Administrative law and procedure under the NIRA

Material Information

Administrative law and procedure under the NIRA
Series Title:
Work materials - Office of National Recovery Administration ;
Aiken, Paul C
United States -- National Recovery Administration
Place of Publication:
NRA Organization Studies Section
Publication Date:
Physical Description:
vi, 368 p. : ; 28 cm.


Subjects / Keywords:
Administrative law -- United States ( lcsh )
bibliography ( marcgt )
federal government publication ( marcgt )
non-fiction ( marcgt )


Includes bibliographical references.
Additional Physical Form:
Also available in electronic format.
Statement of Responsibility:
by Paul C. Aiken.

Record Information

Source Institution:
University of Florida
Rights Management:
This item is a work of the U.S. federal government and not subject to copyright pursuant to 17 U.S.C. §105.
Resource Identifier:
020509169 ( ALEPH )
01159772 ( OCLC )


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AD, ITiST"'.TRAT LA 7 A7' P!X7OC'"-^! R TIS "'IRA

Ppul C. Ain-n

K A2CH, 1<'V6


Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2012 with funding from
University of Florida, George A. Smathers Libraries with support from LYRASIS and the Sloan Foundation details admrnvela36unit


This studv of Ad'-iinistrativ' L.- Pnd Freot-iiur, und-r thep 7IRA
was rronrod by Fr. Paul C. Airn of the 1-A Or.-nnization Studies S-c-
tion, Hr. Willipni W. Brrdsleir in 'hpre.

As the title ineicptes tha autl or hp. ttrTotod nn administrative
law studOv of th0 I'ntionrl Industrial H'-covrr Act rnd its administra-
tion by I7A. He d00 it desirnblo to include an introductory
discussion of ad-inistrative theor". This is th- ouroose of Port I,
in -hich tho traditional theories are oxariin-d and a surv-r is then
madm of --hat th- -'ourts say they do -nd of -hat the courts actually
do in the cases -or-sntpd to thpm.

Th- r-ason for th0 study lis in !'hat -7A did or failed to do as
Smatter of "due processs" of la-,. Th subsinc of th a study, -ith
rpsnoct to nr_ nroc-durci is to be fo-u:ai. "'Yi'Part I! -in the consi-dat-ftion
of procedural an. suistentiv- nrobl-ris in noo-'-'-iing and code
administration, -hich might hnva be-n suj-act-d to r-.v-rsR judicial
treatment had not th, cocos bTon t=r-inat-d by th" Sior-nr- Court's
decision of ]Ty ?7, 1935.

The reader ,ho is -orimn.rilv int-r-st r in th- portions of the
study d0finiteOv r l tto. t 7TPA nlay th-reforp "'ish to turn at once
to Part II, b-inninr --ith Cha-ot-r V, although it is to be observed
that this chanter 7'as -ritten mRrely .s a -oart of the author's
concaot of the stud.-r as a '.holh. It -las not thought of merely 3as an
introductory cha-otr to Pprt II.

A third Dart of th- studr treats -ith th- constitutional -owers
and their delegation involved in the 7IRA and 3R-A. Tho lines of cases
and the theories nec-ssarv to th no-oers purported to have been granted
by. the ITIRA ar- nutlined. Th-n, the manner of the delegation of
thse -oor-ers is considered, '-ith -DarticUlar errohasis given to the
remote and numerous redplegations, as well as to the question of what
persons could rroT-rly -xercise the -oo-rs of thp Act.

LastlVr, in a desire to offer more than a critical analysis, the
studr points out possible mpens of for-stalling too close judicial

It can hardly b- d-nied that under the provisions of the
R-covery Act the '`RA processes of code-makinp -nd code Prmndm-nt
'ere legislative in nature. 3-cause of this it cman be argued
reasonably that "due -rocess", in the procedural sense of notice and
the develo-ment of facts through hearings sufficient to justify the
approval of coco's and amendments, -ps not necessary in NPA code-
mp'"ing to any greater d-gree to Anv tr reatr degree than it is
necessary in the legislativ- pcinns of the Congress. In recognition
of this point of vieR the author has included a discussion of it in
Chaptr7 V. It is his intent that the stud.- should convey the
impression that the observance of -procedural "due process"' on the
part of YTRA in code-maR-ing ,-as dJsirnbl", because of the possibility



tht thp courts in arisin-. in connection -ith th" -nforcern nt
of codas would giva consid.orptio" to th0 ffct-findin'- methods of NRA.
It is not his intent that the st'i'i" should cnv"-, th- i'nrossion that
tho obsorv.rnc0 of ororolur.l "'r.- rrocess" was a =ra.uirLont of r.od-_
mn'king in an absolute s ns .

It is fully rcngni'ce. that students of the subject of this studv,
Particularly as it Pnters into a^-ects of administrative In-T in which
th- courts have hpood Oo,-n f,- ricisiors, ny hav= points of vi,- in-
consistont -ith the authors. Tl1o study, of course, presents the
author's -noint of vip and. th comm-nts Pne conclusions are his own
end not official utterances. In tho addend'.im -ill be found a comment
by one reviewer of th1 '-anuscri-ot.

At the back of this r--ort r'ill be found a brief st1teP1nt of the
studies undertaken 'b- tho Division of Rovipm,.

L. C. IIershall
Director, Division of RBview

!'nrch 23, 1936



P, Letter of Trnrnsmittal ..................................... .... i

A C.'- e Review .................................. ...........1


Part 1. An Adminirtr.-tivp Lay background .................. 4
.AYT E]" I

ThThe TIhecr- f Adninistration
I. Sevara.tion of Governmental Povwers .................... 7
II. Gro'.-'th of A.'.,'i-iistration an(d
Ad -inistrative LT.i .................................. . 8

III. Delection of Povier 'nd Pinlity in
its Exercise ...... .................... ............................. 8
cu.r-':- iii
CHA?... Il

Revie'- byr the Courts and S,- efuards A-,.inst Abuse
of Ac'.:inistrative Poier

naturall" a. "i ier" law.................................. 13
"D.e Process of L'-". . . ............ .......... .. .... 14
Ultra c-nC Intra Vires ....... ............... ............ ............ 15
Jurisdictional Pnd Constitutional Fact..................... 15
Qaestionscf'La ........ ....... ................ 16
Discretionary and ministerial Action ........................ 16
Requirements of Evidence... .... . . . .. .. .. .. . . . 17
Self-Limitation by the Courts "Political
questions" Exhausting Available Administrative
Remedies. ............................... ............. 18


Administrative Finality anC the C,,ases.
I. -arrow Review.......... ............................... .. ............ 20
The Government and. its Internial Af'ffirs................. 21
The Government exten(.s a Privilege. ...................... 22
The Governmaent supplies v Service....................... 24
II. B c'a,2 Review ........ ...... 25
The Interstate Comerce Co mission...................... 25
The Fedoril Trade Comnissin .......................... 28
Sfubstantive Due Process anC- Private Property_
"Business Affected with a Public Interest".............. 29
III. Jurisdictional Fact .......... ......... ............ .. 32
Use to Circumvent Y.-.rroar Reviewv .............................. 32
Recent Imr ortance ... ... ....................... ........... 33
Avoiding the Theory..................................... 33


9 S33,3


IV. General ProcedurFl Requircments. .. .
Ill-Definepd ............. ...... ... .. .. .............. 74
Requirements Vary 'Jithin Field With Fields ........ 34
Usually Acceote,. 7equire.irnts Notice Hearing...... 35

Part II. Problems of Ad:inistration and Administrative
Law in IRA .............. .. .. .. ... .... .**. 37


Th" Sc-'-i,: ie .. .
Legislation by Scheme. .................... ......... 38
Legislation or Aijudication -The Tariff Commission......... 41
The Interstate Commerce C -' mission Fearing Require-
ment of the Act ................... .................. . . ... 43
Forcing Issuance or llestraint (f C'.eLs... .................... 49
Ccnf.itional Approval.................. .......... ............... 50


The A6-d:inistrative Approach ... .
The Problem and tie Technique........................... 52
Position of Industry war{;aini with MRA ................ 52
Rule by Majority Vote...................................... 53
Position of NRlA- Haste and Confusion...................... 54
Procedure Personnel............ ............... ......... 54
Industry Self-Government ................................... 56


Jurisdiction and Jurisdiction-l Fnct

7i.thin Purposes of the Act.............................. 59
Relation with other Governmental Agencies.................. 59
Prr_)onents' Representative Character....................... 60


The Procedural Scheme and the Hearings.....
The Act and Procedure................ .......... .......... 61
Controversy and Facts ...................................... 62
Short and Inadequate Hearings ............................. 63
Ar!j Jent annd Opinion ........................ ............... 63
Cross E intin. .................................. 64
Rebuttal Testimncny anCd Confidential 2eports................ 65
Relation to Witnesses Subpoena ........................... 66
Oath ...................... .................... ............. 67
Oral Hearings .............................................. 67



C:A?'7.I< IX

FinCin : '.r.J the Record :'
Adnlissibilit- ar. : 7..'ei{:ht rf Evidence ...................... .. 3
Contents of tAe Eecorc ...................................... 68
Iinc'-i1s n.' the Factual. Bsis Pnd Ex, ;.,les. ... ........... :-
Tacit Approvol Ti ......... ................... 74
Bu:ren of Proof... ..... .. ........ ........ ... 74
Publication of Findings ............ ........... .............. 77

CTAi'TER X in Publicn.tin, IYotice, and other Administrative
Action b', IR.-. ...
I. Publication of A&I':ini,-te-.tive Regulations ................. 79
II. i1otice an6 Participation in the Inidustries' ............... 81
Activities . ... ............................................. 83
III. Other Fo.-nw1 Actions b-7 uRA ............................. 83
Interpretations .... .......... ........... ................. ... 83
A lendr.; lents. ........... ................ ... .........
::en- r tions and. .:ce-:tions . .. .... ........ ....... ........ 84
Sttys................. ........ . . . . .............. 85
IV. Deterr.ii nations ............. ...... ... ....... . . . . 85
V. Violations by MRA -f Its O-n Procedure ................... 85


Problems in Substantive Due Process of Law and
AC. 1i n -- otre .ti n.
I. Ref.'n.,nabbleness . .... ................. .... ..... .... 87
II. A Probleu in Adrinistration ................................ 89
III. Lfalfeasance ...................... ... . .... .. ....... . 94


Coc.1ic:nce and Enforcement Activities.
The Problem of Enforcement.. ....................... .......... 97
T' e Staff............. ............. ... ................ ...... .. 97
Interpretations as a Problem................................ 97
LUethocs of Enf'rcrnent Limitation of Act Boycott -
"Conpliiance" -Suits by Indivicuals Enforcemient ......... 97
Proce.dure................. . . . . . . ..... . .. 98
Ar'.".ii-:i strative "Due Process".. ......................... .... 102

Part III. Powers cf thr T.I.R.A. and Their
Deler-Ption... ....................... 103



Po,.:c's of the I'.I.1.A..
Specific Povrers ........................................... 104
Ii- ie". cn Incidental Powers. ....... ............ 104
The Co ierce Concept ..................................... 106
The Concept of Unfair Conroetitinn........ .......... 109
T'e Conceot of "Business Affected with a Public Interest". 109
Lr.bor Cases. ......... 0 . . .... ... .. 1
The "Enc regency" Doctrine. .............. . ... .... .......... 111
The Problem of "Assessments" ............................. 111

Chapter XIV

Delegc.tion by Congress.
History of the '.---in "Deleta tests non Otest
ele. ari". .. ......... ................ ............... .... 113
Delegation of Legl Theory ................................ 114
Dele-ation and. StnJdards in the Cases................... 114


Delegation b- the President end i.R.A.
Delegation A Chpr.ncteristic rf Ad:linistration .......... 117
Delegation by the PresiCent and Rernote'redelogation....... 117
Code Authorities as Private Persons....................... 119
Private Agencies in Administering Law ..................... 120
Public Character of Code Authority Activities............. 122
Cod.e Authorities as Interested Persons.................... 122
Conclusion on Legal Status of Code Authorities............ 124
Standards for the Ex:ercise of Poer ...................... 126
Powers Exercised by CodeAuthorities...................... 127

Part IV. Conclusions and Suggestions..................... 131


Forestalling "Broad Review"................ ............. 132

C:Arm: -XVII

Adriii.ictrative Safeguards and the Challenge of

Table. fini .................. ..................... ....... 134
Table cf Cases...... .. ...... ...... .......... ...... ..... 345

Table of Treatises, Briefs, Reports, et cetera................. 355

Table of La7 Review Articles, iTotes and Comiment............... 359

Add.endu-.. . .................................................. ... 364




Th- writer 2!h"s long h"-d nn inter-st in problems of P'aninistra-
tive la- and acP'inistrntior. Soon after he b-<7pi- a -oart of the ITRA
staff he realiz-d that he hnd an oinortunity to ob7erv" nt first hnnd
the operations of one of th- lTrgest administrative efforts over
undartnaken by our Government. As AI'-'s -dministrntive history unfolded,
hp became acutely a'are that it res-nted 1"inv problems -hich could be
valuably ep-oroach'd from the vip-ooint of administrative la,.w At the
time of the Sch'chtgr d.pcision (]Try P7, 1935) h, had coll-cted a
consid-rable amount of material to be 'ispe in a study -hich he intended
to "mak ind.opndent of 7UFA.

The intent of this stud"- hns not P.lone bon to state merely the
-stablishd. administrative law found in the cases or logicplly de-
ducible from them. In th- empirical stat- of administrative law
there might be little of value in following such a narrow approach.
Rather, it has been intended to su.i7st -'hat a,- might reasonably
be assumed from the supe-stions mTc by the courts in their opinions,
or the future of the law indicated by judicial trends. This study
is not alone limited to "due -orocess of I-," in the limited sense that
tlpre must b- a. rell established$ rule based uwon this conc-nt before
a problem can be considered. It is felt that the courts have indicated
that, in the main, .oorl administrative -oractice rill provide good law.
The administrative orantice must be such that it does not sacrifice by
efforts toward efficiency thp affording of full justice to every
individual. This dops not m-an the tying doM'n of administration by petty
procedural requirements, but it does mpan that the old procedural re-
quirrvmnts and Pnri ne,' ones necessary to Pssure equal justice to those
affected by administration mist be maintained.

The first dutv of this study, since probably the majority of its
readers will not b- train-d in administrative law, is to establish a
background in that field. The lega 1 theory of the separation of
governmental oo,-rs, the delegation of oowors, is a necessary pert of
such background. To understand our l0.a. system, judicial review with
all its many aspects must be considered. The administrative law
created by our courts sets forth two theories of judicial. review, one
broad, the other narrow. The elements, historical, psychological, end
analytical entering into these theories of judicial review are essential
to an understanding of ho- the judicial mind might a-proach the
administrative -oroblem or-s-nted by NRA.

I/ The author's interest was first directed to the question of the
finality of administrative determinations -hen as a graduate
student at Princeton, Professor Bdward S. Corwin pointed out the
problem to him as a subject for research. Other questions of
administrative la- have been supirsted by another former teacher,
Professor J. Forrester Davison of the Georp 7ashington University
LpW School, to whom the author is socially indebted, as also he
is to Professor Charles S. Collier, of George 7ashington University
Law School, Dr. Henrv Zeining of Princeton University, Judge
P. W. Speard of the Federal Commu.niceations Commission and Mr.
Edmund H. Worthy, an attorineqr for the Securities and Exchange
Commission for their encouragement and assistance.


The subject matter of the NIRA involved matters of disputed economic
and social character. Such problems when treated administratively have
been subject to the most careful scrutiny by the courts. Therefore, it
would seem that ITRA should have foreseen the possibility of "broad review0
and attempted to have met it. The scheme underlying the Act, both ad-
ministratively end procedurally, had little precedent, and none for the
extended use to which it was put. HPA should have reasonably expected
procedural requirements of the nature found in the "broad review" field-
to be imposed upon it. In fact, little thought seems to have been given
to the entire question of procedure until over a balf year after the
passage of the Act.
As an illustrative agency, ITRA was in a position considerably more
difficult to define than that of most administrative boards. As the
agent of the President, it may have been endowed with certain legal
attributes enjoyed by him. Obviously grec.t difficult lay in the fact
that the position of final administrative authority was occupied by the

A variety of technical problems in code making and code administra-
tion provide the major portion of this study. There is little need to
fully state here all of these problems. A brief survey of the nature of
these problems, however, might serve to point the direction taken by
this study. The administrative approach was handicapped by hasty, in-
experienced personnel, and a failure to give early and thorough con-
sideration to possible problems of administrative law. Questions of jur.-
isdictional fact rose. Some were unavoidable, others might have been
more carefully handled if a consideration of the possibility of judicial
review had been had.

INTRA hearings were in the main- inadequate. They often placed a
premium upon short duration, rather than exhaustive development of a
factual basis. Rules against argument and opinion were abused and no
helpful result is seen in prohibiting them. The powers of subpoena and
punishment for perjury would have been useful instruments. "Notice of
opportunity to be heard" was as full as desirable in the sense of hearing,
notice, or an internal procedure within N.R.A.

Little attention was paid to the problem of admissibility of evl-
dence. The requirement that all evidence relied upon mast be in the
record was not adhered to. The factual basis for findings was often
inadequate, substantial evidence not having been taken. The problem
of burden of proof was frequently ill-considered. The statement of
the basis for action was not always as complete as desirable. Pub-
lication of administrative action was not complete or fully accessible.
Better legal draftsmanship would have been of material assistance to
1.R.A. iTotice was usually given quite fully. The approach to the
problem failed to consider just what persons were absolutely entitled to
it, and to how much time should have reasonably elapsed between notice
and hearing. Other formal actions by II.R.A. such as interpretations,
amendments, exemptions and exceptions, and stays were not given as full
safeguards procedurally as would have been desirable.



Compliance procedure as a hitter of statutory nnd. constitutional
law did not seem to be in harmony with the courtst views of the proper
character of administrative enforcement.

Examples of malfeasance by administrative officers -ire not un-
known in the administr-,tion of NRA. NRA was responsible for the actions
of its officers and those of code authorities, There are a number of
incidents where UIRA failed to properly control action by these persons.
NRA did not always follow its own procedure. Its substantive action
was not always buttressed by such an overwhelming factual basis that
it would have been impossible for the courts by use of the "due process
of law" concept to have controlled the administrative action.

A full consideration of constitutional powers and the indications
of the cases is not found either in the drafting of the NIRA or its
administration. The question of delegation did not appear to be im-
portant aside from the fact that extreme redelegations were indulged
in. The redelegation of power to interested persons and to private
persons not acting as public officers was open to serious question.

A more careful consideration of these problems of administrative
and constitutional law might have gone far to have made H.R.A. a mode
acceptable to the courts. This would probably have entailed serious
procedural and substantive changes, although the same general objectives
might have existed.


i*, .

P .- R T

AN ID I N- i1 S T R 'S T I V 1

L A 0 G E. C U IT 1)




The first o-" 'icirl st, tcnenet uoon the 7IL (1) made by
the ("') aoint'L the Adriinistr't ivc ,joblem:

"It is, fLurLther , chr.lla'', to aAjiinistrc-
tion. r'e .re relaxin r soae :1' the safec'i'rcis of
the antitrust l:.'s. The public nust be .:rOte.ted
against the abuses th.-.t led to their enactment, and
to this end wve ar ,'-utting in -,l..ce of old princi-
ples of unch:ecked co;.ietition so,.ie new Government
controls. They must above all be imr -rtial and
just. Their ,ur-ose i-f, to f"ee business not to
IL 1. i t -n .n .
sh'acle it W nd no m.n who st. ndo on the construc-
tive for-,-rr1i-loo'-in. side of '.iis industry ha.s any-
tliin.7 to fear fro-i them. To such ncmn the opportun-
ities for in6ivi1'unl initiative .7ill be open more
aprly than ever. Lct me ma'ce it clear, however,
thint the antitrust l,;'s r.till firmly against
mono.-,olies that 'ectrein t' _o6.: r-nd price fixing
T;.iich alloa-w inord.lin-'te .,rot its or unfairly high

Our economic philololh:l, written into our statutes (3)
was one of free comr:,etition, 7it r.a.t coor.e..tion which might lead to
restraints u-on business an-. co0i.crce. Alt]hou-h the Anti-Trust Acts
were never completely an& enercetic-.ll.y enforced.(4), consent-decrees
and injunctions existed at the tine of th.:. passage of the IURA. cover-
ing many industries ..,nd ( .) These bear testimony to the fact
that certain industries -n,-i trale., ct le-.rt, felt the anti-trust laws
inadequate. Before the depression there '.e:-.? r:Iny suggestions that the
anti-trust la:s *?era Frocrustean bed -:-hich ill afforded needed ind-
ividual treatment to s oeci-1 -. robLlens(S' During the war these laws
received sli.-''t attention. The drive ris 'o -roduce (7). How this was
done, or hou the products r.ere m.-rketed mattered little, the demand
bein,- so great. e cur .rr'ts contracted., it was natural to desire to
continue or commence cooper:tiv-e action to check the frantic efforts of
individual -lants to wenther the storm (8',. M.any of the ills of the dep-
ression rnd its cont nur.nce '-ere laid -t the door of the anti-trust laws.
General Johlnson, more responsiblle for the lI-IA than any other person,
has forcefully e.oressed his views on this subject (9).

The tas': that IT?-A set for itself w-as to complete and admin-
ister a body of deleg-iated leislrtionri more voluminous and more import-
ant in subject matter iand effect ti-r.n ev," b-efore undertaken by an ad-
ministrative body in this (or a.r- other E-B-lish speaking) country. It
involved the definition and of ..Lajor philosophies of social
and economic import. To intelli.entl- n ...nbly state such import-.
ant policies a.. giantic problem of fact-findinr wTas created. It involved
more tha.- the diLcov,-r;y o po'ir. f.-:.,.ts. It involved



the analysis amn'. evaluation of such f:cts. The imnoort .-'ce of this
function, mnd the crryin.z nee'. for an r.d-iminitrmtive ngency and ex-
perts to reform it, r.cther thUn the courts or the le-islative bodies,
improperly" ea'-ix ec1. -s they are to od.courtei-r handle F.uch problems,
was fully reco.-tized b-- those in hi-h places in '-L-A (10). The adequacy
of the bo'.- create&,' and. the st.-tute attempting to authorize it, from
the vie'.ooints of administrative anC. "due process of laT7
conce:'ts %7ill be thie sco'e of this p-oper.


- -M





Many of the difficulties which administration encounters
arise from the "separation of powers" doctrine. Although not as spe-
cifically recognized in the Constitution as it is in the primary laws
of some of our States (2), it finds support in the three fold divi-
sion of the governmental structure set up by the Constitution (3).
Whether the framers were consciously follo'ving Montesquieu, the
British Constitution or the Colonial governments, it is accepted
that Montesquieu (4) gnve voice to the doctrine which became pa-
triotic knIowledge to school children, and revered by our lawyers (5).
It was this very reverence that has created much of the difficulty(5a).
Not content with treating it as a fiction our jurists have frequent-
ly employed the theory in ways that have caused great limitations
upon the natural trend of government, or strange contortion to achieve
the needed or desired results (6). It seems well-established that in
actual practice there has always been an admixture of governmental
powers that is, no one division of government has exercised all
the powers analytically belonging to it under the theory (7). Leg-
islatures have as a matter of historical practice done judicial acts
such as granting divorces (8), setting aside a decree of probate
and orderiri:; a new hearing with liberty of appeal (which had not
before existed) be granted (9), declaring a person quilt of treason-
and inflicting penalties and confiscation of property of persons de-
clared guilty (10), and confiming; a doubtful title to land (11).
Although courts pretend to apply the doctrine to themselves (12),
they make rules for their own procedure (13) a matter conferred
upon Congress by the Constitution (14); they grant certificates of
naturalization (15), a function that seems administrative and one
not involving a "case" of "controversy" (16) as those terms have
been construed by the courts (17). The examples of executive exer-
cise of both legislative and judicial powers are so numerous and will
appear so often in this paper that tiey need no comment here. The
evidence indicates that the doctrine has never been realized in prac-
tice (18) in the national and state governments (19). Each depart-
ment inherently demands enough power whatever its nature (20) to
carry out functions essential to the preservation of its own integrity.
There has always been in our legal literature a recognition of this
admixture of powers and the political doctrine or legal fiction nature
of the theory (21). More recently there has been considerable criti-
cism directed at the reverence given Montesquieu's fiction (22) as
being unscientific (23), impractical (24) and a mere political doc-
trine (25). It can be seen by study that the development of the
doctrine in this country has been strongly flavored by judicial re-
view; that it could have just as well developed along the lines of
the "political question" notions (26) as it has in other governments
(27). The burden of this theory in relation to the growth of Admin-
istration and Administrative Law will be considered shortly.




The use of the administrative technique has had a phenomenal
growth in the last half century (28). Up until then the
growth had been steady. With the recognition of the existence of
administrative law (29) came increased demands by the problem of
modern society (30) for the use of administrative machinery (31).
Even when there has been frank hostility to this growth it has gone
on relentlessly (32). At present both in this country and England
this situation presents a major battleground for opposing political
forces (33).

The opponents of this phenomenon rally to their support
both the doctrines of judicial review (34) and "separation of powers."
It is urged that each division of government iuast exercise the powers
entrusted to it and that this exercise can not be delegated (delegata
-potestas non potest delegari) (35). Necessity has rebutted these
arguments by pointing to the practical advantages of administrative
action (36). The saving of the legislature's time is probably the
chief value (37). Bat there are other pressing reasons for resort
to the administrative device, such as the contributions which can be
made by the expert (38), the fact that the legislature is not in con-
tinuous session and its slow procedure, when in existence, which will
not meet many of the demands for surumary or prompt action (39), and
the peculiar adaptability of administrative action to promote and pro-
tect individual and public interests (40). The result of these advan-
tages is a great mass of delegated legislation (41) having the full
force and effect of law (42).

Administration has grown up without benefit of Constitutional
recognition. It has, therefore, been forced to follow a
pattern which made no place for it. Certain formulae and fictions
are employed to circumvent the doctrinaire difficulties. Adminis-
trative offices and many students feel it would be highly desirable
that administrative action in its proper spheres be free from judi-
cial interference. More respect and greater prominence would inure
to administration, and there would be a greater fruition of adminis-
tration as a useful public agency. Administrative finality mast rest
upon one o'f two views, either that judicial review should not be had
of a fourth and equal division of government (43), or that government
is comprised of two functions: 1. representing the public will and
2. giving effect to the expressed will. Upon such theories it may
be reasoned that the judiciary should be no more powerful than the
executive or administrative.


Despite the hampering effect of governmental form and theo-
ries already discussed, administrative legislation and adjudication
continue to grow paying lip service to constitutional doctrine.
The legislature can not delegate its legislative power but it can
employ agents to find facts. It is in this function of fact-finder,
that courts first consciously recognized administration (44). The
.legislature declares the policy and the administration finds the


: O-

facts uoon which the policy ",o's into Offect or to wilch the policy
shall be applied so runs the tr,'litional statement (45). If the
"details" to be lillol in or tae '.isis for deter":nriini wct'.,1r the
statute s.iall a 1'ly are important oncxi'li there is really a deli,',ation
of le-i1'-itivc pcwer though it :i.ay be so trivial as to not excite tihe
court. In fact, the courts :ecc-nize t.e dele-'gtion. They further
recognized that legislative or judicial 'o '.ers softened by a "quasi"
may be involved (46). The delegation may be anrJoous to the power
the court exercises in cases before it, of statutory interpretation
which frequently may decide that the lit. ro1 application of a statute
was not intended in certain instances or where tie statute does not
cover certain problems soecif.lly that it does So by i.mnlication.
Either tie ro,'vantages of tne administrative techninuo or dissatisfac-
tion with judicial approach (47) must have led to the attempt to
use administrative a.encies.

The next ste) after the frank recognition of dele:.,.ted power to
administrative a.:encies is to see what measure of the finality desired
by these -'encies is extended to their actions by the courts. The
traditional statement is that the nd"-iinist-rative bodies beinr proper
fact-finders, their findlings of fact will not be reviewed by the courts,
or the courts will not substitute its ju'?..;.mnt upon questionss of
facts" for that of the entrusted fact-finder (48) wit' certain ex-
ceptions later to be noted (49). "Questions of law" have long been
the peculiar province of the court (50), but as time went on acriinis-
trative bodies decided questions of law before thie problems reached
the courts. Often these questions were decided in a vwa, that pleased
the courts. There developed the notion that administrative deter-
mination of "questions of law' would be "persuasive" upon the courts
(51) that is, the court would not disturb thle administrativee de-
cision as long as it accorded witli thie court's onm feelings. A
further co:rniicaticn ansars. There is no clear cut distinction be-
tween "nuestinns of law" and "questions of fact" (52). Often a pro-
blem, which at one time is a "question of law" to the court, will be-
comie a questionn of fact" to the same court at another time (53).
In questicnable problems of this character thle curt :.i''t treat them
as "questions of law," a thin- ouite easy to do; if it did not desire
to review or to change the determination of the administrative body
these problems rinit be termed "mixed questions of law and fact" (-A)
and extended t-ie finality of "questions of law." This latter practice
is frcuentiz resorted to if an allegation of fraud or mistake is not
so clear that the court feels it should interfere (55).

The statement just made is couched in the court's terms and
approached '.vith a view to what the Court says. A'L,.i-inistrative law
is so new that vie can not expect to find it an orderly system perfect-
ly described oj tie courts (56). We must look at what the courts do
in each field. This will be done later. First we :,"ust see upon what
theories the courts review.

9 I8



Cne of the doctrines of English law, most distinjaishing it from
other o otinso n-
othor systems, was lon; th',uht to -.fford rdocuate protection to indivi-
dual rights. This was "the rule of law" (1). Its protection has 'been
found inpdoqiuate. If an aCuninistr:tive official by sunm.ary action does
$40,000 (or even $4,000) of damauye a j-itd,-nent may be forthcoming readily
enough, but its collection will prove far more troublesome. It is urged
that Congress or the legislatures should review administrative action,
since it hps given the mandate it t;hould. judge the desirability of its
administration. The nmractice, h]i.over, m-nr been otherwise (2). Some-
times the legislature delegates this check specifically to the courts
(3), more frequently, this is not done (4). There are even statutory
indications that it is not desired (5). In England, where such statutory
c.-tatements are ,iore common (6), this has been a strongly contested field.
Although, checks are desirable this does not posit that administrative
-ower is greatly abused (7).

It would be well to briefly survey the existing checks other than
those exercised by the Courts.

Aside from control by the courts, there should be checks upon ad-
ministration from other directions. In as far as the chief executive
must accept responsibility for the actions of adi rinistratiie bodies he
should have a general control over their policy. Until the Lm-o1re0s
decision (7a) it was thought that the rernovv!l power might afford such
control (7b). It may be that the President does not have to accept
responsibility for the actions of all aW:Jtiiistrative 1o'.rs. The Congress
must, however, be responsible for the policy of all administrative agen-
cies which it authorizes, if not their administration. Therefore, it
wviould seem that the legislature rmst deal with the problem of o oe.:Q.
assisted by the executive who, it is hoped, will be in harmony with it

In -ngland Parliamentary control over delegated legislation has -one
sormevihat farther than the control exercised by legislatures in this
country (7d). There is the procec.urc 1ovmn as laying an administrative
rule upon the table. Such rules and regulations laid upon the table be-
fore Parliament .iny be disa-pDroved by either house within a certain -oeriod
(usually not over forty days of any session). If not disapproved they
have the full force of law. Other tyses of rules and regulations require
a definite Parliamentrp.r a--proval, by either or both houses, within a
certain number of legislative days. A provision that either house can
make suggestions to the body creating, the rules is often attached to both
methods of control. Farther than this, provision are frequently inserted
in s tatutes allowing rules to have full force until Parliament acts upon
them. Even if parlirient acts negatively r-jgr).irng a rule, any enforce-
ment of such a ru-le previous to the Parlianentary action is legal. This
system has raised a storm of criticism by EnT;lish lawyers who urge that
approval is made a mere formality while allowing the stamp of Parliamen-
tary authority to rest upon the regulation and so preclude control by the
courts. It is the contention of these men that there is no practical


responsibility. The merit of their arguments is not a subject for con-
sideratinn here. It is merely intended to -)oint out that there should
be simple, efficient safe-uards to preclude abuses of -nower.

Other controls lie in the publication of rule" and the control over
budgets and >,, iroprn. tions. One of the most effective i;:eans seems to be
the system of interpellationn" of ministers to which, greatt resort is had.
Pointed questions union -oossible shaiay practices or questionable adminis-
tration, bringing with them the bright light of publicity, will go far
to remedy abuses of nower.

In most English speaking countries the 1-istoric controls of legis-
lative rowver over apororriations, legislative -)ow'er over personnel exer-
cised through irmneachment process and the right to confirm appointments,
and the -orrer of investigation are in most common use. The first two
methods are unwieldy and ineffective as against minor abuses of power.
The process of investigation is analogous to the English system of
"1inter-oellation", but is resorted to only sn-smodically, and then usually
onlj in the most odious cases.

Aside from these controls, little has been done in the United States
to provide safe-guards against adminiistrative abuses of power. Some five
years ago lTorth Caroline established a Director of Local Government,
"whose duties- will be to standardize and supervise the business methods
of counties, cities and tovwns." (?e) This is iot precisely in point as
a matter of control of administrative action, but it is referred to since
there is a great analogy between activities of munici-nal corporations
and those of administrative bodies.

ITew York has a grea+ amount of delegated legislation, but no control
over it (7f). The State Legislative Reference Librarian states regarding
this -)roblem, "As I understand it, the enforce.-ent of rules or orders
made in any state department is left wholly to the administrative officer
of such department, and the Legislature and Executive appear not to in-
terfere in such enforcement, after the authority has been once granted to
Ztae iDeoorttre.nt." Recently, in :Tev York it has even been oronosed
to clothe administrative bodies with greater rule making pow,,ers without
any specific legislative check over the exercise of these -powers.

In i.lassachusetts all departments, boards, commissions or officials
making general rules or regulations must file copies :ith the Secretary
of State, and imust secure the approval of the Governor and his council
(?g). The Secretary of State :.-rust file and index such rules .and regular
tions, and make them generally available. There is an appeal open to
citizens to the Governor and his council on questions of authority and
jurisdiction which does not preclude other legal redress. Annual reports
must be made to the Governor or to the General Court (7h). In most cases
such reports ?re made to the latter. Further than this, Mlassachusetts has
not gone, although the problem has been given serious consideration.

With the exception of Wisconsin, other regulations of administrative
law making are unimportant. The most widespread agitation in any state
for safeguards appears to have existed in Wisconsin. Wisconsin has a
system of "interpellation" modeled upon the foreign systems (7i). This
statute, however, has only been used three times, once in 1935 when the


-I' -

Legislature, meeting in ,oint zc,--ion, cn.lld before it the iiembers of
the Board of Control, which h acdrinistcrs all lriws relating to the sttete
charitable and ioenal institutions. So luach time wns ricnt in controversy
over rules that no extensive _v'4.ti-niL .L.. had.. Tha statute was last
used before this in 1925, so it c-,i be scb that experience under it Ooes
not testify as to its possible value. A statute Trassed ir. 1931 created
an Executive Cotuicil of the Governor. This body was authorized to in-
vestigate the activities of quasi legislative a t.:c.cics, nd iLi':e rcorts
to the Legislatue'e. This secns to be, ho''evcr, oil.; one of the minor
functions of this council. TW.c .-rerent Governor and his predecessor :have
not ao-oointed all the m).'iIbcrs proviC.cdl by the statute. The council it-
self has not yet been called uponi to erform the functions for which it
was created.

This review indicates that little has been done in this country
along the line of develo-oing safegua.rds and controls in the field of ad-
ministration despite the fact that there Csee:-is to be a vital need for
action uoon this -roblem.

Although the legislature may choose between conflicting theories
(8), the courts are reluctant to allow s'ich -iowers to administration
apart from the supervising chech of judicial review (9). In the past
courts have usually allowed Administ.'-tive bodies to exercise such power.
Recently, this has been objected to, if the range of choice is too large
or involves subject matter of too great importance (10). Judicial review
in this country extends to statutes; in England it extends only to admin-
istrative action or by-laws (11). It is not clear that it always extends
that far (12). From a position of -or:-iea-L'tive inferiority to the legis-
lature (13) our courts have risen Until they now exercise review of legis-
lative and administrative action under a number of theories.

The naturala" or "higher law" b!.ses of review arie of the greatest
antiquity (14) of any of tnc courts' a-proaches. In early 7Enlish law
Bracton declared that the barons must out "the bridle of law" upon a ruler
acting outside the law1s-preceets (15);'again there is a reference in
laguna Charta to hir
1agna Chrta to hiher law (13); and there is the well knmow.nm attempt of
Lor.d Coke (17) to establish judicial review. The doctrine finds its first
utterance in the Supreme Court in the opinion by I1r. Chief Justice Chase
in Calder v. Bull in 1798 (18). The doctrine grew and ripened into an
accepted basis u on which to limit the power of government (19). It has
meant that common law precedents miay be employed (20), or that the court
would rely upon its own feeling of what it felt was universally considered
just or--.honest" action (21). It is in this latter aspect that the doc-
.trine has been most severely criticized. (22)

S "Natural law" theory has grown into, and has been greatly absorbed
by, the "due process of. law" concept (23). For a considerable time after
our constitution was written "due -orocess" of law had little significance
save -orocedural (24). This was true until as-late as 1870 (25). From
humble origin (26) administrative -rocedure (27) due process has be-
come an instrument '.hereby statutes and administrative action are over-
ruled as having no proper constitutional basis or unreasonableness (28).
The doctrine received a casual reference in D:red Scott v. S Dindford (29);
it next was broadened in the Legal Tener Caes (30). Despite later use
of the doctrine of "natural law" (31) the due process concept is in.vw



regarded as firmly established (32) even by those disa-onroving of its
That the relationship between the two is close is an-iarent from the
reference by judges to the doctrines as being identical (33). Due pro-
cess of law now gives the courts -power to introduce limiting principles
of taxation, formerly one of the chief problems of "natural law" (34),
to oonde:,in rate schedules as unreasonable (35), and to condemn other
social and economic legislation upon the same basis. This great growth
has been the cause of much heated debate. The late Justice Holmes ex-
pressed his views upon this subject strongly and often. Dissenting in
Baldwin v. Inissouri (36) he said:

II have not yet adequately expressed the more than anxiety that I
feel at the ever increasing scope given to the Fourteenth Amendment in
cutting down what I believe to be the Constituional rights of the States.
As the decisions now stand, I see hardly any limit but the sky to the
invalidating of those rights if they happen to strike a majority of this
Court as for any reason undesirable. I cannot believe that the Amend-
ment was intended to give us carte blanche to embody our economic or moral
beliefs in its prohibitions."

Many persons have felt that the concept is an agency to maintain
property interests (37).

That this type of judicial control is the common tendency of courts
can be seen from the fact, that, although England is said not to have
judicial review, and certainly no "Idue process of law" concept such as
is known to us (38), still English courts have a strong disposition to
review administrative action, even when clothed by statute with finality,
upon any of several theories (39). Of course, the English courts do not
go nearly so far as ours. and at times exercise no chec: (401. The signi-
ficant thing is that there is in existence as a characteristic of courts
a disposition to control administrative or legislative action. As we
shall see due process of law has t-wo problems: 1. Can power be exercised?
2. Has it been exercised properly? These two questions to test adminis-
trative action have broad powers to shape our course of government (41).

WithoUt either of the two theories discussed, the courts have a
check in the interpretation of statutes and the doctrine of ultra and
intra Courts in the exercise of their normal duties are called
upon to apply statutes or other law to the cases before them. Wherever
there is ambiguity or conflict as to meaning, and this is the stuff of
which lawsuits are made, the courts must interpret the law (42). Although,
there is no express Constitutional prohibition to the giving of finality
in the determination of certain disputes, to other agencies than to courts,
this has not been done without the courts' approval. Questions of law
and the interpretation of statutes the courts have successfully maintained
are their exclusive bailiwick. This nower of interpretation has been
often used to achieve results, not desired by the legislature (43). It
is obvious that the Dpower of interpretation is tremendous. The likeli-
hood that the exercise of such power will be colored by the n-personal
philosophies of those who have it, is even more apparent.



-I. -

This doctrinaie of "i1Lcrretati n" is r.iother of the-Ultra ,iJd intra
vires concepts. A logical -h.' of statutory inte-pretation is tlit of
determining the limits of authorityy an,, jurisdiction conferred b' parti-
cular statutes. This action bo'-.oiec a liitation u'ioai both legislative
and adiiinistr-tive action (-1 i). As a nuostion of -,ow,'ers and of dclega-
tion of -;owers either under a. written or unwritten Constitution the
necessity of interpretation places great influen-.ce and control in the
hands of the courts. That there should be such a restraint u' on the
parties ui desire of the Administration to enlarge its own poucrs is ad-
mritted by students and advocates of administrative action (45). heree
the nropler (under our acce-oted views on "judicial review") limits of the
courts restraining power end, and the -nositive injection of the courts'
own views begin is a debated problemm that looms large in the administra-
tive field (46).

In the Unitedi States the ultrS vl S doctrine is bound up with the
problem of jurisdictional fact (47); it is in n,,land that the phrase
ultra vires has been most considered (48). A brief glance at the English
problem will point the consideration of jurisdictional fact. The so-
called "Henry VIII clauses" (named from a broad statute of similar
character in the reign of that monarch) provide in effect that rules
putting the statute into effect "shall not be questioned in any legal
proceeding." Stated differently, the rules shall "have effect as if
enacted in the Act" (49). Without the assistance of the open doctrine
of "judicial review1t, in vogue in this country, the English courts faced
a ticklish problem when the first cases under such a statute arose. The
first and a leading case is institute f Pa tent ALoi11s v. Locl, .o od (50).
Lord Herschell, L. C. is plainly troubled. The most difficult situation
he envisages is that of the administrative rule under the statute being
contrary in effect to the statute. would d this mean that the administra-
tive rule having the effect of a latter statute would override the sta-
tute? As the case did not involve the -point, whatever might be said
concerning it was dictum. As such, it is far from lucid. Lord 1.orris
(51) exDresced the o-oinion that the court should test for ultra vires.
This latter view seems to have prevailed. WThen it became obvious that
a statute might be grossly contorted the courts have felt a test of
ultra vires to be desirable (52). This test was used in "TE: arZte" Yaffe
(53) with the indication that an English judicial review, more limited
than our omwn, now rests established umon the theory interpretation and
the right to test for ultra nt "r e, 1 _eS (54).

The problem of jurisdiction is merely another form of ultra intra
vires.. And as the Constitution is merely a ,!higher statute," it can be
seen thcft once judicial review and the power of interpretation is estab-
lished the Courts feel they can review to see if either the statute or
the Constitution provide a basis for the powers attempted to be exercised
(55). Should this test of jurisdiction be limited to the Courts' de-
clared province "questions of law?" The indications are that the Courts
will not be thus restricted. The facts unon which jurisdiction is as-
sumed the "jurisdictional facts" will in proper instances be deter-
mined by the Courts. This may-be because jurisdictional fact often is
used "in the sense of the meaning of the word or terms into which those
circumstances (,)roved circumstances which are another sense of the term,
"fact") are summed u-o for the -ournose of attaching legal consequence to
them" (56). It is this dual sense of the word "fact" that provokes much



of the controversy. Probably, the most satisfactory solution would be
to allow the administrative agencies to determine the "proved circumstances"
and allow the legal consequences to be decided by the Courts (in those
fields here they invoke the doctrine) either administrative or judicial.
This would be only a compromise and subject to much attack: as such. The
problem looms so large as a device of judicial review of administrative action
that its use will be further examined (57),

A closely related doctrine is that of "questions of law" which, as.has
alret.d-c been indicated, the Courts have stoked out as their peculiar pro-
vince (58). The ambiguity (39) of the terms "law" and "fact" are such that
great confusion exists (60). It is evident that there is great overlappirng
that thie same question may variously present "law" or "fact" to different
courts, or even to the same Court (61). The difficulty is illustrated by
the C-ratz case (61a). It has been variously urged that the question of
whether a ty-ing contract is an unfair method of competition is one of
"law" c.nd that it is one of "fact". The courts, in many fields, are reluc-
tant to forejo the final word on. problems such as interpretation (62) so
they actually determine many questions of ultimate fact (63). It is doubt-
ful if any workable distinction or separation could be found (64), so we
may expect the Court will have open this ready avenue of eaporoach. The
ease with which the Courts utilize this approach is seen in fields of dis-
puted social policy (s5) or 'here the statute uses such an indefinite stan-
dard as "unfair competition" (66). Like use has been made of the concept,
as a colleague to "jurisdictional fact," to check the harshness of alien
determinations (67). From this ennumeration the usefulness of the concept
is apparent. ,

An early- doctrine, in use before the phenomenon of great administra-
tive action was observed, is that of discretionary powers and ministerial
duties. It' is well stated in the early cape of Decatur v. Pauldin, (68),
decic'ed in 1840. The Court held that the refusal of a pension to the widow
of Stephen Decatur. involved the exercise" of discretion u-oon the part of the
Secretary of the Navy. The basis for the decision seems to be the feeling,
that a choice in the judicial sense was involved, and that such a choice
made in good faith, should not be disturbed. It should be pointed out that
the Court expressed a willingness to overrule the Secretary's decision if a
wrong decision of law had been made. The exercise of discretion will not be
disturbed by injunction or mandamus. A failure to act may represent the
conscious choice not to act (69); while ma.ndamus will lie to force the per-
formance of ministerial duties (70). NIeed of choice and freedom from judic-
ial review in the -fields of "narrow review" (71) still exists (72) although
the doctrine is .little mentioned and has become dwarfed by other forms of
judicial control.

A new and subtle means of review lies in the Court's treatment of
questions of evidence. It may be that the court is attempting to under-
stand the administrative problems (73). The judicial technique, in so
trying to appreciate the administration's position, calls for a full consid-
eration of the evidence. The next step, and one often taken, is for the
Court itself to evaluate the evidence (74). In a large percentage of cases
where administrative.orders are upheld; the Court does so, only after full
consideration of the: evidence (75). It is of course natural to the judicial
technique to so consider evidence, but sometimes the purpose may be definite
to limit administrative action by resort to a statutory implication (76) or


some notion of the Court's so p.. to '.,it evidence to be control] ing.

Although in s-ome of the earlier cases, especially those involving
the discretionary concept, there was often no evidentiary requirement, it
mi.'ht be said that evi.eLce is usually required" to support any positive
administration action (77). Tae of the "discretion" cases
lies in the fact that some e:.trnorCinrLry lei:,l reed' ;as sou,-ht which
the courts were reluctant to give, coupled with a feeling that the act
was judicial. Where a reasonable choice could be made the courts hecita-
ted to use the injunction; and where action might result in. leaving the
applic;-:it in the same position, the courts saw no advantage and only a
waste cf effort an,., prestige in .using mannd.amus. Where the statute re-
quires a hearing, an order wholl: unsupported. by evidence is of no effect
(78). Certainly, where there is no basis evidence the action will be
closely scrutinized, and upon a proper shoring an attacking party may
have it reversed (79). In a recent case decided in 1933 (80), where a
Virgini- statute authorized an adn'iinistrative official to order grade cross-
ings eliminated, when in his opinion, it became necessary, but providing
only for a hearing if the railway was dissatisfied with the order, there
was held to be a denial of due process of law.. The. court apparently re-
lied u)on the necessity that adninistrative findings be supported by evi-
dence (81). The requirement as to the amount of' evidentiary support varies.
The sta.terients of the court are differently phrased in terms of "some evi-
dence" (32) "evidence" (83), and- "substantial evidence" (84) as being neces-
sary t-o sv.pport an order. Usually, where there is "substantial evidence"
to suppcort the order, or it is not manifestly against the weight of the
evice.--ce, it will not be molested (85). Statutory- requirements as to evi-
dence vary: from where the statutes is silent to where it may detail what
evidence should be present. This seems to have little effect upon the
courts. It is doubted if a statutory statement that there need. be no evi-
dentiarl:- basis would meet judicial requirements of "due process of law."

In cases where the evidence is abundant courts do not care to review.
In cases where there is none or the interference are absurd there is little
problem in tha courts' review. It is- in those doubtful cases where the
evidence is "meager or unsatisfactory"? that the difficulty arise-s (86).
Strictl: soea:ki-:-, what basis of judicial review of evidence exists other
thpin the residuary "due process1" concept is hard to determine. Why final-
ity as tr fact, even as to the v.'ei.'iht to be given evidence, can and should
not be determined by an administrative bcdr is difficult to see. It would
be unfortunate to reduce our administrativee tribunals to mere magistracies
for the ccnduct of hearings preliminary to judicial consideration" (87).
On tnh c'tier hand, arbitrary and capricious failure to act upon evidence
or actin- contrary to the obvious significance of the evidence, should be
as full,- subject to check as is any ad-inirstrative procedure.

Jurists feel that a grave responsibility is intrusted to administra-
tive agencies (88). By temper anC technique these agencies may not be as
considerate of individual rights as the courts. In the requirement that
there he a basis in evidence for the action taken in the courts merely hold
another check. The requirement will vary upon such influence as,
whether the subject matter is considered governmental or involves inter-
fere:ice ;ith individual rights, the historical nature of the field, the
care useC. by ad jAinistrative agencies in gCathering and analyzing facts, as
well as rnany- other factors.



In addition to these theories whereby review is had by the Courts,
it should be considered that there are certain restraints imposed u-con the
courts either by themselves deliberately as a matter of policy or through
the force of circumstances. There is the doctrine that an administrative
remedy must be exhausted before aoolication is had to the courts for re-
lief (89). This is said to awoly in some cases to ao)lications for a
rehearing or a modification (90) or an original hearing (91). It is
especially a-nlicable to requests for the issuance of extraordinary
legal remedies, where any reasonable administrative remedy remains

The doctrine of politicall questions" furnishes another self-
limitation uoon the courts (92) which is of long standing (93). It
has particular significance in international relations (94). questions
of grave executive -oolicy, and the -iroblem of whether a State is
maintaining a "reoublicen form of government (95). Another limi-
tation lies in the constitutional specification that "the judicial
cower shall extend to all cases - -and/- - controversies" (96).
It is under this clause that the courts may decline administrative
functions (97) and refuse to give declaratory judgments (98). -Thile
so limiting themselves the courts do not hesitate to review action
taken under formulae already considered.

What is the value of this process of judicial checks uoon a
field otherwise greatly independent? There are many advocates of the
administrative technique, 'vho see no advantages, and feel that un-
symoathetic courts are merely sabotaging a rival. But, it is wise
to remember the extreme youth of the extensive use of administrative
government. It is quite -orobrble that there are as many inconsist-
encies and injustices in the administrative orocess as there are in.
the.courts' review. True, alninistrative law is contr-dictory, un-
systematized and bewildering (c,9). Administration is also new. It
is without the eroerience of the courts in sa,'e-aarding individual
Rights. Policy often dominates so that adminzstLation may overlook
individual injustices and its own acts of urn.-iirness (100). And, al-
though, many of the courts' restraints are highly desirable, guiding
and tempering administrative Pction into its highest utility, the
courts' very technique often unfits them to exercise the great control
they do. The answer to the inadequacies of administration does not
lie alone in the courts (lO1). Yet in this country by subtle means
and often means most obvious the courts do fr-shion and guide adminis-
trative procedure and policy (102). New methods and devices are
needed to meet new situations. The use of specialized courts is grow-
ing (103); there is too, a growing demand for declaratory judgments
(104). Des-ite this need, we must not forget the value of a reasonable
judicial check. Such a check brings the legislature and administration
closer together (105). An understanding of the peculiar -oroblems of
the other is of extreme value to each. The judicial process has been
a ooverful agency in giving substance to the administrative technique;
it has made the development of this new instrument of government a
more orderly growth, a more useful and recoected form of government (106).

This review has not been made for the ouroose of praising or de-
nouncing judicial review of administrative action. There has been,
however, an attempt to carefully point out both the advantages and dis-
advantages. The ournose of this consideration has been to point the
problem -- to show the gantlet of possible judicial reviews (as stated

by the court) thl-t thL -ction cof a ne,-' nninistr"tive ac:ency rnust run,

A st-tenment of thee formai1l- of review is not enough to r-ive
a urooner rersective. It is neeo.-o-r," ti see ho', the courts )ooly
their revie'.v to te v-rious fitL'.ds of ,biinistr-tive action, to ob-
serve rhat circtumstp-icEs Feom to influence the actionn of tie courts.
That vill be the burden of the ne-:t cha-tcr.

-2." -




Administrative activity in the business of government has
been variously classified. One of the most useful classifiactions
for o-Lr purposes is that of Professor Dick-inson (2) dividing it into
three classes: 1. The individual seeks .a privilege; 2. The govern-
ment oerforias a. business; 3. The government performs a necessary funct-
ion. There are other clauses of acninistrative activity. A quite import-
ant one the Eovernment seeks to regulate private business will be
considered in a following section. It is this class, possibly coupled
with a new one here the government cooperates with industry in its
self-regulation which is most important in this study.

rThen the government is engaged in a function inherently and
historically necessary, the courts are reluctant to disturb adminis-
trative action (3). For efficiency, absolute control by the government
of its officials and employees is necessary (4). Salaries may be re-
duced by Congress without question (5), except those of judges of
"Constitutional Courts" (6). The removal and appointive power, until
recently (7), has been free of judicial restrictions, even where an
employee was dismissed so that a political debt could be paid (8), or
where the statute (9) only specifies removal "for causes prescribed by
law" after notice and hearing, and the President removes without hear-
ing or specification of grounds (10). The narrow revie- rule is close-
ly followed in this field upon such questions as inefficiency,incompet-
ency, and interdepartmental disputes (11). Tha-,t the courts are willing
to give great finality to the removal power over a subordinate officer
as necessary to the efficient administration of government was indicated
by the Oregon Postmaster Case (12). An even more significant case is
the recent "Hufihrcys decision (13), refusing to extend the doctrine
to app-orove the President's removal of a member of an independent board-
the Federal Trade Commission. liether the Commission is a legislative
agency or, an executive one because of its administrative duties is not
clear. The court in the Humphreys case probably operated upon the basis
of the former concept. The suggestion is obvious that there is a limit
to executive necessity, despite its recognized supremacy in internal

In the adPinistrative affairs and determination of the War
and Navy Departments great finality is also extended, it being felt by
the courts that "any other view might tend seriously to embarrass the
work of raising an army." (14)

The same line of decisions found in the removal power cases
is followed in regard to officers of the military or naval service (15),


the courts e.xlaiiiin, tli-t there is no v''t interest in, or contract
right to office (16). Likewvise, review of militr," 1", under the "clue
process" concc!t is similarly n r ow.(17)

U.S.?. Cripaud. (18) indicates the -reat extent of delegation
of power and administrative finality allo,.ed the government in making
rules and reguk] tions to protect its own property. The making of rules
and regulations under a vague statutory standard was not thought impro-
per, nor did the fact that a violation of such rules Pnd regulations
was made a penal offense "oby Congress chan-e the situation. The language
of the case is broad. Limited to its peculiar facts, it is merely a
precedent for such action in the limited field of the government reg-
ulating its internal affairs, or its ovm property.

