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A Leadership Research Publication of the Eastern Caribbean Center, L~iuersitg of the virgin Islands
from the President
Life and decisions in the Caribbean as in tdie rest of the world have been impacted by the traic events of
September 11, 2001. Police makers aMnd leaders in the region have new challenges to address in the areas of
security and economic activity.
This volume of c4rbbean Penpectes looks at the daunting issues that face the leadership in the region from
a number of different perspectives. ver" qualified writers have articulated their views in the following titles,
"Securitq in Obscurt? The Impact of September 11 on Caribibean Societies and Peoples," "National Security
and Community Policing: police Leadership and the Civic Alliance," "The Impact of September 11 on Cailbbean
Tourism and Caribbean Leaders' Response,' and "The American Mediterrnnean: A Base for Terrorism?"
There is much food for thought for those who understand the increasing complexity' of our world.
I commend Dr. frank Mills for his efforts in continuing to produce a volume that contributes positivdely to the
dialog necessary for effective leadership in the Caribbean.
We hope you find this volume of Caribbean Perspectives stimulating and useful.
LaVeme E. Ragster, Ph.D.
A Leadership Research Publication of the Eastern Caribbean Center,
University of the Virgin islands
The Eastern Caribbean Center (ECC) is a resource organization that conducts research and associated training, technology transfer and information
dissemination, responsive to development issues in an evolving K.S. Virgin Islands and applicable to small island communities. It conducts and
sponsors research in the UA.S. Virgin Islands and the rest of the Eastern Caribbean and disseminates information to enhance the contribution of
scientific inquiry to human well-being in the Caribbean region.
Editor-in-Chief Editorial Board Design/Production
Frank L. Mills, Ph.D. Vincent 0. Cooper, Ph.D. Robin Sterns, Ph.D.
Director, Eastern Caribbean Center Professor of English and Linguistics
Carlyle Corbin, Ph.D.
Representative for External Affairs
Chancellor, St. Croix Campus
Director of Libraries
Frank L Mills, Ph.D.
Director, Eastern Caribbean Center
Dion E. Phillips, Ph.D.
"" ' Chair, Social Sciences Division
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Post-September 11 New York skyline,
to pose the greatest potential threat to pea
direct military conflict between the two na
For the moment at least, it seems as t
security in its obscurity. Economic and polio
status that should be celebrated. However
parts of the world brace themselves for att.
suers, peaceful irrelevance does not seem
and pondering the where the next bombs
war from the comfort of their living room
live footage of the last military strike. Some
the "backyard" of the world's super power
However, a closer look at the issues t]
passive observance from the sidelines 1n
Caribbean origin have played prominent
ism. First, there was the infamous shoe b
of Jamaican origin who came up with the
an aircraft by installing a bomb in the s,
was thwarted by a flight attendant who
player to subdue Mr. Reid. It turned out
Brixton, England, where it is rumored he
forces for training in Afghanistan. Caril
I 'the Iman at the mosque was none other
fastly disavowed any connection to terro
characterized the mosque as fertile recru
Of course, these are minor parts in
major players are American and Sau
Saudi Arabia, as is the presumed ring
Bin Laden. But the major oil producer r
States, while Afghanistan and its Ta
Only Cuba, the sole remnant of the
socialist bloc in the Western Hemi-
sphere, sits precariously perched in a low
intensity war of words with the United
States. Although it was omitted from
membership in the "Axis of Evil,"
charges that Cuba has produced chemi-
cal and biological weapons have been
unofficially leaked by U.S. intelligence
agencies (though the charges have been
disputed by former U.S. President
Jimmy Carter and others). The possi-
bility of escalating hostilities between
Cuba and the United States continues
ce and security in the region even though
tions has not occurred since 1961.
hough the rest of the Caribbean can find
tical marginality may hardly seem to be a
r, for the time being at least, while other
acks from terrorist or their would-be pur-
luite so bad. Instead of ducking for cover
11 land, Caribbean peoples can watch the
s on television, checking in with (\ N for
times it is beneficial to be tucked away in
hat have been raised in the war suggests
lay not be possible. Already, people of
though minor roles in the war on terror-
omber, Richard Reid, a British national
novel but ineffective idea of blowing up
ole of his shoe. His attempt at sabotage
alerted a large, Trinidadian basketball
that Mr. Reid belonged to a mosque in
may have been recruited to join Queda
)bean nationals emerged again because
than a Guyanese ex-patriot, who stead-
rist activities, even as the British media
iting ground for Islamic militants.
the unfolding drama of the war. The
li; 14 of the 19 hijackers were from
-leader of the terrorist forces, Osama
remains on good terms with the United
liban leaders have borne the brunt
of American fury. As promised, the Americans appear to have won a decisive victory
over the Taliban by delivering on their promise to bomb Afghanistan back into the
Stone Ages. However, even as the Americans contemplate their next military moves
the significance of what they have accomplished so far remains in doubt. The pri-
mary targets of the war against Afghanistan, Osama Bin Laden and his ally Mullah
Omar, remain at large. Furthermore, the defeat of the Taliban is hardly a feat to
boast about since nearly twenty years of war had brought the nation to Stone Age-
like conditions even before the bombing began.
Indirect Efflects of 9/11 Uthe Begin
While the Caribbean may be able to escape this con-
flict without becoming either the target of a terrorist attack
or a launching pad for U.S. military activities, there will
clearly be some indirect impact on the region. The clearest a t h w
sign of this is the use of Guantanamo Naval Base in Cuba 0 0 t P by
as the indefinite holding tank for Queda combatants. Con-
fined to open-air cells in the blazing Caribbean sun, it ap-
pears that the former combatants will be held on the base
until the United States figures out what it will do with them. A e
Denied legal counsel or the rights traditionally accorded
under the Geneva Conventions to those deemed prisoners
of war, the Queda fighters may end up staying in Cuba for
a very long time. Their presence is just the most obvious s
reminder that while Caribbean may not be in the middle of a s f rem in
the fighting it does not mean it will not be incorporated i d T p t
into American military plans. o t ,
More significantly, Caribbean peoples traveling to or
working in the U.S. will most likely be affected by changes A p p *p p
in the laws regarding immigration and visa applications to L a h P Mulla
the United States. Since 9/11, foreigners of all kinds, in- O p p p p
cluding university students, have come under increased scru- f t d
tiny and suspicion. Since September 11, hundreds of indi-
viduals, many of them foreigners, have been incarcerated U i h 4
in U.S. prisons. Not all of these individuals have direct or b a P nerl
even indirect connections to the 9/11 hijackers, and many p W 0 p 4
are not even Middle Eastern. In the dragnet that unfolded 14
in the aftermath of the attacks, scores of immigrants were A
rounded up, some for crimes as minor as a visa violation or A c e bfr
identity fraud, as part of the clamp down that ensued. Like bo e p
their counterparts at the Guantanamo Naval Base, they re-
main confined indefinitely, without formal charges, legal
representation or a trial date.
It would not be surprising if Caribbean nationals were among those ensnared in
this anti-terrorism sweep. After all, news reports have let it be known that there are
Mexicans and other Latin Americans among those being held, as well as Africans and
Europeans and others from places unknown. Why would Caribbean nationals be left
out? With the sweeping powers it gained since the passage of the Patriot Act, the U.S.
Justice Department, under the leadership of John Ashcroft, has the ability to take
extraordinary measures against individuals it suspects of terrorist leanings. Since the
attackers prepared themselves for their deadly mission by enrolling in American flight
training schools, foreign students of all kinds have come under greater scrutiny. Simi-
larly, individuals who have applied for visas to travel to the United States since Sep-
tember 11, have found the waiting period to be longer and the number whose appli-
cations have been denied has increased substantially.
Even Mexican President Vicente Fox, who once seemed to have a cozy personal
relationship with President George W. Bush, now finds himself snubbed and unable to
fulfill one of his primary campaigns promises. Prior to 9/11, promises had been made
by the Bush administration, that movement of people across the U.S.-Mexican border
would be made as easy as the movement of goods and services made possible by
NAFTA. But while the Canadian border remains relatively open, access for those who
seek to cross the southern boarder has been made more difficult. Even though the
U.S. economy remains heavily dependent upon immigrant labor, passage for those
entering by land via Mexico, or bv air into any major U.S. city, has become more
The war and its numerous unforeseen ramifications poses other indirect impacts
for a region whose economic fortune is so inextricably tied to that of the United States.
Many Caribbean nations had pinned their hopes for a brighter economic future on
increased access to U.S. markets. Having been left out of the CBI (Caribbean Basin
Initiative) which largely rewarded U.S. allies in Central America, several Caribbean
leaders were hoping that an expansion of NAFTA, which had been promised by the
Clinton administration, would be realized under President Bush. But with the econo-
mies of Latin America's economic powerhouses Argentina
and Brazil foundering, the attraction of expanded trade
... for n t tile ur between the US and its southern neighbors appears to have
diminished. Too small to wield influence and too economi-
cally dependent to chart an independent course, Caribbean
societies find themselves once again in the familiar position
of waiting for the tides to change. With few other options
juie i available, the region's leaders find themselves hoping that
u ies oat some time in the not too distant future the United States
0 will once again give consideration to the fortunes and wel-
I ,fare of its little neighbors to the south.
In the meantime, the tourist-dependent economies
Stie & e of the region can only hope that the decline in visitors from
*r North American since September 11 is temporary. In the
aftermath of the attacks the tourist industry suffered a major
a blow. With fewer Americans traveling, hundreds of hotel
Swill continreservations were cancelled and cruise ship lines make fewer
to be [*e b o our e sce." stops in the ports of the region. According to Jean Claude
Baumgarten, president of the London-based World Travel
and Tourism Council (WTTC), "While worldwide loss in
travel and tourism demand was 8.5%, the loss in the Car-
ibbean was 13.5% and that translated into 365,000 to-
tal jobs lost" (Caribbean Business, May 9, 2002).
