New Panama Canal treaty : hearings before the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, House of Representatives, Nine...


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New Panama Canal treaty : hearings before the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, House of Representatives, Ninety-fifth Congress, first session ... August 17, 1977
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Serial - House, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries ; no. 95-13
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iii, 186 p. : ; 24 cm.
United States -- Congress. -- House. -- Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries
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Panama Canal (Panama)   ( lcsh )
Foreign relations -- United States -- Panama   ( lcsh )
Foreign relations -- Panama -- United States   ( lcsh )
federal government publication   ( marcgt )
non-fiction   ( marcgt )


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Full Text






AUGUST 17, 19T7t

Serial No. 95-18

P~n~dfor te et o the Ctemittee on Merchant Marine and Flaheries

W70 0WASHINGTON : 1977


GLEN NN, Mew Yok,

BHMA OHEY, hi PHLIvealaPMihia JOH DIN GEL GehgaorLg.iaLSEY R. aifri

RALPH H. ME CA FE..lioi..RM N. New York~~i''!!!!!ii ~

BARBRA TUS,scuetPALS RBEJ.,Vria DAVID R. BOWN, MissisippiX~ ,

DO BOKR asigo

LE AuON Oregon .. .

NOMNE 'MUS e aphr

JA E,.OESTR inst


H earing held A ugust 17, 1977 ....................................................................................... I
Appendix including text of treaties dated August 10, 1977 .................................... 101
Statement ofBeckel, Robert, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional
R elations ................................................................................................................. 21
Bunker, Hon. Ellsworth, Ambassador at Large, U.S. State Department ..... 21
Dolvin, Lt. Gen. Welborn G. (Ret.), Department of Defense, Deputy Treaty
N egotiator ............................................................................................................. 21
Hansell, Herbert J., legal adviser, U.S. Department of State ......................... 21,27
Linowitz, Hon. Sol M., Ambassador, Chief U.S. Treaty Negotiators .............. 21.24
Moorer, Adm. Thomas H., USN (Ret.), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
1970-74 ................................................................................................................... 79
Prepared statement with attachments ........................................................ 80
Wyrough, Richard, Treaty Coordinator and Member of Negotiating Team,
U .S. Departm ent of State ................................................................................... 21
Additional information supplied byDornan, Hon. Robert K., editorial from the Wall Street Journal .................. 18
State Department, Opinion from Attorney General Bell, dated August 11,
1977, re Panam a Canal Treaty .......................................................................... 31
Communications submitted fromBell, Hon. Griffin B., Attorney General, letter to Department of State dated
A ugust 11, 1977 .................................................................................................... 31
Murphy, Hon. John M., letter to President Carter from former Naval
Commanders Carney, Burke, Anderson and Moorer .................................... 2


............................. P A A M C A N AL.. T R E A TY............................H ...... i i.. i


....hi gt n D .C. ......
Th commiii met pursuant toiiiliii notice, ati10:15iaim.,iin Roi
1301, Logo os/ffc ulig oorbeJh .Mr

from letters which I feel are indicative of U.S. opinion on this issue.
A practicing physician, 78 years old, from Honolulu, Hawaii, states, "This is the first time I have ever written to any member of our Congress. However, I think I would be remiss if I did not express my opinion as an American regarding the giving away of such an important part of our country ga th e Pan4ma Canal. Why not give away the Hawaiian Islands, Alaska, or any other part of the United States?"
In another letter, a retired Vice Admiral of the U.S. Navy says, "Early on, I was the U.S. Attache in Venezuela, making frequent trips to Colombia and Panama, and making me well aware of Latin American history, temperaments and attitudes. In my last three years of active duty, I served as Commandant of the National War College in Washington, a tour which reinforced my long-held view that retention of U.S. sovereignty in the Panama Canal Zone is essential to our national security."
Finally, let me quote from a letter from,"a consuldngpetroleum geologist who was also an intelligence staff officer in the U.S.: Air Force Reserve for over,33 years, including five years as a senior intelligence analyst with DIA in Washington: "The Panama Cknal: is of vital strategic importance to the United States, and- the free and unimpaired flow of traffic through this water. way must -,be maintained by the United States. It is extremely important that the Canal Zone be kept out of the hands of the dictator, Omar Torrijos. Your committee should well know of Castro's influence and- I the winds of politics in Central America. I I I .
"Very soon now the Alaskan oil fields will come onstream.,. AA there are no facilities on the West Coast capable of handling., this crude, it is only- logical it will be transported by tanker to either the Gulf Coast or the Eastern Seaboard through the Canal.": 1 : ..
Many of our former military leaders are fearful of losing. the only: water passage between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.. Fout of. the, most outstanding names in recent American Naval histor'V-*Arleigh Burke, Thomas Moorer, George Anderson, and Fbabert &r.,-. ney, all former Chiefs of Naval Operations-have concluded that the Panama Canal should remain under American sovereig'n: con-, trol, as provided in the existing treaty.
In a recent letter to President Carter they said:
Dear Mr. President: As former Chie& of Naval Operations, fleet con6ariders 'ik6d Naval Advisers to previous Presidents, we believe we have an obligatift to y:od' am: the nation to offer our combined Judgment on the strategic value of the Pan Canal to the United States.
Contrary to what we read about the declining strategic and economic val4e ort1i Canal, the truth is that this inter-oceanic waterway is as importa more lg to the United States than ever. The Panama: Canal enables the United StMes k transfer its naval forces: and, commercial units from ocean to ocean as the n"d-, arises. This capability is micreasingly important now in v ew of the redu*,*i=,of the U.S. Atlantic 'and Pacific fleets ...
The Panama Canal represents a vital portion of our U.S. naval and mafldiap' assets, all of which are aboolutely essential for free world security-Ift: is, considered individual and combined judgment that ou sbauld instruct our: D"W40. tors to retain full sovore in control for the JWU States over both the P Canal and its protective Came, the U.S. Canal Zone, as piovided in thei' $Rom* treaty.
Very respectfully, Robert B. Carney, Arleigh A. Burke, George Anderson, Thomas H. Moorer.

The Cbpies of these letters are available in this room.
I quote these letters to demonstrate that there are many citizens of this -country,-. including many experienced in Latin American affairs, who have come to a conclusion far different from that of the executive branch. It is intellectual arrogance for these executive branch :efficials'to assume that only:they are 'informed and that the rest -of the. country. is ignorant, or. incompetent. .-,-Whi* House officials have indicated that "we have the facts." Thi&committee will be interested in knowing those facts which will counter the record that we have which indicates that the Torrijos regime has. consistently violated its present treaty arrangements ..with..the U.S., -giving. every indication that the surrender of:our most. hasic -authority on the Isthmus will further whet the power appetite of this dictatorship in Panama. A list of the violations in the last two years by the Torrijos regime of its existing treaty arrangements with the U.S. has been made available on the press table.
I "The executive branch may have the facts, but one to which they 4ailed t6 give proper emphasis is the manner in which Panama has continuously increased its: demands in negotiations over the years. ..Testimony given to the Panama Canal Subcommittee recently indiVates that-Panama. has escalated.its demands year by year in the negotiations, and our negotiators appear to have caved in to these
inaMilquetoast fashion. The-setting in which these talks have taken, place will only serve to increase demands from Latin America and the Third World in the years to come-demands which can onl be fulfilled at the expense of the U.S. national
While the executive branch may have the facts, officials have
-been deliberately ignoring the vital role which the House of Reprelentatives will play in the effectuation of any new treaty arrangement. More specifically, as far as this committee is concerned, Axbcle IV, Section 3, Clause 2, of the Constitution, which reserves to the Congress "the power to dispose. of Federal property and Itemritory and to make all needful rules and regulations for that property, must be heeded. The Committee on Mer-chant-Upfine and Fisheries is empowered by the Rules of the House with responsibility for the Canal Zone, and, therefore, the &pomt of temtory in. that Zone falls within the jurisdictional
of this committee.
.....AU committee can only hope that, in its negotiations with the Panamanians,..that the executive branch has not been guilty of such .4 grow Qversight:and jurisdictional miscalculation as has been made lr.. the aRparent 4"ump ion that a bi ding legal: pact could be made for the disposal of U.S. property without the consent of the U.S. HOQW'. : oURepresmtatives.
..The betto that the, U.S. is a bona fide 1woperty holder in the
-Qwal. Zone, that we havetitleto the Panaman CanaL and a vested
-the Zone. The 1903 Treaty with Panama made wope holder;:the Joint Land Commission, authorized
tr".ty, purchased land from private pitizens in, the Zone xm;. Ow 1914: Tre4ty...with C olombia: confirmed thou i1fettered title
-of the IM tolhe, Canal and the Panwaa Railroad;. and-tbe US. has


expended money in connection: with Canal Of
$166,362,173 as of 1914.
Without addressing all of the specific foundations of.. U-&
interests with respect to the Panama Canal and Canal Zone, clear that the: U.S. is the owner of itasets of 'the Panama CAnal Company and the Canal Zone Goverlimentj and that:.'We ha:V6 ownership of the waterway, appurtenant. installations,.: I buildinnags, and other structures in the Zone. Further, the assets ofthe Panama Canal organization and, military departments and -agencies:: of: the U.S. Government in the Zone are assets which are propetty:subject to Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2, of the:Constitution.
As I said, the -Constitution gives the,-Congr6ss, inaluding the House of Representatives, "the power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the territory or other property of the United States.",
Thomas Jefferson interpreted this provision of the Constitution by stating that while the President and Senate can make treaties, wherever they include matters confided by the, Constitution -to the legislature, an act of legislation will be required to confirin : the treaty, and that the House is "perfectly free to paw the wt or refuse it, governing themselves by their own judgment whether it is for the good of their constituents to* let the treaty go into effect or not.'
There is considerable and impressive case law which substantiates the Jeffersonian interpretation.that a treaty requires statutory implementation if it deals with'subject matter exclusively reserved to the House of Representatives.
Moreover, prior practice with respect to the Panama Canal and Canal Zone demonstrates what should continue -to be: the rule. Property of the U.S. associated with the Panam, a Canal enterprise has been disposed of in the past only in accordance With Congressional authorization.
On the other hand, it is significant to note here that in.hearings. conducted by the Panama Canal Subcommittee in 1972, the State Department's leading case law precedent supporting a Casud giveaway was Jones -versus Meehan, which granted title to a 10-footwide strip of land to Chief Moose Dung and Chief Red Bear of the Chippewa* Indians after they had ceded to the -U.S. the entire Red River Valley. Just last week, the State Department admitted- that such a legal basis was "obscure." I agree. And their other case was U.S. versus 43 Gallons of Whiskey. After they 1972, the State Department called the subcommittee to say that their condu,sion, on that case was "misleading in their statement," and, wished to change the record. So much for the State Departm6nt s legal position.
This committee is, of course, interested in morethan--the:lauth wization and disposal of property. The Committee on Merchantm Marine and Fisheries also has legislative authority over the sbucture and authority of the Canal as an operating entity; lando'4,and waters for Canal use; options for Canal construction:and/or and
a sea-level canal; annuities to Panama in connection with the Canal; and neutrality and international -guarantees. fbr: the Canal. We also have an interest in employee conditions, rights andcom-

pensation', and defense. arrangements.. Thus, the committeerequires the 1act& in these areas because we are concerned that:
--The economic compensation package being offered to Panama will f0ce increased tolls and other charges to the extent that the Canal will cease to be an economically viable thoroughfare.
-,, Canal agreement is being advanced.on the basis of violent threats,,a tactic which will itself beget violence at the Canal, and briag more demands on the U.S.
The faie of the present Canal Zone employees is being cast to the whW.. and the very people who keep the Canal open, efficient, neutral and secure are expendable commodities in this rush to appeasement.
Based, on what we have seen thus far, we fear that the type of control which the U.S. is to exercise until the year 2000, and which the.executive branch is praising, is the most impaired kind of coa.rol.,And I suggest. it is really a misrepresentation if anyone arojes that it is the kind of control we have now.
*,relinquishing sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the lands and. waters, we need tooperate the Canal, we are allowing the Canal tq, become subject to the pressure and harassment of a Panamanian dict
The U.S. willbe the primary operator of the Canal to the year 200 but .. the U.S. will only be one of the guarantors of the noutrality:of the waterway. We will not control relations with all Canal. employees, but rather we will divide the nationalities and automatically create two camps divided against one another. We will.not control most of the very installations that the Governor of tbev.Canal Zone, in his testimony before this committee, has called v4tal.,to its operation-things such as anchorages, breakwaters, cb*mwls. and :harbors, locks, dams, navigational aids, power stations, tugs and, probably most importantly, dredges. We will have a bu-ilt-in systeui to continuously raise tolls, which undoubtedly will bethe. -undoing of the waterway. Our use of land and water will probably beso restricted as to allow little resistance to any attempt at. Oieiv takeover of the Canal by Panama. In short, the Canal will be hostage to the military dictatorshi in Panama, not in the year 20QQ, but. immediately,: and, based on their past record, it is a situation not to be desired.
..,We, b9pe to hear today the facts which will alleviate these con"r
Maay. of:us on: the committee have equally compelling concerns about. the: %.agreement for permanent neutrality of the Canal. The fact sheet provided to the committee on Monday by the Department of,*akJ*ndicates: that "'our continuing freedom of action to maintaJnAh#, Caual's neu -ality will not be limited by the Treaty." This
es.. that the e of the new neutrality agreement does not
8: fi" .. 0y: pervait the U.S. tbe right to intervene in the event of
4, gnt of Canal,: a right which we unquestionably
-4 at the prosent Aime. The executive branch has been "selling" theasreement on the.basis of a Pan nian concession on the U.S.
ht to intej vene. I seriusly doubt, based on what is known to the cmraittee that :any Ouch right of intervention exists: -in the new twWw- This area appears. to.. bethe very reason why former Secre-

tary of State Kissinger refused toedmthe;..m tnai t Moay of this week. But I understand now ho &hs mado a indere amnte
The anal issue is not a minor one Itnvolves ethettif the transifeof assets amount ing to billtn of dolast-hfis ~r~ value" of the Canal today is about $24 billion. Th ale ofUS defense assets in the Canal Zone ranges somewhere beaueed 93 and $6 billion. In the next 28 years, the total amount, eoom=penadiore & Panama under the new treaty comes to: $1-1/2' billion. And- the value of loans and guaranthes to -Panama may be somnething- less than a thalf-bitlon do11arst So wie aedridering an grentehul the range of from $7-12 biltion, and thiat may be: a conservative: estimate. It is important to consider that the U.S. witlheseiv.kotangible assets in return forthose to go:to Panama under tM eii of the traty, as we undertand them :.
dn the hysteria of attempting to justify this unnown and- quest tionable treaty, it has been suggested that U 8 -flag chi s do not use the Canal. Nothing could be further fruitsthe trutl Many of our U.8. carriers use the Canal in -varying degrees, ad: t ofar largest container operators use- the Canal to a considerahle degeri For example, eone large container operator had 98 transits inO176 amounting to $1,575,072 in tolls, and another carrier ba,9 488a sits. So far in 1977, this same operator -had 50 trasitsaoutn to $950,922 in Canal tolls. By any standards, this is signifieausg and points ep very succinctly the fact that, the propedentso-ti Canal treaty will go to any lengths to distort the truth.;lInprepared documents I saw showing Canal passages by-Americandle te arltv in the year 1946, when there -was an overwhehmng dumber transiting the Canal, and went to the year 1975, they didie aft flagycarrierseonthe chart. The misleading fact Is that 70 perent: f the conmneree in the Panama Canal either beginsin, or windaupi, an Ametican port. Seventy percent of the toll increaer wibe pi by the American consumer, and the fact that a policy,a the US, has permitted the U.S.-flag Merchant Marine to virtally Mapm from the 'seas still doesn't mitigate against the ac that the m morcel itself, 1is 70 percent- American commerce, land, thereforth American consumer will pick up- 70 percent -of ttb. 1To anyoner who might doubt this Member's intestionhsha l state that not a centimeter of the Canal Zone, not one piece ofU& property, not the fate of a single Zone employee, o ariothenikl beyond that which has already been appropriated, will blro over to the Republic of Panama's dictator withgoat the pir p proalof the House of Representatives, as providedM 4
It misfortunate that the present negotiation radhdadb just a the46ongress had adjourned for the Menmhers' woks wf&f. their districts. For this reason, not all of the bouniteo ould be here today. This should -i no way t ps 'aldc of interest. Absent members have expre eew tei rentntion to carefully read the transcript ofthseaig i At thia point, 1 yield to the r ng Majrt Merbtk bM present, Mr. Hubbard.
Mr. RUBBARD. Thank you very mook Mr Chabrna-'el members of the committee. I am grateful-for this:11 -ore

here~~~~ Imy d this mrig thouht norane of the trayte avengoi
ated~~~~ .eale hLs'mnhwthi Mh erant Main Panda'ish
First let e ae that I couid ek membgecors ond inded a hnoritteae, bsof whcBubcomite adM.lanwt wit u, Ialo. onide i amaonthat Irame cnvced that te dto thissqu toayA teat ha bt eHuse. wtot Reesethoatio n of th Conress ndwtoltte supoV of the grCnsitti, Sma inoh Amercan peple Thre s and reultions resptin thvrhelirr

reagons ~ ~ a t hs o eo thercnit Stae and o Finhre
-Commttwwas o nsrue as ol prejuek anybeclaimp of h 'Pari~a C aal Sucopaticubfir h tatemtte m re Article IVl-oto h l
-Secondly, ~r c attoetontaIa vned inhatcl Ie prvie treaty ~ ~ pqer witb aiie y oh th oute any qualificatin ind the enad. reer o Ate1V te powe. Jursition Sein3 Jausei~ ~r 2lerl wreits rewith the Congress salhv~oe odsoeo and mae. llneefulrulst ane.g'lateiossecig th ofteerepetty Constitutiontie fllbes oostur as tteution and thaim ifdeh U nte Stte.oropnypartuad Strolypet.ha runting~1 eaowrscntritee is tcane as proie Ina "Cogressallhavte ofwte U.withe anqalifiZon indierp ing~xchiveess gaist he Caal'setec anridithen ke te
qmsin oftbe,.S.-tgernoycesl thisadmiitratieongras sw wbbl.,.nt: iith-trighntse mitl andne Th os.oRpasenotie mtst seo:aresonibiivea itteur lesonsfrtom ourth inlverr are to erearetthosenwh seemnlyrdc tot wil majoitysentmen onthe Panmae Caal the defense ofm view,,,e sverignri tf the cargo deteno the co Zn n re fti ae, le re roghe heCanal te anal Zhe on is
a for operationstinfLatineAmerica
':,I~~~~ Pmlreb h acneii Itdofnesthetionl ajsorn -t ,eradicate60 mhwseta ils onmdtel Atanti psie and 2e Our~~n~stde It isane seea ilitaryscommunicatiovns in,~~~~~o the hemispnfic. here.aetoe' h emol o iln
to foget he neess bato the aim Caial as be. efcenft ?ibn inVieV-%ftV:oetrouh U.S. Cnl. ine C914, n is 1n

been kept low and have been raised. only twice: during: t1w Cmal!s history. Increased tolls and deteriorating oervice would 'bave a serious impact upon consumer prices in this nation.
Even worse would be the impact upon Latin American nations, such as Nicaragua, which ships more than three-quarters ef'its trade through the Canal. The Canal's potential as-a-meanwof international economic and politicAl blackmail is infinite.
My committee colleaguesand I have been: told a great deal- about the vulnerability of the Canal Zone to riots and disruptiom We have been cautioned that if the new treaty is not ratified, outbrealm an inevitable. I have only two questions in this regard. Would it not be easier for the U.S. to deal with such disruptions if U.S. defense forces were in the Canal Zone,,in there by right, and in themfor good? Second, is it not- a dangerous precedent for the U.S. Lto negotiate with other nations: on the premise that violence and terrorism are unavoidable unless we concede at every point? I dread to think what our response might be if restless Mexican students were to demand that the U.S. cede the land between San Antonio and the Rio Grande purchased from Mexico.
Let us not delude yourselves about the, magnitude of the transfer we are considering. The price of international economid-and defenm stability is miestimable; but, the priceof the assets alone which are to be transferred has been set at somewhere between $10 ,aftd:$15 billion.
It is my understanding that underthe terms of a separate treaty to be signed later by the nations of the Western Hemisphere, the U.S. will guarantee the neutrality of the Canal and its free: access to all the world's shipping even after the year 2000. If the wdety of the Canal is threatened, the U.S. is not restricted from military intervention.- It is unclear to me whether the U.S. Will have an affirmative right to intervene, or whether it ismerely not.restricted:,ftm intervening. In the fbrmer case, the weight of international. law would be with us. In the latter, U.S. intervention could: besubject. to world repudiation.
: I am certain that Ambassadors: Bunko and Linowitz:,faced:an
arduous task in striking an agreement with General Torrijos which recognizes the conflicting interests of : the US. and Panama. The task, before us today is quite different. The interest of all of us here is the interest of theAmerican people. Letus:reason with each other to ensure that the defense and economic: interests of t1W U.S., and indeed of the entire free world, have not been sacrifned althe bargaining table in Panama City.
TheCHAMMAN. Mr. McCloskey.
Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My only question, Mr. Chairman, goes to the propriety of the House U',kqUl*rM'g into the matter at this particular point M" time. Clehrly administrations feels that it is to the best interests of the U.S. and our nAtional security to conduct these negotiations through'to a conclusion'4::and in the President's notice to us he has indicMed. that he has approved an agreement in principle but that: the Ammal,, drafting contm*ues. I take it that 'in this drafting preem the negotiations continue, and I question whether the Rouge oU : should enter into deliberations on the conduct of the

... conductin these............................... ne o ia i n .......... fe r t a h y y p e ui ii
th blt obrn hs.ngoitost uccsfi ocuin
........................ provisios f Article IV ofi the Consitu-iiii~ iiii
tin u tsest eta hspssafnaetlqeto st

wheter or sstemof overmen canendue oer te nxt dcad
whn h amnitrtoncealy heCie Eeutv ceal, a
the~~~~~~ ~ ~ ~ ......... pwradtersosblttocnutngtaininfein,,
afuis: n h Snaeclaryisrpoedte owrtoraiy n cosettothstray y h tothrd ot. epiean pwrsw
haeune Atcl VIdo' ko ta teHos wud usto

gentleman thot historical precedent particularly the wCond-Har Pauncefote Treaty, was necessary because the .0m9ress rM
e ents to prior treaties enacted by the: executive, .braneh. While the purpose of this overWght' hearing is not, sped#ca4y related to certain items that are under negotiation but cleaJay transcends the negotiation, it goes to:,the constitutional questim and that, of course, is the power and the right of the House Representatives and its constitutional prerogativw. on A -V jip El transfer matter and treaty such as. this.
I yield to the gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Oberstw.
Mr. OBspterAR. I thank the Chairman for yielding. The Ght man of the SubcomnAttee on the Panama Cand of this FuWAA ZAL[nittftW.! the Honorable Ralph Metcalfe, of 111finaii, W I iecessarily absent. from this hearing due to surgery, and has asked me to: read his on his behalf, and, with the Chaix's indulgence, I wW do. that.
Mr. Chairman, you have called these hearings to discuss the'role' of the House of Representatives in establishing a new relationship with the Republic of Panama concerning the future, status of the: Panama Canal :Zone and the Panama Canal.
I commend you for holding these hearings. During the 92nd Congress, you, as Chairman of the Panazna Canal Subwmmittee, held extensive hearings on the role of the House under Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2, of the Constitution of-the United Stabui6 and the effect of this section of the Constitution on any proposed transfer of lands and waters from the U.S. to the Republic of The
hearing record established that the House of Representatives must have a role concurrent with the Senate under Article IV, Section 3,Clause 2, of the Constitution. The hearings you have called today, Mr. Chairman, are being held in order to uphold thev prerogatives of, the House in the proposed property transfbr. At this time, I also want to commend this administration, andr particularly Ambassadors Ellsworth Bunker and Sol Linowitz, fbr. their roles in negotiating a new treaty with the. Republic Panama.
We have men only the outlines of the proposed. treaty, and of course, I cannot, nor will 1, comment on a document which I -h vi: not seen. However, 'this administration has the now
realities in Latin America and has responded accordmgly. TM4 administration's perception of these new realities has bion, to that of the three preceding administrations, all of whom carrWd on negotiations with. the Republic of Panama concerning the future status of the Panama Canal Zone: and the Panama CanaL, Ft the present Administration is to be commended. The administration should not sully such a: worthy. ob*ej edi", by ignoring the constitutional prerogative of the House*: I have -W praised the negotiators of my concern that th4i role of, iti*ROMW under Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2, be gniied i in A .
new treaty, and, as recently as last week, I communk.aW tho. 811MO message in a telegram to the President. I regret that I. as chairman of the Panama Qumd cannot attend these am followiq 14
hearings today. 1.
orders to remain at home after ond surgery. H64mva,.4 certainly read the hearing record with very, clow 9=utiny, an& U.