Another essential function is that of taxation. Here the
government comes more closely in contact with its citizens than in any
other field of administrative action considered in this section. The
leading case in this field, and probably the leading case for the narrow
review theory is Iurray's Lessee v, Hoboken Land and Improvement Company
(19). Here it was. held that the issuance of a distress warrant involv-
ing a summrary proceeding, under statutory authority, by the Treasury
against a delinquent collector, was not a denial of due process of law.
The court based its decision uoon the historical fact that such pro-
cedure was used inlEngland in tax nm.tters : nc had been used in the
Colonies (20). An additional fact that must have weighed heavily upon
the court was the then recent scandal of a 1r^e embezzlement by a col-
lector of the Port of ile'7 York. In cdd-ition, the p-oractical needs of
government for revenue are such that it would be highly impractical to
stop this life-blood of government, merely to give the taxpayer a right
to protest. hearing can be afforded later. Interests must be balanced.
Here, the governnent-ts far out-wei;'hs the individual's interest (20a).

The case, also, is famous for the classic statement of pro-
cedural due process requirements in the narrow review field:

"For though, due process of lait generally im-
plies actor, reus, juclex, regular allegations, oppor-
tunity to ansv-er, and a.trial according to some settled
course of judicial proceedings, yet, this is not
universally true." (21)

The doctrine of narrow review i, ap-olicable to procedure and
to the exercise of discretion in construing a statute. In the early
decisions and some of the present cases (22) the discretion of a high
official, such as the Secretary of the Treasury, in tax matters was
not questioned. L'ore recently where decisions by such an official in-
volve substantive principles of general imuortance.the courts have
exercise a considerable measure of control (23)..This control is ex-
ercised in terns of interpretation, and not of "due process of law"
which in this field is restricted to procedure. It is not used to the
same degree that review is in other fields of social and economic policy,



nor is it found in cases which umey adversely affect individuals but do
not lay down statutory interpretations of such great importance in-
volving debatable fiscal Dolicy (24). iharrow review in this field
seems to mean that only arbitrary, fraudulent, or capricious action
will be questioned, with the exception of certain important questions
of general and substantial character which may be considered as orob-
lems in statutory interpretations.

Customs detenm.iinations are a particular class of tax matters.
They involve private property,, often of substantial value. In addition
to'.the tax character, the government'ss continuing policy of dis-
couraging importing has probably been of force in es-
tablishing narrow revie- here (25). 'Exoert k-nowledge is also invoked in
the evaluation of goods. (26). The couLts have no desire to involve
officials in "inextricable confusion" (27) by intrusion into this field.
Despite the narrow revie'-7 generally accorded to the customs decisions,
customs officers are not allowed to classify articles under their
statutory heads. This the court has done itself in some cases, while
in others the question has bee-i given to v jury (28). The courts have
kept. open the door of possible revie,-r b-- such qualifying statements as:

",While the general rule is that the valuation
is conclusive upon all parties, nevertheless
S the aperaisement is subject to be impeached where
the appraiser has proceeded on the wrong prin-
ciple, contrary to law or hes transcended the
powers conferred by statute." (29)

SThe courts are hesitant to use such bases unless the equity of the
situation clearly cldenands it.

Procedural requirene-nts ai'e ouite lax'. "Crrelessness or ir-
regularity" by officers "."ill not ooen the way for judicial review, (30).
The procedure described in Auffnordt v'. Heddin (31) illustrates the
informality and laxity of proper procedure in this field. 1. The
importer or his agent -:ere excluded from the reappraisement. 2. There
was .no opportunity for the importer to support his oath or entry, or
to confront opposing witnesses by testimony in his own behalf. 3. No
opportuJity wras available to sift the evidence openly or secretly heard
in opposition to the importer. 4. The importer was niiot permitted the
aid of counsel. The court di(. not condemn these practices. "ITmhe pro-
ceedings for appraisal must necessarily be, to so.--e extent, of a
summary character," it said (32).

Where the government extends a privilege (35) it does not meet so
many citizens. Usually, property interests are smaller, "Private
rights"1 ar-e little -ffected. The demand for review is, consequently,
not great. ITarro-, review is the established doctrine in the field of
land office determinations (34). Iandamus and injunctive remedies are
greatly restricted (35). Even an interpretation as to what is "vacant
land open to settlement" given by the de-oarti.ent while it had control
over. the subject matter, was made final, when brought up in e, pro-
ceeding for mandamus (36). Here, too, procedural requirements are
lax. In Burke v. Southern Pacific RR Co., (37) the court said that a
decision of the Lend Department made without investigation or hearing


as to lands knoT-i1 publicly to be of 1in.'" cha-racter is irreu1lar,
"but as it is the r'ct of a I.e lls condtit'ite,' t ibiui. l ,..i is done
vA'ithin its jurisdiction, it is not void pni. t`.erefore losses title.t
Great finilit is f.ivcn to f i% ii.-s of ac (Z0). It is interesting
thst facts su o,-iclv finr'.ly ieteraineI -a'e open to direct attack by
the government, \'-ic]i c I 1ue to cccwol a ,,rtenrt is'.'d. by it (39),
although an attemteLd c.-..Incellation, b action within the Kepartment
without resort to the courts, is of no effect. (40). In addition to
review upon the '.e'i.ri..entts ar:'lication, a rovicw is sometimes riven on
grounds of such nistiLC.e or frau3 as to prevent a full presentation of
one's case the latter being really a procedura.l safeguard (41). Such
review con not be had in collateral proceedings such as ejectment.
Determinations are absolutely final a'"-inst such attack (42).. An
improper application or a misconstruction of the la 7 are -;rounds for
review (43). The courts determine jurisdiction if an attempt is made
to patent land, having certain disabilities mc.king it not patentable,
and will break the force of the ,atent (44). If twvo authorities conflict
as to jurisdiction the cou-'t -ill determine the matter (45). The in-
dications are that the courts will allow much leewa'-,r to officials uoon
such questions unless there is substantial doubt. Heath v. TTallace (46)
illustrates this. Here, althov-.h the coi1.-ts upheld an administrative
finding as to the jurisdictional fact of whether lands "subject to
periodic overflow" were "s',wamp 7-q,. ove:-flored," it did. so because it
felt the question resolved "itself into ovi of definition of v-orCs or
terms, more th,-.n one of inter-oretation of a statute," and for the more
significant reason thlt it Vthoi.oht the inter-oretation issued was a
proper one.

There is little need for extended review of cases in analogous
fields. It is enou. to -.point out that noa'ro'- revie- exists in fact
in such fields, alt.o'X-;i the courts by their language always reserve
an avenue by '-:ich relief -a1 be extended to chosen cases. In the
pensions field, we hrve alreacl- considered the early case of Decatur v.
Paulding (47). The field of patents is also one of narrow review (48).
The sane seems true of the regulation of radio broadcasting, despite
the fact that full statutory review is provided, where a grant is to be
made (49). This does not seem the case where an existing license is to
be cancelled (50). Other cases involve such problems as granting liquor
licenses (51) and allowing the uase of a trade-naue under the ILeat In-
spection Act. (52).

The im-'igration cases (53) are an important field and the unusual
treatment there have been acco:deC. demands some consideration. There is
involved a delicate problem of internatin relations, a field which the
courts have often been reluctant to touch (54). Fearing that they
would be s',iamped b," a flood of alien cases, the courts extended finality
even to the administrative determination of the jurisdictional fact of
citizenship, in the widely discussed .Ju Toy case (55). Finality as to
decisions of other facts was unquestioned in the early cases (56). An
analysis indicates some subtle distinction between exclusion and ex-
pulsion. In the latter the courts have been more prone to interfere (57).
This same basis has been used to avoid the Ju Toy decision in the case
of a person arrested within the territory of the United States (58).
As time has gone on the courts have overcoLe their first skittishness
and have found more reasons to demand their intervention. Alien



procedure was harsh and open to unfavorable criticism (59). The pro-
cedural due process clause was iiore closely interpreted (60). The re-
quirements of evidence have been tightened (61), and questions which
might be said to involve questions of either .aw or fact are treated
as questions of law for the court's interoret.tio-i (62).

Governic.-it is supplying public services is taekinc on a new type
of duties. The ex-tension of government into such functions has been
continuous (63). Our postal service (once carried on as a private
business), until recently furnished one of the fen examples of such
activity on the paart of the federal government. The importance of
administrative orders (64) to the efficient conduct of the business is
so great that the courts are hesitant to interfere in uost cases (65).
Decisions by the administrative officer of questions of fact and "even
upon mixed questions of law and fact, or of law alone "will not or-
dinarily be reviewed"t (66), The court in the case, from which this
language is quoted, suggested that it had the power to review, "and
will occasionally exercise the right of so doing." Here as in other
fields, cases involving almost identical questions will be treated
differently. The determination that "faith healing" claims were fraud-
ulent, the court held to be a matter of opinion not supportable by
evidence (67) (although if medical questions are presented to the court
it will allow a jury to decide on ec-pert testincny), while a claimed
panacea maybe declared fraudulent upon evidence thought by the court to
be substantial (68).

The basis for most of the early cases and a criticism has been
voiced by M1r. Justice Holmes:

"The decisions thus far have gone largely, if not
wholly, on the ground that if the government chose
to offer a means of transportation which it was not
bound to offer, it could choose what it would trans-
port; which is well enough when neither law nor the
habit that the government's action has generated has
made that means the only one. But when habit and law
combine to exclude every other, it seems to me that
the 1st Amendment in terms forbids such control of the
post as was exercised here." (69)

In cases clearly involving a valuable and. substantial privilege
such -.s the second class mailing privilege, the courts in normal times
(70) 7ill probably exercise a more careful scrutiny (71) of adminis-
trative action than in routine matters (72).

This surve-- shows that narrow review is no precise doctrine,
easily stated .nd completely followed in any field. Rather it repre-
sents an r:o-,roach taken by the courts depending upon facts peculiar to
narrow review: fields generally, to some particular field, or even an
individual class of cases. Rules for the exercise of administrative
power may li'-ewise vary (73). In narrow review fields there exist such
statements by the courts, that the, could, if desired, exercise as
effective a check as they do in the broad review fields. The important
fact is, they onl-r upon rare occasions of individual hardship is such
exercise had.

98 38


Recently, j'overnnont is noe anc. more into the regulation
of private b.sirL3ss. An entircly no' problem hn: bKcn presented to the
cou-ts, Before an, re;r.ons a" offered. for the cou-rts' attitude as
shown b7 the c: ses, the t-o ,i.nst in io-rtvt fecleral fields should be
considered. Such revnlation presents urn; difficult problems in
adLiinistra.t o.i. ? i.i should not wi)e o,.t private profits, if
State re-ulc.tinn, not Sta.te o'.;erershi,, is thie .(enir"C .im of the
statute (74-). B,-r! iced this must be the public interest be-
hind the statute. Out problem is nt one of ._,oners, but rather, of
such fairness, as the courts 'ill a-prove. Then administrations have
failed to meet the end desired b the legislature, or have causes in-
dividu-al injustices in cffectin- t'ie ouroone of the statute, the coi.u.-ts
feel that there is cause to intervene (75). The problem of cu,.) 4-1
lation in fields of disnuted. socir.l -,.nd. economic colic:" r-'u:ie I .
cisions upon questions of fact. not susceptible to precise r-: , 4,,.tion.
The adequacy of service, thie reasonableness of a. ra.te, tL. .. :ness
of a trade practice, involve opinions 7hich ..ay vary cn; cial and
economic philoso-oplies of1 these entrusted "7it1. th-ir .' :-no.tion vary.
Such orobiems mi-ht be calle" "1-iixed questions of 1, fact," but
this roald be of little help, for this certe-o.'y .- D nave been
created for sach :roblei's rhich ti: courts do r -3 to hanCle (76).

The e-rl-- history of the Initer'stat-e Co'c Cori.;iission is one of
bein7 checlred ar.n-1. haompered., b"- the ro:-ts (77). The co'.rts full review
was soon distasteful to Congress. The nob'x.-rn Act, .atteLIpting to curb
the courts resulted (7?'). I'o-', rer..t ."in.lity is -iven to the Co.nmission's
determinations (79) The cou-.ts even cite n,.-rrow review decisions from
fields involvin- the ,ove-nmentIs o"n r:-op-erty (GO). There are few
cases Lroon procedural for'-i suh1 :..s the Alien Cases bring up, for the
Commission follo'-is a firly cor.olete -orocec.u--e. It is thlrourh the
evidence reauireuent thit the colu-ts exercise their greatest control.
The courts have no desi-re to reduce the Coi.,aission to "a mere instrument
for the prose of t,!:iv: testii.iony to be subr.iitte". to the courts for
their ultinr.te ?.ction". Altnou-t:, great finality is claimed for the
Commission, t.-iis nay apO..ea.l onl'" because the coL'urt is not so displeased
vith individual deterninations to review : the,.. Certainly, the court
has stated in some cases a brof'. br.sis of i-eviev. In Interstate Commerce
Commission v. Union Pacific _.. Co. (82) t~ie court st-ted the traditional
fornala ofi revie'- to test Con.ti+ut ional -nd statutory intra vire_, and
mistakes of la-':

"Questions of f-.ct ,i"- be involved in the determination
of questions of la:', so t.t r.' regular on its face,
'a be set aside if it ar#, that --- the rate is so
low7 as to be confiscator-.: in violation of the Constitutional
prohibition against to :in- property, without due process of
la'7, if the Conmission acted so .rbitrarily or unjustly as
to fix rates contrary to evidence, or '-'ithout evidence to
support it; or if the authority therein involved has been
exercised unreasonably."

This case ignored. a long line of r'ece-ents urgedO. by counsel upon
the court (83). To save itself the burde.e of corrolete judicial review,


-2 6.-

the court statef- that it "17oul,. not exnuine fc.cts further than to de-
termine whetherr there was substantial evidence to sustain the order"(84).
IIore in line with this latter statement, but staunchly demanding an
evidentiary requirement that Lt- finding be not contrary to the
"indisputable character of the evide-.ce" -was Interstate Commerce
Commission v. Louisville anC_ iTashville R. Co. (85). :eauire:ents of
evidence vary further with the statement t.'i.t an order may not be
issued "without any evidence whatever" to support it (86).

We have seen in this field a dis.:osition, at first, to carefully
review the Cormission's findings of fact. With a, new statute this
attitude was relaxed, but the court has kent a grip uoon the findings,
by its occasional requirements of substantial or some evidence. The
real problem has been practices rather than rates, although the courts
from time to time have tried their hand at valuation (87). On the
whole it may be said that after a bad start the co-mmission has become
a remarkably efficient instance of administrative action in the field
of regulation of private business (88). The Commission's orders have
received a finality approaching narrow review, though effective checks
rest in the courts, which the-., will not hesitate to exercise upon
occasion (89). qo one ,answer is readily available to the question,
why has this Comrnission achieved so much finality. i.uch credit must be
given to the fact that Congress intended a national system, and that
this need -7as a'rrecic.ted by the court (90). The problem had developed
to such acute proportions thc.t existing; la..' '7,s obviously inadequate.
It was not a,: situation of fittinG pieces into a.n e.:iztin- pattern, but,
rather, the demanC. was for an entirely ne'-r picture (91). Congress,
in fact, was most persistent in forcing upon the court the Counission's
continued demands for power an'- finality in its exercise. IThento, '"
sthe s r.Uy6, of of. ?,-ert A I ,.,. td q'1isJ i-*.. c t ri .il,;, ciPFar
L a th courts. In such situ .ti-..s, the rlos co1v:iint solution Irs
to refuse review (92).

The Federal Trade Comuission has not yret achieved the desirable
status which the Interstate Coru-ierce Commission enjoys with the courts.
MIainly, the Commission has been limited to false advertising (93), and.
to standards of unfair *practice known to the common law in which it has
been suite successful (94). The attempts to develop new concepts and
nev stancz'rds have until recently been uniformly disastrous. Its powers
of investi-r.tion have been liiaited (95). When it seeks to enforce aL
order, the -roceeding is such that the courts may, readily substitute
their ow7n views as to the conclusions to be drawn from the facts (95).
Such cases as the C-ratz Case (97) and the Curtis Publishing Company Case
(98), to mention but two of the better knowm cases, struck heavy blows
at the early usefulness and even raison d'etre of the CoLumission (99).
In the latter case, the court employed the substantial evidence re-
quirement in conjunction with its asserted authority, to rule whether
in law th3 fa).cts constituted an unfair method of competition. Although,
recognizing that the usur.l procedure where the evidence was inadequate
would be to remand the case to the fact-finding agency, the court saw
here a situation where "in the interests of justice, the controversy
should be decided without further delay" (100). This it proceeded to
At the time Carl crland (101) wote his careful study the state
At the time Carl :c:Farland (I01) wrote his careful study the state


of the cases i-.s suchll th.t he con,.d bitterly s !.1, ",v'13n juries n.r
accept or reject evidence and :' inferuees, but the 7!r'l e
Commission JVn do neitt'r" (102). This stui.v ',. scribes the dCifferent
.positio.i" of the Th^'.ral T":. Coitissic ,v,". the Inter2state Coi.uierce
Com'lission (].''). 1. 7`xc courts r. cnsider the entire record as a
basis for the orders of the federal Tr 'e Co-wnission, while the orders
of the Interst',te Coumarce Commission are challeor--cd only from the
atooc]c of ulr fie r
'aproaches of ultra vires -an. evidently sufficiency (104). 2. The
treatment of the *vide-icc is tempered b- the judicial attitude toward
the legislation involved, its subject natter, an&. its administration (105).
3. The court has acceoter. the policyy developed by the Interstate
Commerce Commission, but has refused that developed by the Trade

lIr. UcFarl-nd next offers = ec7olanation for these rep-orted
differences. He suggests that the subject matter is fundam~ntally
different. The Interstate Commerce Connis'sion treats with public
utilities. The courts are used to their regulation by the government.
On the other hand, the mercantilee -orld of the past has been relatively
free from regulation. Thl 'courts, therefore, are reluctant to allow
innovations in this field. (106). 1. It is sug'.cested thrt the
personnel of the Interstate Co.ierce Coomzission h's exemplified the
best use of the expert and thca-t it is superior to the personnel of the
Trade Connission. Coupled 7ith the dishaanmony and lack of tact upon
th6 op-art of the Trade Commission in the conduct of its internal and
external affairs, L:r. IcF-rlid sees in this situation a basis for some
of the Trade Conmissionts 'difficulty (107). 2. He suggests that the
Trade Commission's procedure has been open to more uifavorable comment
than that of the Interstate Coym.erce Coaission. 3. Of particular
importance are the opinions given b- the two Cowuissions. There is an
indication t-hat, the Trade Con isionIs have been hasty, ill dravn and
based -apon insufficient evidence. The Interstacte Commerce Comnission,
on the other hand, has much nore careful-ly followed the judicial
technique, Ir.,wi.: its opinions carefuIJlj an.. fully considering the
evidentiary- basis for its action. Yr. :;ciarland. concludes that the
opinion by such Coinissions should- state facts and the reasons for the
conclusions dra'nn. The suggestion is obvious, that the more judicial
the opinion, the more likely it is to be clothed with finality (108).
4. The courts offer-- an e:.-ol.raation for the different treatment based
upon the statutory lnuAge r. cFarland thinks this is of little
importance as an e:.jlanetion. 5. The doctrine of review if based
upon the formula of "questions of law" and "questions of fact."
6. The different enforcement procedures provided invite the treatment
that has been accorded the. tro Comrmissions. The orders of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission become effective in a specified time unless
set aside hy the courts upon application of parties affected. The
Trade Commission, on the other hand., must apply to the courts to secure
enforcement of its orders. 7. The sta,ndardls set up for the Interstate
Commerce Commission to follow, although couched in as broad language
as those as the Trade Comnission uses, refer to nore particular situa-
tions (109). The writer has s1v,-ested above in addition to this that a
greater amount of expert knowledge of a kind not readily digested by the
court, is required in the functioning of the Interstate Commerce
Commission (110).




8. The more satisfactory the experiment in administration, the more
authority will flow from the legislature. And it might be added that
the more pleased the court, the greater the finality the legislation
will be given.

Much of the difficulty of the early Trade Commission mat be
attributed to the lax standards of the Act (111) which amounted to a
broad statutory grant to work out the law in a certain field, within
the limits of the term con-petition. It was the very laxity of the
delegation that must have made the courts feel that their careful
supervision was needed. (112). Confidence in the administrative
body's ability to meet the problems presented to it in a capable and
not too visionary manner, comes but slox7l' to the court (113). This
confidence is essenti,-.l to any real ae_-inistrative finality (114).

IlcFarland expressed the need for legislative and administrative
reforms if real good was to come fro7, the Trade Commission (115).
Without awaiting new legislation, almost as a, contradiction of
,cFarlandcs thesis cane a series of favorable decisions. But instead.
of being a contradiction, these cases furnished further evidence to
substantiate the thesis which had been advanced, for they represent
more careful treatment by the Coi.unission. The opinions were handed down
at a time when economic forces indicated a greater need for trade
regulation. The Royal Milling Co. Case (116) merely involved an unfair
advertising problem, a field in which the Conmission had been com-
paratively successful. The judicial note struck in the opinion was new.
Where the order of the ConL.iission is supported by evidence it will be
upheld. The Alagoma Lumber Company Case (117) used almost idential
language. The facts and the language of the Keppel Case (118) are most
revealing of the courts' new attitude. An order of the Commission had
been directed against the distribution of package candy by the "break
and take" method. This the Commission had found to be unfair com-
petition. The court denied that the Commission's jurisdiction was limited
to practices that have been found unfair byr the court (119). It frankly
recognized the gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion (120).
The language of the court best illustrates its more ready attitude to
give s6me finality to the Commission:

"While this Court has declared it is for the
Courts to determine what practices or methods of
competition are to be deemed unfair - -, in
passing on that question the determination of the
Commission is of weight. It was- created with the
avowed purpose to it in "a body specially competent
to deal with them byr reason of information, ex-
perience and careful study of the business and
economic conditions of the industr- affected,' and.
it was organized in such a manner, ,7ith respect to
the length and expiration of the terms of office of
its members, as would Give to Qpportunity
to acquire the expertness in dealing with these
special questions concerning the industry that comes
from experience.1 Report on Senate Committee on
Interstate Commerce, ITo. 597, June 13, 1914, 63rd
Cong. 2 Sess., pp. 9, 11,. See Federal Trade


Commission v. Beerh-Fut Pac-rin,.-: Co., s',pra, at 453;
compare Illinois Control R. Co. v. Interstate Comniicrce
Corr.iiszion, 206 U. S. 441, 454. If the point were
more doubtful th-n ,'e think it, ,e sl-oul.:! hesitate to
reject the conclusion of the commission, based as it
is upon clear, specific amO, corcn-eien;ive findings
suc-'ort o by evi(" (121)

This comr3arative survey has been extended to the length necessary
to show. 1. the reluctance of the courts to give finality at first and
2. how much finality may be -v.inod as the courts' confidence in the
administrative boCy increases. T-he cases also indicate that substantial
means of review are open to the co-rts, and that they rill be used '-ihen
the courts deoem then.i necessa:'-y.

Where property interests ai'e involved the courts are quite cau-
tious in extending administrative finality. Of course, property in-
terests are involved in taxation, but for many reasons, thought good
by the courts, the government s ne-Id, of narrow review is felt to far
outweigh the interests of the individ-ial taxpayer. Professor Dickinson
has suggested "that the rep- iness of the courts to review tends to
vary strongly with the size of the property interests at stake" (122).
The courts themselves have given weight to this view. Snmnary action
has been held proper as to items of little worth, such as fish nets
valued at fifteen dollars each. The court, recognizing the difficult
of drawing the line, consciously.r adopted the value test (123). Large sum
sums of i]oney involved in litigation will cause the court to give much
more comprehensive treatment to a legal point already res adjudicata

The regulation of radio communication is an apt illustration of
the forces &t work in such fields. If an C?._'*lication for new time or
increased power is made, the courts, tho-uh given a statutory review,
are reluctant to upset the admin-istrative findings,(125). The courts
have a wide charter of review; the hearing must be adequate and not mani-
festly unfair; the findings must not be contrary to the indisputable
character of the evidence; and the facts must, as a matter of law,
support the order (126). This charter will be resorted to where sub-
stantial money has been invested in good faith and the Commission is
jeopardizing this investment without compelling reasons (127).

The regulation of common callings or "business affected with a
public interest" because of the large property interests have received
particular treatment by the co-urts* (128). The function is regarded as
"delicate and dangerous, an',. ought to be exercised with a keen sense of
justice on the part of the regulating body, - - The Coorts ought not
to bear the whole burden of saving property from confiscation, th ugh
they will not be found wanting 'there the proof is clear (129). The
responsibility of the regulatory agency is even more great than that
of an agency operating a government owned business, fbr the question of
profits and the denial of property without due process of law are not
similarly presented (130).

The courtsI interest in social and economic facts has already been



observed. In fields of disputed social policy the judicial technique
usually involves an extended analysis of the facts. The temptation is
strong for the court to substitute its own conclusions.

This judicial attitude has crystallized into the well-known concept
of "business affected with a public interest" (131). Other business,
it is hel., can not be subjected to certain toes of regulation, par-
ticularly price-fixing. The pi-blic interest concept sees the fixing
of prices as a guaranteed payment for the dedicatio:A of business to the
public, and the limitations u-on the free use of property thereby en-
genered. A number of the federal courts expressed this reluctance to
approve price reeulatian, in cases involving 1T7A codes (132). In a
case (133) involving the sane statute, concerning when the Nebbia case
(134) so liberallyr construed the concept of business affected with a
public interest, "the same court shoved a disposition to be apprised of
all the operative facts in the case before giving any relief. This
interest in previous profits and "spread", both before and since the
issuance of the order questioned, shows a constant interest, in
economic questions and possible injustices, properly presented to the
court (135). The conclusion must be had that private business not, in
the courtsT opinion, sufficiently affected by a public interest is pro-
tected by a broad review exercised by the courts. This protection
takes the form of forbidding certain regulations proposed by the
legislature, and a fortiori b0,T an ad-inistrative agency. This might
even be called "judicial legislation" to distinguiish it from the broad
review which will be seen to exist in cases of business affected with
a public interest. The point that this consideration has meant to
emphasize is the keen interest the courts evince in any positive reguu-
lation of business, and their disposition to fully review the basic
economic facts, and to substitute their own views for legislative (or
administrative) declarations of policy.

In cases of State regulation, the Supreme Court has long shown a
disposition to fully consider the facts involved. This does not mean
that the court has overruled the administrative decisions, but it does
show an early interest that some facts be present upon which a "fair-
minded board" could determine the conclusion reached (136). The in-
terest of the court, also, has long been extended to the confiscatory
nature of rates. Although the court will not make rates itself (137),
a judicial determination has been declared essential (138). The court
has not hesitated to declare its theories of valuation (139), nor to
make demands overruling the opinion of a "fair-minded board" (140).
All this control could be exercised by the court,while leaving the
primary fact-finding final and undisturbed in the administrative hands.
That is, a review by the courts to see if there were proper evidence
present could furnish a sufficient check. The really upsetting notion
is that injected by the Ben Avon case (141). The indications of this
case are that the courts will allow a trial de novo by the lower
federal courts, both of the facts and the law. (142). The Suipreme Court
of Pennsylvania referred to the review of the valuation order of the
Public Service Commission by the Superior Court as "merely the sub-
stitution of the courtsl) judgment for that of the Comamission" (143).
The Supreme Court of the United States sustained the action of the
lower Pennsylvania Court:


"loo!.'!,, at the entire opinion we are compelled
to conclude that the Surreme Court intorpre,'tcd the
stat'.ite as Tritlhholli,- fro, i the courts power to
det'mViine the question of cbnfi.'.c tion accor'inr,
to their oan inde.,'--: i6reit jiLnt u .n h action
of the Comuission cones to be considered on appeal.----

"In all such, if the ovner claims confiscation
of his propcrt- A*ill result, the state must provide a
fair opportunity for submitting that issue to a
judicial tribunal for determination upon its ovm
indeOendent judgment as to both law v (n. facts; other-
wise the order is void because in conflict with the
due process clause." (144)

Broad review of regulation of business affected with a public
interest, eand judicial interference with regulation of private
business are established facts. The Ben Avon c,-se is still the law,
although not ever:,. allegation of "confiscation" rIerits such complete
review (145). The courts interest in the siibstantive nature of
social and economic* regulations vust be -.ccepteO, as an operative fact
in considering the scheme Luikrlying the .ITIlA.



- 1-



The courts' use of jurisdiction and jurisdictional fact question as
a method of review has been observed (1.46). The precise character of its
use in the cases demands some attention. The problem itself, is not new
but it has gained recent impoortance in administrative la-7 with such de-
cisions as Crowell v. Benson (147) and Ng 4ung Ho v. White (148). An
early English case (149) points out the problem. Did a charter giving a
college of physicians authority to punish malpractice give them jurisdic-
tion over all -oractice? Lord Holt, answering the question, held that the
authority was not limited to those unskilled in fact, but extended to
allow an inquiry into any administration of "Iohysick" to determine if it
were unskillful.

The question of jurisdiction over a defined subject matter, since it
clearly demands statutory interpretation, is a question of law (150).
Again, the baffling oroblem of trying to distinguish questions of law
from questions of fact arises. It is seemingly an unsolvable penumbra.
The difficult situation is where jurisdiction rests u-oon the determination
that the evidence is susceptible of more than on- conclusion as to what
are the "Facts"t (151). Another problem is the attempt to limit the ad-
ministrative body, not to a general subject or field such as the practice
of medicine or the injury of an employee, but to the precise question the
administrative body is called upon to decide, malpractice or accidental
injury (152). If the court so restricts the administrative body it does
away with much of its usefulness. The cases are simply twice adjudicated,
and the administrative board is placed in the position of master for the
taking of evidence for the court. "7hen the entire function of an admin-
strative body rests u-oon the determination of a fact, held by the court
to be coextensive with its jurisdiction, and so also determinable by the
court, it is no longer clothed with the independent 0ow'ers, which it
would seem should be its oroper s-ohere if its action is not judicial.
The courts have frequently taken over the determination of such questions
as whether a comoanv is insolvent (153), a horse has glanders (154), or
a railway has paid in ten oer cent of its capital stock (155). The court
frequently finds that its opinion -Egrees with that of the administrative
body. This attitude is found -,here the court carefully examines the
evidence, but concludes that the determination made was oroner (156).
These cases have not stirred uo the criticism, as have the cases where
the court disagrees with the administrative determination. Nevertheless,
the technique is identical.

In U.S. v. Ju Toy (157) the assertion that a claim of citizenship,
by a person of Chinese descent seeking to enter the United States, went
to the jurisdiction cf the administrative officer was denied. The Dis-
trict Court had entertained new evidence and found Ju Toy to be a citizen.
The court speaking through I1r. Justice Holmes was apparently apprehensive
of a flood of cases, whatever the justice of the particular case. Huch
criticism was directed at the court (158). lore as a matter of individ-
ual unfairness than as a problemm of orooer law. Iluch of this criticism
finds a basis in the fact that alien orocedure has been none too con-
siderate of individuals under its jurisdiction (159). Seventeen years
later, an almost identical question was presented to the court in
Ng Fungp Ho v. White (160). The court reversed its former position. The



only important actual difference in the two cases lay in the fact that in
the latter case the -etitioners were within the territorial bounds of the
United States, when the immi'-:ration officers claimed jurisdiction over
them. These persons had once be:n seeoin- entry which had been allowed.
By this, they seemed to have > s; int') a f;ivored class. It is thought
that today, upon the auth-v>rity of this latter case the Ju Toy case might
be reversed, and in a hnbes cjr rocji.', after administrative
remedies are ixhaqsted, a trial de novo in a federal court might be se-
cured on the fact of citizenship. If it wore not, it could only be, be-
cause some special significance is att-,ch-d to presence within the country,
even though through illegal entr'-. The courts have long exercised a con-
trol over questions of law which often appear to be very close, to, if not,
of a jurisdictional nature (161).

In connection with "broad review," the Ben Avon case (162) has already
been fully treated (163). That case rested upon the proposition that the
orooer allegation of "confiscation" raises a constitutional question going
to the final jurisdiction of the administrative body. This is called
"Constitutional fact, H which means jurisdictional fact in those cases where
the Constitution furnishes the limitation (164). It means that the case
demands an independent judicial hearing to determine if the administrative
body had jurisdiction, or had jurisdiction to make the decision it did
(165). Before this case, the Supreme Court was content to accept conclu-
sions of the State administrative bodies, having some reasonable basis
(166). The broadest review, and an ability to substitute an independent
judgment, whenever the administrative action does not accord with the
courts' views are the real implications of the doctrine (167). The recent
case of Crowell v. Benson (168) takes the doctrine one step farther, and
applies it to findings of federal administrative boards (169). The Supreme
Court allowed the District Court to make independent findings on entirely
new evidence as to the jurisdictional questions, whether, 1. There was
injury upon the navigable waters of the United States, and 2. Whether the
"master and servant relation" existed. Said Mr. Chief Justice Hughes,
speaking for the court:
"In cases brought to enforce constitutional rights, the
judicial power of the United States necessarily extends to the
independent determination of all questions, both of fact and
law, necessary to the performance of that supreme function.
The case of confiscation is illustrative, the ultimate conclu-
sion almost invariably depending upon the decisions of questions
of fact. This court had held the owner to be entitled to 'a
fair opportunity for submitting that issue to a judicial tribunal
for determination upon its own independent judgment as to both
law and facts. "' (170)

Mr. Justice Brandeis, in a vigorous dissent, pointed out that this
view had not been adopted in cases involving the Federal Trade Commission,
the Interstate Commerce Commission, or the Packers and Stockyards Act
(171). The majority opinion does not specifically refer to the Fifth
Amendment, but that must have furnished a basis (172). It has been sug-
gested that the. case may be limited to the admiralty power of the court
and a holding that Congress mayr not cut this down by making the findings
of an administrative board final (173). It is probably true that Crowell
v. Benson was merely an outcropping of a somewhat obscured theory of
review which has long' e-xisted. The courts can not hope to review de novo
the facts in such cases. The task would be overwhelming. On the other
hand, administrative bodies cannot hope to always escape this potential
review, without the exercise of extreme care and fairness.


It is quite possible that the ec::ecisc of this theor; by the courts
.vy be gre'.tl:, reduced ob .a.rninistra:ivc .ction. Questions likely to be
c1l1ec. jurisdiction-l fct." should be- tre-ted -.s questions of fact
-lonie. A. overwhelming record to su--ort the r.'.ministr-.tive determination
should be oi'.ins tkingly built. It mitnt even be ,vell to throv, out some
douLtful cases, until sui icient judici-i sanction for .ecidin- such
problems h-d 3r-durll"y a.ccrcted. The St- :e courts .iavc been relucw-nt to
review qucst-onc of "jurisdcliction,.l frct" wlhere the a.dministrtive detcr-
min-tton v... su orted by subst-nti 1 evidence (174). The judicial technique
is such th t if the court ?-L:rc-.s vith the ejministrntivc inding, even
though -.ll the f-.cts re most c-.refu'a).- revie-icd, the decision mnay be put
in terr'.s o.f iivi:ijg fin-lit; to t o :'miistr-.tivc decision. (175). It would
seem thn-.t -y' t.In c: re, to .c ,r -11 eort-n.c--t evi..ence'n, -. taking
jurisdiction o.Il- in cle.-.r, the -'-miniistr-.tive -gcncies co-. ld. dernd
a rcsj-.ect f--Gi-. the courts, reflected i-n an incre.sing freedom from review
by the "jurisdiction..,l fr,.ct" ,iea,ns.


There is considera-.ble confusion s to -,"r'.t -,)rocedl-rr.l requirements
actually c-.n be to ex:ist (176), The .-rroLlei h'"s been said to present
"a wildernessof single inst-.nces, -I.ibij-ity .-nd inconsistency of principles"
with "1c wide difference in the scope of judici.-al. review in different fields
of -ndministr,.tive reEul-.tion" (177).

Procedural-. requirements not ,ll-cdLefined. Host attorneys think
of adrainistrotive due process .s notice .nd hc..ri.g. Of course, it cajn not
be eXpectecc tha..t in Jcner 1l the requirements of judidiaol procedure must be
followed. Administration is .iore infor'ma:l. The procedure of the courts
is not the oroce.are of -.dministr-.tio.. F-.irness in the -,"rticul.r case -.nd
the p:'.rticul:.r field must be the touchstone nainil reliec-d. upon.

Proceduracl rc quircment? v.-.y v.'it'-h. the field. They more Iax in
those fields studied in con .ectio-. vi ch .n-rro- review. Police power thi.nt
requires suj.ur'ry -ctlion c.-.n not be. hinde-cd by renuiremnerts such a.s notice
'nd he-.ring before action n (178). Professi:;.z-l r-.ctice ever -. period of
time, or the peculiar soci;-l historr- of an problem ma." ha-ve the deepest in-
fhLLence u-,on the requirements of -orocedur-c in hanc':ling such problems (179).
In the dcld of customs (183) the procen.,.r.l requirements r7re
light. The social history of this field, involvi:-ng .s it does our tariff
policies, ..nd. the csta.blishiicnt of this field when the courts were much less:
prone to inquire into executive nact.on, :'oes f.-r to the ic.x require-
ments. Here, it ha's been held proceedings m-y be secret without the
right to cross-ex-.mine wit-,e-sses bcing: -ff orded; that ill evidence need not
be disclosed, to the importer, if he h-.s right to st-.te views 2%nd
suggest questions to be -sked vwitnesses (IS1). Li]:e"ise, in the field of
tax collections, srnur.ry .ctio-'i. involving distresF -nd seizure of property,
without notice, he-.ring or op ortunitv to confront and cross-exa.nine
opposing witnesses, is proper wherc '. l.ter judici-.I or P.dninistrmtive
hearing is -hiorded (IS:).

Alien procedure h,-.s many qucstioniable features (183). The hearings r
held before local immigration inspectors who -.ct -s justices and prosecutor
UsuAlly the Llicen hLs no counsel :n. the hePring is riv-.te. Evidence is


. informal, The trial iL. the Dcn rtricnt is .a papor one, -nd th- st-tutcs
do not even ronequire that a Ic,-.1:, trained or e,.ric,'cC person p,-czie.
All this is done ,ui-.!.r the justificA.ti ,.. of sp-.cO, cxpcrtize, -co-.iornmy.
Of these, Dc.-,i Va.. Vieck sa,.ys: 1. S ',ccL is not neccstary; 2. ThI of,. icial
is not an ex:zpert; 3. Ec,,nor.-i .:'y r be %a juLtification (Il.,). In the early, the courts ,c.r.,.', quite content with such procclu-rc. Th-Lt an alien
did not underst nd ar proc,,:.; iL wvas being hel(? bcc use of ignor-i-ce- of the
English lan ua-ge, r- th.-. lack of asnistancc of counsel or friends was not
abhor.-c.-t to the courts, dc,.iite a high souncl. statencnt by it about Cue
process of law (185). Recently the court ihas evinced a more ?trict attitude.
The hc' must bhe more than a, mere semblance; the right to produce evidence
must not be denied (186). A lover federal c.jurt has held that W -hncc 'n
alien does not iLdcrstand tcstim-iony it must be -:.-plained to her; the re
must be aflordc'. th, privilege to cross-examine which the court referred
to as a "Constitutional right" (187). Counsel ma.y not be denied access to
the hco-ring; an- it is funrm]-icntal that procedure set up by the c-cncy's
ovn rules must be ,Qhcr:1 to (188).

In the government's postal oper tons, the .nost strict procedural
requirements Arise v, hcre the i. .ill"' privilege is involved. Even in such
cases a hearings need not be, nor must the decidi.i:g oiJficial state
the reasons for his decision (189).

Procedur -.l requirementt; become more strict in fields designate,. s
reccivian broad review. The control by the "substa.ntia.l evidence"
renuirei-cnt of Intersta.te Coi.m'ercc Comnission determinations has been
observed. Frequently, Congress may by statute define certain require-
ments -.s in the case of the Fe'cral Comuni ic-ations Conrission (190) and
its predecessor the Federal hadio Cor"ission (191). There an order by
the latter Comnission changing a station's frequency w s to become effec-
tive Aoril 30, the hearing being called for June 17, this was such error
that the order was dCeclared void (192). The recent case, involving a
Virginia. statute empowering the State Highway Co;ninissioner to order the
elimination of grade crossings, and. failing to provide for noticc,.hearing,
or review of the officer's action was held bad despite decisions of the
highest Vir:i.nia court affording a review if the action was arbitrary (193).

In addition to varying with the fields, procedural requirements may
vary within a field. This does not mean merely that, chronologically,
they bEcCme less or more str-ict (as in the alien cases). It means that
-hey may vary with diffe:!ent jurisdictions or even in the court depend-
in.:: upon the particulars of each case. Particularly in tax cases involv-
ing valuation assessment, the cases vary as to notice and hearing
requirements. The only rationale, seemingly obvious, is that notice and
hearing are required unless the administrative body has such an extended
jurisdiction that it renders such requirements impractical (194).

Requirements )f notice varry. A notice may be given by statute (195).
If so given the meeting must be held in the place and at the time specified
by the statute (196). It has been held that where a party, v/ho complained
of failure to meet, showed no disposition to attend the meeting, he could
not successfully urge lack of notice (197), The predominant rule, however,
is to demand a strict statutory compliance (198). notice requirement in
tax cases, as alrc *.f.y pointed out, vary (199). If a subsequent notice


~?-. 5-

-nd he-.rivg iu- to oc ii.d .1. t-W: r-.-e'v, -lnOUicc 3H th.C former"-s
is not requL-ed (2',..). F..ihr-c to ,ivc .-,rice 'e-)c-dj.s uron the pr-.c';ic-lity
of hle siUur 5. In such c' t-x -oy ith x::tcn'e& jurisdiction
or ,,herc suni .,.:'/ r c.-: .rcc. a.-c.7e r to -protect publicc health is
dein:.n.c. -.. t, rcfulati-,s to be ibros'. Ui 1> to:o ) nerors notice
requiremne.ts .re ! (,{.l).

Require cae-t.s nf -.-notice .r*- f cours,.-- io -vicst in fields of disputes.
s0oci-1 n, econor.:ic ... cti... iivi .l -.roperty interests

In Dr'ctic .li, 'n. c- se t.Y t .r'equires ,-otice, P. he.-.ring, is l.iso
reoiuir:d. Te former xittou the itLer vroJld s.-liy ,be a barren ro-
tection ("')../. .i'ne right t be r.:' 1If .e.rncde,, is generally considered
vit .1 to .l]. ':jiiinist:. ti-e -ctioan, with the exception of '. fev i.-st nces
where -Uhr, inLivi-a.1 r-.-I: -;I L
mere i-viu .1 *o-lC. in lit-lF L;, Chc requirer.,ent, or the public
vioul' oe t'oo )rc t;'. incorve: i_:'.cer2. (2204). F-: ris'.: howcvcr &oes not i.n1y,
in most iist- r.ce for:,.'.l ':.occ:'j-'e ( 05), :'o-" more th'.n Me he-i.rinig
-u1.- ; s LiC:er ry (<'06). T!.; ut st T_..'. n is, in, the
I-e .rii ri, .,- t be t'.ir (F07). As :'. Ju'stic2 C-.r- ozo h-.s s iC:

"The 'hi ..:rie:I t- t . . co:' .is. -.:s 0rc to
jiv-e bE r'i, t., -e1 to t, c i seq' snc.: th t ,'e t.o
follow to tin rtt:'c' ':. ..,. revie Lch ncir
orders -,ii). L.. suL'jcct." (.2,.%)

The s.c-roc_'; *e. .0ac.v d i:nT.e.. L .re notice tond
he-.rin-', or, c-s it ,,-.s b- n otc-r.-,,rse tcrnieo., -n ororbuinity to defend
(209), -.hej"evcr f i sncs ,,.;,.- c . If Sie,-,o is ,'ny s t'.tutory su;gestion
indic'tini "n ifltoRtio, -."-.t sri.c- s'.ifc5uzuis bfe provided, or that evidence
be required, notic-....... ',r ?_-.-Cr --Usoluto essentic-ls (210). Other re-
quircmcnt .-'c i..rdc, .s apeciic ch :cies (relly .n -spect of notice),
cross-e-X-rti--, tio.n ( 1 0 ,Lti1 C' to c-Le dcO Cc-rucv of the her.ring), the
rijht to -.r.ue th: l.v -rnc'. css (, iso *'. -; ring -roblemn) (211). Just
vrwh.t tvne nc -,:tice -"c. -,' .ri.: "re s.-Jficicnt v".'ic; (',12). Where a full
judiciall revio-', or tri.-.l de novo ic -recent thc. -dministr-'tive requirements n. so ncv;:,- (..1-). T.CI i f. tco -,rob-bl, is thr- :c.nd fairness
of the , Alt-hot._ --.tlco -nd .y- ri.- -.y .ve disacvn.taes
such -s 'cpnsc nnd d7l1.-..- (213i:,.) their dcsiranility should demand their full
utilization .s m,..ns of nrotoctitg the rn'ulic.

There :re nmir.oc of ".dmtLnistr-tive agencies which function .s
court cl .:,sely fol1 moving ju.'ici-.l ,roce'r.u-e (214). On the whole, the
bench -nid the b..r both hov,-i :r, diso.ositi.)n to a-ccor(. such court c a
hi ,he" pL..c, thn:; Liven to ,o, other -('cninistr-.tive adjudicatory cyencies
(215). The irn.lic--.tior. zis h t tnc m,:re juc.ici-l or more in aP-3e;'.rPAnce
i.n .ncli.,nistr-tive r1d-judic-.tiou. se;-e s, the .."-enter the finaolity it willbe
extenc-rd, other f..cto-.s kbi c4u-'l.

A now ....7iis tr tivc .,:c:y '-.e .1i-g "- fiCeld o- disputed economic
a.nC soci-.l policy is unaier the closest -c-'"tiiiy of she courts. Its 2.ctions,
proce(.ur-.1 r-.-,C subbst-.ntive- muct o -.most circrnspect und its progress
most c-rcful, if it is 2-.-sired to 1-:eep judici-'. control -*t the minimum.6
Even T-hrisc )recrutions oiron""n-" .e, if the- courts -ire h:eenly enough
interested. It is, hov',evcr, stc;. 'ci t.v- ri-It direction, the direction
indicated by the c, es.



P R L B L E !.' S O F AD D I .'I S T R A T I 0 N






Cne of the foremost advantages offered by the administrative
device is flexibility. It would be, indeed, unwise to attomot to
crystallize into formal and absolutely binlinj concerts administrative e
action as it stands today. It is a new technique, offering many varia
tions to meet the new and constantly arising: problems of society and
government. As the common law developed into a body of more or less
frozen concepts, and as equity has tended to do the same, so may P'l-,il-
istration. Any attempt to hasten this would be undesirable. The vev
value of administration lies in its empirical state, in its eoas"- pta-
bility to the demands made upon it. This is far from indicating L-.:t
every new administrative device should be welcomed, unquestione., as a
contribution to government. tn the contrary it should be car-fully
tested, not only by its apparent ability to meet the problem, but by
the precedents of other administrative forms and the circumstances
surrounding their use. Such a test is the first necessary s te-r when the
iR.1 is to be observed.

It was obvious with the passage of the TTPA that powers more vast
than those ever before delegated (except in war time) were delegated
to administration (1). It is probably that some of the persons respon-
siole in drafting the a.Act and in its first administration realized that
here was an agency sui generis. (2) Others, outside 'of NRA, later
ex-pressed such recognition (3). The Act itself was quite indefinite as
to wnat plan or plans if any it had sought to copy. It was equally
indefinite as to what actual form, as a matter of plan and procedure
the administration of the Act would take. It was most apparent that
the plan .,roviding for application by private members of industry for
approval by the President of a scheme of law orooosed by these individu-
als would be followed. As the Act was developed this proved to be the

As shall be seen, there were few orecedents i- American government
for such a plan. The most analoguous system is o e found in England.
This method of administrative lqw-ma!ring has been called "procedure by
scheme" (4). As history is long qnd interesting nnd today it repre-
sents one of the major administrative devices used in English govern-
ment (5). The orocedare consists of a proposal by a group of interested
persons. An investigation by government inspectors follows; next a
local hearing is held. The hearing allows counsel to be heard and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses. The inspector (much like an WRA
Deouty Administrator, or an examiner for the Federal Communications
Commission) then submits a fill report, analyzing the facts and setting
fort nis recommendations to the appropriate Iinister (6). The pro-
cedure of proposal, inspection (the activities of Research and Planning
were analogous), hearing and recommendation to a superior for his an-
provil, is quite analogous to NRA procedure.

The subject matter of this administrative form was, in its early
history, almost always limited to local projects of little general
interest. This explains the reference to it as "private bill legisla-
tion oy a department" (7). It was used, for instance, in connection ith



slum clearance projects (8). After tie *iorld 7.7r the use wis broadened
to include wider r.easires of socialization. Such a need can be seen
in tngland not divided as is this country into territorial States
evcn with conrideraole local legislative power. Grouos reoresr-nting
special interests or areas miy apoly for aprov9l of schemes. An
example of the substantive problems now dealt with is the aalpamation
of mines in a district by aree:.ent of a majority of the owners and
approved by the oroper minister, although a minority of the owners re-
fuse to cooperate. (9) The development in England has been slow. It
has been subject to the Courts' test for ultra vires (10).

The iT.A as a procedural scheme was not the result of any such
gradual growth or general development. -Fev; examples can be found of
power delegated to administrative officers or agencies' to aporove pri-
vately proposed schemes. Upon application of groups the Federal Trade
Commission has an'.roved rules of unfair competition solely as a co-
operative program for group members. These nad no bindin, effect upon
members of the group or non-members (11) although they might serve as
the oasis for a cease and desist order. In the procedure under the
Flexible Tariff Act (12) there is an analogy. There, -interested
domestic producers-could acply to the President for a levelling out of
costs of production, by increasing: the tariff upon competing foreign
manufactured articles. There were precedents aplenty for governmental
regulation of business (13), but there were practically none suggesting
that the individual industries frame their own laws (other than the
fact t,,lat nearly any pressure group can secure introduction of a bill
embodying its own views. This, of course, does not involve administra-
tive approval).

As many have suggested (14) the Act was indefinite as to the form
of tne administrative agency (15). But since it was recognized by the
Act there would be an agency or agencies this created no legal diffi-
culty for the use by the President of such assistance was contemplated
in specific terms (16). It was agreed that the Act intended some mea-
sure of cooperatiwva action between government and members or groups of
industry (17). No provision can be found for the steps in code-making
that became established (18) or for the administrative set-up and in-
ternal plan of procedure that developed (19). The NRA as developed
creates a difficult problem in classification in terms of the estab-
lisned forms. Here was an agency giving awa:, its powers freely, often
lavishly. This presented a question of powers, but an unusual one
of how much power could be so delegated rather than the usual one of
how much the administrative agency could gather to itself under its
charter (20). Here too, was an agency exercising powers partaking of
the le-islative, the administrative, and tne judicial nature (21). The
most important power exercised was the approval of codes and the inci-
dents of that power. The problem of compliance had a separate charac-
ter and will be considered later (22).

The WRA Legal Division proceeded upon the basis that code-making
and approving was a legislative function governed -i',inly by the court's
attitude in the Norwegian Nitrogen Case (23). Procedure, the Legal
Division seemed to feel, might be lax (24). In the ease so strongly
relied upon the so-called Flexible Tarriff-Act was the basis of the



procedure -there questioned (25). The Act was a "delegation - - of
the legislative process" (26) to the President, who could adjust the
tariff schedules to mept lower costs of irodaction abroad. The specific
points involved went to the adequacy of the hearing. The Tariff Commis-
sion, wnicn by the Act had oeen given power to conduct investigations
to assist the President (27), refused to give information to the inter-
ested importer as to the costs o'f oroduaction of a local factory (that
owned by the applicant). Counsel for the importer wrote a letter .de-
manding to see "every particle of evidence" gathered by the Commission
and that he be allowed to examine all -itnesses including the inspectors.
The data had been gathered with the understanding it would be held con-
fidential. The court, speaking through Yr. Justice Cardoza, denied that
counsel's demands must be net to afford due process of law. It based
its decision upon the following pointers inter alia: 1. The history of
tariff procedure, both legislatively and administratively (28); 2. The
Commission's activities being distinguished from limiting powers of
public service companies (29); 3. The Commission being merely an adviser
to the President, who was not bound by its advice. (It was not "an arbi-
ter between adverse parties" so its procedure might be built to fit the
problem in absence of more stringent statutory requirements (30); 4. It
being unreasonable here to force the Commission to disclose such infor-
mation, or treat each person affected as an individual litigant (31).

The next inquiry must be the value of this decision as authority
for i'RA practice.

The Norwegian Nitrogen Case proceeded upon a broad statutory
grant in the case of orocedure. This was positive recognition by Con-
gress that the Commission should, be free to develop its own procedure.
The NIRA, on the other hand, made no provision for procedure. It can
not be said with equal force that Congress positively felt that the pro-
cedure adopted would be the best when it did not even know what agen-
cies would be used or the exact character of the problems. That the
NIRA failed to provide procedure did not authorize arbitrary action.
The due process requirement demanded that orocedure be reasonable to the
end sought. There is some evidence indicating a reasonable comparison,
some indicating a reasonable distinction. The touchstone must be in
tne subject matter dealt with and the end sought.

Historically, the government has long exercised great nooers in
the tariff and taxation fields (32). Our political policy has favored
the imposition of tariff. On the other hand, government regulation of
or cooperation with business is relatively new and.far from being so
widely approved. It may be said that the policy behind the tariff is
fairly well settled while in the field of business the economic and
social policies are most hotly disputed.

Besides this historical difference, tariff collection and regula-
tion are closely related to taxation. Despite the economic significance
of tariffs, they are fundamentally taxes. The tax field is one accorded
narrow review, with slight procedural requirements. Business regulation
on the other hand is a field subject to the closest judicial control,
where procedural requirements have been relatively high (32a).



