United States/Soviet military balance


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United States/Soviet military balance : a frame of reference for Congress
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Library of Congress -- Congressional Research Service
Chwat, John Steven ( jt. auth )
Collins, John M ( jt. auth )
U.S. Govt. Print. Off. ( Washington )
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Table of Contents
    Front Cover
        Page i
        Page ii
        Page ii-a
        Page ii-b
    Letter of transmittal
        Page iii
        Page iv
    Title Page
        Page v
        Page vi
        Page vii
        Page viii
    Table of Contents
        Page ix
        Page x
    Background, purpose, and scope
        Page 1
        Page 2
    Part I. Evidence introduced
        Page 3
        Page 4
        Page 5
        Page 6
        Page 7
        Page 8
        Page 9
        Page 10
        Page 11
        Page 12
    Part II. Evidence analyzed
        Page 13
        Page 14
        Page 15
        Page 16
        Page 17
        Page 18
        Page 19
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    Part III. Ends equated with means
        Page 35
        Page 36
        Page 37
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Full Text

94th Congress I
2d Session f




A Frame of Reference

for Congiwss




Congressiomal iPisearch Service


Printed for the use of the Senate Committee on Armed Services




For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. governmentt Priutiug Office
Washington, D.C. 20402 Price $1.45


JOHN C. STENNIS, Mississippi, Chairman

HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington
THOMAS J. McINTYRE, New Hampshire
HARRY F. BYRD, JR., Virginia
SAM NUNN, Georgia
GARY HART, Colorado

STROM TI URMOND, South Carolina

T. EDWARD BRASWELL, Jr., Chiuf CO(nsel aid Staff Director


Page 19,

Page 22,



Page 58,

figure 4, bottom line before notes: USSR current status is
figure 5, U.S. nuclear artillery and U.S. margin both are 700.
U.S. margin in helicopter carriers is +5.
figure 8, U.S. tube artillery is 3,510; Soviet margin is 13,460.
Annex A:
Army nuclear artillery: U.S. difference 1965 is + 1,750; 1975
is +700; net U.S. change is -1,050.
Move Soviet Border Guards to left land margin as main
6th line from bottom: friendly aims.


IVah4th1 tou, D.C., Ju aiy 22, lf7,-
T1O11. ()MIN (C. S'I-ENNIS,
(ta 6,r ,, S Hia, 1U( d S( ie. (ommlttee,
212 It) Sl N 0 ;t g.ce B a ib Iii,

EA "lI M ( HAIRMAN: At my request, tile Congressional R,-,earrl
Service ()f tie Librarv of (0 1og'ne-s lias prepared a (etaile(,-tii2l
on 11 ti iTiet(1 StviesSoviet liliiarv Balance" as a fi-am e)t
referewefv ) comi' (ler'atio1 .of the Defen>eDeplartment budget i-tlle',t.
A cop v (,iiclo'!e,(l.
I fel(iirve t latI tis >t1(lv iS 1baluce(l, (letailei, ,IInd thi oll~it-i)1r-
vokiiio. 1 I tias beeii reviewed by over 100 knlowle(Igeable per'(on. 1!1
the Exv V ive an:(1 l ghil ive Branc(.hes. It (.ontai s the l ld or(()I-
prehe:-i ait 1(rcunreit unclassificd (l ata )11 tIc, relative sl nIefl*fll'
and o'in o1 the Soviet Uilo 1nd tt lie Unite(d Sa .It ._o
suggest, .v (rat ler t aii aiuwers) w \ih the (Nun ittee aatdI
the ( Th: miglt want to ak in evaluat0ii t 1 our iiational -,ec uritv
iieed .
In ordl't o(rive tl)i' 'tu-lv the wi(ier ci'ulatio n1which it
I respe)ct*l Lv reqtuest that it be publilw(hl as a ( oiIItee Prit.
Sincere1 ,
EiiE (.


Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2013


A Frame of Reference for Congress




Senior Specialist in National Defense

Research Assistant

Conygress.onal Research Service

January 21, 1976


The Soviet Union, alone among all countries in tfie worl(l today,
has sufficient strength to challenge Aierica nilitarily in. lMany areas
of mutual interest overseas and Ibring power to bear on our hloiieland.
Other countries, large and small, routinely pose a(l(liti(onal threats
that our leaders may wish to (leter or (eal with suc(es'llllY, but tie
balance between U.S. and Soviet alne( forces generallylv offers thle
best yardsticks with wfi(h to nieasure U.S. national (le"e,1 ,e reire-
ments. Appraisals containe(l herein therefore afford a hni ue frane"
of reference for reviewing U.S. military ostre in general an(l the
defense budget in particular.
Part 1, which introduces evidence, i(lentifies a strong shift in tile
quantitative military balance toward the Soviet Union over the 1past
10 years. That conclusion comes as no surprise. It crolssiup)annually
at budget time, when Pentagon spokesmen call for more dollars with
which to shore up this co'intry's defense.
Raw statistics, however, are significant only in context. What each
side has is less cogent that what U.S. armed forces can (1o o denland,
despite Soviet opposition.
This study, which begin,- analysis at the point where most others
sto), consequently compiles andt applies a set of force sufficiencv
factors for ascertaining "how much is enough?", a question often
asked by U.S. leaders, but never objectively answered.
Part II identifies some imbalances as important, others as im-
material, then goes on to examine the match between U.S. ends and
means. One salient finding seems evident: misp)laced priorities in
many cases make poor use of available funds, by stressing inadvisable
)ohicies and inessential capabilities at the expense of (ritical sectors.
Part III, keyed to 45 multipart questions for Congress, suggests
ways to mate realistic ends with measured means, minimizing risks
in the lprocess.1
-Step One is to ascertain real requirements, predicated on
imperative U.S. interests, objectives, anid commitments.
-Step Two is to reshape U.S. force structure, defense policies,
and fund allocations so they correspond.
-Bolstering bu(lgets is tle last, not the first, resort.
A national defense debate, with serious participation by parties of
all persuasions, would sharpen issues and identify ol)timum options.
This study of the U.S./Soviet military balance (as oposed to the
total strategic balance, which involves political, economic, social, and
other aspects of national power) is intended to lay part of the ground-
work for Congressional contributions, not just this fiscal year, but in
the future.



Letter of Transmittal .........-III
Abstract----------------------------------------------------- vii
Background, purpose, and scope--------------------------------------I

The quaTntitative balance:
Strategic nuclear-------------------------------------------3
Tactical nuclear--------------------------------------------
G(round forces----------------------------------------------
Naval forces --------------------------------------------------6
Tactical air forces --------------------------------------------- 6
Strategic mobility forces.---------------------------------------- -6
NATO'Warsaw pact.--------------------------------------------7
The qualitative balance:
Manpower---------------------------------------------------- 9
M ateriel------------------------------------------------------10
NATOi Warsaw pact------------------------------------------- 11
The controlling matrix ------------------------------------------12

Causes of asymmetries:
Geographic influences-------------------------------------------13
Technological influences-----------------------------------------14
Threat characteristics------------------------------------------ 14
Pervasive policy decisions..-------------------------- 14
Quantum instead of incremental improvements_------------------14
Quality instead of quantity----------------------------------15
Firepower instead of manpower-------------------------------15
Sustained combat conecpts- -------------------------15
Total force concepts----------------------------------------16
Cyclical cutbacks-------------------------------------------16
All-volunteer force----------------------------------------- 16
Money for manpower---------------------------------------17
Particular policy decisions ---------------------------------------17
Strategic nuclear policies--------------------------- ---------17
Tactical nuclear J)olicies--------------------------------------18
General purpose force policies---------------------------------20
Strategic mobility policies----------------------------------- 21
Assessing asymmetries:
U.S. quantitative superiority-------------------------------------- 21
Superiority disadvantageous _-----------------------------------22
Superiority deceptive-----------------------------------------22
Superiority an ambiguous asset------------------------------- 23
Superiority an assured asset----------------------------------23
United States/ Soviet quantitative equality------------------- --24
Soviet quantitative superiority---------------------------------- -24
United States/Soviet correlations militarily immaterial---------- 24
United States/Soviet correlations militarily important----------- 25
Appraising U.S. ends and means:
Present balance------------------------------------------------28
Strategic nuclear problems-----------------------------------28
NATO-related prol)lems-------------------------------------28
Naval combat problems-------------------------------------29
Strategic mobility p)roblems----------------------------------30
Projected balance----------------------------------------------30
Research and development programs-------------------------- 30
Procurement/deployment programs-------------------------- 31
Budgetary emphasis---------------------------------------- 32
Predicting Soviet intentions------------------------------------- 33

Identifying options-------------------------------------------------35
Ascertaining real requirements:
Review U.S. interests---------------------------------------- 35
Review U.S. objectives-------------------------------------36
Review U.S. commitments-------------------------------------- 36
Review U.S. military roles and missions--------------------------- 37
Adjusting policy guidelines:
Review strategic nuclear policies---------------------------------37
Review general purpose policies_----------------------------------38
Adjusting available means:
Review U.S. force structure ------------------------------------- 38
Review U.S. budget procedures_----------------------------------39


A. Trends in the quantitative balance---------------------------------43
B. Force sufficiency factors ------------------------------------------47
C. Current U.S. defense commitments---------------------------------55
D. Glossary-------------------------------------------------------57
E. Abbreviations---------------------------------------------------69

1. United States/Soviet numerical balance4----------------------------4
2. NATO's numerical balance----------------------------------------7
3. The technological balance-----------------------------------------11
4. SALT I force levels---------------------------------------------19
5. U.S. quantitative superiority -------------------------------------22
6. United States/Soviet quantitative equality -------------------------24
7. Soviet quantitative superiority: Correlation between like forces
militarily immaterial5------------------------------------------25
8. Soviet quantitative superiority: Correlation between like forces mili-
tarily important5----------------------------------------------25
9. U.S. aims to be accomplished-------------------------------------27
10. Key U.S. shortcomings-------------------------------------------27



A Frame of Reference for Congress

It is not true that more is always better than less, ortlat,
the nation could always use more. The United States could
have ten times as many.., forces as the Soviets and
still not have enough, or one-tenth as many and have too
How illuch is Ekough?

The Soviet Union, alone among all countries in the world to(ly, nli
sufficient strength to challenge America militarily in many area of
mutualtinterest overseas and bring power to bear on our iomneland.
Other countries, large and small, routinely pose additional threat-s
that our leaders may wish to deter or deal with successfully, but the
balance between U.S. and Soviet armed forces generally offt'- the
best yardstick with which to measure U.S. national defense
Comparing military credits and debits, however, is a complex
matter. Good big armed forces, for example, are almost always superior
to good small ones. Quality commonly prevails over quantity only
up to a point, beyond which numbers clearly take precedence. Still,
great size can impede rather than improve performance, uile~s
calculated to serve essential interests. Technology, in turn, is a poor
substitute for first-class strategy. Reserve components augment
active elements. Allies sometimes add to or detract from regional
capabilities. Present status may be less meaningful thai projections.
A cornucopia of constraints condition capabilities. Consequently,
some asymmetries between U.S. and Soviet armed forces are im-
portant, others are immaterial.
The purpose of this paper therefore is twofold:
-First, to furnish the Congress with an objective analysis of the
United States/Soviet military balance.'
-More importantly, to provide a starting point for Congresional
debate on the subject.
Coverage comprises three sections:
-Part I introduces evidence as dispassionately as possible.
The strategic balance between two countries or coalitions involves all elements of national powe-r: poliiea1
stability at home and leverage abroad; national institutions and values; geographic slrengihc ad w eaik-
nesses; the economy, especially natural resources, industrial capacity, and finances: the people, including
their numbers, location, character, morale, and education; the scientific and technological ase"ta:, s the
integrating factor, leadership. This study is devoted exclusively to the military balaiic(, which is just one
specialized aspect.

-Part II examines that evidence in ways that segregate significant
U.S. shortcomings from those that are superficial.
-Part 111 suggests ways to remedy flaws by rematching ends with
Conclusions concerning Soviet intentions and certain qualitative
considerations are strictly circumscribed by the absence of classified
information in this study. Statistical summaries that form the frame-
work for analysis coincide with official figures in some cases, and
slightly conflict in others. Such deficiencies are matters of minor
detail that do not affect any findings.
The end product, which supports no special brief, avoids branding
the evident balance as either "good" or "bad." Instead, it affords the
Congress a frame of reference for shaping its own consensus, if so
inclined, in open and executive sessions.2
2 See Annex D for a glossary of specialized terms. Annex E summarizes abbreviations.

The quaAtitative military 1)ala('e Ain(e 196.5 h1a-, 6liiftwI an i-
ally- in favor of the'. Soviet Un ioi i'w Fic..ire I u1(1t Annex A for iv-' eIi
status and trend). Indeed. no le 1 a I tlll.H lat Vafl t lUB L
lluntinoton identifie "thei -Icutive eli-le in me..ican ii
power" a, the preeminentt feature i [conteuiporary'] inteiiailiz dI
,y15 ~ '1~pvti.-8V Cofluftl at-tie-. ii'V.; P U (
Tlhi-; section simlply i la C O~i'n t i ve 1"1.......T
SilnificanCe i- revealed only in eotevt with otler 1 (leva" m 1t lit(P!,-,
which are reviewed in ubsecieut segilent-s Readler-s teelee -o1(I!
postpone per-sonal (on1lions until all pertinent evidlen'nce a-. een
introduced and examined.
Strategic T cleai-
This cou:-itrv' numerical upeilri ty il l1 ''at eoI(' n ueleaf ,,veapon-.,
which was s tili evidIent a (Ite ago, has (li.-olve(I.
1lie Unite(l t ate- ad tbiree timl e- a many iiteirconinen al hatli-i i
mi -iles (ICBiMi-) a-. the ->oviet Union in 1965 (.1,54 to 224). The
Soviets had more balli-tic bii-Kle sibmarine- SB. -'BN). but we
had four' time-s a n any -ub-lati led missies ( >LB\I-, 496 to 120,1
becaive U.S. boat- mounted 16 tube- each anid their-. average d only
three. Neither -i de 1 y(1 yet dleploved multiple independently tarcretalle
reentry vehicles i(\[IRs but "176 of our Polaris A-3 SLBL 'carried
three multiple reentry vehicles M(IRVW) each bv June 19 c5) ,o tle
warhead totals stood at 1,702 U.S. and 390 Soviet. 2
1 lunington, Samuel P., Afie*r Coni ai ..... The Fu1i,'ions of ti Mlii arv EsTti hne i. "TIl A .'
of the American Academy of oh ival and Social Sieiwnc. Maruh 1'j73. p. .
2 MIRV data furnished by Oilicek of the (hit 4of Navaol Op Jraion>, ,laiary 16. 197G.

FIGURE 1.-United States/Soviet numerical balance
(See Annex A for details

ALCMs Warheads SLBMs Air defense
Fighter/a't tack aircraft Missiles
Art illcrv Medium bombers

Marines Anti-tank Weapons Personnel Tanks
Helicopters Logistic tail Divisions Artillery
Air defense

Aircraft carriers Attack Submarines
Aircraft afloat Cruise missile ships
Combat boats
Aircraft ashore
Mine countermeasure ships*

Airlift A.jSealift
*.Not shown in Annex A.

Iodiy, the United States lags in every category, except for MIRVed
lalnliers and aggregate warheads. Continued U.S. ascendancy in
qtiantities of heavy bombers and air-launched cruise missiles [ALCMs]3
compens-ates in part, but Soviet superiority in sea-launched cruise
missiles (-SLCX1s) offsets that advantage to some extent.4
The United States/Soiviet balance between anti-ballistic missile
[ABM1] forces is close to irrelevant, since neither country ever deployed
extelisive installations. Air defense assets, however, are a different
case. This country, in conjunction with Canada, maintained the
worlh's most comprehensive system in the mid-1960s. Ten years
later, that accumulation has been cut to the bone. Only 12 dedicated
fighter-interceptor squadrons, half in the Ai#National Guard [AN G],
will remain after phaseouts are complete.5 All surface-to-air missile
[SAM] batteries once assigned to the Army Air Defense Command

3,Short-Range Attack Missiles (SRAM) now are deployed by U.S. Strategic Air Command (SAC).
Mediumn-range ALCMs and SLCMs are in research and development stages.
4 Shaddoek, which is the only Soviet SLCM with strategic nuclear capabilities, is essentially an anti-
ship missile.
5 Pr- stn plans will eliminate six F-101 squadrons from the ANG by the end of FY 1977, reducing U.S.
fighter-inoerceptor strength to 12 active and res,.rve F-106 squadrons. Schlesinger, James R., Annual De-
f, nse Departnent Report to tho, Congress on the FY 1976 and Transition Budgets, FY 1977 Authorization
Roqufst a, d FY 1976-1980 Defense Programs. Washington, D.C., U.S. Govt. Print. Oil., February 5,
1975, p. 11-41. Updated telephonically by Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (J-5) on November 5, 1975.

(ARADCOM) were inactivated in FY 1974.6 By way of contrast, the
Soviet air defense shield currently contains 2,700 intercel)tor aircraft
and 12,000 SAMs.7 That agglonmeration, which is larger than ours at
its apogee, is constantly being improved.
Tactical nuclear
U.S. tactical nuclear delivery systems are concentrated in general-
purpose land- and carrier-based fighter/attack aircraft and tube
artillery.8 Conversely, the Soviets feature specialized cruise and
ballistic missiles, although iinpreIve Backfire bombers-i are begiliming
to suI)plement their fleet of obsolescent Balgers, wlio--e penetration
prospects are poor against well-(lefeniled targets in Eulal ia.
Air power gives the United States an evident global e(lge in forces
for tactical nuclear purposes. The Soviets, in turn, evince extreme
quantitative superiority in central Earope, where their sirface-to-
surface missiles outnumber ours by about 10:1 and their 700 nuclear-
capable aircraft by something like two-to-one.'
Gro and forces
The numerical strength of U.S. ground force., including marines;
h nne-atch e Iovletes
has never matched Joscow's massive army. ,Soviet lernonne1 strength
presentlv is 21 times that of the U.S. estaf)lishment. and our (divisions
are outnumbered 9:1 (16s Soviet, 19 U.S. Arny/Nlarine)." Sonie 9,000
U.S. main battle tanks compare unfavorably with 34,500 in the Krem-
lin's armored force," which las 40,000 steel-l)iated personnel carriers,
double the size of the U:.S. contingent. Their stock of anti-tank
(AT) missiles is almost triple ours.'2 America has only two clear quanti-
tative advantages: we have many more helicopter-, and the U.S.
marine Corps dwarfs its Soviet counterpart, wVhuCih fields a small
fraction as many men (197,000 to 12,000), has no divi-ioii>, and no
orgalic air -upport.

1 1-42: update idei ,ical. Sovon Nike uereulesbatteries (3 in Alsk-. 4 in Florida), p1lis four
I,, Iniu o are aai]bI for a Ii 2a1 doployineii oxV5 a.
7 Th Ie ate ,50,.) 'AM limchcrs in lhe Sovic' i, ventorv. Soin have nulliiile rails. The nullr teis d. -
crt asii sometm1,1 ouRl electronic ct inter ChOlll crEIhletsu.e{ES (ECCM) ae nnprovin g at current sies, accord-
ilia 1( I)efnse lntlli-nce Agency on Jltut, 15. 1it.
The U.S. Army has so A n11(lear ihi-tii-t issles :il itomi( demolitions. Our NvyVS T'rri and
TAL )s _missiles are nuclear capable in s,,rface-to-snrface and sur fa-e-to-air itols. The Navy also has
nuclear depth clarges. Nevertheless. our tactical unclear niglit is n ainl% as 0 -,1 al tove.
Th Soviet \ir Force has on ly a otnt 35 pilots qualified i' clical deli(cr\ Itch\-i, u, s, according to
I i-fense Inteligen, e ,Aency on January 15. 1976h. Varsaw 1P:act air forces rtuiable to asist. since they
have no n,:clear \ ('apons. NATO air Pces, ill colnrast. t(o lrti rte sultIalv
Th U .S. Army and Marieine('OrTmSi cl, d from 1,,153.to10 1 ,77,!) (( a t ive duty p ,nnel between
1065 tA 1963 in response to involveincnt in the Victn n ar, then cut ba.k 1 a coiliid strength iof
About 65 Soviet Category 1 divisions are at 75 percent or gr I ter per-oimI stronlN wii h comh'plte equip-
mere. The ratio between nose forces and active U.S. Arny A rine divisionis is 1on zil i 3.,) 1. -ovi, ldivi-
sions at full strength have only about half the lnanpower of U.S. outnterparls, but itiiost as niati1 tanks:
States Soviet

U.S. armored, Soviet tank divisions:
Men--------------------------------------------------------------- 17,5(') 8,400
T a n k s .---------------------------------------------------------- ... 3 24 3 16
1.S. iechanized, Soviet motorized rifle divisions:
Men..--------------------------------------------------------------- 16,())) 10, 500
Tanks--------------------------------------------------------------- 216 188

It U.S. ArmyMarine and Soviet main battle tanks today are all mediums. The U.S.S.R. also has 2,500
antiquated heavy tanks that are not counted above.
12 TOW and Dragon are the primary U.S. AT weapons. Squad-level LAWs (light assault weapons) are
effective only for last-ditch close combat.

Naval forces
Ten years ago, the Soviet Navy had already outstripped the United
States two-to-one in attack submarines (336 to 169), but its surface
fleets had just begun to break out of their coastal cocoons and compete
on high seas. Today, they have more major combatants in every
Category except aircraft carriers, and a virtual monopoly on surface-
to-surface anti-ship cruise missiles, which are mounted on cruisers,
destroyers, submarines, an(l small craft. Tile Soviets have even
surpassed us in numbers of amphibious ships, ending once Iramatic
U.S. dolninance--not because they built many more, but because we
have halved1 our force since 1965.
Three important U.S. pluses compensate in part for otherwise
lopside" statistical comparisons in Soviet favor. First, the U.S. Navy
includes seven nuclelar-powered surface combatants.'l The Soviet
Navy has none (although its 75 nuclear attack and( cruise missile
submarines outnumber our 63). 1 Second, U.S. carrier air power is
unsurpatssed. \oscvow as yet has no fighter/attack aircraft afloat,
and still will rely on short-range, vertical/short takeoff and landing
(VSTOL) versions when ships of the Kiev Class enter active service.
East, but surely not least, the U.S. Navy not only has more ASW
aircraft afloat, but more shore-based as well (450 to 360 in the latter
category, which commonly is considered a Soviet quantitative
Tactical air forces
Amnerica's land- and carrier-based combat aircraft, excluding
forces for strategic air defense, quantitatively outclassed Soviet
tactical air power in 1965 as they (1o today. However, that comparison
is deceptive, since a large segment of our naval air arm is dedicated
to fleet defense. The Soviet Air Force presently has 25 percent more
fighter/attack aircraft and medium bombers than the U.S. Air Force
and Marine Corps combined. Total tactical air transport ratios
favor the Soviet Union (500 U.S. C-130s, 800 Soviet Cubs).
Strategic mobility forces
Strategic airlift and sealift forces are used to shift personnel,
equipment, and supplies intercontinentally or between widely sepa-
rated theaters.
America's sealift assets under Military Sealift Command (MSC)
and in the U.S. Merchant Marine were more than twice as large as
those of the Soviet Union in 1965.15 Since then, situations have
reversed. The net U.S. loss, from +1,433 vessels to -1,349, exceeds
the size of our 1965 inventory, which was 2,778 (we presently count
Military Airlift Command (MAC) had amassed a marked numerical
superiority over Soviet strategic airlift in 1965, and increased the
disparity during the past decade. Accurate analogies are elusive, how-
ever, since both countries augment military airlift with commercial
13 U.S. nuclear-powered surface ships currently include two aircraft carriers and five cruisers. Two more
carriers and four cruisers are under construlc ion.
14 The United States has no cruise missile submarines.
15 The former Military Sea Transport Service (MSTS) was redesignated Military Sealift Command on
August 1, 1970. Military Air Transport Service (MATS) became Military Airlift Command on January 1,
16 Military cargo ship capacities vary from about 7,000 to 34,000 tons. U.S./Soviet tonnage comparisons
might be more meaningful than tallying ships, but reliable unclassified statistics are not available.

carrier-. Jet transports of our Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), for
example, handled nine-tenths of all p)assenger service between thie
U.S. west coast and Vietnam during America's ivol vement in tliat
conflict.17' Soviet Aeroflot aircraft are 1)redesignate(l for iinilar piirt)ose,.

One anomaly is worth special nenition. soviet state i(, mbilitv,
unlike that of the United States, depel(, hleavilv onl overlandl ItIoe-
mnent by road or rail to NATO Europe, the -Middle East, the Indianl!
Pakisanip)enlnslla, an(l parts of Asia tlatt tIiroiit oil lie ", e -ter
Pacific. U.S. airlift and sealift assets terefor'e are counterbalance(l in.
those critical areas by Soviet interior Land line .

A I TOiTWarsaiv Pact
Europe is the only area where U.S. anid Soviet conmb.-al foce. ( are
in direct and constant contact. T e balance in tlat theater is cuirrentitl
more important than in any other. (.See Figure 2).
The United States presently provides about 10 percent of NATO's
ground forces, 20 percent of its naval forces, aii(d a quarter of its tactical
air forces, (liscounting 50,000 American troops that perform a.pecialized
missions in Europe (such as those with Defense Comniunication
Agency), but are not controlled by U.S. European Command
(EUCO.M). Soviet proportions in the W arsaw Pact are much greater
in every category."i


United Soviet Warsaw
States Union NATO Pac

Combat/support personnel. ..------------------------ 26G, 000 595,000 625,000 895, COO
Committed 2------------------------------- 5 31 27 57
Armor---------------------------------2 16 12 27
Other--------------------------------- 3 15 15 30
Reinforcements .---------------------------- 11 40 17 51
Armor---------------------------------2 15 3 17
Other--------------------------------- 9 25 14 34
Total-------------------------------- 16 71 44 108
Reserve -.-.-.-.----------------------------8 22 9 22
Armor.------------------------------------ 2 9 2 9
Other------------------------------------ 6 13 7 13
Grand total------------------------------- 24 93 53 152
Tanks ------------------------------------------ 2,100 11,500 7,000 19,000
Tactical aircraft 5 ---------------------------------- 400 2,300 2,300 2,900
Light bombers ---------------------------------- 01 00L1 0
Medium bornbers -O --- -_-- --.0350
Fighter"attack----------------------------------- 40u 900 1,750 1,300
Interceptors-------------------------------------- 1,100 350 1,300
MRBM IRB---------------------------------------- 0 583 0 583

1 NATO and Warsaw Pact figures include the United States and the U.S.S.R. European countries counted are West Ger-
many, the Low Counitries, Luxern bourg, and Norway, plus B~itish troops in Germany; last Germ3'y, Czechoslovakia,
Pcland, and most of European Rjssi3.
2 United States and NATO committed divisions include duMl-based U.S. LrIgades normally o in the United
United States and NATO divisions for reinforcement purposes include all active U.S. Army divisions, less 1 in Korea,
plus 1 Marine division. Soviet divisions are Category and 2 on:.
Reserve component divisions include all U.S. National G lard divisions and S-.iet Categcry 3 divisions.
5 Tanks and tactical aircraft include only those in countries/re0.ions noted ajuve. U.S. car rier-aircraft and dual-based
fighter squadro-3s are exzluded.

'7 Annual Air Force Alnanac Issue, 1973, Air For('e Magazine, May, 1973, p. SO-81, 112-113
13 Proportions veriiied by DOI) on Jaanuary 19, 197C.

65-316-76- 3


United Soviet Warsaw
States Union NATO Pact

Combat support personnel. ..------------------------- 10,000 115,000 575,000 345,000
Divisions: 2
Committed--------------------------------- 0 0 39 31
Armor---------------------------------0 0 6 7
Other---------------------------------- 0 0 33 24
Reinforcements----------------------------- 0 8 0 0
Armor--------------------------------- 0 3 0 0
Other---------------------------------- 0 5 0 0
Total--------------------------------- 0 8 39 31
Tanks2----------------------------------------- 0 2,250 3,500 7,250
Land-basel aircraft 2 3 .---------------------------- 0 280 733 655
Fighter attack_ 0 50 450 200
I nterceptors----------------------------------- 0 200 275 425
Light bombers---------------------------------- 0 30 8 30
Surface combatants 4--------------------------------- 19 12-17 76 12-17
Attack carriers--------------------------------- 2 0 2 0
Helicopter carriers------------------------------ 1 1 1 1
Cruisers-------------------------------------- 1 2-4 4 2-4
Other escorts---------------------------------- 15 9-12 69 9-12
Attack submarines..-------------------------------- 3-6 10-13 34-37 10-13
Conventional--------------------------------- 3-6 8-10 34-37 8-10
SSM---------------------------------------- 0 2-3 0 2-3
Carrier aircraft4----------------------------------200 0 200 0
Fighter squadrons-------------------------------4 0 4 0
Attack squadrons------------------------------- 6 0 6 0

1 NATO and Warsaw Pact figures include the United States and the U.S.S.R.
2 Includes forces in Italy, Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, plus selected Soviet units in Hungary and southern Russia.
3 U.S. aircraft in Spain are included above with tactical air support for central Europe (3 fighter squardons, total 54
4 Normal deployments only. All 3 Soviet aircraft carriers belong to the Black Sea Fleet, with 1 in the Mediterranean.
Great Britain currently operates 1 attack carrier with 30 aircraft. France has 2 with 40 aircraft each. None is shown on
figure 2, since all 3 normally operate in the Atlantic, rather than the Mediterranean.
Source: Mainly the Military Balance, 1975-76, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975, pp. 5-26,
95-102. Augmented and updated by various DOD agencies, January 1976.

