Soviet space programs, 1971-75 : staff report


Material Information

Soviet space programs, 1971-75 : staff report
Physical Description:
v. : ill. ; 24 cm.
Library of Congress -- Science Policy Research Division
United States -- Congress. -- Senate. -- Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences
U.S. Govt. Print. Off.
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Publication Date:


Subjects / Keywords:
Astronautics -- Soviet Union   ( lcsh )
Astronautics and state -- Soviet Union   ( lcsh )
federal government publication   ( marcgt )
non-fiction   ( marcgt )


Includes bibliographical references.
Additional Physical Form:
Also available in electronic format.
General Note:
"August 30, 1976."
General Note:
"Prepared by the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division and Economics Division of the Congressional Research Service and the European Law Division of the Law Library, the Library of Congress"--Vol. 2.
General Note:
Volume II prepared by the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division and Economics Division of the Congressional Research Service and the European Law Division of the Law Library, the Library of Congress.
General Note:
At head of title: Committee print.
Statement of Responsibility:
prepared for the use of the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, United States Senate, by the Science Policy Research Division, Congressional Research Service, the Library of Congress ...

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University of Florida
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All applicable rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
Resource Identifier:
aleph - 025924113
oclc - 38707528
lcc - 77000939
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Full Text

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AUGUST 30, 1976.-Ordered to be printed

Printed for the use of the Committee on Aeronautical
and Space Sciences

67-596 WASHINGTON : 1976

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402 Price $2.25

FRANK E. MOSS, Utah, Chairman
JOHN C. STENNIS, Mississippi PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
GILBERT W. KEYES, Staff Director
JAMES T. BRUCE, Professional Staff Member
JAMES J. GEHRIG, Professional Staff Member
CRAIG M. PETERSON, Chief Clerk/Couneel
JOSEPH L. PLATT, Assistant Chief Clerk
WILLIAM A. SHUMANN, Professional Staff Member
CRAIG VOORHEES, Professional Staff Member
Dr. GLEN P. WILSON, Professional Staff Member
CHARLES P. LOMBARD, Minority Counsel
EARL D. EISENHOWER, Professional Staff Member, Minority

S. CON. RES. 113
Agreed to August 30,1976
Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring),
That there be printed for the use of the Senate Committee on Aero-
nautical and Space Sciences one thousand five hundred additional
copies each of volumes 1 and 2 of its committee print entitled "Soviet
Space Programs, 1971-1975", Ninety-fourth Congress, second session,
prepared by the Congressional Research Service with the cooperation
of the Law Library, Library of Congress.


February 17, 1976.
Hon. FRANK E. Moss,
Chairman, Committee on Acronautical and Space Sciences,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
Dear Senator Moss: Pursuant to your letter of request, the Con-
gressional Research Service with the cooperation of the Law Library
has undertaken a study of the Soviet space program for the years
1971-75. The study has been divided into two volumes, of which this
is the second.
The purpose of the study is to bring up to date previous reports,
prepared by the Library of Congress for your committee, published in
1962, 1966, and 1971.
The second volume has been completed and is herewith submitted.
This volume has sought to review the Soviet goals and purposes in
space, resource allocations, space organization, and the Soviet attitudes
toward international cooperation in space and space law.
It should be emphasized that the report is based exclusively upon
unclassified, open sources, both Soviet announcements and independ-
ent sources in the Western world. A comparison of information in this
report with that in classified sources has not been made.
Dr. Charles S. Sheldon II, Chief of the Science Policy Research
Division and Senior Specialist in Space and Transportation Technology,
Congressional Research Service, has been coordinator of the project,
and has been responsible for the summary.
Dr. Joseph G. Whelan, Senior Specialist in International Affairs
in the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional
Research Service, has been responsible for writing Chapters 1 and 4
(the latter with Mr. Francis T. Miko).
Dr. Domas Krivickas and Dr. Armins Rusis, Senior Legal Specialists
in the European Law Division of the Law Library have been respon-
sible for writing Chapter 5.
Dr. John P. Hardt, Senior Specialist in Soviet Economics and Mr.
George D. Holliday, Analyst in Soviet Economics, Economics Di-
vision, Congressional Research Service, have been responsible for
writing Chapter 3.
Mr. Francis T. Miko, Analyst in Soviet and Eastern European
Affairs, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional
Research Service, has been responsible for writing Chapter 2.
The study has been reviewed by appropriate individuals both in
Government and outside in the interest of accuracy and security,
although the final responsibility rests with the authors and the
Congressional Research Service.
Sincerely yours,
Acting Director.

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2013

H Washington, D.C., June 11, 1976.
Hon. FRANK E. Moss,
Chairman, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Transmitted herewith is a report, Soviet
Space Programs, 1971-1975, in two volumes. The report was prepared
for the use of the Committee by the Congressional Research Service,
with the cooperation of the Law Library, Library of Congress. This
report is a follow-on to similar reports published at intervals since
1962. It is, as are its predecessors, a comprehensive and detailed
study of the Soviet space program.
Volume I provides an overview of the Soviet space program, its
facilities and hardware, the manned and unmanned Soviet space
missions, Soviet bioastronautics, Soviet civilian and military applica-
tions, and projects future Soviet space plans. Volume II examines the
goals and purposes of the Soviet space program, the organization of
space activities in the Soviet Union, allocation of resources to Soviet
space activities and Soviet attitudes towards international space
cooperation and space law.
The report was prepared under the direction of Dr. Charles S.
Sheldon, II of the Congressional Research Service, Library of Con-
gress. Dr. Sheldon, one of the free world's foremost authorities on
Soviet space activities, is also the major contributor to the study.
Other parts of the study were prepared by other experts in the Library
of Congress, and Geoffrey E. Perry, consultant from the United
Mr. Fred Doering of the Government Printing Office prepared the
report for printing.
In every respect this report is a remarkable accomplishment. It
represents scholarship at the highest level but was done at mini-
mum cost.
I believe that this study of Soviet space programs has resulted in
an important report and will be most useful to the Committee and to
other members of the Congress.
GILBERT W. KEYES, Staff Director.



I. Political goals and purposes of the U.S.S.R. in space------------- 1
A. International setting, 1971-1975; emerging detente in
Soviet-American relations---------------------------- 1
B. Soviet political uses of space--------------------------- 1
1. The climate in 1971---------------------------- 1
2. The climate in 1975---------------------------- 2
C. Some generalizations---------------------------------- 2
II. Organization and administration of the Soviet space program .---- 2
A. Introduction --------------------------- ------------ 2
B. General sketch of the Soviet decision-making process---... 2
C. Organization for decision-making on space affairs--------- 2
III. Resource burden of the Soviet space program ------------------ 3
A. Introduction----------------------------------------- 3
B. Soviet secrecy---------------------------------------- 3
C. Soviet space spending--------------------------------- 4
D. Burden and opportunity costs of the Soviet space program- 4
E. Future prospects------------------------------------- 4
IV. Sovietlattitude toward international cooperation in space--------- 4
A. Space cooperation: An idea whose time had come--------- 4
B. Soviet-American bilateral space cooperation ------------- 5
C. Other areas of Soviet cooperation----------------------- 5
D. Space cooperation: Some generalizations----------------- 6
V. Soviet attitudes toward outer space law------------------------- 6
A. General principles of outer space law-------------------- 6
B. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused
by Space Objects----------------------------------- 6
C. Registration of objects launched into outer space--------- 6
D. The "Interkosmos" program--------------------------- 7
E. Intersputnik--- _--------- --__--- --------------- 7
F. Soviet bilateral agreements on cooperation in outer space.- 7
G. The draft of an international treaty relating to the Moon- 7
H. Remote sensing of Earth resources by satellite------------ 8
I. Direct broadcasting----------------------------------- 8
I. International setting, 1971-1975; Emerging detente in Soviet-
American relations------- -------------------------------- 9
A. Major trends in Soviet-American relations, 1965-1975 -.-- 9
1. Space and international relations _---------------- 9
2. Changing cycles in international relations: From
Cold War to interdependence? --------------- 10
a. Onset of Cold War .---------------- 10
b. Changes in late 1950s and early 1960s------ 10
c. Further change in late 1960s and early
1970s_------- ------------------ 11
d. Emergence of detente, 1972-1975---------- 11
e. Interdependence: A new cycle in interna-
tional relations?----------------------- 12
3. Roots of detente ------------------------------ 12
a. Khrushchev's doctrine of peaceful coexistence,
1956_ ----------------_-------.---- 12
b. Cuban missile crisis, 1962 --_------------- 12
4. Course of detente, 1965-1975: An overview-------- 13


B. A year of transition, 1971------------------------------ 14
1. Areas of tension- ----------------------------- 14
a. Vietnam war, a persistent irritant- -------. 14
b. Sino-Soviet dispute; improving Sino-Ameri-
can relations ------------------------- 14
c. Other points of friction------------------- 14
2. Areas of accommodation------------------------ 14
a. Nixon's mixed assessment ---------------- 14
b. Progress in arms control ------------------ 15
c. Progress on European security ------------ 15
d. Improving Soviet-American commercial re-
lations ------------------------------ 15
e. Other areas of accommodation -----.-----. 15
3. On balance ----------------------------------- 16
C. Summit meetings and durable problems, 1972-1974 ------ 16
1. Positive developments -------------------------- 16
a. High point in detente -------------------- 16
b. Winding down Vietnam war- .-----------. 16
c. Meetings at the summit ----------------- 16
2. Obstacles to detente_ -------------------------- 18
a. Declining euphoria; rising skepticism ------- 18
b. Human rights-trade issue ---------------- 18
c. Impact of Yom Kippur war and oil embargo. 19
d. Impasse on European security------------- 19
e. Other difficulties: SALT, growing Soviet
power, Nixon's visit to China----------- 19
3. An emerging realism---------------------------- 19
D. Reaching a plateau, 1975----------------------------- 20
1. Through the spring of 1975 -------------------- 20
2. Since the summer of 1975 ---------------------- 21
E. Detente: Definitions and perceptions; causes and motiva-
tions -------------------------------------------- 24
F. Detente: Future prospects in an emerging interdependent
world-------------------------------------------- 25
1. Obstacles to detente --------------------------- 25
2. Favorable factors ------------------------------ 25
3. On balance----------------------------------- 26
4. Detente in an emerging world of interdependence.-- 26
II. Soviet political uses of space --------------------------------- 27
A. Comparative years 1971 and 1975 ------------------ 27
B. In an environment of tension, January-July 1971--------- 28
1. Vietnam: catalyst of tension--------------------- 28
2. Downgrading American space effort-------------- -29
a. Conflicting appraisals of Apollo 14 mission-- 29
b. Limited Soviet media coverage of Apollo 14-- 30
c. Shortcomings of Apollo; greater value of
Lunokhod -_----------------------- 30
d. American militarization of space: A missing
theme-------------------------------- 32
3. Magnifying Soviet space achievements------------ 33
a. Underlying purpose ---------------------- 33
b. Stress on perfectability------------------- 33
c. For peace and mankind------------------ 35
d. Decompression of the space race; commit-
ment to space leadership---------------- 36
e. Perception of future plans ------- ------ 38
4. Identifying space achievements with CPSU and
Soviet Government-------------------------- 40
a. CPSU and Soviet Government as source of
space success-------------------------- 40
b. High visibility of political leaders in linkage
with space ---------------------------- 41
c. Value and practical results of space explora-
tion -------------------------------- 43
d. Use of scientists and cosmonauts as political
instruments -------------------------- 44.


5. Rituals and mythology of space_ --------- --- 44
a. Political purpose: Glorification of the USSR._ 44
b. Building prestige of cosmonauts and cosmo-
nautics _---------- -----_------------- 44
c. On the death of the Soyuz 11 cosmonauts. ... 47
6. Soviet political uses of space: A summing up -------- 49
a. Major themes-- ------------------------ 49
b. Accent on the positive -------------------- 49
c. Space exploration: A serious business -------- 49
C. In an environment of detente, January-July 1975---------- 50
1. Detente and the Apollo-Soyuz joint mission_ ------- 50
a. Against a background of improving relations. 50
b. The Apollo-Soyuz project: Major political
themes_ ------------------------------ 50
c. Illustration of political themes------------- 50
(1) By the Soviet leaders -------------- 51
(2) Within ASTP-------------------- 51
(3) Within the media ----------------- 52
d. Reaction abroad to ASTP ---------------- 52
2. Characteristics of space relations------------------ 53
a. Absence of familiar Soviet themes and actions- 53
(1) No downgrading of the American
space effort ------------------- 53
(2) No exaggerated claims for Soviet
space efforts ------------------ 54
(3) Easing restrictions on secrecy ------ 55
b. Presence of familiar Soviet themes and actions- 56
(1) Identifying space success with the
CPSU and Soviet Government- 56
(2) Use of cosmonauts and scientists--.. 57
(3) Limits to openness -------------- 58
(4) Rituals of space ------------------ 59
3. Political significance---------------------------- 60
a. Strengthened detente --------------------- 60
b. Advancing the principle of space cooperation- 60
c. Soviet gains in prestige -------------------- 60
d. Intensity and depth of Soviet space commit-
ment ------------------------------- 60
III. Some generalizations ---------------------------------------- 61
A. Controlling effect of the political environment ---------- 61
B. Predominance of the CPSU leadership------------------- 61
C. A persistent commitment to space exploration __-- ---- -- 62


I. Introduction --------------------------- ----------------- 63
A. Purpose of the chapter -------------------------------- 63
B. Problems of Soviet secrecy and inadequate information- ... 63
C. Speculative nature of presentation -_------------------- 64
II. General sketch of Soviet decision-making process_ --------------- 64
A. The Communist Party-------------------------------- 64
1. The Party Congress ---------------------------- 64
2. The Central Committee ------------------------ 64
3. The Politburo ------------------------------- 65
4. The Secretariat ------------------------------- 65
5. Other Party units ------------------------------ 65
B. The Government structure---------------------------- 65
1. The Supreme Soviet --------------------------- 65
2. The Council of Ministers ------------------------ 66


III. Organization for decision-making on space affairs ----------- 66
A. An overview ----------- ----------_---------- -
B. Role of the Communist Party ---- ---------------- 67
C. Role of the formal Government structure ----------- 69
1. The Council of Ministers .---------------------- 69
2. State Committee on Science and Technology ------ 70
3. The State Planning Committee ---------------- 71
D; Role of the military establishment- --------------------- 72
1. General role ---------------------------------- 72
2. The Ministry of Defense ----------------------- 72
3. The Strategic Rocket Force ------------------- 73
4. The Air Force ------------------------------- 74
E. Role of the scientific establishment -- ------------------ 74
1. Overview ----------------------------------74
2. The Soviet Academy of Sciences ----------------- 76
a. General organization ------------------ 76
b. Space institutions under the Academy------ 77
3. Input from the universities ---------------------- 78
F. The question of a centralized Soviet space agency -------- 78
1. The evidence -------------------------------- 78
2. The structure -------------------------------- 79
3. Speculation on individual identities -- --------- 79
IV. Some concluding generalizations ----------------------------- 82

I. Introduction _-------- -------------------_------------- 85
A. Post-Stalin space drive an imperative -------_----------- 85
B. Emergence of space burden in post-Khrushchev period --- 86
II. Soviet secrecy ----------------------------- 87
A. Establishment of the Stalinist system ---__------------ 87
B. Post-Stalin retention of secrecy -------_---------------- 88
III. Soviet space spending._ __ _________ 89
111.~~~~~ Svespcspnig----------------------------------------- 9
A. Priority of space allocations --------------------------- 89
Table 3-1-U.S.S.R. state budget by item of expendi-
ture, 1965-74 -------- ------- -- 91
B. Unification of military and civilian space ---- ------------ 92
Table 3-2-U.S. civil and military space efforts ------ 92
C. Threat of American inferiority ------------------------- 93
IV. Burden and opportunity costs of the Soviet space program -------- 93
A. Definition of burden and opportunity costs --------------- 93
B. Party primacy in space policy ------------------------- 94
C. An onerous or tolerable burden of military space_ ----- 95
D. Opportunity costs: Military-space vs. investment in growth- 97
E. Military or civilian space ----------------------------- 98
V. Future prospects --------------------------------------------- 98

I. Space cooperation: An idea whose time had come --------------- 99
A. ASTP: An achieved goal ----------------------------- 99
B. Focus of chapter ------------------- --------- 99M
II. Soviet-American bilateral space cooperation -------_----------- 100
A. Origins of ASTP_ --------------------------- 100
B. Early space cooperation and ASTP agreements, 1970-71_-- 101
1. Gilruth-Petrov meeting, October 1970 ---------- 101
2. Keldysh-Low meeting, January 1971 -------------- 101
a. Terms of agreement_ -- -------------_ 101
b. Early results of January 1971 agreement-... 102
c. Soviet reactions to January 1971 agreement- 103


C. Agreements at the Moscow summit, May 1972-------- 104
1. Impact of emerging detente_------------- 104
2. Agreements on space cooperation ________- 104
a. Low-Kotelnikov meeting, April 4-6, 1972--- 104
b. Moscow summit agreement on space coopera-
tion, May 24, 1972 ---------------- 105
c. Terms of the Moscow agreement on space
cooperation ------_------------------- 105
3. Soviet attitude toward May 1972 agreement ------ 106
a. Immediate reaction -------------------- 106
b. Taking a retrospective view--------------- 107
4. American attitude towards May 1972 agreement -_ 108
a. A view from the State Department_----- -- 108
b. A view from NASA---------------------- 109
D. Soviet-American views of ASTP, July 1975 -------------- 110
1. ASTP: "Central effort" in Soviet-American space
cooperation ------------------------------ 110
a. Other areas of space cooperation -----------110
b. Preparation for ASTP------------- ------ 111
2. ASTP: Reaffirmation of established Soviet policy_- 113
3. ASTP: From the American perspective --------- 114
a. Levels of response -------------------- 114
b. At the official level ---------------------- 114
c. In the press ---------------------------- 116
d. Skeptical and dissenting opinions---------- 117
III. Other areas of Soviet space cooperation --------------------- 121
A. Cooperation with France ----------------------------- 121
1. History of cooperation ----------------------- 121
2. Highlights of cooperation, 1971-1975----------- 121
3. Significance of French-Soviet cooperation ------- 122
B. Cooperation with India ---------------------------- 123
1. Background of Indian space program ------------ 123
2. The development of Indian-Soviet cooperation----- 124
3. The space agreement of 1972 ------------------ 124
4. Significance of cooperation ------------------- 125
C. Cooperation with other non-Communist countries--------- 125
D. Cooperation with Communist countries ----------------- 126
1. Background --------------------------------- 126
2. Interkosmos and Vertikal ---------------------- 126
3. Intersputnik----------------------------------- 126
4. Significance of Soviet-Bloc cooperation---_--_----- 127
E. Cooperation in the UN and other international organiza-
tions ------------------------------------------- 127
1. Soviet attitude toward multilateral cooperation --- 127
2. Cooperation at the United Nations --------------- 128
3. Soviet cooperation with other international or-
ganizations -------------------------------- 128
IV. Space cooperation: some generalizations _-------------------- 129
A. Demonstrated success in cooperation ----------------- 129
B. Factors favorable for space cooperation--------------- 129
C. Deterrent to space cooperation-------------------- 130
D. Future prospects for space cooperation --------------- 131
Figure 4-1 Cartoon on ASTP------------- ---- 131

I. General principles of outer space law -------------------------- 135
II. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Objects ----------------------------------------------- 141
A. Rules on liability _-----------_------------------- -- 142
1. Absolute liability and liability based on fault------ 142
2. Damage------------------------------------ 144
3. Limits to compensation of damage -------------- 145
4. Law for the assessment of damage -------------- 145


B. Parties to the liability proceedings --- -------------- 148
1. Claimant party --------- --------------- 148
2. Respondent parties---------------_-- --- -- 148
a. States ------------------------------- 148
b. International intergovernmental organiza-
tions -------------------------------- 148
'C. The procedure for the settlement of compensation to the
victims of damage ---------------------------------- 149
D. Some concluding remarks- ---------------------------- 150
III. Registration of objects launched into outer space---------------- 151
IV. The "Interkosmos" program-_-------------------------------- 156
V. Intersputnik ------------------------------------------------ 159
A. The structure of the Intersputnik organization---------- 160
B. Organs of the Intersputnik organization ----------------- 161
C. Finances------------------------------_------------ 163
D. Amendments. Denunication. Termination---- ----------- 163
E. Particular differences between Intersputnik and Intelsat--- 164
VI. Soviet bilateral agreements on cooperation in outer space--------- 165
A. Agreement between the U.S.S.R. and France ------------ 165
B. Agreement between the U.S.S.R. and the United States_-- 167
C. Agreement between the U.S.S.R. and India------------- 168
D. Conclusion ------------------------------------------- 169
VII. The draft of an international treaty relating to the Moon --------- 170
A. The scope of the treaty: The Moon, or the Moon and other
celestial bodies_--------------------- 172
B. Demilitarization of the Moon -------------------------- 173
C. National non-appropriation---------------------------- 174
D. Exploration and use of the Moon -------------------- 175
E. Common heritage of all mankind ----------------------- 177
F. Further arrangements on the exploration of the Moon---- 178
G. Advance notification and sharing of information- ------- 180
H. Prevention of contamination and adverse changes--------- 181
1. Visits of installations -------------------------------- 182
J. Liability------------------------------------------ 182
K. International consultations ----------------------------- 183
VIII. Remote sensing of Earth resources by satellites ------------------ 184
IX. Direct broadcasting------------------------------------------ 188
A. The UNESCO declaration of 1972---------------------- 190
B. The Soviet draft------------------------------------ 191
C. The problem of prior consent ------------------------- 195
D. Results of the deliberations ------------------------ 196
A. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by
Space Objects --------------------199
B. Convention on Registration of Objects Launched Into Outer Space-- 207
C. Agreement on the Creation of the International System and
Space Communications Organization "Intersputnik" ------- 213

By Charles S. Sheldon II*
Science and technology are major forces shaping the 20th Century.
Space exploration as a manifestation of these also impinges upon inter-
national relations.
After World War II, there was a protracted period of "cold war".
However, the Cuban missile crisis brought a sobering and constricting
influence on reliance on nuclear deterrence. Also, there has been more
pluralism in the relations among states, with old alliances reshaped
and less clear cut.
In the 1970's, detente has been favored as a policy, and inter-
dependence among nations of many ideologies is recognized. The
course of detente has not been smooth, with Vietnam and the Middle
East crises examples of severe tension.
The opening talks and visits to China, summit meetings with the
Russians, and the SALT I (strategic arms limitation talks) agreement
have all strongly influenced the atmosphere between the two super
Detente has continued to be strained by the issue of human rights
in the Soviet Union, and clashes of interests in such areas as Portugal
and Angola. Yet there are enough common interests between the
super powers that despite all the strains and clashes, there are growing
areas of accommodation and exchange.

1. The climate in 1971
In 1971, the Russians in their media seemed more devoted to
attacking U.S. policies related to Vietnam than in recognizing successes
in the Apollo program. The unmanned Lunokhod rover was touted
as a better approach than the high cost and risky manned Apollo
flights. An earlier theme of attacking the American space program
on the grounds of its militarization had largely disappeared. The Soviet
space program was still described in terms suggesting its high degree
of perfection. Apollo was described as a risky aberration, while the
true path to further progress was linked to Soviet successes in Earth
orbit. Soviet leaders gave high visibility to the Soviet space program
and their personal links with it. Emphasis was put on the practical
benefits which would flow from the program.
*Dr. Sheldon is chief of the Science Policy Research Division, Congressional eseareh
Service, The Library of Congress.


The deatLs of the three Soyuz 11 crew members was a severe blow,
but special honors and rituals attended their funeral, and their
sacrifices were taken as important to future achievements.
2. The Climate in 1975
In 1975, the climate was quite different. The Apollo-Soyuz Test
Project received tremendous attention and was heralded as a building
block to further improvement in relations between two partners of
similar capabilities in space. Of necessity, there was some easing of
space secrecy on the part of the Russians as a condition of the co-
operative effort. At the same time, the political uses of space to glorify
achievements of the Soviet system continued, and there were sharp
limits to the amount of openness.

Soviet space activities have been manipulated to serve certain
political purposes. The political leadership of the Soviet Union holds
the commanding position in determining the nature of space activities
to augment their goals and purposes. Their commitment to the space
program remains very strong.


The purpose of the chapter is to understand from the open litera-
ture how the Soviet space program is organized and how it functions
in relation to other Soviet institutions. The task is made difficult by
Soviet secrecy in this regard, and there may be a marked difference
between the formal organization of the program on paper, and the
realities of working relationships.

The Communist Party is the dominant force in all spheres of Soviet
life. Its Central Committee is the continuing body of power, but is too
large to run daily affairs, which are determined to a greater extent by
the Politburo and its Secretariat.
The formal Soviet Government is built in parallel with the Party
with largely overlapping memberships in key posts. The Supreme
Soviet meets every four years, but the most significant organization
is the Council of Ministers, in practice selected by and controlled by
the Central Committee of the Communist Party. The ministries and
State committees carry out the day-to-day tasks of the Soviet

There has never been an organization chart or description of the
Soviet mechanisms for running their space program made public by
the Soviet Government. While there is a complexity of overlapping
organizations of Party and Government, for most functions, there
seem to be key individuals who are personally responsible for the


performance of certain functions. Presumably goals and priorities
are set by the Politburo. It is possible that D. F. Ustinov is the key
member in the Politburo concerned with space, but decisions probably
are also strongly influenced byAndrey Grechko, the Defense Minister,
and by Peter M. Masherov, who handles science and related fields.
Another key figure may be Vladimir A. Kirillin, Chairman of the
State Committee on Science and Technology. His organization is the
highest level government coordinating body for scientific work.
Within the Ministry of Defense, the Strategic Rocket Forces, com-
manded by General Vladimir F. Tolubko, conduct all launches. The
Air Force is responsible for cosmonaut training.
The Soviet Academy of Sciences may play a more active role in the
space program than its American counterpart, but it is not clear that
it sets real priorities, nor has the same degree of manpower and
logistics support as do the military institutions which operate space
related activities. Until recently, the President of the Academy,
Mstislav V. Keldysh, was also a prominent space scientist. Under the
Academy are many commissions, institutes, and organizations which
deal with space research. The two most prominent public spokesmen
for some years were Leonid I. Sedov and Anatoliy A. Blagonravov.
More often in recent years, the Chairman of the Interkosmos com-
mission concerned with international activities, Boris N. Petrov, is
the principal public spokesman on space matters.
Western analysts disagree as to whether there even is a Soviet space
agency per se. Of leaders close to actual hardware and operations, the
late Sergey P. Korolev after his death was confirmed as the anonymous
Chief Designer. It is possible that he was replaced by Mikhail K.
Yangel, but he is now dead, too. He may have been replaced by a one-
time Korolev rival, Vladimir N. Chelomei. Valentin P. Glushko was
the principal designer of rocket engines. Aleksey Isayev, now dead,
was another prominent designer of rocket engines.
Many of the prominent figures in the Soviet space program have
not been identified in public or have signed review articles in the
press not under their own names, but under pseudonyms.

The Soviet space program has reflected national economic, political,
and military goals to a larger extent than the U.S. program. The pro-
gram has been, like the military establishment, a favored claimant
on research institutions and industrial support for use of the available
Soviet resources. Both Nikita Khrushchev and Sergey P. Korolev
played special roles in establishing this high priority and both have
passed from the scene. Probably since that time, space projects which
did not contribute directly to military strategic systems have under-
gone the closest scrutiny. They have had to make many choices
about their space goals and how best to compete or cooperate with
the United States.
No space expenditure figures are listed in the published Soviet
State budget. There is a long tradition of hiding information viewed
as State secrets. The intermixing of space facilities for military and


civilian purposes has contributed to the strictness of the rules on
disclosing data on space resources. Hence, Western estimates must
be built upon selective and incomplete monitoring and interpretation
of indirect data, plus extremely selective Soviet releases made for
prestige purposes.
Defense and space spending have been increasing about 3 percent
a year in the period 1960-1973. The space part of the defense budget
moved from 2 percent in 1960 to about 11 percent in 1972. The CIA
claims Soviet space expenditures amount to about 1 percent of their
GNP, while the Department of Defense suggests a more likely range
is 1 to 2 percent. Comparisons are made difficult by the inherent
difficulties of costing their programs and converting them to dollars,
allowing for the preferential pricing policies which may understate
the full costs of these programs for defense and space.


A way of looking at the burden of the Soviet space program is to
ask what other benefits are foregone because of the use of resources
for space. Apparently Soviet choices involve inputs both from the
Party and from institutional interests in science, the military, in-
dustry, and economic planning. There has been an especially strong
preference for military space missions.
Presumably much of the Soviet space program visible today is a
reflection of decisions taken several years ago. There is Western specula-
tion whether currently, the same high priority is being afforded space,
or whether a period of diminishing returns has been reached.
The planning for the next fifteen years suggests so many capital-
intensive projects for the national economy that the opportunity costs
for space may very well rise. It is not at all clear that in a squeeze
the leaders will necessarily opt for holding up the levels of military
space expenditures to the detriment of civilian space if they see other
benefits the latter may bring, including cooperation with the United
The priorities afforded the Soviet space program will depend upon
the perceptions of the Soviet leadership as to economic costs and
political gains. If arms limitations are negotiated, more cooperation in
space seems likely, and this might bring an increase in priority for
civilian space programs.

In July 1975, Soviet-American space cooperation reached a new
climax in the successful execution of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project
(ASTP) with the joint docking in orbit of manned craft from the
two countries. Soviet cooperation has included not only bilateral
efforts with the United States but also with France and other countries,
and multilaterally with other countries of the Soviet Bloc.

The ASTP gradually emerged from both informal, unofficial sug-
gestions and from step-by-step negotiations at governmental levels.
Direct proposals were made in 1970, and the test mission objectives
were agreed upon in 1971. ASTP was paralleled by other efforts
related to exchange of lunar samples, use of weather data, coordina-
tion of sounding rockets, and joint work in space medicine and biology.
Planetary data were also exchanged.
The Brezhnev-Nixon summit in 1972 represented something of
a turning point in detente, pulling together many agreements, a num-
ber of which had been negotiated earlier at lower levels. These includedl
formalizing the ASTP draft prepared by George Low of NASA and
V. A. Kotelnikov, Acting President of the Soviet Academy of Sciences.
The formal agreement was signed by President Nixon and Aleksey N.
Kosygin, Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers. Progreos
was noted and the agreements reconfirmed when General Secretary
Brezhnev visited the White House in 1973.
There was much joint work with multiple visits by technicians
and cosmonauts and astronauts between the two countries. At a
personal level, many of the contacts grew very close and were quite
Official U.S. and Soviet statements on ASTP showed strong support
and praise for the project. Reviews, in the American press were
mixed, and some political views in the United States reflected skepti-
cism as to the value of the project on the grounds of high cost, low
benefits to be gained, safety, and giveaway of American technology.
Additionally, some thought the prestige of the repressive and "back-
ward" Soviet State was being enhanced through the acceptance of
the U.S.S.R. as an equal partner.
As a result of the President de Gaulle rapprochement with the
Soviet Union in 1966, joint French-Soviet space efforts were initiated
that year. These have been continued by Presidents Pompidou and
Giscard d'Estaing. There is a permanent mixed Soviet-French
commission which selects and sets the terms for specific projects
of space cooperation.
Soviet bilateral cooperation with India began on a small scale
as early as 1963. Under a 1972 agreement, plans were made for the
launch of an Indian satellite by the Russians, and this was accom-
plished in 1975. A follow-up launch is now planned.
By far the most active cooperative agreements are those of the
Interkosmos Council which controls multilateral efforts of the Soviet
Bloc nations. Some 14 Interkosmos satellites have been sent to orbit.
The same nine nations are also members of Intersputnik which is the
Soviet Bloc equivalent of Intelsat.
The Russians also work on space policy matters through the
United Nations, the International Astronautical Federation, and the
Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) of the International Coun-
cil of Scientific Unions (ICSU).


During the 1971-1975 period, the Russians have generally main-
tained a pofsitive attitude toward space cooperation in contrast with
much of their position of the 1960's. They have actively participated
in both bilateral and multilateral cooperative space activities. The
ASTP project was the culminating event of the period.
Cooperation in part grew out of a growing mutual confidence
and a political desire to enhance detente. It also comes from an aware-
ness that some costs in the future will exceed the economic and tech-
nical capabilities of any single nation. But space cooperation could
regress very quickly if political conditions worsen.

Current Soviet policy is built around international cooperation in
space activities. This has led to treaties governing the use of outer
space, the rescue and return of astronauts and objects from space,
liability for damage caused by objects launched into space, and
registration of objects launched into space. At the same time, Soviet
jurists believe U.S. representatives are trying to dominate the writing
of rules and of treaties to fit U.S. interests. The Russians recognize
remaining acute problems where the principles developing for space law
conflict with the sovereign and territorial or air space rights of states.
They also draw scme distinctions between the rules which should
govern relations generally among states, and those that should apply
within the bloc of "Socialist" states.

The treaty on liability was difficult to negotiate. The treaty estab-
lishes an absolute liability for damages caused by space objects, except
to the extent that the launching state can prove fault on the part of the
injured party through some negligence. The damages to be compen-
sated have to be direct and tangible. The treaty sets no upper limit to
the compensation which might have to be paid for damages.
The treaty deals not only with the roles of individual states but of
joint operations and various kinds of consortia. Claims commissions
would be required to arbitrate the amount of damages to be assessed.

Voluntary registration of space launchings began under the terms of
a 1961 United Nations resolution. After protracted debate, agreement
was reached late in 1974 on the text of a mandatory registration treaty,
designed to support the identification of objects, as a part of imple-
menting the liability treaty. Much controversy had surrounded the


issue of requiring identifying marks- oni all space objects to helip in thd
assigning of respuonsibility for damages. TFils suggeKsion presentel
great technical difficulties, and while imairking was encouragel, it di(l
not seem by itself a certain way of identifying the responsible launch-
ing state.
The Russians proposed their Soviet Bloc cooperative space program
as early as 1965, and it was formalized by an agreement in 1970. Its
activities are considered joint in nature, even if the agreement does not
necessarily create an international organization.

The Intersputnik agreement was signed in 1971 after three years of
negotiation. Its purpose was to create an international communications
system using Earth satellites. Intersputnik was to be consideled a
juridical person. It was structured so that each member country
had one vote, with decisions made by at least a two-thirds vote. It
differed from Intelsat in that nonmembers of the ITU (International
Telecommunications Union) could join, and it did not use the weighted
voting formula which in the early years of Intelsat gave the United
States a majority control. Intersputnik has remained pririmarily a
regional organization of smaller appeal than Intelsat.

Soviet jurists have spent less time discussing the principles of the
bilateral agreements such as those of the Soviet Union with France, the
United States, and India, than they have on other issues of inter-
national relations of outer space activities and law.

The Russians proposed a treaty on use of the Moon in 1971. Essen-
tially, the draft spelled out detailed rules already adopted in more
general form in the treaty on use of outer space. Demilitarization of the
Moon was repeated in specific form.
Additionally, the Moon was not to be appropriated by any state or
by any other organization or person. Freedom to explore the Moon
was made explicit. Questions on use of the Moon's resources were
more difficult to resolve. Other issues involved contamination of the
Moon, and visits to the bases of other states, liability for damages, and
consultation among states. A final draft has not been agreed upon as yet.

A working group at the United Nations considered rules under which
remote sensing of resources might be done, and the issues of freedom of
flight and protection of sovereign rights proved to be quite difficult.
The conditions under which information might be released or shared,
brought debate and differences of view. No final resolution has been


The Russians have spoken against the threat of direct broadcasting
from space to individual receivers as a form of external intervention in
domestic affairs. The Soviet draft calls for cooperation and prohibits
misuse of direct broadcast, and would permit it only with permission
of the receiving state. They even list prohibited topics of transmission,
both rather all-encompassing and at the same time vague. Disagree-
ments among states are still so extensive that no treaty has yet reached
the level of an agreed upon draft.

By Joseph G. Whelan*
1. Space and International Relations
Science and technology are two of the main forces shaping the 20th
Century: they form the basis for modern industrial civilization; they
are principal instrumentalities in the search for international develop-
ment; they provide the energy for the Third and Fourth World's thrust
into modernity. In brief, they are looked upon as a sort of Aladdin's
lamp, insuring its possessors, creativity, progress, and success in the
Modern Age.
Yet science and technology have created the most perplexing
dilemmas for modern man. These dilemmas derive from an ambivalence
that enables them to be sources of peace, creativity, and progress, and
conversely of war, decay, and retrogression.
Space exploration uniquely manifests this ambivalence in science
and technology: it has broadened man's vision; it has opened a new
world of expanding knowledge; and it has created a new environment
of challenge for mankind against the forces of nature. Yet space
exploration became enmeshed in the politics of the Cold War. The
negative effects were far-reaching: Soviet-American rivalry was
stimulated; world tensions heightened; and an enterprise, naturally
amenable to cooperative activity among nations for the good of man-
kind and science, was diverted from this purpose and transformed
into an instrumentality of political, even potentially military, conflict.
Space exploration is, therefore, more than strictly a scientific and
technological undertaking: it impinges upon politics; it is inevitably
a problem in international relations; it is one of many areas in inter-
national life today where science, technology, and diplomacy converge.
Accordingly, this study, as in the case of its three predecessors, opens
with a summary of and commentary on recent developments in
Soviet foreign policy, more particularly in Soviet-American relations.
*Dr. Whelan is a senior specialist in international affairs, Foreign Affairs and National
Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, the Library of Congress.


2. Changing Cycles in International Relations: From Cold War to
a. Onset of Cold War.-International politics appear to be entering
a new cycle of structural change.' The Cold War in Soviet-American
relations seems to have been decompressed and modified by detente.
Bipolarity has given way to multipolarity. And, the changing re-
quirements of international politics are said to have introduced a new
functionalism in the conduct of international relations. Interdepend-
ence is the term used to describe this newly perceived cycle of change.
The essence of interdependence is survival through international
cooperation, a mode of diplomacy imposed by the imperative solu-
tions to global problems.
In the early postwar period the distribution of power and the
alignment of world forces had radically changed. New states and new
constellations of power emerged to fill the power vacuums in the world
created by the destruction of the wartime Axis alliance and by the
liquidation of Western colonial systems. This transformation of power
arrangements was the beginning of the era of bipolarity and global
confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States. It was
also the beginning of an era in which the processes of decolonization
in the less developed countries (LDCs) of Asia and Africa were for
the first time to play a prominent role in contemporary world affairs.
The structure of world politics was thus made up of three major
components of power: the United States and its allies; the Soviet
Union, its satellites in Eastern Europe, and supporters throughout
the world Communist movement, including China; and the Third
World of neutralist states in Asia and Africa, emerging from colonial-
ism to independence.
b. Changes in late 1950s and early 1960s.-Two fundamental
changes occurred in the late 1950s and early 1960s that were to alter
this structure of international relations. One change, occurring after
the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, was the sobering and constricting
influence of nuclear deterrence. Mutual awareness of nuclear energy's
awesome power had a two-fold effect: it limited the options open to
the United States and the Soviet Union in the use of power against
one another to achieve political goals; and it reduced the range of their
influence over other nations. In brief, nuclear power was limited as an
instrument for political manipulation and for applying pressure
on the international scene. The other change was the growing diversity
within international political systems that brought an end to an
effective bipolarity and generated political pluralism throughout the
Except for the growing complexity of the arms race, stimulated in
part by unimpeded progress in advanced weapons technology, nuclear
deterrence has remained a fixed component in the structure of world
politics. However, political pluralism continued to evolve, changing
power relationships for both the United States and the Soviet Union.
1 Section I of this chapter draws upon the following sources: Whelan, Joseph G. and
Francis T. Miko. Detente in Soviet-American relations, 1972-1974: A survey and analysis.
Washington, Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, 1975. 115 p.
(Multilith: 75-169A) ; Miko, Francis T., Soviet-American Relations, 1969-1974 : A chrono-
logical summary and brief analysis. In, U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs.
Detente. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Europe. 93rd Congress, 2nd Session. Wash-
ington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974, p. 485-533; and, Whelan, Joseph G.,
Detente with the Soviet Union. Issue Brief Number IB74120. Washington, Congressional
Research Service of the Library of Congress, 1974. 8 p.


Their virtual monopoly on power was effectively contested, though
on a lesser order of magnitude, by other claimnr ts; namnely, the Third
World and competitors for power within their r"spective blocs. The
emerging nations contributed to altering the distribution of world
power and changing the world political environmlent, while cntrifugal
forces, working within both the East-West biocs, generated diffusion
of power within the blocs, loosened the bond of group cohesiveniess,
weakened control from the center, and thus added t the general
trend towards international pluralism.
c. Further change in later 1960s and early 1970s.-By the late 1960s
and early 1970s, therefore, the structure of international relations
had again been fundamentally transformed. What had once been a
bipolar world was now transformed into a multipolar world. The
Soviet Union and the United States maintained their primacy as
nuclear superpowers, and in the final analysis they alone determined
nuclear war or peace, but beyond this much had changed. Diversity
had weakened the solidarity of their alliance systems. Within the
Communist world, China's differences with Moscow could not be
composed, and- their dispute, growing steadily since the early 1960s,
escalated to a first class power conflict. International communism,
as a global political movement and once a significant component of
Soviet power, was fractured into many pieces as new alignments
along geographic and ideological lines were created within the move-
ment and as new opportunities arose for constituent parties and
member-states to assert greater claims of independence from the cen-
tralized authority of Moscow.
Limitations were now placed on Soviet power within the Com-
munist movement, and in general its overall power base was sub-
stantially reduced. By 1972, China moved out of its self-induced
isolation, established informal diplomatic relations with the United
States, and began to play an active role in international relations as
a Soviet competitor. As a consequence, a new triangular power
relationship took shape constituting the Soviet Union, China, and
the United States.
Political pluralism was also at work in the West. United States
control over NATO and its predominance in Western Europe eroded
as Europeans began to think of Europe as an independent political
force and as Americans seriously debated the issue of troop with-
drawals from the continent. A mood of neo-isolationism was envelop-
ing the country as it entered into the post-Vietnam era.
Nations of the Afro-Asian neutralist bloc, having emerged from a
heritage of Western colonialism, seemed to assert with greater per-
sistency and effect their political claims between the competing East-
West blocs, and to insist upon recognition of the bloc as an important
though essentially unstructured power factor in the international
arena. Japan, though emerging as one of the world's great economic
powers, was reluctant to play a comparable political role in world
politics. In this changing world environment even Latin America
began to assume a foreign policy stance far more independent from
its mentor to the North.
d. Emergence of detente, 1972-1975.-Thus, as Soviet-American
relations entered the period of detente in 1972-1975, radical changes
had indeed occurred on the larger international scene. But other
changes were on the horizon whose full impact was yet to be felt


much less measured. The Arab oil embargo of 1973-1974 dramatized
what specialists had long feared; namely, that the world was entering
an era of shortages-in energy, food, and raw materials. The LDCs,
possessors of much of the world's raw materials and resources in
short supply, appeared at this juncture to have gained an unexpected
leverage against the advanced industrial countries. Complicating
the problem of shortages and inextricably part of it were the problems
of an exploding world population and spreading inflation. Accele-
rated by the quadrupling of oil prices, inflation threatened many
economies of the world. Other problems such as environmental
pollution, use of ocean resources and the seabeds, and arms control
imposed themselves with greater force on the conscience of global
e. Interdependence: A new cycle in international relations?-Foreign
policy specialists now perceived the emergence of a new era of inter-
national relations in which nations of the world would be increasingly
drawn into global arrangements for the orderly and fair distribution of
essential resources and for the resolution of mounting global problems
in which all nations had a stake. Interdependence was the term used to
describe what was believed to be a newly emerging structure of
international relations. It was said that the urgency of interdependence
imposed a new requirement on nations, that of achieving inter-
dependent solutions through functional diplomacy and international
cooperation. Interdependence was said to offer mankind's only
route to survival.
3. Roots of Detente
a. Khrushchev's doctrine of peaceful coexistence, 1956.-The principal
trend that emerges from developments in Soviet-American relations
during the time-span of this study-indeed, in the past 13 years-
is the evolution of detente. Detente is generally construed to mean
an easing of tensions in international relations. As a principle, guiding
relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, it assumes
that war between the two superpowers would be disastrous. The
Soviet Union has been ostensibly committed to the principle of
detente-or as the Soviets prefer, peaceful coexistence-at least since
1956. However, it has never denied its ideological commitment to
"struggle" against world capitalism.
In contrast, the United States has been philosophically inclined to
resolve differences with adversaries through peaceful means. Rather
than being committed to "struggle", it has in general sought to
establish a harmony of interests with the nations of the world, in-
cluding the Soviet Union. This philosophical inclination did not,
however, preclude the use of force in defense of American national
interests. Since the mid-1950s, therefore, the United States has
responded affirmatively to indications of a Soviet desire for an accom-
modation in relations. Thus detente seems to be rooted, at least
philosophically, in the mid-1950s when Khrushchev formally pro-
,claimed the Soviet doctrine of peaceful coexistence and when the
United States responded accordingly in a spirit of accommodation.
b. Cuban missile crisis, 1962.-As a matter of practical policy, how-
ever, detente seems to have had its roots in the Cuban missile crisis
-of 1962. In this crisis Soviet efforts to demonstrate that the balance
-of power had shifted to the Soviet advantage were thwarted by


American determination to meet this strategic challenge head-on.
Thereafter, Russia's global thrust was diminished; serious efforts were
made by both sides to stabilize their relations; but in an environment
of improving Soviet-American relations Khrushchev laid the ground-
work for expanding Soviet military power, both strategic and con-
ventional. Specialists in military affairs reasoned that the Russians
were determined never again to back off in a showdown with the
United States. Still, detente was given a thrust forward, and conclu-
sion of the partial nuclear test ban of 1963 (among other lesser but
still positive measures) is now looked upon as a high point in what
observers perceive to be an evolving spirit of detente.
4. Course of Detente, 1965-1975: An Overview
The course of detente in subsequent years was not smooth. What-
ever momentum had been achieved in the last years of the Khrushchev
era was arrested during 1965-1968 by American involvement in
Vietnam, the provocative Soviet role in the 1967 Middle East crisis,
and the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in
August 1968. Despite scattered evidence of improving Soviet-Ameri-
can relations during this period (e.g. conclusion of the nuclear non-
proliferation treaty in the spring of 1968), it was not until 1969-
some six months after tensions generated by the Czechoslovak crisis
had subsided-that both countries seemed to move again in the
direction of detente.
In viewing Soviet-American relations over the entire seven-year
period 1969-1975, it seems that this relationship was marked by
periods of tension and accommodation with a gradual movement
towards an overall improvement in relations. The Vietnam War re-
mained a source of tension until the signing of the Paris Peace agreement
in January 1973. On two occasions (in 1970 and 1973) the outbreak
of hostilities in the Middle East brought the United States and the
Soviet Union to the verge of direct confrontation. Numerous other
problems developed in their relations. Nevertheless, the overall pic-
ture was one of progress in the formation of a more stable relationship
between the two countries. High points in this developing new relation-
ship were the Moscow Summit of May 1972, the Washington Summit
of June 1973, the Moscow Summit of June 1974 and the Ford-Brezhnev
meeting at Vladivostok in November 1974.
In 1974, detente seemed to be characterized by significant increases
in the depth and breadth of relations. From the basic goal of avoiding
war, the United States and the Soviet Union moved to build an
extensive network of interrelationships, so that some optimistic
observers contended that detente might become irreversible. The
validity of this judgment remains to be proven. In the fall of 1974,
however, scholars spoke of a pause in the momentum of detente.
In 1975, this pause seemed to become a fairly fixed condition as the
structure of Soviet-American relations was tested by cross-currents
of positive and negative trends. The future course of this relationship
could be affected by a number of unanswered domestic and inter-
national questions.


1. Areas of Tension
a. Vietnam war, a persistent irritant.-Moving from the general to
the particular, it is possible to identify specific trends and high points
in the period covered by this study which illustrate the alternating
currents of progress and retrogression in detente. The year 1971
appeared to be a time of transition from the diminishing Cold War
spirit to the gradual emergence of detente.
Areas of tension were clearly visible in Soviet-American relations
during 1971, though varying in degree of seriousness. Vietnam re-
mained a key source of contention. The United States had reduced
its troop involvement from 530,000 at the beginning of 1969 to less
than 140,000 by the end of 1971, but this disengagement of ground
forces was balanced by escalation of the air war in Vietnam, Laos, and
Cambodia. The Soviet Union was silent on troop reductions, but it
sharply denounced the intensified U.S. bombings. Premier Kosygin
referred to American "barbarism" in Indochina as a barrier to peace
in international relations.
b. Sino-Soviet dispute; improving Sino-American relations.-Further
deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations and signs of improvement in
Sino-American relations served to arouse Soviet suspicions of American
policy in the Far East. President Nixon's declaration of intention to
initiate a dialogue with Peking, favorably received by the Chinese,
was crystallized in a surprise announcement in July 1971 that the
President would visit China sometime in 1972. The Soviet press
responded with repeated warnings against anti-Soviet collusion,
despite American assurance that its policy of rapprochement with
Moscow remained unchanged.
c. Other points of friction.-Tensions continued in other areas of
Soviet-American relations. Peace was no nearer in the Middle East
as Soviet-American interests remained at odds. Continued Soviet
probings in Latin America, notably Soviet naval visits to the Carib-
bean, evidence of Soviet efforts to establish a Caribbean naval base,
and active support of "leftist" regimes in Chile and Peru, aroused
concern in Washington. Declaration of the Pakistani-Indian War in
December 1971, moreover, found the Soviet Union supporting
India and the U.S. supporting Pakistan. Finally, incidents involving
attacks upon Soviet officials and property in the United States by
American extremist groups, provoked by Russia's anti-semitic
campaign, and Soviet retaliation with attacks on American citizens
in Moscow, provided small but steady irritants to Soviet-American
2. Areas of Accommodation
a. Nixon's mixed assessment.-Areas of tension were eventually
counterbalanced by those of accommodation. In February 1971,
President Nixon offered a "mixed" assessment of relations in his
"State-of-the-World" message to Congress. He pointed to progress
in SALT, the Berlin question, and cooperation in such areas as trade
and exploration of outer space. But the importance of these positive
developments was diminished by provocative Soviet action in the
Middle East, Cuba, and Berlin; unrestrained Soviet anti-American
propaganda; and the unacceptable Soviet proposal for a general


European security conference in the absence of a political basis for
improved relations. Reduction of American forces in Europe was
pronounced impossible without Soviet reciprocity.
b. Progress in arms control.-By the end of 1971, however, Soviet
hostility was muted as accommodation was reached in many areas of
relations, particularly in arms control and East-West relations in
Europe. In May 1971, a breakthrough occurred at the Helsinki
strategic arms control talks. A compromise was announced between
the American position, requiring across-the-board strategic arms
curbs, and that of the Soviets, calling exclusively for limitations on
anti-ballistic missiles (ABM). Arms control discussions in 1971 would
now emphasize ABMs with some limitation placed on the number of
offensive missiles (ICBMs). Though the SALT I agreement was not
reached until 1972, the Helsinki talks produced two agreements in
September 1971: one was directed at eliminating the danger of ac-
cidental nuclear war, and the other at improving satellite "hot line"
c. Progress on European security.-Significant progress was also
achieved on European matters. The status of Berlin, long a bone
of contention in East-West relations, was clarified in a preliminary
Four Power agreement signed in September in which the Soviets
accepted responsibility for the unimpeded flow of traffic between
West Berlin and West Germany. The Western powers had made final
approval of the Soviet-West German treaty, normalizing relations
and resolving frontier questions, contingent upon Soviet acceptance
of this agreement. Moreover, a compromise was reached on the con-
vening of a European security conference (CSCE), a Soviet objective
designed to legitimatize Soviet wartime conquests and formally fix
East-West frontiers, and a conference on the limitation and balanced
force reduction (MBFR), a Western prerequisite designed to reduce
Soviet military power in Europe and to balance it with that of NATO.
In May 1971, Brezhnev, who a month before had reaffirmed Soviet
adherence to its policy of peaceful coexistence at the 24th Congress
of the CPSU, suggested that two separate conferences be held simul-
taneously. The way was thus cleared for major East-West talks on
the security of Europe.
d. Improving Soviet-American commercial relations.-Furthermore,
the pace of improving Soviet-American commercial relations was
visibly quickened as the American policy of linking trade with
improving political relations as a prerequisite shifted to actively
encouraging commercial ties with the Soviet Union independent of
and as an inducement for better political relations. By the end of
1971, an exchange of high level trade authorities and a tendency by
the U.S. to lower restrictions on Soviet trade appeared to solidify
improving commercial relations.
e. Other areas of accommodation.-Finally, symbolic of the steady
movement towards detente were:
-the October 12 announcement of President Nixon's visit to the
Soviet Union in the spring of 1972;
-the agreement of October 22, designed to prevent accidents
at sea; and
-the series of agreements concluded throughout the year on
space; that of January 21 to expand cooperation in space


research and sharing of data; of October 20 on exchanging
data on Mars flights; and of December 30 on the exchange of
data on the biological effects of spaceflight.
S. On balance
In every sense, therefore, 1971 was a year of transition from Cold
War to detente in Soviet-American relations. Despite persistent
irritations, the areas of accommodation appeared to far outweigh
those of tension. Atmospheric conditions in relations seemed to alter
perceptibly as the way was now cleared for reaching further agree-
ments and formally ratifying those that had already been reached.

1. Positive Developments
a. High point in detente.-In retrospect the period 1972-1974 seemed
to be a high point in the improvement of Soviet-American relations.
Momentum toward detente quickened as significant agreements
were concluded and a close and more formally binding relationship
on both sides was established. A pattern of annual summit meetings
served to advance and solidify the seemingly enlarging spirit of
b. Winding down Vietnam war.-The winding down of American
involvement in Vietnam no doubt contributed a great deal to im-
proving the climate of Soviet-American relations and clearing the
way for summit talks. In 1972, it was apparent that both sides wished
to deemphasize the Vietnam issue in their relationship. President
Nixon's order to blockade all North Vietnam ports and mine Haiphong
and other harbors immediately prior to his Moscow trip in May 1972
was met with surprising restraint on the Soviet side. Twice during
1972 Soviet leaders conferred with the North Vietnamese in what
was believed to be efforts to end the war. A peace agreement was
finally concluded in January 1973 after a temporary disruption
of the Paris peace negotiations by renewed American aerial bombing
of North Vietnam in December undertaken as talks threatened to
break down. Perhaps one of the most formidable obstacles to Soviet-
American accommodation was thus removed.
c. Meetings at the summit.-The four summit meetings during 1972-
1974 seemed to serve four purposes: (1) to ratify and thus formalize
agreements already reached; (2) to set the priorities for future negotia-
tions; (3) to establish a formal structure within which detente was
to progress; and (4) in general, to create a political environment for
building mutual confidence.
President Nixon initiated the pattern of summit conferences with
his visit to Moscow during May 22-29, 1972. With General Secretary
Brezhnev, he signed numerous agreements, the most important being
the Strategic Arms Limitation accord (SALT I), imposing limits on
total numbers of American and Soviet offensive and defensive missiles.
Both sides agreed to begin consultations on a European security
conference (CSCE) after final signature of the Four Power agreement
on Berlin and to pursue discussions on mutual force reduction (MBFR)
in Central Europe. They also initialed several other agreements
previously negotiated including accords on cooperation in medical
research, space exploration, avoidance of collisions at sea, increased


cultural and educational exchanges, and joint efforts at solving
environmental problems. Agreement was also reached on measures
to expand commercial relations, such as, the creation of a joint
U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commercial Commission.
The second in this current series of summits was General Secretary
Brezhnev's visit to the United States during June 17-25, 1973. At
this meeting President Nixon and Brezhnev signed a declaration of
principles pledging to accelerate strategic arms limitation talks with
the goal of concluding a SALT 11 treaty by the end of 1974. Other
accords were signed on cooperation in oceanography, peaceful uses
of atomic energy, expansion of cultural exchanges, and on expanding
commercial relations. Agreements reached at this Washington summit
were generally regarded as evidence of Soviet-American determination
to continue the momentum of detente.
The third summit took place during June 27-July 3, 1974 when
President Nixon journeyed to Moscow to confer with Soviet leaders.
This summit was conducted against the background of growing
problems for President Nixon arising from the Watergate scandal.
Only a limited agreement was reached on the strategic arms limita-
tions at the second Moscow summit. Each side was restricted to one
ABM site, and restrictions were placed on underground nuclear tests
after 1976. Both sides pledged to continue efforts at settling inter-
national problems; to expand cooperation in medicine, space explora-
tion, environmental protection, energy, and other areas; and to
establish a broad framework for trade relations.
The fourth summit took place at Vladivostok on November 23,
1974 between the newly inaugurated President Gerald R. Ford and
General Secretary Brezhnev. At first regarded as a "get acquainted"
meeting, this summit produced a tentative agreement to limit the
number of all offensive strategic nuclear weapons and delivery
vehicles through 1985. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger described
this d:velopment as a "breakthrough" in efforts to curb the arms
race. Further negotiations were expected to take place in Geneva
during 1975 on technical questions with the expectation that a final
agreement could be signed during the Brezhnev visit to the United
States in the summer of 1975. Press reports said this summit meeting
and the agreement appeared to exceed expectations by far and
undoubtedly would give "new impulse" to East-West accommodation
at a time of uncertainties on both sides. Subsequently criticisms were
made of the Vladivostok agreement on grounds that the so-called
"cap" placed on the arms race had been too high, permiting a wide
range of strategic buildup, and that it perpetuated Soviet advantages
in strategic throw-weight and allowed such a large number of MIRVs
that American land-based forces were likely to be vulnerable to attack.
There seems to be little doubt that this series of summit meetings
improved the climate of relations. An imposing network of relations
had by this time been established, and both sides exclaimed that
detente was irreversible. Among other favorable indicators in addition
to the substantive agreements concluded at the summits were the
signing of the Four Power Berlin agreement, the opening of preliminary
talks on European security in Helsinki and on MBFR in Vienna, and
the signing of a treaty banning biological warfare weapons and calling
for the destruction of stockpiles of any such weapons.


2. Obstacles to Detente
a. Declining euphoria; rising skepticism-Despite this imposing
two-year record of detente, still formidable barriers remained that
detracted from these achievements and indeed produced counterforces
that reduced their impact on the course of Soviet-American relations.
As a consequence, initial euphoria over detente had become clouded
with skepticism by the end of 1974.
b. Human rights-trade issue.-In retrospect, growing skepticism
of detente in the United States appeared to center on one main source;
namely, the issue of basic human rights as it related to the principle
of free emigration from and intellectual freedom in the U.S.S.R.
This issue became linked with the expansion of trade as Congressional
critics of detente attempted to use the Soviet desire for American
trade and technology as leverage to expand human rights in the
Soviet Union. In turn, the Soviets resented this course as interference
in internal Soviet affairs.
Conclusion of a comprehensive commercial agreement on October 18,
1972 set the stage for the expansion of Soviet-American trade as the
Soviets agreed to settle the long unresolved Lend Lease World War II
debt of $722 million in return for the U.S. extension of credits and
most-favored-nation (MFN) status to the Soviet Union. As a result,
commercial relations moved ahead rapidly during the next two years.
(In 1973, trade between the United States and the Soviet Union
totalled $1.4 billion.)
But in August 1972, the Soviet Government had established a
graduated exit fee up to $25,000 for a person possessing an advanced
degree from a Soviet university or institute who wished to emigrate.
Ostensibly, the decree was designed to reclaim lost educational costs
to the state caused by emigrating Soviet citizens. However, the West
interpreted this action as a measure to discourage Jewish emigration
to Israel.
The trade-human rights issue was joined when on October 4, 1972,
Senator Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.) introduced an amendment to
the Trade Reform Act under the cosponsorship of 72 Senators. The
amendment prohibited the extension of credits or MFN status to
non-market (i.e., Communist) economies which restricted or taxed
emigration by their citizens. A similar amendment was introduced in
the House of Representatives by Rep. Charles A. Vanik (D-Ohio) and
henceforth was termed, "the Jackson-Vanik amendment."
The human rights issue became further exacerbated (and locked
into the trade question) when Soviet repression of intellectual dis-
senters, notably, Soviet physicist Andrey Sakarov and Nobel Prize
winner Alexander Solzhenitsyn, was given widespread critical coverage
in the Western media. On February 13, 1974, the Soviets expelled
Solzhenitsyn, a repressive action that strengthened the mood in
Congress and the press to reassess detente and its benefits.
Attempts to resolve the human rights-trade issue in September 1974
by Soviet assurances of relaxing emigration restrictions in return for a
congressional grant of MFN and credits appeared to clear the air,
but on December 18, 1974 the Soviets denied that they had agreed to
any specific emigration measure in exchange for American trade
concessions and declared that they would reject any American effort
to interfere in internal Soviet affairs. This negative Soviet response
fueled rising criticism on the value of trade and technology transfer


and reinforced the growing countertrend of skepticism within the
Congress and among knowledgeable critics throughout the country.
In brief, the value of detente itself was now being seriously questioned.
c. Impact of Yor Kippur war and oil embargo.-Other emerging
issues were to have a spoiling effect on the prevailing euphoria over
detente. The October 1973 war in the Middle East threatened to bring
the Soviet Union and the United States into confrontation as the
United States responded to Soviet hints of unilateral intervention with
the declaration of a worldwide "alert" of American military forces.
Soviet support of the Arab oil embargo (October 17, 1973-March 18,
1974) that threatened to cripple the economies of the West provided
an additional irritant to relations. This new round in the Arab-Israeli
conflict tested the limits of detente, according to qualified observers.
d. Impasse on European security.-Moreover, the conferences on
European security (CSCE and MBFR) reached an impasse as both
sides came to grips with the most fundamental issues of the Cold War.
Soviet resistance to the free exchange of ideas, people, and information,
and their insistence on preserving the substantial Soviet advantage in
conventional forces in Central Europe created a seemingly immovable
deadlock. Faced with these hard realities, supporters of detente were
compelled to scale down their expectations.
e. Other difficulties: SALT, growing Soviet power, Nixon's visit to
China.-Nor was SALT II productive, at first. Negotiators had failed
to broaden categories of strategic weapons to be restricted and to re-
place the interim agreement on offensive weapons with a permanent
one. American criticisms of SALT I as not benefiting the U.S. suffi-
ciently, the continued buildup of Soviet military power, the successful
testing of Soviet missiles with multiple independently targetable re-
entry vehicles (MIRVs) in August 1973 and January 1974-all caused
concern among American skeptics who were particularly fearful that
the balance in missile strength would be upset. On the positive side,
the "conceptual breakthrough" that Secretary of State Kissinger had
failed to achieve in his March 1974 trip to Moscow (much to his
disappointment) was apparently achieved at the Vladivostok summit
in November. But even this agreement was not wholly satisfying to
skeptics who questioned the value of "excessive" allowable limits for
a continued strategic buildup.
Reports of an enlarging Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean
and estimates of growing Soviet military power and the decline in that
of NATO published by the prestigious Institute for Strategic Studies
of London, moreover, appeared to re-inforce the position of skeptics of
Finally, President Nixon's visit of reconciliation to China during
February 21-28, 1972, three months before going to Moscow, could
not have set well with the Soviet leaders, and in all probability stimu-
lated further concern, if not fears, of an anti-Soviet collusion, and
aroused further doubts among Soviet skeptics of detente.
8. An Emerging Realism
By the end of 1974, therefore, a vigorous skepticism appeared to
dampen much of the earlier euphoria over detente. Negotiations were
going forward on virtually every political front, but an awareness of
progress seemed to be combined with a realization that while the Soviet
Union and the United States had by then created a favorable atmos-
phere for relations, and indeed had established an impressive network


of agreements for strengthening a functional relationship (41 agree-
ments were signed during 1972-1974), still they had yet to resolve the
hard-core issues of the Cold War.

1. ThIrough the Spring of 1975
For at least the first six months of 1975 detente in Soviet-American
relations appeared to reach a plateau. Further advance in detente
seemed to be arrested as both sides came to grips with outstanding,
and formidable, issues in their relations.
SALT II negotiations continued along their steady but inconclusive
course as negotiators attempted to resolve technical details arising
from the Vladivostok agreement.
The Middle East crisis appeared to stabilize in a state of prolonged
irresolution. Soviet military supplies to Arab forces were replenished,
especially in the case of Syria; and extensive military aid was given to
Libya, suggesting to analysts that the Soviets were seeking an alter-
native client state to Egypt which was then tilting toward the United
States. Israeli forces, diminished by the Yom Kippur war, were also
strengthened from American arsenals. At the diplomatic level the
Soviets appeared to maintain a posture of detachment, keeping to the
sidelines, while the United States took active unilateral diplomatic
action (largely unsuccessful) to find a basis for compromise between
Egypt and Israel.
Conferences on European security (CSCE and MBFR) had yet to
acli -ve their goals, though press reports in mid-June spoke optimis-
tically of a compromise at CSCE that would clear the way for a full-
blown summit conference of leaders from all participating countries.
(Differences had centered on the free exchange of peoples, ideas, and
information East and West, and on such confidence-building measures
as pre-notification of military maneuvers.)
Some of the cooperative acgreements concluded at past summits were
producing some positive results. Most notable perhaps was continued
progress in the planned Soyuz-Apollo spaceflight scheduled for July
The most serious setback, not altogether unexpected, was the Soviet
cancellation on January 14, 1975 of the 1972 trade agreement with the
United States, including the Lend-Lease settlement. This action was
taken in response to what were viewed as discriminatory provisions
in the Trade Reform Bill, signed into law on January 3, 1975, linking
MFN to liberalized Soviet emigration policies. Furthermore, the
Soviets were reacting to the imposition of a $300 million ceiling
(hardly sufficient for Soviet expectations and plans) on credits to the
Soviet Union in the Export-Import Bank amendment signed into law
on January 4. In a parallel move, the Soviet press stepped up criticism
of the United States, in sharp contrast to heretofore positive media
treatment. On the other hand, Soviet officials emphasized their con-
tinuing commitment to detente.
A fairly realistic reading on the state of detente at this juncture-
at least on the official level-was perhaps the public utterances by
General Secretary Brezhnev and President Ford, and particularly
by other officials in the wake of the collapse of American policy in
Vietnam. In a speech in Budapest on March 18, Brezhnev reaffirmed


the Soviet commitment to improving relations with the United States,
but cautioned that a slowdown in detente could jeopardize previous
achievements. Similarly, on April 10, President Ford strongly endorsed
detente in his "State-of-the-World" message; called for removal of
existing trade and economic sanctions against the Soviet Union;
but also warned that detente must be a two-way street and would not
be allowed to become a "license to fish in troubled waters."
In the wake of the Vietnam debacle in April-May 1975, Secretary
of State Kissinger reaffirmed on May 12 the United States commit-
ment to detente but warned that the continued expansion of Soviet
military power on a global scale constituted "a heavy mortgage on
detente" and jeopardized new trends in Soviet-American relations. On
its part the Soviets reacted with restraint during this period of severe
setback for United States policy.
As for the attitude of the American people in the spring of 1975,
one student of foreign policy, Richard Rosecrance, described opposi-
tion to detente in the United States "while diverse and inconsistent
from one group to another-must be rated today as strong." 2
2. Since the Summer of 1975
By the summer of 1975, detente had clearly reached something of
a plateau. Momentum appeared to stall as critics in the United States,
stimulated in part by the visit of Solzhenitsyn, leveled sharp attacks
on the Soviet failure to grant human rights, particularly with regard
to Jewish emigration, and on alleged (but never officially confirmed
by the U.S. Government) Soviet violations of the SALT I agreement.
Failure to reach agreement in the SALT II and MBFR negotiations
seemed to energize further skepticism in the country. The conclusion
of the European Security Conference generated still further doubt and
concern because of Soviet failure in the past to carry out humanitarian
commitments similar to those contained in the Final Act and because
the agreement had the effect, it was argued, of sealing the division of
Europe and confirming the Soviet Union's World War II conquests in
Eastern Europe. One of the few favorable developments at this time
was the successful staging of the Apollo-Soyuz joint manned space
By autumn the Soviets responded to what they perceived to be an
accumulation of grievances against the United States. Among the
grievances were: the Sinai accord between Egypt and Israel with the
United States acting as mediator, reached without Soviet participa-
tion; remarks by Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger concerning
U.S. readiness to resort to nuclear weapons as an alternative to defeat
in war and his warnings against Soviet military advances, making him
the Soviet Union's prime American target in denouncing opponents
of detente; aggravation over the trade-emigration-human rights issue
which the Soviets looked upon as intervention in their internal affairs;
and the American lukewarm, even critical, response to the Helsinki
agreement concluded as the Final Act of the CSCE, for Soviet leaders
a long-sought goal and a prized accomplishment of Soviet foreign
Binding issues of disagreement on both sides were the polarization
of Western and Soviet supported interest in Portugal and failure to
reach agreement on SALT II and MBFR.
2 Rosecrance, Richard, Detente or entente? Foreign Affairs, April 1975: 469.


By the end of October, progress towards achieving military detente,
the very heart of the concept of detente itself, seemed to reach a
critical juncture. The decisive issue centered on SALT II and disagree-
ment over the precise definition of strategic weapons, that is, whether
or not the Soviet Backfire bomber and the American cruise missile
should be counted as strategic weapons in calculations for an agreed
strategic balance. In the event of failure to reach agreement it was
speculated that the Brezhnev-Ford Washington summit, intended as
a signing ceremony of a SALT II agreement, would be indefinitely
postponed; that negotiations would then be put off until 1977; and
that the issue of detente would be thrust into the political arena of
both nations where powerful political forces are known to be contesting
its merits: for the Soviet Union, the 25th Congress of the CPSU,
scheduled to be held in February 1976, is expected to sanction or reject
the continuation of Brezhnev's "peace program," depending largely
on its demonstrated success or failure; and for the United States,
detente is expected to be a major issue in the upcoming 1976 Presi-
dential election. Under these conditions it was estimated that control
of nuclear weapons could become an even more elusive goal as pressures
mounting on each side for building a stronger defense, escalated the
arms race to a new and more dangerous level, thus diminishing pros-
pects for achieving a military detente. This scenario of possibilities
led The Christian Science Monitor to state editorially on October 17,
with respect to agreement in the area of military detente, that, "Time
is of the essence."
Through November the momentum of detente appeared to remain
fixed at the critical juncture noted in October. Deadlock in SALT II
negotiations persisted over the decisive Backfire-cruise missile issue.
Breaking the deadlock was an essential American condition for the
long delayed, yet much anticipated Washington summit. Hints of a
possible Brezhnev-Ford meeting in late December on the occasion of
a Brezhnev visit to the Cuban Communist Party Congress were down-
graded, though a Brezhnev-Kissinger meeting in Moscow was held
out as a possibility. The dismissal of Secretary Schlesinger, regarded
in Moscow as an opponent of detente, resolved the Kissinger-
Schlesinger dispute within the Administration over conflicting percep-
tions of detente and policies to carry it out, but appeared to have no
immediate and tangible effect upon the course of Soviet policy.
Indeed, tensions in Soviet-American relations were revived as Presi-
dent Ford and Secretary Kissinger warned the Soviets that military
intervention in the Angolan civil war was a threat to detente and
reaffirmed the Administration's intention of maintaining an American
defense posture second to none. Reports of alleged Soviet violations of
SALT I, sharply contested by Kissinger, seemed to reflect the depth
of anxiety over detente in certain sectors of American life. On their
part, the Soviets, concerned about increased American criticism of
detente since the CSCE meeting in Helsinki during mid-summer,
reaffirmed their intention of maintaining a strong defense and warned
against any erosion of vigilance; but they also pledged to make detente
irreversible which they perceived to be a reality of international life.
Despite tensions on the surface and continuing deadlock in SALT II,
therefore, some positive signs were discernible in the flow of events
through the end of November: both countries remained committed


to detente as official policy, and some slight movement was apparent
towards a summit meeting.
As the year 1975 came to a close, it was becoming apparent that
detente was being seriously tested in two vital areas of Soviet-American
relations; namely, the military, and the political-ideologicial. With
respect to the first, attempts to break the stalemate in SALT II by a
Kissinger trip to Moscow were now deferred until January 1976. An
effort was made to break the stalemate in MBFR by an American
offer to reduce its 7,000 tactical nuclear weapons ars(nal in Central
Europe by 1,000 and American troops by 29,000, in exchange for
withdrawal of a Soviet tank army of some 1,700 tanks and 68,000
men; but the formal Warsaw Pact response was not expected until
early 1976. Thus considerations on military detente, still deadlocked,
were further delayed and extended into the new year.
The most immediate, but less decisive, test of detente was, however,
in the political-ideological area as the Soviet Union and the U.S.
became more deeply involved in the Angolhn civil war. All along the
Soviets insisted that there could be no detente in ideology. And in its
support for the MPLA faction the Soviet Union further insisted that
detente did not mean an end to the national liberation movement and
a cessation of the anti-imperialist struggle; it did not mean a freezing
of the world into a socio-political status quo. Accordingly, the Soviet
Union, acting on the apparent assumption that the United States
would wish to avoid another Vietnam-type involvement, poured tons
of military equipment and some four to six thousand Cuban troops into
Angola. The Soviet Union denied the relevance of their extensive
support for the MPLA to the pursuit of detente with the United States;
both were separate, disconnected areas of Soviet political concern.
The Soviets pleaded no contradiction in both policies.
The United States (at least the Ford Administration) took the
contrary position: it linked the future of detente in Soviet-American
relations with Soviet policy and behavior in Angola. The Soviets were
warned that continued military involvement in Angola would endanger
detente. The United States response to this new Soviet challenge to
American policy was explained in terms of Kissinger's search for a
balance in world diplomacy and the use of a two-track system to
achieve detente with the Soviet Union. This interacting system sought
harmony in relations through accommodation on the one hand as in
SALT and expanding trade relations and international exchanges, and
by a firm determination to check Soviet global power and influence
now perceived to be entering a new imperial phase on the other. The
larger purpose was to seek a world in balance using counterweights of
power, China and Japan being power potentials for future alignments.
Senate opposition to further covert U.S. military aid to non-Soviet
supported factions fighting in Angola, based on fear of another involve-
ment as in Vietnam and denial of a direct American interest, appeared
to thwart Administration policy momentarily. Still, the Administra-
tion, pledging non-involvement of American troops, insisted on
mounting a "major effort" in Angola.
At the close of 1975, therefore, serious difficulties and dilemmas in
detente appeared to surface: continued stalemate in SALT II/MBFR
negotiations suggested the extraordinary difficulties inherent in seeking
military detente; the threat of a Soviet-American confrontation in


Anr! exos-ed 1bth the dlemma and frailty of a con~cpt that was
per einved from differine and eential- contradictrv po-itioa. At
stake was the future of detente."


