Portugal (including the Azores) and Spain in search of new directions


Material Information

Portugal (including the Azores) and Spain in search of new directions a report
Physical Description:
vii, 21, 1 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.
Pell, Claiborne, 1918-2009
United States -- Congress. -- Senate. -- Committee on Foreign Relations
U.S. Govt. Print. Off.
Place of Publication:
Publication Date:


Subjects / Keywords:
Politics and government -- Portugal   ( lcsh )
Politics and government -- Spain   ( lcsh )
Politics and government -- Azores   ( lcsh )
federal government publication   ( marcgt )
non-fiction   ( marcgt )


General Note:
At head of title: 94th Congress, 2d session. Committee print.
Statement of Responsibility:
by Senator Claiborne Pell to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.

Record Information

Source Institution:
University of Florida
Rights Management:
All applicable rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
Resource Identifier:
aleph - 025785612
oclc - 02837226
System ID:

Full Text






MARCH 1976 '
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4w,2 0WA HI GT N 1976

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware
PAT M. HOLT, Chief Of Sfa
ARTHUR M. KmL, aChift~

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Washington, D.C., .Fe.&uary 27, 1976.

C~iJ~nan Cminttee on Fore*p Relations,
U.S. Mte, ashington, D.C.
DEAR Onan MR CAR Nlam pleased to submit the enclosed report
on m reenttrip to Portugal and Spain.
My isi toboth countries came at an important timb in the political
devlopentof both of these strategically located countries which
Inth cseofPortugl wih in 1974 emere from 46 yearss of
dicatoshi anew constitution is being drafted parliamentary elec-
tions~~ haebe cheduled for April 25, 1976; and a new President will
be eecte on une 27 of this year. At the same time, Portugal. is
strggintoovercomne massive economic problems and is enevo'
to eetLe pecial concerns of the Azores islands. In Spain, lbrl
izaton as learly begun, and plans are being made for the first
democaticeletions in over forty years.
I hoe thtP my report will prove of value to the Committee in
evalatig eents in* Portugal and Spain and in determining what
Ameic'sroe h aould be in supporting democratic development in
those ~ tocutries. I further hope that may views on the proposed
treat withSpin will be helpful to members of the Conmmitee and
to teSeateasa whole in deciding whether to give its advice and
consnt o te ratiification of that important treaty.



the merianiniser.ttatties, Salaza was usteerringm aPortga
on aneutal cursewhilFrndividutl and Iam*pet uafraid, mon h
Axis.~~~~~ ~ siebnldngfrihn el tof hielp.sumrne tio
As a Delegate osfpenthi PortugueeledCrs and asataeebruI
remember~~~~ bigarsetwchrSpmis tihnsoe tubuent derarys.3
As~~~~ ~o the yervrgesetewrdseeedto pass by wide vitwo
So,~~~~ ~ fowei a atclryitrsingto PrieMisturn tothse contihes
aftr mretha athid f acetur. oreig aairs Jose partiuela conceirn
itiituen areemblyortnduehe heritars
I~~~~~ ~pris was accmpiie by mey wife, Kiiad yM.GedB
my rsposiblitis a aembrlof the Snatero IFeroreg Reaionist
helTg Minste thei prepaeilzon oftisrpot
Both~~~h Ambassadoe FakCrucanAmassdo Spenish Stabler
venencng hemelvs i orertou be t ohei help.
Thepeio Ferur 1 wa sen inPotual an(Fbrar





Sine te rvoutin o Apil25, 1-974, Portugal has undergqy pa
perod f cntiuig cise duin which many in this country feared
.t~a~ton fom f ttartaiansmwas destined to be replaced b~y an
q .Toi crelr frm.Inmy iew ted~eep pessimism about the prospects
f~r'Oe urvvalof dmocacyin ortugal was never just ifie, and re-
in tat cunty hae brne out, my early confidence ex-
presedon he enae fooronApril 18, 1975 that th Portuguese
peope bcaue o thir nnae cmmon sense, conserva~tism and relig-

develomet ws he aiureofthe Communist inspired yutsch of
Noveber 5, 175 hichmarkd a importanit divide in Portugal's
poltial:lie.Wi th cntiuig oqmmunist threat must not be under-
estiate, te Comunstsandthe other Marxist paries of the
extemelef ar ceary o th dfensive and the dmaocratic parties
Itiouguese people and their leaders are
to e cngrtultedon he aythey have gotten themselves onto a
relaivey stblecoure ateran initial period of instability and
vioenc. Ay sciey o peplethat has been in- the darkness of
dicttor hiformor thn to sore years! would understandably
woble.andzi-za a it s t eerged into the ful ligt of freedom,
jus. a a ersn wo -ad eenloked in a dark room for a lonig time
woud fndi dificlt-to alka sraight line if he or she were suddenly
I fat,.itisa rmarabe ahivement that in the short span of two
year Potuga ha ovethrwn n entrenched dictatorship, divested
itslf. ofa lrg coonil epi launched a far-reaching economic
recver, pogrm, stalised heframework for the re-establishment
,of emorac; bguntheproessof returning the military to the bar-
rackl ad stnnnd a ommnis coup-all with virtually no blood-
shed.Wht oher contr ca bost of a similar record? Much remains
to ii one liwevr, na he chevements to date will not be secure
untl.,ubsanc, i gien o te eerging democratic institutions and
t& halth of he eonom i8'estred.
tte yon ilitary officers who over-
tbrw' he 0aeanoregme newwhat thywere against but had no
...c~et iea f hatthe wee fr.hey reacted against thirteen years of
..fstrtiod n te Arian:war wich they vi Iewed as supporting a sys-
Wooffoual apialt~ whch,16eefitted only a very small stratum of
rprtgues socety Theyoun catains and majors also were disturbed

favoed reatentin promotions.
ratic alternative to the Salazar/Cae c
"i" ;~' ;:: ; i ":;;;;"~ iiiii iiil i; ii iii
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stae, he ellorgnized Commundists wer e only tone rp dt
tal th kndf anguage that ther mltary plotter watdt ha.I
expoitng hisrecptivity to'Marxiism, a Commumet atyfr h
d to gain power b infiltrating a milis
ment Whn, aterthe overthrow of Caetano, the armedfrce aei
cler tatthzinended to become the "motor" of peunists were well placed to wield in

p titt po ila support.
The.Decine of omni st P owier.-The Communsthwvr

ovrp...and and wer t-maneuvered 'b
Part. Te Soialsts extracted Commtunist agreem'ent t odn lp
t on April 25, 975 fora Coinstituent Assembly Which woulldraft

