Soviet space programs, 1971-75 : staff report


Material Information

Soviet space programs, 1971-75 : staff report
Physical Description:
v. : ill. ; 24 cm.
Library of Congress -- Science Policy Research Division
United States -- Congress. -- Senate. -- Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences
U.S. Govt. Print. Off.
Place of Publication:
Publication Date:


Subjects / Keywords:
Astronautics -- Soviet Union   ( lcsh )
Astronautics and state -- Soviet Union   ( lcsh )
federal government publication   ( marcgt )
non-fiction   ( marcgt )


Includes bibliographical references.
Additional Physical Form:
Also available in electronic format.
General Note:
"August 30, 1976."
General Note:
"Prepared by the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division and Economics Division of the Congressional Research Service and the European Law Division of the Law Library, the Library of Congress"--Vol. 2.
General Note:
Volume II prepared by the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division and Economics Division of the Congressional Research Service and the European Law Division of the Law Library, the Library of Congress.
General Note:
At head of title: Committee print.
Statement of Responsibility:
prepared for the use of the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, United States Senate, by the Science Policy Research Division, Congressional Research Service, the Library of Congress ...

Record Information

Source Institution:
University of Florida
Rights Management:
All applicable rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
Resource Identifier:
aleph - 025924113
oclc - 38707528
lcc - 77000939
System ID:

Full Text

" L]L ij]]]~
. . ... .................A

5iA iNUNE FLGH iii.RMS iIOii i
J A MB ..................................,

pAWM H "S ) H

........................... S T T EE N T


-: -r *" '* t .".n* .:'.** :i.:* I .W . ..: .!-
.. :* ": '.: : "*: .' ., ': 'r ::,:, : .
.. -r 4*~"'...A'" :.
-~. I.***. )K^ ^'
S "" Y : 'l *: '. .. ., *; :... *- f, *
.. 'A. : .. .. ...

M:. : . i' : "


g q
~ ~ ~ ~ 7 **..' .41*'. ^ w**
." : "" .: ": : "".. ". :" : ".- .I ":;. ^ .iV..": ": .*

I ... : ... Y'',: .' '
:. ,* : *: ... *':.' F.:: .:*. % .: .*^ *, ^.m ...
:* : -. :, ."-... ... .. ...- : :.. ; (t :.. :: i *
*:. -.. ;: ..* .:. *..: r **

.. ... . : T..: E::. : .,':. :

1W 444449
:.'": .. : .'; "- ""/ V* / :^ : *.::' :!: ::" .

44*:. .. 7 :. ." ."..4 :; .. : :,; ;' .. '. S: : ::. ..
.. .,! V ...... i*r
*" :' : :'* : : i .,
*. .: : : .. .. .:. *': : *i ., .* *::; 4 ? ^^
444, 4 :"4 ": ,.". :%4 1 ..

I ~ 14
el". . "4 :. :.::.: .. "....4 .
I+ 4EW"

.. ... .*4. 4A h:*** *:.. -" y,
::: *: : .* .: ...ll, : ': ::. *:L *: ; .*:,. .:, ; :** '., ? T ^^^^^ ^

S '. ... ". ..
... '' ) .. ,r ... II :

4 .~4 7.j' i t .i: e'.E :: :.: '4'' .:!.' I:'':

.. ..14. .7 .:" I'" .:":7 ':

24 4. .. .. .t ...1.1('.. .
... ; : ." 'E." ." "' : .. .
.ju j.' : .[ '': :. ., .l- .











AUGUST 30, 1976.-Ordered to be printed

Printed for the use of the Committee on Aeronautical
and Space Sciencus



For sale by the Superintendent of Docurnmets, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402 Price '*w,.5


FRANK E. MOSS, Utah, Chairman
JOHN C. STENNIS, Mississippi PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
GILBERT W. KEYES, Staff Director
JAMES T. BRUCE, Professional Staff Member
JAMLS J. GEH RIG, Professional Staff Member
CRAIG M. PETERSON. Chief Clerk/Counsel
JOSEPH L. PLATT, Assistant Chief Clerk
WILLIAM A. SHUMANN, Professional Staff Member
CRAIG VOORHEES, Professional Staff Member
Dr. GLEN P. WILSON, Professional Staff Member
CHARLES F. LOMBARD. Minority Counsel
EARL D. EISENHOWER, Professional Staff Member, Minority
S. Con. Res. 113
Agreed to ArGUST 30, 1976.
Resolved by the Senate (the Houts,, of Reprc.s'niatives coiilur-ling),
That there be printed for the use of the Senate Committee on Aero-
nautical and Space Sciences one thousand five hundred additional
copies each of volumes 1 and 2 of its committee print entitled "Soviet
Space Programs, 1971-1975", Ninety-fouirth Congress, second session,
prepared by the Congressional Research Service with the cooperation
of the Law Library, Library of Congress.


Washington, D.C., January 29, 1976.
Hon. FRANK E. Moss,
Cha irman, Committee on Acronautical and Space Scie nces,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR Moss: Purs',nt to your letter of requestt. the Con-
gressional Research Service with the cooperation of the Law Library
has undertaken a study of the Soviet space program for the years
1971-75. The study has been divided into two volumes, of which this
is the first.
The purpose of the study is to bring up to date previous reports pre-
pared by the Library of Congress for your committee, published in
1962,1966, and 1971.
The first volume has been completed and is herewith submitted.
This volume has sought to review Soviet space resources, facilities
and hardware, past and on-going programs of flights, research and
applications, and projections of future plans.
It should be emphasized that the report is based exclusively upon
unclassified, open sources, both Soviet announcements and independ-
ent checks on such data derived from U.S. observational equipment
whose findings are published in this country, and from corresponding
British data. A comparison of information in this report with that in
classified sources has not been made.
Dr. Charles S. Sheldon II, Chief of the Science Policy Research
Division and Senior Specialist in Space and Transportation Tech-
nology, Congressional Research Service, has been coordinator of the
project. Also, he has been responsible for writing the summary, Chap-
ters 1, 2, 6 and 7, plus preparing the appendices.
Ms. Marcia S. Smith, Analyst in Science and Technology. Congres-
sional Research Service, has been responsible for writing Chapter 3.
Mr. Christopher H. Dodge, Analyst in Life Sciences, Congressional
Res-earch Service, has been responsible for writing Chapter 4.
Ms. Lani Hummel Raleigh, Analyst in Physical Sciences, Con-
gressional Research Service, has been responsible for writing Chap-
ter 5.
Ms. Vikki A. Zegel, Analyst in Life Sciences, Congressional Re-
sen rch Service, has been responsible for writing the Chapter 3 Annex.
Mr. J. Glen Moore, Analyst in Science and Technology, Congres-
sional Research Service, has been responsible for writing the Chapter
7 Annex.
Mr. Geoffrey E. Perry, leader of the Kettering Group based in the
United Kingdom, has been responsible for writing the Chapter 5
Annex and the two Chapter 6 Annexes.



The study has been reviewed by appropriate individuals in more
than one institution of Government in the interest of accuracy and
security, although the final responsibility rests with the authors and
the Congressional Research Service. Thanks are also extended to the
following additional consultants and reviewers of the entire volume:
Mr. Geoffrey E. Perry, Mr. David R. Woods, Mr. Charles P. Vick,
and Mr. Maarten Houtman.
Sincerely yours,
Acting Director.


lVash;ngton, D.C., June 11, 1976.
Hon. FRANK E. Moss,
Chairman, Committee on A eronautical and Sp,,(t Sciences,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR M.. CHAIRMAN: Transmitted herewith is a report, Soviet
Space Programs, 1971-1975, in two volumes. The report was prepared
for the use of the Committee by the Congressional Research Service,
with the cooperation of the Law Library, Library of Congress. This
report is a follow-on to similar reports published at intervals since
1962. It is, as are its predecessors, a comprehensive and detailed study
of the Soviet space program.
Volume I provides an overview of the Soviet space program, its
facilities and hardware, the manned and unmanned Soviet space mis-
sions, Soviet bioastronautics, Soviet civilian and military applications,
and projects future Soviet space plans. Volume II examines the goals
and purposes of the Soviet space program, the organization of space
activities in the Soviet Union, allocation of resources to Soviet space
activities and Soviet attitudes towards international space cooperation
and space law.
The report was prepared under the direction of Dr. Charles S.
Sheldon, II of the Congressional Research Service, Library of Con-
gress. Dr. Sheldon, one of the free world's foremost authorities on
Soviet space activities, is also the major contributor to the study.
Other parts of the study were prepared by other experts in the Library
of Congress, and Geoffrey E. Perry, consultant from the United
Mr. Fred Doering of the Government Printing Office prepared the
report for printing.
In every respect this report is a remarkable accomplishment. It
represents scholarship at the highest level but was done at minimum
I believe that this study of Soviet space programs has resulted in an
important report and will be most useful to the Committee and to
other members of the Congress.
Staff Dirc-tor.

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2013


I. Overview, supporting facilities and launch vehicles of the Soviet 'age
space program-------------------------------------------- 1
A. Overall trend------------------------------------------ 1
1. Gross statistics--------------------------------- 1
2. Breakdown by categories -------------------------- 1
3. Comparative weights of payload ------------------ 1
B. Launch sites in the Soviet Union ------------------------ 1
1. Tyuratam-------------------------------------- 1
2. Plesetsk--------------------------------------- 2
3. Kapustin Yar----------------------------------- 2
C. Soviet launch vehicles---------------------------------- 2
1. The standard launch vehicle series ("A")----------- 2
2. The small utility launch vehicle ("B")------------ 2
3. The flexible intermediate vehicle ("C") ------------ 2
4. The non-military large launch vehicle ("D")------- 2
5. The military combat space launch vehicle ("F") .- 2
6. The very heavy launch vehicle ("G")-------------- 3
D. Tracking and other ground support ---------------------- 3
1. Communications needs--------------------------- 3
2. Earth orbital tracking in the U.S.S.R-------------- 3
3. Foreign tracking stations------------------------- 3
4. Sea-based support ------------------------------- 3
5. Deep space tracking----------------------------- 3
6. Space operations and data processing centers------ 3
7. Space research centers--------------------------- 3
8. Manufacturing and assembly centers for spacecraft
and rockets----------------------------------- 3
9. Test and training centers for space ---------------- 4
II. Program details of unmanned flights---------------------------- 4
A. Early years------------------------------------------- 4
B. The Kosmos program--------------------------------- 4
1. Kosmos scientific flights-------------------------- 4
2. Kosmos precursor flights------------------------- 4
3. Flight mission failures disguised as Kosmos--------- 5
C. Other recent scientific flights---------------------------- 5
1. The Prognoz program------------------------- 5
2. French payloads carried by Soviet launch vehicles--- 5
3. Indian and Swedish payloads carried by Soviet launch
vehicles------------------------------------- 5
4. Soviet vertical rocket probes---------------------- 5
D. The second generation of planetary flights ---------------- 5
1. The Mars attempts of 1971 and 1973-------------- 5
2. The Venus attempts of 1975 --------------------- 6
E. The third generation of lunar flights ---------------------- 6
1. Luna 16, 18, 20, and 23------------- -------- 6
2. Luna 17 and 21 --------------------------------- 6
3. Luna 19 and 22---------------------------- 6


III. Program details of man-related flights--------------------------- 6
A. Early years ------------------------------------------- 6
B. The Soyuz program---------------------------------- 7
1. Soyuz ferry flights to S:tlyut space stations--------- 7
2. The Apollo-Soyuz Te-t, Project- ------------------- 8
C. The Zond program of manned circumlunar precursors---- 8
D. The Soviet manned lunar landing program---------------- 8
E. Unmanned biological flights----------------------------- 9
IV. The Soviet space life sciences----------------------------------- 9
A. Cosmonaut selection and training------------------------- 9
B. Space medicine------------------------------------ 9
C. Life support systems and technology--------------------- 9
D. Gravitational biology and medicine ---------------------- 9
E. Space radiation---------------------------------------- 10
F. Gas atmospheres and pr, -sures ------------------------- 10
G. Space biology and exobiology ----------------------------- 10
H. Conclusion-------------------------------------------- 10
V. Soviet application of space to the economy-------_---------------- 10
A. Communications satellitce------------------------------- 10
1. Molniya satellites------------------------------- 10
2. Statsionar satellites------------------------------ 11
3. International cooperation------------------------- 11
4. Direct br(oadcast--------------------------------- 11
B. Meteorological satellites-------------------------------- 11
1. Meteor satellites-------------------------------- 11
2. Experimental weather satellites------------------- 11
C. Other civil applications--------------------------------- 11
VI. Soviet military space activities --------------------------------- 12
A. Introduction------------------------------------------ 12
B. Extension of civil type space activities to military needs --- 12
C. Navigation----------------------------------------- 12
D. Space related control systems--------------------------- 12
E. Electronic frrc'tiig or elint s;Lce missions---------------- 12
F. Minor missions in space for the military------------------ 13
G. Early warning satellites-------------------------------- 13
H. Military manned space missions------------------------- 13
I. Recoverable military observation flights------------------ 13
J. Ocean surveillance------------------------------------- 13
K. Fractional orbit bombardment system satellites----------- 13
L. Military interceptor/inspector/destructor satellites--------- 13
M. Ground based space detection and defense systems-------- 13
N. Orbital bombs stationed in orbit------------------------ 14
0. Analysis of Soviet flights to discover the military component- 14
1. Minor military missions------------------------- 14
2. Electronic ferret or elint missions---------------- 14
3. Navigation and navigation/geodetic mi-sions------- 14
4. Obscure missions operating in the store/dump mode 14
5. Targets for interception and the interceptors them-
selves--------------------------------------- 14
6. Fractional orbit bombardment satellites ----------- 14
7. Military ocean radar surveillance ----------------- 14
8. Early warning satellites-------------------------- 14
9. Military observation photographic missions -------- 14
VII. Projections of Soviet space plans-------------------------------- 15
A. General technical capabilities---------------------------- 15
B. Unmanned space flights-------------------------------- 15
C. Manned space flight----------------------------------- 16
D. Soviet philosophy toward their space program------------- 16

I. Overall trends in flights---------------------------------------- 17
A. Gross statistics----------------------------------------- 18
Table 1-1-Worldwide record of known space launchings- 20
B. Breakdown by categories-------------------------------- 22
Table 1-2-Summary of Soviet space payloads by mission
category (with U.S. comparisons)------------------ 23


I. Overall trends in flights-Continued
B. Breakdown by cat cgo ric,--Continued Page
Table 1-3-Detailed summary of Soviet space payloads
by launch site, launch inclination, name or category,
launch vehicle and year--------------------------- 25
Table 1-4-Summary of Soviet space payloads by name- 29
C. Comparative weight of payload-------------------------- 30
Table 1-5-World table of payload weight to orbit or
beyond----------------------------------------- 32
IT. Launch sites in the Soviet Union-------------------------------- 33
A. Tyuratam. -------------------------------------------- 33
B. Plesetsk----------------------------------------------- 35
C. Kapnitin Yar------------------------------------------ 36
Table 1-6-Number of successful orbital and escape
launches by site and by year----------------------- 38
III. Soviet launch vehicles------------------------------------------ 39
Table 1-7-Number of succe-ssful launches to Earth orbit and
beyond by basic first stage by year------------------------ 40
Table 1-8-Soviet launch vehicle characteristics--------------- 43
Table 1-9-Soviet launch vehicle lifting capabilities ----------- 46
Table 1-10-Soviet launch vehicle upper stages and capacities.-- 47
A. The standard launch vehicle series ("A")------------------ 48
1. The original version-A-------------------------- 48
2. Launch vehicle with lunar upper stage, A-1 --------- 49
3. Launch vehicle with improved planetary upper stage,
A-2----------------------------------------- 50
4. The added stage version for eccentric orbits and
escape missions, A-2-e- ------------------------ 51
5. The standard vehicle with maneuvering stage, A-m- 52
6. The standard vehicle possibly in an A-l-m configura-
tion------------------------------------------ 52
7. The standard vehicle possibly in an A-2-m configura-
tion- ----------------------------------------- 52
B. The small utility launch vehicle ("B")-------------------- 53
C. The flexible intermediate launch vehicle ("C")------------- 54
D. The non-military large launch vehicle ("D")------------ 55
1. The basic vehicle without extra stages, D----------- 55
2. The improved vehicle with an added stage, D-1 ----- 56
3. The improved vehicle with regular upper stage plus
an escape stage, D-l-e------------------------- 57
4. The possible use of a D-l-m version--------------- 58
E. The military combat space launch vehicle ("F")----------- 58
1. Use as a weapons carrier, F-l-r ------------------- 60
2. Use as a maneuvering vehicle, F-l-m -------------- 61
F. The very heavy launch vehicle ("G")--------------------- 61
Table 1-11-Soviet surface-to-surface land-based stra-
tegic missiles------------------------------------- 65
IV. Tracking and other ground support------------------------------- 66
A. Communications needs---------------------------------- 66
B. Earth orbital tracking in the U.S.S.R -------------------- 66
C. Foreign tracking stations-------------------------------- 67
D. Sea-basedsupport-------------------------------------- 67
1. Kosmonavt Vladimir Komarov --------------------- 68
2. Akademik Sergey Korolev- ------------------------ 69
3. Kosmonavt Yuriy Gagarin------------------------- 69
Table 1-12-Characteristics of known Soviet
space and missile monitoring and control ships- 71
4. Other tracking ships------------------------------ 72
5. General locations of Soviet tracking ships----------- 72
E. Deep space tracking------------------------------------ 73
F. Space operations and data processing centers-------------- 73
G. Space research centers ---------------------------------- 76
H. Manufacturing and assembly centers for spacecraft and
rockets---------------------------------------------- 76
I. Test and training centers for space----------------------- 77

I. Early years -----------------------------..------------------- 79
A. Origins of the Soviet space program---------------------- 79
1. Early interest------------ ------------------ 79
2. Organization of the Soviet effort for space ------- 81
3. Soviet weapons planning---------------.-..---------- 81
4. Plans for the International Geophysical Year----- -- 82
B. The first Sputniks -------------------------------------82
1. Sputnik 1 --------------------------------------82
2. Sputnik 2-------------- ------------------------83
3. Sputnik 3------------------------------ --------83
C. The first Lunas--------------------------------------- 84
1. Luna 1 -------------------------------------- 84
2. Luna 2 ---------------------------------- 84
3. Luna 3---------------------------------------- 84
D. The Korabl Sputniks----------------- ----------------- 85
E. Beginnings of the planetary program--------------------- 85
1. 1960 Mars attempts ----------------------------- 85
2. 1961 Venus attempts----------------------------- 85
3. 1962 Venus attempts----------------------------- 86
4. 1962 Mars attempts----------------------------- 86
5. 1964 Venus attempts----------------------------- 87
6. 1964 Mars attempts ----------------------------- 87
7. 1965 Venus attempts----------------------------- 88
8. 1967 Venus attempts----------------------------- 88
9. 1969 Venus attempts----------------------------- 90
Table 2-1-Atmosphere of Venus, early Soviet
data ------------------------------------91
10. 1970 Venus attempts -----------------------------91
11. 1972 Venus attempts----------------------------- 92
F. The second generation lunar program --------------------- 93
1. Change of technology---------------------------- 93
2. 1963 Moon attempt------------------------------ 93
3. 1965 lunar attempts------------------------------ 94
4. 1966 lunar attempts------------------------------ 94
5. 1968 lunar attempt------------------------------ 99
G. The first maneuverable satellites------------------------ 99
H. The Elektron program --------------------------------- 100
I. The Proton program----------------------------------- 100
1. Proton 1--------------------------------------- 100
2. Proton 2------------- ------------------------ 101
3. Proton 3-------------------------------------- 101
4. Proton 4 ------------------------------------- 101
II. The]Kosmos program------------------------------------------ 102
A. The need for Kosmos--------------------------------- 102
B. The cover plan of Kosmos------------------------------- 103
C. Broad categories within Kosmos- ------------------------ 106
D. Techniques for defining Kosmos missions----------------- 107
E. Kosmos scientific missions------------------------------- 109
1. Use of the B-1 for scientific flights----------------- 109
Table 2-2-Identifiable use of the B-1 launch
vehicle for scientific orbital missions-------- 110
2. Use of the C-1 for scientific flights---------------- 112
Table 2-3-Identifiable use of the C-1 launch
vehicle for scientific orbital missions-------- 113
3. Use of the A-1 and A-2 for scientific supplemental
payloads -------------------------------- 113
Table 2-4-Identification and possible use of the
A-1 and A-2 launch vehicles for Kosmos
scientific and supplemental payloads-------- 116
F. Kosmos military flights--------------------------------- 118
G. Precursor flights within Kosmos ----------------------- 118
H. Flight mission failures disguised as Kosmos---------------- 118
I. Summary on Kosmos flights---------------------------- 119
Table 2-5-Summary recapitulation of Kosmos, other
name, and unacknowledged Soviet space payloads by
mission category, 1957-1975---------------------- 119


II. The Kosmos program-Continued Page
J. The Interkosmos program------------------------------- 120
1. Overview of all international orbital flights-------- 120
Table 2-6-Summary list of Soviet orbital and
escape flights which carried experiments of
other nations------------------------------ 121
2. Interkosmos flights of the period 1968-1970-------- 123
3. Interkosmos 5----------------------------------- 123
4. Interkosmos 6----------------------------------- 124
5. Interkosmos 7----------------------------------- 124
6. Interkosmos 8----------------------------------- 124
7. Interkosmos Kopernik 500----------------------- 125
8. Interkosmos 10- -------------------------------- 125
9. Interkosmos 11-------------------------------- 125
10. Interkosmos 12 ---------------------------------- 125
11. Interkosmos 13---------------------------------- 126
12. Interkosmos 14---------------------------------- 126
III. Other recent scientific flights------------------------------------ 126
A. The Prognoz program----------------------------------- 126
1. Prognoz 1-------------------------------------- 126
2. Prognoz 2------------------------------------- 127
3. Prognoz 3-------------------------------------- 127
4. Prognoz 4-------------------------------------- 127
B. French payloads carried by Soviet launch vehicles--------- -128
1. Oreol 1.-------------------------------------- 128
2. MAS-1----------------------------------------- 128
3. Prognoz 2-------------------------------------- 128
4. Oreol 2----------------------------------------- 128
5. MAS-2- -------------------------------------- 129
6. Further French experiments----------------------- 129
C. Indian payload carried by a Soviet launch vehicle---------- 129
1. Antecedents------------------------------------- 129
2. Aryabhata-------------------------------------- 129
3. A second flight---------------------------------- 130'
D. Swedish cooperative programs--------------------------- 130
E. Soviet vertical rocket probes----------------------------- 130
1. National flights---------------------------------- 130
2. The Vertikal international program ---------------- 132
IV. The second generation of planetary flights------------------------ 133
A. Soviet use of planetary windows------------------------- 133
B. The Mars attempts of 1971------------------------------ 133
1. Launch failures---------------------- ---------- 133
2. Launch of Mars 2, Mars 3, and Mariner 9---------- 134
3. In-flight progress-------------------------------- 134
4. Mars 2 arrival----------------------------------- 135
5. Mars 3 arrival----------------------------------- 135
6. Instruments on the landers ------------------------- 136
7. The orbital buses and their activity- -------------- 136
C. The Mars attempts of 1973------------------------------ 138
1. The launches of Mars 4, Mars 5, Mars 6 and Mars 7- 138
2. The flight en route- ------------------------------ 138
3. Arrival at Mars--------------------------------- 139
4. Follow-up details of the flights------------------- 139
D. The Venus attempts of 1975----------------------------- 142
1. Launch of Venera 9 and Venera 10----------------- 142
2. En route to Venus -------------------------------142
3. Landing of Venera 9----------------------------- 142
4. Landing of Venera 10---------------------------- 143
5. The Venera 9 and 10 orbiters---------------------- 144
V* The third generation of lunar flights----------------------------- 144
A. Luna 15 ----------------------------------------------145
B. Kosmos 300 and Kosmos 305---------------------------- 146
C. Luna 16----------------------------------------------- 146
1. Comparative cost of Luna 16 and a typical Apollo
mission--------------------------------------- 149
D. Luna 17 and Lunokhod 1-------------------------------- 151
1. Flight of Luna 17 -------------------------- 151
2. Description of Lunokhod roving vehicle ------------151


V. The third generation of lunar flights-Continued
D. Luna 17 and Lunokhod 1-Continued
3. Review of operational life- ------------------------ 152
Table 2-7-Summary record of the performance
of Lunokhod 1---------------------------- 154
4. Scientific findings- ------------------------------- 154
5. Relative minerits of manned versus unmanned roving
lunar vehicles---------------------------------- 155
Table 2-8-Comparison of Lunokhod 1 and
Apollo 15 rover---------------------------- 155
E. Luna 18 --------------------------------------------- 156
F. Luna 19 --------------------------------------------- 156
G. Luna 20----------------------------------------------- 157
1. Flight of Luna 20-------------------------------- 157
2. Surface activity------------------------------- 157
3. Iturn i flight and recovery------------------------ 158
4. Scientific rcsults--------------------------------- 158
H. Luna 21 and Lunokhod 2_-------------------------------- 159
1. Flight of Luna 21-------------------------------- 159
2. Opcr:itions of Lunokhod 2 ------------------------ 159
Table 2-9-Summary record of the performance
of Lunokhod 2-------------------------- 160
I. Luna 22----------------------------------------------- 163
J. Luna 23 --------------------------------------------- 164
VI. Statistical table-; on deep sp:ce missions-------------------------- 165
Table 2-10-Summary of lunar distance, flight attempts-------- 166
Table 2-11-Summary of planetary distance flight attempts----.... 170

I. Early years-------------------------------------------------- 173
A. Advance preparation for manned flight- ------------------ 173
1. Sputnik 2-------------------------------------- 173
B. The Korabl Sputnik precursors to Vostok ----------------- 174
1. Korabl Sputnik 1------------------------------- 174
2. Korabi Sputnik 2-------------------------------- 174
3. Korabl Sputnik 3-------------------------------- 174
4. Korabl Sputnik 4-------------------------------- 175
5. Korabi Sputnik 5-------------------------------- 175
C. The Vostok program----------------------------------- 175
1. Vostok 1--------------------------------------- 175
2. Vostok 2-_---------------------------- 176
3. Vostok 3--------------------------------------- 176
4. Vostok 4--------------------------------------- 176
5. Vostok 5--------------------------------------- 176
6. Vostok 6--------------------------------------- 176
D. Kosmos precursors to Voskhod-------------------------- 177
E. The Voskhod program---------------------------------- 177
1. Voskhod 1 ------------------------------------- 177
2. Voskhod 2- ------------------------------------- 178
II.SThe Soyuz program --------------------------------------------179
A. Precursor flights to Soyuz------------------------------- 179
B. Soyuz flights 1-9--------------------------------------- 179
1. Soyuz 1---------------------------------------- 179
2. Kosmos 186 and 188----------------------------- 10
3. Kosmos 212 and 213----------------------------- 181
4. Kosmos 238------------------------------------ 181
5. Soyuz 2---------------------------------------- 182
6. Soyuz 3---------------------------------------- 182
7. Soyuz 4 and 5----------------------------------- 182
8. Soyuz 6, 7 and 8-------------------------------- 183
a. Soyuz 6--------------------------------- 184
b. Soyuz 7--------------------------------- 184
c. Soyuz 8---------------------------------- 184
9. Soyuz 9---------------------------------------- 184


II. The Soyuz program-Continued
Pa e
C. Further tests: Kosmos 379, 382, 3TQ and 434 -------------- 186
Table 3-1-Flight parameters of Kosmos 379, 382, 398 and
434---------------------------------------------- 186
D. The space station era----------------------------------- 187
1. Soyuz 10 atnd 11 with Salvut 1 ------------------- 187
a. Salyut 1 --------------------------------- 187
b. Soyuz 10-------------------------------- 189
c. Soyuz 11-------------------------------- 190
Table 3-2-Daily log of activities on Salyut 1
during the period Soyuz 11 was docked to it-- 192
2. Kosmus 496---------------------------------- 194
3. Salyut 2-------------------------------------- 194
4. Kosmos 557----------------------------------- 195
5. Kosmos 573----------------------------------- 196
6. Soyuz 12-------------------------------------- 196
7. Kusmos 613---------------------------------- 197
8. Soyuz 13-------------------------------------- 197
9. Kosmos 638, 656, and 672----------------------- 199
10. Kosmos 670----------------------------------- 199
11. Soyuz 14 and 15 with Salyut 3------------------- 200
a. Salyut 3-------------------------------- 200
b. Soyuz 14------------------------------ 201
c. Soyuz 15-------------------------------- 204
12. Soyuz 16------------------------------------- 204
13. Soyuz 17 and 18 with Salyut 4 ------------------- 206
a. Salyut 4-------------------------------- 206
b. Soyuz 17------------------------------ 208
c. April 5 Anomaly ------------------------ 211
d. Soyuz 18------------------------------- 212
14. Soyuz 19, the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project---------- 213
15. Kosmos 772---------------------------------- 214
16. Soyuz 20 with Salyut 4------------------------ 214
III. The Zond program of precursors to manned circumlunar flight------ 214
A. Zond 4----------------------------------------------- 214
B. Zond 5 -----------------------------------------------215
C. Zond 6----------------------------------------------- 216
D. Zond 7--------------------------------------------- 217
E. Zond 8----------------------------------------------- 217
IV. The Soviet manned lunar landing program----------------------- 218
A. Verbal evidence--------------------------------------- 218
B. Technical capability----------------------------------- 219
1. Rendezvous and docking------------------------- 219
2. The spaceship---------------------------------- 220
3. The launch vehicle-------------- ---------------- 220
C. Conclusion-------------------------------------------- 221
V. Unmanned biological flights------------------------------------ 221
A. Komos 110------------------------------------------- 221
B. Kosmos 605------------------------------------------- 222
C. Kosmos 690------------------------------------------- 222
D. Kosmos 782------------------------------------------- 222
E. Soyuz 20--------------------------------------------- 223
VI. The Soviet cosmonauts--------------------------------------- 224
A. Biographies of cosmonauts------------------------------ 225
Table 3-3-Summary list of Soviet cosmonauts------ 228
VII. Statistical tables on manned space flight------------------------- 229
Table 3-4-U.S. and U.S.S.R. manned space flights----------- 230
Table 3-5-Soviet flights related to biological payloads-------- 233
Table 3-6-Soviet crews by program -----------------------238
Table 3-7-Manned spaceflight programs summarized (Soviet)- 239
Table 3-8-Manned spaceflight programs summarized (U.S.)--- 239
Table 3-9-Comparative time spent on space missions--------- 241
Table 3-10-List of deceased astronauts and cosmonauts ------ 242


