U.S. troop withdrawal from the Republic of Korea


Material Information

U.S. troop withdrawal from the Republic of Korea a report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate
Physical Description:
xi, 85 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.
Humphrey, Hubert H ( Hubert Horatio ), 1911-1978
Glenn, John, 1921-
United States -- Congress. -- Senate. -- Committee on Foreign Relations
U.S. Govt. Print. Off.
Place of Publication:
Publication Date:


Subjects / Keywords:
Military assistance, American -- Korea   ( lcsh )
Foreign relations -- Korea -- United States   ( lcsh )
Foreign relations -- United States -- Korea   ( lcsh )
Armed Forces -- United States -- Korea   ( lcsh )
federal government publication   ( marcgt )
non-fiction   ( marcgt )


Statement of Responsibility:
by Hubert H. Humphrey and John Glenn.
General Note:
CIS Microfiche Accession Numbers: CIS 78 S382-6
General Note:
At head of title: 95th Congress, 2d session. Committee print.
General Note:
Jan. 9, 1978.
General Note:
Reuse of record except for individual research requires license from LexisNexis Academic & Library Solutions.

Record Information

Source Institution:
University of Florida
Rights Management:
All applicable rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
Resource Identifier:
aleph - 024781013
oclc - 04379562
lcc - KF49
System ID:

Full Text
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As the date on the letter that follows indicates the final draft of this Joint Report from Senator Hubert
and myself was in the process of being printed at -the time of his death. One of the last letters I received
-from him Just a short time earlier dealt with details of this report, I knew personally of his extreme interest in t". ifiatters and his concern that they -be handled with

tZrr experience, vitality, counsel, and wisdom will usm& While, I am saddened by 'our loss of his pres. enee I am Wwred. and happy to release our joint reporL JoiaN GLFxii.


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Th~rran STATes SEATa,
Coxxrrraz ox Founw GRE t4xoN, IWashington, D.C,7January 9, 1978.
Hon. onN SmAmANs,
67hOsairsmitee on Foreign Belations U.S. 8en eallLton%, D. C.
Dmmt Mn. CHAmauN: On March 9, 1977, President Car-ter announced his Admnistation's -intention to withdraw all U.S. ground combat troops from the Republic of Korea in four to five years. Specific masuse as uplagnin this decision were developed during the spring of 1997 and ihumatinc during the July 926, 1977, TT.S.-South Korean securiy conuletative meeting. Earlier mn June 1977, the Committee on. Fohit1Retions held three days of closed hearings on the with.The President's decision to withdraw troops from Korea will have a critiesl ipad on the peace and stability of East Asia. Indeed, one of the taot important but often overlooked aspects of the Korean withdraw a ie effect it has on other East Asian nations. These countries ae t as one of a series of steps indicating a weakening United State a lad~fentta that region. TO.omest for, withdfaw''al the president has proposed an $800 millione31tr aid pakg addition to already planned annual' aid of $27 milin The Pull Committee plans to hold hearings on this aujc earthis year. Becus fthe orac of the President's decision, the Subcommitteee Frna l ac and the Subcommittee on East Asian and P8feAf~r cooperated in an oversight effort which included two tr"10t th ar Af Ihedietion of Senator Humphrey, Committee sta er~k'1ass Binnendijk and consultant Lt. General
Herbet Beknt0 UM Rot.), traveled to Asia from August 1-19
to assm teseam.Laterin August Senator Glenn visited Korea and tonppaidb Conmnittee staff member Roy Werner.
We, lav jM 1 wrtte thsport on "U.S. Troop Withdrawal fron:h ]e a~t as ofKra' in an effort to provide background ma-.
terisl aw thsyas er:WTCrport concludes that negotiations between Notmn ot oe-ae stle nd North Korea has over
tim i. an aes a offensive capability. UJ.S.
treop wtdaamut hrfz proceed with great care and with
renewed a~lwtcefrst reduce tensions in the Korean peninsua,


wbdle being n3indU that those deefidons wW &W have majorr bapad on all nations in the East "an ngica, report refieC6 only our
opuuons and not those of the Su&o ttem Humarr H. H Y,
V41h APO on
AspWance. Am

6ha A6 Subcommktw on .. ... t Asim and P"* Affaim

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Summary and condusions ----------------- ---------------------------------------------- -------- ---- 5
Chopter, M* tonal Xorew:.
ko th Korean --------------- 7
U.S. interests
-- ------The Chinese-Soviet equation----- ------------------------------- 9
The Soviet Union ------------------------------------------------ 10
China ------------------------------------------------------------ 11
The view from Japan ----- -------------------------------------- 13
Views from other Asian allies ----------------------------- 15
Summary ------------------------------------------------------ 18
Chapter-II.-The U.S. Decision and the South Korean Reaction.*
The witbdrawal decision -------------- ; ---------------------------- 19
The U.S. decision proem ------- ------------- ---------------- 19
The South Korean reaction ------------------------------ 7 -------- 21
Chapter HL-The Afflitary Sittiatim in Korea:
The mMtary balance ---------------------------------------------- 27
Attack seenarto ----- ----------------------- ------------------- 28
Warning time ----- ---------------------------------------------- 30
The air balance ------------------- ------------------------------ 31
Naval balance --------- ----------- ----------------------- 31
North Korea's military posture ----------------------- ------------ 32
Sununaryof the balance ----- ----------------------------- 32
South Korea's military posture and nudear option ------------------- 33
empter lv. -The Role of U.S. Forces in Korea:
Status of U.S. troops in Korea ------------------------------------- 35
Asistwe with the defense of Korea ----------------------- 39
Deterrence ------------------------------------------------------ 40
The armistice and U.N. Command role ---------------------------- 41
Chapter V.-U.S. Military and Fkmomic, to South Korea:
Oduth Korean requirements ---------------------------------------- 43
The 1971-75 modernization plan (MOD) ---------------------------- 44
The force improvement plan ---------------------------------------- 44
The nsatory aid package ------------------------------------ 45
war reserve stockpiles ------------------------------------- I --------- 47
Pvb1ic:Uw 480 food aid and the defense budget ------------------ 48
Other econwaie to South Korea-----. ------------------- 49
Chapter VI.-South Korea"s Domestic Defense Industry:
Ova-Oew -------------------------------------------------------- 51
Spedifie defense industries ---------------------------------------- 52
CUpter VIle-Human Rights in Korea:
Background ----------- --- ----------------------- - ---------- 57
The hwnan rights record In Sotft Xorea ---------------------------- 58
Human rights in perspective, the cam of North Korea ---------------- 60
-U.S. troop withdrawal and the human rights problem ------------- 61
L--PaUtleal Background ot the Republic of Korea:
The Government of Syngman Rhee ------- ------------------------ 63
Civil mffitM7 government - ------- ------------------------------ 64
The politics of cowdtational revision -------------------------------The Natioual Amembly --------- t ----------------------------------- 67
The ju&cW brandt ----------- ; ------------------------------------- 08
I*W government --------------------------- - ----------------- 08
------------------------------------------ 69


In the,:2600 4)f 16 Appeftdik M.-'Economfe IDev v
f 1: Nx :!i- - - - - - - - 74

Deftnse spending ---- ------------ ------ ------ 75

Balance of payments --------------- L -------------------- 76

Trade ------------------------ ------- 77
Foreign debts -----------Investment climate-------- ---------------- 78

Inflation ------------------------- --- 79
fnergy 79

A III.-Poadble Military Mater*! Produetka ]164:

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of terins In
Appendix IV.-U.S. Forces in the

V.-U.&-US.&-EL M111tary Perves In 84
VI.-IM -76 Moderulzatieii Rfigublieaf JK': I M
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ve &- ik futu 'Sto f.
ores. kL9,R.,,pubHcI urV....*I.ffi,4r&Wa4 h)
IV a be ] no Pr &.--,sure on e United tates, le ng many
va S
Administration officials tq.,,belikeve h would rather see the UlAted.. States rerhain in Korea to assure its stability. Japan, our most Asia hiw Muic 1 s
I* 1 41
,L...;bmjkO. '-Ur-rm;-incUplomafi-otallobetween:Northim4.KIRMW. PIWO. -4diaJogue was brokm
K40kM. favors Ow. us quo
jai;Wn d sjow gzoeessi of
-M* the 14wer fma &Uproviti to. re-.
a fi Can to a lime Isms such. as
reauedon, ne North refuseii to;enter into any negoUations with 0"" 11an+Pu* but has invile&6o WW States to ne&tiate militax7
AThwrUnited)9taftir-IM rehuw to bi gurawwith the
No,* (DIM'K. 'libem- si al& q.uI&=derrftMOffieA[*tim&cy
R blicie.. ]Cxwm ILK, Instetid Ahe
U-S-. AWKt:,an&, RK), di DR tbe. ,N orth h a w To']* ected.:
taffoTt-66 hiiti*6einqdtil&hm "egoU*iAims in::aa Attemputtoveduce temions am the Koiea* ti) Us..troqp wiffidmwal.have
Ifa P 'trWp
Y Ounew
stn- g
IT. s Umd
atmai: h sMI has
Wkdift! e9bf ted States
A to thr6ww jMV4CWM -withdr in, ank
Ag -kwal PIAM
ogW,:: to Kbnug... -tv the.. t abk:., The Vnited
*04 a" reom AmtsuldhWan IIPMPIIDVe

Q&rt*JwdK 'Pled to withdrmw alIU.S. 94, ktrvapf AMMA Widuft. !years,
PIP" M&r
AMU:.TJm:. timpAs.
IPM W*IN*OW]Mki&.9 %W
Ab" Vtim #Ovbknt
I to jjjjj_,$ AIM' to WWALIMM k


mr, imal and ground si pport role after 19M The rem=* tw vW
drawal cited b, y the Administration are South Korea's ress, wavering congressional support for a continued UA preseaft in Korea, andU.S. detente with Worth Korea's two prmedprd allim
Because vf the -A-mfined nature of the PrafidenVs
South Korean orbd4*j*x*M Ishey Alftwm -H bit wwo
only "informed." Between March aind July 1977 tbay know only that
U.S. troops would be Lasy4ftembeafain 4111OW
and compensation Aa rvat an,
jr*0, 16W f 7.
ticm4 ailid s f
Q.. 4.1 TITY 14 jf I t M bA
i. C 9:11 t.tl 1. 1.1k, U.i T1 vl ieAlOvIr ,

has shifted f Irom rough parity in 1970 to a eei advantap mr" North mi 1977. The p1s"Cionw. an jaill Ahe North ground weapons ( ant MO, ars'),2! nbt o
"llery, rt
'Q an AN. #461901kt
Onft 'mid, U fit
1W Haw
abib f C r::: ikifoffi& '467f
bakh6 tan be 110CIUM'I qj di ujg..
L -Z
whek Uis nis nu
ybe. Un
1A .11 di-v: X of!T rie rwSn wml
Td -TJA 11 1fiO!)i237q
Worth- KA"&#tOuxd..Ay ew oreAw: DMZ either. totnJm advi of. js,: !:NK1 4 An tiktu*
661110i;J1111iL4. W e Amy AIM
M: itaid 1fKWW= 1:
Korea, has the 91 .0f Ok Aftsak,
&V "d
ties: of a bumddhrough bo 866d woidd Us* x'A 1114
U.S. com M do: not: ikim great 701 R& witilmusivx0im
1"lky to &tea
UMDRS '9Drdi XONOL6 TbO &Wt r Otpekizwk
to. restrain orww&"
run"=we Owler... of NOI& rwrelbiv btaw

am the Ino'st t1"-XMvA 'a

4W 1-1 ONOMP4 VA(PA13
to: hil dbiWn
10i Ode* ahd: i divi4" I" taibnmP fAir

f unetions and ff"ymbohzie U4.,)COMM to AL Of

k Sou., K0
I 1111 0 rea.helps to
the militAry situation i ihree ways: it provides considerable fire0wer it provides for an L response that serves as an
important determt; and the. V is able to orchestrate trace'Operstim";4nd restrain. zealous. Soiath Korean
:any Overly
rftgUoux to incidentiL.? A 4
Will. weaken:ddenvwe and Removal of U.S. grogad forbal. dehtedl.w.i
10604ffilf t. WjM;UJO".ass]JstanCe
tQ so M_ O"dwj ad W=
function can be replac6d by .17"
ROIK foibms. Trw- withdrawal::Will pMably require d=ges in thep ,
UN Wifimmd: $tradum vtjxffit iati diplomatic-In"sures'. to
UPProp, ....
c"M result in iA. 8"OR M' e peninsuls::16ur yea=
*Mtain'the option not to, become involved
in ahbtbpr groundwar in .Asi&; but With:-the Umited. States Laintaining ita.. mm V.S. Naval and Air Form personnel would
undoubtedly vwsh"ld break out.
be involvedif

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Current plabsta: 4r $.LV.,billiou'lift FMS-trO&ts and grant mihta;y 1', 1981 Tlit $800 milliion gid to, Scouth, KQr& Ithrot&: fism 76ar tramuster-tof IS. equipmwt currently., int K the
HJ read L 17
0 a quandt or quality M6 Aqwpmffit' f th
tbd& I Bmi&s emewn about be ninff 4a
gm CP earmm IM. in. 16: arm. In
(kmgvessioiial u'proval has talft&- -6 far
on x: symbolicnattli
1111mullitm qf the
Ilk VSJUOV ttlm ii;,* mot-just in I[Corea: but t* many
th6 W
nUckPWJA A) d-, EmA Asian, Arta.... Disappr6via of
IF Jtpiv 16W
.. .. ... ...
thi maxLy 6ther verv conceded nations of the region as a decided
-lack of ;xnmitmenC by. the* United'StAteti,'. ft-bommitment they havii
al sepou V questioned, from, a. of moves.. made. by, the
in'the IMA:yeki.
0 1 Kom s iio th ificgrant aid
Of';So eco D $76 e SpecId be 'tlie -s6l_,3 ct f f6rtheir si
AA"i t
n1distion ab6ut 60 o*qr gag could Mul...
411 01 ini &Ations.
For exw m is:eoup-m le.;bW P-46y's IC&
pie, the Aodmini
&mth.Korw Tikis would in4vduce highly sophisticated weapons iniuo
a newregam +fpr the fumt Wne. wW.Appears inconsistent with the President)3 a ms-+ Wwfeu:... J AAother unresolved military -sales problew dkpoifim. tion stockW Q. we.. -Of R"Hy $1 billion in V, S.
P i-W.. -W far IWIK toe.
&Mth jt rWS domestic defeum indust.y is. the Ikey.,to its aW i ty,
deW 'O in t40 North X0 ..fias'a *all-7daveloped.do aes-....
iously relied on ports Souffi has, prev im
Pri; i s to rapi y rvnelop this industry have led to two major problems; quality control and w management.

South Korm Im-the pe q4mm npo
oim Me,1041 W
Sme expe t
m a 6w
*r ,
V6:humift 11itaktioul SeatkKofta kmA mob eat, ibdm
warrants continuous US. di omatio attention. %NO ave,"
beed. Aad 9A.
of "Am
&Wording to st*erid db6dentsint6rvieive&hjr4&o Otis
coam of forbu e bave beem -N-wkMbm for xft]-*
ft bio' bjsi&d;hii%14R)
Comp", M--1 to A& riphts rw6r & All *'pods: df hk.,iw X"th Kai* A 4
any oceuWion Xed
on, eduawtu. 4'. ,
bMd r117
trafled'.. I 11.
state. A Aw
The Republic of Ko vnkhL
1. .., .. .*'o 84A IM
*orld the 7 ftmt' of tmde P7 iouifts
export-led #a i0ff
cement sijnmm FidU &fenm'f; WM
ewrent, 665. of GNPi howevw, and *a@4 *m SOA16
growtL lsouth.K x loWJ
W"'Wmw fiv YCU16 lju Aft mrwim mmizm P2*41
eeted to Opline from 1.1.0 Vwic iA W.T t4 AMA. "T.M" ix I 1mita',
1 AMP, 0 Mergy ply or trode, I VIP
*t, 1w able, to mignat W&
&uth f6rits,-dww. "if
a, vidlable IMWT Okj
dii,livibpmeut In 1%,uthKoreaV
aut4prikarian. central government, weak
pirtili and hrdf d tolemee kr4issent
4 r 11 I
twe Tucian'
tr, aditiohal C respect, f and e9ma
or p i A Me 4
dpmmratic cpomptg is n6(APY IM I .A4:i'V
4" 141
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Reco.x .nawo.s

0 Th Seateediuldreview the miliary tansfer authorization
base~aymthe ..litical-. itary neds of the are:a adavoidlikn
ito.tebrbr scandal. Ltng term U.S. Political -lgmnsin thle whole East-Assan region must not be jeopardized for the short-terma objectives of the scandal investigation.
I. Because of the current unbalanceJ between North and South Korean forces on the peninsdula, each phase of U.S. troop withdrawal abould be approached meet cautiously. To assure Congress that withdrawal ean proceed .with Minimum risk,-eilto should be submitedreqmring a detaile Presidential report prior to each withdra&wal phase. Thereor would include assmnsof the military
balnceasthepennslath impact of withdrawal on the miitar balance, the aequacy of U.S. Military assistance, the impact of withdrwa a te Nand ROK comnitutre, ROK defensive
fori~atinsand defense industry developments4, the U.S. reinforcemenat esablty and the progress of diplomatic, efforts to reduce teais- i thear.
8. Our EFAA Asian allies should be adqaeycnutdpior to eac pheaOf thBrooed withdrawal
4. heU.. sholdcontinue through word and deed to make clear its continuing commiMtmen to South Korea in order to avoid any chance of a North Korean miscalculation.
5. maordiplomatic offensive. should be undertaken to try to bring bh eaeas to the.ngtitn table. The negotiations should focus a :arms control mauetopWithdrawals from theDM
ares "s patsland codece. buig measures. ACDA should be7b ed to:sud possible arms conrol alternatives to be
8The Unite Stats0abMldnot ecgieNorth Korea without
res' eca scogitonof South Korea by North Koreas allies The U.B. shoaldhowever, matchinforal contacts and gestures which the
POand U88E aremakin toward South Korea.
T. Th huma rigt ituaion in South Korea needs constant diploaestie gmhIbOara hudke in mind that the human
righare Nedof Kat oreas innily wre.
8 eva ehanlmatr aol be considered in connection
wit, hemiitwytrnsw utorzaimrequaest icui:(a) the
nee tWtelase~i ito equpmet or a dollar ceding; (b) thei aed ofd.e.ainanelaeetcosts: used by the ExecupIata; (d) -t pae of this trasernIVIS.Arm~y redns;and
(e) im dniedlityof aPosiatia detremiatothat the transImea dos mt A i~catlyaltr etherthequaitaiveor-


90 M Committee on ForAft, ReIiWionp should Unim vAy R
jectod sale Of F-46 waiters to S611th Korei;, enn 494 of ij6p'IIJ46
Is, P#A
an escalation of a Xcirean ar s At7 *
lo. The M ry Assistan ACIVM;J... G-w! for South Kome
should again be authori I
FY 1VM T&hniad awistance team to help-South. Korea unprove its on A.
basis are warranted. . ....
lie The vat of War Ptesdive, f f U
tkw to
enluited finane
trabsfer "to South. Xpre&