Ground forces of the two principal protagonists are grossly dis-
proportionate in the crucial center sector, where 190,000 troops in
U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) account for most of our personnel
strength. Fewer than 75,000 of those are in divisions, versus 250,000
for the Soviet Union. Twenty-five Soviet Category 1 divisions, backed
by 7,000 tanks, confront five U.S. divisions with 2,100 tanks along
the East German and Czech borders.'9 An estimated 46 more Soviet
Category 1 and 2 divisions are sited in Hungary, Poland, and Euro-
pean Russia as combat-reatly reinforcements.20
Some 2,300 Soviet tactical aircraft face 400 from the United States
astride the Iron Curtain.2' The air-ground balance is better along
NATO's south flank, where neither superpower stations sizable army
elements and carrier aircraft augment shore-based squadrons.
The naval balance in the Mediterranean tips markedly toward the
United States on a day-to-day basis, but Soviet surge capabilities are
impressive. The Kremlin, for examl)le, massed 95 ships of all types off
Turkey's south coast, plus 30 more in the Indian Ocean, during the
Arab-Israeli outburst of 1973. The U.S. Sixth Fleet totalled 60 during
the same period, including three attack carriers. An Essex-Class

19 Statistics in Figtire 2 conflict somewhat with those in the text, which considers only those divisions in
East Germany and Czechoslovakia so as to present the best possible U.S. and the worst possible Soviet case.
U.S. tank strength includes those stockpiled in Europe for divisions that would deploy by air from the
United States in emergency.
20 Ramifications are viewed in Record, Jeffrey, Sizing Up the Soviet Army, The Brookings Institution,
1975, 51 p.; and in Lawrence, Richard D. and Record, Jeffrey, U.S. Force Structure in NATO: An Alterna-
tive, Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1174, 136 p.
21 Tactical aircraft figures include fighter/attack and air defense interceptors. U.S. strength includes squad-
rons based in Spain. The Soviet figure would swell to about 3,200 if fighter/attack units in the three western-
most Military Districts of European Russia were added.

carrier, with five e,corts, constittite(1 our Inldilan Ocean coiplelliei(i at
that time.22
The true balance, of course, includes a blend of allies oibth >i(lt .
Warsaw Pact airiroun(l forces in northern atld ('e)i al Ill",o'-
outnumber NATO in nearly every categorvy. NATO reiiiforcei'e i ,,
inclu(Iing U.S. National Guard units, are less numero s thal those of
rival nations. The Soviet side coudd quickly aclilex e ttle classic rati1
of 3:1 suI)erioritv in ground c(nlmbat forces thlat maniv llilitarv Inch
cite as a I)rereqiiisite for successful offensive o(le-tiotl 23'i \ ,lif-
1o)etantly, the IK'emln could ms massive power at tiles, place,- a1
under conditions of its choosing, while NATO (defen(ls a front thai
stretches 500 straightline miles from tile Baltic to the A-, nil eiorr.
Quantitativecomp~arisons between NATO an(lI Warsaw Pact naval
forces appear more advantageous, but Figuri'e 2 affor(ds -an index oiilv
for those forces normally positioned in tle Meditenlaitean. NA( >,
there as elsewhere, still has an abolute monopoly on at t ack canli(,1-.
armed with hiigh-perforniance fighiter/attack aircraft, but lliips furi :,
both sides,, especially U.S. and Soviet leni-of-wa,', either and ilea l(,
the Atlantic at will. Natural geographic choke l)(ilt, sucl as tilhe
Greenland-Ieeland-]Faeroes Gal), Gibraltar, and the Dad(e(l(,(leT-,
would help NATO's navies rest rict free Soviet passage a(t(/ u, b-t nol,
before, any outbreak of hostilities.

The raw quantitative balance ust revealed inust be con(liti(nedJ )y
qualitative considerations, some of which benefit the United Steate,
others the Soviet Union. A sample list, in no particular order of
iml)ortance, includes: leadership; discipline; morale and motivation;
education; training; combat experience; organization: conmmandl a li
control arrangements; staying power; and technology. The sum de-
termines effectiveness.
Superiority in all or most of those categories can enable nunericlly
inferior forces to compete successfully-categorically, or within limits,
according to circumstances. Conversely, forces with gIeat quantita-
tive superiority could d prove insufficient if serious sliortcomings w ere
evident in even one of those entries.
Coverage below simply hits a few high spots for exeimplary purposes.
Comparing the U.S. and Soviet nilitar> manpower pool is a > -
jectlve process, since the basic building blocks are pro(luce( by sIiarpl\
differentt social systems. Observers at one pole ol)ine tllat re>l e tiv e
national characteis exert a "pernaent an(l often (lecisive i". fiucm'e
upon tie weight [eacli] nation is able to l)ut into tle scaes of intel,-
national politics.'' 24 Authorities at the antipode ,cofl at national stere-
22 Moorer, Thomas i., Soviet Presence in the Indian Ocean. A "talkill pap er" to assist his 1 -i)resn>' 1 i
to the. Senate Armed Services Committee on Miarch 12, 11,4, p. 3; and ('ottreli, Alvin J., The t1li;(I-
Military Balance in the Persian Gulf Region, Washingtoii, (eorgetown Instiliuho for 1ntcrntmi ionl I(1
Strategic Studies, March. 1974, p. 8.
23 The 3:1 ratio ostensibly required for offensive operations has no factual foundation. Victory freqUei, Ily
goes to small, but cleverly maneuvered forces.
24 Morgenthau, Hans J., Politics Among Nations, 4th Ed., New York, Alfred A. Kitopf. 1!N67, p. 122,

otypes (Americans are individualistic and inventive, Soviets physically
strong and stoic), which they contend are unsubstantiated.21
Military training, complemented by civilian education, contributes
to force effectiveness. Both sides stress comprehensive uniservice pro-
grams, joint service exercises, and operations with allies. Each exhibits
idiosyncrasies that can be assessed quite differently, depending on
perspective. The Kremlin, for example, places top priority on political
indoctrination, which many U.S. military men believe is less important
than practicall" matters. The DOD stipulation that 80 percent of all
U.S. Arny enlisted men should have high school diplomas finds no
count erart in Soviet policy.2 In short, indices that indicate training
excellence in one establishment may not apply to the other.
Coinbat experience is somewhat more straightforward. The Soviet
Army and Air Force since World War II have been used only to sup-
press unrest in satellite states and skirmish on the Chinese border.
The Soviet "blue water" Navy has never fired a shot in anger. By
way of contrast, all four U.S. services were committed in the Korean
War (1950-53) and the Vietnam War (1965-1972), not to mention
the Dominican Crisis (1965). However, the U.S. Navy was essentially
unopposed at sea in every instance, and neither our Army nor Air
Force experienced armed conflict under conditions analogous to those
in NATO Europe. Whether U.S. combat experience constitutes pluses
or minuses thus is contentious-some lessons may indeed be sound,
others might best be unlearned.
Intangibles like temper are especially tricky to evaluate, unless the
evidence is clear, as it was in the early 1970s, when disciplinary
difficulties devitalized U.S. armed forces: drug abuse, "underground"
activity, crime, racial friction, irresponsibility, and rebellion against
authority were common manifestations.27 Positive action by the
Defense Department and military services, combined with the U.S.
withdrawal from Vietnam, eviscerated or eradicated many of the
contributary causes. Order reputably has been restored-the Secretary
of Defense last addressed such "special problems" in his annual posture
statement two years ago-but only the crucible of combat could
confirm the current United States/Soviet qualitative balance in this
Technological supremacy traditionally has been a strong U.S. suit,
and remains so in many areas, as Figure 3 shows. The day has passed,
however, when U.S. scientific ascendancy can be taken for granted.
Soviet efforts already equal our own in several respects, surpass us in
others and exhibit strong momentum."
25 Organski, A.F.K., World Politics, 2d Ed., New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1968, p. 87.
26 U.S. Congress. Senate. Hearings before the Appropriations Committee on Department of Defense
Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1976. Part 2, Department of the Army. 94th Congress, 1st Session. Washing-
ton, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975, p. 12.
The Kremlin advocates 12 years of schooling for every Soviet citizen, but no policy excludes conscripts
with less education until that aim is achieved.
27 Congressional concern was considerable during that period. See for example U.S. Congress. House.
Committee on Armed Services. Report by the Special Subcommittee on Disciplinary Problems in the
U.S. Navy. 92d Congress, 2d Session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., Jan. 2, 1973. 29 p.
28 See Part II, section on Technological Influences, for a few specific comparisons of U.S. and Soviet

FIGURE 3.-The technological balance

Composite materials Cmnlall of c(rnl)()1('11S
Computers E:tse of maintijiance
Guidance systems Gas turbine engines for Sii)s
Microtechnology R )ckets an d raiiljet s
Night vision
Nuclear-powered ships
Optics; acoustics
Submarine det action
Submarine silencing
Aircraft Armored personnel carriers
Artillery ammunition C chemical warfare
Antisubmarine warfare Cold weather equipment
Electronic countermeasures Lngineer bridging
Guided munitions ICBM "cold launch" I
MIRV reliability ICBM payload, yield
Missile accuracy Low-level air defense
Survivable submarines Ship size versus firepower
Target acquisition Short-range SSM
I A "pop up" technique that ejects ballistic missiles from silos or submarines using powerI)laiis that are
separate from the delivery vehicles. Primary ignition is delayed until projectiles ale safely clear of con-
tainers/carriers, preserving the launcher intact for reuse if required.

NATO/Warsaw Pact
A wide range of qualitative considerations and constraints iifilIllice
the NATO/Warsaw Pact balance.
Capabilities in the crucial center sector, for example, ore conditioile(
el eci"ally by missions (large Soviet elements relutedly are requil'e(f
to enforce internal security in satellite states 29) ; the reliability of
allies (some forces in the Soviet sphere might revolt in emergency,
some NATO states stay neutral); mobilization seeds (Soviet ground
forces fill Category 2 and 3 divisions already cadred, this countirv
calls up Reserves and the National Guard); reinforcement times (tile
Soviets viashort land lines, U.S. forces by sea and air); the rea(liness
of reserves in tens of equipment and training; command stnictiires
(Soviet central authority versus NATO's need for consensus); com-
monality of arms, ammunition, equipment, and rel)air 1)arts (all
accoutrements are similar on the Soviet side, many (Of NATO's are
not); and vulnerabilities (NATO's installations are coiicentrated, the
Warsaw Pact's are dispersed),a
Raw naval figures are misleading in the Mediterranean, where
NATO outnumbers its rivals markedly. Soviet submarines are diicult
to detect with available ASW devices, even in those shallow waters,
because thermal layers and many merclantnlen distort sodiisV.
Moscow's new-model anti-ship cruise missiles pose potentially e,,rious
threats. Some are sea-skimmers. Some have steep trajectories that

29 What percentage of Soviet forces are devoted to internal security is debatable. The Kremlin, ho vever,
did add five divisions to its East European deployments during the Czech rebellion of 196, and all liv
30 For basic considerations, see The Military Balance, 1975-76, p. 95-102 and Collins, John M., U.S. M lht ary
Support for NATO, prepared for the Senate Armed Services Commitlee, Jan. 19, 1973, p. 20-31. ])ci:il
are developed in Record, Jeffrey, Sizing Up the Soviet Army, p. 8-32, 47-49.


demand a different defense. Many can be deployed on small, speedy
craft that are cheap to produce in comparison with NATO's surface
combatants, which make superior targets. Soviet target acquisition
capabilities currently are limited to the range of shipboard seekers
for most purposes, but close peacetime contacts with NATO's naval
forces in the Mediterranean help compensate-reaction times to
surprise attacks might be measured in seconds. In short, comparing
the combat effectiveness of forces whose functions and characteristics
tre so different leaves great latitude for error.'
TIi coid trolling matrix
MNanpower and materiel attributes like those just outlined are almost
meaniiigless in isolation. The overall quality of opposing armed
forces can only be ascertained in context with the organizational struc-
ture, strategic concepts, and logistical apparatus needed to orchestrate
their actions. Those elements to a large extent are shaped by factors
in Part II.
31 Rules of thumb for comparing the strengths and weaknesses of opposing naval powers are delineated
and discussed in U.S. Congress. House. Means of Measuring Naval Power, With Special Reference to U.S.
and Soviet Activities in the Indian Ocean. Prepared for the Subcommittee on the Near East and South
Asia (if the Committee on Foreign Affairs by the Congressional Research Service. 93d Congress, 2d Session.
Washiugton, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974.16 p.

Quantitative and qualitative analyses of Uiiito(1 States/S()viet
armled forces simply i(lentifV salient asv'iNm- t"et ries. I() assess ttle i1l--
portance of imbalances, it is necessary first to kilow wl! y t1ler exist.
(Iritical U.S. deficiencies then can le isolated frothose Of slight
Ine(luities for and against the United States (Figlf 1-8 ) can be
trace( in part to geographic circumstatice, technological tpecliar-
ities, and U.S. threat appraisals, but te J)repon(dera!ee ensue(I be-
cause of deliberate policy decisions by both spl)erpowers, l)egiiining
three decades ago.
Geographic influences
Soviet armed forces safeguard the world's largest state, wliich
stretches 3,000 miles north-to-south and 7,000 east-to-west, the latter
distance being equal to the expanse between Washington, D.C. and
Burma. NATO's forward defense forces abut Warsaw Pact buffer
states, whos- loyalty depends in part on a strong Soviet presence. A
hostile China shares Siberia's lengthy southern frontier. HugeSoviet
standing armies, air defenses, and tactical air establishments thus are
uiderstandable.I Carrier-based fighters are unnecessary. IRBMIs/
dRBMs and medium bombers provide the requisite reach across
Eurasia's land mass. The United States, still isolated by oceans
despite technological developments, currently has different homeland
defense problems.
The U.S. economy, including aspects associated with national se-
(unitv relies extensively on imports. Intercontinental commerce is
important. Most of our defense commitments are overseas. We there-
fore enjoin the U.S. Navy to keep critical sea lanes open in exigency
and project offensive power onto foreign shores in support of American
and allied interests. Strategic airlift plays imperative roles.
The Soviet situation of course is quite different. That country is
relatively self-sufficient in raw materials. Xf[ost allies under its aegis
are directly accessible by land avenues. The IKremilin h as been re-
lictant to coiit its own combat forces in far (istlit states since
Kluruschchev got his comeuppance in Cuba Tie Soviet Navy con -
sequentlv is still stru( tured primarily to protect thee mother country
by checking U.S. carrier air power aiol SSBNs, to shortstop) U.S. rein-
forceIments for NATO, cut U.S. supply lines whei(1r re(fuile(d, amn(
Marines, anti-ship missiles, andi fast patrol bo best. An embryonic core of aircraft carrwvs aid a ilt pii iouv >1 iI
is the first indication that ,[oscown layi/il('1 t dtext em l its of fensive
reach an(l improve its ability to project J)olitical power.
I Many U.S. milit ary men contend 1 hat Soviet forces far exceed Itho; r(,e qire ( for dci eIrruce : ndo foefIS(',
but Soviet stan(r'(ds for "1nW much i's enis oghi ?"' may t e ;ig s nif Ie ilv i tifore it li iOlrs.
Soviet training learns, service troops, SAM crews, :and ilttercvpI) r pilots, all o nom catalit or dhfellsive
in nature, once flooded the Nile Delta o help protect the Kren li ii's si iv mi le iii ill iiiilit av a'id, but
offei vc' forces inl Egy)t were always exclusively Arah. ('u ni l 11t oviel, frc elus low fight in Aligola.

Tech n ological ifluliences
Soviet quantitative advantages in fighter 'attack aircraft count
several models whose capabilities are grossly inferior to F-4 Phantoms,
which have set the U.S. standard since 1962.3 Even modern MIG-
25s lack multipurpose adaptability, being mainly for reconnaissance
and air defense. None equal our F-4's unrefueled combat radius, and
none call be refueled in flight. Their ability to accomplish ground
support missions falls far short of F-4s, which have a 16,000 lb pay-
load (apacity in comparison with an estimated 2,000 lb for MIG-21s
and 2-,NO0lf)for I1GJ-3s.4 Some Soviet fighters could outperform
F-4s in air-to-air combat, being fast, more maneuverable, and able
to operate at higher altitudes, although U.S. avionic packages, elec-
tromc countermeasures (EC-M), and missile armaments reduce the
margin. F-15 and F-16 aircraft hopefully will preserve our qualitative
edge in the 19SOs.5 As a result, U.S. decision-maKers currently accept
unspecified degrees of Soviet numerical superiority without undue
coil] punction.
The Soviet Army, with 1,710,000 more men than its U.S. counter-
part, requires nmcih more tactical airlift, as the balance sheet shows.
The disparity in numbers, however, is disproportionate, because
nothing in the Soviet inventory matches performance characteristics
of the U.S. C-130 fleet, which is easily the world's best.
Threat ctiacacteristics
Giant Soviet ground forces would imperil the continental United
States only if accompanied by adequate amphibious assault, strategic
airlift, and logistic support apparatus, which is not the case. Part of
those forces, together with tactical air elements, are pinned down
senipermanently along the Chinese border, where they pose no
immediate threat to U.S. associates or allies. A substantial percentage
of Soviet troops serve internal security purposes in satellite states.
Such factors all limit U.S. general purpose force requirements.
Perrash*'e policy (cis8ofl0S
Deliberate U.S. policy decisions account for the quantitative and/or
qualitative ascendancy of Soviet armed forces in several areas. The
seven summarized below overarch all others.
Q lantilm i stead of incremental improvements
The prevailing U.S. approach to research and development, pred-
icated on technological initiative, features "pioneering and aggressive
innovation." 6 Quantum improvements are the ain. That policy
stimulates creativity in one sense, but paradoxically cultivates con-
servatism. Many modest advancements are accused of approaching
obsolescence before they can be deployed. Successors for aging systems
thus are often delayed indefinitely while U.S. scientists strain for
1 About half of all Soviet counter air and a quarter of all close air support aircraft have been deployed since
i970. according to U.S. Air Force sources.
4 SV-19A Fencer ground attack aircraft have a payload of about 7.500 pounds. No unclassified payload
figures are available for SU-1720 Fitter Cs, which are de-igned for deep interdiction. Both were deployed
in 1974.
5 Brown, George S., Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee on United States Military
Posture for FY 1976, Washington, Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 5 ,1975, pp. 106-107.
U.S. Congress. House. Hearings on Department of Defense Appropriations for 1976 before a subcom-
mittee of the Committee on Appropriations. Part 4, Research, Development. Test. and Evaluation. 94th
Congress, 1st Session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975, p. 366-69, 531-32, 553-54.

The Soviet since WorMi War I [ have e'l)oilt-e(! increment al imn-
lbitajn.7'J~et( J- 1oderniZe(
pro vetnents of tile existing et abhIsI'net.' 2\o(l," le
arms and equipment are procured as they, vbecomie available. Tlhat
p)rocedure ensures continually improved catj)aI)ilities wi icli narrow or
(lose qualitative gaps while U.S. force- ,, i ake d(" with lro(lucts iII
J OQality instead of q~iai.ty
The United States donors a Princi)le of Wa!r called Econoin-y (f
Force. Conversel, the Soviets iin1)licitly 1)refer tlie Prilcilple of \I Ia- .
This country, N therefore chooses quality instead f' (lantity. aii4
general retires outdated items when new ones titer the inventory.
The opp)osition, which opts for both, adds recent arrival> to exltiing
stocks, onowing out pIredecessors only -hen they ceate to -erve
useful l)urploses. The effects of those (liametricaly (lflereIt
policies accentuate quantitat ve imbalancc-> betw .een...nd Soviet
armed forces.
Firepower niistead of manpower
The United Statespl'aces a high premium on human life. This
country therefore replaces manpower with firepower wherever
possible. High dollar costs for pay and allowances reinforce that
policy, which keeps personnel strengths down and supl)ort require-
ments up in U.S. armed forces, but not in the Soviet Union.
Sustained combat concepts
Title 10 of the United States Code, which prescribes an Army, Navy,
and Air Force that could, if required, conduct "sustained" combat
operations, has a profound influence onU.S. force structure.' 0 All
three services must -maintain solid logistic and administrative est al)-
lisnents to fulfill that function wherever U.S. interests are involved.
The Soviet Union seems to have a different philosophy. its air
and ground forces are best adapted for a short, (lecisive conflict if
NATO and the Warsaw Pact clash." Admiral Sergei Gorslikov a1'-o
has shaped a first-strike, "one-shot" Navy, without much stavinn
power.12 "Tooth-to-tail" ratios therefore reflect poorly oil U.S. general
purpose forces, which are long on logi tlic S support and sonietimes. short
on combat power in comparison with soviet counteit)arts.
7 Ibid.
8In practice, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union subscribes exlusivly to quantum Pimp or
incremental improved ent policies. V.S. tanks, guns. airralt. and oThher i t emos oftu ter.o re pea ted modi-
fications that add to or alter original capabilities without replaciiig I},aFusJ:ivN s. The Soviets iegn e11-
phasizing 1,oth approaches about four years ago (bid, p. 553-54). Neverthees, tLe ditferetiations d, cried
are essentially correct.
9 There are exceptions, as with any rule of thumb. The U.S. Armv, for example, no 1lo' er uses M- S tanks.
but M-48A5s are being equipped with new diesel engines and 105121111 guns for our Marines. Many itt ns
retired by U.S. armed forces still serve some allies.
10 Title 10, United States Code, Chapter 307. Section 3062; Cha-ter 503, S ciion 5012: :nd Chapter fl7,
Section S061. See sunimary and amplification at Anne B uider heading "Operational Functions of ,.S.
Armed Forces."
It See for example Canby, Steven L., NATO Muscle: More ha(iow Than ciii -e, 1orei-n iwicy.
Fall 1972. p. 44-16: also Lawrence, Richard I). and Records. Joffry, V F.S. orkce S1 i, i in in NA Tor k p.
Some authorities suggest that both studies underestimate Soviet staying power if >o. diI ic ies in
I .S. Soviet cono#epts stilt are clearly evident.
12 Understandizg Soviet Naval 1)evelopments, Washil-1 on. Office of the ('hief of Njval 0 pr ii ,
April, 1975, p 1P: aid Spurt. Russell, Moscow: Drawitig ithn'A i.n &wilines, Far ,n j" 'Ic
Review, October 31, 175, p. 26 34.



Total force concepts
When the United States began to retrench during final stages of the
conflict in Vietnam, the Defense Department placed increasing em-
phasis on so-called Total Force Concepts, which count on collective
security and reserve components to offset reductions in our active
duty establishment.1 Soviet leaders rely more on active forces and
le. oi allies to support national interests. Those conflicting policies
e'it iibute substantially to comparative force postures reflected in
Figure 2 and Annex A.
( Welical c"1,backs
( atback in U.S. ariiic forces have followed every American war
finc, \ve won our ill(lependence. The current cycle began about 1970.
Single tlien, (irawdownsl have been drastic. No service escaped the
knife, as the Air Force (id after the Korean conflict. Te Aimv has
been sliced in half since personnel strengths reached high points in
196S (1,570,000 then, 790*000 now). Soviet personnel, vhich exceeded
our own by S5-7,09)0 in 195, currently surpass us by about 2.7 million.'"
Their weapons inventory dilates similarly, while ours declines.
U.S. deci1,on-makers intended to constitute a smaller force which
modernization measures would endow with greater capabilities than
its predecessors. However, rates of retraction exceeded those of
refurbiLhmh ent. Size, therefore, was reduced without concomitant
incres,,"es in strength. Moreover, the higher performance of new
systens does not always compensate for the sharp reduction of flexi-
b'ilitv caused by fewer numbers.
All-coli nicer force
Three decades of U.S. conscription ended in January 1973, when
draft calls registered zero, although the Selective Service System still
functions on a standby basis."1
America's withdrawal from Indochina, implementation of the Nixon
Doctrine (which demanded fewer general purpose forces than previous
containment policies), budgetary difficulties, public opinion, and re-
evaluations of pressing threats led U.S. leaders to establish manpower
requirements at 2.2 million in 1973.16 That ceiling has remained almost
The United States probQbly could slightly exceed stated recruiting
limits in these times of tight economy, but if society were more afflu-
ent, we would face serious problems filling quotas. In either event,
this country is compelled to stress reserve components. Influences on
the balance of U.S. and Soviet active forces thus are adverse.
13' Laird, Melvin R.. Statement before the House Armed Services Committee on the FY
1972-1976 Defense Program and the 1972 Defense Budget, Washington, Department of
Defense, March 9, 1971, p. 21.
14 See the following table:
1965 1975

Soviet personnel---------------------------------------------3510,000 4,812,000
U.S. personnel ----------------------------------------------2,653,000 2, 134, CCO
Difference-----------------------------------------------857,000 2,678,000
Figures include stratf gic offensive and defensive personnel, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and
Soviet border guards.
15 Military Manpower Requirements Report for FY 1974, Washington, Department of Defense, February,
1973, p. 1-2.
16 Ibid., p. 5.
17 The FY 1976 manpower authorization is slightly less than 2.1 million. Public Law 94-106, October 8,


Money for manpower
The cost of U.S. (lefense maiipower has (lolll)le(l ( liriig tiOe )ast
decade; owing to the iiiitiatioii of annil ly ) raises 811.d
a one-time inIcrease to make our Al1-Vol intteer Force feasible. Pay an i
allowances now absorb abot, t 5, percent of tlie defeiise bh l,,(4. As-
sociated outlatys for troop liosiii1, re various other activities presenltly pitsh the tot al close to) 65 celtts olit >i
every dollar.'8 Relative shares for iillpliower !have bot. sit!)iliz&(], htl
absolute outlays will cotim to oclimi bas t)rohram iehiii < increases periodically Ktake effect.11
The impact on force mo(lerrizalioin is iii iicse. ?,Iai)owev (1 S
added to inescapable expemlitutres for operations ali(t failit'eIl(' ( ,'
sharply re(luce funds for resea el, developi'iewit, ald proel un'!m(ei fit ,()-
grams in an inflationary envivonluient thiat casts p'ies to ('s'ulaUe.2
The Soviet Union, with far lower palys c ales ( a cojitrolle! (,c less afflicted by inflation, could afford a larger force and i ,ileiii :t
a more rapid rate ifits total defense btidget were exactly te .samte as
that of the United States.21
Particular policy decisions
A spate of subordinate policies, most of them ,deriedt at l:,ea. 1 1-
directly from the seven above, affect United State./Soviet asynnilet ies
in specific functional areas. The following list is depictive, rather t11ani
Strategic nuclear policies
U.S. defense decision-makers settled on a strategic nuclear triad ()f
bombers, ICBMN and SLBMs in the late 1950s, and h.ve clumg to it
ever since, whereas the Soviets stress land-based ballistic n issies
and downplay manned aircraft.12 America' s mixed force matrix N\ias
focused primarily on city targeting early in the 1960s to acconui our second-strike strategy of Assured Destiuction, which preserve(
deterrencee by means of a "balance of terror." Capabilities WCeve'
required to eradicate "s one-fifth to one-fourth of the [Soviet]
population and one half of [Soviet] industrial capacity".23
Beyond those finite demands, U.S. (lecision-makers believed tb~it
relative strengths were irrelevant. The Defense Department placed
less credence in the number of delivery vehicles than in the stock
Is Schlesinger, James R. Report to the Congress on the FY 1976 and Transition Budgets, p. 123-126.
19 Public Law 90-207, 90th Congress, (81 Stat. 649), Section 8.
20 Schlesinger, James R. Report to the Congress on the FY 1976 and Transition Budgets, 1). Di.
21 Soviet pay and allowances were an estimated 18-25 percent of the total defense ludget iit 169, I1 e,' s
date for which unclassified data are available. Cohn, Stanley H., Economic Burden of I)efense E_\penwiu ures.
A chapter in U.S. Congress, Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies, a Coompendiun of Iapers Sulmni I-
ted to the Joint Economic Committee. 93d Congress, 1st Session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Oil., 1973,
p. 150.
Such comparisons are always suspect. The Soviet defense budget is secret. Segients are coiicealed ul Ic r
civil headings. Expenditures are enumerated differently than in the United States. Rut les are dillicli In
convert accurately into dollars. Most Western calculations therefore are based oil one of tNN 11w1 l od(loigl S.
The first, which manipulates published Soviet data to correspond with U.S. categoriesand exchuIiges rut h's
for U.S. currency, risks undereslimating the Kremlin's expenditures. The second, which jiidges how inuich it
world cost to duplicate visible Soviet defense efforts in U.S. dollars, risks overosiniat iontis.
22 About 30 percent of all U.S. warheads are on ICBi\Is, as opposed to 80 percent for lhe Soviet liOl.
MIRVing Soviet ICBMs may push that proportion to well over 90 percent unless Moscow elecls to inzi all
multiple warheads on SLBMs.
23 McNamara, Robert S., Statement before the Senate Armed Services ('onimnit lee on fle I' 1'.1 73
Defense Program and 1969 Defense Budget, Washington, epartment of Defese,, "Ja, 22, 196", p. 30.


of separately targetable nuclear warheads.24 That conclusion strongly
influenced this country to install MIRVs, instead of augmenting its
inventory of bombers and ballistic missiles. Our ICBM/SLBM
holdings have stayed static at 1054 and 656 respectively since 1967,
while Soviet launchers increased.
None of the U.S. weapons systems were expressly engineered with
the requisite combinations of accuracy, payload, yield, and responsive-
ness to neutralize time-sensitive hard targets like missiles in silos,
because city targets are soft, sprawling areas. The Soviets, by way of
contrast, specialize in heavy ICBMs and high megatonnage.
Arms control accords have also shaped the balance since 1972.
Phase I of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) produced
an AB I reaty that, with the amending protocol two years later,
restricts each side to a single ABM site containing no more than 100
missiles.2' The SALT I interim agreement on strategic offensive
sN-stems "froze" selected force levels for the period May 1972-
October 1977 (see Figure 4), pending more lasting arrangements
now addressed by SALT II negotiators. U.S. officials seek essential
Tactical nuclear policies
A smorgasbord of tactical nuclear weapons was technologically
feasible in the late 1950s. The United States experimented with all
or most before deciding to stress adaptable aircraft and artillery that
hopefully have sufficient accuracy and small enough yields to fight a
limited nuclear war in crowded NATO Europe without causing
unconscionable civilian casualties and collateral damage, yet still
function effectively in conventional combat.27
24 Ibid., p. 52. Decisions, for example, were taken in 1961 to reduce the planned number of Titan squadrons.
Atlas ICBMs were retired in 1964. The Minuteman program was compressed from 1,200 to 1,000 missiles
that same year. Data received telephonically from Air Force Systems Command Historical Office, Jan. 9,
25 The SALT ABM Treaty permitted each side two ABM sites, one to defend the capital city, a second
to cover ICB Ms. The Protocol reduces authorization to one site each. U.S. Congress. House. Legislation on
Foreign Relations, With Explanatory Notes, by House Committee on Foreign Affairs and Senate Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations. Joint Committee Print. 93d Congress, 2d Session. Washington, U.S. Govt.
Print. Off., March 1974, p. 1175-1179; U.S. Congress. Senate. Protocol of the Treaty with the U.S.S.R.
on the Limitation of ABM Systems. Executive 1, 93-2, Sept. 19, 1974. In Legislative Calendar, Committee.
on Foreign Relations, 93d Congress, 1st Session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., Jan. 2, 1975. p. 14.
26 SALT I and II interrelationships, together with current stumbling blocks, are summarized in Collins,
John M., SALT II Issues (Issue Brief Number IB 75074), Washington, Congressional Research Service,
updated as of November 13, 1975. 21 p.,
27 For general background see Schlesinger, James R., The Theater Nuclear Posture in Europe: A Report
1o the United States Congress in Compliance with Public Law 93-365. Washington, Department of Defense,
1975. 30 p.
Honest John rockets, the least accurate of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, have largely been replaced by
Lance missiles.
U.S. R&D programs for mobile MR BMs were cancelled in 1964. Thor and Jupiter missiles were removed
from Western Europe and Turkey that same year. Data received telephonically from Air Force Historical
Office, Jan. 9, 1976.



