The political and economic crisis in Southern Africa


Material Information

The political and economic crisis in Southern Africa
Physical Description:
Ballance, Frank
Freeman, Constance ( joint author )
United States -- Congress. -- Senate. -- Committee on Foreign Relations. -- Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance
U.S. Govt. Print. Off. ( Washington )
Publication Date:

Record Information

Rights Management:
All applicable rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
Resource Identifier:
aleph - 25956094
oclc - 2819420
System ID:

Table of Contents
    Front Cover
        Page i
        Page ii
    Table of Contents
        Page iii
        Page iv
        Page v
        Page vi
    Part I. Summary and conclusions
        Page 1
        Page 2
        Page 3
        Page 4
        Page 5
        Page 6
        Page 7
        Page 8
    Part II. Political situation in southern Africa
        Page 9
        Page 10
        Page 11
        Page 12
        Page 13
        Page 14
        Page 15
        Page 16
        Page 17
        Page 18
        Page 19
        Page 20
        Page 21
        Page 22
        Page 23
        Page 24
        Page 25
        Page 26
        Page 27
        Page 28
        Page 29
        Page 30
    Part III. The economies of affected countries
        Page 31
        Page 32
        Page 33
        Page 34
        Page 35
        Page 36
        Page 37
        Page 38
        Page 39
        Page 40
        Page 41
        Page 42
        Page 43
        Page 44
        Page 45
        Page 46
        Page 47
        Page 48
        Page 49
        Page 50
        Page 51
        Page 52
        Page 53
        Page 54
        Page 55
        Page 56
    Back Cover
        Page 57
        Page 58
Full Text
\fL pr7

2d Session J












I ,, -/ l t P '

A 'Cf ,

76 ..
'"05900V A P o

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations





JOHN SPARKMAN, Alabama, Chairman

GALE W. McGEE, Wyoming
GEORGE S. McGOVERN, South Dakota
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware

HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania

PAT M. HOLT, Chief of Staff
ARTHUR M. KUHL, Chief Clerk

HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, Minnesota, Chairman

GALE W. McGEE, Wyoming
GEORGE S. McGOVERN, South Dakota

HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania

RICHARD MOOSE, Staff Associate


Foreword ------------------------------------------------------ v
I. Summary and conclusions------------------------------------- 1
Rhodesian crisis--------------------------------------- 2
Namibia ------------------------------------------------ 3
Homelands in South Africa--------------------------------- 4
U.S. policy action---------------------------------- 4
II. Political situation in southern Africa----------------------------- 9
Rhodesian crisis----------------------------------- ------ 9
The genesis------------------------------------------ 10
The leadership conflict among African political parties---- 10
1. The four groups--------------------------------- 10
2. The evolution of unity under the ANC umbrella----- 11
3. The disintegration of unity------------------- -----12
The armed struggle----------------------------------- 13
Interaction between the ANC and the army---------------- 15
The positions and reactions of surrounding states---------- 16
1. Zambia -------------------------------------- 16
2. Mozambique ----------------------------------- 17
3 Tanzania ----------------------------------- 18
4. South Africa----------------------------------- 18
Present situation and prognosis for the future------------- 19
Namibia/Southwest Africa --------------------------------- 22
SWAPO ----------------------------------------- 23
Windhoek Turnhalle talks------------------------------ 24
The current situation--------------------------------- 25
South Africa------------------------------------------- 26
III. The economies of affected countries----------------------------- 31
The disruption of Southern African transport network- --------- 31
The effect of sanctions on Rhodesia's neighbors---------------- 33
Zambia --------------------------------------------- 33
Aid for Zambia----- ------------------------------ 36
Mozambique ---------------------------------------- 37
1. The cost of applying sanctions against Rhodesia----- 37
2. Mozambique economy---------------------------- 40
3. Aid for Mozambique---------- -------------------42
Tanzania ------------------------------------------- 43
Tanzania's economy-------------------------------- 45
Zaire ----------------------------------------------46
Causes for the crisis-------------- ---------------- 47
Glossary -----------------------------------------------51
Map of Southern Africa showing transport routes and mineral
resources ---------------------------------------------52
Map of planned South African homelands--------------- ------52


This report on the political and economic crisis in southern Africa
is one of a continuing series of staff reports prepared for the Sub-
committee on Foreign Assistance of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations. Following Secretary Kissinger's trip to Africa in April,
1976 and his major policy statement in Lusaka. Zambia, the Sub-
committee requested that the staff undertake a study of the economic
and political conditions in southern Africa to assist it in making in-
formed judgments regarding the possible provision of a-si-,tance to
countries of the region.
Conflicts between whites and blacks in southern Africa have esca-
lated recently to new levels of violence. Pressures are building toward
a destructive race war in southern Africa, with a potential for catas-
trophe for those who live there. The United States has pledged its
efforts to achieve a peaceful transition to majority rule in Rhodesia
and Namibia, but time is fast running out for the implementation of
constructive proposals. This report sets out the economic conditions of
the countries of southern Africa in some detail, and thus provides the
basis for an evaluation of their economic needs and the possible role
of U.S. assistance.
This report was written by Frank Ballance. Special Assistant for
Economic Affairs for Senator Jacob Javits, and Constance Freeman.
of the staff of the Foreign Relations Committee. Both have lived in
Africa for several years and have travelled there extensively. Their
report is based primarily on a three week trip in May. 1976 to Zambia.
Mozambique, South Africa. Tanzania and Zaire. In these countries the
staff met with U.S. Embassy officials, host government officials, parlia-
mentarians. UN personnel, newspaper editors., and other informed
observers. In addition, interviews in the United States and extensive
research in the available literature contributed to this report. The re-
port was written during the month of June after their return, and
thus does not include certain recent developments, such as the pro-
posals- made by the Windhoek Turnhalle constitutional conference.
The Subcommittee hopes that this report will be a useful addition
to knowledge of this important part of the world. The views expressed
in the report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent
the views of the Subcom nmittee members.

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2013



In the eyes of Africans and much of the rest of the world the Ango-
lan crisis of late 1975 and early 1976 marked the beginning of the
final phase of Africa's transition to black majority rule. Similarly,
the awkward results of the U.S. involvement in Angola precipitated a
search for a U.S. policy appropriate to the peculiar demands of this
stage in Africa-United States relations. Angola lit the fuse for further
dramatic confrontations between black and white and East and West
in southern Africa. Since that time negotiations over Rhodesia have
broken down and guerrilla incursions have intensified. South Africa
has experienced bloody race riots reminiscent of the "Sharpeville mas-
sacre" of 1960, and substantially more dangerous for the country's
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's trip to Africa in April, 1976,
in the wake of Angola represented the first major shift from the policy
established in 1969-the modified option 2 of National Security Study
Memorandum 39-which stressed relaxation of pressures on white
southern African regimes with a view toward encouraging concessions
to the black populations and the presumed rejection of violent actions
by the latter. The United States had more actively supported the black
governments and movements during the 1960's. Secretary Kissinger's
statements in Lusaka pledged U.S. support for majority rule in Rho-
desia, and assistance to countries working to bring this about. His sub-
sequent talks with Prime Minister John Vorster of the Republic of
South Africa in June indicates that the Secretary believes that South
Africa has an important role to play in the resolution of the explosive
problems of this region-although itself part of the overall problem.
Since the Angolan misadventure. U.S. Government statements
regarding Africa have reflected both a deep concern about possible
Russian intervention and domination in the region and a renewed
commitment to the peaceful achievement of majority rule. Secretary
Kissinger's Lusaka statement synthesized these dual goals by empha-
sizing Western action to promote moderate black governments in the
region as a bulwark against Communist inroads.
The Soviet Union has gained prestige among some African govern-
ments because of its support for the winning faction in Angola. Ob-
servers often speculate that the U.S.S.R. would further welcome the
opportunity to increase its influence in southern Africa by supporting
other African liberation groups. The Chinese have recently had closer
ties than the Soviets to Tanzania and Zambia. and now to Mozambique.
largely as a result of their support for FRELIMO in its struggle
against Portuguese rule. However, the Soviet Union probably is the

only member of the Communist world which has the military capacity
to lend decisive weight to the struggle of the liberation movements.
Prolonged warfare or intervention by outside forces, most notably
those of South Africa, to assist Rhodesia could lead to major Soviet
arms supplies and possible use of Cuban troops.
U.S. understanding of the forces at work in southern Africa will
have a direct bearing on the formulation and implementation of any
new U.S. policy in that region. The pace of events since Angola sug-
gests that little time remains for decision-making or the launching of
new programs. U.S. economic assistance to the countries of this region
would provide a symbol of support for moderate policies. Further, al-
though the economic problems of countries in the area are very serious,
even relatively small amounts of U.S. aid could be targeted to deal
with particular economic and administrative deficiencies of the recip-
ient countries.
Since the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) by the
present Southern Rhodesian regime in 1965, international action co-
ordinated through the United Nations has attempted to use economic
sanctions to pressure the minority government toward concessions
aimed at majority rule. South African support for Rhodesia-as well
as violations by numerous other countries-vitiated the effect of sanc-
tions on Rhodesia. The major victim of sanctions has, instead, been
Zambia, whose economy was closely linked to its southern neighbors.
The Portuguese revolution in 1974 set in motion a chain of events
which resulted in independence for Mozambique and Angola and a
major shift in the balance of power in southern Africa. Many Rho-
desian blacks have grown increasingly disillusioned with the prospects
of obtaining any major share in the government and economy of their
country. Numerous attempts at negotiations, both between the United
Kingdom and Rhodesia, and between the Rhodesian whites and
blacks, have ended in failure-the latest being Joshua Nkomo's widely
publicized talks with Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith, which
collapsed in March of this year. Since then, all sides have been pre-
paring for military action, and armed confrontations are steadily
The Rhodesian (Zimbabwe) nationalist movement has become in-
creasingly fragmented over the past few years, however. In 1974 the
four black Rhodesian political movements were consolidated through
outside African pressure under the African National Council (ANC)
umbrella. This artificial creation never enjoyed extensive popular sup-
port among "liberation" group members. It has now shattered and
power seems to be passing to a nebulous leadership group within the
military wing of the movement.
There is increasing pessimism in Africa and among African ex-
perts about the possibility of peaceful transition to majority rule.
The Rhodesian whites remain opposed to all except minimal changes;
despite external pressure, they seem to feel that they can hold out
indefinitely. Although the Zimbabwe People's Army seems too small
and ill-equipped to dislodge the white government at the present time,
it has managed to bomb the rail links with South Africa and occa-

sionally to penetrate close to the capital of Salisbury. At a minimum,
the guerrillas appear to be gaining sufficient strength to cause further
disruption, leading to economic and political erosion Nwithin Rhodesia.
This is the perhaps inevitable result of the failure of earlier efforts to
bring about a peaceful transition. In this context all-out efforts to
moderate the conflict are a prinnary meains-and probal)ly a last
chance-to avoid possible tragedy both for Rhodesia and its neighbors.
Many African countries have made the achievement of majority
rule in Rhodesia a key foreign policy goal. At great cost to itself
Zambia closed its border with Rhodesia in 1973, and Mozambique
followed suit this year several months after its own independence.
Tanzania, Zambia, and Mozambique have all given sanctuary to Zim-
babwe nationalist groups and fighters since UDI, and the armed
struggle is currently being waged across the borders of Zambia and
Mozambique. The Presidents of the four most involved countries-
Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique, and Botswana-serve as a coordinat-
ing and consultative group assisting the nationalist factions in their
dealings with the outside world. Although bitterly opposed to South
Africa's apartheid policies the four "front-line" President were prag-
i atic enough to recognize South Africa's influence over Smith's gov-
ernment. This group gave its blessing to the efforts of Zambian Presi-
dent Kenneth Kaunda and Prime Minister Vorster to bring together
the contending parties. However, cooperation with South Africa
broke down following the collapse of negotiations and South African
intervention in Angola.
Some well-informed South Africans appear to recognize that it is
no longer in South Africa's self-interest to shore up the white minor-
ity government in Rhodesia, because a further radicalization of the
Zimbabwe liberation movement threatens to have ramifications in
South Africa. Nevertheless, the inconsistency of promoting majority
rule for Rhodesia while denying it to South African blacks confronts
the South African Government with a dilemma. South Africa's con-
servative white electorate inhibits development of any policy which
would appear to abandon the Rhodesian whites. Thus, while South
Africa is unlikely to send its own troops back into Rhodesia. there are
limits on how much political or economic pressure it is willing to
exert against the Smith regime.

South Africa's dilemma is compounded by growing international
pressure to withdraw from Southwest Africa (Namibia), a former
League of Nations mandated territory, whose current occupation by
South Africa has been declared illegal by the International Court of
Justice. This pressure and the recent independence of surrounding
countries have led the South African Government to accelerate its
timetable for self-rule in Namibia and to reconsider the wisdom of
directly applying its domestic policy of "separate development" to
Constitutional talks based on ethnic group representation are cur-
rently underway in Namibia's Capital, Windhoek, with the objective
of establishing a federation of senmi-autonomous ethnic areas. South

Africa's refusal to accept participation of the black political party
recognized by the United Nations and other countries and interna-
tional groups. SWAPO (South West African People's Organization),
as the representative of the Nambian people, casts doubt upon the ulti-
mate acceptability to all concerned parties of any formula agreed to
by the Conference. Most observers believe that SWAPO's inclusion
may be necessary if the talks are to be successful. Meanwhile, SWAPO
incursions over the Namibia borders from Angola are increasing.
SWAPO's military efforts, because of its relatively low level of pre-
paredness, and the fact that Namibia's terrain is not very favorable
for guerrilla warfare, are substantially less advanced than those of
the Rhodesian guerrillas.

The South African Government's policy of separate economic and
political development for blacks has led to the creation of tribal home-
lands theoretically destined for political independence. These ten
homelands now consist of 113 separate land fragments comprising 13
percent of the South African land area. The largest and least frag-
mented of these, the Transkei, is scheduled to be granted independence
on October 26, 1976. Most African governments regard the home-
lands as a logical extension of apartheid and have announced their
refusal to recognize the independence of the Transkei. The recent and
ongoing urban unrest in the Republic of South Africa is making it
more difficult for the South African Government to convince other
countries that separate development satisfies the aspirations and needs
of its non-white population.

A common reaction in Africa to the Kissinger pronouncements has
been the observation that the failure to follow up U.S. policy state-
ments with positive action would generate renewed skepticism among
Africans about that policy.
In this connection, the question of whether and how pressure is to be
applied against Rhodesia is widely viewed as one of the most immedi-
ate tests of U.S. policy. Many Africans regard the repeal of the Byrd
amendment, which permits continued U.S. importation of Rhodesian
chrome ore and other "strategic" materials, as the most important step
which the U.S. could take. In the eyes of much of the world, this legis-
lation makes the United States the only U.N. member in official and
open defiance of U.N. sanctions against Rhodesia.
South Africa has great scope for applying pressure on Rhodesia,
and many people, including supporters of South Africa, argue that it
is in South Africa's self-interest to do so. Some observers have sug-
gested that the United States could stress this point in its discussions
with South Africa instead of debating the possibility of United States
concessions-for example, recognition of the Transkei and increased
trade and investment, including the provision of nuclear materials for
"peaceful purposes"-in exchange for South African economic pres-
sure against Rhodesia.

