keeping operations, the heavy reliance on the Secretary-
General seems a perilous foundation, perilous both for the
position of the Secretary-General and for the stability of
Christian Science Monitor, February 20, 1964-, and
February-?!, 1964-.


126
The functioning; of UNOGIL
Tiie observers began to function very quickly, though
on a limited scale. Within forty-eight hours of passage of
the June 11 resolution setting up the Observation Group, the
first patrols had begun. The history of the Group's
mission is one of a steady growth in intensiveness and ex
tensiveness of operations. Although there vas a continuous
expansion of UNOGIL's activities, the operations of the
organization can be divided into two broad phases, with
mid-July the break point.
Phase I.-The first phase of the Observation Group's
mission centered on two objectives: first, to be seen and
to see as much as possible thereby malting the United Nations
presence definitely felt; and secondly, to lay the ground
work for a more ambitious program than was possible under
the initial conditions. The observers had made notable
progress in both areas by the middle of July.
The methods used for surveillance throughout this
period were the regular and frequent patrols of all acces
sible roads from dawn to dusk by United Nations observers
in jeeps. Late in June the jeep patrols were supplemented
by aerial reconnaissance, first by helicopter and then by
both helicopter and airplane. The operation might be des
cribed as of the probing type; patrols fanned out toward
the border from the headquarters initially and later from


167
The need to base the establishment of the Force on
the consent of the participating states was established
formally at the outset of the consideration on the Force.
The Canadian draft resolution calling on the Secretary-
General to submit a plan for an emergency international
force stipulated that "the consent of the nations concerned"
should be obtained. Debate clarifying the meaning of this
phrase revealed that the sponsor had intended that "the
nations concerned" refer to the nations contributing to the
-51
Force. In short, the Assembly was not imposing an obliga
tion on any state to contribute to the Force against its
will.
The legal basis for the participation of the member
states rested on the letters of the participating states
offering to contribute' to the Force and the Secretary-
52
Generals response to those letters. These agreements
shed light on certain other questions of importance relating
to the extent of consent required of the participating
states. First, these agreements suggest that a state can
mahe its decisi'on to contribute to the Force conditional.
Several states in stating their willingness to participate
in the Force imposed conditions on that participation.
^Ibid. pp. 70-71.
' 52U.N. Doc. A/3502/Add. 1 to Add. 30; U.D. Doc.
A/3502, Annexes 1 to 6; and U.N. Doc. A/39^3, Annex 1.


77
Yet, the very explosiveness of the Palestine question
also limited the Mediator's freedom in strengthening the
Truce Supervision Organization. The Security Council and
the participating delegations checked his more controversial
or ambitious plans. Thus, when the Mediator suggested the
permanent members of the Security Council as seconding
states for UNTSO, the suggestion was gently vetoed in favor
of more limited participation by the members of the Truce
Commission: when the Mediator tried to include a small
armed force in the operation, the powers above balked.
This was more ambitiousperhaps more riskybhan they
wanted. In addition, support for the mission tended to be
bland and passive. Members of the United Nations were
cautious about over-involvement in the volatile Palestine
situation. Nonetheless, at critical junctures in the life
of the Truce Supervision Organization, the Security Council
tendered the support necessary to keep the mission alive.
Related to the question of the capabilities of the
Truce Organization is that of its actual success or failure
in fulfilling its mission. The evidence is mixed and the
answer depends at least in part on how one interprets the
role of the observers. Were they merely to observe and re
port on the trucewere they to prevent major truce viola
tionswere they to guarantee that the truce was maintained
inviolate?


362
The prestige and position of the Force were hurt
not only by the military defeat per se but also by the
cease-fire agreement. The agreement was bitterly opposed
in principle by the Afro-Asians and by the Congolese
Government. The Afro-Asians viewed it as surrender to
Tshombe, while the Congolese authorities considered it
tantamount to recognition of the legitimacy of the Katanga
regime. In addition, the terms of the agreement were con
sidered to favor Katanga. The United Nations was accused
of making the agreement primarily to obtain the release of
the 190 ONUC prisoners captured during the September
, 64-
engagement
Not only did the position of ONUC seem to be slip
ping back toward what it had been in early 1961, but all
the old problems were cropping up again.
Within Katanga the problem of mercenaries continued
serious. Tshombe refused to take action to eliminate
foreign military personnel, arguing that Katanga had paid
them all off on August 28 and that they were no longer a
responsibility of Katanga. The United Nations pointed out
that not only were they still present, but that a new
difficulty had arisen:
Burns and Heathcote, op. cit., p. 117.


coming years. For want of any more formal title we will
simply call these three possibilities the limited approach,
the ambitious approach, and the flexible approach.
The limited approach to future use of the non-fighting
force technique is one which would emphasize caution: caution
in further development of the technique and caution in its
use in new crises. Little effort would be made to institu
tionalise the non-fighting force. Forces would be created
ad hoc for specific problems. Situations which promised to
be controversial or highly challenging would be avoided.
Use of the group would be confined to relatively ideal
situations such as that found in Suez. Since the responsi
bilities of the group would be limited in an ideal situation,
its powers would not have to be great. There are, however,
difficulties with this approach. First, it may simply be
an impossible course to pursue. It is difficult to guarantee
in advance that a situation will be ideal for a group. Few
situations are ideal. Even those which seem ideal at the
outset of a crisis often grow more difficult with the passage
of time. Second, the sterility implicit in this approach
raises questions as to its desirability. The peace-keeping
group would seemingly be condemned to handling innocuous
situations, while the most important to stabilize the
serious and the difficult would be out of bounds.


1-14
The difficulties of feeding and equipping the force
in its early stages have apparently been reduced from those
encountered with the Suez and Congo forces. (That the prob
lems have not been eliminated, however, is suggested by
complaints over the low stock of rations made in connection
16
with the Yemen mission. ) Perhaps the most important
factor in the improvement has been the increased emphasis
on making arrangements for the support of the troops prior
to their entry into the troubled area in the early
missions attention was concentrated on getting the men
quickly in the field, support and supply notwithstanding.
In addition, the acquisition by the United Nations of a
small supply of equipment for the use and stock of peace
keeping forces-in-being has eased the early weeks of new
missions. For example, in Lebanon the initial equipment
needed was borrowed from UNEF stores. The effort now under
way to standardize the equipment in use and bring it more
and more under United Nations, rather than contingent
ownership, should further contribute to the rapid establish
ment of an effective force.
lb
In the Secretary-General's report of September 4,
1963, on the functioning of the United Nations Yemen Obser
vation Mission the Secretary-General answered "irresponsible
and reckless accounts of conditions relating to the Mission.
He indicated that there was not and never had been "any
serious shortage of rations, though ration stocks reached a
low level at one point due to a temporary uncertainty as to
the best means of transportation." U.N. Doc. S/5412.


28
Security Council was markedly unresponsive to these calls
12
for men.
The Commission may have further stimulated the
establishment of a military organization to supervise the
truce by its own ineffectiveness. Lacking assistance and
confined closely to quarters by the fighting in Jerusalem,
the Commission found it difficult to fulfill the functions
assigned to it. Complaints about -the lack of information
coming from the Truce Commission were frequent and voci
ferous in the Security Council.
This then was the situation in the spring of 194-8:
the mandate was drawing to an end, tensions were heighten
ing, and fighting increasing. The partition plan, which
the United Nations had devised as the answer to the
Palestine question, seemed to have little chance of imple
mentation. The United Nations, aware of the critical nature
of the situation, was unable to settle on an alternative
solution.
12
Some delegates raised practical objections to send
ing officers into Palestine: the Canadian representative
felt New York was too distant from Palestine to serve as a
source of control officers; the Argentinian, that Palestine
was too dangerous. The Soviet delegate contended that
since no functions of a purely police nature were initially
assigned to the Truce Commission, the Council could not
decide that the Commission, created for another purpose,
should now undertake control, and police functions. Security
Council, Official Records, 3rd Year, 291st meeting (May 12,
194-8), pp. 9, 13, 16, and 1?.


155
The Establishment of UNEF
The establishment
The United Nations Emergency Force was created by the
General Assembly acting in its First Emergency Special
Session. The Special Session was convened under the "Uniting
14
for Peace" resolution after the Security Council failed to
act on either a United States or a Soviet cease-fire resolu
tion because of the negative votes of France and the United
Kingdom. The session met from November 1 to November 10.
Meetings were long, running to the early morning hours on
several occasions; and behind-the-scenes consultations were
intensive.
Credit for initiating UNEF is generally accorded to
15
Lester Pearson, Foreign Minister of Canada. x Pearson was
the driving force behind the idea of using a military force
The relevant parts of the "Uniting for Peace" reso
lution provide: that emergency special sessions of the
General Assembly be called on 24-hour notice on the vote of
seven members of the Security Council or a majority of the
General Assembly if the Security Council because of a lack
of unanimity among its permanent members fails to act in any
case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, a
breach of the peace, or an act of aggression. It might be
noted that some question was raised as to the legality of
the move since it was argued that the action on which the
Security Council failed to act did not fall under Chapter
VII of the Charter.
1^The credit for first proposing an international
force has been claimed by Sir Anthony Eden, Prime Minister
of Britain at the time. Eden did make reference to the
association of a United Nations force with the Anglo-French


Prance, Portugal, South Africa, and a few others. They
held that the expenses of peace-keeping operations must he
financed in accordance with special rules under Article A3,
Chapter VII, of the Charter. The Soviet reasoning is sug
gested in an early statement prepared for the Working Group
of fifteen. In the statement the Soviet Union cited
Articles 11 and 24- to prove that all questions relating to
the adoption of measures for the maintenance of inter
national peace and security fall exclusively within the
competence of the Security Council. Prom this contention
the Soviet Union reasoned as follows:
The procedure for carrying out action for the
maintenance of international peace and security and
the material support of such action, including
financing, are governed by Articles 43 and 48 of the
United Nations Charter, from which it follows that
the Security Council determines which of the Members
of the United Nations is to take action to carry out
its decisions and that the conditions for the pro
vision by a State of armed forces and other assistance
are to be defined in appropriate agreements concluded
between Members of the United Nations and the Security
Council. Only the Security Council, through the con
clusion of the above-mentioned agreements with States
Members of the United Nations, may decide the question
of the payment of expenses involved in operations for
the maintenance of international peace and security.
Consequently, the consideration of and the adoption
of decisions on appropriations for such operations
fall v/ithin the exclusive competence of the Security
Council. The General Assembly may not take decisions
regarding the procedure for payment of the afore
mentioned expenses.
Expenses connected with operations for the mainte
nance of international peace and security, that is, in
curred under Article 43 of the United Nations Charter,


445
matches, in terms of depth of commitment and breadth of
powers committed, the scale and difficulty of the mission
undertaken.
As a peace-keeping group assumes heavier responsi
bilities, the group may need not only greater moral backing,
but also a stronger material base, better trained and
organized men, and possibly a wider mandate. For example,
the force which is thrust into a highly volatile situation
in which all the elements are not easily controlled may
well need to be empowered to shoot if necessary to quell
riotous action. Such a broadening of mandate and expansion
of powers was found necessary in the Congo.
Our review of the conditions which determine the
success of a peace-keeping group in the field has emphasized
the importance of ensuring that the powers of the force are
adequate to its assignment. The difficulty of the assign
ment is primarily a product of the situation into which a
peace-keeping group is thrust. The power and capability of
a group are a product of both political factors support
from the member- states for the group and its mission and
such practical factors as mandate, equipment, and training.
As the Congo experience forcefully demonstrated, it is not
always possible to foresee accurately the full dimensions
of a peace-keeping group's task at the outset of a mission.
The greater the responsibilities assigned the group, the


these circumstances the Force followed a policy of limited
action It confined its role to one of trying to maintain
as much order as possible in the Congo without resorting to
forceful means to attain its object and to protecting those
individuals and groups who might seek United Nations
4- 4-1
assistance.
The Force tried to discourage aggressive acts by the
Congolese troops by showing its colors. There was increased
patrolling, marches to show the United Nations flag and
emphasize the United Nations presence, and some, not very
successful, joint patrols with the Congolese. Where civil
war was occurring the United Nations troops attempted to
stop itwithout disarming the parties or using arms them
selves. Sather they acted as a liaison to try to reduce
tensions between the disputing parties.
Useful as these activities may have been, the efforts
of the Force, with its limited means and restricted mandate,
were pitifully small in the context of the violent, steadily
worsening conditions in the Congo.
Events at the United Nations Headquarters in New York
and in the Congo seemed to be building to a climax at the
end of I960 The low point in the life of the United
Nations Force came in January, 1961, when the Force seemed
'Perhaps as telling a comment as any on the whole
confused Congo situation was that in October every govern
ment leader, actual and proclaimed, was under United Nations
'protection. This included the Chief of the Armed Forces.


275
mandate of the force already in effect. In general, the
United States and the Western European states adhered to
this line.
The United States was apparently somewhat troubled
by the implications of the resolution and strove to mini
mize their significance. The official attitude was that
before force was resorted to, every effort should be made
to accomplish the purposes of the paragraph by negotiation,
conciliation, and other peaceful means. In addition, it
was held that the "appropriate measures" to prevent civil
war referred to were limited both by earlier Security
Council resolutions (particularly those establishing the
principle of consultation with the Government of the Congo
and impartiality and non-interference in the internal
affairs of the Congo) and by those provisions of the Charter
restricting the use of force and prohibiting the Organization
4.5
from intervening in the internal affairs of a state. The
United States position pointed up a potential conflict be
tween the non-interference provisions of the August, I960,
resolution and the use-of-force provision.
The United States reservations with respect to the
resolution were shared by the United Kingdom, among others.
The British representative in the Security Council stressed
ZjTt
^Security Council, Official Records, 16th Year,
941st meeting (February 20, 1961), p. 17.


309
(2) Tlie expenses should be met under special agree
ments concluded in accordance with Article 43 of the Charter
between the Security Council and the countries providing
15
troops. ^
(3) The expenses should be borne in larger part by
those states with a special responsibility either for peace
and security (i.e. the permanent members of the Security
Council) or for the situation itself (i.e. the former
Administering Power). The under-developed states favored
shifting responsibility for 01TUC to the permanent Security
Council members and Belgium, while the Communist states
argued that Belgium ought to bear the bulk of the costs.
(4) The expenses should be financed entirely out of
voluntary contributions.
The resolutions passed by the General Assembly on
the financing of OUUC reflect this variety of opinion on ^
how the operation should be paid for. The basic pattern
for financing was set in December, I960, when it was de
cided that assessments would be apportioned on the basis of
the regular budget.
15
^The International Court of Justice rejected this
position, reasoning that the Security Council had duly
authorized the Secretary-General to implement the resolu
tions, that the Security Council can act through instruments
of its own choice, and that there was no necessity for the
Security Council itself to determine the arrangements to
carry out its decision. International Court of Justice,
Certain Expenses of the United Nations, pp. 176-77.


187
Exclusion of certain states from participation in
the Force provided no answer as to who should serve. The
actual determination of the composition and the size of the
Force was made on the basis of several considerations: a)
the needs of the Force on the basis of its functions and
responsibilities; b) the desirability of balance in the
Force in terms of geographic distribution and military
organization; c) the comparative utility of the troops
offered in the light of needs; and d) the relative availa
bility and economy of transport for troops offered together
56
with their essential equipment.
After all the relevant factors were taken into
account, a comparatively small number of states of limited
military power remained as potential contributors. Ten
nationsBrazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, India,
Indonesia, Norway, Sweden, and Yugoslaviawere tapped to
supply the troops for the United Nations Emergency Force.
Thus, the Force encompassed contingents representative of
the major geographic areas and non-aligned blocs then in
the Assembly.
There has been a remarkable stability in the size
57
and source of troop contributions to UNSF over the years.
56U.N. Doc. A/3694-, p. 2.
cn
-"The table in Appendix B shows how UNSF looked
initially and over the years in terms of composition.


311
did not work very well in practice because of the failure
of a large number of states to meet their assessments.
A rather unique method, the United Nations bond
program, was introduced to finance both UNEF and ONUC from
mid-1962 to mid-1963. Under this approach the Secretary-
General was authorized to sell $200 million in United
Nations bonds to cover the costs of the peace-keeping
missions. The bond program also ran into difficulties.
The member states proved reluctant to purchase the full
$200 million worth of bonds. More than a year after the
program had been initiated less than three-fourths of the
bond issue had been subscribed.
In mid-1963 the United Nations turned to the assess
ment plus voluntary contributions method of financing. The
life of the Force was extended from January to June, 1964,
only after pledges of voluntary contributions had been re-
17
ceived to cover a portion of the costs of ONUC.
Where, in fact, did much of the burden for paying
for ONUG rest during its lifetime? Certainly not with the
former administering power Belgium nor with permanent
'The cost of maintaining a Force of 5 350 men in the
Congo for six months was estimated at $18,200,000. The
first $3 million was to be assessed on the base of the regu
lar assessments. For the remaining sum the 85 under
developed nations would be assessed at 55 per cent of the
regular rate. The United States, Britain, Canada, and other
Western powers agreed to make special donations of $1.3
million. The Congo itself pledged to pay $5,200,000. The
New York Times, October 1, 1963 and October 12, 1963.