I. Mission Summary ---------------------------------------------243
A. ASTP crews------------------------------------------- 244
B. ASTP hardware---------------------------------------- 245
C. ASTP experiments ------------------------------------- 245
1. Photography of the solar corona and zodiacal light
against the background of the night sky --------- 246
2. Investigation of refraction and transparency of the
upper layers of the atmosphere----------------- 246
3. Photography of daytime and dust horizon- ------246
4. Microorganisnis growth------------------------- 246
5. Fish embryonic development- -------------------- 246
6. Genetic experiments---------------------------- 246
7. Artificial solar eclipse--------------------------- 246
8. Ultraviolet absorption--------------------------- 246
9. Zone-forming fungi----------------------------- 246
10. Microbial exchange test ------------------------- 247
11. Furnace system experiments- -------------------- 247
II. Historical background----------------------------------------- 247
A. ASTP agreement-------------------------------------- 247
B. U.S.-Soviet cooperation- -------------------------------- 247
C. U.S.-Soviet preliminary talks---------------------------- 249
1. Key personnel---------------------------------- 250
III. Joint preparations--------------------------------------------- 250
A. Astronaut and cosmonaut training- ---------------------- 250
B. Simulations------------------------------------------- 251
C. ASTP docking system development---------------------- 251
1. APDS development------------------------------ 251
D. Spacecraft atmosphere and pressure differences ------------ 252
E. Communications-------------------------------------- 252
IV. Political issues------------------------------------------------ 252
A. Contributions to detente-------------------------------- 253
B. U.S. doubts-Senator Proxmire and the C.I.A- ----------- 253
C. Post-ASTP plans for future U.S.-U.S.S.R. cooperation in
space----------------------------------------------- 254
V. Summary---------------------------------------------------- 254

I. Introduction-------------------------------------------------- 257
A. Informationresources----------------------------------- 257
Figure 4-1-Soviet literature agencies and interrdela-
tionships ---------------------------------------- 259
Figure 4-2-Soviet literature for life sciences digest ----- 260
Table 4-1-Foundations of space biology and medicine-. 261
Table 4-2-Space life scien..-; source journals----------- 263
B. Organization of the Soviet space life sciences effort ---------- 266
Figure 4-3-Organization of Soviet biomedical institu-
tions------------------------------------------- 267
II. Cosmonaut selection and training------------------------------- 27%
A. The selection process----------------------------------- 270
B. The training process------------------------------------ 273
1. General protocol-------------------------------- 273
2. Vestibular training------------------------------- 275
3. Visualtraining---------------------------------- 276
4. Acceleration training----------------------------- 277
5. Weightlessness training--------------------------- 277
6. Physical and survival training--------------------- 278
7. Behavioral and simulator training----------------- 279
Table 4-3-Soviet training devices for condi-
tioning the operational habits of co-monauts-- 280
III. Space medicine---------------------------------------------- 281
A. Medical monitoring----------------------------------- 281
B. Medical instrumentation and biotelem',-try ---------------- 283
Table 4-4-Biomedical monitoring on Soviet and
United States spacecraft 1957-1975--------------- 283
Table 4-5-Characteristics of biomedical monitoring
systems for different manned spacecraft missions.--- 284


III. Space medicine-Continued Page
C. Exercise and associated equipment---------------------- 285
D. Medication and emergency drugs----------------------- 287
E. Nutrition--------------------------------------- 288
F. Work-rest cycles and biological rhythms ----------------- 289
G. Biomedical findings----------------------------------- 291
Table 4-6-Dynamics of change in body weight of
cosmonauts after flight-------------------------- 292
IV. Life support systems and technology--------------------------- 293
A. Air regeneration and space cabin ecology----------------- 293
Table 4-7-Oxygen content of certain peroxide com-
pounds of alkali metals and their capacity for ab-
sorption of carbon dioxide----------------------- 294
B. Water and food management- -------------------------- 295
C. Waste management------------------------------------ 296
D. Space suits and clothing ----------------------------- 296
E. Man-machine interactions ----------------------------- 297
F. Rescue equipment and emergency measures-------------- 298
Table 4-8-Means of cosmonaut protection and rescue
in case of rapid depressurization of spacecraft cabin-- 299
G. Future trends and systems----------------------------- 300
Figure 4-4-Characteristics of integrated life-support
systems---------------------------------------- 301
V. Gravitational biology and medicine---------------------------- 302
A. Linear accelerations----------------------------------- 302
B. Weightlessness and simulated weightlessness-------------- 305
Table 4-9-Reactions of man and animals to effects
of weightlessness-------------------------------- 306
Figure 4-5-Proposed process of adaptation to weight-
lessness ---------------------------------------- 308
Figure 4-6-Overview of current hypothesis concerning
processes involved in man's adaptation to zero
gravity--------------------------------------- 308
Figure 4-7-Effects of the influence of weightlessness
on man---------------------------------------- 309
Table 4-10-Means of preventing adverse effects of
long-term weightlessness------------------------- 311
C. Rotatory environments and vestibular factors------------ 312
D. Noise and vibration----------------------------------- 315
VI. Problems of space radiation----------------------------------- 316
A. The space radiation environment----------------------- 316
Table 4-11-Nature and location of electromagnetic
and particulate ionizing radiations in space-------- 317
Table 4-12-Average dose absorbed by the astronauts,
according to thermoluminescent dosimetry data----- 318
B. Biomedical aspects of space radiation-------------------- 319
Table 4-13-Expected short-term effects from acute
wholebody radiation--------------------------- 319
C. Radiation in combination with other spaceflight factors-- 321
D. Radioprotective compounds and shielding--------------- 323
E. Non-ionizing radiations and force fields----------------- 324
VII. Gas atmospheres and pressures------------------------------- 325
A. Hyperoxic environments------------------------------ 325
B. Hypoxic environments-------------------------------- 327
C. Carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, and inert gases-------- 329
Figure 4-8-Classification of C02 toxic action effects in
relation to P co2 -------------------------------- 329
Table 4-14-Toxic effects of elevated CO2 ------------ 330
D. Pressure effects--------------------------------------- 332
Figure 4-9-P co2 of the AGA as a function of baro-
metric pressure; three zones of oxygen supply: -
hypoxia, normoxia, and hyperoxia---------------- 332
E. Respiration and toxicology---------------------------- 334
VIII. Space and exobiology-------------------------------------- 334
A. The biosatellite program------------------------------- 334
B. Exobiology------------------------------------------ 339
C. The search for extraterrestrial intelligent life- ------------ 341
IX. Conclusions------------------------------------------------- 343


I. Early recognition of potential uses of applications satellites--------- 345
II. Communication satellites ---------------------------------------345
A. Early experiments-------------------------------------- 345
B. The Molniya system -------------------------------- 14
1. Description of Molniya 1------------------------- 346
2. Operation of Molniva I --------------------------- 347
3. Molniya 2---------_----------------------------- 348
4. Molniya 3-------------------------------------- 348
5. Launch programs of Molniya 1, Molniya 2, and
Molniya 3------------------------------------ 348
Table 5-1-List of Soviet communications-related
space flights------------------------- ------ 349
6. The Orbita ground station system ---------------- 349
a. Station construction----------------------- 350
b. Orbita station locations-------------------- 350
c. Operation of Orbita stations---------------- 350
C. The synchronous communications satellites---------------- 351
1. Kosmos 637, Molniya 1-S-1 and Kosmos 775------ 351
2. Statsionar/Raduga------------------------------- 351
D. Broader proposals and applications of Soviet communications
satellites-------------------------------------------- 353
1. International links----------------_---------------- 353
a. Intersputnik system --------------------- 353
b. U.S.-U.S.S.R. cooperation------------------ 354
c. Washington-Moscow hot line --------------- 354
d. "Mars" portable ground station------------- 355
2. Joint experiments with Franc_---------------------- 355
E. Future of communicate( ns satellites-technical considerations
and direct broadcast satellite -------------------------- 355
III. Meteorological satellites---------------------------------------- 357
A. Early experiments-------------------------------------- 357
1. Kosmos 14 and 23------------------------------- 357
2. Kosmos 45, 65 and 92---------------------------- 357
3. Kosmos 44, 58, 100 and 118----------------------- 357
B. The announced weather satellites of the Kosmos series------ 358
1. Kosmos 122------------------------------------- 358
a. Instrumentation-------------------------- 358
b. Payload appearance----------------------- 358
2. Kosmos 144------------------------------------- 359
3. Kosmos 156------------------------------------- 360
4. Kosmos 184------------------------------------- 360
5. Kosmos 206------------------------------------- 360
6. Kosmos 226------------------------------------- 360
C. The Meteor system of weather reporting ----------------- 360
D. The fully operational Meteor satellites-------------------- 361
1. The launch program of the weather-related satellites- 361
Table 5-2-List of Soviet weather-related space
flights (main sequence)--------------------- 361
2. Operation of the Meteor system------------------- 362
3. Future of meteorological satellites------------------ 363
E. Soviet weather rockets---------------------------------- 364
F. Other weather-related flights----------------------------- 364
1. Molniva 1-3 and Molniya 1-4--------------------- 365
2. Kosmos 149 and 320----------------------------- 365
3. Kosmos 243------------------------------------- 365
IV. Navigation satellites------------------------------------------- 366
A. Soviet references to navigation satellites------------------- 366
B. Actual navigation satellite flights ------------------------- 367
V. Earth resources satellites --------------------------------------- 367
A. Earth resources data from the Meteor satellites ------------ 368
B. Manned flights gathering Earth resources data------------- 369
C. Permanent space stations-------------------------------- 369


Table 5A-1-Replacement sequence of Molniya 1 satellites ---------------372
Table 5A-2-Replncement sequence of Molniya 2 satellites------------- 373
Table 5A-3-Molniya time and longitude of ascending nodi,-- ----------- 373

I. Introduction ------------------------------------------------375
A. Definitional underpinning- of military space aictivity.------ 375
B. Soviet statements on spice for military purpie-c.--,-_ 377
II. Extension of civil type space activities to military needs---------- 380
A. Weather reporting ------------------------------------ 380
B. Regular communications ----------------------------- 381
C. Geodesy and mapping--------------------------------- 381
III. Navigation ----------------------3----------------------- 83
IV. Space-related control systems--------------------------------- 384
A. Traffic control---------------------------------------- 384
B. Military command and control------------------------- 385
C. Other secure systems---------------------------------- 386
V. Electronic ferreting or elint space missions ---------------------- 387
VI. Minor missions in space for the military ------------------------ 388
VII. Early warning military satellites------------------------------- 388
VIII. Military manned space missions------------------------------- 389
IX. Recoverable military observation flights- ----------------------- 390
X. Ocean surveillance------------------------------------------- 393
XI. Fractional orbit bombardment system satellites------------------ 393
XII. Military interceptor/inspector/destructor satellites ------------395
XIII. Ground-based space detection and defense systems--------------- 395
XIV. Orbital bombs stationed in space- ------------------------------ 398
XV. Analysis of Soviet flights to discover the military component----- 400
A. Use of the B-1 vehicle at Kapustin Yar and Plesetsk----- 401
1. Kapustin Yar--------------------------------- 401
2. Plesetsk------------------------------ ---------401
3. Other B-1 flights at both sites- ------------------ 402
Table 6-1-Probable military space flights using
the B-1 launch vehicle by Kosmos number,
apogee and perigee ------------------------ 403
Table 6-2-Other space flights using the B-1
launch vehicle by Kosmos number, apogee
and perigee ------------------------------ 405
B. Use of the C-1 vehicle at all three launch sites ----------- 406
1. Tyuratam developmental flights ----------------- 406
2. Plesetsk elint or ferret missions ------------------ 406
3. Plesetsk navigation missions--------------------- 406
4. An unidentified category at Plesetsk------__-------- 407
5. A Plesetsk series which could add geodesy to navi-
gation -------------------------------------- 407
6. Plesetsk military communications possibly for com-
mand and control---------------------------- 408
7. Plesetsk targets for interceptors------------------ 408
8. Plesetsk minor military C-1 flights--------------- 408
9. Non-military uses of the C-1 launch vehicle------- 409
Table 6-3-Probable military space flights using
the C-1 launch vehicle by Kosmos number,
apogee and perigee- ---------------------- 410
Table 6-4-Other space flights using the C-1
launch vehicle by Kosmos number or name,
apogee and perigee- -----------------------413
C. Use of the F-l-r and F-l-m launch vehicles at Tyuratam -- 414
1. Weapons use of the F-l-r launch vehicle---_ ---- 414
Table 6-5-Probable military space flights using
the F-l-r or F-l-m launch vehicles by Kos-
mos number if any, apogee and perigee----- 415
Table 6-6-Apparent weapons-related flights
of the F-l-r launch vehicle---------------- 416
2. Military interceptors for inspection and destruction- 424
Table 6-7-The Soviet military space intercep-
tor program, with orbital changes ---------- 425


XV. Analysis of Soviet flights to discover the military component-Con.
C. Us(, of the F-l-r and F-l-m launch vehicles at
3. Military ocean surveillance using radar----------- 430
Table 6-8-Military ocean surveillance flights
of F-l-m------------------------ ------- 430
4. Remainder of the F-l-m program------- ---------432
D. Military use of the A-1 launch vehicle------------------ 433
Table 6-9-Use of the A-1 launch vehicle including
probable military nonrecoverable space flights as
well as others by Kosminos number or other name
(excluding Elektron), apogee and perigee---------- 435
E. Military uses of the A-2-e launch v(ehicle--------------- 436
Table 6-10-Use of A-2-ce launch vehicle for eccentric
Earth orbit space flights including probable military
Ksinios and others by name with apogee and perigec
(plus Elektron A-1 flights)---------------------- 438
F. Use of the A-1 and A-2 launch vehicles for military recover-
able observation mik-ions--------------------------- 440
Table 6-11-Soviet military photographic recoverable
Kosmos missions by Kosmos number and days
duration ---------------------------------------441
Table 6-12-Sun i i ry of Soviet military photographic
recoveral)le Kosmos by years and by generation and
subca t cgi ry ------------------------------------445
Table 6-13-Summary of Soviet military photographic
recoverable Kosinmos by years and by announced in-
clination-------------------------------------- 446
1. Flight durations------------------------------- 447
2. Launch sites---------------------------------- 447
3. Inclinations------------------------------------- 447
4. Altitudes of the flights-------------------------- 447
5. Identification of variants------------------------ 448
G. Summary of commitment of launches and payloads to
military versus civil primary uses--------------------- 451
Table 6-14-Approximate comparison of United States
and Soviet successful space launching and payloads
primarily civil-oriented versus presumptively mili-
tary-oriented -_ -------------------------------- 452

I. An operational system with a 74 inclination---------------------- 453
Table 6A1-1-List of Soviet navigation satellites at 74, 1970-
1972--------------------------------------------------- 453
II. The change to 83 inclination----------------------------------- 454
III. The radio transmissions---------------------------------------- 454
IV. Conclusion -------------------------------------------------- 455
Table 6A1-2-List of Soviet navigation satellites at 83, 1972-
1975--------------------------------------------------- 456
I. Launch statistics---------------------------------------------- 457
II. Mission pr(,file------------------------------------------------ 457
III. Photographic coverage----------------------------------------- 458
IV. Radio transmissions and telemetry formats----------------------- 459
V. Recovery beacons--------------------------------------------- 462
VI. Identification of possible targets-------------------------------- 463
Figure 6A2-1-Ground-tracks of Kosmos 246---------------- 463
Figure 6A2-2(a)-Ground-tracks of Kosmos 463-------------- 464
Figure 6A2-2(b)-Ground-tracks of Kosmos 464--------------- 465
Figure 6A2-3(a)-Ground-tracks of Kosmos 596-------------- 466
Figure 6A2-3(b)-Ground-tracks of Kosmos 597-------------- 467
Figure 6A2-3(c)-Ground-tracks of Kosmos 598------------- 468
Figure 6A2-3(d)-Ground-tnirck of Kosminos 599-------------- 469
Fitgire 6A2-3(e)-Ground-trracks of Ksmnos 600_-- --------- 470
Figure 6A2-3(f)-Ground-tracks of Kosmos 602-------------- 471
Figure 6A2-3(g)-Ground-tracks of Kosmos 603------------- 472
Figure 6A2-4-Ground-track. of Kosmnos 759-------------- 474
VII. Related observations of telemetry for the manned programs--__ ----- 475


I. Introduction---------------------------------------------- 479
A. How plans can change---------------------------------- 479
B. Paucity of Soviet indicators----------------------------- 480
C. Effects of personality,. and sporadic events---------------- 481
D. Capabilities vs. intentions ------------------------------- 481
II. General technical capability------------------------------------ 482
A. Overall support---------------------------------------- 482
1. Industrialization and gross national product--------- 482
2. Key industry, ----------------------------------- 482
3. Education and manpower------------------------- 4,'
B. Supporting hardware and facilities for space- -------------- 483
1. Launch sits ------------------------------------ 483
2. Tracking systems-------------------------------- 483
3. Manufacturing and testing of space hardware------- 484
C. Vehicle capabilities------------------------------------ 484
1. Existing vehicles --------------------------------- 484
2. Additions to the vehicle stable--------------------- 485
3. Use of high energy fuel in rockets ------------------ 485
4. Nuclear and electric rockets----------------------- 485
5. Reusable vehicles -------------------------------- 486
III. A chronology of Soviet statements on future space plans----------- 486
IV. Analysis of Soviet intentions in space---------------------------- 487
A. Unmanned space flight---------------------------------- 487
1. Earth orbital science----------------------------- 487
2. Civil space applications--------------------------- 488
a. Communications-------------------------- 488
b. Weather--------------------------------- 488
c. Earth resources--------------------------- 488
d. Other------------------------------------ 489
3. Military applications----------------------------- 489
a. Recoverable observation------------------- 489
b. Early warning---------------------------- 489
c. Electronic ferret-------------------------- 489
d. Ocean surveillance------------------------- 490
e. Navigation------------------------------- 490
f. Geodesy--------------------------------- 490
g. Mapping--------------------------------- 490
h. Communications-------------------------- 490
i. Minor military---------------------------- 490
j. More threatening missions------------------ 491
4. Lunar studies----------------------------------- 492
5. Planetary studies-------------------------------- 492
B. Manned space flight------------------------------------ 493
1. Soyuz-----------------_------------------------- 493
a. Ferry------------------------------------ 494
b. Independent mission ----------------------- 494
c. Component------------------------------- 494
d. Docking modes--------------------------- 494
e. Tankage--------------------------------- 494
f. Solar panels------------------------------ 494
g. Work module- ---------------------------- 494
h. Heat shield------------------------------ 494
i. Seats ------------------------------------- 494
Table 7-1-List of Soyuz variants------- 495
j. Soyuz capacity and mission potentials------- 496
k. Further variants of Soyuz----------------- 497
1. Overall design considerations--------------- 497
2. Salyut------------------------------------------ 499
a. Military Salyut--------------------------- 499
b. Civilian Salyut--------------------------- 499
c. Salyut ai a component-- ---------------- 499
d. Large conical instrument container--------- 500
e. Docking _------------------------ 500
f. International cooperation ------------------ 500


IV. Anal-is of Soviet intention in space-Continued
B. Manned space flight-Continued Page
3. A long-term -jpa' station------------------------ 501
a. Single launch---------------------------- 501
b. Multiple lainliches----------------------- 501
c. Other orbits----------------------------- 501
d. Near-term------------------------------ 501
e. Longer term---------------------------- 501
4. Reusable sp:ice shuttle -------------------------- 502
5. Zond------------------------------------------ 502
6. I:-linned lunar landing _----------------------502
a. Background----------------------------- 502
b. Reqzirnments -------------------------- 503
c. Asse--;;n.-nt of Soviet capa:bilities- ---------- 505
d. Criilponents and alternative. __ --------------506
e. Unpublished tui.idies- --------------------- 510
f. Total reqiiiremnent- for Soviet manained lunar
landing------------------------------- 513
7. Manned planetary flight------------------------- 515
8. Clo)nies on the Moon and planets---------------- 517
9. Intor-tellartr:ive1l ------------------------------- 518
C. Pace and tiniin ----------------------------------------- 518
D. Soviet phihlo-'phy toward their space program-------------_ 519
1. National pride ---------------------------------- 519
2. National prestige ------------------------------ 520
3. The en iineering logic of developing spice appli-
caItioln-_------- ------- -------------------- 521
4. Interest in science and di-c)uver _____------------ 522
5. Willintine-s to subordinate ilunvdi.ate consnumer
-ga in - -- -- - -- -_ 52 3
6. Marxist-Leninist religion------------------------- 524
7. Final cocnclu-ions-------------------------------- 524
FORECASTS 1970-75 ------------------ ----- -------- 525


AND SPACECRAFT -- ---------------- -------------_-___ 609


By Charles S. Sheldon 11*


Statistics on space activities are only approximate and are subject
to revision, but enough data are available to afford a reasonably good
overview of rates of relative progress among nations.
J. Gross Statistics
Although the U.S. launch pace has declined since 1966, the Soviet
record shows no similar drop, and now runs about three times as high
as the current U.S. level. While the U.S. record of failures in flight is
fairly well known, the Soviet Union continues to hide most of its fail-
ures, and these can only be estimated as probably proportional to the
number of successes in the same ratio as applies to the U.S. space
.2. Br:c1akdown by Categories
Despite Soviet and U.S. secrecy in hiding the missions of military
space flights which overall make up a majority of launches, in both
cases it is possible from open sources to deduce these missions. The
largest single component in both programs are the flights which have
a recoverable payload from low Earth orbit, presumniably flown for
observation purposes. Examination of 27 program elements shows that
both the U.S. and Soviet programs are broadly based, seeking mul-
tiple goals, with the primary difference being the Soviet inclusion of
fractional orbit bombardment satellites (FOBS) and satellite in-
spector/destructor flights. These flights have no U.S. counterparts and
on the Soviet side have ceased after 1971.
3. Comrparatie Weights of Payload
In the absence of published data, only estimates can be made, and
the launch capacity of the rockets used have been normalized to nom-
inal low Earth orbit equivalents. These show the Soviet Union cumu-
latively has launched about 50 percent more tonnage than the United
States, and is currently running about four-fold the U.S. level, now
*that the Saturn V has been withdrawn from use.

1. Tyuratam
This site, in Kazakhstan, is the Cape Canaveral of the Soviet Union,
launching many research and development (R & D) flights, some oh-
*Dr. Sheldon is chief of the Science Policy Research Division,. Congressional
Research Service, The Library of Congress.


servation flights, all manned, lunar, and planetary flights. It is offi-
cially called the Baykonur Cosmodrome, but it is 370 kilometers south-
west of Baykonur, adjacent to the new rocket city of Leninsk.
2. Plesetsk
This is the Vandenberg Air Force Base of the Soviet Union, located
north of Moscow toward Arkhangelsk. It is used mostly for military
operational flights, most civil applications flights, and for extreme
latitude scientific flights. It has never been named or pinpointed by
the Russians.
3. Kapu.tin Yar
This site on the Volga River near the Caspian Sea is equivalent to
White Sands, New Mexico and Wallops Island, Virginia. It is used
to launch vertical probes and small satellites for civilian and military
purposes, as well as conducting missile tests. The Russians now iden-
tify it as the Volgograd Station.

1. The Standard Launch Vehicle Series ("A")
This adaptation of the 1957 SS-6 Sapwood ICBM intoo rcontinenti f l
ballistic missile) is still the mainstay of the Soviet program, with a
first stage thrust of about 500 metric tons. It was used for Sputnik 1
and still is used for the Soyuz and many other flights today. It hlas
been used more times than any other orbital launch vehicle in the
world. With improved upper stages it will put up to 7.5 metric tons
of payload in orbit. It is launched at Tyuratam and Plesetsk.
2. The Small Utility Launch Vehicle ("B")
This adaptation of the SS-4 Sandal MRBM (medium range ballistic
missile) is used for the smallest direct-injection Kosmos flights proba-
bly with payloads ranging up to about 400 kilograms. It has been
launched to orbit from Plesetsk and Kapustin Yar (first in 1962).
3. The Flexible Intermediate Vehicle ("C")
This adaptation of the SS-5 Skean IRBM (intermediate range
ballistic missile) may be able to put as much as one metric ton into
low orbit. With a restartable upper stage, it is able to put payloads into-
circular orbits at various altitudes at least up to 1,500 kilometers.
It is launched from Plesetsk and Kapustin Yar, and used to be
launched from Tyuratam, starting in 1964.
4. The Non-Military Large Launch Vehicle ("D")
First used for the Proton scientific payloads, it is now used for deep
space flights to the Moon and planets, for 24-hour synchronous flights,
and for Salyut space stations. It can put about 20 metric tons into
Earth orbit, or send up to about 5 metric tons toward a near planet
at a favorable window. It is launched from Tyuratam, beginning in
5. The Military Combat Space Launch Vehicle ("F")
This adaptation of the SS-9 Scarp is used from Tyuratam to put up
ocean surveillance radar flights, and earlier was used to loft both
FOBS (fractional orbit bombardment system) and inspector/destruc-
tor flights. It has never been announced as in use for a definable scien-
tific or civilian mission. Flights to orbit began in 1966.

6. The Very Heavy Launch Vehicle ("G")
Presumably this was first launched in 1969, but through 1975, it had
not made a successful flight. It may be designed to put about 135 or
more metric tons into Earth orbit, or to send over 60 metric tons toward
the Moon after Earth orbit rendezvous with other elements. Estimates
of first stage thrust range as high as 6,300 metric tons.

1. Communications Needs
Tracking and communications with spacecraft are necessary to their
successful use. The early Soviet support in this regard was limited and
has had to be improved.
2. Earth Orbital Tracking in the U.S.S.R.
Soviet tracking facilities have been identified in part in connection
with the recent Apollo-Soyuz Test Project, and some very elaborate
missile and space defense tracking systems are also known to exist.
The vast geographic extent of the U.S.S.R. provides a fairly adequate
setting for such work.
3. Foreign Tracking Stations
There is a scattering of relatively modest tracking stations in
Africa, Cuba, and probably at Kerguelen and in Antarctica, but noth-
ing corresponding to the big stations used by the United States at some
overseas locations.
4. Sea-Based Support
In the absence of good land-based overseas tracking stations, the
Russians have put into service some fairly impressive large tracking
ships both for Earth orbital support and for deep space mission
6. Deep Space Tracking
While deep space operations are aided by tracking ships, and there
may be facilities in the Far East, the main deep space station is at
Yevpatoriya in the Crimea, also the main flight operations center for
Earth orbital flight.
6. Space Operations and Data Processing Centers
These were relatively simple at first, but over the years, better com-
puter support and graphic displays have been introduced at the launch
sites, at Yevpatoriya, and now at another manned operations center
at Kaliningrad near Moscow.
7. Space Research Centers
Limited information is available about such space research centers.
Two well-known ones are the Leningrad Gas Dynamics Laboratory
and the Moscow Space Research Institute.
8. Manufacturing and Assembly Centers for Spacecraft and Rockets
Probably much construction is carried out in conjunction with air-
craft plants, with use of rail transport to deliver modules to the
assembly buildings at the launch sites for further testing.

.9. Test and Training Centers for Space
Environmental chambers and other test equipment are used increas-
ingly, often with the actual flight matched on Earth by an analog
exposed to as close to the same environment as can be achieved. The
principal training center for manned flight is at Zvezdnyy Gorodok
in the Moscow suburbs.

Interest in the Soviet program for space d(lates back at least to the
last century when Konstantin Tsiolkovskiy, now the patron saint of
the space program, began publishing his ideas in this regard. Soviet
space plans were announced for the International Geophysical Year
in 1955, a day after the announcement of Project Vanguard, but these
turned out to be about two orders of magnitude more ambitious.
The first Sputnik (October 4, 1957) and Luna flights had great
political impact upon the world position of the Soviet Union. Prepara-
tions for manned flights and for flights to the planets followed in
quick succession. During the mid-1960O's, the Soviet space prograli
began to proliferate in many directions including work aimed at prac-
tical applications of a civilian and military character.

From 1962 on, most Soviet flights were simply named Kosmos and
given a number. This sweeping label covered a great variety of scien-
tific, manned precursor, and military end uses, and also was used to dis-
guise certain failures which attained Earth orbit, but did not accom-
plish their probable full purpose. Even so, through study of repetitive
patterns in orbits, the kind of debris associated with flights, and the
timing of these flights, it has been possible to group most of these in-
dividual payloads according to their mission purpose.
1. Kosmos Scientific Missions
The early B-1 launched Kosmos flights were scientific, roughly
equivalent to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's
(NASA) Explorer series. These came from Kapustin Yar, and then
occasionally from Plesetsk. When they carried experiments from other
countries of the Soviet Bloc as well, they were generally named
For the last few years, virtually all Kosmos and Interkosmos scien-
tific flights have been launched by the larger C-1 class vehicle from
Plesetsk and Kapustin Yar.
Some of the military observation flights launched by the A-1 or A-2
vehicles have carried supplemental experiments related to science, and
over a period of time references to the findings have appeared in the
literature, but the main mission is not mentioned.
2. Kosmos Precursor Flights
About 23 flights related to the manned program have carried Kos-
mos names. At least 9 flights with the Kosmos label were direct pre-
cursors of the Meteor weather satellites. A miscellany of other precur-
sor flights, also received the Kosmos label.


3. Flight M;ss;on FaihPres Disguised as Kosmos.
At least 11 mission failures received Kosmnos names.

1. The Prognoz Program
Four long-duration flights related to measuring solar weather phe-
nomena and their interactions with Earth have been launched under
the label Prognoz.
2. French Payloads Carried by Soviet Launch Vehicles
Oreol (Aureole) 1 and 2 have been French spacecraft used for
auroral studies as a follow-on both to Soviet Bloc aurora studies and
to French-Soviet conjugal point studies between Kerguelen and the
Soviet arctic under the code name Arkad.
MAS(SRET)-1 and 2 have been small French engineering test
satellites carried along on the same flights as Soviet Molniya commu-
ni'ations flights. Individual French experiments have been carried on
other Soviet flights, including Prognoz, a biological Kosmos, and on
lunar and planetary flights.
3. Indian and Swedish Payloads Carried by Soviet Launch Vehicles
In 1975, the Indian payload Ariabat (Aryabhata) was launched
from Kapustin Yar on a C-1 vehicle. A much more ambitious pay-
load to do Earth resources work is expected to be launched in 1977 or
With little fanfare, a Swedish cooperative program also has begun,
although the first payload in 1975 with a Swedish experiment failed
to attain orbit. More are to follow.
4. Soviet Vertical Rocket Probes
Most major sounding rocket launching are conducted from Kapus-
tin Yar. Both geophysical rockets and animal flights have been ca r-
ried out. The international part of the program applies the name
Vertikal to the flights.


Most planetary windows to Mars and Venus have been used since
1960, with the exception of the time in the case of each planet that the
launch vehicle was being upgraded from the A-2-e to the D-l-e, plus
the 1975 Mars opportunity which was skipped because of the high en-
ergy requirements.