The economies, and thus the fortunes, of south-central Africa were
tightly interwoven during the colonial period. The Republic of South
Africa, as the only industrial economy in the region, exported its goods
and trained technicians to the surrounding countries, and absorbed
unskilled surplus African labor from the same countries. The mineral
wealth of Rhodesia, Zambia, and Zaire made necessary and possible
the development of a network of rail lines reaching both the Atlantic
and Indian Oceans. The former Portuguese colonies of Angola and
Mozambique were firmly integrated into this system, and their ports
served as channels for the exports of the interior.
There are numerous examples of the economic interdependence
which Southern Rhodesia and Zambia (Northern Rhodesia) devel-
oped during the ten years of federation prior to 1964. At the time of
Zambia's independence in 1964, its oil supplies came from Rhodesia
via a pipeline from Beira, Mozambique, to Umtali, Rhodesia. Its power
supplies were generated on the Rhodesian side of the Kariba Dam.
The airline and railroad were an integrated system with Southern
Rhodesia. Most skilled personnel running Zambia's copper mines were
white Rhodesians and South Africans. Since 1964 such links have be-
come increasingly disrupted at great cost to all the countries of south-
central Africa. These problems have been exacerbated by the world-
wide recession and declining commodity prices.
Zambia, Zaire, and Mozambique need external economic assistance
of all kinds, particularly balance of payments support to cover un-
precedented deficits, in large part caused by the application of sanc-
tions against Rhodesia. The U.N. estimated that the cost to Zambia
of the closing of its border with Rhodesia from 1973 through 1975 is
$330 million. Mozambique just closed its border in March 1976, and
the cost of this action in the first year, as estimated by the United
Nations, is $140-165 million. Zaire's economic crisis is primarily the
result of a combination of mismanagement and world-wide recession
but events in Rhodesia could intensify Zaire's troubles if all transit
routes to the south were to be closed.
Other countries in the region not directly affected by sanctions also
need external assistance. Botswana's economy would be badly hurt
if it applied sanctions by closing the border with Rhodesia, since
Rhodesia Railways is its single link with the outside world. Tanzania
has played a key role in the struggle for majority rule in southern
Africa. While the primary reasons for its current economic problems
are a poor resource base and recessionary pressures, it has also borne
some of the costs resulting from the redirection of Zambia's transport
routes northward.
Secretary Kissinger stated in Lusaka that the U.S. was "ready to
help alleviate economic hardships for any countries neighboring
Rhodesia which decide to enforce sanctions by closing their frontiers."
In particular, $12.5 million was pledged to Mozambique.
The Congress recently authorized $75 million for southern Africa
in the International Security Assistance Act of 1976. Zambia and
Zaire could each receive $27.5 million in balance of payments support.
The remaining $20 million is undesignated, but it is understood that
it would be used to assist other affected countries in the region. Po-
tential uses for the $20 million include economic support to offset the

impact of the sanctions on the Mozambique and Botswana economies,
training programs for refugees from Rhodesia and Namibia, regional
transport and communications, general refugee assistance, and ad-
vance planning to deal with the economic consequences of the transi-
tion to majority rule.
The needs of the southern African region are vastly in excess of the
assistance currently under consideration. This assistance would pro-
vide, however, a visible demonstration of United States support for
those southern African countries whose economies have suffered from
their support for majority rule in Rhodesia. Whether such assistance
will have more than symbolic value will depend both upon how it is
used and whether it is augmented by additional aid in subsequent
years. If the situation continues to deteriorate, both the needs of these
countries and their requests for foreign assistance will no doubt
There are closely related aspects of the southern African crisis
which are not amenable to direct economic assistance. Some observers
argue that the United States should apply greater diplomatic and
economic pressure on South Africa to withdraw support for the Rho-
desian whites and to reform its own system of apartheid. Others argue
against increased United States involvement of any kind. Secretary
Kissinger's June 1976 talks with Prime Minister Vorster indicate
an opening of official communication channels which might eventu-
ally also involve South African blacks directly.
In the eyes of black Africans another crucial test of U.S. policy
will be whether or not the United States recognizes the independence
of the Transkei in October 1976. Recognition could be interpreted
as an acceptance of the policy of separate development. In the same
vein, most of the world community. is unlikely to accord recognition
to an independent Namibia unless such independence has been achieved
through the full participation of indigenous political groups.
In spite of continuing hopes for a negotiated settlement in Rho-
desia, there is a broad consensus that violent resolution of the con-
flict is more likely. The longer the struggle drags on, the more im-
portant the military leadership elements within the liberation move-
ment are likely to become and the less likely they will be to accept a
settlement achieved by the present political leadership. Informed ob-
servers believe that as the situation develops, it will be important
for the United States to develop widespread contacts with all involved
parties and not to align itself with any one black Rhodesian faction
or individual. Avoidance of hostility to any one faction may help the
United States to prevent an impasse similar to that which character-
izes U.S. relations with Angola.
While it is recognized in southern Africa that the U.S. is unlikely
to provide military assistance, African observers point out that there
are other ways in which the United States could demonstrate a positive
attitude toward liberation forces. More importantly, the United
States could refrain from assisting the Rhodesian white government.
It might also provide medical and educational assistance to libera-
tion groups, or even financial assistance to enable them to explain their
views abroad.

Secretary Kissinger has agreed to coordinate United State.-Rho-
desian policy withl Presidents Kaunda, 5Machel. Nyerere and Seretse
Khama; niany claim that this same policy would be app)1)ropriate for
other outside powers. A firm U.S. commitment to avoid direct mili-
tary intervention in the conflict and to coordinate actions closely with
the four Presidents would provide a strong moral position from which
to influence the approaches and policies of other countries.
Many A fricans and concerned observers believe that direct U.S. mili-
tary invol-enwent in Africa is likely to be counterproductive and that
it would lead to the misallocation of resources which could more bene-
ficially be used for development. U.S. arms sales to the area would
probably heighten regional tensions without providing real security
to the recipient countries. A case which is frequently cited, particu-
larly by economic experts, is that of military sales to countries such
as Zaire, which face severe economic crisis and possible massive de-
faults on existing debts. Even indirect further U.S. military in-
volvement would also make it more difficult for the United States
to argue against similar actions by other powers.


The 1976 breakdown in the Joshua Nkomo-Ian Smith negotiations
reduces hopes for a speedy negotiated settlement of the Rhodesian
crisis. Pressures are increasing within Rhodesia as escalating guerrilla
attacks penetrate. deeper into the country. At the same time, the Afri-
can liberation forces themselves are in disarray. The attempt to unify
the four key movements under the ANC umbrella appears to have
failed and political leaders are spending most of their time trying to
supplant each other.
Reportedly disillusioned with attempts to negotiate, and with the
ineffectualness of non-violent political efforts, the guerrillas have
formed their own "third force" which recognizes the leadership of an
eighteen-man command. Who commands this group is. however, un-
clear. The shifting alignments and multiple conflicts within the Zim-
babwe nationalist groups are complex, but an understanding of them
is important to an assessment of the future of Rhodesia.
Virtually all informed observers believe that majority rule in Rho-
desia is inevitable. The issue is when and how it occurs. Who leads
and controls the army and who ultimately concludes the arrangements
for transition to majority rule will have a significant impact upon the
structure and ideology of the resulting Zimbabwe regime. This in turn
will influence events in Namibia and South Africa.
There is evidence that the focus of power within the liberation move-
ments has shifted to the military. And there are indications that the
potential military leadership is more radical in its economic and po-
litical thinking than any of the old political leaders. There is a con-
sensus that a negotiated settlement by Nkomo, or someone with his
laissez-faire approach, is likely to result in a society that would be
viewed more favorably by the United States and South African gov-
ernments than a society born out of a protracted and increasingly
violent struggle. But there is declining belief in the likelihood of any
such settlement.
The four Presidents' (Kaunda, Nyerere, Machel and Seretse
Khama) most immediate commitment is to a speedy transition to ma-
jority rule, but there is evidence that they are also acutely aware that
the characteristics of the transition and its Zimbabwe leadership will
affect the ultimate outcome. Kaunda has tended to favor Nkomo, and
Machel the military. The positions of Nverere and Seretse Khama are
less clear. All four have attempted to moderate leadership struggles
in the past and are likely to continue to influence them. The struggle
for control of Zimbabwe is in a state of flux. Yet some insights into
possible outcomes may be provided by examining the roots of the
struggle, including how and why old leaders are being discredited
and who the new ones might be.

Europeans have been resident in Rhodesia for less than a century.
They first arrived in 1890 when the Prime Minister of the Cape, Cecil
Rhodes, sent British troops to conquer the indigenous Shona and
Matebele tribes. Southern Rhodesia became a crown colony with inter-
nal self-rule in 1923, but perhaps half of the present white population
(approximately 270,000) arrived after World War II and 10-15
percent after the independence of the former Portuguese colonies.
Southern Rhodesia was linked with Zambia (previously Northern
Rhodesia) and Malawi (Nyasaland) in a Central African Federation
in 1953. This was strongly opposed by the Africans and subsequently
disbanded in 1963 when Zambia and Malawi became independent. At
the end of that period Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front defeated its more
liberal predecessor and became the Government Party. Smith opposed
political concessions to blacks. In 1965 the Rhodesian Front issued a
Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from Britain and
instituted a rigorous system of racial discrimination.
African resistance to European rule dates back to Rhodesia's initial
colonization. Indeed, the Shona group of tribes still blame the Matebele
tribe for selling out to the British after the Matebeles themselves had
conquered the Shona in the early 1800s. Contemporary organized op-
position to white rule in Southern Rhodesia originated in 1957 when
the first nationalist political party was formed. Its first task, together
with similar parties in neighboring countries, was to oppose the

The Four Groups
During the 1960s and early 1970s four major political parties or
groups developed among Africans in Rhodesia. They all grew out of
the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) which was founded
by Joshua Nkomo in 1961. ZAPU in turn was the successor of a series
of movements created by Nkomo and banned by the Rhodesian
The first serious split in 1963 resulted from a leadership conflict
between Nkomo and Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole. Sithole formed a new
party, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), whose mem-
bership was primarily composed of Shona ethnic groups. Contention
between the two groups continued and they were both banned and
their leadership detained in 1964. ZAPU reorganized underground and
continued to build a political and organizational structure within
Rhodesia: it also established an external office in Dar es Salaam. The
locus of ZANUT activity shifted abroad when the detained Central
Committee delegated authority to Herbert Chitepo, who had been
elected ZANU National Chairman in 1963. ZANU subsequently shifted
its base from Dar es Salaam to Lusaka in 1966.
Two new groups entered the scene in 1971. Ongoing leadership con-
flicts within ZAPU and ZANU resulted in a further breakoff of a
group which formed a third party, the Front for the Liberation of
Zimbabwe (FROLIZI), under the leadership of James Chikerema

and George Nyandoro. This group never developed a large following.
The fourth group, the African National Council (ANC), did not
start out as a political party but rather as a forum to contest the con-
stitutional settlement proposals of 1971. It was generated largely out
of the internal ZAPU organization but also had ZANU support. A
churchman viewed as a moderate, Bishop Abel T. Muzorewa, was
chosen to head ANC. He succeeded in defeating the settlement pro-
posals and continued to negotiate with Smith until 1974.
The Evol fion of Unity Under the ANC Umbrella
During the autumn of 1974, President Kaunda of Zambia and Prime
Minister Vorster of South Africa began to discuss the possibilities of
a peaceful settlement of the Rhodesian conflict. Although far apart
politically, their interests coincided through Vorster's newly launched
policy of detente with black Africa and Kaunda's hope that the im-
pending independence of former Portuguese colonies would temper
Rhodesian white intransigence. Kaunda and Vorster persuaded Ian
Smith's government to release both Sithole and Nkomo from prison so
they, together with Muzorewa, could participate in talks with the
Presidents of Zambia, Tanzania and Botswana about the possibilities
of a negotiated settlement.
A precondition for successful negotiations seemed to be unity among
the four contending factions. There was, however, initial resistance
to moves toward unification. Before his release from prison in 1974,
Sithole had been relieved of his position as President of ZANU and
replaced by the former Secretary General, Robert G. Mugabe. Sithole
was subsequently reinstated but his relationship with Mugabe con-
tinued to be uneasy.
Much of the external wing of ZANU, including Chitepo, opposed
unification with the other groups. The militants, in particular mem-
bers of the Karanga tribe, led by Joshiah Tongogara, maintained that
military efforts were succeeding and negotiations would simply delay
progress. In addition, unity might mean sharing leadership with those
who had not previously participated in the fight. Sithole received the
backing of some of those who favored a political solution (largely
Manyikas), but the militants never acceded to the merger.
A final source of contention revolved around FROLIZI. Nkomo
tried to convince Chikerema and his group to return to ZAPU since
FROLIZI continued to be small and weak. Chikerema refused and
demanded instead an equal share in the leadership with the other
groups. This continues to be resented by the others.
These difficulties were superficially resolved; an agreement to merge
the four groups under the banner of the ANC and interim presidency
of Bishop Muzorewa was reached in early December, 1974. The other
three leaders (Sithole, Nkomo and Chikerema) were included in an
enlarged executive until a Congress could be called to adopt a revised
ANC constitution and formally elect the ANC leadership. The aims
of the new ANC were: (1) To continue the struggle until liberation
had been achieved and (2) to prepare for any constitutional confer-
ence which would establish a system allowing the equal political par-
ticipation of all adults. Smith agreed not to redetain Sithole and
Nkomo and the Organization of African Unity recognized the ANC
as the sole representative of the Zimbabwe liberation struggle.

The Disintegration of Unity
A significant number of ZANU members, especially those rep-
resenting the military, never acknowledged the ANC umbrella. They
retained their own ZANU organization and continued the armed
struggle, even though the ANC had committed them to a coase-fire. At
the same time, this ZANU group experienced a period of internal
strife. While unity talks were taking place in late 1974, a group of
disaffected, Mozambique-based ZANU soldiers marched on Lusaka
where they kidnapped various liberation group leaders and allegedly
killed a number of other people. This was ostensibly a protest against
conditions in the military camps. It was contended that this so-called
Nhari Rebellion was supported and possibly initiated by some of the
Lusaka based leadership (largely Manyika). The external leadership
council of ZANU (Dare re Chimurenga) severely disciplined the
soldiers who participated in the raid and expelled the suspected
leaders from the party. Some of those disciplined were subsequently
killed or disappeared.
By early 1975, the leadership in both the Dare and the Military
High command had become predominantly (approximately 80 per-
cent) Karanga. The Chairman of the Dare, Chitepo, was the only
remaining Manyika. He was assassinated on March 18, 1975 just after
returning to Lusaka from Malawi, where two of his Karanga col-
leagues had been arrested.
After the funeral the Zambian Government detained approximately
50 leaders of ZANU including Josiah Tongogara, the Chief of De-
fense. Other prominent Karanga figures who were detained include:
Cletos Chigowe, Chief of Intelligence; Kubirai Kangai, Secretary of
Labor; Rugare Gumbo, Secretary of Information; and Henry
Hamadziripi, Secretary for Finance. About 1,000 ZANU members
were also shipped off to a remote camp, and subsequently sent to
Malawi after a series of conflicts with the Zambian police.
A number of interpretations have been given of this chain of events.
An international commission set up by the Zambian Government to
investigate Chitepo's assassination reported that these events were
the result of an attempt by the Karangas, and notably Tongogara, to
consolidate their leadership position within the Dare and the Military
High Command. The Report notes that those who were expelled from
the party after the Nhari Rebellion were from the rival Manyika
group. Chitepo, although also a Manyika, had not openly opposed
their expulsion. Nevertheless, those Karangas who were attempting to
consolidate power may have viewed Chitepo's knowledge about their
activities as a threat. Further, according to the Commission, Chitepo's
abandonment of his Karanga colleagues in Malawi detention was an
additional source of resentment.
ZANU rejects this interpretation, maintaining that Chitepo might
have been assassinated by the Manyikas because he failed to oppose
the expulsion of his Manyikan friends from the party. ZANU further
alleges that since Chitepo continued to oppose ANC unity he was more
likely eliminated by a coalition of forces who saw him as a stumbling
block to unity (Zambia) and others who wanted to throw the ZANU
leadership into disarray (South Africa and Rhodesia).