166
resolution, in both sections A and C, envisaged use of
armed force against an aggressor. Although UNEF was not
established for that purpose, its validity might be assumed
on the premise that the "right to establish such a smaller
force was implicit in the right to establish a more
29
ambitious force."
A key to UNEP's operation, legally and practically,
was consent. As a non-enforcing type of force created by
the Assembly, consent was necessary to its operations.
Consent of two sorts was basic: consent by the states
sending contingents and consent by the host state, Egypt,
to the presence of the Force on its territory. From a
practical standpoint at least the tacit consent of Israel,
the United Kingdom, and France was necessary as well. (The
need legally for their consent to the Force was vehemently
denied by a number of delegates who contended that one
could hardly hold that an aggressor's consent was necessary
to action to end that aggression.If these states had
not cooperated with UNEF, a far larger force with a broader
mandate would have been necessary.
-Tiouis Sohn, "The Authority of the United Nations to
Establish and Maintain a Permanent United Nations Force,"
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 52, No. 2 (April,
1^58), p. 235.
50
v See, for example, the comment of the representative
of El Salvador, General Assembly, Official Records, First
Emergency Special Session, 56prd plenary meeting (November
5, 1956), pp. 70-71.


140
crisis in Lebanon was virtually over, related to the General
Assembly resolution in August which requested the Secretary-
General "to make forthwith, in consultation with the
Governments concerned and in accordance with the Charter
and having in mind section A of this resolution, such
practical arrangements as would adequately help in upholding
the purposes and principles of the Charter in relation to
Lebanon and Jordan in the present circumstances and thereby
facilitate the early withdrawal of foreign troops."55
In short, a de facto shift in the reason for the
observers' presence seems to have occurred. They were there
not to stop infiltration, but to provide the international
presence which would enable American troops to withdraw
from the area without loss of prestige. The early reports
of the observers indicating no evidence of massive infiltra
tion had been subject to question on the grounds that the
observers were inadequate in number to really survey the
scene. Thus, an effective, strong organization which could
issue reports which would not be challenged was necessary
before withdrawal of United States troops could be justi
fied.54
55General Assembly resolution 1237 (ES-III). Yearbook
of the United Nations 1958, p. 50.
- -
v Qubain interprets somex^hat differently the increase
in men and materials in August and September. He suggests
that the "real life began to be pumped into [the Observation


8
early in the history of the United Nations, The larger
observer groups, such as the one used in Palestine, would
fall in the middle. At the far end of the range would be
the small armies established by the United Nations to keep
the peace. Some characteristics common to all these groups
can be observed. In each case the situation which brought
in the United Nations was one in which fighting had occurred
and was liable to break out again; in which emotions over
the issues were high and agreement not readily reached.
Most involved nations which had gained their independence
since the Second World War. The purpose of the observers
was to quiet the situation not through forceful meansfor
they were few in number and unarmedbut through the moral
and psychological effect conveyed by their presence. The
purpose and means of the peace-keeping force were similar
to those of the observers though a limited use of arms was
possible to them.
The small observer groups might be considered as the
prototype of the military presence. The small observer
group technique has been used by the United Nations in three
situations: in Greece from 19^8 to 195'+; in Indonesia from
19d7 to 1951; and in Kashmir from 19^9 to the present. In
Greece observation was carried out along a 500 mile border
by between 50 and dO military observers operating in teams


375
Yet in halting the military initiative the United
Nations Command apparently had reservations. Although they
did not want to seem aggressive, they did want to achieve
their objectives. Accordingly, it was decided that the
December 30 cable requiring clearance was too restrictive
and would unduly handicap the Force. On December 51 a
second cable was sent which advised the military to exploit
the road-block success, to extend the Elizabethville
perimeter, and to keep the gendarmerie on the run. United
Nations Headquarters Judged that the potential conflict of
the second cable with the first and with statements by the
Secretary-General about halting the fighting would not
develop because of the automatic limits to the Forces
advance imposed by the fact that reinforcements in troops,
77
air support, material, and bridging had not arrived.
The calculations of those composing the cables went
awry, however, when the automatic limits failed to function.
As an ONUC company moved out on December 31 in a probing and
patrol action, it encountered little opposition. It pressed
forward, crossing the Lufira river and establishing a bridge
head on the opposite bank. After crossing the river, the
unit received a cable calling for a halt in advance before
the river was crossed. This confronted the field commander
with a dilemma. It would be risky militarily and potentially
Ti
Ibid., p. 57


2
halt that; violence through the mere fact of its presence.
It represents in tangible form the concern of the world
community that fighting be prevented. It serves as a human
truce line, powerful not in and of itself, hut powerful
because of what it represents.
The non-fighting force is one of the most significant
innovations in the realm of pacific settlement made by the
United Nations. It is both a reflection, of the challenges
which have confronted that body and a commentary on United
Nations efforts to meet those challenges. The world with
which the United Nations has had to cope has been a complex
and difficult one. Problems are many and hardly made more
simple by the setting within which they occur: one of a
world complicated by its division into conflicting power
blocs; by the recent rise of a number of turbulent, dis
contented, newly-independent states; and by the awesome
destructive power of nuclear weapons. In this difficult and
uneasy world outbreaks of violence have been frequent,
particularly in the areas just emerging from colonial status.
The solutions to the problems causing the violence are not
easy to find. In most cases the issues have not been black
or whiteneither the identity of one "aggressor," who
might be dealt with handily by sanctions, nor just and
acceptable solutions have always been clearly evident. Yet
for the United Nations to do nothing in a crisis merely


217
UNEF undertook to secure and supervise the cessation of
hostilities. In the period following the withdrawal of
invading troops, the Force has been charged with the task
Q4-
of maintaining peace in the Middle East.
UNEP's responsibilities during the first phase of
operation were set forth primarily in two resolutions:
resolution 1000 (ES-I) of November 5, 1956, and resolution
997 (ES-I) of November 2, 1956. Under the terms of the
former resolution the Force was "to secure and supervise
the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the
terms" of resolution 997. All the terms of resolution 997
would seem to include not only overseeing the cease-fire
and withdrawal of all forces behind the Armistice lines
but also ensuring that there was a scrupulous observance
of the provisions of the armistice agreement and a halt to
raids across the armistice lines. Nonetheless, the phrase
"all the terms" left room for interpretation as to the pre
cise mandate given the Force and was to become a source of
controversy.
The responsibilities of the Force in the period
following the departure of the Allied and Israeli forces
were defined by resolution 1125 (XI) providing for the
"placing of the United Nations Emergency Force on the
Sgyptian-Israel armistice demarcation line and the imple-
^Ibid. p. 10.


<4-03
action as well as wide privileges within the host state. It
should be remarked, however, that negotiation of these
principles has not always guaranteed their implementation in
practice. In particular, the provision ensuring the United
Nations troops freedom of movement has caused difficulty on
occasion: not. all parties have always been willing to sup
port the active role for the force implied by full freedom
of movement.
The principle of consent is firmly installed with
respect to the non-fighting force. It applies not only to
the entry of the force into national territory and its
status therein, but also to the composition, leadership, and
functions of the force itself. While a minimum foundation
of consent is essential to the force's existence, it can be
argued that the principle of consent has been pushed to the
point of undercutting the force's effectiveness. Details of
organization and operation can be subject to too much
negotiation. Perhaps this is one of the inevitable costs of
the multi-national force.
A third great, principle which has guided the non-
fighting unit is that of political neutrality. The function
of the United Nations presence is to create an atmosphere of
calm in which basic political solutions to the questions at
issue can be sought. To fail to remain politically neutral
xfould weaken the military unit's ability to maintain peace
without resort to force.


426
yes, but one must probe more deeply. Would tbe sovereign
states be willing to give tbe United Nations an independent
or semi-independent existence by giving it an independent
income? Would tbey be willing to release tbe controls beld
on tbe world organization's activities tbrougb tbeir
financial support or non-support of those activities? It
seems unlikely that tbe members of tbe United Nations would
give tbe organization this much discretion. More probably
tbey would wish either to keep tbeir fingers on tbe purse
strings or to confine tbe independently-financed activities
to innocuous and non-controversial welfare-type measures.
Tbe exercise of effective political control over a
force poses a second unresolved problem. Tbe Security
Council and tbe General Assembly have been either unable or
unwilling to lay down more than tbe broadest guidelines for
tbe activities of tbe peace-keeping group. In every case
great discretion has been given to tbe Secretary-General (or
in tbe case of the early observation groups to tbe Mediator
or tbe Conciliation Committee) in both tbe establishment and
supervision of tbe force. Again this seems to stem from a
lack of political consensus among tbe members. Tbe lowest
common denominator of agreement is tbe establishment of a
force. Beyond that there is division.
Tbe consequence of tbe Council's and Assembly's abdi
cation of responsibility for managing tbeir peace-keeping


149
There were two dimensions to the Suez crisis:
Egyptian-Israeli relations constitute one dimension;
Egyptian-Anglo-Erench relations comprise the other. The
United Nations had prior involvement with each dimension of
the problem and a special responsibility therefore to re
solve a crisis which it had been unable to prevent. Yet
the crisis was not easy to resolve. It arose out of a
complicated situation; there were rights and wrongs on both
sides. What was the nature of the problem and the United
Nations ties to it?
The Israeli-Arab problem had long been on the agenda
of one United Nations organ or another. The Israeli attack
represented the culmination of a bitterness in Arab-Israeli
relations which had existed since the creation of Israel.
Although Israel took the initiative in the Suez situation,
the attack could hardly be deemed unprovoked.
It will be recalled from the earlier examination of
the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization that the
Arab-Israeli war had ended in 1949 with the signing of
armistice agreements between Israel and each of the major
Arab belligerents in that war, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and
Syria. Despite the establishment of considerable machinery
to police the armistice, the armistice was never designed


370
was making every possible effort to solve the outstanding
issues by peaceful reconciliation.
By the late fall of 1962 United Nations authorities,
strongly backed if not prodded by the United States dele
gation, decided it was imperative that a solution be found
to the problem of Katanga's secession specifically and of
the Congo generally. It was assumed that once the problem
of Katanga was dealt with, it would be possible to cope
effectively with the political, economic, and financial
problems of the Congo as a whole.
A variety of elements contributed to the growth of
feeling that a solution must be found. First, the longer
that Katanga was able to defy successfully the Central
Government, the more likely its independence was to become
permanent. Yet, the corollary of an independent Katanga
seemed to be a weak, unstable, financially insecure Congo.
Failure to bring Katanga into the Congo would doom the
United Nations operation in the Congo to failure. Moreover,
Prime Minister Adoula's failure to deliver on his initial
promise to end Katanga's secession was causing disaffection
with that moderate government and raising the spectre of a
72
shift to more extreme elements.
Second, the ability of the United Nations to resolve
the crisis in Katanga seemed on the verge of decline. The
^This possibility was particularly disturbing to the
United States which had visions of a Communist-oriented or


115
the time each of the reports of UNOGIL were issued, com
mencing with the Second Interim Report, which marks
attainment of the size initially desired.
In addition to the observers there was a civilian
staff of 126 connected with the mission: 34 general service
staff; 17 professional staff; and 75 field service staff.^
While the usual practice of having the seconding governments
pay the salaries of the observers was followed, it was
necessary to provide not only travel and subsistence but
salaries as well for the civilian staff.
Honey: the financial base of UNOGIL.-The United
Nations Observation Group in Lebanon was a relatively expen
sive venture for the United Nations. The expenditures for
1958 for UNOGIL were slightly greater than those for the
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization for 1948. The
Observation Group in Lebanon cost $3*665,831; UNTSO had cost
$3*581,600. (It might be noted that UNTSO was a lengthier
and somewhat more ambitious operation than UNOGIL.) By 1958
the United Nations was more accustomed, and perhaps more
stoical, toward large expenditures than it had been earlier.
While questions regarding the financing of UNTSO were raised
both at the time the resolution authorizing the Organization
was passed and at the time the supplementary estimates were
approved, the arrangements for the financing of UNOGIL were
5
U.N. Doc. A/G.5/763 (November 14, 1958)


tlie manifestations of tlie deeper troubles in the Congo
troubles which were to provide the context of United Nations
action.
Most basic of the difficulties within the Congo was
a complete lack of preparedness for independence. The
Congolese had virtually no elite trained to take over rule
of the country. They had practically no experience in self-
government. Experience at the national level in governing
the country or at the higher levels of administration was
., 6
nil.
If the Congo was ill-prepared for self-government,
it was little better prepared for nationhood. There was
little feeling of unity, little sense of a Congolese
nationality. Tribal rivalries divided the country, fre
quently erupting in violence. The political parties which
had sprung up so quickly in the late 1950's (estimates of
It was not until 1957 that the Congolese had been
allowed any participation in governing the country. At
that time they were given a role in the governing of the
cities of Leopoldville, Jadotville, and Elizabethville.
Reforms providing for greater Congolese participation in
governing were prepared, but before they could go into
effect the wave of history had made them obsolete. In the
late 1950's political parties began to spring up demanding
full independence. In February, I960, at a Round Table
conference of Belgian and Congolese leaders independence
was suddenly granted. See Richard Miller, Dag Hammarsk,jold
and Crisis Diplomacy (New York: Oceana Publications, Inc.,
1961), pp. 266-267. See also Staff Memorandum on the Re
public of the Congo, Printed for the use of the Committee
on Foreign Affairs, 86th Congress, 2nd Sess., August 24,
I960, pp. 2-3.


69
observers assigned to each Arab and Israeli Army Group.
There was also one group of observers for the coast, one for
the control of convoys between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, and
59
one for the airfields. Deployment of the observers was
flexible throughout, however, and they were moved to the
spots most needed.
The shift in deployment practice in the Second Truce
was for the purpose of making it possible to observe both
armies in combat, the better to detect violations of the
truce and to investigate complaints. Although in theory
the truce area included not only Palestine but the seven
Arab states involved in the conflict, in practice most of
the observers were located in the Palestine area in view of
the concentration of hostilities there and the limited number
of observers. Obviously more observers could have done a
more thorough job of surveillance.
The organization of the observers may not have been
the most efficient when evaluated on the basis of concentra
tion of responsibility. It seemed, however, to fit a
situation in which national sensibilities had to be taken
y'Illustrative of how the deployment in the Second
Truce worked out in practice is the deployment of the 500
officer observers at the end of August, 194-8. The dispersal
on August 23 was as follows: 66 in Jerusalem; 24- with Tel
Aviv convoys; 35 supervising airports in Middle Eastern
countries; 22 supervising coasts and seaports; 113 assigned
to ground control; and 4-0 stationed at headquarters. The
hew York Times, August 23, 194-8.


337
posed a far more difficult problem for the United Nations
a problem not to be solved until the beginning of 1963.
As challenging as bringing Belgian withdrawal and
considerably more difficult was the Forces responsibility
to restore law and order to the chaotic Congo. An obvious
place to begin was with the disorderly and turbulent troops
of the Congolese National Army (ANC). Since ONUC could not
use force except in the direct emergencies in self-defense,
the main hope of controlling the Congolese troops seemed to
rest in disarming and retraining them. Yet, a limited
program of disarmament undertaken at the outset of the
mission was soon halted upon the complaint of Congolese
AO
authorities. United Nations officials rejected both the
use of force and the disarmament of Congolese troops in the
face of the disapproval of the Government as completely
incompatible with the nature of the United Nations mission.
The United Nations Force was a peace force, not a fighting
force. Unanswered was the question of a peace force's
ability to cope with the situation in the Congo. If the
ONUC had been allowed to disarm and retrain the Congolese
troops at the outset of the mission, the gap between the
Force's responsibility to ensure order and its ability to
accomplish this end might have been eased.
475
Although the ONUC had no warrant to disarm the
Congolese troops forcibly, on a number of occasions the
troops gave up their arms voluntarily on the arrival of
United Nations contingents. Thus, in Luluabourg 3?000


177
steady maintenance of the inert but receptive posture
of a sandbag, even if a sandbag has a surrounding
halo.^
let even an inert sandbag, particularly an inert sandbag
with a halo, can be most useful in an explosive situation.
And given the basic characteristics of sandbagsand of
para-military United Nations forcesit is perhaps wisest
to keep responsibilities commensurate with power.
Characteristics of UNEF
Let us turn now to an examination of the character
istics of the United Nations Emergency Force. These
characteristics were not spelled out at the time the con
cept of the Force was approved by the General Assembly with
virtual unanimity. The central characteristics emerged
over timea product of past experience, the ideas of the
molders of the Force, and of the situation itself.
The task of translating a general directive for a
force into a force-in-being, able to meet its responsibili
ties effectively, was monumental. Because UNEF represented
an innovation in the United Nations arsenal of peace instru
ments, there were few precedents to guide the planners and
administrators. Experience with the United Nations Truce
Supervision Organization in Palestine was helpful, but not
entirely applicable. The path-breaking was made more
LL
Stone, ojd. cit., p. 11.


as Mediator. Count Bernadotte served as Mediator until his
assassination by Jewish terrorists in September, 1948. At
that time the Secretary-General appointed Bernadotte's
22
principal assistant, Dr. Ralph. Bunche, as Acting Mediator.
The Mediator was vested with both great powers and
great responsibilities in the creation of a truce super
vision organization. With few precedents to follow and
little guidance from the Security Council or the Assembly,
the Mediator made the crucial decisions which gave shape and
form to the Truce Organization and, incidentally, set a
pattern for the future. According to the United States
representative on the Security Council, the Truce Organiza
tion was not the product of the Council or the Assembly but
of the Mediator who had built it from the staff of the Truce
25
Commission, and the staff assembled by the Secretary-General.
However, it would be misleading to suggest that the
Mediator was unfettered in his determinations regarding the
shape and character of the Truce Organization. In fact, the
Truce Supervision Organization seems to have evolved from a
mix of the Mediator's decisions, the situation itself, and
cIt might be noted, that although the resolution calls
for selection of the Mediator by the permanent members of
the Security Council, Bunche served as Acting Mediator for
nearly a year on the basis of the appointment by the Secre
tary-General. The appointment was ratified by the Security
Council.
^Security Council, Official Records, 4th Tear, 437th
meeting (August 11, 1949), p. 7.