Thi- overview of Soviet-American relation during 1971-1975 rai-e
basic questions about definition and perceptions, caues and motiva-
tion of detente. The Soviet definition of detente (or as they prefer,
peaceful coexistence, sugests two principa points in common with
tho-e of the American definition: namely, recogition that detente is
both a process and a condition of relations-the condition being a
relaxation of tensions and an exercise of mutual restraint. The esential
point of difference is Soviet insistence that there can be no peaceful
coexistence or detente in the ideolog realm. Recociiation of the
antithetical doctrine of Communism and capitalism is not possible.
Thi- reality, they assert is dictated by historical necessity.
Alr: a and te Soviets thus view detente from dfferent per-
speive but the areas of agreement nonetheless appear to be
considerable. Foreign policy leaders in both zovernments recognze
their fundamental ideological and political differences; they accept
the vital and dnamic role of power in their relations; they realze the
inevitability of rivalry: they under-rand the limits of detente. To
them. detente does not mean agreement on values; it is not a state of
rapprochement, much less of entente. It is rather a process and a
condition of relation that issue from a mutual illinness to avoid
nulear war.
Apparently sharinu in c mmn a desire to create a fraework of
relations, the Soviet Union and the United States seek to establish
through functional dinpomacy reasonable stability wihin the context
of a larger international sytem, one presumably based on the principle
of interdenedence. At the heart of the detente process i a mutual
denial of force in resolving difference. The assumption eems to be
that the modalities and the process of detente can enable both nation
to manage thei differences while at the same tie protect their vital
interests and maintain peace.
Sill. profoun ideologcal differences, noted above, exist n Soviet
and American perceptons of detente that in both theoretical and
practical ters are formidable and accordingly cast a hadow of
negatvissm over detente. The Soviet Union is committed to contmuing
"strugg!e"; it rejects ideolocals a pemanent state of peace with
capitalim and aEppears only to have modified its ideoloical views
suciently to reach a momentary accommodation with the United
tates, a modification on the periphery, not at he central core of
doctrine. The Soviets remn committed to achieving the oals of
Conmunism. They remain comitted to the conquest of power e.g.
support for local wars and wars of "national liberation") through the
use of power in situatios that could invite cofrontation and accord-
min generate serious consequences. In brief, the relationship remais
adversarial: the Soviets are tring to have it both ways: to have peace-
ful competition with the United States and draw upn its economic and
te knological resources, while at the same time actively supportng
I Whels. Joph G. D.ente th te Sce: TUor.. e B~e nber IB 72. WSi ztn, Ury of
Congress CSrne-io RJ arch e r, c 2, J7 6, p. 3-5.


the transformation of the world into a pattern acceptable to their own
unique beliefs and preferences. The problem arises when what is in
reality revolutionary theory is applied to practical politics and
generated into action through the use of power.
In contrast, the American outlook inclines toward composing
differences through peaceful means; it rejects "struggle" as a con-
tinuum in relations; and generally it seeks a harmony of interests amlong
its adversaries.
Multiple causes brought about detente in Soviet-American relations,
and these causes are rooted in a convergence of national interests.
Detente in the political/military area issued from the imperatives of
peace in the nuclear age, a mutual desire for security, and a common
negotiating condition of strategic parity. Stalemate in Europe,
changing American attitudes towards its responsibilities in Europe,
and the impact of the Sino-Soviet dispute created unique opportunities
and requirements for each side to achieve its respective interests.
Failures of past policies (United States in Vietnam; Soviet faillres
arising from Khrushchev's excessive globalism) provided still another
mutual interest in the pursuit of their respective foreign policies.
Finally, Soviet needs and deficiencies in economics, science, and tech-
nology, in combination with proven American capabilities and a desire
to serve other political purposes, created special forces of mutual attrac-
tion. In all, the causes of detente did not issue from any one-sided
source or from one single source, but rather from a condition created
by the chemistry of mutual interests.

1. Obstacles to Detente
Considerable obstacles lay in the path to the success of detente.
Among them are the following:
(1) fundamantal ideological incompatibility between the American
and Soviet systems, combined with continued Soviet emphasis on
ideological struggle between those systems; (2) continuing rivalries
between the two superpowers in areas of overlapping strategic interest
around the globe, particularly what critics of detente perceive to be
the expansion of Soviet military power and the decline in that of
NATO; and (3) the suspicions, doubts, and fears arising from a shared
historical memory of over two decades of Cold War.
2. Favorable Factors
On the other hand, major factors encourage efforts to continue the
process of detente: (1) threat of thermonuclear war and recognition by
leaders of both countries that every effort must be made to prevent its
occurrence; (2) the common danger of nuclear proliferation which can
only be reduced through great power cooperation; (3) the Soviet need
for Western technology which can be obtainable only in an environ-
ment of reduced East-West tensions; (4) the continuing Sino-Soviet
dispute, coupled with improved relations between China and the
United States; and (5) the growing interdependency among the
nations of the world, regardless of social systems, in the face of pressing
global problems.


3. On Balance
Detente continues to be severely tested in many areas of Soviet-
American relations as noted above. The initial euphoria over the new
Soviet relationship now seems to have evaporated and a sense of
realism appears to prevail. Certainly the American people, and
particularly the Congress, remain hopeful but skeptical. Dangerous
tensions arising from deep rooted Soviet-American rivalry seem
destined to continue as a natural phenomenon in the relationship of
great powers whose interests and goals remain fundamentally con-
flictual. Nonetheless, both Governments still appear to be currently
committed to detente as a state policy. If their relations continue to be
characterized by a self-imposed restraint and a genuine desire to reduce
tensions, then the prospects for the future may be greater than what
now seems possible.
4. Detente in Emerging World of Interdependence
Beyond the specific problem of crisis management in Soviet-
American relations lies the much larger phenomena of interdependence.
This is the term used by foreign specialists and statesmen to describe
what they perceive to be a new cycle of change in international
politics. Looked upon as the conceptualization of the world in transi-
tion, it is presented as a workable rationale for continuity in a time
of change. The idea, not new-long ago John Donne expressed it in
the phrase, "No man is an island"-seems to have been given currency
and momentum by the rising expectations of detente; the emergence
of the LDCs, especially those resource rich, as a serious power factor
in international relations; and by the global nature of today's prob-
lems (e.g., environmental pollution, scarcity of resources-energy
.and food-arms control, equitable use of the oceans and seabeds,
to name some of the most important). The universal appeal of inter-
dependence arises from the fact that it purports to offer a route for
common survival.
Described as a modern Copernican revolution and a fallout of the
Space Age, the idea of interdependence views man's Earth from space,
and perceiving his problems in totality, advocates solutions through
imperatives of cooperation dictated by the sharing of a common
fa'te. Barbara Ward expressed the idea in terms of "Spaceship Earth",
a closed ecological system of nations bound to a common destiny in
space in which interdependence is the key to survival. Rev. Theodore
M. Hesburgh, President of Notre Dame University, told Britain's
Ditchley Park conference in September 1974 that interdependence is
an idea whose time has come.4 U.N. Secretary General Kurt Wald-
heim, addressing the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations on
April 23, 1975, reinforced this view when he said: "Only through the
interdependence of all nations can the independence of each nation
be assured." Secretary of State Kissinger perceives interdependence
as a unique conceptualization of an emerging international system.5
4 Hesburgh, Theodore M., C.S.C. The problems and opportunities on a very interdependent planet.
Ditchley Foundation Lecture, Sept. 20, 1974. In, Congressional Record, May 8, 1975: S. 7730-S. 7736. (Daily
* Text insertedin, Congressional Record, May 12,1975: 87841 (Daily edition). The growing awareness of the
imperatives of interdependence has been recently manifested in international conferences of Western leaders.
In an address to a ministerial meeting of the International Energy Agency in Paris on May 27, 1975, Secretary
of State Kissinger quoted Goethe as saying that "the web of this world is woven of necessity and change."
And he added: "We stand at a point where those strands intertwine. We must not regard necessity as capri-
cious nor leave change to chance. Necessity impels us to where we are but summons us to choose where we go.
Our interdependence will make us thrive together or decline together. We can drift, or we can decide. We have
no excuse for failure." (The New York Times, May 29, 1975, p. 19.)


In practical terms interdependence requires renewed emphasis on
functional diplomacy, a type of conduct in international relations that
places a high premium on international cooperation. The assumption
of its advocates is that through the cooperative interaction of nations,
international relations will become infused with a moderating and har-
monizing spirit. Solutions to common problems can issue from this
new spirit, it is argued; peace and security for all may be achieved. The
binding force of this new functionalism, unlike at other times, is the
common desire to survive. Mankind has no other choice, it is said;
interdependence offers a route for common survival.
The test of interdependence, if that is indeed the emerging pattern of
international relations in the mid-1970s, would seem to lie in the extent
to which the great and lesser nations of the world can perceive the full
implications of the "Spaceship Earth" concept and accordingly modify
their national interests to accommodate the needs of the whole. Inter-
dependence would seem to ask a great deal of peoples and nation-
states, requiring a cosmic overview of world affairs and a kind of con-
duct in foreign affairs and perception of national interests that tran-
scends generations, even centuries, of deeply engrained habits and
traditions. As Hesburgh put it, "Interdependence is a thought and
theme that runs counter to many of our shibboleths of the past;
nationalism, ethnocentrism, rugged individualism, empire, cold war,
East and West with never the twain meeting, declarations of inde-
pendence." 6 Yet, the alternative to this option may be far less appealing
and more difficult to accept than what at first may seem apparent.
Thus, if interdependence is indeed the essence of the current chang-
ing cycle of international relations as some observers claim, then the
present stage of detente in Soviet-American relations may well be a
supreme test in microcosm of its viability. For at this juncture there
seems little doubt that detente has had a profound effect on the modali-
ties of Soviet-American relations: it has created an environment of
measured tolerance and a mutually acceptable form of coexistence to a
degree seemingly never before achieved; it has permitted the art of
diplomacy, a recognized mark of progress in civilization, to function as
seldom before in search of a more genuine harmony of interests. Yet,
detente carries no built-in guarantee of an enduring peace because the
essential differences, touching the vital political, power, and ideological
interests of both nations, remain intact. In the final analysis, therefore,
judgments on the value and viability of detente would seem to derive
from an appraisal that balances goals and expectations realistically
with the hard realities of limited achievements, mutual interests, and
enduring differences.

The above survey and analysis of Soviet-American relations suggest
a great disparity in the modalities and realities of relations during the
years 1971 and 1975. In retrospect, 1971 appeared to be a time of
transition from Cold War to detente. Relations were tense; progress
towards easing tensions was slow; expectations for improvement were
* Hesburgh, op cit., p. S7727.


modest. In contrast, relations in 1975 seem to have improved re-
markably. Though expectations of detente may now have diminished
somewhat from the heightened euphoria of 1974, still its forward
momentum has not completely stalled. Nevertheless, detente appears
to have reached something of a plateau, a decisive point perhaps where
only time can tell whether its promise can become a reality.
Because 1971 and 1975 contrast so markedly, this analysis of Soviet
political uses of space is placed within the context of this dual time-
frame-at least the first seven months of each year. The resulting
examination of core-samples within this timeframe may reveal certain
persisting and differing characteristics of Soviet political behavior
regarding space activities within contrasting environments of tension
and detente.

1. Vietnam: Catalyst of Tension
Vietnam catalyzed increased tension in Soviet-American relations.
Reduction of American troop involvement from 530,000 at the be-
ginning of 1969 to less than 140,000 by the end of 1971 was somewhat
compensated by escalation of the air war in Vietnam, Laos, and Cam-
bodia beginning early in 1971 and continuing through the months
under review. The Soviets were silent on troop reductions, but they
vigorously denounced intensified American bombings and the expan-
sion of the war into Laos and Cambodia.
The Soviet media and official pronouncements took on much of the
flavor and coloration of the Cold War during this period. A Tass
pronouncement of February 3 (published against the background of
the successful Apollo 14 launching on January 31), "strongly" de-
nounced "the armed intrusion of the United States and Saigon puppets
into Laos," charging that "the United States ruling circles" were
"completely responsible for aggravation of the situation in Laos and
entire Indochina." According to the Soviets, the "spreading of the
flames of war to the territory of Laos by the United States and its
puppets is an act of aggression, a new open violation of the United
Nations Charter, gross flouting of the principles of the international
law." Accusing the United States of further violations of the Geneva
agreements, the Soviet announcement stated that "these actions show
again how brazenly the U.S. administration flouts sovereignty, and
independence of other states, how easily it breaks the United States
commitments under international treaties and agreements * *." 7
On February 10, Viktor Mayevskiy charged in Pravda that the
invasion of Laos "by U.S. military and Saigon puppets" was a "shame-
less trampling under foot of international law." 8 A Red Star editorial
on the 7th of February (corresponding in time roughly with the Moon-
walk by the Apollo 14 astronauts), accused the U.S. "imperialists" of
"striving for the umpteenth time to change the situation in that area
to their advantage" and as a consequence were fanning "the con-
flagration of the criminal and dirty war." Reiterating other charges
of treaty violations and violations of international law, the editorial
stated, "It is obvious that international law and agreements, even
7 Moscow, Tass International Service, February 3, 1971. By and large the translated material used in this
chapter is taken from the Daily Reports for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe published by the Foreign
Broadcast Information Serivce.
8 Moscow, Tass International Service, Feb. 10, 1971.


logical conclusions, do not play a determining role in Washington's
current policy." "Forces which follow the law of the jungle and the
law of the big stick in their actions in the international arena," Red
Star declared, "are coming more and more to the surface in the U.S.
capital." The editorial concluded: "The Soviet people and all other
peaceloving peoples brand with shame the bloody crimes of U.S.
aggressors. The conscience and logic of all mankind demand an end
to the imperialist banditry in Indochina."'
When civil disturbances erupted in Washington in the spring of
1971 as a result of expanding U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia-a
time coinciding with the launching of Salyut on April 19 and Soyuz 10
on April 23, the Soviets appeared to quicken and sharpen their
political attacks on the United States. A report in Pravda on May 5
by Boris Strelnikov entitled, "A Bloody Battle in the U.S. Capital,"
recounted the events of "the day of the mass disobedience" in Wash-
ington.10 A few days later V. Matveyev reviewed in Izvestiya the three
weeks of antiwar demonstrations in which "the U.S. military and
police apparatus have been in a state of full mobilization" and were
"waging military operations" against college and university students,
housewives, Negroes, and government employees. "The initiators of
the 'dirty war' against the peace-loving Vietnamese people," he wrote,
"had to be convinced both of the futility of their estimates for the
desired outcome of the intervention in Vietnam and of the futility of
their hopes of 'appeasing' Americans in the face of the Pentagon's
bloody adventure." According to Matveyev, the mass anti-war move-
ment erupted because American intervention in Southeast Asia had
reached a "dead end." Protests against the war were "the result of
its people's courageous struggle against the aggressors." 11
Other officially sponsored media coverage gave renewed emphasis
to alleged American atrocities in Vietnam and re-iterated other
familiar themes in their vigorous protests against U.S. involvement
in Vietnam. Thus expansion of the war in Southeast Asia revived
the Cold War spirit in Moscow and generated renewed Soviet political
attacks on the United States. Within this general milieu of aggravated
tension, the Soviet Union structured its political response to both
its space activities and those of the United States.
2. Downgrading American Space Effort
a. Conflicting appraisals of Apollo 14 mission.-The Apollo 14
mission (January 31-February 9, 1971) was barely over when
American space scientists and engineers began to describe it as a turn-
ing point in lunar exploration: a period of testing and reconnaissance
had now ended, it was said, and a wide-ranging and methodical cam-
paign of discovery had begun.12 No such elevated appraisal came from
Moscow; the emphasis there was on downgrading the Apollo 14
mission and upgrading by comparison the value of the Soviet auto-
matic lunar explorer, Lunokhod 1, then probing the lunar surface.
Thus, the Soviets reverted to one of their traditional themes in exploit-
ing space exploration for political purposes; namely, to denigrate
the American space effort.
0 End the U.S. Aggression in Indochina. Red Star, Moscow, Feb. 7, 1971: 1A (Editorial).
10 Pravda, Moscow, May 5, 1971: 5.
11 Matveyev, V. Do Not Throw Your Conscience Behind Bars. Izvestiya, Moscow, May 11, 1971:2.
2 The New York Times, Feb. 14, 1971: E6.


b. Limited Soviet media coverage of Apollo 14.-In contrast to the
Apollo 11, 12 and 13 missions, Apollo 14 received minimal coverage
in the Soviet news media. (Even coverage of those earlier missions
was small in comparison with that given in other countries.) In the
evening of February 5 Soviet television viewers got only a brief two-
minute look at astronauts Commander Edgar D. Mitchell and Captain
Alan B. Shepard Jr. as they walked on the Moon. This report was
juxtaposed with a six-minute condemnation of the "American and
South Vietnamese puppet invasion" of Laos, complete with films
showing anti-war protest demonstrations in the United States and
reported shots of the invasion force in action. As the commentator
talked about the Laotian invasion, what appeared to be old news-reel
footage of American paratroops floating through the air was shown,
suggesting to viewers that paratroops were jumping into Laos. Only
the barest facts, with straight forward commentary, were given in
the Apollo 14 coverage. Moreover, the Soviets did not inform the
Russian people about the mission until the actual launching. Some
advance press notice, though insignificant in size, had usually been
given on previous missions.1 Publicity in the press was also severely
restricted to a few brief articles.14
In an apparent effort to counteract the impact of Apollo 14, the
Soviets gave expanded media coverage to Lunokhod 1. In fact during
the three-month period January through March 1971, Lunokhod 1
was given high visibility treatment in the Soviet media. In the evening
of February 5, Tass provided more space to Lunokhod 1, then in its
80th day of exploring the lunar surface, than to the Apollo astronauts'
walk on the Moon. In general, such media coverage stressed the greater
scientific value of Soviet unmanned lunar flights such as Luna 16
and tended to downgrade that of Apollo 14. 5
Thus at the outset the impact of the Apollo 14 mission on Soviet
citizens was effectively minimized and the continuing achievements
of Lunokhod 1 maximized. Unfavorable comparisons in their minds
between Soviet and American lunar accomplishments, objectively
so one-sided in the American favor, could, therefore, be avoided.16
c. Shortcomings of Apollo; greater value of Lunokhod.-To insure that
the Soviet people perceived "correctly" the comparative value of the
Lunokhod mission over that of Apollo 14, the Soviet media took great
pains-the American press spoke of an "obvious attempt"-to em-
phasize what it judged to be the shortcomings of the Apollo manned
spacecraft approach as compared with that of the successful instru-
mented Lunokhod.'7 Soviet reports on the Apollo 14 mission, therefore,
tended to accent its negative aspects.
13 Gwertzman, Bernard. Soviet 'muffles' Apollo 14's feat. The New York Times, Feb. 6,1971:14. Only a
brief factual statement was given by Tass on the lift-off and landing on the Moon. (Moscow, Tass Interni-
tional Service, Jan. 31, 1971, Feb. 1, and Feb. 5, 1971.) Apparently, coverage in Eastern Europe was uneven.
The Bulgarians reported the spaceflight but in the context of comparing it with Lunokhod 1 and then citing
the advantages of the Soviet craft. (Sofia, Domestic Service, Feb. 5, 1971.) The Czechs carried one seemingly
objective and sympathetic report describing the activities of the astronauts on the Moon. It concluded:
"Although a few unplanned problems arose during the flight-problems which after all can always arise
during such complex projects-the Apollo 14 flight was probably the most successful of the flights of this kind
thus far." (The nine-day flight had ended. Zemedelske Noviny, Prague, Feb. 10, 1971:2.) Polish television
provided hundreds of thousands of viewers in Warsaw with live coverage on Feb. 5 of the first portion of the
Moon walk. (The New York Times, Feb. 6, 1971:14.)
14 The New York Times, Feb. 10, 1971: 24.
15 The New York Times, Feb. 10, 1971:14.
16 Bernard Gwertzman, Moscow correspondent of The New York Times, reported that the "skimpy cov-
erage" of the Apollo 14 mission "has been disappointing" to the Russians since many have developed some
expertise on space matters through the years. However, Soviet citizens with American friends seemed aware
of the mission and sought information on whether the lunar module had successfully landed. When told that
it had, Gwertzman reported, the usual reaction was the Russian word, "molotsy," roughtly meaning,
"Good going, boys." (The New York Times, Feb. 7, 1971:14.)
17 The New York Times, Feb. 10, 1971:24.


Pravda's Washington correspondent Boris Strelnikov stressed in a
report broadcast to the Soviet people the fatigue experienced by the
astronauts. Some American scientific observers, he also noted, did not
conceal their disappointment that the astronauts failed in carrying
out one of the basic tasks of the program; namely, to climb the ridge
of Cone Crater and take specimens. Strelnikov did not blame them:
they did "all that was humanly possible. Alas, lunar conditions proved
poorly suited to the activity of man".'
At the outset Izvestiya was sharply critical of Apollo 14, claiming that
a cane presented to Astronaut Shepard before lift-off had become
"symbolic" of the whole mission. Izvestiya correspondent Melor Stursa
reported from New York: "The difficulties aboard the Apollo 14
spacecraft, coming just after the Apollo 13 failure, could have an effect
on the U.S. space program, local observers feel. Even without this, the
program is under heavy fire from critics." Stursa went on to discuss
Apollo's docking difficulties. Moscow observers detected a "distinct
negative tone" in the Stursa report.19
In general, the Soviet press seemed anxious to capitalize on the
success of unmanned probes such as the Lunokhod 1 Moon rover and
to cast. doubt on the necessity of manned spaceflights like Apollo. The
cost factor was a special point of emphasis. The Chief Designer hailed
the perfect performance of Lunokhod 1-not one of its numerous
instruments, mechanisms and assemblies had broken down, he said-
and comparing it with Apollo 14 gave this critical appraisal: "These
flights, without doubt, will go down in the history of space exploration-
But huge sums have been spent on the preparation of such expeditions,.
whereas most of the tasks facing them could be solved by
automatons." 20
But more important, in the Soviet view, Apollo exposed man un-
necessarily to great personal danger which was not the case with
instrumented spacecraft. Boris Yegorov, a cosmonaut and physician
who flew with Komarov in October 1964, asserted that the Apollo
expeditions were "extremely complex and very dangerous." He cited
the unpredictability of solar eruptions and the inability of return once
into or beyond the atmosphere and the Earth's gravitational field.
"Thus the danger of radiation infection exists," he said, adding, "In
our opinion this is a risk and an unwarranted one." He also emphasized
the danger that man, once on the Moon, could not be rescued if
trouble occurred. While Yegorov did not foreclose the option of
manned spaceflight, still he strongly emphasized the value of the
Soviet use of instrumented and Earth orbital flights.21

1s Moscow Domestic Service, Feb. 8, 1971,
19 The Washington Post, Feb. 2, 1971: A6,
20 Moscow, Tass International Service, Feb. 6, 1971.
21 An interview over Budapest radio, Budapest Domestic Service, April 6. 1971. Similar themes were
emphasized in the Czechoslovak press. A dispatch from Moscow by A. Ban was entitled: "From the pages
of the Soviet press: An Unequivocal Victory of the Ideas of Soviet Science: The American Astronauts
Have Returned Safe and Sound-But It was a Close Shave; Lunokhod 1 Successfully Continues to Inves-
tigate the Moon: Automatic Devices a Great Achievement." Ban reiterated the argument of Soviet scien-
tists that "the Soviet automatic space laboratories, and particularly Lunokhod 1 and Venera 7, have demon-
strated that the automatic devices presently created by man achieve more than man does under conditions
which are unsuitable for him and dangerous to his life." Ban cited Soviet press coverage of the Apollo 14
mission, noting that it came close to ending in technical failure "and might have exacted human lives."
Ban asked: "Well, is it worth while to risk human life,-that unique, unrepeatable and irreplaceable thing
in nature-when automatic devices can now do far more than man, when they work more precisely, are
practically unlimited regarding the extent of research and, in addition, are also durable? From the scientific
point of view the reply is clear, and this is now being confirmed by an increasing number of American sci-
entists as well. Obviously, the propaganda interests under capitalism are stronger than the scientists'
views." In comparing Apollo and Lunokhod, Ban concludes: "If one compares the results of the Soviet
automatic station with what the American astronauts have achieved, one sees unequivocal proof of the
victory of the ideas of Soviet science in space research." (Pravda, Bratislava, Feb. 10, 1971: 5A.)


On the occasion of the Apollo 14 flight and in subsequent weeks the
Soviet people were assured that the chosen way of Luna and Lunokhod
was superior to that of Apollo. Soviet scientists gave published
testimony to this fact, as in the case of Professor B. Rodionov who
concluded a technical analysis of the Lunokhod mission: "The 6
months of Lunokhod's active existence and the total success of its
mission are an outstanding achievement of Soviet science and tech-
nology. It testifies that self-propelled automatic apparatuses have a
great future in researching the planets of the solar system." 2
d. American militarization of space: A missing theme-Apparently
absent from the arsenal of Soviet political themes designed to down-
grade the American space effort is the charge, consistently made in
the past, that the United States uses space for military purposes
while their programs are used only for peaceful purposes. Perhaps the
omission can be explained by the progress in military space technology
apparent to observers following openly publicized American space
activities. Reasoning by analogy effectively disarms the Soviet propa-
ganda thrust of innocence in adapting space technology to military
Soviet military space programs are discussed in Chapter Six of
Volume I of this study. Suffice it to say here that the Soviets have
extensive military space programs. As in the case of the United States
it is estimated that perhaps three-fifths of Soviet spaceflights have a
military emphasis. While secrecy shrouds information on the allocation
of space funds for civilian programs, still, as Dr. Charles Sheldon
II, has written, ... a very considerable number of their flights and
research give telltale indications of serving military purposes." 2
(NASA allocates about two-thirds of U.S. space funds to expensive,
ambitious, and developmental-oriented civilian programs.) 24 It is
known, for example, that three single inspector/destructor satellites
were flown in 1971, affirming the suspicion that the Soviets have
created a capability to inspect and destroy satellites.2" Also the flight
of the Soviet orbital space station Salyut 1 in 1971 aroused concern
for its military applications. As The New York Times said in an edi-
torial, correlating the political implications of the U-2 with Salyut,
. . uneasiness must grow as political leaders in many countries
contemplate the potential military uses of large semipermanent
manned space stations such as Salyut." 26 Finally, the inclusion of
verification procedures in the SALT I agreement of May 1972 calling
for "national technical means" meant an official and public Soviet
admission in an international agreement of the use of so-called "spy
satellites." 27
22 Rodionov, B. A laboratory on wheels. Pravda, Moscow, May 25, 1971: 3. Rodionov concluded a Pravda
article of April 19, 1971 entitled, "An automatic topographer at work": "The Lunokhod-1 points to a new
direction-the creation of automatic, remote control apparatuses for terrestrial topographic surveys. The
time will come when such apparatuses will become a reality. Achievements in space will find applications
on earth." (Pravda, Moscow, April 19, 1971: 4)
23 Sheldon, Charles S. II. United States and Soviet progress in space: summary data through 1974 and a
forward look. Washington, Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Jan. 13, 1975, p. 38. (Mul-
tilith: 75-18 SP.)
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid., p. 44. For further commentary on the development of the Soviet anti-satellite system, see
George C. Wilson. Soviet space shots indicate progress toward satellite interceptor system. The Washington
Post, April 3, 1971: Al.
26 Soviet space station. (Editorial) The New York Times, June 9, 1971: 42. Sheldon designates Salyut 1
and Salyut 4, launched Dec. 26, 1974, as being in the civilian program; the military program to date has
included Salyut 2 and Salyut 3, launched June 24, 1974. (Sheldon, op. cit., p. 11.)
7 Article XII, Paragraph 1 of the Treaty on ABM's states: "For the purpose of providing assurance of
compliance with the provisions of this treaty, each party shall use national technical means of verification
at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law." Paragraph
2 states: "Each party undertakes not to interfere with national technical means of verification of the other
party operating in accordance with Paragraph 1 of this article." Identical assurances are given in Article V,
Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Interim Agreement on ICBM's. (Texts in, The New York Times, May 27, 1972: 8.)


In the light of such readily perceived developments in military
space technology, therefore, it wouldi have had little effect (if it ever
did) for the Soviets to continue accusing the United States of "mili-
tarizing space" while covering their own programs with a cloak of
S. Magnifying Soviet Space Achiercmentu s
a. Underlyi g purpose.-In counterpoint to tile political thrult of
downgrading American space efforts, the Soviets nmagnified their
own space achievements, often in disproportion to reality. Thi,
underlying purpose was to maintain rand increase the prestige of
the Soviet Union in the eyes of tIle world."8
Prestige, though an elusive political concept, is nevertheles an
important powe; factor in international relations. It is lirett!y
correlated with the influence that a state can execcise withinj an inter-
national political system. In brief, prestige is a reputation for power,
and power defines the parameters of pressure and determnines the
measure of success or failure in seeking political goals.
Conscious of the prestige value of space exploration, the Soviets
have used it since the beginning of the Space Age to magnify tihe
image and reality of Soviet power. Accordingly, they stressed those
characteristics of their space activities that were calculated to achieve
this purpose; namely, perfectability in their own programs, dedication
to peace and the general welfare of mankind, denial (at least overtly)
of being in a space race with the United States, and a perception of
future plans that reflected a smoohl-runming -pace prog:a ni con-
ceived within a logical progression of building upon successive
b. Stress on perfectability.-Perfectability is an achieved goal if
Soviet statements on their space program are to be believed. Orderly,
well-planned, scientifically and technologically sound, no risk to
human life, in short, perfection-these are the characteristics con-
veyed. Very seldom is error admitted, except perhaps when a space
accident occurs, as in the case of Sovuz 11, that cannot be concealed
from the monitors and trackers in the West.
Secrecy shrouds the Soviet space program.30 Preflight statements
are not a Soviet practice, and those made in the course of a flight con-
tain only the barest details. Outright failures, serious or minor short-
2 The matter of prestige was discussed at length by the writer in the previous studies on the Soviet space
programs. See, U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. Soviet space pro-
grams, 1962-65; goals and purposes, achievements, plans, and international implications. 89th Congress,
2d session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966, chapter II, p. 32-42. (Hereafter cited as. Senate Space
Committee, Soviet space programs, 1962-1965.) See also, U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Aeronautical
and Space Sciences. Soviet space programs, 1966-70: goals and purposes, organization, resources. facilities
and hardware, manned and unmanned flight programs, bioastronautics, civil and military applica ions,
projections of future plans, attitudes toward international cooperation and space law. 92d Coi ress. Is'
session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971, chapter I, p. 23-26. (Hereafter cited as, Senate Space
Committee, Soviet space programs, 1966-70.)
29 Walter Sullivan, science writer for The New Y',)r Timex., interpreted the death of the three cosmonauts
in Soyuz 11 in the context of prestige. He wrote: "The Soyuz-11 tragedy is also a blow to the Soviet hopes of
recouping some of the national prestige lost to the American Apollo missions. However, the ussians have
two unmanned space probes en route to Mars and their five-ton weight suggests that they are probably
carrying a system for landing on that planet late this year. if there is television equipment on board, this
could provide mankind with the first view from the surface of another planet." (Sullivan. Walter. Tragedy:
when the hatch was opened, the men were dead. The New York Times, July 4, 19,71: E6.)
30 The extent to which secrecy envelops the Soviet space program is evident by the fact that little is kn owa
about its organizational pattern; with few exceptions the names of leading space officials are kept eret;
the exact name of the space organization is unknown; and the number of people emplo. ed in space wor,
has never been disclosed (it is estimated to be close to 600.000). (Sheldon, op. cit., p. 20 and 39.) O'ne of the
most protected secrets is the identity of the Chief Designer of Spaceships. From indirect evidence he was
believed to be Mikhail K. Yangel, a 59-year old engineer who is a member of the Academy of Sciences.
Yangel succeeded Sergei P. Korolev, who was publicly identified as Chief Designer only at the time of his
death in January 1966. (Shabad, Theodore. New Soviet manned orbital flight seen. The New York Ti
March 15, 1971: 17.)


comings can thus be concealed. Explanation, and thus exposure, can
be avoided. The usual claim that all mission objectives have been
accompllished may, therefore, not be true, but in the absence of a pre-
flight statement that ordinarily would cite those objectives and
provide criteria for measurement, it would be difficult to disprove the
Claims of perfection in Soviet space activities was a dominant theme
in the period under review, even in instances where shortcomings were
evident. On April 23, 1971, Soyuz 10 was launched with a three-man
crew to rendezvous and dock with Salyut 1.32
The flight was, however, terminated after 5.5 hours. Upon landing
at Karaganda and being welcomed by the First Secretary of the
Karaganda Obkom, Akulintsev, Col. Vladimir Shatalov, commander
of the flight, said in a statement: "The flight was not a lengthy one,"
but in terms of the amount of work and magnitude of the tasks to be
performed, "the flight was a big, complex and intense flight with great
tasks. Now it can be said that the Soviet Union's research in the field
of opening up space is continuing and we are continuing to travel along
the road toward the creation of orbital research stations." Shatalov
concluded: "We, the crew, are satisfied with the work. We are fully,
satisfied with all that we were given to do and with the results we,
strictly speaking, brought back to earth. .. 3
At a press conference, Shatalov described the docking procedures,
remarking that "All apparatus and instruments functioned nor-
mally." 34 Test Engineer Nikolay Rukavishnikov, another crewman,
stated: "I was amazed by the irreproachable accuracy with which the
automatic systems carried out our commands or the ground com-
mands." Flight Engineer Alexey Yeliseyev commented on the
significance of docking spacecraft with orbital stations, indicating,
like the others, no difficulties but rather citing this activity as "a
matter for the future." "Practice shows", he went on, "that the crea-
tion of such stations is one of the general directions of contemporary
cosmonautics." Other Soviet space officials praised the flight, noting
particularly its successful accomplishment and its significance in
developing orbital stations.36
American space specialists were far less enthusiastic than the Soviets
about the putative success of the Soyuz 10 mission. Some space ob-
servers were puzzled by many aspects of the mission. Particularly
baffling was why after docking the cosmonauts remained only 5.5 hours
31 Sheldon, op. cit., p. 30.
32 According to the Tass announcement, Cosmonauts Vladimir Shatalov (commander) Alexei Yeliseyev
(flight engineer), and Nikolai Rukavishnikov (test engineer) were to conduct joint experiments with orbital
station Salyut, placed on near-terrestrial orbit on April 19; make a comprehensive check of the ship's per-
fected on-board systems; test further manual and automatic control systems, the orientation and stabiliza-
tion of the ship in different flight conditions; and conduct medical-biological research to study the influence
of spaceflight factors on human organisms. (Moscow, Tass International Service, April 23, 1971.)
13 Moscow Domestic Service, April 25, 1971. The Tass announcement on the completion of the flight
recounted the declared purposes of the flight and its accomplishments, giving no hint cf problems. (Moscow,
Tass International Service, April 25, 1971.)
34 Pravda, Moscow, April 27, 1971: 1 and 3.
3a Ibid.
36 In a published interview B. V. Raushenbakh, a corresponding member of the USSR Academy of
Sciences. commented that the approach mooring and docking were successfully carried out; that the crew-
men "showed that they knew the ship's systems very well and had a fine feeling for the features of their
work"; that the flight "envisaged a limited time for the carrying out of scientific and technical research
tests", not thFe two or three orbits for some experiments but rather "the Soyuz-10 crew fuailled the same
volume of work in the time of one orbit"; and finally that "the crew succeeded in completely fulfilling the
planned research and testing of the 'station-ship' system." (Red Star, Moscow, April 28, 1971:1)
Cosmonaut Maj. Gen. A. A. Nikolayev observed: "A complex of research on verifying the efficiency of
the improved s stems for joint search, remote approach, mooring, docking, and undocking of the ship and
the automatic station was carried out during the course of this experiment. Together with this, a great
volume of research and experimental work was fulfilled." (Red Star, Moscow, April 28, 1971:3.)

and then from all indications did not attempt to board Salyut. It
seemed to them an extravagance to launch three men into orbit for
such a short duration. The major expense is in the launching.37 To
other American space specialists, in the words of a report from Wash-
ington, "Soyuz 10 was something of a bust." The mission did not do all
that it should have, in American eyes, if this was to be a manned
workshop in earth orbit.38 Writing four years later, Sheldon attributed
the truncated mission to "some unspecified problem with hatches,"
making it impossible "to complete the intended mission of manning
the station." 39
Clearly the Soyuz 10 mission fell somewhat short of the perfection
claimed by the Soviet Union. As one contemporary report put it.
"The Soviets may have been first in space with a space station, Salyut.
But the mission was, to date at least, not as impressive technically as
Moscow led the world to believe." 40
Generally a note of perfection and triumphalism permeates Soviet
commentaries on space. Never is there an admission of error in the
means and purposes of the program. Tass said of Lunokhod 1: "Fault-
lessly functioning for five months are all the systems of the lunar
machine and the numerous scientific instruments."41
Academician M. V. Keldysh, head of the Soviet Academy of Science,
extolled the virtues of Lunokhod along with other automatons as
demonstrating "high operational qualities."42
Even in times of the ultimate space tragedy, the death of cosmo-
nauts in space accidents, the Russians were careful to preserve the
image of perfection. Few details were published on the cause of the
death of the three Soyuz 11 cosmonauts, though great tribute was
paid to their courage and all were accorded the highest honor in having
a state funeral. Academician Boris N. Petrov, the noted Soviet space
scientist, explained in Pravda that in space exploration, "An accident
can never be ruled out . when such complex machinery is being
tested and mastered." Despite this tragic ending, Petrov wrote, the
crew "implemented its program in full measure and with great success."
"The checking out of the construction and systems, equipment and in
instrumentation of the new Salyut-Soyuz space complex confirmed the
correctness of the principles on which it was based."43
Thus the image of perfection within the bounds of human reason
and the integrity of the program, its sponsors, and space personnel
remained intact.
c. For peace and mankind.-To maintain the idealistic image of both
their system and its underlying political philosophy, the Soviets have
persistently identified the purposes of their space program with the
search for world peace and achieving the good of mankind. Again the
political intent is to cast the Soviet Union in the most favorable light,
to its own people and before the world at large. Accordingly, the
military aspects of space go unmentioned. Stress is solely on the self-
less dedication of the Soviet Union to the welfare of humanity. Inter-
national space cooperation is placed within this political context.
3 Wilford. John Noble. U.S. experts puzzled. The New York Times, April 27, 1971:30.
3s Stanford, Neal. Soviet Salyut misfired? The Christian Science Monitor, April 27, 1971:1.
30 Sheldon, op. cit., p. 8.
40 The Christian Science Monitor, April 27, 1971:1.
41 Moscow. Tass International Service, April 17, 1971. Tass special correspondent Dmitri Dmitriev said of
the explorations of Lunokhod 1 on the lunar surface: "It investigated a new group of large crters and the
machine had ample opportunities to prove again and again its excellent performance." (Moscow, Tass
International Service, March 18, 1971.)
42 Moscow, Tass International Service, April 12, 1971.
' The Washington Post, July 5, 1971:A12.


Thus in a message of congratulations to the Sovuz 11 cosmonauts
on l June 11, the Soviet leaders expressed confidence that they would
"cope well" with "this responsible and complex assignment, whose
fulfillment", they said, "will be a major contribution to implementa-
tion of plans for developing space for the good of the Soviet people and
the whole of mankind." 44
And in a speech at an electoral meeting in the Kremlin Palace on
the following day, Brezhnev explained that Soviet science has pro-
duced "outstanding achievements, particularly in the sphere of ex-
ploration of the cosmos and heavenly bodies." To the "illustrious
Lunokhod which continues working on the Moon, and to our two auto-
matic stations, which continue their flight to Mars," he said, "the
world's first manned orbital station, Salyut, has been added." "Like a
hospitable hostess," Brezhnev went on, to the applause of the audience,
"it welcomed two visitors, the spaceships Soyuz 10 and Soyuz 11."
The "courageous crew," Brezhnev continued, "are working success-
fully in carrying out important research in the interests of the Soviet
people and all mankind."4"
At this time of high visibility for space exploration when Soyuz 11
was orbiting the Earth, rendezvousing and docking with Salyut, the
Soviet Union submitted to the United Nations a draft treaty calling
for international cooperation in the exploration of the Moon and bar-
ring any nation from establishing sovereignty or setting up military
bases there.46
To Pravda editors this proposal demonstrated again Soviet advocacy
of the peaceful uses of outer space and reaffirmed the Soviet "people's
noble aspiration to direct the successes in the study and utilization of
space to strengthening the cause of peace and mutual understanding
and cooperation between states." 47
Reinforcing the image of excellence and perfection, the Soviet
Union has, therefore, continued to project the idea that their space
activities have a certain nobility of purpose, the most important being
the furtherance of the cause of peace and the advancement of space
science for the good of all mankind.
d. Decompression of the space race; commitment to space leadership.-
Khrushchev had catalyzed the space race. Realizing the political
benefits to be accrued from early Soviet space gains after Sputnik, he
44 Shabad, Theodore. 3 Soviet spacemen board workshop after docking. The New York Times, June 8,
45 Pravda, Moscow, June 12, 1971.1, 2.
46 Gwertzman, Bernard. Moscow offers draft treaty for cooperation on the Moon. The New York Times,
June 9, 1971:2.
17 A remarkable achievement. Editorial. Pravda, Moscow, June 9, 1971:1. That the Soviet Union is con-
cerned about the positive aspects of space cooperation was evident in a commentary by B. Petrov. He
wrote: "Space research is assuming a more and more complex nature. Under these conditions the develop-
ment of cooperation between scientists and specialists of different countries is becoming urgent. We already
have effective examples of cooperation in this sphere. In accordance with the cooperation program of the nine
socialist countries, four satellites of the Interkosmos series and the geophysical rocket Vertikal-1 have already
been launched, and cooperation with France and certain other countries is developing. In particular, joint
research is being conducted into the magnetically linked points of the Earth-Arkhangelsk Oblast and the
Kergelen Islands in the Indian Ocean-and the opportunity has arisen for conducting experiments in laser
detection of the Moon with the aid of the French angle reflector which is installed on the Soviet Lunokhod
and so forth. Agreement has been reached on the development of cooperation between the USSR and the
United States in certain directions of space research." (Petrov, B. Looking into the future. Pravda, Moscow,
April 12, 1971:3.)
Like the Sovit Union, the United States also states that its space program is designed for the good of
mankind. Dr. Wernher von Braun, Deputy Associate Administrator for NASA, concluded a speech at
Texas Christian University in February 1971: "Today, our manned and unmanned space flight programs
are enriching mankind's knowledge of Earth and the universe, and of man himself. They are helping us to
form a more accurate concept of the Creator's physical works, and of our place in this incredible Design. We
are standing only at the beginning of a comprehension of Works that inspire increasing awe the more we
learn." (Von Braun, Wernher. Man, and space exploration. Inserted in, The Congressional Record, Feb. 24,
1971:E1114. Daily edition.)


made space exploration as much a political weapon of the Cold War as
a scientific undertaking. His objective was to humiliate the United
States as a global political leader, by degrading its preeminence in
science and technology, while magnifying that of the U.S.S.R., and
accordingly enlarging Soviet prestige. The United States took iup the
challenge. Thereafter, a spirit of rivalry permeated Soviet-American
space relations.4"
Under Brezhnev, the rhetoric of Soviet space politics has been toned
down and the overt use of space for political purposes rest rained.
American successes, especially that of the Apollo program, made Soviet
comparisons and exaggerated claims less appealing andl credible to the
world audience and accordingly less effective. Business-like, a term that
has characterized the Brezhnev leadership, has also characterized the
tone and thrust of Soviet-American space relations, reflecting bothl the
style of the leadership and the changing political milieu from Cold
War to detente.49
Despite these overt changes, an undercurlrent of rivalry persists, less
abrasive than in the past but nonetheless present and active. The
United States continues to view space exploration within the context
of a race.50
More subtle and low pressure, but still motivated partly by the
unstated political purpose of achieving space leadership, is the Soviet
approach, which in the period under review stressed Soviet "firsts" in
space rather than making outright references to a space race. In fact,
the impression conveyed is that space exploration is so extraordinary
a scientific undertaking for the benefit of all mankind that it should
not be cheapened by using the means of a "race" as its motivating
The Soyuz 10 mission of June 1971 aptly illustrates the subtlety in
the Soviet claims of space leadership. In the spring Salyut had been
hailed as the first orbital scientific station. On June 7, the Soviets
announced that Salyut had started to function as "the first piloted
orbital scientific station." "Solved for the first time," Tass said, "was
the engineering and technical task of delivering a crew to an orbiting
scientific station by a transport ship." 51 "The creation of the manned
4s For a discussion of Khrushchev and the politics of space, see, Senate Space Committee, Soviet space
programs, 1962-1965, chapter II, p. 79-146, and Senate Space Committee, Soviet space programs, 1966-1970,
chapter 1, p. 53-64.
" Ibid.
0 Examination of published materials during the period under review clearly indicates the inclination of
both American space officials and the press to perceive space exploration in a competitive contest. George
M. Low, acting Administrator of NASA, told the Senate Space Committee on March 30, 1971, that the
United States had achieved space supremacy in the 1960's by putting the first men on the Moon, as well as
with other achievements in space science, space applications and aeronautics. "But today," he said, "there
is every indication that we will lose this leadership, and once we do, we may not again have the capacity to
catch up." (The Washington Post, March 31, 1971:A8.)
Illustrative of the perception by the press is the article by Jack Waugh from the Manned Spacecraft Center
in Houston and published in The Christian Science Monitor on Feb. 12, 1971. According to Waugh, the Ameri-
can lunar program would end with Apollo 17 late in 1972. After that there were no plans for further U.S.
lunar exploration. But the Soviet program, though still unmanned, was, he said ,"just cranking up." The
Russians, he continued, would be collecting data from the Moon long after the U.S. had stopped. In the ex-
ploration of the planets, notably Venus where they had just landed a package, "the Soviets are equal to or
ahead of the U.S." He noted that every space expert was aware that the Soviet Union contined to fly more
than twice as many space missions a year than the United States. According to Low, the Russians placed 88
payloads into space, to only 34 for the U.S. in 1970. Moreover, Low noted that the SovietUnion was then
spending more on space research and development than the U.S. and was building a giant booster rocket.
Waugh quoted one "pessimistic American space scientist" at Houston, predicting that "by the time we pick
up a Moon program again, who knows when, we will have to get permission from the Russians to land. By
then they will own the place." Waugh went on to cite certain shortcomings in the Soviet program but con-
cluded with this view of the "space race": "... what worries American lunar expertz is that it may be the old
story of the tortoise and the hare. The American hare has been fast and flashy. But the Soviet, tortoise in the
long run may win the race." (Waugh, Jack. Space race: U.S. hare, Red turtle? The Christian Science Moni-
tor, Feb 12, 1971: 1,3.)
51 Moscow, Tass International Service. June 7, 1971.


orbital scientific station Salyut," observed a Pravda editorial two days
later, "is one of many major phased achievements of the Soviet
investigators of the interminable depths of the universe." And then
came a listing of Soviet "firsts": "Starting with the first artificial
Earth satellite, the first 'Moon rocket,' and man's first flight in space,
the words 'for the first time in the world' have accompanied a large
number of launchings of Soviet manned and automatic space appa-
ratuses." According to Pravda, Soviet workers and intelligentsia con-
gratulate "all those who have participated in the creation of the
world's first manned orbital scientific station on the new and important
step in the development of space technology and manned flights." 52
Finally, Brezhnev, in his election speech in the Kremlin Palace of
Congresses on June 12, exclaimed to the applauding audience that
Salyut, "the world's first manned orbital station," had joined the
"illustrious Lunokhod" then "working on the Moon" and two auto-
matic stations continuing on their flight to Mars, in carrying out the
scientific purposes of the Soviet space program.53
Thus by inference did the Soviets make their claim to space leader-
ship. The success of the Apollo program was explained away to Soviet
advantage by implying a special virtue and wisdom in the Soviet
near-Earth orbital approach to manned space exploration. The Apollo
program was then coming to an end; the decision to place a man on
the Moon was exclusively political; the United States would then
revert to the chosen Soviet path of creating near-Earth manned
orbital stations-so went the Soviet line of reasoning. Success in
launching Salyut, a major step in a long-term program of near-Earth
manned orbital missions, was a universally recognized Soviet "first"
and thus by inference suggested a rightful Soviet claim to having
chosen a path that could lead ultimately to space leadership.
Space race, therefore, may have been dropped from the Soviet
lexicon of space politics, but the near two decades of rivalry for space
leadership has by no means ended.54
e. Perception of future plans.-The goal of space leadership is implied
in Soviet perceptions of future plans: it is part of the larger political
effort to magnify Soviet achievements in space and project a positive
national image.
52 A remarkable achievement. Editorial. Pravda, Moscow, June 9, 1971:1.
63 Pravda, Moscow, June 12, 1971: 1,2. In speaking of the various stages in space exploration, Cosmonaut
Nikolayev remarked on the occasion of the Soyuz 10 mission: "We are rightly proud that by the efforts of
Soviet science and technology and by the efforts of our scientists, designers, engineers, technicians and work-
ers, Soviet people were the first in the world to overcome the majority of these stages." (Red Star, Moscow,
April 28, 1971:3.)
s4 Cosmonaut Yegorov suggested many of these ideas in an interview over Budapest radio in which he
compared the Soviet and American approach to space exploration. Yegorov elaborated on the Soviet use of
Earth orbital flights and long-distance automatic apparatus, and on the dangers of Lunar explorations, such
as by Apollo manned spacecraft. "For the tine being," he said, "American space exploration is following a
different road [from that of the Soviet]. NASA has spent all the money it has for the Apollo program which
at the time was an exclusively political decision. They wanted to attain an appropriate political effect by the
first manned landing on the moon. This has been achieved and today they do not want to further develop
the Apollo program, but they too are returning to the earth orbiting program." Yegorov noted that the Soviet
Union still had plans for sending men to the Moon. Preparations were in progress, he said, but this was "a
question of the future." Then he raised the question: "Is it possible that the United States was competing in
sending a man to the moon only because they did not know the plans and aims of Soviet space explorations?"
Americans, he continued, "would have been competing even in any case, but if I wanted to express myself
rather brutally, I would say 'advertisement'" "As you will soon see, they will abandon the moon" program.
He predicted that the United States "will send up one or two more Apollos and then will switch to earth
orbiting flights and to launching space stations orbiting the earth. The first U.S. space station, as far as I
know," he concluded, "is planned to be established for 1972." (Budapest Domestic Service, April 6, 1971.)
It is significant to note that the Soviets launched Salyut, their first orbital station, on April l9, thirteen days
after the interview, and on April 23 launched Soyuz 10 to undertake a rendezvous and docking experiment
with Salyut. As American space specialists indicated, the Soviets were far ahead of the U.S. in launching
scientific orbital stations.


Serious Soviet assessments of future plans in space were usually
made independent from what the United States might have been
doing and generally suggested that they were geared uniquely to
Soviet resources and capabilities, expectations, goals and purposes.
Hence, their perception of future plans portrayed the image of a
program well conceived, carefully planned, logically developed, per-
fectly executed, and steadily pursued. These characteristics are evident
in statements made in the past and during the period under review, as
in the case of the one by Cosmonaut Nikolayev who remarked on the
occasion of the Soyuz 10 mission that the development of the Soviet
space program "was not done suddenly, not in the chaos of events,
but in a planned and consistent fashion: each preceding step prepared
the subsequent step and was a stepping-stone toward the achievement
of a new stage of man's path not only toward the investigation but
also the utilization of space." 55
That Soviet attention would continue to be focused on launching
deep space probes with automatic devices and creating Earth orbital
space stations was evident in the material examined. They were indeed
common threads running through much of the commentary during
January-July 1971. Academician Petrov sketched out the general lines
of Soviet future space activity in a commentary on Cosmonautics
Day. Automatic devices, he said, "are now assigned the leading role
in the study of space, the Moon and the other heavenly bodies of the
solar system." According to Petrov, they were paving the way "for
people in space as in probably no other sphere of human activities."
With their potential growing every year, such automatic devices "are
the true scouts of the universe." And for the next few years "they will
remain in practice the only tool for direct study of distant space and
planets." Though automatic devices were less costly than manned
flights, Petrov still did not rule out the latter: they "have a worthy
place in the Soviet space program." Citing the value of manned
flights, he observed that at the present stage of the Soviet space pro-
gram, "space in the vicinity of Earth, where manned flights are es-
pecially effective, is the principal arena for such flights." Petrov
termed the first epoch of the Space Age one of breakthrough for man
into space; the second, he said, might be called "the era of orbital sta-
tions and systematic research work by man in space laboratories, a
decade of the extensive use of automatic stations." He predicted that
the next decade would doubtless bring about the "further improve-
ment of automatic scouts of the universe." 56
On the same occasion Cosmonaut Beregovoy gave a more colorful
and appealing view of future orbital stations. On the future course of
Soviet space activities he said:
Cosmonautics will obviously develop into two directions-manned orbital
stations and automatic craft for investigating deep space. Let us daydream a
little. In the next decade I believe that permanent orbital stations and large-scale
space houses beyond the limits of our planet will become commonplace. Scientists
and specialists will work onboard them. Ferry craft will cruise between the
stations and the Earth, replacing the crews regularly. Such stations will prove
very valuable both for scientific research and for people's practical activity.57
55 Nikolayev, A. A. Maj. Gen. A new step in space. Red Star, Moscow, April 28,1971:3.
'a Petrov, Academician B. Looking into the future. Pravda, Moscow, April 12, 1971:3. (Condensed in Cur-
rent Digest of the Soviet Press, May 11, 1971, v. 23, no. 15:45.)
6i Trud, Moscow, April 21, 1971:3.


Deep space probes with automatic devices, manned space stations
operating in near-Earth orbit, and even manned lunar landings were
thus vital elements in future Soviet space plans.58
What seems significant in these projections, besides suggesting
the technical aspects of spaceflight, is the image they portray to their
reading and listening audience. It is a self-affirming image, conveying
the notion that what is being undertaken in space is intelligently
conceived and prudently executed-and, it might be added from the
viewpoint of an outside observer, politically effective, for it suggests
to the Soviet and space interested world audience the positive virtues of
the Soviet space program.
4. Identifying Space Achievements with CPSU and Soviet Government
a. CPSU and Soviet Government as source of space success.-Another
use of space for political purposes is the calculated Soviet habit of
identifying their space achievements with the CPSU and the Soviet
Government: the Communist Party, and by inference the Soviet
Government are eulogized as the primary source of success in space.
The rituals of Soviet space activities, notably in cases of manned
spaceflight, call for a dramatic and spectacular setting from lift-off
to the final reception of cosmonauts by the Soviet leaders in the
Kremlin Palace of Congresses. Vigorous efforts are made to communi-
cate the event to the Soviet people as it unfolds. The media are saturated
with space oriented material. Extensive commentaries by space
scientists, engineers, cosmonauts, and popular science writers are
carried through media channels to the people. Every effort seems to
be made to let the people know just what is being done, why it is
being done, and who is doing it-but most important, who is re-
sponsible for bringing to the Soviet people glory and renown through
success in space. Responsibility rests, of course, with the CPSU and
the Soviet Government; their institutional value is identified with the
glory and success in space; they are shown to be the font of all benef-
icence for the Soviet people, and by implication, also for mankind.
In a political sense the primary source of energy for Soviet space
activity is the Directives of the Five Year Plan-for the period under
review it is the Directives of the 24th Congress of the CPSU. This
document gives formal and official sanction to what is to be done;
it becomes the point of reference for space scientists, cosmonauts,
and political leaders; it is the nexus, connecting space activity with
space politics.50

51 Cosmonaut Yegorov said of Soviet manned lunar landing plans: "Of course there have, and there
are still such ideas. We do think of this as well and preparations are in progress, too. But this is a question
of the future." (Budapest Domestic Service, April 6, 1971.)
Sheldon writes in 1975' "For the future, the Russians speak confidently of building a large and permanent
orbital station for many men, for the purpose both of conducting Earth applications work and scientific
observation of the stars, and additionally serving as an orbital assembly, checkout, and launch facility to
send manned expeditions to the Moon and planets. Keldysh, President of the Soviet Academy of Sciences,
predicted in October 1969 that such a station might be ten years away but would more likely be available
in five years. It may be that the long awaited new large launch vehicle will find use in lifting major com-
ponents for such a station. Using this vehicle, the U.S.S.R. could put up its equivalent of the U.S. Skylab
any time from 1975 on." (Sheldon, op. cit., p. 76.) Regarding exploration of the Moon, Sheldon writes:
". . a Soviet manned lunar landing does not seem imminent, but is still expected as part of Soviet long
range plans. Going to the Moon with men has been talked about so long and prepared for at such expense
by the Russians that one must assume they will proceed as soon as they solve their present problems of
unreliability of hardware." (Ibid., p. 78.)
59 The Directive on space published by the 24th Congress for the Five-Year Plan covering the period
1971-1975 states: "To ensure in the new five-year period. .. The conduct of scientific work in outer space
for the purpose of the [further] development of long-range telephone and telegraph communications, tele-
vision, meteorological forecasting and the study of natural resources, geographical research and the accom-
plishment of other national-economic tasks with the aid of satellites and automatic and piloted apparatus,
and also the continuation of basic research on the Moon and the planets of the solar system:. . ." (Pravda
and Izvestiya, April 11, 1971:1, Current Digest of the Soviet press, June 1, 1971, v. 23, no.18:12.)


On the occasion of the Soyuz 11 mission Pravda reviewed the direc-
tive of the 24th Congress that mapped out what it termed a broad
program of scientific work in space. "Soviet scientists, engineers,
and technicians, workers, and our famous cosmonauts," the editorial
said, "are persistently and purposefully implementing it." 'o
At the conclusion of the mission Brezhnev heaped praise on Soviet
industry, technology, and science for making a great contribution
"toward fulfilling the majestic program" set down by the 24th
b. High visibility of political leaders in linkage with space.-Soviet
political leaders are featured prominently in these efforts to maximize
party linkage with space. At crucial points of high visibility, from
pre-lift-off to in-space flight, return, and the iKremlin reception, the
presence of the Soviet leadership is made manifest. Part of the ritual
in manned spaceflight missions is the telegram of greeting and con-
gratulations from Brezhnev, as General Secretary of the CPSU,
Nikolay Podgorny as President of the USSR Supreme Soviet
Presidium, and Alexey N. Kosygin as Chairman (or Premier) of the
USSR Council of Ministers, on behalf of their respective institutions
"warmly" congratulating the crew. Emphasis is placed on achievement
in space science in keeping with, as in the case of Soyuz 11, the "grandi-
ose plans" of the Party.e2 Respectfully and according to formalized
routine, the cosmonauts respond from space, noting, as in the case of
the Salyut crew, that they were "profoundly grateful" to the Party
and Soviet Government for the congratulations and pledged to
fulfill the "motherland's assignment." 63
After the flight, the Soviet leaders host a reception for the cos-
monauts in which again the linkage of politics to space is maximized.
The reception becomes an occasion for an outpouring of praise in
recognition of the beneficence bestowed upon Soviet space science
and its personnel by the political leadership. Podgorny observed that
the Soyuz 10 mission occurred as the Soviet people were embarking on
the carrying out of the decisions of the 24th CPSU Congress-decisions,
he emphasized, designed for the "upsurge of all spheres of national
economy and at further increasing the well-being" of the Soviet people.
In an air of self-praise, he exclaimed: "The constant attention which
the Party gives the advancement of science and technology has enabled
our country to emerge in the forefront of scientific-technical progress,
which plays an increasingly important role in the modern world." 64
On other occasions of high visibility the Soviet leaders enhance the
Party-space linkage by implying, if not explicitly stating, the causal
connection of one to the other. A case in point is May Day, a day of
consummate commemoration in the liturgy of communism and one
that is filled with historic meaning. On May Day 1971, Brezhnev,
speaking as party leader and from the most sacred of platforms, the
0s Pravda, Moscow, June 9, 1971:1.
61 Pravda, Moscow, June 12, 1971:1.2 Commentary over Moscow radio during the Salyut 1 mission linked
the purposes of the mission to the directive on space in the 24th Party Congress Directive. (Moscow Domestic
Service, April 19, 1971.)
62 On the occasion of the Soyuz 10 mission the greeting stated: "A new stage in space exploration-the
program for the work of the 'Salyut' orbital research station began to be implemented in the year of the
24th Congress of the CPSU, which worked out majestic plans for a further powerful boost of the socialist
economy, for strengthening the might of the Soviet state, for increasing the living and cultural standards
of our people." (Moscow, Tass International Service, April 26, 1971.)
a Moscow, Tass International Service, June 7, 1971.
"6 Moscow Domestic Service, April 30, 1971.


Lenin Mausoleum, singled out the achievement of Soyuz 10 in extolling
the virtues of communism, saying triumphantly:
It was with feeling of admiration and pride that Soviet people learned of a new
triumph of Soviet science and engineering-the successful launchings of the
"Salyut" orbital space station and the "Soyuz-10" spaceship. A new important
step has been made in space exploration. This is a great achievement, an em-
bodiment of the talent and labour of Soviet scientists, engineers, technicians
and workers, the skill and selflessness of our hero cosmonauts.65
The Party-Government-space connection is not, however, a one-way
effort. Soviet scientists and cosmonauts reciprocate, acknowledging
the primary role of the Party and Government and expressing their
gratitude for the beneficence flowing therefrom. Speaking of Soviet
science in general, Academician Keldysh, President of the USSR
Academy of Science, underscored the "responsible tasks" entrusted to
it by the CPSU which, he said, "gives all-round support to scientists
and displays constant concern for the development of science." In
reciprocation, he exhorted Soviet scientists to "assure the 24th Con-
gress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union" that they "will
exert every effort for the further development of science and the accel-
eration of technical progress for the welfare of our people and for the
sake of the great cause of communism." 66 On behalf of Soviet space
scientists, Academician G. Petrov, Professor A. Dmitriyev, and
Doctor of Physical and Mathematical Sciences M. Marov, affirmed to
the 24th CPSU Congress that in implementing Party directives on
cosmonautics they did not doubt "that the upcoming years will be
marked by new achievements in the study and conquest of space.67
The cosmonauts reciprocate in like manner. At lift-off the cosmonaut
commander routinely pledges in a formal statement on behalf of the
crew to carry out successfully the assigned tasks and expresses "warm
thanks" to the Communist Party and Soviet Government leaders
"for their high trust" in them. Cosmonaut Shatalov, commander of
Soyuz 10, Communist Party member, and delegate to the 24th Party
Congress, shared his impressions of the Congress in his pre-flight
statement, remarking that "he and his comrades took very close to
heart the report delivered by Leonid Brezhnev and the Congress
decisions. The cosmonauts were particularly moved by the passages
referring to the plans for space exploration," according to Tass.68
At the Kremlin reception the cosmonaut commander, as in the case of
Shatalov, performs accepted ritual when he reports personally to the
Party and Government leaders on behalf of the crew that their assign-
ment had been fulfilled and that they were ready to take on new tasks,
and then expresses the crew's gratitude for entrusting the mission to
Thus, by symbols, rituals, and other public acts the Communist
Party and Soviet Government leaders are linked to space in a variety
of ways. The purpose is apparently to create the image and reality
that the Party especially and its leadership are the primary source of
space achievements, the sole dispenser of beneficence and wisdom,
and accordingly a fit object of public confidence, respect, and perhaps,
even veneration.
s5 MGscow, Tass International Service, May 1, 1971.
" Pravda. April 2, 1971:5. In, Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 23, no. 15, May 11, 1971: 22 and 24.
*7 Pravda, Moscow, March 30, 1971:4.
* Moscow, Tass International Service, April 23, 1971.
*g Moscow, Tass International Service, April 26, 1971 and April 30, 1971.


c. Value and practical results of space exploration.-In an apparent
effort to fortify the close identity of space achievements wit the
CPSU and Soviet Government, the political leadership takes great
pains to build solid popular support for the Soviet space program.
One aspect of this effort is to point out in innumerable ways to the
Soviet people the practical value and utility of space exploration for
During the period under review Soviet political leaders, space
scientists, cosmonauts, and the media interspersed their conm enta "ies
on space almost routinely with assurances that space exploration made
practical sense, often supporting their observations with references to
the Five Year Plan Directive on space. On the occasion of the Soyuz 11
mission a Pravda editorial reiterated the directive from the 24th CPSU
Congress which had "mapped out a broad program of scientific work
in space for the purpose of developing communications, television,
weather forecasting and the study of natural resources, geographic
research, and the solution of other national economic and scientific
tasks." "Soviet scientists, engineers, and technicians, workers, and our
famous cosmonauts," Pravda stated, "are persistently and purposefully
implementing" the directive.70
The experiments initiated in the Salyut orbital station, Pravda went
on, "show that Soviet science has acquired a powerful new means for
the most rapid fulfillment of the exciting plans of the 'space 5-year
plan.'"' n Academician Keldysh made the same injunction to the-
Communist Party Congress. "While developing the utilization of space
devices for the exploration of the universe," he said, "we must increas-
ingly employ these devices to accomplish practical tasks in the fields
of communications, meteorology and navigation, to study natural
resources and to carry out geographic and oceanographic research." 72
Other scientists reiterated what came to be a familiar theme. Acad-
emician A. Blagonravov, Chairman of the Commission of the Soviet
Academy of Sciences for the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
cited the practical value of orbital stations such as Salyut in space
meteorology, space photography, space geology, the study of resources.
the discovery of new mineral resources, oceanographic work, and
"Over 25 million inhabitants of Siberia, the Far North, the Far East,
Central Asia have now had an opportunity of viewing transmissions
from the Moscow Television Center and have really become aware of
the practical work of space research," according to Academician G.
Petrov, Professor A. Dmitriyev, and Dr. M. Marov.74 Besides the
practical spinoffs, cosmonautics, in the words of Cosmonaut Nikolayev
"is stimulating the development of many fields of technology as well."
"In an amazingly short period of time," he said, "cosmonautics has
become one of the main levers of scientific and technical progress." 17
Thus, while Soviet public opinion may have no direct impact on
decisionmaking in the Soviet system, still the political leadership
respects this vast, formless force, and being skilled manipulators of
public opinion, they would hardly let slip by an opportunity to
7o Pravda, June 9, 1971:1.
71 Ibid.
72 Pravda, April 2, 1971:5. In, Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 23, no. 15, May 11, 1971: 22 and 24.
7s Blagonravov, A. A. What are "ethereal settlements" needed for? Pravda, Moscow, April 26, 1971:2..
'4 Pravda, Moscow, March 30, 1971:4.
7' Moscow, Tass International Service, April 28, 1971.


strengthen their quest for legitimacy by identifying their leadership
position with so dramatic and successful an undertaking space
d. Use qf scientists anrd cosmonats as politcal instrmert.- he
foregoing commentary suggests a final point in Soviet efforts to identify
space achievements with the Communist Party and Soviet Govern-
ment: namely, the use of scientists and cosmonauts, at least in part, as
political instrumentalities: both are called on to justify Soviet space
exploration and to publicize its achievements.
Doubtless Soviet space scientists seek to advance their own profes-
sional interests and that of science in general and, moreover, perform
a most important role as educators for the Soviet msses. But the data
examined suggests that their commentarie are also intended to lend
professional support to the decisions on space taken by the political
leadership. More than that, they contribute to the larger task of magni-
fying the role of the Communist Party and Soviet Government by
asociating them with success and achievement in space. Such com-
mentaries are not confined to technical journals but are found in the
major Soviet press, such as, Pra da (the newspaper of the CPSU),
Ic 'tya ( the organ of the Soviet Government), and Red Star (the
journal of the aimed forces). In its domestic and international service
Ta--. as well as the Soviet press, draws heavily upon these commen-
talies for use in the media's mainstream coverage. In addition inter-
views are conducted with space scientists as in the case of Professor
Vladimir Siforov. Director of the Moscow Institute of Information
Transmission Problems, who elaborated on the purposes of the Mars 2
anil Mars 3 missions.7
Often the tone and thrust of commentaries by scientists are straight-
fow-ard, highly technical, and devoid of obvious propaganda, as on
the occasion of the Soyuz 11 mission when Academician V. Palin, one
of the Soviet Union's leading cientists in the field of physiology and
medicine, discussed in a highly technical article the biomedical aspects
of space flight." Other times they are flavored with political themes.
But in all cases the underlying assumption is justification and reaffir-
mation for what is being done and of the judgment of the political
leaderslhip in doing it.
Similarly, the cosmonauts have a political role to play, a role to be
examined in the next section.
5. RE als and Mythology of Space
a. Political purpose: Glorfication of the U.S.S.R.-With nearly two
decades' experience in space politics the Soviets have established a
fairly set ritual for staging manned spaceflight missions to achieve
maximum political effect. This ritual seems designed to create a certain
mystique and mythology around the whole idea of space exploration.
The political purpose is readily apparent; namely, to glorify the
U.S.S.R.. its institutions, people, leaders, and ideology, and to empha-
size in a dramatic way the value of space exploration.
b. BRiling prest yg cos na ts and co.smonatics.-In the Soviet
Union the cosmonaut- and cosmonautics command great prestie.
Soviet sociologists report that high school students in the Soviet
's Mocow. Tass r:eational Serice. 1June, 1971.
Pai, Mar is ertn in or i Prvda, Moso, June 11. 19T1: 3. A other exaple is te a l by
Acaderitan Blagonravov Ed Engier Yu. Zayver on the ocion of the Salyut-Soyu 11fig in whih
the;y discsed the problem of automati sta-s and ei d spseigh. (Man is opening up the uni-
verse. Ndedlya. M ow, no. 17, April 1~-, 171: 6-7.)


Union view the profession of cosmonaut as one of the most popular
and prestigious. To Soviet youth the cosmonauts are among the most
important heroes. They are much better known to the public at large
than are the Soviet political leaders: the private lives of the latter are
kept secret, while those of the cosmonauts are given full coverage in
the media with intimate, personal details about wives, families, and
hobbies, the sort of homey details that Russians like to know but are
rarely given on their political leaders.78
The Soviet media fortify the image and reality of prestige.
Articles on space generally seem to project a feeling of confidence
and affirm an underlying assumption on the value of spaceflight to
the nation. An extensive interview with the Chief Designer of Space-
ships in March 1971, perhaps the most prestigious but unnamed figure
in Soviet space affairs, exuded this feeling of the prestigious nature of
spaceflight and reflected an attitude of respect, even awe, which his
position commands.79
The Soviet leadership takes great pains in building and maintaining
the prestige of cosmonauts and cosmonautics, and it does so by creating
around them rituals and symbols that embody the virtues of heroism
and wisdom and exemplify national greatness. April 12, the anniver-
sary of Gagarin's orbital spaceflight in Vostok in 1961, hat been
proclaimed Cosmonautics Day and is celebrated, as that in 1971, with
great pomp and circumstance. Some 6,000 people joined the entire
Soviet leadership at the Kremlin Palace of Congresses to commem-
orate this event.80 The political impact of the event was apparent in
the message sent to the Central Committee of the CPSU, Presidium
of the Supreme Soviet, and the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers which
said in characteristic, triumphant tones:
Yuriy Gagarin's flight was a triumph of socialism, a brilliant confirmation of
Lenin's prediction about the stormy growth of the socialist state's might, about
the flourishing of the inexhaustible talents of our people. The Soviet state's
outstanding successes in space exploration have won world-wide recognition.81
Moreover, cosmonauts are featured prominently in parades, such
as that on May Day 1971, and are singled out for high praise by the
CPSU in its list of commemorative May Day slogans. Ranked 37th
in a total of 60, the slogan for 1971 exclaimed:
Glory to Soviet scientists, designers, engineers, technicians, and workers who
are opening new horizons in the conquering of space!
Glory to the valiant Soviet cosmonauts! 82
Finally, the prominence given to Soviet space scientists and cosmo-
nauts in the media indicates the esteem with which they are held by
the Soviet people and the desire by the leadership to build upon that
esteem and draw political capital from it.
78 Gwertzman, Bernard. Russians mourn Soyuz 11 astronauts; 3 deaths still unexplained. The New York
Times, July 2, 1971: 14.
7 Kudryavtseva, G. Here the "Soyuzes" are born. Socialist industry, Moscow, March 14,
1971 : 4.
8s Moscow, Tass International Service, April 12, 1971, and the New York Times, April 13,
1971 : 18.
S Moscow, Tass International Service, April 12, 1971. Taking full advantage of the
occasion to make a political point of high visibility at that time, the message went on:
"We wrathfully condemn the dangerous armed provocations organized by the imperialist
circles and resolutely demand an end to the criminal war conducted by the United States
in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia and a full liquidation of the aftermaths of Israel's aggres-
sion against Arab countries."
2 Text of CPSU CC slogans for May 1, 1971, Pravada, Moscow, April 18, 1971:1.
Coverage on May Day in Moscow Domestic Service, May 1, 1971.


Perhaps the greatest source of prestige-building for the cosmonauts
and cosmonautics is the ritual that surrounds manned spaceflight
missions. The flight of Soyuz 10 on April 23, 1971 is characteristic. In a
pre-recorded message at the Baykonur Cosmodrome, Cosmonaut
Commander Shatalov, a member of the CPSU and delegate to the
24th Congress, explained in general terms the purpose of the mission,
expressed the gratitude of the crew to the CPSU Central Committee
and the Soviet Government for entrusting them with the mission,
shared his impressions of the Congress, and pledged to succeed in
carrying out the mission.83
During the flight messages are exchanged between the Soviet leaders
and the orbiting crewmen, usually mixing mutual congratulations with
laudatory comments on the value of the mission for space science
and the socialist economy and in this instance the carrying out of the
space directives of the Five Year Plan.84
Upon returning to Earth Cosmonauts Shatalov, Yeliseyev (a mem-
ber of the Komsomol CC), and Rukavishnikov (also a Communist
Party member) were given a reception in Georgievsky Hall of the
Great Kremlin Palace, hosted by the top Party and Government
leadership. Entering the hall to the sound of Glinka's chorus "Glory"
and to a "stormy applause" from the audience, the three cosmonauts
reported to their leaders who "warmly" greeted them, on the com-
pletion of their assignment a an announced their willingness to fulfill
new tasks. Flowers were presented to the leaders and the crewmen.85
After delivering an address extolling Soviet virtues, the value of
space exploration, and the heroism of the cosmonauts, President
Podgorny presented each with awards: Shatalov and Yeliseyev, both
Pilot-Cosmonauts of the U.S.S.R. and twice awarded Hero of the
Soviet Union, were given the Order of Lenin; Shatalov was pro-
moted to the rank of air force major general; Rukavishnikov was
awarded the title, Hero of the Soviet Union, together with the Order
of Lenin, the Gold Star Medal, and the title, "Pilot-Cosmonaut of
the U.S.S.R." 86
What is significant about Podgorny's address is the choice of words
that seem intended to magnify the prestige of the cosmonauts, glorify
the Party and nation-state, and add to the mystique of space explora-
tion. Hence, Podgorny referred to "our glorious cosmonauts," the
"intrepid cosmonauts," the "gallant cosmonauts." He noted that the
whole planet had reverberated with the world's first spaceflight "by
our glorious countryman," Gagarin. His "torch" of "glorious deeds
was carried by other Soviet cosmonauts, worthy sons of the Soviet
motherland who embody the best characteristics of our heroic people."
Podgorny informed his audience that "the glorious crew of the
Soyuz 10 spacecraft has been given our motherland's highest awards."
He expressed confidence in "more victories in space which glorify our
people and our country." He pledged a toast to the "gallant crew of
the Soyuz 10 spaceship . and to all Soviet cosmonauts, the wonder-
ful sons of our great motherland, as well as to our scientists, designers,
engineers, technicians and workers who are opening new vistas in the
83 Moscow, Tass International Service, April 23, 1971.
$I Moscow, Tass International Service, April 26, 1971.
s1 Moscow, Tass International Service, April 23, 1971 and April 30, 1971.
-*6 Moscow, Domestic Service, April 30, 1971.


conquest of space. To our great Soviet people, the builders of
-communism!" 8
Full media coverage is given to such events so that the Soviet people
themselves can share in the excitement of manned spaceflight and the
honors being officially bestowed upon their cosmonauts. The airwaves
carry such praise of them and their work as this broadcast over
Moscow Radio on April 28, glorifying the success of Soyuz 10:
Our people are proud of the fruitful work by the heroic conquerors of the spaces
of the universe. Millions of people repeat from the bottom of their hearts the words
of the CPS U Central Committee May Day slogan: Glory to the Soviet scientists,
designers, engineers, technicians, and workers who are opening new horizons in
mastering space; glory to the valiant Soviet cosmonauts.8
Having been elevated to this high level of prestige by all the power and
authority of the CPSU and Soviet Government, it is no wonder that
the Soviet people venerate their cosmonauts and that the political
leadership uses them effectively as communicators on space matters
and as ambassadors-of-goodwill.89
c. On the death of the Soyuz 11 cosmonauts.-Perhaps nowhere is the
prestige of the cosmonauts and cosmonautics in the Soviet Union more
dramatically revealed than in the cases when tragedy strikes, as oc-
curred with the death of the three Soyuz 11 crewmen. Such tragedies
aie occasions for a genuine outpouring of grief for the loss of human
life, adulation for demonstrated manly courage, and gratitude for
achievements in the service of the nation.90
On June 30, 1971, Tass announced that on the 29th the Sovuz 11
crew had completed their flight program and was directed to make a
landing. Returning to Soyuz 11, the crewmen prepared to unlink from
Salyut. This task accomplished, they fired the braking engine at the
required time; the parachute system was engaged; and before landing,
the soft-landing engines were fired. Descent and landing in a pre-set
area were smoothly executed. A helicopter-borne recovery group,
landing simultaneously with the spaceship, opened the hatch and found
the crew, Pilot-Cosmonaut Lieut. Col. Georgiy T. Dobrovolskiy, Flight
Engineer Vladislav N. Volkov, and Test Engineer Viktor I. Patsayev,
in their seats "without any sign of life." 91
A commission was established to investigate the accident. On July
12, it reported that the cosmonauts died as a result of a rapid change in
the capsule's air pressure. The drop in pressure had been caused by "a
loss of the ship's sealing." 92
87 Moscow Domestic Service, April 30, 1971.
8 Moscow Domestic Service, April 28, 1971.
F; During the period under review the material examined abounds with instances where the cosmonauts
were used in the media to explain certain aspect, of the Soviet space program. In a lengthy article in Red
Stir, Nikolayev discussed the value of the Soyuz 10 mission. (Nikolayev, Maj. Gen. A. A. A new step in
space. Red Star, Moscow, April 2-, 1971: 3.) Part of the tasks of Soviet cosmonauts is to travel abroad. In
Feb. 1971, Valentina Tereshkova, the first spacewoman in the world, was a guest of honor at the All-Slovak
Aktiv of Women-Workers in Bratislava, Czechoslovakia. Such occasions provide opportunities for the
cosmonauts to communicate with peoples beyond their own borders. (Prague, CTK International Service,
Feb. 26. 1971.)
w For references to the death of Cosmonaut Komarov, the first man to die in a space accident, see, Senate
Space Committee, Soviet space programs, 1966-1970, p. 18, 22, 28-30, 38, 44, 49, 62, and 74.
t Moscow. Tass International Service, June 30, 1971.
9 The New York Times, July 12, 1971: 1. Sheldon noted that the crewmen were the "victims of an air
leak in a valve of their reentry command module which came open shortly before reentry." (Sheldon, op.
cit., p. 9.)