al iht sueyu r h iat t .flyspotoui

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my keoecmeno y onbhl,:M. hirmnh ol
liet ogauaete diitaino ht| eli rlin
pico..dplmc:adpriuaryI wol iet cnrtlt
Ambasadrs inoitzandBuner o anacheveenttha I hin
I tndteU..i go tedwthorAmrcn egbost
the 6xtth
i:vikta, hoghti tet, ewllhv dmntrtdt th atosofCnra n Suh mrcata te anhv

President Carter, as I recall, announced at the very outwt, of his administration his desire to attain a newlreaty by AprK.- Leter+iJune. At one point, the Panamanians prdtested the haste,,.-..ev6wn though they sat back and held out 'in their jaw% knowlet'the President had put the U.S. at a disadvantage mi the negotiationp:by expressing his owndeadlines.
That was very poor strategy, to say the least, on: the part of the President.
I can't help but question the haste.,
This committee has received testimony that shows previous-: Presidents did not put themselves in such a corner or box themwIved Mi by any self-imposed time restriction.
Why the rush?
Why the hoopla and fanfare about this treaty-a treaty not a treaty-a treaty that has not even been completed, no less initialed or signed?
Why on the last day of Linowitz' unconfai-med appointment?
Without an actual treaty at hand, I know many in Congress And the press corps have concluded it simply is all flim-flam.
For whose benefit?
The apparent reason seems to be that all these trappings of a fait accompli-in the absence of a true fait accompli-evidently are intended to make it more difficult for the Senate to reject the treaty, if and when one is actually completed, signed, and submitted to that body.
I think that few, if any, U.S. Senators, regardless of party::-affifiation, will not see through such tactics. The Panamanian people should never have been misled: by the White House and State Department into thinking that they will be given-or already have been given-the Canal Zone and its installations and the waterway.
Our people, too, have been fed distortions.
First, the executive branch has sought to convince Congress and the taxpayers that the Canal Zone is not U.S. territory. This contradicts both the U.S. Supreme Court and what the executive branch, itself, held' for many decades since the 1903 treaty with Panama.
Second, the State Department has sought to convince us the Canal is vulnerable and can't be defended. Since 1906, when the Senate Committee on Interoceanic Canals took testimony ldwwing the vulnerability of the proposed canal, it has been known that its defense mostly was a matter of the will of the U.S. to deftnd it. On July 26, Brigadier General 1. P. Graham, speaking for the Department of Defense, told this committee's Subcommittee on the Panama Canal, and I quote- "The Panama Canal Zone mid the Panama Canal can be defQe in a hostile environment" Then General Graham went on to say: "however, it could not be possible to guarantee that the Canal could be kept coutinudusly operational."
Both parts of the General's sentence could be equally applied-to the Sault St. Marie Canal, or to New York City, or LoulsdIfe, or to the Brooklyn Navy Yard, or to: Edwards Air Forte Base, or to Pittsburgh's steel mills, or to California's aircraft factories.


Defense is a matter of firepower-and willpower.
his testimony with these words: The Gen*ral conclude
the canal's strategic value is not expected to change substan. tiallyso long as1t provides the sole means of transition ships across the Am n"can continent. In conclusion, the Panama Canal is and .;wnll:: remain an important asset, the use of which is important to achicymln MIt of U.S. military objectives."
Thirdly, the executive branch has sought, to convince us the Panama: -Canal economically is a losing proposition.
This ommittee's Subcommittee on the Panama Canal took testimony lad year demonstrating that the vast bulk, if not all, of the Canal's recent deficits was caused by the Canal Company's new policy of taking depreciation on paper on titles, treaty rights and excaVations. Thaf bookkeeping action was initiated by the company in 1974 contrary to the position and guidance of this committee.
last year the Senate took no action on a bill origiin thi committee and passed by the House to terminate such
Hance the Canal truly is not a losing proposition. This year, the QW0ernor has already told this committee it will again be in the black,:even with the above-mentioned depreciation being taken. 7!onnage through the Canal has continuously increased except for one year, 1976. Both transit and tonnage again are on the rise in 1977.
executive branch has sought to convince us that Atrrendering the Canal Zone and the Panama Canal is of the utmost importance to improving our relations with Latin America, telling, us those -Latin countries unanimously support Panama's derdands.
The executive branch, however, has been mute on the fact that on several occasions, meetings of the Organization of American States ..bavebeen characterized by resolutions opposing increases in, canal tolls. At the most recent meeting of the OAS last June in Grenada, a K resdution was- unanimously endorsed by vote of 19-0, that: ..%eafrirnis the principle that Panama Canal tolls should only reflect the operational cost of the waterway." It-11s:-well known, but not proclaimed by the White House and Stnte Department, that trade and maritime ministers of those Latin 0ountrie& oppose Panama's getting control of the Canal and raising ,the, WHO. by some: 300 to 500 percent, as it promises to do to gain a profit, since their trade and economies would be adversely affected
Our gimmig the Canal to Panama for her chictator, Omar Torrijos, 4&.rn1*1k:,at theexpense of his Latin American neighbors, not only will, not endear us to them, but.will engender growing dissatisfacloss of respect for us throughout Central and South :Aranica.
Y.:, WeAhave it: on the authority of two former Assistant Secretaries of*Ate. for Inter-American Affairs, that nothing will satisfy Panama$ s politicians. I believe they will forever come up with new dMiliandsi even-if we:: gave them every sqauare inch. of the Canal ..Zohe and, everything in it.

97-746 0 77 2

Ambassador John M. Cabot, Secretary., 19WKI... a
letter to the Washington post May:16 197(4 in "id--.
I have not heard much from the pro-new-treaty advocate a about Ihe many concessions the Pahamania:ns. have won fium us, tanuumator how, w*m we sought the minplementation of the barelyratla 1936 sites outside the Zone fbr its defenge, they blackinailed 'us =be ore"grvv=111 the j,, or how, after the war, they simply rejected a ne*, treaty granting4is 4heiwr =tted ugfe despite the 1936 treaty, or how every concession on our part only Ied to,demands on theirs Previous history does. not reas=Tfik Im.
Mr. SNYDER. Arnbassador.'Thomas C.,Mann, Assistatit Sftretary,, 1960-61 and 1964, and UndLr Secretary of State:, fbt::,Bmfi6MiIC Affairs, 1965-66, wrote"Phillip Harman, Director, Canal Zorie NmProfit Public Information Corporation.- on March 9. 1977 : In response to your inquiry, it would, 'in my opinion, be f U- to reliliquish our treaty right to maintain, operate eind'protect the canal prior9% the tinii, trans-isthmian canal is available to u&
Abrogation of the rights of the United States under treaty has. long bee* the dominant issue in Panamanian politics. Politicians therefore seek to oixtdo their opponents. in obtaining concessions from the United Statei;'for mafiy:it has been the issue used to advance their individual political fortunes. As a result, MAOA66ft Panama makes a set of demands of the United States These are negodatect ri, ultimately, an amendment to the original treaty is zn;d Before the ink .' has W time to dry on the amendment,'a new set of demands is made with tbp same res*t.
Mr. SNYDER. Fifthly, the executive branch has soughV to ewivince us the Canal is obsolete because large oil tankers and: aircraft carriers cannot transit it.,
The facts are that only our 13 largest carriers exceed the Canal's capacity, and that none of the supertankers were designed for trade routes that utilize the Canal. Ninety-eight percent of our naval vessels, including nuclear submarines, can transit the canal', 96 percent of our U.S. merchant fleet can, and so can 93 percent, of, the world's shipping. The fact those subs must surface for, transit Is of no more significance than the fact they must surface for. repairs. The St. Louis Post-Dispatch, on March 28, 1976, quoted "a high Pentagon official" as saying that the: U.S. no longer had a two-ocean Navy, and that "The Panama Canal. is absolutely: essential. if we want to mount a force by -sea lift for amphibious action. We would have to assemble the amphibious craft from both coast&" -1 .
Despite the supposed obsolescence of the present waterway, the executive branch, in giving it away, has not seriously proposed 4Z sea-leve'l or any other canal in Panama or elsewhere. to Iake4ts place. Ambassador Thomas Mann's advice makessense. Keep this one at least- until another one is built.
Sixthly, the executive branch has sought to convince us -that we must, turn the Canal Zone and waterway over to Panama to keep it it open, efficient, neutral and secure," by avoiding::.. conhuatation, sabotage and guerrilla warfare with Panama.
The executive branch is silent over the fact that- once Panama gets total control, any opposing Panamanian political faction. or terrorist group could hold the Canal hostage against the government in the same way Torrijos has held it hostage with.tbreats against us.
As the Chairman has pointed: out, the White, House claim it "has the facts" in condemning Congress for the attitude of many Senktors and Representatives on the Canal issue.

the ~ ~ ~ ~ 5 anat yet just as consistently, clieni as agnency
keptthefact as- ide as possible from the public. J fid,-he easn- ot iffienit to comprehend. I have always felt thh th -mre he eole learned about this giveaway the moire
The~~~~ neetOiinRsearch Poll poves I was correct. As pbli awrenss f the treaty negotiations increased from 18 porent in197 to30 ercent in 1976, to O7 percent .in 1977, the p~reitag, o tosepolaewho want to continue control of the Canl, ncrase repecively from 66 percent to475 percent, to "78
Mr.haiman I annt disagree more with am olleague from 'fbria wo sis y right, about the executtive session. If -this trety s's dan god or the American people, as they have been ptolathig cros hiscentry, I say, let the American people have
-e ",f thewiteses don't want: to answer the questions in puw) We hairan, t is because they have something 'to hide fkomthoAmerimnpeole. That is clear to me and to the American
J. hmi mycoleage as been playing up in Amy's tree house for

-..r. ATOHis Thnk ou, Mr. Chairman. I want to congratulate y~o4:M. Charmn, ormoving expeditiously an considering the
tretyon hePanama. Canal. The issues raated by the agsetnft ..~prncilereached by -the executive branch of our gowe-tientandtheRepblic of Panama do raise serious concerns. My cnstiuent, ina pll I did recently, are usest reluctant to Wi~~dihomtolof hePanama Canal. I share their concern over the.Wntnue, netraityof -the canal; but I mustesayr there are a lot
ues tat reraiedthat also, give ume cernover our foreign
in:Suth meria. I look forward t the details of .the agremm n, rincplead will attempt to approach the issues with
W~harzn&h1,4awlke most people who don't like to part with aftyhd4af ~alu artcularly under:-pressure. But. I think it is impotantthatweach: it as much as possible unemotionally
Md "the uegotiof ust what Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2, of the 0 ow neas.,Does the .U.S. House of Representatives in ha~wel# o ly in the disposition of the Panama Canal? I fil, IWal so 1.rea: he Cbotitution that way,: and I would hope
iwil agree.
The Cm~mAN Mr. auman.
_BAW w. r, CArman, i want to add my, general endorsetha~-:#ttewvtthe Chair, made and take issue with the

I think this is a perfectly appropriate forum for tt*: J Of these issues, particularly in view of the Administration's popaganda campaign conducted during the last ten: Aays. It wouW. mak Joseph Goebbels blush in his heyday to am. how this., has. Isen orchestrated. I have seen more on television of., our two--,dmi;UA-, guished Ambassadors last week than I have Qvnkite and Na4ers. I think it is appropriate that we have a say a few things to them, as we are now, and to get some answers from tbem. I don't think anything they will hear, this morning. will upset too much after all these months of sitting across'the table some very hard-nosed negotiators on the otbor side. We want you to understand it is all done in good spirit, but we are also very serious about what we say. We expect you to do what we tell you here in this hearing in the.. future writing of the treaty, and I am sure YOU will follow our instructions.
I would like to hear in your comments today, gentlemen-the. two Ambassadors and associated State Departmept types that are with us-I would like to hear a little bit about not, only the negotiations, the actual possible treaty terms. When you get to. your c ments.. and I have read some of your formal statements andthey -sounded as long-winded as ours-I would hope after your formal statements. you will tell us a little about the context of the negotiations, particularly in view of the fact that one of the major Soviet La tip American experts has been in Panama recently for an exteadeo stay. I would like to hear about the proposals that the Soviets are making now to build a major factory in Panama, to locate a bank there, the negotiations going on between the Soviet Union..and the Pan Government about establishing a free zone in the City
of Colon so the Soviets can expand their activities in the -rest, of Latin America, about the building of a Soviet hydroelectric plant and whether you feel all- these negotiataons between the Soviets...and Panama has any bearing at all on the question of whether or not vM. should relinquish control of the Canal. I would like to hear your full explanation of the do" x k you. have been giving us'about defense of the canal. You tell us one of the reasons wemight as well cede control is that we can't. deiend, the Canal, anyway, that any guerrilla force can bomb the fawd..LLY. and put it out of commission. Please square that with President Carter's expensive telegram he sent to me and aU 535...other Congressmen and Senators about how we will be able to be#*r once we abandon the Canal Zone. If we can't defend it now, howean we later? Let's have some answers on that. Lastly, I want to tell the negotiators, Mr.. Omirman.. because some conservatives are not willing to fight, andpoemim.,Ge is willing to initial a document that he read, the6re, Ain ams great many Members of the Congress who: do try to. constituencies, and I would suspect todayff you-had tal*. ilk" on this issue nationwide, it would be the same. as 'in th#' District of Maryland, overwhelming rejection of at least we now understand to be your proposal. I don't think we have seen anything *in the cootext Ofhistoryii Mi the last generation or two that will be as momen, as tlu*s issuo-vT thinkwe confront in these hearings and the treaty which wffl be

eventually, I daiqeon stoun whtreadnt Csal liberal~ byiis isalsmn ft.i An r hen yo s rougt upreen
'theAmer peole r e ouse ito wa abew fisit fnte chapter,~ 'nteap and Iha know otharererso theFoeg ,lices'. Smetime theie othe body thinks Ms. Mumsl Trt you, know whir a.Ft or sent Imentdik to cmplmentyouforcomplenigti Ambassador o.vnoit that he Hose' Re estlyve diently an withoanet roei the. somesiio kin ofe equiabl soluion. Praf Mr.Chai bdnsdor'tst Iroknw bothin mh Constitu tionat ight I ry tl eaind ab ou hi.oufidght pAril
IV~~~tn an t mlctosf r ealusit s thew .sigt merme
ORO~mntat ,do, lsy aoets e gnthat Iod hpes will i
run theworld, anm iss y ue.o htor etmns
-'like this. Wen believe or Lntepinoipt -an
wolorls coldtaim n'oiewy h
'Bdilker'for~ parigsohoetyilarely ike coloniasma dao hcd~~~~rr intyn ocm osm beinasd of itl soion ms e aamai Canal. BuiwilsIhaeehi Mr. C iran ad AmaundrsandkandwIbkno my constites
caugt~btwe having st, re ally, ar nches tioa seurity ea
re'alle and itmlctor orn heisecuri, re the transportation issuesiHown
yet: 86' vea mrajo treanispforttion arStery wihar withyouwhy fel us s, Amerbicn fla, eve he filea t~itenCanalrCaneweofensureatheaneutra
theyloolie thsfe anbel-eing the cemofsef :..:deDfxnin~tin th w epoe conoiimpactsonew th s .S
.'Vr.'issesatstae weflatary at the U.S.? no u
-bf hni~a,. I knw I on't know.uarl Bute Iodoknowlsm tad t wt
86 mth n,, m cont is trei to bcued guaranted s thr< t Aflatiofishployee sihtePnm afandBu secue, Iad whie o lbfty pn~iplsandrld nd tei eantionshie aso they ica

Wttyf-th'tU-S: hat e the hiastoryato lseair bHi w 11:W ~ ~ ~ ~~r abeWe hs'sa jtsfaoraIthionk whteny weti th

in he ana? Watillbetht Wenoweilookpat othe relatio il th e................................. r i in to y i p a c t o n............. th ei'H ", ii : ii:,i U :ii:. ....

Meserm~h thnsIdntko.BtI mo nwta atm

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wiit iiiiiiiiinitiiiiiiiiith eiiiiMHHiii ............................... s s &iiiiiiiii iiiiii 'a n d):) (: s e c u r e................ a n w h e n ........

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tr],646 44 beinvia

with France and England, there is a lot to be learned.Thowne the kinds of issues I tljmk we are inter'ested'mi. JIU
Lastly, and not at all least I thinkwhat my constitute wa nt.,to know, and I want to know, is this really a giveamW-, N tliiiiPQ4 a throwaway.? Or is it that by sharing a resogme and.c6m .UP, With an equitable agreement, we don't lose puwer, butwe g "ipwer through a reputation of fairness, equitaNlenesi in our 14* American policy?
So as we review theproposed Canal treaties, I am nte esW in seeing how we can strike a balance with the porLmium s o determination and the protection and safety and fy qf .the
U.S. It is those principles by which I judge my actions-9 Ws.
Thank you.
The CHmRmAN. Mr. Dornan.
Mr. DoRNAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Linowitz and Mr. Ambassador BunkerI want toa
myself with all of the opening remarks of theChair, and, t,.would like to again say to both of you something I have I said MO: PUMIC many times, that I will give as much of 'my tune as possible:,,to defending your sincere interest in negotiating what has probably been the toughest treaty this country has had in a decadeor 9re, and I will not stand by. quietly when the Far Right try to is"*, 6 you non-patriotic or more.evil motives than what: you hwi txia& to acconiplish.
Mr. Bunker, .1 think your record as an s
virtually without peer. Y ou have had a career that:,. 14 684 Oescribed -with the word incredible.
Mr. Linowitz, in spite of your bushiess, M tso: Wwch MOM
aboveboard in, that area, I t you were handed the, t4ughesti
hottest potato that anyone'has been p*ven to back up the work,.. Ambassador Bunker has worked on with such zeal. H.Ow. Vqr,. I 1AM*%A111W%
would hope that you would return the compl hnent in, MY your sincerity and your position by not ascri" tQ M Ikor
anyone else in this country who intelligently, in V..iurrse,
takes exception to your conclusions, that we are noteither f O:IIVwlpg evil motives or even defending some: sort of weird imperialismi. .. ...
I came across an editorial, flying here this,,morn;ng, frora.,my district, in the Wall Street Journal, and, Iwould like,:W.,111! 1 first paragraphs, which does not take a stand for'or A e
treaty you have worked so hard on. It just Werely w*XWO
straight on this breast-beatm'g, mea. culpa. it -that some people in the State Department have that somehow or otlhw we must
purge ourselves of the "evil" we have perpetrated on OWN *.W. nian people for 63 years.
The article begins:
David McCullough, author of a widely-hailed histo of the buMbn #of tbe: Pa"m
Canal, commented recently that if ard- in= hawe. awuw cW10!W kIke canal with the water gone and Wr 4
just the. ow](04VO to 1,
what a civilization must have builtthii!" And of codrw they would be right. The canaI:: mnks aniaAg the tea '0 0 ring feats of history. Coundnir the fruitless eftbrta..Otthi Friuck 4*7idn". in the building, costing million wW om 25AW, livw,
Even in the Space Age, the canal remain its six.808 41440.0locka that lift ships 85 feet to cross a shallow mountain range "d rittiti Q to"

level~~~1 Thein dt w ra atfca aea rastgte rlo s ye gllos ever aterl necesar fo th locs; tsnnl rafforcenuisfl fro 40pe,000 cap na50m rnstbten
canat popib8 By thbtmeseianlepnesis1. ..The~~t wasal waloeta negnesng alf. tha cofsrthn U nvl. e the ....ozes of heeering Th feats rafof .W.Gell ev an tereicl scouge Axerias or orethen proucetuf anAeric rmin wit se,00cnlanythig it l setuit to dol haipits" ~ ~ ~ ag isinr ta90inha erdteianmehaningpoe itn to91r the.~ ~ ~ ~ :ta aeat ns estan it isahark of th toS br al h~r retnss test Sucheein cieas ow lW al a te e meia accpkplihmext f CrlosFinandalercans, and ailgiailt ogere eddypr
10 ~ ~ ~~~ypwr the nt wstepoutorm n Aerof bimngifth delf-y coiffidbown eravaswpost-Worldo WartIIneventseinoHu gory,
hao,4"me,-hionab i itlea ationistl for ith .s o maofsitati one to dispara ~ ~ 11 aheeetofheps.Sverc natotew ltle Cneed fore th "'colonial~~ ~ enlv"poldb gyAmccmanie ad he U..gitios that nedowose' uqe ~~~~~~tr ove bhe canal tosppr Panama byol tgis ooba hic aed ar owhms thn A1903n.vrwemnlyfvr ein
It i #qttetha.:-uhpowrlyere yhentrwi no dateaoub mfdth tety Theyrentunkownven ny h o anmanianspost-olibral to akenthe Hnary, 'Butb~e if ou eliee tat iaaonstaeit fbo atlrlarta the U.S.tomianaznef authmity~ ~~Ir ttecigarosasalovpromote gotodwn, thi ws hemisphnee frthe

.beaM adwe~k~ul erousa actne bth a.S reudiationso those whov pro~deda ythatwoudnericn rte crd in Panama is soething200

c::opnin pll o thet Zoeicand atereding ao epintg
*e~~~~~~~ Owa-ni ht eenttuany Secifr icll to sit n the atm ovegenmusin ts illngns to the cnuson liealyo takte havel

X. t igt hlpfo th amiisrageo th e tau dauothear hul be very

cONesion areproptd y a thie tamtus qoowl in Sth Koishrea rande
Iblso ulythi n trneet sbigngtae n
6.ffiis~~~~ thi- f ntb: n neeos ac bpatian pdaproach giv thoeh
hhve ~ ~ ~~n Chaiee~hteAeiman ancod takngm the loedhfro f)eocat like Daie Floo ofe Pennsyl-pl P After evera t dontoe dmnstratin after ranhcrpsouh r maerialbeca efse struifcureandsimo tanawrl

po" ovest6 c g'thle otuu, presene hsl any vetig Kpo resnseneahasomhwnrote
Ve~~~~~nr if e iv u this adiitainntoioesitear tha hoicas
athbbiib a value of $io lws
16sein.t fn ut" hs ray ibin eoiatdadI

c Y i&: t 1 kep tis abiprtisn aproch, ive th
lcni,11,1 6 akig te lad ro
fix~ thi ram. uppr in: m rma an

hi n ohrprmnntDmcrt ik'aie lodo ensl

one-quarter of a billion dollars to a rock in the lvdian
Ocean called Diego Garcia.
I have to pause to determine why we are going to 91*109 up this waterway when we know in this room, those: of us Wh' o.. have done deep research in this area, that heads of-state most ifriejWy to us whisper in quiet of privacy not-to give the cahal to an uti is le man-and a man who *in his political leanings will drift. to the: far, right in order to take control, or thefar left as Mr. Castm In qrdar to secure him power for the rest of his lifetime. When I look: at: the Hungarian brutality or last year's -ugly disgrace of t
warriors used to kill young black men, when I look at a. ovation for a brutal murderer named Idi Ammi by the Organlzatwn, of African Unity, I have to scoff at the opinion of the Third: World and what it thinks if the United States if it does or does not cave in, on something that it thinks we should.,
So I don't give much credence to reason one that South Ame6m will love us more if we give up the Canal. I...
Reason two is even more offensive: that we will prevent bloodshed.
Mr. Torrijos-and I hope we will discuss his brother, a fugitiye from justice for heroin running in New York and BuenosAires, rewarded by an ambassadorship to Spain-I ho will.. analyze
the personality of the man who said in Ne kP "This treaty. has avoided the deaths of 50,000 young Panamanians." We are told that this is why we are negotiating the canal, because he is going to negotiate some type of vicious tantrum tantamount to Mn, Nloriqp setting bombs on American territory last October, an incident that our ambassador in the Canal Zone kept secret. when he chewed Torrijos out for that conduct. The ambassador agreed that Mr. Noriega set bombs in the Canal Zone. When we look at ti)at personality threatening deaths in the Canal Zone if we don't ", e. him the canal, then I call that the worst foreign bla ma 11 1. have seen since the North Vietnamese tweaked the nose of Secretary: Kissinger.
hope we will discuss whorehouses in the Canal, ski 'sw*. bank accounts and the rumors about Treasury De going to the Panamanians privately trying to slip more mone to the TorrIjos regime rather than do things openly and abov:e bqa *-, If they are rumors, let us discuss them. I am opposed to the ranking minority member, whoig.l.reispept for his zeal and: intellect as a Congressman, -,about g into executive sessions. If Newsweek is correct that. this -Wiul ZZ: over into congressional campaigns and maybe affect the president" campaign, then let's have it all out here in, the open. 11.0it'sdMuse.. everything, from houses of prostitution to brotheisrunn, orom IRt's get it out in the open.
I told you gentlemen before in Panama, concuri* -t6it, this type of open discussing makes your job easier because &4.,Mr.: To *Jos knows what he is up against, not only in th6 U.S,, Senate: but also here in the U.S. Congress under the excell...'. 14ade." Dan Flood and the Chairman of this Cornmi M '111111iu. IWS about this canal than I could learn in the next two Yft= Thank you.