Although nominally a member of the political leadership of the
ANC, Robert Mugabe never fully approved of unification. After
Chitepo's death and the redetention of Sithole by Smith in April, 1975,
Mugabe called for ZANU to withdraw from the merger and strongly
defended the Military Council when its members were arrested in Zam-
bia. He left Rhodesia in the spring of 1975, and returned to Mozam-
bique where he worked with the military. It was Mugabe's assumption
that following Sithole's release the latter would raise money and sup-
plies for the troops. When the expected material had not arrived after
a year, Mugabe went to Europe, denounced Sithole and the entire
ANC, and started his own fund-raising efforts. Mugabe has recently
been elected Secretary General of ZANU.
The core leadership of the ANC (Muzorewa, Sithole, Chikerema
and Nkomo) also split apart during 1975. After Sithole had been re-
leased from detention to attend the OAU Foreign Minister's Confer-
ence in Dar es Salaam and the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Con-
ference in Jamaica, he and Muzorewa decided they were likely to be
detained if they returned to Rhodesia. Nkomo went back alone and
started to negotiate with Smith and plan for a Congress to elect per-
manent, leaders. The other three leaders considered the plans for a
Congress to be an Nkomo plot to usurp leadership, since they could not
go to Rhodesia. Sithole therefore acknowledged the continuation of
Muzorewa's ANC presidency and proceeded to organize a Zimbabwe
Liberation Council (ZLC) to conduct the armed struggle.
Relations continued to be very tense when the four leaders met again
at the abortive Victoria Falls talks in August, 1975. When Sithole
announced the formation of the ZLC, with himself as Chairman and
Chikerema as Secretary, in September, Nkomo refused to recognize it
as a valid institution. He proceeded to hold a National Executive Com-
mittee Meeting to plan for a Congress in Rhodesia and Muzorewa ex-
pelled him from the ANC. Nevertheless, Nkomo held the Congress and
it elected him president of the ANC. The other three leaders did not
recognize the Nkomo presidency nor he the ZLC so the split was solidi-
fled. Nkomo continued to attempt to negotiate with Smith until March,
1976, and the others traveled around the world supposedly building
support and collecting supplies for the army.

Going back to 1965, the Unilateral Declaration of Independence
convinced both ZAPU and ZANU that they would have to fight for
majority rule. The external wings of the two parties started training
programs for guerrillas and ZANU launched its first offensive in April,
1966, at the so-called battle of Sinoia. Although ZANU forces were
completely routed they continued guerrilla incursions until 1970. These
military efforts were not very successful, and the acting head of ZANU,
Chitepo, called for a retrenchment. Fighting was resumed in 1972
when ZANU began to cooperate with FRELIMO in Mozambique and
opened up the northeastern front through Zambia.
Military actions of some ZANU guerrillas continued during the
ceasefire declared by the ANC in 1975, although conditions in the
guerrilla camps were very arduous. Supplies were not getting through

and much of the military leadership was in jail in Zambia on suspicion
of assassinating Chitepo. Sithole and Muzorewa tried to establish
control over the rebellious guerrillas after revolts in both the Tanza-
nian and Zambian camps by establishing the 21-member Liberation
Council (ZLC). However, the guerrillas were not effectively con-
sulted about the council. In addition, Noel Mukomo, who was ZANU
"Secretary of Defense" before Tongogara and suspected by the Kar-
angas of starting the Nhari rebellion, was appointed to it. Conse-
quently, many guerrillas did not recognize the ZLC and proceeded
instead, in late 1975 with encouragement from the four Presidents,
to establish their own unified military command.
The great majority of the fighting forces in this new "unified" army,
Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA), come from the old military wing
of ZANU (ZANLA), which was largely Karanga controlled. A joint
ZANU/ZAPU command has been set up. It is not clear whether the
command consists of nine commanders from ZANU and nine from
ZAPU or twelve and six respectively. The leadership of the seven
Departments of Command is also shared. If the Director is from one
party, the Deputy comes from the other. Despite this formal structure,
informed observers question the degree of and commitment to unity.
Some of these observers allege that ZANU accepted this structure in
the expectation that Tongogara would be released and consequently
feels betrayed since he is still being held by Kaunda. The ZAPU
forces are quite small and probably make up only 10 per cent of
ZIPA. Reportedly some ZAPU members are convinced that ZANU
still controls the army and are therefore considering pulling out of
Personality clashes played an important role in previous splits
among Zimbabwe liberation groups so the identity of the commanders
is not being publicized. It is fairly certain, however, that Rex
Nhongo is the head of the nine ZANU commanders and perhaps of
the overall Central Command. He was the ZANLA Field Commander
at the height of the northeastern front offensive through Zambia. He
is also a Karanga and a close associate of Tongogara. The Commission
report on Chitepo's death states that he made the bomb which killed
Chitepo. And it is thought that Tongogara continues to direct the
operations of ZIPA from jail through Nhongo. As the Secretary Gen-
eral of ZANU, Robert Mugabe has also continued to maintain influ-
ence within the army although he is a Manyika. It is uncertain
whether he is actually one of the commanders.
No one, including the commanders themselves, seems to know
exactly how many troops ZIPA has or where they are located. The
estimates range from 2,000 to 20,000. There are probably about 1,000-
5,000 operating within Rhodesia or just inside the Mozambique border.
Guerrilla strikes have occurred in the south on the Beitbridge-Victoria
Falls road and on both the Botswana and direct South African rail-
roads. There have also been incidents all up and down the Mozambique
border and close to the capital city of Salisbury. ZANU officials claim
they have 20,000 troops in training in Mozambique and Tanzania and
sent 700-3,000 out to the operational bases in May, 1976. Even the
Rhodesian Government asserts that the number of guerrillas has in-
creased from 100 in 1964 to 10,000 in 1976.

The largest concentration of troops is in Mozamibique. although
training and especially transit camps continue to operate out of Tan-
zania. There are some ZAPU troops left in Zambia. Kaunda expelled
the ZANU cadres, however, after Chitepo's assassination and the
subsequent unrest in ZANU camps. The northern front in Zambia was
closed during most of 1975, but lhas recently been reopened. There is
also some discussion about opening a new front from Botswana.
A number of outside groups are assisting ZIPA. FRELIMO sup-
port on all levels as far as the Mozambique-Rhodesia border has been
essential to it, especially in the area of discipline. The Soviets have
traditionally assisted ZAPU and are now reported to be channeling
supplies through FRELIMO. Some Chinese instructors are said to be
in the Mozanmbique camps but Chinese influence declined after they
elected not to play an active role in Angola during late 1975. ZA.NU
has historically obtained training and assistance from China and
Tongogara was trained there. The Cubans and some eastern Eu-
ropeans are also providing technical and training support but there
are apparently less than 200 Cubans in Mozambique. There seems to
be a widespread feeling that Africans must wage their own revolu-
tion and that Cuban support similar to that received by Angola would
be undesirable. Finally, Tanzania recently sent 1,500 troops to help
Machel keep order, and Nigeria and Zambia have been talking about
sending some of their own forces.

There has been a great deal of debate about whether ZIPA, which
is also called the "third force", continues to acknowledge the political
leadership of the ANC or even part of it. Both Sithole and Muzorewa
publicly accepted the Chitepo report and blamed tribalism and par-
ticularly the Karangas for the unrest within the army. The ZLC was
established without consulting the Karangas who appear to be pre-
dominant in the army-the ZIPA high command was set up without
the backing of the ANC political leadership.
Starting in November, 1975, some members of the army wrote to
interested parties such as Tanzania, Mozambique and the OAU Liber-
ation Committee repudiating and denouncing the political leadership
for allegedly failing to assist the army and misusing funds raised to
support the earned struggle. The precise source of and support for
these communications is not clear. Reliable sources believe that the
political leadership has spent little time in the camps, either because
they have been barred by Machel or felt threatened by members of
ZIPA itself.
Parts of the former ZANU forces have never recognized the ANC
leadership. The majority of former ZAPU members, however, were
loyal to Nkomo and may still be supporting his leadership. If, as is
often claimed, the military is now dominant and if the military now
has established its own leadership, it seems unlikely that the current
political leadership will have an opportunity to play a very significant
role, at least until (or if) it once again becomes possible to negotiate.

The on-going Rhodesian conflict has had an impact upon both the
economies and politics of most of the surrounding states and they in
turn have become important players in the efforts to resolve the prob-
lem. The most active and affected of these states include Zambia, Mo-
zambique, Tanzania and South Africa.
Zambia has used diplomatic/economic and supported military means
to resolve the situation in Rhodesia. Best known, perhaps, are its dip-
lomatic and economic efforts to pressure Smith into accommodating
some of the demands of the blacks. At great cost to itself, Zambia
closed its border with Rhodesia in 1973 to all except Zaire-bound
traffic. Subsequently, Kaunda, together with Vorster, was a key force
in laying the groundwork for negotiations between the liberation
movements and the Rhodesian Government in 1974. Zambia was also
the major theatre of military operations of the external wing of ZANU
from 1966 until 1975, and the northern front offensive was waged
across its borders after 1972. The other groups also had offices in
Zambia and carried out some of their limited operations there.
These two approaches began to conflict in 1975 when many of the
Zambian-based ZANU members refused to recognize either unity
under the ANC umbrella or the negotiations Kaunda had worked so
hard to set up. After the Nhari Rebellion and Chitepo assassination
Kaunda closed the northern front and rounded up the ZANU guer-
rillas, subsequently sending them to Mozambique. They have not been
allowed to operate out of Zambia since that time. Kaunda also detained
much of the ZANU military leadership and closed the ZANU, ZAPU,
and FROLIZI offices in Lusaka. The only liberation force which con-
tinued to be recognized was the ANC. However, after Muzorewa and
Sithole threw Nkomo out of the party in the fall of 1975, Kaunda ex-
pelled them from their Statehouse offices to more remote quarters out-
side Lusaka.
Until the negotiations were terminated in March, 1976, Kaunda
seemed to favor Nkomo. Experienced observers believe that this sup-
port probably derived not only from Kaunda's commitment to a nego-
tiated settlement but also from his sense of comradeship with Nkomo,
since they are both "old-line" moderates. Aaron Milner, an influential
and close associate of Kaunda, has also backed Nkomo. Both Milner
and most of ZAPU are members of the Ndebele tribe.
Kaunda has been criticized within Zambia for being both too radical
and too conservative in his policy on southern Africa. There appear to
be a number of people in the middle class who want to reopen the
Rhodesian border for economic reasons. It is also rumored that South
Africa has provided significant amounts of direct economic assistance
to Zambia. Some limited aid was sent to the rural reconstruction camps
and the February issue of "African Development" which contained an
article about South African assistance to Zambia, was kept off the
newsstands in Zambia. It does not appear that significant amountits
of aid have been accepted although there are strong indications that
the possibility was seriously discussed.

Opposition from those who believe Kaunda to be too conservative,
i.e., the left, has not been particularly effective. This point of view was
centered in the University where there were some student demonstra-
tions relating primarily to support for the MPLA in Angola. Kaunda
closed the University in February, 1976, and detained a number of
lecturers and students who were suspected of attempting to radicalize
the other students. The causes for this action appear to relate to both
internal University politics and external political issues. The foreign
lecturers were deported and the University has reopened.
After the negotiations broke down in March, Kaunda again pledged
himself to support the armed struggle; the northern front was re-
opened in June, 1976. He is still keeping the ZANU/Karanga military
leaders in detention. It would be difficult to release them since the
Chitepo Report, which Zambia commissioned, specifically identified
them as Chitepo's assassins. It is believed that Kaunda may also con-
sider them too radical an element to have at large. Experienced observ-
ers have speculated that their continued detention might cause dissen-
sion between Zambia and the Third Force or with Machel and Nyerere,
who evidently favor newer and more radical leadership.
Mozan mbique
During its struggle for independence from Portugal, FRELIMO
cooperated with and assisted the Zimbabwe liberation forces and par-
ticularly ZANU. Since independence the Mozambique Government has
continued to play a key role in the growing conflict, including the
closure of its border with Rhodesia in March, 1976.
It appears that Machel was never as optimistic about the possibili-
ties of a successful outcome to Rhodesian negotiations as was Kaunda,
but he did agree to go along with the others. During the past year the
guerrillas have concentrated even more in Mozambique and have con-
tinued to obtain FRELIMO assistance. Some observers assert that
Machel currently favors the Third Force and military leaders over
the political leadership. If true, this position would be consistent with
Machel's leftist leanings and his own rise to leadership through the
military. Machel and Tongogara were fellow students at military staff
college in China.
Machel probably exerts a good deal of influence over the eighteen-
man command of ZIPA. He has tried to keep the army isolated from
the old party leadership which might promote dissension among them.
Muzorewa and Sithole visited the camps in July of 1975 but they
have not been there since. Reportedly Machel has restricted Muzorewa
and Sithole to Maputo when they are in Mozambique. In early June,
Muzorewa stated that he had been "let down" by Machel. Machel in
turn announced that the front-line nations and the OAU would now
support the Third Force directly because there was so much disunity
among the political leadership. In response to Muzorewa's charges that
he had been "let down" Machel asserted that no leader "worth his
salt" needed permission to visit his own people.
Mozambique is becoming an increasingly important base of guerrilla
operations. Nevertheless, Mozambique regards hot pursuit actions
across its borders by the Rhodesian security forces as incursions upon
its sovereignty. Smith has stated that direct FRELIMO troop involve-


ment in the conflict would elicit a Rhodesian declaration of war
against Mozambique. Reportedly, Rhodesia has already bombed guer-
rilla bases in Mozambique and Rhodesian troops have clashed directly
with the Mozambique army.
Although Tanzania does not border on Rhodesia, President Nyerere
has been one of the strongest proponents of the struggle against the
Smith regime. The first external offices of the Zimbabwe liberation
groups were established in Dar es Salaam and military training and
transit camps have existed in southern Tanzania since UDI in 1965.
Tanzania has also strongly enforced sanctions against Rhodesia. For
example, travellers with Rhodesian stamps in their passports are al-
lowed to enter Tanzania only under exceptional circumstances.
There is some evidence that Nyerere, like Machel, was skeptical
about the possibility of real progress through negotiations and about
South Africa's "detente" policy; nevertheless, he agreed to go along
with negotiation attempts. He, like Kaunda, closed the offices of
ZANU, ZAPU, and FROLIZI and agreed to recognize only the ANC
in the spring of 1975. Nyerere now appears to favor the Third Force
but his views of the more radical Karanga leadership are not clear.
Some observers contend that both he and Machel would prefer the
leadership of Tongogara to that of Nkomo.
South Africa
South Africa has supported the Rhodesian Government both eco-
nomically and politically for a variety of obvious reasons. On the
other hand, the coup in Portugal and resultant independence for
Angola and Mozambique caused Vorster to intensify his policy of
"detente" with black Africa. The Rhodesian conflict is a major stum-
bling block for this policy. The South African Government has begun
to pressure the whites in Rhodesia to become more accommodating to
black demands. Hence, Vorster cooperated with Kaunda in initiating
the series of talks in 1974 which paved the way for an attempt at
negotiated settlement.
There seems to be general agreement among the informed public in
South Africa that the Rhodesian whites have neglected numerous
opportunities to ameliorate the situation in the past and that they
should have started sharing power several years ago. Many South
Africans view the appointment of four African chiefs to the Rho-
desian cabinet as an important step, but one which came to late. They
now believe that the blacks in Rhodesia will only settle for undiluted
majority rule, and those who hold this view feel that South African
intervention in Rhodesia would be unwise. Interestingly enough, this
position has been taken by a number of representatives of the Afri-
kaaner press.
The South African Government is thought by experienced observers
to be reluctantly prepared to accept a black government in Rhodesia,
although it would vastly prefer a gradual transition by means of a
qualified franchise over a period of years. The latter course is consid-
ered preferable because blacks are not thought to be prepared to run
the country. A more rapid transition would probably be more accept-
able to South Africa if the new government was led by a moderate like

Nkomo who is viewed as more reliable than the other leaders. The
South African Government fears a black left-wing government be-
cause it might attempt to spread its ideology and commitment to
majority rule to South African blacks. In contrast a peaceful transi-
tion to a moderate black government might assist South Africa in
solving its own problems because it could alleviate some white fears
and encourage black moderation.
South Africa withdrew its troops from Rhodesia eighteen months
ago. Experienced observers believe that it is unlikely, after the recent
Angolan experience, that they will be sent back unless Cuban and/or
Russian troops actively join the guerrillas. It is considered possible,
however, that the more conservative. elements in South Africa could
compel the government to become involved if there were massive guer-
rilla incursions into Rhodesia or numerous white deaths.
On the other hand, it is considered highly unlikely that South
Africa will close its border with Rhodesia. This would be unaccept-
able to those who believe strongly that South Africa should be sup-
porting its Rhodesian "kith and kin." Pressure from the right has
traditionally had more impact upon the Vorster government than
pressure from the moderates or the left. Furthermore, most South
Africans do not believe in the use of sanctions because that policy
could too easily be turned against them.
Nevertheless, most observers believe that if South Africa has to
choose between its own needs for transport facilities and those of Rho-
desia. it will fulfill its own needs first. Informed opinion allows for the
possibility of subtle pressure on Rhodesia but believes that it would
have to be a carefully orchestrated policy in order to avoid enraging
the right wing.
On balance, South Africa will probably continue to put pressure on
Smith to accommodate and to promote negotiations with the hope that
a moderate government will be the result.

