The future of aviation : report


Material Information

The future of aviation : report
Series Title:
Serial - House, Committee on Science and Technology ; no. 94-EE
Physical Description:
2 v. : ill. ; 24 cm.
United States -- Congress. -- House. -- Committee on Science and Technology. -- Subcommittee on Aviation and Transportation R. & D
U.S. Govt. Print. Off.
Place of Publication:
Publication Date:


Subjects / Keywords:
Aeronautics -- United States   ( lcsh )
Technology assessment -- United States   ( lcsh )
Aeronautics -- Research -- United States   ( lcsh )
bibliography   ( marcgt )
federal government publication   ( marcgt )
non-fiction   ( marcgt )


Includes bibliographical references.
General Note:
"Serial EE." (v. 1-2)
General Note:
Volume 2: A compilation of papers.
General Note:
At head of title: Committee print.
Statement of Responsibility:
prepared by the Subcommittee on Aviation and Transportation R. & D. of the Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, Ninety-fourth Congress, second session.

Record Information

Source Institution:
University of Florida
Rights Management:
All applicable rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
Resource Identifier:
aleph - 025989317
oclc - 02819203
lccn - 76603286
lcc - TL521 .U623 1976
System ID:

Full Text


lr I












Serial EE


JULY 1976

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science and Technology

72-601 WASHINGTON : 1976

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washinton, D.C. 20402 Price $4.60

OLIN E. TEAGUE, Texas, Chairman
DON FUQUA, Florida JOHN JARMAN, Oklahoma
ROBERT A. ROE, New Jersey LOUIS FREY, JR., Florida
MIKE McCORMACK, Washington BARRY M. GOLDWATER, JR., California
GEORGE E. BROWN, JR., California MARVIN L. ESCH, Michigan
RAY THORNTON, Arkansas GARY A. MYERS, Pennsylvania
HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
JIM LLOYD, California
TIM L. HALL, Illinois
JOHN L. SWIGERT, Jr., Executive Director
HAROLD A. GOULD, Deputy Director
REGINA A. DAVIS, Chief Clerk
FRANK R. HAMMILL, Jr., Counsel
JAMES E. WILSON, Technical Consultant
J. THOMAS RATCHFORD, Science Consultant
JOHu D. HOLurMLD, Science Consultant
RALPH N. READ, Technical Consultant
ROBirT C. KETCHAM, Counsel
ROBERT B. DILLAWAY, Science Consultant
MICHAEL A. SUPERATA, Minority Counsel

DALE MILFORD, Texas, Chairman
ROBERT A. ROE. New Jersey JOHN W. WYDLER, New York
JIM LLOYD, California
TIM L. HALL, Illinois




Foreword -.--------------------------__--_----_ v

Prof. Neil A. Armstrong, professor of aerospace engineering, University
of Cincinnati, also advisory member of Kenton County Airport Board,
Cincinnati -------------------------------------------------- 2
Prof. Holt Ashley, professor of aeronautics and astronautics and me-
chanical engineering, Stanford University------------------------__ 9
Harold S. Becker, vice president and treasurer, The Futures Group------ 12
John G. Borger, vice president and chief engineer, Pan American World
Airways, In -----.----------------------------------------- 46
John C. Brizendine, president, Douglas Aircraft Co. Division, McDonnell
Douglas Corp ------------------------------------- 58
Dr. Robert H. Cannon, Jr., chairman, Division of Engineering and Ap-
plied Science, California Institute of Technology ------------------ 74
Richard E. Cohen, Bureau of International Commerce, U.S. Department
of Commerce ----.------------------------------.-- 81
Harry E. Colwell III, vice president, Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. and
division executive of its aerospace division ---------------------- 113
Andrew de Voursney, group vice president-finance and planning, United
Airlines ----------------------------------------------------- 118
George C. Eads, executive director, National Commission on Supplies
and Shortages------------------ ------------------------- 129
Glen A. Gilbert, Glen A. Gilbert & Associates, aviation consultants----- 145
Prof. Paul Gray, chairman, department of quantitative business analysis,
University of Southern California_ ---------------------------_--- 170
J. C. Green, manager of operations analysis, Sikorsky Aircraft---------- 186
Malcolm Harned, president, Cessna Aircraft Co ----------------------- 191
Willis M. Hawkins, senior adviser, Lockheed Aircraft Corp----------- 199
Dr. Klaus P. Heiss, president, ECON, Inc--------------------------- 204
Prof. Robert Horonjeff, professor of transportation engineering, University
of California, Berkeley----------------------------------------- 283
David R. Israel, Technical Assistant to the Administrator, Energy
Research and Development Administration------------------------ 296
Franklin W. Kolk, vice president-technological development, American
Airlines ----------------------------------------------------- 313
John F. Leyden, president, Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organiza-
tion ------------------------------------------------------- 321
Hans Mark, Director, Ames Research Center, National Aeronautics and
Space Administration ------------------------------------------ 328
Dr. Richard R. Nelson, professor of economics, Yale University Institute
for Social and Policy Studies--- -------------------------------- 330
William H. Ottley, executive director, National Pilots Association ------- 353
Frank N. Piasecki, Piasecki Aircraft Corp --------------------------- 358
Paul H. Poberezny, president, Experimental Aircraft Association -------- 383
Simon Ramo, vice chairman of the board and chairman of the executive
committee, TRW------------ --------- ------------- 387
Robert A. Richardson, executive director, Helicopter Association of
America --------__-----__---------------------------------_ 392
John E. Robson, Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board ------------- 401


R. W. Rummel, vice president, technical development, Trans World Page
Airlines ----------------------------------------------------- 405
Dr. Abe Silverstein, retired director, Lewis Research Center, National
Aeronautics and Space Administration --------------------------- 409
Ronald Smelt, vice president and chief scientist, Lockheed Aircraft
Corp-------------------------------------------------------- 412
Floyd E. Smith, international president, International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers ------------------------------- 424
Dr. H. Guyford Stever, Director, National Science Foundation--------- 428
T. R. Stuelpnagel, vice president and general manager, Hughes Helicopters- 457
Charles M. Walker, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury ---------- __--- 497
Henry C. Wallich, Member, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System-------------------------------------------------------- 516
John H. Winant, president, National Business Aircraft Association----- 538

From the first days of powered flight, the United States has played
a leading role in the development of aviation. Through. the steady
application of newer technology, we have continually developed faster,
safer, larger, and more reliable aircraft.
In recent years, the United States has been absolutely preeminent in
the world marketplace. Today, 85 percent of the commercial aircraft
flying in the free world are of U.S. manufacture. The economic bene-
fits of this have been very substantial. Yet, a complex array of new
problems has emerged to confront the industry. Foreign challenges to
U.S. technological leadership are gathering momentum. Airline earn-
ings have declined to the point where they can no longer provide the
traditional stimulus for development of new aircraft. And, research
and development costs for sophisticated new equipment have climbed
beyond the means of individual companies.
Charged with the legislative responsibility for civil aviation R. & D.,
and therefore in large part for its future directions, the Subcommittee
on Aviation and Transportation R. & D. undertook a comprehensive
examination of the "Future of Aviation." The purpose is to lay the
basis for a national civil aviation R. & D. policy and in doing so to
make a useful contribution to national transportation policy. In addi-
tion to 8 days of hearings, a number of invited papers were also
solicited by the subcommittee and are compiled in this volume.

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2013


Prof. Neil A. Armstrong,
Professor of Aerospace Engineering,
University of Cincinnati, also
advisory member of Kenton Count=yZ.: r
Airport Board, Cincinnati Greater
April 30, 1976 Cincinnati

Mr. Neil A. Armstrong
1739 North State Route 123
Lebanon, Ohio 45036

Dear Neil:

Attached you will find comments about the areas which Airport Staff
Members believe require future study and research for the improve-
ment of civil aviation. Those areas are as follows:

1. Environmental Control Noise
2. Pavement Evaluation, Testing and Design
3. Security
4. Crash-Fire-Rescue Manning and Equipment
5. Bird Strikes
6. Fog Dispersal
7. Aircraft Removal

In discussing some of the economic aspects with Mr. John Brockett,
his comments were as follows:

"The problems which are related to this subject and its direct
immediate effect on airport operations are rather intangible, but
yet in the long range directly beneficial to an airport operation.
I would see basically about four areas which could directly affect
the ultimate airport operation through the expenditure of R&D funds
of this nature including the economic multiplier effects which
might be a contributing economic factor in a given 'airport com-

"The expenditure of R&D funds is, in my opinion, essential to
conserve the favorable competitive position which the American
airline industry enjoys through the development of new aircraft and
additional ground transportation methods (both on site, such as
people movers, and off site through development of mass transport-
ation systems in bringing the customer to the airport). Additionally,
the expenditure of monies for the development of better methods of
ground handling of equipment and baggage would also directly benefit
an airport.

"Naturally, if facilities are to be constructed for this type of
research and prototype work, the construction of such facilities on
airport property would again directly benefit an airport operation
itself if construction monies could be funneled in that direction.

PHONE: (806) 283-3151


Mr. Neil A. Armstrong
April 30, 1976
Page Two

"Another question which concerns me as much as the continuing
growth of the technology of the industry, however, is the economic
basis of operations of the airport industry, particularly as it
might be severely restricted in the medium and smaller hub areas
through the media of deregulation. This to me is one of the
greatest concerns which we have today and something which hopefully
R&D funds could be substituted within airport income for purposes
of supporting revenue levels. In this manner the economic basis of
revenue bonds would be maintained to continue the necessary updating
and changing of facilities to meet current equipment requirements
and current enplanement loads."

I hope that some of this material will be beneficial, and we most
certainly appreciate your efforts in assisting us in getting our
points to the forefront.

If you have any questions regarding the enclosed material, feel
free to contact me.

Cordially yours,

Robert F. Holscher
Director of Aviation



Noise pollution is the gravest problem facing airport authorities

around the world. Curfews, noise abatement flying procedures and

limiting operations are temporary measures which do not solve the

noise problem. These measures reduce Airport capacities and

inconvenience the traveling public. Therefore, NASA and the FAA

should continue to further research and development in both

retrofit and engine design that will assist in reducing to an

acceptable level the nuisance of aircraft noise.

Further studies should be undertaken to develop zoning and land -

land use controls including specific recommendations on coipatable

uses outside airport boundaries.


From a cost-benefit basis, pavement evaluation and testing with

a view toward developing a rational pavement design offers con-

siderable potential. To illustrate this need, it is important

to note that since inception of the ADAP program, 55% of all

Grant-In-Aid funds have been expended on runway and taxiway paving

and paving-related items. In that same period less than one half

of 1% of available FAA funds for research and development have

been aimed at'improving methods of pavement non-destructive

testing, evaluation and design.

Funding of pavement rehabilitation through floating revenue

bonds, is normally based on a 20-year life cycle; however, a

pavement that lasts ten to eleven years is considered exceptional

while seven years is more the norm. Airport pavements are deter-

iorating because of aircraft weights and frequencies of commercial

operations. Accepted pavement design, based on highway program

experience, is simply not adequate to satisfy the needs of the

jet era. It is imperative that improved techniques and concepts

be developed to allow today's engineer to design an operational

surface which will withstand the weight and frequency.of current

and future aircraft.

Only in the past year has the airport sponsor, the airlines

and the aircraft manufacturers been successful in calling the

attention of the FAA Administrator to the cost-effectiveness of

a continuing pavement R&D program.

The pavement research and development program must be structured

to provide sustained annual allocation of funds that will'permit

the emergency of an effective non-destructive testing program

and the evolution of a rational pavement design.


The recent bombing at La Guardia Airport which cost many lives,

injuries, and severe property damage, highlights the need for

expedited engineering research and development to improve the

posture of aviation security. We understand that the FAA has

requested.supplementary appropriations to pursue needed security

research and development. We support this request and urge the

Committee to recommend such appropriation.


Since implementation of FAR Part 139, Airport C rtification,

in mid-1973, airport auth6rities have been r uired to expend

millions of the requirements outlined in this Part. In may cases

meeting these requirements has cuased a rise in the airport

operating budget from 25% to 40%, which places the airport in

a severe economic squeeze, particularly the smaller airports.

We support efforts to make air transportation the safest transpor-

tation system, and we endorse efforts to safeguard lives of air

travelers. We believe, however, that the current method of

requiring airport sponsors to provide a crash-fire-rescue capa-

bility based on aircraft size is arbitrarily-subjecting the

airport to enormous capital investment and operating and mainte-

nance costs that are not cost-effective in light of the lives

saved that can be directly attributed to airport C-F-R equipment.

Much investigation has been made of survivable aircraft accidents

and alternative means of containing aircraft fuel fires. Although

it is not suggested that C-F-R capability external to the aircraft

should be completely eliminated, it is known that technology is

available or can be made available to provide an on-board explosion

prevention system that will minimize the effects of fire in the


engine area and in personnel, cargo and baggage compartments.

Provision of an on-board explosion prevention system to minimize

the hazards of fuel fires should reduce the need for airport/

municipal authorities to purchase, maintain and operate at

enormous cost, a variety of C-F-R vehicles.

We urge the FAA to continue its research into: Aircraft fuel

explosion prevention systems; Safe, non-toxic compartment interior

materials; The practicality of an on-board internal fire suppres-

sion system; and the Design and construction of a small, quick

reaction, all purpose CFR vehicle that can be purchased, maintained

and operated at minimum cost.


Although not widely known, bird strikes constitute a serious.

hazard to aviation, both in commercial and non-commercial

operations. In the years 1968 through 1973, to illustrate the

severity of the hazard, there were 330 U.S. Air Carrier Accidents

resulting from bird strikes. Of the 330 carrier accidents, 54

aircraft were destroyed and 136 received substantial damage.

There were 1273 fatalities associated with these accidents and the

heavy loss of life and property continues each year.

Individual efforts by airport authorities, airlines and industry

to control or minimize bird strikes has been largely unsuccessful.

In light of the severity of the hazard, we believe it encumbent

on the Federal Government to diligently pursue methods to reduce

this danger to a minimum.


Warm fog is responsible for 95 of all the visibility restrictions

and associated delays that occur at airports throughout the world.

Although fog at U.S. airports occurs on the average of only 1%

to 2% of the time, it is responsible for the loss in revenues of.

about $100 million annually through cancellations, delays, and

diversions of air carrier flights. It is necessary to seek methods

to minimize the impact of fog on aircraft operations to improve

aviation safety, increase airport capacity and reduce inconvenience

to the traveling public through the development of operationally

reliable fog dispersal systems.

Current technology is capable of developing an operationally

reliable system. We urge the Committee to recommend a program for

this development.


A study should be undertaken to determine the technical, operational,

and economic feasibility of new ground systems to significantly

improve the recovery of heavy aircraft disabled or damaged at large

airports. While the basic functions to be performed in the typical

aircraft recovery operation have become well know, the influence of

the many variables incident to each recovery have so far frustrated

efforts to institute a standardized and uniformly effective approach

to the problem. As a result, the rec6very of a damaged or disabled

aircraft from the vicinity of an airport runway still requires a

great many hours, if not days, to complete, and may cause a

lengthly closure of the entire airport or a portion of it.

The intensive utilization of large. metropolitan and international

airports and the exceptionally high acquisition costs of modern,

heavy commercial transports greatly aggravate the recovery problem.

The recovery operation must be speedily accomplished to avoid

extended closure of the airport and it must be conducted in such a

manner that secondary damage does not occur to the aircraft.