The OnmwMAN. Mr. Trible?
Mr. Tamar. Let me say I welcome the opportunity to hear f*om Abassadors Bunker and Linowitz in regard to the proposed treaty
-ihPadama and engage in what I hope will be an unemotional eolqu!f-on this important issue.
J zhtaid add -that I share the concern voiced by the Chairman and asbe members of this committee. My own prelirnalary view is that the proposed treaty is contrary AhB: national security of the United States and international annersa R is one thing to surrender sovereignty to thae Canal U6e and another to pay the Panamanians so liberally to take the
mloff our habnls.
I leak forward to the discussion this morning and I appreciate the Vportimity to have the occasion to meet with you and discuss this

The CaAamAN. Thank you.
Mt Abassader, of course, it is a few days since August 10, and I t h:that the foram on this issue has been reserved for the mattesiwe branch.
If the members of committee will indulge themselves in equaIng som feelings, I an, sure that you and Ambassador nifowhozlr Godferal Dolvin, Mr. Wyrough, Mr. Hansell and Mr. aBec1 have profitted from what generally is an across-the-board ohieig in the House on the issue.
Wow, Mr. Ambassador, we are certainly happy to hear your views
on thiskse.
basadowuwana. Mr. Chairman and members of the Linewitz and I are here today at your invitaint
w ithn. yon the,.non. Panama Canal agreement. Accompanying as are Mr. Hlerbert Mansall, the Legal Adviser of the Department of .Sate; Lt. General Welborn -G. Dolvin (Retired) of the Department of
DefnseandDeputy Treaty Negotiator; Mr. Robert Beckel, Deputy AmisantSecretary of State for Congressional Relations; and Mr. Richbard Wyrough of.,the Department of State, Treaty Coordinator
and mpberof negotiating team. Ambssdo Linowitz, Mr.
Hand I will have brief opening statements..
IMurphy, in, his letter inviting us to this hearing, dP% ec theJ% i pAortance Of fully and. promptly inorin the Congres abut thenew agreement. We endorse this objective and hope

It is, I believe, worth noting that this-t ninixtmtim, laa- iotmsulted extensively with the Congress, during the scouts oU the negotiations. Over the past seven mm 016 and
I, as well as various other officials from the &ate..antl V..; I Departments, met individually or in groups with, most OfAhe bers of theSenate and with a.,largw.,number of-lHbuso.... interested in the Panama Canalissue. This is the, secon& timw this year that we have testified befbre. this
In our last appearance before you-- -On...March 16---".. reported
that there were several ,isaues still to be Today.. wal am
confirm that both sides have,. agreed in -principle onthe, ti= : .:. of a new canal agreement, which is in the process of, beingput:49 ftW form.
The agreement will involve two treaties. One: will 90vem.& operation and defense of the canal until December 31, 19994) other will provide for the permanent neutrality of the WOMMY.
We believe the terms that have been negotiated are favorable in every important respect-they assure the efficientoperation of the canal-they enable the United States to protect the canal-rthey guarantee the canal's neutrality indefinitely-and: they.'provide. an economic settlement that is fair and: reasonable.
In the remainderof my statement I wilI explain- the =T=90ments for the canal's operation and defense under the: new Ambassador Lm*ovn*tz will then discuss the neutrality,: and the economic arrangements.
The United States will retain control of both opefttion :4"d defense of the canal for the remainder of this century-. that is, vuUl December 31, 1999. Duri that period Panama will take part in both operational and defense activities. This, arrangementW111,74W
.A- ,
sure that the United Statres can guarantee the uninum efficient operation and security of the canal after theinew tmty goes into effect. At the same time, it will provide Panama both the time and the opportunity to develop -the experience and apabffity needed to assume responsibility for canal operation and defimse beginning in the year 2000.
An important element in canal operation are the provisions for use of the lands and watersin the premat%40koal Zone. Under the treaty, the -Canal Zone will eease.. 'to exist-and Panama will assume general territorial jurisdiction. over the am of the Zone. However, the United States will retain, acoess.-Iba a#d the rights to use all land and water areas and installation*17.. for the operation, maintenance and defense of the,-coxial... December 31, 1999.
Insofar as defense is concerned, this means that the. United Stoilii will retain bases for the defense of the canal. A Status of Fmves Agreement similar to such agreements elsewhere will. CoVer the activities and presence of our militarY forces.
In operating the canal, the Unit M- States will ad. Itbi0ouAl IL
United States Government agency, which wfll replace the Panma I Canal Company. The canal treaty will specify cm-tain.Amarm of the agency, which is to be tablished d"ugh legislati6h "enact6d

by the,.Congresm.: The agency will have aboard of directore made up of five Americans and four Panamanias,all of' whom will be appointed -by the United States.
hexecutive effcers of the agency wil e a Canal Administrator and a Dephty Admiist rator. Until 1990 the Administrator will be an American, and the Deputy a Panamanian. Thereafter, the Adminitao will be a Panamanian and the Deuyan American.
Thrug te:CaalAgency, ~thdiie Stateswllhv the necesat powers, to, regulate canal operations, including the setting of toils.
Oppif Si'mpottance to the future operation of the canal are the treaty' govering the 'personnel of the canal enterprise. '1ii~ emio have been worked out with three objectives in
si in:I ; we must ensure that the canal will have a trained and fifly qub ified work force. Second, we must provide fair treatment to the ediployees both U.S. and Panamanian, who presently work ftr the eanaf.l Third, we want to open inrasing opportunities to I taimfians for employment at all levels in preparation for Panama's assumption of responsibility for canal operation at the treaty's
Under' thi ew treaty, terms and conditions of employment will gtoetrly be no 'lems favorable to persons already employed than t he in free immediately prior to the start of the treaty. With I~M-Ul to4 lbeie. wages, there will, be no discrimination on the basis af nationality,1ex or race. Panama and the United States will
toem iniIding appropriate health and retirement programs.
UdLf the treaty a number of activities now carried out by the Ahiie State wFbe termhinated or transferred to Panama. The tanus of the new agreement call for persons employed in actvities tMS eI 988 to Panantsto be rained by Panama to the marxitun axn ol le. If addition, the United States will provide app opit~ery !Jtir~ient program.
pitisins ill govern U.S. citizen employees. New em,4 "yeg,-A ishos A hicwfed after the new treaty takes effect-i
gopralybe rotated every five years. Present employees of the
YC K aiq and the Canal 26tne Government may continue to
new age n ti their retirement or until the teratinaru .-o Oiir employment for any other reason.
neshtdFr of present U.8. citizen company employees will be
reduO 20percent during the first five years of the treaty. Any eioo ILIII :'whosejob is adversely feted by the treaty will receive prior"1 jinlabent assistance. All will enjoy rights and grotecsiiar W t hese of United States Government -employrees else0here ahba'd. Percent employees .will have access to military pdatal V os exchfange and comissary facilities for the first five
TItrns'e to Pana'ma of jitrisdiction over the area of the Canal Zone wil also affect 'U.S. citizen canal -employees.. Under the new
tretyUtitedStates: crimnal juidction over its nationals will be phased.'down during th fis Mhe years, of the treaty. Thereafter, Pi i 101ll exrcis prinr ciinal jurisdiction with the understahibgthat it-may wive jurisdictio to the United States. United Stabte ithzi e"ltes n their dehdents charged with crimes

will be entitled to procedural guarantees and will bw permitted. to serve any sentences *in the United States in acwrdaum... with a reciprocal agreement.
That concludes my statement A mismaclor- lAnowits vdU now explain other aspects of the new canal agreement.
.. . ...... .
The CHAMMAN. Ambassador Linowitz.
Ambassador LINOwrrz* Mr. Chairman, members of the commottee, for more than 13 years, under four PresidOnt tha, Vi-14-ed States has been seeking the basis for a now treaty wril% Pina replace the outmoded treaty of 1903. Last week we.were able to announce agreement in principle on the basis ty arrangements which will, we believe, fully respond to the 114' interests and aspirations of each countrv. At the same time,: the accord will recognize our mutual responsibility toward the countries of the Western Hemisphere and the world.
Upon our return to Washington last Thursday, A
Bunker and I met with the President, the Secretary of rWiense, the Acting Secretary of State, and the Joint Chiefs Of viewed with them in detail the principles which had been !:iego#-. ated and which will be *incorporated into the texts of. twa newtreaties which, as you know, are now being draftqd. At the end of our meeting, the Joint Chiefs indicated to'...the. President that in their Judgment these principles full r p'ovido -for the security needs of the United States and... that ley'.. therefore, completely support them.
Yesterday, at Preident Carter's request. General George Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and J met vith IfopmVir'. President Gerald Ford in Colorado and outlined the term pE.-theagreement to him. President Ford expressed his satisf"im'at-the arrangements we had made in these negotiations... and,, J s,
endorsement to the p les agreed upon.
Both President Carter and President Ford believe that we aiv, now on the threshold of concluding.two treaties.withPan ma, Jv are fair and equitable and which President Carter hais properW called "an example to the world of how nations can work. together for the benefit of all."
This, then, is the moment when the United. States can, finan realize the fruits of so much effort by both. Democratic-,and RePU can administrations to achieve a fair and reasonable new treat-y arrangement which will preserve our interests mi the the same thne permi us to act the way a omt na, dou 131) 041d Ambassador Bunker has outlined various 6f the n*mfl our new treaty arrangements., I wou14 like toZollow b*. several others.
The new canal agreement wiU pro.36AO the basialfbi awar=04 0' the United States continued a( to a Which is e
secure. As .,Ambiassiidor 11unker Im otaWd Oe4y
U.S. forces will have the rep mainta
primaul P.M-11-ult
canal defense until the ear 2000; but the estate Vw U-Vi
important rights extenZing beyond that date.


A separate neutrality treaty, which will take effect simultaneously with the new canal treaty, will commit the United Staites adPanama to aintain a regime of permanent neutrality of the ..abal.*CUnder.athe rules of neutrality to be set forth in the treaty, the e..Cnal is to be open to merchant and naval vessels of all nations at all: .-times without discrimination as to, conditions or charges of

A special provision authorizes U.S. and Panamanian warships to transit the: canal expeditiously in both peace an war and without being subject to any restrictions as regards means of propulsion, armament or cargo.
Tetrety ~gives the United States defined rights to assure that Wthe .canal's' :permanent, neutrality is maintained and places no .limitdtion on ear ability to take action as may be necesedry in the Event that the canal's neutrality is threatened or violated.
-.ilt in most important to point out that unlike the treaty governing vanl -operation, the neutrality treaty is of tiadefiniter durationt. In dio t he, neutrality ;treaty will provide a firn foundation for
assui that our long-term interest in the maintenance of anr open, scceible, secure and efficient canal is preserved. HJ fe.Nw as to the economic terms of the new canal agreement: At the
itat teeegtiations both countries agreed-in the 1974 sieiger-Tack Statement of Principles-that Panama should reimae a "just and equitable share of the benefits derived from the A ppration of the canal in its territory." Consistent with this princi.4 eo:the. United: States maintained during the negotiations that
paments to -Panama should be drawn entirely from canal rev.jiiwAat is, that the payments should reflect the canal's eoX4. o wale as measured by its revenue-generating capacity. ... 1 heade representatives took a different view at *first. They
prposda large initial iump-sum payment together with- a very 4Isdleanawity,. total value which far exceeded the most optimis_kddproein bE anal revenues.
iThei Fbamangians argued that these large sume were not dispropotionate considering the canal's economic value to the United 18ttMand. whhn, compared with payments made by the United eMBto fer, alghts of more limited duration and scope in military base gueeanmt with other countries. They poin ted out that under the
-ew treaty Panama weuld be committing itself to a close and longael being patership with the United States; -and they urged thattis was easonmenough fbr the United States to give Panama 4waakenshles stin -by affording it additional resources for its
uphiom 8 telbpment. *
Te parent which ha now been worked out has two compenentts: First payments to Panama, -to be financed, entirely from canal,~ ree-s will. be -provided for in the new treaty. And a package: of, loansloan guarantees, and credits outside of the treaty and amsbject to .existing statutory procedures is also, planned.
i~ayment toPnm-rmcnlrvne obe provided for in
the neW~reaty willconsist, of-., (a). a fixed 'share of tols amounting to 30 cnts~er PnamaCanal ton: We. estimate that this will.yed 4
mi~on o 50 lion, per year (b) an annuity of $10, million, also to

be drawn fi!om canal revenues; and. A0 up to... an additimak $10 million per year if canal traffic ..and revenues, The economic development p outside: of the treaty. -consists
of, loans, loan guarantees and credita extending over a period of, five to
years andwill include the following components-all. support Panama's economic developm. up to $200 million- m*
Export-Import Bank credits; up to $75 million in AID housing guarantees; and a $20 million Overseas -Private Investment 1.,.Corporation loan guarantee to CORNA., the Panamanian national development corporation, a national development bank
In addition, the United States is undertaking to provide Ito: Nnama up to $50 million in Foreign Military. Sales iir: : averi Uten years to assist it in developing the ca ility -needed to exercise its responsibilities for canal defense t r the new agreemerrL
None of these loans, guarantees and credits will require pprwnations from the Congress. I want to Istressi however, that the disbursement of funds under these vograms will be subject. to'lall the procedures and criteria which normally apply to each of the programs involved.:
We believe that the economic settlement isfair, reasonable ,and appropriate. We are convinced that itis a good investment. toWard establishing a new relationship with Panamathat will protect our long-term interest 'in the canal; and it will notinvolve anyadditional burden for the American taxpayer since it: can W, from canal revenues.
Let me add a word to my prepared statement, Mr. Chairman, respond to some of the comments made this morning. :i
I submit to you that one single question that you, member%, 4, the Senate and the American people should ask yourselves about this new treaty arrangement is. simply this: Is it in thehighest natidnal interest of the United States? If thisarrangenient is not, should be rejected and you should be among the first to do so. Did'if you are persuaded that the agreement we havexeachedisindeed nil the highest national *interest of the United StatW it deserves.your full support.
As you know, President Carter, President Ford, the Joint Chief of Staff, Secretary Kissinger, Secretary Vance,' Secretary. Harold Brown, have all come to the conclusion that this new arrangement as outlined is in our highest national interest
We hope that you, too, and the American people and the members of the Senate vVill. openmindedly andifairly andthoughdWly examine these provninions and arrangements and -do w- M':4m atow sphere of mutual trust and respect, so that the Ameiican.peopie can get what they are entitled to get, the greatestwisdozu -and: best judgment of those who have undertaken to. serve: the people. I have no. question m'lnymind that when, youhavehad4hat opportunity, when all the details of the treaty 'which, aze still:- not finally drafted are put before you, that you will mee what has been reached as an agreement, which is indeed fair -And e4yait&Me:: and which is indeed in the highest interest of the United. States.
Now Mr. Herbert Hansell would likia :to make:: Wcozement
The CHAiRmAx- I would like to, clarify one.. thint., (M pW A second paragraph, you say, "will commit the United States and

lannaa to maintain a regime of neutrality." I believe you added the word "Dermanent"?
Aigrbtaleadbr kiNowns.' Yes, sir.
'The CHim~MAN. Where did you add the word "'permanent"? tidshadir laNowrre. "a regime: of permanent neutrality of the
Th'tnAmm. Thank you.
Mr. Man tl?
Mr. He Auox. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman land members of the committee, I wish to address thib me sing a legal. question that you and several members of the
apeitt" have already mentioned. I refer to the, question -of whatho property of the United States in the Canal Zone may be
ajpsd:.of by..treaty, or whether legislation is required for snch a
I_:.,a unireased by the legal views expressed by you and Mr. Hubbard and Mr. Metcalfe. But with all due deference the Achninia. tttioa pecifically the Department of State and the Department of 44sisej agm very- a lear that the correct answer to that question is
( akgoer the Conatitution, property of the United States may he ex A of by either method..
pqnw this, committee has oversight responsibility for the adnia station of the Panama Canal, the Canal Zone and its waters, I qpyecito that the committee has a particular interest in, this legal quks~piAud I wish to discuss it fully with you. DAmbwadona Runker and TLinawit have described the. general wow, the proposed treaties. I would simply wish to reiterate that tindr the .propened ,treaties, the,. Congress would have gentinuin
I is reponsibility over: such matters as U.S. defense activities
Paamei.. organisation and fumctioning of the canal operation, .~~ ............ .anagempnt of the canal, employee relating and
na tion.
oddton napecific legislation. will be required to knplement w~puyespeaks of the new relationship, including the establishpment 0(J v w ammal opepatiag agency and a .new employment systeem, 400 easures noopcerping the financial management .of tle anal.
4 s.,alear that extensive implementing legislation wilbe man 41not able yet to make specific propoaas aoncerning
tbek co tpated legasIation since the texts of the treate are still tknerlnep~ tion However, I :monid, emphasize, Mr. Chairman, that-he:Hm of -Representatives -will. in any event have a major role in, the creation and imlmnainof any new relationship between Ahet~ United: States and Panama. J. would- noike. to. turn: to the legal question concerning the power-to transfer property,
TP nb~x of the prolem is the, interrelation of the treaty power clase f the Castitution, Article 2, section 2, clause 2, and the

Article 2, section 2, clause 2. dealing: with. tbe: powem-4 : the. President, states: "He shall have Power.. by and-with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provied twoAhir;Wof the Senators present concur.'
Article 4, section 3, clause 2, provides; "'The COngrew Aiqll.. have power to dispose of and make all, needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other property. belonging to tbe United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as.:to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particullarr
of F...
I first note that nothing in the of the two clauses limits
the treaty power with respect to disposition of property. Nor is Article 4 with respect to disposition of property exclusive.
As Mr. Justice Field stated in Geofroy-v. R "thelreaty
199,82 power,
as expressed in the Constitution, is in terms unlimited except-by those restraints which are found in that instrument 10 .'" But thete is no restraint expressed in the Constitution with respect to disposition of property. The property clause- in Article 4,, like most -of- the clauses granting legislative powers contained *in Article 1, provides that "Congress shall have power", without any qualification indicating exclusiveness against the treaty power. k- : --.Today the rule is firmly settled that the treatypOWer extends to all areas within the legislative authority of Congress that, are: not expressly reserved by the Constitution to the exclusive Jurisdicdm of Congress. Under Article 6, clause 2, of the Constitution, a treaties made under the authority of the United States! which tire self-executing take effect as the law of the land. The Constitution, of course, contains some provisions which hwit the treaty power with respect to specific subjects. PrincipaL instances are Article 1, section 7, clause 1, and Article 1, ioadon 9', clause 7. The former clause provides that "all bills fbr raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives."... The second clause cited ordains that "no money shall be &*vmfrom the, Treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made, by law." Hence it is recognized that treaties may neither impose taxes nor directly appropriate funds.
The property clause in Article 4, however, contains no that would exclude concurrent application of the treaty power. In fact, the placement of the property clause in Article 4 of the Constitution-which deals with Federal-State relations, rather than Article 1,which deals with the powers of Vkher
evidence that the property clause does not restrict the treaty power.
As the debates in the Constitutional Convention of 1787 show, the property clause i i ated in: conjunction with the grant:to Congress, in the preceding clause of section 3, of the: power to create new states in territories ceded to the United States.:
The powers of Congress enumerated in clause'2.::of thaVeection were added to establish Federal authority over these erritories: and other property belonging to the United States,, while xv sernng the claims of the States and the United States In dispulU matters. The drafting history of that clause shows no indicatimi of any i.nt.entto restrict the scope of the treaty power.


It is also,:significant that the property clause in Article 4 links '%J e p6P,,r to disposeof property closely to "the power to make all needful Rules and Regulations" respecting the Territory and other pro y belonging to the United States.
Tbese two categories of congressional power are closely related. The.applicability of the treaty power for one of these categories 4hould-,lw-the.same for the other. It is well settled that the treaty power can be used to make rules and regulations governing in the territory belonging: to the United States, even in the District of
The power to d ispose of public land and other property belonging to the United States by treaty is also supported by judicial decisions aAd: lovg stan&mg practice.
The... most-Eamiliar judicial statement of the power to transfer rights in. land by treaty was made by Mr. Justice Clifford in Holden V. Joy: it is insisted that the President and the Senate, in
00", such a treaty, could not lawfully covenant that a patent
should be issued to convey lands which belonged to the United
"'Ilii 66out the consent of Congress, which cannot be admitted. 04 the -contrary, there are many authorities where it is held that a treoty -may convey to a granted a good title to such lands without an act of Congress, conferring it, and that Congress has no constitutional power to settle or interfere with rights under treaties, except in, cases purejy. political."
,$imilarly, inJones v.,Meehan,, Mr. Justice Gray stated: "It is well settled that a good title to parts of the lands of an Indian tribe may be, granted, to. individuals by a treaty between the United States and the, tribe., without any act of Congress, or any patent from the Executive autbo rity of the United States. ; Althpugh the treaties in these cases were concluded with Indian tribes, the decisions are authoritative precedenth for treaties with foreign nations. As the.Supreme Court has stated, the former power of the United States to make treaties with the Indian tribes was
coextensive with that to make. treaties with foreign nations. In regard to the latter, it is, beyond doubt, ample to cover all usual subjects of diplomacy."
Let me now turn to the treaty practice of the United States. There the precedents look two ways. The record shows instances where transfers of territory and other property have been made by or pursuant to treaties alone and instances where treaties or executive agreements disposing of property belonging to the United States have been concluded pursuant to or contingent upon congressional authorization.
Precedents supporting the power to dispose of property by treaty alone can be found in the boundary treaties with neighboring wwers, especially in the treaties between the United States and Great Britain of 1842 and 1846 for the location of our northeast and northwest boundaries, and in the treaty with Spain of 1819 which effectuated the session of Florida and determined the boundary west of the Mississippi, ceding lands claimed by the United States on the Spanish side of the boundary.
Mexico of 1933 and the treaty with Mexico of 1970. Both of these

I would like to call your special attention to the treaty with
97-7" 0 77 3

treaties provided for the rectification 'of the river channel..::-and Vie session of lands which would have been left on t1wather sidw of the channel. ..... .
Other recent examples of treaties transferring or provk"finifor the transfer of real and personal 'property, are the-1reaties bet*96n
ok . the. 0 i I
the United States and Honduras of 1971 recognizing soverewn .y of Honduras over the Swan Islands and the treaty between thi United States and Japan of 1971 -for the return to Japan, of 1he Ryuku and Daito Islands. Both treaties included provmiions. fourth transfer of real and personal property belonging to the United States or its agencies.
The terms of the treaties either tranderred the propeet16Y ly or agreed upon the transfer of property. The transfets were made without implementing legislation apparently: in, reliance. on: the treaty or general statutory authority to dispose of fbreign ex6ea property.
In the history of transfers of property to Panama, we have: had a mixed practice. Property has been transferred by executive agreement implemented by a Joint Resolution, by treaty providing, specifically for legislation, and in at least one instance by treaty alone. However, in the legislation implementing the 1955 treaty, Congress recognized the validity of conveyances ma& by operation of the treaty.
Thus, Mr. Chairman, for all of these reasons, we conclude.that the Constitution permits the transfer of property belonging to the United States under the treaty power., Mr. Chairman, I am authorized by the Attorney General to state that he concurs in the conclusions I have expressed here today. Ie Attorney General has provided a formal, written opinion setting out his views. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I submit a copy,. of that opinion for the record.
The CHAMMAN. Without objection, it will be included in the record at this point.
[The information referred to follows:]

.h Secretary: tae

You ltter of July 2,19 77 requests my opinion, in, connctio wit th negotintion of a new Panama Canal treaty on ~ 19 afut ogy anovn te ty-making power pf the Pres:dent dto relatio to t9he poer of Congress to dispose, of errtoy orpperge belognging to thpUnited States. he-qesanzis whether a treaty ay dispese of erritory

_Orproery-belonging to the United States absent statutory m~orizaion.,

Th onstitution provides that the President shall

hav poerto make treaties with the adv ice and consent of the enat, if two-thirds of the Senators present concur (Arice I, section 2, clause 2); and it provides further tha teaies made under the authority of the United States


shall be the "supreme law of the land." Article V1, clause 2.