Almost a year later there is still no complete recov- are wl ijre o
ery for the industry, and with several American airlines
in serious financial trouble prospects for the future do s e te o
not appear bright at the moment. Following 9/11, the
bew shoue ban minfu our exitece
greatest losses in revenue from tourism were sustained
by the Dominican Republic ($837.2 million) and Puerto fatthrhvebnh
Rico ($589 million). However, Jamaica, the Bahamas and
ecnoican pliialintailtythtplgus hefoe oviere public ando e parts
Cuba incurred losses in excess of $200 million, while
bring ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ben littl comon tho peihr ofinta ean ie epta nedvlpet
Barbados, Aruba, Bermuda, Trinidad and Tobago and
Curacao each experienced losses in excess of $100 mil-
Though organizations like the WTTC project signifi-
cant gains for the region's tourist industry this year, there
continues to be considerable unease about the prospects
for a full recovery. Having supplanted the banana andlso be shielded
sugar industries of a previous era, tourism is now the wrd .
economic king for many Caribbean nations. However, as 6. o
the events of the past year have shown, it is a weak and
unstable king, one whose hold on the thrown is only se-
cure because at the moment no viable contenders to the
dominance of tourism exist.
So, for now at least, the war against terrorism may count Caribbean economies
among its casualties. Only time will tell if the injuries inflicted are minor injuries or
mortal wounds. Once again it appears that for as long the region's fortunes are tied to
the vagaries of the U.S. economy, instability and underdevelopment will continue to
be the bane of our existence.
In a relative sense, this may not be so bad. After all, compared to other parts of
the developing world, the Caribbean is relatively well off. Unlike Africa and the Middle
East, the Caribbean is not threatened by war and so far at least, there have been no
terrorist attacks. For the moment at least, the region is also less vulnerable to the
economic and political instability that plagues the former Soviet republics and parts
of Asia and Latin America. Things could assuredly be worse, and while that may
bring little comfort to a region that remains mired in perpetual underdevelopment,
during a time of global war and uncertainty, we should at the minimum count our
The world has changed since September 11, and how the Caribbean will affected
in the long term remains to be seen. As the future unfolds before us we should be
mindful of the fact that sometimes the obscurity that comes from being stuck in the
periphery of the world economy is not a bad thing. We may not see the growth and
prosperity that is needed, but perhaps we will also be shielded from the devastation
and destruction that will befall other parts of the world.
Items left at St. Pauls.
"The horrific events of September 11, 2001, in New York and
washiton take their place along with other defining moments
of infam a=out which we say that the world will never be the same
a4ain. Certinl the obscene realities of the holocaust in World War II
m45t have engenyered a similar response as humanity witnessed man's
inhumanity to man. With respect to September 1f, one immediately
focuses on the cruelty and senseless loss of innocent life....
By Jean Holder
Caribbean Tourism Association
The horrific events of September 11, 2001, in New York
and Washington take their place along with other defining
moments of infamy about which we say that the world will
never be the same again. Certainly the obscene realities of
the holocaust in World War II must have engendered a simni-
lar response as humanity witnessed man's inhumanity to man.
With respect to September 11, one immediately focuses
on the cruelty and senseless loss of innocent life and later
turns his/her attention to the disruption of the world's eco-
nomic life and the negative impacts resulting in losses in both
merchandising and service trades.
An analysis of the immediate impacts of these terrorist
acts, to place them in the context of the overall performance
of the tourism industry, while offering some suggestions for
future development in this significant area of Caribbean
economy, can prove very beneficial to all Caribbean nations.
Tourism is for most Caribbean countries the engine of
economic growth. In 2000, the number of stayover visitors to
the region were some 21.2 million, and cruise passenger ar-
rivals reached 14.5 million, making the Caribbean the world's
top cruise destination. Together, they spent $ 20.2 billion U.S.
dollars. The industry's importance can also be judged from
the fact that it employs one in four persons in the region.
Additionally, worldwide economic realities have seen a
growing dependence by small Caribbean states on the tour-
ism sector due to a number of factors:
* Many of the countries in the region which were also
engaged in primary agricultural export crops for both
employment generation and foreign exchange earnings
have seen those industries stumble and fall under the
pressures of trade liberalization and loss of preferences.
* The infant manufacturing industries in the region have
struggled under similar pressures and intensive competi-
tion from low-cost producers in the Asia and Mexico.
* The bright future seen for financial and other services
has been somewhat dimmed by the tactics of the OECD
member states which, having taken upon themselves the
responsibility for ridding the world of money laundering
and low tax regimes, have singled out a number of small
Caribbean states for hostile treatment, thereby dimin-
ishing the comparative advantage which these states
seemed to be achieving in the area of financial services.
The events of September 11, 2001, were a cruel blow to
Caribbean tourism for two reasons. The first is that terrorism
or any form of confusion and a disturbance of the equilib-
rium is travel and tourism's greatest enemy. Travelers, espe-
cially those traveling for leisure, regard security of life and limb as their greatest
priority. Travel and tourism, therefore, suffered traumatically on a global scale, and
the region received its share of trouble. There was no aspect of the industry which was
not negatively impacted. The second is that the events impacted Caribbean tourism
when it was already reeling under pressure from other difficulties, a matter to which
I will return a little later in this paper.
After September 11, it was estimated that at the global level, international air-
line traffic immediately fell to about two-thirds of what it normally would have been
for the fall period due to a resultant acute fear of flying which was most pronounced
in the U.S. This put enormous financial pressure on all airlines, which in 2001 suf-
fered the greatest losses ever in a single year. Some outstanding examples; both Ameri-
can Airlines and United Airlines lost over $1 billion each. Canada 3000, Canada's
second largest passenger airline, ceased operations on November 9, 2001, promising
to restructure and reduce capacity by 30%. The Belgian airline, Sabena, and the
Swiss carrier, Swissair, ceased operations. All carriers were impacted by the increased
cost of security and the escalating costs of insurance. British Airways and other Euro-
pean carriers cut staff and reduced capacity.
The cruise lines had their fair share of the difficulties also. Renaissance Cruises ceased
operations on September 25. Micky Arison, Chairman and CEO of Carnival Cruise Lines
and President of the FCCA, speculated that there were five or six cruise lines that might
not survive in the diminished market. The cruise lines began
offering large discounts and travel agent conunissions as high
as 20% and began a mad scramble to reposition their ships
'i at th *a from Europe to Mexico and the Caribbean, due to real and
l ia perceived insecurities. This had a two-fold effect. The Carib-
bean countries and land-based suppliers to the cruise industry
were pleased to have increased cruise traffic at a time when
tourism generally was down. The increased competition from
cruise tourism, however, struck terror into the breasts of Car-
ibbean hoteliers, already facing reduced occupancies and fall-
The tour operators from Europe, which are respon-
h s m t p i sible for a very large volume of Caribbean business and whole-
salers, all of which operate on tight margins, immediately be-
gan to feel the squeeze from reduced traffic. They began an
assault on hoteliers to radically reduce their rates for the win-
ter period in 2002.
The impacts of all these developments on the region's
tourism were manifold and in some cases dramatic. The U.S.
market, which supplies 48 % of all Caribbean business, took
an immediate hit of 30%. The European market, which rep-
Am a Ai a resents 24% of business, fell some 12 % across the board.
A e l o Caribbean airlines, unable to lay claim, like U.S. car-
1 b o e riers, to the largesse of the U.S. public purse, struggled under
the heavy burden of greatly increased insurance and security
costs at a time of reduced traffic. They tried as best they could
to hold on to staff at pre-September 11, 2001, levels for the"Tee vnt US
rest of 2001 and into the winter. 200 weer
Caribbean hotels fared very badly in September and Oc-
tober but began to see a return of business from November, Caribbean
due to the diversion of traffic from other competing destina- T
tions for several reasons: the Caribbean was seen as far more terois Te
secure, in some cases more secure than some U.S. domestic fuio ma e
destinations; there was now a great deal of excess capacity in t c
airline seats due to falling international traffic; and heavily th s s i moe
discounted rates brought a Caribbean holiday within the reach ta n ms gh
of many who would normally otherwise be unable to take one.
All these developments can be expected to have their eco-
nomic consequences in 2002; on the plus side, relatively high t e Bh
occupancies in February and March 2002 helped to keep ho- era o is
tel doors open and saved jobs. However reduced rates in the
winter mean reduced profits for hotels during the period when sei COp
Caribbean hotels are meant to make the profits which help to
spread income over the rest of the year. Reduced profits for sS re P n f
tourism enterprises mean less government revenue, fewer jobs
and less salaries and wages for employees, all of which trans-
late into lower sales of goods and services in the community
generally. The events of September 11 are in fact having a
longer tail than expected. Airlines like BWIA which had hoped
to ride out the crisis by now, suddenly find themselves having
to reduce staff at all levels due to disappointing level of loads
and revenue as the year has unfolded and hotels remain anx-
ious about business in the summer. A ray of hope is signs of economic recovery in the U.S.
in the second half of 2002 which would spread to Europe. The year 2002 will, however,
remain a year in which success will be judged by survival rather than growth.
The events of September 11, 2001, certainly focused the attention of the Caribbean
political directorate on the tourism industry as never before. They had little choice. They
were besieged by both local and foreign travel and tourism companies for relief measures
which ranged from the reduction or removal of taxes and duties to direct grants to cover
losses, to increased marketing dollars, to guaranteeing very large sums of money to cover
insurance against terrorist activity. By and large, governments responded very positively
and a number of national and regional programmes, which in more tranquil times might
never have received support, were put in place.
Heads of government of CARICOM, augmented by government representatives
from other non-CARICOM CTO member states, met twice in Nassau, the Bahamas,
in October and December 2001, to address the crisis from both general and tourism
perspectives. These meetings resulted in historic decisions to launch a joint public/
private sector $16 million U.S. dollar TV campaign, to support a special CTO pro-
motional and public relations programme, to put together a proposal for a Sustain-
able Tourism Development Fund and to draft a Regional Tourism Strategic Plan for
the consideration of heads of government later in 2002.