Present techniques for recovering damaged or disabled aircraft

fall short of the required need, while the potential for advancing

the state of the art is considerable.



by Holt Ashley
Professor of Aeronautics
and Astronautics and
Mechanical Engineering
Stanford University

This brief statement is prepared from the very individual viewpoint of a
university professor specializing in aerospace, but also a person who has
long been involved with consulting and with the aerospace-related govern-
ment advisory apparatus.

Aviation is one of the two or three human activities where the highest
demands are continually placed on applied science and technology. In the
civil sector it will always provide essential transportation services for
people and valuable goods there is no superior mode to displace it in
the manner that aircraft displaced ships and trains. In ways that others
can explain much better than I, it provides constructive sustenance for
the national economy and promotes favorable trade balances.

Against this background, it seems self-evident that all elements of society
with a tradition of supporting aviation R. & D. have a future responsibility
at least to maintain and preferably to increase that support; the appropriate
measure is constant, not "then-year," dollars. The U.S. Government will
remain unique among these elements, for the support it furnishes through
such agencies as NASA and DOD far exceeds all other sources both in
magnitude and in quality. The price of abdication by Government will be
a fairly swift loss of the leadership that has been painstakingly built
since before World War II. I do not believe the American public will accept
this loss with equanimity. Yet the price of regaining it could easily be
twice that of its routine maintenance. If our resolve is adequate, foreign
competition is quite incapable of overcoming our present advantage. Events
like the recent sales of F-16 fighters and even of wide-bodied transports
are enough to convice me.

The term "R. & D." encompasses a host of activities. But I should like
to focus attention on just two of them. They are sectors closer to the
"R." than to the "D." and ones where a painful erosion of "constant-dollar"
support has occurred since around 1970. For the long-term future of civil
aviation, I assert that they are also the two most significant.

The first sector is the in-house activity of the NASA Research Centers
under the Office of Aerospace Science and Technology. By and large, the
work I refer to is funded out of the category which Congress and NASA call
the "R. & T. Base," but the Centers' effectiveness is also constrained
when unjustified limits are placed on the number of NASA permanent pro-


Especially in the field of fluid mechanics (but quite respectably in other
such disciplines as engine materials, structural dynamics, simulation, etc.,
etc.), these Centers share a unique tradition of outstanding direct contri-
butions to aviation science and technology. Names like Gilruth, Whitcomb,
R. T. Jones, Garrick, Phillips, Allen, Chapman are honored "household
words" throughout our profession. The military services will readily
acknowledge their continuing reliance on NASA's "in-house," and with more
reluctance they will admit to never having maintained comparable excellence
within their own laboratories.

The degrading effects of recent budgetary trends on NASA's in-house strength
must be reversed. The agency's own leadership has been deterred in recent
efforts to rebuild it, more by the heavy hand of OMB than by the Congress.
But given suitable Congressional urging, that leadership would, I believe,
be glad to give details on how this deplorable deterioration can be countered.
Furthermore, whatever corrective measures are taken by the Congress should
not interfere with NASA's excellent programs of funding aviation R. & D.
in the private sector.

The second sector with which I am concerned i' volves research and advanced
education in the universities. In two June 1975 issues of Aviation Week
and Space Technology, it was reported that college enrollment in aerospace
engineering had declined by 70% during the preceding five years and that
the number of autonomous departments had dropped from over 50 to 23.
Although the former is slowly being reversed, these two trends have
dangerous implications for aviation's future. With the economy beginning
to recover, there are already indications of several years of higher
demand for well-trained graduates than can possibly be supplied under present
circumstances. Equally serious are the decimation and aging of a faculty
complement which, in the 1950's and 1960's, produced a series of outstanding
research discoveries far too numerous to be catalogued here.

I am not recommending a massive infusion of federal dollars which would
fully restore the university aeronautical establishment to the perhaps-
excessive levels of the 1960's. More modest and selective measures can,
however, create levels of activity and of excellence commensurate with
legitimate national needs.

Let me offer a few specific proposals with high leverage toward these ends.
First, the former NASA programs of academic fellowships and design trainee-
ships should be revived at about the maximum size achieved during the late
1960's. Second,'the very effective NASA university research program should
be encouraged not necessarily with large budgetary increases but because
it can hold its own when not subjected to artificial constraints or to
inappropriate demands for short-term accomplishments.

A third measure, with a double payoff, would be to permit NASA and DOD
aviation R. & D. activities to increase their professional manpower. The
increased availability of research jobs would both stimulate more first-
rate students to enter aerospace and revivify the agency's aging staff.
An imaginative parallel scheme has been suggested by Col. David Scott of
Dryden Research Center: a "civilian ROTC" to assist college enrollees
who might contemplate federal service in aviation R. & D..


Finally, it is a matter of history that certain research-sponsoring offices
in DOD have developed the most sophisticated, successful and rewarding
relationships with university science and engineering to be found anywhere
throughout government. In particular, the Air Force Office of Scientific
Research and the Office of Naval Research deserve the thanks of the aviation
community and the American public. A case can be made that the products
from their grants and contracts have been and will be nearly as important
to civil as to military aeronautics. Their research budgets, in constant
dollars, should be restored to the levels of the 1960's.

In summary, I am confident of a bright future for U.S. civil aviation.
With an eye toward its longer-term welfare, I have tried to outline a
series of proposals for steps that might be taken by the Congress. As
seen against the federal budget, they involve modest expenditures. Their
potential payoffs are out of all proportion to their costs.

72-601 0 -76 2


Mr. Harold S. Becker
Vice President and Treasurer

124 Hebron Avenue, Glastonbury, Connecticut 06033


The Futures Group is a research and management consulting firm specializing in future-
oriented policy analysis. It was formed in 1971. Members of its staff are skilled in
economics, political science, history, social psychology, physics, chemistry, anthropology,
the humanities, law, statistics, systems analysis, engineering, and computer sciences.
Studies are performed by The Futures Group for private and government clients in the
United States and abroad.


Vice President and Treasurer

Mr. Becker is one of the founders of The Futures Group, which he now
serves as Vice President and Treasurer. He is responsible for the supervision
of company contracts and grants, marketing and data services. He is also in-
volved in formulating and directing company-sponsored work of The Futures Group
on systems and analytic and decisionmaking techniques and is responsible for
personnel management, budgetary planning, and administrative activities of the

He is currently directing studies for a large industrial client on con-
sumer purchasing patterns and household appliances. Recently he completed a
study for the Federal Aviation Administration of alternative socioeconomic
scenarios of conditions in the United States, the demand for air travel and
approaches to policy analysis for the national aviation system. For an indus-
trial client he conducted an investigation of energy supply and demand environ-
ment in the United States and has recently worked with NASA on a broad-based
study of future technical, social, economic, and political trends which may be
important to the future of space flight. A major part of this activity was
related to United States and world demands for energy, food and agriculture,
and non-renewable resources including the various constraints associated with
making such items available for the needs of the United States. A major data
service of the company, Pharmaceutical PROSPECTS, was largely developed by and
the first issued prepared and marketed by Mr. Becker.

His previous research and consulting activities have included work on
such subjects as the socioeconomic consequences of prepaid legal services and
of legalized gambling; the future of drugs and pharmaceuticals; an assessment
of the socioeconomic consequences of alternative maritime technology policies;
the future of the stockholders' movement and its impact on corporate affairs;
the design of mechanisms for systematically identifying and ranking promising
candidates for research on the national level; the likely evolution of the
agricultural solid waste management problem in the United States and its atten-
dant threats to the environment; future prospects for use of space technolo-
gies in commercial applications; the design of studies to investigate the im-
pact of energy demand and supply on business, the economy, and the overall
quality of life; an approach to the organization of research in the area of
energy by the private sector; and compilation of forecasts related to energy
demand and supply and the packaging industry. Mr. Becker has authored or other-
wise contributed to publications of The Futures Group on many of these subjects.

Prior to formation of The Futures Group, Mr. Becker was Treasurer and
Senior Fellow of the Institute for the Future. His research at the Institute
involved a number of subjects, including technology assessment and methods
of improving the planning process on the community level, the latter in-
volving a study which concerned the selection of community goals, action
programs, and indicators of the progress toward goal attainment.


Prior to joining the Institute for the Future, Mr. Becker was Direc-
tor of NASA's Advanced Projects Office at George C. Marshall Space Flight
Center (MSFC), where he was responsible for developing goals and plans,
along with specific project designs, for the national space program. These
programs involved participation of all elements of NASA, various agencies of
the Department of Defense, and a broad cross section of United States indus-
try. Before this assignment, he was Deputy Director of the Advanced Systems
Office at MSFC. Management and supervision of government personnel and
contractor efforts were included in these activities. He was also a member
of the Graduate Studies Advisory Committee at MSFC and helped design a new
Ph.D. program in systems engineering and systems analysis at the Georgia
Institute for Technology and lectured in the program.

Prior to his work with NASA, Mr. Becker was Director, Launch Vehicles,
Advanced Systems, at North American Aviation, Inc. His responsibilities
involved technical and fiscal planning and direction of systems studies on
advanced reusable and expendable launch vehicles. His last assignment at
North American was in the corporate offices, where he was involved with
planning and evaluation of company-wide research and development.

Mr. Becker received a Master of Engineering degree from UCLA (1959) in
a special program devoted to management and operations research techniques.
His undergraduate degree, from the Georgia Institute of Technology, was in
aeronautical engineering (1951). He has completed graduate courses in man-
agement and advanced mathematics.

In addition to the above policy analysis, planning, and advanced design
activities, Mr. Becker was involved for many years in various aspects of
hardware research and development. He held several positions in engineering
management and as a contributing engineer for industry. Certain of these
activities were quasi-government positions, especially those associated with
the Air Force ballistic missile program. For The Ramo Woldridge Corporation
and later for Space Technology Laboratories, he was involved with systems
engineering and technical direction of contractors developing propulsion
systems for ballistic milliles. Prior to the Air Force ballistic missle
program, Mr. Becker was engaged in research, development, and flight test
activities at North American Aviation, Inc. on intercontinental missiles.

He has taught and lectured for industry and academia on technology assess-
ment, forecasting, futures research, industrial planning and decisionmaking,
community goals and development planning, management and organization concepts
and personnel motivation techniques. The organizations for which he has lec-
tured or taught include Columbia University, University of Connecticut, Univer-
sity of Hartford, The Brookings Institution, the U.S. Department of Agriculture
Graduate School, State University of New York, UCLA, and Georgia Institute of
Technology and various industrial firms.


Mr. Becker's publications include numerous technical papers and presen-
tations. While at the Institute for the Future, he authored A Method of Obtain-
ing Forecasts for Long-range Aerospace Program Planning, April 1970; A Frame-
work for Community Development Action Planning, in two volumes:, including An
Approach to the Planning Process, with Raul de Brigard, March 1971. Among his
earlier publications are "Adapting Space Plans to Changing Times," Aeronautics
and Astronautics, March 1969 and "Space Launching Systems: Present Technology
and Future Possibilities," presented at the Institute of Aeronautical Sciences,
June 1962, and numerous other corporate reports and papers.

Mr. Becker's major publications since formation of The Futures Group are
listed in the attachment.

(A utility company) and the Shareholders Movement: An Evaluation of
the Shield's Proposals, July 22, 1971.

The Use of Cross-Impact Matrix Approaches in Technology Assessment,
with Theodore J. Gordon, August, 1971. (Published under the title "The
Cross-Impact Matrix Approach to Technology Assessment" in Research Management,
[July 1972], pp. 73-80. Also published under the title "Utilization of
Cross-Impact in Technology Assessment" in M. J. Cetron and B. Bartocha [eds.],
Technological Assessment in a Dynamic Environment [New York: Gordon and Breach,
1973], pp. 663-672, and in M. J. Cetron and B. Bartocha [eds.], The Methodology
of Technology Assessment [New York: Gordon and Breach, 1972].)

Prospects for Energy Utilization in the United States, A Study of
Power Consumption and the Quality of Life, September 1971.

Analysis of Ailing Products--It's Decisions That Count, with Theodore J.
Gordon, October 1971.

Future Energy Demand, Production, and Use: A Compilation of Forecasts,
December 1971.

A Case Study and Forecast of Steel Production, Consumption, and Export
by (one nation), December 1971.

A Systems Approach to Problem Oriented Research Planning: A Case Study
of Food Production Wastes, January 1972.

Comments on Institutional Arrangements for Performing Technology
Assessment, February 1972.

Technology Assessment Study of Socio-Economic Factors Important to
the Postal Service, July 1972.

Report of Delphi Inquiry into the Future of American Water Resource
Utilization and Development, with Richard G. Woods and George Patrick Johnson,
(Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota, January 15, 1973).

Future Technological and Social Changes. An Investigation of Opportunities
and Threats for (a large industrial firm) As Perceived By Its Employees (Report
of A Delphi Inquiry), with J. Incerti, January 1973.


U.S. Ocean Shipping Technology: Forecast and Assessment Task I Technical
Report, as Project Leader of The Futures Group staff (East Hartford, Conn.:
United Technologies Research Laboratories, June 15, 1973).

Democracy in America--1987, September 26, 1973.

"Technology Assessment: Another View," Business Horizons, Vol. 16, No. 5,
pp. 58-60.

"Management of Risk Using Trend Impact Analysis: An Application of Com-
puter Techniques for Corporate Planning and Decisionmaking," with H. Gerjuoy;
an extension of remarks presented at the 166th National Meeting of the American
Chemical Society, Chicago, Illinois, August 29, 1973.

The Pharmaceutical Industry PROSPECTS 1:1, et al., November 1973.

The Socio-Economic Consequences of Legalized Gambling: The Impact of
State Lotteries and Off-Track Betting, with D. Weinstein and L. Deitch,
January 1974. (Published under the title The Impact of Legalized Gambling:
Lotteries and Off-Track Betting [New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974].)

The Management Dilemma: Private Profits vs. Social Responsibility:
Lessons from Japan, Inc., with C. Donahue, April 1974.

"Anticrisis Management," Business Horizons, Vol. 17, No. 3 (June 1974),
pp. 50-52.

Focal Points in the Future of Food and Mineral Resources, with L. Heston,
June 1974.

Lifestyle in America and the Economic Viability of Business, with L.
Heston and C. Donahue, June 1974.

"How To Lose Industrial Freedom--Become a Real Success in the Marketplace,"
February 13, 1975.

The Potential for Reducing Shipbuilding Costs through Automation and
Mechanization, et al., February 1975.

The American Consumer: Purchasing Patterns in the Late 1970's, et al.,
February 1975.

"Questions for Futurists," World Future Society Bulletin, Vol. 9, No. 2
(March-April 1975), pp. 8-12.

Prospective Crises: Some Challenges to Planning, September 5, 1974.

Conventional and Unconventional Space Missions, September 6, 1974.


The Future Environment: U.S. and World Trends, with Forecasting Inter-
national Ltd., July 15, 1975; a series of essays for NASA covering such
subjects as population growth in developing countries, urbanization of the
United States, changing age distribution of the United States, toxic sub-
stances in food, food supplies in the fourth world, future U.S. mineral
demands, and future U.S. energy demands.

Alternative Future Scenarios for the National Aviation System, et al.,
September 1975. This report appeared in four volumes: Vol. 1, Executive
Summary; Vol. 2: Alternative Scenarios; Vol. 3: Scenario Construction
Methodology; Vol. 4: Implications of Advanced Aircraft Technology.

The Socioeconomic Impacts of Prepaid Legal Services, et al., September
1975. (Published under the title Prepaid Legal Services: Socioeconomic
Consequences, by L. Deitch and D. Weinstein, with H. S. Becker and W. L.
Renfro [Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Company, forthcoming].)