1. The Mars Attempts of 1971 and 1973
The move up to the D-l-e launch vehicle permitted Mars 2 and 3 to
include both orbiter and lander craft within each 4,650-kilogram pay-
load. The orbiters put secondary emphasis on picture-taking, but gath-
ered a wide range of synoptic data. One lander did not make a soft
landing; the other began a television transmission from the surface
which was abruptly terminated before a complete picture was received.
Because of higher energy requirements which cut the weight of pay-
load available, tasks were further divided on the second occasion
(1973). Mars 4 returned pictures but did not achieve orbit; Mars 5

did both. Mars 6 returned direct readings of the atmosphere but did
not send signals from the surface; Mars 7 missed its landing, and flew
by the planet. In summary, the flights fell well short of their goals,
yet collectively returned valuable data.
2. The Venus Attempts of 1975
The use of the D-1--e launch vehicle permitted both Venera 9 and
10 to carry orbiters and landers, and each pair worked well. The land-
ers repeated previous direct readings of the atmosphere and sent back
surface pictures which showed rock formations, sunlight and shadows,
and a view to the horizon. The orbiters as of this writing are probably
still functioning, but only limited findings have been reported to date.

Starting in 1969, Soviet unmanned lunar flights graduated to use
of the D-l-e, probably able to carry as much as 5,800 kilograms to
the vicinity of the Moon. Luna 15 and two Earth-orbital Kosmos rep-
resented early trials which fell short of their objectives. (Luna 15
crashed on the Moon during the Apollo 11 mission )
1. Luna 16,18,20, and 23
These four fliglhts were all aimed at returning samples of lunar soil
to Earth. Luna 16 and Luna 20 were both successful in making soft
landings, using a television inspection system, then drilling for core
samples which were loaded into a return vehicle which flew directly to
Kazaldistan. The amounts returned were about 100 ,rains each. mod(1-t
but enough for valuable analysis in several countries. Luna 18 landed
in rough terrain (lurain) and did not survive. Luna 23 damaged its
drill during the landing so was abandoned within three days.
2. Luna 17 and 21
Both spacecraft made soft landings to discharge on the surface re-
motely controlled roving scientific laboratories. Lunokhod 1 operated
for about 10 months, traveling over 10 kilometers, returning over
20,000 television pictures, plus mechanical and chemical tests of the
soil, and doing topographic studies and some astronomy. Lunokhod 2
operated over 3 months, traveling about 37 kilometers, and retiurn-
ing over 80.000 television pictures. It also made soil tests, topographi-
cal studies, and astronomical measurements.
3. Luna 19 and 22
Both spacecraft were placed in lunar orbit to do both high resolu-
tion and wider area photographic survey work, plus gathering synop-
tic data on orbital conditions. Each operated for something over a
year. There were studies of the composition of surface rocks, circum-
lunar plasmas, solar radiation, Jupiter radio emissions, and lunar mas-

The Soviet program of manned flights was preceded by many verti-
cal probes from Kapustin Yar carrying dogs and other animals to al-
titudes above the sensible atmosphere. Sputnik 2 carried the dog Layka.
to orbit.

A succession of precursor craft called Korabi Sputniks made Earth
'orbital flights including the first successful recovery on Earth with two
dogs as passengers.
The flight of Yuriy Gagarin in Vostok 1 on April 12, 1961 created
almost as much sensation in the world as did the flight of Sputnik 1
less than four years earlier. By 1963 there had been six manned flights,
two pairs occurring at overlapping times, with the last flight occupied
by a woman, Valentina Tereshkova.
The Voskhod follow-on flights included the first three-man crew
and the first EVA (extra-vehicular activity).
The attempted recovery of Soyuz 1 in 1967 resulted in the first flight
death of a human being, although three American astronauts had been
killed in a static test at Cape Canaveral three months earlier. The So-
viet program back-tracked to more automated tests including the suc-
cessfuil conduct of two sets of dockings within the Kosmos program.
By 1969, a manned docking was accomplished, and two crew mem-
bers transferred by EVA from Soyuz 5 to Soyuz 4 to return to Earth.
A complicated group flight of three manned ships that fall did not
include a successful docking. Soyuz 9 in 1970 set a duration record
of 18 days.
1. Soyuz Ferry Flights to Salyut Space Stations
In 1971, Soyuz 10 docked with a Salyut 1 station for a combined
weight of over 25 metric tons. However, the station was not occupied.
Shortly, three more men went up in Soyuz 11 to enter the station, with
a total flight time of almost 24 days. A large variety of geophysical,
astronomical, medical, and ship systems tests were conducted. Tragi-
cally, just before reentry, a pressure equalization valve stuck open,
and when the ship had landed automatically, the men were found to be
dead. This was a major setback to the Soviet schedule, and required
more unmanned tests.
A Salvut 2 station was launched in 1973, but it failed within a mat-
ter of days, and was not visited by a Soyuz. Kosmos 557 that same
spring was also a Salyut station and it failed even before the Salvut
name could be applied. Sovuz 12 was sent to orbit in a two-man flight
in 1973 as a check on improved systems for the Soyuz ferry version,
returning to Earth in two days. With no Salyut station available, the
year was closed out with an independent flight of Soyuz 13 doing the
kind of astronomical work (but on a more limited scale) which was
done with the Salyut station.
In 1974, Salyut 3 was put into a low orbit, with much the same char-
acteristics as the aborted Salvut 2. It was judged to be largely a mili-
tary observation flight, capable of operating either manned or un-
manned. An all-military crew in Soyuz 14 went up for about 15 days
and occupied the station. A similar crew in Soyuz 15 followed, but
made poor approaches in rendezvous, so came down again in two days.
Salvut 3 continued to operate in automatic mode to complete six
months in orbit, during the course of which a data capsule was re-
turned to Earth by remote control.
Salyut 4, with characteristics similar to Kosmos 557, was sent to
a higher orbit late in 1974. During 1975, it was visited during a 30 day

flight by the crew of Soyuz 17, and then during a 63 day flight by the
crew of Soyuz 18. Primary emphasis was put on astronomical work, al-
though there was also study of Earth resources, medical problems, and
ship systems. Late in the year Soyuz 20 made an unmanned flight to
Salyut 4, and remained docked to it in a long-duration test as the year
ended. Between the flights of Soyuz 17 and 18, another Soyuz was
launched on April 5,1975, which ran into difficulties during the launch
phase, and an automatic abort put the crew down about 1,600 kilome-
ters away from the launch site 20 minutes later. They were rescued.
2. The Apollo-Soyuz Test Project
As a result of U.S.-Soviet negotiations, was reached to
conduct a joint flight which would include the use of a new universal
or androgynous docking system, together with the conduct of other
experiments. On the Russian side, there were several unmanned pre-
cursor flights under the Kosmos label, and then Soyuz 16 in December
1974 was a complete analog for the flight to come, even to the test of a
docking ring which it carried to orbit and then docked to several times.
On July 15, 1975, the joint flights occurred on time. Soyuz 19 was
followed to orbit 7.5 hours later by an Apollo, and the two crews were
united after Apollo conducted the active rendezvous and docking. Not
only did the flight require development of the new docking system, but
for the first time detailed engineering exchanges of information on
hardware and procedures. The crews and their back-ups had to learn
each other's languages. There were repeated trips between Houston
and Zvezdnyy Gorodok, and eventually visits to both launch sites.
For the first time the Soviet launch and recovery were shown live on
worldwide television. For the most part, the flights went according to

Although Western observers had expected the Russians to be the
first to send men around the Moon, a variety of delays and troubles
beset this part of their program. Zond 4 through Zond 8 made un-
manned flights testing various aspects of the operation which was to
carry men as soon as the systems were man-rated. All those planned to
pass near the Moon and return to Earth did so and were recovered.
Most return approaches were over Antarctica toward the Indian
Ocean. Zond 5 landed in that ocean. Zond 6 and 7 made a skip reentry
over that ocean and flew on to Kazakhstan, thereby cutting the G load.
Zond 8 approached Earth from the north, and landed in the Indian
Ocean. But time and events had obsoleted the program, and no further
developments have been noted since 1970.

For a long time the Russians were sufficiently confident they would
be the first to land mein on the Moon that they made a number of
predictions to this effect. Apollo eventually ended that hope. But if
Apollo 11 had failed and lost the crew, and if the several Soviet re-
quired elements of technical systems for manned lunar landing opera-
tions had been more successful, they might have pursued their work

to be first. There is not much doubt that one by one they were develop-
ing the components needed for such lunar operation., and were learn-
ing the techniques of rendezvous, asseml)ly, landing, and IEarth v et 11r-
from lunar distances. The pro,'ramn was set aside for the prevent
shortly after the first G-l-e vehicle failed in launch, and the Apollo
11 flight was successfully completed.

Five payloads have been dedicated to Soviet biological experiments
starting with Kosmos 110 in 1966, and continued with Kosmos 605,
690, 782, and Soyuz 20. These have carried a variety of animals,
insects, plant life, and microorganisms. Kosmos 7t82 in the fall of 1975
has carried additionally experiments of the United States, France,
Czechoslovakia and Romania.

The Soviet space life sciences effort is the most comprehensive in
the world, and information about this effort is surprisingly available
to scientists in other countries. Subtle differences exist between the
U.S. and Soviet approaches.

The cosmonaut selection and training process is evolving from a
program of rigorous physical conditioning to one that is more special-
ized and task-oriented. More accurate quantitative methods are being
developed to predict cosmonaut behavior and performance. More elab-
orate new training facilities and spaceship analogs have been con-
structed. The program encompasses preparation for orbital, lunar, and
even interplanetary flight.

The technology of medical monitoring, diagnosis, and treatment
of disorders arising during progressively longer spaceflights has been
significantly improved. Equipment has been developed to counteract
the undesiral ile effects of spaceflight, mainly weightlessness. The foods
available have been expanded and upgraded.

While the basic Soviet life support systems remain the same, many
modifications and improvements have been made in these systems,
including" better recycling of water and air. The ultimate goal is an
almost totally closed ecological system able to perform reliably for
months or y"ars. Alroz.(y ground tesi of closed ecological systems
have been operated up to one year, with lower plants, higher plants,
and men.
These studies have received considerable attention, particularly in
combination with other spaceflight factors. These include high gravity,


weightlessness, and rotatory accelerations to determine effects and
human tolerances, and steps to overcome problems through physical
conditioning and drugs.
Experiments in radiobiology are extensive, including study of pre-
ventive measures through u-e of drugs, shielding devices. and force
fields. These studies extend to the conditions to be found on manned
interplanetary flights.

The Russians are making considerable study of the effects on the
crews of different gases and atmospheres in life support systems. They
are also studying the effects of altered atmospheric pressures, par-
ticularly sudden decompression phenomena, to learn limits of human
tolerance and the prevention and treatment of related disorders. In
general, they still favor spacecraft atmosphere.- as close to Earth's as
possible. They are working on management of toxic substances that
may be found in atmospheres.

Their unmanned biological satellites in recent years have grown in
technological quality in their automated man cement and handling of
large numbers of animals and plants in order to meet their metabolic
requirements. They are studying with suitable parallel controls the
effects separately and synoptically of weightlessness, radiation, and
rotatory accelerations on their experimental subjects.
Study of exobiology includes the possible life forms that might exist
on other planets, the detection of extraterrestrial life, and the search
for intelligent life elsewhere in the universe.

Every sign points toward a continued commitment to manned flight
even to the planets and beyond. The successes in the life sciences are
already reflected in the operations of their orbiting stations. The space
life sciences seem assured of continuing support at a high level.

1. fMoJi ya Satellites
The principal part of the Soviet communications satellite program
has revolved around repetitive use of the Molniya classes of payloads,
put up by the A-2-e vehicle into an eccentric orbit ranging from
around 500 kilometers in the southern hemisphere to about 40,000
kilometers in the northern hemisphere, and inclined at about 63 degrees
to the Equator. Three satellites of the Molniya 1, 2, and 3 class variants
are in the same plane in four groups 90 degrees apart for a total of 12
active at any one time, to meet military, international, and domestic
television and civilian message traffic requirements. These satellites.

connect with about 60 Earth terminals of the Orbita system. The iin-e
of the Molniya inclined, eccentric orbit has made it po.-.sible to put up
heavier payloads of greater power to cut ground termlinal costs, and
to give good service to northern latitudes.
2. Stats;onar Satell;tes
Starting in 1974, several years later than expected, tlhe Russians have
begun experimental flights to equatorial 24-hour synchronous orbits,
fixed relative to a point on the surface of the Earth, by using the larger
D-l-e launch vehicle. Late in 1975, the first Statsionar of 10 projected
for the next five years was placed in orbit and given the new name
3. International Cooperation
The Russians have moved at a deliberate pace to set up their own
Intersputnik Soviet Bloc cooperative communi(c tions system in
competition with the Intelsat consortium used by mo-t of the rest of
the world. However, they also have an Earth terminal near Lvov to
link into the Intelsat system. The Washington-Moscow "hot line" uses
both American satellites and Soviet Molniya satellites to link the two
4. Direct Broadcast
For the future, the Russians may overcome their own objections to
direct broadcast satellites which could penetrate their censorship, and
may create their own direct broadcast system. But their ambivalence
shows in their proposal to permit action against program material
offensive to the receiving nation through jamming or even satellite
1. Meteor Satellites
Several years of expanding experimental service was carried on be-
fore the Meteor system was declared operational, and by the end of
1975, 24 satellites of that name had been placed in orbit. They are
three-axis stabilized, and are launched by the A-1 vehicle. They carry
television cameras with a resolution of about 1,200 meters, with two
cameras each covering a slightly overlapping path about 1,000 kilom-
eters wide. A separate infrared (IR) sensor system returns night
pictures to supplement the day pictures. More recent flights have
added APT (automatic picture transmission) for realtime coverage.
Soviet weather satellites not only give cloud cover pictures, but re-
port on ocean ice, snow cover on land, and have even given some geo-
logical information of value.
2. Experimental weather satellites
Weather cameras have also been carried on a few of the Molniva
communications satellites. Advanced sensors related to passive micro-
wave to determine ocean currents, ice fields under cloud cover, and
soil moisture have been tested in Kosmos flights starting" with Kosmos
243. An experimental Meteor 2 was orbited in 1975.

In time, Soviet navigation satellite use is likely to spread from
purely naval to the merchant marine.


There are not yet any comprehensive Soviet Earth resources satel-
lites of the unmanned variety. Techniques of Earth resources survey
are under development largely within the manned program, supple-
mented by individual experiments in unmanned satellites.
Finally, the Russians also speak of versatile future cities in space
serving many economic and human purposes, but these are not yet
discussed in terms specific enough to be considered actual hardware

The Soviet Union claims each individual space flight to be
scientific in character, and in the early years many Soviet charges of
agressive military intent were made against the United States spice
program. As Soviet military space capabilities have grown in quantity,
variety, and operational effectiveness, such charges against the United
States have largely been muted, and a certain accommodation betv.-eC.n
the nations has been tacitly developed in this regard.

Weatlier reporting is generally an open activity, and military clients
of such a system are not identifiable from the fact of such flights, but
of necessity exist.
By now, it is suspected that the Molniya 1 satellites have moved from
handling civilian television and telephone traffic to government and
military uses. This is beca use this series is maintained actively while
the newer Molniya 2 and 3 flights have taken on the tasks originally
assigned to Molniya 1.
Geodesy and mapping could be either civil or military functions.
The al i.sence of identification of such flights by mission suggests that in
the Soviet setting, they are still considered to be military.

The Russians have claimed a navigation satellite system for many
years, but never have identified a specific payload as assigned to this
use. They probably have gone the same technical route as the Ameri-
cans in building a system which leaves the using submarines or sur-
face ships passive, manipulating the signals heard in an onboard ship
computer to establish the ship location in reference to the known
position of the satellite.

There is no si:_n the Russians yet operate a spaceborne traffic control
system. They probably do use space links both for military command
and control, and to maintain clandestine channels of cominiunication.

Russian concern with all kinds of electronic intelligence is so well
noted in their literature that one must assume many flights gather such
intelligence, whether in the form of message traffic or of radar charac-

A miscellany of minor missions such as environmental monitoring,
testing of new components, and radar calibration are not viewed as
especially sensitive military activities, but are not specifically identified
by the Russians. They almost certainly make such flights.

In an age of short time spans between initiation of missile launch
and arrival of warheads at targets, early warning systems are a natural
concern of military planners. It should be assutnmed that Soviet space
flights include provision for early warning sensors.

In the Soviet case, military manned missions, beyond the use of
military cosmonauts, is not admitted to, and must be inferred from
the performance of some missions.

The Soviet Union only obliquely admits to use of military observa-
tion photographic flights in space, but the characteristics of their pro-
grams and the obvious need in both strategic and tactical applications
are so great that their use must be probably the highest priority mili-
tary mission under active application.

Because naval vessels may operate under radio silence and maneuver
to maintain positions under cloud cover where possible, an obvious ap-
plication of space technology is an ocean surveillance system, using
radar to penetrate the clouds. Such a Soviet system is now flying.

While the United States has not considered fractional orbit bom-
bardment satellites as cost effective, considering the alternative uses of
limited funds, the Russians at least for some years held a different
view, and worked vigorously to bring to operational level such a sys-
tem. These satellites have not been flown since 1971.

The United States abandoned its one-time commitment to develop-
ment of a satellite co-orbit inspection system. The Russians pushed
such a system vigorously, demonstrating intercepts at many altitudes,
and exploding the inspectors after making close approaches.

Because the Russians have an antiballistic missile (ABM) system,
one is not rash to assume they have at least a limited capability to in-
tercept and destroy satellites with these same weapons.

There is no evidence the Russians have placed weapons of mas
destruction in sustained orbit, and both major space powers are sig-
natories of a treaty prohibiting such action.

It is possible to match the characteristics various military space sys-
tems should have to be effective against the characteristics of actual
Soviet flights which have not been specifically identified by the Rus-
sians as to purpose. The repetitive patterns of most of tles, flights
make their mission identification fairly easy to a reasonable degree of
certainty, although some judgments may have to be altered with time.
Categories found include:
1. Minor Military Missions
These are launched by the B-1 or the C-1 from Plesetsk and less
often today from Kapustin Yar.
2. Electronic Ferret or Flint Missions
These are launched by the C-1 or the A-1 from Plesetsk.
30. Navigation and Navigaqifon/Geodetic Missions
These are launched by the C-1 from Plesetsk.
4. Ob.scre Missions Operatiqng in tlhe Store-dump Mode
Whether launched from Plesetsk singly by the C-1 to about an
800 kilometer altitude, or eiaht at a time by the C-1 to about a 1.500
kilometer altitude, these flights probably serve communications pur-
poses related to command and control or tactical communications, or
for other clandestine purposes.
5. Targets for Interception and the Interceptors Themn.selres
The C-1 from Plesetsk has been used to put up targets, and the
F-l-m from Tyuratarn has put up both targets and the maneuverable
interceptors themselves.
6. Fractional Orbit Bombardment Satellites
For a period of six years, the F-l-r was used at Tyuratam to fly
simulated bombs about 95 percent or so of the distance around the
Earth back to home territory, but this was suspended in 1971.
7. Military Ocean Radar Surveillance
The F-1--m maneuverable satellite is being used increasingly for
ocean surveillance, and at the end of the mission, the "hot" radioactive
power source is being moved to a higher orbit from which it will not
decay for many centuries.
8. Early Warning Satellites
The A-2-e is used to put early warning satellites into 12-hour orbits
from Plesetsk, most likely for this purpose. It is possible the first simi-
lar use has been made of the D-l-e at Tyuratam to put such a payload
into a 24-hour orbit.
9. Military Observation Photographic Missions
The largest single element of the entire Soviet space program is

made up of recoverable missions which stay in low circular orbit for
periods up to 14 days and then return to Kazakhstan. They are
launched both at Plesetsk and at Tyuratam, using the A-2 launch
Analysis, particularly in the public domain by the Kcttering Group
of the United Kingdom, sorts these flights into various slubsets by
maneuvering capabilities, and telemetry and beacon formats. These
have made it possible to estimate the categories of camera resolutions
and often to identify the specific Earth targets which they watch.
Overall, the ratio of military uses to civil uses of space launches by
the Soviet Union is two to one.

Soviet space plans for the future are commented upon extensively
by Russian spokesmen, but usually without specific timetables. So
much is predicted that one realizes not all the goals can be attained
in the near term. Hence, the task is to estimate intentions rather than
just their broad technical capabilities. Such coming trends may be
estimated both from the clues of precursor flights and subsystems
development and from a careful reading of how they make their public
predictions. The best estimates of the future may fail to materialize if
external events intervene, or if their policies are changed.

They have now built up a complex, of industry, experience, and
human talent which is capable of supporting indefinitely their present
high level of space flight, and there is no reason to assume there are
presently any plans for retrenchment. Further growth may come, but
at a slower rate, unless they put into service a reusable space shuttle,
which could provide a "quantum jump" in what they do. The long
awaited very large lift vehicle, the G class, will probably appear, and
permit some direct launches of large payloads without the necessity
for orbital assembly to the same degree otherwise required.

Their existing activities in science, weather reporting, and com-
munications should continue to grow in operational effectiveness. One
can expect further flights to the Moon of sample retrievers, roving
vehicles, and orbiters. Both Mars and Venus will continue to receive
attention when the windows for launch are favorable. Later, there
will be Soviet flights inward to Mercury, outward to the giant planets,
and new missions to comets, planetoids, and out of the plane of the
Military uses are already so large a part of the total that they will
continue to expand upon and perfect the great variety of activities cur-
rently being pursued. The question of more threatening missions is
one that turns both on the issues of arms controls and of the possible
appearance of new technologies which could, change prevailing as-
sumptions as to what is now "reasonable".

Several more years of flights using the evolving Salyut station and
the Soyuz ferry craft should be expected. These operations will
develop toward longer and longer life stations with resupply and
Manned lunar landing seems to have been delayed longer than was
expected five years ago, but has not been written out of the realm of
possibilities. All the hardware ingredients which were being rushed
to readiness in the late 1960's and shortly thereafter are still in exist-
ence with active production lines. When the Russians are confident
their systems will work reliably, they will visit the Moon, probably
usinir a combination of Earth orbit reiidezvous and lunar orbit
r en dezvous.
Mtanned interplanetary flight is not only an announced goal in
speeches, but a strong likelihood in terms of the work being done on
space medicine and life support systems. An operational Soviet space
shuttle would move plans for such work from the merely technically
possible to the economically possible.
For the more distant future, human settlements on other celestial
bodies and study of interstellar travel are of interest to the Russians,
but not yet in the form of concrete plans.

The Russians have taken pride in their space accomplishments, and
have not been loath to exploit the prestige associated with their suc-
cesses. Space technicians seem to have convinced the political leader-
ship, which often has an engineering background, of the economic
necessity and benefit of pursuing an expanding program of explora-
tion and application.
They have not neglected science and discovery for its own sake. If
this has involved any delay in improving the lot of the consuming
public, it is part and parcel of a broader philosophy of sacrificing the
present for Communist "'pie in the sky".
For a system which flaunts its atheism, there is a certain element of
secular religion in the official attitude that Soviet man through his
mastery of science and technology can control his destiny for the
good of his system of society and government.
Overall, their space program is pursued consistently, in orderly
fashion, seeking multiple goals; and the investment in support of these
ends is substantial, and probably in real terms is in excess of the U.S.
program at its previous peak.


By Charles S. Sheldon II*
The purpose of this section is to provide a perspective on the trends
of development of the Soviet space program, including data on its
general composition before turning in detail to particular components.
To this end, statistical tables have been developed which will cover the
entire period of flight operations even beyond the years on which this
report is concentrated. It may be noted by the discerning reader tliat
over a period of time some numbers in historical tables are modified
from those previously published. This is because even at this late date,
there are some new disclosures and also fresh interpretations of old
data based upon more recent events which permit a refinement and
more meaningful interpretation of what was even less perfectly under-
stood earlier. In one sense, there never will be final figures for iimny
tables. Not only do governments maintain policies of secrecy, but many
numbers are based upon arbitrary definitions which are only occasion-
ally spelled out in sufficient detail to be able to understand why two
tables which purport to cover the same events come up with different
numbers. For the most part, Soviet official numbers show fewer varia-
tions than do their U.S. counterparts. This may be because when an
early estimate is made and published, the Soviet authorities continue
to use those data, even if their own computers later could make avail-
able slightly different refined figures.
While this study does not present a complete comparison of Soviet
space data with that of other nations because it was not called for in
our terms of reference, some of the tables which follow do include
worldwide coverage in order to provide a perspective on the Soviet
The basic data come from national announcements such as TASS
bulletins and National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) press releases, plus the compilations of several national agen-
cies. Most of the basic worldwide record maintained by the United
States is compiled by Norad (North American Air Defense Com-
mand), a joint U.S.-Canadian activity at Colorado Springs. Norad
data are passed to the Goddard Space Flight Center which selects a
part of these data and may add a few items of NASA origin which
are then issued every other month. There is a corresponding activity
in the United Kingdom. The Royal Aircraft Establishment at Farn-
borough, Hants, has a satellite analysis group headed by Desmond
*Dr. Sheldon is chief of the Science Policy Research Division, Congressional Research
Service, The Library of Congress.


G. King-Hele which once a month issues a limited cirriulation tabuta-
tion combining data from many sources to provide more data than the
basic U.S. public lists show. These preliminary monthly lists are
cumulated and corrected from time to time. In addition to the above
official sources, similar unofficial lists, often with additional details.
are carried semi-annually in Flight Ifernational in London, bi-
monthly in Spacer iew in Amsterdam, and monthly in Spaceflight in
Table 1-1 which follo%%s is a world sniiiillary by years of launches
and payloads to Earth orbit or beyond, successes and failures to the
extent known or c.-tiniatable for each country. As such, it reveals
something about trends, but nothing about the size,. the effectiveness,
or the utility and significance of each flight. According to the table,
the Soviet U7nion reacdied a peak in number of successful launches in
197.75. This contrasts with the U.S. peak of 1966 from which declines
have brought this country down by about 62 percent. The flights of
all other nations are minor by comparison with the two space leaders.
The record on payloads to Earth orbit is somewhat more erratic
because the count includes a scattering of flights in which a consider-
able number of payloads were sent up together. Even so, approxi-
mately the same trends are reflected as for launches. For the so-called
escape payloads, those sent to the vicinity of the Moon, the planets,
or around the Sun. the number of payloads is much smaller. In this
case there is no single Soviet peak. and the U.S. peak was in 1967.
One can be reasonably sure that the record of successful launches
is complete. The number of payloads may be nearly right, although
there is always a chance of a pickaback which for some reason was not
announced, or a piece of debris was thought to be a useful payload in
the absence of information to the contrary. On the other hand, the
record of failures is very problematical overall. The U.S. count on
launch failures is probably accurate despite the reluctance of our
Government to give prominence to these failures. The number of U.S.
payloads lost through failure to reach orbit is more suspect because
there is no legal obligation to report how many payloads a launch
vehicle may have contained. The counts for all other non-Communist
nations andl their international agencies are probably accurate. There
is no reliable public record of possible Soviet or Chinese launch fail-
ures. Only two Soviet launch failures have been acknowledged by that
nation. (These were the Soyuz launch of April 5, 1975 and a launch on
June 3, 1975 which included a Swedish experiment.) In addition
two Soviet launch failures were officially publicized by the U.S.
Government. (These were the Mars attempts of October 10 and Octo-
ber 14, 1960.) However, because of the Soviet use of the orbital launch
platform technique for sending payloads either to deep space or to
eccentric Earth orbit, a strong inferential case based upon time of
launch and behavior of debris can be made that 22 payloads intended
for escape missions fell short of that objective, and count as "failures"
even though they were in most cases Earth orbital "successes". In some
of these cases, the Soviet Government did not even acknowledge the
fact of launch. For the purpo es of this table, judgments on success or
failure of launchels and payloads 'are based exclusively on whether

hardware attained Earth orbit or "e%-ape", not on whether the pay-
loads functioned and returned data. There is no public basis for classi-
fying by operational effectiveness the payloads of iiost of the Soviet
flights and those of the U.S. Department of Defense.
There were two choices open to the analyst in estiiiating the unre-
ported and unimmeasurable Soviet or Chinese failures. One was to com-
pile a list of rumors (as hlas been done by J. A. Pilkington in the
United Kingdom) ; the other was to argue that development of a com-
mon technology has probably moved at a somewhat similar pace in
different countries, and therefore the known failure rate of the United
States could afford order of magnitude ratios to apply to the records
of those countries which do not admit to failure. The latter course
has been followed. Neither the rumor approach nor the common ratio
approach can be counted upon to be accurate. What would not be satis-
fying would be to accept uncritically the oft-repeated early Soviet
claim that their program unlike the American has no failures. In the
1970's the Russians issued a feature length motion picture. "The Tam-
ing of the Fire", which was a fictionalized account of the life of rocket-
eer Sergey Korolev, and this included footage of one spectacular near
launch site failure after another, to reflect the problems of the days
Korolev was developing the standard launch vehicle. The pictures
appeared to be genuine, and in any case represented a shift in policy
by acknowledging that all space programs have their difficulties. The
directly measurable Soviet failure rate for their deep space prograni
runs higher than a simple ratio comparison with the United States
would suggest, but this may have something to do with their use of
the orbital launch platform technique, and poorer worldwide support
facilities for this phase of their flights.


