Congress and foreign policy


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Congress and foreign policy
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Table of Contents
    Front Cover
        Page i
        Page ii
        Page iii
        Page iv
    Letter of transmittal
        Page v
        Page vi
    Table of Contents
        Page vii
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    The debate over the U.S. role in the world
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    The debate over U.S. policymaking system and the congressional role in foreign policy
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    Major functional problems facing U.S. foreign policy
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    Specific regional issues
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    Back Cover
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Full Text
. tI-n. onfo u r


Congress and

Foreign Policy



74-032 WASHINGTON : 1976
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 204-102 Price $1.90

I I '-,

THOMAS E. MORGAN, Pennsylvania, Chairman

L. H. FOUNTAIN, North Carolina
ROBERT N. C. NIX, Pennsylvania
GUS'YATRON, Pennsylvania
BOY A. TAYLOR, North Carolina
LEO J. RYAN, California
DON RONKER, Washington
GI.'RRY E. STUDDS, Massachusetts

EDWARD G. BIESTER, JR., Pennsylvania

JOHN H. SULLIVAN, Staff Consultant



VWashington, D.C., August 12,1976.
With the resurgence of congressional activity in foreign affairs, the
need has arisen for a document which summarizes the activities of
the Congress in that area.
The Committee on International Relations long has provided sum-
maries of its own activities in documents such as the annual "Survey
of Activities" and the biannual "Legislative Review Activities" report.
Those documents do not, however, provide information in any com-
prehensive way about foreign affairs-related activities of other House
committees, the Senate or the Congress as a whole.
For that reason, the Committee on International Relations has
requested that the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division,
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, prepare an an-
nual report of actions taken by Congress which impact on American
foreign policy. The first such report appeared in 1974.
This report has been expanded by the Foreign Affairs and National
Defense Division to include subject areas not covered in last year's
edition and is, in general, a more comprehensive study.
It is expected that these documents will be of assistance to the conm-
mittee and its members in undertaking both legislative and oversight
responsibilities in the area of foreign affairs. The report should also
prove helpful to other committees and Members of Congress, as well
as to scholars, the press, and the public.
THOMAs E. MORGAN, Chairman.

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2013


Washington, D.C., August 12, 1976.
Chairman, Cormmittee on International Relations, U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives, Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. CHAIkRA.\N: I am pleased to transmit to you at this time
"Congress and Foreign Policy-1975," a report summarizing congres-
sional contribution to the shaping of U.S. foreign policy in 1975.
tio teshpn of UT.S. foreo
In examining congressional input into specific foreign policy deci-
sions, the report attempts to analyze the larger issue of the role of
Congress and its relation to the executive branch in the formulation
of U.S. foreign policy. Statutory directives and their subsequent ap-
plication provide the most common vehicle for congressional involve-
ment in foreign policy, while consideration of executive agreieminents,
generation of public opinion by discussion of issues in public hearings,
and reports and observations by members and staff contribute to the
policymaking process.
Primary attention in "Congress and Foreign Policy-1975" is given
to the activities of the House International Relations and Senate
Foreign Relations Committees. However, pertinent activities of other
committees and of the whole House and Senate are included in the
overall analysis. The report does not attempt to detail all congres-
sional activities relating to foreign policy or to present legislative
histories of all foreign policy related measures.
As the preparation for "Congress and Foreign Policy-1975" con-
tinued well into 1976, an attempt has been made to provide the reader
with references to occurrences in early 1976 which were a logical ex-
tension of events of 1975. The purpose of the report, however, has
remained to study the congressional role in U.S. foreign policy in
1975; December 31, 1975 was in many instances simply too arbitrary
a line for an adequate evaluation of Congress role in various issues.
This report was prepared by members of the Foreign Affairs and
National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, and was
edited by Margaret Goodman, analyst in international relations.
Actig Drr'tor,
Congress /on,,l Res,,irrci ,c/'i,0'.


FOREWORD---- ------------------------------------------------------- III
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL------------------------------------------- V
THE DEBATE OVER THE U.S. ROLE IN THE WORLD-------------------- 1
Introduction- ------------------- --------------- 3
U.S. foreign policy issues and goals and the defense budget--------- 5
Action on component parts of the defense budget-------------- 5
Other related issues---------------------------------------- 10
Diego Garcia and U.S. Indian Ocean policy------------------ 11
Congressional oversight of intelligence activities ------------------- 15
Activities of House and Senate select committees-------------- 18
Issues and areas for congressional action ---------------------- 26
ROLE IN FOREIGN POLICY----- --------------------------------------- 29
Introduction------------------------ ---------- 31
Congressional organization for the conduct of foreign affairs--------- 32
Study commission proposals for reorganization- --------------- 32
Changes in congressional organization------------------------ 36
Congress and war powers---- -------------------------------------- 39
Presidential compliance with the War Powers Resolution------- 40
Inclusion of U.S. civilian combatants under the War Powers
Resolution--------------------------------- ------------- 43
Congressional oversight of executive agreements------------------- 45
Legislative proposals ...------------------------------------ 45
Implementation of the Case-Zablocki Act--------------------- 48
Review of specific agreements------------------------------- 50
The congressional role in the determination of specific policies------- 54
The Turkish aid controversy-------------------------------- 54
The Jackson-Vanik amendment------------------------------ 60
Introduction------ ----------------------------------------------- 67
Weapons transfer, proliferation, and control---------------------- 68
Conventional arms transfers-------------------------------- 68
Nuclear exports, nuclear proliferation -----------------73
The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks------------ --------78
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency---------------------- 82
Relations with the Third World--------------------------------- 84
Foreign aid----------------------------------------------- 84
Multilateral economic relations with developing countries------ 92
Congress and the international economy------------------------- 100
International monetary affairs------------------------------- 100
Foreign investment policy---------------------------------- 102
International trade---------------------------------------- 109
Participation in the United Nations system----------------------- 112
Review of 1974 General Assembly-------------------------- 112
Seventh Special Session, September 1975: Prcparations and re-
sults -------------------------------------------- 115
Participation in the 30th session ----------------------------- 115
Congress and financing the U.N. system--------------------- 116
The status of Israel---------------------------------- 117
Other congressional activities ---------------------------119



Problems of Global Resource Management ------------------------ 121
Congress and U.S. foreign energy policy--------------------- 121
U.S. international food policy------------------------------- 126
Congress and the Law of the Sea---------------------------- 132
Space research-------------------------------------------- 139
Other international environmental issues--------------------- 141
Congress and individual rights: Human rights and MIA's---------- 146
Human rights ---------------------------------------------146
Status of MIA's------------------------------------------- 150
SPECIFIC REGIONAL ISSUES --------------------------------------- 155
Introduction -------------------------------------------- -----157
DWtente policies ----------------------------------------------- 158
Relations with the U.S.S.R--------------------------------- 15S
Relations with China_ -------------------------------------- 161
Middle East affairs .--------------------------------------------16(1
Congress and Latin America ------------------------------------ 16(iS
Panama Canal treaty negotiations._ ---------------------------- 6IS
Cuba --------------------------------------- ------------ 172
Congress and Africa -------------------------------------------174
Southern Africa: Unresolved Is-uies- ----------------------------- 174
Zaire_ __- --- ---- -------------- 177
East Africa: The Horn----------------------------- ----- 17S
Aid and development ------------------------------------- 179
Conclusion .--------------------------------------------------SO0
Congress and Asia: Selected issues -------------------------------182
United States-Korean relations----------------------------- 1S2
Congressional approval of commonwealth status for the northern
Mariana Islands------------------- --------------------- 1S4

The Debate Over the U.S. Role in the World

INTRODUCTION---------------------------------------------------- 3
Action on component parts of the defense budget- ---------------- 5
Other related issues. -------------------------------------------- 10
Diego Garcia and U.S. Indian Ocean policy- --------------------- 11
Activities of House and Senate select committees ------------------ 18
Issues and :ireas for congressional action-------------------------- 26


Congressional influence on U.S. foreign policy frequently stems
from decisions on specific issues, in reaction to positions initiated by
the executive branch. This generalization held true for the most part
in 1975, but the Congress also attempted at various times to step back
and look at the larger picture of U.S. commitments and role in the
world. These attempts were characterized as inconclusive, for no evi-
dence of policy change, or even clear evidence of consensus, emerged
from the debates and hearings. However, they did serve to communi-
cate an indication of congressional concern over future directions of
U.S. foreign policy, and over the role of Congress in shaping that
The great debate on foreign policy in 1975 occurred during Senate
debate on the fiscal year 1975 Defense Department authorization. The
debate ranged over such questions as basic foreign policy objectives,
political and military alliances, and the future of detente. In another
attempt at a wider perspective on foreign policy, both the Senate and
House foreign affairs committees conducted hearings to consider
future directions of U.S. foreign policy.
A major area of congressional foreign policy involvement in 1975
was the evaluation of U.S. intelligence activities conducted by House
and Senate select committees. The primary focus of both investigations
was on abuses of power by U.S. intelligence agencies, reflecting con-
cern for the image of the United States in the world today as gener-
ated by these activities.


Through its action on the defense budget, the Congress annually
establishes military force levels and spending authority, and thereby
provides the underpinnings of national security policy. In many cases,
action on the defense budget has even more direct impact on inter-
national affairs. Congressional decisions during action on the fiscal
year 1976 defense budget with a direct relationship to U.S. foreign
policy included:
(1) The provision of funds to add three combat divisions to the
Army, including two brigades to be added in NATO Europe through
the replacement of support troops. (The program was approved
tacitly. Congress did not vote funds specifically for this purpose.)
(2) Approval of military construction funds for the Indian Ocean
base at Diego Garcia, with certain qualifications.
(3) Funds for foreign military assistance, including military assist-
ance funds in support of U.S. Middle East peace objectives.
(4) The denial, through an amendment to the Department of De-
fense appropriation bill, of funding for any involvement in Angola.
(5) The rejection of amendments to reduce forces in Korea and
(6) The unilateral phaseout of the sole U.S. ABM site.
(7) Reductions in funds for intelligence activities.
(8) A new requirement, included in the defense authorization bill,
that the Secretary of Defense consult with the Secretary of State and
annually submit a joint report on foreign policy and military force
The total national defense request of $107.7 billion in budget au-
thority included $101.7 billion for Department of Defeni-,e military
functions and $4.6 billion for foreign military assistance (excluding
subsequently requested funds for the Middle East and other revisions).
The administration did not seek to relate the defense budget request
directly to international developments or current U.S. foreign policy.
The underlying assumptions, as outlined by Secretary of Defense
Schlesinger, included continued power rivalry with the Soviet Union,
the primacy of NATO Europe to American security interests and
the -necessity for U.S. leadership, and the continued importance of
U.S. interests elsewhere, including Asia and the Middle East.

ACTION ON COMPONENT PARTS OF THE DEFENSE BuxD. E't RIEQL E. Funding the total national defense budget annually in\ wolves a dozen
or more authorization and appropriation acts. In addition, the year
1975 saw the first trial run of the new congressional budget process.
Prepared by Richard P. Cronin, analyst in national defense; and Joel M. Woliinn,
analyst in U.S. foreign policy.

In House Concurrent Resolution 218, the first concurrent resolution
on thle budget, approved by both Houses on May 14,1975, the Congress
established target ceilings for the national defense functional area.
These targets constituted reductions of $7 billion in budget authority
and $;.3 billion in outlays from the amounts requested. $1.3 billion
of tlhe bu (l,,et authority reduction stemmed from the collapse
of South Vietnam and the elimination of any need for fiscal year
197T funds for South Vietnamese forces. House Concurrent Resolu-
tion 466, the second concurrent resolution on the budget, received final
approval in the Senate on December 1 and in the House on Deceim-
ber 12, 1975. The second budget resolution, which adjusted the con-
gressional budget for fact-of-life changes and converted targets
(aggregate basis) into ceilings, assumed a reduction of $200 million in
budget authority and $100 million in outlays for non-Middle East
military assistance, but assumed, without passing judgment on its
merits, congressional approval of the full Middle East assistance
The Department of Defe, sc App'opriation Authorization Act (Public
Law 94-106)-The So-Called Procurement Bill
Thlie Department of Defense authorization request for major weap-
ons procurement, R.D.T. & E., manpower strength levels, and other
purposes, totaled $29.9 billion for fiscal year 1976, including funds
requested for military assistance to South Vietnam. As passed by the
House on May 20, 1975, H.R. 6674 included $26.5 billion in funding
authorizations, a $3.4 billion reduction. The Senate bill (S. 920),
passed on June 6, included $25 billion for procurement and R.D.T. &
E., a reduction of $4.9 billion from the administration request. In
both cases, the major reductions were obtained through the elimina-
tion of unneeded funds for South Vietnam, by propl)osing to fund only
part of the requirements for cost growth in previously authorized
Navy shipbuilding programs, and declining to approve a $300 million
reqllest for an inventory contin.,ency fund.
The Senate rel)ort on the authorization bill (S. Rept. 94-146) in-
clud(d, seiverlal provisions of foreign policy sigllifwicae, incluidilig a
di'rtive to the Departmient of Defense. to submit, by December 31,
1975, :i report on lonl--terim basing- alternatives in tlie Pacific. As part
of the 1>:ttig, study, the committee also directed that thle Department
of l)(4fviise conduct an indeplli study of military alternatives in
Korea i, iicludinil mutng iit 1 (ef1e iis ,ll.. llrelllett.s ad11(1 U.S. troop levels.
PI'ior to its co,.sideliatiou of tli. specific budget itemls covered by the
milit:iry pro(wcn-iueent authorization bill on tlie floor, tlhe Senate held
a wide-'arnijlfr ",re,.t (ldleate" June 2 to 3, 1975. on foreign policy
an(1 sevuirity issues in ian effort to clarify the policies and postures
u (dlrlying Ile :d,,inist ration request. The major focus of this debate
w5s o,, such questions :,s basic foreign policy objectives, political and
military alliances, and the, rivalry between the Communist and the
non-Co( u iiuinist worlds.
Senator Dick Clark, for example, saw the end of the Vietnam conflict
as an opportunity to initiate a new era in U.S. foreign policy and to
"cultivate new attitudes and relationl'slhil)s tli:t, reflect an awareness
of tlhe world as it really is-snmall, lperilous, and interdependent." 1
IClanrk. Dick. Military Procurement Authorization Act, 1975. Remarks In the Senate.
*Congre lminnnl Record (dolly ed.), V. 121, June 3, 1175: S. 9423.

In a somewhat more critical vein, Senator Adlai Stevenson III as-
serted that the United States had no foreign policy now. Because of
this, he argued, it is difficult to intelligently debate military priorities.2
Senator Hubert H. Humphrey stated that the problem for the United
States in international affairs was the absence of a mechanism for
coordinating national security policy in its totality.
Senator Thomas McIntyre urged that the United States "learn to
discriminate in the kinds of commitments we make." He said that our
role must lie between that of policeman of the world and Fortress
America.3 Both Senators Alan Cranston and Edward M. Kennedy
expressed similar views, with Senator Kennedy suggesting that "the
United States must become a peaceful world neighbor, and stop being
a militant world meddler." 4
Other participants in the debate, such as Senators Barry Goldwater
and S trom Thurmond, however, urged a strong defense posture abroad
as the best protection for this country's security. Senator Goldwater
warned that "post-Vietnam international politics would not improve,
but would almost certainly grow worse." He therefore insisted that the
United States had to maintain all of its political and military alli-
ances in Asia, as well as Europe. While he called for the United States
to develop a "more flexible" defense posture permitting greater free-
dom of choice overseas, he also warned that the Nation "can neither
deny nor dodge certain distinct but terrible forces at work; namely,
the increasing power of the U.S.S.R. and China and their continuing
messianic stance." 5 Senator Harry F. Byrd cautioned his colleagues
that history has taught that "our international commitments have
value only insofar as they are perceived to be credible by both our
allies and our adversaries."
Senator Sam Nunn linked a strong defense posture to the continued
viability of detente, and emphasized that the military capabilities of
the Soviet Union, not that country's current posture toward the
United States, must be the basis of national security policy. "Friendly
smiles and gestures," he said, "can disappear in a period of about
8 hours." 7
The results of the debate, however, proved disappointing to those
who wished to link foreign policy commitments, especially reduced
commitments in Southeast Asia, with a smaller U.S. force structure
and a reduced defense budget. The main achievement in this respect
was the adoption of an amendment offered by Senator John Culver
requiring that the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense
annually submit a report on foreign policy and military posture for
the upcoming fiscal year. This report was intended to explain the
relationship of our military force structure to overall foreign policy
in the year ahead. Although the amendment was adopted by voice
vote in the Senate, the House conferees on the bill considered the
2 Stevenson. Adlal. Military Procurement Authorization. Act, 1975. Remarks In the
Senate. Congressional Record (daily ed.), v. 121, June 3, 1975: S. 9411.
3 McIntyre. Thomas J. Military Procurement Authorization Act. 1975. Remarks in the
Senate. Congressional Record (daily ed.), v. 121. June 3, 1975 : S. 9425.
Kennedy. Edward M. Military Procurement Authorization Act, 1975. Remarks in the
Senate. Congressional Record (daily ed.). v. 121, June 2. 1975: S. 9220.
5 Goldwater. Barry. Military Procurement Authorization Act, 1975. Remarks in the
Senate. Congressional Record (daily ed.), v. 121, June 3. 1975: S. 9415.
S Byrd. Harry F. Military Procurement Authorization Act. 1975. Remarks in the Senate.
Congressional Record (daily ed.), v. 121, June 3, 1975: S. 9459.
7 Nunn. Sam. Military Procurement Authorization Act. 1975. Remarks in the Senate.
Congressional Record (dally ed.) v. 121, June 2, 1975: S. 9213.

proposed annual report "unnecessary and redundant." 8 But the Senate
(onMferees insisted that a report of this kind was "necessary to provide
thle Congress a better comprehension of the actual need for our military
force structure required to support our current and projected foreign
policy." '
Consequently, the final version of the fiscal year 1976 military pro-
curement authorization legislation (Public Law 94-106, Oct. 7, 1975)
included a new section requiring that such a report be submitted:
SEC. S12. The Secretary of Defense. after consultation with the Secretary
of State, shliall prepare and submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the
Senate and the House of Representatives a written annual report on the foreign
policy and military force structure of the United States for the next fiscal year.
how such policy and force structure relate to each other, and the justification
for each. Such report shall be submitted not later than January 31 of each
The salient fact of congressional action on the. fiscal year 1976
defense request is that economics and the debate over national priori-
ties. not foreign policy goals, carried the most weight. While tlhe
uncertainties following the Vietnam debacle prevented an effective
consensus on foreign policy goals and national security means, the trial
run of the new congressional budget process facilitated the making of
clear choices, not only on total levels of Federal revenues and expendi-
tures. lbut also the proportions to be devoted to each of the 15 budget
functions-including national defense and international affairs. The
d(eparttlres from the President's budget request in these areas were
clear and signifiacnit expressions of congressional intent, and the
targets set by the Congress for the national defense and international
affairs functions were reflected in the subsequent spending" legislation.
The initial defeat in the Se:nate of the first conference report on the
procurement aulithorization bill, an llnprece(lented action, dramatically
highlighted the importance placed on the new budget process. Tlie
issue was not the direction of U.S. foreign policy, or the relationship
of the speid(ling request to real U.S. security requirements, bulit the
q(Ies! in of whether the proposed authorization, if fully funded, would
ex.(ed the congressionilly established Iiudget targets.
T7,n D(p-I,,,'ri/it of Deft 1., 1Pp./pprO/u,-;f;o1 Al (t (P'u7l"c L'a, ".'-21 2)
As amended, the administration request for tlhe Department of
Defense appropriation bill, the main defense spending measure, totaled
S97.9 billion in budget authority for fiscal year 1976 and $86.6 billion
in (,stilfated total outlays. TIle administration requested $23.1 billion
in tbudge(t authority for the transition quarter. The fiscal year 1976
total included $1.3 billion in budget authority for military assistance to
Southt Vietnam.
II.R1. 11861, passed by the House on October 2, included $90.2 billion
in new obligation authority for D)epartment, of Defense military activ-
itio.s for fiscal Vyear 1976 and $21.7 billion for tlhe transition quarter.
.S.. (',iI.'r,.-:. ..SiV itp: (C irmmiltt. i on Tonriifr-ier. Ai. thorlzln npi',rmprintlon for fIscnl
)',ir 1976 im l th pelrid hg l1in1li g J. ly 1. 1lI7i. nmid iiendig Sptnil 'ar :10. 19761. f,,r milll-
iitrv prir, iir l ., rseM'ireh miid l fvol ol)i'im,.1 t. f ,th-1. duIty, rr,*Prvf'. in l r'lvi nn prsimu icl
-ri,.iiLth Ivvvli. miillnrv tr ining Ktid-W t lom is. and fii r other irpin ,s : Ponnfreni'e rpliirt
to ;irc'rI iii v 1{ | If I IM-74. Witln- iL.noi, I'.US. (;o\ ein en iIt O'tint ig (1t1cc'. 1975. 94thi ('onig,
lnt -,,s.. .. I,,pt.i)4 -:iSNi. p. t;ii..
SIn neiirdaii-nc wIth this ri~pilr-ninut. mHlh a report wn> anddPd ns a pr,'face to tlh

The bill represented a reduction of $7.6 billion in budget authority and
$3.7 billion in outlays from the fiscal year 1976 request, and an increase
of $8.1 billion over the amount appropriated in last year's bill.
The House Appropriations Committee report (H. Rept. 94-517)
and the resultant bill included several provisions of foreign policy
significance. The committee cut $40.6 million, or about one-half, from
the funds requested to operate the Safeguard ABM site at Grand
Forks, N. Dak., and directed the Department of Defense to deactivate
the site by the end of fiscal year 1976. The Army had planned to oper-
ate the site during fiscal year 1976 but to maintain the system below
full operational readiness status thereafter. The committee did not
accept the argument that valuable operational experience could be
gained during fiscal year 1976 and stressed its belief that the impend-
ing deployment of MIRVed missiles by the Soviet Union would nullify
the future ability of Safeguard to protect the Minuteman ABM fields.
In its fiscal year 1975 report, prior to the Communist victory in
Vietnam and other parts of Indochina, the House Appropriations
Committee had recommended a number of changes in the U.S. com-
mand and force structure in both Japan and South Korea. These pro-
posals included withdrawal of U.S. 2d Infantry Division elements
from proximity to the Demilitarized Zone and the total removal from
Korea of a nuclear weapons command. In its report on the fiscal year
1976 legislation, however, the committee modified its position in re-
sponse to the changed U.S. position in the Pacific after the fall of
Vietnam, and decided not to press for the accomplishment, during
1976, of certain troop realinements which it had originally recom-
mended. Instead, the committee reaffirmed the U.S. treaty commitment
to the Republic of Korea and simply asked the administration to
implement those of its recommendations which were possible and to
exercise necessary caution. The committee maintained, however, that:
* plans should be made for trimming the entire U.S military presence in
Korea to a force of approximately 20,000 men by fiscal year 1978 on the assumip-
tion that the situation will have stabilized appreciably by that time and our
military assistance programs will have improved the defensive posture of ROK
ground and air forces.
The committee also went on record as affirming the central nature of
the U.S. security relationship with Japan while encouraging Japan's
recent movement toward assuming more responsibility for its con-
ventional warfare defense.
In Europe the committee stated its intention not to provide funds
for the annual Reforger and Crested Cap exercises subsequent to fis-
cal year 1976. The committee questioned the military utility of these
annual rotations of U.S. units to Europe and indicated its belief that
the exercises served only the purpose of reassuring NATO of the c:ip)a-
bility and will to deploy forces to Europe.
Of the $7.7 billion in House reductions, the Department of Defenlse
appealed roughly $2.6 billion in cuts to the Senate Appropriations
The Senate bill, which passed on November 18. 1975, included -490.7
billion in budget authority for fiscal year 1976 and 5_)1.8 billion for
fiscal year 1977. In its report, on tlhe measure (S. Rept. 94-446)
the Senate Appropriations Committee specifically opposed certain
foreign policy objectives contained in the House report. Without fore-



closing the possibility of changes in the mission and structure of U.S.
forces in Korea, the Senate committee opposed recommending any
firm plans or a timetable for a drawdown in U.S. troop levels. Noting
thel expressed intention of the Senate Armed Services Committee to
look into the Korean issue, the committee deferred action pending
completion of the Armed Services Committee's study of the question.
The Senate committee also opposed the action of the House in order-
ing the "unilateral mothballing" of the Safeguard ABM site, and it
restored $40.6 million which the House had cut from the request.
In floor action the committee's position on ABM was overturned by
tlhe passage of an amendment providing for the dismantling of the
ABM site save for the perimeter acquisition radar (PAR) system.
The conference report (H. Rept. 94-710), which passed the House
on December 12 and the Senate on December 19, included $90.5 billion
in budget authority for fiscal year 1976 and $21.9 billion for the tran-
sition quarter. Conference action confirmed the decision to phase out
Safeguard but provided the full requested funds to cover termination
costs. The conferees agreed that the Department of Defense should
plan for a drawndown of U.S. forces in Korea, but that the Congress
should not predetermine personnel reductions or time phasing.
Final action was delayed until January 27, 1976, when the House
concurred in a Senate amendment (to a House amendment) which
provided that no funds in the bill could be used for any activities in-
volving Angola, other than intelligence gathering.
The Military Construction Appropriation Act, 1976 (Public Law
The military construction appropriation bill, H.R. 10029, which
received final approval in the House on November 18, 1975, and in
the Senate on November 19, funds military construction and family
housing activities for fiscal year 1976 and the transition quarter. Items
of foreign policy interest in the bill included $13.8 million for con-
struction at the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia, and $117 mil-
lion for Trident submarine facilities.
In addition to the foreign policy issues raised during the Senate's
crllsiderat ion of the military procurement authorization bill, other
aspects of U.S. commitments abroad were considered by the Congress
diiring 11)705. Thiey inch(lded approval lby l)otl Houses of the U.S. pro-
postal to station 26()0 A.Ilri'clii civilian teclnici:ics in the Sinai to mon-
itoIr i lic Egv, t in-Israeli (liseligienment agrrenent. The Senate For-
ei(-) lJ ;i tions Committee, however, had previously required the ad-
iiiiiiist r;nit ion to certify that, all secret ;issiirmnees to the two belligerents
I1v revealed before proceeding to vote on tlhe measure." These develop-
mnivts sre (lisc.ssed in grreater detail in the section of this study deal-
ing with executive agreements (see pp. 45-53).
In addition, the Subcommittee on F'utiture Foreign Policy Research
and Development of the House Commnittee on International Rela-
It U.S. Congress. Senate: Commlttre on Foreign Relations. Early warning system In
S. irinl. IJTirlngm. 94tli Cong.. 1st ess. Oct. 6 and 7, 1975. WashIngton, U.S. Government
Printing Office., 1975. 264 pp.

tions 12 and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee each began a
series of hearings aimed at a broad reassessment of U.S. foreign policy
for the years ahead. The House Committee on Armed Services also
held a series of hearings on overall national security programs and re-
lated budget requirements which covered, among other subjects, the
relationship between foreign policy and defense planning, and alter-
natives in foreign and supporting military policy.13
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, responding to a Senate
resolution in November 1973, held hearings to review the U.S. commit-
ment to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and organiza-
tion the following March. No further action on the question was taken
by the Congress, however. In any event, the SEATO Council of Min-
isters at their annual meeting in New York on September 24, 1975,
voted to phase out the organization over the next 2 years. The Council
d(lid not discuss the Manila Pact and it is assumed that it will continue
to be in effect.

In several major actions in 1975 the Congress supported adminis-
tration proposals regarding development of U.S. military support
facilities on Diego Garcia, a small island in the Indian Ocean. The
question involved in approving funding for this development goes
beyond the issue of the actual costs, which represent a rather small part
of the defense budget; the decision to develop the Diego Garcia fa-
cility bears on great power relationships, the potential for an arms race
in the Indian Ocean, U.S. interest in open sealanes to the Persian
Gulf, and questions regarding the information made available to
Congress by the executive branch detailing the agreement with Great
Britain to release the island for U.S. use. The case of Diego Garcia
presents an interesting example of the interrelationship of foreign
policy, defense goals, and strategic considerations.
In accord with provisions of the 1975 Military Construction Act
(Public Law 93-552) the President was required to certify to Congress
that construction of military support facilities on Diego Garcia was
essential to the national interest; if neither House adopted a resolution
of disapproval within 60 days, funds authorized under Public Law
93-552 could be obligated for Diego Garcia. The President issued such
a certification on May 12, 1975 (House Document 94-140), and Sen-
ator Mansfield introduced a resolution of disapproval, Senate Resolu-
tion 160, on May 19, 1975. (No comparable resolution of disapproval
was filed in the House.)
"U.S. Congress. House: Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on Future
Foreign Policy Research and Development. Reassessment of U.S. foreign policy. Hearings,
94th Cong., 1st sess. July 15, 22, 23, and 24, 1975. Washington, U.S. Government Printing
Office. 1975. 183 pp.
The Press and Foreign Policy. Panel discussion. 94th Cong., 1st sess. Sept. 24, 1975.
Washington. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975. 34 pp.
Is U.S. Congress. House: Committee on Armed Services. Full committee consideration
of overall national security programs and related budget requirements. Hearings. 94th
Cong.. 1st sess. Dec. 3. 4, 5. 8, 9, 10, 15, 16, 17, and 18, 1975. Washington, U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1975. 586 pp.