Airport Demand-Capacity Relationships: Policy Implications of Alterna-
tive Future Scenarios for the National Aviation System, with E. Feini, J.
Joseph, and J. Stover, January 1976.


Report 251-86-01


Prepared for

U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Science and Technology
Subcommittee on Aviation and Transportation R&D


Harold S. Becker

124 Hebron Avenue
Glastonbury, Connecticut 06033

May 21, 1976



This paper reviews the evolution of government support of and partici-

pation in civil aviation R&D. It summarizes the de-emphasis of aviation

R&D which occurred with establishment of NASA and the dissolution of NASA.

Potential DOD contributions to civil aviation also are discussed.

The diversity of interests, especially federal, which influence civil

aviation R&D policy is summarized and the current inability to formulate

acceptable national R&D goals for civil aviation is also treated. Recom-

mendations are made for a way to establish goals for civil aviation in

terms of socioeconomic conditions in the United States and for establishing

priorities for aviation R&D on the basis of those goals.

Finally, the growing tendency for government and private sector employ-

ees to compete for federal R&D funds is described. Suggestions are made

for minimizing this competition in order to foster increased motivation and

creativity in the generation of technology to satisfy goals of civil aviation.




Abstract ii


Introduction. 1
Some Conclusions and Recommendations 2
The situation 2
Recommended courses of action 3
The Changing Role of the Government in Civil Aviation R&D. 4
The Contribution of Civil Aviation--Do We Know Where
We Should Go? 13
The Role of Government--Partner or Competitor? 20







Many factors will continue to influence national civil aviation R&D

policy in the United States. On the one hand, they include various tech-

nologies which encompass both air and groundside capabilities. On the other

hand, they consist of various socioeconomic, demographic, and institutional

factors which both respond to and shape the demand for new technologies and

utilization of technologies which exist. This paper is not directed at pro-

viding recommendations for specific technologies or technology programs.

Rather, its intent is to discuss trends in sponsorship of R&D which is in-

tended to support civil aviation. In particular, these thoughts are intended

to spotlight some of the current and potential insufficiencies in the insti-

tutional framework associated with establishment of R&D direction and with

funding and administration of R&D programs themselves.

There are many individuals and institutions in the United States inti-

mately familiar with various aviation technologies, including those related

to aerodynamics, structures, propulsion, avionics, ground systems, etc. Con-

sequently, the Congress has no shortage of recommendations about future tech-

nologies which could be pursued, along with the specifics of their contribu-

tion to civil aviation economics, flight vehicle performance, and environ-

mental impacts. Estimates about their potential availability and associated


costs are even available from the technologist within reasonable ranges of

expectation. But not as easily available to the Congress are judgments on

how and why research on these technologies should be pursued.

Man's recent journey to the moon seems to have created, within the

United States, a general attitude that the technologist can provide the pub-

lic almost unlimited capabilities if sufficient funds and time are allocated

to stated goals. In fact, delays in curing the problems of urban decay, pol-

lution, sickness, disease, etc., are frequently not understood by the public

because of the major accomplishments of many branches of technology--

especially those of the aerospace industry. But many of the problems and

insufficiencies associated with current aviation R&D policy stem, not from

an inability of the technologist to provide desired capabilities, but rather

with the apparent growing inability of our society to properly counsel, ad-

vise and--as appropriate--provide funding support for the technologist. Goals

for aviation are ill defined or nonexistent, or institutional parochialisms

preclude progress. These thoughts are not offered as being exhaustive or

completely comprehensive. But it is hoped that they include some concepts

which will be helpful to the Subcommittee on Aviation and Transportation R&D.

Some Conclusions and Recommendations

Before discussing some of the institutional factors involved with civil

aviation R&D policy, it seems appropriate to summarize the thoughts which


The situation:

1. Government financial support of aviation R&D will, for the

foreseeable future, continue to be necessary.

2. Institutional insufficiencies rather than shortcomings in tech-

nological capabilities are the primary constraints to improving civil aviation

in the United States.

3. A recognized set of goals or objectives for civil aviation does

not exist and, hence, an efficient way of establishing R&D priorities does not

really exist.

4. Government sponsorship of R&D in the private sector, coupled

with the accomplishment of R&D by government personnel, will increasingly

create competition and hinder development of appropriate technologies.

5. DOD contributions to civil aviation are likely to be less sig-

nificant over the next five to ten years than they have been in the last twenty

years (especially in areas of growing concern to civil aviation such as air-

side and ground congestion which cause delays and create safety problems.)

Recommended courses of action:

1. Establish socioeconomic goals for civil aviation's contribution

to the United States. These targets should be expressed in quantified terms

(as discussed later) to the greatest extent possible.

2. Establish R&D priorities for alternative technologies based upon

the degree to which they could contribute to civil aviation's ability to accom-

plish the above goals and upon their estimated costs, timing and risk involved.

3. Reduce the competition between government and private-sector

employees for federal funding of their individual R&D programs (i.e., restric-

tive institutional relationship so that government employees who participate

in decisions on federal funding of industrial R&D are in lesser competition

for the same funds to support their own programs.)


The Changing Role of the Government in Civil Aviation R&D

Few would dispute the fact that federal support of aeronautical R&D has

had an important, if not critical, rolein the successful growth of civil

aviation in the United States--and around the world, for that matter. The

U.S. airline and aircraft industry and other important sectors of American

life have benefited economically from this growth. Possibly with the excep-

tion of the original R&D by the Wright brothers (leading to their flight at

Kitty Hawk in 1903), the funds provided by the federal government and the

activities of federal employees have provided a wellspring of technologies

upon which the U.S. air carrier and aircraft manufacturing industry grew and


The role of the government in sponsoring aviation R&D was recognized

early in the development of heavier-than-air craft. In 1907 the U.S. War

Department released specifications for a military "flying machine," and two

years later the United States was the first nation to possess a military air-

plane, the Wright Flyer, supplied by the Wright brothers. However, there was

a lack of R&D follow through, and from 1903 to 1913 Italy spent 20 times more

on aviation R&D than the United States, while Russia, France and Germany spent

more than Italy. But foreign R&D was actually based on U.S. prototypes and

concepts. The United States recognized early the need to support aeronautics

R&D and the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) was established

on March 3, 1915 via a rider to the Naval Appropriations Act. The purpose of

the NACA was "to supervise and direct the scientific study of the problems of

flight, with a view to their practical solution."

U.S. Congress, Policy Planning for Aeronautical Research and Development,
89th Congress, 2d Sess., Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, U.S.
Senate (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 28.


Funds of $5,000 per year for 5 years were appropriated at that time

for the NACA. This funding ceiling was soon removed, as in 1917, $87,515

was provided to the NACA as part of the Naval Appropriations Bill. The

need for the NACA to engage directly in large-scale testing and experimen-

tation was recognized, as this 1917 appropriation included $69,000 for lab-

oratory construction at Langley Field, Virginia. Indeed, from that point

until its inclusion in the National Aeronautics and Space Administration

(NASA) in 1958, the annual funding of the NACA increased essentially each

year, as shown in Table 1. Early in 1917 the NACA obtained the status of

Table 1


1915 ..... . ..$ 5,000 1938 . . .. $ 1,280,850
1916 . . . . 5,000 1939 . . . . 4,063,980
1917 . . . .. 87,515 1940 . . . . 4,180,000
1918 . ... . 112,000 1941 . . ... 11,200,000
1919 . . . ... .205,000 1942 . . ... 19,865,910
1920 . . . . 175,000 1943 . . ... 25,428,736
1921 . . . ... .200,000 1944 . . .. 38,392,215
1922 . . . ... 200,000 1945 . . ... 40,942,330
1923 . . ... ... .225,600 1946 . . .. 24,014,393
1924 . . . .. 307,000 1947 . . .. 30,713,000
1925 . . . . 470,000 1948 . . ... 43,449,000
1926 . .. ... .... 534,000 1949 . . ... 48,652,000
1927 . . . ... 513,000 1950 . . .. 128,000,000
1928 .. . . .. 550,000 1951 . . ... 63,068,000
1929 ... .... 836,770 1952 . . ... 69,000,000
1930 . . . ... .1,300,000 1953 . . . .. 66,286,100
1931 . . . 1,321,000 1954 . . ... 62,439,000
1932 . . . . 1,051,070 1955 . . .. 56,860,000
1933 . . . . 920,000 1956 . . . . 72,700,00-
1934 .... .. ... 709,250 1957 . . ... 78,620,500
1935 . . . . 766,530 1958 . . . . 117,276,209
1936 . . . . 2,544,550 1959 .. ... 101,100,000*
1937 . . . ... .1,630,550

*NASA took over all NACA assets and unexpended funds in September 1958.
In addition there was appropriated for NASA in fiscal year 1959, $229.1 million
making a total of $330.9 million for the new agency.

Source: U.S. Congress, Policy Plann in for Aeronaumt cal ResearcIh and
Development, 89th Congress, 2d Sess., Committee on Aeronautical
and Spa"e Sciences, U.S. Senate (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Covern-
ment Printing Office, 1966), p. 166.


an independent agency, and from that point it operated in close harmony with

American industry. In April 1918 plans also were approved for construction

of the first wind tunnel, a five-foot diameter facility, at Langley Field,

Virginia. Following World War I, the federal government dominated aeronautics

R&D and actually owned and operated several production facilities. Indeed, it

was the sole customer of the output of civilian aircraft factories.

In March 1920 the NACA proposed a national aviation policy to, among

other things, 1) extend use of its facilities and personnel to industry and

universities in order to further R&D work outside the government, 2) expand

air mail service, and 3) authorize airplane competition to stimulate major

new designs. Cooperation with industrial efforts continued, and in 1921 the

NACA distributed over 20,000 copies of various technical reports and notes to
2 Even from these
government, industrial and educational organizations.2 Even from these
earliest years, however, government activities were not centralized in that

agency. In its 1924 annual report, the NACA Committee on Aerodynamics noted

that, in addition to its own direct control of R&D at Langley and at Stanford

University, it also was receiving reports from the Washington Navy Yard Aero-

dynamics Laboratory, Engineering Division of the Army Air Service, and from

MIT. It billed itself as "in close contact with all aerodynamical work being

carried out in the United States."2

In spite of its apparent overview of aeronautics R&D activities in those

early days, there seems little to indicate that there was any significant

structure to the programs coming from a set of national goals or purposes for

aviation, from either a federal or private sector viewpoint. The first

2Ibid., p. 39.

72-601 0 76 3


directive with any semblance of a national focus seems to have appeared with

the Air Commerce Act of 1926 which instructed the Secretary of Commerce to

foster air commerce; designate and establish airways; establish, operate and

maintain aids to air navigation; arrange for R&D to improve such aids; license

pilots; issue air-worthiness certificates for aircraft and components; and in-

.vestigate accidents. The enactment of this Act was not coincidental, as sched-

uled commercial air service began in 1926 with 5,782 passengers carried that

year. By the middle of the 1930's, this figure had risen to about 462,000

passengers; and by the early 1940's, to over 4 million.

The ability of commercial air services to operate with any semblance of

economic viability was markedly supported by federal funds, including subsi-

dies for carrying mail--and, of course, through the technological contributions

flowing from work of the NACA. In 1928 the NACA developed the first cowling

for radial air-cooled engines which increased the speed of the Curtis AT-5

from 118 to 136-mph. with no increase in horsepower. The NACA was providing

data for industry and the military on locations for fairing engine nacelles

into the leading edge of wings to increase performance. It also demonstrated

the impact of boundary layer control on lift. The NACA technical reports were

viewed as being "gospel" during the 1920's and industry relied on them for

data and technical advances. The early boundary layer control work was fol-

lowed in 1932 by publication of a comprehensive report on the derivation and

the characteristics of airfoils. This systematic delineation by the NACA of

airfoils proved to be the standard upon which many civil and military aircraft

relied for many years.

Ibid., p. 40.


In 1935 another step with a national overview was taken when the Presi-

dent's Federal Aviation Committee recommended a broad policy in all phases of

aviation, including strengthening commercial and civil aviation, expansion of

Air Force facilities, establishment of more realistic procurement practices

with industry, and the study of closer governmental inter-agency relations--

including expansion of experimental and developmental work and better coordi-

nation with the NACA. By the end of the 1930's, the NACA facilities were

expanded markedly when in December of 1938 a special committee on "future

research facilities of NACA" recommended what in effect became the Ames Aero-

nautical Laboratory at Moffett Field, California. Another committee, on the

same subject and headed by Charles A. Lindbergh, recommended that a power

plant research center be established immediately which resulted in the Air-

craft Engine Research Laboratory at Cleveland, Ohio. This facility, estab-

lished on June 26, 1940, is now known as the Lewis Research Center.

The close relationship between civil and military aspects of aviation

continued to be recognized when, in October 1940, Congress appropriated $40

million for construction, improvement and repair of up to 250 public airports,

as it was determined that such work was necessary in support of national-de-

fense. By the end of 1942 an additional $159.6 was appropriated for what was

then 504 sites. Research facilities at Langley and Ames Laboratory were

doubled with new construction, also for "defense applications."

Coordination and direction of civil aviation, and of organizations which

influenced aviation R&D, probably began in earnest about 20 years after the

creation of the NACA. The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 coordinated all non-

military aviation under the Civil Aeronautics Authority (CAA), whose purpose


was to foster civil aviation and regulate air traffic. Reorganization of

the CAA occurred in 1940 with creation of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB).

In 1946 a National Aeronautical Research Policy was formulated by the AAF,

the Navy's Bureau of Aeronautics, CAA, NACA, and the aircraft industry. This

policy was created largely to clarify relationships among NACA and other R&D

agencies. The statement charged NACA with responsibility for "research in

the aeronautical sciences," the military services with "the evaluation of

military aircraft and equipment and the exploration of possible military ap-

plications of research results," the CAA with "expediting the practical use

of civil aeronautics of newly developed aircraft and equipment," and the air-

craft industry with "application of research results in the design and devel-

opment of improved aircraft equipment, both civil and military."4

The increasing importance of government sponsorship of aviation R&D in

the United States was recognized again when, in 1949, the Unitary Wind Tunnel

Act authorized construction of additional NACA facilities, wind tunnels at

universities, a wind tunnel at the David W. Taylor Model Basin, and establish-

ment of the Air Force Arnold Engineering Development Center at Tullahoma,

Tennessee--because of the "recognition of the fact that industry could not

subsidize expensive wind runnels for research in transonic and supersonic

flight." Concerns about inadequacy of U.S. capabilities further prompted

Congress in 1950 to ask for "the development of improved transport aircraft,

particularly turbine powered aircraft, aircraft especially adapted to the

economical transportation of cargo and aircraft suitable for feederline

operations." The Prototype Aircraft Act of 1950 appropriated $12.5 million

Ibid., p. 41


over 5 years to this end but, as some have noted, the funds were never used

due to lack of industry support.