0 r- C-) .t U-) I m I-. m .r 00

C0 V)
"0 U) ct q .r C n0 c 0m W 0

(n ZC')
1 W Il S

LU _
en. r U" C)r 0 r t 0 -c

0' 0 -, 4 l

z 00
-) c.-,-

CC m




< C~j

-c (V4 C',

a II

C) .L
C1 C0C r-C 00 ^-:Z -T -e'C 0') 0a

Cw i3 .-C0r r -wWW r

COC(. I 0 -r l rl-U" C: -c<^ >-CM 00 m C

I l c- n, I
0n T3 a-L tlLoIC f-r l -r

0 -m
Z Io

S~ -

1 I 1 (V -
0W S 0

U- a U- sz '.0 LZ '. c r .0 .'-'. 'r-r-. -. i- r-
4 -4S c

0 >I








- -


a J







- -



* ~Ja4LflCJ-4CJa-4C~ (\J.4..~a-4 a
* $ S a a
* a a a a
S a a
a I a
a a a I a a a a a
a~C..JC~J~ a a,-S a a L.~4 S a
I a a I a I a I S
a a a a a a
a a a a a a a
a a a S a a a
a a S S S a a
a a a a a S a a a
a a a a a I I S
a a a a a a a a a
a a a a a S I a a a a a a
a a a a a a a a a a a a a
I S I a a a
S a I a I I a a a a a a a
S I S a a a a a I I a a a
a I a a a a a a a a S a a
a a a a I a a S S t I
a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
I S I S S ft a a a I a a a
a a a a a a a a a a S t a a
a a a a S a a S a a a a a a
a a a a a a a a a a a a. a a a a
a a a a a a a a a a a S a a a a a
a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
a a a I a a a a a a a a a a a a
a a a a a I S a a S a a a a a
a a a a aaaaa a a a a a a a
a a S a I a a a a a a S a a a a
a a a a *aaa ii,, asia,
a I I a a a a a a a a a a a a a I a
a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
a a a a I a a I 5 I I S S a I S a a
a a a a a S I S a a a a a a a a
S I S a a $ a a a a a S I a a a a I
a a a a I a S S I I a P I a I a a a
a a a a a a a I I a a a a a a a a a
a S S P a a a I S a S a a a a a a
a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a I
a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
a a a a a I a a a a a a a a a a a a a
a a a a a a a S a a a a
S S a a I a a a(%J.~c a 1.4 5 5
a a a a a a a a a a a I a
a a I a S S a a I a a a a
S a a a S a a a a a a a
a a a a a a a a a a a a
a a a a a a a a a a a
a a a a a a a a a a a
a a a a a a a a a a
a a a a a a a a a a a a a
a a a a I a a a a a a a a a a
a a I a I I a a I I R a S S aC'aal a a
a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
a a a I I a a a a a a I S a a a
a a a a a a a a a a a a ,
S I S i S S a a a a I a a a
a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
a t I a I a a I I S P a S I a a
a a a'-.*a a a a a a a a a a a a a
a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
a a a S a a a a a a a a a a a a
a a a S a S S I S I S S a a a a
a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
a a a a a a a a a a g a a a a a
a a a a a S a $ I I S I I a I
I a a S I I I I I I I I a a a I a
.~4OO O~C~J(%Ja-aOOI'a. ~ .--4C.JCJ(%JC.J ~
~4 - -

a a a a I a a a a a a a a ;
a a a a I a a a a a 4 a a a a
a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
S a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
S a a a I I a I I a a a a a a
I a I S I I I I I a I a a a a
S a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
a a a a a a S I a a a t 5 a
a a a a a a a S a a a a a a
I a a a a I a I a a a a a a a
a a a S I a a a a a a a a a S a a
I a a a a I I a a a i.~ I a I *
S a a a S a a a a a a a a a a a a
a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
~ a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a i a a
S S I I I S a a a a a a a a a a a a
I a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
a a a a a a a a a a S a a a a a S a
S a a a a a a a I I a a I a a a a a
S aaaaaaaaaaa a a a a a a a
a I a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
a a a a S a a a a a a a a a a S a a a
S a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
S S a a a S a a a a a a a a a a S I a
S a a a a a a a a a a a a ~ a a a a a
a a a a a a S S a a a a a S a a a a a
a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
S a a a a a a a a a a a S a
a a a a a a a a aC'.J a ~ a a-~ a a
a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
a a a a a a a a a a a a S a
a a a a a a a a a a S a S
a a a a a a a a a a a a S a
S a a a a a a a a a a a ~ a a a a
a a a a a a a a a a a a a ~.-4 a a a
a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
S a a a a a a a a a a a a ~ S S a
S a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
S a a a a a a a S a a a a a a S a
S S a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
S a a a a a a a a a a a a a a S a
S S S S a a a a a a a a a a a a a
a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
a S a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
S a a~a.J a a a a a a a a a a a a a
a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
a a a a a a a a a a a a ~ a a a a
a a a a S S a a a a a a ~ S a a a
a a a a a a a a a a a a I S a a a
a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a

--- -

a a a a a a a S a a S a a a a a a a a
a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
a a a a a a a a a a S a a a a a a a a
a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
S a a a a a a a a S S S a a a a a a a
a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
a a a a a S a a a a a a a a a a a a a
a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a S S
a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
a a a a a a a a a a a a a a S a a a a
S a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a S a a
a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
S a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
S a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a S a S
a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a

---------- ------- 4 a~.4

la I 0(A0 0 = go >. a >-
=3 M ", ,.= ,- Cc Cc 0 c ,
,.I _g | c 0 5.v .. C =
.-.(D c E -E
Cc -5 g0 ,

_., 2 U E 1 ,.

on. ,-,,.> u (D
E|| C^S (A S
~E C

0 -0 0

o0 .oc .5 .E

-- .w .--- 0
-:z.aE" E t5 0 U ,
CA^ S, i 11

"-= .,.'o = == 0. =. ,. .o

o ._ oU C U,- E....0
*;0 -r 2 | CA _
oC)-.V CA ~ (D0 .

I~~ .0|?-1 |

-0- g 5 .-S =
= *i ,"- 3c_

o =0 .0 00C) U ,

a>3-" -", ,E .5 9 0"
.0.00w C-| g 2i= .
~~o0 .00 >

4nU*E- coC)U 0 2.0

i-s U,0^ Ui ^1 -= -
= =
I. D CID00 0 E Q MMEanC

e- 0 Uz_(.1) M 00o1 0SS u
.0u "C (c (D a- Wa 0.0.

( A C) J 0 0u j n

*^ ~ S-c O ~ 02' *0 3, w tg=D CO Ca
.0 .MU 0

a- e aDE- *- >. 3- .~ = a- a 0 U0

M-0 En cu Cc Cc
Z.0 > W -C .~ ~ 0
E C- U: =n 'w' C ,-
>1' ) =W== =- 00 U, i -
a-.r 0.9- c t==B

W~0 0-. z-


ca 0 0. )= 0 > a

S0 0 ; f
S0=- a2

M.. w R J --.' E
=S U, 0 -< g-o- 3

.EG" o a o. t >E =

-0 -. Q.u ^*j 0- 1)

W i w a-c e
a> 0? -_- *U-' O s i)*
-?- 23S3 ..o^T -S
oE ^,) 3Ss
s ^o ^ ^ 0 U, -f
.0-0 U- e^|t .^
-'. a^ x..- 0)C' 5 0

5. 0 -=a^ ^ ^^5
7S. Ss! arS ^

S|| ij .|s c,1^1 a
o=0C2 S "0

!~-O CD Z
*^*^*^- %.. -.LS .9 2--

.4o() c a'n o
^g-o-l--g~g -T^^ 0SE

cu w 0 Q) -~ w F- x
L> = C) U, 0- m

U-. C.
0.0 M 0 W -M 49 -0 20
0 O n o c -1 r-. 5
E -c.S E = "oS~ -'3 -

U, 0 >~ -~ %J0 -.
mE C -Z:'J .-(D0 i -c .

c -0 go> .- 0
-7; Zi
^js -s CD^s
||^--=E|2 ESS^-
*iE^ ^.Cc >'5 -=M
5-5--E~-E ^ 5^S.Em
Ww E uo* -g 2- .

d z 0

.0 v a> c

c) M.."
aB.0 ST

- an c 3

C- -1
0 w

-0 I>-
f) 0i'-
o to i '-

.Q 00
00= C) 0 Ua

CD o
.c3- 1 '"

r .0 ? 0 an a-
an 0>|
*S 0>0S

a- 0 T4 0.,
. E 0. 3 -

o 0= ii
) 0 0

.0 i


Table 1-2 which follows analyzes Soviet payload stati-tics by the
probable mission categories, including some tentative conmpii-os with
the United States. For a large number of Soviet flights such data are
not published, and a variety of analytical techniq(iues have had to be
applied to come up with this approximation of the probable imissions.
Each of these categories will be di('cussed in some detail further into
this section. Some flights canii be tagged because those of a particular
series have been given a specialized name and usually described in fair
detail. But most have been thrown under the catchall label "'Kosnmos"-
which means Space. The pri.:s release. issued at many of these launches
references the release in 1962 which accompanied Kosn,,- 1 which listed
so many potential missions as to account for almost any tling. In the
instance of the Kosmos flights, they nmust b)e studied for all known
characteristics of time and place of launch, of orbital elements, of total
time in orbit until decay, and of measurable behavior in orbit. Some
of these flights later have their results published in articles in the
Soviet scientific journals. Thlen inferences can be nade about others
of similar characteristics. For example, years before the United States
announced that it had been operating previously iiiLanlnounced mili-
tary weather satellite program, it was evident to close observers that
when a succession of payloads were put into 960 kilometer circular
orbits, just retrograde enough to be Sun-synchronous, this would al-
most have to be for the purpose of taking low resolution pictures such
as those used for weather reporting purposes. Likewise, when the
Soviet Union puts up heavy satellites about 30 times av year and calls
them down from low circular orbit after just a few days in orbit, one
has to think of high resolution pictures recorded on film which will be
analyzed in laboratories on Earth. Similar assessments based on logic
and inference give a fair basis for defining the missions of most
There are inevitably some arbitrary classification problems. For
example, should the first flight in a new series only later defined and
made fully functional be classed with that series, or listed under "ve-
hicle tests"? In general, the decision has been to list them with the
emerging program. Then there are flights which may serve at least
two major purposes. Here somewhat arbitrary choices have been made
based upon the best estimate of the dominant purpose.



































oocnnr~oot^-OCO cniP4 ; t

LA C LM `-0(04 W 'a- CM ("4 -

- -o 4

-.00 t0 M ~ )0 :"m M :11
=- as a

o min *- -C i

c i

1 C 4
a a0(aJ a (.l(J ,- (


2 a a a D a a a

: ( 1 li !

s S'
a a a a ; a? a- a

L" L" >-=j 3
a0 a a yas o ^ a a a
t a

a a~tgoa at4(t) aa4 a a
Sa a a a ia a
a a

a a
a a a
a a~)~ a a~t.-4~J a a('~ a
a a a a a a
a a a a a a

a a
a a a a a a
a a a a a
~ a.4C'J('a a ('a a a (0 a
a a a a a a a a
a a a I a a a a

a a a a a a a a

a, a a : a a a -a

a,') 6 a ar- -- a

..-..i a ,, ., ,z...q(".J a =a a a l=,. a l,
a. a. a. a.. a. a.












CMj 00.-I CM 4a a) 0 a

~- a u aw, a a.2 a ( a

0N a J a 4 a

aD a, aa a a a0
>M a h O a a



a a a
a ( a a

a a a a a
a a a

ao o a a t a a a a
a* a_ as an o
U) i ai a a

a a aaasaS aa a

00 ( ". -
-cri Q M

00(0C0I-- a C a

-i ''i -

- a a a- ia
^(0'soo ^-~cot

^-< -

^-lOCO~l CM-*-'C



r- o0




(NI -

W ;, ,j 0 <-S

3: 0 -

w ltl ac

tw M K on
.-l>i'r *'g o r


m C^ CL m
^ -" c: o 2. .E 5,

pV Q

6=' Es C

^*-*'-04= 0w
on .5 0
'a>~~~~ c ( Vr >'

~ -~aanV)C C >
3a_ 00 .

aa ) in 0m3

C.) C io C i

E-- = 0 E

-* 0C) QCaa
o 5 K eC -; roc E0

>. tht.- OU


4Q ) m< e a)c -


0. c a (


C a C=' a) E
ana) 0-
IL;M M?">B M

C:C 4) 0

> r- mi~~a n ~ a

'5 a) E-*C~

-- (a. 86
&'StS *.Eia-oC.

a.~~O) Mc~n ~ .
g>5-.5.0s < S

E:- a ) 0>

~~E0 UC.a ULLa
0- a o-

2 W } Iroo

00 !2
.C a).>
UO 0 n (5 -C (V n>Ea

a t C,

(a ow
(~a' C' a. -E^ .
'/ 5 Ca) a- 5
a- C < a .)> c-cu
h- ~ an (V5 2 '3S .
0~~~~ C C 3S S=>

a.- >-= t a- ) 0-*=CT =2

0O ..C'J f t TO OG5)
an *o<*-0CC C>^


(NJ a


a a

a a
a a

a 3


*-q 0:

f' Mo


Table 1-3 in effect provides some of the back-up for Table 2 by list-
ing all Soviet flights by years, by launch site, by flight inclination, by
launch vehicle, and by cl '-s of name.
T h:rIl 1-4 is a simpler array of the ,anle number of flight totals by
year, but groups them by the names if any assigned by the Soviet
Governmient itself.













I~ 0



! CM


i- *- i

a a
a a
T a a a a a a
a aa a a au a
a a a a a a a
a a a a a a a

a ai a a a a a

a ) a a a a a

a_ a> as a a
a a a a
a aa a a a
a a a a a a

at as a; as ae a
a.q a a
a a a, a a

i aa a

aCJ a'J
a a a a a a
a a a,
a a a

at a I a a I

a a a

a a. a a
a a o a a
a) a.- a-a-a
a- E I II(% aIa a

a a a a' a
a. a- a- a a


-n C C', 0- CMC4

In* -1 a a a a a

:14 aM al) a M ar Ca%

*a I -4 M aa Ca a Ca
a S


I I a I I I I a a a a a I I a I a o

..4 Ca C -4 aq a a 0 A C J a a -

DOM LO 60 U.) LO ,,, ,) O,,OO -

o ^im co- con C.--*
CM 1 !i t0 ^

CM) (1 u* !5:2 0

aM a E a a a a a0 a a a a

00 000 o
E: E -)'

>%a 2 0.00 Vol
E- E E E E E .2E=,EaE
11ca at a> aaS I a a
a I a a a a a

a a g ao a8 S a a a a a a
a a a a a a I I I I a a a a a a
a a a a aa I a a a a a a
a a a I a

a a I a as 4 a a a a o I a a^ a
a I I a
a a -a a -a a a, ar a a-a a a,"- aN = ,a a, a a

a I a a

li^ ^ i i a a a a ai a a a a > a a< a^ a a> ax a a
a a a a a'O / ea ga a~ a aa a' a : a a> a a0a a
a a a.J aa .-. a aar,, ",.. a a M a a ......, a ,C%.--.
a a

a a- a a I a I a a a a a ^ a a a a a

I o ) i o ,.IP o i,' ,i. *.. 1hurI(* o o '
a a a a a~ a a. IN

- 1- I- I (.I L i L I- -X t- IJ I- I_ I- "_ "* I-' '-'I j"f N- N p-- N Nr "*I
a a a I a a a a a
a a a a. a a a .I0 CJ a a I aea a.. C a ,.. a
I a a a a a a a a

a -=, ~~-.a a a a a% aaV)%J.... a ... a

a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a o a ia )
II I a a~- i r 1 a a I a( a a ia a aI a aa"

o a a a a a a a a a a-a..a 'a', a, a
a a a a a; a a aoo a a aoa c ea oa a aa
a a a a a a a a a a a a a a

a a a- a a a .. ...j a- a a a a a ",a a : a% ac,J

I Ia- a a I a)) a... a m I a aa, a:= a a' a- a a) a: a:.t: a a a
a a a aa:a a a a a a a="=---'= : a": 1a a a 0 a a a a a
a a a a a a1- a a a a' a a a a a a a a a a a ,


--,,, CMr M CI" C rM
o at)

i" I

c *"n
a a a a IaI I a I a a a
'j M aa a! ii M0

01 ) I 0 a' a

Cl C' 0 i

a a a a a

o0 o .4 -4- -A -. iy
a a=a a -a a a a I I a a a a a i

o o 0
-'4 a a a a C J. a a a a aa4 a aa! a a I a ar. .

- a I I a I a
*_a a a a I a a a aMa a a a a a a aa
-a- .,,= a ,,,,,, a a a a a a,, a a=, a a a to a a a a

L i
t o
*o I a a a a a a a i a aa

0 a a I a a

o. <7
aaw. a a..a a a. a al. c J a a a a a a.. a a a a a a a a a a ~

C, cl '

t- 0
(7 I'l cl
I 2

a~" d, E E a a ) w w 0 a a a v w

a a a a a aa I a a a C a
a a a I a a

E -4 1. 1M (
U- LA LL <- < < 'I-cc

C. CM l 0 CM 'D O n


--J t M M0

0-). a a,,=, a1 U I ato,,,aa aaNN N N a a a a a a,

oL E
] I a a I la -. ,- a. ..i a ,I a a a a a a a a a a a a I a a a a I a a a a a a

a a a

a a I a

f 2
>. -_ ',,
oa I a a aa"Ia aa a

m I E I cc
2 ^ ^ , ?i .. . f>ii I 1o>0
Q a a g a a
S a. a a a a aa)

o I SIP I3: I ~o- _o /:I I I l I@ I| o1
a09 a .. ?. -- -a

*S_:o_ =o ,,_ o^ i --g_ : olil ooo og-2
ao ao ra a a a a a a a a a a a aaroa aa a? aS-S r.'i'^ ao* a S oa

-d-ooaowooooe~>c CoWM >= CL o.-< ~ o o >ooa
L a a a= a2 a a a a-a ao2 a a a a a
Il a- a2 a- a a a a, a) a< a! aj a5 a a a! ai al a! !2 a a~- : a a aa a a


iOw s w 00-. oi (0 .t ~-. musC~o r-.r-.
CM CM nC cm

M -4 M M -l PP* -

-4 (N -----4-

p p p-4-4 p p p

p p p p p p p p

p p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p p

p p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p p

p p p p p p p p

p p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p p

p p p p p p p p

p p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p p

p p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p p
P I I p p p P P
p p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p p





p p p p p p p

p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p

p p p p PC~J-4
p p p p 1-4

~-4 p p porn
P P 1-4
p p p

p p p
p p00(N
p p p
p p p p
p p p p
p p p p p
P p p PU~ P
p p p p P
p p p p p
p p p p p
p p p p p
p p p p
p p p p~%JC~4
p p p
p p p p
p p p p
p p p p
p p p p P P
p p p p P p
p p p p 0-4 p p
p p p p p p
p p p p p p
p p p p p p
p p p p p
p p prnOO p p
p p p p p
p p p p p
p p p p p
p p p p p
p p p p p p
pp p~..J p p p
p p p p p p
p P P p p p
p p p p p p
p p p p p p
p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p
p p p p P p p
p p p p p p p
p p p p P p p
p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p
p p p p p p P
p p P p p p p
p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p
P P P p p p p
p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p
P p p p p p p
p p p p p p p

1- P-i -. =1 P0w r- m r- -cr Cm (N M ul) M' .- M r
(0 Cn ( CM -C




PLfl P(fl


-i(N( ( pO p p
p p

p ",4 p


P 01-

p p





p i





p1 1


p p

p pT

p CpM



(N I~(N

'-4 ~

p P
p p

P(N ~(N

p P

p P p
p~ (N p

p p p
p p p
p (N p

p p p
p 1-4 p
p p p
p p p
p p p p
p p P p
p ~(N P p
p p P p
p p P p
p p P p
p p p p
p p p p p
p p p p p
p p p p
p p p p p
p p P P p
p p p p p
p p P p p
p p p p p
p p p p p
p p p p p
p p P p p
p p p p p
p p P p p
p p p p p
p p P p p
p p p p p
p p P p p
p p P p p
p p p 1 p
p p p p p
p p p p p
p p p p p
P 1 P p
p p P P p
p p p p
p p p p p
P p p p p
p p p p p
p p P P p
p p P p p
p p P p p
p p P p p
p p P P p
p p p p p
p p P p p
p p p p p
p p
p p P P
p P p
p p P p p
p P P P
p p p p p
p p I P p
p p P P p
p p p
p p P P p
p p p p
p p p p
p p p p
p p p p
p P p p
p p p p p
p p p p p
p P P P p
p p P p
p p p p
p p p p p
p p p p
p p p p p
p p p p p
p p p p
p p p P p
p p p p p
p p p p p
p P p p p

I 1

conrconoc10co .o to fto C.0 O to

CM CM CJ cM -, CM (Nj CM (N P1 L Lfl UO I t> kIn Lo ) tO U" F-.
(0 D0(o (0 .C 1.0(0 10 >(0( 0 w(0(0(00w(.0(0w
0 p0 O p^ p ip p p^ p^ pf p^ pf Pf tP P p^ ^ fp p^ tp

I cI

0 0
a> '-, '^ o J2 ,, ,

+- 'n .-- to0. a < j

( -- <:" -- 2 .-- "- 5 20< -'

-_ C_ C>- ,
=7 0 ^ 0c 1 `2
i oe 'S '~ ; .i o 11
1116- -gi j ..2s : w -

EEE 7o,3*Gb-^/O tOCT,09'D--;;O 'SZ;

c~~~- = :- Q *- =2c o o;
W,-.2 CE- -2 | 13 C'* QS2! E -

oo 0 Q0. O.*; O o o oo, S3 0 .* 0 's o

'E='E*'c E- <-EE uth*E';'U,",) (/E EE EE "E
p p p p p p p p p p p p p p P p se p n p
p p p p p p p p p p p p P p p p p
p pS p p p p p p P P P p p p p p sp p p

--- CMJ C C - ,- C C- -

c c' i -0- .4,
.-. r ro. -- '- --- r. ~- r 000 0 2000 0 0.
ro p o ~ p aa p p p I I p p5

p pp OT p p p ,, p P

_. -Q.--a --o "- ... S- c .Ja-- '"""" 0 o,%.
:00 XpD p"
P CC Ca Q .0 ) ~

o o o o .Qo Eoo o E o > =
1000 C. 0 I C-* 1 'I-pp P

I 8 p E W- a E w S
E- IC I I p' E I_" ,I
W0) (n CA co w Vp V) f^ >( aiU 11 (A

* E cSS-S0S.ZE >

0w o
(* l '.0 t CO C l iJ c
Ht soo oo ooo oo "oo)0)oo
~- i- c- r~c c *^ ~ c r < y ~ !& i- 0 0 .C C -' ~-

0 M~i ~ t a O C itai't aiO^Mi... Cfl(#)(fl

I -4 ~ C~)(N-44






































C 0
- C


,i- L l

- .-

** (J



(NJ l t A l.-

M CMl en rm m
CO 00 00 00 00 CO


a a4
I l* = t


c V c- e C
I4,..t t(*


c c > >-z I
UC" Ct.-

I i
0 0 0) 0 0 .-
E E 2 E E~
j> ( I


M 00C

in ooo

co r :

oor mo











( Ss

(V CC'
if l-

0 NM- 0 m cn0

10 C 4-
(O 0 *1:5 00)
- >00)- >-2
(V -E0:.S (n02)oro

4) 0 CL
1= (V*-0- E m ,w3 w

4- -- >, 0 a
>V M0000
c .0 w'=- 0

-"0 t W a CAIh 3 f t


o M3-C 0C

4- (V*O C two~)i
0 M =-

CC 0
4- 0a) (V~'~.CC xU-W

-o W

1 0 E = -o
~ .4-) WY

M E= m~llO D m-
4- In to= en*; c) C .00 4-
c 0) cc -- 4 L,- (
0 0o0
WC C ;c
.0 .0 W 4)

'Vo ^ Ea= o3

E. ELI c- E l
0)0 cnE -

(0o) 3I4-C

0- E~4 w 2300 U
0 0)"-T0)0)4-4;-*- 0.0

W-. = = w4=-
V) W*- M W- w^n (n.'
SM C 0) U-^ (V "~

M.0 in "W0 "-'E

0 w t442

0)0 0)CD 0 4
Qo M Cc* =- c /

Co.2- (A tt o

m=.o M^ .1
X3m I << twt C O c

C0 C-0 T> 0 0.0 M
21 .^ C.-0

I- r ^ -00 0

c/) 0.cnCn
LsJ 00u~0 wi.
0~~0 (Dc~,>. M
06 M0>. 0 0)

0>..~.0(VE C 0f
MCc 0) M.~ o*
mc.E -0 04(C 'w

M. M CL M ~~

00 0
04 )v W~k '-.00

M... 0 )
.0 a( _n n 4)|C

E = -.0) (V
3V.. .C0)mCa4- M 1, C
U ilC~ 0 l

0 a)I '5 a- 3
fl -C0 2 -J
^s^ ^^^C


Ln" COCM COM (%.r -s
I I IJ -i(J a aC air~Ca ai a a- ai 4-

C a0 (M :iMM P I *
a a a a i

*in^T i CMMMi' -

CN C", "' CM 4 M N ,
CM a<^C aM aM af a* a *^ a aa a

U-)- C14 C*4 Ln fCMJ
a(J I aiOa a a a a% J.J ~ a a-

1:1 M CM Cf, CM"-`CM
*1. a i a 1, aap.. a a a N a- a a L-, a a

O 10

ir1 iW il "-

a a a .-, a"a a a aN a a a a,, .-a.= a--


CM- -CM -00

a 4 a a
S a a
a aI a 5
a a a g a> a, a aa a 2

3 60 0 0 0. IS00
a a a E a a a a m a a

a a a a,... g a a a a a a a a a a
a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a o a a
a a (O l o a a a a a a a a a a a a a
a af!aa a a a
a a a a a a a a a a a a

a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
a a a a a a a >a a ao a a 2
a a
a a
a CJV a) a.-l%
a a af.. a
a a
a a
a a
a a a a a a a a a
I a a a a
ar~~e a CJ attJ a a a a' It)'J%
a a a aI4 a
a a a a a

a a a a a a a a a a
a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
a a a a a a a a a

a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
a a a ~ C l a a ~ t a~).aC .J a a a a a a a a a
a a a cQ a a a a a a a a a a a

a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a ao
a a I a a a a a a I a a a a a a a a a a a a a
a a a. a ~ a a a a a a ') a a a a a a
a a a ~ fl a a a a a a a a a a a a ao
a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a ao

aIt f~aj a a a a a 'J-
a 1) a a a a a a

a a a a a a a a a

a a a a a a a a a a a a a ,a a

M- -

- -'

0)- 0

f-O 00

r- aoo

C. 00 LM

ra.0O IC%
"a, 0

I10tO I t0



- a3




a > *;; a M C > J
2AZ 0 .--
tho^ xo *
C;m --
O^-a.-5 a^
5D a -0 r

a.- ILI CD 9
-QO( CO.w

-LA.J CL .0
5 C0 03" 0

(V0(VJC-0 .oL^ <
fl 4-a- a -2 a

(V OT-S "> (2o V-
t)0.0 -~ >.-Z an

.0 .00

S"-ca3- 0 o.., t
4) a n-
CD m

r- E c- cUac,

0 (V '-o
u~V ,t.

co C 0 m

OT*^o cEE">0
U.2 2- CO 0 i0 (

00c C 0C>
"I.-SE 0-.-
anCQ,(V .C^S o

ro C C 2^c =

>.j=- t= z cn
Eo0c.2'; ca:zo a

CD CD.04)

c-=j= (D 3-C:> En
M-0V C)(



0042-102 -M
= 3 E -..

0 -az-C

M r.5.- R-

~ an>
0 a- ~ 0.a-

^o*-) C4 v r"e
F- m-

o- ot* en- C 0 *

.0 C: (V "^n CQ C Cu -

-o C= Cf >

ro C >aOj-m o O

.s an C -
o0 an. c*-

1= 0*S.= Ca

an- 0 C)I 00r c i

(V ~ 0
I- I-J:!-
CO 4- a.) C.)

ana- .00_ x
I*- (V W 0


There is no certain way of finding out the exact weights of )payload
carried to orbit by each nation as only selectively is such information
released by the governments concerned. Further, the actual weights of
payload, announced or est imated, suffer from two statistical problems.
heree is no universal definition of what constitutes payload, and the
significance of a given payload weight is modified by the velocity im-
parted to it.
A payload iay be defined by some reports as the total weight sent to
orbit, and by other reports as the weight above the accompanying
rocket casing. Still others narrow the definition to the specific weight
of ins rumentation carried in a space vehicle. Illustrative is the variety
of numbers associated with an Apollo Moon flight. The typical range
of numbers are 136.000 kilograms in Earth orbit, 45,400 kilograms to
the vicinity of the Moon, 5,440 kilograms returned to Earth, for a crew,
someC rocks, and film with an approximate weight of perhaps 400
The amount of payload carried by a given rocket is subject to divi-
sion of weiglcht carrying capacity between fuel to attain a given velocity
in order to reach certain altitudes or inclinations, and the useful pay-
load of the vehicle structure and its instrumentation or passengers. A
given rocket will place the largest amount of weight in orbit by being
fired due east from an equatorial launch site, because the rotational
speed of the Earth is added to the rocket speed. All launches from sites
closer to the poles or at higher inclinations if posigrade put up less
payload. The use of retrograde orbits at any inclination exacts a car-
rying penalty by working against the rotation of the Earth.
Being mindful of these several qualifications, perhaps the most use-
fudl kind of comparison is to estimate the weights of payload which
could be put into a low circular orbit, which reflects in a sense the
potential payload capacity of each launch, even if in a particular case
payload was traded for more fuel to send the lighter payload to higher
orbit or to escape. We are handicapped in compiling such statistics
related to total weight by other problems. For some vehicles, we do not
have definitive information on their lifting capabilities (see the dis-
cussion which follows on each Soviet vehicle). Further, even when we
know something about vehicles, such as those of the United States,
there are constant technical changes being made and the precise charac-
teristics of even the seemingly known vehicles may not really be known
to the outsider. Most striking are the kinds of changes which have oc-
curred in the Thor Delta family whose capacity ranged from a few
hundred kilograms in the early days to a spread today up to thousands
of kilograms, depending upon the length of main tank. and the number
of solid-fuel ,trap-ons.
Table 1-1) which follows is offered with some recitation because it is
so approximate, but it probably is generally indicative of trends. It as-
sumes an approximate average capacity for each launch vehicle used.
and applies this to the number of launches each year from each coun-
try. The table has not been further refined to convert the comparisons
to a uniform ea-t ward equatorial launch; rather, it accepts as the aver-
age the site of Tvuratam as the best Soviet site at about 45.6 degrees
north latitude, and Cape Canaveral as the best U.S. site at about 28.5

degrees north latitude. Hence the table is not a measure of any act ual
weight of payload, whatever tlihat definition. It represents some kind of
a normalized maximum carrying cal)acity of rockets to place space-
craft in an orbit of about 185 or 200 kilometers above the Earth, firing
due east from the named launch sites or their other national equiva-
lents. The table divides the U.S. and Soviet payloads between small and
medium launch vehicles and those of very large capacity, because the
latter so influence the totals.
Others have tried to esti-mate the actual weight of Soviet payloads
by use of the small number of data points made available. The most
ambitious and recent of the.:e calculations is that by Anthony Kenden
of the United Kingdom.1 Kenden took as a starting point a figure men-
tioned by the Soviet Chief Designer of Rocket Engines. Valentin
Glushko. who cited by July 1, 1973 a Soviet total of 742 satellites
weighing 2.2233 metric tons, and 41 more weighing 110 tons which
reached escape velocity. Kenden then examined lifting capacities
quoted by the TRW Space Log, previous studies of the present writer.
and those of the tables published by the Royal Aircraft Establishment.
Ile examined in some detail the flights for which there are Soviet pub-
lished weight figures, those whose weights are fairly readily estimat-
able, and finally those that are more obscure. Bv looking at each class
of launch vehicle and each type of mission, Kenden builds numbers
which provide a reasonably good fit with the figure from Glushko.
His effort is generally satisfying, although there is one minor flaw.
Hle assumes that certain figures published in the TRW Space Log
have been 4tiinated b y them on the basis of optical data and decay
rates. The figures in question were supplied by the present writer to
TRW, and hlie in turn obtained them from the publications of the RAE
in Great Britain. Hence, although they may be the best numbers ob-
tainable, many of them essentially are estimates made by J. A. Pilking-
ton, and similarities from one source to another are not signs of con-
firmation but of use of the same original source.
SKenden. Anthony. An analysis of the masses of Russian spacecraft. Spaceflight, London,
August/September 1975, pp. 289-297, and 344.