The court in tne tariff field was infla',nced by a judicial
attitude that had grown uo when the coLirt: wv. re exercising much less
control of adminibtrative action. Although the court is not subject
to any strict res a5judicatq notion of beirn bound by its own decisions,
they have a strong influence upon the court nuless there is compelling
reason to abandon the established views. A mere reference to
Auffmordt v. Heddin (33) brings bacl- the vision of quite lax adminis-
trative orocedure in this field bearing the approval of the courts.
uf course, in this case the legislative asoects were practically miss-
ing, being outweighed by the adjudication given. This merely places
the legislative procedure in the norwegian Nlitrogen Case in a stronger
position for it is generally conceded that administrative adjudication
requires higher standards of procedure than administrative legislation.

The economic sanctions should be observed. A major portion of our
wealth is represented by our industries. Importers, however, are a
small class. Although large sums of money and substantial property
interests are often involved in the tariff questions the courts are much
more keenly aware of the interests of private business within the coun-
try. The voice of business booms; that.of the importers is seldom heard.
Mr. Justice Cardoza specifically stated that the case was not like lim-
iting public service comp-nies in the transaction of their business (34).

A most significant distinction lies in the fact that by the
statute the Tariff Commission was mnde an advisory agency purely, whose
recommendations, did not bind the President. The NI.A authorized the
delegation of any functions and powers given to the President (under
Title I) (35). This..meant that the President could make the agency
NRA more than advisory. This he did specifically in the case of indus-
tries employing less than fifty thousand employees (36). It would be
improperly technical to stop here. If the President in fact bound him-
self by the firndirngs of the agency he created, without exercising indepen-
dent action of his ,own, it would seem improper to say that the agency
was merely advisory. Especially is this true if it is argued that, when
such p fact is formally recognized by the President the agency is no
longer merely advisory. To say that NRA "las merely advisory would be a
fiction as absurd as those often found in the common law. The indica-
tions are that when a statute is silent (except to allow the agencies
used to exercise all power given by the Act) and final power is in fact
given to an agency the court will recognize this. Our courts are not
known to be hammered by such a Gordian.kiot of. legal reasoning as this one
suggesting the agency to be merely advisory.

The last and a dominant consideration suggested by this case must
be: wer=- the approach and problems of IIRA so predominantly legislative
as to exclude other considerations or were there sufficient adjudicatory
aspects present to demand the procedure required by such problems? The
courts nave recognized that the fixing of customs duties is more than
fact-finding (37). It involves "the kind of discretion to operate an
intelligent legislative plan" :(38. The problem presented to the admin-
istration is not in the nature of litigation (39). The policy stated;
the government is merely using this machinery to effectuate that policy
against one group the foreign competitors. Legislative action by an
administrative agency though required to hold a few formalities is,



compensatingly, given much less .power procedurally. The Interstate
Commerce Commission anud the Federal Trade Commission are Freatly limited
in subpoenaing witnesses i.nd forcing them to testify (40). This feeling
toward administrative legislation may be colored by the fact that a hear-
ing is not a prerequisite to the validity of either public or private
bills in this country and the doubtful value of opinions usually at such
hearings when held (41). Even being able to call NRA hearings legisla-
tive would have provided no cure-all. The frequency with which courts
have refused to accept findings by legislatures is all too well known(42).

While some writers have thoudht- that the rate-making power is legis-
lative because of its enormous consequences on the future (43), others
more discerning have seen another problem (44). This other problem is
the conflict of interests between competitors and the adjudication of
this conflict based upon tne administration's interpretation of what the
law requires in the particular case. Fixing a rate may be legislative
as to a shipper, but when the hearing resolves itself into a contest be-
tween competing roads it assumes a judicial nature. We think of legis-
lation as involving a group rule for future conduct. But rate regula-
tion may involve the judicial determination that in the past one road's
rates were unfair or discriminatory and result in the administrative
action of declaring a future rate. So in IRA the problems presented often
had this judicial aspect in large quantities. Few hearings %.there were
that did hot become sharp contests between opposing competitors each ad-
vocating a standard of conduct as being proper or improper. To have
listened to one of these hearings would have been enough to suggest the
definite nature of the dual contests that so frequently arose. The dis-
tinction is not clear, but a general rule interpreting a statute so
drawn as to hit particularly at a small group or an individual, that is,
competing with the group advocating the interpretation, partakes more of
the nature of a judicial contest than legislation. This fact has been
recognized by one of the leading minds in the field of administrative
law (John Dickinson) (45). An order applying to an individual or a
few individuals, as against a regulation applying to a class is said to
require, constitutionally, notice and hearing (46).

The evidence most strongly indicating legislative character was the
product. These codes of fair competition were drawn up in form of
broad rules of prohibitions or positive action. On their faces they were
as legislative as any statute for a class. It is when this mask is torn
aside, and the creation of these codes is understood to include rulings
making the course of one competitor proper under the legal standard
given, and the course of another competitor unlawful by the same stand-
ard tnat the judicial character of the contest becomes apparent. Cer-
tainly, here there existed often a most bitter and personalized contest.
As the Act wRs framed, unless the courts had ruled these rules involve
questions: of law for our determination (47) (in which case NRA would
have been made equally impotent with the Trade Commission), the only
question upon which there would have been necessarily due process of
law procedurally, would have been whether there was a violation of a
code rule. Although legislatures need not give such guarantees, admin-
istrative agencies usually are not allowed such freedom of action.
Patterning iNRA after the Tariff Commission would have availed little,
if the Courts felt that its subject matter was more of the type handled
by other commissions and its contests more personalized, i



One strong evidence (4:) lickinr" to support the contention that
NRA problems were so j-iicinil as; to require orccedurnl srfe-g-aards
existing in the Interstate Commerce commission cases is the fact that
the Act did not specifically r.:t tire heMrin:" in the section relied
uoon in NRA activity (49) with ce;rt.iin exceotions. However, failure of
a statute to require a heeril, does not meean th'.t one may be dispensed
with. The due process requirement is one of fairness. If fairness
demands a hearing, one must be Lad. And the hearing must be just as
complete .s needed to satisfy the tests of fairness.

Althur1h the Act made no general hearing requirement, it made a
limited one of most significance. Section 3 (a) affords the only sug-
pestions to be made a basis for the Code process. Congress placed two
definite limitations upon this process. The first one, directed against
monopoliess or monopolistic practices", is well known. Less publicized
wqs the Conr-ressional proviso reading,, "That where such code or codes
affect the services and welfare of persons engaged in other steps of the
economic process, nothing in this section shall deprive such persons of
trig right to be heard prior to approval by the President of such code
or codes." This requirement would appear to be of the utmost determi-
native value. Few codes were ever aoproved that did not affect"the
services and welfare" of other not immediately within the industry. At
least, the Congress contemplated a hearing in such situations. It might
De aruaed that Congress, failing to provide for hearings upon purely
internal problems while providing for hearings upon external matters,
did not contemplate a hearing in the former situations. If the courts
had accepted this argument, there remained the constitutional "due pro-
cess" argument that such matters require a hearing. Coupled with the
recently evinced attitude of the court's holding administrative bodies
to hiih standards of action (50) it is highly probable that the courts
would have said NRA procedure must embrace a full hearing. An attempt
was made to further meet this statutory requirement by an executive
order providing for hearing and automatic stay until determination of
the issues raised in the case of persons outside an industry showing
thavt they had not participated in establishing or consenting to a code

Whether legislative (51) or judicial the problems of NRA in form
and substance were much more closely related to the rule and rate mak-
ing power of the Interstate Commerce Commission than to the duties of
the Tariff Commission under the Flexible Tariff Act (52). It must be
understood that the use of concepts of legislation and adjudication can,
at best, be only suggestive. All three of the usually classified powers
of government may be present in one administrative agency (53). They
may be so arranged that any attempt to classify them will be hopeless
(54). This was certainly true in NRA (55). It would be unwise to be
deluded by concepts. The "legislative," "judicial" classification is
often more text book than case book. There has been a recent disposition
by the Supreme Court to demand higher standards of administrative fair-
ness (56). Administration is not legislation by legislatures, which have
historically a position not ,o easily qu6st0ioned bby thrc6iurtsi rthe _-.
Chicqgo Junction Case (57) suggests that where a monopoly is given there
sufficient basis for a le-al interest in a competitor to challenge the


order. This indicates a feeling on the part of the court that such
directly affected inter'psts ,re important and must be considered. It
has been suggested above that ,2A's position differed from that of the
Interstate Commerce Commission in the instant case (58) inasmuch as a
hearing was required by the statute taere involved while the NIRA re-
quired no such hearing. However, the President contemplated that hear-
ings be held (59). Just what weight would be put on this is difficult
to say. As ITRA purposed to afford a hearing the courts would probably
not approve a hearing which it deemed unfair or inadequate.

It must be admitted that tne evidence is contradictory. The
strongest and most abundant evidence suggests that the courts probably
would have held 1NRA to a rather high standard of procedure. In fhce of
the evidence it was impractical tc assume ot eiprwise. The higher the
standard adopted the better the chances that the courts would have ap-
proved the procedure.


Should it be :id Jtt-d thr-,t the code-a2i;;.. norocess wn nd,.rinistr-tive
leJislation what effect would .'iis "ve ".po'i its status in the Courts? That
the question of "due Tr1ocess" in co- cudcoe u can not c l
due iues in od, .'-i, cl-,uld coe un can not e.:,-ilv
be denied. True, the Presider.t it iot abject to extraordinary lcj-nl re-
medies as has been s'.iesa in thi chtr ( ). Tis creates local dif-
ficulties, but not for a mi:. ute s" uld. it be t',o.:4Jht th ,t thcy arc insur-
mountable. Legislation itself is arren until it is enforced. So too the
codes until they w.'ere enforced -&a little effect upon -oroncrty and indivi-
dual rights, except that bars of tl.' anti-trust laws were let down to cu.-
gest combinations which might be directed against these rights. A most
circu snect enforcement -rocess which would give every desirable procedural
safegu-.rd it is urL.ed, by those whio feel "due processs concepts should not
be ap,-licd to cod--TnaLinj., would pr6clude the due -rocess question being
raised (59b). This argument means thrt. no matter how arbitrary, capri-
cious or unreasonable the procedure of codc-ma2ing, since we dub it "legis-
lative" it escapes judicial control. By neat len_-uagc and classification
this view has produced a judicial miracle. It has extended to an admin-
istrative process dealin- substantially with private industry and busi-
.ess, more narrow review than can be found in the alien or land patent
cases. The proponents of this view have not gone so far as to argue that
code-ma:king would not be tested by substantive due process. Legislation
by Congress and State legislatures is subject to this control. A fortiori
administrative legislation must be subject to a review' on this basis.
The result of the argwine:t is this: the procedure .. be haphazard or
eminently unfair; the result, however, must meet tests of legal fairness.
Thus a complete divorce en-t between procedure and substance is had. The
patent difficulty and the one ignored is that unjust procedure is a great
persuasive force u'ion the courts to determine that results are unfair.
Fair procedure and fair results can not be so blandly divorced. To know
whether results are fair it must be determined whether all the pertinent
facts are likely to be before the a&dministrrative body and to be considered
by it in arriving at its decision.

Certain specific evidences indicate that the courts would not re-
li..-i~l control over administrative "legislation" merely because it is
analogous to action, by a coordinate division of government. As a matter
of loL.ic and analysis if the tripartite division of government is treated
as more than a helpful division it could be argued that the judiciary
should have no control over administrative application of the law. Admin-
istrative agencies -oerform functions delegated to them by the legislature.
Frequently t.ey are responsible to the exectuive branch of the government.
So it mi'-ht be arjied control of administration should rest either in the
legislative or executive or in both. No matter what the desirability or
the lo.ic of such a contention, the judiciary in our system plays a much
more vital role. The first part of this study has been devoted to point-
ing out that the judiciary having acquiesced in the delegation of power
to administration has nevertheless maintained a strong control over the
r.ianner in which power has been exercised through a variety of concepts.
(59c) It is well recognized that at the beginning of our government,
once judicial review had been established, the courts could have applied
the doctrine of delegate, notestas non protest delegari to many acts of
Congress. Whether from weakness of position or genuine desire to aid
in the orderly development of n-eeded governmental forms, delegation was
allowed. Later as administration became more vital the courts quietly
developed "broad review" doctrine (59d). It must be remembered that the


first declaration upon this problem was one of "narrow review". (59e)
But let it not be forgotten that a review wa.s indicated.' That is important.

ITow what is administrativee legislation?"' T.hose. term is it and
what are the implications of it? Dr. F. F. blachly, co-author of a treat-
ise entitled "Administrative Le.islation and Adjudication," states that the
term administrativee legislati..n"1 is used both in France and Germany.
He believes, however, that the reel basis for the term's use in this
country is the frequent reference bv Enlish writers to ndii,,inistrative
rule.cs and regulations as "delegated legislation" and other related t-5.
(59f) If this be true, those wh-o believe the name legislationn works
such Airaculous changes in our cadministretive law have failed to consider
that as the tern is used in En :.-land it embraces ooth "legislation" in
the sense of class rules and "adjudication" in the "sense of orders directed
at particular individuals. (5c) Perhaps, legislation is being distorted
from its true meaning when it is looked up-on as a class rule. The great
mass of legislation has alway-s been private bills, and too, classification
can be easily extended to the -,'lace where a rule nay affect only one
individual. In fact, it is extremel'-e difficult to find any tenable dis-
tinction between "administrative legislation" and "administrative adjudi-
cation." Professor Dickinson offers the following:

"Wha.t distinguished legisliati:n from adjudication
is that the former affects the rights of individuals in
the abstract and must be ap-lied in a further proceeding
before the legal position of any p:aricular individual
will be definitely touched by it; while adjudication op-
erates concretely upon individuals in their individual
capacity." (59h)

Professor Dickinson does not contend for any hard and fast distinc-
tion with entirely different legal co-nsequences flowing from each class.
In fact he speaks of the futility of trying to classify a particular ex-
ercise of administrative power as either wholly legislative or wholly
judicial (59i). If pushed to its logical extre.-Le and to a use Professor
Dickinson never intended, it would. indicate that the "cease and desist"
procedure was not adjudicatory merely because enforcem-Ient against a stub-
born party could be secured only by rec'ure to the courts. (59j)

What the test Jiven amounts to is that: WT.erever the.enforcement
machinery lies in the control of the administration, its act in using
that machinery against any individual with the result that his property
or his person is affected is "'djudication." The instances where this
is true are not :iany. They exist, nrrticu.larly, in "broad review"
fields. Tax collectors i.y distrain -ro-.mrty or alien inspectors arrest
an alien. If the test. is not based upon the actual enforcement of rules
or orders Iade it must refer to classes as opposed to individuals. This
has already been considered.

The difficulty of creating any air-tight distinction within the
field of administration is abvious. It -presents an even greater problem
than creating such distinction in the general field of government. It
ignores any accepted classification of government If we treat admin-
istration as a fourth division of covernrent, this view says administra-
tion is not different from the legislative in certain segregable parts
nor from the courts in others. Thus, the raison di etre (a flexible
9838 new governmental fDrm) for a separate administrative division falls from

- 7-

tho wei *ht of cl.:. ificatioin. If :over.r .,nt is veiwed as police inal-ing
0..d )olic I tion is -o classified as to pa'rta>e of both. Here the difficulty pro-
bably lies in that dele,.tions given "*li..istrption such policy
control in the past tha.t toe roi-1 fiucotio' of ad in.istorini: a stated
l&4_islative police ,'-. bcei ovc'"or '-r ,. Wien this is considered the
value of clrsifications such as "legislation" aid "'Ktjudication" to
bind the co'.rts and our minds must '.c s,.-ciously questioned.

"Legislation" and "adljudication" are merncely convenient analogies.
Merely because an administr-tive bode- is m 'circa general rule in con-
formity with a policy stated does not .iean that this action should be
outside the courts' control while the enforcement of that rule is care-
full.,l cecked as to -rocedure. If the courts adopted this view they
.i-idt well be "swallowing a camel" for questionable actions could be put
in legislative form while the enforcement gave the most elaborate proced-
ural (Lui r-.antees.

It is a well-establishe.d leg "1 principle that the legislative judg-
ment is not to be questioned as long as it o-)erates in the ambit of its
c-c'nstituti-,nal po'.ers. Yet *nim, public men and students of public law
ilave reoeatdily c.,argeI our ..lighest court with substituting its judgment
f.-r tAat of the legislature. A legislature does not need to hold hearings
u-,on a bill although it usually does. It is presumed to know the facts
upon which it bases its judgment. WTicnever a court steps in and says
those facts are inadequate, it also says in effect either the legislature
had an improDer factual basis or it did not follow a view which could
be reasonably sustainel by the facts. Either of these views amounts to
a higher procedural requirement being :lac.d upon the legislature.

That the courts do not step in;u place limits upon the parlia-
mentary conduct of either house of Congress as a deliberative body does
not mean that the magic of the word "legislative" covers any action taken
under its mantle with an invincible armor of propriety, or sanctifies all
procedure branded with its name. On the contrary, where the Congress
delegates the legislative function of investigation for the purpose of
legislation (59k), the courts have erected some rather stiff procedural
requirements and limitations (591). If the Federal Trade Commission in
its investigatory capacity be either an administrative body or a legis-
l.tive agency it would seem that the fact that limitations were imposed
by the courts stands as authority for the proposition that the courts will
under ;..:r-er circumstances limit the procedure of administrative bodies
acting legislatively.

It could hardly be expected that by terming administrative action
"legislati-'n" it eould be clothed with the same dignity in the eyes of the
court as the action of a coordinate branch of government. The courts have
not been orone to classify administration in any final form. They reco-
gnize that all administrative action'is not alike (59m). Mr. Justice
"olmes pointed out that tPese actions might be- "legislative, judicial and
executive in nature." (59n) Treatment does not depend so much upon the
types of administrative action but upon the articularr questions that
may come as to operation in relation to the individual. Much is made of
the Norwegian Nitrogen case, which has already been fully distinguished
from the N2A prrjblem in tilis chapter. That ce e must be limited to the


fact that the attorney Df those affected by the Tariff Commission's re-
commnendation demanded to see all the evidence before the Commission, even
that which it had accepted as c:nfidential. :.ere the term "legislation"
presented a convenient analogy to suggest as in the tax assessment field
not all the procedural guaraintees :f "a town meeting" or a judicial totall
need be afforded to protect the individual. Proper administration is a
balancing of administrative efficiency and fairness to the individual.
The Flexible Tariff Act sets uo certain -procedural requirements, partic-
ularly notice and hearing (59o). Althaigh the courts have enforced these,
other questions of this character hLave not arisen except the limited pro-
blem already suggested (59p). The status of the law upoon this act is so
indefinite that it can be safely said that there seems to be no really
strong authority existing for the "legislative view."

The Panama and Schechliter caies have been pointed to as lending
credence to the "legislative" approach. In the latter case tie court
used the term "legislation" to strike dr,,m the delegation, not as an an-
alogy upon wnich to limit its own -ocwers of judicial review. Legislative
rower except within certain limits can not be delegated, said the court.
This was no indication that U-'ere properly delegated th6 courts would ignore
their control exercised in the .ast over use cf delegated power. In the
Panama case much the same situation is true. Trere is, however, an addi-
tional and valuable evidence. Alternative grounds upon which to strike
down the governmmnAts case were 3ffere&. Cther than the impropriety of
the delegation the court said an executive :-rder must have associated with
it some possible factual basis upon which ai official may act. This is
significant. The order issued was just as broad and general as an NRA
code. Its character as legislative secms identical. Yet the court in-
dicated a willingness to cc.ntrol the technical procedural question indicat-
ed. Further, the court indicated, that it still conceives of administrative
action in terms of fact-finding as opm osed to the traditionally stated con-
cept of legislation.

The dissent of iMr. Justice Cardozo has been pointed to as setting
forth proper l egal theory as to the nature of tie President' s action. It
is suggested that the dissent says the President's order is "legislative"
and not subject to procedural requirements. It is to be expected that the
Justice who wrote the opinion in the ITorwejian Titrogen case would use
similar concepts A.ere. ITo matter .ow much one approves tie philosophy of
dissenters in desiring freedom from judicial review, it should not be for-
gotten that law is still to be found in majority opinions.

There is a recent case which gives Mr. Justice Brandeis an opportunity
to offer his views, writing for a unanimous court. (59q) Here he attaches
some of the c.Laracter of legislative action to administration. It is to be
carefully observed that this raises no conclusive presumption but merely
raises a prima facie presumption of validity (59r). Pains were taken to
point out that the fact tViat the action was called "legislative" did not
make it binding upon the court. This is in harmony with the language found
in the dissent by 1lr. Justice Cardozo in the Panama case.

The attempt in this study is to point out the state of the law
and possible judicial trends in this administrative law problem. Proper
weight must, of course, be given to all the pertinent facts and analogies


m am I

in any particular situation. Th,' realities of judicial control can not
b.i i. ,red. It is t view 'f tf -"ritor that thi're is little hope to
avoid them in a field such a 7I1A b neoat di.finition and classification,
or by adding a stLp (l:2.,islation) to the -,*::inis trativc process which
by its nature indicitu'-. to' del-2.rtion r*f ,roator powers to administration
and can not hope to finK, inonUdia'itc favor in the judicial eye.

No one would dny that tlc del.*ition struck down in the Schechter
case was declared bad bec-u.e there v:.-.s *:mn atte.apt' to delegate great legis-
lative oower. As -.uch the whole cl',n procedure was illegal. The
only thing this study can ho1e to do is, considering the powers granted
existed constitutionally and that the delegation was curably by setting
narrower limits u-:on action and setting mere well-defined standards, treat
the or-)bljms as ....rdinary problems in administration. If the delegation
:i.d. b..,en cured it. is .iAhly improbably that the powers exercised by NBA
-w:ulrl -aave boeen df such a policy nature to have made the word "legislaticn"1
such a bogey. The probability is that hTRA would nave been such a fact-
finding a-cncy th,.t procedural requirements would i have unquestionably at-
tach'ec. Problem-n in 1A administration are treated (in the chapters that
follow) individually: as a ,iattcr of g',od administration and justice in
the particular circumstances surrounding it. Each problem is viewed in
relation to la"i -n. p)r-ctice in related administrative fields with a part-
icular consideration :-f ,v:het-er IRA problems demanded such procedure. It
is not intended to split hairs by attempting to point out the legal limits
';f undesirable aW,.-i.nistrative prc..ctice. fRath]er it is hoped to suggest, by
viewing the )recedents and']. the circumstances, ;il'at practice would have been
so eminetly fair and just i t i7ould esc-)e question upon grounds of
administrative law.

That the Pr.sident was iva'er, %ov'ir b;/ tLiU Act to approve proposed
Codes raises so:ie inte-retin co'riderati:ns. .7ould mandamus or injunction
lie against -im eit.-er to tfrce ti.c issuancer C.f c':.des or to prevent their
approval? Frc'm pDosition as I.i:id :if -nm nu. al branch of the Government,
the Presidcent unJer t- so'i.rat'-.n -f -,o.'er theory derives immunity from
judicial -process (60). Lnotzt'r ba.-.i] -t? in tihe- nalogy between the Pre-
sidant s .position. as head f t..e vornmrnt to sovereign authorities in
other -overnLents. StilL a- fund basis rests on expediency.
AltLou i his actions in a':r-'vvin, a in"ay not be enjoined, the courts
could achieve the same result bi. decl,-arin thLe President lacking in power
(61), or tie ap:,rovcd Code arbitrary and unfair in substance or in procedure.
It would seem t'.at the President could have been arbitrary or capricious in
refusing to approved Codes w7itAi:ut affording aggrieved persons a judicial
remedy, n:. IRmaLtter -re- closely tieir p)ro)pcssal wer- in accord with the require-
ments cf tL-e Act. Since- the .drive was to aprc-ve codes it was not probable tiis questi n viould arise. It ices indicate, however, a difficulty
that i.ay arise fr.n giving such po.,rer to thie President.

As to am Adiinistr-'tive Board Dr o-Lficer b-th mandamus and injunction
will lie in proper circ'wistances. .7Tiere any discretion involved has been
exercised s .all t .-.t remains is a minis-terial duty mandamus may lie (62)
-.r vhere jurLcdlicti.-n i2 1'efuued by an -iinistrative board mandamis will
lie (67). Sr miandrrnu's :aiit iave pr.,jerly laid vwere NSA refused to consid-
er the .f ai in custri, :r mnicre an official refused to forward cer-
tain p-ape.s -...ic:.e .1:',a.ld aave f",r.ward2d unler the procedure as set up



(64). If a showing were made that the mere approval cf a Code by the Pre-
sident would have caused irreparable injury, it mi'it have been urged that forwarding of thie Code by tne 1IJA to tre President could be enjoined.
Such an argument would have been cf doubtful merit (65). The effect would
have been enjoined t-he President. It is not contended here that where the
courts might view ITRA as acting as an a&.nt cf the President in a narrow
sense that extraordinary legal remedy w7uld Issue. Thero has been too
little time to fully consider this problemL. Instances where injunction
might properly lie can be envisaged alth-ugh tnhe courts are extremely re-
luctant to issue extraordinary legal remedies. This is especially true
of mandamuis. Thus, a premium is placed upcn inaction (66). This may be
only an incident of the courts feeling, the attitude having arisen from
the reluctance of courts to give relief requiring positive action by those
it can not easily control. This discussion has been intended to show that
*the introduction of tae President as the final administrative authority
complicates thle situation as far as t.Le application of extraordinary legal
remedies because of the dignity of his position both analytically and his-
torically. Unless there was some ccompeolling reason it would seem desir-
able to have such final authority rest in some other person or body than
the President.

The N.I.R.A. makes specific provision for conditional orders of ap-
proval (*). There are a few cases involving the use of such orders making
requirements not specifically included in a statute (67). The few cases
seem to allow regulations reasonably consistent with the statute and its
purposes (68). Professor Freund has suggested that "in the absence of ex-
press statutory provision the power of administrative authorities to annex
conditions to licenses should be denied" (69). This seems correct where
the administrati-n tries to gain ends it could not reasonably reach under
its statutory power. It would not seem to be so compelling where the con-
ditional order was -armonious with the statute and made to remedy a defect
in a proposed scheme. Also c nsiderable merit can be seen in the use of
a conditional order as a protection to t-e public (70). The Act provided:

"Thle President may, as a condition of his approval of any such
code, impose such cz-nditicns (including requirements for the making
of reports and the keeping of accounts) for the protection of
consumers, competitors, employees, and others, and in furtherance
of the public interest,.............. as tie President in his dis-
cretin deems necessary to effectuate the policy herein declared.3

The reasonableness of the use that tie President's conditional orders
were put to would seem to have been the test.

The Act was couched in broad terms. The procedures to be used were
not specified. The dominant scheme of industry written codes, approved by
the President, was a new governmental form. Its main precedent, the English

(*) Secti:n 3(a)



procedure by scheme, had never been put to such large uses. The pro-
0.. "! +,r.c it3 i',.t 1,0jt "e l-ed by the courts are difficult
oif ascertaim,+-nt altuju t.-u -v!,l nce indicates that the Interstate
Commerce Commission supplied the clos,.ct analogy. subject matter,
although not the ..iannor of treatment, was -rL.,re closely related to that
dcelt with br the Fe"cr:' Tr' Coom is+ucln. TtIo making of Codes appears
to have been le.islativo nid akjud-.Jcatory. Placing final power in
the President created a legal difficulty, in that there is no recoarse by
extraordinary legal process a-ainot his acti:,n or inaction, as did the
failure to specify the conditional order of ajpr',val as a proper device.
An additional problem lay in the administrative approach.





The ,TIP-A vwas designed tc meet' not one -oroblein but a number of those
presented by the "Depression". For this very reason the so-called theories
of the Act were too numerous (1) to furnish any really useful guidance to
most .ersons interested in the Act (2). The rno(-u1.;r name of the statute
indicated that it 7,,s enacted. tc do a job start recovery. This is fur-
ther shcvmn by the self-devised name rf the Administration. In addition to
the li;Aitntion'of the Act in the creation of the scheme there were lirmi-
tations in the circumstances existing at the time of the Act's passage.
A state of near ranic "as a.-noarent. Action was the essence
demanded. The advantages of srrift efficient administrative action were
needed if the inp)etus of recover? ',,ns to be felt at once. (3) It w.ns
this initial imnetus rThich it was thoiaght would be the momentum necessary
to bring recovery.

I!T7A started from scratch. There 17a9. little )olicy and no organization
The latter fact has caused sone adverse cornient (4). It is doubtful if
this cI ,.L-ent is well taken for the intention was everywhere apparent to
effect nn organization as sorn as possible, There the suggestion that
the President could nullify the '-hole Act by doing nothing (5). There rre
many l-,,s vhich he could make inoperative by failure to act. The important
facts are what is done or can reasonably be expected, not the weird
possibilities. NRA had enough Jifficult nrroblems to face without conjuring;
up imprrbeble "straw men".

The situation was such that seed was -nreferred to slow painstaking
survey. This was the case because a consensus of action by industry vras
desired, and the latter method ',as not in -oarticular favor in arny, event
with the then NRA Administration (6). The demand for celerity of action
required a certain measure of industry crc-neration. It -oeuld have been
im.-cssible to have created the codes that were made without such aid. Of
course it ,ight have been -oossibl.e to have licensed some of the larger
industries but this procedure was not desired. It smacked too much of the
hated concept of "government in business".

General Johnson has described NTRA' s position:

"All other agencies had billions to loan or give away.
3iiA gave nothing. It took. It imposed sacrifices. Everybody
likes Santa Claus. ITobody favors Simon Legree. Consequently,
i1T.L made powerful enemies".

This could only mean that cooperation of industry could be secured by
offering concessions, sho-ing positive advantages to be gained or by
threatening to use the license power. The former two methods were chosen
althcmuh IRA was not sure hor successful they would be (8). A number of
industries offered codes because it was being done by other industries,
because it wns the popular thing to do. This was in part a result of a
trei.lend~us sales effort on the -,art of NRA 1vhich might be more unkindly
called "ballyhoo". A number of industries possibly more keen to their


n intri'eots, possibly ,,il" i j t' stand .-) ninst the Adiministration lhvC
to be- offeredd uresitive incentives. (i). Aiion' the incentives offered
were freedcm from the Anti-r__urt lavs, ,iru] o'sitivo sanction in enforci,.g,
apprrved industry ngreerients u:,on recrlcitrint members of industry.

NUA x:as domi-^ntly interested in securi.r better conditions for labor,
hi .her wvoes and a spreading of the r:. This was done to raise the 'ur-
chpsi'.i.v- , or of the masses anoe erase unemployment (10). Industry '7as
see':i,-i-: ;csitive adcvant.:es through favcroble trade practices for its
sacrifices (ll). The result was usually a bargaining by industry with
,:overri.iei-t (11a). This was recognized by a number of NRA officials.
Goncr.-l Johnson described the situation as "-olain horse trading and bare-
f:ceC. yceler playing" (12). Other high officials less robustly called it
a "t-.1iic 1'.-ro.uo"(13) or "partial colnensation for increased labor costs"
(14), ihe n(rtion became so popular with adminiistrative officials that
the-" "-.:;. tested it to industries, oerhaeps thinking the industries were not
sufficiently aw-re of the possibilities (15). Codes grew up and were
an-roved, not because .1T2A thou:'ht there was evidence to support the pro-
visi--.s, but because they contained the best provisions NRA thought it
coul.5. obtain from industry (16). It must be remembered that NRA '"rs not
an ii-rortitil judg-e. It was a proponent of certain ends (17).

Aurther result of the code technique was to place agreement and
majority vote at a premium. Often this became the only guide to the
propriety rf code proposals. Whis was true both as a result of the
difficulty of securing necessary economic data to form a basis and the
viens of presidin,- officers. Even -,here a presiding officer preferred
to collect evidence he was handicapped by the pressure to get codes
ao-ircved. After the excitement of thcse hearings following the first
few. large ones presiding officers as a --hole tried to get some explanation
of thie purpose of code proposals. r-'o things probably prompted this:
1. A desire to avoid later interpretative difficulties and 2. The
insistence of the Legal Division on the need of "building a record"' (18).
Oftea there vwas a feeling that negotiation should take place in the con-
fere:ices, and that industry agreement was the only essential other than
the rfficerts own often naive view that the provisions be legal (19).
This latter view usually meant a' Clearance by the Legal Division, members
of 7.hich often v;ere swept along by the haste everywhere surrounding them
to cc-clusions none too carefully considered. Provisions for control of
substr-.-itial economic problems by majority vote was written into codes (20),
This discussion of majority vote as a substantive test is not offered
critically, although it is felt that such guidance is not always the most
wise in an economy so intricate as ours. It is offered to afford a back-
,'rcun(% for the procedure followed in NRA. Majority agreement procedurally
see-,s to be a poor substitute for careful explanation of means and ends
set L'crth in a record which may be preserved to offer to the courts as
"justification" for action ta':en or a-onroval given,

As a result of the serious administrative problems and the relatively
con .ndil-.: position of industry, the Administration's position offered
many difficulties. Haste in some matters, delay in others, and confusion
in nearly all existed. There was -pressure from all sides (21), by industry,
by political forces, and special labor and consumer groups (22).


Business came to YRA more quickly than w.s anticipated. IRA had no suf-
ficient organization to handle the -,roblerMs -nresented (23). Coupled with
the pressure to iet codes "thirou'h the mill" it can be easily seen how
errors wculd creep in, provisions iculd not be fully understood and rell-
reasoned judgments net always given. Of this, ell ]\RA directing officials
must have been fully conscious (24). In the balancing of disadvantages
they probably, consciously chose the course follo-ed haste in approving

Haste in securing personnel was easily auparent (25). No systematic
scheme or necessary qualifications for an; responsible positions were even

One of 1RA's most important functions should have been fact-finding.
1RA v-a-s meant to deal more replisticlly 7ith business problems, than could
the courts or the legislature (36). In this there was such haste that it
was alsaost impossible for IRA t- -iroperl-perform this function. The con-
fusion (27) and pressure Were so great that responsible officials could
not stand the pace physically (28). W.ith nerves unstrung and body tired
careful fact finding became a distant dream (if it were even remembered).
NRA's own procedure demanded such iiste that a busy presiding officer or
adviser could not hope to even learn, let alone analyze, the basic facts
of an important industry in the tine allotted (2r).

In the drive to get codes approved specific policy was ignored at
first (30). When policy was issued it often proved so broad and sweeping
that numerous exceptions were requiired (31).

Haste had a powerful effect u-)on procedure. Hearings were necessary
evils to be dispensed with as readily as p-ossible whenever there was a
demand to put a code or a pr-vision through (32). The work could be more
quickly, done in the conferences. That the record failed to contain
these cften valuable evidentiary discussions mattered little. The quickest
most covenient administrative means are hot always the best, especially
if there is possible judicial review (,3). The difficulties that might
result from questionable proced-.ue seems not to have been recognized.
There was no planning that a search vill disclose other than the goldu
fish bowl "'and "controversy" ideas (34). The responsibility of the Legal
Division should have been of a most grve character. Recognizing that
many presiding officers had no legal training the legal adviser should
have had considerable hand in shaping the course of hearings. Even here
the presiding officer may have had legal training there was no assurance
that he had a proper appreciation of the -irocedural requirements of ad-
ministrative law. The same holds good for legal advisers. The Legal
Division as p unit seems to have paid little attention to the problem of
procedure. A careful check of instructions given to legal advisers dis-
closes only fifteen memoranda with any bearing on the problems of this
study, (35). Of these only a very few touched on procedure (36). Their
dates indicate that they came in the form of a rationalization of existing
procedure rather than a careful recoi,,iendation upon vThich procedure should
have been built. In a resume of cases upon the NIRA published by the
Legal Division there is no division dedicated to urccedure des-oite the
fact that some of the cases suggested the problem (37).


It in 1iffimilt to i ', t oc re, )onsibility of the lack of thr-ujht
.,iv ii jrut.J i : i ,is Trere *iven orally. The Legnl
Division r-.s arngare of the ,orblA- ns indic'-ted by its memorandn even if
the aworealesn crme as -.n 7fter-thn.,'ht. TV resT onsibility probably varies
frri, crse to case. t'-r-e ro j',ibe t'm *y\7r ,rscna] filinrs must h've
beci-i. thie 2irive tr Lrdtc c ,.. jic: rJuction does not mean per-
manence or stability. Froi,-u r )cc uare could have gone far to hqve in-
suredi this had the Act been held constitutional.,

.TWc- the need fcr policy wr7s reco- :iised there was s tendency tower.c
tot- grent rigidity. Government has devised no sounmder method of dealing
with of economic and. social import thn the case method. The
difl'icultT found in the Anti-tru-ast lwrs, it was clai,.ied, lay in their
idclic- cf trying to fit All industries to one mould. M2A in its latter
darys dove.loped in this direction (38). There were situations where policy
:s acnet a sUfficient answer to the economic facts. A poliCy that might
Flcv; cue industry, because of its organization unusual liberties :night
be disti'ictly unfair to another. The form of such trouble lay in allow-
ing too great freedom to an industry because policy requirements had been
net cr in the desire of Deputies to adhere to policy desr.ite industry's
--ell-,-rou-ded request. Periips the difficulty lay not so much in the
polic- sz-eicunced. bat in its forms. Standards of action, standards of
maens ?nd end, coupled with intelli.:ent administration may be far more
orcductive thn absolute rigidity of detail. Of course, the latter is
desira''.e as a matter of uniformity where no other outeighing considera-
tions exist.

It m-.y have been that such policy grew up because of apprehension of
higher d.ainistrative officials toward the administration of those
officials nost closely in contact 'ith individual industries.(38a) .I'x'itlr
tc the haste with '-hich personnel was selected there were other pressing
orobleins presented by personnel, -oarticularly from Division Administratrrs
dolin tc nqd. including Assistant Dep.uty Ad-inistrators. NRAI s personnel
prr b] ers can not be assigned to political patronage fot it is common
knc' ledje that the vast maejcrity of those in responsible positions
(nci- inany not in such positions) '7ere brought into the organization
through personal connections with those already in 1E. The immediate
nucleus of officials were trusted friends of General Johnson or business
assrcirtes. There Were some labor leaders. On the whole they or their
friends se? dom furnished the important presiding officers. People there
/e-'e 'aplenty desiring to work for HRA. There may have been a sufficient
nuTbo-r Cf cal)able admi-nistrptors with a public viewpoint, but this is
do'ubtfu.. One thing is certain. Many presiding officials had no con-
cetion of the rcoper character of an administrative hearing or its 1ur-
*}Gse. 7ven worse is the suggestion that presiding officers may have
rfte; hIad cr at the time had substantial interests in the industries
co;miu under them although this was probably contrary to NRA policy (39).
There were a number of cases where NRA officials were graduated into
the ran':s cf industry t comparatively princely salaries (40), This
does not nean that there was dishonesty upon the part of such persons.
It i.:,.ic,-tes, however, such an akiness of spirit that the public interest
as -rt from industry's interest or personal interests might have been
sc slighted (41). The principle is well stated in the judicial


field that no man shall be a judge in his o-m- cause (42). There is little
reason '-hy it. should not avsply in the administrative field. It is so
recognized in England (43). The rule is a protection to all interested
persons an&. to the judte. No matter the honesty of the presiding officer,
it is w7ise to avoid the a ,-'pearance of -ocssible evil. The cry often
raised wUs the need for trained men. A man '-ho knows the problems cf an
industry toe intimately because he has once lpbored with it may be so
biased Ds not to be an impartial judge. It Ls possible to understand the
problems rf an industry, without having workedd for it.

Perhoaps in light of the circumstances MRA could have done no better.
It wvculd hnve bean impossible to have call-ed upon the Civil Service. The
job was too large for it (44). The Brockings study well states the

"A problem in public xeruo:rnel administration more
difficult than that of securing industrial specialists
for ccde drafting and code enforce ernt can scarcely be
imagined. To secure at once persons well versed in the
intricacies of the industry and yet free from bias and
questionable interests was a (lifi."iculty of the first
magnitude. Many persons would have bad more confidence
in the selections if eligibility for appointment had been
determined more in the open by an inde-oendent personnel
agency using a system in which the facts of education,
experience, and interests were massed 1upon by a special
coMIAittee of ccnmoetent examiners of high standing, and one
which left a reasonably complete record". (45)

This element of bias so:.ietines showed itself as insufficient aware-
ness cf any public interest. He! oonsible officials made premises which
could not always reasonably be kept. For example, a responsible official
made a -rrnise that an aooproved code provision could d not be touched until
the industry agreed to the changes (46) yet the Act indicates a desire
that the President modify or cancel any ao-nprcved code provision where he
deemed such action necessary (47).

zA additional difficulty lay in the fact that presiding officers
did n-iot alrx-ys get along well with their advisers. Advisers like hearings
were someti.ies looked upon as-a needless nuisance (48). IMuch of this
feeling resulted from the idea that hearings were to be forums of contro-
versy opposed by orders to rush the code-making process. Controversy
delayed hearings. Long hearings delayed cuttingg codes through".

The theory of industry self-government provided a strong limitnticn
upon pdj.ii-.-.istration. Many felt that 'ith adequate industrial inforMption
much of the solution of the depression would come from industry (49).
Many industrial leaders and some OBA officials followed the theory that
whatever a representative group in any industry thought best for that
industr-" should be accepted as prima facie in the public interest (50).
After crdes were approved this ras extended tc the place that ITRA officials
often discouraged the sending of pertinent infrrma-tion to the Acbdministra-
tion (51). Indifference tr the public interest as such further colors


I -.1

some cf the difficulties tr be foumd in thl .9drmiinistrative qr..-,romch.

Any consideration of ;e i roceC)rl problems must be msde onlr Pfter
an understanding is hrl cf tbe inherent limit, tions cf the scheme and the
ad-Tinistrative Fn-.,'roch. Ind.ustr ,'s !bi7itr to bnrgfiin, the trust placed
by NRA in industry self rcver.riient acnd. te value of majority vote, the
haste and corfusion surrou-Jin'- the -hole aimdertntkinP., the failure to
reccg.nize the ir,,ortance mnd difficulty cf procedure, and the li.-iitpticns
of the oersrrnnel nll had important influences upon due process of lin,
both procedu-'-L;l. pnd substantively, and the Tack of it in NRA.




ITBA assumes a ride range of jurisdiction. Whether this was always
properly assumed is a prelimins.ry consid.e. rtion to the propriety of pro-
cedure. The review exercised by the courts over administrative action
through questions of jurisdiction and jurisdictional fact has already
been observed(l) as hcs the recent importance of the latter question in
the field of administrative lan (2). Jurisdiction has a close relations
to qucstionL of la, and it is cuitc -ossiblL that a number of the broad
terms in ihe Act mifht have been subjected to judicial definition. This
it has been observed hsqx-cencd to man:r of the problems of the Federal Trade
Com-.ission (). A more review -'ould have been for the courts to
have d.etennined whether the actual f;-.cts supporting jurisdiction existed.

A number of questions that --ould hnve furnished both problems in
jurisdiction and jurisdictional fr.ct ap-pear in the Act. The codes were
to be E..plicable to an industry or trade or subdivision thereof (4).
That is r-,o.-jerly an industry or trade? Did the Fibricated Metals Code
(5) cove---:: liore th-n mne industry? The code for the C-rephic Arts Indust-
ries (6) purpoted to cover anyone who might perform the "act or process
of -orintin',, impressing, stamoing, or transferring upon paper or paper-
like subst.-,nces, of any ink, cnlor, pignent, including any and all par-
tial processes and services used in printingg. The code by its title
covered more than one industry e'1thou-h the Act did not specifically
authorize such coverar-e (7). It se-ms, of course, that subdivisions of
an inC.ustr-- might be split up. Even this might be carried to such extreme
eno.s thr.t courts rTould interfere (8) if they felt that such actions had
been carried unreasonably fvr. The problems mentioned are illustrated
by the titles of such codes es the Lumber and Timber Products Code (9)
an.d The '4op Stick Code (10). Could a verticle code be said to properly
cover o n industry? The resale p-.rice- iraintenance -lan of the Tobacco Codes
were in effect a verticle code (11). It wFs often possible to "freeze"
a distributive system with such a code. It is quite possible rith the
courts' 1knon antipathy to this tyne of action that the courts might
have saic. an industry was net neent to refer to such separable activities
as manufa.cture and sale not zener.l-.y carried on by the same persons or
firms. Imnurop.r:r classification of firms as belonging to an industry
where there ras good evidence to sho'" they did n-t is another possibility
(12). The suggestion is that the court might have tried its hand at
classification. Overlapping codes furnish still a further problem. It
coul6. be ei.ily thought that it is unreasonable to require a firm to pay
tribute to more than one Code Authority vhile performing only one opera-
tion (13) or to be in the dark 'ns to -hich set of fair trade practices
it must operate under. The Bak-ing and Resta.ur.:.nt Codes illustrate the
situation (14). Large restaurant chains operating bakeries for use in
connection with their restaurants or separately, were covered by the
Bal:in:,, Code (15). Overlapn-,ing codes mi;ht mean that a small group would
be conrpelled to abide by a particular obnoxious provision (16). It is
quite possible that then code structures became unreasonable the Court
would have said there was no jurisdiction under the NIRBA to approve such


a codeLLo or that the *:rou,., codified '"as nyt in :a inc(ustry in the
metuii.L, of .the Act.

Other problems E%-bie.. frown code structure r,.:ise the question whether
codes were within the purposes of the Act. Could a code prop. rly ccv.I-
pe-',;ons ,mr: oyin:- no l.-,bor? It ;L.s been thought not. Yet, this is Tprc-
ci.el;;- v,.at the Fur Tri.riin.- Contractors Code did (17). 'he Act s'z
"t rrde or ine- try", not on, ]o.yers of lbor. foreverr, the entire structure
of 'h:. Ac% ir.dicates that the latter wa, intended (18). In the instant
Cocie the proponents were Louisiana tr',ppt rs of ":u.k-r't vho leased the
tr!-..-,oinG privilc fts on lar.'e bodies of s!-, np w-yin. n -)erccntr-e of the
catch. Sozi t:-',i-Tjers were actual employs of lnnd-owners or intermeo.-
i;cLte -r,.n(.-lessors. Both the trappers and the lanc.-o'-ners and middle-men
who' i'roMn the 1-.nj-o-'ners and to the tr'--,pcrs desired large percent-
ages of tl'e catch. Colonel Conkllnc0, the Deputy Ad.ministrptor, felt that
the lcnd-o.ners hliE the upper hr-n, and that the tr.i:qit-:rs were in need of
relief. This he deterrmine' -to -ive them through the medium of a code.
At first all the -..3visers including the legal adviser (19), expressed
the o ,inion that this .-rou,- could not -,roperly be given a Code. Finally
Colonel Cor-:lin.- prevailed and the Code was Fur Tra:pring Contract-
ors Code instead of Fur 2r--.-uers Code. The Ic vord contractors
with a group of dummy labor provisions camouflaged the situation so that
a coide w.s issued (20). In such n situation ., court -iijht be expected
to say there is no reasonable relation here pith codes contemplated in
the Act and the Administration ho.s no j.riFdiction to approve such a code.

,hen definitions -'ere hastily and. looFely dravn serious -questions
of jurisdiction often arose. Probably the best tEeans of settling these
contests vould have been to review the representative character of 'pro-
ponents and ssenters. This method ras frequently ignored. In its place
interpretation wa,; resorted to. An interpretation upon the basis of v'orf
used in the definition mi ht extend the code's jurisdiction far beyond
that which it could claim as a matter of representation (21). If a group
were brought under a coc'e as a result of such a procedure it wouldd have
an excellent case on '-hich to challn-nge the code's jurisdiction.

Jurisdictional -problems bet' een governments and between their agencies
frequ.- tl-y aPrise (22). A number of jurisdiction.-1 problems lay in the
wide reference of the Act to trades or industries, while other agencies
existed rith a mecsui'e of industrial control. The Federal Trade Commis-
sion and the Department of Justice had long been active in the field of
industrial relations. Consent decrees and injunctions secured by
these agencies provide the largest problem. There was an effort made to
clear with the Department of Justice, and many codes were delayed because
of this (23). Although some decrees were for-sllv modified many were
not, --et coc.e provisions permitted actions in violation of court orders
(240). An unusu 1 situation would have arisen hc-d the courts punished as
contempt such actions. Io such action by the courts has been brought
to writer' s attention.

A number of proposed and approved codes involved or interested
other federal r--encies. The A-ricultural Adjustment Administration, the
Petroleum Administration and the Federal Alcohol Control Administration


- I-

-c -

each exercising power delegated under the Act rere interested in a number
of codes (?5). In the codes interestin.- the latter the Treasury Depart-
ment had a gravw interest as tl-e licensing agency (26). Then too, the
relationship with the various labor agencies was not clearly defined (27).
The Jublic utilities- proposed codes each involved a relationship -ith
other gov-rnmental- agencies. The Telegraphic Communications Industry
was substantially related to the powers of the Federal Communications
Commission (28). The Natural C-as Industry vas of interest to the Petro-
leum Board (29). Of more interest and qauting considerable dissention
was the Electric Light and Po-er Industry (60). Although NPA's relations
were mainly of the most cordial nature in a case like that last referred
to haId NRA p-ersisted in codifying the industry there might probably have
been p-ore:ented a jurisdictional problem for the c'nirt,.

An ii:.portant problem of ultr-. vires is presented by code legislation
-hich undertook to govern pvcrsons outride of the industry making the code
(31). There were many refinements of this problem. Some codes accomplishE
the desired result by providin, members could not sell to or deal with
firms engaged in certain practices (32). The effect was usually suostan-
tial. To remove a source of supply or a market may be as substantial in
results as legislation in -ords. The Legal Division recognized the serious
nature of this problem (33). Despite this, examples ,ere frequent.

It was generally conceded that as to the desire to have a code pro-
ponents ;iust have been representative. The exact tests which should have
been applied were in dispute. Of course, a representation of as high a
percentage by each test, and of over fifty percent by all tests rould
have been desirable. Economic data was so scarce that-it was possible
to misrepresent representation in many inst-nces e-ither through ignorance
or design (54). The problem of actual representative character is cer-
tainly one of jurisdictional fact. There was a possibility that the
courts would undertake to determine this question themselves if they felt
that 1TRA h.d found incorrectly. lIBA's drive to approve codes may have
often caused responsible officials to accept less evidence than would be
desirable upon this problem. Upon the r'hole, however, this was one of
the p-oints most scrupulously checked by the Acdmninistration, particularly
the Legal Division.

Aside from the code as a r'hole another' question presents itself.
Was it necessary that there be a majority of assenters to each code pro-
vision? Certainly, a majority of the industry by some test must be as-
senters. Did it matter that their e-sent ',as gained, despite strong and
even violent objections to certain code provisions?. Cases can be imagined
where this might have been important. Of course, many of the more e:.-er-
ienced industry members refused to assent until assured of their desires

This brief survey shows that N?A's jurisdiction was open to many
questions. The facts upon '-rhich jurisdiction was thought to rest were
not albar: reduced to absolute certainties. In both these questions of
re-oresentative character there existed a pregnant possibility of judicial
check. 1TRA often avoided possible difficulty by refusing to act. :iany
questions could not be avoided. The rise course and the one usually fol-
lowed 'as a strict requirement that industry groups be as representative
as possible.



Ad. ii:.istrative ")roccure is not the for.:,oT roccd'u-c of the courts
(1). If it rere auch of t:e value of the a,.i2inistrative technique woulk`
be 7estro 'e. :o general rules or forms can be ernectec. Froce'r're is
us.v .I-"- built to neet the eer-.s of the particular field (2).

Statutes establish': ac.ninistr;.tive a-encies vary as to the detail
with '.ich they .set forth the -rocedure to be followedC. Somre statutes
ifn. .-. t'e m-roble.2 (5); others say little; still others outline thie )ro-
ce- .:7 -. _-ther Cefinitely (,). There has been a. recent teno.n:cy to in-
cli'e P. requirement for a heari. in statutes (5). If n.o -rocedure is
s-oeci'ies the ae"ic.y .zi.j use r-:, reasonable -oceure it oeins; resite'ed
tht. .-'e "irocesE of lnvw is intended. (6).

The Act contained fer" references to -rcce:ure (7). There was a ta-
riff .'..just..lert -orocec1.'.re (9). .'otice an were s-)ecifie', in the
lice.s...;:. -rovision (9) and in special instances in .the code oroce'ure
(13. O-ther than that the Act was silent.