Following hearings before tlhe Senate Armed Services Committee 4
Senate Resolution 160 was reported adversely to the Senate.' The conm-
mit ee's report on thle resolution and additional and minority views
tiled with it )present a summary of both sides of the argumnient on the
Diego Garcia issue. The position of the majority of the committee was
that the United States lias vital interests in tie Indian Ocean area. be-
cause the sealanes there lead to the natural resources of Africa, India,
and the Middle East, acnd are particularly important for shipment of
Middle Eastern oil. Second, tihe committee noted that the Soviet Union
had increased its presence (to a force of 15 to 20 ships, half of which
can be classed as combatants), and its capability to operate in the
Indian Ocean by tihe reopening of the Suez Canal and the construction
of a naval support facility at Berbera, Somalia; the Diego Garcia
facility would provide the Unitedl States a comparable capability to
sustain naval operations in the area. Third. the committee argued thliat
construction of modest facilities at Diego Garcia would be a prud(lent
act ion in view of the fact that the nearest independent U.S. fuel supply
in tL.e absence of the Diego Garcia operation is at Subic Bay in tlhe
Philippines, 4,000 miles from the Indian Ocean.
The linnority views on Senate Re.solution 160, presented by Senators
McIlntyre. Culver, Hart of Colorado, and Lealhyv, argued tliat con-
vilWing evidence that expansion of the Diego Garcia base facility was
essenti:il to U.S. national security' liald not been presented. To the con-
trary, they considered it essential to assure that all avenues toward
prelentingu a superlpower arms race in thle Indian Ocean be explored
before a U.S. comili it iint in the area be mnadil alnd noted that despite
previous suggestions of the Senate Arnmed Services Committee anil
siilkliar suggestions from the U.N. General Asseml)ly, the adniistra-
tion had not approaclied( the Soviet Union on the issue of an Indian
Ocean arms limitation agreement since 1971. The report also noted
that none of the 29 nations on the Indian Ocean littoral had ,riven
p1)ublic support to the proposed U.S. base expansion on Diego Garcia.
Looking to tlhe strategic arglilments pre-elited by tlhose favoring ex-
pa1sion of the Diego (Garcia facility, the minority views c(nmln(led
that if the U.S. oal is to be able to "shliow the flag, it lhas the capability
to d(o so witlhouit Diego Garcia; but if the goal is a(ctuallVy to 1be al)le to
vond)uct major milita'v. ol)(trati0ons. I)i(ego Gari: cii- itself is liribably
not sitfficie'iit." The Iilli(norit V vivws ,',ntcl ud1(ed flthat the prol)()Sed(l base
cx paiis iti on ID iew ) (Ga rci i ald a ssieindi a syivmbnl ic iimportance beyond
it-. military sigiiific,;iic.
Sc.w tal 1bRslution 1t v(;is rejected by tlei Senate (43-5;))) on July 28
Sfter i leagt delte. a lontr the ilnes presented in tlie precedini s -
aryi. i" e no resluti(on ol disa proval ws acnisildered by tlie Irouse,
tlie :i(lilisit rati,,ii w;is free to obligate fiscal vear 1975 nuilitary con-
st ri. t )iii f',ds for tle o.,st rct.I ion Ii on Di(igo ( arcia.
S. 12-17, 1lie fiscal .ye:r 1.76 miiilitay c ( tnstruction alut1iorization.
thi 111011 year 1976l itar cost ui
contaallined a pro\vi)ion itlhotllrizin 1..3.8 illioll for mlilltary colstruc-
1 j il iLr,- .. S.-inmt'l : 4'iii, iil frr', on Arni',l S ilr-vlis. I lDknpprovE Cooil.trui't Ion
1' 1ri r-ts oil I l i' I ..i 11 l i r if li. (;ii rea. Ifen rliiLv. June 10. 19!175. 941h Ii'tl n,.. lst se-s. W ash-
Iiii',IJz I'.S. (;,inv riiiiim iit Plliflllii ()flir., 1!i75. (All e,.\ ciillive sessloii if the 'ollnllllt(te wis
also Ii.Iil ol Juiie 17, 1117i. )
1 I'.- 'lnil, Tri' s. S mi ,te: It)i.;ili|>ravi' onit rii tl- iln Pril|'ti nnil the Isl inlid (if T)liinr
(;i itrel. ( l e Net. 91 I2112) !9 lhi ('Ciui.. 1st ses. Jiiin .S. I 1i75. Wn iliitig lon, IT..S. (Gim 'rn-
1r1int Prhilriiu i I le v. Juine 1 I. 1 i975. lpit.
lIllhd p. 21.


tion on Diego Garcia.'7 H.R. 5210, the comparable House measure, also
contained a $13.8 million authorization for Diego Garcia. During
debate on the measure on July 28, 1975, Representative Leggett in-
t produced an amendment, which was subsequently rejected, to strike the
Diego Garcia funds.
Diego Garcia funding was carried through the conference report on
S. 1247 (H. Rept. 94-483), and the report was passed by the House
without debate on September 24. During Senate debate on the con-
ference report on September 29, Senator Culver raised the issues of
the status of former inhabitants of Diego Garcia and of the nature of
the secret agreement between the United States and Great Britain. On
both issues, evidence was presented to indicate that the administration
had not provided Congress with complete information, but had
presented the impression that the island had for some time been unin-
habited, and that no financial arrangements were involved in the
United States-Britislh agreement.18
The final debates in 1975 on the implications of U.S. base develop-
ment at Diego Garcia for U.S. policy in the Indian Ocean occurred
during Senate consideration of the fiscal year 1976 military construc-
tion appropriation measure, H.R. 10029. (The measure had passed
the House on October 8 without debate on the $13.8 million for Diego
Garcia. The report accompanying H.R. 10029 (H. Rept. 94-530) stated
that the Navy's request for those funds had been approved because
of the expanding Russian influence in the Indian Ocean shipping
lanes.) The Senate Appropriations Committee also approved the $13.8
mii!lion Diego Garcia request (S. Rept. 94-442) in H.R. 10029. On
the floor of the Senate, however, an -amendment proposed by Senator
Culvor was approved on November 6, 1975, to delay use of the Diego
Garcia funds appropriated by H.R. 10029 until July 1, 1976. The
maior thrust of the arguments in support of the amendment was to
reduce the likelihood of an arms race in the Indian Ocean, and to give
the administration an additional opportunity to move toward a mu-
tual 'arms restraint agreement for the Indian Ocean with the Soviet
The conference report on H.R. 10029 (H. Rept. 94-655) passed by
the House on November 18 and the Senate on November 19, revised
the Culver amendment to delay use of the appropriated funds only
until April 15, 1976, with the exception of $250,000 to be expended
without time restriction for aircraft arresting gear. Senate and House
floor debate on this compromise indicated that the delay would not
present problems for the Navy's leadtime and procurement schedule,
17PP See U.S. Congress. Senate: Committee on Armed Services. Report to aceoinpi v
S. 1247. "Military Construction Authorization. Fiscal Year 1976." S. Rept. 94-157. 94th
Cone.. 1st sess. Washinuton. U.S. Government Printinz Office, 1975.
The Senate bill contained a provision (sec. 609) to withhold the Diego Garcia aithoriz:i-
tion If a resolution disualiproving obligation of fiscal 1975 funds had been passed. As
S. Res. 160 was dpfeited prior to final consideration of S. 1247, the issue was dropped in
the conference measure.
1See also Congressionnl Record (daily ed.), "Diego Garcia-A Question of Human
Rights." v. 121. Sept. 24. 19)75 : S16556. 16560. Senator Culver had presented an anniiilim'nt
to the State Department authorization for fiscal year 1976. S. 1517, adioted on Septenim-
her 17. requiring the President to report to Conaress by November 1. 1975. on the role
or the T'nitd States in the rmnoval of inhallitnts from DI,'o GCnrcin. and evirs..ij tlie,
sense of Congress that the United States should negotiate with the U.S.S.R. to limit
arms buildup In the Indian Ocean. The amniendmnient was silis',llientiy dirollpped in con-
ference with the House.

and would still provide time for a U.S. initiative to test Soviet inter-
est in an arms restraint agreement.19
In addition to this legislative activity, additional congressional ac-
tions to evaluate the need for and implication of further construction
on Diego Garcia included hearings by the House International Rela-
tions Committee and two factfinding missions to Somalia. The major
themes of the House hearings were the role of the Soviet Union in the
littoral states of the Indian Ocean, the prospects of arms limitations
in the Indian Ocean, and the status of former islanders.20
At the invitation of the Somalian Government. the House and Sen-
ate Armed Services Committees both sent factfinding missions to Ber-
bera, Somalia.21 The reports of the two missions both concluded that
development of a substantial Soviet installation was taking place in
Berbera, and the Ser.te report recommended expansion of the Diego
Garcia facility to counter this development. However, Representative
Leggett, a member of the House team, described the Soviet facility as
a "rather modest facility' 22 in a statement introducing his amendment
to strike Diego Garcia construction funds from the House military
construction -authorization.
Thus, in 1975, Congress resolved to develop U.S. military support
facilities for the Indian Ocean. However, the Congress did not reach
any consensus on the potential implications of this commitment for
U.S. foreign and defense policy, or receive clarification from the ad-
ministration on details of agreements with the British permitting
U.S. use of the island. While supporters of the U.S. development
argued that increased U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean is necessai v
to counter Soviet activities by providing fueling and communications
facilities for the U.S. Navy, opponents of the Diego Garcia funding
have claimed that the facility will lead to the development of a three-
ocean U.S. Navy, contribute to the arms race in the Indian Ocean, and
add to tensions in that region.

9The State Department reported to the Congress on April 1.5. 1976, as requested by
the Culver amendment, on the status of negotiation efforts. The report concluded thut
"* * we do not perceive It (an arms limitation agreement In the Indian Ocean) to he
In the U.S. interest at this time. Congressional Record (daily ed.), v. 122, May 6. 197i:
U.S. Congress. House: Committee on International Renlations. "Diego Gnrcla. 1975:
The Debate over the Bmsep and the Island's Former Inhabitants." Hearings. 94th Cong.. 1st
sie-s. Washington. U.S Government Printing Office. 1975.
"I U.S. Congress. House: Committee on Armed Services. "Report of the Special Sub-
Commilttee to Inspect Facilities at Berbera. Somalia." Hearing. July 15. 1975. 94th Cong..
1st sess. (HASC No. 94-19). Washington. U.S. Government Printing Office. 1975. 11 pp.
S1ei4 te: Committee on Armed Serv-ces. "Soviet Militnry Capability In Berbera. Somallia.'"
Committee print. 94th Cong.. 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office. 1975.
2:i pp.
2 Congressilonal Record (daily ed.) v. 121. July 28. 1975 : 17654.


In 1975 the key agencies of the U.S. intelligence community were
subjected to the most intensive congressional scrutiny since their crea-
tion in the years following World War II. Through the efforts of two
select committees, one in the House and one in the Senate, Congress
and the American people were given detailed information regarding
the operations, procedures, and missions of the American intelligence
In the fall and winter of 1974 serious charges were made in the New
York Times concerning the activities of the Central Intelligence
Agency. On September 8, the Times reported that the CIA had di-
rected the infusion of millions of dollars into Chile between 1970 and
1973 in an effort to aid groups opposed to the Marxist regime of Presi-
dent Salvadore Allende Gossens and in an attempt to "destabilize"
the Allende government. A coup did occur in Chile in September 1973,
during the course of which President Allende was killed, or committed
suicide. Following the publication of the September 8 Times article,
President Ford acknowledged at a press conference that the CIA had
been involved in certain efforts in Chile aimed at assisting the oppo-
nents of Allende, although he denied that the CIA was involved in
the coup itself. One key result of these revelations was the focusing of
congressional attention once again on the CIA's foreign covert action
operations, a subject that had been the source of intermittent con-
troversy for a number of years.
An important legislative enactment related to this controversy that
emerged in the latter months of 1974 was section 662 of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (Public Law 93-559, the Hughes-
Ryan amendment) which stipulated in part that:
No funds appropriated under the authority of this or any other Act may be
expended by or on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency for operations in
foreign countries, other than activities intended solely for obtaining necessary
intelligence, unless and until the President finds that each such operation is im-
portant to the national security of the United States and reports, in a timely
fashion, a description and scope of such operation to the appropriate committees
of the Congress, including the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United
States Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the United States house
of Representatives.
It was presumed at the time of its passage that this nmen(ldmnent to the
Foreign Assistance Act would enable Congress to maintain better
oversight by requiring the CIA to report, through the. President, on
covert action operations conducted by the Agency overseas. Questions
regarding the effectiveness of this provision in enabling the Congress
to stop covert actions with which it came to disagree were raised late in
1975 when a contro-versy developed between tlhe President and Conjgress

*Prepared by Richard F. Grimniiimett. analyst In national defense.


regarding CIA funding of pro-Western forces in Angola. (See United
States-African Relations. pp. 176-77. Thle questions regarding section
6(2 centered on the fact that under its provisions the appropriate
congressional oversight committees do not have an express veto
autli ority over covert action operations of the CIA. This situation
creates serious problems for these committees should any of them
wish to end any of tlhe covert actions that are brought to their
On December 22,1974, the New York Times reported that the CIA.
in direct violation of its statutory charter, conducted a "massive, illegal
domestic intelligence operation during the Nixon administration
against the antiwar movement and other dissident groups in the
United States." Thie Times article also charged that "intelligence files
on at least. 10,00ou American citizens" had been maintained by the CIA.
and that the Agency lhad engaged in "dozens of other illegal activities"
within the United States, starting in the 1950s, "including break-ins,
wiretapping a-d the surreptitious inspection of mail." Following the
publications of the Deceimber 22 Times story, President Ford ordered
('IA Director William E. Colby to provide him with a report on the
allegations. After reviewing the Colby report, President. Ford on
January 4, 1975 established an eight-menmber Presidential Commission,
chlaired by Vice President Nelson A. Rockefeller, to "ascertain and
evaluate any f-acts relating to activities conducted within the United
States by the Central Intelligence Agency." Yet within 2 weeks of tlie
Roel:efeller Commnission's (Teation, CIA Director Colby hliad acknowl-
edged. before subiconmmittees of the Senate Appropriations and Armed
Services (Comnittees, that the CIA had in fact engaged in certain
dome('stic operations against American citizens in recent years. Colby
eplipla, however, that these activities were not of tlie scope alleged
in the New York Times article of December 22.
.At thii juinture, the Senate and the IHou.e determined that separate
('cogressioual probes of the allegations raised against the CIA would
1w n (ecs-;iry in order to estal 1ish the facts at isiuie and to restore public
('oifid .e In te i agency o011ce again, Inasmuch as oilier unIits within
thie Aknerivan intelligeiwe network, such as- the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigjition, iad, also( been cila rged( with misdeeds in recent years, pri-
mi arily in the aara of domestic suirveillance, it was decided that the
'co1gressioa:1l inquiries would focus not only vii tl:e CIA, but oil all
U.S. aeies e(.lga.ed in intellijre(ce a(ct ;'tiites, fo-reign and domesttic.
(01n ,Jainary 27, 197,5. the Scinate, by, a \(vote( of S2 to 4, established tihe
Sente Select (Comimiiittee to S Idv GoverImient Operat ions With
Re(.p.,'t to Ikitellien,'ce Activities. Eleven Senators we're appointed to
t)le co,,miittie., six Denocrats and five Republicanis. Senator Frank
('1hur'i-h (D)-Ibl:ilio) \ ,s iamed chail-iian. WSena1tor Johlin Tower (R-
Tex.) vie c! .airtam:1i1. Senate resolutionn 21, which estiallished tihe Sen-
ate seltct com it tee, .,\e it broa authority to determine whethlier tlie
(',.t r:ul Jitellligenice Age.y,,. the Fededal B'ureaiu of Itnvestigation,
or( y ,ilver agen'yi, ofl tlie Federal GoIernm(e,(.t, (Wor a1Vy lisons work-
ing for or on ble:ilfofsich gen.ies., lhad teg:ged in "illegal, ilimpropel'
or iitn(1iicl activities.v" Tlie com,,ilittete was sll)se(1uellntly ('llarged( to
s )il 1id t it.- fi*mliId :aId(I wIIcoi il 'iine1d i 11,,s tno t l;ter thi:ul Alril k), 1976.
()n "IFe,,l: rI:v 19, thlie IIots of Rep 1se -)lit ti\ .s votedl 2SG-120 its
:ipp :r,,v of Jlowis e.,,ldition :1,s. autlior:/ii ;an i,,1 iiry into "allega-
tio -s o(f i i o)i.qr fil(1 illc ;il :acti .'itis of iitellige'ice :age,(cis in tie

United States and abroad," through the creation of the House Select
Committee on Intelligence.
Ten Representatives were appointed to the House committee, seven
Democrats and three Republicans. Representative Lucien N. Nedzi
(D-Mich.) was named chairman. In early June some members of the
House select committee raised questions concerning the propriety of
Representative Nedzi remaining as chairman of the committee in view
of the fact that he had previously received secret briefing from the CIA
on mniatters that had now become a focus of the committee's inquiry.
Subsequently, the controversy was resolved through the passage of
House Resolution 591 on July 17, 1975, which added two Democrats
and one Republican to the committee. Representative MIichael Har-
rington (D-Mass.) and Representative Nedzi were not reassigned to
this reconstituted House Select Committee on Intelligence. All other
members of the first select committee retained their scats on the new
one. Representative Otis G. Pike (D-N.Y.) replaced Mr. Nedzi as
House Resolution 138 gave the House select committee broad powers
to investigate "the organization, operations, and oversight of the intel-
ligence community of the U.S. Government." The resolution author-
ized an inquiry into the activities of the key agencies or units of the
intelligence network, such as the CIA, the FBI, and the Defense Intel-
ligence Agency (DIA), as well as "any other instrumentalities of the
U.S. Government engaged in or otherwise responsible for intelligence
operations in the United States and abroad." House Resolution 591
reaffirmed this mandate in its entirety and directed the select committee
to report its findings to the House no later than January 31, 1976.
In the course of public hearings held by the two Select Committees
on Intelligence a number of important subjects related to U.S. intelli-
gence were examined. The Senate select committee focused its public
hearings on major controversies that had been the subject of the Rocke-
feller Commission report (President's Commission on CIA Activities
Within the United States) and press accounts of questionable opera-
tions of the CIA, FBI, and other intelligence units. This approach led
the Senate committee to examine the involvement of the CIA in assassi-
nation plots against, foreign leaders, CIA operations in Chile against
Salvadore Allende Gossens, and FBI counterintelligence programs
within the United States. The House select committee focused its pub-
lic hearings on the budget of the intelligence community, the perform-
ance of the intelligence community in selected crises, and the questions
related to risks and control of foreign intelligence programs of the
United States.
Efforts of the House select committee to obtain various kinds of
classi-fied data from executive branch agencies led to a number of dis-
putes between the committee and executive branch officials over the
kinds of documents, papers, and testimony thliat would be made avail-
able to the committee and the restrictions tfliat would be placed on the
use of such information should it be given to the committee. On a num-
ber of occasions, the House select committee found it necessary to sub-
pena classified documents in order to receive them. The House select
committee made a compromise agreement in November in order to
obtain a subpenaed State Department memorandum of Mr. Thliomas B.
Boyatt, relating to the 1974 Cyprus crisis. In accepting tins arrange-


ment, the committee specifically stipulated that its action "shall in no
way be considered as a precedent affecting the right of this committee
with respect to access to executive branch testimony or documents." In
November, the House committee also voted to hold Secretary of State
HIenry Kissinger in contempt of Congress for failing to appropriately
respond to three separate committee subpenas for data relevant to the
committee's investigation. By early December the administration had
responded to the three subpenas to the degree that the House committee
was able to conclude that "substantial compliance" with them had
occurred. As a result, final House proceedings against Secretary Kis-
singer were dropped by the House select committee.1


The following is a synopsis of information developed or expanded
upon by the two select committees in the course of their respective
hearings. Information from other congressional hearings in 1975 that
are directly related to the subheadings below is also incorporated.
Sources for this information are either hearing documents or press
accounts of hearings.
Intelligence caon m un ity b budget
Comptroller General Elmer B. Staats told the House select commit-
tee in July that the General Accounting Office does not know how much
the United States spends on intelligence because of current restric-
tions on its auditing authority with respect to intelligence agencies. As
the result of these legal obstacles, the GAO is not in a position to
knowv whether or not there is duplication or lack of coordination
among the agencies of tlhe U.S. intelligence community. James T.
Lvinn, Director of the Office of Management and Budget (0MB),
testified before the House select, committee in August that because cur-
rent law permits the Director of Central Intelligence to expend large
sumns of money on his own authority, the Director of 0MB could not.
rive assurances that none of the moneys currently appropriated for
the CIA were being spoient for illegal activities. William E. Colby,
Director of Central Intelligence, stated in testimony before the House
.lect committee in August that the CIA did not. inform either the
intelligence siwollommittees of Congress or the Office of Management
and Budget (0MB) about the CIA's mail-opening program or its
(lealin-gs with org(ranized crime until after these activities had been
terminated. In testimony before the House select committee in Au-

T'lhip omiprrmise arrnneement regnrdlng thp Ronyantt memornndiim provided that the .]rf t Commit teep fil Intellienee would aceept an "nmnlgamntion of State Dc-
tilrtmnent (ldoviinif-ts" which Included "in Its entirety the pnpers deserbled as the 'Dissent
Mtcmirniidium' i-rePinred by. T'hormiis Boyatt while Director of Cypriot Affairs In the (State]
Theiairtinint." rThis amailgaamitlain wag to hp naceomplanled by an affidavit attesting tlint
tit-. r.i .tt niemnrnandunm was containedd unahrldged within the amalgamation." In return
th1. IouseSelP S t I ')iIn mItve on Intelllgence would consider that Its subpena for the
Tormort ,iilnm h v,! bon ffil lirl itl \it\h h v th% e Stntp iepartm nnt. For mnterinia and testl-
ii,,v' rlnirlnit tof the l It iii i ii i'minr n,'i m ce n', t rii ver.-y. fliP qiiettion of the committee's
c" oss to ii1frirmatlon. ;tni! fhi' dli ini of Si,.r,'tary of Statv Ilenry IKlsslnger for contempt
tif C',nr rpsq., see the follwinr f ,Il i' ii ri tN :
I'.S. 'Cmrit : rt",s HoUci :, Sri,hct ('iiininl tec on Titelligpniee "I'.. Intelligence Agencies
iin,! A Tllvlflr Ther I'prfurniwine. of the nTitplllrence Co uni(n nlty TIearlngs. pt. 2. 11. 12. 11. 25. ':: Oct. 7. :'i. 31. 1975. 941hi ''ng.. 1st tsess. Waahington. IT.S.
(;,.-rniimirit Print iu L (ffl"v. 1i7., I'.S. Int ,llli enre Agencies and AetlvltIP : Committee
r'T-.. <.fdlnr i P't 4. .'Pit 10. 29: Oct. 1: Nov. 4 6. 1 3 14. and 20. 1975. 94th Vonn .. 1st
SPss. Washilngton. V'.S. Gotvernnient I 'rlntling Oflro. 1975. iteport (if the Sele't Coninlttoe
(1n Itr'niltl..r-ire <'ltlTn- IIuiirv .\ Kksl nt er. Togethr With Ciriirurrlng nnd Dis.entlnz
Vi1wu Toer .q. 1t.75 pl.t. Nrp 94 W:1.. 94111 Cong.. Ist ses.. Washlngton. U.S. Government
I'rlntiu,: ifll,'l-. 1'.752. 29i p]i.


gust, FBI witnesses stated that the Bureau's budget for intelligence-
gathering and counterintelligence activities for fiscal year 1975 was
$82,488,000-a substantial portion of which went for counterespionage
purposes. During one of his appearances in August before the House
committee, CIA Director Colby urged that the entire budget of the
CIA be kept secret by Congress.2 The House, on October 1, supported
this position by rejecting, by a vote of 267 to 147, an amendment of
Representative Robert N. Giaimo (D-Conn.) that was intended to
make possible public disclosure of the total amount appropriated to
the CIA. During the House debate on the Defense Department ap-
propriations bill in 1975, Representative George H. Mahon, chair-
man of the House Appropriations Committee, extended the oppor-
tunity to all Members of the House to have access to classified budget-
ary data on intelligence under proper safeguards which would pro-
tect the information from public disclosure.
CIA domestic activities
In February and March in testimony before the Defense Subcom-
mittee of the House Appropriations Committee and the Government
Information and Individual Rights Subcommittee of the House Gov-
ernment Operations Committee, respectively, CIA Director William
E. Colby acknowledged that "over the past 8 years" the CIA has main-
tained files on four Members of Congress,3 and that the agency main-
tains a wide range of files containing information on American citi-
zens. Colby cited reasons for these files being maintained, but added
that it was not possible to make an accurate estimate as to the number
of names kept on file. On June 10, the Rockefeller Commission re-
port was released. It stated that the "great majority" of CIA do-
mnestic activities complied with the law, but that certain operations-
mail openings, buggings, break-ins, and the collection of materials
involving the names of more than 300,000 individuals and organiza-
tions-"were plainly unlawful and constituted improper invasions
upon the rights of Americans." 4 In June, CIA Director Colby testi-
fied before the Government Information and Individual Rights Sub-
committee of the House Government Operations Committee that a
continuing CIA review of its records had led to the determination
that the agency had files on 75 current Members of Congress. Colby
stated there was "no provision for immunity for Members of Con-
gress from such attention." He also acknowledged that beginning in
August 1973, the CIA had destroyed some files, including some
documents that conceivably might have been used as evidence of
criminal activity by the agency. This destruction has since been sus-
pended, Colby added.
In hearings held in October, the Senate select committee received
testimony from a number of former public officials on tlhe CIA's mail-
opening program. Details of this program were first provided in March
with the release of the testimony of William J. Cotter, Clhief Postal
2 US. Congress. House: Select Committpee on Intelligence. "T'.S. Tntell1ience Aen.ies
and Activities: Intelligence Costs and Fiscal Procedures." Hearings. Pt. 1. July 31. A r. 1,
4-R. 1975. 94th Cone.. 1st S.e... Washington. U.S. Government I'rlntinz Office. 1975.
3 U.S. Congress. House: Subcommittee on Department of Defense. Committee on Appro-
priations. "Central Intelligence Agency Domestic Activities." HTlearinas. Feh. 20. 1975.
94th Cong.. Ist sess. Washington. T' S. Government Printing Office. 1175.
4 .S President 1974- (Ford). "President's Commissinn on CIA Activities Within
the T'nited States." Report to the President. June 1975. [Washin-ton. For sale I.v the
Superintendent of Documents. U.S. Government Printing Office. 1975.] 299 pp.


Inspector of the United States. on the subject, taken in executive session
before the courts. Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice
Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee. During the Senate
select committee's hearings, it was revealed that in the course of its
0-year program of mail opening, the CIA lihad opened foreign cor-
re. pondence to and from "selected American politicians," including
Senators Edward M. Kennedy, Hubert H. Humphrey, Frank Church;
Representative Bella Abzug; and Richard M. Nixon. Arthur F. Burns.
(Chairmn of the Federal Reserve Board, and civil rights leaders
Martin Luther King, Jr., and his wife Coretta, also had their mail
opened. In addition, mail of the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations
and Harvard University was opened and examined by the CIA. An
official "watch list" for mail opening was kept by the Agency-an
index of at least 1.300 names that the CIA had determined were to
receive special attention. Individuals 'whose names. were on this watchl
list" included author John Steinbezck; Linus Pauling, Nobel Laureate
and(l Victor Reuther, United Auto Workers official. Officials of the CIA
stated that tlhe mail-opening program of 1953-73 was known to be
illegal within the Agrency while it was being carried out. Operation
TITLINGUAL, as it was termed, reslllted in the filini,.g. of 2.705,72(;
envelopes and the opening, of 215T,820 letters in New York drinuo- the
20-yeai'ar period. Former Postimasters Generail J. Edward Day, John A.
Gro)nouski. and Winton M. Blount testified that. they could not recall
ever being told during their respective tenures with thle Postal Service
that the CIA was opening U.S. mail.5
CI. 1 and assas.xuiuwn plot.,
In 'Noveml)er, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence released
a 347-page interim report on "Alleged Assassination Plots Involviingr
Foreign Leaders" 6 which discusses the role of the CIA and others in
plots a.rainst Premier Fidel Castro of Cuba. Rafael Trujillo of the
Dominican Republic, Gen. Rene Schneiderof Chile,. Patrice Liumunba
of tlie Conzro-now Zaire-and President Ngo Dinh Diem of South
Viet inani. The report held in part that "officials of the U.S. Government
initiated plots to assassinate Fidel Castro and Patrice Lumumba." that
"American officials encouraged or were privy to coup plots which re-
.ulted in the deatlfis of Trujillo, Diem. and Schlineider"' and that "CIA
officials imade use of known underworld figures in assassination efforts."
The rel)ort. also observed that tlhe "apparent lack of accountability in
tle command and control system was such tlfat tlhe assassination plots
wouldd have lxenm undertaken without express authorization." On D)-
,.eiillHh. 18, Senator Churchl and nine of his colleagues on tlie Senate
Select Coirmiittee on Intelligence introduced S. 08-25, a bill to make
unl;\ wfil the, entering into a conspiracy to assassinate a foreign ofli-
cial outsi(Id thle Inited States, or tlie attempted assassination of a
foreigni, offli:ial outside thle UInited States.
7 I' ( S Iirr:'rvs,. S'iaitte S.9.i.rt ('-r, i iiiltI t To S1 tI ,iIv'E I,'rimii fifit lI Ov'orn I I'Ii -. W ith
ITo oii t To t It.! I tl i,..vii, A '.tt h I T '* Itf i 1L' vrii Actvl ; t III : M: 111 OInp nin ." I ln rit -,,;.
'1 00 "'. "'1. t2 wiiid 2 V1!7.5. nitdi 'oii i.. 9st e.. Vii'tlitgton S. Go. ( iov'rnm it Print.-
thw OV |,'. 19~7rb
ST' S ('Cioirrf-'r. S-ri ritf*: trr't ("' iniltlcttIPt( P T So ,tilldv GOvorii)ntIPtnlhI O prn t ifi'nq W It iI
Pf.>pr ((t to Ttiffni? l i "111 A0e 01lv 4i Ie*.. F ,\l 1' 1 i n 'iint In plots Involvin1z fnr ('Irn 1nniders.
Nov. '2'0. 19175. Srtnte RIpt. No. 9.4 .115. 9-1th Cong.. 1st SRs.. Watshilngton, IT.S. Govern-
mtrift I'rItIrnir (tOflfic. 1175 :!17 pil'.