W0 (N M t o. ~-L 00( --q d. (Nr WN ( mr M
-(N (0-3lA 000 00~ O-" (0r cLA
0000000 LA 00o (N 00(N.Oi~(000(0 i<. -n r-
-4 C( 0i A L; 00 0 r-z C t60 06 C5 r 0" a L(7 'r; r-
(N0 w0.- D 00 w- m Co r- 00 C crw 0
m 4( QUl) M L r-.wLA-LO -



~ ~ ~ ~ C I*- 3333 3 3 3

W) ~ ~ ~ ~ ^ P% "00 0 ( t m""( -mrc
Lr n w a -- W

r-.r -W rcof
U, I 3 3-4 3 1

.mm* L 10 3
4= In .- MM to D

W-4 -3 D r-3 W I M W 3 .0

-.0M 1.0 Ln CM M^ M/ MM M '-C ,-
3- CM 3 ;-7 CM CM 3 4 4I

u') W to 1.0 to 40Cc (. UD(.0fl I-< cM- fL, fl 1- 1
'-' -iCD C" M ro c c"' tfp m cn'^
* I I 3 3 M3 MIMI 3 3i ~ 0 ~O C l C C ir>Itf
*-no m i 3 3 I 3 3 3 i I t r I cM i -ir
C *P -i 3 3 i 3 3 3 3 I 3 3O3 '<0 -i i- O M -i 3u
3 3 3M3 3 3 3 3 3 I I 3 I i ia ^

* 3ooc 3 3 3 3 3 m 3r 3 o3 o 3 3 ic3 c i i
en 3T 3s 35 3o 3f o 3 o e3 3 T 3 7 0 0 3 f eI I y o

Z* BO -aB>.0
0:= B0^;Q

0 t ^ O 5-=

C 04m C

>S ^>
% -..=

_o E

(D" M-> > m(
.& 0= 0C M

.0ae x2n

w caI
co vi * w
>now oo

CD3 .2n 0
Cg -0 0 10

co. -O w = C&
a) CL= M--,
-1 >, B = to

W. c=cx u"!a


a) (
.0 o S a>
D > E= c

0*O .=-4
*| C.-j>. ) I
0 e T (n=0

3. .0 >3 ^'c^
00 ^ h..

00 a 0 0<:^ >3
f> a> o Inc

O r>.~;: 'an.2
oo _So>

cc .a 00

C.;p Z (5 J-
.5 e E *3 S*I ?

E 00~'
Iin cc=
00_ U) 0 Uw~

L 0 D
0-E >~=
si ~ c M2 s

Cc ca w "2=

00o =0 oE
S.= CoE 0 3t

cc -E 0

X.C0eCE 0

0' 0*0').-S. 0.

0 -0 o5
ui a) (D ^" o
I.^ =- -_| -

-- d0. 0.35

50- oE*~Eo

Eo- c Cs ocr^a
moo m W- o b. 2 r .

0 cc > 0 0w Q
ca w~ 0 m C
.B. o 0 oS -4 wE

0) L>< 0,< o = >.0 0 0 4
=0) 0 E *" =>

(- --. 0 >%"
(n c C LC,.'0
W= 3 M0)C J

0C Q E AL c'-0 0 0
MO = M0 0o >
34.0 ~~ (DN 0 ~-L .

i.. n I~c e> 0
00 cc >.O0 = IV

Lc L*-
a=T 0.Io
SC 0.

3'' ..

0 Cd..

>0 CL.0

0 E

5 0o' 0
r- In

- Mo.
>0 .0 w
-o 0*
0) -45
_-o -C

roi- 00-

-= 3 01.)
LU 0=2"

o^& 1
0 l^-
-~- 0T


The Soviet Union has three collections of space launch pads, just as
does the United States. Curiously, even the functions of these three
locations have a similarity, which will be detailed in the sections to
The largest and most versatile of the Soviet launch sites is ne:lr
the rail stop village of Tyuratam in Kazakhstan at about 45.6 N.
latitude, 63.4 E. longitude. The RIussians call it the Baykonur Cos-
modrome, although it is about 370 kilometers southwest of the station
stop of that name on quite a different railway line. It originally may
have been thought that by giving contradictory information about the
cosmodrome, the Russians would maintain some element of doubt in
the Western world, since the town of Baykonur is on the correct
ground trace of the early Soviet flights which were at 65 inclina-
tion. To this day the Russians pinpoint the launch pad for manned
flights as being at 47.3 N. and 65.5 E. which is patently false in light
of conclusive public evidence of initial revolution ground traces and
known launch times. Presumably based upon Soviet data, the NASA
press kit for the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project lists the launch site as
being at 47.8 N. and 66 E. This does not square with NASA Landsat
photographs and the visits and descriptions supplied by NASA
visitors to this launch site.2
Tvuratam was first accurately placed in public announcements by
the optical studies of Professor Tadao Takenouchi in December 1957
following his observations of Sputnik 1 and 2. The American trade
press continued for some years to report the launch site as being in
European Russia, until the RIussians themselves announced it was in
Kazakhstan (albeit at false coordinates, at the time of the Gagarin
flight in 1961.)
Tyuratam was the site from which the first Soviet ICBM's were
fired, all the early Sputniks, all manned flights, all lunar and plan-
etary flights, the earlier communications satellites, all the fractional
orbit bombardment system (FOBS) and military inspector flights.
It is also the area from which all heavy payloads put up by the Proton
"D" type launch vehicle. Presumanbly when the largest Soviet launch
vehicle is brought into use, the same site selection reasons will recom-
mend Tyuratam as the place for its launch.
In effect, Tyuratam is the Kennedy Space Center (Eastern Te.-t
Range) of the Soviet space program.
The first good look at the immediate launch site of the standard
launch vehicle was provided by a 1967 movie giving an historical re-
view of the Soviet program during the previous ten years. Those fairly
sweeping panoramic views fit consistently with the carefully cropped
or pointed views which had been released piecemeal in previous years.
Earlier the Russians had disclosed that the historical marker for Sput-
nik 1 was beside the pad used for manned launches, one more factor
confirming the lonx term use of both the .s-me pad and the same first
stage for missions from Sputnik I through Soyuz 19, the Apollo-Soyvuz
2 Aviation Weet-. Now York. January 14. 1974, nn. 12-13. pi,'tnrps.
STakenouchi. Tadao: A launch site In the Kizil Kum Desert? Kagaku Asahl, Tokyo.
February 1958, pp. 40-48 (in Japanese) ; reported earlier in press dispatches.


Test Project (ASTP) flight. For a long time no outsider could .ret to
the launch site. President De Gaulle was taken there in June 1966 to
s'ee the launch of the first acknowledged weather satellite (Kos: o)
122) accompanied only by his personal physician. In 197o, Pn-c-idelt
Pnlompidou saw the launch of a military observation satellite (Ko-io;
3(6)8) which carried a supplemental scientific l payload. Fiiallyv in con-
nection with the upcoming ASTP flight, three parti'- of nAmerican
astronauts and technicians were flown in at night, put up) in a hotel.
driven to the launch pad, and then were returned to their hotel for
another night flight out.
In the meantime, low resolution pictures made public by NASA
routinely to anyone interested showed that the Landsat, 1 views of thle
Tyuratam area, were covered with ro ds. railway tracks, and other
signs of human activities including almost certainly aIsse.imblv b)ui(ld-
ing's and launch pads which spread over a distance of about 13") by 90
kilometers or more. Also, the NASA people flying at night saw a (t-
tering of electric lighlits fromni their aircraft that spread over distances
of about this amount. At the day of the launch, the Aimerican ainibas-
sador, the science attache, and Willis Shapley of NASA headquarters
were flown there in daylight hours for the launch, but did not see too
much from the air. People did report that the little railway stop of
Tvuratam these days, is completely overwhelmed by the adjacent
city of Leninsk, of perhaps 50,000 people. This city has not been shown
in public Soviet atlases, and seems to owe its existence to the growing
space activity. With launch pads for many different launch vehicles
widely scattered over the area, it is not possible to speak of a single
closely defined latitude and longitude as defining the site, or to know
what all the launch facilities look like. The original "A" class stand-
ard launch vehicle is carried horizontally on railway flat cars to the
launch pad, tilted up, to sit on a stand over a large flame deflector pit.
The base of the rocket in the upright position is well below the level
of the railways tracks which deliver the rocket. There is a many-plat-
formed service tower which is tilted away from the vehicle some time
before launch, and shorter supports for the first stage which retract
away after ignition when thrust reaches a certain level. Tall adjacent
lig'ht-weight structures are described as carrying lightning rods to
minimize electrical interference with the launch equipment and vehi-
cle. and perhaps to carry television or motion picture equipment.
One gains the impression that tracking and guidance of Soviet space
vehicles during the launch phase involve fixed radio, radar, and/or
optical stations down range. This is because repetitive flights of a
given launch vehicle tend to be flown at almost exactly the same or-
bital inclinations. To achieve the right azimuth for launch, the whole
vehicle assembly and platform are rotated to the required compass
heading. When two very similar vet different flight inclinations are
achieved using different launch vehicles and other evidence supports
the judgment, one receives the impression the difference in launch
vehicle is also matched by using a different launch pad, and in order
to fly the right "slot" in relation to the guidance points down range.
the resulting orbit has a slightly different inclination.
Pictures in movies as well as the visits of NASA people show that
the assembly of vehicles and the attachment of payloads occurs in
special assembly buildings. Checkout of spacecraft is done in the ver-

tical position. Mating of spacecraft and launch vehicles is donlle hori-
Although only one launch pad in a vast cosmodrome ha> been opened
to limited inspection, the Landlsat pictures of the whole area conifirmi
the general impression that this is open steppe country, relatively flat
aid only slightly rolhing. There is no basis to the rumors of the early
days that Soviet launches were conducted by winged, l'nroverable
booster stages which ran on a track up a mountain side Iifore becom-
ing airborne.
Other Landsat pictures suggest there is a general area in which
spent first stages impact on the steppe, and informally R ii s in the
program have suggested they are able to salvage for reuse some com-
ponents from this "bone yard".4
A Soviet account of the Baykonur Cosmodrome d -scribed the as-
sembly-test building used for the Soyuz. The building is called the
MIK (Montazhno Ispytatel'nyy Korpus). The arti le said that a
Soyuz is first given a full checkout in the MIK, and then again on the
pad. In the MIK, the separate modules are tested in vacuum chanm-
bers, including the firing of maneuvering engines. After the individual
modules are tested, they are assembled to create the whole vehicle
and returned to the vacuum chamber for further checkout. Then they
are also placed in an anechoic chamber to test the radio compatibility
of the assembled ship with its communications systems.5
Another account of the Tyuratam complex was ,a rried by Space-
flight. Leninsk was identified as the long-referenced "Rocket City" of
Soviet accounts, about 2,090 kilometers southeast of Moscow on the
main Moscow-Tashkent railway line, with Tyuratam the original
village railway stop. The area was described as rolling but mostly flat
country, with complex irrigation systems and some tall trees planted.
The climate is very extreme summer and winter. It is said to be about
32 kilometers from Leninsk to the ASTP launch pad. and about 1.6
kilometers from the MIK to the pad. using the standard Soviet 5 foot
gauge railway track to join the two points. The second pad for the
ASTP backup was supposedly another 32 kilometers away. The same
account said there is a, test building for the G-l-e rocket and a gantry
122 meters tall for full assembly testing of the G-l-e.6

The second of the Soviet launch sites is near the town of Ple-etsk
on the railway from Moscow to Archangel at about 62.8 N. latitude,
40.1 E. longitude in European Russia. This site has never been spe-
cifically acknowledged. It is finding increasingly heavy u~e. primarily
as an operational site, in contrast to the often experimental or special-
ized nature of the Tyuratam flights.
Plesetsk is in effect the Vandenberg Air Force Base (Wv-tern Test
Range) of the Soviet Union. From here are launched many of the
navigation satellites, the weather satellites, and the majority of the
military satellites for a wide range of purposes. Now also, most of the
Molniya class inclined orbit communications satellites which previous-
4 Aviation Week. New York, February 18, 1974, p. 17, pictures of drop area.
B Pravda, Moscow, May 25, 1975, pp. 1. 2.
Spaceflight, London, 11 October 1975, p. 368.


ly were launched from Tyuratam are also launched from Plesetsk.
With its northern location, Plesetsk is used for missions which require
coverage of extensive parts of Earth, since even flights launched due
east for maximum payload capacity cover most of the inhabited Earth.
Plesetsk had been discussed in the Western press as a missile launch-
ing area. its later space role presumably was known to Western
governments, but the first public disclosure of this space cosmodrome
came from the Kettering Grammar School in England. Geoffrey E.
Perry published the first clue in April 1966 shortly after the first
space launch in March.7 Hie published the pinpointed location in No-
vember 1966 when flights at different inclinations had established a
nodal point of crossing ground traces.8 As additional kinds of missions
were launched from the Pleoetsk area, their patterns of orbital inclina-
tions suggested launch pads scattefred over a considerable geographic
area. Landsat pictures confirmed to the public that Plesetsk was spread
over tens of kilometers although not quite as large as the Baykonur
Cosmodrome near Tyuratam.9
When weather conditions are just right, an occasional Plesetsk
launch has been visible from Sweden and Finland, when the still firing
rocket rises above the horizon. The closest the Soviet Government has
come to acknowledging Plesetsk is to permit its use for cooperative
Soviet Bloc payload launches, one of the first being Interkosmos 8 of

The third Soviet launch site is near Kapustin Yar on the Volga
River below the city of Volgograd at about, 48.4 N. latitude, 45.8 E.
longitude, also in European Russia. Indirectly the site has been finally
acknowledged by the Soviet Government, as some suborbital launches
as referred to as coming from "Volgograd Station". The area has been
used for a long time as a rocket test station. In the middle 1950's be-
fore the first Sputnik, Aviatian Week magazine revealed the United
States had a radar station in Turkey which used radar to follow mis-
sile and test rocket firings from this point.10 Magazines of the period
said that Soviet short and medium range missiles were launched south-
eastward from there toward the Kyzylkum Desert near the Aral Sea
as the principal test range. In fact, this launch site was so well known
that for several years after 1957, the American press assumed that
it. was used for the launch of the early Sputniks and Luna flights when
in fact they came from the Tyuratam ICBM test center.
It was not until 1962 that payloads were placed in orbit from the
Kapustin Yar site, using the smallest of the Soviet launch vehicles.
and only in 1973 did they start space launches from Kapustin Yar
which used the intermediate size of launch vehicle. All the "B" class
small launch vehicles from there put payloads into an inclination of
48.4 to 49 degrees. All the intermediate "C" class vehicles. put payloads
into an inclination of about 50.7 degrees inclination.
T Perry, G. E., Flight International, London, April 21. 1966, p. 670.
8 Perry, G. E., Flii;-'.t International, London. Nov. 10. 191'6, p. 817.
9 Aviation Week, New York, April 8, 1974, pp. 18-20.
111 Avialtion Week, New York, October 21, 1957, p. 26.


The combination of use of the smaller launch vehicles and the i-e
of the site for launching vertical prole's make this site seem to parallel
a combination of the Wallops Island, Virginia station, and the White
Sands, New Mexico test area. Some AVestern observers speculated that
when the day camine that the Soviet Government would ease its security
rules sufficiently to open a launch site to outside visitors that Kapustil
Yar was most likely to be the first to "go public". This view was en-
couraged when finally Soviet bloc scientists were permitted to go there
in connection with the launch of Interkosminos flights which began in
Landsat pictures of the area show signs of activity over many kilom-
eters. but not on the scale of Tyuratam or even Plesetsk."l
Sary Shagan, the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) test station to inter-
cept rockets fired from Kapustin Yar, was also found in Landsat
Table 1-6 which follows summarizes the known successful launches
by site, worldwide, to provide a perspective on their relative levels of
activity for orbital launch purposes. The figures do not reveal addi-
tional suborbital or missile launching. The table reveals that Plesetsk
has conducted more successful orbital launches than any other base
in the world with Vandenberg and Tyuratam running neck and neck.
and Cape Canaveral a poor fourth.
11 Aviation Week, New York, December 1. 1975. pp. 18-19.
12 Aviation Week, New York, November 25, 1974, pp. 20-21.


MS 00 00 t r _,
-M C14 OLO 90i k
I I-

F-- tDic'in- Wi99r 99r

ri2 I
M 4m ^ ^00 % CM *-*

- cn
C) Ln ^MO

o ~~C 00 "44-C%-

00 CD (.D, --r 90-
-o C C

0!~ r-oc'CM C" L 999 099
LO m

. CM CM -

.d. 1y o10rc


I~ cv ZrI^
C.0o- tcn 9 90 004

I ~ ~ c M-= 1 D in r-- m M

Q. 6 =
00 = ;

to <*C0 = r= E

4=0 I 4.2 --E
I : w
*y 1 009.00 ..C.^ 9999

2 9 9

J PI 5.o3=2x
9x 9 9M-
9 9

(%J- 999999^

I I( f- *C'- s *9- *

o 9cV7r.0o
to 99 9 9
2 ~ 9999
0- 9 9999 9 9
9 99 99n
9 9 9 9n
oo 9999999
0>9 9 9 9
-4o9 9 9 9

0' 9 9j9

- 99 9 9
I 9 99 99g

F-S. 9C'94 S?9 9 -.5 .
in 9 9 999999999r
oo .2 99999s E 999.-*
9" io 9 S9 9O 9 99 9
95 9" 9 e 9
9 9^ 9B S .9 9 9 99
9 9 9 999999999a

9 9 9 9 9 9

9 9 9999995 99
9 9 9 9 9 9/} X


4 1 E 06'

k 0c W0
-- o2-!m

^|i U, C
cs >0C o f0T
'- "**:E :-

8 )0 -SSS g

C -4 E

4D cc" 04)

4= 0 C Ce
- 0co "> I

CM = ( C w o-C 5

.04-) a -im
"M i2 u = 0'
wC x e c0

rs |il 0
?" s s<
= =^ fsgl
^~~~ 0-'S < .

Ei "5^0 5fni

CM C = )''
F- P= sCll%^
00> sO~

c C 0E

W .- -

e .'o

1,= .0

- .4-
I j


- : ) E,
0 = ,
- 0A9.-
d. ooCCI

0 "-s
E- ME4'

*0 0 O**

j2 fflh*J
<0 ^S

=l 0 00
-4 0

fS-i 9 ic

vi h*.- (04
if. o- 00

0 a= QO
c 0 e eo

-0. f *- i fi 0

*E .." Ep


In the Soviet Union as well as in the United States, the develop-
ment of military long range nisseils was the essential source of ni,,.t
of the space launch vehicles until such time as space needs for larger
Capacity rockets began to exceed missile capabilities.
There was one difference, however. The United States started its
civilian space program with a non-military launch vehicle, the Van-
guard, assembled for the International G(eophysical Year (IGY) by
a team directed by the Naval Research Laboratory. This country
moved step by step to use of the modest-sized Redstone. and then to
intermediate range nmissile.-, the Jupiter and the Thor, before applying
any ICBAMs to orbital flights. Its small, solid-fuel Scout, like Van-
g(ruard, was not evolved from a military missile.
By contrast, the Soviet Union from the outset took its original
ICBM and applied it to space work for the flights from 1957 on, and
-till uses this vehicle, although now with improved final stage or
stages. Only after some years did the Soviet Union move down in
size to use of medium-range and intermediate-range missiles as first
stages for space launch vehicles. Also, an improved Soviet ICBM has
been brought into the stable of space launch vehicles, but to date has
been reserved exclusively for limited types of military space payloads.
When both countries needed to exceed the capability of existing
military missile first stages, they moved to create launch vehicles exclu-
sively dedicated to space launches. In this country, these were the
Saturn family, plus the hybrid Titan III vehicles which combined
a modified military missile with large solid-fuel st rap-on boosters. In
the Soviet Union, the first larger vehicle was the Proton or "D" fam-
ily,. and we believe, a new larger vehicle in the Saturn V class, the
*G" family, which has not yet flown successfully.





C i















o r-. "N W0 I Lml .t~ -R -. MM (D ul) wr (r -c M N M C4 U
aeT '- 4 T O--7 S 4*I
T/ CO .11 m< -c< Iln

00~~ ~ ~ -9 |. nC "-r-:

C".o. cn"'OT-r co m Lo
mt r- I. C

en ae a, 00 L- 'D a 2

m^ 'o (^3 to) a, r^- C., *"^t .Zrci r1u
m o- r ala
aaaI al

.' C'i r" C)0 Cj0
e >i i

ro m 9.0 aa -4 CM alo
*3C aa a a *-

~C (C C a.-C' 00-
I~ ~ l"<

COCM- -- aa a -*

fCO -:t I l a
ar>-4r '- a wl

w 'I Ln
CMO^- Ca oo

a a W 5

V)oo ':i1 <
I co

w *- a I a 1 1

D C C I n C a m

i ^4 1 t^ = = I

E- r.: E
o, 1 CU -z = fc
E > U a E
*0 a~ a a a a 1 1

a"'- ^ a3 aa a> E I a S
I- a^ a'- a Eaa aa ^
> c a ao a a I r a a. a a a a a
a- a^ a S O- a< a. ^ a a a a
a a a a a a a a a a a a
a asta^McSa a aa E a a a a 5
a a a a a a a a I Sj a a a a
a-^ ^ 0 a a1^ a a a aa |a.a a
? a a a a a a a a a*= ^
a! < a a-^ a a^^ r'^ O -C



0.- ^ i
0- C, -0

=.Q (Dw C

.g E -r- (
r.-. -n

o -D I"c r-
"S o *"'"

wm U c U > -2

Ev; v CD 0J
oEC C->

E-o (/io

> 0
4 c- 0 o-

o o f t('

04 I~- .1

L)5S ..-^ .

-. C.)
54 E > CI 0

(Dt ma m/ d)<

W. -S .1
t- ~ ~ > ror a D:
Eo 5.Ec ,
-4- -4-i^


E75S-- r
0' -

a-.C (U C) a

v) 00 C.)
OT (U 0 -e oo

o o cu

>"as .2 -.=-

0.- a -o 0 m~4
?Q- .CS S- 0.

C ( w, L.t- o0

W 0.0 0.0 0
0-(01; (0* 0,-

.00 ~ C> <_- (n-
t- *c .->~ 'Om =

M-.0 0 i
E .- M- >af

0~~~- wg^ Q'=C-
S0x- 00 i-. 0

mS. -5
re -- ^- -a

0 0 "- ~o t
0.2-: *<-wi":
.-0 2 i> '00co

B3 ~.0 *- OJ ;_

4-3>, .....co00

00.~? 0)=

*a:>- E- 0) l-a)o-

0 0)1 -o'--.
C0)- : 0- i-s' m CO
S s =evC

Table 1-7 summarizes the successful flights of basic classes of launch
vehicles over the years by all countries, providing a perspective on
their relative frequency of use. Tiils table has deliberately been kept
simple, and it does not reflect tle grcit number of upper stages used
with the basic vehicles.
The table shows that the Soviet original ICBM[, Sapwood, or '"A"
renmins the m(,.st used launch vehicle in the world, followed by the
U.S. Thor. Use of the Sand(al or "B" began in 1962. The Skean or
"C" came into use in 1964. Tie Scarp or "F" after its introduction in
1,966 seems to have peaked early and is used only occasionally now.
The Proton or "D" as a bigger vehicle is used less frequently, but its
applications are growing. We are still waiting for a first successful
flight of the "G" very large vehicle, so it does not appear in this table.
Aviation WTVeek and other publications claim there have been three
flight failures of thle "G" vehicle since a first attempt in 1969. Even
the "D" vehicle seems to have had many troubles in developmentn"
The Soviet Union does not name or even identify by appearance
and capacity many of its launch vehicles, giving reasons of military
security. Only after many years have pictures. of some been released
or models put on display. It is a satisfaction that these pictures and
models when made available are consistent with the previously derived
inferential analyses based upon the performance of these vehicles and
the few facts disclosed by the Soviet Government.
The original Soviet ICBM which was brought into both missile and
space use in 1957 was put on public display in 1967 under the lal,,vl
Vostok. The same launch vehicle but with a longer upper stage is
used for Soyuz. Neither label is sufficiently descriptive for the pur-
poses of this study, as this original first stage and the two kinds of
upper stages are used for many different missions. Likewise, the
smallest of the Soviet space orbital launchers is now on display labeled
Kosmos. This is not sufficiently descriptive either because the Kosmos
name has been applied to payloads launched by all five basic first
stages. It may be worth emphasizing that in the absence of any corn-
prehensive and consistent public use by the Soviet government of a
nomenclature system, all those in general use in the West have been
invented in the West. In the early days of orbital flight a great variety
of names of space vehicles purportedly of Soviet origin appeared in
magazines, but they seem to have had no more basis than the fanciful!
truck up the mountain side for the winged launchers which in fact
never existed.
Gradually over a period of years, Soviet missiles of the surface-to-
surface type were assigned numbers with the prefix SS by the U.S.
military services, and as these missiles were better and better defined.
their designators and approximate characteristics were made avail-
able to the trade press or showed up in congressional testimony. Thus
the SS-4, SS-5, SS-6... Some of these missiles such as the SS-7 and
SS-11 achieved a prominent place in the Soviet arsenal without being
clearly seen by the Western public, and they were not used as space
launchers. When missiles were seen to the extent their configurations
were recognizable by the military branches of the NATO powers, code
13 Alsop. Stewart. Salt and Apollo 13. Newsweek, New York. April 27, 1970, p. 112. He
described a large number of failures of this vehicle.


names such as Sandal, Skean, Sapwood were assigned, and these
also in time reached the trade press. Military authorities in the West
seem also to have created a nomenclature v-ystem for space launch ve-
hicles, whether of military missile or other origin, and these carry the
prefix SL. But an authenticated list has not been made public, so can-
not be used here across the board. Some years ago in the TRW Spa'ce
Log in the absence of anything better a svste.m was devised which is
being used in this report because its use has spread throughout much
of the Western world, and it meets at least minimum needs. The basic
scheme is to assign a capital letter to each basic first stage, and then to
use a number for the principal upper stage of the particular launch ve-
hicle, and a second number if the earlier upper stage is replaced. A
final stage is indicated by a small letter generally indicative of its capa-
bility such as e-escape, m-maneuvering, r-reentry, and h-higher
As subsequent discussion will show, even though the Soviet Union
has not disclosed an overall nomenclature system for its launching ve-
hicles, it has identified some of the individual rocket engines, such as
RD-107, RD-108, RD-119 which will be discussed in later parts
of this chapter.
Table 1-8 is a summary of the characteristics of Soviet launch ve-
hicles. Because of Soviet secrecy, it must be considered as highly pro-
visional. This is especially true when irreconcilable differences exist
in partial Soviet data made public, and when Western observers have
not seen pictures of some models and disagree as to their possible per-
formance. With this warning about uncertainties, perhaps the table
at least gives some notion of the scope of launch vehicles, the relatively
modest number of kinds, and about what their dimensions, power
plants, fuels, and thrust approximate.
Table 1-9 summarizes data for each known rocket type as to the
number of kilograms which can be sent to different orbits, and trends
over the years as these vehicles have evolved. It suffers the same un-
certainties as other tables where the Soviet Government released only
partial information, so must be considered provisional and subject to
revision. However, it is at least generally indicative of what the lift
capacity of each principal rocket is.



I 0



03 -
(.S. 44



00 -





C 0




Q :




(.OCJ ,

e a.-,

I to
_j _j

CC 4

I=C i

-4 -to, 4 4

0) 0 )4

4 F

I~ InV



4Vt 0
F 4 M

F- F F

4n 4 F
F) F1 F(
F -

o *c F F F-
CM* 4


F F 4
F~ F
uF F Fo






F.0 4n 4(0


I 1


1 1.
14 4 4 4
0%0 4 4
,F F F
4 4
4 4 4=
4 4 F 4 4-

4- CM4 4

4 4 4 F F0

0)0) 4 4
CC 01 fi CM
0M0) F F

U)) 4
00 I
0)) 4
F CO4 4
4 F F F F
-4T4 4S
o a t

F F |






0 0

o0 4

C", ,i o e
F !
1 t

0 4
JJ 44
0^0 C4


0) 0) 4 F


1(-4 4-4

-4 C







(D000 0

(n Uw v
Cv en 4 in4 )

01 I}

| a>

! !

i I

iv ^
QQ i
F F 4

4 4 4 4 F!
4 CM

4 4 4 4
4 F F

4 F F
4 4 F F(6

F 4 F F
4> 4 F F

S0 0)0m CC 0)0)
oomcltc6 00 Co00 m0)0%J 0m0 i OaO; 00 m0 C.j
C-4 CS m M-5 CM4 q -4



F > F Fp
F 4 4 F
2 ^F F F F

-4 F 4 4
F F 2
o F F~ F
F F F Fo

4 1 4 F F
sF F
4 4 F ss
0 F 4 F F
*O 0 FO F
F^ FM Fo


0 cc '
F F 4 4
8 WaF 4 4
F F > 4

* 4(0 4 F

o05 0.3 = g
00 g ) 0'
oJ- S 'Fe 0


to000 Ol !

0-0 C0, CO

-I j

Ln 00-C

w I
c c

ri if C
m-1 4 ;
4 4 F

F 4 4
F = F

4 F 4 4 4

- 4 CM

F F 4 4 F

F F 4 4
FH 4 404
F F 4 4 4o




C -


.D 00 C0.

e- -
M 0

x !


0 0

*r w m 4 4n

Cn U-0C3

r CJ 04 J;
4s 4

30) 4
C )-)
I0 000

-^ -4


. Q





Ca ^
a> C-t











(%,,, ,(-- S0
,, -. 1 f,


^0 0




- a

= a


* a
* aQ


tO 40(0 O

C'),n CQ m,-< 55



a; C a a) ,

0 0 0 0
*i a 3 a S S S
aM a a B S 5 a a a

I20 0 S 2 O a SS a S X>STS=
5T c a o a a 5 a S S ^

*^0 **-00-" tBOOO^-
^ a a> a S a o a ax asa

5t( aT W a.0 a) a a
a a a a a s a a a
a ~ ~ ~ ~ 4 V) an a 0


an"3 '

- 0 ((C



anQ s-

o -inr


a a sa

a a an a a

S- 5 5 5 a a
o oi 5 a a a
S^ aO 5/ aJ SA

U- ,

-o C) E

a aSa g

'(fl at ,

- -
- -

CO 5

* a a
CM 5 5
* a a


a S a

a 5 a

acar a

a 5

a S.S ia a

ae 5/* aT o









0 1
*> a .a

a a a


+ ~ Ii
al a a

a a" a a
a a

3a~ a

a I



*/ a.; a a a

aC ( S S


u, a

w-. .,- .-

^**S..,S .. a o III- U ,,1
C=E 0 >. o.- C'u

-o .I: ... I::L ;.- -
0 c0

":.0 *-' ....0-oin ..-) ,^

'Z"a) ;C --.," ) ". : .0-, "u
w ^-0*--i iZ

:0 0. 0 0
l-o> <-> n> ->W CA -
ZoE.^og a)-o

o ~ -o

=ca0. 0.L w C LI) E
0)i i'..I '-a^ 0 is .-

0 0 M=0 o
0 ChQ 0 co <0.