10
commissions established by the General Assembly or the Se
curity Council to work out a solution to the problems at
9
issue. In at least two instances the initiative in the
use of the military observers came from the field organiza
tion. The number of observers used in these situations was
small, and the scope of the mission was correspondingly
limited. Their primary function was to patrol and to ob
serve, The value of the observer groups has been attested
to repeatedly, however, both by statement and by the practice
of using them for long periods of time.^
A second level of United Nations peace-keeping
activity can be detected in the ambitious observer group,
as represented by the United Nations Truce Supervision
Organization in Palestine, the United Nations Observation
Group .in Lebanon, and, to a lesser extent, the United Nations
;In Greece the observers operated under the United
Nations Special Committee on the Balkans until the end of
1951 and under the Balkan Sub-Commission of the Peace
Observation Commission from 1992 to 199^; in Kashmir under
the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan; and
in Indonesia under the Consular Commission and the Good
Offices Committee.
*<)For example the Third Interim Report of the India-
Pakistan Commission had this to say about the observers:
"Although a number of minor incidents took place during the
first six and one-half months before the cease-fire line
was finally demarcated, observer teams, composed of officers
from Belgium, Canada, Mexico, Norway, and the United States
headed by Commission's military adviser, in close cooperation
with military authorities on both sides, greatly contributed
to preventing the development of any of those into major
breaches of the cease-fire." U.N, Doc. S/4-30, Rev. 1, p.
51.


4-57
TABLE A-2 Continued
UNTSO
UNEF
CJNUC
Member States
Vote Authorizing
Mediator
Vote
tthorizing
Plan
for Force0
Vote
Approving
Force
Vote on
Financing
Force
(1957)
Vote
Approving
0NUCf
Vote on
Financing
19608
Vote on
Financing
1961h
Vote
to Accept
I. C. J.
Opinion*-
Pakistan
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Panama
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Paraguay
-
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
-
Yes
Yes
Peru
Abs.
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Philippines
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Abs.
Abs.
Yes
Poland
Ho
Abs.
Abs.
No
Abs.
No
No
No
Portugal
Abs.
Yea
YeB
Yes
No
Abs.
No
Romania
-
Abs.
Abs.
No
Abs.
No
No
No
Rwanda
-
-
-
-
-
.
-
Yes
Saudi Arabia
Abs.
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
_
No
Senegal
-
-
-
-
-
Yes
-
Yes
.Sierra Leone
-
-
-
-
-
-
Yes
Yes
Somalia
-
-
-
-
-
Yes
-
Yes
South Africa
Yea
Abs.
Abs.
Abs.
Abs.
Abs.
Abs.
No
Spain
-
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Abs.
Yes
Abs.
Sudan
-
-
-
Yes
Yes
Yes
Abs.
AbB.
Sweden
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yea
Yes
Yes
Yes
Syria
Abs.
Yes
Yes
Yes
-
-
-
No
Tanganyika
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Yes
Thailand (Siam)
Abs.
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Togo
-
-
-
-
-
Abs.
Yes
Yes
Trinidad and Tobago
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Yes
Tunisia
-
-
-
-
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Turkey
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist
Yes
Yes
Yes
Abs.
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Republic
Union of Soviet Socialist
No
Aba.
Abs.
No
Abs.
No
No
No
Republics
No
Abs.
Abs.
No
Abs.
No
No
No
United Arab Republic-5
Abs.
Abs.
Abs.
Abs.
Yes
No
Abs.
Abs.
United Kingdom
Yes
Abs.
Yes
Abs.
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
United States
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Upper Volta
-
-
-
-
-
-
Abe.
-
Uruguay
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Venezuela
Abs.
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Abs.
Yes
Yes
Yemen
Abs.
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Abs.
-
Yugoslavia
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Abs.
Yes
Abs.
In Favor
31
57
64
57
70
45 *
57
76
Against
7
0
0
8
0
15
11
17
Abstained
16
19
12
9
11
25
12
8
aA dash (-) indicates that
a state was not a menber
of the United
Nations at the time
the vote was
taken or was not
present for the
vote.
^General Assembly resolution 186 (S-II) adopted on May 15, 1948.
cGeneral Assembly resolution 998 (ES-I) adopted on November 4, 1956, at the 563rd plenary meeting.
dGeneral Assembly resolution 1001 (ES-I) adopted on November 7, 1956, at the 567th plenary meeting.
eU. N. Doc A/3560 (February 25, 1957).
^General Assembly resolution 1474 (ES-IV) adopted on September 20, 1960, at the 863rd plenary meeting.
8U. N. Doc. A/4676 (December 19, 1960).
hU. N. Doc. A/5066 (December 19, 1961). '
iGeneral Assembly resolution 1854 (XVII), Part A, adopted on December 19, 1962, at the 1199th plenary meeting.
Votes recorded for Egypt prior to 1958 are included in United Arab Republic tabulation.


24
it to take the steps preparatory to partition. The force
which the Commission recommended was not an army under
Chapter VII of the Charter, hut an international police
force to maintain law and order in a territory for which
6
international society was responsible. The report of the
Commission said, in part:
It is the considered view of the Commission that
the security forces of the Mandatory Power, which
at the present time prevent the situation from
deteriorating completely into open warfare on an
organized basis, must be replaced by an adequate
non-Palestinian force which will assist law-abiding
elements in both the Arab and Jewish communities,
organized under the general direction of the Commis
sion, in maintaining order and security in Palestine,
and thereby enabling the Commission to carry out the
recommendations of the General Assembly. Otherwise,
the period immediately following the termination of
the Mandate will be a period of uncontrolled, wide
spread strife and bloodshed in Palestine, including
the City of Jerusalem. This would be a catastrophic
conclusion to an era of international concern for
that territory.7
The Security Council's response to the Palestine
Commissions request for troops was negative. The reluc
tance to implement forcefully the Palestine decision was
not due solely to a lack of will. There were real legal
and practical complications involved in implementing the
partition resolution. Por example, Ambassador Austin,
representative of the United States, suggested that the
6U.N. Doc. A/AC 21/15, p. 23.
^U.N. Doc. A/AC 21/9, pp. 18-19. Cited in Larry
Leonard, op. cit., pp. 656-67.


76
but the strongest action acceptable to the cautious members
of the United Nations.
A second question which is of major concern relates
to the capability of the Truce Supervision Organization to
fulfill its mandate. Was the Organization equipped to
maintain peaceful conditions in Palestine?
The Truce Supervision Organization represents a
classic example of the organization that grows in response
to challenge. Not only the emergence, but also the de
velopment, of the Organization was a product of the
situation and its necessities. There was little discussion
of what UNTSO should be at the time it was established,
though it seems to have been assumed that it would be modest
in character. Starting modestly, the Organization expanded
in size and scope of activities to meet its responsibilities.
Expansion to meet new challenges was possible because
strong leadership in the shaping of the Truce Organization
came from the Mediator, supported by the Secretary-General.
The political mileau in which the Truce Organization
functioned was such that the Mediator had freedom in shaping
and guiding the Truce Supervision Organization as long as he
did not go too far. The Palestine issue was explosive and
difficult and most of the representatives were willing, and
perhaps believed it administratively necessary, to delegate
responsibility in the matter to a subordinate unit.


253
favor, none against, and 3 abstentions The United Kingdom,
France, and China abstained because of reservations regard
ing the provision calling for Belgian withdrawal. There
was apparently no opposition to the injection of a United
Nations presence into the region.
The speed with which the Force vas authorized was
matched by a comparable speed in bringing the Force into
existence. Thirty-six hours after passage of the July 14-
resolution the first United Nations troops from Ghana and
1 X.
Tunisia were disembarking at Leopoldville.
The dispatch with which the mission was set up can
be attributed at least in part to two things. First, the
Secretary-General and Secretariat members v/ere able to draw
on the accumulated experience of past efforts. Although
they might know little about the Congo, they did know what
must be done to establish a force. They knew what needs
had to be met and they had some idea as to how they could
be met. Moreover, personnel were available both at Head
quarters and in the field who. viere experienced in estab
lishing and operating a peace-keeping mission. 3unche, who
"^'"Perhaps symbolic of the variety of difficulties that
v/ould plague the Force was the rivalry between Tunisian and
Ghanaian troops to arrive in the Congo first. Ghana wished
to have its men arrive first and when informed that United
States transport planes would pick up Tunisians and deposit
them first, the Ghanaians asked for Russian transportation.
Russian transport was given and Tunisian and Ghanaian troops
arrived almost simultaneously.


452
to accept th.e dangers of unfettered seif-kelp. Under the
flexible approach a continued evolution and institutionali
sation of the peace-keeping technique can he anticipated.
(The growth will he slow and new principles and practices
will he tested as they are assimilated. Use of the peace
keeping group in crises can he expected to he selective.
Although its invocation will not he confined to the ideal
type situation, there will he an effort to determine whether
the powers, measured particularly in terms of political
support and material preparedness, are adequate to cope with
the actual and potential problems in a volatile situation.
This line of development lacks the certainty that comes with
the permanent institutionalized force, hut it has the ad
vantage of flexibility. Highly unfavorable situations can
he avoided. The force can he shaped so as to increase
support for it in the field and at United Rations Head
quarters. Advances in peace-keeping can correspond to the
temper of the times. In short, the chances for success in
peace-keeping ventures can he maximized.
The future United Rations military groups have no
easy road ahead; success is in no way guaranteed. The path
of wisdom would seem to he to act, hut to act judiciously.
For the United Rations to assume responsibility beyond its
capabilities in a crisis and to fail could he disastrous,
hut for the United Rations to do nothing is to wither on the


Chapter
Page
Hen for UNOGIL 110
Money: the financial base of UNOGIL. 115
Material: the logistic base of UNOGIL. 118
The legal status of UNOGIL 119
UNOGIL in Action , 122
The role of the observers 122
The organization of UNOGIL 124
The functioning of UNOGIL 126
Phase I 126
Phase II ... 156
Conclusions. 141
IV. BEYOND THE OBSERVERS: THE UNITED NATIONS
EMERGENCY .FORCE 146
Introduction 146
Conditions for Creation of UNEF 147
The crisis area 14-7
The United Nations involvement 148
The Establishment of UNEF. ......... 155
The establishment ............ 155
The legal foundations of UNEF 165
The mandate 170
Characteristics of UNEF, 177
Leadership of UNEF. 178
Support for UNEF 184
vi


20
The United Nations involvement
United. Nations involvement with Palestine dates from
the spring of 194-7 when the United Kingdom, despairing of
finding a means to resolve Jewish demands for a national
state in Palestine with Arab opposition to such demands,
turned the entire complex, explosive problem over to the
United Nations. The solution which the United'Nations de
vised was for the partition of Palestine into an Arab state
and a Jewish state with economic union and the inter-
2
nationalization of Jerusalem.
Although reached only after lengthy investigations
by a Special Committee on Palestine and extensive debate in
the General Assembly, this solution, which was embodied in
the resolution of November 29, 194-7, was adopted with little
enthusiasm. The deficiencies, in the solution were all too
evident. Most serious of these was the lack of provision
for implementation by the United Nations in the face of the
Arab hostility to the plan and the announced unwillingness
of Britain, the mandatory power, to cooperate in implementing
a plan unacceptable to either of the principals.
2
The plan was based on the majority recommendations
of the eleven member United Nations Special Committee on
Palestine, set up in the spring of 194-7 by a Special Session
of the General Assembly to make recommendations on Palestine.
The majority plan was recommended by Canada, Czechoslovakia,
Guatemala, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, and Uruguay. A three-
nation minority of India, Iran, and Yugoslavia recommended a
bi-national federation, while the eleventh member, Australia,
abstained. Por the report of the Committee see U.N. Doc.
A/364-.


An acceptable stalemate with the United Nations guaranteeing
against a recurrence of hostilities might on occasion seem
preferable to a compromise of principles This comment is
not meant to impugn the value of establishing a state of
non-fighting, but merely to suggest that if the non-fighting
force technique is to be effectively used, it must not be
come a substitute for a solution to basic issues. It is,
after all, theoretically only the first stage in a United
Nations effort to resolve a crisis.
Our delineation of the factors that affect establish
ment and effective use of a non-fighting force in a
particular crisis leaves open the question of the future of
this peace-keeping technique. Can we expect extensive and
successful use of the force? Is it likely that the powers
and responsibilities of future peace-keeping groups will be
in balance? If in balance, will it be at the level of low
power and few responsibilities or at that of extended
responsibilities and powers? Although a definitive answer
to these questions is hardly possible, some possibilities
for the future can be. suggested.
We begin by accepting the need for the non-fighting
force technique in the world. Evidence of that need is wide
spread. There has been an increasing tendency to call on the
United Nations military presence to cope with situations of
tension and violence. Even the attempts which have occurred


30
-i 7
resolution of May 29 ^ The foundation provided for the
Truce Supervision Organization by the Assembly and the
Council was skeletal. Neither the resolutions themselves
nor the debate accompanying them laid down precise guide
lines as to what the Organization was to be. The unwilling
ness of the United Nations members to draw definitive lines
for the truce group suggests a resistance to heavy involve
ment and limits to support for the truce.
The General Assembly resolution called for a truce
and established a mediator,, to be selected by a committee
of the General Assemblythe committee designated was com
posed of the five permanent members of the Security Council.
The Mediator's principal functions were to arrange a truce
in Palestine and to promote a peaceful settlement between
Arabs and Jews. The provision which provided the basis for
a truce organization merely stated "that the Secretary-
ih
General shall provide the Mediator with an adequate staff,"
The Security Council resolution was also vague on
details of the Truce Organization. Its provisions instruc
ted the Mediator, in cooperation with the Truce Commission,
to supex'vise the truce and decided that a sufficient number
of military observers should be provided. That was all.
,
yThe May 13, 19^8, General Assembly resolution was
resolution 186 (S-II). The Security Council resolution was
passed at the 310th meeting of the Council and can be found
in U.N. Doc. S/801.
1 9
General Assembly resolution 186 (S-II).


LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Page
1. Organization chart of United Nations Truce
Supervision Organization ... 65
2. Organization chart of United Nations
Observation Group in Lebanon .... 125
5. The relationship of the Force's power to its
responsibilities over time 526
4. Organization chart of United Nations
operation in the Congo 531
xi


A/39895 Nov. 11, 1958, "Report of the Special Politi
cal Committee."
A/4002, Nov. 19, 1958, "Twenty-fifth report of the
Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary
Questions. Budget estimates for the period 1 January
to 31 December 1958."
A/4072, Dec. 11, 1958, "Report of the Fifth Committee."
A/C.5/763, Nov. 14, 1958, "Report of the Secretary-
General. United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon
and Expenditures Arising from General Assembly reso
lution 1237 (ES-III)."
General Assembly, Official Records, Fourteenth Session
(1959), Annexes
A/4160, July 23, 1959, "Cost estimates for the
maintenance of the Force: report of the Secretary-
General ."
A/4171, July 31, 1959, "Budget estimates for the
maintenance of the Force: report of the Advisory
Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions."
A/4176 and Add. 1 and 2, Sept. 10, 1959, "Manner of
financing the Force: report of the Secretary-General
on consultations with Governments of Member States."
A/4210 and Add. 1, Sept. 10, 1959, "Progress report
of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Emergency Force."
A/4335, Dec. 4, 1959, "Report of the Fifth Committee."
A/C.5/800, Nov. 12, 1959, "Supplementary estimates for
1959. Revised estimates for I960: report of the
Secretary-General."
General Assembly, Official Records, Fifteenth Session (I960),
Annexes
A/4396, July 8, I960, "United Nations Emergency Force:
Cost estimates for the maintenance of the Force: report
of the Secretary-General."
A/4486 and Add. 1 and 2, Sept. 13, I960, "United Nations
Emergency Force. Progress Report of the Secretary-
General. "


51
it might have repercussions on the upcoming presidential
election.^
By the end of September most of the delays and diffi
culties had been resolved and the Truce Organization had
attained its maximum size500 observers and 179 auxiliary
and Secretariat personnel. The Truce Supervision Organiza
tion remained at roughly this size through the first quarter
of 1949. At that point scaled reductions began to be
effected by the Acting Mediator because of the transition
which vas taking place from the truce to the armistice and
the parallel decline in incidents. By August, 19^9 when
the truce was replaced by the armistice, the observers
numbered only 79.
The replacement of the truce by the armistice did not
end the life of the Truce Supervision Organization com
pletely. A small organization, ranging in size from JO to
40 observers plus auxiliary personnel, was retained to help
maintain the armistice and cease-fire. In 1956 under the
pressure of increasing tensions in the area, the size of the
observer group was expanded to 57 men. By 1959 the number
of observers had been stabilized at around 120 with a sup-
57
porting staff of approximately 150 persons. '
va
y Bernadotte, op. cit., p, 195
David Brook, The United Nations and the Arab-Israel
Armistice System, 1949-59 (CoIiunhra~l]niversi'ty' doc toral"
dissertation, I^OlT, pp. 117 and 189.