It would be misleading, however, to believe that the
Caribbean's tourism difficulties began in September 2001
or can be addressed simply through a number of short-term
ton of t C I measures taken in late 2001, largely to respond to a par-
The year 2001 had begun with weak tourism per-
formance. The European market which had grown by
double-digit increases in the decade up to 1999, grew by
only 1% in 2000 and would have seen negative growth in
2001, even if September 11 had never happened. The U.S.
market was showing some resurgence in 2000 and 2001,
but had seen years of poor performance up until that time,
in spite of a booming stock market and almost full employ-
ment and economic prosperity in the Clinton years in the
U.S. The Canadian market, once a great producer for the
region, was contributing only 6% of our business and is in
any case largely dominated by the Spanish Caribbean. Ironi-
cally, the Intra-Caribbean market, largely ignored by Car-
ibbean public and private sector was contributing 7% of
business in 2000. The Japanese and South American mar-
kets, reflecting their local poor economic performance, were
at their lowest ebb.
As early as February 2001, the Caribbean Tourism
Organization ( CTO) and the Caribbean Hotel Association
(CHA) were lobbying Caribbean governments to hold a
Tourism Summit to address what was seen as a critical situ-
ation in regional tourism. The more immediate causes of
m ithe problem were seen as economic recession in major source
markets, unfavourable exchange rates in Europe, a prod-
uct which was becoming largely uncompetitive, as other
new products in new and old competing countries states
were becoming more attractive, and too small a share of
voice in a marketplace, full of the clamour of the competi-
tion which was outspending the Caribbean at every turn.
CTO, however, had other concerns in addition to those expressed above. It won-
dered to what extent Caribbean tourism, bred and nurtured in an era of "meet and
greet tourism," was failing to change in the face of a changing environment of re-
search, scientific analysis and information technology.
To what extent it was doing more of the same when the customer had changed
and the means of reaching him were changing every day? If the answer to these
questions is "yes" then we face larger challenges than simply returning to where we
were prior to September 11, 2001, or even January 2001, and the Caribbean politi-
cal and private sector tourism leaders have their work cut out for them.
I suggest that there are at least five challenges which
face us: "Put am l the b n
p Creating a proper understanding among Caribbean peopleto
of the tourism industry in economiic and social terms. 11
" Taking greater control over an industry on which we are ar
so totally dependent. We have minimal ownership of our o o Ol whc *
airlines, the tour operations which deliver our business or
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~pa on whcreas wee aree nowag fepometopruiisfr aiba ain
the cruise industry.
" Taking the fullest possible advantage of the Caribbean ena e i t o
brand to market the region competitively against the rest
of the world.t tourism Orga i [ r o
" Re-energizing a Caribbean tourism product which has been i p es ans an
described as non-competitive, unfashionable and unprof-
itable. of structuree
* Transforming Caribbean tourism from the 'meet and greet in ordr e a
mode" into a scientific, analytical and information-based t
Put simply, the Caribbean needs to adopt a strategic ap- st s
proach for tourism, and the burden of the regional strategic
plan on which we are now embarked is to fundamentally restructure the Caribbean tour-
ism industry in terms of its policies, plans and organizational structures in order to en-
hance its competitiveness and sustainability. Its objectives must be clear:
* To increase tourist expenditure annually and retain the maximunm amount in our
countries for the development of our people. This is what tourism is about.
to enhance the linkages between tourism and other sectors of the economy which
help our economic diversification.
* To increase the level and range of employment opportunities for Caribbean nationals
in the industry.
To increase the range and level of professional skills which will not only make it
possible to take advantage of new opportunities, but will also enhance the level of
service quality throughout the industry. We need to plan the National Tourism Orga-
nization of the future.
To minimize the adverse impacts on the socio-cultural and natural environment and
other touristic assets, while maximizing the benefits to the wider community.
to achieve the highest levels of technological expertise needed to compete in the
" To improve the return on investment both for the public and private sectors.
to enhance the supporting infrastructure.
Each Caribbean country will also have to see these as national objectives to be incor-
porated in its own national strategic plan.
The time has come for the countries of the region to understand that in the field of
tourism, the competition to the region lies outside the region, and that our hope for the
future as small developing states, is to join our forces and present a united front to the rest
of the world.
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Notwithstanding the various labels used to classify nationalists and their numerous
strategies to operationalize nation-state formation and/or reform domestic political struc-
tures, nationalism will be the most pressing political problem of the new millennium. World
civilization will not reach its fullest potential if the nationalist conflicts of the twentieth
century are not resolved in the early decades of the new century. Besides world civilization,
the United States, now also a target of armed groups, has a vested interest in understand-
ing nationalism and its variants in the developing. U.S. security is profoundly affected by
the growth of militant nationalist force within the Caribbean Basin.
Martinique, Guadeloupe, Puerto Rico and Colombia are "hot spots." In Colombia, the
internal political conflicts are complex, and "War on Terrorism" provides only an overlay
of an already existing counter-insurgency alliance between Bogota and Washington against
the left-nationalist forces within Colombia. In Martinique, Guadeloupe and Puerto Rico,
the armed nationalist groups have been dormant during the post-Cold War era. A de-facto
cease fire is in effect, but no one should think this will last forever. Vieques remains a flash
point for nationalist forces in Puerto Rico. With the Colombian Civil War intensifying and
drug trafficking remaining a major source of instability, US foreign policy is at the cross
roads. We must ask ourselves: will the War on Terrorism obscure the long-standing con-
flicts within the Caribbean?
On one hand, globalization has taken place within the region, and a new democratic
wave has swept the entire hemisphere. Except for Cuba, the Western democratic model is
dominant in the Caribbean Basin. However, Cold War-era policies have remained frozen in
a few instances, and the U.S. opposition to leftist-nationalist forces has continued to shape
U.S. foreign policy. The War on Terrorism is mainly focused on militant Islamic forces
within Western and Central Asia. In the Western Hemisphere, U.S. foreign policy has only
slightly changed. Hence, there are contradictory trends among U.S. foreign policy elites,
and we in the Caribbean must pay close attention.
Globalization has deepened the expansion of capitalism throughout the Caribbean
basin, and it has particularly shifted the direction of U.S. capital flows from within the
insular Caribbean to Mexico. Two regional integration processes have been ongoing si-
multaneously, and they provide incentives and constraints to political elites in Caribbean
societies who seek greater autonomy in the international system. The regional integration
or reor do etcpltclsrcue, nain ls wil be th mos
no e its fuls poeta if th nain ls cofit oftetw nit
90 oup, ha aF vete iners in *nesn nainls an its
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growh o miltan n~ton~i~torcewifin te~rbbe~ B~i n
processes are: (1). European integration into the European (N \FTA). They mitigate against abrupt unilateral changes
Union (Maastrich Treaty); (2) North American integration by the United States, Western Europe and Caribbean national
into the North American Free Trade Agreement/NAFTA. elites.
These two regional integration processes began during the
Cold War era, but they have developed further during the EUROPEAN UNION (Eu)
first twelve years of the post-Cold War era. These regional The expansion of the European Community into a re-
integration processes must be highlighted as stabilizing forces gional unit that includes western, central, and eastern Eu-
for their potential to spurn metropolitan conflicts)
and/or facilitate new nationalist forces.
GLOBAUZATION AND ITS IMPACT ON STRATE(4IC OP-
TIONS FOR THE CARIBBEAN
The post-Cold War era has facilitated the ex-
pansion of global capital in all areas of the periph-
ery. Except for Cuba, the entire western hemisphere
was already firmly integrated into the world sys-
tem by the mid 1980s, and U.S. capital was domi-
nant in most Caribbean societies. Since 1980, U.S.
foreign policy elites consistently implemented the
twin policies of democratization and trade liberal-
ization within the insular Caribbean. The Ronald
Reagan and George Bush I Administrations suc-
Professor Malik Sekou.
ceeded in imposing western liberal democracy and
neoliberalism as the sole orthodoxies for nation-state forma-
tion and new nationalist elites during the period.4
The Caribbean Basin Initiative/CBI was essentially an
economic strategy to assist faltering Caribbean economies as
well as a systemic device to expand U.S. capital and shore up
unstable pro-Western regimes. Caribbean participation in CBI
mandated full implementation of neoliberal policies and full
compliance with the technical advise of the International
Monetary Fund/IMF and World Bank. By 1989, many Car-
ibbean nation-states had implemented structural adjustment
programs and non-independent societies were formulating
reforms to do likewise. The collapse of the Socialist bloc pro-
foundly affected Cuba, but it had little impact on the rest of
the insular Caribbean. The deepening of regional integration
processes has been the most important challenge to regional
elites, and globalization has emerged parallel to the growth
of regional integration units. These regional integration units
have provided the incentives and constraints for autonomous
behavior by political elites in the region. Two regional inte-
gration units are relevant to the strategic options available to
the political elites in the insular Caribbean: the European
Union (EU), and North America Free Trade Agreement
rope will transform the international system. A multipolar
system will emerge as three Great Powers, Britain, France
and Germany integrate with their immediate European pe-
riphery.5 This European Union has become a reconfigured
core area, and it will rival the United States as an economic
competitor in the 21st century. Kegley, Jr./Raymond assert
functionallyl, the European Community is not a secu-
rity but a trade bloc, designed more to make business
than to make peace. Some contend the twenty-first cen-
tury will belong to Europe because it is advantageously
positioned.... Given its economic advantages, Europe is
likely to compete with the United States economically
but continue to draw upon American military support.
United States and the European Union have different
interests, especially on trade policy; as capitalist economies
both units will foster trade competition and conflict.
