Citation

## Material Information

Title:
Attribution of responsibility and severity of penalties in criminal statutes
Creator:
Tremble, Trueman Rennels, 1946-
Publication Date:
Language:
English
Physical Description:
vii, 232 leaves. : ill. ; 28 cm.

## Subjects

Subjects / Keywords:
Causality ( jstor )
Content analysis ( jstor )
Criminal law ( jstor )
Criminals ( jstor )
Death ( jstor )
First degree murder ( jstor )
Homicide ( jstor )
Intentionality ( jstor )
Manslaughter ( jstor )
Statutory law ( jstor )
Criminal law ( lcsh )
Criminal liability ( lcsh )
Dissertations, Academic -- Psychology -- UF ( lcsh )
Psychology thesis Ph. D ( lcsh )
Genre:
bibliography ( marcgt )
theses ( marcgt )
non-fiction ( marcgt )

## Notes

Thesis:
Thesis--University of Florida.
Bibliography:
Bibliography: leaves 227-231.
Also available online.
General Note:
Typescript.
General Note:
Vita.
Statement of Responsibility:
by Trueman R. Tremble.

## Record Information

Source Institution:
University of Florida
Rights Management:
All applicable rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
Resource Identifier:
0022769131 ( ALEPH )
14050696 ( OCLC )

Full Text

PAGE 1

ATTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND SEVERITY OF PENALTIES Hi CRIPCH^IAL STATUTES By Trueman R. Tremfole, Jr. A DISSERTATION PRESEt-JTED TO THE GRADUATE COUNCIL OF THE Ul^IIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFIKU4ENT OF THE REQUIP^E-ENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPIiY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 1972

PAGE 3

ACKNa'fLEDGEMENTS Initially, I want to express ray appreciation to Dr. Marvin E. Shaw, chairman of my dissertation ccninittee . Dr. Shaw has helpfully guided me at each phase of this project and, moreover, throughout the last three years of ray graduate education. I also want to thank Dr. Guillermo F. Mascaro for his interest in this research; the insights that he provided me are reflected in this paper. In addition, I am grateful for the help that Dr. C. Micliael Levy, Dr. Richard K. McGee, and Dr. Eliner W. Bock gave me as ccmraittee numbers. Finally, I want to acknowledge four students at the University of Florida Â— David English, Mjarguerite Gamble, Pete Laskey, and Peggy Wagner Â— for their assistance iri developing the content analysis system and in the classification of the statutes. IX

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TZffiLE OF CONTENTS Page Aa
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METHOD (Continued) p ^ Content Analysis . 45 Content Analysis System 45 Identifying the units of analysis ..... 45 Categories of analysis 45 Criteria for classification 48 Judges 50 Procedures 51 Severity Measurements 53 III RESULTS 59 Inter judge Reliability . 59 Testing the Hypotheses 65 Hypothesis One 65 Hypothesis Two 67 Florida statutes 67 Homicide statutes 76 W DISCUSSION 80 Heider's Theory and Related Research ...... 80 Causal Structure and Penalty Severity .... 80 OutcoTie Seriousness 88 Criminal Law 92 Conclusions 95 APPENDIX A STATUTES SELECTED FOR COITTENT ANZ\LYSIS AND ALTERATIONS OF THEIR TEXTS 99 APPIM)IX B SYSTEM OF CONTEtTT ANALYZING CRIMINAL LM'JS FOR THE ATTPJBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY ... 189 APPENDIX C ETSTRUCTIONS USED IN SELECTnxIG CRITERIA l-ORDS AND PHRASES FOR COI^IENT ANALYSIS SYSTEM 214 APPENDIX D MATERIALS USED TO TEST THE SECOND HYPOTHESIS BY THE FLORIDA STATUTES 215 REFERENCES 227 BIOGRZ^PHICAL SKETCH 232 IV

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LIST OF TABLES TABLE Â• Â• Page 1 Interjudge Reliability for All Statutes as Measured by Percentage of Tvvo-Person Agreements and Pi_ . 60 2 Interjudge Reliability (Percentage of Two-Person Agreements) for Statutes Analyzed at Beginning, Middle, and End of Content Analysis . . .62 3 Intrajudge Paliability ......... 54 4 Percentages of Statutes Representing the Levels of Causality ' . ....'. ... . 66 5 Mean Seriousness Ratings of Outcones ' Described in the Florida Statutes Used to Test the Second Hypothesis 69 6 Summary of Analysis of Variance for Penalties Prescribed in the Florida Statutes . . . . 71 7 Mean Penalty as a Function of Level of Causality and Degree of Outcome Seriousness ..... 73 8 Mean Outccxne-Seriousness Rating as a. Function of Level of Causality .......,' 75 9 Severity of Penalties Prescribed in the Hanicide Statutes Representing the. . , :_ r Levels of Causality 77

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Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate Council of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requireirents for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy ATTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND SEVERITY OF PENALTIES IN CRIMINAL STATUTES By Trueman R. Tremble, Jr. August, 1972 Chairman: Marvin E, Shaw Major Department: Psychology According to Heider's theory of the attribution of responsibility, the amount of responsibility attributed to an actor for an event is dependent upon the extent to which personal factors, as opposed to environmental factors, are perceived to have caused tiie event. To study this theory, a content analysis of criminal laws was undertaken to determine first, the extent to which the different levels of causality (ccmnission, foreseeability, intentionality, and justification) described the conditions under which a person may be held liable for criminal conduct and, second, the severity of the penalties prescribed in than. Three judges categorized each of 272 Florida statutes and 187 nonFlorida hcmicide statutes at one of the four levels of causality on the basis of the definition of the punishable conduct presented in the statute. The severity of the penalties prescribed in a sarrple of the statutes was VI

PAGE 8

also measured. As a control measure, 31 university students rated the seriousness of the outccmes described in 90 of the Florida statutes. Supporting the first hypothesis, the distribution of the statutes across the levels of causality differed such that the levels of foreseeability and intentionality most frequently described the conditions for criminal liability. Corparing the penalties prescribed in statutes classified at the four levels, the penalties increased in severity from the level of foreseeability to the level of intentionality and then decreased at the level of justification; these findings supported the second hypothesis. As would be expected, other incidental results indicated that more severe penalties tended to be prescribed for more serious outcomes. Since criminal liability typically appeared to be contingent upon a contribution of personal factors greater than the mere caimission of the criuiinal conduct and since the severity of the penalties tended to vary with the degree of personal causation, the results were interpreted as supporting and increasing the generalizability of Heider's theory. Together with the results of past research on this theory, the results of this study also tentatively suggested that the principle of retribution is reflected in the conditions for criminal liability and in the severity of penalties as set forth in criminal sta-tutes. vxi

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ampTER 1 INTRODUCTION Heider's (1958) tÂ±ieory of the attribution of responsibility (AR) has provided a framewDrk for recent research on AR by individuals. Legal discussions of criminal liability and psychological research raise the possibility that the causal structures outlined by Heider's theory are represented in the criminal law and, in turn, are related to the severity of the penalties prescribed by the law. Given this possibility, the purpose of the present study was to test predictions based upon Heider's theory by a content analysis of criminal statutes. Heider's Theory In discussing the conditions under v^ich an individual attributes responsibility to an actor for the outccmes of his actions, Heider enphasized the phencanenology of the attributing individual and, more specifically, the attributor's perceptions of the causal relationship between the actor and his action outcor^s. As a general thesis, Heider proposed that the amount of responsibility attributed to an actor for an event increases with tlie extent to which personal factors a""e perceived to have caused the event.

PAGE 10

Perception of Causality According to Heider, when an individual observes a relationstiip between an actor and an action outcome, he perceptually differentiates between the extent to vdxLch personal factors and environmental factors contributed to the outccane. Personal factors include the. perceived Â£ibility, expended effort, and especially the intentions of the actor. Environmental factors consist of those situational characteristics, such as social norms and task requirements, which would influence anyone acting in the situation. Depending upon the perceived influence of personal and environmental factors, the individual forms different impressions about the causal relationship between the actor and the action outcome. Heider delineated two types of causal inrpressions . The first, referred to as personal causality, describes those situations in which the actor is perceived to have intentionally produced eai outcone. According to Ifei.der, intentionality phencmenologically signifies that the actor directed his abilities and efforts in order to achieve the particular outcome. Consequently, causality for tiie outcone is attributed to the person (i.e., the actor) when he is perceived to have intentionally produced it. The second form of causal inpression, referred to as inpersonal causality, describes those situations in wliich the actor is perceived to have unintentionally produced an outcome. Under these circumstances, environrrental factors, such as luck, are perceived to have deter-

PAGE 11

mined vdiich outcome woiold be produced, and causality is attributed to the environment rather than to the person. Attribution of Responsibility The perceived causal relationship is a principal determinant of AR in Heider's formulation. According to his general proposal, the amount of responsibility attributed for an action outcare varies with the extent to which personal factors, as opposed to environmental factors, are perceived to have caused the outcome. Thj.s proposal reflects Heider's notion that causation for personally caused events is attributed to the person rather than to the environment. That is, in tlie attributor's phenonenology , personally caused events are more ijitimately linked to the acting person. Judgments of responsibility, thus, depend on the extent to v^aich the actor is perceived to have been actively and intiicately involved in causing the event. In elaborating upon this proposal, Heider identified five sets of conditions, or levels of causality, under vrfiich responsii>ility iray be attributed. As originally presented, the levels represent stages of cognitive developioit such that across the successive levels, tlie attributor draws finer distinctions between tlie causal influence of personal and environmental factors. At each successive level, the attributor also requires a greater causal contribution of f^rsonal factors before attributing responsibility. An alternative conception of the levels, which is more compatible with the

PAGE 12

present research, is that the levels simply describe different \vays of perceiving the causal relationship between an actor and his action outcofies either by different individuals in the sane sitiaation or by the sariie individual across situations. In the order of increasing cognitive sophistication, the first of Heider ' s levels may be referred to as the level of association . At this level, the actor is held responsible for outcorres associated with him in any way. At the level of caimission, tlie second level, responsibility is attributed to the actor for outcomes that he actually produced, regardless of the foreseecÂ±)ility of the outcanes. At the next level, the level of foreseeability , responsibility is attributed to the actor for outcomes that he might have foreseen that his actions would produce even though he did not necessarily intend to produce them. Impersonal causality characterizes the causal structures underlying the first tliree levels . At the f ourtli level , the level of_ intentionality , responsibility is attributed for intentionally produced outcorres. Personal causality, therefore, underlies AR at the fourth level. At the level of justification , the fifth level, less responsibility is attributed for intentionally produced outcorres if the actor is perceived to have been influenced by environmental factors that would cause most individuals to feel and act as he did. Although personal causality characterizes AR at the fifth J.evel, the attributor takes into account the source of the actor's intentions and attributes less responsibility if

PAGE 13

tÂ±ie actor is perceived to have been rnotivated by environmental factors . Heider proposed that 7VR increases with the relative extent to which personal factors are perceived to have caused the event. Inspecting the extent to vAiich personal factors characterize the causal structures of the five levels, personal factors are increasingly required for AR from the level of association to the level of intentional ity; at the level of justification, there is a relative decrease in the perceived influence of personal factors vdien the actor is perceived to liave been motivated by environrrental factors. Congruent with this characterization is an hypothesis which was first elaborated and tested by Shaw and Sulzer (1964) and v^hich was a basis of the present study. According to this hypothesis, if a ccarparison is rrade among the amounts of responsibility attributed by adults for events representing each level, AR increases from the level of association to the level of intentionality and then decreases at the level of justification. Research Related to Heider 's Theory A niJinber of studies have sterm'ed from Heider 's theoiry. The results of tliis research liave generally supported Heider 's thesis that AR varies with the perceived causal influence of personal factors. In addition to causal structure, other structural characteristics of the event, characteristics of the actor, and characteristics of tlie attributor have also been shoT,\zn to influence AR. This

PAGE 14

research lias also dQinnstrated tÂ±at the sanctioning process is related to AR. Research Techniques In the first eirpirical test of Heider's theory, Shaw and SiiLzer (1964) sought to compare AR for events representing Heider's levels of causality. To do so, they wrote short stories for each level that linked a fictitious person to an action outcome by the causal structure of the level. Stories at the level of foreseeability, for exanple, portrayed a person v^io produced an outcoire under conditions such that he might have foreseen that his actions would produce it. Individuals read the stories and judged vdiether and to \\hat extent the person described was responsible for the outcone. In addition to causal structure, the influence of other variables on AR can be studied by this technique. Outcone quality, for exanple, can be studied by nnnipulating the favorability of the outcorres described in the stories. Most of the studies directly related to Heider's theory have used Slnaw and SixLzer's technique (Briscoe, 1970; Cuthbert, 1966; Day, 1969; Garcia-Esteve & Shaw, 1968; Kronstadt, 1965, 1967; I'fcan, 1958; Mussenden, 1971; Schneider & Shaw, 1970; Shaw, 1967, 1968; Shav7, Briscoe, & Garcia-Esteve, 1967; Shaw & Reitan, 1969; ; Shaw & Schneider, 1969a, 1969b; Sulzer, 1964; Sulzer & Burglass, : 1968). -_ -.. . :In a number of studies , AR or a phencmenon similar to it has been investigated without systerratically varying the levels of cau-:

PAGE 15

sality. The techniques used in this research were, neveirtlrieless , similar to Shaw and Sulzer's technique in that stimulus materials describing events were presented to individuals vjho then judged the responsibility of characters involved in the events. The stimulus materials used have included the following: written scripts or narratives (Gilmore, 1966; Gordon & Jacobs, 1969; Lackey, 1968; Landy & Aronson, 1969; Shaver, 1970a, 1970b; Shaw, J., & Skolnick, 1971; Shaw, Floyd, & Gwin, 1971; Tesser, Gatewood, & Driver, 1968), tape recordings (Walster, 1966, 1967), pictures describing social interactions (Forbes & Mitchell, 1971; Wright, 1961), and films of silhouetted characters (Wright, 1967) . Unless otherwise itentioned, the research reviewed in this paper was conducted by means of either Shaw and Sulzer's technique or one of the other techniques related to it. Research on AR Causal structure . Â— One hypothesis tested by Shaw and Siilzer (1964) was that corrparing the amounts of responsibility attributed by adults for events representing Heider's levels, AR increases from the level of association to the level of intentionality and then decreases at the level of justification. To test this hypothesis, university students rated stories like those described earlier. Half of the stories at each level linked the fictitious person to positive outcoires, and the other half described negative outcomes. The results of the study generally supported the hy-

PAGE 16

pothesis. Using tÂ±ie same technique, the relationship between AR and causal structure has been subsequently investigated across outcomes varying in quality and intensity (e.g., Shaw & Reitan, 1969; Sulzer, 1964); acts of canmission and omission (Briscoe, 1970); and such siÂ±iject variables as cultural background (e.g., Garcia-Esteve & Shaw, 1968). Although these studies have demonstrated that variables other than causal structure influence AR, they have also fairly consistently supported the hypothesized relationship between AR and causal structure. Tremble and Shaw (1972) tested this hypothesis in a field setting and by a different research strategy. Based on their responses to opinion statements, university students and members of the sxarrounding ccrrmunity were grouped at the levels of causality which represented their perceptions of a U. S. Army lieutenant's involveiiBnt in killing civilians during the Viet Nam conflict (popularly known as the "^ly Lai Incident") . A coiparison was then irade among the amounts of responsibility attributed to the lieutenant by individuals grouped at the levels of ccrardssion, foreseeability, intentionality, and justification. In support of Heider's theoiry, AR tended to increase from the amoxmt attributed by individuals who perceived the event as represented by the level of ccmmission to the amount attributed by individuals perceiving the event at the level of intentionality, and relatively less responsibility was attributed by individuals whose perceptions represented the level of justification.

PAGE 17

Taken together, these studies provide considerable support for the hypothesis that AR increases from the level of association to the level of intentionality and then decreases at the level of justification. It appears, therefore, that the perceived causal structure of an event as defined by Heider's levels is a c3etenninant of the ainount of AR. In supporting this hypothesis, support is also garnered for Heider's general thesis that AR varies with the perceived causal influence of personal factors. Other structural variables . Â— In addition to causal structure, other variables characterizing the structure of the event appear to influence AR, These variables include outccsne quality, outcome intensity, and the nature of the action. Outcorre quality refers to vdiether the outccnie is positive (favorable) or negative (unfavorable) . In a number of studies, Shaw and Sulzer's technique has been used to compare the airoijnts of responsibility attributed for positive and negative outccrres (Day, 1969; Garcia-Esteve & Shaw, 1968; Kronstadt, 1965, 1967; Mban, 1968; Mussenden, 1971; Shaw, 1968; Shaw, Briscoe, & Garcia-Esteve, 1967; Shaw & Reitan, 1969; Shaw & Schneider, 1969b; Shaw & Sulzer, 1964; Sulzer, 1964) . A relatively consistent finding of these studies has been that more responsibility is attributed for negative than pDsitive outcomes. In addition, outcome quality has been fotoid to interact with causal structure. Although the data are not conpletely consistent with respect to the nature of this interaction, it appears that more responsibility is attributed for negative out-

PAGE 18

10 cowBS especially at tJie levels of foreseeability, intentionality, and justification. When causal structure has not been systematically varied, however, mi^ed findings have been obtained for the relationship between outcane quality and AR. Wright (1961) did not report significant differences between the amounts of responsibility attributed for positive and negative outcores. In contrast, coiparatively greater AR scores for negative outcomes have been reported in two other studies (Shaw, Floyd, & Gwin, 1971; Wright, 1967) . A second outcore variable that influences AR is the degree of favorability of the outcarre, conmonly referred to as outcai:^ intensity. In research conducted by Shaw and Sulzer's technique (Briscoe, 1970; Cuthbert, 1966; Day, 1969; Garcia-Esteve & Shaw, 1968; Kronstadt, 1965, 1967; l-toan, 1968; Shaw, 1968; Shaw, Briscoe, & Garcia-Esteve, 1967; Shaw & Reitan, 1969; Shaw & Schneider, 1969b; Sulzer, 1964), it has typically been reported that more responsibility is attributed for high intensity than for low intensity outcoiTes but that the extent of this relationship depends upon the causal structure of the event. Like outcone quality, intensity appears to hiave its greatest effects at the levels of foreseeability and justification. VJhen causal structure has not been systematically varied, no consistent relationship has been found between AR and outcome intensity. Walster (1966), for example, investigated the amount of responsibility attributed for accidental outcort^s and found a positive relationship between AR and the severity of the outcome. In

PAGE 19

11 six studies sterrming from Walster's research, two reported either an inverse relationship between AR and outcome severity or the direction of this relationship to be dependent upon the quality of the outcome (Shaw, J., & Skolnick, 1971; Walster, 1967); nonsignificant relationships were obtained in the remaining four studies (Shaver, 1970a, 1970b; Walster, 1967). A third structural variable that appears to influence AR is the nature of the act. For the levels of f oreseeability , intentionality, and justification, Briscoe (1970) ccnpared the amount of responsibility attributed for outcomes produced by acts of ccmraission with the amount attributed for outcomes produced by acts of omission. As predicted, more responsibility was attributed v^en the outcome was produced by an act of cormission. In surrmary, AR appears to be influenced by outcome quality, outccme intensity, and the nature of the act especially vdien causal structure is systematically varied. It has typically been found that outcoit^ quality and intensity have their greatest effects for events representing the levels of foreseeability and justification. The influence of outccaiB variables, there fore, is somewhat 'dependent on tlie causal structure of the event. As Sulzer (1964) noted, the causal influence of personal factors is somewhat ambiguous at the levels of foreseeability and justification; variations in outcome quality and intensity perhaps 'alter the perceived influence of personal factors at these levels more than at the otiier levels . When the effects of outcome var-

PAGE 20

12 iables have been investigated without systematically varying the levels of causality, inconsistent results have been obtained. This inconsistency perhaps reflects the interaction between outccme variables and causal structure. In the studies on accidental outcomes, for exanple, the inconsistent results nay be partly explained by the finding that the effects of outcome intensity are not as great at the level of ccxnmission as they are at sowe of the other levels . Characteristics of the actor . Â— In addition to the structural variables, the actor's characteristics appear to affect the amount of responsibility attributed to him. Wright (1961) reported that subjects were more willing to attribute responsibility and attributed more responsibility to authority figures than to peers. Similarly, Shaw and Sulzer (1964) found a tendency for children to attribute more responsibility to adults than to children. Using a sanple of black respondents, Forbes and Mitchell (1971) studied the amount of blame assigned to a stimulus person who was portrayed as frustrating another person; they foiand that more blaire was assigned when a white person was portrayed as frustrating a black person than when a black person was portrayed as frustrating a \^iite person. The results of the three studies just presented perhaps reflect processes similar to those demonstrated by Lackey (1968) and Shaver (1970a) . Investigating the effects cf interpersonal similarity on AR, these researchers found that an attributor assigned less responsibility to an actor vdien he assumed that

PAGE 21

13 the actor was similar to himself than vAien he assxjmed that the actor was dissimilar. Other characteristics of the actor have been found to influence the amount of AR. Gilmore (1966) demonstrated that inental health workers were iriore willing to attribute responsibility and attributed inore responsibility to a mentally healthy person than to a nientally ill person. Both VJright (1967) and Shaw, Floyd, and Gwin (1971) investigated the perceived source of the actor's motivation and found that more responsibility was attributed to an inteinally rnotivated actor than to an externally motivated actor. Gordon and Jacobs (1969) , however, reported that the socio-economic status of an accused person did not appreciably affect the proportion of individuals judging him guilty of burglary. Characteristics of the attributor . Â— ^A.s Heider's theory is concerned with the phenomenology of the individual, a number of studies have investigated the effects of characteristics of the . attributor on AR. Among the subject variables investigated have been age, etlmicity, variables related to intellectual performance, and personality characteristics. One purpose of Shaw and Sulzer's (1964) study was to ccrtpare the amounts of responsibility attributed by second-grade children with the amounts attributed by college students for events representing Heider ' s levels . Ihey found that children emitted a relatively less differentiated pattern of AR. That is, carrpared to '

PAGE 22

14 adults, childi^n tended to attribute more responsibility at the levels of association and cortmission and to attribute less responsibility at the levels of f oreseeability , intentionality, and justification. In subsequent studies (Garcia-Esteve & Shaw, 1968; Kronstadt, 1967; Moan, 1968; Shaw, Briscoe, & Garcia-Esteve, 1967; Shaw & Schneider, 1969b) , the relationship between age and AR has been investigated nore extensively. Kronstadt (1967), for exarrple, grouped subjects at several age levels and found that the typical adult pattern Â— increasing AR from the level of association to the level of intentionality with relatively less responsii)ility attril)uted at the level of justification Â— tended to emerge by ages 10-12. These findings support Heider's representation of the levels of causality as stages of developmental sophistication. In addition to age, the effects of the cultural background of the attributor have been examined (Garcia-Esteve & Shaw, 1968; Shaw, 1968; Shaw, Briscoe, & Garcia-Esteve, 1967; Shaw & Schneider, 1969b) . To surmiarize the findings of this research, ethnic background has been found to influence AR; however, ethnic differences have been found to be most prominent in younger subjects. Shaw and Schneider (1969b) , for exairple, demonstrated that 7-8 year old black children attributed more responsibility than conparably aged v\Siite children, that the pattern of AR for 9-10 year old black children was less differentiated than that for white children, but that the AR scores for older black and white children (11-12 and 17-19 years) did not significantly differ.

PAGE 23

15 AltJiough intelligence is apparently related to cognitive development and sophistication, Shaw and Schneider (1969a) failed to find a systematic relationship between intelligence and AR, Kronstadt (1967) , however, reported that the development of the typical adult pattern of AR was sortewhat retarded in children with primary learning disabilities. Finally, several personality characteristics have been shown to affect AR. Cuthbert (1966) found that highly authoritarian individuals attributed more responsibility than low authoritarians for events representing the levels of foreseeability and justification. Similarly, Sulzer and Burglass (1968) demonstrated that empathetic ability and punitiveness influenced the amount of responsibility attributed at the levels of foreseeability and justification. Wright (1967) reported that intolerance of ambiguity accentuated the extent to which more responsibility was attributed for negative than positive events. Self -acceptance and rigidity of self-concept have also been found to affect AR (Wright, 1961) . Nonsignificant effects, however, have been obtained for perceived locus of control (Lackey, 1968), social desirability (Mussenden, 1971), and for record of criminality (Moan, 1968; Mussenden, 1971). Sunmary . Â— A number of variables appear to influence AR. The causal structure of the event as defined by Heider's levels of causality has been repeatedly shown to be an inportant determinant. These findings support Heider's proposal that AR varies with the extent to which personal factors are perceived to have caused the

PAGE 24

16 event. Interacting with causal structure, outcotie quality and intensity influence AR so that nore responsibility is attributed for negative than positive outcomes and for high intensity thaji low intensity outcomes. Finally, characteristics of the actor, such as his perceived similarity, and of the attributor, such as cultural background, are related to AR. Assignment of Sanction When a person is judged responsible for an action outccxna, he is believed to be accountable for his behavior, and this judgment presumably makes him susceptible to sanctioning. Sulzer (1964) and Shaw and Reitan (1969) have rraintained that a distinction should be nade between the AR for an event and the actucd assignment of sanction (AS) for it. According to this position, AR and AS are interrelated phencmena in that AR provides a frame\vork for AS; however, factors in addition to AR determine the sanction that is actually assigned. The research evidence tends to support this position; however, the nature of the differences between AR and AS does not appear to preclude the use of AS as an indicator of AR. Like AR, the relationships between AS and such variables as the type of the act (Briscoe, 1970); cultural background and age (Schneider & Shaw, 1970; Shaw, 1967); intelligence (Shaw & Schneider, 1969a) ; record of criminality (Mussenden, 1971) ; personality characteristics (Cuthbert, 1966; Mussenden, 1971); and attraction to the accused (Landy & Aronson, 1969) have been explored. Due to

PAGE 25

17 the amount of research available, however, AR and AS can be best campared with respect to the effects of causal structure, outccare quality, and outcome intensity. Using Shaw and Sulzer's technique, Sulzer (1964) first investigated the effects of causal structure on AS. Sulzer and subsequent researchers (Briscoe, 1970; Cuthbert, 1966; Mussenden, 1971; Schneider & Shaw, 1970; Shaw, 1967; Shaw & Reitan, 1969; Itanble & Shaw, 1972) have found tlTat AS generally follows the pattern obtained for AJ^ Â— I^ tends to increase from the level of association to the level of intentionality and then decrease at the level of justification, Outccme quality (Mussenden, 1971; Schneider & Shaw, 1970; Shaw, 1967; Shaw & Reitan, 1969; Sulzer, 1964) and outcome intensity (Briscoe, 1970; Cuthbert, 1966; Schneider & Shaw, 1970; Shaw, 1967; Shaw & Reitan, 1969; Sulzer, 1964) also appear to affect AR and AS in the same direction. Like AR, greater sanction is assigned for negative than positive outcomes and for high intensity than low intensity outccmes; hovvever, these outccsne characteristics interact with causal structure so that outcome quality and intensity most greatly affect AS at the levels of foreseeability, intentionality, and justification. Although causal structure, outcome quality, and outcome intensity influence AR and AS in the same direction, these variables appear tx) affect AR and AS to different degrees. First, AR and AS follov; the same pattern across Heider's levels; however, the amount of responsibility attributed for an outcome has generally been found to be greater than, or at least as great as, the amount

PAGE 26

18 of sanction assigiised for it. In directly carrparing the amounts of AR and AS, both Si^v and Reitan (1969) and Briscoe (1970) foiond AR to be greater than &S. Similarly, Sulzer (1964) reported that the proportion of individuals willing to attribute responsibility for " an event was usually greater than the proportion willing to assign a sanction for it. Cuthbert (1966) found that causal structure accounted for a greafer proportion of the variance in AR scores than in AS scores. 'These, findings indicate that causal structijre more . . .; strongly influences the amount of AR than the amount of AS, Outcome varisMes, on the other hand, appear to affect AS rrore . than AR. Sulzer (1964) , Cuthbert (1966) , and Briscoe (1970) found tliat variations in outcore intensity produced greater variations in AS than in AR. Shsw and Reitan (1969) also concluded that AS is relatively more determined by outcome intensity. In addition to outcare intensity, Sulzer reported that outcone quality appeared to influence AS iDore thsm. AR. These findings support the position advanced by Sulzer (1964) .: and Shaw and Reitaii (1969) . Since causal structure and the outcome variables affect 2Â® and AS to different degrees, AR and AS do appear to be different pheicirena. Ihey are, nevertheless, interrelated phenomena. Ihat is, since AR is generally greater than, or at least as great as , AS , AjR appears to provide a f rarrework for AS by setting an upper limit on the amt:)unt of AS. After this framework has been established, other variables, such as outcoire intensity, appear to determine the arcomit of sanction finally assigned. . .

PAGE 27

19 Although causal structure and the outcoine variables differentially influence AR and AS, the nature of these differences does not seem to preclude the use of AS as an indicator of AR. Of particular signif iciance , AR and AS tend to follow a similar pattern acixiss Heider's levels of causality. It seems possible, tlierefore, to use a measure of AS as an indicator of AR in order to study predictions related to Heider's theory in settings vdiere a direct measure of AR cannot be obtained. Heider's Iheor^^ and the Criminal Law V'flTenever a person is judged guilty of a crime, a form of responsibility is being attributed to him. The criminal law, thus, is one area of everyday experience in vÂ±iich AR is a frequently occurring process. Inspection of legal theory and of more descriptive accounts of the conditions for criminal liability reveals considerable overlap betaveen Heider's levels of causality and the conditions under which a person may incur criminal liability. In addition, psychological research guided by both Heider's theory and the criminal law has obtained evidence suggesting that variables caiprising Heider's levels are similarly related to both the severity of the punishments assigned by individuals and the severity of the penalties prescribed in criminal statutes. These correspondences between Heider's tlieory and individual processes, on the one hand, and Heider's theory and the criminal law, on the other hand, raise the possibility of st'jdying of Heider's theory in the context of the criminal law.