367
Just as important as men and equipment was the change
in attitude at United Nations Headquarters and among some
member states toward the Force. The change is well-
illustrated by the Secretary-General's order on December 6
to United Nations Forces to take any air or ground action
68
necessary. The strong support given by the United States
to the Force-support taking moral and material formswas
also important. This support was particularly significant
when demands for a cease-fire vrere made by France, the
United Kingdom, and others. As its NATO allies called for
a cease-fire, the United States supported the United Nations
decision to continue fighting until its objectives were
69
achieved.
Without going into the details of battle, it can be
noted that the United Nations fought effectively. It
quickly gained control of the air and slowly seized key
installations in Elizabethville. By the time of the cease
fire ONUC had control of virtually all important installa
tions and probably could have imposed a military solution
if it had continued to fight.
The New York Times, December 6, 1961.
^The United States Secretary of State endorsed
publicly U Thant's move to restore the United Nations free
dom of movement and to effect the United Nations mandate
to reintegrate the Congo. The New York Times, December 9,
1961..


294
Tiie most notable difference between the composition
of OUUC and of earlier peace-keeping groups was the impor
tance given to the principle of regional solidarity. In
the organization of UNEP states from the Middle East had
been excluded from participation because of their special
interest in the situation. However, in the formation of
the Congo Force the earlier practice was not followed.
Instead of exclusion of African states from participation,
heavy reliance was placed on them for contributions to the
Force. The importance of the principle of regional soli
darity was reflected in the initial composition of the
Force. Approximately three-fourths of the troops during
the first three months of the operation were African.
The Secretary-General's reasoning in emphasizing
the principle of regional solidarity was revealed in his
first report to the Security Council on the implementation
of the resolution. Hammarskjold contended that just as the
ultimate solutions to the problems of the Congo must be
found within the Congo itself, so also should international
assistance be given to the Congo by its sister African
states as an act of African solidarity.^ The Secretary-
General's use of Africans may have been a consequence both
African states should give military assistance to the Congo.
Defeated in the Security Council vote, the proposal won the
support not only of the Soviet Union and Poland but also of
Tunisia and Ceylon. Ibid., p. 57.
5U.U. Doc. S/4598, p. 20.


233
authorities, finally, a special unit of the Egyptian
police, which was to cooperate daily with TOTEE, was to he
established to control infiltration. No such special unit
was ever created, hut close relations have been developed
between units of UNEE and police detachments in the four
districts into which Gaza is divided. In fact, UNEE was
regrouped so that its battalion boundaries would correspond
to the administrative sub-districts in the Gaza Strip with
114
the express intention of facilitating such cooperation.
There was also agreement on certain rights that would
be accorded UNEE to enable it to operate effectively. Among
the more important of these was the right to defend itself
against hostile action and the right to freedom of movement.
Defensive action by the Eorce in a couple of early incidents
demonstrated to the populace that the Eorce did have some
power behind its presence and helped to quiet the situation.
Nonetheless, the Eorce has worked under serious
limitations in carrying through its functions. So serious
have been the restrictions on the Eorces power of preven
tive action, in fact, that the Commander of the Eorce has
commented that it is surprising that infiltration has been
kept to such low figures. Most important, TOTEE has no
right to use force to back up its orders. It can fire only
TT
U.N. Doc. A/3943, p. 16


390
1963. Tlie agreement under which the transfer was made and
the Force functioned was negotiated by former United States
Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker. The United Nations Force in
West New Guinea, in response to the local situation and to
the heavy burden in money and men imposed on the world
organization at this time by the United Nations Forces in
the Middle East and the Congo, was a deviant from the usual
pattern of peace-keeping forces. Although the headquarters
staff was multi-national, the Force itself was not. Some
1,500 Pakistanis were deputized to serve as the United
Nations presence. The costs were not borne by the United
Nations, but by the two parties directly involved in the
questions at issue, that is, the Netherlands and Indonesia.
The Force's duties presented less challenge and fewer prob
lems than those of most peace-keeping forces. A political
settlement had been reached in this case prior to the
establishment of the Force, and the principal responsibili
ties of the Force were to help implement that settlement.
Its primary assignment was to maintain civil order In an
orderly society, while its maximum duration was set at
eight months.1
1See Paul van der Vieu for a rather critical view of
the United Nations role in West Irian. While admitting that
the United Nations helped achieve a smooth transfer of
authority, the author wonders if it was not achieved at the
cost .of neglect by the United Nations of its responsibility
to guarantee rights to the native people and future self-
determination. See Paul van der Vieu, "The United Nations


transportation system within the Congo for ONUC. The third
challenge related to the need to supply the Force with heavy
combat equipment when it shifted to at least a semi-fighting
role. Finally, there x^as the omnipresent problem of routine
day-by-day support of the Force.
The first assignmentthat of transporting thousands
of men and supporting equipment into the Congowas sub- .
stantial. The United Nations met the assignment with rela
tive effectiveness, calling on both experience and the
assistance of member states in doing so. Speed was con
sidered to be of the essence. The United States, assisted
by the United Kingdom and Ethiopia initially and Canada,
Switzerland, and the Soviet Union later, provided air sup
port, flying the first troops into the Congo within forty-
eight hours after passage of the authorizing resolution.
The United States did not feel constrained in the Congo
situation to limit its flights to staging areas outside
the crisis area and so was more directly involved in the
20
Congo mission than it had been in the Suez operation.
Moreover, the United States continued to provide essential
transport services to ONUC for the duration of the mission.
In addition to providing air transport the United States
See the comments of Brigadier General Tarleton H.
Watkins, "Operation New Tape The Congo Airlift," Air
University Quarterly Review, Yol. 13, No. 1 (Summer, 1961),pp.
16-33.


169
"between the United Nations and the participating states the
Secretary-General asked only that adequate prior notification
he given before withdrawal of the contingent. The experi
ence with the United Nations Force in the Congo suggests
that whatever moral or legal obligations might be imposed
by the agreement to participate, the participating state
will, in fact, withdraw its contingents whenever it wishes.
Just as the consent of the participating states was
necessary before the Force could be established, so also
vas the consent of the host country, Egypt, necessary be
fore the Force could begin to function. This too was a
condition of the Forces operation from the outset. In his
second report on the Force, the Secretary-General said,
"While the General Assembly is enabled to establish the
Force with the consent of those parties which contribute
units to the Force, it could not request the Force to be
stationed or operate on the territory of a given country
without the consent of the Government of that country.
Several of the offers to contribute units to the Force
specified that Egyptian consent should be given to the
operation. In fact, the principle that Egypt's consent was
necessary seemed to be quite generally accepted. The legal
requirements coincide with the practical. As the first
3%.N. Doc. A/3302, p. 20


61
states upon which the status of later peace-keeping groups
rested. First, the status of the observers was established
not by negotiation bub by United Nations fiat. Second, the
rights and privileges specifically guaranteed the observers
were not spelled out initially in any formal agreement or
official document. It is true, however, that the first
instructions from, the Mediator to the observers enunciated
certain basic rights the observers were assumed to have.
These included the rights to access, safe-conduct, and free
, 49
movement.
The position of the observers in Palestine became an
issue in the fall of 1948 following the assassination of
Count Bernadotte. The Acting Mediator pointed to "the dis
turbing tendency on the part of both Arabs and Jews to
withhold cooperation from the Truce Supervision Organization
and to place obstacles in the way of its effective opera-
tion."y Accordingly, he requested the Security Council
to give special emphasis to the obligations and liabilities
of the parties with regard to the Truce Supervision Organi
zation, In response to this plea and to a growing number of
incidents involving the observers, the Security Council
spelled out the duty of Governments and authorities vis-a-
vis the Truce Organization in the resolution of October 19*
I;^U.N. Doc. S/928, p. 2.
5U.N. Doc. S/1022, p. 46.


Organization regarded its composition. Bernadotte's initial
thought was that the Truce Organization should be composed
of representatives of the major powers on the Security
Council, Accordingly, on May 30, the Mediator contacted
the French, British, American, and Soviet military attaches
in Cairo inquiring as to the units which they could con
tribute to a truce control organization. Within days the
Mediator's basis of selection of members of the Truce
Organization shifted. On June 3 it was made known that,
aside from some Swedish officers, only representatives of
countries on the Truce Commission, that is, the United
States, France, and Belgium, would be used in the Truce
Organization.
The reasons for the Mediator's shift remainobscure.
Bernadotte suggests at least two. On the one hand, in his
memoirs he hints that a United States official exercised
some discreet pressure in suggesting only members of the
25
Truce Commission take part in truce supervision. On the
other hand, in a July 13 statement to the Security Council
Brnadotte suggested another reason for changing the basis
of selection of observers. He said:
o 4
^According to Bernadotte on June 2 the American charge
d'affaires, calling to inform him unofficially that the United
States was willing to contribute twenty-one officers to act
as observers and the necessary staff and aircraft, also sug
gested only members of the Truce Commission participate.
Folke Bernadotte, To Jerusalem (London: Hodder and Stoughton,-
195D, p. 4-5.


116
handled routinely, with little questioning or grumbling by
representatives. The difficulties of Suez financing may
have made these outlays seem trivial indeed. The lack of
visible concern over financing UNOGIL may also be attributed
to the fact that since the operation was virtually completed,
practically no new commitments were involved.
The methods used to finance the Observation Group
were nearly identical to those connected with the Palestine
operation. Initially, the Secretary-General spent for
IMOGIL under the authority vested in him by General Assembly
resolution 1231 (XII) to incur expenses of up to two million
dollars to meet unforeseen and extraordinary costs relating
to the maintenance of peace and security. (It was under an
almost identical authority that Secretary-General Lie met
the costs of the Palestine operation.) In late July when
it became apparent that an expansion of the Groups activi
ties would lift its expenses above the two million dollar
limit, the Secretary-General obtained the concurrence of
the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary
Questions to enter into commitments of up to four million
dollars.
The spending by the Secretary-General under his
emergency authority still left open the question of how
these outlays would be covered by the General Assembly.
The Secretary-General suggested two alternative methods by
which the General Assembly might meet the estimated 1958


421
On the one hand, there has been little open opposition to
the initial establishment of any of the peace-keeping
operations. There have been no negative votes in the Se
curity Council, though there have been abstentions, on the
establishment of the military presence. On the other hand,
neither has there been a willingness on the part of all the
states to support the peace-keeping missions whole-heartedly
with men, money, and material. Moral support is come by
more easily.
The Non-ffigating Force: Its Non-Institutionalized Side
The areas in which the least institutionalization of
peace-keeping has occurred are precisely those which are
closest to the heart of the operation. Thus, the financial
basis of the peace-keeping mission and the proper locus of
decision-making and control of the force pose issues still
unresolved.
The financial questions relating to peace-keeping are
unresolved because the United Nations is a league of
sovereign states. Members opposed or luke-warm to a peace
keeping operation do not favor commitment of the nation's
resources, even a very small part of those resources, to
further that peace-keeping venture.
As the United Nations has undertaken new and more
ambitious peace-keeping assignments, it has actually retro-


198
The same states which were the firmest advocates of
collective responsibility also held that the expenses of the
Force should be apportioned under the formula used for the
regular expenses of the Organization. However, some ac
cepted the need to modify the assessment formula to take
account of special factors, such as the limited resources
of the smaller states.^
A second approach to the financing of the peace
keeping force characterized some of the African and Asian
states. On the one hand, they admitted that the action of
the General Assembly in creating UUEF imposed a financial
responsibility on the member states to pay for the Force.
On the other hand, they stressed the need to apportion the
expenses of the Force fairly and equitably. Translated,
fairly and equitably meant so that the expenses would not
fall too heavily on countries with under-developed economies.
7*75
The representative of the United States, for ex
ample, recognized that full application of the principle of
collective responsibility might create difficulties for
smaller countries. He indicated that the United States was
willing to make large voluntary contributions to ease the
burden of the membership as a whole. General Assembly,
Official Records, 11th Session, Fifth Committee, 553rd
meeting (December 17, 1956), pp. 115-16. Denmark and Brazil,
both contributors to the Force, held that special considera
tion should be given those countries providing troops in
order not to place an unwarranted burden on them. See
General Assembly, Official Records, 11th Session, Fifth
Committee, 5^th meeting (December 5? 1956), p. 67 and
555th meeting (December 18, 1956), p. 130.


A/4580, Nov. 18, I960, "Supplementary estimates for
the Financial Year I960. United Nations activities
in the Congo for the period 14 July to 31 December
1960.
A/4587 and Add. 1, Nov. 22, I960, "Report to the
Secretary-General from his Acting Special Representa
tive in the Congo."
A/4592, Nov. 24, I960, "Report by the Advisory
Committee on the Congo."
A/4676, Dec. 19, I960, "Report of the Fifth Committee."
A/4703, March 1, 1961, "Report of the Secretary-General
A/4711 and Add. 1 and 2, March 20, 1961, "Report of
the United Nations Conciliation Commission for the
Congo."
A/4713, March 21, 1961, "Report of the Advisory Com
mittee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions."
A/4740, April 20, 1961, "Report of the Fifth Committee.
A/C.5/836, Oct. 24, I960, "Report of the Secretary-
General ."
A/C.5/860, March 27, 1961, "Statement read by the
representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Re
publics at the 825th meeting of the Fifth Committee."
A/C.5/862, April 14, 1961, "Statement by the repre
sentative of Mexico at the 837th meeting of the Fifth
Committee."
A/C.5/863, April 14, 1961, "Statement by the repre
sentative of India at the 838th meeting of the Fifth
Committee."
A/C.5/864, April 17, 1961, "Statement by the Secretary-
General at the 839th meeting of the Fifth Committee."
A/C.5/868, April 26, 1961, "Statement by the repre
sentative of Mexico at the 845th meeting of the Fifth
Committee."
General Assembly, Official Records, Sixteenth Session (1961-
62), A/4800, TlAnnual Report of the Secretary-General on
the Work of the Organization, 16 June 1960-15 June
1961." Supplement No. 1.


101
Requests the Secretary-General to make arrangements
forthwith for such measures, in addition to those en
visaged by the resolution of 11 June 1958, as he may
consider necessary in the light of the present circum
stances, with a view to enabling the United Nations to
fulfill the general purpose established in that reso
lution, and which will, in accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations, serve to ensure the territorial
integrity and political independence of Lebanon, so as
to make possible the withdrawal of United States forces
from Lebanon;.. .^2
Although intensive efforts were undertaken to make this
resolution acceptable to all Council members, it too was
vetoed by the Soviet Union. However, the Soviet veto came
not because of objections to a strengthening of the Observa
tion Group but because of the failure of the resolution to
indict the United States for its invasion of Lebanon. In
fact, Soviet amendments to the Japanese resolution included
23
provisions for a strengthened Observation Group. ^
The Secretary-General evidently interpreted the
Security Council action as almost, if not quite, a mandate
for a strengthened Observation group. In a much noted
statement, Secretary-General Hammarskjold announced to the
Council following the defeat of the Japanese resolution, his
intention of going forward with the strengthening of the
Group. In the words of Secretary-General Hammarskjold:
Times, June 26, 1958. In late June Charles Malik, the Leba
nese Poreign Minister, suggested an international force of
7,000 to end the infiltration. See The New York Times, July
1, 1958.
pp
U.N. Doc. S/4055, Rev. 1, pp. 58-59.
23
^Security Council, Official Records, 15th Year,
856th meeting (July 22, 1958), pp. 4-5.


58
in the area. The consequent deficiencies in communication
caused serious delays, often prevented the maintenance of
security of operation, and hampered exercise of operational
control of observer groups along fronts.
The situation with respect to transport facilities
was little better. Both the quantity and the quality of
vehicles and planes available left much to be desired. At
the outset of the truce no means of transport were avail
able, and it was only slowly that needed items were
acquired. Even then many were in a bad state of repair; by
the end of the First Truce some 50 per cent of all vehicles
were inoperative because of lack of proper maintenance
facilities and spare parts. Performance of the functions
of patrolling, air reconnaissance, and rapid transport of
observers to the scene of incidents suffered correspon
dingly.
Only in the field of naval reconnaissance did the
Mediator find the facilities adequate to the requirements
of the task. And here the mission was handled, not by
seconded personnel with used equipment, but by the regular
crews of vessels placed at the service of the United
4 6
Nations by the United States and France.
During the Second Truce an effort was made to remedy
these deficiencies. More equipment was acquired and a
4U.N. Doc. S/1025, p. 11.