The institutional framework for federal support of civil aviation R&D,

and the direction of that R&D, was markedly altered when President Eisenhower

in 1958 signed the National Aeronautics and Space Act creating NASA. It was

noted that "the qualities of leadership and the technical excellence achieved

by the NACA made it a logical choice in 1958 to serve as the nucleus of the

organization to carry out the national space mission."6 Many arguments have

been raised that this single step largely relegated federal interest in aero-

nautics, and in particular civil aviation R&D activities, to a much de-

emphasized role. In 1958 the NACA appropriations had totalled $117 million,

but the estimated 1976 budget plan for aeronautical research and technology

within the NASA program, in constant 1958 dollars, totals $86,379,000--a 26%
reduction in real terms. As observed by many, the role of aviation tech-

nology within the NASA federal agency seems best described by designating that

agency as The NATIONAL Aeronautics and SPACE ADMINISTRATION. NASA funding.of

aeronautical research and technology over the past several years has averaged

about 7% of the total NASA budget, and in recent years has actually declined,

dropping from 7.3% in 1974 to an estimated 7.1% in 1975 and an estimated 6.5%

in 1976.8 The argument has been made that space has prospered at the expense

of aeronautical advancement.

5Ibid., p. 34.

Ibid., p. 42.

Assumes a 6% inflation rate of the GNP price deflator for FY 1976.
Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget,
The Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1976 (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 799.


The two tasks assigned to NASA, the civilian exploration of space and

continuing research into aeronautics (originally performed by the NACA)

clearly were not identical in scope. But the type of contribution to avia-

tion which had been provided by the NACA has not continued. Several reasons

may be offered. NACA worked well with both industry and the military because

its mission was research, which was clearly complimentary and not competitive

to either the industry or the military. NACA possessed few aircraft and did

not let R&D contracts of any significance. It had well-equipped laboratories

and, hence, attracted excellent scientists and engineers who contributed im-

portant advancements to the state-of-the-art with no specific requirement

that these innovations and their data have a mission-application. Indeed,

for 40 years the NACA responded quite reliably to requests from industry and

various defense agencies for aeronautics information. NACA facilities were

often unique. With the creation of NASA and the emphasis on space flight,

aeronautical research functions under the auEpices of NASA were largely over-

shadowed by the important mission orientation of its space flight activities.

It has been argued that as NASA emphasis on aeronautical R&D declined,

major benefits from military activities were forthcoming. In the recent CARD

study, it was stated that "the present study of this problem (transfer of

-technology between military and civil aviation) revealed no lessening in the

funding provided by the military to support aeronautical research and devel-

opment, and it appears that there will be no major reduction in the benefit

U.S. Congress, Policy Planning for Aeronautical Research and Development,
pp. 167-168.


military R&D provides to civil aviation."0 This view, however, is disputed

by many who argue that there has been a growing divergence between military

and civil requirements for aeronautical R&D. One major factor behind this

divergence is Public Law 91-441 which limited the degree to which R&D by the

private sector could be reimbursed by the military as part of a company's

independent research and development program if it did not have rather direct

DOD applications. Nevertheless, few would argue that equipment in operation

by the air carriers have benefited markedly from propulsion developments and

other military work in structures, aerodynamics, and electronics and communi-

cations. Indeed, the DOD expenditures for aeronautical R&D during the bulk

of the 1960's exceeded that of NASA by more than a factor of 10, with Air Force

expenditures themselves exceeding those of NASA by the bulk of this amount.1

But it seems likely that civil aviation's future problems may, for the

next several years, receive decreasing benefits for military R&D. Problems of

air and groundside congestion and traffic delays and mid-air collisions are

increasingly troublesome to the public and air carriers. It is not clear that

DOD will center much significant effort on these areas.

The institutional framework and the factors involved with influencing

civil aviation R&D have become increasingly complex and fragmented. At the

same time that aeronautics activities apparently were being submerged within

SU.S. Congress, Civil Aviation Research and Development: Policies,
Programs and Problems, 92d Congress, 2d Sess., Subcommittee on Aeronautics
and Technology of the Committee on Science and Astronautics, U.S. House of
Representatives (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972-1973),
p. 110.

1U.S. Congress, Policy Planning for Aeronautical Research and Development,
Table 49, p. 170; Table 51, p. 182.


the NASA framework, there has been a continued proliferation of government

agencies which, in one way or another, influence and control funding of civil

aviation R&D. Elements of NASA, FAA (created in 1958), CAB, and DOD are in-

volved. And federal programs that influence civil aviation do not stop there.

The Department of Commerce, the Department of Housing and Urban Development,

various offices of the Department of Transportation (of which FAA is a part)

including the Federal Highway Administration and the Urban Mass Transportation

Administration, and the Environmental Protection Agency' all impact the direc-

tion and utilization of technologies associated with civil aviation in one

way or another. Each one of these agencies and departments largely has its

own goals and objectives-and its view of the role of civil aviation in

American life.

The Contribution of Civil Aviation--Do We Know Where We Should Go?

With such a diverse set of viewpoints impacting on civil aviation policy,

it is hardly any wonder that many are frustrated by their inability to per-

ceive an adequate thrust and direction to civil aviation R&D--or, for that

matter, to perceive a semblance of any real policy at all. The House Subcom-

mittee of Aeronautics and Space Technology of the Committee on Science and

Astronautics concluded in its 1970 report that reasons for concern existed

about the United States maintaining its long-held world leadership in avia-

tion. The report of the Subcommittee expressed the need for a National

Aviation Plan, and, as a result of the 1972 hearings, largely repeated the

same concerns. In 1972 the Subcommittee concluded that the United States,

although still maintaining its world leadership, was rapidly losing its

position in world aviation. It referred, among other factors, to the


determination of foreign nations to penetrate the world aviation market.

The Subcommittee stated that "...the United States currently enjoys a domi-

nant but threatened position of world leadership in aviation. Further, it

is evident that the United States has on the record in various forms an ex-

plicit objective to retain this world leadership role."12 In its January

1973 report, the Aviation Advisory Commission also strongly voiced the need

for a comprehensive National Aviation Plan. And the debate today seems

largely unchanged--a plan is still being sought.13

Reports of such hearings and studies, which are typical of statements

expressed, do not specify the criteria for measuring world leadership in

aviation-or for that matter, the nature of the contribution civil aviation

should really make to the nation. Clearly, leadership as viewed by each of

the agencies and organizations which ultimately contribute to the shaping of

national aviation R&D policy are varied. It is not clear that these organi-

zations agree as to what the measures of such leadership are or should be and,

possibly more important, as to what would really constitute adequate levels

or values of such measures. As the Aviation Advisory Commission on The Long

Range Needs of Aviation reported in January 1973, "Simply put, aviation has

no single home."13

Thus, although we are dissatisfied with and frustrated about the status

of R&D in support of civil aviation, there is no clear and accepted objective-

oriented statement of the type and level of R&D which should be pursued. But

12U.S. Congress, Civil Aviation Research and Development: Policies, Pro-
grams and Problems, p. 48.

Aviation Advisory Commission, The Long Range Needs of Aviation:
Report of January 1973 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1973), pp. 35 and 33.


without the existence of a single recognized authority for aviation policy,

the current approach to budget setting is, and by necessity must be, based

upon our system of compromise among the -divergent interests involved. Clearly,

two types of technology are desired by those involved with shaping aviation

policy, On the one hand are those technologies which are directed primarily

at enhancing the economic return to the aircraft industry and the air carrier.

These technologies are typically associated with increasing system performance

of one form or another, and/or reducing costs. Other technologies are asso-

ciated with removing or minimizing various undesirable impacts of air travel

such as noise and air pollution. In the case of those who operate civil

aviation systems for a profit, the former areas of technology represent those

which are continually desirable. The second category of technology (asso-

ciated with reducing environmental and other undesirable aspects of aviation)

often is perceived by operators as detracting from their ability to maximize

profits, and in some cases this technology is viewed as making it largely im-

possible to maintain any level of profitability at all. Hence, such tech-

nologies are not really "requested" by operating companies and are often

resisted by the commercial operator. These technologies find a place in the

commercial market largely due to operating constraints established through

legislation, which thus creates the need for acceptance of them.

With such conflicting views of technology, it seems appropriate, or

really necessary, to seek some form of "worth criteria" for alternative.future

technologies--criteria based upon the needs and desires of the users of such

technology. Hence, technologies could be assessed on their ability to con-

tribute to both the objectives of the private and public sectors. But such

an approach would require specification of the degree to which civil aviation


can and, more importantly, should contribute to the nation's well-being.

Clearly, such an approach can be viewed by some as tantamount to institu-

tionalizing a highly managed or "big brother" society. There currently is

no shortage of opinion about the degree to which demographic, socioeconomic,

and ecological conditions in the United States can and should be managed and

regulated by government.

Arguments supporting increased governmental regulation

of the national aviation system (and other high technology areas) are based

upon the increasing complexity of our society, both domestically and inter-

nationally, coupled with the increasing impact which some technologies al-

ready have had and in the future are likely to increasingly have upon us.

Alternate arguments point out that the well-being of Americans, and for that

matter the rest of the world, can only be assured by a return of the United

States to a bottom-line, free enterprise motivation, on the premise that such

a framework is most conducive to creative and innovative thought. It seems

sensible to recognize that, at least for the next one or two decades, neither

position will prevail and that a compromise between them will prove to be the

most tractable approach. Rather than "manage technology," it may be more

appropriate to establish specifications defining the characteristics desired

of our systems of transportation. Of course, such specifications can and

really should be time variant, i.e., the "worth criteria" can become more or

less demanding as conditions warrant. Indeed, if we cannot prepare such

specifications for the technologist, we will indeed be hard pressed to assess

the technologies he proposes.

4 acrae, Norman, "America's Third Century," The Economist (October 25,
1975), pp. 3-44.


Clearly, such a set of socially relevant specifications cannot be pre-

pared quickly and easily. The government, either the executive or legisla-

tive branch, or perhaps both, for the next five or ten years might be the

natural catalyst for providing such criteria--but participation of the indus-

trial sector should be an integral part of. such deliberations. The ability

to quantify desired contributions of civil aviation for-our nation's socio-

economic well-being was addressed by Booz, Allen Applied Research, Inc. in the

early 1970's. In its study, Booz, Allen included an estimate of the contribu-

tion of civil aviation to the gross national product of the United States.

It considered such factors as direct salaries, generation of profit, and

government tax revenues. The calculation estimated direct and the induced

contributions from civil aircraft manufacturers and certified route air car-
riers. From the data presented in the study, it appears that from about

1950 to the end of the 1960's, civil aviation's contribution to GNP increased

from about .2% to almost 1%, increasing about .2% every 5 years! As the re-

port includes levels of employment in civil air transportation and related

industries, impacts on balance of payments, levels of various forms of pol-

lution and various measures of productivity of air transportation, it demon-

strates in primitive fashion how various technologies contributed to these

"socioeconomic conditions."

15For a somewhat more complete discussion of this approach to technology
assessment, see Becker, Harold S., "Technology Assessment: Another View,"
Business Horizons, Vol. 16, No. 6 (October 1973), pp. 58-60.

16Booz, Allen Applied Research, Inc., A Historical Study of the Benefits
Derived from Application of Technical Advances to Civil Aviation, Vol. 1,
Summary Report and Appendix A (Detailed Case Studies) for the Joint DOT-NASA
Civil Aviation R&D Policy Study (TST-30), Department of Transportation DOT
TST-10-2/NASA CR 1808 (Springfield, VA: National Technical Information
Service, February 1971).


If we already have been able to historically relate GNP, employment and

other economic factors' to various features of air transportation, it seems

reasonable to postulate that future socioeconomic contributions of civil avia-

tion can be spotlighted and technological features of air transportation at

least partially described in light of those targets. For example, many govern-

ment and private-sector organizations continuously provide projections of GNP.

Although such projections are hotly debated, it seems reasonable to expect

that at least an acceptable range can be established upon which civil aviation

goals might be established. Targets could be described for civil aviation's

contribution to GNP, which in turn could be translated into levels of activity

for air transportation. The adequacy or inadequacy of technology to support

such activity (e.g., to provide employment, foreign sales) along with estab-

lished targets for noise, pollution, safety, etc., would provide much clearer

insight into preferred areas of technological endeavor.

Some initial work along such lines was recently accomplished for the FAA.

It depicted alternative scenarios of demographic, social, economic and life-

style conditions in the United States which influence air travel. National

levels of air travel and air traffic at certain regions and airports were

estimated under those conditions so that the adequacy of aviation technologi-

cal (and other) policies could be assessed.17 In the normative scheme pro-

posed here, one or more scenarios representing desired conditions could be

selected and alternative aviation technologies which best contribute to those

conditions could then be spotlighted.

Becker, Harold S., et al., Alternative Future Scenarios for the
National Aviation System, Report 174-72-01 (4 volumes), Vol. 1, Executive
Summary; Vol. 2, Alternative Scenarios; Vol. 3, Scenario Construction
Methodology; Vol. 4, Implications of Advanced Aircraft Technology (Glaston-
bury, CT: The Futures Group, September 1975).


Is it possible that debates on such subjects might illuminate values

associated with the number of jobs a union is willing to sacrifice--or what

level of reduced earnings stockholders will find acceptable if certain re-

strictions are placed upon operations at a given airport to maintain various

noise and pollution levels with a given level of technology? For example,

levels of employment in various industries directly and indirectly linked

with civil aviation could be estimated based upon various levels of air

travel associated with the selected scenarios as a means of assessing R&D


As noted earlier, preparing objectives or specifications for civil avia-

tion will not be easy. Among other difficulties, it embraces the concept of

coming to grips with value changes in our society. In other terms, it re-

quires an attempt to estimate today what tomorrow's generations will hold as

desirable and acceptable. Certainly, this seems to fly in the face of a great

deal of man's experience. That which was valued yesterday is often damned

today, and today's levels of satisfaction will not satisfy tomorrow's needs.18

The point here would be to raise part of the Congressional debate on alloca-

tions and appropriations for civil aviation R&D from the level of specifics

about given technologies to discussion of the potential contribution of civil

air transportation to socioeconomic conditions in the United States. Tech-

nologies which can contribute to desired socioeconomic conditions could then

be more effectively spotlighted.

18Becker, "Technology Assessment: Another View," pp 58-60.
Becker, "Technology Assessment: Another View," ppo 58-60.


As noted in the recent CARD study: "In the future, civil aviation's

role as a contributor to social goals of the nation will become increasingly

important. Civil aviation's contribution will depend upon its ability to

influence regional development, to affect favorably population distribution,

and to aid in conserving land resdurces. Both a broader approach to R&D and

an adjustment in the regulatory environment will be necessary for civil avia-

tion to make these contributions effective."19 It now appears appropriate

and necessary to seriously consider increasing the degree to which we quantify

such contributions of civil aviation to social goals if we are to improve our

approach to setting R&D policy.

The Role of Government--Partner or Competitor?

Even if such goals or worth criteria were to be established, can the

government, through funding of civil aviation R&D, effectively contribute in

the national interest? There seems little question that support of civil

aviation R&D by the federal government is really a necessity. Questions are

largely associated with what forms that support shouli take and what areas of

technology should be supported.

The allocation of federal funds for support of civil aviation R&D can,

of course, take two forms. Federal funding can support work done within the

private sector.' On the other hand, it can support construction, staffing and

operation of government-owned facilities. In the former case, funds can be

applied through contracts, reimbursements of independent research and develop-

ment activities, or possibly through tax benefits and credits for socially

U.S. Congress, Civil Aviation Research and Development: Policies, Pro-
grams and Problems, p. 56.


contributory and beneficial technologies.20 In any event, such support is

viewed as reasonable because of the market risks to the developer and manu-

facturer, the large cash investments associated with current and future

levels of technological development programs, and, as a result of these two

factors, the inability to raise capital in the public marketplace. Indeed,

the the private sector are not insignificant, as the economic break-

even point for*large transport aircraft has been estimated to be in the order

of 10 years, as shown in Figure 1.