Delivery system States U.S.S.R.

"Freeze" level, May 1972 1. ..-------------------------------------------1,054 1,608
Max conversion 3. ..-------------------------------------------------- 1,000 1,399
Already converted. ..----------------------------------------------------0 32
Current status. ..---------------------------------------------------1,054 1,603
"Heavy" ICBM's: 4
Pre-1964 models:
"Freeze" level, May 19721-------------------------------------------------54 209
Exchanged for SLBM's. .. ...----------------------------------------------0 6 32
Current status. ..---------------------------------------------------54 177
Post-1964 models: "Freeze" level, May 1972 1------------------------------------ 0 313
Current total. ..-----------------------------------------------------54 613
"Freeze" level, May 1972 1. ..---------------------------------------------656 740
Maximum conversion6..-.-.-.-.................................................710 950
Current status. ..-----------------------------------------------------656 725
"Modern" ballistic missile submarines:
"Freeze" level, May 1972 8----------------------------------------------------- 41 43
Maximum conversion. ..-------------------------------------------------44 62
Current status -...... 41 45
Heavy bombers. .------------------------------------------------------- (10) (16)
Total ICBM, SLBM launchers:
"Freeze" level, May 1972 1----------------------------------------------1,710 2,348
Current status. ..-----------------------------------------------1,710 2,348

1 The "freeze" level of May 26, 1972, reflects Soviet delivery systems in operation and under construction at that time.
All Soviet figures are U.S. intelligence estimates, since Moscow refused to furnish statistics.
2 Open sources originally charged the U.S.S.R. with 1, 618 ICBM silos, but U.S. officials since have accepted about 10 of
those as command and control centers or training sites, rather than launchers for operational missiles.
3 Pre-1964 ICBVI's could be exchanged for SLBM's on a 1-for-1 basis, according to SALT I rules. Figures shown indicate
ceilings if that course were chosen. The U.S. ceiling of 710 SLBM's was mathematically unattainable. We could trade 43
of our 54 Titan ICBM's for 3 Poseidon boats with 16 launchers each or for 2 Trident boats with 24 launchers each. Either
alternative would increase the number of SLBM's to 704. unless we switch to SSBN's with more than 16 tubes.
4 Pre-1964 "heavy" ICBM's, by U.S.definition, included U.S. Titan Ii's (1962), Soviet SS-7's (1961), and SS-8's (163).
Post-1964 models, by U.S. definition, included all land-based ballistic missiles significantly larger than Soviet SS-11's.,
When the SALT I Interim Agreement was signed, only SS-9's qualified. This study counts 100 SS-19's (as of January 1976)
although SALT II accords may eventually consider them in the "light" ICBM category.
5 Some Soviet SS-7's and SS-8's have been dismantled and exchanged for 2 nuclear-powered SLBM submarines.
6 Soviet pre-1964 SLBM's on diesel submarines did not count, but those on H-class nuclear-powered boats did. Figures
shown indicate the ceiling if the maximum allowable number of ICBM's were converted to SLBM's.
; SALT I limitations did not include 10 Soviet H-class nuclear-powered submarines or 22 G-class diesel-powered boats.
The former are armed with 3 SS-N-5 SLBM's each (range about 750 nautical miles). The latter carry 3 SS-N-5's or 3
SS-N-4's (range 350 nautical miles).
8 Only 25 Y-class Soviet ballistic missile submarines were in service in May 1972. All 41 U.S. SSBN's were operational.
9 Soviet submarines 44 and 45 replace an estimated 32 SS-7's and SS-8's. See footnote 5 above.
10 Not covered by SALT I.

The Soviets in contrast elected to emphasize unipurpose inter-
mediate- and medium-range ballistic missiles, along with free rockets.
None of their systems are capable of discriminating nuclear combat-
the yields are too large and they are too erratic. Airfields, ports,
logistical bases, command/control installations, and other area
targets (many of which are collocated with German cities) could be
engaged most effectively.28

28 Wolfe, Thomas W., Soviet Power and Europe, 1945-1970, Baltimore, The Johns Ilopkinis Press, 1970,
p. 197-199, 203, 20(j, 211, 456-458.


General purpose force policies
Records are replete with general purpose force policies that account
for asymmetries in the United States/Soviet military balance. This
section silhouettes four (one for each service) as illustrations.
Soviet assembly lines turned out about 9,000 heavy tanks before
they ceased production about 1962. An estimated 2,500 still are
combat-effective. This country, however, never put much store in
heavy tanks, and discontinued development a decade earlier than the
Soviets, None remain in service. Instead, U.S. armored elements are
equipped with more versatile mediums that trade steel plate protection
for sp-ee|, maneuverability, air mobility, and ability to operate in
areas were bridge capacities are low and terrain is somewhat re-
The Soviet Navy specializes in ship-killing cruise missiles. An
estimated 108 major combatants (including 68 submarines) and 135
fast patrol boats are so equipped. The U.S. Navy, which has nothing
coml)arable, assigns such roles to 14 aircraft carriers 10 and traditional
submarines armed with torpedoes, as an outgrowth of policy de-
cisions taken two decades ago.3' The consequent imbalance will
persist until the United States begins to deploy Harpoon missiles
in quantity (beginning late in 1976).
America's fighter/attack aircraft (Navy and Marine, as well as
Air Force) all perform deep interdiction missions and provide close
air support for ground combat units as a matter of policy. The Soviet
Union would depend heavily on MRBMs and IRBMs for the former
task in a nuclear war, and emphasizes massed tube artillery, mortars,
and multiple rocket launchers along lines of contact between Soviet
and enemy forces.
Differences between tactical fighter inventories of U.S. and Soviet
Air Forces thus are greater than statistics in Annex A indicate. Our
aircraft generally have greater range, payload capacities, choices of
ordnance, and loiter abilities. Soviet counterparts are comparatively
simple, light, maneuverable, and less vulnerable on the ground, since
they can fly from primitive strips that permit far greater dispersal than
that enjoyed by U.S. forward-based fighters.32
The United States Marine Corps, organized, trained, equipped, and
psychologically conditioned as an elite air/ground team, exists pri-
marily to seize and defend lodgments on foreign shores in support of
U.S. foreign policy predicated on collective security principles.33 The
29 U.S. Congress. House. Military Tank Procurement. Tenth report by the Committee on Government
Operations. 85th Congress. ist Session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1957, p. 16.
30 One U.S. attack carrier was decommissioned in January, 1976. Another will leave active service before
the close of FY 1976.
31 U.S. Congress. House. Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 12564 before the Committee on Armed
Services. Part 2 of 4 Parts. Subcommittee No. 3 (Seapower). 93d Congress, 2d session. Washington, U.S.
Govt. Print. Off., 1974, p. 1003.
?2 Military Forces Handbook: Military Forces of the UI.S.S.R. and Peoples Republic of China, Washington,
U.S. Air Force Systems Command. 1975, p. 13-14.
33 See "Operational Functions of Armed Forces", Annex B.

Soviet Union, which conducts its few overseas olperations lihroi tl
proxies, as yet has no analogous l)olicy, although al emergillg aim-
phibious assault force suggests that the Kremlin soon may tlave than token intervention capabilities iii Africa and Sotitl Aia.
Strategic mobi11ty policies
U.S. )oli(ie, have sup)p)Orted strategic air t ral5l)(Ot since tlie early
1960s, when Congress and the Execuitive Bralch collaborat e IIII
efforts to correct shortcomilngs. Sllcc1e(l1mg crises;, s!wc11 as t hose iII
Berlin, Cuba, Vietnam, an i Israel,i tlnlersc()e 't ttle illl) adIequate intercontinental airlift to 1)Voject U.s. 1,,pwe.r fii(liO/ > l)ly
allies. Assets afforded1 by C "-s and (,,1",,thus are
anywhere in the WOPl A4
Deploying U.S. force, without being al)Ie to silst.-in ttlemn coitl(
sow the seeds of disaster. Corollary sealiftt forces ('oi-e(q ttl* N are
required,d but our Merchant Marine has )eel al\owe(t to lg1Ii-l1.
Only 118 ships remain in the Military Sealift Collmfanld ( oltr olle(l
Fleet, including 14 in rea(ly reserveereduce(d operating statlls .36 In
accord with national policy, we therefore place extrao'diiia'y (el)en(1-
ence (95 percent) on U.S.-owned, but 1)rivately-ol)erated, commercial
carriers that fly foreign flags and are manned by alien crews who owe
this country no allegiance.31 Many of the ships are poorly suited for
military purposes. Total force policies also pass heavy resl)onsibility
to selected allies, who are expected to provide shi)s and relatedI serv-
ices in times of common emergency, including offloading assistance
and oI)erations to clear supillies from terminal areas.
The Soviet M.lerchant Marine, by contrast, consists In aili]V of
modern, highly-automated ships that currently carry more than half
of all the Kreinlin's transoceanic cargo. Coordination with the Soviet
Navy is complete.31

U.S. quanttatire superiority
Areas of U.S. qtuantitative superiority over the Soviet Union are
indicated on Figure 5. Some are negative or neutral in vale. Some
facilitate strong leverage in other contexts, but have almost no sigif-
icfnce in terms of the United States Soviet balance. S'me 1oerln;
affect p)erceptioi-, but provi(ie few cre(lible capaitilities. ()-,ily a few
confer conclusive advantage on the Unitcd States.
3' MeNarnara. Robert S., Statement on the FY 1969-73 Defense Budget, p. 130-140.
35 More than 95 percent of all U.S. military bulk cargo bound for Vietnam moved by sea, including aviation
36 Statistics f'lrnished by Military Sealift Command, as of October 3, 1975.
37 UnderstandiIn Soviet Naval I)evelopnents, p. 39.
3S Ibid., 1). 3) -40.



United States Soviet Union U.S. Margin

Strategic offensive:
MIRVed ICBM. ..-------------------------------------------550 110 440
MIRVed SLBM. ..-------------------------------------------416 0 416
ALCM. ..-----------------------------------------------1,140 185 955
Heavy bombers.. ..-----------------------------------------463 135 328
Tankers. ..-----------------------------------------------615 50 565
ICBMlSLBM warheads. ..------------------------------------ 6,794 3,442 3,352
Strategic defense: None. ...----------------------------------------NA NA NA
Ground forces:
Airmobile divisions. ...-----------------------------------------1 0 1
Infantry divisions....------------------------------------------6 0 6
Marine divisions....-------------------------------------------3 0 3
Nuclear artillery pieces....-------------------------------------450 0 450
Helicopters2 -------------------------------------------------9, 487 2,580 6, 907
Naval forces:
Personnel 3-.-.-......------------------------------------------ 515,400 386,000 129, 400
Attack carriers------------------------------------------- 14 0 14
Helicopter carriers..------------------------------------------7 2 0
Cruisers 4------------------------------------------------------ 27 13 14
Destroyers 4--------------------------------------------- 70 65 5
Nuclear-powered attack subs 4------------------------------------62 35 27
Carrier aircraft. --------------------------------------- 1,508 53 1,455
Marine fighteriattack aircraft 5-------------------------------- 468 0 468
Mobility forces: Strategic airlift..-----------------------------------300 60 240

1 Excludes United States FB-111's and Soviet Backfire bombers.
2 Helicopters include 487 in the U.S. Marine Corps.
3 Excludes ballistic missile submarine forces.
4 Cruisers and destroyers exclude SSM types.
3 U.S. Air Force and Marine shore-based fighterilattack aircraft combined fail to equal Soviet counterparts (2,768 to
Note: See Annex A for sources and explanatory notes.

Superiority disadvantageous
The United States has 129,000 more general purpose Navy personnel
than the Soviet Union. Differences are due principally to U.S. logistic
support and administrative elements that afford unparalleled staying
power. Nonetheless, this country uses many more people than the
opposition to operate fewer ships. That phenomenon deprives other
defense sectors of much-needed funds in this era marked by high
manpower costs.

Superiority deceptive
Token U.S. superiority in infantry, airmobile, and marine divisions
is smothered by the Soviet total (19 to 168). Even if one U.S. division
equalled two of the Kremfin's, which sometimes is true for personnel
strengths but surely not combat power,"9 40 Soviet Category 1 divi-
sions in north-central Europe outnumber our five by 4:1. Using that
same criterion, Warsaw Pact divisions still outnumber NATO counting
all ready reinforcements.
America's numerical advantage in conventional cruisers and de-
strovers disappears when Soviet SSM ships are included in the tally
(27 U.S. cruisers, 33 Soviet; 70 U.S. destroyers, 85 Soviet). Moscow's
overall edge in escort-type vessels is 223 to 195, if one counts ships in
our Naval Reserve, but excludes Coast Guard vessels.
Similarly, the two-to-one U.S. numerical predominance in nuclear
attack submarines is almost nullified if Soviet nuclear-powered cruise
missile submarines (which carry torpedoes as well as SSMs) are
considered: 62 U.S.; 75 Soviet.

39 Soviet tank divisions have half as many men as ours. Their motorized rifle divisions are two-thirds
the size of U.S. mechanized divisions. Tank strengths in each case are about equal.
40 Total escort figures include cruisers, destroyers, frigates, corvettes, and other escorts of all types.


Superiority an am biglotis asset
Manned bomibers, the original coin 1)onent of tlie U.s. st rategic
1ucle artriad, must penetrate increasinUgly effectiveC e( (fen'e11-
in-dep)th to reach targets Tliey iave little ,al)lit\ to ei gage it e-
sensitive targets (such as I( B ls), since lliglit are measll e(I in ea lV
hours, not minutes. Consequently, sonie s.,ke)tics assert that U.S.
sup)eIoity in strategic aircraft and short -range ,at tack i ile
(SRAM) i- a dubious asset.4 As they see it, U.'S. (leterrent )owers
depend much more on ballistic missiles, which could strike swiftly
and would be "home free" in the absence, of a >otindI Soviet AW~f
Inmen-se U.S. superiority in MIRV launcher r- and ballistic inissile
warheads is often lauded. American lreeminence clearly affect,
peacetime perceptions to our benefit, at home and abroad. Fixed-sIte
ICBMs could survive a sneak attack with greater retaliatory caIpa-
bilities than would be preserved if each silo contained a single warhead.
Beyond that, however, the practical utility of many IIRVs i,
problematic, in the opinion of many observers. Most Soviet c ounter-
force targets would be inmune to a U.S. second strike, since Soviet
reserves could be launched on warning. Huge stocks of U.S. XlIRVs
will be inessential for assured destruction missions until Moscow
deploys a comprehensive and credible ABM system presentl
proscribed by SALT), because a handful of survivable _iIRVed
missiles could cover sufficient targets. MIIRVs would be equally
superfluous for fighting a "tit-for-tat" war. Some critics therefore
believe that maintaining U.S. superiority in i\IIRVs would divert
dollars that could be used better to correct known deficiencies else-
where in our defense establishment.
Helicopters are another ambiguous asset. They provided unsur-
passed battlefield mobility in Vietnam, but whether similar employ-
ment would be possible in NATO Europe's high-risk air defense
environment is subject to conjecture. If not, our numerical superiority
would lose significance.
Superiority an assured asset
America's amphibious landing forces (but not amphibious lift) are
much more numerous than three Marine divisions indicate, because
several Army divisions are also qualified. The consequent flexibility
opens up U.S. options not otherwise available.
U.S. carrier air power is also greater than statistics show. Marine,
as well as Navy, fighter/attack squadrons are trained to operate
afloat when required. Soviet and proxy forces in under-develot)ed
areas still rely almost exclusively on land-based air support, and en-
tirely lack high-performance carrier aircraft. The U.S. edge thus is
41 SRAMs can be used to improve the penetration powers of manned bombers by suppressing enemy
defenses. They can also engage static targets of other kinds. To do so, however, the bombers they accom-
pany must first breech enemy defenses-in-depth, since SRAM's effective range is only about 100 miles.
42 Many military men discourage attempts to analyze components of the U.S. strategic nuclear triad in
isolation, since the synergistic effects of mixed forces far exceed the capabilities of any given system. Ballis-
tic missiles and manned aircraft (or other airbreathers, like cruise missiles) create wholly dissimilar dill-
culties for defenders. The Soviets, not knowing where U.S. bombers might strike, must cover all critical
points, whether we have many aircraft or few. Further, the current mix of U.S. forces confronts the Kremlin
with insoluble first-strike scheduling problems. SLBMs, with flight times of six to ten minutes from firing
positions along our continental shelf, might catch B-52s on strip alert, but still lack the accuracy and
yields to crush missile silos. Soviet ICBMs, enroute about half an hour, are best-suited for such targets, but
would allow SAC ample time to "scramble" its bombers. U.S. SSBNs at sea are almost invulnerable in any
case, given Moscow's present ASW capabilities.
This section, which acknowledges the need for mixed forces, simply suggests that future effectiveness
might be improved by amending the mix to counter Soviet countermeasures.



United States/Soviet quantitative equality
Between U.S. quantitative superiority on one hand and Soviet
quantitative superiority on the other is a zone of approximate equality,
where asymmetries are minor (Figure 6).
lActive forces only]
United States Soviet Union Difference
Strategic offensive: Light ICBM's-------------------------------- 1,000 990 10
Strategic defensive: ABM missiles..---------------------------------100 64 36
Ground Forces: None. ...------------------------------------------ NA NA NA
Naval Forces:
Escorts 2. ..-----------------------------------------------98 105 7
Patrol/ASW aircraft ashore..-----------------------------------450 360 90
ASW helicopters afloat-------------------------------------- 80 53 27
Air Forces: Total tactical aircraft. . ..-------------------------------- 5,000 5,350 350
Mobility Forces: None. ..-----------------------------------------NA NA NA
1 This study counts all Soviet SS-19 ICBM's as "heavies", although SALT II accords may eventually consider them in
the "light" category.
2 Escorts on this table exclude cruisers, destroyers, and U.S. Coast Guard vessels. They include 34 U.S. Naval Reserve
Note: See Annex A for sources and explanatory notes.
The balance between light ICBMs is important, because that
category contains most of the land-based ballistic missiles on both
Neither country enjoys credible ABM capabilities. The U.S. site at
Grand Forks, North Dakota, which functioned briefly as an active
R&D facility, is being shut down, except for Perimeter Acquisition
Radar and related facilities. The Congress expects "that the interceptor
missiles and warheads will be expeditiously evacuated." 41 Even so,
parity will continue to pertain for all practical purposes. The 64
Soviet ABM missiles around Moscow- could be easily saturated.
The quantitative standoff in fixed- and rotary-wing ASW aircraft is
meaningful only when measured against missions. Neither side has
sufficiency, given current submarine strengths.44
Equal totals of tactical aircraft are far less important than superior-
ity in particular types, such as fighter/attack.
Soviet quantitative superiority
United States/Soviet correlations militarily immaterial
Soviet quantitative superiority in any given category is of little
concern when offensive forces or weapons systems compete against
dissimilar defenses. If the Kremlin increased its cruise missile holdings
by many multiples, there would be no call for this country to recipro-
cate in kind. Stronger SAM defenses would serve our purposes better.
Inequities are irrelevant where non-combat forces are concerned. Each
side sizes according to missions, not enemy counterparts. Figure 7
indicates cases where correlations consequently are immaterial, except
perhaps for perceptions.
43 U.S. Congress. House. Department of Defense Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1976, Conference Report to
accompany H. R. 9861. Report No. 94-710. 94th Congress, 1st Session. December 10, 1975, p. 28.
44 Soviet ASW concentrates essentially on U.S. ballistic missile submarines. Our ASW efforts are directed
primarily against Soviet attack submarines, which challenge U.S. abilities to control sea lanes and protect
shipping in emergency.


[Active forces only]

United States Soviet Union Soviet margin

Strategic offensive:
SLBM's ----------------------------------------------- 656 725 69
SLCM's-----------..--------------------------------------- 0 348 348
Ballistic missile submarines----------------------------------- 41 73 32
Medium bombers. ....-----------------------------------------66 500 434
Strategic defensive:
SAM launchers------------------------------------------ 330 9,500 9,170
Interceptors -------------------------------------------- 396 2,700 2,304
Ground Forces: SSM ------------------------------------------ 180 1,853 1,673
Naval Forces:
Amphibious ships 1 .--------------------------------------------57 85 28
Patrol boats.....---------------------------------------------- 7 230 223
Shore-based bombers. ...---------------------------------------0 480 480
Air Forces: Reconnaissance aircraft-------------------------------- 340 750 410
Mobility Forces:
Strategic sealift. ..---------------------------------------- 1,009 2, 358 1,349
Tactical airlift 2..-.-...-----------------------------------------------------------. 500 800 300

I Amphibious ships exclude helicopter carriers.
2 U.S tactical airlift includes reserve C-130's.
Note: See Annex A for sources and explanatory notes.

[Active forces only]

United States Soviet Union Soviet margin

Strategic offense:
Heavy1. .. ..---------------------------------------------54 613 559
Total. ..--------------------------------------------1,054 1,603 549
Strategic defense: None...---------------------------------------NA NA NA
Ground Forces:
Army personnel.. ..--------------------------------------- 789, 100 2, 500, 000 1,710, 900
Divisions _2-----------------------------------------------------------------------------19 168 149
Main battle tanks 2------------------------------------------------------------------8, 975 34, 650 25, 675
Armored carriers --------------------------------------- 19, 000 40, 000 21,000
Tube artillery3 ----------------------------------------- 5,610 17, 150 11,540
Naval Forces:
SSM cruisers. .. ..---------------------------------------------0 20 20
SSM destroyers------------------------------------------- 0 20 20
Attack submarines....-----------------------------------------73 253 180
Air Forces: Fighter/attack 4.........................................2,300 3, 590 1,290
Mobility Forces: None----------------------------------------- NA NA NA

I This study counts all Soviet SS-19 ICBM's as "heavies," although SALT Ii accords may eventually consider them in
the "light" category.
2 Includes Army and Marines.
3 Artillery includes Army and Marine conventional and nuclear capable pieces.
4 Fighter/attack aircraft exclude those based on carriers.

Un ited States/Soviet correlations militarily important
The balance in any given category affects military capabilities
directly when like offensive forces or weapons systems con e)te aaiist
each other: U.S. divisions versus Soviet divisions; U.S. fighterair.caft
versus similar Soviet aircraft; and so on. Examples are indicated in
Figure 8. Regional balances frequently are more important than total
inventories, as already noted.
U.S. quality compensates for quantities in different degrees. U.S.
overages in some categories could counteract shortages elsewbhel e
(more SAMs, fewer interceptors, for example, but we are strong in
neither). However, certain imbalances create distinct disadvantages.


Soviet quantitative superiority in ICBMs may soon imperil the
U.S. second-strike force of ballistic missiles in silos. At the very least,
America's ICBM launchers should outnumber Moscow's anticipated
stock of warheads with single-shot kill probabilities. Otherwise, the
U.S.S.R. at some time in the future might compromise one leg of the
U.S. triad.
Numerical imbalances between U.S./Soviet and NATO/Warsaw
Pact ground forces are considerable .4 Disparities both in deployed
strengths and ready reserves are especially evident in central Europe,
where our troops are spread very thinly. Five division equivalents in
the U.S. zone, including two armored cavalry regiments, cover a
250-kilometer (155-mile) front, approximately twice the desired dis-
tance. Those forces are insufficient to conduct a mobile defense, featur-
ing selected strong points well forward. We have no locally-available
reserves above division level.
The "small" U.S. contingent presently in place is to be reinforced
rapidly in emergency by elements now in the United States. Expedi-
tious arrival would depend on strategic warning, readily-available
airlift/sealift assets in adequate amounts, rapid action by NATO's
politico-military leaders, and the preservation of vulnerable reception
facilities in Europe, none of which is assured.46
Asymmetries between U.S. and Soviet cruisers, destroyers, and
attack submarine strengths also are important, because all such ships
can engage each other in combat. There is no direct relationship
between like systems, as there is for ICBMs, because submarines sink
surface ships, and vice versa, but numerical superiority nonetheless
would assist the so-called "one shot" Soviet Navy if a war of attrition
There is no consensus concerning the implications of many asym-
metries identified in foregoing sections. Those who believe in bald
U.S. superiority across the board discern impending disaster for the
United States. They recommend that America's military establish-
ment be reinforced immediately. Even those who prefer quantitative
parity as the U.S. force posture standard feel some queasiness when
confronted with statistics like those in Annex A.
Superiority and parity, however, are oriented exclusively on Soviet
holdings, without regard for real U.S. requirements. Sufficiency, a
better standard, concentrates on what this country can do despite
Soviet opposition, not on what each side has.47
The following exposition therefore focuses on possible conflicts
between available U.S./Soviet assets (Figures 5-8) and announced
U.S. aims (Figure 9). Findings are summarized on Figure 10.48
45 Refer back to Figure 2.
46 For fuller discussion, see Collins, John M., U.S. Military Support for NATO, p. 21-28.
47 Superiority is a force planning concept which demands markedly greater capabilities of certain kinds
than those possessed by opponents. Parity/essential equivalence is predicated on particular capabilities that
are approximately equal in overall effectiveness. Friendly and enemy numbers need not jibe in either case,
but statistical strengths tend to be overemphasized, because friendly force levels depend on the extent of
enemy deployments. By way of contrast, sufficiency as a force-sizing criterion calls for adequate abilities to
attain desired ends without undue waste. Superiority thus is essential in some circumstances; parity suffices
under less demanding conditions; and inferiority (qualitative as welltjas quantitative) sometimes is
48 See Annex B for force sufficiency factors.

FIGnuiFi 9.-U.S. aims to be accomplished
National security interests
Physical Securily
World Power
Self Determination
Freedom of Action
National security objectives
Deter aggression
Defend United States if deterrence fails
Safeguard other states whose security is linked with our own
Military roles and missions
Title 10, United States Code
Overcome aggressors that imperil U.S. peace and security
Conduct prompt and sustained operations on order
Protect U.S. shipping
DoD Amplification
Gain general air superiority
Gain general naval supremacy
Deal with one major and one minor contingency concurrently
U.S. objectives in NA TO Europe
Deter Warsaw Pact aggression
Defend without major loss of territory if deterrence fails
Maintain a high tactical nuelear threshhold
Strategic mobility aims
Reinforce and resupply NATO Europe in emergency
Facilitate U.S. operations elsewhere as required
Supply selected allies
U.S. defense commitments 1
Congressional resolutions
Executive agreements
Policy declarations, communiques
1 See Annex C for details.

FIGURE 10.-Key U.S. shortcominigs 1
Strategic nuclear problems
Prelaunch survivability of ICBMs
Postlaunch siirvivability of bombers
Defense for U.S. population, production base
NA TO-Related problems
Active Army small compared with global commitments
Key assets ext reinely concentrated
Absence of ABM defense in Europe
Cracks in the NATO alliance
Readiness/responsiveness of U.S. reserve components
Naval combat problems
Protect U.S. shipping/reinforce NATO
Navy small compared with global commitments
Surface combatants exposed to short-range missiles
ASW unable to cope with large-scale submarine threat
Amphibious lift insufficient for landing forces
Strategic mobility problems
Airlift insufficient to move ready reserves rapidly
Sealift depends on foreign-flag carriers
1 The Soviet Union is plagued with its own set of prol)lems. Some are precise ount erpt)arts of those shown
above. Others are different. Thus study concentrates on U.S. problems that call for U.S. solutions.