PAGE 1

THE NON-FIGHTING FORCES OF THE UNITED NATIONS: AN INSTRUMENT FOR THE PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES By JOAN SACKNITZ CARVER A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE COUNCIL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA December, 1965

PAGE 2

DEDICATION To Jay and Jimmy

PAGE 3

^ ACKNOWLEDGMENTS When one comes bo the end of a graduate program and bhe completion of a dissertation, there are many persons to whom a debt of gratitude is owed. To all those who guided me in my graduate courses and who assisted me with this study, 1 express my sincere thanks. T am particularly indehted to Dr. Frederick Harbmann. Not only did Dr. Hartmann stimulate my interest in bhe field of international relations, hut he also directed my attention to the subject of peace-keeping groups. His perceptive comments and constant encouragement have been invaluable bo this study, I am deeply grateful for his generous assistance, My thanks go too to Dr. Arnold Heidenheimer for his valued instruction and guidance and for his useful suggestions in connection with, this study. I wish to express as well my gratitude to Dr. Manning Dauer for his assistance and for his unfailing ability to resolve administrative crises with dispatch and kindness. I would like to thank bhe University of Florida for the financial aid which made possible my graduate studies and bhe preparation of this dissertation. I am grateful bo the staff of the library of the University of Florida for its assistance and to Mrs. Thyra Johnston for typing the manuscript. iii

PAGE 4

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS iii LIST OH' TABLES x LIST OF FIGURES xi Chapter I. INTRODUCTION. 1 1 1 PEAC B-K E EPI NG TH ROUGH OBSERV ATI ONA FORMATI VE STAGE: THE TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION IN PALESTINE 17 Introduction 17 Conditions lor Creation of the Truce Organization 18 The United Nations involvement 20 The crisis area: internal conditions ... 21 The precedents for peace-keeping 22 Establishment of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization 29 The establishment 29 The legal foundations 55 The mandate. • 55 Characteristics of bhe Truce Organization 58 Leadership ...... Support for the Truce Organization .... 4-1 Hen for the Truce Organization 41 iv

PAGE 5

Chapter Page Money: the financial base 52 Material! the logistic base 56 The legal status of the Truce Supervision Organization 60 The Truce Supervision Organization in Action 65 The role of the Truce Supervision Organization 63 Organization for action 6'+ The functioning of the observers 70 Conclusions 7 A *III. PEACE-KEEPING THROUGH OBSERVATION-AN ESTABLISHED INSTRUMENT: THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVATION GROUP IN LEBANON 80 Introduction ... ....... 80 Conditions for Creation of UNOGIL 83 The crisis area: internal conditions in Lebanon 8J The United Nations involvement 86 The precedents for peace-keeping. ..... 87 The Establishment of the Observation Group 88 The establishment 88 The legal foundations ..... 92 The mandate 9'+ Characteristics of UNOGIL 104 Leadership of UNOGIL lO'l Support for UNOGIL. 110 v

PAGE 6

V Chapter Page Men for UNOGIL 110 Money: the financial base of UNOGIL. 115 Material: the logistic base of UNOGIL, 118 The legal status of UNOGIL 119 UNOGIL in Action ....,.,,, 122 The role of the observers .,....,. 122 The organization of UNOGIL 124 The functioning of UNOGIL 126 Phase I 126 Phase II 136 Conclusions, 141 IV. BEYOND THE OBSERVERS: THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE 146 Introduction ,..,..,.,, 146 Conditions for Creation of UNEF 147 The crisis area • 147 The United Nations involvement 148 The Establishment of UNEF. 155 The establishment ....... 155 The legal foundations of UNEF ...... 165 The mandate 170 Characteristics of UNEF 177 Leadership of UNEF. 178 Support for UNEF 184 vi

PAGE 7

Chapter Page Men for UNEF 184 Money: the financial base of UNEF. 190 Material: the logistic base of UNEF. 207 The legal status of UNEF 212 UNEF in Action 216 The role of bhe Force 216 The organization of UNEF, 218 The functioning of UNEF 222 Phase Is the withdrawal 222 Phase II: the stabilization of the area. 229 Conclusions. 237 V. AN EXPANSION OF PEACE-KEEPING: THE UNITED NATIONS FORCE IN THE CONGO-ITS ORIGINS 242 Introduction 242 Conditions for Creation of the United Nations Force 244 The crisis area: internal conditions in the Congo 244 The United Nations involvement 249 The Establishment of the United Nations jt! orce ,,.............. c-yj. The establishment ...... 251 The legal foundations of the United Nations Force 255 The mandate of the United Nations Force 264 Conclusions 284 vii

PAGE 8

y Chapter Page VI. THE UNITED NATIONS FORCE IN THE CONGO: THE OUTER LIMITS OF PEACE-KEEPING? 287 Characteri sties of the United Nations Force. 287 Leadership of ONUC 287 Support for ONUC 293 Men for the United Nations Porce 293 Money: the financial basis of the Porce 298 Material: the logistic base of the Force 312 The legal status of the United Nations i. Ul Ow# a • • 9 e tt /I y ONUC in Action 323 The role of ONUC 325 The organization of the Force 330 The functioning of the United Nations Force 33^ Phase I 334 Phase II 338 Phase III 3^3 Phase IV 351 Conclusions 378 VII. THE NON-FIGHTING FORCE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT 389 Recent Uses of the Non-Fighting Force. 389 The Non-Fighting Force: Its Institutionalized Side 39^ viii

PAGE 9

Chapter Page Institutionalization of a philosophy of action 398 Institutionalization of a philosophy of force composition 4-08 Institutionalization of a methodology 4-12 Institutionalization of a Force bureaucracy 417 The significance of institutionalization. 4-20 The Non-Fighting Force: Its N onInstitutional iz.ed Side 121 Conclusions 4-31 111. THE PERFORMANCE AND POTENTIAL OF THE NONFIGHTING force ny\APPENDIXES W BIBLIOGRAPHY 465 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 502 IX

PAGE 10

LIST OE TABLES Table Page 1. The Growth of UNOGIL: The Increase in Observers Over the Months 1142. The Scope of Observational Activity by UNOGIL from June through October, 1958 138 3. Source of Troops for ONUC 297 A-l. Record of Critical Votes in the Security Council on the Establishment and Support of Peace-Keeping Groups. 4-55 A-2 V Selected Critical "Votes in the General Assembly on the Establishment and Support of Peace-Keeping Groups 4-56 B-l. The National Composition of UNTSO 4-58 B-2. The National Composition of UNOGIL 4-59 B-3. The National Composition of UNEF Over the B-4. The National Composition of ONUC at Selected Times 461 B-5. The National Composition of the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYF) 463 C-l. A Comparison of Peace-Keeping Expenses and Regular United Nations Expenses in Selected Years and Selected Periods 4-64

PAGE 11

LIST OF FIGURES Figure Page 1. Organization chart of United Nations Truce Supervision Organization 65 o c Organization chart of United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon 125 5. The relationship of the Force's power to its responsibilities over time 326 l \- Organisation chart of United Nations operation in the Congo 531 xi

PAGE 12

CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION The blue berets of the United Nations military men who do not fight serve as a symbol of the world's concern for peace. In mid-1964 the "blue berets" watched over the peace of the world in remote and scattered areas: in the hot; deserts of Sinai and the Gaza Strip; in mountainous and barren Yemen; in the borderland of Kashmir; in the lovely, troubled isle of Cyprus. In the past they have served in Greece, Indonesia, Lebanon, the Congo, and West New Guinea. In this study it is proposed to examine the development and use by the United Nations of the military presence as an instrument of pacific settlement. The non-fighting force, 1 as we will term the military presence, is an international military contingent which is neither equipped for real hostilities nor intended really to fight. Called into being not for purposes of collective security, but for those of pacific settlement, it is injected into a situation of tension, instability, and potential violence to prevent or Non-fighting force is used in this study to mean ^ both military observer groups and military forces like UNEF. Some authors' restrict its application to the military forces. The term is used by Lincoln Bloom field in The United Nations and U.S. Foreign Policy (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1960), p. 66.

PAGE 13

2 halt thai; violence through the mere fact of its presence. It represents in tangible form the concern of the world community that; fighting be prevented. It serves as a human truce line, powerful, not in and of itself, but powerful "because of what it represents. The non-fighting force is one of the most significant innovations in the realm of pacific settlement made by the United Nations. It is both a reflection of the challenges which have confronted that body and a commentary on United Nations efforts to meet those challenges. The world with which the United Nations has had to cope has been a complex and difficult one. Problems are many and hardly made more simple by the setting within which they occur: one of a world complicated by its division into conflicting power blocs; by the recent rise of a number of turbulent, discontented, newly-independent states; and by the awesome destructive power of nuclear weapons. In this difficult and uneasy world outbreaks of violence have been frequent, particularly in the areas just emerging from, colonial status, The solutions to the problems causing the violence are not easy to find. In most cases the issues have not been black or white — -neither the identity of one "aggressor," who might be dealt with handily by sanctions, nor just and acceptable solutions have always "been clearly evident. Yet for the United Nations to do nothing in a crisis merely

PAGE 14

because a solution was not obvious would not only be an • indictment of its effectiveness but dangerous and irresponsible. The possibility of small conflicts expanding into large, of brush-fire wars becoming world wars, is omnipresent, The non-fighting force is one of the answers of the United Nations to this sort of challenge. The non-fighting force is injected into the problem area as a means of holding the situation in abeyance, while a peaceful solution is sought. The non-fighting force is a "manifestation of the view that an organization which is incapable of providing collective security may yet contribute significantly to peace and security if it concentrates on helping states to avoid drifting too near the brink of war, and not 2 on rescuing them from the brink itself." We have referred to the non-fighting force as a significant innovation of the United Nations. This statement should be qualified. The non-fighting force as a pacific settlement technique is primarily, but not entirely, a United Nations product. There are forerunners of the non-fighting force in pre-United Nations days — though these are few in number and apparently influenced United Nations 2 Inis Claude, "The United Nations and the Use of Force," International Conciliation No. 532 (March, 1961), p. 375.

PAGE 15

efforts little. 5 Under the League of Nations there were two cases, Vilna and the Saar, in which an international police force was brought into existence. The two main League experiments with a force were both connected with ensuring that plebiscites conducted by the League would be fair. It should be noted that such an international police force differs in basic conception from the collective security military force. The police force is designed more to keep order by its presence than to restore the peace by its action. The police force usually operates on the basis of consent and has limited powers as well as limited functions. The first effort of the League to establish an international police force came in connection with the Vilna situation. After the Polish-led occupation of Vilna in 1920 the League set up an international force to ensure a fair and impartial vote in a plebiscite to determine Vilna' s future. Under a League Council resolution of November, 1920, a force was authorized which was to consist of 1,500 to 1,800 men from eight states (Belgium, Britain, Spain, France, .Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden). Plans T -''bespite the similarities of the non-fighting forces used by the' League and those set up under the United Nations, there is little or no evidence that those responsible for the United Nations forces took much account of or were very much influenced by the League experience. There was no mention, for example, in the establishment of UNEF of the League experience. See Gabriella Rosner, The Un ited Nations Emergency Force (New York: Columbia University Press, IVbjTT p.^22~7~

PAGE 16

for financing the force were laid and its functions defined. The nations contributing the men were to supply their contingents with equipment, pay their regular salaries, and advance. funds for their transportation and maintenance. All expenses over and above those normal to maintain the troops in their home state would be repaid by the League, with reimbursement of the League by Poland and Lithuania. This project was abandoned, however, before it could come to fruition when it became apparent that it could be executed only with great difficulty. There was too much opposition and too little real support for the League action. Poland and Lithuania accepted in theory the idea of the plebiscite guaranteed by an international force, but in practice cooperated but little. Opposition by the Soviet Union may have delivered the final blow to the plan, for the states contributing to the force were not anxious to send their troops in when a neighboring great power objected. The second effort to establish' an international force, again to maintain conditions for a fair plebiscite, was more successful. In 193^ the League Council created an international force which operated with French and German consent to ensure order before, during, and after the Saar plebiscite. William Frye, A United Nations Peace Force (New York: Oceana for The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1957), p. 50.

PAGE 17

The Saar force had a function similar to that of the United Nations non-fighting forces — to exercise by its presence a restraint on the use of force. There are parallels not only in purpose but in structure, legal regulation, and control between the Saar force and those forces used by the United Nations in Suez, the Congo, and Cyprus. The Saar force was composed of 3,300 men supplied by four nations: Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden. It was under the command of a Britishappointed Commander-in-Chief who directed the staff officers of each national unit. The consent of the parties concerned was a prerequisite to the formation of the force; while an advisory committee composed of three members appointed by the Council and assisted by a sub-committee of the states contributing to the force had wide latitude in making plans for the creation and direction of the force.. Financial arrangements were based on the principle that the League would bear expenses exceeding those normally made by the contributing states to maintain their contingents. Out of these administrative and financial arrangements came an organization able to execute its functions with ease and 5 efficiency and without the use of arms. ^The use of an international force at Letitia is sometimes cited as a precedent for the non-fighting forces of the United Nations. See, for example, ibid p. 51. In this case the force was not really very international however. In a conflict between Peru and Colombia over the

PAGE 18

Despite the success of the Saar experiment, there was no consideration at the United Nations preparatory conferences or at the San Francisco Conference in 19^5 of the establishment of a permanent non-fighting force. The importance that this sort of force could have in stabilizing crisis situations was evidently not foreseen. All efforts to create an international military force were concentrated on the establishment of a fighting force under Article 4-5 of the Charter. Thus, there were only a few precedents either theoretical or actual for the United Nations use of military men for peace-keeping purposes. The history of the nonfighting force is short; for all practical purposes the evolution of the non-fighting' force from tentative beginnings in observer groups to small armies occurs within the lifetime of the United Nations. If the uses by the United Nations of the military presence were placed on a continuum, running from the least to the most ambitious in size and scope, they would fall into three broad groups. At one end of the continuum would be the small, multi-national observer groups used primarily Colombian settlement of Letitia, the League Council resolved the issue by placing Letitia under the administration of a League Commission for one year. The Commission was assisted by an "international force." The international force was, in fact, composed only of Colombian soldiers deputized by the League of Nations and wearing special arm-bands.

PAGE 19

8 early in the history of the United. Nations, The larger observer groups, such as the one used in Palestine, would fall in the middle. At the far end of the range would be the small armies established by the United Nations to keep the peace. Some characteristics common to all these groups can be observed. In each case the situation which brought in the United Nations was one in which fighting had occurred and was liable to break out again; in which emotions over the issues were high and agreement not readily reached. Most involved nations which had. gained their independence since the Second World War. The purpose of the observers was to quiet the situation not through forceful means — for they were few in number and unarmed. — but through the moral and psychological effect conveyed by their presence. The purpose and means of the peace-keeping force were similar bo those of the observers though a limited use of arms was possible to them. The small observer groups might be considered as the prototype of the military presence. The small observer group technique has been used by the United Nations in three situations: in Greece from 19'lB bo 195'+; in Indonesia from 194-7 to 1951 ; and in Kashmir from 19*9 to the present. In Greece obsei'vation was carried out along a 500 mile border by between JO and 40 military observers operating in teams

PAGE 20

9 of six. The personnel, as well as the equipment necessary n for the mission at the outset,' came from eight states — Australia, Brazil, China, France, Mexico, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States — all of which were members of the Special Committee on the Balkans. in Indonesia approximately 68 observers served, selected from the same countries that were members of the Consular Commission: Australia, Belgium, China, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In Kashmir, observers have been on duty since early 19^9 to aid in. maintaining the C0aS e™fire between India and Pakistan. The observers have numbered about sixty over the years. The initial seconding states were Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. In all these cases the observer teams were under the direction, at least initially, of the special b U.N. Doc. A/935, PP. 21-22. ^Establishment and maintenance of the observers raised serious financial questions because the initial appropriation for the Special Committee on the Balkans did not include a sum large enough to cover observer costs. A request to the Secretary-General for additional funds received a negative response. Thus, the Special Committee decided to accept offers of equipment with the recommendation that the donors be reimbursed at the next General Assembly session. Later budgets did include an appropriation to cover the observer costs, U.N. Doc. A/574, P. 3. ^Pakistan was also a member of the Special Committee on the Balkans, but apparently sent no observers. Seats on the Special Committee were open for Poland and the Soviet Union but were never taken. Had they taken their seats presumably they might also have participated in the observer group's activity. This might have been precedent-setting. U.N. Doc. A/57'+, p. 2.

PAGE 21

10 commissions established by the General Assembly or the Security Council to work out a solution to the problems at issue. In at least two instances the initiative in the use of the military observers came from the field organization. The number of observers used in these situations was small, and the scope of the mission was correspondingly limited. Their primary function was to patrol and to observe. The value of the observer groups has been attested to repeatedly, however, both by statement and by the practice 10 of using them for long periods of time. A second level of United Nations peace-keeping activity can be detected in the ambitious observer group, as represented by the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine, the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon, and, to a lesser extent, the United Nations ;, In Greece the observers operated under the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans until the end of 1951 and under the Balkan Sub-Commission of the Peace Observation Commission from 1952 to 195*M in Kashmir under the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan; and in Indonesia under the Consular Commission and the Good Offices Committee. 1() Por example the Third Interim Report of the IndiaPakistan Commission had this to say about the observers: "Although, a number of minor incidents took place during the first six and one-half months before the cease-fire line was finally demarcated, observer teams, composed of officers from Belgium, Canada, Mexico, Norway, and the United States headed by Commission's military adviser, in close cooperation with military authorities on both sides, greatly contributed to preventing the development of any of those into major breaches of the cease-fire." U.N. Doc. 8/4-30, Rev. 1, p. 31.