anewiiiiconsiituio. InreiiiiitH, t oilioilsts ieid to the sa
of siglelabr cnfederation, Itiersindicl althoughtatlnvle
theris tht te beter organized Communists wou tkeorth
labo moemen aspart of a broader strategy to seizecntrlo h

aid off, hower as the Socialists andt
PopulariDemocratic Party (PPDi scored a stunning vict the
s bly elections of April 25, 1975, wini
voteandtunist and sall alied parties only se19
Socalst, edbyMario Soares were particuarly sue~su nh
lfreedom as the priipal issue dvidingth
ists. Since the April 1975 election, th
bn steadily improvig their poitio
to he oin whrethey may soon be able to take oontr4
Aftr te lecio, Communist excesses, such a thetaevroth
Socilistnewsape Republica and the Catholic radiosatoeRn&
cena, eneate scond thoughts about the CommunistPryo h
par ofthemiltay. Major Melo Antunes, who was pic e
sponiblefor eveoping the political ideology of the g r
Moveent MFA)and is now Foreign Minister, moblie ltW
gypsitonto heCommunist leanings of the then Prm ]it
Vasc Gocales.Vasco Goncalves was eventually indue orsg
and as eplcedlast September by Admiral Pmnheio zvdia
polticl odeat. Then, on November 25, the. Commns it
madethe atalerrr of inspirinY; an attempted coup. Apwnlfoe
seen5 hisposiblity Azeved o had quietly but effec~vl:Cbn.
ttate~ ~ onrsorndiscipline and imjproving the effeciene.;
key Amy unt in isbon. That unit, aided b) the lack ofbodPD~i
su prt or te Cmmunists, broke the back of the couatep*
Vn ll f te eents culminating with the Novembe.2 opitl
captalze n teirinfluence in key power centers-th ilt fe
medi, ad te lbor movement-and quickly Seim oe.ea~;
over thy uneretimated the strength and iifluenceeO t4hlio
Churh ad th ned to develop mass popular tuvport. Ateddih
goodsene an deermination of the Oagt; majority of tePl"6,6

Thus evntsiawPorugalphav borneu yowwomn assessmentumade
mistakeif the United Sates adopted policies ased on the assumptio

thatthePortgitse-have alrady cast their lot for a closed Communist
socety!,ad tat"it would .be unproductive and potentially disas
troalo usin heUnited States to lose our cool and over-react."
Te~exttofSoviet financial support for the Portuguese Commun
istPary rmaisamystery, but whatever its size it appearg 'to hae
been lard ireleant. According to Socialist Party sources, the Com
muni~~~s spn wny times what the Socialists did in the Co' hetituen
AAeblrlecionand yet fared poorly.
ee.4 ~ Noeme 6:5 Portagal has been movn back toward th
ce'trofth pliial. spectrum. This movement hsbeen so fast i
faa:thV her i aninreasing fear that the principal threat to Portu
guesedemoc acymy now come rfrom the exdtreme right. An unstable
Seffect may thus be emerging. It seems clear, ho
6wrgal will beme neither a communist state nora
one. ical stability is mstlikelyrto be fund in thec
soliatiwvfpowr around the parties of the center-left or non-iom-
,munistief That means that the Socialist iPartyb and the PPDe ar
'liel towild~hepreponderance of zpower, although it cnannot be e
cluded tht te oter-esight Center Socia Democratic Party (CDS)
w~ch eemsto b growing in strength, will also play an importan
,.,Ijokig o te uture, a long list of urgent tasks must be addresse
bythePorugusepeople as a whole, their elected representatives, th
govenmen, te plitica parties, the military, business. leaders, an
the hurh beorePortuguese democracy is consolidated. In thisr pro
ces Ah. Uite Sates must play a supportive role-not by intbrerm
ing or oflering o gratuitous advice on the composition of the govertnment
but.' by providing economic assistance and showing patience and
undestadin asthe Portuguese effect nee'ded economic and socia
ebanwo Te Potugese people have clearly demonstrated that de
spite~ ~ thimoitcliexperience resulting from 48 years of~dictator
i~ivhaynowcontitute a very sophisticated and sensible body politi
whic meitshe onfdlence and trust of the American people and th
Unitd Sate Goernment.
"In rde toillstrate the. challenges- facing the Portuguesepeople
and he ew drecions which theyr are seeking, I would like to discus
Staes:ca&do o sist in: rebuilding the, Portuguese economy; the- roe
ofotb~hurc th6role of the military; and Constitutional and politica
.im~ant uatin!of tertitorial integrity and the Azorean inde
PM-dnebque~ionfor discussion i1w Part II of this report.
Pouguese Economy.-In blunt terms, the Portugues
bnov is in asse an& gotting worse. Almost all of the Portugues
O s and political party leaders with whom an spok
AoM ra, htt.te rea test need is to stabalize the economy; otherwis
thetvfl Le~iereaning: threiats from both the extreme Wet and th
Vight., Th

Sk~by o democratic. development is therefore sound

ugakm t V onomicproblems, are usually: blamed on. th
&&e~polriP4purgftd)y ter vrio~s goernmnts-estalishd folow

ing the April 1974 revolution. To a large extent that- mi true, but it
should alsobe borne in mind tath Portugal has sffered frd seous
structural defects in its economy for many yersad enoned an
artificial prosperity under the Salazar/Caetano roguime. Duin those
years, Portugal ran a chronic trade deficit in its balance ioi payments
largely because of food imports. Food production declined in. Pa' a
in the 1960's because somet 60,000< people left the farms each ''yat,
primarily to take 'obs in the boornung economies of the. IEurpean
Economic Community. Receipts from tourism and emigrants' remit -
tances covered the' trade deficit and permitted the country to: ignore
its agricultural problem and the weakness of its exports.eesto. Te
Portuguese banking industry was another source'of weakneso. Although
financially strong, the banks concentrated on the: short-term finoming
of foreign trade sandland speculation to the detriment of leag aerm

iiiiiiiiiliiii ........~

apital vestment in in...dustry

Portugal's low level of unemaployment was algo artificial, as appi 010-
niately 100,000 workers a year left Portuigal in the 1960% U6 work
abroad. In 1974, over one million workers, or approximately one~lidr
of Portugal's labor force, resided abroad, including in: the African
colonies. The swollen ranks of the civil service and the armed forces