Present balance
Strategic nuclear problems
The present balance between U.S. and Soviet strategic offensive
forces would be degraded dramatically by pre- and post-launch
attrition at the onset of a general nuclear war. Our ICBMs and,
bombers both are vulnerable in different degrees. This country,
having absorbed a Soviet first strike, would have to retaliate with
truncated elements whose coordination and control could be disrupted.
Our forces would have to function in a chaotic atmosphere, where
nuclear effects (blast, heat, radiation) might drastically decrease
expected capabilities.
U.S. strategic defensive problems are perhaps even greater. If
deterrence should fail for any reason, and massive Soviet attacks hit
the United States, we would be exposed to the full effects, unable to
protect our population or production base. The Soviet Union, like
the United States, lacks sizable ABM capabilities but, unlike this
country, still stresses strong air and civil defenses.49 Some studies in
fact claim that city evacuation plans shortly will enable the Soviets to
engage in nuclear combat with far fewer casualties than this country.50
That contention is unconfirmed, but even partial defenses could
buttress the Kremlin's bargaining power in times of intense inter-
national crisis, by undercutting our second-strike Assured Destruction
NATO-related problems
The vulnerability of U.S. and allied ground combat, tactical air,
support, and command/control forces in central Europe increased
sharply when France withdrew from military participation m NATO.
At West Germany's waist, the theater now is barely 130 miles wide,
less than one-third the distance from Los Angeles to San Francisco.
Maneuver room for armies is at a premium. Congestion at air bases
approaches supersaturation. Some U.S. aircraft and logistical instal-
lations were repositioned in the United Kingdom, but most U.S.
supplies, including ammunition, are stored within a 30-mile radius of
Kaiserslautern. The first sharp Soviet surge could sever friendly sup-
ply lines, which radiate from Bremerhaven, Rotterdam, and Antwerp,
then run closely behind and parallel to the prospective front. Air-
fields also could be overrun.' Every lucrative military target, including
command/control centers, air bases, ports, and supply depots is
within easy reach of Soviet IRBMs and MRBMS.5" The absence of
ABM defenses thus is critical. The Soviets, who have less need for a
49 Titov, M.N., Yegorov, P.T., Gayko, B.A., and others, Civil Defense, Moscow, 1974. Translated from
the Russian. Ed. by G.A. Cristy, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (Document ORNL-TR-2845), July,
1975. 118 p.; Gourd, Leon, Soviet Civil Defense in the Seventies, Coral Gables, Florida, Center for Ad-
vanced International Studies, University of Miami, September, 1975, 128 p.; Scott, Harriet Fast, Civil
Defense in the USSR, Air Force Magazine, October, 1975, p. 29-33; Fact Sheet, Soviet Civil Defense, De-
fense Civil Preparedness Agency, May 2, 1973. p. 4.
50 Baker, Howard H., Jr. Reassessing and Refining Our Foreign Policy. Remarks in the Senate. Congres-
sional Record, June 24, 1975, p. Sl1410;
Wigner, Eugene P., The Myth of "Assured Destruction." Survive, July-August, 1970, pp. 2-4;
Defense Civil Preparedness Agency briefing of Post Nuclear Attack Study (PONAST) II, prepared by
JCS Studies Analysis and Gaming Agency on May 23, 1973. No pagination. (116 p.)
51 Bowen, John W., then Chief of Staff for the U.S. European Command, in personal correspondence to
the author, November 27, 1967. The situation he perceived at that time remains essentially unchanged.
France has not undertaken any agreement to realign herself militarily with NATO. The use of French
forces and territory in time of crises would be subject to a political decision. NATO therefore does not plan
on French participation. Senate Hearings on FY 73 Authorization for Military Procurement, Op. Cit.,
Part 2, p. 523. For implications of de Gaulle's decision to evict NATO forces from France see Moon, Gor-
don, A., I, "Uncertain Future," Army, March 1967 and "Invasion in Reverse" Army, February 1967.

tactical AB? J system and possess strong antiaircraft capabilities,
are not so disadvantaged.52
Total force coieJ)ts applied to NATO Europe als-o exhibit faw .
The entire south flank, for examl)le, i' shakY" ftrom the Atlantic
seaboard to Asia MnMor. Portugal has 1)eell politically niu1stable all(
militarily unreliable since piniola was outed(tl li autuIn 1974.
Italy, with continual government crises, a sick econoim3i anl a
strong Communist Part.\, faces serious G)olell. Greece ll('i Tu, ke
are more concerned with threats from each other thall from tln e
Warsaw Pact. French forces would assist in NATO's forxar d (I efolmie
only if French leaders concluded that French interests were e ndangoere(1.
U.S. reserve components display spotty degrees of resl)on-ivenes.
Some tactical fighter, reconnalsance, and(airliftunit-relitedlv
could be enroute to Europe almost immediately, others in 1e s than
10 days .51 Army National Guard divisions, despite recent improve-
ments in readiness, still would require weeks to receive personnel
and equipment fillers, complete team trainin, and deploy. (Soviet
Category 2 divisions allegedly could be on site in days) .5 If war witjI
the Warsaw Pact were Thort and decisive, a- some students of the
subject suggest, only those elements mobilized and positioned early
would count. The remainder would be ineffective, no matter how
impressive they might look on paper.+a
Naval combat problems
The scarcity of U.S. surface combatants compared with global
commitments and contingency requirements strains capabilities.
The U.S.S.R. can concentrate power where and when it wants befou'
hostilities break out, while the U.S. Navy must cover extended sea
Carrier aircraft and shipboard SAM defenses would afford a fair
shield for U.S. fleets if the Soviets fired anti-ship cruise missiles from
long range, but the U.S. Navy has almost no protection against
surprise attacks launched from close quarters. Soviet ships so armed
could stand close in during crises, perhaps interspersed with U.S.
elements, then strike suddenly with a high probability of success.
The Soviet inventory of ballistic missile and attack submarines
is a bit smaller than it was 10 years ago (376 then, 326 now), but
capabilities have expanded significantly, while U.S. cruiser, destroyer.
and escort strength declined by 131 shipR. We discarded nine aged
ASW carriers during the same -decade. That shift in the quantitative
balance, coupled with continued ASW detection dfliculties, seriouslv
impairs America's ability to protect sea lanes required for iml)o-taIlt
U.S. commerce and NATO resupply/reinforcement purpose-s Steps
to bottle up Soviet boats before war began might well provoke combat,
not prevent it. Outnumbered U.S. forces therefore would initially be
52 French and British ballistic missiles can reach targets on Soviet soil. but those in fixed sites are vulner-
able to surprise attacks by IRBMs, MRBMs, and SLBMs with short flight times. They might i htbe dh
stroyed, but their reliability would be in doubt.
53 U.S. Congress. Senate. Hearings Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Fi al Year P,73
Authorization for Military Procurement. Part 2 of 6 Parts. 91d Congress, Ist Session. Waslhiziin.o U.S.
Govt. Print. Off., 19,72, p. 1123.
5 Data received from Office of the .oint Chiefs of Staff (J-5) on January 16, 1976.
55 Greater reliance on brigade and battalion-sized Army National (}uar4 forces, and iess on full divisio.s ,
recently was amounced by former )efense Secretary Schlesinger. Ieocontended iii it "we s>iouui-1 ,-
pretending that we can use [National Guard and Reserve divisions as full substit tis for active hit .vyLroii
forces." Guard Divisions Played Down, Army Times, March 1, 1975, p. 31.
M Includes ships in U.S. Naval Res re, but excludes Coast Guard.


compelled to find, fix, fight, and finish Soviet submarines beneath
open seas. Enemy boats returning to base for refills would have to
transit attrition barriers at choke points, but before then they could
deal great damage.57
Assault sealift problems are also imposing. One marine amphibious
force (MAF)-a marine division with its associated air wing-normally
embarks on 48 amphibious ships.58 U.S. Navy holdings today total
just 64, including seven helicopter carriers. Ten on the average are
undergoing overhaul at any one time. The 48-ship requisition thus
constitutes 88 percent of all operational assets. Only half of our am-
phibious lift is available in the Atlantic area. The remainder is located
along the U.S. west coast and elsewhere in the Pacific. Lead times to
assemble, load, move, and conduct a division-sized amphibious
assault would approximate two months from time of alert.59 Whether
such operations could succeed under general war conditions is
Strategic mobility problems
Increased dependence on strategic reserves in the United States
instead of forward deployment places increased demands on mobility
America's airlift assets, the world's best, still exhibit shortcomings.
Figure 5 shows 300 aircraft (70 C-5As and 230 C-141s) in operational
squadrons, but a substantial slice is grounded for maintenance at any
given moment.60 Moving our only airborne division to the Middle
East (where Brezhnev threatened to commit ground combat troops
during the 1973 Arab-Israeli crisis) would take a week if alert times
permitted prior preparation, longer if not.6 Flights to NATO Europe
are shorter, but lift requirements are much larger. A lengthy period
thus would elapse before all airlifted elements closed.
U.S. sealift dependence on foreign flags has already been discussed
(see strategic mobility policies).
Projected balance
Nothing in United States/Soviet R&D, deployment, or budgetary
trends is likely to eliminate the problems just enumerated. A few will
be eased. Others will be exacerbated.
Research and development
Air- and land-mobile missiles now in design stages would reduce
pre-launch attrition threats to U.S. ICBMs, if a sizeable percentage
of our present force were converted. Better low-level performance and
penetration aids should improve post-launch survival prospects for
future U.S. bombers, although evolving Soviet countermeasures en-
sure continued sharp competition Other strategic offensive R&D
57 Sea control problems related to potential Middle East oil crises are covered in U.S. Congress. House.
Oil Fields as Military Objectives: A Feasibility Study. Prepared for the Special Subcommittee on In-
vestigations of the Committee on International Relations by the Congressional Research Service. 94th
Congress, 1st Session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975, pp. 19-20, 66-67.
58 Statistics were drawn from a Marine Corps Command and Staff manual. They would be modified to
meet specific contingencies, but requirements would be similar.
59 Schlesinger, James R., Report to the Congress on the FY 1976 and Transition Budgets, p.11-93. Supple-
mented by telephone conversation with Operations and Amphibious Matters Branch, Headquarters, U.S.
Marine Corps, June 27, 1975.
60 Airlift availability rates were reviewed in Report to the Congress: Airlift Operations of the Military
Airlift Command During the 1973 Middle East War, Washington, Comptroller General of the United States
(GAO), April 16, 1975, pp. 10-15, 57-58.
61 Includes roughly 11,000 men, a basic load of ammunition, and five-day supplies of rations and fuel.
Statistics furnished telephonically by staff members of the 82d Airborne Division, April 8, 1975.
62 U.S. bombers on final approaches to many Soviet targets would have to overfly open water or flat
terrain that facilitate low-level radar coverage for air defenders.

programs, like bigger ballistic missiles and maneuverable reentry
vehicles (MaRV), do little to circumvent key shortcomings. Perfecting
cruise missiles might strengthen short-term "U.S. deterrence, but night
also prove to be a long-term liability if the Soviets deploy equivalent
systems: they have stout air defenses, whereas we do not.
U.S. and Soviet scientists both seek to solve ABM problems, but no
breakthroughs appear imminent. The Department of Defense has
no programs that specifically concern air defense for the United States.
R&D related to U.S. civil defense receives very low priority.
Laser-guided anti-tank weapons, "smart" bombs, new artillery
ammunition, and SAM-D are among the R&D innovations U.S.
forces count on to compensate for superior Soviet numbers in NATO
Europe, but science offers no other relief for U.S. shortcomings.One
crucial problem, the absence of ABM defenses, is susceptible to R&D
solutions, but if a suitable system surfaced tomorrow, the SALT I
Treaty would preclude deployment. Additional complications actiially
are anticipated, since the Soviets already are testing mobile IRBMfs
in a MIRVed mode.
R&D programs seem unlikely to ease basic naval combat l)roblems
in the predictable future. On the contrary, quieter, faster Soviet
submarines, long-range Soviet SLBMs that allow larger operational
areas, and improved ECM for Soviet anti-ship missiles will increase
U.S. ASW detection and fleet air defense difficulties.
Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union is experimenting
with any equipment expected to alter strategic mobility means
Procurement1deployment programs
Replacing B-52s with B-is is the only strategic nuclear p)rocure-
ment/deployment plan directly related to current Li.S. shortcomings.
Introducing Trident simply will complicate Soviet ASW problems.
SALT accords prohibit increasing the number of American ICBMs to
equal or exceed those of the Soviet Union. Multiplying MIRVs to
include all U.S. missiles would maintain a lead in warheads, but be
of limited value in light of our key shortcomings.
Soviet modernization efforts, in contrast, are of unsurpassed magni-
tude. They feature four new ICBM families, all with greater payload
capacities than their predecessors, and all being tested with MIRVs.
Two systems incorporate "cold launch" techniques that allow retire
capabilities using larger missiles in existing silos. Backfire bombers,
vastly superior to aged Bear and Bison aircraft, are entering the
inventory. Eight new Delta-class submarines with 12 long-range
missiles each have already been launched. "Stretched" versions with
16 launch tubes are now under construction.64
America's strategic defensive plans include no procurement and
extensive cutbacks. All anti-ballistic missiles will be removed this
vear.5 All six Air National Guard F-101 interceptor squadrons will
phase out by the end of FY 1977, partly because of budgetary priori-
63 Backfire bombers, a SALT II issue, could strike targets in the United States without in-flight refueling,
then recover in Cuba or some neutral country in Latin America. The Soviets have only a few tankers, and
only a few of those could serve Backfires.
64 Schlesinger, James R., Report to the Congress on the FY 1976 and Transition Budgets, pp II12-i116;
Updated informally.
65 U.S. Congress, House. Department of Defense Appropriations. Fiscal Year 1976, Conference Report,
p. 28.

65-316--76- 6


ties, partly because of beliefs that "without effective ABM defenses,
air defenses are of limited value against aggressors armed primarily
with strategic missiles."66
Soviet strength is growing rapidly in central Europe, according to
recent statements by the Chairman of NATO's Military Committee.67
This country, which annually considers sharp force cutbacks, has no
plans to significantly alter the present balance by adding forces.68
Exchanging F-4 squadrons for F-15s and F-16s will curtail tactical
nuclear capabilities, since neither new aircraft can carry nuclear
weapons.69 No solution to congestion problems or exposed supply lines
is seen to be soon forthcoming.
One U.S. attack carrier was retired in January, 1976. Another will
be decommissioned before the end of this fiscal year. At that time, the
Navy will be able to maintain no more than two on station in the
Pacific and two in the Atlantic/Mediterranean at any one time. Only
12 ships will be available for active duty. The 13th is designated for
training.70 Carrier aircraft, a prime means of projecting naval po -er
and protecting U.S. fleets, will be reduced commensurately.
Meanwhile, the Soviets are equipping gun destroyers with anti-
ship cruise missiles as an extra capability. The U.S. Harpoon, when
deployed, should strengthen deterrence by promising counterbattery
fire in kind, but Soviet first strikes could still be destructive. The
Soviets' forward deployment posture is improving in Cuba and along
the littorals of Africa and South Asia, where several countries already
service Soviets ships.71 The United States is experiencing difficulties,
especially in Turkey and Greece.72
The United States is doing nothing to reduce dependence on
merchant ships flying foreign flags. Few ships suitable for military
purposes are being built. Soviet programs, which emphasize small
ships for use in small ports, ensure responsive forces under firm
control that support operations in underdeveloped areas and assist in
projecting political power.
Budgetary emphasis
U.S. budgetary projections paint a bleak picture when related to
pressing U.S. problems, even though absolute outlays are very large.
DOD's baseline budget has been cut by 20 percent since 1964.
Expenditures continue to decline in terms of purchasing power,
percent of the total federal budget, and U.S. GNP.7' High disburse-
ments for pay, allowances, and other manpower costs will persist,
given prevailing policies. Comparatively little mill be left over for
expansion and modernization after unavoidable operations/mainte-
nance outlays are deducted.
66 Schlesinger, James R., Report to the Congress on the FY 1976 and Transition Budgets, p. 1141.
67 NATO Warned of Soviet Offensive Power, Aviation Week, December 15, 1975, p.19.
6s Adding two or three U.S. Army brigades and associated elements to USARE UR will have little effect
on the overall U. S./Soviet military balance in Europe.
69 New U.S. Fighters a Worry in Europe, New York Times, December 22, 1975, p. 17. F-15s are not wired
to handle nuclear weapons. Modifications could be incorporated only at great cost. F-16s are designated as
"nuclear capable", but could carry nuclear weapons only if retrofitted. F-111 squadrons could be dedicated
to NATO in emergency, at the expense of other missions. Clarification received from Air Force staff members
on January 13. 1976.
70 Sea Power Cut in the Pacific, Washington Star-News, December 24, 1975, p. D-10. Updated by Office
of the Chief of Naval Operations, January 19. 1976.
71 See for example Means of Measuring Naval Power With Special Reference to U.S. and Soviet Activities
in the Indian Ocean, p. 4, 10-12.
7 See especially U.S. Congress. House. Greece and Turkey: Some Military Implications Related to NATO
and the Middle East. Prepared for the Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Foreign
Affairs by the Congressional Research Service. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975.63 p.
73 Schklsinger, james R., Repor't to the Congress on the FY 1976 and Transition Budgets, pp. 123-126.
The baseline budget excludes incremental war costs, foreign military assistance, and retired pay.


Such trends sap quality as well 'as entity, s lice (ili (jt!llel(es
include fewer flying hours and less silif) steamillg tine, fewer I) Illlelvers
anl other exercises, inaintenantce slowdowlls, aII(! progralml str etel otuis.
(Tie latter actually increase costs in tlie loiwg run.)
The Soviet Union, accordiIug to some alittliorities, is ollt-j)erling
this country at a rapid rate.h Those coiclu1i0115 'ii, ar liye111il)O>5i1)le
to substantiate, for reasons already elleni mlerate 1. It seeill clear,
however, that the Kremlin is willing to conmiiit sizeable re .o rce(- 'or
national defense. Even if pessimistic U.S. estimates were radically
erroneous, and rival budgets were equal, the Soviets woulld h1ave Iliore
money for modernization, being less bothere( by inflation ai li 1i'11(1 41e
manpower costs.
Still, the U.S. situation is not all bad. Bu(lgetary criij.t:, real or
imagined, stimulate the search for innovative, less exper-iiv o-(li us
to our national defense problems. Necessity u ally i, the ilotlier of
Predicting Soi et lintentItios
No appraisal of the United States, Soviet 11tilitary balance would be
complete without some note of Soviet intentions, bich efl et chla(Iie-
able states of mind among men in the Kremlin. Other ie, t!lere \oildt
be no way to predict the imminence or intensity, of prospective perils .
Two opposing schools of thought (with kaleilos-;co)ic da(les In
between) currently collide. A quick summary of associated 1)1ilo sopl ies
points up the differences. 75
School "A" discounts the significance of Soviet stride ince the
mid-1960s. America's Assured Destruction capabilities afford a soml
nuclear deterrent, so the argument goes. Accommodations in Europe,
including those at Helsinki in 1974, stabilize that area, reducing
risks of armed conflict. Soviet influence elsewhere allegedly del)endls
more on diplomacy than military power. Equally important, 'oscow's
adventures in uncommitted countries, such as Somalia and Angola
are little related to compelling U.S. interests.
School "B" is less sanguine. As its members see it, the sapping of
U.S. relative strength has far-reaching implications for a foreign
policy predicated on partnership and negotiation. Inability to provide
a strategic nuclear shield for the Free World, coupled with failure to
defeat a ninth-rate country like North Vietnam, erodes America s
alliance system. Consequently, reciprocal arms control accords,
which once were strategic adjuncts, assume crucial proportions. U.S.
national security, School 'B" conten(ls, quite literally depemns to a
high degree on cooperation by a canny competitor, who'e incentives to
collaborate are slight.
Ascertaining which school is correct exceeds thescope of this
unclassified study. Suffice it to say here that the extent to which
suspected Soviet intentions should shape actital U.S. capabilities- is a
subject that calls for caution. Intentions can change overnight, but
improving military capabilities is a time-consuming process.
74 See for example CIA Finds Soviet Arms Budget Now is Ahead of U.S., New York Times. July 22,
1074, p. 2; and Schlesinger, James R., letter to Senator John L. McClellan, Chairman, SubconlnIi itC On
Defense of the Committee on Appropriations, October 23, 1975, p. 2.
75 For discussion, see Bleehman, Barry M., Handicapping the Arms Race: Are the Soviets Ahead? The
New Republic, January 3 and 10, 1976, p. 10-21.


The primary iissioln of U.S. iefen, d(ecviiosii-imikers tiS( ) IIatch
realistic ends with measllrel i neans, nimim ziig i,ks inO le l ~ess.
This brief section suggests courses of actio 1 hat singly ()r i cI ll)illa-
tion, could c()rrect shortcomings shown in Fimlre 10.'
Some shortfalls wotild be excisledl Sil Iaiiemislly if tlie kx('etliVe
Branch and C ongress cnil)ressel America's aitnis. Resliainlg strategy
wouhl eliminate or ease several others. So wotiltl force adjiltimieiits.
Additional cuires are conceivable.
This section explores prime Joptions in turn, 1)osimo' samp )le (ttiest iom0
which Congress, if so inclined could use as a starting l)oiit for hearings
on the Subject.

Review U.S. interests
The only sacrosanct U.S. interests aI'e survival an(1physical Sec(11ity,
which must be satisfied to preserve tihe American people and their
production base as an indel)endenu state with iterritorial integrity,
national institutions, and values intact.
Interests in worll peace, world power, world stability, selfvleter-
inination, freedom of action, democracy, human rights, national
honor, and credlibility all stem from convictions (subscribed to by
seven presidents since Franklin D. Roosevelt) that America's fhitmre
is closely linked with the world coInlunity. ( 1rrent gaps between
U.S. ends and means womild assume less significaice if such interests
in international security affairs were res(inlded or redluce(l.
A fundamental review of U.S. foreign policy to identify which in-
terests are essential, whiclh are of secon(lary Iml)ortance, an( which
are irrelevant thus ranks first in order of iml)Olrtalce. (?o)gent (lpies-
tions include:
-Are U.S. national security interests insel)ara|ble fromt u)ir cnm-
nections with other states? Why? Which ones?
-Does U.S. economic prosperity demand inp)itt from other comi-
tries? Which countries? What items? Ilow imuch? What cm-
sequences would be caused by loss?
-Does the United States have a moral obligation to help safeguard
countries overseas? If so, which ones?
1 U.S. military posture is affected by our balance with count ries an(] coalil ions other than the Soviet U1 union
and the Warsaw Pact, as noted on page 1. None of those relationships are reviewed in this study, hut courses
of action addressed in this section could be used to adjust U.S. ends and means in any geographic or functional
area where the United States experiences problenis.


Review U.S. objectives
Amending America's national security objectives could basically
affect the way available forces influence the U.S./Soviet balance,
whether interests changed or not. Asymmetries between ground com-
bat strengths in central Europe, for example, would assume less im-
portance if this country abandoned its objective of maintaining a high
tactical nuclear threshold in NATO Europe.
There is very little latitude for improving relationships between
U.S. ends and means by altering strategic nuclear objectives. Deterring
general war, generally acclaimed as the most important of all aims, is
not negotiable. Lip service or less is presently paid to goals affiliated
with aerospace defense. Consequently, the only significant opportuni-
ties for adjustment concern safeguarding other countries.
Answers to questions of the following sort would help sort out the
-Should the United States still seek to contain Soviet expansion?
To contain the spread of Soviet influence through the use of
proxy states? If so where? Under what circumstances?
-Is maintaining a global balance of power an imperative U.S.
objective? Regional balances? Why? Where?
-Should the United States strive to deter regional wars? What
kinds (conventional, tactical nuclear, revolutionary)? Why?
-Should this country be able to cope with one major and one minor
contingency concurrently if regional conflicts occur? 2 What kinds?
Why? Where?
-Wherever answers seem to be "no," what substitute objectives
would satisfy U.S. interests?
Review U.S. commitments
America's security commitments overseas were concluded between
1947 and the mid-1960s, during the United States/Soviet Cold War
confrontation that predated the current period loosely called "de-
tente." All told, they obligate the United States in one way or another
to help defend Latin America and nearly every nation along the Sino-
Soviet rim (refer to Annex C).
The Atlantic Alliance, .which considers "an armed attack against
one or more [members] . an attack against them all," commits
each signatory to take, "such action as it deems necessary, including
the use of armed force." I No other pact is that specific, and none is
so centrally affected by the United States/Soviet military balance, but
most nonetheless have related implications.
Downgrading or discontinuing certain commitments in consonance
with altered interests and objectives could help correct military im-
balances between the United States and the Soviet Union if forces
freed from inconsequential areas were shifted to sites of crucial con-
cern. Associated questions include:
-Which commitments contribute least to U.S. security?
-Would inimical implications arise if they were scrapped?
-What forces would be freed? In what numbers?
-What use would they be elsewhere?
2 Such as Soviet armed intervention in NATO Europe or the Middle East, with diversions elsewhere.
3 Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.


fceriew U.S. military roles and it/ NN/ on s
"itle 10, Unite,1 State.s ('o(de a(i relate! I I)()DO) I tri.ctionR.u- O-io'H
rolesi/nliioS toI U.S. 1rIled t'ce ( ee Aiiinox 811 t I a il ) i,I-
iliatclied endls anl iiwaii- ensle w!i el treuuth is i-lIfiieiet to fllfill
a.signel functions. "It i- tlie in ten t of ( i0gres, '1,e h )f xail )le, to
provide coin)at power ical)able of "overcIn ing i[ ,l f ji. t ( 4jl/ ] 1 v
nations ,-soj)o )Ile for a oi'(esive cts" t111, ii ri U. S. pe(ie 1n1(1
sectirityj but ,U.S. war-> i niing cal)ailities 8- iiiltenti()nl- 8la ye 1)('en
absent for a croo(l inaiv ve ars.
Removing realistic i'(,(11 ireinenlIs an(1,1or reviing: r(e--oiii-e. would
bring U.S. assets anl ai ils into 1)etter balance. Several questions
thus seem in order:
-Should strategic nuclear roles'/iission-s be segregat e(Il fF1toii thoe
for conventional forces? In either instance,
-Is war-winning 11*n essential re(quirement? If not, what l-,Iold be
substituted? Deterrent capabilities on! v ? (on flic;t oi tol capa-
bilities? How would clianges affect U.S. security?
-Should U.S. armed forces be charged with conducting prompt
combat operations? If so, how promptly? On what scale? Where?
Globally or in selected regions? Relate to active force require-
ments, the readiness of reserve components, and Soviet threats.
-Should U.S. armed forces be charged with conducting sustained
combat operations? Under what conditions? Relate to total
force size and tooth-to-tail ratios.
-Should this country seek to gain and maintain general air and
naval supremacy? What are the alternatives? How would ad-
justments affect the United States/Soviet balance?

Prevailing U.S. policies cause many asymmetries between U.S.
and Soviet armed forces, and mismate ends with means. Each should
be analyzed to ascertain its continued advisability. Questions below
are keyed to salient U.S. aims and shortcomings shown on Figures
9 and 10.
Review strategic nuclear policies
-What policy is best suited to deter a Soviet first-strike? Deter-
rence based mainly on city targeting or a combination of counterforce/
countervalue capabilities across the conflict spectrum?
-Is peacetime essential equivalence in ICBMs an acceptable U.S.
force structure standard, given our second-strike strategy? If not,
what policy adjustments would ensure survivability? Reduce reliance
on ICBMs? Renew launch-on-warning option,,?
-Are the American people well-served by deterrent policies that
downgrade strategic defense? How would alternatives affect U.S.
-Should SALT policies control U.S. efforts to achieve a satist'ac-
tory balance with the Soviet Union? What advantages and dis-
advantages are evident? What alternatives?
4 Title 10, United States Code, Chapter 307, Section 3062.


-Do "bargaining chip" policies help or hinder U.S. efforts to achieve
a satisfactory balance with the Soviet Union? If they help, which
"chips" are advantageous? Why?
Review general purpose policies
-Is unilateral U.S. disarmament, as repeatedly practiced, a sound
policy in the present world environment? Relate to U.S. objectives
and Soviet capabilities.
-Does a high nuclear threshold in NATO Europe best serve U.S.
purposes? Would changes in policy strengthen or undercut deterrence?
In what ways? Would increased risks be serious or inconsequential?
-Are total force concepts still sound? If so, should the balance
between U.S. active and reserve forces remain constant or change?
Between U.S. forces and allies? In what ways? What substitute
policies should be considered?
-Does the All-Volunteer Force permit an acceptable balance
between U.S. and Soviet forces? If not, would conscription be prefer-
able? What are the alternatives?
-What is the optimum balance between U.S. forces in specific
overseas areas? Relate to requirements for responsive reserves.
-Are forward defense policies obsolete? If not, what is the optimum
balance between U.S. forces in overseas areas and those in strategic
-Is military assistance an effective policy? How does it improve
U.S. security? To what extent? In what areas?
-Should the United States institute stringent controls over the
sale of conventional arms? Would the Soviets sell where we decline?
If so, how would it affect our security?
-Should present pay and allowances policies be perpetuated? If
not, what options should be studied? Reduced pay scales for regular
forces? Constant scales that disregard cost-of-living increases? Lower
scales for conscripts if we ever return to the draft?
-Is continued dependence on foreign-flag shipping a sound U.S.
policy? Relate to U.S. objectives and commitments. What cost-
effective alternatives would improve our security?

Review U.S. force structure
Significant improvements in the United States/Soviet military
balance would ensue if ways were found to eliminate excessive redun-
dancy and extraneous capabilities caused by outdated concepts,
shaky assumptions, interservice rivalry, vested interests in govern-
ment and industry, and various other influences. Answers to questions
of the following kind would assist.'
-Is a strategic nuclear triad the most effective U.S. force structure?
What affect would fewer systems have on U.S. security? More systems?
-Do current components of our triad comprise the optimum mix?
If not, what replacements would be preferable? Many cruise missiles
instead of manned bombers? Mobile instead of fixed ICBMs?
5 It is important in each instance to ascertain the impact on overall U.S. defense posture as well as in-
fluences on the U.S./Soviet military balance.