The final breakdown of negotiations between Smith and Nkomo in
March, 1976, left little basis upon which to resume them. Both parties
rejected the British proposal for a two-year transition to majority
rule; Nkoma because it was too long and Smith because it was too
rapid. Some observers contend that the year-long negotiations were a
charade to demonstrate to the world that negotiations were impossible.
The four Presidents have now agreed that armed struggle is the only
available tactic for the immediate future.
Even as both sides build up their forces, the leadership situation
among liberation groups remains confused. Nkoma claims that he has
significant support within Rhodesia. He probably continues to con-
trol the ANC/ZAPU party structure but most of his popular support
is limited to the Bulawayo region and the predominantly Ndebele
areas. However, the Shona group of tribes compose 4.5 million of the
6 million blacks in Rhodesia and they have traditionally resented the
The politically aware among them have tended to back ZANU.
Muzorewa seems to retain the more generalized support of the less


politically aware which he acquired while organizing against the Con-
stitutional proposals in the early 1970s. It is difficult to determine if
this support has been alienated by his recent more radical stances and
statements. Chikerema never had and still does not appear to have the
support of more than a small splinter group. Finally, Sithole continues
to try to reassert control over the old ZANU cadres but with diminish-
ing success.
The consensus seems to be that the old leadership is losing its grip
and no real solution will be possible without the concurrence of the
Third Force or military. The relevant question then becomes-who
leads the Third Force? Tongogara from prison? Mugabe, who is Sec-
retary General of ZANU? Rex Nhongo in his own right and not as a
front man for Tongogara? Soviet-trained Albert Mangena, who was
recently identified by Newsweek as a key leadership figure? A figure as
yet unnamed or unknown? Or is the leadership genuinely wielded by a
group? At this juncture even the best informed observers simply do
not know.
ZIPA is building up its forces and guerrilla activity. The strategy is
said to be to train and to raid until the fall rainy season when ZIPA
can launch a major offensive. Meanwhile, the tension is building
within Rhodesia despite government claims that morale among both
civilians and soldiers is high.
The recent guerrilla attacks on Beitbridge and the railways shocked
the Rhodesian whites, since these areas were previously considered safe
from guerrilla incursions. The Rhodesian Government subsequently
called up the reserves, withdrew military exemptions, and increased
taxes in order to double its annual defense budget to $180 million. All
of these measures have had a negative impact upon the economy.
All able bodied persons are now being called upon to contribute
to the struggle. It has become necessary to protect the entire 800-mile
long border and to provide heavy security guards for all trains and
road traffic leaving Rhodesia. The protected village policy (similar to
Vietnamese protected hamlets) along the borders is being more rigidly
enforced. During May, 19 individuals apparently were shot on sight
by security forces because they were found outside village boundaries
between 6 p.m. and 6 a.m. At the same time the Rhodesians are actively
recruiting mercenaries from other countries. Reportedly they recently
recruited some 30 Americans and British in Iran. The mercenaries'
passports and airfare are said to have been withheld until they finished
training or their tour of duty. May, 1976 was supposedly the most
violent month in the history of the conflict. Death estimates for both
sides range between 104 and 141 in contrast to 26 in January. One
source indicated that the kill ratio, once 12 to 1 in the Rhodesian Gov-
ernment's favor is now running at only 3 to 1.
These events have apparently led to some reevaluation of the situa-
tion among Rhodesians. The government continues to maintain that
both whites and blacks are committed to the struggle on the economic
and military fronts and will not give in to the "communist" guerrillas.
But some white Rhodesians are apparently debating abolishing voter
qualifications in order to stimulate new discussions with black na-
tionalists and Smith has recently declared his willingness to contem-
plate bringing more blacks into the government. Former Prime Min-

ister Garfield Todd has recently been released from house arrest in
what some observers consider an effort to placate white liberal opinion.
The leader of the opposition white Rhodesia Party, Timothy Gibbs.
has called for the elimination of racial discrimination, a return to the
common voting roll for whites and blacks and a qualified franchise.
Another group, the National Pledge. has raised $150,000 for a cam-
paign to end racial discrimination.
Nevertheless, the laagerr" or siege mentality reportedly remains
strong, especially among those who have lived in Rhodesia for many
years. The white emigration rate is about 1,000 per month but the
inflow of Portuguese from Angola and Mozambique has largely com-
pensated for the loss. The core population is likely to stick out the
fight, if only because they cannot get their assets out or maintain
the same standard of living elsewhere. It is particularly debatable,
however, how long the new arrivals will want to remain.
Although the future outlook is too murky to predict, three possible
scenarios in particular seem plausible. An increase of Rhodesian "hot
pursuit" missions into Mozambique might evoke a stronger reaction
from that country with or without outside assistance. The OAU has
recently asked Mozambique for reports about Rhodesian border viola-
tions. Mozambique would probably first seek help from OAU coun-
tries, several of whom are considering the provision of assistance. Few
parties favor a request for Cuban or Russian intervention at this stage
although this is sometimes mentioned as a last resort. Even without
outside help, an aggressive response from Mozambique might elicit
the Rhodesian declaration of war against Mozambique that Smith
has threatened.
A second possibility is an ongoing build-up of troops on both sides
with an increase in guerrilla attacks and Rhodesian responses. This
might continue until the fall rainy season when the physical condi-
tions for guerrilla incursions will improve. At that point the libera-
tion groups might plan to launch a major offensive, possibly with the
support of troops from other African countries. Whether or not the
Rhodesian security forces will be capable of effectively repelling them
may depend as much upon the state of the economy as on the state
of the army. If conditions become too difficult the South Africans
might come to their aid, whereupon the black nationalists would prob-
ably also ask for additional outside assistance.
The third possibility is the resumption of negotiations. The black
groups have stated that they will only negotiate if there is a prior
agreement to a fairly rapid transition to majority rule. The white
Rhodesians are unlikely to agree unless forced by economic pressure
from further border closures, a large outflow of whites leading to sig-
nificant economic decline, or some other measure which would con-
vince the whites they were going to lose. A simple change in govern-
ment leaders is unlikely to have this effect, since Smith would most
likely be replaced by a more conservative figure.
In general, the consensus of informed opinion is that the longer it
takes to resolve the Rhodesian conflict, the more violent will be the
solution and the more radical the ensuing government. The Third
Force seems to be assuming the authority once held by ANC political
leadership. Many of the Karanga leaders of the old ZANU military


are still in Zambian prisons. If they are released, they may well be-
come the new ZIPA leaders. They are unlikely to defer to the old
political leaders when it becomes time to negotiate, because they have
pledged themselves to change not only the skin color of the ruling
group but the socio-economic system as well.

At the conclusion of the Angolan civil war in early 1976 there was
widespread speculation that military activity, possibly with Cuban
involvement, would spill over into a concerted military effort to es-
tablish majority rule in Namibia. Instead, the primary focus for both
attention and action became Rhodesia. Nevertheless, tensions are build-
ing in Namibia and even the South Africans have recognized that
they must establish a shorter timetable for self rule. Pre-constitutional
(Turnhalle) talks are underway but the participants do not include
the major black political party, SWAPO, and the terms of reference
of these talks are not acceptable to them. Experienced observers be-
lieve that if a peaceful settlement is not reached in Namibia by the
time the Rhodesian conflict is concluded, the force of the armed strug-
gle will be directed to that arena.
As a former German colony, Southwest Africa became a South
SAfrican protectorate under the League of Nations after World War I.
Shortly after the United Nations was created, it voted to rescind
South Africa's authority over its former protectorate, and has since
passed numerous resolutions calling upon South Africa to withdraw
from the territory and return it to the United Nations for a transition
to independence. The most recent of these, Security Council Resolu-
tion 385 adopted this year, includes a provision to explore the use
of more forceful measures if South Africa has not withdrawn its
troops by August 31, 1976. The United Nations has established a Com-
mission on Namibia (the United Nations' name for Southwest Africa),
which is headed by Sean MacBride, and will soon open a Namibia
Tnsitute in Lusaka to train future government leaders.
South Africa has never recognized U.N. authority over Namibia, and
views itself as an administering not an occupational force, present in
the territory at the invitation of the people. Most nations do not accept
this position since the people's will is expressed by a minority white
Namibia is a large barren country located in the southwestern part
of Africa, believed to have large natural resources including diamonds
and uranium. The total population numbers less than 900,000, only
100,000 of whom are white. The white population is estimated to con-
sist of 25,000 whites of German descent, 25,000 Afrikaaners who im-
migrated from South Africa and 50,000 South African Civil Servants.
Forty-six percent (400,000) of the population come from the
Ovambo group located in the north and nine other black African and
"coloured" groups make up the remainder. Racial discrimination and
apartheid measures in Namibia are similar to those existing in South
Africa. The local legislative assembly and the territory's representa-
tives to the South African Parliament are white.


The Southwest African People's Organization (SWAPO) has been
recognized by both the United Nations and the Organization of Afri-
can Unity (OAU) as the legitimate representative of the majority of
the Namibian people. The OAU Liberation Committee has put
SWAPO in its "first category" for maximum assistance and it is the
only liberation movement to which the British provide direct
The South African Government long ago outlawed SWAPO. A
number of its leaders are imprisoned on Robbins Island, and periodic
round-ups, detainments and even torture of suspected SWAPO mem-
bers apparently occur. Efforts to wipe out underground SWAPO
bases were increased last year when South African troop strength
geared up for the Angolan incursion.
The external branch of SWAPO has made Zambia its primary base
for a number of years but Zambia seemingly is fearful it will have the
same kind of problems with SWAPO that it recently experienced
with ZANU. It consequently maintains rather tight control over the
estimated 10,000 SWAPO members within its territory. The U.N.
Namibia Commission and Institute for Namibia are located in Lusaka
and a farm and school were established in the same area to accom-
modate the augmented flow of refugees during the mid-1970's. The
farm has recently been closed and the school moved to Kayomo where
"outsiders" are no longer welcome.
Most recently the Zambians have arrested and kept in "protective
detention"' approximately 20 SWAPO members, including Andras
Shipanga, who is well known in diplomatic circles in Lusaka. The
Zambians denied this detention for two weeks after it occurred. Some
observers have claimed that there was an internal threat, against the
top SWAPO leadership, most notably against the President, Sam
Nujoma, who is usually identified as a moderate and part of the "old
boys" school. Some claim that a nascent revolt was developing among
a group of young Turks who resented the old guard's lack of results
during their many years outside Namibia. The old guard was also
accused of misusing funds and material. Another interpretation is
that Shipanga in particular was challenging Nujoma from the right
through his western contacts. A third possibility is that Shipanga's
group was interfering with Nujoma's attempts to negotiate wth
South Africa about possible SWAPO participation in the Turnhalle
Either at the request of Nujoma or on its own initiative, the Zam-
bian Government decided to arrest a small group and allow the ma-
jority of the leadership to continue organizing. There are also indica-
tions of splits between the internal and external wings of SWAPO.
SWAPO's present ideology is moderate relative to that of other
liberation groups; its leadership has been largely western educated.
Symbolically the party advocates free enterprise except for natural
resources which it believes should be jointly owned by the private and
public sectors. The current splits within SWAPO may reflect chal-
leniges to this position; a long struggle might result in a more radical


Until recently most guerrilla operations against Namibia were con-
ducted over the Zambian border via the Caprivi strip. A major of-
fensive was planned for 1975 but was subsequently shelved so as not
to interfere with the Rhodesian negotiations. At that time it was esti-
mated that SWAPO had about 1,000 trained troops divided into three
groups. Those in Zambia were Russian trained, those in Tanzania had
Chinese instructors, and a third group was operating in northern
Namibia, where they facilitated the large refugee migration of 1974.
More recently SWAPO's base of operations has shifted to the Angola
border where it has a new source of Soviet supplies and MPLA sup-
port. There has been an increase in guerrilla attacks this year from
Angola. Twenty South African soldiers were killed between January
and April and several whites have recently been attacked near
A major component of South Africa's policy of dtente has been an
attempt to find an acceptable solution to the Namibia problem. Since
the South African presence is considered illegal by most international
forums, outside intervention is possible and has been discussed by a
number of groups. Most recently the Commonwealth Ministers in
Jamaica denounced South Africa's role in Namibia and called for an
accommodation with SWAPO. During the fall of 1974, the Southwest
African Nationalist Party (white) first considered the possibility of
conducting constitutional talks based on the premise that the people
of Southwest Africa, not South Africa or the United Nations, should
decide the future of this territory. Talks were subsequently convened
in the fall of 1975. Although formally all options were considered
open, the underlying intention was to work out a constitution and
governmental structure consisting of a loose confederation of semi-
autonomous ethnic areas similar to South Africa's homelands policy.
In other words it was an attempt to get other ethnic groups to accom-
modate the ruling whites. The convention has no legal mandate to make
its decisions binding.
Participation in the talks is based upon ethnic group representa-
tion. Eleven population groups originally sent 156 delegates. There
was no limit on the number representing each group since decisions
were to be reached by consensus. Part of the purpose of the exercise
was to circumvent SWAPO, so no political party representation was
allowed. Even the white opposition party could not send representa-
tives since the territorial government's Executive Committee desig-
nated its National Party members as delegates. This has caused some
contention, especially among the Germans a number of whom do not
feel adequately represented and would prefer to negotiate with the
blacks on their own. Black delegates represent tribal groupings and
some claim that South Africa influenced the selection of conservative
and often illiterate tribal chiefs.
The South Africans maintain that SWAPO is not eligible to partici-
pate in the talks because it is an illegal political party, not the rep-
resentative of an ethnic group. SWAPO in turn refuses to take part
in any talks organized along ethnic lines. It considers itself a political
party which represents all the people of Namibia. It has further re-


fused to recognize any talks instigated by the occupying force because
legally only the U.N. Namibia Commission has the authority to con-
duct negotiations leading to independence.
Although the SWAPO refuses to consider negotiating with Southi
Africa along what it views as master-servant lines, it lias set down a
number of conditions under which it will talk. These include: (1)
South African recognition of the independence and right to self-deter-
mination of the people of Namibia, (2) elimination of the idea of par-
titioning Namibia, (3) recognition of SWAPO as the sole representa-
tive of the Namibian people, (4) release of all Namibian political pris-
oners. and (5) free repatriation of all Namibian exiles without fear of
detention. South Africa has rejected these conditions but it is sup-
posedly debating its categorical reject ion of all SWAPO participation.
Ideally it would like to split SWAPO and convince part of the group
to 1)articipate in the talks on an ethnic representational basis.
Even though black delegate selection was supposedly carefully or-
chestrated by South Africa. some of the resolutions which have come
out of the conference are in line with SWAPO goals. They included
calls for the establishment of a multi-racial government by June 30,
1976, an end to ethnic politics, one man-one vote, the elimination of
all racial segregation laws, and a three-fold increase in the minimum
wage (to $120 a month).
Chief Clemens Kapuuo, the leader of the Herero tribal delegation,
presented a blueprint constitution which provides for a unitary state
instead of a loose confederation of ethnic groups. Election to the leg-
islature would be based on universal franchise and the two chambers
would be divided on north-south lines with the intention of moving
toward political rather than ethnic group representation. The current
Southwest African legislature is thought to be unlikely to agree to such
proposals. It is significant, however, that the whites are even willing to
discuss these key issues with blacks.