fighting in Africa further relieved pressure on, the Salazar/Caetare
regline to develop employment opportunities at home. The Portu see
ec'onomy under Slazar and Caetano was thus living on +orro~vae
When the April 1974 revolution occurred--it could not have come
at a worse time economidally -the international economy was deateri-
orating rapidly, oil prices were rising, Portuguese exports--n ably
textiles-were falling and because .of declining job opportunities

iiiiiiii"" 1"""'"iiss~aii~; iu
abroad the export Portuguese labor fell from an annul rat& of

i100i00ii 0 to 20,000 in 974 thus requiring the Portuguese eno to
provide jobs and housing for a larger work force. With so meany Per_
tuguese still working abroad, further layoffs of overseas Partugyese
workers threatened to result in a large flow of Portuguese war bm
back to Portugal. After the revolution, the employment and housing
problem was further exacerbated by the influx o some 350,000 reas
from Angola, mR8ostM ofwho arrived withfersocsoraktil
skills. Thus, international economic realit~ies and dreolnizatim old
have presented any governmeont--however wise and sautions-4ith
monumental problem s.
T'he arevlutionary procses clearly added to these economie wos,*
Workers felt exploite under the Salazar/Caetsna rRiJand de
manded higher wsages and a horter work week after th re alntl
Wages rose by 42 percent in 1974 and by 30 percent in 0&"t thb
sam'e tune consumiption rose and output fell. 'The obvious result WAS
inflation, which was 'in the range o20-30 perceptmi 1976., Food
shortages also occurred, as the distribution system becam~e dislahoated
and agrarian reform disrupted productionpawtrns...I4
Most distressing of all, new fixed busminss investmen. plummeted
111 1974 to less than one-third of the 1978evl Iestment ma~y eVen
be negative now as capital has fled Portugal &Ad.: IOU lat have
caiiiiiiised production because of bankptcy. d
therefore job opportunities, may thus actually be declihining. Forbn t
firMs that were able to stay in buswiess, ,sharpl risng, ,wgs l0ow~ed
copraeiiiiadihspuiresrii~h ifte~-

prixitte investment capital. Firmts borrowed from the banks to finance,
these mieressed wage bills. Thu, once: again, as in the days of Salazar
and Cletano,--the banks were employing their funds for short-term,
nonproductive uses'.
-q Mtionlisaionprocess also disrupted the Portuguese economy
and contbibuted to the decline in *investment. Although only Portu-
guesie ,fim were to: be nationalized,, some foreign firms were illegally
denupied bywoktrs "as were some Portuguese firms which, because
of theiamn ll size, were supppsed, to be exempted from nationalization.
'The nationalization of bank's had a particularly far reaching, effect.
G ovenmet officals discovered that because 'of the nature of the
Pea asgu~se -ecomeomie structure, characterized by conglomerates of
family Refdoms- -and interlocking corporate relationships, assuming
cantrolufat enabank often resulted in taking control of some 150 other
firms., I wasiold- that the-government acquired control of a half dozen
or soal~wspapers. in this'manner.
i Yor the most part, the relatively few families which controlled the
PNituguese. 'economy left Portugal. This excod us, together with the
feplateeinAt of professional managers by workers committees in
nationahzed or occupied firms, created a large management void
which the revolutionary regime has not been able adequately to> MIl.
M-hn of the nationalized firms have, as a result, either gone bankrupt
or, are operating uneconomically. Moreover, the revolutionary regime
castiaside the investment projects formulated _by, the Caetano govern-
meet, and, did not develop. alternative ones.
., -wag tet -only industry and banlting that underwent nationaliza-
tion and suffered from ilegal occupation. Under an agrarian reform
law, aimed- at .breaking up the large estates in the Alentej o region of
soaherna Bestgal,'land holdings are limited to 1250 acres of dry land
or# 125 acmlsof drrigated land. Holdings in. excess of these amountst
waslvxexpropraited and turned into cooperatives rather than divided
i="gsthe individuallenant farmers who worked the land.
As with nationalized, industry, the criteria for expropriation were
Entpalways.shoumwed and many small farms were seized. The setting
up of cooperative farms was done in the early'days of the revolution
under eGmwunaist leademahip, and became bases for Communist
actiitby. throughout Port' gal. They became areas for storing arms anid
sagn uralsla or the shock troops which the Communists disp4tched
to.L bon and other urban areas. At one point the Alentejo, under the
same enas 'of the Communists and other extreme leftists groups,
becameN irtualy & state within a state.
44ase on, set *in,, however, as farmers inthe north, where small
hddig* ae. the rule and large estates few in number, joined with
hoNd ented: the cooperatives,'m` pressurnkg the authori ties in Lisbon
tart duspend the agrarian reformi law-threatening *in one instance to
cut *f*food: supplies to Lisbon The: Azevedo government has responded
by reaffirming -its support for agrarian reform, Ibut has promised to
"nd dvitions" 'in* its appiaon
As a result of the above developments, the Portuguese gross national
product.(GONP). declined by 6-74 pecent in 1R75; unemloyent rose
to yover 40000 or1 vprxmtl 12I15 percent of thie labor force
(rZoulye equvalent to the unemploYment rate of over 14 percent
in my ow-n state of Rhode Island); and the balance of trade will

probably b inve (ofei byoer$1 biionwn. 1h7e "asan

demandenor Potts igable prouct vleablaod diseruped..pee "l
Tmarketing Wheireas, u in othr e prouaces;o o fall
,,;iii,;; ,,iiiiiiiHiiiiiii; ,isi;;,"""iiii;,,,ilii; ,iiiiiiiiiiiiii ;iliis;,;iiiiiiilii Hi

thihe ms blwPotgeshled worer -coroad bcmeet thamm4 &tdY4"
mefore inotugal and sharplyd reduce almost, a~ll of lanesertivta
ostgayedawa inedroves Cponseqentlythe o foreign curency pertonk
Pborug -al's reservs foove $1quilinmwents. the aetan gos.-ns"
fell)eelomewasqpicklyexhuse relinderoing.sthnecontry~
depeden ornga its sizale buts vlneriay blem g6irsrvst.
Throbe is aetain smpomenu in the procness of eoonougadetroai
whichmusth bee hated i Thue a ecornomy murstn threor em sablie
before, icand be ncsimproved With.nalmostn allnfes reseven:god
Portugal's icomediat problemis one toforeignexcange liudiyt
pay fort essental importreuirlemeyneed smuch as foo (Prua imprt
aboutce ovehene-halfofts fod ore rementl) There is...also the l

term deveomental problem orelatinhege to*nvestmn and: proucivty
il ug~liii' ................... ...................7...

btPortugal moust solve its liquidity probltem firt.h TheisUd
prole is8 tohsef sypom buf oth wieaoknesus o otanti4 agie]tr
sectorthioneed to iduret. Ia rtuern of tourism andemirat reit
to es andr b k the necess ity of ration alizing o..investment. Ir..........