The Soviet leadership extended the highest honors to the deceeas d
crewmen by ordering a state funeral. Their bodies Itiv-in-state for
eiglht hours in a hall of the Central Army House in mid-town Moscow.
Their portraits, draped in black, adorned the facade of the building.
Solemn music was played; wreathes and flowers from the Soviet
leadership and others were displayedl; and honor guards surrounde(d
the open caskets as thousands of grief-stricken Moscovites paid their
last respects to their space heroes. Brezhnev, K osygin, Podgorny. and
other Soviet leaders took turns joining the honor guard. Letters of
condolences from the leadership, eulogistic and laudatory, were sent to
the next-of-kin. Memlbers of the highest echelons in Soviet political.
scientific, and military life signed the obituaries.f All three co-mo-
nauts were awarded posthumously the highest honors of the state.4
An open letter from all pilot cosmonauts was published, expressing
their grief and pledging to carry on the tasks set forth in the Soviet
space pIroram.9
The grief of the Soviet people was great, and it was publicly por-
trayed through the media. Moscow radio broadcast songs of mourning;
television screens showed the black framed portraits of the dead
space heroes. Their tragic deaths, said Tass, "cause a deep pain in tile
hearts of the Soviet people"; their loss wa- "taken by everybody as
the loss of the most dear friends and relatives." Poems and eulogies
by famous writers were read over the radio and television. Con-
memorative articles were published as special features in Prarda and
Izrestlya. Three streets in Kaluga, the birthplace and home of Russia's
space pioneer Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, were named in their honor.
Tass sunmmed up the feeling of grief in the nation this way: "The whole
country is in deep mourning." 96
For the space interested public abroad the accident seemed to be
perceived as a loss for all humanity. Messages of condolences poured
in from the Socialist states, extolling the courage of the cosmonauts
and the glory they added to the Soviet Union and to world com-
a Moscow, Tass International Service, July 1, 1971. "For many of the Russians who stood in line under a
blistering sun the experience of viewing the cosmonauts . was emotionally trying." said an Associated
Press dispatch from Moscow. (Thi Washington Post. July 2. 1971 :A22.) Characteristic of the letters of con-
dolences from the leadership was the following to the Dohrovolskiy family: "We are deeply grieved at the
death of your son and husband, the courageous pilot cosmonaut, commander of the ship, Soyuz 11, stalwart
and fearless communist. faithful son of the Soviet people, Hero of the Soviet Union. .. Georziy
Timofeyevich devoted his whole life to selflessly serving the homeland and the Soviet people. His lift will
always inspire the Soviet people in exploits in the name of the triumph of communism." (Moscow Domestic
Service, June 30, 1971.)
8 The title Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded to Dobrovolskiy; the second Gold Star Medal and ti'le
Hero of the Soviet Union to Volkov: the title Hero of the Soviet Union to Patsayevr-ll "for heroism and
courage shown durine the test of the new space complex, the orbital station Salyut and the transport ship
Soyuz 11." (Moscow Domestic Service. June 30. 1971.)
0S The letter seemed intended to reaffirm Soviet purposes in space and to strengthen the confidence of the
Soviet people in their space program. "We express firm confidence that what happened cannot stop the
further development and perfection of space engineering and man's striving for space. striving for the cogni-
tion of enigmas of the universe." the letter said. It expressed arief in the loss "but also pride for what they
have done for the homeland in the space orbit." It noted the success of their experiments and the "rre-
mendous possibilities" opened up for mankind by orbital stations. The cosmonauts carried out the program
with "extreme accuracy and transmitted data that will enable their comrades" to go forward and develop
space exploration. All three chsmonauts had much in common, the letter said. "In the first place it was their
infinite love of our homeland, tremendous will power and self-discipline, tireless striving for perfection,
and inflexible devotion to space." Orbital stations were a complex but natural stage in developing Sovet
space engineering, the cosmonauts said; and they concluded: "The Central Committee of the CPSU. the
Soviet Government, our people may be confident t at each of us-both those who already made space
flights, and those who are still t :'.ake t. r .irs figt to a high or' t-wil do their best to even mre
strengthen and glorify the undying space glory of our socialist homeland." (Moscow, Tass International
Service, July 1, 1971.)
M oscow, Tass International Service, June 30, 1971, and The New York Times, July 2, 1971:14. Bernard
Gwertzman, Moscow correspondent of The Times, described the great prestige the cosmonauts have among
the Soviet people and added that this explained the great "outpouring of emotion" at the news of Soyaz 11
accident. "Radio commentators," he said, "were even trying to discourage people from going to view the
bodies, saying that thousands were already on line in the 90 degree heat."


munism. The space community in the United States and Britain
responded with messages of condolences.97
The final tribute to the cosmonauts was that reserved for Soviet
citizens held in the highest esteem by the Conmmunist Party and
Soviet State-a military state funeral with a procession to Red Square,
funeral orations by the Soviet leaders from the platform on Lenin's
Mausoleum, and final burial of ashes in the Soviet pantheon of heroes,
the Kremlin Wall. The central theme of Keldysh's oration, besides
giving reassurance on future spaceflight, was that the Soyuz 11 flight
was successful in that it opened a new stage in exploring space using
manned orbital stations and that the flight program of the dead
cosmonauts was a scientific success.98
Thus in life and death Soviet cosmonauts are treated with great
respect and esteem. The treatment accorded them and the honors
extended by the Party and Government have become a central part of
the ritual in the growing mythology of the Communist Party, its
doctrine, and the Soviet state. This ritual and mythology are important
because they show the high value that Soviet political leaders place
upon space exploration as a national effort; they fortify the positive
political image of perfection; but more important, they are instruments
that measure the Soviet commitment to space exploration.
6. Soviet Political Uses of Space: A Summing Up
a. Major themes.-To sum up, Soviet political uses of space during
January to July 1971 were projected against a background of tension
produced by U.S. expansion of the war in Indochina. Familiar political
themes of the past emerged: downgrading of the American space
effort; magnifying Soviet space achievements; identifying success in
space with the CPSU, the Soviet Government, and their leadership;
and reaffirming the rituals and mythology of space exploration.
Absent were some of the old propaganda themes, the bombast, and
self-congratulatory rhetoric of bygone years.
b. Accent on the positive.-The accent was rather on the positive
side of the Soviet space effort-their achievements, steadiness of
purpose, skillful planning, and care in execution. An air of self-
confidence appeared to have set in, a feeling that the Soviet Union
has arrived in space, that it has really made its mark, and that its
achievements have won for them the respect of the world. Absent was
the feeling of inferiority so apparent beneath the over-compensating
bombast of the Khrushchev era.
c. Space exploration: A serious business.-Clearly, space exploration
is a serious business for the Soviets, and while political spinoffs were
sought in bninding the people to space, still the efforts made to com-
municate with and educate the masses in the complexities of space
exploration illustrate the seriousness of the enterprise for them.
The Soviet style and tone of communication on space matters may
be stilted, stylized to a fault, and almost Victorian in its attempt to
generate an aura of old-fashioned heroism around manned spaceflight;
97 Budapest Domestic Service, June 30, 1971; Sofia Domestic Service, June 30, 1971; East Berlin ADN
International Service, June 30, 1971; and Moscow, Tass International Service, June 30, 1971.
Moscow, Tass International Service, July 2, 1971, and Gwertzman, Bernard. Drop in pressure hinted in
deaths of 3 astronauts. The New York Times, July 3, 1971:1. In the crowd of honored guests at the funeral
was Col. Thomas P. Stafford, the American astronaut who attended as President Nixon's envoy. At the
time of the funeral for Cosmonaut Komarov, who had perished in the crash of Soyuz 1 in April 1967, the
Russians refused to admit an American astronaut to the funeral.


it may represent itself as the systematic bearer of glad tidings to
keep up the image of perfection; still, beneath the rhetoric of the
communicators is revealed a hard, serious commitment to space
exploration. The idea of space as a durable, on-going national commit-
ment is very much in evidence and seems to be well integrated into
the policies and programs, politics and purposes of the Party and
Government. Space exploration is geared to the national economy,
and efforts are made to relate space to the practical needs of society,
a thrust that is also evident in the larger Soviet commitment to
building an impressive scientific infrastructure. In a word, an air of
institutional permanency is apparent, and while much energy has
been expended in the rituals and mythology of space, still the Soviets
appear to be building on a reality, not a legend.

1. Detente and the Apollo-Soyuz Joint Mission
a. Against a background of improring relations.-The tone and
character of Soviet-American relations had changed radically by
January-July 1975. Summit conferences in Moscow, Washington,
and Vladivostok had established the outer structure of relations within
which detente as an idea and process took root and flourished. While
the momentum of detente had slackened in the spring, summer, and
autumn of 1975 as both nations came to grips with the hard problems
of military detente; namely, SALT II and MBFR, still both sides
remained firmly committed to their mutually declared policy and
seemed undeterred in their efforts to iron out serious, fundamental
Thus, the political climate was strikingly different in the first half of
1975 compared with that in 1971. Serious obstacles to better relations,
such as the Vietnam war, had been removed, and the process of detente
was unfolding within a system of concrete negotiations. It was within
this favorable climate of improving relations that the Soviet Union
and the United States completed preparations for the Apollo-Soyuz
Test Project (ASTP). Accordingly, Soviet space politics-and indeed
that of the United States as well-were geared to detente: the results
contrasted markedly with other times when Cold War tensions in-
truded and had a spoiling effect.
b. The Apollo-Soyuz Project: Major political themes.-Preparations
for the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP) generated a close interaction
among Soviet and American space specialists and cosmo-astronauts.
These cooperative efforts were brought to a supreme test during the
period of the joint flight, July 15 to July 24, 1975.
The Soviets stressed two major political themes during flight
preparations, lift-off, in-flight, and the post-flight period; namely,
that ASTP was a supreme example of space cooperation, a goal, they
claimed, the Soviet Union had long sought; and that the project was
made possible by detente. Indeed, ASTP was represented as a further
justification of detente. The conclusions to be drawn from the flood of
media coverage was that detente was a valid policy and that it insured
peace in the nuclear age, a goal sought by all mankind.
c. Illustrations of political themes.


(1) By the Soviet leaders.-The Apollo-Soyuz mission was regarded
on both sides as a political act." To this extent it was a shared political
goal. The joint flight was intended to further the purposes of detente.
Brezhnev set the tone on the Soviet side when he said prior to
lift-off on July 15-a statement often repeated: "The Soviet and
American spacemen will go up into outer space for tle first major
joint scientific experiment in the history of mankind. They know that
from outer space our planet looks even more beautiful. It is big enough
for us to live peacefully on it, but it is too small to be threatened by
nuclear war." 100 On the occasion of the successful docking on the 17th,
Brezhnev congratulated the cosmo-astronauts saying:
Since the launching of the first artificial Earth satellite and the first manned space
flight, outer space has become an arena of international cooperation. The re-
laxation of tension and positive changes in Soviet-American relations have created
conditions for the first international space flight. New opportunities are opening
up for an extensive fruitful development of scientific ties between the countries
and peoples in the interests of peace and the progress of the whole of mankind.101
And in a congratulatory message to President Ford on the 24th
upon the completion of the joint mission, Brezhnev referred to the
flight as "an important milestone" in Soviet-American "exploration
and use of outer space for peaceful purposes." Indicating that the
successful flight "lays a foundation for the possible subsequent
Soviet-U.S. projects in this field," Brezhnev concluded:
The flight of the "Soyuz" and "Apollo" spaceships is of historic significance as
a symbol of the current process of easing of international tension and improve-
ment of Soviet-U.S. relations on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence.
At the same time, it constitutes a practical contribution to the cause of further
development of mutually beneficial cooperation between the U.S.S.R. and the
U.S.A. in the interests of peoples of both countries, in the interests of peace
on Earth.'10
(2) Within ASTP.-Space cooperation and detente were persistent
themes emphasized within ASTP as it developed. "Our flight will be a
symbol of peace and cooperation between peoples on our planets,"
said Cosmonaut Leonov, commander of Soyuz 19, in the final stage
of preparations.'s0 "What is going to happen in space in July," said
Dr. Boris Petrov, head of the Interkosmos Council of the U.S.S.R.,
"is more than a technical operation. It will be a symbol of rapproche-
ment between our peoples." 104 The "hearty handshake" in space, as
Tass termed it, and the joining of metal plaques brought by both
ships into a single memorial plaque symbolizing Soviet-American
space cooperation, were staged with infinite care to convey the
intended message of peace and cooperation.105

oo The New York Times said editorially: "The importance of the Apollo-Soyuz mission is primarily political.
It is as true now as it was several years ago, when Messrs. Nixon and Brezhnev agreed to the jcint venture,
that both sides want the most dramatic possible public demonstration of detente in action." (Detente in
space. The New York Times, July 16, 1976:37.)
00oo The New York Times, July 16, 1975:18 and Moscow, Tass, July 13, 1975.
101 Moscow, Tass, July 17, 1975.
102 Moscow, Tass, July 24, 1975.
103 Moscow, Tass, March 29, 1975. Earlier in an interview, Leonov remarked: "We are all eager for the
success of the flight for it will open new great opportunities for international cooperation in space in the
interest of all the people of the world." (Moscow, Tass, Feb. 1, 1975.)
104 Moscow, Tass, May 22, 1975.
t10 Moscow, Tass, July 18, 1975. "Smile, Tcm and Alexei, you're on the air," wrote David F. Salisbury of
The Christian Science Monitor from the Johnson Space Center at Houston. "When Soviet cosmonaut Alexei
Leonov and American astronaut Thomas Stafford meet in space and exchange their first historic hand-
shake," he continued, "the moment will be as wellstaged as a scene in a television drama. Each minute of
their joint activities has been carefully arranged. Their meeting was planned as the world's TV spectacular
of the 1970s." According to Robert Shafer, NASA associate administrator for television, a number of events
in the ASTP have been juggled around to ensure that major crew activities were televised. This was "in
keeping with the major mission objective to conduct a highly visible demonstration of international co-
operation in space," he said. (Salisbury, David F. Space handshake staged with care. The Christian Science
Monitor, July 17, 1975:1.)


Finally, in the Soviet view ASTP was to accrue benefits for both
sides, not just the Soviet's, as some American critics claimed. These
benefits were summed up by Yuriy Marinin, a Czechoslovak scientific
commentator who after exploring the allegation of unequal benefits
and defending the Soviet position, concluded that the joint flight
"will benefit both sides. It will contribute to the cause of peace, inter-
national security and detente in relations between the two great
powers." 106
(3) Within the media.-The joint flight was a media event. Soviet
television, radio, and the press were inundated with space-related
material. Space scientists, cosmonauts, science commentators, po-
litical leaders-all got into the act. For the first time the Soviet people
could view "live" an actual lift-off, in-flight activity, and landing;
what they did not view on TV or hear on the radio, they could read in
the press. On the day before lift-off James F. Clarity, Moscow cor-
respondent of The New York Times, reported that there was a "virtual
deluge of information" on the joint flight. For the first time in Soviet
space history officials held a full-scale news conference and answered
questions, not all friendly ones, in advance of the launching. Clarity
suggested that the Soviet people may have been given more informa-
tion than they could digest. 107
On July 15, the date of lift-off, Izvestiya carried a bright red headline
usually reserved for special holidays. It read, "Soyuz-Apollo: Orbit of
Cooperation." 108 Perhaps this headline best summed up the central
point stressed in media coverage. It could be phrased in the simple
formula, detente plus cooperation equals peace and security, not only
for the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., but also for all mankind. In brief,
media content constituted a massive affirmation of Brezhnev's peace
d. Reaction abroad to ASTP.-Except for China which downgraded
and criticized the joint mission, the world reaction, as viewed through
Soviet sources, appeared to be highly favorable. A sampling of reaction
abroad, as selected and reported in Soviet media coverage, revealed
an enthusiastic response with particular stress on relating ASTP to
the virtues of space cooperation, detente, and peace. The New York
Times was reported as acclaiming the flight as evidence of cooperation
and peaceful coexistence. Agence France Presse noted that it opened a
new stage in the history of space exploration and cooperation between
0to Marinin, Yuriy. It will not be just a friendly handshake in space; prior to the joint Apollo-Soyuz flight.
Pravda Weekend Supplement (Bratislava), June 13, 1975:10.
107 Clarity, James F. Soviet Union publicizing the mission. The New York Times, July 15, 1975:22. See
also, Osnos, Peter. Mission a Soviet media event. The Washington Post, July 15, 1975:A9.
108 The New York Times, July 16, 1975:18.
o10 Aleksandr Piradov, Soviet representative on the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space, termed ASTP, "an event of great political significance." He stressed, in the words of Tass, that "we
stand at the threshold of a qualitatively new stage in the advance of cosmonautics: A space bridge of co-
operation for the benefit of all mankind." (Moscow, Tass, June 10, 1975.)
Cosmonaut Vladimir Shatalov said the joint flight was "of a great political significance. The pooling of
efforts in space exploration calls for mutual trust, mutual understanding and goodwill from both countries.
The good beginning made on space routes will contribute to the implementation of joint projects in other
fields too." (Moscow, Tass, June 25, 1975.)
Vladen Vereshchetin, Vice Chairman of the Interkosmos Council of the USSR Academy of Science,
observed in the periodical International Life: "The Soviet Union is ready to continue to do allit can in order
to consolidate mutually profitable and equal cooperation with the United States, cooperation that will help
to cement world peace. Peace stands to benefit from the forthcoming Soviet-American meeting in cosmic
orbit." (Moscow, Tass, July 3, 1975.)
On the day before lift-off Yuriy Zukov wrote: "For a decade and a half Soviet and American space explorers
have worked separately. A change in the international atmosphere was essential for them to pool their
efforts. A change was needed in the relations between our countries, a change from the state of cold war to
accord on peaceful coexistence and business-like cooperation." After quoting from Brezhnev's statement on
the spaceflight and its relationship to the avoidance of nuclear war, Zhukov concluded with a comment on
strengthening peace through joint Soviet-American efforts. (Moscow, Domestic Service, July 14, 1975.)


both countries. France's weekly L'Humanite Dimanche proclaimed the
flight as serving the interests of all mankind and noted that the hand-
shake in space has special significance because it symbolized not only
new horizons in scientific and technological cooperation but also the
persistent efforts by peoples who affirm peace and peaceful coexistence
on Earth. The Italian L' Unita said the outstanding results were due to
the relaxation of tensions that was gaining ground. Poland's Zycie
Warscawy declared that the summit meetings of Soviet-American
leaders on Earth had paved the way for the historic rendezvous of the
cosmo-astronauts in orbit. Czechoslovakia's Pravda said that the suc-
cessful termination of the flight was the result of continued efforts by
the Soviet Union and other members of the socialist community to hold
out for an increased easing of tensions and the peaceful coexistence
with states of different social systems."0
Though Moscow sought to put the most favorable face on the joint
mission, some Americans, Westerners, and the Russian man-in-the-
street were critical. One Western diplomat in Moscow saw ASTP as an
extravaganza that the Soviet Union wanted to vaunt a nonexistent
technological equality with the United States. Another disagreed with
this "cynical" interpretation saying that the Soviet man-in-the-street
was getting a very heavy dose of friendship with America. One disillu-
sioned Russian expressed the danger that the mission would lull Ameri-
cans into thinking everything was fine in the Soviet Union when
actually nothing had changed. Some visiting American journalists
dismissed the flight, in the words of the press report, "as a public-
relations job by a money-starved National Aeronautics and Space
Administration in the United States." Some diplomats argued the
middle position, seeing the flight as a modest but worthwhile gain in
opening up a secretive society a little bit more."'
Whatever the mix in judgments on the purposes and effects of the
joint mission, the overall impression suggests that the Soviet leader-
ship (strongly supported by their American counterparts) went to
great lengths to relate the mission to the political purposes of detente
and that ASTP indeed appeared to be a great political success.
2. Characteristics of Space Relations
a. Absence of familiar Soviet themes and actions.
(1) No downgrading of the American space effort.-Discretion was the
most significant characteristic of Soviet space relations with the United
States during January-July 1975. Absent were some of the familiar
themes and political actions characteristic of Soviet space politics
during the most intensive periods of the Cold War. There was no
downgrading of American space programs or activities. Allegations
of American critics that the Soviet Union gained more from the joint
mission than the United States appeared to be met by and large with
studied restraint. Such assertions were politely rejected with reminders
of the difficulty in getting sufficient congressional appropriations for
carrying on the American manned space program, an experience not
shared by the Soviet Union, and that the one-sidedness in going
forward with ASTP, therefore, really benefited the American side.
However, Soviet interests would not suffer, it was said. Both sides
would really be the beneficiaries from a joint enterprise that furthered
10 Moscow, Tass, July 26, 1975.
111 Pond, Elizabeth. Russians, Americans assess flight benefits. The Christian Science Monitor, July 23,
1975:4 and Wilford, John Noble. Joint flight assessed. The New York Times, July 24, 1975:58.


the cause of detente, cooperation, and peace.12 American space
officials were cited to dispute the charge of an uneven technological
transfer to the Soviet Union.
Sharper rebukes to this allegation took the shape of counter-charg(es
that the critics were opponents of detente. Yuriy Zhukov, a leading
Soviet publicist, referred to such critics as "demagogues in the U.S.
who stand against scientific cooperation with the U.S.S.R." In reply
to such critics, he said : "It is not accidental that U.S. firms are buying
ever more licenses for inventions from us." "3
(2) No exaggerated claims for Sovief space efforts.-Nor were there
the characteristic exaggerated claims for Soviet space efforts. Restraint
and discretion suggest the tones of Soviet statements on space matters.
And for good reason. Soviet space failures would have made any
exaggerated claims very difficult, if not ludicrous, to make. The
successful 30-day orbital flight of Soyuz 17-Salyut 4 in January-
February, the longest Soviet manned space flight, was a major tri-
umph; still, media coverage appeared to be routine and matter-of-fact.
However, American observers, pointing to past Soviet failures, opined
that the flight would probably restore Soviet self-confidence in their
much-troubled Soyuz-Salyut program.1"
The aborted Soyuz flight on April 5, amid final preparations for the
joint Apollo-Soyuz mission, no doubt embarrassed Soviet space officials
after this momentary lift in morale by the success of Soyuz 17, and
dampened any enthusiasm, if it existed at all, for making exaggerated
claims in space. Failure of the mission raised doubts in the West about
Soviet technical competence to go forward with the Apollo-Soyuz
project, but Soviet space officials, acknowledging that the trouble was
caused by an obsolete rocket booster, gave assurances to NASA
authorities that this booster would be replaced by a modern one for
use in the joint flight."5
Any Soviet embarrassment over the Soyuz failure in April must have
been overcome by the successful launching on May 24 of Soyuz 18 and
its docking with the orbiting station Salyut 4, and by the sending in
June two automatic space stations, Venera 9 and Venera 10, in the
direction of Venus. Space specialists in Moscow believed that at least
in part the stepped-up Soviet activity in space (in addition to these
major launchings, the Soviets orbited numerous smaller satellites) was
intended to demonstrate competence in a broad range of space systems
and dispel the impression that the Soviet space program was in trouble.
The Venus probes, the first in three years, served to remind the world
that the Soviet Union had made the only successful landing on
112 Marinin, op. cit.
113 Pond, Elizabeth. Soviets hail space cooperation. The Christian Science Monitor, July 15, 1975:1 and 7.
11 After the disaster of the Soyuz 11 flight in 1971, the second Salyut was reported in 1972 to have broken up
In orbit. Salyut 3, which incorporated certain improvements over its predecessors, had greater success. A
two-man crew visited the orbital station for two weeks in the summer of 1974, but another crew, launched in
August, was unable to dock following the failure of its approach guidance system. In 1974. the United States,
by contrast, had flown the longest manned mission of 84 days with a crew aboard the Skylab space station.
(The Washington Post, Feb. 10, 1974:A1.)
1u The Washington Post, April 30, 1975:A21, and the New York Times, Mary 25, 1975:1.
116 Osnos, Peter. Soviets seek to overcome space setback, The Washington Post, June 13, 1975:A23, and Mos-
cow, Tass, June 10, 1975. That American space specialists perceived the importance of the Soviet Venus probe
was indicated in a statement by Dr. Hans Mark, Director of the Ames Research Laboratory. Deploring a cut-
back in space funds by the House of Representatives, Dr. Mark observed that the Soviet Union had launched
two more flights to Venus and said: "The Russians are way ahead of us. To them, planetary exploration is a
matter of national policy." (Blakeslee, Sandra. Space scientists deplore fund cut. The New York Times,
July 21, 1975:26.)


That the Soviets were gaining in self-confidence by these achieve-
ments prior to the Apollo-Soyuz mission was evident by the tone of
confidence and satisfaction that marked their reports on the Soyuz 18
mission, and the strong implications by Soviet specialists that Salynt 4
would be used by many successive crews manning the orbital station
in shifts ranging from a few weeks to months.''7 To the di;cerning
observer the Soviets could also be seen to draw confidence from the
belief that by participating with the United States in a joint mission
on the scale of Apollo-Soyuz they were able to demonstrate effectively
that they had achieved parity in space.
Thus, setbacks in space had made it difficult for the Soviets to flaunt
their successes as they had done in the past. But in keeping with the
spirit of detente and the style of the Brezhnev regime, they were able
to make their point of competence in space and parity with tlhe United
States by solid and highly visible achievements."8
(3) Easing restrictions on secrecy.-Evidence of an improving Soviet
attitude in space relations was apparent in the easing of restrictions
on secrecy. In the course of preparations for the Apollo-Soyuz mission
the Soviets admitted, albeit reluctantly, American officials and astro-
nauts into areas of space work heretofore held in the greatest secrecy.
Preparations had apparently gone smoothly until the Apollo crewmen
insisted on touring the Tyuratam Cosmodrome, inspecting the
Soyuz launch pad, and visiting the Soyuz spacecraft. Air Force
General Thomas P. Stafford, commander of the Apollo spacecraft,
said: "I never fly on a spacecraft I haven't been in on the ground."
Reluctantly, the Soviets agreed to the visit,"9 in conformance, it might
be added, to the principle contained in the April 6, 1972 agreement on
the joint flight. NASA project officials had uniformly insisted and
gained agreement that American crews had to be familiar with the
actual Soyuz that would participate in the mission.'19
On their four visits to the Soviet Union the astronauts also visited
Star City, the cosmonaut training center 30 miles outside Moscow.
Americans also spent hours touring and working at the new space
control center at Kaliningrad, near Moscow. As Astronaut Donald K.
Slayton said in Moscow, "We have seen everything we need to see to
fly this mission effectively." 120
Such openness along with a willingness to permit "live" TV coverage
of the mission stirred favorable comments in the West. One opti-
mistic Western diplomat in Moscow contended that the mission as a
whole was significant. "This whole system has been built on a threat-
a threat from outside to destroy the country," he said. "It's a major
step to take away the enemy." He argued that the decision to let
down secrecy barriers and open up the Soviet space program as much
as the Soviets did could have wider effects in this "very cautious,
bureaucratic system." "When the .genie gets out of the bottle," he
suggested, "it's very hard to put it back." 121
117 Browne, Malcolm W. Salyut 4 mission nearing record. The New York Times, June 23, 1975:1.
u11 The Russians seemed willing to go to some lengths to insure the success of ASTP, wrote John Noble
Wilford from the Houston Space Center. "For they looked upon the mission,as among other things," he said,
"a means of gaining an apparent parity with the United States in space technology-a parity at least in the
eyes of the Russian people, if not the experts." (Wilford, John Noble, Joint flight assessed. The New York
Times, July 24, 1975:58.)
11 O'Toole, Thomas and Peter Osnos. Detente's space spectacular. The Washington Post, July 13, 1975:
1la Information provided by NASA.
120 The Washington Post, July 13, 1975,A6.
ui The Christian Science Monitor, July 23, 1975:4.


One Soviet science writer was similarly optimistic. "This secrecy
S. bothers us too," he said, adding, "But I think this will change.
As cosmonauts train with your astronauts, as our people go more and
more and see how you do things . I think they will begin to loosen
up." Another prophesied: "I cannot be sure. But I begin to see a
few green shoots in the frozen ground. . If we cultivate these,
if we don't expect too much but cherish each sprout, I think eventually
we will have a garden." The Apollo-Soyuz information flow, said
Robert C. Cowen, science writer for The Christian Science Monitor,
"may be the first flowering of that garden." 122
b. Presence of familiar Soviet themes and actions.
(1) Identifying space success with the CPSU and Soviet government.-
Familiar themes and actions of past Soviet space politics were evident
in the period under review, notably the identification of success in
space with the leadership of the CPSU and the Soviet Government. At
the conclusion of the successful mission of Soyuz 18, for example,
Brezhnev, Podgorny, and Kosygin on behalf of the CPSU, the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and the USSR Council
of Ministers, respectively, sent greetings to Cosmonauts Klimuk and
Sevastyanov, saying that they had "delighted greatly their com-
patriots and millions of people throughout the world." "Our glorious
cosmonauts," they went on, "manifested all-round skill, lofty moral
qualities, courage and heroism." In a self-affirming statement, the
leaders said that the mission confirmed that the creation and flight of
orbiting scientific stations using relay crews "is one of the most im-
portant directions for man's penetration into space and a decisive
means for the further profound study of the universe and the under-
standing of our planet." "Your feat," the message continued, "is a
splendid example of selfless service to the cause of communism and of
the accomplishment of the tasks of our Soviet homeland." The Soviet
leaders congratulated all participants in the operation, saying that they
"made a worthy contribution to the accomplishment of the majestic
tasks outlined by the 24th CPSU Congress." 23
In response the cosmonauts, scientists, engineers, and technical
workers who participated in the Soyuz 18-Salyut 4 mission thanked
the Soviet leaders for the constant support of their work and they
dedicated "the successful implementation" of the mission which had
"important scientific and national economic significance, to the forth-
coming 25th Congress of the CPSU." Reaffirming the Party directive
of linking space to the practical needs of the nation's economy, the
authors assured the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Govern-
ment that they would apply all their knowledge and strength to further
developing space technology "in the interests of science and all
branches of the national economy." 124
Significantly, Cosmonaut Leonov, commander of Soyuz 19, directed
a message of gratitude to the CPSU CC and to Brezhnev personally.
"We are greatly moved by the warm words of Leonid Ilich," Leonov
said, "and we shall be working ever better. One is moved to say much
to Leonid Ilich in answer to his warm words and we, the cosmonauts,
will express our sincere feelings of gratitude to him once more when
we see him upon return to Earth." 125
Cowen, Robert C. Soviet press in a new "orbit"Itoo. The Christian Science Monitor, July 16, 1975:21.
12 Moscow Domestic Service, July 26, 1975.
14 Moscow, Tass, July 27, 1975.
m Moscow, Tass, July 18, 1975.


In these and other exchanges the Soviet leadership drew to them-
selves and Soviet political institutions credit for Soviet success in
space and by implication, if not by direct reference, conveyed the
message in almost a paternal way that the prime mover in Soviet
space achievements was the CPSU and its leadership in the party and
(2) Use of cosmonauts and scientists.-Similarly, the Soviet leader-
ship called upon cosmonauts and scientists as spokesmen of the space
community to affirm the wisdom and validity of the Party's judgment
and decisions on space affairs, to play an educational role in communi-
cating with the Soviet public, and in the international field to act as
representatives of the Soviet Union. In brief, they placed their prestige
and authority in the service of the party and state.
Accordingly, Cosmonaut Shatalov credited the staging of the
Apollo-Soyuz experiment to the efforts of the CPSU and the Soviet
Government in pursuing the policy of detente. Stressing a theme
central to the Soviet political perception of this mission, Shatalov
emphasized not only the important technical and scientific aspects of
the flight but also the mission's "great political significance;" namely,
furthering the principle of peaceful coexistence and international space
cooperation. "The pooling of efforts in space exploration," he said,
"calls for mutual trust, mutual understanding and goodwill from both
countries." Shatalov added, "The good beginning made on space
routes will contribute to the implementation of joint projects in other
fields too." "27 In a detailed discussion of the use of orbital stations and
their role in future Soviet space exploration, space scientist Boris
Petrov quoted Brezhnev directly, in what appears to be a mutually
affirming statement, as saying, "Soviet science sees the creation of
orbital stations with changes of crew as man's highway into space."'2
Articles such as this by Academician Boris Petrov and other
scientists played an educational role in communicating with the
Soviet people on space matters. Within the mass of information
flowing through Soviet media channels on the occasion of the Apollo-
Soyuz mission were articles, interviews, and statements by space
scientists. In part they were instructive for the Soviet people as in the
case of an article by Academician G. I. Petrov appearing in Pravda;
in part they were an authoritative affirmation of decisions taken as in
the case of Dr. Kirill Kondratyev, corresponding member of the USSR
Academy of Science and a leading Soviet space specialist, who
described the mission as "a memorable landmark in the history of
international cooperation and an assurance of progress in outer space
exploration for the benefit of the whole of mankind." 129
z1 That the Soviet leaders are anxious to establish a close identity with the cosmonauts and their success
in space was indicated, to the embarrassment of some Soviet authorities in Washington, by an apparently
"faked" photograph, showing Brezhnev talking with Leonov and apparently Soviet envoy to the U.S.
Anatoliy Dobrynin in the background. While one Soviet specialist attributed the picture to a bad retouching
job and one previously taken, others subscribed to the "fake" theory, noting that Leonov's head seemed far
too small for his body. The picture was reproduced in Moscow's major newspapers on Tuesday, presumably
July 22. The problem is Leonov and his fellow cosmonaut Valeriy Kubasov did not land in the Soyuz until al-
most 2 p.m. Moscow time on Monday, July 21, nearly 3,200 km away in Soviet Central Asia. According to
wire service accounts, they were then taken to the nearby town of Arkalyk and from there 320 km by heli-
copter to the cosmodrome at Baykonur. Baykonur is about 2,400 km from Moscow, and it would appear to
have been impossible for the cosmonauts to have been in Moscow in time to have a picture taken and de-
veloped for Tuesday's newspapers. Wire service accounts did not place the cosmonauts in Moscow until Wed-
nesday. Dobrynin was in Washington all week long. (Weintraub, Richard M. Brezhnev picture questioned
The Washington Post, July 27, 1975:A4.)
I" Moscow, Tass, June 25, 1975.
"u Petrov, B. N. Orbits of the future. Trud (Moscow), Feb. 5, 1975:3.
127 Petrov, G. I. Interview: into the expanses of the universe. Pravda April 12, 1975:3, and Moscow, Tass,
July 19, 1975.


Fiinally, cosmonauts continued to play a key public relations role.
Media attention given to the visits of the Apollo-Soyuz cosmo-
astronauts to the Soviet Union and the United States were prime
illustrations of the political uses of spacemen by both countries.
Furthering the cause of detente and space cooperation was clearly a
commonly shared objective.
Less dramatic but still illustrative was the selection of Valentina
Nikolayeva-Tereshkova as the Soviet representative to the United
Nations conference in Mexico City in June-July 1975 held as part of
the commemoration of International Women's Year. Nikolayeva-
Tereshkova is Chairman of the Soviet Women's Committee and has
the unique distinction of being the only spacewoman in the world.
Upon returning to the Soviet Union, Nikolayeva-Tereshkova gave a
report of the conference in Pravda. She described the "constructive
cooperation" between the delegates of the socialist countries and those
from the developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America;
noted that the "firm and principled" position taken by the delegates
of the socialist states, with the support of those from states adhering
to a "progressive course," ensured the success of the conference to a
considerable degree; and finally observed that the Communist Chinese
delegation, which "stubbornly tried to split the participants," failed
and "actually found itself in isolation." 130
Probably few countries could have put forward a representative with
such high prestige value and visibility. Thus as spokeswoman for the
foreign policy interests of the Soviet Union, Nikolayeva-Tereshkova
had great opportunity to make a favorable impact and to further the
interests of her country. On its part the Soviet Union had a unique
instrument for pursuing its political purposes.
(3) Limits to openness.-It is true that during the Apollo-Soyuz
mission the Soviets lowered the barriers of secrecy, but with serious
limitations. The Apollo astronauts saw secrecy, notably the with-
holding of information, as a prime problem to be solved in the entire
undertaking. "They just have it engrained in them," said Slayton;
"they don't tell anything to anybody except on a need-to-know
basis." ''3 Even when the astronauts were permitted to visit the
Tyuratam Cosmodrome, they were flown in at night and out the next
night. Questions had to be limited to the launching pad, rocket, and
spacecraft they would be on. Requests to see the underground block-
house were turned down.132 Moreover, American newsmen were not
permitted to witness the liftoff of Sovuz 19.13"
Nor were Americans given any satisfaction when making inquiries
about future space plans, particularly regarding possible cooperative
experiments to follow on the success of ASTP. Such inquiries were
politely but firmly turned aside, pending the results of discussions
planned late in 1975.134
t' Moscow, Tass, August 9, 1975.
131 Osnos, Peter. Astronauts see Soviet space pad. The Washington Post, April 30, 1975:A21.
132 O'Toole, Thomas and Peter Osnos. Detente's space spectacular. The Washington Post, July 13, 1975:
133 The New York Times, July 16, 1975:37.
134 Wren, Christopher. Soviets expected to push long-term lab in orbit. The New York Times, July 28,
1975:34. Wren observed that the Russians were not expected "to adopt a lower profile following the highly
visible venture that has brought them new prestige in space."


An indication of just how tight Soviet security is on space affairs was
revealed by Robert C. Cowen, science writer of The Christian Science
Monitor. When American science writers toured the Soviet Union in
1972 as the result of an exchange arrangement, they found that they
often knew more about the Soviet space program than did their Soviet
counterparts. Not only were goals, dates, and results of many missions
withheld, but details on facilities and missions, widely known in the
West, were unknown to many of the Soviet science writers."1
(4) The rituals of space.-The rituals of space were carefully attended
to, and integrated into the ceremonials were the familiar themes of
peace, detente, cooperation, for the good of mankind, space explora-
tion for the needs of the national economy, the unique communist
virtues of the cosmonauts, etc. Podgorny awarded the cosmonauts of
Soyuz 18 and 19 Orders of Lenin and the Second Gold Star medals to
the Heroes of the Soviet Union. They were honored in a Kremlin
reception, in Podgorny's words, as "our glorious heroes, the courageous
conquerors of space." On behalf of the Soviet leadership Podgorny
thanked the cosmonaut-heroes for having fulfilled the tasks of the
Party and people and for having received the highest awards of the
state. In response the cosmonauts, as expected, thanked the Soviet
leadership for the high appraisal of their labor in space and declared
their readiness to carry out any task assigned to them by the Soviet
While certain aspects of the space ritual were apparently not re-
peated, one formality was added that no doubt will be followed again
should the Soviet Union and the United States decide to stage another
joint manned mission; namely, the signing of the document of readi-
ness. On May 22, upon completion of the final preparatory stage for
the flight, NASA Deputy Administrator Dr. George M. Low and acting
President of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences Vladimir Kotelnikov
met at the Presidium of the Academy. Also present were the directors
of ASTP, officials of the Interkosmos Council, heads of mixed working
groups, and commander of the Soyuz crew, Cosmonaut Leonov.
Project directors Glynn S. Lunney of NASA and Konstantin D.
Bushuyev, his counterpart in the Soviet space community, reported
on the completion of the preparatory stage of the mission. Presumably,
the signing of the document of readiness was to symbolize the formal
authorization for the mission to go forward to completion.'37
That the rituals of space play an important role in Soviet space
politics is apparent by the value that the Soviet leadership assigns to
them. The awards and public ceremonies are officially created symbols
of national recognition of achievement. They bring added honor,
respect, and prestige to space exploration, and to the cosmonauts,
space scientists, and technical workers. But most important the rituals
of space are directed towards the greater edification of the CPSU and
the Soviet state.
135 The Christian Science Monitor. July 16, 1975-21. The New York Times observed editorially that in the
Apollo-Soyuz mission. "there is evidence of the distance both countries still have to go before they reach
genuine friendship and trust. The place from which the Soyuz rocket took off yesterday -the city of Len-
insk -is not indicated on any unclassified Soviet maps, while the public references to it as Baikonur actually
refer to a place 200 miles away. If it were not for American spy satellite pictures of the Soviet Union, this
country might not even know the exact coordinates of the point from which the Soyuz craft took off." The
Times termed the Soviets "fanatical" on security. (Detente in space. The New York Times, July 16, 1975:
138 Moscow Domestic Service, August 25, 1975.
13' Moscow, Tass, May 22, 1975.


3. Political Significance
a. Strengthened detente.-A review of the period January-July 1975
suggests four generalizations relating to the connection between
politics and space exploration. First, it seems evident that detente was
a precondition to space cooperation on the scale of the Apollo-Soyuz
joint mission; and to this extent the mission was, as Brezhnev said in
his congratulatory message to President Ford, "a symbol of the current
process of easing of international tension and improvement of Soviet-
U.S. relations on the basis of the principles of peaceful co-
existence." 13
However, the Apollo-Soyuz mission may have been more than a
symbol: in circular fashion the mission appears to have served the
positive purpose of re-inforcing a favorable environment for expanding
detente. But within limits, since space cooperation lies essentially on
the periphery of outstanding problems in Soviet-American relations,
and the hard, central core of differences in the area of military detente
remain intact.139
b. Advancing the principle of space cooperation.-Despite the dif-
ficulties in achieving military detente, the principle of space coopera-
tion has no doubt been given a formidable push forward by the
Apollo-Soyuz mission. As noted in the preceding sections, this was the
main thrust of Soviet statements on the mission. President Ford
expressed the American view when he said on the occasion of the
Soyuz 19 launching, "This space mission . demonstrates that the
United States and the Soviet Union are prepared to cooperate in a
common endeavour of great significance, importance and complexity."'40
c. Soviet gains in prestige.-That the Soviet Union gained in prestige
as a result of the successful joint flight is apparent from reactions at
home and abroad. To have the demonstrated technical and scientific
capability of participating in such a complex operation with a space
power so advanced in space science and technology as the United
States cannot have escaped the attention of an attentive world. What
no doubt added to the global popular appeal of the mission was the
visual proof that the two superpowers with basically conflictual social
systems and many diverging, national interests could indeed cooperate
in such a dramatic undertaking on a common basis of detente.
d. Intensity and depth of Societ space commitmrnent.-Finally, Soviet
space activities in this period suggest the depth and intensity of the
Soviet commitment to space exploration. On visiting the Soviet
space center near Tyuratam, Astronaut Stafford reported that from the
amount of construction under way, the Soviets were "dedicated" to
pursuing the goals of their space program.41
138 Moscow, Tass, July 24, 1975.
139 The New York Times warned editorially against exaggerated expectations from ASTP. It concluded
an analysis under the heading, "Detente in Space": "The Soyuz-Apollo mission is a major step forward
toward greater cooperation between the two great countries involved. But it is a limited island of intimacy
in the great, troubled ocean of Soviet-American relations where there are also areas of deep political cleavage,
notably now in Portugal and the Middle East [not to mention SALT 11 and MBFR negotiations]. The
danger is that the Soyuz-Apollo mission might become a sort of Potemkin village in space, an event which
could arouse unrealistic expectations here. By all means let there be progress in detente; but the crucial tests
at least in the near future, will take place here on earth." (The New York Times, July 16, 1975: 37.)
140 Moscow, Tass, July 15, 1975.
i41 Osnos, Peter. Astronauts see Soviet space pad. The Washington Post, April 30, 1975: A21.


The American astronauts said that they were impressed by the
"tremendous effort" the Soviet Union was putting into its space
Despite restrictions placed on their movements by the security-
conscious Russians, American space specialists had seen enough, in
the words of one report, "to convince them that the Soviet Union
is continuing to put vast resources into its space effort." Referring to
assembly sheds that the visiting party saw scattered throughout the
area near the Bavkonur cosmodrome, Astronaut Slay ton said, "I'd be
surprised if they weren't working on some advanced technology . .
but we didn't see it." 143
Moreover, published statements by Soviet space scientists and
cosmonauts suggest extension rather than retrenchment of the Soviet
space commitment.
Given the Soviet inclination to view such scientific enterprises in a
political context, all of this suggests the high political value that the
Soviet leadership places on space exploration.


Soviet space politics with respect to the United States since 1971
suggest three broad generalizations. The first is that the governing
factor in space relations is the political environment within which they
function. Simply stated, an environment of tension produces negative
responses; one of detente, positive responses. In both cases space
exploration is manipulated to achieve certain political purposes. The
Apollo-Soyuz project probably would have been inconceivable in 1971;
in 1975, it was a logical outgrowth of detente; it made political sense.
In large measure, therefore, the future of Soviet space politics will be
determined, as in the past, by the character of Soviet-American
political relations.

Secondly, the CPSU, the Soviet Government, and their leadership
hold the commanding position in Soviet space politics. The rituals of
space are organized around the glorification of the Soviet system, its
leadership, and ideology. Collectively, they are the seminal source of
all energy and promise for the future; they are the center of the Soviet
universe. Thus, the future of the Soviet Union in space is not neces-
sarily the decision of the scientists and engineers but of the political
leadership and its perception of the role of space exploration in aug-
menting the power of the Soviet state and in furthering the purposes
of its ideology.
42 Clarity, James F. U.S. astronauts visit Soviet base. The New York Times, April 30, 1975: 5.
143 Newsweek, v. 85, May 12, 1975: 85.


Finally, what emerges most prominently from the data presented
here is the intensity of the Soviet commitment to space exploration.
If the Soviets are scaling down their ambitions in space, it is not evi-
dent from the directives of the 24th Congress of the CPSU, in the
statements of the Soviet leadership in politics, science, and cosmo-
nautics, and in what has been demonstrated in the first seven months
of 1971 and 1975. Space exploration had been an essential power
factor in Soviet international politics during the bombastic, risk-
taking era of Khrushchev's missile diplomacy; it remains so in the
more restrained era of detente under Brezhnev; for as a handmaiden
of Soviet power in the Space Age, it has been shown to be a proven,
not a wasting asset.



By Francis T. Miko*



Testifying before Congress, Dr. Malcolm R. Currie, Director of
Defense Research and Engineering at the Department of Defense
The Soviet space program is a large, broadly oriented, stable program. In
order to put this program in context, I would like to point out that the Soviets
are continuing to expand their base of scientific manpower, the breadth and
depth of technological investigations and the improvement of research and test
facilities. . As I see it, the Soviet space program is an integral part of their
evolving national posture and it is neither being "overemphasized nor "starved"
relative to manpower, facilities or funds.'
The aim of this chapter is to determine the organizational and
administrative structure of the Soviet space program on the basis of
the open literature. An effort is made to describe key organizations
and groups involved in the program and to assess their interrelation-
ship. This chapter attempts to discover where decisions on space
originate and to find the channels through which they pass to the
operational level.

Soviet secrecy is an obstacle to research on manv facets of that
country's development. Subject matter with any strategic implica-
tions or which is deemed sensitive is covered by all-pervasive secrecy.
Soviet officials regard the civilian and military aspects of their
space program as sensitive. Thorough Government censorship ex-
tends to all areas related to the organization and administration of
the program. The result is that very little information on organization
can be gleaned from the available Soviet literature.
The open Western literature does not reveal a great deal more on
the Soviet space organization. Since there exist no detailed conclusive
studies on the organization and administration, one can at best try
to piece together the fragments of information.
* Mr. Miko is an analyst in Soviet and East European affairs, Foreign Affairs and National Defense
Division. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress.
1 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. NASA Authorization for Fiscal
Year 1975. Hearings . March 18 and 20, 1975: Part 2. Washington, Govt. Print. Off., 175, p. 78T.


Since the available Western literature on the Soviet space program
is largely speculative and sometimes contradictory, the effort here
is to present the various views put forth and to synthesize them where
possible. The arguments are viewed against what is known about
Soviet organization for decision-making in general.
Clearly, the Soviet Union has a general organizational method. It
seems a logical assumption that the administration of the space
program should not diverge very far from the established Soviet
pattern of doing things. Since a fair amount is known of Soviet
operations in some less strategic areas, certain inferences can be made
with respect to the space program from those operations. Caution
must be exercised, however, as there is often to be found an informal
functional organization of Soviet endeavors which is different from,
and at the same time more significant than, the formal organization.

1. The Party Congress
The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is the dominant force
in all spheres of Soviet life. While formally outside the Government
structure, the Party exercizes control not only from the top, but at
all levels through a centralized hierarchical organization that parallels
the Government and social structure at all levels down to local
enterprises and institutions. The Party Congress which meets at
irregular intervals, every few years, is formally the highest Party
organ. However, in practice the Congress has very little power and
serves chiefly as a forum in which the leadershio announces the
launching of major policies.
2. The Central Committee
The Central Committee is elected by the delegates to the Party
Congress to function between Congresses and act as the highest
permanent party institution. Its membership (241 full members and
155 candidate members) is still too large for effective decision-making.
One of its major functions is to elect the Politburo and Secretariat
which are the real top decision-making bodies in the Soviet Union. It
also ratifies Politburo decisions. Central Committee election of Polit-
buro members and ratification of decisions are still primarily a pro
forma function. In most instances, approval of Politburo decisions
and changes is automatic and unanimous. Nevertheless, the Central
Committee is significant in that its membership for the most part
represents the political elite of the Soviet Union and it exercizes
control over policy implementation.
The Central Committee is divided into departments which for the
most part parallel the Government structure at the ministry level.
These departments have oversight duties over the corresponding
ministries in the Government. The departments also provide infor-
mation to the Politburo.


3. The Politburo
The Politburo, together with the Secretaliat of the Party, exercises
supreme power in the Soviet Union. Because of over-lappl i)ing member-
ship in these two highest bodies, their activities are well coo(rdinated.2
The Politburo presently has 14 full (voting) nmenl mer-s and 7 candidate
(non-voting) members. The Politburo selects and renmoves its own
members and those of the Secreta rint, even though formal authority
for this function rests with the Centrall Committee. 'Tle Politburo
establishes all major policy guidelines and acts as the final arbiter
among the competing interest groups in the Soviet Union.
The power structure within the Politburo has varied over the years.
Under Joseph Stalin, there was genuine one-man dictatorship, and
the Politburo itself, became a virtual rubber stamp body. Since
Stalin's death, there have been differing degrees of collective leadership.
Both Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev were able to carve out
dominant positions for themselves, but neither has been able to achieve
absolute authority.
4. The Secretariat
The influence of the Secretariat parallels that of the Politburo.
Among its duties are the appointment of major Party, Government,
and other officials. The Secretariat chooses the candidates that are
to run in elections (for the most part unopposed). It carries out
oversight duties to assure that Party policy is being implemented at
all levels. Despite the authority wielded by the Secretariat, it cannot
be considered a separate power center, competing with the Politburo,
due to the factor of overlapping membership. Some of the individuals
who head key departments of the Central Committee are also members
of the Secretariat.
5. Other Party Units
From the Central Committee down there is a vast network of Party
organizations which assures the Communist Party of control over
Soviet society. These organizations are to be found at the Union
Republic, district and local levels. The close to 500,000 primary
Party cells are at the bottom of the hierarchy. These are established
in individual residential neighborhoods, factories, army units, schools,
research institutions, and anywhere that there are three or more
Communist Party members.
1. The Supreme Soviet
In principle the Soviet Government is completely separate from
the Communist Party apparatus. In fact, once again due to the
phenomenon of overlapping membership, the Government leadership
consists entirely of Party members and many key Government
officials also hold major positions within the Party hierarchy. The
2 Currently, there are six members of the ten-man Secretariat who are also members or candidate-members
of the Politburo. They are General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev, P. N. Demichev, A. P. Kirilenko, F. D.
Kulakov, M. A. Suslov and D. F. Ustinov.


Soviet Government has no independent authority, but is the mecha-
nism through which Party policies are implemented.
The Supreme Soviet is the Soviet legislature and in theory the
highest organ of the Soviet Government. It consists of two equal
hou(ses-the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities.
Elections to the Supreme Soviet are held every four years and a single
list of candidates is nominated by the Communist Party. Between the
infrequent sessions of the Supreme Soviet, its Presidium functions on
its behalf. The Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium (presently
Nikolay Podgorny) also acts as titular Chief of State. The Supreme
Soviet plays no significant role in the actual Government of the
country. Election to the body is sometimes a ceremonial honor
bestowed on political figures, scientists, cosmonauts, artists and
2. (The (oncil of M1inisfers
The (Council of Ministers is the most significant organization of the
Soviet Government. Its approximately 100 members are nominally
appointced by) the Supllreillm Soviet and theoretically they are re-
sponsible to that bo(id. In practice the Council of Ministers is selected
y and responsible (lirectly to the Central Committee of the Com-
munist Party. The Chairman of the Council of Ministers (presently,
Alexeyv os ygin) is also called the Premier or Prime Minister of the
Soviet Union.
Directly under the Council of Ministers are the ministries, State
Committees, and other bod(ies which carry on the day-to-day tasks of
Soviet Goverinment. Thle Soviet Acaldemy of Sciences also falls under
the supervision of the Council of Ministers. Below the ministries are
the industrial branches and the institutions which fall within the
jurisdiction of each.

The Soviet Union has never released an organizational chart of its
space program. Given the degree of official secrecy surrounding the
program, certain logical assumptions cannot be documented. One such
assumption is that the space organization follows basic Soviet adminis-
trative patterns. There may be as many as 600,000 people working
directly on the space program or in space related activities.3 Such a
massive organization would appear to require a high degree of co-
ordination. However, it cannot necessarily be concluded that Soviet
space administration is a rational streamlined decision-making
mechanism. In an earlier study of the program, Leonard N. Beck,
in fact, found the opposite in some areas; namely, administrative
Western observers have occasionally wondered how the program can
function effectively in view of the overlapping jurisdictions between
Party and Government, the participation of a myriad of institutions
3 Sheldon. Charles. S. II. United States and Soviet Progress in Space: Summary Data through 1974 and a
Forward Look. Washington. U.S. Library of Congress, January 13, 1975, p. 21. (Congressional Research
Service multilith no. 75-18 SP).
4 U.S. Congress. Senate, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. Soviet Space Programs, 1962-
1965: Goals and Purposes, Achievements, Plans, and International Implications. Staff report. Washington,
Govt. Print. Off., 1966, p. 158.


with no clear hierarchical relationship, and differiences' that exist
everywhere between formal organizational structur es andl the loose
informal working structures. Yet the results show that while the
space organization may not function with optimumn efficiency, it at
least functions reasonably well. Two aspects of the Soviet govern-
mental system may help to explain the success of the space program.
The first such factor relates to the multiple responsibilities assigned
to leading individuals. Where there is no clear link between organiza-
tions involved in the same program, a link may often be found in the
person of their leadership. When two seemingly unrelated organiza-
tions are headed by the same individuals, coordination seems rela-
tively simple. The outsider trying to understand Soviet organizations
is faced with a difficulty arising from this factor. Once a person is
identified as a key figure in a given program, it is still not always
possible to identify the associated organization. Fallacious conclusions
can be drawn about the importance of a specific institution in an
organization such as space on the basis of its individual membership.
The second such factor is what Leon Trilling, in an earlier congres-
sional study calls the principle of single responsibility, operating
throughout the Soviet system. Where there is no clear institutional
responsibility, there often exists, formally or informally, a leader who
will be held accountable for the success or failure of the program at any
level.5 This factor of single responsibility would seem to imply a fairly
strict chain of command operating in the Soviet space organization.

As in all areas of Soviet policy, the Communist Party asserts its
leadership over the space program. Top-level decisions on space are
probably made in the Politburo. Control over implementation of the
decisions is probably the responsibility of the appropriate departments
in the Central Committee. Soviet leader Brezhnev underscored the
leading role of the Party in science in a speech marking the 250th
anniversary of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. He said:
S. Comrades, in the future you will have to work even more, more persistently
and more effectively. We have no intention of dictating to you the details of
research topics and the ways and means of research-that is a matter for the
scientists themselves. But the main directions of the development of science, the
main tasks that life poses, will be determined jointly.6
The Politburo in its capacity as the highest policy-making body in
the Soviet Union is responsible for establishing goals and priorities,
setting up the organizational framework and funding of the space
program. It presumably seeks the advice of experts in the field, before
arriving at decisions.
The main directions of Party policy on space can be publicized in a
variety of ways. A platform sometimes used to launch major programs
is the Party Congress, held at irregular intervals. At the 24th Congress
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), convened in
1971, for example, directives were issued to organize scientific work in
outer space "in the interest of development of long-distance telegraph
6 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. Soviet Space Programs: Orga-
nization, Plans, Goals, and International Implications. Staff Report. Washington, Govt. Print. Off., 1962,
p. 62.
Academy of Sciences' 250th Birthday. Speech by L. I. Brezhnev. Current Digest of the Soviet Press,
v. 27, October 29, 1975: 3.

and t(elephone comlmunications, television, weather forecastinig, the
study of natural resources, geographical research, etc., with the help
of automatic and piloted spacecraft".7 The functions of tlhe Party
Congresses for the Iiost part do not include the establishment of
policy. They serve generally as a forum for unveiliing policies that
have already been decided by the leadership.
Final re)ponsibility on space matters within the Politburo rests
with the de facto Soviet leader. The degree of the Soviet leader's
personal involvement in space decisions has probably varied over the
Observers have pointed out that at the time of the launching of
the first Soviet Sputnik in 1957, Soviet Premier Nikita Khlrushchev
may not have immediately grasp)ed the full political significance of
the achlyivelent, although he certainly already supported space
research. Upon the successful completion of the Sputnik mission,
Khrushchev's initial statements seemed to lack a great degree of
enthusiasm. A few weeks later Khrushchev's tone changed. He heaped
praise on the individuals who accomplished the feat; he was boastful
of Soviet leadership in the space field; and he took personal credit for
the success of the Soviet space program. IHe was probably responding
to the Western reaction of amazement and disbelief.8 Khrushchev's
level of personal participation in decision-making on space may have
grown after his initial lesson in the propaganda value of space accom-
plishnments. At the awards ceremony following Gagarin's successful
mission as the first man in space in 1961, Khrushchev emphasized
his personal role in the Soviet space program. He was presented the
first and highest medal of honor for the successful flight. Also among
those most prominently honored was Leonid Brezhnev, then the Soviet
President, who may have had some responsibility in the administra-
tion of the space program within the Politburo.9 Nikita Khrushchev
allegedly took a very active part in formulating space policy decisions
in 1963, when it was reportedly decided to accelerate the program
in response to American successes.10
Following Khrushchev's ouster from the Politburo in 1964, his
successor, Leonid Brezhnev, initially appeared to be moving in the
direction of scaling-down or de-emphasizing the Soviet space pro-
gram. In his statement welcoming back Cosmonaut Komarov and his
crew from their successful Voskhod flight, Brezhnev said in an appar-
ent criticism of his predecessor and of the United States:
We are pleased of course, that our country is ahead in the exploration of space.
But we Soviet people do not regard our space exploration as some kind of race.
The spirit of reckless gambling in the great and serious matter of exploring and
mastering space is deeply alien to us.1
According to American intelligence estimates, the person within
the Politburo today with primary responsibility for space matters is
candidate member D. F. Ustinov.12 It may be some indication of the
thrust of the Soviet space program that Ustinov's other primary
7 Sevastyanov. V. and Y. Faddeyev. Soviet Cosmonautics and Scientific and Technical Progress. Space
World, v. 1. September 1972: 21.
8 For an account of Khrushchev's reactions see Daniloff, Nicholas, The Kremlin and the Cosmos. New
York. Alfred A. Knopf, 1972, p. 66.
9 Ibid., p. 74. See also: Dornberg, John. Brezhnev: The Mask of Power. New York, Basic Books, Inc.,
p. 163.
10 Oberg, James E. The Voskhod Programme: Khrushchev's Folly. Spaceflight, v. 16, April 1974: 147.
1 Dornberg, op. cit., p. 186.
12 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Reference Aid: CPSU Politburo and Secretariat, September 15,
1974. (A (CR) 74-25).


duties are in the areas of defense industry and foreigln inilitarvy aid.
He also has secondary responsibilities in the field of securitv.
Ustinov is a graduate of the Professional Teclhicil Schooil and the
Leningrad Military Mechanical Institute. He lihas beie a eallidate
member of the Politburo since 1965 and a milember i of lihe ('entral
Committee since 1952. He has served in the GovernieIIt as a D)eput
Chairman of the Council of Ministers and as Miii~t-ri of )Dfense
Industries. Earlier he held senior positions in researcl institutes and
directed the "Bolshevik" plant in the armaments sector.'3
While primary duties are assigned to individual Politburo inmebers
probably on the basis of background, interests, and prestige, each
member of the ruling body shares responsibilities in all areas. More
intensive participation in decisions on space could be expected from
those Politburo members who have primary decision-making re.sponsi-
bilities in related areas. Among these would be Andrey Grechko, who
is the Soviet Defense Minister and has defense responsibilities in the
Politburo. Petr M. Masherov, who handles science, industrial admin-
istration, and education, could also be assumed to have close ties to
the space field.
It is difficult to name the Central Committee departments most
closely involved with the space program, as all have not been fully
identified. The departments handling science and educational insti-
tutions (headed by Sergey P. Trapeznikov) and defense industries
(headed by Ivan D. Serbin) probably have a role in the oversight of
the space program. The Central Committee as a body is reported to
have conducted intensive reviews after Soviet space setbacks such as
Salyut 1 and Salyut 2 in 1973."
At the lower levels, the Communist Party also has the capability to
perform a "watchdog" function over space affairs. Basic Party units
are present at research institutions, in the Soviet Academy of Sciences
and its branches, in the relevant military sections and within the
industries doing space work. While the main task of these units is
probably the ideological training of the workers, they would seem to
have other potential control capabilities and could provide a direct
channel between the Central Committee and the individual

1. The Council of Ministers
Central Committee policy guidelines on space, on the basis of
established patterns, would pass directly to the Council of Ministers.
Theoretically, the Council of Ministers is responsible to the Supreme
Soviet, but in terms of the structure of the real decision-making
process, the Supreme Soviet appears to play no role. The passing of
directives from the Central Committee of the Communist Party to
the Council of Ministers is simplified by the fact that the Chairman
of the Council of Ministers, the ten Deputy Chairmen, and the heads
of the subordinate ministries, State committees and other agencies
all simultaneously hold high Party offices. Six of the 15 full members
of the Politburo are also members of the Council of Ministers. For a
ts Crowley, Edward L. (et al) eds. Prominent Personalities in the USSR: A Biographical Directory.
Compiled by the Institute for the Study of the USSR, Metuchen, N.J., Scarecrow Press, 1968, p. 652.
14 White, Sarah and Grigori Tokati. Green Light for Soviet Space? New Scientist, v. 65, February 1975:


period under Joseph Stalin and later Nikita Khrushchev, the General
Secretary of the Communist Party also assumed the position of
(Chairman of the Council of Ministers (Premier). Those duties are
now separated with Soviet leader Brezhnev acting as General Secre-
tary of the Party and Alexey Kosygin acting as Chairman of the
Council of Ministers. At the same time, Kosygin is a ranking member
of the Politburo, although not a member of the Party Secretariat.
The Soviet Constitution refers to the Council of Ministers as the
highest executive and administrative organ of the state. It is the
Government's central coordinating, planning, and controlling body,
and is accountable directly to the CPSU. While the Soviet Constitution
gives the Council no legislative authority, it does in fact issue orders
and decisions that become law. Major Government policy decisions
are made in the Presidium of the Council of Ministers on the basis
of Party guidelines and directives."
Members of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, aside from
Chairman Kosygin and First Deputy Chairman Kirill T. Mazurov,
who may play a significant role in the space organization are Vladimir
A. Kirillin (Chairman of the State Conunittee on Science and Tech-
nology), Nikolay K. Baybakov (Chairman of the State Planning
(ommittee), Veniamin E. Dvmshits (Chairman of the State Com-
mittee for Material and Technical Supply), and Leonid V. Smirnov
(Chairman of the Military Industrial Commission). Non-Presidium
memibers who hiead ministries and other departments subordinate to
the Council of Ministers with a probable input into the space pro-
gram, include Andrey A. Grechko (Defense Minister), Sergey A.
Zverev (Minister of Defense Industry), and Konstantin N. Rudnev
(Minister of Instrument Making, Automation Equipment and Control
2. State Committee on Science and Technology
The State Committee on Science and Technology is the highest
Government coordinating body for scientific work, at least in the
civilian sector. There are differences of opinion among Western
analysts regarding the role the Committee plays in the space organiza-
tion. It is generally thought to have a significant role. Some analysts
view it as the chief coordinating body of the space program. Still
others see it as an intermediary between the central space institution
and the Government and Party leadership."7 On the other hand, its
position may be limited to that of coordinating some of the associated
research and development activity contributing to the space program.
The precursor of the Committee was the State Committee for
Coordination of Scientific Research established in 1961 under Nikita
Khrushchev for the purpose of adapting basic research to industrial
development. It was created in conjunction with the reorganization
of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Narrow engineering institutes were
moved from under the jurisdiction of the Academy and placed under
the corresponding industrial ministries. Henceforth, the State Com-
mittee for the Coordination of Scientific Research would replace the
Academy as coordinator of Soviet science, leaving the latter as an
institution of basic research.'8 The action by the Khrushchev leader-
15 See American University. Foreign Area Studies. Area Handbook for the Soviet Union. Washington,
Govt. Print. Off., 1970, pp. 390-393.
ls U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, op. cit.
17 Smolders, Peter L., Soviets in Space: The Story of the Salyut and the Soviet Approach to Present and
Future Space Travel. Guildford, Lutterworth Press, 1973, p. 29.
16 Juviler, op. cit., p. 153-154.


ship was at least in part politically motivate'.d. On the onIe hand it
appeased those pure scientists in the Academy who resented the
growing intrusion of engineers in the mnebership and tihe redirecting
of the Academy's work toward the industrial sector. On the other
hand, it reversed the trend under which the Acaideimy' accumulated
increasing authority as the central scientific organization of the
Soviet Union. The diffusion of its responsibilities may have been
undertaken to eliminate what the Party viewed as a potential threat
to its paramount position in the field of science.
The Committee was renamed in 1965, reemerging as the State
Committee for Science and Technology. Under its new name, the
Committee continues to be responsible for coordinating Soviet
research and development (primarily in the civilian sector); establish-
lishing priorities, and introducing new technology into the industrial
areas. Furthermore, the Committee oversees the numerous research
institutes and laboratories now under the industrial ministries.19
One feature of the Committee, since its birth, has been the pre-
ponderance of officials from the defense industrial sector among its
ranks. The first two chairmen, MI. V. Krunichev and K. N. Rudnev,
both had defense related backgrounds. Indications are that the Com-
mittee does not coordinate activities of the defense industries.20 The
only seeming explanation for the presence of the defense people in its
ranks is that the defense establishment has significant influence over
the civilian scientific and technological establishment.
The State Committee on Science and Technology is presently headed
by Vladimir A. Kirillin, who is also a Deputy Chairman of the Council
of Ministers and a member of the Communist Party Central
3. he State Planning Committee
The State Planning Committee (GOSPLAN), under the direction
of Nikolay K. Baybakov, is responsible for planning scientific, tech-
nological, and economic activities in the Soviet Union, as well as
exercising budget control. It falls in the Ministerial and State Com-
mittee structure directly under the Council of Ministers. It has an
input into most Soviet undertakings, especially those, such as the
space program, in which numerous organizations and sectors of the
economy are involved. Within the State Committee are a number of
regional and functional departments. The Committee is also respon-
sible for overseeing plan fulfillment. One of its most important duties
is to participate in formulating the overall short and long term plans
of the Soviet Union such as the Five-Year Plan.2
Very little is known of the relationship between the space organi-
zation and the State Planning Committee. It is generally assumed
that the space program falls under the system of precise advance
planning, prevalent throughout the Soviet Union. Integration of the
space program with the other national undertakings would seem to
require a considerable degree of involvement by the Committee.
1 American University, op. cit., p. 354-355.
o0 Gallagher, op. cit., p. 68.
.1 Ame:ican University, op. cit., p. 609-611.



1. General Role
Since the early history of Soviet space and rocket research there
has been a close tie between the scientists and the military establish-
ment. Scientists and inventors learned very early that undler the
Soviet system, the best way to get generous and quick funding for a
project was to impress upon the military the defense or strategic value
of the undertaking. The initial research ins-titutions dealing with
rocketry such as the Leningrad Gas Dynamics Laboratory were
established under the control of the armed forces. The secrecy cloaking
Soviet space research can at least in part be explained by the military
link. Soviet space scientists themselves are said to have a history of
"secrecy consciousness." On the whole, Soviet space scientists have
not been "prolific recorders of their findings." 22
Western opinion varies on the military-civilian mix of the Soviet
space organization today, and on the degree of separation between the
military and civilian aspects of the program. The Soviets themselves
claim that their entire space program is purely scientific and peaceful
in purpose, which is known not to be the case.23 In fact there appears
to be general consensus among Western experts that the military is
deeply involved in the program. Some analysts see the military estab-
lishment as controlling essentially only the military side of the space
program with a large part remaining in civilian hands.24 Other observers
have expressed the opinion that the military shares, with the Soviet
Academy of Sciences, the organizational control of the program.25
Foy D. Kohler has suggested that rather than a NASA-type central
agency, existing organizations, "particularly within the military estab-
lishment," are primarily responsible for directing the program.26 Dr.
Thomas O. Paine, the Administrator of NASA, in testimony before
Congress in 1970, attributed a key role to the military in the space
program. He said:
The Soviet space program is generally considered to be directed by the Soviet
military, and public analyses indicate that a very considerable proportion of
flights no doubt serve military purposes.27
2. The Ministry of Defense
The military establishment exerts general influence on policy at the
ministerial level through the Defense Ministry with input from the
five military branches. Perhaps more significantly the military has a
direct input at the highest Party level through the membership in the
Politburo of Defense Minister Andrey Grechko and the presence of
numerous military officers in other high Party offices.28 This factor in
itself would allow the military to have an influence over the space
organization at the very top. It is generally believed, however, that
22 Daniloff, op. cit., p. 30-32.
3 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Astronautics. Review of the Soviet Space Program;
with Comparative United States Data. Prepared by Charles S. Sheldon II. Washington, Govt. Print.
Off., 1967, p. 81.
4 See for example: U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. Soviet space
programs, 1962-1965, op. cit., p. 147.
25 See Ulsamer, Edgar. The Soviet Space Effort: Still Increasing. Air Force Magazine, v. 56, October
1973: 56.
26 Kohler, Foy D. and Dodd L. Harvey. Administering and Managing the United States and Soviet
Space Programs. Science, v. 169, September 11, 1970: 1050.
27 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Astronautics. 1971 NASA Authorization. Vol. 1.
Hearings held February 17, 19, 20, 24, 25, and 26, 1970. Washington, Govt. Print. Off., 1970. p. 13.
28 American University, op. cit., p. 580-581.


the military establishment exercises more direct influence over the
The Soviet Defense Ministry which is directly under the Council of
Ministers in the Government structure is charged with directing,
administering, and supporting the military branches. The Defense
Minister and his two or three deputies head the organization. At the
next level are the other deputy ministers, including the connmanders-
in-chief of the major military branches and the most important support
branches. Below this level are the General Staff and the Main Political
Administration. The Main Political Administration which acts as the
Party's "watch-dog" in the military is simultaneously a section of the
Party Central Committee adding another significant link. The next
level in the military hierarchy includes the operating commands.29
A striking difference between the Soviet defense structure and, for
example, its American equivalent is that the Soviet establishment
consists of military men from top to bottom. Upon the death of
Marshal Malinovskiy in 1967, it was at first rumored in the West that
he would be replaced by Dmitriy F. Ustinov (the Politburo member
responsible for space and defense industries). If selected, he would
have become the first civilian in that position. Reportedly, he was the
Party choice but under stiff opposition from the military, Grechko
was chosen in his place.30
In terms of the Soviet space program, an important characteristic
of the Defense Ministry is its relationship with the strategic industries
which manufacture the hardware. While structurally these industrial
sectors are under the Defense Industries and other Ministeries, directly
under the Council of Ministers, they are in practice controlled by the
military establishment, according to some analysts.3
Below the Ministry of Defense, the five coequal branches of the
military are the Army, Navy, Air Force, Air Defense Command, and
the Strategic Rocket Force. The Air Force and the Strategic Rocket
Force have a direct operational role in the space program.
3. The Strategic Rocket Force
The Strategic Rocket Force conducts all space rocket launches
whether for military or civilian purposes. It was established in 1960
and is the elite branch of the Soviet military. The primary mission of
the force is to launch strategic nuclear missiles. The size of the force
has been estimated at 250,000 men. Very little is known of its orga-
nizational structure. It is commanded by General Vladimir F. Tolubko
who replaced Nikolay I. Krylov upon his death in 1972. He is a member
of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party.32
The Strategic Rocket Force is thought to operate some tracking
stations and tracking ships. It also may exercise some control over the
launch facilities.
N Gallagher, Mathew P. and Karl F. Spielmann. Soviet Decision-making for Defense: A Critique of
U.S. Perspectives on the Arms Race. New York, Praeger, 1972. p. 38-39.
so Ibid., p. 41.
31 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. Soviet Space Programs, 1966-
1970. Washington, Govt. Print. Off., 1971, p. 85.
32 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Reference Aid: Directory of USSR Ministry of Defense and Armed
Forces Officials. April 1975, p. 13. (A-C R-75-14).


4. The Air Force
The Soviet Air Force is responsible for co-monaut training at Star
Village (Zvezdnyy Gorodok) near Moscow and for the recovery of
spacecraft. The chief of cosmonaut training is Lieutenant General
Vladimir A. Shatalov, himself a veteran cosmonaut,.
The Soviet Air Force, or long-range Air Force as it is sometimes
called, is distinct from the Air Defense Command which is responsible
for the defense of the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countrie-
from foreign attack. The Air Force has been compared to the U.S.
Strategic Air Command since its mission may be similarly limited.
The advent of the missile age and the establi~lhment of the Strategic
Rocket Force to man the missiles has diminished the overall role of
the Air Force.3 The Air Force is presently commanded by Chief
Mar-hal of Aviation Pavel S. Kutakhov, a full member of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party.3"


1. O(hrview
Soviet Party leader Brezhnev in his speech marking the 250th
anniversary of the Soviet Academy of Sciences said that the country
had more than a million people working in various fields of science,
calling it a "great force that must be used properly." 3 It is not
definitely known what percentage of these people work on the Soviet
space program, or how precisely they are organized. The Communist
Party exercises varying degrees of control over the entire scientific
The National Science Foundation sponsored a study on Soviet
research and development which concluded in part:
The cardinal aspect of Soviet organization for research and development -tems
from the fundamental nature of the Soviet State wherein the allocation and
employment of natural resources are determined and enforced by the central
government. As is true for all economic, cultural, and other functions of Soviet
society, the lines of control over research and development progressively converge
toward the apex of State power, the Central Cinzmiittee of the Communist Party
and its executive branch, the USSR Council of Ministers. All basic decisions on
the scale, direction, and organization of research and development are made -r
re subject to confirmation at that uppermost level of authority as if by the
directors of a giant, nationwide, all-inclusive holding corporation.37
The dependent relationship of the scientists to the Communist
Party is just as emphatically underscored by Soviet leaders. On this
subject Leonid Brezhnev said:
Socialism and science are indivisible, and this is the reason for the victory ,f
socialism. Socialism alone makes possible the utilization of the gains of science in
the interest of the people and makes it possible to bring to light the creative
potential and talents that abound in every people ...
* I would like to pay special attention to a highly important problem-the
Party spirit of our science. In whatever branch Soviet scientists work, they are
alwais distinguished by one characteristic-a high level of Communist conscio: s-
ns and Soviet patriotism.'*
. Smider, op. cit. p. 30.
SAmerican Ulniversiy, op. cit., p. 5S6.
S.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Reference Aid: Directory of USSR Ministry of Defense and Arned
F r -es Offcials, op. cit., p. 9.
f Academy of Sciences' 295th birthday, op. cit.. p. 4.
:' Ko-ol. Alexander G. Soviet Research and Development: Its Orgarization, Personnel, and Funds.
Car ridge, Mass., The M.I.T. Press, 1 p. 3.
t" Academy of Sciences' 250th birthday, op. cit., p. 2.