The Schechter' s brief (11) ,,ent at 're.t ! to oint out this
feature of the statute. Secificlily it --oiniter' out t'e-'e r'ere no -ro-
visions for notice, the talin^ of evidence, .nd the scarcity of the find-
in7 re-_- .ire.ients. It also sw:-'- -estef that the President's a-ooroval ", .
be utt -1" arbitre:'ay anc ca-ricioas. As .ado already. been sqtv-sted,
ther-e is judicial chec': t-rouh ultra vir:1- upon the President in all
case, exce-ot a refusal to act (which 'ou!. not be involve- in the brief's
su-"estion r. .., (12)

T'- fact tViat io -)rocerure -r-s state". in tie Act is not uncor.nion.
an-. octs ueleatinj a,:-iinistrative .io-rer !o not state .a rocedure, but
allo- the ad.inistrtive bod- to set uro its ov-rn "-ocolv:.-re. Of course,
'e'-eer this nrocee'ure provides d'ue proci.s of la. for inividuals af-
feet.c' is ulti v tely to be the Court. > t e Court's own
,ecisio--.s it is certain tha,-t .n Act by nrovidein -oroce'ure
does not esca-Oe the roceural reouirezimets of the FJ-ifth A .end :ient. The
Sc'.e.ter Cormoration's brief continued its attack : u-on the Act by say-
in] t t Federal ?:'-d'e Co.imission procedure procidCed due -rocess of la-,
.h'-,ile the -rocedure of the ecovcr.r-,- Act c'id not (IJ). federal Trade -ro-
ce"''.e 1Wad never be, sevel-, "uestione,. There was little need to as
jud-ici.l review rras so readily 7.vilable. Still the federal 7,-a.e Co.-
:iss-on Act (14) was far froi, establishin: iny full irode- are. Counsel's
ar:-:L ,F..t procec.ed u.'on tie fallacy that a@Zministrative '.e -orocess aust
be e7t.lis,.ed by the statute. It transcends the sta.tute. The renuire-
.ient is ',e by the Constitution. It :ay be suo7lied a-crt from statu-
tory direction or in accordance with it. It must in any event be afforded
by .e AC .inistration- or t':.e courts ,-ill offer it when a nro-oer crse co ies
befo-.- tre:., Co-J.mel elabor.ated u-ooni this ar--.ent (15). nether the ar- referred to the enforcement procedure or the code- 7mAi ne procedure
is -ot clear, 7orwever, it is only in enforce. -nt that there is a close

- c2-

analo .. 1- L' e -,:o')lC... oaf :--oc,'c.r e to t 'e 7"er l Tr? e Co'U.i'ssicn.
Cou:,sel ued t:r t1 e ct .. . 1 ;;.'ce It nTesc.:ibe" no con:stitutionr.l
met o.'. or -iroce for -sce: t;.i .-.i .._.t -.e u.- iL .,ie ,.:o s of Cornn-eti-
tion, ?:.: i.' t'dc ,-Ies ect tot"U'. if:'rs f:-'o.. t-_;e ..Fede al Co. iiis-
sion Act. It is ,:ene:-.i-]. .o-i:e.r.,- t.-p.t tLe 'T-r' e Cc.ainssion Act ,oes
not establis' :.'oc-'s-e -,it '."..-: : e.r-ice o0 cr:.?ctit;ure, su.c.i as the I:;te.--
state Co..L.ierce Co ois1io Act 'oes. c-,o-jer,, counsel finr.s ver.'y ela-.ornate
orocc" ur1-c este)!lis _e"' '."' t'e T-pade Co. :sso". Act i.- t.Lw- fF..ct that five
i1n)artial Co,.L.'.; -ere to j- a- -ointe-C r" t':-.e Presie,-nt r'itj1 t-.e
advice of thie Senate, and t'., t 'e DO..'. -ics io.- :f it -jelicve& any -ersoni
wVas usi"._, F-1 cL'f'ir iethe' of cor-cetitio-: i. co,'.,rcrce or, t:.Pt a -)roceed.-
in. '-ro '. Je i-n t.'e -.'ol.c int restz, ccju..' se."'ve fcr..:-a.l int on t-ie
person .acLu.sec setting, fort> t-.e c-iPL.'--es. T'-:.e co. -;lpint ..2ust contain a.
notice of the '_erri.r-: .-ivin .'a.t.e r.- stpti-n- tV'ie -).lace. The -nerson
serve,.'. c.'. "tLe i-it:t to an~e.r .n," s.'.o" cu.use '.- theP Com.mission shoul'.
not eL.-,e'- a ce.?se P-,. ,esist er e:. 'estui. ,on ',s recuirer -'-ic'h nust be
re:.ucec Co '-ritijng. T'-e Co..Fio-.i ..' ren-ui:'er_ to .ia':e findin.js of frct.
:.:u.t iL is to be re e'.fboerc& ''int1' tei ".A _ro-uteQ all this -oroce.ure sneci-
fic l.... 'itiin its on 3o,-'. Ps tF il-'.--' c t lteif or tLie Plte-"nma.te nroce-
C'ure of i:juinction 'rocee,'i"p's befc--c t.--e Courts. l.ere is force to t'.ihe
suggestion t'-iat t"ie Tr-f'e Cor..issi., :roce(ur0 -Ilace'" ro coan-ulsi-on to
force o:3eience to its orders umtil t_-e'e -p '.s licatio to ti.e Courts
to enforce its ori'n-s. In 7A, on the other 'n-o-::, novel h'arssment in
the forn of cor-nli .-nce ".)2oceec'.in-:s ',:.s -:. vo='ac- (16). 'ven if this latter
-roce'iure -,,-s ], it could _.-P e u '],-=, 3(
.roce '-. it coc' e jeeni ecl..r'- a still leaving as :ooc
thie cof'e-:":in, ni-oce'.Lre, .r.ssm:'In._ t-.-t it .,et due n-rocess of
law reoui:-e..ients.

TI e ...Pin iroce'ural idea to ")e fr-n' in crl" '-V was to hear all in-
terestcC'. --',rties (1?). 'IPA -s ",- fouan 'of controvers.:" it wvas thlou-iht
,vou'.lc. fu.-ish a -erns "to ,et the'" (IC). T:.e intention of the Pre-
sirc.ent "rs to afford. a herin;_ (19). This .'as reflected in t'-he attitude
of t'ie Ac,-'.inistrator (2?). Desnite t:-is -,e 'have Cee'n-i t'at hiigh IJRA offi-
cials fid not feel a.-at the usual i.mnlication?, of F. statutory hearing re-
quire.nlnt need be folloeC (71). Statutes -rrovi'.ing for hearings are
constr-uer1. to mean thIL there is n ?rivi.]ee to i.itrZc'uce evidence and.. a
dCaty to 'eciC.e in hccord.anrce "'it th'e evi ence (-.U). The "ise course if
the e:xi-encies allowed it was to -nro'ide t."-. fullest n-ossible heari-iz.
Court, -)refer such aP. hearain" (?S) r nd it is the 'tale ..,ut of juC.icial
revievr that a.dminirtrative action ..iust f-ce.

Controvers:- not fact-fin'ir- ,.- the first st:tepd touchstone to wi-at
an ."?A heerin-' ras Cesine,- to oe (.:) In order that one nifit be heard
nroce,:ure orovider', for e'. reouest to b'e .r'.-e -rior to t-re heari; '-ith a
statement as to oersorn's desires i.r testif--'.n. that is, the deletion,
amend..ient, addition to or sv'.'-'ort of a nrc.posed n-orovision (25).. In fair-
ness o .:-A it should be stated, there was al iost .10 adt-erence to tle
requirement that one desiring to be .a witness as': i.l advance to a-.near.
I.RA -oresiding officers freely extendeC the '-.rivile.-e of testifyin-; to an-/r
person requesting to an-.eer either i: .nediately before or c'uring, a herxrin:.

Ot~i:r t'- n t -_. 'Tlic state.nentT u-ion controversy little guide is
offered" '-" PA as to the character its hearings ,,ere to tale. hearingss
',ere a-)--arently not even considered -.',s i..nortant as "a .ood niublicity
story" (?6). Later, '"IRA ex-oresse? el Ot.ihtly -.ore detailed statement of

t."'. "-:ce're to be uise.' 1.irinri; -ubolic e. r-.i;s, ( l7). T'is 't','- '-:it 'e-
u.:-i ... rsi"in- officers to srek "to elicit fcts fro.:a t.i o- one.ts .
"ro i','*. ts of .-necific oro-icions .'- tFe ooo'" cd code for the T r o,'- of
&etrio nnt of such-,ovs1s"(
bri.' :* or.t tVe necessity, benefit or etrient of suc ov ()
Thiiv Z :. tCe-nt iniicats that controvc .s'.% alone .ia^ rove, ni,,'r ".t,.
"'-:, r feel::.: ,ar. manifest that crcii'inj; officers r.Ist to '. r-e act
as .' e"a.:iner cone dct in t, n 1"e 12fl>CT RiiCbjct to
revi'"". >?-s ''ener' iJo"on tio:; of controverry co-*'-, '.c,''eo.
t-.-.t i;ing officer 'c c... core riF; -lorifi,. 'efere . Ce"t'tin-
v,, c general Vhe:i o-ctin, rs a orc.i',:. officer "'," n c' kn "tn
-)VI-ri r ;.'cn fiiiestioner np) Mp y -nor!"pi''-^ txi cr fi .\o '*r'0 0"
P. o: !io. An i --ortrnt .27A official :s 1es'rieJ n h', .rp.,, s.s "J series
of st 1 e.,' ,ts y)7 intoreste' partiess so'.neti.'o baclc: "'it> co... ie'.r'.le 1.e-
gal '" stetis ical ,.Xatr, (,.so: ti .(. s ns. ..o rteC b:/ r'nvt: n:i e.'ce--t senti-
.ne'lt L" -e If-e'v dent ?t.'ite.:'ents," (3').

I. 'rt P i, in ,',"'' te .C":.rin-. c )e e frev'u t., fomnc'. ':'e;i t.xe 0 re-
si. "; officer `r,,'e 10 atte.nt to ellcit facts, it -,s vaite -7os'ib !e
tlip -rec orc '-' )Ce c ''rc" i'.s to -'ticn '.'l, ii.ort':nt --ro'.- sion.
..i -'t .c true :'ie to a. v"-riet:7 of re';so,' even Kienr advisers -icre "-iven full
rein '. .-.stion. T/'e 'Av-ser .nay I:Lve ". :io infom,.rrtion to-tb 1-
.t'_tr- 's -ast -tractices or t-.e ''o'-< ] of t" e -rovisions i;: cve n-,-eared
i.i:o;:t.,. S'1. 1 c7'>metitors fren-.7c0t.; ,-'e-e too 'ooor to co". to '". in_
to.I, 'x t-'e.r ,2,; hve receive, no :r twice. -Co:..... o>' "orvi 'ic.ns, nvive
a.s t." '..e:y. rv.!es, so.tetines ".'reeo .c- to voice objections i ."'..:n ,
un"'.r '.e assurF,.ce tht their objections ".c1 boe consi-, e:e. :nattors
JirOL.. o'.t" in tie cnf-e:'.ce, T-e iDress-Are tro -eat coc es rov s
:'r.ent irdce .ent, to 00so.e es-'iin, off'ice-s, to ,es'i'r not contro-
v"rs-" -uit 1..r,. .ent. 7'len t.ere -*as (.. ent ..r' ere ortenec.
trr: e '.t 7 ,inoe'.1,ei's of :n in'_ .stw:'y "Soes not .epa tl,-.t tVe -Wclic inter-
,est ov even the in'.ustr-,7's i tere+ e,-oul -be ..l. serve.. T',scse fq.cto:s
co;.--I1c 1 t'-tii ne.ctiot o. t,_e vrt T e'7es i -in11 officer.', serveC to 7o)'..oe
.m. --. 'e'-a.te recrr,-::'s (31). S-oort e,'in s alone '7,erPe not tlie only re-
co-.s t-:at courts CO 'taveconsir' ere: inn-'".e--'ite. T.-t .'O s.erve to il-
las r: -t 1 ,-.': t pom.ieti nes .:-m-ep.e An- entire transcript of one :eari:r
exc.. .c.i.e of tVie re rocJ.ction of t.'e co e cr-n be rn .,cec' less tn.
onc .'te' e (2). T-eer' ares IU.ler of oth-er e:-.-n.l"o]es (:.). In
t.e c o I- an.' ore i-'ror.-t inccutries 'R.earin';s 'Orrc often r.iSte
"lo.n cr o raratively (14).

7A ,ex-esse eire to nia've no ar 11.e:nt or o-inion at :e'ri-k
(',) T-.e .;I:a.Ifeot".t of ?cc.irately ,isti-ui"in. t'een
fict ," opinion o :r.:ient n exl".tio or intn rretation- of" fact
nrev-'.t'.' t-te fua!.file.,t of t !. desire. T-,e best :]no., n means of c;s-
tin -i.s .- fact from o-:inion lies in the rnles of evi ence ('.a). It
is ;oJTtec if t"is -neans was -ver resort. to in ?. So ra.le tat
there e ..oi,10 be no o--inion tes ti.iorn- ,eca-e oof no .ei!O to the A-:einistr.a-
tic.i. >:ste'', it '-!as subJject to ;ab -:)-resii ', officers. The us"asal
.Dr- j, '-as to al.lov,! a witnesss to r-ble *oa.r'rrc. as he -ishsr eniressin<
a'n" t.: ,-'t tha.t in his h' 'o. -. rn .-'-..n the r'.c a-,ainst ormi--
ment or o.-inion was invorec, aw-ins;t a. oartic .c rly ist'stefuiil Abit of
tsti v (6). .

7'ere eare other arixnents for a different' rule in addition to the
nossi.),Uty' of abu-se by resi-'ino officer;. -oinion testi.ionr-y is often


necescrr" to C'ecie issues i: '.-suts. in is ever: .ire tr-,.e in the fiel."
of tr- e fr. ivi'ust.. "r '' f.,,.ts .*' ofte '.sel_-s or nion-e:.-istent in r.-
sence of o->i.nion t.o :ive 0I1..1."; 'olo.). or E, IDf o-i.-icn evife.ce is
ad .1iS i ._Jr i-. courts it '-T .Jc, c. ? -. t"`. t it l .!. .e a:' .is i".)le fortiori
in a. lini-trc tive *v ocese".i ic .e .'. 'ose to je .mic. .ore la: ii
their ,-enuire.,e: ,ts as to t'le "," is !ii.i t::, of evi' c-ice. It ":as ,oeeSi su-
geste' t'"t it is ",neron s to ,"onsi.e, o L,."- o. evni"e-ce (-7). >..t -"er.
oni.-ion fu.--ishes ti'e o-l cl-.-.e to ti. t-v.e sitir.tion iJr :n in,'ustry it
must ie Occe-.te: if is to '" a7:.'y ei. entjir "sis for p.ction.

Ar:-,iwleit as to inter-;rnttion to ".e a.o.t ,non ti-e f:'cts .anc the con-,
CluLSiOns Cc .,e I rar'n ''ol-O.'. -,eei to : n "i" to .- e s i cin officers. Sel-
0o.n "'eC'e --resi-c.,m.: officers so intii"", el :onnectre- "iti nrn iniLustry t"-t
P. str te...ent of s.tetistic-l i- uo".ir tieC. -i." si.-)le facts would, suffice
to a.ffcrC a )ro-Der bn.sis for. t.eir fi'i .. .'. Aru uent of t'-e fccts te.-i's
to -)oi..t ho the critical iE., '" "O'L.I:' ?e:.. 'o 7e z.-'i en r".lly A'el-)-
ful a' itic'-1. to bare 1i.:tro7..ctio_' cf frcts. e-.e too, tie co.-non --r.,c-
tice -T"s to n.llo'- .rgUitent t .o..-. :.i t_.xor it -c-'" -r.nel'. Th.e :'istinc-
tion 'oet','eE st.tin: facts .-.','.,-et .r: si -,le ftcts i-nto conclusions
of fact is so subtle tllct ic, 7.R, lost t- _-,.rt i -re-.idLing officers. A hear-
in, i- t--c "r'ue process" sense is usu..:ly ti]_,, to include such rea.son-
.,ble arL.Lv.ent of te'-e facts as is 'esire'.' a n i ;,,-reste(. -ap.rt:, to -Doint
out -iis nositio: (:o) T-his is t-.-ue e-en i.. I_-.c -_.stricte'' nrnce,:ure of
custo is 'eter.."iinati.~ns (J9). ..ere svust. .-ti 1 ro te'',t interests or' .e'-
ouestiorns of econo..3 c si.nifica.-ce re i-volveI it 'iihly .,r esir'.')le
to allow a full -.:-u...ient of tie f"'ts. Tt th'e inte-.-este '-.rties'
privile,_e of )einm 'erdr. It also .f-tor 's .elf.'l direction to t-le n0r.-
siuin of icer.

A'L-.ient as to tlie I a.- -.rese_-its .Jo-c , ciestion. Al'.inis-
trative 2.,encies i:n a1"-in,1 'ecisions ' keen ri2 eye to tie -"ecisions of
courts in T:-,e fielJ of its activities. "c;--e a statute uses such terms
.s "fair practice," "uizf ir co ietitive -r=.ctices," in' "interstate or
forei.rn co,..ierce" it c'.n 'i e e::.ctc.' t--,t "*reve nucstionr of law noulr' a-
rise. Ar'-r.ient of co,-nsel xu-non sc.:' io_'.l' -)e :'.el'oful to the
Ac.,iinist..-tion. It ,'-oild further i-i 'ic-tr t- t".e courts that the AcJ.ninis-
tra.tion ,'rs '" of the le,,"l i. :-rolic:tins r-"' ir full"- c6nsidere-. the.-.i
esneciclly "-'-ere thie AM.niriistrc.tive ,licision -involver' changes in the e:is-
tiu,n st-.te of the law. '"-A or- 'e le7'rl r-f.i.t.ent (.-2). It adhered nuite
closely tc its rule. or rI-s evir'ence --'con such leral -)ocints sought or
relco .ie' (41).

Little disaCvantr.-ae c-in be sec-. .allov'i:-: v-urime.nt exce-nt the tine
consn.1ec Positive nee. for r a-Lr-ne-t of tnre facts is evident. Argx.nent
of t'e la- .' oul inC"ic..te to t cc'.-.ts a .>sire to be al)solutely fair
nJd to --roceeC i.non a fully ren.,one@I course. -'A ello'-'e" -.r.unient union
the fccts ')ut refuse2, to recognize t'.is in its stated rocerure. It 17ould
see..i aCvantageous to have -i.:e state, 'roco'ure en." nr-.icticed. nrocee.ure
accor'".. Fers.usivc reasons e:.:isted- ,'.'r e.r., p'net of ti.e lrx and introduc-
tion of -ertinent evif.en-ce shoul.1 h".ve been encouraec6,

Should the '.rivile-e of cross-exr,~.iin.tion '.-:ve -.)een afforded by UJA?
The stateC" '.-RA -nroce'ure refuse,' --srties such (4.). All neces-
sary questions it *':7..s tho-uht coLIC be 'it oy the nresi'in officer or his
advise-'-s. Crosr-e.-r.:ination is frenuentl-' to be an essential of a
fair -," linistrative hearin;1 (4). This is -'roba')ly more true ,r'here a stp.a-


tti1- P ,' i\ r' P r ,.e"ri"." ": .'- in .. .broa '' cvic" .i'icl .. I. I' :e ..ei'-':;^ t^.ces
o.a .:-ct of a contert "t'7,een v"-ties, c"*.:.-s-ex,'., i. ction -s Oc liable.
... eari:'" "e-e of cue n'ture. I' these ocr "-' coo- natio
ni.-'"'-! ,:';ie oft.,., been heil.;'. ] Tt c'" i I o co'ourse, be ..c -wr2' a to ".. c
*"i ' *'-*'" ,e ;.,e...ns of Fel :1 'e-"i is ere i.. "):RsiZ.''i;, officer
nuist t .:rcise diIcretion li: 1itn it -,e i t serves no re'l TI" 'ose. I
r J-' i !itrative 'r-oce'vhre cros-ex,. ,i tion iit be li nitec to u1se
re l contest of i.terrsts e:"istec. Croi-;r .r'.inptio 0 p iu -
tr'. : :en.l wv.lue in co-Ai .. t''. teere',,1: evidence (i:.). Its .so ii
suc *..o.'iate "Places "(s "''"eTe a rii' r c b'F co.e i'; f:'ct contest
jet"-1,, li.ite n v. uer of .,ics .rticlr i 'e 'o
..i .i" "esiroble.

".l&1ted -roble. s -e ,o., i C reJ'utt l test a .oi;t (-, &) an confi-Cen-
tipal 'eorts. '.L,' offici-i ,"'te> st-'tcc' t-'.'.t r-3"uttr.l ',s not to oe 0 l-
lo0-u. 'e,'t i ty in ,i'orc' .c rule eistcx. Al..iost i:'v:zria")ly
aite- ..'.:in:- st,.te:icnt mo,, -' -ro-oso.' co. e "rovision t -e ,rc-'onents
eere 1-ro ve"'' to .r'.e n1 n ern., st.1'te ent to 0 ", criticism. v irecte' "r
o'yo. -. "ts fro:i, thel- floor o:: ; .via.e-'s. ei:tt,,'l -&.s not li.:ite' *o -)ro-
"o-ieI's .So-eti:nes a -rcsiai.: office- so lost control o:? v .e.ring tiat
Scros-fire of stcter.Ients n ar v.-:ents b -,,ol-)oi'ents n."' o)oonents en-
se'. "*en flexioility of ",*roceh're t'rs, in c. o C. cl:o' ao certain i'ri''p.'it
0o r,"'roch "mo\lt su 'est itself s-)rrfer")_le. "-e orde:: of -roc'v're
of t. il ":i.'ht not 'ixve bec( e:-itirel-r :.t of -,'.ce. ?ro1o:1- ti-st (aito
-L ii. ;',iff) coui' hlave -- se t':ei:r c .'.e; t'" the o`-'one:t ; e ". .' 0en
Sc o. '-, .-' t'-ie -)rbo-ooncnts. 0 .is cou.1.' .o've oe-.-. I i iteC' to i ivi(' i )l
- 'o --s or to t.7 co1e "roioscl as -. o ".l. A:, T-A -)roce''re -re'7 it
. -, acoi-U.ion for very er to vi"' -os.. to e ' . -,-'orients were givenn t'ie -.rivil_, e to s'oen:'. -,tfter .ieir o'yone:l'ts
t',e7 -pre in fact ..iven ? r'eb ttal o-,.ort'U-Ait o.. .o'n- tt'. c.a.nce to stte
t:ie q J-st,,rntive c. -r.racte-- of t''eir c. se. It sot l be wflir ot to allo1
-ov..t,. --re.nttn- .l o ''it:yi. :. fuAte. iicte b t. ev-
oI-* iti.. of -)r-oco' I -aito t0. ci? 20-se. A I ran: reco -ni tion in 'A's st.'Utee
-)roc .-e -'oy,1ir -<"ve ebeen ,e'esioa'b.]. o

T-A never nr.:e :,. for.y, ot, rt.-i e:At t -.t it ever ,acte" in re,--.rd to
cor' c '-,:. T'os.'ls aroon evi,'ence :.ot iint-o.uce t a _.eeri-:. It is auite
m-'o-.le thnt reliance ",," --l.-'.ce" i5 ore t.rn o'e case u.n-on siob. evidence.
'"e y_'ble"n resente, b:y n. f:ri!'re to -.-ve r asis i. t".e record for ?.c-
tio:, -c te subject of treat'.e.t at .notli-. -loace (.G)'. ''..en reliance is
I:. *.. -o t. "confi.'cntial re-o rt" by ,n a-:ent or infor-i.tion fro'n secret
Titn-.-. to-2ere is r-isec the craestion -'ethor c, airooer i..aring l'.,.s been
aczo:- e interest'" -rt.ifesc. t,' CO "eonfi.ential report" vrole: vas --,re-
sente' 1,o tl'e n:lishli courts in t1'-, I'>ou-s 'cse of L--, oy ... -sit "oo''
v. A-'. e (47:). Alt':.o--, tn; of TLors ceci"ec t'.-rt t*ei ."as no
rij.t to see tl:e inspector's "-o "rt, it createC., a stor.-n center in nn.!lish.
-*iiit-ative la'? (K-). ?ie :--ecent 7.e 'ort of toe Co.nittee on -inister's
Po-e-.-s (<.9) S'.'iedn t-a't ,,ne nactices of ,, :i:.j confic.enti.1 rc-
port- )o EvoifeC. T' -olo certsl see. thle fairer rule !n, te one
to b followed "unless -r;.:ve consi .e:bAions of oublic --olicy.- intervened.
T k e~ ~~ ~~ I:. ,e ,tt s c .s .
T.> -.itec" States cases indicate t:t t-,e r'-l e of tne ArliC -e case is not
!a7 i-. '-is co-ontroy (3D). It can be reac-il seen that fail-le to intro-
6iuce -re-ort into t'.e evidence "ay kceema n- rt" in. i2nor-nce of ",hat ev-
idence is desired by the aC"r-i.istrative b.. It may be t hat, the re-oort
hap.F :ot been carefully rran and thlt evidence by te parties it uicl-
ly est-')isI., tAhis fact (51). 'uch the sae:.e line of arjoi.ient holds for t:e

fail-are to -)lace all tes'-i o..' of tsse. -, t' e record' of the ea-i-.-
(53). There is iot o:--o't'.nit to c -cific a.s--ers (57) --hen notice
of the evidence to b)e relic --.--: n-s !3 & :i1-. :'A coLi.d :'ave )laced. it-
'self in te clear i- :.'c. "- o -ec-.t i .e7Firc v.,. confi-'e:ntial reports
if it :iu- stated t,.t ;t 'o.. ot -re1- soi suich evidence eCcent, of
course, -hen jrm.v'e )uJlic--,o.iCc e -...: ,-- .e .e 'ec:'-ee.

T0o -oo-er of s'.ib,)oen'. ,-:.:, ;ven b t.:e Act. T'?.is .-ne t that .RA .-i-mst
content itself -t'it" t.Le -,it.ies-e .esirini to testify. T-e Fe-er- rr?-'e
Co:muissiorz (54_) an tVie Tc--ff Cc .,.s ion ( .i) '--ave th-e -o'-er of sub--)oenp..
As t1i'e President ...ii.-it cll -,.n-on t.cs.-- oj...iiEsions to their nroceduiues
(56) tlie su-ooenp r"c',e '7,r. p)-OVF.r "" t/.e Act 1--tO..,u.-7li not riven to :-3A.
The courts have )een. rclLu.ct7.-.t to "iv i,1in:istla.tive bo. ies too great
o-,Trer of this c..r.cte. 0:ie ."roe 9" oc.'-.ure i-Lvolves an issu.--nce of
a su.o-ooeln,. ".)Y t ,e '. Tinistra.tive iO-7-. If 2'"e -. .'arty tovird i,-ich it is
directed tp:es no -hee'. tLe ,.:..;st'.tive o.y can a-o-ly to the courts to
co':n-el co-:.-liance .-ithi t_-. su-. oe' .. (-. 7). T.'e theory is th;-t the adl.iinis-
trative boc'y can not itself -oi'.is":. L.- ,-n-co.r-linvnce '7ibh its process as
this .m-y de-rive an in,'ividuF.l of '-is li-..rt% "it'.out a trial. 7o nore
trial is had, hor-:evcr, ,".ic:.e co'.:'t -,--nishes .a person ior refusal to o-
boey its access. The Teder.l Trc,'Ce Co.;. ?-io-. (57E:) ."._st a-nly, and u'-
tit necessary facts, to the Atto?.: to institute -roceedinzs to
cor-oel F-e-earance an.' testi.iony. .' e Attorney-%eneral :-.s the discretion
to refuse to act (3").

There were nuierou-.s occc-sions in 'i-?A ?'-.ere the ,)o'.7er to sub-roenr
witnesses an2 records -ouldC have becn of conside-rable value. Persons a--
oearinj ; before i-A -ere fra:_ to a". unus'iE.l ,'eTree. `,ere repre times
when such frankness 7oul,. have been fT.tal. rThen in -)reference to testi-
fyin2 it often -r-s tL.o.--ht best to Fa,', nothinT, or to fail to p--ear (50).
In such cases, es-eci.lI.:/ *'iere 7_-'. ,7.s ir- .Liri, into the manner in whicI
code provisions had beeO a -'inistered, the subp-oena oulO been a
useful divice.

As an alternative .ie-ns to th'e '.b-.oen-i-n"- of -,itnesses the investi-
Cation of books :in"' records :..y be resorted to in a.n attemrot to build a
factual basis fo--' .cti-Nn. This nzo-er of investigation is considered le-
gislative vh-ere t"he facts are re-)orteC to Congress, but ,.:-ere the facts
furnish a, basis for adC.ninistr.tive Ection :iit not be so treated.

7"eneral fishin e::-erc'itionE into t".c affairs of a stranger for the
chance that something i "iscrec'.itable .ii.-it sho07 un are imiformly condemned
(60). As Conr.ress can not nmunishi con'eRn)t if its investigation is not
legislative (61) likewise erenercal innuisitorial powers in the hands of
an Cc.-..inistrative body .Pre severely fro'-n:.C nUon (62). The courts
expressed rave doubts .-heter (Dom-.'ess) could dele..ate the nower (to
einbark on Leneral inouiries) if it nosses,,es it - -" (3). Thile .-A
had no power to conir.el oral testi.iony in e'bsence of" express statutory (,;-) it exercised an analogous oo'e', in recouirin: L-.t certain
books and records be ke_-nt and. re-norts iad.e to it (65). Such information
could b)e required as a condition to a-n-'roval, o.nd the necessity to period.
ic-illy supply information vras e::-ressi:, zenctioneO by the statutory lan'.-
uae (66), This dli.". not mean such information need not be judiciouslyr
la,.les. hany codes reco.nizinL' tiis required that information be .- ent.
confidentia-1l (67). ,

9. '3 I

NRA did not require witnesses to take *"n on'th. ITelthor did the
Agricultural Adjustnent Act although in the administration of thLct Act
an oath -'as required (68). The oath is not thou!iht to now have the
dissuasive power it once did to prevent perjury. Df site this, it hl'.
been su. ested th:Lt the courts may require it in administrative proceed-
ings if one n-irtr demands it ('"). Ad0Lnistering an oath no -,'.,cr to
punish perjury is quite barren. Most witnesses -or,r usually fr.n1: in
testifying. Their candor often an-.roachcd the roint of self-incrimination.
Occasicnally if a ooint could 'be gained a witness might try to lcave an
impression not in accordance with the facts. For these situations.a
statutory requirement that witnresPes testify ur,..r oath and astatutory
provision for -punishing perjury should :-avc been welcon.. devices. It
might be said that such -revisions would have defeat,'. the cooperative
spirit ITIRA sought to create. Most honest witncs.,s might, however, have
preferred this protection fro:n those less scrupulous that they.

Another question raised in connection with hearings is t'it of the
use of iv.ritten briefs. Does due process of la'r require oral hearings?
When the -problem has been discussed the answer has usually bcen,no (70).
The problem arnse in two ways i4 1.PA. A presiding1 officer desirin- to
save time, keep the record free from controversy or for other reasons,
might ask a witness to put his test-ionr_ in the form of a brief (71).
Just 'ihat consideration "as given these briefs ca.n not be said. It
probably varied considerably. Where no consideration was given, it was
likely that little more was accorded to the hoaning itself. To nany
presiding officers the record -as not important. The (.orninaiit consider-
ation was What provisions certain persons would agree to. The problem
of oral hEaring could arise where it 'as sought to anend a code by
"notice of opportunity to be hoard.1" T1A here set up a test of
"likelihood that a substantial minority or group. will object - -" (72).
Another test that is suggested from our survey of broad review is the
substantial effect upon property that the proposed regulation might 4ave
had. A more comprehensive test was stated by the Legal Division for the
guidance of its steff (73). It seems to more nearly approximate the
attitude the courts wo.ld probably adopt. The use of the device of
opportunityy to be heard" rested upon the feeling that it is an admin-
istrative impossibility to give a: separate hearinr upon every proposal
or to do all acts in "town meeting" (74). Despite these sound consider-
ations full oral is usually felt to be more clearly a
guarantee of due process of law,. If the subject matter is im,?ortant
a hearing 'will be held" If the subject matter is not so
.would seen. that the matter could wait until the next hearing would be
held. This dilem-a su. --?sts that the device probably should have been
more limited in its ap-olication, that is to such natters without consid-
erations of policy involved to which all interested parties could
readily qgree.

Certain shortcomings have bc*:.rn discovered in the hearings afforded.
Possible improvements have been discussed. Such a view of hearings as
has been had is designed to show the formal guarantees that should have
been extended to interested parties to have insured that they would be
fully i4eard.




Fn"DIi:--',3 ? .T I-. TT '.C33.D

The basis for the adLriini.strative determination is of the uti.inst
importance. It involves primarily qr.c:stii:.' .s of ?dmnissioility of
eviLence, weight to be givenn evidence, tfc. record: made, snd the
determinations which may properly be :n.-e.

Students of administrative lpvr hr-ve lon- contented themselves
with the Tenerality-ttL.,t administrative bodie' ere not l:-.eld to the
technical rules of evidence of the ccurts, thPt one of the prime
functions of administration is to be freO.d of such nipndicaps (i).
Recently Judge Stephens has made a care-'vl ntu-dy of this problem
(2). He conducted a survey of just how r ,. to -.inlt extent adminis-
trative bodies apply the rales of evic.ence (3). Although the answers
did not show any careful attcv.vt `;enei." '3y to follow the rules of
evidence it showed that they were often Ur .i-.l (4). Acmjiiniztrr-tive
bodies like courts take judicial niotrice of fr cts. The courts will
not always uphold findings made on s"..Ch n besis (n).

Rules restricting admissibility of 6v0.ence r".ich is deserving
of some consideration often come in for r:-uch criticism, (6). The
remedy lies not in abandonment, but in a fully considered relaxation
(?). There is certainly the v3lue of -, :)r'-eble test beinr available
when evidence is conf, sin.;ly conflicting. The c;,ief use in such cases
could be in the weight givenn .evidence. o' Ever, there is nn advantage
in having the rules .convenient as a r:enns to restrict evidence of a
highly inferior sort.'-
Administrative bod.ies hv
Ad-inistrative bodies hove prosb].ay ziven little thou.\ht to the
use to be made of rules of evidence (S). 1 -I. ...y quite a measure of
informality prevails -s to the admissibility, of ev/icence (9). Little
help is given by the statutes or rui.lesc of 'r-ctice of such bodies as
the Interstate Coirnerce Commission or ti.e ec.eral Trade Co-imii-ion
(10). The latter Comimsiih ,n.sunlly -doiits evit.ence but will listen
to objections 6uLrin- final ar-umIent on the rmeri.ts of the (ll).
In fields -,r'iere problems of eco/:o,.iic effect arise, it is 'esirEble to
allow a considerable .ie;,sure of freed,.om to 1'ityiesses, it bein;,- so
difficult to determine what &re facts (j). Such testi..,ony probably
can be considered as exert. The i'ative bodies &re not free,
however, to follow whatever rules t}-*y eoire. Decisions of the courts
refusing to uphold e-dnini'str-tive d.eter.-:inations hrva the effect of
establis'.iing evidentiary requirements (13).

Hearsay evidence is ,generf.lly admissible (1-1.). In John Bene
& Sons, Inc. v. Fedlerl1 Trade Comnission (5) a. person whose usual
occupation was running; a "beauty parlor" testified as to the use of
"Daxol" and peroxide. Though not ,'ith t pe cosLany at the time to
which her testiriony referred she wrs .llo',ed to testify. As she
stated, her lmov'leri:.e canie from the; f-ct tha t "at'.the time they
incorporated, the whole case was erpl-,ined, and I have all the
papers concerning the case." Other exi.,les of lie-rsey appeared in
the course of the oroceetin.;s. Te-tii.iony is admissible said the Court,


"if oi th, k'inc, tht ust.olly tffectv fair-:int cm'en in +'. conuct
,l t 'i' r -ilvy 'i',. .ore imortrnt 1fi irs. It "sho 'h be recCiv. ,t
-. ,' i :ercd; but it o c be fI Irly Cone" (16). In ..i'T; c. .'. the
C't itU r. *f e tC s (17). If if i In ri *;' e., i L Al.
.. '- i. rIle to 0 'ec1 ive l ..'-.s t 1.v. ast k; i ; v1 ,
zu ),.cL iL to t',- test ;n. of cross- yP:.ifnation (18) if the _..ilt c,'c
.,.c -t .it ]; -. %-A never refused tcstimo.,. of;er ." ;t t *" 'n- on the
r,: ..a .s. L Uron sbst:.-itiAl uontc-stet orohlern there
'.L..,i,' *C .-.i t":Cit in )rocercing cautiously in acce. )tn! s-ch testinmony
'l" "a-o s~ t
t'.,. sa a .( .er.l matter it could proou;biL oe acceotef. ZrL',yV.

Tie "best evidence" rule, likewise, r'o:io not !;e.r. to eC a rule
to b, strictly/ yp)lied. 'n..oUbte.1y, wit wa not followed by I-,".
TA.erc sce'-ns little iepun v'hy it o !old be unless SUb,,tmntia]. nterc.ts
. er. iivolv,- .ncd it colia by sbo'i that failure to adl.ere to the rvle
m.i:,ht ,rc.j dice the r',:'sition of -n interested party. Affidavits and
letters could also be freely rcceptea subject to the eame limitations.
NIRA mnde fr-e use of such eviCLence. The ':ir'.ctice in absence of objection
(19) perfectly y proper.

Interested o)rties sometimes rise inii courts the frct that evidence
was improperly admitted. One course to ll.y the possibility of such
action chllen:.'-i.: _TRA Lehrin:s mi ;it hove been to hove allo,:'ed the
tc-kinj- of exceptions to the ou. issibility of evidence. The nr01ent on
these except ions could have been heprd lster by a special board of
quialified. perscrns. woulC. h]-ve indicated to the courts that T-71A
vwas acut-ely avwre of the problcei of cvicence enk' had no, desire to
!crcj'.2&ice -nryone by occeotin. evidence to whicA proper objection had
ueen ta&en. Objection, probably, was not tEcen in 17RA proceedings
becnusc of the greet informality th)t prevailed.

As we shall see YRA often actec without -ny )-pprent factual
basis (2(.). 2eliprnce was freueintl h7C u')on briefs never incor-oorated
in t.,:e -ecord, informal conferences, and conversations. Ass1,.:in;" that
ti.ere -'ere few cases of bad faith action by responsible officials there
waq often little evi( ence -vailable for a coart to (-eternine the
c ecquacy of the fact,..l? basis or the reasonableness of the action.
PreliL2.i-:;ry conferences (21) pond poet-herin conferences (2:.) were a
reo-i."r p_:rt of YRA procef.tre. It is r,..,:"r.:able how .:.n/ ill-reasoned
anc. i.,. .. li tic !.rooospis were cut out by these con:erences. Often,
tioui.h, these conferences serve& as a basis of corndroeiise (23) or
justificr.tion for provisions which on their face :d.'iht not a.p),ear to
be fully in the public interest. In such instances where subs.tapntial
action rested upon conference a reord' should have been kept. Another
anplogous practice was the "off the record" discussions. Thece discus-
sions often contained extrei2el3 frank and valuable evidence which
have -one far to sustain or even condem-n NTTA detE.rmi5.-.tions. By failing
to include this mnateri,:l in the record it probably lost its evidentiary value,
no matter how persossive it riht have been upon the individual administrator.
There have been statements that administrative action need not rest upon
the evi,.'ence in tie record (24). And an occasional case may be food in
fields other than those demanding siumary action in the exercise of the
police :o':.-er (25). In fields related to 27RA (as interstate commerce
re.alation) as well as others (26) it has been -enerall-' held thct
administrative action must have a basis in the record (27). The require-
ment is simple. It is intended to give notice to the parties end afford


I "'N

a basis u-on v]hich a cov.rt revie"'in, the case may oct (2?.) The case
of i i S. v. Abile.e <7 So-,.thern .,- Co. (29) sC-ovs7 the court's attitude.
Thc- question .nvolvec ',,'. r.sie :,ro riety of uosin-> certain annual reports
in the hrLn's of the Interztrtc Co:....erce Col...qiision referred to by the
examiner -t the heorins as follo'vs, "no dc, it will be necessary to
refer to the .nn,.ul reports of all the carriers" (-0). The Coiniission
contenc.ed that tnis was notice to t.e _is&rtics its Rules of
Practice t;,en in force priorr to Lecember 10, 1i923). These rules
provi.edL that co)ies of all material other t.._-mn tht;t on file with the
Comnis-sion must be offereC. into the record. .Isteripl on file could
be used if specific-jlly referred t-:. After referring to the fact-that
these were adverser/ orocee.din-s in slbl tnce ;,r. Justice Brandeis
speaking' for the Couart said:

"The oh.jectionr to the use of the Cate contained
in the annual reports is not 1 ck: of [.,.thenticity or
untr.ustworthiness. It is t.rt thie carriers wver:e left
without notice of thie evidence v.ith f"'oib t',ey were,
in fact, confronted, 's later cAr-closed by the finding
made. The requirement t.-it in an adversery
specific reference be made, ic :'sC-enLi, -l to the sub-
stantial rivhtz of the parties" (Jl).

A legislature is not held to nny. sLuch requirements This has caused
many- to think that an adnin-istrr-tive boc..y, in fact lezislEting, should
not be. Thi? mii-'-ht not be the vie-:,.' vhich 'il. oe follo'"ed by the 'courts.
Courts, et rrc.sent, have a stron. feeling that certain defined limits to
administrative action sinould be established and enforced (32). To insure
against jucicisl revievi scriux.lous care should be had to bu.ild a careful
record substantiati.i- ,-l actions trl!:en. VTA fell far s"iort of the
desirable standard. TIn thc-t l.ter dc-s of its '.niinistretion, however,
more thou.t was iveii, to t',is orobIe...

Fin(.ins by ?c,:iinistra.tive bo,.ies renLt.ire a factual basis. The
courts have made thiLs ,ore imioorta-nt by their requirements of some
evi.'ence ant. substsntiql evidence (.3). Altiou.- -. Lere was ano hearing
requirement in the strt.te to co;.-!e1 in ?ccorcamnce '-Aith the
evio.ence (34-) th].ere are stron-, consider, tions indic:tin.?z that .'NA would
have probably been held to such a recu,.irement (:3). The courts manifest
an intense interest in the evic.entisr, bnsis of regulations l
administrative bo( ies affecting iro;,leris of industry (36). A recent
illustration a.,pears in '93 U. S. (A,)'; An Drder nf the Interstate
Commerce Comrnission u-nider the Bo.iler Ins-,ection Act required that
certain equipment be used. In disc-sin, this order the court said:

"The primary nuestionr of f.-ct present( for determination
vwas, as the report .of the Cominission states, whether the use
of locomotives equipped ".'ith hand reverse sear, 9s" compared
with oo'-er reverse jear, causes unneoess,,ry peril to life and
limb. The re.)ort discusses at so!ie length the alleged ad-
vantages and disadvantaes of the two clrs-es of reverse gear
srid the expense which the proposed chanie would entail, and
concludes, with 'findin-s' that to a certain extent the change
should be made. But whether the use of any or all types of



c .:-i i- eoco1 noti s er *, 'j \ r i '. 11. Lj1C Cer e 17y:1'
c,..appred with wover reverse *e r c :v'ce i i,.iccenm.ry
ril I to ife -n li .b' is lft 4ntii, T' to ine rn .
his -, !. etc o,:cencc of the 'e ic or ,',em t i i:l-
i .-, rq.ireC,. to sup c t the Oo ,fi ..-.ion's order'
1i?1n c .;, it void. ( .)

2t is not i -tendeC. to sa.'est tlh.t there must be t. reliance
,*ire *i-;:nii evi ..:rce offtr,." 'by irtere,-ted parties. T:,ere i; no
re a-7o. ',hy the governmentt sl ould v.o1 iovZCntv i e ate, tno find evidence
(6'.) .. It 'hoCuld, of course, be introe.:ce into tie record to re-
Ctive treatment as evieY..ce (4LO). To escape bro-c review there
,..', t je re -,FJo. 1:1-e evi ence in the record to i- tdh .(fciniR-
trr tive fiin,' i,'vs. For instance t),)icol. evio.e.,c u consiceredc
Src-: er basis for actio-n (41), ,ihile -iere tre *?te results "as
a substitute for typical, evidence i,:; :i,,eqor-te. (42).

-RA freq', ently treated the roo em. of. securing a full factual
basis cavalierly. (42s) 7'.e 3roorins'' stuLy ha:s c-nrnEentecL u';on
t'i;,s. T,'', tiiings., it sa;, 7, weere outst 'lt .;, 1. "the rarity of]y .rnQ. convincing -resentr:tion .of fhctval evidence," fnd 2.
"the casual way i w'.ich iiitricate coue. previsions were oa-sed over
rit fOu t nplysis or clarification. (..3). 3oth Administretion
c'-iployees and applicant. groups v'ere responsible for this. Contro-
versy could always roc.duce a fi.ll record of f:cts, was
especi.ll- tirae where greatt inity -eared on the )art of the members
of the applicant industry. This seems to have been the situation
yith the lumber inCustry end its coee '(44). A 'shfilor *cokness was
the sl objectt of reference in the brief, for the Sc-lechter Corp. (4.F).
The '-Iovern.:ernt called a. witness in the trial in. the lower court who
testified as to the evil of "selective hillin:". The witness in the
testirrmony referred to certainly "vance6 no COLI *ellii, reasons or
1',cts a 3.iinst the practice. When a -ubstanItial trade practicee
requirc-nent is bpsed on such fl"...: or iTll-expressed testimony it
mTa^, .E, rfa-dily Cc'.el1uC ed tIth thete cartss would ,be hesitant to accept
it as a sufficient basin. Thin inu not referred to because exmunles
are -iot available in 1IA, but to -h,,ow owv astute conoel c.-nr bring such
Weaknesses to the Attention of E court,

This problem' is of such ihniortcnce that a few examples ol' fact-
finc..: -aend the factual basis for determinations should be ob.erved.
(45 a) The r'. r Drcssin- and Fur F yain Co&e (46) provided for the
establis,.-iiient of minimum service c.har,^es (Z7?). Various divisions
of the industry aojplied for e, .ro'rl of uiniifiam service ciarxe
sched.':.les. These were all approved. with some ch.ang:es. The case
of the Do- and Long Tiair Division is illustrative. This division
probably presented the best cost &ta, and asked for service charges
closer to the cost indicated, by. the ,eta than any other division (48).
Figures from ten firms of an i,-d'.-try havin;; from twenty to thirty
firinns were offered. Of course the character of the industry with
its small firms jumping in and out of business made for this. It was
these small firms th-t probable could have furnished the lowest
costs had figures been kept, (49). So' it is seen not even typicala"
evidence was offered. Six items on the schedule approved (50) had
no basis at all. Fi.lres were not even offered as to the cost of


processing these items. At least six other items probably had little
basis in the figures s9 b di ttea (I). A further co!.olic.jtion was the
fact that processes differ (5-2) and ty jes of work vary widely (53).
This schedule, like those of the othiEr divisions, became the subject
of frequent violation anu:. ocon iell. into d.isuse.

The story of uniform cost pccountin- syte-,s is also interesting.
At hearings there was usually,' a brief r.efrence mace to the desira-
bility of such systems, thou-h it is '.oubTed if this was always done.
Plans were submitted to the Administration. Sormetimes hearings were
held upon these plans. An ill t.iinrtin.,- instance is the hearing (54)
for the plan of the Fire Extinguisner inuacturin=: Industry (55).
The plan was si..bmitted (56), but no te.tiiion,- :as offered to justify
it. No questions ,ere askced by. the representatives of the Division
of Research and Plannin.g, vwhic] divisionn was usua elly charged with the
responsibility of approving -uc, plans. 'Lhe plaxi w7as later approved
upon this evidentiary basis (5?).

Fact-findind- was not always relief' u.on. -he Administration
sometimes olainly ar7iitted tht F. rovaFl of im-ortait -provisions was
bosed upon aireer.ent wvitl-iin the rnkcs of industry (58). The basis of
agreement beta/een labor sarn inciastry was, probably, the one most
commonly rtzorte& to in -ll labor questions (59). Congress made some
statements that ;i- ht be construed as .ts.nd.ards for the labor problems
(60). Perhaps, Con:ress thoL'v,ht that the agreement of labor and in-
dustry would oe adequate. The writer has found no evic.ence on this
point. It remains tha-t a,-rese-,.ent was the primary basis. The Research
and Plai-nin,: Diivision did study labor conditions in the various in-
dustries. These studies ,were sometimes ,the basis for Edministrative
action. Often thie facts merely served 9.s an aid1 to the Labor Advisory
Board and labor in cc.rryin" ':r th-eir borai-nn.";.

A most unusual case is that of machine limitation in the Cotton
Carded Yarn Industry. An adminiztrstive order was issued, peculiarly
enoug-h, signed auth-ioritativel, by the oz.e A:ut.hority and concurred in
by .Tovern:ncnt officials (Cl). There is jio testimony in the transcript
of hearin-: for the Cotton Textile In,'".:try (62), nor has any record of
any inCependent hoarins: been found.. UTndovbtecly, strong evidence was
submitted to the Administration. Still an order of such important economic
effect upnoon business enteroriqes should have been fully justified by a
hearing at which a full record was made, while affording any opposition
an opportunity to com-,letely sct forth its case. Perhaps, emergency
action may require a tectporary restrai:tin order. Certainly, a hearing
should have been held at the first o ;ortunity.

Happily, NRA was not given to such action in its 1r ter days. Much
damage had been done by then, however. Once the impression is afield
that administrative action is hurried, not fully reasoned and- grounded
in the facts before the Administration, the public as well as courts
start viewing the action most critically. Especially should this have
been remembered in dealin- with the field that comprised NiRA's prOvince
(63). Too often NRA seemed ti accent indv-stries' judgment that anything
was "unfair" which was annoying or disruptive of established methods.


-,'7, "-

At the public heari.. ; for the Llectric Light and Power Induistry,
the -enerel coLn..el of ',-A, Mr. Donald i-ichberg, static 0:

"It has never been re rcrded as an ippro riate
objection to the .resentrtioi. of coe by those
truly re',,rcscntative of r'iy industry to pr,. sent
evi(,e',ce concerning actual, or ali" ce decrelictions
in the .-rivate or public c *nL.-,ct of the sponsors of
a cod - The moral _r':.& ts of those onsorin,
or opposing. a code .iia" be a, blnc' as, mini ,,:ht or
as vhite as sno-,. But the process of co6e i,':in
is not to oe confused r.ith the operation of a clean-
ing, and dyeing establishment." (64)

Courts in cri-..iann] prosecution do not llowv evidence o to the past
c!,aracter of the defen,;'it, unless he puts his cL.aract r into evidence.
1PRA hearings were not criminal prosecutions, but rather hearings to rain facts
uupon which an economic policyy could be devised for an industry. To be
legally sustaina.ile the a(neral policy and stendarc-s for frar-in: the de-
tails should have existed. Had they existed the wor.-: of filling in de-
tails mi'ht have been so obvic,.:1.--,- a l'-ninistr:tive ,'is to avoid the use of
the Lifficult analogy to legislation. In perforraing this function of
policyy ms:ing for industry the past history or present attitude of an
inu:atry, a trade association, or an industr,: ,roui)miYnht be quite
pertinent to the issue of ho-v much ,o"er or what type trade r.ctice
provisions should be oiven an industry. Such evidence appears to have
been valuable in the c.-se of the )ro0osed Cottonseed Oil Refinini Code.
Pest abuse of an open-nrice filin system indicated the disposition of
the industry tov7ard reported iliformoption ,:nd the use to which it might
be put (65). No one woull hrve v/ished to clo-e his e,, es to such
obvious facts as the sposorshi of the )re o-sed Corn Dry 1illingi
I-.dustry by the 7heat .-lour 'Code Au.t'.ority to come under the
code of the latter (66). Without oi-aen.tin. upon the character of
that code authority or its direction it is 7pparent that its ad6min-
istration was apropos to this problem.

The Fur .:;n.;acturin; Industry Code contained a number of
restrictive trade practice provisions (67). The attitude of ledii-jv
spokesmen for the industry as stated at a public hearing (68) indicated
little syxnpathy for the consumer (69). & evidence of attitude should
have been quite relevant to what powers of self-government should have been

TNRA did itt.mpt to establish a factul basis in many instances.
Le.?pl Advisers seemed most avare of the desirability of such_ action.
Advisers of other boards or divisions en::-, -ed in the effort only when
they opposed a proposal or knew nothing about it. These advisers were
often able to develop mr-i an;.les which had little concern to the
presiding officer or had not been brought to his attention. In this
advisers were early handicapped by a rule that all questions had to
be directed through the presiding officer (70). Presiding officers
'.;ho desired to limit controversy often refused to re,.,est the questions
or so charn-'ed them as to nullify their effect (71). In later practice
questioning by advisers -;r.s freely allowed and did much to develop
more complete transcripts. The adequacy of the questioning depended
:reatly upon the individual adviser. Many advisers preferred to remain
silent at the hearing. Others, ho-ever, made very substantial contributions


toward developing; a record. The 3.A. r.le despite the contrary practice
wi',s never cL3n,,ed

Another .n.ic;p lay in the theory of t.cit e jroval relied upon
by many industry groups, A 'code provisionn ni nht -rovide for study of a
subject or a proposal to be made in accor.--nce v'ith cert-ain principle
or certain problems (72). These provisions were usually in the form
of an expressed right to pe-tition. It is Col.btec. if this conferred
anything not already had. ;I'n(.vstry frenuentl2y ur-;ed thnt NRA had
tacitly approved a provision of the character set forth in the charter
of study. If lRA has not done this ,'hat was the uir-oose of the orovi-
sion industry might ask. Frequently !TA would ucce .,t the argument
and approve, the proposal without further hea.rin:. The factual basis in
such cases was usually grossly inc'.ecuite for at the hearing the provi-
sion would be passed off as merel- allox'!iv. a. study to be madc. Many
persons in 1TRA were aware of this subtle :-rieans of obtPining provisions
without subjecting them to such a justification es mi.-ht be necessary
if presented without .this ireliLin.ri step (73).

Burden of proof is usually thought ta lie on t'lose persons applying
for action to be taken to show vihy wh't ti-ey desire should be clone (74).
In NRA procedure the burden of proof si.oul(' h.?ve rested upon the
proponents groups as far as there v'as to be such a burden. Almost
without realizing it the burden was somretiies liifted to o:.oonents of
the proposed rovision (75). The attitude of -?< officers toward
advisers ,,vas frequently similar. "The in..'.str: wants the orovi-ion.
.;Jhy shouldn't it have it", th-e a(viser v'oulr. be rslkedC in effect? The
propr procedure would have been to h-Pve .)lcccd the burden squarely
upon the proponents or realizin, that t.Le burden could not be met
provide for a.temrporary "period of expe'i-i.mto.l o.)eration" (76).

Proposals by the Administration brin. u.- the sane .,roblem. Should
there have been a duty upon the A"niinistration to prove that its pro-
posal was desirable? Certainly, i-here the effect was to nullify provi-
sions granted industry this would secrn to 'azve been the Roperr procedure.
iiere details would needC no such tre.,tiieit, but jrovi!ions of a suostantive
chaaracter should be established- as in hrr-nonj vwitr the requirements of
the Act.