At the same time, the Constitution gives Congress a number of specific powers that bear upon matters commonly subjected to the treaty power. I need mention but a few: pursuant to Article I, section 8, Congress has power to regulate foreign trade, to provide for the protection of rights in useful inventions, to make rules go% erring captures on land and water, to establish a uniform rule for naturalization, and to punish offenses against the law of nations; and, of course,, pursuant to Article-IV, section 3, Congress has power to dispose of territory or property belonging to the United States. Moreover, there is autho-rity for the proposition that Congress ha's general power. quite apart from these specific powers, to enactlegisla.4, tion relating to foreign affairsi United States v. CurtissWright Export Corp... 299 U.S. 304 (1936); Perez' v. Brownell,

356 U.S. 44 (1958).

A question that arose very early in our constitutional history was whether the existence of these congressional powers limits the power of the President and the Senate to

Conres ha poer o eguate ca th teaty be given th
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Duringithe:pendency of the appeal President Jefferson,, with the adviceaxid consent of the Senate, concluded a, treaty with France. The treaty provided, among:other things, t1wt vessels that had been seized by either nation should be "wtually restored" if they we're not yet "definitively condemned."

Thus, when the case of the Peggy came before the Court, the question was whether the treaty controlled the disposition of the prize. If it did, the schooner was to be restored to France. If it did not,,, the schooner was to be condemned, under the statute; and the proceeds were to be distributed eq mlly:between the United States and the officers and men of the Trumbull,

The Court held that the treaty controlled. It was

a law of the United States, not by virtue of any act of Congress, but by virtue of the command of the Constitution itself, and it had intervened during the appeal to change the statutory rule that had governed the decision below. Because the sentence of condemnation was not yet final, the schooner was not yet "definitively condemned," and it was therefore subject to the treaty. The schooner was to be restored to France. 1 Cranch at 109-10.


Implicit in the decision vas the'elementary proposktion that the President with the advice and con*qmt of the Senate, had power to make a self-exeduting treaty: affecting the disposition of a vessel captured at sea evm though Congress had power to make rules (and had in fact made a conflicting rule) governing the same subject matter* The Court expressed no doubt whatever about the constitutionality of the treaty.

In the years that followed this decision the Supreme Court gave "self-executing" effect to numerous treaties that disposed of matters that Congress had power to regulate. See, e.g., Hijo v. United-States,., 194 U.S. 315, 323-24 (1904)(claims against the United States); Cook v. United States,, 288 U.S. 102, 118-19 (1933)(customs inspections); Bacardi v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150, 161 (1940) (trademarks); see generally Henkin, supra, note 1, at 149. Today, as a result of these and other decisions, it could not be successfully maintained, as a general proposition, that the treaty power stops where the power of Congress begins. On the contrary:, the Court has said that the treaty power, operating of itself and without the aid of congressional legislation, extends to all


proper subjects:for negotiation between our Nation and

others. Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 3321(1924).

The lesson of history is that these "proper subjects"Anclude many that are within the legis.lative J'urisdiction

of Congress.

My second observation is related to the first. I

have suggested that the two powers -- the power of Congress to legislate and the power of the President and the

Senate to make "self-executing" treaties -- may overlap.

I do not mean to suggest that they are coextensive. They 00 are both created by the Constitution, and they are both

subject to the fundamental limitations that are imposed 2/
thereunder; but the limitations that apply to the one do not necessarily apply to the other. The treaty power

may extend to subjects that are beyond the legislative

jurisdiction of Congress. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S.

.2/ In Reid v. Covert., 354 U.S. 1 (1957). Mr. Justice Black stated the applicable rule: "The prohibitions of the Constitution were designed to apply to all branches of the National
Government," including the Congress, the Executive, and the
Executive'and Senate combined. Id. at 17-18.


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wit tht~isein rde toanser he uesionyo hav -


tween our Nation and others; and when atreaty purports to do so, it acts ex proprio. vigore, without the aid of legialation, and is effective for al-l purposes, provided itdoes.. nothing that is forbidden by the'Gonstitution.:,

Does the Constitution forbid the President and the Senate to make self-executing treaties disposing of territory or property belonging to the United States? I have taken note of the opinion, held by some, that the Constitution entrusts certain matters to Congress alone...1'n my opinion, however, the disposition of territory or property belonging to the United States is not such a matter. In my view, territory or property belonging to the United States may be disposed of by action of the President and the Senate under the treaty clause,

There are at least four considerations that support this conclusion, and I shall discuss them briefly below.

First, the fact that the Constitution gives Congress power to dispose of territory or property belonging to the United States does not suggest that the President, and the Senate have no power to do so under the treaty..


clau e. This was the implicit teaching of Marshall's decision in the Peggy and of the cases that followed. The existence of power in Congress does not imply an absence of power under the treaty clause. On the contrary, the one proposition ofwhich we can be certain is that many of the powers that are given to Congress are shared by the President and the Senate when they act, under the treaty clause, to conclude and effectuate bona fide international agreements.

I think it follows that if one were to hold that the power to dispose of territory or property belonging to the United States resides in Congress alone and is distinguishable in that respect from the numerous powers that are shared, one woad be obliged to find some basis for the distinction either in the text of the Constitution or in the history of the relevant provisions. I find none.

The language of Article IV, insofar as it confers upon Congress the power of disposition, is identical to the language of Article I, which confers upon Congress numerous powers that may be exercised by the President and the Senate through self-executing treaties,, Article


IV says that Congress "shall have:powez to disposeof: territory or property belonging to the United States, just as Article I says that Congress "shallhave power":.. to regulate foreign commerce,, ta make rules-governing captures on land and water, and so forth., Article IV goes on to say that Congress shall have power to make 11all" needful rules and regulations respecting territory or property., As in the case of Article I, however, Article IV does not say that the powers it confers -- the power to.. dispose of territory or property, and the power to make rules and regulations respecting it -- shall reside in Congress alone.

The record of the proceedings during the Constitutional Convention supports the interpretation that is suggested by the language of the Constitution itself. The territory and property clause of Article IV was adopted during a general discussion of the role that the central government should play in coiinection with the territorial claims that had been asserted by the several States with respect to the western lands. In the course of the discussion there was no suggestion whatever that the purpose or effect of the clause was

ii !i ii ,,, , 43
to g ii CongressJ exclusive power to authorize or imple"- """ : " ,i

men ineraioa agemnsdsoinftrioyo prpety Se 2 .ora h ecrso h eea
Covnio of18 45-9 46 66(e d d*97[rinfe cie s @arn]

The,,l hisor of the i treat ci~i lause~ isil even more con clsv.Drn h~oeo h ovninsvrlpo


(2) that treaties, including treaties affecting rights

in territory, could be effective.-in the absence of 5/
action by both Houses.

This brings me to the third consideration'that sup-,.

ports my basic conclusion. To the extent thatthe Supreme

Court has spoken to the question, the Court has:said that

the President, with the concurrencevof the Senate, mmy conclude a treaty disposing of territory or property belonging to the United States, and that suctr a treaty may convey good title to the territory or-property in questione

5/ 1 should note that this very point was considered in "Ehe State conventions that were called to ratify the new Constitution. The objection was made that the treaty clause gave the President and the Senate power to alienate. territory, The Virginia and North Carolina conventions proposed a re- medial amendment that would have required every treaty ceding or compromising rights or claims of the United States in territory to be approved by three-fourths of the members of both Houses of Congress. 2 Documentary History of the Con*titution 271, 382 (in U.S. Cong. Doc._ Ser., No. 4185); see generally S. Crandall, Treaties Their Making and Enforcement.220-21
(2d ed. 1916).

No ac ofCnrs srqie.nje4 ttsv ro

10 Haw 442! (180) ..... v.i~i Wilson 23 How 45 (85)

[11ti isi inise thtth rei
dent7' and Sente in iconcludin suh -ret, oldnt aful

coeat htapaetshudb
issued t covylnsw i ibe-i

A "

and historical considerations I have readyy mentioned, provide substantial support for the proposition that a treaty disposing of territory or property belonging to..the United States may be self-executing. J find no cases to the contrary.

Finally, my conclusion is supported by historical practice. While I do not suggest that the commands of the Constitution may be attenuated by persistent practices not in conformity with them, I must-observe that as a matter of historical fact the President and the Senate have made self-executing treaties disposing of territory or property belonging to or claimed by )the United States.

I shall mention one rather clear example of the

practice. Under the Florida Treaty with Spain (1819) the United States ceded all its territory beyond the Sabine River in Texas to Spain in return for the cession of the Spanish territories of East and West Florida. 8 Stat. 252, T.S. No. 327. While there had been some dispute over some of the relevant boundaries, the congressional debates, as well as President Monroe's annual message to Congress, make it clear that many considered the action to be an outright cession of American territory in exchange for

Spansh eritory. .36 Annals of Congress_1719-38, 174381; 2J. Lehardeon, Messages and Pa pers of the Presidents 55 189).No statute authorising the American session was eer acted.

ahre have been a number of other treaties that

self-executing insofar as they have disposed of teritoy r property belonging to the United States onr Mv omprmisd a clai f the Uied States to property or errtoy claimed by a foreign power. 7/ I do not betthe validity of these treaties could be questhestiie: of two decisions by the Supreme Court. Foster
2 ei253 (1829); United States v. Arreconda 6 Pet. 9 (8,32). Congress did enact legislation authorizing thePreidet to take possession of the Spanish cessions and to~rovd.rules fo,3 their government. Act of March 3, 1819
XCII,3 Stat. '523, Act of March 3, 1821, c. XXXIX, 3 Stat

g.,,United'States-Great Britain Treaty of 1842
C~ehte_;-shburtont) 8 Stat. 572, T.S:. No. 119; United States ditat titin treaty'in Reg'ard to Limits Westward of the Mk1*fou:ains of 1846 (Oregont Treaty),9 Stat. 869, T.S.,
i6 1W

In stating my opinion with respect to the question
you have raised, I have taken"note of general' kinciples
that bear upon the relation between congressional power HP
and the power of the President and the Senate under the
treaty clause; but I have no occasion to express an opinion
with respect to any other questions that may arise in that
context, and I express none.

Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General

Mr. HANSELL. Before concluding, I would like to add several observations about matters discussed during this hearing.
With reference to Mr. McCloskey's thoughtful request about executive session and your response, Mr. Chairman it -has been our understanding, as a result of advance discussions,: that following MY presentation the committee might wish to ask questions concerni the constitutional and legal issues I have discussed. axid-that the committee would then go into executive, sessionto the extent, that it wanted to question the Ambassadors about'the threat
This was not, of course, because there is anything W hide., It i because we want to negotiate the very best treaties that we chn. Many of the members of this committee have been involved in negotiations and know the, importance of protecting the cozifide' tiality of negotiating, positions.' We are prepared to tell. the c-.9mlaite. tee what we can, but we do not. at this very crucial momen .. t:, 14 -the negotiations want to tip our hand to those across the table r to provide information that could jeopardize the negotiating position. Of course, when the job of negotiating the treaties is completed, the results in the fullest possible detail will be spread on the public record.
One other comment, Mr. Chairman, in reference to the comments about Ambassador Linowitz' appointment and service by Mr. Snyder. While we did not anticipate such a personal reference, I think it is appropriate to say that Sol Linowitz needs no defense from me. His reputation, character and integrity speak for themselves; but on behalf of the President and the Secretary of State I m p oud to say the questions mentioned were, of course, fully inquired into at the time of his appointment, on the basis of his full disclosure of the facts; and the innuendos suggested were and are totally groundless and unwarranted.

t- Thie mildes'my presentation. Thank you for this opportunity to appear.t
haCHAIMAN. Thank you..
Amhassadon Bunker, are there other statements by other membes of -the panel?
Ambassador Buram. No other statements, .Mr. Chairman.
The CAIRmMAN. .Thank yeu, We appreciate the opening R'satements-..,.-We have: some questions that go -to one of the meet vital areas ad, of cousse,tbat. is the question of judediction. which Mr. Hansell just dirdated himself to.. -.1
..We as a exmmittee will proceed under the five-minute rule. If there are areas that get into what you feel are sensitive to your negotag -position, -if you would indicate to us we, will reserve thoe questins',for executive. ession. ----I -m Mr...Ghairman, if that was a unanimous -consent reqest-The CHAIRMAN. It was not.
.4. r. Bakenna. e. Chairman stated that we will reserve them for executemssion. *I think that abould be resolved. The :.IRNA I4-hink, we sheud- get. as much -of this hearing
vaerwdy as we can .*. ,
.SNYDER. Everything I read in the press maid they: negotiated, a treat.S he lawyer there just now says they -are still negotiating.. If

A~ercm--people They :either have or have not reached -an
The CAIRMA. I yield to the gentleman for a question.
z. SYmen Iwan to go on the record as. objecting at this point
...:heMWanga.We are-not: going into executive session at this 1ie. sbe -gentheman's.-right will be protected at an appropriate
bn~.,.SPan. Thank roa.,
I meas assaador Bnnker, do you .agree .with -the
.0roosiionthat the United States holds a property interest in the

baedarBueam. That its, owns property?
Ch&VWesex. .Yes. .
mamd ann B~5M -toe own about one-third of the area of

;ssZ,)x Ih ama wo .18ae to read to you-ia Camptroller Gener,,&Sopnion, and I wish Mr. Hansell would take note of it.
Adhjne.68 t3im7,1eter froen the Cemptroller of the ,United Otatesj addressed t& me., concerning, this, issue. I won't go through
the; eaireauft I wilrefer the letterZ en toto to you. It says, "'lbaritorycor, ,other property, belonging- to,. the United
Sae1.e .h United Staetes' interest in the Paniam Canal Zone can- ultiumtely be divested. only through an: act of Congress.".
s. & R outhearinsi the 92nd Congress, conclusively convinced 4iW' Stte Department .and they::acquiesced, .as -did, the justice Departmnt*s that: propertytransfers, even though Congress, in-the Coast alote haveo itserci rothve ian tvat areao.idint t

us. W did antat
I rtyuis M'dpo s te epn imdaey fim h Atrtel esterel will, Sae eatmn'saeen.rlth ion s ihip tat d o r asl'beei hti cs afYution v ayr r utc n i ocr wasio not mya itntey eea pnosaeCm ;ont hutc akoo ore as bee fullory eetl

>ropn Tettcan co nst:ii fctePrsdn'~ayr.I
Dt e asevotafes of Serert v.1rit nth aa

caa that the
M.sivenictdi y fimtvermrsM.Car man thAeLL at poTH ca1 eeecsdt ipoeo-yo h

'ForignReltion Comiteenaintained that Congress alone- has consituionl auhorty otasfer territory and property. ,,-In 1974 i~imleentng te. 1955 treaty with Panama, it was figan-te,,ongess tht athoized the-disposal of many parcels of lanL. ertin boudar adusments were acquiesced in by the tt C*re, ad te, tat Deartent took the position that Congress 11..'Atortyovral lndtansfers..
'Opnio. o ths;.ommttee, past treaty practices that the S~t Dearten ha cied reeasily distinguished ero the situa fimthf cnfont u no. example, the treaties with. Meico v~d Grat Briainconernlads the ownership of which wask in
Mm~s qt te cse in he anal Zone. We submitted in earlier reprtsto he onres th tileand deeds of every parcel that was puxcase I y th UntedStaes. Some of the treaties involving huha trbes merly nvovedaboriginal title; other involved ,the Ainado o exstig ighs.The Supreme Court always recogthattheIndana ereindpendent communities subject to the indpeneut. pwerof he nited States. That does not relato to
I~e. pactce he tat Dearment cited concerning treaties was rejcte by th. Idia Apropintion Act of 1972 beeanse Members of'ongess..eheed hatpoer to dispose property was yeste mclsivly th 4Congess I hink that overrides both Stat and

Mr. umAR. Thnk yu, r. Chairman.
In ehaf o th prpery ones interests in the Canal Zone, the X~td, taest-ofvorse ha mid dearly. Our expenditurealhave ine~ed~he rignal$10 milio payment and annuity payments M9.4etoPanniavn 104 te 40 million paid to thelFrephhCanal P nyin..923 he pymen of $7 billion in investment by the
1 qute -romthe ew Yrk'imes an article that went throughK ome- ~taeof enucy: "'United States and Panamaniar AciU -~dai. A~git 0, losd the negotiations and say that the d~t= ...gre mtto e incorporated into a new treaty on the a: a~ar as ollws:"-I refer only to the economic %ARMAeca in;_.hatis he-way it is headed-"Economit Ookh~htioed~taes"'-and I quote from the Times-"will milinannually fotllrevenue 0miloanually for the canal's Gowdun 1$1.nA~in mor if canal revenues.. permit. Panama willalso recive 50 mlli n ilitary assistance over the next ter AM WIGF &Wilonl Ao prgr s involving almost $300 million in iar lon, ua~toss rebein developed."
time~~~ M~fu Congress have been home, repeatedl Mcontifwwt ]hve:askd this question, including. last night a M2" ecrit, rd- Aint m.Sturgis, Kentucky,. asked again: "Is ,a= copeaton the treaty's goal?" and the quesWn. t~ 4iskods sou we, the United States Government, pay ima to akethe ana from us?

Could you answer that queston for up. Aenutitaesd =moe give them -any sensible reply.e Ambassador latewns In th ill Be pine- Maj ikgeDnah.e are: now paying to Panama $22 Anit on a year as-thannmmu atn for the canal. It shared in 198 with $2I00 and te te increased a couple of times sine, so we ask op 48 8 M
annaly.That comes to $6 anare for the Iad in, Pathed alner theKsigrTc principle I reerdto earlierpalakch was -1
call gre to as one of the eight points, that. .a) fihad as itabWe
paymentwould be made to Pasama for them offitallaudii tbe clesr feeling, was, and remains,:that-psnemillion is.not such- fals. payment. We therefore. undertook in the course of these nege lab tins to arrive at a figate that we thought wol 7-p- *** the value of the canal during the life at, the treaty.
We arrived at awfigure ta was very alse to what, vm ha Originally put forward. 'It is based on the am..mpain.t th an.. itself will earn the moey to pay thdtamonat, to Panma- IThe American taxpayer will not be asked to make payment therefore, we think it is a fair arrangement and one which pageriffpCM" m.b the value of the anal to us during the i fe of: the treaty. Now you have brought a question, Mr. IHbbard-6 Mr. HUBARD. Yes Constituents continue to ask me,,t marwe the United States Government, paying up to $50:mion a-r a the Panamanians to take over the canal?" I can't ameother ab you, please?*
Ambasador Lm~owrrz. First, we are not paying the Paaika ni to take over the canal.
Mr.: HUBBARD. It 800ms that way-, y0u woul agree Ambassador lanowrs. It is important to recognis tat, a sia going to be operating the canal until the year M00.Ve::use g6 to be paying Panama ani annual payment cuigthe sh26* areo
running the canal, so we are not paying Panagnato take -over. th canal. That is an important fact to make clar an* .1aa gave me. that opportunity.rfMr. HussARa. In my opening statement; I:aintimned (m-a oc about the -terms of a separate treaty whereby the Whited Statb:wl guarantee the neutrality of the canal and ts feeacesoasth world's shipping, even after the year 2000. I understand the United States is not restricted fromastfVM militarily after the year 2000. 'Does: this: mean tdtoi.ineStates will have an affrmative right laaler interdationalJW to intervene, and should we intervene, would the United SasIrik international repudiation if other nations ware to disagme w 8 ~te decision of our Goernment :to- inervne?
Ambassador ahewTrz. It weald not tbeapproprete a for us to talk abt the preci nguag e hm the tyAw intoeoficial form, : il -hVe adeqate opostal to t.
Mr. HuEMMMnthe treaty has notbteem Ambassder liadwrs. It -has nota bee. ofally Wpa
now engaged in the very diffiut, -et .naap a...roe: evepy aiagle wordbeon the way it: should b"twor.
Mr. EummAnn. But you would4 try to prote our ihndr international law to intervene, in the wordiag?