The scientists are said not always to welcome the Party's control
over their work. Some analysts view the Party-science community
relationship as one of chronic tension. This may be explained partially
by the fact that Soviet science has been subjected to Party control
without the scientists themselves having been integrated, to alv
significant degree, into the Government decision-making process. ()n
the whole, analysts believe, American scientists have more influenlce
on policy than their Soviet counterparts through institutions such as
the President's Science Advisory Committee or the Special Asi-stant
for Science and Technology. (Ironically, such American ins-titution
were established in response to the Soviet Sputnik challenge).3"
This is not to imply, however, that individual space scientists have
no input into top-level decision-making. On the contrary their influ-
ence, at times, can be significant. It was reportedly Sergey Koiolev.
the former Chief Designer and major figure in the Soviet space pro-
gram, who convinced Khrushchev to provide major support and fund-
ing for the Soviet space program by promising that, given the proper
tools, he could beat the United States in sending up a sputnik for the
International Geophvsical Year in 1957.40 However, Soviet scientists
do not appear to be involved in the decision-making on an institutional
or sustained basis.
An important factor in viewing the Soviet space organization is the
distinction that exists within the Soviet science establishment between
what one analyst calls civilian scientists and defense scientists. There
is a striking contrast between the scientific achievements to date of the
defense sector on the one hand, and the civilian sector, on the other.
The defense sector has had remarkable successes, while the civilian
sector has had very mixed results, including stagnation in many areas,
over recent years. Defense research and development receives prefer-
ential funding which in turn has the effect of providing the defense
scientists with more favorable working conditions than their civilian
counterparts. It has been estimated that the defense sector, in the
broad sense, receives as much as 80 per cent of research and develop-
ment allocations.41 In this estimate, the entire space effort is included
in the defense category, on the grounds that the space program has
had the success, commitment of resources, and preferential treatment
characteristic of that category.
Many analysts believe that funding alone does not explain the
greater effectiveness of defense and space R&D. They see a more
efficient organization in the strategic areas. The views of these analysts
were reenforced in a 1962 speech by Premier Khrushchev. He
attributed Soviet success in these areas to the "centralization and
concentration of scientific and design forces in the appropriate com-
mittees" and admitted that this sort of efficiency did not yet exist in
other areas.42
Despite the difference between the two scientific sectors (defense
and civilian), they share many common problems. One factor that
probably works against rapid progress in space research is the existing
compartmentalization of scientific work. One scientist or group of
'9 Juviler. Peter H. and Henry W. Morton, eds. Soviet Policy-making: Studies of Communiism: in Transi-
tion. New York, Praeger, 1967, p. 58.
0 Gallagher. Matthew P. and Karl F. Spielmann. Soviet Decision-making for Defense: A Critique of
U.S. Perspectives on the Arms Race. New York, Praeger Pub.. 172, p. 72-73.
4 Ibid., p. 55. 66.
42 Pravda, November 20, 1962: cited in Gallagher, op. cit.. p. 68.


scientists does not necessarily know what the other is doing. Scientists
throughout the Soviet system are said to be plagued by an inability
to gain from the free flow of ideas and information which Western
scientists, for example, rely on heavily.
2. The Soviet Academy of Science
a. General Organization.-The Academy of Sciences is the most
visible institution of the Soviet space organization. The Soviet Union
presents it as the counterpart of the U.S. National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) in its space role. In negotiations with
NASA on space cooperation, the Soviet Union is represented by
Academy officials. Some leading Western experts subscribe to this
dominant position attributed to the organization by Soviet spokesmen.
The Dutch expert Peter Smolders maintains that under the control of
the top Party and Government organizations the actual "coordina-
tion of all space activities, manned as well as unmanned flights, is in
the hands of the Soviet Academy of Sciences." 43
Other observers agree that the Academy is one of the institutions
heavily involved in the space organization, providing research support,
consultation, and acting as spokesman for the program at home and
abroad, but dispute the central role within the organization attributed
to it. They do not deny that key figures in the Academy might actually
be involved in the central coordination of the space effort in other
capacities. For example, the former Academy President, Mstislav V.
Keldysh, is recognized as a prominent space scientist. The Soviet press
has associated the "successes of the U.S.S.R. in the exploration of
space" with his name and has referred to him as an organizer and
initiator" of the space program.44 Furthermore, membership in the
Academy is a form of recognition for which leading space scientists
seem to be prime candidates.
The evidence generally used to support the arguments of those who
doubt the central role of the Academy as an institution in the space
organization is that (1) its scope of responsibility has become too
limited as a result of the various reorganizations for the Academy to
play the role of coordinator; and (2) the Soviet Communist Party
leadership and the military establishment seem to have a historical
mistrust toward the Academy (despite the esteem in which they hold
it) that would make it unlikely for them to give the institution the
central coordinating role.
Membership in the Soviet Academy of Sciences is one of the highest
honors conferred by the Soviet State. The functions of the Academy
encompass not only the natural sciences, but also the social sciences,
law, and humanities. The academy is considered to be the leading
center of basic and applied research in the Soviet Union. Under the
Academy are fourteen Republic academies and seven branches. It
serves as coordinator for the pure scientific research carried on by the
academies of the Soviet Union Republics and the specialized institutes.45
In all, the Academy incorporates 250 scientific institutions and em-
ploys over 160,000 people, 40,000 of whom are highly trained
43 Smolders, op. cit., p. 29.
" The New York Times, May 31, 1971: 32.
45 Juviler, op. cit., p. 134.
, Academy of Sciences 250th Birthday, op. cit., p. 4.


The highest body of the Academy in the formal structure is the
General Assembly which includes all the regular and honorary mem-
bers. Real control is exercised by the Presidium of the Academy. The
Presidium members for the most part hold high-level Party posts.
They act as the channel for Party and Government directives. Below
the Presidium is the Scientific Secretary. Under him are the councils,
departments, and agencies. As elsewhere in the Soviet system, the
Party exercises control from the top and at every level of the Academy.
Political secretaries are assigned to every institute and departmnnt.
The President of the Academy is A. P. Aleksandrov.
The Academy was reorganized in 1963, when reforms mentioned by
Khrushchev as early as 1956 were instituted. On the basis of the re-
forms the Academy remained the central coordinator of theoretical
research. Many organizations, such as the Institute for IMetallurgy
were transferred to the industrial ministries. The Academy continued
to carry on some engineering research of fundamental importance, but
it no longer worked on the practical applications.4 As a result of the
reorganization, the Academy remains the single most important and
prestigious scientific institution in the Soviet Union. However, it has
lost its position in the overall administration of Soviet science and
Within the structure of the Academy are to be found several com-
missions and sections directly involved in the space program. Other
space commissions may fall under the jurisdiction of the Academy.
Some of these units probably contribute significantly to the space
effort while others may serve primarily as a front for the more secret
space organization.
b. Space Institutions ,under the Academy.-Under the auspices of the
Soviet Academy of Sciences are numerous commissions, institutes, and
organizations which deal with various aspects of space research. In
1954, an organization was established under the title Interdepartmen-
tal Commission for the Coordination and Control of Scientific-
Theoretical Work in the Field of Organization and Accomplishment
of Interplanetary Communications. It was headed by Leonid I. Sedov
and included, among others, Petr L. Kapitsa and Anatoliy A. Bla-
gonravov. The main function of the Interdepartmental Commission
was to coordinate scientific research aimed at launching a Soviet
Sputnik. It was also reportedly responsible for developing experiments
to be carried out in space, for publicizing Soviet space achievements,
maintaining contacts with foreign space organizations, and sending
scientists to represent the Soviet Union at international space con-
ferences." The Interdepartmental Commission was reportedly super-
ceded by the Commission on the Exploration and Utilization of
Space, headed by Blagonravov.49 (Soviet sources refer to it as the
Commission for the Study and Use of Outer Space).50
Another institution apparently under the auspices of the Academy
of Sciences is the Commission for the Promotion of Interplanetaly
Flights, headed by Leonid I. Sedov (formerly with the Interdepart-
mental Commission and Vice President of the International Astro-
4 Juviler, op. cit., p. 155.
a Daniloff, op. cit.. p. 56, 76-77.
40 Beck, op. cit., p. 148.
M Lebedev, Lev. Soviet Space Researh. Space World, v. k-11-131, November 1974: 22.


nauitical Federation)."5 The organization is also referred to as the
Comnmission for Space Travel."2 At least one of its important duties
seems to be as spokesman and representative internationally for the
Soviet space program.
A major agency of the Academy of Sciences is the Council for Inter-
national Cooperation in the Studies and Uses of Outer Space (Inter-
kosmnos). The Council is the coordinator for all cooperative space
ventures with the countries of Eastern Europe, to which the Soviet
Union attributes major political significance. Chairman of the Council
is Boris N. Petrov, considered a foremost expert in cybernetics and the
theory of automatic control. lie is also the Director of the Depart-
ment of Mechanics and Control Processes at the Academy and a pro-
fessor at the Moscow Aviation Institute. Furthermore, lie is another
leading international spokesman for the Soviet space progranm.'3
The Institute of Space Research, directed by R. Z. Sagdeyev is one
of several advanced research centers operated by the Academy.'4
Soine of these Institutes offer advanced university degrees.
The Soviet Academy of Sciences also operates some of the space
tracking stations within the Soviet Union and ten of the tracking
slhips operating around the globe. Other space communications ships
are operated by the Navy and the Strategic Rocket Force. The Co-
ordination and Computing ('enter which analyzes communication re-
ceived from space is also reportedly under Academny administration, as
is Star Village (Zvezdny Gorodok), at least formally, where the cos-
mnonnuts are trained by the Air Force.:'
3. Input from the I'niversities
Universities in the Soviet Union are thought to have less of an input
into resealrch and developmlent than their American coiunterparts. The
institutes of higher learning conduct much of their own research. But
their work does not seem to be integrated with the research performed
at the Academy and elsewhere. This deIpartmlentalization inhibits the
exchange of technological information between the universities and the
space organization and among the uiniversities themselves. Further-
more, it is said to work to the detriment of the tability to improvise in
the space progr am."6 The universities may constitute a large untapped
or wasted resource in the Soviet space program.

1. The Eridence
Over the years Western experts have been interested in the ques-
tion of whether there exists a central coordinating agency for the
Soviet space program. There is evidence and strong opinion on both
sides, but no proof. Clearly, an undertaking of the scope of the space
programi needs high-level coordinating. While it is an accepted fact
that the highest level oversight comes from the Communist Party
leadership, it also stands to reason that this group does not conduct
the day-to-day management of the program.
61 Gwertzman. Bernard. High Space Costs Backed in Soviet. New York Times, February 28, 1971: 20-
52 Smolders, op. cit.. p. 29.
5a Pond, Elizabeth. Soviets Plan to Land on Venus. Christian Science Monitor, June 17, 1975: 1, 9.
54 The Soyuz-13 flight. New York Times, no. 52, December 1973: 12-13.
55 Smolders, op. cit., p. 30.
56 Coexistence in Space? Swiss Review of World Affairs, v. 25, August 1975: 3.


The specific questions involved in the sesp e agec,.y specul!tion are,
(1) whether a central agency, distinct from tlie institutlions alrealdy
discussed, exists at all; (2) if a separate coordinatinig mnechaniism exist-,
whether it is a formal agency rather than an informal groupin1g along
"Manhattan Project" lines; and (3) the structure alnd memberl-ip of
such an organization.
In 1963, the Aerospace and Technology Division of the Library of
Congress released a study on the management of the Soviet space
program, together with organizational charts, according to which the
Soviet space program was headed by the State Commission for Space
Exploration, directly under the Council of Ministers.7 The Soviet
press on very rare occasions has referred to a "State Commission."
In general, however, the Soviet media speak obliquely about the
"collectives" of scientists and other talent. In 1972, an American
reporter visiting "Star Village" near Moscow spoke of the "State
Commission" clearing the spacecraft for launch, and said that while
the identity and scope of the organization is not known, it is presumed
to incorporate many of the functions of NASA."8
Another observer, Nicholas Daniloff, quotes one source as having
identified the Soviet space agency as the "State Commission for the
Organization and Execution of Space Flight." 9 He also attributes
responsibility for all launches to the Commission.
Other analysts believe that the Soviet Union has no space agency
which approximates America's NASA."0 In place of such an organiza-
tion, they perceive an elaborate system of coordination among
participating institutions on an informal basis. One observer sees a
"tendency to resort to ad hoc arrangements to override whatever
barriers exist" in high priority fields of Soviet research and develop-
ment. This he believes functions only because of the intimate participa-
tion by the Soviet leadership. Top officials can intercede quickly
when stumbling blocks and jurisdictional bottlenecks, such as plague
much of the civilian sector, develop.61
2. The Structure
The central coordinating mechanism of the Soviet space program
probably includes representatives from the upper echelons of the
Communist Party, the military establishment, the scientific establish-
ment, and the industrial ministries and state committees that have
an input into the space program. The top positions in the organization
have been identified as including a Chairman, one or more Deputy
Chairmen, a Launch Director, the Chief Designer, and the Chief
Theoretician of Cosmonautics.2 Other probable high-level members
come from the military, including Air Force and Strategic Rocket
Force representatives, and from the scientific and industrial sectors.3
3. Speculation on Individual Identities
The chief officials and scientists of the Soviet space program must
bear the burden of working in complete anonymity. Nikita Khrushchev
5a U.S. Library of Congress. Aerospace Technology Division. Management of the Soviet Space Program.
Washington, October 1963. (ITS: AID Report P-63-117).
s* Wilford, John Noble, Soviet Space Center: Hope Amid Expansion. New York Times, March 22, 1972:
1, 20.
5* D)aniloff, op. cit.. p. 76-77.
60 See for example: Ulsamer, op. cit., p. 56.
s6 Gallagher, op. cit., p. 70.
62 All mention of the Chief Theoretician has been dropped and the position probably no longer exists.
*3 U.S. Library of Congress, op. cit., figure 3, and Daniloff. op. cit.. p. 7S.


frequently explained that the secrecy surrounding their identities was
necessary to protect them from the threat of assassination. As a
result, guessing the identities of space officials has become a lively
game in the West. The Russians only disclose the identities upon the
deaths of space leaders. However, occasional clues do appear in the
Soviet media inadvertently.
There were reportedly occasions in the past when impostors were
actually paraded to conceal the real identities of space figures. Accord-
ing to one account, Sergey P. Korolev, who was the Chief Designer and
leading scientist in the Soviet space program, became infuriated
because L. I. Sedov was being presented at international congresses as
the leading Soviet space scientist. When the Western press began to
refer to Sedov as the father of the Sputnik, Korolev allegedly demanded
of Khrushchev that the true identities of all the people involved in the
launching of the first Sputnik be published. While Khrushchev did not
comply with this demand, all further reference to Sedov as the man
behind Sputnik were reportedly stopped.64
The position of chairman in any national coordinating commission
on space would, at least formally, be the most important. Dmitriy F.
Ustinov, previously referred to as the top Soviet official on space in
his Politburo capacity, has been suggested as a possible chairman of a
"State Commission." Whether Ustinov, as a Politburo member, would
become involved in the day-to-day administration of the space pro-
gram is open to question. Some of the speculation on the position is
based on the perceived identity of the earlier chairman who was
thought by many to be Konstantin N. Rudnev, now the head of the
Ministry of Instrument Making, Automation Equipment and Control
Systems (and probably still influential in the space program). He had
been in charge of defense industries from 1958-1961 prior to becom-
ming chairman of the precursor to the State Committee on Science
and Technology while allegedly heading the "State Commission." He
was also a Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. A man who
possesses a very similar background, and is, therefore, a logical sub ect
of speculation regarding the chairmanship, is Vladimir A. Kirillin.65 He
is currently Chairman of the State Committee on Science and Tech-
nology and a Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, as well as
a member of the Party Central Committee.
Leonid V. Smirnov and Sergey A. Zverev are two other people who,
on the basis of their present positions and backgrounds, in areas
associated with the space and defense fields, could be considered
possible candidates for the position of chief space coordinator. Smirnov
is Chairman of the Military-Industrial Commission and a Deputy
Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Zverev holds the important
post of Minister of Defense Industries.
Korolev held the position of Chief Designer of the Soviet space pro-
gram until his death in 1966. In this capacity he presumably worked
under the direction of the Chairman. However, on frequent occasions
he is said to have reported directly to Premier Khrushchev. He was
responsible for the scientific and technological aspects of the Soviet
space program. According to some sources, Korolev also held the posi-
4 Vladimirov, Leonid. The Russian Space Bluff. London, Tom StaceylLtd., 1971, p. 19.
U6 Daniloff, op. cit., p. 81.


tions of Launch Director and Deputy Chairman of the "State Commis-
sion".66 It is unlikely that one man replaced him in all three positions.
Mikhail K. Yangel is believed by some observers to have replaced
Korolev in the position of Chief Designer. When Yangel died in 1971, a
TASS Soviet news agency obituary called him the "outstanding scien-
tist and designer in space technology" and the "man who raised a
galaxy of outstanding designers and scientists". It said that he had
made a unique contribution to the unmanned lunar program and the
Venus and Mars programs. He was also said to have had a major role
in the area of manned space flights. Yangel was a full member of the
Soviet Academy of Sciences and of the Supreme Soviet. He had re-
ceived the highest Soviet honors during his life. After World War II
he is known to have worked on Soviet aviation and rocketry and is said
to have directed a top national rocket design bureau.67
Since Yangel's death, speculation on the identity of the Chief
Designer has involved Vladimir N. Chelomei. He is known to be a
prominent figure in the Soviet space program. He is thought by some
observers to have had a position rivaling that of Korolev under Khru-
shchev. Chelomei graduated from the Kiev Aviation Institute and
designed jet aircraft engines during World War II. After the war he
began to work in the rocket field. He became a Bauman Engineering
School professor in 1952. He, too, is a Supreme Soviet Deputy.68
Other names have been mentioned from time to time as possible
members of the "State Commission". Valentin P. Glushko is known to
have been a designer of rocket engines. In early Soviet space literature
his name was linked with that of Korolev and Tikhonravov. He has
been suggested as the possible Chief Designer of Rocket Engines.69
In his obituary, Aleksey Isayev was identified by TASS as the chief
designer of the rocket engines for the Vostok, Voskhod, Soyuz and
Mars spacecraft. Very little was revealed about his background other
than that he was a university graduate who worked in the field of
aviation and rocket engine development. He was called one of the main
creators of the first Soviet jet in 1942. In his lifetime he had received
the highest Government honors and awards.70
Leonid I. Sedov, as a specialist in mechanics and aerodynamics, is
also thought to have an important role in the program, even though he
may not be "the father of Sputnik" as the Western press at one time
A final point which has interested Western observers concerns the
true identities of leading space scientists who write articles in the
Soviet Union under pseudonyms. Key figures in the space program are
known to have used this approach to maintain their anonymity in the
past. Korolev allegedly used more than one pseudonym in his life time.
A former Soviet journalist who at one time wrote about the space
program said that Korolev regularly wrote articles for Pravda under
the pseudonym "Konstantinov".71 He is also thought to have been
the author of articles under the name Professor K. Sergeyev. These
articles were generally New Year's reports on the Soviet space
6 Daniloff, op. cit., p. 78.
67 Mikhail Yangel Dies; Soviet Space Scientist. Washington Star, October 27, 1971: B5.
M Shabad, Theodore. Russians indicate rocket specialist heads space program. New York Times, July 14,
62 Dainloff, op. cit., p. 84-85.
7o Soviet Rocket Designer Identified. Washington Star, June 27, 1971: All.
TI Ibid.


program. If he indeed wrote the articles, lie nierely reversed hisi
names. This has led to speculation that the articles which started to
appear in the late 1950s by Professor G. V. Petrovich may have
been written by Valentin P. Glushko, the rocket engine designer.7
Without speculating on pseudonyms used by other leading space
scientists, it can be guessed that some of tlhe signatures appearing on
articles today may be pseudonyms for key space figures.
4. Some Concluding Generalizations
Few conclusions can be drawn on the organization of the Soviet
space program with any degree of certainty. It is known that tie
Communist Party exercizes overall control from the top through its
Central Committee and ruling Politburo and at every level through an
elaborate network of "political secretariats". The top decisionmaker
on space is the General Secretary of the Party whose degree of personal
involvement depends on his own discretion. (There are indications that
Nikita Khrushchev, as a space enthusiast, involved himself intimately.
It is possible that Leonid Brezhnev participates less directly.) The
Politburo member charged with directing the space program is thought
to be Dmitriy F. Ustinov. This position would appear to make him
tlhe top space official.
At the Government level, the directives of the Communist Party
leadership are received by the Council of Ministers. The coordination
is simple because the Council inclules several of the Party leaders.
The Council of Ministers has under it the ministries and state com-
mittees which oversee many of the elements going into the space
program. The most important are the Ministry of Defense, the
Ministry of Defense Industries, the State Committee on Science and
Technology, the State Committee on Planning, the Military-Industrial
Commission, and the Ministry of Instrument Making, Automation
Equipment, and Control Systems. Among them, they control the
industries and the research and development involved in the space
The military establishment plays a large, possibly dominant, role in
the space program. Military influence may be exercised directly or
through outside organizations on which it is heavily represented. in
this context, it seems revealing that most of the individuals who are
mentioned as probable high functionaries in the space organization
have strong military or defense industry backgrounds. The military
participates directly in the space program at another level. The Air
Force is responsible for cosmonaut training and vehicle recovery. The
Strategic Rocket Force conducts all space launches. The three major
launch sites are administered by the military.
The Soviet Academy of Sciences and its subsidiary organizations are
extensively involved in the space program, but possibly not in the
central role sometimes attributed to them. The Academy and its
members are held in the highest esteem in the Soviet Union, but there
appears simultaneously to be an element of mistrust toward the
scientific establishment and its chief organ among the Party and State
hierarchy. Furthermore, since its reorganizations, the Academy does
not seem to be set up in a manner that would allow the most effective
coordination of the space effort.
*2 Daniloff, op. cit., p. 84.


Therefore, it would appear tihat there is cent ral coordinatinig
mechanism which lies outside the Science Acaldemy l structulre and
which includes high-level representatives froml thlle mIIIajor palrticiplatiing
groups; namely, the ('onum unist Party, the miilitary, tIhe s-ielnti-t-,
and the sectors of the Soviet econoimy involved ini thl(e )patc:e Iprogram.
Whether this mechanism is a formal agency such as the tIIuch d(i--
cussed "State (Commiission" or just an informal g()Irping f ke(v
individuals remains an open question. There is strong olpinion, b)lut
there seems to be no conclusive evidence on either side. lRegariinl
the membership of this coordiinating mechanism, spetuilation Lv
various Western observers has been inclul(de as a point of interevt.
However, due to the tight veil of secrecy that surrounds key Soviet
space figures, their identification remains a highly conjectural exerci-e.


By John P. Hardt* and George D. Holliday*
Since its emergence to prominence in the 1950's, the Soviet space
program has reflected national economic, political, and military
goals to a larger extent than the U.S. program. The correlation of
Soviet national objectives in military and civilian space has been
facilitated by the apparent centralization of decision-making in the
Politburo of the Communist Party.' Moreover, the administration of
Soviet military and civilian space has been less distinctly separated
than in the United States. Consequently, reliance on favored research
and development institutions and the more sophisticated military-
industrial support industries have placed Soviet space in the favored
position with military claimants on resources. In a sense, the old
resource allocation choice between "guns and butter" placed space in
the preferred position of the former. Under Stalin's rule, it was clear
that this broad question of resource allocation choice was not an
operative policy issue. Only in the Brezhnev period, especially since
1967, does such a choice appear to have been an active consideration
for Party economic decision-makers. In the modern Soviet context,
for example, we may say that the decision to build new chemical
fertilizer plants or new military or space facilities might result from
these broad "guns or butter"-type considerations by the top
For most of the Stalinist period and the transitional rule of Nikita
Khrushchev, resource allocations to the military and space programs
were largely given or stipulated for Soviet economic planners. The
special personal relationship of Academician Sergey Korolev and
Party leader Khrushchev doubtless contributed to the special space
priority in the post-Sputnik period. With the passing of the two
from the scene politically and physically, the space priority has
probably been more institutionalized, and less personalized.

*Dr. Hardt is senior specialist in Soviet economics and Mr. Holliday is analyst in Soviet economics, Eco-
nomics Division, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress.
1 Cf. Francis T. Miko, Organization and Administration of the Soviet Space Program, in this volume.
2 Central Intelligence Agency, Soviet Economy: 1974 Results and Prospects for 1975, March 1975, p. 21.


As the military claims on investment funds began to be assessed
more critically in the late 1960's, the space claims may have come
under increasing scrutiny. There appears to be an increasing awareness
of the alternative uses of scarce resources in the space program. The
sophisticated demands of civilian investment programs for proj-
ects such as petrochemical plants appear to have been given increasing
attention. In considering these competing demands for resources, the
part of the space budget that did not contribute directly to military
strategic systems was probably under the most severe pressure.
In assessing the resource burden, we have in mind two rather differ-
ent kinds of questions:
1. Objectively, what were the quantity and quality of resources
made available to the space programs?
2. Subjectively, how did the leadership appear to view the burden
of space programs in terms of the options foregone in other alloca-
tions-the opportunity costs?
From the former measurement of resources devoted to space, we
might also be able to throw some light on the question of the selective
efficiency of theprograms. Equivalent allocations to space programs
in countries such as the Soviet Union and the United States probably
resulted in different outcomes.
The more subjective question of opportunity costs-although more
difficult to assess-might provide insights on future program develop-
ments, help to explain past space program choices, or indicate a basis
for the cooperative program in space. The alternative costs or percep-
tion of needs may have influenced Soviet decisions on competing with
the United States in the "race to the Moon," choosing between manned
and unmanned flights, and assigning priority to development of a space
shuttle. Moreover, if the economic gains were deemed sufficient, the
political costs of U.S.-Soviet space cooperation may have appeared
more tolerable. To be sure, many of these choices were technologically
constrained. However, the margin between economic and technological
feasibility is difficult to establish with any precision. More funds for
research and development might overcome technological constraints.
The objective question is primarily a measurement problem. At-
tempts to measure, in turn, are limited by the accuracy of Soviet data
or the willingness to disclose the data and by problems of translating
Soviet measurements-either in physical or monetary terms-into
measurements susceptible to international comparisons. If Soviet
leaders have been increasingly interested in choice among space and
other programs, the accuracy of measurements may be presumed to
have improved. However, the limitation on disclosure of information
in the Soviet system makes such a judgment difficult to document.
The secrecy system has been and continues to be, so pervasive and
restrictive that direct access to the kind of information normally
available in the West is severely limited. Moreover, the access of many
Soviet officials and professional analysts to Soviet data is also sharply
restricted. This important information precondition is so crucial in
influencing what an outsider may deduce or what most insiders may
know, that a detailed discussion of the Soviet State secrecy laws, their
current applications, and impact is the first step in our analysis.

Full Text


In 1970, in virtually the same kind of orbit at the first series of
Meteor payloads, there came Kosmos 389. The most likely supposition
was that this was a weather satellite which had failed, and hence had
been given a Kosmos name instead of a Meteor name, so as to hide the
fact that no weather pictures were being returned.
This supposition almost certainly was wrong. Each year for six
-years a single repeat of this kind of flight has occurred. The Meteor
failure explanation no longer fits. Furthermore, all the Meteors since
the beginning of 1972 have flown at the new, higher altitude while
these Kosmos flights continue at the older, lower altitude.
With no published findings, these flights almost have to be military
in nature. Next, one applies the kind of analysis which permitted the
sorting out of each of the different families of C-1 military flights to
look for possible matches which might suggest that a later generation
craft was coming into use which might carry more equipment than a
smaller C-1. Where the C-1 payloads which put up singly may range
about 800 kilograms, an A-1 would probably put up three to four
times that much (2,-I00 to 3,200 kilograms).
There are not enough of these payloads to provide a navigation sys-
tem, and no such telemetry has been discovered coming from these
flights. They are not high enough to be helpful for geodetic work.
They could handle store dump communications on a limited basis. But
they come closest in altitude to the C-1 electronic ferret flights. Hence,
most Western observers have counted these flights as belonging in the
latter category. Undoubtedly having a larger A-1 satellite than the
payload used in the major C-1 elint system already described would
afford extra opportunities to monitor a wider range of electromagnetic
frequencies, record more data for later replay, and carry on board
more special equipment for preliminalTry analysis of signals detected.
There also might be some division of labor between two classes of elint
satellites. The big network in planes 45 degrees apart might be used
mostly for capturing a large volume of communications where mes-
sages are heard only once. The more complex and less common larger
elint satellites might concentrate on specialized sources of electromag-
netic signals such as radars where presumably the class of signals
would be repetitive. There seems no way to determine the accuracy
of such speculations based upon material in the public domain.
Table 6-9 lists all the A-l, non-recoverable uses for military pur-
poses, and for convenience includes parallel columns for weather satel-
lites, so the general relationships of flight mode can be compared.


Solar activity also varies in 11 year cycle.s. At the peak of solar ac-
tivity, giant eruptions on the surface of the sun, termed solar fl,..,
occur. These develop rapidly and last from 30 to 50 miinutes during
which time iritense radiation is emitted. The intei-ity of radiiation va-
ies substantially with the size and activity of a solar flare. High (',.r-rv
protons, alpha particles, and a few heavy nuclei emitted( during ..)lar
flare activity constitute a radiation hazard to sp:cecrews outside of thl
Van Allen belts of geomagnetically trapped radiation.-'9
There are two belts of geomagnetically trapped radiation around
the Earth which contain electrons and protons. Space vehicles v:.-it
trajectories of 30 degrees inclination from the equator or largjtr will
traverse these Van Allen belts five times each day. Nearly the cnti-'r
accumulated radiation exposure of all orbital missions to latee is at-
tributable to Van Allen belt radiation. But the dose received by spacr -
crews has been determined to be of no biologically significant
hazard.260 261
The characteristics of space radiations are summarized in Table 4-11.

Nature of
Name Radiation Charge Mass Where Found

Photon-----.....------ Electromagnetic.- 0 0 Radiation belts, solar radiation (produced by
X-ray-------------. Electromagnetic... 0 nuclear reactions and by stoppirg elsc-
Gamma ray----------- Electromagnetic... 0 0 trons), and everywhere in space
Electron.------------ Particle.----- -e 1 me1 Radiation belt and elsewhere
Positron ------ Particle----- +e 1 me Cosmic rays, radiation belt, solar flares
Proton-..------..---- Particle---------- +e 1,840 m, Primary cosmic rays, radiation belt, solar
or 1 amu 2 flares
Neutron------------ Particle-------- 0 1,841 m. Secondary particles produced by nuclear
interactions involving primary particle
Pi meson----------- Particle----------... +, -, 273 me Cosmic rays, radiation belt, solar flares
or 0
Alpha particle------- Particle-----..-----. +2e 4 amu Primary cosmic radiation (nucleus of
helium atom)
Heavy primary nuclei.. Particle----------. +3e 6 amu Primary cosmic radiation (nuclei of heavie
1 me=electron mass.
2 amu=atom mass unit
(Newell & Naugle, 1960;Sondhaus & Evans, 1969; Glasstone, 1958)
SOURCES: The Bioastronautics Data Book, 1974.

In addition to the above, there is a fourth type or secondary type of
radiation which occurs after primary radiation has passed through a
resistant substance such as the spacecraft structure or radiation shield-
ing. This type of radiation is often referred to as bremsstrahlung and
consists of gamma rays.
The radiation doses accumulated by Soviet and American astronauts
during space missions are summarized in Table 4-12.

280 Ibid.
281 Engli h. R. A. Apollo experience report: protection against radiation. Wahi!iton.
D.C., NASA. 1973. 15 p. (NASA TN-D-70o0)

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2. Vostok 2
Major German Titov became the second man to reach orbit on
August 6,1961, remaining up for a day to complete 17 orbits. In most
respects the flight was like that of Vostok 1. There is some inconsist-
ency in Soviet accounts with regard to the final phase of recovery in
the Vostok program. The implication, although contradicted by other
reports, is that Gagarin rode in his ship tall the way to the surface of
the Earth. But is seems clear that from Titov on through the rest of
the Vostok program as 7,000 meters the cosmonaut fired open the hatch
and then the ejection seat to come down separately from the main
cabin. The cabin, after being slowed by air pressure and protected by
ablative material, apparently still struck ground hard enough that even
the cosmonaut in a contoured couch would not enjoy the landing. Like
the dogs which preceded them, most of the cosmonauts were fired out
free from the main ship on their seat, which was mounted on rails
pointed toward an escape hatch. After coming well clear, the cosmo-
naut would then free himself from his seat and come down on a
personal parachute.
3. Vostok 3
.M:ijor Andriyan Nikolavev was launched on August 11, 1962 into
a flight which lasted four days. It can be noted that a flight of similar
duration had already been made by a Kosmos military observation
satellite using essentially the same hardware but without a life support
system; and Korabl Sputnik 1 with the complete Vostok equipment
had flown for four days when retrofire occurred. All the Vostoks flew
in orbits which would experience natural decay in less than ten days.
From the outset every flight carried life support of air, water, food,
and electricity to last for ten days, even though no flight lasted that
4. Vostok 4
Lieutenant Colonel Pavel Popovich was launched August 12, just
a day after Vostok 3, into a close co-orbit so that the two ships ap-
proached within 6.5 km of each other in clear visible range. This was
impressive both in terms of the ground support at the launch site in
readying the facilities for so quick a turnaround (unless two pads were
used) and also for the accuracy in timing the launch and controlling
the flight parameters to guide the second ship to the same location as
the first. This group flight was heralded as a portent of future
5. Vostok 5
On June 14, 1963, Lieutenant Valeriy Bykovskiy was launched into
orbit for five days of flight, matching the time of a predecessor Kos-
mos military observation satellite. This set a Soviet manned duration
record of 119 hours, 6 minutes-not exceeded until Soyuz 9.
6. Vostok 6
It is possible that this launch was a day late, because it went up on
June 16, 1963, and on an orbit which would not permit a sustained
rendezvous with Vostok 5. The orbit did, however, permit a brief pass
at a distance of only 5 kmin. The pilot was Valentina Tereshkova, the
only woman to fly in space to date, and she remained in orbit for three


U.S. flights had gone beyond passive military support to placement
of weapons of mass destruction in orbit. This latter possibility can be
analyzed to show its complete absurdity, but will not be done here.
At the height of Soviet "hysteria" about U.S. overflights, evcn the low
resolution pictures taken by the NASA TIROS weather satellites
were described by some Soviet writers as "spy in the sky" flights.12
It has already been suggested that the Russians faced an informa-
tion handling crisis of their own in the very months that the United
States was "unwriting" its own history of articles about space observa-
tion, and was trying to defuse a potentially bad situation by toning
down and taking the spotlight off U.S. military space flights and
'provocative" program descriptions. Whether our policy was both
correct and wise is a matter of opinion. In the long run it seems to
have worked, but not necessarily for the reasons originally offered.
The Russians decided they wished freedom of action in a number of
military space fields, and that their own withholding of information
on coming programs could be protected with a very simple cover plan
which gave as complete privacy as technology would permit while
maintaining the wholly "peaceful" image of the first five years of
spaceflight. This was simply to have a blanket, all-inclusive flight de-
scription which was generally correct or at least hardly challenge-
able which could be used for the bulk of their flights. At the same time
70 percent of all flights could be given the meaningless name Kosmos,
and a serial number. This "openness' of name, immediate release of
orbital elements, and peaceful Kosmos label, could be contrasted with
the fact that half of U.S. flights were for the Department of Defense,
had no name, no announced mission, and details on orbital path were
withheld for weeks or months for belated release, sometimes after the
flight was over. This Soviet practice was only a propaganda ploy, al-
though an effective one, when in fact a cover name, serial number, and
vague description provided no real information. The Soviet release of
orbital parameters was useful, but presumably told no more than was
already evident to the tracking systems of the United States and
Here is the text of the Kosmos announcement of March 16, 1962:
A series of artificial Earth satellites will be launched from different cos-
modromes of the Soviet Union during 1962. Another launching of an artificial
Earth satellite was carried out in the Soviet Union on 16 March 1962 . .
The launching of the artificial Earth satellite continues the current program
of studying the upper layers of the atmosphere and outer space in fulfillment
of which a series of satellite launching will be effected under this program from
different cosmodromes of the Soviet Union in the course of 1962. The scientific
program includes: The study of the concentration of charged particles in the
ionosphere for investigating the propagation of radio waves; a study of corpus-
cular flows and low energy particles; study of the energy composition of the
radiation belts of the Earth for the purpose of further evaluating the radiation
dangers of prolonged space flights; study of the primary composition and intensity
variation of cosmic rays; study of the magnetic field of the Earth; study of the
short wave radiation of the Sun and other celestial bodies; study of the upper lay-
ers of the atmosphere; study of the effects of meteoric matter on construction
elements of space vehicles; and study of the distribution and formation of cloud
patterns in the Earth's atmosphere.
Moreover, many elements of space vehicle construction will be checked and
improved. The launching of sputniks of this series will be announced in .separate
reports. This program will give Soviet scientists new means for studying the
physics of the upper atmospheric layers and outer space."
12 Aleksandrov, Col. B. Spies in the cosmos. Red Star, Moscow, July 23, 1961, p. A.
Is TASS. March 16, 1962, 1701 GMT.

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the ship while too shallow an approach will scid( the -lJip skipping
out into space not to return with the crew still alive before consum-
ables are exhausted. The best of returns involves problems of dis-
sipating high heat loads, spreadingl de.eleration to avoid peak G load.s,
and finally maneuvering to a suitable recovery area, with contingency
survival plans to meet any conditions of ocean or land.
Undoubtedly any systems study of the entire mission elaborates
these requirements into tens of thousands of pages of detail almost all
of which are important to a successful mission. The public probably
does not comprehend how far human organization and plaiining had
to go to provide successful Apollo flights beyond the building of giant
rockets anjd the selection and training of highly motivated astronauts.
c. Ass(ssmient of Soviet Capabilite s.-James E. Oberg wrote an
assessment which dealt with some of the requirements mentioned,
above.8 His title reveals his conclusion. He pointed out that up to tlhe
middle of the 1960's, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union
haLd demonstrated accomplishment of any of the ihmar requirements.
except that the United States was coming along with a global tracking
and communication network. During the second half of the 1960's, the
United States obviously met all the requirements, since it was success-
ful in a series of Apollo landings. During the same second half of the
decade, the Russians began to demonstrate the establishment of essen-
tial elements as well. They demonstrated unmanned circumlunar flight
with Earth recovery, but had not yet done lunar orbit with Earth
return, and their lunar landing and return demonstration which came
in 1970 was a proof of principle but only with a very small soil sample
returned under very high G load conditions, not anything related to a
manned flight. The tentative conclusion which Oberg reached, and
which seems reasonable, is that the Russians had demonstrated a
manned ciretmilunar capability through the Zond program, but lacked
confidence the system was sufficiently man-rated to send a cosmonaut.
Second, they might have demonstrated in 1969 an unmanned flight to
lunar orbit and then Earth return of a ship capable of carrying a
human crew, if the G-1--e vehicle had not failed in its launch. If done,
a maimed lunar orbit flight, roughly equivalent to Apollo 8 might ha ve
come by 1970. Third, work to develop a manned lunar landing capa-
bility was well along, but its timetable and operating mode are harder
to determine.
Oberg based his conclusions on what we know about the perform nee
of the A-2 and D-1-e launch vehicles and what NASA officials were
saying about the new G-1-e vehicle. Soviet tracking support was
greatly improved through the construction of large tracking, coin-
munications, and command ships with specially stabilized antenna
platforms, and using the Molniya satellites to keep the ships in touch
with the main Soviet space center. They also demonstrated a growing
capability to guide and control at lunar distances, and to do rendez-
vous and docking in Earth orbit. They had flown long enough for an
18 day lunar mission if needed, and they had demonstrated a self-
contained space suit free of life support umbilicals. They demonstrated
an ability to return from lunar distance, cutting the G load. absorbing
the heat load, and steering to home territory by skipping out of the
8 Oberg, James E., Russia meant to win the Moon race, Spaceflight, London, May 1975,
pp. 163-171, 200.



Av. absorbed Av. absorbed
Spaceship I dose i'mrad) Spacecraftl dc,,e (rirad)

Vosto................................. ----------------------------------2.0 Gemini 3........................... ---------------------------23.0
Vostok 2 ..........------------------------------- 11.0 Gemini 4........................ ---------------------------r. 0
Vostok 3............................... 6-------------------------------2.0 Gemmi 5........................... ---------------------------17; 0
Vostok 4........................ 45 0 Gemini 6----------------------------........................... 0
Vostok ------------............................... --' 0 Gemini 7........................... 1- 0
Vo st,-; 5 ------------------------------ -44. 0 Gemn 7------------------------------ 0L
Vostok 6 ......................-------------------------------. 44.0 Gemni 8........................... 1---------------------------0.0
G T... 9 ........................... 19. 0
Voskhod ............................... 3.0 G 1mni -.-.......................... 720.0
Voskhod 2-............................ ( 0 Gemini 11--------------------------.......................... 28.0
Gemini 12 --------------------------.......................... 20.0
Soyuz 3------------------------------................................ 85 0
So. : 4................................ --------------------------------70.0 Ar,-!Io 7............................ ---------------------------156.0
Soyu: 5................................ --------------------------------52.0 8.' ............................ ----------------------------150.0
Soyuz 6......................--------------------------------.7 5 Ah9------------------------..........................--. 2)2.0
Sovuz 7................................ --------------------------------63.0 t'.10........................... .0---------------------------4-.0
So,uz 8................................ --------------------------------72.5 AcI'D 11........................... .---------------------.
Soyuz 9-------------------------................................ 323.5 ADCI1, 12---------------------........................... 5'7.0
A : Il.: 13 ....-------------...................... 2 '.0
Salyut ---------------------------------................................ 870.0 A-:Ih 14........................... ---------------------------11!2 0
A .. iIo 15........................... .--------------------- 0
& -1 ... 5........................0
Apollo 17 .---------------------------........................ 0
S,lhb............................. -----------------------------259:1-3500

1 Inclnationof orbit for Vostok and Voskhod spa:esh', ps = 63 ; for So)uz ships=52:; for Gemini craft=33-; for Aicllo
craft=31-33; for S.lab. 50s.
SOURCE: Tobias, C. et al on'z'ng R3Ji.ation. In: Foundations of Space B.ology and Medicine, Vol. II, Ch. 12, Wash.
D.C., NASA, 1975, pp. 473-531.
During the first o,',luati,,n ol Salvut 4, tin, average 24-hour dos;agre
was about 15-20 millirads.
Despite a higher orbit, the radiation dose was relatively small as a
result of low -laract1 *i .22-3
The more si nificant radiation effects which could occur in the event
of harmful radiation doses include:
Early Effects :
Skin erythema and dezqunmntion.
Gastrointestinal and neur.n muscular effects.
Depression of bl,'A, formation.
Decrenased fertility or sterility.
Early death.
Late Effects:
Permanent or delayed skin changes.
Increased incidence of cataract.
Increased incidence nf leuken;i. and other cancers.
General shortening of life span.'
In the Soviet Union, the dose standards for short term spaceflights
of up to 30 days. expressed in rein (roentgen equivalent man; roughly
equivalent to rad), have been calculated as:
Allowable dose-15 rem.
Dose of justified risk-50 rem.
Critical dose-125 rem.
As can be seen in Table 4-10, the radiation doses thus far absorbed
by astronauts and cosmonauts have not even approached the allowable
dose level. Nonetheless. there continues to be concern in Soviet and
American bioastronautics circles that solar flare events could expose

M Tobias. C. et al. Tonizing radiation. In Foundations of Space Biology and Medicine.
Vol. II. Ch. 12. Book 2. Washington D. C.. NASA, 1975, pp. 473-531
STr'vd (USSR) Feb. 1, 1P7-, p. 2
2' Lnnzipm. W. H. Radiobiological factors in space conquest. Aerospace Medicine, No. 8,
1969, S34-S43


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380 kilometers at an inclination of 51.83 degrees. However, no findings
have been noted in the literature and the flight was not repeated.
Prognoz 1 was launched on .April 14, 1972 into an orbit ra TgiCig
from 200,000 and 950 kilometers, using the A-2-e launch vehicle, and
placed in an orbit inclined at 65 degrees with the. launch occurring at
Tyuratam. It was described as intended to study corpuscular, ganmia,
X-ray, and solar plisma interactions with the magnetosphere. The
weight was given as 845 kilograms.
Later, pictures were released to show the probe as being a pressurized
cylinder with hemispherical ends, 4 solar panels, and various external
instruments and antennas. The payload was put in its highly elliptical
orbit from an Earth orbiting platform, and then after separation from
its probe rocket, it used special memory devices to orient itself toward
the Sun and spin-stabilize it.
It carried an X-ray spectrometer and proportional counter in the
1,500 to 30,000 electron volt range, and scintillation spectrometer for
gamma rays in the 30,000 to 350,000 electron volt range. Another
spectrometer measured the proton flux in the 1 to 35 million electron
volt range. It had a Cerenkov counter for electrons in the 40,000 to
140,000 electron volt range, and a scintillation spectrometer for pro-
tons in the 30,000 to 210,000 electron volt range. Other devices meas-
ured the solar wind, and radio emissions in the 1.6 to 8 kiloHertz
range and also in the 100-700 kiloHertz range. It also had a mag-
netometer, orientation detectors, and dosimeters.
2. Prognoz 2
Prognoz 2 seems to have been virtually a repeat of the earlier flight.
It was launched on June 29, 1972 into an orbit ranging from 200,000
kilometers to 550 kilometers at an inclination of 65 degrees. In addi-
tion to the experiments as listed for its predecessor, it also carried a
French solar wind experiment.
3. Prognoz 3
This flight came on February 15, 1973. It carried about the same
instrumentation as its predecessors. The orbit ranged from 200,000 to
590 kilometers, at an inclination of 65 degrees.
A followup report in early 1974 implied all three payloads were still
active, but was not quite so specific as to state this. It said that the
devices were calibrated periodically, and were returning data. A still
later report on February 16, 1974, as Prognoz 3 began its second year,
mentioned only Prognoz 3 as active. There had been 160 radio sessions
with it to report data on solar activity and on solar-terrestrial
4. Prognoz 4
After a lapse, the Prognoz program was renewed with the launch
of Procnoz 4 on December 22, 1975. It was described as being in gen-
eral like its predecessors, except the weight was a little higher at 905
kilograms. It was designed to study the corpuscular and electro-
magnetic radiations of fhe Sun and magnetic fields near Earth. The
orbit was 199,000 by 634 kilometers at a 65 degree inclination, with
an orbital period of 95 hours, 40 minutes. It was launched by an A-2-e
rocket system from an orbital launch platform.


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There is not too much doubt that the two sets of triplet flights, ,adi
involving a double intercept were all of a pattern, but there are maiivy
unanswered questions about staging and procedures, as tlhe visible
record has inconsistencies which are not readily resolved.
In the absence of any Soviet discussion of the flights or findings
from "experiments", there has been speculation in the West about the
operating modes and purposes of the Soviet interceptor tests. A few
people saw them as purely benign for space rescue purposes. It seems
unlikely that the Russians would go to such expense to develop a
humanitarian system without open discussion of it, to take some credit
for their generosity. Other people were convinced that the F-l-m
target vehicle was the destroyer craft, reasoning that since the inter-
ceptors, not the target were being destroyed, this would be a proper
interpretation. Supposedly if the U.S. Saint project had been seen
through to completion, and it conducted a passive inspection in co-
orbit with a sensitive Soviet military payload, then the ability to
destroy the Saint could be a possible Soviet countermove against such
inspection. Since most estimates are that the explosions in the inspec-
tors took place at some considerable distance from the targets, it seems
more likely that the explosions were generated in the F-l-m inspectors,
whether to preserve tlhe secrecy of their possibly advanced technology
hardware, or in exercise of an ability to shower a simulated target
with shrapnel through self-de, trution, after a real interception and
inspection had been conducted. In real combat, if the interceptor-
gathered data suggested the target. was a threat, ground controllers
could send a command to the interceptor to explode while within
range of the target.
It would be interesting to know why a vehicle as large as the F-l-m
,was used to launch the targets, unless nothing smaller at that time
could be placed in the same orbital plane as the interceptors. In any
case, a new feature was introduced into the program in the flights
of 1971.
On February 9, 1971, Kosmos 394 was launched from Plesetsk using
a C-1 vehicle in a brand-new inclination-65.9 degrees. It was put
into a circular orbit about 600 kilometers above the Earth, where it
was separated from its carrier rocket.
On February 25, Kosmos 397 was launched from Tyuratamn using
the F-l-m again, also on a new inclination for this vehicle-65.8
degrees. It started out in low orbit, where it dropped its carrier
rocket. It then moved to an eccentric orbit very much like those of
Kosmos 249, 252, 374, and 375. It made an inspection of the target,
moved away, and was exploded.
Kosmos 400 was launched by a C-1 at Plesetsk on March 19, 1971,
but this time was placed in a circular orbit about 1,000 kilometers
up, where it separated from its carrier rocket.
On April 4, 1971, Kosmos 404 was launched at Tyuratam with the
F-l-m vehicle. It left its carrier rocket in an intermediate eccentric
orbit, then climbed to a near-circular orbit ranging from about 1,000


degrees of the area to be studied. The two reference stars are then
found, whereupon Orion-2 itself takes over with an automatic point-
ing system accurate to 3-5 angular seconds. The instrument has 13
electric motors for drive. Although some of the Orion-2 system is
automatic, both cosmonauts are needed for these experiments; one to
orient the ship, the other to work Orion.
Also mounted on the Orion system is an instrument for studying
X-ray emissions from the Sun. These studies were done on the 65th
orbit. The camera has several channels and can take photographs
simultaneously in several ranges of the X-ray band, and has a 70
degree field of view. Observations were carried out at the same time
from Earth for comparison purposes.
During the mission, the cosmonauts made 10,000 spectrograms of
more than 3,000 stars in the constellations Taurus, Orion, Gemini,
Auriga and Perseus. The spectrograms were in spectral classes from
2,000-3,000 angstroms (these cannot be studied from Earth since the
atmosphere absorbs emissions less than 3,000 angstroms) and the stars
were of the 10th magnitude generally, although the cosmonauts were
able to photograph some even of the 12th. Special sensitive film was
supplied by George Low of NASA for this project.
Navigation.-Experiments were continued into autonomous navi-
gation, specifically to determine the accuracy of control systems and
the testing of new instruments for orientation using the Earth and
9. Kosmos 638, 656, and 672
Kosmos 638 was launched on April 3, 1974 into a 325 x 195 km orbit
inclined at 51.8, that intended later for the Apollo-Soyuz Test
Project (ASTP). It stayed up ten days before recovery. Kettering
found signals on 20.008 MHz.
Kosmos 656 was launched on May 27, 1974 into 354 x 194 km orbit.
This time the inclination was 51.6, that used for ferry flights to
Salyut stations. The mission lasted just two days, suggesting that it
was like Kosmos 573 and Soyuz 12, probably ferry versions of Soyuz
without solar panels.
Kosmos 672 was launched on August 12, 1974 into a 239 x 198 km
orbit, inclined at 51.8. The orbit was adjusted to the ASTP position,
approximately, when apogee was moved to 238 km and perigee to 227
km. Later, like Kosmos 638, it was confirmed by the Russians to be
an ASTP test flight.
10. Kosmos 670
Kosmos 670 is worth a special look because it differed from other un-
manned Soyuz flights of the period. It was launched on August 6,1974,
into a 307 x 217 km orbit. What was unique is that the inclination was
50.6, not used on any other flight launched by an "A" class vehicle.
The flight lasted only three days before recovery. In some respects, its
external flight parameters hardly distinguished it from military re-
coverable observation flights. The inclination was close to that which
Western published rumors had predicted would be that used by the
big "G" class vehicle. There was speculation that this might be the
first test of a ferry vehicle to a new large space station to be put up
by the G-1 at some future time. Without more information, no firm
conclusions can be drawn.


t;,ons room has five lbnks of consoles, 24 in total with a large screen
inap of the world in front center, with the orbital patlh aiid all track-
inCr stations shown on the map, with adlitionmal data listed on side
panels. It was evident from these disclosures that there must be a dif-
ferent and possibly more versatile center already in use elsewhere. Tile
Jussians were evasive on this point, but during the Apollo Soyuz
mi-ion mentioned almost casually that the Salyut mission was being
controlledd from a center at Yevpatoriya, the same site in the Crimea
where the deep space tracking station is located. Whether there are
still other major control centers is not known. It is reminiscent of the
fI"ct the United States has control facilities at each of its major launch
sites in Florida and California, and also lias additional facilities in
IHouston, Texas: Greenbelt, Maryland; and Sunnyvale, California at
the very least. So for some purposes, the Russians may also have
additional locations in use.

Reliable information about Soviet space research centers is also
limited. There are a few which have come to public attention. For ex-
aimple, the engine development work of the Leningrad Gas Dynamic;
Laboratory has been revealed through research publications of a theo-
retical nature, and early experimental engines as well as a few cur-
rently operational engines have been put on display and described as
developed there. There is even a museum in Leningrad where it is pos-
sible to see these products.
The large body of published literature in various fields of space
sciences reveals researchers in many scientific institutes pursue studies
of geophysics, the upper atmosphere, radiation, space medicine, the
planets, the Sun, and so forth. But it is not possible from these papers
to build a definitive list of titles and locations of space laboratories and
centers. It can be assumed that some are in the new science cities which
have been created in several parts of the Soviet Union.
A fairly detailed description of one major institute was provided
during 1971. The Moscow Space Research Institute of the Soviet
Academy of Sciences consists of administ native buildings, parking lots,
and landscaping in front, and laboratories in the central area, with
experimental and storage areas at the back. The administrative build-
ing has three stories, underground parking, a library, conference and
reception rooms, and an auditorium seating 1,200 persons. The labora-
tories are in a 13-story building with 2-story annexes. There are spe-
cial air-conditioning units in towers nearby. All told, there are 41,000
square meters of floor space, including 33,000 square meters in labora-
tories; and the building volume is 599,870 cubic meters, including
534,700 cubic meters in laboratories.62

Few details are available on Soviet factories equivalent to those of
American industry in which specialized craft are built or where
'serial" production is carried on. Occasional American visitors have
e6 Stroitelstvo I Arkhitektura, Moskvy, Moscow, No. 1, 1971, pp. 26-29.


hydrogen anrd atomic oxygen in the upper atnio ;Ahere of Mars. By
January 9, 1972, they said work was proceeding in orderly fashion,
and that the dust storm zeeined to be subsiding. Pictures taken with
the red filter were showing dark areas of "seas again, while ultra-
violet pictures again showed bright clouds. A routine progress report
was issued on January 29.
TASS further reported on March 1, 1972 that the dust storm was
over. The soil temperature on Mars at a depth of several tens of cen-
timeters was found to be largely independent of the time of day. The
ionosphere was defined as beginning at a height of about 80-110 kilo-
meters, with electron concentrations sharply increasing, then gradu-
ally diminishing with height. The orbital buses were said to be con-
tinuing to explore the structure and surface of Mars, taking pictures
of the planet, and measuring the temperature, pressure, density, and
chemical composition of its atmosphere. A second bulletin that day
said that by March 1, Mars 2 had made 127 orbits of the planet, and
Mars 3 had made 7 orbits around Mars. It concluded saying, "The
program for the work of stations Mars 2 and Mars 3 which ,re orbit-
ing Mars as its artificial satellites is nearing completion.21 This was
attributed to the growing distance of Mars from Earth.
Only over a period of time as analysis proceeded did more of the
findings become available. On March 22, 1972, it was reported that
photography had played a minor role compared with the other data
gathered. Mars 3 did three surveys of the planet during the dust storm
and four more afterwards. The estimate was that billions of tons of
material had been on the move during the dust storm. Water vapor
was found to be about 1/2,000 that of the Earth, with a measurement
in the range of from 50 to under 10 microns.
In April it was revealed the camera, systems uted had a 52mm focal
length for the wide angle camera and an unspecified longer lenorth for
the narrow angle. Color filters were red, green, and blue. Some 12
frames were exposed and automatically developed on board, then
scanned with 1000 lines of 1000 elements each. for trnnsmisv'on to
Earth where they were recorded both on magnetic tape and on electro-
chemical paper.
Although the main work program ended in March, the t--o orbiters
were still being contacted in July at a distance of 385 million
k lometers.
The program was reported formally complete:! by August 22, 1972.
Bv then .irs 2 had emninete,1 3'CV orbits and M.ars .". 20 orbits of the
planet. They had returned internlanetarv data. and done integroted
studiris of the surface and atmosphere of Mars in visible. IR, and T7V
ranges, plus radio studies. They measured thermnil differences b-- re-
vion and variation in Ttit1,tdes. The etimatc on water vanor was low-
ered to 1/5.000 that of Earth. The TTVY studies revealed the qtmicture.
he;,rht, composition, and temperature of the upper atmosphere. The
radio itdlies grave the pressure and temperature at the slirfn,',p. Dust
particle size and concentration was measured. The mninietic field was
mn.- ll red.
The temneratire ranze was found to be between 13 C. and -. 1 .,
except at the north pole where it was -110 C. The temperature drops
21 T.A S. March 1. 1972. 1446 GMT


a Mayak transmitter and recorder from the German Democratic Re-
public, a high frequency probe from Czechlloslo'vakia, and an iono-
spheric gas dischlurge counter and other equipment from the Soviet
Union. The equipment was designed to record st rhamrs of (lectrons
with an energy in excess of 40 kiloelectron volts, and protons with an
energy of more than one miegaelectron volts. Speciali!ts of all four
countries were ;it the launch, signaling the gr'etr op(.iniess about
Plesetsk which has yet to be identified as a launch site in any Soviet
public release.
7. Interkrosmos-Kopermnik 500
In honor of the 500th birthday of Copernicus. the number 9 was not
associated with this payload, but the next in sequence became number
10 on its later launch. This ninth launch came April 19, 1973 at Kapv-
tin Yar.
This payload carried equipment to measure solar radiation and the
ionosphere. It was developed jointly by the Soviet Union and Poland.
The telemetry system was Czechoslovakian. The instrumentation meas-
ured sporadic changes in radio waves of decameter range. (0.6 to 6.0
MHz). The radio spectrograph was built in Poland, and low frequen-
cy-high frequency ionospheric probes were built in the Soviet Union.
Data were received at ground stations in the Soviet Union and in
Czechoslovakia. Simultaneous ground observations were inmade in the
participating Soviet Bloc countries.
8. InterkLosmos 10
Interkosmos 10 was the first to use the C-1 class of launch vehicle
in the Interkosmos series. It was launched at Plesetsk October 30,1973.
It carried instrumentation to determine the concentration and tempera-
ture of ionospheric electrons, using equipment from the German Demo-
cratic Republic and Soviet Union; to measure magnetic field varia-
tion, electric fields in the range of 0.7 to 70 Hertz, and electron, ion,
and neutral atom fluxes in the range of 0.05 to 20 kiloelectron volts
within Soviet apparatus; and to study low frequency electric oscillations
of plasma in the range of 20 to 22 kiloHertz (designed and built in
Czechoslovakia). It carried a Czech telemetry system and Soviet tape
recording systems. Ukrainian experiments also were carried.
B. N. Petrov saw the flight initiating a new stage beyond explora-
tory experiments to making a concentrated attack on complex issues.
He said the synoptic recording of much data would increase the value
of the results 100-fold. Flight of the satellite was coordinated with
launches of German-Soviet weather rockets.
9. Interkosmos 11
Interkosmos 11 was launched May 17, 1974 as the first C-1 Inter-
kosmos launch at Kapustin Yar. It continued studies of the solar ul-
traviolet and X-ray radiation, and interactions with the upper at-
mosphere. The experiments were provid(led by the German Democratic
Republic, the Soviet Union, and Czechoslovakia. Again. ground sta-
tions in Soviet Bloc nations made synoptic readings.
10. Interkcosmos 12
Interkosmos 12 was launched October 31. 1974 at Plesetsk to con-
tinue studies of the atmosphere and ionosphere and flow of micro-



is not possible, a spacecraft is coii-idered to be "sterile" only in lthe.
sense that. the probability of cota:i!i miatio from the spacecraft on
another celestial body is quite low.A -;'X
Another approaehi in exobiology is t!he investigation of terrestrial
rmic'o-organii ins under conditions 1)ievhd to simulate :ia extrater-
re.trial environment. Thus, Soviet and Ameritcan investigators have
subjected a wide variety of lower organisms to artificial atmospheres
stimulating the environment of Mars. The Soviet "artif iiil Mars" is a
specially designed chamber at the Institute of Microbioleo-ry under the
U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences. Some species of xerophytic orgniisms
have survived and multiplied under these extremely harsh con(lition.s
of extreme cold, extreme heat, lack of water, and lack of a: terrestr ial
atmosphere. Hence, some Soviet and American specialists believe that
there are some areas on MIars where life conceivably could exist. In the
opinion of Academician A. A. Imshenetsl:iy, the study of life on other
planets will contribute to a better understanding of the evolution of
life on Earth. The first probe to specifically investigate life on Mars
is the NASA Viking vehicle which was launched in the summer of
1975 and will land on the surface of Mars in the summer of 1976. This
station and a follow-on sister ship will carry out a number of exobio-
logical experiments including the detection and measurement of the
metabolism of living organisms, assimilation of carbon monoxide and
carbon dioxide; decomposition of substrate; labeling with radioactive
carbon; and experiments involving gas exchange. All experiments will
be conducted in parallel using data from the same sample. It is not
known when the Soviets intend to launch a probe to Mars or other


While the search for extraterrestrial forms of lower life is limited
by the distance biological probes can be dispatched, the search for
extraterrestrial intelligence involves the use of radioastronomy and
associated electronic equipment with which to detect electromagnetic
signals which might indicate that highly developed civilizations exist
far beyond the reaches of the solar system. Both the Russians and
Americans have developed highly organized individual and collabora-
tive programs for the detection of signals from extraterrestrial civili-
zations. The collaborative program is exemplified by a conference
entitled, "Communication With Extraterrestrial Intelligence
(CETI)*, which was held in 1971. Both the Soviets and Americans
have radiotelescope systems. A giant Soviet system is located near
382 Hall. L. B. (NASA). Personal communication.
3% T-mshenetskiy, A. A. Extraterrestrial Life and Its DPpection Methods. Op. Cit.
3- The Planptiry Quarantine Program: 1956-1973, Washington, D.C., NASA. 1974, 56 p.
(NASA SP-4902).
3'Life in the "artificial Mars". Soviet Latviya (USSR). Augl-t4 7, 1974, p. 2 (FRD
3 Imshenetsliy, A. A. Space Biology. Successes in Microbiology (USSR), No. 7, 1971,
4r-rri (FRD ,S20).
M Imshenetsky, A. A. et al. Long term effect of high vacuum on microorganisms. Micro-
biology (USSR). No. 5, 1973.836-28S (FRD 1810).
3- Klein, H. P. et al. The Viking, 1975. biological experiments. Icarus, Vol. 16, 1972,
p. 139.
The acronym "CETI" has recently been replaced by "SETI" (Search for Extraterres-
trial Intelligence). As a consequence both acronyms are now used Interchangeably.


that this word related to the individual crew-members and \ ,(-nt on to
show that there was a regular sequence with each state lield fr ofie
minutee.6 The fact that word 4 exhibited the same periodicity p1)Jited
to biomedical subcoinmmutation with word 8 indicating tie. c,,:mionaut
being monitored at the time and word 4 probably relatillng to respira-
tion-rate. Supporting evidence for this was later obtained at intervals
from TASS reports of values for such rates for different crew meim-
bers. It was thus possible to assign the medium value to the commander
in tlhe center seat, the short value to the test-engineer in the left-hand
seat and the long value to the flight-engineer seated on the right.
The Soyuz 4 and 5 mission also provided a clue to the function of
the very short words 6 and 7. During the time of the EVA traiisfer of
Khrunov and Yeliseyev from Soyuz 5 to Soyuz. 4, word 7 became very
long and tlis, tog(rether with subsequent obser% atiouis that it also became
very long immediately prior to the separation of modules for reentry,
sugg(rested that it was a measure of the degree of pressurization (in
terms of vacuum) of tlhe orbital module, which was serving as an air-
lock at this tile. Word 6 was assumed to refer to tihe pres -tre in the
reentry module. After the EVA transfer had been completed, word 8
of the Soyuz 4 telemetry frame took on the short-medium-long sequence
whereas that of Soyuz 5 remained medium until recovery."
Word 13 of the Soyuz 9 frame took a minimum value that sounded
like a "blip". This was presumed to refer to the rendezvous system
which was not carried on this solo flight-a fact confirmed by the
Soyuz 9 commemorative stanip.
Such considerations of short-wave telemetry from Soyuz 11 showed
nothing untoward up to the moment of separation of the modules
immediately prior to reentry-thlie instant of tragedy.1S
No obvious biomedical sub-commutation has been observed in Sovuz
flights after this time but support for the hypothesis of pressurization
information being carried on words 6 and 7 came during the Soyuz
16 flight. These words were both observed to lengthen during the
5th orbit but neither reached the very long state associated with com-
plete depressurization. This suggested that pressure-dumping to the
level planned for Apollo-Soyuz Test Project. (ASTP) had been prac-
tised. This was confirmed during the ASTP mission and published
data from that flight may be used to provide calibration for the'
The short words 6 and 7 are characteristic of Soyuz and observa-
tions in Kettering and Akrotiri showed that Kosmos 772. with the
short words, was an unmanned test of Soyuz. In this instance, words
4,12 and 13 were all blips.
The first Salvut transmitted C/W PDM telemetry, similar to that
of Soyuz, on 15.008 MHz. Here the characteristic short words appeared
at 3 and 7 in the frame. Toward the end of the manned phase of its
operation it transmitted its own format on the Soyuz 11 frequency of
20.008 MHz.
The Ketterinar Group failed to pick up any signals from Salvut 2
but it is probable that it used the same 19.944 MHz frequency which
1" Perry, G. E. and R. S. Flagg, Journal of the British Interplanetary Society, 23, 451-
46i4. (1r.70.
17 Ibid.. Fiq. 7. D. 45.9.
is Perry, G. E. Northampton and County Independent, 60, 24-25 (October 1971).


support for space rendezvous and missile intercepts, or supporting
the Gosplan. Hence, even if it was judged that in many technical fields
they were two to five years behind the United States, that would hardly
be a basis for writing off their capacity for further progress, or for
finding ways around some specific limitations.
3. Education and Manpo-'er
The Soviet Union today has a larger student population in science
and engineering than does the United States. While the two countries
are more or less matched in numbers of working engineers and scien-
tists, any extrapolation of trends based on the number being trained
gives the Soviet Union a strong emerging lead. However, some studies
suggest that much Soviet technical training is narrower, and in a time
when many people end up having more than one career as national
needs change, the American trained engineer may prove more adapta-
ble collective ely than the Soviet counterpart. At the top, the very best
people in terms of performance, breadth of grasp, creativity, are about
equal in both countries.
The Soviet Union is a nation with a large population, many tech-
nical institutes, a good base of trained manpower, and reasonably good
access both to their own many scientific journals, and the shared world
community of knowledge. If it chooses to pursue a large space pro-
gram that is both vigorous and ambitious, it is in as good a fundamen-
tal position to achieve this as any nation.
1. Launch Sites
The Soviet Union demonstrates from time to time that its three
launch sites each of which is spread over many square kilometers of ter-
rain and with multiple pads, are capable of conducting a considerable
number of space launches in a few days. Their annual total launches
are the highest in the world even though some pads and some vehicles
are used only sporadically. Perhaps a contributing factor to high
launch rates is the checkout for many vehicles done in horizontal
assembly, followed by rail movement to the launch pad and a short
time in vertical position on the pad before launch. This type of launch
may be typical even of the D class launch vehicles, but less is known
about the long-delayed and uncertain-performing G class vehicles
which are so large that they may have to be assembled and tested on
the pad.
2. Tracking Systems
The Soviet Union still lacks a deep-space worldwide network equiv-
alent to that used by NASA, but manages passably by timing major
activities to occur within view of Yevpatoriya in the Crimea. There
may be another deep space capability in the Soviet Far East, but this
cannot be confirmed. Additionally, their three largest tracldking ships,
while falling short of the high capacity of Yevpatoriya, can give mi-
portant global coverage, especially up to lunar distances.
Soviet ability to do automatic rendezvous and docking, intercepts,
and 24-hour synchronous flights suggests their general Earth orbital
capacity is at least adequate. We also have seen them run the Soyuz
6, 7, and 8 operations simultaneously, and the Salyut 4, Soyuz 19, and



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be achieved to individual receivers, instead of following the present
practice of routing programs to an Orbita station prior to local dis-
tribution. (Moscow Radio, February 7, 1972, 0930 GMT.)
Academician Aleksandr Mikhaylov predicted tliat an automatic
observatory on the Moon to conduct a wide range of experiments is
quite conceivable in the not distant future. He said the same applied
to Venus and Mars, and that the risks and costs of sending human
crews to the planets exceed the value of such expeditions for many
years to come. (TASS, February 29, 1972, 0655 GMT.)
V. Denisov, candidate of technical sciences, and V. Alimov, eni-
neer, discussed possible practical tasks for automated lunar spare sta-
tions which they considered feasible in thie ne:ir future. An unmanned
weather observation station could be established on the Moon to col-
lect instantaneous weather data over the entire Earth. As a second
task, radio and television programs transmitted from the Earth will
be received by a lunar station and after being boosted, will be relayed
back; terrestrial receivers will make lunar-boosted broadcasts avail-
able to millions of people. A third task would be to utilize the Moon
as a convenient base for an automated astronomical observatory. An
observatory could also be used to investigate co.nic rays, solar wind
and corpuscular streams. A possibility related to this third task would
be to utilize the Moon as one point in an Earth-based radiotelescope
system. Research into celestial features is frequently performed simul-
taneously by two radiotelescopes located at a considerable distance
from each other. A radiotelescope installed on the Moon and paired
with a terrestrial one would have an effective distance on the order of
400,000 kilometers. As a result, the resolving power of the Earth-lunar
complex increases significantly and it becomes possible to determine
more accurately the structure of small terrestrial bodies very remote
from the solar system. It was also noted that the Moon is free of ter-
restrial radio interference and that far longer uninterrupted observa-
tions would be possible than on Earth since the Moon rotates extremely
slowly. (Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya, Moscow, March 22, 1972.)
V. B. Sokolov discussed space stations and interorbital transport
vehicles of the future. It will be desirable that some types of orbital
stations be assembled on Earth and put into orbit intact. In the future,
however, stations of far greater size will be required than those which
can be put into orbit by a single carrier-rocket. It will be necessary to
develop transport ships and carrier-rockets which in full or part can
be used more than once. In conducting some experiments there is a need
for individual modules which are not rigidly attached to the stations.
If the modules are close distance to the station the crew can service
them without using special transport. If the module is distant from
the station, it will be possible to use a transport platform with ma-
neiivering by engine. Such "interorbital transport vehicles"' may
eventually be used to cruise between circumterrmest trial and circumlunar
stations and between bases on the lunar surface. As the number and
size of orbital stations increases, some of them will be used as assembly-
launching platforms where large interplanetary ships will be assem-
bled from individual compartments delivered from Earth. (Zemlya i
Vselennaya, Moscow. No. 3, 1972, pp. 14-19.)
Academician B. N. Petrov in discussing the Soviet space effort in
the immediate future stated that man will not replace automated sys-


the Taman. It was then transferred to the Semyon Chelyuslin for
the trip to Bombay, where it was put aboard a cargo plane for the
flight back to the Soviet Union.