Even more, the European integration process affects the
flexibility of France as a Great Power. During the Cold War,
French national interests differed substantially from the United
States. Even now, as the United States pursues militant Is-
lamic groups and challenges the Ba'athist regime in Iraq,
France does not share the same hard-line views. After World
War II, French metropolitan elites made major concessions to
colonial elites and middle strata within the insular French
Caribbean. As the most powerful continental state in Europe
and led by a progressive coalition of Communists and Social-
ists, France integrated Guadeloupe and Martinique as over-
seas departments in 1946. The Caribbean branches of the
French Communist initiated the integration process at the
immediate aftermath of World War II when leftist forces within
the French metropole were at their height of national influ-
ence and prestige. The conservative political parties had sup-
ported the Vichy regime and were largely discredited by their
fascist sympathies. French integration of its Caribbean colo-
nies completed the pre-Cold War process of cultural assimi-
lation, but essentially, French elites developed neo-mercan-
tilist trade linkages with the new overseas departments.
When the metropolitan elites shifted to the center/cen-
ter-right under Charles de Gaulle, the juridical integration of
Guadeloupe and Martinique was a fait accompli. These two
departments were essential in maintaining the existing French
presence. "At the same time, strategic interests in the Carib-
bean region became more important, especially the space base
at Kourou in French Guiana, because of the assertion by the
new regime of French's independence from the two super-
France dominated the European Community through-
out the Cold War era, and it was able to subsidize the over-
seas departments due to their relatively small populations,
sizes, and proximity to Europe. In cooperation with Britain,
France formulated international trade regimes that main-
tained core-periphery relations with former colonies and over-
seas departments. During the Cold War era, from 1975 until
very recently 1995, the Lome Agreements stabilized the flow
of cash crops and raw materials to the European market
through trade regimes that created multi-year credit and loans
to peripheral producers. The Lome Agreements guaranteed
markets and prices and production quotas.
Likewise, the sugar and bananas that were produced in
Guadeloupe and Martinique were subsidized by Paris and
provided guaranteed markets. French neo-mercantilism en-
tered a minor crisis after the Maastricht Treaty was signed in
February 7, 1992, and it worsened after global trade liberal-
ization expanded. Although an inter-parliamentary group
representing the overseas departments had pressured the
French metropole to adopt the special declaration, "Ultra-
peripheral Regions of the Community," regional elites have
been anxious in the implementation of the structural funds
for agriculture investment and guaranteed markets for ba-
nanas.0 The United States led the charge to implement the
resolutions of the Uruguay Round of negotiations. It supports
rigid implementation of neoliberalism on this particular in-
stance due to domestic economic lobbying by U.S. multina-
tional corporations and international pressure by Latin Ameri-
can states which seek growth in the EU market.
Political pressures from Germany, the ascendant Great
Power, and the United States, the remaining superpower, have
heightened the fears of Guadeloupean and Martinican elites.
Even within France itself, an anti-globalization sentiment
exists that opposes American goods from la mal bouffe (junk
food) to Hollywood movies. French culture has been pitted
against a globalization process that is perceived as Ameri-
canization. More so than the rest of the European Union, this
anti-globalization climate fosters a level of conservatism
among Caribbean elites and middle strata who seek current
trade ties to continue. If German economic power increases,
France will be pressured to re-consider its "internal" trade
policies, and this review will force French Caribbean elites
to adapt to new market realities.1 The re-emergence of
militant nationalist groups in Martinique and Guadeloupe
are dependent on French domestic policy (now European
NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (NAFTA)
In the post-Cold War era, U.S. dominance of the West-
ern hemisphere will continue for the foreseeable future." Al-
though this dominance had eroded during the Cold War era
and its unilateral capabilities was temporarily limited in the
post-Cold War era, U.S. elites have intensified the expansion
of their capital within North America and selected Latin
American countries. The Bush Doctrine as it is being for-
mulated, is essentially the embodiment of U.S. unilateralism
to its logical conclusion. Every foreign and domestic policy
enacted since September 11, 2001, was in the making from
1991 until now. In fact, some of the hard-line stances on
"rogue" states were devised at the height of the Cold War.
The main strategy to expand U.S. capital in Latin
America has been NAFTA. (The Free Trade Agreement of
the Americas is still in the embryonic stages). However, Puerto
Rico's importance as a central geo-strategic location allows
that territory to remain important to U.S. elites even as its
economic potential diminishes. Since 1992, NAFTA has deep-
ened regional trade liberalization between Canada, the United
States, and Mexico. Significant sectors of the U.S. light manu-
facturing base have been transplanted to northern Mexico.
With geographical proximity, competitive labor costs, larger
markets, and few internal economic constraints, Mexico has
attracted U.S. entrepreneurs and investment. Puerto Rico's
position in the Caribbean basin as a preferred base of U.S.
light manufacturing has began its decline. Before NAFTA,
Puerto Rico was a primary location for U.S. investment. To-
day, its economic options are limited. These economic op-
tions are tied to the geopolitical reality that Puerto Rican
nationalists must contend with the sole superpower that is in
the middle of global -nh-1.- against militant nationalists or
Given the recent "war climate" within the United States,
the stakes could not be higher for Puerto Rican political elites.
Should Puerto Rico completely integrate as a state of the
union? Or should it seek sovereignty? Can it continue as a
satellite economy when globalization by its very nature will
cause capital to shift to Mexico, Chile, El Salvador, Hondu-
ras, and the Dominican Republic? Should the Vieques struggle
be mothballed until the War on Terrorism is over? Let us
briefly review the Puerto Rican context.
During the Cold War era, Puerto Rican elites and middle
strata largely supported full integration into the U.S. economy
through "Operation Bootstrap." This economic strategy was
a Puerto Rican version of industrialization by invitation.14
Led by Governor Munoz Marin, the Popular Democratic
Party/PDP pushed for rapid modernization of Puerto Rican
society through the transformation of an agrarian economy
into a fairly diversified one that was an extension of the U.S.
metropolitan capital. Carr informs us that the new economic
policy was a success.
Between 1947 and 1959, the gross national product
(GNP) doubled in Puerto Rico, and 1958 Puerto Rico's per
capital income was the highest in Latin America. It was this
impressive growth that led [Governor] Munoz Marin, always
concerned with the economic consequences of "naked" inde-
pendence, to abandon his conviction that independence was
the only dignified escape from what he called "the spiritually
corrupting atmosphere of a colony."'
Initially, the United States supported the PDP strategy
of decolonization by reforming the unincorporated territorial
status and eschewing independence and statehood. The U.S.
elites supported Public Law 600, which was a compromise
between federated state structures and a sovereign entity. This
"third way" was approved by Congress on July 3, 1950, and
it was ratified by a plebiscite in Puerto Rico.
Metropolitan support of the reforms with quasi-colonial
structures enraged Puerto Rican nationalists, and they un-
leashed violent protests and an armed campaign. We shall
return to this discussion when we examine Puerto Rican na-
tionalism. However, the core status of the United States and
its hegemony of the world system in the 1940s provided in-
centives to local elites and middle strata to pursue greater
integration within the U.S. economy. Further, Puerto Rico's
significance as a major base for U.S. national security had
increased during and after World War II. In the early Cold
War era, the island was perceived as an important cog in a
defensive shield against Soviet intervention.
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The Caribbean Basin is not a base for terrorism of
any type. The most serious military conflict is the Co-
lombian Civil War which is tied to strictly internal
contradictions between the ruling elites and popular
classes. The U.S. War on Drugs masks a deeper socio-
economic crisis of abject poverty, powerlessness and
economic marginalization. Illicit narcotics production
is only the symptom of the larger issues of declining
market values for traditional cash crops and the in-
From January 1, 1959, the establishment of the Cuban
Revolutionary state, U.S. entrepreneurs increasingly focused
on investing in secure, stable U.S. territories, mainly Puerto
Rico. Also as the Cold War intensified in the 1960s-1980s,
U.S. foreign policy elites activated and expanded its military
advantages in the island; it was acutely aware of the geo-
strategic importance of Puerto Rico, as an important forward
base to check possible leftist-nationalist expansion in the ba-
sin. Successive Administrations were willing to dole generous
sums of Federal aid and largesse to the Puerto Rican people.
This generosity was an essential part of U.S. strategy to
avoid another Cuban-style revolution and provide an alter-
native model of development to regional elites. It also was a
necessary tool to prevent increased Puerto Rican inummigra-
tion to the mainland United States since earlier economic
downturns had the direct impact of encouraging large scale
immigration to urban areas in the North. During the 1940s
to 1960s, Operation Bootstrap stabilized the Puerto Rican
economy and politics, and thus, stave off demands for radi-
cal change and revolution.
The Cold War ended but U.S. hostility toward the Cu-
ban Revolutionary regime intensified. As the only real ideo-
logical threat to U.S. dominance and impediment to its re-
gional integration strategy, the Cuban state was singled out
for additional systemic pressures and constraints. Due to na-
tional security demands, Puerto Rico has remained impor-
tant as this embargo was tightened. Despite a mass cam-
paign to remove Naval bombardment from Vieques, one that
was forcing concessions from the Bush-Cheney Administra-
tion before September 11, 2001, Puerto Rican political lead-
ers have basically accepted the Washington position that
Puerto Rico will remain a geo-strategic link in US defense.
Hence, while NAFTA shifts U.S. capital toward Mexico, U.S.
national security requirements have frozen foreign [domes-
tic] policy on Cuba, Puerto Rico, and indirectly the US Virgin
ability for Colombia to transform its position in the global
economy, hI the Caribbean Basin, the U.S. War on Terrorism
will lead to increasing military and financial aid to Bogota
with the short-term objective of crushing the leftist-national-
ist guerilla armies within the country. However, throughout
the insular Caribbean, US foreign and domestic policies have
Caribbean political leaders of independent nation-states
are familiar with U.S. foreign policies after September 11,
2002-essentially, they have not changed. For leaders in the
non-independent Caribbean societies, the domestic politics
of their metropoles have become more important than ever.
Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands are most profoundly
affected by domestic metropolitan policies. No nationalist
movements will be allowed much space in US territories, and
nationalists in the Dutch, French, and British territories are
acutely aware of their limited political space within the re-
gion. The American Mediterranean will continue to host na-
tionalists (even leftist forces) but not terrorists in the imme-
diate future. U.S. dominance of economic and military ties
prohibit any serious attempt to engage U.S. military forces in
the Caribbean Basin.