PAGE 22

11 Observation Mission in Yemen. These groups have been considerably larger and more expensive than the prototype observer teams. They have ranged in size from 200 to 600 men and have been supplied with a substantial amount of communications and reconnaissance equipment. Their mission is correspondingly expanded. It may include investigation as well as observation. World opinion may be mobilized to supplement the observer presence as a deterrant to aggression. Such groups move the United Nations a step closer to use of a full-fledged military force. Both the Palestine and Lebanon endeavors were ambitious enough to qualify as miniature armed forces. Their experience is directly relevant to the emergence of the technique of the peace-keeping force. This emergence of the full-fledged military force takes place with the creation of the United Nations Emergency Force, a force of some 6,000 men, to cope with the Suez crisis in 1956. it was followed hj the United Nations Force in the Congo, created in I960 and ranging in size from 15,000 to 20,000 men, and the Force in Cyprus, set up in 1964 and numbering about 7000. These forces represent the furthest extension of the United Nations development of peace-keeping techniques. Not only were they far larger in size and more expensive than the observer groups, but they also had somewhat broader powers at their disposal. Although

PAGE 23

12 in theory and in most cases the powers of the peace-keeping force are only slightly greater than those of the observer group, in practice considerably greater powers have been exercised at times, particularly by the Force in the Congo. This study will examine comparatively and in depth the non-fighting force technique as utilized in four cases: the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine, the United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon, the United Nations Emergency Force, and the United Nations Force in the Congo, Reference will be made as well to the recent uses of this technique in Yemen and Cyprus. There are striking differences in the characteristics of these four groups: differences first in the size of the contingents, which range from the 689 man maximum of the Palestine group to the 19,707 man maximum force used in the Congo; differences too in the situation which called the units into being. In Palestine the organization was there primarily to maintain a truce imposed on Jews and Arabs by the United Nations. In Lebanon the organization was stationed at Lebanese borders to observe and stop infiltration from without by spotting it. In Suez the force was to stabilize the international relationships of the states involved by making possible the withdrawal of British, French, and Israeli forces from Egypt and ensuring against a resumption of hostilities between Egypt and Israel. In the

PAGE 24

13 Congo the United Nations Force was to help establish internal order in the newly independent nation, thereby bringing about the withdrawal of Belgian forces brought in because of post-independence turbulence, preventing the intervention of outside powers, and aiding the Congo to become a viable state. Bobh the Lebanese and Congo situations were complicated by overtones of civil war. Despite the admittedly significant differences between the groups, they can be considered as a unit because of all they share. All are composed of military men; all are used in situations of tension, instability, actual or potential fighting. All initially have a common purpose, to promote peaceful settlement by curbing violence through the effect of their organized and disciplined presence as representatives of the United Nations. Although they may be armed, they are backed by the prestige and power of the organization rather than primarily by the power of weapons. At the same time, the discipline of the personnel makes them capable of quick and effective response on behalf of the organization within a context where the use of force is or may become prevalent. The study is divided into two main parts. In the first section case studies of the four peace-keeping groups are presented. In each case an examination is undertaken of the origins, characteristics, and operation of the group.

PAGE 25

14 Political, legal, financial, and. administrative factors are taken into account;. An effort has "been made to make each of the cases parallel the others as closely as possible in order to facilitate generalization. The second part of the study is devoted to an analysis of the technique of the non-fighting force, based on the material developed in the case studies. The objectives of this analysis of the non-fighting force technique as an instrument of peaceful settlement are two-fold. The first aim is to determine the nature of the instrument which has been developed. We are particularly concerned with the degree to which an institutionalized technique, readily available in recognizable form for use in crises, has emerged and the degree to which each force is unique. Going beyond the question of extent of institutionalization is that of the reasons and significance of the institutionalization which has occurred. The analysis of the nature of the non-fighting force as an instrument of peaceful settlement leads more or less directly to the second, central purpose of the study: the evaluation of the performance and potential of the non-fighting force. The conditions which determine the effectiveness of the nonfighting force as an instrument of peaceful settlement are hypothesized on the basis of the experience thus far with them. On the framework of the evaluation, first, of the

PAGE 26

15 instrument as it exists and, second, of the conditions of its effective use, some tentative conclusions are put forth as to the potential for the future of the non-fighting force. The justification for a study such as this one rests in the past and potential significance of the non-fighting force as a technique for pacific settlement and in the dearth of comparative studies on the force itself. Almost all the studies of the peace-keeping groups done thus far have concentrated on a particular use of the force rather than on the force, considered abstractly, as an instrument of peaceful settlement. It is hoped that by using a comparative case study approach, some conclusions can be reached with regard to both the nature of the force and to the conditions under which it may be used successfully. These conclusions might then serve as the hypotheses of later studies, enabling us to refine and elaborate our knowledge of peace-keeping endeavors. To go beyond what has been done in analyzing the nonfighting force as a peace-keeping instrument seems important not only for scholarly but also for practical reasons. The force is being used more and more often. Proposals for the creation of ad hoc forces to meet new crises come with increasing frequency as do those for a permanent force of some sort. As early as 19^8 Trygve Lie, then Secretary-General, proposed a guard force of 1,000 to 5,000 men — a proposal

PAGE 27

16 unenthusiastically received and so emasculated as to be transformed into a resolution to establish a small field service. Not much was said about non-fighting forces in the early 1950' s, perhaps because fighting forces were still too much in the forefront. From 1956 forward, however, under the impetus of the successes of the United Nations Emergency Force, proposals for a permanent force have come forth steadily, seriously, and at times with impressive origins. In general, these proposals have originated less often with members of the United Nations Secretariat than with individual statesmen, United Nations delegations, Governments, and non-governmental organizations. One of the most persistent advocates of some sort of permanent force has been Lester Pearson of Canada; among the most influential advocates were Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy. In the face of these efforts to make more and more extensive use of the non-fighting force as an arm of the United Nations, it seems that it is time to evaluate on the basis of past experience the merits and usefulness of the non-fighting force.

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CHAPTER II PEACE-KEEPING THROUGH OBSEHVATION-A FORMATIVE STAGE: THE TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION IN PALESTINE Int roduction In Palestine in May, 19^8, violent fighting erupted between Israeli and. Arab. A truce supervision organization, created by the United Nations to help still that violence, stands as one of the pioneering ventures in the field of peace-keeping through theyuse of the military man in a non-fighting capacity. In the first decade of the United Nations there were other uses of military observers— in Greece, in Indonesia, in Kashmir, for example. Yet the Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine differs from these truce observation teams. The difference lies primarily in the extensiveness and scope of the operation, but this difference is so great as to be almost one of kind, not merely size. In Palestine the Truce Supervision Organization reached a total size of over 600 men and had at its disposal twelve airplanes, 150 jeeps and trucks, and four ships with their crews. It had extensive communications equipment 17

PAGE 29

18 and its own communications system. It was in short, almost 1 a little army — albeit a little army without guns. Many of the rudiments of the military force are found in the Palestine group. In the problems faced and solved, in the accumulation of precedents and personnel experienced in the use of the military, there are links, direct as well as indirect, between the Palestine experience and the later use of the non-fighting force in more ambitious endeavors. The Palestine venture moves the United Nations a step forward in the employment of the non-fighting force to carry through its objectives. To fully understand the place of the Unit;ed Nations Truce Supervision Organization in the development of the non-fighting force as a technique of pacific settlement, it is necessary to briefly review the history of the Organization: its origins, characteristics, and functioning. Con dition s for Creation of the Truce Organization The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization "Comments from, various sources noted the resemblance of the Truce Organization to an International force. Dr. Ralph Bunche, Acting Mediator, said that the operation by the fall of 19^8 had grown into both a diplomatic and a military one, involving reconnaissance on land, sea, and air. It amounted to an unarmed army of occupation in close contact with United Nations Headquarters. General Assembly, f f i c i al R e c o r d s 3rd Session, Fifth Committee, 157th meetTng~T November 5, 19^-8), p. 64-9* See also The New York T imes June 14, 1948.

PAGE 30

19 (UNTSO) was designed bo symbolize in concrete fashion the United Nations concern that fighting he halted in Palestine, while a permanent solution was sought to the problems at issue. In other problem areas fighting had occurred without evoking such a strong United Nations response. What were the conditions which led to the use in this case of a contingent of military men to represent the United Nations presence? Several elements contributed to bringing the Truce Organisation into existence. First, the United Nations had special responsibilities with respect to the Palestine problem stemming from its prior involvement in the situation coupled with its failure either to find a solution acceptable to all parties or to win agreement of the United Nations members to the imposition of a solution. Second, the fact of open and heavy fighting between Jew and Arab in the Holy Land made apparent the urgent need for some sort of action. Finally, the variety of solutions and the proposals for a United Nations enforced peace put forth in early 19^8 as well as the tentative experimentation with a truce commission prepared the way, at least in part, for establishment of a peace-keeping group to quell the violence and to facilitate the search for a permanent solution.

PAGE 31

20 The United Nations involvement United Nations involvement with Palestine dates from the spring of 194-7 when the United Kingdom, despairing of finding a means to resolve Jewish demands for a national state in Palestine with Arab opposition to such demands, turned the entire complex, explosive problem over to the United Nations. The solution which the United' Nations devised was for the partition of Palestine into an Arab state and a Jewish state with economic union and the inter2 nationalization of Jerusalem. Although reached only after lengthy investigations by a Special Committee on Palestine and extensive debate in the General Assembly, this solution, which was embodied in the resolution of November 29, 194-7, was adopted with little enthusiasm. The deficiencies, in the solution were all too evident. Most serious of these was the lack of provision for implementation by the United Nations in the face of the Arab hostility to the plan and the announced unwillingness of Britain, the mandatory power, to cooperate in implementing a plan unacceptable to either of the principals. 2 The plan was based on the majority recommendations of the eleven member United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, set up in the spring of 194-7 by a Special Session of the General Assembly to make recommendations on Palestine. The majority plan was recommended by Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, and Uruguay. A threenation minority of India, Iran, and Yugoslavia recommended a bi-national federation, while the eleventh member, Australia, abstained. Por the report of the Committee see U.N. Doc. A/364.

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21 The problem of implementation was discussed in the Assembly and some of the smaller powers went so far as to put forward proposals for forceful implementation. These remained only proposals. The majority of states, including the major powers, showed a marked reluctance to commit themselves to forceful action in Palestine. Thus, the United Nations was in the anomalous position of recommending a solution which might require force to implement it, while being unwilling to apply such means. The crisis area; internal conditions A second important element in the Palestine situation was the fact of fighting. After the passage of the partition resolution in November, 194-7* the situation in the Holy Land rapidly deteriorated. Fighting increased in scale and intensity: the convoy battles and bomb outrages which characterized the first months after the passage of the resolution became steady skirmishes by March and full-scale war by May, 194-8.^ x -^Guatemala proposed an international police force of contingents contributed on a proportional basis by states other than the permanent members of the Security Council. New Zealand suggested that it be agreed that if violence occurred in Palestine, a united effort to suppress it would be made by an international force to which each country would contribute proportionate to its strength. Larry Leonard, "The United Nations and Palestine," International Conciliation No. 4-54(October, 194-9), p. 64-6. 4For a description of the various phases of the war see Edgar O'Ballance, The Arab-Israeli War (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957).

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22 The preced ent s for peace-keeping The United Nations could hardly ignore a situation becoming ever more violent with which it was directly involved. Proposals, plans, and limited measures of United Nations peace-keeping tumbled one after another between November, 19^7, and May, 19^8. Although these proposals set few concrete precedents for the Truce Supervision Organization, they probably contributed, to creation of an atmosphere conducive to decisive action ultimately by the United Nations. The General Assembly had made virtually no initial provision for implementation of the partition decision beyond setting up a five-nation Palestine Commission to administer the territory in the interim period between, the Mandatory Power's departure and the establishment of the Arab and Israeli states. The Security Council was instructed to give all necessary aid and guidance to the Commission and to take the necessary measures for implementation of the plan. It was soon apparent that the Commission would need help to fulfill its mission. Two major efforts in the spring of 19'1-S to provide such assistance can be delineated: the call for a force for Palestine and the establishment of a truce commission. In January and February, 19'l-S, both Secretary-General Trygve Lie and the Palestine Commission struggled with the

PAGE 34

23 double problem of executing the partition decision and of smothering the violence already aflame in the Holy Land. Both put forward, more or less openly, proposals for forceful action by the United Nations. The proposals were received with little enthusiasm and less action. The Secretary -General, who "put the full weight of (his) office consistently behind the organization's decision from the time it was first taken," took two approaches. On the one hand, he quietly set in motion Secretariat studies of the possibilities of creating an international police force and inaugurated exploratory conversations with some of the smaller nations on their willingness to supply a force to execute the Palestine decisions. On the other hand, in public statements he tried to impress the Security Council members with their responsibility for enforcing the resolution. The Palestine Commission was more direct in its proposals. The Commission found it impossible to assume its responsibilities due to violence in Palestine and a lack of cooperation by Britain, the mandatory power. It therefore confronted the Security Council with a special report in which it contended that an armed force was necessary to bring an end to fighting in Palestine and to enable ^Trygve Lie, In the Cause of Peace (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1^5^77 P 5%~-

PAGE 35

24 it to take the" -steps preparatory to partition. The force which the Commission recommended was not an army under Chapter VII of the Charter, but an international police force to maintain law and order in a territory for which international society was responsible. The report of the Commission said, in part: It is the considered view of the Commission that the security forces of the Mandatory Power, which at the present time prevent the situation from deteriorating completely into open warfare on an organized basis, must be replaced by an adequate • non-Palestinian force which will assist law-abiding elements in both the Arab and Jewish communities, organized under the general direction of the Commission, in maintaining order and security in Palestine, and thereby enabling the Commission to carry out the recommendations of the General Assembly. Otherwise, the period immediately following the termination of the Mandate will be a period of uncontrolled, widespread strife and bloodshed in Palestine, including the City of Jerusalem. This would be a catastrophic conclusion to an era of international concern for that territory. 7 The Security Council's response to the Palestine Commission's request for troops was negative. The reluctance to implement forcefully the Palestine decision was not due solely to a lack of will. There were real legal and practical complications involved in implementing the partition resolution. For example, Ambassador Austin, representative of the United States, suggested that the 6 U.N. Doc. A/AC 21/15, p. 23. 7 U.N. Doc. A/AC 21/9, pp. 18-19. Cited in Larry Leonard, op_. cit pp. 656-67.

PAGE 36

25 Security Council authority to use force to cope with threats to and. breaches of the peace did not extend to the use of such force to implement a recommendation by the General Assembly. In the face of doubts on the legal soundness of the forceful action and the unwillingness of the major powers to alienate either side, the practical problem of where to get troops for a force loomed large. let, the report of the Palestine Commission was not without significance. It triggered reconsideration of the entire Palestine issue, first in the Security Council from February through April, 19'l8; then in the Second Special Session of the General Assembly, meeting from April 16 to May 14, 19*4-8. The search for an alternative political solution to partition was not fruitful.' Reconsideration did lead, however, to a separation of the problems of fighting and of the future of Palestine. As it became increasingly apparent that a political solution would not be found quickly or easily and as the fighting intensified, efforts were concentrated on halting the Arab-Israeli conflict. Security Council, Official Records, 3rd Year, 253rd meeting (February 24, 1948] p. 26?T q 'The United States delegation raised the possibility of a temporary trusteeship for Palestine and even indicated willingness to supply some soldiers for the purpose of establishing such a trusteeship. The idea was not accepted by the majority of the United Nations members however. The United States main purpose in calling for a special General Assembly session was to get consideration for the trusteeship proposal.

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26 The Security Council attempted to quiet the Palestine situation through a series of cease-fire calls, running from April 1 through the end of May, and by creation of a Truce Commission. The cease-fire resolutions called in varying terms for a halt in the fighting, and until the May 29 resolution all were virtually ignored. Yet the Security Council activity in the period prior \:o the effective truce had an influence on the truce which was finally established and on the organization set up to maintain it. Establishment of the Truce Commission can be singled out as of particular importance to later developments. The Commission was created "by a resolution of April 23 to assist the Security Council in implementing the cease-fire calls and to report to the Council on the situation in Palestine. The experience of the Truce Commission revealed the need for an expanded truce supervisory organization, thereby stimulating the creation of such an organization. It also provided a formula for determining the national composition of the organization, once established. (By suggestion of the United States, the Commission was composed of representatives of the members of the Security Council that had consular representatives in Jerusalem with the exception of Syria. Under this formula the Commission was composed of representatives of the United States, Belgium, and Prance.) 10 The justification for this method of selection was

PAGE 38

27 The Truce Commission drew the Security Council's attention, to the problem of truce supervision with requests for more assistance. First, in connection with a proposal to demilitarize Jerusalem, the Commission queried the Security Council in early May on the possibility of obtaining a fifty-man force to provide the guarantees necessary to both sides if the truce were to be upheld. Second, in a cable of May 21 the Commission indicated its need for a small body of competent military observers to assist it in carrying through its functions. In the same cable the Commission expressed the conviction that the only effective means to bring a cessation of hostilities was through employment of a neutral force, sufficiently large and powerful to impose its will on one or both parties, created under Article 41 or Article 42 of the Charter. 11 The that use of representatives already in Palestine would be a prompt, effective, and simple way of providing the Security Council with an arm in Palestine to report to it and to help execute its decisions. Significantly, in the light of later developments, objections to this method of selection were voiced by the delegates of the Soviet Union and of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, both of whom abstained on the resolution establishing the Commission. Security Council, Official Records, 3rd Year, 287th meeting (April 25, 1948), pTT5: ~~ 11 X U.N. Doc. S/762, p. 3.

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28 Security Council was markedly unresponsive to these calls TO for men. The Commission may have further stimulated the establishment of a military organization to supervise the truce by its own ineffectiveness. Lacking assistance and confined closely to quarters, by the fighting in Jerusalem, the Commission found it difficult to fulfill the functions assigned to it. Complaints about the lack of information coming from the Truce Commission were frequent and vociferous in the Security Council. This then was the situation in the spring of 194-8: the mandate was drawing to an end, tensions were heightening, and fighting increasing. The partition plan, which the United Nations had devised as the answer to the Palestine question, seemed to have little chance of implementation. The United Nations, aware of the critical nature of the situation, was unable to settle on an alternative solution. 12" Some delegates raised practical objections to sending officers into Palestine: the Canadian representative felt New York was too distant from Palestine to serve as a source of control officers; the Argentinian, that Palestine was too dangerous. The Soviet delegate contended that since no functions of a purely police nature were initially assigned to the Truce Commission, the Council could not decide that the Commission, created for another purpose, should now undertake control, and police functions. Security Council, Official Records 3rd Year, 291st meeting (May 12. 19*8), ppT 9, 13, 16, and 17.