This section provides a brief discussion of whether the U.S.S.R. had
a program for landing men on the Moon. A more detailed examination
of this subject as well as an exploration of the entire range of possible
future space missions can be found in Chapter Seven.
The threat of the Soviet Union reaching the Moon before the
United States gave the American space program the impetus (emo-
tional and financial) it needed to achieve what it has today. Thus
the question of whether there was indeed a "race" to the Moon or not
is of no mean import to those who paid $25 billion to "land some clown
on the Moon" as detractors are fond of saying.
Unfortunately there is no definitive way to prove the case either
way. All that is attempted here is an analysis of statements made by
those who should have known the direction of their space program
prior to Americans landing on the Moon in 1969, and their technical
Prior to 1969 there was a wealth of statements reflecting the posi-
tion that the Russians were interested in landing on the Moon and an
extensive collection of these quotes (as well as statements on other
aspects of the space program) are given in the 1966-70 edition of this
report (pp. 359-384). If the case were to be proved on verbal evi-
dence alone, there would be no question but that a manned lunar
landing was high on the Soviet agenda. A sample of statements prior
to July 20,1969:
Cosmonaut Feoktistov outlined the Soviet space program as involved in four
progressive steps: (1) Study of geophysics and solar phenomena, and unmanned
flight to the Moon and planets; (2) study of space biology and man's adaptabil-
ity; (3) learning to link up and assemble in orbit a launch facility, as a step to-
ward landing an expedition of men on the Moon; and (4) sending landing
expeditions of men to Mars and Venus with fundamentally new rocket and
spacecraft systems. (TASS, December 31, 1964, 1524 GMT.)
Professor Yelizavetskiy stated: "The launching of the Voskhod 2 and Leonov's
space walk strengthens the confidence that the first people on the Moon will
be Soviet people." (Moscow Radio, March 19, 1965, 0730 GMT.)
Cosmonaut Leonov said there is a regular, scheduled preparation in the Soviet
Union for the conquest of space and the time is approaching when men will land
on the Moon. The task of landing has been solved. (Budapest MTI, April 6, 1966,
0907 GMT.)
Academician Keldysh said it is now clear that soon man will land on the Moon
and on other planets. (Moscow Radio, October 24, 1967, 1400 GMT.)
Academician Konstantinov stated that landing a man on the Moon does not
belong to the realm of fantasy any longer. This is an affair of the nearest, of
the most imminent future. Everything is already prepared for this undertaking.
There are a few details like radiation hazards, but these will be solved soon.
Perhaps the Americans even will be first, but it is still a competition and a
question of prestige. (Vjesnik, Zagreb, January 21,1968, p. 8.)
Cosmonaut Shatalov told the Hungarian news agency correspondent in Mos-
cow that the Soviet Union will require "six, seven, and perhaps more months"


'considering Earth orbit rendezvous, lunar orbit rendezvous, lunar
surface rendezvous, and even lunar in-transit rendezvous (once urged
by a minority in this country).
(3) WVhether done by direct flight or through rendezvous and dock-
ig,, there is a place for specialized modules not only for propulsion
'but for manned support and other payload and control devices to and
from the Moon, in lunar orbit, and for descent to the lunar surface
and ascent again from the lunar surface.
(4) Assuming that rendezvous and docking of various propulsion
and specialized modules are necessary, then a successful program
requires a demonstrated ability to do such work accurately and in
timely fashion in the places selected by the mission planners. As is
known, Apollo llse(d lunar orbit rendlezvous (LOR) Fi.,oes.-fully, but
over the protests of an influential group of advisors who preferred
Earth orbit rendezvous (EOR).
(5) With or without rendezvous and docking, the mission requires
well developed tracking and high capacity communications syste"is.
preferably functioning 24 hours a day and uninterrupted in line of
sight by the rotation of the Earth. Not only must there be a large
computational facility on Earth, able to work virtually on a real-time
basis, but the lunar expedition should have a self-contained computing
and navigational ability to work independently of reference to surface
features of the Earth.
(6) Both for reasons of safety and for gaining maximum scien-
tific advantage, there must be adequate mapping of the Moon to under-
stand surfa,-'e conditions, to select worthwhile targets for investiga-
tion. and to insure su-.' ful landings. A knowledge of lunar mascons
is imiportant to celestial nieoli;-ni o calculations as well as being able to
loeate and maneuver precisely the ship or ships in three dimensional
space near the Moon. It is also important to understand the interacting
gravity for'o-e of multiple natural bodies in space.
(7) There m,,t be adequate life support sy:stenis both during the
fliYht and on the lunar surficeo. with a.leqi.te lean.n-erl air of the
rij(ht constituents and prcure and with attention to contaminants
"and outgas-iin. There mu-t be potable water, food, waste management,
proper temperature controls, and radiation protection, including ,rec-
otrition of the possibility of a solir fl-ire during the mission. Also.
attention mist be paid to maintaining inner ear function for orienta-
tion and well-being, good m.sle tone. body coordination, and accurate
perceptions during the varied conditions of weightlessness, low
gravity, and acceleration including high G load.
(8) There must be a thorough engineering study and pra.tial
reliability to handle the several problems of applying ship accelera-
tions. making fine corrections of orbit and velnocity. joining stages with
secure loc:s and tight seals, managing boil-off of cryogenics, avoiding
deterioration caused by corrosive fuel: achieving sure git'1ions at
only the right times, insuring even propellant burning and balanced
chamber pressures, providing leeway for shortfalls in some enOines,
getting clean separations by explosive bolts, and having a thorough
understanding of the interactions of ships, systems, and natural forces.
in each of many kinds of maneuvers and operations.
(9) There are special problems of Earth return that go beyond
Earth orbital flight. The returning ship mnit be in a narrow corridor.
with the operators recognizing that too steep a return will burn up





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gas, perhaps argon. At the landing site, the air pressure was measured
as being 6 millibars, and the temperature 230 K. (-3 C.).
Meanwhile the orbiting vehicle, Mai rs 5, was returning a wide variety
of other data. It made a radio prol)ce of the atmosphere at 8-32 cm. It
uSed a radio telescope at 3.5 cm. Its infrared radiometer worked in the
8-26 am range. The spectrometer with an interference filter worked
in the 2-5 /an range. A narrow band photometer with interference
filter studied the CO band at 2 pm. Another narrow band photometer
with interference filter studied the H20 band at 1.38 /Lm. There was a
plioto-television complex of instruments to take pictures, develop the
film, and scan these for facsimile transmission to Earth. Another
photometer with interference filter covered the 0.3-0.8 /m range. Two
polarimeters covered 9 narrow bands in the range of 0.35-0.8 min. An-
other photometer studied the ozone band at 2,600 angstroms. A differ-
ent photometer measured the intensity of scattered solar light in the
Lyman alpha range of 1,215 ang.-troms. There was also a gainmmania
Several experiments were duplicated among the four main vehicles.
Magnetometers were carried on Mars 4 and 7, as were plasma traps.
Multichannel electrostatic instruments were carried by Mars 4 and 5.
Mars 6 and 7 carried micrometeorite sensors and cosmic ray sensors.
It was Mars 7 that also carried a French solar radio wave experiment.
Mars 5 made a study of the chemical composition of the atmosphere
measuring the amount of water vapor and ozone. Mars 3, after the
dust storm two years earlier had found only 10-20 /m of water vapor.
But Mars 5 found some readings of up to 80 /m, of water vapor, with
variations of 2 to 3 fold even within short distances of a few hundred
kilometers. Mars 5 found that the amount of ozone by volume was 10-s
percent, with the layer at 30 kilometers.
Between them. M\1ars 4 and 5 took 60 photographs, often of high
quality. Those with resolutions as good as 1 kilometer were taken
with a camera whose focal length was 52 mm. Other pictures with a'
rn-olution ranging up to 100 meters were taken with a camera with a
focal length of 350 mm. Pictures scanned for return to Earth were
done so either at 1,000 by 1,000 fineness or at 2,000 by 2,000 fineness.
Mars 4 used a red filter. Mars 5 used a blue filter.
Apparently, not only was there the photo-television system, but also
an optico-mechanical TV scanning system. In addition to the general
filters referenced above, Mars 5 used other red, blue, and green filters,
and a special orange light filter. From the pictures taken, rectified
maps were produced which provided control points and links with
the pictures taken two years earlier by Mariner 9. In one region it was
possible to do a geomorphological study.
In summary, although the payloads collectively did much less than
hoped of them, the mission was not the total loss some Western publi-
cations seem to have assumed. Further details are carried in the refer-
enced Soviet reports.
A small amount of supplementary detail was carried in another
Soviet publication. The Mars 4 and 5 photo TV systems were described
as designed to attain 700 and 100 meter resolutions at best for surNvey
purposes. The camera already described as having a focal length of
52 mm was called Vega. It was f/2.8, providing a 23 by 22.5 mm frame
and its look angle was 3542'. The other camera already described as


craft, and although sounding rockets can travel higher, they leave
vapor trails which do not permit close examination of some aspects of
the atmosphere's characteristics.
In order for the readings to be accurate, the apparatus must be kept
extremely cold. Until this mission, a conventional cold generator with
compressors was used. But a great deal of energy was required for this
method, so this time the Russians provided an ice coat of solid nitrogen
which maintained the proper temperature quite successfully.
Astrophysical.-Two X-ray telescopes were used to study radiation
from various areas of the universe. A "Filin" set of spectrometers was
mounted on the outside of the station to detect the radiation by sensors,
and was linked in parallel with a set of two optical telescopes (70 cm
long with a 6 cm diameter and 1 degree field of view) to identify
exactly what object was emitting the radiation. They used two modes
of observation: one with the axis of the telescope permanently fixed
on one area of the sky, and the other where the ship's commander
oriented the ship and the flight engineer positioned the telescopes, as
had been done with Orion-2. The Russians announced that for the first
time an autonomous system of stellar orientation was used to train the
telescope, but provided no further details. The second X-ray telescope
RT-4, was not described until the Soyuz 18 mission.
During their extensive operation of this system, the crew studied the
Crab Nebula, supernova explosion remnants in both the Vela and
Puppis constellation, the Ori (sic) star (probably Rigel), white
dwarfs, neutron stars and black holes, as well as the background radia-
tion of the galaxy along its meridian.
Solar Photography.-A telescope made in Crimea was used for
studies of the dynamics of the Sun in the ultraviolet. The orbital solar
telescope (OST) was equipped with a KDS (for Krymskiy Difrakt-
sionnyy Spektrometer-Crimean Diffraction Spectrometer) and it
studied specific areas of the Sun, not the entire disc at one time. Al-
though the Russians announced that the telescope had operated for
two weeks before the crew came aboard, they also reported that the
pointing system had malfunctioned causing the Sun to blind the main
mirror. (The apparatus had two mirrors, the main one 25 cm in
diameter with a 2.5 meter focal length, and a rotating mirror.) To
correct this and make the telescope operational for the remainder of
the flight, experts at the Crimean Astrophysical Observatory decided
to reposition the rotating mirror so that the Sun's rays would be re-
flected into the main mirror. To accomplish this, the cosmonauts had
to position the ship so that the telescope's axis was pointing directly
at the center of the Sun. This was no easy task, for the crew had to
measure the time it took for the rotating mirror to move from one sup-
port to another in its normal mode of operation, so they could calculate
where it had to be stopped to assist the main mirror. The only way to
do this was by listening to the mirror's movements, which the crew did
with a stethoscope from their medical kit. Not only did this make the
device operational, but once again proved man's usefulness in space.
Although the main mirror was in a conical niche to protect it from
micrometeorites, the cosmonauts had to resurface it by spraying a new
reflective layer onto it. The Russians were delighted that the process
worked well, for it was a deciding factor in their astrophysical plans
for future space stations. If the surface could not be recoated, there


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B. KOS3MOS 605
After a seven year hiatus, the Soviet Union launched another bio-
logical satellite, although it is unclear whether a Vostok or Soyuz was
used. A Soviet picture not published in the West seems to show a
Vostok derivative. Kosmos 605 was launched from Plesctsk by an A-2
vehicle on October 31, 1973 into a 424 x 221 km orbit, inclined at
62.8, with a period of 90.7 minutes. Aboard the vehicle was a cargo
of several dozen white rats, six boxes of steppe tortoises, a colony of
Drosophila fruit flies, flour beetles, a mushroom bed and cultures of
living bacteriological spores. A control package was kept on Earth
during the 21 day space flight, with the only difference in conditions
being the gravitational factor.
A. Burnazyan, Deputy Health Minister of the Soviet Union, de-
scribed the purpose of the mission as "to investigate what functions
and processes at the cellular level of the organization of living sys-
temns are particularly sensitive to the action of weightlessness and
space radiation, and how substantial an effect these can have on the
functioning of the organism as a whole." 22
The condition of the animals was assessed by the amount of motor
activity exhibited. This was measured by a special electric monitoring
system which used the animals as cores in a weak magnetic field inside
their cages. The amount of movement was registered every two hours
and telemetered to Earth.
After recovery of the spacecraft, equal numbers of space and con-
trol specimens were subjected to autopsy at various time intervals.
Some were examined immediately after the flight, others were kept
up to 30 days, and still other were kept for prolonged study. A detailed
discussion of the results of this mission are given in Chapter Four.

A year after Kosmos 605, the Russians launched another mission
dedicated to biological re-ear'ch. Again carrying white rats, turtles,
Drosophila, lower fungi and microorganisms, Kosmos 690 was placed
into a 389 x 223 km orbit inclined at 62.8 with an A-2 vehicle on
October 22,1974.
The primary purpose of this mission, unlike Kosmos 605, was to
study the effects of stronger radiation on animals and plants in space.
For this, a cesium 137 gamma-ray source was used to dose the rats
with 200-1000 rad daily on command from Earth (1,200-1,300 rad is
After recovery on November 12, the space rats were not only less
active than their controls, but they had developed hemorrhages in the
lungs. Scientists concluded that exposure to radiation in space has a
much greater effect than on Earth. A more detailed discussion of the
biological aspects of this mission is in Chapter Four.

Pursuant to an agreement between the two countries, the Soviet
Union included U.S. experiments on the next in their series of biosats.
22 Pravda, Moscow, Nov. 9, 1973, p. 3.


heavy lift vehicle has been under development. Indeed. it hns even beoon
described as t:aving the general capacity of the Saturn V. Depending
upon wbuhat assumptions one makes about upper stage efficiency, its lift
capacity for several missions can be variously estimated. If it was orig-
inally intended to fly during the late 1960's, it can be speculated that
perhaps some or all of the stages of the D-l-e vehicle related to Pro-
ton, Zond, deep space, and Snlyut payloads, would represent a shortcut
way to attain an earlier operational capability. This would be akin
to the U.S. use of the S-IVB stage on Saturn V or the Centaur stage
on Titan III. Since the D-l-e vehicle does not demonstrate the kind
of lifting efficiency associated with high energy fuels, then perhaps
the G-1--e heavy lift vehicle also will fall short of its full potential in
early use. The NASA estimates about the Soviet vehicle put the first
staLe thrust in the range of 4.5 to 6.35 thousand metric tons, compared
with 3.4 thoiiusand metric tons of the Saturn V. But without high
energy fuels, that might mean a capacity to deliver about the same
45,500 kiloirrams to the vicinity of the Moon which a Saturn V typical-
lv will send.
How reliable van such estimates be? That is hard to say for a vehicle
which the Russians have not discussed in specific terms, and which
in any case is too big to be paraded. But since the "national technical
mean's5" which are used to count Soviet missile silos and slight differ-
ences in their dimensions are freely cited by Secretaries of Defense,
one has to assume that this Nation should have a fair idea of the srope
of work associated with such a postulated large vehicle.
The Russians themselves have thoroughly obscured the issu of
whether in fact such a vehicle exists. Some have praised the economy
of orbital assembly over direct flights to the Moon with a big vehicle.
On November 12. 1965. Co-mnonaut Nikolayev stated in a Sovio radio
interview that studies were underway to see whether manned flights
into deep space should be solely through orbital assembly or also
through use of a large vehicle for direct flights. By July 1966, a Czech
commentator, Jan Petranek, was talking in terms of a 100,000-kilo-
gram-payload ship.23 In March, 1967, General Kamanin, the leader of
the cosmonaut corps was predicting flights to the Moon of payloads in
the 60,000 to 70,000 kilogram range.24 This might have meant through
orbital assembly, but if based upon use of high energy fuel in upper
stages would scale well with the 4.5 to 6.35 thousand metric ton thrust
first stage for the G class vehicles, since a Saturn V at 3.4 thousand
metric tons thrust would deliver 45,500 kilograms on a similar mission.
One of the most specific forecasts of a very large Soviet vehicle
was written by Karel Pacner of Czechoslovakia in the October 4, 1967
issue of the Prague magazine Student, in which he specifically credited
Cosmonaut Popovich and General Kamanin as saying the very large
vehicle was under preparation, that is, a vehicle well ahead of the D
class. By October 1967, Cosmonaut Feoktistov, who was a senior official
of the space design bureau, was quoted in Pravda as forecasting deep
space flights using both the approach of Earth orbital assembly and
direct from the surface of the Earth with [large] vehicles.25 In March
Petranek, Jan, quoted on Prague Radio, 1530 GMT, July 21, 1966.
s4 Kamanin, N., quoted on Warsaw Radio, 1900 GMT, March 9, 1967.
25 Quoted by Moscow Radio, 0300 GMT, October 3, 1967.


Soviet research has indicated that prol)lnc('] ex',PsuIre to elevated
carbon dioxide (above 7.5 mm 1ig) is undesi r1,lde krs.illse of chronic
toxicity. In an artificial gas atmosphere to be ised for 3 or 4 ont I ,
the pCO2 must not exceed 3-6 mm 1Ig. Investigations continue to
determine the optiniimum limits of carbon dioxide in artificial ga-; at rios-
pheres to be respired for loni periods of time. The positive effect of
carbon dioxide on tolerance of hypoxia and other strs':e, is also re'eiv-
ing considerable attention.33'-333
Carbon monoxide is also a gas of concern in the artificial gas atmos-
phere because it is extremely toxic at very low concentrations. Several
investigations in which animals have been exposed to this gas have
been conducted. These studies have indicated that spaceflight factors
such as hypokinesia decrease resistance to the gas. Exposure to oxygen-
rich environments facilitates the elimination of carbon monoxide while
not significantly altering resistance to it. The studies indicate that the
permissible concentration of carbon monoxide in spacecraft should not
exceed and should perhaps be less than the permissible limit allowed
under industrial conditions.334-335
The use of inerIt diluent g.,ases such as helium in artificial gas atmos-
pheres is receiving considerable attention in the Soviet and Amerie:;n
space and undersea. life sciences communities. Both Soviet and Ameri-
canm investigations of man and animals chronically exposed (up to 60
days) to helium-oxygen and helium-nitrogen-oxygen atmospheres at
normal pressure have revealed no unfavorable effects on metabolism.
respiration, circulation, or central nervous function. Although ter-
restrial life forms are accustomed to nitrogcren in the atmosphere, its
absence has not been found to be of serious biological significance.
Human mammalian cell cultures exposed to helium-oxygen atmos-
pheres for up to 10 generations have revealed no noticeable shifts from
normal. The only feature which has been found to differentiate bio-
logically helium from nitrogen is the thermophysical property of the
former which intensifies thermoregulatory processes because of its
high heat. conductance. In one recent Soviet experiment, however, a
helium-oxygen atmosphere was found to increase the tolerance of hu-
man subjects to accelerations of 4-8 G. The positive effect was at-
tributed to an intensification of respiration and an elevation of puil-
monary ventilation and gas exchange possibly associated with a de-
cline in aerodynamic resistance to breathing. Thus, there appear to be
few if any biomedical barriers to the use of helium and certain other
of the inert gases at normal pressure in an artificial atmosphere. In-
deed, helium is commonly used as a diluent gas in hyperliaric deep-
diving atmospheres. However, there is no indication that diluent gases
3' Malkin. V. B. Barometric prpssiire and gas eomnno-lt!nn. Op. Cit.
= rinzkova, V. A. et al. Acid base balance In the blood respiration of byp.ernpnip L)
mixtures. Space Biology and Aerospace Medicine (USSR), No. 2, 1975, 20-27 hFRD
m2 r 2S! 5).
3 Deynega. V. G. et al. Effect of an altered atmosphere and Inri-,n(r'd temperature on
human respiration and g:ic exchange In a small encl.i-ure. Space Binolo'y and Aerospace
Medicine (USSR), No. 6, 1974, 5S-63.
'A Abidin, B. I. et al. Effect of restricted activity on resir.tnnce to the acute effect of
carbon monoxide. Space Biology and Medicine (USSR), No. 2. 1973. 32 33..
335 Abidlin. B. I. et al. Effect of high oxyven content on the intensity of formation and
elimination of some gaseous products. Space Bioligy and M'NIliine (USSR), No. 4, 1972,


tional antenna was used to return the signals to Earth. The pietwues
showed rocks clo.-e at hand and the horizon at a distance of 1.5'kilo-
meters away. Picttires were taken twice on February 4, a nr oce on th lie
5th, so that with changes in shadow length, different objects were high-
lighted. Also, there was some shift in the payload between the sec-
ond and third picture series giving a slightly different perspective. As
1near as c'ii be judged from the Soviet accoint-4, each picture series
involved in the panoramas included nine posit ions of thl mi error.
Kosiios 111 was launched on March 1, 19)6, but failed to leave its
low Earth orbit from which it decayed in two days. It is generally
assumed that it was intended to be a lunar orbiter mission, but it
could have been another lander.
On March 31, 1966, Luna 10 was launched toward the Moon from
an orbital launch platform. The weight of payload sent toward the
Moon was 1,600 kilograms. Apparently, the vehicle w\as structured like
Luna 9 in terms of its propulsion, guidance, orientation, and commu-
nications elements, except that the laiiding station was replaced by an
orbital station of a different nature. Luna 10 was braked to enter lunar
orbit, the first man-made object to achieve tlii.-. The main propulsion
unit was separated from the payload after lunar orbit was attained,
and the remaining payload weighed 245 kilograms. The initial orbit
was about 1,017 by 350 kilometers with an inclination of 71o54' to
the lunar equator and had a period of 178.25 minutes. Although tlt
prime purpose of the flight \vas science, at the 23rd Congress of the
CPSU (Communist Party, Soviet Union) the delegates were brought
to their feet when the payload circling the Moon played back to
Earth the st ra ins of the Internationale.
Luna 10 was not equipped with a television camera, but it lihad a va-
riety of instruments to return data. One task was the reporting of
meteoritic impacts on the payload. Another was to determine the ther-
mnal characteristics of the Moon without interference of the Earth's
atmosphere. Another had to do with study of the Moon's magnetism, if
any. Also, there was a need to establish some notion of the irregulari-
ties of the Moon's gravitational field.
One midcourse correction had been required on April 1, and then
when it was 8,000 kilometers from the Moon, the braking engine was
fired to drop the speed from 2.1 kilometers per second to 1.25 kilo-
meters per second so that it could go into orbit. The payload was
separated 20 minutes after the end of ret rofire.
The listed instruments were: A meteorite particles recorder; a
gamminia spectrometer; a magnetometer; instruments for studying solar
plasma; a recorder for infrared emissions from the Moon; and devices
to measure radiation conditions in the Moon's environment. The gravi-
tational studies were pursued as a byproduct of the tracking. The
device was battery-powered, but by careful husbanding of this elec-
trical supply, it was possible to continue to receive radio signals from
the payload until May 30, 1966. By this time, there had been 460 orbits
of the Moon, and 219 active transmiiissions of data.
By placing the payload in an orbit inclined at 72 degrees to the
lunar equator, it was able to take readings over much of the surface
over a period of time. The stunt of sending back music was achieved
by programing some semiconductors to emit a definite sequence of
electrical oscillations.



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Acceleration and Deceleration Effects:
Impact Accelerations.
Coriolis Accelerations (vestibular effects).
Acoustic Energy Effects.
Altered and Normal Gas Atmospheres:
Oxygen (hypoxia, hyperoxia).
Carbon dioxide hypercapniaa, acapnia).
Noxious gases (carbon monoxide, pyrolysis by-products etc.).
Odors (food, body, chemical etc.).
Biological Rhythms:
(Circadian Rhythms.
Work-Rest Cycles.
Dec impression Effects:
Dysbarism (decompression sickness).
Explosive Docompression.
Disnses. and Injury:
Cause and Prevention.
Treatment and Drug Therapy.
Personal Hygiene.
Natural and Synthetic Foods.
Food Packaging.
Relative Biological Effectiveness.
Do'se and Dose Rate.
Somatic and Genetic Effects.
Protective M.easurrs (drugs, shielding, force fields etc.).
Temperature and Humidity:
Motor Kinetics.
Motion Sickness.
Hypodynamia and Hypokinesian.
Preventive and Prophylactic Measures.
Work Capacity:
FP tizne.
Muscle Tone.
Physical Training and Exercise.
Subjects being investigated in the psychological and behavioral
sciences include:
Boredom and Confinement.
Mental Fatigue.
Motivation and Vigilance.
Neurnoses and Psychoses:
Personality Dynamics:
Group Interaction.
Space Crew Problems:
Ron uirnments.
S.-letion and Screening.
Task Analysis.
Work S-hedule and Performance.
Weightlessness Effects:
Work-Rest Cycles (sleep et.).


11. Soyus 14 and 15 with Salyut 3
In 1974 the Soviet Union launched their second successful space
station, Salyut 3, which remained in orbit for seven months. It was
intended to be host to two manned crews, Soyuz 14 and 15. The first
docked successfully and conducted joint experiments for 14 days, while
Soyuz 15 was unable to achieve a link-up.
a. Salyut 3.-Salyut 3 was launched June 25, 1974 into an orbit
270 x 219 km, inclined at 51.6 and with a period of 89.1 minutes. This
Salyut was of an improved design (details will follow) and had sev-
eral characteristics about it which suggest its mission was military
ran-ther than civilian.
All four men sent to work with Salyut 3 were from the military:
usually in the Soyuz program Russian crews are comprised of both
military and civilian persons. On board was a 10 meter focal length
high resolution camera, 12 and the Russians announced that for the first
time Salyut 3 was constantly oriented toward Earth with the help of
an electro-mechanical stabilization system. Although this could simply
indicate Earth resources photography, as the Russians announced, the
low orbital parameters of the space station and the long focal length
camera with its folded optics suggest high resolution photography of a
nature not needed for Earth resources work. Also, during the success-
ful docking of Soyuz 14, the crew transmitted on the 121.75 MHz fre-
quency normally used by Soyuz missions, but once they entered the
space station the frequency was changed to 143.625 MHz (Salyut 3
itself transmitted fifteen spacecraft hardware parameters on 19.946
MHz, previously used by Salyut 2).
The Russians announced that Salyut 3 was 21 meters long (see
page 188) with an internal volume of 100 cubic meters. The aggregate
weight of the Salyut/Soyuz system remained at over 25 metric tons.
On September 23, after hosting the crew of Soyuz 14 and then being
unmanned for more then two months, a module separated from Salyut,
went through a reentry procedure, and was recovered, quite likely
indicating that photography had continued on board Salyut
Salyut 3 functioned for more than twice its design life, reentering
the atmosphere by command over the Pacific on January 24,1975. By
December 25. 1974, after completing 2,950 revolutions around Earth
(by 1500 GMT), the space station had hosted 400 scientific and tech-
nical experiments, had 8,000 control commands transmitted to it, more
than 200 dynamic operations were performed, there had been 70 tele-
vision and 2,500 telemetric communication sessions, 500,000 firings of
the stabilization engines, and 5,000 kilowatt hours of power had been
produced by the solar panel energy supply system. An atmospheric
pressure of 835-850 mm Hg and a temperature of 21-22C were main-
tained throughout.
Some of the changes to Salvut were:
(1) Miniaturized circuitry in control loops;
(2) A more efficient power supply and life support systems, includ-
ing better thermal control. Solar panels capable of rotating 180 were
substituted for the stationary kind used on Salyut 1 so the station itself
1 Major Redecizn Marks Salyut-3. Aviation Week and Space Technology, New York.
July 15. 1974: 293.


FIGI'UREK _.-Ksms 166, an orbiting solar observatory.


By Charles S. Sheldon II*

More than half of Soviet space launching to date have been in
direct support of military missions. Table 6-14 at the end of this chap-
ter will summarize trends in this rega rd. Chapter One, Tables 1-2 and
1-3 gave the basic information on which the table in this chapter
reached its findings. While these tables show the great importance
of military applications in the Soviet space program, they also show
that the program is not wholly military in its objectives. Other chap-
ters discussing the organization, the goals, and the hardware of the
Soviet program show the many elements of the program used for
scientific and civil or economic applications, which make the diversity
of the total program abundantly clear.
There has always been an element of speculation about Soviet pur-
poses in space because of their skillful use of information policies to
combine a large flood of information about many aspects of space
flight, including the quick identification of flight names and orbital
parameters, and at the same time they have a policy of tight security
and secrecy over the real purposes of most payloads and minimal in-
formation about the technology of Earth orbital flight. Earlier chap-
ters of this report have shown techniques for penetrating this obfi isca-
tion to provide fairly reliable indicators of real Soviet objectives,
flight by flight. If this is not possible on the day of launch, particularly
with new variations, this usually can be accomplished within a year or
two by painstaking analysis of all the evidence which finally enters
the public domain. It is partly a subjective judgment in the end, with-
out Soviet cooperation, whether we have really explained all flights
or whether there is a remnant where even our "guestimates" and intui-
tive feelings may be misleading us. In general, experience seems to
demonstrate that our more conservative views about mysterious
flights in the end find better support than the more speculative guesses
that a particular new event is about to lead immediately to quantum
jumps in ambitions and achievements.
The Russians have maintained they must pursue policies of secrecy
over some aspects of their flight program because they do not want to
boast in advance of concrete accomplishment-which is just another
way of saying they hate to tarnish their contrived image of superiority
by admitting to failures which inevitably occur in all space programs
*Dr. Sheldon is chief, Science Policy Research Division, Congressional Research Service,
The Library of Congress.



Space operations require extensive support from Eairth, including
not only a launch pad with its associated as-sembly and checkout equip-
ment, but also down range gulidance and command, tracking, and other
communications links. After the payload is in orbit, then tracking is
useful for keeping posted on it and on all other objects in space, and
for commands to the payload and receipt of (lata gathered or observed
by the payload.
The Soviet Union may have started its spa'e programs with a curious
mixture of very ambitious and comprehensive plans for uF(, of lar,.e
vehicles which could perform many missions in Earth orbit and be-
yond, combined with minimal support on the ground in terms of varie-
ties of hardware, limited number of pads, and minimal communica-
tions links.
It is very likely that the early launch guidance was primarily by
radio, radar and optical mn-e:tns because of the pattern of flying down
the same corridor repetitively from Tyuratam: indeed this may still
be true for many space launches, simply with more radio and thleodo-
lite tracking stations being added along additional corridors. This is
suggested by the fact that vehicles which almost certainly must come
from different launch pads. added when new types of vehicles were
added, fly on inclinations that vary from the earlier standard ones only
by an amount compatible with passing near some down range truck-
ing points in about the snme relationship as vehicles launched from
the original pads.
Minimal ground support will permit the start of a program, but as
needs to exploit the potential of space for science and applications
grow, then more is required in Earth-based facilities.

Soviet public statements aboit their tracking capabilities for the
early years made particular reference to optical tracking facilities.
Theze were in many parts of their own country. They also encouraged
observers in Soviet bloc countries to send reports of observations to
Moscow. Some of the equipment was relatively simple: only a few
more advanced telescope systems were pictured, with no indication of
how many of these better systems there were.
Even with Soviet reticence in discussing more than optic,,l track-
ing. there were Western reports of a network consisting of a master
station and twelve others equipped with receivers to measure Doppler
shifts in radio signals, tracking radars, and phototheodolites. trans-
miting data to a central computation center.31 Four such stations were
revealed as to location by the Russians in 1964 in a COSPAR report.32
The first official and rmPrp (ten'P,-o liz;no come in connection with
the Apollo Soyuz Test Project in 1975. This included the following
seven land bases: Yevpatoriya, Tbilisi, Dzhusaly, Kolpashevo, Ulan-
Ude. ITssuriyisk, and Petropavlovsk.33 Mo likely thn not, there are
other stations to meet the needs of particular programs.
2 Aviation Week, New York. January 26.1969, p. 26.
Cospar Bulletin No. 18, Paris. April 1964, pp. 10-11.
Aviation Week, New York. May 5, 1975, pp. 42-43.


Cradled within the cylinder was the experiment package as if within
an annulus. Separate cutaways of the experiment showed typical
blocks of metal, paraffin, and plastic as often used for cosmic ray
experiments. The ship was able to transmit many channels of tele-
metry. The low orbit led to its decay after 87 days.
2. Proton 2
This similar payload was launched on November 2, 1965, and lasted
92 days. It was in an orbit of 637 by 191 kilometers, at an inclination
of 63.5 degrees, and with a period of 92.6 minutes. It also was an-
nounced as weighing 12.2 metric tons. Western optical studies of the
accompanying debris in Earth orbit left in doubt whether the whole
core vehicle was in orbit with the payload (the D version) or an upper
stage (the D-1 version).
3. Proton 3
After eight more months, Proton 3 was announced as launched on
July 6, 1966. It was in an orbit of 630 by 190 kilometers, at 63.5 de-
grees inclination, and with a period of 92.5 minutes. It also had an
announced weight of 12.2 metric tons. Decay came after 72 days. This
flight continued the study of cosmic rays, including solar cosmic rays,
and their energy spectrum and chemical composition in the range up
to 100 trillion electron volts. It measured the absolute intensity and
energy spectrum of those of galactic origin, and it sought primary
cosmic rays for any particles which might have a fractional electrical
charge. Specific reference was made to searching for the postulated
fundamental particle, the quark. In any case, the orbital station af-
forded study opportunities impossible to pursue on the surface of the
Considering that three such similar payloads were flown, and prob-
ably without too efficient a use of the new launch vehicle, it seemed
perhaps the primary purpose of the flights was to test the new vehicle
with science getting a free ride, much like the three early flights
of Saturn I which carried repetitive Pegasus meteoroid experiments.
4. Proton 4
The final Proton flight came on November 14, 1968, as an improve-
ment over the predecessors. It was put into an orbit of 495 by 255
kilometers at an inclination of 51.5 degrees, the inclination used here-
after for D-velhicle launches, with a period of 91.75 minutes. It de-
cayed after 250 days. This time the payload weight was listed as 17
metric tons.
Later, a replica was put on display, and it was substantially like its
predecessors, but at one end there was a blunt, conical nosecone, even
though the payload was non-recoverable. It had a number of rod
antennas, and the same kind of solar panels. This time there was agree-
ment among Western optical observers that the accompanying spent
rocket casing in orbit was on the order of 12 meters long, 4 meters
in diameter, the same as seen with the Luna 15 and Zond 4 flights (the
D-1 version).
The Soviet description of the experiments this time raised its capac-
ity to measuring cosmic ray energies up to a level of one quadrillion
electron volts, (105eV) and to do chemical analysis studies in the
range between 10 and 100 trillion electron volts. It was also to study


sion sickness, general dvsbarism, and the etiology and pathogenesis of
bubble formation in decompression sickness. Activity in this field
has been particularly high since the Soyuz 11 incident. Emphasis has
been on detailed physiological analyses of decompression disorders
and approaches to preventing or minimizing the damaging effects of
various types of decompression phenomena. This researchl also paral-
lels manned undersea research. Space oriented research tends to con-
centrate on the physiological effects of normal and decreased atmos-
pheric pressure while undersea research focuses on decompression from
high hydrostatic pressures.'10', 341
There are three fundamental causes of decompression di'ordlers.
First, elevated pressure and damage therefrom in body cavities is the
result of the difference, between high internal and low external prC-:-
sire which can occur during explosive or rapid decompression. Second,
saturated gas can form bubbles in body fluids or tissues during decom-
pression from high to normal or from normal to low atmospheric
pressure. Finally, actually boiling and vaporization of body fluids with
severe damage to surrounding tissues can occur during rapid or ex-
plosive decompression from a normal atmospheric pressure to one ap-
proaching a vacuum state. Soviet research has concentrated mainly
on gradual or altitude decompression disorders with emphasis on the
mechanisms of effect of decompression on the function and morphol-
ogy of organs, tissues, and biological fluids of animals. Changes in
respiration, circulation, and detailed analyses of gas composition and
other indices of the blood are also examined.342'343
The ultimate purpose of Soviet research on decompression disorders
is to develop methods for preventing, increasing resistance to, or pro-
tecting individuals from the unfavorable consequences of these factors.
Recent research has examined the application of low pressure (hypo-
baric) mixed-gas atmospheres as a method of preventing altitude
decompression disease. It was demonstrated experimentally that the
development of decompression sickness can be prevented by prelimi-
nary desaturation for 6 to 8 hours in a nitrogen (60 percent) and oxy-
gen (40 percent) atmosphere maintained at 550 mm Hg (760 mm Hg
is normal atmospheric pressure). It is speculated that the application
of this method in a spacecraft cabin could prevent decompression sick-
ness should cabin pressure decrease to 250 mm Hg or pressure in an
extravehicular activity (EVA) suit decrease to 180-200 mm Hg.
Experiments have involved tests of variations of the above. Exposure
to a 100 percent oxygen atmosphere for 5 hours or to an oxygen-
nitrogen atmosphere for 10 hours at 430 mm Hg has been demon-
strated to be an effective method for preventing decompression
sickness in human subjects working in a low pressure (200 mm Hg)
atmosphere for 5-6 hours. Other approaches designed to prevent or
treat decompression disorders include cardiovascular and respiratory
"0 Ibid.
341 Gramenitskiy. P. M. Decompression disorders. In: Problems of Space Biology. Vol. 25.
oR.eow. "Nauka" Press, 1974. 349 p.
42 Ivanov, K. V. et al. Blood changes during decompression sickness after forced de-
compression. Hygiene, Labor, and Occupational Diseases (USSR), No. 5, 1975, 36-39
(FR! D:2458).
M4 Bogoslovov. G. B. Pathogenesis of some respiratory and circulatory reactions accom-
panying drops in barometric pressure. Space Biology and Medicine (USSR), No. 6, 1972,

67-371-76-- 2,


FIGURE 46.-Vostok in three guises: Left: The Vostok still attached to its lunar
final stage rocket. Upper right: The Vostok in its operational form in orbit
showing both the manned capsule and the service module with batteries and
other support equipment. Lower right: The manned capsule as it is recovered
on Earth.


Establishment (RAE) report suggested, however, that Kosmos 382
used a double burn of the launch vehicle rocket stage, for their register
lists it as first appearing in the initial orbit and then shifting to the
intermediate, where the platform was released. The RAE apparently
misinterpreted events, though, or one would have to assume the rocket
stage actually made a separate maneuver equal to that of the launch
platform. They probably relied on poor information from NORAD
which the latter organization did not correct or qualify. Since this is
contradictory, the object reported by RAE close to the initial orbit
of the payload must not have been the same rocket casing listed at the
intermediate orbit.
The nature of the initial orbits of the three similar flights was very
similar to a Soyuz orbit, and indeed the signal formats and frequencies
used also resembled Soyuz, so an A-2 launch vehicle was used. But
Soyuz class ships have repeatedly been listed by the Russians as having
a maximum altitude of 1,300 km. The use of an orbital launch platform
like a lunar or interplanetary flight and the further climb with on-
board propulsion to more than 10,000 km is clearly beyond the Soyuz
capability. This, then, was the first use of the A-2-m vehicle, a much
more maneuverable version of the A-2.
Kosmos 382, though, differed from the other flights not only be-
cause the perigee was raised instead of the apogee, but a very substan-
tial plane change was accomplished in the final maneuver. If this pay-
load was similar to that of the other three, then only a D class vehicle
could have been used to make maneuvers of such magnitude, and that
apparently was a D-l-m.
Mr. G. E. Perry of the Kettering Grammar School in England cal-
culated the delta V's involved in Kosmos 379 and found a very close
match to what might be expected for lunar orbit insertion and for
trans-Earth ejection.4 He concluded that all four flights involved
testing of a Soviet equivalent of the American SPS engine used for
the Apollo command service module on lunar flights. The assignment
of the three similar flights to the Earth-orbit category in the 1966-70
edition of this report resulted in some criticism. That all four were
Moon precursors is a logical explanation, but knowing the limitations
of the A-2 vehicle and keeping to a very conservative analysis, the
original designation of Kosmos 379,398 and 434 as Earth-orbit related
and Kosmos 382 as part of the lunar program stands until such time
as an overt program clarifies the situation.

1. Soyuz 10 and 11 with Salyut 1
By the earlier criteria listed under Soyuz 4 and 5 for a space station,
the world's first such station was launched by the Soviet Union in 1971.
Two missions, Soyuz 10 and 11, were sent to work with the station and
it remained in orbit for about six months.
a. Salyut 1.-Very early on April 19, 1971, the unmanned space sta-
tion Salyut 1 was launched from Tyuratam by a D-1 vehicle into a 222
x 200 km orbit inclined at 51.6. Initial announcements were vague, as
usual, stating the purpose of the mission as a test of elements of the
4 Perry, G. E. Flight International, London, December 10, 1970, p. 923.


creation while low tolerance is associated with decreased secretion of
these substances.239
Other physical factors such as heat and gas atmosphere play a role
in the sensitivity of the vestibular analyzer to rotatory accelerations.
High temperate ure, particularly in the 45-50C range, decreases human
resistance to motion sickness. Similarly, a hypoxic gas mixture (10.5
percent oxygen and 89.5 percent nitrogen) increases vestibular sen-
sitivity while decreasing vestibular stability. On the other hand, an
atmosphere rich in oxygen (40-43 percent) and carbon dioxide (2
percent) increases vestibular stability to rotatory stimuli.240-242
As a result of the large body of theoretically oriented research, a
number of approaches are being developed to detect space, crew candi-
dates with latent or subtle vestibular sensitivity to spaceflight factors.
At the -,ime time, methods are being developed to ti'aiii cosmonauts
in order to prevent, or at, least delay and minimize anticipated
vestibular disorders during spaceflight. For example, a series of 2,622
experiments were conducted between 1961 and 1970 on 777 subjects.
The subjects were exposed to pressure and heat. chambers, spacecraft
mockups, and aircraft which flew through parabolic trajectories to
produce short term weightlessness. They were also exposed to rotating
chairs and other vestibular training devices. The results of these tests
were compared with data from the Vostok and Soyuz flights. It was
determined that isolation, decreased atmospheric pressure, a helium-
oxygen atmosphere, hypokinesia, overheating, and hypoxia signifi-
cantly decreased vestibular and orthostatic tolerance. All kinds of
physical activity were found to improve tolerance. Figure skating,
water sports, basketball, and soccer were the most effective approaches,
while running was the least effective. A crawl swimming stroke with
simultaneous rotation and rotational chair training with fast head
movements were two particularly effective exercises. The most effective
methods of determining vestibular sensitivity in pilots and cosmonauts
were tolerance tests in aircraft and the use of a vestibular test with
simultaneous optokinetic stimulation.243-245 Recently, the selective tens-
ing of shoulder muscles has been found to decrease the severity of
motion sickness and to shorten the subsequent recovery period.26
As with other spaceflight stresses, the Soviets have conducted con-
siderable research on pharmacological preparations which prevent or
suppress motion sickness and vestibular disorders. A novel prepara-
tion tested in 1972 was sodium hydrocarbonate. Intravenously injected,
the preparation was tested in the laboratory, in clinics, and at sea. A
239 Nemchenko, N. S. Effect of Coriolis acceleration accumulation on catecholamine ex-
cretion. Military Medical Journal (USSR), No. 4, 1974, 55-56 (FRD #1822).
o240 Yuganov, E. M. et al. Influence of high temperature on the onset of motion sickness.
Military Medical Journal (USSR), No. 6, 1972, 86-88.
241 Sidelnikov, I. A. et al. Threshold sensitivity of the vestibular analyzer during
hypoxia. Space Biology and Aerospace Medicine (USSR), No. 6, 1974, 55-58.
24 Markaryan, S. S. et al. Effect of increased oxygen and carbon dioxide content on vesti-
bular resistance. Space Biology and Aerospace Medicine (USSR), No. 2, 1975, 65-68.
243 Khilov, K. L. Certain problems of vestibular function evaluation in pilots and cos-
monauts. Space Biology and Aerospace Medicine (USSR), No. 5, 1974, 476-498 (FRD
24 Kopanev, V. I. The problem of human statokinetic tolerance in aviation and space
medicine. Izvestlya of the Academy of Sciences, USSR. Biological Series. No. 4, 1974, 476-
498 (FRD # 1965).
2 Yakovieva, I. Ya. et al. Function of spatial coordinate perception during active, pas-
sive, and complex vestibular training. Space Biology and Aerospace Medicine (USSR),
No. 5, 1974, 60-66 (FRD #2040).
240 Ayzikov, G. S. et al. Human tolerance of Coriolis accelerations while tensing various
groum)s of muscles. Space Biology and Aerospace Medicine (USSR), No. 3, 1975, 69-74
(FRD #2480).


1. Kosmos 122
Kosmos 122 was launched on June 25, 1966, though without an an-
nounced specific mission at the time. The Soviet Union and the United
States already had an agreement to exchange pictures gathered by
weather satellite over the so-called Cold Line between Moscow and
Suitland, Maryland. For some months, no satellite data were trans-
mitted over the line because reciprocity was the rule and there were
no Soviet pictures forthcoming to match those of the U.S. TIROS
Ilovever, after some months during which the Russians apparently
experimented with this payload, they finally acknowledged that it was
a weather satellite.25 For a few weeks, then, pictures on a selective basis
were transmitted to the United States over the Cold Line with reci-
procity on the part of this country. The pict iures received in the United
States by cable were not of good quality, and ]they arrived too late for
real-time use in weather prediction. Part of the trouble lay in the inade-
quacy of the. cable link, 1)lit slow Soviet proce.ssinnr in Moscow also
seems to have been a factor. The pictures ccnsod coming after a few
weeks, strongly suggesting that the payload inst ruiiientation had had
only a short life.26 This flight was the last one of its series flown from
Tyuratam with an A-1 vehicle at a 65 degree inclination.
Although Kosmos 122 was not very successful as a long-term-use
operational device, it pioneered some important techniques in weather
reporting, more nearly matching in concept the complex U.S. Nimbus
series rather than the smaller and simpler original U.S. TIROS type.
(a) Instrunme'nfation.-Kosmos 122 carried instruments for a tele-
vision survey of the cloud cover, other #-.meras for the infrared survey
of clouds both by day and night, and further instruments for measur-
ing the radiation of the Earth's atmosphere. The instrnientation of
Kosmos 122 made use of the 8-12 micron window of transparency for
its day and night scanning of infrared. Ordinary television was used
for daytime cloud cover pictures, and for measuring limits of icefields
in the absence of clouds. The downward intensity of radiation was
measured in three bands. Measurements in the 0.3 to 3 micron range
(visible light and lower infrared) made it possible to measure the inten-
sity of reflected radiation, about 70-80 percent from clouds, most of the
rest from oceans. Studies in the 8-12 micron band made it possible to
estimate the temperature of the Earth or of clouds visible from the
satellite. Measurements in the 3 to 30 micron range made it possible to
mea sure the total flux of heat energy from the Earth and from the
atmosphere into space. Data from the satellite were processed through
a computer on Earth with appropriate allowance for the position of
the satellite to derive radiation intensity maps of the Earth. It was
made clear that Kosmos 122 was still experimental and reported data
for only parts of its total orbit.27
(b) Payload Appearance.-When pictures of Kosmos 122 were
released, it was revealed to be a fairly large cylinder, perhaps 1.5
meters in diameter and 5 meters long, and extending from opposite
sides were two large solar panels of three segments each. It was three-
axis stabilized with fly wheels driven by electric motors; it could tilt
'- Izvestiya, Moscow, August 19,1966, p. 4.
SThis was confirmed as 4 months by Izvestiya, Moscow, March 17,1967, D. 5.
7 Izvestiya, Moscow, August 21, 1966, p. 5.


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ground crews. The sequencers are such that the Soyuz can be flown
in the unmanned mode. Hand controllers do permit the cosmonaut
to guide manually spacecraft attitude and translation. But in contrast,
American spacecraft are provided with several control modes to guide
spacecraft acceleration and rate.166 Thus, the Soynz is frequently
referred to as a man-rated, unmanned spacecraft in which cosmonauts
have minimal command, control, or trouble-shooting capability.
Aside from sp-icecTaft manual control considerations, there is evi-
dence that the Russians have devoted considerable thought and re-
search to the general problem of space cabin habitability. They have
also thoroughly reviewed American approached to the problem. The
result is a fairly empirical approach to the. design of the spacecraft
calmin and Fss ciated equipment. The Soyuz command module has been
designed for utility and comfort. Instrument panels and consoles pro-
vide for the most efficient possible readout of data and manipulation
by the operator. Other habitability factors of vital importance to crew
function and well beincr are also being investigated in considerable
depth. Those. include cosmonaut work-rest cycles and sociopsychology
(di'cuss'!d in Section II and III), illumination of spacecraft working
and living areas. and space cabin house!:eoping problems. Theoe fac-
tors are a zsaming greater importance as the duration of space missions
incre.,sr.-. Accordingly, Soviet research in this sphere is oriented
toward interplanetary space missions of many months duration.67

As is the practice in the American manned space program. Soviet
spacecraft are provided with emergency backup systems for virtually
every Fnlk in the life support assembly. However, in the event of a
catar-tt.P(ophic situation in winch a space mission mu-t be aborted, space
cr(w; are provided with emergency rescue equipment as well. In the
Soyuz spacecraft, emergency separation of the descent module (which
occurred in an April 5, 1975 Soyuz mission) is provided for during a
launch phase malfunction by means of a solid fuel propulsion unit.
Upon s.ia ration, the descent module parachute deploys for an even-
tual soft. landing on either land or sea. Once landed, the crew is pro-
vided with a portable emergency supply unit in the event that landing
has taken place in a remote area or far out at sea. The unit contains
food, water, communications gear (radio with power source), clothing,
fishing and hunting equipment, and medicine. In the early Vostok
series, the portable emergency unit was contained in the cosmonaut's
: ..t, which, wiith the cosmonaut in it. could be ejected from the space
capsule during an abort or landing in a remote area.168
The portable emergency supplies aboard the Soyuz spacecraft are
intended for two cosmonauts and are. subdivided into four units: In-
sulated sits. flying boots and gloves are in the first and fourth units;
foodstuffs with a total caloric value of about 4,500 calories (about a
m Ibid.
167Petrov, Yu. A. Physiological hygiene and psychological aspects of life organiza-
tion in spInecraft cabins. In : Fo nations of Space Biology and Medicine. Vol. III. Part 1.
Ch. 6. Waqbineton. D.C.. NASA. 1975 (In press).
1S Chrnr akov. I. N. Protection nf the life and health of crews of spacecraft and space
stations In omereency situations. In: Foundations of Space Biology and Medicine. VoL 3,
Part 3, Chapter 14, Wash., D.C., NASA 1975, (In Press).

The fir>t known space use of the system was for FOBS test. apparently
in a four stage version. The fir'-t stage is suborbital. A courier rocket
stage, whether second stage or third stage is not clear, is abandoned in
the initial orbit attained. The Royal Aircraft Establishment gives its
dimensions as 8 meters long by 2.5 meters in diameter. In flight, a
further change in orbit occurs, and this places an orbital platfoiii in
still another position. It is from this latter object that retrofire occtur-
(hence the designator "r" syiiibolizing the retrofire fourth sta,'-.)
which drives the warhead back to Earth, while the rest of the orbitinig
hardw-are continues in space for at least a few more orbits.
2. Use as a Maneuvr'irng Vehicle, F-l-rm.
The F class vehicles have now appeared in several other flight mo,!.
and these will be discussed in a later chapter. The essential change in
the hardware is the appearance of a fourth maneuvering stage which
may be the outgrowth of work started in the Polet and Kosmos 10 ,
and 125 programs. These can be labeled the F-l-rn series, although
there may be subtypes to fit the different flight modes which have been
observed. All the F class space payloads have been launched froi,
Tyuratam. The weapons-related flights have been at an inclination of
49.5 degrees. The maneuvering flights, for a variety of military pur-
poses in the general range of from 62 to 66 degrees inclination. The-se
additional missions seem to relate to inspector/destructor flights,
radar ocean surveillance, and possibly other uses.

Perhaps the most elusive space launch vehicle in the Soviet collec-
tion is their very heavy system. The need for such a system is highly
compelling if the Russians have been serious in their interest in both
manned lunar flight and later manned planetary flight. They have
talked a great deal about orbital assembly of orbital stations and deep
space manned craft, but the actual use of orbital assembly has not
kept pace with the talk and rumors of what they may be planning to
do. Some of these possibilities will be discussed later in this study.
While orbital assembly is seen by Soviet space officials as the ult im.te
technique for many advanced inisions, the availability of a lar'.
launch vehicle would serve Soviet interests at an earlier date in tLe
same way the Sa urn V was of i'.e to the United States. Even when
assembly is commonplace, putting up some heavy and complex compo-
nents with a large launch vehicle has advantages.
Over the years, the Russians have taken some special pride in build-
ing large aircraft, hydroelectric dams, drag lines, battle tanks, artil-
lery. They have in the past stressed their leadership in high payload
weights in space. One can imagine that a very large space launch .
vehicle would find a place in their hardware development. However.
because they have treated all space propulsion details as sensitive
information, they usually have waited some years after launch ve-
hicles became operational before revealing details about them. This
has been evident in the text of this chapter. Consequently, it is very,
difficult to find specific Soviet, statements about a very large vehicle.
In the United States, however, there have been statements by the
most senior NASA officials through 1970 that such a Soviet very



in Vienna in September 1972. In response to a question about Soviet
space goals through the year 2000, it was agreTd that thie NMoon, Mars,
Venus, and probably in several years, Mercury and the outer planets
will be the objects of unlanne(l space probes. At a later time after the
possibilities for automated craft have been exliuisted, and wliei t lie
time has come to establish permanent stations on the Moon, Soviet
cosminonauts will also land on the Moon's surface. Four to six years
may possibly pass until that time. Manned flight to neighboring
planets lies in the even more distant future. Manned Mars expedi-
tions could be expected toward the end of this celntuiry. Since the costs
of such an expedition are very high, such a flight would actually be
feasible only through international cost sharing. Because of its ex-
treine temperature and pressure conditions, the planet Venus navy be
completely out of the question for a long time. The major problem in
extended space flights continues to be weightlessness. According to
present scientific knowledge, an interplanetary expedition which did
not create its own artificial gravity would hardly be possible. (Flieger-
Revue, East Berlin, January 1973, pp. 20-21.)
Academician A. A. Blagonravov said that around 30 Soviet lunar
missions have been launched so far and that researchers consider addi-
tional lunar missions important. He described the Moon as a long-term
orbital station where scientific instruments delivered by automatic and
manned spacecraft operate for long periods. The use of a standardized
landing stage is economical and it makes possible the sending of a
variety of payloads to practically any spot on the lunar surface. He
stated that mobile automated systems provide an excellent means for
obtaining detailed information needed to answer the remaining ques-
tions the Russians have about the Moon. Automated Lunokhod-type
vehicles will also be important to the study of Mars and other planets.
Because of the great distance between Earth and Mars, and the conse-
quent time-lag in the transmission of commands, it will be difficult to
make the vehicle autonomous. Continuous control of motion is incon-
ceivable. He said there is no doubt that in the near future the first Mars
rovers will be transmitting information from the surface of the planet.
Prototypes of Martian rovers, he said, are being tested and perfected
on the Moon. Concerning the respective roles of man and machine in the
study of space, he said that automated spacecraft will always precede
manned missions although they cannot replace man in everything. He
said that the exploration of the Moon and the planets with automated
systems is the most rational approach at the moment. Recent research
indicates that manned flights to Venus, Jupiter, Uranus and Neptune
are totally out of the question. Consequently, the way is open only to
automated vehicles. (Pravda, Moscow, March 19, 1973, p. 2.)
Cosmonaut Shatalov stated that many space research tasks can be
accomplished only through prolonged manned missions. He s:iid that
future plans for space research are tied to the development of heavy
artificial Earth satellites, such as the Salyut orbital station. The plans
give rise to the problems of long-duration orbital space stations and
reusable spaceships which he believes the space industry will be able
to solve. Central to the manned-flight program is the effort to develop
long-duration orbital stations. Progress in interplanetary exploration
will be made through the conquest of circumterrestrial space, includ-


passive mission which is out of proportion to Soviet .-,,unrit in other
military space missions.
The Meteor satellites and certain seasonal flighlits of the nMilitary
photographic recoverable series flown to high latitude are i. ,l to
give weath er coverage of the Soviet Northern Seas RIoute :I(.o-- tlhe top
of Eurasia. Soviet naval vessels are moved bel tween such port. :H.
Murntua sk or Archangel and Petlropavlovsk or Vldivostok thlr illugh
this route, when ice conditions permit, -aving the long trip around
Africa (or Suez, when open).

Another chapter of this report has also discussed communications
by satellite, using the Molniya system. Again, it is impossible to say
what proportion of total traffic handled through Molniya is of a
military nature. The Russians have announced the system not only
handles television broadcasts but also telephone, telegraph, and other
data transmission. We know that the Molniya is used as a relay for
space-related data transmitted between satellites and ocean tracking
ships, to extend this link on to Yevpatoriya and Kaliningrad, among
other points.
There are now more Molniya satellites active than are required
for likely civil purposes. For example, the Molniya 1 satellites operate
in one frequency range, while a successor Molniya 2 series operates
at higher international frequencies, both in support of the Orbita
ground station system. As described earlier, each of these Molniya
systems keeps a Molniya 1 and a Molniya 2 always in sight of the
home territories by spacing the orbits 90 degrees apart, with four
type 1 and four type 2 satellites in operation. As of this writing, the
Molniya 3 series do not yet make up a complete pattern of four. By
Soviet description, Molniya 2 now takes care of regular domestic
television programs, and Molniya 3 has an operational capability for
color television (as well as probably serving the Soviet-American hot
line link). But Molniya 1 replacement flights continue to be made.
Mindful that in the United States, some older trunk telephone links
not up to current commercial standards are leased to the Government,
one wonders whether the Molniya 1 satellites are not relegated to
governmental uses, including military message traffic and data links?
But the analogy could be pushed too far, as in the U.S.S.R. the military
may have a claim on better facilities than individual Soviet citizens
making telephone calls.
This leaves the question of Molniya IS, the synchronous communi-
cations satellite in 24-hour orbit. The general-use link in such an orbit
was to have been called Statsionar and to use international frequen-
cies. Instead the only satellite positively known to be used for com-
munications purposes is in the Molniya 1 series, and after the launch,
nothing more has been said about its use. Did it fail, or is it part of a
military system of communications?

Geodesy is both a military and a civilian interest activity. The Rus-
sians correctly identify U.S. geodetic satellites as performing a mili-


FRANK E. MOSS, Utah, Chairman
JOHN C. STENNIS, Mississippi PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
GILBERT W. KEYES, Staff Director
JAMES T. BRUCE, Professional Staff Member
JAMLS J. GEH RIG, Professional Staff Member
CRAIG M. PETERSON. Chief Clerk/Counsel
JOSEPH L. PLATT, Assistant Chief Clerk
WILLIAM A. SHUMANN, Professional Staff Member
CRAIG VOORHEES, Professional Staff Member
Dr. GLEN P. WILSON, Professional Staff Member
CHARLES F. LOMBARD. Minority Counsel
EARL D. EISENHOWER, Professional Staff Member, Minority
S. Con. Res. 113
Agreed to ArGUST 30, 1976.
Resolved by the Senate (the Houts,, of Reprc.s'niatives coiilur-ling),
That there be printed for the use of the Senate Committee on Aero-
nautical and Space Sciences one thousand five hundred additional
copies each of volumes 1 and 2 of its committee print entitled "Soviet
Space Programs, 1971-1975", Ninety-fouirth Congress, second session,
prepared by the Congressional Research Service with the cooperation
of the Law Library, Library of Congress.


The six-point peace agreement between Egypt and Israel was signed
on November 11. Kosmos 607 had l)eell launched on the previous day
and, like its successors, Kosmos 609, 612, 616 and 625, was doubtless
used to monitor the effectiveness of the cease-fire.
The importance of the role of these reconnaissance missions was em-
phasized in a series of articles which appeared in the Londoan Si ,,/'ly
Telegraph.14 Under the sub-heading, "Cosmnos knew better than
Egypt," they wrote:
Kosygin asked about the Israeli "incursion" and Sadat explained that it was
a stunt to enable Mrs. Meir to cheer up her compatriots. But by wviy of the
Cosmos satellite and Intelligence reports the Soviets were getting quite a differ-
ent picture. The embassy received information and Cosmos pictures which were
shown to President Sadat, and the Soviet military attache spelled out for the
Egyptians what it meant. Here were the Russians explaining in Cairo to the
President of Egypt who did not know what was happening only a few miles away.
The first concrete measure to help was ordered at once, and efuire Kusygin
returned to Moscow, the Autonovs began flying in 300 Soviet military persontuel.
In the three examples cited above the targets of the reconnaissance
were fairly obvious but, in most cases, it is more difficult to determine
the prime target, even if one exists. In the absence of mnanoeuvres to
produce a stabilized ground-track the only real clue is to be found in
the location of the perigee of the orbit. This defines a band of latitude
close to which the particular target lies. Greater confidence is obtained
if it can be shown that the time of pass through perigee takes place
around local noon. If the ground-track is subsequently stabilized the
analyst is then presented with sixteen fairly precise locations spaced
at approximately 22.5 intervals around the latitude of perigee. A
glance at a terrestrial globe will show that some of these may be elimi-
nated as they fall over the oceans or, in the northern hemisphere,
within the territory of the U.S.S.R.
The methodology can be outlined by consideration of a very recent
flight with distinct peculiarities. Kosmos 759 was launched into a 62.8
inclination orbit from Plesetsk at around 0530 GMT on September 12,
1975. Although we had been expecting a launch following the recovery
of Kosmos 757 on September 9, the launch took place 9.25 hours earlier
than that of Kosmos 757 only sixteen days before.15 Our mid-day
monitoring session consequently failed to reveal the existence of the
new satellite since it was no longer in range of the Soviet ground-
stations at that time. We later learned that Wakelin picked up the two-
tone short-wave beacon in Cyprus, at 0541 GMT shortly after insertion
into orbit. Although TASS announced the launch at 1347 GMT it was
not carried in the English news broadcasts from Radio Moscow that
evening. I picked up strong two-tone signals on 19.994 MHz on my bed-
side receiver at 0719 GMT on the Sunday morning at the start of the
35th orbit. This showed that it was a member of the special sub-set
of non-manoeuvring payloads.
Aside from the unusual hour of launch, calculations based on two-
line orbital elements issued by the Goddard Space Flight Center
showed that the placing of perigee was also unusual in that, like
that of Kosmos 720, it occurred close to 10 S on the southbound
14Dobson, C. and R. Payne, Why the Arabs didn't win. Sunday Telegraph, Lon [date?].
15 Recoveries normally take place In mid-week; In the last 18 months, almost two-
thirds of the recoveries have been on Tuesday or Wednesdays. The implication of this is
that, due to the standard 12 to 14-day durations of these missions, launches are made
towards the end of the week. Aside from five Tuesday-launches, all launches of recoverable
reconnaissance missions have been made on Wednesday (13), Thursday (7) and Friday (8)-


Test Project (ASTP) flight. For a long time no outsider could .ret to
the launch site. President De Gaulle was taken there in June 1966 to
s'ee the launch of the first acknowledged weather satellite (Kos: o)
122) accompanied only by his personal physician. In 197o, Pn-c-idelt
Pnlompidou saw the launch of a military observation satellite (Ko-io;
3(6)8) which carried a supplemental scientific l payload. Fiiallyv in con-
nection with the upcoming ASTP flight, three parti'- of nAmerican
astronauts and technicians were flown in at night, put up) in a hotel.
driven to the launch pad, and then were returned to their hotel for
another night flight out.
In the meantime, low resolution pictures made public by NASA
routinely to anyone interested showed that the Landsat, 1 views of thle
Tyuratam area, were covered with ro ds. railway tracks, and other
signs of human activities including almost certainly aIsse.imblv b)ui(ld-
ing's and launch pads which spread over a distance of about 13") by 90
kilometers or more. Also, the NASA people flying at night saw a (t-
tering of electric lighlits fromni their aircraft that spread over distances
of about this amount. At the day of the launch, the Aimerican ainibas-
sador, the science attache, and Willis Shapley of NASA headquarters
were flown there in daylight hours for the launch, but did not see too
much from the air. People did report that the little railway stop of
Tvuratam these days, is completely overwhelmed by the adjacent
city of Leninsk, of perhaps 50,000 people. This city has not been shown
in public Soviet atlases, and seems to owe its existence to the growing
space activity. With launch pads for many different launch vehicles
widely scattered over the area, it is not possible to speak of a single
closely defined latitude and longitude as defining the site, or to know
what all the launch facilities look like. The original "A" class stand-
ard launch vehicle is carried horizontally on railway flat cars to the
launch pad, tilted up, to sit on a stand over a large flame deflector pit.
The base of the rocket in the upright position is well below the level
of the railways tracks which deliver the rocket. There is a many-plat-
formed service tower which is tilted away from the vehicle some time
before launch, and shorter supports for the first stage which retract
away after ignition when thrust reaches a certain level. Tall adjacent
lig'ht-weight structures are described as carrying lightning rods to
minimize electrical interference with the launch equipment and vehi-
cle. and perhaps to carry television or motion picture equipment.
One gains the impression that tracking and guidance of Soviet space
vehicles during the launch phase involve fixed radio, radar, and/or
optical stations down range. This is because repetitive flights of a
given launch vehicle tend to be flown at almost exactly the same or-
bital inclinations. To achieve the right azimuth for launch, the whole
vehicle assembly and platform are rotated to the required compass
heading. When two very similar vet different flight inclinations are
achieved using different launch vehicles and other evidence supports
the judgment, one receives the impression the difference in launch
vehicle is also matched by using a different launch pad, and in order
to fly the right "slot" in relation to the guidance points down range.
the resulting orbit has a slightly different inclination.
Pictures in movies as well as the visits of NASA people show that
the assembly of vehicles and the attachment of payloads occurs in
special assembly buildings. Checkout of spacecraft is done in the ver-


Neither cancer nor poverty can be curetl by goverl-ient fiat, and there
are other proldents which also dc-erve attention and are not nev-a.-arily
comlllt itive with the space prorazim.
Be' u.e the United Stat e.-3 made a very co,.tly effort to create its
Apollo calplbility, which has it own problei. of liIfifted folIow- 'n,,
it %was no small Soviet achievement to acquire einotZh I -pace prest ige
that they could be,.ouie a ipartnler in tlic Apollo-Soyuz T. -i Pro '. t.
That exercise is sf,.n by sonie Ameri<:;tns as a soft-hea(letdl U.S. give-
a',a',y in tlie interest of d(etente, and by other Americans as a ti-eful
step towai rd future cooperation in which both sides gain.
3. 'The Engineri- ag Logic of DLe,'loping Spae.( Afpplications
The Soviet Governiient has at its many levels, including the highest,
men whose profess ional traiBining has been in engineering and sciel-ice.
The specialists from the space field can make their case for concrete
benents from space development and have some confidence that their
arguments will be quickly understood, tested, and accepted in terms of
engineering logic. There probably is less risk that appeals at the
highest level will be judged in terms of more normative views or
manipulated in relation to public works log-rolling or control of vot-
ing I locs. They also have a procedural advantage in that they probably
do not have to fund projects on an annual budget basis, which risks
continuity of work. They are more likely linked to five-year plans as
the tbas-ic decision unit, and even longer term commitments can be
made without the same threat of reversal with an early election. The
political power in the U.S.S.R. is self-perpetuating in the sense that
when new officials are to be elected, they are nominated by the people
in power, and the vote is largely to ratify these decisions.
The Russian authorities have become convinced that use of space
technology in support of work in meteorology, communications, navi-
gation. and Earth resources is fully defensible in terms of the en-
hanced productivity of the national economy which will result. Even
in the complete absence of national pride and prestige considerations,
this work would still be well worth doing in terms of the economic
benefits, some short term, others long term, and the investment is
considered a wise use of capital.
One may argue whether a better engineering solution to Earth
resources work lies in small, automated spacecraft or in large manned
stations taking synoptic readings and bringing human judgment
to bear in space rather than through remote controls on the ground.
But this is a peripheral argument. Both approaches will work, and
the decision becomes a broader systems problem which relates to total
goals sought. The forecasts of practical applications to communica-
tions, weather, navigation, and Earth resources work in connection
with space stations are almost always linked to plans for manned
obhervntories looking outward and manned assembly stations to pre-
pare ships for mannned flight to the Moon and the planets.
Another area of space engineering applications is to military uses,
and here, too. it seems clear that such work has been judged highly
practical and immediate in the benefits ret turned. It is hard to imagine
thnt the fragile world structure could have been held together through
all the crises of recent years if the two major nuclear powers had not




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FIGURE 44.-The second generation planetary vehicles of the Mars 2 and 3 com-
bination orbiters and landers, and Mars 6 and 7 combination fly-by and lander
Mars craft. (Copyrighted drawing by D. R. Woods.)


dum, but also some decisions can continue for many years without
the annual budget cointe-ts etwvCeen a PI'esident an d a Congre-s f:i',ed
in the United States. BuIt the political s"ste'ii of the Soviet UI"I'nJL
as in all states must be rc.ponsive to somie kind of a coiisii.iis if it
is to survive for long.
In the United States, in spite of our slow pro(esses(s where i-s'ies
move through the bl iriaucracy and the, and where many
interest groups throughout our society make their inputs, we I;tve
had an example of a fairly sharp shift in attitudes. In tn1W slumer
of 1969, Apollo 11 rea,.hed the surface of the Moon, a great euphollia
swept the public, and many foreign nations al-o not only to
be impressed with the achievement but to share in the sue,.--. Tlie
Vice President called for going on with a manned expedition to Mars.
Buit within a matter of months. it scmed as if the slpae progra;li
fell into some lower estate with much more attention fori.ned on
ecology, pollution, and social elhanaes. It waq popular to label thwe
space program as a misguided and not very usful effort. Actually,
space expenditures had peaked in the middle 1960's and had (been
goin(r downhill quite markedly sin,"e that time.
Althouilh we can study Soviet de'ision-making from its out ward
manifevst nations, many of us have le.-s of a feel for the subtleties of their
processes. Over recent decades we have seen changes in Soviet political
alignments. There was the Russo-German pact of 1939; then the
U.S.S.R. was an ally of the Western democracies; post-war America
became the prime "enemy" of the Soviet bloc; now we have d&tente
and our men have flown together in space.
Probably careful analysis will show consistent threads of national
interest prevail in both kinds of societies, but the current itnanifesta-
tions can seemingly change quite abruptly and even arbitrarily. The
task here is to discern some of the underlying, persistent goals, but
to recognize the sharp shifts of direction which may occur from year
to vear.
It is hard enough to predict trends in the U.S. space program when
business cycles and popular enthusiasts of particular times shift
the relative priority of work on space. Estimating Soviet behavior hans
added difficulties. They have never provided a table of space expendi-
tures or budget commitments. Even if they did, there would be transla-
tional difficulties to understanding what they were doing when the
costs of the factors of production in the two countries give entirely
different ratios to the relative values of different inputs. In thle absence
of any economic measures, we have to fall back on counting the number
of flights, estimating weight of hardware, and looking for clues to
Soviet attitudes in speeches and articles.
To a considerable degree over the last 20 years, the two space pro-
gramins. American and Soviet, have interacted politically with each
other, regardless of disclaimers by leaders in the two countries. This
interaction means that judgments of either program cannot be taken
in isolation but must be tempered and modified by what each observes
or assumes about the other nation. Hence, what the United States
decides on the space shuttle, planetary flights. Earth resources satel-
lites, and military applications could have significant repercussions in


added so that now it includes a new centrifuge, spacecraft docking
mockups, and Soyuz and Salyut trainers.32
While there are fundamental similarities between the United States
astronaut and Soviet cosmonaut training programs, there are also
some major differences. For example, according to cosmonaut A. A.
Leonov of the ASTP crew, American astronauts have more flight
training while Soviet cosmonauts heavily emphasize parachute jump-
ing under a variety of situations. There is no formal or mandatory
physical conditioning program for American astronauts who carry
out physical training independently. This is in marked contrast to a
mandatory and rigorous program of physical training for Soviet cos-
monauts. The ASTP program has offered a unique opportunity to
compare the relative merits of two training programs in detail.33
2. VestibvTar Training
Since the flight of Vostok 2 in 1961, in which cosmonaut Titov ex-
perienced transient episodes of disorientation and nausea, the Russians
have placed heavy emphasis on the vestibular training. This training
involves both passive and active exercises designated to increase the
resistance of the vestibular apparatus (inner ear) to the various linear
and angular accelerations associated with spaceflight. The Soviet em-
phasis on the vestibular system is particularly evident in the research
literature which will be discussed in a subsequent section.34 But it is also
evident in various recent accounts of cosmonaut training.35 36
Prior to the training cycle, vestibular stability and sensitivity are
evaluated on an individual cosmonaut basis. The protocol of the subse-
quent vestibular training program is therefore tailored to the vestibu-
lar profile of the cosmonaut.37
The category of "active" vestibular training is characterized by
strenuous gymnastics and a number of sports which are known to
stimulate the vestibular system. A variety of devices are used includ-
ing the Loping swing (a rigid, standing, vertically rotating swing),
trampoline, and a large wire-mesh drum which the trainee can rotate
violently through a number of planes. Acrobatic exercises including
swimming, scuba diving, running, and figure skating and ballet, are
also commonly employed. Incorporated into these regimens are various
standardized body and head movements designed to selectively stimu-
late the vestibular system such as somersaults, various head and trunk
movements, and jumping exercises which require total-body rotation
through 90. 180, or 360 degrees. Parachute jumping (including free
fall) and simulated weightlessness training in a water-filled drum is
also included in the category of active vestibular training.38
Passive vestibular training, on the other hand, doeq not require the
active muscular participation of the cosmonaut. Rather, it is a me-
chanical type of training in which the cosmonaut sits or is strapped
3 "Prospects for manned spacefliaht and life sciences In the Soviet space promrnm accord-
inr to 'Astronautics Day' discussions." Prnvda. April 12, 1973. p. 3. (PRD 1112.-l).
3ss Unn,1n. Apollo-Soyuz joint flight training. Sovetskaya Rossiya (USSR), 28 July 1974,
p. P. (IRT) 1944).
M Niknolivv. A. Space-Road Without End. Mioscow. "Molodaya Gvardiya" Press, 1974.
p. 42-4 (PTRD Yn1$86).
3 Unslened. Cosmonaut Training. Sovetskaya Estonlya (USSR), Dec. 6, 1974, p. 3
(F'RD )I#21P3'8.
UT nsltned. The cosmonaut prepares for flight. Kryl'ya Rodiny. No. 3, 1974, 10-13
(FRTr 4?nA7).
Niolayev, A. Space-Roqd Without End. Op. Cit.
9 Ibid.


The Russians have listed a number of attractive features of the
active chemical air regeneration systems which explains their con-
tinued use not only in the manned space program but also in manned
undersea programs. These features include efficiency of operation over
a broad range of temperature, humidity, and barometric pressure;
resistance to vibration, acceleration, heat, and explosion; simplicity of
design; high operational reliability and automatic performance; and
of major importance, relatively low system weight. The major Soviet
misgiving about the use of stored or liquid oxygen systems is the com-
paratively high weight penalty as well as their vulnerability to dis-
ruption by a number of spaceflight factors. Hence, the Soviet use of
active chemicals for spacecraft atmosphere control is expected to per-
sist, at least through the Soyuz/Salyut series of spacecraft.150

Food supply and management on Soviet spacecraft was discussed
under "Nutrition" in Section III. (Space Medicine). A more detailed
account of this aspect of life support for both the American and Soviet
spaceflight programs is provided by Popov.151
The stored-water management system on the earlier Vostok and
Voskhod spacecraft consisted of a rigid metal container, an elastic con-
tainer for water storage, a water supply line connected to a mouth-
piece, a cartridge for disinfecting and deodorizing the water, and a
water cutoff device. The water was consumed by sucking through the
mouthpiece. A silver ion preparation (0.1-.14 milligrams per liter)
was used for purification and mineralization. Some water was re-
claimed from the dehumidifier.152
As spaceflight missions have increased in duration, more elaborate
and efficient water management systems have become necessary. Water
reclamation was first successfully tested in the Soviet year-long cham-
ber experiment of the late 1960's and has since evolved into an opera-
tional system.'53 The water regeneration system aboard the latest
Salyut 4 space station provides that moisture from respiration and
perspiration can be reclaimed. Moisture is condensed in cooling and
dehumidifier units and stored. The stored gas/liquid mixture is then
fractionated, purified, decontaminated, and heated prior to human
consumption. Minerals are added to the reclaimed water in solid form
and include calcium, magnesium, bicarbonates, chlorides, and sulfates.
A warning signal is flashed if impurities remain in the reclaimed
water. Both stored and reclaimed water are used for human consump-
tion in present Soviet spacecraft. Total consumption of water is about
2.2 to 2.5 liters per day per cosmonaut, including about 1.6-2.0 liters
for drinking. During the 29-day Soyuz 17/Salyut 4 flight, the two
cosmonauts consumed about 100 liters of water. The Soviets are now
investigating more elaborate, closed water regeneration systems which
would recycle virtually all water. Vaporization, sorbents, and semi-
permeable membranes are candidate approaches under consideration.
1R0 Umanskly, S. P. Man In Space Orbit. Op. Cit.
161 Popov, I. G. Food and Water Supply. In: Foundations of Space Biology and M'liclne.
Vol. III. Part 1., 1975 (In press).
1351 Ibid.
1 Wnter and food regeneration in space. Pravda Ukrainy (USSR) Feb. 5, 1975. p. 2.
(FRD .12234).


radiations. Of present concern to Soviet space radiobiologists are the
effects of electrostatic, and IIIagtnetic fields. This is apparently dlo 1to
a parallel interest in the use of these fields to surround the spacecraft
and act as a temporary shield against bursts of ionizing radiations.
Considerable attention has therefore been given to the biological ef-
fects of very strong fields of this type on humans, animals, and micro-


The constant maintenance of an artificial spacecraft atmosphere
which optimally satisfies the metabolic requirements of space crews is
among the most vital problems in the space life sciences. Not only must
the spacecraft atmosphere be totally reliable virtually 100 percent. of
the time, but its pressure and chemical composition must be constant
within rigorous physiological limits. For this reason. Soviet and An ;"r-
ican research on the physiological effects of altered gas atmosphere-,
and pressures has been and continues to be extensive.
Soviet research concentrates on those parameters of the gas at-
mosphere most vital to human physiology, namely, pressure and
chemical composition. There is emphasis on the choice of diluent
and the permissible limits of the partial pressures of oxygen (p02) and
carbon dioxide (pCO2), temperature, toxic substances, and other subtle
parameters. The Soviet research effort, like the American one, is fun-
damentally subdivided into physiological investigations of the effects
of oxygen-poor hypoxicc), oxygen-rich (hyperoxic), and carbon-
dioxide variable (hypercapnic and acapnic) atmospheres as well as
those containing a variety of inert gases including nitrogen, helium.
neon, and argon. Pressure physiology includes investigations of the
effects of high pressure (hyperbaric) and low pressure (hypobarie)
atmospheres as well as studies of the physiological effects of rapid
changes in pressure (compression and decompression). Finally, the in-
fluence of altered gas atmospheres on tolerance of and adaptation to
other spaceflight factors such as confinement, isolation, accelerations.
and radiation is receiving considerable attention. 302-305


While oxygen is necessary for life, in higher than normal concentra-
tions it has distinct and complicated toxic effects on the organic;.
The persisting Soviet philosophy in the manned space program is to
2w Trukhanov. K. A. et al. Active Protection of Spacecraft. Moscow. "Atomizdat" Pub-
lishing House. 1970. 230 p.
298Unsigned. Honey comb in space (active protection of spacecraft with force fi,.ds).
Chemistry and Life (USSR). No. 7, 1975. 26-28.
m Nakhil'nitskaya, Z. N. The biological effects of constant manontic fields. Space Bo:"..-"
and Aerospace Medicine (USSR). No. 6,1974, 3-15.
30 Galaktionova, G. V. et al. Modification of the cytoapnetic effect of IrInni7lnr ra.-.ition
during exposure to constant magnetic fields. Space Biology and Aerosprace MediclAue
(USSR), No. 6. 1974.25-2.q.
o01 Stasyuk. G. A. Alterations in blood content after the short-term effect of a conti-'ouq
magnetic field on the human organism. Physicians Practice (USSR), No. 12, 1972, .-?-
(FRD #1582).
32Malkin. V. B. Barometric pressure and mas composition. In: F.iundntions of Space
Bi,)oiry and Medicine. Vol. II. Ch. 1. Book 1. Washington. D.C., NASA, 1975. pp. 3-64.
303 Sirotonin, N.N. The pathogenic effects of gn. atmospheres. In: Ptliolozin-i Pl.vhi-
ology of Extreme States (P .D. Gorizuntov et al, Eds.). Moscow. "Meditsina PuhW.!: 1973. pp. 36-70 (FRD #1699).
3' Azadzhanvnyan. N. A. The Organism and its Gas Environment. Moscow, "Meditsina"
Publishing House. 1972, 246 p. (FRD #1317).
SKntovskiy. Ye. F. Functional morphology during extreme states. In: Problem. of
Space Biology, Vol. 15. Moscow, "Nauka" Press, 1971, pp. 180-429.