PAGE 28

20 Conditions for Criminal Liability Under what conditions nay a person be judged guilty of a crime, that is, held criminally liable? In delineating principles of the criminal law, Hall (1960) outlined the ideal conditions for criminal liability. As an initial limiting condition. Hall maintained that the ordinarily reasonable adixLt should be held liable only for conduct which has been established by the law as criminal and punishable. Only certain types of activities, however, should be defined as criminal. Specifically, liability should be incurred for conduct that created or caused effects v^ich are considered to be socially harmful. If a person has corrmitted socially harmful conduct, his liability should be further contingent upon the mental state or mens rea that accompanied his conduct. According to Hall, the person should have at least been avare of the effects of his conduct. If the person had been a^mxe of the harm produced by his actions, he may be held liable either if he intentionally produced the harm or if he chose to act and, thereby, heedlessly and recklessly produced it. Hall contended that the mens r-ea requirement just outlined is the crowning principle of the crinunal law. It assures that a person is held responsible for socially harmful conduct which is truly his own conduct. As a system of subjective morality underlies the law, the mens rea requirement also guarantees ttiat the person who is criminally liable is also morally responsible. While Hall outlined the ideal conditions, discussions of the elenents or components of crimes (Corpus Juris Secundum , 1961; Florida

PAGE 29

21 Jurisprudence , 1956; Perkins, 1969) provide nore descriptive accounts of the conditions under which a person nay be held liable. Traditionally, a crime has two corponents: objective behaviors 'and the mental state (the mens rea) acccxrpanying the behavior."'-' For a person to be held liable for a certain crime, it must be demonstrable that he emitted the behaviors delineated by the law and, additionally, that his conduct followed fron the rcois rea -' also specified by the law. As rroitioned earlier, Hall maintaiiied that a person should be held criminally liable only if he had been aware of tlie effects of Ms conduct. Discussions of the defini.' tions of crimes , hov^ver , reveal that there Is considerable variation in the iroital states specified for different crirres and that these mental states do not necessarily conform to Hall's specifications . It seems possible to distribute the mens rea coipo" nents of most crimes along a continuum ranging frcm, at one end, a premeditated intent to produce tlie particular harm to, at the other end, criminal negligence due to a failure to be aware of the contingencies of vM.ch one should, have been aware . Crines known as the strict liability crimes, however, do not appear to belong to this continuiin. Strict liability crimes are defined without reference to the mental state of the perpetrator so that ' ' the coimdssion of the specified conduct is the major ODndition for criminal liability. -' :..-;. The law also takes into account justifying and excusing conditions. Based upon Perkins' (1969) analysis ,. three types of'

PAGE 30

22 justifications and excuses can be identified: (1) characteristics of the person which are considered to reduce his capacity to entertain the requisite mens rea (e.g., insanity, involuntary intoxication, immaturity) , (2) modifying circumstances that also reduce the capacity to entertain the requisite mens rea (e.g. , ignorance of fact, necessity) , and (3) circumstances Wnich place social values in conpetition (e.g., public authority, prevention of criine) . While Hall (1960) as v;ell as Perkins underscored the effects of justifications and excuses on the mens rea requir orient. Packer (1968) anphasized that the recognition of such extenuating conditions also serves to protect the individual's freedom and autonor^. As indicatai by Perkins, extenuating conditions can either totally exculpate a person or reduce his guilt to sane lesser degree. Based upon this presentation, there appears to be considerable similarity betv.^een the conditions for crimixial liability and the conditions for AR as outlined by Heider's levels of causality. Ihe commission of the conduct for v/hich responsibility is attributed is an inportant condition in both the law and Heider's theory. Except for the strict liability offenses v^ch appear to be represented by' Heider's level of commission, criminal liability is also contingent on the mens rea associated with the commission of the conduct. Tlie mens rea elements of crimes appear to vary fron negligence to preri-editated intentionality, and the causal structures represented in Heider's levels of foreseeability and intentionality lie within this range. Altliough the legal concept of justification

PAGE 31

23 is broader than Heider ' s concept and includes tlie personal characteristics of the actor, justifying conditions reduce responsibility in both the criminal law and Heider 's theory. Assignment of Punishinent Guided by both Heider 's theory and the criminal law, Friedrich (1965) investigated the punishments assigned by individuals and in criminal laws for harmfiiL acts produced under varying conditions. According to Friedrich, Heider believed that an individual judges another person's culpability by referring his observations of the person's behavior to a set of assiitiptions , beliefs, and expectations concerning the conditions of responsibility. ' Speculating that the theory and practice of the criminal law reflect the ordinary person's fraiiewDrk for judging culpability, Friedrich examined lav; texts and cases in order to identify variables that influence such judgments. Based upon this examination, Friedrich predicted that the following four variables influence the amount of punishment assigned for hannful acts: (1) the severity of the harm, (2) the actor's foreloiowlesdge of the hannful consequences produced by the act, (3) past provocation to the actor, and (4) present threat to the actor. Several degrees were distinguished for each of these \7ariables. The three degrees of foreknowledge, for exanple, v^ere the impossibility of knowing of the harmful consequences, scfiie knowledge of tlie harmful conseqaences , and clear knowledge of the

PAGE 32

24 iTarmful consequences. For each possible ccanbinatdon of the four variables, a story was written about a hypothetical actor v*io harmed another person. Individuals read each story and rated the amount of punishment that the actor should receive. In addition, fcvTO law professors jointly identified the penalty that the New York Penal Code would prescribe for the actor. For the ratings iiade by individioals, Friedrich found that progressively niore punishment was assigned as the severity of the harm and as the actor ' s foreknowledge of the harm increased . Less punishinent \^ra.s assigned when the actor had been provoked or was currently being threatened by the person he harmed. The severity of the penalties prescribed in the penal code tended to increase or decrease in the same manner as did the ratings rrade by individuals with, the major exception being that the criminal code prescribed a nore severe penalty, rather than a less severe penalty, for provoked acts. From variables extracted fron the criminal law, Friedrich appears to have generated Heider's levels of ccnmission, foreseeability, justification, and possibly intentional ity. In doing so, Friedrich 's research further demonstrates the conceptual similarity between the criminal law and Heider's theoiry of AR. Friedrich 's findings rejgarding the severity of punishments aire perhaps of even greater significance. The results generally suggest that the penalties prescribed in a criminal code are sensitive to the causal v-ariables ccmprising Heider's levels of causality; more specifically.

PAGE 33

25 they suggest that both the punislTnients assigned by individijals and the penalties prescribed in the law are similarly related to these variables. Conclusions In conclusion, there appears to be considerable siiTiilarity between the conditions for criminal liability and the conditions for AR as outlined by Heider's levels of causality. This similarity raises the possibility of interpreting the conditions for criminal liability in terms of Heider's levels of causality. Using fictitious events, Friedrich found that tl:ie severity of the penalties prescribed in criminal lav/s and the severity of the punishments assigned by individuals tended to be similarly related to variables conprising the levels of causality. This finding suggests that the penalties prescribed in laws could be used to study the punishments assigned for events representing the levels of causality. Research Problem and Hypotheses The discussions of criiunal liability and Friedrich 's research suggest that Heider's theory is reflected in tine conditions for criminal liability and in the penalties prescribed for crirres. The purpose of the present research, thus, was to study Heider's theory in the context of the cr:ininal law. To do so, criminal statutes were content analyzed to determine the levels of causality at vdiich persons nay be held responsible and punish^able for criminal conduct.

PAGE 34

26 The content analysis then afforded the opportunity to test tivo predictions derived from Heider's theory and related research. Research Problem. One function of criminal statutes is to define and describe the socially harmful conduct that is punishable by the law. In order for a person to be held liable for a crime defined by a statute, it must be derronstrable that his behavior conformed to tlie definition of the criire (Corpus Juris Secundum , 1961) ; thus, statutory' definitions of crimes appear to outline the conditions under which a person iray be judged responsible and punishable. Heider's levels of causality rnay also be considered to describe different sets of conditions under which responsibility is attributed. By doing so, Heider's theory vas studied in the context of the criminal law. Statutes v^iich defined crimes and prescribed penalties v,ere first classifiexJ into categories representing Heider's levels. In this rrenner, the levels of causality ^N^ch described the statutory conditions for criminal liability were ascertained. Having content analyzed the statutes, it was then possible to examine botli the differential representation of the levels and the severity of the penalties prescribed in statutes classified at the different levels. lb execute this study, criminal laws had to be divided into units that could be placed into categories representing Heider's levels and that simultaneously preserved an identifiable connec-

PAGE 35

27 tion between the criininal conduct described in the law and the penalty prescribed for it. Accordingly, the unit of content analysis chosen for this study was the socially harmful conduct punished by a certain penalty . The unit of analysis can be outlined more coirpletely in terms of the content of criminal laws. Each unit of analysis consisted of conduct. Inspection of criminal statutes revealed that different types of conduct rray be punished by the Scame penalty. Preneditated murder, for example, and murder in the commission of a felony may be punished by the penalty of death. It was possible, therefore, for a single unit of cinalysis to describe several different forms of conduct. The conduct prohibited by tlie law was also considered to be socially harmful. LUce Heider's theory, the criminal law theoretically distinguishes between conduct and its effects, with the socially liarroful effects providing the reason for prohibiting the conduct (Hall, 1960). An examination of criminal statutes, hoviever, revealed that the harmful effects of crimes are not necessarily explicitly sta.ted in the laws themselves. In analyzing a given unit, therefore, it was often necessary to infer tlie harmful effects of tlie conduct described in it. Each unit of analysi.s also contained a penalty. This component points out one additional char'acteristic of criminal statutes. Rather than defining crin:es, some laws describe conduct that vvould ordinarily be punishable; however, the conduct is described in terms of conditions which exculpate the perpetrator. These laws, nevertheless,

PAGE 36

28 were appropriate for tÂ±ie present research since they outline conditions under vdiich non-criminal responsibility is attributed. These laws also dictate a legally significant disposition vfcLch represents the least severe "punishment", no punishment. By including such laws, the penalties ranged from complete exculpation to the death sentence. In sunmary, the unit of analysis consisted of the various forms of conduct and their harmful effects which were punishable by a penalty ranging from exculpation to the death sentence. For convenience this unit was referred to as the "statute". It should be noted that the boundaries of the statute used as the unit of analysis did not necessarily conform to the boundaries of a law found in a crimiiial code. In this study, statutes were to be classified into categories representing Heider's levels of causality. In doing so, it seemed reasonable to use four of Heider's levels Â— ccmnission, , foreseeability, intentionality, and justification. In past research on Heider's theory, the level of association has typically been described by I events vd-iich tlie actor did not commit and with which he was quite i reiTotely associated (e.g. , by group membership) . In the criminal I law (Hall, 1950; Perkins, 1969) on the other hand, a person must generally commit a crirre in order to incur liability for it. The 1 level of association, therefore, did not appear to be applicable to the criminal law. As originally defined, Heider's levels represent the conditions ; under which responsibility is attributed for action outccnes. Vlhlle \

PAGE 37

29 legal tlTeory also distinguishes between conduct and the effects of the conduct, laws often describe conduct without explicitly differentiating beb^een conduct and its effects. The levels of canmission, foreseeability, intentionality, and justification, therefore, TAere redefined so that as content analysis categories, they could accoiroodate conduct as well as conduct and its effects. In doing so, the definitions of the levels were broadened so that the causal conditions described by Heider's levels characterized the conduct classified at tlie redefined levels; however, the causal conditions did not necessarily refer to the particular consequences of the conduct as they do in Heider's formulation. TlTe distinguishing causal condition at Heider's level of intentionality, for example, is intentionality, and criminal conduct described in terniis of intentionality was classifiable at the redefined level of intentionality even if the intention did not directly refer to the particular outconies produced by the conduct. All four levels Vvere redefined in tlais iTBnner. In the present study, thus, the level of cornmission vjas defined as follows : Responsibility is attributed at the level of commissioh if the law describes conduct tlmt is perfonned by a person . The law does not describe conduct performed under the conditions of foreseeability, intentionality , or justification . At Heider's level of conmission, the causal condition for AR is the ccaimissicn of the outcome. This condition was reflected in the redefined level in that all statutes classifiable at this level merely described con-

PAGE 38

30 duct without reference to characteristics signifying the conditions of foreseeability, intentionality , or justification. At Heider's level of foreseeability, responsibility is attributed for outccnies that might have been foreseen by the actor. The level of foreseeability was redefined around the concepts of foreseeability and kna,vledge , and all statutes classifiable at tlie redefined level described conduct associated with foreseeable outccmes or knowledge of factors partly defining the crime. The level of foreseeability vras redefined in the following inanner: Responsibility is attributed at the level of foreseeability if the law describes conduct that is performed by a person who either (1) could have foreseen or did foresee the social harm produced by his conduct or (2) could have kno\-m or did know factors that partly define his conduct . The law does not describe the conduct as being performed under the conditions of intentional ity or justification . At Heider's level of intentionality, the distinguishirig condition for AR is the actor's intention to cause the outccfnes of his actions. According to the redefined level of inte-ntionality, all statutes classifiable at this level described conduct manifesting intentionality; however, the intention ODuld refer to the harm produced by tile conduct, a similar harm, or seme other harm explicitly stated by the law. The level of intentionality was redefined in the following manner : Responsibility is attributed at the level of intentionality if the law describes conduct that is performed by a person who either (1) intended to produce the specific social

PAGE 39

31 harm of his conduct, (2) intended to produce a social harm smilar to the one that te produced , or (3_)_ performed the conduct along with an intent to acconplish soiie other harm that is explicitly stated by the law . The law does not describe the conduct as being performed under the conditions of the level of justification . At fielder's level of justification, a lesser airount of responsibility is attributed for intentional outcomes produced under justifying conditions. While environmental factors are the only justifying conditions in Heider's formulation, the following factors served as justifying conditions in the redefined level of justification: (1) environmental circumstances that would affect other individuals so that they too Vvould be more likely to perform the conduct and (2) personal characteristics which would reduce the person's capacity to formulate and/or control the intentions of an ordinarily reasonable person. Personal factors were considered to be justifying factors for twD reasons. First, in Heider's naive analysis of action, personal characteristics as well as environmental factors can limit personal causality. Second, as GUmore (1966) suggested with respect to mental illness, the actor's personal characteristics can create an ambiguous situation such that he may be perceived as eitlier less resistant to environmental inducements to manifest his intentions or less capable of intentional conduct. The redefined level of justification differed fron; Heider's definition in another respect. Heider discussed the mitigating influence of justifying factors on the AR for intentional outcomes.

PAGE 40

32 Acx^ording to tÂ±ie redefined level, responsibility vss attributed at the level of justification for any conduct as long as justifying factors vrere given consideration. This modification is ccupatible with Heider's formulation in that if a person can identify and ta]uld be rrore likely to perform the conduct , or (2) the person is descrjÂ±ed as iTaving personal characteristics that \vould reduce Ms capacity to formulate and/or control the intentions of an ordinarily reasonable person. Hypothese s The content analysis afforded tlie opportunity to test two hypotheses based upon Heider's theory and related research. Before

PAGE 41

33 elaborating upon the hypotheses, an assuiiption that underlies them should be made explicit. Heider's theory delineates phencmenological factors that influence the individual as he attributes responsibility; consequently, his theory predicts judgments of responsibility by individuals. Rather than directly representing the judgments of individuals, criminal statutes represent legislative or group decisions about, first, the conditions under v\diich defendants should be judged guilty and, second, tlie punishments for defendants Vvho have been judged gioilty. Even though Heider's theory is not directly predictive of group decisions, predictions about statutes can be advanced frcm Heider's theory and related research if it is assurred that the decisions ennbodied in statutes reflect the perceptions and judgments of individual legislators. Itore specifically, in defining crires, legislators have been influenced by their individual perceptions of responsibility so that the statutory definitions of crimes reflect the conditions under which they as individuals would attribute responsibility. In addition, the penalty prescribed in a statute reflects the punishment that individual legislators would be willing to assign for behaviors performed under the conditions defined in the statute. The results of a recent role-playing study (Shaw & 'Eranble, 1971) provide indirect support for this assunption. As fart of the background information read by each member of the four-person groups, the foramn of three factory workers was accused of an act that ad-

PAGE 42

34 versely affected the three workers. For different groups, the conditions under vdiich the foraiian had reportedly produced this negative outcome v;ere structured to represent a control condition, the level of commission, the level of foreseeability, or the level of intentionality. During the role-playing phase \diich follCT-ved, the forerrHn atteirpted to reach a decision with the three vrarkers about a cliange in their work procedures. It v^as found that decision-iraking time and decision quality varied as a function of the personal causality of the forerran. These findings suggest that tlie causal structure of an event can affect group processes and, indirectly, that this variable could be reflected in decisions about crinnnal liability. Given these assumptions, the first hypothesis was has&l upon Heider's proposal tliat AR varies with the extent to which personal factors, as opposed to environinental factors, are perceived to have caused the event. This proposal, Wnich has been supported by past research, seemed to iirply that if legislators' decisions about the conditions for criminal liability do reflect their individual perceptions of responsibility, they would be likely to structure these conditions so that criminal liability requires a relatively greater contribution of personal factors. That' is, the levels of causality are differentially represented in the criTtdnal statutes, and those levels which are relatively more characterized by personal causality are the inore frequently represented levels. This expectation, it should be noted, is also conpatible with Hall's

PAGE 43

35 (1960) contention that a system of subjective morality underlies tlie criminal lav;. Since the relative contribution of personal factors varies across Heider's levels, this expectation was tested by coTparing the number of statutes classified at the different levels. The first hypothesis, therefore, was that there is a difference in the number of statutes representing the levels of commission , foreseeability , intentionality , and justification . Based upon Heider's theory, it was speculated that like the relative contribution of personal factors, the number of statutes classified at each level increases from the level of ccnrnission to the level of intentionality and then decreases at the level of justification. A directional hypothesis, however, did not seem warranted. Legal discussions (Hall, 1960), for example, imply that the level of foreseeability suffices for criirinal liability. In addition, Sulzer (1964) reported that there was basically no difference between the proportion of individuals vto were willing to attribute scsrie degree of responsibility for events representing the level of foreseeability and the proportion willing to attribute responsibility for events at the level of intentionality. Legislators, therefore, iray be just as willing to attribute responsibility at the level of foreseeability as at the level of intentionality so that the relative number of statutes at the levels of foreseeability and intentionality was somewhat unpredictable. It should also be mentioned that a comparatively snaller number of statutes v;as expected at the level of justification and that this

PAGE 44

36 smaller nmriber was partly artif actual. Although the law takes into account justifying factors, an inspection of criuiinal codes revealed that such factors are not explicitly enunciated for each offense; furthermore, it has been maintained (Hall, 1960) that unless such considerations influence judgments of guilt, justifying factors are more appropriately considered in administering punishments. Past research has demonstrated that like AR, the amount of sanction assigned by individuals increases with the relative extent to which personal factors are perceived to have caused the event. It seemed likely that if the penalty prescribed for a crime reflects the punishment that individual legislators are willing to assign, the amount of punishment prescribed for a crime wDuld depend upon the extent to which personal factors contributed to the socially harmful conduct. This expectation is supported by Friedrich's (1965) finding that the severity of statutory penalties and the j amount of sanction assigned by individuals tended to be similarly \ related to variables conprising Heider's levels. The second hyI [ pothesis of this study, therefore, was that comparing the severity [ of the penalties prescribed in the statutes classified at the ji levels of causality , the severity increases from the level of comnaission to the level of intentionality and then decreases at the level of justification . The assunption underlying this study is that Heider's theory is reflected in the criminal law. Legal writings and Friedrich's (1965) research appear to support the validity of the assurrption.

PAGE 45

37 As the review of the research revealed, most of the support for Heider's theory has been obtained in the laboratory setting and by Shaw and Sulzer's (1964) teclTnique iii particular. Confirmation of predictions from Heider's theory through a content analysis of criminal statutes, thus, wDuld make two additional contributions. First, it wDuld provide direct support for the assumption that Heider's theory is reflected in the criminal law. Second, it vrould tend to extend the generalizability of the theory both to the criminal law and across research techniques. Surrmary The purpose of this research ^-^as to study Heider's -theory of AR through a content analysis of criminal statutes. The following twD hypotheses, based upon Heider's theoiry and related research, v.'ere then tested: (1) There is a difference in the number of statutes representing the levels of commission, foreseeability, intentionality, and justification. (2) Caiparing the severity of penalties prescribed in statutes classified at the levels of causality, the severity increases from the level of comnission to the level of intentionality and then decreases at the level of justification.

PAGE 46

CHAPTER II iVETHOD Sanple of Statutes Statutes Selected TwD sannples of laws v^re selected for this study: (1) criminal laws of tlie State of Florida and (2) homicide laws of states other than Florida. The sample of Florida laws was drawn from Florida Statutes Annotated (Title 44, Sections 779.01-377.14) which contained the laws of tlie State of Florida updated for tlie year 19711972. An examination of this volume revealed that it contained approxinmtely 525 criminal laws prescribing at least one penalty and tlTat the laws ^^ere arranged into 52 cliapters according to similar types of offenses. In order to obtain a representative sample, the laws were chosen by randcmly selecting 24 of the chapters of lav/s and, additionally, the chapter of hcxnicide laws. By this procedure, approximately 249 laws prescribing at least one penalty v.ere selected, more than 45% of all such laws. A representative sanple of non-Florida hanicide laws was obtained by randomly selecting 25 states of the United States. The states selected were as follows: Alaska, Delaxvore, liawaii, Indiana, lovia, Louisiana, tiaine, I^feryland, Minnesota, Ilississippi , Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahcna, Oregon, ]Rhode Island, South 38

PAGE 47

39 Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and VJyoining. Eash state's hanicide laws were taken from a piÂ±ilication similar to Florida Statutes Annotated . Whenever possible , the hcxnicide laws were identified by chapter titles. Accordingly, vÂ»hen the laws of a state were arranged into chapters, those laws within a chapter entitled "homicide" (or having a similar title such as "murder" or "manslaughter") were selected as the laws for the state. \1ben the laws of a state were not arranged into chapters, the laws of the state were searched until there was located a series of laws that defined and penalized crines of hcmicide, defined as the killing of one human being by another (Perkins, 1969) . These laws were then used as the sairple for the state . Regardless of vAiich of the tro procedures had been used to identify them, all of the hcmicide i I laws originally selected were content analyzed except for those i i mentioned later. Tlie honncide laws selected and references to publications from which they were taken are listed in Appendix A. Preparation of Statutes for Content Analysis A booklet of typewritten laws was compiled for each chapter of Florida lav/s and for each state's homicide laws. Each booklet of Florida laws was labeled with the title of the chapter of laws placed in it; likewise, each booklet of hcmicide laws was entitled by the name of the state whose laws had been placed in it. Each of the 50 booklets presented verbatim and in the order of their -'.Â•^Â•Â»-*U>" J*-.

PAGE 48

40 original appearance all of the laws contained in their respective chapters with three exceptions. First, the penalties prescribed in the laws were replaced by codes. Second, several types of laws or parts of them were omitted. Third, references to footnotes were added to certain laws. These alterations are discussed in the next three sections. Coding the penalties . Â— Wost of the laws selected for this study prescribed at least one penalty. To reduce the influence -^. of the penalty's size on the content analysis and to facilitate the recognition that a penalty had been prescribed, the te:
PAGE 49