Namibia is an Achilles heel for South Africa; there is a growing
belief within South Africa that it must eventually be turned over to
the Namibians. Some South Africans believe that what happens in
Namibia today may be a projection of what will occur in South Africa
tomorrow and the accomplishment of peaceful change in Namibia
could provide a challenge to South African whites to go through the
same process. Indeed, the Namibian talks are sometimes viewed as a
possible trial run for South Africa. If they are to play that role the
talks must be successful, yet without the participation of SWAPO any
system emerging from them is unlikely to be accepted by the Ovambo
people who constitute the largest part of the population. As the pri-
mary black political party in Namibia. SWAPO has fairly widespread
influence; while South Africans publicly reject SWAPO's power, their
on-going attempts to get SWAPO to join the talks indicate a private
recognition of SWAPO influence.
Althoiiuh the Turnhalle talks were originally planned to take three
'ears it is currently projected that they will reach a solution or break
down at the end of one year in the autumn of 1976. On August 31,1976,


the United Nations Security Council plans again to consider the
Namibia question. South Africa is categorically opposed to a United
Nations supervised or controlled election. SWAPO, on the other hand,
claims it will recognize a plebescite only if South Africa withdraws
from Namibia. SWAPO further asserts that it will continue guerrilla
operations should there be any new government which it views as a
black puppet of South Africa, installed by elections which have not
been controlled by the United Nations. In this case, informed ob-
servers believe that SWAPO would be likely to call for outside sup-
port as the MPLA did in Angola.
Meanwhile South Africa continues to organize for both an eventual
augmented conflict or a transition to self-rule. Vorster has invited
outside representatives, including the OAU, to go into Southwest
Africa and meet with the "true leaders" (not SWAPO) of the people.
There have been some recent breakdowns in petty apartheid as racial
designation signs are taken down, a few hotels become multiracial, and
the pass laws are revised.
Ethnic homelands are being established in Southwest as they are in
South Africa proper. Local rule has been granted to the eastern Cap-
rivi Strip and to the Republic of Basters, which is made up of 20,000
coloureds of mixed Dutch-African descent. At the same time, a one-
kilometer wide no-man's-land has been established along the thousand-
mile-long Angolan border to try to control SWAPO raids.
Informed observers believe that the immediate situation in Namibia
is not as explosive as that in Rhodesia, and that the chances of a peace-
fuil solution are better than in Rhodesia. But the time span in which
this must be accomplished, if widespread violence is to be avoided, has
been significantly shortened by other events in the region. The results
of the Turnhalle talks, the United Nations deliberations and the in-
ternal dissentions within SWAPO will all help to determine the event-
ual outcome.
The Republic of South Africa presents a much more complicated
situation than Rhodesia. One person in five is white, compared to
one in 23 in Rhodesia. Sixty percent of the white population is an
Afrikaans-speaking, Dutch-descended group which settled Cape Pro-
vince in South Africa at roughly the time the English colonists set-
tled America. These people feel themselves to be African, and are rec-
ognized as such by many black African leaders.
The recent serious outbreak of rioting by urban Africans in Johan-
nesburg and Pretoria demonstrates the enormous tensions in the social
structure in South Africa, and how closely related the events in
Rhodesia and Southwest Africa are to those in South Africa itself.
The foreign policy thrust of the Vorster government has been to pur-
sue a detente policy with moderate black African states to the North,
while continuing to force the pace of separate development within
South Africa. In essence, South Africa has been prepared to deal with
black Africans outside South Africa in a manner quite unthinkable
internally. This policy has suffered a number of severe blows: the
collapse of the Smith-black nationalist talks at Victoria Falls in Au-
gust, 1975, which were engineered by Vorster and Kaunda; the inter-


vention of South Africa in the Angolan civil war, which Ihadl the
effect of confirming majority black African support for the MILA
and now the recent urban rioting by blacks, an indication that the
blacks do not accept Vorster's claim that separate development is a
satisfactory solid ion to South Africa's racial problems.
Because South Africa is recognized as a key element in the solution
of southern African problems, events in South Africa will have an
important bearing on Rhodesia and Southwest Africa. The disturb-
ances in the various African townships have directly challenged the
South African Government at home for the first time in many years,
and external pressure on South Africa may also increase sharply. A
decline in foreign investment, such as occurred after the Sharpeville
massacre, could have a most damaging effect on the South African
economy-especially in conjunction with the drop in world gold prices.
Since the Nationalist Party, the party of the Afrikaners. came to
power in 1948, the government has pursued a policy of racial separa-
tion and discrimination known as apartheid. Only whites have politi-
cal power. The entire edifice of laws and regulations preserve white
supremacy through job reservation for whites, residential and educa-
tional segregation, inferior black education, and a pass-law system
that permits Africans to live in urban areas only if they work for
whites. Political organization by blacks has been ruthlessly sup-
pressed; even black trade unions are not permitted.
The Sharpeville massacre in 1960 and South Africa's growing iso-
lation from the rest of the world forced the government to hasten
its steps to implement separate development as a means of justifying
its policies to the rest of the world and removing blacks not needed
as laborers from white South Africa. The government determined
to create Bantu homelands (Bantustans) to serve as the designated
areas of the various African tribes of South Africa. Ten Bantustans
have been established, varying in size and administrative development
from the Transkei. the largest, least scattered, and "prepared to be-
come independent on October 26, 1976-to South Ndebele, a tiny frag-
ment of land with no administrative organization. A map of the Ban-
tustans in the Appendix makes clear the fragmented character of these
The Bantustans together comprise only 13 percent of the total land
area of South Africa; the remaining 87 percent is to remain under
white control. At present there are 113 separate fragments of land,
to be consolidated at some future time to thirty-six. At that time
KwaZulu, the homeland for the four million Zulus, will consist. of ten
separate fragments. Two separate states of five fragments will con-
tain the 3.950.000 Xhosa speakers. Six fragments make up the Ban-
tustan of Bophuthatswana for the 1,720,000 Tswanas. South Africa
plans to give these ten Bantustans complete independence, although
only the Transkei has been given a definite timetable for this
The. Bantustan policy is the intellectual creation of the Nationalist
Party, on the theory that South Africa is a multinational country, not
a multi-racial one. There has never been any referendum to determine
whether Africans or even whites want Bantustans. Sharing political
power with Africans is an anathema to Afrikaners. In their view,


separate development permits blacks to have their own political sys-
tem apart from the whites, whose power over the remaining part of
South Africa will be left unchallenged. In reality the Afrikaners see
quite clearly that with their total population numbering just a bit over
2 million they cannot share political power with 20 million non-whites
without quickly losing their hold on the government. Thus the Ban-
tustan policy enables the Afrikaners to fragment the non-white
groups and push them out into homelands where they cannot chal-
lenge white power. The anticipated end result is a residual South
Africa in which the whites are in the majority.
Experienced observers in South Africa readily point out a number
of what they consider to be fatal flaws in the policy of separate de-
velopment. Even the enlightened (verligte) segment of Afrikaner
intellectuals themselves admit some of these flaws and profess concern
over whether the pace of change has overtaken separate development.
However, officials of the South African Government show no sign of
rethinking separate development, but instead are pushing ahead with
its implementation.
The homelands policy has no provision for the 2.3 million coloured
people of mixed race who live primarily in Cape Province, and the
700,000 Asians, who live largely in Natal. Both groups are highly
urbanized, yet they have neither rights in the white towns nor hope
of a traditional homeland. A commission of inquiry into the conditions
of the coloured people, under the chairmanship of an Afrikaner
woman sociologist, has just recommended widespread changes for the
coloured population, but some of the most significant of these pro-
posals were rejected by the Vorster government.
Second, and most serious, it is noted that the homelands policy does
not deal with the situation of urban Africans- who live outside the
homelands and comprise between one-half and two-thirds of the total
population. These people will continue to have no rights or power in
white South Africa. In theory urban Africans should belong to the
homeland of their language group, even if they were not born in the
homeland and have no ties there. Urban Africans now have no "right"
to be in urban areas unless employed, and are sent back to their tribal
areas if they lose their jobs. Under the homelands policy their situa-
tion would worsen because they would ultimately lose their South
African citizenship, and become foreign migrant laborers in their own
country. Thus it is not surprising that there is widespread hostility
to the homelands policy among urban blacks.
The extent to which the government is prepared to force the Ban-
tustan policy on an unwilling population is demonstrated by a recent
government move that threatens serious friction between South Africa
and the Transkei, which is on the verge of independence. The South
African Government has announced that the 1.3 million Xhosa who
live outside the Transkei will be considered Transkei citizens on Oc-
tober 26, the date of Transkei's independence. Chief Matanzima,
Transkei's Prime Minister, has rejected this declaration and has stated
that the Xhosa in South Africa are the responsibility of the South
African Government.
The South African Government has gone further by announcing
that black businessmen and professionals will be required to take home-


land citizenship as a condition for renewal of trading or professional
licenses. Black leaders have reacted bitterly to this policy. The Rand
Daily Mail, Jolianniesburg's leading newspaper, labelled it "political
black-mail" and wrote: "It is coercion of the most blatant kind, and is
dangerous." In addition, the limited home ownership (really long-
term leasehold) available for Africans in Soweto will be available only
to those who have taken homeland citizenship.
The limbo in which urban Africans exist in South Africa is not rec-
ognized in the policy of separate development. This group is relatively
more educated, more prosperous, and more aware of the outside world.
The politically conscious among them argue that Vorster's detente
policy is meaningless unless he comes to terms with blacks in South
Africa. Many of them now feel that events in Angola, Mozambique and
Rhodesia prove that their time has come and they are prepared to hold
firm for one man, one vote, in South Africa instead of being bought off
by political rights in independent Bantustans. Events in Soweto show
that these feelings are at a flash point.
The third major flaw which observers point out with regard to the
Bantustan policy concerns the fragmented and economically weak
character of these entities. Former Prime Minister Verwoerd was op-
osed even to foreign investment or white settlement in the homelands,
ut this view was ultimately rejected as unrealistic.
Nevertheless, the Bantustans remain economic backwaters, and
serve chiefly as pools of unskilled labor for white South Africa. Agri-
culture is the main economic activity of the homelands, with virtually
no industry and very little mining. The most valuable mineral areas
and much of the best farmlands have carefully been left in white South
Africa. The Transkei must import as much corn as it produces. If this
is indicative of other Bantustans, none is likely to be self-sufficient in
food. Furthermore the Bantustans are virtually totally dependent on
South Africa for transportation, electrical power, communications,
health facilities and trained manpower. Since they comprise only 13
percent of South Africa's total land area, it is difficult to believe that
the Bantustans can ever be more than economically helpless, mini-
states completely dependent on the good will of the South African
The independence of the Transkei on October 26 will present the
rest of the world with the necessity of deciding whether to recognize its
sovereign status. The overwhelming majority of African states have
already announced their intention to refuse to recognize Transkei's in-
dependence. Africans regard it as a stepchild of apartheid and as a
reactionary attempt to ret riibalize Africa.
The United States has stated that it intends to be guided by African
countries on the issue of recognition. Since only a handful of African
states at most are likely to recognize the Transkei, it seems unlikely
that the United States will do so. Many urban black South Africans
would regard it as a betrayal of their interests by the United States
and in direct contradiction to the policies enunciated in Kissinger's
Lusaka speech.
The possibilities'for peaceful change are rapidly fading in South
Africa, as they are in Rhodesia. The anger and frustration of urban
Africans have exploded in the worst urban violence since the Na-


tionalists came to power. Many of the young Africans believe that vio-
lence is the only answer to their condition. The question now is whether
the violence in Soweto will lead to a strengthening of the right wing
of the Nationalist Party, or to a greater push for reform by other
whites. The limited reforms of the recent past such as a partial lift-
ing of segregation in sports, international hotels, and parks are ap-
parently not enough to satisfy many blacks. The real issue is whether
the whites will move toward meaningful sharing of economic and
political power with the blacks. Available evidence leads one to con-
clude that whites are not prepared to make such concessions.
The outcome of the Rhodesian situation and the progress toward
self-government in Namibia are vitally important for South Africa.
The emergence of moderate governments in both countries could pro-
vide South Africa with border security and the maintenance of eco-
nomic ties. Moreover, it could set the tone for similar developments
in South Africa. If South African whites see that black governments
in Rhodesia and Namibia continue to accept and protect whites it will
help to allay fears about changes in South Africa.
The pressure for change on South Africa can only grow stronger
and the timetable for meaningful action foreshortened. It is dis-
couraging to find that South Africans are still obsessed with cosmetic
changes instead of facing up to the fundamental change necessary to
deal with non-white concerns.

A major legacy of colonial rule in south-central Africa is the close
linkage between the economies of countries in this area. South Africa
is the major economic power in the region, and has served as a power-
ful magnet, drawing African labor from countries to the north. Rho-
desia, Zambia, and Malawi were joined together in the Central Afri-
can Federation, a white-dominated union that lasted for ten years
until 1963. The economies of the Portuguese colonies were closely tied
to South Africa. Mozambique in particular served as the major chan-
nel for trade from Rhodesia. and the port of Laurenco Marques also
served South Africa. The British-built and owned Benguela Railroad
ran from the port of Lobito in Angola through Zaire to Zambia and
provided a significant outlet for their copper exports. The mineral
wealth of the heart of central Africa: Zambia, Zaire, and Rhodesia
has made possible the development of a relatively sophisticated rail
transport system.
Prior to Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence in
1965, virtually all of Zambia's copper exports and a good deal of
Zaire's copper were exported via Rhodesian railways to Mozambique
ports. Zambia's imports came over the same routes. U.N. sanctions
following UDI sharply cut Rhodesia's oil supply, but it was replaced
by South Africa and Mozambique so the economy continued to func-
tion. Rhodesia subsequently shut off its oil supply to Zambia, forcing
Zambia to turn north to Tanzania for oil. Thus began a major effort
by Zambia to reorient its transport routes northward through Tan-
zania. Initially, an unpaved road (the Great North Road), carried
Zambia's copper exports 1,000 miles to the port of Dar es Salaam and
brought in the oil needed to run her economy. This proved disastrous
during the rainy season, and Zambia urgently required all-weather
transportation routes for both exports and imports.
After the World Bank rejected Zambia's and Tanzania's request for
a loan to construct a railway line from Zambia to Dar es Salaam.
the Chinese provided an interest-free loan of $100 million for this
purpose and built the railroad in record time. This line has just been
completed but will not be fully operational until the rail bed has set-
tled. Zambia and Tanzania also built an oil pipeline to the Copper
Belt. and the U.S. provided assistance to pave the Great North Road.
The Rhodesian border closure in January, 1973, further disrupted
Zambia's links with the outside world, and shut Zambia completely
off from its export routes through Rhodesia and Mozambique. The
Zambian-Rhodesian border has remained closed since that time, except
for transit traffic to Zaire.
The final blow to Zambia's transportation routes was the Angolan
civil war in 1975, which shut the Benguela Railroad. This railroad