CIA and Chile
In February, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee released por-
tions of executive session testimony given by Richard Helms, former
Director of the CIA, before the committee on January 22, 1975. In
this testimony, Mr. Helms acknowledged that he had provided in-
complete information concerning the involvement of the CIA in
Chilean affairs when hlie testified before a Senate committee after Presi-
dent Salvador Allende Gossens had come to power.7
In December, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence released
a 62-page staff report entitled, "Covert Action in Chile 1963-1973." 8
which discussed the participation of the CIA in efforts intended to
block the election of and later to further the overthrow of the govern-
ment of Marxist President Allende of Chile. The report estimated that
the CIA spent $13.4 million for such purposes in Chile during the 10-
year period. Of this total, roughly $8 million was spent on propaganda
and support of political parties, while another $4.3 million was spent
to influence and support the mass media in the country. The report
added, however, that no direct involvement of the CIA in the 1973
Chilean coup itself had been established.9
National Security Agency operations
In hearings before the House select committee in August, Roy
Banner, General Counsel for the NSA, stated that current law on
wiretaps does not prohibit the National Security Agency from eaves-
dropping on overseas telephone calls placed by American citizens.10
In testimony before the Senate select committee in October, National
Security Agency Director, Lt. Gen. Lew Allen, Jr., stated that from
1967 to 1973, the NSA had secretly scanned international telephone and
cable traffic, intercepting the messages of 1,680 American citizens and
groups and the messages of 5,925 foreign nationals or organizations.
This program, formally designated Project Minaret in 1969, was
halted in 1973. Allen testified that the National Security Agency had
not obtained court. orders to authorize this electronic surveillance by
his Agency nor had the NSA received the specific approval of Presi-
dent Lyndon Johnson or Richard Nixon or that of any Attorney
General. Director Allen stated that all communications intercepted by
the NSA had at least one foreign terminal."
NSA supplied information to other intelligence agencies and units
such as the CIA, FBI, DIA, and the Bureau of Narcotics and Danger-
ous Drugs (BNDD) on the basis of watch lists given to NSA by these
other intelligence groups. The information supplied by NSA was
7 U.S. Congress. Senate: Committee on Foreign Relations. CTA Foreign and Domestic
Activities. Hearing on Activities of the Central Intelligence Agpncy in Forein Countries
and in the United States, Jan. 22, 1975. 94th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office. 1975. 39 pp.
8U.S. Congress. Senate: Select Committee To Study Government Operations With
Respect to Intelligence Activities. Covert action in Chile 1963-19)73. Staff Report. 94th
Cone. 1st spss. Washington. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975. 62 pp.
9 For testimony and other documents related to covert action in Chile see U.S. Congress.
Senate: Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence
Activities. Intelligence Activities: Covert Action. Hearings. vol. 7. Dec. 4 and 5, 1975.
94th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976.
10 House Select Committee on Intelligence. Hearings. Part 1.
"'U.S. Congress. Senate: Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With
Respect to Intelligence Activities. Intelligence Activities: The National Security Avncy
and Fourth Amendment Rights. Hearings. vol. 5. Oct. 29 and Nov. 6, 1975. 94th Cong..
1st seas. Washington. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976.


selected from interceptions the Agency conducted as part of its foreign
intelligence mission. Among the categories of individuals marked for
surveillance in this matter were: (1) about 30 Americans and about 700
foreign nationals and groups suspected by the CIA of extremist and
terrorist activities. (2) approximately 20 Americans who had traveled
to North Vietnam and were believed to be a link to possible foreign
influence on the antiwar movement. (3) about 450 Americans and 3.000
foreigners suspected of illegal drug activities by the BNDD, (4)
approximately 1S) American individuals and groups and 525 foreigO
nationals and groups suspected by the Secret Service of being a
danger to the President. and (5) about 1,000 American individuals
and groups and 1,700 foreign individuals and groups suspected by
the FBI of terrorist and extremist activity.12
In November, the Senate select committee disclosed the details of
Operation Shamrock, a secret program through which three interna-
tional telegraph companies, specifically, RCA. Global Communication's.
ITT World Communications, and Western Union International. pro-
vided the National SecurityAgency (NSA) with copies of the great
bulk of the international messages these companies sent from 1947 to
May 15, 1975, when the program was terminated by Secretary of
Defense James Schlesinger. Senator Frank Church. chairman of the
select committee, stated that it had been estimated that the "N.SA in
recent years selected about 1.50.000 messages a month for NSA analysts
to review." Senator Church also noted that FBI agents had reviewed
messages in the Wasliington offices of these throe, companies Somt
d(etailis of these activities were first publicly mentioned in late October
through a report by tlhe staff of the Government Information and
Individual Riglits Subcommittee of the House Government Operations
Committee. In his November testimony before the Senate Select Conm-
mittee, Attorney General Edward H. Levi expressed no conclusions
on the legality of Operation Slhamrock or on NSA's practice of moni-
toring overseas phone calls of U.S. citizens, noting that the matter was
currently under review by tlhe Justice Depart nent.13
Performance of tie intel7 qenee com m utty
During hearings before the House Select Committee on Intelligence
in September an(d October, testimony and evidence were received re-
n. testimony and "
Ia'rding the performance of the intelligence community prior to nota-
bl, international incidents. The post mortem report of the intelligence
community regarding the 1973 Middle East war stated, for example,
that "there was an intelligence failure in the weeks preceding the out-
breilk of war in the Middle East. on October 6. Those elements of tihe
intelligence coninniity responsible for the production of finished in-
telligence did not perceive thle growing possibility of an Arab attack
:i nd thus (1did not warn of its, imnimineince." In addition, tlhe intelligence
community, according to William G. Hviland of the State Depart-
ment, did not provide any "specific warning of tlhe coup on April 25,
1974. in Por'tugal." F ruIfherniore, the performance of the intelligence
community in connect ion with the 1974 Cyprus coup, in tlhe words of
t he itzllite ,.nce community's post mortem report, "fell quite short of
tle m,:rk." 14 In a sworn statement, released by tlhe House committee,
1 HIel'I.
iiouse Sl'.ct Committee on In lfllg ,n'.rr I[enrlnigsi Part 2.


former Ambassador to Greece Henry J. Tasca, stated that the CIA in
Greece had not informed him of a potential coup against Archbishop
Makarios, the President of Cyprus, before the coup occurred, even
though the CIA had received information that such a coup was possi-
ble.15 A former CIA analyst, Samuel A. Adams, charged that months
before the 1968 Tet offensive in Vietnam, U.S. intelligence "had de-
liberately downgraded the strength of the enemy army in order to
portray the Vietcong as weaker than they actually were." Adams added
that then CIA Director Richard Helms "fed the phoney figures" to
Congress prior to the Tet attacks stating that the strength of the
enemy was declining.16 These charges were disputed in December
hearings before the House committee by Defense Intelligence Agency
Director, Lt. Gen. Daniel 0. Graham and by CIA Director William E.
Colby. General Graham and Director Colby both stated that no con-
spiracy to coverup Vietcong strength had occurred and that Tet did
not represent an intelligence failure by U.S. intelligence agencies.17
Executive control of the intelligence comnm ?nrity
In testimony before the Senate select committee, in September, CIA
Director William E. Colby acknowledged that the CIA had, from
May 1952 until February 1970, operated a $3 million program to ex-
periment with and develop poisons and biochemical weapons, as well
as devices to administer them. This project, known as NKNAOMI,
was undertaken in conjunction with the Special Operations Division
of the Army Biological Laboratory at Fort Detrick, Md. Colby also
confirmed that the CIA had maintained a secret cache of deadly
poisons-one derived from cobra venom, the other a shellfish toxin-
in spite of a direct Presidential order that such materials be de-
stroyed. Richard M. Helms, former CIA head, testified that he had
issued an oral instruction to the appropriate CIA personnel that the
CIA's cache of poisons be destroyed in accordance with President
Nixon's 1969 and 1970 directives on the subject. Helms said he did not
follow up his oral directive with a written one. He assumed his order
had been carried out because CIA employees were trained to accept
oral commands as orders written in "blood." 18
The House Select Committee on Intelligcence received testimony in
October from James R. Gardner, a former liaison officer of the State
Department to the Forty Committee of the National Security Council,
that between April 1972 and December 1974, about 40 covert action
operations had been approved by the Forty Committee without a single
formal meeting of that group being held. The Forty Committee is the
NSC subcommittee charged with reviewing and making final recom-
mendations to the President concerning proposed covert action opera-
tions.. Gardner said that in place of formal meetings, the business of
the Forty Committee was conducted by telephone and telephone
votes. The decision to hold or riot to hold a formal meeting was made
Ibid., part 4.
16 Ibid., nart 2.
17 U.S. Congress. House: Select Committep on Intplligenep. U.S. Tntelligpnce Agenl.,s
and Activities: Risks and Control of Foreign Intelligence. Hearlnns. pt. 5. Nov. 4, 6:
Dec. 2-3. 9-12, and 17, 1975. 94th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Government Printing
Office. 1975.
18U.S. Congress. Senate: Select Committee To Study Governmentnl Operations With
Respect To Intelligence Activities. Intelligence Activities: Unauthorized Stornge of Toxic
Agents. Hearings, vo:. 1. Sept. 16. 17, 18, 1975. Washington. U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1976.


lhv the Forty Committee's Chairman-thle Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
later testified before the house select committee that every covert ac-
tion operation undertaken by U.S. agents is "personally approved by
t lie President." Tlhe Clhief Executive, Kissinexer said. receives "all the
decisions" of the Forty Committee for his "final determination." "
r0j1 ', i( 1, 01 ,o0Q/077 ,.qenPt tfYftrq proTram?. related to intelligence
In September, representatives of the Army, in testimony before the
TiiN(, t estlatj0j,-s Sulw(ojn Ij*ttpe Of t! e -" "1-
Investiations Suommittee of the ose Armed Services Committee,
liclo-ed tlint tlie Army had slurrel)titiouslv given LSD to servicemen
ii the course of druglr experimients conducted betweenn 1958 and 196"2
to determine the potential applications of the drug- in intelligence op-
eration-:. Dr. Van "[. Sim. former head of the Army's drug testing pro-
,ram-. testified in Septemlwr before a joint hearing of the Administra-
tive Practice and Procedure Subconmmnittee of the Senate Judiciary
Committee and the Health Subcommnittee of the Senate Labor and Pil)-
lic WVelfare Committee, that the Army was experimenting on soldiers
with : powerful drnz known as BZ as late as 19074. The subjects who
took the dnrg were never told what they would be taking or how it
might affect them. Dr. Sim added that few followip studies have been
Made on tlie individuals who took tlhe dr(g-s through tlhe program.
In September, Chlarles Senseny. a weapons expert who worked with
the Army's Special Operations Division at Fort Detrick. testified be-
fore tlhe Senate select committee that the unit carried out simulated
poison and germ attacks on tlhe New York sulwvay system and Gov-
erinlent installations such as the Pentagon and the White House. Tlie
attacks were carried out. said Senseny. in an effort to develop counter-
mreasres na.anst possible enemy use of poisons or zerm agents against
ilhe United Statep,.20 It wNsa revealed in November in testimniony before a
joint h]WeaTrin! of the Administrntive Practice anl Proced res Subcom-
mittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee and tlie tHealthl SIbcommit-
tee, of tle Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee, that (drur
;ddict. u11dler._oinl" rehlal)ilitation at the National Institute of M3ental
,,:i It i w' i Adietiont Research Center in Lexingrton. Kv., we re rewarded
with payments in narcotics in return for their participation in CTA-
funde(d ru-,Lr exl)riments. The prora was funded by tlhe( CIA under
the cover of the Office of Naval ResearchI from 19 lto 19053. and through
(itlher CTA arrInllrveniits from 1953 to 19"2. wlien thle program was
ternminated. Altlio|iil!i the expl)eriments with hallucinogenic (driuts in-
volved vol lmite(es wlio had knowledge.e of tlhe fact t liat tlhev were hlav-
in I dnils administered to them. tlhe" also included hundreds of un-
witting sul)jects as well.
(1..I ad n.'. organ;.zaton.s
In testimony before the THoise select committee, CIA Director
W1illii:a E. ( 'olby ackiiowlehdged that tlie CTA employs as informants
:1) ro l1 part-tilme corres)opo(dle-lts of major Aerican news-gatherin.,
nrmtizatios. "I'liese ('A inforiianil s include free-lfince television and
19 'uisr Sflpr't Oiminit tpob on Iiintlllivnr'e. Inrings. Pt 2.
Si,.iiit, Si. li.'t ('rIninlltt? r T ,i Study (Govrinne*intal Olirri mtli W ith Resppct to Inltlli-
L' if't, Actlvlties. Hearings. Vol. 1.


radio correspondents as well as part-time writers for various news-
papers and magazines. Colby added, however, that the CIA did not
employ any full-time staff correspondents of U.S. news-gathering
Intelligence agencies and the Internal Revenue Service
Donald C. Alexander, IRS Commissioner, testified before the Senate
select committee in October that the CIA and the FBI had used the
Internal Revenue Service to harass political activist, groups. Alexander
also confirmed that the IRS Special Services Staff had a watch list
of groups and individuals for possible income tax audits. Individuals
on the IRS list included former Senators Charles Goodell and Ernest
Gruening; civil rights leaders Jesse Jackson and Coretta King;
columnists Joseph Alsop and Jimmy Breslin. and former New York
Mayor John Lindsey. Organizations on the IRS list included the Na-
tional Education Association, the American Jewish Committee, As-
sociated Catholic Charities. the NAACP, the American Civil Liberties
Union, the John Birch Society, and the Ford Foundation.22 In August,
Commissioner Alexander told the House select committee that the In-
ternal Revenue Service had ended its generalized intelligence activities
in January 1975. He added, however, that it was his view that controls
over the distribution of tax return information among Government
agencies were too lax and should be strengthened through new
FBI counterintelligence and suri'ilclance arti lites
In July, FBI Director Clarence M. Kelley acknowledged at a press
conference that the Federal Bureau of Investigation had for many
years engaged in "surreptitious entries" of private premises in the
United States for the purpose of "securing information relative to
the security of the Nation." Kelley confirmed also that the FBI had
broken into foreign Embassies in the United States for "counter-
intelligence" purposes. In September, the Senate select committee
disclosed that the FBI from 1942 until April 1968, had committed at
least 238 illegal burglaries against 14 "domestic subversive targets."
At least three other such domestic targets were subjected to numerous
break-ins from October 1952 until June 1966. FBI witnesses also told
the Senate select committee in October that for 26 years, from 1940-
1966, the FBI had opened and read mail in eight c(ities-New Yorlk.
Washington, Miami, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Detroit. Seattle. and
Boston-apparently without the approval of the Attorney General
and without a warrant from a court. The purpose of this prog -;i,
said IV. Raymond Wannell, Assistant FBI Director for the Intel-
ligence Division, was to aid in the location of potential spies.24
In November and Decemnber, the House ailid Senate select comn-
mittees heard detailed testimony regarding various county intelligence
-' House Select Committee on Tntelltgence. HTarinws. Pt. 5.
'.TT.S. Conres. Senate .Sel'et Commitrr-p To Stnily Go 'rnnmontal Opor:itlons Withi
Rrspeet To Intelligence Aetivitips. lntellivence Activities: Internal Rl venue Service. Tli'n:r-
in-,s. vol. 3. Oct. 2; 1975. 94th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Guvterntiitment i''ii i.i;
Office. 197(.
23 House Select Committoee on Intellizenr'. Hoarini.-. Pt. 1.
2- "Snate Sel'ct ('ommittie To Study Guvt'riinmeultal Operatins. With ,Nl-qU Ct to
Intelligence Activities." Hearing-s. vol. 4.

74 '--


efforts of the FBI.25 The Senate select committee received testimony
during November regarding an FBI program, in effect since 1961, to
discredit the late Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.-a program which, in
the words of FBI Assistant Deputy Director James Adams, had no
"statutory basis or justification." In December, thlie Senate select com-
mittee heard a report from its staff, based on FBI documents and
testimony of various witnesses, which held that the FBI had been
used for political purposes from the Presidency of Franklin D.
Roosevelt to that of Richard M. Nixon. The report recounted evidence
that the FBI had-for Presidential political ends-conducted wire-
taps, supplied secret dossiers, and engaged in physical surveillance of
Str'lategic a n ms linitation talks and intelligence
On December 2, 1975, former Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral
Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., testified before the House select committee
that Secretary of State Kissinger had been less than candid with the
President and Congress regarding what Zumwalt asserted were "gross
violations" by the Soviet Union of the 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation
Agreement (SALT I). Zumwalt also charged that U.S. intelligence
analysts had been denied access to important data by U.S. l)olicy-
makers (luring the period prior and subsequent to the signing of tlhe
SALT I agreement-making their jobs all the more difficult. Zum-
walt's testimony was challenged before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee the following day by former Defense Secretary James
Schlesinger, and by Secretary of State Kissinger in a December 9
S c h l e s i n g e r ,.e 5
press conference. At a later date, the House select committee received
the testimony of CIA Deputy Director Edward Proctor that certain
documents regarding Soviet compliance with the SALT agreements
had been withheld by Mr. Kissinger from certain administration
officials, including Secretary of State William Rogers.27


kAs 1975 ended, the House and Senate select committee began pre-
paring their final reports and reconimmendations.2s The Senate Gov-
.ern-iient O1perat iolns Coiimittee in mid-Decellber scheduled hearings
for Jiniary 1976 to Consider legislative proposals to oversee the intel-
ligence community. In view of the issues raised during the months
of p)llblic hearing rs before the two select committees, it seems likely
that the Conress in 1976 will be confronted with a number of choices
related to oversight of the UT.S. intelligence community-once all of
the final reports and recommendations are filed and released. The fol-
15 I S. Congress:
JIYone" Sdel.rt romniittoe on Tnti.lIgnnerp. "UT.S. Intelligence Agencies and Activities:
ILnm1-sti, TInti-lig.nce I'rogrnims." H',aringH. plit. 3. Oct. 9; Nov. 13. 18. and Dec. 10,
9"77,. 94th ',iig.. 1st ss,4.. Wnshlnuton. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975.
Siiin:at' : Sri.-fi (' ii ntltcP 'jo Study <;\v'frnmentril Operations With Respect to Intelli-
g.ii, A,.\v tivtl,. "lint 'lllircn vr Act i vltis: Federal Burenn of Investigation." IHenr-
Ini-. vol. n. Niv. 1,. 19, lIve. 2. 3. 9. 10. and 11, 1975. 94th Cong.. 1st sess.,
Wii-'ilnitin. I'.S. GoverniiniPnt I'rintlng Officef. 1i97(6.
SS'Tiiiti. (omnittri 11 To Study (;ovwriinm'ntnl Olprntlons With Respect to Intelli.
rfg n.-. Actlvitivs. n .rings. vol. 6.
z7. liiimim. St'lect (',ipinflil f t o 4in IntlligR'n'r. IIecIrlngs, pt. 5.
''li'h fIMinl rl',minir dintio nas of the Ilotnis selv'et commlttpe werp fild on Feb. 11. 1976.
U.S. ('oiniigr.-.. llo.- Selert c',iimintt v on InlelligPnee. Recommendations of the finnil
ril-rt tf fli. lhii,.. Si.lct Criiinltti oin Intelllm enric,. lursuant to H. Rs. 591. Feb. 11.
V17; II1111 I{.Reit. No. i4 I8 ::. !9-t1th Coni., 2d1 sv-s. W'ishligton. U'.S. Government Printlnz
Oflli,'r. 1T971;. 291 pp. T'lhie Sonimte mileN t committee's finnl reomnmendlatlons and report
wri- filed on Apr. 26 and 2.. 1976 (S. Rept. 94-755).


lowing are some of the more important issues and subject areas that the
Congress may address.
Intelligence 0 oversight Committee
Congressional oversight of the intelligence community has generally
been the responsibility of the Appropriations and Armed Services
Committees of the House and Senate. In October 1974, the House
expanded this oversight responsibility by adopting House Resolu-
tion 988, which included a provision giving the Committee on For-
eign Affairs (now the Committee on International Relations) the
special oversight function of "reviewing and studying, on a con-
tinuing basis, all laws, programs, and Government activities deal-
ing with or involving * intelligence activities relating to foreign
policy * ." Since the passage of the Hughes-Ryan amendment
to the Foreign Assistance Act in 1974, the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee has participated in the formalized review of CIA
covert action operations along with the other intelligence oversight
In the wake of the investigations by the House and Senate select
committees, the Congress is likely to be asked to consider changes
in the current oversight arrangement. Possible changes could be
the establishment of either a joint intelligence oversight committee
or an oversight committee for one or both Houses. Should the Con-
gress or either House decide to establish such a committee, a num-
ber of issues would have to be resolved in the process. Congress
or the individual Houses would have to determine the. appropriate
size of such a committee as well as what the permissible tenure
of service of committee members should be. The jurisdiction of
such a committee over agencies of the U.S. intelligence community
will also have to be determined. Should this jurisdiction, for exam-
ple, be limited to U.S. foreign intelligence agencies or extended to
include domestic intelligence units as well? Should such a commit-
tee have legislative jurisdiction and authorization authority over
the agencies within its purview? Should such a committee have ex-
clusive legislative, authorization, and oversight jurisdiction over the
intelligence community, or should it share these authorities with
other standing committees in the House and Senate? If the Con-
gress or either House decides to establish a new oversight committee
arrangement, it seems likely that standards will have to be de-
veloped to govern disclosure of classified information by Members
who serve on any new committee that is created. Such standards
would undoubtedly address the means by which classified informa-
tion could be released to other Senators and Members of Congress.
or the public at large.
Covert action operations of the CIA
A major point of controversy during recent vears has been covert
action operations of the Central Intelligence Agency. In light of
the revelations regarding CIA activities in this area, it is possible
that it will be recommended that current procedures governinm" noti-
fication of the appropriate congressional committees (as required
by section '42, of the Foreipn Assistance Act of 1961 as amended)
be changed. It may be recommended that a new oversight committee
be given the statutory right to a comprehensive briefing on each


proposed CIA foreign covert action operation prior to its initiation.
it may further be recommended that such an oversight committee
have the authority to disclose to the Senate and/or to the House, CIA
,ovrt action operations it believes should be terminated should they
be initiated over the objections of the committee. The Congress will
certainly be asked to determine whether or not the assassination of
foreign officials, the entering into a conspiracy to do so, or the attempt
to assassinate such an official by U.S. citizens should be made a crim-
J nal offense.
IZ/1C.11i'etcc CO community budget
In view of thle controversy that lhas developed in recent months
OverT tlhe intelligence community's budget and the uses to which it
i. put. it is possible that legislation will be recomlmended to change
the budgetary process currently in effect for intelligence groups.
eC.pecially tlhe CIA. This may be done in an effort to facilitate greater
ove1irght of such units by both the Congress as a whole and any new
oveii,,glit committee that may be created. It may be proposed, for
eNIiIi)l'. thlat an al- niual authorization of tihe national intelligence
c(iiiiii i lity budget be required, including direct votes on it in secret
.se.-ions of the House and/or the Senate. Restrictions on the ability
of t le. CIA. to reprogram or transfer funds for its use from other
aITconts-. 's well as checks on tihe authority of tlhe CIA Director
to expencd funds for tlhe CIA on his own certificate, may also be rec-
(omii(ndied. Should Congress determine that an annual authoriza-
tion of the national intelligence community budget be required, it
will nerd to establish specific guidelines to govern access to and use
of 1this ILudget ary data by Members of both Houses.
I!P or,' n/, ;.zeiob. of the bfi7dl7g/ ehce co mm u1n/y
To define more clearly tlhe missions and permissible activities of
1l.e CIA, NSA, and other agencies of the U.S. intelligence com-
Iuiinitv, and thus facilitate oversight of such matters in the future,
the Congress niay be asked to amend the statutory charter of tlhe
CIA annd to legislate new charters for other intelligence units.. To
promote greater efficiency and to eliminate unne('essary duplication
of effort within the intelligence community, a general reorganiza-
tioi of it, may be proposed, including a redefinition of the position
of the Director of C(e.tral Intelligen(e and thle powers and respon-
sihilities that inhere in it.
T'ie above issues and subject areas are illustrative of the scope of
cloie,., in the intelligence oversight areas that face the Congress
19- 1'70 commences. Problems in this area are exceedingly complex
:,,]1 t ley will ,undoubtedly require intensive examination and debate
to ,'.nlve saitisfavtorily. Yet an important step toward that reso-
lution wlis t:ike, in 1975 through thle wide-ranging use of congres-
sio ,ial iII vest i.,al i Iv.e lPOw rs.

The Debate Over U.S. Policymaking System and the
Congressional Role in Foreign Policy

Introduction--------------- ---------------------------------------- 31
Study commission proposals for reorganization---__- ---- 32
Changes in congressional organization---------------------------- 36
CONGRESS AND WAR POWERS ------------------------------- ----------39
Presidential compliance with the War Powers Resolution -------__ 40
Inclusion of U.S. civilian combatants under the War Powers Resolu-
tion-------------------------------------------------------- 43
Legislative proposals------------------------------------------- 45
Implementation of the Case-Zablocki Act-------------- 48
Review of specific agreements-------------------------------50
Turkish aid controversy----------- ------------------54
The Jackson-Vanik amendment--- ------------------- 60


The years since the height of U.S. involvement in Vietnam have
produced a reaction in Congress to a perceived imbalance between
the Congress and the executive branch in foreign policy decisiominak-
ing. A majority of the Congress has agreed that efforts must be made
to reestablish and strengthen the congressional voice in foreign pol-
icy; passage of the War Powers Act (1973), the Case-Zablocki Execu-
tive Agreements Act (1972), specific policy directives such as the Jack-
son-Vanik amendment (1974) and the Turkish aid cutoff (1975), and
various other legislative actions to require increased executive branch
reporting in order to facilitate congressional oversight, respond to this
This section of Congress and Foreign Policy 1975 attempts to look
at the issues which, in 1975, were pivotal in the effort to redefine the
relationship of Congress to the executive branch in foreign policy-
making. For instance, in an attempt to deal more efficiently and effec-
tively with foreign policy issues, the House International Relations
Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee have both
reorganized subcommittee structures. Other proposals for reform of
the congressional foreign policymaking structure were made by a con-
gressionally appointed Commission on the Organization of the Gov-
ernment for the Conduct of Foreign Policy (the Murphy Commis-
sion.) Many of the Commission's recommendations, however, have
not been implemented.
In 1975, the reporting requirements of the War Powers Resolu-
tion were invoked on four occasions, with some questions raised as to
the extent to which the act did permit greater congressional involve-
ment in the decisionmaking process. Congress also reviewed its role
regarding executive agreements and considered various legislative
proposals to increase its oversight of such agreements.
Congressional efforts to reassert foreign policymaking prerogatives
resulted in at least two instances in the passage of legislation specifical-
ly affecting U.S. policy toward particular countries. The issues of U.S.
aid to Turkey and the linkage of U.S. trade concessions with Soviet
emigration policies provoked controversy with the administration,
which tends to see the congressional foreign policy role as one of in-
fluencing policy rather than making it.


Congress" concern about assuming a more responsible role in foreign
policy in recent years has directed increased attention to ways in
which congressional performance in foreign policymaking is related
to congressional organization. This concern for organization in 1975
produced a substantial number of proposals for reorganization, but
rather limited actions to implement these proposals. A congressionally
appointed Commission on the Organization of Government for tlie
Conduct of Foreign Policy 1 (referred to as the Murphy Commission
,fter its Chairman. Robert D. Murphy) made its report in June 1975;
its proposals for both congressional and executive branch reorganiza-
tion focuiied primarily on tlhe increasing relationship between inter-
nattional economic and political affairs. Reorganization proposals made
by the Congress itself have related to such matters as intelligence
oversight and the possibility of establishing a Joint Committee on
National Security, and reorganization of existing committee and sub-
commnittee striictuires.

i[u rpkiy Co! corn m? ...ofl,
The Commission onl thile Organization of the Government for tlhe
Conidluct of Foreign Policy was established by the Congress in 1972
to study ways bv which the executive and legislative branches make
anld implelvlent, foreign policy. Congressional interest in the report's
re,1e10iiie(ndiations wvas mliinial inll 1975: n11o coillmlittee conducted hear-
ings on tle Collmmissimon relpot. and only isolated references have been
lm1(de to its specific recommendations.
The onlv recommendation m1ad,1e by tlhe Murp)hy Commission to re-
'ceive ('conIressional action called for including teli Secretary of tile
Tis',' 1 s a. stat aitIry 11('i1il]er of the NXa io il1 Sec'rity (Concil. Tei
i16,1i1r. 11S. _.,.0, by Issed bv the Send; te mi October i), 1975, and by
ille fos 1e o, Dec)('e('lI)(.r 17, 19715. It wAIs sii slpient\lv vetoed by Presi-
d('nt Ford (S. Do%, 94-14.5, Jn.1. 1 97), )wi o argued that enactiment
of l,. h.,.i -1t i,)n is 'ne:.ccs.:'y .i'y because tlhe President has tile autimor-
it\ to invite the Secreti:ry of tile Trea.-iury to participate in Council
;flirirts whenm is.- ines of >iili.-laiital inteite!4 to tli 'IDresi.-ii Departmiient
;r.e involved. T'1, Se,.it, ove' Vrold e tlie Pre-id(elft il veto) oin Janiuary
2". 197(; :is ()f thiis wmitilir tlie ]lbise lfia! not cosidered tlhe matter.
IThle two sect ions of tif'e Murphly Cmoin mission report dealing specif-
ically withi (onare~i'il part iciplit io)j in foreigin policvInak iug out-
line recm iii'll]idlal M s1 to e(''t c(',gressioal res.l(, i:iliity i two iM -
l 'r'-iuirod Iy (Gnlp A. NMnttox. annl.vst In Intrnntlmnnal relatiolm.
'U S. 0mmiii.-li,.i oil 1h1. Org unnlzn/i of ih, Gnv,'rnnmint for thie C ndmiuct of Fnrelcrn
PjIllhy. (Iriport) June, 19 75. W sli liigton. U'.S. Gu.vernment P'rinting Offl e. 1975. 27S plip.


mediate challenges to U.S. foreign policy: Increasing international
economic and physical interdependence, and the resultant merging of
domestic and foreign policy issues.
The Commission maintained that the Congress has too long deferred
to and allowed its powers to be usurped by the executive branch, and
it cited a survey of Members of Congress that indicated dissatisfaction
with Congress' diminished role in foreign policy. The Commission
expressed the belief that the security of the Nation requires that Con-
,ress and the executive branch resolve foreign policy issues through
"shared participation and responsibility." Although the Commission
recognized that the executive branch must conduct U.S. relations with
other countries. Congress and the executive do share important respon-
sibilities in foreign affairs: War powers, the appointive process, and
treaty powers. And only Congress has the power to regulate foreign
commerce, an increasingly important responsibility.
To facilitate the effective legislative/executive sharing of responsi-
bilitv the Commission:
(1) Endorsed the War Powers Resolution and encouraged both
the executive branch and the Congress to adhere to its spirit of
(2) Recommended that a. statement of national commitment be
adopted by a congressional concurrent resolution to assure that
any promise to use armed force in defense of a foreign country
result from a treaty, statute, or concurrent resolution approved
by both the legislative, and executive branches;
(3) Proposed that to curtail excess of executive authority, all
national einerrencies and statutes delegating emergency powllrs
should conform to the National Emergencies Act, all existing
formal states of national emergency should be terminated and
in the future, declared emergencies should contain provisions for
(4) Asserted that the flow of information within the Govern-
ment should be as free as possible, all unnecessary classification
procedures be terminated, ;nd a more comprehensive system of
classification be enacted, with oversight and maintenance of this
system of classification performed by a Joint Committee on
National Security;
(5) Urged the Senate to continue to demand that all appointed
foreign policy officials possess the necessary qualifications for their
positions; and
(6) Encouraged the Congress to exercise more effective review
and oversight through report )ack requirements for executive
testimony and reports, thus encouraging more executive/le2islIa-
tire cooperation.
Whiile the Commission acknowledged that Congress had made "sub-
stantial progress" in many of these areas, it offered the above recom-
mendations to qualify or strengthen the advances already made.
The Commission then turned its attention to recom nnwendations for
cGngressional organization and procedures. The Commission report
concluded that it is necessary that the House International Relations
Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee have broad
jurisdictional flexibility on foreign policy issues, particularly in the
consideration of economic questions that may have implications for


foreign policy. It expressed general approval of the Senate's jurisdic-
tional responsibilities, but proposed a review of the Senate subconmmit-
tee -Y>(eli. Tlhe Commission was. more critical of the House and
recommended that the House Banking and Currency Committee and
the International Relations Committee have concurrent legislative
oversight of international financial organizations and that the Inter-
national Relations Committee broaden its oversight functions in trade
policy islu(s, particularly over reciprocal tariff agreements. The Com-
mission report endorsed the full utilization of subcommittees and joint
he:ariLgs to coordinate congressional action in the foreign policy field.
Specifically, the Commission proposed that the Foreign Relations
and International Relations Committees be afforded the opportunity
to review and comment on tlhe budget estimates made by the appro-
priations committees to determine the foreign policy implications, if
any, of the estimates. These two committees should also be represented
on thl budget committees of both Houses. To expedite the authoriza-
tion process the Commission suggests that authorization bills be
limited to genlleral expenditure and that more detailed review peri-
odically be made of permanent legislation or multiyear authorizations
with focus on the long-term effectiveness of programs. The Congress
might also consider combining authorizations and appropriations into
a single process handled by House-Senate "program committees."
Tlhe Commission felt that more evaluation and review of major
prograiii,,s and policy were necessary. The report of tihe Commnis--ion
al.-o recoi1miended that:
-There be a central congressional repository for written reports
supplied to Congress by executive agencies, and a system of secu-
rity classification be developed by the. Joint Committee on Na-
tional Security;
-A part of the Congressional Researchl Service focus steadily on
issues to which Congress as a whole accords high priority, llnder
tle guidance of the Joint Committee on Congressional Operations;
-'liere 1)be improved reporting procedures and accounting of inter-
national progcrail1 in which the United States participate,;
-Tlie Joint Conmmittee on Congresional Operations develop Letter
resvearchl facilities, including thIe periodical publication of a snni-
innry of (ongre,;sional foreign affairs research interests; 1ie more travel by teams of members to review international
pi'ra and at repl)orting procedure for tlhe'e trips be enconur-
:iged '; a1l that
-Public :i w reness of congressional activities le increased via tele-
visd t A ri ,rs.
11' iijo rit y of the Murph N Comiissioii() *s revcomiimliendations a'cti-
ally .:', \ili tl l i i(r:io of foreign iItY.lirs withlinl tl(I exec'f-
tie', br'ancl. 1BIvec'ai,, thl,. (Cnstitultion ,.oinfrs III(. 1)ri1;1i'1Nv responlsi-
lilitv\ for Ilie cm'idiit of fo.i.icr.l l ic on1 lie it is essenltial
tlia:i lie I ;ive ii Wo IIMeteIt s(t:i(' a I ) le to a;- .-- all issues witli foreig-n
IMoli'V iIpli,)titiu. TI.10e ,('1 a n State D)epalrtmieuit, are assign.
r..,, ii,-ihilii fvfor t11 *is fil ictio, IBut ;1s till- scope of foreign )polic'
irC,.i',I -.- to ri.lin ,.I '.tl'ciiv lt(-.'-t srii'tir'i n .s-t 'receive l'1ore input
fi,0 t11er ti ic' f c(,. t: i ie, n in forei,, plicr,.y iille. Stc int l-
I lie i rlijijxl ioordinvtiof 1 will bvcoisse inr( 1resuinglyss iiiportnt wiitl
Ihc rovin^con~ilxi(v o gllisl isue., he 'oi n]ift maint,-ined~.