41 prescribed in laws, the nature of the alterations may be described more clearly in terms of this variation. Many laws set forth a specific set of punishing consequences as tlie penalty for the crime. In the following law, for example, publicly using indecent language is punisliable by imprisonment not exceeding 30 days or by a fine not exceeding $25: Any person vho shall publicly use or utter any indecent or obscene language shall be punished by irrprisoniTient not exceeding thirty days, or by fine not exceeding tvs5nty-five dollars ( Florida Statutes Annotated , Title 44, Section 847.05), The text of a law that prescribed a penalty in this nanner was altered by deleting the specified penalty and by substituting for it vrords or a phrase wiiich indicated that tlie crime was punishable by the coded penalty. Thus, the above law was altered as follows: "Any person who shall publicly use or utter any indecent or obscene language shall be pimished by Penalty 847.05-1 . " A second way of prescribing penalties is by declaring a crime to be a misdemeanor or felony (or seme other grade of offense) . ^-flien such a declaration is made without further specifying a penalty, reference is being wade to penalties that generally apply to misdemeanors or felonies vihose penalties are otherwise unspecified. Disposing of railroad switch keys, for exanple, is defined as a misderrEanor in the following statute: It is unlawfxil for any person to make, buy, sell or give away any duplicate key to any lock belonging to or in use by any railroad coripany in this state on its switches or switch tracks, except on the written order of the officer of said railijl a ~ mi r.rmyr-*'*^ "sw^Â— PAGE 50 42 road conpany whose duty it is to distribute and issue switch lock keys to the ertployees of such railroad ccsnrpany. Any person violating the provisions of this section sliall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor ( Florida Statutes Annotated , Title 44 , Section 860.10). The text of a law prescribing a penalty in this fasMon was altered by deleting references to the grade of the crime and by substituting for then vrords or a phrase \^aich indicated that the ' crime was punishable by the coded penalty. Thus, the last sentence of the law just presented was altered to read as follows: "Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be punished by Penalty 860.10-1 . " In scrae laws, conduct that ordinarily constitutes a crime is defined as "justified" or "excused"; legally justified and excused conduct is subject to acquittal or exoneration. In this study, this type of conduct was considered to be punishable by a penalty of years of imprisonment. To incorporate a coded penalty into this type of law, a phrase or sentence was added to the text of the law which indicated that the conduct VTas punishable by the coded penalty. Before attaching the coded penalties, explicit references to exoneration or acquittal were deleted. The text of the following homicide law, for exanple, was altered by adding (no previous deletions were made) the phrase placed within paren-theses : Homicide is excusable (and punishable by Penalty 9.48.150-1) vjtien corrmitted by accident or misfortune in doing any lawful act by lawful ireans, ' with ordinary caution and without any unlawful PAGE 51 43 intent ( Revised Code of Washington , Title 9 , Section 9.48.150) . Generally, one coded penalty was substituted for each penalty appearing in the types of laws just described. In several instances, however, it was found that separate laws described either different crimes or different forms of the same crime and tliat each of these was punisliable by a penalty set forth in only one of the laws. In these instances, a coded penalty was incorporated into, each law that described a different form of the crime. In doing so, references to the penalty were deleted fran the text of a law, and a phrase or sentence was added which indicated that the crirre was punishable by the coded penalty. While this practice was applied to the laws prolribiiting several types of offenses, it was perhaps most frequently applied to the iranslaughter laws. For several states, one law presents a generic definition of manslaughter and prescribes a penalty for it. Following this law, each of several laws separately describes a different form of the crirrs of nanslaughter, and each form is punishable by the penalty set forth in the first law (for an example, see Florida Statutes Annotated , Title 44, _ sections 782.07-782.15). For these laws, a coded penalty was incorporated into each lav; describing a separate form of manslaughter, and references to manslaughter were deleted from each law except for those laws that provided generic definitions of it. Since the unit of content analysis, or the "statute", consisted of the conduct punishable by a single penalty, each coded PAGE 52 44 penalty demarcated a separate statute. The number of statutes, therefore, was determined by the number of coded penalties. Following the procedures just outlined, the sairple for the study consisted of 272 Florida statutes and 187 homicide statutes. Qnitted material . Â— In general, the chapters of laws were unaltered except for coding the penalties. Since they would have unnecessarily corplicated the content analysis, several laws and separate paragraphs of laws were excluded from the booklets; these laws contained infonration that would not have contributed to the content analysis. Rules of evidence and procedural matters (such as the disposition of confiscated gambling equipment) are examples of such inforriHtion. Laws that had been repealed were. also excluded. Hie updating manuals acconpanying the published laws were used to determine whether a law was currently effective. Laws prohibiting crimes other than homicide are scraetiraes embedded in a chapter of homicide laws. Exairples of such criaies are performing abortions, aiding suicides, and assault with intent to murder. The laws proscribing crimes other than homicide were excluded frcm the booklets of non-Florida homicide statutes. Footnoted definitions .Â— Finally, one type of law was altered, because it did not provide enough information to be ireaningfully classified. This type of law defines a crime by presenting its common-law label, and classification of the statute required knowledge of the crime's common-law definition. References to footnotes were added to those laws which appeared to define crimes in PAGE 53 45 this manner. Placed at the end of each booklet affected, the footnotes furnished definitions of the corresponding crimes. As it turned out, definitions were added for the following crimes only: murder, iranslaughter , voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter. The definitions for these crimes were taken from a law dictionary ( Black ' s Law Dictionary , 1968) . ;!^pendix A presents the chapters of laws selected for this study and references to the publications from wliich they were taken. For each law placed in a booklet, any textual alteration is noted. Ihis appendix also lists the material that was excluded frcm the booklets. In addition, the footnotes added to certain homicide laws are presented. Content Analysis Content Analysi s System The content analysis system vss comprised of a body of interrelated definitions, rules, instractions , and examples which were designed to guide the judges in identifying and classifying the statutes. Presented verbatim in Appendix B, the content analysis system is generally outlined in this section. Identifying the units of analysis . Â— Conceptually, the unit of analysis, or tlie statute, consisted of the various forms of socially harmful conduct punishable by a single penalty, lb identify a statute, a judge was first instructed by the content analysis system to locate a coded penalty. For the coded penalty. PAGE 54 46 the judge was then to identify the statutory material describing the punishable conduct \*ere conduct was defined as sirtply the actions or failures to act punishable by the penalty. After having generally delimited a statute, the judge was instructed to examine two characteristics of the conduct irore thoroughly. First, he was to determine whe'ther different "forms of conduct" were punishable by the penalty. According to the definitions provided, there were different forms of punishable conduct if several sets of actions (or failures to act) which appeared different from each other were susceptible to the penalty. Second, the judge was to ascertain the social harm produced by the conduct. To do so, he was instructed to infer or identify the harmful effects v^iich he believed that any form of the conduct \^ould produce. Except for the stipulation that it refer to tlie effects produced by any form of conduct, social ^^J^ ^^as undefined. The analysis of a statute into the forms of conduct and the social harm was incorporated into the content analysis system because of the conplexity of the statutory material and as a means of increasing the likelihood that different judges would attend to the saire material in classifying the statute . ' ' ' Categories of analysis . Â—After the conduct comprising the statute had been identified, it was classified into a single category representing the level of commission, foreseeability, intentionality, or justification. In the content analysis sys- PAGE 55 47 tern, these levels were defined as follows: (1) Level of Corrmission : Responsibility is attributed at the level of conmission if the law describes conduct that is perforrred by a person. The law does not describe conduct performed under the conditions of foreseeability, intentional ity, or justification. (2) Level of Foreseeability : Responsibility is attributed at the level of foreseeability if the law describes conduct that is performed by a person vAio either (a) could have foreseen or did foresee the social harm produced by his conduct or (b) could liave known or did know factors that partly define his conduct. The law does not describe the conduct as being performed under the conditions of intentionality or justification. (3) Level of Intentional ity ; Responsibility is attributed at the level of intentionality if the law describes conduct that is performed by a person who either (a) intended to produce the specific Inarm of his conduct, or (b) intended to produce a social harm similar to the one that he produced, or (c) performed the conduct along with an intent to acccarplish sane other harm that is explicitly stated by the law. The law does not describe the conduct as being performed under the conditions of justification. (4) Level of Justification : Responsibility is attributed at the level of justification if the law describes conduct that is performed by a person under any of the conditions of conmission, foreseeability, or intentionality, as described earlier. The law additionally describes the performance of the conduct in terms of factors, like the following PAGE 56 48 ones, that would attenuate the airount of responsibility attributed to the person: (a) the person performing the conduct is influenced by circumstances that v;Duld affect other ordinarily reasonable persons so that they too would be more likely to perform the conduct, or (b) the person is described as having personal characteristics that would reduce his capacity to formulate and/or control the intentions of an ordinarily reasonable person. Criteria for classification . Â— A judge classified a statute at one of tlie four levels by considering the descriptions of the forms of conduct in the statute to outline the information that the law takes into account in attributing responsibility for the conduct. If only one form of conduct was described in the statute, the statute was classified at the level at which the law appeared to be attributing responsibility for the form of conduct. If more than one form of conduct was described in a statute, a judge was to consider each form of conduct and the level at which the law appeared to be attributing responsibility for it. Such a statute was then classified at the level at which across tlie various forms of 'conduct, responsibility was most "characteristically, commonly, frequently, or predcrainantly" attributed in the statute; if the law appeared to attribute responsibility at several levels equally often, the statute was classified at the least sophisticated of these levels (in Heider's theory) . PAGE 57 49 Along with the definitions of the levels, a judge was iastructed to use tavo criteria in classifying a statute. The first criterion involved certain words and phrases v^iich iTad been listed to represent the levels of foreseeability, intentionality, and justification. i\ccording to the first criterion, if the conduct in a statute was described by a word or phrase (or a similar one) listed for one of these levels and if the word or plurase conveyed the nieaning of its level, the statute was to be classifed at the level represented by the word or phrase. To obtain the vrords and phrases for the three levels, an original list was drawn from two sources. Part of the. list consisted of vxjrds which had been used to define crirres in a textbook on the criminal law (Perkins, 1969) and vrfiich appeared to signify characteristics of Heider's levels. The rsraining vrords were extracted from approximately 100 criminal laws. Most of these laws, according to Perkins (1969), defined either strict liability crirres or crimes with mens rea conponents varying frciti negligence to intentionality . The original list was reduced to 54 sets of words and plirases by grouping together synonymous words. For each set of wDrds, a legal definition was developed. . The definitions were primarily based upon definitions found in a law dictionary ( Black ' s Law Dictionary , 1968) ; secondary sources for the definitions were Florida Words and Phrases (1955) , a textbook on the criminal law (Perkins, 1969) , and an ordinairy dictionary (Webster's Dictionary, 1960). The 54 sets of WDrds, their _~-4>i<-t^-4>cii Â»i^ , t^tr-i^iK PAGE 58 50 definitions, and, whenever possible, an exainple of their use in a law were then read by the researcher and two University of Florida students familiar with Heider's theory. These individuals independently classified each set at the level which they believed the set to signify (Appendix C presents the instructions used in classifying the words) . Each of the 39 sets of words vdiich had been identically classified by the three individuals was then listed in the content analysis system to represent the agreed-upon level. If the conduct in a statute was not described by a word or phrase listed for a level of causality, the judge was to classify the statute at the level of commission unless the second criterion was satisfied. According to the second criterion, a judge was to classify such a statute at the level of foreseeability, intentionality, or justification only if he believed, first, that th^e conduct wDuld ordinarily be performed under the conditions defining one of these levels and, second, that other persons reading the statute vciuld agree with him. Judges To partly fulfill course requirements, three upper -level undergraduates at the University of Florida classified the statutes at the levels of causality. Before doing so, the judges studied Heider's theory and classified stories at the levels that they had been \^/ritten to represent in previous research. To becoire PAGE 59 51 accustoned tx) reading laws, the judges then read a series of criminal laws that had not been selected for the content analysis. After this background training, the judges individually studied the content analysis system. As the final training exercise, the three judges and the researcher together discussed the system and applied it to several statutes that were also not part of the sample. Procedure The judges independently classified the statutes in their order of appearance in the 50 booklets. Except for a law dictionary ( Black ' s Law Dictionary , 1968) and an ordinary dictionary, the statutes were classified on the basis of the information provided in the booklets. Hie judges recorded the level at which they classified the statutes on separate scoring sheets. These sheets also provided space for the following identifying information: the judge's name, the booklet title, and the coded penalty derrarcating the statute. After having recorded this information, tlie judges perfonred an additional task. For each statute, they wrote brief descriptions of the crime punishable by the coded penalty. As discussed later, these descriptions were used to obtain ratings of the seriousness of the crimes. Except for three sets of booklets, the 50 booklets of statutes were classified in a different and randomly assigned order by each judge. The first five booklets (the Florida statutes in Chapters 805, 846, and 783 and the hcsnicide statutes of Oliio and Alaska), the middle four booklets (the Florida statutes in Chapters 838 and 865 and the hcmicide statutes of Oklahoma and Minnesota) , and the . ^Â».-=^i^ -i'a ii Â«Â» iin,i*<(;,;anr^a^i*-asi-Â«wEÂ«Â«^'*.te^.v* Â— V nT -iii r ji ran i -***-Â•Â•. MÂ—^>tu:soÂ«>n*9Â»e:*>Â«U<^H PAGE 60 52 last six booklets (the Floric3a statutes in Chapters 851, 800, 805, aiid 812 and the hcmicide statutes of Washington and Indiana) were the same for each judge. These booklets were selected so that each set contained a total of 40 statutes and so that approximately half of the statutes were Florida statutes and the other half were homicide statutes. By this arrangement, estimates of inter judge reliability were obtained for statutes classified at tlie beginning, middle, and end of thie content analysis. After having classified all 50 booklets, each judge reclassified the first five chapters; using the reclassified statutes, estimates of intra judge reliability were obtained . The content analysis required a period of approxinstely seven weeks. It seemed likely that during th-is period, the judges would adopt somevAiat idiosyncratic uses of the content analysis system i and that tliese differences would result in low reliability estiirates. Two measures V'^ere taken to offset this likelihood. The judges were first encouraged to use their copies of the content analysis system as they classified the statutes. The second procedure, which was similar to one used by Harvey and his associates (Harvey, White, Pratlier, Alter, & Hoffmeister, 1966) to cope with this problem, involved two group meetings held during the seven v;eeks. At these meetings, the judges independently coded several statutes which afterv.'ard were not classified as part of the sample. The judges then discussed the reasons for their decisions. This second procedure was designed to point out and clarify PAGE 61 53 different interpretations and uses of the content analysis system. ; . Severity Measurements To test the second hypothesis, it was necessary to measure and compare the severity of the penalties prescribed in statutes classified at tiie four levels of causality. As suggested by past research (e.g., Shaw & Reitan, 1969), an adequate test of the second hypothesis also required control of outcome intensity. lb do so, the second hypothesis was tested in two different ways. First, the penalties prescribexi in a cross section of Florida statutes were conpared, and outcome intensity was controlled by rreans of ratings of the seriousness of the outccjres described in the statutes. Second, the penalties prescribed in the homicide statutes were ccxipared. In this second approach, outcaie seriousness was controlled by selection since all of the honicide statutes pertained to the saine type of outcome Â— the death of another human being. To test the second hypothesis by the Florida statutes, 30 statutes representing each of the levels of ccranission, foreseeability, and intentional ity were selected. Each of the 90 Florida statutes was selected according to three criteria. First, the statute had been classified at the appropriate level by at least two judges. Second, the statute specified a maximum period of confinement in a penal institution that could serve as the penalty PAGE 62 54 and that was scalable in years. According to this second criterion, statutes tliat prescribed the death sentence, life inprisonment, or a iTDnetary fine were not selected. Third, the criminal conduct defined by the statute was amenable to description for the seriousness ratings discussed later. lb obtain statutes meeting these criteria, a random selection procedure was initially used. For the level of ccOTnission, 30 statutes were randomly selected from the 38 Florida statutes that met the first two criteria. For each of the levels of foreseeability and intentionality , 30 statutes were randomly selected frcm all Florida statutes that had been classified at that level by at least tvx3 judges. After having randomly selected 90 statutes, each statute ^-ras examined. If the statute ii:Bt the penalty criterion (this applied to tlie statutes representing the levels of foreseeability and intentionality) and if tlie statute appeared to be arrenable to description, it was used to represent the level that it had been chosen to represent. Of the 90 statutes, 81 met these criteria. Six statutes, tliree representing each of the levels of foreseeability and intentionality, did not neet the penalty criterion. Three statutes, one at the level of carmission and tsro at the level of foreseeability, did not appear amenable to description for the seriousness ratings. Each of these nine statutes was replaced by a statute satisfying the selection criteria. To do so, the statutes classified at a given level by two or more judges were PAGE 63 55 listed in their sequential order of appearance in Florida's criminal code. Each replaceinent statute consisted of the first statute that succeeded the rejected statute and that rret the selection criteria. Of the 90 sta-tutes, therefore, 81 were selected by the randan procedure; the rerraining 9 were selected in a more arbitrary fashion. In order to control outcome intensity. Treasures of the seriousness of the outcoires were obtained. lb do so, a short description was written for each of the 90 Florida statutes. The description presented the objective outcome or result of the conduct described in the statute. One statute selected for this analysis, for example, was as follows: ^\hoever shall unnecessarily kill another, either v,4iile resisting an attempt by such other person to commit any felony, or to do any other unla\srful act, or after such attempt shall have failed, shall be deemed guilty of manslaughter ( Florida Statutes Annotated , Title 44 , Section 782,11). This statute describes conduct that leads to the outccrre of hanicide, and the description for this statute was as follows: "A person is killed." In the following statute, the outcome is not as readily separable fran the conduct as it is in the last exarrple: Whoever trades, traffics for or buys, except from the producer or his authorized agent, any cotton or leaf tobacco, unless the saite be baled or boxed in the usual manner, or unless upon some exhibition of evidence in writing that tlie producer has parted with his interest therein, shall be punished by inprisonment not exceediiig six months, or by fine not exceeding one thousand PAGE 64 56 dollars ( Florida Statutes Annotated , Title 44 , Section 865.08) . For this type of statute, an outconie, such as the loss of tobacco due to theft, was not inferred; rather, the outcorrB was described in terms of the objective product of the conduct. Thus, the outcome in the last statute was described as follows: "Cotton or leaf tobacco is bought without having evidence that the producer has p^lrted with his interest in it." In writing the descriptions, an attempt was made to exclude references to causal structure. Since the outcomes of several statutes were the saire, 87 different outcomes were prepared. These outcomes were assembled into a questionnaire in a random order. The questionnaire was introduced by written instructions directing the subject to rate each outcome for "how serious you believe it to be." Thie subjects indicated wiiere they vould place the outcomes on a 7-point scale ranging from to 6. The end and middle points of the scale were verbally defined, respectively, as "ix>t at all serious", "moderately serious", and "extremely serious". The subjects indicated their responses by \\riting tlie chosen numbers in blank spaces printed next to the outcon^s. The descriptions of the outcoir^s and the instructions for tlie seriousness ratings are presented in /Appendix D. The outcomes were rated by 13 rrale and 18 ferrale students at tlie University of Florida who voluntarily participated in order to fulfill requirements for a course in introductory psychology. Each subject responded to the questionnaire during one of three group HT--_i^=-e_y-.iil-.^|* PAGE 65 ' 57 sessions attended by 9 to 12 individuals, lb administer the questionnaire, the researcher read the instructions out loud while the members of a group read them silently. In doing so, it was emphasized that the subject was to rate each outcome as it was described and in terms of his own opinions about its seriousness. Each subject then rated the outcomes at his own pace. Approximately 20 minutes were required to rate all 87 outcomes. After each subject in a group had finished, the purpose of this project was explained. Using the Florida statutes and the seriousness ratings to control outcone intensity in the manner described later, a comparison was made among penalties prescribed at the levels of cormission, foreseeability, and intentionality . The level of justification v;as not included because of the small number of Florida statutes classified at this level. In testing the second hypothesis by the homicide statutes, however, the level of justification was included. In these tests, coirparisons were made among the penalties prescribed in the homicide statutes classified at the levels of foreseeability, intentionality, and justification by at least two judges; the level of commission was excluded due to the small nura' ber of homicide statutes representing this level. Ideally, the second hypothesis would liave been tested by analyses that included , all four levels; however, the levels included in the two separate approaches used in this study did overlap and together 3mbraced all four levels. PAGE 66 58 In testing the second hypothesis, the dependent variable was the sevc; ;-.y of the penalty. Each of the 90 Florida statutes prescribed a naximum penalty scalable in years; therefore, in the tests involving the Florida statutes, the dependent variable was measured by the iraxiraum number of years of confinement which could be iirposed as the penalty. When a penalty consisted of a nsxirrtum nuirber of days of confinement (e.g. , 20 days in jail) , it was converted to years by dividing the iraxiimim number of days by 365 days. Likewise, penalties set forth in months were divided by 12. In testing the second hypothesis by the honicide statutes, penalty severity was indexed by the most severe penalty prescribed in a statute. These penalties varied among exoneration, a -specifiable number of years imprisonirent , life inprisonment, and the death sentence. Ihe hcmicide penalties were considered to represent an ordinal scale of severity that increased in the order just presented . PAGE 67 CHAPl^R III RESULTS The first hypotliesis was tested by examining the frequencies with v.'hich tJrie foior levels of causality were represented in the sta.tutes. As iiTplied earlier, iyfo separate designs were used iji testing the second hypothesis. First, tlie penalties prescribed in the Florida statutes v/ere tested in a 3 (level of causality) X 3 (outcome seriousness) conpletely randomized factorial analysis of variance design. Second, the penalties set forth in the homicide statiites V7ere coiipared in a nonparaiietric one-way analysis of '/ariance design. Before reporting the results of these analyses, ttie inter judge reliability of the classificati-on system is presented. Inter judge Reliability Using all statutes, t^io measures of inter judge reliability ^vere calculated.. The first \ms the percentage of statutes vfaLch each pair of judges had classified identiccilly. The second measure v^.s the gi coefficient (Scott, 1955) which coinrected the percentage of inter judge agreertent for the number of categories in the classification system and the frequency with v^dch each vra.s \ised. ;in Table 1, these measures are presented for the Florida statutes, the hcxnicide statutes, and all statutes combined.. 59 7 b y ^i afiÂ— a nm r wrgan i ^i i j m i^ > *j gafTJMsaga ip ii ' i t w n^aBsa^iMip^Â— tw in Â» c ci ri Â— i PAGE 68 60 TABLE 1 Inter judge Reliability for All Statutes as Measured by Percentage of TwD-Person Agreements and Pi Statutes Pair of Judges AB AC BC Percent Pi Percent Pi Percent Pi Florida (n=272) 61 .39 68 -48 72 .56 Horde ide (n=187) 82 .71 89 .83 81 .69 Total (n=459) 69 .53 77 .54 75 .61 'Â•Â«ii^u<>af_^^l^. PAGE 69 61 For all 459 statutes, the median percentage of inter judge agreement was 76%, and the rt^dian pi coefficient was .61. Ihese indices suggest that, for the total set of statutes , an acceptable level of inter judge reliability had been achieved. Analyzing the Florida and homicide statutes separately, the honiicide statutes were classified scsnewhat more consistently than the Florida statutes. Ihe median percentage of inter judge agreement, for exanple, was 82% for the homicide statutes and 68% for the Florida statutes. A relatively greater reliability for the homicide statutes was also found in the percentages of S'tatutes classified identically by three, twD, and no judges. For the Florida statutes, these percentages v;ere 52%, 43%, and 5%, respectively; the caiparable percentages were 75%, 23%, and .5% for the hcmicide statutes . The first, middle, and last 40 statutes were the same for each judge, and after having classified all statutes once, the judges reclassified the first 40 statutes. For each of these four sets of statutes, inter judge reliability was estimated by the percentage of statutes that each pair of judges had classified identically. In Table 2, these percentages are presented separately for the Florida, homicide, and all statutes within each For the first, middle and last sets of statutes, the degree of interjudge reliability appears to have been canparable to that PAGE 70 62 TABLE 2 Interjudge Reliability (Percentage of Two-Person Agreements) For Statutes Analyzed at Beginning, Mddle, and End of Content Analysis Statutes Pair of Judges Set Type AB AC BC First 40 Florida 52 76 76 HoTiicide 79 89 84 Total 65 82 80 Middle 40 Florida 70 85 70 Hcmicide 90 95 85 Total 80 90 78 last 40 Florida 75 90 70 Honicide 80 100 80 Total 78 95 75 Receded First 40 Florida 19 67 33 Homicide 74 95 74 Total 45 80 52 In the first set of Statutes, there were 21 Florida and 19 hoTucide statutes. In the other two sets, there were 20 statutes of each type. PAGE 71 63 obtained for all 459 statutes. For example, the rredian percentage of interjudge agreement for all statutes within a single set was 79.8% as ccmpared for 75% for all statutes in the study. Within each of these sets, tlie hcmicide statutes were also classified more consistently than the Florida statutes. Of even greater irrportance, interjudge reliability appears to have remained relatively stable ac2xiss tlie three sets of statutes. For the second classification of the first 40 statutes, however, a lesser degree of interjudge reliability was obtained, especially for pairs of judges involving judge B and for the Florida statutes. A scxnev^iat decreased reliability was .also found in the estirtates of intra judge reliability (see Table 3) v^^ch" was measured by the percentage of statutes that had been identically categorized in the two classifications of the first 40 statutes. Corpared to the measures of reliability conputed from the reclassification of the first 40 statutes, all other reliability estimatesappear to be appreciably higher, which suggests that the stability of the measures involving the reclassified statutes is questionable. The reduced consistency found in the reclassified statutes could indicate either that the first 40 statutes were relativelymore difficult to classify (as suggested by one of the judges) or that the jiodges v;ere less accurate in the reclassification due to a desire to ccsTplete a relatively tedious task. PAGE 72 64 TABLE 3 Intrajudge Reliability Statutes Judge A B C Florida (n=21) 67 33 62 Homicide (1^19) 95 89 100 Ibtal (n=40) 80 60 80 Note. --Table erttries represent the percentages of statutes which a judge classified identically iji the two classifications of the first 40 statutes. PAGE 73 65 Testing the Hypotheses Hypothesis One The first hypothesis vas that there is a difference in the frequencies with which the levels of causality are represented in the statutes. A statute was considered to represent the level at vMch at least b,'XD judges had classified it. By this criterion, only 14 statutes (or 3%) were not classified. Tte percentages of statutes representing the four levels are presented in Table 4. As they pertained to a variety of criminal offenses, the Florida statutes provided the principal test of the first hypothesis. As Table 4 reveals, the levels of cormission and justification were represented in relatively small proportions of the Florida statutes, and the levels of foreseeability and intentionality were represented in larger and approximately equal proportions. According to the chi square test for ncminal categories (Siegel, 1956) , the distribution of the statutes across the four levels significantly differed frcm tlie expected distribution (X = 124.06, df = 3, p < .001) ; likewise, the distribution of the statutes classified at only the levels of ccranission, foreseeability, and intentionality significantly differed from expectation (X = 34.55, df = 2, p < .001) . These findings supported the first hypothesis. Like the Florida statutes, most of the tomicide statutes were classified at the levels of foreseeability and intentionality PAGE 74 66 TABLE 4 Percentages of Statutes Representing the Levels of Causality TVpe of Statute Level of Causality Canmission Foreseeability Intentional ity Justification Florirla 15 40 39 1 Homicide .5 44 36 19 Ifote. Â— There was no interjudge agreanent for 13 (or 5%) Florida statutes and for one (or .5%) homicide statute. -*Â»^ Â•Tlr-Sir.-^-:-Â«fT^X-=-4 --i" " -: ^;;^V 'ir.Vta *r-: -. ;|.Â»Vi r- PAGE 75 67 (see Table 4) . Since only one homicide statute represented the level of ccmmission, this level was excluded frcm tests involving the hcmicide statutes. According to the chi square test, the distribution of the homicide statutes classified at the remaining three levels significantly differed from the expected one (x2 = 17.85, df = 2, Â£ <.001); ]xMever, the distribution of the statutes classified at the levels of foreseeability and intentionality only was nonsignificant (x2 = 1.51, df = 1, p < .30) . These findings both supported the first hypothesis and were congruent with those for the Florida statutes. Hypothesis Two Florida statutes . Â— The second hypothesis was that the penalties increase in severity from the level of coirmission to the level of intentionality and then decrease at the level of justification. As discussed earlier, 90 Florida statutes had been selected to test this hypothesis at the levels of coimission, foreseeability, and intentionality. To evaluate tlie penalties statistically, an analysis of oovariance design had originally been planned. In this manner, the median outcane-seriousness ratings could have been used to statistically control outcome intensity. The analysis of oovariance, however, assumes homogeneity of the within-grcijp regression coefficients (Kirk, 1968) , The regression coefficients for the levels of commission, foreseeability, and intentionality were 1.08, 1.57, and 5.15, respectively. Testing their homogeneity by the procedixce outlined by Kirk (1968) , the coefficients differed significantly (F = 5.47; df = 2, 84; Â£ <.G1). As the coefficients Â— Â«ff -rÂ— lr>->* PAGE 76 68 were not hoirogeneous , the outcome of an analysis of covariance coiold not have been meaningfully interpreted. To test the second hypothesis by the Florida statutes, a ccmpletely randanized 3x3 factorial analysis of variance design, therefore, was used. Across the three levels of causality, three blocks of statutes were formed according to the iredian seriousness ratings of the outcones described in -them. To form the blocks, the ranges of the outcome ratings for each level of causality were first inspected (see J\ppendix D) . The outccare ratings ranged from .04 to 5.00 for the statutes representing the level of canmission, frcm .02 to 5.90 for the statutes at the level of forseeability, and from 2.50 to 5.90 for the statutes at the level of intentionality. The differences in the seriousness ratings at the three levels, ^Â•^lich is discussed more thoroughly later, indicated that if all statutes had been used, blocks of statutes with homogeneous outcone ratings oould not have been completely crossed with the levels of causality. It was decided, therefore, to use those statutes for which outcome ratings fell within the range oomnnon to all three levels Â— 2.5 to 5.0. The outcorre^ ratings of 17 statutes at the level of commission, 16 statutes at the level of foreseeability, and 28 statutes at the level of intentionality were located within this range. These 61 statutes v/ere then divided into three blocks of statates with nonoverlapping outcome ratings. The 20 statutes with outcome ratings of 2.5 through 3.1 were grouped into one block, the "low" seriousness group. The 21 statutes with outcome PAGE 77 69 TABLE 5 jyiean Seriousness Ratings of Outoon^s Described in iÂ±ie Florida Statutes Used to Test the Second Hypothesis Level of Causality Degree of Seriousness LC3W Moderate High TTotal Cbirmission 2.85 (8) 3.42 (5) 4.35 (4) 3.37 SD=.66 Poreseeability 2.77 (6) 3.43 (3) 4.34 (7) 3.58 S]>=.78 Intentionality 2.83 (6) 3.58 (13) 4.33 (9) 3.66 SD=.62 Note. Â— Table entries represent irean seriousness ratings. The figures in parentheses represent the number of statutes grouped in the particular cell. PAGE 78 70 ratings of 3.2 tiirough 3.8 formed the "moderate" group. The "high" seriousness group was coirposed of statutes with outcome ratings of 3.9 through 5.00. Table 5 presents the mean seriousness ratings for the nine causal ity-outoone combinations. As revealed in this table, the outcome ratings for the 61 statutes were relatively homogeneous across the levels of causality, and a conpletely randomized analysis of variance confirmed that the seriousness ratings at the three levels did not significantly differ (F = .95; MS = .476; df = 2, 58; p > .05) . Â—error Â— Â— In testing for differences in the penalties, the least-squares solution for a oonpletely randomized 3x3 factorial analysis of variance was used. The least -squares solution is described and recoirmended by Kirk (1968) for situations in wiiich cell sample sizes are unequal for reasons related to the independent variable. The values of the penalties entered into this analysis and all corparisons stemming fron it were transforrred by the reciprocal transfonration (transformed penalty = 1/penalty + 1) ; the transformation was necessitated by the lack of homogeneity of variance in the raw penalties representing the different causality-outcone comrbinations. In this analysis (Table 6) , significant effects were cbtained for causal structure and for outcome seriousness; however, the causality-outccme interaction was nonsignificant. Table 7 presents the mean penalties, based on untransfonred data, for the nine causality-outcome combinations. Comparing the transformed PAGE 79 71 TABI^ 6 Summary of Analysis of Variance for Penalties Prescribed in the Florida Statutes Source ss df xMS F " Causal structure (C) .9101 2 .4551 6.56** Outcome Seriousness (0) .5380 2 .2690 3.88** C X .1092 4 .0273 .39 Within :ell 3.6087 52 .0694 . ** p < .01. * p < .05 PAGE 80 72 penalties at each pair of levels of causality by Dunn's multiple conparison procedure (Kirk, 1968) , significantly rrore severe penalties were prescribed at the level of intentionality than at either the level of foreseeability (d = .2577; MS . . = .0694; C = 3; df = 52; p < .01) or the level of coinmission (d = .2527; i^4S . , . = Â— within .0694; C = 3; df = 52; p < .01); however, the penalties prescribed at the levels of comiission and foreseeability did not differ significantly (d = .2267; -MS^ithin " '^^^^'' Â£ = 3; df = 52; Â£ > .05) . These findings partly supported the second hypothesis in that greater penalties were prescribed at the level of intentionality than at the r^Tiaining two levels; however, the nonsignificant difference between the levels of ccxmdssion and foreseeability was nonsupportive. Scheff^'s method (Kirk, 1968) was used to test for differences in the severity of the transformed penalties as a function of outcome seriousness (see Table 7 for untransformed X's) . According to these analyses, significantly less severe penalties were prescribed for low serious outccrnes than for either moderately serious outcor^s (F = 7.71; df = 2,52; p <.05) or highly serious outccsres (F = 10.03; df = 2,52; p <.05) . The penalties prescribed for moderately serious and highly serious outcomes did not significantly differ (F = .1739; df = 2, 52; p >.05), hcweverThese findings are congruent with the past research demonstrating a relationship between outcone intensity and the amount of AS. Two incidental findings are noteworthy. First, for all 90 Florida statutes originally selected to test the second hypothesis, the PAGE 81 73 TABLE 7 Msan Penalty as a Function of Level of Causality and Degree of Outoorne Seriousness Level of Causality Source Degree of Outcone Seriousness Low I^-bderate High Ibtal Corrmission X SD .70 .88 6.17 7.87 2,81 2.21 2.80 5.02 Foreseeability X SD .65 .62 .47 .37 3.29 4.25 1.77 3.14 Intentional ity T SD 2.10 2.07 4.75 2.88 9.58 7.82 5.74 5.69 Total X SD 1.10 1.47 4.48 4.79 6.02 6.73 3.83 5.25 Note. Â— Table entries were formed from raw penalties while the statistical tests were performed on transformed penalties . PAGE 82 74 vintransforrned penalties and the corxe spending outcc?me-seriousness ratings were positively and significantly correlated (r = .53; "xy t= 5,85, df== 88, p< .001, one-tailed). Similarly, positive and significant correlations were obtained within each level of causality. The correlation coefficients between penalty and outcome seriousness were .31 (t = 1.73, df = 28, p <.05) within the level of commission; .50 (t == 3.03, df = 28, p <.005) within the level of foreseeability; and .64 (t = 4.40, df = 28, p <.001) within the level of intentionality. Inspecting the latter three correlation coefficients, the strength of the relationship between outccsne seriousness and penalty size appears to liave increased frx3n:i the level of conmission to the level of intentionality; hov,ever, iising Fisher's r to z_ transformation (Hays, 1963) , none of thedifferences between the within-group correlation coefficients were significant at the .05 level. The positive correlation between outcome seriousness and penalty severity was ccmpatible v/ith the previously reported differences in penalty size as a function of outcome seriousness. .. . The second finding also pertains to the seriousness ratings of the outcomes described in the 90 Florida statutes. According to a corrpletely randomized analysis of variance, the serious ratings at the three levels of causality (see Table 8) differed significantly (F = 7.59; MS = 1.62; df = 2, 87; p <.01) . Tested by Scheffe's error method, the outcomes at the level of intentionality were significantly more serious than the outcomes at either the level of PAGE 83 75 TABLE 8 _^fean Outcome-Seriousness Patings as a Function of Level of Causality Source X SD Level of Causality C5Dimiission 2.60 1.04 Foreseeability 2.90 1.62 Intentionality 3,80 .69 PAGE 84 76 cxOTnission (F= 13.33; df = 2, 87; p < .01) or the level of foreseeability (F = 7.50; df 2, 87; p < .05); however, the differences between the outcane-seriousness ratings at the levels of carmrLssion and foreseeability v;ere nonsignificant (F = ,83; df = 2, 87; p > .05) Homicide statutes . The second hypothesis was also tested by ineans of the homicide statutes representing the levels of foreseeability, intentionality, and justification. Of the 187 homicide statutes, one was excluded from the analyses reported here because it had not been classified at any level by two or irore judges; one because it was the only statute classified at the level of coinruission; and one because it did not specify a readily determinable penalty. For the remaining 184 statutes, the n^xiinum penalty prescribed was used as the dependent variable. Table 9 presents the percentage of statutes which represented each of the three levels and which prescribed a penalty of a certain degree of severity. For the purpose of tabular presentation, the penalties have been grouped according to intervals of years. For exanple, all statutes prescribing a penalty of any maximum number of years of confinement ranging fron 1 year in length through 10 years in length have been grouped at the interval of 1-10 years. Ccmparing all 184 statutes by the Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance by ranks (Siegel, 1956) , there was a significant difference in the penalties prescribed at the three levels (H = 113.96, df = 2, p < .001) . Using the I'lann-Whitney U test (Siegel, PAGE 85 77 TAHLE 9 Severity of Penalties Prescribed in the Homicide Statutes Representing the Levels of Causality Level of Causality Penalty i^ 1-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 99 Life Death Foreseeability (n = 81) 54 31 4 5 6 Intentional ity (n = 67) 7 7 1 1 40 42 Justification (n = 36) Â— ^ 69 14 11 3 3 Note. Â— Table entries represent the percentage of statutes which represented a level of causality which prescribed one of the following as the maxiinum penalty: (a) a period of iirprisonment (in years) within one of the intervals listed, (b) life irtprisonment, or (c) the death sentence. PAGE 86 78 1956) , tiie penalties at the level of intentionality (lAd = life irrprisonment) were significantly more severe (Z = 8.82, U = 453.5, p < .0001; Z = 8.29, U = 39.5, p < .0001; respectively) than the penalties at either the level of foreseeability (Md = 10 years) or the level of justification (Md = years or exoneration) . The penalties prescribed at the level of foreseeability v.ere also significantly more severe than the penalties prescribed at the level of justification (Z = 5.91, U = 480, p < .0001) . Since the severity of the honicide penalties increased from the level of foreseeability to the level of intentionality and then decreased at the level of justification, these findings supported the second hypothesis . To provide more stringent tests, a second set of tests was calculated using statutes that prescrU^ed maximum penalties within a more restricted range . The hcmicide statutes used in these analyses specified maximum penalties that ranged from 1 to 40 years of confinement. Since only 10 statutes at the level of justification prescribed such penalties, each level was represented by 10 statutes. Tlie level of justification was represented by the 10 statutes just mentioned. Each of the levels of foreseeability and intentionality was represented by 10 statutes randomly selected from the statutes (n = 72 and 11, respectively) which had been classified at that level and which met the penalty criterion. Conparing all 30 penalties by the Kruskal-Wallis test, a significant difference was found in the severity of the penalties PAGE 87 79 prescribed at the three levels (H = 14.79, df = 2, p < .001) . The penalties prescribed at the level of intentionality (Md =24.8 years) were significantly greater (U = 4, n-,1 = n22 = 10, p < .002); U = 10, nj_ = n2 = 10, p= .002; respectively) than the penalties prescribed at either the level of foreseeability (Md = 10 years) or the level of jiostification (Md = 12,5 years); however, the penalties at the latter two levels did not significantly differ (U = 39.5, n -j^ = n^ = 10, p > .10) . As the p^enalties prescrited at aie level of intentionality were more severe than the penalties prescribed at the renHining two levels, these findings also supported the second hypothesis. PAGE 88 CHAPTER IV ' DISCUSSION Criminal st3.tutes were content analyzed in order to test hypotheses about the representation of Heider's levels of causality and about the severity of the penalties prescribed in them. In general, the results supported the hypotheses and, therefore, the theory and past research upon which they were based. Together with the results of past research on Heider's theory, the results of this study also seem to have ijiplications about the principle underlyijig the attribution of responsibility (criminal liability) and the prescription of penalties in criiriinal statutes. Heider ' s Theory and Related Research Causal Structure and Penalty Severity The first hypothesis was that the levels of canmission, foreseeability, intentionality, and justification are unevenly represented in criminal statutes. The distribution of the levels in both the Florida and homicide statutes supported this hypothesis. In both sets, the levels of commission and justification were represented in relatively small proportions of the statutes, and each of the levels of foreseeability and intentionality were represented in approximately 40% of the statutes. As noted earlier, the small pro80 Â• P-f^.,---*-.,Â— IM.' PAGE 89 81 portion at the level of justification was scjnewhat artif actual due to the arrangement of the statutes. The results for the remaining three levels suggest that in criminal statutes, responsibility is seldomly attributed for the mere ccmmission of criminal acts and that responsibility is most frequently attributed under conditions represented by either the level of foreseeability or the level of intentionality. Although a directional hypothesis was not advanced, it was speculated that like the perceived causal influence of personal factors, the representations of the levels would increase frcm the level of commission to the level of intentionality. Since the levels of foreseeability and intentionality were equally represented in both sets of statutes, this speculation was not confirrred. The failure to confirm it might be regarded as evidence against either Heider's theory or the validity of the content analysis. The equal representations of the tv70 levels, however, more likely stemrred frcm the relative scopes of the levels and/or the nature of the judgments guided by them. One factor that is likely to have contributed to the equal representations of the two levels is their relative scopes. In Heider's tlieory and the present research, the level of foreseeability is defined in terms of the knowledge of the actor, and responsibility is attributed at this level when it is attributed for outcries that might have been foreseen. This level, however, is not restricted PAGE 90 82 tjo Tmknown but foreseeable outcortes; rather, it also corrprehends known outcomes that v/ere not part of the actor's intentions. The level of foreseeability, therefore, is represented by a variety of actor-outccme relationships that vary in tenrs of the actor's knowledge of the outcome. At the level of intentionality, on the other hand, responsibility is attributed for only one type of actor-outcorre relationship, the intentional production of an outcome. Conpared to the level of foreseeability, the level of intentionality appears to carpreheiid a smaller variety of relationships. Thus, the equal representations of the levels of foreseeability and intentionality may partly reflect the greater variety of relationstiips classifiable at the former level. If so, intentionality may have been the single most frecpently represented relationship, but tlie greater variety of relationships conprehended by the level of foreseeability resulted in its being represented as frequently as the level of intentionality. The contention that the level of foreseeability includes a variety of actor-outcome relationships is supported by the research indicating that the amount of AR (Kronstadt, 1965) and punishment (Friedrich, 1965) vary with the perceived degree of the actor's knowledge. The distribution of the statutes may also reflect tlie nature of the judgments guided by them. As used to derive the first hypothesis, Heider's theory is concerned with the amount of AR as a function of perceived personal causality. In testing the first hypothesis, no PAGE 91 83 ineasure of the amount of AR was obtained; rather, the causal structures which provide frameworks for all-or-none judgments of guilt were assessed. In retrospect, the distribution of causal structures guiding absolute judgments should not necessarily follÂ«v the same pattern as judgments of the amount of AR. In such cases, the most frequently represented causal structures should be those which generate the perceived degree of responsibility that is adequate for a judgment of guilt. Without assuming that the criminal law attributes responsibility at a given state or level of moral development, Heider's theory does not predict the causal structiores producing this perceived degree of responsibility. The equal representations of the levels of foreseeability and intentionality , thus, could indicate tliat in the criminal law, either of these causal structures fosters the perceived degree of guilt sufficient for an absolute judgment of liability. The second hypothesis was that the severity of the penalties increases from the level of commission to the level of intentionality and then decreases at the level of justification. To ccrapare the penalties prescribed in statutes representing the levels of ccmnission, foreseeability, and intentionality, 61 Florida statutes were used. It was fouled tl-iat the penalties prescribed at the level of intentionality were significantly greater than the penalties prescribed at the level of ccmnission or the level of foreseeability; however, the difference between the latter two levels was nonsignificant. The PAGE 92 84 honicide statutes were used to ccnpare penalties prescriJDed at the levels of foreseeability, intentionality , and justification, and it was found that the penalties at the level of intentionality were significantly more severe than the penalties at the remaining two levels . Except for the nonsignificant difference between the levels of ccmnission and foreseeability, these findings supported the second hypothesis. They are also congruent with previous research (e.g., Shaw & Reitan, 1969; Sulzer, 1964) demonstrating that the ainount of sanction assigned by individuals is affected by the causal structure of the event. In addition to the assignment of pmishments by individuals, Friedrich (1955) reported evidence suggesting that the severity of a statutory penalty is related to the causal structure of the event for which it is prescribed. Ihe results of this study confirm Friedrich 's results and provide more direct support for such a relationship. As discussed earlier, past research has demonstrated that the pattern for AS tends to follow that for AR. Thus, to the extent that penalty size reflects the amount of AR, the results of this study indirectly support Heider's theory by suggesting that in criminal statutes, the amount of AR is also related to the relative causal contribution of personal factors. The failiore to find a difference between the levels of ccmnission and forseeability appears to contradict the second hypothesis and Heider's theory. Rather than disconfirming Heider's theory, this PAGE 93 85 failure could have resulted from eitÂ±Ler the invalidity of the content analysis system or the seriousness of the outcones used in the analysis. Each statute \vas classified at the level at vM.ch at least two of the judges had placed it. ExaiTiining the Florida statutes finally classified at the three levels, the percentages of statutes classified at the levels of connmission, foreseeability, and intentionality by all three judges were 32 percent, 55 percent, and 64 percent, respectively. Of the remaining statutes placed at the level of comiission, 58 percent were classified there by two of the judges and at the level of foreseeability by the third judge. Based upon this data, it appears as if there was relatively less agreenent about the representation of the level of commission and, f urthennore , as if the disagreerrent was directed toward classifying the coirroission statutes at the level of foreseeability. This disagreement could indicate that the statutes representing the level of corrmission were invalidly classified and actually represented the level of foreseeability. If so, the nonsignificaiit difference beb'/een the levels of comiission and foreseeability is accounted for by the failure of the content analysis procedure to validly discriminate between the two levels. In testing the second hypothesis by the Florida statutes, outcone ijitensity was controlled by forming the statutes into groups that, across the three levels, were homogeneous with respect to the outcoreseriousness ratings. As the outcoire ratings of these statutes ranged from 2.5 to 5.0 (on a 7-point scale) , the outcanes used to test the PAGE 94 86 second hypotJiesis are best characterized as moderately to noderatelyhigh serious. Past research has found that causal structure and outcome intensity interact to determine the amount of AS. In analyzing such an interaction, Cuthbert (1966) found that causal structure appreciably influenced the assignment of punishments for highly serious outcomes only. Inspecting the AS scores reported by Shaw and Reitan (1969) , the greatest difference between the levels of foreseeability and counission appears to have been obtained for high intensity negative outcomes. The failure to find a difference between the levels of camiission and foreseeability, thus, may reflect that causal structure and outccane seriousness interact in such a fashion that the sanctions assigned at the levels of cannission and foreseeability are most reliably different for very serious outcones. V-Jhether the nonsignificant difference indicates that penalties are undifferentiated at the levels of commission and foreseeability, that the levels themselves were not validly differentiated by the content analysis procedure, or that the effects of causal structure were moderated by outcone seriousness must be determined by future research. In conclusion, it was found that the frequencies with which the levels were represented in the statutes significantly differed such that the conditions for criminal liability were most often structured according to the levels of foreseeability and intentionality. These findings supported the first hypothesis. Except for the nonsignificant difference betv/een the levels of ccmmission and foreseeability, the second hypothesis was also supported; that is, the severity of the PAGE 95 87 penalties increased fron the level of foreseeability to the level of intentionality and then decreased at the level of justification. It is concluded that the results of this study generally confirmed the hypotheses upon vMch it was based. These results appear to justify two additional conclusions. First, to the extent that the content analysis categories validly represented Heider's levels of causality, the results of this study support Heider's theory of AR and related research. The causal structure of an event does appear to be reflected in the conditions for crijrdnal liability as embodied in criminal statutes. As the levels of foreseeability and intentionality were the nx)st frequently represented causal structures, the findings iirply that criminal liability is typically contingent upon a contribution of personal factors beyond the mere ccmnission of the criminal act. To the extent that penalty size indexes the amount of AR, the results suggest that AR increases from the level of foreseeability to the level of intentionality and then decreases at the level of justification. These results, thus, indirectly support Heider's proposal that AR increases v/ith the perceived contribution of personal factors. In general, the results also replicate those of past research deraonstrating that the amount of AS varies with the causal structure of the event. The second additional conclusion is tliat the results extend the generalizability of Heider's theory. Predictions from Fielder's theory were supported in the context of the criminal law suggesting that the PAGE 96 88 theory is generally applicable to the attribution of criminal responsibility (liability) and the prescription of penalties in the criminal law. Although Holder's theory may be applicable to the actual administration of the law, generalization is limited to legal theory and criminal statutes until the judgn^nts of responsibility and the prescriptions of penalties in criminal cases are studied. The methodology of this research also extends the generalizability of Heider's theory. Although other techniques have been used (Tremble & Shaw, 1972) , most of the evidence for relationships between causal structure and AR and AS has been gathered by Shaw and Sulzer's (1964) laboratory technique. By supporting Heider's theory through a content analysis of criminal statutes, this study adds to the body of research demonstrating that the applicability of Heider's theory is not limited to laboratory settings in vThich subjects judge stimulus materials about fictitious events. Outcare Seriousness Past research on AS by individuals (Cuthbert, 1966; Shaw & Reitan, 1969; Sulzer, 1964) has demonstrated that greater sanctions are assigned for high intensity outcomes than for low intensity outcores and, moreover, that outccme intensity and causal structure interact so that the effects of outcome intensity on AS are moderated by the causal structure of the event. Friedrich (1965) similarly found that the severity of a statutory penalty was related to the seriousness of the harmful event PAGE 97 89 for v^iich it was prescribed. In the present study, the Florida statutes were grouped according to the seriousness ratings of the outcomes described in them. It was found that the penalties for moderately and highly serious outccmes were significantly more severe than the penalties prescribed for outcon^s with low serious ratings; however, the interaction between causal structure and outcome seriousness was nonsignificant. That more severe penalties tended to be prescribed for more serious outccmes is corrpatible with past research. Along with the results of Friedrich's study, these findings suggest that the severity of the penalty prescribed in a statute, and indirectly the degree of responsibility, is related to the objective nature of the criminal event as well as to its causal structure. At first glance, the failure to find a significant interaction betv/een causal structure and outccsne seriousness seons to conflict with the past research on AS by individuals; however, the conflict may be more apparent than real. CXatccsnes with extremely different seriousness ratings were not included in the analysis, and the relatively limited differences in the seriousness ratings may have suppressed an interaction. Past research (Cuthbert, 1966; SiiLzer, 1964) suggests that if an interaction had been obtained, outccme seriousness would have probably affected the penalties at the levels of foreseeability and intentionality to a greater degree than the penalties at the level of ccnimission. If, as discussed earlier, the PAGE 98 90 Florida statutes classified at the level of ccrrmission had been misclassified and actually represented the level of foreseeability, the nonsignificant interaction could have resulted frcm the levels included in the analysis. Thus, the nonsignificant interaction could iirply that outcome seriousness differentially influences the prescription of penalties in statutes and the assignment of sanctions by individuals; hoA^ever, due to the limited range of the outcome ratings and/or the levels of causality included, this research may not have been designed so as to detect an interaction. Two additional results pertaining to outccme seriousness were obtained. First, the outcones at the level of intentional ity were rated as more serious than the outcones at the levels of ccjimission and foreseeability. Second, by comparing the wi thin-group regression coefficients, outcome seriousness appears to have predicted penalty severity somewhat better at the level of intentionality than at the other two levels. How to account for these findings is puzzling. As Heider's theory does not account for the perceived seriousness of events, the results do not directly fall within tlie scope of his theory. One possible explanation, however, merits attention. That the outcomes at the level of intentionality were rated as more serious than the other outcones possibly indicates that intentionally produced social harms are perceived to be more serious than unintentionally produced harms. Although an effort was made to obtain ratings of outcome seriousness independent of causal structure, this finding could indicate that the effort was unsuccessful. Based on PAGE 99 91 an examijiation of the outccsne descriptions (see Appendij< D) , intentionality does not appear to be directly expressed in the descriptions of tJie outcot^s representing the level of intentional ity any more than in the descriptions representing the other two levels. Regardless of explicit references to causal structure, however, rresasures of outcone seriousness confounded by causal structure could have been obtained by an "inferred" causal structure. That is, the subjects rating the outcomes may have violated the instructions; inferred from their normative expectations whether conviction for an outccme typically occurs for the accidental, negligent, or intentional commJ.ssion of the outcome; and then rated the outcone in terms of the inferred condition. The "correct" causal structure of the outcone would have been inferred if the subjects had identified the condition (accidental, negligent, or intentional) corresponding with the causal structure extracted fron the outcone. As they were aware that they were taking part in a study on the "seriousness of crimes," the subjects may have indeed been motivated to make such inferences. Unfortunately, no evidence bearing on this explanation, v^ich is a variant of the theme of demand characteristics (Ome, 1969) , is available. Its tenability, however, is sonev^iat doubtful. For this process to have produced the seriousness ratings, a substantial proportion of the subjects would have had, first, to guess the saire causal condition, second, to guess the correct causal condition, and, third, to be similarly affected by the inferred causal condition. Even if this process PAGE 100 92 did produce the differential outcore ratings across the levels of causality, it cannot readily account for the relatively stronger relationship between outcoi^ seriousness and penalty size within the level of intentionality. In sumnary, this research has demonstrated that the severity of a statutory penalty is related to the seriousness of the outcore for v^ich it is prescrited. In congruence with past research, this finding suggests that the penalty prescribed in a criminal statute is related to the objective characteristics