Portugago'sPortugal'srproblems aour e to lreantd cmpex t. b
thsole byer Aisbna rlo, Eve wit atr p hidhlyre strictie ecnoi
austereidy proigrm Potgltahedismcsa.1bilo n o
assistuanc inover the nx ereore so-pimailgn h form of:ndnt mmeta
farrangeentstold coeorta *a nyexchange lossellsemgl w Iooud n
$oprly sale could meet itse liudiaty rquree n of.9 some.u::l as
iats 6 ons ofhlag gold, buhot withu ubtnill ers.n.h
inerntonal gold markedit, Ifthepi of goludity i, fo eanm l:
to e driven bavcek -tCterien of $35 ane ouncte wic praevaeda
yegaris agoPotugals reserves woul bem exhausted Amadta
ths ear.gese emaresultot imoreproduc mitivfor. Poruga to s t
fortun..e in old.......... may..ets.av tosell som go.

orderl Usoe S!es woul prepe to provid advsantag fPotgl as ela te
natornusl wthlre dgoled hmoldngs.ivle r sflos

iiiiiiiiiiiiin cl dii
Portugal. The detaled amounts involvd: areaii~ollowsz
. . . . . . . . . .
F:. i q

;;iEi i~ i i iiii; i iiiiii

I ""iiiliiii 'iiiiliii ; "~ l
[in millions of dollars ill' ;

1.A .6-- -- -- -- --7 7-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 15.0 1 55.0 10.0 55.0.
T a 7 t; -iii- (1 ii) lii .........---- --- --- --- ---....
--- .(14. (1%0) (10.0) (53.0)
.. . .. 1 3 2 - - - - - . .. ..........................................
... 0.0 ... 0 ---............. 0.0

S. ...................... .. .15.... ,,0i
----- ---- ----- ----. 35.0 3110.0. 39 0
on Dc. 195 athozed$50 000,Q of this requested atmt
5l r 1976 for the Angolan refusee airlift.
.AAltoug th~ ifl~nstrtio reuesed 10,00,00 for the transitionalt qtierfr, the Senate autho~ritation provides for
r9 u z n b p to the transitional quarter. Th, Tuin the cae upporting assistance
!/4 o $N,00,00 or$12,00,00 is auhrized.
formlatng ts conmicassistance 'program, the United States
h~s: ben ased y he oruguese GoVerunmert to concentrate-
wiplyI-,elive-on ocil ifrastructurte, leaving the rebuilding -of
ilfdutr*itlifrtiultur~lxglyto the West Europeans. In FY 1976,
US pogrms W1a ra 'l iclue orexample, rat for the relief resettle-
nimtand mplymen of etunees from Angola, and loans an& grants

future, rural development, housing and
urba devlopmnt, ommuity health, education, transportation
Euroean cononic ommunity is providing $187 :nillion in
fec lons o Prtualan the Euiropean Free Trade Association
*if. rvid: aothr $00 illion. Most recently, West Gedrinany

P i i
i~sabfshd, hiatralassstnce program involving $25 million in
emeesiosd iii an $20 mllon in a central bank loan.
0na eftuese goernentofficial told me that, inhtis view, foreign
id a~ie, oityif her isa coherent, coordinated p$lan for utilizing

.............. 11
vh&:zeiedoovenirenthas recognized, this imperative and has

!oii ;;;
set p anoffie tocoorinat al foreign assistance requirements' of the'
varm minstrisin he gverment. In addition, guidelines are being
draw up o aithenextgovrunment, to be elected in April, in planning
and u lamntinga sond >gram utilihzing foreign assistance.
1) -;e str~ly otugal's future lies with the West and
tt en dn peration with its West European allies,
mus rmai cmmtte t poviding the economic assistance which
I neds noe Prtuuese leaders with a Western democratic
-en~ionmus beabl topoint to tangible evidence of Western
s~po i thir.-nes ad -deas: are to prevail. Portugal, after almost
fa& ~htriesof'ooldg o Arica and Asia for national fulfillment,
isredrang o Erop. Te dspersal of Portuguese around the world
1~ ~ 8 nedNosieal help in coping with
itsadjstmntlot ftl toA ew political orientation but a new eco-
nbsnc ad. eogrphi on tswell.
Whda for* asitinee-ill be a&n important factor instabilizing
t~piuwee eelkm inuh remains t& b& done by the Portuguese
th~selas May.: poitiias of both -the left and the right now

V Aiiiiii ..................AAJ U tA A g ~ t
recognize tha thre prcesonainlztnwnto:fr.I theme
Portugese econwom is to ent, e Private enstl
constituts 70 peret of Porugl' inusr-ms he encurge
and both private and publii icmesen craM

.. leady i t is.......... bei

iiiiiiii iiiiiii
retbed M n melean cmonofterrwr
of ntionatpsblized or d yascu inX hrs t ec dbc-nsm
Whethrwrt waxet private bonnershipall iilberstteei sc
tcasesxis nlotg yetcer.I the case o hentonlzemaksah
Fomelth i rsunieyvenr, to be uncrmle adprvteonrsi
orestnor ed.oMeaningfulicomeinesatiomo h eiesihwvr
nowd private be ex-pectd invsmn toksma bepenute

favorable climate for new private '*netet uigta eid
he said, the, government, should takesest n lbrurs n
develop sound, governmkent inestmen rjcs ihave oad
thus encouraging private mineste-VtfolwInhicneto'!
other sources told me that the Portuge vnnn.i
many of the ainestmgent rojects o he tn a
revive some of theme. I a~s ndersadttanivetmt 6oVj
aimed at stimulating private investmets sben rw padwl
be iessed soon.
The Ohurek in Portugal.-The Roman ahlcCucnPrua.
made a conscious decaision ot to beomeivle i tepliiso h
revolutionary process. Rather, it sawadcniugt e-tso:
as one of fostering reconciliation,denighua brts,-d