To maintain an integrated approach to foreign policy as the eco-
nomic issues become more complex, the Commission proposed a cen-
tral coordinating role for the State Department in economic policy-
making with international implications. However, two Comini.nion
members, Senator Mansfield and Mrs. Engelhard did not concur with
this recommendation according to the State Dtepartmient responsil)lity
for the coordination of foreign economic issues. In appendixes to the
Commission report, they acknowledged the growing importance of
economic issues to foreign policy discussion, but suggested that all
aspl)ects of economic policy remain under the responsibility of the Sec-
retary of the Treasury, whom they felt to be best qualified.
The Commission further advised involving other agencies in the
foreign economic policy decisions )by broadening the NSC to allow
more debate on economic issues, organizing several advi-ory boards
with members drawn both from within the Government and from
the. private sector to advise on economic policy matters, and requiring
greater economic expertise in the Foreign Service and throughout the
In its recommendations for improving congressional /executive rela-
tions, the Commission stressed cooperation in the flow of information
and communication between as well as within branches. Improved
cooperation, the Conmmission reported, is particularly important, with
regard to executive agreements, emergency powers, and executive priv-
ilege. To improve congressional participation in foreign affairs, the.
Commission study proposed a Joint Committee on National Security.
In te Iigence o V ( -.8 ght proposals
Proposals for reform of congressional oversiglit of intelligence activ-
ities were contained in the report to the President by the Commission
on CIA Activities Within the United States (the Rockefeller Com-
mission) and the Murphy Commission reports, and they were also
made by the House and Senate Select Committees on Intelligence. For
a detailed review of these recommendations, see pp. 26-28.
Joint Committee on National Security
Several Members of Congress have periodically introduced legis-
lation to coordinate the foreign affairs activities of both Houses of
Congress through the creation of a Joint Committee on National
Security, and the Murphy Commission also recommended establish-
ment of such a committee. Proponents of the measure argue that a
joint committee could improve congressional effectiveness in the area
of foreign affairs through better coordination of the two foreign
affairs committees, and the Murphy Commission recommended that
a Joint Committee on National Security "could perform for the Con-
gress'the kinds of policy review and coordination now performed in
the executive branch by the National Security Council, and provide
a central point of linkage to the President and the officials nt the
There has been considerable opposition to the proposal for a joint
committee. In supplemental remarks to the report of the M.urphv Com-
mission, Commission member, Senator Mike Mansfield objected to the
recommendation, arguing that a joint committee might not only de-
2Commission on the Organization of Government for the Conduct of Foreign Pollry.
p. 208.


crease the authority and power of existing standing committees, but
could become a "supercommittee" and fall under the influence of
the executive branch, thereby reducing rather than increasing con-
.ressional authority for national security affairs.

Coillerftce s,'u.tu1re
Per-lhaps the most important changes in 197'5 relating to congressional
'e:i-i rtioii of its role in foreign policvmwaking involved reorganization
Of the Foreign Affairs Committees of botli Houses. The House Com-
mittee on Internationial Rlelations (previously the House Committee
4) Foreign Aflairs. with name calag(ed by IT. Res. 163 in March 1975)
repl.a( *' its geo'r.phic subcommittees with functional subcommittees.
The revised structure is designed "to deal more effectively with the
lniljo)r iilternaitional problems which are increasingly global in nature-
.-11C1 ;Is energy and food shortages and international trade."' The
follov"inL sl '(,lbcommittt-tees weri e (estallislhed: Oversight: International
Sec iulitv and Scielitific Affairs; International Operations; Interina-
tliol:il Political: ai1d Miliitary AfIbaii-s; Intermatioal Resources, Food
;iid Energyv: Intei iialiomal Economic Policy; International Orgami-
.;ioi.-:- ad111 Inter nti0l al Tnaide and Commerce. In addition, a Spe-
ci;il Sub'coniniittee on Investig(ations was createde, as well as a Special
iullilmlittee ,on F1tue1 Foi)reigni Policy Researc aind Development.
The c.,111(,es in thle comlIittee's suicomittttee structure were also
intended to help the International Relations Committee deal effec-
tively vwith its (expallded juris(lictional responsibilities. The Commit-
tfee Reform Amliendmle)(,ts of 1974 (II. Res. 9qq, adopted Oct. 8, 1974)
l.i':deiind tile jurisdi.tion of tfie International Relations Committee
to include jilrisdiction| over international commodity agreements and
int,0i'Atioiial t trade nnd trade with enemy, export controls, interna-
tio:iii1 ,i':tio,,. :;nd nondolnlcstmic aspects of Public Law 480. The
(ou ,,itffe :i1,so a'nve lup) jhirisdlicti)n over international fisliii"I agree-
Hirnt- :1,1!i interirition:il fitinnaci:l alnd mnmietary orw-nizations (de
fH,'to ),-.I , ilit v fr wli ic I had aI'eadv len1,Il exercised )lv tlhe Iouse
(' iiiiiitt,, oil Bin Ii,:, Currency and ITosi.,n), 1mt it did maintain
Jon)l.,ii-i1; itve ovt' i, lit ;v utlio'it for t ese a en-;s.
'1'he S,"it, ,(e F'i,' Rl-Iatio4t.- C1omnittee vo(e(l in FIelNi1: Nrv" 1975
to : 1i-li1di- distintii-14 i let\\ i,')isultaii\,'. sthudlv or oversigrlfht, alnd
::(1 1-#). mii ii ittles Thlie comlImiitte'(s s1i)COih1il ittcf v-t iiture now in-
,I.~,fi- Iive 11 ,'ion;,1 ;imd four fmctijol al s",,,olnllitlevs: Afjrlian Af-
f:iir-: Ari's Coti'rol, TIt.rn;itiointl OrgaIlizations, and Seciurity
PC1 ~I 14' its E: 1. I wn It ~Ii A ffbi i I- Fi t' L I(lAffiiS ir()'CEIl A qqict -
.\ ,,.nts: F'l, rof,,,nn .\ff:iir : F";,r l 1s1ern Affaiirs: Foreign .ssi.t-
:i,< ,' ild lo.oinic Poli, y.: Nulti a tiolml Corptortios,: Ner Ea stern
:l'dl "oItII .\ 11i: A 11l I l',-: Oc,,:t s .Ind Inteti ualifolal Environment;
aNll Ave'fT1I1 I e1-6s1p1vler Affliirs. The Foreign Relat ions Committee
tr':,, ci,-idei l',i:l.- tioi. I Iredi,'i.. In d nll *Vi1ntlIons only in
rnill ,,,iiiitt,., witlh siil,, mmilittee fliu ctiot ) lln, |' allv confined to
,,\ci;.-lit. Iftowever, tlie Sui),co,, itt,,ee on Forei,'n Assistance and
l.I'oii, i, Poliyv \v:is assisted legi:Clat iv juri -diction for foreign
Cinicr,,'- Tiit,. : rInmtinlttpp on Forrlgn Affairs. Presq relrase. Morgan nnnoincs
fn w I'P, r,.l'.:n AfTilIr-4 ('-miiinl I f.. slrut-tlir(. F"-h :1. 19!75.

economic and military assistance programs, foreign military sales
programs, and U.S. participation in multilateral assistance programs
and international lending institutions.
Both the Senate and the House increased the size of committee staffs
during 1975 to accommodate the increasing responsibilities and re-
search needs of Congress in all areas, including foreign affairs. Senate
Resolution 60 allows each Senator not already assigned a committee
staff member to hire one staff person for each major committee onl
which he serves. The Committee Reform Amendments of 1974 in-
creased all House committee staffs from 6 to 18 positions. One-third
of these staff personnel are designated minority staff, but may be
detailed to general committee work when necessary.
The House International Relations Committee rules for the 94th
Congress state that all committee and subcommittee meetings and(
markup sessions, except those relating to internal budget or personnel
matters, shall be open to the public.4 In some instances, hearings and
markup sessions were held simultaneously, with administration wit-
nesses available to answer questions during the markup. While some
observers have criticized this procedure for remov-ingo the actual give-
and-take involved to more informal settings away from the public eye
and for increasing the potential for executive branch influence oni
committee decisions, it must be noted that public access to markups
means that members' positions on legislation in the formative stages
are part of the public record.
Joint referrals of legislation
The increasing interrelationship of foreign and domestic policy
issues has resulted in increased use, in both the House and Senate,
of joint or consecutive referral procedures. The House Committee
Reform Amendments of 1974 authorized tlhe Speaker to refer bills
to more than one committee, either through joint or consecutive re-
ferrals, or by dividing a bill into various parts. For example, the
Rhodesian chrome bill (H.R. 1267) was referred sequentially to the
International Relations and Armed Services Committees, while the
Comprehensive Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation Act (I.R.
9294) was referred jointly to the International Relations, Merchant
Marine and Fisheries, and Public Works and Tran.sportation
The Senate has used joint and consecutive referral procedures for
some time, and made frequent use of them in 1975. For example,
S. 2607, to repeal the embargo on U.S. trade with Northl and South
Vietnam, was referred jointly to the Forei( 'ln Relations and IBanldking
Housing, and Urban Affairs Committees, and the International Food
and Development Assistance Act (H.R. 9005) was referred consecu-
tively to the Foreign Relations and Agriculture Committees. Aks ;
result of these joint referrals, conference committees have included
representatives of involved committees. The conferelice committee onil
H.R. 9005, for example, included members of the House International
Relations Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations and Agricul-
ture Committees.
4 Meeting. can he floed if a qunorum of the committee or subcommittee. in open se'sonr.
determines by rolleall vote that alnil or part of a day's meetings shall ho .l<,'(>i. Commnittee
stnff P-tiiates that less than 10 percent of committee meetings were hlI in cli-edi session
In 1975.


Con flimnation process
Through the power of confirmation, tlhe Congress. and the Senate in
particular, is able to influence the choice of policymakers who advise
the President in foreign policy decisions and may be influential in
determining tlhe direction of U.S. foreign policy. In the Senate, the
Foreign Relations Committee has imposed an informal reporting re-
quir(lemllent on nominees submitted by the executive branch for confir-
mations. All nominees proposed by the executive branch are requested
to submit a statement agreeing to thle National Commitments Reso-
lution (S. Res. 91-S)5 and providing information on political con-
t ril utions and any possible conflicts of interest.
The Assistant to tlhe President for National Security Affairs is cur-
rently not subject to Senate confirmlationj. Thle influential role that
Secretary Kissinger assumed while occupyiig this position lias caused
concern by some Melmbers of Cong-ress. 'ThIe -.lurphy omissionin also
expressed concern over the situation and proposed that thllis position
not be occupied by an individual with other official resl)oisibilities.
James Stanton incorporated many of these comierlns iii I1.lL. 11342.
initrodured on Deceeinber 19, 1971. ali ( recomlimeiilded tlhe estlalishlent
of the position of Special Assistant to tlie Pr-sildeit for National SecIu-
rity Affairs. This Special Assistant would advise tlie PIresidet on the
"coordination and integration of domestic, foreiigi military, a id other
policies relating to the national secur'ity."I He would 1be subject to Sen-
ate confirmation, thus allowing tlhe ('olgress limited influence and
oversight in the conduct of his responsibiltie.. Fiiially, the Special
Assistant would not be permitted to hold ,iiy otlier Federal ollice or
serve on active or reserve duty in the Armed F1orces.
5 Thi resolution (detinns a national commitment as thep use of the Armed Forces of the
V'ie.1 States on foreign territory, or a promise to assist a foreign country. governuiiiint.
(r ,,i'Tilf, by the us orf the Armed Forces or financial resources of the United Stnt,,s. Tlih
rf-liiution maintains that a national commitment by the United States results ouly from
afliriative action taken by thle executive and legislative branches of the IU.S. Girv.riiinlnt
by means of a treaty, statute, or concurrent resolution of both Houses of" Cont,'e,: .pciti-
cally providing for such commitment.


The War Powers Resolution (Public Law 93-148), frequently re-
garded as a symbol of congressional resurgence in foreign policy, was
partially implemented on four occasions in 1975, and was discussed
in relation to U.S. involvement in the Sinai peace force and U.S.
paramilitary involvement in Angola. In each instance when the
resolution was actually implemented (the evacuations of U.S. and
foreign nationals from Danang, Phnom Penh, and Saigon, and
the .3ayagucz. incident), the executive branch complied with the
law's section 4 reporting requiremeneiits and notified Congress of the
actions taken regarding the use of U.S. forces. Subsequently, a House
International Relations Subcommittee held hearings to evaluate ex-
ecutive branch compliance with the War Powers Resolution.1 In
addition, the Subcommittee on International Political and Military
Affairs of the House International Relations Committee also con-
ducted hearings (May 14 and 15, June 12 and 25, July 25 and 31, and
Sept. 12, 1975) on the seizure of the Mayaguez and factors involved
in the executive branch decision to use force to retrieve the vessel.2
and requested that the General Accounting Office undertake a de-
tailed study of the seizure and U.S. diplomatic and military attempts
to secure release of the ship and crew.
While reaction to the viability of the War Powers Resolution was
generally favorable, reviews of. congressional performance with re-
gard to executive branch/legislative war powers prerogatives were
mixed. Although the President did heed the provisions of the War
Powers Resolution in the four instances involving use of U.S. forces,
he was permitted to circumvent the series of statutory provisions en-
acted between 1973 and 1975 which prohibit the use of funds to finance
combat activities and other military or paramilitary operations "in,
over, and off the shores of North and South Vietnam, Laos, and Cam-
bodia." The Vietnam Contingency Act of 1975 (H.R. 6096, H. Rept.
94-155) was passed by the House on April 17, authorizing funds for
the evacuation of U.S. citizens and certain Vietnamese nationals, but
containing no congressionally mandated authority for tlhe use of
U.S. Armed Forces for that purpose. The Senate-passed measure
(S. 1484, S. Rept. 94-88) did specifically authorize the use of armed
forces as necessary to complete the evacuation of U.S. citizens, and
the conference report, of the measure (H. Rept. 176) followed essen-
tially the Senate model and was approved by the Senate April 25.
However, consideration of the conference report by the House was
Prepared by Margaret Goodman, analyst in international relations.
SU.S. Congress. House: Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on In-
ternational Security and Scientific Affairs. War Powers: a test of compliance. Hearings.
94th Cong., 1st sess., May 7 and June 15. 1975. Washington, U.S. Government Printing
Office. 1975. 135 pp.
2 Complete hearings not yet published.


delayed from the originally scheduled date of April 29 to May 1,
after the final evacuation from Saigon hlad been completed, and the
report was then rejected by the House.
Thus, it would appear that Congress failed to take advantage of
an opportunity to assert its influence on executive branch activities
through its power over the purse, by permitting the President to pro-
ceed in Indochina in spite of statutory prohibitions on such use of
funds. When questioned about. the effect of tlhe statutory prohibitions
after the rescue of the Mayguciz crew, Monroe Leighl. State Depart-
ment legal counsel, stated:
* * the enactment of the funds limitation provisions * did not go so far as
to lpevent the President from exercising his constitutional authority to rescue
American citizens simply because those citizens happened to be in Indochina * *
According to another commentary on tlie subject, however, "(t)he law
liad becomee a mere inconvenience whielh-thlanks to 1)l)blic sull)l)ort. tlhe
legal theories of the State Department, and the acquiescence of Con-
gress-could be ignored."4


Tile. four reports filed by tlie President 5 in compliance with tlhe
War Powers Reso.lution were brief accounts of the number of 17.S.
forces involved in each incident, tlie approximate times of their in-
volvement, and the numbers of U.S. and foreign civilians directly
affected )by each operation. All four reports indicated that tlhe Presi-
dent acted pursutant to his constitutional powers as Commander in
Chief, and tliat thle reports were filed "in accordance with the Presi-
dent's desire to keep the Congress fully informed" and "taking note
of Section 4 of tlhe War Powers Resolution," 6 rather than specifically
indicating compliance with the resolution. In addition, the State De-
parItment legal advisor, Monroe Leigh, noted that the President. hliad
consulted with Congress on all four occasions, although specifically
required to do so only in those situations involving actual or imminent
(Confressioual reaction to the President's compliance with tlie War
Powers RIesoluition was expressed principally during thie. 2 days of
heari ngs conducted by t lie IToIse Tnernational Relations Subcom-
mittee on Tnternational Security and Scientifie Affairs. Concern with
the etntmeral attittide of the e(xective blranchli toward tlhe legislation
w:s voiued.d, while more sl)pecific attention was directed toward (loefi-
litiornlal proMllenis. Senator Jacob( Javifs. one of tlie priucil)al Senate
sporIsrs of Iile iien.iire. exp)ressedl satisfaction flthat tlme legislation
lIad1 "stoo(ld up) well in its initial tests," although lie observed that
SIT S. *'i,,_'r.s. IIous11 ('oniiiiltie on i iit'ni l itinanI Relationis. W ar powers; a test if
f'- 1iiiilliiTi' '*, f ill
w'4nn' ii. Mixl'inlf' J. St rrn clhiiiiit: the VWar IPowfrs luwoi'itinn : thi' cate for puirt-
ttri o | T'rI r l l i. ll i i\v I 'twH vi o' 'I;(). Novirinhor 175. ipp. 2-1.
S,. (', C ':r-,.-s ICoo *C ni',nonitte on ITntornatilinn1 Il{.i ntlons. Stn)[oni iilttee oa Tnter-
nitlnriil .S'.-c.rilv nnd Selontifie Affnir,. "rih. Wnr Pnwfers Resolution : relevant documInts.
(vorr -;inmilfri'-e. ri'mports. (C(onimill ep print N4lih Cing.. 2d ses.. J.ianuairy 11)76 edition.
W': 'Ii'..'l,[I. I'.S. (<';'.f lTiiini t v 'rli tlliL' Ollicr 19.75. pri 40-45.
*'I'," r,',iirt ,f 1h' I Inw inning l d Ji m 'liaoii I','hii fvtli' lnltilons rofi-trrfid to twi toItln 40n0 (2'
of thw rolhitlotn. "th. iinilrtrilriet i ,if IT S. iarimled for-'rs Iiit, the te rriltory. nAr;mmn',.. o41T
\l rB nr' f ir i 1 i .:1ii n1,: t in o 14tlO whll,. p.(iil ,oI fr oiimilit." inl li thr rolm rt oon theP Mnl.niy, .
IlT.1- ,I-1 | i<-vffll I 'ml .'llini 4(t) (1). "hlit ro tlijoilha i of U'.S. Ir"oiis into his(lltIh's ,r lint,
itt intilonis \%liro iitinlti.iit Invilv.riir int In liostillitlis I. flc.nlr n In tlldvted by the tl ir.iini-
tarters T, li r,-I, rt on tih- Snlgoin evaeuatilln rferril oily to section 4. without inillcitlimn
, f i llhrftloltl.


the reports filed had been "brief to the point of minimal compliance
with the requirements of the law," and "did not provide an adequate
informational basis for informed congressional action." 7
The War Powers Resolution was not fully tested in any of the four
instances in 1975 because U.S. troops were voluntarily withdrawn in
each case after a brief period of time. However, the executive branch
has maintained the position put forward in the President's 1973 veto
message, that the War Powers Resolution unconstitutionally attempts
to restrict Presidential power as Commander in Chief of the Armed
Forces. In the compliance hearings, the State Department legal ad-
viser maintained that:
Besides the three situations listed in subsection 2(c) of the War Powers Reso-
lution, it appears that the President has the constitutional authority to use the
Armed Forces to rescue American citizens abroad, to rescue foreign nationals
where such action directly facilitates the rescue of U.S. citizens abroad, to pro-
tect U.S. Embassies and legations abroad, to suppress civil insurrection, to
implement and administer the terms of an armistice or cease-fire designed to
terminate hostilities involving the United States, and to carry out the terms of
security commitments contained in treaties. We do not, however, believe that
any such list can be a complete one, just as we do not believe that any single
definitional statement can clearly encomnipass every conceivable situation in which
the President's Commander in Chief authority could be exercised.8
Mr. Leigh argued further that if the. President's use of the Armed
Forces is pursuant to a constitutional grant of power-as the four
reports submitted by President Ford claim-then any statutory provi-
sion to cut short that use, such as the 60-90-day limit set forth in the
War Powers Resolution, would be unconstitutional.9 Thus, Congress
cannot yet claim to have achieved an effectively proven limitation on
Presidential warmaking powers in the vehicle of the War Powers
More specific problems discussQd during the hearings regarded defi-
nitions of hostilities and consultation. Various Congressmen ques-
tioned the fact that the President did not choose to define the situation
surrounding the final Saigon evacuation as a possibly hostile situation,
in spite of the fact that the airport was under rocket attack, and two
JT.S. Marines had been killed at the airfield the day preceding the final l
evacuation. In an exchange of letters which followed the hearing, the
State and Defense Department spokesmen argued that "hostilities" or
"imminent hostilities" must be defined situationally. In the case of the
Saigon evacuation, they pointed out that since the operation hl;d ter-
mninated by the time the President's report was filed, the question of
possible congressional action under section 5 of the law (which is trig-
gered by a, see. 4(a) (1) report of involvement in hostilities or imui-
nent hostilities) was moot. However, the issue still remains, since in
future, instances the Congress and the executive branch may not agree
on what constitutes a hostile situation, and therefore, on whether or
not section 5 will become operative.
Problems concerning the definition of "consultation" arose in tlhe
context. of the J MayaauIez incident, in which tlie President claimed that
he had consulted with congressional leaders, while most Members of
Congress involved reported that they had been informed of Presi-
dential opinion after the fact rather than given an opportunity to
exchange views with the President prior to the decision. Although the
7 i.S. Congrp.,. House. War powers hearings. p. 69.
8Thid.. pp. 90-91.
74 I2id.. p. H1.
74 -03_-7fi---4


law provided that the President consult with Congress, the require-
ment is qualified by the phrase "in every possible instance," making
that section, according to Representative Findley, "the least precise
andi therefore the least effective part of the War Powers Resolu-
tion." 10 The congressional leaders involved objected to the fact that
they did not have direct contact with the President until after key
decisions had been made, and comments at the hearing expressed skep-
I icism as to whether tlhe President had in fact been precluded by his
other respolisib)ilities from more extensive interchange with Members
of Congress. Ad(lminist rat ion witnesses argued that the communications
bet weenfl the White House and Membllers of Coinfress were consistent
with the consultation requirements of tlhe War Powers Resolution.
Representative John Seiberling and Senator Thomas Eagleton in-
trodiced similar aimeiulments (IH.R. 7f9-4 and S. 1790 respectively) to
tlie War P'owers Resolution to clarify the consultation provision by
repl:.ir5ng thle phrase "consult with Congress" with "seek the advice
and ,ouLnsel of Congress" and by further defining the meaning of the
phrase. Senator Javits suggested that the President should have con-
sulted with the Hiouse International Relations Committee and tlhe
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, but noted that he did not believe
the situation warranted aliiending tlhe resolution at that time. Repre-
sentative Clement Zablocki, chairman of the House International Re-
lations Subcommittee responsible for the war powers resolution, and
tlhe principal Houtise sponsor of tlhe measure, concurred with Senator
Javits; neither body considered the proposed amendments in 1975.
apparently taking the position thliat the hearings and other publicity
had provided the White. HIouse with a clear indication of conares-
siunal concern with the way in which the matter had been handled.
An additional issue receiving some attention during the hearings
concerned Presidential authority to rescue U.S. citizens and foreign
nationals. Senator Eagleton introduced an amendment to the War
Powers Resolution (S. 1790) to clarify the authority of the President
to rescue U.S. citizens from threatening situations abroad. The ques-
tion of Presidential authority to evacuate foreign nationals, an issue
raised in the House. hearings, does not relate directly to the War
Powers Resolution, niut rather to the need for specific congressional
approval for such action and the extremely confused status of the
Vietnam contingency legislation at thle time of evacuation.
During Senate debate, on the Sinai resolution (S.J. Res. 139, Public
Law 9t-110, debated on Oct. 9, 1975), which includes provisions for
200 U.S. civilian technicians to lie stationed in the Sinai, the War
Powers Resolution was debated in relation to the President's authority
to resuew civilians. Arguing that, tle War Powers Resolution in effect
gives tlhe President, tutliority lie did not. previously have to act out-
side tlie United States without. a declaration of war, Senator James
Abouiirezkl proposed an amendment (to the Sinai resolution) to pro-
hibit the President from introducing U.S. Armed Forces in the Middle
Ea 4t. Ills amnendiment was not passed, but thie Sinai resolution as ap-
proved by the IHouse and Senate does contain language to clarify
that the resolution does not give the President any authority to intro-
dure, U.S. f roops whiichi he did not already possess.
Ibid., p. 57.



Senator Eagleton also reintroduced a proposal to assure that the
War Powers Resolution covers paramilitary operations. He had orig-
inally offered a similar proposal as an amendment to the War Powers
Resolution in 1973, but his amendment was defeated during Senate
debate on the measure. In 1975, he included the proposal in S. 1790,
and when the issue reemerged later in the year as the question of
U.S. civilian a nd paramilitary involv-ement in Angola arose, Senator
Eagleton reintroduced the proposal as an amendment to S. 2662, the
Foreign Assistance Act of 19T75.11
In support of his proposed amendment, Senator Eagleton noted
that the executive branch has claimed that the President possesses
inherent powers to conduct paramilitary operations. According to
Mitchell Rogovin,., special council to the Director of Central Intelli-
gence, "Congress has formally acknowledged that the President has
inherent constitutional authority to use military force short of war.
and this acknowledgment is implicit in the War Powers Resolu-
tion * "12 Rogovin's analysis concludes:
If the President has the power to dispatch troops to foreign countries and
to use military force short of war-and the foregoing discussion clearly demon-
strates that he does-then it would logically follow that he has the power to
send civilian personnel to foreign countries to engage in covert action * '
Senator Eagleton pointed out that CIA Director William Colby
had acknowledged that five U.S. pilots and five ground agents had
been engaged in paramilitary activities in Angola; had these agents
been U.S. military rather than CIA civilian personnel, the President
arguably would have been required to report their activities to the
Congress, and Congress could have sought to terminate the opera-
tion. Eagleton argued that failure of Congress to broaden the War
Powers Resolution might encourage Presidents in the future to resort
to paramilitary operations to avoid the reporting requirements for
uniformed forces.
Language such as that contained in Senator Eagleton's proposed
amendment presumably would also cover U.S. civilian personnel in-
volved in the Sinai early warning system; this point, however, was
not mentioned in remarks on the amendment or in discussion of the
early wa ring system.
1. Emerson, J. Terry, Constitutional authority of the President to use the
Armed Forces in defense of American lives, liberty, and property. Congres-
sional Record (daily ed.) v. 121. May 6, 1975, pp. S7526-S7530.
2. Glennon, Michael J. Strengthening the war powers resolution: The case for
purse-strings restriction. Minnesota Law Review, v. 60, No. 1, November
1975, pp. 1-43.
3. Jenkins, Gerald L. The War Powers Resolution: statutory limitation on the
Commander in Chief. Harvard Journal of Legislation, v. 11, February 1974,
pp. 181-204.
u See Eagleton. Thomas. Foreign Assistance Act of 1975-S. 2662, amendment No. 1291.
Congressional Record (daily ed.). vol. 121. Dec. 16. 1975, p. S22254.
12 Rogovin, Mitchell. Statement before the House Select Committee on Intelligence,
Dee. 9. 1975. (Mimeo) p. 7.
Is Ibid., p. 8.


In recent U.S. history Presidents have concluded executive agree-
ments with increasing frequency. These international agreements,
which do not go to the Senate for approval of ratification as do
treaties, have on numerous occasions served as the basis for extensive
commitments of U.S. men, materiel, and/or money abroad without
the prior knowledge or approval of Congress. This unilateral execu-
tive activity has contributed to the creation of an imbalance in the
constitutional system of checks and balances between the executive
and legislative branches. While the executive branch has been able
to cite various statutory, treaty, or constitutional authoritie- as the
bases for conclusion of these agreements, clear criteria acceptable to
both branches on the differences between treaties and executive agree-
ments have been lacking. A first step toward resolution of the im-
balance was the 1972 enactment by the Congress of the Case-Zablocki
Act (Public Law 92-403) which provides for the transmittal by the
Secretary of State to the Congress of the text of any international
agreement other than a treaty no later than 60 days after such agree-
ment has entered into force. By this act the Congress endeavored to
acquire access to all such agreements concluded. While Congres. might
not be concerned about every executive agreement, receipt of all of
them would assure that Congress would make the determination -as
to which agreement might require closer attention.
During 1975 various Members of the Congress continued their con-
cern with the problem of executive agreements as they pertain to the
development of foreign policy and national commitments without the
active participation of the Congress. At least five different types of
legislative proposals were submitted during the first session of the
94th Congress although none was reported to the floor of either House.
The Separation of Powers Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary
Committee held hearings on two of these bills, and at the same time
reviewed implementation of the Case-Zablocki Act on the transmittal
to the Congress of international agreements other than treaties.
Finally, the Congress responded to the series of agreeinments which
were associated with the Sinai Middle East accords.
Of the bills submitted during 1975 which provided for some sort of
congressional review of executive agreements, the legislation pend-
ing before the House Committee on International Relations included
H.R. 4438, which was submitted by Chairman Morgan of thliat coim-
mittee and was directed primarily at agreements which constituted
*Trppnrpd by Mnar.iorip Ann Rrnwne. analyst In International relating and Clyilde R.
Mark. analyst In Middle East and North African affairs.


commitments, and HT.R. 5489, which was identical to a Senate bill,
S. 1251, and provided for review by the Senate alone. In addition,
H.R. 1273 was almost identical to S. 3830, which had been passed by
the Senate. in 1974, but with the word "specific" added in the last
section. H.R. 1268 was the only bill which provided that such agree-
mnents would not enter into force unless a concurrent resolution of
approval were passed by both houses within 60 days. Most of the
legislative proposals provided for entry into force after a 60-day pe-
riod, unless a resolution of disapproval were passed. A chart identify-
ing the important substantive elements of each bill as well as those
of S. 3S830, 93d Congress, follows:


H.R. 4438

H.R. 5489/S.1251


(a) Type of international
(b) Limits on agreement to
be transmitted.

(c) Transmittal agent.-----
(d) Transmitted to------_
(e) Special procedures for
(f) Conditions for entry
into force.

(g) Definition of "executive

(h) Not applicable to .----

Notification to other
countries of this act.
Approval before the
end of 60 days.

Any executive agreement.- Any executive agreement.- Any executive agreement.- Each executive agreemenLt- Any executive agreement.- Any executive agreement.

See (h).

Secretary of State.
Congi ess.
In force after 60 days un-
less concurrent resolution
of disapproval by both
Any bilateral or multilateral
international agreement
or commitment, other
than a treaty, which
is binding on the United
States and made by Pres-
ident or any officer,
employee, or represent-
ative of executive

Executive agreements en-
tered into by President
pursuant to provision
of Constitution or prior
authority by treaty or

(k) Special provisions...

Not specifically authorized
by law or treaty.

Secretary of State.
In force after 60 days if
concurrent resolution of
approval by both Houses.
Same as S. 3830.

See (h).

Secretary of State.
Same as S. 3830.

Same as S. 3830.

Concerning the establish-
ment, renewal, continu-
ance or revision of a
national commitment.
Same as S. 3830.

Any bilateral or multilat-
eral international agree-
ment or commitment,
regardless of its disig-
nation, other than a
treaty, and including
agency-to-agency agree-
ment madeby President
[same as S. 38301.

Executive agreements en- -
tered into by President
pursuant to specific
provision of Constitution
or prior specific authority
by treaty or law.

... Special procedures for
emergency situations: in-
to force immediately
but congressional sus-
pension within 10 days
by concurrent resolution
of both Houses.
... Defines national commit-

See (g).

In force after 60 days unless
resolution of disapproval
by Senate only.
Any bilateral or multilateral
international agreement
or understanding, formal
or informal, written or
verbal, other than treaty,
involving or intent is to
leave impression of, a
commitment of man-
power, funds, informa-
tion or other rcsourccs
of United States made
by President [same as
S. 3830].

See (h).

Secretary of State.
Same as S. 3830.

Same as S. 3830.

-.-...... S ame as S. j3j3U.

Provides for resolution of
approval before end of
60 days.

IS. 3830, 93d Cong., was approved by the Senate on Nov. 21, 1974.