of the event as well as to its causal structure. Ihe nonsignificant interaction possibly points to differences between the assignment of sanctions by individuals and the prescription of penalties in statutes; however^ this research may not have been designed so as to detect an interaction. Other results on outcone seriousness my represent the influence of a phenomenon similar to damand characteristics; ho/ever, these findings do not fall completely within the scope of either this explanation or Heider's theory. Criminal Law From its inception, the purpose of this research has been to study Heider's theory; consequently, the focus has remaijied on this theory rather than the law itself. As the research was conducted by using legal material, its results and the results of other studies in the framework of Heider's theory are potentially applicable to the criminal law. ihe results seem to ijiply that the law attributes responsiloility PAGE 101 93 (liability) and prescribes penalties in accordance with the blameworthiness of the individual; that is, judgn^ts of guilt and prescriptions of penalties are founded i:^n the principle of retribution. Although such a conclusion sems to be warranted, it cannot be advanced without reservation. Historically and presently, there have been several corpetijig rationales or justifications for the use of punishirent in the criirdnal law (Bittner & Piatt, 1966; Gibbons, 1968; Packer, 1968). Ihese justifications have included deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution. According to the principle of retribution, a person should be judged guilty of Â— held responsible for ~ a crine because of his moral blameworthiness; furthermore, the punishnent for the crime should fit the moral blaireworthiness of the perpetrator. In this study, it has been demonstrated that penalty size increases frcm the level of foreseeability to the level of intentionality and then decreases at the level of justification; the results of past research have shown that the amount of responsibility attributed for an event follows the sane pattern. This study has also shown that the penalties for more serious outcomes tend to be irore severe than the penalties for less serious outcorres; in past research, a similar pattern has been obtained for AR. If it is assumed that AR is a judgment of the moral blaireworthijiess of the accused individual and that the sanctioning process is at least partly rrediated by perceived blameworthiness, the results of this study and those of past PAGE 102 94 research suggest that the principle of retribution underlies the attribution of responsibility and the prescription of penalties in the criminal law. Ihat is, they suggest that the conditions for crjjninal liability and the prescription of penalties are based upon the perceived moral blameworthiness of the criminal. Although this conclusion may be warranted, two notable reservations iTTUst be discussed. First, according to the retributive position, judgments of guilt and the prescriptions of punishment are founded upon the moral blameworthiness of the individual. For the results to support the conclusion, judgments of responsUoility and measurements of the amount of AR must signify the perceived moral blameworthiness of the accused person, and the research on Heider's theory has not clearly demonstrated that a judgirent of responsUDility does signify the j^rceived blameworthiness of the individual. In several studies (e.g.. Shaver, 1970a; Iterttole & Shaw, 1972; Walster, 1966) , the concept of responsibility has not been defined for the subjects judging the actor; in these studies, v/hether a judgment of responsibility referred to the blameworthiness, capacity, personal causality, etc., of the actor is unknown. In studies using Shaw and Sulzer's (1964) technique, responsibility has frequently been defined for the subjects. In Sulzer's (1964) dissertation, for exanple, the subjects were instructed as follows: "... Your task is to read the story carefully and then decide whether person P is responsible for the specified event. If a person is responsible for PAGE 103 95 sanething, that n^ans we might praise or blame him for it. (p. 107) . " Ihe instructions continued to the effect that if they believed the person to be resjxDnsible , the subjects were to JJidicate how responsible they believed him to be. Instructions such as Sulzer's have the obvious advantage of anchoring judgn^ts of responsibility and, moreover, anchoring them in terms of praise and blame; however, they do not instruct the subject to iiidicate how blarreworthy he believes the person per se to be any more than to indicate how susceptible the person might be to blaire. Ohat is, such instructions anchor judgments of responsiliility in terms of blane without clearly specifying that the judgments are to signify the perceived blameworthiness of the person. A conclusion from this research that the criminal law is founded upon the principle of retribution, therefore, is limited by the failure to specify clearly the meaning of a judgn^nt of responsibility, and this conclusion is justified only to the extent that such judgments have signified the moral blaneworthiness of the person. Further investigation, thus, is needed before this conclusion can be advanced without qualification. Although it is readily evident, a second cjoalification should be noted. This research has dealt with criminal statutes, and the administration of the criminal law in terms of actual cases was not investigated. The conclusion regarding retribution, therefore, is limited to the statutory conditions for AR and to the penalties prescribed in statutes, ivhether retriJ3ution influences the actual administration of PAGE 104 96 the criminal law is open to future research. Conclusions To suimiarize the principle results, a significant difference was found in the frequencies with which the levels of coimiission, foreseeability, intenUonality, and justification were represented in the saiTples of Florida and tomicide statutes. The levels of commission and justification were represented in relatively snail proportions of the statutes, and each of the levels of foreseeability and intentionality were represented in approxiinately 40% of the statutes. These findings supported the first hypothesis. Although the difference between the levels of comnission and foreseeability ^vas nonsignificant, the statutory penalties increased in severity from the level of foreseeability to the level of intentionality and then decreased at the level of justification; these results generally supported the second hypothesis. Finally, it was found that more severe penalties tended to be prescribed for more serious outcomes . In addition to the conclusion that the tavo hypotheses were generally supported, four conclusions are drawn from these results. First, to the extent that the content analysis categories validly represented Heider's levels, the results support Heider's theory of AR and related research. As the statutes could be reliably analyzed in terms of the levels of causality, the causal structure of a criminal action does appear to be represented in the statutory conditions for criMnal lia- PAGE 105 97 bility. The finding that the levels of foreseeability and intentionality inost frequently described the conditions for liability indicates that criminal liability is contingent upon a contribution of personal factors greater than the mere canmission of the crime. The results bearing on the second hypothesis generally replicate ' those of past research indicating a relationship between AS and causal structure. To the extent that penalty size indexes the amount of AR, these findings also indirectly support Heider's proposal that the amount of AR varies with the perceived contribution of personal factors. Second, the results extend the generalizability of Heider's theory by gathering support for it in the context of the criminal law and by virtue of the research methodology. Third, along with the results of past research, the results indicate that the sanction assigned for an event is related to the objective characteristics of the event as well as its causal structure. Fourth, with noted qualifications, the results of the present and past research on Heider's theory seem to imply that the principle of retribution underlies the conditions for the attribution of responsibility (criminal liability) and the prescription of penalties in criminal statutes. PAGE 106 APPEl-roiCES PAGE 107 APPENDIX A STATUTES SELECTED FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS AND ALTERATIONS OF THEIR TEXTS Introduction This appendix contains the chapters of laws selected for the content analysis. In preparing the laws, the texts of several laws were altered. Alterations in the content of the laws are also presented here. The chapters of laws are listed by underlined side headings. The side headings consisting of the word chapter , a set of numbers, and a title (e.g., Chapter 782 Homicide) refer to the cliapters of Florida laws; these laws were taken frcxn Florida Statutes Annotated , Title 44. The side headings consisting of the name of a state (e.g., Alaska) refer to the states whose homicide laws were selected; next to the name of each state, there is a reference to the publication from which its homicide laws v;ere taken. In the order of their appearance in the chapters, the laws found within each chapter are listed under the chapter heading by their statute, or section, numbers (e.g., 782.01, 2A:113-1, 22-16-17). If a law was not read by the scorers during the content analysis, its amission is noted along with the reason for its exclusion. In order to present any alteration nade in the la\'7s read by the scorers, the 99 PAGE 108 100 the following prx)cedures have been generally adopted: (1) If a law was not altered, only the statute nurriber is listed. (2) If a carplete sentence or paragraph was deleted from the text of the law, the deleted inaterial is quoted or referenced so that it can be identified. The follov/ing is presented, for exairple, to indicate an alteration of this type in ^^fest Virginia Statute 51-2-1: "The second paragraph ;vas omitted because it describes procedural matters." In content analyzing the laws, the scorers read Statute 61-2-1 in its original form except for the deletion of the second paragraph (and except for any other changes listed for this statute) . (3) If a cxsiplete sentence was added to the text of the law, the added sentence is presented along with a reference to its location in the law. For exainple, the addition of a sentence to Florida Statute 876.12 is indicated in this manner: "The follaving was added as the last sentence: 'Any person or persons convicted of violating the provisions of this section shall be punished by Penalty 876.12-1 . ' " Statutes 876.12 was read by the scorers in its original form except for -hlie addition of the above sentence as the last sentence of the statute. (4) If part: of a sentence was deleted from the text of a law and if nothing vra.s substituted for the deleted inaterial, the text surrounding the deleted material is presented along with a set of parentheses with no vxDrds within them. Empty parentheses, therefore, PAGE 109 101 indicate where irnterial was deleted from a law without substituting other naterial for it. For exar^ple, the deletion of the w^rd felony from the title of Florida Statute 790.162 is listed in the following manner: "The title was altered to read: ^Threat to throw , place, or discharge any_ destructive device j^^; penalty.'" The title of Statute 790.162, thus, was worded in the n^nner just presented except for the parentheses. (5) If a sentence within a law was altered by word substitution or by adding words without having deleted part of the original text, that part of the statute as it was read by the scorers is presented here. The iraterial presented here contains part of the statute (as it is originally worded) surrounding the altered part and the altered part within parentheses. For exanple, the first paragraph of Florida Statute 782.04 is origijially vxDrded as follows: "... shall be murder in the first degree, and shall te punishable by death.'' In preparing this statute, a coded penalty was substituted for the penalty prescribed in the statute; that is, the word death was replaced by Penalty 782.04-1. This alteration is listed in the following manner: "The first paragraph was altered as follows: Â• . . . shall be murder in the first degree, and shall be punishable by ( Penal ty 782.04-1) . '" it should be noted that most of the alterations were of this type and, more specifically, consisted of the substitution of a coded penalty for the penalties prescribed in the statutes. (6) The addition of a footnote defining a crime is indicated in this appendix by a statement to the effect that such a footnote was PAGE 110 102 added. Footnotes defining the crijT^s of murder, irens laughter, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter were the only footnotes used. These footnotes were as follows: Murder . Murder is a crime whereby a person of sound mind and discretion unlawfully kills another person with express or ijiplied malice aforetJiought, that is, with a deliterate purpose, design, or determination distinctly formed in tlie mind of the perpetrator. Murder is sometimes divided into degrees, usually murder in the first degree and murder in the second degree. Murder in the first degree is generally defined to consist of homicides connitted by poison, lying in wait; hcmicides conmitted in pursuance of a deliberate and premeditated design; and, additionally, homicides accompanying the coirmission of sane of the more atrocious felonies such as burglary, arson, rape, and robbery. Murder m the second degree is generally defined to consist of homicides corrmitted with a purpose to kill that is instantaneously formed in the mind of the perpetrator and, additionally, homicides coirmi-tted with a purpose to inflict the particular injury without caring '/*iether death is caused. Manslaughter . Manslaughter is tlie killijig of another harvan being without malice or deliberation. There are tavo types of manslaughter. The first is voluntary manslaughter. Voluntary manslaughter occurs i-^.en one person unnecessarily kills another person utx)n a sudden heat of passion (for exairple, upon a sudden quarrel, tv/o persons fight with one person killing the otlier) . Involuntary irrans laughter, the second type, occurs uhen one person kills another person v/hile committing an unlawful act not usually tending to produce great bodily harm or \^ile committing a lawful act ^/ithout using the proper caution or the requisite skill. Voluj itary Manslaughter . Voluntary manslaughter is the unnecessary killing of anotiier human being (1) upon a sudden heat of passion and (2) v/ithout either malice or deliberation (as for exanple, upon a sudden quarrel, two persons fight, with one person killing the other one) . Involuntary Manslaugh ter. Involuntary itHnslaughter is the killing of another human being (1) without malice or deliberation and (2) in the conmission either of an unlawful act not usually tending to produce great bodily harm or of a lawful act without using the proper caution or the requisite skills. PAGE 111 APPENDIX A STATUTES SELECTED FOR CONTm"T A^IALYSIS AND ALTERATIONS OF TflEIR TEXTS Listing of Statutes Qiapter 782 Homicide 782.01 782.02 The following sentence v;as added as the last paragraph of the statute: "Any person connitting justifiable homicide shall be punishable by Penalty 782.02-1 . " 782.03 The follaving sentence was added at the end of the statute: "Any person conxnitting excusable homicide shall be punishable by Penalty 782.03-1 ." 782.04 The first paragraph was altered to read: "...shall be murder in the first degree, and shall be punishable by (Penalty 782.04-1)." The second paragraph was altered to read: "...sh^ll be murder in the second degree, and shall be punished by (Pe nalty 782.04-2)." Bie third paragraph was altered to read: "... shall be murder in the third degree, and shall be punished by ( Penalty 782.04-3) ." 103 t w-.j^Jjt^m::m Â« . U -.^0.1.* PAGE 112 104 782.05 l^is statute was altered as follavs: "... cc^rmonly called a duel, with deadly weapons, shall be (punishable by Penalty 782.05-1 )." 782.06 This statute was altered as follows: "... the person guilty ' of the act descrihed in (a) or (b) shall be (punishable by Penalty 782.06-1) , " 782.07 This statute was altered to read: "... shall be deen^ inanslaughter, and shall be punished by ( Penalty 782.07-1) . " 782.08 This statute was altered to read: "... assisting another in the corrmission of self-murder shall be (punished by Penalty 782.08-1 ) ." 782.09 This statute was altered as follo^^s: "... resulted in the death of such mother, shall te (punished by Penalty 782.09-1) ." 782.10 This statute was altered as follo^vs: "... death of such child or of such mother he thereby produced, be (punished by Penalty 782.10-1) ." 782.11 This statute was altered as folla^s: "... or after such attenpt shall have failed, shall be (punishable by Penalty 782.11-1) . " Â• PAGE 113 105 782.12 This statute was altered as folloivs: "... to avoid such aniiral, such owner shall be (punishable by Penalty 782.12-1) . " ' 782.13 This statute was altered as follows: "... human being shall be drowned or otherwise killed, shall be (punished by Penalty 782.13-1) ." 782.14 This statute was altered as follows: "... every such captain, engineer, or other person, shall be (punished by Penalty 782.14-1) ." 782.15 This statute was altered as follows: "... produce the death of ' such other person, he shall be (punishable by Penalty 782.15-1) ." 782.16 This statute was altered as follows: "... was murdered, she shall be punished by ( Penalty 782.16-1 ) . " Chapter 783 Dueling 783.01 This statute was altered as follows: "... such challenge, altJiough no duel ensues, shall be punished by ( Penalty 783.01-1 )." 783.02 This statute was altered as follovs: "... encourages or promotes such duel, shall be punished by ( Penalty 783.02-1) ." PAGE 114 10( 783.03 lliis statute was altered as follows: "... accepting a challenge to fight a duel, shall be punished by ( Penalty 783.03-1)." Chapter 790 ^:feapons and Firearms 790.001 790.01 Subsection (1) was altered as follav;s: "... concealed weapon on or about his person shall upon conviction be punished by ( Penalty 790.01-1) . " Subsection (2) was altered as follows: "... concealed firearm on or about his person shall be (punished by Penalty 790.01-2)." 790.02 790.04 QnLtted. ihese statutes describe administrative procedures. 790.05 Ihis statute was altered as follo^^s: "... counties of tliis state, shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by ( Penalty 790.05-1); provided, this section shall not... ." 790.051 790.06 Â• Onitted. This statute describes adirunistrative procedures. 790.07 Section (1) was altered as follows: "... attorpts to use any weapon or carries a concealed weajxDn (shall be punished by Penalty 790.07-1)." PAGE 115 107 790.07 (Continued) Section (2) v;as altered as follou^s: "... atteirpts to use any firearm or carries a concealed firearm (shall be punished by Penalty 790.07-2) ." Section (4) v;as altered as follows: "... atterrpting to comnit any felony or while under indictment (shall be punished by Penalty 790.07-3) ." 790.08 Onitted. Tnis statute descrites aciiiinistrative procedures. 790.09 ^is statute ^.'as altered as follows: "... slung shot, or n^tallic knuckles, shall be punished by ( Penalty 790.09-1)." 790.10 This statute was altered as follows: "... so offending, upon conviction shall be punished by ( Penalty 790.10-1) . " 790.11 790.12 790.13 Omitted. This statute had been repealed. 790.14 This statute was altered as follows: "... sections 790.11 and 790.12 shall upon conviction be punished by (Penalty 790.14-1)." PAGE 116 108 790.15 'mis statute was altered as follows: "... street or occupied premises, shall be punished by ( Penalty 790.15-1) . This section shall not apply... ." 790.16 The first paragraph was altered as follows: "... to do dajTuge to the property of any person, shall be (punishable by Penalty 790.16-1) . " The last t^ paragraphs were deleted because they describe administrative procedures. 790.161 The word felony was deleted from the title of the statute. The first paragraph was altered as follows: "... and any person convicted thereof shall he (...) punished in the following nenner. . . ." Paragraph (1) was altered as follavs: "... or any person, the person so convicted (...) shall be punished by ( Penalty 790.161-1) ." Paragraph (2) was altered as follws: "... the property of any person, the person convicted (...) shall be punished by ( Penalty 790.161-2) ." 790.162 The title was altered to read: " Tlireat to throw , place , or discharge any destructive device (...) ; penalty . " The body of the statute was altered as follows: "... any person convicted thereof shall be (punished by Penalty 790.162-1) . " PAGE 117 109 790.163 The word felony was removed from the title of the statute. The body of the statute was altered as follows : "... any person convicted tliereof shall be punished by ( Penalty 790.163-1) . " 790.17 This statute v/as altered as follows : "... of unsomd mind any dangerous weapon, other than an ordinary pocket knife, (shall be punished by Penalty 790.17-1) . " 790.18 This statute was altered as follows : "... every person violating this section shall be (punished by Penalty 790.18-1) . " 790.19 This statute was altered as follows: "... the air space of this state, shall be punished by ( Penalty 790.19-1)." 790.20 Ooitted. This statute had been repealed. 790.21 Omitted. This statute describes administrative procedures. 790.22 Paragraph (2) was altered as follows: "... any firearm in violation of the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, (shall be punished by Penalty 790.22-1) . " PAGE 118 110 790.221 Paragraph (2) was altered to read: "(2) Any person convicted of violating this section (shall be punished by Penalty 790.221-1) . " 790.23 Paragraph (3) was altered to read: "(3) Any person convicted of violating this section (shall be punished by Penalty 790.23-1) . " 790.24 This statute was alterejd as follows : "... Any such person wilfully failing to report such treatinent or request therefor shall be (punished by Penalty 790.24-1) . " 790.25 emitted. This statute consisted of a declaration of policy. Chapter 791 Sale of Fireworks 791.01 791.02 791.03 Omitted. This statute describes administrative procedures. 791.04 791.05 Qnitted. This statute describes administrative procedures. 791.06 This statute v/as altered as follows: "... co-partnership, or corporation violating the provisions of this chapter shall be (punished by Penalty 791.06-1) . " PAGE 119 Ill 791.07 Chapter 795 Enticing Away Unmarried t-Jbinen 795.01 This statute was altered as follows : "... clandestine irarriage of such person without such consent, shall be punished by ( Penalty 795.01-1 )." 795.02 This statute was altered as follows: ".., assists in such abduction for such purpose, shall be punished by ( Penalty 795.02-1) ." 795.03 This statute was altered as f oUcta^s : "... house of prostitution in this state, shall upon conviction be (punished by Penalty 795.03-1) .' Chapter 800 Crin^ Against Mature : Indecent Exposure 800.01 This statute was altered as follows : "... either with mankind or with beast, shall be punished by ( Penalty 800.01-1)." 800.02 Ihis statute was altered as follows : "... lascivious act with another person shall be punished by (Penalty 800.02-1) ." 800.03-1 This statute was altered as follows : "... Any person convicted of a violation hereof shall be punished by (Penalty 800.03-1) . " PAGE 120 112 800.04 This statute was altered as follows: "... rape where such child is female, shall be (punished by Penalty 800.04-1) ." Chapter 805 Kidnaping and False Iinprisonirient 805.01 This statute was altered as follows: "... kidnaped fron this state to any other state, place or county, shall be punished by ( Penalty 805.01-1) . " 805.02 This statute was altered as folla^rs: "... shall be guilty of kidnaping a person and shall be punished by ( Penalty 805.02-1) . " 805.03 The title \^s altered to read: " (Removing) children frcm state contrary to court order. " Paragraph (4) was altered as follov/s: "Any person convicted of a violation of this law shall be (punished by Penalty 805.03-1) ." Chapter 806 Arson 806.01 This statute was altered as follows: "... guilty of arson, in the first degree, and upon conviction thereof, be punished by ( Penalty 805,06-1)." PAGE 121 113 806.02 This statute was altered as follcws: "... guilty of arson in the second degree, and upon conviction thereof, be punished by ( Penalty 806.02-1) . " 806.03 This statute was altered as folla^s: "... guilty of arson in the third degree and upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by ( Penalty 806.03-1) . " 806.04 This statute was altered as follows : "... fourth degree and upon conviction thereof shall, unless otherwise provided, be punished by ( Penalty 806.04-1 ) . " 806.05 This statute was altered as follows: "... to bum such building or property; and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by ( Penalty 806.05-1) . " 806.06 This statute was altered as follows : "... insured by any person against loss or damage by fire, shall be (punished by Penalty 806.06-1) ." 806.061 This statute was altered as follows : "... statement in writing iji support of a claim for loss or damge by fire, shall be punished (by Penalty 806.061-1) . " PAGE 122 114 806.07 This statute v/as altered as follows : "... mentioned in this section is burned in the nighttime, shall be punished by ( PenaltySOS. 07-1) ." 806.08 This statute was altered as follows: "... product of the soil, or the soil itself, of another, shall be punished by ( Penalty 806.08-1) ." 806.09 This statute v;as altered as f ollov/s : "... guilty of the burning, as accessory before the fact, and be punished by ( Penalty 806.09-1) . " 806.10 Paragraph (1) was altered as follows: "... guilty of the burning, as accessory after the fact, and shall be punished by ( Penalty 806.10-1) ." Paragraph (2) v;as altereci as follov/s: "... fireiran in the performance of his duty shall be (punished by Penalty 806.102 ) . " 806.11 This statute was altered as follov/s : "... make claim or demand for the insurance thereon, shall be (punished b y Penalty 806.11-1) ." PAGE 123 115 806.111 Paragraph (1) was altered as follows: "... bum any building or property is guilty of a (crin^) . " Paragraph (5) was altered to read: " (5) Any person v*io violates tills section sh-all, upon conviction thereof, be punished by ( Penalty 806.111-1) . " Chapter 811 Larceny : Receiving Stolen Goods ; Related Crirres 811.01 811.02 Omitted, These statutes had been repealed. 811.021 Paragraph (2) v/as altered as follows: "... guilty of grand larceny and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by (Penalty 811.021-1) . " Paragraph (3) was altered as follov;s: "... guilty of petit larceny and upon conviction shall be punished by ( Penalty 811.021-2) . " Paragraphs (4) , (5) , and (6) were omittexi because they contain procedural information. 811.022 Â• Paragraph (1) was altered as follavs: "... without paying the |, purchase price therefor shall be (punished by Penaltv 811.022-1) [ ^ . I for the first offense. For a second offense, he shall be (punished | by Penalty 811.022-2) , and for a third offense he shall be (punished by Penalty 811.022-3) . " PAGE 124 116 811.022 (Continued) Paragraphs (2) , (3) , and (4) were omitted because they contain procedural infonration. 811.03 This statute was altered as follows: "... alarm caused by fire, shall be punished by ( Penalty 811.03-1) . " 811.04 This statute was altered as follows : "... testainentary instrument, shall be pijnished by ( Penalty 811.04-1) ." 811.05 This statute was altered as follows: "... thereby to injure or defraud any person, shall be punished by ( Penalty 811.05-1) . " 811.06 This statute was altered as follows: "... thereby to injure or defraud any person, shall be punished by ( Penalty 811.06-1) . " 811.07 This statute was altered as follows : "... one hundred dollars in value, shall be punished by ( Penalty 811.07-1) ." 811.08 This statute was altered as f ollov/s : "... shall be deemed guilty of larceny (and shall be punished by Penalty 811.08-1) . " 811.09 This statute was altered as follows: "... not the subject of larceny at cammon law, shall be (punished by Penalty 811.09-1) . " PAGE 125 117 811.10 This statute was altered as follows : "... comTDn and notorious thief, and shall be punished by ( Penalty 811.10-1) ." 811.11 This statute was altered as follows: "... calf, the property of another, shall be punished by ( Penalty 811.11-1) . " 811.12 This statute v;as altered as follows : "... subsequent term of court, shall be punished by ( Penalty 811.12-1) , " 811.13 This statute was altered as follows : "... the property of another shall be punished by ( Penalty 811.13-1) . " 811.14 This statute vras altered as follows: "... shall, upon conviction, be punished by ( Penalty 811.14-1) ." 811.15 This statute was altered as folla/;s : "... subsequent terra of court, shall be punished by (Penalty 811.15-1) . " 811.16 This statute was altered as follows : "... to have been stolen shall be punished by ( Penalty 811.16-1) . " 811.163 Qnitted. This statute pertains to evidence. PAGE 126 118 811.165 Paragraph (2) was altered as follows: "... for the period of time required shall be punishable by ( Penalty 811.165-1) . " 811.17 Qnitted. This statute describes aclirinistrative procedures. 811.18 This statute was altered as follows : "... coirmon receiver of stolen or embezzled goods, and shall be punished by ( Penalty 811.18-1) . " 811.19 The first paragraph was altered as follows : "... guilty of larceny and, upon conviction, shall be punished (by Penalty 811.19-1) . The act of. . . " The second paragraph was altered as follows : "... kills any dog, the property of another, sb^ll be (punished by Penalty 811.19-2) ." 811.20 Omitted. This statute had been repealed. 811.201 Q-nitted. This statute describes administrative procedures. 811.21 The first paragraph was altered as follows: "... care, or control of thie same, shall be punished by (Penalty 811.21-1) ." 71 11 *ri| ."I r,j=irTÂ« >-* ?^ er.' I iniP^, Â»^-H PAGE 127 119 811.22 This statute xms altered as follows: "... care or control of the same, shall be punished by ( Penalty 811.22-1)." 811.23 This statute was altered as follov/s: "... permission of the ovmer or agent, shall be pmished by ( Penalty 811.23-1 )." 811.24 This statute v;as altered as follov7s: "... with the intention of iiTfounding them, shall be (punished by Penalty 811.24-1 ) . " 811.25 Ihis statute was altered as follows: "... v/ithout the permission of the corner, shall be punished by ( Penalty 811.25-1)." 811.26 This statute was altered as follows: "... by penning such cattle or other domestic animls, shall be pmished by (Penalty 811.26-1) ." 811.27 Sub-paragraph (a) was altered as follows: "... one hundred dollars ($100.00) or more, tlie offender shall be (punished by Penalty 811.27-1) ." Sub-paragraph (b) was altered as follows: "...less than one hundred dollars ($100) , the offender shall be (punished by Penalty 811.27-2)." PAGE 128 120 811.271 Paragraph (5) was altered as follows: "(5) Violation of the provisions of tliis section shall (be punished by Penalty 811.271-1) . " 811.28 Qnitted. This statute pertains to evidence. 811.29 Paragraph (4) was altered as follows: "... a violation under subsections (2) or (3) of this section shall be (punished by Penalty 811.29-1) ." 811.30 This statute v/as altered as follows : "... person convicted thereof shall be pimished by ( Penalty 811.30-1) . " Chapter 812 Embezzlement 812.01 This statute was altered as follows : "... fraudulently converts it or its proceeds, or any part thereof, to his own use, he shall be punished (by Penalty 812.01-1) . " 812.02 This statute was altered as follows: "... larceny, or any part thereof, shall be pvmished (by Penalty 812.02-1) ." 812.03 This statute was altered as follows: "... it is so leased, he shall be punished (by Penalty 812.03-1) . " PAGE 129 121 812.04 This statute was altered as follcfws: "... eraploynient or membership, he shall be punished (by Penalty 812.04-1) ." 812.05 This statute v/as altered as follows : "... to prove a defaulter therein, shall be punished (by Penalty 812.05-1) . " 812.06 This statute was altered as follov\?s: "... entrusted v/ith the custody thereof or not, be punished by ( Penalty 812.06-1) ." 812.07 812.08 Thiis statute was altered as follows: "... abets any officer, clerk or agent in any violation of this section, shall be (punished by Penalty 812.08-1) . " 812.09 This statute was altered as follavs: "... certificate or order, to his avn use, he shall be punished by ( Penalty 812.09-1) ." 812.10 The third paragraph (labeled 2.) was altered as follows: "... effects so converted, secreted or withheld, and shall be punished by (Penalty 812.10-1 ) . " The fourth paragraph, labeled (2) , v;as emitted since it pertains to evidence. Â•*.Â«Â«* ^>i^raswi PAGE 130 122 812.11 This statute was altered as follows : "... knowing the same to have been embezzled, shall be punished by ( Penalty 812.11-1) ." 812.12 This statute was altered as f ollov/s : "... credits coming into his hands as such receiver, shall be (punished by Penalty 812.12-1) . The failure of. ... " Chapter 813 Robbery 813.01 Chatted. This statute had been repealed. 813.011 This statute was altered as follows : "... property \*Lich rray be the subject of larceny, shall be punished by ( Penalty 813.011-1) ." Chapter 823 Nuisances: Doors of Certain Buildings 823.01 The first paragraph was altered as follov;s: "... public morals, shall be indictable and punishable by (P enalty 823.01-1) . " The second paragraph was omitted because it describes administrative procedures. 823.02 TMs statute was altered as follo^vs: "... any house or building, shall be punished by (Penalty 823.02-1) . " PAGE 131 123 823.03 This statute was altered as follows : "... circulated a false alarm of fire, shall be punished by ( Penalty 823.03-1) ." 823.04 This statute was altered as follows : "... any person convicted of such offense shall be punished by ( Penalty 823.04-1) . " 823.041 Paragraph (3) was altered as follows: "... violating any of the provisions of this act shall be (punished by Penalty 823.041-1) . " 823.05 823.06 This statute v/as altered as follows : "... fails to corrply with the provisions of this section shall be punished by ( Penalty 823.06-1) . " 823.07 823.08 823.09 This statute v/as altered as follows: "Any person violating any provision of section 823.07, F. S., (shall be punished by Penalty 823.09-1) ; provided, however, . . . person corrmitting such violation, then such person shall be (punished by Penalty 823.09-2) . " j i 823.10 I The following was added as the last sentence of the statute: f "Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be punished by Penalty 823.10-1. " PAGE 132 124 Chapter 838 Bribery 838.01 This statute was altered as f ollov/s : "... brought before him in his official capacity, shall be pijnished by ( Penalty 838.01-1) . " 838.011 838.012 838.013 This statute was altered as follows: "... provision of sections 838.011 838.012 shall be punished by (Penalty 838.013-1) ." 838.02 This statute was altered as folla^7s: "... trust or appointinent under the constitution or laws of this state, and be punished by ( Penalty 838.02-1) . " 838.03 This statute was altered as follows : "... referee has been chosen or appointed, shall be pimished by ( Penalty 838.03-1) . " 838.04 This statute was altered as follows : "... referee has been chosen or appointed, he shall be punished by ( Penalty 838.04-1) . " 838.05 This statute was altered as follows : "... any duty pertaining to his office, he shall be punished by ( Penalty 838.05-1) ." PAGE 133 125 838.06 838.07 This statute was altered as f ollov/s : "... provisions of i section 838.06, shall be punished by ( Penalty 838.07-1) ." [ 838.071 I I, f The last sentence was altered as follows: "Whoever violates ( the provisions of this section shall be punished by ( Penalty 838.071-1) ." 838.08 Quitted. This statute pertains to evidence. 838.09 This statute was altered as follows : "... proposed law or resolution shall be punished by ( Penalty 838.09-1) . " 838.10 This statute was altered as follows : "... such elective public office shall be punished by ( Penalty 838.10) . " 838.11 emitted. This statute had been repealed. 838.12 Paragraph (1) was altered as follows: "... threw any garre, contest, match, race or sport, shall be (punished by Penalty 838.12-1)." PAGE 134 126 838.12 (Continued) Paragraph (2) was altered as follows: "... throw any game, contest, match, race or sport, shall be (punished by Penalty 838.12-2 )." Chapter 839 Offenses by Auctioneers , Public Officers and Employees 839.01 Ttiis statute was altered as follows: "... false statement, shall be punished by ( Penalty 839.01-1) . " 839.02 This statute was altered as f 0110",^ : "... regulations prescribed by lav/, he shall be punished by (Penalty 839.02-1 )." 839.02 1 Paragraph (2) was altered as follows: "... provisions of this section shall upon conviction be (punished by Penalty 839.021-1) . " 839.03 Omitted. This statute had been repealed. 839.04 Tnis statute was altered as follows: "... any county, shall be pmished by (Penalty 839.04-1) . " 839.05 Tills statute v/as altered as follows : "... corporation of vM.ch he is an officer, shall be punished by (Penalty 839.05-1) ." PAGE 135 127 839.06 This statute v/as altered as follows: "... so offending shall, for each offense, be (punished by Penalty 839.06-1) ." 839.07 This statute was altered as follows: "... person upon conviction thereof shall be punished by ( Penalty 839.07-1) . " 839.08 . ... The last sentence was altered as follows : "... section shall upon conviction be punished by ( Penalty 839.08-1) . " 839.09 The last sentence was altered as follows : "... this section shall be punished, upon conviction, by ( Penalty 839.09-1) ; provided, that. It < Â• Â• Â• 839.091 839.10 The last sentence \vqs altered as follows : "... this section shall, upon conviction, be punished by (Penalty 839.10-1) ; provided, that... ." 839.11 This statute was altered as f ollov7s : "... especially provided for, shall be punished by ( Penalty 839.11-1) ." 839.12 The first sentence was altered as follows: "... which he charges, he shall be pimished by ( Penalty 839.12-1) . " PAGE 136 128 839.13 The first paragraph was altered as follows : "... person so offending shall be punished by ( Penalty 839.13-1) . " The last paragraph was anitted because it pertains to evidence. 839.14 This statute was altered as follows : "... papers or other ^nritings, he shall be punished by ( Penalty 839.14-1) ." with the proper clerk, 839.15 This statute was altered as follows: " shall be punished by ( Penalty 839.15-1) . " 839.16 This statute was altered as follows: "... the drawing of jurors, he shall be punished by ( Penalty 839.16-1) . " 839.17 This statute was altered as follows : "... to his ovm default or neglect, shall be (punished by Penalty 839.17-1) ." 839.18 This statute was altered as follows: "... unless otherwise provided, be punished by ( Penalty 839.18-1) ." 839.19 This statute was altered as follows : " process delivered to him, shall be punished by (Penalty 839.19-1) ." ^W*-* ; J VT'-^r-iirT-lM Tn~aT ( PAGE 137 129 839.20 This statute v;as altered as f ollcsvs : "... escapes and goes at large, he shall be punished by ( Penalty 839.20-1) ." 839.21 This statute was altered as follows : "... lawful process whatever, shall be punished by ( Penalty 839.21-1) ." 839.22 emitted. This statute had been repealed. 839.221 Omitted. This statute describes procedural policy. 839.23 The first sentence was altered as follows : "... circuit court and qualified to act as surety shall be (punished by Penalty 839.23-1) ." 839.24 This statute was altered as follows : "... wilfully fails to perform the duty shall be (punished by Penalty 839.24-1) ." Chapter 843 Obstructing Justice 843.01 This statute was altered as follows : "... legally authorized person, shall be punished by (Penalty 843.01-1)." PAGE 138 130 843.02 This statute was altered as follows: "... person of the officer, shall be punished by ( Penalty 843.02-1) . " 843.03 This statute was altered as follo^vs : "... such intent is effected or not, shall be punished by ( Penalty 843.03-1) ." 843.04 The second paragraph was altered as follows : "... refusing to assist shall be punished by ( Penalty 843.04-1) . " 843.05 This statute was altered as follows: "... attenpts so to do, shall be punished by ( Penalty 843.05-1 ) . " 843.06 This statute was altered as follows : "... arrested upon civil process , shall be punished by ( Penalty 843.06-1) . " 843.07 The first paragraph was altered as follows : "... neglects to obey such justice, shall be punished by ( Penalty 843.07-1) ." 843.08 This statute was altered as follows : "... matter pertaining to the duty of any such officer, shall be (punished by Penalty 843.08-1) ." 843.09 This statute was altered as f ollov/s : "... any criminal charge to escape, he shall suffer (Penalty 843.09-1)." PAGE 139 131 843.10 This statute was altered as follows : "... any criminal charge to escape , he shall be punished by ( Penalty 843.10-1) . " 843.11 This statute was altered as follows : "... any conviction or charge of an offense , shall be punished by ( Penalty 843.11-1) . . . punishable by iraprisoninent in the state prison, then by ( Penalty 843.11-2) Â— tool or instrument to him shall be subject to ( Penalty 843.11-3) ." 843.12 This statute was altered as follows : "... entitled to the lawful custody of such person, (shall be punished by Penalty 843.12-1) ." 843.13 This statute was altered as follows: "... his escape or to avoid detention or recapture , shall be (punished by Penalt y 843.13-1) . " 843.14 This statute was altered as follows : "... imprisonment in the state prison for life, be punished by ( Penalty 843.14-1) ; and where the offense... was punishable in any other manner, he shall be punished by ( Penalty 843.14-2) . " 843.15 Subparagraph (a) was altered as follows : "... review by certiorari after conviction of any offense, be (punished by Penalty 843.15-1) ." PAGE 140 132 843.15 (Continued) Subparagraph (b) was altered as follows : "... in connection vjxth a charge of a misdoneanor, be (punished by Penalty 843.15-2) ." 843.16 Paragraph (4) was altered as follows: "... corporation, violating coiy of the provisions of this section sliall be (punished by Penalty 843.16-1) . " Chapter 846 Opium Dens 846.01 846.02 This statute was altered as follows : " about the premises where sold, shall be punished by ( Penalty 846.02-1) ." 846.03 This statute was altered as follows : "... person in violation of section 846.02 shall be punished by ( Penalty 846.03-1) ." 846.04 This statute was altered as follows : "... purpose of an opium den shall be punished by ( Penalty 846.04-1) . " 846.05 This statute was altered as follows : " principal medicinal agent, shall be punished by (Penalty 846.05-1) ." 846.06 846.07 emitted. These statutes pertain to evidence. PAGE 141 133 Chapter 847 Obscene Literature : Profanity 847.01 emitted. This statute had been repealed. 847.011 Subparagraph 1-a was altered as follows: "... assist in doing, either knowlingly or innocently, any act or thmg inentioned above, (shall be punished by Penalty 847.011-1) . A person who. . . section, thereafter violates any of its provisions, (shall be punished by Penalty 847.011-2) . " Subparagraph 1-b v/as emitted because it pertains to evidence. Paragraph (2) was altered as follows: "... transmit, show, trans mut, or advertise the same, (shall be punished by Penalty 847.011-3) . In any prosecution . . . . " The last sentence of paragraph (3) was altered to read: "Whoever violates this section (shall be punished by Penalty 847.011-4) . " Paragraphs (4) , (5) , (6) , (7) , (8) , (9) , (10) , and (11) were emitted because they pertain to administrative procedures or evidence. 847.012 Paragraph (3) was altered as follows: "... violating any provision of this section (shall be punished by Penalty 847.012-1) . " Paragraphs (5), (6), (7), (8), and (9) v/ere omitted because they describe administrative procedures. PAGE 142 134 847.013 Paragraph 2e was altered as follows : "... provision of this section shall (be punished by Penalty 847.013-1) . " Paragraphs (3) and (4) were omitted because they describe administrative procedures and legislative intent. 847.02 847.03 Qnitted. These statutes describe administrative procediores. 847.04 This statute was altered as follows : "... as to be heard by another, shall be punished by ( Penalty 847.04-1) ; but no prosecution. . . ." 847.05 This statute was altered as follCTvs : "... obscene language shall be punished by ( Penalty 847.05-1) . " 847.06 The first paragraph was altered as follows : "... matter of indecent or iimioral character, shall be (punished by Penalty 847.06-1) ." The last two paragraphs were anitted because they pertain to evidence and administrative procedures. 847.07 Quitted. This statute pertains to evidence. PAGE 143 135 Chapter 849 Gambling 849.01 This statute was altered as follows : "... whether heretofore prohibited or not , shall be punished by ( Penalty 849.01-1) . " 849.02 This statute was altered as follows : "... violation of section 849.01 shall be punished (by Penalty 849.02-1) ." ' ' 849. OS This statute was altered as follows : "... for the purpose of gaming shall be punished (by Penalty 849.03-1) . " 849.04 This statute was altered as follows : "... non-ccrtpos mentis or under guardianship shall be punished by (Penalty 849.04-1) . " 849.05 849.51 emitted. These statutes pertain to evidence. 849.06 Paragraph (2) was altered to read: "Violation of this law shall be (punishable by Penalty 849.06-1) . " 849.07 This statute was altered as follows: "... other thing of value, upon such tables , he shall be (punished by Penalty 849.07-1) . " M** >'*' "* V Â— ^Â»-Â« . ! i^Â«i > ' ' > Â— c-'Â»* PAGE 144 136 849.08 This statute was altered as follows : "... for money or other thing of value , shall be punished by ( Penalty 849.08-1) . " 849.09 Paragraph (2) was altered as follows: "... subsection (1) of this section shall be punished by ( Penalty 849.09-1) . " Paragraph (3) v/as altered as follavs: "... subsection (1) of this section shall be punished by ( Penalty 849.09-2) . Any person vjho... violates any provision thereof shall be punished, upon conviction, by ( Penalty 849.09-3 ) . The provisions of this... ." Paragraph (4) was altered as follows: "... subsection (1) of this section shall be punished by ( Penalty 849.09-4) ; provided, that ... thereafter violates any provision thereof shall be punished, upon conviction, by ( Penalty 849.09-5) ." 849.091 This statute was altered as follows : "... membership or affiliation in any such group or organization shall be (punished b y Penalty 849.091-1)." 849 .092 849 093 849 10 The last paragraph was altered to read: "Any violation of this section shall be (punished by Penalty 849.10-1) . " PAGE 145 137 849.11 This statute was altered as follows: "... for any right, share or interest therein, shall be (pimished by Penalty 849.11-1) ." 849.12 Quitted. This statute describes administrative procedures. 849.13 This statute was altered as follows : "... in connection with lotteries, ccannits the like offense, shall (be punished by Penalty 849.13-1) . " 849.14 This statute was altered as follows : "... acts all of which are hereby forbidden, shall be (punished by Penalty 849.14-1) ." 849.15 849.16 849.17 849.19 Quitted. These statutes describe administrative procedures, 849.20 849.21 849.22 Qnitted. These statutes describe administrative procedures. 849.23 This statute was altered as follows : "... provisions of sections 849.15 849.22 shall, upon conviction thereof, be (punished by Penalty 849.23-1) ; provided, that ... provisions of sections 849.15 849.22 a second time shall, upon conviction thereof, be (punished by Penalty PAGE 146 138 849.23 (Contdjiued) 849.23-2); provided, further .. twice convicted already, stiall, upon conviction thereof, be deemed a 'cormon offender' and shall be (punished by Penalty 849.23-3) . " 849.231 849.232 Qnitted. This statute pertains to administrative procedures and property rights. 849.233 This statute was altered as follows: "... violate the provisions of section 849.231 shall, upon conviction, be (punished by Penalty 849.233-1) . 849.24 Paragraph (2) was altered as follows: "... bookmaker on the grounds of a permit holder shall be (punished by Penalty 849.24-1) . Ibr a second like offense in this state, he shall be (punished by Penalty 849.24-2) . " Paragraph (5) v/as altered as follows: "... jai alai fronton without haying been reinstated by the ccranission (shall be punished by Penalty 849.24-3) . " 849.25 Paragraph (2) was altered as follows: "... engages in bookiTaking shall be (punished by Penalty 849.25-1 ) ; provided that . . . thereafter PAGE 147 139 849.25 (Continued) violates this act, shall be punished, upon conviction, by ( Penalty 849.25-2) . " 849.26 849.46 Qnitted. These statutes describe administrative and civil matters for the most part. Chapter 851 Bucket Shops 851.01 851.02 This statute was altered as follows: "It is (unlawful) for any person . . . bucket shop within this state , shall upon conviction thereof be punished by ( Penalty 851.02-1) . " 851.03 This statute was altered as follcws: "... deemed an accessory, and upon conviction thereof, shall be (punished by Penalty 851.03-1) ." 851.04 Qnitted. This statute pertains to evidence. Chapter 856 Drunkenness ; Vagrancy ; Desertion 856.01 This statute was altered as follows : "... liquors or drugs shall be punished by (Penalty 856.01-1); but no... ." PAGE 148 140 856.02 856.03 The last sentence of the second paragraph was altered as follows: "... speedy trial, and upon conviction shall be (punished by Penalty 856.03-1) . " 856.04 Paragraph (1) was altered as follows: "... withhold from them the means of support, shall be (punished by Penalty 856.04-1) ; provided, however. . . . " Chapter 860 Offenses Concerning Aircraft , Motor Vehicles , and Railroads 860.01 The last sentence of paragraph (1) was altered as follows: "... violation of tlrLs section shall be punished (by Penalty 860.01-1) . " Paragraph (2) was altered as follows: "... vehicles mentioned herein, he slTall upon conviction be (punished by Penalty 860.01-2) , and if the death . . . any person while intoxicated, such person shall be (punished by Penalty 860.01-3 ) . " Paragraph (3) was emitted because it pertains to legal procedures. 860.02 ... This statute v;as altered as follows : "... control of such conveyance, shall be punished by ( Penalty 860.02-1) ." 860.03 This statute was altered as follows: "... shall be intoxicated, he shall be punished by (Penalty 860.03-1) ." PAGE 149 141 860.04 This statute was altered as follows: "... train in this state, shall on conviction be punished by ( Penalty 860.04-1) . " 860.05 This statute was altered as follows : "... road bed or rolling stock shall be punished by ( Penalty 860.05-1) . " 860.06 The first sentence of this statute was altered as follows: "... any person convicted of a violation of this section shall be punished by ( Penalty 860.06-1) . " 860.07 The first sentence was altered as follows : "... oh any railroad in this state, shall be guilty of a (crinne) ; provided, that Â— ." The second sentence was altered as follows : "... provisions of this section shall be punished by ( Penalty 860.07-1) . " 860.08 This statute was altered as follows : " Â— connection v;ith railroad business , shall be punished by ( Penalty 860.08-1) . " 860.09 , This statute was altered as follows : "... any obstruction thereon shall be punished by ( Penalty 860.09-1) . " 860.10 The last sentence was altered as follows : "... violating the provisions of this section shall be (punished by Penalty 860.10-1) . " PAGE 150 142 860.11 This statute was altered as follows: "... drive cattle thereon, shall be pianished by ( Penalty 860.11-1) . " 860.12 Omitted. This statute had been repealed. 860.13 Paragraph (3) was altered as follows: "... provisions of this section shall be punished by ( Penalty 860.13-1) . " Paragraph (4) was emitted because it pertains to administrative procedures . 860.14 The last sentence was altered as follows: "... violating the provisions of this section shall be (punished by Penalty 860.14-1) ." 860.15 Paragraph (2) was altered as follows: "... wilfully violating the provisions of this section shall be (punished by Penalty 860.15-1) ." Chapter 862 Offenses Concerning Seamen 862.01 Ttie last sentence was altered as follows : "... provisions of this section shall be punished by ( Penalty 862.01-1) ." ' 862.02 The last sentence was altered as follows : "... seamen or sailors shall be punished by ( Penalty 862.02-1) . " PAGE 151 143 862.03 This statute was altered as follows: "... any port of the state, he shall be (punished by Penalty 862.03-1) . " Chapter 865 Violation of Certain Commercial Restrictions 865.01 Qnitted. This statute had been repealed. 865.02 This statute was altered as follows : "... product of the state , shall be punished by ( Penalty 865.02-1 ) . " 865.03 Quitted. This statute had been repealed. 865.04 This statute was altered as follows: "... rubbish or other thing, shall be punished by ( Penalty 865.04-1) . " 865.05 This statute was altered as follows : "... deceive or defraud the purchaser, shall be (punished by Penalty 865.05-1) ." 865.06 Paragraph (3) was altered as follows: "... any act inade unlawful under this section (shall be punished by Penalty 865.06-1) . " Paragraphs (3 a) and (4) were emitted because they pertain to administrative procedures. 865.061 Quitted. This statute had been repealed. PAGE 152 144 865.062 865.07 The first paragraph was altered as follows : "... containing such syrup or mixture , shall be punished by ( Penalty 865.07-1) . " 865.08 This statute v/as altered as follows : "... parted with his interest therein , shall be punished by ( Penalty 865.08-1) . " 865.09 Paragraph (4) was emitted because it pertains to administrative procedures. Paragraph (5) was altered as follows: "... failure to cooply with law shall be ( Penalty 865.09-1) . " 865.10 Paragraph (3) was altered as follows: "... violation of this section shall be punishable (by Penalty 865.10-1) . " Chapter 870 Affrays ; Riots ; Routs ; Unla\^^ful Assemblies 870.01 Paragraph (1) was altered as follows: "... affray shall be punished by ( Penalty 870.01-1) . " Paragraph (2) was altered as follows: "... inciting or encouraging a riot, shall be punished by ( Penalty 870.01-2) ," 870.02 This statute was altered as follows : "... other unlawful act , each of them shall be punished by Penalty 870.02-1) . " PAGE 153 145 870.03 Ihis statute was altered as follows : "... ship or vessel , each of them shall be punished by ( Penalty 870.03-1) . " 870.04 This statute was altered as follows: "... deemed one (1) of the rioters or persons unlawfully assembled, and may be prosecuted and punished (by Penalty 870.04-1) . " 870.041 870.047 870.048 This statute v/as altered as follows : "... emergency measure established pursuant thereto shall be (punishable by Penalty 870.048-1) . " 870.05 This statute was altered as follows : "... officers and all persons acting by their order or under their direction , shall be ( ... ) fully justified in law (and punishable by Penalty 870.05-1 ) ; and if any of said officers . . . refused to aid and assist said officer shall be (punished by Penalty 870.05-2) . " 870.06 The last sentence was altered as follows : "... participating in such drill or parade , shall be (punished by Penalty 870.06-1) . " Chapter 876 Criminal Anarchy ,, Coirmunism , Wearing Masks , Hoods , Etc. 876.01 PAGE 154 146 876.02 The last paragraph was altered as follows : "... shall be (punished by Penalty 876.02-1) . " 876.03 This statute v;as altered as follows : " Â— presence , aid or instigation shall be (punished by Penalty 876.03-1) . " 876.04 This statute v/as altered as follows : "... permits such use to be continued, he shall be (punished by Penalty 876.04-1) ." 876.05 876.07 876.08 This statute v/as altered as follows : "... failing to corply with the provisions of sections 876.05 876,10, shall be (punished by Penalty 876.08-1) . " 876.09 876.10 This statute was altered as follows: "... perjury, and shall be prosecuted and punished (by Penalty 876.10-1) . " 876.11 876.12 The follov/ing v/as added as the last sentence: "Any person or persons convicted of violating the provisions of this section shall be punished by Penalty 876.12-1. " PAGE 155 L-147 876.13 The following was added as the last sentence: "Any person or persons convicted of violating the provisions of this section shall be punished by Penalty 876.13-1 . " 876.14 The following was added as the last sentence: "Any person or persons convicted of violating the provisions of this section shall be punished by Penalty 876.14-1 . " Â• : 876.15 The folla-;ing was added as the last sentence: "Any person or persons convicted of violating the provisions of this section shall be punished by Penalty 876.15-1 . " 876.16 876.17 The folla.<7ing was added as the last sentence. "Any person or persons convicted of violating the provisions of this section shall be punished by Penalty 876.17-1 . " 876.18 The following was added as the last sentence. "Any person or persons convicted of violating the provisions of this section shall be punished by Penalty 876.18-1 . " 876.19 ' The following v/as added as the last sentence: "Any person or persons convicted of violating the provisions of this section shall be PAGE 156 148 876.19 (Continued) punished by Penalty 876.19-1 . " 876.20 The following was added as the last sentence. "Any person or persons convicted of violating the provisions of this section shall be punished by Penalty 876.20-1 . " 876.21 Qnitted. This statute contained the penalty that had been incorporated into statutes 876.12 876.15 and 876.17 876.20. 876.22 876.23 Paragraph (1) was altered as follows: "(1) It shall be (unlawful) for any person. . . . " Paragraph (2) was altered as follows: "... violates any of the provisions of this section shall be (punished by Penalty 876.23-1) . " 876.24 This statute was altered as follows: "It shall be (unlawful) for any person after. . . Any person convicted of violating this section shall be (punished by Penalty 876.24-1 ) . " 876.25 Qrdtted. This statute perta.ins to the rights of an individual convicted of violating certain statutes. PAGE 157 149 876.26 876.27 876.31 Omitted. These statutes pertain to administrative procedures and the rights of persons convicted of certain crimes. Alaska ( Alaska Statutes Annotated , Title 11, Section 11.15.010 Section 11.15.110) 11.15.010 This statute was altered as follows : "... guilty of murder in the first degree , and shall be (punished by Penalty 11.15.010-1) . " l 11.15.020 [ This statute v;as altered as follows : "... an aircraft and thereby occasions or iiTplQn:Tents the death of another (shall be punished by Penalty 11.15.020-1) ." 11.15.030 This statute was altered as follows : "... guilty of murder in the second degree , and shall be (punished by Penalty 11.15.030-1) . " 11.15.040 This statute was altered as follows : "... guilty of manslaughter' and is punishable by ( Penalty 11.15.040-1) . " The footnote defining manslaughter was added. 11.15.050 Omitted. This statute pertained to suicide. PAGE 158 150 11.15.060 emitted. This statute pertained to abortions. 11.15.070 This statute was altered as follows : "... which produces the death of the person, is (punishable by Penalty 11.15.070-1) ." 11.15.080 This statute v;as altered as follows : "... second degree , or is not jiistifiable or excusable, is (punishable by Penalty 11.15.080-1) ." 11.15.090 The following was added as the last sentence: "Every person conmitting justifiable hcmicide is punishable by Penalty 11.15.090-1 . " 11.15.100 The following was added as the last sentence: "Every person committing justifiable homicide is punishable by Penalty 11.15.100-1 . " 11.15.110 The following V7as added as the last sentence. "Every person cormiitting excusable homicide is punishable by Penalty 11.15.110-1 . " Delaware ( Delaware Code Annotated , Title 11, Section 575 Section 578) 571 This statute was altered as follows : "... guilty of murder in the first degree and (shall be punishable by Penalty 571-1) . " PAGE 159 151 572 This statute was altered as follcws : "... in the second degree and of a felony, and shall be (punished by Penalty 572-1) ." A footnote defining murder was added. 573-574 Omitted. These statutes describe administrative procedures. 575 Paragraph (a) was altered as follows : "... except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, is (punishable by Penalty 575-1) . " A footnote defining manslaughter was also added to paragraph (a) . Paragraph (b) was altered as follows : "... it is so found by the verdict , shall be (punished by Penalty 572-2) . " A paragraph defining manslaughter was also added to paragraph (b) . 576 Qnitted. This statute pertains to administrative matters. 577 Omitted. This statute pertains to assault. 578 Omitted. This statute pertains to attempted murder. Hawaii (Hav/aii Revised Statutes , Title 38, Section 748-1 Through Section 748-12) . 748-1 748-2 PAGE 160 152 748-3 emitted. This statute pertains to evidence. 748-4 This statute was altered as follows : "... murder in the first degree shall be punished by ( Penalty 748-4-1) . Whoever is ... murder in the second degree shall be punished by ( Penalty 748-4-2) . " 748-5 Omitted. This statute pertains to administrative procedures and evidence. 748-6 A footnote defining manslaughter was added. 748-7 This statute was altered as follows : " the offense of manslaughter shall be (punished by Penalty 748-7-1) . " 748-8 emitted. This statute describes administrative procedures. 748-9 Paragraph (a) was altered as follows : "... negligent homicide in the first degree and shall be (punished by Penalty 748-9-1) . " Paragraph (b) v/as altered as follows : "... negligent hordcide in the second degree and shall be (punished by Penalty 748-9-2) . " 748-10 emitted. This statute pertains to administrative procedures. PAGE 161 153 748-11 emitted. This statute pertains to assault and battery. 748-12 emitted. This is a statute of limitation. Indiana (Bums Annotated Indiana Statutes, Title 10, Section 10-3401 Through Section 10-3405) . 10-3401 This statute was altered as f ollov/s : "... murder in the first degree and on conviction shall suffer ( Penalty 10-3401-1) . " 10-3402 This statute was altered as f ollavs : "... whereof the person thus injured shall die, is (punishable by Penalty 10-3402-1) ." 10-3403 This statute was altered as follows : "... the person thus injured shall die within this state, is (punishable by Penalty 10-3403-1) ." 10-3404 Thi-S statute was altered as follows : "... murder in tlie second degree, and, on conviction, shall be (punished by Penalty 10-3404-1) ." 10-3405 The first paragraph was altered as follows : "... voluntary manslaughter, and, on conviction, shall be (punished by Penalty 10-3405-1) ." PAGE 162 154 10-3405 (Continued) The second paragraph was altered as follows : " Â— involuntary manslaughter, and, on conviction, shall be (punished by Penalty 10-3405-2) : Provided, That motor vehicle, the punishinent for the offense shall be ( Penalty 10-3405-3) . " Iowa ( lov/a Code Annotated , Title 35, Section 690.1 Section 690.11) 690.1 690.2 This statute was altered as follows : "... murder in the first degree, and shall be punished by ( Penalty 690.2-1) ." 690.3 This statute was altered as follows : "... murder in the second degree, and shall be punished by ( Penalty 690.3-1) ." 690.4 Omitted. This statute describes administrative procedures. 690.5 Craitted. This statute had been repealed. 690.6 690.7 Omitted. Ttiese statutes pertain to assault. 690.8 Qiiitted. This statute pertains to inciting homicide. 690.9 Omitted. This statute pertains to attempted homicide or injury. PAGE 163 155 690.10 This statute was altered as f oIIctvs : " crime of manslaughter shall be (punished by Penalty 690.10-1) ." ..'_. _"'; A footnote defining inanslaughter was added. 690.11 This statute was altered as follows : " causes the death of a human being is (punishable by Penalty 690.11-1) . " Louisiana ( Louisiana Statutes Annotated Revised Statutes , Title 14 , Section 29 Section 32). 29 30 The last sentence was altered as follows : "... crime of murder shall be punished by (Penalty 30-1) . " 31 The last sentence was altered to read: "TVhoever carmits manslaughter shall be (punished by Penalty 31-1) . " 32 The second paragraph (sentence) was emitted because it pertains to evidence. ... Tne third paragraph (or sentence) was altered to read: "I'Jhoever cortmits the crime of negligent homicide shall be (punished by Penalty 32-1) . " i^.-'T*tO''M.i-*Â»'r--irtf-'J-'.-V r ^ ffr Â« k.T5 i-^t-; V r > -Â«" ^rVir-^-enrr.l--^tt r Â— s^If* m PAGE 164 156 ^^i^e (MaJJie Revised Statutes Annotated , Title 17, Sections 2551 2552 and Sections 2651 2657) . 2551 This statute was altered as follows : "... as defined by camion law, shall be punished by ( Penalty 2551-1 ) , except that... ." A footnote defining manslaughter v/as added. 2552 The first sentence was altered as follows: "... concerned therein, and thereby human life is destroyed, is (punishable by Penalty 2552-1 ) ." The last sentence was omitted because it pertains to a criire other than hcmicide. 2651 This statute was altered as follows : "... is guilty of murder and shall be punished by ( Penalty 2651-1) . " 2652 The first sentence was altered as follows: "... thereby injured, and human life is thereby destroyed, is (punishable by Penalty 2652-1) ," The last sentence was emitted because it pertains to a criire other than homicide. 2653 This statute was alteresd as follows : "... any person , of which he dies in the State , is (punishable by Penalty 2653-1) . " PAGE 165 157 2654 Ihis statute was altered as follows : "... murder and may be indicted, tried, and punished (by Penalty 2654-1) . " 2655 emitted. This statute pertains to evidence. 2656 emitted. This statute pertains to assault. 2657 emitted. This statute pertains to attenpted murder. Maryland ( The Annotated Code of the Public General Laws of Maryland , Article 27, Sections 387 -388 and Sections 407 414). 387 This statute was altered as follows : "... the crime of manslaughter shall be (punished by Penalty 387-1) . " A footnote defining manslaughter was also added. 388 The first paragraph was altered as follows : "... grossly negligent imnner, shall be guilty of (the crime) to be known . . . , and the person so convicted shall be (punished by Penalty 388-1) . The police ... . " The last paragraph was emitted because it pertains to procedural matters . PAGE 166 158 407 This statute was altered as follows : "... wilful , deliberate and premeditated killing shall be (punished by Penalty 407-1) . " 408 This statute was altered as follows : "... attempt to perpetrate any arson, shall be (punished by Penalty 408-1)." 409 This statute was altered as follows : "... cattle , goods , wares or merchandise , shall be (punished by Penalty 409-1) . " 410 This statute was altered as follows : "... penal institution in any of the counties of the State , shall be (punished by Penalty 410-1) . " 411 This statute v/as altered by adding these words : "... and punishable by Penalty 411-1) . " A footnote defining murder was also added. 