CurretCash Beakeen
Douars -Preliminary Study Cash Breakeven
+500 Program Corrmminent ATP* --
-First Flight
0 {First Delivery



0 2 4 6 8 10 12
*ATP Authority to Proceed

Source: Aviation Advisory Commission, The LongRan
RageP Needs of Aviation: Report of Jnuar973
(Washlington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1973), p. 27.

Figure 1

20Becker, "Technology Assessment: Another View," pp. 58-60.


But whether federal funding provides support of private-sector activities

or operation of government facilities, the institutional arrangements involved

with such activities can either enhance or inhibit competition between the

public and private sectors. In the days of the NACA, the open dialogue and

free exchange of data clearly proved effective in expediting generation and

beneficial exploitation of technology. Of course, government participation

in development of technologies for the civil sector are widespread around the

world. The British, French, and West Germans have and continue to provide

government sponsorship for technologies which are employed in the "private

sector." The Soviet and Japanese governments also provide direct support for

civil aviation R&D. But unless we are to nationalize our aviation industry,

the "working relationships" between industry and government will continue to

importantly influence the effectiveness of federal spending on civil aviation

R&D--and the degree to which it actually contributes to the private sector and

to creation of a healthy civil aviation system in the United States.

Government sponsorship of R&D creates difficulties which influence the

motivation and creativity of private companies. One of these difficulties is

the inability of private organizations to maintain a proprietary interest in

government-supported technologies.

And growth of government-accomplished R&D, especially under the auspices

of NASA programs seems to have engendered a growing spirit of competition be-

tween scientists and engineers in the public and private sectors. Government

employees often seek out ideas for new technologies from the private sector

but are reticent to share insights, as such insights are employed to justify

federal budget requests for R&D programs which maintain employment levels at

72-601 0- 76- 4


various government centers. The search for personal recognition in the pur-

suit and development of technologies is not an insignificant factor in in-

hibiting communications about and exploitation of technology. Clearly, this

environment is markedly different from that which existed during operation of

the NACA. In that era, the relationship of industry to government was rather

different from our current situation. Industry openly sought the aid and

advice of NACA researchers who, in turn, freely offered their opinions and

widely published NACA reports. As recently no'ted, "Tdday when a problem

arises, it is recognized as an opportunity for a sale of a research project,

rather than as a matter to be brought to NASA for solution."21 Although it

has been observed that "this competition between NASA intramural research

centers and industrial laboratories is not necessarily detrimental to aero-

nautical progress,"21 it has been the observation of this author, from both

government and private-sector employment, that the nature of such competition

has an inhibiting effect on communications among those involved in structuring

and pursuing civil aviation R&D. And this effect is more significant than we

would like to accept or have been led to believe.

Indeed, the motivation, dedication and capabilities of persons working

in technical and scientific activities of government are largely the same as

those working for industry. And the opportunity for a "sale of a research

project" exists in the mind of both the government employee and the private-

sector employee--and both are seeking employment. The point here is to spot-

light what, in fact, could be a significant inhibitor to improving approaches

21U.S. Congress, Policy Planning for Aeronautical Research and Develop-
ment, p. 168.


to civil aviation R&D policy in the United States with the hope that mech-

anisms can be established to minimize institutional barriers which have

been created, often unknowingly. Such mechanisms might include reducing the

participation of goverment employees in decisions on federal funding for in-

dustrial R&D in areas where those government employees are competing largely

for the same funds. Alternatively, changes might be made to reduce the degree

to which government personnel accomplish R&D that can be done by the private

sector. Of course, a combination of these approaches may also be viable.


May 21, 1976


by Mr. John G. Borger
John G. Borger Vice President and Chief
Engineer, Pan American
Introductory Note: World Airways, Inc.

The views herein are those of the writer.
Obviously, much of the knowledge and experience
reflected in such views has been gained during
his employment by Pan American World Airways since
1935, but the statements herein cannot be con-
sidered to reflect an official position of Pan Am.

Within a lifetime, we have seen remarkable transitions in our primary

modes of transportation. The Queens of the Sea are lying at docks,

waiting for the salvaging cutting torch. The luxurious limiteds

and express trains are no more. Sea and rail shipping of freight

are still strong, particularly of bulk cargo, but trucking on one

side and air transport on the other are whittling away on the

carriage of mixed cargo loads.

Andre Priester, the first Vice President and Chief Engineer of Pan

Am used to put it this way: "Speed is the prime commodity of air

transportation". Reduced time of transit, of course, has been our

main objective through the years, but on the way we have also

learned to produce safe operation at reduced costs, to achieve

lower cost per seat mile or per ton mile. This combination of

speed and competitive costs with safety, has resulted in the dis-

appearance of passenger vessels and limited trains. This is the

kind of transportation the passenger and shipper want.

The most influential factor in the achievement of higher speeds

and lower unit costs has been the development of superior airplanes.

Productivity has multiplied many times, as shown in Figure 1.


Page 2.

Over the past 45 years, U.S. transport airplanes have become the

best in the world. Starting with the Boeing 247 and Douglas DC-2

in 1933-34 including the famed DC-3, Boeing 314 Clipper, the DC-4,

Lockheed Constellation, the DC-6 and its magnificent successor,

the DC-6B, through the early B-707 and DC-8 jets to our present

wide-bodied B-747's, DC-10's and L-1011's, plus the shorter range

B-727's, DC-9's and B-737's, there have been few challenges to

American transport airplane supremacy. The exceptions have been the

Comet, the Viscount, the Concorde and possibly the current A-300B.

How was this superiority achieved? What follows is one interested

observer's concept.

First, the United States formed an ideal geographic, economic and

political base for development for an air transportation system.

Distances between cities are great enough to demonstrate the benefits

of air transport speed. Airlines could develop for the most part free

of Government controls or interference except with regard to

routes, fares and safety. Competition between airlines developed

not only with respect to equipment and operating speed, but to lower
cost per passenger mile. (The jet program did not go forward until

the airlines were assured that operating costs per seat mile would be

less than those for the DC-6B.) As long as airlines were reducing

fares, there was little Governmental interference.

Development of America's international air routes brought on a need

for different airplanes. First it was amphibians, then flying

boats to connect the two American continents, primarily because of

the scarcity of suitable airports. Then, as the oceans were

challenged, the need for longer range airplanes developed. With the


Page 3.

building of airports brought on by World War 11, the flying boat

was no longer economically competitive. (In the pre-war period,

Pan Am had always operated just about the same number of land planes

as sea planes.) But the overseas airlines have continued to need

longer range airplanes than the purely domestic airlines the

latest example being the development by Boeing of the 7,000 mile

747SP to joint Pan Am/Boeing specifications. Probably the most

influential factor in transport airplane design is the route struc-

tures of customer airlines.

Competition among the aircraft and engine manufacturers has always

existed. Boeing 247's vs. Douglas DC-2's and -3's. Lockheed

Constellations vs. Douglas DC-4's and -6's; Boeing 707's vs. Douglas

DC-8's. And now Boeing 727's and 737's vs. Douglas DC-9"s;

Douglas DC-10's vs. Lockheed 1011's vs. Boeing 747's. Pratt &

Whitney vs. Wright Aeronautical. Now Pratt & Whitney vs. General


Competitive free enterprise has invariably produced better airplanes

and engines(the writer was direct participant in simultaneous

development of the B707 and DC-8). In competitive airplane develop-

ment however "three's a crowd", for whenever three manufacturers

competed to produce essentially the same article, one was hurt badly.

Other important factors in the development of superior airplanes

have been cevelopment of superior engines, and a very close builder-

operator relationship.

It is a truism in the airplane business that if you don't have a good

engine, you don't have a good airplane. Since the 1920's American


Page 4.

engines have led the way, challenged only by the British, and before

World War 11, by the Germans. We have always hdd a strong, healthy

and technically innovative engine industry, and all signs point to a

continuation. More so than their airframe counterparts, the engine

manufacturers have been able to translate technical knowledge,

tooling and other derivativesusually including early operating ex-

perience from military engine programs into commercial programs,

even though there are many differences between military and commercial


A unique feature in the development of American transport airplanes

has been the close relationship between the designers/builders and

the ultimate operator. A transport airplane is a very complex

combination of machinery, which must operate in harmony for thousands

of hours and flights. By working together, the manufacturer and

operator solve many operating problems long before the airplane goes

into operation. The importance of this cooperation cannot be


Sound basic research by NACA and its successor NASA has been trans-

lated by the manufacturers into operating airplanes. All of the

manufacturers have found it advisable to have their own research

facilities, but these are usually more specialized and used for

testing specific configurations and design refinements.

It is most important that NASA continue with its basic research

which undoubtedly will carry over into some generalized applications.

But it is not believed that NASA should dilute these efforts by

crossing the rather vague dividing line into configuration design.


Page 5.

The manufacturers are better equipped to handle this phase because

they are more familiar with manufacturing requirements and customers'

desires, and they must bear the ultimate designers' responsibility.

Heretofore, there always has been sufficient capital available to

finance private development of commercial transport airplanes. But

as technology advances, and under the influence of inflation, costs

have been increasing. Figure 2 shows the trend over the years

(accuracy of some of the individual points may be questionable, but

the overall trend is a close representation of actuality).

ReDorted development costs of the Concorde represent a dramatic

example of this trend, but they have unquestionably been inflated

by the extremely long development period over 13 years and

possibly by some redundancies.

Now we have a new problem: financial health of the customers.

Almost all airlines have encountered serious financial difficulties

over the past few years, with the result that they do not have the

funds available to order replacement or new airplanes. The banks

and other financial institutions have become increasingly wary of

making such funds available through loans or other financing.

And there's little incentive for any manufacturer to make a sale

if he's not sure how or when he's going to get his money.

The result has been a dearth of new orders. Boeing and Douglas

have been subsisting primarily on orders from foreign airlines,

Lockheed has not announced a new order for some time.

Meanwhile, there is a real need for new equipment. Early B707's

and DC-8's are now 15 years old or more. Their normal technical


Page 6.

obsolescence has been given an added push by the rise in fuel price

from an average of 11 cents per gallon to 40 cents.

There is considerable pressure from the public to make the airplane

quieter, and pressure from-the EPA to reduce emissions from turbine

engines. It may even be possible to achieve small improvement in

direct costs per seat mile, although this will be most difficult

not only because of the increased fuel cost, but because of increased

labor rate costs and increased airplane prices.

NASA is undertaking a long range program targeted at achieving

improvement in aircraft energy efficiency in the order of 50% by

1985. This is a good program, its success should assure continued

technical superiority of American transport airplanes even though

the results will ultimately become available to all aircraft

manufacturers. To realize the full benefits of this program however,

entirely new airplanes and engines will have to be designed,

developed, tested and built, which means availability for service

not less than 10 years from now.

But the knowledge is already in hand to realize about half of the

overall improvement in aircraft and engines derived from existing

designs. Derivation designs should not cost as much to develop.

Example: The B747SP development cost was much less than half that

of the B747, in spite of inflationary effects. Such derivative

airplanes could be less noisy, and certainly less costly to operate

than the older jets they could supplant. The manufacturers are

reluctant to undertake such programs because of lack of customers

with money to finance even these reduced development costs.


Page 7.

It therefore appears that the first prerequisite to renewed pro-

duction of superior airplanes, and the overall health of the

aircraft manufacturing industry is restored financial health of

the customer airlines, and confidence of the financial community

in future health of the airlines.

To the writer, the most pressing need for new airplanes is re-

placement for B707's and the older DC-8's, as mentioned earlier.

Some replacements probably will be provided by B727-200's, some

by B747SP's/DC-10's/L-1011's. But there does appear to be a

need for a 180-200 passenger airplane with something like 3500-

4000 nautical miles range.

The biggest potential market for replacement airplanes will be

for successors to the remarkably successful B727's. But these

are going to be more difficult to improve upon; the successors

probably should incorporate some of the energy efficiency improve-

ments from the NASA program, if they are ready in time.

People have talked for many years about designing an airplane

optimized solely for carrying cargo. The trouble with this

concept is that the potential market for such an airplane has been,

and is expected to continue to be, too small to Justify undertaking

a program, particularly if the airplane is to be much bigger than

the B747F. An exercise should be undertaken to determine if such

a design could really be better than an improved derivative B747F.

Certainly a more efficient cargo carrier can and should be developed.


Page 8.

We are also seeing the first operation of a supersonic transport.

The Concorde certainly achieves the primary objective of improved

speed, but whether supersonic flight times are attractive enough

to overcome the accompanying compromises in operating costs,

comfor level, noise and other environmental effects remains to be

seen. Assuming Concorde does not fail, it is believed that SST

flight times will ultimately be demanded by a large portion of

airline passengers, and all major international airlines will have

to provide SST service. We now know that a safe and environ-

mentally acceptable SST can be built, but whether operating costs

can be competitive is still subject to proof. There exists a large

question regarding SST economics, particularly under current

financial conditions. Much more evidence is needed before commit-

ment to a program can be justified.

In the long run, it is believed we should continue to stress im-

provements in direct cost per seat mile (or per ton mile).

Improved energy efficiency probably will be most influential in

achieving such lower costs, although the traditional approach of

improving the payload carrying capability of the airplane cannot

be neglected.

It is believed that more seats can be added to existing passenger

airplanes, and more tonnage capability to cargo airplanes, but

whether airplanes with larger fuselages will be built probably

will be dependent on a more favorable market atmosphere.


Page 9.

In developing a new airplane, the manufacturer must lay out many

dollars for design, aerodynamic, structural and systems analysis,

similar testing, tooling, ordering materials and equipment, parts

manufacture, sub-assembly then final assembly, flight test and

certification. Although orders are accompanied by advance payments,

the manufacturer sees no reversal of cash outflow until initial

deliveries commence, years after start of the program. If he's

very skillful and lucky, he may break even about the same number

of years later. With increasing development costs, capital

requirements for an entirely new airplane easily can exceed the

net worths of both airframe and engine manufacturers. A major

mistake, serious delay or accident, or introduction of some unknown

factor could mean disaster.

With the present financial state of the airlines, and increasing

development costs, it would appear that capital requirements and

risk may be becoming too great and potential profits too small to

provide sufficient incentive for one manufacturer to go ahead with

a new air transport development. If some way could be found to

limit the manufacturer's total outflow of cash it should be

possible to maintain U.S. leadership in transport airplanes, for

the technical leadership is still well in hand, although vulnerable.

Perhaps the government could provide financial support through

guaranteed low interest loans, or some other means. But, it is

considered most important that the government provide support not

control of the program. There is no more certain way of assuring

the mediocrity of future commercial air transports than through

the assumption of control of the projects by the government, a


Page 10.

joint corporation, or a committee of "experts". This concept

has been tried in the past, with each resultant airplane a failure

(examples: the Douglas DC-4E, ATA Specification A-1 Martin 202

and the US SST). Project control and responsibility must rest

with seller and buyer, with the only government control that of

airworthiness requirements.

The reason for the preceding review of historical background is to

support a contention that we Americans have developed a good system

that has resulted in the best airplanes and the best airlines in

the world today. Competitive air transport manufacturing/operating

systems controlled or strongly influenced by governments or

consortia have not been able to measure up competitively, and it

is strongly believed they have been more expensive overall to the

taxpayers. In other words, we have a good system; it works. If

it is going through some rough spots, let's smooth them out, not

abandon the system for another that we know hasn't worked as well.