=i2E' 1Zc -23 21 1,
-=*^^-^- ~ ~0 CuCC TJ*^C
U,>**^ sl C.)o .ins
Ot in i a)s 0^C 0

0 E'in &5 Cu.0 = o>4-C

5 z _.;. Io .S -j.Q 0 :

o >0 ._Z W oc. :,-O"c-_
-...52Cu Cu Cu

Z r-a i.,.n 0 0 0

I::," 00 "--

C-- W 4-v.: ) Eo. o''
C'.O C-3:.C

,, .. 0.. -,, 0 m i )

(0. o -(0) a 0-,-0
CuL,< -.) .. 0. = 0-"> -.0
E0( C 0 m L- cU -.=
G, CD 0 )Cu
to .TO- .;2 0' .'E

Cu W

-0 0. m C-- E 1)E'wow
>~~0)z. -Cu 0)0) E=0 E
^:-*-go~-3 o

_~~~ CuL E'0

9 ca'nCL) w u ) 0
>u CU') m uU
m~0.0 0 OW 0j~
'-in'- v>:i-J o >

,, E

o: cn / C -~ )C
Cl, 0
m _2 < *s^.= *6

wwi IV~ >% =) 0W *> w 0-0)
0)e >0 c" 0)-- "->- >0 C ua -0o.0
' >0 -C 0- =C Cu0) .0 uh-.
0.-04- ,,: ,.- in ,:: -,-,
CL -
no OT .-c:c u< 3:. *c r 4) V)I cc

-=" ":^" 5^ == ""=- "-o
C.)0i o in .0

-0 2 2- .m w>
o'9 L9 0= w". c> w"a sC =O
MCAw U' w_ oo: to

wo o ~~wZ,,,,=- C
I w 0 = ,W. -= -. O m 0

"S'2 ->-l 1'= Lz
24c) 'u00 in 0-> c*t0..o-W
- o In 10 Ck0O s n in

Cu 04 ---0 i
E tw=. "). = Q- >1w .
C> In CU>0
Cl) 0 Cua C/ oaE 0~

,-&. :-^S"' o, "=2"> -^E^ Q*,a*
*=- w w in E- -;
cn w- C m r-(--M

-- 0- --a) 0.-o O'w0
-..- : -: C. 6 Q ,._

0 .l .. I0 i
0~ Li mooio~a


ilcnjiriin 0a~ii
mw) 0D M 0v- 00 C 0 CD>0
=). 00 0_a
a) re cn in a-
X 0M C 0 4- ow m -W w
W>j 4- CL -0")0u ==`)
0C.1n 4).- =0 ) C0 CI a 0) Cn 0'- =
0) 4) = = w .I"0 ).0C
00) = 0~ E wn 0C.

oin E-i~..-.o i >..s.0C00Cu
vw.0 = W w=

c .E C cO-)o 2 'ww- 0 o*
~ ~ C .0) 0 ..0).E.. oT

ce t ~ Cu.> o.s '- 0)C o0 2 Cuo
o o w 0)- 03 T c) bQ
000 CL.. W1. Cu0 Cu > 0)Ct)

67-371-76- 5








- CM in










I00 lo
t00>-< 0>0

-^ S'S^I CM o o in P r ,,,

Lo t,00


i jC'
CS !


"I Clr D. C4U)r
ci LO" m r | LII
i 0
OU.) u- n Du>n L

i i C
OCO) ro1 CM Cf) mo c^rro rm S,(101(0n

!cr'l 1. 1 00C

c-o.tom o oo mo tfoif moir m^o'm:,m ~
-i ^-,., c u">r~t =' =,

4C I LMC = on
U'li CD. 01) LnC L D3l=1
4i~ CD c

01.i LO OOMO coin Loro)ou ~

LCOD 18 :48 IS, 2:3 oooo con(=
CMi CM M L" -pT

0~~ ~ ~~~~ C O CO 000 ct I^0

m c pU U)C)O = mC U- LOCt 0p CMCnD J ) =OOuC nE ` C)Mo C

oino c ou"o r- o L r-r Dr r or o(. roc o to fl %
oc~i oc~r~r~ Lr~~o o~a-- e o OMLL

-;a.c::s z,
19 -. m =

SE wu-

Lu f to

CL~ a CD


46 rS.c
MS Wl hBtm

*ucac ---

=S E-

"C'= > 0<
S -0w

LL3 W 3 "
W t4-c.
E 4>'

0L X-
C 0^

S3 CD~e 2ec

'El s- -.
*x .: =*s w

r 0) Z:C XS
"oP > CL -j
1^" .t;2M *o1 M
a) ^c:r c

m^ -oIS0.

|E C>^ v

*S S E>
1- ^ ^C1
>0 >-_ -TS
W ca ( h ^ f

'n Ci.L!
aE c ^ 2 ^

Gn -1 ? -" ^
ca I-L Z jc E

im i1
oE Eg- Mo "

w E a>1 >D WoS g

C; 0>! = ^
E^ 'm o
g 0 M CL M m


co col

oo I
00 0

C <

! io
i i
I It





0o 00
0 E>


(V4 0
4- I0

0 >V
0 03 _- 01
E OCV c o.i <
34 J. 0< c
0 0 0 6.

2 C' 5 = l- I^ 0 0 Q>. *S *
S E 0

Js >1 .0 0 0 m
;o>c-_i P EE -C at 00 0 3

^c L vi<" ? w n y w ln v w W)i
S0o>, o o3 C 3
3 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~C C'- >v imC n c o ,wn wn
000 0 0 0 C>Q C0 0 0 00 0

CD =1 CD I0 0 cn C=0 C0 C0
C)oo C r-LO un t> u,,,* Ln 1-0 u"u ) -* ^

C- C 4 C 4 m m

tO-T mrC -r CD, CD *-Csl C, ''*^'"3^ C>C >C>=C > = D C D
o6* r iu 6c6v;c d0 c..j c, u-'J 06 I

en C0 0 0) 0 00 }
*- ~ Qc N lC j C .i, r j 4- C4 4 ~ C4

m cc m 0 mC4

&' > CV CO <0 (
tai.' 1- to v0 too 00
mmow 3 WO (G?'- ? BOM
*c a

s::*++.++! +^S X2. ,

(.D-m W "c.Q 4 1 4 C)

to C0 --- -+ 1 w

~ we 2 2 t-UO w -u ~
E .2 4- 44a
<1~~ ~ ~ ~ 41 41 < 1'tc'8 U, Z


o S- Q.25

.0 (0< -
= (VD

S- a'(V ^

(4 --
';*- E m0 c

On =r'

m 00W
E .0.r: ^a

2P ' . .000 E a

E g
*4o 0w.. 0- fl .

MM tt t i -
W 0
0 > 0

E c
O0=W( =
. c z 'E

E~~~C (no- >>
- >.- o
c E o ua

0 o-=0 e>-0 EO

114 E~. E-cn

0 CD W |

004l- W

.0 Cm
0a *-35 >4 S E >Q

> -o E-o5

E Ci4
o.oo 0' ga

M-0.5 V) W

= =

0 c CO


-.0 E j0-
(4050 VK

w5 ai .

Co 0 C-
WV .-- gn

V00" 0
W 4-E E-2.

W- 0-(V-.--
c =>
0 M0
w, (, o O r- o
00- .oo

I .I C

Co 'w Ca t

0.0 o U

4 CD -
.0 = go. 0 ?*

n (, '-* 5 (V C<

V*4S 0 r C '- W^ j

0 B- 0 2- T TL

oc- g- *g c

3> e >o. -3

o('*- 0 0.s'o

E4- G -QSM
.C j!











1. The Or;ginal Version-A
Some time in the early 1950's a large Soviet rocket engine was de-
veloped for use in connection with the first ICBM, and it may have
been considered even at the outset for space work as well. The Russians
designated this the RD-107. Thlie engine burns kerosene and liquid ox-
ygren, uses a single shaft turbine assembly to pump the oxid(lizer and
fuel to four combustion chambers with exit nozzles and to two steering
rockets. There are auxiliary systems to pump a hydrogen peroxide
gas generator and to run a liquid nitrogen to nitrogen gas pressure
supply. The engine operates at 60 atmospheres to produce a vacuum
thrust of about 102 metric tons with an I,, of 314 seconds. A variant of
the same engine is called the RD-108, differing from its predecessor
primarily in having four steering rockets instead of two, and its vac-
uum total thrust is 96 metric tons. The first ICBM which also became
the launcher for Sputnik I was assembled by placing four long tapered
tanks of roughly cylindrical shape around a sustainer core. Each of
these strap-ons had an RD-107 engine and the central unit had an
RD-108. All five units with their 20 main nozzles and 12 steering rock-
"ets are ignited on the pad. and as soon as thrust builds up to lift off the
pad, the rocket rise.. When the boost task is over, the four strap-ons
fall away leaving the sustainer core to continue burning for a time.
The total assemblage creates a fairly graceful impression. The cen-
tral sustainer core. 28 meters long. described from the ground up starts
as a regular cylinder, then flares outward, and tapers back again, creat-
inc a hammer head effect. This peculiar shape was selected to blend
with the four strap-ons which are modified elongated tapered cones.
When all five units are strapped together, the result is a fluted pyra-
mid effect with a maximum base diameter of 10.3 meters, including
the four stubby fins.
This is the vehicle which the Russians claim first flew as their orig-
inal ICBM from Tyuratam on August 3. 1957.a4 Then it was used for
the launch of Sputnik 1 on October 4. 1957. and likewise for the next
two Sputniks. During that period the rocket had no upper stage, so it
was not used very efficiently for payload weight purposes. The entire
sustainer core was placed in orbit on these occasions, and one of the
blurmred Western photographs taken of such a rocket tumbling in orbit
definitely suggests its hammerhead shape which has since been revealed
by the Russians. Judged by the weight of the last and heaviest of these
payloads, the lifting capacity of the rocket was about 2 metric tons
to low circular orbit. It is possible that the residual weight of the spent
rocket casing was on the order of 6 metric tons.
With the announced weight of Sputnik 1 at under 84 kilograms, it is
understandable why Western observers in that period postulated the
ue of a much smaller launch vehicle than the real one. When people
rushed out of doors to see the passing of the first satellites, usually
they were really viewing that 28 meter rocket easing, like a Pullman
railway sleeper tumbling end over end. rather than the spherical Sput-
nik 1, 0.58 meters in diameter, or even Sputnik 3 which was 3.76 meters
long. Sputnik 2 remained attached to its rocket.
14 Moscow Radio. August 2,1967 S000 GMT.


Some time later, when the United States launched the Project
Score satellite in the same mode as Sputnik 2-namnely, leaving the
payload attached to the spent rocket casing-it injected the entire
sustainer portion of the Atlas launch vehicle into orbit. The United
States announced achievement of the world's heaviest satellite to date
(3,969 kilogramss. The useful payloadtl wa. actually about 68 kilo-
grams. This provoked Leonid Sedov of the Soviet Union into somie
testiness, when he pointed out that the total weight in orbit in con-
nection with each of the three Sputnik launches had been in exceed of
the U.S. weight. The residual Soviet weight has been assumed to be
about 6 metric tons, and the Sputnik 2 vehicle which like Score re-
mained attached to the rocket body weighed 508 kilograms for a total
combined weight of perhaps 6,508 kilograms.
2. Launch Vehicle with Luvnar Upper Stage, A-1
Considering the lead times involved in developing space vehicles, it
is likely that well before the time of Sputnik, the Russianis were de-
signing and building an upper stage to fit on their original model
ICBM, and this raised its orbital capacity to over 4,700 kilograms,
though its first use was for direct flights to the Moon with a net pay-
load weight of about 400 kilograms.
This upper stage used for the Luna 1, 2 and 3 flights was the first
Soviet spacecraft to be put on public display in replica. Mounted on
top of the sustainer core by an open truss structure, it measures about
3.1 meters long and has a diameter of 2.58 meters. Strangely to this
date the Russians have not announced the designator for the single
nozzle engine or given its thrust. Its thrust should be on the order of
10 to 20 metric tons. We are left with a mystery in the Soviet accounts.
They reported for some years that the total thrust of all the engines
was 600 metric tons. Having then told us that the five engines of the
core and boosters had a thrust of 102 metric tons each, by subtraction
the upper stage thrust should have been 90 metric tons, which would
have put a heavy G load on this stage when it fired. This is the amount
of thrust of the Soviet RD-219 upper stage engine, but it has two
nozzles, and the lunar stage engine has only one nozzle. When this
rocket was lised for the direct flights to the Moon, the lunar stage was
accelerated to a speed sufficient to send it to the Moon along with the
payload. The combined weight of spent rocket and payload was on the
order of 1.500 kilo'ra ms.
When the Russians were ready to begin test flights leading toward
placing man in orbit, they used this same upper stage on the original
launch vehicle. It was not until 1967 that a replica of Vostok 1 was put
on public display (Paris Air Show), and indeed, the upper stare of
that assembly was essentially the same as the earlier unveiled lunar
stage of 1959.
It was mentioned that at first Western analysts thought a r;!uch
smaller rocket had been used by the Russians for the launch of Sputnik
1 because that payload weighed only 84-1 kilograms, and people at first
were unaware of the great weight of accompanying rocket stage a]o)
in orbit. A second factor in the underestimation was the different e
in design philosophy. For example, the early U.S. Atlas missile has
such light construction that it must be kept pressurized all the time to
keep it from collapsing of its own weight in relation to skin thickness.


This was done to maximize performance for a given size of vehicle.
By contrast, when the Soviet launch vehicle arrived by ship at Rouen,
France, observers were fascinated to note that the core and boosters
were unloaded with cables attached at opposite ends, and workmen
,could walk the length of the empty rockets. The implication was the
Russians did not feel weight-limited, and had built rugged vehicles
which still permitted them to carry the payload they wanted, within
reasonable limits.
3. Launch Vehicle with Improved Planetary Upper Stage, A-2
The Luna and Vostok version of the standard vehicle did not exploit
the total potential of the first stages, and so an improved stage was
built which began to fly as early as 1960. Its first public disclosure came
in 1961 in connection with the Venus attempts of that year. The Luna
upper stage was replaced by a stage 6.6 to 8 meters long. It was able to
send about 1,500 kilograms of payload to the Moon, not counting the
weight of an escape rocket, and over a period of time the capacity was
raised. Without an escape rocket it was used to increase the Earth or-
bital capacity. The first announced use in Earth orbit was to put up
6.583 kilograms, and subsequently, the capacity has been described by
them as 7.500 kilograms maximum. It was used for the pair of Voskhod
manned flights, and has continued in use to the present time in the
Soyuz manned flights. In addition it is the version most used in the
Kosmos program for those flights which perform a military mission
followed by recovery after some days.
It is the Soviet practice to disclose information only piecemeal about
their vehicles. In the case of the Vostok it was years before they dis-
closed the thrust of the rockets or their number. The sole statistic
beside the orbital weight was an output of 20,000,000 horsepower, not a
common measure for describing the power of rockets. As mentioned
they later said the combined thrust was 600 metric tons from six
When the Voskhod flights came, they said the rocket had seven en-
gines of 650 metric tons. No replica was put on display, so that analy-
sis in the West was made more difficult. Subtraction of the announced
thrust of the five core and booster engines seemed to leave 140 metric
tons of thrust for an upper stage of 2 engines. This was not logical for
the purposes or for the observed behavior of the flights. It is only in
1975 that we finally have a fresh Soviet statement on this rocket com-
bination. First of all, they have adjusted downward the thrust of
the central core rocket to list it at 96 metric tons, giving 504 metric tons
for the combined thrust of the core and boosters. Now they list the
same upper planetary stage, as used for Soyuz as having a thrust of
30 metric tons. The stage is powered by a single engine with four com-
bustion chambers and nozzles. There is no clue as to how to reconcile
the 534 metric tons of combined thrust in Soyuz with the 650 metric
tons quoted for the same stages in the Voskhod of many years earlier.
We still do not know what the seventh engine alluded to earlier meant,
as only six can be counted.
The mystery of why the Soviet listed thrusts ran ahead of normal
reality was finally solved in 1975. Maarten Houtman of Amsterdam
was talking with a Soviet engineer at the Paris Air Show, and was
told that the 600-metric ton figure for thrust was found by adding to-

gether the combined thrust of four RD-107 engines at 102 tons each,
plus the RD-108 engine at 96 tons, for a total of 504 tons, and then
adding to that the thrust of the same RD-108 which continued to burn
after the four strap-ons dropped away, making the total of 600. The
arithmetic is impeccable, but it seems a most peculiar way to count
total thrust, and it still ignores the thrust of the final stage.
A review of the book by Leonid Vladimirov (Finkelstein) shows
that he published in 1971 the thrusts of the Vostok (A-l) rocket four
years ahead of the 1975 Soyuz disclosures on the same rocket, and he
further had information that the mysterious upper stage had a thrust
of 11 tons, which is consistent with the RD-119 engine to be discussed
4. The Added Stage Version for Eccentric Orbit and Escape Missions,
The A-2 version, just described, was itself a step back from the A-2-
e, already partly described. In this version, there was indeed a seventh
engine, in contrast to Voskhod and Soyuz. This added stage when
used is contained within the shroud which covers the payload. The
Russians after Luna 3 used consistently a special technique for their
flights which required an extra stage. This was especially important
for flights more nearly in the plane of the equator, since the Soviet
launch sites are at relatively northern latitudes. The rocket assembly
is launched from the cosmodrome to place the interplanetary larger
stage plus the payload in low circular Earth orbit, where the burned
out stage is separated. During the course of the first orbit as the pay-
load heads northeast across the South Atlantic to cross Africa, a spe-
cial orbital launch platform, never specifically described as to shape,
dimensions, or weight, is oriented and from it the final payload is
launched to higher speed by the escape rocket. This probe rocket, after
it has done its work, is separated from the payload and flies on es-
sentially the path as the payload. It has not been described in detail
in Soviet publications available in the West. However, it was shown
diagrammatically in a Soviet pamphlet written in German, "Nachrich-
tenbriike in Kosmos" which described Molniya 1. This has subsequently
been issued in English: "A Satellite's Overhead". The stage is shown
as a stubby cylinder measuring about 2 meters in diameter and per-
haps 2.5 meters long. The Royal Aircraft Establishment estimates its
length as 2 meters. Soviet payloads which are launched from the orbi-
tal launch platforms and given their impetus with this added escape
stage also carry a special maneuvering engine for orbit adjustments
and smaller verniers for orientation.
When this whole system works, it does a very effective job. The
Soviet program is given added flexibility as to launch windows through
the technique of orbital launch, and calculations can be made as to the
final stage firing in the relative tranquility of the vacuum of space.
This flexibility is important for the Russians who have lacked the
worldwide network of land-based tracking and control stations which
the United States has developed in cooperation with other nations.
But the number of steps required to cnrry out a deep space mission, sup-
ported by automatic devices and a few ships, tended to expose these
5s Vladimlrov, Leonid, The Russian Space Bluff. London: Tom Stacey Ltd., 1971, p. 83.

operations to a fairly high failure rate. Assuming that in general So-
viet flight successes and failures are compare able to those of the United
States because competent people in both countries are applying the
same technology, then we see no particular reason why Soviet Earth
orbital operations should be any less successful than those of the
United States. But deep space work with the platform launch tech-
nique presents in fact another story. For example, the United States
has made 59 launch attempts for escape missions, of which only 11, or
19 percent, have failed to escape. The Soviet Union has made an un-
published number of attempts to use the orbital launch technique, but
we can note that of 65 Earth orbiting platforms carrying payloads in-
tended for the Moon, Mars, or Venus, 20 failed to send their probe
payloads beyond Earth orbit, or a failure rate of 31 percent, higher
than the U.S. rate. The total failure rate is undoubtedly higher for
deep space missions because additional flights presumably did not
even attain Earth orbit.
5. The Standard Vehicle with Maneuvering Stage, A-m
Late in 1963 and again in 1964, the Russians flew payloads with the
name Polet, and these were heralded as but the first ones of a large
series. In actual fact, no more flights occurred with exactly the same
characteristics, and the name itself was not used again.
What was distinctive about these flights was that they came early
enough in the Soviet program and were ambitious enough in perform-
ance for their being an application of the A vehicle. They were
launched from Tyuratam. Each was advertised to have made extensive
changes of altitude and also of orbital plane. However, the amount of
plane change was not specified, and it is doubtful that it was very
large. Neither flight left a separated carrier rocket in orbit as a guide
to how extreme the subsequent maneuvers were of the final payload. So
apparently the A-1 or A-2 were not used for these launches, but some
experimental maneuvering stage which remained attached to the pay-
load. Either this combination did not work out as hoped, or the "im"
stage subsequently has been incorporated into other hardware, to be
discussed later.
6. The Standard Vehicle Possibly in an A-1-m Configuration
There were two more engineering test flights which bore at least a
partial resemblance to the Polet flights. These occurred in 1965 and
1966 under the labels Kosmos 102 and 125. There were no separated
carrier rockets accompanying the flights, and their location of perigee
in the southern hemisphere suggested that their lunar type stages had
been only suborbital with an integral upper stage firing half way
through the first orbit to put the apogee back in the latitude of the
launch site. It is a temptation to consider this a further development
of the use of the "m" stage, but without Soviet data, it is not provable.
7. The Standard Vehicle Possibly in an A-2-m Configuration
In 1970 and 1971 there were three flights (Kosmos 379, 398. and
434) which have never been adequately explained. In another context,
their possible missions will be examined. They behaved a little like
regular A-2-e vehicles in that they abandoned an interplanetary type
stage in low Earth orbit after their launch from Tyuratam. Later they
abandoned some piece of hardware in an eccentric orbit which reached


out to approximately 1,200 kilometers. After this a maneuvering en-
gine integral with the payload carried the flight to a distance of be-
tween 11,000 and 14,000 kilometers, depending on the flight. It is pos-
sible that this was therefore a series of flights using the A-2-m con-
fiigruration. On the other hand, supposing that the hardware abandoned
in an intermediate orbit was an "e" upper stage, then the payload may
have incorporated a new fourth stage of high efficiency, anld it might
be labeled the A-2-e-h combination. Until there are more flights to
give us data points, or a Soviet explanation, we may be left with no
firm answer possible.
Elsewhere in this chapter, Table 1-10 attempts a synthesis of the
data collected in Tables 1-8 and 1-9 to suggest a possible set of rela-
tionships among the rocket engines and stages used in different ve-
hicle assemblies. It must be stressed that this is somewhat of an exer-
cise in building a castle of sand. One good -wave of new Soviet disclo-
sures even if not crumbling the whole structure would change some
of its parapets and towers of speculation.

Just as the United States looked to the Redstone, Thor, Jupiter,
Atlas, and Titan in the missile inventory to serve as first stages of
space launch vehicles, the Russians also saw the logic of applying
the results of extensive military R & D. As discussed, the original
ICBM, SS-6 or Sapwood became the standard Soviet launch vehicle
from 1957 to the present time, with its lift capability gradually im-
proved to as much as 7.5 metric tons. Even with the economies of serial
production, this is still an expensive way to put up every payload
whose weight may be a small fraction of 7.5 metric tons.
Moscow parades of military hardware had revealed medium range
and intermediate range missiles which should have been quite capable
of serving as the first stage of space launch vehicles. One of these, the
SS-3 or Shyster was later pictured by the Russians as the largest of
four classes of vertical probe rockets used for geophysical payloads
and biological flights launched at Kapustin Yar during the late 1950's.
Shyster was replaced in parades by an improved version which may
have a range of about 1,600 kilometers instead of about 1,000 kilometers
like its predecessor. This newer model was code named SS-4 or Sandal.
It was the principal rocket which showed up in Cuba during the fall
of 1962, so its picture became well known in the United States.
Kapustin Yar, a primary base for test flights of the Shyster and
then the Sandal missile, came into use as a space orbital launch site
in March of 1962 when Kosmos 1 was announced. The small Kosmos
flig"Its, all flown at close to 49 or 48 degree inclinations would have
been ideally launched by the Sandal, and that was the conclusion of
Western analysts for five years. No specific weights were announced
for these groups of Kosmos payloads, strongly suggesting that there
would be a large military component among them. However, from a
study of the replica payloads which have been put on display, this
vehicle should be able to lift from 260 to 425 kilograms to orbit. A
Soviet official at the Montreal Expo told David Woods the range was
2S0 to 600 kilograms. In 1967 at the Paris Air Show, the Russians put
on display for the first time the RD-119 upper stage rocket used for

this launch vehicle. It had been developed between 1958 and 1962: at
the Leningrad Gas Dynamics Laboratory. Its design concept was a
little like the RD-107 and RD-108 from the same source. It operates
at a pressure of 80 atmospheres, has a thrust of 11 tons, and a vacuum
Isp of 353 seconds. It burns unsymmetrical dimethyl hydrazine
(UDMH) and perhaps liquid oxygen. The single nozzle is bell-shaped,
and a single shaft turbo pump system drives the fuel and oxidizer
supplies as well as fairly elaborate set of auxiliary nozzles for roll,
pitch, and yaw.
Late in 1967, with the expansion of the Moscow Museum of Indus-
trial Achievement, a total assembly of this small Kosmos launcher was
put on display. This confirmed the analysts had been right: It did
use a modified SS-4 Sandal first stage, with an added upper stage
powered by the RD-119. Most of the payloads it puts up nre spin
stabilized, and then the carrier rocket upper stage is separated. In at
least one case, the payload was not separated. In another cnse, two pay-
loads were put up in a single launch. Twice, a special aerodynamic
stabilization was used. More recently the first stnage rocket engine has
been displayed as the RD-214. It has four nozzles, burns kerosene in
refined form and nitric acid. Its thrust is 72 tons, the Ip is 264 sec-
onds, and its chamber press re is 45 atmospheres.
Althoiiugh this study is devoted to the space program and not to
military hardware per se, so much reference is made to military sur-
face-to-surface missiles, many of which are also used for space pur-
poses that Table 1-10 has been appended to give a quick reference
check list of the better known of these.

Small, relatively modest Soviet payloads for five years came only
from Kapustin Yar, and after that also from Plesotsk, but not from
Tyuratam. In 1964, however, a new series of flights began at Tyuratam
with a vehicle which was neither a B-l. nor the large A class. It can be
designated the C-1, and starting in 1967 it also cainme into use at Ple-
setsk. It was first used for a space launch from Kapustin Yar in 1973.
As first used, it put up multiple payloads, initially three at a time,
then five at a time, and now eight at a time. Starting at the end of 1965
and most of the flights since have been single payloads. The earliest
launches were in eccentric orbits, and then came flights with circu-
larized orbits, and these have been at increasing altitudes.
This performance seemed in excess of what could be expected of the
B-1 launch vehicle both because of the many multiple payloads, and
the demonstrated capacity to achieve circularized orbit at higher al-
titudes. In addition to that the appearance of the flights from a cos-
modrome not. used for the regular small Kosmos or B-1 flights was
a further indication. Even where flights of the B-1 and the C-1 come
from the sa me cosmodrome, there are marked differences in inclination,
suge 4ting the use of different launch pads.
As Western analysts sought a military missile which might fit the
needs of a first stage of the C-1, the SS-5 or Skean came to mind.
This had been paraded in Moscow, and was believed to have a range
as a missile of close to 4,000 kilometers. It was also known as the missile
which followed the Sandal into Cuba and posed an added threat then
because of its greater range.


The Skean-based C-1 type of launch vehicle has not yet been put on
display by the Russians, but finally some photographs are appearing,
and they confirm the use of this particular missile for the first stage.
The first photograph was obtained in the West by Maarten Hioutman
of the Netherlands. The exact dimensions are not known, but s'ane
ratios have been developed by Phillip S. Clark of the United King-
dom. The vehicle may be as much as 2.5 meters in diameter althoughli
it may be 2.4 or 2.25 meters and about. 31.6 meters long. It probably
could put over 1,000 kilograms into low Earth orbit but has not been
used that way. More likely the payloads range from about 900 to 500
kilograms, decreasing with altitude. The reticence to discl-ose anything
about its rocket engines or performance again suggest a role which is
largely military. Even the Skean missile when paraded in Moscow
carried a plate to hide its power plant. Kenneth Gatland says it has
four nozzles.

In the United States the time came when occasional needs for put-
ting up large space payloads exceeded the capacity of existing v%. rieties
of military missiles, and hence the Saturn I and I B were created. They
grew out of preliminary designs of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency
Redstone Arsenal team headed by Wernher von Braun. Much the
same need must have been felt in the Soviet Union, and they, too, have
created their first non-military-missile vehicle for space purposes.
Some Western analysts speculate it was first designed as a super
ICBM to carry the 100 megaton city buster warheads that Premier
Khrushchev talked about. In any case, its flight test program has
been limited to space work.
1. The Basic Vehicle without Extra Stages, D
The first launch of a new large vehicle came in July 1965, with a pay-
load named Proton 1, and said to weigh 12.2 metric tons. The payload
replica was put on display and it had a cylindrical cross section of
about 4 meters. When the payload was orbited, it was accompanied
by a separated spent carrier rocket stage. Published Western estimates
of this stage have ranged between 12 and 27.7 meters in length, and
these different figures in turn have raised issues not fully resolved
about the first three Proton flights.
The vehicle has not yet been put on public display, even though it
has been flying for ten years, noi has a complete photograph been
shown. Motion pictures of launches, released in the last year or so
tantalizingly show the upper stage and payload, and also the attach-
ment points of strapped on boosters. Inflight pictures are too fuzzy to
do more than reveal that there are six boosters firing at the time of
ascension from the launch pad at Tyuratam.
The first careful drawing of the vehicle based upon these partial
looks was done by Peter Smolders of The He postulated
that the general appearance was that of a scaled up A class vehicle
with six instead of four boosters. Subsequently closer study by Charles
P. Vick and others in the United States builds a case for the same
essential operation of boosters, but that these may be regular cylinders
15 Smolders, P. L. L., Soviets in Space, London: Lutterworth Press, 1973, pp. 70-71.