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3em an f t most unstable and violent regions
hial e 0 'he woTids
thiw the: iM : edntut A. -apan the
y Fow-Malar powers Chinit,
tioyi&,Vnion I iad th6:,United States) inelgivd developments Mi northeja4 4Wa As: SW eant. Inthis, t 6ntext the prospects for war 6r peace
in, tba,--reg*wnKstre:,ol :critieaI impdfta and the US, cmunitment to
Son& ji01*h:::hAs, implications that.ae"reponsl Rhdl 916bal m scope.
ASO%& has historically occupiM central role in .rbda ]t Great=interIS: A &I pc in
po"ti tw
eds interse&,4rr.K*r** Rnd r fleet their respective nation inter
9" However): the changing internationall invirenment, ion this &cade
basNmsened the potential for violence. "D6tente" between Moscow'and
-M hip kra0proehiftnent- betwem Peking and Washington and the reduced tensi
000.. wfliwy, xek;of aw ti ve mWed an en of ons.
IM ftereise "control"" over the poli YIIII :of, cles
4), .,T60:,often Ameiieans think of Rorea in a vacamingi outy the w, ilitarybalance between North tnd South
'larwas, P0fiI4 Ih
ovft".1ri, is thittdevelopments Korea
Alffe0b."XIII of, BastA4 involve severd:::great powers,, and are, p6tentia4-dwitabilizimg to the presentinternational equilibrium, 104
Y J., g9veromeats. of Ow two 2TdvnWbk to agree on
1,, M im IV%
T', e h-$ou&: tQw. was a statement by PreEd
Wot ijkv xi
k he emphasized a'wilh -This wth 6. st repo cad the:use of foree. to reunin UW* XQ r
"0 f00L4Wqd,.a4:,, otati i the 19,60's during
p riod of -tow coafroo Gn,
WW4 gwerTu =4, 4; %aeld't$11 along the DXZ WM
r apptahonsion
Tu$ D4wese_ relktiont smItiod: m*
in'both A wem Shordy ftfi6i the A
it -the"i VM... -br SW idivi ed
X ess itae
M-4 xi*
M, Vm
,left 'ThaA
O N 4 ... ... ..
On j6bt 001hMunufm rev"led. that, desfiiip hattm
held WVM'M repremntafim of the North andSouth M, discuss reunifias tlon T he cohmuniq_ 44he No
771-7=7T, -bon, of the Nofth-South
UwAim, Committee to facilitate ffiscu triety.(? ob

o d drAWAL; Soitth X
r IV
(I 0i M ,&* __.
UwAiftv 4M* 46W)k ngqf%11'. 'how

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tics but does s of W. tranAti *mvK*xvhmo he
Urged rAn"s=ion 4,q OkIOIK"ew to, the U W- ]Re
hnvm.r" *lnv 'hat
Miects, however, any ion t would give legitimacy to' the Republit, af.) Oreq (ROK): ::swh seajNtmemb mmp.ft t i*,*-*-"Oj"i*b*ltijonorROK. PaftiCAP4004 mw"Mm 'AAWS" Akn&mftt
0,41-, nflAve
North-Sou -4 talks whiek epixim 0721ave h.&
wit ith tbo exceptimofTm
OV F*njt
t1helaum. e0ectivalY suspeno Bank*"
*to ropw a meamptim C. atign. It wW" to a %ms hunmoibui4ft me*muw mu& as, lamW risft
i exq. ige&
41ad a 1 h tkwi& 06POWIff, "bim&
to: focus, insteadOwmnier joUitarytimnes UwIfa"ejAkhw0&W ma ai mw JimitAtions..
t6 AM
North ilakbrallaum; wia i68d3WempwhA the
Al Ibw
wabl& a
P90-ion OL Called SMOMI. M for r4bwer td) LA t&"
up 4&8: b*VO, howaveri i bem Defarmind&d
foi6 to W;e I 'inap*i4fl*
,qV liable j6"PmjjAwbjmpwbptk sidtmpaiha
table prior to V JSO ground troop withilra'wal froni the uea have m6t -been productive. I Al -7i .:%- kj1JI)TI
AUough 49 naii o. ns recognize both North and South WoreA e. Yorth,)Xppeorw to be"1641W internationally. North K6i i 14,4#w" Kome, 'howomr4.4b, now""go i0m, theV LJL
f$kV#r wO, oa& Ad% Btt;,m tM.-I MMjt d Mhtzont Koo r*
".illustrated 'Noftk Ywift: did n6t
notiontWodifical stlwim". 0
UN, and the ROK has applied unmemmfully for,
The 4ROU f6f tmWnt diA1*0 M@mi id
$eRkh.. Ahl sqmrL PWftio&xb66qjft "a

boa M040"kt P0. Z
q4Y Imw
fij io t
ij N VS .9
Wk- i9h
bo K
re Awk let, #*e Otim

itment to Sb for: ees or'
Unit d Statm eith rA6 comniit additional com. at
orenepondt'Itgee 6 .Irea comm Outh Korea.
din tht, penifisula, C61114 82SIP the d ate United StatesO eAoVipfb0ane6th*tI4is
Min e16 p !gm im 1972
the Rldiein wa th 'rimiry U 8 role X has been
a mil I.,
atkmA s4naintAined-i Ii resniffifiry Sin 1#56 the Uri= 6 i 'it
eri& in OK6rea"unddr 'the alispi Ahw United :Nations (IJI reA. lix u y council Resolution
flt dfit Itho decision enre s 4 the UN See rk C
S/1511 (Ittl 2t 10,W), whithv-r Inember StA to ftnish assistanc .11 wi Unn attack ri ofth, Koret. The
e to the ROX torePi
W v Ifi:'8Wth::Xor6a_Is 4166 consistent with; but
sta 6" 'F"Ot troops-'
nIck :requ& 4 the U.A ROK vauai Defefise Treat (1954). which
sftdes fhat (1)... "kh anned atfack. in' the Pokific Are a .-on ioither of the
4 1 atid
on fety" and (2)
P&'rd89-* W:' Id-be-da, _0119 t6 AS' 0A]i peaee sa
a v I Iiine6t the conimon:6 -rer ifi: accordance with its. that rich" P it WM, ng
66fistifut-mk nal 94i do Carter Aated that troop withdi-A*al vin n6t* &f r&t diii'i Ont and ho" bliely reaffirmed it
ODL severI14occasions.
TT.S., t ifitftr jiil 66, has ilso been necessary.'because the 1'05a Ar sfi e A ba)wit- 'W the-United- Stift d, the arinisth-*n 9iiii U t der
ti i'At qr th IK6i-oa lh is rOsPonsible un
t* A*hf f6r trut% keop- Twhn continueg
mg -ca y;,& state of war to
in ftmL41ce, now:'%, 'it year. '136th the tn
Rep-ablae, of Xonig"have kepiesteff : cklled'for:
rMimmt, arfa n ement but all s;tich' J have be en Oectedby
9 ..... ...
A& hn p'O-4fiiiee 6f stability' ih'' -6Unite f Statft
Ohink, Japan and the Sov a h if"test
"tes iet Unioli in Onsing
to. I .
pen ithdrim U S.
bd* the ifi" ...Ile lpregident's decision wi
ftoin I 'ra y cause
ki4k has fi itu* 11' 'd other 9fate to
reconsider. thexple of the Urifted States MFAd "A. Koftan developments thus are a 4y to abilityt W the region.
11.1 y7t
Wili Ah6ig
Am, curr, 'it, it sth ce -Iryfto
Aii, re 611 lftdeACk n* o dim Sovie interea in inahi,
t ar6 1 ybft&*nO,8-trftfy allies dfid tradihr
IsIft 'h k, $ rt b
Pa 61itical nva rv,
Mort %S ca
th"; M6*erth6Ieqs('*b6th P616n and
With ni te azid Ja,Pmi ibdm
j th, y
itno *h "AcOd
r9ta dg-aiid'vi wI6, tf.14.
it lisKtl ea,
c rhoA that anY'WithL..
fi mamnev
a, that
ittrj,, b0ahee As 10hr
4iv0,6m ptbsAdng Me"POwe& in, t*
...... rem

terra" 4 vic4wy W P O-W
neither, :iit N
P Y 444
able tofight A" war. joi, ;Q ou
the': P190 or 4 X MIO
W4. -i V eko to the,pujr4iit f
Gul hxv*Utle4c
tba i e but W
71 ith lt4,al4 Sui)g'i C6 I It# 4 CAI
Frym s gorth Pe W VF Olk]L -PQ
P 0 rv,USOW sisw it 21jows them
each amY
either XoscoWor 411# kin red, tQ4
,ms.. to. be a owx
China w. r, _a41
evI since
the.0ther-944a, P ug' 11111
Wind b6ffi:9111
MAW (441
Neither.. ..un S, PDW wunu
04 Y,
en&TOng ia Pwa -Xgrqos? Pw mwht r.)4
.f* PYl 01
if it ,wsn not pubhool
that, c6uld 9 W t4e intemmia"fifo.-Oal both ful to emp hmize cat on as their f j
apPS-:V4#.V eUnS"red yXimll f 3uugg, must ,XQrtA
c"t doubts W out: their sup" for QvextJy- ag
however, hm -no. apta- ous.- q
tz N*tw.
talWorth Korwo 9 AA Rj
c k So v
Nio#h Korea is EL cre i on'
Of tI Uwked Stqbw) Today, Nam
paxtwran4 smum 4 410
$( "O4ecMOlfm-Q A 17
Ova- 1 0 14"U'de St IM,
by jml f*fTr
4*-VjoU$'' epe'gilence. uV)A q* MT, w,
co win Urring-, 41
1$yn, Augu4.J9tA,, ,.,8 *1

fused to particWai ,-, ggp^ 01, the U.K14.S.R. New the 'V.LS,#.$jR., "41W'fh Q.I (or tbar PiO Wpmed the
in, -t6, 1
Aft Ak +
W F: vmT..7 A

401 d4, ia a utiified'- Kork. UnpretliebtbI6 Kim ith the'.United
cotdd IW.fial ra*tbW86 101hidn iW6 k con' f Rct V i
uft 0
Stso&. In&ed4 giveii the wiz f tbb U.8 -Navvship Pueb&Ahe
and thrill m'r&rs onl DW;them is 8;
.-tba U-7 B L .M 4ar.. The
SoWef-fear that Xim mulditiv4vel _AR OvIet,
W emaxinium ex1hWty.Wh;6nxj icidi g,*hetli t ta g&(ta. wait 4M. theofqrb;''Mil gome'distifice from- Kilwil'sun 1: jv
Ju lato, WCPYO 1h began t() asset that, the' Seoul Gov
t"': 4 the United. States.
ernwmt V" Iftot, but,*:. 2ke 0
ingl tjl
the a tbAt 1194 ft ist, !Aatm,,: presuini e
RRO, =& tho U, SX.R-) '",6annot, dftl W11 Oft 611 lew recopkim the"?y ( 'FBIS Trei!& ij.i AMng maybe fie:i W. that WSW*: og all' vdth: the
*c Ilize Siduth Kbtid in:,)A6 futurs "do 11r4ted State&1102,M10116 b, awi*41. Vfti"' h" beeu lem.. sup ivtof
a&ion. A1t1.wq& MAi 1I Sung vWked East ft Enropd ahd Nort ,A in
fncs: 1975 helms not
e ,Moscow nfice 1961, -N16ie'hss1:*,member ofthe Soviet Bifii*ura Wn to, XotthXorft since Kos'y'ginls Visit, in IM. However PEA Is C1)14 visited. thio
iWjkV=ry,1W7 North K remior onff
xvm*' t-gpok*4ith T&oui Btezhmv andW eks osygm.
SOWh*gyb anda hk ,,alsoiakt-n a leweordial tone. Soviet media : still re t*6 Xoman states", an& the.,.U.S.S.R. hasYet, to ondorsb:
Xw+ Roakils -ck-='Ao be, the 'Ilsole 86*ero _atate" on theRorean
ul'. Most impo ntly as variam:
,penin a % I government ana ysts p(Ant:
rt ry as
geAs at Soviet we ita
si9t&0wis,*eadi1* dw1M'M" 'Trhdebativ t*6At hm it"
g. mn the low
dpefia4. devblopmoxt pibbaUy voflects,.$W million, mi def aults
t payment on, ertditg)
i no Anostxwmt evidence, ofAho Soviet attitude is founditt: the September 9, 1977, banqi et marldng the 201 annive"aryof th6,,D1PRK, wlwaP6-Mr. &1oitefitse* esfididutai iftemW 6f the CPSV Caniral.. Nmviifts Politburo aw fwe, 8!& it ,p b# I r bwe crekto eon(466w 6nAkive -to, r6unit k th country onA peaed'al and.demobisi& *fthoot, A, ny Outmldointerferen'ca,: aftef t he withdrawal, of k WkWPI,
I Z froth $outh XoTea.".71jis: ond: "rhor ovklenoe g7
ett.S, OW thA, Soviet V, won- v"j bib eontent*40th tho swus
-Ifi y 'kapolfAnt, im"S" m4fie V.&-Soyiut I ionsnip: b? ntati of the, Hpilgw ttgreemexyt,
'(%d Forde' teducti F; Moscow-will
-0"0! thowion itsmeirits. In BrethmvIs rep.mm
At in Fob"tiy WOon thio'w6rld sittiad6n,
nirV Vna vW 6fiheLLAK4 an, In ihis,,context thena
wi bf *d oro* from, Vkj< ith W1111'not-sign
COOW& e"V*s -19oviet"mutionahip or &ad Mosw* tA? "oh*%,::.
. .... .. ...
t y
Pekin$ j, tttifilt6 Wkd*... h&P 4M" stipported North Korea'spositiofis on reuftification. In? a joint communique following Kim's. visit

erol #*te of tke A 0
ign, -_411) A 'AWN
Ta'a i *n WW a 10 nAtign suffiis ,& .,(h* 4
1 -A. 1. _n
014 QW( i-40Y MA
W JAct 91.1yS
i t Ve nerican p in East. o*ever
jo AAIte pf",
cqmpoti ion
fluency than the eventss. ____ "I
amistance than th e* 86 0 +
DP RXxqi4t4ry Aid 04m- ftw,*Jw Wr*M Iy been W PX4 ot tba
F yI'M
C44,_ WO., 1$7. : mflyqud to lwmg p
*ampR 0 i i.
11"Was theii major thre94 0 004me aro AONJOIWAW of. forces n4Dt lead Ila tho
8 -mile common, border witl NortUXor4w diptrial baws, Hew, inthe avaut of w* NOTffi Kore4 9 a bqger at**, oa;004 eta
offnition. MWM' I do,
have dOPI
&vmth, Fled torexam M
More spfti& conmm 'hM"tWAafti ,
b4w4 en Chim and, Korew, whiah bkolhe 43064,treso, 'IIIAII';*W4i .
aw:Automauc defense chLpft if the DPM is an event could mean war with the Vnited. 9, 4ad,,
this 4s not.,:des"hle. Thuts, during KW&-J9,T.&, wisk, 4t tho-ChInworged. restraint tT Xi
China,. thus can. retaiw.elbsewlies, with'fl* to
adva bile caution& )FOr'iftota" iw
t be
hono mL..L R.. anuiverwy of the IWW*his,-Yew tb*,WAW#MW-O0 Dail, _pbsernd I'TheChinesi people resolaW suppdWid w*VwpbAw,) pe;plal ...their s. t T VaiporW'' t MIWW'-*"404'
an inde dent sudppaceftl reAM, 4CatxO*f pen v -0 'ALifi.s. force redwtioul:in4waoflitsetimwiwt don -it& I ftsk foreip POEW, 4", tel" ]_:hit'i Will M* SD]Ue trq MLO': bOievW,,tW, tbe, Mmftw ttwitb
7 i.-' AL --e
to t4pthmt of Soviet "dewirm meut7 I Oiixiwo Piskiog,,pe ive its U,$,. relAUNW14 to"be iral 4'w* 4bility, tto Ov6j -air 4" throughout the.- region, 'XO"O*$r,Y4e weiglit on It re ing 0' f U.S. resolve, -m deislin wi the A such bilateral mat, rs as SALTO,

.. .. ....
X6ceaCUnite4:*stes,-,JaP"m suminit communiques have4lways
stmaed qw, *npoftapee. of Korea to Jaw = Tba 1975. Ford--Miki. Comexample,,,eallod Sou -ea security Ilessentia.111 to
mumqtte fbr' th or 's
Pegbe M jiort4md Agia, On tho, loexasion of Vim.Preiident MondaYs visit ts T4, Feb -197 P, 'me Miniatek Talmo: Fukuda said
in-I ruary r,
thi 'Tdroan,%ituation (teeply effectss the Peve nad,.stability of East
iVwIu4mgI, Japitia." lh re are severaI te ns,,f or Japanis. conCem. Pir Lerea-has historkaT.&W-4ontestic.. tiCa importance
toi. Jvopao. Tha Odly -Pre-World War. Illattemptgi 4tt inv4sion of. Japan
jm Stso I'de K an, strifts. In.
o& from Korea acrossfl* ;M vni)e 'wi ore '0 rigin
OIj4,pRh0,woL:Korewi o live in Japan toav ( On -he, Ropublic -of
d Li 61 refugew. W,'( dCbe exp We& it
dtm 81 6,ond Kgrea it ol ic M dance. to Jvanb.-,,n
viaw.no. betweexx Soth. Vorea: *a is $&Ibillion
and total Upanese investment in Korea is stilatZ $6,90:.Million.
TkIrdvZoso: i*01 0outermfioal voitigal: ftod.. str*tegic. importance, to
J4@*nAiJ*w vi,.Ws Ba,44si w-0trategie 'olitibs: as iripol&T, with.the
6oV*s(VWj*he..-.PIRC.,detexWV4g Japan-'a fate.
kis -the, vpi*migf .: thesp: reUtiojiships and thu, a
J eyiws io, Own-4to s&Ia*rie*hIy,.Iinke4..*Ah thtit.0 Korea..
Ln cof Komi 'Ithe Japa
t -pro ReJai 'Stau$.Ifail-5 to, tect thv:.
mew Uph to defen
*,Xadex.these inuiastaneeg ight
4voliq), 4 Situat4ow thia vvidd 4* r: the.: Ir
is far less me-4 about. the wit The Upane-se =Ublie however, conce
-ov bg4 JAtp&na Wwevw,
naw G exwe4k- T Ow
h":Ii*e& um'der its s, oo warl',opostakukion AW, 30, ytom and.. genersa y
04' -,taken
4,40a to y voaei
:Md t V.S. woops
P 12
in d ywm..
0 "Orcent, fe t the
.,did IM -VW. Tha ecemb6i! nO pe"ut I wt i Ip p 19U
those po!!Qd, would op
;gt h7" i W04 tha Pf", the
Peoent PW
American use of, basesiak *P,*PAf North, Korea attsJ d South eaP
..... ....... ..... i n
the Marc* wa, defense
power it"U.
A* ub%:
lit *oderato
%vow #Y
leader, A -th
or QJ*Pn A 40t,
izAV UxwM to beginbi
x-W, iwued W wk at vow:
1 tjWr4*
Ne _W11 WT;e MffVWOVWRqWW *"PALI4RWVpq"Ox$
lowolll Ojjitlv m-tv).I.Ark 1 '.0 J A iAg yim VI a:

#K A

.of r him thi4poo 44
UA Offici &Yom The fiist i hase d s -from t&"el,
Preddmt Mondalos To", *ieft--inkdw P riod tb*

confidence in'the TJ.$. &feniAoond POI taken 6 Y, esw e&rflier. In iold the ciW
presenbelbahe -in gowth4k6rea
"nd r"he
The s th -Tiet
Toky& Itwas nudelo14i t6ttble firm, b ut fhat withdrawal Woulat bw
t g vml decinon by Jtkvp tnesi,
MiAistar Hato"ma sftvw;d the, pwftii% duking 4 I nw$ i&er#iew b i LN.
Ts", it. .-Oat, ta, *Aft* e W*)
rho rd phase evolybd dunng ,A4t;1M$,4ROK oami particular, Ithe July 1217.Wu the Awerr'An re"ftinafibfi Of J&Panew fears. Aft t the ;ao tirgj,, 4 BItb* h, Stop, 'in Yci to ,,fe"Wwvtha at 4 "I
ISO, tPaltow"
tU.S detemihsti to r"nalifiA A A P", fifie i*portedly -rtised'W oH' ctj t6, tW U.S., OsTiL niai
*th Ambasm&r ta'Ai4- Ot G
1K7, t1* 'Foreigh '7)Vt"6r expmmed 11s,,mtisfution "in, the, td6W, recent developments, referring to the July SCW betweiWtkoi W toik;o-, SWes whd South lKaoso
The* *40w Way, is-4 W ifwp
that jiw&i,
alme- with.the ivithdft-VmlAf Sftth X&ft'issqtisfib&
It - 4, 1 1
pengatory aid 1*cksgpe. PurreiAly, they fill" M 'MAO "sider &,ftit xma 4,di ind p ftb*W IWf on.
'Ext a, ii,
to Mea8ures" Ra'6ver, thq- *M all
to theimiAti6lbs
-maintenince of the "Ibilitiry- tuftg)v k
iL;ued efforts to P" t a North
ot U.S., i
-major power COMMitmaitsu Iffift"t Mk ,'
Th TJA w
44, Statesf h", *Hea4,*
gre" "M
pwntg., Pro kUtr1*011
severO iAtetviev' ed
as t 0MEM a inmft *
self 4'iftPowd limit 0 no glw4fig-AV
ik Nik Mpeodm Wserious, thought is: b ing gi*on o 6, tary aid to South Koria. The: Jul' 29, 1976', Defense. White !?A r.

hOW,, thete: *fll I. -to scale hosdi ite i Biper
iiiiam-, 4, KO"41 in th&, im:w late N' t Oft' Mi6 W11 calls
for humlost qpahtativ6, hAVro*cqnents1thi figmhter'Aj d ASW aircraft 016. i
iknd,,si .Uls tio- ntarh to- militafization. -Amy i crease in Japan's miliz Ou" i4 rm. in ban fi 0.1 rildher ha
vin ion clear
t -nnu
t0i an: Ar6w,. of inuch:greAte. ': instabi
14W r I R1ty
ftch woub -by a U.S.:witlidftwal from
mi K* siio*sdul Not"i Ktoreafi mivamm -of South'Koirefi,
or dov*pm2#q ,'Q Worth.Or South Korm...:
gAluoia uv1iWy mmh themma-likely JApauese a4ion will
....... -Iewamnic: assistance to South Korea to offset inWX ddenm gm recohomie cultural and
The believe such
PQXOWSI fies IMP .;e
cook" 0.4:. Oalmth Korea& Finally,
JOP" I irV robabir vontkue to try. to dev international, under0 P medum.. on thi6 p a.
III,=. ffie Pore
o f A* P jSjjjft4M.
ALIU.1m 16 1% 1.
tbe.&A#ft"i- im and
# . 1 9 1 MRS1.
r OMID stex an*44 iatoe Wed. 4 theic i#m pressed
ceitainty-about tht elme'r V.UB. pohey. m" eA.to r
ftbor*Odtom I doeisieft, the Pa"Ne Aqognifidn of the RC
M6 e ne IS, PUt4&#' ani
ial rew ition
d tiatikam "ifid aji'fighti ssueo, xuaed. m-Any Asian legdem to
o 4m AA_ p" -4- A-8 on U.& Polis U
asmucoordi"W. In Waohin
A, S
have similarly spoken with Senator Glenn Abo 1CV In
eMong With Hanoi P eking sad even: Pyongyang
: ig hi
about h- 1111 rigbtg smou
ould, oujr exp -concerns Sly
.. .... ftev, Oiii relitiouslo wifh gu Korea, the
mh places South,
&VI-ft, U*Ves 'he lrmalsiloeetn h
iiato f 0* can we
ifitAlizatiorl" of',: '...Indian
movane VAet
4m, *O, 40, ffic med ito6ut, tit
PIP" O V *;Pio even
tiif s A that Ares of e bb A- C& t 6d
its, I iLnd air O"m m
''d stdst
Or of the::Is
Pt year's mili"17
thoI it id not.,ps0e to n onesis and Thailand, even I

M, Y1
Aff I i Sol, an" t
'74 77 -r
tr to L 1, j #
imlox bolail JLWI WN 4ill i*wa W.1- V