1. Molniya 1-3 and Molniya 1-4
At least two and perhaps more of the Molniya 1 communications
satellites already discussed have carried a television camera in addi-
tion to their communications relaying equipment. One of the first
revelations came when it was reported that Molniya 1-3 from a height
of about 40,000 kilometers had photographed almost a hemisphere of
Earth, showing that 80 percent of the visible part of the Northern
Hemisphere was cloud-covered. A succession of such pictures during
the course of a day was expected to make it possible to trace the fornma-
tion and movement of cyclones, hurricanes, and other formations
important to weather prediction. This was to supplement data from
regular weather satellites at much lower altitude. The first picture
was taken May 18,1966.49
Further details of the system came with the launch of Molniya
1-4 in October, 1966. The television camera system was steerable from
Earth, and included both wide angle and narrow angle lenses, to-
gether with various filters, so that several kinds of observations could
be made through remote controls from Earth. The purpose, again,
was to trace synoptic processes transpiring over large regions of the
Northern Hemisphere.50
2. Kosmos 149 and 320
Kosmos 149, launched on March 21,1967, has already been mentioned
as a small satellite launched from Kapustin Yar with a B-1 launch
vehicle. It represented the first attempt to stabilize a spacecraft
through aerodynamic forces while still in orbit. Four rods attached
a ring-shaped conic section to the main body of the satellite, and after
attaining orbit, the rods were telescoped to extend the ring to a posi-
tion well back from the main body of tlihe satellite where the very thin
upper atmosphere between 240 and 300 kilometers above the Earth
stabilized the craft as to pitch and yaw. A two-stage gyro gave sta-
bility as to roll. Gas jets were used to achieve the initial stabilization
after separation from the carrier rocket, and thereafter no other
active devices were required, such as gas jets, reaction wheels, orienta-
tion sensors, or other attitude controls.
The satellite had two multichannel photometers to scan the Earth
in two mutually perpendicular directions, to determine Earth bright-
ness in a narrow region of the spectrum including the molecular
absorption band of the visible region. Another instrument was a
radiation meter in the 8 to 12 micron visibility window to measure
the radiation temperature to an accuracy of 1 degree Centigrade. The
TV system on board measured escaping radiation only in narrow re-
gions of the spectrum in contrast to the wide spectrum coverage of
the TV system used in Kosmos 122 and 144. The data returned to
Earth concerned the temperature regime of Earth's surface and
clouds along with quantitative characteristics of the brightness of
Earth as seen from space. The payload decayed in 17 days.
Kosmos 320 had the same characteristics of orbit, and remained in
orbit for 25 days. Similar results were obtained from the second flight.
3. Kosmos 243
This satellite has already been described as a regular military ob-
servation satellite, recovered after 11 days in orbit. But it also carried
49 Izvestlya. Moscow, May 20, 1966, p. 6.
60 Krasnaya Zvezda, Moscow, October 22, 1966, p. 1.


The combination of use of the smaller launch vehicles and the i-e
of the site for launching vertical prole's make this site seem to parallel
a combination of the Wallops Island, Virginia station, and the White
Sands, New Mexico test area. Some AVestern observers speculated that
when the day camine that the Soviet Government would ease its security
rules sufficiently to open a launch site to outside visitors that Kapustil
Yar was most likely to be the first to "go public". This view was en-
couraged when finally Soviet bloc scientists were permitted to go there
in connection with the launch of Interkosminos flights which began in
Landsat pictures of the area show signs of activity over many kilom-
eters. but not on the scale of Tyuratam or even Plesetsk."l
Sary Shagan, the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) test station to inter-
cept rockets fired from Kapustin Yar, was also found in Landsat
Table 1-6 which follows summarizes the known successful launches
by site, worldwide, to provide a perspective on their relative levels of
activity for orbital launch purposes. The figures do not reveal addi-
tional suborbital or missile launching. The table reveals that Plesetsk
has conducted more successful orbital launches than any other base
in the world with Vandenberg and Tyuratam running neck and neck.
and Cape Canaveral a poor fourth.
11 Aviation Week, New York, December 1. 1975. pp. 18-19.
12 Aviation Week, New York, November 25, 1974, pp. 20-21.


/ 1 L IA

FIGURE 15.-Soviet D-1 launch vehicle upper portion from a film clip. (Drawing
by C. P. Vick.)


dentists on Earth to study each small advance and dliseovery so thlat
new tasks can be plaimed with care, theni the extended life of the
automated vehicle even with slow speed gives a useful result.
Both roving vehicle types were undoubtedly expensive to develop,
although the automated Lunokhod system should cos-t mafly tiii.-,s
more, including its Earth control units. The mission costs prolab 'lv
were on the order of ,450 million for the manned rover and 91'2)
million or more for the one-way trip of the automated rover. The
contrast is that men aei bring oberNvational powers, deploy certain
experiments, collect the most interesting rocks, and make soii ie types of
repay irs on a scale not yet possible under the Soviet plan. But the Soviet
plan permitted improvements in performance and interpretatio- s of
experiments which could be used to adjust the further program of the
same mission working month after month. E-sentially, one ex v)ndi-
ture for an Apollo flight would do the tasks of both Luna 16 and Luna
17. The Ameria in apprioaeh l)roughlt back letter samples and permitted
men to have experiin.-es remote sti idy cannot duplicate. The Soviet
approach gave more time for intellectual development of surface ex-
ploration. It c( is re a-onable to su L:LreSt that the Lunokhod and
Apollo approaches are conilplementarv rather than; competitive, an I
in fact even the Russians acknowledge this officially even though
they have stre.-sid tlie comipair;tive cheap- iess of their automated
The next Soviet lunar flight was that of Luna 18, launched on Sep-
tember 2, 1971 at 1641 Moscow time. It was launched with the D-l-e
vehicle and carried the .same basic third generation bus that had bet.n
used since Luna 15. It was observed by Soviet astronomers at a di--
tance of 100.000 kilometers from Earth.
On September 7, Luna 18 was put into lunar orbit at 100 kilometers
circular orbit, and an inclination of 35 degrees to the lunar equator,
with a period of 119 minutes.
The Russianis announced on September 11 that there had been $5
radio sessions with Luna 18, and that it had completed 54 orbits of
the Moon. It was then braked to make a landing which occurred at
3 34' N. and 56 30' E. in high terrain. They said the topography
was unlucky, and signals ceased at touchdown at 1048 Moscow time.
F. LUNA 19
Luna 19 was launched on September 28,1971, using the same launch
vehicle and bus as its fairly immediate predecessors. The initial em-
phasis in the press release was on research from lunar orbit. Astron-
omers were able to spot Luna 19 on the way to the Moon at a distance
of 120,000 kilometers. A day later (September 30), the number of
fixes obtained on the payload had risen to 60 as more observatories
found it.
On October 3, after 26 radio sessions, the Luna 19 payload was
braked into lunar orbit, 140 kilometers circular, at an inclination of
40 35', and with a period of 121.75 minutes.
A minor orbital adjustment on October 7 made the orbit 135 by
127 kilometers, and a period of 121 minutes. After that there were
progress reports about monthly, but not many details. Through De-


FIGURE 22.-Elektron 2 or 4, the other halves of dual geophysical observatories.


It has been reported that both the United States and the Soviet
Union arn, committed to continuing their cooperation in space beyond
the ASTP. Indeed, it is felt that much of the project's justification
would be l,' if notliii'L !:'th'r were planned.
At least two post-ASTP cooperative efforts have been agreed to by
the two countries. The Soviet Union invited the United States to
propose and furnish biolovy experim'-nts which were carried abo:,rd
Kosmos 7T2, a Soviet satellite in Novenhber-Decernber 1975.
(For a more compl:e (i!scl-sion of tlWis flight, see Chapters Three and
Four of this report.) The -:,reemient for this ex)erirnent was
noeg,)tiated at. the fifth meeting of th.e joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. working
group on spaet biology and medicine, held from October 26 to Novem-
ber 4, 1974 at T;shklcnt. In Auuust 1975, the Soviet Union asked the
United States Nitionil Aeronautics and Space. Administration to
provide experiments for a second biology satellite in 1977, similar to
the 1975 mis-sion.
The United States experiments carried on the 1975 mission were:
Plant tlmor? growth experiment to study the effects of prolonged
wei zhtlessness on plant systems and to quantitatively and qualitatively
measure cellular responses to G forces. Carrot slices were used as test
Cae( ot -e,77 /m7lure hlr)crmnent to evaluate the effect of zero-G on
plant systems and to determine the effects on normal embryonic tissue
development. Carrot cell cultures were used in this experiment also.
Hea cy particle radiation experiment to measure the physical param-
eters of high charge and energy particles on board the spacecraft.
Stak-s, of detectors were placed in each of two biological experiment and at four other locations in the spacecraft.
Ki/lifish expe r ;nent to evaluate the effects of zero-G on vestibular
systems. A graded series of killifish embryos representing key develop-
ment stages were evaluated. Post-flight analysis will center on normal-
ity of vestibular functions and microscopic and physiological changes.
Similar experiments with killifish were conducted during the U.S.
Skylab flight and the U.S. portion of the ASTP flight.
Embryon'c development of fntit flies to evaluate cosmic effects on
the aging process of drosophila. This experiment was jointly prepared
by scientists of the Moscow Institute of Medical and Biological Prob-
lems and the United States National Aeronautics and Space Adminis-
tration Ames Eesearch Center.
In addition, the Soviet scientists invited the United States experi-
menters to participate in some seven other tests from the standpoint of
post-flight specimen analysis. As a reciprocal gesture, the United
States invited Soviet scientists to take part in its experiments.
In summary, it may be said that the successful completion of the
Apollo-Soyuz Test Project mission was a step toward the realization
of the goals set forth in the May 24,1972 agreement between the United
States and the Soviet Union on cooperation in the exploration and
peaceful uses of outer space. The technological cooperation between

did both. Mars 6 returned direct readings of the atmosphere but did
not send signals from the surface; Mars 7 missed its landing, and flew
by the planet. In summary, the flights fell well short of their goals,
yet collectively returned valuable data.
2. The Venus Attempts of 1975
The use of the D-1--e launch vehicle permitted both Venera 9 and
10 to carry orbiters and landers, and each pair worked well. The land-
ers repeated previous direct readings of the atmosphere and sent back
surface pictures which showed rock formations, sunlight and shadows,
and a view to the horizon. The orbiters as of this writing are probably
still functioning, but only limited findings have been reported to date.

Starting in 1969, Soviet unmanned lunar flights graduated to use
of the D-l-e, probably able to carry as much as 5,800 kilograms to
the vicinity of the Moon. Luna 15 and two Earth-orbital Kosmos rep-
resented early trials which fell short of their objectives. (Luna 15
crashed on the Moon during the Apollo 11 mission )
1. Luna 16,18,20, and 23
These four fliglhts were all aimed at returning samples of lunar soil
to Earth. Luna 16 and Luna 20 were both successful in making soft
landings, using a television inspection system, then drilling for core
samples which were loaded into a return vehicle which flew directly to
Kazaldistan. The amounts returned were about 100 ,rains each. mod(1-t
but enough for valuable analysis in several countries. Luna 18 landed
in rough terrain (lurain) and did not survive. Luna 23 damaged its
drill during the landing so was abandoned within three days.
2. Luna 17 and 21
Both spacecraft made soft landings to discharge on the surface re-
motely controlled roving scientific laboratories. Lunokhod 1 operated
for about 10 months, traveling over 10 kilometers, returning over
20,000 television pictures, plus mechanical and chemical tests of the
soil, and doing topographic studies and some astronomy. Lunokhod 2
operated over 3 months, traveling about 37 kilometers, and retiurn-
ing over 80.000 television pictures. It also made soil tests, topographi-
cal studies, and astronomical measurements.
3. Luna 19 and 22
Both spacecraft were placed in lunar orbit to do both high resolu-
tion and wider area photographic survey work, plus gathering synop-
tic data on orbital conditions. Each operated for something over a
year. There were studies of the composition of surface rocks, circum-
lunar plasmas, solar radiation, Jupiter radio emissions, and lunar mas-

The Soviet program of manned flights was preceded by many verti-
cal probes from Kapustin Yar carrying dogs and other animals to al-
titudes above the sensible atmosphere. Sputnik 2 carried the dog Layka.
to orbit.


other than nitrogen are being contemplated for use in the Soviet
manned spaceflight effort.336--8
The pressure of an atmosphere determines the physiological action
of its chemical constituents. Figure 4-9 depicts this pressure/gas rela-
tionship in an artificial gas atmosphere (AGA) as it concerns the
physiological action of oxygen.339

1100- ._
900- Hyperoxia-
800- Sea level
700 i\i~- -500
-_ 1000
E 600- 1 !:__1 2000 E
E 5004
4500o i 000

300- i8000 -
200- 1Hypoxi9ww i- 10000 <
!'M- illM I l Q2ooo
jI r i i" 12000
100- 111111 ilill 14000

20 40 60 80 100
0, content, %

F'IGURE 4-9.-PO2 of the AGA as a function of barometric pressure. Three zones
of oxygen supply: hypoxia, n(oruoxia, and hyperoxia.
Source: Malkin, V. B. Barometric pressure and gas composition. In Foundations of
Space Biology and Medicine. Vol. II., Ch. 1., Washington, D.C., NASA, 1975, pp. 3-64.
The atmospheric pressure used in Soviet and American spacecraft
differs substantially. As discussed earlier, a normal terrestrial atmos-
phere of 760 mm Hg is used in Soviet spacecraft while a pure oxygen
atmosphere at 258 mm Hg has been used in the American Mercury,
Gemini, Apollo, and Skylab programs. In both cases, space crews are
provided with the oxygen necessary for optimum physiological per-
The danger of sudden or even gradual space cabin depressurization
in the vacuum of space, while remote, is nonetheless always a factor
to be reckoned with, as the tragic fate of the Soyuz 11 demonstrated.
Therefore, Soviet researchers have devoted considerable effort to the
study of the physiological effects of altered atmospheric pressures, in-
cluding gradual and explosive decompression, altitude decompres-
,":6 Sushkov, F. V. et al. Biological evaluation of the effect of an oxygen-helium atmos-
phere on cell cultures. Space Biology and Medicine (USSR), No. 4, 1973, 38-43.
: Troshikhin. G. V. Heat regulation in a hypoxIc atmosphere with nitrogen-heliumn
dih)tion. Space Biology and Medicine (USSR), No. 6, 1972. 23-27.
:'' Kamenskiy. Yu. N. et al. Effectiveness of a helium oxygen atmosphere during
tran-sverse accelerations. Space Biology and Aerospace Medicine (USSR), No. 4, 1975,
SMalkin. V. B. Barometric pressure and gas composition. Cit.
-a Malkin, V. B. Barometric pressure and gas eomp~ositton. O Clt.

connect with about 60 Earth terminals of the Orbita system. The iin-e
of the Molniya inclined, eccentric orbit has made it po.-.sible to put up
heavier payloads of greater power to cut ground termlinal costs, and
to give good service to northern latitudes.
2. Stats;onar Satell;tes
Starting in 1974, several years later than expected, tlhe Russians have
begun experimental flights to equatorial 24-hour synchronous orbits,
fixed relative to a point on the surface of the Earth, by using the larger
D-l-e launch vehicle. Late in 1975, the first Statsionar of 10 projected
for the next five years was placed in orbit and given the new name
3. International Cooperation
The Russians have moved at a deliberate pace to set up their own
Intersputnik Soviet Bloc cooperative communi(c tions system in
competition with the Intelsat consortium used by mo-t of the rest of
the world. However, they also have an Earth terminal near Lvov to
link into the Intelsat system. The Washington-Moscow "hot line" uses
both American satellites and Soviet Molniya satellites to link the two
4. Direct Broadcast
For the future, the Russians may overcome their own objections to
direct broadcast satellites which could penetrate their censorship, and
may create their own direct broadcast system. But their ambivalence
shows in their proposal to permit action against program material
offensive to the receiving nation through jamming or even satellite
1. Meteor Satellites
Several years of expanding experimental service was carried on be-
fore the Meteor system was declared operational, and by the end of
1975, 24 satellites of that name had been placed in orbit. They are
three-axis stabilized, and are launched by the A-1 vehicle. They carry
television cameras with a resolution of about 1,200 meters, with two
cameras each covering a slightly overlapping path about 1,000 kilom-
eters wide. A separate infrared (IR) sensor system returns night
pictures to supplement the day pictures. More recent flights have
added APT (automatic picture transmission) for realtime coverage.
Soviet weather satellites not only give cloud cover pictures, but re-
port on ocean ice, snow cover on land, and have even given some geo-
logical information of value.
2. Experimental weather satellites
Weather cameras have also been carried on a few of the Molniva
communications satellites. Advanced sensors related to passive micro-
wave to determine ocean currents, ice fields under cloud cover, and
soil moisture have been tested in Kosmos flights starting" with Kosmos
243. An experimental Meteor 2 was orbited in 1975.

In time, Soviet navigation satellite use is likely to spread from
purely naval to the merchant marine.



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magnetic field of Earth. (This has also been used in some U.S. space-
craft.) 32
The Meteor System includes: (1) artificial Earth satellites, (2)
stations for reception and processing data, and (3) service for the
control and operation of the on-board systems and their regulation.


The Russians tested individual components of wNeaflier satellites.
in the Kosmos program with a variety of payloads and orbits, cul-
niinating in Kosmos 122. The third state of the program involved the
interim introduction of the Mfeteor system with the referenced flights
from Kosmos 144 through 226, all launched at Plesetsk.
Yet, the U.S.S.R. did not signal the completely operational stlatui.
of the Meteor system until 1969 when it began naming certain satellites
Meteor, without further designation by number. (Westerners, for
convenience, add numbers to the Meteor name.)
1. The Launch Program of the Weather-related Satellites
The table which follows is a summary of the main sequence of sim-
ilar payloads:


Initial Orbital Elements
Period Apogee Perigee Launch
ScitsIlite (min) (km) (km) Date

Kosmos44 ------..------------------------------- 99.5 860 618 Aug. 26,1964
Kosmos 58-..-------------------------..------... --- 96.8 659 581 Feb. 26,1965
Kosmos 1C0 -------------------------------------......................................... 97.7 650 650 Dec. 17,19r5
Kosmos 118-------.----.. -------------------------- 97.1 640 640 May 11,1966
Kosmos 122 ..------..---..---------------------------- 97.1 625 625 June 25, 1966
Kosmos 144---..------. ---------------------------- 96.9 625 625 Feb. 28,1967
Kosmos 156 ..--- ------..---------------------------- 97.0 630 630 Apr. 27,1967
Kosmcs -----.-------.. --------------------------- 97.1 635 635 Oct. 24,1967
Kosmos .o..------------------------------------------ 97.0 630 630 Mar. 14, 1968
4Kosmos 226 ------------------------------------- 96.9 650 603 June 12,1968
Meteor 1-1.......................................... -------------------------------------97.9 713 644 Mar. 26,1969
Meteor 1-2........ -----------------------......---...----------- 97.7 690 630 Oct. 6, 1969
Meteor 1-3.-----.....-......-- --...-----------.-----....------------.. 96.4 643 555 Mar. 17,1970
Meteor 1-4....-------------------------------------.......... 98.1 736 637 Apr. 28, 1970
Meteor 1-5.......................................... ------------------------------------102.0 906 863 June 23, 1970
Meteor 1-6...........-------------------....--- .....---------------.. 99.5 674 633 Oct. 15, 1970
Kosmos 389 ------------------------------------................... 98.1 699 655 Dec. 18,1970
Meteor 1-7.......................................... -------------------------------------97.6 679 630 Jan. 20,1971
Meteor 1-8- ------------------------------------- 97.2 646 620 Apr. 17,1971
Meteor 1-9.-------------------------------------................................... 97.3 650 618 July 15,1971
Meteor 1-!0 ------ --.---------------------------- 102.7 905 880 Dec. 30,1971
Meteor 1-11------------------------------------ 102.6 903 878 Mar. 30,1972
Meteor 1-12 ------------------------------------- 103.0 929 897 July 30,1972
Meteor 1-13 ------------------------------------- 102.6 904 893 Oct. 26,1972
Meteor 1-14------------... ------------------------. ....... 102.6 903 882 Mar. 20,1973
Meteor 1-15...--------------------------------- --.-. 102.5 909 867 May 29,1973
Meteor 1-16..------------------------------.- ---- 102.2 906 853 Mar. 5,1974
Meteor 1-17.------.......-------------------------- ----.. 102.6 907 877 Apr. 24, 1974
Meteor 1-18.----- -------------------------------- 102.6 905 877 July 9,1974
Meteor 1-19--------------.-------..--------------- 102.5 917 855 Oct. 28,1974
Meteor 1-20 ------------------------------------- 102.4 910 861 Dec. 17,1974
Meteor 1-21------------ ------------------------ 102.6 906 877 Apr. 1,1975
Meteor 2-1 ------------------------------------- 102.5 903 872 July 11,1975
Meteor 1-22....--------------------------------- --..- 102.3 918 867 Sept. 18,1975
IVleteor 1-23 ------ ------------------------------............... 102.4 913 857 Dec. 25,1975

SOURCE: Appendix A.

32 See Space Exploration and Applications, Issued by the United Nations, covering the
meeting of August 14-27, 1968 at Vienna, Austria A/CONF. 34/2. Vol. 1 in the original
language of the participants. The papers were made available in mimeograph form as early
as the previous April.


been allowed to visit aircraft factories, and it is always possible that
some space manufacturing is done in closed but adjacent buildings in
some of these aviation centers. Occasional photographs have shown
assembly lines for Vostok and for Soyuz spacecraft, and the numbers
of such craft shown in the pictures strengthens the notion that the
same basic shells are used for the large unmanned recoverable Kosmos
flights used by the Soviet military to conduct observations of interest.
Somewhere there must also be a production line for the smaller Kos-
mos, because many use the same basic shell, with modifications to fit
the particular missions of the craft.
Except for the very largest launch vehicles, presumably almost all
components are rail-transportable, especially as the Soviet railway
lines have a generous clearance gauge through tunnels and stations.
We know both through Soviet movies and through the recent visits to
Tyuratam that launch rockets and payloads are brought together in
assembly buildings within a few kilometers of the launch pads, with
the mating done horizontally, and then the combined rocket and pay-
load pushed out to the pad atop flat cars and special transporters by
Diesel locomotives. At the pad, the transporter tilts the rocket up into
a vertical position for final checkout and launch. This may not be true
of the G-l-e class vehicles, but seems to apply even through the
D-1-e class.
Of necessity the Russians must have test stands for rocket develop-
ment, and environmental chambers for rockets and payloads. These
are not described as to location in the open literature.
Because of the numerous Soviet failures in planetary payloads, they
have come to the American practice of having a duplicate payload in
an environmental chamber undergoing as nearly as possible the same
conditions as the actual spacecraft in flight, so that if problems de-
velop, solutions can be tested with the laboratory "bird". This was first
announced as the practice with the Venera 4 flight.63 Something similar
has been hinted at in connection with manned flights in 1974 and 1975.
The principal test and training center for Soviet cosmonauts is at
Zvezdnyy Gorodok east of Moscow in the suburbs. This has been visited
by both the American astronauts and NASA technicians, and also by
the Western press. There are classrooms, isolation chambers, centri-
fuges, simulators, and mockups, as well as good living accommoda-
tions for the cosmonauts and their families, and associated scientists
and technicians.
Apparently there are some facilities for training in the Tyuratam
area, presumably in or near the new, burgeoning city of Leninsk. The
American visitors found the accommodations provided at Leninsk to
be equal or superior to those provided at the Kennedy Space Center.
The cosmonauts when suited up for flights ride out to the pad in a well
equipped, air conditioned bus, much in the manner that NASA astro-
nauts are transported.
When the Soyuz 9 cosmonauts returned to Earth, they went to a
special isolation center, which was highly reminiscent of the Houston
quarantine facility, perhaps as a dry run for similar procedures once
Soviet cosmonauts return from the Moon.64
3 Tass, 0R00 GMT, October 19, 1967, quoting Komsomolskaya Pravda, Moscow.
I TASS, 1704 GMT, June 20, 1970.


The Soviet Government has long had a reputation for giving spe-
cial attention to the gathering of elint (electronic intelligence), also
referred to ferreting, or sigint (signal intelligence), comint (communi-
cations intelligence), and radint (radar intelligence). In basic defi-
nition, all spacecraft which receive and report on electromagnetic
radiation are performing the same basic task, whether that is for pur-
poses of solar studies, astronomy, weather reporting, Earth resources
work, communications, or weather reporting. Electromagnetic radia-
tion varies in frequency or wavelength in strength for natural reasons
and may be modulated deliberately in amplitude or in frequency by
man. It ranges from gamma radiation of very short waves and high
frequency, to X-rays, to ultraviolet, to visible light, to infrared, to
radio frequencies of many kinds, to very long waves of low frequency.
The kinds of detectors and the classification or use of that information
differ from one satellite to another, and whether the signals are
relayed in analog form or first converted to digital form, and whether
various forms of sampling or other processing are necessary.
It is still useful, however, to sort out categories of difference in
origin and use of these signals. Some data are part of the natural
environment, and these may obscure the receipt and recognition of a
second major group of signals. The latter are those generated by man-
made activities. In turn, the man-made signals or emissions fall into
two major subgroups: (a) those directed toward space deliberately to
be picked up and relayed by satellite, and hence supporting the func-
tion of communications satellites as part of a cooperative system; (b)
those not intended to be picked up by the receiving satellites, such
as private messages, or inadvertent leakages of signals, and hence sup-
porting the function of elint, radint, comint and related categories.
Military interests extend to all natural phenomena, partly to under-
stand the difference between natural signals and those which are man-
made, and partly because many natural emissions, such as reflected
light or radiated heat, translate into pictures and data of use to de-
fining ground activity or airborne and space activity. But those emis-
sions which were generated by electronic devices such as radio stations,
radar equipment, microwave towers, and other spacecraft give us a
general category of signals whose frequencies, power level, location,
direction, and times 9f emission may answer questions of military in-
terest. Although detection of the signals prieseJits technical challenges,
understanding the signals after their capture may be an even bigger
challenge. For example, if the signals seem to be verbal, can the sig-
nals be read as a known language, or have they been encrypted in some
fashion through use of a cipher or code? If they are the output of a
radar set, what is the exact nature of those signals and their ability to
discriminate targets under what conditions? Recent newspaper ac-
counts have said that today even the inadvertent signal emissions of
an electric typewriter may be capturable beyond the building where
the machine is in use, and those indirect signals translated back into
the text of the message being typed. Now it is probably unlikely that
typewriter signals can be found in space in attenuated form be(e.Ise
they would be overwhelmed by other background "noise" or the jumble


(2) A determination of what direction sprouts would grow in with-
out the Sun's rays.
(3) The study of fish. In previous experiments, scientists discovered
that adult fish lost their sense of spatial orientation in a gravity-free
environment. On this mission, Danio rerio fish eggs were brought
along. When the fish hatched, they exhibited no orientation problems
as the adult fish had.
(4) Samples of microbes were taken from different parts of the
Soyuz craft and from the cosmonauts themselves (hair and skin) to
test microbial transfer. This was repeated on the ASTP mission to de-
termine if any contamination occurs when one space crew is visited
by another, as might happen in long-duration space stations.
(5) Zone-forming fungi were studied for two reasons. First, these
fungi develop a new growth ring every 24 hours on Earth and sci-
entists wanted to see how often one would grow in space where a
"day" is only 90 minutes long. In addition, the fungi were placed
inside a device called "Ritm" which had a dosimeter mounted on the
outside to measure the amount of radiation entering the flask to see if
it had any effect on the fungi. During ASTP, fungi were flown on both
ships to see how different amounts of radiation in various areas of
space would affect the organisms, since Apollo and Soyuz would travel
in different parts of the sky except for the time they were docked
13. Soyuz 17 and 18 with Salyut 4
Still in orbit at the time of this writing, Salyut 4 has already hosted
two manned missions which totaled 93 days: Soyuz 17 for 30 days, and
Soyuz 18 for 63. In turn these missions broke the Soviet space en-
durance record and brought them closer the American record of 84
days on Skylab 4. Salyut 4 also has accommodated one unmanned
mission, Soyuz 20.
a. Salyut 4.-Salyut 4 was launched on December 26, 1974 into a
270 x 219 km orbit, inclined at 51.6. This was soon raised to a 350 km
circular orbit, higher than previous Salyuts, and done apparently to
conserve fuel. There were again modifications to the space station, for
example easier access was provided to certain mechanical areas of the
ship for repair and replacement of parts.
The length of the space station was announced as 23 meters (see
page 188) with the same volume (100 cubic meters) and weight (over
25 metric tons).
The solar panels were described as individually rotatable and having
a total area of 60 square meters producing 4 kilowatts of power. The
panels turn automatically on signals from solar gauges indicating
what position the Sun is occupying at any given moment. There also
was a third bank of solar batteries added.
The space station has an MMMS, micrometeorite monitoring sys-
tem, with 4 square meters of panels serving as sensors. At first par-
ticles were measured acoustically, but now a capacitator type is used
which registers both the impact and penetrating power of each par-
ticle. Two thin metal plates, which are insulated by a layer of teflon,
close together when struck by a particle and a pulse is sent to the con-
trol center. The skin of the station (which reflects 3/ of the light rays
hitting it) serves as a shield from these particles. If a meteorite hits


to 30 kilometers. Here, the camera system was activated to take another
photograph for development on buard and facsimile traiiii.-,-.ion tj
Earth. A good quality image was obtaiiied. Afterwards, the orbit was
changed to 1,286 by 100 kilometers, at 21 degrees inclination, and a
period of 3 hours. It was unusual in Soviet practice to be able to ac-
tivate a camera system after a one-year lapse and to carry out all the
iteps to return a picture to Earth. Regular operations were reported
as cont inu ing.
In mid-October, the Luna 22 flight was reviewed, to cover its 15
moitlhs of operation. It had observed several hundreds of thouzanad. of
sq'itre kilometers. Because of the lack of atmosphere, it was able to
fly much closer to the surface of the Moon than Earth -atellites can ap-
proa(cli Earth, hence taking high resolution pictures. The.-e low orbits
it intermixed with high orbits for picture taking over larger regions.
The satellite studied tlhe composition of lunar rocks based on their
gaiiii, i radiation, circumilunar plasmas, and solar cosmic rays. It aLo
studied meteoritic density, solar long wave emissions, and Jupiter
emissions. It studied mascons. There were 1,500 trajectory measure-
ments made during 2,400 radio sessions with Earth. The controllers
sent 30,000 radio commands to Luna 22. It was able to measure meteor-
itic material down to one one-hundred-trillionth of a gram. Its naneu-
vering fuel was exhausted on September 2.32
The Western press reported mission completion in early November
1975.33 One radio broadcast from Moscow apparently included a
statement to the effect that the mission would prove of groat help to
future manned flights to the Moon, but it has not been possible to pin-
point the time this statement was made.34

J. LUNA 23
Luna 23 was launched on October 28, 1974 at 1730 Moscow time
using the D-l-e launch vehicle and the orbital launch platform tech-
nique. it was described as intended to do further re-earch into the
Moon and of space around the Moon. A telescope equipped with tele-
vision enhancement at the Zayliskiy Alatav Mountains was able to
t rack the flight. Alma Ata Observatory was able to track it two nights,
at 30.000 kilometers and at 200,000 kilometers.
An orbit correction was made on October 31. Then on November 2,
the braking rocket was fired to put it into a lunar orbit of 104 by 94
kilometers, at an inclination of 138 to the lunar equator (retrograde).
The orbital period was 1 hour 57 minutes.
November 4 and 5 the orbit was adjusted to 105 by 17 kilometers.
On November 6, it was further braked to land at 0837 Moscow time
in the south part of the Mare Crisium. The landing was achieved and
signals returned, but the terrain was unfavorable. The attached drill
on the platform was damaged and not able to function. It had been in-
tended to drill a sample to a depth of 2.5 meters, and to test other
equipment. As a consequence, communications with Luna 23 were ter-
minated on November 9, after operation of a reduced research
-" Sotziallsticheskaya Indnistriya. Moscow. October 15. 1975, p. 3.
Flight International, London. November 6, 1975, p. 705.
SPerry, G. E., private communication.



Launch Site and Inclination
Tyuratam Plesetsk
Year and category 51-52 65 69-71 62-63 65-66 67 72-73 813

3rd Generation....... 428 (12) 410 (12)-----------.....-..------ 443 (12)..............................
Low Resolution...................... ... .... ...........--------- ------ -- ...----....----...-....-............
PDM-Science....--....-- --- -........... ...-- ..----------. ....---- ..-- ....----- .------ ---------------------
3rd Generation-------....... 431 (12) 392 (12)----------.............------- 439 (11) ---------------............ 403 (12)
Low Resolution.------... ............. .......-- ---... ....---- .--- .-- ..------....- .....-- .-- ....-----.-..
PDM ...----------.---.. -...-.-.-..-.----.---.-------------.---- --------------.-. -.-----
3rd Generation...------- 420 (11) 399 (14) -----------------396 (13)-- 401 (13)406 (10)
High Resolution ....... 429 (13) 4417 (12)------------------- 4247 (13) ------- ...
Morse-Maneuverable.. 432 (13) 452? (13) .---------------.... 430 (13)-------- 456 (13)-.........
463 (5)...---------------.. 4547 (14) --------464? (6) ....--...
466 (11).--------------------------------------------..-
3rd Generation..---------.------ 3907 (13)-----------------438 (13)-------- 427 (12)-------
High Resolution ......------------------ -----------------------.----------. 442? (13).........
2-tone maneuverable -------------------------------------------.-. .----------- --......-...
3rd Generation ...------- -----------.---------..------------ 470 (10)------------.---------
Low Resolution ...------...-.- .............----------------------...---------.----..------.-
2-tone Science--.......------.--...---------------------------------... -------------....---
3rd Generation---..--------- -----------------.-------------- 490 (12)--..------ 477 (12) 484 (13)
Low Resolution .....------ ------..------------ ------------- 525 (11)-------- 518 (9)-------
POM-Science --................-----------....-------------------................................................
3rd Generation.-----...---------- 473 (12)----------------- 512 (12)-- ------------ ------.
Low Resolution---------------................. 493 (12) ---------------------------------------.----
PDM..--------------------- 517 (12). ---....------------- ------------------- -...-....
537 (12) ------ ----------------
3rd Generation-------....... 499 (9) 471 (13) 519 (10)------- 78 (13)-------- 483 (12) 486 (13)
High Resolution -------------- 474 (13)------------------. 4957 (13)-------- 522 (13)----
Morse-Maneuverable --...--------- 491 (14).-------.---------- 503 (13) -------- -----------.-
492 (13)------------------- 538 (13)-- ---------- --......................
513 (13)------ ---------------------------------------
3rd Generation......----------- --------------------------- 488 (13) --------515 (13)-------
High Resolution---------------------------------------------- 527 (13) -------------------.-
3rd Generation ....--.- ----------------------------------- 502 (12)----------------- 541 (12)
Low Resolution ............................................................---------------------------..-------.......-
2-tone Science -----.-----.---.. -................-----------------------. -------.
3rd Generation ---------------. ------------------------------ 561 (12).--------...... 552 (12) 555 (12)
Low Resolution..--......-----------------------------.................................................-------..................
PDM-Science-..----------..- ..... .........-----------------------.------.....----...-...
3rd Generation .....--------------- 547 (12)------------------- 575 (12) ------ -----......................
Low Resolution.--------------- 583 (13).------------------ 578 (12) ---- ----------......................
PDM-...-------------------- 599 (13)------.- ----------- 596 (6)-----...............--------.......
3rd Generation-------. 572 (13) 543 (13) 609 (13)--------- 548 (13)-------- 560 (13)..----.....
High Resolution------....... 581 (13) 551 (14)------------------- 563 (12).-------- 584 (14).......----
Morse-Maneuverable...........-----------------------. ------..------- 577 (13)--------.. 598 (6)----.......
579 (13)---.----- 600 (7)-----
603 (13)-----
3rd Generation.....-------... ------------------------------ 550 (10)-------- 554 I* 556 (12)
High Resolution-------..-----......-----...------------------ 559 (5) --------602 (k9). ..
2-tone Maneuverable-- ---------------------------- 597 (6)---.----- 607? (8)-"
587 (13)-------- 612 (13).-----.-
625 (13)---
3rd Generation------.... -- -------------......-----------------------------... .. 576 (12).--....
Low Resolution. ..-------.---------------------.------------------------.. 616 (11)----........
2-tone Science- ..........................................................-------- ..-- ---- ........
3rd Generation-----------------------.----------... 629 (12) ------- --------- 635 (12) 669 (13)
Low Resolution ------------. ----------- ---------- 692 (12)...---------------- ------------
PDM-Science-------------------------------------- 697? (12) ---- ------------------------
3rd Generation..---------------- 658 (12)--------- 653 (12) --- ---.--------- 696 (12) 640 (12)
Low Resolution-----.---..-------- 685 (12)-.---- -- ---------- --------------------------
PDM ----.....................---------------------------
3rd Generation.. .....----- 632 (14)----- .. ....
High Resolution---------------................. 667? (13)..--............---------- ---- --------------------.
Morse-Maneuverable..----------------------------------------------.- -.-----------------
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2-tone Maneuverable.... ------------691 (12).----- ----659 (13)----- ---------.............................------
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671 (13) .. ......-.-------------------
688 (12).--.."-------"-------
3rd Generation.-----------............--........ -------------------------------- 664 (12) 693 (12)
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10. Microbial Exchange Test (J)
Microflora microbial samples were taken from cosmonauts and
astronauts before, during and after the flight to determine the char-
acter and conditions of microbial exchange among men confined in a
sealed compartment.
11. Futrnace System Experimcnts (J)
This series of joint "multipurpose furnace experiments" was con-
ducted in order to determine the effects of weightlessness on some
metallurgical and chemicrystallization processes in metals and semi-
Since 1957, the two themes of United States-Soviet space relations
have been competition and cooperation. With the passage of time. the
competition in terms of propaganda has diminished and the tentative
efforts on both sides to propose limited sharing of information and
some joint experimentation have gradually strengthened.

The Apollo-Soyuz Test Project was provided for as part of an
agreement on cooperation in the exploration and peaceful uses of
outer space, signed May 24, 1972 in Moscow by then President Nixon
and Chairman Kosygin. Article Three of that document states the
The parties have agreed to carry out projects for developing compatible
rendezvous and docking systems of the United States and Soviet manned space-
craft and stations in order to enhance the safety of manned flight in space and
to provide the opportunity for conducting joint scientific experiments in the
future. It is planned that the first experimental flight to test these systems be
conducted during 1975, envisaging the docking of a U.S. Apollo-type spacecraft
and a Soviet Soyuz-type spacecraft with visits of astronauts in each other's
spacecrafts. The implementation of these projects will be carried out on the basis
of principles and procedures which will be developed in accordance with the
summary of results of the meeting between represe-ntatives of the U.S. National
Aeronautics and Space Administration and the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences
on the question of developing compatible systems for rendezvous and docking
and manned spacecraft and space stations of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., dated
April 6, 1972.

The Apollo-Soyuz Test Project was the first joint manned space
mission involving the United States and the Soviet Union, but there
have been several other cooperative space-related endeavors between
the two nations.
Efforts to develop U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space research may be
traced back to the early space projects planning in 1955 for the Inter-
national Geophysical Year (IGY). Further efforts were made at
various times, but none of these was generally productive until 1962.
The United States at that time made specific proposals which resulted
in talks between the late Soviet Academician Anatoliy A. Blagon-
ravov, and the late Dr. Hugh L. Dryden, who was then Deputy Ad-
ministrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
As a result, a three-part, bi-lateral space agreement was drawn up in
'Text of US/USSR Space Agreement. NASA NEWS Special Release, May 24, 1972.


F I- -I
I I".











origins in the Pentagon, the sensors were not permanently blinded,
but for periods of time up to four hours were neutralized. This hap-
pened from October 18 on three times to 24-hour synchronous satel-
lites and twice to 12-hour semi-synchronous satellites. The story said
the intensity of the phenomenon was from 10 to 1,000 times that of a
forest fire or volcano, and that no weather satellite had found any
natural source for these events. The frequency of the signal was like
that to be expected of a hydrogen-fluorine laser. The signals had come
from the western part of the U.S.S.R. The suggestion was that if the
source was from lasers, then the intensity that might be expected if
used against low-flying U.S. missions would reach levels 50,000 times
as high. The United States since the early 1960's has probed Soviet
satellites with lasers from Maui, Hawaii, and Cloudcroft, New Mexico,
to determine lens and film types used in Soviet photographic missions,
but not in a manner to cause deliberate damage to such Soviet
This suspicion, if borne out, would have been of enormous conse-
quence to detente, the SALT talks, and the military positions of the
two countries, so naturally raised many public questions. Secretary of
Defense Rumsfeld responded to these, saying that investigations were
continuing, but that the preliminary findings were that major gas
pipeline explosions had ca used these signals. He said known explosions
and fires from over-pressurizing a major gas line correlated well with
the satellite data, and he reviewed the U.S. use of laser probing of
Soviet satellites.
It may be too early to close the book on these incidents, because it
seems strange that gas fires which have been observed many times
before have not previously had this same effect on satellites. If it was
the intensity of these particular fires, then this experience may help
to calibrate and interpret future signals received by satellites in what
is clearly an evolving technologyy.8

Space writers and staff studies have explored the possibility of
stationing bombs in orbit. Such an operation is now outlawed by treaty,
and there is no real likelihood that any weapons of mass destruction
are in orbit. Before such activities were banned, and while such activ-
ities might have been contemplated, it is not likely that technology
had yet reached the place where such stationing could be carried out.
The question of whether there were any developmental flights of the
basic hardware is one which will be assessed later in this chapter. It
may be helpful to discuss the subject for some perspectives on the
issue. Setting aside the matter of the treaty for the moment, and
looking at the kind of proposals which have been made in the past one
can reach some conclusions.
In assessing the merits if any and the drawbacks which are con-
siderable of any orbital bomb system, one must recognize that tech-'
nology is not stationary, and what may be the right answer today on
technological feasibility may be different tomorrow. For example, in
some future age, one might imagine a highly developed ability to travel
17 Aviation Week, New York, Decemher 8. 1975, p. 12ff.
Is Aviation Week, New York, January 5, 1976, p. 18.


will likely be more changes made in the selection of specialty profiles
than in the biomedical selection process itself.1T


1. General Protocol
In the early phases of the Soviet manned spaceflight program, the
Soviet Air Force was responsible for cosmonaut training under Gen-
eral Nikolai Kamanin, who until recently headed that program."8 The
first formal training site was located at Frunze Airport on the out-
skirts of Moscow. In early 1960, the program was shifted to the new
specialized facilities at Zvezdnyy Gorodok (Star Town) which is now
the center for all cosmonaut training (also known as the Gagarin Cos-
monaut Training Center). Secondary, specialized training facilities
are scattered throughout the U.S.S.R. These include a number of high
altitude military stations in mountainous regions which are used for
acclimatization to hypoxia (decreased oxygen) and general physical
conditioning, various locations along the Black Sea which are used
for underwater (simulated weightlessness) training,19 and even Soviet
Antarctic bases, such as Vostok which are used for stress physiologi-
cal research of relevance to the space program.20-22
The basic principle adhered to in Soviet cosmonaut training pro-
grain, as in the IT.S. astronaut training program, is that each crew
member must be able to control the spacecraft, to service the regular
systems of the vehicle, to carry out basic missions during the flight
and to land the spacecraft. At the same time. each crew member must
be sufficiently specialized to carry out specific flight missions. The
training program therefore satisfies mission specialization while assur-
ing that the cosmonaut has a knowledge of a wide range of
The fundamental Soviet philosophy for training cosmonauts is to
design training curricula which exceed the physiological and psycho-
logical limits of the trainee and all situations anticipated in the space
mission. To this end. there are distinct phases in the training program.
The first involves general preparation which is administered to train-
ees who have not previously flown a mission. Here, the trainee is
administered lectures and examinations on such subjects as the mechan-
ics of spaceflight. space navigation, general principles of the space-
craft, astronomy, geography, meteorology, space biology, and
The next phase involves technical preparation. This phase begins
after crews have been established for a particular mission. The crews
are familiarized with specific features of the mission through studies
in the form of lectures and seminars with examinations which are con-
"7 Rnkavishnikov, N. The Cosmonaut as a Researcher. Op. Cit.
Link, M. M. et al. TraininIn of Astronauts. Tn: Foundations of Space Biolozy and
Medicine. Vol. III, Part 4, Ch. 16. Washington, D.C., NASA, 1975 (in press).
"9 Parin. V. V. Some important problems of space physiology. Aerospace Mpiflcine, No. 9,
19 9. p. 1011.
2 Antoschenko. A. et al. At first In the water-then in space. Aviatsiya Ko-monavtika
(1TSSR). No. 10. 196q. 75-77.
21 Unsigned. Aviatsiya i Kosmonavtika (USSR), No. 4, 1973, p. 45 (Library of Congrpps.
FRD 120'O).
2 UnPilned. A Iday at the Cosmonaut Training Facility. Sotsiallstlcheskaya Tndistrlya
(USSR). S Ap)ril 197. p. 4.
"Rukavishnikov, N. et al. The Cosmonaut as a Researcher. Op. Cit. p. 45-50.
2- Ibid.


of the total assembly of two stages and associated equipment, but it
must have been close to the 4 meters diameter of the D-1-e roclkut
(also estimated as 3.72 meters), and also stood about 4 meters high.
Because the D-1-e vehicle is used for the third generation series of
unmanned lunar programs, we can estimate the weight brought to e-
cape speed to be on the order of 5,000 to 6,600 kilograms. After retro-
fire to slow into lunar orbit, the weight may lie in the range of 4,00! to
4,500 kilograi.s. Further braking to achieve a landing should give a
number in the range of 1,800 to 2,000 kilograms. These are very rough
estimates. In the case of Luna 16, the Russians finally announced a
landed weight of 1,880 kilogra 1s.29
As events of the flight unfolded at the time, no advance warning
was given of the specific intended mission, but over the weeks follow-
ing, more detailed accounts were made public. The first task of the
craft, once on the surface of the Moon, was to review its own hoisc-
keeping functions to insure that all subsystems were in working order.
It had to establish not only its exact location on the lunar surface, but
also find the local vertical:. Then the arm attached to the landing stare
was extended out, generally beyond the immediate blast area of the
braking rocket. Its special drilling unit, consisting of a hollow cvl-
inder with cutters at the end went. to work, with controllers on Earth
sensing remotely how fast to cut in relation to the apparent hardii-.-s
of the lunar material. The drill vwas allowed to cut into a depth of about
35 centimeters. The Russians are not certain whether at this point they
reached bed rock or an isolated hard stone. But rather than risk dam-
age to the equipment, drilling ceased. The saiiiple in the tube coni-ist-
ing of soil ranging from fine dust to more granular sand was carried
on the same sampler arm up to the as.ont stage and inserted into the
recovery capsule which was then hermetically sealed.
Then preprogramed information plus instructions from Earth pre-
pared the spacecraft for launch. After 26 hours and 25 minutes on
the surface, the ascent stage took off at 1043 Moscow time on Septem-
ber 21, using the descent stage as its launch platform. The lower stage
remaining on the Moon continued to broadcast to Earth data on local
temperature and radiation conditions.
According to the Bochum radio space observatory in the German
Federal Republic, strong and good quality television pictures were
returned from the craft. Such pictures were not made available in the
United States either by Bochum or by any other source, so the report
has to be accepted with reservations.
The return flight to Earth was made without midcourse corrections.
In contrast to the Zond flights which were to have been precursors to
manned flights, and hence made with as low a G-load, and as low heat
loar return as possible from the Moon, the Luna 16 payload made a
straight ballistic return to Soviet territory. The time and area of re-
covery was announced in advance by the Soviet Government. As it
came closer, the ground complex calculated its point of return with
increasing accuracy. On September 24, the recovery capsule with its
sealed cylinder of lunar soil was separated by a pyrotechnic device
from its lunar launch rocket, while approximately 50.000 kilometers
from Earth. The capsule hit the dense atmosphere at 0810 Moscow time.
2 TASS, October 3, 1970, 1035 GM.T.


had been direct ascent missions; probably starting in October 1960,
the change to a more powerful upper stage occurred, and the added
flexibility of launch from orbit was intended, an approach which has
been used ever since for deep space missions. Another launch was
announced on February 12,1961-Tyazheliy Sputnik 5-and from this
came a probe or Zond rocket carrying another Automatic Interplane-
tary Station (AIS) called Venera 1. The payload weighed 643.5 kilo-
grams. It was by far the most elaborate payload combination to be
unveiled to that time. For some weeks the mission went well, but at a
distance of about 7.25 million kilometers from Earth, communications
ceased. The payload is estimated to have passed Venus at a d(listance
of about 100,000 kilometers on May 19, 1961, based on its known
3. 1962 Venus Attempts
Venus launch windows come about every 19 months. True to prac-
tice, the Soviet Union launched multiple attempts on August 25,
September 1 and September 12, 1962 carrying Venera spacecraft. All
of these reached Earth orbit, but failed to launch their payloads suc-
cessfully toward Venus, leaving various kinds of debris and major
sIgments in Earth orbit. No Soviet acknowledgment of these launches
has been made to this day. The United States routinely published its
Goddard Satellite Situation Report including the Augiit 25 pieces
of debris in Earth orbit. But then it began to worry about the possible
diplomatic consequences of such announcements, and for a time sus-
pended publishing the statistical report altogether; and when it
resumed, it skipped all Soviet objects in orbit after August 25, 1962.
However, all objects, listed or not, are assigned a sequential astronomi-
cal designator which is supposed to account for all observable objects
in orbit. The omission of certain designators signalled to anyone famil-
iar with the system that there were unacknowledged flights in orbit.
In early September, press accounts rumored that the United States
had begun to make secret military launches, and the Soviet represent-
atives at the United Nations made charzos against the United States
to this effect. Our representative denied this and said the stories "were
not wholly accurate", rather than revealing there had been a Soviet
launch on September 1. The diplomatic stances adopted by both coun-
tries are not too flattering to either, in retrospect. Actually, for a long
time, the September 12 Soviet launch was carried in British publica-
tions as a secret U.S. launch because of the de facto U.S. and Soviet
agreement not to disclose these Soviet failures.
4. 1962 Mars Attempts
The window for Mars flights comes about every 25 months, and
Soviet launch attempts were made on October 24, November 1, and 4,
1962. All three reached Earth orbit; the first and third were never
acknowledged by the Soviet Union because that is all they did. The
flight of October 24 was especially awkward in its implications be-
cause it came at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, and it broke into
a considerable number of pieces of debris which followed a path
bringing these within view of the Alaska BMEWS missile detector
system. The first impression might have been one of a massive missile
attack against the United States, although the computer must have
quickly revealed it was not.















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Abstracts AA) Computer e c Eology. Bibliography
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IQuE 4-1.- Soviet literature agencies and interrelationships.


days. In contrast to the other cosmonauts who were experienced mili-
tary test pilots, Ms. Tereshkova had worked in a textile factory, took
up sports parachuting, and then was trained for her flight. Although
she did not have the background of experience common to her Russian
and American counterparts, she gained more orbital experience in time
than all the flights in the U.S. Mercury program combined. Her flight
emphasized that the Vostok system was designed to maximize use of
automatic devices, with manual override to be usedl only in emergencies
or experimentally. This feature prevailed through later Soviet pro-
gramis as well, as all systems have been tested through complete mis-
sions unmanned first. It also strengthens the supposition that the
transition from Vostok flights to Kosmos military photographic
recoverable flights made a minimum of redesign necessary. Measure-
ments on the Kosiios flights by Alan Pilkington, formerly of the
Scarborough Planetarium, in England have revealed they are of the
same dimensions and brightness as the Vostok payloads.
On October 6, 1964, Kosmos 47 was put into an orbit 177 x 413 km
and after just one day was retrofired to come back to Earth while its
carrier rocket flew for eight days. Just six days later 'a manned flight
(Voskhod 1) came with elements of 178 x 409 kmin and also stayed
up one day.
On February 22,1965, Kosmos 57 was put into an orbit 175 x 512 km.
This time something went wrong, for the payload was exploded in
orbit. Voskhod 2 did not follow as closely after this precursor as had
happened the previous fall. One can surmise that it required a little
time to determine that whatever went wrong with Kosmos 57 would
be unlikely to occur in the manned flight to follow. Hence the follow-
up flight was delayed 24 days 'and then entered a 173 x 495 km orbit.
1. Voskhod 1
Voskhod 1 was launched on October 12, 1964, and based upon infor-
mation released after the fact, we can determine that it was put up
by an A-2 launch vehicle, which permitted increasing the payload
weight from the 4,700 kg range to 5,320 kg. The payload itself has
been shown only while covered with its launch shroud, but this was
so similar to that of the Vostok series that Voskhod seems to be only
a modified Vostok.
The principal modification of this first flight was removal of the
heavy ejection seat on its rails. Then within the approximately 2.5
meter sphere of the cabin, it was possible to place three seats side-by-
side, but with the center seat raised. By this time such confidence had
been gained in the reliability of the basic system, that the cosmonauts
did not wear cumbersome protective space suits and helmets, but com-
fortable coveralls. This practice was followed until the Soyuz 11
tragedy, when the three-man crew died due to a pressure leak in their
cabin. Without ejection seats, the landing of the ship with crew on
board was eased by use of a final braking rocket.
Voskhod 1 was the first multi-manned flight. The crew was led by
Colonel Vladimir Komarov, accompanied by a military physiologist,


nizing interactions between nations in the conduct of major scientific
research projects. He said, however, that the development of such
cooperation is conceivable only under conditions of peaceful coexist-
ence. He added that "the Communist Party and thle Soviet Govern-
ment are following a firm policy of strengthening peace over thle entire
Earth and Soviet scientists see it as their duty to support thils course
by the broadening of scientific contacts with scientists of different
countries." (Pravda, Moscow, June 29, 1975, p. 3.)
Academician R. Z. Sagdeyev, Director of the Space Research In-
stitute IT.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences. discussed the possibilities for
future international cooperation in space research and the implications
of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project flight for future Soviet-American
cooperation. He said that the ASTP flight is'an important stage in the
development of cooperation between the U.S.S.R. and the United
States in the investigation of space for the welfare of man. He said
that it must be assumed that the project will serve as a basis for other
joint projects in this field. In Sagdeyev's opinion, the preparations for
this project represent the optimum forms of international cooperation
and that such forms will undoubtedly be used in the future. Prospects
for joint international space programs of the future include manned
flight to the planets, improvement of global radio and television sys-
tems, and a number of other projects which require a generalization of
experience in the scientific and technical advances of different coun-
tries. He said that the years 1977-1978 have been announced as inter-
national years for investigating the magnetosphere. It is proposed
that about 50 spacecraft of many countries will carry out coordinated
experiments. Soviet and French scientists, he said, are jointly discuss-
ing the problems involved in investigating Venus and its atmosphere
by means of inflatable balloons and simultaneously with artificial
Earth satellites. Sagdeyev also said that "orbital beacons" satellites
which would support air and oceanic navigation, and satellites for
investigating the Earth's natural resources and oceans, should both
have an international character. (Pravda, Moscow, July 24,1975, p. 2.)
Academician V. Glushko, in a discussion of orbital space stations,
said that physiological problems associated with weightlessness are
the principal stumbling block in the present stage of the Soviet manned
space program. While it is possible to rotate a station to create artifi-
cial gravity, he said that observations requiring a definite and constant
orientation would be difficult to make. He said that the designers of
the Salyut stations are gradually approaching the ideal in which
operations auxiliary to scientific research are carried out by automated
systems. As an example, Glushko cited the "Kaskad" system for the
automatic orientation of Salyut-4. "Kaskad" made it possible to
reduce fuel consumption "by several times." Salyut-4 also utilized an
autonomous navigation system which included a complex of sensors
and an on-board computer, supported by Earth-based information
centers. In the future, he said that the entire navigational support of
the flight will be the crew's responsibility. On another topic, he said
that closed cycling of matter are gradually being introduced in life
support systems. Systems tested by the Salyut cosmonauts are proto-
types of future space greenhouses which not only close the cycling of
air and water, but also will supply the cosmonauts with fresh vege-


lislied by the Navy as SPASIJT, also called the )Dark Fencel. It was
strung in a line at a fixed latitude across the tier of southern Stati"s
from Georgia to California. Several radio stations send out a fan
shaped signal in CW (continuous wave) which then would be reflected
back to Earth by any satellite, no matter how uncooperative, passing
through the fan. RIadio receiving stations are also spaced along tllh
sale latitude. By sending any reflected signals to a computer at Dalil-
g'(te, Virginia, it calculates the location of the passing satellite, and
adds the data to its memory bank. Successive passes throughll tlhe fanl
establish the presumed orbit of the sat'.',llite. The computer remem ITILi rs
what. should be coming through the fan, and any new object or any
object displaced from its estimated path sounds an alarm and is a sig-
nal to analysts to gather more dat a until the unexplained "blip" can be
accounted for.
A .-cond method for finding uncooperative satellites is through
radar, such as the ones already described as making up the BMEWS
system. In addition to those three there are other radars intended spe-
cifically to keep track of space objects. The exact number and location
of such is not in the public domain. One is clearly visible to motorists
on the New Jersey Turn Pike because of its large radome near Morris-
town. Others are known to be on Shemya in the Aleutian Islands, and
in Trinidad. At Eglin Air Force Base in Florida is a large phased
array radar which uses electronic rather than mechanical scanming of
the sky. Especially since the 1975 difficulties with Turkey, public atten-
tion has been drawn to the U.S. radars in that country which could
watch some Soviet launching. Tlie. British have a large station at
Malvemrn in England. A good radar not only can observe blips, but with
some discrimination and good computer support can reach conclusions
about the shape and dimensions of space objects, although presuillably
the answers are not definitive when some radar absorbing materials
might make an object seem smaller than it really is, and adding corner
reflectors might make it seem larger.
A third approach is through optical devices. Tracking cameras of
high sensitivity and wide fields of vision were introduced in some
instances fairly early in the U.S. program. These capabilities have
been enhanced over the years at Cloudcroft, New Mexico, and in
Hawaii to get enough resolution to see something of the target
Since all of these U.S. systems have had repeated publicity, and
Soviet needs are similar, one can assume they have examined all these
techniques. We know they follow their own space probes to distances
as great as 250,000 kilometers and more through use of electronic
enhancement of optical signals. We also know they have long been
active in development and deployment of radars. Their purported
state of development was described in detail by a pair of articles in
Aviation Week.15 This study reflects a high level of Soviet technology.
There is even less information in the public domain about the
location of its space surveillance radars than about corresponding
U.S. stations. In the early days, the Soviet Union encouraged people
15 Miller. Barry. Soviet radar expertise expands. Aviation Week, New York, February 15,
1971. pp. 14-16: Soviet radars disclose clues to doctrine. Aviation Week, Febru-
ary 22,1971, pp. 42-50.


round bodies of different diameter, the manufacture of long-life bear-
ings, and the significant improvement of bonding methods were als,
mentioned. He noted, however, that the pra('tical a llccomplishment of
these and other industrial processes in space req.i i res that large space
stations or factories be put into orbit. The station can have a ma.-s of
hundreds of tons. Nuclear power plants constructed on Earth, inde-
pendently put into orbit, and subsequently docked to the orbiting fac-
tory may be the source of electricity, although solar technology may
also be used. (Kryl'ya Rodiny, Moscow, No. 7,1974, pp. 22-25.)
Academician B. Petrov said that large orbital stations assembled in
orbit and lasting for several years (up to 10 years) with rel)lacelment
crews of 12 to 20 people were possible, in principle, in the foreseeable
future, but such projects will become expedient only when the possi-
bilities of orbital stations with small crews have been exhausted and
when the economic, scientific and technical advantages of such stations
have been suil)st.antiated. In the distant future, one can speak of the
expediency of elaborating plans for superlarge multipurpose orbital
stations designed for a crew of 50 to 70 people increased later to up to
100 people or more. In addition, specialized unmanned stations visited
regularly by cosmonauts will be established. He said "there is no
doubt that ships used once only will be employed for a long time to
come, and alongside this, transport ships used many times over will
be created with high aerodynamic efficiency for controlling atmos-
pheric descent with small load factors." (TASS, Moscow, August 6,
1974, 0830 GMT.)
General Shatalov reported that the Soviet Union is developing
unmanned spacecraft "tankers" that would rendezvous with manned
or unmanned Salyut space station vehicles to replenish their consum-
ables and prolong their useful life in orbit. According to General
Shatalov, the unmanned tanker vehicles would carry consumables such
as reaction control system fuel with an added weight capacity due to
absence of cosmonaut life support and reentry systems. A malfunction
of a fully automatic rendezvous and docking system being tested for
use by the Soyuz-like tanker vehicles prevented Soyuz 15 cosmonauts
from docking with the Salyut 3 reconnaissance spacecraft on Au-
gust 27, 1974. (Statement made during an Apollo-Soyuz Test Project
training session at the Johnson Space Center [no specific date given.]
Aviation Week & Space Technology, New York, September 16, 1974,
p. 22.)
Cosmonaut Sevastyanov stated that future Soviet space technology
will develop in two directions-toward more perfect automated sys-
stems and toward more perfect manned systems. Automated craft
will in the next few decades explore increasingly remote regions of
the solar system, land on and explore the Moon, Venus, and Mars. The
use of manned systems for these tasks is uneconomical so far. He said
that in the future huge manned orbl)ital complexes assembled in space,
will carry sophisticated technology and power plants, which will trans-
mit through laser systems, energy directly from outer space. He
praised cooperative international space activity and said that "in
this rests the biggest and most promising prospects, the biggest con-
tribution of cosmonautics to all mankind." (Prague CTK, October 9,
1974, 0800 GMT.)


to estimate from changes in angles to these points the location of the
vehicle. A fourth method was to take pictures of star fields and to
measure the position of the Sun with a sextant in order to establi,1h
the vehicle's location.
The Russians reported the telemetry coming from Lunokhod 1 was
so extensive that just the engineering data on the behavior of the wheels
produced a greater data flow than was obtained from all spacecraft
combined for the years 1957-1960. The vehicle experienced many vicis-
situdes as it climbed into and out of craters and occasionally met
boulders. Sometimes the list was 30 degrees. But by changes of course.
and backing when necessary, it managed very well. Some areas of dust
were found with delpths up to 20 centiimeters. Then the ninth wheel,
a distance measuring device, would not always turn, and other data
were required to establish the actual distance covered.
Another interesting phenomenon was measurement of a 1,000-fold
increase in the level of low energy protons between April 7 and 10,
1971, after a solar flare had been observed from Earth on April 6.
As the table shows, during the seventh lunar day, liLt:tle travel was
accomplished, and it was feared that deterioration of systems would
require restriction of experiments to static ones. But in fact, it came
back to good performance the eighth day, with a rapid deterioration
thereafter. When the last of its travels were over. it was positioned so
that the passive laser reflector supplied by the French could continue
to be used for many years to come.
5. Relative Merits8 of Manned Versus Unmanned Roving Lunar
The success of Lunokhod 1 inevitably brought back the recurring
questions about the relative merits of manned versus automated flights
to the Moon. This same kind of analysis has been offered on return of
lunar samples. No clear cut answer was possible in that instance, but
it was hard to escape the conclusion that Apollo flights at costs up to
$450 million each, out of pocket, bringing back 90 kilograms of docu-
miented samples selected with some care over many kilometers of ter-
rain (lurain) should have greater scientific merit for analysis than
a Luna flight at roughly $100 million or so bringing back about 100
grams from a site selected at random.
The closest parallel between the Luna 17 with Lunokhod 1 mission
would be Apollo 15, which was the first to carry a manned roving
Loaded Total dis- Useful life
Name weight (kg) tance (kin) (days) Power source Control
Lunokhod 1-------------- 756 10.5 298 Solar cells.. -------- Earth.
Apollo 15 rover----------- 698 64.4 3 Chemical batteries. Astronauts.
SOURCES: Weight of Lunokhod 1: TASS, 8 Feb. 1971, 1152 GMT. Distance for Lunokhod 1: TASS, 9 Oct. 1971, 1222
GMT. Apollo 15 rover data from NASA press kit and subsequent press releases.
It will be observed this is something of an apples and oranges com-
parison. Time is of the essence with a manned flight to the Moon, and
the greatest mobility and practical speed are important. But if there
is time for an unmanned vehicle to recharge its batteries, and for sci-


cosmonauts will still have to lbe quite ver'-iitile and be able to Sllubsti-
tute for each other so that the imaii crew c:in perform the -,ienti-ts'
functions and the scientific personnel caian control the spa. craft. In
the future, he said that it is indisputable that stationary laboratories
will appear on tlhe Moon and expeditions will lheald for Mars. It. is
quite possible that the persoiiiiel of such lunar stations and the crews
of the Martian ships will be international. At the present staIe of the
Soviet space prograi however, automated spacecraft will play an
enormous role in the study of the Moon and thie planets of the solar
system. (Izvestiva. Moscow, April 12, 1972, pp. 1-3.)
Academician Sedov: "A.utomatic vehicles have now many times con-
vincingly proved their capabilities as a sole means of exploring cir-
cnmtern'strial space, the Moon. and the planets in the initial st ars."
Concerning manned missions to the planets, he said that a landing on
the Venerian surface by a manned spacecraft is impossible, at least
within the foreseeable future. Moreover, in general terms a manned
mission to either Venus or Mars is an unusually complex and expensive
tnsk, immeasurably more problematical than sending a man to the
Moon. He vwas confident that the problems of manned exploratory
missions to the planets would be solved, but for a long time to come
scientists will be receiving their main information on the planets
from iinmann ied craft. He said that in the next few years it is entirely
possible that long-duration spice stations with international crews
will appear in cireumterrestrial orbit. Debate, he said, has been in
progress for some time on a draft plan to organize an international
manned scientific laboratory-station on the M[oon. (Krasiiaya Zvezda,
Moscow, April 12, 1972, p. 2.)
K. Ya. Kondratyev, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences corresponding
member, said that a combination of space and Earth-based technology
offers extremely great possibilities for learning about the Earth's en-
vironment and natural resources. Hle cited as examples the prospects
for using remote space-l)ased sensing systems in combination with
direct measuring Earth-based systems to: (1) Develop models for
fishing in the world ocean. (2) Provide uninterrupted weather data
collection. Soviet weather satellites also carry actinometric in-4tru-
ments which permit a study of planetary distribution of heat absorp-
tion and radiation. And (3). map the Earth's surface. He said, too,
that certain tasks exist which can most effectively be resolved only
with spacecraft manned with crews which include specialists trained
to fulfill an appropriate scientific program. The need for long cyclos
of uninterrupted and comprehensive observations makes it essential
to develop long-duration manned orbital stations which become bases
for research into the planet's environment and natural resource-.
(Sovetskaya Rossiya, Moscow, April 19, 1972, p. 3.)
Cosmonaut Ye. Khrunov discussed the problem of eliminating or
attenuating the adverse effect of weightlessness on the human body
caused by long-duration orbital station operations. The most effective
means for contending with the undesirable effects of prolonged
weightlessness would be the creation of artificial gravity. However, its
creation would involve great difficulties. For this reason scientists are
seeking other ways to extend the time man spends in space. Proposals
include the wearing of anti-G suits and use of special trainers, vacuum

The tables which follow are intended to supply a quick refereIlcee
check on the flights of all nations intended to go to lunar distance or
beyond. Table 2-10 summarizes flights which went to lunar distance,
or were intended to go there and failed their purpose, to the extent
known. Table 2-11 does the same for interplanetary flights. The chron-
ological nature of the tables permits the addition of cumulative na-
tional weight totals to the extent known to permit one kind of com-
parison of relative effort.





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preserve the natural ct rnngth of the rock sample, and oil vapor lubri-
cation to prevent its parts from sticking. After each brief applic.a-
tion of the drill, there would be a pause for a fresh television view. The
sample acquired was one with both sand and hard rock. The drilling
arm had been rigged to emerge vertically from the platform, rotate
to the desired azimuth, and then was lowered to the ready position for
drilling. All this took 7 minutes. After television inspection, there
were 2 more minutes spent to adjust the direction of the drilling arm,
and 3 minutes for final descent to surface contact. The drill operated
at 500 rpm, and it took just 7 minutes to extract the sample. After
this was completed, the arm lifted up the drilling unit with its intact
sample to line it up with the recoverable capsule and insert it. This
was hermetically sealed. There followed a 20 hour wait to insure that
when launch cainme for the return flight to Earth it would be carried to
the selected area of the Soviet Union.
3. Return Flight and Rerovery
Launch occurred at 0158 Moscow time on February 23. The sample
was well shielded by ablative material on the recovery capsule. After
separation of the capsule from the launch rocket, it made a ballistic
entry with aerodynamic braking, and then further slowing by para-
chute. Its radio beacon was picked up by aircraft. The landing took
place on an island in the Karakingir river at 67 34' E. 48 N. Three
tracked rescue vehicles trying to reach it broke through river ice. and
pickup had to await the availability of a helicopter and daylight. The
bright orange parachute was then spotted. About 5 mm of material
h:ad been ablated from the capsule surface. The sealed container with
the lunar sample was taken out and transported to the lunar receiving
laboratory where 14 hours after the return the contents were put into
a steel tray. The landing had occurred at 2212 Moscow time on Febru-
ary 25, 40 kilometers northwest of Dzezkazgan in Kazakhstan. The
landing conditions were ones of blizzard and low clouds. The search
area had measured 80 by 100 kilometers. This time the entry was at
an angle of 60 degrees, providing a lower G load than that experienced
by the return of Luna 16. However, temperatures ran higher.
The sample container was opened in a helium atmosphere. The sam-
ple itself proved to be lighter in color than that returned by Luna 20.
It was described as light to dark brown, and also as light gray, again
demonstrating the difficulties associated with describing the colors of
most lunar samples.
Later, the Luna 20 return vehicle was referred to as a VLAS (re-
turnable lunar automatic station), said to have considerable micro-
miniaturized equipment to make it function. Luna 16 and 20 were
described as essentially the same except for minor regrouping of
components to improve conditions. It was noted that this time the
landing had been made in daylight in order to gain better quality
stereo telephotos of the landing site.
4. Scientific Results
This flight provided an opportunity for further scientific exchanges.
The United States was given 2 grams plus photographs, in exchange
for 1 gram from Apollo 15. Earlier the United States had supplied
material from Apollo 11 and 12 for material from Luna 16. The
French had been given material from Luna 16, also, and now received
a sample from Luna 20.


FIGURE 25.-An assortment of scientific Earth orbiting payloads. Left side, top
to bottom: Kosmos 23, Kosmos 5, and Kosmos 381. Right side, top to bottom:
Kosmos 97, Kosmos 149, and Kosmos 49. Kosmos 23 did meteorological work;
Kosmos 5 did particle and radiation measurements; Kosmos 381 was a top-
side ionospheric sounder; Kosmos 97 carried a maser and atomic clock; Kos-
mos 149 not only took cloud cover pictures but after attaining orbit deployed
the annular ring on long rods as an orientation means in the upper atmos-
phere; Kosmos 49 made studies of magnetic fields, IR and UV radiation.


very close to the 1.797 km/s(e calculated by Grahn. But his calculation
for Kosmos 382 came out to 1.465 km/see under the 1.732 kni/se, of
Grahn. He saw them as full-duration firings of the Soyuz propulsion
system, and he had already advanced the thesis that Soyuz itself was
designed to fly from Earth to lunar orbit and back to Earth, because
of its inherent high delta V when fully loaded.
As far as the lunar landing itself was concerned. Woods ass.ilimel
the propellant loa(ling equivalent delta V from lunar orbit to surfare
and back to lunar orbit to be 2.3 km/sec way, while Grahn
assumed it was 3.3 km/see for both. As already pointed out, Kramer
quoted earlier Apollo 11 estimates for the descent where the delta V
amounted to 1.83 km/sec.
At the time of the Kosmos 379 flight Perry calculated that the two
maneuvers entailed delta V's of 0.4 and 1.4 km/sec respectively."
NORAD did not report a low initial orbit for Kosmos 312. but Perry
noticed that the initial Equator crossing of that flight was too far
east by 9 for the first NORAD-listed orbit to have been true. A
month or so later, he realized that the delta V's for LOI and TEI of
Apollo 11 totaled the same as the delta V's for Kosmos 379, and that
the second delta V for Kosmos 382 was, as in the case of Kosmos 379,
also 1 km/sec. The perigees of these flights were in opposite hemi-
spheres, presumably because the first experiment involved perigee
burns to make the orbit more elliptical and therefore perigee was
placed in the region of the Tyuratam launch site. But the second
experiment required an apogee burn to raise perigee, and hence the
apogee was in the northern hemisphere where the burn could be con-
trolled and monitored more easily.
In the case of Kosmos 382, Perry calculates that the initial parking
orbit was 303 by 180 kilometers. Using a restartable upper stage of the
D vehicle, the orbit was adjusted to the eccentric pattern reported by
NORAD, probably with a delta V of 1.0 km/sec. The change from
the initial NORAD)-listed orbit, to the intermediate orbit required a
further delta V of 0.27 kin/sece. For the final maneuver, Perry orig-
inally assumed a plane change of 4.3, the difference in inclination, but
this assumed the change occurring at the Equator and gave a delta V
of 1.0 km/sec. However, on realizing that the plane-change would
take place at apogee, near the northern apex of the orbit, he showed
that the necessary change in azimuth would be nearer 14 if carried out
at 50N latitude. This means a delta V of 1.6 km/sec, or even more,
and comes very close to the Sven Grahn calculation.
More recently, Perry calculated two burns, each of a delta V of
2.4 km/sec, for Kosmos 737, the first geostationary Kosmos.12 This
suggests that the Kosmos 382 was most probably lunar-related rather
than geostationary.
From these several estimates, it is evident that these Western
analysts are making different assumptions so that they do not come
out with universally agreed-upon figures which can be linked to any
one explanation. But in general, at least the flights of Kosmos 379.
398, and 431: probably generated enough delta V to be tests of the steps
to move from an Earth-Moon trajectory (TLT) into lunar orbit (LOI)
and from lunar orbit to Earth return (TEI), or alternatively, to
1 Perry, G. E., Flight International, London, 98, 923, December 10, 1970.
12 Perry, G. E., Flight International, London, 105, 439, April 4, 1974.


On October 19, 1968, Kosmos 248 was p)ut into an orbit like that
announced for but not attained by Kosmos 217. It may have started
in a lower initial orbit, but that is not clear.
A day later, Kosmos 249 was launched, probably leaving a rocket
casing in a low orbit reminiscent of FOBS which decayed the next
day. Then Kosmos 249 was maneuvered into a markedly eccentric
orbit whose perigee was very close to the average attitude of the
Kosmos 248 orbit. It was adjusted to come into close proximity to
Kosmos 248. The initial Soviet bulletin on this flight added new
phraseology: "Scientific investigations under the program have been
carried out." Indeed, what happened was that after the satellite had
made its high speed close inspection of Kosmos 248, it moved away
again, and was exploded into a cloud of debris.
On November 1, Kosmos 252 was put into orbit in a pattern virtually
identical to that of Kosmos 249. Again, it made a high speed flyby
of Kosmos 248, moved away, and was exploded into many fragments.
The initial Soviet announcement said: "The scientific research envi-
sioned by the program has been fulfilled." Because the orbits of Kos-
mos 249 and 252 were so placed that they would have lasted many
years, the prompt announcement of program completion was a pretty
good indication that the explosions coming as they did in a pair
were planned.
This made evident that the Russians who had practiced cooperative
rendezvous and docking with Kosmos 186 and 188 and again with
Kosmos 212 and 213, were now conducting inspections of what could
be non-cooperative craft. The explosions of these two payloads could
mean that they carried instrumentation and other devices the Russians
did not want to leave in orbit for some future generation of curious
inspectors of another nationality to find: or they could have been
exercising the destruct mechanism, presumably at a safe distance so
as not to destroy their own target.
Now it was possible to go back and put into context other statements
and attitudes. It was interestinGf that during the period the Russians
were criticizing the United States for having an MOL (Manned
Orbiting Laboratory) plan, they credited MOL with a capability of
inspecting and destroying the satellites of other nations. This was
carried in Red Star in 1965, and was one of the more preposterous
things credited to that unwieldy, long tank with its human crew at
one end, and its limited propulsion capability.33
The Russians were aware that at one point the United States had
under early development an unmanned system called Saint which was
supposed to co-orbit with potentially dangerous foreign satellites to
inspect them. This program, as well as MOL, was abandoned bv the
United States. Apparently, by contrast, the Russians went ahead
with their parallel system, and added a destruction capability to the
inspection phase.
With the experience of Kosmos 248, 249, and 252. it was possible
to ro back through earlier flights and to discover that Kosmos 217 and
185 had enough characteristics in common that they were either
precursor engineering tests or were parts of systems, presumably
targets, which failed before any interceptors could be sent up.
33 Viktorev, G, The olive branch and space arrows, Red Star, Moscow, September 21, 1965.