:through mo-4 of their length rather than the tapered design used for
the A class vehicles. There may be a brief transition at the upper end
into a conical fairing to the point of attachment to the sustainer core
When the first launch occurred the Russians heralded this vehicle
as opening the door to many important space uses. These included the
construction of manned space stations and unmanned flight to the
planets. It was given a brief and non-explicit description, generally
said to produce about three times the horsepower of the A vehicle.
If one makes the assimiption that the same design philosophy was
used, and this seems borne out by the limited looks provided in Soviet
filims, then the vehicle should be much like an A vehicle scaled up in
volume three-fold (or 1.44 times linear), with the likely change that
the boosters are mostly cylindrical. Holding to the same proportions,
the basic vehicle sustainer core should be about 40.7 meters long. The
combined thrust of the core plus six boosters should be on the order of
about 1,542,000 kilograms, or chl.-e to 220 inmetric tons of thrust for each
engine. Any simple three-fold scaling pre:vi-ts contradictions. If one
aMi:mes the A vehicle would lift 3,000 kilograms, the D vehicle should
lift about 9,000 kilograms. If the A-1 and A-2 lift in the range of
4.725 to 7.500 kilograms, then the D-1 should lift about 14,175 to 22,300
kilograms. The first three Proton payloads were 12,200 kilograms, not
an ideal fit for the D or D)-1. The fourth Proton at 17,000 kilograms
was in the right range. If the estimated length of the accompanying
orbital rocket for the early Protons was 27.7 meters, that is too short
to be the sustaiiier core which may be 40.7 meters long, if operating in
the "'A" class burn sequence. The problems with both weight lifting
capacity and length tend to minimize the chance that the first Protons
were put up in the same fashion as Sputnik 1 through 3. We have to
allow for the possibility of a D version but the case is not strong. Vick
prefers the notion that the core vehicle is ignited at altitude rather
than at ground level. But he suggests that if this long stage went into
orbit, it might weigh enough to explain the relatively low payload
weight of the first three Protons.
2. The Improved Vehicle with an Added Stage, D-1
If the D vehicle was to demonstrate its potential in more ambitious
flights, it needed one or more added stages, and, as discH -3sed, may have
had an additional stage from the outset. Applying the proportions of
the A-2 interplanetary stage and scaling up three fold, its 8 meters
should be about 11.6 meters on the larger vehicle. This is compatible
with the 12 meter length assumed by the Royal Aircraft Establish-
ment in its publications.
One notes that the Saturn I with a first stage thrust of about 680
metric tons would put up 9,072 kilograms of payload, and the Saturn
I B would put up closer to 18,500 kilograms. Considering the first stage
thrust of the D class vehicles as perhaps 1,542 metric tons, then at the
same level of efficiency and same use, the D class vehicles should have
the potential to put up payload weights in the range of 20,570 to 41.950
kilograms. In fact, one must scale this back both because there is no
evidence for the Soviet use of LOX-hydrogen fuel in upper stages,
Vick, Charles P., The Soviet Superboosters-1, Spaceflight, London, December, 1973,

Rand because the launch site c le,:s favorably located than Cape
Canaveral. In addition to that is the Soviet desigfm philosophy which
tries to offset heavier structures for launch vehicles with more thlrust,
this combination being at the expei,:ne of payload weight.
In the first half of 1967 caime two Konmo- I:' Lnine.e, 146 and 1.54.
The.e were given routine anomnemeneiit ),V the Russians. but British
optical measurements showed a carrier rocket in orbit lareirr than t ihe
interplanetary stage of the A-2 rocket, and smaller that the posLi!e
27.7 meter length associated by some (estiates with the fir-t Proton
launches. The payloa(ld were estimated at 11.2 meters in length 1 3"
meters in diameter. One must re'.ognize that a small number of read-
ings of an indirect nature which make some ass-unimptioni- about shape
and surface must render all measurements thlat are very tentative. The
British etimate at the time was that the piyhlo;ds in question might lie
in the 18,000 to 27.000 kilogram range. Thje'O numbers would square
generally with use of the D-1 launch vehicle.'
What we do not know is whether these flights performed their mis-
sions as intended in low Earth orbit, or were intended to fire probe
rockets (making them D-l-e) into some further trajectory.
In November 1968, Proton 4 was launched into orbit, and seemed
to be accompanied by a 12-mieter spent rocket casing. The RiTisians
announced a weight for the payload of 17 metric tons, reasonably close
to the Western estimate of 18 metric tons for the D-1.
The first Salyut space station : also put up by the D-1 seem to have
had a weight of about 18.6 metric tons. With reports that they are
likely in the future to (row to a weight of closer to 25 metric tons, this
might still be within the capacity of the D-1. but pushing close to the
possible upper limit.
3. The Improved Vehicle iith, Regular Upp, r Stage plus an Escape
Stage. D-l-e
During 1968, several Zond flights were made into deep space and
around the Moon, some to return to Earth for successful recovery.
These were identified as capable of carrying men. Of the known ve-
hicles, only the D-1 with added stare should have the capacity to carry
a crew on a circumlinar voyage. The pictures which ultimately were
released of the Zond 4 through 8 series showed a craft which looked
like a Soyuz without its work compartment but with a high gain an-
tenna for long range communications. Because the Soyuz weighs about
6.570 kilograms, the Zond may be in the same range, but more prob-
ably lower such as 5,800 or even 5.300 kilograms saving weight on the
work compartment but carrying added maneuvering fuel.
The D-l-e vehicle came into further use in 1969 for the unmanned
Luna flights starting with Luna 15. Only orcasionallv have weights
been announced. Luna 16 was listed as having landed 1,880 kilograms
on the Moon. which is generally compatible with what one would ex-
pect. Since the Russians have announced an A-2-e payload of 1.640
kilo,..gramns sent to the vicinity of the Moon (Luna 11) and 1,180 kilo-
grams sent to the vicinity of Venus, then a three fold increase with use
of the D-l-e would give 4.920 kilograms and 3,540 kilograms respec-
tively. In fact the D-l-e likely does better. For lunar flights, it prob-
ably can carry payload in the range of 4,820 to 6,500 (more. likely
lb Flight International, London, March 30, 1967, p. 495.

between 5,:) and 5,)0) ; and for planetary fligits to Venus or Mars.
dependinrg on the year it (*' ii prol,;I ly) deliver between 3,500 and 5,000
kilo,:i;tms. The-e mimbcrs square with the only aninollnced weighit- for
Mars 2 and 3 at 4,650 kilograrjis. TJhe D-l-e has now alho been used
to place several payloadls in 24-hour circular orbit close to a fixed
po.-ition over the Equator.
The Po,.,.l,' Use of a D-l-7a Ve..ion
In December 1970. Kosml; :u w:' launclhed with onlv a routine
announcement of its initial orbit, which ranged( from 320 kilometers
S1.04110 kiloii nwers at an inclinationl of 51.6 degree,. Western observers
noted( that it had the same kind of man-related telemetry and fre-
quenei'". as ,used for the Soyuz prog.raml and the other Kosmnos flights.
starting with 379 which mig,,ht have been launched by an A-2-m
vehicle. But Koni<:> ;32 wa- different in its performance. It was
imaneuvered upward to 1,615 kilometers by 5,072 kilometers, and then
It I!'r I I- -7 16 01(t'FS to
again from1 2.577 kilometers to 5.02 kilometers. In addition, on the
last l'aneiver, the orbital plane was shifted to move the inclination
from 51.6 degrees to 55.9 degrees. This was. something that involved
energy expenditvre, for a payload, presumably large enough to carry
a human crew, that was beyond the capacity of any A-2 class vehicle.
Coi:.- quently, it has been jud(Ie(l to be a version of the D-1. Since it
used a platform launch technique, it left a spent carrier rocket and
platform in the initial orbit reported by the Russians. Its subsequent
multiple burns went beyond the performance of previous escape
rocklts. Hence one is ledl to the po:-sibility of a D-l-m combination,
with an improved maneuvering stare. Sotime people would suggest,
ailingg it a D-1-h. indicating that the upper stage not only maneuvered
but demonstrated some special high performance.
If at some point the Russians brinr in a new family of upper stages
propelled by high energy fuels as the United States has done. we.
should see further increases in the lifting capacity of these A-2-e and
A-_-m as well as D-1--e and D-l-m vehicles.

The cumbersome SS-6 Sapwood ICBM represented a beginning for
the Soviet intercontinental missile stockpile, but its use of cryogenics,
and awkward shape for potential silo use must have indicated fairly
early that despite its continuing usefulness for space, it was not
especially good for missile purposes, unless these were first strike.
In a 1967 article in Rod Star, General Tolubko stated that these
surface launches of the [Sapwood] took a long time to prepare and
that later version rockets were smaller and placed in silos.19
As Soviet missile capabilities improved, they conducted more and
more tests at the principal test site of Tyuratam which extended to the
Kamchatka target areas, and then beyond to the mid-Pacific. These
flights were often protested by the Japanese when target area closures
were announced by the Russians. Photographs released by the United
States Government of Soviet missile tracking ships in mid-Pacific
and even of splashes of reentry bodies suggested that the United States
Tolubko, V. F. Strategic Intercontinental ... Krasnaya Zvezda, Moscow. November 18,
1967, p. 1A.

was monitoring Soviet tests in the same way that Soviet ships mon-
itor U.S. missile tetsn. The Riussiaiis have always d(e'ccribvd1 the-e Pa-
cific tests as further tests of carrier rockets, often signalling through
variation in the language that new models were coming into tlhe test
program, rather than just continuation of earlier series. The obser-
vations made of the flights suggest they have definitely been tests of
military missiles, not space carrier rockets as such. Every so often in
the past, Soviet military leaders Tmade specific reference to the high
accuracy with which these tests delivered the "peiiultiinate" stage, of
the carrier rockets to the assigned area.
As Table 1-11 summarizes, the Western powers have assigned SS
designators up through the SS-20 so far, and there are NATO code
names for most but not all of these, depending on whether they have
been available on display or pictured in clear photographs. Of the
longer range missiles, the SS-4, SS-5, and SS-6 have already been
discussed in the context of their adaptation to space flight. At one
time the SS-7 Saddler made up a large part of the Soviet missile in-
ventory, but it was never put into a Moscow parade, and so far as can
be judged was not adapted for space use. It was apparently a fairly
modest capacity ICBM, which may have been the missile once shown
in a rather blurred film clip from a Soviet movie and pictured on the
cover of Missiles and Rock'ets magazine in the United States. The
SS-8 Sasin was paraded in Moscow for a number of years, as the first
Soviet ICBM ever given such public exposure. It seems never to have
played a very prominent part in the inventory, but did become oper-
ational. According to U.S. Department of Defense testimony before
Congress, the SS-11 replaced the SS-7 as the principal part of the
Soviet ICBM inventory. Despite its extensive use. it has not been
paraded in Moscow, and it does not seem to have come into space
Having been hidden so carefully, it lacked any publicly known NATO
code name until quite recently, but is now called Sego. It was also of
relatively modest capacity.
Three other ICBM class missiles have been paraded in Moscow.
These are the SS-9, SS-10, and SS-13. Taking them in reverse order,
the SS-13 Savage is the technological equivalent of a Minuteman. But
the Russians seem not to have favored solid propellant missiles for
long range missile or space launch use. Some observers have said this
is because their chemistry has not kept up with the same state of the
art attained in the United States. In general, the Russians have moved
from the early cryogenic systems to storable liquid propellants. The
SS-10 Scrag was first paraded in May 1965 and has not been seen since
1971. It was a long, cigar shaped three-stage rocket described by the
Russians as "akin" to the Vostok launcher (which was then still two
years away from its first public unveiling). The stages were joined by
open truss sections. The Russians also hinted that this vehicle was cap-
able of putting a bomb in orbit for delivery to any place on Earth. In
November 1965, when it was paraded again, the Russians were a little
defensive in their comments stressing it did not violate any treat re-
strictions on use of space weapons because such agreements prohibited
their use, not their production. Further, they said in a sense, every
ICBM is a space weapon, anyway, as all such missiles fly through
space, and their use is permitted under the terms of the space treaty.


1. Use as a Weapons Carriej', F-1--r
When Soviet test flights of fractional orbit boiiibardriiit s'si,-r'i,
(FOBS, see Chapter Six) began in 1966, unofficial Wes1tern observers
wondered if they were seeing the SS-10 Scrag being flown. Later. tlihe
U.S. Department of Defense credited the FOBS flights to the S-9
Scarp with added stages. Apparently the SS-10 Scrag never enter .l
the operational inventory. It \was paraded agaii in I\[ay 1966 and No-
vember 1966. The same brief description of its orbital use continued.
However, when it was paraded in Novemiiber 19(7, no reference was
made to an orbital capacity, and in the parade appeared for the fii-t
time the SS-9 Scarp. The TASS report on this new SS-9 was:
The last to appear were mammoth rockets each of which can deliver to tarl'-,.t
nuclear warheads of t..renfilous power .... These rocukt.s can be U.-ed for i:,.ter-
continental and orbital launch ii-.'is
The SS-9 has indeed become an important element in the Soviet ar-
senal, and in retrospect it is po-ible to trace its further extension to
use in the space program as well, for missions closely allied with mili-
tary f unctions., but not the more civilian and scientific part of the Slp;ce
In I)ecember 1965, the Russians announced rocket tests which they
called tests of "landing systems" with "(%mie elements" falling in t'.e
Pacific (staging, not payloads), which fitted the operational pattern
of FOBS fliglhts which later. In November 1966, General I)a:i-
kevich associated orbital rockets with silo launches, and said these ve-
hicles carried very large warheads.2:' Secretary Laird in the United
States stated that the SS-9 Scarp was the carrier of the FOBS
The SS-9 S(carp wvas paraded as a 33.2-35 meter long, bottle-shaped
rocket, with a princii, l diameter of 3 meters. In the parade the war-
head section was about 1.15 meters in diameter, then expanding into
a cone to join the makin 3 meter diameter cylinder. It is hard to tell pre-
ciselyv whether thlie SS-9, Scarp as paraded was a two or three sta'.Y:-
vehicle. It miny have been divided at about 17.5-19.7 meters up fromn
the base, within perhaps another 10.4-8.5 meters maldkin up the second
stage. and 5.3 meters making up either a third stage with warhead or
simply a warhead.
Since for two years the SS-10 Scrag was described as an orbital
weapon, it is possible that the third stage of that vehicle was trans-
ferred to the SS-9 Se:-.rp for a further version which has not been pic-
tured or put on display. In some of its space uses. a fourth stage is a1o
required, to account for the patterns of debris or expended rocket c s-
ings whiich ci;1n be observed in flight.
Our interest in this rocket in the context of this report is as a
military space payload carrier, the F-l-r or F-l-m. We cannot say
what tibe whole assemblage looks like today. From parade views, we
know the first stage is quite different from the A class vehicles. 'While
tlIe A class use- a core with four strap-on boosters, for a total of 20 noz-
zles, the F class firs-t stage shows 6 nozzles visible, while a plate covers
the center part of the base, which could hide a seventh central nozzle.
20 TASS, Ms"ow. 0710 GMT, November 7, 1967.
21 Dankevich, P. E., Interview on Moscow Radio, 1430 GMT, November 18. 1966.
SLaird, Mehvin LR. Fiscal year 1971 Defense Program and Budget, Feb.ruary 20, 1970,
p. 103.

The fir>t known space use of the system was for FOBS test. apparently
in a four stage version. The fir'-t stage is suborbital. A courier rocket
stage, whether second stage or third stage is not clear, is abandoned in
the initial orbit attained. The Royal Aircraft Establishment gives its
dimensions as 8 meters long by 2.5 meters in diameter. In flight, a
further change in orbit occurs, and this places an orbital platfoiii in
still another position. It is from this latter object that retrofire occtur-
(hence the designator "r" syiiibolizing the retrofire fourth sta,'-.)
which drives the warhead back to Earth, while the rest of the orbitinig
hardw-are continues in space for at least a few more orbits.
2. Use as a Maneuvr'irng Vehicle, F-l-rm.
The F class vehicles have now appeared in several other flight mo,!.
and these will be discussed in a later chapter. The essential change in
the hardware is the appearance of a fourth maneuvering stage which
may be the outgrowth of work started in the Polet and Kosmos 10 ,
and 125 programs. These can be labeled the F-l-rn series, although
there may be subtypes to fit the different flight modes which have been
observed. All the F class space payloads have been launched froi,
Tyuratam. The weapons-related flights have been at an inclination of
49.5 degrees. The maneuvering flights, for a variety of military pur-
poses in the general range of from 62 to 66 degrees inclination. The-se
additional missions seem to relate to inspector/destructor flights,
radar ocean surveillance, and possibly other uses.

Perhaps the most elusive space launch vehicle in the Soviet collec-
tion is their very heavy system. The need for such a system is highly
compelling if the Russians have been serious in their interest in both
manned lunar flight and later manned planetary flight. They have
talked a great deal about orbital assembly of orbital stations and deep
space manned craft, but the actual use of orbital assembly has not
kept pace with the talk and rumors of what they may be planning to
do. Some of these possibilities will be discussed later in this study.
While orbital assembly is seen by Soviet space officials as the ult im.te
technique for many advanced inisions, the availability of a lar'.
launch vehicle would serve Soviet interests at an earlier date in tLe
same way the Sa urn V was of i'.e to the United States. Even when
assembly is commonplace, putting up some heavy and complex compo-
nents with a large launch vehicle has advantages.
Over the years, the Russians have taken some special pride in build-
ing large aircraft, hydroelectric dams, drag lines, battle tanks, artil-
lery. They have in the past stressed their leadership in high payload
weights in space. One can imagine that a very large space launch .
vehicle would find a place in their hardware development. However.
because they have treated all space propulsion details as sensitive
information, they usually have waited some years after launch ve-
hicles became operational before revealing details about them. This
has been evident in the text of this chapter. Consequently, it is very,
difficult to find specific Soviet, statements about a very large vehicle.
In the United States, however, there have been statements by the
most senior NASA officials through 1970 that such a Soviet very



heavy lift vehicle has been under development. Indeed. it hns even beoon
described as t:aving the general capacity of the Saturn V. Depending
upon wbuhat assumptions one makes about upper stage efficiency, its lift
capacity for several missions can be variously estimated. If it was orig-
inally intended to fly during the late 1960's, it can be speculated that
perhaps some or all of the stages of the D-l-e vehicle related to Pro-
ton, Zond, deep space, and Snlyut payloads, would represent a shortcut
way to attain an earlier operational capability. This would be akin
to the U.S. use of the S-IVB stage on Saturn V or the Centaur stage
on Titan III. Since the D-l-e vehicle does not demonstrate the kind
of lifting efficiency associated with high energy fuels, then perhaps
the G-1--e heavy lift vehicle also will fall short of its full potential in
early use. The NASA estimates about the Soviet vehicle put the first
staLe thrust in the range of 4.5 to 6.35 thousand metric tons, compared
with 3.4 thoiiusand metric tons of the Saturn V. But without high
energy fuels, that might mean a capacity to deliver about the same
45,500 kiloirrams to the vicinity of the Moon which a Saturn V typical-
lv will send.
How reliable van such estimates be? That is hard to say for a vehicle
which the Russians have not discussed in specific terms, and which
in any case is too big to be paraded. But since the "national technical
mean's5" which are used to count Soviet missile silos and slight differ-
ences in their dimensions are freely cited by Secretaries of Defense,
one has to assume that this Nation should have a fair idea of the srope
of work associated with such a postulated large vehicle.
The Russians themselves have thoroughly obscured the issu of
whether in fact such a vehicle exists. Some have praised the economy
of orbital assembly over direct flights to the Moon with a big vehicle.
On November 12. 1965. Co-mnonaut Nikolayev stated in a Sovio radio
interview that studies were underway to see whether manned flights
into deep space should be solely through orbital assembly or also
through use of a large vehicle for direct flights. By July 1966, a Czech
commentator, Jan Petranek, was talking in terms of a 100,000-kilo-
gram-payload ship.23 In March, 1967, General Kamanin, the leader of
the cosmonaut corps was predicting flights to the Moon of payloads in
the 60,000 to 70,000 kilogram range.24 This might have meant through
orbital assembly, but if based upon use of high energy fuel in upper
stages would scale well with the 4.5 to 6.35 thousand metric ton thrust
first stage for the G class vehicles, since a Saturn V at 3.4 thousand
metric tons thrust would deliver 45,500 kilograms on a similar mission.
One of the most specific forecasts of a very large Soviet vehicle
was written by Karel Pacner of Czechoslovakia in the October 4, 1967
issue of the Prague magazine Student, in which he specifically credited
Cosmonaut Popovich and General Kamanin as saying the very large
vehicle was under preparation, that is, a vehicle well ahead of the D
class. By October 1967, Cosmonaut Feoktistov, who was a senior official
of the space design bureau, was quoted in Pravda as forecasting deep
space flights using both the approach of Earth orbital assembly and
direct from the surface of the Earth with [large] vehicles.25 In March
Petranek, Jan, quoted on Prague Radio, 1530 GMT, July 21, 1966.
s4 Kamanin, N., quoted on Warsaw Radio, 1900 GMT, March 9, 1967.
25 Quoted by Moscow Radio, 0300 GMT, October 3, 1967.

1968 at Frankfurt, Leonid Sedov, the important space academician,
stated there were now larger rockets in existence which were used
exclusively for space, as opposed to adapted military rockets, and that
these could support flights to the Moon and planets. The rocket re-
quired for landing on the Moon already existed, he said.26
Rumors and cosmonaut predictions of a manned lunar landing by
the end of 1969 were prevalent in the first half of that year, and could
reasonably have been supported only by flights of a large vehicle. It
is hard to conclude the Russians were really ready for such a mission
on the basis of public evidence, although some surprising development
might have made it feasible. Alternatively, the Soviet predictions of
that spring may have garbled plans for manned orbital flight around
the Moon and also the automated return to Earth of lunar samples
gathered by remotely controlled devices, rather than referring realis-
tically to manned lunar landings that early. In any case, no success-
ful flights of the big vehicle were accomplished, and the American
press by early fall was repeat ing stories of uncertain origin that there
had been a failure (or failures) of the big vehicle. It is obvious that
hopes for any manned operations, whatever the missions, in 1969 were
not met, including any time-competitive flight to rival Apollo 11, or
any follow-on American flight if Apollo 11 had failed.
The next Soviet reference to a potentially large vehicle was by
Academician Boris Petrov in August 1969 that a new type of vehicle
would be used to place a large unmanned space station in orbit, that
it was not necessary to send men to the Moon when automatic devices
could perform the mission of bringing home rocks. He said that up to
four Soyuz craft could then dock with this large new space station.
While talking of ultimate flight to the Moon, he claimed that Luna 15
could not carry a man, but that the Zond class could; and further that
some flights would be direct to the Moon.27
From these many speculative statements and inferences of the logic
of how to achieve missions the Russians have repeatedly claimed were
encompassed within their interest, it seems possible to postulate at
least two versions of the large vehicle: One would be the G-l-e, in-
tended for flight to the Moon; the other would be the G-l, intended
for launching a space station core into Earth orbit. Later versions
might substitute high energy fuel upper stages enhancing the per-
formance over the levels estimated to be similar to the Saturn V.
One can speculate that any direct flight to the Moon with men would
be beyond the capability of the G-l-e as described, since the Saturn V
could not do this. Either a rendezvous operation would be required, or
the G-l-e would have to be uprated with high energy fuels, to make it
the equivalent of the one-time NASA design concept called Nova.
Some of these possibilities will be explored in further details in a later
Meanwhile, what has happened to the class G vehicle? Some West-
ern observers doubted that it ever existed. This seems unlikely, consid-
ering the need and the NASA official testimony. Charles P. Vick has
even drafted a book about this vehicle which the public has not seen,
with his findings summarized in Spaceflight magazine of London.28
6 Frankfurt Radio, 2020 GMT, March 20, 1968.
27 Tokyo Kyodo, 0505 GMT, August 20, 1969.
2 Vick, Charles P. The Soviet Super Boosters-2, Spaceflight, London. March 1974. p. 94.


Aviation Week has carried a number of times the apparent dat-. or
periods that launch attempts were made with the G cli ss vehicle. :l1
of which failed.29 If it is true that there have been three failures sin'e
the first attempt in 1969, this must have been very disappointing to thle
program managers. Now, six years later, we still have not seen a suc-
cesfull flight. The prograin i may be as much as sixteen years old. and
presumably a very heavy iniv-stment has been made in assvmbly, 1-t-
in,,, and launch facilities as well as the cost of developing the flight
articles. The investment is perhaps almost too much to write off, .snid
future parts of the program depend upon successful development.
Charles P. Vick has inade extensive studies of the Landsat pictur"e-
of the Tyuratam launch area, using pictures taken in several different
wavelengths, and he is convinced lie can pick out two very large lauiah
pads and a major assemblny)v building which support the G class vehi-
cles. While his studies have tested a variety of hypotheses for various
structures which might represent the design of the G class vehicles, it
seems the data in the public domain are too scarce to come up with any
real notion. Assuming that tlhe vehicle ses some form of clustering as
is true of both U.S. and Soviet vehicles of large size, and further
assuming the configuration is anything like the A class vehicles, then
the basic stages without escape stage and payload may measure on the
order of 80 meters tall and with a base measure of 17 meters, or if there
are fins, 21 meters. No one should be misled into thinking that these: ,
dimensions are the actual ones; rather, they merely show in terms of
tankage how big a vehicle of the A configuuration would be if the
thrust were around 5.4 thousand metric tons.
This concludes the discussion of launch vehicles which either have
been used successfully or there are strong grounds for suspecting have
been tested for space purposes. Predictions for the future will be con-
sidered in another chapter. Some Western analysts have postulated
a number of additional Soviet space launch vehicles, including one
midway between the D and G vehicle sizes,0 but this chapter has not
speculated on vehicles which have not appeared in some form, as
even dealing with the "known" vehicles has proven difficult enough.
29 Aviation Week, New York, March 17, 1975. p. 71 summarized these failures. See also
Charles P. Vick, The Soviet Superboosters-2, Spaceflight, London, March 1974, pp.
o For example, see: Stine, G. Harry, Some Strange Things Happened at Baykonur, in
Analog Science Fiction/Science Fact, ----------1970, pp. 104-120.




















V .rl 61$ f- 0- W-4< r OtTn ooflp00 fl. V-&I to

0 00000 C)000C0000.D00 ) C
M c) 4 C) w C) CO = lzC
,,.,-".+ + +-

0 .00 .0g0CD C 0
to0 L00 M 0 0 1 0 LC
o i .
c < or-.6 cooo 000i^mo

4 M

00 00 .0 C0

4-4- inmcoi 4 C0 -

o i i l 1 1 1 1 # 1 1 1
I- o o_ CI I #

~ C; C; C;

C, ; C o 0 o C C) o o 0

on -JW-J

|s i i^ iss i I il' =

C M M C M M C4

.21' 1.5, .S 0

.,. .


in~~~~~ a .= ba> 0

-CC l l f i l
m I -11 M W I 0? 0 -e r-4

C 0 ( ^ CM ) V W, icIW 0, c In 1 P

I w I w w IO ) w w I w c w w w 1 C / I L 1
MfOO Ot~O M MO Otlc~l^ i

*5 E .2 *5n,.S:ar

. S > a 0 (n c .
2 *(A: 0 5 a

cu -c C:

b -- S- .t

"- 0E1- _
=2.* 04 0 E= =~,,-
3 4 g E c w= ..

o _3 o > ,= -" _

0 os._ .
E u=

co rt" '* m < a' o )',,
0 a W W* =

4n .- a, 4n

$ "Eg 2s
"- 4, .-

s~ "is !="&
0 0 0"O

o" =". o 0 '-o

? 1^ S .- ,.,'
cc -o-

www _M200 --,
7 0 Ea-6 z Oj-U
= 0 .~ Q>5~n 4'S -S

n 0 4_:'.2 E
C *r

= 2^| | 4.-

E aS'. S.S *

*O C*- =*='o (-'^ t*

1 '* EE E ` a;
ru w E tun

c a cu w_ aE
c0 a> t s> Q.O M. uj = o
Eo c t C
E 0 <=0C
E'DO (0 >
Qu E~

| I Cu I0 (n0
.E .0=.^^ E O0~ u0 = 0

m M.0 -a Er:- Cta
.-. S.^S-' uI uD^~ 2 ^

00~~ .. .cr
0 (0 g0 C u

03 aw2 3 <

0n! > 0
." C"oCC0O*-. C 0 -2m

mc w CD 0 1 ID

0 S'04-0S^ 00 S

0^^ g~s i cu/C/ 00 ca
l~0iO0i-.,O ||
iS-^sa~js^S 2
4A00 g s^- *
Cu4a^^l ...^0 C
0'-froE-->mn ~ c roC0

*3(0O).0C0 ES 0,'- a
sfs ^su --50 0 =
|-5^|004= oCsi-3

.c 0.04= 0=^ a -=

0..CM-. Oc >E. 3 >4S
2 .E^ S S>4 C ^



Space operations require extensive support from Eairth, including
not only a launch pad with its associated as-sembly and checkout equip-
ment, but also down range gulidance and command, tracking, and other
communications links. After the payload is in orbit, then tracking is
useful for keeping posted on it and on all other objects in space, and
for commands to the payload and receipt of (lata gathered or observed
by the payload.
The Soviet Union may have started its spa'e programs with a curious
mixture of very ambitious and comprehensive plans for uF(, of lar,.e
vehicles which could perform many missions in Earth orbit and be-
yond, combined with minimal support on the ground in terms of varie-
ties of hardware, limited number of pads, and minimal communica-
tions links.
It is very likely that the early launch guidance was primarily by
radio, radar and optical mn-e:tns because of the pattern of flying down
the same corridor repetitively from Tyuratam: indeed this may still
be true for many space launches, simply with more radio and thleodo-
lite tracking stations being added along additional corridors. This is
suggested by the fact that vehicles which almost certainly must come
from different launch pads. added when new types of vehicles were
added, fly on inclinations that vary from the earlier standard ones only
by an amount compatible with passing near some down range truck-
ing points in about the snme relationship as vehicles launched from
the original pads.
Minimal ground support will permit the start of a program, but as
needs to exploit the potential of space for science and applications
grow, then more is required in Earth-based facilities.

Soviet public statements aboit their tracking capabilities for the
early years made particular reference to optical tracking facilities.
Theze were in many parts of their own country. They also encouraged
observers in Soviet bloc countries to send reports of observations to
Moscow. Some of the equipment was relatively simple: only a few
more advanced telescope systems were pictured, with no indication of
how many of these better systems there were.
Even with Soviet reticence in discussing more than optic,,l track-
ing. there were Western reports of a network consisting of a master
station and twelve others equipped with receivers to measure Doppler
shifts in radio signals, tracking radars, and phototheodolites. trans-
miting data to a central computation center.31 Four such stations were
revealed as to location by the Russians in 1964 in a COSPAR report.32
The first official and rmPrp (ten'P,-o liz;no come in connection with
the Apollo Soyuz Test Project in 1975. This included the following
seven land bases: Yevpatoriya, Tbilisi, Dzhusaly, Kolpashevo, Ulan-
Ude. ITssuriyisk, and Petropavlovsk.33 Mo likely thn not, there are
other stations to meet the needs of particular programs.
2 Aviation Week, New York. January 26.1969, p. 26.
Cospar Bulletin No. 18, Paris. April 1964, pp. 10-11.
Aviation Week, New York. May 5, 1975, pp. 42-43.