S. 38301

H.R. 1268

H.R. 1273


The Separation of Powers Subcommittee of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary held hearings on the two Senate bills: S. 1251 and
S. 3(;2. These were tlhe only formal public hearings on the broad issue
of executive agreements during 1975. The 13 witnesses included four
Senators. representatives from the Departments of State, Defense,
and JUstice, and five lawyers from academia, in addition to Adm.
Elmo R. Zumwalt. retired Chief of Naval Operations. A short time
before the hearings started, the New York Times had published copies
of two letters between President Richard Nixon and South Vietnam-
ese President Ngiuyen Van Thieu in 1972 and 1973 in which Nixon
promised "s-wift. and severe retaliatory action" by the United States
if Nortli V ietnamn failed to abide by the terms of the 1973 Paris Peace
Agreement. ''Thlese agreementst" had never been transmitted under
the Case Act and in fact Congress had not known of their existence.
Yet 1oth Subcommittee Cliairman James Abourezk and Senator
Clifford Case took the position that they constituted a clear commit-
ment for tli United States. Senator Case pointed out during thie hlear-
ings flHat Congress. being unaware of these commitments, had passed
the Case-Churlch amendments in August, 1973 barring military ac-
tivity on, over, or off the shores of both Vietnams, Laos, or Cambodia,
innd effectively disabled the United States from performing the Nixon
commit meIIts.
ThIe 1972 trade agreement with the U.S.S.R. was also identified by
Seniator Cnse as creating serious foreign policy difficulties because it
was not submitted promptly to tlhe Conguress llun(ler the Case-Zablocki
Act: it was not offiiallv transmitted for more than a year and then
only after tlie Foreign Relations Committee requested it. One )part of
tfi,,e ireeiw(,l.nt-an international agreement between the Export-Im-
p,,rt Baliik :ndf ti-e Vne-litortrAnink of tlhe U.S.S.R.-contemnplated the
exteiision of -i i)stantial credits to the Soviet Union under conditions
f-ivorlible to the U.S.S.R. When the details were madle public, comIgres-
si,,)al action on the Export-Tmport Bank Renewal Act severely lim-
it.d fmids tli:it cold It be lent to the Soviet Union without prior coil-
"i .-ioiml approval. Acordlimi' to Case. this congres.sional action was
-I factor in thie Soviet s1's)en.-sion of thlie entire trad(le agreement and the
bii..klown of the arrangmn(nts that liadl been reaclied on Soviet
eii-!f;it.tion. P'rior conr(e0'ssional coiisideration of tlie trade agreement
or Senate co isider.ation of it as a treaty, wolld( have. according to
( C -c. e,;t alli-1 (1 the scope ;1i 1 limits of tile slb.idi /ed(l credit, l)rol)osal
primr to its oent r into force 'i' 1d wAould have reduced tlie possibility of
several' foreign policy repl)ercissions. In general, executive branch wit-
n,.d- -,- at ll -. S-,Iriation of P1 owners Suloinmittee hlearings opposed
.,,'K-ll iion v, Ilich l)rovided, for colgressional rev iew and possible dis-
:;)pprov:11l of executive agreem wiits, recomniiending inistead(l that pro-
c,..l.nbs 1e dv'i-1ed for more freqien t briefing of Congress by tlhe
eV.'utivc !)r:t ic\ Spejivic o)e jectiois were vaisedl ()n constitutional
gi,,tnlds ;i1a.! Iis l e st' of : l'gisla tive veto procedure e.

I.t MI.i-:I \NlAO'roAT1 OF T"E( C.\sjF.-Z.nm.iCKi ACT
'Iiiler present proved Ires, tllie agreeiienllits transmitted pursuant to
the C( 4se-Za1l.ocki Act are received iM thle Senate Foreign Relations
:ad Ho iose Tiitr'Iiatioii:l Relations Committees. Notice of their trans-


mittal is published in the Congressional Record as an executive com-
munication. Each committee circulates a list of the agreements re-
ceived to its members and to its staff, who screen the list for agreements
which might require further investigation. The House committee
publishes in its calendar a country and subject index to the agree-
ments transmitted.
During 1975, according to tentative figures compiled by the Depart-
ment of State, the United States concluded 13 treaties and 276 inter-
national agreements other than treaties (executive agreements).1 Dur-
ing the same year, the Secretary of State, in accordance with the Case-
Zablocki Act, transmitted to the Congress 272 unclassified and 11
classified agreements. Since August 22, 1972, when the Case-Zablocki
Act was signed, through the end of 1975, 868 agreements other than
treaties had been transmitted to the Congress. In spite of these statis-
tics, however, some Members of the House and Senate indicated that
not all agreements have been transmiitted. For example, Representative
Les Aspin released a statement on July 21, indicating that between
400 to 600 agreements had not been transmitted under the Case-Za-
blocki Act.
In addition, the Separation of Powers Subconmmunittee in May 1975
received testimony with regard to the 1972 Trade Agreement with the
U.S.S.R. and the Nixon-Thieu letters, and during hearings in July,
State Department legal adviser Monroe Leigh acknowledged that he
was reviewing six agreements between U.S. intelligence agencies and
their foreign cotunterparts to determine whether those agreements
should be transmitted under the Case-Zablocki Act.
A basic type of agreement which has usually not been considered
by the executive branch as coming under the Case-Zablocki Act is the
agency-to-agency arrangement. While the subjects of these agreements
are generally routine, they are occasionally of consequence in their
impact and effect on future foreign policy. The intelligence agreements
referred to by Leigh might also be considered in this category.
During early 1976, the Comptroller General of the United States
submitted to Senator Abourezk a study which examined the imple-
mentation of the Case-Zablocki Act relative to U.S. agreements with
the Republic of Korea.2 The GAO also made certain observations about
implementation of the Case-Zablocki Act in general:
This report focuses on the need for (1) better control procedures concerning
the submission of agreements by Government agencies to the State Department
and (2) clarification and reemphasis of the full extent to which the Congre.s
and the State Department desire to be advised of arrangements under the Case
Act. Particular clarification is needed regarding arrangements that may not be
legally binding, oral arguments, arrangements with parties other than states, or
arrangements subordinate to or implementing a broader agreement.3
In addition, the GAO had the following recommendations:
The Senate Foreign Relations and House International Rela-
tions Coimnittees may want to specify more clearly what they
consider to be an "international agreementn" *
*; *
1 During 1975. the Senate received 11 treaties and approved 6 of them in addition to
9 treaties submitted before 1S175. A total of 24 treaties were still pending at the end of
1975 (5 of which were approved by the Senate in January 1976).
2 U.S. General Accounting Office. U.S. agreements with the Republic of Korea. Report
of the Comptroller General of the United States. Washington, 1976. 25 pp. ("B-11u058"
Feb. 20. 1976).
a Ibid., p. 2.
A Ibid., p. 18.


The committees may want to request the State Department to
reemphasize to other agencies the need to report all agreements.'
Xo comprehensive list of international arrangements being con-
cluded with foreign countries by U.S. agencies is currently avail-
able. A more comprehensive listing of such arrangements is
needed. * The committee may * wish to have established
a more inclusive agreement reporting system, which would pro-
vide for a cumulative listing of all arrangements reached or
negotiated by a Government agency.5
The Department of State, in response to the GAO report, on March 9,
1976, circulated an airgram to all diplomatic posts outlining "Case
Act Procedures and Department of State Criteria for Deciding ,What
Constitutes an International Agreement" and directing that "all in-
ternational agreements concluded by any officer or representative of
the U.S. Government be transmitted to the Department of State, Office
of Treaty Affairs, no later than 20 days after entry into force." The
airgram indicated that agency level agreements would be transmitted
under the Case-Zablocki Act when they met certain criteria as deter-
mined by the executive branch.


The Sinai accords
The Sinai accords of September 1, 1975, produced several conflicts
between Congress and the executive branch.6 The most immediate issue
was congressional approval for placing 200 U.S. civilian technicians
along the new Sinai cease-fire lines to observe possible violations of the
accords. Congress debated the cost, danger, need, duties, protection,
rem.loval., supervision, selection, and other factors relating to the tech-
niciains before granting approval on October 9, 1975. But during the
cor-se of the technicians debate, several other issues emerged. The
executive branch provided the Congress copies of several secret agree-
en:its si ged ly the United States and Israel and Egypt.7 The Presi-
dent hleld that the secret agreements were executive agreements and
beyond the purview of the Congiress. while several Membelrs of Con-
gress iiiaintsiined that the agreements were treaties subject to the advice
.iid coniseit of tfie Senate. TI'lis debate was not. resolved by Congress.
Another area of 'onlention between the Congress and the executive
branlc' revolveId a round the question of whether the United States

5 l ,i,.. ppi. 17- 1 .
6 Theso four lilrii were (1) t(li E.'yptilntn-Tsrnoli accord on Sinai. which outlinerl the
h :-i' a nrerm nt; (2) the lE'vptinn-ilsrn:rli annex to tlio Sinni accord, which e.tibhlshed
fhe ii4- ffI'r zvni : (3) lrotwol, Ito lti' E .\j ptian ii-lsr.ii nacord (a tuanll.y signed on 4)cto-
lher 10). whbih Trovirleil for ilie iiiehnni-n 'if the movement to the new cen.e-flir, lines;
nrnd (4) U.S. proposal for an early warning system in Sinai. which provided for U.S.
,iv'erslht of an prctronic warnlii S.Viem.
7 'hi.f four ItiTs. w 1r i1 llTiimer tif iiiiin ot f n .reiniepnt betwe, n the GovernmPnts or
Israe, l nn O li- InitiI Stiits. vhleh provlilcd for (a) IU.S. considernatlon of Isrnrli
economicc militrv. inl fill TII nP n nil (h) svtpemin it Ic r'on IltntIon In the event of a
vlnit i'iim fif ti n'',in- Iru eli :ie'nrds : ('2) memorandiilim of anerepmpnt hpfween IlihP
(G'iv.riiinvrintf f i. r ,I nrn' l llio l'nltfl Statlire (tlh getiersil pence conference), which
l ir vi I .rl f,,r a e',rirlni ti t pTollev bepw pen tihe U'nitmd Stntps and Tsrael rigrdingi a
fl'rt ',ul;fi."iL I,|ici r 'fi iir -f ni t (;ri'evii ; (3) ilssI rituetps froin the 1U.S. Govirninint to
TI'r.',l. w i'hIhi .ii rliil.I n Anwerl'ntn T I.nldcrnatlon of Igrnpi'R sH hliNtlInted weIpons newds;
iiil (4) uranee from thie T.S. CGoverniment to Ei.vpt. which provided for (aR UT.S.
v',i,.rlTilln iof f tiir iir in ,itlnt,1iin with S rIa. ()) pom illile U.S. reaction to violations
Si e al th. S in i erord.s. ;ianid ( I' .S. tiechlinirni and econonilc assistnncc.

made commitments in the secret agreements. In most cases, the so-called
commitments were so ambiguously worded that it was difficult to de-
cide if the United States was or was not committed to take specific
actions, but it was possible to distinguish intentions which could be in-
terpreted later as forming the basis of commitments. The Congress
challenged the legality of the so-called commitments or intentions on
two grounds: First, that the agreements were not treaties and therefore
not binding on the United States; and second, that the wording left so
much room for interpretation that the so-called commitments could not
withstand simple legal tests for clarity and intent. The Congress was
challenging the right of the executive branch to enter into commit-
ments and to hide those commitments within nonpublic executive
agreements. At year's end, the issue remained unresolved.
The existence of the secret agreements also raised the issue of security
classification and public access to. executive branch documents. While
the Congress and executive branch were arguing about release of the
full texts of the Jagreements, the Washington Post and the New York
Times on September 18 published the previously secret agreements.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee on October 3, voted 12 to 2
to release the agreements,8 while the executive branch accused Congriess
of leaking the documents to the newspapers, and endangering national
security. This conflict failed to produce any resolution to the issues of
access and classification.
Committee review of the associated agreements
The House International Relations Committee held 6 days of hear-
ings on the proposal for an early warning system in September and on
October 3 voted, 31 to 0, to approve the sending of the technicians,
House Joint Resolution 683.9 According to the committee report:
The time [almost 1 month] was well spent. A variety of complex issues were
involved in the approval which required thorough attention and discussion in the
Congress. Further, there was a need to avoid the kind of haste which in times
past sometimes accompanied congressional action involving national comminit-
ments: for example, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.'0
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held 6 days of hearings in
executive (closed) session before holding public hearings on October 6
and 7. Some of the comments of the committee in reporting on the
legislation were significant:
Most of the Committee's consideration of this matter has been centered on two
questions: (1) the extent to which approval of the 200 technicians might commit
the United States to a broader network of assurances, undertakings, or agree-
ments, and (2) the extent to which the elements of this broader network were
divulged to the Committee, the Congress, nnd the country.
As indicated above, the Committee is satisfied that it has been informed of all
the relevant assurances and undertakings which are a part of the overall Sinai
Further, the Committee has taken pains, both in the language of the re.solutin
before the Senate and in its legislative history, to nail down the point tlihat Con-
gressional approval of the proposal to send 200 technicians to tlihe Sinai Peninsulia
8SThe committee pnililished th- ngreeinentq in U'.S. Congre!.s. Senate. committee on
Foreign Relations. Early warning system in Sinai. Hearings. 94th (nng.. 1st sess. Oct. 6
and 7. 1975. Washington. U.S. Government Printing Office. 1975. pp. 249-2,52.
9Three of the committee's meetingg were In executive closedd) session, and two were
open to the public. On the first day. the committee heard testimony In both open and in
executive sessions.
10U.S. Congress. House: Committee on International Relations. To Implement the I'nit',d
States Proposal for the Early-Warning System in Siani : Report together with supple-
mental and additional views on |louse .Joint Resolution 6P3. 9.4th Cong.. 1st sess. House.
Rept. 94-532. Washington. U.S. Government Printing Office. 1975. p. 2.

is precisely that-no more, no less-and that it does not imply approval or dis-
approval of anything else.
At the same time, the Committee recognizes that some of the ancillary agree-
ments will result in requests to Congress for authorizations and appropriations.
The point the Committee wishes to emphasize is that by approving the limited
proposal for technicians in the Sinai the Congress does not in any way bind itself
to any particular course of action with respect to future proposals.'
While members favored the insertion in the legislation of a statement
disavowing congressional support for any other agreements, of what-
ever form made during the negotiations, others considered that so
specific an amendment, would give such agreements a formality whichll
they did not intend them to have. In its final form the Congress adopted
a statement as proposed by the International Relations Committee:
SEC. 5. The authority contained in this joint resolution to implement the
"United States Proposal for the Early Warning System in Sinai" does not signify
approval of the Congress of any other agreement, understanding, or commitment
made by the executive branch. (Public Law 94-110.)
Legal ?menmwranda
The issues of whether the four associated agreements should be con-
sidered as treaties or as executive agreclncnts and of whether their
status as executive agrreelllents in international and domestic law would
be maintained without congressional action were the subjects of a
memorandum of law prepared by the Senate Office of Legislative
Counsel (OLC) at the request of Senator Dick Clark. In summary
the September 24, 1975, memorandum by the Senate OLC concluded
that constitutionally one of tlie agreements, and possibly two others.
werie. beyond the power of the President. to make without the advice
and consent of tlhe Senate. Tlie Senate OLC further concluded tliat
willhout the advice and consent of the Senate. one agreement and pos-
sibly the other two, were without force and effect under donlestic and
intenatio,,al law. In determining the distinctions between treaties
?,ill executive( agrvements and evaluating tlle four associated aoree-
i,,nfs. the Senate. OLC used the following criteria: (1) text of tlhe
Constit ution, (2) intent, of tlIe Framers. (3) actual practice. (4) Su-
preme Court cases, (5) comments of authorities and views of the Sein-
ate Foreign Relations Conimittee, and (6) criteria emviployved by tlie
Department of State in Circular 175.
Tie legial adviser at tlie, Department of State, M[onroe Leigh. on
Otoler 6. 1975;. replied in writing to the uiiemiorandumll of law of the
Semnile OLC. Leigh concluded hliat. tlie Senate OLC nmemno's basic pre-
mise that all important. international agreemelnts miust as a mtnAter of
law lbe s-.lmlitted to tle SenIatle as treaties a-,d imust receive tlie 'advice
and consenit of tlie Sente 1t before entenrinl into force was totally fi lse
Mi1d r(endlered in'v:ilid ,ost of tlhe nl:il vsis tlhat followed froilm it ws well
ais flie fiial a ,concl sl1iolls i,','clied. During liis ;mi;ilvsis Lei g-li diiii.ssi l
eye 'ral of Iltle statei,,ents ii:,ldeI i tllie Se i ate OC analysis withl out
disc.ission or juistification ;(nd s,'ressed ile role of practice. ,'usloi01.
:,i,,l is:gie, as a basis for I lie use of (xe(,ilt ive ag'reeitentts. Leigh stated:
h,'it hier an agreement is nutlhwrizd ly ( 'onstitiution, triely, or statute, it can-
not lb< refused fill free ind ,ff,(t in either ii tlifiilml or international ln w sim-
ply because It was not submitted to the Senate ai a 1 rlalt y."
11 I'.S Vongrps. Rpnnte: Cnmmittee on Foreign Relntlonq. Early wnrnlng gyrtpul In
Sinai; TIIport together with indivIdidnl views to aernmpany S..I. les. 1.M 94th Cong..
1t -u-m Si.intp. Rh'rt. .4 415. Witshln ft-n. I.S. Go ernmPnt Printing Office, 1975. p. 9.
1 CongresHional Record fdally ed.], v. 121. Nov. 14, 1975: S20105.


This initial exchange of legal memorandums was followed by an
October 22, 1975, Senate OLC response to the Leigh reply of Octo-
ber 6.13 On February 5, 1976, Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Af-
fairs Arthur W. Rovine submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee a reply to the second memorandum by the Senate Office of
Legislative Counsel.14
This exchange of legal memorandums did not resolve the issues they
addressed, but they did identify the positions of the Senate and of the
Department of State on the nature, origins, and use of the executi-ve
Congress and the Spanish bases agreement
During an October 19T5 briefing before the Subcommittee on Europe
of tbe Senate Foreign Relations Comminttee on the progress of the ne-
gotiations on the Spanish bases agreement, Assistant Secretary of State
for Congressional Relations Robert McCloskey indicated that the
agreement would be submitted to the Congress for approval, although
lie was not certain it would be submitted as a treaty to the Senate or as
an executive agreement to the Congress. However, that statement repre-
sented a positive step, as there had been requests since 1969 that it be
sulibmitted to the Congress in one form or the other before entering into
force. On February 18, 1976, the President transmitted to the Senate
for its advice and consent the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation
between the United States and Spain, signed at Madrid on January 24,
1976, together with its seven supplementary agreements and its eight
related exchanges of notes.
'a The first three memorandums were inserted in the Congressional Record by Senator
John Sparkman : Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 121, Nov. 14. 1975: S20102-S20115.
14 Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 122, Feb. 17, 1976: S1687-S1692.


TIe Juily 1974 couiI) d'etat in Cyprus, engineered by the ruling mili-
tary junta in Greece. and the subsequent Turkish military intervention
on tlhe island, generated considerable activity in the 93d and 94th Con-
gresses in the form of resolutions and amendments affecting U.S.
commitments abroad. These developments culminated in a challenge
by the Congress to the administration over its conduct of foreign policy
on the Cyprus issue, and the continuation of economic and military aid
to Turkey in light of Turkish use of American-sulpplied arms and
materiel during its invasion of the
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1975 (Public Law 93-559), approved
on December 30, 1974, contained a provision requiring the President
to suspend all military assistance, sales of defense articles, and the
izsuance of licenses for the transportation of arms, ammunition, and
implemnents of war to the Government of Turkey. The Turkish inter-
vention on Cyprus and extension of military control in the northern
part of the island were held by Congress as a violation by Turkey
of the conditions under which American aid was provided.1 The
President was authorized to delay the effective date of the suspension
until Febrmuary 5, 1975, if he determined that this would further
negotiations toward a peaceful resolution of the Cyprus situation.
President Ford ma(lde such a determination on December 31, 1974.
Turlkey could, therefore. receive aid uiintil February 5,1975, providing
that it adlhered to the ('y s cease-fire and refrained from trnsport-
ing additional troops or arm.imeiits to the island. Anot lietr provision of
Public Law 93-.559 included an allocation of $25 million for the relief
of t lie 2 0,000 Cypriot 1'efu.,es displaced by the conflict. After Febru-
:1r' 5, under the terils of tlie Foreign A\ssistance Act, m1ilitary aid to
Survey could not be resumed til tlie President certified that: (1)
Turkey wais in compliance with aihl grIe.llints entered into concern ng
tle0 r.eqlireliients of Akleri'cal military aid legislation, and (2) sub-
-In il ia l progress.6 liad bee'n n :dle toW a rd a greenient regarding military
forces il Cyprus.
At lie lieall rt of tlie eIvi):' Frgo on military assistance and sales to Tuir-
key X\as tile assertion. that Turkey, dtringn its intervention o f Cp' is
in July 197-1, and especially d-ri1g its subse(quleit, extension of mili-
tiary control over. tl(e northelri 3S:31s percent of the is and, had violated
SI'r, .n'ri l by IvrI. ii:nl M. I'rm.ii., spiwelillst In Middle Eastern affairs.
IT'"', I~rnvi~l' n. r,1', 1. la : .vvc. .5l0.5(l of lt F,'orevlign Assls.Inve Aft of 190ln an(1
we. :; ( ,) 1' I li. l"-,. i lii Military Snils A it iri(.scrl(ii tilE I irijln slbll(e ii of Amiiorliin
in illliry v a -,I l, ii. t to f'l'rlrii rn uiintrciv If thl se: cwiiitl IonH or puI rposis ar' violated, ai
inriii'd(i:il, *'it ifT of uid It. rmi illrm l.


agreements required by U.S. law by using American-supplied ma-
teriel for purposes not envisaged in the Foreign Assistance Act and
the Foreign Military Sales Act. Turkey had agreed in 1'947 not to use
American-supplied defense articles except for authorized purposes,
including self-defense, internal security, and participation in collec-
tive arrangements or measures consistent with the United Nations
Charter. As expressed by a series of votes in the latter part of 1974,
therefore, Congress went on record against Turkey's violation of that
agreement and in affirming the principle that U.S.-supplied military
equipment may not be used for purposes other than those for which
it is furnished.
A General Accounting Office legal opinion strongly admonished the
Department of State for its failure to make the required determina-
tion on Turkey's eligibility for military assistance following the vio-
lation of U.S. law. It stated that:
* section 505 (d) of the Foreign Assistance Act and section 3(c) of the For-
eign Military Sales Act-in view of their express terms particularlyy the refer-
ences to "immediate" ineligibility) * place a specific duty upon cognizant
officials to expeditiously consider, and make appropriate determinations con-
cerning the applicability of such provisions in circumstances which clearly sug-
gest potential substantial violations.2
In response to a request by Senator Eagleton for a legal opinion
relating to Turkey's ineligibility for further military assistance, the
Department of State, in a letter of November 22, 1974, stated:
The administration decided that it was impossible publicly to express a legal
conclusion on the issue of Turkey's eligibility for further assistance and sales
without undermining our foreign policy objective of persuading Turkey and
Greece to enter into direct negotiations for a solution to the Cyprus problem.3
The 1975 developments
During January 1975, the administration endeavored to assure the
Congress that progress was being made toward negotiations on Cyprus
and, while an early overall resolution of the problem was not antici-
pated, meaningful steps would likely commence in early February.
At the same time, warnings were voiced by the Turkish Government
that if the suspension of military aid and sales took effect on Febru-
ary 5, Turkey would have no alternative but to review United States-
Turkish bilateral agreements and impose restrictions on U.S. military
installations in that country. On January 24. Secretary of State Kis-
singer invited the Congress to join in "a new national partnership"
in the conduct of foreign policy, and called for nonpartisan coopera-
tion as "a national necessity." He stated flthat the "growing tendency
of the Congress to legislate in detail day-to-day and week-to-week
conduct of our foreign affairs raises grave issues," and pointed to the
restrictions on aid to Turkey as ene example where "tactics have de-
feated the very purpose that both branches meant to serve, because
the legislative sanctions were too public or too drastic or too dis-
criminating." 4
State Department spokesman Robert Anderson declared in a state-
ment on January 31 that the February 5 deadline was "not helpful
2 Congressional Record [daily ed.], vol. 120. Dec. 24, 1974: S20531.
'"A New National Partnership." Address by Secretary Klssinger before the Los Angeles
World Affairs Council on Jan. 24, 1975. Department of State Bulletin, v. 72, Feb. 17, 1975,
pp. 202-204.


in any way in trying to induce a settlement because it puts pressure on
one of tlhe partiess" and that the administration believed it would be
a disaster to drive Turkey from its Western alinement and weaken
American security interests in the eastern Mediterranean. In a meet-
ing on February 1 between congressional sponsors of the arms cutoff
and Secretary Kissinger, the Secretary of State disclosed that no "sub-
stantial" progress had been made toward a Cyprus settlement. His
appeal for further delay of the suspension wvas rejected.
With the embargo in effect, the Turkish Government announced
tlhe drafting of retaliatory contingency plans which included the
closu re of some U.S. military and other installations. At the same time.
a leading proponent of the embargo, Senator Eagleton, declared on
Fcbruaiiry 14 that the Ford administration "may be playing a danger-
lsly irresponsil~)le game"' with its statements deploring congressional
artio:n against Turkey.
During a closed session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
oil Februiary 27, Secretary Kissinger reportedly repeated administra-
tion concern over the Turkish arms embargo, warning that the issue
tr;nsi-ended the Cyprus dispute and jeopardized United States and
;'lied(l security interests in the entire eastern Mediterranean region.
In an attempt to alleviate some of the strains in the relationship
between the United States and its two NATO allies, Secretary Kis-
singer subsequently met with Greek Foreign Minister Dimitrios
Bitsios., in Brussels on March 7, and with Turkish leaders in Ankara
on March 11 for talks on negotiations. Thereafter, Kissinger proposed
that further negotiations looking toward a settlement be resumed
under the auspices of United Nations Secretary General Kurt
On March 26, the Foreign Relations Committee, by a 9 to 7 vote.
approved a bill (S. 816) which would permit the President to lift the
,-uspension of military aid to Turkey and would require him to report
to Conirress every '>0 davs on progress toward a Cmnrus peace settle-
1int. Sponsors of the bill included Majority Leader Mansfield, Minor-
ity Leadler Scott. Committee. Chairiian Sparkman, ranking minority
committeee member C:i.e. and the chairman and senior minority meivi-
lier of the Ariled ,Services Committee, Stennis and Tower. ('Chairwiman
Sjar-km;,i informed newsmen that tlhe vote reflected congressional
.concern over tI he p)otvntt ial loss of Turkey as a membel)r of NATO, and
indi'm ted that p:isa;ge of the bill would be helpful in bri'ngiing about
tiegotit i ios on a C1p'"lls settlement. S. S W( wws reported to the Senate
from tlie comnlimittev oil April 10 (S.. Relpt. 9-14-74). Four days later,
o01 tlv Houso side. Represntatlivs ia 1mil ton :ad(1 w Buchanan intro-
,liild : 1 i11 (H.I. f91S) to authlorize further suspension of tlhe
Tlurk ish ;iqmm lT 1mba r ro.
ITn, the CGOerk Governmenut with revw pen ris.iion for thie U.S.
;t] Fl'eet to ,s.e tlhe liar1,or of Erlf'sis. 17 miles west of Athens. Various
"ot1,ir Akicrical mnililary facilities also were closed. Tih, GovernnKnt
rt ri,,ted ,,i vi lzes, i mmnities. :nii d exed iiptifions formerly rnint-vd
to Aiiivrivaii l)e'rsoiinel, an(d declared that the eimlaining five U.S.
il1i, sI llat ions" in Greeee were to N(1 p)lac(ed u1111d'e G( reek con ii iiiude rs.
'lThe Senntv, oi .May 19. by a 41 to 40 vote. p1ased S. -q-46. wviclu was
r ,crrred to tlo IIHouse Committoe on International Relations on May20.
.fajo*rify Leader Mansfield had given warning that by prolonging the
('reo-Tm'lrkish dispute over Cyprus, NATO would suffer severe dam-

age. lie said that the vote had been expressly scheduled to allay
Turkish resentment of the United States and thus strengthen the hand
of the administration in influencing progress during forthcoming talks
on a settlement.
During June and July, the problems of achieving a consensus on
the issue of Turkish aid became apparent. Indeed, differences between
tlhe executive and legislative branches, and sharp divisions within
the Congress itself, became manifest on July 24 when S. 846 failed
passage in the House by a vote of 206 to 223.
U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, William Macomber, stated before the
National Press Club on June 12 that continuation of the embargo
could produce "a disaster," with Turkish retaliation in closing U.S.
defense and intelligence-gathering facilities in Turkey. On June 15,
Turkish Prime Minister Demirel declared that his government "can-
not consider the attitude of the United States, which refuses to sell
arms to her faithful ally of 30 years, as friendly. Turkey should not
be expected to carry out bilateral agreements unilaterally." Two days
later, following a meeting of the Turkish Security Council, Foreign
Minister Ihsan Caglayangil announced in Ankara that American in-
stallations in Turkey would be placed on "provisional status" on
July 17, and that his government would notify the United States
which of the bases would continue or cease operations. At the same
time, a formal note was delivered to the United States which stated
that the Turkish Government had "decided to negotiate the new rules
lnd conditions governing the maintenance of joint defense facilities
and activities with the United States."
On June 19, and again on June 23 and 26, President Ford met
with Members of Congress to appeal for resumption of military aid
to Turkey.
Secretary Kissinger, in a speech in Atlanta on June 23, reiterated
the administration's opposition to the congressional suspension of
aid to Turkey, and declared that alliances remained "a first interna-
tional priority" of the United States. But Kissinger also stated in an
apparent reference to Greece and Turkey, that "no country should
imagine that it is doing us a favor by remaining in an alliance with
us. * No ally can pressure us by a threat of termination; we will
not accept that its security is more important to us than it is to itself."
On July 8, Secretary Kissin'er met with groups of House Mem-
bers, including a briefing to freshmen. White House legislative
liaison staff and State and Defense Department and NATO officials
also provided information on the potentially damaging effects of the
ban for United States and North Atlantic Alliance interests. At the
same time, Greek-American interest groups actively campaigned to en-
courage citizens to communicate to their representatives their op-
position toward lifting the embargo.
On July 9, Representatives M[organ. Broom field, Z.bloli. I.amil-
ton. Findley, Buchanan. and Whalon introduced HT.R. 8454, which
would (1) permit deliveries of military aid already contracted for
by Turkey before the Fehbruary 5 cutoff: (2) allow Tuirkey to purchase
for cash any further arms it required to fulfill its NATO respon-
sibilities; and (3) required the President to report to Congress evry
60 days on arms sales to Turkey snd prog-ress toward a Cvnyprus settle-
ment. The bill was described as being "neither pro-Turkish nor pro-


Greek," but "an even-handed attempt to settle the Cyprus question
and to preserve the NATO alliance." President Ford, on July 10.
following a White House breakfast meeting with 140 House Mem-
bers, called H.R. 8454 "a good compromise." which, if passed by Con-
gress, would lead to "the settlement of the Cyprus situation and to
the continuation of Turkey as a strong and effective partner in
Responding to an urgent request from President Ford, tlhe House
Committee on International Relations on July 10 met for 10 hours to
consider the Turkish arms issue.5 Witnesses included Under Secre-
tary of State Joseph Sisco, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Macomber,
Assistant Secretary of State. Arthur Hartmann. CIA Director Wil-
liam Colby, and Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert Ellsworth.
Testifying in opposition to the bill were former Under Secretary of
State George Ball, former Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance;
Representatives Brademas, Sarbanes, Rangel. and Beard; and rep-
resentatives of Greek-American groups. On July. 11. by a 16 to 11
vote, the committee approved H.R. 14.)4, as amended. Subsequent-
ly, byv a 19 to 4 vote, the committee agreed to take up S. S46, in lieul
of H.R. 8454. and reported that bill, with amendments, to the House
on July 16 (II. Rept. 94-365). The committee noted in its report tlhe
Turkish perception of the legal issues relating to its intervention on
Cyprus. On tlie one hand, the 1947 United States-Turkish agreement.
limited the use of American-supplied equipment to tlhe authorized
purposes est.l)lished in U.S. legislation. On the other hand. Turkey
had responsibilities under article 2 and 3 of the 1960 Treaty of Guar-
antee to maintain the independence, territorial integrity, and secu-
rity of Cyprus, and. under article 4, the right to take action to main-
tain arrangements that had been established for an independent Cv-
pris; and under article 2 of the Treaty of Alliance between Cyru,.
Greece. and Turkey. e-m-h pnrmv undertook to resist "any attack or
S(rfrression. direct or indirect, ammiinst the independencet, or territorial
integrity of Cyprus. Whlatver its position with respect to American
Jaw. Turkey felt it was acting" accorldinu to international law and the
1060 nccorul(q to whlich it was a 1)artv. Moreover. the embargo against
Turkey indicated a selective enforcement of U.S. law in that several
similar military agreements whichl had been and wore beintr violated
lv other friendly states had not led to denials of aid. and tlie United
States had furnished arms to countries that were in po-session of
territory of other states.
President Ford, on TJuly 17, urged a large delezatiomi of Homi",,
1Menl.,1lrs 1o lift. at lest partially, tie bn on nrms shipments to
Tlrkev in order to miitfiinii oper',ion of U.S. military installaitions
in that eol'mtr v. On July 20. eeover:ml thomwa md Greek-A mericns rallied
in fiont of tlhe Capitol :im'diist i resimiption of aid to Turkey. On
July 2.1, S. 4\. was coiisilre,'l bv ti0e Iouse and dcefonted ly a nnr-
row martrin of 17 votes. Supporters', of the nieaslre pointed oit fltat
tlie :11,s i n(11,1 1ro l ;rii 1d 'ievel ilst tlie reverse of wlirit 1(nd ellen
itended in helping to 1,.inr alho1it a Cyprus settlement and claiim1ed
that it also liad jeopnrl'dizdc Ile seci' 'ity of tlive United St.v-t; and tlhe
I .S. ('. ncr-tq. IToiuip : rommiTTniil t il ntii rnntpr lnn ti n rlntIn 5i ,pnqln nf Prn-
il1.ilie.Yvw A ainil t Milittarr A.,l,,tnn'-P to Tiirkov. ITpnrIng, 94th Cong.. 1st si', .Tiily 10.
1975". Washlnaton. V.S. Covernmenl Printlng Offlr', 1975.