carried about 50 percent of Zambia's export trade at the time. The
line is still not open: several bridges remain down in Angola, trapping
Zambian imports and rolling stock in the Lobito port area. These
successive disruptions forced the diversion of Zambian cargo to Dar
es Salaam and Mombasa, causing serious congestion and the hold-up
of 70,000 tons of Zambian copper for several months. A 40 percent
force majeure cut was imposed on copper exports.
Mozambique's decision to close its border with Rhodesia in March,
1976 was the final element of disruption in the once close transporta-
tion links in southern Africa. Mozambique's enforcement of sanctions
leaves Rhodesia with access to the sea only through South Africa.
Rhodesia has two railway lines running to South Africa; the old line
runs through Botswana, and a new line through Beitbridge links Rho-
desia directly to South Africa.
Botswana has thus far hesitated to sever its economic links with
Rhodesia, and the U.N. has exempted Botswana from the application
of sanctions against Rhodesia. However, the President of Botswana,
Sir Seretse Khama, has recently said that Botswana could comply
with U.N. sanctions against Rhodesia if it were assured of technical
and financial aid to keep its own trade routes operating. The railway
running through Botswana is owned and administered by Rhodesia.
Botswana has no rolling stock, locomotives, repair yards, or technical
staff of its own. A Canadian survey has recently estimated that Bot-
swana would need 130 technicians, 50 train crews, 300 wagons, and 10
diesel engines-at a cost of roughly $88 million-to continue the rail
operations if sanctions were imposed. South African cooperation
would also be necessary because Botswana's 500,000 tons of vital im-
ports and its 300,000 tons of beef, copper, and nickel exports must
pass through South Africa.
Rhodesia, a landlocked country, is vulnerable to pressure from the
surrounding countries, especially Mozambique and South Africa. Al-
though Rhodesia officially estimated that only 30 percent of its traf-
fic to the sea was affected by the Mozambique border closure, reporters
estimate that the percentage is much closer to 60. In 1973 Mozambique
ports handled 2.8 million tons of Rhodesian exports and imports.
By 1975 this figure had dropped to 2.1 million tons, still leaving a
significant tonnage to be diverted through South Africa's overbur-
dened ports and railways. Rhodesia also lost 2,300 railway wagons,
which were confiscated by Mozambique when sanctions were applied.
This amounts to one-sixth of the Rhodesia Railway total rolling stock,
which would cost about $50 million to replace. Rhodesia's shortage of
foreign exchange makes it virtually impossible to do so. In addition,
Rhodesian imports will cost more and exports will be less competitive
because export routes through South Africa are much longer than
those through Mozambique.
Rhodesia has survived for more than ten years in the face of U.N.
sanctions. During nine of those years, from 1965 to 1974, it averaged a
real growth rate of 7 percent. A sharp reversal was set in motion by
worldwide recession, oil price increases, and falling commodity prices.
Industrial output fell 1.4 percent in 1975, and imports have been
drastically reduced.


While Rhodesia can probably continue to survive economically for
some time, the application of sanctions by Mozambique ialakes its posi-
tion much more difficult. Rhodesia is now totally dependent on South
Africa and its good will for the use of railroads and ports. Both are
congested and South Africa may well find an additional two million
tons of imports and exports burdensome. South Africa could well give
first preference to her own commodities.
Rhodesia also faces a severe economic drain because of the increase
in guerrilla activity. This has lead to an increase in tlhe defense budget
and the call-up of virtually all able-bodied men to serve in the Rhode-
sian Army. This latter has had a significant disruptive effect on
business within Rhodesia.


Until the closure of Mozambique's border in early March, Zambia
was the African country that bore the heaviest brunt of sanctions
against'Rho'desia. Zambia's transport difficulties have been a major
drain on the economy. With the closure of its transport routes through
Rhodesia and Angola, Zambia's external links are through Tanzania
and to a lesser degree through Malawi and Mozambique. Close to 87
percent of Zambia's copper exports travel out by rail or road through
East Africa.
The remaining 13 percent goes through Malawi. The Chinese-built
Tanzania-Zambia Railroad has been completed but is not yet fully
bedded in. The maximum the line can handle at present is one train
a day of about 20 wagons carrying 800 tons. This amounts to roughly
15,000 tons a month.
The paved road between the Zambian Copper-Belt and Tanzania,
built with U.S. aid, permits road transport of copper exports, although
it is an expensive alternative to the railway. Recently a fleet of 52 heavy
trucks has begun operating on this route.
The heavily congested and inefficient port of Dar es Salaam is a
major bottleneck, and roughly 7,000 tons of Zambian copper is esti-
mated to be backlogged there. In addition, about another 7,000 tons of
Zambian copper remains in the Angolan port of Loboito. The export
route through Malawi requires, transshipment to Malawi Railways. A
direct road link between Zambia and Mozambique should be paved
soon, since financing has been obtanied. Even with these alternative
routes. Zambia's transportation system is inadequate for its needs.
The reasons fpr Zambia's economic crisis are fairly apparent. Zambia
is a one .commodity economy. Copper provides over 90 percent of its
foreign exchange and in normal times, 50 percent of its government
revenue. Copper will provide no revenues for the government in 1976.
In a one year period, copper prices have fallen by two-thirds, from
$1.50/lb. in 1974, to $0.55/lb. in 1975. Foreign exchange earnings from
copper fell from $1,320 million in 1974, to $729 million in 1975. The
closure of the Benguela Railroad led to a 6 percent decline in the vol-
ume of exports for Zambia in 1975. The real gross domestic product


during 1975 declined by 3 percent to $1,389 million. If the deteriorat-
ing terms of trade are included, the effective decline is estimated at
24.6 percent.
Zambia experienced its first trade deficit since independence during
1975 when the official balance of payments short fall was estimated at
$388 million. However, the real balance of payments deficit for 1975
amounted to about $640 million because Zambia accumulated $250
million arrearages in the payment of imports. These are computed as
capital inflows.
The Zambian Government introduced a restrictive budget in Janu-
ary, 1976, which contained a wide range of new measures including in-
creases in personal taxes, customs and excise taxes, sales and gasoline
taxes. Also a compulsory saving scheme was announced. The budget
contained a 36 percent cutback in capital expenditure and an attempt
to reduce current expenditure by over $86 million.
The mining companies are also faced with serious cash-flow prob-
lems because of their difficulties in getting imports and exporting cop-
per. In 1975. the two major mining companies were forced to borrow
about $250 million in the Euro-dollar market in order to maintain
normal operations. The Minister of Finance estimates that their bor-
rowing requirements for 1976 will range from $380 million to $570
million, depending largely on the extent of the transport problems.
The improvement in the price of copper to about $0.72/lb. has now
made it possible for the mining industry to operate at above the break-
even point. It is unlikely in the near term, however, to generate the
foreign exchange earnings necessary to ease the balance of payments
The increased costs of imports also have had a serious impact on
the balance of payments. For example, the bill for imported petroleum
is likely to rise from $89 million in 1975 to about $125 million in 1976.
The Ministry of Finance estimates that it will need $156 million to
cover a major part of its unpaid 1975 import bills. Even after various
measures have been adopted to tighten control over the balance of pay-
ments, the deficit for 1976 will be about $319 million. Further, this is
probably an optimistic prediction since it is based on the assumption
that Zambia will be able to reduce its imports from a level of $950
million in 1975 to $700 million in 1976.
Zambia has drawn about 76 million SDRs (roughly $87.4) from the
IMF from the three categories of standby facility, compensatory
financing facility, and oil facility. One tranche is only worth about $14
million to Zambia. Zambia has requested IMF balance of payments
support to cover its projected external financing needs in 1976. Dis-
cussions with the IMF are now in progress but full assistance would
probably amount to only $90 million. Even this amount may be con-
tingent upon Zambia's devaluation of its currency.
The World Bank is considering a program loan of about $25 million
and the EEC has agreed to make available to Zambia loans and grants
totalling $81 million over a period of four years. Bilateral assistance
from Western European governments may reach another $40 million.
After taking all these forms of assistance into account Zambia will
still require close to $400 million from other sources during 1976.


Sir Robert Jackson, Coordinator of the United Nations assistance
to Zambia, has estimated that the costs to Zambia of closing the border
with Rhodesia will total $330 million at the end of 1975. Zambia has so
far received only $63 million in aid from a small number of United
Nations miemlber countries.
Agriculture has also not fared well since independence in 1964.
Production of tobacco, once a significant export crop, has declined in
absolute terms. About $70 million is spent yearly on imported food.
Only about 90,000 head of cattle are produced annually, and in one
recent three-month period in 1975, the nation had to fly in 60,000
tons of beef from Botswana. These imports have now ceased but
Zambia is not yet self-sufficient. The government is attempting to
establish state cattle ranches, but so far these have not been very
successful. The staple food is corn; Zambia now seems to be attaining
self-sufficiency in this area at least. Marketed production of milk
has actually fallen, and imports of milk were necessary in 1975.
Zambia requires imports of both butter and cheese. A major source
of difficulty for the agricultural sector in Zambia has been the very
large gap between urban and rural wages. Copper miners were well
organized and paid, and their high salaries have tended to push up
salaries throughout the urban economy in Zambia. There has con-
sequently been a major rush to the cities, and Zambia is today probably
the most urbanized country in Black Africa. Previously government
subsidies have held down the prices of staple agricultural products.
but the recent necessity for government belt-tightening has meant the
end of these subsidies. In February, the price of corn meal jumped
110 percent as a result of the removal of government subsidies. The
inability of the government to develop agriculture has been one of
Zambia's most serious failures.
One effort to solve the rural-urban gap was a World Bank proposal
of intensive development zones that could become growth poles in the
rural areas. These were designed to provide a package of services to
the farmers. The cost of this program to the Zambian Government and
the tight budget situation has caused its adoption to be postponed.
In short, Zambia has many of the typical problems of a single-
commodity developing country. A high copper price led both the
Zambians and the outside world into thinking that Zambia had a
higher level of prosperity than actually existed. The Zambians had
elaborate plans for the development of their economy, on which they
spent a great deal of money, often without satisfactory results. Fre-
quent changes of government personnel and lack of trained man-
power have hampered Zambia's ability to implement its plans. Zam-
bia has been unable to overcome the gross imbalance between the
urban areas, especially the prosperous mining sector along the rail-
road line, and the rural communities which are much poorer. There
has been little progress in moving their economy away from depend-
ence on one commodity. In fact, Zambia's relative prosperity from
copper has probably prevented them from taking the necessary steps
to diversify their economy or develop agriculture as Malawi has


Zambia was simply unprepared for the very large drop in copper
prices, and was without a cushion and had to restrict its development
plans. Its hopes for bringing its rural and urban sectors into greater
harmony have receded further into the future. Zambians are par-
tially responsible for this impasse but clearly the fault is not ex-
clusively theirs. Foreign assistance would be important to Zambia to
compensate in some small way for the disruption of development plans
caused by the Rhodesian crisis, and the continuing need for trained
manpower and sound economic advice. Zambia's mineral wealth ought
to provide the basis for long-term prosperity, with aid providing a
bridge over the present difficult period.
Aid for Zambia
Zambian officials projected a series of short-term needs totalling
slightly over $60 million. These include fertilizer requirements for
1976 and early 1977 of $25 million, mining and earthmoving equipment
of $2.5 million, fisheries refrigeration equipment of $5 million, water
supply equipment of $13.5 million, and spare parts and unspecified
services of $10 million.
Zambian officials thought that three commodities could be financed
under Public Law 480: wheat, edible oils, and stock feeds. They pro-
vided figures for total annual consumption, without specifying how
much they hoped to receive from Public Law 480. Neither tl'e Zambian
officials nor U.S. Embassy officials had detailed knowledge of the op-
erations of Public Law 480. AID sent an expert to clarify the situation
in May. Other possible U.S. programs in which the Zambians expressed
interest were an AID Housing Guaranty program ($15 million) and
Ex-Im credits.
Zambian officials also discussed a number of long-term requirements.
These include $20 million for a hydro-electric scheme for rural electri-
fication and rural power transmission, and a dairy development scheme
for which the Dutch Government is conducting a feasibility study.
Both these projects would need a great deal of forward planning be-
fore U.S. aid could be committed.
The United States has not previously had a bilateral aid program
in Zambia. The establishment of a formal AID mission will probably
not be necessary if U.S. aid is limited to short-term BOP assistance
and P.L. 480. Although Zambia's most urgent short-term need is for
BOP assistance, there are genuine limits on the amount of overall as-
sistance that can be used wisely. Zambia still lacks adequate trained
manpower, and this slows up in poor planning and implementation.
The Zambians are extremely sensitive to outside criticism and what
they regard as interference in the management of their country. In
these circumstances informed observers believe that it would be best
for U.S. assistance to begin cautiously so that expectations will not
be so great that neither side can meet them. If an aid relationship be-
gins to develop, there are narrowly focused programs in food produc-
tion, health, and manpower training that can make substantial con-
tributions in areas of Zambian weakness without costing enormous
sums of money. Zambia's political philosophy of humanism provides
the right environment for the implementation of "New Directions"
AID programs, if basic structural and managerial problems are recog-
nized and treated seriously.

:%,)z.%'% u F.,v
The Cost of Applying Sanc'tion. Agahi.'t Rhodesia
The People's Republic of Mozambique became independent on
June 2?., 1915, after a 10-year struggle was waged by the Front for
the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), whose leader is tlhe cur-
rent President, Samora M.achel.
Mozambique was a Portuguese colony for 500 years, but there was
little development of the interior until the last 50 years. Mozaiubique,
like Zambia. has a dual economy: a large subsistence agricultural econ-
omy, which is extremely poor, and a relatively sophisticated modern
sector, developed mainly to service the transport needs of Rhodesia.
South Africa, and Zambia.
Mozamnibique was a highly dependent colonial economy. It was an
important source of imports into Portugal. Plantations were required
to sell all or part of their output to Portugal at prices determined
there. It was a major market for Portuguese exports. A highly pro-
tective tariff and foreign exchange system provided preferential entry
for Portuguese exports at prices which would have been impossible
under a free market system. These colonial arrangements help to
account for a degree of dependence on Rhodesian rail traffic which
proximity alone would not necessarily have produced.
The U.N. economic team that visited Mozambique in April, 1976, to
determine the impact on the Mozambique economy of applying sanc-
tions against Rhodesia stressed the patterns of colonial dependence.
"The developmental objectives prior to independence had
important implications for the structure of the economy of
Mozambique. The bulk of the investment was in ports and
railways designed to facilitate the transit trade and provide
the means to carry on the trade with Portugal. The financial
system was integrated into foreign monetary systems, espe-
cially the escudo, and rand areas. A high proportion of capi-
tal formation was directed toward creating larger, more
modern urban centers at the ports, and to developing a high
level of services in these centers. A high level of activity was
involved in servicing international trade-banking, insur-
ance. forwarding, clearing. Essential services, such as health.
education, and recreational facilities, were concentrated in
the urban centers and were designed to cater to the demands
of expatriates, settlers, and tourists. The road system that
evolved was designed to serve the urban centers and to ,timiu-
late tourism.
Very few investments were directed toward expanding
agricultural production in the subsistence sector, or to intro-
ducing cash crops into this sector. Most of the investments in
agriculture were directed toward large production units in
the hands of settlers or to plantations of such crops as sugar,
rice, and cotton to provide staples for export to Portugal.
This kind of economic and social structure was very vulner-
able to external influences. There was a very small internal
economic system as only a small part of consumption was
produced within Mozambique. Very little in the way of social