1936 DC-3 7.5 I 23.6 Seats or Tons Knots Hours/Year
Block to Block
1939 B-314 7.5 22.6

1940 B-307 8.0 U 42.5

1946 DC-4 9.3 128.3

1946 L-049 6.5 l 97.5

1949 B-377 9.2 g 159.4

1952 DC-6B 10.0 ] 137.8

1955 L-1049G 10.0 Mi 182.0

1956 DC-7C 11.6 g 236.8 W

1958 B707-121 9.2 1 707.8

1960 B707-321 10.4 814.7 EQUIVALENT CARGO SEAT MILES
(BASED ON 209 lbs.)
1960 DC-8 10.7 775.9

1963 B707-321B 12.0 1016.9

1965 B727-21 8.0 in 307.6

1967 DC-8-63 11.0 1 1473.3

1970 B747 11.0 2981.0

1972 DC-10/L-1011 8.0 ] 1202.2

1975 Concorde 9.3 1084.9

1976 747SP 11.3 2302.3

I I500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000

[ ,000


1,00 -600__ 0
i7 DC-10
o i

S. C-13___3 C-_141 :__
!0j DC-8 '
0 COSTS 1011

1 DC-6 747

: I DC-8-10 DC-10 >
OS ,707-120 .. 77
,Jo 10 0 \ 727 i

DC-3 g*
o D3 CV-240

i 307 DC-4
1 DC-3
--911935 1945 1955 965 19575 -5



3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846

18 May 1976


Mr. Dale Milford, Chairman
Subcommittee on Aviation & Trhnsportation R&D
Committee on Science and Technology
U.S. House of Representatives
Suite 2321 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Mr. Milford:

The attached paper is submitted in accordance with your request, for
review by the Subcommittee. As your letter suggests, there are a host
of subjects which must be examined prior to establishing a National
Civil Aviation R&D Policy that can sustain the aviation industry into the
next century. My paper really is not so all encompassing; however, as the
title of the paper suggests, I feel strongly that committee action as
advocated by the paper should be instituted. The aviation transportation
industry is in a difficult period of existence and some strong medicine must
be administered if the patient is to continue to serve the United States
as it has in the past.


ohn C. rizen *i




Biographical Information

John C. Brizendine has been president of the Douglas Aircraft

Company division of McDonnell Douglas Corporation in Long Beach,

California since July 17, 1973.

He joined the firm in 1950 and held a succession of increasingly

important positions in flight development, engineering, program

direction and top management involving the design, production,

testing and marketing of McDonnell Douglas commercial and military


Mr. Brizendine was manager of the DC-8 and DC-9 jetliner programs

and vice president-general manager of the DC-10 tri-jet program. He

also was vice president-engineering and executive vice president

of the Douglas division and is a member of the McDonnell Douglas

board of directors.

Born August 3, 1925, Mr. Brizendine graduated from the University

of Kansas with a bachelor of science degree and a master's degree,

both in aeronautical engineering. He was a U.S. Navy pilot during

World War II.

72-601 0 76 5


John C. Brizendine, President, Douglas Aircraft Company
McDonnell Douglas Corporation
Air transportation remains a true growth industry and a major factor in the world's economy.
But disturbing trends are threatening the viability of the airline industry and its supporting manufacturing
industry, and therefore threatening U.S. dominance in the world transport market.
Air transportation is vital to the U.S. economy. It provides 85% of the intermediate to long
range common carrier movement, and we have no alternative system. It still is a bargain, with U.S.
fares up only 35% over the past seven years, compared to rises of 86% in the Consumer Price Index
and 100% in rail fares. Industry earnings, however, have not been commensurate with growth. The
industry's ability to meet the demands of continuing growth and modernization is dependent upon
the confidence of lenders and investors.
Proposed deregulation is a primary threat to this confidence. However, fare options and more
liberal charter rules can serve both the airlines and the traveler while avoiding total disruption of
the world's best air transportation system and the erosion of lender and investor confidence. We need
to remove that threat of deregulation and continue to provide the best service at the lowest cost.
Technology can continue to provide the necessary increases in efficiency and productivity,
but not if economic threats block airline modernization. Historically, the civil aircraft industry has
transferred technology from DOD programs, with NASA assistance, to civil applications. Recently,
however, DOD programs have had primarily tactical applications with little civil fallout, forcing both
aircraft and engine manufacturers to seek risk-sharing foreign partners -- with financial backing from
their governments. NASA's budget is inadequate to replace the earlier DOD stimulus, and only a small
fraction of that budget is applied to aeronautics. While IRAD has value, it offers little incentive to
the commercial manufacturer.
To protect and enhance the U.S. industry's position, we recommend:
1. Establishment of a national policy recognizing the national economic value of the U.S.
air transport system and the world market dominance by the U.S. civil air transport manufacturers.
2. Creation of a healthy U.S. airline industry through regulatory reform (as opposed to
deregulation) and realistic fare management.
3. Recognition of public financial responsibility in the enforcement of environmental
regulations, in terms of noise reduction and energy conservation approaches via modernization.
4. A new R&D policy providing direct NASA financial support of R&D leading to civil-
applicable technological advancement.
5. Consideration of IRAD coverage for civil projects, with specific tax incentives for
civil aerospace R&D.

17 May 1976
Page 1 of 8

John C. Brizendine, President, Douglas Aircraft Company
McDonnell Douglas Corporation

Air transportation is a vital element now in the world's economy. The average man, woman, and
child in the entire Free World traveled 139 miles by air last year. Driven primarily by American
technology and its favorable impact on air fares, an overage Free World traffic annual growth rate
of 13.5% has been achieved since World War II. Air travel remains one of the true growth industries
with worldwide increases some two to three times the rate of overall economic expansion as measured
by real Gross National Product. This growth is continuing--witness the rapid following
of the recent U.S. economic recovery by traffic increases of near 20%-in the U.S. in the last twelve
months. Because the U.S. air transport manufacturers have dominated the total Free World market,
a substantial American civil transport manufacturing industry has developed providing employment
for over 250,000 people. As a leader in'that industry, McDonnell Douglas is vitally concerned
with the economic health of the airlines--particularly those of the United States. However, some
disturbing trends have appeared which threaten the U.S. airline industry and, hence, the supporting
U.S. civil transport manufacturing firms.

Scheduled air transportation in the United States today is not just the dominant common carrier
transport for all distances beyond those in the daily regime of the automobile; it is essentially the
only viable intermediate to long range common carrier system in our country and is carrying over
85% of all passenger traffic at distances over 200 miles. It has no significant competitive system
or reasonable alternative. Maintenance of this only viable national passenger transportation
system--i.e., air transportation--is not just an arbitrary objective; it is mandatory to the nation's
very fabric of existence. A corollary to this fact is the essential need for a strong American civil
transport manufacturing industry. This dominance of the air transport system is a consequence of
3 major factors--economic advantages--i.e., a) low fares; b) a service-oriented system that is
the envy of the remainder of the world; and c) the fundamental air transport time saving
to the traveler. These demonstrated advantages have resulted in the United States air trans-
portation system accounting for nearly half of the total Free World's system in spite of the fact
that the U S. population is only 8% of the Free World's total. The main factor in this success
is the relative low cost of such U.S. transportation.


Page 2 of 8

Commercial air transportation is one of the better bargains available to the American public in
today's inflation-plagued economy. This is no occident. It is the fundamental results of favorable
technology progress coupled with thoughtful governmental regulation of this quasi-utility to
guide it via competition to translate the technology-caused cost reductions into fare reductions
and competitive service increases to make it useful to the maximum number of people. Figure 1
is a 30-year history of average U.S. domestic airline yields in terms of cents per revenue-paying
passenger-mile. One can see that even in terms of current year dollars, airline fares have been
held essentially constant except for the most recent year's distortion by inflation aggravated by
the near tripling of cost of fuel. If the data in Figure 1 are expressed in constant 1958 dollars,
they show that there has actually been a long term decline at 1.78% per.year compound rate.
(In spite of the problems of 1975, it too was a year of actual yield reductions when measured in
constant dollars.) Another way to illustrbting this performance is to compare the changes in the
airline fares with the U.S. Government Consumer Price Index (CPI). By 1975, airline fares had
increased 35% while the CPI had risen 86% over 1958 prices, or almost 2 1/2 times as much.
Railroad fares, for example, increased by over 100% in this period in spite of massive Federal
economic assistance. One would see a similar favorable air fare comparison if the comparison
were made against the cost of a bag of groceries, an automobile, or most other things in our
economy. If one moves out of the U.S. economy and compares U.S. air fares with those of other
nations, he will also discover that in spite of the high standard of wages in the U.S. and the
minimal direct financial support of the U.S. airlines by the U.S. Government, scheduled air
fares in the U.S. are the lowest in the Free World. Europe, for example, averages 50-200%
higher fares than the U.S.; Japan is some 50% higher. Viewed in the larger context, the fare
performance of the U.S. airlines has been outstanding--perhaps too much so.

As can be seen by the plots of Figure 2, the U.S. airlines' earnings trend has not been
commensurate with the traffic growth. Both their book earnings and their internal cash
generation has, in constant dollars, shown a decline while traffic continued to grow (albeit
at a somewhat slower rate during the recent economic recession years). In consequence, to


Page 3 of 8

finance the airlines' growth, borrowing has been necessary -- enormous amounts, which have placed
the average U.S. airline in a position where it owes twice its net worth to its creditor banks,
insurance firms, etc. Hence the U.S. airlines' ability to progress and modernize is largely
dependent on the continued confidence of the creditors to provide additional capital. While
this general pattern is typical of many growth industries, others have managed to increase their
prices and earnings enough to hold debt to more normal industrial ratios of perhaps 40-50% of net

Even though airline fares are now in need of careful reassessment to permit a return to profitability,
current proposals for massive and abrupt deregulation may well endanger any progress. This is not to
blindly oppose any regulatory change or reform. CAB reform for quicker action on rate proposals
and/or fare flexibility for airlines such as a general rule allowing them to set their own fare structure
within some reasonable limits (say: plus or minus 30%) would be healthy for the industry as well as
the public. The suggested freedom of entry and exit for all scheduled airlines is believed to be
counterproductive. The forward thinking of the recent CAB liberalized charter rules which permitted
One Stop Inclusive Tour Charters (OTC) to come into effect late last year is beneficial in achieving
lower fares and some freedom of entry and exit in a low price market without destroying the service
benefits of the scheduled airlines. The proposed Advanced Booking Charter (ABC) should be beneficial
to the personal traveler. The public is entitled to expect more creative and imaginative services by
the airline which will give them a choice of price and quality of air services. Using European
experience as an example, it is reasonable to expect that this more liberal charter authority will
have the effect of giving the public that choice. We support the view that a parallel situation will
probably occur in the United States and that the principles of more price competition, plus free entry *
and exit, both achieved through the more liberal charter rules, will establish a pattern which would
largely satisfy the objectives of the champions of deregulation while retaining the demonstrated
superior service of the scheduled airlines.

If healthy airlines, a viable aircraft industry, and long-term economical fares remain
national objectives, two things are strongly recommended: (1) threatened drastic
deregulation of the scheduled airlines must be terminated and confidence thus restored
within the financial community for the future stability and profitability of the airline


Page 4 of 8

industry and (2) the U.S. must continue the historical pattern of providing better service and low
cost fares through the use of more efficient aircraft and systems. Deregulation of scheduled airlines
as currently proposed is counterproductive since the very proposal itself has already inadvertently
impaired the airlines' key tool to lower costs and fares--modernization by the continuing acquisition
of more efficient aircraft. The U.S. airlines' necessity to obtain financing to replace less efficient,
noisy, high-fuel-consumption airplanes has been made at least difficult if not impossible by the
fears and uncertainty that the deregulation proposals and discussions have created in the financial
community. This outside financing, plus internal capital formation from increased profitability,
are both necessary for modernization.

The current uncertainties have effectively created a moritorium of progress in the field of energy
conservation since new modern fuel-efficient aircraft cannot be purchased. In 1975, the total
U.S. airline industry purchased only $252 million worth of new equipment--the lowest value since
1962 and a value which has caused massive layoffs in the civil transport manufacturing industry.
The Douglas Aircraft Company alone in 1975/1976 will reduce employment on civil transports by
approximately 10,000 people--a direct cbnsequence of the uncertainties in the airlines.

A convincing argument that continuing advancement of technology does in fact create succeeding
generations of aircraft of improved efficiency and productivity can be seen in Figure 3. Here we
see the cumulative reduction in the direct operating cost of Douglas commercial transport aircraft
since the DC-3. Although these costs of transporting a seat one mile can hardly continue to decrease
at these historical rates, we must exert all efforts to prevent any significant reversal in the trend
because of cost increases in some of the contributing elements, such as the price of fuel. Continued
modernization of airline fleets to take advantage of the already available technology of the
modern transport must not be blocked by the uncertainty and threat of deregulation.

In the longer view, the driving force for the continued reduction in airline operating costs is
American technology. A strong continuing flow of technology into our commercial transport aircraft
will increase the benefits to the traveler, to his earthbound counterpart who seeks a quieter environment,
and to the airline managers and stockholders who want tools to fight against the cost pressures such as
rising fuel prices. The civil transportaircraft manufacturing industry, like its customerairlines, hasbeen
a growth industry perpetually short of capital and total ly dependent on the economic health of the
airlines--a cyclical health at best. Hencethe civil transport manufacturing industry has nothad the
independent resources to accelerate the technology but has "ridden on the coat tails" of the military air-
craft technology funded by the U.S. Government via the Department of Defense and assisted by the


Page 5 of 8

fully dedicated efforts of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA). However
the enormously effective impact of many years of research and development accomplished for
military aircraft but adapted to the civil transport should be credited as the primary technology
driving force. Aircraft cabin pressurization, jet engines, high bypass ratio turbofan engines,
aerodynamic and structural refinements are but a few of a host of past civil aviation technology
benefits resulting from military Research and Development (R&D). Almost as important as the basic
technology development itself was the role of the military in putting that technology into production
aircraft when the technical risk (and its consequent financial risk) was intolerable to the civil industry.
Each succeeding aircraft development from the all metal airplane to the jet age, and more recently to
the new wide-bodied aircraft, has provided significantly more efficient service to more people at
lower costs.

Three things have happened which have grave implications on this traditional technology flow.
First, the applicability of military aircraft technology to the civil transport has been rapidly
declining as the needs of the military -- largely tactically oriented -- have separated from civil
requirements. The military aircraft technology budget is concentrated on the supersonic regime and
on tactical aircraft of relatively short structural life (compared to civil transports) as typified by
the new F-15 and F-16 fighters. Even accepting the concept that the B-1 supersonic bomber has
potential technology aid to a future Advanced Supersonic Transport (AST), the technology and
requirement differences are large as shown in Figure 4. This same "separation" phenomenon has
taken place in the vital aero engine field. Civil transport engines have been typically a further
application of military engines. Today, however, we find that General Electric has been driven
into a cooperative venture for a new "ten ton" civil engine with the nationalized engine industry
of France ("driven", since there was no U.S. Government funding available and the French
Government readily funded the major share of the new developments). The other major American
engine company, Pratt and Whitney, is similarly teaming up with the nationalized engine industry
of the United Kingdom for a competitive engine project. At present, because of the risk and
inordinately large funding requirements associated with many of the untested efficiency advancements from
new technical innovations, commercial aircraft and engine manufacturers are being forced to work
out agreements with foreign companies and governments to share the risk and provide funds for
such improvements. The new subsonic ten-ton engines by GE (CFM-56) and P&W (JT-IOD)
are leading examples. Such risk-sharing ventures with foreign companies and governments would


Page 6 of 8

not be necessary if the United States Government R&D policy specifically supported civil transport
aviation to an extent consistent with the importance of economical air travel and the importance to
our nation of retaining a competitive aircraft industry.