1. More precisely, the capital shift has been in northern Mexico along
the U.S. border. Maquiladores have sprouted in this region: they are
low-wage manufacturing plants that mainly hire young Mexican
women. Except for Haitian workers, Mexican labor costs are extremely
competitive. In comparison to Puerto Rican workers who are employed
at minimum U.S. wages and with basic labor and safety standards,
Mexican workers are paid one tenth the amount of Puerto Ricans and
endure extremely poor working conditions. Further, due neoliberal
policies that were implemented in Mexico as preconditions to join
NAFTA, land reform and the reduction of national subsidies to small
farmers marginalized farmers in the southern states. This has stimu-
lated a new set of anti-systemic actors in southern Mexico who prevent
capital flows to expand beyond the northern part of the country.
2. The Association of Caribbean States (ACS) has an extremely diffi-
cult task in developing a regional integration model. The European
Union (EU) evolved from the European Community which was the
result of centuries of struggle between nationalism versus unification.
After World War II, the French used the Mormnnet Plan to create the
requisite neo-functionalist principles and institutions to build a uni-
fied Europe. The EU took five decades to consolidate. NAFTA is not as
old as the EU, but the close economic integration of Canada and the
United States as well as the common socio-economic and historic ties
of Mexico with the United States are strong foundations for a regional
unit. The ACS will have serious problems. The driving force of this
unit are the Caricom states which are the smallest, least endowed, and
most susceptible to drastic electoral shifts. The French- Dutch- and
Spanish-speaking Caribbean have the largest populations, landmasses,
and natural resources. Except for Puerto Rico, none of the island-
states within this body have a manufacturing base dedicated to con-
sumer items and heavy industry. With an industrial base, the regional
integration process will be limited to a cartel.
3. The autonomy of the Cuban nation-state within the international
community and its ability to challenge U.S. geopolitical interests within
the Caribbean Basin and else were tied to its linkage to the Socialist
bloc. The revolutionary Cuban regime was a close ally of the Soviet
Union and member state of the Council for Mutual Economic Assis-
tance. By the conclusion of the Cold War era, Cuba conducted ap-
proximately eighty seven percent of its trade with the Socialist bloc.
U.S. economic pressures were kept in check by close integration within
the Socialist bloc. As the Soviet Union collapsed, the U.S. Congress
passed the Cuban Democracy Act/Hehlms-Burton Resolution to block
Cuban dealings with capitalist economies. These two factors forced
Cuba into a "Special Period" that lasted from roughly 1992-1996.
The Cuban leadership was been forced to adopt austerity measures
that broadly resemble the structural adjustment policies of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund. The Cuban socialist model has been sus-
pended and a mixed economy has been developed. Since January 1999,
the normalization of United States-Cuba relations has been ongoing,
despite public statements to the contrary by the leadership strata of
both nation-states. For details on the Cuban crisis and its adjustment
to the Soviet collapse, see Frank T. Fitzgerald, The Cuban Revolution
in Crisis: From Managing Socialism to Managing Survival. New York:
Monthly Review Press, 1994.
4. The numerous "setbacks" of U.S. foreign policies from the John FE
Kennedy Administration to Jimmy Carter Administration (1960-1980)
heightened the awareness among U.S. elites to support western de-
mocracy and economic growth. I am referring to the emergence of the
following anti-systemic actors in the Caribbean Basin who either seized
state power or were on their way to do so: (1) New Jewel Movement-
People's Revolutionary Government (1979-1983); (2) Sandinista Na-
tionalist Front (1979-1991); (3) Farabundo Marti National Libera-
tion Front (1979-1996); (4) National Union for Guatemalan Libera-
tion (1978-199). Incidentally, except for Sendero Lumninoso/Commu-
nist Party of Peru, all of the leftist forces in Latin America and Carib-
bean Basin supported bourgeois democracy as a necessary stage be-
fore socialism was to be built. U.S. Containment policies obfuscated
this important reality, but the negotiated settlements that all leftist-nation-
alists participated and their subsequent political practice validate their
claim that they too wanted democracy and humane versions of capitalism.
The Reagan-Bush era actually encouraged both reactionary and revolu-
tionary elites to find a democratic consensus-although the right wing forces
have been able to determine the roles in their favor.
5. The cut-off states in the Eurasian landmass appear to be Greece,
the Balkans and Eastern Europe. The Russian Federation is highly
unlikely due its vast geography, Great Power status, residual
authoritarianism, internal nationalist conflicts and remaining Com-
munists led by Gennady Zhukhanov. These leftover Communists are
not yet spent forces, and a new hybrid regime that is partly Soviet and
capitalist may emerge as a new major actor in the international sys-
tem. The Russian Federation will not be integrated by the EU in the
near future; the central and eastern European states are the immedi-
ate priorities for regional integration. Turkey seek membership into
the EU, but with a strong Islamist movement and an internal counter-
insurgency campaign against the Kurdish nationalists, admission will
be difficult. The EU will be dominated by the three major actors, Ger-
many, France, and Britain (literally in that order).
6. Charles W Kegley, Jr. and Gregory Raymond, A Multipolar peace?
Great Power Politics in the Twenty-first Century. New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1994, pp. 197-198.
7. The law creating the integration of the overseas departments was
formally passed in 1945, but it took effect in 1948.
8. De Gaulle supported the creation of a French Community along the
lines of the British Commonwealth. His views were supported by the
left in the overseas department, but they were opposed in Africa and
Asia. The "No" on September 18, 1958, Guinea ended Gaullist illu-
sions of a reformulated French empire. The local Gaullist in Guadeloupe
and Martinique became the standard bearers of the department status
and the left eventually grew to oppose it.
9. Richard D. E. Burton, "The French West Indies a l'heure de l'Europe:
an overview," in Richard D. E. Burton and Fred Reno, French and
West Indian: Martinique, Guadeloupe, and French Guiana Today.
Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1994, p. 10.
10. Emmanuel Jos, "The Declaration of the Treaty of Maastricht on
the ultra-peripheral regions of the Community: an assessment," in
Burton/Reno, eds. French and West Indian, p. 86. Further, in pages
90-97, Jos indicates that the inter-parliamentary group was able to
convince the European Community member- states to classify under-
developed areas as "problem regions" based on an earlier program for
"ultra-peripheral" regions. Since 1986, this concept was in usage in
the Community. Ultra-peripheral regions are structurally underdevel-
oped and underprivileged within the Community. Geographic, climatic,
and economic factors limit economic growth. Great distances between
the metropole and the ultra-peripheral regions incur great costs for
international trade: the Azores is 1,500 km from the Portuguese coast;
Madiera is 900 km away; the Canaries are 1,050 km south west of
Spain; Guadeloupe and Martinique are 7,000 km from France; French
Guiana is 7,500 km away; and Reunion is 10,000 km away. Except for
French Guiana, all of these regions are micro-archipelagoes or insular
areas with populations less than one million inhabitants. The tropical
ultra-peripheral regions such as Guadeloupe and Martinique are sus-
ceptible to hurricanes; their economies are based on marginal activi-
ties, banana plantations and tourism. Jos ended his analysis by sug-
gesting that another protocol ought to be introduced into the programme
of options specific to the distance and insularity of the DOMs (over-
seas departments). His final questions are prescient: "Will France's
partners understand it? Will they accept it? And at what cost?"
11. Since the re-unification of Germany in 1989, its economic power
is increasing, but the astronomical costs of re-integration East Ger-
many have dampened the zeal for eastern European integration. Fu-
ture member states to the EU may very campaign that Germany ex-
tend preferential trade, aid, and investment privileges similar the ones
that France have with the overseas departments.
12. The 21st Century may be the third American Century for Latin
America and the Caribbean. No other state in this hemisphere has the
capacity or will to replace this reality.
13. Tentatively, they would be Chile and Costa Rica.
14. During the tenure of the Anglo-American Commission, Arthur Lewis
a St. Lucian economist promoted strategy of regional elites inviting
external capitalists and capital into the region. They would transform
moribund agrarian societies by introducing modern manufacturing
and disseminating mature capitalist relationships.
15. Raymond Carr, Puerto Rico: A Colonial Experiment. A Twentieth
Century Fund Study. New York, Vintage Books (Random House), 1984,
pp. 75. )
"One of the pivotal strategies of
terrorists is to create fear among a
population. "Kill one, frighten one thousand"
has lonq been part oftheir instruction kit
An acd of terrorism immediate creates
an infectious ps cholog9 of fear. obviousl
this deep tar is what resulted from
the terrorists' attack in 2001 on the
World Trade Centre in New York, a fear
which motivated click security conferences
and fresh counter-intelligence
arrangements across the rest of the world,
including the Caribbean."
ne of the last nights of the memorial li.ht disay at the former World Trade Center site.
One of the last nights of the memorial light disr la I at the former world Trade Center site.
By Ramesh Deosaran, Ph.D.
Director, Centre for Criminology and Criminal Justice
The University of the West Indies, St. Augustine Campus,
Trinidad & Tobago
This paper contains two related parts. The first provides a
brief discussion on the need for effective leadership in matters
of state security and crime reduction, and in the changing
context in which the Caribbean finds itself. The second part
provides, briefly again, a motivational paradigm for scien-
tific police leadership in building community policing.
TERRORISM, POLICE LEADERSHIP
AND COMMUNITY POLICING
One of the pivotal strategies of terrorists is to create fear
among a population. "Kill one, frighten one thousand" has
long been part of their instruction kit. An act of terrorism
immediately creates an infectious psychology of fear. Obvi-
ously this deep fear is what resulted from the terrorists' at-
tack in 2001 on the World Trade Centre in New York, a fear
which motivated quick security conferences and fresh counter-
intelligence arrangements across the rest of the world, in-
cluding the Caribbeani.