21-346, 0 -16 4

'A (.2

Why, mmuo, alwoon* AM NO 6 m: it m 4 tbq taken they.
exp h
*4 *lot w
"Can wwm= rely an dk*TiIW S*6*?-WeW-Avkkik6
Secretary Viknce!s, WIlrOdito Wlbo Wmw
rmm"Wed some, MAst t6untiie@ thuei
fiAU@d:'stat@utxmt9 abcat U.S. seegritrlttertzU -iu As" SWtes, *6 M': tatreat. Ea& nation sml*z tht 4f
as& power vacuuml.':i'nli&,41:it&4mitse ty=l#nj Col
Lee KusLn Yewls: e tspokeii: 466L
A W-j"W41.40001 M.,Q AwApid 'S -4
'"4091*40 A bode* i ROV" 14,
M. : il
-"Fohr Bft sC AM Ae MK: tw-M&
Ime IN
tbAVj&.tft WOM at theit"WNI- lut loll m '113iim6mft *dimiWOW lbudwr
tlonaoc the Immt t" de"4eq," WA914ja
conaldOatlou lu To,- a
for the wlthdmwal of all W, 1h
Wk of 14OKnem
tr9m W11 mpp k -w
termi uena.4 46i r VtLrll$

llevM t4x OA t* :.
froili, 012m. for
raw4l t,
do rose4 Asi
tre-at 'to naUtotm
US' promise al to,
'0 one as
ore 17
were mr
b6 Sin %
chi COW JOUSIA0 3) lead
a -j"A'
to ;WOUW

#rlSl -vjx -e, J
TOWSX1 ;A) I...; S1
MT peop
eowbifw WIV Vft wit V,.O.
As &iffiir Alt.;
;4: EIJ3XUU9MVM 1 F,
ZV= Xo *1 ii l
-SeCurl apmment. In gen-Ortl th' I t
t t m
ret g ift'defeim nu ltor &, *U&
forces there. However, became the PRC has &i4l6we

andhienasdiidd omlands, some aviials se h rdtability
of ^EScomitmnt t Soth-ewe as n iporantsigal to
everat .S~dcisons egadingnor action with. the PRC and the fate of'iwamn.
C oiical feel aoeln -with South Korea since they sent
troo s in15) hyaecnendWith President Carter's Asia
po 7 but arenot uaaos&tertiudtwrdthe Korean decis foeig'$(nidr Ippait aidtha hesawtheKorea decision asi pat of an ioal 'l. withrawal from Asi and this concerned bim. ise was n6t 'howevr amla with Many details of decision.
VirDaeae inite Lkhowever, sid that as: a military man he
na -pd ht th nie Satscol quickly -eintroduce ground oi-w iy thatx our onied.cmmtmn was the imp ortant
1 i el eige ndaeincreasingly tu raing: to ASEAN. to ad 'fmoral4 and psychlgical" support for* their security 4..eyface 10,000 in- get anbrer clashes with C0amAsa, Teos ome rnenste Thanintook a hard line
o 6(A 4beities 6adwa orthrown bythe military in Otbr
Ti naiinulitary places a high premium on ..M miiayassance ap tis~ repcbsevoafSuhKra bservers la Thailand

ThMpie Vr cocre bu h oenwthdrawal, but
the ilppines Unde Se0tr of efen e atd t his tvrnmos di not-believe the United States would abandon the western Paii and that the tUnite d States would adequately compe .nsate South Kor-nThe prevalent -concern in the Phihippines was that Japan might rest to the Korean decision by rearming and perhaps eventually devekopig nuclear we:ans. 'lkh Philippines are able to take a more relax.vie becuseo(1thi geographic position; (2) the absence of imeiaesecurity thret; (9) their belief that U.S. bases will
rev 1 nth Philippines; n (4) their compensating diplomatic
E eiatosbewe the Phlpies and the Unie States a in underway Ironicaly, the Koendecision makes the Philippa eesmoe upo tbAa rviulbt for their psychole .impaea: and th0ir proximity to Korea. Many Asian leaders into~riwed~Aad they would watch the United States-.Philippine base aq-t ions as ajn iniais.fU.S. intent inthearea. In addition, O? ki aesp'rnr iin absent A general. war, is reinforce4 or" Noe Th. ..two .uadron.of F--4a statioed atClark should
14 to.erryto Korea in less than 2A hours

strianan derpment a concern about troop: withdrawal is
1 .1the fiir witlahawal from Korea ma syboliz the
-i .r ftldtwA from is. SBecond, they see'Korea as "con e Of
lidihl. 'k *toinitratoa po lties? Acoring to
th Ai~fi '" ,they believe thait "ay step which sub-

Altells KOO status qw
'y Ve
ti V" &Ybc j*

regAiftL41 Ir
geopo Itift
(Nylmtil l 10*- 1'' 't ,,
stalyze the decinion'm It. "Ulk
Milt. W itn t0keth r bimf '6ftatilm tit ruvu WJL
tinuing lu.s. co ftmt tot AA&:.,*V6 I Aa- t
t t k KWN; 477 .7 pbseefid evoludon the a 06plei
Teme iAd gei urfty red Oh
P01*6*11 Pwhological and mir"ity
Cruew to reta thi-eOrmMiem,
,... oil.
poiffical-militAry eqw, ib U ined voia
6f thi num ra st be mainta
cdhWt9Us6m im-ith Asimi.4111ies fed'their t
ppiparance, W p Pi
a Of our
belated ffly-has the.Adininist *m &Ole fa
ndence IS niD*: b restore nii
n, the qft
moily aftt". h&V* Hel interomfiw V at
premwvmg the t6sedat A
ir W
and the emerging balance must thereforebe ovak'
bro!Lder coutexL An _-Cqnzallm .. ....
thm o ml xi d woijo ji,ic j: ,.7r, i j., tj 91 j,

I. A, n e

t j

.. .. .... .


50, f
A'. fwxitt A I.,;, jj:M,4:n -7,1. Ht

-flit i ii ?ij,

J 9V

D., 1 -Koii RiAMON

TnE.- Wn7EMRAWAL DEMfOX lcific 0 *#h4jraWiI PjWeSS are stated in
f t PrqgdbntiO : MIni1Uo3k:, 2 -tih& the sabBequentROXAT.S. joint Comumqpe"Troo :, in f
t stagv&..
wit44rmya4 woyj sk C a
1978 whe m:'6 000' d iH
pn w
jp 6 ith
Olec will be ddod
-m h a doOkF, .. a..
f V.S txobe l ,.,..aIOK command
be eA abolished mpro", ThiB second. stap
opera ion.al. e&iefic
Sul ing. of the thiid
ji VMTOI k Idy :)p(.rt troops. (Deleted.] M
T*oO4 4e ehd Oon poTitical &v6ldpOients UA the xte
M A d-remaln In
t ibat '6f IMIOUNiul
allIn 'ry Sim
thisphas e i:"'
Ai 1082."ne" fimin o P*C" bemum
the 1980,prez, 4 lediph. Ag s -h 'it 01
T Al. ? ,
d Pie ent -to, reevaluate e most'
na 6fdie three drawl phftQAI&
J10 IN2 tho I Staitm w. -qld. ire4tiu in, Smo, Korea, the
n, And,- I ce,,t logistics
Qn7 .4 191 oayr X10 py.iwe
#I-M ions p nn bA hdbal ring e b6u '00
Ad Zd *Qlv d
*6ftld 16e sditioned uth' of Seoul'wf
1- I- 1 3:
firA, of
dWfig the isAy war.
o* -'t iriqvp is ulilplown, V4 coul be I bp Upjoifis f
*i&drftwAI i not'juStifiodli th AdhAvilstftfion'
b -P*t q M0"ft
141 U.: .6 41
4 truis M 10MA, I-AfatithAftir deetari g hers candid."Y.ry Jimmy
Cirte.:Wld editorial bourd. he fa*oi-ed'taking'
t! io* m CKI. aftw: and wwo" -W&tlhe rrvows. as.w= as he,. became so t na ft r
][v M W"
52: on an,
ff N"imp wi&i di spritg 1915
Were wiiii&fiod t6 it, jhusid
o: ,groujid A. ..4 ,
1110 IWO ia Cafterfilrmed:.up
pmum on lwithdmwwal (May 1975) that official, indl: to
Vdh XOM411irm dw-gaog, &.Mum*v* UIVAM 011i 10M. I
of:-Irixfis ..,Lk iwv: 1:10 Fr 141.
pai t OM-A
not66- bim imad'I"tfo r refirchwo at the St itte DeparMiefit &M X*d onul.


President Carter's
F4ibruary 4 119117 W. Vice ide-231
conference in Toloo: xl x:. oEv.: ? K
With respect to Korea, I emphasized our meern to a xbkble Situation on the Korean peninsula. I cited th4ma VIIX phase down our ground form only in close vowmbWiaaAwO,. 0009prW&P vonpopillwO ACUPM*Oalouth
Kore& We will maintain our a#.capoLNUtyta Xorqa. In upgrading Korean adf-de"
in response to a reporter's questi*6 ,, *n : ejawrt
Il. 0
1%ere. i*i i.i6 dtA W la i A4W Ok
apprea&br. &e UW Unitad Mt:taw
6u ,ora'Ae ki
thqAW-VA. colmder thadio6 -becai* )f
e C# LtA -I
''On'March'*9 Preside&, CArtcw1:UaA&Fbiwei gn -inl;6r P*k TM chiu% V to TI
with&iwafbehe( fle and::..!."to ill Korea
RM) U id,
Oftusivi. ibffityj *ia th
t k OW V h)r l
aiis ic Odin
in re i primzril t -so *Vlemew
tion-"D# odt=4 or *tthdm* boa I h, tw*
that the wqre never aslmd w,, wilthdr&* ,t
PO lev th*"th6y, .. it.."
ask6d ?e
6 i9d id, 6 pr6
did contain gom b 4
reportedly, they were not given prominence. e
static military balance had. a favor tAlIeWorth was
relegate an appendix and &"idlng to s0fii6, participants w coquted. becp*m it exclude 4:,U,$ for
1310.4d.46 ..
00'.. at in 5: Ye W'' )dl- HAxf -1:,:,..d-,1A-,.)
The -.1tipublie of Vam,: MWWd be allM to 64Md iWM.. a Noith Xomm gt*4* witboutAhe'1pv*"=eftvtUj%- 4 "
d -powc, R
K.The.,Pux *a$ in AprA. MJ
five troop withdrawal optioOs rangm.*f..,.Immi w*hdrawdt, aI UIS
by.1 i vatsasitimdatw
twaitaken tSh*sal,
[Del -a .0 A w.. 6,vq,
d 0 IS9 c- I 1i W- (TO
oom miss
Defense to implement the withdrawal and militay'amistance. T1WJQ0W.Chie& Of SURA Owl t.* thVAM6AMM*iftk6 MUW
Dofeos Tm- I WMI
pxv- vi 41 4 Od if IhoTjA Air-FArew allme thoWithdftW$L Dtb". op UL#& I," Wk:11iik4 I .. i
A&kSML e, .. JA b Ito i
evidenced by comments of c4natiMMA ."at SiagiMS100
General John' K., Singlaub.

8 M Snesidank Meat esmnd:s decison during a

w o : af- A~ded bease of Soutsh a, reaks economic strength saM 5wf ld Mnoed. e p irovement in: U.S. relations wth

an am-cwl that TUnder Rearets of ft-tat Phil THhbib nd .Toint chiefs oft:Stal -Chairman Gleneral derge Brown would visit Seoul and Tokyo to "explain" the policy. Individual Japanese and Koreans have sincechre&i private that the "consulttios promised by the
Preidnton Mireh! eei fact esions in which they were informed of the policy, but that actualconsultations never transpired. According h South Korn oAlciails, the closestthsbiael dbousions cam to actual consultations was during the July 6 1977
Scrit C onsulaotive -Meetin (SM) in Seoul,.between U.S ees
Secretary Harold Brown Sa Korean Defens Minister Suh 'Jyoug Chul. Before the meeting the Admini-straxtion' had met unexpected opeeition: to th withdrawal decision ftrm some members of the Sente.To satist this opposition and to meet the requirements of the Joint chiefs of Btaff, the Adinsration slightly modified its position at the: SOM Meting. Withdrawal of the final two c combat blades was delye until at leap 1981 Kand additional fihter aircraft were promised fo*h ..bs t N The United tes reiterated its
defense commitrxent and pledgettensive military assistance. Korean. negotira told SereaY Brown that military assistance shouldI be bae6n equipment rather than money. They did not wish
torpea te coofuse commitments of the 1971-75 MOD plan and presented: Secretary Brown with, a list of requested military equipment generated by ait.vKee-t@ ny ertr Brown: seoepted
the oep of discusig equipment rather than funding levels fr a
copn Yaid .1pakage.N haIpWee pirt it A ffial 'id
p vmws generted during the next two months. After the SOM,
Bep '0 6 o f Krea Goenetoffieials began speaking somewhat more optimistcally about their future.

drawals as a bargann chip in biaea rmlilateral negotiations to reduce tensions on the peninsula. In rejecting these possibilities, the'
Addhstraionmay hve lotian, important opportunity. Similarly, ap lmt~lno high-level. efforts were Made to gain even tacit nonbie;, epplede from China and the Soviet Union until Secretary of Yasce' Agst visit to Peking. There the subject was reportedl disonse for h~,an hour [deleted J.Te eerministic. way the
Admnitrtin proachedh itdaa decision in large measure
preludd uing the withrwal 1 as lvrgtogain concesons.

'earer arnngs th intia 8oathKorean renetion to Presideb::K0ftIWr% atch 9 statement pledging, withdrawal in 4 to 5 years was one of alarm. The South Korean Foreign Minister reportedly was told of the plans in Washington later that day. The ROK 'Defense

Alinister. tolct....thel 9VA tub A Ax
President cortee, g:. iowisit* i &*w-ratiw VILOMS. and offece4mo-taagible t"*tWA*lwr8oiAh Ko aw on 'Tlow

Mmmm mid-Mar&- sa& Jaiy the,-,Cartw,,Afti
pped'ame safe"x& that tha, god& Xereo* Wught JTW U bib/Giorgo.. Nown, visit.gs*e thm -an, "Oe
tim. ymuld lba. %be.SOMIll woz*



Ohm, 40

i:*. e. IR 4-:'



AA. but vf*t

y 'A 'j, Jj f':.. 'V 4: .'.C! "'.A.1 Tk
A x
-41 a.x1*4q.
I C.4 q: .
'14. tQ::O.* SY. 44: wl

.. .... N.A
L, j

4d *A W ib. Alm

.... ... ...
1W .110 b
41. 14
-M N A a..7 'I

Afefh / 'Wdearit .osutaiv Meeting. th outline of u.S w elhm- p rovide amaanaio became clearer and the concern

Dilm"19August the staff interviewed a wide-rangaing group of South
Korete o gauge their reaction to the President's decision. No one,
incudig vrius issdet ladesagreed with the decision. Some aceted itasa0fift s-compli and focused on the compensation packamwhile others held out the hopeo-that a reassessment, might still
the decision. er::p esni
all the people infivewd thee rpeeaig the ROK Government and business inte bats were mostaupbeat and optimistie.President Park had reportedly told government officials "not to beg." Aware of the concern in his country, Brsiddl4t Park has developed a "can do" stotc *1 d1.o help best mboralc Privately, however, his national
seexiy aviarstro y ppose the.. ecision and hold out the hope of

and in its ability to crease domestic production of defense gods
The greatest concern was displayed 4yopposition leaders of -the Ngortw.. art National Asibyqnfrom President Park's
part m nvrit rof rs and dissidents. NDP Chairman Lee Chulsqcuna, who poii alls close to President, Park and presides over a didi 8'k in criticizing the withdrawal decision. Lee told the staff: "everyone in Sduth Korea opposes withdrawal, even the soshine boys.. -. you doa nt hear Yanine go home from-us; We know wat Communismn is." Similarly, the Speaker of the National Assembly, Chang II Kwon (a former ROK Prime Minister and often mentioe as a future Presidentidl choice) told the staff: "I don't understand wh President Carter is in pnch a hrr to vithdra grouad forces... is sal U.S. T investmnes and it is of tae iefretoalreAsnea
tries." Under bWs guidkeea the N. na en l aee rslo
() requesting the release of politia prisoners under the Emergency

interviewed generally stresia& the i BBt~lt Xoew3 Ity t
defend itself did not necessarily mean that North Korea was deterred. Dissidents were well aware of the threat to their remaining freedom

Why shimld the Unlted States change a policy that has been working well for 25-yearat
U.S. dispower eloe will not provide deterrence. Vietnam abowed the teadema7 or airpower.
South Krse has had as resmlanto of the U.S. poney. It caneot lbe Kaam econmic progress alone slace West Germany has a mueh stronger eonomy ants U.S troose wll remed there. Thu%, thee musd be some racial element involve.
Noth Koean' ses eats metremi e a irrational. By sivingsthm the east altharangI ehedule they will to able to plan their attack wen in advance.
Impsalle.There must be a reassessment. We need 8 to 10 years to make the

2l1;*48 D -WA7

There Wkw bewuavanimted, ia# wftawAq#O
bminsn' r j i7d the. Wbe Zoe Nq
4 V
feLAsl6n 3iivaMtary ifdL Korea: Iff critkul to nortbdw:Agw.
ft vfthdi*vs bm Ash*:. j t vw
'11111411 fivai" Ummmmw ponufti
:decisi(YA to: C&L, $000 K*tft&


ILk l






.What mll
AN. Sh abs io.
MOMRMR"Wrjr mamwes

xX ... ..
(By '(20"

ng Unm9yong i

F. w AN x .. .... .. f..

..... 17. .

4w A .. ... ...... .

3 gm:. :.-X41.

ii25iiii iiiiilii
Early announcement of troop withdrawals without accompanying
reassu rances an d few consultation s p robably helped to create th e co
iiiiiiiiii ex p ressediiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii b y m o stiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii S o u th K o rea n s iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii d v e i h p o e iiiiii iiiiiiiiiiiii iiiiiii i t..i...................................................aviiiiiiiii
oul eit' ihrwla hy i i 17 ihte7hDvso
withdawal Carful anagmentof th sitatio in uneindiJlyio 1977ease theconcrnbut he itens reatio migiihavibeeire

duce ifthe eciion nd ts erlyimplmenatio ha bee hadle
more diplmatically

-v Al

"Ag p i.

oh mv W!

HursAi Sxipannow an Kones

em:4rdieriff Wtseoate :of the military balance in Korea. veral factft tesodifet-ences. First, toe sailitay satistics 104vry..clkieudAg pon their origin al nd date ad, vari9Te -loam Mny be,-e phasied: -fterrain, manpower,
rvestrngh ad dfesive posture are considered mostimportant,
Sotgif firepower -and, Surprise are given
M*Wthe. balasce as the North. T' ind, the inchusion of OL',V~und nvalahd.iar power obviously alters the balance. Ile ifftar baanc presented below in classified term.
1970 1977
Republic of Nrhe u lic Of Nort Korea Keosn Korea Kora

9 O 06 MO520 1

1e sODo 2, a0 ,1 SpI%
-----1 0-8
Ma~~~z sesR --4a~ __Z2s
----- 13320D2

o Deletedl De 2 *3-4
GUM *35 10 2800 *240
onfny beirreater

W h~m' Meu]* b power only, :the, balance has .shifted from r~ogh, atlefinite advantage. for the North in 1977. A
41le aault weapons (t&s PCS, assault lity (artillery, MRLs andm mortars) shws,
S,~~~~ ahe y early twq-too advantage in both ,cate-,
oroyqa tWo-to-one-advantage p MbatiW jet
pp~b qu0klitative ixnferiority and, a more thanfourto-nfs' inati-aircraft gunsand-navy, eabat vessels..
addiion orthKora has almost nullified SoiuthlIorea's active c 4VTrinM~r avanageand apparenAtly plans to continue this, trend
Iraf ag has just been 'lowered to ae16.

[Deleted] this firepower advantage gives North Korea a definite afen sive, capability. Because of Southi Korea's forward defense stf the close proximity of Seoul, and problems of maneuver in Kooii mountainous terramn, firepower is a critical -factor in determinin g overall military balance. It is also believed that the North willirmi tain a significant ed~ge in equipm ent umbers mindl" Arecapablit during the next five years.
This disparity &rose because of. North] Korean production nc that occurred at the expense of the civil economy. Currently Not Korea produces s mall armns recoiless rifles-mrtrs TeV lU"** artillery, AAA weapons, -AP~s,. submariesnd pensibl tanks.
rely o PRO and: Soitiprso4.rrthdh a
sGoisticated equipment Soviet a id has amost stp4shWWes Vb9v PRO military assistance continues, fs.*. -VI
These, elements alone, however, will 1notdetermine^the o6tom war in Korea. Considerations: suha Uality, of eU"ipmM

North Korea (generuage ofeie South Korea (penere~p 4fearv physses epsext) WO e ground combat diatsone. Advantage of terrain ad delest Greater ground firepower. peaitons
More armor assets. More modern aIr assets.