412 emitted. Tliis statute describes administrative procedures. 413-414 Omitted. These statutes were incorporated into earlier statutes in adding the coded penalties. PAGE 167 159 I'linnesota ( Minnesota Statutes Annotated , Part 5, Section 609.18 Section 609.215). 609.18 609.185 This statute vzas altered as follows : "... raorder in the first degree and shall be (punished by Penalty 609.185-1) : (1) Causes the death... ." 609.19 This statute was altered as follows : " guilty of murder in the second degree and may be (punished by Penalty 609.19-1) . " 609.195 This statute was altered as follows : "... guilty of murder in the third degree and may be (punished by Penalty 609.195-1) : (1) Perpetrates an act... ." 609.20 This statute was altered as follows : "... manslaughter in the first degree and may be (punished by Penalty 609.20-1) : (1) Intentionally causes . . . . " 609.205 This statute was altered as follows : "... manslaughter in the second degree and may be (punished by Penalty 609.205-1) : (1) By his culpable... ." PAGE 168 160 609.21 Ihis statute was altered as follows : "... operation of a vehicle resulting in death and may be (punished by Penalty 609.21-1) . " 609.215 Quitted. This statute pertains to suicide. Mississippi ( Mssissippi Code 1942 Annotated , Title 11, Section 2215 Section 2233) . 2215 The follov7ing was added as the last sentence: "Every person vdio shall be convicted of murder shall be punished by Penalty 2215-1 . " 2216 This statute was altered as f ollaÂ«;s : "... second engaged in such duel , shall be (pxonished by Penalty 2216-1) . " 2217 Quitted. This statute contains the penalty incorporated into sections 2215 and 2216. 2218 This statute was altered as follows : "... emission of another shall be justifiable (and punished by Penalty 2218-1) in the following 2219 This statute was altered as follows: " procurement, or amission of another shall be excusable (and punished by Penalty 2219-1) ... . " PAGE 169 161 2220 Ihis statute was altered as follows : "... besides such as are above enumerated and excepted, shall be (punished by Penalty 2220-1) ." 2221 This statute was altered as follows: "... killing would be murder at conmon law, shall be (punished by Penalty 2221-1) . " 2222 This statute was altered as follows: "... resulted in the death of the nother, shall be (punished by Penalty 2222-1) . " 2223 Qnitted. This statute pertains to abortions. 2224 This statute was altered as follows : "... not in necessary selfdefense, shall be (punished by Penalty 2224-1) ," 2225 This statute was altered as follows: "... atterrpt shall have failed, shall be (punished by Penalty 2225-1 ) ." 2226 This statute was altered as follov/s: "... law, and not in necessary self-defense, shall be (punished by Pe nalty 2226-1) ." 2227 This statute was altered as follows : "... engaged in an attenpt to caimit such injury, shall be (punished by Pe nalty 2227-1) ." PAGE 170 162 2228 This statute was altered as follows : "... to avoid the animal such owner shall be (punished by Penalty 2228-1) . " 2229 This statute was altered as follows : "... human being shall be drowned or otheri'/ise killed, shall be (punished by Penalty 2229-1) ." 2230 This statute was altered as follows : "... person shall be killed, every such captain, engineer, or other person, shall be (punished by Penalty 2230-1) . " 2231 This statute was altered as follows : "... which shall cause the death of such other person, he shall be (punished by Penalty 2231-1) ." 2232 This statute was altered as follows: "... authority of law, not provided for in this chapter, shall be (punished by Penalty 2232-1) ." 2233 Qnitted. This statute had been incorporated in previous laws in referring to the penalties for the various types of manslaughter. Nebraska ( Reissue of the Revised Statutes of Nebraska of 1943 , Chapter 28, Section 28 401 through Section 28 405). 28-401 The first sentence was altered as follows : "... murder in the PAGE 171 163 28-401 (Continued) first degree, and upon conviction thereof shall suffer ( Penalty 28-401-1) ." 28-402 This statute was altered as follows : "... murder in the second degree; and upon conviction thereof shall be (punished by Penalty 28-402-1) . " 28-403 Ihis statute was altered as follows : "... guilty of manslaughter; and upon conviction thereof shall be (punished by Penalty 28-403-1) ." 28-403.01 This statute was altered as follows : "... irotor vehicle homicide and, upon conviction thereof, shall be (punished by Penalty 28-403.01-1) . " 28-404 and 28-405 Quitted. These statutes pertain to crimes other than homicide. Mew Jersey (New Jersey Statutes Annotated , Title 2A, Section 2A: 113-1 Through Section 2A: 113-9) . 2A: 113-1 2Ar 113-2 2A: 113-3 emitted. This statute pertains to administrative matters. PAGE 172 164 2A: 113-4 The first sentence was altered as follows : " aiders , abetters , counselors and procurers , shall suffer ( Penalty 2A: 113-4-1) . " l!he second sentence was altered as follows : "... murder in the second degree shall suffer ( Penalty 2A:113-4-2) . " 2A: 113-5 This statute vjas altered as follows : "... crime of manslaughter shall be punished by ( Penalty 2A:113-5-l) Â• " A footnote defining manslaughter was also added. 2A: 113-6 This statute was altered as follotvs: "... kidnapping, murder, rape, robbery or sodomy, (shall suffer Penalty 2A; 113-6-1) ." 2A: 113-7 emitted. This statute pertains to attempted honicides. 2A: 113-8 Quitted. This statute pertains to a criire other than homicides. 2A: 113-9 This statute was altered as follows : "... rights or safety of others , is (punishable by Penalty 2A: 113-9-1) . " New York ( McKinney ' s Consolidated Laws of New York, Book 39, Title A, Section 125.00 Section 125.60). 125.00 125.05 PAGE 173 165 125.10 The last sentoice was altered to read: "Criminally negligent hcmicide is (punishable by Penalty 125.10-1) . " 125.15 The last sentence was altered to read: "Manslaughter in the second degree is (punishable by Penalty 125.15-1) . " 125.20 The last sentence was altered to read: "Manslaughter in the first degree is (punishable by Penalty 125.20-1) . " 125.25 The last sentence was altered to read: "Murder is punishable by Penalty 125.25-1) . " Â• ' 125.30 125.35 Quitted. These statutes pertain to administrative matters. 125.40 125.60 emitted. These statutes pertain to abortions. Ohio ( Ohio Revised Code Annotated , Title 29, Section 2901.01 Section 2901.10) . 2901.01 The second sentence was altered as follows : "... murder in the first degree and shall be punished by (Penalty 2901.01-1) . " The third sentence was omitted because it further described the penalty. PAGE 174 166 2901.02 The last sentence was altered to read: "Whoever violates this section is (punishable by Penalty 2901.02-1) . " 2901.03 The second paragraph was altered as follows: "I'Jhoever violates this section is (punishable by Penalty 2901.03-1 ) . I^Jhoever being . . . together to violate this section, shall be (punished by Penalty 2901.03-2) . " 2901.04 The second sentence was altered to read: "Whoever violates this section is (punishable by Penalty 2901.04-1) . " 2901.05 This statute was altered as follavs : "... guilty of murder in the second degree and shall be (punished by Penalty 2901.05-1) . " 2901.06 This statute was altered as follows : " guilty of manslaughter in the first degree, and shall be (punished by Penalty 2901.06-1) ." A footnote defining .manslaughter was also added. 2901.07 The last sentence was altered as follows : "... contributes directly to the death of any person, shall be (punished by Penalty 2901.07-1)." PAGE 175 167 2901.08 Quitted. Ihis statute pertains to offenses other than hcmicide. 2901.09 The last paragraph was altered to read: "Whoever violates this section shall be pmished by ( Penalty 2901.09-1) if such attenpt results in the death of the person upon whan it is made." 2901.10 Ihe last sentence was altered as follows : "... upon whom it is made, shall be punished by ( Penalty 2901.10-1) ." Oklahona ( Oklahoma Statutes Annotated , Title 21, Section 691 Section 733) . 691 692 693 694 695 emitted. This statute pertains to evidence. 701 The following was added as the last sentence. "Every person convicted of murder shall be punished by Penalty 701-1 . " 702 emitted. This statute pertains to evidence. 703 PAGE 176 158 704 705 706 This statute was altered as follows : "... and every second engaged in such duel, is punishable by Penalty 706-1 ) . 707 Quitted. This statute had been incorporated into earlier ones in adding references to the penalty for murder. 711 The following was added as the last sentence. "Every person Â• guilty of manslaughter in the first degree is punishable by Penalty 711-1." 712 This statute was altered as follows : "... which produces the death of such other person, is (punishable by Penalty 712-1) ." 713 This statute was altered as follows : "... not prohibited in the next following section, is (pionishable by Penalty 713-1) ." 714 Qnitted. This statute pertains to abortions. 715 Ouitted. This statute had been incorporated into earlier ones in adding references to the penalty for manslaughter in the first degree. PAGE 177 169 716 The following were added as the last words: "... and pijnishable by Penalty 716-1 . " A footnote defining manslaughter was also added. 717 This statute was altered as follows: "... to avoid such aniinal, the owner is (punishable by Penalty 717-1) . " 718 This statute was altered as follows : "... human being is drowned or otherwise killed, is (punishable by Penalty 718-1 ) ." 719 This statute was altered as follows : "... bursting or breaking any person is killed, is (punishable by Penalty 719-1) ." 720 This statute was altered as follavs : "... death of a human being is produced, is (punishable by Penalty 720-1) ." 721 This statute was altered as follows : "... occurs whereby any human being is killed is (punishable by Penalty 721-1) . " 722 emitted. This statute had been incorporated into earlier ones in adding references to the penalty for manslaughter in the second degree . PAGE 178 170 731 This statute was altered as follows: "Honicide is excusable (and punishable by Penalty 731-1) in the following cases ... . " 732 This statute was altered as follows: "Homicide is justifiable (and punishable by Penalty 732-1 ) when canmitted by . . . . " 733 This statute was altered as follows: "Hcmicide is also justifiable (and punishable by Penalty 733-1) when ccmnitted by . . . . " Oregon ( Oregon Revised Statutes , Title 16, Section 163.010 Section 163,140) . 163.010 Paragraph (3) was altered as follows: "... murder in the first degree sliall be punished by ( Penalty 163.010-1) . " 163.020 Paragraph (4) was altered as follows" "... murder in the second degree sliall be punished by ( Penalty 163.020-1) . " 163.040 The folla/7ing was added as the last sentence: "(4) Every person convicted of manslaughter shall be punished by Penalty 163.040-1 . " 163.050 Qnitted. This statute pertains to sioicide. 163.070 This statute was altered as follows : "... which produces the death of such person, is (punishable by Penalty 163.070-1) ." PAGE 179 171 163.080 Quitted. This statute had been incorporated into earlier ones in adding references to the penalty for manslaughter. 163.091 This statute was altered as follows : "... guilty of negligent homicide, and, upon conviction, shall be punished by Penalty 163.091-1) ." 163.100 This statute was altered as follows: "The killing of a human being is justifiable (and punisliable by Penalty 163.100-1) v^en ccsrmitted . . . ." 163.110 This statute was altered as follows: "The killing of a human being is excusable (and punishable by Penalty 163.110-1) when carmitted. . . ." 163.120 Qnitted. This statute pertains to evidence. 163.130 Qnitted. Tliis statute pertains to evidence and administrative procedures . 163.140 Qnitted. This statute describes adndnistrative procedures. Rhode Island ( General Laws of Rhode Island , Title 11, Section 11-23-1 Through Section 11-23-4) . 11-23-1 PAGE 180 172 11-23-2 This statute was altered as follows : " unless he shall then be under sentence of imprisonment for life, shall be (punished by Penalty 11-23-2-1) . Every person . . . second degree shall be (punished by Penalty 11-23-2-2) . Every person . . . under sentence of irrprisonment for life shall be (punished by Penalty 11-23-2-3 ) . " 11-23-3 This statute was altered as follows : "... canmit manslaughter shall be (punished by Penalty 11-23-3-1) . " A footnote defining manslaughter was also added. 11-23-4 emitted. This statute describes administrative matters. South Dakota ( South DaJcota Ccnpiled Laws 1967 , Title 22 , Section 22-16-1 Through Section 22-16-39) . 22-16-1 22-16-2 22-16-3 emitted. This statute pertains to evidence. 22-16-4 This statute was altered as follows: "Hcxnicide is murder (and punishable by Penalty 22-16-4-1) when perpetrated without ... . " 22-16-5 22-16-6 PAGE 181 173 22-16-7 Thj_s statute was altered as follows: "Homicide is inurder (and punishable by Penalty 22-16-7-1) when perpetrated by any' act . " 22-16-8 22-16-9 This statute was altered as follows: "Honiicide is murder (and punishable by Penalty 22-16-9-1) when perpetrated without. . . ." 22-16-10 This statute was altered as follows : "... in such duel , is guilty of murder ( ... ) , may be prosecuted in any county in the state ( , and shall be punished by Penalty 22-16-10-1) . " 22-16-11 The following was added as the last sentence: "Every person convicted of violating any provision of this section shall be punished by Penalty 22-16-11-1) . " 22-16-12 Quitted. This statute had been incorporated into earlier onÂ® in adding references to the penalty for murder. 22-16-13 and 22-16-14 Omitted. These statutes describe administrative procedures. 22-16-15 The following was added as the last sentence. "Any person convicted of violating any provision of this section shall be punished by Penalty 22-16-15-1) . " PAGE 182 174 22-16-16 This statute was altered as follows: "HOTiicide is (punishable by Penalty 22-16-16-1) \*ien perpetrated without. ..." 22-16-17 This statute was altered as follows: "Homicide is (punishable by Penalty 22-16-17-1) when perpetrated unnecessarily... ." 22-16-18 emitted. This statute pertains to abortions. 2216-19 Quitted. This statute had been incorporated into earlier ones in adding references to the penalty for manslaughter in the first degree. 22-16-20 The follov/ing vjere added as the last words of the statute : "... and punishable by Penalty 22-16-20-1 . " A footnote defining manslaughter was also added. 22-16-21 This statute v;as altered as follows : "... manner and thereby causes a human being to be killed, is (punishable by Penalty 22-16-21-1) ." 22-16-22 This statute was altered as follows : "... bursting or breaking any person is killed, is (punishable by Penalty 22-16-22-1) ." PAGE 183 175 22-16-23 This statute was altered as follows : "... human being is drowned or otherwise killed, is (punishable by Penalty 22-16-23-1) . " 22-16-24 This statute was altered as follows : " Â— whereby the death of a human being is produced, is (punishable by Penalty 22-16-24-1) ." 22-16-25 This statute was altered as follows: "... manslaughter in the first degree under existing laws , (punishable by Penalty 22-16-25-1) . " 22-16-26 This statute was altered as follows : "... which produces the death of such other persons , is (punishable by Penalty 22-16-26-1) . " 22-16-27 This statute was altered as follows : "... occurs whereby any human being is killed, is (punishable by Penalty 22-16-27-1) ." 22-16-28 This statute was altered as follows : "... circijmstances permitted to avoid such animal , the owner is (punishable by Penalty 22-16-28-1) . " 22-16-29 emitted. This statute had been incorporated into earlier ones by adding references to the penalty for manslaughter in the second degree. PAGE 184 176 22-16-30 This statute was altered as follows: "Homicide is excusable (and punishable by Penalty 22-16-30-1) when corrmitted by. . . ." 22-16-31 This statute was altered as follows: "Homicide is excusable (and pixiishable by Penalty 22-16-31-1) when committed by . . . . " 22-16-32 This statute was altered as follows: "Homicide is justifiable (and punishable by Penalty 22-16-32-1) when committed by . " 22-16-33 This statute was altered as follows: "Hcaidcide is justifiable (and punishable by Penalty 22-16-33-1) when necessarily. . . ." 22-16-34 This statute was altered as follows: "Homicide is justifiable (and punishable by Penalty 22-16-34-1) when committed by Â— ." 22-16-35 This statute was altered as follows: "Homicide is justifiable (and punishable by Penalty 22-16-35-1) when corrmitted by... ." 22-16-36 through 22-16-39 emitted. These statutes pertain to suicide. Texas ( Vernon's Annotated Penal Code of Texas , Title 15 , Article 1201 Article 1258) . 1201 PAGE 185 177 Texas (Continued) 1202 1203 1204 1205 1206 1207 The following was added as the last sentence: "Any person committing justifiable homicide shall be punished by Penalty 1207-1 ." 1208 1209 1210 1211 1212 1213-1214 emitted. These statutes pertain to procedural matters. 1215 1216 1217 1218 1219 1220 1221 1222 PAGE 186 178 1223 emitted. This statute pertains to evidence. 1224 1225 1226 1227 1228 The following was added as the last sentence: "Any person coarnittijig excusable homicide shall be punished by Penalty 1228-1 . " 1229 1230 1231 1232 1233 1234 1235 1236 1237 This statute was altered to read: "Negligent honicide of the first degree shall be punished by (Penalty 1237-1) . " 1238 1239 1240 1241 PAGE 187 179 1242 This statute was altered as follows : "... hcynicide ccmnitted in the execution of such unlawful act shall be ( Penalty 1242-1) . " 1243 This statute was altered as follows: "... penal law, the hcmicide resulting therefrom is (punishable by Penalty 1243-1) . " 1244-1255 emitted. These statutes had been repealed. 1256 1257 This statute was altered to read: "The punishment for murder shall be ( Penalty 1257-1) . " 1257a Omitted. This statute pertains to evidence. 1257b This statute was altered as follows : "... charge to the facts in the case and shall instruct the jury that (if) from all the facts and circumstances in evidence the jury believes the defendant was prompted and acted (without) his malice aforethought, they (can) assess tlie punishment at ( Penalty 1257b-l) ; provided, however, that... ." 1257c 1258 emitted. This statute pertains to evidence. PAGE 188 180 Utah ( Utah Code Annotated 1953 , Title 76, Section 76-30-1 Through Section 76-30-14) . 76-30-1 76-30-2 76-30-3 A footnote defining murder was added. 76-30-4 This statute was altered as follows : "... murder in the first degree shall suffer ( Penalty 76-30-4-1) . Every . . . murder in the second degree shall be (punished by Penalty 76-30-4-2) . " 76-30-5 76-30-6 This statute was altered to read: "Voluntary manslaughter is punishable by (Penalty 76-30-6-1) . (Involuntary manslaughter is punishable by Penalty 76-30-6-2) . " 76-30-7 Qnitted. This is a statute of limitation. 76-30-7.4 This .statute was altered as follows : "... disregard of human life or safety, shall be (punished by Penalty 76-30-7.4-1) . A death under. . . 76-30-8 This statute was altered as follows: "Homicide is excusable (and punishable by Penalty 76-30-8-1) in either of the following cases Â— . " PAGE 189 181 76-30-9 This statute was altered as follows: "Honicide is justifiable (and punishable by Penalty 76-30-9-1 ) v/hen ccmnitted by public ... . " 76-30-10 This statute was altered as follows: "Homicide is also justifiable (and punishable by Penalty 76-30-10-1) v/hen ccjrmitted by any Â— 76-30-11 76-30-12 emitted. This statute had been incorporated into earlier ones in adding references to the penalties for justifiable and excusable honicides . 76-30-13 emitted. This statute pertains to attempted killing. 76-30-14 emitted. This statute pertains to assault. Virginia ( Code of Virginia 1950 , Title 18.1, Section 18.1-21 Through Section 18.1-26) . 18.1-21 A footnote defining murder was added. 18.1-22 This statute was altered to read: "Murder of the first degree shall be punished (by Penalty 13.1-22-1) . " PAGE 190 182 18.1-23 This statute was altered to read: "Mxirder of the second degree shall be punished by ( Penalty 18.1-23-1) . " 18.1-24 This statute was altered to read: "Voluntary manslaughter shall be punislied by ( Penalty 18.1-24-1) . " A footnote defining voluntary manslaughter was also added. 18.1-25 This statute was altered to read: "Involuntary manslaughter shall be punished by ( Penalty 18.1-25-1) . " A footnote defining involuntary manslaughter was also added. 18.1-26 Omitted. This statute pe.rtains to administrative matters. V7ashington ( Revised Code of Washington Annotated ^ Title 9 , Section 9.48.010 Section 9.48.170). 9.48.010 9.48.020 9.48.030 The last sentence was altered to read: "r-turder in the first degree shall be punishable by ( Penalty 9.48.030-1) . " 9.48.040 The last sentence v/as altered to read: "Murder in the second degree shall be punished by ( Penalty 9.48.040-1) . " PAGE 191 183 9.48.050 This statute was altered as follows : "... duel out of the state , in wiiich any person is killed, shall be (pi:inished by Penalty 9.48.050-1) ." 9.48.060 The last sentence was altered to read: "Manslaughter is punishable by ( Penalty 9.48.060-1) . " A footnote defining manslaughter was also added. 9.48.070 Tliis statute was altered as follows: "... injury ccrrmitted upon the mother of such child, is (punishable by Penalty 9.48.070-1) ." 9.48.080 Qnitted. This statute pertains to abortions. 948.090 emitted. This statute pertains to abortions, 9.48.100 This statute was altered as follows: "... not himself in fault, such owner or custodian shall be (punishable by Penalty 9.48.100-1) . " 9.48.110 This statute was altered as follows : "... human being shall be drowned or otherwise killed, shall be (punished by Penalty 9.48.110-1) ." PAGE 192 184 9.48.120 This statute was altered as follov/s : "... v^ereby the death of a hunen being is occasioned, shall be (punished by Penalty 9.48.120-1) ." 9.48.130 This statute was altered as follows: "... design, shall cause the death of the latter, shall be (punished by Penalty 9.48.130-1) ." 9.48.140 This statute was altered as follows : "... whereby the death of a human being is occasioned, shall be (punished by Penalty 9.48.140-1) . " 9.48.150 This statute v/as altered as follows: "Hcmicide is excusable (and punishable by Penalty 9.48.1501) when camiitted by. . . . " 9.48.160 This statute was altered as follovv's: "Hanicide is justifiable (and punishable by Penalty 9.48.160-1) viien committed either... ." 9.48.170 This statute was altered as follows: "Homicide is also justifiable (and punishable by Penalty 9.43.170-1) when ccranitted either... ." PAGE 193 185 West Virginia ( West Virginia Code ^ Chapter 61, Section 61-2-1 Through Section 61-2-8) . 61-2-1 A footnote defining murder was added to the first paragraph. The second paragraph was omitted because it describes procedural iratters . 61-2-2 This statute was altered as follows : "... first degree shall be punished by ( Penalty 61-2-2-1) . " 61-2-3 This statute was altered as follows : "... second degree shall be punished by ( Penalty 61-2-3-1) . " Â• 61-2-4 This statute was altered to read: "Voluntary inans laughter shall be punished by ( Penalty 61-2-4-1) . " A footnote defining voluntary rrenslaughter was also added. 61-2-5 This statute v/as altered to read: "Involuntary manslaughter is (unlawful) , and any person convicted thereof shall be (punished by Penalty 61-2-5-1) . " A footnote defining involuntary manslaughter was also added. 61-2-6 emitted. This statute pertains to administrative matters. PAGE 194 186 61-2-7 Qnaitted. This statute pertains to attenpted killing or injury. 61-2-8 emitted. This statute pertains to abortions. VJisconsin ( VJisconsin Statutes Annotated , Title 45, Section 940.01 Section 940.12) . 940.01 The first sentence was altered as follows : "... human being with intent to kill that person or another shall be (punished by Penalty 940.01-1) . " 940.02 This statute v.'as altered as follows: "... depraved mind, regardless of human life , may be (punished by Penalty 940.02-1) . " 940.03 Tliis statute v;as altered as follows : "... consequence of the commission of or attenpt to commit the felony, may be (punished by Penalty 940.03-1) . " 940.04 emitted. This statute pertains to abortions. 940.05 This statute was altered as follows : "... death of another human being under any of the following circumstances may be (punished by Penalty 940.05-1) ... . " PAGE 195 187 940.06 Sentence (1) was altered as follo^-/s: "... death of another human being by reckless conduct may be (punished by Penalty 940.06-1) ." 940.07 This statute xvas altered as f oIIovn's : "... which the circumstances may permit to avoid such animal, imy be (punished by Penalty 940.07-1) . " 940.08 Sentence (1) was altered as follows: "... firearm, airgun, knife or bow and arrow may be (punished by Penalty 940.08-1) . " 940.09 Tills statute was altered as follows : "... the death of another may be (punished by Penalty 940.09-1) . No person shall. . . ." 940.12 Omitted. This statute pertains to suicide. V?yoming ( VJyoming Statutes , Title 6, Section 6-54 Through Section 6-58) 6-54 This statute was altered as follows: "... human being, is guilty of murder in the first degree and shall (be punished by Penalty 6-54-1)." PAGE 196 188 6-55 This statute ^vas altered as folla^/s: "... human being, is guilty of murder in the second degree, and shall be (punished by Penalty 6-55-1) . " 6-56 This statute was altered as follows: "... other person, whereof the person thus injured sliall die, is (punishable by Penalty 6-56-1) . " 6-57 This statute was altered as follows : "... whereof the person thus injured shall die within this state, is (punishable by Penalty 6-57-1) ." 6-58 This statute was altered as follows : "... neglect or criminal carelessness, is guilty of nians laughter, and shall be (punished by Penalty 6-58-1) . " PAGE 197 APPENDIX B A SYSTEM FOR CONTENT ANALYZING CRIMINAL LAWS FOR THE ATTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY General Instinctions 1. Use the content analysis system described later to content analyze the laws. 2. Each law generally consists of a number designating it, a title, and a text in v>fcLch criminal conduct is described and penalties are prescribed. In preparing statutes for content analysis, the original penalties v^re removed and replaced by the word Penalty and a series of numbers and letters (e.g.. Penalty 750.05-1) . Following the procedixres, definitions, and criteria outlined in the content analysis system, you are to content analyze the naterial ccrtprising the laws each tijie you encounter a penalty (i.e., the wiord Penalty and a series of numbers and letters. 3. Content analyze the penalties according to the order of their appearance in a booklet of laws. You can return to a penalty if you need to; however, atterrpt to analyze the penalties in the order of their appearance. 4. In making decisions about each penalty, use the material provided in the booklet of laws in which the penalty is located. This material will usually consist of the texts of the statutes. In same 189 PAGE 198 190 laws, however, you will find references tx5 footnotes that are located on the last pages of each booklet. When you are content analyzing a poJTtion of the iraterial and vihen a footnote is referenced in this material, consider the content of the footnote to be a paxt of the naterial . Content Analysis Systen 1. Read the law imtil you encounter a penalty. For the penalty, consider all the inaterial that describes the conduct susceptible to the penalty; this material nay involve more than one statute. Identify the conduct that is susceptible to the penalty and the social harm that is produced by the conduct. A. Identify the conduct susceptible to the penalty. 1) In general, conduct consists of the actions (e.g., killing soreone) or failures to act (e.g., not stopping at a stop sign) that are described by the law and that are susceptible to the penalty. Consider the conduct as it is totally described by the law; that is, in identifying the conduct, include all the imterial describing it. Example One statute is stated as follows: "Whoever causes bodily harm to another by an act done with intent to cause bodily harm to that person or another may be punislied by Penalty 940.20-1 (Wisconsin PAGE 199 191 Statutes Aimotated , Title 45, Section 940,20) ." Ihe conduct described by this statute is causing bodily liarm to another person by an act perfonned with an intent to cause such Iiann. According to one statute: "Any person who, by the operation of any vehicle upon any Mghway or upon other property, public or private, at an irrraoderate rate of speed or in a careless, reckless, or negligent manner, but not wilfully or wantonly, shall cause the death of another, shall be punishable by Penalty 750.324-1 ( Micliigan Ccanpiled Laws Annotated , Chapter 750, Section 750.324)." The conduct susceptible to this penalty is driving a vehicle either at an irrmoderate rate of speed and causing the death of another or in a careless, reckless, or negligent fasliion and causing the death of another person. In the last two examples, acts ^vere proscribed by the laws. In this example, a failure to act is described and susceptible to penalization: failing to cover an open v^all so as not to be dangerous to hurran beings, animals, or fowls. According to this statute: "Every person owning or occupying any land on which there is a well having a diaineter greater than six inches and which is rrore than ten feet deep shall at all tiires keep tlie same covered in such a rranner as not to be dangerous to huiran beings, animals or fowls. "Any person violating tlie provisions of this section slTall be punished by Penalty 18.1-74-1 ( Code of Virginia 1950 /Annotat ed, Title 18.1, Section 18.1-74)." ~ " 2) It may appear to you that several different sets of actions (or failures to act) can be susceptible to the saim penalty. Each of these different sets of actions (or failures to act) will be called a form of conduct. Identify and distinguish between the forms of conduct that appear different to you and that are susceptible to the penalty. 1 The example statutes were altered as they would have been for ' the content analysis. PAGE 200 192 Consider each form of conduct as it is totally described by the law. Example According to one statute: "Every person v*io knowingly sends or causes to be sent, or brings or causes to be brought, into this state for sale or distribution, or in this state possesses, prepares, publishes, or prints, with intent to distribute or to exhibit to others, or who offers to distribute, distributes, or exhibits to ' others, any obscene natter is punisliable by Penalty 331.2-1 ( West's Annotated California Pesnal Code , Title 9, Section 311.2) ." The followxng different forms of conduct are susceptible to the same penalty: (1) knowingly sending or causing obscene natter to be sent (or knavingly bringing or causing obscene matter to be braught) into tlie state for sale or distribution, (2) knowÂ±ngly having or making (possessing, preparing, publishing, or printing) obscene matter in the state with an intent to distribute or exhibit it to ' others, (3) offering to distribute, distributing, or exhibiting obscene rratter to others. Or^ statute provides: "Ary person who, by the operation of any vehicle upon any highway or upon other property, public or private, at an iirmoderate rate of speed or in a careless, reckless, or negligent manner, but not wilfully or wantonly, shall cause the death of another, sliall be punishable by Penalty 750.324-1 ( I^ichigan Ccrapiled Laws Annotated , Chapter 750, Section 750.324)." Tlie following two different forms of conduct are susceptible to the same penalty: (1) driving a vehicle at an inmoderate rate of speed and causing the death of another person and (2) driving a vehicle in a manner that could be described as careless, reckless, or negligent and causing tlie death of another person. B. Identify the social harm. The social harm can be identified by inferring the harmful effect or consequence that the conduct, susceptible to the penalty, woiold prxxiuce. For each penalty, identify the one social harm that any form of the conduct susceptible to the penalty would produce. PAGE 201 193 Examples According to one statute: "Any person, who unlawfully taJ^es any won^n against her will, and by menace, force, or dioress, coirpels her to marry him or any other person, or to be defiled, or v7ho unlawfully talces any vjcmm against her will with the intent to corrpel her by menace, force, or duress to marry him or any other person, or to be defiled, shall, on conviction, be punished by Penalty 1-1 (Code of Mabama, Title 14 , Section 1) . " The social harm produced by~the conduct susceptible to Penalty 1-1 is the violation of the rights and privileges of womanhood by an actual or atten^ted forced marriage or defilerrent. One statute provides: "Every person who assaults another with intent to conmit murder, is punishable by Penalty 217-1 (West's Arjiotate d California Penal Code, Title 8, Section 217)." "The^nduct susceptible~to tliis penalty produces the social harm of creating a serious apprehension of bodily injury in another person. C. Exclude from further analysis any conduct that is not susceptible to the penalty. Conduct that is not similar to tliat described by the law vrould, of course, be excluded. The text of the law may explicitly exesnpt certain conduct from susceptibility to the penalty; exclude such conduct frcm further analysis. Examples One statute states: "No person, firm, or corporation shall cut or remove or destroy any native growing fruit bearing shrub or tree on any native growing timbered lands in the state of North Dalcota, except where such land is being cleared for agricultural purposes. Any person, firm, or corporation violating any of the provisions of this section shall be punished by Penalty 12-41-13-1 ( North Dakota Century Code , Title 12, Section 12-41-13)." In further analyzing the conduct described by this statute, do not include conduct consisting of clearing land for agricultural purposes. PAGE 202 194 Anotier statute provides : "A person who provides , supplies or administers to a pregnant \^o:nan, or procures such vranan to take any rredicine, drugs, or substance, or uses or employs any instrument or other means vte.tever, with intent thereby to procure the miscarriage of such voran, unless it is necessary to save her life, shall be punished by Penalty 13-211-1 ( Arizona Revised Statutes , Title 13, Section 13-211) ." Do not submit to further analysis conduct that consists of attanpts to procure a miscarriage to protect the life of the pregnant xvcitian. 2. For each form of conduct, estimate tlie level of the attribution of responsUaility that is required for a person to be susceptible to the penalty. A. Tb nake this estimate, initially assume tliat the description of each foim of conduct represents both of tvro things. First, assume that it represents the description of a person vfho is performing "the conduct; tliat is, assume that the description of the form of conduct describes the behavior of a person. Second, assume that the description comprises tlie information that is sxrfficient for the law to attribute responsibility to him and to punish him; that is, the description represents the info23:H.tion that the law requires to be known before it will attribute responsibility to him and punish him. B. The level of the attribution of responsibility required for a person to be susceptible to the penalty consists of the level at wiiich the lav/ is attributing responsibility vAien the description of tlie conduct comprises the information that suffices for the law to attribute responsibility to the person. PAGE 203 195 The law may require a lower level of the attribution of responsibility. It iray appear logical to you that if more information were available to the law, the law would take this information into account and, tliereby, attribute responsibility at a higher level. For example, the law may merely describe a form of conduct that does not imply foreseeability, intentionality, or justification. If this were the case, the law WDuld require the level of coiimission. Even though it may appear logical to you tlvat tlit law would consider information relevant to foreseeability, intentionality, or justification if this information were available and, thereby, would attribute responsibility at a higher level, the law does not require this information so that the level of ccmnission is the required level. Example Only one form of conduct is described by the following statute. This conduct is negligently ijijuring another person. The use of the word negligently suggests that the level of foreseeability is required for a person to be susceptible to Penalty 1239--1, Even though it may seem logiceil tliat a person who intentionally injures another person would also be susceptible to a penalty, the level of foreseeability is required for tliis conduct. Here is the statute: "Negligent injuring is the inflicting of any injury upon tlie person of another by criminal negligence. "VJhoever conmits the crinne of negligent injuring shall be punished by Penalty 1239-1 ( Louisiana Statutes Annotated Revised Statutes, Title 14, Section 39).'' PAGE 204 196 3. Classify the conduct according to the one level of the attribution of responsibility that is generally required for a person to be susceptible to the penalty. A. Estimate the level of the attribution of responsibility required for each form of the conduct to be susceptible to the penalty. B. For all fomns of conduct susceptible to the peiialty, then classify the conduct according to the one level of the attribution of responsibility that is generally required for susceptibility. To do this, consider the various forms of conduct and the corresponding levels of the attribution of responsibility required for susceptibility to the penalty. Then classify the conduct according to the one level that is iTOst characteristically, coimDnly, frequently, or predominately required for a person to be susceptible to. tJne penalty, regardless of the particular form of conduct. This most characteristically, cormionly, frequently, or predominately required level is the level that is generally required for susceptibility to the f^nalty. For each penalty, record the generally required level. Exairples Since witli intent to describes all forms of false pretenses susceptible to Penalty 713.1-1 in tliis statute, tlie level of intentionality is the level that is generally required for a person PAGE 205 197 to be susceptible bo it: "If any person designedly and by false pretense, or by any privy or false token, and with intent to defraud, obtain from another any money, goods, or other property, or so obtain the signature of any person to any written instrument, the false making of which would be punished as forgery, he shall be punished by Penalty 713 . 1-1 {Iowa Code Annotated, Title 35 , Section 713.1) ." One statute provides: "Any person who negligently and carelessly sets fire to any Vvooded country or forest belonging to this state or the United States within this state, or to any place from wiiich fire is conmunicated to any such wooded country or forest, or wiio accidently sets fire to any such wDoded country or forest, or to any place to wMch fire is ccsmmunicated to any such i^vooded country or forest, and does not extinguish the same or use every reasonable effort to that end, or v/ho builds ciny fire for lawful purposes or otherwise in or near any such vvOoded country or forest, and through carelessness or neglect permits said fire to extend to and bum through such wooded country or forest, shall be punished by Penalty 39-514-1; provided that notliing herein contained shall apply to any person who in good faith shall set a back fire to prevent the spread of a fire already burning ( Tennessee Cede Annotated , Title 39, Section 39--514) ." At least three different forms of conduct can be extracted from the conduct susceptible to Penalty 39-514-1: (1) negligently and carelessly settijig fire to v.ooded coun-try, (2) accidently setting fire to vrooded country, and (3) building a fire and then through carelessness or neglect allowing the fire to bum wooded country. Because carelessness and negligence describe tvvo of the three forms of the conduct (forms numbered 1 and 3) , the level of foreseeability is required for these tv?D forms of conduct. Since this ].evel is raost frequeiitly required, tlie level of foreseeability is tlie level of the attribution of responsibility generally required for susceptibility to the penalty. C, TwD or more different levels of tlie attributi.on of responsibility may appear to be equally general. If such a case arises, select tlie lowest of these levels as the generally required level. 4. Iti estiirate the level of tlie attitbution of responsibility . required for each form of conduct and to classify the conduct PAGE 206 198 according to tlie level of the attribution of responsibility generally required for susceptiÂ±)ility to the penalty, use the text of the laws, "vvords and plirases", and the general nature of the conduct. A. Consider tlie entire text of the laws and any referenced footnotes diat describe tli.e conduct susceptible to the penalty. B. Certain "v.ords Jind phrases" have been identified, and are listed later, to represent tliree levels of the attribution or responsibility. 1) If one of these words and plirases describes the conduct (or similar I'lOrds and phrases that are not listed but that convey the meaning of die particular level) , classify the conduct as requiring the level represented by the vÂ»rd or phrase as long as the v^ord or phrase does convey the ineaning of tlie level and as long as its meaning is not altered by other v^rds and phrases in the text of the law. 2) If tiie text of tlie law does alter the meianing of one of tliese vvords and phrases, niake your decisions in terms of tlie total text describing the conduct. Attention must be directed to one such alteration. Several words and phrases may describe the conduct (or a forra of it) , and these vx^rds and phrases may represent different levels. The words knowingly and intentional ly , for example, rray describe a form of conduct. As a general rule, if such words are connected by and, classify the conduct according to the higher level. If the conduct, for exanple, were "knowingly and intentionally receiving stolen property", classify it PAGE 207 199 as requiring tÂ±ie level of intentionality. As another general rule, if such vsords and phrases are connected by the word or, classify it as requiring the lower level. If tJie conduct were, for example, "knowingly or intentionally receiving stolen property", classify it as requiring tlie level of f oreseeability . C. No word or phrase, similar to those listed to represent a level of the attribution of responsibility, may describe the conduct. If no such x^rord or phrase describes the conciuct, classify the conduct at the level of cormaission unless you believe tliat the general nature of the conduct described is such that sane level other than ccantdssion is required and unless the conditions outlined later are satisfied . 5. Use tlie following definitions and criteria to estimate the level of the attribution of responsibility required for each form of conduct and to classify the conduct according to the level of the attribution of responsibility generally required for susceptibility to the penalty. ^' Le'^'^l of Coninission 1) General definition. Responsibility is attributed at the level of conmission if the law describes conduct that is perfoinned by a person. The law does not describe conduct performed under the conditions of f oreseeability, intentionality, or justification. PAGE 208 200 2) Classify the conduct at the level of commission if the following conditions are iret (both a and b) : a. the law describes conduct; and b. the conduct is not described in such a fashion that the conditions of f oreseeability , intentionality, or justification, as defined later, are satisfied. Examples Since conduct is described, since no word or phrase representing another level of the attribution of responsibility describes the conduct, and since I do not believe tliat the descriptions of the conduct would allov/ people to infer reliably anotlier level of the attribution of responsibility, the level of coiimission is generally required for the conduct to be susceptible to tlaeir corresponding penalties in each of the following statutes : (1) "Mioever uses any automobile, truck or other irotor vehicle ovmed by this State for any purpose except in tlie transaction of business for the State shall be punished by Penalty 1342-1 ( Vernon ' s Annotated Penal Code of Texas, Title 17, Article 1342) ." (2) "Any person v,ho shall witliout the consent of the owner or person in charge of a rrotor vehicle climb upon or in such vehicle, whether the same be in motion or at rest, or sliall ^.viiile said vehicle is at rest and unattended attempt to manipulate any of the levers, starting crank or other device or to set said vehicle in motion shall be punished by Penalty 1343-1 ( Ve.mon ' s Annoteted Penal Code of Texas , Title 17, Article 1343) ." (3) "All logging and railroad locomotives, dinkey engines and other engines and boilers operated or used within two hundred feet of any forest, cut-over, brush or grass land, v/nich do not use oil as fuel, shall be equipped with efficient appliances or devices to prevent the escape of fire and sparks from the STiioke stacks, ash pans and fire boxes thereof. Such applicances and devices shall at all tirres be kept in proper adjustment and in good repair, and the State Forester or his designated agents iray examjjie any loconotive or other engine to detennine the condition of said appliances and devices. Any person operating any logging or railroad locomotive, dinkey engine or other engine or boiler in violation of any provision PAGE 209 201 of this article shall be sentenced to Penalty 1329-1 (Vernon's Annotated Penal Code of Texas, Title 17, A2rticle 1329)7^* B. Level of Foreseeabili ty . 1) General Definition. Responsibility is attributed at the level of foreseeability if the law describes conduct that is performed by a person v^o either (1) cxDuld have foreseen or did foresee the social harm produced by his conduct or (2) could have known or did know factors that partly define his conduct. The law does not describe the conduct as being performed under the conditions of intentionality or justification. 2) Classify the conduct at the level of foreseeability if the following conditions are met (a, b, and c) . a. the law describes conduct; and b. the law describes the conduct in terms of one of the f ollov/ing : (1) description of conduct in terras of v,ords and phrases representing the level of foreseeability. a) words and phrases, like tliose listed below (and o'tlier WTords and phrases that are not listed but that convey the rreaning of the level of foreseeability) , describe the conduct and imply that the person (1) could have foreseen PAGE 210 202 or did foresee the harmful consequences of his conduct or (2) could have known or did !know factors that portly define the conduct, b) if the text of the law does not alter the meanings of these WDrds and phrases so that the level of foreseeahility is no longer signified by them, classify the conduct at the level of foreseeability if these VvOrds and phrases describe or define the conduct: aid, aiding careless, carelessly, carelessness oounsel had good reason to believe, has good reason to believe, has reasonable grounds to believe knows, kno\"ffi, knowing, knowingly, with knowledge of negligence, negligent, negligently, through negligence (may be noiified by such words as culpable, criminal, or gross) reckless, recklessly, through recklessness (perfonned) under circumstances likely to produce the particular harm unreasonable wanton, wantonly, wantonness (harm is produced) while ccranitting or atterrpting to coinnit soire other act that is likely to produce the harm of interest or v^ch naturally leads to the harm of interest PAGE 211 203 (harm is produced) ^lile camnittijig sane other unlawful act or in the consequence of comnitting an unlawful act (perfonr^ed) with or without due caution or circumspection; without using proper caution (2) -nature of conduct inherently includes foreseeability of consequences. a) if "the law does not describe the conduct in terms of vÂ»rds and phxases representing the level of foreseeability, the general nature of the conduct may suggest that most persons performing the conduct could foresee that their conduct would produce the social harm (the conduct's Inarmful effects or consequences) . b) if the general nature of the conduct does suggest that most persons performing the conduct could foresee that their conduct would produce the social harm, classify the conduct at the level of foreseeability if all of the follov/ing conditions are irsit: 1you clearly identify a social harm that the conduct would bring about; 2you believe that most other people reading the lav/ vrould independently identify the conduct to produce the same social harm as you do; 3you believe that rrost persons perfojmiing the conduct cou].d ordinarily foresee that PAGE 212 204 their cxDnduct would produce this social harm (i.e., you believe that conduct of this general nature Â— not a specific instance of it Â— would generally be performed under the conditions of foreseeability) ; 4you believe that most other people reading the law \vould also believe that most people performing the conduct could ' ordinarily foresee that their conduct would produce this social harm. (3) the conduct is described by vrards and phrases representing the level of intentional ity as defined later. Tlie person is susceptible to the penalty, however, for a particular harmful effect of the conduct which is not itself described by the words and phrases representing the level of intentionality and which is more of a foreseeable but unintended consequence than an intended consequence, c. and ; the conduct is not described in such a fashion that the conditions of intentionality or justification, as defined later, are satisfied. Exarrples Because all forms of "the conduct in the statute that follows are modified by the vÂ»rd knowing , the level of foreseeability is generally PAGE 213 205 required for susceptibility to the following penalty: "Any person beiag irarried who shall narry another person, the lawful husband or wife being alive, and taiowing that such lawful husband or wife is living, shall be punished by Penalty 26-5602-1 ( Georgia Code Annotated, TitJ.e 26, Section 26-5602)." The conduct in the following statute is not described in terms of words and plu-ases dnat represent the level of foreseeability. The general nature of tlie conduct, ho^vever, seems to require this level: "Any person who sh^ll place or throw glass or other dangerous pointed or edged substances in or on any beach or waters adjacent thereto, highway, or v.'alk or on public property witliin 50 feet of a public highway, shall be punishable by Penalty 750.493a-l ( Michigan Compiled Laws Annotated, Chapter 750, Section 750.493a)." In the follo\';ng statute, the conduct susceptible to Penalty 1335-1 generally requires id'ie level of intentioiiality since it is descrH^ed in terms of wilfully . To be susceptible to Penalty 1335-2, this conduct must lead to the death of another person. If a death v;ere produced by the wilfull injury of the railroad tracks, the death would appear to be an unintended but foreseeable consequence rroreso than an intended consequence. Susceptibility to Penalty 1335-2, thus, seenis to generally require the level of foreseeability. Here is the statute: "If any person shall mlfully place any obstXLiction upon tlie track of any railroad, or remove any rail therefrom, or displace or interfere with any switch thereof, or in any way injure such read, or do any dairage to any railroad, locomotive, tender or car v/nereby the life of any person might be endangered, b.e sliall be punished by Penalty 1335-1. If the life of any person is lost by such act the offender is guilty of murder and punishahle by Penalty 1335-2 ( Vernon ' s Annotated Penal Code of Texas, Title 17, Article 1335) ." Level of Intentionality . 1) General definition. Responsibility is attributed at the level of intentionality if the law describes conduct that is perforrred by a person who either (1) intended to produce the specific barm of his conduct, or (2) intended to produce a social harm similar to the one that he produced, or (3) performed the conduct along with an PAGE 214 206 intent to accoiplish sane other harm that is explicitlystated by the law. 2) Classify the conduct at the level of intentionality if the following conditions are inet (a, b, and c) : a. the law describes conduct; and b. the law eitlier (1) describes the conduct in terms of vrords and phrases representing the level of intentionality or (2) describes conduct of a nature that you perceive to inherently include intentionality of consequences . (1) description of conduct in terms of words and phrases representing the level of intentionality. a) ;vDrds and phrases, similar to those listed later (and other words and phrases that are not listed but that convey the meaning of the level of intentionality) , describe the conduct and imply that the person (1) intended to produce the particular harmful consequences of his conduct, (2) intended to produce harmful consequences similar to those that his conduct produced, or (3) perfonr^xi the conduct along wi-lJi an intent to accoiplish seme other harm that is explicitly stated by the law. PAGE 215 207 b) if the text of the law does not alter the meanings of these v.ords and phrases so that they no longer signify the level of intentionality as defined here, classify the conduct at the level of intentionality if these words and phrases describe or define the conduct: calculated to (produce) conspiracy, conspire defraud deliberate, deliberately, with deliberation designed, designedly, by design, with design of false pretenses forcibly forcibly and against another person's will fraud, fraudulent, fraudulently intentionally, v/ith intent to (of) , with the ijitention of, with a specific intent lying in wait premeditated, -through premeditation purposely, with purpose of, for purpose of v/ilful (willful) , wilfully (willfully) PAGE 216 208 with a depraved mind r-egardless of the social welfare of others (2) nature of aDnducÂ± inherently includes intentional consequences. a) if the law does not describe the conduct in terms of v/ords and phrases that irepresent the level of intentionality, the general nature of the conduct may suggest that most persons performing the conduct would intend the social harm (the haimful consequences) produced by it . b) if the description of "the conduct does suggest that most persons performing the conduct v^ould intend the social harm, classify the conduct at the level of intentionality if all of the folla.'/ing conditions are satisfied: 1you clearly identify a social harm that the conduct would bring about; 2you believe that icost otlier people reading the lav/ would independently identify the conduct to produce the same social harm as you do; 3you believe that rrost persons performing the conduct woiild ordinarily foresee this social harm and would ordinarily intend to produce it (i.e., you believe that conduct PAGE 217 209 of this general nature Â— ^not a specific instance of it Â— would generally be performed under the conditions of intentionality) ; 4~ you believe that most other people reading the law V/Ould also infer tliat voost persons ^^erfomiing -the conduct \\oi.ild ordinarily foresee this social iTarm and would ordinarily intend to produce it. c. and ; the conduct is not described in such a fashion that the conditions of the level of justification, as defined later, are satisfied. Examples Tiie following statute describes conduct that generally requires the level of in.tentionality because all forms of the conduct are described by the v.ord w ilfully : "Mioever wilfully bums any bridge vhich by law or usage is a public highvsy shall be sentenced to Penalty 1320-1 ( Vernon ' s Annotated Penal Code of Texas , Title 17, Article 1320) ." Tlie follov/ing statute describes conduct that generally requires the level of intentionality Joecause all forms of tlie conduct are perforrred along v/itii an intent to accomplish soma other harm (in this case defrauding a nev/sboy) that is stated by the law: "Any person who obtains newspapers from persons under eighteen (18) years of age engaged in selling newspapers at retail, without paying therefor, with intent to defraud such a person selling newspa^^rs sh^ll be punished by Penalty 10-2122-1 ( Bum's Indiana Statutes Annotated , Title 10, Section 10-2122)." Although no word or phrase representing the level of intentionality describes the conduct susceptible to Penalty 10-2115-1, tlriis conduct seems inherently to require the level of intentionality. This conduct is described in the following statute: "Whoever represents or advertises himself by poster, circular letter or in any other PAGE 218 210 nmmer, as the agent of any fictitious or spurious insuraiice corpany which xs not possessed of the capital and assets required by the laws oÂ± this state shall, on conviction, be punished by Penalty 10-2115-1 ( B-om's Indiana Statutes Annotated , Title 10, Section 10-2115) ." ^* ^^^1 of Justification 1) General definition. Responsibility is attrJJDUted at the level of justification if the law descrUoes conduct that is performed by a person under any of the conditions of comdssion, foreseeability, or intentionality, as descrited earlier. The law additionally describes tlie psrfomance of the conduct in terms of factors, like the follov/ing ones, that v7ould attenuate the amoiont of responsibility attributed to the person: (1) the person perfoiToing the conduct is influenced by circumstances that would affect other ordinarily reasonable persons so that tliey too would be more likely to perform the conduct, or (2) the person is described as having personal characteristics -that vTould reduce his capacity to formulate and/or control the intentions of an ordinarily reasonable person. 2) Classify the conduct at the level of justification if the following conditions are satisfied (a and b) : a. the law describes conduct. The conduct can be performed at any of the levels of corrmission, foreseeability, or intentionality, as defined earlier; and b. the law additionally describes the conduct in terms' PAGE 219 211 of factors that you perceive Vvould attenuate the airount of responsibility attributed to the performer of the conduct . (1) describing tlie conduct in terms of factors, lilce tlie following ones, would attenuate the amount of responsibility attributed: (a) the person perforired the conduct under circumstances that you perceive would increase the likelihjood that irost ordinarily reasonable persons would also perform the conduct; or (b) the person who performed the conduct is described as having personal characteristics that would reduce his capacity to formulate and/or control the intentions of an ordinarily reasonable person. (2) if these words and phrases (and otlier words and phrases that are not listed but that convey the meaning of tlie level of justificationÂ—see later) describe the conduct and if the n^anings of these words and phrases are not altered by the text of the ].av; so that a different level of the attribution of responsibility is signified, classify the conduct at the level of justification: coerced by soneone (or his threats) , under duress, iopelled by someone (or his threats) PAGE 220 212 excuse, excused insanity, niental illness in the (exercise of tlie privilege of) preventing a felony, to prevent a felony in the (exercise of the privilege of) defense of others, in the defense of another in tlie heat, in tlie heat of passion, in the sudden heat of passion iavoluntary drunkenness, involuntary intoxication under provocation, under sudden provocation under the pressure of natural physical forces, due to necessity (3) other ^vords and plirases, tliat describe the conduct, could suggest justifying conditions to you. Use these additional vords and plirases to classify the conduct at the level of justification if all of the follo\^7ing are satisfied: a) you would attribute less responsibility to the person who perforrred the conduct under the influence of the conditions, represented by the vrords and phrases, than to the person vAx3 performed the conduct and was not influenced by these conditions; b) you believe that most other people reading the law wDiiLd also attribute a smaller aniount PAGE 221 213 of responsibility to the person who performed the conduct under the influence of the conditions than to the person who performed the conduct and was not influenced by than. Exanple Tlie conduct susceptible to Penalty 940.05-1 in the following statute generally requires the level of justification: "Whoever causes the death of another human being under any of the following circumstances may be punished by Penalty 940.05-1: (1) Without intent to kill 6md while in the heat of passion; or (2) Unnecessarily, in the exercise of his privilege of selfdefense of others or the privilege to prevent or terminate tlie canmission of felony; or (3) Because such person is coerced by threats wade by someone other than his co-conspirator and which cause him reasonably to believe tliat his act is the only means of preventing iimiinent death to liimself or another; or (4) Because the pressure of natural physical forces causes such person reasonably to believe tliat his act is the only means of preventing iirruinent public disaster or ijiininent death to himself or anotlier ( Wiscons in Statutes Annotated, Title 45, 940.05)." PAGE 222 APPENDIX C INSTRUCTIONS USED IN SELECTING CRITERIA WORDS StCi PHRASES FOR COInTIENT ANALYSIS SYSTE-I Consider each of the follovv^ing sets of words and phrases as they are defined. Suppose a set of words and phrases were used exclusively to describe conduct associated with a person; furthermore, suppose that the conduct is a crime. If responsibility were attributed to the person for this conduct, at what level would you generally perceive that the responsibility is being attributed? That is, if responsibility were attributed to a person for conduct described by the set of words and phrases, what level of the attribution of responsibility does the set of words and phrases suggest to you in general? Choose only one of tliese levels: camussion, foreseeability, intentionality , or justification. iMake your selection in accordance with these definitions of the levels. Level of Ccmni ssion. The set of words and phrases generally describes conduct that could be performed . The conduct described by the set of \'vords and phrases does not generally inply foreseeability, intentionality, or justification, as defined later. Level of Foreseeability . The set of v/ords and phrases generally iirplies that (a) the person does or could foresee the consequences of his conduct or tliat (b) the person does or could know facts that partly describe the conduct. The conduct descriJ^ed by these v/ords and phrases would not generally imply intentionality or justification, as defined later. Level of Intenti onality. The set of words and phrases generally implies tliat the person performing tlie conduct intended the consequences of the conduct. The conduct described by the set of words and phrases would not generally imply the level of justification, as defined later. Level of Justification . The set of words and phrases describes factors that would attenuate the aiiraunt of responsibility attributed to the person. These factors can be (a) circumstances that would influence the person performing the conduct and tliat would affect other ordinarily reasonable people so that they would be more likely to perform the conduct too, (b) personal characteristics that would reduce the person's capacity to formulate and/or control the intentions of an ordinarily reasonable person, or (c) any other factor that would reduce the amount of responsibility that you would attribute to the person. 214 ! . Â«!JÂ».*rtWI PAGE 223 APPEbDIX D MATERIALS USED TO TEST TtlE SECOND HYPOTHESIS BY THE FLORIDA STATUTES Instructions for Outcome-Seriousn ess Ratings As part of a study on the seriousness of crimes, we are interested in the perceived seriousness of harmful events. In this questionnaire, therefore, several events have been descriloed which some people are likely to consider to be harmful to some degree. For each event, we want your opinion, and v/e want you to indicate how ser ious you belie ve the event to be_ by v/riting a ni:tmber from to 6 in tlie" blank printed next to it". Here are some examples of the events that you will encounter in this questionnaire: (1) "A person is killed;" (2) "Indecent and obscene language is used in a public place;" (3) "VJhile released on bail, a person charged with a misdeameanor fails to appear in court as required." A blank space is printed next to each event. For each event, you are to wTite in its space a number from to 6 v.hich best represents where you would place the event along the following scale: 1 2 3 4 ~~~~ 5Â—Â— g (not at all (moderately (extremely serious) serious) serious) You may believe tliat the event is "not at all serious," that is, that the event has no harmful effects and that it is alright for it to occur, if you believe this, v.'rite in the space beside the event. On the other hand, you may believe that the event is "extremely serious," tliat is, that the effects of tlie event are among the most harmful possible; if you believe this, va'ite 6 in the space beside the event. If you believe that the event lies bete/een these extremes and is "moderately serious," write 3 in the space beside the event. If you believe that the event is more than "not at all serious," but less than "moderately serious," choose the number between and 3 that best represents your belief. If you believe that the event is more than "mcxlerately serious" but less than "exiiremely serious," choose the number between 3 amd 6 tliat best represents your belief. 215 PAGE 224 216 In rating each event, assume that it is camiitted by a person who does not have any particular right, permission, or authority to comiit it. For exairple, one event is described as follows: "Taking cultivated fruit or vegetables valued at$100 or more." Assume that this property was taken by a person v^o did not have the right to do so. If the event describes a failure to do sonething, make the similar assunption that the event should have been cormitted. For exaiiple, one event is described as follows: "Failure to assist a peace officer in preserving the peace." Iii rating this event, assume that the officer should have been assisted. Finally, assume that the event is ccmnitted by any ordinarily reasonable person unless a specific type of person is nentioned (as in one of the examples presented earlier, a specific type of person Â— scnieone charged with a misdemeanor Â— is described as comnitting the event) . Other than these assurrptions , rate the events as they are described, and do not take into account any extenuating or aggravating circumstances that would affect your beliefs about their seriousness. If you have no questions, please begin.