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The payload was designed to make a variety of solar and iono-.1)horic
mieasurements, including measures of the concentration and location
of electrons and positive ions. The flight lasted 52 minutes, during
which time it reached an alt it ide of about 4,400 kilomne rs. The pay-
lo:(1 was separated from th'e rocket body by more than 100 kilometers
to minimize distortion of (1.,ta which might occur in a location close to
the carrier rocket.
In 1970 there were additional geophysical rocket launching. One of
these came on October 3, and flew up to about 500 kilometers. It did
solar ultraviolet and X-ray studies.
On September 24, 1971, a geophysical rocket was sent to an altitude
of 230 kilometers. A similar rocket was launched on October 9, 1971 to
an altitude of about 500 kilometers.
2. T1he Vertl;cal International Program
The Interkosmos organization of Soviet Bloc countries ha spon-
sored sounding rocket flights under the name Vertikal.
Vertikal I was launched on November 28,1970 at Kapustin Yar prob-
ably using the first stage of the B-1 (SMS-4 Sandal), but possibly still
using the SS-3 Shyster, or Soviet designated A-3. The paylend was
sent about 500 kilometers up. It weighed 1,300 kilograms. The rocket
was 23 meters long with a diameter of 1.66 meters. Instrumentation
measured the X-ray spehrmiin, and the concentration of electrons and
positive ions, as well as electron temperature. These. instruments had
been manufactured jointly by the German Democratic Republic and
the Soviet Union to specifications also supplied by Bulgaria and
On Augus't 20, 1971, Vertikal 2 was launched and it flew to an alti-
tude of 463 kilometers. The description of payload weight, dimensions,
and participants seemed to match those of the earlier flight. The pay-
load section separated from the single stage carrier rocket at about 90
kilometers, carried by momentum to the high point of the flight. Para-
chute recovery was used to ret rieve the payload.
On September 2, 1975, Vertikal 3 was launched at Kapustin Yar, at
0740 ",Iozcovw time. presumably with the same B-1 first stn.e or Soviet
designated A-3 sounding rocket. It reached a maximum altitude of
502 kilometers, following separation from the single stage carrier
rocket at 97 kilometers altitude. The experiments continued the pre-
vious work on interactions between solar shortwave radiation and the
ionosphere and upper atmosphere. The assembly and launch itself
were conducted by representatives of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia. the
Cerman Democratic Republic, and U.S.S.R. Two weather rockets with
Buluarian and Soviet equipment were launched at the same time, and
various ground stations made measurements at the same period.
It was interesting that during the summer of 1975, the R us'ans put
on display in the usual Moscow museum a replica of the Vertikal pay-
load. but referred to the payload as a Prognoz, the name reserved for
the three flights which had ranged out in very eccentric Earth orbits.
This replica or one like it was at the Paris Air Show in the spring of
the same year.


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Lieutenant Boris Yegorov, and a civilian technical scientist, Konstan-
tin Feoktistov. Although the flight lasted only one day, the special
crew made it possible to obtain much more comprehensive medical
data as well as operate more complex checks on the payload systems
and external experiments. The flight also returned live television pic-
tures from orbit.
There is an interesting political sidelight to this mission, for while
in orbit Premier Khrushchev sent congratulations to the crew and
promised to see them on the reviewing stands in Moscow on their
return. They landed less than 24 hours later, but when they reached
Moscow, Mr. Khrushchev had been replaced by Party Secretary
Brezhnev and Premier Kosygin.
2. Voskhod 2
Still another variant of the original Vostok hardware was provided
by this flight which was launched on March 18, 1965. Again the A-2
vehicle was used, and the payload weight was raised to 5,682 kilograms.
Although no pictures of the actual payload have been released, the
shroud view in the assembly building showed a large bulge well for-
ward. This flight carried only two seatts, and added instead an extend-
able air lock to permit egress into space without evacuating the main
cA bin of air. An obscure Soviet photograph recently became available
showing a Voskhod I raining exercise using a Vostok-shaped cabin.
The ship was commanded by Colonel Pavel Belyayev, the first cos-
monaut with a naval air force background, accompanied by Lieutenant
Colonel Aleksey Leonov. Leonov won a place in history by becoming
the first miin to perform extra-vehicular activity (EVA). During
flight be donned a completely self-contained life support system back
pack. Having switched to a supply of air enriched with oxygen in
order to purge much of the nitrogen from his blood, he then entered
the extendable air lock, sealing the hatch behind him, and then after
depressurization opened the second hatch to look out into space.
Finally he pushed free to float at the end of a tether line in the weight-
le-s. airless medium of space, with his eyes shielded from the Sun by a
special visor. Beneath him in a few minutes passed a good part of the
Soviet Union.
The event was recorded by a replaced external television camera,
and he also took along a hand-held motion picture camera. As might
be expected, his physiological indicators showed he was under consid-
erable stress. In general, his suit was so cumbersome that he could do
little more than float awkwardly at the end of his tether and wave for
the cameras. The whole event amounted to about 20 minutes exposure
to the vacuum conditions, of which about 10 were outside the ship on
the tether. Leonov explained later that he had some difficulties in his
big suit getting back in without losing his camera, and Colonel Bel-
yayev had to repeat the orders to get him to come in, as he not only
experienced the tension of being the first to go out, but the same eu-
phoria several American EVA astronauts displayed.
As had happened after previous Soviet flights, the claims of
Leonov's EVA came under some dispute in the West. Complaints cen-
tered around analyses of the Soviet-released pictures which included
not only blurred views, and the better motion pictures, but a number
of sequences to fill in with simulation what would have been harder to


launch vehicle was first committed to a program to send men around
the Moon. These Zond flights, numbered 4 through 8 before the
prograin was abandoned, are treated in a separate chapter.
A. LUNA 15
As the summer of 1969 approached, the Americans had already had,
their previous Christmas flight of Apollo 8 to lunar orbit, and in the
spring had practiced rendezvous operate ions in lunar orbit with Apollo
10. The Soviet Union had its full crop of rumors, confident predictions,
and contradictory accounts about what the Russians were going to do
to offset or even beat the upcoming Apollo 11 flight to the Moon with
the goal of landing men for the first time. These rumors and their
possible validity are treated in a different chapter.
By late June or early July there were rumors in Moscow that the
Russians were about to do something spectacular within a few days
related to the Moon. Several accounts tied these rumors to the big G-l-e
vehicle in the Saturn V class. Rumors say it was launched, but failed
to reach orbit. It is known that tracking ships which had been on sta-
tion in various oceans including the Indian Ocean shortly departed
their stations for port. But despite this possible setback, a different
kind of important launch camie on July 13 from Tyuratamni. It used
the D-l-e vehicle and was named Luna 15. It was put into the usual
kind of intermediate orbit from which it was sent toward the Moon.
The typical midcourse correction was executed onl July 14 and on
July 17, it was braked into lunar orbit. Apollo 11 was launched with
its human crew toward the Moon on July 16, with the target date of
July 20 for landing on the surface. The Soviet flight and its successors
of the same series flew a slower course than used previously in order
to maximize payload capacity, despite use of a more powerful launch
There was some concern in the United States as to whether this
somewhat mysterious flight, whose detailed goal had not been re-
vealed, would interfere with the manned mission. All the Russians had
said was that Luna 15 was designed to study the space around the
Moon, the gravitational field of the Moon, the chemical composition
of lunar rocks, and provide surface photography. American astro-
naut Frank Borman who had recently been in the Soviet Union made
a personal appeal to Soviet officials for the orbital elements which had
not been announced at first, and asked for assurances that the flight
would not interfere with the Apollo mission. He was given the orbital
data of 203 by 55 kilometers, with a period of 120.5 minutes, and was
told that there was no intention of endangering the Apollo flight.
On July 19, TASS announced an orbital change to an inclination of
126 degrees, with the orbit ranging between 221 and 95 kilometers,
with a period of 123.5 minutes. On July 20, this was modified again to
an inclination of 127 degrees, and the range from 110 to 16 kilometers,
with a period of 114.0 minutes. This happened just before the landing
of Apollo 11. It looked like either a Soviet readiness to take high
resolution pictures of future landing sites, or a preparation for an
immediate landing by Luna 15 itself.
The next Soviet announcement came on July 21, while the Americans
were on the lunar surface. Luna 15 had fired a retrorocket and had
"reached" the lunar surface in the "preset" area. A total of 86 corn-


The Goddard report is inadequate by itself to answer all the ques-
tions that public sources of information could provide. The Royal
Aircraft Establishment (RAE) at Farnborough in England gives a
much more explicit description of all world flights, including Soviet,
by labeling which objects are payloads, which are spent rocket casings,
which are special capsules, and which are miscellaneous debris. The
British also give the hour of launch which often helps to identify the
launch site and sometimes the purpose of the mission. Because the RAE,
too, is looking for repetitive patterns and they can add some data from
optical or radar observations, they are able to list the shape, weight,
and dimensions of most objects to the best of their estimating ability.
They describe the orbit more completely than does Goddard by giving
the date of orbit determination, sometimes with multiple entries, the
estimated orbital life time, the semimajor axis, the orbital eccentricity,
and the argument of perigee. This is in addition to the Goddard type
information on apogee, perigee, inclination, and period.
Still more information on Kosmos flights is available from private
observers whose findings may ultimately find their way to publica-
tion at least in summary form. The chief of these sources is provided
from the team of observers linked with the Kettering Grammar
School, Northants, England. Geoffrey E. Perry, the head science
master of the school has led this effort with important support from
his family, colleagues, and successive generations of pupils. Coordi-
nated information comes from correspondent stations in Sollentuna
and MalmS, Sweden, operated by Sven Grahn and Jan Ola Dahlberg,
and one in Cyprus by Peter Wakelin. Horst Hewel in West Berlin and
Richard S. Flagg in Gainesville at the University of Florida cooperate
at times of manned space flight. Christopher D. Wood contributed
data from Fiji until he returned to the United Kingdom.
The Perry effort first concentrated on the signal characteristics of
the then mostly eight-day military recoverable photographic missions
of the U.S.S.R. Doppler shift in signals made it possible to establish
the flight path to a good degree of accuracy. When the flights were
ready for recovery, the radio beacon was tracked, and the stages of
retrofire, ionospheric blackout, parachute opening, touch down on the
ground, and arrival of the pickup crew to turn off the final beacon
could be logged with great precision.
Perry's studies proceeded to identify telemetry format so that even
on the first revolution it has been possible to discern which flights
fall into each of the several modes of operation, with most of the
newer flights staying up 12 to 14 days. Often impending launches
could be forecast because a spacecraft already in orbit would vacate
its previous frequency, moving to a different one in order to free the
original frequency for new launch coming within the day.
By study of the pen tracing of signals, Perry was able to correlate
some of these readings with probable expenditure of photographic
film during the flight, and to find some of the other housekeeping
or environmental parameters being measured.
Hence, with the passage of time, these Kettering techniques have
given a highly professional, consistently positive identification to
many aspects of the Soviet space program from completely unclassi-
fied, private sources, which are not matched by any public release
of data by the Soviet, United States, or British governments. The


The signals from the antenna are fed through the wave-guide to the
band-pass filter, through two low-noise parametric amplifiers, which
increase signal strength 100 million times, and then on to the rest of
the receiving terminal equipment. The first parametric amplifier is
cooled by liquid nitrogen and operates without fr equency conversion.
The second parametric amplifier is not cooled and operates with a dou-
ble frequency conversion. For operating convenience, even at the cost
of some noise, all the receiving equipment is located in the same cham-
ber. The equipment is mounted on a standard bay with an IF filter and
preamplifier, as well as quartz crystal heterodyne oscillator with a fre-
quency multiplier and an additional IF filter which prevent, overload
of the amplifiers by locally generated noise. A tunable beat frequency
oscillator is included to provide for manual tuning of the signal in
addition to automatic tuning provided by the quartz crystal heterody(ie
oscillator with a frequency multiplier.12
The quality of the television picture output from the ground stations
in most respects is fully adequate by international standards. The
scanning standard is 625 lines/frame, 25 frames/second with audio
inteirral to the video band on a PCM basis. The signal is transmitted
from the Orbita ground station to the local broadcast television sta-
tion by a single hop, point-to-point microwave or coaxial cable link.
Further improvements in the Orbita stations have been adding the
capability of sending and receiving radio telephone and facsimile sig-
nals between the station and six Molniya satellites. Still other equip-
ment being added to Orbita stations will greatly expand their capacity
to provide the complete range of telecommunications activity, includ-
ing computer data relay.13

1. Kosmos 637, Mob, ;ya 1-S, and Kosmos 775
On March 26, 1974, the U.S.S.R. launched its first 24-hour syn-
chronous satellite-Kosmos 637. The satellite was probably designed
to study problems of launch and stabilization.
The Russians launched their first synchronous orbit communicate ions
satellite-Molniya 1-S-on July 29, 1974. The spacecraft was placed
in an equatorial orbit, 35,850 kilometers high with a period of 23 hours
59 minutes and an inclination of 0 degrees 4 minutes. The equatorial
orbit was chosen in order to give coverage to Eurasia, Africa, and
Australia. Molniya 1-S is probably a prototype for the Statsionar
communications satellite. Statsionar satellites would be used in an
international consortium known as Intersputnik (see below).
On October 8. 1975 the Russians launched their third synchronous
orbit satellite, Kosmos 775. It has been suggested that Kosmos 775
could also be a precursor to the Statsionar; however, its mission has not
been positively identified.
2. Sf,'i -tonar/Raduga
According to notifications submitted by the U.S.S.R. to the Inter-
national Frequency Board of the International Telecommunications
1 Pravda. Moscow, October 29, 1967, p. 3; Radio Moscow, No. 10, pp. 16-17; Elek-
tr ovr a/.'. N\o. 11.
1" Rao Moscow, No. 10, October 1967, pp. 15-16. This source discusses more technical
as -ci.ts of the circuits than is presented here. See also Elektrosvyaz' No. 11, 19A.7, pp. 4-8.


these, the cosmonauts have been heard reading through a series of
numbers prefaced by the words "Form 2" and "Form 3". He has shown
that the less frequent Form 2, containing fewer numbers, relates to
the medical status of the crew and that Form 3 is concerned with the
spacecraft's systems status. There have been indications when a spe-
cific time or orbit number has been quoted that the data refer to an
earlier period when the spacecraft was out of communication with
ground-stations. Dean has been able to correlate certain numbered
data points with values for humidity (typically kept constant at
around 10 percent), partial pressures of oxygen and carbon dioxide,
total pressure and temperature. It appears that the latter are measured
at two or three locations corresponding to the Soyuz orbital and
reentry modules and the Salyut space station. Dean also has noted
that the Soyuz 14 Form 3 contained far more data points than the
corresponding forms for Soyuz 16,17 and 18.
This observation of Dean's, the use of different frequencies and
transmission mode and the all-military crew of Soyuz 14 points to the
existence of two parallel space station programs within the Salyut
label: one military in a low Earth orbit and the other scientific in a
higher orbit. Perry has pointed out that no recoverable reconnaissance
Kosmos payloads were flown between the recovery of Kosmos 674 on
September 7 and the launch of Kosmos 685 on September 20 during
which period the Salyut 3 station was passing over Kettering at times
normal for the recoverable Kosmos types. Moreover, it was officially
announced that a data capsule had been automatically returned to
Earth on September 23.


tinents, measuring movements of the Earth's crust, mapping all
changes on the surface of the Earth for constantly updated coverage,
establishing a tightly controlled geodetic grid, and meastriiing the
total thermal, radiational, and gravitational spectrum of the globe.
(TASS, April 26, 1971, 1923 GMT.)
Academician Blagonravov saw manned stations as making a major
contribution to studies of space physics, astronomy, astrophysics, and
biological sciences. Stations will be the place in which new devices are
tested(, ultimately to permit the fitting out of manned expeditions to
distant planets. He also stressed practical Earth applications. As an
illustration, he said that photographs taken of Africa by the Zond 5
Moon flight built up a geobotanical map of that continent on the dis-
tribution of vegetation more accurate than data from hundreds of land
expeditions over dozens of years. (Pravda, Moscow, April 26, 1971,
p. 2.)
Academician Oleg Gasenko stated that orbital stations afford the
best means of solving medical-biological problems connected with long
stays in space, related to problems of readaptation to gravity after
weightlessness, problems in the cardio-vascular system, and vest ibulary
problems. Also, he noted the psychological problems which may appear
with extended flight, and the weakened protective reactions to micro-
organisms. (TASS, April 27,1971,0746 GMT.)
Cosmonaut Nikolayev stressed the application of coming manned
stations to atmospheric and ocean observation, pinpointing forest fires,
tracing the movement of cyclones, prospecting for minerals, noting the
ripening of crops, forecasting crop yields, and charting polar ice. He
also saw a trend toward faster, larger capacity computers and reduced
weights for instruments and other devices. (TASS, April 28, 1971,
0650 GMT.)
Cosmonaut Nikolayev reminded his readers that Leonid Brezhnev
after the return of Soyus 6, 7, and 8 said "Our science has approached
the creation of long period orbital stations and laboratories and these
are the decisive means for the broad conquest of space. Soviet science
regards the creation of orbital stations with replaceable crews as man's
main path into space. They can become cosmodromes in space and
jumping off points for flights to other planets. Major scientific labora-
tories for the research into space technology and biology, medicine and
geophysics, astronomy and astrophysics will come into being." (Red
Star, Moscow, April 28,1971, p. 3.)
Cosmonaut Feoktistov said the primary emphasis of space develop-
ment is becoming economic-crop control, oceanography, and geology,
and also space manufacturing of super-pure crystals and metals. One
of the most pressing problems is the reduction of costs of orbital flights
by developing a reusable shuttle vehicle. Later will come manned inter-
planetary ships. (TASS, April 29. 1971, 0606 GMT.)
Academician M. V. Keldysh spoke of the possibilities of using space
stations in the future as large scale power stations to transform solar
energy to transmit it to Earth for use. K. Davydov reviewed the usual
array of broad applications to be expected from future manned space
stations. He further described as essential elements in orbital complexes
(1) long term space stations, (2) transport shuttle systems, and (3)
specialized modules and equipment to pursue research and to assemble


16 or 17 orbits in order to bring the ship down in the prime recovery
area in Kazakhstan. However, the 51.8 inclination of the flight also
brought the 18th orbit to the regular recovery area. One gathers that
to this point the pilot was in no immediate danger, since Soviet space-
craft are equipped with backup safety features. (Data made available
during ASTP raises some safety questions.) Retrofire and passage
through the upper atmosphere where radio blackout occurs is said to
have passed routinely. But what happened after that is still unclear,
for in the last few kilometers of descent, the parachute system which
should have gLiven Komarov a steady ride down to the surface for a
final rocket soft landing failed, remaining furled and twisted with its
lines so that the ship, and pilot, were destroyed in the hard impact.
Speculation as to what happened has included whether the aero-
dynamics of the flight had not been tested enough, since Soyvuz was
a different shape from its predecessors, to the rumor that while the
ship was on the pad water seeped into the parachute compartment, in-
terfering with the system's effectiveness. This seems unlikely, since all
manned payloads have a shroud until they are outside most of the
atmosphere, a protective environmental blanket while on the pad, and
a large escape rocket assembly on top of the Soyuz class ships which
should cover the parachute compartment.
Komarov's death was, of course, a great shock to the Russians,
especially since only three months earlier the United States had lost
the crew of Apollo 1 in a pad fire as they were running tests a few
days prior to launch. Although the Soviet Union sent a message of
sympathy, it was coupled with claims that the U.S. accident was a
direct outgrowth of a reckless race to be first on the Moon and the
greed of U.S. private enterprise willing to cut corners in safety and
quality, even for manned flights. The statements implied that such
considerations were nonexistent in the Soviet Union.
Although the fraility of human planning was revealed in the Apollo
fire, which only in retrospect became so clearly deficient in design, the
Soyuz 1 accident showed that accidents are not tied to economic or
political systems, but to design, quality control, and sometimes simply
lack of knowledge or human error.
Just as the American manned space effort was delayed for almost
two years for investigations into the Apollo fire, the Russian manned
program waited for 18 months before seeing another launch.
2. Kosmos 186 anid 188
Just in time to highlight the 50th anniversary of the Soviet State in
early November 1967. the Soviet Union conducted a double space oper-
ation with unmanned Sovuz prototypes. On October 27, 1967 Kosmos
186 was put into a low circular orbit for a period of four days. While
Kosmos 186 waited in orbit, Kosmos 188 was launched on October 30
for a three-day flight. This was a direct ascent, first orbit rendezvous
launch, which brought it within about 24 km of Kosmos 186. At this
point the ships were programmed to conduct a completely automatic
close rendezvous and docking on the side of the world away from
Soviet territory, later passing over the U.S.S.R. in docked configura-
When the seeking devices on both ships found each other, they were
oriented into a head-on position and Kosmos 186 became the active


Compiled by Charles S. Sheldon II (in collaboration with Barbara M. DeVoe for
the earlier years) and with computer input by Carol B. Garrett and Christine
This record has been compiled on the basis of TASS bulletins of
launch and orbital information. Where orbital information and decay
or weight information was not supplied by the Soviet Government,
first resort was made to the data of the Royal Aircraft Establishment,
Farnborough, and further supplemented in a few cases from the
National Aeronautics and Space Admininstration Goddard Satellite
Situation Reports. Identification of launch site, launch vehicle, and
mission has been developed in a synergistic fashion between this
appendix and the analytical tables in the main text of this report,
through observation of repetitive patterns in the data.
In a few cases, such substantial changes in the locations of orbits
occurred that it has been useful to list more than one orbit. Those pay-
loads in heliocentric orbit have their elements listed in astronomical
units (AU) and their inclinations to the plane of the ecliptic, while
their periods are listed in days (D) rather than minutes.
Where decay dates are given, the total duration of flight is also
shown in days contained as a figure in parentheses.
It should be remembered that such a tabulation is subject to further
revision particularly as objects decay from orbit (including controlled
landings on Earth or on other celestial bodies).


difficulties in the launch preparations delayed the flight beyond the
window. In any case, it was not until July 18, 1965 that Zond 3 was
launched on a trajectory which carried it all the way out to thle orbit
of Mars. But because the launch was lmadle without reference to a suit-
able launch window for Mars, that planet was nowhere near the Zond
when it achieved that distance. However, as a diagnostic, test, Zond
3 also made a flyby of the Moon, passing it at a distance of about
9,200 kilometers. It took 25 pictures of the far side of a quality supe-
rior to those of Luna 3, and these were returned to Earth by facsimile
a number of times at ever-greater distances, proving the ability of the
communications .system to do its planetary task. Some sirnals were
still being received when Zond 3 reached the orbital pA'.th of Mars.
7. 190(5 T enus attempts
With renewed confidence in the basic Zond bus, the launch of No-
vember 12,1965 was named Venera 2; that of November 16 was named
Venera 3; but that of November 23 was only Kosmos 96, because it
failed to launch its Zond from the Ea rth orbiting platform. Venera 2
passed Venus at a distance of about 2-1,000 kilometers on February 27,
1966. Venera 3 struck Venus on March 1, 1966 about 450 kilometers
from the center of the visible disk. The Russians received many con-
gratulations for these twin successes, which included sending the first
manmade object to the surface of another planet. Soviet emblems were
contained in the payload. A few days after the congratulations had
been received, the UT.S.S.R. revealed that communications had failed
in both Zonds at an unspecified time shortly before the planet had been
reached. This ran the total to 18 Zond payloads expended without a
single bit of planetary data returned, although there were a number of
cinineering triumphs involved and some data on the interplanetary
medium, as well as pictures of the Moon.
8. 1967 V'ut.s Attempts
Venera 4 was launched on June 12,1967, using an A-2-e vehicle like
its p)redecessors, but carryvly a he.,vier payload of 1,106 kilograms.
Two days before arrival its missi-on was revealed as one to make direct
atmosp)heriec measurements. On October 18, 1967, a capsule separated
from the bus, and after aerodynamic braking, the caps ule deployed a
p: !-;chute, on which it hung for about 1.5 Earth hours while descend-
ing toward the surface where it depo-ited the Soviet coat of arms
marked on a pennant of metal, as had been true of Venera 3. Its suc-
cessful return of planetary data was an import:' it first in the Soviet
program. Data were refined over a period of time, apparently sug-
g.tin some problems of calib)ration and interpretation. At first the
Riisians thought they had data readings all the way to the surface,
1)ut unless a landing had occurred on a very high mountain peak, it is
more likely that signals ceased at an altitude of 25 kilometers. With
this 1ssc:inption the Soviet data could be reconciled with the indirect
U.S. Mariner readings, which were Iased upon interpretations of
radiated and reflected energy.
The main bus of the Soviet Venera 4 carried a magnetometer,
cosmic ray counters, hydrogen and oxygen indicators, and charged
particle traps. It found a weak hydrogen corona at 10,000 kilometers
above the surface on the night side of Venus and a magnetic field only


closely resemble in their regular patterns and signal emissions the navi-
gation series already discussed, except that these would seem in some
fashion duplicative and surplus. One is reminded that navigation and
geodesy are not easily separated as both need precise orbits, accurate
timing signals. Both are capable of using Doppler shifts of frequencies
carefully tuned to measure distances or pinpoint locations. If one had
to decide which series was predominantly for navigation and which
predominantly for geodesy, the choice would seem to be the ones
appearing very frequently would serve a day-in, day-out navigation
purpose. Those flying higher and less frequently would allow the link-
ing of triangles over greater distances for building the geodetic grid
defining the geoid. Hence, this series from 1968 to the present is con-
sidered the most likely candidate for a geodetic system. This would also
account for some of the stray flights at similar altitudes but at other
inclinations such as 83 degrees (Kosmos 480) and at 69.2 degrees
(Kosmos 708). Using several inclinations often helps geodetic work.
G. P,,setsk Military Communicationm Possibly for Commannd and
The highest altitude flights of the C-1 are those that put up eight
payloads at a time in circular orbits about 1,500 kilometers high. The
trade press believes them to be military communications satellites. If so,
it would seem they are of the store-dump type because they do not fly
high enough to permit real time communications among all Soviet
forces. These launches come two or three times a year, meaning even if
their instrumentation fails that probably 24 to 30 or more are active at
any one time. These would seem to come closest to providing a redun-
dant route, limited number of channels, worldwide system such as
might be needed for some kinds of military communications and com-
mand and control. The store-dump feature would not allow real time
control of all missile forces, but it would allow passing of information
to or from Soviet submarines and other organizations if time was mod-
erately important but not demanding to the extent of being real time.
The fact that we should be looking for military communications svs-
tems within the Kosmos family is strengthened by testimony before
Congress by the Department of Defense that such systems exist be-
yond the Molniya, more open system. They could also be used on a
real-time basis for tactical communications within a given theater of
7. Plesetskc Targets for Ivterccptors
There is one other small class of C-1 flights different from all the
rest whose mission can be established. These occurred in 1971, and per-
haps in 1972 (Kosmos 521) when payloads were put up at several
different altitudes, but all at 65.9 degrees inclination, later to become
targets of F-l-m launched interceptors from Tyuratam. See com-
ments below on Kosmos 752.
8. Plesetsk Minor Military C-1 Flights
Last of all among the C-1 military-related payloads are a very
small remnant-Kosmos 660 at 83 degrees and Kosmos 687 at 74 de-
grees. With their eccentric orbits, they do not fit the regular military


I. Overview, supporting facilities and launch vehicles of the Soviet 'age
space program-------------------------------------------- 1
A. Overall trend------------------------------------------ 1
1. Gross statistics--------------------------------- 1
2. Breakdown by categories -------------------------- 1
3. Comparative weights of payload ------------------ 1
B. Launch sites in the Soviet Union ------------------------ 1
1. Tyuratam-------------------------------------- 1
2. Plesetsk--------------------------------------- 2
3. Kapustin Yar----------------------------------- 2
C. Soviet launch vehicles---------------------------------- 2
1. The standard launch vehicle series ("A")----------- 2
2. The small utility launch vehicle ("B")------------ 2
3. The flexible intermediate vehicle ("C") ------------ 2
4. The non-military large launch vehicle ("D")------- 2
5. The military combat space launch vehicle ("F") .- 2
6. The very heavy launch vehicle ("G")-------------- 3
D. Tracking and other ground support ---------------------- 3
1. Communications needs--------------------------- 3
2. Earth orbital tracking in the U.S.S.R-------------- 3
3. Foreign tracking stations------------------------- 3
4. Sea-based support ------------------------------- 3
5. Deep space tracking----------------------------- 3
6. Space operations and data processing centers------ 3
7. Space research centers--------------------------- 3
8. Manufacturing and assembly centers for spacecraft
and rockets----------------------------------- 3
9. Test and training centers for space ---------------- 4
II. Program details of unmanned flights---------------------------- 4
A. Early years------------------------------------------- 4
B. The Kosmos program--------------------------------- 4
1. Kosmos scientific flights-------------------------- 4
2. Kosmos precursor flights------------------------- 4
3. Flight mission failures disguised as Kosmos--------- 5
C. Other recent scientific flights---------------------------- 5
1. The Prognoz program------------------------- 5
2. French payloads carried by Soviet launch vehicles--- 5
3. Indian and Swedish payloads carried by Soviet launch
vehicles------------------------------------- 5
4. Soviet vertical rocket probes---------------------- 5
D. The second generation of planetary flights ---------------- 5
1. The Mars attempts of 1971 and 1973-------------- 5
2. The Venus attempts of 1975 --------------------- 6
E. The third generation of lunar flights ---------------------- 6
1. Luna 16, 18, 20, and 23------------- -------- 6
2. Luna 17 and 21 --------------------------------- 6
3. Luna 19 and 22---------------------------- 6



| ,

-----------------MEDICAL FACILI TIE


FIGURE 4-3.-Organization of Soviet Biomedical Institutions.

The most prominent facility involved in the Soviet effort is the In-
stitute of Biomedical Problems under the direction of Dr. Oleg
Gazenko. This relatively new facility, constructed in the late 1960's,
is under the Ministry of Health and is located on the outskirts of Mos-
cow. Many of the articles published in the Soviet journal, Space
Biology and Aerospace Medicine reflect the research being conducted
in or supported by this facility although such articles seldom show
instructional affiliation credits. The military Medical Academy imeni
Kirov located in Leningrad also plays a prominent role in the Soviet
space life sciences program. A great many academic centers and insti-
tutes under the USSR Academy of Sciences provide additional sup-
port to the program. A listing of some of the more prominent facili-
ties is contained in the still valuable Aerospace Technology Report
published in 1965.4
Topically, the Soviet space life sciences effort can, for convenience
sake, be categorized into physiology and medicine, psychological and
behavioral sciences, and human engineering. Under physiology and
medicine, the following subjects are being investigated:

1 Mandrovskly, B. Soviet Bioastronautics and Manned Spaceflight. Programs. Organiza-
tion, and Personalities. Washingmton. D.C., Library of Congress, Aerospace Technology Di-
vision Report No. P-65-14, 1965, 118 p.


Interplanetary Society), and the United States (ARS-American
Rocket Society) were experimenting with rockets, and writing papers
,on space travel. The most aggressive support and conversion of rocket
work to meet practical applications came in Germany where the Army
appointed Captain Dr. (and later Major General) Walter Dorn-
berger to head this effort. From the VfR, he drew interested technical
support, and his young chief engineer was Dr. Wernher von Braun.4
It was this team which eventually produced the V-2 rocket of World
War II, the vehicle which also became the first significant tool for
exoatmospheric research in the United States, the Soviet Union,
France, and the United Kingdom. Modifications of the V-2 especially
were important to early Soviet military miissilery, while several U.S.
rocket systems clearly show the same ancestry.
Dr. Dornberger, Dr. von Braun, and several hundred of the top
rocket engineers of the German program came voluntarily to the ad-
vancing U.S. forces in Europe, or were acquired at the end of the war
under Operation Paper Clip. Soviet forces, meanwhile, overran the
principal test station on the Baltic at Peenemuinde, and later, under-
ground factories in Silesia. They picked up more hardware and test
equipment, and some technicians, but fewer of the top group of engi-
neers. The Western allies also acquired in territories they overran, near
the English Channel, complete and partially a-:sembled V-2's which
they stockpiled for experimental use. Apparently the Soviet Union in
the postwar years resumed serial production of the V-2.
It should be emphasized that the Soviet Union had a strong rocket
program of its own well before any technology was picked up from
Germany. No nation made more effective use of tactical rockets in
combat during World War II than the U.S.S.R. Also, there is an
extensive technical literature throughout tlhe 1930'Os largely coming
from the Gas Dynamics Laboratory in Leningrad in support of
understanding rocketry.
The United States had its own rocket efforts in the Army and Navy,
and later the Air Force, with such outstanding centers of effort as
the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena and the Naval Ordnance
Test Station, China Lake, California. The German Paper Clip scien-
tists were first at Fort Bliss, Texas, and later at Redstone Arsenal in
Huntsville, Alabama. Other work was pursued in private industry
under Government contract.
The full details of the corresponding Soviet effort are obscured by
their penchant for secrecy, but the broad outlines have been revealed
in summary histories. One can sense the barest beginnings of an
international competition in the early years after World War II. From
the debriefings of Dr. Wernher von Braun, the United States was
presented with fresh ideas on how rockets could be made to fly across
the Atlantic Ocean carrying weapons, although Dr. Vannevar Bush
was able to point out a number of reasons why the concept was imprac-
tical at that time.5 The Germans also described permanent manned
space stations in Earth orbit serving a variety of scientific and military
purposes. These plans were brought to public attention in understand-
4 Dornberger, Walter, V-2, New York: Viking Press, 1954.
SEmme, Euigene M., Op. Cit, p. 108: Dr. Bush testified before Congress in about 1947:
"[An intercontinental ballistic missile] is impossible and will be impossible for many years
to come. I think we can leave that out of our thinking. I wish the American public would
leave that out of their thinking."


FIGURE 2.-Left: Soviet launch vehicle A, with early Sputnik payload. Center:
Soviet A-1 launch vehicle with early Luna payload. Right: Soviet A-1 launch
vehicle with Vostok payload.


regulation system, and was supplied with food. The dog was wlr,.1 so
as to radio back to Earth its pulse, respiration, blood pir:.-u,-1., and
electrocardiograms. The cabin environmental parameters were a:-o
telemetered back to Earth. Automatic devices controlled the quality,
component gas'-s, temperature, and circulation of the air supply. The
dog was trained over a period of time in preparation for the flight,
including exposure to vibration, and periods up to weeks in a :.-aled
cabin of small dimensions.
Layka withstood the launch and flight environment suc,. -:fully,
returning considerable useful data. Howv-ever. becai si. the ship was only
powered by chemical batteries and was not desg-ned for recovery, after
one week, a prearranged system killed the dog and terminated that
part of the experiment.

1. Korabl Sputn k7 1
By adapting the A-1 vehicle, earlier used for direct a.-,ent flights
to the. Moon, the Soviet Union was able to create an Earth orbital sys-
tem which could carry at least 4,700 kg to low orbit. This found its first
successful use on May 15, 1960 with the launch of Korabl Sputnik 1.
It was described as weighing 4.540 ki1 consisting of 1,477 kc of instru-
ments and equipment and a self-sustaininr biological cabin of 2.500 kg.
In the cabin was the dummy of a man with characteristics of body con-
struction and function like a man. designed to check on the operation
of the life support system and stresses of flight. The ship radioed
both extensive telemetry and also prerecorded voice communications.
The Russians some years later told how they wanted to avoid Western
claims that they had flown a man on this mission and lost him, so
rather than taping a pilot's voice sending typical flight data, they in-
stalled the tape of a Russian choral group singing.
After four days of flight, the reentry cabin was separated from its
service module and retrorockets were fired. Unfortunately, the atti-
tude was incorrect, for the cabin moved to a higher orbit, and it was
five years before it finally decayed from orbit.
2. Korabl Sputnik 2
This launch came on August 19, 1960 and carried the dogs Strelka
and Belka. This time the period of flight was reduced to one day to
minimize the risks of equipment malfunction, and recovery was suc-
cessfully accomplished, for the first time in history, with the two dogs
becoming national heroes and put on display, obviously healthy
despite their experience.
3. Korabi Sputnik 3
Apparently this launch of December 1, 1960 was a repeat of the
previous flight except that the perigee was lowered to assure auto-
matic decay within the reserve capacity of the life support system.
After one day, retrofire was ordered, but the angle may have been
too steep, for the cabin was burned beyond successful recovery. The
dogs Pchelka and Mushka became the first important casualties of
orbital flight.


stated that in the future advances in photointerpretation must allow
the Russians to utilize the lremainingi 60 percent of the information
contained in space photos. Improvements in resolution will enable
agronomists to see finer features on the Earth's sur-fa ce. To be of maxi-
mum use, such detailed photographs should be available on a daily
Eight Soviet 1,jenti of geology and agriculture in Sioux Falls, South Dakota in October
1975. NASA and U.S. Geological Survey representatives and several
inmenibers of the Soviet delegation reviewed the results of the two
nations' previous remote sensing projects in geology and considered
possible future work in this area. Several of the Soviet scientists at-
tended the first William T. Pecora Symposium on the applications of
remote sensing to mineral and mineral fuel exploration held in Sioux
Falls, October 28-31,1975.
Other Soviet scientists will visit an agricultural area used as a test
site for interpreting and evaluating data gathered by aircraft and sat-
ellites. (In 1974, American scientists visited a comparable Soviet test
site near Kursk in the Ukraine.) Discussions with U.S. Department of
Agriculture scientists are also planned.
This cooperative effort by NASA and the Soviet Academy of Sci-
ences is one of several undertaken following an agreement reached in
1971 and formally endorsed at the May 1972 Moscow summit meeting.
Another scientific exchange occurred in early 1973, when NASA and
the Soviet Academy conducted an intensive study of the Bering Sea
using satellites, aircraft and research ships to evaluate the usefulness
of remote sensing for studies of sea ice conditions.
In an effort to improve remote sensing capabilities Soviet scientists
are seeking ways to determine the vertical profile of temperature
change beneath the ocean surface, chemical composition and salinity
of the water, its chlorophyll content and evolution of turbulence and
wind conditions at the surface from space imagery. Such information
would be of great value to fishing interests.70

The earlier section on manned flights has already treated the in-
creasingly heavy emphasis which has been placed on gathering Earth
resources data in manned flights, particularly in the Soyuz and Salyut
programs. Soyuz 9 during the course of its 18-day flight went quite
far in this regard, both because of the amount of time available for
such pursuits and because it built upon the more limited experience of
its predecessors. There is no necessity here to repeat the list of measure-
ments made by the Soyuz flights. The Salyut flights have further ex-
tended this effort.

Articles: on the future study of the Earth from spvce inevitably
mention the desirability of permanent space stations. Russians place
a high priority on the development of manned space stations. Discus-
sion of Earth resources experiments has already described some of the
O Wazirov, M., Satellites for the Agronomist, Zemlya Vselennaya, No. 1, Moscow, 1971,
pp. 7T-77.
70 Kondrat'yev, K., Cosmic View, Izvestlya, Moscow, January 22, 1975, p. 3.


In an article by A. Donets and D. Pipko it was reported that the
space shuttle concept was presented at the 24th International Astro-
nautical Congress held in Baku as a possible solution to the problem of
reducing the cost of space launches. The United States space shuttle
was described. (Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya, Moscow, Novem-
ber 18, 1973, p. 4.)
K. Kondrat'yev, Corresponding Member of the U.S.S.R. Academy of
Sciences, said that only through satellite coverage can reliable data on
the environment be obtained which would insure that the theoretical
arguments on environmental degradation assume a truly scientific
nature. While remote space sensing makes it possible even now to
resolve a number of practical Earth-related problems, he said that
much still has to be done to improve and develop the technology. The
tasks he mentioned included improving the accuracy in interpreting
satellite information; continued research on the comparative analysis
of images of different scales; expanded( non-meteorological inter-
pretation of satellite meteorological information; and continued re-
search on the problem of combined subsatellite geophysical experi-
mnents with the aim of improving methods for the clear interpretation
of the data. He also mentioned the need to compare in detail the po-
tential of manned orbital stations and automatic satellites and to
study the possibility of using the Moon as a platform for remote sens-
ing of the parameters of the Earth and its atmosphere. (Pravda,
Moscow, December 25,1973, p. 4.)
It was reported that the Soviet Union has developed a lunar
roving vehicle which can walk across the surface of the Moon on six
"legs" at a speed of 6 kmh, according to TASS. The spider, built
by the Leningrad Institute of Aviation, is remotely controlled by
means of a laser beam, which apparently can also be used to transmit
data back to the control center. (Flight International, London, Decem-
ber 27, 1973, p. 1062.)
Correspondent: Unlike the space transporter being planned in the
United States, the Soviet transporter is to be first used for long-dis-
tance flights on Earth; later it will be used for routine journeys be-
tween space and Earth. An "airport machine" will carry the space
glider "piggyback", lift it to an altitude of 30 km after a horizontal
takeoff, and then return to its point of departure. At the 30 km
altitude, the space glider will ignite its rocket engines, rise to an
altitude of 10'0 km, and achieve an orbiting speed of 28,000 km per
hour. The space glider is intended to have the capability of flying
to any point on the Earth with passengers or freight on board and
land, like an aircraft. The first practical flights are to take place at the
end of the 1970's or the beginning of the 1980's. In the second planning
phase, the space glider is to be developed into a commercial means
of transport operating between Earth and space with the capability of
being able to withstand up to 300 flights into space without incurring
damage. (Complete text: [FRG Magazine on Plans for Soviet Space
Transporter], Hamburg DPA Radio in German, December 29, 1973.)
A. Serov discussed the scientific and technical problems that need
to be solved before a manned Martian expedition can be attempted.



As medical monitoring programs during spaceflights have become.
more complicated and demanding, the need for sophisticated medical
instrumentation has increased. Therefore, the rather primitive medi-
cal instrumentation used in the early biosatellites and Vostok series of
manned flights has evolved into equipment which has been designed
for flexibility, utility, and accuracy of data sensing. For example, elec-
trocardiogram electrodes used in the early Vostok flights were pasted
onto the skin whereas now they can be emplaced with tape. Similarly,
EEG electrodes are now mounted in a helmet rather than pa.Ated onto
the skin. Seismocardiography, which provides data on the force,
rhythm, and ejection of blood from the heart into major blood vessels,
was first used on Vostok 5 and is now standard equipment in the
Soyuz/Salyut series of vehicles. New instruments have also been
developed to measure blood circulation in the head. In general, medi-
cal monitoring equipment has become more compact, more reliable in
operation, and simpler for the cosmonaut to use.78
The biomedical monitoring programs of Soviet and United States
manned spaceflight and biosatellite missions since 1957 is provided in
Table 4-4.


Spacecraft, biosatellites, and Physiological measurement Features of onboard medical equip-
year of launch methods meant and biotelemetry systems

2d Soviet Earth satellite (1957). ..--Electrocardiography, pneumography; ar-
terial oscillography, actography.
2d-5th Soviet spacecraft satellites EKG; pne'-imography; phonocardiogra-
(1960-61). phy; sphygmnography, electromyogra-
phy, actography; arterial oscillogra-
phy; body temperature reading; seis-
Vostok spacecraft (1962-65)-----.. EKG; pneumography; seismocardiogra-
phy; kinetocardiography; electroocu-
lography; EEG; galvanic skin reflex.
Mercury capsules (1962-65)-----.. EKG; pneumography, arterial pressure;
body temperature readings.

Voskhod spacecraft (1964-65).. ---

Soyuz spacecraft (1967-75)------

Gemini spacecraft (1953-67).....

Kosmos 110, artificial Earth satel-
lite (1966).

EKG; PG;seismocardiography; EEG; elec-
trodynamography; motor acts of writing.

EKG; PG; seismocardio(raphy; body tem-
EKG; impedance PG; arterial pressure;
body temperature; phonocardiography,
EKG; sphygmogram; seismo-cardio-
gram; aorLic pressure.

Apollo spacecraft (1968-72).-----. EKG; impedance PG-..---...---------.

Biosatellite 3 (1969)--..-.....

EKG; impedance PG; EEG; changes in
blood pressure by cath-,erizaoon of
pulmonary vessles; arterial and venous
system; brain temperature with im-
planted sensors; study of behavioral

Equipment was turned on with a pro-
grammed device.
Commutator for successive measurement
of slowly changing parameters, electro-

Placement of preamplifiers in cosmonauts'
clothing; multipurpose use of amplifie
Automatic arterial pressure reading; sys-
tem of EKG and impedarce PG tracing
using common electrodes.
2 units: medical monitoring and medical
examinations; special medical monit-
oring panel actuated upon going into
Special medical monitor panel for record-
ing body temperature and pulse while
going into orbit.
Use cf special onboard tape recorder for
medicophysiological parameters.
Electric stimulation of receptor zones of
carotid sinus using a prcgramed
device; automatic administration of
pharmacological agents.
Upon exit or, the Moon's surface pulse
rate was retranslated in the lunar
module and through its telemetry
system to Earth.
Automatic analyzer of calcium, creatine,
and creatinine in urine; special bio-
telemetry device with 10 channels
operating at an access speed of 100, sec
and one "slow" channel (101sec).

7Bayevskiy, R. M. and W. R. Adey. Methods of Investigation in Space BDloloy and
Medicine: Transmission of Medical Data. In: Foundations of Space Biology and Medicine,
Vol. II. Part 5., Ch. 18, Washington, D.C., NASA, 1975. pp. 668-706.


stresses; such as hypoxia have also shown promising results in animal
The effects of radioprotective agents on vital organ systems such
as the vestibular apparatus is also of concern since many of the agents
under consideration affect vital nervous functions. Finally, there is
concern that certain preparations which confer protection against
radiation may reduce tolerance of other stresses associated with
Despite the large Soviet effort in this field, there is little evidence
that the radioprotective drugs investigated thus far are actually in-
cluiled in the Soviet spacecraft medical kit. This may be due to the
fact that nearly all radioprotective compounds have various unde-
sir:,ile side effects which may be further potentiated by the space-
flight itself. There has been some speculation, however, that Soviet
cosmonauts have been administered unspecified "prophylactic" radio-
protective drugs prior to the flights of Soyuz 4 and 5. And a com-
pound called "ambratine", a complex of vitamins, was listed as the
only radioprotective preparation aboard the Soyuz 11/Salyut 1 com-
plex in 1971. But there has been no further mention of the use of
radioprotective preparations or drugs since that flight. In general,
most Soviet experts in the field are of the opinion that the use of radio-
protective agents thus far investigated is unrealistic and that other
alternative methods of protection against radiation, such as shielding
'294 295
or the use of force fields, will have to be developed.294 295
As an alternative to radioprotective drugs, the Russians are invest i-
':.mingz other approaches to crew protection during space risions. The
1most obvious approach is the use of certain materials to shield the en-
tire spacecraft, certain compartments therein, or vital parts of the
human body known to be particularly sensitive to the effects of ioniz-
ing radiations. This is a complicated problem becauiie certain of the
primary cosmic radiations are so powerful that no type of shielding
could possibly stop them. In addition, there would be the problem of
secondary radiations which occur when primary radiations ass
through shielding or other materials. Nonetheless, Soviet investigators
are calculating the parameters of shielding which would be necessary
to minimize the effects of space radiations, particularly those from
solar flares, during prolonged missions.296

Radiations which do not produce ionization effects in biological
tissues are also of some concern during spaceflights. These include the
ra diofrequency and microwave radiations emitted from radio and nav-
igational equipment, electric and magnetic fields which might be used
to deflect ionizing radiations in the event of a solar flare emer-
gency, ultraviolet radiation from the Sun, and the visible and infrared
211 Sverdlov, A. G. et al. Relation of the hypoxic and protective effect of some radioprotec-
tors. Radiobiology (USSR). No. 2. 1972. 221-228 (FRD #922).
292 Antipov, V. V. et al. Study of the reactivity of the organism exposed to transverse ac-
celerations and radioprotectors. Aerospace Medicine, No. 8, 1971, 72-81.
213 Suslova, L. N. et al. Effect of rndioprot4ctors on the functional state of the vestibular
-na ':r-or. Space Binlo-y and Medicine (USSR), No. 2, 1973, 45-48.
1 Taiinlt, JT. A. review of Soviet manned spaceflight dosimetry results. Aerospace Medi-
ciro, No. 12. 1969. 1547-1556.
29o Gurovskivy, N. N. et al. Some results of investigations during the flight of the scien-
0 orbit.inz station. Salyut. Op. Cit.
:e Dudkin, V. Ye. et al. Analysis of the of a radiation shelter for prolonged
s..i.-li1ghts. Space Biology and Aerospace Medicine (USSR), No. 4, 1975, 72-74.


at such places as Kheys (Hays) Island, on Soviet scientific research
ships at sea, and even in Antarctica.
The largest sounding rocket the Russians have named is one they
call the A-3, which in U.S. nomenclature is the SS-3, and which
NATO calls the Shyster. It is possible that the major international
cooperation flights use the Sandal or SS-4, that is, the fir-:t stage of
the B-1. One mission was so far ahead of the rest in its reach that it
is more likely it used the SS-5 Skcan, that is, the first stage of the C-1.
In May 1957, the Russians announced they had sent a rocket 211
kilometers up, which carried five dogs. The payload weighed 2,196
On February 21, 1958, a very complex geophysical rocket with a wide
range of atmospheric and solar experiments was sent 473 kilometers
up. The payload weighed 1,515 kilograms.
On August 27, 1958 a payload of 1,690 kilograms was sent up to
452 kilometers, carrying two dogs, Belyanka and Pestraya.
On July 2,1959, a rocket carrying about 2,000 kilograms of payload
was sent 241 kilometers up. It carried dogs named Otvazhnaya and
Snezhinka, and a rabbit named Marfusha.
On July 10, 1959, another rocket with a payload of about 2,200 kilo-
grams was sent about 211 kilometers up, this time carrying several
dogs including Otvazhnaya again.
On June 15, 1960, a rocket with a payload of 2,100 kilograms was
sent 221 kilometers up. Included this time were a rabbit and two dogs,
including Otvazhnaya on a fifth flight.
There were similar sounding rocket flights on June 6 and June 18,
1963. The first went 563 kilometers up.
On September 20 and October 1, 1965, rockets were sent about 480
to 500 kilometers up doing wide ranging geophysical experiments in-
cluding taking various measurements of the ionosphere and photo-
graphs and spectrographs of the Sun in the ultraviolet and X-ray
By looking at the parameters of these flights, they were probably
all conducted with use of the A-3 (SS-3 Shyster) geophysical rocket.
A new series of flights began in 1966, quite possibly with the same
launch vehicle or perhaps its SS-4 Sandal successor, but adding to the
usual range of geophysical experiments some unusual propulsion ex-
periments as well. The first was called Yantar 1, launched on Octo-
ber 13,1966. It made studies of electron concentrations and photo emis-
sions in the ionosphere. But it also scooped up atmospheric nitrogen,
after attaining speed throualh its rocket motor, to sustain a special ion
electrical rocket with propellant. This was seen as lending toward fu-
ture hypersonic aircraft. In 1969 there were more Yantar flights, but
the dates and the performance have not been reported in detail. All the
flights seem to have operated in the altitude range of 100 to 400
On October 12, 1967, a single, much more ambitious sounding rocket
flight was made, and it seems likely that a larger launch vehicle had
to be used. such as the first, stage of the C-1 (SS-5, Sklean). Pictulres
released of the payload showed an instrument container much like a
small Kosmos satellite. If the larger rocket was used, it probably went
from Tyuratam, as no pad had been used at Kapustin Yar by that
year for such a larger vehicle.



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expired air is recirculated through a carbon dioxide absorbent. The
basic elements of space suits are a covering layer, detachable gloves,
pressure helmet, and attached or detached (spacecraft) life support
system. The outer layer provides structural strength and consists of a
system of cables and cords. A layer of rubberized material covers the
outer layer. Thermal insulation is provided by an elastic layer with
low heat conductivity. Through the inner aspect of this layer, a ven-
tilation system, powered by a centrifugal blower supplies respirable
gas to various sections of the suit.16'1-163
Conventional clothing worn inside the pressurized spacecraft cabin
is designed for comfort, hygienic properties, and durability. Under-
wear is made of cotton and rayon. Flight suits worn over the under-
wear are made of polyester fibers which possess high thermal protective
capability, high durability, elasticity, and resistance to wrinkling,
chemicals, bacteria, solar energy, and general wear. For short-
duration spaceflights, Soviet cosmonauts wore clothing only once,
after which it was discarded and stored. On longer-duration space-
flights of the Soyuz/Salyut series, flight clothing can be reworn after
cleaning aboard the spacecraft. Soviet cosmonauts are also provided
with conventional leather work boots of light weight.164

Unlike American spacecraft, in which the astronaut is the critical
link in control and guidance, it has been continuing Soviet practice
to minimize the role played by the cosmonaut in the spaceflight mis-
sion. Accordingly, the instrumentation inside the Soyuz cabin is mini-
mally designed for human interaction. Cosmonauts have few if any
launch duties. All command and control activities that are under
cosmonaut control are carried out in the Soyuz descent module. The
launch vehicle instrument panel contains no booster readouts or
booster rocket guidance control. Nor do Soyuz crews have control
over the timing of any necessary launch abort procedures which are
carried out automatically or from the ground control station. During
an abort, such as occurred in the recent Soyuz failure of April, 1975,
the spacecraft shroud and descent module separation from orbital
and service modules is under automatic control. Similarly, Soviet
spacecraft orientation displays are virtually nonexistent and cos-
monauts have no spacecraft attitude display or data on rates at which
yaw, pitch, and roll maneuvers are made. Primary attitude reference
is derived from the use of a simple periscope.165
The Soyuz spacecraft contains no man/machine interface typical
of American spacecraft such as the Apollo digital computer which
permits direct communication with the guidance and control systems.
Virtually all Soviet operations are carried out by pre-programmed
sequencers which cannot be manipulated either by the cosmonauts or
If Jones, W. Individual life support systems outside of a spacecraft cabin, spare suits, and
capsules. In: Foundations of Space Biology and Medicine, Vol. III. Part 1. Ch. 7. Wash-
ington. D.C. NASA. 1975 (in press).
'1 Alekspyev, S. M. et al. Altitude and Space Suits. Moscow, "Mashinostroyenlye" Press,
163 'ruanskly, S. P. Man in Space Orbit. Op. Cit.
6 Finogenov, A. M. et. al. Cosmonaut clothing and personal hygiene. Op. Cit.
Soyuz 0ives cosmonauts little control. Aviation Week and Space Technology, Jan. 21,
1974. 3S-41.


FIGURE 20.-Sputnik 3, the long-life orbiting geophysical observatory.


I. Overall trends in flights-Continued
B. Breakdown by cat cgo ric,--Continued Page
Table 1-3-Detailed summary of Soviet space payloads
by launch site, launch inclination, name or category,
launch vehicle and year--------------------------- 25
Table 1-4-Summary of Soviet space payloads by name- 29
C. Comparative weight of payload-------------------------- 30
Table 1-5-World table of payload weight to orbit or
beyond----------------------------------------- 32
IT. Launch sites in the Soviet Union-------------------------------- 33
A. Tyuratam. -------------------------------------------- 33
B. Plesetsk----------------------------------------------- 35
C. Kapnitin Yar------------------------------------------ 36
Table 1-6-Number of successful orbital and escape
launches by site and by year----------------------- 38
III. Soviet launch vehicles------------------------------------------ 39
Table 1-7-Number of succe-ssful launches to Earth orbit and
beyond by basic first stage by year------------------------ 40
Table 1-8-Soviet launch vehicle characteristics--------------- 43
Table 1-9-Soviet launch vehicle lifting capabilities ----------- 46
Table 1-10-Soviet launch vehicle upper stages and capacities.-- 47
A. The standard launch vehicle series ("A")------------------ 48
1. The original version-A-------------------------- 48
2. Launch vehicle with lunar upper stage, A-1 --------- 49
3. Launch vehicle with improved planetary upper stage,
A-2----------------------------------------- 50
4. The added stage version for eccentric orbits and
escape missions, A-2-e- ------------------------ 51
5. The standard vehicle with maneuvering stage, A-m- 52
6. The standard vehicle possibly in an A-l-m configura-
tion------------------------------------------ 52
7. The standard vehicle possibly in an A-2-m configura-
tion- ----------------------------------------- 52
B. The small utility launch vehicle ("B")-------------------- 53
C. The flexible intermediate launch vehicle ("C")------------- 54
D. The non-military large launch vehicle ("D")------------ 55
1. The basic vehicle without extra stages, D----------- 55
2. The improved vehicle with an added stage, D-1 ----- 56
3. The improved vehicle with regular upper stage plus
an escape stage, D-l-e------------------------- 57
4. The possible use of a D-l-m version--------------- 58
E. The military combat space launch vehicle ("F")----------- 58
1. Use as a weapons carrier, F-l-r ------------------- 60
2. Use as a maneuvering vehicle, F-l-m -------------- 61
F. The very heavy launch vehicle ("G")--------------------- 61
Table 1-11-Soviet surface-to-surface land-based stra-
tegic missiles------------------------------------- 65
IV. Tracking and other ground support------------------------------- 66
A. Communications needs---------------------------------- 66
B. Earth orbital tracking in the U.S.S.R -------------------- 66
C. Foreign tracking stations-------------------------------- 67
D. Sea-basedsupport-------------------------------------- 67
1. Kosmonavt Vladimir Komarov --------------------- 68
2. Akademik Sergey Korolev- ------------------------ 69
3. Kosmonavt Yuriy Gagarin------------------------- 69
Table 1-12-Characteristics of known Soviet
space and missile monitoring and control ships- 71
4. Other tracking ships------------------------------ 72
5. General locations of Soviet tracking ships----------- 72
E. Deep space tracking------------------------------------ 73
F. Space operations and data processing centers-------------- 73
G. Space research centers ---------------------------------- 76
H. Manufacturing and assembly centers for spacecraft and
rockets---------------------------------------------- 76
I. Test and training centers for space----------------------- 77


In the case of the United States, the Mercury was as much as tlie
available Atlas launch vehicle could put up. It could carry only one
person, and vwas intended to fly for three orbits, but was stretched with
experience to a day and a half. The Gemini contract was let to the same
builder on the ground that time would not permit a complete redesign,
and establishment of know-how. While Gemini looked like Mercury,
it was really a new ship, not only able to carry two persons, but able
to open hatches for EVA, and having a service module and added
instrumentation to permit rendezvous, docking, and a variety of other
experiments, some in conjunction with the Agena target propulsion
unit. The more powerful Titan II with storable fuels also added to
caipacity and flexibility. Apollo of course was desi.Lrned to provide the
tremendous fuel capacity, special power units in the form of fuel cells,
elf-contained navigational and general purpose computers, and dock-
ing equipment needed for working with the lunar module (LM) to
make the lunar round trip. It could have been a complete d(lead end,
when the lunar landings were terminated with a number of missions
cancelled. But it was possible to adapt at great expense the shell of a
S-IVB stage into the Skylab station, another very useful but dead-
end project, and then the over-qualified Apollo, by limiting the fuel
carried was available for ferry visits to the Skylab, and later to meet
with the So-uz in the Apollo-Soyuz Test. Project (ASTP). Now
Apollo has joined Mercury and Gemini as a museum exhibit only,
along with the Saturn launch vehicles which no longer are manu-
factured and which no longer fly, even though they exist in mothba.ll
The question is whether the Soviet program shows the same series of
ad hoe decisions or whether a longer rango plan has dominated their
thinking. Vostok gives some evidence of being dead-ended. Indeed,
the spherical capsule most closely r'semibled in general characteristics
a high-altitude balloon capsule of the 1930's, plus ablative shielding.
and a service module mostly loaded with chemical batteries. Voskhod
was no more than Vostok with the ejection seat replaced by several
seats to crowd in a multiple-person crew. Without the ejection system
and manned parachute landing used with Vostok. the Voskhod car-
ried some risks in abort situations, and required an extra rocket. land-
ing system just before touch-down to cushion the hard blow of land
impact. America throughout has been limited to water landings, al-
though there was talk of paraglider landings beginning with Gemini
which were eliminated from the program as costing too much time and
adding other uncertainties. Soyuz gives the first signs of being a better
planned ship for a sustained space effort, and the discussion in Chapter
Three as well as this chapter demonstrates that it has many limitations
and compromises. Zond for circumlunar manned flight is clearly built
of Soyuz elements, and the debate which will emerge in this chapter is
the extent to which Soyuz or Zond was originally intended to be the
main stream of Soviet development, at the time planning originally
was done.
The American Shuttle is designed to be our sustainable effort., and it
has been compromised in a number of respects for both fiscal and tech-
ni,-'Al reasons. We have yet to explore how long the Russians will stick
with Soyuz derivatives, and when they will create a new Earth orbital
manned system.


As mentioned earlier, the Soviet cosmzonaut, Titov, first experienced
dizziness and nausea during the flight of Vostok 2. Later, other Soviet
and American space crews were to experience similar symptoms. >o-
viet cosmonauts have reported that illusions of vestibular origin :ire
intensified during rapid head movements and are analagous to soejsa-
tions experienced during rotation. Some Americ an astronauts have d(e-
veloped weak signs of motion sickness which did not seriously affect
work capacity. Four Soviet cosmonauts have reported moderate ve-tib-
ular disturbances. Of 27 Apollo astronauts. 6 have reported unpleas-
ant sensations in the stomach, two have reported nau-ea and vomit-
ing, and three have reported spatial disorientation and illusions. While
none of these episodes has been of an incapacitating nature, the phe-
nomenon is of sufficient concern to justify a considerable research
effort in both space programs to elucidate the mechanisms of vestib-
ular disorders while developing approaches to prevent or treat
Motion sickness is a major side effect of the weightless and rotat-
ing environments although the genesis of the disorder differs in each
environment. There is a heavy investment of Soviet and Ameri.nn re-
search effort to determine the mechanisms by which vestibular dis-
turbances occur under a variety of situations. In both programs, rotat-
ing chairs, counter-rotating striped drums, and entire rotating rooms
in which test subjects can remain for days and weeks are used. The
Soviet literature on the subject of vest ibular function is extensive. The
research effort is devoted to both theory and practice with particular
emphasis on the physiology and anatomy of the vestibular apparatus:
the relationship of the vestibular apparatus to the brain and ether sen-
so-ry systems; the response of the vestibular apparatus to various ro-
tatory and Coriolis accelerations; the genesis and prevention of motion
sickness; the vestibular training of fliers and cosmonauts; and vestibu-
lar pharmacology.231-234 What emerges from these studies is the fact
that human head and body movements relative to the plane of rotut io:,
as well as repeated exposure and training play an important role in
the onset, severity, and duration of vestibular autonomic reactions.
There is also considerable interaction between the vestibular appairat llis
and other sensory syst ems, most notably the visual analyzer.235-23S
There is a close relationship between vestibular stability and neur-,-
humoral function. For example, high tolerance of rotatory accelera-
tions is as-sociated with increased epinephrine and norepinephrine .-.--
=Yuganov. Ye. M. et al. PhysIol,,ey of the sensory sphere nin'lIr p'pfight conditions.
In: Foundntions of Space Biology and Medicine, Vol. II, Ch. 15. Book 2. Washington, D.C.,
NASA. 1975. 571-5,9.
30 Grayhiel. A. Angular velocities, angular aeopiprptinns. and corlolis accelerations,. Tn :
Foundations of Space Biology and Medicine, Vol. II, Ch. 7, Book I. Washington. D.C.. N. \A,
1975. 247-304.
m' Bryanov, I. I. et al. The gp-nesis of vestibiilo-automatic disorders In spaceflights. S-'.,-e
BioLiuy andil Aerospacer Medicine. ('.SSR) No. 3, 1975. 9 5-.
232 Bryvanov, I. I. Certain otorhinolaryngnlI'gical problems in the medical support of apace-
flivhts. Op. Cit.
Kalinovskaya, I. Vestibulomotor Reactions in Man. Moscow, "Mir" Piibl.hlng House.
1970. 165 p. (Translate] by M. Singer).
23 Khilov, K. L. Fiinetion of the Organ of Equilibrium and Motion Sickness. Lenin-
grad. "Meditsina" Publishing House. 1969. 278 p.
Solodovnik. F. A. To'erance of rotation with continious and Intermittent hRp.d'
movements. Military Medical Journal (USSR). No. 4. 1974. 53-r5P (FRD :1818).
23 Polyakov. B .1. Peculiarities of the nystagmic reactio-n of human beings nfr-r their
exposure to linear accelerations. Space Biology and Aerospace Mc.dieile (USSR), No...
1974. 60-63.
27 Kekhayev. V. N. Interrolatlonship between the vestibular and visual analyzers. HPr-il,
of Otrrhinol.irynaol,',y (USSR). No. 13. 1974. 54-57 (FRD #1904).
=9 Kurashvill. A. E. et al. Problems of intorartion of the vpstlbular and optle analyzerg-
Bpace Biology and Aerospace Medicine (USSR), No. 2, 1974, 42-47.










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the largest number of such military photographic payloads of any
nation. (For example, a larger number of these Soviet missions than
the second most active space operating nation has flights in its total
space program, civil and military-the United States.) There is no
reason to suppose, given the high priority these satellites evidently
enjoy, that the Russians aie not getting back a dividend they be-
lieve makes the flights worth their cost. On at least two occasions,
there have been suggestions to the United States that it use similar
payloads rather than U-2 aircraft. Khrushchev suggested them as the
way for the United States to surveil Cuba after an American aircraft
was shot down by a missile over Cuba. More recently, the Russians
suggested satellites as a better way to check on missile defenses near
the Suez than to use aircraft. But at the same time, they have charged
that satellite pictures have been passed by the United States to Israeli
military authorities4
In summary, one application of space technology is to collect elec-
tromagnetic radiation emitted or reflected from the Earth. When this
is done at lowest resolution and from fairly high altitude, the results
are thought of as primarily of use for reporting weather, with such
data usually in the visible or infrared range. When done at inter-
mediate altitude and with somewhat higher resolution, and often in
many parts of the spectrum, such results feed the growing experimen-
tation with Earth resources evaluation and management. When the
flights are done at the lowest sustainable altitudes and presumably in
still higher resolutions, the resulting data reveal human activities in
considerable detail. Wavelengths of visible light are the most obvious
of interest, because of the well developed state of the art with photo-
graphic film able to accept vast amounts of data on small pieces of
lm which can be magnified for closer study. But selection of different
sensitivities to various frequencies both in the range of visible light
and beyond into infrared and ult raviolet, and use of color film all may
extend the analytical opportunities. Here we find an area of applica-
tion which blends together what is happening in Earth resources work
and in military studies. For example, lower resolution multispectral
work may reveal geologic and tectonic features which are not other-
wise apparent. But as one moves into detailed study of agricultural
crops and forests, with an interest in crop kinds and their health plot
by plot, or marking trees which maybe diseased, the resolution require-
ment becomes more severe. The same is true in use of Earth resources
satellites for application in urban land use studies. The task of meas-
uring the economic status of housing or spotting those houses which
have insufficient insulation in winter through their infrared signatures
begins to be a technology not wholly distinguishable from what mili-
tary users of space data might require. Photography in the visible
range would reveal the gross outlines of major human activities on the
ground, whether construction, or order of battle on placement of mis-
siles, aircraft, tanks, and trucks. But one can also imagine it would
be useful in some cases to couple what seems to be true in a photograph
with synoptic data taken at other frequencies. For example, what
appears to be an undisturbed forest in visible light might show in
14 Moscow Radio, July 14, 1970, 1900 GMT.


lite, suggested to a number of scientists that a decimal place had been
in error. There were still others who could not accept thle notion the
Soviet Union could be first in a field of advanced technology and they
invented elaborate schemes for explaining Soviet trickery to simulate
a satellite which they felt did not exist in fact. It also became popular
to believe there were constant Soviet attempts to launch which gen-
erally failed, and that whatever had been put up was necessarily
crude and only for propaganda purposes, and in any case was built by
Germans or stolen from the United States. The assessmients were wide
of the mark.
2. Sputnik 2
While the first Soviet satellite was a bad shock, its simple structure,
limited battery power, and lack of instrumentation, other than its
beacons, could be contrasted with the more elaborate, miniaturized in-
strumentation prone iised for Vanguard. However, on November 3, 1957,
the second Soviet payload placed in orbit was announced as weighing
508.3 kilograms, and it carried a respectable range of geophysical in-
strumentation. Also, it contained a life support system and returned
biomedical data for a week from the dog, Layka. This supplied basic
data for planned manned flights. The life support system showed it
could function remotely. Data were returned on the effects of weight-
lessness and G load during launch, on radiation, and on temperature
changes. Sensors measured some kinds of radiation and micrometeorite
impacts. Also. the Russians revealed what was evident to visual observ-
ers: The payload remained attached to a much larger spent rocket
casing, so that the total weight was probably on the order of 6.5 metric
3. Sputnik 3
In the months which followed, the United States faced the frustra-
tions of launch delays and launch failures, including the explosion of
a Vanguard test vehicle on December 17, 1957, with the world press to
witness the ball of fire at the launch pad. However, the revived Red-
stone Project Orbiter, which might have been launched even before
Sputnik 1, met with success on January 31, 1958 (local time) to put up
14.5 kilograms of payload and rocket casing for Explorer 1. Also, Van-
guard was later (March 17, 1958) successful in putting up a 1.4-kilo-
gram test vehicle and a 23-kilogram rocket casing.
On May 15, 1958, the Soviet Union put up Sputnik 3, and it was
by far the most formidable challenge to the U.S. program. It was a
1,327-kilogram orbiting geophysical observatory of considerable so-
phistication. Unlike the two battery-powered previous flights, this ve-
hicle was equipped with solar cell panels, elaborate louvres for heat
control, and an array of instrumentation which matched all the experi-
ments planned for the U.S. IGY series of flights and also those planned
for the immediate post-IGY period. Although this ship carried
heavy, off-the-shelf conventional electronic equipment such as vacuum
tubes, it also contained thousands of solid state devices. It was in ef-
fect the early equivalent of the American OGO flights of 1964 on,
although with a lower data rate of return. It is to Soviet credit that
the ship continued to operate electronically until the moments of its
reentry and burning in the atmosphere two years after launch.


However, it was ainnouincd at the conference that initial steps iad
been taken to establish a re:earcili center, Klaspii, its purpose t4, dl-
velop new iit'thods of using r'eitote sellsing to study the natural re-
sources of the Caspian region. The conferees were al.-o inforiined tihat
plans were underway to build a central scilentifiec institution to study
thio Earth's resourcs from space.60

Geologists were among the first to use space photographs. They
have long used aerial photography for research. However, the ]iLaxi-
mum area of the Earth's surfa ce that can be photographed at aiiy giveii
time from an aircraft is 1,000-2,000 square kilometers. The dimeni-.ions
of geological structures-folds, depressions, and faults in the Earth's
crust-are mai.,ured in hundreds and thousands of kilometers. Sii.'h
large geological formations can only be seen as a whole from .space."
Soviet geologists cite nuiIicrous geological discoveri,.- resulting from
the u1e of space photographs. lImiages of tihe Earth from space have
enabled geologists to see faults which have not beeii discovered by
ground expeditions. They have also been able to correlate such geo-
logrical atio i ialies with mineral deposits and increa.-ed seismic ac-
tivity.0-2 Rissian scientists al.-o claim that satellite imagery led to the
dli:coverly of iron at Malyy Klinjgajii and coal in the Amurskiyva
Geologist., in the Soviet Union are now revising existing geological
maps. Many regions which earlier had been considered well explored
geologically, such as the ULrals and thle Caucasus, have appeared ell-
tirely different after a space .-survey.64 Thus, a space map of a territory
comprising 6 million square kilometers has enabled i lie All-Union
Aerogrological Trust to formulate new theorie, about the tc,-tonic
structure of the region.65
Using satellite images Soviet agronomists can monitor crop growth
over large areas. It has also been discovered that with satellite philot',.s
it is possible to detect the degree of moisture of various tyvpcs of
soil-from the most arid desert to irrigated farm Iand.6A More ac',t-
rate information on snow cover in the Tien Shan and Himalaya Moun-
tains has enabled farmers to irrigate the crops more effectively. Space
surveys also make possible the study of the formation and dessication
of intermittent lakes.67
In the future the Russians plan to use Earth resources data from
space in a variety of fields. Space surveys will be used for estimating
crop yields and monitoring insect infestation. Forests and large land
reserves will be monitored for blights as well as for fires.68 In 1971
an article appeared which claimed that scientists were using only 40
percent of the information contained in space imagery. The author
m TASS. Moscow, March 10. 1975, 1757, GMT.
61 Andronov, I., Op. cit., p. 3.
c- Idem.
SPushkar, A., High-Altitude View. Tzvestiva, M.oscow, August 5, 1975. p. 5.
64 Bryukhanov, V., Aerogeologiya Trust, Orbital Geology, Izvestiya, Moscow, July 25,
1974. p. 2.
65 Op. cit., p. 3.
SViniwi-radov, B. V., and A. A. Grigor'yev. Viaornnbnrot V Prirode i Yego Rol'v. Formir,
5Iow.,w. Resursov Presn Vod, Stroyizdat, 1973, pp. 204-217.
67 Idem.
Is Andronov, I., Op. cit., p. 3.


the Intelsat system and that the satellite would be quite large and l' ve
a high power output.17
On November 15, 1971, nine countries signed an agreement in
Moscow to establish the Intersputnik system. Parties to the arrec-
ment are: Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, East Germnany, Huii-ary,
Mongolia, Poland, and Romania.
The first direct television transmission from the U.S.S.R. to Cuba
was performed November 7, 1973 with the telecast of the Red Sqi ia re
Parade. Later, telecasts of Soviet Communist Party Secretary Ieonid
Brezhnev's state visit to Cuba were relayed to Moscow. The Int(er-
sputnik system was formally inaugurated in February 1974 with the
commencement of regular relays, via Molniya 2 satellite, betwe.'n
Cuba and Rtussia. Telecasts were relayed by the Caribe Earth station,
equipped with a 12 meter dish antenna and located 30 kilometer- from
Hava in Haruco. Later, a Czechoslovakian station in Prague was
completed on the eve of the 1974 May Day celebrations, and, an lTlan-
Bator, Mongolia station was finished before the October celebrations
of the same year.
(b) U.S.- U.S.S.R. Cooperation.-The Soviet Union has constructed
a major Earth terminal close to L'vov in the Ukraine near the Polish
border to operate in international commercial communications with
Intelsat. The Russians have purchased from ITT Space Communica-
tions (International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation) twelve
duplex voice-grade channels of Spade terminal equipment that makes
possible operation with satellites on a demand-assi-nment basis. ITT-
U.S.S.R. negotiations on the Spade equipment developed duriill the
Washington-Moscow hotline discussions (see below). With Spade
terminal equipment, the communicator can utilize satellite channels
that may remain unused for long periods. Spade equipment installed
at the L'vov station would give the U.S.S.R. direct access on a demand
assignment basis to 25 similarly equipped stations in the United States,
Canada, Peru, Brazil, Argentina, United Kingdom, Netherli.nds,
France, Italy, Greece, Switzerland, West Germany, and Sweden.18
(c) WVashington-Moscow Hotline.-The United States and U.S.S.R.
on September 30, 1971 signed accords on the prevention of accidental
warfare which authorized the establishment of a new Washington-
Moscow "hotline" via satellite. The main objective of a satellite link
would be increased reliability. Although the terrestrial hotline, which
was established as a result of the Cuban missile crisis, has never been a
target of planned sabotage, it has been subject to occasional disruption,
with sections of the cable blacked out by fire, pilfered, and once plowed
by a Finnish farmer.
The hotline system consists of two duplex telephone-bandwidth
circuits equipped for secondary telegraphic multiplexing and four
ground stations for transmission and reception. One circuit is on the
Molniya system and the other is on the Intelsat system. Encoded tele-
type messages will go from the United States to Moscow in English
via the Intelsat system and from Moscow to the United States in Rus-
sian via Molniya 3 satellites.
Originally, the Russians intended to use a station in the suburbs of
Moscow for Intelsat and a Molniya station at Vladimir. However,
"Aviation Week and Space Technology, New York, August 26, 1968, p. 19-20.
Is Aviation Week and Space Technology, New York, September 22, 1975, p. 9.