Bettr ar dfens sytemCoete ansporio newrwl b center aut prod~n A*
Capability of urrise
Distance to:ga
More comumnetp $790 O
Proximity o.major aue e.:n; mI

'Ian at&upon~h Souh North Koe oulf 4:e
age of clhoosing the time and phse..t col oncentrateit ledgreat firepower advantage and atqv [ deletd] dvisionsrgvn little or no iw a. soitth. Vorea
Som o..f these 1 positions were visted bSenaoi Gen it'o
te ttHwev er there 'areia y 1ea Jspotsogk.16h 443
will be: diflieult tsopNorth Koea, th&r. T lAOIS di&*,in 1974 could also abused ,to gain surs behindI the D .
Nort'sto~enivepotential ys' reevd tdeSuhE nld the political cartoon tfoliowvmg


Miitay zone

****~4Underground tunnels,

This t-ime..

eg .I..aus bo/)
amplepe North Korean, river-crossing..equipment provides another option for invading South Korea. 'Military. analysts believe:thA a North, Korean attack would pron3ort Kral aTtae wodr fi mvre~ac *T.it "sl4 ..ef..f eJwo

infrepower of-its, nearly 2,000 tanks. The ROK's 1,100 tanks. are supj~dmted -by aboutt 100. U.S.: operated M-60 tanks, but. currently its .n mail .A3oal M_.1. ak aepnal no wroteh, for the -hsT-54/55 tanks [deleted] Attacking Nort Korean tanks would
to pass through mountain valleys, givmig South Koreas4 dfensive
ntae.The importsuce o tseerain features was evieti
Ap l1951, when a PRC/Nort Korean attack was channeled, and: Aefeaed by'sa numericlly iferior force.
.n _"es1lt off rt atak agnSoul via: these coridrs would
bly' be deermined b the ability of ROK force to hh h
3r~l 'fortified FYBA- ALIPHA lietwo to five miles south of the
.[NDleted.] Substantial, improve emenits: are: required and maj or
hbad, Seoid is 1 lst Aq to 28 miles,* t teSouh0ostos1ote1ot

1 ( tool s,Cq.Wu defense of $9eoul andthe 1 6, utewr4 me; superior
; ad scue iesof communication to the rear. 'tese factors,

arnmng t L is crteal and" b6te *orth Kor has superior -Mas Ag
Souh Kor forces alone lak7mobility; 0
a viibil yor a first strik .-ail lmi
calUS and ROK tactical air agP
on 10korea~n naval1 s11p-ty ame anniou landing ofgm4sut
cOng =tions.1:
War:0im i the single rorsti*fa in theml
equation. leted.]
Warning .fia pending attack .tgi o te
Statgi nirng is bsdon broad -~ix an m ilitary indie while ita warning is provided by preise evidnee that an at attack is .minent. [D)eleted.]
North Koe is a total closed si.t thu- noth osi Of tactical R*ning. [eted.] In additon s- -- e Kranf are curr-entin poito 66A atakneSo WAAfi d -n
1 x treo ..ovements may not be fothomng
The in Rt Of U.S. troop WithdrW IT. ) &Piy .a potenti srprise attack IS uncle . --t 'a
Mgtige cr s itcal that whether a aedsa safl
be sban adequate resolution of -th.
*rns an BA
The-- bace continues to favor ofe qusatitw~o
advant-esi fighters and fighterbobm NkOler modes

North Mi : V

Thersh threa NrhKrei:

"orth w bteaefne att
1 AB~a a +.w L *de4s' A %011.1..sa

but Soi Ai
11 i W" fro 91 rerftft, could be
launched directly from [deld sites near the DMZ, Additional landAr4o4a"e *ft? bufltl -near the DM& The combat radius of the 'MI.O 11-9/21:5vaUldiSROW thenvito range over the northern part of the
W.0 WR(OWX S, and7 ROK lwit= their aircraft. [Deleted., Most NO .. korean flights aremrefuuy monitored but, the
indicates th is6 can be
it surt, a
14orp M.I.nI Air OR *m 1973 ri
achieved. if'an attack is latinched from what appears to routine exercise... [Deleted.]
Signifil6antly, however, the presence of three squadron ...s of U.S. F-4 force st- eapaWity'shifts the air balance in pi rean e.'
abcaft fai-d Wr a d
.h Squil T Sghters provide both interceptor
Xomp to, f &Y" t a be U.S.
R!id ground support, capa. fluuycowmitted) they, could achieve
the grQuiidb4ttU:..-withM* the.Airst days, of battle. Oa-r superwrKT.OverNorth Kore4 is aware of this capability and would attempt to reduce
ol igmiediat6 e4eoUvenem of.:.TJ.S.- air power by attacking U. SoW, -Deleted.]
1 4 AvAL aALAwon
ne...nav'al Waace, Minus thoearly involvement Of: the U.S. 7th Met'lavo Nortk 'M 'Xol7alls s, reIL gTeates navej assetsare. its
mi ny I*Pedo, and4patrol b6ats' and its sAmarine'floet" The North's advantage gives it the capability t.o mine ROK harbors, land, small 't idairfield operations and interrupt rea, Warf &me
0" tea
opera ionsMe
PF Korean advantage however, would soon
e ce tM:, U-S 7th Fleo is qDmmi

... ..... .... .
X0 Hfflif rren
1, ary- ii ws qu
AIAnffik*nt adv;4a ges. in the'dritical first"d4s of fi 'htin if theg"" I &w whio ve taetiW and kr gle surprise. Thest N.-r&, Vorean ad 'fAhtd ite *at least pardk Oftt b en' f th In'Y th6 ptw Ce e.
Unt" blilm*'Oft, liud AS SU01DO, rtm*g -16rce. If..... the Wist o bntinued., Qie lbijiil i6 "shoutd- shift t6 tho" Kquth a"- ;Inobilized'its reserve forces and AktLS. assistance. br&A'to arr'iy' on'tIle MSUIS'.'

i4yittit up -lit Notth Kom ftised: queslyi 9 th
Public Kofte ismOU'tbe peltip$411 Ooff Its, owh Urms
that ihie*:Xbrth inan-00efi-, IP* dke the follow, evidence
'NortUlCov*O, dwislon P OeoiatA) impkt n UUM
"N 118+erio dvoffewive 4uth"Ag ,tia*. SAXVivid. I6bflb::aAilF7 tI ... ...
Of( dsyw RIWA: iv"ppl
40" *or h4ft 3bia 90

21-346 0 7B 6

Oftthe vv** 7 4', r17 7;7
North, K"O"a-a'dit k& s Utft#k
lpqWkm [&*edl, which t* lmdboV 1xiftit
I... 1 0 1A I
Pt"" Mtim& AhnoA A114f iU
..,,North Kwft mskes niA effartsith
tudi iNx
Deleted] forward hardened, airfields haxt' 6eeii,'A 4ilt
[dWkied] ...... x J.
[Delettd] lafge deleted) bunkers ha e boqi huiWv4iA4%WWd along. t1w DMZ to hoirs 'Iang-rwTe A*Mfi M
bktip# ROK radar and dA*AWPaWUMz1
0:: Division4vel exemQA% may havo res#mcs& *ftet:..
TW;DNorth X6rean tuimelz hais banidigco*er ltit4 edtfld"be
traversed -by 3,000 to 5,000 troops I*r hour., Swmi6e6lovii O*i4 this tutmnei and concurs in thi's issesment. South Korean und some American... military officials -believe that more t=els exist a- r
the: DM4 Detection of additionAl tunneb, % 'Mftlt
North Korea no 19W us", txpiosiv'es th, ttftr"th V&
North, Kom now has si VC
Other analysts dimgreb., Sme b6fieve that 1 orffi n1fti
posture is designed to be used as a bal-Lsining chip'iA reduction ne-gotiations. S611 6th6ft 4, terpi Aflh7e 1969 decision to' ]build military. a,
up the Nprth Korean m s:,& defenwrqs
over.: Norffi Vietmjii. Sknil rl 'K= V P .rior I a 7,
to is im Meetings in eldng an-intgrmted asx,
the Vaited. StAtes nQt to -attia Ve,
Wl of Vietnim-These analysts fe p, *41 -that North X f,*' WS 4
by 13n ited.. States in' 1050.
isded' the Ooy note t6 zpaigr Aigbuild a, 6?mplexie' un d !krgue ha aened,' a
defensive in nature. Th o'not thift)ie NorthIC ty
e for 'ZoQ "ey als vore A
has limited -offensive cf pabjhty, "glits b,#pFs,,1LR *spersed primarily in the northern part of the county. 16,
oba. attention % of Worth.Kor": Cuqliot ty
p..ossAhlp t1mit thii 111M 1 4_ iva#QA Igo: Or
deployment. 'Wha 'U14"Wa" W
,positioning'! ;md thw,..Ar.. )0W#r1,,AWP capability that cannot be 'Ignored. They have- the m'1litary)VW"wJv t &601, sbpuJd-.%, W 1W a
s'w% f favorable. They,,h4vo A&W olult, tho r"Wa -that, off- War template this- o0ioU. On Apird" 18, ios 8*2
00 revolution M0, Vd, the, tame
inn will not just look at it wit oldled a A M91Y
64Pport tbe-southKoftanpeople. 11 with, the
we "U resolutely, answer it wW w4 *00, Wly 41V T ne
opprmors. In thiswar We will only lose the military

C aA 0 -

and will gain the country's reunification." The current North Korean offensive posture is the single most destabilizing factor on the Korean peninsula today.
The ROK military posture is considered defensive. Unlike the brkth : any mobilization for an attack would be easily
d t#lcted. With inferior firepower and inferior air rpower, the ROK f6rices'w6uld have W'difficult task in trying to attack the well-defended and f, rtified positions of North Korea. Moreover given the economic o i n ena nn,
the S uth, Preside t Park told S tor Gle "it would
la to conten plate the South attacking and endangerring their stiw6esses since 1964,'"
However., sincle'1971, the ROK has attempted to redress the, emerg't& balance first with the 1971-1975 Force Modernization
P G'I MOD) and then with the W 1980 Force Improvement Plan (FIP). The MOD plan: MA 2 cars behind schedule, and the FIP is
also far behind d heduie (see Chapter V).
1 completion of: the FIP would still leave South Korea
*ith a firepower imbalance. This-added to the withdrawal of the 2nd
Visi -leted] froin Korea c Id lead t substantial in cu ty in'
i 0 'on: E& 011 se ri
AheBouth. This potential insecurity has, already resulted 'in renewed tM fr6m -many cit-cles A>r: 3evelopment of a Korean nuclear weapon. For example, Foreign Minister Pak Tong-Chin told the National Asse ly on June 30 that although the Republic of Korea was a -party tothe Nonproliferation Treaty, it would make, an "independent judgeountry s surviv ion, the leader
we4t"If t.he al was at stake. In addit
...of the OPIPWI ion. N-ew Democratic Party, Lee Chul-seung, told the gtafth-at if. the'coritinuing atmosphere prevails, hisparty "may not find any justifiable object-ion to demands by some ruling Mrty assemblymen that South Korea build its own atomic weapon.
South Korea has the capability to develop a nuclear weapon. It has one nuclear reactor in operations second under construction, and four more on the drawing boards. It also has two of its own low-grade uranium ore beds. More significantly, however, it does not have a reprocessing plant for s wnlk; uranium or the capability to enrich its domestically mined uranium within the next five years. Given their current technology, experts believe the South Koreans could produce a bomb "in a few years" if they could find an external source of plutonium or enriched uranium.
South Korean officials are aware of the dangers involved in choosing the nuclear option. It could totally alienate the United States, disrupt reLnGnal stability und invite a possible North Korean pre-emptive stAkeip Yet, there have been reports that attempts may have been made in fhe pa.A by the ROK to develop both a weapon and a delivery system. [Deleted.]

A uj

V-3 fa k 4




A Al.

I v . ... .... ...


Pl pi. k



mrwl Nx XK I x ij

'T ?J X.K. jt


lk ....
A .... ..



.... ..... ... ..... ... ...


T'f rk

k )KA

fi'V J4

Ja ... .....


K 4 00:

. .. .. ......
.. .... .......

.. . ... .... .....

A:A .

IV. Tim Roix or U.S., Fonous xx KonsA
TIe 4PQD0 American soldiers currently stationed in South Korea serve three functions: assistance witlh definse, deterrence and truce Ieeig. Some senior U.S. military officers in Korea privately believe that'i(He second and third fiine ions cannot -b transferred from. the Unit 8 S to" to the Republic of Korea forces in fia years and the first
can~"i Dotnfre ny t rat difcly isarsltte r
fe t less eir e military or diplomatic situation imrovs,
Is trno wihrawal could lead to a war that would involve at least the .Force and Nag. Other U.S. military adficials, the U.S. Ad be seado 8- Korea'and th State Department disagree with this itf Feiin- They stress that the^ U.S. withdrawal will not be total and as Irskl thrff2uctions can be continued if adjustments are ma d e.'' r e st t s r p r on U S tr o s i
This section will provid abresauseotonUStopsi E irea -and analyze thge withdrawal decision in light of their defense, iirrentiand trace-keeping functions.
Combined. ROK and American military forces in Korea -today total 640,000 men, all under operational control of the United Nations Command. The complex maze of com mand structure may be simplified by the following chart.



Jig .............................. . . . . . . . . .
4 ft, #






Mr, gi -p #
4 4t

0 e If

'Y # j

# U

e"f ,j pig

Jwrv&ttt' I tit, 41 NAM




.. . .
1 4 Ur

...... ... .. YI& recently ditr
ift an exeresse le"ed Team Spirit [Deleted.]
4 In 19M Gi finowoi 4A davdoped a
CO ft bOMIA (16s*ftd t o'defwit this efteanjr be&re it rewlxs SeouL ORMI-I F amt.. KbreoA trOID vtre: moved north of on a Smes of "WI[xirIIC:ea 111 we li t& 1114 &feim pfiaisienvi.isio6ed the temporaryOcCups"On.of 966d iifta RM forbels.ngronped and counterattackedL The changes
&0608. viW:: the
)MIAMICS as. and population center
VkArde*616 of this forward defuse strategy:: hap several ]*M4 consequencM It, has ScOwtuat6d the need for Istrong,, in-depth Mumve HKUPU mobility, excellent
ta& -axr port, better air defism and substantial
WWRM time before an, P!Ulnwm It- hasaim made an, temporary oeIMM : unaweotabl6 both ally and in
ac of the Kabdi Of forces to e net result is that
Imn A: larger role now than.
funA D74 ift the dd n m Mf. thus making ground
V & forcoa entl* Is' *an Of the,*
proAW needed to
wiul'*6 f4ward def6io.emetipt 7%ei*'
HN" 1 .6
g*therii*:: *ud analysis to the probabi#q Ofearly warning
Cobbanan high intensity, modern combat;
ders. ekpe&66
Y reserve armor and anti-armor Capacity to
*Aiall ULM RO and
Irv &rm 9DX 4efen N ilesy so
er apaible of" W:Superiorky and, providing
*9 irt)
!9 __ _V
If 74 MrWard'ait Kefttrilum thit viA dii ect air strikes
Wni ztions
COnunimifttiobs tionsand
99istics opera
ickly, Call 2TOUn
qw rewrve d naval and air
-&fttth they 'W6;i;i'on any
U.S. comi an&i- of Kcbijx Johli Q I
A. f GO
t4 and
ro erl
ug _A --At
VICUMutz WVuld allow the IROK 'd th6 VS W 'D In
PI d 110ch" Wthe New Yea
vftw V&S6 Sistance SOuffi
I the
ina t wed in

. .... ... .
d1m inA 16 yeaft f1b. i:W 14,:') 1 It v M!

.. .. ... ..deM. 311 4
The tvs: i roop I OU Y "-eJW" th,& Utuai
presence 6 a V i a
Defense Treaty servesftvo. Fir
of, tr4,:,grQuud: M
major '40 gns,
a IS. V
tholl stM in s reserve posture0 IWOUK t 6,
9, 416.
in figh," within: 48 hoiir9--cert&mJy Woe 26 a, with_.W
thi.: 4roe imm Jx"pl lu'l -4,as JW 4 1
. 41- 0. 1 ^A^ar k 6n
wire. Any President laced with iicli an . . .
AA; IM 42
have: little choice, but to comrait fwew to t",
of, the wora Theseewid deterrent '18 nuclft; .
The. Preaideat s W thA=W4,dec U "'n, e
[dpletodj. After...., no. pie sta r
1k .. ) .. ... ... .. ..
it nd Wtw the en ;,laA Segul.::. Nelet
The: A... iWiOtxVktOOn I's Conw1oams this wn: ;,reixma#4
h" attempW to put an'' VIO nee OWC4 1 re llij
structure consi* Off cont .... .. ..... on OF theP541VuAW
Defense Treaty- statements',, stressing, Pont m0wiou I h
"nuclem r (8) emphasis on the torrentt nat4m -q, tile,
a i 4 t6m
ining a
mg; :(4) statements I d expand jqui
ap, wiz .. I J?. g re g k
exercisw.,vA*h-t&,ROK aiid stressing
tar Cf. Run
ability; and..(5) pledges to boost ROK. -ta,4 CxV t us
provide deteiT nce through a strong ROK defewo.
The effectiveness of this alternative dekerieitce structure *W. robabl depend upon;the abil#Y of. the U.S. to sup eav ralfilitary
C%CV%&4,M S;ut Korm without ers4in 0 ry
......ance to g" *vng
the coiiAAen(e of Koreans in the contm-umi V. conwoknvpa' -an&
laced support
the importance P by, North Koreans on tie air And na
which the UniW States would supply c In ase,of WAllthree .Pf.t 0 0, %
-;ie@e factors are in quesiiqn U4.Jolu (see ChapterV) i0ill require Cong'Fes1q" roval
inet.-wi Wcal reactiotm X en e, CMbeen th qn. OrAM
mitment is low, despite continued'.reasMir*cc lfiront,*' istra
tion. li m Pong Ch6 and Kim Dy WOX4 P
tionaLsecurity advisors m the lud Use (the 11", M '
told.0ovanOtee on Foreigq 1, &6OPW Staff
We are In the post-v OM *atom., VOO'na ,
Pb rdad vresm dam tbe. purpow of, rI -non Wdmw*:
must be seen:'b* North Korea'as "a U.S. opti M At th bedowe'llitO th i 6titer Asian pound war.
This coump byne r artiqk ; o4 PW
staw t rem lgu So Vs fr6iaS uth,(o*f6M'k P V!
Y y wdete= rr bi of to a
IM wfiethevq! Zny o' 6V 4e agaP munist.. the NoAh.
invamou from
empba4zed the'limitationsat both taotkatiki4 st Donw
P chairman of
wFample,'. Cb, i Yon g 1W (C he- 1 Tfi6its*'
16 1 1 V ,
:the 1" t* fh6 St
-0 t6 f()
mna I U P, bl Ott
is. wha coim e.tn*mi" r"% 'I Vqf ti.oi*

:2 In thefinal enslyss dterrence is~psybhological'and dependIs upon percept ions by the North Koran leader, spcfcly uponKi
'has~i ii: Ibed

D: 80n h a endsrie yUS fiil as "shrewd, unpreditble4, enicklatnuhlsad stubborn."1 His pesoaity and shwthrwl eiso as gie'ieto a theory [deleted]J that
atitl North. Koren leader mi gt risk an invasion if the pportiinity is rght. The theory asserts that afterm198 the United States: would honor its commitment by proiding 1alyb0it si avle Oprt. nher may bea short periodafe 1981
VOW fiilVIII iiriiiicoil
....b iiiiiiiihiiiie

Meater ar a first strike, then an att6ek on Seou ili
OUUUUMX 6 edeanioud be taken quickly, then military support from the ul .H.R or PRCis 4 awmarwaary.. Pyngyang would then appeal %Lf a casefir and 1a negotiated solution. V4J ,U-S, Emey officers in Korea discount this theory stating that the polme (squens dor Norh Korea of a miscalculation womuldt he j~~p.. deatam tha .. nc is maintained. They point to Kim II

.:,O baan, one can conclude that the U.S. troop withdrawal W1l
derene and to sone degree increase the risk of war. If war shmd-reakout, U.S. Naval and Air Force personel would soon kboma intoledrsntn the President with a possible dilemma. If LArt mks progress du' the first days of fighting, as many
eqw .S. troops weald eitha em to be withdrawn completely for ik.*W o.a prnimatinn o mrinforced by additional IU.S. forces. Either mu ieet with5 epposition, fromn the American public.

In 6ifi a s n sse'intlning the trce. He isses tua-hanp6nrardrios
tkia :y ROK forces are able to say "we wanted to react but the
Unitd Sttesl held us back."
'There' are th r recenti2 examples, of how U.S. operational control of ,a military fores ton South: Korea enabled the United States to ordquaatea rseton hatwasfirm but not provocative.. During the AbgoM 18,1970 tred ctng icident: [deleted] the reaction was A4fed until reserve forces could be mobilized. :Then the response
was pth~dd nd he tee as .cut down. Similarly, in connection
t July 1977North KoreAn attack on the' U.S. helicopter over the, DMfZ and the August 1977 North, Korean declaration of a 50-mile sailitary sAw zone, coordinated U.S.,-South Korean responses were developed., [Deleted.]
Removal. of U.S. ground combat forces before a new: arrangeMmnt
the 1958 Armistice'would, however, create a -situation in
al iIuJ.: Commiander -as the CINCUNC could order trueefsbut would not have forces available to police, those
o&s. %eaniiimosity between the two Koreas is deeply engrained and hemotonal Without U.S. troops in Korea. there would be less
4 A -A4


m4aijitsoa &uth Korww w the, possibility--o,( 4 wal& klhe, .... ..
Command is illr being
neA f'ouito five years a wilt
funotiops.", TheSouth, -11 orapns ara xlsDrpportpd TJ. S-.,give up, o Lal 44a,, trol,
or'cep axe withclmwn, how4 vm. kule 49r, A
;' Ots : ratiM dinkiiilishes- If the c r Y" #i4&#q*Ll A4g 64 *W*
i thifd generation, solution mast. be WJ4 "ders mater autonomy alus
y4 ret'.J....N.-the, by Win jw*4aWoo4. 4- f f )) *"#

r.:M' q-l






.. ... .... .

;J j



X. W (11A t1liNE

4. ... llV-JJPM tin W, rw


ANb_ kojMalo To Soum KoRxA
Eco AssimxcE

Wtary deS i lative.to North KoreaI has been.
oe provided by U.S. troops its soil.: )Ae becau'Mof tlwdeWrre u I on
Soutk,]Cerea is, Mike rap" d, military ILmwith the need, to
t's wh* MR-AAAW Thie, U S. I Uorps
. . . .....
mium 1, er believes the ROK needs: greater quantities. of anti-armor weapons. tanks, PAillery, and hardened communications, command and
1: PacM. Rim
On46 senior U.S. observer, KoTea said the probability of fulfillin
requirements by 1981is 50 percent. Other improvements needed
W U'MUtt0f;forwaxddef b1se tions, earl' miliefield. emplantment
im I r9ad IMMOV9. 1 !s C;;IilUy, better intelligence
prove(I I npo V
-'Oaid hahle atioit and enhanced battlefield
idbiliq__14-thl ROKg'P hie Istaff.
.T rewrements. into acco"t, Secretary of Defense
ftairl-Irown, during the July 25-26 Security Council Aleeting
To trozat" sit Aa to the Rebublic of Xorea certain equipment now in the vAtory of 'U..S. forces in Korea; ft prevfdiv I ementaq fordtn Mgntajt r sales treffita to help the Republic of Kam juipr6ver ta defense:'foree c*pubilitteki;
ent. will
fukh r: Aabd that th U.S&' Go "biako-tvailable appropriate wea enable
Y Wis. to
dk6 *1publir .6f X wbi -to doer, North x6ti a, gression and make the ROK's dbfeuse ry prom.
ized 24heconerr as* 'that theqe efforts would be m de llwlthin
t e Itiv f t %L ovar=ent's atWitr"ansfer pokey- He also said the U.S. will can inne and" muitary exemses with ROK10rces
f j QiUt aggression
tkiiainfiiinlhe foKm to resist renewed
*0!a4thp publicq of korea.
form, 6 ments-W the F
IM31prove cost Y a
the8th Ariuy4trans r or qompe don
vePM h Te inel n"t,

a kd'possibl-v a ti 0 f War rve, Stodw. Cu md.'estiM Akal year 1977 thr :i year 1981 am
e 1* 4,
f.r., OF.
FX eosb me U.S.
(edimats) Pr2ibution
S n1mvemempfan(Fih ------------- -- ---- 3.,5. 4
'S A, V,

*W"Mzed in 1977 91111978.