For the Caribbean, we must now remind ourselves that
there are at least three types of terrorism confronting us: (1)
terrorism motivated by political and ideological beliefs, that
is, the terrorism of hatred and revenge, (2) narco-terrorism,
that is, the increasing inter-island and tran-shipment traf-
ficking and use of illegal drugs, all of which tend to subvert
state security and the formal financial and economic struc-
ture, and (3) bandit terrorism, that is, the wanton attacks on
personal safety and property even kidnapping within the
various states of the Caribbean, attacks which create intense
civil unease and mounting pressures on the respective Carib-
bean governments "to do something quickly" about crime
Of course, as far as security controls and prevention are
concerned, it should be noted that within each type of terror-
ism and often linking all types is the role of information. That
is, information about when and where a "drug deal" is about
to be made, about where and how the preparations for a bomb
attack is being made, about who are involved, who has an
unusual travel schedule, about where the stolen" goods are
hidden, etc. Apart from high-level security monitoring, satel-
lite searches, etc., the provision of information by citizens
through a well organised community policing structure can
be quite helpful on the ground level where such information
is likely to flow, if not originate.
So the question immediately arises: Is the Caribbean, at
least the relevant authorities, sufficiently ready to deal with
these three forms of terrorism? The first type of terrorism
listed above is akin to the attack on the World Trade Centre
in New York, or the actions of the guerrillas in Colombia and
the Philippines. Within the last twelve years in the Carib-
bean, the most notable act of this type of terrorism occurred
in Trinidad with the Muslimeen's attack in 1990 on the
country's Parliament. After a series of court trials, one reach-
ing the Privy Council, the Muslimeen remain free today. There
has also been no public inquiry into the reasons or causes for
The garrison gangsterism in Jamaica or even the mur-
der in the Catholic cathedral in St. Lucia fall on the fringe of
this level of terrorism. While the St. Lucian Government has
sought to deal quickly and firmly with the cathedral attack
and, within judicial limits the garrison gangsterism in Jamaica
remain sustained by political partisanship and drug traffick-
ing. The persistent flirtations with elements of the Muslimeen
by Trinidad politicians, including those in leadership posi-
tions, help weaken the country's reputation for good gover-
nance, and law and order.
Narco-terrorism, the second type, is on the rapid increase
where, on one end, several communities are almost totally
lost to "the drug culture," and where, at another end, there is
the fear that drug-money may be finding its way into the
financing of election campaigns in some parts of the Carib-
bean. Both governance and civil society are in jeopardy.
The third type of terrorism listed above, bandit terror-
ism, is, more than narco-terrorism, a source of great public
fear. In some Caribbean states where nation-wide surveys
have been undertaken, for example in St. Lucia and Trinidad
and Tobago, over 60 percent of the population express a high
level of fear of crime. That is, they are afraid of walking in
the streets, are afraid of being kidnapped, are afraid of hav-
ing their homes broken into, are afraid of being attacked both
at home or in the street, etc. From several other less formal
sources, there is no reason to doubt that the level of fear of
crime in other Caribbean states is any lower.
Though their methods differ from international terror-
ists, our own gun-toting bandits who rob and kill citizens and
businessmen create the similar effect, that of fear and infec-
tious insecurity among our populations. Within the last year,
from Jamaica to Trinidad and Tobago, down to Guyana, the
spate of murders, wanton violence and robberies has left our
Caribbean population frightened and besieged. Clearly, the
traditional ways of dealing with these and other crimes are
not working effectively. And so, our Government like those of
other besieged Caribbean states must develop a refurbished
political will to realise the stark deficiencies in current ap-
Throughout these three types of terrorism, the need for
and role of information from citizens are critical both for pre-
vention and detection, In fact, from a recent survey of police
officers in Trinidad and Tobago (sample of 550 out of 6,000),
over 80 percent said that "information from citizens" is the
most critical element in helping the police to solve crime most
of the time. And the provision and gathering of information
from citizens is a fundamental part of community policing.
Apart from narrowly-framed intelligence agencies or special
branch operations, the crime-fighting leadership across the
Caribbean has put their heavy bets upon the adoption and
implementation of community policing. Since 1993, the As-
sociation of Caribbean Commissioners of Police (ACCP), a
regional body comprising 24 police jurisdictions, has adopted
community policing for these 24 Caribbean states.
However, in a 2000 position paper by the ACCP Presi-
dent, Hilton Guy,, the ACCP noted that, while some Carib-
bean states have begun implementing community policing,
others have taken either "a luke-warm approach or have not
yet addressed the issue in any deliberate way." And from avail-
able data, even those countries which have adopted commu-
nity policing, the degree of success in reducing or preventing
crime is quite varied, to say the least. Overall, the figures for
serious crimes across the Caribbean remain rather constant
for the last five years, and this, in the face of rising public
fear of crime and feelings of encroaching terrorism.
Two challenges for leadership arise: one, that the vari-
ous governments across the Caribbean apply a more serious,
sustainable policy towards supporting and developing com-
munity policing; and two, that the police leadership take a
more scientific, ground-level approach to community polic-
ing. But let us briefly refer to the definition of community
policing. One of the many definitions is: "Community polic-
ing is a new philosophy of policing, based on the concept that
police officers and private citizens working together in cre-
ative ways can help contemporary community problems re-
lated to crime, fear of crime, social and physical disorder and
neighbourhood decay" (Trojanowicz, Kappler, Gaines and
Bucqueroux, 1998, p. 5).
The ACCP defines community policing this way: "Community policing is in es-
sence, a collaboration between the police and the community that seeks to identify and
solve community problems. In this way, the police are no longer the sole guardians of law
and order. All members of the community become active allies in the effort to improve
the safety and quality of life in the various communities" (President's Address, ACCP,
2000, p. 5).
The definitions point quite sharply towards a community, ground-up type of crime
prevention and crime reduction. Hence, the need for police leadership especially since, as
a fresh form of civic responsibility, citizens will likely have to be properly motivated to
participate in the community policing mission. But before we get more fully into the
challenge of "police leadership by motivation", we must still keep in mind how times
have changed and the effect such global changes will have upon safety across the Carib-
The turn towards community policing in the Caribbean has rested not only on its
intrinsic merits, but on two other related factors:
(1) An admission that "traditional law enforcement" approaches are not working well.
(2) Mainly because of its widely-expressed civic purpose and required community part-
nerships, community policing carries great popular and political appeal (Deosaran, 2000).
Given the relatively recent though varied implementation of community policing in
the Caribbean, the ACCP at its 2001 Annual Executive Meeting established a Caribbean
Task Force on Community Policing with the overall objectives of gathering a further
understanding of the complexities of community policing and improving its implemen-
tation across the Caribbean. Two major sets of issues were noted for attention: the com-
munity context of community policing and the internal readiness of the police organisation
to deliver the programme.
In terms of both policy and practice, community policing has become a very popu-
"Fo th Caribean, we mus no'eidorevsta hr
ar at les the tyef terrs cofotn us:0
(1 terrs moiae by poltia an idolgia bes tha is,
trfici. and use of *a drgs al ofwihtndtuvr
n (3) badi terrim pha is th wato pttacks0
propa saet Pn prpq 0' eve kidn n -Piti
the varou stte of th Carbban atak P cratites
civi unas 0nd 0 0'n prsues nte repetv Caiba
lar option for cities in North America, Europe, Australia and many parts of Eastern and
South-East Asia. In some instances, for example in China, community policing became a
mode of formalising a lot of what had already existed in terms
of community partnerships and services (see, for example, Peak
"An am t of crimc amand Glensor, 1999; Trojanowicz et. al., 1998).
ciAn examination of crime and community policing in
the Caribbean is important for other countries to consider -
leve is cprtant fol especially the United States, Canada, England and Europe -
forcemenpnsid er since it is becoming clearer that economic and technological
especi te S ts Ig fe globalisation also carries trans-national currents of criminal
activities, for example, drug trafficking, customs and immi-
gration scams, trans-national terrorism, commercial frauds,
tourist crimes, etc.
that e nic e The increasing flows of economic investment and busi-
technologica globa also ness traffic between the Caribbean and North America bring
cr eti ndpolce ledeinto focus the relationship between investment confidence and
cuial pact ipties, security and crime, the latter being important in terms of both
official crime rates and the fear of crime. The region's eco-
nomic attractiveness and its general reliance on tourism there-
rfore make safety and security critical matters.
Imta nereleatlte wAs indicated earlier, while all Caribbean countries have
indeed accepted community policing as a policy, the degree of
tasm lmer ader th oersoimplementation varies from one country to another. Most of
tan cim s e;tc the smaller islands have an ambiguous combination of public
relations, police patrols and charity acts as community polic-
ing programmes. Such variation is not entirely due to a lack of
will by the police organisation itself. Take the case of Jamaica. With its very high crime
rate and violence, police manpower and public expectations demand that law enforce-
ment become a highly visible priority, leaving little or no time to engage in developing
crime prevention or community-inspired programmes.
In fact, the private sector in Jamaica has threatened to mount an all-out campaign
against the Government if the Government does not do something quickly to reduce the
levels of crime, violence and murders in that country, meaning that short-term law en-
forcement response should be a top priority. Of course, it is still possible in such a context
to utilise such high fear and stringent pressures over serious crime to initiate and integrate
the wider parameters of community policing. There are two major issues here; one, the
statistics on the serious crime rate are still used as the most compelling criterion for judg-
ing police performance and Government action, and two, with such public pressures, the
political and police leadership will be hard-pressed to emphasise community relations
and partnerships at the expense of quickened, hard-line law enforcement. At times, both
are not compatible in any one community.
In the relevant literature, two major forms of leadership are typically listed. One is
task leadership, the other is social leadership. The first focuses on defining and getting the
task done; it is a command type of leadership, similar to the command type of leadership
within the police hierarchy. The second type emphasizes con-
sensus building, team-formation with lateral responsibilities.
The challenge, as difficult as it is now, is for leadership within
the police service to adopt and practice effectively both types
of leadership, that is, if community policing is to succeed.