-Should air defense aircraft be replacedI entirely bv surface-to-air
missiles? If not, what mix would be most a(lvant ageoils? () what
extent should tactical fighters sUI)lai t specialized interceptors for
continental air defense?
-Should U.S. tactical iiclear capabilities include I RB .Is/
M RBMs? Compare strenigths arnd weaknesses with tliose of tactical
-Could nmch larger inventories of less sopllisticate(l weapons
increase U.S. capabilities at reduce( costs? Wlat would be the
optimum (istriblltion of higlh-cost, tIgh-perf)romance items to rela-
tively low-cost, low-performance items in specific systems (the so-
called hi-lo mix)'?
-To what extent could lighitly-arm)reI, low-cost fighting vehicles
supplant U.S. tanks in NATO Europe? What missions would suffer?
How woul(l overall security be influenced in conseqtlence?
-Does a three-division Marine Corps contribute significantly to
the United States/Soviet military balance? Would U.S. capabilities
increase or decrease if the Army absorbed major Marine Corps
functions? Why? Are amphibious assault capabilities still ani, essential
U.S. asset? What would we gain or lose by scaling back?
-Do Marine air wings contribute significantly to the United
States/Soviet military balance? Would U.S. capabilities increase or
decrease if the Air Force absorbed marine air wing missions? Why?
-Does continued emphasis on large surface combatants contribute
significantly to the United States/Soviet naval balance? Woul(
capabilities increase if many small, fast ships were substituted?
Relate to survivability in conventional and nuclear attack
-would fast, coml)aratively cheap, easy-to-service gas turbine
engines serve future U.S. cruisers and (lestrovers better than nuclear
power? What credits would accrue? What debits could be expected?
-What advantages would accure from increased cooperation with
NATO on R&D, production, proclremlenlt, and standardization?
What disadvantages?
Review U.S. b udget procedures
Inflation, recession, balance of payments problems, and dollarr
devaluations all inhibit efforts to create U.S. military cal)abilities
that can compete successfully with the Soviet Union.
Two procedures in particular bear review:
-The Congress tends to judge individual programs In isolation.
To what extent would ends and means merge nore successfully if
Congress also examined manpower an d materiel iterr(elaion,hips
within and between the several services?
-Total life cycle costs of competitive systems still are not clear.
How could DOD and the Congress better assess long-term expenditures
in relation to expected capabilities for )roposed weapons anid

Quntitativ(e aII(, iIl *11Qlcii~tdI~e(, (lliitalive de i,.in;,v-,, di-
advantagi0 (.)l lm i! l lt> l, t li!lt % il-l!i ,!to (, t 1 ) i l
essential ams a l e(itrihlii tIt() illll)al"llce-.. l)('t weenU.S. 1a(1 >()Vie,
arned forces. That c0)(lit H)1 i, bv yhomeans st atic. A mx A (,levail
shows a thlisit tlat likelyvN-1 ''cotitilie
take dynan ic t ej)- t o rat I fy, rei fi f)re, reti 8 o r re ret cii V ll n 1 tes.
As it stands, the qulatititative balance continues t) shift t owar(t
the Soviet Union. U.S. (Jiialitative 51uperiorityv iw Nl 81)('I1-ate[
completely and, in certain respects, is slowly slippin' away. America'
global rest)onsibiiitie-, cotipled with U.S. reliance on reserve coipo-
nents, permit the Soviet Union to concentrate 1)ower while we remain
dispersed, depending heavily on allies and arias control accordls to
safeguard our national interests. Force structure stan(lards that stress
essential equivalence instead of sufficiency encourage overem1)lasis
on arms and equipment that bear scant relationship to pressing
Quantitative asymmetries that favor the Soviet Union attract the
most attention, but the absence of comparable capabilities is only
occasionally cause for concern, as Figures 7 and 8 indicate. Mismatched
U.S. ends and means are much more important (see Figures 9 and 10).
Very few positive U.S. programs, contemplated or in progress, will
alleviate associated problems.
Some of the cogent U.S. shortcomings identified in earlier sections
would lose significance if this country scaled down its overseas in-
terests, accepting uncertain costs related to reduced world power
status, the possible loss of Free World leadership, and long-range U.S.
security. Others could be corrected (entirely or in part) by policy
changes, such as amending military pay scales to allow more money
for modernization without a bigger budget. A third course of action
could contribute by scrapping inessential and/or inappropriate
capabilities, present or proposed-the contemplated expansion of our
strategic nuclear triad from three to seven systems typifies programs
that are ripe for review.' Some steps, like reshaping the U.S. Navy
to meet emerging Soviet threats, might demand additional expending
funds. Risks courted by allowing any or all shortcomings to remain
uncorrected should be carefully calculated.
Which combination would be most suitable (indeed, whether auiy
action is essential) might best be ascertained by a national (lel)ate
to sharpen issues, and identify optimum options. This study lays the
groundwork for Congressional Iarticipation.
Sound conclusions wotld allow ( egress and the Executive Branch
in concert to chart a course that matches ends and means in i ai w
that assure America's ability to deter and, if need be, (lefend succe-
fully against any sort of Soviet armed aggression for the rest of the
20th Century.
5 Manned bombers, hard-site IC B.Ms. nd sui)marine-launehed ballistice missils comprise 11 cuir rrent
triad. Air-launched and land-mohile ballistic missiles, along with air- and sea-launched cruise missiles', are
in various stages of R&D. All are considered as add-ons, rather than replacenints for present systems.





Statistics contained herein are calculated to show changes in the
U.S./Soviet quantitative balance over the last 10 years. Columns for
1965 and 1975 first indicate comparative force levels, then identi
how far ahead or behind the United States was at those selecte(
times. The right hand column reflects cumulative shifts ill U.S. status.
In 1965, for example, we had 6.30 more ICBMs than the Soviet Union.
Today, they have 549 more than we do. The net change in balaInce
thus is 1,179 in favor of the Soviet. Some entries in the net change
column are positive, although this country currently is behind. Those
circumstances occur when Soviet reductions exceed those of the
United States, but Soviet inventories remain numerically superior.
Other entries are negative, although the United States currently is
ahead. Those conditions are caused by Soviet expansion that narrows,
but does not close, specific gaps.
Comparisons include active inventories only, except as noted.
Reserve components and allied forces are addressed in the text.
Multiple open sources were used to compile basic data. Various staff
sections in the Pentagon amended and/or supplied many statistics.

1965 1975
United United
United States United States Net U.S.
States Soviet (difference) States Soviet (difference) change

Personnel I--------------220, 800 308, 000 -87, 200 76, 700 414, 000 -337, 300 -250,100
Navy------------- 16,550 8,000 +8,550 18,400 14,000 4,000 -4,150
Air Force---------204, 250 300, 000 -95, 750 58, 300 400, 000 -341,700 -245,950
Ballistic/cruise missiles:
ICBM--------------854 224 630 1,054 1,603 -549 -1,179
Heavy 2 ........ 54 224 -170 54 613 -559 -389
Light 3---------- 800 0 800 1,000 990 10 -790
MIRVed ..--.... 0 0 (40) 550 110 440 +440
SLBM--------------496 120 +376 656 725 -69 -445
MIRVed ..--.... 0 0 (40) 416 0 +416 +416
ALCM 4 ............ 1,260 190 +1,070 1,140 185 +955 -115
SLCM..------------- 0 140 -140 0 348 -348 -208
Submarine----- 0 92 -92 0 300 -300 -208
Surface -------- 0 48 -48 0 48 -48 -0
Bombers----------------935 1,420 -485 529 635 -106 +379
Heavy..-------------630 210 +420 463 135 +328 -92
Medium 7 ..-.-....... 305 1,210 -905 66 500 -434 +471
Tankers 8-------------- 1,000 0 +1,000 615 50 +565 -435
Ballistic missile sub-
marines---------------31 40 -9 41 73 -32 -23
Nuclear-------------31 15 -4 16 41 54 -13 -29
Diesel---------------0 25 -25 0 19 -19 +6
ICBM/SLBM warheads-__ 1,702 390 +1,312 6, 794 3, 442 +3, 352 +2,040
MRV---------------528 0 +528 480 514 -34 -494
MIRV---------------0 0 (40) 5,810 640 +5, 170 +5,170
See footnotes at end of table.


1965 1975
United United
United States United States Net U.S.
States Soviet (difference) States Soviet (difference) change

Personnel 9.............
Army --------------
Navy --------------
Air Force -----------
ABM missiles 10 --.. .....
SAM launchers 11 .......
Interceptors 12 ..........

120, 750



Personnel 13......-..939,950 1,800,000 -860,050
Divisions 14---------- 16 147 -131
Infantry ..... 8 0 +8
Mechanized...-- 1 90 -89
Armor 4 50 -46
Airborne ------- 2 7 -5
Airmobile ...... 1 0 +1
Tanks 15 ------------ 10,200 30,500 -20,300
Heavy --------- 0 2,500 -2,500
Medium--------8,200 25,000 -16,800
Light----------2,000 3,000 -1,000
Armored carriers 16_- 20,700 35,000 14,300
S S M 17 -- -- - - -- -- -- - - -- -- -- - -- - -- -- - - -- - -- -- -
IRBM----------- 0 101 -101
MRBM 0 608 ---608
LRCM--- -0..-------------...................
Nuke artillery18 .,750 0-------------
Other artillery 19 -- 1,750 ..........................
At missiles 2.-------- 16,500 ..........................
Helicopters--------- 4, 000 ..........................
Personnel---------190, 000 10, 000 +180, 000
Divisions ------------ 3 0 +3
Separate regiments 21 0 0 (40)
Tanks--------------545 75 A470
Artillery------------840 75 +765
Aircraft-------------478 0 +478
Fighter---------229 0 +229
Attack----------249 0 +249-
Helicopters----------419 0 +419
Border Guards ...... 0 200, 000 -200, 000
Personnel22-----------650, 500 292, 000 +358,500
Aircraft carriers----------32 0 +32
Attack 23----------- 16 0 +16
ASW--------------- 9 0 +9
Other24--------------7 0 +7
Cruiser2 .-------.------- 33 22 +11
SSM28 ............. 0 14 -14
Other-------------- 33 8 +25
Destroyer25 ------------ 217 150 +67
SSM26-............. -0 24 -24
Other-------------- 217 126 +91
Other escorts 25,27-.......-(38)38 103 (-27)-65
Attack submarines 28 .... 169 336 -167
Conventional ....... 169 322 -153
Nuclear 29 12 +17
Diesel ----------140 310 -170
SSM28---------------0 14 -14
Nuclear -------- 0 0 (4)
Diesel---------- 0 14 -14
Boats------------------ 0 460 -460
SSM 26.............. 0 110 -110
Motor torpedo ...... 0 350 -350
Amphibious ships 29__.... 118 14 +104
Tactical aircraft 30--------4,729 800 +3, 927
Ashore/amphib ..... 352 800 -448
Bombers 3 ..... 0 400 -400
Patrol/'ASW 32_. 352 400 -48
Afloat 332, 132 0 +2, 132
Fighter----------712 0 +712
Attack----------961 0 +961
ASW34-----------459 0 +459
Fixed wing- 222 0 +222
Helicopter. 237 0 +237
Sealift3Z--------------2, 778 1,345 +1,433
See footnotes at end of table.


8, 500
9, 000
197, 000

3, 543





-29, 900
-26, 000
-14, 900
+6, 420
-400, 000

+129, 400
+2, 775


-850, 850
-9, 200

+5, 000
-200, 000

-229, 100


1965 1975
United United
United States United State- Net U.S.
States Soviet (difference) States Soviet (difference) change

Personnel 38 ............ 531,000 400,000 +131,000 530,700 500,000 +30 700 -100,300
Tactical aircraft Zo .----- 5, 800 3,250 -+-2, 550 5, 000 5, 350 -350 -2.900
Fighter/attack----._---3,800 2,800 +1,000 2,300 3,590 -1, 290 -2 290
Recon/ECM --------- 820 450 +370 340 750 -410 -780
Strategic38....-- 26 8 +18 300 60 +240 +214
TacticalI39-..........- 620 750 -130 500 800 -300 -170

1 U.S. reductions reflect the inactivation of strategic bomber squadrons.
2 Definition of "heavy" ICBM's conforms to U.S. SALT I unilateral statements. Includes U.S. Titans; Soviet SS 7,
SS-8, SS-9, SS-18, SS-19, although SALT II accords may eventually consider SS-19's in the "light" category. An esti-
mated 100 of them were deployed in January 1976.
3 Definition of "light" ICBM's conforms to U.S. SALT I unilateral statements. Includes U.S. Minuteman 11, Ill; Soviet
SS-11, SS-13, SS-17.
4 ALCM's with nuclear warheads include U.S. Hound Dog, SRAM; Soviet AS-3 (Kangaroo), AS-4 (Kitchen), AS-6.
Where statistics are lacking, but mass production confirmed, figures shown reflect standard force loadings-for example,
2 Hound Dogs per B-52, 1 AS-3 per Bear bomber, 2 AS IIl's per Backfire.
5 Strategic sea-launched cruise missiles currently are limited to Soviet Shaddock, which has a maximum range of about
250 nautical miles (NM). Its estimated effective range is closer to 150 NM. Figures shown are tubes only, not missiles.
Their primary mission probably is antiship.
"Heavy" bombers include U.S. B-52; Soviet Bear, Bison.
"Medium" bombers include U.S. B-47, B-58, FB-111, Soviet Badger, Blinder, and Backfire.
U.S. 1965 tanker figure includes 50 squadrons (average 20 aircraft each).
U.S. reductions reflect the inactivation of interceptor squadrons, SAM batteries, and radar sites.
10 Soviet 1965 ABM figure excludes abortive deployment of possible first-generation missiles around Leningrad.
11 SAM air defense launchers include U.S. Bomarc, Hawk, Nike-Hercules, both Active and National Guaid. Soviet forces
include SA-1 through SA-6. Soviets have 12,000 missiles for 9,500 launchers.
12 Interceptors include U.S. Air National Guard squadrons as well as those in the Regular Air Force.
13 Army strengths exclude strategic nuclear elements. U.S. figure for 1965 parallels that prior to the Vietnam war buildup.
The peak in fiscal year 1968 was 1,570,000.
4 U.S. figures exclude separate brigades and regiments which sometimes are used to calculate "division equivalent"
strengths. Soviet tank divisions are shown as armor. Soviet motorized infantry divisions are shown as mechanized.
16 U.S. medium tanks include M-48 and M-60; all others are light tanks. Soviet heavy tanks include JS-2 3, T-10;
T-54 55, T-62 are mediums; PT-76 is light.
10 U.S. figures are limited to armored personnel carriers. Soviet statistics include scout cars.
17 U.S. SRBM's include Pershing, Lance, and Honest John (Lance has entirely replaced H.J. in Europe). Soviet SRBM's
include Scud A, B, Scaleboard, Frog. The Soviet LRCM is Shaddock, a land-based version of their strategic nuclear SLCM.
18 U.S. nuclear artillery includes 155 mm and 8-in howitzers. The Soviets may have nuclear rounds for 203 mm gun-
howitzers and 240 mm mortars, but perhaps only for training purposes.
19 Conventional artillery excludes mortars, antitank guns, rocket launchers, recoilless weapons, and antiaircraft artillery.
20 U.S. antitank missiles include Dragon and Tow. Soviet models include Snapper, Swatter, and Sagger. No Soviet
missiles are helicopter mounted.
21 Soviet marines (naval infantry) in 1965 comprised small units with the 4 fleets (Northern, Baltic, Black Sea, and
Pacific). They now are organized into regiments.
22 Naval personnel strengths include naval air elements, but exclude ballistic missile submarine forces.
23 The Soviet VSTOL carrier Kiev is sometimes called a cruiser.
24 Soviet helicopter carriers of the Moskva class aresometimes called helicopter cruisers. U.S. counterparts are commonly
categorized as amphibious ships.
25 U.S. Navy reclassified many cruisers, destroyers, and other escorts in the spring of 1975 to conform more closely to
international terminology. The 1965 column reflects 1975 classifications to facilitate comparisons.
26SSM refers to anti-surface-ship cruise missiles in this table. Soviet SS-N-2, 3, 9, 10, and 11 are included. SS-N-3s
(Shaddocks) are shown as strategic missiles, but have antiship missions.
27 Escorts include frigates, destroyer escorts, and other comparable oceangoing craft of 1,000 tons or more. U.S. Naval
Reserve ships, shown in parentheses, are immediately available to augment active forces in emergency. U.S. Coast Guard
vessels are omitted.
28 Soviet coastal submarines are excluded.
29 Amphibious ships exclude helicopter carriers and landing craft (such as LCU, LCM, LCVP).
30 Total aircraft for Navy and Air Force include all types. Subordinate entries, which include selected types only, do not
equal the total.
31 Soviet naval bombers include Badger, Blinder, Beagle, Backfire.
32 Soviet naval patrol/ASW aircraft include Bear, May, and Mail. The latter is an amphibian.
33 U.S. naval aircraft afloat exclude those assigned to Marine squadrons.
34 The sharp drop in U.S. Navy ASW aircraft between 1965 and 1975 reflects the decommissioning of 9 ASW aircraft
ca rriers.
3 U.S. sealift included 329 vessels in the Military Sealift Command (MSC)-controlled fleet in 1965 and 118 in 1975.
(MSC was called Military Sea Transport Service in 1965). The remainder are Merchant Marine. No such breakout is possible
for Soviet ships.
.6 Air Force personnel strengths exclude strategic nuclear and naval air elements.
37 Current Soviet fighter/attack figures include 2,000 aircraft intended primarily for counterair missions and 1,500
earmarked primarily for close air support of ground forces.
3 Strategic airlift forces include U.S. C-5 and C-141 aircraft, Soviet Cock and Candid.
39 Tactical airlift forces include U.S. C-130's, active and reserve. Soviet figures indicate Cub only.
40 Par.


Whether the prev-ailing and projecte(d United .Sta ae S x)iet military
balance is acceptable dep)ends o irelationshiips between e(lds (interests,
objectives, commitments) and means (manpower, inateriel), as
conditioned by acknowledged and anticipated thieeats, Wherever
detrimental risk-versus-gain ratios appear, adjustment s are in order.'
This annex silhouettes the full range of fundamental force sufficiency
considerationsincluding policy guidelines and constraints.

National security interests
National security interests exerted minimum influence on U.S.
force requirements before World War II, because our interests were
essentially self-satisfying. Their influence todayv is central. The
nation now must have sufficient power, both real and apparent, to
satisfy two irreducible interests:
-Physical security
Contributing U. S. interests, like world peace, stability, national
credibility as discerned by others, and strategic freedom of action also
affect force requirements.
National sec/Irity objectives
Three overt-iding U.S. objectives stem directly from the fundamental
interests identified above:
-Deter attacks against the United States
-Defend this country if deterrence fails
-Help safeguard other states whose security is closely linked with
our own.
The first two objectives are rarely challenged, but controversy
constantly arises concerning how many forces of what kinds are
essential to accomplish them. Force requirements for the third
objective range from few to many, depending on which states in
which parts of the World are designated. There currently is no
Commitments related to contingencies
America's alliance system, designed to assist in satisying U.S.
interests despite present and potential threats, includes eight mutual
defense pacts, whose membership totals 42 countries, Executive agree-
ments and other pledges involve 30-odd more.
1 Decision-makers have little control over risks that result from miscalculations, such as overati ng friendly
capabilities, underrating the opposition, or placing excessive emphasis on shaky assumption. Calculated
risks, including those incurred by Congress in the appropriations process, can be restricted to considerable


It would be impossible to honor all such commitments concurrently,
except in special curcumstances (for example, general nuclear war).
Current U.S. concepts therefore prescribe sufficient forces to:
-Deal simultaneously with one "major" contingency (wherever it
might occur) and one "minor" contingency.
-Redeploy rapidly from one major theater to another, as required.
Among all possible contingency areas, four receive top priority:
-NATO Europe
Northeast Asia
-Caribbean/Panama Canal
-Middle East
Forces for one area are not necessarily appropriate for the others,
either in size or structure. The Caribbean is essentially a naval theater,
while Northeast Asia needs combined arms. The mass formations
which are effective in NATO Europe would find little space to ma-
neuver in Panama.
Operational fit nctions of U.S. Armed Forces
Congress, in accord with Title 10, United States Code, confirms
fundamental functions for each U.S. military service. The Depart-
ment of Defense, with Presidential approval, prescribes primary and
collateral functions in greater detail. Forces should be sufficient to
fullfill each function effectively.
Title 10 junctions (Chapter 307, section 3062)
It is the intent of Congress to provide an Army that is capable, in
conjunction with other armed forces, of:
-Overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive
acts that imperil the peace and security of the United
-Conducting prompt and sustained operations on land.
DOD directive 5100.1 Selected primary function
-Defeating enemy land forces
--Seize, occupy, and defend land areas
-Assisting in air defense of the United States 2
-Participating in joint amphibious and airborne opera-
Collateral :fnctions
-Interdicting enemy air/sea power and communications
through operations on or from land
Special responsibilities
-Operating land lines of communication
-Providing administrative/logistic support for unified
and specified commands
Title functions (Chapter 503, section 5012)
-Conducting prompt and sustained combat operations
incident to war at sea, including naval air operations.'
-Protecting shipping
2 "Aerospace defense" is a more accurate term than "air defense", since Army functions include anti-
ballistic missile defense.
3 There is no explicit statutory authorization for the Navy to conduct strategic nuclear operations. That
function is implicitly included under "operations incident to war at sea", according to current interpretation.


DOD directive 5100.1
Selected primary f lactioms
-Seek out and destroy enemilnaval forces
-zSupp)ress enemy sea commerce
-Gain and intiintainl general naval supremacy
-Participate ill joint amlphibious and airborne
-Protect vital Sea line,. of coInimlic'ation
-Conduct land and air operations essential to naval
Collateral Function 's
-Interdict enemy laid1/air power and communications
through operations at sea
-Provide close air and naval support for land operations
-Participate in overall air efforts as directed
Special responsibilities
-Provide sea transport for other services
-Provide administrativeIlogistic support for unified and
specified commands
-Provide for sea-based air defense of the United States
Air Force
Title lOfitncttons (Chapter 807, section 8061)
-Conduct prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air
DOD directive 5100.1
Selected primary f nt)cttos
-Defend the United States against air attack
-Gain and maintain general air superiority
-Defeat enemy air forces
-Prepare for strategic air warfare 4
-Furnish close combat and logistic air support to the
Army, and air transport for all services
-Participate in joint amphibious and airborne opera-
Collateral fnct ions
-Interdict enemy sea power through air operations
-Conduct antisiibmarine warfare operations
-Conduct aerial minelaying operations
Special responsibilities
-Provide administrativejlogistic support for unified and
specified commands
Marine Corps
Title 10function (Chapter 503, section 5013)
-In conjunction with the Navy, seize or defend advanced
naval bases
-Conduct land operations essential to naval campaigns
DOD directive 5100.1
Selected primary finction s
-Participate in joint amphibious operations
-Protect naval property
4 "Strategic aerospace warfare" is a more accuMIte term thaa "strategic air warfare", sielc dliiic miles
are involved.


Collateral functions
-Interdict enemy air power and communications
through operations at sea
-Provide close air support for land operations
-Participate in overall air efforts as directed
Special responsibilities
-Contribute to sea-based air defense of the United
.Military missions
Service functions outlined above influence force requirements for the
U.S. military establishment as a whole. Specific missions and areas of
responsibility assigned to unified and specified commands under the
Unified Command Plan and various operations/contingency plans help
determine whether implementing forces should be many or few.
The number of U.S. troops needed merely to act as a "nuclear
trip wire" in NATO Europe, for example, would be somewhat less
than those that underpin present missions of U.S. European Command
(EUCOM), which is enjoined to:
-Maintain an effective conventional as well as a tactical nuclear
-Defend assigned sectors without major loss of territory
Strategic reserves under Readiness Command (REDCOM) must
furnish forces to:
Reinforce NATO in emergency
-Reinforce other areas in accord with U.S. treaty commitments
and contingency plans
And so on.
If decision-makers perceived no threats, there would be no need
for armed forces to deter or defend against aggression. U.S. ends
would be easily attained.
Three types of threat impinge on U.S. interests and objectives in
ways that influence the United States/Soviet military balance:
-Strategic nuclear threats to the United States
-Challenges on the high seas
-Direct confrontations between U.S./allied and Soviet troops, as
in Europe and perhaps the Middle East.
Since deterrence is the paramount U.S. objective, psychological
impressions on our primary adversary are very important. What
numerical relationships are necessary is a contentious matter.
Threats to allies, but not the United States (like Soviet threats to
NATO) determine the size and structure of U.S. general purpose and
strategic mobility forces.
Threat estimations
Two basic considerations dominate the threat-evaluation process.
Capabilities indicate what opponents could do, if they were so in-
clined. Intentions indicate what they are likely to do. Heavy weights
assigned to capabilities sometimes create greater demands for forces
than strong reliance on intentions. Since even the best of estimates

may be erroneous, U.S. (lecisLon-makens would be well advised to
adopt postures that will secure essential interests if estimates prove
Armed forces
The numbers and types of armed forces needed to discourage
aggressors are not necessarily the same as those needed to fighlt a
war if deterrence fails. Overoptimnizing forces in favor of tlie former
aim thus may incur inadlvertent risks. Consequently, sufficiency
standards should foster flexil)ility. Furth er, abilities to coicen trate
power at appropriate times and places is more meaningful thlan the
extent of total inventories.
The quantitative balance is most significant militarily whien like
offensive forces or weapons systems compete against each other, as
one division against another. Pitting dissimilar forces against each
other (SLBMs versus aircraft, for example) (lispells any need for
balance between like systems on either side. Quantitative/qualitative
correlations between mobility and other non-combat forces are ir-
relevant, because missions, not enemy counterparts, determine
Nevertheless, quantitative and/or qualitative superiority would
be advisable if any other posture so adversely affected perceptions
on either side that peacetime stability would be deeply eroded and/or
U.S. confidence in wartime capabilities seriously undercut.
Nonmilitary means
Armed forces are only one element in deterrence/defense equations,
and maybe not the most important. When political, economic, or
psychological power can satisfy objectives, military requirements
usually can be reduced. Tradeoffs, however, are not always obvious.
When time is a crucial factor, firepower may be essential for deterrent
and defensive purposes.
National security policies
Assorted U.S. defense policies spell out ground rules for attaining
stated objectives. Each affects force requirements in special ways.
A few cogent policies are surveyed below for illustrative purposes.
Total force concept
This country currently subscribes to a total force concept that
relegates indispensable roles to U.S. Reserve Components and
armed forces of allies. That approach has been used to justify sharp
reductions in U.S. ground forces since 1969. Overall sufficiency is
strongly conditioned by the following factors:
-The readiness of U.S. Regulars
-The responsiveness of U.S. Reserves and National Guard
-The reliability of allies
All three considerations are in question.
Flexible response
A simple, relatively low-cost U.S. strategy called Massive Retalia-
tion substituted nuclear firepower for manpower in the 1950s, before


Moscow amassed assured destruction capabilities against America.
Since then, this country has implemented a complex, costly strategy
called flexible response, which calls for a wide range of deterrent/
defense options. Force requirements, especially in the conventional
realm, increased.
Forward deploymentIForward defense
A substantial (but changeable) percentage of all U.S. general
purpose forces are deployed overseas as tangible evidence of U.S.
resolve, in position to react rapidly if regional threats appear to
imperil U.S interests. The remainder of our deployable forces (as
opposed to those for base operations) comprise a strategic reserve
in the United States, ready to reinforce wherever required or establish
a new U.S. presence in troubled territory.
-High proportions deployed overseas generate greater demands
for combat and associated support forces.
-High proportions retained in reserve generate greater demands
for quick-reaction airlift/sealift forces and for base support.
Nixon /Ford doctrine
The Nixon Doctrine, adopted and slightly adapted by President
Ford, stipulates that "we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power
threatens the freedom of [an ally] or a nation whose survival we
consider vital to our security . In cases involving other types of
aggression . we shall look to the nation directly threatened to
assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its
defense." Three influences on U.S. force requirements are readily
-Sufficient forces are needed for nuclear deterrence/defense
-Forward deployment assumes reduced importance in most areas
-Emphasis shifts to air and sea power at the expense of ground
The United States proclaims a strategic nuclear second-strike
policy that spurns "launch-on-warning" options for ballistic missiles.
U.S. SLBMs on station at sea are unaffected, being almost invulner-
able. Fixed-site ICBMs aie sure to suffer heavily from attrition-even
peacetime superiority (which we do not enjoy) could translate into
inferiority following a Soviet attack.
Second-strike policies also influence U.S. requirements for general
purpose forces that would be susceptible to heavy losses if the Soviets
triggered surprise attacks (surface combatants, for example, are
vulnerable to Soviet short-range anti-ship cruise missiles).

Geographic constraints
Geography has a direct and sometimes decisive influence on strategic
nuclear as well as general purpose force requirements. Representative
considerations include:
-Size of operational areas
-Number of points/areas to seize and secure or defend

-Type terrain
-OwnershiIp of contested terrain
-Tjin, (i'tance factois
-Lines of communication
Each factor influences different type folrce- in diffelrelit fa-lli ,l<.
Few coitretional forces, for example, al'r required i to( efell Ithe t11em
U.S. land area with its diver-e target. because ocean e dIWtl aiid
distance effectively isolate us from invader-. By way o()f tra, a
comprehensive array of tratep.c h ttcla(r chrc would be needed Ito
defend that same area from attacks by eneiflV bomber- anlI. baIlitie
missiles, since distance affords no screen. Soviet force- uihIti-nlo oi
-NATO soil could use tactical nuclear weao)0lls with little (,onelil for
collateral damage. The United States, defeIlling friendlv tert-irv
could not.
Budgetary covstraints
Ideally, national security intere-ts are the bases for objertive-. and
commmitent which, within policy guidelines. shape strateorv. stirate-
gic concepts conditioned by threat generate military force requfire-
nients. Budgetaryv assets then are allocated to sativ need-.
That Utopian sequence rarely occurs in real life. National defense
competes with other sectors. There never is enough money to go around.
The trick is to walk a tightrope between excessive defense ex)endlitures,
that emasculate political, economic, social, scientific, and ecological
programs on one hand, and deficient defense expenditures that actively
endanger national security on the other. Equ ally important, over-
allocations in any ien military sector can undercut essential capa-
bilities elsewhere.
Trend forecasts
Satisfaction with the status quo is insufficient. Defense decision-
makers must also ensure that major military trends best serve future
U.S. security interests. Early identification of inimical trend- is
imperative, since elemental changes in most military capabilities
require long lead times measured in years, not days or months. United
States/Soviet budgetary emphases, R&D programs, and procuremnent
deployment patterns are along the important indicators.
No number of armed forces, regardle-s of quality, is sufficient when
strategic concepts are Seriouslv flawed. Conversely, superior strateov
can overcome otherwi-e insurmountable obstacles. Mao. totally unable
to compete succe,4ully with Weste ii technology, Capitalized oncheap,
but highly effective, concepts-. for revolution ary war. The United
States till has no adequate antidote. 'Material force, of cour-e. i-
important, but Emerson was right when lie wrote that "Thouojht
rule the world."
Sufficiency requirements are especially sen-itive to a-:-unption-.
which apply to every criterion cited above. Paradoxically, exce->ivelv
optimistic and pessimistic assumptions both fo-ter insufficiency. TIhe
former cause decisionmakers to underestimate true force rcquiremlents.