future of NATO. Opponents of S. 846 countered that Turkey had
violated U.S. law in using equipment provided by U.S. foreign as-
sistance in its invasion of Cyprus in July 1974 and that to lift even
partially the embargo would sanction that violation and encourage
similar abuses by other recipients of U.S. arms sales. Turkey's threat
to close U.S. bases amounted to blackmail and extortion, they claimed,
and there was no guarantee that suspension of the embargo would
result in negotiations toward a Cyprus settlement.
The failure of Congress to lift the arms ban, despite appeals by the
Ford administration, brought about the threatened Turkish retalia-
tion. The Turkish Government assumed control over all U.S. bases and
installations, and suspended all American military operations in that
country. Prime Minister Demirel rejected the offer by President Ford
of $50 million in weapons grants in return for reopening the bass
which had been made in Helsinki at the end of July. (The President
had offered the arms gr-ant under legislation permitting him to provide
arms to friendly countries when the executive branch considered such
aid vital to the national security.) Turkey refused the grant on tlhe
basis that it was unwilling in principle to accept as a gift what it was
quite willing and able to pay for. The Turkish Government cliiimed
that the congressional arms eml)argo, which not only halted military
aid to Turkey, but also banned the sale of military hardware on a
commercial basis, violated common defense agreements with the United
States that committed thlie United States to supply military equipment
to NATO allies.
Even if the arms embargo should be removed, the relationship
between Ankara and Washington would probably not be the same
because Turkish domestic politics would proscribe the reopening of
all tlhe bases. Such leases as Turkey would consider e:.sential to tlie
NATO alliance might be reopened, but mnder NATO, rather than
American control. Appearing before the Senate Committee on Armed
Services on July 30, Secretary of Defense James S,.lesinger said that
several of the U.S. installations taken over by Turkey "cannot be
duplicated," and that "others can be duplicated at considerable
In response to the suspension of operations at U.S. installations in
Turkey and to deteriorating" United States-Turkishi relations, the
chairman and rankii,'g mu minority member of the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations introduced S. 2130 on July 30. The bill contained
the same language as S. 846 which had been rejected by the House on
July 24. The T'urkish.- aid provisions were attached to an authorization
for the Board of International Broadcasting for fiscal year 1976. On
July 31, the Senate passed the bill by a vote of 47-46. The bill failed to
come to a vote in the House before the August recess, which began
on August 1, because of parliamentary maneuvers by its opponents.
House Rules Committee Chairman MIadden refused to convole tlie
committee to consider grantiinl the rule n(,.wesry for floor action.
The Committee on International Relations ]>!eP on S,.ptember 17
to consider S. 2230 following an urgent request from Pre-idel Ford
that the Turkish arms eilbargo b)e st l(,iast partially lift,.l l-.:t U.S.
security interests in the eastern Mediterranean be jeopardized beyond
repair. The committee reported the bill on September 22 (H. Rept. 94-
500). As reported, the measure l)ermitted (1) delivery of approxi-


)natelv $1S4.9 million of military equipment contracted for by tl1
"lTurkish Government prior to the February 5 cutoff; (2) commercial
caishi sales; and (3) U.S. Government sales, credits, and guarantees
for equipment considere. necesiaryv for Turkey's defense responsi-
biiities to XATO. "Fle latter, however, would be permitted only after
enactment of the fiscal year 1976 Foreign Military Sales Act autlhor-
izat ion bill.
Debate on S. 2230 followed much the same argument as had occurred
for S. 846. but it included announcements by various House Members
tl,;t they were switching their positions and supporting a suspension
of the embargo. Tleir principal reason was the deterioration of I.S.
security interests in the eastern Mediterranean region. On October 2.
the House approved S. 2:230). as amended, by a vote of 2;'7-17(;. The
Senate concurred with tlhe House amendment on October 3, and tlhe
mie;isure was approved on October 6 (Public Law 91-104).
Turkey, in re-p)Onse to thf, pa.-sage of the bill. announced that ncgo-
tiations on the status of U.S. military installations in Turkey would
resume after Turkey's mlidtrmi elections of Octol)er 12. Turkishl For-
eign Minister Caglayangil termed the vote "a positive step toward
liftingir tlle sha(low that I;,is fallen on Turkislh-Anierican relation.-."
Greek Government officials were reported as having acknowledged
fliat the arms embargo hlad not accomplished the p lrlp)Ose of forcing
Turkey to make concessions o,.er the Cyprus i:-sue, and that they
: appearedd willing to try 1: new ipt)1roach.
On October :',), lPreside; t Ford trans-niitted to the Congress l)roi)ose((l
revisions to draft l'Qi.slation, originally forwarded on May 15. to
authorize foreign assis-tance programIs fIor fiscal year 1976 and 1977
and for tlie transition period July 1, 1976, through September 30, 1976.
These revisions contained specific amounts, including $75 million in
military assistance and $1-3) million in foreign military sales credits
for Turkey. (Greece would receive $50 million in MAP and $110
million in FMS credits.) The President stated that these amounts
"take into consideration urgent needs for defense articles and services
oni the part of these two important NATO allies." Tlhe President's
proposals were introduced a.s H.R. 10594 and S. 26(62. On December 8,
complying within provisions of Public Law 94-104, President Ford
s,11imitted his first report on administration efforts to help resolve the
Cyprus dispute. In the report, the President said that he hliad initiated
Ialks with 1)oth sides and with concerned European allies. Ile stated
tl:iat there had been "a na'),wing of differences on most of (lie key
ih.5si s lecssary to ,,egotiat a (';iCyprs solutionn"

The Jic'k-,r,)I-Va ik :,ii:iir 1 :',t Il)assedl by Congress in 1974 was
pr',)iipt(ed by specific ci'v,'(,rn alb)olt thle Soi'et Un io)'s treatment of
t -.I( minoritv ;.'il (!(',s ot f .-o (,.In M e]l rIS of ('()Congress tI at t e
Sovi,,( T niii i :'.;! l r 1i,;u)iIir!,f l c ,l'cs ionis (o hI uiiii:,11 rigl)ts in (x-
,. I ,,i:',, f .or )(')1(clijt r,',iv l fr[' tie Uniitedl StZtest ."l1,i -infninl~ iit
(lith, IXv f tht T'ic l(1 Act of 1.)74--I)ulic Ia w ,;- IS) proklil)its
ce.',I .:,fii ,i of IU.S. (o,\ P'1' il'nt cr'hits and ufmost-falvo;'ed nation (.MFN)
tr':,!( .t:!ii- ilo .(ert.i (' ,iiuiiiiii!ist (co ltri' s tih t restrict free e in gri-
*I'rpiaiirr- I by C rnrlo Lalttl rla. mni:ly-t In Eur'roj-nn affairs.

tion of tlher citizen,. unless the President makes a favorable deter-
mination on conditions for a specific country and asks Congress to
wa i ve the Trade Act restrictions.
Despite what appeared in October 1974 to be Soviet acceptance of
the link between emigration of Jews and reception of U.S. trade can-
cessions, the Soviet Government informed the United States on Janu-
ary 10. 1975, that it could not accept the conditions Congress had
attached to the Trade Act, as it considered the congressional action to
be interference in Soviet internal affairs. Consequently, through 1975
an impasse blocked the administration's plans to normalize commercial
relations with the Soviet Union.
This apparent stalemate raised three essential questions about con-
gressional intervention in the conduct of foreign policy: Did the
amendment hinder or hurt the detente process; did it cause the Soviet
Union to purposefully cut the number of Jews allowed to leave, and so
act to the detriment of Soviet Jews; and did its restrictions cause
IT.S. enterprise to lose trade opportunities to other industrialized
nations which offer the Soviet Union normal trade relations and
official credits?
Because it may come to be regarded as one of the first successful
congressional attempts to alter the administration's detente objectives,
the Jackson-Vanik amendment may eventually be credited with more
influence in redefining U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations than it deserves, for
subsequent developments in 1975 (Portugal, Southeast Asia, Africa,
comparative defense postures) are perhaps more important as sources
of increasing criticism of detente in the United States.
The Soviet Government obviously regarded Congress insistence on
the amendment as a setback; but evidence also suggested the Soviet
1Union was willing to regard these developments as a temporary slow-
(lown in only one area of improving U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations. It is con-
ceivable that the Soviet Government has been expecting that its Octo-
ber 1972 lend-lease agreement with thle ITnited States will provide
additional incentive to Congress to change the stand on trade with the
Soviet U-nion. Under the agreement, the Soviet Union is not required
to make any additional payments on the agreed debt other than the .48
million already paid unless tlhe United States grants the U.S.S.R.
MEN status by the end of 1976.
The Soviet, refusal to implement the 1972 trade agreement with the
T united States did spark some controversy between the administration
and Congress about the role of Congress in foreign policyvmnakii!,.
Proponents of the Jackson-Yanik provisions rel)utted admi ili tration
criticism with an announcement of their firm support for the legisla-
tion as passed. They maintained the Soviet Union had bre.'chled a com-
mitme it made in good faith and criticizedd the administration for
attei pting to blame Congress for the Soviet Union's bad behavior.
After this sho-'t excluI,"e. congressional attention to tliis issue do,-
,r.',ased markedlly :t after February 1975.
President Ford did try to raise the i-sue again in April when lie
called for remedial legislation to cori'ect the impas-e on trade and
emigration and repair danlage done to U.S. foreign policv interests.
None was forthcoming. Bills(TJ.R. 3307, T.R. 5313) submitted to the
Subcommnnittee on International Trade. Investment. and Moneta ry Pol-
icyv of the House B:1inkiil', Currency, and Holcsi nc Commiittee to e;., :


S300 million Export-Import Bank credit ceiling on commercial agree-
mnents with thle Soviet Union received minimal attention. In any case,
these bills skirted the essential issue that the Soviet Union remains
ineligible for U.S. Government credits, regardless of any ceiling, until
it satisfies the Jackson-Vanik conditions or those conditions are
It is probably accurate to say the Jackson-Vanik amendment's ef-
fect on Jewish emigration was probably greater while it was being
d(lebated than after it became law. In 193, when the House first con-
sidered the trade legislation, emigration reached a peak of near 35,000
for the year. After the House approved the Jackson-Vanik amend-
ment in December 1973, the rate of Jewish emigration declined each
year. The decline in 1974 may have been a signal to the Senate of the
consequences if Congress were to approve the legislation or it may have
been the natural result of the Yom Kippur war and other factors which
caullsed fewer Soviet Jewish citizens to want to leave. Once the legis-
lation passed the Senate, emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union
further declined to a 5-year low, of only approximately 14,000 leaving
the U.S.S.R. in 1975. Soviet authorities argue the decline is natural.
Critics feel it has been expressly controlled by the Soviet Government.
Two essential considerations remain. First, although harassment
and other measures to discourage a desire to emigrate persist, the
Soviet Government has continued to let a certain number of Jews leave.
Second, Congress has the power to repeal or alter its legislation, so
that some levera 'e may still exist that could perhaps produce a com-
promise understanding.
Continued congressional interest in the emigration question and
human rights (also stimulated by the conclusion in Helsinki of the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) was expressed
when two delegations visited the Soviet Union; one from the Senate
in late .-lune 1975, and the other from the House in August. During
these visits members of the delegations also met with Soviet Jews
wanting to emigrate in order to discuss their problems first hand.
Somn. m-mbers of the delegations reportedly conceded that the Jack-
son-Vanik provisions were not helping the situation for Soviet Jews,
and raised the possibility of some future action to bypass the current
trade bars. if the Soviet Union could give evidence of progress on
luiman rights issues. Other members doubted Ilhe utility of any link
between trade and emigration.6
Congress did. however, agree to grant MFN and credit eligibility to
Romania. Rom:iniat and the United States siarned a trade agreement
on April 2, 1975, but Congriess waited until Julv before approving it
in order to have an observable improvement, in Romania's emigration
rnte as evidoul o of progress. Senator Jackson and others supported
tlis step, claiming that. nan understanding with Romania indicated the
tr(lo slation plrovisions on emigration were workable.
B''.9 manIny complex factors influence. the level of U.S.-U.S.S.R.
tr:i(!C. it is beyond th(e s ol)e of this report to make a definitive assess-
UT S CEnnI"fr.. :
,.riife: r'olTninilto oft tern onF i ,TIftl n.i I',nctrfs nnrl T'nd rl Stttp-SonvI et Rnlntlonn.
ir.ni1lltvp Print. 94th (one., l0t ess. Wn,;hningtnn, I..S. Government Printing Offlep. 1975.
-V: "".
irii-: C',mrltti- on thfr .Jii rlInry. El"drratilnn of SnIrlot .TpWq. 'ronmmlttee Print. 94tb
'iiL,. 241 os. W i1Nhinutnn. I.S G vrveriiiimint Printing Offi er, 1976. 54 pp.


ment of the effect of the Jackson-Vanik amendment on U.S. trade with
the Soviet Union. The administration contends a lack of United States
MFN and credits has caused the Soviet Union to turn to other coun-
tries for technological imports, but such U.S. trade has not been shut
off either. Soviet trade officials have apparently indicated their esti-
mate of lost U.S. trade to be near $5 billion. Such an estimate cannot
be uncritically accepted, but at the same time should not be completely
In conclusion, it would appear that the Jackson-Vanik amendment
since its passage, has not really furthered the interests of Soviet Jews
trying to leave the Soviet Union and that leverage which caused the
Soviet Union to take steps to influence Congress' decision is now
diminished. Some Members of Congress became aware of this develop-
ment, but did not propose significant measures to help correct the
current impasse. Essentially, Congress' attention has been deferred,
while both sides have reassessed certain elements of East-West trade
relations. Moreover, proponents of the amendment can claim that it
has been successfully applied with regard to Romania, and the the next
step, therefore, should be up to the Soviet Union.
Under current conditions, U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade of significant volume
can continue; but such factors as credit and a rapidly increasing Soviet
balance-of-payments deficit with the West (perhaps in the range of S4
to $5 billion in 1975 according to a CIA estimate) may change the main
lines of future commercial relations. Soviet agricultural performance
also affects the flexibility of the Soviet Union on trade decisions with
the West. Finally, U.S.-U.S.S.R. political relations, mainly, and also
progress on nuclear arms agreements, could strongly affect Congress
reaction to trade developments with the Soviet Union.

Major Functional Problems Facing U.S. Foreign Policy

INTRODUCTION----- --------------------------------------------------- 67
Conventional arms transfers----- ---------------------------------- 68
Nuclear exports, nuclear proliferation---------------------------- 73
SALT talks 78
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency --------------- 82
REL.ATIONS WITH THE THIRD WORLD--------------------------------- 84
Foreign aid--------------------------------------------------- 84
Multilateral economic relations with developing countries----------- 92
International monetary affairs------- ---------------------100
Foreign investment policy---- ---------- --------- 102
International trade- ----------------------- 109
Review of 1976 General Assembly -------------------------------112
Seventh Special Session, September 1975: Preparations and results--- 115
Participation in the 30th session--------------------------------- 115
Congress and financing the U.N. system ___------ ----------------- 116
The status of Israel-------------------------------------------- 117
Other congressional activities----------------------------------- 119
Congress and U.S. foreign energy policy ------------- 121
U.S. international food policy.. ----------------- 126
Congress and the Law of the Sea----- -----------132
Space research- -------------------------3
Other international environmental issues------ ---------------- 141
Human rights_ 146
Status of MIA's --------------------------150


This section attempts to observe the congressional role in some of
the basic foreign policy issues facing the United States, such as
weapons control, U.S. relations with the Third World, other interna-
tional economic questions, participation in international institutions,
and problems of the "International Common." A common thread run-
ning through all these issues is the concept of interdependence. As
used here, the term implies many linkages: between U.S. domestic and
foreign policies; the interrelationships of such issues as agriculture,
energy, economics, nuclear proliferation, trade, et cetera; as well as
emphasis on U.S. relations with other countries, for these problems
can only be resolved by the world community of nations.
As the line between foreign and domestic policy fades on many
issues, the congressional role in determining U.S. policy in many
cases becomes more important. Congressional prerogatives in trade
regulation, foreign aid, commodities regulation, and support for
U.S. participation in international institutions place increasing re-
sponsibilty on Congress for the determination of U.S. policy priorities.
This section examines some of the major functional problems of U.S.
foreign policy, focusing primarily on those aspects of the issues which
require congressional consideration.


In recent years, the m0st significant trend in the transfer of U.S.
conventional arms to foreign nations has been the decreasing use of
Military assistance program (MAP) grant aid and the increasing
reliance on the foreign military sales (FMS) program. The military
assistance program las been reduced from an appropriation of $5.7
billion in 1952 to less than .$800 million per year for the last 8 years.
In fiscal year 1975, thei amount appropriated for the MAP was
$475 million. Conversely, U.S. Government cash and credit arms
sales under the FMS program have grown from $1.6 billion in fiscal
year 1971 to over $10 billion in fiscal year 1974 and $9.5 billion in
fiscal year 1975. The most dramatic increase in the FMS program
1has been the sale of large amounts of sophisticated weapons, as well as
tra-ning and logistics support, to the oil-producing states of the
Middle East.
APn7s sa.le
This concentration of arms transfers to the Middle East, as well as
tlie large amounts of arms and military services involved, stimulated
increased congressional interest in the role of the United States as
perhaps the world's leading supplier of military equipment. This
interest focused on the policy issues involved in these transfers and
on thie lack of congressional control or oversight over many aspects of
the arms transfer program. Many in Congress have felt that the United
States has emerged as the world's leading arms merchant with little
thought or emphasis, other than economic, on the foreign policy impli-
cations of these sales, particularly sales to the Middle East/Persian
Gulf area. Such arms sales, it has been contended, contribute to and,
in(leed, stimulate regional arms races, encouraging certain regimes
to givee undue attention to military as opposed to social-economic
development. Arms transfers are also said to link the United States
with regimes prone to practices inimical to our concepts of human
(digtlity, to promote regional instability, and to increase the ability
f9nd tlie willingness of these nations to resort to force, using U.S.
;'rii to :pttlee international dlisputes. Moreover, it was alleged, this
ni:,ssive transfer of weapons, technology, and training reduces U.S.
force readliness, creates U.S. military commitments, and could involve
t1i, United States in international disputes in ways in which we do not
w.shm to be involved. In addition, there was sonie ap)prehlnsion that
'.S. control over these weapons once they are. transferred is, at best.
t,.-I1ols :a1pd tlat ithey could be transferred to other nations and used
in \'';i vs not inteinued. ;is for e\;iinplo. :mgaimist Israel.
P i'\. \ rp,! by TriTrbh rl Y. S'liiinillr. Icl:,l'a t In na tlin al tilfeni s .
( ;,5)


In response to these policy issues concerning U.S. arms transfers,
several committees held hearings on arms sales programs and policies
during 1975. Closed hearings, later published, were conducted by a
subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee in April which
focused on the impact on U.S. readiness of sales of military equip-
ment.1 In March, the Subcommittee on International Political and
Military Affairs of the House International Relations Commnittee con-
ducted hearings on a request by Ethiopia to purchase arms from the
United States to combat a rebel group in Eritrea.2 The same subcom-
mittee later that month conducted hearings concerning the training of
foreign military forces by U.S. civilian contractors.3 Of particular in-
terest to the subcommittee was a contract which had recently been
made public for the training of the Saudi Arabian national guard by
the Vinnell Corp. The Senate Armed Services Committee, also in
March, held executive hearings on the modernization of the Saudi
Arabian national guard. That same month, the Special Subcommittee
on the Middle East of the House Armed Services Committee reported
on a visit by 18 members of the committee to the Middle East and com-
mented on U.S. arms sales to the region as well as on the Vinnell con-
tract.4 In this regard the subcommittee report stated:
Selling military equipment and weapons systems to countries such as Saudi
Arabia invariably involves the selling of training as well * *. In summary,
the contract is not inconsistent with the kind of technical assistance that 11u
been provided in the past.
A special study mission to gather information on U.S. arms sales
to Iran. Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, was conducted by Representative
Pierre S. duii Pont IV, during the period May 22-31, 1975. In his re-
port to the House International Relations Committee, Representative
du Pont. concluded that, "the United States and the Persian Gulf na-
tions have legitimate reasons to engage in the transfer of arms,"
although he also felt that the United States, "should initiate a policy
of restraint in its arms sales in terms of absolute amounts, level of
sophistication of the weapons, and the percentage of each national
market it controls." 5
Annual hearings held from 1972 to 1974 on the Persian Gulf by the
former Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia were continued
in 19795 by the Special Subcommittee on Investi'ations of the House
International Relations Committee. These hearings, held during June
nnd July 1975, focused on the continuing (debate on arms sales to the
Persian Gulf and provided, in the words of the subcom nittee chair-
1 I'.S. Congress, Senate: Committee on Appropriations. Department of Defense Apprn-
priations. fiscal year 1076. hearings before a Subcommittee on Appropriatlons. ..
94th Cone'.." let sess.. Washineton. UT.S. Government Printing Office, 1975. pp. 169-2";..
2TT.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on Foreign Affairs. U.S. Policy
and Rerniquest for Sale of Arms to Ethiopia, hcarinz before the Subcommittee on International
Political an(d Military Affairs. 94th Cong., 1st sess.. Mar. 5, 1975. Washington, U.S. Govern-
ment Printlnz Office. 1975.
Committee on International Relations. U.S. Defense Contractor's Training of Foreign
Military Forceq. hearings before the Subcomnmittee on International Political and Military
Affairs. 94th Cong., 1st sess., Miar. 20. 1975. Washington, U.S. Government Printing
Office. 1975.
4 Committee on Armed Services. report of the Special Subcommittee on the Middle
94th Con".. 1st seags,, Mar. 11, 1975 (HASC No. 94-3. Washington, U.S. Government
Printing Office. 1975.
5T U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on International R-lations. I.S.
Arm< S:.l,,q tn the Persiann Gulf. report of a study mtision to Iran. Kuwait. and Saudi
Arabia. May 22-31. 1975. Dec. 19, 1975. 94th Cong.. 1st sess. Washington. U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1975.


man. "an essential background on an area of vital foreign policy con-
terni." 6
Thle major provision of law which gives Congress approval or dis-
aapproval authority over cash sales of arms is contained in section
36(b) of the. Foreign Military Sales Act. This section (the Nelson
amendment) adopted in 1974 requires that any letter of offer to sell
defense articles or services in thle amount of $25 million or more shall
be submitted to the Congress prior to being issued, and shall not be
issued if tlhe Congress, within 20 calendar days after receiving such
statement, adopts a concurrent resolution stating that it objects to the
proposed sale. This provision is waived, however, if the President cer-
tifies that an emergency exists which requires such sale in the national
seceurit v interests of the United States.
On July 14, 1975, Congressman Jonathan Bingham and 10 co-
sponsors introduced House Concurrent Resolution 337 disapproving
proposed sale to Jordan of air defense systems (Hawk and Vulcan). A
similar resolution (Senate Concurrent Resolution 50) had been intro-
duced by Senator Case on July 11. Hearings were conducted in the
House on the Binghamin resolution on July 16 and 17,7 and on July 24,
t0ie International Relations Committee formally reported the resolu-
tion disapproving tlihe proposed sale on the grounds that its excessive
size would tilt the balance of power in the Middle East against Israel
and virtually guarantee that Jordan would be drawn into any future
conflict. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held public hear-
intgs on Senate Concurrent Resolution 50 on July 15 and 21, 1975, and
held executive hearings on July 18, 21, 24, and 25, 1975. However, no
ict ion was taken.
Following action of the House International Relations Committee,
the Department of State, after consultation with members of the
committee, agreed to suspend temporarily the Hawk sale and again
seek to negotiate a compromise. On September 3, the administration
notified Congress of its intention to offer Jordan the same Hawk
missile package which Congress objected to in July. Apparently no
compromise had been arranged, despite Secretary Kissinger's visit
to Jordan following the successful conclusion of the negotiations onil
a new agreement in Sinai.
Consequently, on September 4, Congressmian Bingham introdiuceed
House Concurrent Resolution 382 which again would have prohibited
the proposed sale. On this occasion, however, a compromise, was
reached. In a communication to the Congress on September 17 8 the
President indicated that tlie. Government of Jordan had indicated
that these, missile systems would be permanently installed at fixed
sites as defensive and nonmohile antiaircraft, weapons. This pledge,
which sought to insure that these weapons could not be used in an
offensive, role, and thus would pose neither strategic threat to Israel
I'.S'. (,jigrer,. TIhsiiqe ot RepreHmntnllve4, Committee on International Relation,. the
Persinln G;nlf. 11)75: 'hp f',,nttnulne lph'ito on Arni SnPlhps, hnrings before the Speeial
Subcommittee on Investigations, 94th Cong.. let sess. Washington, U.S. Government
Pr'i-i ng I line ,.. 197.5.
'71V.S. ChJimrus.. ITnv,,e ut RIPrno.ntntlvp., Commlttee on Internntilonal Relations. Sub-
'oiilnil t i f, wi Internlit lonin l l'nlltlinl aind Military AffnirtA. ipropostld male to .,ordnn of the
TRawk nrid Vulcan Air Defent', Sy Ryrnt hllnrlng,. July 16 and 17, 1075. 94th Cong., list
l.qKr. Wn% wilntton. IT Government Printing Offlce, 1975.
SOTTS. (',iivri,,'. ilolMe. ('ornm unltit Inn from Iho Prldepnt of the iTnited StRtee tranp-
inltting Information concerning tihe sale of Hawk nntlalrcraft missile to Jordan, 94th
(',IL' 1st ses. JIoii. l)ls Dociument N11. 94-256. Washington, U.S. Government Printing
<)1ir,., I' I75.


nor affect the power balance in the Middle East, was satisfactory to
the Congress and, on September 17, House Concurrent Resolution
382 was withdrawn.
Two other resolutions to prohibit proposed arms sales under the
provisions of section 36(b) were introduced in the closing weeks of
the first session of the 94th Congress. On December 10, Mr. Rosenthal
submitted House Concurrent Resolution 507 which objected to a pro-
posed sale to Saudi Arabia of certain defense articles and on December
18, Mr. Zablocki introduced House Concurrent Resolution 517 which
objected to the proposed sale of F-15 aircraft to Israel. The Sub-
committee on International Political and Military Affairs held a hear-
ing on House Concurrent Resolution 507 on December 17, but no
further action was taken on either of these resolutions prior to the
end of the 20-day period allowed for congressional disapproval action.
One additional legislative action was taken by the Congress in 1975
on the issue of arms sales. Section 150 of the Foreign Relations Au-
thorization Act., fiscal year 1976 (Public Law 94-141), signed by the
President on November 29, 1975, amended section 414 of the Mutual
Security Act of 1954, section 42(A) of the Foreign Military Sales
Act and section 511 of the Foreign Assistance Act to require that all
decisions concerning issuing licenses for export of articles on the
U.S. munitions list, any sale proposed to be made, or the furnishing
of military assistance:
shall be made in coordination with the Director of the U.S. Arms Control and
Disarm.' ment Agency and shall take into account the Director's opinion as to
whether such decision might contribute to an arms race, or increase the pos-
sibility of outbreak or escalation of conflict, or prejudice the development of
bilateral or multilateral arms control agreements.
Grant military aid
Although grant military aid, as indicated, is now a small portion
of total U.S. arms transfers, this program received a great deal of
congressional interest and action in 1975. First, the fiscal year 1975
appropriations bill for economic and military assistance (Public Law
94-11) was not cleared until March 1975, three-fourths of the way
through the fiscal year. This bill appropriated $475 million for grant
military assistance, $125 million less than had been authorized, and
$732 million less than had been requested by the administration (al-
though the administration request had included $222 million for
The rapid sequence of events in Cambodia and South Vietnam gen-
erated congressional action on a number of bills whose provisions
reflected the changing military conditions, with a variety of com-
mittees considering separate bills dealing with the President's mili-
tary aid requests, refugee assistance, troop authority, and appropri-
ations. As they were overtaken by events, the bills were dropped or
A total ban on arms transfers to Turkey in reaction to the improper
use. of U.S.-supplied armaments in the Turkish invasion of (Cypruq,
took effect on February 5, 1975. On October 3, Congress rever'sed it-
self and cleared a bill (Public Law 94-104) partial:dly ending this 8-
month prohibition on military aid and arms sales to Turkey. (For
additional details Turkish aid controversy see pp. 54-60.)
An llth hour Senate battle aimed at shutting off U.S. military aid
to two factions fighting a Communist-backed group in the Angola


civil war lield iup final congressional action on the $90.5 billion fiscal
197C. defense appropriations bill (I.R. 9S61).
Tieo LOuse on December 12 approved the conference report on i le
',ill. bItt when the bill reaclied tihe Senate floor on December 15. a
coalition of Senators led by John V. Tumnney insisted that a amend-L
n,.liit be added baiming tlhe uise of any funds appropriated in the act
fir "any activities involving Angola other than intelligence
This proposal was debated in open and secret sessions over a 4-day
period, and was filly approve,', by the Senate on December 19. The
1!( fellse appropriation bill wa1 thlien returned to conference to resolve
tlii- issue. The conference accepted the Seniate ban on funds for Angola
:i;d the bill containing this provi.-ion was adopted by the House on
J,,.uarv 27, 1976 and was signed into law (Public Law 94-212) on
February 9, 1976. (For additional details, see pp. 174-181, United
States-Africa relations.)
On May 15, 1975, the President forwarded to the Congress draft,
l.,';lation to authorize foreign assistance programs for fiscal year
1976 and 1977, and for the transition period July 1. 1976 through
September 30. 1976 (the new fiscal year beginning in fiscal year 1977
will begin on October 1 rather than July 1). This proposal was printed
as House Document 94-158 and was introduced in tihe Senate as S. 1S16.
Because of uncertainties caused by clanging eveiits, particularly in tlhe
Middle lEast anl Indochii.a, specific :mnoutrts for security assistance
programs were not included in this draft legislation.
On October 30, 1975, the President tranusnitted to the Congress
proposed revisicnis to this draft legislation which included specific
.rmoii;uts for security assistance programs. The President proposes for
fiscal year 1976 the following authorizations (dollars in millions):
Military assistance program -------------------------------------- $422. (0
Training -------------------------------------------------------29. 30
I.MS credit sales ------------------------- -------------------- 2,374.70
Security supporting assistance --------------------------------------- 1, S67. .55
Middle East special requirements---------------------------------- -50.00
Seveiity percent of tlie fiscal year 1976 program is concentrated in
the Middle, East. These proposals were introduced as H.R. 10594 iiand
S. 2(GG2.
Primarily because, of tlhe late submission of tlhe President's request
for funding* for the security assistance program, authorizing legisla-
tion for tlhis program wats considered separately in 1975 from auttlhor-
izinjr legislation )nl economic as-istan ce programs.
I :iii g.- oni tliese bills focused on t]ih policy issues which lhad coln-
:d ( trogout, tie year--tlie foreign policy aspects of
ihe program. its statutory framIewOIr'k, and possible ways to bring
ibouit -A i ',g(iwi'ncd legislative (cmitrols oil arms transfers.
Girei t lv lmodifid versions of these bills were reported out of com-
,,itte(' a l( lpasse('di bv ('ach Ilouuse inl early 1976 (S. 26(. ') paSsed Felru-
:ry is, 19,(,6; LH.R. 1190w3, pal)ssd MIar'cli 1970; conference report
P:asse('I April '29, 1976). TheI bill iIc (uded m amy major modifications to
t lic sc111rit v assistance programs II and was described by the Senate For-
eigi 1 relations Committee as "thie most significant piece of legislation
in the field of foreign miilitary assistance policy since the enactment
(f tli( M1utual Security Act more t.hlum a quarter of a century ago.
Sowv. "is bill was vetoed by tlhe President on May 7, 1976.