AmbasadorLN.1mas, We will not use the words "intervene" or ffenvendmU !, I Tcan guarantee you. ai~h Cumsw The gentleman's., ime has expired. IuM. -McOloskey? .--
Mr. McCuomar. Ambassador Bunker and Ambasador Linowita, I would like to join in the commendation of your work.
I note- 'i the August 22nd inse of Newsweek maaie that your oppoent atss. th. megedea tables -General Torrijes, said, "I oe never -iMO:my ife dealt with .people as hard as Ambassadors Lnewita andrBuakes. They fought for 1440 square kilometers of the dae like ase Rsasians fought for Leningrad. We literally fought for every house in the Zone," I think that is. possibly the. best testimot bin that on did you very best in.the interest of the United States. Aft Me. ***4 you: raised a point in year testimony that goes to the
-very heart of the relationship between the two branches of governmaent. Have a message I would like to have you convey back to the heretary. of. State.
1Tot as the beauty of the particular form of -government we have le inrthb~e etaint indhe various branches of government from dating complete power in their relationships with other branches. 4ron isre pointed out the very real constitutional. questions of the House of Representatives' involvement in a matter of ongoing anegtans is foreign policy. This relationship between the 4wnchm Af government, I think, requires candor. and trust on both
Iam compelled to say to you that what was less than three weeks do the V an Asistant Secretary of State refused to testify before ifi.comamittee: at the request of the minority, not on a matter of itrnational treaty negotiations but on a piece of domestic legislaVar-te cargo preference bill. Now the refusal of the Assistant Scetary of State to come down here and testify that Friday V~rhoanmakes, it diffiealt for those of us on the minority who pxpe andid -testify to conskler your testimony today with the 40amedignity and care that we might otherwise have given. It is Aard~ dbmeo under-stand why legal counsel for the Secretary of 4katx. abl-:4ify: en Panama Ganal negotiations but refuses to 4w~l. sto the -validity of treaties of commerce, navigation and
*edship, we have with our allies.
Iae that point because in the delicate days that lie ahead, I am gon to:bear that very. seriously in mind when we consider the Ow~~ Xih to tabe, Department opinion. I really see no reason any kar tor th Assistant Secretary of State ar the Secretary to a twe.. com beor this committee to give an opinion as you have gsven today on: the validity of the Constitution. If we can't get fair testimony from you as to whether the impending cargo preference
leilatio violates international, treaties or. not, it -is: difficult to consider this -testimony today-with te seiuness which. I think i i
AbasaorBunker, Ambassador: Linowitz.: points out-that our 6 quetnshould be the, security interests of the United States. my. understanding: in, the -previous -testimony. that we had kefrmo srr. b nn nlfowrr associfae that+ 1i+erallr, the grenats

the eaoitinuing rancor that is ffle iotmont by Padaanam. but d1b by Latin Americans in generate against what th' perde 4to.e ea continued imperialism on the part of the Unied iii a bygone age at a time when we and most of the ohi.blkIa nations inthe world have abandoned occupation ouMdd a 1~dft1 ental limits. .**
Can yo comment briefly on the question as to wheter r n if we insisted to retain sovereignty over this cansl timt, there a any possible way that our military forces coldi defend-the: can:nd MM operations against determined sabotage bay, say, 13 Mafinas strain in demolitions or by the'sIpper df a neutral ship who chamet blow his ship uap while passing through the canal? Ambasador BUNR I think it woald-be very diffiealt tob 8ni the canal under those conditions. It is venerable to The problem. is to keep the canal open and rmn 'I would like General Dolvin to comment. General DoxLvix. I would only like tb add, Mr. Mceleakey"-!ad you know I have said this before-that it is not- a- question, of whether or not you can defend the canal but whether you can defend it and at the same time insure its operation,. That canal is very vulnerable, not only from a defense standpoint but also fom shipping through it. Mr. *MCEDSKEY. Let: me be specific, if I can. You have presenttp a brigade and reinforcing air support' guarding the canal. IALt- me At a marine demolition squad. Isn't it a fact that they could work their
wat through despite the defense we have in pl~e? General Doevin. It is certainly very difficult to defend. 'It as difficult to say you could not put enough forces in, I suppose;.to take rather drastic action. .. .
I think the answer to your question -is that we are nat pared agatist that type of sabotage.
Mr. McCaostar. Our Chairman, who won the Distinguished: 8rvice Cross in Korea as leader of the Second Platoon, I aret sure would have no problem with defending that. The CHandMA. The time of the gentleman haxapired., I night say that the Weathermen succeeded in: blowiap~upth Senate side of the capitol and we did not use that as an excuse to give it away.
Mr. belrstat?
Mr. saastan. Thank you very much, Mr.: Chairman.:.. The presentation, Mr. A mbassadr, left wnertain dri 1ain what the arrangement will be between the Wnited Panama after the year 2000. At that point, wha* the Ca a.oe becomes fully Panamanian prophity, is a payment to be mahd6 to the United States, or is that something yet to be worked out
Ambassadoir traowrra No payment will be mukdb.IS
Mr. OBERSTAR. Is the threat of trratist attack: ban. tis treaty, as seems to be the thrust of your imn and if sa o?
Ambassador BUxKER. We believe the threatisl this
treaty. We believe that the best: assurance of Baepin* the=,open and operating is through a partnethip opeattion with Pts aa is in the Interest of both of i us to keep, the annal -open, amate, efficient, and operating on a nondiscriminstasy basi

anal. remainin o aatifre al Airnbs~ado: BuxF..If curitandv h bein n they dpoteit thna no, here ave n t hat egtter o th weat ope whe
quesfions~~ ~ owhteterwis bettiorers ha ifobwemswere oine aw&.t the poito ofa thtamiisrai
quetio I elive ou smelude t ahw arrafne Dpment fees i reardto ncraseseunrableo toe etremat atthneefrc that hs twocomponnts at the bees.o thin e canldo fotrnat taspretatt thdh caanasatl.on
-,inde~hecurenttrety -hevpee*n t tea ste a n ibi iW, of to"Cna:Zon to poio -nal intrsfn that falo oretisithe f
fee heei -Paam, avngoredo tisrelationshi with CnrladSus and~~~~~~>r ien neete htcn teaibboenan reas ,4ftd -ookaftr~h inernleite ond hat g and wh yo ti durudgenttha thy cn d tato upoertn ur relonhis w db loo aftr th extrnI sacry. he ne ssuechue isrhig intrna: scurtybut te -oin eaonry i the anamn Can the ointChifs, hecmbier couneterieshin th e eiere hangi a eoltonontePaaa a
Fl~r'OMMTAR.I beieveit r triptoLtin oftaminicoutrion tileA so ong, s: e d no esildet of thoecute a sed 1it Panama,~ ih aa ean unea the Panam s ana k itato. ftnemanian,~~ ntoasndthteet n hoore ian aofo mane security~ ~~a to op aali o ocu en supreme whle nwl bait as muc 'n Fnam's iterg ou prte hhe ere.nIf we dtisos n
44 tink her isa grat reoaltionshipst, and Ithtinkth possit

effet ofthe sucessul. egifficnuto n our relationships wit
Lai'mrcn onre.
AmasdrLNw.MyI syteoeiewihi iho

w OAaoevr-Lt-mrcncutyistePnmnl
Iti teon sseonwic thrconrisi h eipeehv
ma mo aue ihutarsltino h Pnm aa
issue,'we cno makoa aifcdyadecugngplc

w?.Ua i. A eia
Iii!T l Ail r-,a m rc n cu ies

Mr. OmRsTAR. I concur with tbat. I maybe. that point on this committee, as hasbeen, made appermt by. the. previous statements. I do think the larget issue ofifie.r4de of U.S. diplomacy *in Latin American: is at stake- here; it is -rftW 13MA.' the ad bjeat af Ahese
property of the Panama Canal Zonethat is the b* negotiations but, rather, the relationship which the Uhited.Stirtea: shall have with its neighbors to the south on the basis, of: equality of sovereign nations: or *in the.- role of a territorial power.: .. .. ..... .
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.'
The CHAIRMAN. Mr.: Snyder?
Mr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mt.- Chairman. Ambassador Bunker or Linowitz, I have here an Associated Pressstory published in the Annapoli's Maryland Even' Ca it. W-,,. f or August 12th, entitled "Carter Spends Day $tudyiz* Canal. 118 said the United States "can help, along with Panama, to the neutrality of the canal in perpetuity, its openness to international shipping, and in time of danger to our own coitntry, with our own warships being given expedited passage." Is the word "perpetuity" that appears in the President's, quote the same thing as you two have been referring to as "indefinite.' and permanent" in your statement?: Ambassador LINowrrz. The word does not appear in thetreaty. Mr. SNYDER. Which word?
Ambassador LiNowrrz. Perpetuity. Mr. SNYDER. Is the President wrong in that? Dor., 3mu, mean in y1ow
perpetuity" when you say "'indefinite" and- "permanene' statement today?
Ambassador LiNowiTz. I mean indefinite. On the record. VF8:.Wi11 not go into further discussion on that point. Mr. SNYDER. Well,. does the neutrality, that 'you refer to M6.1your'. statement'today mean that warships of an enemy at warwith thtr, United States could pass through the canal? Ambassador LINowrrz. Again, you are getting into specific prmsions of the treaty which will have to wait until thetreaty, lis reitdyMr. SNYDER. Does it mean warshps of an enemy.:,of the: vw;4 States t et at war can cross through the canal? Ambassador LINOWITZ. Mr. Congressman, you am asking thew: questions and I -cannot address them in open session. Mr. SNYDER. What does the term "regime of neutrality.' that YOU refer to, mean.?
Ambassador LiNowiTz. We are talking abodtIce. ijag open, accessible, secure and efficient. Mr. SNYDER. That is all it means? Ambassador LiNowrrz. That is what -it means, Sir$ Mr. SNYDER. The State Department fact sheet*:..pag& 9 stateffo "Panama will assume general territoriial. jurisdiction --over .'the. present Canal Zone at the Trea y's *tart.!': Does. that take plam, immediately upon ratification by the Presidentwith Ow-advice md consent of the Senate, or after,,varmius kinds of on-that yvur counsel said, we are: going, to have to adopt to iznpWn*nt thb.4rimAy?' Ambassador LINowrrz. Would,::you pleas: tell: Mae whem.,.. W eye: reading from?
Mr. SNYDER. The fact sheet, on page 8.

ringenin thaeayiorcltatcomsnnt
1,4-Mr S.4,~m..S,,tat il talede theateepmary rsponicaion ofthetrety y te Pesndt we ave nd htcosto. eh poicneonthacnlnth
-now getting into.rz the, temsofth "Mt ,SYD.Dos ha lnugh eta te isuss. ia Nco woul beabl tomov ino te Znent fat shetatd Aus, 15:i

Ambasado- LwOWI Te with PanSat hafte the yeiary r00sponsbilit for he debnsefe ne ofde the
Mr.~~~~~ s wNDR eaenttl ith theu ldeship downr theren
aboutbe have,.ha don ins timsce past. mih
Ambassador ~ ~ d LIO msyno ht bey apporitate forms ito 4w, canWwith the nteg thassthjudgmentrthen, on biliy itha oftheUnied tis insteae of Norandyiton Mr. NYDR. ho wll o temiliary fe canae quic and zab ~e bo ehes aftr the yerm 200 toe
Ana withoutIOWTZ We seuedaril
bmity-,hich I dn't. think we canh t discusstat Mr. SYDER.The SateD penae seot fore Aust rciel "At~~~~~~~m fi raysed ormltr rsneings ase. o the e enironmentreaty prpoal as aea guide toyu
M.: r.'NYDE.,Y goahed- oughouict the neoiatbeiovwit inth defnse f th canl ogh mayabe abltoser th at.00 rw f te nvionmntl ipac o b:~~~~~~ imdsd!ioiz h es o yt cmeedIthaink w
V-SNM I wehave a rem exet toe heaversi i n thertywl


be one concerning the environment which both OA1rArifw=W6: to protect.
Mr. SNYDzL Sir, if: the environmental studyis., uvAawayj how 'did it serve as guidelines for'the treaty as require& by. thO Natimml Environmental Policy Act of 1969?
Mr. WYROUGH. I can only say to: you -that we havt a, reidevi o(Ale environmental questions underway., That review: is.:: not !,-yet completed.
Mr. SNYDER. So you didn't follow your own State Depattment guidelines o*r the Environmental Policy Act of -1969? Is that miiappropriate at this time'?
Mr. WYROUGH. I have no further comment other than whata have made.
The CHAiRmAN. The time of the, gentleman has, Bxpired
Mr. Hughes?
.Mr. HuGHEs. Thankyou, Mr. Chairman. I would like.,to defer my questioning at this time.
TheCHAUMAN. Ms. Mikulski.
MS. MIKULSIU. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to oame back to a very fundamental question where we talk about -maintaining the neutrality of the Canal. How do. you see that-zeutrality being maintained?
-Ambassador Li win Youmean specifically? MS. MIKULSKI.Yes, specifically. Everybody says the Ca al is: going to be a neutral territory. How will that be main axe
tainied? Sincewe
t omg to assume -the responsibilities for m intaining the neutrAlity, ow are we going to do it?
Ambassador LINOWITZ. The U.S. and Panama will have Xespombility for maintaining the neutrality of the: Canal., We wiU, b&in a position to undertake whatever is. necessary,, to assure that nevitality is maintained.
Ms. AfixuLsin. What does "undertaking whatever: is? mean.?
Ambassador LINowrrz. I don't think *in this open session I should go into that.
Ms. MKuisju. If we were in a closed session, is there, M*: fact, ja plan that exists for maintaining the neutrality :of th&,,0&naM Ambassador Lmow-rrz. There is no planned invo1vemenL,.,--...'.V1' MS. -341KUTAK You said you can't say anything because& wel a* 'in open session., If we were in closed session,,,could you answer,,111y question? Could you then be.specific and outline founie whatilau deem the criteria for whatever is necessary to maintain: the: neutrAlity of the Canal?
c AAmbassador Lnqownuz. The "ty will Mot speU aut..spetifibkuy riteria for us to use. It will give us the authority tq::kdowh3C-vre think necessary.
Ms. Mmuma. Well, the treaty might give you the-authwity,-:butI am interested in the ways and means by which thato ] be
accomplished. Didg in Your. disc on with., thaPreWdent of the U.S. say to him, Jimmy, this is the way we could ..... ..... J0
neutrality of the Canal"?
JAmbassador -LiNowrm. I never call the Flixd&nt Jinirnyol: .... Ms. Mmumi. Well, I have.

id yeu ay, "Mr. President," is there a plan?
=Amasado+ LumewrTZo 'Ihere was disenesion about ways of assnring that the neutrality of the -Canal would be .maintained involving the Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs and the negotiator.Ms.Af MaUIkL I see. It would seem that the success of this treaty or plan, -will be baed on our good relationship with Panama.
..year estimate, how secure is the current regime in Panm? Is there an indication that that government is stable and would be the the type of government that we would be dealing with in 1999? .Amhassadore.BurNa.i I think it is safe to say it is more stable than any.ghwarnnt that has existed in Panama since it became anainde- endnt country. Torrijos has been in power since 1968. His teh adder theseonstitution expires next year when there will be an election'tfor a- successor. The country- has been stable under his govermnshe It has been more stable than any government so far.
-Ms. Havasm. If his -term expires in 1978, Ambassador Bunkerd am. sure that we have some intelligence on the current political chasks. fbr poet-Torrijes. What would you say that is? Would yon say it seems to be a secure democracy ?, Do you think it will border on Authoritariawism, either from the right or the left? What indicationado we h'Ave?
And BumanR. It is not a democracy in our terms. Its is
authoritarian in many ways. There is participation, however, under the cdestitutioh ly the National Assembly, 505 members who are tweq, gelected There are guarantees of civil liberties and the usual
gaantent, of rights of liberties of the citizens. The press is salatippg free, although it is a guided press, certainly. But, in general, I mol,,ealhy:.4hat the government has- been, -since 1968, since Torrijos tnhk. aver, very stable.
Ms. MaKureSK. You know when you do a treaty the two lines are, U:. u : -p....YO* pm .and I will do my part, meaning the other penzpdat. Dd pan really:- feel secure with making this type of arragegmtent with the Panamanian Government? Because many of my donstitnents say, can we really trust them? I am not taking a gpitimg a way or the other. I am seeking your advice. You make al V wit mFrane ExFance has been around a long time. England hibe ao nd .a leng time. if you make a treaty with Panana, rb tak arout 1968 wih is the current stable government,
a h a elain, become then, can we really be assured that they *Vidotheai pad and act in good faith as this.-What prparations
not dowehave if they abrogate the treaty..D we say we
ador LIWOWrr= May I say several things in answer to
1MstMIKUL8I. Certainly
Ambssaor ANOWrr. Wht General Torrijos has been asserting hasi beei asserted.. since 1903 by presidents of Panama. The demand that thv sovereignty be recognized, that something be done about what it,;rkgards as an unfair, unwelcome intrusion, into the country, and therefore what he is asserting now has been asserted, and I dari *ay~i we.di not: haVe: a treaty, his successor would be

Secondly, Panam has respected evr te it:has embased into, so thr as we know. This Caa rayhas been a hde&.4., 4heir
trat, to use their words, for years,: and they nonetheles. tama rspected it..* The third is this treaty would be subjected to plebisciteo the people have -to -put their approval on tlie treaty.: -Under. those arrangements there is some reason for confidemn ifte treaty isr approved and entered into in goed faith that it wlt be repeated.
MS. MmoUISK. Thank you. That was helpful. The ORAIRMAN. Mr. Bauman.
Mr. BAUMAN. I want to pursue my colleagues questionig abont the reliability of the regime withwiel we -are tinV 2 want to ask one question. I believe, told
as the single most importat issue in the aineIm America today, at the top of the agenda of every gaurament tn tha area, is the Panama Canal. Would yen not perhaps and that to say the threat of Castro and Communism might be coeqM wth this problem?
Ambassador Livowns. I didn't eny thwer to sp. I sada e top. High on the agenda of every, country. Mr. BAUMAN. I apprciae that er: Snmetime w. d perspective, and I was under the impression that Castre anh the Communist activity in the area are more of a threat than the .A cestrol of the -canal.* '- .-1
Ambasdor lawowrrz. What I meant by that, perknputo carify, is that there are countries which take a different fiew with epect to Mr. Castro, but no matter what position they take of Me .,anao, they are together an the fact that a ne Pana.a r .eaty mu.. be brought into play. Whether you are talking about: Argentina or Venezuela, or Mexico, wherever yon find this bt is an item n which they have a common cause. 1 .*
Mr. BAUMAN. I would think that most -impartial ahmanam..atf ILatin American affairs over the last decade would say the seesse they have this unanimity of view- regarding. the Can l the manifest weakness demonstrated by this an& time patadministrations in dealing with Castroe the refused to faee up to the Communist threat in the area. The oanly remesyu agabere today testifying, in my view, is the failame:,na ous pofyin -Latin
Ailmer t f i ii l mun ......... T want to .p. 6his b..#.... E ar.ierew
I mentioned the fact that we have seen in- July the-wvisitation de:, 8oviet trade delegation to Panama., headhd bp. ame~op lbthis atti negotiators in Latia Amerioa. The Sdvietsware proposangwqme economic aid, buying at an enormously inflated pric6 the @dr lbs Panamaian sugar crop, proposing th' alshmn a-is and power plants and banking facilities on the part of the Soakeds What is to prevent Torrijos, six months: nr ix mint:after 4the
Union and bringing into Panama the Soriet -presence.:Iwh,abb bb
-ously the Russians badly want.
Amhandor AnqowtW. I: think Ambadssadom Runedue wasnR tB on th at..............
Ambassador Bowman. There was a Sovietdra~dela theeks in maid-July who did. discuss various projects, as I undesad-


with the Panamanians, various things like electric plants, sugar mills, and so forth, but apparently this was largely a discussion and nothing came out of it. The only substantial result of the Russian visit was agreement to exchange resident trade representatives.
As you know, Panama has no diplomatic relations with Russia.
Mr. BAUMAN. They hardly need that when the Cuban Embassy has 225 people in Panama, one of the most enormous staffs, I would suggest.
Ambassador BUNKER. The Cuban delegation is well monitored by the Panamanians, I daresay.
Mr. BAUMAN. I take that to be some sort of an answer.
When we were discussing the stability of regimes, Mr. Linowitz commented that every Panamanian president since 1903 has taken the same position. I think the number is 57 presidents; I would inform my colleague from Maryland, and 1, too, am concerned about the stability of the present regime. If I am not mistaken, Mr. Torrijos may well be subject to election under the constitution, but I am informed that the constitution names him as president for life within that document, itself; is that not correct? That is a little less than democratic, wouldn't you say?
Ambassador BUNKER. Yes, that is correct.
Mr. BAUMAN. Not only would we have to. have an election, I would say to my colleague, we have to amend the Panamanian constitution to get him out of office.
TheCHAIRMAN. Would you yield?
Mr. BAUMAN. Yes.
TheCHAIRMAN. On the question of plebiscite, there is a totally government-controlled press. in Panama. Of course, it has always been a source of concern to this committee as to how you can have a plebiscite in a country that has no free press-a totally controlled press, and I think you have made that point very, very strongly. Mr-BAUmAN. Just in closing, I would like to get a comment from any of you gentlemen on a brief remark I will quote, made by Romulo, Escobar Bethancourt, the chief negotiator on the Panamanian side. In a speech on the 12th of August in Panama City, before the student group there he said; "We have obtained the regulation of U.S. defense sites in the Republic of Panama in the face of the anarchy and absolute authority which they possess to install them when, where, and how they see fit in the Canal Zone. We have obtained the elimination of the Canal Zone as a jurisdictional entity of the U.S. Government three years after this treaty is implemented. This, in our opinion, constitutes the basic aspect of these negotiations. This constitutes a revolutionary step in the face of the existing treaty with the United States."
Is he correct in what he is saying here; that, in effect, the Panamanians view this as complete or nearly complete surrender of the American position? You understand he was talking to a radical student group, trying to impress them.
Ambassador LiNowrrz. You well know, speaking in Panama about an arrangement that poses some very difficult problems for the Government of Panama that incorporates some terms that publicly they have said they would never accept, it becomes necessary to put the best face and the most agreeable provisions forward.

"-746 0 77 5

That should not surprise you, sir, any more than it would 'in any other country, and the fact is, and I think this is quite clear, and he has said so, they anticipate a difficult time getting the requisite plebiscite approval for this treaty. I would not be surprised at Ambassador Escobar saying things that don't perhaps always gibe with what we say here.
Mr. BAUMAN. I am not surprised at Ambassador Escobar's statement, either. I wish the candor of our representatives in public matched his, because I think the questions that have been put to you today deserve to be answered. We didn't start this publicity match. The White House did. If you have a treaty, you should have the guts to lay it on the table so the American people can make a judgment. This fight is going to go on for a long time.
Ambassador LiNowffz. You haven't been willing to wait until it is laid on the table.
Mr. BAUMAN. You chose the weapons. If publicity is to be it, you ought to be willing to tell us what it was President Carter asked me to endorse the other day when he sent the telegram, and what Gerry Ford got "snookered" into in Colorado the other day. If you can't tell us the treaty's terms in public, the treaty isn't worth a damn, in my opinion.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you wish to respond?
Ambassador LiNowrrz. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hughes.
Mr. HUGHES. Thank you. I would like to follow up briefly on the line of questioning by my colleague from Maryland. I gather from what you have said and what we have read in the press and what I otherwise know about the issue, that the Panamanians really are very unhappy even with the principles of accord that we now have some broad parameters and some idea about.
What leads you to believe that the treaty that you have negotiated really is going to be satisfactory to the Panamanians or that five or ten years from now, we are not going to find they desire some further modification. I direct that to either Ambassador Bunker or Linowitz.
Ambassador LiNowiTz. In the first place, I tried to indicate before, Panama has had a history of abiding by treaties reached and agreements reached, but let me say very simply, a treaty is a twoway street. If one party for the treaty undertakes to abrogate it, that at least raises the question as to how far the other is committed to live with the terms of the treaty. Remember, at the end of that treat comes turning over operation of the Canal. TThereforme, this woulYbe in jeopardy or difficulty if Panama did not adhere to the terms of the treaty.
Mr. HUGHES. Obviously one of the concerns that we have as a nation is how we are perceived by our Latin American p ighbors. What reaction have we had from our Latin American neighbors to the articles of agreement?
Ambassador LiNowrrz. Uniformally approving, I would say. You may recall that before the final session we had in Panama, General Tornijos met in Bogota with the presidents of the democratic countries, Colombia, Venezuela, Mexico, Costa Rica, and Jamaica, and they hammered out what proved to be the Panamanian position

presented to us when we got to Panama, so that the democracies of Latin America have been closely involved with Panama in the whole negotiation.
When President Carter came into office, I think there were seven or eight presidents of other Latin American countrio s who wrote him a joint letter, telling him this was the first item to deal with in the hemisphere. In short, there has been a clear indication that the countries of Latin America regard this as important and that they approve.
Mr. HUBBARD. Will you yield for a second?
Mr. HuGHEs- I would be happy to yield briefly.
Mr. HUBBARD. Thank you to my colleague from New Jersey for yielding at this point.
Would you agree at the annual Organization of American States meeting in June a resolution was adopted in which 19 Latin American countries stipulated that the U.S. should raise the Canal toll charges only if it is needed for the operation of the waterway and this resolution was telling the U.S. that Latin America would frown on raising the toll charges if used to increase the annuity aid to Panama? Your fixed share of tolls is part of the treaty proposal, and this would yield $40-50 million a year to Panama, where they are getting $2 million now.
How could our Latin American neighbors be that much in favor of this if it is going to cost them so much more?
Ambassador LnqowiTz. I think it is very significant that recognizing it is going to cost them more, they still endorse the 'treaty. 'Recognizing tolls will have to be increased, they think it is a good idea. They believe what is at stake here is so important they still want this treaty approved.
Mr. HUGHES.Mr. Ambassador, I find it very difficult, first of all, to believe that as long as there are any Americans present or the possibility of our presence in Panama exists, that we are not going to have a real potential for unrest and discord. I am looking at the bottom of page 3 of your statement, where you make the statement, "In short, the neutrality treaty will provide a firm foundation for assuring our long-term interest in the maintenance of an open, accessible,, secure,, efficient canal is preserved."
Well, one of the things that suggests such potential to me is, first of 'all, that we are going to be looking at how the Canal is operated economically. I don't know how you can otherwise read the term "efficient." And I find it very difficult to believe that we are going to have any amount of widespread satisfaction with Panama over a treaty where we are still going to be in a position of making certain that the canal is open, accessible, secure and efficient.
Doesn't that suggest to you that we are going to be overseeing the manner in which Panama operates the Canal? Is that not what you are suggesting by the term "efficient"?
Ambassador LiNowin. I hesitate to go beyond what I have said, because we have dealt with it, we are dealing with it, in the treaty in a way which is acceptable to the Panamanians, and which I think answers your question in general language but clearly.
Mr. HuGHEs. Let me ask you another question. I have read with a great deal of interest our commitments to Panama should we

consider building a sea level canal. Is there some substance to the media reports?
Ambassador LINOWITZ.Well, we have in this treaty an arrangement whereby Panama and the U.S. jointly will explore the feasibility and necessity of having a sea-level canal.
Mr. HUGHES.Why in the world would I, as a Member of Congress, or any Member of Congress, be interested in providing additional resources to build another canal in a country that doesn't want us now? That seems illogical to me.
Ambassador LINOWITZ. Then we don't do it. It depends on whether we want a canal in Panama. If we want one, we thought it would be fine to have an understanding in the treaty that we can do something about it. I
Mr. HUGHES. It seems to me that what we should be doing is perhaps upgrading-if our canal is insufficient-the present canal instead of building another one? Ambassador LINOWITZ. You are saying we are better off without the option?
Mr. HUGHES. I am saying to you, I hear so many conflicting reports, among them being that we don't need the Canal because the vessels in the years ahead won't be able to use it. And then -I hear perhaps we will need a sea level canal. Then we hear our National needs have changed so radically, that such a canal is strategically unimportant.
Ambassador LINOWITZ.Mr. Congressman, I must have been confused. We have the option as to whether we do or do not go ahead with building a sea-level canal. What we are saying, and for this I think we deserve some compliment rather than otherwise, we have brought back in this arrangement an undertaking on the part of Panama to join with us in exploring the feasibility and necessity of such a canal, and if we jointly decide it is a good idea, to negotiate terms and conditions.
Mr. HUGHES.You don't see any basic difficulty with the fact that the Panamanians don't want us now, and yet we talk about joiing with them in another venture?
Ambassador LINOWITZ. Under the new treaty they will want to deal -with us. That is exactly the point. We are getting Panamanian cooperation.
TheCHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. Mr. Dornan?
Mr. DORNAN. Ambassador Bunker, do you know who Senor Huber Matos is?
Ambassador BUNKER. No, I don't. Ambassador LINOWITZ. No.
Mr. DORNAN. For the first time, he was exposed to this country coast-to-coast on an NBC show called "Weekend." He was Castrops key lieutenant that pulled Castro's revolution out of the fire when he was about to go down-a school teacher who flew in, himself, in a C-47, the necessary small arms and ammunition to save Castro's revolution.
That man is now naked, blind, and in solitary confinement in a cell, with the windows sealed off with concrete blocks, and dying in a cell in Cuba. That was his reward for suggesting that Castro should not turn his revolution into a Communist one.