The latter cause decisionmakers to feel that no number would be
enough, so why waste manpower and money. A few conflicting
assumptions currently in vogue are exemplary:
-Force is (not) outmoded as a foreign policy tool
-D6tente does (not) reflect benign Soviet intentions
-U.S. nuclear superiority (parity) is (not) essential
-Controlled nuclear war is (not) conceivable
-Considerable strategic warning of war will (not) be available
-War in Europe would (not) be short and conclusive



Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact 1947):
United States Dominican Republic Ptanaina
Argentina Ecuia(l or" Paragii av
Bolivia El Salvador Peru
Brazil Guateniala riinidad and Tobago
Chile Haiti Iruguav
Colombia Honduras Venezuela
Costa Rica Mexico
Cuba' Nicaragua
North Atlantic Treaty (1949):
United States Italy Greece (1952)
Belgium Luxembourg Turkey (1952)
Canada Netherlands Federal Repubiic of
Denmark Norway Germany (1955)
France Portugal
Iceland United Kingdom
Security Treaty between the United States and Australia and New
Zealand (ANZUS 1951).
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (SEATO 1954):
United States Pakistan
Australia Philippines
France Thailand
New Zealand United Kingdom

Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines (1951)
Mutual Defense Treaty with South Korea (1953)
Mutual Defense Treaty with China (Taiwan) (1954)
Treaty of Mutual Security and Cooperation with Japan (1960)
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Spain (1976) 2

There have been five Congressional resolutions since 1945. Each of
these has been requested by the President to mobilize CongressionaIl
1 Cuba was excluded from the Rio Pact in 1962.
2 Signed January 24, 1976. Senate ratification pending;



support at times of foreign police crisis. The five resolutions follow.
Dates of the joint resolutions refer to the day they were signed into
law. The date for H. Con. Res. 570 is the day the resolution was
cleared by Congress. It did not require the President's signature and
does not carry the force of law.
Formosa resolution, H.J. Res. 159, Jan. 29, 1955. covering Formosa
(Nationalist China) and the Pescadores Islands against "armed
attack" from Communist China.
Middle East resolution, 11.J. Res. 117, March 9, 1957, proclaiming
U.S. policy to defend 'Middle East countries "against aggression from
any country controlled by international conmiunism."
Cutiban re, solution. iRes. 230, Oct. 3, 1962, to defend Latin
America against Cuban aggression or" subversion and to oppose the
deplovient of Soviet weapons in Cuba capable of endangering U.S.
Berlin resolution H. Con. Res. 570, Oct. 10. 1962, reaffirming the
U.S. determination to use armed force, if necessary, to defend West
Berlin and the access rights of Western powers to We'st Berlin.
Vietnam resolution. H.J. Res. 1145, Aug. 10, 1964, known as the
Tonkin Gulf resolution, authorinzmg the President to use armed forces
to repel attacks against U.S. forces and affirming U.S. determination
to (efend any SEATO treaty member or protocol state (this includes
Vietnam) requesting assistance.

The United States has entered defense arrangements by executive
agreement with the following countries:
Denmark-------------------1951 Iran--------------------------1959
Iceland--------------------1951 Turkey..--------------------1959
Spain ----------------------1953 Pakistan-------------------1959
Canada.. ..--------------------1958 Philippines...-------------1959, 1963
Liberia. ..---------------------1959

The State Department 1967 compilation of U.S. commitments
includes *34 Executive Branch policy declarations and communiques
issued jointly with foreign governments. The following areas and
nations are covered by these pledge: Latin America (Monroe Doc-
trine), Berlin. Iran, India, Jordan. Israel, Thailand, South Vietnam,
the Republic of China and the Philippiines. With the exception of
India, th ese polic- declarations and conmniques cover nations which
also have received U.S. pledges under treaties,. executive agreements
or Conoresnioial resolutions. India received a pledge in 1954 from
Pre-ident Eilenhower that the United States would act to prevent
Paki-tan from uig U.S. military aid against t India.3
Courtesy t" Co:i o a" Qurterly Se rvi"e. From "; 1 D h!s.: U. . i.ar. Ci mn.ts Abroad,
i9 9. Updated by author, Lwarv.. 176.


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Admin l\ i-t u ,ivO tlI p(,rt Per<(,lAel. t(! A >o i>-tiatl f Ah11it),. t ,
Aero..pac:e ( t, e An i cl-ir ve tei-m M: )~3i-ii_" t] (at ,

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...\irborn, for:,:. ( qpira t ion- Groi titl .oiii ta }) t I i i ii V f, fore (1t'-i i f 1
prinial ily (tln(I d t tai'aeln i lle a or oi' tyxpe air a(.> Vriiit iI al

()0r (1x Ailohiie for(ce?-', (,t) ,ri.tl i'-.
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(cru1'ise 1 -0le of t heir ii.e neutali/ Ilieii. LEC .pu, nt iIel1( (-a
intercept r r ai 'ftl lsurfauc-to-air llli--ile> suveille Ievi,-
Air-lainme!wi J : t c 'l uuiiile" An-l i-de )iiforceile traii orteJ by
and r ib ll-oj e( f r lal or i -batcdi fa i-lift an or1 li-liter-ttIu-
air I1,.(n a- blip-.p, balloon- an t1 dirijibles ,t'u- ao

.Air-lauflehe( cii-e u )i-ile" Any r uise n is'--le trahnsporte 0(1l) a~ld
open (IdCf-..} Of1ofe-alit aifrepaIt aId l or lith(ter- Ttcn- r ir-
laonbih t l sfown li'mc(1- or roa )., 01)T u~I

and aInc illa11Y

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an(I or a, a' i U fii ,- an(1-0;, crair raft ndor h ei-i11ii

airc(. 01 -1(11 e- i, u 'ii h >.., baJ!oorl1u IandSc(1/
Air-auniedfi:u>l- fllle i.tlfiAny 10 a aIe r hu pcllft- Ii i-:md

fot tl,j,jtl>r!v(s. il; l.e/-lV ~IH ~i)iIV a- ,i'-.

11, !0li-iut 1d *~U ttip .' 1v filh(1,W. ,I,,l uti,. 0 / t Uf )f'a '
land. and ed r )I), It K' ( ifl a!Korl aiIriO -- tnd Jo I, Ia tiI,
ani l~h~ldu, at~l ,aP, bil-- 'tt bida1 ---n-, ai 'a'. n,Ii',, AIb1ej. lt -
oper' a 110I 1.
Anrtiballi-i hi,.illr I lii :. All )I i.u-ilru- I hilt f tJ) fi l ai-- Pa V
ho-tile' l atli-i e d- icite'j--. P oIlu(' ,V. i-u' 1I& afl 11ir 1 t heir it) ,1t

includes weapons, target acquisition, tracking and guidance radars,
plus ancillary installations.
Antisubmarine warfare: All measures to reduce or nullify the effec-
tiveness of hostile submarines; in relation to this study, specifically
concerns operations to detect, locate, track, and destroy submarines
used for strategic nuclear and conventional purposes.
Area target: A target whose dimensions encompass two or more geo-
graphic coordinates on operational maps. Cities and military bases
are representatives.
A rms control: Explicit or implicit international agreements that govern
the numbers, types, characteristics, deployment, and use of armed
forces and armaments. See also arms limitation; Disarmament.
Arms limitation: An agreement to restrict quantitative holdings of or
qualitative improvements in specific armaments or weapons systems.
See also Arms control; Disarmament.
Assumption: A supposition concerning the current situation or future
events, presumed to be true in the absence of positive proof to the
contrary. Used for planning and decision-making purposes.
Assured destruction: A highly reliable ability to inflict unacceptable
damage on any aggressor or combination of aggressors at any time
during the course of a nuclear exchange, even after absorbing a
surprise first strike.
ASW: See Antisubmarine warfare.
Attack aircraft: Tactical aircraft used primarily for interdiction and
close air support purposes. See also Fighter aircraft.
Attack carrier: An aircraft carrier designed to accommodate high-
performance fighter/attack aircraft whose primary purpose is to
project offensive striking power against targets ashore and afloat.
Attack submarine: A submarine designed primarily to destroy enemy
merchant shipping and naval vessels, including other submarines.
Balance: See Military balance; Strategic balance.
Ballistic missile: A pilotless projectile propelled into space by one
or more rocket boosters. Thrust is terminated at some early stage,
after which reentry vehicles follow trajectories that are governed
mainly by gravity and aerodynamic drag. Mid-course corrections
and terminal guidance permit only minor modifications to the
flight path. See also Reentry vehicle.
Bargaining chip: Any military force, weapons system, or other re-
source, present or projected, which a country expresses willingness
to downgrade or discard in return for concessions by a particular
Basic load: That quantity of nonnuclear ammunition authorized and
required to be on hand within a military unit or formation at all
Bomb: A weapon dropped from a manned aircraft of any sort. Gravity
is the primary force, but "smart" bombs can be guided electronically.
Calculated risk: The deliberate acceptance of gaps between ends and
means in accord with estimates that enemies are unlikely to initiate
actions that will interfere unacceptably with friendly arms. See
also Intention; Risk.
Capability: The ability of a country or coalition of countries to execute
specific courses of action. Capabilities are conditioned by many
variables, including the balance of military forces, time, space,
terrain, and weather. See also Intention.

Civil defense: 1ssive Imaslres signedd to ilimiiiiize 1Ole f(' -,'of
enemy action on all asj)eets of civil 1ife, inaritiiulaI'l*v to p'otect tlle
l)OIlmilation an(1 l)n)(illCtion base. I ncltiles villieli('l 'vl( tel> torI-epir
or re tore vital Utilit ies anl(l facilities.
Civil Reserve Air Fleet: U.S. c l1llerci al" ai reaftt~til c rexv-' allcateii
in eniei(eie(y for Nexclusive military iin iiiteriatiolual a(l (Ioliiet i
Close air S1ll)ort: Air strikes again st tarz(,,e, V near en hl t) (UHI1 toI
colbt l1t1 it t lu at detailed co)F(inl a tion betweell 1)8'lt i.il)atili gair
adgrolind ,elem)ellts is requtire(i.
Col<. lm il i :l"A "Im)<)111~)" tecillmlio-p e fta(ejects liti :i il, fv;)
silos or UI) i ', uIsig" l)oWeT plants t erare-v1Ilt( i' ' delivery vel ii ies. Prim a IN niti( )l is (t(l ve! llttil Iij 'tile -;a8e
safely c8"',r of t h I al1 Ier.
Cold( war: A state of intlr-iational ten- oll at tile lower (l,)(] of thle flic t spec t r1 H W, I ('e re i ff!o li t ical, e (t o l ) ( I t(cl o l )-ict al -(,i o)l o)gi -
('l, psycliological, j)arraliiilitary, a8lo1 milit al-V Ii)(' -, >lel hoi't of
suttaine(1, amiled comoat are orclhetrate( to atta11linati(olial
Collateral casualties and diamagZe :Pl;ical harm (lone to)lersons an!d
p)rop)erty collocated with or adjacent to t argets. ( ollateral effect
may be welcome or unwante(l, (leI)en(ling o1n circlimstaui(,e.
Combat power: A coml)ilation of cal)meliti related to a s)ecific
I() ,e or coialition-,. Ingredients inclm(le
military balnce between counLI-ries o oltos If2rdeInl1(I
numbers and tvl)es of forces;technologic,tl attributes of weaonl-,
and equipment; (iscil)line; morale; pride;confi(dence; lar(lile-'"
elan; loyalty; training; combat exl)erlencl ; comand(' ro)
arrangements; staying power; and leaderslil). Combat power is
illusory unless accompanied by the national will to use it a s re-
quired. Se al.o Military balance; National will.
Command and 'ontrol: A Aiarrangement of facilities, equipment, 1)er-
sounne, andl roe((iure' used to acquire, process, (1and (liSseniliatf'
data needed by decision-makers to plan, (Iirect, and control
Commitment: An obligation or ple(dge to carry out or support a given
national policy. Se al.so National security 1)olicies.
Conflict slectrin" A continuum of hostilities tllat ranges front sill)-
crisis111 e11elI vering' 1in coll-war situations to tlie imost violeinit fi)-l
of general war.
Con taiment : Measure-, to (lisColiage or prevevit tile el)1 ..dn of
ieneiy territorial l mol(lings am(l;or influence. Specilica 1 I, a .
police directed la ll)st coin n,Uuist exl>)T,1>ion.
C that (n'8lareaonably be anticil),atc(1 an that l)~robably wouI Il ave, a
detrimental effect on national security;ictions in (a-Q -uc'lit

Controlled couitei force wa r:, W1' ill wlich olle oir 1)both > ide- colc-
trate o I'e(licing eneiuv strateic l'aet ala O1v t-ce ilI a hal'-
gaining -ituiatioui, 811(1 tla' 'l)e(jill I)ie<(' 1-ti(u(ls to minimiz e <:('lhilvarm* t
ca-,malties and ( Controlled war : A war w\lared in resI)onse to t lie <('0nti1( U rc('i )t i all(1
evaluation of information concerning chl1anges in thie sit atio ,
combined with the c mtll)etence to a.djusit atiordil V. (e1bo
Controlled counterforce War.


Conventional (forces, war, weapons): Military organizations, hostili-
ties, and hardware that exclude nuclear, chemical, and biological
Cost effectiveness: A condition that matches ends with means in ways
that create maximum capabilities at minimum expense.
Counter city: See Countervalue.
Counterforce: The employment of strategic air and missile forces to
destroy, or render impotent, military capabilities of an enemy
force. Bombers an(l their bases, ballistic missile submarines, ICB.\
silos, ABM and air defense installations, command and control
centers, and nuclear stockpiles are typical counterforce targets.
Sue also Countervalue.
Countervalue: A strategic concept w hich calls for the destruction or
neutralization of selected enemy )o)ulation centers, industries,
resources, and/or institutions which constitute the social fabric of a
society. See also Counterforce.
CRAF: See Civil Reserve Air Fleet.
Credibility: Clear evidence that capabilities and intentions are suffi-
cient to su)l)ort purI)orted policies.
Cruise missile: A pilotless aircraft, propelled by an airbreathing
engine, that operates entirely within the earth's atmosphere. Thrust
continues throughout its flight. Air provides most of the lift. In-
flight guidance and control can be accomplished remotely or by on-
board equipment. Conventional and nuclear warheads are available.
Cruiser: A large, long-endurance surface warship armed for independ-
ent offensive operations against surface ships and land targets. Also
acts as an escort to protect aircraft carriers, merchantmen, and
other ships against surface or air attack. May have an anti-sub-
marine capability. Own aircraft-handling capability restricted to
one or two float planes, helicopters, or other short take-off and
landing types.
Damage limitation: Active and/or passive efforts to restrict the level
and/or geographic extent of devastation during war. Includes.
counterforce actions of all kinds, as well as civil defense measures.
See also Counterforce; Civil defense.
Defense: Measures taken by a country or coalition of countries to
resist political, military, economic, social, psychological, and/or
technological attacks. Defensive capabilities reinforce deterrence,
and vice versa. See also Deterrence.
Defense-in-depth: Protective measures in successive positions along
axes of enemy advance, as opposed to'a single line of resistance. De-
signed to absorb and progressively weaken enemy penetrations.
Destroyer: A me(lium-sized warship configured to escort and protect
other ships against air, submarine, and surface attacks. May also be
used for independent offensive operations against enemy ships or
land targets. Some embark one or two helicopters.
Detente: Lessening of tensions in international relations. May be
achieved formally or informally.
Deterrence: Steps taken to prevent opponents from initiating armed
actions and to inhibit escalation if combat occurs. Threats of force
predominate. See also Defense; Escalation.
Disarmament: The reduction of armed forces and/or armaments as a
result of unilateral initiatives or international agreement. See also
Arms control and Arms limitation.

Division Equivalent Separate brigades, regifiients, and coinl)arable
combat forces whose aogr'eg ate cai)ailities apl)PoNxillate tlio-e of a
division except for staying lv'wer.
E(I M:See Electroltic co) thrill Wdtl1e0.
Electronic cotlit ei-i easi res" A i'fofn of electru)iic a t" ilatp ire-
vents or d( ,2'1d(-, offectivO 110111N of the lel1ill a 21 1(t
spectr1m. ,5alIll g I, a *ylical talctic. S( (aNso Elictroliic (-(,llltel-
counllterl-llc "slre-o.
Eleetr nic lC ll rc l II llla ii-:A foi-rii of elec~tnic: wni-far,
taken to ii) >iire effective s11-( of tlie (l, 'ciro iw-lietic >pectnrilil (!-tite
enemiv 1,C(NI1 ffoirt-, .,c eal,,o Elect t ro lic (tll[ 't(0"I'
Ends: r IalS0m i V ~ trs ,ot) e(:(,-, a (,-" iw[colllllit ll( with nilitarY roles a d 1Ui's5 i1- X ii'l (,tii'61w ait o1( w) aw-
coip)lislle(. 'N also learnss.
Escalation : .i i lIea4, (teli)berite o 1)ri(1l'ted, ii thle "')op
and/or intensitv of a conflict.
Escort" ( iUsors, (lestroYers, frigates, an(d ot!ler' ur11 face wal ji
exl)res-lslv confipIred to defend other ships a-ait eneinv attack.
May be imtltipil)nose (e. anti-air, anti-sibiialne) or 11 1luirpoe.
May also be assigned in(epeldent offetie nisvioiSl. Y(e also)
Cruiser; Destroyer; frigate.
Essential eqiiivalence: A force structure stan(lard that deilandL
capabilities al)l)roxiInately equal in overall effectiveness to those of
particular ol)ponents, It does not insist oi numerclal equality inlli
cases. See also Parity.
Fighter aircraft :Tactical aircraft used primarily to gain and iaintaill
air superiority. See also Attack aircra ft.
First-strike" The first offensive move of a war. As applied to general
nuclear war, it implies the ability to eliminate effective retaliationl
by the opposition. See also Second strike.
First use: The initial enI)loyment of specific military measures, su('ti
as nuclear weapons, diringr the conduct of a war. A belligerent 'c0ld
execute a second strike in response to aggression, yet be the first
to employ nuicleair weapons. See also First strike.
Flexibility: Capabilitiesthat afford countries and weapons s-,teinisa
range of options, and facilitate smooth adjustment when situation-s
change. S(e also Flexible response.
Flexible response: A strategy predicated on meeting aggression at an
appropriate level or p)lac'e with the cap)ability of escalating the level
of conflict if required or desired. See also Flexibility.
Forward base: A military installation lnaintaine l on orein soil or on
a distant possession tlat is conveniently located with regard to
actual or potential areas of operations.
Forward defense: A strategic concept which calls for c'0taliiilV (1'
reptulsing military aggression as close to tlleo rignial line of contact
as possible to protect inlp)ortant areas.
Free rocket: A missile witl coifletely self-contained propellant
package that is neither gittel nor controlled in flight.
Frigate: A niediiun to small su facee warsliij) aIrmel as an escorl
against surface attack and either air or submarine attack. I eav he
capable of enlbarking alid handling oe or two helicopters. &'
also Escort.

General purpose forces: All combat forces not designed primarily to
accomplish strategic offensive/defensive or strategic mobility
General war: Armed conflict between major powers in which the
national survival of a major belligerent is in jeopardy. Commonly
reserved for a showdown between the United States and U.S.S.R.,
featuring nuclear weapons.
Hard-site ICBM: Anv ICBM in a silo that provides substantial
protection against nuclear attack. See also Hard target; Intercon-
tinental ballistic missile.
Hard target: A point or area protected to some significant degree
against the blast, heat and radiation effects of nuclear exposions
of particular yields. See also Soft target.
Heavv bomber: A multi-engine aircraft with intercontinental range,
designed specifically to engage targets whose destruction would
reduce an enemy's capacity and'or will to wage war. See also
Medium bomber.
Heavy ICBM: U.S. Titan II; Soviet SS-7, SS-8, SS-9, SS-18, SS-19
for purposes of this study. See also Light ICBM.
Heavy tank: Tanks weighting more than 60 tons are generally
designated as "heavies," although the United States no longer
uses heavy, medium, and light as classifications. See also Light
tank; Medium tank.
High threshold: An intangible line between levels and types of conflict
across which one or more antagonists plan to escalate with great
reluctance after other courses of action fail, or which they could be
compelled to cross only if subjected to immense pressures. See also
Low threshold and Threshold.
Itti-Lo nix: Mingling high-cost, high performance items with relatively
low-cost, low performance items in any given weapons system to
achieve the best balance between quantity and quality in ways that
maximize capabilities and minimize expenses.
ICBM: See Intercontinental ballistic missile.
Intention: The determination of a country or coalition to use capabili-
ties in specific ways at specific times and places. Intentions are
conditioned by many variables, including interests, objectives,
policies, principles, commitments, and national will. See also
Capability; National will.
Interceptor: An air defense aircraft designed to identify andi'or
destroy ho-tile airbreathing weapons systems such as bombers and
cruise missiles.
Intercontinental ballistic missile. A ballistic missile with a range of
3,000 to 8,000 nautical miles. See also Ballistic missile.
Interdiction: Operations to prevent or impede enemy use of an area or
Interests: See National -,ecuritv interests.
Intermediate-range ballistic missile: A ballistic missile with a range
of 1,500 to 3,000 nautical miles. See also Ballistic missile.
I RBM\: See Interme(iate-range ballistic missile.
Lancl-on-w rningo: Retaliatory strikes triggered upon notification
that an enemy nuclear attack has been launched, but before any
weapons hit friendly territory.
Light ICBM: U.S. minutemen; Soviet SS-11, SS-13, SS-17, for pur-
poses of this study. See also Heavy ICBM.


Light tank: rLaiks weighing less than 40 tons are general ly (eia
as "light," although the Ullited States lo]I() e r tieavy,
medium, and light (Iassifi at ioas. ,S (/.o Heavy taiik;N 1,i1
Limited war: Armed encounters, (Xell or more major powers or t~1'teir )xies v (lltllt al.v ,ercl-e va 0iol,
types andl degree" of resrait to tpve(,ll tI ll lal V'eal "' OZ -aial i0].
Objecives, r a s fr"e' '" we", ,, allda (itt ll
be limited.
ILine of c(ThH11l ,11fi tuenLaBmi. se,,,tI 811t (,,1 ( -~( mlip Iii n lo
tile coii1iict of intei'liatlonal se('li> afair,-, j>a Ptc!!ai]Y tte l -
ployneiit o()f aii ( l forces and a5(,ici, tz (i l(i_ .. ,'i)b(r.
Logistics: Plajis f ad operations a-',-K(ci,-,tc XXIIi] l]e ({>j,1]. (n-Ie -

evacuationl, and (ip -ition of mateiel: lie I IoveHle, neli(11,
and hopitalization of h)ersollnc1; the ae(jli itiun or {(;i>1()
iaintoiince, opeftion, and di.,ipo1tdiof taci .tie-, ;aiid d
acquisition or furnihiv'g of services.
Low thresholid: Al iiltainible line between level a ai lype of oiflic.t
across which one (r more antagonists plan to e-(alate \vib -:,tian
regret, or which th1ev wold be coInpell to (m<, ,(klilv i 1-t:b-
jected to pressures. See( also IIigh tilre-hold an(iThre-liold.
\Maneuverable reentry vehicle: A ballistic ni1-iw v~a l'Ia4 or decoy
whose accuracy is improved by terminal guidance mect anisdu.
MaRX: See laIaneuverable reentry vehicle.
Mas-ive retaliation: The act of coulntering reiof in-v type xiri
tremendol ,,destructive power; particularly a crui-Iig ,iunuclear
response to any provocation deemed serious enolgl to warrant,
military action.
Means: Money, manpower, materiel, and other re> sources converte(
into capabilities that contribute t the aceomplislment of national
securities ains. Se ahlo Capability; Ends.
Iedium bomber: A multi-enginediaircraft that lacks i,-itercontinen t al
range without in-flig-ht refueling, but is suitable for strategic boiib-
ing on one-wav intercontinental euision. oven Iacking tanker
Medium-range ballistic missile: A ballistic missile with a range of 600
to 1,500 nautical miles. See also Ballistic missile.
Medium tank: Tanks weighing between 40 and 60 tons generally are
designated as "'medliuims," although the United State- no longer
uses heavy, medium, and light classifications. Ste also tteavy tanky;
Light tank.
Merchant marine: All non-military vessels of a nation, publicly- and
privately-owned, together ith crews, which engage in doIetie
and/or international trade and commerce.
Military balance: The comparative combat power of two competing
countries of coalitions. See also Combat power; Strategic balance.
Military power: See Combat power.
Military strategy: The art and science of emp)]oying military power
under all circumstances to attain national seci irit objectivess bNr
applying force or the threat of force. S eealso Tacti(c.
MIRV: See Multiple indel)en(lently-targetable reentry vehicle.
Mission: A function or task assigned to specific armed forces.


Mobile missile: Any ballistic or cruise missile mounted on and/or
fired from a movable platform, such as a truck, train, ground effects
machine, ship, or aircraft.
Mobilization: The act of preparing for war or other emergencies by
assembling and organizing raw materials; focusing industrial efforts
on national security objectives; marshalling and readying Reserve
and National Guard units and individuals for active military
service; and'or activating and readying new military organizations
filled with personnel inducted from civilian life.
\IRBM: See MeIdium-range ballistic missile.
MRV: See Multiple reentry vehicle.
Multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle: A missile payload
comprising two or more warheads that can engage separate targets.
See also Multiple reentry vehicle; Reentry vehicle.
Multiple reentry vehicle: A missile payload comprising two or more
warheads that engage the same target. See also Multiple inde-
pendently targeted reentry vehicle; Reentry vehicle.
National interests: A highly generalized concept of elements that con-
stitute a state's compelling needs, including self-preservation, ind'e-
pendence, national integrity, military security, and economic well-
National objectives: The fundamental aims, goals, or purposes of a
nation toward which policies are directed and energies are applied.
These may be short-, mid-, or long-range in nature.
National policies: Broad courses of action or statements of guidance
adopted by a government in pursuit of national objectives.
National power: The sum total of any nation's capabilities or potential
derived from available political, economic, military, geographic,
social, scientific, and technological resources. Leadership and na-
tional will are the unifying factors.
National security: The protection of a nation from all types of exter-
nal aggression, espionage, hostile reconnaissance, sabotage, subver-
sion, annoyance, and other inimical influences. See also National
security interests, National security objectives, and National secu-
rity policies.
National security interests: Those national interests primarily con-
cerned with preserving a0state from harm. See also National interests
and National security.
National security objectives: Those national objectives primarily
concerned with shielding national interests from threats, both
foreign and domestic See also National objectives and National
National security policies: Those national policies which provide
guidance primarily for attaining national security objectives. See
also National policies and National security.
National will: The temper and morale of the people, as they influence
a nation's ability to satisfy national security interests and/or
attain national security objectives.
Naval superiority: Dominance on the high seas to a degree that permits
friendly land, aerospace, and naval forces to operate at specific times
and places on, over, or adjacent to the high seas without prohibitive
interference by enemy naval elements. See also Sea control.


Nuclear delivery stem: A nuIclear weajol), toget e wit It it 'mean of
p)roplsion anl1 associated inst all atimis. I icdu(de'carrirs such1as
aircraft, ships, ai inotor vehicles. e alo Nu(1(ar )0l1
Nuclear weapon: A bomb, 1His-ile warlleaid, or oilier (live 1Ie oni-
nance item (as 0o1lo l to> a Hto811expl-Rilltal device) thiat exlo ies a-
a result of energY relee 85(y(Im atomic nuclei'resi. uting from tisiol1,
fusion, or 1)oth. S (ee also N ui iar leliverv sv t,-'ll.
()bjective" :See Nati Overkill" I)estruictive ( should be a d eq uat ( t ) loespt J' y1' S ecifi e d1 ta rgetts al( /1 at tlait S-
cific security V obj e operations s 8a1! V maii tl alce: All activities of armedI f'rce ,, in l)eace
mid in war, t) ocirr. t rategi,, latitjal, ti'aimiil l, logi-tic, and
,admlnl, t atlx ( issioI0 S.
Parity: A force strlcturell st llrlvwhich ell enP ls tha cal)ilitie-
of specific forces anl iweald) '1 systm lbe l)1lroxin ate( Veq111 III
effectiveness to ( e1iemi('Ov cl ilterlarts. ',e e(l. Essenial equivileice.
Payload: The Weapon l1( (llor cargo c' ()acit o' ano y tall l' 1' mnisile
system, extlressed varioti>1v i ll polliis; lllnbers of air anld1 aii-to-surface Ilis iles, ('1\W caIlist e('I gns, sen Yr1>. E ,i\C'
packets, etc; and in terms of missile wamllead fields (kilot oil>,
Poli(y : See Nat "lal secul'it p i(ie.
Postlaunlh survivabilit Th:lie ability of ay 'given delivery system to
breach enemy defensess an attack designated targets. See alo
Prelaunch sulrvivabilitv.
Posture: The combined strategic intentions, Capabilities, (and vulner-
abilities of a count'Vr or coalition of countries, inclldling the strength,
disposition, aiid readiness of its armedt forces.
Prelaunch survival)lhtv :The ability of any given (leliverV system to
weather a surprise first-strike successfully 1ad ret alitate. See ai/o
Postlaunch survivabilitv.
Proxy war: A form of limited war in which, great powers avoid a direct
military confrIontation by furthering their national seu'r"1ity lt" e'-
ests and objectives through conflict between rejpresentatives o(r
associates. See abso Limited1 war.
Rapii reload capacity: The ability of a st rategic i Hclear deliVery
system to conduct multiple strike's. This characteristic( lI'!eseHtlI ,s
Confined! to aircraft, but la1(I-111ot1ile 1is1lea'l; (1 harl->ite 1 ( IC
have the j) t "li S ."t Subi m8',+ S + ('OI ( V 11 V('o)l! 1I1e re 11 ni! eId at
ea, but a sig-ificantlvy eatcl tiime lao would occur.
Readilne "' ai ilitv of sp ecific ('.111 ("d foi' es to1 'e'-l>>llt ii li il1(
'All Reentr! vehicle:" Tht j)art of a a)alli-tic islue (ldc-el t) re,,nter
th~e eatl 'atx ll eh e e 111.11 ,(rten+i=l st,' ,,- +>tofiW, trn,.wle<'<>
in t forceinci : lAw12m1(11t vi i l it v!ei a':8abte.Ill 1111V O'fl'01r 1 1ca
b1)' itrooldcinlocal-aalal'mad ()I. 1 lIt crc I't c(c -. t a

t(-4'e ( llmoil,eit: Arnied for.ce>s 1ot i acive .i<'. I . Ie-vv
(Coullolelt1-; iic1' lle theI. 1iv Na tital (+,+s'utrd aiA Arnm I{eR\v ('
tle Naval t'1U'-cF' ; he l' arlle C Oe)' the>(eve: tli( Ai'- N tliuanl
Guai-l11, .11d Air 1 < Frc( tReery'.