A U.S. interagency working group calculated that moi th $8*
lion in foreign. exchange. could e: repaired. to.satisfy $9 military needs until 1985.
The FIP foreign exchange costs are.. omrrently estimated, at, $3.5 billion. The TTnitkid States _FMS credit contribution t6 th'0
*11 fiscal yeam 0 The U.84, 6941, k6& in" compensatory aid package, of 8th. Army equipment is val ued a $800 in 'Ilion. This, howemr,, apem iof the.
ntwf P only ,004rhalf the Valu eq ipment currently with the 8th Army. The additional' $900461'11R lie
will eithernotbe replaced ovwill the United,-Statw wiV b-0 asked- to prs6vi 6" tihlwk_44.0 411, additiomt militaryai&in fikal"ye&% Mili*ry, Aid *W'& f
y ear,1978.*ou'l&bo, $1.075billionooralto". Ne to, over&6 previous 5 years
.. ... .... u T t F 7 1 1
xl J. i. i I K:,
ItOFn W7
54122 5ii 21 k4
Lpains- 2N 5i ;27
7.,:Q 24. 2 1 jrW L,1 Aft'G, 51
Total-__- 556.2' 532.2 363.0 157.3 141K S IK 4 iWD It, 6#6 _fi $ fra
IndudO trawkiga.quaft. I's
.In 1971 the United States.and South xlorea *r
b dn or ei Modern ization P. Tho:,A 0 pensate for the withdmwatoltheIL.S.1th Divisioii.* equipw4 .,.nt as *m delivered : (,eq nPe n#4*wV1, Y; MAis
military U4ivisjei 'i ftV v 11
_,.,plan Was ye4rsa*
TheMOV 2 5Wk7v
T, Px9yi44 t0A*AAd*1
C k paymmt sch

RFA j4d"
qW 0
FM 528
W'o. I l1V
rcqe S I )(.1 ITA, AP?
The South Xoreans were no 'tis with: the terms of the, MOD
,4 ZWfin .
Prd "t]4
ie;n I
and hit chai the equipment purchased.

(nil Art^.'
.. .. ... .. .
4'he Un#ed States has indicated geMr&1AMDVDtt:1W* 1i4W== 5,oyedr (1974-80 F" Plan -(-+jP)-. Theplu
to -sviolvio E i0,$G-911bH1ion* Thipcost
,pdbat 'stijn**viry_ rom
re(*nt version of the plan wmilable- ta- th e ,

v4:5-earcot o $k5bio and foreign: exchange csso

OR~F.7l 1'otal cost
Af 'ewv (m-- ---ion--- -- -)Air d- -- -- -- --nse- -- - -qu-an-t

mvegac equipment --Resperve provts .(Arm----y)--------- f eltd

....e. ... el.. ...s. .. ... ...
OthW talraft -- -- -- --.--
Commenri:.M .ienton (Navy)e -----Baseo imrvm ns- trne-,-.--- .' .----, -.

Equipment-mprovemen-(Navy)------ ---[Deleted]ia mSv ateIso miio trathoie nM
1nn1netin and electronic ..lonwl
A?8 Force4 bas/tctca contrutio

qupetrpaeet, e~t my .oc ht.o xs

to b use fourth lan nd n aditioal $00-00 ilion l
ar raie quetionsaboutthe aiity ofSut ea mt meet

owepeagate~~ foWhemliayoc imaac ha old -exist
the present o trover toio the Keupetcr
.ei. ge. th...vson.h.eupmn.oudb cm trns
on aphasd bais a U.S trope wthdrw.Acorig. the
a le409 '' s 198tollas), alcuatedby p-rojetnth

olen Aaa aseii dollar, value, sad. would:allow
adastitut lmn for equipment curnl inth low a MW antn00yf

apy~~~~ ~ ~ a .... ..r a.a.u r .oesu o c

8coaventional amtme. 1st seMrtoname

the original ROK request. For example, their request, for Ms4ht@M twe Lance Battalions and Sti0a SAA~s was rejected. In the case of the 3-60 tanks, 3f-48A5s were s ituted:: In grate& inft.ifIg

H -1 C B R A . ... .... .... ... .. .... ..1. .. ......
08 4 0 h lc p e . .. ........... ....... .. ..
UH-1H helicopter---. ... -Improved Hawkbatloeqpmn..2 Tow companleseqiet. .
M edium tank, M 48A5 -- -- -- Tank recovery vehicle, M--88-- Engineer construction battalion (Heavy) equipment ..,- U Armored vehicle launched bridge(AL)auce Light recovery vehicle, M7. ..,. ----Armored pronlcarrers tracked, 3-118..-----------I

Howtzr he av, towed,, 8-in-- .-.A.

Howitzer, heavy, sef-r ele d, 4n In. ------ -Vulcan guns.... - - -- -- - -- - -
Air traf~e control battalion equipmet ----------44 Ground reconnaissance and surveillance radars ..-----Roeqaripend-- oteui-nt..
This ~~~~equipment wou--proide--out -Kors-wih-aditioal--bil igt (hcelopte ---P-s ad se--prpele-mrtr arirs;dtehoe
Watercaf &s Vtek in i

toe atcquirend by.or eq82uipt.h uretinlty m
pei upetwuda: .jmt e**t

TnksM4A aksadov fexsigo~

SAX laAr am= Naval ,, combtant deSuhfwwt tfli n-tb O
esfly nottc.Nr consiee sal ohe chrt-it%.dtiaji o, Col 1e diied y r col. 2 eaal col. 3. ,t .dum

AIN~ K n! only en6a agh equipment to
t# seq, rps
16 W. X '00 1: N*W ore&
Tummt kivtntory.- Oq will StAll
E06illiZ6 A9, huvda mumer cal Ad'
v4ofige 6 er South'KoWq In 01,ke* cateOries-except APICs. and SAVI
kmmhem b IVft US, MATyst hi;we"i d6 tiot expect 14 ih Korewl
Ot% I ..
level *ffi RatIter,"Aiby anticipate continued: build up in
WI 4bajor_ catqties export, fighter dromft: and antiaircraft guns.
js of the 1982
61 lysis Con.sidem6b atitative:: aspects
bilance. 1ETIA16, the COMWWAUml Souil Kom would receive:
0060 indderuteb. eqtapimut (such -as the, M-48M tank,
bV .. d IT&Gved Hawkla)' but nothing that would. lead to
*r4UaRt&tiVf 'ixnbailaiw6, with: -th&;curri6t North Korean inventory.
Cowderm9the numer'al superiority of the 19_brth 'there -9 no justipn pen
R*tIon for, fhe Nor-th to, bW an: arm4seb because of the com
7y packa 4 "'IKk A
rtment Ism Purrentl# ribvieving a ,requeA f6 F-16
AWri *Orthl Oyu proposed saW agitemnt--(seeChapter
aiftbdace, -,s6]Vk))!stica wed t* -in the are f r,
ha I iA tmls *Ad North 3" Pt. MeiaompeAwfor equivalent
biinoonsistentwith the VOI. arm.control implications of
iarmsi toinsie r4,,pofiey 'The
tbmM jiommd m" be eval din light of the milA.
46V Abu p6m
Tho, RX&mftm,.rBrnmh ha% vid' th transhr package
a. t1k.. ;rP,& his substantially
LW ft is old. 19K
I tenimrto'. Conxmmona pasmldebim *ad, Al m*hi ia SeCUX8
094, appreprWionwam5required. Tet Sout Korea's currmobt Wormomm: Stafts nw. Rdt warrokf.5 a t jilxa m The: trad
lstsa& IP912UMPwassended in 1976 I&ZIMMRSASAL, KO Although. rm does.hav& foreign ex WE menion
Amwm Gi albout C" of %900: 1
b diffiquit to. mimorb.",. ut X6rem wimumic 'Itsinnerm projwt
"prff.."wnt in Ahmira hv"y healthy: debfLtervice..ratio :so:
Pay LEM not be
equipment mastbe puroh "P::by tieFUhb ovoutuia t,
t)* AGO" 4jTomI
a, for WNW requms4meW, Arepo"r the
-fir ltm.lm
ing., iiid th a6indant supply ef
U, Yal
di fima, year ngTemonal authoriz
mg 1978 Co ation, U.S./ROK
have, t[Olowl 4!tyla. of o*munition on. Jmm4L The Defense
18 rt e plioii WelebBd
ID Pe meni s g4 I IS& a' ply by 1980 and eventually
I'll ay SUP] a
1.4 _.
VMjkP to
aimion 1W
lowno& tit InId Tj
19410 1411(j, f N, Aj L

POF"MqkOftAMM: tbffWN- iA"906WWWWP

Stocks Allies third, artilJor stocks t%W
by random
-a Arjj*. to:dA&mire-whedwrJbeft 9hft4R1 d!Mtonqtk4V&OtV and aW correctivee. V:rOgraM* n :I umm hw4, been' *-dequately addressed tb*,F6ev6 vaBr%*t1L ... 4: 1: .ne 00st. f6i Hi bWkAgles to the -Amkred J*w
letedj-day1a"Lis -ro
might.. consider).having XO s: fund a hLrg&:,,.porUm!Q1,. th mi
M ck:.1N.1.5W 9 N: A-I:k : q
TU fttm of'W: stcoft. Uts ..Prese
owned Otion is sent to Korea Ea large quantitiev'4mdw, 11mitwVww contained inSedim &U of the Forwgn.,iA houg
Var obe source states thxtAhe'vWIRWWS- ,of WasAf,
stocks Klores total $M nWHon. In I fiscal -yearvl9l& tht !Oono"
*onzed an, illiot' or bd*tbdd the trmaferxep- ..
a 1 bwkkeieping1? -charge fromolba -US. &bPnm*. to ft'.0
that. r V '" WO
other and grem i"r
and C(n onal Opriations*ould beK*uired's
to Asmiconcemonaltrawfer to Korea. As tion, additional ammunition will be propositioned in.:.Kens. In *tty l however-, -there I's little:. difference between X &_Owrmd I WltM.: d le 7U.8 1. ..ary K. (1034rk
Korean-OwIned Aockpi inflict
stockpiles north of Seoul told the staff they' would. ra.. wM- TVFSAammunition:ilitijlaeof.:war"&r Of its kpi4ow
The U-SCommanding-Genera1did not disagree with, th*bAantidtW_Further, Defense D lawyers have-xukd.th t:
Ar ras ;;,1eVkmtrol Act gi" the prmeei ih tr and Wof the =; rlt:
Wfe11":;VMSA.,9toc1rz to. Xore -,maedliMy"O"O We"Mey'4&: laye m rmmt bxidsi in tim.. of W". il go
I t en.. C -cue tk
ii d Wely be: seAt, to the, vi -IM44:W
1073.. More S* SA ammunition Is iift VOr6a,,y, it
31152941 01 CMll1Y1*M'P' OSE.ble.f.: thetr-S-to rew6ve it. Tho-WRSA
then re t-tem back-dborl*amip in
presents a type of shor
th6 longer run must be settled, probably by-Salp,'it XOM
'ne third 'maue, overly": 1= 6d,
commanders with Senator'. Glenn. Corrective nicat'a 'res w 1H. U.S. toolifti&I imistanm-and ienhinted twdifta n 66** Wk t S *h j xiYK .1 -1
Kor i0dwtlty.
VbUM, LAW 440 IbOD AID AND -on
i lAt tl
Or hp. ]Kenneb; A tvof
shipPublic lAiv 480 Title I food -powin- 4o1o"Y&"aid for xeduvmd t extile.ovor ...If was sita
tw4ho.commitmea-vould-temi e: M aqn- _xfie tow 2k W
Public% 480 commodities however, hostuot Wit"ppedAUI IW A
,called 'for 111;47' ,ailliqr
grem ent-. rixxv4moft *an**dut*dibwYW
currency payme. n ts, plus -the "nGrm4? ,VU Iwwi 484ias""ft Asil 5 yeatso, Taken together the 6d pA&W was worth $776 nuillion on rmi b intMst ten
very concessioAal te ow -year gram perW,. 40 year