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217 APPENDIX D (Continued) Descriptions of Outccmes for Seriousness Ratings* Ccinmission Carrying a concealed weapon (Note: A weapon means any dirk, nietallic knuckles, slingshot, billie, tear gas gun, cheraical device, or other deadly instrument; hc^vever, firearms, such as pistols, or ccfimon pocket knives are not weapons) (790.01-1). 3.1 .5 Manually carrying a pistol or repeating rifle (790.05-1) . 3.3 ,0S A weapon is used in ccnmitting a felony (Note: A weapon means any dirk, metallic knuckles, slingshot, billie, tear gas gun, chemical device, or otlier deadly instrument; however, firearms, such as pistols, or corraon pocket knives are not weapons) (790.07--1) . 5.0 5.0 Carrying a gun or other firearm in a national forest (790.14-1) . 2.6 .5 Possessing a short-barreled rifle, short-barreled shotgun, or a machine gun (790.221-1). 4.6 5.0 A firearm or concealed weapon is in the possession of a person convicted of a felony (790.23-1) . 3.2 20.0 * The descriptions of the outccmes are organized according to the levels of causality that they represented. The number placed at the end of each description is the coded penalty number; it can be used to identify the statute from which the outcome description was taken. Beneath each description are two sets of numlDers. The one at the left is the median seriousness rating of the outccme. The one at the right is the maximum penalty (in years) prescribed for the outccme.