PAGE 40

29 Establishment of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization The establishment Actual establishment of the Truce Supervision Organization came in direct response to a marked intensification of the Palestine crisis. Full-scale fighting broke out in mid-May with the proclamation of the state of Israel, the ending of the British mandate, and the invasion of Arab armies. Necessity spurred the United Nations to positive action. Efforts to halt the fighting intensified. Out of these efforts came an effective truce and the organization to supervise it. There were, to be precise, two truce organizations, one created for the first four week truce, in effect from June 11 to July 9 S 19*8, and a second more extensive and permanent organization to maintain the Second Truce, effective from July 18, 19*8. Although the truce was replaced in August, 19*9 by an armistice based on agreements between Israel and Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria respectively, a skeleton truce organization continued in existence to assist the parties to maintain the armistice and to ensure observance of the cease-fire. The Eirst Truce and its organization were based on a General Assembly resolution of May 15 and a Security Council

PAGE 41

30 1? resolution of Flay 29. The foundation provided for the Truce Supervision Organization by the Assembly and the Council was skeletal. Neither the resolutions themselves nor the debate accompanying them laid down precise guidelines as to what the Organization was to be. The unwillingness of the United Nations members to draw definitive lines for the truce group suggests a resistance to heavy involvement and limits to support for the truce. The General Assembly resolution called for a truce and established a mediator, to be selected by a committee of the General Assembly — the committee designated was composed of the five permanent members of the Security Council. The Mediator's principal functions were to arrange a truce in Palestine and to promote a peaceful settlement between Arabs and Jews. The provision which provided the basis for a truce organization merely stated "that the Secretary 14General shall provide the Mediator with an adequate staff," The Security Council resolution was also vague on details of the Truce Organization. Its provisions instructed the Mediator, in cooperation with the Truce Commission, to supei'vise the truce and decided that a sufficient number of military observers should, be provided. That was all. -'The May 15, 194-8, General Assembly resolution was resolution. 186 (S-II). The Security Council resolution was passed at the 310th meeting of the Council and can be found in U.N. Doc. S/801. General Assembly resolution 186 (S-II).

PAGE 42

31 .Debate on. the nature of the Truce Supervision Organization was almost non-existent. The General Assembly resolution which established the position of Mediator had received little discussion, before passage. The resolution was proposed by the United States in a sub-commission set up originally to consider a provisional regime for Palestine, but diverted in the face of fighting (and inability to agree on any provisional regime) to the problem of violence in the Holy Land. The Mediator proposal was put forth on May 13, the next to last day of the Special Session, with the statement that despite its late introduction, the provision represented, not something new, but merely the consensus of views which had been expressed in the sub-committee. The discussion of the resolution in the plenary session centered on whether the position of Mediator should be established at all, not on the proper scope of responsibilities of the Mediator. Debate in the Security Council did little more to clarify the role and nature of the proposed Truce Organization. At the time of passage of the May 29 resolution attention was focused not on the role of the Mediator and the Truce Organization but on the question of whether mediation or coercion should be used to solve the crisis. The extent of unwillingness of the Security Council to commit itself on the Truce Organization is suggested by

PAGE 43

32 the failure of any Security Council members to come forth with substantive suggestions at a session of the Council convened for the express pin-pose of formula bing instructions for the Mediator in establishing the Truce Organization. The French delegate apparently expressed the view of the Council when he suggested that confidence along with wide powers to implement the resolution should be given the Mediator. 15 The votes in the General Assembly and Security Council on the truce resolutions suggest substantial support for the truce and its organization. The vote on the May 14 General Assembly resolution establishing the truce was 31 in favor, 7 against, and 16 abstentions. D The opposition came from the Communist bloc nations and Cuba, The expressed reason for Soviet disfavor was that the truce operation represented a Western maneuver to prevent partition from ] 7 becoming effective. That Soviet opposition was designed J 5 ""Security Council, Off icial Records 3rd Year, 313th meeting (June 3, 1948), p. 28. 16 "The states which abstained were the Arab members of the United Nations, joined by some Latin American states and Australia, Siam, and Greece. General Assembly, O ffic ial Records, 2nd Special Session, 133th plenary meeting (May 14, 1948), pp. 44-45. See Appendix. A for a complete listing of this vote. 17 in fact, the opposition to the Truce Supervision Organization fits the pattern of Soviet thinking about the United Nations during this period, with its general hostility to any sort of United Nations police system on the basis it infringed national sovereignty and its insistence

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33 merely to voice disapproval and not to kill all action is suggested by the fact; that the Soviet Union and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic abstained on the critical votes in the Security Council. T he legal foundations The legal foundation for the establishment and functioning of the Truce Supervision Organization rested on the General Assembly resolution of May 1'+, 19*8, and the Security Council resolutions of May 29 and July 15, 19*8. The authority under which the position of the Mediator was created and an organization to aid him authorized was not specified in the resolution. However, there was no challenge raised as to the power of the General Assembly to create a subsidiary organ under Article 22 of the Charter to assist it in performing its functions. More question could be raised as to the provisions of the Charter under which the Security Council called for an end to hostilities. The Security Council calls for a ceasefire prior to the May 29 call had been clearly taken under Chapter VI of the Charter. Apparently the May 29 and July 15 cease-fire resolutions were also taken under Chapter VI, on the veto and on keeping important decisxons in the Security Council where they were subject to the veto, ior further discussion of the Soviet position see Alexander Dallin, The Sovie t Union at the United Nations (New York: Frederic! A. Praeger, 1962).

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34 but each made reference to Chapter VII and seemed to move progressively closer to actual invocation, of enforcement measures. In the debate in the Security Council on the Way 29 resolution two schools of thought emerged. One, including the Soviet Union and the United States among its proponents, called for action under the enforcement provisions of Chapter VII, apparently feeling that stronger action than 1. 8 had been taken in the past was necessary. The other school of opinion, including among its adherents Belgium and Britain, called for action under Chapter VI, viewing invocation of Chapter VII as a serious and uncertain step. There was feeling that invocation of Chapter VII without assurance of effective application of measures of coercion and without knowledge of all the potential consequences of 19 such ac-oion was a serious step, not to be lightly taken. The May 29 resolution did refer to Chapter VII, however, and the July 15 resolution made even greater use of that section of the Charter. In the July 15 resolution the parties were for the first time ordered to comply with the measures specified by the Council under Article 40 of the r8 For the Soviet statement see Security Council, Official Records, 3rd Year, 309th meetxng (May 2 9, W, P. 27~To~f~tEi-TJnTted States statement see Security Council, Offi cial Records 3rd Year, 308th meeting (May 28, 19*8), pp. 19 Security Council, pffj^l„R^cords, 3rd Year, 309th meeting (May 29, 19*8), pp. 10-14.

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35 Charter. Article '(0 refers to provisional measures and remains a step away from the enforcement action envisioned under Article '42. Nonetheless, the reference to action under Chapter VII was potentially significant. In theory at least such a resolution opened the way to forceful action by the United Nations in the event of failure by the parties to comply with the cease-fire order or of truce violations. In fact, however, strong action was not taken by the United Nations when, truce violations of a serious nature did occur. Although some question remains as to the precise provisions of the Charter under which the United Nations was acting, it would appear that the potential authority embodied in the July 15 resolution was greater than the authority actually invoked under that resolution. It may be suggested that political rather than legal factors explain the limited response of the United Nations to some serious breeches of the cease-fire. The mandate The truce supervisors' mandate was based on the May 29 and July 15 resolutions calling for a truce and on the terms of the truce itself. The resolutions and the debate accompanying them provided only the most general guidelines as to the functions of the observers and the conditions under which they were to operate. The resolutions called

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36 for an end to hostilities, banned the introduction of military men or materials into the belligerent axea, and enjoined the protection of Holy Places and shrines. None Of the resolutions specified precisely what the role of the observers was to be in ensuring that the truce terms would be carried through. It was left largely to the Mediator to spell out the role of the truce observers—the responsibilities they should bear and the policies they should follow in meeting these responsibilities. The mandate of the observers, as defined by the Mediator on the basis of the relevant resolutions, limited the role the observers could play in the Palestine crisis. It is true, however, that the Mediator initially interpreted the responsibilities of the observers in relatively broad fashion. Their primary purpose, in his view, was to prevent a renewal of large-scale fighting during the truce and to preserve the equitability of the truce. The phrase ••to prevent" might have opened the door to a widening of the authority of the observers. The door which was opened was quickly slammed shut. Potential disagreement among the .embers on the preventive functions of the observers was forestalled by the Secretary-General's firm declaration that the Truce Supervision Organization had no preventive

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37 authority and could not take any preventive measures in 20 advance. Moreover, the conditions under which the observers were to function were narrowly drawn. First, the observer was to be "completely objective in his attitude and .judgment" and to "maintain a thorough neutrality as regards 21 political issues in the Palestine situation." Such a requirement was probably necessary for success in a delicate mission. Second, the power available to the observer to meet his responsibilities was quite limited. He had, for example, no enforcement power and was denied arms of any sort. The decision on arms was made by the Mediator. That it corresponded with the desires of a majority of member states was indicated by the rejection by the members of later efforts of the Mediator to broaden the powers of a few of the observers by arming them for especially difficult tasks. Although the invocation of Chapter VII of the Charter in the July 15 cease-fire call might have justified such a broadening of the observers' mandate, no effort was made to use the resolution for this purpose. ?0 L.M. Bloomfield, Egypt, Israel gnfl the Gulf of A^aba (Toronto: The Carswell Company, Ltd., V^/)j p. fv 21 U.N. Doc. S/928, p. 1.

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38 Characteristics of the Truce Organization The creation of a non-fighting military unit to help restore and maintain peace represents only the first stage of United Nations action in a crisis. The group must not only be created; it must also operate effectively in the field to achieve its objectives. It may he suggested that the ability of the group to carry through its charge will depend on the balance of the equation of its responsibilities and its powers. Intimately related to the power of the force are the characteristics of the force itself. Three aspects of the force seem particularly relevant to the determination of its effectiveness: a) its leadership; b) its size and character; and c) its support at headquarters and in the field. Support in turn takes several forms. At United Nations headquarters it can be read in terms of votes, finances, logistics, and manpower. In the field cooperation and non-cooperation are indicative of the attitude of those with whom the force deals. Leadership The Security Council resolution calling for establishment of a mediator to supervise the truce provided that he should be appointed by the permanent members of the Security Council. On the advice of Secretary-General Trygve Lie the permanent members selected Count Folke Bernadotte of Sweden

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39 as Mediator. Count Bernadotte served as Mediator until his assassination by Jewish terrorists in September, 19*8. At that time the Secretary-General appointed Bernadotte' s 22 principal assistant. Dr. Ralph Bunche, as Acting Mediator. The Mediator was vested with both great powers and great responsibilities in the creation of a truce supervision organisation. With few precedents to follow and little guidance from the Security Council or the Assembly, the Mediator made the crucial decisions which gave shape and form to the Truce Organization and, incidentally, set a pattern for the future. According to the United States representative on the Security Council, the Truce Organization was not the product of the Council or the Assembly but of the Mediator who had built it from the staff of the Truce Commission and the staff assembled by the Secretary-General. However, it would be misleading to suggest that the Mediator was unfettered in his determinations regarding the shape and character of the Truce Organization. In fact, the Truce Supervision Organization seems to have evolved from a mix of the Mediator's decisions, the situation itself, and 2"2 It miK ht be noted that although the resolution calls for selection of the Mediator by the Permanent members of +-hP qpruritv Council, Bunche served as Acting Mediator ioi ip^wTveL on the basis of the appointment by the Secrefarfienefaiy ?he appointment was ratified by the Security Council 25 Security Council, Official Record s, 4th Year, 437th meeting (August 11, 19*9), p. TT

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40 the influence of the Secretariat; and of certain of the national delegations, particularly the United States. The relationship between the Mediator and the Secretary-General appears to have been one of close collaboration. Although the critical decisions seem to have been made by the Mediator, there is evidence that the SecretaryGeneral's role in the decision-making process went beyond 24 merely implementing the requests of the Mediator. Several things suggest an important part for the Secretary-General in the Palestine operation: first, the Secretary-General's role in selecting the Mediator, for it was Lie who proposed Bernadotte as Mediator and who appointed Bunche Acting Mediator; second, the close personal friendship between the Secretary-General and both Bernadotte and Bunche; and third, the fact of direct and evidently much-used communications between Lake Success and the Mediator's headquarters at Rhodes. What was the relationship of the Mediator to the Security Council and particularly to those nations which were most concerned with the Palestine question because of ""^According to Stephen Schwehel, the United Nations effort in Palestine might be classified as a joint fieldheadquarters endeavor in which the Mediator and he S^retaryGeneral collaborated in. indispensably interdependent fashion. Stephen Schwebel, The_Secj^toy^ej^er^l„of the Unit edNationgj. His Politica l Powers""and Practice { Cambridge: Harvard University Press," 1952), p. H>.

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41 membership on the Truce Commission and consequently participation in the Truce Supervision Organization? These national representatives exerted little day-to-day influence on the decisions and actions of the Mediator, hut they did hold an ultimate check. If his decisions were not regarded favorably, pressures could be exerted to alter them or to prevent their implementation. Thus, the Mediator's decisions on both the composition and the size of the truce group were modified under the pressure of the national delegations, acting not openly through Security Council rejection of proposals, but through inaction and behind-thescenes pressures. It is not without significance that both Trygve Lie and Count Bernadotte were activists, desiring strong United Nations action to resolve the Palestine issue. While they gave vigorous leadership to the Truce Organization, their more ambitious objectives were curbed by the caution of the Security Council. The scope and limits of the Mediator's powers will become clearer with an examination of the decisions made on such crucial aspects of the truce group as its proper composition and size. Support for t he Truce Org anization Men for the Truce Or ganization. -One of the most significant decisions made with respect to the Truce

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4-2 Organization regarded its composition. Bernadotte 's initial thought was that the Truce Organization should be composed of representatives of the major powers on the Security Council. Accordingly, on May 30, the Mediator contacted the French, British, American, and Soviet military attaches in Cairo inquiring as to the units which they could contribute to a truce control organization. Within days the Mediator's basis of selection of members of the Truce Organization shifted. On June 5 it was made known that, aside from some Swedish officers, only representatives of countries on the Truce Commission, that is, the United States, Prance, and Belgium, would be used in the Truce Organization. The reasons for the Mediator's shift remain' obscure. Bernadotte suggests at least two. On the one hand, in his memoirs he hints that a United States official exercised some discreet pressure in suggesting only members of the 25 Truce Commission take part in truce supervision. On the other hand, in a July 13 statement to the Security Council Bernadotte suggested another reason for changing the basis of selection of observers. He said: 25 Ac cording to Bernadotte on June 2 the American charge d'affaires, calling to inform him unofficially that the United States was willing to contribute twenty-one officers to act as observers and the necessary staff and aircraft, also suggested only members of the Truce Commission participate. Folke Bernadotte, To Jerusalem (London: Hodder and S t ought on, 1951), P. *5.

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4-3 However, in continuing my negotiations with the two parties I was told by the representative of the Provisional Jewish Government that they could not accept having British observers. They felt that, since the British had been there during the period of the Mandate, it would not be a very happy solution to have them coming back as observers. I then had to change the basis for the selection of the observers and, instead of using the five great powers as countries to provide me with these observers, I had to find another solution. I then thought of the Truce Commission in Jerusalem, appointed by the Security Council, in which Belgium, France and the United States were represented; and I asked that my 2 £ observers should be taken from these three countries. Whatever the reasons for the change in formula for participation, the change did bring the Truce Supervision Organization in line with a kind of rough rule-of -thumb being followed in staffing observer groups at that time: exclusion of the Soviet Union from participation and use of the most convenient national representatives (i.e. those with some prior involvement with the question or area). The formula developed to determine who should participate in the Truce Organization had two limitations. First, it restricted participation in the Truce Organization to a narrow base. Second, the exclusion of the Soviet Union from the unit became' a source of criticism of the supervision effort by the Communist bloc. The issue of the composition of the Truce Organization recurs throughout all Security Council discussion of "^Security Council, Official Records 3rd Year, 333rd meeting (July 13, 19*8), p. 4.