Until the opinion in the cse of Pc-,noria Refinin.- Company v. Ryan
(77) was written there had never been a cicar st.teinent in our law
concerning the nature of an aui'inicitr'tive fincin,.T from the standpoint
of publishing the basis for action. Caees exi-ted in6.icating that there
need be no such statement (78). Such c-x sessionss ,.'ere mide in cases where
an evidentiary basis was not bein, too Ztro': ly required. The courts in
their early history were reluctant to interfere 'vith executive action (79)..
Cases then decided -fall into what has been called the field of narrow
review. Where there have been stotutorj reuire.nents (80) or where an !
administrative a.peal On the record is to be had (81) the cases have re-
quired a statement of the basis of action. But in situations where the
finding was the last administrative one -nd %,ias not enjoined by statute
to express its basis there had never been -ny requirement for such ex-
pression until Jnnuary 7, 1935. In -n:;lpnC. it is considered to be a
principle of natural justice thar.t a .)Prty be informed of the basis for
an aCministrative action (81a). I



Tce o-!', h cn :3se crentcd : -,''" v .',i of ],.J (];.). One of the
It( I rr- ti 'c roun,.. n-'f t'.' J ci i....i 'x:.s that the y.c Y,-tive Order
S' t t c the 0 ". i t b.-..s b.. d, S-id "r. Chief
.........-. ; ". t ", CA e vvhe .i.i- "( i t-" r
J ; ,'. .7 sr i:i,: .at i.v'(c rt : *

"21 .* : i' "- :'., t ''.tr ''.,i, ct-, t :, the vali ity
o_ t"..x r.'.tib'ti : i.. t ".'*n ',;, tO i. xecdtive
-t. ".-.ti n ( c'. T.. c ti.c- Order contr ins
n:, i., i ;, n s t t .1 .'.t ,l: L. .: *" n' o 01 O tlhe
Brt :iCi crt'. I cti.y :. c.,C 1i% t c .,ro ioi 'io.on.
- - If it ct .,' Be '-'i- t L-t fI the four
e: :cn:r^- ns r:..*' i-: t' .t'- a i- i: ''L 2.22 ere.i~:
C. it C. I. r:.'"' ;'. tic'.i.r -i -'.. t 'es or con-
aition, '; "'. '..ic . ." to ':,:,v:r t' ,- C:t rcise of the
v t'-.ixitx,' c.-.fc .s... .r:1.-. t -o.l.0 not :Ict
..n;].. "it: v,.t i';. u t- t' ;ie circu-. ttrces
1.nd c i, i ti,-J, i. .i: '.i,. , i as to the
e.:iste:ce ni .ic re i e ... .. e ; .ctiofn would
bL. nflie s'- i''r t t U, ':. t .:cli'.t, for otherwise
t.'e C.i.-,c ".'o - i tI .e .. ,.'. f tor. dis-
cretirn r-s tln-iL q, '- i r" t '. ,'t ..rity' ''oul.d be
irefc' ctuil. - -

ri'ot'lT, Ce., ',,. 1 t : I.: Lt I, ,'t;. e C movince, is
-lot t".I c-..-,ict ci i'i; t'.:iE or "'ith the ore-
s'.:r.-ti jnr tt-c'.. : 3 : "-c ve "c Zcion. Tio reoo t,
V;e ar- cm.ce -c: 'it:;, tv. r ,.- t'.Cmn of the dele;-tion
of ic "i'lativ,. nn"-Lr. I t.: c'. ti'in is to be ,unished
fnr the crime of ;i:1-ti_- ". Li.! .tive orler of an
exec'..tive ff -,'pr, *:,r of [. of co missionon, due
nvoccs; of I- re-1' ,tiies t'. L it '-.l a)car th'-..,t the
nrdci is -ith.inr. tl'-e Futorit, :f ti, officer, board or
comn7T1isi cn, -'d, if t".-1-t ....t I'i .6. )ein S 0 on deter-
:Iin:.-tions of 1 .ct, ttho0.- 1' r..i.:-..tion. must be shown.

...r. J-.ustice C, r ,-.z, .ir ,.,tir;, took: exception to this portion
of t Ci-, J.sticc'., inion (..- .:'is zncr, rcle is not necessarily
universal. It sc., oc twi.-t it 'ii ,- to broad review fields
req..irin; (",,-,ic bet-t.en i .,,.ort"*t 'A _lii-ies, or where criminal penalties
ar,- i.ivolvt (t).

In a o .in, .wm (:,) anjc.i '- n 1,, .r. Jua.-.tice r,"nc.eis the
i'hvnt -, ri t.,i ".it'i (T'ov/'..i,':., 3- ') there is an indication
th-t the cozrt '.:-, q:itctl.z q. Ji iit, t "it. second paint of the Panaa
Case (cT). 7.-L c-.e invol-;t -, c.' :-;-d crer ef the Dcpartn.ent
of Aric] tre of th Sr)tof :.- *:.n uruscribinr- certain fruit and
ve-.,Et_-bles contFiners -s t-n. ;t .n.i r ")e to be used. It ''as urged
upon t2e court th'.t no :'re2-l.U ti".:. -- :i ..t: facts were properly
present to ..tif' the Pa":ini' tr' tivc action. SaiL the cou-rt:

"The contention is viul'out support in authority
or reason, nnd rests upon ,-iscc.e.tion.-------
The question of lawv; may, of course, lw -vycs be raised
whether the leisltture IL". to dele-ate the
authority e.-ercised." (8)

For this proposition t-ihe cor.i.t cited tOe Pani'rna a.nd Schechter cases
(89). The court continued in laiig.tage th-t .'.o -nmucnri to put the law
upon this subject back to its state in 194:

"Where the relation is 'ithin the scooe of
authority def sy deletter, t,.e ,re,.,ntin of the
existence of facts j..istiiy-n.r-" its specific exercise
attaches alike to statutes, to m-A.icipal orc i.iances,
and to orders of -i.nitrtiv: ho, is. - - --
Here there is added reea.rn fr- '. p,.l,'inr the ore-
sumption of v.lidity; for r- *i.ltion no.' chal-
lenged was adopted after notice nlbl.ic lie.rin.
as the statute required. It is c iitende, tlipt the
order is void because tne ..:r iirtr~tive bo".y :-.Lde no
special findings of fct. 3:-.t the st.tL'.te d.i. not re-
quire special - -. WVichita Rail-
road and Li.Pt Co:npasn-' v. Public utilities Coi.-Aissicn,
260 U. S. 41.), 5i8-3 ; i:ailer v. by, .5-4 U. S. S3, 44;
Southern Ry. Co. v. VirSi:i, 2-0 Tj. 3. 1Th', 193, 134"11

Mr. Justice 'rordeis either i'inores the second Point of the
Panama case or elke he Cei'inltely overri&J.r, it, citing as he does
the Wichita Railroad C Li'lit Cn,.mn: v. Public '"ilities Corrumnission
(91), and M1:h]er v. Eb-T, (-'2) fc.r th. pro ,o'.'ition t'iey ri.htfully
stand for that a statutory requirement of fin6in"-s must be complied
with. Mr. Chief Justice liu.ies had cited these c? a;s as authority
for the second point in the Panama case despite the fact that they were
based upon statutory requirements not present in the Par.a:ia case. The
citing of Southern Ry. Co. v. Vir-"iri) (9S) clouds the veifht to be
4iven to Ir. Justice B,-- ndeis' stPten-.,ot "apc;i the point, as this case
does not stand for the same )ro.po2ition that the others do. In 'spirit
it is much iior-c rigid then thm others requiring F-s it does certain
proce,!ural safectards in absence of eny statutory provision.

It seems too early now to try to evP,'fuate the Pa-cific States Box
and Basket CoarLpn., v. 'White case (9.). The fields see.', to be properly
analogous. In the ? case there was no attempt to state a factual
basis for the executive order x:'-ile in the Prcific 2oe- case a hepring
had been held. When there htr been a hi::-rin.-; a court may presume that
the administrative action is predicated upon the hear in'. Thle situation
becomes more difficult for the court where it is not eviderit whether the
administrative action is based upon any facts. Of course, Pll such
administrative action does not require a hearing, but if none is held
the requirement that the basis of the action taken be set forth seems
reasonable. Certainly, the safest practice would be to fully state a
basis in findinr.s for any adiiistrative action taken in a field of



-ioci 3l or c &c'.Jic oolicy. aot i' is it a te- .:,rC at;iint judcici;Al
att ck it is Cood aeiiniLtr-3tive t.e biVe to V ti t the a0 ) irch
h:,s oeenr. well-consi ered. If not l..j-I]' rece spry Ds a matter of
ii t-.tvf1 iJ-J twice This j _'-ctic woul Eee:;i c ': i 2

AvA statement of inin s usu'lly .mar, c by tieir for. i:.'lity
(''5)'1,. ji,,C in;j mere often miac.e in the In,1. -' of the statute or in
cert-in stocks phrases (96). This practice lis not becn favoredC by
tile courts (:".'). It would s-eemi a better .ir.:--'tice not to u';e "stilted
1e... 'hraseolo ," bvt rather to tell the !7tory of the economic
:itL,.ntion involved (.8). .-LA practice V7.e not -ied by -n,'.' .t.?tea:ent
0 Thicy in this reard. type of fi .;i-s to be was never
irn.icate6. The only strteLaent was that there woulC be a finding
st..ted. in E:c'i letter of transmittnl (99).

i-ny of the early codes were based uoon more full findings than
those approved later vhen the pressure be<'.,.e much greeter. These
early codes usually contained a statement from the "RA and one by the
President. Later practice varied. In codes not reqxjirin.- the
President's approval only a state ent by the -RA will be found.
The first ccde, that of the Cotton Textile I.i.-u:;try, was accompanied
by a twelve e statement b,, the Ak .initrr-tor (100). The L. niber and
Timber Products Industry Coce .,- suO:-orte: by a sixteen page
memorandum of transmittal (101). This letter vas one of the best
of the tyoe written; but vhen the m-:" iitu..e of tJe industry 'nd the
great i)r:blems with which the code dealt are considered thifs
memnor.nduelin seems ,-rossly iwrdeut e (102. 3y the time the ei.hth
code was reached the findings h? droned. to little over a pe
(10K). Code 1o. 1.3 did not even include a fi,.cinY: of fact except
for a brief and hasty reference to Ir -rinii and fincin.s in the
executive order (104). Tn thV st- teoent of fin'-in s for the Leather
IndCstry Code not one vord is said about the trade practice pro-
visions (105). This is quite typical of vzh&t frequently happened.
These in ''euate fl' ">{.is were s .'.zted to the court in the brief
for the Schechter Cor;,oration (106). It probablyy would have been
e:!ir!ble for the President to have stated the basis for his finding
in something more than a ritualistic .na.iner. The ar7,jrcnt of the
brief that neither the order of the President nor the letters of the
Secretary of Agriculture or the Administrator contains any reason-
abl.e showi tition is entitled to carefr.l consideration. It must be remembered
tr'ft records were made which in many instances would have substan-
tiated the action token- or in effect, the finding made though
not stated.

Tin,.si.-it in this problem is better than foresight. ITZEA
had little Tuidance in the cases jnhen its first findings were made.
Prudence and an attentiveness miiJIt have 7i4ecsted that along with
a fll1 record, a full statement of the basis for action should have
been mpde. Such- care could hardly h::ve been expected from early :IRA.
A future administrative body with a similar task will be wise to
frame its findings along the style of a judicial opinion, and to
be careful to have ready for the courts a fully re.a:,3cned and com-
plete statement of its findiniws properly grounded on recorded
evi dence.



Another problem of fincir n:s rested in the acceptance by
iNBA of fin'Li-n:'s ,nce by other -,.encies. As t is also involved the
question of the oro iriety of the ceie.letion it 'will be discussed in
a chapter K.ealin... wit? !ele Ttion (1M7).





Thern the famnnus legal fiction that every man is prersumed to Iknow
the lI.v (1) ripened there was no msss of administrative legislation
with which to cope. ma- be present in Parliament by his
representative, but one would 1-ardly say he is present at the proceed-
ings (or the case may be action without proceedings) of every adminis-
trative board. The mass of LA.linistrative rules (2) only more acutely
present the same problems that the rnlish scholar Bentham so clearly
saw: 1. It is contrary to our morals .to punish a man for disobedi- a law of which he had. no notice (3) and 2. Publication alone
is not enough. Publication may.only tend to bewailder (4) if the orders
are not easily accessible and. clearly draVn."

The .problem has been most acute in the United States. Often only
a small percentage of the rulings of an important bureau will be pub-
lished (5). Executive orders (since 1905) may be found in the Depart-
ment of State and the Library of Congress. This makes them far from
accessible to the public (6). The state of publication is one of
absolute confusion (7) in a field where ten times as much law as
Congress makes exists (8).

-IPA only served to complicate the problem (9). The great mass of
industrial legislation resulting from it was brought to the court's
attention in the Schechter case (10)'. lIRA's code record section does
not. even have a record of all the purported administrative action (11).

The most publicized example was not the responsibility of IRA but
the Petroleum Administration. In connection with the argument before
the Supreme Court in the Panama case (12) it was found that there had
been an indictment for the violation of a non-existent provision.

SAnother interesting example lay in the National Labor Board
created Aujast 5, 1933 apparently by a press release (13). A formal
order by the President was not issued until more than four months
later (14).

The same difficulty was faced in England (15), until the passage
of the Rules Publication Act in 1893 (16). This act solved the diffi-
culties of the sit-cuation there. The more important rules are fully
published while only a reference is made to the local and less im-
portant rules (17). Certain it is, that some such legislation has
long been sadly needed in the United States (18).

The problem demanded lMAts best consideration. Code Record was
an offered solution. Code Record failed only where Deputies and others
were negligent or wilfully failed to cooperate. Confusion was such
that 1MA regulations and codes could not have been expected to have


always been clear. Explicit instructions should have been given and
emphasized that only those documents filed with Code Record had any
force. Efforts ..should have been- mada to discourage the numerous
drafts of "codes" which circulate o6fton as genuine.

Almost as confusing as the mass of delegated legislation and the
difficulty of securing access to it was the variety of administrative
forms and the differing uses to which each were put. One dplving into
the mysteries of ERA sub-legislation must -,restle with executive
orders, administrative orders', office orders, office memoranda, an
office manual, and NRA bulletins. The use to which th'-se forms were
put varies. It would serve little purpose to point out the. precise
history of each. It must'he borne in mind that these are forms of ad-
ministrative action. If it said that executive and administrative
orders were generally legislative this merely means they affected in-
dividuals through a class, or group. Likewise as affecting individuals
as a matter of direct intention under some legislative power such 4r-
ders might be adjudicatory. S66 it is best to say where a direct effect
was had upon the interests of individuals or classes executive and ad-
ministrative orders were employed. They were also employed to del,-
gate power and set up administrative organization and procedure under
thn Act. :

The other frrms enumerated were in the most part for internal use
within ITRA. Approved by the Administratr or his delegate they carried
the force of an administrative order. Sometimes, their effect upmn
code provisions or their requirements upon members of industry wore
such that it might be said that the interests of individuals or classes
were affected. Individualized action wasI taken by the various labor
agencies set up under "theI N.I.R.A.:,' the Industrial Appeals Brard, and
by the Compliance Division in Bile Eagle removals. Thp latter were
sent out by telegram. 'It would seem that they should have had at least
the dignity of an administrative order, since the effect on property
might be so vital. General instructions as to' procedure may be found in
compliance field letters. : :.. ....

It is obvious that to one not experienced in thp intricacies of
NRA administrative forms the mass of orders and the variety of forms
in which they might appear could well present a hopeless labyrinth.
No precise procedure can be outlined. As in England all orders of
general character and importance should be neIr-lly published. In-
dividual orders would not require the same distribution, but copies
should be sent to all interested parties and kept available in speci-
fied well-kIown public depositories. An effort should bep. made to
classify administrative action in such categories as would indicate
clearly prccodure, powers,' responsibility, poli-cy, general rules or
requirements upon industry, .and special or individual rules and re-
quirements. It is not hoped to solve the problem here, but merely to
suggest the vital necossi-ty of giving full thought to it. A recent
fndnral statute has taken a step toward the solution of this problem.
It provides for a Fndepal Register which will- be analogous to the
English rules publication system (18a). '


Dra'ftsmanship was likewis.e' an irnprt-tnt problem. Cloudy lan,-ua[L"
was sn,.eti:'.rs sought by industries horinj to bett-r their position by
inter-retation later. The Legal Division gyve its staff warning of
the vital nature of draft:nminship (19). In tne latter dazys of IT;U_ a
study c-f the problem was mrnido by a mor.iber of the L.."al Divicion. It
is difficult t- lay a fing-r u'-n any of the ills arising frr-m this
source. Ambiguity was the chief difficulty and this war reflected
when ouestions of interpre-tation arose (20). If NRA could have done
more it would have been onrly to have increased and rrrmphasizcd its
warning. It also have charr'-d the Review Division or some other
agency with the supervisicn of draftsmanship.


The givi:,g of reasonable notice is on: of the first requirements
of administrative due process (21). Thi problem is often viewed as a
technical onn since ,it seldom is brought up in & case (22). Require-
ments vary. In some field, there need be no notice or only the barest
kind (23). In the field that iTRA dealt with a full and reasonable
notice must be given as to the matters to be considered. The form of a
notice must reasonably relate to the action to be taken (24). The time
given should allow a -?erson to be present and to make some reasonable
efforts to ,rrpoare-a case and secure evidence (25). WniZat persons are
entitled tc notice? Mr. Justice Holme.s has pointeJ o.ut that it is im-
possible tr rive the full protection of a "town meeting" (26). Yet,
when cibstantial property rights are affected every reasonable pre-
cautioci should have been taken that any person affected should have re-
ceived adequate notice. If ea pcrs-n is entitled to an individual
notice he is allowed to makle a positive showing in the courts that he
received none (27).

Official statements never fully set forth the degree of notice
necessary. Statements were mad.- upon the form and procedure to be
followed and establishing an official bulletin board (28). Full notice
could hardly b1 found in publication upon a bulletin board. NRA was
concerned with the manner of giving notice, that is how to get out
wide notice. It did not concern itself with the problem of just what
persons had t, be given notice. This is no criticism of what was dane,
but rather a pointing out of the approach taken as distinguished from
the one courts would probably use. Actually, NIRA made serious efforts
to widely distribute notice. The rng-.il1r course was.ta send notices to
labor unions, the labir press, gEnvrnraent officials, the press, trade
asscci.tion -ulications, State ITRA offices, Resident Adjusters and
Regional Director, Fir-t Class Post Offices, a special list, plus any
additional persons whom the Deputy Administrator suggested (29). The
Deputy Administrators, usually, tried to secure from the industry mem-
bers with v.whorr they were negotiating as full a list as possible of all
known mcjiber: r:f the industry. Still, in som iLidustries it is obvious
that it would be impcscible to ever make a complete list of all members
(30). In such cases if every reasonable ff 'rt were made to notify all
interested oartics, if the industry croun was properly representative,
and if a t:-pical viewpoint and evidence were fully presented for each
economic interest the courts might consider that sufficient notice and
hearing (31) had been given. This is only speculation as to what might
be called reasonable,

- I ,*

Full Text


Business Library CLASS----BOOK-----------DOC. ftOOM


\ . OFFICE OF NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION -DIVISION OF REVIEW .. 0 .,. 0 ., . c u ,._\. .:> 1' • .... ' Tj 9 _., ,., T ("' ... rj. ' I .. .. . c 4 ./ ... ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE UNDER THE NIRA By Paul C. Aiken WORK MATERIALS NO. 81 1 R. A. r . u v c I D l E p iLK 'Jl M K ll r.l NRA ORGANIZATION STUDlES SECTION MARCH, 1936


9838 Peu.l C . Ai 1-c:m YPJ\. STTTI?S : :_il__i.C?,


Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2012 with funding from University of Florida, George A. Smathers Libraries with support from LYRASIS and the Sloan Foundation


0 R :: CJ R D T 1 i s studv C'f ) .. d"lin1.s t 0 tivo LC',..,. pnrl Pr0,... u re> unc1.0:i. '' IRI\. "'<"S u rA-onr"d h;v l r . Pa11l C . Ai1r"'n 0 f tl o :-::lA SP.c tion, Hr. Willil"'1 W . r i n r.hP.r . P.. As tho titlo incicp tP.s tho t:P,t } or hpc; t'ttorrrot o d c::m oTI'loc1 it c1oc::irE'blP t o a n . intr 0 ductor; r discu sion o f ad:in i strf'1tiv"' thoorv . This is tho o f ? a r t I , in,-.} ir.h t} 0 trr:Hlitionn J thoori S D T0 0X8Tl1i'1o(l A . n d [\ survoy i s thP. n m a d"' of hat tho rourt s oay t)1""' ' d o Pnd of ,...,ha.t thP. actu ally do in thP. CAS "'S to thorn . Tho rP.ason f 0 r tho otud .v lios i n hFtt d i d o r f a . i J "ld to d o as A mattP.r o f 11duo u r 0r.P.ss11 0 f l F t'..,.• ThC! s n b stPnC"'! o f t hR stu.d; r , mith rosu o c t t o 1TRA u r or.Q ciur"l i t0 Je fo --l.J-in, P nrt rr i n the of procod u r A l enc'l sub s tC'nti v"' orobl0'TIS i n r.or0-"'1P1-ing Ancl codo administration, ,..,hir.h rnip!h t hr'!V0 boo n t0 a.d v o r sP. judi c iFtl trea tmont h a d not tho cN1os :;oon by the s,1Dr"':rl"' Court 1 s docision o f Uay 1935. ThR ropdor is n r im P r ilv in t h o D 0 rtions of thR s tudy [lo f inito] > r ro P toc'l. t0 'JA;'r tJ:o.o r q foro n i s h t o turn A . t OnCP. to P art II, b o g i n n i n;: • ith C:1f-Jo t a r V, r'!l t h o u g h it is to bR obsorv"ld tha t this chapt P.r ,,..,R S rrr i tt"ln 'TIP.r o l y PS 8 . 'DArt of th"l R:Uthor 1 S concout of tho stuCl.'r as A ,...,holo . I t "T<:'.S not t h o u,g;h t of a s a n introductor:r r.hP D t o r t o P rrt II. A third nPr t of tho studv troats tho constituti0na l u o and t h oir (l_ o l o g 8 t ion inv C'lvoc1 i n tho and 1-, P..A. T hP. J.inos of cas<=Js a.nd tho thoorios to tho D 0 '"1o r s p urportod. to h a . v o bRon g r ant<=Jd b'! t h o 1i IRA f\r o Thon, tho "1F'117l"'r of tho of thoso i s c onsi d"3ro . \ 0!'1Uhasi s givAn to thA r"3mO t o and num erou s rP.d0loea t i ons, a . s mol l CIS to t h o q u Astion Of wha. t uorson s could ur0p o r 1 y tho u omnr s o f t h P Act. in .g to offor t h a n a critica l a n a lysis, thA studJr :ooints o 1 t D Os s i b l o q opns of f o r o n t a J l i n g too closP. judicia. l control. It c a n h a . :tdl' bo doniod the1t unc3.Ar tho urov i sions of thA Ac t t h o 1 :BA procos sos o f pnc1 cod."'l a .. vrRr"l logi sla t i vo i n n atur<=J. :ao causo o f t h i s it cp.n bo arguod . r oasonably that 11d.u9 Drocoss11, in t h"'! u r o c o d _ura l sRn sP. of notico and thP. d<=JvP.lopmP.nt of f A . c t s t hrou g h hAE'.::'i-'1g s sufficiRnt t o justify tho aoproval of cof'cs And P"l0ndrnonts, mps o t in 1TRA c o domal:ing to a n y g r o a t o r t o f.' T o P . t"'r o . R ? T RP. th;:, .. n it is n ocRss.ery i n tho lPg i s l ativ o pCil'ns o f tho Con g ross. In r Acognition of t his :9oin t of vio..-r th"'l has a d iscussion of it in Chapter V. I t i s h i s into n t t h e t tho s tudy s h o uld th9 iJ!l!:lr"'lssion t h a t obs<=Jrvanc"' of p r o codura. l 11 Clu o pro c "lss"' on t h R uart of NRA. in C OO.P.-Tl'la1: i n g "F.l. S o _osirAbl R , bocaUS"3 of thA uossibility 9838 -i-


tho o u r . in a r i i in o n ,or io mith thn on of codo s wou l d gi, o t n t lv:. ft' t-f inCli n . mot " o s of I • It i not hi i n t n t th."'t t 1dy . hnul-1 onv'";' r ho i m rossi o n t hl't tho obsorv,q r.o o f roco urn l 11nuo rocF>ss 1 ns a .r.2 .fl.ltiromont o f r.odo mn in i n Rb. son . It i fully r .co n izo(l hnt stud uarti u lflr l . as it on t o r i n t o < of f ubjF>ct of this s tud,r, d"linis t rc, t i 0 1 . "'7 i n mhich th"' cou ts hnv0. h<' dP d c1o1"1!! f"'T>'T r:. o ci. sinl' s , Mt. y hFIV"' uoints of vit:1"1 in con istont with t hiC> U t hC' 1s . }l}lp Stnd;v , Of r.Ourcq, 0SO.nt s thP. author's uoint o vioT>'T ar.d tho r.onr.Jusion s h i s o w n nd n o t official I n t h o mill found a comfTlAnt on8 rovi 8 o f tho nanuscriut . At thA b aC'1 of t his ri 11 bo. found studies und8r takon bv tho :Jivision of RPv io.m • 23, 1936 . L. C. ilc;rshC111 DirP.c tor, Divis ion of R ovio.m ii-


---: r ... -.:.


TABJ.J:: Gl CuETEFTS Pae;e 1 tte:.. of Trr:m.smi t t 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i A Gc: e:::n l Re ie t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1 C EAPr'fK1 I Int:i:ocl:nc ti o n P 2xt l. An ACI.rJi ni c: t n-t. t i Lm! T nc 1cgr ouncL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • 4 C HAP'IER II The T'1err" f A dr:inistrn. t ion I . Se :9a rn.tio n of Gov e .1.nnen t a l Po 1ers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • 7 I I. G ro\?th 0f Aclhli n i '"'tr8tio n antl. Ad 1inistrative L::nv........... . ....................... . 8 III. Delegation rf Powe in its Exercise . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 I I I Revie; ' -.r Cour t!'.: c • ..r1CI. S . ""fp g u a rds Against Abus e of 11l.T.._ heal11 anc. 11hi-=>i. .. er11 lEW.................................. 1 3 11Dl.le PI'O cess o : f Lc:tw 1 1 • , • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1 4 Ul trc .. c. i'lC. I n tra Vires....... . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . J.. S Juriso.ictionn l r>nd Constitutional Fact...................... 1 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 6 Discreti 0 n a r y and i,inis t eria l Actio n .......................• 1 6 Requi:..ements of Evidence.................................... 17 Self-Li;n i tation b y the C ouTts 11P oli tica l Questions" Exhausting .Ava ilable Administrativ e 1 8 CHAPTEl1 IV Administrative anc L t'r..e C,:1,ses. I. NarroVJ Review .....•.••..............•.. . .............. . 20 2 1 T h e Govermllent an(; its Inte rjJ.El,l Affr: .irs ............•...• The Gcvernrnent e .-tel1C:.s a Privilege...................... 22 The Governr.1ent supplies 2 Service....................... 24 II. B:.."oaC_ Review ............................................ 25 T h e I n t e rstC1 . tt-> Co:arGG:rc e C o , 1mi ssion...................... 25 T h e Feder a l Trade C ou!'l issic n............... . . • . . . . • • . • • 28 Subs tan t i ve Due Pr0c e s s anc". Pri t e Proper t;;r 1113usiness Affected '.7i t h e . 11•••••••••••••• 29 III. JuT'isd_ictir'rlal F act..................................... 32 U s e to Circumvent Na rnwr Revio.vr ......••...•..........•.• 32 Rece11t 33 AvciC: ing the Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 9833 -iii-


TABLE GF CONTENTS -2 Page IV . Generul Pro ed.ural Requir m"' ts. I 11-Defined ................ ........... . 34 Requir ment Vary-7it in FieldWith Fields ....... . 34 Acceptecl auirer.1r 1t .r otice -Hearing.. . . . . 35 Part II. rroble: . 1s of Achiinistration etncl Administrative Lnv1 in liR A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • 37 CHAPTER V Tn . s :1<: . 1 . . Let: i by ScheJ11e........................... . .......... 38 Lecislation o r A djudicati o n T e 'I'ariff Cor .missi o n... ...... 4 1 ThE' Inte rstat e CCYrnmerce C o 11.i ssi o n -Hearing RequireLJen t of the Act. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Forcing Issuance o r rf Codes ... ... ........•... ..• 49 ConC::. i tional . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . • 50 C H API 'ER VI The Acirini strati v e Approa c h m , P , 1 -t . T 1 ... 1e r o er:1 ai.1C!. ae e CLlnl qu.e .... .....•............ .......• Positio n of J3ar g!lg vri th lJRA •.....•....••.• Rt..lle by 1."ajor i ty V ote ............. .................... . ... . Position of NR.A -Haste a nC!. C onfusi o n •..•...•.....••••••••• Proceci11re -Personnel ................... .... .............. . Se lf-Governrnent .............................. _. ...• CHAPTER VI I Jurisci.iction anc1 Jurisdicti o n a l F act 52 52 53 54 54 56 iJi t hin Pur:po se s of the .Act . . . . . • . . . . . . . . • . . • • . . • . . . . . . . . • . • 59 Relati c1 r;i o ther Governmenta l Agencie s . . . . . . . . • . . . • . . • • • 59 Proyonents1 Ch. 'lrc,cter....................... 60 C.F...APT.SR VI I I The Procedur a l ScheTile and tl1..o tiearings .. The Act C'-nd. Procedure ....•........•...•... ...... ...... .... . 6 1 a nd. F acts ... .......................... ......... 62 S:1ort anc Inadeoua.te . s . . . . . . . • . . • . . • . . • . . . . . . • • • • • • • 63 ... .._ .. A.l""'C:,1.lr1ent a:,.Y).d. Opinion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 C:."'o s s Exarnin8 t i C'l1 . . • . . . • . • • • • • • • • • . • • . • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 64 Rebuttal Testir.1cny C onfid . e: : 1ti::..l ::::.e-ports................ 65 Relation to witnesses Sub }Joen a . . . ........... ............. 66 Oath. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 Orc:tl . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 67 9838 -Lv-


••• • ' 1


inl;<' nne 0::c Adnis•ibilit: n.nd r:-el ,"h t (I! .vide:: e ...................... . . • ss Co:nte:nts of t:1e. Tiecorc.l. .............. . .................. . .... • 68 . ' 1 :Finci.ing_, anc. t '1e F, tua1 . cllCJ.. cs................ u. T it A p 11ovo . l T . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4 e:: C'f l "Cl"J.:. . . . • . • • • . . • • • • . . . . . . • • • • • . • . . . • . . . • • . • • • . • • . • 7 4 J.iceti0n of Fin0 i nc;s . ..................................... ?'I C HAPTER X s i !l Publicn.ti 1iotice, .::::nd 0t'1er Ad:1ini s t r:.:tt i ve Action b y lillA . I. Pu"licC'Itl0n f r..egu lations. ................ 79 II. Hotice anc" in the I 1 duotrie.s'.. ............. 8 1 .Acti vi tiec: .............................................. . III. Other A ti0ns o :7 lJRA............................... 83 I n ter.!.) I .. e t ct t i c n s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3 .A.ule lldiJen t s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 a11d. Excep t i l'l1S................................. 84 Strj'S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 I V . Det el.,minat ion s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • 8 5 V . V i o lations by lffi A '?f Its 0'.m Procecl.ure ••.•....•..........• 85 C HAPTER XI Probleus i n Sub s t a n ti v e D u e Process 0f L aw -and AdJ 1ini stl[l.ti nn. I. ReD.sonableness............................................ 8? II. A Pro1leu in 89 I I I • f.ial f easance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 CE.AP' rER X I I 2:11d E nforce ent Activities. The of Enforceuent • ....•..•.....••••.••......•..•...• 97 T:!.e Staff. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 7 Interpretations as a P roblem.. . . . • . . . . • . • . • • • . • . • • . . . • • • . • . . • 9 7 Lethoc, s 0f Enforcemen t L imitatio n o f A c t Boycott -Sui t s by Inc\.iv iC.ualsEnforce;'!ent ....•...• 97 P1.,o cet:...ure ... "' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . • 98 Ac'.r.1L1istrative 11:9ue Process1 1 ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 102 Po.rt III. Po;.,rer s cf t11P -T.I.R.A. anci Their Delec;a t ion .........••.•...............•.......• 1 ()3 98::::>8 v -


T L.C c:, CulTTKJTS 4 CH.APTEH XIII Po'.T:i..'S of t : '1. A . . S.9ecific Poner .......................................... . r'llu. The Coi.JTTlerc The Concept Gonce t Incid . ntC'l.l Po\!Grs ............................• Cc,ncep t . . .... . . ............................ . r)f Unfnir Con1net i tin n . . ..............•........ 0f ":Business Aff .ctec: '"lith a Public Interest". .l.Jc..'""" eu ......•........•..............................• o llm rganc y11 :Doctrine . . ......•.......................• The Pr0blen 0f "A'"'sesSI'1ents11 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• XIV b y Congres . Hi stc,r y of t:1e :a..\:im "De leP.:C'. til. pot e skts n o n oo t e s t .. , p p e 104 104 106 109 109 110 111 111 clelegP..ri11 • •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 113 Delet>ati011 of Le :>c\1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 Delet;a.tio n an0 . Stnndards i n the Cases . . . • . • • • . . • • . • • . . . . • • 114 Delegation by the President end l.i.R.A. Dele(;ation A rf AdninistrC'.tin!l........... 117 Delegation b y the Pres i(ent a.n0 Renote"E.edelegation •..••.. 117 C oo.e Authorities as Private P ers0ns. . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . • 119 Private Agencies i n Adninisterin; Lfl.w,............... ..... 120 Public Character o f Code A u thority Activities ..•....•....• 122 Coc1e Authorities as Interested Persons.... . . . • • . . . . . . . . . • • 122 Conclusion o n Le gal Status o f C0d.e A.ut:nori ties............ 124 StandarG..s for the E:xerci se of P o ,:er .....•..••.•.... , . . . • . • 126 Pm.ers Exercised by Code tie s...................... 1 2 7 Part IV. Conclusions Sugsestions ....................• 1 3 1 C E.APTER XVI Forestalling H3road. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 132 AdmiEistrati v e S eJ'egu.:1.rG..s aDc. the C hn.llenE;A of 134 Table c-f Cases................................................. 345 Table C'f Treatises, B :tief s , ;_elJ0rts, e t cetera................. 3 55 Table "' L a1.7 Review Articles, lTotes a.:..1d. .. rnent................ 359 Ad.d_el1dUJTI. . . . • . • • • . • . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • 3 6 4 9838 -vi-


1 GEPERAL RE . r lone h0d ,n in urob of PdMinis r tivo larr and So0n )lo bACf'Tl1 rt -cArt of thP TRA staff bP. thrtt ho hEld ::on t o <1t -first h<1nd thP. oporaticn s of OnP of tho offort 0Vor undortal':An b Y our As 1 s edMini strl'lti vo history unfo hP boca!11A r ClltP.lV Cl'"arP. thFlt it u rosontP.d n1Any uroblP.lTJS bo valu['lbl r a nr0echod f rom tho viovrooint of RdTTii!listrPtivP. lA . m . At thP. timP. of tho (JTf.l.y hP. had a considorablP amount of P'lf.ltori e l t o usP.C. in a s tudy intAndod to ma:k-o i '11.Cl.opondon t of FR A. Tho intont of this n0t boon to thP. 0St b iShAd aclmi istratiVA lctM fC'und. in thP 0r dAducibl"l from th<>Jn. In tho P.npirical stato of acl.rninistrcto. student e t PrincP.ton, Profossor S. nointo.d out tho. -oroblRm t0 him as a for ro.sAB.rch. Otho.r quP.stions of admini strati VP. lar. h < _vo. sug . P. sto.d bv anC'th"lr forfler tP. achP.r, Prof"lssor J. Forro. st"lr Davison of t hP '::78.shington Uni vorsi. ty Lp.'tlf School, to mhom tho author i s ind"lbtP.d, as also hP. is to ChBrJ.os S. Collier, 0 f Gqorg o University L r . w School, Dr. Honnr iloining of Princoton Univorsi ty, JudgA P. W. So.wa.rd of thA Coml"1unicPtions Commission ann Edmund H. Worthy, an attorn.o.y for th8 SRcuritio.s and Exchange Commission for thoir "lncouragPJ11nt and HssistancA. 9 838


2 -The subject matter of the NIRA involved matter s of disputed economic and social character. Such. pr'oblems when treated administratively have been subject to the most careful scrutiny by the it would seem that NRA should. h$-ve foresee n the p o ssi bili ty of llbroad reviewll and a t tempted to have met it. The scheme underlying the Act, both administratively anci procedurally, had. little precedent, and none for the extended use to which it wa . s put. NP..A should have reasonably expected procedural requirements of .the n ature found in the llbroad reviewlt field to be im,posed upon it. In f act, little thought s e e m s to have :teen given to the entire of procedure until over a r.alf year after the passage of the Act. _ As an illustrative agency, NRA was in a position considerably more difficu:l;t to define than that of most administrative boards. As the agent of the President' it ffi?JT h ave been endowed with certain legal attributes. enjoyed him. Obviously greo.t O.ifficultJ lay in the f act that the l)osi tion of final'rat:ive authority was occupied by the . . A variety of technical problems in cocie mal

. Compli.:->nce proce d 11re a s a nat rer o f s t atuto r y nn.d con stitutional law did not seem to b e in with the courts r vier1s of tho p r ope r character of administrative enforce m ent. Examples o f m alfeasance y a dmini strative officer s e not unkno w n in the ndministrntion of NRA. NRA was r o s ponsiole for the actions o f i t s officel's nnd those of c o de nuthorities, The r e arc a numb e r of incidents r1her e NRA f ailed t o p r op erly c o ntrol a c tion by these persons. NRA d i d no t always f ollow its own p r oc e du r e . I t s substantive action was not always buttresse d by such an overwh e lmin g f a c t ual b asis that i t w ould hav e bee n impos s ible f o r the co u rts by use of the lldue p r o cess o f law11 con cept to have controlled the administrati ve a c t i on. A full con s i d e r a t i o n of c o nsti t u tiona l power s and the indication s of the c a s e s i s no t f ound e ither in the d rafting of the lHRA o r its administr ation. The questio n of did not a ppecr to b e i m portant asid e from t h e fac t that extreme r ede l e g ations wer e ]ndulge d in. The redelegatio n of p ower to interest e d per s o n s an d to private persons not acting IJ.S public officers was open to seriou s q u estion. A more careful con side r ation of t h ese p r oblems o f administrative and constitutiont l law might h a v e gon e f a r to h

P . . \ltT I A .r D I N I S ': 1 T I V JJ 1 ... r 1:1 _ (:I':Gll.G\J TD 9838


E -IJ:n:-'..OD CTIOIT 'Ihc fi1 s t o_,. 'ici

6 -the analysis Emcl of such f:'"'.cts. The of this function, 2 .ncl the crying for Em r-;,dministrc.tive a g e"'lcy and experts to it, r c .ther thr>n the or the leg i s l ative bodies, c . s they are to h a nd.le such :probJ.eE 'lS, was fully recor;nized. those in hie:h p lc.ces in I -.?t..A ( 10). The c>.dequacy of the create(:_ < L the st:::.tute attem:9ting to it, fror1 the viewpoints of aCti.ninistro.tive [l.ncl. substanti8.1 lldue process of l arr11 conce-9ts will be tl1.e of this :poper • . . 9838


' 1 -CEAPTER II THE TriEORY O F A:DI'I!!I ST TIO T I. SEPARATION OF GOVERl-POWE.L S ( l) .:my of the difficulties whi 1 adrnini strat ion encounters arise from t h e "sepnration of powcrsn doctrine. Although not as spe cifically recognized in t 11e Constitution a it is in the primary laws of orne of our States (2), it finds support in the three fold division of the structure set u p by the Constitution (3). Whether the framers were consciousl y follo ing; :ontesquieu, the British Constitution or the Colo nic:t l governmen t s , it is accepted that 'ontesquieu (4) t;' g rant certificates of naturalization (15) ,. a function that seer.1s ac1r.linistrative and one not involvi:ag a 11case" of "co ntroversy " (16) a s those terms have been construed b y t h e courts (17). The examples of executive exercise of both legislative and judicia l p owers are so numerous and will appear so often in t his pa:9e r tha t t ... 1 e y need no here. The evidence indicates t hat the doctrine has never bee n realized in prac tice (18) i n national and state governments (19). Each department inherently demands enough p o wer whatever its nature ( 20 ) to carry out functions essentia l to the preservation of its own integrity. has alway s been in our legal literature a ;recognition of this admixture of powers and the politic a l doctrine o r lega l fiction nature of the theory ( 2 1 ) . flore recently there has been considerable criticism directed at the reverence given Montesquieu1s fiction (22) as bei n g unscientific (23), inpractical (24) and a r.1ere political doc trine ( 25). It can be seen b y study that the development of the doctrine in t his country has been strong l y flavored by judicial re view; that it could have just as well developed along the lines of the " political question" notions ( 26) as it has in other g overnments (27). The burden of this theory in relation t o the growth of Administration and Ad.rninistrat'ive Law will be considered shortly. 9838


8 -II. GROWTH OF ADM I NISTRATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW. The use of the administrative technique has had a phenomenal growth in the l ast half century (28) • . Up until then the growth hacl b e e n steady. With the recognition of the existence of administrative law ( 29) cam e increased demMds b y the problem of modern society (30) for the use of afuninistrative machinery (31). Even when there has bee n frank hostility to tnis g r0wth it has gone on relentlessly (32). At present both in this country and England this situation presents a major battleground for opposing political forces (33). .. The op ponents of this phenomenon rally to their support both the doctrine.3 of judicial review (34) and "separation of powers. 11 It is urged tha t each division of government r.rust exercise the powers entrusted to it and that this exercise can not be delegated (delegata potestas non pot est deles.:ari) (35). Necessity has r ebutted these arguments by pointing to the practical advantages of administrative action (36). The saving of the legislature's tim e is probably the chief value (37). But there are other pressing reasons for resort to. the admi:rii strati ve device, such as t h e con tri but ions which can be made by the expert (38), the fact that the legi.slature is not in con tinuqus session ru1d its slow procedure, when in e xistence, which will not meet many of the demands for or prompt action (39), and the peculiar adaptability of administrative action to promote and protect individual and public interests (40). The result of these advantages is a great mass of delegated legislation (41) having the full force and effect of law ( 42). Administration has grown up without benefit of Constitutional recognition. It has, therefore, been forced to. follow a .pattern which made no place for it. Certain formulae and fictions are employed to circumvent the doctrinaire difficulties. Administrative offices and many students feel it would be highly desirable that administrative .action in its proper spheres be free from judicial interference. More respect and greater prominence would inure to administration, and there would be a greater fruition of admini strati on as a useful public agency. Administrative finality. rest upon one oftwo views, either that judicial review should not be had of a and equal division of government (43), or t hat government is co1.nprise d of two functions: l. representing the public will and 2. giying effect to the expressed will. Upon such theories it may be reasoned that the judiciary should be no more po werful than the executiveor administrative. III. DELEGATION OF POWER FINALITY I N ITS EXERCISE. Despite the hampering effect of governmental form and theories already discusse d, administrative legislation and adjudication continue to g row paying lip service to constitutional doctrine. T h e legislature can not delegate its legislative p ower but it can e m p l oy agents to find facts. It is in this function of f act-finder, that courts first consciously recognized administration (44). The ,legislature declares t h e policy and the administration finds the 9838 f


{' lQ,., ... f cts U"9on w . ich the olicy 6 0 8 8 into ff to to wllicl 1 t ! -oolicy hall be f.l.pplied, o run tho trnlitional t r t e. nt (11.J). If the "de tails" to be filled in or t.1 0 o. si ford t wi!Ot.der the statute s.wll a_: l.f are import nt L"l1101 ::,n t.l'.re i o. elegation of legi ln.tivo pcwt: r thoush it :11ay be so trivial :ts to no t excit e t'.le court. In fat, t1e c ourt _ecognl7e t .l8 delebFJtion. T11eJ further recognized that le_;i lative or ju icial ; ')o•r.rers softenf'd by 8 . " Cluasi11 may b e invol v d ( 46) . T}10 d.el3ga ti on may be annl obouz t o the powe r the court exerci es in case b81ore it, of s t atutory whicL frequently may decide that the 1 _1. t era1 . a : ) } Jlication of a s t atute was not intended in cert ain instances o r W11ere t 11e s tatut e does not cove r certain p r oble.11s s r>ecif lcull; t..:.1e. t i t does so oy Lplication. Either arlvantages of tne a1Liinistrative tecnnioue o r dissatisfaction wi t h judicial (Ll?) !'Tllst hav e led t o the attem)t to use afuniniqtrative a gencies. The n ext ste_) aft e r e1e frank r e cognition of delegated :9ower to administrative asencies i s t o see vina t mea .sur e of the finality desired by the<>e P..genci es is extend ea. t o t : u ei.r o n s by the Tne traditional s t a t emen t i s that the bodies beir.g l ) roper fact-finde r s , their findings of fact nill t b e r e v i m-ved. by ti.1e c ourts, o r tLe courts will not tute i t s of facts11 for that of t : 1 e entrusted fact-finder (48) certain exceptions later t o be noted ( 49 ) . "Questions o f law11 long been the peculiar p r ovince of t:ne c ourt ( 50), but as time want on admini s trative bodie s decided questions of law befor e p roblen1s r sa. ched the courts . Often t h ese questions w e r e dec i ded i n a waJ t hat p leased the courts. Tl1er e d e v eloped the n otio n tl1a t admini s tra tiv3 determination of "questions of law 1 would be 11persw1sive11 u ,;Jon the courts (51) -that is, the c ourt would n o t dist u r b f:'.uministrat i v e decisio n a s long as it acco rded t :1e court's o:m f eelings. A further complicatio n a1Y9ears. Thare i s no clear cut be tween "questions o f law11 and 11questi on s of fact11 (52). Often a :::_Jro blem, which at one time is a 111 uestio n of law" t o the c ourt, will be come a "questio n of fact11 t o t!Le same court at anot-'ler time ( 53). In quectionable prcblems of tni s ccurt treat as II q_uestions of law, It a t h ins (!Ui t e easy t o do; if it rl_id no t desire t o review or to change tl1e de t ermination of t i1e strati ve body these p r "Jblems m iJ;ht be termed 11mi xed ques tion s o f law and f act'' and exte::1ded finality o f "question s of law.11 This latter practice i s frequently resorted t o if an allegation of f r aud or mistake i s not s o clea r that the feels i t slould i nterfer8 (35). The statement jus t made i s c ouc:1e d in the c ourt' s terms and wlth a view t o wha t Court says. Administrative l aw is so nm1 t :1a t we can n o t e xpect t o f i n d it an orclerly s y s tem perfectly described by tl1e courts (56). ve m u s t look at wha t the c ourts do in each field. T his will be d one l a t er. Firs t we must s e e uoon wha t theories the courts r eview.


11 C:::AP7.ER I II f :JY 1'1ill COW.TS 1C OJ!' 'Di :I 1 H SThA'l'I VE ? 0\v'ER . One or t : 1e doctrine<> of :L;nglis l 1;-,w, 1 .10st distinguishing it from other systems, wns lon u t hou.:;h t to n f:.t.ord t'dequnte protection to individual richts. This nas 11t '1e rule of la -_,rr (1). Its protection has been found inedequnte. If nn ad1 official by surmnary action does $40,000 ( o r even $4, 000 ) o f e j1ldbffien t may be forthcoming readil y enoue;h , but its collection will p r o re far more troublesOI1e. It i s urged that Congress or the let.;islatures shoul d review a d ministrative action, since it ht'. s g iven the n anda te it should. judge the desirability of its administration. The practice , lonever, hflc been othe r nise ( 2 ) . Some timer. the legislature delegates this chec k specifically to the courts ( 3) , more f requentl y , t his is no t done ( 4). There a r e even s t atutory indications that it i s no t desired (5). In tingland, Hhere such statutory r, tate en ts are .1or e common ( 6) , this has a s con tested field • .. ... checks a r e desirable this does no t p o sit that adm i nistrative ov1e! i; greatly a bused (7) . It would be well to oriefl y survey the existing check s other thm 1 those exercised by the Court s . A side from co;.1trol by the courts , there should be checks u pon administration from other directions. In as f a r as the c haef executive must accept responsibili for the actioa9 o f administratiire bodies h e should hav e a seneral control over thei Y Until the Humnhrev ' s decision (?a) it wa s thol.lL;h t that the remova l p ower might afford such control (?b). It .1ay be t h n t t'1e President does no t have to accep t responsibility for the actions of ell adr!1L1istrative The Con gress must, ho wever, be respor 1sible for the o f all a dmi nistrative agencies uhich it if not their aclministration. T her efore , it would seem that ti1e legislature must deal vri t h t h e problem of . assisted by the executive wl10, i t is h o ped, will be in h armony w i t:1 it (?c). In 3nglana P arliamentQry contro l over &elegnted leg i s lation has somev-1hat f mther than cont:col exerciseC.. b y legi slatures i n this country (7d). There is the procec'.urc k:L .. as layin[; nn ve rule D:POn the t able. Suc h rule s a n d r e5ul8tions lnid upon the tc.ble be fore P arliame:nt 1nay be disa:ouroved by either h0use -vvi thin a c ertain •Jeriod (usually not over forty days of nny sessi n:1). I f 11ot disapprove d they have the full force of laTI. Other tyoes of rules regulations require a definite Parliamentary by eithe r or both h ouses, within a certain nUinbe_ of legislative days. A provi sian that either h"'use can mc>,ke susgestions to the body tl:1e rules is often attached to both methods of control. Furthe r than t h i s , l)rovisinn are frequently inserted in statutes allowing rules to have full force u;.1til P arliament acts unon them. Even i f nent acts negative l y r egar clins a rule, any enfor-ce ment of such a r1J.le p r evinus to the P a:cliamen tary action is legal. T his system has raisec1. as torr:: of criticism by laYJyers who urge tha t aJ:r,roval is . made a i1er e formality while allo'. "ing tl1e stamp of P arliamen tary authority to rest upon the regu.lation and s o :) r eclude control by the courts. It is the contention of these men that there is no practica l 9838


12 -responsibility . T'ne merit of their ar:;; u men t s is no t a subject for con sideration her e . It i s merel y intended t o "JOint out teat tnere snould be efficient safecuards to preclude abuses o f . , ower. Other controls lie i n ti.1e ;Jublication of rules anci. the control over budgets and One o f the most effective means seems to be the system of 11int e i1_Jellation11 of w i n i s te:i.'S t o Hhich resort is had. Pointed questions unon possible shady p r actices or q_uest ionable adr:ri ::lis tration, brincinb with them the -urispt lig h t of -;::.ublici ty! will t;o far to remedy abuses of p ower. In most English sneaking countries the controls of legislative p ower over appropriations, legislative over personi.1el exer cisec_ through ir_n:oeachment process and the right to confirm appointoents, and the -oo wer. of investigation are in mos t com..rnon use. The first t w o methods are unvvieldy and ineffective as agah1st hli:nor abuses o f p ovver. The process of i nvestigation is analosous to the En glish system of but is resorted to only suc:;smoclically , a n d t l1en usually only in the most odious cases. Aside from these controls, little has beei.1 done in the United States to urovide safecuards against acJ.mi nistrative abuses of power. Some five years a;o Horth Carolina. established a Director of Local Governme_lt, 11whose duties v vill be to standardize and suryervise the business methods of counties, cities and towns. rr (7e) This is :1ot precisely in poil1t as a matter of control of administrative action, but it is referred to since there is a great analo:;y betv..reen activities of rnunicinal cor-oorations ru1d those of administrative bodies. New York has a great amo1mt of delegated leg i slation, but no control over it (7f). The State Lesislative Reference Librarie41 states recarding this 11A . s I it, the enforce; . 1en t of rules or made in any state department i s left v;holly to the administrative officer o f such department, and the Le Gislature and Executive appear not to interfere in such enforcement, after the authority hns been once g ranted to the 'State u R ecently , in iJe w York it h.?,s even been pro?Josed to clothe administrative bodies with greRter rule p o 'lvers without any SlJecific legisle.ti ve check over t l:e e xercise of these } )OWors. In L1assacJ.1usetts all departments, boards, commissions or officL:!ls making general rule s or must file COJ?ies Y l i th the Secretary of State, and must secure the apnroval of the Governo r and his council (7g). The Secretary of State file and index such rules and rebUla tions, and make them generally available. There i s <:tn appeal open to citizens to the Governor his council on q uestions o f authori and jurisdiction which does not preclude other legal redress. Annual reports must b e 111ade to the Governor or to the Genera l CouTt (7h). In most cases such reports nrc to the l atter. Furthe r than this, 'i.>assachusetts has not gone, although the problem has been given serious consideration. _ With the exception of Wisconsin, other regulations of administrative lavv making are unimportant. The nost widesJiread agitation i n any stt-.te ifor safeguards Ep})ears to have existed in Wisconsin. Wisconsin has <:t system of 11interpellation11 mode l e d upon the foreign systems (7i). This statute, however, has only been used t h ree times , once in 1935 when the 9838


Legislature, n e etin::; i 1 ;joint _cs,i on , c '1l lcd b fore it the Jtcmb e r s o f the Board of Control, ::hich r c l atin..; to the st( tc charitabl e and uena l i 1 1 s ti tuti o1b. So 111Ur h tim , . , "'S :. ncnt in con trov o r .,y over rules that no si ve r. t i oni1 g . as h<'.ll. T c "'t a tute was 1 t used before t i i 1 1925, o it c e 1 con under it c1oes not te to its "'OSsiblc v alue . A s t,.,tute "1< ecl ir. 1931 creat 0 d an E:xecuti ve O'll.t"lcil o f tl1e Governor. This body w a s n.uthori zed to in vestigate tne a c tiviti , s of qunsi :::lilcl Lake reports to tl1e Le :; i s lc::.twe . T!1is set:Jms to be, ho'. 'evcr, onl;y one of the minor function..; of this council. T h e ")i'c . ci t Governor i1is predecessor :hnv e not aunoi1ted all the 1:1embcrs provice d b y the statute. The council it self has :1.ot yet cl:1.lled D:POll tu ')erform the functions for which it vas created. This review indico.tes t 12t little has o(:en done in this country along the li:1e of develo1in:; a:i.1d contro l s i n the field of adninistration despite the fact that there seems to be a vital need for action UDOn this ' Although the legislature m2.y chao e between theories ( 8), tl1e courts arc relucta:1t to ellovr s'lch - • owers to admi:.1i strati on apart from the supervisinE; checl: of judicial r eviev : ( 9 ) . In the Jast courts have usuall allo7ed .AdiJiriistr,.tive bodies to suc h JJOv;rer. Recently, this hc:. s been tn, if the range of choice is too lars e or involves subject matte r of too ( 10). Judicia l r eview in this country extends to statutes; i n England it extends only to aCL-nin istrative action or by-laws (11) . It i s not clea r that it a l ways extends that fnr (12). From a l JOsitio:.1 of compa rative inferiority to the legislature (13) our courts have risen 1."-nti . l they nov v exercise review of legis lative and administrative action under a nunber of theories. The 11naturo l11 or 11nigl.1er lav.r11 br,ses of review are of the breates t antiquity (14:) of any of the courts 1 apryrooches. In e arly E11glish law Bract on decl.... r e d that tho o Rrons Hmst nut 11 the bridle of lav111 unon a ruler acting outsid e the nreceuts (15);ngain there is n reference in .. a bJla ChA.rtn t0 hiGher l av.r ( lG) ; and there is the ell kno. ' m a t of Coke (17) to establish judicia l r eview. The doctrine finds its first utterance L ti1e Supreme i ll t:i1e opinion b y C nief Justice Ch ase in Calder v . lllil1. in 1798 (18). The doctrine ;rew and ripened into an acce-,Jted basis upon which to limit the p o "!Cr of governmen t ( 19). It has meant ti1nt commo;.1 l a r p r ecedent's b e (20) , or that the c o urt vrould rely U:DOn its own feeling of v-rhnt it felt v;as universally considered just or 11honest11 action (21). It i s in t his latter aspect that the doc.trine has b .een mos t sev e r e l y criticized . ( 22) 11.r atural l a v 111 theory has .;;rom into, and has been greatl y absorbed by, the rtdu e process of. lan11 concept For a considerabl e time after our constitution yas ' I r i ttcn 11due uroce s s11 of law had little s i gnificance save procedural (24). This was true lL'ltil as late c:s 1870 ( 25). From humble oric;in (26) admi:1istra tive rocedur e (27) due process has be come an instrument '.'!hereby statutes a d m i nistrative a ction are overruled as havi (; i10 ?['Oper constitutionRl basis or "Jllreasonableness (28). The doctrine received a casual r eference in v . (29); it next was broadened i the (30 ) . Despite later use of the doctrine of rlnatura l l a w11 (31) the due :Jrocess concept is nnw 9 __ 838