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218 Failure to keep records of the sales and purchases of secondhand goods by a dealer (811.155-1). 2.0 1.0 Someone's vehicle or draught animal (e.g., horse or ox) is temporarily taken or used (811.21-1) . 3.1 .5 Cattle are driven a distance of 10 miles or itore frcm their proper location (811.23-1). 2.6 3.0 Failure to keep sales records and work orders for tropical and semitropical friait by a dealer (811.271-1) . 2.4 ,5 A bonfire is made within 165 feet of a house (823.02-1) . 2.9 .08 The carcass of a dorestic animal is improperly disposed of (823.041-1) 2.0 .5 The duties of a public office are performed by someone before he has met the legal qualifications of the office (839.18-1). 2.8 .25 Profane, vulgar, and indecent language is used in a public place (847.04-1). 1.2 .16 Indecent and obscene language is used in a public place (847.05-1) . .9 .08 Being drunk frcm alcohol or drugs (856.01-1) . 1.4 .25

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219 Being a vagrant (856.03-1). .6 .5 An automobile is driven by an intoxicated person (860.01-1) . 3.9 1.0 A person perforrris his duties on a train or other public carrier while intoxicated (860.03-1) . 3.6 . .25 A train is boarded while it is in motion (860.06-1) . 1.6 .08 Failure by a dealer to keep records of the purchases of automobile parts \-dien these purchases ai-e made from people who are not regular dealers in automobile parts (860.14-1). 3.0 .5 A syrup is sold that is a mixture of different ingredients without having labeled its container with both the percentages of the different ingredients and the address of its manufacturer (865.07-1) . 3.6 .5 Cotton or leaf tobacco is brought without having evidence that the producer has parted with his interest d_n it (865.08-1) . 2.1 .5 There is a fight between two people in a public place (870.01-1) . 2.1 1.0 The idea is advocated that the constitutional govemiient should be overthro^-m by force or violence (876.021) . 3.4 10.0 A mask is worn that covers a person ' s face and conceals his identity (876.12-1). .4 .25