Thus, 1975 was a period of increased congressional interest in all
policy aspects of U.S. arms transfer programs. It was a year of fact-
findling hearings, and investigations on this subject, leading to at-
tempts to make major modifications to the program in 1976 which
wold emphasize expanded and strengthened congressional! control
over all aspects of U.S. arms transfers.

The issue of controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons is a
problem area where a number of commercial, economic, and politi-
cal interests converge both domestically and internationally. The
problem-proliferation of a nuclear weapons capability to other coun-
tries-and the goal-nonproliferation of nuclear weapons-are much
easier to define than are the steps which the United States as a member
of the community of nations might take to realize the goal.9 This state
of affairs was reflected in congressional activity which tended to
stress the immediacy and urgency of the problem, but which was
limited to exploratory efforts at defining general recommendations
to alleviate the problem rather than to solve it.
The desirability of avoiding a further proliferation of nuclear
weapons has increased as the number of nations capable of acquiring
such weapons has grown and as there is no corresponding increase in
world political stability. Unfortunately, in this respect, the growing
need for energy sources other than fossil fuels has led to an increased
emphasis on nuclear power and many nations now have the need and
the means to acquire the materials and technology of nuclear power
from the major nuclear exporting countries: The United States, the
Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and Germany.
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),
in force since 1970, spells out the obligations of its nuclear weapon
state parties to refrain from the transfer of nuclear weapons, and of
its non-nuclear-weapon state parties not to acquire such weapons, and
the safeguarded conditions under which nuclear transfers are to take
place. Nevertheless, the fact remains that not all nations, and not even
all nuclear weapon nations, are parties to the NPT; and any party
can dissociate itself from the treaty upon 3 months' notice. Thus, even
on a formalistic-legaalistic level, restraints on military nuclear ac-
quisition are only partial. On the economic level, it is possible for
almost any relatively affluent nation to obtain the expertise and ma-
terials needed for the production of some nuclear weapons.
Section 123(d) of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended [Public Law
93-485 (88 Stat. 1460), 42 U.S.C. 2153] gives Congress the power to
veto any agreement for cooperation in nuclear energy with other
countries entered into by the United States. These agreements are the
vehicle by which transfers of nuclear information and materials take
Prepared by Dagnija Sterste-Perldns. nnalytt in international rl-itnoiis.
9 Some observers have questioned the desirability and realismin of nonproliferation per v-
as a zoal. Alton Frye in a Jan. 11. 1976. New York Time. rnazazine nrtile. "How to R1n
the Bomb: Sell It," cites legitimate regional security threats and resultant fears of the
nonnuclear weapon states as an Inexorable motivation for their acquiring nuclear ,"ij'itv.
To alleviate this precnrions situation In whihli there Is no rewnr proposes that the United States and the Soviet Union devise "erpidible arrniurenints" to
protect nonnuclear states against the threat or use of nuclear weIponl. He ,iingg1,tq provi-
sion by the superpowers, in the event of a nuclear nttnck on the territory nf a iionnivi'.cir
state, nf a comparable number nnd scale of nuclear weapons with which the victim could
74-( T o 2


place and hence by which nuclear proliferation can occur. By this
means, Congress has an opportunity to control U.S. international
nuclear policy. But, it is not clear to what extent Congress can over-
see the details of each individual proposed transaction, and the main
congressional efforts to deal with nuclear proliferation during the past
session concerned general policy guidelines.
The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy has long been concerned
with domestic and international aspects of nuclear energy. In a recent
report to Congress summarizing issues of concern regarding nuclear
developments,1" the committee stressed the necessity for agreement
among the nuclear supplier nations "so that transactions will not be
conducted on the basis of which nuclear supplier has the least rigorous
safeucard requirements," and said that such negotiations should be
a "top foreign policy priority." The report also suggested expanding
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), role from detec-
tion to include prevention of diversion of nuclear material, and em-
phasized the need to assess the part that security assurances on the
part of the United States might play in leading nations to ratify and
adhere to the NPT.11 And the report posed a question: Is it wise for
the United States to use nuclear reactors and technology as "interna-
tional political bargaining chips"? This report was submitted pur-
suant to Public Law 93-514 (88 Stat. 1611) and served as a tool for
congressional and public understanding.
The congressional committees with preeminent responsibility in for-
eign policy and international affairs considered the problems of nuclear
proliferation during this session. The Subcommittee on International
Security and Scientific Affairs of the House International Relations
Cominiittee held hearings 12 on House Concurrent Resolution 371 and
Senate Concurrent Resolution 69, which deal in a comprehensive way
with horizontal and vertical proliferation issues.13 Starting with the
final declaration of the NPT review conference as a point of reference,
the resolutions make four recommendations with respect to arms con-
trol negotiations: Embodiment of the Vladivostok recommendations
in a treaty and a subsequent further mutual reduction in strategic
weapons; conclusion of an agreement to end all underground nuclear
explosions; a halt to nuclear transfers to countries not party to the
NPT or not accepting IAEA safeguards; and negotiation of an agree-
inent to reprocess all plutonium resulting from nuclear transfers in
regional multinational facilities. Testimony from administration offi-
cials slated, on the whole, that the resolutions do not conflict with cur-
rent UI.S. policy objectives and negotiations. The resolutions were not
report ed out of committee during 1975.
The Subconmittee on Arms Control, International Organizations,
and Security Agreements of the Senate Foreirn Relations Committee
held a number of hearings on various proliferation issues throughout
10 '.S. Cniirres. J.Toint Committee on Atomic Energy. Development. Use, and Control
of EIn'rL'y for lhip Conimon Defense nnd Security and for Peaceful Purposes. First
annual report to the United States Congress by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
piirsuint to siRe. 202(b) of the Atomic Energy Act. as amended. 94th Cong., 1st sess. I1.
lTH-it. No. 94 3 ;f. Wnishlngton. U.S. Government Printing Office. 1975. 104 pp.
11 Senator Symlngton and staff from the Foreign Relations. Armed Services, and .TJoint
Atomic E-,ifrrv ('onimlttetfH had visited the IAEA in Vienna and SALT negotiators In
Gorywvn ,Jin, 2'9--.llv 3.
U.1,S. CongroHs. House:. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on Inter-
national Seutirltv rind Seientifilc Affairs. Nuclear IProliferation : Future U.S. Foreign Polir'y
lmpll1-tloim. livanrIncs. Oft. 21. 23.. 2. 30:; Nov. 4 nnd 5, 1975. 94th Cong.. 1st sess. Wash-
ington. UIT.S. Government Printing Office. 1975. 506 pp.
Ia flrliznitnl pr,,llfrrntlon refers to thei further Initial acquisition of nuclear weapons
"hll4 verti.fil plrllfi-ratlon refr-rs to additionH to currently existing nuclear stockpiles.


the year, none of which had been printed by the end of the session. On
December 10, the full committee reported favorably Senate Resolu-
tion 221,14 which was agreed to by the Senate December 12. The resolu-
tion calls on the President to assume international leadership in seek-
ing cooperation to strengthen the IAEA, to consult in the United
Nations and elsewhere on increasing international efforts to strengthen
and broaden safeguards, and to seek cooperation with suppliers to
restrain nuclear transfers. The resolution had the support of the
administration and was passed by voice vote without substantial
The House Interior and Insular Affairs Subcommittee on Energy
and the Environment devoted a substantial part of its 1975 oversight
hearings on nuclear energy to problems of international prolifera-
tion.15 Chairman Udall articulated four recommendations for the
United States to promote in formulating new international policies:
Strengthening the IAEA; cooperation among exporting states to
obtain strict safeguard agreements from all recipient states; placing
enrichment and reprocessing facilities under international control in
regional centers; and developing a long-range energy policy which
would produce alternative energy sources to nuclear power.
Actions by the United States alone cannot, of course, solve the pro-
liferation problem, which is tied in with international political con-
siderations. As regards the interaction of U.S. nuclear capacity and
foreign needs for nuclear power, commercial considerations come into
play. Export of U.S. nuclear technology, materials, and facilities is
expected by the Energy Research and Development Adninistration to
surpass U.S. aircraft sales as the main nonagricultural balance-of-pay-
ments asset in the next few years. In 1974, U.S. sales of uranium enrich-
ment services abroad amounted to $421 million and it is expected that
sales over the next decade will total about $5 billion-in addition to
$1.5 to $2 billion annually in sales of services, equipment, and facilities
by the U.S. nuclear industry. When the United States sells nuclear
materials abroad, it is under safeguards contained in agreements
between the United States and the recipient country and the IAEA.
IAEA safeguards include protective devices on the related facilities,
inspections, and on-site observers. Their purpose is to deter and to
detect any diversion of nuclear materials by the recipient country to
unauthorized, that is, military use. There has been no documented in-
stance of diversion of material in contravention of the safeguards sys-
tem."" Whether this record is testimony to universal compliance or to
the inadequacy of the safeguards can be argued, but there is near
unanimity in the conclusion that the IAEA, while doing an adequate
job under its financial and legal constraints, must be augmented in
order for its safeguards methods and personnel to be less thinly spread
over the expanding facilities for which it is and will be responsible.
14 U.S. ConaresR. Senate: Committee on Foreign Relations. International Safeguards of
Nuclear Materials: report to accompany S. Res. 221. 94th Cong., 1st sess. Rept. No. 94-525.
Womtinaton. U.S. Government Printing Office. 1975. 6 pp.
"5U.S. Congress. House: Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Subcommittee on
Energy and the Environment. Oversight hearings on nuclear energy-International Pro-
liferation of Nuclear Technology. Hearings, July 21, 22. and 24, 1975. 94th Cong., 1st
sess. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975. 118 pp.


Two major international convocations during 1975 served to hig.h-
light the major concerns of the nuclear "haves" and "have-nots and
demonstrated (lifficlulties which eventually would have to be overcome
for successful control of proliferation of nuclear weapons. During
Ma, parties to the YPT came together ;in Geneva for the first 5-year
rev.v' of thle treat's op,,ratioil. The finil delay rat ion of the review
loirtinfl ind !Thiir-d World nations. Specificalv, it focused on reconl-
iniemi tions largely applicable to the nuclear superpowers, the United
.tanfs ;,m(. the Soviet 17nion, callirlic for priority on a coprensee
nuclear weapons test ban to halt the nuclear iarms race; stating that the
United States ond the Soviet Union. as steps toward this end. should
nMinimize their underground nuclear weapons tests and formalize the
Vladivostok agreement in a SALT agreement ",'t the earliest possible
d(ite," ;ind dleclnringr that the NPT provisions prohibiting nuclear
weapons and nuclear weapons teelhnologT transfers from nuclear
-.C: pon Qtat(-e to nonnuclear weapon states had been "faithfully ob-
se'rvd Iy all parties." Thle emphasis here was a clear indication that
nonmcle;ir weapon state: and nuclear importing states, are inrea-
in,_v loolkin, at limitations on United States and Soviet atomic weap-
nry (restrictions on "vertical proliferation") as a precondition for
strict limitations on their own activities.
kA second ;eries. of nmeetincs, initiated by- the United States and held
in secret sessions in London and Paris be1in)inpr in June. involved the
major nuclear exporting countries. Participants in these talks, which
were aimed at. promoting agreement on the universal application of
more stringent, safeguards as a precondition for any nuclear exports,
were the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom,
France. Canada. West Germany, Japan. and Italy. As the talks pro-
gressed, it was reported that the United States encountered opposition
to its proposal to establish multinational regional fuel processing cen-
ters-a proposal also advanced later by Secretary of State Kissinger
in his September 22 speech before the U.N. General Assembly-largely
because of the question of control.
It has been U.S. policy to require that the reprocessing of spent fuel
from its nuclear exports take place in U.S. plants, in order to minimize
the ri,: of diversion of wveapons-grade material which can be derived
from such fuel. Other nations, most notably West Germany in a major
:"l pr rr. jjIi'ieent with Brazil, have actu'allv exported facilities and ec,:, for ti,, ent i ie nuclear fuel ,cycle, inclicudin uraniim enriich-
nient :'rnd ,'prioe,,.ing plants. Such dicrepanlncies in export, policies of
comnmerI'ial competitors woul(l 1)e likely subjects of an international
a.',.-,Pv'ent a:monzr the nuclear Sup)pliers.
Another often ment ioneld roal would be tlie requirement by nuclear
-lppli(.rs tl:!t thle reciient corntrv ut iliz! adequminte phvsical security
iim.'IsIres to prevent thleft by subnational groups-terrorist factions,
o(tt;lW organizations, et cetera-of nuclear materials. It is not clear
now tflut md e iiate security would lbe constituted in each individual
cas, and to d(late. no materiNals are reported to have been stolen by any
sclh -'iol)p, but tlhero is a 'freneml fear that the possibilities for theft
;i Te ,E.:Ir tl they slo0iuld or could be. 'T'ie-e fears are not prompted
ijlvly by conditions in other nations but by lthi state of domestic U.S.
faivil iti(s as well. For instance, the digest of a General Accounting Of-


fice. report to Congress released April 23 17 recommended increased
security for U.S. nuclear weapons shipments that travel on highways
and streets.
The concern over physical security was embodied in legislation con-
sidered at length by the Senate Committee on Government Opera-
tions during the first session and into the second session of the 94th
Congress. The proposed Export Reorganization Act of 1975, S. 1439,
which was the subject of hearings.18 called for a system of interagency
checks on nuclear exports, including a requirement that safeguards
against theft, diversion, or sabotage in the receiving nation be at least
as stringent as those required within the United States. At various
times through the year committee Chairman Abraham Ribicoff and
other members of the committee were prominent in publicizing nuclear
proliferation problems. Other fruits of the committee's interest were
two informational volumes 19 which received wide circulation.
Opposition to legislation further restricting U.S. nuclear exports
has come from the executive branch. Pursuant to section 14 of Public
Law 93-500, the President on May 6 submitted to the Congress a re-
port on the adequacy of laws and regulations to prevent the prolifera-
tion of nuclear capability for nonpeaceful purposes, and on the ade-
quacy of domestic and international safeguards.20 Prepared by the
Energy Research and Development Administration with assistance
from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency and others, the report concluded that no additional
legislative authority was required to control nuclear exports and that
the United States was making "major efforts" to gain acceptance of
export control policies by other countries to further inhibit prolifera-
tion. With respect to physical security measures, the report stated
that the United States was working toward adoption of an interna-
tional convention on this problem and was -iding IAEA safeguard
development efforts; and that close cooperation with the other supplier
nations was necessary, "to avoid a competition which would be based
on minimizing the safeguards applicable to purchaser nations."
During the IAEA meeting in Paris at the end of May, Secretary
Kissinger assured tlhe delegates that the United States would increase
supplies of enriched uranium to mireet the demand in countries agreeing
to currently required safeguards. This statement might have been
intended to allay the fears of potential U.S. customers that increas-
ingly stringent safeguards would d )p imposed by the United States, and
to reverse the slight trend toward th.e granting of nuclear supply
contracts to other nuc!oa r exp orders.
17 Tn.erted In the Conrpss.ional Renord (dailIy edition) vol. 121, Apr. 25. 1975 : P. n by Senator Symington.
'q '.S. Conure.:.. SenatP : rommitton on Government Opr-itionc. The Exiort Ror(,ir'l:i-
tlonn Aet-1975. Hearings. Anr. 24. :'. ind. Mvay 1, 1975. 94th Cone.. 1st sess. Wa-ihingtoii.
F.S. Oovnrnent Printinr Offi,'. 11-7', 57? pp.
19TT... Con."--es. Senate: Conmmttp on Government OnpraHtion. Pnerfiul Nilp-ir
Export. and Weapons Proliferation a eoipeniuim. 94th Conz.. l.t sess. Committee print.
W'-Mn-fton. T.S Governmont PrIntli" ff- 197.'. 1.21'5 pp.
T7.. T-Pirnrv of Connrrp.s : ('onnfrp.Rinnil Rese.irch Service. Faetq on 'vvlnnr Prolif r,,-
tion ; a hlnnhnolk. Prennred for tim (on'mittee on Government Operntionn. 1'.S. Senate.
0-11 (, r*-., lt seas. W shin on. T'.S. Government PrIntinz Offlre. 1975 259 pp
20IT.S. President. 1974- (Ford). Laws .ind Resinlntlons Governlne Nnclpoir Expnrft
,mnI Doe.tic and Internationnl Niiel- r Spfeainrds. from the Prsidc.'nt "F the
Tn-'il1 States trnnQmittin" a rpnort on tIP ndeonnimy% of Inws nnd renditions to prrevfliit thile
prolife-'nt ion of nuclear cnnhillitv for ,ponp erul purnosep. nnd on the arlpqu icv of ,hinieo-
tic nnd Intprpitionnl ssff,-,'nrn1. ir.r-iiint to ictlon 1.1 of fthe Frtport .dri"ini'tr:itlnn
A:nondnmpnt- of 1974 (Pulir T.rvw 1".. 'an). 9n4th (rnnr.. 1st ses. Houe Doc. 94-1:'1
nhi'tii ton. U.. Government Printinz Offi,., 1975. 55 pp.


During 1975, the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) con-
tinued between United States and Soviet teams of negotiators in
Geneva and between Secretary of State Kissinger and various Soviet
officials. These efforts were directed toward concluding an interna-
tional agreement which would implement the principles established
by President Ford and Soviet Party Leader Brezhnev in Vladivostok
in late 1974. The Vladivostok agreement in principle includes a 2.400
ceiling on the number of each country's strategic delivery vehicles, of
which 1,320 can be equipped with multiple independently targettable
reentry vehicles (MIRV's). By September 1975, an impasse had de-
veloped over whether to include in these ceilings the Soviet "Backfire"
bomber and the United States cruise missile. By the end of the year, it
was planned that Kissinger would meet with Soviet leaders in Moscow,
in an effort to resolve the stalemate.
On January 22, Kissinger ended 2 days of discussions, where re-
portedly the Soviet Union offered a major proposal to deal with the
weapons systems in contention, as well as a possible reduction in the
overall ceilings established at Vladivostok. At the conclusion of the
talks, Kissinger said that "we will reply in a, few weeks and then
continue the negotiations." In the meantime, the Geneva discussions
reconvened on January 28, 1976.
Conqressiolna active ities
An opportunity for direct congressional participation in the making
of an arms control agreement occurs when the Congress is called upon
to approve an agreement concluded as a result of international nweo-
tiations. Aside from Senate advice and consent under the treatymaking
powers of the Constitution, the CongroTess has additional authority over
arms control and disarmament agreements. Under the Arms Control
and Disarmament Act of 1961, no action to limit U.S. forces can be
taken "unless authorized by further affirmative legislation by the
Congress,21 a provision which covers agreeminents which (1do not take
the form of treaties.22 Thus, through this act, tflip. Congress is assured
a role in any international agreement, in the area of arms control, a
point which represents a unique source of congressional power. Since
there were no new agreements concluded during 1975, the only instance
of this kind of congressional action was the Senate approval of the
1974 protocol to the ABM treaty. The protocol provides that the
United States and the Soviet Union are oeach limited to one defensive
missile site.2 Approved by the Senate in November 1975 by a vote
of 63 to 15, the protocol pronipted l tittle (controversy during congres-
sional consideration.
The minimum congressional controversy wns l)asically attributable
to strong congressionall opposition to ballistic missile defense which
*Prepared by LTeneice N. Wu, analyst In International relations.
'" 22 Tr.R.C'. 257.1.
For pxvmplp. the Intrrim ngrpenimnt connrludPd during thp 1972 strntetie narm. limitation
t;ik, wnf nninrnvPdfl hv Joint reRoluition since It wns an expcutlve agreement rather thnn R
trf',tv. fr'n)ile Trw 12 44tr.
The firlglntl A NT3 TrPeaty of 1972 provided two mlsrllP sites for each country.


had been evident since 1969.24 Indeed, at the time the protocol was
concluded in July 1974, the United States had already limited itself
to one ABM site. This had been accomplished by the 1972 congres-
sional action which denied funds in the defense procurement authori-
zation bill to build a second ABM site around Washington, D.C.
During 1975, congressional action on the defense appropriations
bill (H.R. 9861) severely limited the way ABM funds could be used
for the remaining site at Grand Forks, N. Dak. Other than funds for
operation of the perimeter acquisition radar, as stated in the law
(Public Law 94-212), the approved funds could be used only for
the "expeditious termination and deactivation of all operations" of
the Safeguard facility.25 This language was an acceptance of the Sen-
ate amendment, and its approval in that body was followed by the
disclosure that the Department of Defense had planned to keep the
system operational only until July 1, 1976, and would have placed it
on "standby status" after that time.Y The action of the Congress re-
stricted the use of ABM funds further than that planned by the
Department of Defense, but in light of these plans, may represent
only a minor initiative.
The limitation of funds represents one of the major sources of legis-
lative influence in matters of national security. In pursuing this course
in the case of the ABM, the Congress also signaled a willingness to act
upon weapons systems in a way which would limit them further than
the restraints imposed by an international agreement.
Although Congress has exercised little, if any, power over ongoing
arms control' negotiations, at least as far as detailed negotiating posi-
tions and bargaining are concerned, it has attempted in a number of
different ways to influence U.S. SALT policy and possibly the out-
come of the negotiations.
One of the ways in which the Congress has sought to influence SALT
is through the congressional resolution. Two that received some atten-
tion in 1975 were Senate Resolution 20 (with its House companion H.
Res. 160) and Senate Concurrent Resolution 69 (H. Con. Res. 371,
comparable, but slightly different). The simple resolutions call for
completion of the negotiations to finalize the Vladivostok principles, as
well as further negotiations on mutual restraints on weapons develop-
ment within the Vladivostok ceilings, on mutual reductions to lower
levels, and on a mutual commitment to continue talks on weapons
systems not covered by the 1972 SALT accords. The concurrent reso-
lutions call for "prompt embodiment" in a treaty of the Vladivostok
principles, and suggest that a next step should be talks on a 20-percent
mutual reduction in strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, and those
equipped with MIRV's. (These latter measures also address other arms
control'areas, like an underground nuclear test. ban.) Thus, these reso-
lutions sought to address SALT issues in a substantive manner, by
suggesting goals for the President to pursue during the negotiations.
'U.S. Senate. Commtttpp on Forpign Rplations. Protocol to the Limnitinon of Anti-
Ballistic Missile Systems Treaty. Report to accompany Ex. I, 93-2. Nov. 3. 1975. 94th ronz.,
1st sess., executive report No. 14. Washington. U.S. Government Printing Otffice. 1975.
p. 2.
mConference Report on H.R. 9861. Congressional Record (daily ed.), Dec. 10. 1!175:
H1?i ?77.
John W. Finnpv. Safegiuard ABR.M Syytem to Shut Down; $5 Billion Spent In 6 years
since Debate. New York Times. Nov. 25. 1975.


During 1975, congressional action on these measures has been limited
to hearings,27 which may have served to stimulate public discussion of
the pertinent issues.
Similar congressional activities have been in the form of substantive
proposals by individual Members, notably in 1975, those of Senators
Henry Jackson 28 and George McGovern.29 One group of House Mem-
k er'S, led by Congressmenn Steven Symms and John Dent, sent a letter
to the President with several ideas for what should be included in a
SALT II treaty, and tied these proposals to their own approval of a
prospective SALT II agreement.30 The impact of measures like these.
which elicit no public response from the administration, cannot be
easily evaluated. When and if a SALT II agreement is concluded, it
might be evident to what extent these congressional proposals have
been incorporated.
R elated national security concerns
As noted above, congressional consideration of the defense money
bills prompted the discussion of some arms control issues involved in
defense decisions. Besides the action which limited the U.S. ABM
deployment, several attempts were made to limit strategic weapons
in an effort to affect the goals of SALT negotiations. An example of
this type of measure was the Humphrey-Brooke amendment to the
defense procurement authorization bill (H.R. 6674) to prohibit the
use of funds for flight testing of maneuverable reentry vehicles
(MA .RV), unless the President certified to the Congress that the Soviet
Union had begun MARV flight testing or that it was in the U.S.
national interest to begin a program.31 ThTe amendment also set down a
specific congressional procedure to decide, once the President had
made the proper determinations, whether the program should be
By curtailing MARV flight testing, supporters of the Humphrey-
Brooke amendment asseirted, tlie Soviet Union would have confidence
that a U.S. MARV system had not been deployed. (Suirveillance of
flight testing lias bec, iie one of the few ways in which progress toward
deployment can be determil-ned by national means of inspection.) It
was hoped that by stopping, deployment, a iut ual agreement to limit
or e(linminalte MARIIV 1miiht be achieved at SALT.
On June G, 1975, the Senate approved the amendment by a vote of
4:-431. However, in (coin ference, the Senate receded froim its aUlin(l-

vT.S. Con'rr,,ss. I!onisP: CnommittPi on Internationnl Relntlons. Subcommittee on Tntr.
natI',nal Seeiirltv nnd Sclntlfi" Affnir.. The Vladivostok Accord: Implications to U.9.
,.*iirlty. Ariis Ciontrol. nnd Worldh Poae. IIearlngs. 94th Cong., 1Rt seas.. June 24. 25,
nrid .. 11!75. W Nhiiinton. U.S. f;oGnrprnmnTt Printlna Offire. 1975. 197 pp. The ub-h-
',iIntilttip on Arms Control andl Intprnftlonnl Organizatlon of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tl on: ('iinmitt.f 1, so hli. d liv rings on the, subje'ct of SALT. but these have not been printed
as ,,f th!l writln n.
Ui'li-rtfWt.k pnd Strutlile Armns Reduction. Congressional Record. (dally ed.),
r:i, r','-i 1'2 1I f : T s -, :;R S.5 1):;!.I
To' ii rd Effectiv1e Arn.s ('Contrl. C,,n rpssionnl Rerord (dally ed.). Mny 5. 1975:
:-'7: 7' 2 S7:,1.
W f.ipT r.- lr' n TIsue Warnilrn to 1:ord on .% ,T. Crnnuresslon:il Reror,1 (dally eil.).
! i '' . PIT S : l'r.",l:,/\.
a''l MARZV '.vstiii Is (omllri.sfl o(if n linltitle nilsslle ,quipped with ItN own n:ivlgntlnn
:,i.1 control sy t'tem pnli' of aiilfntiriLt Its. co trs, fi dl'wln, Inn nch from thr delivery
v,'(loIT1 'I'i. 'Hr niiiTi i 1 lii iic l 'v.lp il to A.l' Fvo n higli (l4 rrie of afciirncy anltd I
,;.,mieliltv to d.niu (1f<'vnivi, meniirri. Armns onitrel siip oi!'tprg hnve contended thnt
lr,. -,heij In' ;,'r,.n.i.ifl a(' nrl ('cv 'if' n r ai'li.|' weapon cmuld i 'niplv :i % a fl,'v tow ir'd a flr:t-
striko eninhlllty. IPossesslon of P flrst.-lr rik pnha lltty could have a destablllzlng effect
In 'i l, 'nflirI Stits. r.'l,.'tt m l:lii'' balance :is ell f iis ronstitute a thrent to nrms
l lu, la tion

melnt on the grounds that during fi-cal year 197G the only planned
MARV flight testing was for the Navy Evader missile. The conference
report explained that testing this weapon "could in no way be con-
strued as supporting the development of a high accuracy MAiV,."
The fate of the Humphrey-Brooke amendment might indicate the
limits of congressional attempts of this kind. Because the weapons
development process is an extended one, the congressional fullndii
process becomes extended. In 1975, the funds sought for MARV were
only for one of the initial stages of development. Apparently in the
view of the Congress, this stage did not pose a threat to the strategic
balance or arms limitation efforts. Thus, the case of the Humphrey-
Brooke amendment may suggest that it is difficult to make arms con-
trol considerations seem urgent in the early stages of weapons
Other congressional efforts to seek restraint in weapons programs
were evident in various amendments to limit or delete funds in both
the defense authorization and appropriations bills. The strategic weap-
ons systems affected were the B-1 bomber, improvements in strategic
weapons to achieve a counterforce capability. the Trident submarine
and missile systems, and cruise missiles. These efforts largely failed.
although some modest cuts were achieved. In the case of the B-1
bomber, the conference committee warned that authorization of the
requested funds did not represent a commitment to production of the
congresss and alleged SALT violations
During 1975, congressional attention also focused on allegations of
Soviet violations of SALT I. This issue was the subject of hearings
held by the Senate Armed Services Committee's Subcommittee on
Arms Control 33 and the House Select Committee on Intelligence.
While the Senate committee's inquiry was on the substance of the
allegations regarding Soviet compliance with the SALT I agreements
of 1972, the House group approached the problem differently. Rather
than investigating the charges of violations themselves, the House
committee examined the executive branch machinery established to
monitor n arm s control ai:reeiv nt. The committee voted contenimp)t-of-
ConLrress citations against Secretarv of State Ki-iinirer in an effort
to obtain infor,',nntion on this subject. Quzstionii were ra' -d we, her
'national security adviser, Kissiniger had provided various U.S. offi-
cials with complete information on Soviet compliance with SALT I.
Following issuance of the citations. the admiinistration provided cer-
lain data to the committee. In delition. Kissin2er's explanation At a
press conference, in December 1975, of the Governmeint process iln-
volved'in verifying SALT compliance, cast new light on this important
responsibility in the arms control area. Tlie cong'ressional initiative
on this issue resulted in a notable example of congressional oversight
of the implementation of an existing arms control agreement.
32 U.S. Congress. Senate : Aiithorizing" appropriation; for fiscal year 1976 and the prioil
bozinnina JlTy 1, 1976. and ending Sppteniber 20O. 1.r76 for military procurement . and
for nther piirno e-. (onfpreneop rrpnrt to ncoompminv H1.R. 6C'74, Sept. 19. 1975. .4th ConTI .
lt e,<. S. Rnpt. No. D4-.<5. W:Tfhin-ton. U.S. GOnvornment Printinz Office. 19.'75 p. 7-5.
33 I.S. Congress. Senate : Committee on Armed Sprvlces. Siiheonnilttee on Arms Control.
Soviet Complinnes with Crrtnin Provislons of the 1972 SALT T nrmeenientq. H0nrin. 9411ti
roCnn.. 1st sess. Mar. 6. 1975. Washin-ton. U.S. Governmnent Printiing Offire, 1075 22 jpT'
OthbPr committees held executive hearln,-,s on this pilz iet, which had not lieni print ',1 an
of this writing.