1 4-:-. regarded as firmly e stablishe d (3;2) eve n by those disa-• )T.Iroving of its extent. That the betwee n t he tvro is close is au , )arent from the reference by jud,ges to the doct.rines as being identical (33). Due pro cess of law no w gives t h e courts power to introdu ce limiting principles of taxation, formerly one of the chief problems of 11natural l a 111 (34), to .conde m n r ate schedules as unreasonable ( 35), ;md to conderrm other socia l ru1d economic u p on the same basis. This great gro 1th has bee n the cause of much heated deb ate. The l ate Justice H olmes expressed his view s this subject strongly and often. Dissenting in :Bald win v. IHssouri (36) he said: III have not yet a de quately eJq)res sed the more than anxiety that I feel at the ever increasing scope given to the Amendment in cutting dovm what I believe to be the Constituional rights of the States. As the decisions now stand, I see hardly any limit but t h e sky to the invalidating of those rights if they ha:-p:pen to .strike a majority of this Court as for any reason undesirable. I c annot believe that the Amend ment was intenQed to give us c arte blru1che to embody our economic or mora l beliefs in its prohibi tions.11 Many lJersons have felt that the concept is an agency to maintain property (37). That this tjpe of judicial control is the common tendency of courts can be seen from the f act, that, although England is s aid not to have judicial review, and certainly no ndue process of law11 concep t such as is b1om1 to us (38), still English courts have a strong to review administrative action, even when clothed by statute rlith finality, upon any of several theories (39). Of course, the English courts do not go nearly so far as ours and at times exercise no checl: ( 40)). The signi ficant thing is tha t there is in existence as . a characteristic of courts a disposition to control administrative or legislative action. As w e shall see due process of law has t,vo problems: 1. Can p ower be exercised? 2. Has it been exercised properly? These tv-w questions to test administrative action have broad to shape our course of government (41). Without either of the t w o theories discussed, the courts have a check in the interuretation of statutes and the doctrine of ultra and intra vires. Courts in the e xercise of their normal duties are called --. upon to apply statutes or other law to the cases before them. Wherever there is anbiguity or conflict as to me.aning, .and this is the stuff of which lawsuits are made, the courts must interpret the law (42). Although , there is no express Constitutional prohibition to the giving of finality in the determination of certain disputes, to other agencies than to courts, this has not been done without courts1 approval. Questions of law and the i nterpretation of statutes the courts have successfully maintained are their e xclusive b ailiwick. This of i n t erpretation has been often used to :achieve results, not desire d b y the legislature ( 43) . It: is obvious that the povver of interpretation is tremendous . The likelihood that the e xercise of such p o wer v1ill be collored b y the nerson a l philosophies of those w ho have it, is even more apparent. 9838


-l.J -This uoctrL1e of 11intcr')I et .... ti.'"'n11 is mothe:c of t !le Y_l tra ... j d vires concel) ts. A 'lhnse 01 s t;. tutor J in te .. :prctc. ti oj is th<'t o f determi ning tho lLnits 0.1 < utl ority :1:u. ju isdiction con erred bJ parti cular statutes. T i s ;"'.Ction be omes rt li11 i tat.ion u-r)on both lebislv..tive and adm ini tr<.tiv e rction ( L4 ) . A s a n-LlP. tion of IOHor nnd o f dcleG tion of " or:ers ei thor undo:c <.. Wl'i tten or un 1:ci tten Constitution the nee .ssit of int "'r')rct ption :ulr! es crcrt L1fluer ce ancl co n trol in the hands of tho court.,. ':21 nt. tho.L e s. ou..ltl b e such a re train t U1;on the partis;m desire o f the AdnLaistratio.1 to its ovrn povrers is a d n1i tted b y stude.o.1ts r11d advocrte3 of action (45) . ill ere the proper (under o u .r PCC01)ted vie :s on 11juclicia l rcvie'.vtt) limits of the courts restrainir b p ower end, nnd t h e "Ositiv e injection o f the courts' o''V11 views 1 is n ,)roblem tha t looms lcnge i n the Rdministra tivc field (46). I n the United States the v.l t:r;:n doc i s bound U:L ) with the problem of jurisdictiona l f nct (47); it is in 2n6 1Md that the phrase ultra vi.1ee_ has been nost considered (<18). A brief g lance at the English prob lem will ' point the consic1.erRtion of jurisdictional fact. The socalled 11Henr y VIII clauses!! (named from a broad s t atute of simila r character in the reig11 of tha t lf!onarch ) provide in effect that rules putting the stntute into effect 11shall be questioned in any legal nroceeding.11 Stated differeutly , the rule shall 11hFlve effect as if enacted in the Act" (49). Without ti1e of t h e open doctrine of "judicia l reviev , ,u, L1 vo t,ue in.t 11is c o1.u try, the 2nslish courts faced a ticklish i')roblem vvhen the firs t cases under such a statute nrose. The first and a leading case i s J_nst.i t_ut e . ... (50). Lord Herschell, 1. C. i s nlainly troubled. Th e m o s t d.ifficul t situation he envisages i s t :1a t of a lJn i nistrative rule under the statute being contrrrr y in effect t o t:!.1e s tc.tute. V ou..ld this mean tha t the administra tive rule having the e ffect o f a latter statute would the sta tute? As the case did n o t L1vol ve t h e ooin t, w h atever m i Ght b e said concerninb it was dictLL'TI. As suc h , it i s far from lucid. Lord Uorris (51) expressed the o')iniou t h.:tt the should test for ultra This latter view seems to '1ave :) r e v ailed. Yfuen it beccme obvious that a statute might be crossly contorted the courts hav e f elt a test of ultra to be desirable (52). tes t wa s used in 11Ex lli3-rte11 Yaff..... (53) w ith the indication that an En glis h judicial review , more limited than our own, nov1 res t s established UPOi1 the theor;y i nterpretation and the right to tes t for pl tr..G,-iP..tDi (54). . The ; )roblem of jurisdiction is merel y another form of :ultra -intra vires •. And a s the Constitution is merel y a stntute," it can be seen th<.t once judicia l r eviev ! a n d the p ovrer of intel!lrete .tion is estab lished the Courts feel they c2.n r eview to see i f either the statute or the Constitution :pr 'ovide a bas i s for the i)OYrers to be exercised (55). S hould tes t of jurisdiction be limited to tJ.1e Courts' de province 11q u e stiOi.1s of law?" ':'he indications that the Courts will i.10t be thus restricted. The f acts U D O n v:r:1ich jurisdiction is as sumed -the "jurisdictional f acts " will 'in proper instences be deter mined by the Courts . This maybe because jurisdictianal f act often is used 11in the sense of the m eaning of the vrord or terms into which those circumstances (;Jroved circi.llJlstances which are another sense of the term . 11f act11) are surrnned U1) for the •)urpose of a ttacl1ing legal conseq u ence to them" (56). It is this dual -sense o f the word llfactll tha t provokes much 9838


1 6 of the controversy. Probabl y , the most s?..tisfactory solution noulO.. be to allo\7 theadministrative agencies to determine the " proved circumstances" and the legal consequences to be decided by the Courts (in fields the3r invoke the doctrine) either administrative or jucl.icial. This \7ould be only a compromi s e and s:tbject to much attac. : as suc h . The problem looms so large as a device of judicial review of ad.min istrative action that its use will be further (5?). A closel3 r r e lated doctrine is that of 11questions of la\?11 Tihich , as .has alread,y indicated, the Courts hav e s tekeo_ out e , s their peculiar vince (58 ) • The a .mbigui ty (59) of the terms 11la'l711 ancl_ 11fact 11 are such tl1at g reat confusion e xists (60). It is evio.ent that there i s that t:1e same question may variously present 11law11 or 11fact11 to different courts, or even to the same Court (61). The o .ifficulty is illustrated by the Gratz case (6la). It has b een variously urged that the question of whether a t ying contract is an unfair method of com petition is one of 11law11 and tha t it is one of 11f act 11• The courts, in fields, are reluctant to foreg o the fina. l word on. problems such a s interpretation ( 62) so they actually many questions of ultimate fact (63). It is doubtful if any workable distinction or separation could be found ( 64). , so n e . may expect the Court will have open this .ready avenue of e.pDroach. The ease with \ 7hich the Courts utilize this an-oroach is seen in fields of dis puted sociai p o licy (65) or uhere the uses . such an te standard as "unfair competi tion11 ( 66). Like use ha. s been made o f the conce::_J-t, as a colleagu e to 11jurisdictional f act," to check the harshness of alien determinations (67). From this enumeration the usefulness of the is _a,:pparen t. An early doctrine, in use before the phenomenon of great admini stra-ti v:e action nas observed, is that of discretionary and ministerial It is v1ell stated i!i the early " case of Deca,tur v. Pc.ulding ( 68), deci0.ed in 1840. The Court he-ld tha t refusal of a pension to the -r.rido'\7 of St.ephen Decatur. involved. the exercise' of di scre'tion u yon the part of the of the Navy. The b asis for the d.ecision seems to be the feeling, that choice in the judicial sense was involved, and that such a choice mad e in good fnith, should not be disturbed. It should be pointed out that the Court expressed a wilJ.ingness to 9verrule the Secretary's decision if a wrong _ decision of law had beem made. The exercise of rrill not be disturbed by injunction or mandamus. A failure to act may represent the conscious c hoice not to act (.69); while mandamus will lie to force the per formance of ministerial duties (70). Need of choice and free do m from judic ial review t:P.e -fields of 11narrow revieri11 (71) still exists (72) although the doctrine is .little mentione d and has become dwarfed by other of judicial control. A ne\7 and subtle. means of r eview i n the Court Is treatment of . questions of evid: ence. It rriay be that the court is attempting to under s tano_ the admini strative :problems (73). The judicial technique, in so trying to ap-pr eciate the s position, calls for a full.conside ratio. n of the evidence. The next step, and one o ften t alcen, is for the Court itself to evaluate the evio.ence ('74) • . In a large percentage of cases whe r e aCIJTiinistrati ve orders are upheld; the Court does so, only after full consideration of the evidence (75). It is o f course natural to the judicial technique-to so consider evidence , but sometimes the pur pose ma;y be defini tel; to limit administrative action bjr resortto a sta t utory implication (76) or b; 9838


..... 17-some notion of tho Court'" sc) to '.at evidence to be control) AlthouGh in some of t .. e earlier cases, espe ially those involving the oiscr tionary oncept, there Has 0ften no evidentiary requirement, it might 1Je se. id. thet evi0ence is required to support any positive adrt.linistration action (7'1). T'1e e::pl.:'nnt.ion of t'1e 11discretion11 cases lies in the fact that son. e:\.trnorC:in. ry rewec.y ras sout;ht which the co1.u-ts nere reluctant to give, COUJ?l d nith a feeling that the act was juc'.icial. Vlhere u reasonable choice coulCl b e made the courts hesi tc.. ted to use the injunctio1; ancl here nction micht result in leaving the i!l the same position, the c0urts saw no adv antagr> and only a wnste C'f effort and p resti1s e in usinr; man damus. \There the statut e r e quires a an order 1.msupporteo. b y evidence is of no effect ( 7 8). Certainly, vrhere there. i "' n0 basis vin evidence the action nill be scrutinized, and upon a. proper shr,ring an attacking party may have it reversed (79). In a recent case decided in 1933 (80), where a Virginic. statute authorized an admini s .tra t i ve officia. l to order gracle cross ings eliiJinated, '17hen in his 01)ii1i n, 'it beca.11e necessary, but providing only i'C'r c-. if ti:1e r n i l, ay 11as d i ssati sf ied with the order, there \'7as held. t o be a deni a l o f d.ue p r ocess of lc:.n. The court ap:parently relied 1.l2_)0n the necessity that ncJ.nini strati ve fino ing s be supported by evidence ( 81.). The requi rei.1ent as to thr> amount C"f evidentiary support varies. The stt1teE1ents of the court differently phrased in terms of 11some evi-dence 11 ( 82) "evidence 11 ( 83), and. 11 substantial evi0 .ence" ( 84) as being ssary tC' s1.o;_oport an order. Usuc-.ll;y , nhere tl1ere is '"sub stc:m tial evidence 11 to SU}Jl)Ort the order , or it is not a gainst the vmight of t h e evi

In addition to these theories whereby r eview is had by the Courts, it should b e considered that thete are ce 'rtain restraints im"l)osed uuon the courts either by themselves deliberate l y as a matter of l JOlicy or through the force of circumstances. There is the doctrine that a n administrative remedy must be exhausted b efore aDnlication is had to the courts for relief (89). This is said to in some cases to a o . Jl.icB .tions for a rehearing or a modification (90) or an hearing (91). It is esuecially an'Jlicable to requests for the issuance of extraordina r.f legal remedies, , i vhere any rea.sonable aillninistrative rellledy r emain s availc:.ble. The doctrine of 11'Jol1tico, l questions" furnishes another selflimitation u u on the courts (92) which is of long stRnding (93). It has particular significance in internationa l relations (94). questions of grave executive 1JOlicy, arid the roblem of vrhether a Sta.te is maintaining a. 11reuublice. n form of g ove:rnmentr. ( 95). Another limit ation lies in the constitutional S i'Jecification that 11the judicial uower shall extend to cases --[and/---controversies 11 ( 96). It is under this clause that the courts may decline administrative functions (97) and refuse to give declaratory judgments (98 ) • ."?bile so limiting themselves the courts do not hesitate to review action taken under formulae already considered. What is the value of this urocess of judicial checks u o on a field otherv'i se gre8 .tly inde-oendent? There are many advocates of the administrative technique, who see no and feel that unsymuathetic courts are mer ely sabotpging a rival. 13ut, it is wise to remember the extreme youth of the e x t er-sive use of a dministrative government. It is quite oro"be.ble tha t there are a s many inconsist encies and injustices in the administrative orocess as there are in the courts1 review. True, ad.::ninistrative law is contra dictory, UJl-. systematized and ( 99). Administration is also ne w . It is ,,i thout the exoerience of the courts in individual rights. Policy often dominates so that admin:.s:. cati o n may overlook individual injustices and its own acts of (100). And, al many of the courts' restraints are highly desirable, guiding and tempering administrative action into its highest u tility, the courts' very technique often unfits them to exercise the great control they do. The ansvver to the inadequacies of a .dministratio n does not li'e alone in the courts (101). Yet in this country b y subtle means and often means most obvious the courts do L shion and guide administrative procedure and uolicy (102). New methods and devices are needed to meet ne w situations. The use of specie.lize d courts is grow ing (103); there is too, a growing demand for d eclaratory judgments ( 104). Des J i te this need, we must not forget the velue of a reasonable judicial check. Such a check brings the legislature and administration closer togeth e r (105). An understanding of the uroblems of the other iG of extreme value to each . The JUdicial urocess has been a '90vrerful a e ency in giving sub stance to the administrative technique; it has made the develoument of t his new instrument of government a more orderly a more useful a nd resnected form of g ov ernment (106). This review h a s not bee n m a de for the uuruose of praising or de nouncing judicial r eview of a .dministrative action. T he r e has been, however, an attempt to carefully point out both the and disadvantages. The of this consideration has been to point the nroblem --to show the gantle t of uossible judicia l r evie, v s (as stated 9838


.... 17some n otio n of t h ... Court•. SC' n...; to ,.; lett evidence CYU.t)1t t o b con t rol) in,e; • .Altllo u t;h i n nome of t e arlicr c sc:>s, "'pe iall y tho"'e involving the c'U scretio n ary oncept, ther e \IF's oft e n n o evidentiar y requir e m ent, it be s e . icl the.t e viclen e i s requir e d t o s upport any positive adraini stra t ion act i o n ( 7 ?). T 11e o f 11d i scr etio n 11 cases lies i n the f act that som l e cc>l r emed y uas soucht which the cot.rrt s ,-,er a r e l uctet:Ll t t o give, c o u p lee YTi tl1 a feeling that the act was juticia l . \"There a reasonable c hoice c ould b e made the courts he si t a ted t o use t ile injunction ; and rhere nction mir.;ht result in leaving the applicC'; i n t h e s ame position, the courts saw no a .dvantagP and. only a w aste o f effort and prestit<;e in usinr; mandamus . \Ther e t h e statute require s a 11e arin{; an order unsupported b y evidence is of no effect ( 78). Certainl r, there i s no basis vin evidence the action rrill be closelJ -scrutinized., and upon a prope r sho,ring an attacking party may have it reversed (79). In a recent decided in 1933 (80), where a Virgini.:'. statute authorized. a n administrative official to order grade crossing s eli!Jinated, when in hi$ o ,;L1ion, it beca.11e necessary, but providing only for c::. if t11e r ail'. 7ay rras dissatisfiecl with the order, there \7as h e l d to be a denial of G.ue p r ocess of lc:.n . . The. court apparently relied the necessity that strati ve fino ing s be supported by evi clence ( 81). The requirement a s to thf' N :10U1'1t of evidentiary support varies. The stuter.1ents of the court clifferentl;>r phrased in terms of 11some evidence 11 ( 32) "evidence 11 ( 8 3 ) , and. n substantial .evi0.ence" ( 84) as being ilece s-sar: y to s1:>;_oport an UsuD .ll37 , YThere L1ere i s 11 sub stf.ln tial evidence 11 to the order, or it is not a gainst the of the evi(;_e:1ce, it uill not be molested . (85). requirements as to evidence vc._ry from w :1ere t l 1e sta. t u t e s is silent t o where it may Cl.etail Hhat evid.e:1ce should be :9re sent. This sePn s to have little effect upon the courts. It is doubted_ if a stat eDen t that there neecl be no evi dential7 basis meet judicial requirements of 11due process of la\7. 11 In cases 1.-rhere the evidencA is abundant courts do not care to revieu. In uher e t here is nC'ne or t h e interferences are absurd there is little pro bleD in the. courts 1 rP.vie1. 7 . It isi:.-1 those d.oubtful cases ,-;rhere the evidence is 11meager or unsati sf 8 .ctory11 that t h e difficulty ari se s ( 86). Strictl:r speal:L1::;;, v1hat basis of juclicial review of Aviclence AJ>.:ists other thnn the resid.uary 11due p rocess11 conce} t is hard t o determine. Why finality a s tC' fact, even as to the v reit: h t to be given evidence, can and should. not be cetermined by an Rdministrative body is difficult t o see. It would. be ru1fort1.mate to redt.,_ce our tribunals to mere magistracies for the c o:1cJ.uct of he.:uings p r Pli:: :ina r y ' to jucii cial consideration 11 ( 87). Cm hand, arbi trar;y a n .ci failure to 8 .ct upon or actin, ; t o the obvious significa11ce of t h e evidence, should be as fullc • subject to check a s is any ad.:1ini stre.ti ve procedure. Jurists feel tl1.::. t c::. gravA responsibility is to administrative aE;el1cies (88). :By a n c . t e c hnique these agencies ma, y not be as consiC:.erate of incH vidual rir ;hts as t h e courts. In the -requirement that there he a basis in eviderice t h e a c tion tal;:en in the courts merely hold check. Tile requirement uill vary u pon such influence as, whet"1er t h e subject m atter is consiC:.ered. governmental or involves inter fere:lce 1.;iti1 inc'..ivic1ua. l rights, t h e n ature of the field, the care usecl. by adr.1inistrativp ap,;encies i n gathering and analyzing facts, as well as nanv other f[>_ctors. 9838


l e In addition to these theories whereby review is had by the Courts, it should b e considered that there a .re certain restraints imDosed uuon the courts either by themselves deliberately as a m atter of oolic y or through the force of circumstances. There is the doctrine tha t a n administrative remedy must be e xhausted b efore aDnlication is had to the courts f o r relief (89). This is said to in some cases to a J"Jlic,g.tions for a rehearing or a modification (90) or a n hearing (91). It is esuecially au,Jlicable to req"'.le sts for the issua.nce of extraordinar7 legal remedies, where any rea . so nr1.ble administrstiv e rel!ledy r emains availeble. The doctrine of "'Jolitical questions" furnishes another selflimitation u o on the courts (92) which is of long stpnding (93). It has particular siE,nificance in internationa l relations (94). questions of grave executive iJOlicy, and the .,,roblem of vrhether a Sta.te is maintaining a . "reuublican form of g overnmentr. (95). Another limit ation lies in the s-oecification tha t "the judicial uower shall extend to all cases..... -[and/---controversies11 ( 96). It is under this clause that. the courts may decline administrative functions (97) and refuse to give declaratory judgments (98 ) • . :bile so limiting themselves the courts do not hesitate to review action taken under formulae already considered. What is the value of this urocess of juclicia. l checks uoon a field otherv• i se greatly inde"Dendent? There are m any a clvoca tes of the administrative technique, w ho see no and feel that un symua.thetic courts are merely a rival. :Cut, it is wise to remember the extreme youth of the e x t er.sive use of administrative government. It is quite orobc _ble that there are a s many inconsistencies and injustices in the administrative orocess as there are in. the .courts' review. True, ad.:uinistrative law is contre . dictory, unsystematized and bewildering ( 99). Administration is also new . It . s without the ex-oerience of the courts in s ai' individual rights. Policy often dominates so that admi n:..s: . . cation may overlook individual injustices and its own acts of (100). And, al many of the courts' restraints are highly desirable, guiding and tempering administrative action into its highest u tility, the c.ourts' v ery technique often unfits them to exercise the great control they do. The a:r).5''i'rer to the inadequacies of administratio n does not lie alone tn the courts (101). Yet in this b y subtle means and often means most obvious the courts do and guide administrative procedure and uolicy (102). New methods and devices are needed to meet new situations. The use of specie .lized courts is growing (103); there is too, a growing demand for declaratory judgments (104). D e s • Jite this need, we must not forget the v elue of a reasonable judicial check. Such a check brings the legislature and administration closer togeth e r (105). An understanding of the nroblems of the other is of extreme value to each . The judicial urocess h a s been a uovrerful in giving substance to the administrative technique; it h a s m a de the d e velo-oment of this new instrument of government a more orderly a more useful and resnecte d form of government (106). This r eview h a s not been m a de for the Duruose of praising or denouncing judicia. l review of administrative action. There has been, however, an attempt to carefully -point out both the advo::mta. ges and dis advantages. The pUrpose of this consideration has been to point the nroblem --to show the gantlet of -oossible judicial reviews ( a s stated 9838


-1.-by the ourts) tLAt the of a ne• administr"tive arency mus run, A ement of tl ese for m l"le of rovie,., is not enoue-h to t:"ive a urolJo r e rsnective. It is ne to soc o,-, thv c0urts :HJul y their r evie;v to t11e vr>rious fields of tive [1Ction, to obs erve l"hat circums ances to infl ence the o f tne courts . That ill be the burden of he ne t cha)ter .


20 -CHAPTER I V F IHALITY _1\IJ) Tim C ASES I. N.A.?2 0' iiJ =iEV IE': l ( 1) Administrative activity in the business of government has been v e .riously classified.. One of the most useful cle .ssifiactions for our pu.r: ;JOses is tha t of Professor (2) dividing it into three classes: 1. The individual seeks o. privilege; 2. The government performs a business; 3. T h e government perfor11s a necessary function. There a:ce other classes of adninistrative activity. A quite im portant one -the government seeks to regulate private business -r:rill be considered _ in a follouing section. It is this class, possibly coupled with a n ew one rrhere the government cooperates nith industry in its self-regulation which is most in this study. When the government is engaged in a function inl"lerently and historically nece':l'ssarJr, the courts are reluct8nt to di stu.rb administrative action (3). For efficiency, absolute control bzr the government of its officials and .is ( 4). Salaries may be reduced by Congress without question (5), excep t those of judges of 11Constitutional Courtstt (6). The removal and a p pointive p o wer, until recently (7), h a s be.en free of judicial restrictions, even TI'here an employee was ctismissed so that a poli tics. l debt could be p:aid (B), or where the st8.tute (9) only specifies remova l "for causes prescribed by law11 after notice ana_ heu.ring , and the Presiclent removes without hearing or s pecification of g roLmds (10). The reviery rLlie is closely followed in this field such questions a s inefficiency,incompetency, and interdepartmenta l disputes ( 11). Th e.t -tne courts are willing to give grea t finality to the remova l poTier over a subordinate officer as necessary to the efficient adninistration of government wa s indicated by the Oregon Case (12) • .Arl even nore signific8.nt case is the recent -Hurii.phr eys decision (13), refusing to extend the cloctrine to approve the President's removal of a member of an independent boardthe Federa l Trade Commission. Wnether the Comnission i s a legislative agency or, an e xecutive one because of its afu1inistrative duties is not clear. The in the Humphreys c ase probably operated upon the b asis of the former concept. The suggestion is obvious tha t there is a limi t to executive necessity, despite its recognized supremacy in interna l matters. In the Rd.ii1inistrative affairs and deternination of the War and Navy Dep artments grea. t finality is also extended, it being felt by the courts tha t H ony other view might tend s eriously to embarrass the work of raising an army.n (14 ) The same line of decisions found in the remova l por:rer cases is followed in regard to officers of the military or naval service (15), 9838


. 1 -the courts ex:9 laining the:rc i s no vo , t \.:l. interest in, or contract right to office ( 16) . , r evic' r o nili 1'1. \/ under the 11clue process" concc 1 t is si11ilarlJ -011.(17) u . s . v . (18) incic['..ten the cre,,. t ext ent of delegation of powe r o.ncl administrative finalit r Rllo ;ed the government in making rules ancl regu.Jc: tions to protect its o w n property . The making o f rules and n vngue sta tutory was not thoueht improper, nor did the fact thut a violation of such rules regu.Jc:t tions was made a pen a l of1.' ense by Con gress chanr;e the situation. Th e l alilguage of the case is broa d . Limited to its peculiar facts, it i s merel y a precedent for such action in the lim ited fiel d of the government reg ulating its interna l aff airs, or its oun pro1)erty . Another essentia l function is tru: . t of taxation. Here the government comes more closel y in contact its citizens than in any other field of administrative action cons i dered in this section. The leading ce1se in this fielcl, and probabl y the leading case for the n arrow revie11 theory is h:uTra.y' s Lessee v . Hoboken JJand and Improvement Company (19). Here it nas. held thr-.t the issuance o f a cListress \7arrant involving a SumillE.ry proceeding , unc cer St8.tutory authority , b y the Treasury against a delinquent collector, VT[',s not o. deni a l of due process o f lo.w. The court b ased its decision u:_9on the historic a l fact th<.'. t such proceclure \7as use(! _ in /En g land in tB.x n::. t ters O.l1.G_ had been use d in the Colonies (20). An acl.ctitional fact that must have heavily upon the court llas the then recent sca nd2.l of C'. la. r t e embezzlement b y a collector of the Port of Neu Yorl>:. In add. i tion, the ::,>ractical needs of government for revenue are such tha t it woulc_ -be highly im p r actica l to stop this life-blood o f g ov ernr.1ent , .mere l y to give the taxpayer a right to protest. A-hearin.g Cai1. be afford_ed Interests must be balanced. Here, the government's f a r out-neic h s the interest (20a). The case, also, is famous for the classic statement of pro cedural due process Te quirenents i n the nc:rroB reviev-1 field: ttFor though , 'cl.ue process o f la'.-r' r,enerally im-plies actor, r eus, ju< lex, r egul

-22-nor is it found in cases \lhich a.dve;:-sely affect individual s but do not lay cJ.O\'m statutor: / interpretations o f such great irr9ort.:mce involving debatabl e fiscal (24). Harron revie. in this field seems to uean t:1n. t arbitrary, or act ion be with the exception o : cert ain im?ortant of gen e r a l anG. subs tan. t i a l c harc::.c ter ;.Thich nay be considered as problem s in s tc.tutory interpre tatiOi: l . Custom. s deter!Jinations are a particul2.r class of tax matters. The y il1volve private property, often o f substantiP . l v alue. I n addition to.the tax ch2. r acter, . the GOvernment's continuing policy of discouraging im}JOrting has probably been of cOi1Si c _ e r::,,bl e force in establishing nB.rrow revie1'! here (25 ) . Ex:_oert knm' is a lso invoke d in the evaluati011 of goods. ( 26). The c011:cts have no clesire to involve officials in "inextricable confusion!! ( 27) by intrusion int o this fiel d . Despite the narrovv revieT J generally accorded to the custom s decisions, customs officers are allowed to classify articles their statutory heads. This the court h a s c.lone itself in some cases, while in others the h a s given to 2 jury (28). Tl1e courts have kept OlJen the door of possible revie17 b:,;such qualifying statements as: 111.TI.1.ile the gen eral rule is that the valuation is conclusive upon all parties' nevertheless the appraisement is subject to be impeached rrhere the 3;p-praiser has proceecled on the nrong prin. ciple, contrary to or h 2 . s the p ouers b y statute .11 (29 ) . Th e courts are hesitant to use such bases unless the equity of the situation cl_eoands it. Procedu:;:-al quite lax' . "C F ,relessness o r ir regulari tyfl by officers nill not open the 'f.TP.,y for judicial (30). T).:le procedure described in .A.uffmor d t v . ( 31) illustrates the l2.xity of proper procedure in this :field. 1. The importer or his e,gent \rere exclud.ed f::com t !:e reappraisement. 2 . There wa s .no opportunity for the importer to support his oath or entry, or to confront opposing witnesses b y testim or.w i n h:is own: beha..lf. 3. N o o p : oortw1 i ty n.e.s a vo.ilable to sift the evicl..enc e openl y or secretly heard in oppositio:1 to the importer. 4. The il:1po:tter was permitted the aid of counsel. IJ:•he court di0. not condemn tp.ese :practices. 11Th e proceeding s for a-ppraisal must be, to so:.1e extent, of a summar y cha r acter," it s _ a icl ( 32 ) . Where the government extends a, -privile g e (33) it doe s not mee t so many citizens. Usually, plo:perty i nterests "P:rivate rights" a::..e little o .ffe.cted. T h e demand for is, consequently , not g reat. Harrm• review is the established d .octrine in the fiel d of land offic e det err!linations ( 34). Ecm d a mus and injunctive reuedies are g r eatly restricte d (35). Even an interpretation a s to nhat is "vacant land o:pen to settlement" given the

a s to lands kno rrn public l y to be of r'. ch."'racter is ir 'e l n.r , 11but as 1t i t .1e I'Ct or. a le .. -constit'lterl t ibuncl D.i1C:. is rlon'3 r;ithin its jurisdi tion, it i s not void dl:. pt"'.sses title .11 Great finn.lit r .:.s t;ivcn to j i r h in.s of It i .. interestine; facts su,, 'OSPG.l r fin<" .lly <.•.etGr'lL1eu. 'lXe opGn to G..lrect a ttack by J the gov e rnm n t , \7'.ic,l Cc •l ..,ue t o ccucel a :0• tent iss •.ed b r i t (39), alth ough an cttemptet a ttack (42).. .An improper C1.:9pl ica t i o : 1 or a misconn truct ion of the l a 1 1 c9.Y' e crounds for r evien ( 4 3) . Tle courts detexnine jvriodiction if o.n nttempt i s made to l n n d , h a.ving c erta i n disabilities mukine; it not patentE'.ble , and ':ill break t h e force o f the -pa t ent ( 44;. If t u o authorities conflict a s to jurisclictio: . l the COU:C't nill determine the r.1atter (45). The in dications are that the coul'ts allo1-r i;mc h lee vray to officials u pon such questions unless there i s subst['.ntia l d.m :bt. v. TI'allace ( 46) illustrates ::te r e , the cou:,:-ts upl 1 e ld. a n administ::-ative finding c>. s to the jurisdictional f a c t of l anc1s 11subject to overflow" ner e "snarnp r.nC. ov e.,..flo,:;ec-1," it u i C . so b e c ause it felt the question resolved "it s elf into m 1 e o f of ,orc . s or ter-:1s, more one of inte rJ.)T G tt'.ti0!.l of a st<:1.tute , 11 a.nd for the more significant r eason thpt it t :1o1.-;_..J;} t the inte r p r e t::.t i o n issued. a one. ... There is little need . for e x t e n cl.ecL revierr of c,.,s e s in enalogous fields. It is to :point 01:Lt t :12.t revie" e}'.:ists in fc..ct in suc:1 fields, t:1e vourts by tll.eir languaee al7ays reserve an. avenue b y '.•llich :relief r ue-.:• b e e:xt e nd.ed to chosen cases. In the fielcl, n e :1;we c ousici.;;: ee_ case of Decatur v. P aulding ( 47). Th e field. of 'Y)at ents is o.lso one of na:rro11 revien ( 4 8) . Tl1e sru:1e seems t n1e of the r e F r.tibn of radio broadcasting, despite t-l.e f act tl.1.::-t full revie': i s :p:toviclecl, a grant is to be made (49). r his cloes not seer a the cr-tse n:1er e e.J.l e xisting license is to be Cc?.ncelle

-24 -procedure : ra s ha:csh a.ncl op e n to unfavora.ble critic ism (59) . The procedura l d.ue proces s clause was nore closely inter:'reted ( 60). he re-quirements of evidence have been tight ened ( 6 1), and questions uhich might be s aid to involve questions of ei tl1er J.a\7 or fact are treated as questio'-8 :Jf law for the co1.,.rt 's interp:ret[l.tio1 (62). is supplying uublic services is taldng on a ne\7 type of duties._ The extension of g ov e rmnent into such functions has been continuous ( 63). Our posta l service (once carried_ on a s a :9rivate business), until recently furnished one o f the fe1'7 examples of such activity on the part of the federal government. of administrative orders ( 64) to the efficient conduct of the bus_iness is so great tl:lf!.t the cou:tts Etre hesitant to interfere in 11ost cases (65) . Decisi'ons b y the a

I I . :BROAD .T :;:ecently, e,;ovE'rnmcnt p u ... l' .. e0 .. ore ''.nl'. I!10re into the regulation of private b't ... ;;, in ss. .An ;; '1 ti :-c l : r nc•. orob:L .n h. r. been pre s e n ted to the COI.U'ts . ::Sefon' any CC'l,ons av off 3 l''H'. o:. ... e COJX..'tP 1 attitude as sho11n b7 the t' 1.10st im . J O i tnnt fec.Lerc:1. l J. ields shoul0. be cons i cl.ered . Such ret;1.'l<1t ion pre ::.;cnt llrn: cUff lcul t problems in adL1inistratio11. "'")e:;ulatio not rli_;_)e out profits, if State regulc).tion, not State o,-mership, is tlle cJ .. esireo of the statute (74). B.::l.ln.lCed asainst this mu t be the public interest behind the statute. Out probler.1 i s not one of but rather, of such fairnev s , as LlC courts ':'ill a: prove. ID1en adiainistrations have failed to meet the encl. des i r e the legisl.:1ture, o r have c auses in diviCl.ual injustices in effectint; the :9ur:9ose of the stntute, the co1.rrts feel that there is cause to intervene (7 5) . The problem of sucll rr!gu lation in fields of social and economic policy reau:re ; cisions upon questions o f fact ;.1ot susceptible to precise 'l c;,.:ce to hanc.le (76) . Tl1e history of the Interstate Cor :men .. e Cormission. is one of being an0 .. h[l.Ii1perecl b :r the cou::-ts (77). Tl e courts' full r evien wo.s soon <3 .. istasteful t o Cons:-ess. The HepbD_Tn .Act, atterapting t o curb the COUl'ts (7J ) . ron, e:r ee. t fin c tlity i s given to the Coi!1filission's determinations (79). Tl1e cou:tts eve n cite narro-.;r revien decisions from fields invol vin:; the 1::;overnment t s O"::n ( 80) . There e.r e feu cases LXpon p 1oceclural form such o.s t.he A lien Cases bring up, for the Commission follo7s a comp lete proc e0 .. I t i s through the evidence requirelilent t lle.t the exercise their g reatest control. T h e com:ts have no

.. 2 6 the court state(_ that it lly:roulC. not exauine fc.cts f \rrther than to determine hether there nas substa:.r1tia l evidenc e to sustain the orcler11(84) . I.Iore in line nith t his latte r statement, b u t staunch l y demanding an evidentiary require:nent -tha t finCI.i11g be not to the n indisoutable cha rEJ.cte r of the -was Interstate Commerce -'' _ _:c_.=...:._-=..-==----=--=-Commiss ion v. anC.. Hashville R . Co. ( 8 5 ) . ?ea _ uire:1en ts of evidence further '1:7i t h tl1e s tateiuen t ti.1e. t an orcler 11ay not be issued "vii t h out a;r:iy evidence whatever'' to it (86). We have seen in this field. a tion, a t first, to c a refully r eview the Co1:Illliss ion t s s of fact. W ith a neu . statute this attitude was rela."'{ed, but the court ha. s ke:') t a gri:9 uon the findings, by its occasional requirements of substantial or some evidence. The real problem has been practices.rather than rates, _ a lthough the courts from time to tim e he"ve tried their hand a t v a h;tation (87). On the whole it may be s aid_ tha t after a bact s t a.rt the coTI1r'lission has become a reTJarkably efficient insto .nce Of ac3.minist .rative action, in the field of regulation of business ( 88) • TJ:1e Corru:liss ion's orcLers have received a finality approaching n arr o w review, thoug h effective check s rest in the CO'lU'ts, rrhich they will not hes i to exercise u pon occasion (89). No one ansr.,rer is readily available to the question, why has this ComE1tssion a .chieved so much finality. I.iuch credit must be .give n to t l 1e f act tha t Con gress intend .ed_ a nationa l systen, a.."ld that this neeCl. , -;as e:p;recic-"te0. the (90_). Th e had o . eveloped to such a.cute :pr o:ool1tions tha t exist i n::; laY r ' .7as obviously inao.eq11ate . It was not t\k'1.tion of fi ttinc pieces into Em :9attern, but, rather, the d erJancl rras an entirely ne'"T oicture (91). Con gress, in f act, most pers,istent in forcing the court the Co11nission1s continuecl debands for pm7'er ancl its exercise. ThEn , -toe; t!:\e 2.1e c ':-. s -__ : c y , J.s c cf . ex:ne:rt J :) :i: 1 : s E::..l t (' d cfu.G-s t i o'L s t r<:::c:(;i 1 ;•r c l P,s_:. , t o _ tiJ.e courts. I n suc h situ.:-..... t he. most .co:t! . v e :1i e n _ t Wl'. S tG r $fuse review (92). The Federc:..l Trade has not yet. achieved the desirable status YJhich the Interstate Com.r1erce Commission enjoys the courts. Mainly, the Commission has been ltmited to false advertising (93), and to standards of unfair practice knm1n to the common la\7 in rrhic:h it has bee n a _ui te successful (94). The attempts to cievelop new concepts and nerr stanc'.ard. s have until recently been uniformly disastrous. Its po\lers of investigc.tion have been limited (95). When it seeks to enfcrc:e an order, the yroceeding is such that the cow:-ts may readily. substitute their o n n vievrs a s to the conclusions to be drawn from the f acts (9 5) . Such cases 8.S the Gratz (97) ancl 'the Curtis Publishing Compan y Case (98), to mention but two of the bette r l;:nown cases, stru,ck heavy blo-.:1s a t the earl y usefulness and even r aison d'etre of the Conmission (99). In the l atte r c ase, the court employed the substo..ntial evidence requirement in conjunction nith its asserted authority, to rule nhether in law t h2 constituted. C1l1 nethod of competition • .Although, recognizing th._'l,t the usU?..l procedure where the evidence wa s inadequate v.,rould be to remD1J.Cl_ the c ase to the fact-fincUn g agency, the court saw here a situation where "in the interests of justi-ce, the controversy should. be decided without delay11 (100). This it proceeded to do. At the time C arl J.1cFarl3.J.J.d (101) wrote his careful study the state 9838


" , of tho cnsos s su h t: <'t 1 e y s.;y, juries nay acce t or t cv i 1.encc n n 1. h ,-' .iiL --cncc .".;, b"n t he :ii'ec'.er--1 r:'l .,_{ .. e Com::ti sion cl. nvit' . rll (lOt ) 0 i'his Jtu,>r CCGcribos the ci.ifferont :positiO.lf of t'1e :-'e<.1E'r<1.1. 1'r"'\."'-l"' ortni<.,io t1 u I:c1tc>rst<'.te COJJI'!lerce Cor:nission (lu:-). 1. 'I'l e co-tu:t s r"' o .sit'er tho record ns r\ fo:. tll.J orclcrs o-" J'GcLern. Tr,ie CO.ll"'lis r ion, •hile the orc1crs of the Int r t t.e oum0rce Co11uniss i o n arc ch:•Jlcn.,.od only from the up prouchc of 1.U.trn r ne. evi 0 .ently sufficiency ( 104 ) . 2 . Tho treutme"lt 0.1. tJ.1c cvide,1ce is the jucUcic.l nttituc1e to\7 ard the legisl:1tion involver_ , its subject natter, E>nc. its udninistro.tion (105). 3 . The court h : ; . s c .cce:Jtec1 . t '1e )0 1 i c:r b y thG Inters t u te Cor.:1::1erce OoP.Uriissi on, but h [ . s tht'.t d .eveloped by the Tro..secl insufficient eviclence. Tl1e L1terstnte Commerce Comnission, on tl1e ot:1er :1<' .. nC:., hcs nucl1 follonecl jud_icial technique, drc.wL1t-; its o pinions carefully c:mc:_ fully considering the basis for its r.ction. }:r. concludes thE>. t the opinion by such Coi:li1issions sto.te f o .cts nnd the reasons for the conclusions d r[1.1.'Tn. The suggestion is obvious, that the more jucl.icial the opinion, the more likel:r it is to be clothed uith finulity (108). 4 . The courts offe::: an for tl1e treutment based u;_oon the sto.tuto:cy l t;n guage. thinks tl1is is of little importance us o.n e-c:9 lnnat ion. 5. The doctrine of revieTI if bo.secl upon the fornulo.._ o: 11questions of lo.n" ancl.. Hquestions of fact." 6. The different enforcE?;1ent s providec1 invite the treutment that has been accorded the. tr:-o COJ!!nis s ions. The orders of the Interstate Cm: u:.1erce Commission become effective in a time unless set aside h3r the courts u pon .. of parties affectecL. The Tracle Comsission, on the Llust a-p:91 Y to the courts to secure enforeement of its 7 . Tl1e str.nd9-rc1s set for the Interstate Commerce CO!J!niss ion to follou, .':'. 1 t hOi..\_,l1 coucllecl in a s bro2.d lo.ngtlc'lge as those as the Trn.c'.e Com 1iss ion uses, refer to nore particular s i tua tions ( 109). The: uri ter has Sl..lf;gesteo. 2.bove in n

-2e8. The more s atisfactory the exoeriment in administration, the more authority nill flow the legislature . .And.. it mi ght be add.ed t h a t the more pleased the court, the greater the finality t h e legislation will be given. Much of the difficulty of the ee.rly Trade Commission mat be attributed to the lax standards of the Act (111) which amounted to a broad statutory grant to work out the law in a certain field,within the limits of the te:rm com-petition. It was the very laxity of the delegation thatmust have made the courts feel that their careful supervision was needed. (112). Confidence in the administrative body's ability to meet the problems presented to it in a capable and not too visionary manner' comes but slo\7ly to the COL.U't (113). This confidence is essentia l to any real aa.;-ninistrative finality (114). McFarland the neecJ. for legislative ancl reforms if real good r:as to cone froE the Commission (115). Without awaiting new legislation, almost as a c ontradiction of NcFarlancl_t s thesis Cai.:le [1 series 'of fav6ra"ole is ions. :Sut instead.. of being a contradiction, these cases furnished f1.rrther evidence to substantiate the thesis which had. been advanced., for they represent more careful the CoEunission • . The opinions. TI'ere handed don n at a time rrhen economic forces a greater. need for trade regulation. The Royal Milling Co. Case (116) merely involved an unfair advertising problem, a field in the C6ITL1iss ion had been comparatively succe'ssful. The juclicial note struck in the opip.ion was new. Where the order of the CO!Ili.]ission is supported b;y evidence it will be upheld. The Alagoma Lwnber Company Case (117) used almpst idential language. The facts. and the language of the Keppel Case (118) are most revealing of the courts 1 ne\7 attitude. An of the ConElission had been directe d agi:dnst the clistribution of packe> . g e candy b y the llbreak and take11 method.. This the commission had found to be com-petit ion. The cour. t denied that the CO:mmiss ion t s was limited to practices that have been fotind unfair the court It frankly recognized the gradual process of Judicial inclusion and exclusion (120). The language of the best illustrate. s its more ready attitude to give some finality to the Commission: . 9838 11\fuile this Court has declared it is for the Courts to determine what practices or methods of competition are to be deemed unfair ----, in passing on that question the of the Commission is of weight. It \1e.s. created with the avowed purpose to it in "a body specially competent to deal Tiith the:r.1 b y reason of information, experience and careful study of the business and economic concli tions Of the affected, ' it Tias o:rgani zed in such a manner, '.7i th respec. t to the length and expiration of .the terms of office of its members, a s ,roulcl 'give to .Q:p:portunity' to acquire the expertness in dealing v vi th these specia, l questions concerning the industry that comes from R euor t on Senate ComQittee on Interstate Commerce, No. 597, June 13, 1914, 63rd Con g . 2 Sess pp. 9, 11, • See F e d e r a l Trade


v . Beech-l'Tut P aclting C o., 1prn, n.t 4.53 ; compare Illinois C entral -'-. C o . v . Int rGtate Commerce 206 U . S . 441, 451 . I f tho uoint were more doubtful th'"'n think i t , 1 .e should hesit a t e to reject the conclusi')Jl oJ:' the o u1i s sion, based as it is U"pon claur, s:pecific fi1dings SU".fY-Jorte o . b y uv i c l e : 1ce.11 (121) This c ora:pc:1.rati e S'lrrvey has bee n exte nded. to the length necessar y to sl101.1. 1. the reluctMce o f the cou::.ts to give :finality at first and 2 . how much finality be "..incd <1S the courts ' confidence in the administrative boa.y increases. The cases o , lso indicate tha t subst:mti a l means of revie 1 ouen to t:1e courts, an0. tha t -rrill be used nhen the courts deem theD n e c essa::.-y. Where prope:cty interests aie involvecl the court. s a r e quite cautious in extending finality. Of course , property interests a r e involved in taxation, but for many reasons , thoucht good by the courts, the government r s nee d . o f narron r e v lei! is fei t to far outrTeig h the interests o f the iru iivicLl.c-'11 t&.x.-oayer. Professor Dickinson h8-S sugGested "that the reacdness of tll.e t o revieTI tends to Var" Stl'Ong l y Tiith the Size o f the prop e ' r t y intere sts at stak ell (122). The court s thenselves l1ave given rvreight t o this view. s -...unmary action has bee n h e ld_ pro:9er as to iterJs o r littl e worth, such a:s fish nets valued at fifteen d .ollars each. T-:'le cou::.t , recognizing the difficul tu of dravving the line , consciously adopted the value test (123). L a r g e sum sums of r;10ney involved in litigati o n uill C8.use t .he colli-t to give much more comprehensive treatment t o a legal point alrea.dy res adjudicata (124). The regulatiOl1 of l"aCLlO c o!:l!m nication is an apt illustration of the forces &t w ork in fiel ds. If a n for nen time or increased :power is made , the c ourts, thoJ.,_h give n a statutory review, are reluctant to u p set the a.G.ninistrative s , (125). The courts have a wide charter of r evie1: r ; the hearing mus t b . e adequate and not manifestly; t h e s ijust n o t be contre.ry to tJ.1e indisputable char ncter of the evidence; the fe.cts must, as a matter of law, support the order (126). This charter will be resorted to whe r e substantia l r:1oney has bee j:.. inve:..:ted in good f aith and the Commission is jeopardizing this investmen t yrithout compelling rea.sons (127). Tl1e regulation of comElon CCl.llings or "busL1ess affected Tii th a public interest" because of the large interests have r eceived particular treatment b v t h e CO'u.:'ts (128). The f'lmction is regarded_ as "delicate and dangerous, 0'\l,f;ll.t to be exercised rri th a keen sense of justice on the part of the regulating -The Cou Tts ought not to bea: r the ':!hole burden of s aving pro :perty from confiscation, th ugh 11ill not b e found ':he:c e the -proof is clear (129). The respons i bil i of the regulatory a t; enc;,r is even mor e great than tha t of an a gency operating a G ov ernment business, fbr the question of profits and the clenial of pro:pe: c t y rri thout due pi-ocess of laTI" are not similarl y (130). couJ. 'ts t interest il1 socia l anc: ec.Jn o mic facts has already been 9838


3 0 observed. I n fields of Q isputed socia l policy the judicial technique usually involves an e xtended. of 4he facts. The temptation is strong for the court to substitute its pwn conslusions. This judicial attitude has crystallized . into the Tiell-known concept of "business affected .with a public interest" (13 1 ) . Other business, it is he let, c a n not be s u b ,jected to certain tJoes of regulation, particularly The p1.<.blic interest conce:9t sees the fixing of price s as a guaranteeD. payment fo1, tli.e ded.icatio: . 1 of business to the public, and the limitations the free use of thereby engenered. A number of tl1e fed.era l courts tl1is rel u ctance t o approve price regulatiam, in involving JITEA cod .e s (132). In a :case ( 133) involving the saJ :le statute' concerning Hhen the Nebbia case (134). so libe rall y construed the concept of business affected Tiith a public interest, "the Salile couxt shoued a disposition to be of all t h e operative f acts in the case before giving any relief. This interest in previous profits and 11spread", both oefore and since the issuance of the Ol'de:-c questioned, show s a constant interest, in economic questions and possible injustices, properly presented to the court (135). The conclusion 1mist be had that private business not, in the courtsf opinion, suSficiently affected by a public interest is protected by a broad review by the courts. This :protection takes the form of forbiddipg certain regulations pro pose d by the legislature, and a fortiori b y an adrninistrative agency. This migpt even be called ''judi-cial legislation" to clistinguish it froL1 the broe, d review which will be seen to e xist c a ses of business affected nith a public .interest. The point that this consideration has meant to emphasize is the keen interes t the courts evince in any :positive regulation of business, and their to fully review the basic economic facts, and to substitute their own view s for legislative (or administrative) declarations of policy. In cases of State regulation, the Su:p:ceme Court has long shovm a disposition to fully consider the facts involved. This doe s not mean that the court has overruled the administrative decisions, but it does show a n early intereE\t that some facts be present upon which a "fair minded boa,rdll coulc1 determine the conclusion reached (:J-36). The interest of the court, also, has long been to the confiscatory nature of rates. Although the court will not make rates itself (137), a judicial determination has been declared_ essential (138). The court has not hesitated to declare its theories of valuation (139), nor to ma k e demands overruling the 0:9inion of a "fair-minded boc:>.rdll (140). All this control could be exercised b y the court,while leaving the primary final and undisturbed in the administrative hands. That is, a r evien bz.r the courts to see if there nere proper evidence present could furnish a sufficient check . The really upsetting notion is tha t injected. b y the :Ben , .A.voh case (141). The inclications of this case are. that the courts will allow a trial de novo b;) the loTier federal courts, both of the facts and law. (142). The Court of P ennsylvania referred to the r eview of the v aluation order of the Public Service ion b;-I the S1.1perior Court as 11merely the sub stitution of the (court's) judgment for that o f the Com.missionll (143). The Supreme Couxt of the Unite d States sustained the action of the lower Pennsylvania Court: 9838


['. t c:1tire o-o1r i ol 1 \.r(' <'. e compelle d to co n lucie thc.t the Com ' t e t c d the st['.t 1 t e a s rith h o l dil__, f rOJ'l the L:O"Luts p o \.rer to d e termine tlte anentio 1 1 of confis .c .tio n r . c cord .ing t o t l e i o•n 1 . i;1clo31e1dent j 1.l.(l.t;JTlU"lt r.r:len the action of t l 1 e Comui s.:>io cones to be c o nsid.e r0cl on appeal.---11 I n F1.ll sue:. cc.:.s e s , i f the m m e r laim s conficcation of llis n i l 1 r e ult, the s t a t e mus t a i::c opportunity that issue t o a judi c i 1 fOi' u_pon its o r m i nd .epen de n t judg men b as to bot h lan fn.cts ;

3 2 III. JURISDICTIONAL FACT The courts' use of jurisdiction and jurisdictional f a c t question a s a method of review has bee n observed (1.46). T h e :_Jrecise of i t s use in the cases d emands some attention. T h e prob lem i t s e l f , is not new but it has gained recent importance in administrative l a w w i t h suc h decisions a s (147) and Ng Flmg H o v. White ( 1 4 8 ) . An early English case (149) . ) oints out the problem. Did a c harter g iving a colleg e of p h ysician s a u t hority to uunish mal: J r actice give the m j urisdiction over all practice? Lord Holt, the quest i on, h eld tha t the authority 1111as not 1 imi ted to those uns>dlled in fact, but extended t o allow an inquiry into any a d.Ipinistration of 11p h ysick11 to determine if it were unskillful. The question of jurisdiction over a definedsubject matter, since it clearly demands statutory interuretatirm, is a questio n of law (15 0) . A gain, the baffling problem of trying to distinguish questions of law from quest.ions of fact arises. It is seemingly an unsolvable penumbra. The difficult situation is where jurisdiction rests U \)On the determination tha t the evidence is susceutible of more than one conclusion as to what are the 11Facts11 (151). Another yroblem is the attemp t to limit the ad ministrative body, not to a general subject or field s u c h as t h e practice of medicine or the injury of an employee, but to the precise question the administrative bod y is call.ed: u pon to dec.ide, mal practice or accidental injury (152). If the court so restricts the administrative it does away with much of its usefulness. T h e cases are simpl y t wice a d judicated, and the administrative board is in the position of master for the taking of evidence f a r the court. When the entire function of an adminstrative body rests U-:)On the determination o f a f act, held b y t h e court to be coextensive its jurisdiction, and so also d eterminable b y the court, it is no longer clothed with the inde:9endent n o wers, 117hich i t would see m should be its uroper if its action is not judicial. The courts h ave frequently over the determination of such questions as whether a comu any is insolvent (153), a horse has glanders (1 54), or a railway has uaid in ten per cent of its c a pital stock (155). The court frequently finds that its '"' grees with that of the a d m i nistrat i v e body. T his attitude is found where the court c arefully e xamines t h e evidence, but concludes tha t the determination made (15 6) . These c ases h ave not stirred u u the criticism, a s h ave the c ases where the court disagrees with the administrative determination. 1Jevertheless, the technique is identical. In U.S. v. (157) the assertion that a claim of citizensh i p , b y a of C hinese descent seeking to ente r the United States, went to the jurisdiction c f the office r was denied. The District Court had entertained new evidence a n d found Ju Toy to be a citizen. The court throug h r.:Ir. Just ice Holmes was apparent l y a-r;>"9rehensi v e of a floo d o f c o . s e s , whatever the justic e of the particular c ase. Uuch criticisr!l wa s d i r ected a t the court (1 58). J iore a s a m atter of individu a l unfairness than a s a of proper law . J fuch o f this criticism finds a ba .sis i n the f act tha t alie n nrocedure has b e en n one too c on side r a t e of individuals under its jurisdiction (159). Seventeen y e ars l a t er, al'l a lm ost i dentical question was Dresented t o the court in N g Fun g H o v. White (160). The court r e v ersed its f o rmer "9osition. The 9838


-33-only actual diffe rence in th cas8s lay in the fact that in the latter case tl e etition•.'rs we e vlthin the territoriP . l bounds of he Unite States, the o claimed ove r them. These uersons had once b e n f:0t):in.''" entr,r which h."l.d bee n allowed. :9y this, they seemed to h< )' sf,t::<.i tnt'1 n fnvore' class. It is thought that today, upon the authorito .... ; is 1 att r c the Ju Toy case migh be r e v ersed, pnd in a hn ec!.E.. co_n1s .. L.oceecli 1o-, afte r administrative remedies are a tr lc.•l de . nov? _ in a f eder a l court might e secured on the fact of citize nshi ) . If i t not, it could only be, because some specia l significa nc e is att(.cha d to :Presence within he country, even t houg h t hrough illegal ent:r . The courts have long exercised a control over quest i ons of law w hich often appear to be very close , to, if not, of a jurisdictional nature ( 1 61). In conn e ction with 11broad review, 11 the B e n Avon case ( 162) has alr eady been fully treated (163). That case rested upon the that the :oro e r allegation of 11confisca.t ion 11 raises a constitutional quest ion going to the final jurisdiction of the administrative body. This is called 11Const i tutional fact, '' which mea.1s jurisdictional f act in those case s where the Constituti on furnishes the limitation (164). It means that the case d emand s an independent judicia l hearing to determine if the administrative body had jurisdiction , or had jurisdiction to make the decision it did (165). Before this case , the Su yreme was content to conclusions of the State administrative bodies, having some reasonable basis (166). The broadest and an ability to substitute an independent judgment, whenever the administrative action does not accord with the courts 1 'views are the real implications of the doctrine (167). The recent case of Crowell v. :9enson (168) takes the doctrine one step farther, and applie s it to finding s of federal administrative boards (169). The Supreme Court allowed the District Court to independent finding s on entirely new evidence as to the jurisdictional questions, whether, 1. There was injury upon the navigable wa. t ers of the United States, and 2 . Whether the "master and servant relation" existed. S aid Mr. C h i e f Justice Hug hes, speaking for the court: 11In cases brought to enforce c onstitutional rights, the judicial powe r of the United States necessarily extends to the independent d etermination o f all questions, both of fact and law, necessary to the of that supreme function. The c ase of confiscation is illustrative , the conclusion almost i nvariably dep ending u pon the decisions of questions of fact. This court had held t he owne r to be entitled to 1a fair op portunity for submitting that issue to a judicial tribunal for d etermination u pon its o w n independent judgment as to both law and facts. '11 (170) Mr. Justice 3randeis, in a vigorous dissent, pointed out that this view had not been adonted in cases involving the Federal Trade Commission, the Interstate Commerce Commission, or the Packers and Stockyards Act (171). ';j).e majority o pinion does not specifically refe r to the Fifth Amendment, but that must have furnished a basis (172). It has been suggested that the. c ase may be limited to the admiralty power of the court and a holding that Congress may not cut this down by making the findings of an adMinistrative board fina l (173). It is probably true that Crowell v. B enson w a s merely an outcropping of a somewhat theory of review which has long . e xisted. The courts can not ho p e to r eview d e novo the facts in such cases. The task would be overwhelming. On the other hand, administrative bodies cannot hope to always escape this potential review, without the exercise of extreme care and fairness.