to repay. Depite the fact that top ROK officials expect the agreement to end in- 19:, the State Department calculates that the United States still owes :orea $100 millin worth of commodities. The Korean MinistE conomic Planning, Nam Tok-u, said that continuation of Public Ta 480 aid was important at this time. The local currency profits of thnnommoity sales are Korean Government revenue which in turn ake ugR to offset increasing domestic defense costs. He said without the1xblic Law 480 local currency revenues, the ROK would have to e-rtai economic development or increase taxes because defense Costs could ho be ggue
.~B Howe-- onomic casm for continued Public, Law 480 aid outsieof th nm.4Areents is weak. South Korea currently has a $50 miffo pugE with. the United States and is virtually
sefsufficn ca.), 1r asia 3ois b r countries receivingT zoa 7U uatifiahon for a Idhconcessional element in thie Public dis ciitainly not as posuas sin 1971.
a manama asmaxcaso~ sn mna
~~~~~ ~.. .... T3M MOU ASSA( O OT DE

Bec- -01 M aiaes the United States no longer has a
bilateral at a for Soith Korea. Indirect iistant cotmportrog+E Bank loans, OPIC insuaCe sadawsnb osn sarance garantees and short-term
inaninedn addition, US. contributtions t h
Fien-sacial ]Isittos indirectly' aid Korea through Anitid-evelopment and. balance of payments financing loans. The chart blw summarize thds loanm:

1M 197 197 1973 1974 1975 1976

----------- 117. 7 21. 1 20. 7 155. 262. 8 502.5 215. 2
A: 122 LS 6. 229 11-2 20 5 74. 1
------ A. 0. M 0 10X 20 350 25.0
.M 400 8. 30 1830 92.0 297.5 25.0 we 15&.I&0 7.0 150 3W. 5. US 0
... .. .. --- .---- -- .7 .. . .7 35.4 53.1
17. 1 SL 3 51. 3 75. 2 60. 4 77.6 5 15.o E .. .. .... ...... ... .... .. 8. 4
..~~ ................
Th ahasheled he out Koeanecoomyto ontnueisii
throghot th 194--7r wrldwde ecesion

!a IV srsl

a mv
A Of

e;:. vi irv .%,v
'. ) t ''I n

Ill lN ,
I fpg VIA 14 i Ph! OU


% "TT WIN 14)

1A 4":fd z,-, .171 i W: U fl. if
W, PT IV i A 7114 M. W101 lilt 0 U lv ti blwii

a layfil va: N%:.! ] :,:I? U:Z ixffl
n 4 i. HAP llii:il
GO wor MW F11,11 wrill"m K 14,

.... .. .. .. .....

t:*!Aff WW Z


...... .... ... ...


i v:::x.::!:,1'v: wavi pin -jar?
.Na. Ad

I m

40.4 N.

T L 0
K 117T
..... JaMit KoaffiAls Doxono Dzrzxm I LIU

no most common reason glvi n for the withdr4wal of U.S.. ground
Jac Kxl Amnomae mod. iadvArial capadV. Now that
Id 11 ....... Rar" m" switelt a portion of
WJULFOAMNL JLA1P1WL_1,_.rL WMA I.I...,Wity into defense industries. This will take became indusbjef are still mi early stages of
t'M ave: i0ourred oweral.Problems. Pressures for quick P 4, j ... !W1.1"...1,LPV koweve- ,j"cs North K orealsdefqnw industry is
vir2.7wivek and'contin arms imports by:South Korea are a
.AMXj'itj8:f, 9 is ux4ear. ho the South will be
trodr IEL
0 d&%= n % indust powmg wM
Wef"" 9n S" rge we the fiel P: of ei .._m 4WAt ,,,Li94:.. weapons.444 _80rae OrtitLer-T am em*g produced... But
4 XbTiNi is 'i 10 WX trom son-M) I in numum.: or Ueav
AbOVI" WNW 4ena16
0 IKJ g, by 1j...& miliP 1 ven lie _6 A 6hqw and.projected

T"Usic, deficiencies: exist in the ROIK defexm... in&M iftufficifteift, 4%..., *bA AM
ft. : I . in
io 2r efficiency
i"s febw sacemit ush Cal 4,,, p
i 1.1 j A, : 1 4",
tob0d,,,, arms and U13 eqmpi 1 fBb6k" ;6f them ichieviihents, they yider xtea the techiiiem I y' unpo a.. ...... .. y in industriAl e criticall rt&ht m
I&C4 W611 tgeWeians. A U.S. Military
A notesthat "even the
ing "A. &jr. defe=M X-.W*ry
v of. P &YIng
t $OW
rML L P3 ucUon.. in
cm bd%.^,2 A'WA 'ITAw".ftyn
05 f, I I tims and testing.. of UIPAA&%A"
W I *
atxol proome are& Tfie O n4 rWdj bi rebi4a gement
1 w ik rs N ffiijr reWt r iur p Ction
prob tor res6luti() j *eak Coordination. anj inadequ,%be jiAnuWtWW *Ohn"69 Pimmijfachn-iAk, tool indt*tries,
4"w" A Ai ..WIWI A
W64k m Mat
11 IN W
tliab tvOo deficiencies. The most difficult, task facing UA MAAR tbft___ a WWOMOf:"..Aitiii"6- d
SP -ft.
=U jwt hatilwaTq..- 11V," I -,bo
-3m6baw mild autf liftleft beffi
A 4
LA7.: gx:


these tasks are awomplished, the goal of self-reliance wxU be time consuming, prohibitive in costs, and ultimately a failwv,
The rapidity of the defense industry's growth, has created other problems. Since the early 1970's, South Korea's indigenous production hm increased.,.X*dAyo. Who *T
defense industries and [deleted] arsenals which produce or member tdeleted] U.S. originated itews *Jyp 'pment and a variety of local equipment under the supervision of the Defense Industry gureaum."of the Mu"Aif bf Defeat& ........
delaygi an tft &Igft FtWA4&P*
ornment offidals. [Deletedl). In ift" t6 4%;Z u
1311ea, lot edft
eatio6a Afft*
sho dWto.rxiftuadeth W&It( s in higher 49&dArds%6f qua t 0
Anahee plmLnftm mid c6ordihitida. "M Az6#
Defense Development IADD)- ihe'ROX,'re W HkOi* alo
Oy'does. nofhave li ]W. d6fi6d role
As a: kiwalt,:1. a Urko d: hiformition R q
hafti M4, Fiiirher SP" -&i se -ind Orbood[6
"ceed6d the eaptLbili.. tlii'AD06D *ihoid r: &6 MS t43CIM1Cal-'I98i ffilieiafi;06 Al Llih 'D a
4155.1 defining responsibilities and,, relationships betw 6S
for quality control measures, 1 -dekrable and should "9 be urOd by
Vr ;1 f
t.-+4 j
et &noffi..ex Pio -4tfeii5p
-. , 14
to P. ORM )Q 4" J ,eIr
o* er costs 44
ty W
Pr repair"
ji 7:1.1 e

sft liibg-ar pert
adk.-Reld; radio Ad AX/VRQL12 *ehWi ad" 6 tow 'I
W-IN i ri0ek,* 11 &0 SIB--8q-' chb6aMwoM' :muni ions, In effo j Sd&h Korean tsO6- mbly iii 66fi s
hn( nd' th-t kjffil 9'1 fl litAllt- ol At,
66iifi A Jn6ri detailedd" V*O,
dio' i1iiiiES'in. V* r du Viffie
cap'a qI) 0 Cf

itzers, we= magufact um &.41he ADIN smi441so:V1
packages without updating the inf6- M-ation, In 'addition ldmi
IT. 1 61
497445 1 -dt feft4
l: pn;' r o yp a a r e i -,TbAO'6 dafew'-i 11TOed frum Waott fWato ing mste-rish *rI& 41OW e0na"I the Ministry of Defense officiall$A ted U.S. technical assistance

+J1wkMAAG.,In response gL teehnidal: survey team from Rock/'
(!D i .;.Ammals arrived Mi
d 110* and k Wster$fiet (194W. York).
y- 1976,,toieval tiethew Becaisethe4rassessmentrefor 5 ifie teic]05Acil IIN" rtim IL t6&nic&I assistance
er 1976
bow Watervliet Arsenal arrived in Decemb toprovide
rW* in'be each and tube: prodiaction.::

Ve discussions. regardm*g upgradirkg of ROK armor assets between.the ROX Joint Chiefs of Staff and the US. MAAG
in .1 .?n werebon4dered ROK desire for
of thiM bOA-l tank not be met [delete.
OTI wibvlk. of conversion material, and technical assistance are. to be
from the but Korea will produce up to 30pereetit of
r"11i 191,tk o*re& 6&er eftraft. ith thme
WK-, a gma y
requqs for
6DOiatteg,. ota the. ..Aox t
if A leito6i, Of 10SOr a*, catQful atfentioh should
(4) -its a4 H. 2 w it..wij
Pysw to arms coat ol i P allbojl&' .'ho. 1 affect pro1. QEA .,., Y... . 1
V4. forces aji4.0 416 very ap might
tlo 4efease. The, P-16 ha CAM b tie n of speedmaneuver(*AW raAius, swd' t a More highly
weapon thwn a Mg XR the rth
thi .0 or South Koi aa mIn W iticon, t6 1U.B.: Gjmi nt, I continues to have.. reservapt9posal.sl6r, Q ,Wp aircraft.
Air &fewe ii i las
ki Nelth thi Box to d,velop the MAAG: he& been was. nk
_P61;616MJ e0wabilifift: for the:::IIAWK and -NikeR&OWIAndaMe 4 8.uch a.-hLeffity, IbeaW ii: Sbuth Korea, could
Ahese M ven
slits N*Mmd d6llan Overthe of, issid
10*4vlabde COMtW;MdbMdArMkSPOrt&tiM 'Of 10eal
mpsur part& In late 19741 the ROK GovernmeatAw. a commprW Maintenance, f"ity to be W". under, contract b d Star
Lipal brean eltoured
11 M 4 1
were started, ar tech* M PVr*MS ., .1 ...
T" ary-petouniel4nd eon,ksAaM pany.
smwl Aarted to provide techuii il assistance to'69 8outh-]KorftnsObvipusly, continuingLtechnieal and managerial assistitnes to-the air

ia U&6t r@g Id iu hte&'un&r
1: indus7,
tries also ...reduce ad.Nuate stocks of W-mm, 81-mm, *W.4,14ndf viw ,mvm. r
affmao in
im nu
IMA*" me*xI..TIw liii l J& toloaft.; de.-w on othw countries while Umming Koomkim, tmok p"dueOoa

iperat MO)RII., I b6d dd&*OM*rIbt*-IbMllAIafitii-k;W
Vellelcim, roducedin-xerea, JAAS-M it4U--tOIIdhi0 Ofltruolk
g these M O% with & 4%]HtO IRAW
0 lind engitit. Algo, utideri de -Wa AA 06a *V M
design A 44-ton X Ik Munjkfti&I.irU6j ig
military speci6ations. Both Amerifth and Japaneigo,=Vwtrucks Are being retrofitted with.S. Korean produced Gertftan,,,. engine. This first Kojman design smnd. rttrofit pro, hm beetismcossful. Plans alsa:call forth desto a n4'piqdq ,, 64 bf-' 6 ck
1980. Xorett N'negt6atingwith Ayi 46;n Mob6i-g be umf Pr6dtt',
kyr theS al gs einbl*Jn )(6-too' tro ftalno .
the Korean.produced diim*1 A.I:. j
Negotiations were un 1ID76 -h Bneland'Hu&w ReAr
derwy, m ; wit
copter companies for co-assemb Y of light observation 1*4qpqtCMA* Heli opter Company Waposed a model 206B,..) Rd- I-i
,ye 0] es
1-161fbopters p'r a vtr opposed iition 0 7.
The Huglies 'W' for the 5MMC'w&9, ju4$041-' W h t.
'Von, W hehoo bb 0* !F6be-' 00, ROX to tbz Be (M. lu addi' -. I ti w 4
with TOW niis'sfie launch capability Whic was Aott, iiid on
the Bell. aghbs itso oNM'1o Go &-' rqjecf Oelo
6&red no fai and rs, the 'CSa C
I ing.As''& resA of thes
awarded to Hukhm n,,o, contract vrovidvi for [de etea with delivery to be *6011.5i'lleted by 1919. Final assemfiO W bo KMa eX4t th'
Otgelet dj .1fiW16 launch,
Air Lilies, partner in-the proi6dt to build. 4", fa t Y, Int national Airpoft, Wides aeting:u c6litracting fi&h 5'
ROIK Government,
in it". 8 r four'.
.. ..... 'U m n.
Waintenwoe, men bpa 97471.. 4W
ingof pilots, Alid by.,
time b finished 1-toolhig
mine uRdin" at Xim "Pal
WRSIML OIRM.. ths-ROKAm fo .the
Mesawhile4 had labAewp-AMIlk, BMW
ope"Ma..emplaymen4,, traiftin& aud: logistiod. VAPPOA) Wkmiwrl v
ba st6au'lly moreRiPPA" qijan J#,Paia- q II Y-0
ammunition vyx s
it I)roduees for itq poms.
quaRty control proce
tq P L fbi f6r hnli[ q,
...... ..... ....
ROK oakw:. .. .. ....
'-d lh
-As- indigenow'de A
ROK has: sought American approvalto sell Ameri ,a seeq ij
fe kut to, -third pme Pqwrim P"em reb9arq
Mary AXR q
'The W W.: $tites. has als o endowed -a request orea
seH',60.-mm,,,.81-mm, and 4-2-hiW"4ii6 rifle. Genei-all h ;wv er. thqI
I*, on baw,,01" thdAp, ift in CO I
witir U.;&- jndustrii&

piiii i MOO

Ilthou h most of the ROK defense equipment is prsnl proau ed under U.S. license, there may be future exceptions. Spciialy th South Koreans have been discussing possible purchases of ril urnldes, anti-teak, weqqms, multiple rocket launchers, sbip to ship
Ai,' air defense miiile, armored personnel carriers and tanks wit other maninal governments. This attempt to diversify suppliers preumably, reflects naggmng desbts about the reliability of the U.S.
aent4 and, of course, differang o ions on the deirabihty of
cbrian weagspystema. The Unitd State does not produce multiple idke:,at ncers or a.,shi to- ship mistle of [deleted] miles range,
b~~therwata~~m mn ahciPO mfiil ar winterwsted.
The more signifleant policy question, however, is how the ROK 66nomyh Ieacts to. expansive overseas defense purchasers. Clearly the entth n ieed not mththe North item for item. For instance, South Xorm toli no need to require shrnarinaes. More importantly, South K6rea cannot afford. vast oversea arms purchases without endangerig her economy. In the opinion of many analysts, South Korean
#tese peningcannot exceed ten percent of its GNP without &1ert-ely setgteenrleconomy and, therefore, political

. . .


0knY, Ing ny;

a- ALI n m.


-412AIN91 In Arte .1 lily
v i q too
1 Ali 4
-Z K

Q On 11"n nj "1"191 WW
1194 1 F&I V vi till 4

p 077 4 To fit; s 1.11 d fit

bon VIM

W AQ 7,15
its- T. A

it "y A

VII. 11trMAN RaGHT8nv Ko.FA
Oon u iKorei, J&:?unPc
p human'righ4 situ& in So rtant, for two
Ahe Amemem p h 4WRhumanitarian.interegt in
e*)Wra freed4ni for their fel I w men the:world over. That inter.,.
i&eTocialjy k6ei in count where iffie'U41ted'states has a= itary 'an per, s more porka commitment, Second,' t4 im at, thoUnited States:
hAs a national ititerest in prevent ing political'
oppression in South Kor6xhoii devellorn 0.4441 gni ijorAomest* confroutAtion. Since there
84";0, US4'.'fID!rli Mpresent4-:'l'ti::gouih Korea: and with, the North poisedto
iot"M# It reeps Wthicuo"Id -Oace Ua t a most precarious
F4 'T.
fluctuated between 119PA So
tu o A or "ftd' ',striet:authoritixian rule. The Govime increasik#y'authoritariaa during fin
1950suntuilection irregukrities in March:1960 Preerpitated. stujy 9 & YVM
NO: Peo houg4 President
kil1041 Alt
4kf detlw*d waAifil IaW' he. vag f6rced toTesigrt in April, 1960. 0i "" v a-role undor Ob *YQa was idiMP"', MCI Oter: ayeor by
by M*jor Gmta4JTr&rk,.AChung Hop- fik,
1 10616:: These transi-i-m:
tipbs oil power, thougIvaWdem6omfic, becurred without the.kvel: of dboestk ii Wenm that might eneonragr. a. North Korean invasion. Then u0sokhTeats of emnornic sanctions by the-United Stat*Park allowed & I*tufn to Civilian -rule in Apfil 1M. ju..aow Constitution provided It, :11 not be. 'n
subskan of. ir sha
D, Jhe i -And ightg,.
P**-:8ervedtwo 4-year t M",
Alm demoombic' txPer iment'euded in Neember 1971 when President.
614red state of 6 ergel, xn rtial 14w in.. Octo
U Vovembei.1979., 27ve rce the:
ith limited public debat& TU-new, Cangtitution. provided'O*, bimii :of eoht''untion of -Psrkls 60 a.
otWiftsh4iiilebvextendiitgPresid fild 6werf- A -BtdixI)*
M&iik% 4t6I(oreZn 'ificalspe-q.g"rallygivei .Teasowemng smtj -y
On: Du
i[Ar 911MMAL o&:KdrANdj6.IVibti -Ahs: North
IOU, Korean: rd In
fPresj&nft*bJvvesz&n Then ih
WW4D 10 4md

14 '0 lal
IM!"Cu Aflu 5 Tr

this period. Second, President Park's 1971-73 diplomatic overtures to.. the North represented a "liberalized" foreign policy that required greater political control at home.:Third, -political economists have suggested that South Korea's economic "drive to maturity" led directly to authoritarian rule. South Koreals.recent growth is based.on export promotion rather tha4imptwt *ubWtp0oa,'&'pdrf promotion r"uires aCCeSS tO credit, technology transfers from developed countries and vertical decision-making stractures-in short, a stable authoritarian political situation. However', -.otbef4dMM*trie&--&uch as Japan-have prospered in recent years widor ik dmoemey ithvyG uv 'exwlt Promotion poli6 desiftWrWin
... .... .. .
poweei Cq as -in
ited:4 tqor ae r t4 *ONI 11; kuthoi4tan
0 .. :,1Dk6!I kn 5
eleetb al battle in 1971: *ith., Kim Uft alys6'Wleve; ) IIE
ened Flairk..A a 'eAu*:h6:4-6iOkIy d6vtrlo fi, lie* i vr
avoided; uoidft*ci6ttflen itithi 97 14 14wo. I,"#
r Dffftr A'!
There himbr, K
bwn few:polified, Aw&Mg W115ouiAl
but most social and economic freedoms have survived. A h hI atten.tive P'lft'smth RIO' 1-huU)"Idfieaft
dy gtbt y iftdMi byPrOSI PW*Is:aOCV;O& Them dissident d..*Msi$tPr*WVW
Opposition politkal: partiesi. apivel%4 dtl*
1"he -aver&goS6uth Kotftn: is:
economy io, and social well being. Ee bsp#ts GNr i
reent misd di&,:1
more-16an ,700 pe Aurb* tribute fori devlelopingwAm The Wbrusry. ..""Wodrldi
4.b# Sot jjW
port sbAes, "the distfibiffionaf intoma in.Kereaiio the developing world," but income distribution i's beem'i"Irg 16*4*11.) vorabl TS is littk outwardevqAence* of
C. eve pop UnrOt
.. i f 6 ..
lead to inassive Civil disfizrbanft X.A K
Vor mmbors of the dissident. gmpa tb* yeam IM-IWA If4oej
been eW.,Adcording t6 Embawy offieia*,Up Ewa
ers am still in jail. In an April 1975 report Amnesty lfttekgtiMWF c6tteluded: A.
Z*ture is "uentlT used in an.aittempVto-4it tae& 0 intimtdatibh, Vhe* ompjise *Atiee-&rturo, el6ftw, b*Wi* gaand'depAvation of shep: for 1mg: #eriodv-, (The:, 1W7 Amneso. lAtAr". popt on SaiRth Korea. does rwt diacuis wtare. "t '..
Detention without. cha q I%,& 47.. 4
W, fre UeVA.- I CoUrt-W1914
fenpeappliqation to call a votfie .Abd laWyers =Y 6e PI&M !1
dbial takeo pk(!e n ihdr- Mbi fteedeuv ri,, Jd
The pAttern siam-1971: ha,4beenIo]rrA
to any Atto!mpts Usubvvxt.L itp--piower., eill ical Unsibm *dZUer thw.goveirnnumt relaza its ntrols bu sideRt: turn reie nkU leadma and dia i
mand;1L retum.w aemocneye Aw. t" ,9UVVW=MJM tightening Controls.
Also see uis. 'Commitments and th-e Qu"tion of
'NikeehIArry. "ReMbIfte of
Human Rights"--Cw9reakonal 'Research B e6 lame Rdef No. IB741115P May 31, 1075...

d16 first'inci ents to Off. this ch6n: ift zs-:
id ctkn w Au103K mamOetitral InteHigene*A'6ncy% Rappuig.
kid Kfin Dae
9 from 146, Tokyo h6tel. It '"a"61diown erihe KCIA acted WWPirklb 'Opro#aJ. How6vek,. di-pidipats'. were
Vbt*f 'JL Trmer Ttesideoitiat c mdidaW hRIVb0n.
pAmw br u",e r hous6 Arred i1mbd CoIntiliudday. mince his abduction.,
In early 1974 two emerorm dee idm 'yr. oteprominl&tied under which mmte-mprisoned
W Dm h* SUMIM& 614974n trials vere! holdf and M
Oli 6 i.- it, Itort
leon"VICte nyw W. pparen v LvWlii jail and
severaJ r1j3C W, Q Unke the
r d to- -Pbopjes'AOv61Ufift3rY'PArt3 (Comjilunistsfwere.:s=6 mc'ed to death.
Qnce F*WM&ftWdehi8 1it:N5 bv od On- August 23,
un er pressure fromiee he abrogated the two
M, d U.S. and Japan,
40 x oil itki lit Fohruary
13 d renewedd
gehkyd es id a e 'r
4 Merendum i4.whi h 18 Pei 6f-those votpr--Oved his ROMM P*&t6Mkii6d' all I buf ft Oi the political
Azn 8 ht 10 41 a ftr1*i-* t1i'sa.mae timi he cal. for nafibW unity, anq reconclRw
-)'O' ibh leader's rmebW-Tark"'d-emne il'itor, efforts. and called
'Nil retait t6t i&JA d i6leasim fth reiniining 85 6
r6o An 'e li cal
=erg. New 90= 6:tAr lona jtii ifi Apiii 1 V The
04ni aent Agia-d t ":hi6'qAflv&' I pisie& forbidding
tic -Z" verhment In o-onvexm-: "i. S
$ 90
u in a now
to ioti M*"'' KO e6W W d
t1t em,hibitOA" -fart c t copiptia dehldn m 1 ''''a ainst
%'K4 19U*- th gb*i WPM Etherke Mei =Mo. 9
6ii to it C nkitutibti udbnt:a.
4 04 ;9
I*MO*61 Tdonn t&' Ofintry "to lfsel t p rtnlfi rresf deiend jzUv6 *Whd u&
m W'110i aiid a 01 a v Oh 6 erWithe MybAkd6* DeWaftfio) *hi df o
mostt6 if qb 9. -k91t* I Pi-69'&nt P r ,i lli;;'i by 'buwdm ot 'Kim Pa4, J A: W
?'-swil m W611 4a is, ibi After'i
All Dvi#-, Ain&lkhave
nvw beft' folftsod snd!bi hm! been tkAbh*rrdd' tdhospi al d'b enfion
in ge a
00 Carto, 60-1: for
W)ft 4 407 te m ti jedlhw WnW) 10
b6 *ho, criticizet2 tndMdu4s,
10"W 13tAk beAed cvk"rs*QqJi-s *ith disigidehts niftd
clearlth4tT resi&nt Park gain oreolLs, 4m Onts. Tht UOA roop n, because
ithus, 6hif it t t06 he :'14 POR&SI


t4# okoft
Ile *&#Rt.
M1*to Atie Yushin'
Od tke pork NWO
EN P" fk troo, Wi uO Ae bAbery, A am u
mgnem viom f9remol weeks but
10:mb"y p&Ws, they, wm A proomb
8044 Korean gm Ada vi
mfon= to whi &. Park Im *wd *Alyth
W 49're4 Almy dism* d"aft mit6e, on Fomigim Magona doS flmtths X-VIA v"AmitplOiv*4Wt tive reO to Curt'41111 POE
meam I t"I aetIOWL

.&Uth" KqMaI._ oei hivi tim U x P
probl 'Awuld be pui b40-:persp.e UM'AI5 nu,, I"
m tw.. the 6trwtu
ed f '801ith
I, La '*.. ctole th
1911" It 09ASY to a r f idiliaki 'h
In acoordan& Witl a UrIT, open ind,,re
Ainericans, t1m official can i a the tr4l"I
judge %,,uth'Kqre* becaum' the v Ui iq r
Koreing vo