This man s son, Huber Matos, Jr., was gunned down in the streets of Costa Rica a few months ago and is still in the hospital.
But even Castro did not use the type of inflammatory Marxist, Lenist rhetoric as this General Torrijos does today when he was still loyal to Mr. Huber Matos.
Mr. Bunker, it says in this August 22 Newsweek issue that Congressman McCloskey alluded to, that you said these are the most complex negotiations in which you have ever been involved. And in the exact piece Mr. McCloskey quoted from, there are five references to potential bloodshed and violence on the part of General Torrijos. He says, we paid a price for liberation. He said that through a war we would have reached our objective much sooner because guerrillas achieve liberation in a shorter time. As he is saying this, according to the reporter, he is puffing on cigars given to him by Castro. He says the Panamanians, are the only ones who can destroy the canal. That is absurd. Any guerrilla group around the world can destroy it. According to Mr. McCloskey a rifle platoon can destroy it.
He said if we have to wait two more years, I don't think the Canal would have been functional. Again, a threat it would have been destroyed.
Could I ask you please to be candid, Mr. Ambassador? Were these the most complex negotiations you have ever been involved in, because you were constantly dealing with implied, veiled, or blatant threats of violence if you failed in your pursuits? Ambassador BUNKER. No, Mr. Congressman, that has nothing to do with our negotiations. They were never made to us, certainly. We were negotiating because this has been the policy of four administrations to negotiate a treaty with Panama over the Canal. This is what we have been trying to do, and it has been going on, as you know, for 13 years. Threats had no part in the negotiations. Mr. DORNAN. Since the New York Times, Jack Paar, and countless Congressmen and Senators were taken for a tragic ride by Mr. Castro, in the first year of his revolution, when he used less inflammatory dialogue than General Torrijos, isn't it possible in spite of our best efforts and Ambassador Linowitz' best efforts and the efforts of four Presidents that General Torr-os could shift violently to the left. Couldn't' he lick the boots of the Soviet Union, within weeks after the terms of the treaty have gone down on paper, have been approved by plebiscites, ratified by the Senate, approved by this committee and the House in session, and if all of this takes place, which I believe is remote, isn't it possible this man could violently lunge to the left to aggrandize himself on an ego trip the way Castro has?
Ambassador BUNKER. I think it would be in the interest of Mr. Torrijos and Panama to be in a partnership arrangement with the US. I think that is the best security that we can have, the best assurdfite that the Canal will be kept open and efficient and neutral.
Mr. DORNAN. But would Castro have the peculiar place in history he does shipping troops around the world to murder people pellmell in other continents if he had not decided to align himself on an ego trip with the Soviets rather than the U.S.?

Ambassador BUNKER. I think Torrijos' judgment, the judgment of Panama, will be that working with the U.S. is -going to be much more profitable for them than to try to branch out in some unknown sphere of interest. They have repeatedly said to us that they have with us a special relationship which they appreciate, which they value, and it is because of this that we are working out this partnership arrangement with them.
Mr. DoRNAN. As I told you and Mr. Linowitz, in the Zone, there are some Americans, I among them, who would not mind seeing a new treaty negotiated with the Panamanian people if they had a responsible form of governmment rather than a one-man dictatorship. We all know we do not live in the universal period of brotherly love but in a period of new nationalism. Is Great Britain still a great nation because it refuses to give up Gibraltar? Is Russia great because it refuses to give up Latvia? Let me ask you this: Are you still on the payroll-and I don't mean this in a disrespectful way-on the payroll of the State Department?
Ambassador LINOWITZ. I have servedwithout compensation. Mr. DoRNAN. Newsweek says a bare six hours before your official tenure was up, you walked downstairs without blood on your hands, but exhausted, with a set of verbal agreements which would lead to
treat What is your status now?
Ambassador LINOWITZ. As dramatic as that sounds, I did not walk down the stairs. Our Panamanian colleagues, because of the keen interest throughout Latin America, said they wanted to announce an agreement had been reached. It was their decision to make that announcement on that day.
Mr. DORNAN. Then you are saying that your impending termination, quite frankly, had absolutely nothing to do with their decision to move quickly?
Ambassador LINOWITZ. Let me say to you that when it was reached, they said with a smile, "We are going to give you a present on your last day." That is the only reference there was to it in the course of these negotiations.
Mr. DORNAN.What is your legal status now? Ambassador LINowrrz. Let me finish the story. We joined Ambassador Bunker and Escobar in announcing the agreements had been reached. At that point we could have done one or two things. We could have said that when the treaty is signed with everything in exactly the right verbiage it will be released and told to the American people then, or we could have said we are going to disclose as soon as possible so the American people can know every single substantive, thing in that treaty. That is the course we chose, in the interest of full disclosure at the moment.
My status now is that I am an adviser to the delegation.
Mr. DORNAN. Although you have gone beyond your six months' tenure which precluded Senate confirmation, you now enter. a new title or role, probably in another six-month period, n abrogating any Senate requirement to approve your tenure as an adviser to the delegation. You are no longer an ambassador?
TheCHAIRMAN. The gentleman will respond.


Ambassador LINOWITZ. Yes. I don't have the same ambassadorial title I carried from President Carter by virtue of the special appointment, by the way, the traditional and frequent appointment of special representative; but my frieiids do know that I once was an ambassador and still call me ambassador.
TheCHAIRMAN. Mr. -Trible?
Mr. TRIBLE. Gentlemen, in the Time magazine edition of August 22, the Torrijos regime was described "making a good treaty his a major issue, he abolished political parties, drove opponents into exile and saw his once prosperous economy falter." Is that an accurate statement of the situa'tion?
AMbassador BUNKER. I couldn't hear the question, sir.
Mr. TpaiBLE. I quote from the most recent issue of Time magazine: "Making a new treaty his major issue, Torrijos abolished political parties, seized control of the press,- drove opponents into exile and saw his once prosperous economy falter." Is that an accurate description of the situation in Panama today?
Ambassador LINOWITZ. Once more, and a little louder.
Mr.'TRiJBLE. I will be happy to send it down if that would help, but I will read it again. The quotation is as follows: "Making a new treasty his major issue, he-Torrijos-abolished political parties, seized control of the press, drove his opponents into exile and saw his once prosperous economy falter."
Again, my question to you gentlemen is simply this: Is that an accuirate, statement of the situation in Panama today?
Ambassador BUNKER. When Torri os took power, he did exile some people, yes. That is quite true. Most of those have been brought back now.'Recently he brought back 100 exiles. There have been some violations of human rights in Panma, but Amnesty International, for example, reported that most of these took place 'before 1970 when Torrijos was consolidating his power' and in the re0ort which our Government sent to the Congress this spring, the statement was made that there was no evidence of systematic violation of human rights in Panama.
Mr. TRiBLE. I don't believe that your response was fully responsive, Mr. Ambassador, but let me say for the record that if indeed the regime in Panama has abolished political parties, seized control of the press an driven opponents into exile, and if indeed they have a.-faltering economy, I question whether that is a responsible country for us to enter into serious agreements with.
Moving on, however, President Carter wrote to Members of the Congress and included with his letter announcing principles of agreement a short summary of the agreement in principle. There is a section entitled "New Sea-Level Canal". It says "The agreement envisions the possibility of building a new sea-level canal." You spoke:to that briefly, but I wonder if you would expand on that concept and your understanding of that statement?
AzAassador LiNowITZ. It is a very simple provision. It says that 'the United States and Panama will together institute a study as to the necessity, feasibility of a sea-level canal. If that study indicates that it is necessary, then Panama and the United States will agree on the mutually 'acceptable terms and conditions by which that canal can be built in Panarna.

Mr. TMBLE. What we have done is simply reserved the right to discuss this matter in the future; is that in essence what we have done?
Ambassador LiNowrrz. A t to enter into a study arrangement and not make to it with any other country and at that time to decide whether we want to negotiate for a new canal.
Mr. TRiBLE. Let me address an additional matter, that IS, with regard to the rights of U.S. employees.
In the fact sheet attached to the President's statement, the following language is employed: "All U.S. civilians employed at the canal can continue in the government jobs until retirement" However, in reading the fact statement included with the State Depart, ment letter, which I received from Douglas Bennett-it was addressed to Members of the Congress-the language is this: "Present employees of the Canal Company in the Canal Zone and Government may continue to work for the new agency until their retirement or until the termination of their employment for any other
The langauge, "until the termination of their employment for any other reason" causes me some concern.
Which is it that will guide the future employment of those employees?
Ambassador LiNOWITZ. Mr. Wyrough has worked on this and has also talked to the U.S. citizens in the zone.
Mr. WYROUGH. I don't believe the statements are inconsistent. It is the intention that the present employtees of the company and the Government can continue to work for the new organization until their retirement or termination for some other reason. Now there are different reasons why that would not occur. Ifit were to occur that they cold no longer work for the new organization, then it would be the intention that they could continue to work for another U.S. Government agency, perhaps in Panama or perhaps someplace else, and indeed the Governor of the Canal Zone is issuing various statements to the employees which will indicate that the U.S. Government is prepared to offer them priority placement assistance for U.S. Government employees. Mr. TRIBLE. The language ofers no security whatsoever to those civilians. Language: "until the termination of their employment for any other reason." The Republic of Panama or any other employer could terminate without reason those civilians; is that not correct? Mr. WYROUGH. The intention is that the present employees will be allowed to continue for as long as possible. There is an intention but not a guarantee that they will not be terminated. The CHMRMAN. Will the gentleman yield? Who would pay the vested pension of those people who have worked for the canal, say, for 25 or 30 years? Would it be the new entity that would pay those pensions?
Mr. WYROUGH. If an employee, be he Panamanian or U.S., who is currently employed by the company or the Government has earned retirement benefits under existing civil service rules, then he would be given the several choices that exist, an immediate cash settlement, a deferred annuity or a full pension. It would depend a great deal on the number of years he served.


TheCHMRMAN.What would be the source of the pension funds?
Mr. WYROUGH. It would come from the United States, from the source of any pension funds of the U.S. Government employee.
TheCHMRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.
'Mr. TRIBLEYou completed my question, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that. I think that point needs to be made.
The CHAmmAN. Mr. Hansell, I have a number of documents I am going to put in the record at this point. One is a study which John I. Killian at the Library of Congress did in 1969. Another one is a study by Kenneth Merrin, legislative attorney of the American Law Division, done for the Library of Congress, concerning the treaty power and congressional power in conflict, cessation of the United States' property rights in the Canal Zone and Panama, and the document which was the basis of my testimony before the U.S. Senate last month on this issue.
It brings together the former question that I pointed out to you, that in 1937, 1943 and 1957, all three instances, the Congress through resolution or legislation authorized the transfer of properties.
Now since congressional approval was responsible in those instances for the transfer of some properties in the Canal Zone, why do you contend now that you are going to transfer 65 percent of the Canal Zone over, and that no congressional approval is necessary?
Mr. HANsELL. Mr. Chairman, I do want to be clear that all we were addressing was the legal issue of whether or not the transfer could be made by treaty. No ultimate judgment has yet been made as to the form in which any or all of the property transfers would in fact be made as part of this package.
I am familiar with your testimony before Senator Allen's subcom mittee, but I am not familiar with the other items that you referred to; but it was the legal issue of the treaty power that was addressed, both by Senator Allen's subcommittee and in the initial request from this committee; the question of how in fact it will be done is a matter,, of course, yet to be determined. There have been and will continue to be extensive congressional consultations which Mr. Beckel can describe in great detail. Consultations',with the leadership of this body as well as the other body will take place befo any ultimate determination is made as to which of the constitutional routes available would in fact be used. TheCHAIRMAN. I have not seen a press relese or news story that has referred to the jurisdiction of the House in this issue yet. I have been searching for them for about the past ten days in the national media.
Mr. BEcKEL. Mr. Chairman, if I may comment on that briefly, we have begun discussions. We testified before the Allen subcommittee on separation of powers. Mr. Hansell gave a statement, as did you. We indicated then that we had not reached a definitive decision in the- administration on transfers of land, water and property and how it would be done from a legislative standpoint. We reiterate that today. We are going to continue to consult with Members. We have spoken with Congressman Metcalfe, Congressman Wright, and we have sought the advice of Congressman O'Neill, Speaker of the House.

I would like to make one other point, if I may.
Mr. Bauman's question about bringing this treaty to the table-I handled the negotiations for this hearin today with your staff director, Mr. Perian, and also with his wife who works for you, and Terry Modglin of your staff. I indicated that the treaties had not been drafted and how difficult it would be for the ambassadors to testify in the.absence of completed texts. They would have difficulty in answering questions- in open session.
Regretably, your news release had gone out. You would not postpone the hearings. I did then also indicate that it was almost unprecedented for administration officials to appear prior to having a treaty in final form. I think that the ambassadors have come a very long way in being straightforward with you today.
I will say that I also indicated to your staff that the time restraints, particularly on Ambassador Bunker who is trying to finish the negotiations on this treat are very severe.
I would ask on behalf of the people at this table who have to get back to negotiations that we conclude as soon as possible so they can get back to that process. I asked that in discussions I had with Mr. Perian and members of your staff.
TheCHAIRMAN. We will continue.
The Panamanian counsel in an article last week was quoted to the effect that the settlement that Ambassador Linowitz discussed earlier included $30 million to $35 million on a 30-cents per ton increase, plus $10 million more, and then an additional $10 million, if necessary. The Consul stated that no -total increase in tolls was necessary. The reason he was making that statement was to take off the onus on Panama for an increase in canal operations cost. He was mindful, of course, of the Granada meeting of the Organization of American States that Mr. Hubbard referred to earlier, whereby in a 19 to 0 vote the OAS resolution on Granada said that only fixed costs should be included in toll revenue calculations. Of course, here we have the Panamanian counsel making that, statement. I think that, of course, if Uncle Sam is going to take the heat for the increases and Panama is not going to share so me of that heat, as obviously they are not doing by reason of the consul's statement to one of the major trade papers which are read on a world basis, by people who use the canal, I wonder about the good faith indicated and whether or not there is unanimity in Latin. America for the action that has been proposed. Would you address yourself to that? Ambassador LINOWITZ. Unanimity on what, sir? TheCHAIRMAN. On the question of the United States entering into this treaty that will in fact cause an increase *in tolls, seriously affecting the economies of nations on the west coast of South America, particularly.
Ambassador LiNOWITZ. As I indicated earlier, we know of no Latin American country that has anything but approval for this treaty. We recognize some of them will be affected if tolls are increased. I think they all know that we are seriously contemplating an increase in tolls but have not decided the extent or when it ought to be applied.
TheCHAIRMAN. Mr. Hubbard?


Mr. HUBBARD. These questions will conclude my questions.
Again, I made an opening statement by expressing admiration for Ambassadors Linowitz and Bunker. I appreciate your being with us today to give us- this information.
Whom did Dictator Torrijos appoint to be the chief negotiator for the Panamanians regarding this treaty?
Ambassador BUNKER. The most recent chief negotiator was Romulo Escobar Bethancourt. Of course, we have had other negotiators, the former foreign minister was the chief negotiator for a period of time. His successor as foreign minister has also been chief negotiator.
Mr. HUBBARD. Regarding Mr. Bethancourt, isn't it a definite fact that he is a close friend and confidant of Castro and one who has ultraleftist leanings?
Ambassador BUNKER. I have no knowlede that he is a close friend and confidant of Castro, no.
Mr. HUBBARD. Do you, Mr. Linowitz?
Ambassador LINowrrz. I have no knowledge of that at all.
Mr. HUBBARD. Are you aware there were witnesses before the Senate Subcommittee on Separation of Powers who described him as having sympathetic Communist leanings and as a friend of Castro?
Ambassador LINOWffZ. No, but may I say, remember, you are asking these questions at a time when we are still concluding treaty negotiations. When you refer to General Torrijos as a dictator, when you make these assertions in public session, you are not being helpful to the conclusion of these negotiations.
The CHmRmAN. If the gentleman would yield, in the March 16 session before this subcommittee, the same assertions were made.
Ambassador UNOWITZ. I regretted them then, too. That was in executive session, by the way.
TheCHAIRMAN. It was in open session as well as closed. Mr. SNYDER. I don't think anybody can deny that the Constitution says that the head of government shall be Omar Torrijos. You have elections, but he is the head of government and that is a dictatorship, pure and simple. If that is not helpful, I am sorry. To be honest with you, I am not wanting to help too much.
Is there any anticipated provision in the treaty for settling claims against the Government of Panama? I am talking about expropriated property. Did you deal with the subject at all?
Ambassador LrNowrrz. Do you mean in the future?
Mr. SNYDER. Property that has already been expropriated by the Government of Panama, American businesses, do you do anything 'to help them get their claims paid?
Ambaswdor BUNKER. I don't know of any outstanding problems. They settled with United Brands and I understand it was a fair arrangement. I don't know of any other problems.
Mr. SNyw.R. Do you anticipate a treaty on that subject?
Ambasia or LINOWITZ. If any company is expropriated under the treaty, it will be compensated for fair market value actually.
Mr. SNYDER. But if they are already expropriated, you don't deal with it?
Ambassador LINOWffz. We don't know of any.

Mr. SNYDER. There have been several discussions about the possible new canal, that if Panama and the United States agree to it-I take it that you are familiar with the Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Study Commission and their final report submitted December 1, 1970, to the President of the United States?
Ambassador LINowrrz. I am generally familiar with it. I have not studied it.
Mr. SNYDER. Let me read to you one of its conclusions, page 85: "In any arrangement for operation of a sea-level canal on route 10, it would be unacceptable for the present canal to pass to Panamanian control and be operated in competition with the sea-level canal."
If we give the present canal to Panama and build a sea-level canal there or elsewhere will we, under this treaty, allow the Panamanian Government to give competition for our new waterway?
Ambassador LINOWITZ. Mr. Snyder, you are talking about the most hypothetical situation, that if we decided the new sea-level canal makes sense we will then negotiate with the Panamanians if that is appropriate. We can't say that now. Mr. SNYDER. But your fact sheet says "if they agree." Will this treaty keep us from doing that? Ambassador LINOWITZ. We are talking about a canal that we might build in Panama. It only makes sense to say that Panama would agree if we were going to do that. Mr. SNYDER. I believe Ambassador Bunker said a new canal company would operate the canal. Is that going to be a Defense Department agency?
Ambassador LINOWITZ. It will be a -U.S. agency, probably under the Defense Department.
Mr. SNYDER. I have heard it is going to be a Department of Defense activity. Am I correct?
Ambassador LINOWITZ. I think it probably will be. It has not been finally determined.
Mr. SNYDER. That is not spelled out in the treaty? Ambassador LiNowiTz. No.
Mr. SNYDER. Has that new body been agreed upon to be a biNational commission of five to four members? Ambassador LINowrrz. Five Americans and four Panamanians. Mr. SNYDER. Has it also been agreed that in 1990 that ratio would shift?
Ambassador LINowiTz. No.
Mr. SNYDER. Is that incorrect information? Mr. Beckel, just to clear the curiosity out of my mind, that you managed Judge Hollenbach's campaign in 1975-it has nothing to do with this matter?
Mr. BECKEL. Yes. I am curious about you as well. You and I ran across each other on the campaign trail. May I say to the Chairman that I went to Wagner College in Staten Island, New York, his district.
Let me make one point about the questions being asked again, if I could. I did, in our discussions prior to this Mr. SNYDER. I don't want you badgering the Chairman on my time.