services was provided to the population at large. The major
external linkages were either with Portugal or with the more
developed sectors of neighboring countries. The structure of
the economy made exploitation easier through under invoicing
and transfer pricing, and made it extremely easy to
frustrate foreign exchange controls. Heavy demands were
made on professional skilled and semi-skilled personnel
which the local educational system was not designed to pro-
duce. This meant that most of the modern sector within
Mozambique depended on expatriates. There was a degree of
vulnerability arising from the expectations by expatriates
and settlers that Mozambique would continue to remain an
overseas province of Portugal. When it became clear that
independence was likely, and towards the end, imminent, the
exodus of professionals, skilled and semi-skilled personnel
was therefore greater than would have been the case if the
transition to independence had been contemplated. It is in
this context that one must examine the effect on the Mozam-
bique economy of applying sanctions to Rhodesia, and closing
its border to Rhodesian traffic."
The report of the U.N. economic mission provides the only detailed
account of the losses that Mozambique has experienced as a result of
applying sanctions. The mission estimated that the direct cost to Mo-
zambique of applying sanctions will be between $139 and $165 million
for the first year, and between $108 and $134 million the following
year. For years thereafter, the costs are likely to be in the region of
$106 to $132 million annually.
Prior to 1965, roughly two-thirds of the tonnage handled in the port
of Beira and about one-fifth of the tonnage handled in the port of
Maputo consisted of traffic to and from Rhodesia, including transit
traffic through Rhodesia. In recent years this proportion has dropped
to about one-half for Beira and one-seventh for Maputo. However,
much of the traffic from Rhodesia was bulk traffic for which revenue
charges and port charges were higher. It is estimated that about half
the revenue for Mozambique ports and railroads was derived from
Rhodesian traffic, although it accounted for less than one-fourth of the
total tonnage.
The Mozambique Railway system in the North and the South was
joined only through Rhodesia. Therefore the closing of the border with
Rhodesia has also cut the traffic links between the southern and north-
ern systems.
The U.N. report estimated that the reduction in foreign exchange
earnings from the railway and ports of Mozambique as a result of the
application of sanctions would be between $57 and $74 million. An
additional $5 to $10 million is lost from the services that were pro-
vided for the transit trade such as clearing, forwarding, bonding and
Tourism accounts for a second category of revenue which has re-
cently been lost. More than 50,000 tourists have annually visited Mo-
zambique from Rhodesia. It is estimated that the yearly revenue loss


from the decrease in tourist trade will be between $4.5 million and
$5.5 million. Losses from airport taxes, landing fees, and other airline
operations by Rhodesian aircraft in Mozambique add up to another
million dollars.
Remittances from Mozambique migrant workers in Rhodesia have
also ceased. Mozambique, in common with a number of other black
African countries neighboring South Africa and Rhodesia, tradition-
ally provided a large pool of unskilled and cheap manpower. Re-
mittances by Mozambique workers in South Africa are still an impor-
tant source of foreign exchange for the Mozambique Government, as
were the remittances to the roughly 80,000 Mozambique workers in
Rhodesia. Many of these people are working in the mines although
some are in industry and agriculture. The U.N. report calculated the
foreign exchange earnings from workers employed in Rhodesia
amounted to $22-25 million a year.
Finally, there are certain costs associated with exports to Rhodesia
and imports from Rhodesia that will no longer be available. Exports
to Rhodesia in 1975 were approximately $5 million and the imports
from Rhodesia amounted to about $20 million. Certain products pre-
viously exported to Rhodesia-such as copper concentrates, asbestos,
and bauxite will be difficult to transport and sell in other markets,
and other products which have been traditionally supplied by Rho-
desia such as corn, iron, tobacco, gypsum, fertilizer, paper and chemi-
cals-will be more expensive from other sources. The total cost of
these changes is likely to amount to some $10 million.
In aggregate terms the ongoing annual cost of applying sanctions
against Rhodesia will be in the region of $108 to $134 million.
Losses on transport and services------------------------------- $63-$85
Losses on tourism--------------------------- ------------- ---4. 5-5. 5
Losses on remittances-------------------- --------------------22- 25
Increase in the trade deficit--------------------------------------- 16
A second category of costs attributable to the application of sanc-
tions relates to additional projects that Mozambique needs for services
that were previously supplied from Rhodesia. A major example of such
a project is the telecommunication link within Mozambique and with
the outside world. Previously many telecommunications connections
were routed through Salisbury and the troposphere station which pro-
vides the telecommunications link between Maputo and most of the
rest of the country is situated right on the Rhodesian border. There-
fore an alternative system will have to be provided if Mozambique is
to be protected from Rhodesian border incursions against the station.
In the same way, Salisbury airport is no longer available as an alterna-
tive to Beira; an alternative airport will have to be provided if inter-
national flights are to be continued to Beira.
It will also be necessary to construct an alternate transport link
between the northern and southern railway systems, probably a road
link with freight terminals at each end. Finally, it is necessary to de-
vote some resources to establishing reception centers for Moza mbiquean
workers from Rhodesia returning to be resettled. It is estimated that
almost $3 million will be required for food for these reception centers.
The total cost of these additional projects is estimated by the U.N. at
$31 million.


Other costs relate the need for additional supplies in Mozambique,
since previously Rhodesia provided emergency requirements, such as
spare parts, food, medicines and small items of machinery and equip-
ment. Additional food production as a cost of $6 million will be needed
to replace emergency supplies from Rhodesia.
The U.N. mission also calculated the indirect cost of applying sanc-
tions. More than 10,000 people, 5,000 of whom were railway employees,
will lose their jobs as a result of sanctions unless new developments are
undertaken. The cost of supplying employment for this redundant
labor force has been included in the U.N. estimates of emergency finan-
cial assistance. However, there will be additional capital costs for pro-
viding alternate employment in various development projects. There are
costs and resulting delays in planning associated with an already over-
burdened administration. As the U.N. mission points out, the sooner
major development activities are undertaken, the shorter will be the
period for which emergency financial assistance will be necessary.
Mozambique Economy
Mozambique's economy has experienced substantial disruption since
independence in 1975. The U.N. mission estimated that the gross do-
mestic product is between $180 and $200 per person. At the same time it
is also estimated that annual income in the rural areas in 1972 was
about $50 per capital. Agricultural production fell some 50 percent in
the commercial sector between 1974 and 1975. Activity in the transport
sector fell about 30 percent between the same years, and in the manu-
facturing sector by about the same amount. Construction activity
dropped off by at least half. Thus it is estimated that there is a de-
cline in GNP of roughly 30 percent in 1975, after a fall of similar
magnitude in 1974.
Relatively little of this fall affected the rural subsistence sector. It
is the urban, primarily expatriate group which has been severely af-
fected, many of whose members have left the country since the middle
of 1974.
The U.N. mission estimated that the trade deficit for 1976 will be
roughly $275 million, which does not include the import component
of emergency and developmental projects necessary to overcome the
effects of applying sanctions. Mozambique has benefited from a sys-
tem of forced savings by Mozambiquean workers in the South African
mines, which was introduced by the Portuguese several decades ago.
After the first three months of the worker's contract, 60 percent of
his wages are withheld, and an equivalent amount of gold at the
official price of $42 per oz. is transferred by the South African Gov-
ernment to Mozambique's account. The Mozambique Government re-
imburses the worker in escudos at the official exchange rate upon his
return to Mozambique. However, the value of this gold to Mozam-
bique as a foreign exchange asset valued at the world market price
of gold is more than three times the official rate at which the gold was
received. This may have added some $80 to $90 million to Mozam-
bique's foreign exchange reserves during 1975. Remittances from
miners have decreased since independence, and this trend will continue
as Mozambique no longer issues passports for work in South Africa.
Even if this arrangement were to continue as it is now, the deficit
would still be between $175 and $200 million. The U.N. mission con-

eluded that the balance of payments deficit in 1977 will be roughly
the same as 1976. Mozambique will therefore require a substantial
amount of financial assistance to meet its balance of payments deficit
of the next two years. Some of this deficit could be met by the import
of essential materials covered by grants. General balance of payments
support is clearly required. The U.N. has compiled a list of specific
commodities needed. Aid could be provided to fund specific import
requirements to ensure that there are no transfers to the Zimbabwe
Liberation Army.
The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has had an
office in Maputo since January, 1975. TUNDP started emergency pro-
grams in four priority fields: health, agriculture, housing, and water
According to experts one of the most serious problems of the
Mozambique Government is the shortage of trained manpower. This
prevents detailed project planning and results in a long lead time in
the development and approval of projects.
Experienced observers state that other difficulties in dealing with
the Mozambique Government included the centralization and slowness
of decisionmaking, the lack of experience in dealing with international
aid, the lack of organization which extends even to the most simple
administrative tasks, and reluctance to accept foreign advisors.
Mozambique needs some 650 technicians urgently. Observers hope that
as the government gains confidence it will become more receptive to
foreign advisors and more sure of its own decisions.
Mozambique has not yet joined the World Bank and the IMF, but
there are indications that it intends to do so. However, it has not yet
made a formal application.
The FRELIMO Government is much more ideologically oriented
than most in Africa. It is Marxist in orientation, and the controlled
press has an anti-Western bias. Political ideology sets the framework
in which economic decisions are taken. It is likely that political de-
cisions on nationalization were made by FRELMO before independ-
ence and implemented afterwards.
While reports of economic disruption are widespread, there is no
evidence of corruption in government at this point. As an example,
food distribution last year during the floods was handled quite well,
and with no evident signs of corruption. On the other hand, there
continue to be food shortages with long queues in Maputo.
Government nationalization has extended to private property, but
businesses as such have not been actually nationalized. Legal and med-
ical services on the other hand have also been nationalized. There is a
drastic shortage of doctors.
The banking sector has not been nationalized, but two large banks
in which the Portuguese Government has interests prior to indepen-
dence were taken over by the Mozambique Government. Some private
banks are still operating. However, the nationalization of property
has caused the mortgage investments of the bank to lose their value,
and therefore the banks themselves are in a nonviable position.
South Africa continues to play a significant role in the Mozambique
economy, especially in the ports and railways. South African Airways,
a government owned corporation, has offered to provide daily air


service between Johannesburg and Maputo so that technicians and
officials from South Africa can commute to Maputo. The South Afri-
can Government is urging business cooperation so that the Mozam-
bique economy can be kept going.
Maputo is still an important port for South Africa, but some busi-
nesses are reportedly reluctant to use the port because of the unreliabil-
ity of the labor force and costly delays. Firms find it more difficult to
get insurance coverage and fewer Western ships are calling. Both
Mozambique and South Africa are pragmatic enough to recognize
that they need each other despite the gulf between their political
There are some hopeful signs in Mozambique's relations with the
United States. Chrome destined for the United States in Beira at the
time sanctions were applied was ultimately released for the United
States. President Machel also has seemed somewhat interested in the
possibility of foreign investment in Mozambique, although his govern-
ment has yet to decide what its policy will be with respect to foreign
At this point sources indicate that foreign investment has not been
ruled out completely. One U.S. missionary, The Reverend Armand
Doll, is still being held by Mozambique. The United States maintains
a low profile embassy with a small and energetic staff.
Aid for Mozambique
A number of countries have provided or have promised to provide
aid to Mozambique since independence. A short account of this assist-
ance may be useful. China reached an agreement with Mozambique in
July, 1975, to provide an interest-free loan equivalent to $56 million, to
be repaid over 20 years starting in 1990. East Germany has agreed to
provide technical personnel and training in sectors such as agriculture,
health, transport, industry, and education. The Netherlands signed an
agreement in October, 1975, for a grant of $10 million. In October,
1975, a general agreement of cooperation between Mozambique and
Portugal was signed. This agreement provided for the employment of
Portuguese technicians and public servants, but many of these civil
servants have terminated their contracts a year early. There has been
a substantial deterioration in relations between the two governments
since February, 1976.
Sweden has committed $12.5 million for fiscal year 1976. For fiscal
year 1977, the Swedish Government has committed $18.5 million. Den-
mark has provided grant assistance for 1975-77, totalling $4.8 million.
The Danes have also provided an interest-free loan of $5.3 million for
the purchase of Danish equipment and services during 1975-77. Nor-
way has committed $4 million for grant assistance in 1975-76. Finland
has committed approximately $1 million for 1976. The Soviet Union
has signed an agreement of cooperation, but the details have not been
published. Arab oil-producing countries have provided $1 million in
emergency funds, and general agreements on cooperation with Zambia
and Tanzania have been signed.
Assistance specifically related to the application of sanctions against
Rhodesia has come from the United Kingdom, which has pledged
about $12 million in soft loans and has pledged an additional $24 mil-


lion, the details of which are to be worked out shortly. The Secretary
General of tlhe Comnmonwealth has visited M(ozambi(que and possibili-
ties of a Joint Commonwealth contribution and technical assistance are
under study. The European Community has sent a mission to Malplito
but the outcome has not yet been announced.
Secretary Kissinger in his Lusaka speech mentioned a U.S. contri-
bution of $12.5 million in assistance to Mozanmbiq(ie. This figure was
originally based on an initial estimate of $57 million by the Mozaill-
bique Government as the cost of applying sanctions. Of this amount
$12.5 million would have been about one-fourth. The $12.5 million
could come from the $30 million allocated to former Portuguese
colonies which was authorized and appropriated by Congress this
Secretary Kissinger addressed the issue of refugees in the area. It is
estimated that there are approximately 17.000 refugees from Rhodesia
in camps in Mozambique. The U.N. resettlement scheme for these refu-
gees budgeted $7.2 million. The initial subscription to this fund was
$5 million, of which the United States provided $1 million. An addi-
tional $2 million is needed for this effort.
A portion of U.S. assistance might be considered in the form of
food: milk, corn, or wheat. The Mozambique Government had not in-
dicated in May how the aid could best be channeled. Considering that
the UNDP is operational in Mozambique and has facilities for moni-
toring the program, some experts believe that it would be sensible to
channel aid through a U.N. special account to be monitored by UNDP.
Because of the lack of administrative experience by the Mozambique
Government, it would seem advisable that any aid be supplied in a
form least subject to bureaucratic tangles. A more conventional aid
agreement is not very feasible at this time because of the still cautious
relations between the United States and Mozambique, the difficulty of
administering an aid program in Mozanmbique, and the lack of trained
personnel in Mozambique to deal with a bilateral aid program.
Like Zambia, Mozambique's absorptive capacity is sharply limited,
and carefully tailored, specific programs that do not require signifi-
cant local administrative inputs can provide considerable impact at
low cost. Any substantial aid program is not thought likely until the
course of "M.ozambique-United States relations is clearer and the major
existing irritant to relations, the imprisonment of the Reverend Doll,
is dealt with.
Tanzania is not contiguous to the states directly involved in the
southern African conflict, and has been relatively little affected by
sanctions against Rhodesia. The major indirect effects have resullted
from its role as a conduit for Zambian imports and exports.
Aid to Tanzania has thus far been ijustified on the basis that Tan-
zania ranks as one of the 25 least developed countries and meets quite
easily the criteria of "New Directions"-for its own political and
social philosophy. More recently this aid has an additional function:
to complement the political relationship developed as a result of Sec-
retary's visit. The United States has agreed to work with
and through the four African Presidents involved in southern Africa.