&40PWL"y'& VIUO& aweveri, Ao OFMA c0*04 u
judging other a'uthoritazi&nm*ve:rnme4ts iiq not available, and to use a, &ftermt
.!a4t us
vith Soutl
'COntist, N XqA, 96TW i 4tion ip abyiml. n m bet vqeC
no 119PIP
these tv uArrm A J Im A
Courudod, f4,01mmPle m Via= n4
practices ;ypp noueiiist6nt in cexArLH* TiLYU tDt&Ut State.,
ide6l -ana'th per
Faamiltecd by, tU.. 1m :. ftutionA erp Xtendqd. to PrW4 th4o ... O k1i PP
is -,WemM4 T hq Qnl .4'. 'o
t Y-C itv- Lua
it h W-"Y,1]1'aa1v1Tnh iinly x0e ihey,AW
4 3gA- iJPA'%* candi&te phown by t)*e Party, Thq.g*N7erUP* 41 vows distribudgin IS, ] Drq -,01tr 14NempAM R
contrast, out Xxoi!ei
S h' lieffl W, ia, es IPPI P 0
UPW Aspembly, holds 411OW"wPAVAte
y W alee
ship of newspap4s, ind-tolerates m public crikisamd,
ormemVs, nistr gunt-v'*: I. I I
thoughug, th ,g Irn gO operatA*, k"ftom Aiiw- N -. PTISOM] -dw nu ibexo- p ioal,,p' mport tbut,,Pr1wn-.,om'dft1 Xc fk MA 1 41.18i")
Wde espiqy#geverI sm- o 910"
]a--$Uug, Tha3
Qfreli On or Y--*'
q tion reported4U. -in -;"tcob A
the 4u 4's -em is-t tb
I molt
m 10

ptd r inv largstaum -&e individual :idaibkfle ti kee fly

9- 0 nin 43of (RITP).ot oe a cosmrgosaal

htde. in of heiavy indu srhs proiiff ecoo, There
Iid,1hd6va seeial. pogkrame. providmng' Ire medical- care;: lowiarent housingg and government-subsidized fo.The North's. garrson Ansty nd hev neteti ees as ledr to North Korean
"nt. da T99e ont lonpyh-so bu 90 ilo due to

fit t tPegagseooindsel policies is felt by
*ber 7Ae to rvt wesIp of land -or freedom to
Anag joe. t-hrvet th pepleareordred: atof the cities and
ith f'd '%e" life shedule, both for rural and arban workers, is rigorous. Although it may be an overstatement, one afector reported that most' North Koreans are forced to work 15-hour talk St by 0 df pltl indoct*rnato eac evening.
Rprts of suhharsh working conditions, however, are disputed by
man wickns i A~wt WNoea TBkr is as rn fredom of movmment. ,Internal.. travel require a passprt approved by officials at both ends at .the trip
datemte that determine ach..person's social and economic privi-lgs.- easileto sse allows for three groups. The first contabsout R1 percent. of the population and consists of "loyalsp
alsead, group consstsof 14 percent Of tepopul~ation, primarily those itkh any previs 0contact with South Koe rtechrirch. They are
easieredsocially unstable and in heed of coonstant indoctrination. lhe -third gruabu percent of the population scniee
"hotile? IThey mandde thos who were once wealthy, former religious 166ders, perons with contacts Kwith Imerial Japan, and anyone who haritieizedtKim 1-Sung Thi hostile group is under constant sr
P seiaie. -By conrtrvA. South Korea has a market ec.onomny, unrentridled inenltaeadahg degree of 'social mobility f A
esInth sort run, President: Carter' decision to withdraw all U.S.
vim troops, from Korea may have ha4 a positive effect on the-huma n
it in South,,Korea. Koreans of all walks of life shared
"oparn about troqk withdrawal during tefirst half of. 1977.
_cgt*"rd sgp, of- Ats& tread, was the liadslide electIon Of an a0 e ekjdei-rdtoal iea Seoul.
4. .L .I positionas been teOmporarily, strength4eref5 hq 0tia prsoes
d~ag Jps~n a ar, the withdrawal decision may have a
iagahreipactd nc h initial effect of the shock wears of, security

A-A- A.LlkO4 lxjUM
d6vib; ii i, Wessurm if FAB Werviewed,,,opppsed U.S. troop 1withdrawaLT h e C50uneo I Of I Cburd % 1006W PWOOn StOA4,,, e
woidd Mw here to maim vlesh oaji W f sW tbe,
roo wjU qlw ,W* oat
Am6ii(-An t de4l & deoh 10
theitt, fred'
Strunk Cr
4 ,Aetjw tw without a strong Americag -Oenm theia Will -AD04 ,, **4
govezoment. A j"
Another emplaint Kormn hah= ARL
rw".. gr-o* wit.hdmwiAigthe.iUnited.:States.:.will-kom tion. The only economic aid th.at the 1ETnited States is:. PO UW -114ililia
levemgeo. The, miAtary *id:Pwkw-=* be, i Own.werAk. ejam the UOQP WM&MWSI eacwt:
4: U



-K Alt,



C t4


... ...... .. .. .. AxPRwDix 1
CA 19 or: Rnqmje 0P IKORPA
bq ItkiqT Or 'M ItIE4=
4apammioccupation in IM.,Two indePMdkMt states were created in 1948. In July:19"S constitution was Ron" and Syngman Rhee became a hiii:iii"e
ww"-Am Ik414M*4962 tbb Wi6ount: mernbly introduced
M _,iA
A to. etata preg&mfialpower& The hill
U_& pl, minister and to bring the b" vantkok Th&Rhee Qovmmwent, countered by aftM_,g-MWfidlaw' J4rI952:for the ftnn artm -K the-wsrtime ...Some SedtJv Kordaj assemblyIn Jul however,
the rehieftnt 106MMMd into qu DA*g a f&; amendP "%adentw Three weeks later
constitutional amendt-AftaiLl"'I'lel" toK 6m"41mt he wouN remain president for life and vf &eNtgonjil Atembf Mi
taveakta. power y reation:tothetxecu
0". Tqachieve. tbeei"p%oetives, theAvv*-term limitation &&W ienufl VW "VO*A Ifrolft thd coiftAkuti6n by-an4mendment
It in
*rr4PUG1 i* 1960 anA
*uonww@m poWiles, uItfinaWy led, to tiota: And 11* &"faff Of the
Ow"am"t in'Ap
Seonwkd I ojea& wak boft In Aiig INO when the government
Alito IL vwrliwnie r system wAh:.l ChbitM"n as IILII 04. fSeV61*1problems: To,- Mlw-Qhaug Gov&mment:
th& "b"60* of 4wWOMMY Stm- fr6m thei ar- the
'Of AV '13M and the buja] Peing df th# ;7o;_4
46 ILtjr& 13 -.' .. K
,IlhiliO aflin
laswrky *j' tit liberVw i1i d
*f : -the ffit* qsifikbft tra I 8.,AntocraC tD a _b#66&
r jpa U _,h
,,,to mainam them ]Rr&l- Was f office ;.W.41 4% wup.,A -0 -army,
cat aim,, &t.) jum j
W* f* i"I 'tarY "P Th I
16M ly au nd-isb"ra, md O'An edz
swam*" fina "r p1wer 944It

The mWtAr is. ipt 40mocra-ey iwXkrqAi
Y revolution.' not the 4estructi
-it is a way of SAVft it it is.g suWcal operate* tendedto Mint social$ 'Ponfleal jwd.. ecoddInic ttiwor-:' 9&4:

The:major political develoPwbik bd*aen 1961 and 1969 *%w the entrenchme;O of former junta Ie4ders c
institutions and government, Tii periI*4vTa69'o'cha A' b a more open contest for pqhtWaJ,,pQW usually 7
er.. un ir
elections. The g!Dvernwent perf6ri & IMO: ... .. .. .. 0.1. th e
after IM and ift weathe.ag.Aomasfiwo .9"
gitimaey, to the Park U7 At K)*1:01* toq
Rwogne_ their J
wag =:084'
by thwUnited States;Alwnd b"Wims'.
of Civil, A. so J. itufibdAwkw
store th m De P AUWR*- r
litical".. park1es Were itted-to resum. 196&:,Uow ever.,,," W.. )hV
initially f wva rble populAr OP townitt
TU-S, FebruAq 1968, AGmeralPark. It*AAf
regime ajid &nhoUwdAh&t.h&_,wovtId4 civilians 4Y the: ummer.. Further.. bwsaidle mDuA&.0atu a yi pro sib
Withmi a OnthoPkrkreversedhibaselfb MO
of milita rule. After intense opposition,. F&A a*cro Amewi plodg64wt May tihh power. wouU, be returnavbT, the wid'z t 1063 Iti AjagWt he
ftem A service aad joined',.the,.mwv4
cratic -Republic=. P"ty DRP).* dated *bj,;;XW:I 4 74 m pa. 064-ftle"
hicle for. ke-junWs con_.U*",edpol W efx) ,Umn Rao
Th-us4 in Ootober 1968 as -the DOnwW" 'A
dental c#ndidate ParkI Snagaiustt eivWXWOOPOn ad=:
a 1. rrow but appariexvtly honest elechim. Hen moderniution: *nd. annoweed inteadodi, 4 u bowMq"M
drive a d -the establishment of a mow*derge tio W"Yv a Zia
0, tOber I the Third. fd"
Inl"T was: again. Pre"4*
of bom.., ptiomln J, I&A. It IT169(sidowl
uly 1969,amid' M4*6
Patk le!k it be kwown t tak hewould IMP
Wt oppow O"U00Mat but'", 40ilf M0101t 114m_ txoir., iwrve: *flki d t r rNIWOWLI
daw r by the DemmrMk, laepublicaR Partyivilmnt t V
ence of o position memiwn 'A"I*r Pr*eSfAObWAJ*StaAdIi wR A
11 rs,
a 0
JI* third aWL
wpm_ Dometiu.,.
a 109 ; t'ujlion 1 IM Po(WI
Obli 0"0
cra4i: Rep a *409"

rec lved: 434' of-, thwv3iW FW i"-_ri i
71VJi6iWr IM dea
maining-vo '14ve
totals of 46.7 (1,06
(1967). Apparently, Park. was _,theikyPirceived by many as a. de4ica" leader anxious to improve socio-ecoia6mic conditions in. South Korea. Economic success was the basis of 'the regime's legitimacy and remainsso today.


ral strength vadily gainedthe DRP electoral caudg won:::314 t. of the As-WrCAMC 4 rhtly to
496AR: 59 u 1967 :.and coinedd sli
oAaJ, Am.gembly elation of a 1971, I 4pposit4pai IMP ww- 65 of thp IN 9mr1e amber electoral Lkict
124"a"tio4a snts:: basod: on t h7e tota. v 6-tes received b 'the 1; T]w D ixined 86: aA seataxespeztively. & eer
9&4 CXV4 9 Masok b AM8 major ur ban axeaa,.the opposition
Pw grDWIUg
mpeza 35 8*8 compared-to.pevm: mats or the DR A
VeV11M.L.in urbaA rew UuA.000. Cd"
relimin occurred with
tie saeuxiiii
a On, -ber fi,
lei of elPergawy 00 Decem Mi. These
nwapipm follo od t4suonot August,1971, North-South Red
Ons, and a of rising student protests climaxed by
wof 4ry troTs, 4gvinst atudmta. I 30 Wpeqple
ples %p ght 6:ot:lpmolice to proteert, unm Preside nt emergency '
-argued these measures were
of situation and North
Iva" Amemblyi,. with only
Av vf:i, J: aw eawe!On,:,Oeto1Or I
hou 11 the IF AR '.. .4 "ustiflubd as neeessa7
AW jumbeenq.
... ..... ... ...... Aoobt.thsit he omfinuation of
nil M,
I V[Ir was cre-ati& by, i4l.
f0il *w io X 4YOO W b ti Wt. A isurp risa. imil OWL 9P on rin prrm
rtani 4y, na un", no:
r h r Uke th
so c Op"Os views My pi.b4c
to lawmw.were
toie Coliwtiaoamas ; diatted W-Fetly &40res ,
'0, Y 'I -? Mow'
e %a educa.
X mg on extensive
io vl overwhelm 1 ) koved: it With 91.6
paign. P K, 111-49
-A. 7",
61 the, petm-at* ic, V.011W. y. However,
w Lsjwt*' SP 4U19..
W" Wilk to h4y6 a diaJogmewith
X, tccaxlwot a6i.dio risk liti .1 Po CA unity
le4 ttrol Ov everything their AP e es, 611"be 1 0: 1972). Later...qn
-9 'Park said'the C&L on the intemafi
rreAt change on l
"d Wash' _g
b6tv en Pekijd in
theatuatibn in,
Awision afthe.
JA -20,090, personnel
equ ut a 9be
gore uritl
*wam mixed
40 re, 4W Ja,4

411 let, tat
Tshift:: Consfitation "10 Op tiOAS.: The 0&6 JDf the, PrWide" S1
tbAt has.. Annh ir
P-O"r:kof ll At
President 4*g, now.41e
Und"Ihigf M 'ect
tion t& w&;! term:01-offiee in,19 I$ lft O*ij wi
2-00 to .5000-,venybersois db tama.: The Praidmt: J Serveg as u4nah. lt ," 4M fl AW
f bb I 1 1 I
nStitUtkhA1P:::xWftdMeAfA 00i by
Assem. b y and a th" bi glbf
Assmb.. that "W ndU&W thelvgideiikT'
tWM6 71AISCOF yftrs 4n tow:
yearavachl, 4.1
The:-Pregidentialt,*tAerp:eu #Vrliq dathoriz#4 i
Shtution Wexw*ixeroA*, I 1444id 19M., Uadv rlhelgT4, EiM Messures.any ex-41, 6M.4.) OW Yuahk Constibl, t Ot, r r ilen
sysbbifi was
Political activ-ity theft: 't di1'468 *Ot
sub: uentlyrMessedt Utee'N''t,
go y of ftihies 4*dw* #AAfitWA 0 TiO
bomomtenced.46:de4h:vf*etm6e.ate-d..*' Apr*4M.
F. A irk
Emergen" WaSOWN6 R, inieffk* *inoe-kay i3l tK v
political Wfionsi "Cal tonsfitut,101W
Emergency Measure itself,- student political: Activi le jr 9
iti x mad s reaAhtt
"false rumors.", Farthar; vnd-mvthe Tniveri4" %tmtfits
J A -Law,
the EducatioA Minister reseed final sathority'0ftim f
profess6ft. More-than 40Whavi&.1j6en'ie iW a 6 Gtdve%'Mkftt:';his justified thii*. restffetiollff)*A vf DbO aeeT,-,
ti*itl.- Onf r-flio n, A(
Ia ui it, Or& I 'S
apinik tliok NOW Kor&ai thmL Thi n -pail)e'"%
andProtestmif chiii& grimp stuclentf ,ind S6 W 116W 4!k W
th,6 iAwbfdoniestic critics of the'.. Governmentt, Accor"Idin I rkl
ffbere Wer(s ftp rai! &u bassy'pefsonnel in Aneu4 1977 160 4 A
in- jiil f r volttion'of Emergenat e. iore 6A. Tep4 dtw-elopnient' W' thitt 6n,'July iT, 19171 14 cof .66 et6 G- J
releaml on parok. This move foillo-Wea C10800, i Unit'ni i AS'S'Oal ris6l ** tion ft 'Ing, emergeAl show len' t6, t1w 60 a
e y- ifteft sures, and len
ne: br6adeninsr "of' eMerOicy r19-hitg in &
f P t
ro &I'dable institute! -n ele, 0 of J
P.rbVides il at &
ff me of natural cakwlty,- ()r a grave, Anau ial or
thcr natb i4aj se v ityl'-qr 'the, pixbll pety #iid,' IRV,?O a, ajjfl jpate dto be thresleo d' the Pf"iO 121 eb1C*ge1WY:-M1ft1Sur2S ja tbi whole Z*nge 6f tI&IOtAu, liffafiQr, 4'M 4411W aff#irs, forejjpa a0airo,- n a&lozaj defen !e-J'L-b
40 16
rights of the JC t4o 4 nfOriq O(A'
Although to infortii fh6 NO' 14
MOSau re R 1) tv n4 Cf- -6,
The' President is 66 S a rity itiAAeThi,!w'nrg tbele 1
eme ures. In: additii6n, t4e esi tit is empowe,

war,,ar wed'. conflict; or similar national ijqy,,whe (her _xweessity, or.a
441,paijitpxy ec ssity, fb.mai
"wr n in
414- t t46 t4w f0ty. lau
_4a d .Orl mobUizatiou of the military
According to an official booklet-on. the. Constitution, an extraordiOary decree.. IsSued by the, President and implemented, under- an exfmordinarylaeasure has the same leffal status as the Constitution it# Ith Or g o,
Atn d W'Ou Ont e6at Undeir an emergency measure
h4sifh ciffed of -6-rdiuaryi law onaefted- by! the Natibii0i Asstnibly. More ht fAllegespeemide6mia uresicannot
by, - ift.. ..
Kl ehbdJo*b"!, im en. y ofindivid- al Under the 1972 Constitution.
i np bot*eci the Thirdand Fourth Constitutions is found in the chiipter oil "Rights and Duties of Citizens,"
*heiv -a leaning 4 thg. ft6edoms- iaf assembi 0, and collective
ng is, dirotigh i 7
a qualifying

_6 atWie:r le of Aho, me-house: NafibOal Assembly has been
-*dme& the Third; lUpublic. Ewh. legis.14tive sem on is
rww, rostricte&to: 06: days., The A iy, may" V;WT be dissolved by the Neddentbefoiv *o.:6mdwio6 of, tit te ,
s si *Year _-m The _Only sppointowifir tt, to,.Am k%"rvWionma* -the Prime J
$U10 "* 11 .. MW1 tnister and
tho Chief lustice of 'the Supreme Court. Members of the StateCouncil
(* _6 Cabinet)-, the, moimbomot the Owx9fituiConaL.Committee (which
-tax, Ion Y2.1som -Uq3M Aj Con" qt* slA v& a kw) -vembers of the Central
gwft eat,
-Pwailan- Ulan 1718n mm 4 tl4e AsArably are 'up p61nt6d, sekly by. the, Vre4&nt with no I W, lativeover
'Efi Vabruar -1 ihw,
VM P"WW1:AsPA*Obly, members,
1%4y-,fcc 4W-1 11111in oblotint&e.legWature
stbloc the DRP : iC rge give PreA
ity wothix of the megLbers
of the Assembly are diZl'"e'lecked for a term of 6 years by sepn t ballot.
While the As mbly is in session, its members are granted immunity
ser x t
V (&AA in, cost ofhig
44tg.1111,Mel er vice
effiklet 6&itefi lmor..Aisemb spea and V"
it -1 kwf -the power of the speaker wexe.
tx -4WdA1r'1d*i AhWI&W61140 Pb #Uapte inembekvi required his, speech tot lie speaker
UW WA ffloii Tfie PV&46V&4a v4a b 11sw I fthe "embly
thyiht: dftegrrmce Of twotIMIANbf 1W in 6hAwivos'pt&Wfit Ah6 bill bc*"ew &vri Hawevar,
-,,of 1 residential appointments'and DRP elected M*fnbdft it is. unlika)y t M11 af
eel4rttw464, I t OCtboo or thei staY% 14 d, I Ps ovlgrseas
U, Atm Isre also Sub*t
t, VnMn V Uj[ lune m bt%
rt i ed in 1972. The rivtedk of its!xobr,
A9&mdbAY *aa
46, *W* aAd fo i f

sAibniissi6ja 'Of 4,60 Uniedit
negaes. Mid", the IM eotistitiftio"I I'I ted o reqaea,, thp, ap ttvft f th
0 r .M9,
Itairt lint ter f or question' "J i' -A
N t nt' Iv.::.: -vil
-A d i r
OU; i U,
Ju d *ci &I powers viwte4. ie
u 14 rtray Of vm* tuition wW the CkmrtjO#g*njmtie;X.L" Qj1040
HO Pnde, tho!:eerf C(Mktitnti Gana eOsIw*s;,,; ivdkW, 4
pendenft* ]4a& been WversrAy. affeeied bIly t io
judwiiial im at4:6the;."e.:of tj the eitizeusIbaskTight*.. 41
The Supreme Court. is-the.: -highest. tribunal, And i&;empowere4 A* establish Ic: er;4
j udi i4i Al", ik)w' t Wift
Justice is appointed by the Ptesident for a *P dog, consent of the National Assembly. The.: pre- 1972 requirement for a rw commendation by the inclependeUt Jud Recom iendat ioh Oblaneil has
bmn deleted. Associate Justices a aalso, appointed? q th Pmgdent,
asare al ower em: Pmiouoy lower courlwg" bA,&bwn
Appointed by- the sup,ofne Cauft. Jvsti,&s and ju SA*Ybe from 6ffie6:': I- throui.gly Aim me
4. M:: blushed bylavwithmandm ky ikkift.4
ciplinary actim. Tenure is:f
ftt uVe. WMMWLqWvW I
I 'L r Z,
Wfore-1079, tho S i a OWfliLS1 Alf*ADOq 1!! kk696.
pro-fing ,theconstituflvn&&*. &aUIhbritYWK"M*M
in the y limited U phs
aippoiintisd I"y t1iiePresident for tjLrwof .6 CM* bf 979'stripped, 16ndic
of, itg;j: ,roto revie rfhwi sof afreaftAr 4mttntionsby- thk SUIV there4ort, wa
les. 170!
thorit Citizens,. e 0
without the right to. aak: co-IS' tO Teview. lkgiddr Cd Oetiong Aigu*
.7? v . 1: ..
A-:- A,

T..he principle.of 10 Arvvexnme" w" Oro*
IK8 sad, t1w .:Mq
the'l0anditution of peal Auto o
Rhft.. llgovernmen-t 10 *MV4,ift. 4WIP
gOVM7,urwat WX lmrg Wnd, t1w Af k4)$
-ChngMypa. kAe t Ment tbe gle0i 1we fe
qRS ro
r or
ei EAhat.lear k ,nia M zpy
aiA, nmvborsof local
histo tImtKhe&d8 of Jocal go; Y, fun*V
dinmd"aind, secret.,.bajIQt-,,,
But when the mili.. airy seized contr'O'Lof'lh, Ver- UAWR'
110ftl COWIcils Were, Oroergo, 4isbo4od, wk, erninint 'Muits de T q UY
i ra -ve a govj
adih'nist hi mis-of the central 4"014'11 Koiki 44
as4eAlhat tht p0jtlickl bli
gov rain
self- nt*t'thW IOQ4r I'q",
A(Iminwt A, 0 4 *0 e
relatively; Beoul4M Usen, 40 0 1111*, S iiiav
e ;fn e
the 06 ntrolL of tjjj tral
Cen government, a are e nine prorv, ces.

ai..4mi86=4 26 mle s huhmn + th~~asessl MZ however,.vis uiue sic its.D.1 us*.,*...s ., va, i.s. suc to.*. di.ec coto .. ad super*io o*fe the Tr.mi

sent by1la Pauldent.
a sf o; iar.7 eaitia assA akarks in. nsn irilsrarant THa As
wardso by marrv ear hoe n +ns wrllagn head 0mwarnae bry heads et towniships.

The~ 1 "ptenstOtof South Korea has created inevitable problosbetwena ace Confucian-oriented political culture and
apwlAy is aLkXnte_ WstemLW_ democeratc concepts. This conflict and
attk~ps ous senyty itat on have oreste a fear of political in.unes prong esdrhI s evident. Yet, this desire for a
autoritrianleader lessens a regime's legitimacy. It is Ui% complex, mix of problem which has plagued the short history of theIlpubicof Korea In aisemse, there is s"il an ongoing struggle to
toka modern Korean pqtiblclture. There has Yet to be a peaceAl trasiio of : A o'rnh 0er f'ot Koe'exsenp as a.exs. The Koenpl oia uhma is stillcharacterized by certain
patterasI ththv rvie ince194: L concentration of govern:met poGWers. in Seoul; the trend toward authoritarian government; IWkn alanoo dtcisnrt; *une of a percerrvel threot fromr Notavh IKora
an nstfietim S- plitalreprmniandr the powerlesess of the
t Theagram on page 70 Filstrates ie current system of


Nesorlof As ;I~ twoe CcH 5".* Co's



k+ E.e.. ..... .
.4 ...... .

~ ~~~~~ .. .. ... ...od e -a 9a 3

4 .. .. ... .

hom 1wmfspee Mititary ekilers. whomd personal loyalty is assured.
----sateinllylaetIn atAdministration and in the Demoepublican. P art smaml number of civilan ministersan
M'ghs have sta iflence, esially in the area ofeeonomic Thi se, oreignbrnly, no shroo indications of MP I # itta te M M wichk is th altimate
800f amftrS, ower. and, lhe only -.otetial threat,'to his PWer,
YW, the ek hfdrswer participants in the 1961 coup
theil unce a prestige parl to their proven managerial
f~awakn mat of t their naiquestionin loyalty to President
$msobseversW loyalty is given an increasingly weighty
edin palitidfal appointments and that this tendency will
aoentuata "th asp paie ntare of the power structure." 1614ry.dmainance haso been. attenuatial somewhat by the infusion of ambassants. In most case then civilians were senior bureaulog, meritorious service in the eeanomic and fiscal areas.
Jh~o mp Of his Govomment, Park has maintained a Pervasive
maltisi caonto thamph th "orean Central Intelligence