Second, the impact of the space age and the national objective of a Man on the Moon swept NACA
into the space dominated National Aeronautic and Space Agency (NASA). While the aeronautics
portion of NASA's budget has been steadily increasing as a fraction of the total NASA budget since
the low of less than 2% in the mid-1960's, it is only some 8% of the total NASA budget today and a
subjective evaluation by my company shows that three percentage points or less of that 8% are truly
applicable to the civil transport field, particularly as it applies to the goals of the next five years.
NASA's work is largely oriented to long term goals and, as such, is not a substitute for the progressively
less applicable military effort. The work that NASA does do is valuable. Some recent examples
of NASA research which will pay off in the future with lower airline costs and thus transferred back
to the people via lower fares, are the supercritical airfoil, composite structures and winglets.
However, in any event, the current $200 million NASA aeronautics budget could not make up for
the fact that the multi-billion dollar military aircraft research and development budget is becoming
less applicable to the civil transport problem.

Third, the principle of Independent Research and Development (IRAD) and the consequent accounting
treatment of such company expenditures as benefits to national interests has always been well
recognized in the military aircraft sphere. In effect, this concept has allowed aircraft companies
to charge independently directed research, equivalent in value to 2-3% of the annual sales of the
company, against the cost structure of military contracts as an allowable item recoverable in the
price of the military contract. This accounting allowance recognized the value of diversified
approaches to critical national technologies. However, this is of no aid to the civil transport
manufacturing company who must fund these equivalent efforts from his profits. Civil aviation
is a major economic asset to our nation. In the days of troubles on our nation's balance of trade,
the Washington quip was, "Thank God for aerospace and the farmer," these being the two major
American helpers to a positive trade balance. Civil aerospace is a dominant element, as shown
in Figure 5. The Federal Government takes some 23% in taxes for each dollar of increased
economic activity from these favorable exports. Using a conservatively-assumed economic
multiplier of "2" for the imported dollars, just this civil aerospace export business creates some
$3 billion annually in added Federal tax revenues. It should not be necessary to further point out
the national importance of supporting civil transport technology.


Page 7 of 8

What are the recommendations in view of these developments? The following are my summary

1. Establish a national transportation policy recognizing the national economic, social and
strategic value of air transportation and the unique U.S. civil transport manufacturing industry
with its world market dominance.

2. Create a fiscally healthy U.S. airline industry.

a. Recognize the earnings need to create capital for more efficient equipment.

b. Sponsor regulatory reform -- not deregulation.

i. Zone of reasonableness concept to allow airline freedom to set fares independently.

ii. Increased charter freedom for both scheduled and non-scheduled airlines.

c. Automatic fuel cost increase flow;-through to fares (as is the case in utility regulation).

3. Recognize general public benefit and consequent financial responsibility in environmental
regulations enforcement on airlines.

a. Financial aid should be supplied for equipment modification or replacement made
mandatory by public law.

i. Recognize that such expenditures are not a responsibility solely of the airline
industry or its passengers.

ii. Provide low interest modernization loans a la the Conrail/Northeast corridor
which approximate $3.8 billion.

iii. Allow special investment tax treatment (negative income tax) recognizing the
fact that the purpose of investment tax credits is defeated if the airline is
not profitable.

b. Encourage modernization replacement rather than short term modification.
For example, modification for noise reduction is marginal in effectivity and produces no
benefits in economies or fuel conservation to the airlines.


Page 8 of 8

4. Increase the emphasis on Government-sponsored aeronautical R&D that has specific applica-

tion to civil transports. The NASA budget should be increased specifically for this

purpose with the proviso that at least 75% of the increase should flow to industry research
contracts. Experimental research and development to build and flight test on current

modern turbofan transports new ideas which hold promise of improvements in commercial

airplane efficiency should be funded via such NASA research contracts. This would not

replace the long term further future work of NASA but would be an addition pointed

toward speeding high risk technologies into application. NASA past funded work on large
scale composite structures such as the composite rudder for the DC-10 airplane is an

excellent example of this technique.

In addition, future high cost, redundant, specialized test facilities such as very high

Reynolds number wind tunnels applicable to large transport airplanes should not be created at
each manufacturer. Instead, a central NASA administered test facility (with industry partici-
pation in the design and management) should be used to economically satisfy such needs.

5. Consideration should be given to IRAD coverage for non-defense projects of national
benefit with serious consideration given to specific tax incentives on R&D for aerospace

companies which have predominantly commercial sales.

The preceding are broad concepts which cannot be detailed in a brief paper. Should these
ideas be judged worthy of expansion, I would be happy to meet with you myself or have my

appropriate executives expand these concepts for you in discussion. I thank you for the opportunity
to present the thoughts contained in this paper.



12 _RAILROADS(REF) 0204 200

** 186
CPI --
10 -(REF) \- -
..- 150
PASSENGER 1958 100
MILE 6-i-.--................. & .---- ..- -.*. -..

0. 0

0 _ __ I- i __- I I I L I I I I 0
1946 50 .54 58 62 66 70 74 78




1.2CURRENT $..**
1.. .. ...- *
1.0 -

0.8'- '*0

0.2 ---. ---


1965 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75





8 DC-3 4

6 3 3
1975 3 1958
2 1
,... DC-8-60

0 -0
1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975


B-1 F-15 AST

OPERATING LIFE (HR) 13,500 8,000 50,000

(F) 265 255 250

% ALUMINUM 41 35 27
% STEEL 15 4 9









0 1 1
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
E: ESTIMATE R6 .cio-11 96



The Honorable Dale Milford, Chairman
Subcommittee on Aviation and Transportation R&D
Committee on Science and Technology
U.S. House of Representatives
Suite 2321 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20515 Testimony of Dr. Robert H. Cannon, Jr.
Chairman, Division of Engineering and Applied Science
Dear Mr. Chairman: California Institute of Technology

I appreciate very much being invited to contribute to the hearings
on the Future of Aviation which your subcommittee is holding this month.

In June of 1974, just before I left my position as Assistant Secretary
of Transportation, I was invited to testify before Senator Moss' committee
in a similar context. At that time I presented my views on some of the re-
search and development programs which I believed to be critical to a future
aviation transportation system that would continue to serve our country in
the years ahead in the most stimulating and vigorous way economically, while
at the same time providing absolute protection for our environment and the
maximum safety to human life. In that testimony I included discussion of
the continuing evolution of an effective air traffic control system so that never
again would we encounter a crisis as we did in 1969, so that we would always
be a step ahead of any growth in air traffic, providing, with never a hitch,
the most time-efficient and energy-efficient movement of commercial air
traffic with the highest level of safety. As you know well, staying that step
ahead requires an R and D program that sees a decade ahead, into both po-
tential requirements and the new technological opportunities to provide
better performance at less cost. With full national deployment of the ARTS
III Air Traffic Control System the FAA has now gotten on top of this problem.
The long-range R and D program FAA has laid out is designed to keep us on
top. It must not be allowed to slacken.

In my 1974 testimony I discussed also new technical possibilities
for improving the fuel economy of transport aircraft, including more pre-
cise navigation, and the use of new automatic control techniques to provide
better flying stability with less structure (and hence less drag). I have
recently had opportunity to review the NASA programs in pursuit of these
opportunities, and note that they are proceeding vigorously.

Finally, in my 1974 testimony to Senator Moss, I pointed out the
probable requirement for cleaner engines' in both subsonic and supersonic
aircraft in order to protect the earth's ozone layer which shields us from
damaging ultraviolet radiation. I noted then that the report from a major
technological assessment of that question would be forthcoming, and would
spell out what measures will be required to provide full protection.


Subcommittee on Aviation and Transportation R&D May 13, 1976
Page Two

The report of which I spoke was published in the spring of 1975,
and I should like to use this present opportunity to focus particularly upon
its results and the impact they will have for the future of commercial avia-

The report has the official title, Report of Findings of the Climatic
Impact Assessment Program. Briefly, it supports the following conclusions:

(1) Preservation of our ozone layer is imperative in order to shield
us from biologically harmful ultraviolet radiation from the sun.

(2) Any really large-scale commercial operations in the stratosphere
(supersonic or subsonic) anywhere in the world would have to be
under strict engine-cleanliness standards to avoid significant
world-wide reduction in the ozone layer.

(3) Clean engine development is feasible, technically and economi-
cally, but will require a lead time of at least ten years.

It is item (3) above which gives special urgency to this matter. For,
while current levels of operation reduce stratospheric ozone by an amount
which is imperceptible, only by strictly requiring future engines to be sub-
stantially cleaner can any future, much larger fleets be prevented from re-
ducing ozone by an unacceptable degree. It is urgent to act now, because
the development of cleaner engines will take some 10 to 15 years to achieve:
Thus, clean-engine standards and the development of clean engines to meet
them, must anticipate any possible fleet growth by at least a decade.

What the Climatic Impact Assessment Program (CIAP) makes possi-
ble is for us to anticipate and totally avoid what could be a serious problem,
and to do so at minimum cost simply by taking prompt, deliberate, positive
actions--both in Research and Development and in the area of international
standards setting.

Prior to the CIAP, the concerns raised by a number of scientists
about a number of ways that high altitude flight might affect the environment
were on such uncertain ground that it was impossible to know where, in the
range from truly serious to entirely negligible, each such concern might
lie. It was simply not possible to lay out a prudent course of action.

In organizing the CIAP, I made sure of four things: first that the
finest scientific specialists in the world were thoroughly involved in the
program and in the process of organizing and presenting its conclusions;
second, that all aspects of the program were conducted in the most open
possible way; third, that an independent assessment of the results was
made by a special committee of the National Academy of Sciences and the
National Academy of Engineering; and fourth, that the full results were
made available to the Congress promptly.

The CIAP was perhaps the most comprehensive technological
assessment that has been carried out to date. During the course of this

72-601 0 76 6


Subcommittee on Aviation and Transportation R&D May 13, 1976
Page Three

intensive program, the uncertainties about what the consequences of high
altitude flight might be were reduced from factors of the order of 100 down
to factors of the order of 3 to 10--reduced to where conclusions can be
drawn and prudent courses of action can be specified.

In particular, the CIAP determined that, of the numerous possible
adverse environmental effects of stratospheric flight that were postulated
in 1970 and 1971, two will require specific preventive measures if a very
much larger volume of high-altitude operations occurs (by either super-
sonic or subsonic aircraft flying anywhere in the world):

First, engines having lower levels of nitrogen oxide emissions
will have to be required. This will be necessary to avoid re-
duction of stratospheric ozone which limits the amount of bio-
logically harmful ultraviolet radiation that reaches the earth.

Second, jet fuels having a sulfur content smaller than that in
current jet fuels will have to be required. This is necessary
to avoid formation of sulfate particulates in the stratosphere
which could alter the heat balance and hence temperature and

The second requirement--for low-sulfur jet fuel--appears rela-
tively easy to meet. Apparently only a few years' lead time will be needed
to achieve almost any sulfur-content standard that may be set.

But to meet the first requirement--for low-NO engines--10 or
15 years of engine development will be needed.

To insure that the environment is fully protected, whatever the
growth and development of stratospheric flight may be in coming years,
the Executive Summary of the CIAP Report of Findings recommends the
following courses of action:

Develop, on an urgent basis, a proper program of international
regulation of aircraft emissions and fuel characteristics for
whatever stratospheric flight operations may evolve in the future.

Accelerate combustion research and engine development programs
needed to make stratospheric flight possible with specified nitrogen
oxide emission standards.

Use low-sulfur fuels. Study the implications of utilizing low-sulfur
content aviation fuels for stratospheric flight.

Develop a global monitoring system to ensure that environmental
protection is being achieved. Continue research (drawing on the
monitored data) to reduce the uncertainties in the present knowl-
edge of the stratosphere and improve the methods for estimating
climatic change and the biologic consequences.


Subcommittee on Aviation and Transportation R&D May 13, 1976
Page Four

To these recommendations the independent report of the National
Academies of Sciences and Engineering adds one more which I wish here
also to strongly endorse: "We recommend that biological and medical
studies of the effects of changes in ultraviolet radiation upon living organ-
isms be increased. In particular, we recommend that studies of skin
cancer be accelerated to obtain better quantitative understanding of the
cause of the disease. "

Since the publication of the CIAP Report of Findings (and indeed
beginning well before that publication) both the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration and the Federal Aviation Administration have taken
important steps to implement the CIAP recommendations.

The NASA has received good 1976 budget support from the Congress
to begin the ongoing atmospheric measurements that will contribute to both
the monitoring base and the further reduction of uncertainty. This support
must be sustained to achieve the objective of protective early warning.

The NASA has also begun astute research on clean engines. This
can help the FAA structure future standards, which in turn can give en-
gine manufacturers fair warning, with targets they can expect, and con-
fidence in the fundamental aspects of the technology.

The Federal Aviation Administration- -with its new High Altitude
Protection Program (HAPP)--has assumed responsibility for developing
standards, and has begun the process of interaction with the aviation com-
munity, American and international, that must precede regulatory action.
This activity must be encouraged relentlessly by The Congress.

Mankind has seldom come to a potential problem of such inherently
global a nature, or been blessed with such a clear early understanding of
how to avoid it. To seize this opportunity--to proceed promptly and de-
liberately to provide effective protection, without the trauma and waste
of a crash program, could set a precedent of considerable generic value
for the future.

I enclose a few pages of technical background on this issue which
the Subcommittee may find helpful. (A full report is, of course, given
by the CIAP Report of Findings.)


Robert H. Cannon, Jr.
Chairman. Division of
SEngineering & Applied Science
California Institute of Technology



Some Background on
Preventing Environmental Impact from Stratospheric Flight

During the discussion of the supersonic transport (SST) project
in 1970, the question was raised (Wilson et al., 1970; Johnston, 1971)
whether impurities from flights of aircraft high in the stratosphere could
alter the proportions of atmospheric constituents with harmful results to
the earth's environment. The question is important because, while they
make up only a tiny fraction of the atmosphere. the constituents in their
natural proportions control the balance of life-giving heat while blocking
lethal radiation that otherwise would reach the earth's surface.

Flight in the stratosphere (typically above 12 kilometers or
39, 000 feet) is of concern, while flight in the troposphere below is not.
The reason is that, through turbulence, storms, and rainfall, the tropo-
sphere cleanses itself of impurities in a matter of days or weeks, but
the stratosphere is virtually stagnant in its vertical dimension and does
not cleanse itself so rapidly. Impurities remain in the mid-stratosphere
for as long as three years (so that there is always a three-year accumu-
lation of past contaminants). Moreover, their dispersion, horizontally,
is worldwide and comparatively rapid, so that stratospheric fleets of any
nation, flying anywhere, produce similar effects everywhere in the hemi-
sphere (northern or southern) in which they fly. High-altitude commerce
over Europe contaminates the sky over the United States, and vice versa.

In 1970, large uncertainties existed in our quantitative knowledge
of the atmosphere's constituents, of its dynamic and chemical behavior,
and of the climatic and biological processes affected by the atmosphere.
Thus, at that time, there was no valid scientific basis for judging where,
in the range from entirely negligible to truly significant, the conjectured
effects of stratospheric flight might fall. There was simply not enough
knowledge from which to draw the needed scientific conclusions.

During the congressional debate in July 1970, legislation intro-
duced by Senator H. M. Jackson directed the Department of Transporta--
tion to mount a federal scientific program to obtain the new knowledge
needed to judge how serious the conjectured effects might be, and to
report its results to the Congress by the end of calendar year 1974.
This report of findings describes the results of the ensuing program.