tive impact on the Church or on......t.... r.......
the whole revolutionary poesse
the Church and reinforce its image. Ee h omnt e kd
the strength of the Church when'theymdaponofecrignr
to the Constituent Assembly election httepstono h imh
would not be threatened if they won. h hrhsfee rmsm:
w ildcat seizures of parish residences andohrpoet,.n t ai.
Renwecenca was seized by workers; bu hrIa eg YF~m
ment directed action against the Cucadal::e y. ezd
properties have been restored.
The Role of the Military-Jut ovr a gteAmdFfw
Movement created' the Councuil of'teEvlioashe% me
ruling body in Portugal and forced tepltclprist,.WM
agreement concentrating political powe nte oni' od ~
next three to five years. Tearmed fre emda httm ir1
resolved to play an active and long-temrl ngvm i
aempedcu of November 25. TheCuni
indeed the military as a whole, is now oiae oald f
tionals" officers who feel that politicesol eIt wpltcm
and that the military should return totebrakasobaspili

w as::..................u s P..arty an d t t fu r he r m l ary em br o


,.i ii .......
meti 'i po .escoud pse a threat to the survival 'of the. armed forces
W-Jin ith hisoutlok the Coutogil has instituted talks with the
poltiW0drie to reise lastzYay 's, pact and is expected to relinquish
rsident and legislature, although some residua


sp ,,,, i, ,,,:,,,,;;=",,, ,urr , ; i iiiiiii ~i ili iiiiiiiiii n" =ili

he military will continue. Those talks were
diswfigto clse henI was in Lisbon, and 'the, political parties
seemd t hav acievd the Council's agreement to all of their de-
mands Morover resonsibility for internal security is to be given

I log it it slf-iledreduction in political influence, the armed
f 0Aesareals enage indramatically cutting the size of the military
estblihmet. hatonc was a 180000 mdanarmhy, for exampile, will
sovft:~ ~ ~ be u ont 6000 Witlh no African wax to fight and a
NATO. cmmimen whch as been nothing more than apaper one,
th" ortouie arm d foce are nowfacing anr identity crisis as they
retrnto:godirin. t a y bin fact, that along with ae healthy
ecoomy poitial tablity will depenI 'on finding a meaningful new
r~l fo th Potugesearmed forces. For -if the young .oficedrswho
fotMA msr~om' he evolution do not find fulfllment inm purely
proiie~onl mliar creer, the temptation toreturnto politicsmay
Portnatly,9 sluton for that problem is close at hand. If Por-
tugas miitay comitent to NATO could be: made a meanningful
ofi.04f mlitry:dispn'e could. be restored through the profes~sional-
ism hic reponibifit for a specific NATO mission could provide;
iflthe"Pottauesa srme forces were to feel involved in a cooperative
m~itky ffot i th deense of the entire NATO area, a real alterms-
Oe t pofti ad leitiadte source of professional pride and
J *tl.,nt ttepttosuggest what kind of NATO task the Por-
tu*6e amedfores ight assume, but an effort should be malde
W~iikiiat th neessrydiscsusions and panning for such a role as
as~pssile ithn1'ATO. Any meaningful role for Portugal will
ob~ousy gnerte rquirement for new military equipm~ent. Most
dbglesentandnees to be replaced. Such equipment needs will
have-U ompte itheconomic development requirements, which
mekmtha ore.71 iliary assistance will be required. I support such
al~fitace bu Tliveit should not be provided by the United
St~iftloi6. urothr:NATO allies have a large stake in t~he develop-
wentof emobacyi~aPortugal. and in Portugal'js assumption of a
*.gr rle i: -AT deense. Consequently, equipping the Portuguese
aiae-f~ce64oul bea cooperative effort in which our European
Cowtift= 4nd itVica Development.-O April 25 of this year,
if H~g& wllythepeole of Portugal will choose their first democratic
egslaur in48yeas.The campaigning for that election is already
tmdrvsy lenthqo~:,th~e constitutronal framework in. which the new
Asseibl wfil opera16 has not been, established. 'There is

n'ew constitutint has ntbenb psceromlotd by-p:5
detialeection will betef Thel Son June27.
fThe Constituent Assemblywhich was elected 'in April .1i7&&

supoed, toe have drawn up whichi tre
tdaytu oflu Weorsa flaloysnt iSqer
exenios havembeen imade incea cotina)hstheflownlomo$

iCo m an s tParty PCP ------ --- --------- --- --- --- -----
Cente Scan vl D e morati Pabrtyat (Ch----------------- 1
Popular temocrti Movefdment l (M pri-----------------

P p lr D eo c rt a t i U npi o n h a U 1 s e ) - - - - - - - - - - -

TheerCqian eu thatAsspembly is clarl dmnaegbteeoer

197 Fofte 20sas ioemn the Ass emby an f-h ete-ih Mi

dhestionyn of deorticdeelCopmnt, tuin, Potuglhv omnig
ev cncntaion of 213er of th.

tyin tand pwrlyl beCoresuibuect t.cange.mhbontttonb
wisth aietatement of fundametal conryiie folwdbahremtos
entitled truaenda in the aondr Dutie, EcnomcOgnztoi o

All country.ls eto o-oiia oerhv enc
Worhe opethat sectinlasabeen partiuldarlm lwbeaskf 8d
fiutyi stipedulatingrthegrle of threpublicdfocsiith oenn
'sintio of cl hales aspecty wasd suspeonded afe hA,

Aredxprcesio Movementrandic h political- pate, rqcA
grethey -imrovied forcmltn the Constiiutio n pro WAri15

nThoe portions ofteliogstithutconompltdtiae elc
.4 "the socioeconounc orgnisatin

heavi con cen veltonpmeme of socealims

leftst oriolentiv noration of bt the contr nih redFre:~
"democracy" rather than "socialism" in recent r*WV4 4bo:;,;:
Cosiuinta mreswl rbbyb oe fitta.teno

of the country.~ LI ,~~~~;~
InteOpnndelrtino unaeta rncpeO

iti tte htPotgli arpbicddc t rnm

te.d ...1Wi
selfintoa clssles soietyand hat ne o. th %ps i .
the state is to sociaiii",;;;; lizete enso poutinan eat.
Of exprssion ad demoratic plitica organi tion re guar Iuwd.
bu'hy r ine o h etv o h tiiio o

landand natural reourcs, aind thebxercise Confidemortipoe

iiiiiirinis. MrsIeovered the..ationalization effected
...... ii
sc Ar 21 are onsired"irreversible coenqruestso