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220 A mask is worn that covers a person's face and conceals his identity (876.14-1). .4 .25 A iTBeting is held on someone else ' s property by a person who wears a mask that covers his face and conceals his identity (876.15-1). 2.2 .25 A burning or flanu-ng cross is placed in a public place (876.17-1) . 2.7 .25 A burning or flaming cross is placed on saneone else's property (876.18-1). 3.9 .25 Forseeability A person is killed (782.11-1) . 5.9 20.0 A person is procla.iired to be a coward (783.03-1) . .2 .5 A weapon or fireana is displayed in a inade, angry, or threatening manner (790.10-1). 4.4 1.0 A firearm or dangerous weapon (other than an ordinary pocket knife) is furnished to a minor or to a person of unsound mind (790.17-1) . 5.0 .25 A firearm or dangerous weapon (otiier than an ordinary pocket knife) is sold to a minor by a dealer (790.18-1) . 3.9 .5 A lewd or indecent act (not rape) is coninitted toward a child under 14 years old (800.04-1). 4.9 10.0

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221 A shopping cart is removed from the premises of a grocery store (811.29-1). 1.5 .05 Failure of an auctioneer to make a complete statement of his sales (839.01-1) . 2.6 .5 Failure to pay public money into the state treasury by a receiver of such money (839.02-1) . 4.3 1.0 Certificates according to v^ich money is to be paid out of p\Â±)lic funds are bought by a county officer (839.04-1) . 2.8 .5 Failure by a judge to file the records belonging to his office upon resigning from office (839.15-1) . 3.2 1.0 A bail which is insufficient is accepted (839.23-1) . 1.5 .08 Failure to assist a peace officer in preserving the peace (843.06-1) . 2.2 .08 An inmate is aided in escaping from a correctional institution for boys or girls (843.13-1) . 3.8 .25 Visiting aii opia^i den as a customer (346.05-1) . 2.6 .5 Obscene literature is trajisported into the state so that it can be sold or distributed (847.06-1). 1.2 1.0

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222 A house is rented to a person who uses it for gambling (849.03-1) . 1.9 3.0 Possessing a lottery ticket or an advertisement of a lottery (849.09-4). .2 1.0 Lottery tickets or advertisements of a lottery are printed (849.10-1) . .3 5.0 The outcome of a contest of skill, speed, power, or enduramce is gambled on (849.14-1). .5 .5 Possessing paraphernalia (not including ordinary dice or playing cards) ccmmonly used in gambline (849.233-1). .4 1.0 Failure to leave a race track after having been ordered to do so because of illegal bookmaking activities (849.24-3). 2.8 .25 A person is killed (860.01-3). 5.9 20.0 A duplicate key for a switch lock of a railroad is given away without having the autliority to do so (860.10-1) . 3.9 .25 Railroad tracks are obstructed by injuring a bridge of the railroad company or by driving cattle onto the tracks (860.11-1) . 4.0 10.0 An aircraft is operated in a manner tliat endangers the life or property of another person (860.13-1). 5.3 .5

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223 The cxxnmander of a ship discharges a disabled sailor or a pauper without having provided for his maintenance (862.03-1). 3.3 .16 A business is operated under a trade name that is neither the proper nane nor the kno^vn called narme of the businessman (865.09-1) . 2.9 .16 A riot is caused or participated in (870.01-2) . 2.9 2.0 Failure to assist a peace officer in suppressing a riot (870.04-1) . 1.9 2.0 Intentionality The death of a child is concealed v;hich prevents knowledge of whether the child was bom alive or dead (782.16-1) . 4.2 1.0 There is a threat that an explosive bcmb, grenade, poison gas bcmb, or other destructive device will be discharged (790.162-1). 4.7 20.0 A false report is made about the planting of a baib (790.163-1) . 3.6 10.0 An explosive barb or other deadly missile is thrown into a building, vehicle, boat, or aircraft (790.19-1). 5.9 10.0 Failure to report the treatrrent of a gunshot wound to the proper authorities by the treating physician or nurse (790.24-1) . 2.8 .5 A dwelling house or a part of it is burned (806.01-1) . 4.4 20.0

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224 Flarnmable or explosive materials are placed in a building in such a fashion that the building could be burned (806.05-1) . 4.9 10.0 Property insured against damage by fire is burned in such a fashion that the insurance may be collected (805.06-1) . 4.0 5.0 A building erected for public use; a factory; or a bam, shop, or office in the yard of a dwelling house is burned during the nighttiirs (806.07-1). 4.9 20.0 Iferchandise is taken fraii a store without paying for it (811.022-3). 3.3 5.0 Hogs are taken from their proper owner (811.14-1) . 3.3 5.0 A dog valued at $100 or more is taken from its a.vner (811.19-1) . 3.2 5.0 Cultivated fruit or vegetables valued at$100 or more are taken (811.27-1). 3.1 5.0 Cultivated fruit or vegetables valued at less than $100 are taken (811,27-2). 2.5 1.0 After it had been entrusted to him, a person conceals property valued at$100 or more in such a fashion that it could be misused (812.02-1) 3.2 5.0 A depositor is deprived of property valued at \$100 or nore that had been entrusted to and misused by a banker (812.05-1) . 3.8 5.0

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225 A security for a loan, is lost because it was misused by the person to whom it had been entrusted (812.09-1) . 3.4 5.0 Misuse of the f-unds of a bank by the receiver of such funds (812.12-1) 3.7 10.0 A gift is given to a public officer whose official actions could be influenced by it (838.01-1) . 3.8 5.0 A gift is given to a court officer \N^ose official actions could be influenced by it ( 838.0 3-1) . 3.9 5.0 A gift is accepted by a sheriff whose official actions could be affected by it (838.05-1). 3.8 .25 A gift is given to a public officer whose official actions could be influenced by it (838.09-1). 3.8 5.0 A candidate for an elective public office is given a gift which could influence his actions on a matter that will cone before him in his official capacity (838.10-1). 4.0 5.0 I^ilure by a public officer to give his successor conplete possession of the records belonging to his office (839.14-1) . 3.8 .5 Failure by a jailor to receive into his jail a prisoner who has been committed to it on a criminal conviction (839.21-1) . 3.8 1.0 I"Jhile released on bail, a person charged with a misdemeanor fails to appear in court as required (843.15-2) , 2.8 1.0

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226 A distrUDutor of publications does not do business with a dealer unless he will also buy obscene literature (847.011-4). 2.8 5.0 Railroad tracks are injured {e.g., by having the rails removed from them) (860.09-1). 5.2 20.0 Vlhen servicing a vehicle, a repairman charges for repairs that were not made or for parts that were not provided or were not needed (860.15-1) . 4.0 .25 Native grov/ing plants that are rapidly beccming extinct within the state are collected (865.06-1). 3.0 .08

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REFERENCES Bittner, E. , & Piatt, A. M. The ireaning of pijnishrrent. Issues in CrLminoloqy , 1966, 2_, 79-99. Black's law dictionary . (Rsv. 4th ed.) St. Paul i^^inn. : West 1968. Briscoe, M. E. Attribution of responsibility and assignnKnt of sanction for violations of positive and negatIve " norTns". " Doctoral Dissertation, University of Rorida, 1970^! Criirdnal law. In Corpus juris secundum . Vols. 22-24B, Sections 1-455 and 1974-2007. Brooklyn, N. Y. : Airarican Law Book, 1961. Criminal law. In Florida jurisprudence . Vol. 9, Sections 1-299. San Francisco: Bancroft-VJhitney, 1956. Cuthljert, A. W. The influence of authoritarianism , severity, and causali ty on attrUoution of responsibility_. Doctoral Dis^^ sertation. University of California, Berkeley, 1966. Day, D. A. The relation of outcome quality and intensity to the perception of intentionality and the attribution of responsibility. Master's Thesis, University of Florida, 1969, Florida statutes annotated . Title 44, Sections 779.01 877.14. Florida v/ords and phrases . St. Paul, Minn.: West, 1953. 3 vols. Forbes, G. B., & Mitchell, S. Attribution of blame, feelings of anger, and direction of aggression in response to interracial "frustration among povertylevel female Negro adults. Journal of Social Psychology , 1971, 83, 73-78. Friedrich, L. K. The naive theory of cul pability . Doctoral Dissertation, Cornell University, 1965. Garcia-Esteve, J. , & Shaw, M. E. Rural and urban patterns of responsibility attribution in Puerto Rico. Journal of Social Psycholo gy, 1968, 74_, 143-149. ~~ 227

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228 Gibbons, D. C. Society , crirr^ and criminal careers: An introduction to criminology . Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1968. Gilmore, S. K. An enpirical study of attribution of responsibility to the "rresntally ill" anT the "^'ientaUvlieaTtHv''' by mental health workers . Doctoral Dissertation, University of Oregon, 1966. Gordon, R. I., & Jacobs, P. D. Forensic psychology: Perception of guilt and income. Perceptual and ?-fotor Skills , 1969, 28_, 143-146. Hall, J. General principles of criminal law. (2nded.) Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1960. Harvey, 0. J., V^ite, B, J., Prather, M. S., Alter, R. D. & Hoffmeister, J. K. Teachers' belief systems and preschool atmospheres. Journal of Educational Psychology , 1966, 57, 373-381. Hays, W. L. Statistics for psychologists . New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963. Heider, F. The psychology of interpersonal relations . New York: Wiley, 1958. Kirk, R. E, Bcperiirental design : Procedures for the behavioral sciences . Behnont, California: Brooks/Cole, 1968. Kronstadt, A. An experimental extension of Heider 's model of responsibility attribution. Ilaster's Thesis, University of Florida, 1965. Kronstadt, A . Develog-nent of attribution of responsibility in normal children and children "with primary lear ning inhibitions .""Doctoral Dissertation, University of "Florida, 1967. Lackey, L. L. Attribution of r esponsilpility as a function of perceived similarity , outcome , intensity, and locus of control . Doctoral Dissertation, University of Florida, 1968. Landy, D. , & Aronson, E. The influence of the character of the criminal and his victim on the decisions of simulated jurors. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology , 1969, 5_, 141-152. I'^Ioan, C. E. Attribution of responsibility by juvenile delincpients . Doctoral Dissertation, University of Elorida, 1968. Mussenden, G. Differences in attribution of responsibility and assignment of sanctions between college students and prison inmates. I4aster's Thesis, Brigham Young University, 1971.

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229 Ome, M. T. Demand characteristics and the concept of quasi-controls. In R. Rosenthal & R. L. Rosncw (Eds.), Artifact in^ behavioral research . New York: Academic Press, 1969. Packer, H. L. The limits of criminal sanction . StÂ£Uiford, Calif. : Stanford University Press, 1968. Perkins, R. M. Criminal law . (2nd ed.) Mineola, N. Y. : Foundation Press, 1969. Revised Code of Washington Annotated , Title 9, Sections 9.48.0109.48.170. Schneider, F. W. , & Shaw, M. E. Sanctioning behavior in Negro and in white populations. Journal of Social Psychology , 1970, 81, 63-72. ~ Scott, W. A. Reliability of content analysis: The case of nordnal scale coding. Public Opinion Quarterly , 1955, 19_, 321-325. Shaver, K. G. Defensive attribution: Effects of severity and relevance on the responsibility assigned for an accident-. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 1970, 14_, 101-113. (a) Shaver, K. G. Redress and conscientiousness in the attribution of responsibility for accidents. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology , 1970, 6, 100-110. (b) Shaw, J. J.^& Skolnick, P. Attribution of responsibility for a happy accident. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 1971, 18, 380-383. Shav7, M. E. Attribution of responsibility by adolescents in two cultures. Adolescence , 1968, 3_/ 23-32. Shaw, M. E. Sane cultural differences in sanctioning behavior. Psychonouic Science , 1967, 8_, 45-46. Shaw, M. E., Briscoe, M. E. , & Garcia-Esteve , J. A cross-cultural study of attribution of responsibility. Research Report No. 3, NSF Grant GS-647, University of Horida, 1967. Shaw, M. E., Floyd, I. A., & Gwin, N. E. Perceived locus of motivation as a deteiminant of attribution of responsibility. Represen^tative Research in Social Psychology , 1971, 2, 43-51.

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230 Shaw, M. E., & JRfiitan, H. T. Attribution of responsibility as a basis for sanctioning behavior. British Journa l of Social and Clinical Psycholo^ , 1969, 8_, 217-226. Shaw, _M. E., & Scbjieider, F. W. Intellectual coirpetence as a variable in attribution of respDnsibility and assignii^nt of sanctions. Journal of Social Psychology , 1969, 78, 31-39. (a) Shaw, M. E., & Schneider, F. W. Negro-white differences in attribution of responsibility as a function of age. Psychonomic Science, 1969, 16, 289-291. (b) Shaw, M. E., & Sulzer, J. L. An empirical test of Heider's levels in attribution of responsibility. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology , 1964, 69_, 39-46. Shaw, M. _E., & Tr-enble, T. R., Jr. Effects of attribution of responsibility for a negative event to a group member upon group process as a function of the structure of the event. Socicjnetrv, 1971, 34, 504-514. ' Â— ' Siegel, S. Nonparametric statistics for the beha vioral sciences. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956. Sulzer, J. L. Attrib ution of responsibility as a function of the struci]::iÂ£?-' HHS^ity;, and intensity of the event. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Florida, 1964. Sulzer, J. L., & Burglass, R. K. Responsibility attribution, eirpathy, and punitiveness. Journal of Personality , 1968, 36, 272-282. Tesser, A., Gatewood, R. , & Driver, M. Sor^ determinants of gratitude Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 1968, 9_, 233-236. Tremble, T. R. , Jr., & Shaw, M. E. Attribution of responsibility and assignment of sanction to Lt. Galley for the My Lai incident. Research paper. University of Elorida, 1972. Walster, E. Assignment of responsibility for an accident. Journ al of Personality and Social Psychology , 1966, 3, 73-79. Walster, E. "Second-guessing" important events. Human .Relations, 1967, 20_, 239-250. " VJebster's new world dictionary , college edition . New York: World, 1960.

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231 Wright, J. M. Attribution of social responsibility and self concept. Dissertation Abstracts , 1961, 21, 3530. (Abstract) Wright, J. M, Responsibility attribution and perception' of social causality. Final Report, NSF Grant GS-461, University of Florida, 1967.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Trueraan R. Trer.Tble, Jr., was bom January 5, 1946, in Richmond, Virginia. In June, 1964, he graduated from Crewe High School. He received tÂ±ie degree of Bachelor of Arts in psychology from the College of William and Mary in June, 1968. Since September, 1968, he has been continuing his education in psychology at the Graduate School of the University of Florida. He was awarded the degree of Master of Arts in March, 1970. Upon completing his doctoral work, he plans to pursue a career in social psychology. 232

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I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. // / /y(^~^'^-^^-rj Marvin E. Shaw, Chairman Professor of Psychology I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. ^.^ Elmer V\f. Bock Associate Professor of Sociology I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. C. Mchael Levy, Jr. Associate Professor of Psyg lology I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Richard K. McGee Associate Professor of Psychology

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I certify that I have read this study and that in rc^ opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Guillermo F. flascaro Assistant Professor of Psychology This dissertation was submitted to the Department of Psychology in the College of Arts & Sciences and to the Graduate Council, and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. August, 1972 Dean, Graduate School

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