The Department's Climatic Impact Assessment Program (CIAP)
has drawn on nine other U. S. federal departments and agencies and
seven foreign ones. It has also drawn on the individual talents of some
1000 investigators at numerous universities and other organizations in
the United States and abroad. It has necessarily encompassed a wide
range of science and technology.

A special committee of the National Academy of Sciences and the
National Academy of Engineering was organized to review the work of
CIAP and to form an independent judgment of the results on which the
Academies have issued a special, independent report (Reference 4).


Some Background on Preventing Environmental Impact from Page Two
Stratospheric Flight (continued)

The CIAP has yielded a harvest of new scientific data, and has
progressed considerably in drawing the data together into a better under-
standing of the cause-effect relations between aircraft effluents in the
stratosphere and environmental impact. Serious uncertainties still exist,
but their magnitude has been reduced substantially so that useful conclu-
sions are now possible. Briefly, they indicate that while present aircraft
operations in the stratosphere do not threaten the environment, in the
future cleaner engines and cleaner fuels will need to be required to insure
that no future larger-scale operations ever do. Early warning by respon-
sible scientists and prompt, careful assessment have provided the time to
act deliberately to insure full environmental protection.

In particular, aircraft engines, meeting reduced nitrous oxide
(NOx) emission standards, must be required in order to prevent reduc-
tion in the stratospheric ozone that blocks the sun's ultraviolet radiation
at the wavelengths associated with sunburn, nonfatal skin cancer, and
other biological effects.

The CIAP was completed on time, and its Report of Findings was
delivered to the Congress on schedule (Reference 5). But in a larger
sense, the CIAP was only a first step in the continuing vigilance we must
exercise. Specifically:

The uncertainties are still large and must be reduced by con-
tinuing atmospheric and biological research.

The stratosphere must be monitored carefully from now on to
assure that our protective measures are doing their job.

The engine development must be carried out to provide future
aircraft with clean engines.

Finally, international regulations must be developed in an
orderly fashion to provide for protective measures as they
are needed.

There is time to do each of these deliberately without the waste-
ful costs of a crash program. But there is no time to waste. Action
must be prompt and sure, starting at once.


1. Wilson, et al., Study of Critical Environmental Problems, MIT
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts (1970).

2. Johnston, H. S., "Reduction of Stratospheric Ozone by Nitrogen Oxide
Catalysts from Supersonic Transport Exhaust, Science 173:517-
522 (1971).


Some Background on Preveriting Environmental Impact from Page Three
Stratospheric Flight (continued)

References (continued)

3. Cannon, R. H., "Planning a Program to Assess the Environmental
Impact of Stratospheric Flight, Bul. Am. Meteorol. Soc. 52, 836

4. Climatic Impact Committee, Environmental Impact of Stratospheric
Flight (National Academy of Sciences National Academy of Engi-
neering, Washington, D. C., 1975).

5. Grobecker, A. J. S.C. Coroniti, R.H. Cannon, Jr.,. Report of
Findings: The Effects of Stratospheric Pollution by Aircraft (Depart-
ment of Transportation, Washington, D. C.. 1974).



MAY 14, 1976



The United States enjoys a well-recognized position of world

leadership in aerospace manufacturing, paced by the success

in the world market of U.S.-built civil and military aircraft.

More than 80 percent of the free-world commercial airline

aircraft are of U.S. manufacture. The U.S. exports over 2-1/2

times as many general aviation aircraft as the rest of the

world. However, this image of world technological leadership

earned by the United States aerospace industry during the 1960's

is being eroded in the 1970's due to a lack of new programs

resulting from the strain on investment resources. This is in

contrast with the continuing achievements of European con-

sortiums, and the efforts of Canada and Japan.

Despite strongly emerging foreign competition, U.S. aerospace

exports have continued to be a significantly positive factor

in international trade, (Table 1). Aerospace exports have

exceeded $1 billion annually since 1957, have reached over



$7 billion for each of the past three years, and in 1975,

reached a record $7.8 billion representing 25 percent of the

industry's total sales and accounting for more than 7 percent

of all exports of U.S. products.

According to the U.S. Industrial Outlook 1976, an annual publi-

cation of the Bureau of Domestic Commerce, U.S. Department of

Commerce, aerospace exports in 1976 are expected to reach over

$7.6 billion, a 4 percent decrease from the all time high in

1975. More than 40 percent of the aircraft shipments in 1976

probably will be for the export market. Aerospace exports in

1976 will account for more than 200,000 full-time jobs. Imports

of aerospace products are estimated at $419 million for 1976,

resulting in a positive trade balance for the year estimated at

more than $7.2 billion. The U.S. aerospace industry continues

to be the largest single manufacturing contributor to the

nation's trade surplus.

For the first time in recent history, Europeans significantly

challenge U.S. dominance of the Free World aerospace market.

With strong support from their national governments, multi-

national European aerospace manufacturers are attacking product

and market niches now lacking U.S. action. As a result, by

1980, Europe could take possibly $1-2 billion annually away

from the U.S. share of the Free World aerospace market. Beyond

1980, this loss of market share, and therefore exports by U.S.

companies, could run much higher. In the face of a determined



drive by European governments to strengthen their aerospace

industries, U.S. industry will have to work hard to minimize

this loss.

Historically, the U.S. aerospace industry has been extremely

successful in the international arena by almost any measure.

For example, the U.S. share of Free World export markets in

aircraft, engines, and parts has been well over 50% for the

last decade, according to international-sourced statistics

published by the U.S. Government on market shares in aircraft,

engines, and parts markets.

This performance reflects many U.S. strengths, especially

the expanding U.S. domestic market for high-quality aerospace

products that could also be exported and major government

expenditures for aerospace-related R&D. U.S. companies also

used aggressive marketing and logistics support for customers

at a time when foreign competition was suffering from small

national markets and fragmented production. These strengths

have supported U.S. dominance into the 1970's. However, this

situation can be expected to change before the end of this


The United States' major airframe and engine manufacturers'

financial resources are committed to their investments in the

new wide-bodied jet airliners. They are in the unfortunate

position of being without sufficient venture capital to under-

take any new major risk programs in order to meet new competitive



foreign programs. Accordingly, U.S. aerospace companies are

looking to government-supported foreign aerospace industries for

financial assistance in new development and production programs.

These joint programs are not predicated on an interest in

exporting only U.S. technology, but rather in an attempt to

maintain the firms' present share of the world market.

The U.S. Government provides no direct support to commercial

aircraft development, production and sales ventures except

through the application of military and National Aeronautics

and Space Administration research and development and Export-

Import Bank loans and guarantees. In Europe, commercial

aircraft usually are fully financed with venture capital pro-

vided by the various governments alone, or in concert. The

Japanese, through Zaibatzu--a coalition of manufacturers, banks,

trading companies and government--provide full or partial

support to manufacturing, sales, and support of commercial

aircraft. Canada's aerospace industry has been subsidized by

the government for a number of years, initially to preserve it

as part of a mobilization base, but lately in recognition of

its significant contribution to the country's balance of trade.

In addition to the competition from foreign-developed and pro-

duced commercial transport aircraft, foreign governments are

actively increasing competition in military aerospace programs.

Some have negotiated agreements providing for rising military



sales to Latin America and African countries where U.S. Govern-

ment policies have restricted sales of U.S. equipment. European

military and civilian helicopters are increasingly displacing

U.S. helicopters in world use.

The Continental European countries and Great Britain--comprising

the major U.S. aerospace export markets--are moving toward

meeting their vast military and civilian aerospace equipment

requirements by combining their industries into consortiums.

Their goal is principally to end reliance on U.S. aerospace

products, although this approach has a reported 20 percent cost

disadvantage. Only items beyond the financial or technological

development ability of the consortium countries are being procured

from outside sources. These outside buys are on a highly com-

petitive basis and frequently require mandatory production

licensing arrangements.

In the past, foreign aerospace suppliers have not been able to

achieve an overall competitive advantage, despite initial market

penetrations, because U.S. suppliers have been able to offer

a full line of economical, efficient, and attractively priced

equipment in a sufficient range of compatible models to meet

potential users' total requirements. They have been able to

do this even when they have entered the market later than the

foreign competition. Due to the lack of available new venture

capital and the increased competitiveness of foreign-government

supported industries and consortiums, the U.S. aerospace



industry cannot rely on continuance of the advantages enjoyed

in the past.

The major policies supporting the development of aerospace

capabilities within the five countries with the highest

developed aerospace industries--France, West Germany, United

Kingdom, Japan, and Canada-are designed to achieve improved

competitiveness in the world market place as follows:

o Government support of consortia team efforts to design,

sell, support and finance families of commercial and military


o Develop management and manufacturing capabilities in order

to achieve independent high technology capabilities. United

States and/or foreign technology and know-how is imported

through multinational development programs, licensing, and

requirements for offset development and production to balance

major procurements of foreign (U.S.) equipment by national


o Government initiatives in rationalization or nationalization

of aerospace industries in order to reduce uneconomic domestic

competition, pool resources and development financing,

standardize equipment for government/industry foreign sales

efforts and increase productivity.

o Government long-term budget planning and funding allocation

for specific aerospace programs with expected export potential,



recognizing that over the long-haul advanced-technology

industries such as aerospace hold the key to future industrial



The financial condition of the U.S. aerospace industry con-

strains its ability to continue major aircraft developments

and to provide the technology required to develop new markets

and to maintain its position against foreign competition. The

research, development, and initiation of production for modern

transport aircraft require a peak commitment of more than $1

billion, several times the net worth of most U.S. airframe

manufacturers. Engine manufacturers must commit more than $500

million to undertake a new engine production program. The

working capital risk requirements of the aerospace manufacturing

and air transport industries inhibit the continued investment

in R&D programs. In addition, civil sales are increasingly

more important in total sales, thereby providing a lesser share

of independent research and development to be carried by

military contracts.

o Direct Government Funding, with or without recoupment, for

development and production of aerospace equipment would ease

the severe cash flow problesm traditional in the industry

and tend to reduce the cost of the equipment. This approach

does raise the problem of Government judgment replacing

market values in the selection of programs. It also negates



the force of competiticn in the traditional development of

better equipment at lower cost. Procedures can be developed

to counter these problems. Government guaranteed loans for

development and production raise the same issues and do not

provide the same relief from cash flow problems. The

establishment of a government-supported National Technologi-

cal Development Bank, providing loans at moderate interest

rates would be an alternate method of developing programs

which have national benefits but too high a risk for commercial

financial sources.

o Tax incentives could stimulate the industry to increase R&D,

resulting in increased technical employment, increased pro-

ductivity, development of new markets, and increased invest-

ment and general employment. The problem is to first improve

the income position of the firms through decreased costs of


o The application of the federal antitrust laws is uncertain

in the areas of joint research and development. These laws

need to be reviewed in order to define revisions for the

promotion of technological growth, especially against joint

ventures of foreign competitors.

o The continued availability of an investmenttax credit and

the review and modification of other Internal Revenue regu-

lations, including accelerated depreciation allowances might



alleviate current cash flow problems and capital investment

and thereby facilitate domestic sales of aerospace equipment.

o Stimulation of U.S. exports in the market environment of

large-scale foreign competition by nationalized, or quasi-

nationalized firms and consorita requires that favorable

financing be available for civil and military equipment.

These export financing requirements include continued Export-

Import Bank aircraft financing, including increasing lending

authority, extending repayment time, and providing for

progress payments between order and delivery.


The U.S. aerospace industry is an advanced technology industry,

it is characterized by its emphasis on research and development

as an integral part of systems fabrication, rather than only

as the first stage in production of an item. The aerospace

industry has had to develop capabilities and resources to keep

up with a constantly accelerating technological advance and

the radically new techniques required to contend with problems

of infinite complexity. Much of the industry's output is in

the form of technological inventions and innovations stemming

from intensive research and development. The industry's complex

products are characterized by high unit-value, precision per-

formance, and reliability.

Defense and space goals have dictated the bulk of R&D demand,

but R&D in aerospace has also created a number of spillover



effects that have influenced technology in metallurgy, computers,

electronics, ceramics, fuels, and power equipment.

The following discussion is extracted from the Report of

Working Group 8 (Air Transport Environment), Section 3 -

Aeronautical Technology Projections, International Aviation

Policy Review, which addresses those advances which are likely

to have a significant influence on the aircraft expected to be

operational through 1985 1990, (Table 2).

In view of the large recent investments in widebody transports,

the slowdown in demand growth, the rising fuel costs, and world-

wide economic problems, the character of the long-haul transport

aircraft fleet is not expected to change dramatically over the

next decade. Much of the commercial transport demand will be

met at least through 1980, and probably through 1985, by

additional production of aircraft currently in service and by

derivatives of these aircraft. The derivatives and growth

versions will incorporate some new technology, but to a limited

degree consistent with the objective of avoiding a new develop-

ment cost. One possible exception is the Concorde, to be

introduced in 1976, which could, when fully operational, capture

most or all of the first-class trans-Atlantic traffic and some

fraction of the business-travel coach traffic. It is con-

ceivable that this could eventually lead to a U.S. SST; if so,

however, operational introduction would not be expected during

the time period being considered. There is also a possibility


that competition, or an upturn in demand and the financial

outlook, will stimulate development of a new subsonic transport

(e.g., "7X7", "DC-X" or "L-10XX").

Technology likely to be incorporated in the modifications or

derivative aircraft sold during the next decade will include

engine and aircraft component improvements directed at reduced

fuel consumption, reduced noise, reduced emissions, and increased

propulsive and aerodynamic efficiency. These improvements could

appear on aircraft ready for service by 1980. More effective

improvements based on R&D currently ready or nearing readiness

(e.g., supercritical wing, high aspect ratio, composite

structures, quiet engines, clean combustors, active controls)

could be incorporated in new aircraft ready for operation by

1985, should conditions warrant their development.

The primary benefits associated with these improvements can

be summarized briefly as follows:

Fuel savings

Modified or derivative aircraft which could be operational by

1980 should exhibit fuel savings on the order of 10 percent,

with corresponding cost savings dependent on fuel prices.

All-new production aircraft which could be operational by 1985

would be expected to yield savings closer to 30 percent. If

the development of new aircraft is delayed an additional 5

years, savings as high as 50 percent appear technically feasible.

72-601 0 76 7



Emission improvement

The concerns relative to stratospheric pollution expressed,

for example, in DOT's "CIAP" report primarily concern NO
emissions. Minor combustor modifications based on technological

advances made within the next 4 to 7 years could reduce the

NOx emission index by approximately 30%.. New engines which

could be developed and certificated by 1985 could incorporate

major combustor redesigns which would reduce NOx emission

indices by as much as 75% below those of current production

engines. It appears that still lower NOx emission levels are

at least theoretically possible, but this further improvement

would not be expected during the time period under consideration.

Noise reduction

It appears that the refanned JT8D engine could reduce the noise

of the narrow-bodied transports (727, 737, DC9) to below FAR 36

levels; however, no decision has been made to retrofit any of

the airline fleets with these engines. The cost of retrofit

is the prime deterrent. It is most probable, however, that an

improved JT8D series incorporating the refanned engine technology

will be produced and installed starting in 1978 in new production

stretched versions of 727 and possibly DC-9 aircraft. These

growth versions, since they will utilize increased thrust, will

not realize the full noise-reduction benefits of the new fan;

they will, however, meet the FAR-36 limits and will be signifi-

cantly quieter than the current narrow-bodied aircraft.