A). Ths amas is annsmible for intelligence-gatherasbvrsive activities, political and econounc surveillance,
welre and other recent police functions.

to-. .,8 be ,heocae Prsue iWi th"a soetv for'poitc* Ia ec nmca 6inte Twhe .&64....in vt. t19 h New emocati sP aty

The uresIved issue is: what political values are best suited to Koean culture f Since 1970 there has been a growing discussion in as pm mand a8our Aabous ']Korean demoey." Some political
aws windigenised" feam of demmstie government, a government
imt ip*tes with tee soit. "radto an otmorar -.ry
atq~ o glaifial ana and that the relevance of Western
rte::concepth and rcie to South Korea should be re-exd.Because Confucianismt~resses a hierarchial system and deferWestrntyl democracy sad egalitarianismaefrincn
InO the* Co6nfecian trdtothe leader is a teacher,-ruler and unen is An -extension of this role. Shared powers, so common in
anpoliia traditimos are alien to Korean tradition. Moreover,
it41s Of inletio haveeblse acquiesenceto authoritarian
~Irark*s objectves of economic develment, & strong.na-. fimaldefense and national solidarity appear to be shared by the
i*ty of ROK: citizens. Hence, thr hs been general acceptance


.tion to;:
JOUR9 (about ,60 ,10-cext.:.ttL,".,poWatiobeoftd y someT of
bom- ofter aTe less -,perm"ed jknA ",t4iz'
Oal f QrAft-m-6 polifif4, de-g*j@pn*nj*;1 t hat w*
If Park is successfuI ij& creatmg a tomt "ton
*omst Tor 4 xWW A04 t1jWC dem9crpey," he, will have rpoolved .4 m*joT que hilAt econoanic developmeat."T'I'm lt"S 444 "we Oh whethi r it is secure enough to aJlgw chspge, an4
*rWilAWW" without violent disruption. The U Dublk o!,Kpjv-+ ha p:,that test.. .. ...

K. k.: k, 10 n JVJ
.. .. ... ... . ....
IN .0
G or X1 J.. 44 1
... .. .......

411 (31 p;-P ITT
4 C, X IrViS 02 A
;W3 rtq* Y


J: t:. 4 A] 4., 411



4q 1 14.

rk 41
4- M 1011fT
k44 (1:1P


if 'qtb -1

"Iff WY.10- V 9 (TT. 7 1 (193 IM4) A J: xr t. 1510 .1.411% W

i t .. ...
.Ecoxo Dsvjuo x1v -TRz..: Rwoxad oP KoRFA
The SwIth Koqima econoilav has beewoneof the fastest-srrowmg in the wodd,.., tweraging nearly 11 percent real growth it nnu&Uy during 'thB, last W On. 'This. growth is.vvid in- two, mts: of statistics: per IM it* o. risen fiviii less. than $100 in 1961 to, $700 in. 1976;
"I "d the m aring.
saiafowk or has risen from 11 percent of GNP in 1961
xMt 111. IM wi b a mrrewondiimg decrease in thea
ization h4s. bem built upon Squth H-orea.. products. produced for exporpkiv ad"n"9POR labor. intensive
s Jwve rum, rm $176 million. m4965 to: O
por-C 11%NP* f bi ion. m 1976
ithJ&PRn and.. the United States as major markets. In short, the Xoreama hay I lopment
ea W. wag% kigh export deve n 40 ihat,
W Ow"OU* call. for shift4n even
VAt _,QUr g -more towards
uustmL 1 baw. i And) a do n**d the section on ffie Fou" h
IW4 velop rwh bem bQth &-polit"I
do m kn $6qiih Xo
.144 psych les ion of how to
alopeaL.Amue 11 4e e4rly 19ft tbo
eem9fflW: 11 VpwAtwa, perhapss the principal.politica
A#* By, '71460P Pq LW 91 bAnges., -in t& economy were evident
M.A -o
foll w B rapid
__MT .. 'th,
ty sta:itt, ed. to
*Vel nt. importantly, t e topLAuML44on o a succepsful inde
economic create a sense of nationalism
entity has helped to'
Swth Korea.
94)rft'O WOUOMY::44W Xw ...boeu bugetedl.- by several severe
of .1073, ;Ln orldy6de, recess (of 1974-75. 4qqk#; th' q CrWS. jkQ
to. 4bW -Vroblems, the 0 s relan econ9lay has
JU P"IMAt 15,2 pqrp WOn 11976, This
=10 1-Man. actu
Z;ow* '89 y &e AA41
POW 1W le4 : rM.-_9
2Q Au
qWth Ween.
0711-76 asa result.of sharD rawk exports. During j
fotesb ;r y 5,8 Weent, a., year
IE p ect 5 perqel* As:: a J) 10767" t140 agdcuit, sectorgecounted' for.. 20.3, pelreept 6f
44MLM in 1970., The industrial, component rose
*MWI "WA, porooAcia.11M tp 36, ept4nt4976. ent#Od
by, 484 V"WWAA ow"r,461 JA .... ... ..
qp V : ... ..
:A: N1.4
.. .... .


in* development was the control of inflationary pressures. Wlyolesale rices increased by a moderate 8.0 'Percent and the ton,unwr zi P both well below the recent uth
index was up by 11.2 percent, tiiend. W6
Korea's stron -export performance resulted in a balance'of P"* Menas turnabout wil only a small $27P inillion. current account aeacit recorded In 1976.
Although led b exports,. other areas of Me ee6nomy also eon-tribute- WIbb hiX grawthrz% in 1W& i0ml, t totid"06tsum
t.on was up 8.1. percent, with private consumption growing at 7 Ver- cent and government conmmptiou at: 10 percent, ROO jf64i,1 ftV*tWeent ..Me.
ment rose by 17 comparedtoi thoJ ngishmsd 4it
1975.A 1 r capita, 1JNP -zt, $698 was daikk ilie $Wjedordeid itt 1913..Puce-& y.t best: ride hanwt:,iinfhiWairy J&2 9,15 5Tereent -ih in the fishi M d' gmuka,
b 8.8 11 rig
fishing gre ereent I *Vi
ou PU i4en by 2509' rb6Ht:W W6411.0
r .: t ,t7.. t,
10. K.. . t6mrAlinofidilona) row I&*- pow*f g3fa
ici mnspo-rtatiott abd
other servift.6 by 9.3 perdetiL TA: gen&&I, Aettaril j Al i:
balanced. oll 4
er OW. the:*i-Klo iftli
1hdic&tor9'Vdint t6 I M its amth gdod JOAr W deonoiny. 11htwitl
gro*thlrate for:GNP at1o' -the hbidifto 6r bmh'4hiit laot
retail -e4se tolOperceut,,'and..aconmod*ltyex 3:
price inci rV
PitalII&P P Oki,
$10 billion. 1 6 cd kTA jS PrOjoiewto HW16, $85& Mithu64firing ig agadon I o*recatk to lea Ad th V 4 06,
A N_... t fm* bf MOP
growth i*U iii AgricWture: hilfing. tb:' s ohg*r1-t6rftV PCrcent. 96vere cold and'dry weatherr 4q6+a tk
ray f0:1 los itt ,ttin S4. bW; 6th
M& agrieu U eft, somCwh r
are expected -to bemA 6f exceedede:.
Someeconomis:4 as-gert that theSouth Korean economy is, quite vulbeicau 0 1 1 S relyly": I
no, 'bl e 00_ 4fid r
rowing to fifiani% n6ede-d r*W mate&W, 1M dlitittg the: 1974-75: w 6rld iec si6ifivh ich: M9
imports'co3 ue& at norm levels zidt rent.: 4ecot IOU: aft&F $1 li6ft
rit deiftdts df $2.0 billion In X bal $Olai
130*751hl ROK: hid yfilized ubout,80 p6mok. a-Wl hoAA dhpacit N1
Mit So4thX&ea:'westheredthe stonW..
. . . X -po
ROK eg-t-ab, 1130AApft W,4ftA1_jft JA Mob 46u4d
rshe&&t Iftit
devel meM*-tT4Mi &iiif-_; 4Aeig
baekdbw 't" IV' fit'Of
t0i e6ngill T.,
continues to inspire Ehk
appears not to have affected that 06hfidence. For -example the Federal Republic -of G ermany recently provided South Korea a 7-year
market-rate loan of million.


(Kf &Mth Y*ft1& eOj1QMjn,:m1nevaW1ity vnav. therefor"
dM e4gh-M: tofSmth]"reu;; k GWRi4mmdeup:
RME a 6108n,
Wr re 19 RO prolonged
Worldwide remsion or. massive worldwide tra(le resUikfimm &vi5atY-! fivea South Kore" prodwts.amunder striction-25 items
We Textiles the leading export (35 percent),
M. a4dea this year.
litlei*PL4 trd& kestricticmwl:l .&..Toi ibloldan' t6 South '0401 ho 21 11 of
XMftv. d*co" Okupt",
P ow
*kri W 4%ated 'thip6 aiv,
be heav Y da u0scle. woul 11 maged. rovded that the w'- A4
q9q6 M -tAjA*%*&tTbh&1 ade remains relatively
ided'and that 9' supph ti
remAl"iteliable, then the ou _oZ
Korea's eeonomy-appearg good.
DJMXM- SMNWNG. ou We", nse. spen h behij iAo
rI.Ca K d6f I gged
UPto Y5 en ing
YA., I.W."d arg M T he. .0 It eat
OMA ffoit iy=
-in- 4etemppe th.us enabled the ROK to inwlemenk
As 4f th -world's most 1.0
4W econount devel" ent thit: :" one
%dil ..Xo J. defin' e eq,1970. is depicted beldw

.W4 J.N
i ....
-7 -------- 230 4.1
387 4.4
442 4.9
777 77777
Apr ------- ------------ 7W 4.0
717 ;.0 7 7 @4:
-d GNP
'"W lh'l tt 11h 19, g b I i res
X,17A ,- trd6v ROKilefefisd q*nding 'were6
vv ;81A), 48 6f 'GNP," thiv6"could, bi 'qorresponding re11n ,viW10) p COnNAUe&1'GNR;gv MWth: A ftfte war to'
5 2L L
f4e- )AbfC'O*er "4 sfimaOd sh.
M 0:.. k&p uheni
66t z4f *ffiAi G' (P % hecesmty %A'ft
Itbift AOdj eirrftt 'IeVel$. Mth6 *ofk f6t6lp
I 1 9 4, .
is C03 MI. A afft increased in ulft''
1C therq'i that kfiy 'W
'k6d-V61itical iitStAihtyU.,& offilUIV -1 10 79 ItOR dd6h ie. b d
d PU gPA
-bf Gmpy
6W& 16 eal'. )bwR I*A 60. Sv& a #eO%6*dUM
plicit4oim fdr fi&
4bgwty, *04 i4w, krity.
"4,il* Owice, between c Lic t ,46d Vn* sp&tdink,
gidi, or the,
_Kqmx'will 11rWW,,ehoosa,4e latter, U.S. FMS credits f
t PIPA zogy, *tl6*,. South ][ .orm partially, to defer'
UA Tpwth. J)ph
1-o4 It

fmanc itsW ownsr mlkayv aWeds by-.A",

year, the 1919A* eIpV* *pA ne R

twots(Lo f77. .-j -...,. s.. ..4

Serw-s-pa--n-s.----------.. a . ------Current acc unt balan e.. -- - - .. . . . . . . . . fe
Net lea -term CA --. ---------- .. .. .. .. .. 0 1
48 he rv s.'. ._ .. .. .... .. .. .... ...... .. ........ ..... .. 7 1 0
Debt service raio (percent)... .. .. ..... ----- ---- ---- ----------5----)

The 1910 current account deficit was $3 milonWhJgro
ingofth. rade de&it by'$1.1 bAilo unts for most: oft unprovemint. Although net long- and ited 1-termcpianidwi fell somewhat short of the $1.5 billion acr en 197, they-were::suicient to' restore the bg.swicbalane to agre' YWRn 4(esit Moreover, the ROK belatedly instituted At sgrm to reducejiett

factors in- altering t red. Oan t eopt I lWereeni~w in 19R76- were, dowix steeply, from, thelevlp p-,s 3e44orp Koreathed to resortto extensive shot-tinA~tfswe
large current accoauee ity. ,,, 4ety e
Projctins for 9771aorapndi n

reservs areexpee d twicesOb ). 4ggy
Aburrent con surplus ofoe$ iogdA 08 l
exhneh,a sotover,, -1 19 w #4

R, funding do lnn1eh i mre eti ;fi hh9
L Lstnget 1 etpr suL.rTge. .A .... CinuedA ..

it kefs 1,*Vw*,SO plxya vm"Pr i6le; Althongh 4apan and
5#ke Soc-t w!Ramz g m4*1 tmrkxft. 41 air, obinboked hwV6 -deofinWd *61fi.::70Verd"'. V iir IM -52 t
i U ,,raftempt ioi 4ivar Wy is; &kftbk Vivm It-6
;Oft merenis. gxpOftTb to Colintries.
Lk in r:fMtor in Korea's rapid
Its bli]t, ; 6f tsmAuiiion. With the balance of
A'a -d vpearionmilmAm Oft for-iniport restraia i ly ills
19,77 s r imate the
-hould V a Pro: for
Wi', _, pro closely,
fer of 'Pjami an _6quip rwr&wm
-ment and indust S(.:,;bo infies of this expanded
theA4 of 1976,show thi6 U.S. share of the mfirket faDiAg Ito 20t*rcent as coin red 616 ji6rc6ht: It Xa;Ws n 1976 wu,:,Wo for the United ft tm A re&ctijij ROX,
rn i(%C in twky.m.1d. r* which eRded U- S tin deliveries.
*M 6f T' iskoreaemk-h
1006k% meW, worlonge 1 i Afb rit htatib ..tnd
aim sldeied su rior M, 4'ri6fti,
on, kpnear
efit oftftg bv, V,S. aso r I
,*It- Wh& 406 he 'f *1i66i
ly #A4 t =Wet.shippir Jima ji e'
A",ft.&MMM6.r" .2il, 4 th 1601K Is
.,L 11trade deAcit of $1.1 MR ion because the Koreans used. overseas
tal to acquire J&p&nW!p6-,Mieh" 'nKf6fts..Becaum of Japanese
91i"consumerpr, Sol th Kqre,4 canu(A sq11 finished ppodap
11 'r4e j4*
()rg I A Volt
VVrhiiient, n !e'M C1 1 L Til: YM -mrial atirtors 9Ad
eter o
L' th'e
a, gT# eSe
h' in,
A," Thoq6
aii"461t, Wfww"
RI-S N71

--CC-VA-! -3 b(Ah pdt%


-AIL mum
4L rC is iNOWA& Uhii MoRm Mid 1 Ow Flag W
0 so wvy UO* h i *+b let r, d oW J W a* ljeb -TRIJO UWIOOI MUM I 01MOU
rece. ts .00,110 5- >f!
will f 4('j AA
b two OW
T"o I--* 4pz
J, lk-M tlilq A rt6 i *048i miffW t 11
IT! )Crij qf I
4"Q ;,
in 1,IQ y,,, till f 0; t I" ;1
10, ff 1 46 Q# XJ.L
Nix 1A sk TJ7- NEW
service ---------------------------------------- 2 397.7 an Lim 10
77 ---TiT717 77744
77 71 t
r 1 7 li 9 5 1 Mity, Wool Icy 737" IVES
b4 I Rabic,
Fil'Op holl fin! stf 1 At it A if
10; "A .0 0 71 1 W of 1 0:

propup; ith W11, 5* WAww
rowing dixrmg th'e,,next f *,ever v jqiAg re
ao q t
WWWWAda by the MON. Yorpm-g,
the:compensAtion package th QpOvel
nA A
W- i 0 to u; PQF""

tit 1
:0. -00 Ow i Ali, f Z
... ........... u Ir v
r6M ft-ihi
of $vutb, Worea. The co- i ........ .........
to V 6pftpit q -14 p='M rp
(Wer A
fo U.S. im
Ajjesilof TTIS&
Op 19u

d !s
hei'Un Off1h WS
t uni however J,
mPr&entatives aftribuW rn of "JTV*A
early 1976 to world e 11C rithee hounw(Al

1 66
Apord -to thOMSAMS


11dL.0, education. Annftl..
11 *kA at 11 : A a
ftftwth is: nine per but jont ventures
"i, it 144, bD pew*nt owtersbip.

an: everbrvmtpri*kmand h' been catised by WravidWVo ng money: mpply and ohgo, fitic TracS.. M CrewAd 15A, percent. in.11M 4Cripereent in &V I percent in W6.1 -Caimumer: prices Pvr.mm1AA,1L9T4* 25A peramtIn 19,76 :: and I L4 percent Mi
the. money supply-duAing this percent m IM 29-5 in 1974,
(46 WcWt in lff%,4U percent
I : a k )utflows
26piremt, M' 19TO: 'Stiom Only. rM.
I*v*h -^3--m-09ft tawts 1974 and 1OT5 prevented higher ra" ottW640' -gm7o *ew AgH4 4ture comm6dit
'7W dV m YOM y prim
Tewt bt'84 discultie! and hligh government supA A- 'a
Abu, _Ilatf m
Otfiw 6&An LCU V
h4 *Me Rblt"r to: inflation has Won
&0 t to.. k6dam infla
th sn-p p din ary.
re w resse
jb as *dlnn d 9016d wMa be
waft -the 7- nt
tiffier fbli &
Ot b h Ma
I've in t of
adde&tax. We'. cioddal h 'kequ- larSKI.M.&Y er N gresulting
t -1

am alhwmt *anixistent k Korelits The ia, i1i'llillited -Ooftflm6ed .&MI reserves
'2191ba'Lltow.blat 4AR7V -teevetable: reserves I SM
7w bd lofiL:D"ed 44 doPlanned production of 19
in vid to so years
gas. a. -.ILIW
TIM Ibir delmilopingi iydftujLJLU p6wer is 10 due
kdi 6 shortap of ram a
0 1 U and forest denudation. georsphical CM tionsq
"gjq"wA*e iopcOW.. that a woo 16iind', in sftthewi ftm Kokw 'but
V*,UwwFft if lprediqtibfi :. P exist. Qome4uOn*, the


414 1 fv..
_Jr!_i L tT 1. A1.114i ij&)J: -n., fi 44
0 1 W61. am@ a to Am 1- *4 a, t 'IN
- ---------------- 5L 9

i0m 4min'.. fie j
rt$) to $1.&I'lilliwin 1 1976 (A4 tb.AFe s;v
The.gQal% during.- ur pa rwas
foreign energysourm& Projectecl Mvestment MaX9Y Is
2.7billion wori an ine o f -tg* Z Uff
Peril- basic p des gue to achieve S g6al OPujienCAd ua&.An ,do.eAiov**vrY nww" deve d*A r
e;Wgy- and to:,. rodumde mAeney,, on wL. O1nv11*4XW*M ile ri
tix)n -:: and Wr Sed1korage cnp*it.*:* V, lt.k Z A
T e 1M. I "'Wi &A
tt evv r itM lbift& domookic, rbA6rrrftg
crBase, o Poe dlewn:A&&MdL MW wiff hold role demond:. t6 the!:992W bwlim iw tatna 4n as M-:1976tThe,.dOviijrnftWht L
.Ift 0164 JIM jWft
OXPGA 91 , ft **d
petroeheiiiimhm: An
TuFmtrihl-Y ar PVeZOA04, OI t*
NVIIel ent' of the' '. eevp9my'. ha, JwAli gu
series, pt A-Year d6prae# sII
Yce v plan
growth has accelerate Irom a 7.12,er6wt avera Plan 1962--M) to 10.5 percent B6,77-71) ij4 I a, during the Third S-Yeir Wan. e Fourtl ,'
07 Yeat:
9 Percent growtI az4oontiaupd wdald
V pvg t
*11s.forthowminnimt ofa, w1f4ustai 1AWwe-cMf)T&Y- ,gvv PQ U _qYT emphasis 16 sociaTdevelopment Aula
ation.'-A _tI the
Innov ccor)c i4: QM,4feR 4S 61
cr a ed W $ 484 in.19 inenam h*
8 1,9 AAU AA t 9, A, i 4"*
not n6cess'ar'ifl 'mtan thit the J lg St Of e, Porsq
crease by that amount but it does foreca4f bd 6i er, tu
The most noticeable LM in the the balance of raAe. In order,
to narrow the trade deficitte. : the maximum extent, the natiaii's commpffity expOrtq::(p"cas.sod,-J6ods, -pkywooa eetv-) dvrriWAhevV
PMOCI, are:... in.envwvAxWV"7peremt annuv*
import growth rate ia.vmlod, ublaIrthe p -06otedAIRW-tots& W116 $20-billion wcurre* FM*Ces ,,do rag
Given their exnoiasia7: 04 .divev"eatii6w -akvimiarktft ATA-,vontin1fii& g 4al prosp"4y some, sivalyaWtkiuk theymmax" Aheiw
Q. i F
dePHALvot. in Urge, moasum: dw Absp6biW4& capital, P;urm* -th 4 kd
term foreign capital to be indu into the Uy I
.dvv; Topment of minlng..)R Ianufacturiwv elation -*a4, -other
Smal overhead empital. Of ale total,$SW billian4saoveady i HAe an&$2A billiowis under ne"tixtjm
va 4MV
a l& P extenial: PT
eion2a liquidity Prohl"M an: on p19nefitry: ,,;;,Vst m,,,Th _PnT111try

Though South Korea has the underpinning of a dynamic, modern
my, issues involving human wants and needs remain unreoved. An Aril 1977 report by 87 Korean university professors noe some prolm in thus area during the Third 5-Year Plan. 11m problems included imbalanced growth between agriculture and idstry, an overemphasis ong besiegsnd not enough attention to soa problems such as h ousing. Nevertheless sconomec growth has
fundamentall sense, housing, health, education, diet and food have proved as con trasted to earlier years. South Korea's transforma=ms~~~~ ~~ nation deedn narcultur and foreign grantst
seralsed mddl-icom ntinal with veyfvrable fu
repdts is owe of the& succg &oIe of econo... mc development.
-~ ~ ~~~~~~~: te Mtoa roiis vrt i i r sbrinated to the
An o daendedn&induial growh Governme~nt and indus1'.so-elsey ogehd tat onlY a war orapoged. world "*ftodld delyterntinleot

.... .......


R 0aa orMia South orea'seffort to..poduce ilitar mageItqlnaa

aAn anInAo ea nteeal 9Aiaj rt a

6th plnK g stae -oer sinc Sot.rM~ ea
arodct aulln quate of, ah ceeiuy aftei'RaNphKrgRwAv toeprec;yaso successful effor beor itca prgtu aisg oduce the same
evrangesianfquant ti of quipmentatth North no reduce. The folwn table4. [taldeltd sa seseto osbepo
duction aabhis Attafinmentu f these% [dltdWolsaepsil
only ~ ~ ~ ~~ b wit th deelpmn ofc thtoloinhacos
Adequated quantities of appopat e macthin tingad n ceasoloing sopheistatl ed machi n mus e availablerom o~r.eucin caadinigiens. sournes.ohs[eee]cmpsil

Technology data transfers must be available and provided in a
timely f ashion.
Adequate numbers of skilled personnel must be available,..
Sufficient financing must be available in order to implementplanned programs.
Continiued availability of raw materials and components is
It should be emphasized that by [deleted Jthe doestic armns In*' dusty will not be able to satisfy all defense materiel requrmns
In the Army shortfalls will -be esecially evident for tanks, APCs, some trucks and some types of Atley 1%'e most critical shortfalls.. will occur in the Air Force and Nay where mjritems will: have. to be obtained from foreign sources.
Manufacture-To build entirely or mostly from indigenosl-bilt components.
Produce.-To manufacture or build with sitbstantial input of fo-r-: eign manufactured components.
Assmble.-To put together from foreign-manufactred COMponents.
Capacity.-The highest machine capability--less unavoidable cont-. straints-to produce an4 item.
Capability.-The probable greatest ability to: prodtic an6te1i

.L% A ~ M wwwmmmmma m Brmgade ---------------------A ar li M Th7 dged-------- -------. ------- ------- ------.Delete.

----------------------------------------- [hetS

.Cad - ------------------------------------.

(H ume -- - .. . . . ---------------- .. .. ..
Ai Vo (4th Air Db sm --c. ............... 7,100-@$st Ckangedt wing..- ..------- ---- .., ...... [IN (d]

Mar --~~~~~- ----------------- -- -- -- --- ----- -

A co6:mparison between U.S., and Sve o91
shows a trend of UITS w-ithlawl wibSovu y

United States: U
Miitry prenl. .. ........ ... 4A3 3 $
Fig terasrrat ... ... ... .. ... .. ...... St
I-i2 bombers, 'i 2114
Attack~~~~~. care.L.. ... ...... 83
Othe flavy combatnt in Aska.. --------- 70426

Thisrendis no nsal due toC the end, of fu.
Indocinad Soviet reinforcements al th ifeMS
reinforcement Capability could quickly dress thialac i ecs
sary. Reodirections in the U.S. naval presence in the Western Ikcifip, however, does cause some concern for America's Asian allies because it is read as an indicator of reduced U.S. interesting Asia. U.S. troop withdrawals from Korea further dramtize these militia tens


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