Mr. BECKEL. I am not badgering the Chairman at all, and if you
would not badger the negotiatiors we would all be set. I wanted to reiterate our position on not making public statements when the
treaty is not finally negotiated.
Mr. SNYDER. You made that decision when you came out in the
newspapers, and now you are saying we want to tell you what provisions we want to tell you about, but we don't want to tell you
about the provisions we don't want to tell you about.
Mr. BECKEL. I don't think that is accurate. You have seen in the
paper a broad framework of principles around which the treaty will be drafted. That treaty has not been drafted. I made that very clear.
Mr. SNYDER.Why are you seeking support for something not even
in writing9. Why have you been going around the country seeking
support for something not in writing?
Mr. BECKEL. We are generating support for what we hope and
believe will be a decent treaty, and I'm sure that some people here
are seeking opposition to it.
Mr.SNYDER. You are generating support for what you hope will
be a decent treaty. I think it is poor judgment on the part of the J President or a former President, as the case may be, to agree to
something that you hope will be a decent treaty.
Mr. BECKEL. It is up to them to make that decision, I think.
Mr. SNYDER. They already have, obviously.
Ambassador Bunker, you indicated in your testimony that this
new board would change leadeship in 1990; is that correct?
Ambassador BUNKER. The administration will change, yes.
Mr. SNYDER. What will be the effect of that?
Ambassador BUNKER. The reason for changing is that Panama
will gradually increase its participation in the operation of the treaty and we believe that it will be advantageous to have the administrator during that latter period be a Panamanian, so that they will gain experience in the operation of the canal and administration of the canal.
.1 Iff Mr. SNYDER. Ambassador Linowitz, in your prepared statement
you indicate several financial considerations and say they will not require any appropr iations by the U.S. Congress; but the Congress will have to appropriate some portion of the Export-Import Bank money wouIdn't they, and isn't the Congress totally responsible for
the AI.D program?
H Ambassador LINOWITZ. I think you will remember that I said, on Pk. page 6, "1 want to stress, however, that the disbursement of funds
under these programs will be subject to all the procedures and criteria which normally abide in each of the programs involved,
which normally include congressional action."
Mr. HUGIMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to apologize for
only catching a part of your exchange, Ambassador Linowitz, with Ms..Mikulski, dealing with the neutrality treaty. As I understand the excharige, your testimony was, and I think it is in your statement on page 3, that there is no limitation of the ability of this country to take whatever action we feel is necessary to maintain
the neutrality of the Canal Zone.
Am I to understand that there is no understanding whatever as
to what form thatwould take, what notice would be required in the

event our country felt that the neutrality of the Canal Zone was threatened? There are no specifics?
Ambassador LINOWITZ. I don't want to get into more than I have said, but I will tell you, there will be no specifics.
Mr. HUGHES. Have there been discussions with the Panamanians insofar as just what course that would take before the U.S. would interject itself in where this country felt the neutrality was threatened?
Ambassador LINowrrz. At this juncture, it would be unwise for me to go into that.
Mr. HUGHES. I want to thank the members of the panel for appearing here today. I know some of you have traveled long distances at great inconvenience and I sincerely appreciate it.
Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bauman.
Mr. BAUMAN. Just a procedural question: There have been a number of questions raised here in which we have been told that the answer can't be discussed in public. Are we going to, after a break come back today in closed session and get answers? The CHAIRMAN. We are going to schedule an executive session. Mr. BAUMAN. Later today?
The CHAIRMAN. I don't believe we can do it today because of the program for this afternoon that some of the witnesses have. Mr. BAUMAN. We will be guaranteed an occasion somethne in the near future to get answers?
Mr. DORNAN. What would be "near future"? The CHAIRMAN. As quickly as we can work it out. There won't be any agreements done before we have it, I assure you. Mr. Bauman?
Mr. BAUMAN. I thank the Chairman. I want to raise one question. I refer to a reply by Mr. Hansell earlier-and I want you to understand, Ambassador Linowitz, this doesn't reflect on you, but I think the answer should be given to us, even if it is in the form of 'a memorandum from the State Department. Earlier, Mr. Snyder made. remarks which I did not consider personally directed toward you. He shares my understanding that the President's appointment of you was a personal appointment; that you, in fact, do not fall within the restrictions of certain laws revealing your campaign contributions or requiring the confirmation of the U.S. Senate.
There have appeared press reports about the fact that you served as director of the Marine Midland Bank and that the Government of Panama is indebted to a consortium of the banks, including Marine Midland, to the extent of about $8 million. There also was a statement made by Mr. Aquilino Boyd that you personally represented the Government of Panama in dealing with President-Elect Carter last year regarding the possibility of a treaty. Again, that has appeared in the press.
Further than that, it is my understanding that your law firm has also represented various Latin American interests, including some businesses in Panama.


The question that all of this raises, and I think you can see quite readily, is that in the absence of any disclosure of your interests, your taking part in these negotiations might have presented a conflict of interest.
Ambassador LINOWITZ. Let me answer that clearly, because I tried to deal with it in the past, but let me make sure you understand it fully.
Before I took on this assignment, I made full disclosure of every memb6rship I had, every board, every share of stock I owned, to the State 'Department Legal Adviser. I have a letter from the State Department Legal Adviser, telling me that it was appropriate for me to take on this post, and indicating that, for example, there were two companies in which I owned some shares that I should dispose of them. I did.
It. was on the basis of that clearance in writing from the State Department with the knowledge and approval of the White House, that I assumed the responsibility as co-negotiator-that, let me say, in accordance with a procedure that is followed in a number of other cases that Mr. Hansell can testify.
A few weeks after I assumed the responsibility, questions began to be raised about'the Marine Midland involvement, because it was involved- in a very small capacity with a large consortium loan involving a number of banks. Although I was clearly advised there was no need to do'so, I did decide to resign from the board of the bank and did at that time, and advised this committee at the meeting in March in closed session that I was going to do so.
I have at no time. represented or have had any kind of position on behalf of the Government of Panama or any of its officialsMr. BAUMAN. Nor has our law firm?
Ambassador LINOWITZ. Let me take it one at a time: Not in any capacity-nor has my law firm at any time; nor does it presently represent anybody in any dealings in connection with the Government of Panama, nor I would think, though we have a large international law firm, I think I can safely say in matters presently in Latin America, but I can't be sure because we do have an office in Rio de Janeiro.
Mr. BAUMAN. The information that has appeared, in the mess is that your law firm, at least, has represented, on occasion, sugar interests in Panama.
Ambassador LiNowrrz. I have never heard of it if they have. Mr. BAUMAN. Mr. Chairman, in the meeting that you will arrange, I would specifically like to obtain responses to the following questions, which I will submit for the record, even though they are given in executive session: Whether or not the U.S. warships will be guaranteed abcess to the Canal under all circumstances; and whether or not any declared or undeclared enemies of the U.S. will argwbe granted access to the Canal and under what circumstances; and whether or not any ships of the U.S. Government will be subjected to any special restrictions or tolls under any different circumstances than presently exist or would be applied across-theboard to all other nations.
lastly, may I ask you, when do you expect that we will have a written breaty so that President Carter will be made an honest man

concerning what he said in his telegram to me in which he asked me to support the treaty. He asked me to read it over and announce support for it.
Ambassador LiNowrrz. We are working as hard-perhaps Mr. Hansell
Mr. BAUMAN. I know you have been working hard today, and we all commend you for that.
Mr. HANSELL. We have a team of lawyers in..Panama working round-the-clock, seven days a week; others working here, pre"paring treaty language, reviewing language, checking questions. It is an extraordinarily complex process, as you might guess. There I'S no way to give any reliable estimate. We are desirous of completing the job as soon-Mr. BAUMAN. Are we talking about six months?
Mr. HANSELL. No, we would hope that in the month of September, and as early in the month of September as possible, those documents would be completed.
Mr. BAUMAN. Thank you.
TheCHAIRMAN. Mr. Dornan.
Mr. DORNAN. Ambassador Bunker, what can we do under this proposed new treaty if the Panamanian Government, itself, decides to shut down the Canal for some political reason and end shipping.? In other words, not a confrontation with some outside danger, but the Panamanian Government, whether it is one man or a junta of colonels, or whatever, it decided to shut down the Canal?
Ambassador BUNKER. During the term of the treaty we have primary responsibility for the Canal's operation and defense, and we can see that it is kept operating. We have the right to do that.
Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Bunker, do you recall my first meeting with you was down in the Canal, and that I told -you how difficult things would go for a treaty on Capitol Hill and that. if you assumed everything was going to take place on Conta Dora Islands, you. were wrong and should aggressively reach out to the American people, with President Carter taking the lead to publicize the treaty as best you could, even how you were moving through negotiations? Do you recall that?
Ambassador BUNKER. Yes.
Mr. DoRNAN. Do you?
Ambassador LINOWITZ. Yes.
Mr. DORNAN.You know I have not criticizedyou for the publicity you are generating. I think it is healthy and the only way you. can move to make this the number-one issue in America during the next several months so that the American people 'can have as many facts as the media will give them to make any decision. .
If I could, please, with both of you, discuss one aspect of your approach I appreciate the way you put it, Mr. Linowitz, that, we must determine if this treaty, specifically when we see it on paper, is in the best interest of the country. In reference to our First Lady's trip to the Latin American countries, you said if the American people would understand what is the decent, honorable, fair thing to do, they would support the treaty, that this was brought up to her in those terms, and then in both Time and Newsweek we hear about it is a matter of conscience for the American people. William Buckley said a great nation would act this way.

Do you see, when you use that type of rhetoric, that the opposite
is someone who opposes your position with all sincerity in their beliefs, particularly if it is based on Mr. Torri *os' instability, which I hold to, or the shakiness of the world scene, given the growth of the Soviet Navy, you are calling my position, or the Chairman's position, you are calling our position unfair, indecent, dishonorable, and
When we put this out before the American people, there is a
chance that the 78 percent of the American people opposed to this Treaty may increase into the 80's. If the Senate reflects the people, then the Treaty is a long way away from the 67 percent needed in the Senate and from the percentage needed in the House when the
constitutional difficulties are worked out.
Could I ask you both to comment on the dignity of positions
opposing giving up the Canal, not to the Panama people, but to Mr.
Torrijos, calling himself a head of state, the euphemism of the age, and also given the Soviet position in the world? Could you both
comment,, on that?
Ambassador LiNOWITZ.Mr. Dornan, may I first say a word? We
both have profound confidence of faith in the good judgment and sound judgment of the American people. That is what has underlain a good part of this effort to get the facts out as soon as we are in a position to disclose them. We know there has been a lot of emotionalism, preconception, prejudice involved in this issue, and that is reflected in the polls which do indicate that a very large percentage
of the American people are opposed to a new treaty.
We know of course, that the question is asked, if the American
people are asked, would you favor giving up the Panama Canal, it is hard to get them to say yes. If it is put in terms, do you think that a new treaty which undertakes to preserve the American interest and deal. fairly with the aspirations of the Panamanians, thereby assuring us a continuing role to keep that Canal open and secure is
in our best interest, you may get another answer.
So what we. are. undertaking to do is to talk wherever we can, to
communicate. I am going to speak to the American Legion on Friday, knowing well that the president of the American Legion yesterday came out against the new treaty, because we think there should be that kind of exchange with decency and mutual respect.
Mr. DORNAN. Would you yield for a second? And then I want to j.. yield to my colleague from Maryland.
We all know how loaded polls can be. The Opinion Research
Organization, highly respected and used by networks-ABC has used them; many large organizations use them-the question they asked was loaded in a sense. It said, "Do you believe the U.S. should retain the ownership and control of the Canal or give the ownership and control of the Canal to the Republic of Panama?" Therein lies a misstatement. We are not giving it to the Republic of Panama if this head of state-concurring with your request-if this head of state, General Torrlios, is in power, given longevity. That loads it. If you said the Republic of Panama, it gives you a softer ring. The
question was loaded in favor of the treaty.
Ambassador LINOWITZ. I just want to make one point because it
relates to this and another question you raised. Remember, under

97-746 0 77 6

no circumstances does the control, the operation, the defense of the Canal, pass to the Panamanian Government until.the yeak 2000. When you talk about passing to anybody, General TorrJos"br anybody else, you are talking about 23 years from now, not about doing it now and somehow that image which I am afraid has been touted around the country deliberately that this is an immediate giveaway, which is entirely fallacious, permeates the thinkingof a lot of Americans to respond as they do to the polls.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Trible.
Mr. BAUMAN. Would'you yield?
Mr. TRIBLE. I yield to the gentleman.
Mr. BAUMAN. On that point, Ambassador Linowitz, I wanted to ask you whether this Time Magazine quote this week is correct. It Ims very apropos to what you stated about the state of the mind of the American people. You are quoted as saying that the opposition'to this treaty is "not only one of emotionalism but one of great ignorance on the part of the American people."
Is that a fair assessment of your view of the public attitude?
Ambassador LINOWITZ. Yes, I think the American people have not had a chance to learn the facts about the new treaty. The polls show that the American people don't know, and the objective'we have is to educate the American people on the facts so they can make up their mind fairly.
Mr. BAUMAN. So they are ignorant as you see it.
Mr. TRIBLE. Ambassador Bunker, I would like to pursue the matter we discussed briefly in the last round. I read a description in Time Magazine of the Government of Panama, and we have heard the term dictatorship used here today. You, of course, are familifair with the situation in Panama. How would you characterize the Government of Panama?
Ambassador BUNKER. I would say it is -authoritarian government, not outright dictatorship in terms that apply to many other countries. Torrijos does have the National Assembly to advise him. He does consult with business groups, labor groups, other groups in the country, on his policy. He does have a legislative council, which advises legislation for the country, and it is submitted to, the National Assembly, so while the government is authoritarian in nature, they are not as much so as many other countries.
Mr. TRIBLE. Are there political parties in Panama?
Ambassador BUNKER. There are no political parties.
Mr. TRIBLE. Is there a free press in Panama?
Ambassador BUNKER. The press is guided. I would call it a guided press, though it does indulge in certain criticism of the government.
Mr. TRIBLE. How about the state of the political opposition? I think you spoke to that question in the last round.
Ambassador BUNKER. As I say, there are no political parties who express themselves. On the other hand, there have been open letters, for example, through the government from independent jurist groups, associations criticizing the treaty, indicating that Panama has been too weak on what it conceded in terms of the treaty; so there is criticism of various kinds in the country.

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As Clii(-V 11.)cific, I )vk' "11 Jll so!)io dir"I-ail Ifir Ton"in

Gulf' c v., ol 1,96-1. Ptw ins-- 1-11:11 po)--i"'kl I sal-! 1ho 1%,111mvi Call;:I. l co"I"'i 'I IK-W t)ow 11w m );:11tic Fick-I -dio-'Ilkl 0-,, ro)-ve!.- '.1" 1)(,


Soviet Union or iiwin)-and 0) becolic j)jvolvco ill tile victlialliose 11.1r.

111c U.S. I)jrjl colmn-jild was never sure during tho,,c carly ph:jscs of 1ho i-mr

of the intentions of either the sovict 1111ion or 111ji)II.Ind ('11illa. Wc kilm." 1hey

had i lie -nava I and ai r capabi I itics to ImOx tl oublr- al ld i":crefore "re 11.1d

to di*;i;.,, up conting-cncy plans for sticli ex-ontualiticc, In Or(](']' to C(ILIN 1 1::(,

tho wartipn ; and haTdship throticlmut the cro-ii-c Navy, I.jrp(, mjj;bt,)-,;

of AtIvIltic Flect units were co:j1J1)U0.As1y rot'll-cd throll!"ll I-lic C.111"ll to 010

combat thcotre hi the Pacific. In aidloon, as I-),(, ric

I loolxd to tho At].intic side -or rapid loistics support. '11)c U.S. A-i-my, the U.S. Air Fcrcc, the U.S. Marine Corps mic' flic, U.S. Navy all rcquil-ccl a

continuous am] heavy flow Of looi-StiC -SUj)j,))' SUCh I'CCCS' S a S fLIC I,
ammunition spore parts and food. Wr allje!i fighting w-1th us in Vietimm

also required considerable support fi-c,.;1 the United States. If tile

Ganal had not leon Lipcn and available, thc in 11jotilaw would bilve I)OC11

much mo-re dj-ffj-,:,iilt and costly to con6u:t. 'llis conclusion is -]),,o f)lthe in,'Yorca.

TO give You scl!;c ide'; of tho C'f Palinil-l C"111"11 usa-c '11"d its

relationship to tll,, war effol-t, in 190 I""Is il total of .500 U.S. .overwmcnt transits throv-di the Caml. As tho v:m- csc;!, fli ol

government 5;lljl)s transitill- by 196,") ]K Ll The 1-0,Col-d ; sl'M'.- fOl2
fliat yc"11-39,66--- cl total of 501, govel-i.. :"m shii"- Mos' C) F

lw%-0 Ships were C:Irryin!" critic,11)). necklo'l Tooi.---tik- '- slipport to 111c,

Opvratil)(- lindel, Ill). col"n':311J.

-As At'l;mt1c, ;iml NYFO's Supicm,, Allied

sitimt, ion at Pall."WA iM 'I V., I Col-saw tilt s

period P os to 19(".1". Tht, w,11- ill Vicll)".:11 1 11:, SI i.11 but- llow


looking it, tho Comial not only as a micans of sencling siipport to Ilic Com.!vindorin-Mief, Pacific, Nit also from the Atlantic perspective. I saw flic possible m-CLI to rcvcv c tile flow of ship!, through Me Conal, particularly if tile sittlition clui-crion-ited in the Michik: E;tst or in fliQ Caribbu.iii (hring tlio!.c xrolatilc montlis of tension and conflict-ill both arcas.

Both ill oul. U.S. palming and in, our NATO planning, we envisioned contingellcics. cillillf; for rcjllforccm-nt from tile 1) ocific Cx-cmi arcas. Lo cnvisioncJ the nev.d for combat'not tolnlagc, Aroy alid Marine Divisions, -illd particularly we saw the necd For villphibio-os lift.

.As Chief cf Nowil Operations I had to Icol: at tJ)c 11tinami Dina) as an

essm-itial. mcans of equalizing-the strength mid providing th6 balance Lotwc-, ;i tile A11,intic ard Pacific fleets. 111ccancal I-I.Lldc it possible to pre-pusitim1 certain types md tormages, but always with ----I)c luiowled;Ic that the balance could be shifted to IJrct LLIfoycsCen situatio-Ls. II)c Pwilmr) Camil th2 1I3Vzi1_ planner Y-mch flexibility Lmd vorsal-ili fliat hc would be dopri-.-c-d of Without it.

As of the Joint Chief- of Staff I became even more sclv _.tivc to

the strotc(,ic valtic of this U.S. C'mal as n 1110'Ins of proLecti))" th"! scl-uri!.y of tile United States. My jot) ns Chainii-m involved M of the Ancvd -oi-ces or 111C UllitOJ 'States---thei-I. collcctivc requi lvin-,-Its- -,md I was prill..11-ily vesiv;ls i 1) 1 c, to 1 ho I rc s i do, i for t) 10 i r 1) i I ity 10 C Zl IT)' O-Ot t 1: C i I- W -1 S i II i S s 01" s .IS by tile cvll lros.';. toly ill t4"t cop:wil .111

imill"'(1J'licl). perceive 1111t it i!; \6101 tO 0:1110d SIA C.; llltcrcc't to r"taill compl .,I(, ol"non.-hip aui co.,iti-oi or tiw Jll-wtlwo ol, I:.,). lv.. pow-,ihi litv flllt I COM:01,111AI .111otit flic to 11ho hillalwi C 111:11 to 'I It'I", 1.1


orimtcd Vpvcniment al-lied with Culm. '11wre.existed the potclaial k1,111j"cr

for giving this U.S. a(Minop.c to a 171,111 IJ)o lijighl- allow or mip)a he pci-tuldcd

that it'. %.:iis ill Ili,, best- interest 1.o permit sovjo power and jilf.hicilk-c to

prevail. by proxy ovicr IJ)C calml, ill inuch tile siil.o Imuller as happened M Cuba.

I was convillccdv Chith-111"In or flic Jff;--and .1 rein.lill colwinced todl)-th.,it

if the Soviet Union ever gaillcd even proxy soverciglity ard Cont-1-01 over 11w

U.S. C.111;J1 zollu and Gillill throt)[111 Cuba, U. ;. Security woll as O.S. pro57perity wuuld bo IAaced ill serious jeop:irdy.

71)c Unitcl Stalies would bo placed ill icop"!rdy ilAcl-m-c'm
1111-Catened. The )DOW I it)' Of DI li,'d C011111101-C-1,11
mobility I..'01110 be I
1 0

and naval forc-es would face tbe same threat. 111C Ccollon-i-C lifc1incs 0
the (.T)ti re IN Etcrn Ifullisphore would be, mccflossly joop.l-dized, mid 1,110

Point thc1c is 110 poillt in surrmdcrj)) this vital int.-crest. li, vo

to see any solid justificttion advam-ed ns 10 Idly fl-to United S'Czltes

will-Ingly sacrifice tile strat.egic adv -linfcs affor(!A d to lis by Cul ]x),-C-JC-,,,

-of the llaninna Camil. Also, by relii)quishirg conlrut ol' the Caw;1 Oi.o a:id
tho Callal A.7 1 0111(' fo)-Ce al) ti,OS- I)-11.jol
C L wlho dep,-Dd oll Our powoladcn;hip t.o accowii,)Jate to the adverse J;:,11 IcnVio.- 01, Such aci-10P (,.:1 0111lil. 711w, Canal Zone could be,-olw fl,.C bilsc of an

and th", i!J1-CCi11-_CS of ",oh-eaway" CIO not tnpp, :ll- 10 this -fjcl.ol- -Jill.,


For the foro-oi-.1o ollon; not

three Ch-ief- of, MIv.11 0;w1-:11ion-, .1 Icit-"), [o 1Vk-:Jd','!li Glilt,)-. 1)

u;Is lol of a polci,[ 1,!!

1)1,,, Pmw;wl C:11ml would bc.,-tw-c :)n

he ovkva I I I I.S. 0," 11

1,kw ev.1.1." (-,-ko
th _y-A

Ilic military mid commercial. cow;ideratinir'; are oloviolls.

Although the large aircraft cm-rivrs ind lorge sulwy-tankers vijymot usc the Giw.jl, 97 percent of' the world's colluv-1-cial illd navol Flects con I]:.c thO C;1n,'11 aS it jS. IbC C,111,11 (.100S med sojwc iie)(lernization.

Aboia two-third:.; of all the current. Cm.-,1 traffic is botuid to oi- 'Imn U.S. ports. V-1jell shipf; vollild tll(- H,-.wn i.pstead*of 1 0jjlg through thc C.111al, they must trave) about 8,000 extra 11610s, have 18,1000 extra miles of v.var and tearl 11ced 8,000 extra miles of filel. On ;111 lV01-Ji,!C it t;ikCS 31 U.-Ara days to round the Horn.

If we worc denied use of the Camill ive .%,ould have to build a much

Iarger.Navy; much larger storage and barber facilities Oil both the ari

West Coasts 'of the United Suitcs ind provjd2 )iy)i-c mcychant S hips well as escorts.

Surrender of U.S. sov,,: rcipity over the 7anal. Zone would inmrit.;ibly Ic;id .to flic, tran-m-lformatioji of Jlc clitirc friell(D). cllnractcr of the the Dilf of 14"'),ico. Everything would oopmw Oil the attitude. of TIlose w"10 k1d soveroi.ont), and ov.-murship.

hi Dii I itavy aff;lirs thcre is 110 sulst-ilute for ov.,.ic)-ship of thc lo.-rito)-y

-in(] the ability to comrol or to deny 11ho wii(Ill's "Ind lbe air spaco.

Mier having lived thmuf;h 11))-cc of Conflict T (101111- boll(-vc J1

tifl\&S 1:11,0 1 ill).1,0111,'Ition to clivis'](10 ;0111, 011, t1he wo wight

Cou.-il. _701)0 'Ind C.111:11 oxcl, to nily ilv;i lnk hl ".kv !,;1 10 use 11 11., M1% ChjjT'j:',1j), I jlj jjj,10 ill 11W )VC,Od 11: ,

1.0 103, sil,%,J by four 01,1cf!; of 1".1val ;ons, ImAu'!hIll.

4.11(,,I hy ['01w d*,,,1111-ui-h,,,1

S1.11c.-. .1"eil:11c ;I!,. 11:11"I ol, my


Regarding the (111'1".itioll of sovercig))ty, (Y...'n-TSbip nild Control, W* th c U. S. Canal Mile and thc- Cinal I mn iiot a lawyer, but I am sati! I'icd vvi ill the Supremc! Court's docis-ion of 1907 in the fam-nis Ifilsou vs. Simi,; czi ;c that Ole thOled Statc-1 do(!.,; have 1cgA soverclipty and ov.-iiership 1'01' the purpm.cs cnaarrratcd in the Trcaty of 1.90). Alis wzl.s w, receMly as 1972. Also, our Con"titution stal-cs ill Article IV, S-ct.ion 3, Claxise 2*'tbat only colli"Y( ss bas th'-.. xithority 1-0 di! pO70 of U.S. Iciritory and other pi-oporty of flic Wited States. '1110 L111"u'li"C ill the Sllpvc:'.. Court's dccisiOD of 1967 is quitc precise. It is not t lie 1,

in our Const At ti on. S-ince the Sup)-cmc Com-1 decision of 1.907 siJ J I su-acls

--it has nevcy been ovci ruled- -and sillce the co:lsti tilt ioll 11) m.. opin,

-Ile bcst governing elocm'.Ont i'll exis-el"CC, I call 0111),

tliav we would be well advised to abide by th,.,sc docujik lj_(S ill oLIT-11 other courtrics.