Exceptfor the appaent irhrever wsibleonaturesosted exrpiain
which have taenpac ho Ifapr, theaonttutiong leveatnothegs
lative Asebytodtriehowl r tohe pricpersuset fotho n h
Constiutionare to bapleinthe futuore.Cneunlteplt
ical ~ ha copstino the legislatr and tuhe politiaoresrs tod whic
it~~ a repns ilhe meocre im portant tha whath istted inth
'h natur deofthepresidncy anod the ipowesvsteod in thatofc
will-als b xre imotn atrsghin dittorhp ghey coure ofbohrolt
ical~ teps oetsand eIamconomc eelpent inPrua.TeRstho fa srn
. ...orweakPreident hase notn yetbeenresolvedi wihinh the Consitun
D my discuPrsysions with l memberso the Congstiun Assebl
and'=hgpoli thical panarty ledesIdetected a hathy cciernta
H::: "" I

d ~ b semocayntbe dsrditedio agim si a s duin Ath 1912
interva between thenfall othmnarchye tand the aceso topoe
Francedasrals noty been ignoed Ine wa Floimrcesse byote srn
tion. bymany with, whom Ispioke thatestrongl h o

be re' doi the Prtuguese peopl apprento b carst~e tactical 4'
3WRarics necessrye to renbuild the economy.uetAe
Lo aheadstiouthedA. ladJn lciosadteetbih
men o a emcuraetialy elecplteda goenento the peoped ofortia
an fotunae thratste de cervative parties en bth the rihco dlf
areelled andS detemind toavo idnifcan gimpsitin ofeihril aom
mettle i imosilefr the pattoyasocialid I o amcnidnti thatwicee
demorati pary coalition gofernmocrati parie gDSoverns sPorugl
of a DS-Scialit co;ltion, argul;;ing that~l~ii!li~' the

the ~ contywilcaesourndbueinership cofidec whichtesr Unteor ae
The~ SoilitPrty seemos clearblyito bein thlargest and best o
niz art,-bu colthestong suchpportnerhich thate party achievdih
Constituetiz Asebly ection masbiiy cbnnoisbeaig e Alutd thp ieo
that eetortws gencerally assumeed thrat therocils Part ewas

actu&Uybe onstitutded.
PPD~nd he DS culdmak *'ificnt ain inApri. Sch ain

may biak6 i impssibe fr th Socalits t maitai the tio
of Opmm a coaliion govenment. Te CDS opnly spe!f mofth
biliof aCDSSocilis coaitin, aguig tht te CD ca
le ncessry usinss onfiencenec&%ar fo ecoomi
recolWy. Amoreominos posibilty beng tlked f isa Soiais,
Commnis coliton.'Suc a artersip eeme vey ulikly hel
I V i ottgl bttatpsibltycnotb xcue, atcual
if crren feas cocering renwed hrea frm th exteme igh
turh ut tobe wll fonded



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s::,rrrr::rr r"r,,iirrrr,, ii !isiiiii iiiiiiii:i!!iiiiiiiiii iiissiii ii iii
lbot oe-tirdofthe way from Portugal to North America. Although
ispverd b Potuguese ,navigators and forming part of Portugal
for ovK 50 yar, ,the people of the Azores, some of whom are of
lleish Frnch' ad Arab extraction as well as Portuguese, have
&veo~e 11 adisint personality and have long felt disadvantaged in


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cop n......e mainland.
A.. rej hve articipated in the political life of Portugal on an
,,jeuilb" wth ainlanders--the first President of the new Republic
.of ortual e tabihed in 1910. was in fact an Azorean--yet they halve
felt~ha cono icaly and culturally they have been treated as second-
citzen. ad hat thiby have been exploited for the benefit ofthe
Kinand Thy ave particularly chafed under a system in which
the ealh dvelped in the Azores has been controlled by banks
don' that the prices of certain products are set in
.Lisontha. tansortation and trade policies have been formulated
forthebenfitonl of the mainland, and that the economic develop-
mentnees oftheislands have been ignored. Culturally, Azoreans
haveresntodtha they have had to go to the mainland for higher
edu'a':ion Ony tis year has a university been established in the
.41toug th isands and their people are quite different individu-
0' th'shae acommon alienation from the mainland which has
mij~std isel i the development .-of separa-tist sentiments on
Sevraloccsios ver the past 100 years, most notably when ma in-
land. Prtu4.,wassuffering fromt political or economic troubles.
Thu, t i nt urprismng that when political turmoil wracked the
mailan afer hefall of the Salazar/Caetano regime, cries of Azorean
sepaatim wre eard again. -When the new revolutionary regime
decard tattheisand groups of Cape Verde and SAo Tome/Principe
yvee o, e ranedindependence, many Azoreans felt that, the Azores
Apul'alo beive an option for independence.
Thesenimet or separatism was not taken seriously in Lisbon
unti Jue.: 975folowing a decision by the authorities in Lisbon to
.m. iow~e pries..r 10ilk produced in the Azores than on the main-
1A~. Te wdesread demonstrations of farmers on: Slio Miguel
W". he k estof the Axorean Wsands, on June 6 'took on an in-
Pmidncecarater, and for the first time the Front-for the Libera-
064 th Azres(FLA) came to be seen in Lisbon as a movement
:en iQt serious account. The military governor o

U~rens. ecae further disenchanted with i~sbon during the
1 ~ ~ ~ is Ofa611111;ctiivity. in tiabon during July and August.


aders to leave the Azores. A. parently reazing that
anti-Communist sentiment in the Azores threatened to sltta
ea off from the rest of Porgal, the then Prime Min
iiioncalves agreed to the military governor's proposal that..
administrative authority be set up for all of the AzoreA andtash
three separate districts in the Azores be done away with. h, dce
lw which set up the Junta Gobernativa (Governing Boar)fosh
Azores was vague concerning" the powers to be exercized'b he una
but as confusion re ed in Laisbon, the Junta, comnposed offu P
members and two cialists (and presided over by the' aeam
cmamnd&er who suggested setting up the Junta) acquireds oe n
more power 'on a de facto baikis. In fact, virtually all &csoso
matters of interest to the Azores are n .ow made by the Jut oo
th basis of its advice.
After the establishment of the Azevedo government inLibnth
Juta in October 1975 set 'up a drafting committee toprae..a
satute of autonomhy uinder the authority granted to it by h dce
law but beforei Constituitional authority to do so had been prvd
hei Junta, increasinglconfident and powerful, also issuda
ment virtually threatening independence if, in the view ofthJua
tohe nw government in Lisbon did not govern properly. Ti 8ae