There are more embracing changes which make it im-
perative for Caribbean states to forge deeper, and more tar-
geted security alliances with the United States and Europe,
apart from the trade and economic agreements now in place.
With international and narco-terrorism part of an encroach-
ing world, Caribbean leadership should move towards creat-
ing a strategic set of security alliances, especially since we
now lack the supporting technology.
Globalisation requires freedom of movement such as that
now engineered within the Caribbean. But freedom of move-
ment globalizes crime, even terrorism. Community policing
sits as the strategic operational lever between public fear of
crime and the kind of civilian information required to reduce
both fear and crime itself. The research has shown, in and
outside the Caribbean, that more than forensic tools, more
than the experience of the investigating police officer, it is
information from citizens at the affected crime scene which
helps to solve most crimes. By forging partnerships with the
various communities, by building public confidence in the
police, community policing puts itself in a strong position to
generate the kind of information which solves and reduces
crime and even public fear of crime. With all its sophisticated
technology and underground manpower, both the CIA and
the FBI have gotten a new realization of the need for citizen
information to prevent and detect terrorism. Community
policing has now become a part of the new information age.
It is an integral part of good governance.
No longer can citizens and governments rely solely on
short term, sporadic law enforcement measures. To deal with
both the escalating fear of crime and actual crime rates, com-
munity policing is a practice whose time has come. Not that
we will ignore traditional law enforcement, that is, the quick,
deliberate enforcement of the law. This will always be re-
quired. But in order to achieve and maintain civil and orderly
communities, in order to help reduce fear and crime itself,
community policing must be used as a key long-term mea-
sure. Of course, governments and the police themselves face
heavy pressures to react with law enforcement measures. Such
is the case of Jamaica where over thirty deaths, including
several police officers, occurred in 2001 from street clashes.
The politically-driven clashes in Guyana have also led to six
deaths in 2001. In Trinidad and Tobago, throughout 2001,
gun-toting bandits struck many homes and business places
with unmitigated violence and fury, kidnapping and steal-
And so, the police must react as law enforcement offic-
ers. But the cause of such crimes, the role of the community
in helping to prevent such crimes, the critical role of informa-
tion, the proactive role of our civic institutions, all these ele-
ments must now be strategically factored into the crime man-
agement and crime reduction paradigm. This is part of what
community policing is all about. Even if some of these things
were done and are being done, they must now be done in a
more effectively co-ordinated and systematic manner across
the Caribbean. And police leadership is the key.
We need to shape a new future for Caribbean policing.
The decision by the Association of Caribbean Commissioners
of Police (ACCP) in 2001 to establish a Caribbean Task Force
on Community Policing in the Caribbean is a landmark one.
As indicated above, it is important to take a military or para-
military approach to security within the Caribbean, but it is
just as important to fight and reduce crime from the ground
up, to bring the various communities into a crime prevention
mode and in their own defense. The community must have a
firm share in protecting itself. Several World Bank reports
have indicated how the crime rate and the increase in com-
munity incivility in the Caribbean have been subverting and,
if left unchecked, will continue to subvert the gains we make
in economic prosperity.
Community policing offers us the opportunity to target
certain crimes, specific neighborhoods and particular of-
fenders, and bring some comfort to victims. When, for ex-
ample, we find across the Caribbean that about 70% of seri-
ous crimes fall within the robbery, larceny, break-ins and
dwelling-house larceny categories, community policing can
put itself into a strategic position to cut that rate down by
50% in the next five years with sound police leadership and
community support. The integrated problem-solving meth-
ods of community policing can indeed achieve this standard
by sustained effort. The preventive approach to crime has to
start from the schools, from the homes and communities,
through the courts and into the prisons and, even afterwards,
especially in the case of prison recidivism. In varying degrees,
all these fall within the parameters of community policing.
With an estimated prison recidivism rate of 60% across
shor ter, sp
pratc whs P P
tha isP h ujnf r e t o
0i alay be ''
ore to aciv 4
cii and or r o
in ore oh~
0n crm 0'sr.
must also turn our crim,
over 80% of the prison population from poor backgrounds, we
e reduction policies to ensure that those who enter prison come
out with better character and skills than what they entered
prison with. We have to provide a prison environment which
reduces such a high rate of recidivism, even if it means afford-
ing deserving prisoners conjugal rights, labour with pay, and
outreach programmes. The old ways of dealing with crime
reduction and imprisonment must change. All such humaniz-
ing conditions will flow from the expected success of commu-
nity policing and effective political leadership.
a 0 BENCHMARKING AND A MOTIVATIONAL PARADIGM FOR
SCIENTIFIC POLICE LEADERSHIP
ehascm e.P The most difficult challenge facing community-based
policing is essentially the "community" part of the mission.
Info emet ~That is, how can a particular police service lead and motivate
its various communities to form crime preventive partnerships.
delie t The research literature and in fact, our own experiences have
e 1W H I shown that information alone is not enough to motivate or
uir lBut in even persuade. If that were so, then countless, generalised slo-
d mai nti gans like "don't use drugs," "use a condom" or "support your
local police" would have been much more successful in chang-
OMM1 unite ing the target attitude and behaviour. In fact, it is quite re-
redue fer markable that the physical dangers of drug abuse and HIV-
AIDS do not appear convincing enough to persuade more
,co Iu J^ ,people to refrain from drugs and unprotected sex. In such situ-
se as keg nations, drug users put and keep themselves in a state of denial
e'^ lAr It or optimism bias. A state of denial means, among other things
that "nothing really bad will happen to me if I use drugs."
Optimism bias means among other things that "I can stop
when I want to, or I am different from others who get afflicted or addicted."
Now, you may well ask what does all this have to do with community policing? In
the first place, I am saying that if we continue to rely only or largely upon pleading with
citizens to help the police, support the police or join with the police in crime prevention,
we will not get very far. In fact we will get nowhere at all as is happening in many
Caribbean jurisdictions. We need much more than generalised pleadings. It is high time
for a reality check. For example, we have to ask, what really motivates or will motivate
civilians to work with or support their police? Now, lest I be misunderstood, we can
certainly point to a number of police youth clubs, neighbourhood watch groups, town
meetings, etc. These suggest that the police and the community, at least very small parts
of it, have met, spoken and perhaps done a few things.
I am not under-estimating the therapeutic importance of such meetings, but in the
context of using civic commitment to reduce and prevent crime, we have a serious and
very relevant challenge that is, how many countries in the Caribbean can reliably dem-
onstrate that such community-police alliances have actually resulted in a ten, twenty or
even a fifty percent reduction of the crime rate for the par-
ticular district or for the country as a whole? This is the chal-
lenge. This is where the proof of the pudding should lie. This
is where the raison (d -ir. for community-police alliances
should exist to reduce and prevent crime. And to get the
civilian community to participate beyond town meetings, or
other mutual admiration encounters.
CIVIC RESPONSIBILITY AND POLICE ACTION
In a philosophical sense the role and value of civility has
been a key element of a civilized society. In fact, civic respon-
sibility is one of two critical elements of a democratic society.
The other is wise and effective governance. Civic responsibil-
ity and mutual trust among citizens and their civic organiza-
tions form part of what is now commonly called social capi-
tal. The major objective of this paper is, however, not to float
into such abstractions, but to suggest one or two ways how
the police can move effectively from the abstract to the con-
crete, from the general to the specific, from concept to tar-
geted action. In this action-oriented scenario, four issues arise:
1. Some of you may argue that crime prevention or crime
reduction is not the total reason for forming watch groups or
police youth clubs, etc. I agree, but I still submit that crime
reduction and crime prevention should be a major objective
of such community-police partnerships.
2. You may also say that police reforms, at least structur-
ally and operationally, must also take place for community
policing to be fully effective and for gaining civic support. I
agree, but that part of the equation is not my major focus
here today, mainly for reason of time. In fact, I will agree
that for effective community-police partnerships to take place,
we need a cadre of appropriately trained officers, trained
particularly in the sociology of policing and the psychology
of social change for starters.
3. hi matters such as conmmunity-policing partnerships, it
is easier in fact, much more possible and effective to moti-
vate a small group or a single district than to seek to moti-
vate an entire country at one time. That is why, for example,
radio and TV messages fail. These unilateral messages and
command appeals for national support or cooperation ap-
pear too diffused and quite untargeted. They are seen as ends
in themselves, whereas they should be used as means to mo-
tivate the civilian community. But even so, there is no mea-
sure of how such messages actually work. Of course with
such messages and appeals, whenever you try to treat every-
body as somebody at the same time, nobody really feels as
anybody. Everybody hears but very few, if any, feel person-
ally persuaded. And so meaningful civic responses are either
quite superficial or totally absent.
4. How can we then, how can a police service really frame
a strategy to motivate and persuade a community to come
out, get mobilised and join with the police in reducing and
We briskly respond to Issue #4 above by setting three
1. The first step is to choose a relatively small district or
village. The level of "community readiness" and "commu-
nitv cohesiveness" should be assessed from the results of com-
munity surveys conducted previously. Such steps are now
being taken in community policing projects in both Saint Lucia
and Trinidad and Tobago.
2. Bring the dangers of crime as close as possible to the
residents. That is, through video, community survey results
and official statistics, show them what the crime situation is
really like. In other words, avoid relying solely on vague ap-
peals or self-righteous sermonising. Try, instead, to let the
"facts" speak for themselves. Of course, a modified strategy
would have to be adopted for a "crime-free" or "low-crime"
The cross at ciround Zero.
3. This third step contains the key motivational paradigm,
that is, we now rely upon the self-interest of residents in this
selected district. Describe the "crime picture" to the particu-
lar district, that is, for example, how many serious crimes
took place in the nation and also in their district last year, etc.
Then zero in on the specific crimes for that particular dis-
trict. Show them the economic and psychological costs, the
social disruptions, etc. caused by such crimes in their district.
In other words, the incremental thrust should be towards rel-
evance, heightening district concern and specific targeting.