Reserves: Sc Reserve component; Strategic reserve.
Revolutionary war: Efforts to seize political power by iletitilmate and
coercive means, destroying existing systems of government and
social structures in the process.
Risk: The danger of disadvantage, defeat, or destruction that results
from a gap between ends and means. Ste akso Calculated risk.
Role: Sc' M islion.
SALT: & trategic Arms Limitation Talks.
ea" conTrol e Te employment of naval forces. supplemented by land
anda" o 1ac force- as appropriate. to dero,- enemy naval forces,
ursenm ca .i commerce, protect vital shipping lanes.
an:d establish l)cal superioritv in areas of naval operations. See also
N aval superiority.
S-co:ld-st ikc : A strategic concept which excludes pre-emptive and pre-
veNive actUons before he onset of a war. After an agressor initiates
hostilitiesl the defender retaliates. In general nuclear war, this
implies the ability to survive a surprise first strike and respond
e c l ,. S First strike.
SLB,[" :0Su Slbmarine ea-launched ballistic missile.
SLC,[" (: 1 Subm:arine sea-launched Cruise
Soft target" A target not protected against the blast, heat, and
radiation produced by nucL sirexplosions. There are manyi degrees of
softness. Some missile ad aircraft. for example. are built in ways
that ward off certain effects, but they are "soft' in comparison
with shelters andt silos. 0S11 a11 Hard target
Specified comm and: A top-echelon U.S. combat ant organizat ion with
regional or functional responsibilities., which normally is composed of
forces frotni one military service. It has a broad, con:tinuing mission
and is established by the President, through the Secretarv of
Defense e. with the advice and assistance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
t (t-l o Uned command.
Stabli)t. S' c ,trategic stability.
Strategic airift:'Transport aircraft, both military and civilian, used to
move armed forces, equipment. and supplies expeditiously over
long distances, especially ite'continentall.. Sc aso Tactical air-
Strategic air war: Aerospwe operations directed against the enemy's
w-making 11 cap:city. Typical targets include industry, stockpiles of
raw materiaNs and linllIhed products, power systenis, transportaton
and communication centers. trategic weapons stem andCities.
Strategic arms limitation talks: Negotiations between the Unlited
'tates and the Soviet Union to curtail the expansion of, and if possi-
ble reduce, strategic offenve and defensive weapons systems of
both countries in an equitable fashion. S& ak5o Arms control: Arms
Strategic balance; The conmparative national power of two competing
countries or coalitions. 8c a/so MIilitary balance National power.
i efenseThetrateg and forces designed primarily to pro-
tect a nation. its outposts and or allies fom the hazards of general
war. It features defense against missiles. both land- and sea-launched,
and l-onalne bombers. 8cc aso Strateye offense.
Siratec mobility: The ability to shift personnel, equipment, and sup-
plies effectively and expeditiously between theaters of operation.
8cc(* also Stratec airlift :strateznc sealift.


Strategic offen-e :Tle strategy and forces (lesigl ie(I mtrinarily to) (le-
stry) lie eiem1 's war-mnkiiig (apaci y {lrit ig relerl W8 U or (k) s()
(legra(le it fliat Olie ) position collapsess See alo Strategic c (1'flfe;
St rateric ret aliatm(V conceptss alilI forces).
Strateoi reserve: n<('1i m1itte(l fo)rcesof 8a, ,( c)ultry or .(ali i(fl of
col11lt ies wliclh are i el(led( to support htlin01a secunit'Ity ilit e14'
a1(1 l>)J ec i ve s, as reo Stratevic rel it<10'v (concepts 811(l forces)" Socoi(1-46ike -i':ai
anl lorces (esigSji (! lprimarily to (lestF()V tile etleniv's ar-in ,
capacity J\ ling oZ'1er'l w8P or to o) (Ien(l(e it ,(lfat tle0)J,)pIm! timl
collap++-e. c(al sttS rat (nic (lefjese ; >trtFle(ric ( tf!iie.
Strat' !i ,ealiflc Naval andl lercliaiA t >il)s t o( '(i witll (>'W- ii- t''!
to moveforce"."l fo'ee(llipme1it, a a1llslpl)Ilie over l<)1Lr(li-I(,
e-,pecially ill eco )ltilelitally.
Stlrategi(. bili v A state of equilib'iumI w!'llch (eIeilF8''e ; ;,+ I (iCI(
by o)pllo>+ < facilig Htlie possiI)ilityo f refleFral wtar. 'l'eil(leif-iie- n()-
wan.] an arni-r ace are restraiwie(l, sitice lIICtIverig f ol. fo'r g-iii, "'I
advant.-in -)neaniloles;s.
Stra tegic waNioi'll Notification t (hat enemv ofrensiye operi-i1 -;of 811y
kindmaylbe iminnent. Tie alert maybe receive ( I min ultes, 1 l ( r-,
(lays, or longer before hostilities comlei'e. See also T actical v -
Submarine ',ea-laun ported by an( llaunched1 from a ship. MN ybe sh ort-, me(i iu1-, i-
termedia te-, or long-ra nge..See also Ballistic missile.
Submarine sea-launched cruise missile: Any air-breatiim-r ui-is;ile
transported by anl launched from a ship. N[ay be short-, ue~liue -,
intermediate-, or long-range. See also Crise missile.
Sufficiency: A force structure stan(lard(l that (leIan(ls capabilities nA(le-
quate to attain (lesirel ends without un(lue waste. Superiority thus
is essential in some circumstances; parity/essential equivalence
Is -icestuntiel ...
sufficesiunder less (leman(ling con(litions', and inferiority. qua lit a-
tive as well as quantitative, is sometimes acceptable. Sre al.,o SuIpe-
riority: Essential equivalence; an(l Parity.
Superiority: A force structure st andard that demand capailities
marked Iv greater than those of opponents.
Survivability: The ability of armed forces and civilianm cor) nuni lies
to withst4and attack and still function effectively. It is (lerivel m-lilliV
from active andl passive defenses. S ,e also Pre-la.cilm su',1iux !lvbilit v
Post-i aunch survivability.
Tactical aircraft :LandI- and carrier-based aircraft as general purposes forces. Selected U.S. eleulent (are routi mely
assigned sfriat egic nuclear mis si
Tactical airlift : rtsport aircraftt (military o nily in die Uie(1 Sr al ,e
used to move armed forces, equiplmeiet, nSlltl)plies xeC~ li! iol INy
within theater of opera tion. S c also Str rat eic ai vl if.
Tactical nui lear forces, weapon,,, opera iolis: Nu cleir c)1b1)8 pt>wer
expressly designed for oleterrent,,, ofiei:Ve, ,1(1 (1efellsive purposes
that contribute to the accomjplisImeii of localized military ni1i-ons;
the threatened or actual application of such power. Ma I-l be employed
in general as well as limited wars. Ste also General war; Limited


Tactical warning: Notification that'enemy offensive operations of any
kind are in progress. The alert may be received at any time from
the moment the attack is launched until its effect is felt. See also
Strategic warning.
Tactics: The detailed methods used to carry out strategic designs.
Military tactics involve the employment of units in combat, in-
eluding the arrangement and maneuvering of units in relation to
each other and/or to the enemy. See also Military strategy.
Theater of operations: A geographical area outside the United States
for which the commander is a U.S. unified or specified command has
been assigned military responsibility. See also Specified command;
Unified comniand.
Threat: The capabilities, intentions, and actions of actual or potential
enemies to prevent or interfere with the successful fulfillment of
national security interests and/or objectives.
Threshold: An intangible and adjustable line between levels and types
of conflict, such as the separation between nuclear and non-
nuclear warfare. The greater the reluctance to use nuclear weapons,
the higher the threshold. See also High threshold; Low threshold.
Throw weight: Tle payload capacity of a ballistic missile expressed in
aggregate poundage for reentry vehicles of all types ( Tarheads,
decoys). See also Payload.
Time-sensitive target: Any counterforce target which is vulnerable.
only if it can be struck before it is launched (as with bombers and
missiles) or redeploys (as with ground combat troops and ships).
Tooth-to-tail ratio: The proportion of combat forces to administrative/
logistic support in a nation's armed forces and in specific military
organizations, such as (hivisions, air wings, and fleets.
Triad: Any group of three military elements with separate charac-
teristics but common basic missions. Specifically, the tripartite U.S.
strategic retaliatory force, which comprises manned bombers, inter-
continental ballistic missiles, and ballistic-missile submarines.
Tripwire: A largely symbolic force positioned on an ally's soil to
advertise the owner's commitment to a particular country or
coalition of countries. Attacks against the token contingent would
trigger a massive response.
Tube artillery: Howitzers and guns, as opposed to rockets and guided
missiles. May be towed or self-propelled.
Unified command: A top-echelon U.S. combatant organization with
regional or functional responsibilities, which normally is composed
of forces from two or more military services. It has a broad, con-
tinuing mission and is established by the President, through the
Secretary of Defense, with the advice and assistance of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. When authorized by the JCS, commanders of
unified commands established by the President may from one or
more subordinate unified command within the jurisdictions. See also
Specified command.
Vulnerability: The susceptibility of a weapons system to any action by
any means through which its combat effectiveness may be dimin-
War-fighting: Combat actions, as opposed to deterrence (which is
designed to prevent, rather than prosecute, wars).
Warhead: That part of a ballistic or cruise missile which contains.
nuclear explosives.
Will: See National will.


Abbrevitati ,- rlit e low arel( iile i t to tli-u o ic it Itext or tdl)e- .

AL( 1O ? [

A t1 "1iOC I J)( -, I) 11I( 1I
Air I)e'iieCo m)ande
Air-lhwnchwtd, lcrm-im- ,i ,ilc

A nt11)D mia (ill al 1'(,
IF pee ()eket ove( 2()iel ~]i
Civil Reserve Air Fleet
lD etart (I'lnt 1)f Det en
1, t rolli( 1i ter e a11 itr( 1 f Ol
European d ( ole(l
F1ree rc (ket over ground
Fi.( jt Year

In-tercontineli tal i i
I nterme11'Id iate-range tballistic mlssile
At ii tlanic 1 ()n (lit
14ght a.,sa-ult weapon
]AMI(lingratt m ec laized
N oaid.m). Atl I ilimit"V 0.21 ft tty
Laiidin (craftVe!hicle, personnel

Ma]ti ve,'able reentry vehicle
Nlilitary AltiliftC'omman
Mt[trine Aniphibio)us Fo)rce
Military All- Tran ,port Service

Multiple rbe eentry vehicle
M ed(.jli-f-( IIIYe bh l liU( ii
i ltiple ree()Iy I i S v( ei(,
M\ Uilitary-eznllift (,'"ii(
,ll""ary S ea IFrfan, pot 'S eni(I(
N ort! tlWant ic Treat%- 01 Organiiza tion
"\ ortIt A m eri('an I cfen (- O ln ml a nd
P" icli c (Comm!and(
Rese(arch! and!(,velo(Ilent

Readllllai Cm(m9)
Strategic Air (Co)inaInd




Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
Surface-to-air missile
Submarineisea-launched ballistic missile
Su bm arine/se a-launched cruise missile
Southern Command
Short-range attack missile
Short-range ballistic missile
Ballistic missile submarine
Nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine
Surface-to-surface missile
Tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided
(anti-tank weapon)
United States Air Force
U.S. Army, Europe
United States Marine Corps
Vertical/short takeoff and landing (aircraft)


ABM. SeeAknti-h l,-4iite ic i ledefcn< ,.
AD)( \ ,c A ir l)(feii)c (, ( i) rimd:l~.
Aeroffit: S l ,)plel telit, ()iiet 1ii:rv airlift
Aeros'pac d( d feii-t S c Air defe i-,& Alti-Ltli t iii-- ih (( ,('.
Aircra ft e:ttri-, :
Q uan titn tive tr(n kl< } I, 19 (G 5-75-..... ..... ... .........................
In Indittri a1i'ai, 197 ...
T in M c d ite i-r :n i w a n 19 )7 :) ... .. . ....... ... ..... ... . . ... .. . ..... .. ... .. .. .. .......
NIATO m i )p()I1 o :itt :t1o e arri(' s. ...

A gn i s t m ti hip mi~isil(, ...... ... ...... ... ...... ...

Qum ntit:t i tr~ncds, air!Iraft, 19.5-7;) .....................
Air defense:
Q intitntive t rends, A int(,rcel)tor-, 965-75 .........
ilj. S liiiiitntlio i .. . . . . . . .. .. .. . .
S o v ie t s r s -- - -- -- -- - - - - ----- - - - - - - - - - - -
R elated to -i--e i il- .... .---------
U .S R & 1). )r ,g r:,u w- ... .. ... ..... . .. .. . . .. .. .. .
L ip service t t o ectives ................................
S ov iet A n-n v f-------.. .. .. . .... . . . .. .. .
)e fi n e d .. .. .. . . . .. . .. . . . . -. - - - -. . . . .
Air Defense C(miniad: U.S. SA[ b:itteries assigned
Air Foree. See S()viet Unio)n, lited States:- Strate-ic offensix
Strategic dcfenive f)rcee: Taetical air forces, Airlift.
Air-launched cruise ni-siles:
U.S. quantitative superi(Writy--------------------------
Short-range attack m iss-iles -..... ---------------------
R elated to air defen se -------------- .....................
Quantitative trend-, 19G.5-75 .------ -----------------------
United States, Soviet ini-l;ile identified -----------------
D e fi n e d - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Quantitative trend-, 1965-75 .------------------------- -
1 s. assets unpa ralleled ... .............................
U .S. tactical airlift problem s .. -------------- -----------
R.S & I). pr r ---:tn-- --.. . ... .. . . . . . . .
United States, >,iit types identified --------------------
R elated to fl rw,1rd e l(,3I-)( lleIt -------------------------
Strategic, tactical airlift (lelined -
Air Natimal (na rd. See National Guiard.
ALCI. See Air-lzmuiched cruise miissiles.
R elated to ) ilitnirv t tah ce -----------------------------
IR elated t( t t(l foree c()n ep'e t- ................... ...... ......
I'nited St ates,, S,,i(t r(i ance con mred .-----------------
H Iclated t- sezilift req ir(-I l lnlwnts .............................
I-el'I ted to c ,111itiih clit"
Tlreas rel t '(dt t, 1.S. firce required ents
V .S e()I IIilt 'l qllc]11t d ...... ................................................ .............
See also' No rti At l:nti cTreaty (Organization \\zir-:iw Pnct.
All-V()Iute(er F ore:
M lnpo w (er ceili- ......-.............-------------------
RIel:ted to Ieserve e() el(ms-n ..- .
Financial costs .---------------------------------------

?a g

.. .. G, 6N 4 1


...... 4 4 4
4 N

- - - - - 2 1

........ 7)N

- - - -- 17,_'
. . . .:9
. . . . 4 5
. . . 4 'I
. . . .57)


.. .. 4 7 4

. . )-- 42(

. . . . 1



Amphibious (operations, ships): rage
Quantitative trends, 1965-7.5----------------------------------- 6,244
As index to Soviet intentions -------------------------------------13
Emerging Soviet capabilities----------------------------------13, 21
U.S. Army amphibious qualifications -----------------------------23
MAF lift requirements-------------------------------------- 30,30N
Available U.S. lift3------------------------------------------ 3044
Current U.S. lift deployments-----------------------------------30
U:.S. assembly times for lift-----------------------------------30
AN(G. See National Guard.
Antiballistic missile defense:
Present quantitative balance------------------------------------4, 28
SALT I authorizations.------------------------------------18, 23, 31
Soviet ABM related to U.S. deterrent-----------------------------23
Soviet systems easily saturated-----------------------------------24
U.S. site closes down--------------------------------------------24
Related to NATO--------------------------------------------28-29
United States, Soviet R. & D------------------------------------31
Quantitative trends, 1965-75---------------------------------44
Antiship missiles:
Soviet monopoly------------------------------------------6, 6N, 20
U.S. problems in Iediterranean--------------------------------11-12
Soviet surprise attack capabilities------------------------------12 29
SS5M ships related to cruiser/destroyer balance----------------------22
Soviet types identified --------------------------------------- 45
Related to U.S. second-strike policy ------------------------------52
Anti.ubmarine warfare:
Quantitative balance in aircraft_------------------------------ 6, 44
U.S. problems in Mediterranean------------------------------- 11
United States, Soviet insufficiency cited------------------------- 24
United States, Soviet missions differentiated------------------ 24N
U.S. ASW ships versus Soviet submarines------------------------29-30
U.S. R. & D. related to problems ---------------------------------31
Antitank weapons:
Present quantitative balance-------------------------------5, 5N, 44
U.S. R. & 1)-------------------------------------------------- 31
United States, Soviet types identified-----------------------------45
APC. See Armored personnel carriers.
ARADCOM. See Army Air Defense Command.
Armed Forces. See Soviet Union, United States: Armed Forces.
Arnmred personnel carriers:
Present quantitative balance,--------------------------------- -5,44
Quantitative trends, 1965-75-------------------------------------44
Arms control:
U.S. emphasizes-------------------------------------------_ 33, 41
See also Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.
Arms Limitation. See Arms control; Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.
Army. See Soviet Union, United States: Army.
Army Air Defense Command: SAM batteries inactivated---------------.4-5
A- sumptions: As force sufficiency factor-----------------------------53-54
Asured destruction:
Linked with U.S. second-strike policy-----------------------------17
Force requirements-------------------------------------------17-18
Related to MIRV requirements-----------------------------------23
Related to SALT-------------------------------------------23
Related to Soviet city evacuation plans---------------------------28
Defined_------------------------------------------------------ 58
ASW. See Antisubmarine warfare.
AT. Se Antitank weapons.
Atlantic Alliance. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Attack aircraft. See Fighter/attack aircraft.
Attack carriers. See Aircraft carriers.


Attack submarine., :Page
Quantitative trends, 1965-75 .................- 6, 44
Soviet Imnol)oly vm SS[ sui)Ii:lriines --- 20, 44
SS \1oats relaltd to total l)al111c(- 22
U .S. A SW focti ed o- . . .. ..... . .. . . ... . ---- 24N
Soxviet subnmriiw-,i ver-us U.S. ASW shi -.------..- 2%-:1)0
Defined --- --- ---- 5- 5

13-1 1))mbnl r: roll(1 t( 1" .t 1)lenls.-- - -",1
Backfire h nm b 'r: stl t(gic lucl(ar1 c:11)tabilisi -. --- -- --- --5, 3 1 'N
Badg r )Ob r: j)en:rl li (ll j)rio)spets5 })...
111ist ic iilcs. Scc' I IIII(,r lt i let at, I i(' illi le-r:nge M ldiuim-ringe
aiid Sq1)lm:lrile s(:-lallnhe(J l)ZalliStic li ils
Bzdllistic fs-i sfn 'r c"
Qt nti t:ii t tivc lid,, 1965 -75------------------------------------ ,4'
S()%Vi--- A-- f----n 2N----------24N
Xersas t.. A SW ,iip) ---------------------- ----------------- 2 9
R.. .. & 1). rlm'ted t i \ prblci ------------------------------
w S11'i1t d11 i ---- 1- ------------------- 31
N ~ w le : r )- - - - - - - - --... . . .. . .. .. . .. . . . . . . . . . .4 3
Sceah, o ini" i
~( C ~lu,~l)1l:Un~ ii- ca-iaiinched lilli. tic iiles.
Bomn bers:
t lantif: tive so i)e1oriiV cited4-------------------------------- 4
Pner i )fprl )- cti r for Badger t)-)1- --)01"-,- .1
As anleim(t )f t.S. triad--------------------------17, 2,1, 2)N, 41,4
nfltueinc ()f liniK' delerrenc(----------------------------- s
lttility (1u1etioi .d--------------------------------------------- 2:8
Post-llimch -!uivnlOilil v..------------------------------------- 2
Future ptnet, tio iilcq),liti('s_----------------------- 0 0N
U... SR. & 1). rbltted t robems--------------
Soviet Backlir he'. ...--------------------------------------------1
Qulntitttive lrcid-, 19(75_ --1.6575---------------4:1
UIitcd Stat(e', Sovicl hIeaxv, medium tl)( identifiede-----------------45
t1eavy, n'(tiai -s defined,----------------------------------62, 63
Budget. Se Deeinse Iudget.
Caleuflat,,ed risk-.s. cc ri-ks.
Capn ilities"
'atd t te:t----------------------------------------------- 50
1)efi (,d .. . . . . .. . . . .5
Choracter. ce Nt ti,,nl character.
Choke l)oin > u-e cby U.S. Nav.--------------------------------------9, 80
Civil d(feive :
>,vilts stre -- --- -
c viet city (v:1cua i n plan,- - - - - ----- ----
R.. I. & 1). p)rograns_- -------------------------I1
1 )efi n e d - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --- 9
Civil 1v(e- c-vo Air Fleet" Suppleent ... i titary airlft---------------
Cold Lnun(h:
Applied to Soviet ICB's1------------------------11
]))nt exrie-e As a-- )ig-ls (uali ..------------------- 1

A. force stufficiency factor_---------------------------------------47-48
U.S. priorities_ ----- -- -- --'
)eined ------------------- -----------------.-------...... .. .. ... .. 0
C>" I'e'-.ionai resol 1i'),:S" defense c()iniit nweu I-id(n iied. .. ..-------------- ,7) -
Colt ienv plans, oera l tion.l, ieuirolll, i t,"
R at ( 'ted to U.S. c()millitn nts ..... .... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..---------------47-4S'
Defined------------------------------------------------------ 59


Counterforce: "Page
Related to bomber penetration problems -..................23
Related to U.S. MIIRV requirements -23
Defined- -........... ----- 60
CRAF. See Civil Reserve Air Fleet.
Cruise missile.,. See Air-launched cruise missiles; Submarine/sea-launched
cruise missiles.
Present quantitative balance-----------------------------------22 44
Related to Soviet submarine threat----------------------------- 29
Quantitative trends, 1965-7.--------------------------------------44
Defense budget:
Influence on U.S. force ceilings-----------------------------------16
Related to All-Volunteer Force -----------------------------------17
United States, Soviet compared----------------------------17, 17N, :33
Effects on U.S. modernization------------------------------------32
U.S. trends ----------------------------------------------32-:''
Effects on force quality------------------------------------------33
As force sufficiency factor------------------------------------- 53
As index to trends.------------------------- --------53
Defense Communications Agency: Not controlled by EUCOM7-----------7
Present quantitative balance-----------------------------------22, 44
Related to Soviet submarine threat-------------------------------29
Quantitative trends, 1965-75.---------------------------------- 44
Detente: Related to Soviet intentions----------------------------------54
As primary U.S. objective-----------------------------------47, 50
Force requirements versus those for combat1-----------------------51
Discipline: U.S. problems in early 1970's ------------------------------10
Present quantitative balance--------------------------------5,,5N, 44
United States, Soviet divisions compared----------------------5N, 22N
Available to NATO, Warsaw Pact-----------------7, 8, 11, llN, 29, 29N
U.S. strength in USAREUR-----------------------------------8 26
Quantitative trends, 1965-75_-------------------------------------44
Draft. See Selective Service.

ECCM. See Electronic counter countermeasures.
Electronic counter countermeasures: Related to Soviet SAM defenses-... 5N
Escort ships:
Present quantitative balance-----------------------------------22, 44
Related to Soviet submarine threat -------------------------------29
Quantitative trends, 1965-73-------------------------------------44
Essential equivalence:
As U.S. SALT II goal ------------------------------------------18
As U.S. force structure standard---------------------------------26
Influence on military balance------------------------------------41
EUCOM. See European Command.
European Command:
Percentage of NATO forces7--------------------------------------7
Selected missions_-----------------------------------------------50
Executive agreements: Defense commitments identified------------------56



F-4 aircraft : C()mnii red with ( ) .t' fighters. -------------------------
F-1. aircraft
D e(sig ned to) p r(e s(w rw (, .S (111,1lit'livee d(ge -................... ...........
N t) In etie'tl el (' :tr ('a l)al ilit v . . . . .. . .. . .. .. . ....... . .. 1
F- ,-iiai-rrift:
I),,;1,i nc d to) 1 res(rv (t V .,S (111l1lilt li\'e --t ---... ... . . .. . .. . . ..
iust he Imo(litied t() deliver nulelr -('--)()-l.. . ._
F-101 :iir(-raift : ei gigeli imte- --(-fron- AN ( -4N
Fighi('r aireraft ( cFighter/mlaek aircraft.
Fight tc' at tack aircraf"
C( :rrier air----w- ... .. .. .. .. .. .. ..-..... ..... ..... 6, 20
M\Iarine air p- --wr .. . ..-- --.. .. . .. 6, 21)
United States, S )\'i('t aircraft eol 'pared ......................- 14, 1
111 l l li )t l)()s e s> v t ns ... . . ... . . .. .... ... .. .... . ... . . . . . .. . .

F-1 *, F-I ( tact i:Ail )lI l r linit at io ll-
Q( l'nitit ati (, trteul(1s, 1 1{5 75.. ..
D e(finled -. .. ... ... ... ... ... ........ .... .... ...... ...... ... ...
Finite det errence Influtence on force requirectiml-- --
Flexi bl e resl)-(,:
As for ufficiencY factor ------- ---------------------------------
l)('fim le d -. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .
Forward i aing. See Forward dep Inent defe(-.c.
Forward defeI.e('. See Fo ward deployme idefcnse.
forward dl v efense:
laet ed to strat('ic nob)ilitv requirenints_
P resen t S()v iet p )-.t tre - -- ------- ... ------------------- ----
s- f'ice sufficiencv factor- --- ---- -------
D ~e fi n ed -- - - - -- - - - - - - - -
Frane: Ilelia)ilitv as a NATO ally_-.....
Funeti(),ii of U.S. Armed Force(-:
A,, forces slliei(cn V fctor - - -
See also Miilitarv missions; Title 10, United State- ',de.

General purp()e force,,. See specific types.
A cai-e of U1nited States, Soviet asymnietrie-_
A force sulf eiencv fact or ----------------- -------------------------
Gorshkov, Admiral Scrgei (G.: Sl-ales SovietNav-_
Cone'rned with Turkish threaits -........ --- --------------
U .S. inival basing pr 1r b 'm s ------- .............................
Gr()und Force-. See North Athantic Tretv ()rganizalilon; S(viet [inioll
Armmy, marines ; United States, ArnM, M marines; War-.aw wPact.

Htarl)oon iissil's:
I )ep loyNm ent date ..................................-----------
As deterrent to S()viet antiship- ni --ile-. -
Heavy bombers. See Bmithiers.
HleavyIe IBi .sSeeliit('rcmtilentalt I llistie missiles.
11lavy tinks. See Tanks.
l clic('q)ter carrirs:
S-u p p)ortin g N A T O .-... .----- ............ .......... .... .... ...
A, elem ent of U .5. aS. n l)hit)isoll lift ............................- -
(,ll:'ntita/ive trends, 1965-75 -------------- 44,
Pre-ent quantit native 1 l,_anc ------- ...........................
'Ts-(fulness to NATO questioned.- ---......
Iti-lo Ilix:
As free structure ()tion------------------------- - -
D )e fi n e d - - - - - - - - - - --- -- -- - - - - - - - - -- - - - -
Huntington, Samuel P. On United States Soviet --- ---n


12, :)2N

,), 1 2N

23', 44
2:1.,, 4 4
4N, 20
2, 2 N
5x, 6i1


: ;0






5, 44



ICBMs. See Intercontinental ballistic missiles.
Intentions: Page
Conclusions circumscribed in this study2--------------------------- 2
Schools "A" and "B" address Soviet intentions----------------------33
Related to capabilities-------------------------------------------33
A.s element of threats------------------------------------------50
Related to detente----------------------------------------------54
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance: members---------------55
U.S. reductions----------------------------------------4, 4N, 31-32
Quantitative trends, 1965-75--------------------------------4, 4N, 44
Intercontinental ballistic missiles:
Quantitative trends, 1965-75------------------------------------3, 43
Soviets stress---------------------------------------------------17
As element of triad-------------------------------------17, 23N, 41N
Percent of U.S., Soviet warheads on-----------------------------17N
Influence of finite deterrence-----------------------------------17-19
SALT limitations---------------------------------------------19, 31
Heavy versus light status of S-19's---------------------35, 24N, 25N
Soviets silos counted-----------------------------------------9
Poor targets for bombers2----------------------------------------23
Related to U.S., MIRV requirements -----------------------------23
Light ICBM balance--------------------------------------------24
Soviet threats versus U.S. requirements ---------------------------26
Pre-launch survivability--------------------------------------28, 52
Mobile models related to vulnerability-----------------------------30
New Soviet deployments ----------------------------------------31
Air- and land-mobile candidates for triad--------------------------41N
Types defined--------------------------------------------------62
Interests. See National security interests.
Intermediate-range ballistic missiles:
Typical targets in NATO Europe------------------------------ 19
Soviets stress,------------------------------------------------120
Related to NATO's need for ABM----------------------28-29, 29N, 31
Soviet mobile models in R. & D-----------------------------------31
Soviet MIRVs in R. & D----------------------------------------31
Quantitative trends, 1975-75--------------------------------------44
IRBM. See Intermediate-range ballistic missiles.
Italy: Reliability as a NATO member------------------------------ 29

Light ICBM. See Intercontinental ballistic missiles.
MAC. See Military Airlift Command.
Main battle tanks. See Tanks.
Maneuverable reentry vehicles: related to key U.S. shortcomings3---------31
Costs related to modernization------------------------------17, 32, 33
See also Personnel strengths.
Mao Tse-tung: Outflanks Western technology------------------------ 53
Marines. See Soviet Union, Marines; United States, Marine Corps.
MaRV. See Maneuverable reentry vehicles.
Massive retaliation:
As force sufficiency factor-------------------------------------51-52
Medium bombers. See Bombers.