2. MJf;;tary Interc optionss for Inspection and Destruction
Although the F class vehicles had come into weapons-relate(ld use
possibly as early as 1.965 and certainly by 1966, these have all bemn
classed as using the F-i-r type of vehicle with its retro-package
which at least in the case of FOBS was used to bring back a dummy
warhead before natural decay would occur.
On October 27, 1967, a new type of vehicle appeared, the F-l-in,
marked by use of a maneuvering stage with a multiple burn capabil-
ity. As further flights of this launch vehicle occurred, there was a con-
siderable variety of u-es or patterns, as sometimes the whole assembly
seemCed to maneuver as a unit, and sometimes there were abandoned
rocket stages and launch platforms before the final payload ended
up in still another orbit. In some cases maneuvers occurred so promptly
the original orbit was not readily detected by the regular Western
sensorss; other times, there was a lapse of time. All of this makes it
difficult to l)e absolutely sure how many operational modes have been
observed, and how many times the apparent differences were occa-
sioned more by getting data readings at different times during the
flights. The first major grouping of F-l-mn flights is summarized in
Table 6-7.
Kosmos 185, the first of the F-l-m flights, was put into a slightly
eccentric low orbit, and then both the payload and the accompanying
carrier rocket maneuvered upward to a somewhat higher, still ec-
centric orbit, which was the one announced prosaically by the Rus-
sians. No purpose was given for the flight.
Kosmos 217, launched April 24. 1968, was announced as being in
an orbit similar to the initial orbital pattern of Kosmos 185. But West-
ern sensors found only debris in a low orbit, similar to that of a FOBS
flight. There was a suspicion that the payload may not have achieved
sustained orbit at all. Presumably the announced orbit was the one
intended as the initial orbit, even though not attained. It raised ques-
tions as to why a patently not achieved orbit was made public.


would be no use in sending up other telescopes for long duration
The Sun was quiet during the Soyuz 17 mission, but good photo-
graphs were taken of dim flocculi (light patches on the Sun barely
discernible from Earth) which exhibited bright features. These areas
were simultaneously photographed on Earth for comparison purposes.
Navigation.-Two navigation systems for autonomous control of the
station were mentioned, and their relationship to each other is vague.
Reports stated that daily tests were made of the Kaskad (Cascade)
autonomous navigation system, consisting of an onboard computer
that makes navigation measurements and determines orbital parame-
ters. The Russians hope it will reduce fuel consumption for orienting
the ship. The "Delta" system was described in much the same way, al-
though it seems as though this system was a functioning part of
Salyut, not an experimental version like Kaskad.
Communications.-A new method of communication was experi-
mented with that utilized a teletype system called "Stroka." This time
the crew only tested the system, so it was used primarily for personal
communications from family and friends, press reports on the mission,
and basic information on orbital parameters. The system apparently
works the same way newspaper teletypes do, with the message coming
out on a strip of paper. This has the advantages that a permanent rec-
ord is provided of communications from Earth, and it relieves the crew
of the need to be present when the message arrives. They can read it
whenever they have time.
c. April 5th Anomaly.-On April 5,1975 at about 1103 GMT, the
Russians launched a spacecraft with the announced purpose of dock-
ing with Salyut 4 and continuing scientific experiments. But a stage
separation malfunction of the A-2 booster forced the mission to be
aborted and the crew, Col. Vasiliy Lazarev and Oleg Makarov, found
themselves landing in cold, snowy Siberia southwest of the town of
Gorno-Altaisk, 1,600 kilomters away from the launch site and only 320
kilometers north of the Chinese border. After the failure, the mission
was renamed the "April 5th Anomaly" and the Soyuz 18 designation
it would have received was given to the next craft in the series.
TASS did not announce the shot until two days later, presumably
to give the crew time to be rescued and their health assessed. It is sus-
pected that they spent the night at the landing site before recovery
teams could meet them. They reportedly exited the spacecraft shortly
after landing and built a fire.
The primary significance of this failure was its relationship to
ASTP, to be launched only three months later. Konstantin Bushuyev,
Soviet program director for ASTP, assured his American counterpart,
Glynn Lunney, that the launch vehicle used in this instance was an old
version of the one to be used in July, and that none of the systems in
common were suspect in the malfunction. This raised a lot of eyebrows
in the West for several reasons. First, there had been no suspicion that
the A-2 vehicle had two versions, although experts were aware of dif-
ferences in the Soyuz craft itself. Second, since the Soyuz's docking
target, Salyut 4, was in a substantially higher orbit than that to be
used for ASTP, it seemed unlikely that a less capable launch vehicle
would be used. Third, the A-2 is used for unmanned as well as manned
missions. Why the Russians would use the older version on a manned
flight rather than using them up on unmanned missions is unclear.












Cosmonaut Yevgen-y Khrunov announced that cosmonauts were en-
gaged in preparations for new flights, supposedly to link up with
Salyut, and on April 6 Victor Louis of the London Emciing Yews re-
ported that a Soyuz spacecraft was ready for launch. Thus when no
launch followed Salyut 2, there was speculation that the Soyuz launch
had failed. On two occasions the space station was in a position for
rendezvous, but no laimuch occurred. When on April 8 Salyut 2's orbit
was raised to 268 x 248 km, above an appropriate rendezvous orbit, ex-
perts concluded that whatever had delayed the Soyuz launch was more
serious than originally thought. Some suggested that. solar flare activity
on the 4th and 5th of April prevented the launch rather than equipment
failure, but when April 11 came and there was still no launch, general
opinion was that either Salyut or Soyuz was having major difficulty.
Spacefl!ght magazine reported that Salyut 2's initial orbit was
higher and more elliptical than Salyut 1's, possibly due to poor per-
formance of the D-1 booster. Numerous fragments detected in the
orbital path suggested the D-1 had exploded, although in retrospect
it seems likely these early pieces of debris were no more than the rou-
tine releasing of equipment and window covers.
The real trouble came on April 14 when Salyut was reported to
have undergone a "catastrophic malfunction" which ripped off the
solar panels and boom-mounted rendezvous radar and radio trans-
ponder, leaving the vehicle tumbling in space without telemetry return.
The craft may have separated into many pieces, some large enough to
be tracked, but most were rather small and decayed quickly. Either an
explosion or a misfiring thruster were blamed, although the most
widely held theory was that the D-1 upper stage had exploded with its
debris damaging the space station.
On April 28 TASS reported that Salyut "had concluded the pro-
gramme of flight," and although the official statement said it had com-
pleted its mission, the word "successfully" (used in the most nom-
inally successful flights) was omitted. This suggests that the Russians
wrote the mission off as a failure. The main body of the station decayed
through air drag on May 28, 1973, and reentered near Australia.
Noting that the telemetry transmissions from Salyut 2 were similar
to those used by Soviet reconnaissance satellites, A riation Week and
Space Technology concluded that the mission was not a Salyut at all,
but that the Russians were simply trying to mislead the Soviet press
and information agencies. The manned Salvut 3 a year later, however,
used the same telemetry and suggests that Salyut 2 was the first of the
military Salyuts.
4. Kosmos 557
On May 11, 1973, shortly.after the failure of Salyut 2, the RPusians
launched Kosmos 557 into a 226 x 218 km orbit inclined at 51.6 and
with a period of 89.1 minutes. Speculation abounded as to its purpose,
since virtually no information was reported in the Soviet press. Its
telemetry resembled Salyut 1, typical of the manned programs.
rather than Salyut 2, typical of the unmanned military reconnaissance
program. (It was not until a year later that the discovery was made
that these military frequencies could be used for a manned station
dedicated to military uses.)
Western experts thought there was a good chance that this was
another Salyut, possibly of a different design, that failed so early in


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continuing needs, and such flights can be expected to continue, although
it appears that the lower orbit missions are being phased out.
j. More Threatening MAissions.-While all the foregoing make mili-
tary contributions, they are essentially support, pas-ilve. and probably
not necessarily destabilizing to the world scene. They increase the
effectiveness of conventional air, sea, and land forces, and even of mis-
silo forces. Where they collect information, they may be creating de
facto the kind of "open skies" situation which many armis control
agencies believe is important to attaining workable arms limitation
But what of other, potentially destabilizing missions in space? One
such is the renewal of satellite inspector/destructor flights like those
which ended in 1971. Inspection seems harmless enough, but the prob-
lem is that if satellites conducting military functions coorbit with un-
cooperative targets of investigation, the added capability of destruc-
tion is a very simple step compared with the rendezvous and the
selection of sensors capable of doing a good inspection. Any space
power must worry about the possibility that another space power may
decide to escalate rivalries to the point of interference with satellites
in orbit, whether it is to blind the eyes of some, or deafen the ears,
or disrupt communications, or take away some abilities to navigate.
This means that such nations must consider a range of both passive
and active countermeasures available on a contingency basis. Presum-
ably arms controllers will press for agreements to avoid mutual inter-
ference, while responsible military authorities will feel it necessa ry
to have contingency plans in case the agreements are abrogated. Pas-
sive measures may include steps to make radar and visual detection
more difficult, or possibly to have so many decoys that the expense
of interception would be very heavy for the returns; also, there might
be increasing use of signals buried in "noise" so they were harder to
intercept, and more of them might be highly directional further add-
ing to the difficulty of finding them. For the longer run, some types of
payloads may be placed at greater distances from Earth.
Such protective measures may be used by the Russians against any
perceived threat from the United States. Likewise, U.S. authorities,
having seen a demonstrated Soviet capability to carry out inspection/
destruction flights against targets at a number of altitudes have to
assume that over a period of time the Soviet capability in this regard
will grow. Meanwhile, it is apparently to the clear advantage of both
nations to avoid direct interference with the space flights of the other,
lest the price to be paid become too high and escalate events to very
unpleasant and unforeseeable conditions.
In the area of weapons of mass destruction, deployment is pro-
hibited by treaty. One may hope that such treaties will be honored
indefinitely, and in this regard, fractional orbit bombardment system
(FOBS) flights, which bordered on the questionable side. have not
been flown by the Russians since 1971. Let it be clear that this paper
does not recommend or even predict the abandonment of restrictions
on putting weapons of mass destruction into space. Intellectually, it
still can be recognized that in some future age if military rivalries of
national states continue, and if major arms are not limited and con-
trolled, one can imagine situations in which arms in space might be


systems of the space station, and to conduct scientific research and ex-
periments on board the craft. The station was described simply as
multipurpose and complex, for carrying out diverse plans.
It was not until the launch of Soyuz 11 that more details were re-
leased about Salyut, and it was initially described as 20 meters long
with a maximum diameter of 4 meters. Since the original announce-
ment, however, the length has alternately been given at 21.4 meters 5
and 23 meters 6 with a maximum diameter of 4.15 meters.7 Later in this
chapter one will see that Salyut 3 was announced as being 21 meters
long, and Salyut 4 as 23 meters. It seems unlikely, due to technical and
development cost constraints, that each space station would be a dif-
ferent length, so it is suspected that external attachments such as radio
transponders are sometimes counted as part of the overall length and
other times they are not.
Salyut is made of several compartments and the measurements for
each of these seem uniform from one version to the next. The com-
partment that serves as a transfer tunnel from the ferry craft to the
space station is 3 meters long and 2 meters in diameter. The main
habitable portion is comprised of three sections: The small cylinder 3.8
meters long and 2.9 meters in diameter; the large cylinder 4.1 meters
long and 4.15 meters in diameter: and a cone connecting the two which
is 1.2 meters long. An unpresurized service module completes the sta-
tion, and it is 2.17 meters long and 2.2 meters in diameter.
The internal area of the space station is consistently listed as 100
cubic meters, and the weight of the combined Salyut/Soyuz system is
consistently "over 25 metric tons". Since Soyuz is about 6,575 kg,
Salyut would be in excess of 18,425 kg (estimates usually place this
weight at 18,600 to 18,900 kg).
Television views showed a considerable amount of space with big
chairs and several control panels. Later it was revealed there were
eight chairs, seven at work stations. Altogether there were 20 port-
holes, some unobstructed by instruments to give a good view of the
Earth and outer space.
Externally, there were two double sets of solar cell panels, placed at
opposite ends, extending like wings from the smaller diameter com-
partments in much the same manner as the panels on the Soyuz. Also
externally were the heat regulation system's radiators, the orienta-
tion and control devices. Some of the scientific instrumentation was
internal, some external.
Because of the low orbit of Salvut during the time it served as Soyuz
10's rendezvous target, the station would have decayed into the atmos-
phere around May 3. Therefore, after Soyuz 10 had completed its
mission, the onboard propulsion systems were fired to raise the orbit
by about 50 km. At least twice during May the orbit was raised even
more to offset orbital decay.
This procedure was also followed after the Soyuz 11 visit, this time
to test the longevity of the station and to keep open the option to send
another crew. But finally on October 11, its engines were fired for the
last time to insure decay over the Pacific Ocean. Pravda reported on
October 26, 1971 that the Salyut tasks were solved in 75 percent of
s "Saliout" devolle pour la premiere fois. Air et Cosmos, Paris, May 31, 1975.
Salyut na Orblte, Moscow: Mashlnostroyenlye, 1973, page 8.
SLes Stations Orbltales "Sallout", Moscow: Mashinostroyenlye, 1975, page 14.






















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hit a reentry corridor between 35 and 48 km above the Earth. If the
ship had approached Earth 10 km lower, it would have been destroyed
by overloads of heat and pressure; 24 km higher and it would have
skipped out of the atmosphere.
Entering the atmosphere at 10,900 meters per second, it w;is slowed
aerodynamically to 200 meters per second and then deployed a para-
chute at 7 km altitude. The approach to Earth was over the South Pole,
and Zond 5 then made a ballistic reentry, landing in the South Indian
Ocean as it headed north at coordinates 3238'S. by 7533'E. The cap-
sule had been exposed to heat levels of 13,000C during reentry.
This was the Ruissians' first water recovery of a space capsule, and
the Soviet account s:;id it wNas especially difficult L, ,.1JS:-(, tl, splash-
down occurred at nirht and the payload had to be discovereded" Re-
covery was directed by the Academy of Sciences rescue service and
the tracking ship Borovichiy which used radio direction finders and
searchlights. An oceanography ship, Va.ciliy Golovnin, carried the
.cipsule to Bombay where it was tr':msferred to a Soviet AN-12 cargo
plane and flown to the U.S.S.R.

Zond 6 was launched with a D-l-e on Novemnber 10, 1968. A total of
three orbital corrections were made: the first on November 12, and the
other two after passage around the Moon on November 14 at a distance
of 2,250 km.
Much of this mission was a repeat of Zond 5. Equipment was carried
to study the effects of radiation on living creatures (although no de-
scription of the biological payload was given) as well as a photoemul-
sion chamber to record the paths of cosmic rays and a device to meas-
ure the i,-pacts of micrometeorites.
More lunar photographs were taken with a standard aerial camera
which had a focal length of 400 mm, frame size of 13 x 18 cm, and a
resolution of 50 lines per millimeter. While Zond 3 facsimile pictures
could provide 1.2 million data bits per picture, each Zond 6 photo-
graph had 134 million data bits. Some of the views made stereo pic-
tures of the Moon possible, both on the near and far sides. The film
itself measured 29 cm wide and 28 meters long.
On November 17, Zond 6 returned to Earth in the same manner as
Zond 5 with one important difference. It approached at 11 km per
second, used aerodynamic braking to slow to 7.6 km per second, and
then the control mechanism on board was used to orient the craft so
that it developed considerable lift and skipped outside the atmosphere
again. Then it made a second reentry into the atmosphere and by con-
tinued operation of its orientation system made a controlled landing in
the Soviet Union in the "preset district." This was a very impressive
achievement, to travel so many thousands of additional kilometers be-
yond the point of ballistic reentry.
The Russians explained that the South Pole approach was the only
practical one for returning Zond payloads to the Soviet Union, because
a direct ballistic approach would bring too heavy an overload for a
human crew. The southern approach permits the long double entry,
skip return. Academician G. I. Petrov noted, however, that the pro-
longed reentry increased the effect of heat flow, and added a con-


height and location, radio signal-type, jettisoned pieces soon after
launch and additional pieces (four in this case) on the day of recovery.
It might well be that these two satellites had dual-purpose missions-
military reconnaissance and Earth resources survey-and that the
newspaper reference to Diego Garcia was purely coincidental and
provided me with a convenient "red herring" .. but then, that is
all part of the fascination such a hobby provides!

The vast size of the Soviet Union enabled a network of ground-
stations to be established providing a good degree of coverage for low
Earth-orbit flights but, from the earliest days, the Soviet Union has
placed great reliance on the use of short-wave communications to com-
pensate for the lack of ground stations outside the territory of the
U.S.S.R. As time went by, ships of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences
were deployed to supplement the coverage from home-based stations
but, even today, their manned spacecraft are out of range of direct
communication for long periods.
The value of long-distance propagation of high frequency radio
waves by "whispering gallery" modes within the ionosphere became
apparent when the signals from the first Sputniks were received at
times when the satellites were well below the horizon of the receiving
station. Consequently all Soviet man-related flights have transmitted
either telemetry, voice or both on frequencies close to 15, 18, or 20 MHz
for at least part of the time.
The first Korabl Sputnik used a pulse-duration modulated (PDM),
15-word telemetry frame on 20.005 MHz in May 1960. The Vostoks and
Voskhods transmitted keyed C/W (continuous wave) and voice on a
variety of frequencies.
PDM (pulse duration modulation) telemetry from Kosmos 140, the
second unmanned Soyuz precursor, was detected in 30-second bursts at
2-minute intervals at Aberystwyth and hindsight suggests that the
intervening 90 seconds were occupied by a continuation of the trans-
mission on each of three other frequencies. This provided valuable
data on which to base the choice of frequency for the manned Soyuz
missions to follow.
The only recording of transmissions from the ill-fated Soyuz 1,
known to the Kettering Group, is on one of Flagg's tapes. Although
unlogged, it comes between two identifiable recordings made on dates
falling either side of the Soyuz 1 flight. This shows that the frame for-
mat was the same as for Kosmos 140 and all subsequent Sovuz flights.
Thirty-second bursts of this type of telemetry received in Kettering
on October 27, 1967, indicated to Perry that Kosmos 186 (not
announced until the afternoon following the Kettering disclosure) was
the first unmanned test of Soyuz since the Komarov fatality.
The Soyuz 3 flight confirmed that the same telemetry format was still
being used for the Soyuz program. Up to the launch of Soyuz 4, word 8
of the telemetry frame was always observed to be of medium length.
However, when Soyuz 5 was launched on the following day, word 8
was seen to take one of three values which may be termed short,
medium, and long. Since this was the first 3-man Soyuz, Perry realized


the Soyuz manual phliase of docking requires use of a periscope, occa-
sioned by tlhe mid-position of the commJl(and module, the periscope
could as easily be swiveled around to point backwards as well as for-
wards, and hlie also noted that early Soyuz ships carried radar tran-
sponders facing both forward and aft. Cosmonaut Bergovoy is said
to have started to describe the ability of Soyuz to dock at either end
when President Keldysh of the Soviet Academy cut him off abruptly.
Oberg added other bits of circumstantial evidence: The use of a self-
contained space suit with back pack, instead of simpler life support
umbilicals as wi(ed by the early American space suits, might have been
an early commitment to lunar work where such self-containment would
be nesa-. ry for surface exploration. Another item: Soviet cosmonauts
are said to have begun helicopter training in 1967-just as the Apollo
astronauts did if they were slated to land LM vehicles on the Moon.15
e. Unpublished Stud;es.-David Woods has continued his studies of
Soviet lunar capabilities, and has prepared a new paper not yet pub-
lished which amends, elaborates, and refines his earlier published
efforts. lie now sees all versions of the Soyuz, with or without the
torus tank, as carrying nitric acid and hydrazine propellants. He sug-
ge-ts the torus lias three tanks within it, never taking full advantage
of its volume, and probably designed to be jettisoned during flight.
(A Vick concept.) He suggests a void between two nitric acid tanks
may have housed electronics. (A Hioutman concept.)
His calculation is that the propellant capacity of the torus is 1,815
kilograms at full load and that of the four spherical tanks is 1,150
kilograms at full load. In the case of Kosmos 159, he suggested this
full load was carried within the lifting capacity of the A-2 by leaving
off both the command module and the orbital work compartment. Then,
in the case of Zond 4-8, he sug-gests not only was the work compart-
ment left off but also the torus tank. He has developed detailed weight
and component tables for all the classes of the Soyuz seen to date, for
the circumlunar early Zond (4-8), and for a postulated "heavy Zond"
which would have restored the torus tank and given it a full propellant
load for an all-up weight of 7,825 kilograms-somewhat beyond the
estimated Earth orbital lift capacity of the A-2 or the translunar
capacity of the D-l-e. He suggests that the lighter, demonstrated
Zonds probably had a delta V of 625 meters/see, not enough to go into
lunar orbit and out (LOI and TEI), but enough to cut flight time
and to refine the accuracy of the flight path, improving the precision
of the flight around the Moon and of reentry into the atmosphere of
Woods suggests that the demonstrated Zond series were primarily to
test the Earth return phase of future Moon flights. His impression is
that the first three Proton satellite flights were engineering tests of
the D-1 vehicle, carrying an external mockup of the heavy Zond serv-
ice module, and Proton 4 roughly a sphere close to 4.5 meters in diam-
eter with a mockup of a docking collar to simulate a man-carrying
capsule the G vehicle might carry in its future lunar use.
By applying a least-squares fit to a variety of available official
Soviet weight summaries he derives the approximate dry weight of the
escape stage of the D-l-e launch vehicle. It comes out as 2,185 kilo-
Collins, Michael, Carrying the fire, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, p. 280.


seriess from those intended as targets or interceptors. What was unique
md special about this different series is that every flight started out
n nn orbit around 270 kilometers circular, and then later produced sev-
eral objects, one of which climbed to about 950 kilometers circular,
while the other two main objects shortly docyed from thlieir un-
-hanged low orbit. Table 6-8 summarizing these flights.
The first of these flights was Kosmos 198, which moved to higher
)rbit, a part of its original single assemblage without separated car-
-ier rocket, after two days. Kosmos 209 the following yea r made its
similarr split and partial move after six days. In 1970, Konmos 367
noved so promptly to its higher orbit, leaving behind the other pieces
n the low orbit that the Russians announced only the final, higher
)rbit. Two such fligcits came in 1971, moving up part of the payload
ifter 8 and 10 days respectively. The 1972 test made its move after 31
lays. The 1973 test moved up after 44 days. while the 1974 tests moved
ip after 71 and 74 days respectively, and the first 1975 tests moved
ip after 43 and 65 days respectively.
Such anomalous behavior raised considerable comment in the West-
,rn trade press, without any good theories being offered for many
rears. Finally some clues were offered by the U.S. Navy which said
he Soviet Union had been developing an ocean surveillance system
whose flights had begun in the 1960's.36
Then things began to fall into place. The same week independently,
he American press carried a story, and G. E. Perry of the Kettering
3roup in the United Kingdom came up with the same interpretations.
Fheir analysis, whether self derived (Perry) and possibly inspired
'by DoD sources?), suggested a coherent picture of what was going
n. This was that the Russians were testing a surveillance satellite
designed to seek out naval movements at sea anywhere in the world,
regardless of weather and regardless of ships maintaining radio silence.
ro do this, they would presumably correlate any data from general
intelligence on ship movements, including direct port observations,
;omint, and long range sonar with radar data from satellites. In order
;o get a good enough radar signal, they needed to keep the radar carry-
ng satellite in fairly low orbit, and on successive passes would sweep
arge areas of ocean with a signal strength great enough to provide
;ome analyzable return signal. Further, to generate the power levels
-equired, they probably were using a nuclear power source with a fairly
,hort half life for an RTG (radioactive thermal generator), rather
;han the more modest amounts of power which solar panels would
provide The argument further ran, if a radioactive source with a short
lalf life were used, it might carry risks of atmospheric and surface
pollutionn when the payload decayed soon from low orbit. Hence, the
operatingg mode was to make the radar survey in low orbit, and when
t was indicated through telemetry that the sensors and processing
equipment was about to fail, explosive bolts were blown to separate the
originall rocket and as much of the hardware as possible to permit
natural decay. But the dangerous part of the payload with the radio-
Lctive RTG equipment was fired by an integral rocket to carry the
'payload" to a higher altitude where a typical decay time was 600
36 DIrector Naval Intelligence, Understanding Soviet Naval Development. Washing-
ton : U.S. Navy, 1974.


positive effect was noted a few days after injection which persisted for
several months. The mechanism of action of this preparation is ob-
scure and its pre-cint status as a motion sickness drug is not known.24
A whole plethora of more conventional dri!.r.- to counteract motion
sickness have been tested. Most have been anticholinm.rgics, antihis-
tamine.-- a, di tranquilizers used individually or in combination. Pro-
phylactic vitaminization with pyridoxine containing compounds has
also bein tested with favorable results. The dru.s include'l in the
Soyuz/Salyut medical kit for vestibular disorders and motion sick-
j)es include plavefin, atropine, ethaperazine, and trioxazine. Appar-
ently, plavefin is the most commonly used drug for motion sickness. It
is not known whether these drugs have actually been used during space
Because there lihas been considerable speculation in recent years that
future Soviet orbiting space stations will be of the rotating type, yes-
tibular physiologists are concerned about the chronic effects of lar.ire-
system rotation on the orientation and vestibular well-being of future
crews. The magnitude of the effect of Coriolis acceleration will depend
on the rotational velocity of the spacecraft, the angular velocity of
head movements by the crew, and the angle between the axes of rota-
tion of the spacecraft and a crew member's head. The vestibular effects
of chronic (up to one month) rotation in large rotating chambers are
therefore being investigated in considerable detail with large numbers
of test subjects. Experiments suggest that, in order to reduce the effects
of rotation on the vestibular apparatus, crew members will need
to move their head transiationally. The experiments also indicate that
chronic rotation increases vestibular tolerance of that factor which
persists for up to two weeks after exposure. If rotating space stations
become a reality in the future, space crews may find themselves under-
going lengthy training in large rotating rooms prior to space
missions.252 253

In recent years there has been relatively little space-related litera-
ture on the physiological and psychological effects of noise and vibra-
tion. Most of the extensive literature on these subjects appears in the
field of occupational hygiene. This may indicate that Soviet space-
craft desig-n has reached a stage where neither of these two factors are
as much of a biomedical threat as they were considered to be in earlier
phases of the Soviet space program.
247 Barnatskiy. V. N. et al. Use of sodium hydrocarbonate as a means of trentinq and
preventing motion sickness. Space Biology and Medicine (I'SSR), No. 6. 1972, 70T-7.j.
2sVasil 'yev, P. V. et al. Vestibular function disturbance nnd medicinal prophylaxis
of motion sickness. In: Problems of Space Biology. Vol. 17. Moscow. "Nauka" Puhlish-
Ing House. 1971. 19q-230
249 Lapayev, P. V. et al. Prophylactic vitaminization with pyridoxine-containinz com-
pounds as a means of preventing vestibular disturbances. Hygiene and Sanitation (USSR),
No.5. 1971, 30-34 (JPRS 5404R)
250 Gurovskiy. N. N. et al. Some results of medical investigations carried out during the
flight of the orbiting scientific station. Salyut. Op. Clt.
21 Mnt'on sickness. Medical Gazette (T'FSR), May 24, 1974. p.3 (FDR ft 1.59)
252 Solodovnik, F. A. et al. Effect of Coriolis acceleration on the vestibular apparatus
of n cosmonaut and its experimental :tudy in the laboratory. In: Problems of Bionics.
Moscow. "Nauka" Press. 1073,. 53-5q (FRD # 1353).
253 Galle. R. R. et al. Cortnin prne'iplp' of adnptattnlon to prnloneed rotation. Space
Biology and Aerospace Medicine (USSR), No. 5, 1974, 53-60 (FRD # 2044).


space crews to doses exceeding the allowable level, particularly dur-
ing prolonged interplanetary flights. Soviet estimates of the maximum
allowable dose of radiation for such flights have been calculated as

Flight Duration (years) :

Ma-tnmu n,

1 -------------------------------------------------------- 200
2 -------------------------------------------------------- .-)
3 ---------------------- 275
It should be noted that there is consider ni'.le variation in recom-
mended maximum allowable radiation doses for prolong,,d flights
in the international bioastronautics community. Some experts have
recommended that space crews could receive a dose of 300 remi per year
of flight.265

Since the recognition of potential hazards from space radiation, the
Soviet Union has supported an extremely large effort to determine
systematically and empirically what effects the various types of ioniz-
in radiation have on man, a -n m Is. plants, and miclro-organismns and
how to prevent or minimize these effects. The basic philosophy behind
this large research effort is that radiation injury has no threshold.
Therefore, any exposure to ionizing radiation, regardless of dose. can
be potentially harmful. Moreover, radiation has a cumulative effect on
biological systems which means that even a relatively small radiation
doses can be damaging if exposure time is prolonged.266-269
A large data base has been accumulated by Soviet and American
researchers on the clinical effects of whole-body radiation. These ef-
fects at acute radiation dose levels are summarized in Table 4-13.


Dose in Rads



Probable Effect
No obvious effect, except, probably, minor blood changes.
Vomiting and nausea for about 1 day in 5%-10% of exposed
personnel. Fatigue, but no serious disability. Transient re-
duction in lymphocytes and neutrophils.
Vomiting and nausea for about 1 day, followed by other symp-
toms of radiation sickness in about 25%-50%c of personnel.
No deaths anticipated. A reduction of approximately 50%
in lymphocytes and neutrophils will occur.
Vomiting and nausea in nearly all personnel on first day, fol-
lowed by other symptoms of radiation sickness, e.g., loss of
appetite, diarrhea, minor hemorrhage. About 20("C deaths
within 2-6 weeks after exposure; survivors convalescent
for about 3 months, although many have second wave of
symptoms at about 3 weeks. Up to 75%o reduction in all cir-
culating blood elements.

2 Tobhls. C. Ionizing Radiation. Op. Cit.
"T2Kuzin, R. A. Radiation Barrier in the Road To Space. Moscow, "Atomizdnt" Publish-
Inz House, 1971, 134 p.
2a9 Gurovskiy. N. N. The Function of the Organism and Factors of Spaceflight. Moscow,
."Medltsina" Pub!lihing House. 1974. 232 p. (FRD 20f75)
2Generozov, V. L. Estahlishmnent of methods for calculating the radiation hazard of
-protons from solar flares. Space Biology and Aerospace Medicine, No. 13, 1975, 74-76.


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manned ones, but stressed that the Soviet space program gives "a
proper place to manned space flights" and that space vehicles and
orbital stations will "often require the intellectual and( creative activ-
ity of a man staying on board." Flight Internation concluded that
Petrov probably meant that relatively short-term manned :activities
apply solely to the orbital station but that, in the long run, cosmonauts
would be sent to the Moon and to Mars. (F] ight International, London,
April 22, 1971, p. 562.)
K. Ya. Kondratyev, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences Corresponding
Member and Space Research Commission Deputy Chairman. reported
that Soviet space research is developing in several completely inde-
pendent directions. Meteorological, communications, navigational, and
many other satellites make up the applied satellites area. Automated
systems to study the Moon and distant planets form another area.
Orbital scientific satellites constitute a third independent area. He
said that in the important area of atmospheric pollution monitoring,
satellites, and particularly manned spacecraft, can be very important.
Hle said that some tasks are not possible with automated craft alone.
He gave as an example observations of the Earth's crepuscular horizon.
This, hlie reported, is the sort of work which was carried out on board
Soyuz 5. (Komsomolskaya Pravda, Moscow, April 25, 1971, p. 1.)
Academician A. A. Blagonrovov explained the benefits of orbital
space stations to Earth sciences. He said long-duration manned orbital
stations, in combination with automated systems, will permit space
research to be elevated to a qualitatively new level. Manned and un-
manned systems will insure the uninterrupted and regular acquisition
of scientific information in astronomy, astrophysics, and the biological
sciences, and will help to set up the most complex scientific and tech-
nical, medical and biological experiments aimed at the further
development of space research. Completely new opportunities are open-
ing up in the study of Earth from space. Mentioned were: (1) research
from space into the composition of the Earth's core; (2) the solution
of such complex hydrological problems as the analysis of the moisture
content in the soil, rainfall intensity, the presence of subterranean
water, and so forth; (3) advancement in the science of surface and
marine topography; (4) the detection of fish from space vehicles; and
(5) continued study of the "terrestrial-solar" link to increase the re-
liability of long-range weather forecasts. (Pravda, Moscow, April 26,
1971, p. 2.)
Academician Blagonravov saw space stations as ideal for practical
applications in the search for Earth minerals, moisture studies, ocean-
ography studies (temperature, sea state, water color, currents), fish
concentrations, magnetic surveys, and also work in radio astronomy.
(TASS, April 26,1971,0546 GMT.)
Scientist Kirill Kondratyev said major results have already been
obtained from space flights in meteorology, communications, geodesy,
and navigation. He stressed the importance of manned observation as
well as use of automatic devices for many further practical applica-
tions, both for resource management and for rapid reporting of threat-
ening phenomena. (TASS, April 26, 1971, 1222 GMT.)
Academician Feodor Chukhrov detailed the future of space geology
as a way of locating mineral resources, studying the structure of con-


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deterioration in well-being to the peril of the flight or flight program.
Tests therefore continue to be developed to eliminate candidates with
latent vestibular problems. One such test is the Coriolis Acceleration
Summation Test in which candidates are rotated in a special chair at
angular speed of 180 degrees per minute for 15 minutes. The Russians
feel that this test is a valuable supplement to other tests of the vestibu-
lar system (otolith reaction; Khilov swing etc.) because it affects all
central nervous (cerebral) functions. It is therefore likely to disclose
latent flaws that other tests might not detect. Presently, candidates
with low tolerance to vestibular tests as exhibited by motion sickness
or increased susceptibility to orientation illusions are eliminated. In
general, the Soviets appear to place a heavier emphasis on the vestibu-
lar testing of candidates than the United States.13
Other medical features of importance in the selection process include
visual function and acuity, auditory function, the state of the immune
system, respiration and gas exchange, water-electrolyte balance, and
general metabolism. Because mineral (calcium) metabolism is a prob-
lem in space, a wide variety of conditions which could lead to kidney
stones and other disorders are used to eliminate candidates. These in-
clude a history of renal colic, gall bladder disease, bloody urine, gout,
and other diseases.14
In the early phases of the Soviet manned spaceflight program, the
comprehensive testing of cosmonauts at the Institute of Aviation Medi-
cine who had passed the initial selection process resulted in a rejection
of 25-50 percent of the candidates examined. Thus, biomedical selec-
tion procedures eliminated up to 75 percent of the total candidates
otherwise qualified. This high rate of rejection has since been reduced
by a more detailed early selection procedure.15
Soviet officials have never released information about the total num-
ber of cosmonaut candidates evaluated as opposed to the number
accepted into training. Indeed, with the exception of the Apollo-Soyuz
cosmonauts, Soviet trainees seldom receive any visibility so that they
are virtually unknown until after they have participated in a flight.
However, German Titov, who piloted Vostok 2, is quoted as stating
that in the 1960's, 51 men were selected for initial physical fitness train-
ing, of which 12 were selected to become the nucleus of the manned
program of the early and mid 1960's.16
As the size and capabilities of Soviet manned spacecraft change in
the future, there will probably be additional modifications in the cos-
monaut selection process. However, in his book, "The Cosmonaut as
a Researcher", cosmonaut N. Rukavishnikov (test-engineer on Soyuz
10 and 16) speculates that two basic categories of cosmonauts will con-
tinue to be selected for multi-manned orbital laboratories and inter-
planetary spacecraft. The first category will consist of the command
crew responsible for the flight and will be made up of pilots, on-board
engineers, navigators, communications specialists, and doctors. The
second category will consist of scientific and technical specialists se-
lected for specific missions peculiar to the flight program. Thus, there
Khilov, K. L. Some problems of evaluating the vestibular function of aviators and
cosmonauts. Space Biology and Aerospace Medicine (USSR) No. 5, 1974. 47-52.
2 DeHart, R. Biomedical Aspects of Soviet Manned Spaceflight. Op. Cit. 32.
'516 Link, M. M. et al. Selection of Astronauts. In: Foundations of Space Biology and
Medicine. Op. Cit.
16 Caidin, M. Red Star in Space. The Crowell-Collier Press, 1963, p. 212-213.








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1. Photography of the solar corona and zodiacal light against the back-
ground of the night sky (U)
A number of shots of the night and dusk sky with the sun at differ-
ent angles behind the Earth's horizon (conditions of solar eclipse by
the Earth) were taken in an attempt to find coronal rays at large
angular distances from the Sun.
2. Ih ,st' i;ation of refraction and transparency of the upper layers of
the atnmosph(vc (U)
Atmospheric refraction was determined from solar disc image flat-
tening in photographs taken of the Sun as it rose and set behind the
Earth's horizon. Photographs were also taken of setting stars.
3. Photography of dayt;me and dusk horizon (U)
Visual observ-ation and photography of light effects in the vicinity of
the spacecraft were carried out in an attempt to determine the char-
acteristics of light-scit tering by atmospheric air, investigate various
layers of aerosol, investigate certain types of clouds, and analyze the
dependence of altitude aerosol distribution on geographical and
meteorological factors.
4. Microorgavniisw Growth (U)
To study the effects of weightlessness and space radiation and the
Earth's mnginetic field on the growth of microorganisms, a culture of
protea vulgaris was placed in a thermostatically-controlled capsule
known as a "Biokat" and observed.
5. Fish embryonic development (U)
To study the growth and development of water animals under space
conditions, regular aquarium fish as well as their fertilized roe were
inserted into "Biokat" aquaria for observation.
6. Gte tic Experimr nts (U)
In order to study the effects of weightlessness on cell division and
genetic mutation in biological organisms, various types of seeds were
placed in one of the "Biokats" and observed.
7. Artificial Solar Eclipse (J)
A series of onboard photographs taken from the Soyuz of the solar
corona "atmosphere" around the Apollo while it eclipsed the Sun pro-
vided a record of the first solar eclipse produced by man. This experi-
ment was of particular interest to scientists because of the relative in-
frequency of naturally occurring solar eclipses.
8. Ultraviolet Absorption (J)
To measure the concentrations of atomic oxygen and nitrogen in
space at the altitude of the mission, different types of mass-spectrom-
eters were used on board. The method of resonance absorption within
the ultraviolet spectrum was employed to determine the densities of
these components of the outer atmosphere.
9. Zone-forming Fungi (J)
In order to study the effects of space flight factors on biological
rhythms, two cultures of the Pushchino strain of Actinomyces levories
(fungi) were observed. Each had been cultivated within different
time zones (United States and Soviet Union) approximately 9 hours
apart, 7 days prior to launch.


approximately 2 meters high, and was equipped with flood lights to
take a surface picture.
Preliminary findings suggested that the clouds through which it
passed were 30 to 40 kilometers thick, with R base 30 to 35 kilometers
high. The upper layers may have contained hydrogen chloride and
hydrogen fluoride, while farther down there may have been bromine
and iodine. The surface pressure was about 90 Earth atmospheres and
the temperature 485 C.
The real surprise was to find that the lighting was as bright as
Moscow on a cloudy June day, so that the floodlights were not required.
Some 15 minutes after landing, a television panoramic picture began
to ei erge on Earth. There was no noticeable dust. and the picture w:,s
quite clear even without further processing. Details were good out to
50-100 meters. There was a scattering of rocks 30-40 cm acro.-s, and
a large stone on the apparent horizon. The panorama generally reached
out to 160 meters, and the horizon may have been 200-300 meters away,
but this was in doubt and probably an understatement. There was a
defined curvature between surface and air at this horizon. The fact,
that rocks cast shadows suggested that direct sunlight was reaching
the surface, in contrast to the expected solid cloud cover. Surprisingly,
also, the rocks were not eroded, but showed sharp cleavages as if
relatively young.
Because the landing occurred on the sunlit side away from Earth,
the data had to be relayed from the surface to the orbiter for further
relay to Earth. Withi the Sun close to the zenith, it was believed the.
light was probably 20 to 25 times as intense as during the Venera 8
mission where the Sun was only 4.5 above the horizon.
4. Landing of Venera 10
On October 23, Venera 10 was divided into separate lander and
orbiter. The lander arrived on October 25. It approached its landing
site at a 20 angle. The temperature rose to 12,000 C. and the dynamic
pressure reached 168 G's during aerodynamic braking. At 60 kilo-
meters, the parachutes opened, and then we were dropped at about 49
kilometers. At 42 kilometers, the pressure was 3.3 Earth atmospheres
and the temperature was 158 C. At 15 kilometers, the pressure was 37
Earth atmospheres, and the temperature was 363 C. Some 75 minutes
after entry began, the landing came at 0817 Moscow time. After this
the lander operated 65 minutes on the surface. It had also been pre-
cooled inside to minus 10 C., and its interior temperature at landing
was 23 C., and its pressure was 2 Earth atmospheres. The surface
pressure was 92 atmospheres and the temperature was 465 C. The
wind was 3.5 meters/sec. The landing occurred about 2,200 kilometers
away from the Venera 9 lander.
As with its twin. Venera 10 was successful in sending back a
panoramic view of its surroundings. Picture transmission was over
by 0922 Mo scow time, and was relayed via the accompanying orbiter
craft. This time the view showed large pancake rocks, possibly with
cooled lava or other weathered rocks in between. At the control center,
the telephotometer picture emerged from the receiving machine on
paper tape. with breaks every so often to permit other data to be
received. It took about an hour for the picture to be received.


still come, the best guess now is that one of these days, we shall see a
successful flight of a very large vehicle. After the troubles it lhas al-
ready experienced, one can imagine a possible redesign effort and also
major steps to increase testing, reliability, and simplified operations to
insure that so expensive a vehicle will do what is intended of it.
2. A dd;tions to the Veh icle Stable
Studies by Western observers have suggested that in many instances
there is a product improvement trend in Soviet launch vehicles which
allows the upgrading of their capabilities over a period of time. But
perhaps some existing models can be pushed only so far at reasonable
cost and risk. Hence, some Western observers postulate that we shall see
new additions to the known types. For example, many of the Western
analyses of expected Soviet missions suggest that the D class vehicle is
not quiite equal to some useful missions, and a vehicle larger than D but
not as large as G would be a useful gap filler both in Earth orbit and in
deep space work. Until such a vehicle appears or its facilities are evi-
dent, considering the Soviet penchant for secrecy, it remains highly
speculative to assume its certainty.
3. Use of High Energy Fuel in Rockets
The Russians have not been in any hurry to move to high energy
fuels as we understand them, because they had the early advantage of
bigger capacity in their conventional rockets. Also, high chamber
pressures were fairly typical so that they got quite a bit of performance
from these engines. It is really a surprise that a decade behind the
Americans, we have not had any good indication of Soviet operational
use of hydrogen-oxygen combinations. In general, they are content to
cluster large numbers of engines of moderate size as they need more
thrust. Perhaps since they have not taken the fairly obvious and clean
route to use of hydrogen and oxygen, it is even less likely that we shall
see early Soviet use of hydrogen-fluorine, metallic fuels, or other
exotic and toxic types.
4. Nuclear and Electric Rockets
There is no good evidence in the public domain to answer how vig-
orously the Russians are pursuing development of solid-core nuclear
fission rockets, even though they are well aware of the possibilities and
of previous U.S. efforts in this regard. One can assume that at least
paper studies and breadboard engines have been tested, as in keeping
with Soviet status as a leading space power. Soviet spokesmen of the
caliber of Glushko have stressed the important place nuclear power
can hold.
Electric rockets have a potential both for station-keeping and for
gradual acceleration on very long flights. Here there is more evidence
that Soviet work continues actively in flight tests. Preceding chapters
have given examples of several classes of flights which have included
electric rocket systems. Those relying on solar cells provide measurable
changes of orbit, but not very large increments of velocity. Future sys-
tems may do more, though to date the only nuclear power sources
announced or circumstantially suspected have been radioisotope ther-
mal generators (RTG's), applying the heat from radioisotopic decay
and not chain reactors of the full-scale fission type.


ight marginally sup)lort a tall rover oni Mars, but thie rover iie.lf
would need a new degree of atitoniation becaisi, any hIiiiall o)per'ttor
would be too far away in time for round trip signals to guide siuch a
vehicle under all circumstances. Perhaps even wit hout fill aitonim t ion
such a device might send back some picttires of the immediate topog-
raphy in its path, then receive the command to move forward within
first piwl ii range, stop again to take a new incremental forwar(l look,
and after Earth consideration move forward again, without too much
ril.: of driving up against a boulder or tackling too steel) a slope. Ice-
turning a sample would require overcoming a greater gravity barrier
than on the Moon, plus accelerating to a speed to Fpermit return to
Earth, with more complex fine tuning of the return path, and severe
energy constraints on the times missions could be performed still to
get bar'k to Earth.
If the Russians during the decide upgrade their planetary efforts
to use of the G class launch vehicle, then there would be a capacity to
make unmanned round trips to planets and to put more ambitious
experiments on the surface of planets. Venus on the surface is not very
promising for longer duration experiments because of the high heat.
But experiments which might float in the dense atmosphere but in a
lower temperature range might endure for considerable periods. Mars
does not seem to present as great obstacles to longer term study as the
surface of Venus, unless the phenomena of large dust storms turn out
to be a problem.
To date, the Russians have only talked about missions elsewhere in
the solar system, and not conducted flights equivalent to the U.S.
flights to Mercury, Jupiter, and Saturn. The D class vehicles are capa-
ble of supporting Mercury exploration, and while a more energetic
final stage might be required, the basic lifting capacity of these vehi-
cles also would support flights to Jupiter and beyond. Should the G
class vehicles become available for a "grand tour" type mission with
suitable final staging, then the kinds of missions for the late 1970's
once talked about for Saturn V in the United States would be possible,
witli visits to a number of the outer planets over a period of years. At
the moment it seems unlikely the G vehicles will be ready for such use
in this decade, or that the priorities would accord it such assignment
considering all the other reliability uncertainties in such a flight.
There are other missions which the Russians have acknowledged as
being of potential interest. These include a flight out of the plane of
the ecliptic by first making an approach to Jupiter: a flight to a comet:
and a flight to a planetoid, or a landing on the satellite of another
planet such as Phobos, Deimos, or a Jovian moon.
An extrapolation of past levels of Soviet planetary activity sug-
gests that over the next decade or two, there will be fresh important
Soviet advances in the planetary field. After a disheartening record
of failures, they have persevered, and many of the flights are now
successful, so that their existing commitment of resources even with-
out a larger effort may be matched by a growing return of useful
1. ,O?/'I,Z
By now, Sovuz has evolved into several types of craft to fill several
different needs. It may be useful to examine some of these categories.


With the passage of time, one is led rather strongly toward a parallel
to the situation of military Kosmos flights which match the Meteor
flights. If so, then Kosmos 174 and 260 were not Molniya flights, but
some new, military mission. This viow is strengtlhened by the fact that
more recently eacch year a single flight with a KoHsTios name in the
Molniya pattern is launched from PleseotsL;. IWhile all the current
Molniva 1, 2 and 3 family launching are conducted at an inclination
of 62.8 to 63 degrees, every one of them has an apogee over 40,000
kilometers, almost an average of 40,800 kilometers. But each of the
four Kosmos flights at this inclination lhas an apogee of 39,000 kilom-
eters approximately, most typically 39,400 as a average value. This
seems fairly convincing that they are not Molniya failures. Even more
convincing, the Kosmos flights have not been in the right planes to fit
the patterns described by Perry and Perkins.
One can only speculate as to the mission if it is not communications.
The United States has given some prominence in testimony before
Congress to its early warning satellites which are placed in 24-hour
synchronous orbits to give warning of all space and missile launching,
with information on trajectory and type signatures, particularly in
infrared. This is the same kind of orbit that the United States uses for
most of its current communications satellites. Because the Russians
have the same need for early warning to supplement their home
ground-based radars, it seems only natural with their most frequent
use of inclined, eccentric orbits for communications, that they would
transfer this proven technique to their early warning needs as well.
The 12-hour orbit with its two high lobes in the northern hemisphere
would be very good in supplying wide coverage in those regions where
missile operations would be most likely. On one daily pass, all of North
America would be in view, plus coverage of the arctic; on the other
pass, all of Eurasia would be in view plus coverage of the arctic.
Again, this is a mission that cannot be confirmed from public sources
of information, but the mission need is so obvious and the usefulness of
the satellites is such a good fit that this analysis is reasonably satisfy-
ing fs a working hypothesis until proven otherwise.
A parenthetical footnote can be added: The D-l-e vehicle is not
known to have been dedicated to military uses, except for the military
manned space station, but perhaps with the upgrading of capacity
common in other missions, it must be recognized that the next time a
few years hence a review of this nature is prepared, the picture will be
changed. It may be concluded that the Molniya 1-S in 24-hour syn-
chronous orbit is the first of military satellites in fixed positions in
lpan1lel to military Molniya 1 satellites in 12-hour orbits. Likewise,
Kosmos 775 also in 24-hour synchronous position may be an engineer-
ing test for Statsionar "civilian" communications satellites, or it might
be the first of a series of military early warning satellites put up in
parallel to Statsionar, in the same way there are parallels between Mol-
niva eomsats and these similar Kosmos early warning orbits.
Table 6-10 summarizes the A-2-e Earth orbital missions, plus the
Elektron A-1 missions, to compare and contrast these several uses.


larly the individual's ability to relate to others. Special training can
,enhance the latter quality.'
One of the classical approaches to the psychological preparation
and evaluation of cosmonauts has been isolation, confinement, and re-
stricted activity (hypokinesia and hypodynamia) training. This has
been carried out in the so-called "Chamber of Silence", a soundproof
(anechoic) chamber in which the trainee is obliged to spend days at a
imle in strict isolation. This solitary confinement and relative inac-
tivity is designed to test the psychophysiological and emotional sta-
bility of the subject. During the exposure, the trainee lives and works
;an altered work-rest cycle corresponding to the anticipated spaceflight
mission. Exposure times have ranged from 7 to 15 days for cosmonauts
who participated in the Vostok program. Medical and psychological
data are gathered throughout the exposure with emphasis on func-
tional and behavioral changes caused by the experiment. Thus far, it
has been concluded that all trainees have exhibited a high level of emo-
tional and psychological stability and have adapted well to the vari-
ous stresses. Special sets of physical exercises, including isometrics and
exercises conducted with the aid of a bicycle ergometer and rubber
expanders have been incorporated into the spaceflight program."
Simulator training also falls within the sphere of psychophysiologi-
cal preparation. Table 4-3 shows the various types of training devices
from which psychophysiological data is derived and demonstrates,
once again, that behavioral observations are incorporated into virtu-
ally all phases of the cosmonaut training program.'"

Dynamic simulators, Fixed simulators,
Functional simulators Specialized simulators Complex simulators

Spacecraft instruments and other systems- Control of life support (ecological) Space station.
Manual control.......................... -------------------Approach mooring, and rendezvous Multimanned spacecraft.
with other objects or spacecraft.
Life support system-.................... ---------------Landing and takeoff from the moon, 1-man spacecraft.
Mars, and other planets.
Optical equipment....-----. ------------... .. Specialized systems (EVA)..- ---
Radio equipmernt--..---------..-------- Piloting and navigation............-------------.
SOURCE: Leonov, A., etal., Psychological features of the activities of cosmonauts; Moscow: Navka Press, 1971, pp 54-66.

In the opinion of P. V. Simonov, a specialist in space-crew psychol-
ogy, simulator training in which malfunctions are programmed and
special training for the most probable emergency situation should be
viewed as the most important aspects of the cosmonaut training pro-
gram and the most effective way of preventing neuroemotional stress.
The development of skills should reach such a degree of perfection
that optimum performance should be assured in the absence of con-
firmatory feedback. As expressed by cosmonaut Khrunov:
Sometimes it happens that a certain individual does everything completely
correctly, but he is found to seek confirmation that this is true. If there is no
such feedback, he becomes confused and begins to make mistakes. Another in-
6o Psychological compatabllity of international crews. Medical Gazette (USSR), April 12,
1974, p. 4 (FRD #1767).
61 Link. M. M. et. al. Astronaut training. Op. Cit.
02 Leonov, A. et. al. Psychological Features of the Activity of Cosmonauts. Moscow.
"Nauka" Press, 1971. p. 54-66.


achieved about 1.83 km/sec, nuid hence could have been related to t'-t3
not of a Soviet flight to the Moon and return, but to a lunar findingg
and ret urn to lunar orbit.
Stephen Ashworth challenged the Woods thesis on the grounds that
Soyuz was not sophisticated enough to support lunar operations, con-
sidering its launch, navigation, propulsion, and environment control
limitations. He cited disparaging comments carried in Aviation Week
which appeared as ASTP-related Soyuz data became available. Ash-
worth did not explain how Zond variants of Sovuz could be used for
circumlunar flights, although these flights were simpler than missions
which additionally included lunar orbit or lunar landing operations.
The James Oberg review renews his theme published earlier that the
Russians intended to be the first to land men on the Moon, also noting
that Soyuz had been modified by omission of the work compartment,
the substitution of a heavier heat shield, and the addition of a high-
gain antenna, all of which required use of the larger D class launch
vehicle rather than the A-2 since these payloads were sent around the
There are continuing studies of these issues, not yet in print. David
Woods and Charles Vick are trying to refine our understanding of the
Soyuz engineering with the help of new Soyuz data now available
through the ASTP joint mission. Considering the fully fueled weirl t
of Soyuz is beyond the capacity of the A-2 rocket, Vick wonders
whether it was not planned from the outset that Soyuz would be
launched by the D class rockets, with only preliminary, pa itly fueled
tests using the A-2. There is no sign of any replacement for the A-2
as a launch vehicle for Soyuz permitting a fully loaded Soyuz to be
launched, and the D class seems oversized for Earth orbital work by
k. Further Variants of Soyuz.-Soyuz evolution may still be con-
tinuing. Kosmos 670 and Kosmos 772 were man-related tests of un-
known purpose. Kosmos 670 flew at an inclination not previously used
by A-2, about 50.6 degrees, and it stayed up three days. Kosmos 772
flew at the ASTP inclination of 51.8 degrees and also stayed up three
days. In November 1975, Soyuz 20 was launched at 51.6 degrees, and
it spent two days making a rendezvous and docking with Salyut 4. As
an unmanned ship, it was described as testing the possibilities for
future ferry craft which could resupply stations, carry crews being
rotated, or perform emergency rescues.
One further improvement in a ferry not yet demonstrated for sure
is that of fuel transfer, although General Shatalov spoke of this in
1974 in Houston. Another useful step would be to enlarge the carrying
capacity of Soyuz from the present two up to three or more. If indeed
the Russians feel confident they can make a succession of ferry flights,
unmanned in either or both directions, they may not need to adapt
Soyuz to carry more than at present. Any real change would involve
so extensive a redesign as to constitute a new ship.
I. Overall Design Cosilerate;ons.-In retrospect, it is interesting to
review the considerations which have shaped the capabilities of each
of the manned craft to date, for the light this may throw on future
developments. There have been fairly compelling issues in both the
United States and the Soviet Union in this regard.


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5. Willingness to Subordinate Immediate Consumer Gains
Although some of the choices between putting the national economic
product to work for consumers and for various capital and public
interest projects differ from country to country, often the variance.
are governed as much by the economic and material conditions as by
publicised ideology. For example, the United States builds much of
its philosophy and practice around supplying goods for private con-
sumption, and looks to participative private ownership of the iicails
of production through large corporations with widely-held stock. At
the same time a large share of its total enterprise involves public fi-
nancing of common services, including defense, welfare, provision of
roads, and other public works. Also, many of the earnings of its private
corporations are not paid out as dividends but are reinvested to fur-
ther expansion of those enterprises. In Japan, the rate of reinvestment,
as an alternative to direct private consumption, is very high indeed
and accounts for much of the fueling of the remarkable Japanese
economic growth machine both in advanced technology and in straight
forward expansion. But even so, consumers in Japan have been close
to universally equipped with color television sets, power washing
machines, and refrigerators. Japan, like the United States, has also
acquired a considerable amount of pollution and urban blight.
In the Soviet Union there has been an explicit subordination of
consumer welfare in the present order to build "Communism"-
very much what used to be scornfully called "pie in the sky" by West-
ern labor agitators of an earlier age. Heavy industry has long en-
joyed a priority over expansion of consumer goods and housing. When
there are shortfalls in five-year plans, they have tended more often
to be in consumer goals than they have been in heavy industry. At the
same time, the lot of the Soviet consumer has been substantially im-
proved over the 1930's, the World War II period, and the earlier post-
war years. Consumers know they are better off, and most of them do
not realize they are behind the improvements of their own client states
in Eastern Europe. But if their expectations rise sufficiently, the pre-
vious pace of capital investment, including work in space, might be
risked in some degree.
Philosophically, however, there may still be a willingness to
recognize a certain amount of psychic income provided to individuals
from community expenditures as well as from direct private consump-
tion. Just as the poor peasant in some countries may take pride in
beautiful cathedrals, the Russian on a waiting list for a washing
machine, a refrigerator, or a car, may still gain some meaningful
benefits from handsome rapid transit systems, from extravaganzas
in Red Square on May Day, and from the prominent accounts in
Pravda and Izvestiya or on color postage stamps that show how the
Soviet Union is exploring the cosmos. Already accepting the concept
of personal denial in the present for Communist pie-in-the-sky later
on, the space program as a long term investment may have better luck
in the Soviet Union than it will in a Western society that wrmts per-
sonal goods and services in the immediate present and whose economists
apply ten percent discount rates to future benefits from space which
make it "objectively" illogical to put capital into space systems that are
the least bit imaginative or long term..


a. Ferry.-There is a ferry version without solar panels and with
modest maneuvering capability which can serve to resupply Salyut
space stations. Relying on chemical batteries, it can operate inidepend-
ently for about three days, but attached to a Salyut, may lie dormant
for up to 90 days, until it is needed for return to Earth.
b. Independent Mission.-A second version of Soyuz has solar
panels, and can conduct experiments and tests that either are not
suitable for a Salyut, or can be done when a Salyut is not available.
The flight of Soyuz 13 was of this type, and the specialized ASTP
Soyuz 19 was also in this category.
c. Component.-It is less certain what the exact role of Soyuz may
be as a component in other, more complex missions. For example, the
Zond circumlunar flights may have stood alone as modified Soyuz, or
they may have been building toward more advanced missions involv-
ing the Moon. Another obscure example relates to Kosmos 379, 382,
398, and 434. These may have been testing parts of Soyuz, or may
have used other man-related but different hardware. Kosmos 159 may
also have tested some Soyuz component.
d. Docking Mod(s.-There may have been as many as five different
types: active docking with probe; passive docking with receptacle;
active docking with probe, plus hatch; active/passive with androgy-
nous connection and hatch; no docking gear.
e. Tankage.-The first nine Soyuz carried a torus tank which may
have been jettisonable, and in any case, the Zond payloads and the
later Soyuz do not have this fuel tank.
/. Solar Panels.-Not only do the ferry craft lack solar panels, but
those with panels have two types. The Zond and ASTP Soyuz 19 have
shorter panels with three segments each. The Soyuz at least up
through 11 have four sep-ments to these solar panels. A few cannot be
classified in the absence of pictures.
g. WVor Moddule.-All regular Soyuz carry a work compartment.
while the Zond variant did not.
h. Heat Shield.-The heat shield is detachable, and is dropped after
reentry and presumably at about the time the parachute is deployed.
It is possible that the Zond variant uses a heavier heat shield to cope
with the higher reentry velocity.
i. Seats.-PresumAbly originally the regular Soyuz all had three
seats, while the Zond may have carried only one seat. From Soyuz 12
on, all Soyuz have carried two seats, in order to carry men wearing
spare suits instead of coveralls.
All of these variations are important to understanding what Soyuz
may have been intended to do and what it may be able to do in the fu-
ture. Albo there may be clues as to whether the ship was designed from
the outset to perform many different missions or whether thesp evolved
out of experience and necessity. Analysis of the possibilities by West-
erners is closely intertwined with interpretations about Soviet inten-
tions for other missions and spacecraft which will be turned to in the
pages ahead. This makes any discussion somewhat complex and over-
lapping. See Table 7-1 for a summary of suspected differences among
Soyuz-related spacecraft.


sanitary-hygiene area which is separate from the rest of the rooms and
has forced ventilation.
The Soviet press release did not mention the largest piece of equip-
ment on b- 'ard Salyut 4, the 'pace telescope. From ohier sources its lo-
cat ion in the center of the large cylinder is known.
Although both Soyuz 17 and 18 docked with Salyut in the usual
manner, with manual control being engaged at 100 meters, the Rus-
sians announced that manual control could be activated as early as
200-300 meters from the station (although this might not always be
wise since deviations in the con rse could occur) or the entire operation
could be carried out automatically. They suggested the latter method
was not always feasible due to an area of "silence" where a crew can
respond more quickly than an automatic sen ing device.
b. Sowtz 17.-The launch of Soyuz 17 came at 2153 GMT on Janu-
ary 10, 1975. Its crew, Lt. Col. Aleksey Gubarev and Flight Engineer
Georgiy Grechlko, were boosted into an initial low orbit which by the
fifth rvrlution was raised to 354 x 293 kin, inclined at 51.6 with a
:90,7 mini,,te period. At this point, Salyut was in a 350 km circular
wibit, so two maneuvers were required to put Soyuz into a docking
position. The actual docking occurred at 0125 GMT January 12 in the
usual manner.
The significantly higher orbit of this mission suggested that its tasks
were astrophysical in nature, and indeed the Russians announced the
following projects for the space crew: research into the physical proc-
esses and phenomena in outer space, Earth resources photography,
medico-biological research, and testing of the station's systems and
Communications were supported by the Molniya satellite and three
tracking ships in the Atlantic: the Akademik Sergey Korolev near
Sable Island off Canada's east coast, and the Ristna and Nevel in the
southern Atlantic.
During the 30 day mission, the cosmonauts followed a cycle of six
days of work and one of rest. They typically ate four small meals
daily, with one-half hour of exercise before breakfast, one hour be-
tween breakfast and lunch, and one hour between lunch and dinner.
No shower was provided, so the cosmonauts washed themselves with
moist gauze napkins moistened with lotion. Shaving was accomplished
with either a safety razor or an electric one which sucked the whiskers
into a container. During the flight, Gubarev lost 2.5 kg of body weight
while Grechko lost 4.5 kg. Physicians explained the flight engineer's
greater loss as a result of extra work performed at the expense of sleep.
At 0608 GMT on February 9, Soyuz 17 undocked from Salyut and
at 1103 GMT landed 100 km northeast of Tselinograd. The landing
apparently took place in a blinding snow storm, with wind velocities
up to 20 meters per second, a visibility of 500 meters, and a ceiling of
250 meters. Despite the adverse weather, rescue teams were on the
scene immediately, and within ten minutes the cosmonauts were on
board a helicopter.
The announced aggregate weight of the scientific apparatus on this
,mission was 2.5 tons, and was used for the following experiments:
Medical.-A veloergometer (apparently part of the Polinom appa-
ratus) was used to measure and predict the functioning of the cardio-
tvascular system, tone of the blood vessels, venous circulation, and


approaches include immersion in water, including diving, free-fall
parachute jumping, training on a special apparatus which simulates
a support-free state, and prolonged bed rest and confinement.48 49
As is typical of linear and angular accelerations, human tolerance
of weightlessness is subject to considerable individual variation. Some
Western observers have noted that up to 50 to 60 percent of subjects
exposed to brief periods of weightlessness during parabolic flights
have experienced vertigo and nausea. Many of the subjects had no
flying background. On the other hand, of 39 Russian flyers exposed to
such flights, only one experienced unpleasant sensations.
It has been established that there are three general categories of
individual response to short-term weightlessness: 1) No response or
sensations of euphoria and well-being; 2) illusory sensations after 12
to 15 exposures; and 3) symptoms of discomfort experienced imme-
diately upon exposure with subsequent difficulty in adapting to the
factor. In the early phase of the Soviet spaceflight program, individ-
uals in the third category were commonly eliminated from the train-
ing program. Later, it was discovered that most persons, even those
with initially low tolerance, gradually adapt to this factor so that
they presquni:,bly need not be eliminated from further training.51
Short-term weightlessness training by cosmonauts ta1:es place both
in small, single or two-siat aircraft as well as in large, multi-engined
aircraft such as the TUT-104.52 The larger aircraft are call,'I "flying
laboratories" wherein fully outfitted cosmonaut trainees can simulate
actual spaceflight situations such as extravehicular activities (EVA).
Soviet cosmonauts are exposed to as many as 30 such flights. One
Soviet cosmonaut reportedly completed 350 hours of total flying time
(including weightlessness training) and conducted more than 100
parachute jumps.53
The more experimental aspects of the problem of weightlessness
simulation will be discuioed in the section devoted to acceleration and
6. Physical ad Surdival Training.
The physical training proor, m for Soviet cosmonauts includes both
mandatory and voluntary regimens, whereas in the United States
astronaut program, physical training is purely voluntary. The vari-
ous mandatory exercise regimens for cosmonauts are designed to
increase tolerance of specific spaceflight factors. For acceleration tol-
erance, gymnastics and exercises on special equipment such as the
Loping swing (a vertically rotating swing) and trampoline are
conducted. To increase vestibular tolerance, there are midriff strength-
ening exercises, various acrobatics, swimming, and exercises on swings
and revolving chairs. For hypoxia training, there is track, cross-coun-
try skiing, and swimming. Competitive sports of the cosmonaut's pref-
erence such as basketball, handball, and wrestling are said to develop
emotional stability and concentration.54
48 Nionl vrev, A. Space-Road Without End. On. Cit. p. 47.
49 TAnk. M. and N. N. Gurovskiy. Astronaut Trsining. Op. Cit.
50 Konanov, V. I. Physiology of the sensory sphere of man under the conditions of space-
fligrht On. Cit.
51 Link, M. et al. Astronaut Training. Op. Cit.
52 Thid.
53 The flight of the manned scientific station Salyut 3, Aviation and Cosmonautics (USSR).
No. S. 1974. 6-7 (FRT) #1983).
4 Makarov, P. Flihwt demands training. Aviation and Cosmonautics (USSR), No. 2,
1974, 44-45. (FRD #1 f1,2).



































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hardware attained Earth orbit or "e%-ape", not on whether the pay-
loads functioned and returned data. There is no public basis for classi-
fying by operational effectiveness the payloads of iiost of the Soviet
flights and those of the U.S. Department of Defense.
There were two choices open to the analyst in estiiiating the unre-
ported and unimmeasurable Soviet or Chinese failures. One was to com-
pile a list of rumors (as hlas been done by J. A. Pilkington in the
United Kingdom) ; the other was to argue that development of a com-
mon technology has probably moved at a somewhat similar pace in
different countries, and therefore the known failure rate of the United
States could afford order of magnitude ratios to apply to the records
of those countries which do not admit to failure. The latter course
has been followed. Neither the rumor approach nor the common ratio
approach can be counted upon to be accurate. What would not be satis-
fying would be to accept uncritically the oft-repeated early Soviet
claim that their program unlike the American has no failures. In the
1970's the Russians issued a feature length motion picture. "The Tam-
ing of the Fire", which was a fictionalized account of the life of rocket-
eer Sergey Korolev, and this included footage of one spectacular near
launch site failure after another, to reflect the problems of the days
Korolev was developing the standard launch vehicle. The pictures
appeared to be genuine, and in any case represented a shift in policy
by acknowledging that all space programs have their difficulties. The
directly measurable Soviet failure rate for their deep space prograni
runs higher than a simple ratio comparison with the United States
would suggest, but this may have something to do with their use of
the orbital launch platform technique, and poorer worldwide support
facilities for this phase of their flights.


Medical.-The Soviets are especially interested in blood circulation
to the. brain in a weightless environment (blood tends to redistribute
itself towards the upper part of the body in the absence of gravity).
In the Levka (Lion's Cub) experiment, the cosmonauts stretch a
special expander with a force of 15 kg at a rate of 30 times per minute.
The heart responds by pumping more blood, and electrodes on the
cosmonauts measure the response in cerebral vessels. The response is
recorded by telemetric devices.
Other Biological.-Oazis-2 consists of two interconnected cylinders
for the study of regeneration. One cylinder cultivates water-oxidizing
bacteria which use hydrogen from water electrolysis for growth. Oxy-
gen is formed here and passes into the second cylinder containing
urobacteria (which break down urea). The urobacteria absorb the
oxygen and release carbonic acid which in turn is passed back to the
first cylinder and used for synthesis of biomass. Thus the waste prod-
ucts of one type of bacteria are the initial material used by other
bacteria to accumulate protein mass: regeneration. During Soyuz 13's
flight the biomass increased 35 times. This is important for long dura-
tion spaceflights where food, air and water might be regenerated so
vast quantities of these perishables need not be carried on board.
Higher plants studied during this mission were chlorella and duck-
weed. Chlorella absorbs carbon dioxide and returns oxygen to the
air, so the Russians want to see how well it grows in space, since ani-
mals, including people, exhale carbon dioxide and need oxygen to
breathe. Duckweed is interesting because in the winter it goes into
hibernation and exists in the form of turions, small bodies with in-
hibited vital activity. In the spring the turions multiply by division
and again become duckweed. The cosmonauts put turions into a vessel
and added kinetin to restore the vital activity. They then added a
nutrient to see how the duckweed would assimilate it.
Earth Resources.-The cosmonauts again studied natural forma-
tions on the surface of the planet as well as the atmosphere. For the
former, a nine lens camera which exposes three strips of film simul-
taneously photographed several areas of Earth. Two of the films are
sensitive to visible light, the third to infrared. Each lens has color
filters so many spectra can be taken and selection can be made as to
which are the most valuable for specific missions.
An RSS-2 spectrogroTaph studied the atmosphere by photographing
day and twilight horizons. This can lead to better weather knowledge
and information on air pollution. In addition, the spectrograph re-
corded the reflection of solar radiation from natural formations on
Astrophiy4cal.-Orion 2, unlike Orion 1, was mounted entirely on
the out-ide of the ship and had a wide field meniscus telescope which
could cover an area 20 degrees square. A canopy surrounded the tele-
scope to protect it from temperature extremes as the ship travelled
into and out of the Earth's shadow, and the optical components were
made of crystalline quartz. A window in the canopy opened during
observation, with exposure times ranging from 1 to 20 minutes.
Designed by Grigor Gurzadyan of Armenia, the telescope is mounted
on a three-axis platform which can stabilize the system with an ac-
curacy of 2-3 seconds of arc. This is vital for successful observation.
Pointing is accomplished by positioning the spacecraft within a few


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everyone that intercontinental missiles are also space weapons. They are fired
via outer space, and the United States, as frequutly stated by the PnIItagon
brass, is constantly increasing their output.2'
In December 1965, the Soviet Union announced test flights of a
"variant of a space vehicle landing system, with sonime elements of the
carrier rockets falling" at the specified Pacific Ocean danger zone.
There was no claim that a payload would be recovered at this loca-
tion.25 This showed that a multistage vehicle of some complexity was
being used. With most systems, the lower stages usually fall in the
Soviet Union, with a final stage and payload perhaps going beyond.
By contrast, this time, a discarded stage was falling in the Pacific,
and the payload, which was suborbital must have been called down by
retrofire into Soviet territory. In light of developments which came
in the next two years, we can surmise that the F class vehicle was being
applied to the early stages of testing what was to become the Frac-
tional Orbital Bombardment System-FOBS.
In May 1966 the Moscow parade still contained the Scrag missiles
and they were still described as orbital, but were given very brief
mention.26 The same was true in the November 1966 parade.27 That
same month, Lt. Gen. Pavel B. Dankevich made passing reference to
the fact that silo launchers could be used for both intercontinental and
orbital missiles, and these missiles could carry warheads ra iing from.
several dozen to 100 megatons of nuclear explosive force.28
On September 17 and again on November 2, 1966, the Russians made
space launching which were the first since January 1963 to be totally
unacknowledged. One can only speculate whether these were launches
which failed their ultimate purpose to the extent of being ignored,
like the Venus, Mars, and Moon flights of 1962-63, or whether they
were not regarded as anything other than related to the military global
rocket program and therefore somehow not necessary to acknowledge.
These flights came out of Tyuratam on a new inclination-49.6 degrees,.
suggesting use of a new rocket or new launch pad or both. Debris or
staging were left at several altitudes. It was even possible that more
than one stage had been deliberately blown up in orbit to protect this
hardware from chance compromise should it later decay nearly intact
in some place it might be recovered.
These two events threw confusion into U.S. information policies
again as similar secret Soviet launches had in 1962. On the earlier
occasion, the Goddard Satellite Situation Report was forced to suspend
publication for many months while officials wrangled over whether
it would endanger security or strain relations if the United States
listed such Soviet launches. That time, the giveaway even to library
readers was that the sequential COSPAR numbers assigned all objects
in orbit were being skipped. This time, those making the decisions
apparently thought the thin to do was to ignore the Soviet launches
by not assigning them COSPAR numbers as well as omittincr them
from the Goddard report. But this did not work either. Objects were
in orbit and astronomers and radar operators were finding them, and
it made it look as if the United States either was playing games or
2 Quoted by TASS, November 10, 1965,1651 GMT.
25 TASS, December 14,1965. 1848 GMT.
Radio Moscow, May 2. 1966.
27 Radio Moscow, November 7. 1966. 0736 GMT.
28 Radio Moscow, November 18, 1966,1430 GMP.


cember 31, 1971, there had been 316 radio sessions with Luna 19. By
January 30, it had completed 1,358 orbits, doing studies of magii. ic
fields, cosmic radiation, solar data, and meteoroids. By March it, at
1300 Moscow time, the count was up to 1,810 orbits, and 516 radio .:--
sions. Emphasis in the release now was on grIvitational studies, whichi
suggested that more elaborate experiments might have shut down bv
that time. On March 19, the report was amplified to repeat the list (of
missions which had been mentioned in January, and to say tliat slec-
tive panoramas of the surface had been taken by canmiera and fasinm1iie
transmission to Earth, covering the region from 30 to 60 S. and
from 20 to 80 E.
On October 3, 1972, Luna 19 had completed over 4,000 revolutions.
It had carried 19 experiments. TASS said it was near the end of its
mission. Findings from radio wave propagjtion suggested a p!".!I IL
around the Moon from the interactions of solar radiation and the
lunar surface. The Luna 19 mission had taught more about the energy
spectrum, and the charge components of cosmic rays in space. Tlie,-
had been over 1,000 communications with the payload. The study of
orbit changes during the mission had helped to map the location of
mnascons. On ten occasions, surges of solar activity were studied, with
the results combined with data from Venera 7 and 8, Mars 2 and 3,
and Prognoz 1 and 2.
Later some more details of the findings were published. The plasma
found near the Moon appeared on the lighted side with the greatr--t
concentration at 10 kilometers altitude. It was detected by using a dis-
persion interferometer sending out coherent signals on 32 cm. and S
cm., with receipt of the signals on Earth. Some 15 sessions had been
held in May and June 1972 to gather the data.
G. LUNA 20
1. Flight of Luna 20
Luna 20 was launched on February 14, 1972 at 0628 Moscow time,
using the D-l-e vehicle and the usual orbital platform technique for
injection into translunar flight. A midcourse correction was made on
February 15, and then it was braked into lunar orbit on February 18.
The orbit attained was 100 kilometers circular, at an inclination of 65
degrees and a period of 1 hour 58 minutes. A day later, the perilune
was lowered to 21 kilometers. On February 21 at 2219 Moscow time,
Luna 20 was braked to a landing at 3 32' N., 56 33' E. in moun-
tainous terrain near the Sea of Fertility. It may be observed that the
landing site was very close to that selected for the failed soft landing
of Luna 18. The braking burn took 267 seconds. Free fall then was
permitted to an altitude of 760 meters. Here, there was a second burn
that lasted until the payload was 20 meters above the surface where
the main engine was turned off, andI small thrust braking took over.
The landing site was about 120 kilometers north of the Luna 16 site,
but in uplands rather than in a mare.
2. Surface Actiuity
After landing, the standard platform turned on its television system
to take panoramic pictures of the surroundings. Then it activated its
extension arm to place its drill on the most promising spot within
reach to drill a sample from hard rock, with the work proceeding i