Specific targeting means you select a particular crime that
can be realistically and viably subjected to a community-
policing programme. House-break-ins, for example. This type
of crime bothers residents a lot. This crime also carries a lot
of neighbourhood implications, for example, watch group
organisation and effects.
Benchmarking the Crime for Community-Policing Action
Of course by selecting one particular kind of crime, this
does not mean that other crimes do not deserve attention.
What it does mean is that manageable focus can be applied
to this one type of crime; that community consensus can be
easily mobilised around this particular crime; that the nature
of this crime is such that residents will have the opportunity
to play an effective part in reducing and preventing its re-
occurrence; and finally, the preventive strategy could involve
both the residents and the police. All these conditions apply
to crimes such as robbery, house break-ins, praedial larceny,
drug abuse and trafficking, domestic violence, and incest.
That is, they offer viable opportunities for dynamic, symbi-
otic commutity-police partnerships. These can be effectively
used as kick-start platforms for further community-police
Let us briefly illustrate by constructing a case study and
set the scientific approach in motion. In the district of Ciceron,
suburban Castries in Saint Lucia, the number of house break-
ins for the past 12 months (May-April) is 60. This number,
60, was obtained from both police reports and victimization
surveys in the district. The number of households in Ciceron
is 1,140 (actual number), thus having a ratio of 19 house-
holds for every break-in. The average number of break-ins
for that 12-month period is five. The particular streets, homes,
pattern (e.g., tools used, etc.) and circumstances (e.g., time
of break-in, etc.) will be presented and discussed with the
residents of the district. You may also consider those who previ-
ously committed such offences in that district. And to what ex-
tent these new offences fit any previous crime profiles, etc.
Now, you may well ask: so what is so new about all this?
Well, it is not so much a matter of how new or old these bits
of crime data are. It is moreso how they can be packaged into
a strategic community-supported crime reduction programme.
And, how this package can be used to invoke the self-interest
and motivation of these residents. In the first place, the data
collection and presentation have an obvious scientific flavour,
especially if it is presented to the residents with the aid of
video grahbic;'. Secondli, rt+e residents' concern and respon-
siveness should be heightened since the particular crime of
house break-in and its incidepe qare of direct relevantce to
them! Thirdly, you can now pose to the residents a direct
question a civic challenge really That is., what can 7ot as
residents do, what both of us the police and you can do to
reduce tihis five-ner-month hois" break-in rate within, the
next year. Can we together bring this rate down to at least
two per month?
This third point involves that critical matter of using a
benchmark to which the residents should conmmnit themselves;
that is, to help reduce the rate of house break-ins to at least
two per month in the next year. One an agreement is negoti-
ated, you will have a civic contract between that community
and the police with a set of specific responsibilities and func-
tions, criteria, expectations, forms of accountability, bench-
marks and deadlines. Similar systems can be established in
other districts with the best results properly and fully dis-
seminated to add a further incentive.
The crime of house break-in was used as just one ex-
ample in this motivational paradigm. We can also use less
tangible factors such as the residents' fear of crime and link
this to the operations of the E-999 and police patrols. In fact,
this particular linkage is part of a benchmarking project now
being undertaken in three police station districts of Trinidad
and Tobago under the jurisdiction of Commissioner Hilton
Guy. In Saint Lucia, in collaboration with the Royal Saint
Lucia Police Force under Commissioner Bernard, a nation-
wide household survey is now underway to measure the things
that bother residents the most, the level of their fear of crime,
the ways in which they are prepared to help the police, etc.
These two community police projects are being carried out
by the UWI Centre for Criminology and Criminal Justice at
the St. Augustine Campus, Trinidad and Tobago and, like a
few other such projects, they are designed to put some scien-
tific meat, some operational precision and some concretised
motivational elements into the community policing mission.
Naturally, you would observe that there are several de-
tails to be worked out from the above proposals, these can
certainly be done as part of further workshops and for sup-
porting training programmes for the police across the vari-
ous Caribbean jurisdictions. The lessons learnt from these
projects will certainly be used to help others who wish to be
helped. This, too, is part of the community policing spirit.
In sum, this two-part paper sought to provide the broad
context in which national security precautions and sharper
police leadership are required. This is looking at the situation
from "top down." The second part illustrates how some con-
cepts from both community policing and management sci-
ence could be effectively used to motivate residents towards
forming and sustaining police partnerships and for their own
safety and civic satisfaction. This is the "ground-up" approach.
In other words, for community policing to become a successful
crime reduction and crime prevention practice, both approaches
are necessary as tools of effective police leadership.
1. The 24 Caribbean states to which we refer are Anguilla, Antigua and
Barbuda*, Aruba, The Bahamas*, Barbados*, Belize*, Bermuda, Brit-
ish Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Curacao, Dominica*, French
Antilles, Grenada*, Guyana*, Jamaica*, Montserrat*, St. Kitts and
Nevis*, St. Lucia*, St. Maarten, St. Vincent and the Grenadines*,
Suriname*, Trinidad and Tobago*, Turks and Caicos Islands and the
U.S. Virgin Islands. Fourteen (14) of these Caribbean states which are
marked with an asterisk comprise members of the Caribbean Commu-
Deosaran, R. (2000). The Dynamics of Community Policing: Theory,
Practice and Evaluation. Trinidad: The University of the West Indies,
St. Augustine Campus, Centre for Criminology and Criminal Justice.
Peak, K. & Glensor, R. (1999). Community Policing and Problem Solv-
ing. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
Trojanowicz, R., Kappler, V., Gaines, L. & Bucqueroux, B. (1998). Com-
munity Policing: Contemporary Perspectives. Cincinnati, OH: Ander-
son Publishing Co.
Answers to the Crossword on p. 32:
Crossword: Terrorism 2002
by A.L. Anduze, M.D.
1. Muslim veil
3. Israeli secret
5. U.S. police organi-
6. Muslim holy war
7. Weapons of -
9. One of four caliphs
10. Afghan capital
12. Afghan group
defeated in 2002
14. Speakers of He-
15. Middle Eastern
19. Mubarek's country
20. Extremist group
22 New Israel
23. Israeli port
27. Syrian president
28. Arabian prince
29. Nigerian capital
30. A language of India
33. Instrument of
35. Bin Laden's orga-
38. _- bomber
39. _- sniffing dogs
1. Commandeer a
2. PLO chief
4. Of Middle Eastern
5. Islamic sanctioned
8. Muslim minority
11. Islamic religious
13. Muslim civil war
15. A person's image,
16. Belligerent offenses
17. Group of Middle
18. Nuclear test
20. Person held as
21. Israeli currency
24. Language of Iran
25. Iraqi president
31. Pilgrimage to
33. It can be germ,
cold or religious
34. Site of 1993 agree-
ment giving West
Bank to PLO
36. Workplace of
Professor Malik Sekou earned a doctorate in political science from the University of Delaware. He has variously served with the
V.I. fire Service, the V.I. Commission on Status and federal Relations and as a consultant to the Senate President of the 22nd Legislature
and Chair of the finance Committee in the 23rd Legislature of the U.S. Virgin Islands. He currently teaches history and political science at
the University of the Virgin Islands.
Professor Ramesh Deosaran is a professor of criminology and social psychology, and Director of the LUWI Centre for Criminology
and Criminal Justice at the St. Augustine Campus, Trinidad and Tobago. Professor Deosaran's research and policy expertise is in the areas
of crime management and crime reduction, community policing and poverty and communication empowerment. He has successfully
implemented a number of training programs in community policing for the police in several Caribbean countries. He is a consultant to
several regional and interregional organizations, and serves as Vice Chairman and Advisor to the Caribbean Task Force on Community
Professor Pedro Noquem is the Judith K. Dimon Professor of Communities and Schools in the Graduate School of Education at
Harvard University. Previously he was Professor of Social and Cultural Studies at the Graduate School of Education and the Director of the
Institute for Social Change at the UAniversity of California, Berkeley. Noguera's research focuses on the ways in which schools respond to
social and economic forces within the urban environment. Noguera has also carried out extensive field research and published several
articles on the role of education in political and social change in the Caribbean.
Jean S. Holder, Secretary Gcieneral of the Caribbean Tourism Organization, was formerly Executive Director and Secretary General of
the Caribbean Tourism Research and Development Centre. Mr. Holder is a distinguished member of the Royal Victorian Order since 1995,
and was awarded the Colden Helm Award in Berlin in 1985 for his contributions to tourism development. He is a graduate of Oxford
University and the IAniversity of Toronto.
September 11 photo credits:
Front Cover: IKONOS satellite image of Manhattan, 9/12/01. Courtesy Space Imaging: http://www.spaceimaging.com/
Editor's page: The viewing wall at Ground Zero. Courtesy Nathan Blaney, Image #1714, The September 11 Digital Archive,
20 October: http://digitalarchive.org/images/details/1714>
Page 3, top: Lower Manhattan at dawn, 9/20/01 from Jersey City. Courtesy Jim Occi, Image #1753, The September 11
Digital Archive, 20 October: http://digitalarchive.org/images/details/1753>
Page 3, inset: September 11, 2001, 9:03 a.m. Courtesy Pete Burke, Image #1788, The September 11 Digital Archive, 20
Page 4: New skyline from the ferry, 9/9/2002. Courtesy Marte Rosso, Image #1682, The September 11 Digital Archive, 20
Page 8: Items left at St. Pauls (original image is color). Courtesy Nathan Blaney, Image #1713, The September 11 Digital
Archive, 20 October: http://digitalarchive.org/images/details/1713>
Page 22: One of the last nights of the memorial light display (original image is color). Courtesy Johnny R. Baltierra, Image
#1642, The September 11 Digital Archive, 20 October: http://digitalarchive.org/images/details/1642>
Page 30: The cross at Ground Zero. Courtesy Nathan Blaney, Image #1712, The September 11 Digital Archive, 20 October:
Eastern Caribbean Center
University of the virgin Islands
"Historically American, Uniquely Caribbean, Globalldg Intemctive"