Medium-range ballistic missiles: Tage
U.S. programs CanCeled- -
Typical targets in NATO Europe -19
Soviets stress --------------- -------------------------- --- ---- 19, 2 0
Related to NATO's need for ABM ..............................-2S--29
Quantitative trends, 1965-75- -...................... 41
D e fi n ed - - - - --- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --- 6.0
Medium tanks. See Tanks.
Merchant marine:
United States, Soviet Fleets compared.-------------------------- 21
I)efi n ed - - - -- - ------- - - - -- - - - - - -- -- ------ -- -- -G :;
MiG aircraft: C(om pared wit Ii 1.S. F-4's -........................... 14
military Airlift (oiinizind: increasin Vg assets --..................
Military balance:
Assessment p)roblems-------------------------------------------- I
Related to strategic balance --------------- ------------- I
D efined----------------------- ----------- ------------6;;
See also Qualitative l)ailance; Quantitalive balance.
Military missions:
As force sufficiency factor--------------------------------------- 50
Defined (See Mission)-------------------------------------------
Military Sealift (, m an d:
Declining assets -------------------------------- 6
Current, size of controlled fleet------------------------------------ 21
Military strategy:
As force sulliciencv factor--------------------------------------- 5
Defined.. .. ..----------------------------------------- 6:;
MIRV. See Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles.
Missile warheads. See Warheads.
Missions. See Military missions.
Mixed force concept. See Triad.
MRBM. See Medium-range ballistic missiles.
MRV. See Multip)le reentry vehicles.
MSC. See Military Sealift Command.
Multiple independently target able reentry vehicles:
Quantitative trends, 1965-75-------------------------------------, 4, 4:1
Related to finite deterrence1-------------------
Related to ICBM second-strike capabilities----------------------2:
U.S. superiority analyzed ----------------------------------------- 23
Related to Assured D)estruction requirements--------------------- 2;
Related to U.S. shortcomings1--------------------------- :"I,
New Soviet deployments----------------------------------------)1
For Soviet IRBM's-----------------
Defined------------------------------------------------------ -64
Multiple reentry vehicles:
Quantitative trends-----------------------------------------------8, 43
Defined------------------------------------------------------ 64

National character: As ambiguous quality-----------------------------9-10
National Guard:
Diminishing air defense role-------------------------------_4, 4N, 31-2
As NATO reinforcements-----------------------------------------9, 11
Readiness of U.S. Army divisions-_----------------------------29, 2 9N
National interests. See National security interests.
National objectives. See National security objectives.
National security interests:
Basic U.S. interests identified---------------------------------- 47
As force sufficiency factor----------------------------------------47
National security objectives:
Comments concerning U.S. goals--------------------------------
As force sufficiency factor-----------------------------------------47
Basic U.S. objectives------------------------------------------- 47
Defined6------------------------------------------------------- 4


NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Naval balance. See Soviet Union Navy; U.S. Navy.
Navy. See Soviet Union Navy; U.S. Navy.
Nixon/Ford doctrine; Tas
Influence on All-Volunteer Force----------------------------------16
As force sufficiency factor---------------------------------------52
North Atlantic Treaty Organization:
Tactical nuclear matters-----------------5, 5N, 18, 19, 28-29, 29N, 36, 53
Key contingency area---------------------------------------7 48
Soviet land lines to7---------------------------------------------7
Percentage contributions of U.S. forces7----------------------------7
Quantitative balance, tactical air forces----------------------------7, 8
Quantitative balance, ground forces--------------------7, 8, 8N, 9, 22, 26
Personnel strengths------------------------------------------ 7,8
Soviet IRB'\IM/RBM [ threats----------------------------------7, 19
Divisions available---------------------------------7, 8, 8N, 11, 22, 29
U.S. air forces in Spain8------------------------------------------8
British, French aircraft carriers-----------------------------------8
Air, ground balance, south flank8-----------------------------------8
Quantitative naval balance-------------------------------------8-9
I)efense frontage-----------------------------------------------9
Monopoly on attack carriers9-------------------------------------9
U.S. combat experience related to---------------------------------10
Forces, installations concentrated-------------------------------11,28
Reliability of members----------------------------------------11,29
Range cf qualitative considerations -------------------------------11
Targets vulnerable to Soviet IRBM, MRBM-------------------- 19
Role of helicopters questioned----------------------------------- 23
No U.S. local reserves------------------------------------------ 26
U.S. reinforcement problems--------------------------------26, 29, 30
Maneuver room------------------------------------------------28
Supply lines ---------------------------------------------------28
Need for tactical ABM----------------------------------------28-29
Problems on south flank -----------------------------------------29
Airlift problems------------------------------------------------30
Related to U.S. R. & D--------------------------------------32,31
Quantitative trends 32, 32N
U.S. ground forces strengthened---------------------------------32N
U.S. forces related to nuclear threshold----------------------------36
High nuclear threshold as objective-------------------------------36
U.S. committments-----------------------------------36, 36N, 48, 55
Article .5, Atlantic Treaty ---------------------------------------36
"Trip wire" related to force requirements--------------------------50
Selected EUCOM missions --------------------------------------50
REDCOM missions --------------------------------------------50
Threats related to U.S. force requirements---------------------- 50
Selected assumptions_ 54
Member states---------------------------------------------5
Nuclear-powered ships: Quantitative balance-----------------------6, 6N, 44
Nuclear "trip wire":
As force sufficiency factor ---------------------------------------50
Defined (see trip wire)------------------------------------------68
Objectives. See National security objectives.
As a force structure standard---------------------------------26, 26N
Defined------------------------------------------------------ 65
Perceptions: As force sufficiency factor--------------------------------51


Personnel strengths:
Quantitative balance, ground forces --------------
N A T O -. - - - - - -- - -. - - -- -.. . .. .. . . . .
United State, S(viet com pared ---------------
All-Volunteer Force ceiling .. .. .. .. . . .
United States, Soviet navies coiiIpnred .
Strategic offensive fees
Strategic defensive forces .................................
Quantitative trends, arm, 1965-75.. ... .
Quantitative trends, navy, 1965-75- .
Quantitative trends, marines, 1965-75
Quantitative trends, air forces, 1965- 75 -
See also Manpower.
Portugal: Reliability avs a NATO member ---------------
Principle o)f lc eioimi v: Stressed by United States ............
Principle of Mnss: Stressed by Soviets ..................
Procurement policies:
United State, Soviet philosol)hies ..................
Related to mnanp power costs ............---. -----
Projections. See Trends.

-- )N
7, S
14, 16.1, IiN
..... 1-I ;, 1(I N

- - -. 44
- - - 44
- - -. .4 4
-- -45

- ...-- 29
- - - -. .15

-- --- 15
-. -- 17

Qualitative balance:
As counterbalance to quantlity_
Basic ingredients----------------------------------------------
Role of national character-
Combat experience -
Temper (discipline, morale)
Technological trends
T r e n d s - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
As force sufficiency factor---------------------------------------
Quantitative bala:ee:
Related to quality---------------------------------------------
Trends since 1965------------------------------ ----- 3, 4, 6G,
Favors Soviet U nion ----------------- -----------------------
As force sufficiency factor-----------------------------------

1, 41

Readiness Comm and: Selected missions------------------------------- 50
R. & D. See Research and Development.
IREDCOM. See Ieadiness Command.
Research and I)evelopment:
Soviet technology improving_ ------------------------ 10
United States, Soviet philosophis --------------------14-15
Related t manpower costs --------------- --------------17
U.S. MRBM 1)rograms canceled---------------------------------- iS
U.S. strategic offensive 1)rograms------------------- --------01
U.S. civil defense priorities--------------------------- -81
ABM research related to SALT --81
As index to trends--------------------------------------------- 5
Reserve colp)onen ls:
Related to military balance-------------------------------------- 1
Related to NATO reinforcement--------------------------------11,29
As element of total force e(ilcepts-------------------------------- 16. 51
Related to All-Volunteer Force.------......- 16
United State-, Soviet readiness reviewed -- --------------29
D e fi n e d .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..-- -6 6
Roles and missions. See Functions of U.S. Armed Forces; -Iilitary nis-iiins:
title 10, United States Code.
SAC. See Strategic Air Command.
SAM. See Surface-to-air missiles.
SALT. See Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.


Sealift: Page
Quantitative trends, 1965-76-- --6, 6N, 44
U. S. dependence on foreign-flag shipping------------------------21, 32
United States, Soviet compared----------------------------------21
Related to total force concepts------------------------------------21
It. & D. trends_-------------------------------------------31
Small Soviet ships for small ports-------------------------------- 32
Projects Soviet political power-----------------------------------32
Related to forward deployment----------------------------------52
Strategic sealift defined--------------------------------------67
SEATO. See Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.
Second-strike policy:
Linked with assured destruction--------------------------------17, 28
Influence on U.S. MIRV requirements ----------------------------23
Linked to ICBM survivability---------------------------------26, 28
Linked to bomber survivability-----------------------------------28
Related to Soviet city evacuation plans---------------------------28
As force sufficiency factor----------------------------------------52
Selective Service: U.S. draft calls end---------------------------------16
Shaddock missiles:
Essentially antiship missiles-------------------------------------4N
Land-based version ---------------------------------------------45
Range, mission------------------------------------------------45
Short-range attack missiles:
Only deployed U.S. ALCM--------------------------------------4N
Characteristics---------------------------------------------42, 42N
Short-range ballistic missiles: United States,-Soviet-types identified -------45
Short-war concepts:
Influence on Soviet forces------------------------------------15, 15N
As assumption-------------------------------------------------54
SLBM. See Sumbarine/sea-launched ballistic missiles.
SLCM. See Submarine/sea-launched cruise missiles.
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization: Member states_--------------------55
Soviet Union:
Challenges America militarily---------------------------------1
Intentions--------------------------------------------2, 33, 54
R. & D. policies--------------------------------------- 15, 15N
Honors Principle of Mass------------------------------------15
Procurement policies----------------------------------------15
Short-war concepts--------------------------------------15, 15N
Reliance on allies------------------------------------------ 16
Defense budget-----------------------------------------17, 17N
Armed forces:
Tactical nuclear considerations---------------------5, 5N, 19, 28, 53
Prouortionate share of Warsaw Pact-------------------------- 7
Emphasize political, indoctrination----------------------------10
Combat experience------------------------------------------10
Reinforcement times in Europe--------------------------------11
Internal security missions-----------------------------11, 1N, 14
Geographic influences----------------------------------- 13, 14
Employment overseas------------------------------13, 13N, 21, 32
Related to manpower costs ----------------------------------17
Need for tactical ABM------------------------------------28-29
Strategic offensive forces:
Quantitative trends, 1965-75---------------------------3, 4, 18, 43
Ballistic missile submarines------------------------------3,29,31
Stress ICBM's----------------------------------------- 17 18
SALT I authorizations------------------------------18, 19, 23, 31
Immunity to U.S. second-strike ------------------------------23
Parity in light ICBM's---------------------------------------24
Potential peril to U.S. ICBM's-----------------------------26, 28
Threat to U.S. bombers -------------------------------------28
Projected threats-----------------------------------------30-31
Long-range SLBM's------------------------------------ ----31
New ballistic missile submarines_------------------------------31
Deployment programs---------------------------------------31


Strategic defensive forces: Page
Quiantitative trends, 1965-75-- --4, 5, 5N, 1S, 44
SALT I auth()rizalions -. -----------------------. 18, 2, 8*1
A13M related to 1>.. deterrent_---- ........................... 28
A B M vull eralbiit -ies ....--- -------------------------------24
Stress air (h fis( .......................... 2d-
R. & 1). programs -........ ..............-............ --- 1
Armyvforces -------- -.----- --------------------------------- 44
Air Force f)rce+s ------------------------------41
Present qmintitative btmane(_-------------------------------5, 5N, 44
])ivisims comilmred with iTllited States ... ..............- 5N, 22 N
T an ks- ----------------------------------------. 5, 5N 20, 44, 45N
I)ivisions for lEur )pea n r ( weeoiin _- I--- ---.....-.- S
I)ivisions, tan ks, per4(oIneql alng Irmi ('urai ... -------- S.SN
Readiness of res(erv.s ....-------------------------------------- 1I1, 29
Persomnel strenIh-...............-------14, 16,1 iN, 41
Shaped for short wVar_15----------------------------------------
Quantitative trends, 1965-5----------------------------------44
See al.o Soviet Armed Forces.
Navy general purpose forces"
Quantitative trends, 1965-75----------------------------------6 44
.Nuclear-powered snwri s......-------------------- ---.-.6, 48. 44
Antiship missiles----------------------6, 11-12, 20, 22, 29, 32, 45-N, 52
Aircraftcarriers, Blaek Sea, i\Iediterranetn---------------------8, 9
Reinforcement capab)ilitiez in Mediterrn.ean------------------- S
Missions related to (emom-, ge(ography--------------------- 1
"One-shot" capability N---------------------------------------i1, 26
Criser-destroer-ecr I)alane----------------------------- 22
Attack submarine balanc-------------------------------------22
Carrier air power ------------------------2
ASW forces, focus of_ -----------------24, 24N
Quantitative superiority rIlat(,d to survival-------------------- 26
Freedom to conceitrate -----------------------------------------29
Submarines verstis U.S. ASW ships2--------------------------2900
Bombers, ASW aircraft identified---------------------------44, 45N
See also Soviet Armed Forces.
Tactical Air Forces:
Tactical nuclear aircraft------------------------------------- 5, 5N
Quantitative balanc(-----------------------------------------6, 45
Balance in central Europe--------------------------------- 7, 8, 9
1.S.., Soviet aircraft coml)ared(------------------------- -14, 14N, 2(
Shaped for short war1----------------------------------------- 5
Quantitative trends, 1965-75--------------------------------- -45
See also Soviet Armed Forces.
Marines (naval infantry)"
Present quantitative balance--------------------------------- 5
Compared with [,SMC5-----------------------------------5,2D-21
Quantitative trends, 19G5-75----------------------------------44
See also Soviet Armed Forces.
Present quantitative balance---------------------------------6-7, 45
Soviet reqiremienis---------------------------------------- -14
Quantitative trend, 1965-75-------------------------------- -45
Quantitative trends, 1965 -7---------------------------------6, 44
U.S., Soviet eoimpa red'--------------------------------------- 21
Small ships for small port2-------------------------------------8
Projects political p)ower------------------------------------
Civil defense:
Soviet stress 2--------------------------------2
Citv evacuation plans-----------------------------------------28
SRAM. See Short-range attack mislies.
S RBM. See Short-range ballistic missiles.
SSB, SSBN. See Ballistic missile submarines.
SSM. See Surface-to-surface missiles.


Strategic Arms Limitation Talks: Page-
I;.S. goal essential equivalence_ -18
Influence on force requirements -18, 19
Limits on ABMS------------------------------------------18,23,31
Limits on ICBM's1----------------------------------------- -19 31
Related to assured destruction -----------------------------------23
Precludes deploying tactical ABM--------------------------------31
Strategic balance:
Related to military balance1--------------------------------------1
Strategic defense:
See also Air defense; Antiballistic missle defense; Civil defense.
Strategic mobility:
Strategic land lines--------------------------------------------7, 13
See also Airlift; Sealift.
Strategic nuclear submarines. See Ballistic missile submarines.
Strategic offense:
Quantitative trends, 1965-75------------------------------------3,43
See also Assured Destruction; Ballistic missile submarines; Bombers-;
Counterforce; Deterrence; Flexible response; Intercontinental
ballistic missiles; Massive retaliation; Research and development;
Second-strike policy; Submarine/sea-launched ballistic missiles;
Strategic retaliatory. See Strategic offense.
Strategy. See Military strategy.
Submarines. See Attack submarines; Ballistic missile submarines.
Submarine/sea-launched ballistic missiles:
Quantitative trends, 1965-7-__--------------------------------- 3 43
As element of triad------------------------------------17, 23N, 41N
Influence of finite deterrence-------------------------------------18
French ballistic missiles as targets --------------------------------29
Long-range Soviet SLBM's--------------------------------------31
See also Ballistic missile submarines.
Submarine/sea-launched cruise missiles:
Soviet quantitative superiority---------------------------------4, 4N
Related to air defense-------------------------------------------31
As candidate for triad ------------------------------------- 41
Quantitative trends, 1965-75_------------------------------------ 43
Shaddock range, missions--------------------------------------- 45
As force structure standard----------------------------------26, 26N
Factors for determining---------------------------------------47-54
Related to nonmilitary power------------------------------------51
As force structure standard----------------------------------26, 26N
Defined_------------------------------------------------------ 67
Surface-to-air missiles:
U.S. batteries inactivated------------------------------------4-5, N
U.S. batteries under ADCOM--------------------------------N
Soviet strengths-------------------------------------------- 5,5N
Quantitative trends, 1965-75-------------------------------------44
United States, Soviet missiles identified---------------------------45N
Surface-to-surface missiles. See Anti-ship missiles; Intercontinental bal-
listic missiles; Intermediate-range ballistic missiles; Medium-range
ballistic missiles; Sho rt-range ballistic missiles; Submarine/sea-launched
ballistic missiles; Submarine/sea-launched cruise missiles.



Tacti cal aircraft. See Airlift, F-4 :tricraft ; F-15 aircraft, F-16 8irenift;
Fighter"at tack aircraft ; ii(, aircraft.
Tact ical air power: Page
Soviet limitations . .. ..-... ........---------------------. 14, 14N? 20
United State, So)viet Irit'V cited ---.24
See also Soviet t UnUio, Air FoXrce; ,ited State>,Air Force, i\ie
Corps, Navy.
T act ical nuclear for (s e/i )1,()I)('l oper t ills "
U.S., Soviet differences ---------------------... ,18), 19, 53
Balance in c(iitral 4lrI)( -- -5
S oviet pilots (tlalitie(t. .. ----- ---------------------------------- N
N o W arsaw Pact capability .----- -----------------...... .... .... ... 5N
V .S. N avy system s.................................................-5 N
F-IS, F-l6 capabilities- 32, 32N
Ht igh threshold as NATO o--jetive, ........- --- ---.. 36
Related to deterrence- ----------------------50
l)efined --- --.. . . .------------------------------------------. 67
Present quantilative balance ------------------------------------ 5, 44
Numbers in Uiited States, Soviet divisions 5-- ----------N
Soviet heavy tank- .------ --- -------5.. N, 20, 44
In N A T O - - - - . . . . -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -. 7, 8
M-48 modificatioi -------------- -------------------------- 15N
U.S. discontinues heavy tanks- ----- ---------------------20
Quantitative trend-, .1465-75 .................-44
United States, Soviet types identified5----------------------------- 45
Heavy tank defined ----------------------62
Light tank defined-- 6
Medium tank defined_-------------------------------------------63
As a qualitative factor- _,------------------------ 9,10
See also Re,earch and development.
Basic types defined -0
As force sufficiency factor---------------------------------------.50
Evaluation p)roess-5---------------------------------------------50-51
See also Capahilitie-; Intents.
Title 10, United State Code:
Sustained combat requirement--------------------------------15, 48, 49
Requirement to overcome agressors_-------------------------------37, 48
Army functions .................--------------------------------48
Navv function -.--------------------------------48
Air Force function- --- ----------------------49
Marine Corp.s ftmtion------------------------------------------ 49
Total force concepts"
Causes1------------------------------------------------------- 16
Related to sealift -------------------------------21
Applied to NATO -----------------------------29
As force sufficiency factor--------------------------------------1
As qualitative factor-------------.------------------------------- 10
Budgeting restrictions--- -- 33
Treaties: Current U.S ------------- -------------------------------
Trends: Key indicators-----------------------------------------------5:3
Composition- ------------------------17,28,41
Bomblers original coimlpneiit .---23
S y nergistic effects .. .... -----.. --.......................- 2:1N
Partial compromise imipendiiig- ----- 426
Conteml)lated eXpalmsi-- 41N----------1N
1)(7fin e d - - - - -- - --- ---- - - - - - - - - - --- -- -- -- - -. (iS
Trident: Related to U.S. prohle-,- 3-----------------------------------31
"Trip wire". See Nuclear "trip wire".


Turkey: 'Page
Concerned with Greek threats--------------------------------
U.S. naval basing problems-----------------------------------2

United States:
Soviets challenge U.S. militarily1-----------------------------
I. & D. policies-------------------------------------14-15, 15N
Honors principle of economy------------------------------15
Premium on human life---------------------------------- 15
Procurement policies------------------------------------15, 15N
Sustained combat policies-------------------------------15, 48,49
Total force concepts---------------------------------16,21,29,.51
Defense budget---------------------------------- 16, 17, 32-33
Armed forces:
Tactical nuclear considerations---------------------5, 5N, 18-19, 53
Percentage of NATO forces-----------------------------------7
Coinbat experience1-----------------------------------------i0
Reinforcement times to Europe-------------------------------11
Geographic influences_---------------------------------------13
Strength related to Soviet problems1---------------------------14
Staving power, tooth-to-tail ratios5-----------------------------5
Impact of manpower costs------------------------------16, 17, 32
Title 10, DOI)-directed functions----------------------15,37,48,49
Selected military missions--------------------------------
Strategic offensive forces:
Quantitative trends, 1965-75------------------------3,4, 4N, 18, 43
Ballistic missile submarines------------------------------3, 31, 43
Stress triad---------------------------- 17, 23, 23N, 26, 41,.41N, OS
Assured destruction policy-------------------------17-18, 23, 28, 58
SALT I authorizations----------------------------18, 19, 23, 31, 66
Bomber penetration problems--------------------------------- 23
MIRV requirements--------------------------------------- -23
Second-strike policy problems---------------------17, 23, 26, 28, 52
Parity in light ICBM's------------------------------------ 24
ICBM survivability--------------------------------------26,28
Prelaunch threat to U.S. bombers2----------------------------28
R. & D. programs------------------------------30-31
Cruise missiles related to air defefise--------------------------31
Deployment programs--------------------------------------31
Strategic defensive forces:
Quantitative trends, 1965-75-----------------------4, 4N, 5, 18, 44
Air defense reductions----------------------------4, 4N, 5, 5N, 24
SALT I authorizations-----------------------------18, 19, 23, 31
ABM site shuts down--------------------------------------24
SAM, interceptor weaknesses----------------------------- 25
Related to cruise missiles-------------------------------------31
R. & D. programs------------------------------------------31
Lip service to objectives-------------------------------------36
Strategic air defense role reduced--------------------------4-5, 5N
Tactical nuclear weapons----------------------------------5, 5N
Present quantitative balance---------------------------- 5,N, 44
Divisions compared with Soviet--------------------------5N, 22N
Percent of NATO ground forces------------------------------7
Troops in USAREUR---------------------------------7,8, 32N
Divisions, tanks in USAREUR----------------------7 8, 8N, 26
Personnel in USAREUR divisions-----------------------------
Personnel strength ---------------------8 16, 16N, 44
Discontinues \1-48 tanks--------------------------------15
Amphibious qualification_------------------------------------23
Readiness of re-erve components -----------------------------29
Airborne assault forces-------------------------------30, 37N, 44
Selected R. & D. progrms--------------------------------3
Adding brigades to NATO----------------------------------32N
Quantitative trends, 1965-75----------------------------------44
Title 10, DOD-directed functions-------------------------- 48
See also United States, Armcd Forces.


Navy general purpose forces
Tactical nhullar weapon - -..........
Quantitative trends, 1 9 (i 75 ....- .....--.
Nuclear-1)owered ships --------------- -___
C arrier air p)>w er ------------------- -. ----
Percent of NAT() naval foree-. -----------
Forces for NATO ..
Force. in Ie' dilerr:un ean. - ------------
Me(diterrauan enbildulp, 1973....
Idnian ()cean uildulp, 1973-.. .
Use of choke 1oinIl- --- ----- ----
Threats form ant ishi1) missile -.
Nissi.ons related i( 1)o via nInal i>iv, ( e~mwi+ll:.'
No U.S. aliship1IiifisilcleI)loved .
(C ru i s e(r- ls t rix y <'r- t c + )rt I a l: n ce . . . .
Attack suhmarine thalance
ASW forces, focI.s (f
Quantitative inferiowitv related to, survivl__
(G lo)lal c( i iiI eit. ...e.Its ----- - -
D iscards ASW eniriKTS .. . ....... ......
Soviet sui) rino's vr +u-s t.S. ASW -hi p-
Amphiiou!. lift ('a)al)ilitie'- .
R1. & 1). related to ]pro>thei, ...................
)eclin in4 attack carrier force
hlarpooni mi ,iles
Title 10, 1)O i )-directed functions ------
See also united States, Armed Forces.
Tactical air forces:
Tactical nucle:ir sv--ten ---_- -- -
Present, qlantita tive Iman-ce ....-
Percent of N ATO air fo rces --- ..........
Quailtit'otive iala nce in central Eluro(pl -_ .....
U.S., Soviet aircraft compared ---------------
F 15, F 1 1 n uclear cUa ) 'bilitic -------------
Quantitative trend+, 1 9575 --.--,
Title 10, 1)01)-directed functions -- ----
See also United States, Armed Forces.
Marine Corps:
Present (juantitative i --alance
I)ivisions included in U.S. total ............
Com pared with Soviet 1onaal infantry_ .......
Tactical air )ow er -- ------------------
U se (f M -48, tanks .........-- ..........
A. I i oi n - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Carrier air qualilicati(Ms -....... .-.-.-.-
Quantitative trend-, 51965 .....-.- --
Title 10, 1)0 1)-direted funetion>-...........
See also United States, Armed Forces.
Present quantitative l)alance.--
1.S. asset-, mpar:dleled ....-- ----------
Tactical airlift pri ilems --------- .-- -
R & 1). pro ram s ------------ ----- -- ----
Aircraft types identified .....................
Related to forw:nrd deplhyinent -----------
Quantitaitive trends, 1965-75 .-.----------
Qu nntitative trends, 19)65-7 .. --- ........
U .S. d(Iendenice oi fo')rign-ftag h1 filing ....
U .S ., S()\ iet cmill)are(d ... .....................
Rela ted to tot il free e cepts -------------
R & 1). trends ---------- ------
Related to forward delloyiment --------

- - --- --- ---
. . . . .. . .. ... 4 ;, 4 1
- .. .. .. ... .. 9 -, 4
-,-_ -N S, -, 4:), 4 t,

--- - --. ,7, 11 12
... , 11 12

..9, 3 )
11 ..12, 20, 29 0, 2', 52

-- 2 )
..2, 41
')) 1.1
- - - - - - - - - 2 2. ,- 1 -
- - - -- -- - -- -- 2 ., 2
-)( p
- - -- - 2 -2

... ... .. ... :2, 2
.. . .. . . . . ..-- - -) -

- -- ------ Ny 1

-, ) '2 : N-

----- -- ------- 5. N i-
- - - - - - - 2 2
-- -- -- -- -) 2 N-
- - - - - - 6 ,. )" 4 1

-.. . . . 14
- - - - - - - - - 2 : )
- - - - - - - - - 4 45 [

6- 7.4. '

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.......... 21
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Civil defense: 28
Low priority ---------------------------------------
R. & programs ------------------------------------------- 31
USAF. See United States, Strategic offensive forces; Strategic defensive
forces; Tactical air forces; Airlift.
USAREUR. See United States, Army.
USM \C. See United States, Marine Corps.
Vertical/short takeoff and landing aircraft: expected use on Soviet carriers- 6
Vietnam war:
U.S. Army, Marine strengths during -----------------------------5N
Aircraft during-------------------------------------------- 7
U.S. combat experience during -----------------------------------10
Influence on total force concepts --------------------------------- 16
Influence on All-Volunteer Force ---------------------------------16
Sealift during -------------------------------------------------21N
Role of helicopters --------------------------------------------- 23
VSTOL. See Vertical/short takeoff and landing aircraft.
Quantitative trends, 1965-75 ----------------------------------3, 4, 43
U.S. superiority cited ----------------------------------------3, 4,23
Soviet stock versus U.S. ICBM requirements ----------------------26
U.S. lead linked to MIRV requirements ---------------------------31
Defined ------------------------------------------------------ 68
Warsaw Pact:
Lacks tactical nuclear capabilities --------------------------------5N
Soviet forces predominate --------------------------------------- 7
Personnel strengths ---------------------------------------------7,8
Tactical air forces ---------------------------------------------7,8
Quantitative balance with NATO ------------------------ 7, 8, 9, 22
Divisions, tanks --------------------------------------------7,8,22
Naval forces ------------------------------------------------ -8,9
Qualities related to NATO ---------------------------------------11
Installations dispersed ------------------------------------------ 11
See also Soviet Union.