111WI), YOU Mr. M:jrr, n.


.fl,...n# a *t*.t~m 86

'The Irc!sideiit
The White fu
wasincto~i 1). C.

Dear Mr. President:

We are cnelonAflg a most iinportant letter fo orfre heso
Raval Operations who give their co: :i2nvd ju~mn nth taei Ya~uc of~ the V1ni Cana to h~e Uited1 54,tes

We think you will agree thbat these~ four mnn are aogth eatra living nval strategists today, both in terms of expLr(rc n idc mcnt. Their letter concluades:

"It is our considered individual anid combined thatmen you a 4ul instruct our negotiators to retain full sovereign cmitro3 for the Unte States over both tbe PaaaCanal and its protctve frnethU..Cfll Zone as provided inj the existing treaty."

We concur in their jIudgemont and trust you will find such action wol consistent with our national interest and will act accordingy Sincerely,

J~~n (A UII L. Mclla s

The~ gP9reu te Udentvuc
Tal Whit Douset~ Sats

As frmerChifs o Navl Oeratonsfetg cotraiicr and ecNoaval e
visers~233 waera prviur PlsIr)y

the~ace Panam Canal. Loia thet Utromtae,;

if ot iloe s, t th UntedStacspha t ever The Pancm soipel of he
the~~~~~~~~~~~ UntdSae otrisc t aaa cesandco-rer as I eit s f toiiyn
A: -riss. Ti*. capbilty i i wre iis cmo nr
ocea tors oceancr cas thnee

tan no -ll iewofthereuce sieofth iUS. Atlantr i as Pcfc the vts1

We recognize hat he Navy' laget aicat rrer an sohe af carer

~a)a j scy aits sf o ay.n
The sper-tnkec rersnbu asmall percent Eof~s the \vold l copnr-~

wisely~~ poiioe as prsusad teson bit, i ilallyt kind ofc a rt Ih M range, limited siutoft hiaw re t~h hial s of ombaants,- fr--hIc
subarne tocrisrsca b funed th~rogoh the rani as al teCvial.

flettri nedd osutan t onble t. as~ (..,I le~ Soti' ~h

becoe smallr o as le ana is moenzd tais pfrobe will opno loge

vice-~orldWar 1, Koiea, Vetna ai~dthe UU& Cub an n~ s ie cimjit5i- t' .iu unts;6d il-isie ofisicsupot o ib A ined Fo~v~rces. The C~vi ))'

Mr. Prefilhent, You have became our leader ata iiewhnOedquc of our naval capalilii- ir being seriougsly chaligd h xttn narifimne thirvat to uu it; compound-MIed by the po# ~biit t; OCamimde Panajvmian sovereilgnty could bie ncutrali7.e4 or ltt lp-ndn nta govcrnrncnt'R relationrhip within other natiorm
*Panaml-anian government hafs clorc tie!; with the pc-n ijngvrmn which in turn Is clofsely tiedlto the Sovet ni. o; fthPara al, Which w.oild be a sc tlour. sct-back in -,mr, wudcnrbet h nice nrtent of the U. S. by ho.-tile naval forcefandtra, u blt osrie

For meeting thle cxrcnt Situaticmn, you have the weWA-knon pTCC]lto former idi:AngxiiAcd Secrctary of Stat (later Che 114ie) hre "in Hughes, wvho, when faced with a coma bestai in19-,dcar t
the Palnalall gcovCmlnmeni that itwas an "aboueftly"ori"oex pect an American administration, i-omte %Inti .aan rsdn.o
any Seerctary of.State, cxr to surrene any part o te ihs-hc b United States had acquired under the Trea- of10,' H.Io.N.44 890h Congress, P. 154),

We recognize that a certain arnount of social unrest is< generatdb tecn trast in living standards bten Zoniaiis and ananwmans lvn ikBilateral programs are reco--cie tougaePnmna e~(-r areas.* Canal n-ode muizalfion, once U.,S.soeigtisuanerl ilt
benef it thic entire Panamnana economy,~ an espcalthsars er the U. S. Zone.

The Pauama Canal represents a vital poi-tion of or U.S&aa ndimiii) assets, all of m.i ich are absolutely essentiial for free -world security. It is our Considered individual and combined jgetht you should izistruct u negotiators to retain flllsovereign control for the Uite tae oe bt the Panama11, Canal and its protective f rame, the I. S. C~ia oo spnie in tho existing treaty.

Very reC! ;-ctifilly,


-GE O1 G A iDF37J J110S 1


AdmiralMOORER. I would like to add a few comments to what I said in my statement. At the outset I would like to emphasize that 'my opinions and my comments are not dictated by emotion or imperception, or prejudice, and while I am not a lawyer, not by ignorance, either.
I have been involved in the Panama Canal issue a long time, and I would like to make a few comments on the proposed treaty.
In the first place, I view the treaty strictly from a strategic point of view as it relates to the overall security of the U.S. I do not see this issue as simply an agreement between a big strong nation and a small nation in Latin America. In my view, it goes far beyond that, because of the strong connection of Moscow with Cuba and the Cuban connection with Panama.
Mr. Torrijos has been to Cuba; he has been decorated; he and Castro have proclaimed the success of their revolutions; Moscow has used Cuba by proxy to send 12,000 troops to Angola.
In view of the fact that the Panama Canal is one of the four maritime waterways of the world-included are the Panama Canal, the Suez Canal, the Strait of Gibraltar and the Malacca Strait-I think the Soviets would like nothing better than to be able to have control of the Panama Canal.
The next thing I would like to say this is a special situation-I read the other day in the Washington Post that we wouldn't like it if France controlled New Orleans. I thought that was nonsense. This is not a similar situation. The Canal-the agreement about the 'Canal--was reached at the same time that Panama became a country. I think the situation is quite different.
Secondly, I think the suggestion that, after all, we are not going to lose control of the Canal for 23 years is also meaningless in the sense that 23 years is a very short time. All that does as far as I am concerned is defer the problem.
The other point made is that the neighboring countries in Latin and South America would be very happy, and that it is their number-one objective, to have a treaty. I don't think that is quite correct, either. I don't believe that the people of the larger countries-Brazil, Argentina and Chile-are eager for such a treaty. I think the economy of the countries on the west coast of South America could be seriously affected by the increase in fees.,
And, finally, I have heard much from my colleagues in uniform, as well as others, to the point that if we don't surrender the Canal-if we don't go along with this treaty and make an agreement which ultimately excludes the U.S. from the Canal area then it will be sabotaged. Well, I consider that nothing more than a threat. The Israelis could tell the Egyptians the same thing. If you don't give us the Canal, we aregoing to blow it up. The facts are, all of these waterways I mentioned are vulnerable. There is no ques tion about that.
During World War II, the Japanese actually dispatched several of their big submarines with kamikaze aircraft aboard with orders to kamikaze the Canal. They were intercepted and turned back.
It is not a matter whether the Canal can be sabotaged or not. It can be sabotaged temporarily. But certainly if the U.S. is going to govern our actions on the basis of threats that: "If you don't do

what we want you to do, we are going to take violent action," well, then, I think we are certainly not being a number-one world power like we should be and we might as well throw in the international towel.
Secondly, I think that the negative perception of third countries which would develop anytime the U.S. demonstrates a weakness is dangerous to our freedom and our prosperity because any sign of weakness causes many countries in the world to tilt, you might say, toward the Soviet Union, and consequently you will see an economic, a military, and a political impact on our position in the world.
So, I feel certain that we can always update the Canal and that we can assist Panama in her economic problems. The facts are, however, they already have the highest per capita income due to the U.S. tribute of $2.3 million and just the presence of the Canal the highest per capita in that area-and for them to sabotage the Canal would bring about economic chaos to Panama. It would be a matter of cutting off your nose to spite your face.
So I don't think that we should be driven by the fear that we are going to get violent action if we don't do what the other side wants us to do.
TheCHAIRMAN. Thank you, Admiral. Admiral, if the Canal was in relatively hostile hands, would that mean that we would have to undertake a much larger expenditure in military bases on both coasts as well as naval equipment, notably expensive warships, in order to compensate for our lack of control of that waterway?
AdmiralMOORER. There is no question about that. As you know, it is 8,000 miles around the Horn. It takes 31 days for some ships. It would cost millions and millions of dollars in additional fuel expenditures, would affect a capability that the U.S. Navy has today to shift forces from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and vice versa. So *in order to compensate for this reduced availability of these combat ships to participate in whatever action they may be directed to participate in, it would take more ships, more warehouses, more fuel storages, and so on. And that would generate a very increased expense.
The only alternative, of course, it we do not have total access to the Panama Canal is to accept this degradation of our strength, in naval terms.
The CHAIRMAN. In other words, many billions of dollars not related to the package of the negotiation are involved in the national security areas of America?
AdmiralMOORER. There is no question about that, sir.
TheCHAIRMAN. Admiral, during the Cuban missile crisis era, one of the critical uses of the Panama Canal, of course, was the movement of fleet units through the Panama Canal, as well as logistical movements of support ships. One of the less publicized elements was the Panama area's vie as a communications center.
If we were denied the communications center of Panama with its security cables and other communications equipment, would you give us the alternative that we would have to that vital communicating link in a Caribbean front?


Amdiral MOORER. I think it would reduce the flexibility and generate time delays in rapid transmission of orders back and forth for those combat units operating in the Caribbean and in the area of the Pacific west of the Panama Canal. You are quite right when you say we rapidly transferred many forces from the Pacific Ocean to the Caribbean area in anticipation of orders to invade Cuba. Many were amphibious ships. HN Today, our contingency plans envision transfer of forces from the Atlantic to the Pacific and vice versa, depending on where the original confrontation happens to-be. This is really my concern, H.. because if this difficulty involved Russia, I think it would be in their interest to operate by proxy and do what they could to inhibit the rapid transfer of U.S. forces to the problem area. The CHAIRMAN. In your prepared statement you turn back the TI pages of history a little bit to the era of the Tonkin Gulf and those many months following the Tonkin Gulf You mention that with the uncertainty as to what action China or Russia might take in
that area to counter a United States move, that without the .-Panama. Canal it would have been logistically impossible to have supported a movement of that size that we have just utilizing West Coast ports and equipment.
Perhaps you could enlarge on that in that respect.
H Admiral MOORER. Well, Mr. Chairman, anytime we have a potential problem it is the responsibility of the senior officers in the military organizations to prepare what we call contingency plans. I call them "What If', what if this happens, what are we going to do? In the future when we might have a similar situation without access to the Canal, we could not concentrate forces, naval forces in particular, and in many cases Army forces, because much logistic support would come from the East Coast through the Canal to the Pacific.
I get back to the point that a country like Panama may not be involved in some conflict or difficulty that the United States might have, for instance, in the Western Pacific, but certainly Russia would be vitally interested and they would, in my view, do what they could to use Cuba to make our problems as difficult as possible. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hubbard?
Mr. HUBBARD. Thank you.
The question I asked the ambassadors: We have been told, of course, that the one major purpose of the treaty would be to improve our relations in Latin America. Are you familiar with this Organization of American States meeting in June where the resolution was adopted in which 19 Latin American countries stipulated that they did not want any canal toll changes, no added charges unless it was needed, absolutely needed for the operation of the waterway? Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir, I am quite familiar with it.
Unfortunately, it has been my observation during the time that I have been in close contact with negotiations and government activities of the United States that we always seem to resort to the pocketbook to solve the problems. In my view, a large payment to Panama would ultimately come out of the taxpayers' pocket rather than from increased fees. If you


increased fees to the extent of $50 million, I think it could be counterproductive in the sense that it would reduce the ship transits and thus would reduce business. Any kind of business is the same: If you put the price too high, you don't get the business.
Mr. HUBBARD. Are the Latin American countries really that concerned about the Panama Canal question?
AdmiralMOORER. I think the emotional interests come from the countries in the immediate vicinity of Panama, such as Venezuela. In terms of the entire Caribbean South America, on balance I do not think so. I have already mentioned the fact that certainly the countries on the west coast of South American would be less than happy over the possibility that the canal could be closed to their commerce, because they depend heavily on the canal.
Mr. HUBBARD. Thank you.
TheCHAIRMANMr. Snyder?
Mr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Admiral Moorer, for being here. We appreciate it. I was interested in your early comments about the Communist presence in this area by virtue of Torrijos and Castro and Moscow. I-just for the record-the staff is showing me a copy of a book by John Read, who was an American Communist, who is buried behind the wall of the Kremlin. The foreward to the book was written by Lenin himself. I don't know what year it was written, but this reprint was copyrighted by Random House in 1960. Those Communists plan ahead. He points out, and I quote: "all straits opening into inland seas as well as the Suez and Panama Canals are to be neutralized." That is exactly what is happening under this proposal, of course.
AdmiralMOORER. I might comment that during the Cuban crisis, in which I was involved, I stated at the time that in my view it would have been far wiser for the United States to leave the missiles in Cuba and get the Russians out, because I was much more concerned about the Russians than I was the missiles. Mr. SNYDER. Admiral, how much less of a fleet do we have now than we had in World War II?
AdmiralMOORER. There has been a radical reduction in the fleet, as you know, sir, compared to World War II. It would say it is down compared to the period during the war in Korea and the subsequent times up until about 1960, it is down from 950 ships down to 550. It has been reduced almost by half Mr. SNYDER.Would you in your expert opinion say we have a twoocean Navy.?
AdmiralMOORER. We definitely donot and we would have no semblance of a two-ocean Navy if we have no capability of transferring the forces back and forth.
Mr. SNYDER. That was the point I was attempting to make. Were you here during the ambassadors' testimony? AdmiralMOORER. Part of it, yes, sir. Mr. SNYDER. Roughly, as I understand their testimony, they said that we were going to keep such military presence there, aftr this treaty is negotiated, up until the year 2000 as was necessary to defend the canal. By that, I would anticipate that they meant that any military presence that was not required in the defense of the canal between now and the year 2000 would be removed.


Could you comment on our SouthCom installation there, and how much of that is not necessary to the defense of the canal, but is cessary for the defense of this country and our defense installations generally, with their operations all over South America? Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir. I don't think you can look at the forces in the isolated context of protecting the Canal Zone per se. There are two problems: One, that I would call the internal security of the canal, th at is secu fty against sabotage and guerrilla-t e activity; and secondly, the defense of the approaches to the canal as well as the canal- itself against regular forces of an enemy. Those forces are vital, in my view, for both purposes.
Next, if there happens to be some kind of an associated confrontation in the Caribbean area, the facilities in the canal would be most useful and effective in establishing the U.S. military position. So I don't know what they mean by saying that the are going to only xetain those forces required to defend the canal. I think that requires considerable expansion. We certainly need a more detailed description of what is implied .1,by that comment.
Mr. SNYDER. Admiral, we had previous testimony before this committee regarding the inadequacies of port facilities on the Pacific Coast. Colonel Sheffey testified "We do not have a port facility on the West Coast to support even a Vietnam-sized war from there. We do not have the means to support a Pacific war by sea transport around South America or Africa." Do you concur in that judgment?
Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir. I would point out that you must not only consider the- simple matter of transporting a ton from Point A to Point B. In the military context, one must consider how long it takes youto do that.
SNY R. In other words, there would just be a big logistical gap in the event we didn't have full control of the canal? Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir. If the Soviets are involved in any way in,,action of that nature, then you have very, very much longer lines which are subject to attack by submarine; so it complicates the antisubmarine warfare problem as well as the logistics programMr. -SNYDER. Ambassador Linowitz said in his prepared statement $ that he gave this morning, from which I will read to you: "Under the: rules of neutrality to be set forth in the treaty, the Canal is to be open to merchant and naval vessels of all nations at all times without discrimination as to conditions or charges. of transit."
I asked him whether this meant if we were at war with another country, could their war vessels use the canal. He declined to mmwer -that.,
Admiral MOORER. I am. glad you asked the question. I though it was a.good question. Of course, I think it would be nothing less than ridiculous for us to permit either enemy ships or ships of any 1. country supporting the enemy to go through the canal. I don't think that that would happen. I don't think the American people would stand for: it.
Mr. SNYDER. Well, I hope you are right.
I thank you very much for being here.

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TheCHAIRMAN. Mr. Bauman?
Mr. BAUMAN. Admiral, I want to thank you for your statement.
I want to zero in on one aspect of the publicity and propaganda campaign, being waged by the White House. I read in the paper one of the key steps to the eventual public acceptance of the treaty would be the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The next day I read in the same papers a report that the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the treaty in all its parts. They presumably have not read it either, since it has not been reduced to writing.
I don't want to place you in a position of having to comment on any of your colleagues, but do you think after the Singlaub affair that there was any question that the current Joint Chiefs of Staff would approve any policy by the Carter administration?
AdmiralMOORER. Let me say, with our form of governxnent-we are the only country that requires the man in uniform to testify before the legislative branch. Generally speaking, he is expected and pressured to support the administration position, I don't care what administration is in at the time. Consequently, t Joint Chiefs of Staff are usually in a position of saying: "We can live with this idea" rather than saying: "We enthusiastically support it. "
But let me say that an amazing thing happened to me on I July 1974. For the first time in my life I acquired the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment. I tell you, I will say what I think. I don't agree with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Mr. BAUMAN. In your heart of hearts, would you think they, tuo*o, might agree if they had the First Amendment available to them?
Admiral MOORER. From a military point of view, in a.: strategic sense, in time of an emergency, which is what the Joint Chiefs of Staff and what the military people are paid to consider. I don't think that they would feel from a professional military judgment point of view that this is going to lead to enhancing the military strength of the country.
I think what has happened here is that everyone is talking about what is going to happen in the canal today and tomorrow. I don't doubt that the canal will function tomorrow, the next day and the next day.
What concerns me is, what is going to happen if we in fact have a military emergency which puts an entirely different light on it?
I had a policy during the time when I was a senior officer that when an issue was brought to me, I always asked one question: Will it work in wartime? If the answer to that was no, I was against it.
Mr. BAUMAN. Do you think that characterizes this statement?
Admiral MOORER. Yes. I think the potential for an interruption andfor generating difficulty at the time of such an emergency is there and I don't see any reason for voluntarily putting ourselves in this position. The only reasons I have heard for surrendering the canal are two fold: One is, as I said before, that if we don't do this, people won't like us, and secondly if we don't do this, the Panamanians will tear the thing up. Those are the only two reasons that I have heard so far.
Mr. BAUMAN. I think you have amply clarified the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I want to thank you for your statement and your distinguished career.


The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Dornan?
Mr. DoRNAN. Thank you, Mr.Chairman.
Admiral, Newsweek and Time that we have both been quoting a lot today, one of them misquotes directly, or states directly that we no longer need this now because we have a two-ocean Navy. Could we touch on this for a second?
Is the Atlantic or the Pacific Fleet capable of supporting any type of conflict or pre-conflict situation event to the size of the Beirut landings in 1958 or tension in Quemoy-Matsu on the other side of the world during that time period?
Admiral MOORER. I think the Navy would be hard put to do that. I don't agree that we have a two-ocean Navy in the sense that I view a: two-ocean Navy; neither do I agree in any sense that the canal is of no further use.
Some mentioned the fact that the aircraft carriers and large ships cannot go through the canal. They didn't mention that today there are no ports in the United States that will accept the VLCC tankers. Ninety-five percent of the oceangoing ships in the world can easily go through the canal. Of 14,000 ships that go through, about 8,000 call at or leave from American ports.
Mr. DORNAN. Are we not designing our most modern aircraft carriers, the TARAWA, which is already finished, to transit the canal, which the TARAWA did last fall?
Admiral MOORER. No, sir. The TARAWA is an amphibious ship. There has been much discussion about building a little aircraft carrier with a so-called V/STOL aircraft aboard. The carriers we have today will- be with us for 25 years or so, beginning with the FORRESTAL and winding up with the NIMITZ, which is commissioned and the EISENHOWER, under construction. So it would be helpful if the carriers could go through the canal, but since they cannot, we deploy them accordingly. But all the amphibious ships can go through, all the submarines can go through, so the point that the-canal is not of any further use- is a very weak argument. Mr.- DoRNAN. I mean except for those large attack carriers, these newer carriers, the LHA made by Litton Industries, they did transit the canal. So it is only our supercarriers that cannot go through? Admiral MOORER. That is correct. Mr. DoRNAN. I would like to discuss the situation in the Carib bean, which is my principal objection to signing a teraty with a dictator.
Would you say, given the Soviet submarine use of the Cuban bases and given the fact that there are submarine-launched ballistic missiles sitting inside those submarines, YANKEE-class, with ten to 12 missiles, and the DELTA-class having more, that we are back to the same situation we were in with the missiles in Cuba in 1961, andthat the Caribbean is now every bit as dangerous as it was when President Kenned was shown the U-2 photography establishing missiles not operational-but about to be operational within one day?'.
Admiral MOORER. Well, I think that what you say is correct. I think that there is a far greater danger, as I see it, and that is the action of Soviet Russia in Cuba, whereby they were able to provide the transportation for 12,000 troops to fight in Africa. The Russians

are still in Cuba. The KGB is operating with the Cuban intelligence and subversive groups and working with the people who are subversive in Puerto Rico and all through South America, including Panama.
I see the danger as a political danger as much as. a mili
danger. Once you get a submarine with a range such as the TA has, of over 4,000 miles, they don't necessarily have to be in.Cuba. They can back off quite a distance. My view is that the real threat is the infiltration of the Communist concept and dogma through that whole area. I have been concerned about that for some time.
Mr. IDORNAN. In as short an answer as possible, would you characterize the Caribbean area as a more dangerous situation today than it was in 1961 when this country was more aware of it?
AdmiralMOORER. If you are measuring it in terms of potential capability, striking power of the Soviets, the answer is yes.
Mr. DORNAN.When I thanked Ambassador Bunker in the hall for his apperance-he is a very distinguished gentleman; we all admire his service to the country-he said to me, "Congressman, we have to get out of there
I can tell from the way he said it that he believes we are better off out than in, and he believes we are going to be dragged into a quagmire based on the fact that the canal is "indefensible."'
In light of this I would like to ask: How many years of service do you have, sir?
AdmiralMOORER. I had 45 years when I retired three years ago.
Mr. DoRNAN. As, I said to General McAulliffe,"Drawing upon eaffil your years of military experience and granting that the World Trade Towers in New York are not defensible, nor is .the ladies room in the Capitol building, given what you have in this canal, is it defensible?" and his exact answer was, "Given a treaty we cannot live with, I say, yes, I can defend this canal." He said this in the presence of nine Congressmen.
I ask you the same question: Would you say, drawing upon your 45 years, that the canal today is defenisble in the terms that any military tgarget is definsible under the control of our country? AdmiralMOORF.R. I believe so. In fact, I believe we must defend it and must maintain access to it.
I come back to the point I made a while ago, that the problem -is, can we maintain the use of it during an emergency.? That is really the issue. There is no doubt about the fact that someone can slip mi there with a plastic charge or something of that kind and blow up a part of a lock or something like that. It can be sabotaged. We have
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had people going aboard aircraft all the time saying, you donpt take me to Algeria I will blow you up. Everybody starts handwriinging and lets them go. I don't agree with the idea that you govern your actions for fear that somebody is going to do violence against you. They are the ones being illegal; we are not.
Mr. DORNAN.Uaning very hard upon your:newly reacquired First Amendment rights, would you comment on this situation: A highly placed admiral in the Pentagon, and by his decorations, told me that he wrote a paper on the strategic, vital value of the Canal Zone to the United States' defense, and that it was rejected by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as not in lie with current administration