Coi,( ,%.;oi% i drfif,? to .,trcuqthn polw'-(mak;iqg
Anrotliher area of armis control in which the Congress has sought to
ex-ercise sonic influence is that of the machinery and process of policy-
imakinl. Duriinci 1974 and 1975, there had been an increased congres-
sional interest in the, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
(ACDA) and its role within the U.S. Government. That interest cul-
ninated with the enactment in Novemnber 1975 of the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act (Public Law 94-1411)34, which includes a number of
.lbstfantive changes in the A:gency's enabling legislation, the Arms
Control and Disarmiiamnent Act.
By enacting these changes in ACDA's legislation, the Congress
appear. to have lbeenl striving for two major objectives: (1) That an
arms control perspectiv-e be taken into account by different groups
resp.(onilble. for policymvaking, including those officials acsociatedl with
weapons acqui.-ition, and( ('2) that the Congress have adequate infor-
imiation about ACDA and its work.
TVe principal changes by which the Congress sought to attain these
,objectives include the following: (1) A change in the law which gives
the Agency the authority to perform certain functions-under the
direct ion of the President and the Secretary of State-previous legisla-
tioi merely assigned tlie Agency tlhe ability to perform then; (2) the
ACDA Dircctor is made( a principal adviser on anus control and dis-
qnia-iant to the National Secutrity Council, a position comparable to
tha!t of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; (3) the deletion of a provision which
prohibits tlhe dissemination of propaganda about the work of the
Agency, a provision which some viewed as inhibiting the Agency s
public inform nation function; (4) a comprehensive d(lescription of the
type of information required in the ACDA annual report to the Con-
Vrc.-:; and (5) consultation with the ACDA Director during several
sta ge( in the process Ly which conventional arms transfers are decided.
A 7/. ronnfrol 'rmp7ct staftments
Pocsiblv tlhe most important. change in ACDA's legislation concerns
tlie requlirT1mlents for arms control impact statements. The law defines
a number of weapons programs which are affected by the require-
ients. he programnIs are all those, involving nuclear weapons, those
weapons programs with an overall cost of $250 million or an annual
(',t of .0iO million, andI tlose whli'hl could have a significant impact on
.ari11is control policy and n1,erotiations. At the time when "any Govern-
mlepit agency [is] preparing any legislative or budgetary proposal" for
:iy of thie programs d,,e'ril)el the law requires, thle ACDA Director
i- to e(, provilded with d(letailed inftorivmation on the program. The
Director is also re(quired1 to -.svss tie proram,-r.'s at'rs control impact
all)]d dse a11 make ( 11mm:n(ations to the National Securitv Cotin -
cil. t ,i, O2'Iu. of [Mani'm elnent ;,1id Bv(dgrot and1 tle governmentt agency
|irol,,si,,i tl i(, prgraiii. Finally, tlhe i197.' legislation r,,niirres that
:inv req'(,(est to 11t, Conlress for ntlo()ri zatifo) of a appropriations for
the weal)ons prograImI. shalll include a complete statement analyzing
S., Buf I'.S. nongrrs. 1ini;: : ('nmmlttep on Intprnatlonal Relations Arns Control
mid) ,lrk rwrinment Art AnwitrlmIntt of 1975. J;nIp 11. 1975. Report to accompany H.R. 757.
A I flT',rL'T-V, 1at K.. IIloneii lrpt. No. 94-2.1. Washington, U.S. Government Printing
Iili r, 1975. 22 1' 1).


the impac-t of such program on anrs control and disarmament policy
and negotiations."35
The enactment of this legislation is a move by the Congress to define
more clearly and expand the purposes which the U.S. Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency should serve. In addition, the legislation
broadens congressional participation in this area.

Armns Control Amendments Approved, Arms Control Today vol. 5, No. 12, Decem-
ber 1975: 3-4.
Frye, Alton. A Responsible Congress: The Politics of National Security. New
York, McGraw-Hill (Council on Foreign Relations), 1975. 238 pages. See
especially pages 67-116.
Kaban, Jerome H. Security in the Nuclear Age. Developing U.S. Strategic Arms
Policy, Washington, Brookings, 1975. 361 pages. See especially pages 263-349.
Maxfield, David M. Disputes over New Weapons Imperil Arms Pact. Congres-
sional Quarterly, November 29,1975: 2583-88.
Nitze, Paul H. Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Detente. Foreign Affairs
vol. 54, No. 2, January 1976: 207-232.
Weiler, Lawrence. Strategic Cruise Missiles and the Future of SALT. Arms
Control Today vol. 5, No. 10, October 1975: 1-4.
85 In the case of those programs which might have a significant impact on arms control,
the determination must be made by the National Security Council before the report to the
Congress is required.


In 1975, five major pieces of foreign aid legislation received con-
gressional attention: The 1975 foreign assistance authorization, de-
laye(l consideration of the fiscal year 1975 foreign assistance appropri-
ation, initial consideration late in the year of the administration's fis-
cal year 1976 security assistance program request, the 1975 replenish-
ment of the Inter-American Development Bank capital stock, and the
issue of aid to South Vietnam and Cambodia and Laos.
Because of the widely divergent problems, programs, and congres-
sional reactions, it would be unwise to generalize about a single con-
gressional position on foreign aid. Each set of circumstances reflected
in the consideration of tlhe various bills is unique, and for this rea-
son. it is more realistic to discuss each bill separately.
1 .'" Forei.q.n Econoiwmc A.ssta.nee Act
The 1975 Foreign Assistance Act (H.R. 9)()5, known aQ tlhe In-
ternational Development and Food Assistaice Act of 1975, Public
Law 94-161) reflected growing congressional concern over the di-
rection and implementation of U.S. policies on food aid and on bi-
lateral assistance to less developed countries designed to increase food
output capabilities. This concern arose primarily from three events:
The impact of the 1972 Russian grain deal on the size of the U.S. food
for peace progral-l (Public Law 480), existence. of famine and near
famine in several areas of the world from 1972 through 1974, and the
1974 W'orld Food Conference.
In thle after'iath of the Soviet grain deal in 1972, U.S. grain re-
serves were seriously depleted and grain prices rose to unprecedented
level,. dnmiatically increasing prices a;d decreasing supplies of the
mIajor food iten in the food-for-pe:,i'e pog)'iraml. Thlie decreases in food
sti)plies available under Public TIaw 4:,) took place during a period
of famini e inll tlhe Saliel region of A frica, in Bangladesh, and in Ethi-
opIia, aiid of short stipplies in va:iriois other resrions. For tlhe less de-
(veloped( coultris as a ,rJ'ropp, 1971 anid 19712 .aw an actual decline in
food prodluctioln. The World F'ood Coiivere ,ce. held in Rome in No-
,ember 1971, .,rve.d as the fo'-'l point for an ex:iamination of tlhe world
food s-it iat ion ild paI rH i :l:irlv for a, examinalt ion of the future food
situation, ill tlie !'ss develolpe'l coIuntrie,. T11ie cogil ressionail nm!)Cbers
of tle (. d.. ele,.ation to tlhe Food Con mfetenice actively participated
in ,.lie sesiuns of the Conference apiir d s.t r,,n ly inf(hienced tlhe position
eventually ta'ke.l by the Un1uited States on tI;(. adlvi!ability of establish-
illt :I world food r( serve.
For the first (i ie. b1)o1li 1( ouses(, aglee(l to seI)trate development as-
'i- ante,'(f" froil,, military a -sist ay'.e. T'l(, 1975 Foreinait Assistitcet Act
1'r, I,'r, el li. 11)., (,,! r nl-l!. n aflyst iII tnitrn i ti(nal r :i ,n .


authorized economic aid of $1,567,150,000 for fiscal year 1976 and
$1,496,800,000 for fiscal year 1977, slightly more than requested by
the President. The measure reaffirmed previous congressional direc-
tives that U.S. foreign economic assistance should attempt to increase
the amount of aid going to the world's poorest nations and to focus
that aid more directly on the poorest people in those countries through
such programs as food and nutrition, population planning, health.
and agricultural assistance to small farmers. This philosophy of eco-
nomic assistance was enunciated initially by the Congress in the For-
eign Assistance Act of 1973 (Public Law 93-189) which substantially
reformed U.S. foreign aid policy.'
Substantive changes contained in the 1975 act include a require-
mient that at least 7,5 percent of Public Law 480 food sold abroad go
to those countries with a per capital gross national product of $300 or
less. and a directive that tv.-o-thirds of the funds authorized for popu-
lation planning and health programs be used directly in population
activities. In addition, the act urged the President to negotiate for
an international system of food reserves, increased emphasis on dis-
aster assistance funding and assistance to countries in meeting their
energy requirements, and required the President to submit to Congress
an assessment of global food production, the steps being taken by other
countries to increase their food assistance, and the relationship of
U.S. aid to that of other countries. (Additional specific items in Pub-
lic Law 94-161 are discims-ed in other sections of this report: See
human rights and Africa sections in particular.)
Both the House International Relations and the Senate Foreign
Relations Committees initiated a new procedure for consideration of
II.R. 9005, conducting simultaneous hearings and markup during open
sessions, with representatives of executive agencies and other witnesses
available for direct questioning during the markups.
The extremely large majority for passage of the foreign aid au-
thorization in the House (244-155) would seoni to indicate a degree
of support in the body for economic assistance that hlias been absent
for several years. Some concern has been expressed that the separation
of economic aid from military aid would jeopardize the passage of
both. Clearly, this was not the case. The passage of the "new direc-
tions" reforms in 1973, and tihe increasing awareness of Congress of
the nature of these chlianges. seems to have been a major element of
the support received in the House. The changes made in Public Law
480 policy this year also were very widely supported. In the Senate,
the same, factors contributed to a 12-vote increase in the ,n rgin favor-
able to passage compared to the vote on last year's foreign aid
Probably the most significant factor in the passage of this year's
foreign aid authorization was the dominant role thflat Comelre-s playIl
in d'i 1fti ng the final legislI.ition. Of the tln-r. titles in I .L. H)U., tiths
I ,iiad II were almost. entirely the result of c mr',:-sio.ii initiative.
Liike tfin <'o()ii:_rssional y i itiated "new dir'e'tio" ,973, the 1978ns
I For more dptailmed dkscission of these refornis., see :
I'.S. Congress. IIotusp :
Committee on Foreign AffTirs. Mutuinl Development amnd Cooperaition Act of 197."
T. Pept. No. f):' "S. JJuly 2A. 197:1. U.S. Government Printiui Oflice.. 1 7,7:' :n<
Cunimmittee on IrnternaitIonaI Relations. Implementation of *Now Dirortimis"' in
Development As-lstnince. (Committee print) I'.S. Goverumient Printiii:, Onffice.
.July 22. 1975. 8C pp.


made this year in Public Law 480 policy, and to a lesser extent the
consolidationn of disaster a-sistance legislation, were designed to re-
orient U.S. aid policy in a direction which is supported( by large con-
greVSional majorities.

May 15. 1975-President Ford submitted $1.51 billion fiscal year 1976 and $1.45
billion fiscal year 1977 foreign economic assistance request to Congress.
H. Doe. 9-1-158.
Aug. 1. 1975-House International Relations Committee reports out H.R. 9005,
the International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975. H. Rept.
Sept. 10, 1975-H.R. 9005 passed by House. 244-155
Oct. 1. 1975-Senate Foreign Relations Commitree reported out HI.R. 9005. S.
Rept. 94-406.
Oct. 28, 1975-H.R. 9005 favorably reported by Senate Agriculture and Forestry
Committee. S. Rept. 94-434.
Nov. 5, 1975-H.R. 9005 passed by Senate. 54-41.
Dec. 4, 1975-Conference report tiled. H. Rept. 94-691. Senate agreed to con-
ference report by voice vote.
Dec. 9. 1975-House approved conference report, 265-150.
Dec. 20, 1975-Measure signed into law. Public Law 94-161.
Foreign. aid approp rit fions
Bcirau-e of the l-te pasao-e of the 1974 for'eimn assistance autlioriza-
tion, final con ress.ion al approval of a fiscal year 1975 foreign assist-
ance appropriation was not forthcoming until March 1975. close to
the end of the fiscal year. The measure event ually reported and passed
(II.R. 1592, Public Law 94-11) appropriated $1.67 billion in economic
and military assistance for the year, $2.1 billion less than authorized,
anld 40 percent below the administration's budget request. Substantial
cuts were made in nearly all programs, with the exception of security
supporting assistance and tlhe Midldle East special requireinots fund.
which were funded at the same level as they had been in fiscal year

.\A l 1) FOR FISCAL YEAR 1974
!In millhns of dollars]

&Isc C! year-
1975 1974

Title 1:
Food and nutrition .......................................................----------------------------------------------------- $00 $500
Population planning anrid health. ................................. .... 125 165
Education and human res'ourcres -----------------------.............................................. 82 92
Selected development problems.............................................. 3---------------------------------------------7 53
Selecled countries and or ,anizations ......................................... 0---------------------- 39
Indochina postwar reconstruction.. ..........................................440 617
Middle East Spe.ial Requirements Fund.---------------------------------------..................................... !00 100
Secuiity supporting assistance .............................................---------------------------------------------- 660 660
Military assistance ........................................................ -------------------------------------------------------475 600
Title 11: Foreign military credit sales ............................................. 300 405
Title III:
Peace Corps .------------------------------............................................................ 77 76
Rgfijgee assistance..................................................... 148 174
International financial! institutions -------.......................................... 619 788

The very Il kewarm support for the appropriation was prolb:11ly due
to several factors. Among tlie most prominent were co(inern over tlie
e,'cCssion andl tlie very large projected IFederal budget deficits for fiscal
years 1975 and 197(;; a reluctance to provide any further aidl to South


Vietnam and Cambodia; and the feeling by many that the funds could
better be used in this country. In addition, some Members indicated
that too much attention in the aid program was devoted to political
and economic considerations and not enough to humanitarian
Fiscal year 1976 foreign assistance appropriations were also delavedl ;
H.R. 12203 was reported by the House Appropriations Committee on
March 1,1976 (H. Rept. 94-857), and passed by the House on March 4.
As passed by the House, the bill provides a foreign assistance ap-
propriation of $4.98 billion, $1.3 billion above the fiscal year 1975
measure, and $775 million below the administration request, with a
large part of the increase attributed to Middle East progra-- s. The
measure was passed by the Senate on March 23,1976 (S. Rept. 94-704)
and a conference report (H. Rept. 94-1006), has not been approved in
both Houses as of this writing.
Feb. 20, 1975-House Appropriations Committee reports out House Joint Re;olu-
tion 219 to continue foreign assistance funding through March 31, 1975.
H. Rept. 94-16.
Feb. 28, 1915--House passed House Joint Resolution 219. House Joint Rescilution
219 passed by Senate, amended to eliminate funds for AID and other fireigii
aid programs as a demonstration of Senate dissatisfaction with repeIated
funding of foreign assistance through continuing resolutions.
Mar. 6, 1975-Conference committee on House Joint Resolution 219 agreed to ex-
tend funding through March 25, with understanding that fiscal year 1975
foreign assistance appropriation would be reported out promptly. H. Rept.
Mar. 11, 1975-House Appropriations Committee reported out H.R. 43592. fiscal
year 1975 foreign assistance appropriation. H. Rept. 94-53.
Mar. 13, 1975-H.R. 4592 passed by House, 212-202.
Mar. 17, 1975-H.R. 4592 reported by Senate Appropriations Committee. S. Rept.
Mar. 19,1975-H.R. 4592 passed by Senate, 57-40.
Mar. 24. 1975-House and Senate agreed to conference report on H.R. 4592. H.
Rept. 94-10S.
Mar. 26, 1975-Measure signed into law. Public Law 94-11.
Security "sance legislation
On October 30, 1975, 51/ months after the original submission of
the administration's request for the 1975 Foreign Assistance Act, the
President sent to Congress a message and draft legislation for the
security assistance programs. Asserting that the delay had been due to
the administration's review of Middle East policy and the r;ipidly
changing events in Indochlina, the President proposed a security as-
sistance package of $3.4 billion, which would finance a $4.6 billion pro-
gram. There were no major policy changes proposed except for the
addition of a new section on military training and the repeal of part
V, Indochina Postwar Reconstruction, of the Foreign Assistanc'e Act.
By program, the President's request was broken down as follows:
Military assistance program -------------------------------------- $4).(
Security supporting assistance--------------------------------- 1. 01 0(00
Foreign military credit sales ---------------- 2, :124, 000
The largest portion of the request, some .)A.4 billion, was intended for
four Middle East countries: Israel, $2.2 billion in foreign military
credit sales and security supl)portin" :issistance: Ecvpt,. ,50 million in
security supporting assistance; Jordan, $'230 million in military as-


sistaiiCe. foreign military credit sales, and security supporting assist-
aice; and Syria. $90 million in security supporting assistance. In other
areas, significant amounts were requested for Greece ($225 million),
Turkey ($205 million), and South Korea ($200 million). Portugal was
pro1,'ramed for $55 million in security supporting assistance.
The response in Congress to tlhe security assistance request was
mixed. In the recent past, congressional concern over U.S. arms aid
lias been directed mostly at the grant military assistance program.
With tlhe continuing increase, in foreign military credit sales, some
Members of Congress have questioned all U.S. arms transfers, whether
by grant, credit, or cash. Because many of those who favored cutting
military aid significantly at the same time supported the $2.2 billion
request for Israel, the exact legislative impact of their general opposi-
tion to military aid is difficult to assess. In tlhe Senate, S. 2662, sub-
initted by Senator Humphrey on November 13. 1975., contained many
provisions advocated by opponents to military aid. Among its most
significant provisions, it would abolish the military assistance pro-
gram, except. for training, by the end of fiscal year 1976: prohibit
military aid to any country that discriminated against U.S. arms
sellers on the basis of race, religion, national origin, or sex; create a
process whereby Congress could disapprove of any arms transfer ex-
ceeding $25 million; and create a process whereby the President or
Congress could designate a country ineligible for any form of mili-
tary aid.
At the adjournment of Congress in December 1975, no security
assistance bill had been reported in either House.2
Fhfer-American Developnment Bank and African Deeloinnent Fund
The House of Representatives indicated its support for multilateral
:is well as bilateral foreign assistance in 1975 when it passed I1.R. 9721,
the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and African Develop-
nment Fund (AFDF) Act of 1975. The measure authorizes $2.25 billion
as the U.S. share of a replenishment of IDB funds and $25 million
subIscription to tlhe AFDF, the first U.S. participation in that Fund.
"The $2.25 billion IDB authorization would require congressional ap-
propriation of $1.3.2 million and cash outlay of $720 million over the
iiext, 4 years. The U.S. sli're of the capital increase is broken down
among the various IDB funds as follows:
tIn millions of dollars
Fiscal year--
... ..1977 a3proxi- 1978 approxi- 1379 approxi-
Authotimtinn Appropriation mation mation matien

Total IDB ...................... $2, ?rfl $240 $140 $4140 $200
Fundr for spoci'l operations .......... 600 (I) 200 200 200
Cir. j',I l shares ......... ............ 1, 65 2 1 2.10 210 0
-iet.'r-,in4n l calhla e ............ . 9C 0 0 0 0
HitP ve.ionA pn"iij .... 1?fl 40 40 40 0
0'ri,,. Iy La'ible .................... ,01 200 200 200 0
I hp administration is requij, ; 'm,. .r)iV .I^ in fi'.il year 1937G to complete the U.S. commitment under 1970 IDB
rent ;nihme:I0,
I f'lhhlr oI .01 i, r capital req;iiies a cogressiii3il a3p o priation but does not involve an actual budgetary cash outlay.
It is ,se'l by the bank as colljteral.
SS. 2002 (S. flppt. 94-601. Jnn. 30. 1976) was. passed by the Senate on Feb. 1.S, 1978.
H.R. 11963 (II. Rpt. 94-84R. Feb. 24, 1976), the House version of the fiscal year 1976
f,,r"liii military assistance measure, was passed by the ihIuise on Mar. 3, 1976.


Two amendments were added to H.R. 9721 during floor debate,
The first is consistent with language in the International Development
and Food Assistance Act of 19-5 (Public Law 94-161) and directs the
U.S. Governor to the IDB to vote against assistance to any country
engaging in a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights;
the second instructs the U.S. Executive Director to the IDB to pro-
pose a resolution which would make intermediate technologies major
facets of the Bank's development strategy and to report to the Con-
gres on the progress of this resolution.
The large majority of House Members favoring final passage of
HI.R. 9721 (249-166) came as a surprise to both supporters and oppo-
nents of the bill. One factor may have been that it immediately pre-
ceded the lopsided House vote to accept the conference report on
H.R. 9005, the International Development and Food Assistance Act
of 1975. In any case, it seems clear that the comment of the bill's floor
manager that H.R. 9721 reflects the House Banking and Currency
Committee's view that U.S. foreign economic assistance efforts should
emphasize multilateral as well as bilateral channels applies equally to
the whole House.
Oct. 8, 1975-H.R. 9721 reported by the House Banking and Currency Com-
mittee, authorizing a $2.25 billion U.S. contribution to the Inter-American De-
velopment Bank replenishment and a $25 million U.S. contribution to the African
Development Fund. H. Rep. 94-541.
Dec. 9. 1975--House passed H.R. 9721, 249-166.
Mar. 1, 1976-H.R. 9721 reported by the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee. S. Rept. 94-673.
Mar. 30, 1976-Senate passed H.R. 9721.
May 11, 1976--Senate agreed to conference report. H. Rept. 91-1121.
May 20.1976-House agreed to conference report.
May 31, 1T76-Approved by President. Public Law 94-302.
Indo.oh bia as.s-,tan.ce*
Congress' decision in 1975 to reject the administration's request for
additional military assistance to South Vietnam and Cambodia com-
pleted a 2-year period of decline in congressional support for Ameri-
can military aid to the non-Communist states of Indochina. Congres-
sional cuts in military aid in fiscal years 1973 and 1974 pointed up the
growing differences between the administration and Congress over
the nature and scope of the American commitment to the Govern-
ments in Saigon, Phnom Penh. and Vientiane in their conflicts with
Communist forces. Public opinion polls indicated that the Amercan
people increasingly favored the position held by the congressional
opponents of aid.3
Congressional sentiment against new military aid hardened with
the advent of 1975 despite two developments. First were the numerous
press reports. beoi'innin in the summer of 1974, that cuts in military
aid had seriously affected South Vietnam's military capabilities by
creating shortages of spare parts for aircraft and artillery and short-
Prepared by Larry Niksch, analyst In Asian affairs.
aFor p-a:-im lp. a Gnalinp poll conducted In January 197. inmedlatly.v ffolowvinu thti
signing of thp eapso-fire agreement found that 50 percent of the Amerleian peolip rlilio'.(d
military aid to South Vietnam in the event North Vietnam launched an offensive: S percent
favored aid under those circumstances.


ages of ammunition.4 The second development was the appearance of
signs that North Vietnam was preparing a major offensive against
South Vietnam in 19715.5 In January 1975, the North Vietnamese
launched a large-scale attack in Phuoc Binh Province and seized the
Province. High ranking Communist officials since have disclosed that
the purpose of the Phuoc Binh offensive was to test the South Viet-
namese Army and the reaction of the United States.
Simultaneous with the Phuoc Binhl offensive was the increasingly
eroded military position of the Cambodian Government's Army. By
early January, Khmer Rouge Forces had cut all land supply routes
into Phnom Penh and had made increasingly difficult the U.S.-directed
effort to supply the capital by way of Mekong River convoys.
On January 28, 1975, President Ford requested supplemental fiscal
year 1975 military aid appropriations of $300 million for South Viet-
nam and $2_22 million for Cambodia. Hlie stated on February 9 that lie
was willing to work out with Congress a plan to terminate all military
and economic aid to South Vietnam after 3 years. However, the House
Democratic Caucus voted 189 to 49 on March 12 against any new mili-
tary aid to South Vietnam and Cambodia for fiscal year 1975. The
Senate Democratic Caucus followed suit on March 13 by voting 38 to 5
against additional aid to Cambodia and 35 to 6 against aid to South
The deteriorating situation of the Khmer Republic prompted Con-
gress to deal first with the request for Cambodia. The Senate Foreign
Relations Committee reported a bill on March 21 (S. 663. S. Rept.
94-54) which authorized $155.4 million in supplemental military and
economic assistance ($82.5 million in military aid) for Cambodia. The
bill prohibited further aid after June 30, 1975. However, the House
International Relations Committee voted on March 15 to adiourn for
the Easter recess without acting on a bill put forth by its Subcommit-
tee on Special Investigations. Moreover, the administration asserted
that it could not accept legislation that would cut off aid after June 30,
because such a prohibition would end any possibility of negotiations.
However, by early March, senior analysts in the Defense Department
and the CIA reportedly gave the Khmer Republic little chance of
survival, and CIA Director William Colby reportedly expressed this

Senator Sam Nunn stated in a February 1975 report on his inspection trip to South
Vietnam that congressional cuts in aid were responsible for the shortages which. in turn.
,Ind a "negativr. ps.ryeholnrir'il effort" on South Vietnamese Forces. Representative Paul
Meoloskey also elted a relationship be-twoeen aid levels and ammunition shortages in
ri.portiniv on him February 1975 visit to South Vietnam (see Conaressional Record. Mar. 14.
19.75: Ell -E11S7). Bnth Nunn and McCloskPy noted that the South Vietnamese had
been trained In American tnactile with heavy emphasis on the use of airpower, artillery,
,iiu1 armor. thus necessitntinz high levels of outside military aid. Tn a series of articles
j-,1i-hed In Aplril 19:76. North Vietnni's Chief of Staff. Gen. Van Tien Dung. stated that
'ongri sslonnnl aid cuts hnd resulted In a i60-pprcent reduction In South Vietnamese fire-
power nndl a 50-percent rednution In South Vietnamese mobility.
Tn October 1974. the Vietnamese Communists escalated their conditions for negotla-
1ins with the Swith Vietnamese Government. demnndlng President Thieu's resignation
as a precondition for talks to resume. Tn late December 1974. a Soviet mission headed by
the1 I ,iis'l nn Artne.d I',lpres Chif of Staff visited liani andi reportedly pledged a four-fold
lnere. '.e in Soviet milltnrv naid to support an offensive (see Robert Shaplen's ".Letter from
S -fion" in the Npw Yorker, Apr. 21. 1975). Also In December. North Vietnam's Defense
MInlstfr Vo NruIven Clap. in two major speeches, described the balance of forces in Vietnam
as lnrr.-,n'lnglr favorable to the revolution because (of the decline of morale and combat
.fff.vllv-.npss of the South Vietnnniese Forces and the "political confusion and a weakened
rillitir'nl peQltin" o if te Unitled Stnteq. In hiq April 1976 series of articles. North Vietnam'q
CGnr.-ral Diinr e disclolNed that the Tnnol Pollthuro lipllevel as early as October 1974 that
Ibi,. Tnlted St.teg would not Intervene annlnst a North Vietnamese offensive In the South
because of Its "Intirnal contradictions," particularly President Nlxon's resignation and
the eronomic problems.
6 'liandnl. Nn.vynn "Suddenly Last Sprlng." Far Eastern Economic Review, v. 89. Sept. 12.
1'7.5 : '.5. Thlr article is based on Interviews with linadlng Communist officials in South

pessimistic view to the House Committee on Special Investigations
on March 10.7
On March 10, North Vietnamese Forces launched major attacks in
the central highlands of South Vietnam. On March 18, President
Thieu ordered a general withdrawal from the northern provinces of
military regions I and II, but the withdrawal quickly became a dis-
organized disintegration of South Vietnamese forces in the north. By
the end of the first week in April, six of South Vietnam's 13 combat
divisions had ceased to function, and North Vietnam controlled ap-
proximately two-thirds of South Vietnam and had some 300,000 regu-
lar troops in the country.
Congress reconvened from its Easter recess on April 7 faced with tlhe
critical situation in South Vietnam and strong public sentiment
against new military aid to South Vietnam and Cambodia. A Gallup
poll of March 9 and a Harris poll of April 10 showed respectively
78 and 75 percent of the American people opposed to President Ford's
aid requests.
On April 10, President Ford put forth a revised proposal for aid to
South Vietnam: $722 million in military assistance and $250 in eco-
nomic assistance for the remainder of fiscal year 1975. Bills were intro-
duced in the House and Senate to increase the total authorization of
military aid from $1 billion to $1.2 billion (S. 1451) and $1.42 billion
(H.R. 5929). Neither bill was reported out of committee.
After April 15, administration officials acknowledged that the mili-
tary situation in South Vietnam was untenable but argued that addi-
tional military aid might contribute to a negotiated transfer of power
to the Communists rather than a total North Vietnamese military vic-
tory. However, the surrender of the Khmuner Republic on April 17 and
the bleak military prospects for South Vietnam prompted Congress to
attempt legislation for humanitarian assistance and evacuation of
Americans and South Vietnamese from South Vietnam. The House
and Senate passed separate bills on April 23 (S. 1484 and H.R. 6096)
that authorized $150 million for evacuation and humanitarian assist-
ance and granted the President limited authority to use U.S. Armed
Forces to evacuate American citizens and certain categories of Viet-
namese. On April 25, conferees approved a report (S. Rept. 94-97)
providing $327 million in refugee, evacuation, and humanitarian aid,
and retaining the Senate bill's evacuation authority. However, before
a vote could be taken on this measure, South Vietnam surrendered to
the Communists on April 30; and President Ford sent American troops
into the Saigon area to assist in evacuation. On May 1, the House
rejected the conference report, thus killing the bill.
Shortly after South Vietnam's surrender, the Communiist Pathet
Lao took effective control of the Government of Laos. Anti-American
demonstrations inspired by the Pathet Lao resulted in harassment of
U.S. officials and seizure of some U.S. facilities. The United States sand
Laos agreed on May 27 to close the Agency for International Devel-
opment mission in Laos and withdraw all employees. Reacting to this
situation, Congress in June placed a provision in a continuing appro-
priations resolution for fiscal year 1976 (H.J. Res. 499, Public Law
94-41) that prohibited the use of any funds in the bill for financial a id
to Laos, and also to North and South Vietnam and Cambodia.
7Lyonq. Richard. "Colby Skeptical on Cambodia." Washington Post, Mar. 11, 1975.
Getler, Michael. "Experts Fear Aid Too Late for Cambodia." Washington Pest. Feb. 27,

In 1975. the United States participated in two major forums at which
overall economic relations with the less-developed countries (LDC's)
were the primary topic of discussion: The two energy producer-con-
sumer prll a'atorv conferences and the resultant Conference on Inter-
inational Ecoionomic Cooperation. and the Seventh Special Session of
the li United Nations General Assembly on Development and Inter-
nat ioril Cooperation.
In the spring of 1975, Con.-zress held hearings on U.S. preparations
aid the issues tl:iat were likely to )e discussed at the Seventh Special
U.N. General Assembly. Congressional advice on policy formulation
was given to tlhe administration during the summer, and a large con-
rl'essional delegation attended tlie Special Session.
NIe short background which follows is included in order to under-
stand thle events which lead to the producer-consumer conferences
and thle Seventh Special General Assemblly. A summary of Secretary
Ki-inwrers speech to the Special Session is included because its pro-
posals, if pursued seriously by the United States and accepted as tlhe
basis for concrete negotiations by the less developed countries, could
form the agenda for the North-South economic discussions for the
next several years.
BRatcr/ o/,rml
Tie year 1974 had been marked by maior confrontations between
the United States and LDC's on international economic matters. At
the Sixth Special U.N. General Assembly on Energy and Develop-
ment lield in April and May, the General Assembly adopted a declara-
tion and program of action on the establishment of a new international
economic order, which had been proposed by the Group of 77, the
more than 100 less developed countries so named because they num-
bered 77 when they first organized at. the UNCTAD III conference
in 1971. The acceptance of tlhe Declaration and Program of Action
on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order was
due mniinly to the cohesion of the LDC's, which had been strengthened
by tlie lack of response of tlhe developed countries to the Arab oil boy-
cott and tlie OPEC oil price increases, and 1by the failure of the United
States and the developed countries to provide any coherent opposition
to tf, itev international econonemic order proposals. The acceptance
of the declaration and program of action was followed in December
l)by the adoption of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States at tlhe *29th U.N. General Assembly 1)by a vote of 120 in favor; 6.
inc.luding tle U7nited States. opposed; ,nd 12 abstentions.
In the New International Economic Order and the Charter of Eco-
nomic ,,li:,.ls 'iid Duties of States. lie LDC's presented their concept
of :; e'iiipi'r(l\- nyw struriite of ecooi'ci relations between the de-
vi.l,,e wnd ad i'- developeld conh' ries. In tlhe most significint provisions
of thfl-v two -(,ts of docluiients, te 1 LDC's demands included:
(a) Full and permanent sovereignty over their raw materials
;1 1(1d r1(so lrces;
(b) Special access to developed country mniarkets for their ex-
p)ort 'ilch id in.r nonrec 'iprocal tariff preferences;
(c) The creation of integrated commodity markets through.
I',l. r-I I, IV l'h riir (:lGlll. n amilyst In Int-rnatlonal rlnations.