Nevertheless there are signs of uncertainty in the future of our aid
program in Tanzania.
Political differences between the United States and Tanzania came
to a head over Tanzania's role and vote in the U.N. on the resolution
declaring Zionism to be a form of racism. Shortly thereafter the State
Department set up an Office of Multilateral Affairs, whose function
was to make visable our displeasure with countries such as Tanzania
who voted against us. One method was to suspend or cut down on aid
to those countries, the so-called Zap List. Thus in the case of Tanzania,
the Public Law 480 Title I request was left pending from last August
until a few weeks ago, when a Title I agreement for 40,000 tons of
maize was signed. Also State has placed a ceiling on grant aid to
Tanzania of $4,450,000 for agricultural programs.
It is understood that it took the Secretary's visit to Tanzania to
change U.S. policy. At the same time, another set of events have over-
taken the "Zap List" as a threat to U.S. aid to Tanzania. The most
serious of these problems are outstanding expropriation cases and pay-
ment to Nello Teer, the AID contractor on the road to Zambia.
Tanzania and Nello Teer went to arbitration about cost overruns
and agreed on a settlement of $4 million. Tanzania admits her liability
but lacks sufficient foreign exchange to pay Nello Teer. AID was pre-
pared to offer Tanzania a loan of $4 million so that Tanzania could
settle with Nello Teer, but questions have been raised in Congress about
the terms of the loan. Under Section 620(c) failure to pay for goods
and services could hold up new loans for Tanzania.1
Perhaps even more serious in the long run are several outstanding
expropriations cases which amount to a few hundred thousand dollars.
Tanzania has promised compensation; but its offer in one case, a cof-
fee farm, has been rejected as too low. The Tanzanian Government
could probably settle the U.S. expropriation cases without great strain,
but observers indicate that it is worried about the precedent that
would be set for the larger expropriations to British owned property.
Tanzanian officials seem to be aware of the potential seriousness of this
problem. A number of U.S. Government officials favor taking a tough
line with Tanzania, and are looking for other issues to hold up U.S.
The lack of clear standards for "adequate and effective" compen-
sation permits considerable scope for leniency or toughness depending
on sub)ject ive evaluations of the country in question. It would be useful
to study the question of expropriation and determine what standards
are being or should be applied. Such a study might develop workable
standards to ensure the proper application of the expropriation bar-
rier to foreign assistance.
The largest capital expenditure related to the southern African
situation has been the Tanzania-Zambia Railway. Another area of
capital expenditure has been the Dar es Salaam harbor, long congested
and a major bottleneck for imports and exports. This situation is
somewhat improved now, but has been a nagging problem for the last
ten years.
In the last few years and largely to deal with the drought, AID has
increased assistance to Tanzania until it has now grown to be one of
1 The issue with Nello Teer has been settled since this report was written.


the larger U.S. programs in Africa. However, the U.S. program is
still smaller than those of several other donors, including those of the
World Bank and the Scandinavian countries.
U.S. assistance to Tanzania is concentrated in food production,
health and population planning. The Great North Road has been
paved( with U.S. assistance. There are one or two Americans on con-
tract to AID assisting in the ports. Otherwise, U.S. assistance is not
linked to the southern African situation. Nor do the Tanzanians want
it linked. Aid is treated as a separate subject to be handled quite apart
from southern African issues. None of the money in the Security Sup-
porting Assistance authorization for southern Africa is projected for
Tanzania, although it is possible that some portion could be used for
transport problems connected with Zambia, Mozambique, or Zaire,
refugees from southern Africa. or training or health programs among
refugees in Tanzania.
Tanzania's Economy
The Tanzanian economy has suffered a number of setbacks in recent
years. Drought in 1973-74 required substantial food imports. Tanzania
lias been hit hard by falling prices for the commodities it exports, such
as cotton and sisal, while world inflation and sharp oil price hikes have
increased the cost of imports. The necessity to import food has a de-
vastating impact on the balance of payments. Tanzania imported over
900,000 tons of grain valued at $240 million between January, 1974,
and September, 1975. This virtually depleted Tanzania's foreign ex-
change reserves, leaving it with an average of three weeks import pay-
ments in 1975. A large portion of these imports were commercial grain
purchases from the United States.
To meet this economic deterioration Ta n za n i a has severely restricted
imports--a fact which is clearly reflected in the paucity of goods in
Dar es Salaam shops-and has tightened foreign exchange controls.
Its reliance on foreign assistance to finance its capital budget is
steadily increasing. In 1975, Tanzania was forced to postpone its
third Five Year Plan because of the large resource gap. The Plan
is now supposed'to be initiated in July, 1976. The Tanzanian Govern-
ment projects that half the resources needed for fulfillment of the
Plan will have to come from foreign sources. It is questionable whether
tanzania can generate the other half from domestic resources.
Tanzania has its own version of African socialism, guided by the
philosophy of President Nyerere. The core of its development strategy
is the idea of Ujamaa villages:'a system of rural socialism based on
cooperative sharing of communal property with a basic level of inputs
and service's provided by the government. Originally the government
stated that settlement in Ujamaa villages was purely voluntary. Re-
cent government dissatisfaction with the slow pace of settlement has
led to forced removal of peasants to the villages. Some observers have
felt that the Ujamaa settlement program has had an adverse impact
on food production. This is difficult to verify, but it is clear that the
government can no longer afford to spend as much on social services
for Uia maa'villages as it has in the recent past. The government
clearly recognizes the need to increase food production and is ini-
tiating programs accordingly.


Zaire has been less directly affected by the Rhodesian conflict in
either economic or political terms than the other countries considered
in this report. It is, however, facing an economic crisis of major pro-
portions which has been exacerbated by the Angolan civil war and
could be made even worse if events in the south cut off all rail traffic
and imports from that region.
Zaire's large land mass of 235 million hectars is rather sparsely
populated by 19 million people, 2.25 million of whom live in Kinshasa.
Roughly half of this land is arable but only one percent is actually
cultivated. If the agricultural resources of just the eastern region were
adequately exploited, Zaire could become a net exporter of food. It is
currently forced to import simply to stave off hunger. The vast mineral
wealth found in the Shaba (formerly Katanga) and Kivu regions is
lengendary. Zaire probably has the world's richest copper deposits.
They currently account for 80 percent of export earnings and 45-50
percent of government revenue. Other important minerals include co-
balt, zinc, diamonds, tin, gold and manganese. Despite these important
resources the per capital income is only $100 a year.
Recognizing the severity of the economic crisis, Zaire was finally
compelled by the state of its economy and the pressures of outside credi-
tors to submit itself to an IMF stabilization program this year. The
package included significant cutbacks in imports and government ex-
penditures and a devaluation of the currency. As expected, this has re-
sulted in steep domestic price increases.
The IMF projected that the stabilization measures would decrease
the balance of payments deficit from $600 million to $100 million. This
estimate was based on 1976 copper sales of 500,000 metric tons at an
average price of $0.66 a pound and a maintenance of imports at the
1975 level of approximately one billion dollars. The IMF plan also
included a debt rescheduling of $200 million.
U.S. officials believe that the deficit will be at least $250-300 million
minore than anticipated by the IMF. Copper production is likely to be
only about 460,000 metric tons and of that only 410,000 will actually be
sold. Further, an estimated average price of $0.66 per pound is con-
sidered too high as the price was only $0.56 until May. It would have
to stay at the current $0.72 for the rest of the year to average $0.66.
Roughly every 10,000 metric ton miscalculation results in a revenue
loss of $14.5 million and every penny difference in the average price
makes a $10 million difference in foreign exchange and $5 million in
government revenue. Thus the deficit in expected copper revenue if
only 410,000 metric tons are sold at 0.63 cents a pound would be $158
million. In addition to a minimum import level of one billion dollars
is considered too low. Minimum requirements without even affecting
any of the root problems in transport or agriculture would amount
to at least $118 million. Thus U.S. officials assert that the deficit will be
$276 million more than the IMF projected or about $375 million total.
The debt rescheduling anticipated by the IMF has not yet taken
place, although discussions are under way. In exchange for the re-
scheduling Zaire has agreed to put 10 percent of its export receipts or
about $120 million in a trust fund to pay 1975 arrearages and the

interest on the 1976 del)t. None of this had been deposited by June
1976. In order to reach this figure by the end of the year approximately
$17 million per month would have to be put aside. It seems unlikely
that Zaire will be able to do this. Current monthly receipts from cop-
per are only about $31.5 million. This is less than supply times price
because costs are deducted and the actual payments are based on an
estimate process which relates to a four-month rolling line of credit.
This inflow is barely adequate to cover the costs of essential mine, fuel
and bread imports. There is nothing left to contribute to the trust
fund. If Zaire's creditors are unwilling to reschedule the debt since
Zaire has not lived up to its agreement, an additional $200 million will
be added to the deficit for a total of $575 million.
Potential assistance available to cover this deficit amounts to only
about $300 million. The IMF has made $160 million available but
only $54 million has not been drawn or already committed. Other
donors, including the United States ($45 million in 1976 and 1977
combined), are discussing contributing about $150 million. Even if
all of these funds become available and the debt is rescheduled, U.S.
officials estimaiate that over $50 million will remain uncovered. If the
debt is not rescheduled the deficit will be about $250 million. In short,
by September or October, Zaire will have drawn all of its IMF assist-
ance arid unless someone intervenes will be forced to default on its
debts. These debts are held largely with Western donors and defaults
would undermine the confidence which the IMF stabilization pro-
gram was designed to engender. If Zaire consequently becomes in-
capable of importing, the mines and transport system will probably
shut down, widespread hunger could result, and economic and politi-
cal chaos seem likely.
Cati.qes for the Crisis
Zaire's crisis has resulted from a combination of external balance
of trade factors, the impact of the Angolan civil war, and most basi-
cally the existence of ongoing and all-pervasive economic misman-
The most. immediate causes are external, more specifically a pre-
cipitous decline in copper prices just when import costs, especially for
fuel, were rising. Copper prices hjt a high of over $1.50 a pound in
1974 and then fell in one year to $0.54 a pound. Although they are
back to $0.72 a pound this month it is highly unlikely they will climb
back up to the 1974 level in the near future. Increased import costs
have had not only a direct impact on the terms of trade but also caused
a decline in copper production since imports essential to the operation
of mines are lacking. Some observers maintain that the most serious
copper problem in Zaire is not price but production levels.
On a more basic level the primary reason why Zaire was hurt so
badly by these external factors is gross economic mismanagement.
Zaire has not only failed to diversify its economy since independence.
it has concentrated even more on a single commodity-copper. In
1959 copper accounted for 40 percent of exports and agricultural pro-
duction for 50 percent. By 1976 over 70 percent of exports were cop-
per and other minerals made up an additional 20-25 percent. There
has been an absolute decline in food production and imports are now


necessary to avert hunger. This has been further compounded by in-
creased urbanization-the population of Kinshasa increased from
450,000 in 1959 to 2.25 million in 1976-and disruptions in the market-
ing system.
Mismanagement is also partially responsible for the large debt ac-
cumulation, much of it for low priority, prestige projects. Zaire has
had no economic plan and inherited very limited trained person-
power at independence. There is no real expert economic management
at the top.
Zaire's wealth has attracted a stream of foreign investors promoting
a variety of projects. Many of these projects were accepted, especially
if there was no immediate domestic disbursement obligation. Most of
this investment comes from the foreign private sector but much of it
has government guarantees. Little attempt was made to determine if
these projects could eventually pay for themselves. This situation
was subsequently compounded by the accumulation of short-term high
interest roll-over debt to cover payment on past loans.
A final and all pervasive problem of mismanagement is widespread
corruption which is even acknowledged by the government. This is
found on all levels and severely disrupts the rational allocation of
resources, and discourages assistance agencies and well-wishers of all
kinds. '
The civil war in Angola occurred just as these other economic pres-
sures were coming to a head. The most serious result of the war for
Zaire was the closure of the Benguela Railroad. This had been the
major transport route for most of the copper exports from the Shaba
region. In addition quite a bit of Zairean rolling stock was destroyed.
At best the railroad could not be repaired until the end of the rainy
season in the fall of 1976. The continuation of guerrilla attacks on the
railroad make even this timetable very optimistic.
The war also resulted in a direct outflow of resources. Zaire prob-
ably provided the FNLA with several million dollars worth of sup-
plies since they were afraid an MPLA government might cut off their
only domestic outlet to the sea through Matadi. Direct military ex-
penditures also increased because it was considered necessary to build
up forces on the border.
Finally, refugee flows of over a million persons put an additional
burden on the economy.
The Rhodesian conflict could further complicate this picture if it
results in the termination of rail shipments from southern Africa to
Zaire. The Shaba copper producing region gets a major portion of its
imports from the south over the rail line which passes through Rho-
desia. The only other options for both imports and exports are the
complicated rail-ship transshipment routes to Matadi (2,600 kilome-
ters) or to Dar es Salaam via the inland lakes.
Zaire is making some efforts to grapple with its own problems.
The crisis did force Mobutu to submit to an IMF stabilization program
but it must be noted that Zaire took the "IMF cure" once before in
the mid-1960's and its impact wore off in several years. One can only
hope that the second dosage will have more permanent effects. Mobutu
does seem more committed now to diversifying the economy and con-


centratinlg on aoricultire and transl)ort although a significant increase
in copper prices might dilute this co'IIitIIent. Efforts are being made
to stenm the flow to Kinshasa by declaring that all unemployed urban
immigrants will have to find a job in fifteen days or be sent back to
the land and new drives against corruption are being discussed.
While it is clear that the root cause for most of Zaire's problems are
internal and its own responsibility, it is probably short.sighlted to coli-
clude that the country should now simply be allowed to suffer the con-
sequences. If Zaire is forced to default on its debts and can no longer
import, political and economic chaos in the urban and mining areas
is likely to result. This would have little immediate impact on the
majority liv-ing in the subsistence agricultural sector but would spread
there as well if the disruption reached civil war proportions. Siinifi-
cant levels of unrest in Zaire might further be extended to neighbor-
ing countries, invite attacks from abroad, or encourage existent seces-
sionist tendencies in Shaba and Cabinda. Assistance from outside
sources which would help Zaire to overcome the most immediate defi-
cit problems could be vital in averting the current threat of chaos but
no amount of money will solve Zaire's long-range problems unless
iimanagemnent practices are radically improved and the economy


ANC-African National Council
FROLIZI-Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe
Namibia-Southwest Africa
OAU-Organization of African Unity
SWAPO-South West African People's Organization
UDI-Unilateral Declaration of Independence
ZANLA-Zimbabwe Liberation Council
ZANU-Zimbabwe African National Union
ZAPU-Zimbabwe African People's Union
ZIPA-Zimbabwe People's Army
ZLC-Zimbabwe Liberation Council

Map of Southern Africa showing transport routes and mineral resources

''CcY7C -- '** ~r ;-
.. . - - .. . . .
. ... .. . . .... . . .n. *;. .. "- ** *i
.. '. . 7
* ...... .. .-. .. .. . -f'. ,.Z : r ~ z m ,, t:

i 0 \ b__ ";.., ,

....---.. -...- ---1

.. .. rA g /- _'.....L. -9:, ...... .
.. . .. .-.- . /.,
.. ..I :I ... . .. ..

-7 t-
..- .. .--. . . -- .---
. . . /:r .' : -
:"... ...... ..... .. ) } "y / _1 "^ 7;t, ri ",,... ;i :*' ", .J ... ....
I--..' ,..,....": .*" _,..- ."' i r f",, ,"
K.' .. ,S . i t ,
....----... .... J "" ,^ /j ,;'-*^ V- *

.. -- , -.
af -" - v '> 1 v
" .7... ... .1I- [ \aJ s-- O ;- ,' ; [ -
^ . a.... . .. . ~ ,' "_-_-_ .... -
**-\"^ /- : .'. ,, N!io '' o s .r ^ ,'. / L ^ _. _.

,^ ...!** "; ,- .:'* .-... ; ,- :" .,- ,, .
... . ... / .,; .-.. .... ..

\ ?? '' '' _-' f.,,-.---'-"--"'~ -
.. . . \ A:,,C, ... y
. .. . .. I". ?. ..,, ,
.- __ ...

.. . -- a-- .' - . .- -" ,
_'^_^ ;:_^ r" \ *.-^^j^^^-.- ..: SO'





Planned South African homelands

V -
-- --

~~j/ ~
.,,i ;c:~

~,* ii-.

* J- -~-



( /~ 'S.
- ~~*5~

* -,- a


-r r-

*-*>* '.. /. .- -

^ .ATAL '1^ -
.' s -.. :----- < -

,,: .'^^ -: -,-? ''' .'' ; ' .

^ --...\. -, ., - .,- ..

- ,-> :. .- '- - .^ -. '. :
S _- : . *- . c -,

-:. -+'-"^ .- .. '


"4 -


- ,J ;. -'. ;---' ..
.- .-^;.

. , - = : . .

: t-

M::. r :

tllI 11111 i ll t III 111 II III 1 H 1111
3 1262 09113 2257