.ent, issued o Novebei 1 1975 expressed sup for t
government but, fearing civil wax and the psil inqoiin:o
ditatorship of the left or right, putthe Aeedo goverm o
notice that if it coutld nodt govern, the Junta would takewavr
seps were necessary to secure the "individual liberties messnilt
democratic life." This declaration was supported by large dmnta
tins throughout the Azores on November 17.
In December, the governmhent in isbon,; apparently fel
the Azoresn senitiment for greater autonomhy was entirelydt
anti-communisin and that the failure of4 te November 25 cu ol
thus damipen that sentiment, atteinpted to issue a newder la

,,,, iii, ,

I iiiii .................................
edu l the powers of the Juntaii .e Junta stod h owe
and Lisbon backed down.
The statute of autonomy is virtually completea
writinig, and grants broad powers, including over thel:na
ecoom to the Azores regional government. In th asec
ofa Potgeeparliament, it is not clear who wil apo*
the statute--the Azevedo government or the Coun'cf h
Revolution. It is clear, however, that for the Azoreans thesauei

=iii i iii, .. .iiii iiiii ;, i .................... ;,, ;;iiii ,,iiuiiiii ", ... "" "" .. "8'" ""'""
non-negrotiable. The events since June 1975 have been agetsouc

necessary to get what they want. Furthermore virtaiiiii iiiiiiiiiiiiiiii
eisted men in the army detachment headquarters in Sao
Azoreans, as are about one-half of the non-comm~issionr ffet
and one-third of the officers'. The army, therefore, cannotheauid
on to impose Lisbon's will if that proves contrary tor Azoreadsri
It is very likely now that the Azores wil aoon havie
sructure permittmig them to determine their bw 'density ntiiti
>ortupuese body politic. Whether that new'status will serve:o

work ou in racice. Certainly, the new arrangement andths
peronsin he zors and Lisbon who will be charged with makigt
a scce;3 deerv achance to establish that autonomy, not indeped
enc, i th bet wy to ensure the well-being of the Azores.
Thestrngt ofindependence sentiment must not be uner
estmatd b Libo. One Azorean deputy in the Constituent Asseml
tol metha inhisviewr if indeplendence weire put to Azoreans i
refeendu now soe 70-80 percent would support it. Soundig
takn a rllis O te Azorean wing of the Center Social Democrti
pary, n hic idependence sentiments are strong, showed ta
45 ercnt avoedindependence 37 percent, wanted the Azrso to
be .'edralsttewithin Portugal, and only 18 percent favoe
autoomy Othrshowever, believe that if ,autonomy is propel
presntedand ut'nto practice, Azoreans would prefer that couse
W1.4cheve of theseviews is correct, it is evident that Azoreans will
n~t ccepu reurnto their former status.- Whatever transpires wt
regad tothe utur status of thet Aores, it is my strong belief ha
the nitd Sttesshould continue to remain uninvolved in ta
purly ntenalmater. The Colmmunists would exploit any Amerca
supprt or'zoran independence, and Azoresas would misuner
standany merian tatements or actions in favor of maintaiin
the tatu quoin te' ,islands.
U.S-Bas intheAzores.-The subject of renewing the base agre
mentwas ot rise by the Portuguese during the course of myvit
to ortgal I ensd, however, that no signi~ficant opposition t
contnuedAmercanpresence exists. In the Azores, the feeling towr
thebas isI i fatvery positive. Given the fact that Azoreanswl
ter role in all matters concerning the islan
shold e e ecedthat the Azorean regional government wilb
invovedin T bae renewal negotiations and will be seeking sb
statia ecnornil, enefits in exchange for base rights. When h
presnt areemnt as negotiated in 1969, the 'weak Caetano goven
mentwaned he ase agreement as a symbol of American suppr
and as pepard t accept very, little in return for use of the baet
Laie onTerciraisland. The 'terms for renewal axe likelytob

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My vsitto Sainwas the firt fact-fiding trip to Spain by a mebe
of:th- Cngesgsice the death of Franico on Nbvetaber 20, 1975Th
ring-the interval between the signature in Ma
Janary24of heTreaty of Friendship and Cooperation withSpi
and ts ubmisio to the Senate on February 18 for its advican
conentto atiiction. The combination oft~hese, circumstancespo
vi~d a.. ppotuity to' hear the view of Spanish authorities o h
importntpoitia evolution which has begun in Spain, andthre
laton~ip f te teaty to that evolution.
,Incoveraton with King Juna Carlo 1,Pime Minister Ais
i Fra, Foreign l Miniister Areila, anid with other
leadrs f to o th as yet unauthorized political parties, we discse
thetrety nd heobligations involved I was categorically asurd
thouhV hat o nw American poblitical and military commitmns
beyod thse s eiialy stated would flow f rom the treaty.
J concluding thtIsould suppor t ratif ication of the treatycn
sideatins elaingto political liberalization were decisive. The tet
hpo ribute greatly to democratic developm
Span. pigifianpohtical changes have occurred in Spainsic
dg through the treaty, the United States i
toecuage further progressto r dmrc.
wil supor th traty, it is withi the belief thait the present Tliberalzn
endvil cntiueand that the Administration should lend its wih
to ~~sh Government move further toward demoray
..Whle n. fa~idl was very impressed by .the fact that the oa
numbr o priones isonlY8.8500. This amounts to 24.1 prisonespe
100,00 O poplaton as compared to our own country wher h
rato i 978 pisoers per 100,000 population. The UnitedStes
theefoehasabiuffour timhes asr many prisoners proportionatlya
0 otlf 0 risoners in pain, h nu
P prsona-9,is 506, down from the level of 1500 or sowhc
gevaild"'hef 'Jan Carlog became king last November 2. h
anih athoitis expect 'that number to drop' to less than10
(coposd o -,errrists and plitical assassins) by the end of uy
197...In~hsconection,, the Spoanish Governim ent is well. aw~area
resut Rmyvist, f the imp otance.,attached by the CongreA t th
uma rihts prvisons inthe foreign. assistance legislat'iol whx
be'a picblein onection with carrying out the terms ofthetray
A sumaryof te record of liberalization since Fra'nco s deahi

"Nol,"C*P aie Of o~pe Onolitical activity by' all non-commnis
P o~r giouips, e.g., holding of Christian Dem (17)

" E)iiiiiiieiiiiiiua ry........