In ild'ition ito tracking stations tied to specific progr ins. the Ruis-
sians have a space defense system, akin to the facilities which feed data
to Norad on this continent. There have been frequent references in the
Western press to their ABMI defense system, which of necessity is not
only a missile launching system, but is also an elaborate tracking sys-
tem, built. around large arrays of radar referred to as Hlien House. Any
system which trackls long raige strategic missiles. also tricks spa'ce
objects crossing Soviet territory or its approaches, regardless of na-
tionality and absence of active signal emissions.
Because of the size of the Soviet Union in geographic terms, 'trctch-
ing as it does to a width close to two and a half times that of the con-
tinental contiguous United States, the domestic space tracking net-
work does a better job of coverage than would a U.S. domestic system.
But any worldwide tracking capability must extend beyond the politi-
cal borders of any single nation.

From the time of Vanguard on, the United States developed bi-
lateral agreements with other nations to permit the establishment of
tracking stations in all parts of the world, especially north and south
through the Americas, essential to coverage of the satellites using
minitrack. Then a similar system was developed for Project NMercury
in an equatorial belt around the Earth. This has since supported
Gemini and the Eaitli orbital operations of Apollo.
The Soviet Union either did not feel the same need for such com-
plete coverage of its flights, being content to pick up recorded data as
the flights went over their own territory, or perhaps they were re-
luctant to negotiate pacts with other countries which would expose the
details of 'their data collection in the same open manner as the NASA
program of the United States.
Hence, in a much more limited way they developed only a few largely
unpublicized tracking stations in other countries, mostly place-" with
a political climate favorable to the U.S.S.R. In December 1967. TASS
referred to Soviet stations in the United Arab Republic (presumably
Htelwan), Mali, and "other" countries.4 By April 1968, Guinea in
West Africa was also named.35 By October 1968. reference was made to
station in Cuba.36 In February 1970, reference was made to a second
station in the U.A.R., this one in Aswan.37 In 1971, they added one in
Fort Lamy, Chad.38 From time to time there have been rumors and re-
ports that the Russians put out feelers that they might like to estab ish
tracking stations in such countries as Indonesia. Australia, and Chile.
It is believed tracking is done at Khartoum in the Sudan, Afgoi in
Somali, Kerguelen (South Indian Ocean) and Mirnyy (Antarctica).

Because of Soviet reluctance to become too dependent upon foreign
la nd-based stations, or perhaps because not all nations approached were
willing to be hosts, the Soviet Union has put considerable emphasis
34 TASS 0755 GMT, December 7,1997.
SMoscow Radio, 1800 GMT, April 13, 1968.
3 Gr.nnma. Havana. October 19. 1968. p. 6.
7 TASS, 1940 GMT, February 8, 1970.
-8 TASS, 1719 GMT, February 8,1972.

upon developing a sea-based support system. These consist of
several classes of ships. One group operates in the mid-Pacific, and has
1 n pictured in Western magazines and book. These are fairly im-
pre.,sive looking, loaded down with radomes and many specialized an-
te(:nas and theodolites. They sorve botli to record missile tests, in the
area where the dummy warhead is to splash; or in sight of the orbital
p'itlh of spacecraft overflying the Pacific, usually for their initial
(Orher less well-equipped ships in comparison with the missile track-
ers have for some years operated in the tropical Atlantic and the Medi-
terranean along the path of orbital flights. Such ships would put into
various ports in these parts of the world for supplies and crew rest.
andl when they left, port it was usually an indication that new space
lalnches were pending.
Byv noting what tracking ships are registered by the Rlus.i;mns as
civilian type vessels, and which are treated as naval ships, it appears
that the Pacific missile tracking ships whose pictures have been pub-
lised(l after being photographed at sea by U.S. aircraft, are under the
opterational control of Soviet military authorities.
By contrast, the shiips sen in the Atlantic and Mediterranean have
iow been identified as operating for the Soviet Academy of Science.
W1lere once these ships were merchant vessels with only a minimni1:
of modifications in appearance to serve the space program, now there
h:-s been a marked upgrading and even the development of highly
sCoi'isticated big ships with considerable communications equipment
on board. In December 1967, the science ships were identified as the
Do7;nsk, Bezhitsa, Ristna, Akesay, Morzhocef., Kegostrov, Nevel,
Ror1ov;chi, and Kfosminonavt Vladb'ir Komarov.39 Since that time vir-
tu;.,ly all of these ships have been named by the Russians as being in
p:rticular regions to support certain spae- flights, especially in the
Atlantic, but also in the Indian Ocean. Subsequent to the 1967 list-
ing. two progressively larger and better science tracking ships have
been added: the Akademik Sergey Koroevz, and the Kosmonavt Yuriy
againi. Details on the principal ships follow:
1. Kosmoavt Vladim 'I Komarov
This was the first of the greatly improved Soviet tracking ships. It
appears to be a converted merchant ship hull of about 11,000 gross
ts with an enlarged superstructure and several large radomes. It
was first spotted by the West on a voyage through the English Chan-
nel while outbound from Leningrad to Havana, Cuba, which harbor
it often frequented.
TASS in June 1970 said the ship has 1,000 or more berths, that it
was built in 1967 at Leningrad, and has special computers and lab-
oratories on board.'0 Pravda Ukrainv of June 23, 1970, said that it
operated during the Sovuz 9 flight with a total complement of 240
men. including 125 scientists."
The Russians have also said that communications between some
spacecraft and Moscow can be maintained on a realtime basis even
vi ien not in direct view of the Soviet Union by having the Kosmonavt
Moqeow Radio. 2200 GMT, November 26, 1967.
4' TASS. 1964 GMT. June 5. 1970.
41 Pravda Ukrainy, Kiev. June 23, 1970, p. 4.


V1(adllm'i Komarov serve as a relay point on Earth, with a further
relay from the ship via one of the Molniya 1 satellites which shares
mutual visibility between the ship and the Soviet Union. This type of
relay was first mentioned in connection with the Soyuz 6-7-8 flights
of October 1969."
2. Akademikc Sergey Korolev
On December 26, 1970, the Soviet Union announced the addition to
the fleet of the Soviet Academy of Sciences the space satellite control
ship Alademik Sergey Korolev. It was described as the largest sci( .i-
tific research ship in the world, 182 meters long and displacing 21..'
metric tons. It was not further described, but was to set out on its
maiden voyage early in 1971.'" Details finally were forthcoming in
September 1971. It was described as a Diesel-engined ship with single
propeller, a speed of 17.5 knots, and carrying a crew of 300. It had a
radome just aft of the bridge, and two fairly large parabolic disl
antennas, one amidships, and the other near the stern. The ship was
described as having 28 suites of office, bedroom and bath for si:ior
command staff, 34 single and 124 double cabins for crew and scient '.
There was a gynmasium, two swimming pools (one enclosed), a li-
brary, reading room, and other cultural amenities. The ship had over
80 laboratories and dual air conditioning systems. The ship was active
in the flights of Soyuz 10 and 11 serving as a link with Moscow via (,
Molniya satellite. It was built at Nikolayev on the Black Sea. With
a range of 22,500 nautical miles, it was capable of 120 days of inde-
pendent navigation without replenishment.."
3. Kosmonavt Yuriy Gagarin
This vessel was the latest and also the largest, most ambitious of
the Soviet tracking ships. The ship made its first voyage in 1971. It
looks as if it had been converted from the hull of a super tanker.
The first account spoke of its having over 120 laboratories. Its scien-
tific instrumentation came direct from scientific institutes rather than
from industrial enterprises, and units were designed for easy installa-
tion and replacement so that the ship could keep up to date as tech-
nology advanced. It was designed to operate away from home base
for as long as six months at a time. It had a 19,000 horsepower turi.-ine
power plant. The library had 10,000 books. Its theater seated :)00
people. There were nine elevators, three swimming pools, and a
sports hall big enough for a football match. There was also an auto-
matic telephone exchange.45
The ship was described as having over 100 antennas, and via Mol-
niya satellites could reach almost any telephone in the Soviet 1Union
around the clock. It was capable of receiving high data rates frtm
satellites and amplifying weak signals at planetary distances. There_ '
were over 1,250 compartments in the ship.
The Kosmonavt Yuriy Gagarin has a displacement of 45,000 tons,
a speed of 18 knots, has a length of 231 meters, and a width of 31
4 TzvPstiya, Moscow, October 19, 1969. p. 2.
." f'ASS. 1817 GMT, December 26, 1970.
44Kamenetskiy, Yu. T. G. M. Balabayev, and 0. M. Zlatopol'skaya "AkadoPmtk Serzpy
Korolev-A New Scientific Research Ship", Sudostroveniye, Leningrad, No. 9, 1971, pp. 3-4.
4 Leninzradskaya Prnvda, Leningrad. July 17, 1971, p. 1.
40 Izvestiya, Moscow, July 18, 1971, p. 3.


Late in December 1971, a photograph appeared showing this ship
anchored in Odessa, getting ready for its first operations. Tihe first
big dish antenna just behind the bridge was like a regular Orbita
antenna for communication with Molniya. One of similar size was
apparently intended to make trajectory and orbital data measure-
ments. The two largest dishes, further back were intended for deep
space work. In the same photograph were the 17,500 ton Kosmonact
Vladimir Komarov and the almost 21,500 ton Akademik Sergey
Korole An accompanying article noted the new ship had 11 decks,
and spoke of its many marvels, including a precision navigation sys-
tem which permitted the antenna to correct for movements of the
ship, movements of star fields, and also correct for angles of list and
yaw in relation to the ship's course, and even for distortions in the
ship's hull caused by heavy seas. This ship is also air conditioned
throughout. Slightly different statistics credited it with eight elevators
and 260 seats in its theater.47
Still another account counted 130 antennas in addition to the four
main dishes. The ship's horsepower was listed as 19,500. It also has
roll dampers and two maneuvering rudders in the bow and a third
in the stern.48
The major antennas were listed as ranging from 12 meters to 25
meters in diameter.49
The new tracking ships were a great advance over such vessels as the
Ilicherss' and Krasnodar, used for space support in 1957 and long
since disappeared.
Table 1-12, which follows, summarizes what is known from public
sources about all the Soviet tracking ships.
47 Tzvstiya. Moscow. December 15. 1971, p. 4.
Trud. Moscow, December 14, 1971, p. 2 ; Krasnaya Zvezda, Moscow, December 15, 1971,
p. 4.
4 Leningradskaya Pravda, Leningrad, March 15, 1975, p. 4.

C n W / / liv
(A 4

4c 4
c/}0' .:
C,)../0 C/v d)C') cd CcM
*'cQ.cO (4 C d).'~ O'; OO

to 3 m m m C m C
tS 0'O' 0 t0V o oo= l^ >= OOOO''''

C .1E-. h-g

S-_j C M c -= 4- 4
0 4) 4) c 4) a) 0 4) 4 ) Q)
(D 40 d-S a)) 4 .080 4 ) ao -

W= -.u- >- __ d
4--' t C, 4) 40 t 1)9<3' 4)'E
m 0.m.-.-.

0 0 m 0 an~ o2.C o=oV0> 0 0 0044~~~44
inLl f--s -4r.0 ^ 0 0~( c. -e gl.^ ^ > -fl si c' r.c, ilr-

m-- c> mq - -- -4,C-4 -4
0 I Wl5 CA 0S i V) 0 0 01-n cn
MOO N 0 Noo o 000 e-o4' o0 0.(

C14 n C%) (D 000C00 CIt M inr 04 to 000 00 W) 00 00
0-0 4 CM- U-) C1 4 "r C-4"R C-4C4M -%< U- ) M -0 C -% C1 4 C) C> (M CO
..4 -4 -4 -4 -".-q M^ 4-4-4 -$ -4 IOOOMCS


















.1 0

I r0 4Od 0 m c m tf- Ln -4( r r 0 co r, to r c w w
m0m)n- m = rcwa p m
000 0t0Cn OC.c- rro rr

in 444 o4 'm '! o~4'O 4 oo 4
C0 C=.S0 'oo I I

4 c 4 C 4 c.* C .. . c

-0 (O C0 'X-' 0 _" -0 -0 -C 0 0 "0 -OD 70 0 -0 7O

S ~E.

mSimOWm t l 00

8, E= wo -2 V) (
M w w^ 0 O. ;=C( O w55

1<~ ~ ~ ~~ w S'l m'l~^ m||II^
4 4S 42 | 4 4 4~ 4 4 4 | 4 4 1- *04
45J 4S S 4 SS 4** 4 ^ 4S 4 41 4?- I4Q 4
< 4 4 a 4 o Q Q4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 (5coi- 4

E 0

w C

a) 0

0. U)

) o


- C
o )

I- -

B (0

.-2 0

o ->
-0 E
e )

4- i
50 1
S U)3



--.. 4)
I<- Ci
0) cb a;
C 0. -Co
.2:2 00 cn
4- C/) 4 -
to) a)

0. a) 0.-;
0 I

o -

4o-' a)

o- .0-
.!2 -E

o- )


o 4-
-) a) w

0 S' 0
-" BO U

0> 001
V 2 --"

(D >L

= >5 ,-C;)

to 0 )
S s !

0 3

0) ro 4- a)

0 A C 0 C5



S ..-E~
0~ a> o 0 (S
e ~ f e
o = EtC:

c. .Ct=- Q
0S-- Ei ='

.S < |.

- r^-4)

0- 55'.

ao >D

a'-') w)4f U) t
4 C U) C- C C

-o~- OM.D0

^^- U)CS >CT3 4---
.- to 0 =o
cn u
t>_ o re M.a-*
*g^ 4sg
^g'C~CL 9g
~~ m .

4- Un) 0) 00 of,
-M 0000 CDCS


4. Other Tracking Shlps
It will be noted from Tab1le 11 that four military track ir-, ship,; .',
relatively small, the Sibir, Suchan, and Si'lialin entered service fi-'st,
The Chdo'hoI'ka. Chazma. and Chumiikaan followed( with the latter two
being larger and faster. It probably wa not coincidence that. during
the recovery of the aborted Apollo 13 flight the Chqrn;'aka was in this
remote part of the South Pacific, not near known Soviet test areas,
when i't offered a-;ist.aice to the Americans. Undoubte,(ly its rea-oil
for being there was the collection of intelligence by studying the
Apollo reentry ablation phase.
Other tracking ships which have broken into the news, include tlie
Mor.zho,'tN. which was put under temporary arrest in a B';izjliaiil po!t,
for violating territorial waters. During the Sovuz 9 mission. Trud i.-
ported that the Mor.Ihovets, Kcgostroe, and Bezhitsa were in the So"th
Atlantic 0
During the Zond cireumlmunar flights, the Ri---ianis have dc: 'i,1' ,
how they deliberately plan for theoe to approach Earth over the pol:ur
regions, sometimes dippipng into the atmi -1)phere and then skipping, iit
again before making a sc'.ond n' and landing. In one case. Zond 5
entered over Antarctica. but instead of developing aerodvnamnic lift to
skip out of the atmosphere and home to the U.S.S.R.. it made a ballistic
reentry and landed in the ocean. The Russians had named five track-
ing ships as being in that ocean, and it vs the Boror;cli .!/that ",icde
the pick up, but the capsule was transferred to a Soviet i!icteorlo !:cl
serve ice ship, the Vasd!y G,,oi.'V. for carriage to Bombay, from where
it was air-lifted home. Zoind 8 a8 larded in the Indian Ocean,. -ifter
a northern approach, but tlhe ship making the pickup was not named.
Closely related to the Soviet Academy of Sciences ships like the
Morzoho'ets and its three sisters are eight ships with naval crew.
that are not known to have supported the space program but ap ar-
ently work on missile prograiis.
5. General Locations of Soic"t Tradfiq ShIps
The foregoing paragraphs have referenced several of the plles
where Soviet tracking ships can be found during missions, but a com-
prehensive summary of theco locations was prepared by James E.
Oberg of the United States." Captain Oberg mapped in relation to
spacecraft ground traces the favorite places for the tracking ship-. For
example, he showed that during most of the Sovuz flights, one of the
high capacity civilian ships anchors off Sable Island, Nova Scotia
(about 1-.50 N, 59.,55 WV) where four successive orbits pa.:s within easy
direct communication range. A second location connected with the
manned flights is in the Gulf of Guinea. West Africa. to monitor retro-
fire just before the reentry and landing near Karaganda in the
U.S.S.R. In this same Gulf of Guinea area, deep space flights get their
acceleration out of Earth orbit, so are often monitored there. WVhen a
deep space flight occurs, the ground trace reflects the combined effects
of the acceleration to escape and the turning of the Earth itself. The
ground trace goes east over Africa, Asia, and the Pacific, but as it
climbs away from Earth, velocity is lost and the ground trace makes a
w Trud. Moscow, June 6, 1970. p. 4.
1 Ohbor. Janes. Soviet tracking from the sea, Flight International, London. Novem-
ber 15, 1973, pp. 828-9.


IT-turn over the South Atlantic and heads west over Central Ameriria.
Hence, there are often tracking ships strung along this Soutl i Atlantic
trace which otherwise would be unobservable with ease from Soviet.
territory. Finally, the Zond type of low G reentry from the Moon re-
quires monitoring and potential pickup near Madagascar in the Indian
Ocean when flights approach Earth over Antarctica. They also must
be in the Indian Ocean between South Africa and Australia when
such flights come in over the Arctic and land in the Indian Ocean. A
large tracking ship either in a Cuban port such as Havana or Santiao.
or in Trinidad gives added coverage to th',se deep space flights during
early critical please( of the escape mission. During the ASTP mnison,
a lar'ge tracking ship was located off the coast of Honduras (at ap-
proximately 160 N, 87.50 W) to supplement the Sable Island position.
Reference lhias already een made to sea-b-!.Sed tracking in support
not only of Earth orbital missions, but deep space flights as well. In
the case of the United States. NASA sa:w a need for 24-hour world-
wide covera-:e to support its deep space operations. It first built
2_5.9-meter steerable dishes at Goldstone, California. and in Australia.
South Africa, and Spain, and thIeS( were followed by 64-meter dishes
for Goldstone. Australia. and Spain.
The Soviet Union could profit from a similar worldwide capability,
but has not achieved the same level of coverage. Its equivalent of Gold-
stone is at Yevpatoriya in the Crimea. once visited by Sir Bernard
Lovell of British Jodrell Bank fame. The design approach used by
the Russians has been different from the American approach. They
seem to have two principal sets of antennas, each consisting of a single
steerable mount carrying eight medium sized dishes arranged in banks
of four. By operating these mounts along a railroad track, they (c.n
serve as interferometers. One would think it logical that there be a
second installation in the Soviet Far East to expand their coverage.
but if there is such a maior station, it has not been revealed.
Beyond that. they rely on such devices as the three largest of their
tracking ships which may take turns serving in the Caribbean area to
extend Soviet deep space coverage. The only other Soviet recourse is
to rely upon automatic systems in their deep space craft, or if more
nearly real time data and commands must be exchanged, to plan their
missions to have crucial events take place when that part of the world
containing the U.S.S.R. faces toward the distant spacecraft.

Early Soviet pictures of space operations centers looked very simple
by U.S. standards, but gradually over time, the pictures have shov.:r
advances in the kind of equipment the Russians have available. T!he
program was about ten years old before detailed descriptions of con-
trol centers began to appear, and it was only with the Apollo-Soyvuz
Test Project that visits by Americans were permitted to one center.
Colonel General Tolubko described for TASS in November 19.7 t!.e
role of the military in the launch of Venera 4. which can probably be
assumed to be typical of so-called scientific flights. Members of the


Soviet Strategic Rocket Force conducted the launch, and ten minutes
after lift-off, control passed from the military to the command mneas-
uring complex of stations all over the U.S.S.R. and on sliip, in
several oceans.52 That sa:ne month, Lieutenant General Leontyev
stated that the Strategic Rocket Forces had been responsible for all
launches of Sputniks, Lunas, Veneras, Molniyas, and the iianned
In May 1968, Rf1d Star described the computing-coordinating center
(KVTS) operated by the Soviet Acadeiiiy of Sciences. This (.onter
collects data from stations all over the world where it is then processed,
analyzed, evaluated, and compareti. Red Star described the center as
having a huge operations hall. with a large map of the world at one
end on which the computed trajectories of the current spacecraft were
displayed. Illuminated panels either side of the main map carry the
principal steps of the launch count down, and a status board of all
other active Soviet payloads. Other walls are covered with more de-
tailed diagramins, table. -raiphs, and maps needed for the operation.
The account went on to ducc-ribe the receipt and use of many channels
of telemetry.4
Pravda carried a further description in April 1969. This was in
connection with the Venera flight-. A side room was used for this
purpose rather than the main hall. There were special telephones and
apparatus for conmmunicating within all computer coordinating centers
and telemetry collection points throughout the U.S.S.R. Data on the
flight position of the two Venera :-pacecraft then in flight were being
plotted on a cylindrical recorder by tracing pens. In the telemetry
section near by, the reporter saw more tracing pens plotting data from
the spacecraft on paper bands. At the opposite end of the establish-
ment were the big computers with the output unit passing out endless
columns of numbers. In the main hall, primary data on the flight were
being displayed on several large screens. The pictures were being
drawn in full color diagrams by connection with a computer which
was generating these displays directly from the telemetry.55 This gen-
eral description is highly reminiscent of the most advanced U.S. dis-
play systems.
More descriptions were released in June 1970. The reporter from
Izvest;'ya reported that on the approach drive to the center he saw
three large steerable antenna dishes which were receiving data. On this
occasion it was Soyuz 9, and as soon as the ship came over the horizon,
the large display screens showed live television from the cabin of the
manned craft. He reported the tape was almost half a meter wide, as
it poured out of a computer with many blinking lights.56
A similar article in Krasnaya Zvezda discussed the problems of com-
mand and control during flights, recommending a combination of
commands sent to the spacecraft by radio from Earth, and others
program-timed on board the spacecraft itself. The report mentioned
that the deep space flights launched from Earth orbit are observed by
radio and sent command signals from ships placed in the Atlantic and
Mediterranean, which is consistent with our knowledge that the probe
52 TASS, 0738 GMT, November 16, 1967.
8s Trud. Moscow, November 19. 1967. p. 1A.
64 Red Star. Moscow, May 16,1968. p. 4.
6 Pravda, Moscow. April 12. 1969. p. 6.
5 Izvestiya, Moscow, June 4, 1970, pp. 1, 4.


or escape rocket is generally fired somewhere over or near Africa.
Other flights are supported by aidr:ift. particularly during the recov-
ery phase, supplementing the ships used for search, rescue, and evai.a-
tion of spacecraft which have landed in areas. Information
from all these sources feeds into the ground complex. The total com-
bination of all support aids involves systems for orbital path mea.isre-
nments, reception and registry of telemet ry, cont rolling onboard instrii-
mentation, communications, and a standard time service. Communica-
tioiis may be relayed through Molniya satellites, and reliance is placed
on the Meteor satellites for supporting weather data.57
Communications in near-Earth space require a greater number of
antennas, but those for flights to lunar and planetary distances need
special, large antenna systems, special molecular and parametric
amplifiers, and special narrow band filters to sort out weak signals
amidst space "noise". At least two but not more than four deep space
stations if sufficiently spread out, are all that are needed for planetary
Still another account in Pravda described the antennas as 25 meters
in diameter at the main space flight control center. The main receiving
antenna is close to the buildings of the center. The transmitting an-
tenna to the spacecraft is about ten kilometers away. Because several
different frequencies are used, and these pass through the receiving
antenna, special devices sort them out to deliver the separate compo-
nents of television, telemetry, and telephonic information. These are
all recorded on magnetic tape, while the information on orbital infor-
mation especially is fed immediately to the computers. When com-
mands are sent to the spacecraft, these are in coded form which has
been put into the computers, so that only pressing a button on a panel
is required. When these signals are played back to Earth correctly
from the spacecraft, only then does the "execute" command go out to
the spaceship.59
It was interesting that through all these years of partial disclosure,
there was never a clue as to the location of the space control centers.
Certainly the launch itself is controlled by military men at the individ-
ual launch sites. It was this immediate blockhouse with its periscopes
that was declared off limits when American astronauts, technicians,
and other higher officials visited Tyuratam in connection with the
Apollo Soyuz mission.
When the Apollo Soyuz mission was approaching, the Russians
opened up some more information by making known they were build-
ing an entirely new space control center for this mission in the general
vicinity of Moscow. It was revealed that the Soyuz 12 flight was the
first one controlled from this new center northeast of Moscow.60 At
first the site was believed to be at Kalinin, 150 kilometers northwest of
Moscow. But the site was finally located accurately when the U.S.
press representatives were allowed to visit it in mid-May 1975. It was
in Kaliningrad, 10 kilometers northeast of Moscow and 10 kilometers
northwest of the Yuriy Gagarin Cosmonaut Training Center at
Zvezdny Gorodok.61 It had been building since 1970. The main opera-
67 Dmitriyev, G. Eyes and ears of the Earth. Krasnaya Zvezda, Moscow. June 12, 1970,
p. 2.
m Idem.
19 Smlrnov, V. Information from orbit, Pravda. Moscow, June 9, 1970.
0 Aviation Week, New York. November 5, 1973, p. 20.
61 Soviet Aerospace, Washington, May 19, 1975, p. 18.


t;,ons room has five lbnks of consoles, 24 in total with a large screen
inap of the world in front center, with the orbital patlh aiid all track-
inCr stations shown on the map, with adlitionmal data listed on side
panels. It was evident from these disclosures that there must be a dif-
ferent and possibly more versatile center already in use elsewhere. Tile
Jussians were evasive on this point, but during the Apollo Soyuz
mi-ion mentioned almost casually that the Salyut mission was being
controlledd from a center at Yevpatoriya, the same site in the Crimea
where the deep space tracking station is located. Whether there are
still other major control centers is not known. It is reminiscent of the
fI"ct the United States has control facilities at each of its major launch
sites in Florida and California, and also lias additional facilities in
IHouston, Texas: Greenbelt, Maryland; and Sunnyvale, California at
the very least. So for some purposes, the Russians may also have
additional locations in use.

Reliable information about Soviet space research centers is also
limited. There are a few which have come to public attention. For ex-
aimple, the engine development work of the Leningrad Gas Dynamic;
Laboratory has been revealed through research publications of a theo-
retical nature, and early experimental engines as well as a few cur-
rently operational engines have been put on display and described as
developed there. There is even a museum in Leningrad where it is pos-
sible to see these products.
The large body of published literature in various fields of space
sciences reveals researchers in many scientific institutes pursue studies
of geophysics, the upper atmosphere, radiation, space medicine, the
planets, the Sun, and so forth. But it is not possible from these papers
to build a definitive list of titles and locations of space laboratories and
centers. It can be assumed that some are in the new science cities which
have been created in several parts of the Soviet Union.
A fairly detailed description of one major institute was provided
during 1971. The Moscow Space Research Institute of the Soviet
Academy of Sciences consists of administ native buildings, parking lots,
and landscaping in front, and laboratories in the central area, with
experimental and storage areas at the back. The administrative build-
ing has three stories, underground parking, a library, conference and
reception rooms, and an auditorium seating 1,200 persons. The labora-
tories are in a 13-story building with 2-story annexes. There are spe-
cial air-conditioning units in towers nearby. All told, there are 41,000
square meters of floor space, including 33,000 square meters in labora-
tories; and the building volume is 599,870 cubic meters, including
534,700 cubic meters in laboratories.62

Few details are available on Soviet factories equivalent to those of
American industry in which specialized craft are built or where
'serial" production is carried on. Occasional American visitors have
e6 Stroitelstvo I Arkhitektura, Moskvy, Moscow, No. 1, 1971, pp. 26-29.


been allowed to visit aircraft factories, and it is always possible that
some space manufacturing is done in closed but adjacent buildings in
some of these aviation centers. Occasional photographs have shown
assembly lines for Vostok and for Soyuz spacecraft, and the numbers
of such craft shown in the pictures strengthens the notion that the
same basic shells are used for the large unmanned recoverable Kosmos
flights used by the Soviet military to conduct observations of interest.
Somewhere there must also be a production line for the smaller Kos-
mos, because many use the same basic shell, with modifications to fit
the particular missions of the craft.
Except for the very largest launch vehicles, presumably almost all
components are rail-transportable, especially as the Soviet railway
lines have a generous clearance gauge through tunnels and stations.
We know both through Soviet movies and through the recent visits to
Tyuratam that launch rockets and payloads are brought together in
assembly buildings within a few kilometers of the launch pads, with
the mating done horizontally, and then the combined rocket and pay-
load pushed out to the pad atop flat cars and special transporters by
Diesel locomotives. At the pad, the transporter tilts the rocket up into
a vertical position for final checkout and launch. This may not be true
of the G-l-e class vehicles, but seems to apply even through the
D-1-e class.
Of necessity the Russians must have test stands for rocket develop-
ment, and environmental chambers for rockets and payloads. These
are not described as to location in the open literature.
Because of the numerous Soviet failures in planetary payloads, they
have come to the American practice of having a duplicate payload in
an environmental chamber undergoing as nearly as possible the same
conditions as the actual spacecraft in flight, so that if problems de-
velop, solutions can be tested with the laboratory "bird". This was first
announced as the practice with the Venera 4 flight.63 Something similar
has been hinted at in connection with manned flights in 1974 and 1975.
The principal test and training center for Soviet cosmonauts is at
Zvezdnyy Gorodok east of Moscow in the suburbs. This has been visited
by both the American astronauts and NASA technicians, and also by
the Western press. There are classrooms, isolation chambers, centri-
fuges, simulators, and mockups, as well as good living accommoda-
tions for the cosmonauts and their families, and associated scientists
and technicians.
Apparently there are some facilities for training in the Tyuratam
area, presumably in or near the new, burgeoning city of Leninsk. The
American visitors found the accommodations provided at Leninsk to
be equal or superior to those provided at the Kennedy Space Center.
The cosmonauts when suited up for flights ride out to the pad in a well
equipped, air conditioned bus, much in the manner that NASA astro-
nauts are transported.
When the Soyuz 9 cosmonauts returned to Earth, they went to a
special isolation center, which was highly reminiscent of the Houston
quarantine facility, perhaps as a dry run for similar procedures once
Soviet cosmonauts return from the Moon.64
3 Tass, 0R00 GMT, October 19, 1967, quoting Komsomolskaya Pravda, Moscow.
I TASS, 1704 GMT, June 20, 1970.


The lunar material recovered by Luna 16 on the Moon was also taken
to a special isolation laboratory at an unspecified point which enimploys
the same general kind of procedures to preserve freedoiim front coil-
tamination, both in and out, as Houston has supplied for its Lunar
Receiving Laboratory.65
All in all, one is struck with the close parallels between the U.S. and
Soviet programs in terms of procedures and equipment, but also with
the paucity of definitive Soviet information in the public domain on
any of these, matters aside from the few facilities which have been
occasionally opened to visitors.
65 TASS, 1077 GMT, September 26. 1970.