-34-It i s qui t c possible thc.t of this by co,_,.rts r,1. : w be gre--.tly r educed bJ r>.L.mLlist r!"',;:;ivc Questions lL.ely to be CL'.llec". 11 jurisdictio:c10_,l f . cts11 shoul.::.1s. There is consi.c:Lern.blc co;.1fusion --.s to ' :rh:..--. t })r o ced.u.rC'. l requirenents actUD..lly ct1-n be to exist (176). ;)roblm:1. _1\S been to 11a wilclernessof singl e inst .'"'.nces , c.i l1bi guit y c..:11c"t. i n co11sistenc y of pri:i:1ci}1l e s11 with 112 . wide differe1.1ce in the scope of judici.::-.1 r eview i n differe:1t fields of regulo.tio n11 (177). Procedur2.l requiremm1ts not V!elJ.-defined. Host o.ttorneys think of o.dmil.1istro.tive d u e p rocess :--.s notice ;:-.nG. he:::.rL:.g. Of course, it C".J.1 not b e expected. thc.t in c;ener< . l the n::q u il'er:lents of , j udd:cio..l p rocedure must be fo l loHe0- • AdmL1i s trL'.. ti on is mor e infornr.l. The of the cou.rts is not tho l_Jr o ceC:.ur e o f in the : . )".rticulr-. r c::-.s e r-'.1.1 d the :o::..rticu.lo..r . fie ld. must be thc touchstone m<.tinl r elieG. u pon. r c quiremen t s v :.r y w i t:1 the f i eld. They mo_ e i:1 those fields studied i n t i O!'l w ith rcvi en. Police pov1er th:. t requiles SUi1ll112.r 3i" :-.ction C <-:-o.n not b e :1inclered b y requiremm :ts such ::.s :-:.otice bef o r e o .ction (178). Pro fessio1ml iocl o f time, o r the peculiD.r socio . l history o f o_ :problem h t1.v e tnc deepest i n fluence U}'lOll the require ments of procerluTe in suc h 1 roblems (179). In the :5.c lcl of cust or:1s s.:-'.l s (18 0 ) the :proccc:; r.:1.l requirements light. The soci[\.1 history of this fie l d , i nv.olvL:g .:'. s it .-oes our :policies, a nc. the estC'.blis}\J t ont of tl. 1 i s f i e l d v h e n tho courts were much less prone to inquir c into exceuti vo tl..Ct..Lon, {_;oes f ,.-., r to e:x11l:::.i n the require ments. Her e , it ht.'.s b een h e l d th.::.t .1roceeclings be s e cret withou t tile right to cross-exr'..mine w i t:wsses b o i:Q.c; t h;. t . . 11 evidenc e need not be disclosed to the importer, if !le h-. s c:. right to .i:is view s :-1-nd sugbest questions to b c ".sked witnesses (lSl). Like; v ise, iTl the field o f tG.x collecti ons, S1..1111J. l r . r y .:,ctio:1 Lwolvin,g d i stress ;.nd seizure of :propert y , without notice , o r O}Y ortuni t;.r to confTOj.l t .'.nd c_osse_-:-Jnine opposil1g witne sses, i s prope r where._', L--. t e r or :::..dninistr."..tive i s (183). Alie n procedure h<1.s mcmy questio:a,:_ble feL'-turos (183 ) . The he.:'rings hel d before locL'.l itru n i g ra.tio n inspectors who . :.ct :.s justicec: L'..nd :prosecutors. Usuiilly the aliel1 h:.•. s no counse 1 the i s pri v :. te. Ev it':.ence is 9838


-35-.inform.l , T:1e tri 1 L1 the Den 'rtmc1l iG "w;.p c r o : 1c , "nd t1 c ct tut " d o rnt : c:.1 r cC}.uir e t1 > . t . ., lct;:.lly t r o r CA.'Y)Cri 1ccc1 11crson p \.;;,.. i c. All t hici done m d"' r 11 of Gpced, e>..1 ) lrtiz, nc.l c co:1omy . Of these, Dc'"'i1 "" Vloclc s .yeo.: l . s,)(' d is o t n eCCS'" ry; Tl1' . o ... ici:. l i s :1ot ..... :.1 c::'lcrt; 3 . Eco nom : 1,y e:. ju"tific t lon ( l 8 1l) . In the c...,rlv ccses, con r t quitL.. contL: '..t v•iv n such p oc duro. Th ..... t :. n r'lien d iC. : t Ul1: r"t 1cl .., } 'lrOC'"'ec i l V'' r r s bcii,g hclc1 b c 'USC of i gnor"'.ncc o f tho Enclish .:1c'. t l of..., r ist'"'.}1CC of counse l or fric:1ds w:.s not :. b or;c.1t t o courts , d e "'i t e oundii. 1 C st".t .1c1s it .:-.bout tuc p r o c e s )f 1"' .\1 (lf'5 ) . Roc , i 1tly tl court evin c n c :. mor e c-trict The l1c:--r i g must he more tl".n ,, m e e s c mbl' . c o ; the right to p roc'ucc evidenc e must n o t b e denied A loY!er feclcr • l court }1:1, hel d . t h'"'.t wl1erc Dil o..lie n does i1ot testimony it nust be expl . "incd . to her ; t?lcrc mu t b e r' L ordc( the privilege t o eros -ex:-mii1 e nhich the court referred to o.s 11Constitut ion:.l ri[;ht11 ( 1 87). C ou:.1s c l m:'.y n o t be denied C'.ccess t o t ! 1 c 1e:.ring; r'.n it is fundc..mento..l t h,..,t pro ccC.ure set u p by the f'. g cncy1 s ow11 rule s mu t be cd to (188). I n t!1" t:;ove rnm ent' s post . 1 o rer t'ions, the . : 10s t stric t procedural requirements '.rise vJhe_ e the" :.1g J • rivilege is ii1vol:cd, Even in s u c h c:--.scs :-. :aced not b e or--.1 , nor must the dec iding o:..f.icic..l st" .te the rcQ s ons fo_ his decis ion (189) . re(l_uirement•: b e c one more strict i n fie lcls .,,s reccivii1G bro;.c . r eview . The control b y thl, 11subs t".nti '.l eviclence11 re auiremc:.1 t o f Int e;rs t C m:1!aerc c Con1r1i ss 2. o n de t e t ion s been observed.,;y, Congress mo..y b y st:.tut e dcfL1e c e r t " . L1 require m ents ;. s in the C o f the F ecle r-:.1 C orn::iss : o n (190) C'.n d its p r eQ.ece s sor the :i?cc:er.'\1 li ..... d .io C or.n.!iss i o n (19 1 ) . Where D . n orc . e r by the 1.--:.tte r C o m riss1011 C D'"'.n g i n g <.:. fr qucnc y ''-' s to bec ome offecti v e Jlpri1 3 0 , the he ... rL1g bein g c o.L e d for June 17, t his 'vvn.s s uch error th'.t the o rcler v r . s cec l'""'. r ecl void ( 1 9.2) , T l 1 e r e c ent C'"'.s e , involving c.. Vi r g i:ni:->. empoyrering the St;._te H i g hw .".y Co;:1 n issi o n c r t o ord e r t h e elim i 2.tio n of g r ".de cross i n g s , f0. i l i n g t o p r o:ic.i . e for notice.., ..hec. r ing, o r of t ' of1icei1s W'"'S hel d despite C:ecisions o f the h ighes t Virc;iniC'. cou r t r.fford ing .:'. r cviev 1 if the C'.ction wC'..s ( 193) . I n '""'.C:C:..i to v ' . ryi::g w ith the fields, p roceclurf'.l requirer:1ont s m o . y v0.ry w ithi n o.. f i e l d , T h i s n o t m co.n mere l ? t hc.t , chronologic:;.lly , t hey oecorae l e s s or m o r e s t 1 ict (<'.s in the C'.licn c o .scs} . It ne0.ns th.:. t 1!1:--.y vo.r y Yri t h C.i f::: e ::-ent jur i sc'..ictim1s o r even L 1 t h e s c o urt C'.e:pe 1 d t h e }X:'.rticul'"'.rs o f etl. c h P.'"'. r ticulC". r 1 y i n t'"'.x invo1vine v:--.l u. ..... t i oi1 !"'.,nc. 2.s sessment, the C<.ses r.ry c..s to not i c e o.nd h e"'-ring requir eme n t s . T h e onl y rC'tio:.1::'. l e , obvious, is t h ' ' t notice o.ncl. ::. r e r equired unless the .:-.C.m i n i stl'.:'.tive boC.y " . s suc h :. n ext e 11c.i.ed j urisdict i o n tm. t i t r e nc"',.ers such r equire men t s impr " . c t i ct'..l (194). Requil c:Ja n-:s • f :.1o t i c e vf'.r y . A notice rr.n.y b e given b y sto .tute (195 ) . If s o g i ven the m e e ti:1g nust b e hole',_ i n the p ln.c e t'..i1d :::.t the time specifie d b y t h e st<:'.tut e (196) , I t h:.s been helcl th8.t where o.. p.:-.rty, w h o compl<'.ine d o f fo..ilu r e t o meet , showed. no dispositi o n t o o..ttec. the mee t i n g , he c ould not successfully urge l acl of notice ( 1 97). The p r eclom i nt'..n t r u l e , how e v e r , i s t o c1emC'.nd 2. s t rict st--.tut ory complio..n c e (198 ) , N o tice r equirement L1 to.x, ::..s 0.l r e :.c'.y pointed out, v'lry ( 199) . I f " . subsequent notice 9 8 3 8


-362.nd i s to b(; i:"l kx l!Jticc a: t!1r. former proceeclnc s is not ( 2') U ) . to c;ivc x :tice lS_ Jo n tnc of .;he s i li. " " such .. . s . t:-, x -cr:>c"J/ i 'GJ.: ,,:cton(eC. jurisdiction or , e ''-s-ur v o.xo:r.c_l.;::c .... olice )')V>!GY to !_Jl'otect --.ublic -1e"tl th is delTk"\ndGc'. t',ncl tl:.e recu lo,ti8l1S to b o b-; too one:::-o'L!.S notice requir e r.1ent s e.r e lj_e;ht (201). R equire: 1e:t1ts nf notice ;-,r-s ,..,-rc;oc.; ,-,-1( econor1i c 1)0ll-r>v ..L _ , c. .. .l. • . :: _ ....., c.• -, .. V u ' cJurse :1e< vicst in f i e lds of dispute( c.:L c ctL1;.; property ::_nterests ( 2•)2). L1 tl1r . t 1equires ;--, he:::.rL1g is ::'.lso r ecrnirod. T h e' the le-tter l)_S'IJ2 lly be Q b.:'..rren t ectio:t! • rl'l18 right tJ b e 1.-::.c::--_r .::., if i S generally CO!lsiclered vit . . l to ;-,ll [',ominis t:rc ,tivo ."\ctian, vvith the exc e < )tio n of,,_ f eH L:st . n ces where ' ch e i m livi(u;, l woulc'l. .:.::''in litt l e bzr tD.e requi.rcEent, o r the pu'olic -oe too e:!:;.ie:lcec_ ( ;;04). E e -.rL:c; : 10vr0v e r G.oes not in lnO"'t f o r > !'""1l / -or;) ' YIOT + h'fYI Jn e he"rl . . l,o" • .._"') _ .J. .... ....,. • • • • -v ........ \.-.. v t ____ .... v -'-'.... _0,r;y ,:Y.;st i s , t:n::t t i n e nch Cf',s e , t!1e mus t b e f air (207) A s Justice ir. s s aic: nT-l e '11e'•rl.l"'' t,, . ..,.... co l c.i:: o,-,,.. <>re to l . J. • ........ 1 G v ..:..1.... •. v • • • • ) -....... ..._ J .. _ giv e mus t b e oL:;,pte<1 to th( c .:.i1sequenci::. s tlr, t follow, to t:1o 2.-tt::.l .cl: "'.r.' ' the I 'evi e .; tc w :i1ich t h eir orders ':ri lJ. be sullject •11 ( .208 ) The r lost. usL.l< D y c,r e n otice 2.-nd or, c . s i t -t:h-.:01 1 ot!1env i se t e !'mecl, . " . n opportunity to defend (2 09), f ;' .irnes!=: I:f the:r8 is 0 n.y s Sl.lbgest1on indi c ,::. t L1 g <.'.'. n in te; J t .ion t h : , t s>J_ch s .:.l feg'llD,l 'O.s b e :;:Jrov i decl , o r th-::.t. t e-,ridence be r e . q-\Jirc.d, notice ::', )-:.:::., :L: l (; C:i:C e ( 2 1 0). Other requirements .::-•.l'e LC',do, : . s ch :.:ges of notice), c_,, tfLWstL;-_1 :::. s t o dw o f the he:--,ring), <-nC:.. the ric;ht to ;-l,r_::;u e the 1''-W ;.nc1_ L-cts C-:.lso ,..,_ 't_ ring p roblem) (211) . Just wh::, t . t y)Je o f ::.1otic e '.nc : }y : .rLv; sufficient (:=512). Where n full r eviev r o r tri0 l cie nova is •lresel'l t the t.dmL1i s ti v e requirements :1.Jt so 11GOY'J is ad. :md f ? ,irness of the J)roceec Engs. Althout,'ll ."'.nd : w : -ring ciism'_V:\i.!.t::'.&es such .:':s expeYlse and (2l3:l ) their des:l.r2:Dili ty should clc_nc."lnd. their full utilizatio n c:.s of (wot. ecting the J-.-r-'olic. There r\ munbcr of . " , clmin i str<'. tive :-,ge::1cies which function as c ourts c l osely folJ.owi n g p r,ctions , 'prdce.' _ur--.llJ subst must b e r::ost cirC'lliDSJl ect . , _nd its p rogr ss most c .",roful, if it is clr;sired to l.:ee}) judici;,l control >.t the minimum. Even so prec <.utions o f f c:.' .110 t e e , if the couTts en?ugh L1tercste c'L. I t is, howevE:.r, . ;_:1 t i.w r i g:n t direction, tne ctlrcct::.on by the Ci'..GCS . 9838


P A R T II P R L B L E M S 0 F A D I N I S T R A T I 0 N A D A D hl I J I S T R A T I ! E L A W I N N R A 9 8 3 8


' o C . APTER V THE S CHE}E (me of t he foremo t adv ntA es of red. by the admi nistr,q,tivP device i fl x ibility. It would be, ind eed, unwise to attornnt to crystallize into absolu t ely binJ i ng conceuts dministra t i ve action a s it stands today. It i s a newtechnique, offering man y v a r i"l tions to meet t h e new a n d constAntly arising proble m s of sociAty and gove rnm ent. As thfl common law developed into a b o d y of more or ess frozen con cepts, and as equity h a s t e nded to d o the same, so m a y Fl.dmln istration. Any attemp t to haste n this \'VOllld be undesirable. The VPrf value of administration lies i n its e m pirical stRte, in its oas bility to the demMds m,q,de u p on it. This is far from indicatine that every ne;v administrative devlCfl should be welcomed, unques i onet , q,s a contrlblltion to government. Cn tne contrary it should be carP flll l y tested, not only by its apparent ability to mee t the problem, o u t b y the p.Lecedents of other n.dministre1.tive forms a n d the clrcumst'tnc, , s surrounding their use. Such a test is t h e first s . t e when the NRA is to be observed. It was obvious with the passag e o f t h e NIRA that oo1111Prs more v,q,st than those ever before delegated (except in w a r time) were delegq,ted to administration (1). It is nrobably that some of t h e p rsons responsi ole in drafting the .1Act and in its first administration realized that here w a s an a gency generis. (2) uthers, outside latPr expressed such recognition (3). The Act itself was quite indefinite as to what plan or plans if any it had sought to copy. I t wt=ts equally indefinite as to what actual form, as a matter of plan and nrocedure the administration of the Act woul d take. It was most apnarent that the plan for application b y vate member s of industry f o r ap oroval by the President of a scheme o f law oro;Jose d bv these indi vidu als would be followed. As the Act W!=lS developed t.hi3 1roved to be the case. As shall be seen, there WPre few ir:. Americ a n government for a plan. The most an8loguous system is OYP follll d in Engln.nd. This method of administrative law-ma._'k:ing has been c.'-.. ! . led. " uroced ..1re by scheme" (4). As history is long interesting todav it repre sents on e of the major administrative de"!,ice s used i n E n glish .e;overn m ent ( 5). The nrocedllre consists of a pro-oosal by H. group of interested. persons. An investigation by government inspectors follows; next a loca l h e aring is held. The hearing allows counsel to be heard and to examine cross-examine witnesses. The inapector (much like qn 1mA Deputy Administrator, or an examiner for the Federal Communications Commission) t hen submits a flil.ll reDort, analyzing the facts F!. nd setting forth his recom mendations to the aparopriate Finister (o). The procedure of pronosal, inspection (th e act1vities of Research Planning wer e analogous), hearing t=tnd recommendation to a superior for his a u proval, i s quite analogous to NRA procedure. T h e subject matter of this administrative form was, in its early history, almost always limited to local projects of little general interes t . This explains the reference to it a s "private bill leg isl:=t tion b y a department" (7). It wn.s d , for instance, in connection ;;rith 9 8 3 8


. slum clearance projec s (8). After tle . orlcl :hr the us wqs broad ned to include wide r s of socializ ion. Such need CRn be seen in not divided as is this ountrv into t P rritoria l States eectl 1t7ith lo a l 1 "''lslatlve oow r. G1ouos r uri? enting specia l interests or a r as m1y for ap )rov a l of schemes . An of t he s b tRnti ve p o lem now cal t 1Vi t!1 i .... thP amRlP,amatio of mines in a distr1ct y of a majorl ty of t.hP o wners and aporoved. by the r oper ninister, alt.nough a minority of t he ownt>rs rrfuse to coo p r ate. ( 9 ) The developmen t in England been slow. It been to t n e Courts' test for ultra vires (ln). The N'-RA a s .q urocedural ' n o t the result of anv such gradual grow ti1 or {; neral devPlopment. Few examples can be fou.nd of pow e r delegated to administrative officers or agencies' to aoDrove privately proposed schemes. Upon of groups the Federal Trade Commission has a;u?Jroved rules of unf ir competi tioi1 solely .q,s .q, cooperati re prog raT!l for _roup members. 'l' hese t18cl . no bind inP effect upon members of the group or non-members (11) althourn they miF!ht serve as the oasis for a cease a nd desist order. In the 1)rocedure under the Flex1ble Tariff Act (12 ) there is an analogy. There, -interested domestic producers could apply to tle President for a levelling out of costs of production, by increasing the tariff u p on competing foreign manufactured rticles. There were precedents aplenty for governmental regulation of business (13), but there were nractically none suggesting that the individua l industries frame their own laws (other than the fact t11at nearly a ny pressure group can s ecure introduction of a bill embodying its own views. This, of cou.Ese, does not involve administrative approval). As many hav e (14) the Act was indefinite as to the form of the administrative agency (15). But since it W'01. S recognizPd by the Act there would be an a g Pncy or agencies this created no legal difficulty for the use b:v the PresidPnt of such assistance was contemplated. in specific terms (16). It was agreed that the Act intended some measure of cooperative action between government and mem.bers or groups of industry (17). N o provision can be found for the stens in code-making that beca'lle e stablished (18) or for the administrative set-up and internal plan of procedure that developed (19). The NRA as developed creates a difficult problem in classification in terms of t h e established forms. Here was an agency giving away its oowers freely, often lavishly. This presented a question of powers, but an unusual one of how much could be so delegated r a ther than the usual one of how much the administrative a gency could gather to itself under its charter (20). Here too, wcs an agency exercising partakins of the legislative, the administrative, and t!l.e judicial nature (21). The most important power exercised w:ts the ap]:)roval of codes and the incidents of that power. The problem of compliance a separate character and will be considered later ( 22) . The l'ffiA Legal Division proceeded upon t:.-le basis that code-making and proving w.q,s a leF:;i slati ve fu.11cti on governed !!IP..inly by the court 1 s at tl tud e in Korwegian Nitrogen Case ( 23). Procedure, the Legal Division seemed tc feel, might -oe -lax {24). In the case so strongly relied upon the so-called Flexible TarriffAct was the basis of the 9838


4 0 procedure there questioned (25). The Ac. t was a 11delegation----of the legislative process'' (26) to the Presid .ent, who could ::tdjust t h e tariff sched .ules to mePt lower costs of orodu.ction .q,broad. The s pecific points involved went to the of. the hearing . The TA.ri:ff Commis sion, which . p y ha.d been given pqwer to cono .uct inve s t ons to assist the (27), refused to give information to t h P interested importer to the costs of nrodu.ction of a local f actory (that owned by the applicant) . Counsel for the importer wrote a lett f'.r . _de manding to see .11every particle of evidence11 gathered by t h e Commission and that he be._ allowed to examine all witnesses including the inspectors. The d.ata had . been gathered with the understrmding it w ould. be held con fidential. 'I'he court, speaki_ng through Mr. Justice Cardoza, dE;lnied that collllsel 1 s.demands be met to afford due process of law. It based its decision upon the following -pointers inter alia: 1. The history of tariff procedure, both legislatively and ad .ministratively (28); 2. The Commission's activities being distingu.ished from limiting uowers of public service companies (29); 3. The Commission being merely ::tn adviser to the Pres-ident, who was not bound by its advice. (It W R . s not 11an arbiter between adverse parties11 so its procedure might be built to fit the problem in: absence of more stringent statutory requirements ( 30) ; . 4. It being unreasonable here .to force the Commission to disclose such information, or each person affected as an individual litigant (31). The next . i .nqui:ty must be the vaiue of this decision as authority for practice. The Norwegian Nitrogen Case proceeded upon a broad statutory grant in the case of orocedure. This was positive recognition by con gress that the Commission should. be free to develop its procedure. The NIRA, on_the other hand, made no for procedure. It can not be said :equal force that Congress positively felt that the procedure would be the .. -best when it did not even know what q,gen cies would be used or the exact charactE?r of the problems. That the NIRA failed to pr.ovide procedure did not authorfze arbitrary action. The due process requirement that I)rocedure be reasonable to the end sought. There is. some evidence indicating a reasonable comparison, some indicating a reasonable di.stinction. : The touchstone must be in the subject matte_ r dealt with and the end Historically, the government has long exercised great powers in the tariff and taxation fields (32). Our political policy has favored the imposition of tariff._ On the other hand, government regulation of or-cooperation with business is relatively new from beihg so widely approved. It may be said that the policy behind the tariff is fairly well settled while in the field of business the economic and social are most hotly d1s'9uted. Besid e s this historical difference, t ariff collection ru1d regulation are closely related to taxation. Despite the economic significance of tariffs, they are fundamentally ta."'':es. The tax field is one accorded narrow review, with slight procedural requirements._ Business regulation on t .he other hand is a field subject. to the closest judicial control, where procedural requirements have been high (32a). 9838


T he court in ttl tnriff fip J d \"'lS inf l Pnced by '"1. j d icial attitud e tha t had rown u n w h n the co urt.;; wt-r e e x e rcLsine: ""luch less control o f d Mini s trnt i v e a c t i on . 1 tho ; h thP co t i s not subjec t to any strict res not1 o n o1 beiP g bound b y i tl:; own decision s , they have a strong influence u c on t h e cour t unl, s th r e is compelling r ason to t1e c s t abli h e d view . A mere rPference to Auffmord t v . Heddi 1 ( 3:5 orin, s b a c k t he visi on of quite lav:: admini s trative .9rocedure in this field bearing t h e a p provn l of the courts. uf course, in this case the RSpects were practically missing, being outweighed by the adjudication given. This merely places the legislative in tho Norwegian CA-se in a. stronger position for it is gener ally conceded that administrativ e adjudication requires higher of orocedure than administrative legislation. The economic sanctions should be observed. A major portion of our wealth is represented by our industries. Importers, however, are a small class. Alth o ugh large SQms of m oney and substantial property interests are often involved in the questions the courts are much more keenly aware o f tne interests 0f .9riv a t e business the country . The voice of business booms; tnat .of the imoorters is s .eldom heard. Mr. Justice Cardo z a specifically stated. tnat the c ase was not like limiting public service in the transaction of t (34). A most significant distinction lies in the fact t(1at by the statute the Tariff Commission w::ts m d e an advisory agPn c y purely, whose recom mendations clid not -bind the President. The N I R A autho:r;-ized the delegation of any functi-ons c:tnd p owers g:i•ren to tho President (under . Title I) (35). This. meant that the President could mal<:e the agency NRA more than advisory. This he did specif.ically in. the case of industries employing. l e s s tnan fifty t h o u s and employees (36.). It would be improperly technica l to stop here. If the President in fact bound himself by the findings of t he R .genc y he created., without exercising indepen dent action of his , own, it would improper to say that the agency was merely advisory. Especially is this true if it is argued that, when such a . fact is formally recogni zed by t he President th8 c:tgency is no longe r merely advisory. To say that NRA was merely advisory would be a fiction asabsurd as those often found i n t he common law. The indications are that 1 .111hen a statute is silent .. allO'IV the agencies used to exercise all power g iven by the A,ct) _ a . ncl final power is in fact given to an agency the court will re. co gni z _ e this. (;ur courts are not known to be hampered by sucl;i a .knot legal reasoning a s this one suggesting the agency to be merely a,dvisqry •.. The last and a dominant consideration suggested by this case must be: werP t he approach and problems of NRA so predomin-antly legislative as to exclude other considerations or were there sUfficient adjudicatory aspects present to dem8..nd the procedure required by such problems? The courts nave recognized t hat the fixing o f customs duties is more than fact-finding (37). It involves "the kind of discretion to operate an intelligent legislative plan11 (38 . The problem presented tothe administration is not in t he nature of litigation (39). The poiicy stated; the government 1s merely using this machine;ry to effectuate that policy against one group -the foreig n competitors. Legislative action by an administrative agency thoug h required to hold. a few formalities is, 9838


comp8nsating l y , g iven much less .p o wer procednrally . The Interstate Commerce Commission the Federa l Trade Commission a r e ereatl y limite d in subpoenaing witnesses '?. nd forcing t hem to testify ( 40) . This feeling toward administrati. ve legislation may be colored by f.q,ct that a . hearing is not a prerequisite to the validity of either c or private bills in this country and the doubtful v alue of op-lnions usually at such hearings when held ( 41). Even being a ole to call rffiA hearin.e;s legi slative would have urovided no cure-all. The frequenc y with hich courts have refused to accept by legislatures is all too well kn own( 42). While some writers have thoug h t that the r ate-making po er is legislative because of its enormous consequences on the future (43), others more discerning have seen another problem (44). This other problem is the conflict of interests between competitors and the adjudication of this conflict b ased upon the administration's interpretation of what the law requires in the particular case. Fixing a rate may be legislativ e as to a shipper, b 1 1t when the hearing iresolves itself into a contest be competing roads it assumes a judicial nature. think of legislation a s involving a group rule for future conduct. But rate regulation may involve the judicial determination that in the past one road's rates were unfRir or discriminatory and result in the a d ministrative action of" declaring a future rate. So in l:JRA the problPms presented often had this judicial aspect in large quantities. Few hearings ,.there were that did hot. become sharp contests between op\ ;osing competitors e a c h ad.vocating a standard. of conduct as being proper or improper. To have listened to one of these hearings would have been enoug h to suggest the definite nature of the dual c .ontests tha. t so frequently arose. The distinction is not clear, b"t:l:t a general rule interpreting a statute so drawn as to hit particularly at a small group or an individual, that is, competing with the group adv.ocatirig' the i nterpretation, partakes more of the nature of a judicial t'han legislation. This fact has been recognized by one of the leading minds in the field of administrative law (John Dickinson) ( 45). .An :order applying to an ind.i vidual or a few individuals, as against a regU.lati.on applying to a class is said to require, constitutionally9 notice and hearing (46). The evidence most strongly indicating legislative character was the product. These codes of fair compet ition were drawn up in form of rules of prohibitions or positive action. On their faces they were as legislative as any statute for a class. It is when this mask is torn aside, and the creation of these codes is understood to include rulings makin g the course of one competitor proper under the legal standard given, and. the course of another competitor unlawful by the same standard t hat the judicial character of t:'le contest becomes apparent: Cer tainly, here there existed often a most bitter and personalized contest. As the Act W R S framed, unless the courts had ruled these rules involve questions of law for our determination (47) (in which CA..Se NRA would have been mad e equally impotent with the Trade Commission), the only question upon which there would have been necessarily due process of law procedurally, would have been whether there was a violation of a code rule. Although legislatures need not give such guarantees, administrative agencies usually are not allowed such freedom of action. P atterning NRA after Tariff Commission would have availed little, if the Courts felt that its subject m atter was more o f the type handled by other commissions and its contests more personalized. 9838


' r . -CnP t1'ong irr> .• ( 'lr' l"l t o suo.)ort tht contention that NRA r o.:rP c:c j ,1 i1l tl 'f' 1 1re o ed.ural safeards e istin in the Interst.qt.P Com;, r P r.ornrn1 .;ion c::wes is thP fact tha t the Act did not snecif ic1ll v r e q .ti 1. :1 rinr in t11P sect ion relied upon in NRA activity ( •J.c) •r.i t.1 e ;t in c;\cf'otlon .. . fR.ilure of a statute to r equire .q, LlP: ri11 o 1e • nr• t t h : . t onr> may be dispensed with. The due urocess is one of fairness . If fairness demands a hearing , onE' must b Lad . And the hearin must be just as complete ns net>dE'd to sA.tisfy t.1E' t e ts of fairness. Al ti.1ou gl 1 the Act made no general hearing requirement, it made a limited one of most significance. Section 3 (a) affords the only sug to be mRde a basis for the Code process. Con gress p laced two eflnite li1'1itat1ons upon this process. Th e first one, directed against "monopolies or onopolistic practices", is well known . Less publicized W!:!S the Con;ressional proviso reading , "Tha t where such code or codes affect t n services :md. welfare of persons engaged in other steps of the econoMic proces, nothing in tnis section shall deprive such uersons of tne r1ght to be he,g_rd prior to a.poroval by the PrPsident of such code or codes.11 This requirem e:1t wou l d appear to be of the utmost determinative value. Few codes w-ere ever al):proved that did not affect11the senrices and welfare 11 o f oth e r not immedi ately \ • i thin the industry. At leq,st, the Con gress contemplated a heetring in such situ.ations. It might be a r gued tha t Con gresc , failin g t0 provide for hearings u pon purely inte rnal probl ems while providing for h e arings upon external matters, did not contemplate a hearing in the former situations. If the courts had accepted this argument, there remained the constitutiona l 11due pro cess" a rgument that such matters requ.ire a hearing . Coupled with the recently evinced attitude o f the c o urt's holding administrative bodies to high standards of action ( 5 tl) it i s highly probable that the courts would have said NRA procedur e must embrace a full hearing. An attempt 'Pas made to furt-he r meet this sta.tutory requirem8nt 'by an executive order providing for hearing and aatoma.tic stay until determination of the issues r aised in the case of persons outside an industry showing thq,t they had not part i cipa.ted in e stFt. Lli shing or consenting to a code ( 50a). Whet her legislative (51) or judicial the problems of NRA in form and substance were much more closely related to the rule and rate making power of the Interstate Commerce Commission than to the duties of the Tariff Commission under the Flexible Tariff Act (52). It must be und .erstood that the use of concepts of legislation and adjudication can, at best, 'be only s 1 1ggesti ve. All three of the usually classified p owers of may b e present in one administrative agency (53). They may be sc arranged that any attempt to classify them will be hopeless (54). This wa. s certainly true in NRA (55). It would be unwise to be deluded by concepts. The "legislative," "judicial" classification is often more text book than case book. 'I'here has bee n a recent disposition by the Court to demand higher standards of administrative fairness (56). AQministration is not legislation by legislatures, which have historically Aposition n.ot ::;.o easi•ly t.he _ j . Chicago Case (57) suggests that vvhere a monopoly is g iven there sufficient basis for a i nterest in a comuetitor to challenge the 9838


order. 'I'h i s indicates a f e eling o n the part of the court that suc h directly affected :'.re i m portMt and must b e con sidered. It has bee n s uggested a bove tha t NRA1s position d iffered from that of the Interstate Commerce Commission i n t h e instant C A Se (58 ) ina s m u c h as a hearing was required b y the s t g . t ute ti.1.ere involved while t h e N I R A required no such hearing . How e ver, t h e P resident contempl G.te d that h e aring s be :held (59); Ju. s t what weight would b e put" on this is diff i c u l t to say. As NRA purposed. to a fford a hearing t h e courts would probabl y not aprove a 'hearing which it deemed unfair or inadequate. It mus t be admitted t hat the evidence i s contr a dictory . The strongest and most abundant e vid.ence suggests that the courts prob'Lbl y woulcl_ have held NRA to a rather hig h sta n dard of procedure. In f l'lc e of the evidence it WA.S im practica l t o assum e ot ter wise. The higher t h e standard adopted the better c hmces that the courts would have a p proved the procedure. I I ' II 9838


'r: ---Should it Of t1r t cod. -.•t: )Ji:.__ )roccss wns ndllinistretvc lcti;islation what effect o 1 l ci. : <' •>Oii its statu ... in the Courts? That the question of " . due:' nrot.:ess 11 i n cod n .. : c J UJ..d . un c a n not cnsi 1 ; be denied. Trlle , tl c it 110 t ,-:.Lbjc r t to exirC'or dinary legal remedies as ha been in t }•i B c1 : . .t; d ' ( r ,J.:•). r• i s crea tes 1 c gal difficulties, but not lorn mi.:.ntp s u lr! i t J C t,:nt t Lc;r arc ins mountable. Lcgisluti on itseJf ir; u .. il 1 ;:ti.l it is enforced. So too the codes until '!.r rc '::.ct' l<.< UTIOi 1roncrty and indivi dual r i ghts, exce •t that b9rs oJ. t.:c mt i t rust hJ.w were let d.own to sug gest comL>illations which M ight b e d ircL.ted these rie;hts. A mo t circwrtS3)eCt enforce ment """"\roccss wl1ich would g i vc every desirable ;;rocedural safeguc.rd i t i s urL;ed , by those who eel "due :Jr:ocess concepts should not be ap lieu to c ode-rnaJ;:inb , would preclude the due 1")roccss questio n beL1g rf'ised (59b). 'l'l :is argument th." t . no matter ho\'1 a rbitraty , capri cious or unreasonab l e t h e procedure of codemal: ing, since we dub it "legis lati ve11 it esc a:9cs judicial control. By nea t l anbuat:;c and classifice.tion this view has y rod . .:<.ced a jud i c i a l m iracl e . It bas ext e nded to a n admin istrative :proc.ess CLealint;; wit h . n r ivat e industry and busi a more narro w review thaa can oe found in the a ll.en or land :patent cases. The p r "Oponer..ts o f this view hav e not gone so far as to argue tha t code-i!lak:ing wou l d no t be tested b y s u b s t antive d u e process. L e:;islation by Coi.1cress end S t nte lesislatures i s subject to thi s c o n trol. A fortiori admj_nistrative l et, islation r.lUst be subjec t to a on thi s lbasis. The resul t of n.r gmnent i s thi s : the procedure b e ha:9hazard o r eminently unf air; tl1e resul t , h owe v er, mus t mB,.,t tests o f legal fairness. Thus a comp l e t e divorce:, ent between <)rocedure a n d subs tance is had. The pate1t difficulty and the one i s n o red is that u n j u s t is a great per s uasive force t"l:e courts t o det e r m ine the_t results a r e unfair. F a i r procedure and fair res.1lts can no t b e ' s o blandl y divorced. T o know v:he ther results a r e f oi. r it must 'oe determil1ed w!1e ther all the per t inent facts are likel y t o b e b efore the body and t o b e considered b y it in a rrivi n g at its decision. C ertain specific evid.e::.ces indicate th-;. t t t e courts would not r e;_ 1i.21 contro l o v e r aCL"':li:i. "legi s l ation" mer e l y because it is anc-tlogous to a c t i o n . by a c o o r dinate d i vision of t:.Overnment. As a matter of l o .;i c a n d anal ;'ls i s i f the tri :nart i t e division o f E;Overnment i s ,treated as more than a hel nful div isio:n i+: coul d b e argued that the j udicia r y should hav e no contro l o v e r strati ve o f t h e l aw . Admini s trativ e a gencies f u nctions delegat e d t o the m oy the legislatur e . Frequentl y are res;_Jonsi b l e to the exectu i ve branch of the government. S o it m ight be a r gued control o f adr n i n i stration s hcu ld r e s t either i n the legislative o r executive o r in bot h . N o matter wha t the desirabil i t y o r the l oE-;ic of s u c h a contentio n , the j u d i c i a r y i n our system p lays a m u c h more vi t a l role. The firs t :'Je.rt o f t his study has been d e v o ted t o pointing out that t h e j udic iary having acquiesced i n the d e legation o f power t o administratio n has nevertheless a strong contro l over the manner in which po•uer has b e e n exercised through a vari e t y of co ncepts. ( 59c) It is well recognized t ba. t a t t h e beginning o f ou r go ver m nent, once j\l.dicia l review hcvd been e s tablis h ed, t h e courts c :m l d have ap:,_Jlie d the doctrine o f delegat a , uotesta s potest d e legari t o many acts o f Cong r ess. Whether fro m weaknes s of position o r genuine desire to aid in the orderly developmen t of need e d governmental forms, delegation was allowed. Later as adrnini b e c ame more vi t a l the courts quietl y dev eloped "broad review" ( 59d). It must b e r emembe r e d that the 9838


4 6 first declaration UlJOn this problem was one of 11i.1arrow review11• (59e) But let it !10t be forcotten t h a t a review WG', S indica.ted; . is i m_portant. N o w v:ha t is 11a dininistra .ti-,:e Whose. term is it and wha t are the imp l i c ations of i t ? D r . F. F. blachly, co-author o f a treatise e1.1title d !'Admi n i strative i:Jec;islation ancl A C.judication," states that t b e t erm 11admini strati ve lee;i slCl..ti 0n" i s used . both i n a D d Gernar..;;r. He believes, however, that the rSal basis for the term' s use in t his country is. t]'le frequent r eferen c e b y En;;lish writers to e . d u i:nistrative rules and regul ations as "de legated legislation" e:"'.nd other r.elated -!Jc::r's • .,(59 f) If t'hi s be true, t hose who believe t1:e name "le6i sla t ion" works such miraculous chan ges in our .. e ,dmi n :i_stretive lan hevve to co.sider tha t ' as the term is used in En.'::;lancl it . e mbraces both 11l . e 6islation11 in the sense of class rules and " adjudication" in the of orders directed at particular individuals. (5Sg) legislati_on is being distorte d from its true meaning when it :.s loo: ;:ed upon as a 'class rule. The . _.great mass of legislation 'has aLways been 1)rivate bills, an.d too , classification can be easily extended to the }'"llace where a rule rJay af::'ect only C?ne individual. In f act, it is extremely difficu l t t o find any tenable d.i _stinction between n.g,d.ministrative legis1 ation" and " admL1istrative ad.jud.i cation.11 Prcfessor Dickinson offers the following: 11Wha t cUstiriguished leg i s l a .tic:1 from adjudica,tion is that the fOl'mer affects the rights of i ndividuE:.lS in the abstract anc1 must b e ap: : ilie d in a further proceeding before the. legal position o f any individual will be definitely touched by it; while adjudication operates concrete l y upon individuals ii1 tl1eir individual capacity." ( 5 9h) Professor Dickinson does not contend for any hard and f ast distinction with entirely different legal c onsequences flowing from each class. In fact he speaks o f the futility of trying to a particular exercise Of strati Ve power as either le; i slati Ve Or Wholly judicial (59i). If pushed to its logical extre--:1e and to a use Professor Dickinson never intended, it woulo. indicate that the "cease ai.1d desist" procedure was not adjudica t o r y merel y because enforcement against a stubborn party cou],d b e secured onJ.y bjr rec ours e to tbe courts. (59j) Wha t the test z i:v e n amounts to is tha.t: Wl1erever the; enforcenent machinery lies in the c ontro l of the a.dmiYJ.istrAtion, its act in using that machinery'against any individual witb the result that his property or his })erso. n is a ffecte d is " 8 .djudicati on. 11 Th e instances where this is true are n o t irany. exist, pc.rticuJ.arly , in "broad review " fields. Tax collectors 1 ,ie. y d i strain o r alien ins:pectors arrest an alien. If the test ; is not based U}lOn the actue . l Bnforcemen t of rules or orders e it 1 n u s t refer to classes a s opposed to individuals. This has already been censidered. The difficulty of creating c.ny air-tight distinction within t h e field o f administration is n,bvious. It a n e v e n greater problem tha n creating suc h distinction in the general field of government. It ignores any accepted classificatio n of gover nment. If ' e treat administration as a fourth division of ,overnr.1ent, this view says administration i s no t different from the l e gislative in certain segregable parts nor from the courts in others. T hus, the raison etre (a flexible 9 8 3 8 new go v ernmental form) for a separate administr ative division falls from


-..J:7t h e of closr i ficr'tio ll . I f oven r ,nt i f v ciHed as poli c;v •. d JC')lic,. .1 1 •• _,, rL i .J.. t.!." f,_; _ •• b e l o n !; ... to the l a tter func tion is s o c lassL .i e a"' to e of both. 1 : r-e the clifficul ty 1'Jro bably lies in tha t delcb ations h < '. !E' • . iven c .G.:1ini .. trntir)n 3UCh _Jolicy control in tl.c past t t t '1c r c:-. 1 f ' J .• of :1r:. . i -;:i.-tering a stated l c0i lativ" polic; :Jc.t; , ' J 1 e . 1 t " 1 i s is tl1e value of clp ions s1:tc h ts " l ee;;i s l<1. t.i o n " r t i 1 d 11a.djudication11 to bind the co rt a nd. our m i :i.ld s mus t J e ser .ious l y ouestio1 ed. 11Lct,isl:1.tio 1 " und " a L judicc...tio n11 are merel y convenient anal o .;ies. Merely because an a dmini strc.ti v e is 1.1 \ :ta a genera l rul e i n conforli1ity with a state d d o s n o t .ean that this action shrul d be outside t h e courts' control while the enforce! e!1t of that rule is care c:1e clccd as to :1rocedure. If the courts ado:vted t his view they . i bt sell b e 11 swallowing a camel" for questionable actions could be in le.;ivlati ve form while the criforce mer..t the nost elaborate ur.: 1 e,1..1.o..rantees. It is a well-establis ed 1eg,'.l principle that the legislative judg J lGnt is not to be questione d as lon.; as it o )erates in the ambit c f its tutional :90

4 8 -fact t h e attorney o f those affected b y the Tariff Commissio n ' s re com1nendat i c n demancled t o see all t '1e e v i d ence before t h e Commissio n , even t hat w hich it h a d acce p t e d a s c :mfidentia l . :ie r e t e rm "leg islation" presente d a c onvenient ana l os'Y t o sugbest a s in t h e tax a s sessment field not all t:.1e p r o cedu r a l . guaral)tees o f " a to'tm m e e t ing" o r a jud i cial 'trf-al need b e afforded t o p r o t ect the individu al. Prope r adm inistration is a balancing o f administra t ive efficiency and fairn ess t o t h e individual. The Flexible Tariff Act sets p r ocedura l requi rement s , part icularly n otice and hearing { 5 9o). .A.l thrus h the c o urts have e n f orced t hese, o t her q u estions u f t h i s cl taracte r J.lav e n o t arisen exc e p t the limited p r o blem already sugges t e d The status of t h e law u pon t his act is s o indefinite t hat it can b e safe l y sai . d that t h e r e seems t o b e no r . eally strong authority e xisting f o r t h e "le gislative v i e w." The Panama and Schec h t e r c a ."es have been :;_Jo1nted t o as lending credence t o t h e 11leg i slative11 a p ) r o a c h . In the l atte r case c ourt used the t e r m " l e g i slation" t o strike clovrri t h e delegatio n , not as an an alog y u pon w hich t o limit its own o f jud i cial review. Legisla tive p o wer e xcep t within c ertai n l imits can n o t b e del e g a t e d , said t h e court. T his was no indication that whe r e :pr ol)e r l y d e l e g a t e d the c o urts would ignor e their c ontro l exercised in t lJ.e )ast over use c f d.el ega tecl p o w er. In t , 1 e Panama case much t h e same si tu..a t i o n i s tnte. T h e r e i s , however, an additiona l and v aluable e vidence. Alternative grounds u po n which to s t rike down t l 1 e g o verniill.Billhts case w e r e offe r ec'l. t:la.;n the improp riet y o f the d elegatio n t h e c ourt said a n exec utive Jrde r mus t have associated with it s ome possible f actua l basis upo:I:l ru1 official may act. T his is sigp.ifican t. Tl1e orde r issu ed . w a s jus t as b r o -ad anc:t g e n eral a s an NRA c o d e . Its c haracte r as legislative s e e m s i d enti cal. Yet the c ourt i n dicate d a willingness to c ontrol the t e chnical :;_) rocedural questio n indic ated. Further, the c ourt indica t e d :that it still c o n c e i ves of administrat i v e actio n in t erms o f fact-findin g a s _ o p _)c;s o d t o the traditi o n ally s t a ted c onc ept of legislation. The dissent o f Mr. Justic e C ardo zo has baen pointe d t o as set t i n g forth prop e r lega l the: o r y a s to the n ature o f P r e s i d e nt's action. I t i s suggeste d that t h e dissent says t h e P r e s i d ent's o r cle r i s and not sub j ect to procedural requiremE)nts. It i s t o b e e x p ecte d . that the Justice who wrote t l1e o pinio n in t h e Nor weg ian Nitroge n case wou l d u s e similar concepts 11. e r e . No m atte r how m u c h . o n e appr o ves t h e p, 1 ilosophy o f dissenters in desiring freedom from_j'udicial r eview , i t shruld not be f orgotte n t hat law i s stil l to b e found in m a j orit y opini o n s . T here is a r e cent cas e whic:h g i v e s Mr. Just i c e B rand eis an to offe r his views, writing for a una...-"lirno u s court. (59q) He r e atta ches soii!Dle o f the c h a r acte r of l e g i s l ative act i o n t o ad1 n inistra tion. It i s t o be c a r efull y observe d t h a t t h i s rais e s no conclusive-:presum:?t i o n but m e r ely r aise s a prima f acie p r esur n p tion of validi t ;y( 5 9r). Pains w e r e take n t o point o u t that t h e fact t h a t the actio n w a s c a l l e d did not make it binding u pon the court. T his is in h a rmon y w i t h tile language found in the d issent b y Mr. Justice C a rdozo in the Panama case. The atte m p t in t h i s s tudy i s t o :point o u t t l1e state o f t h e law and possible judic i a l tre n cls i n t l 1i s admini-st r a t i v e la.w p r ob l e m . Proper w e i g h t must, of cours e , b e giv e n t o e .ll tl-.e pertine n t fact s and analo g ies 9838


-... in any situnt1 n . Tnc roaliti.,s )f judicial centro can no t b..: r o d . It t .',.. vj , 1.. t , \:rit 'r tltat t.wro ls little hope t o avoid t101ln c• .'iclll uch a br nu.:.:.t , t :'l'l tl>JJ...;'nt. , n f ::;:rva t(.r powers to administration and an not _ o:oe t o 1 ' iner circmnstances. any discretio n involved has b een exercise d anr1 all t r emains i s a minis t erial duty mandamus may lie ( 62) lr whe r e juri is refuse d by an adJTiini strati v e board mandamus will 1 i e ( S o mandam u s t 1;ro:.9erly lai d Wllere NRA r efused to c o n sider the p roposal o f an industry , Ml e r e an o f f 1 cial r efused t o forward c ert ain pal)eT s :le forwar d e d under tl.:.e :pr oceclure as s e t u p 983.8