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44 the Mediator's work in Palestine. The Soviet delegate repeatedly protested the make-up of the Truce Organization and found in it the explanation for any and all failures of the Organization. 27 The Soviet Union felt Security Council membership should he the basis for participation. They held that the Truce Organization was an American operation. This charge had some foundation. Most of the auxiliary personnel, over one-half the observers, and most of the guard force were American. A broadening of the basis of participation might well have given the group a strengthened mandate as well as a more independent position. ^The Soviet representative had protested vigorously from June 7 forward the discretion given the Mediator in determining the make-up of the Truce Organization. The argument of the Soviet delegate spread over several meetings ran somewhat as follows. The Soviet representative contended that the decision as to which countries should send observers and how these observers should be made available was one for the Security Council, not the Mediator. The connection between the Truce Commission and the observers was rejected on the grounds that nothing in the May 29 resolution indicated that only Truce Commission members should supply military observers. Finally, the Soviet representative expressed inability to understand why the Soviet Union could not send even five observers when the United States was sending twentyone observers as well as ships and planes. The Soviets pushed their objection to a vote in a draft resolution with two significant features: it would have limited the size of the Truce Organization to a maximum of fifty members and it would have allowed any member of the Security Council except Syria to participate. See Security Council, Official Re^ cords, 3rd Year, 314th meeting (June 7, 1948), pp. 3, 6, and ?~and 317th meeting (June 10, 1948), pp. 41-4528 There was a suggestion in the press that the Mediator may have considered including Russian observers in the organization for the Second Truce. A member of the Mediator's staff indicated that only 200 of 300 contemplated observer positions would be filled by nations of the Truce

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*5 let there is no proof that other staffing arrangements would have been feasible or more desirable. On the one hand, the United States contention, apparently supported by other states, was that opening the door to inclusion of even a few Russian observers would complicate the situation and would provide the Russians a toe-hold making more likely Russian participation in any military force which it might be necessary to send into the Middle East. 29 On the other hand, a limited effort in 19*8 to supplement the seconded observers with a truly international group of fifty United Nations guards proved inauspicious. In midJune the Mediator, finding the sixty-three observers initially called for inadequate to the task, requested a force of fifty men from the Secretary-General. Within three days the fifty men, gathered from the United Nations Guard and the Secretariat, left New York for Palestine, outfitted and ready for active duty. The Force, composed of men from seven nations, was hailed as the prototype of a real international police force. The experiment evidently did not Commission, thereby leaving room for the inclusion of observers from other nations. But if such a suggestion^ actually was considered, it was considered only fleetingly, for when arrangements were made for the Second Truce Organization only the original participants were included. The New York Times July 17, 19*8. ^^The New York Times June 6, 19*8. ^Although the majority of members of the force were American there were also two Frenchmen, one Australian, one

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4-6 meet expectations, however, for only seven of the fifty men remained after the First Truce. Moreover, disappointment 31 in the group was voiced by Bernadotte and by others. Had this experiment in international action been successful, it might have advanced substantially the evolution of the peace-keeping technique. As it was, a change in the pattern of recruitment to a broader and, in our opinion, firmer base did not come until 1953. At that time the composition of the group was broadened with the inclusion of observers from nine states (Australia, Canada, Denmark, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden Swede, one Norwegian, one Dane, and one Chinese. In the_ three days of preparation the men were outfitted in tropical uniforms (slate grey shorts, blouse, and pith helmet) and given such necessities as medical kit, flashlight, whistle, and standard police arms. (Ammunition was not supplied for the arms, for the final decision as to whether the force was to be armed was left to the Mediator.) The New York Times, June 18, 19^8, and June 20, 1948. 51 On the one hand, the venture was termed by The New York T imes as the first international police force. The New" York ~ Times June 20, 1948. On the other hand, severe crTtlcisms were made by those in charge. Bernadotte said, "Originally there had been 50 guards on duty in Palestine. But some had declared they wanted to go home to the U.S.A. They went — though they can hardly be described as returning heroes. In newspaper interviews some complained loudly firstly of the dangers they had been exposed to, secondly of the bad food they had had. Neither had the regulations about an eight-hour working day been adhered to. In their own eyes they were poor little boys deserving of all the pity the American public could give them. It is true, of course, that these guards had been hastily and haphazardly recruited in response to our urgent request." Polke Bernadotte, op. cit. p. 198. See also Paul Mohn, "Problems of Truce Supervision," Inter national Conciliation No. 478 (February, 1952), pp. 70-71.

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4-7 as well as the original three — Belgium., France, and the United States), The truce by then had been replaced by an armistice and the Truce Supervision Organization reduced in size and role. A second man power question of critical importance from the outset to the Organization was that of size. How many men should be committed to the Palestine venture? This decision did not remain fixed. It was a product of the demands of the situation and the willingness of the countries involved to contribute. The Mediator's requests for more men were frequently ignored or met only slowly and reluctantly. The needs of an effective truce organization and the desire of participating states to avoid undue involvement in the situation came into conflict at times. A kind of pattern emerges with respect to the size of the Truce Supervision Organization, a pattern which falls into three major phases—growth, stability, reduction. The Organization's period of growth, the most significant of the phases, extends from its origins in June through September, 1948. Within this growth period there is a break between the First and Second Truces. During the period of the First Truce the Mediator expanded his force in three directions from its original nucleus of sixtythree observers. To supplement the original observers, he requested, first, the fifty guards from the Secretariat and, second, thirty more observers, ten from each

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48 of the participating states. These men did not arrive so quickly as had the original contingents; in fact, the last ones appeared only three days before the end of the First Truce. Third, Bernadotte asked the United States for technical help, acquiring approximately seventy persons to serve in such capacities as medical personnel, aircraft pilots, and maintenance men. Thus, hy the end of the First Truce the Organization had roughly 250 persons directly connected with it. (This figure does not include those persons connected more loosely with the operation who operated the four vessels at United Nations disposal.) An organization of this size was not planned initially; it oust grew— under the pressure of its responsibilities. A sharp increase in size occurs with the Second Truce, which commenced in mid-July. Influenced by the deficiencies of the Organization in the First Truce and by the nature of the July 15 resolution, which ordered a truce under Chapter VII and had no time limits attached to it, it was determined that a larger and more professional Truce Supervision Organization was necessary. The observer staff was more than tripled and additional auxiliary personnel were brought in. Bernadotte requested that the United States, France, and Belgium supply 300 officers to act as observers and 300 enlisted soldiers to handle tasks not

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4-9 suitable for officers. 52 The Swedish contingent which served as a command group under Bernadotte, was increased from five to ten members. And once again the United States was asked to supply approximately 100 auxiliary personnel. The Second Truce Organization was not, in fact, as large nor as rapidly established as the Mediator desired. The maximum size Bernadotte formally called for was 600 observers (officers and enlisted men) plus the auxiliary units. In fact, there were never more than 500 observers; the French quota was not filled. Moreover, tbere were exploratory requests for additional forces which were simply never acted on. It would appear that the Mediator had more ambitious plans for the Truce Supervision Organization than the Security Council was willing to support. For example, in July Bernadotte proposed a 1,000 man force for a demilitarized Jerusalem and received French, Belgian, and American commitments to supply one-third of the force each. Yet the first steps to bring such a force into being were never taken. 33 In August Bernadotte requested a small armed force of around forty men to guard the Latrum pumping station. 3 ^0f the 300 soldiers in each category the United States was to supply 125, France 125, and Belgium ,0. ^considerable confusion surrounded this question. At *rX ?? til reoorted that the Mediator thought the one porno it was reported uneio Truce CoramisSecretariat was recr ui ing the f oice f ^ J ^ the sion members, while the national aei ?^ J United impression *e reoruiti^ was be^ng done outsxdet|e e toea o Tuitions framework. II resuiis aie j_uu.xoc-.uj. Q ^r nQZ ,Q one was recruiting. The New York Times, July 18, 19*8.

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50 The men never arrived and as a consequence the station was blown, up by Arab irregulars. In the same month Bernadotte and Frank Begley, United Nations Security Chief, considered a 6,000 man force, armed, for Jerusalem. This too did not get beyond the talking stage. Not only were the Mediator's more ambitious requests for men ignored, but there was a marked slowness in filling some of his more routine requests. There was greater speed in getting men out to Palestine during the First than the Second Truce. And in neither case were observers present in more than symbolic numbers in the important first days of the truce. During the Second Truce the Mediator had particular difficulty with the United States, which bore a large part of the burden of supplying the Organization with men. 5 ^ While the United States attributed its delay in seconding men to such technical factors as being unsure what sort of personnel was desired, 55 the Mediator attributed delay to political factors and particularly to the United States fear of military involvement in Palestine. Such involvement might complicate relations with the Soviet Union and if anything happened to American soldiers in Palestine, ^Vne Mediator made his initial request for 300 observers on July 16; by August 1 only 120 of the 300 had yet arrived, only 30 of whom were from the Unxted States. The United States was also slow in meeting a request for enlisted men to act as auxiliary personnel. ^The New York Times, August '-I-, 19'+8.

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.1 it might have repercussions on the upcoming presidential 36 election. By the end of September most of the delays and difficulties had been resolved and the Truce Organisation had attained its maximum size— 500 observers and 179 auxiliary and Secretariat personnel. The Truce Supervision Organization remained at roughly this size through the first quarter of 194-9. At that point scaled reductions began to be effected by the Acting Mediator because of the transition which was taking place from the truce to the armistice and the parallel decline in incidents. By August, 19*9, when the truce was replaced by the armistice, the observers numbered only 79 • The replacement of the truce by the armistice did not end the life of the Truce Supervision Organization completely. A small organization, ranging in size from 50 to 40 observers plus auxiliary personnel, was retained to help maintain the armistice and cease-fire. In 1956, under the pressure of increasing tensions in the area, the size of the observer group was expanded to 57 men. By 1959 the number of observers had been stabilized at around 120 with a sup37 porting staff of approximately 150 persons. ^Bernadotte, op. cit p. 193. 57 Davi d Brook, T he United Nati ons and the Ar^Israel i/dviu uiy Q/in-nrrrTTvrrv^ doctoral Armistice Syste m, W^hzl 5™ j ilo dissertation, WIT; pp. 117 and 189.

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52 M oney; the financial base -The Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine was more expensive than any previous observer group. The 19'+8 cost of the operation to the United Nations was 13,581,600 and the 19^9 charge $3,14-7,063. The resolution authorizing a mediator and staff •made no provision for financial support. Yet despite the high costs and the absence of specific financial arrangements, financing proved no real problem. The expenses of TJNTSO were included in the regular budget, and the Secret aryGeneral was allowed great freedom in spending for the group. In providing for the support of the Truce Supervision Organization the Secretary-General followed a precedent set in the financing of earlier, more limited observer groups. He drew on the authority of an annual resolution authorizing him to enter into commitments not exceeding two million dollars to meet unforeseen and extraordinary expenses related to the maintenance of peace and security. Since the Truce Organization's commitments exceeded the maximum, it was necessary for the Secretary-General to obtain the concurrence of the Advisory Committee to raise the ceiling to four million dollars. 59 This was accomplished with little difficulty. ~^ 8 The specific resolution the Secretary-General was acting under was resolution 166, adopted by the General Assembly on November 20, 19*7. General Assembly, Official Records 2nd Session, 121st meeting (November 20, 1^7) P* 1213 59 U.N. Doc. A/678, p. 2^8.

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55 The Secretary-General defended successfully his discretionary powers in a brief discussion of the financing question at the General Assembly meeting establishing the position of Mediator. The point was raised by the representative of Yugoslavia that a General Assembly rule of procedure required, all resolutions involving expenditure of funds to be accompanied by a statement of the budgetary implications drawn up by the Secretary-General and approved by the Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (the Fifth Committee). The contention was brushed aside as inapplicable to the situation. The Secretary-General noted, first, that no precise figure could be given since neither the contemplated size of the Mediator's staff nor the duration of his activities was clearly known and, second, that the Secretary-General had authority under resolution 166 to provide funds for the Mediator without prior reference 40 to the Fifth Committee. The Secretary-General's view of the situation seems realistic in retrospect. The innovating nature of the mission made it difficult to set up any over-all plans with respect to expenditures or to estimate accurately the total costs. In May the Secretary-General ventured a tentative 41 4cost estimate of $100,000 for the first year; actual costs "^General Assembly, Official Records, 2nd Special Session, First Committee, 141st meeting (May 14, 1^;, p. 260. ,,-, 41 Ibid. p. 260.

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5* to the United Nations exceeded three million dollars. In a situation as fluid as that in Palestine tight monetary controls would have made establishment of an effective mission far more complicated. The Secretary-General used his discretion to support generously the Truce Supervision Organization. The emphasis was on meeting the needs of the Organization, rather than on narrow budgetary considerations. The Secretary-General reportedly hesitated fco respond negatively to the almost daily requests of the Mediator for fear of prejudicing the truce efforts.^ 2 (It might be noted that the SecretaryGeneral's discretion may, thereby, have been the Mediator's in fact.) Commitments were made with little consideration of the financial implications. For example, Ralph Bunche indicated that as far as he could remember no definite arrangements regarding the final apportionment of costs with respect to the observers had been worked out fully when the request for observers was made. Despite the unexpectedly high expenditures and the experimental quality of the operation, the General Assembly seemed satisfied in the fall of 19*8 with the activities of ""^General Assembly, C^ici^l_Jeco^ ?£?n? eSSi &* Fifth Committee, 158th meeting (November 6, 19*8;, p. b^a, 45 General Assembly, Official Records 3rd Session, Fifth Committee, 157th meeting (November 5, 19*8), pp. 651-52.

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55 the Mediator and the Secretary-General. Little effort was made to exert tighter controls over the mission. The budgetary requests evoked few comments and fewer changes. The request for supplementary funds to cover the cost of the 194-8 operation was passed with only a little complaining about being asked to approve a fait acc ompli. The estimates for 1949 were approved as modified by the Advisory Committee with oust a few critical comments about the high costs. (The Advisory Committee had reduced the Secretary-General's estimates from $4, 092, 000 to $3, 330, 000 for the first ten months of 194-9.) The Soviet representative, reiterating his usual criticism of UNTSO, did express the view that the narrow geographic base of the organization was prejudicial to the effective control of expenditures. This narrow base, in his opinion, contributed to the high level of expenditure on transport, travel expenses, and subsistence. He suggested, therefore, that the nations providing the observers should shoulder a part of the cost of travel and subsistence. ^ A few such discordant notes notwithstanding, when the debate' and voting were concluded, the Palestine mission had won a vote of confidence. A precedent had been set for the discretion of the Secretary-General. ^General Assembly, Official Records, 3rd Session, Fifth Committee, 158th meeting (.November b, 19^-8), p. 657-

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56 It should be noted that the financing of UNT30 might well have raised more difficulties if the United Nations had, in fact, underwritten all the costs of the operation. The dollars and cents expenditures for the Truce Supervision Organization reflected only a fraction of the total cost. A large share of the equipment was received on loan, primarily from the United States and the United Kingdom, the salaries of the observers were paid by the seconding states, and miscellaneous services were performed for the organization free of charge by member states, particularly the United States, Thus, a few states bore a relatively large proportion of the costs of the Truce Organization. Material; the logis tic base. -The logistics problems confronting those responsible for the organization and operation of UNTSO were formidable. The United Nations had little experience with an operation of such magnitude. There were few precedents which could be followed. There was little or no equipment on hand. Decisions had to be made about almost every aspect of the organization. And it was necessary to do more than make decisions: equipment, supplies, men had to be acquired and transported to the area. The nature of the Truce Supervision Organization's assignment, to observe and report, made transportation and communications equipment essential. In the initial stages of the operation the problem of getting essential equipment

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57 on the scene rapidly was eased by the expedient of 'borrowing. Thus, for the First Truce the United States and the Uni-ced Kingdom supplied eight airplanes, over sixty motor vehicles, and most of the needed communications equipment. Moreover, the United States placed three destroyers with their crews and the French one corvette with crew at the disposal of the Mediator for observation work. The United States made additional vessels available for special activities such as the withdrawal of observers at the end of the First Truce and the movement of equipment. Despite these considerable contributions, the Mediator found the amount and quality of equipment available during the First Truce inadequate for an effective Job of truce supervision. In a report to the Security Council Bernadotte concluded that all aspects of truce supervision had been hampered, first, by a lack of communications and, second, by inadequate motor transport and airplanes. Since commercial telecommunications available for the mission were almost non-existent, reliance for communications had to be placed almost entirely on used British and American field equipment operated by slow speed radio operators. It was with difficulty that even limited facilities were maintained """^The New York Times, July 9, W-8, and U.N. Doc S/1025, p. 5.

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58 in the area. The consequent deficiencies in communication caused serious delays, often prevented the maintenance of security of operation, and hampered exercise of operational control of observer groups along fronts. The situation with respect to transport facilities was little better. Both the quantity and the quality of vehicles and planes available left much to be desired. At the outset of the truce no means of transport were available, and it was only slowly that needed items were acquired. Even then many were in a bad state of repair; by the end of the First Truce some 50 per cent of all vehicles were inoperative because of lack of proper maintenance facilities and spare parts. Performance of the functions of patrolling, air reconnaissance, and rapid transport of observers to the scene of incidents suffered correspondingly. Only in the field of naval reconnaissance did the Mediator find the facilities adequate to the requirements of the task. And here the mission was handled, not by seconded personnel with used equipment, but by the regular crews of vessels placed at the service of the United Nations by the United States and France. During the Second Truce an effort was made to remedy these deficiencies. More equipment was acquired and a 46 U.N. Doc. S/1025, p. 11.

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59 larger proportion of it was chartered or purchased outright. Thus, the number of motor vehicles more than doubled, reaching over 150. Bight airplanes were chartered for a total in service of twelve and important communications equipment was purchased. An examination of the annual budget of UNTSO provides insight into the needs of the observers in the field. The 1948 budget reveals that the $3,581,600 outlay went primarily for three categories of expenditures: personnel, 47 transportation, and communications. The costs of personnel were primarily for subsistence and travel. A fifteen dollar per day subsistence allowance was granted all personnel in Palestine. Although some of the delegates found this exorbitant, the Acting Mediator pointed to the hardships, risks, and wartime conditions as justification for the outlay. (It might be noted that these costs were substantially reduced in later peace-keeping operations.) Salaries were paid to Secretariat personnel and certain technicians and locally hired personnel. The transportation co