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iii ssii",, ,;;;;;,i;iiii '" i
2. Elec~tion8

1976 for town and city councimen howllchoe ewmyos
3. Police Practies

ized public demonstrators; unprecedented px t frgtwg
vigil antes.iiiiiiiiii
4. Press Freedomr
Disconitinuance of gover~nment seizures of Ojcinbepl4a
tions and prior censorship of all but coi publicatio
or articles." Frequient interview of government iitrswt oa
and foreign press. Government controlled televsohabenr"

coverage to politicail eventts, includn activiisorh.c

5. Labor
Acquiescence in allowing both offiial syndic
to carry out non-politicaltrikes Government itre ni tie

in pub utilities only after publi opinion far
to prevent breakdown in essential earviens, e.g., ulctnprain
6. Exiles
Isuance of plports tpoiical exiles of wihsm 0,4v

7. Freedom of Trael tfor Opposition 1 eaders
Issuanice of passportst PSOE leader FelipeGnazad tr
Socialist 1leaders to attend international meetins suneo is
port to Communhistlabo leader Mareetino Coamco
8. Pardon of Prisonrs
Since the King declared a pardon Novembe 4 95,3M.6
prisoners have loon freed including approxiael 0
the penitentiary population was annrnrimnatel,8,0
estimated 500 politicalprioners
9. Abrogation of O ectionable Featuree of Owe Ant-~rs."
The Spanish eovernment issued a DecrFao1
abrogatino 14 articles of the August 28, 19%75 ; wv e.
Of Terror returnig jurisdiction of terroris
and eliminating a mandatory death sentence.
10. Appointment of Government Commi'ssion on ofiuMWR&

ary 11; 1976, and will meet weekly to act upont
for reforms leading to a bicamieral' legislatueint Q'
elected by universal suffrage.
!iiiiiii '"i~iiii~~~li ........................................ ....

Remota of poice f om a uniersty ampues unnless afreuspted by

edecision i Februay 1976, transferring
cerim' imnisratve owrs from Madrid to the provmee of Cafa-
W kilar roposalsar.uder consideration for the Basque area.

,.Th prsen madat ofthe "Cortes", scheduled to be renewed
under ~ ~ ~ ~ a thodeetrlssein March, 1976, has been extended for
18,monhsto llo 'gvenment time to introduce constitutional
dhanba.Witout hattemorary extension, a now Cortes not chosen
b, iniersl sufrae wuldbe installed for a fiire-year term.

A. Fr~ig Miiste anounced intention to consider formal ties
Ordery wihdra al rm last colony in Western. Sahara.
i og with Eupe, especially with Coutncil of
Europe,:. demonstrtingoa willingness to discuss huoman rights
These are ecourgingevelpments, but. there will be little incen-
tiv fo t Spnis, Gven ment to build upnthis record if the
Sante rjetsth Teay f Friendship and Coprto and thus
e-wsss tscoleciv jdgent that there is no ditnto between
the ranc rqpe an thecurent one. If ,on the other hand, the
treariswroed, he andof the liberalizers wrill be strengthened,
aij t4#y... b: bletodemnsra~te that they have secured something
Dx hid thYmo rjam coldnever have obtained--a -broad treaty
qf.owpraton n:4fane ad ther matters -with the United States.
AP Ofthe reat woudcontribute to. the- momentum of success
VA ikwntionl aceptbilty of the new regime. Rejection of the
treoy-wuld eriuslyundrmie, the liberalization trend and probably
alW etho Y of ing Juan Carlos to exaerisea moderating
The rinipa opo iionparties would have preferred that the
trety e cncldedby dmocratically elected government. I share
that mm% bt turifrtmately the previous executive agreement
r~iintto he se f mlitry facilities in Spain-expired last Septem-
ber 6 ad i a ew grement is not concluded soon, the United
Staes illhae t cese tsuse of the bases in Spain by September 26
. ...yea.....ofthi Ieceve th dstinct impression that despite reservations
in ublc aoutthetretyall of the democratic parties understand
thispiedcamnt ad wil nt seriously oppose the treaty. It is inter-
this onn~tiontoote that the diehard Franco supporters-
= a~ld "unke" eement-have taken the most reserved
In ech o my eetigs ih Spanish officials, I asked whether, in
thei viw, he teat voed any commitment, specific or implied,

secretL or pen ether AUAto comeW toU1 the0 defns of Sh i
assistrc inteivnt ofain, internalisturbance. to -wseinedtatn
such ;f commitments were involved a hat thestresty malim n thist

moeo estany what it say hs. sti mto

tionl reormwhich would phrovide a large measureofdrcd
At te naiona level, a priament would be estabihdWt' ot
chamer iretly elected by universal suffrage and amr osrav
upper hambe with a corporate structure along thelnsothcurt
sinlechmbred "Cortes. hsnew upper chambrwudc~
tives sel bvas corporate
fthe laor syia business, the l
so o. I 'dscussing the preservation of this vestgofheFssj:
insird crprate state with a representative of oeprycoet
theregmeitwas obvious that the kind of upper cabrevsoe
by th Spaish is unknown in modemr Western demcais
Onc -te. roposals for constitutional reform- -arcoped,.ty
willbe sbmited to the nation, perhaps as early as uy o oen
dum. unicpal elections will follow in Novembr n ainl
eletios erl in 1977. While the armed forcesappert uprcn
stiutinalreorm and wish to tat out of politics hyar dmn
on hre tins--the Commuinist, ord mst not b eaie;S
mustconinu to' be auitary state an muast notcneetomc
autnom todisaffected areas such as Catalona tdheBsu
regin; adpblic order must be preserved. Thutemliar M
coninu tobe he watchdogs of the political process nSan
Whil I ind muich that is disquieting abouttecosiutoa
refom crretly being contemplated, it is nevertheesaeakbe
beginingaftr more than a third of a century io ittrhpail
patinceandpersistent -pressure, the United Statsadislie n
Westen Eurpe should be :able to bring about fute:lerlzio
in Sain.I a convinced that if the United Statsbreeii h
treatyc ndens: as unacceptable the, still modetbu
begin'n wich Spain is making to become a oe.XM666-
Socity f ffect will be not to aid democracy in htcu' ;,..P
to et t bckby many years.
Inte rsetCrtas, 80 per cent of the members are tndtrctychse
ratebodes.Repesetatives of the family sector are the only ones choen)Y= by he
of houehold, inclding on~naried aults lving lone, re pw tted t vote

'IK L4.



f Ave Viseu



Castelo Bianco



.Vita RvAl eni
Santo Ants r.

Logo% F

.l... nternmotnra! boomitito Cadiz

D striM CAP11

Mi le% e v ,
iiiiiso,;;i; [1 l* i... si; I
i-i-i--- 80i 75f ~ hato




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i Jooecco *~~ > M4ERIAs




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