-50( 64). I f a s hoviTing wer e m a cle mere c f a C ode by the Pre sident would have c a used irreparable injury , i t t :1ave been urged t h a t t : 1e f o r wa rdin g o f t h e Cod e b y t :ae NRA t o the P r esident c ould be enjoined. Such an argument would have bee n of do u b tful merit ( 6 5). T h e effect would have been enjoined President . It is n o t oontendG d that c ourts mi g h t view N R A a s act i n g a s c?Jl a.g.:m t o f t h e Presi c l ent i n a narrow sen s e t hat extra o r dina r;y legal remedy \?ould issue. T h e r e been too little t ime t o fully c o n sider t his p r ob l e m . Instanc e s w :J.e r e i njunctio n might lie c a n be envisaged al t l v u. g. 1 the courts a r e e x t r e m e l y reluctant t o issue e xtrao rdinary lega l r emed ies. T11is i s especiall y true o f m andamus. a p remimn i s p l a c e d U ]on inactio n (66). may be only an incident of tbe c ourts f e e ling , t h e attitude h aving arisen from the r eluctance of courts to giv e r elief r equiring p9sitive action b y those it ca, n not easily c ontrol. T h i s d i s c u s s i o n has b e e n i n t e n d e d t o show t h a t :"the _'introduction of t h e President as the f i nal a d ministrative authority com plicates t h e situation a s f a r as a)plicati o n o f extraordinary l egal remed i e s b ecause o f the d i g n i t y o f h i s positio n b oth ana l ytically and h i s torically. Unless ther e vvas c ompelling reas o n it would s eem dE?sir able to have such final authority rest in some other person o r body than the President. The N. I .R • .A. makes specific p rovisi o n f o r co nditional o rder s of a y.. proval (*). Ther e a r e a f e w cases invqlvi n g t l 1 e u s e of suc h orders mak i n g require m ents not specifically incluqed in a statu te. ( 67). The few cases seem to allow regul atio n s reasonably c o n _sis t ent with the statute and its purposes (68). Pro fessor Freund has s ugges t e d t :1at 11in t h e absence of e x press statutory provision t h e power of administrative author i ties to anne x conditions to lice nses should b e deniedf!_ ( 6 9 ) . T 1lis seems c orrect where the administratio n tries to g a . i n ends it c ould not r e a sonably reach under its statutory p ower._ It would . n o t see m to b e s o compelling whe r e the conditional orde r was l 1 arrn o niou s wi t l 1 the s t atute and made to remedy a d efect in a p ro1)0 sed sch eme. Als o c u n siderabl e m erit c a n b e seen in t h e use o f a conditional o r d e r a s a _ :) r o t ectio n t o public (70) . T :1e Act provided: "T h e Pres ident may , a s a c o ndit i o n of h i s appr o val of any suc h c ode, impose such c : mdi t i ons (incl u d ing requireme nts f o r t h e :naking of reports and the keeping o f a c c ounts) f o r the protecti o n of c onsume -rs, c o mpetitors, employee s , and_ o tl1e r s , and in furt;.1e r a n c e o f the public inte r est, .............• as t21e P resid.ent i n llis clis d e e m s t o efi e c t u a t e t : 1 e l JOl icy her ein declar e d . " T h e reas onablen e s s o f t :1e u s e t l 1 a t President ' s cond i t i onql orders wer e put t o would s eem to have been t l 1 e test . The Act was c ouched i n broad terms. The p r o cedures t o be used were not specified. T h e d omi nant s c !1eme of i n d u stry w ritt e n c o d e s , ap-?r ov e d by the President, w a s a n e w gove rrun e n t a l f o r m . Its m ain pre cedent, t ll e English ( * ) S ectL n 3(a) 9838


I • -..__,.l.procedur., by sch me, lad n u v e r been put to such laroe u es. T 1 e pro-l 3 t ':.1 _./r..;c t, . t .. c.• • J]: ell "'d e losclst w1n.lot;y. T.t8 ubject although not the . 1anne r \ f wn cJo:;ely r elated to that t wi by Tr ' ! ... o •Ji ;L n . T ' c making o f Codes ap_pears t o have beL:n b o ti.1 1 Gisl.:1.t,;.v c adjuc'U catJry. Placlng final power in the President c reat e d a legal difficul t ;y, in th.t t:1ere is no recourse by extraordinary legal :is acti'n o r inaction, as did the fn.i lure t o s-yecify t'J e c o nd.i t .i.c•n a l orde r of as a proper device. An addit i a nQI problem lay ln administrative ap}roach. 9838


5.2-THE ADhi i NISTRA.T.IVE .APPRCJ A C!1 •' • \ • • J • • Th e N IRA was dE;Jsigned t c . meet notone :pro'blem but a numb e r of t hose presente d by the "Depr ess. _ionh. For., this v e r y rea son the so-called t heories of the Act too ( i): t o .. f-v;rmsh a n y really usef u l gui da n c e to most y ersons intere9ted i'n -the Act_ _ ( 2). The n r . J u l n r name of t h e statu_te indicated tl;1at it wc-1 s . ena. c .ted. t o d o . a job start r ecove r y . This i s furthe r shcrm t.he s elf-deyiso d n B m e "'f the Admi nistration . I n addition to the lin i t n t ion 'of the Act in t he creation o f t h e scheme there were lii:Ji ta.tions L 1 the circ m nstances e xistin:;; a t the time cf the Act's pass age. A st2te of nea r IJcmic becoi n ing al..l:'Ja rent. Action w a s the essence dem Bnded. The a dvanta. ges of s wift efficient adm i nistrAtive action uere neec led if the impetus of rec0 v e r y ,!RS t c be felt a t once. (3) I t W P S this i n i tia. l im petus i"Thich it w e s thought • . v ou.ld be the momentu.'ll n e c essary to bring r ecovery. N?.A started from scrRtch . TJ.1er e w a s little Bnd n o orgenizat i c n . Th e latter fact has caused som e edyerse c omme n t ( 4). It is doubtfu.l i f this cc n; -;en t is we11 t aken f o r the i n tention was every1'::rhere a n : parent t o effect en o r ganization as s0cn a.s nossib le. The r e WAS t h e sugge s t i o n thBt the Pre s i d e n t could nullify the '.rrhole Act b y doin g nothing (5). e r e ma.ny lc)1.'-'S which h e could make inoperative b y f ailr to act. The i::rroor t P n t facts are what is dcne or can reasonab l y be expected, not t h e weird possibilit i es. 1TRA hBd enoug h d.ifficu l t nrcblems to face without conjuring up im}Jr c o able "straw men". The situation was such that speed was n r eferre d t o slow painsta':ing survey. T his w a s the case because a co nsensu s of action by inciust r y . .-as desired, and the latter methc d • : 1113s not i n r f avor in an)r event with the then NRA Administration (6). T h e de m a n d f o r celerity o f a c t icn reg:uired a measure of industry c cc:9e r ation. It 1"'Culd hav e been im ncssible t o have created the codes that were m a d e with r u t s u c h a i d . Of it m i ght have been } J O s s i ble to hav e licen s e d sm!le o f the larG,;e r ind ustries but this wns not d e sired. It smac ked t o o m u c h o f the ha.ted ccncept of n government in bus iness". Gen e r a l Johnso n h a s described position: 11All othe r a g e ncies had billions to loan or give a l' m y . Ni iA g ave n othing . It tC'ok. It im;Jc' s ed. sacrifices. S v e r y body Santa Claus. N o b o d y fAvors S imon L e g r ee. C0n sequently , m a . d e uowerful enemi es". rrhi s co uld only mean tha t cooper ation of i ndustry cculd be secured by offe ri11g conc ession s , s hol1ing positive o d .van t a g e s t o b e gained or t h reatening t o use the license p ower. The former t w o methods were c hc sen althcuc;h NRA was n o t sure hO,J" s u ccessful they w ould be ( 8). A number c f indust r i e s offe r e d c o d e s b e cause i t w1-1s b e i n g done b y other ind u s tries, becC)use i t w a s t h e p o p1.lie r t h i n g t o d o . This was i n p Art a r e s ult of a tre u e n d rus s a l e s e ffort o n t h e part of NRA 1'?hich m i ght b e mor e unkindly called A n umb e r of industrie s possibly more keen to thei r 98 38


r '11 i • t l'Cft , tll J.v tri l.l i tr .... trJt1d () ,ninst the Adh1inistration had t b e < L.'ered l,rsitivc in tJr.t.J.ves . A 11on:: the incentives ffe red were f ret:::ldc m f rom the Ant i -IJ.,rus t lC:J' s, •mJ ;) DO si ti ve sAnction in cnfo rcing a Jp rrved i ndustr y t)g r ee1:1ent s U:l10 n n t l :•nt memb e r s rf industr y . N'R.A l!flS domi'18ntly in Sl"C:tring b etter Jonclitions for lnbor, hi, heJ.' rro"'e s and n s readiP' cf the :cr k . Thi s rms a.on tc raise tl1e ')1..1r-'-' clu.')sL1c; .. cr c f the Masses erAst (10). Industr y as Ksitive Rdv n tFJbes thrcu8h f;:wr r -'3ole trAde p r Actices for its sacrifices (ll). The r e ult was usually A b a r gaining by industry Hith e:c'v. rnr1ej-:t (lla). This was r ecognized by a number of NR A officiels. Ge" JC'h n s n describe d the si tu.a t ion as ll olain horse trading and 'Jr'.:.•r (12). vther h i g h rffici?ls l ess robustly c alled it <' llrLliG. _Jr9 __ c r "partia l cornJ_lensation for increased labor c o s t s11 (14). nc tion ' e cr!me s0 poTJula r :rith admil1istr3tive officials tha t it to i nclustries, uerheps thinking the industries 1."7ere no t awRr of the possibilities (15). Codes grew u p and '7ere not bec[luse l-GA there was evidence to support the } J r o but b ecause they co ntain e d the best provisions NRA thought it co,1l 6 . rbtain from industry (16). It must be remembered that NRA was a 1 i'•Jr•rtia l judc e . It was a proponent o f certain ends (17). ill1rther result cf the code technique to place agreement and majrrity vcte a t a 'IJremium. Often this became t h e only guide to the prc:p :,:iety of co de proposals. w2s true b o t h as a r esult of t he dil'f:L cu!.t.,r o f securin g necess A r y economic data t G form a basis and. the vien s ci officers. Eve n a p residing officer to c J.l uct evidence he was handicc;?,U}Jed by the pressure to get codes After the e xcitement of t hese hearing s following the first fe 7 ones presidin g officers a s a , ,hole tried to get some explanatir:n of the of code T.vo t h irle;s probably prompted this: 1. A desire to avoid later internr e tative difficulties and 2. T h e insiste11ce o f the Le gal Division the need of "building a record" (18). Often there nas a feeling that negotiation should take place in the con fele:lCes, and that industry a greemen t was the o nly essential other than the rfficer' s own often nAive vie,,.,., that the provisions be legal This l atter view usually meant a clearance by the L e gal Division, members of often \"'lere swe p t Along by the haste ever;)71:vhere surrounding them t o ccncl us ions none to c caref,J.ll;:r c0nsidered. Provisions for control of subct:>ntiai economic problems by majority vote was written into codes ( 20). rhis c".iscnssion of mCJj crity vote as a substantive test is not offered it is felt that such guidance is not always the Dost wi s e in c:1n economy so intricate AS ours. It is offered to afford a backgrc-c .c". frr the procedur . e followed in 11RA. Majority a greement procecturelly tf' be a poo r substitute for cnreful exolanation of means and ends set J:.'r i n a record •.,rhich maJ r be preserved to offer to the courts as "justification" for actio n ta':en or a : : mroval given. As 2 of the serious administrative problems and the c rrr si tion of indus try, the Adrrlini stra tion' s position offered many {ifficulties. Haste in s('me nBtters, delay in others, and confusion in nccrly all existed. There was nressure from all sides (21), b y indus t r y , b y pC1litical forces, and special labor cmd co nsumer groups (22). 9838


-5-1-Busine s s came to m o r e than wBs anticipated. no sufficie n t organi zation to handl_ e q 1 e nrobl ems (23). Coup led 11ith the y J r essure to rse t code s "th['OU( ; h t h e rni J 111 it can b e _ e Asily s e e n ho11 errors , _ v culci -creep in, _ provision s rycu l d no t -be fully 1p1derstood and Tiell rea.scned judgments : .not a , l we,y.s. g i -ven. O f t h i s , a l l 1 ffi A directing o f ficials must hav e been fully consciou s (24). I n t h e balancin g o f they p r c babl y consciously cho s e the c ours e f ollo,'"e d hast e i n app rovi n g codes. H aste in securing personnel was e asily a pparent ( 25). No s y s t e n atic schem e o r necessA r y qualification s f o r 13n;y responsible position s were e v e n a nnounced. One of NRA' s most im portant func tion s s h ould hav e be e n fact-fin d i n g . NRA. u p s meant to deFJl . more realis,ticBlly Bith business problems, thA n could the col1rts or the legislature I n t his there was such haste t hat i t wa. s a l i , lOSt impossibte for l'ffi,A. t(' perform this function. The c o n fusion ( 27) and press:ure were s o grea t t hat responsible officials cculd not stElnd the pace p h ysically ( 2 8). ' :Vit h n erves linstruJJ.g and body tired careful f a .ct finding became a . dista n t d.ree m (if it were .even rem embered). Nru\.1 s o u n procedure d . e mande.d s u c h hAste that a busy p r esiding officer o r aclviser could not hope .to e _ven learn , let alone a na lyze , the basic fac t s of a n i r J portan t industry in the time allotted ( 2 9 ) . In the drive to get codes approved s pecific policy was i gnore d a t first (30). When policy was issued it often nrove d s o broad and s w e e p ing that numerous exception s were required ( 31). Haste had a p o werful effect procedure. Hearings were n e cessa:rJ' evils to be dispensed with a . s r eacUly As possibl e ' .'Thenever t here was a de mand to l)Ut a code or a provision throug h ( 32). The w o r k could be m ore quick l y in the conferences. T hat the record fqiled to contain these cften valuable evidentiBry discussions mattered little. Th e quiqkes t most co 1wenient administrative m eans are not a l w a y s the b est, especia l l y if t here is 'Possible judiciA l r eview The difficulties t hat m i g h t result from questionable , proced.m e s eem s no t to have been recogni z e d . There was no plarining tha t a search will disclose other t h a n t h e 11go l d.U fish b owl" and "controve rsy" i deas ( 3 4). Th e r e sponsibility of t h e L egBl Division should have been of Cl most c h a ract er. Recogniz ing tha. t man y presiding officers h 8 d n o l e g A l trA i n ing the legal a dviser should have h a . d co nsiderable hand i.u s h.ap ing the c ourse of h e a rings. Even rrhere t h e p r e siding office r mBy ha. v e ha.d. legFJl the r e was n o a ssurPnce that he hed a. proper a p p r eciatio n o f the procedur a l r e quirements o f a.d ministretive law . T h e s ame holds good f o r l egal advis ers. The L egal Division a s a unit seem s to lwve pai d little attention to t he p r oblem of procedure. A c a r eful check of i nstructions g i v e n t o l e g a l adviser s d i s clo s e s only fifteen mernorc:mda with Any bearin g o n the p roblems o f thi s study (33). Of these only a 'Siery few touched o n procedure (36). Their d ates indicate tha t the y came in the for m of a rationAlization o f e xisti n g procedure r athe r than a c a r e f u l r e c o:J,nendCltio n upo n n hich procedure should h a v e b een built. In a resume o f case s u pon the NIRA published b y the Le g a l D ivision there is no division t o nroc e d ure d e soite the f act that som e of t h e cases suggested t h e problem. (37). 9838


I t i11 lff . L r.lll t tr :1] P tho ';;l0nsibil i t;v cf the lAck of thcught J.1. G . 1 10 1' • . • :, •1l, J,"' -ror e .c;iven Th e Divisi\n Ties f t e • ln•bJ.,, , n iH1 incllc:;1ted by its mcmor ::mdn eve1 if the awe .re'1ess e n m e ns .-=1n nft er-thr'\t,'h t . Th ' rcsnonsibilit y probAbl.f VPlries c:-se t<"' C CISC . ,. , : !::i. t .,n .,,r, •H'rsrnPl] f;,ilin,css must oove b t:ei.l t:10 driv tr Jl'Gc1ll c G , .;, -, .L.:: .rr,Juction d('e s not mean per' manence r:r stC'lbiJity. lncEhl llrG cc>ulu h::ve e;rne fer to h':lve in-surecl t his had the Act be n held. c<'nstituti naJ.. thf' need frr uolic;y wr1s. recoplized there was B tendency torrA rcl t0r gTeFlt Gov v rrunent h a s devised no sounder methcd of with -Jro blerJs of economic an0 SC'Cifl 1 im port thr:m the case roe tho d . T h e difl'ic 1.1 t•' fou n d i n the Ailti-trust l aws, it was clah1ed, +ay i n their cf in.:-r to fit " '11 industries to one mould. NRA in its l atter dAys deveJ.o"9e d in this direction (38). There were situations where policy !i-1S net F.l sUfficient a n s ver t o the economic facts. A poliey that might ()llcr: cne industry, because o f its organization unusual liberties mi ght be disti: 1ctly unfair t o another. The f o:rm o f such trouble lay i n allo'!in0 toe great freedom to an industrybecause policy requirements had been met c r i n the desire of Denuties to aQhere to desnite industr y1s .,...ell-.::;rouncLed r e quest. . Perh Aps .the difficulty lay not so much in the B!ulounced but in its forms. Standards of stAndards of me::J!1S end end, cC'u:pl e d with intelli gent adm i nistrAtion may be far mere u r od.uctive thpn a bsolute rigidity of Of course, the latter is desira. Dle B S a matte r cf uniforr:li t y IThere no o ther o u trreighing cons idera. t ions eJ;:ist. It iilBY have been tha t such 11olic:v grew u p bec;,use of a pprehension of hi;l1e r Bd hlinistrP.tive officials tcu.<:Jrd the Administration of t hose off i c i als nost close l y i!-1. contact . .rit h individual industries.(38a) tc tl1e haste with which perso nnel was selected there were other pressing :9ro blen s ?Jre sen ted by personnel, 0art icu 1 arly from Division AdministrB tc rs d O \ Tfl tc Flnd_ including Assistant Deputy NAA' s personnel prroJe:! s c8n not b e assig n e d tf"l po'J.itical patronag e fot it is common knoleCl.[;e that the Vf.lst mc:>j crit3 of t hose i n responsible positions ( ::10t i n such p o sitions) ;7ere brought into the organization thrc-t. :tg h personal connections with t hose alread y in NR.A.. The im mediate nucleus of officials r.;rer e .trusted fri\3nd s of GenerA l Johns0n or b,_,_siness Bssrcirtes. There were S('me laoor leaders. On the w hole they or their friends seJdom furnished the i m ycrtAnt presiding officers. Peop l e there 0:olenty desiring to for l\!RA. There may have been a sufficient mlln-oer c f canable with a )ublic viewpoint, but this is One thins is certain. Many officials had no con cm:>tion of the T)roper ch.g:cacter of an EJdministrntive hearing o r its :1ur:Jcse . Zven 1.:orse is t he SUGgestion th8 t presidin g officers may have (ften r r at the time hod subs ten t i a l interests in the indus tries under them although this was c ontra r y t o NRA policy ( 39). There ue1e a number of cases where l\TR.A officials were gradu;,ted into t lle c f industry a t compar ativel3r princely s alAries (40). This does n o t : 1 ean that there was dishonesty u pon the :oart of such persons. I t hovrever, such An akiness of s pirit that the public AS from s interest or personal interests might have been s c 1etin e s s l i g hted (41). The is well st;,ted in the judici2l 9838


-56field that no man shall be a judg e in his O'J!T..Il cause (42). There is l ittle reason 1.1hy it. should not a opl y in t h e administrative field. It is s o recognized in .England; ( 43 ) . The rule is 8 p r otection to All inte r ested persc n s c:n1.c1 to the judg e.N o rna t ter the honesty of the pre siding officer, it is uise to avoid the a:;pearance of p c s sible evil. The cry often raised WDS the nee d for trained Elen. A man r;ho k nows -the p roblems cf an industry too in tiroa t e l y bec13use he has once le bored. with it may be so bio.sed El. S not to be an im:partia. l judge. It 'is possible to underst::1nd the problen s o f an industry. without having ' ' J Or ked for it. Perlwp s in light of the circumstAnces could h ave done no better. It rrc"Lllcl.. h 0 .ve im:po ssi ble t o have called u .. pon the Civil Service. The job too large for it (44). The Brooking s study well st!3tes the situation: tiA 1;rr blem in ymblic J ?e rsonne l adm i ni stra tion more difficult than that of securing industrial specif:llists f o r code drafting and code enforce:11e n t can scarcely be ii:1a. gined. To secure at once persons well versed in the intrtca.cies of the industry and yet free from bia. s and questio-nable interests v78 s a dif:!:'icul t y of t h e first ma.gni tude. Many persdns would have had m0re confidence in the selections if e1igibility for appoin t111ent had been determined more in the open by an i nde:-oendent personnel agency using a. s ystem in ':'lhich the facts of education, ex:perience, a.nd interests were pDssed 11pon by a special ccm:1 1i ttee of com petent examiners of high stF.:mding, Elnd one which left a reasonably complete record". (45 ) T his element of bias souetirnes shrwed itself as insufficient a\? ness of any. public interest. Responsible of:ficiF.lls made p romises Tihich could nc t RlwRys reasonably be k ept. For exa m ple, a . ble official 8 that a . n code nrovision •;;rc uld not be touched .. until the i ndustry agreed to the c (40 ) yet th8 Act indicates a desire that the President modify or cancel c:mprcved code provision \There he deemed such ACtion ne c e ssa ry ( 47) • .A:.1 a .ddi tional difficulty lBy in the f act that presiding officers did not a . h ;Ay s get along 1:'!ell with their o . dvisers. Advisers like h eBrL_g s were sometir:1es looked upon as a:needless nuisance (48). Much of this feeling resulted from the idea that hearing s were t o 'be forums of controversy opposed by orders to rush the process. Controversy dela.yed hearings. Lon g hearing s delayed " putting QOdes through". ' . The theory industry self-government provided a strong lim i tDticn upon s .clr, 1 i:t'1i'stratiori. Many f elt adequate industrial i nforru!:lticn much o f t h e solution of the de:pression uould co m e from indus try ( 49). Many ino .. us.trial lea.ders a n d soi11e NR.A off.icials follo1: 7ed the theor. thflt whatever a group in a n y . industry thcught best f o r thc:. t should be accepted as prima facie in the public interest (50) • .After cc des were appr0ved this 1:"as ext.ended t ( . place that 1TR.A. 0fficials often discouraged the sending of }:>ertinent infr . rma :tion to the Administration (5:). Indifference t 0 the public i nterest as suqh further colors 9838


-'-7 -sow e .-f the diff i ci...Ll tie tc: b e :fo1Lncl i n the ,'1ctl!Jintstrative aworoa c h . .Any consideration of t h e 1 1' e d 1:;.r n l 1 r oblems must b e mAde only p fter an understanding ifc; h o d cf t l o inh rnt . LiL! i t"'t i ons f the scheme encl the ach.1inistrative c:rppron h . I n<'1u:tr;r ' s ; ! . i J i l i t.' . r t t h e trust placed by NRA in industry s elf And. t J L l value of r.1ajori ty vote, the haste cmd corfusion surrOUL1 din< " : .hol e undertAking , the failure to recc g;ni ze t he irr1nortance ond d iff lC'll t y C'f pro cedur ... , a n d the 1 i m i tFl ticns of the -pers0n!1el nll had irn portent influen cf's u pon due , Jroce""s of lr-m, both procedu:r a.LJ.y end substc:mtively, and t he lock of it in N.RA. 9838


-58CHAPTE H VII JU R ISDIG11I 0li .PJ-;D JU I. ISDICTIC'J A L NRA assumes a vride rang e of jurisdiction. Whether this was al.ays properly c . ssum e d i s a prelirnine. r,y cons id.E.:retion to the propriety of pro cedure. The review exercised by the courts ove r administrative action throug h q_uestions of jurisdiction and. jurisdictiona l fact has alread;)7 been observed(l) as h a s the recent i : 1portance of the latter questio in the fielo. of administrative ( 2 ) o Jurisdiction has a close relatio:'l to que. s t ions of l a, and it i s ClUi t e J Oss i blc that a number of the terms in ihe .Act mi ght have been subjected to judicial definition. J:lhis it has been observed happened to many of t h e problems of the Feder:U Trade ComTT:ission ( 3). A more review nould have been for the courts to have cletermined v"'hether the e .ctua l fe.cts supporting jurisdiction existed. A nu.m-ber of questions tha t i;ould furnished both problems in jurisdiction and jurisdictional f8.ct apJJear in the Act. Tne codes were to be .s;pplicable to an 'industry o:;: tre .de or subd.ivision thereof (4). '7That i s JJTO J!erly an industry or trade ? Did tfl. e Fc::bricated lv.etal s Code (5) cove:then one industry? J:lhe code for the Graphic Arts Industries ( 6) to cover who mi ght perform the 11 act or process of 1impressing, stamping , or transferring upon paper or paper like substonces, of any ink, color, }'igment, including any and all par tial ]Jrocesses end services used_ in The code b y its title covered more than one industry c;. l t houg h the Act did not such coverage (7). It seems, of course, that subdivisions of an inc.ustrmight be split up. Even this might be 9arried to such e_:treme end.s that courts vrould interfere ( 8 ) if they felt such actions had been carried unreasonably f s.r. The Droblems mentioned are illustrated by the titles of such codes es the and Timber Products Code (9) ano_ 1vhe ;'Ao:f? Stick Cod. e (10). Could a verticle code be said to a n inclustry? l1he resale price m a i n tenance plan of the Tobacco Codes were in effect a verticle code (ll)o It w a s often -r;:>Ossible to 11fre eze11 a system with such a code. It is quite possible 1""ith the courts' knovm antipathy to this t;y:9e of a ction that the courts might have sai6_ Dn industry was n o t mea11t t o refer to such separable activities as manufacture and sale n o t c arried on by the same persons or firms. Imprope r classification o f firms a s belonging to an industry where there vras good evidence to sho'.' ! they d i d n 0 t is another poss i bility (12). The suggestion is that the court might h a v e tried its hand a t classifice ,tion. Overlapping codes furnish still a further problem. It could. be easily thought that it is 1mreasonRble to r equire a firm to :9ay tribute to more than one Cod e Au.thori ty v-hile performdmg only one OlJera tion (13) o:c to b o in the d.ark a s to , hich set of fair trade p r actices it must operate under. The B aking and ?..estaura .nt Codes illustrate the situation (14). L a r g e r estaurcmt chains oper ating: bakeries for use in connection with their res t aur?nts or sepe ra.tely, were covered by the Cod e (15). Overlapi•in g cocLes mig:ht mean tha t a small group uould be coapellecl to abide b y a particule r obnoxious provision (16). It is quite possiole tha t when code stn1ctures became unreasonable the Court would have said there was no jurisdiction under the N IBA to approve such 9838


• 1 ' a coclc or tlwt th ,,rou_ J couified ''Ll"' n y t in f d :'11 ii <.us try in thL m et.Ullj of th Act. n::t' esidE 1' O lil ode !:-;tructuro r: . ic; e the question whotlPl ere within the mrpo es o f the Act. Coulcl. a coue J> o,. tly covo pe:.'r>ons oyin no l::.:.bor? I t 1 us be"'n tho .;ht not. tlti' is t h . _ r Tr'1.1rpinr Col'l trcctors Code did ( 17). The Ac t says llt:i.'c;.:;Jing p:..."ivil gE's on o s• :Jn ... :qercentC'"'8 of the c .• tch. Somf t:.'R').Jpers en" actua.l e'11nl oyEi. s o f ::' nndo 01 intE'rrno o . i n.te Boti1 th. trnpper s and the lan<.-o n ers end midrJ.lG -won who lease( from the L n d-o -mere. and to the de ';i reo. 1 8 t ages of tl' e catch. C olonel Conklin.!S, the Deput.y Aclministrc:-.tor, f elt thc-. t the lcnd-o\mer s ha0 . the upu . r h L ncl an-1 tha t the t r 8.ppe rs vrer e i n naec . of relief. This he Ci. e t e r mi necJ -to c.i v them throu..:h tbe med . ium of a cocle. At fL'st e l l ti' 1 e :" viser-s incJ.udin.o; the (19), expresse d the o,)inion th-Lt this ,"'rou p cvuld. n o t o)i op e r l y b e g i en a. Cod e . F inally Colo::hO;l Con:;:l in. p r e vc,.iJ e d en(. the Code V'as Fur Tr.::rp 1ing C o n trEJ.ct ors Code instepd of Y u.r .I' .c-.:,mer s Code. ma• ic yrord "contracto rs" with a groun of dU!llmy l abor p r o v L ; iOrif ca!Il:Jufl.::;e d . the situation s o thP.t a carle '.7LS d (20). In such:. s ituD .t ion "court I:li bht b e ex-oected to sat/ .. the:;."c i s no r<:Bsonable rel :tic-n l-..ere ,-ith codes co n templ a t ect in the Act ar:d. t h"' A 6 ministration h -r. no j 'iri';-. d .ictio n to approve such a c od.e . -11en

-cCeach exercising powe r delegated under the Act in a nUt-nber of codes ( 25). In the codes interestinr-:; the l atter the Treesury De part ment b act c. grave interest as t b . e licensin-g agency (26). Then too, the with the v q r ious labor a .gencies was not clearly defined (27 ) . The public utili ties yroposed codes ee. c h involved a r e lationship rri th govG :rnmental a gencies. The Teleg Commu..nications Industry was substantially" rela. ted to the p o wers of the Fecieral Corrrnu:.1ications (28) . T h e Nature . l Ga s Inc,_ustry V''as of interest to the Petroleum Board ( 29). Of more interest and . consid..erable d issention was the Electric Light and Pomrer Industry ({30) • . A lthough NP..A.1 s relations Wel:.e !Jainly' Of the most COrci.i a l nature in 8. Case lik e that last referred to had. NRA ::_)ersiste d in codifying the industry there m ight probably have been presented a jurisdictiona l pro . b lem for the P...n i mportant problem of ultra vire s . is. pres en ted. by code legi slc:>..t ion v:rhich to govern p(;rsons outside of the industry making the code (31). Th ere were many r efinements of this problem. Some codes accompli she the desired result by providing members could not sell to or deal with f1rms engo. ged in certain practices ( 3 2). The effect VIas usually su-ost.:m tial. To remove a source of suppl;y: or a market may be as substantia l in results as legislation in "'ord. s . Th e Legal Division recognized the serious nature o . f this problem (33). Despite this, exP...mples t''ere frequent. It Has generally conceded tha t as to the d..esire. to have a code pro have been representative. The exact tests which should have been aj}plied were in dispute. Of course, a representation of as high a percentag e by e ach test, and of over fifty by all tests '.'TOuld have been d..esirable. Economic data w e . s so sca:rce tha t . it vras possible . to misre:;)resent representation in many inst.:.'nce s either through ignorance or desig11 (34). The problem o . f actua l representative character is certainly one of jurisdictiona.i fact. There was a possibility that the courts rrould_ undertake to determilie. this question themselves if they felt that l'TRA ha.CL found incorrectly . NRA 1 s drive to approve codes may h ave often caused responsible officials to. acce-;:lt. less evidence than would be desirable u pon this problem. Upon the vrhole , hol!"ever, this was one of the points most scrupulously checked by the Adm inistration, particule, r l y the Legal Division. 1 Asicte from the cod.e as a whole another' question presents itself. Was it necessary that the r e b e a m ajority of a ssenters. to each code pro vision? Certainly, a majority of the inci.ustl"J by spme test must be as senters. Die . it me.tter t h a t their a . .:.-sent "0ras gc:l.ined, despite strong and even violent objections to certa i n code provi s io_s? . Cases can be im 2.gined where this Lfli ght have been important. Of course, many of tpe more e::]_')el iencecl i nc". u stry members refused to c:.sfen t until assured of their (35). . This brief survey shows that NP.A 1 s juri sd,ict ion r."as open to mcu1 y questions. The f acts upon '.-rhich jurisdiction vas thought to r est nere not reduced to absolute certainties. I n both these questions of r el')l"esentative character there existed. a rregnant. possibility of judicial check. NRA often avoided. possible d.ifficul ty by refusing to act. questions could not b<=:J avoi ded. . Th e ,ise course and the one usually fol lowed. ,.,as a st1:ic:t requirement that industry groups be as re}Jresentative as j_)Ossible. 9838


_, L CL TEE VI:::: A.'1i istrr>tivc -"':coccou::ce i s :1ot t i: e 1rc c c dn!'C o_._ t>e court!; ( 1). it , , !.' 1 of v::c--..1..-c e of t:1C' a(. L1istrativP tcc:mioue 'Je tro eo. . o :';E'!le! ' P l rules 01 f c<:u1 'Jc e: :1.;ec Froce-'nre is usl.p n Juilt to tlte nec c's of 'l)<),rticulCJ. r field (-2). St.c:>t u t C' PStc .. V<.."'.r y as to t : ! e ,.:"ct' \'{1 c.. r . s e 'c f ort'l t : 1e )T t o be f 0 Sor. e s t a tutes i.:;n .. :C" )!'Oble::1 ( ')); f'-2'.Y 15 ttle; still ou.tlil 'le ;J.'Oce > .. : e 1'<-c i.ei L i tel: r bee n <'. recent te 1 ency to L1clu E:' re0uire:-:1e 1t fo: n; _ _, i ':1 s tc:t.tutes ( ":). If .!O Trocecl.ure i s L e a gency ::12. 7 use ::J.'1Y '')1" o c e0.u r e i t Dresu..1e::: L U'.e -,rocess of 1:'1..' 7 is ( 6). Act contained fe'' refe::'ences to ) r o c eclure ( 7) . r1 . .L'.1.f "'' J ' 'st'er. t -.... --o c ec',, .• e ( q ] ........... . . .. .!. .J .L .... ..L , • 11. cesi --.. ,.,.,ov1 s1' on ( 0 ) "" -; :, • _. J • . J C I . -'--(1)). Ot> .er t :1e Ar:t [l.l1 c : wer e s"'eci "'. 1 i :.s .t:1..e 1S P S S i }. 8 t . T here "!a s C'\. tacode 0rief (ll) ;.rent "'t to -')ojn t on t t ' feat'L, _re of the st.::>.tute. it out t .1..e2e r ;ere no ro for notice, t:1e of evi•-:ence, o f fino ing It r lso P resi 'ent's a'01Jroval :.1e.y oe uttP.::-1' e .:"Ji :-i.'lC' c<=nricioL'.s . A:.; : _fl0 alree.C!y. Sl.lg:?;Psted , is c • juli'cic-..1 ... ulcra vires U'00n L1e ?resi0ej'.t i n all cases, 8 . to c>.ct : .-oul " :-::ot be i::1 t : . 1e su:=:estion (12). -::-.e fc:>ct t:::c-:t i!O ;'n> s statet '. L.1 t > e Act i s not U.:.ll.cor.'. Jon . .sets c.'elec;atL1.; .,o:re:" ('o : -:.ot state H -"'rocer'ure, out allot:1.e c:>d.;iistrr> .tive to set 1.:n its c , -,.:l Of course , wocer' ;_re "') >ue :process of l a fo:t i:.--1(; ivi0uals a.f fec tee' is 1.'.1 t e l;t o iJe 0.eter . . 1 i :ned .by the Court. : .y t : c Cou r t 1 s it is L:<:1t e>.:1 Act s 1ecificnlLJ toes :: o t escc.;;e reouire::::n.ets of F i f t : 1 A:-1.encL1ent . T:1e Sc>ec .ter -.Or--)ora .tion1s 'Jrief con t L'luec l its t > e Act 0 3 ' in-:; t '.ct ..:'e-::' e:c"l.l 1:::<' f e Co::L iss i or. procedure "Jrocid e0. roces s of lc:>'7 ':<:li le L ' e :•rocec _ ure of :;_ecove r;' Act c: h ' .. ( l '..J). :Ter=: l Tr:=tde ".rocef.:,..:::e 11e,;er 'ueen sevE:rely --nestionecl. Z:.ere \as little ::1eed to 0 . s juclici:-1 revie'7 ,"'., s0 r e.c.c'.i17 .:-.v , :ilP.".:Jl e . Still til e Fec:erel T-rade Go.:1Act r[I.S f8.r fro .. 1 <1: 1y full C OLnse l1s ar.:i lJe: ... t :; r oceec; eO. -.;_•)O n t>e fal1. 2 CJ' t:..a t S trc:>. ti ve , '\.1.8 '01.'0Ces S .ms t ue 'by L1e s tc:.tute. It trP nsce:rv:;s stc?b.J.te . r en uire is :"P.c"e 0y Consti t utio:::. It 'Je su J')liec . c " )<'r t from statutory or in it. It mus t in any event be 'uy e _l;,C: .'inistratio. : or L.e courts .. rill offer it n::.e:::. [1 . ' ' E ' O"Jer G:'.se co 1es 'uefo:. e Co:msel "Ll_'•)o. 1 s f'.r.=;i.l.:tent ( 1 5 ) . \V:.'l.ethe r t:1 e c?.r: ; u. .1eTt l'efer::eci. t o t:1e enforcement procedure or the urocedure is 1ot clec:r. it is only i n enforc men t t:1e r e i s a close


L t:. e of to Counsel a:::::ueo. t>r>. t t :p s s ince i t '):.:esc:r i -)e . :r.o con s ti tuti on<.l o:(' -')ro cec"L'.re fo:::. .=, <1, L t : Jet>.or.s of tion , L"l res')ect tot8..l1 y , "if.::'e.zos L:o:.t Tr.?.0e Co.:1Jis sion Ac. t. It is con.ce:'.t::C: t . . e . t t:le 'I':i.'<'"'. e Co:.:c:J.i ss ion Act : ' oes not •):-: oc er' u,:-e -,it>. of exactitude, as s tate Co. :Llerce Co::-u t ssi o:..l Act C1 oes. : c•:e7er, . cqu?J.sel fir. ve:...-_y te -oroccc'' . u.:re este_:)lis-let.' . Jv t '1e TTgo _ e Coo ::1::iss:.o: 1 Act L1 that five i m-'Jart i a l .-r .ere to "ue FJ.: ) .. "J:r L : . e ?resiCl.ent rri L . e aCI.vice of t::...e Sena t e , allcl 'c>e Co;:1 if. it 'Jelieve0 ariy 1Na.s usLl ..... E'n t.mfa .ir o f .co .. :r")etitio!: L;, corT1erce or 2 . ing Je i n t:.1e i")U0l i c in t, ccuJ.c' se::'Ve fc:.Jc:t l co::T0lflint 0:1. T)erson accused fort> L1e T::.e e .int : .mst cont2.i:1 ? . . . notice of t:J.e ;gi v i nc; a c"at . e e .::...: :'}.lace. I'';,e 1erson ., ., J l • ., t t -. .. .L, . c . ' l' servec .:.ac_ c.1e . o r-t.T)lea.:c <111 • . s .. w-, --ly o_;-:11.;n.ss1on -::. t I • ., • t --, .J• • --. • .,.-.L.., no e:c.t;.er a c e ase 8 .112 c e s 1 s CL:tor.y r!OI.S reoulre(, :-nus tJ oe re:::.uce0. co Pri ting . c;,s iOYl "'P.$ r 'ec•i.1iTeO to .' Je .1:e Of fc.Ct. i t i s t o be re:temberc0. P.r.'.O'YCeC . ail t l'liS "Jrocefure SieCifice .lJ.-_; ' .-ri its own c>. s n.--j t.o i tsP-l'f or ? l ;roce of i n junctii...o?l •"\:-oceec,iY:::;s t , . : e Courts. is force to t1 e suggestion that Cor:1:.1issiO::l "Jl ace:i no COl'fl"}Ulsion to force to its t.mtil -rra. s <"CT")iicatior:. to tl:e to enforce its or0e:"s. In ?.A , :.1Rno, a novell;3.r<'.ssrjent i:1 t:1e fozoi:t o f c or:mlinnce uroceedin.::;s wc:.s i!l -,logue ( 1 6). '""ve:n if Drocer:l..,.re 1 ,7-::.s . h9 . d it coul0. 'Jee:1 c,ecJ.c>.rec l . 1Jac1. , still e . s ;:ooC:. corie-nE'.:.:in c ::-.ssu..::1inc t:,nt it ... 1et due "lrocess of l aw ... . . . 1 nro .cec:twal ideC!. :)e fm.uc; il1 rq_A wa . s . t a l1enr. all teres,teo. ( 1'7) • lJ:Q.A a . s 11;-:. forum 'of C0!.1trover si•11 i.t . vras fun1.ish a i:te8ns 11t . o c;e t t:1e ( 1 8). T > e intel1tion of the ?re-sic.ent u2. s to afford a hea:rin7, ( 1 9). This ':'as L1 t:ie atti of t:.1e A d .1:1inistra.tor (20). Despite t:" i s 1 .cre see':-.1 :ru offi cials C'. ici not feel the usual Llnlicq.tions of 0 s tatutory ::earing re11eed b e followec"t. ( 21). Statute' s ) r ov,:::; _foT :1enri_ngs ?.re cons true0: to mean t:1.:d; there i s a -.;ri vi le:;:;e to i n troCl:_t.1..ce. an0. ,....._ duty t ' o in. t.\ t:1e evir l .ence . ( 2:). F i se course if tile e.iigencies allowed : it to 1roviCl. e t:J.c noss_i,;le Courts 'wefe,r a (23) .:mel it i s t : 1e ga--. 1ut of juciicial tl12t e .dininistrative action :Just not fact-finc. i r ::: L1e first ststec. tm.1chstone to <1e.t a n :1ee.ring was desi gneci . t o oe I n tl:..r : t o:1e be :1ec !'G. nrocec'ure J)rovio. e0 . a reou.est t o .l.?.cie ) rior to :1earinG ,-, ,j_ t:1 a s t ate; 1en t 2 . s to oers.on's i":t"l testif-rj_:ng , t:lat .. is, t:"1e deletion , amenct '.1e::.1t, adcl.i tion to or SU' }'')Ort of El lJroposed 1)rovision (25) • . I n ness to i ?.A it "Je t .l1ere was a l :1os t ad:: .eience to :L:!.e rcquireincnt tl1at o:r.e de.siring 'to "ue a witne,Ps L1 a vc;.:c1ce to a0ueo.r. NRA presidint; officers freely e'-e .,riviler,e of testifyin-; to e.nj' person recuesting . to c?.p-")ear e ither ii1P.ediat'ely before or c.-ciTing c:1.. Ot:Jc:c t>--:1 t":.e ic .state. nci1ts U7)0D cotroversy little E=Uide is offerec3 Jy .""?..A' as to t-:.;.e c :1aracts r its '! to take. were ElYnarel1tly not -even consi c erec1. L:1:oort ant as 11e . c;ooCI ty story " ( 26). . Later, X:R.A expressed 9 . s J.igl:tly .:1ore of


. -' t ' ' ' 1 ( ) '". ) . n t Llo : ccec 1 r8 o u use. c 'YUJ 1c c r v <'!. ::c -•!'e offi c rs t o s e;: 11t -L.ic. i t , :cr.r. i":ro . 1 t . u o "'OnC' .ts .. , 0 )J n_ts o f _ ,,1ecific ')ro rir.i r.s (,f t:1 e . o )o.::e d co<' for LH' .:.r1ose o. ' Cl.t ttc 1 ty, t o r 'lEmt f sue "'ovj r 1 0s 11 ( T.1i s st.:Jt e i::1'i .tcn t .C' t .. o 1 tro.r crsy 1<• . . cr'J, <' , -rnr m:.-nL:c'"'t C .:'t o.:ficc:r :n. : t t o . cn;, '.1' :'ct ::'-S :.: : .c .L! r r ..... JE=' r S1l:>icc.t t o f :cevie--11 • . ?t:r>.I,DS c , : .. 1 1 . 1"'t-Lru 0j' controvr..rry co ,.,.,..,,-,_c1'eC t . . ".t OJ. fico. c , ,_<' )f : 1 cre 1 i('\c1 e-'c:-.. ,(. Cet.' i 1 -l v , C.; •v:1c1 r>cti:1-:; r , , a " '['. :.:'1 '\C''t/ 0ftcj_1 nl:'.esti o i e-c ( .:"') . ny n r."'. i.•'i-: :ot o ' ,.nell ? . :-sis. A.1 i o f_ic i:"l..l _,rs ,1ot_ , , n ,w ..,,;_: 1 ( s seTi . s o f t,-t. cle 1. ;_. tr;rest e ; ":1:>..rtie, s o :lC'ti-. •r.., cort:-i.:!"r'•: J J.c l e -gr->l ;, st.t' . t i s tir..\1 '1es 1tt::., .'J-:')Ol'tr< ' )'/ t:i-1-> e.ce--) t " e :'lti::'le;,t .:.:s t :t t 1 e: . t . . • i l (:1'). O i ' t , .,j_. L 1 , / e r>'..' P tt: "".Ti .-.. -"' c: ) 8 :.' : c e .-1Ci.""l t J.' f m.tnc' • • o=:.. t 1e. -,ye s i , ' i.1 " office-:: l .tP.,__c lO :'tt f:'.l ' l t to facts , i+ r•'.:d.t e t:.e . t t:H:-: c ec:o r c ol, _ l ( .,)?... : " . s t . c " --) : tj_c-,_:t sio. 1 . J c tr--.1e t.o .fl. o:::' n':co 1 e v c : 1 r:-1e :'_'ii'C : 1 f:1.ll rein s0 ('l.'. estion. c:v.s e-r .c .... ".O i:t f o.:.!rtiol ::1-: t':'> t ' o LJ -t 1 1 s ,?st. -,rc=tc' s o r t > e , , . i 1.-:; o f ':.>e >rov i s 5. ns :r".:re <.: : Y•ear e d ton, o : : t > e " .. ."l'J :_ -.lJcicc:. n1.ive c s tc :1.e ;;: 1 n . . 1 e.s , .. : c':. to v oice L ! :w arL:.;f: l :,. e o ")j e -:::ti0i 1 8 , . ,c,.l;'0c c onc;i f .e : : e :n : :J u.ttGrs 11i_o--Ll= m : . t11 L 1 L Je 'l'> e t 1 :;et. c o 0es 'i1B S i r D-;.1.c e .. P:1t , t o ofi' ice::., s o L o t c : n t ;.o V':' rs ..'' . xi; a;r 8 t . 11:_ r-:n t _r-:.: e. s ;'. ; : :T r: 18 n c . : c i::tc. s Jere ::o: t e ; 1 O\.: . • J" . :-t s j_('> ::."e.' i _ , e --te. _.-' o S f" :'V 8 to i 1 l.l.R t ."'t _..8 . 1 '"\e -.->.cc . . P::: C l t ire of one ex.cL ... _c-;j_ .;e o'!: .. cti o:::. o f c o.e C P'1 b e T81)roc'ucec' O l ' les s t-. l c . :"l-onr. ; i"'tet' 1)-''-" e ( ':;? \ :;:----r o "'","' --_,,.,) e-l' o-t , ,e .,.. I : " . 1 • • .... "-.J e -.--t..• '-...,; C.: • 1...--... . . 1 -..J-•.L ,..._ , • .L. J. • '.l t :1e c.-se o f oY'o L1r"n:trir.s , ,c:.r 8 c.-:.'t e::-1 ( •".l.i.t e l on:; c o 1')8.:.'<:-.t ivel y . ex--"': e s s ec.-esiye t o d,,, , .re !1 0 01, o -,i:lio:n e.t 1 e :1<.-. 17fest o :f c'istLl_...-U.i!'; ; _ : L . . -Jet v •ree::1 f-:t c t ;; , _r' 01 , o r 0f. fc1.c t tP-: u J e!, t o f -c--i .L. C:esLe . ' _ F :.e 0est r:-le:=J. n s of feet o _ ;j_;1io: n l..i F s L1 t : :c: :. .. 1lcs of c;v ir'ence ( r : ).:,n_) . I-t i s _... _ o -.. t,)tr:;c' i' :ten. n s rr:soTte-"' to i::1 S o -;;-;_-"C" r n l e t:1o. t t:1 ere n 0 o : tes ti:10n.o:f -.. c l , ; to A'; : : i n:.stTa L.steE' , it r0. s su":J2ect to ... ,_siJ 1):_! office; s ! -::'>. e '\..l.Si..1.<'' . l r:: s t.o , _,_llo: : a •:i co. n s .i 1c.c> e.s . ..,.i s-.'l.Gt' t [ , : ' t t '.;:::. t ca:Je ill >.e:j _ , n ' -'l • .. r.-o '"' l c r,..,..,.. i <' + :-o "'U -. . ). '--\J J. .L ("":i •• .... , u I.' _. ::1er.t 0 l ' o :i.:tli :;n i"T.'"l..S <>. .. ( i s t .--.ste .. cul J i t of ( ' 3 6). (, . E're ot:le' r a r ---:u:.ents f a . c.iff'er eil t : c u l e ir. ti 0::1 to t:l. e of • J'Y .... _-. .>-.. "ln,_on-'-t ' f t , . c '-' • 'c: -'-,... , V ' -L..8S l T l OTly l S 0 e n


neces s< rv to 6 i ssnes i:-: c o f tr.:--J'e c-.::1r' ':':e or i:.1 r..;;se?:lce of t o t.:1e:'< coloT I f is il: courts ... it no-..1lc'. se2 .. _ 1 t:-:.r .. t it .Je ::::_fo-rtiori in .. .1i nistrc,tive 10se to Je . .1ore l a :: L1 L 1ei r ren ui rer:te n t s a s t o tile ;:-/'_ .1i s s i ')i l i t y of evi( e::1ce . It s J.--:-Gester : t-lC'. t it i s ( . 8 . nc;erm,_ s to o')i:'li.: : m (,..7) . :,-_t -<-8:: 01Jinion 1es t>e clne to trv. e situ..<:J.tion i:fl. i:': t"ustr_r it inust Je .C'.Cc e,) tec'\ i f t : 1 e:: e i s to E E17 0-::.sis for Arc;:1r1eDt a s t o to J e nt inon t l!.e fc>.cts 2.:10. co:1 to "Je c ' . ra,• rn '70Ul 0 . see--. 1 to b'3 c-\ n .:-ic: to "'JTesiri: g office:cs. Sel Cl. o .:1 "!e: : e :!resichng o f f icers so i n t hl? r '"' i ru in"'ustry LlP . t E'. or'.re o f s t.e. tisticP.. l L 1l: sL-.•)le fncts suffice to o.fforc a wo 1 e r b0.s i s fL1ciL1:..,s . Ar_;u . -.ent of L . e te::"s to Jl.o t:1e c r i ticFl. l issues . 7.':.ey • :::oL. . l ( ! seE':.1 )c.o f u l 2} Jitio:.l to<'' l i n troO.uctio:,.1 of fP.cts. e2.e too , t-1 e co.:r:1o n -w;-., c tl.ce -r.-.s 8llo,-r t.o,,-i1 c:... V c .. . c ... l0 . L.1. .!.l .... \...J.. .. .: _J. lt--... _ '!...' _ sr .J - • • \J --tion ;Jet '''een -sta t L1:. facts sLnle f!'.cts L1to of fact i s s o su1 Jtle tl:La t . W8.v lost " t 0 nost officer s . A hec?. r i n g i n 11fue sense i s usually to inclnJe SJ. c h rec>.so:1nole a rc;:u.: 1en t of fe. cts as i s c:n 'Jc>. r t ;: to 00L1t out ')Osition (08). T h i s i s t::cue even L1 Ll.c :::estricted "Y)roc e r ' u r e o: c usto ::1s ( 39). -'lJ.ere i n teyests o1 :!eF of econo::d . c s il-;nif i canc e n :rs i:nvo lve0 it see:.1s oesil"?. ) 1 to allovr e. full 8.Y6L.l.:1en t o f t :1e :f2cts. I t c:o ,:nle.tes t>e i::1te::esteC'. 1.::.::t ies 1 privilege of 1Jeing i1eard. It also 0irection to :"ash\.in:; o f ficer. Arc;1."E.1ent as t o lpyr r-. . :lor e f.ifficul t ou,es t ion. A.c".Jii.:is trative ct:;:encies i n ;"ecisions ;mst C'il eye to rlecisions of courts i n t:!e fie l J of i t s activi t ies. a statute uses such terns as 11fe.i r ')r actice ,11 11lli1fnir c o neti tive 'ir-':tct ices,11 ,;,n r , 11interstate o_ forei:.:;;n GOiT.1erce11 i t c.;\ : 1 be e::--;,ec t e '' ouestions of l aw no.1.l r . D . rise . A r cunent o f counsel 0uesttons -)e >.e l')ful to t>.e Ad:1inist :t2.tion. It furt:.1er i n ( :'ic2 . t e t c t:".:.e cmJ.r t s t:1e Ac1:1inis tration '.72. 8 2 . ' o f the <'::.1'' :1\c"' t"le::l es:;ecislly the c!icision i:1volver in tL1G st,'J.te of ele l aw . ' T':A for"Ja'.e le.-;2.1 .?vl"GU.".1e:1t (<.1 /)). It nui te closely to i t s rule. or 1'!2. s e v i0ence U l)On le:;al '10int s sollht or we lco : 1ed ( • Lit t l e cn.n i J e see: ollov;L: g e. t:-.. e ti::te consu.:1e0. Positive nee3. E1T (:"LL::1ent of facts is evident. Argu:.1ent o f 18-"' noulc1 ica t e to t : e cc r::'ts Q cl.esire to u e a "Jso lutel y f air e .nd to -")roceeC: U:Do n a fully ren.F >oned ;."'. r s U:-:lent U"'JOn the f c .(:ts refused t o t .is i n its stated. --rocec'ure. It ou1c1 s ee1 : 1 tac;eous t o :1ave :nacl.e s ta tec'l 'Jroce' :ure c ti ced accorc ' . . r e:(SU.HSi V e reasons e x i S tecl ,-r:::r t Of l<'l\"T and. i n tion o f , ;ertinent eviC:.enc e oeen encou:cageo-. S:1ouJ.CJ. tho <:rivile "'e o f C l'OSS-eX<:-.1i :eF:..tion ee C:".fforcl.ed. o y T : 1e ste . tec, :i:IRA refuseC • 1a.::cties suc:1 "":lrivileg e (45). All :'leccs sary i t '"8.s coul( 0e u t "Jy tl1 e Dresil1_inc; officer or :1is advise:-s. Cross-eY. [:,,:1ination is s R i d to. oe essential of -2. f a i r -;;' __ :linistre .tive () . ;")rooaoly ;:1ore true 1<1ere e1 stc? . -98TJ


-CJ. . ('" -ri ' ' . ... ! , : . . . . 1 ' J .. .. • • . c ., " . :::.tic .. , C" O.., -.. li.1 LiOrl ' C E". f' ' ') :."1 "" c 0";.-rin a t101. )t. c,l, o COL'..l'c;"', '' ,..,,t,) : '.'1-e!";> ".Jl' "le. rJ.' pl e::-•i!l ; . ,l'e L .. c 'i;; , of i t>l' :1ust c ':c:ci.e ct:io. : l i i c i t se ''if'S l'c1 sa. ( ) • "'t<> ns!' i, sue> ...... :oy_•if'te •lcccs 's r"r:. e c . cr•:-L.:; f 1 ( co . e i . f : ct , " c ontest 'Jct"•""o :: li. i i t 1 1 m..1. f "":;,. t i . u--: 1 r '.s , oc; -.o,J .. i ; .l -:e-::-. i:['-.)le. _ e l . t e L l . Jro o l c::< s c'O'..' . . c' i . . t C::J (-'.!:i) t i ?.l -:C'10)ts. o.:-f i i L st!tcr: , s :10i to oc "".1-lo--c,. . -: e :' t lc:-. :i.t y :;_--1 C 1 1 .:. c. __ -;,_ C TUJ.t:-o :.:..s t G '0 • AJ .. !ost :. " : o 1 o sc.: c o e ")":." O 'isio; l t.: P 1TC' nn ents -:e:-e. t o e .'-' .:1 E"'1r: . V• 1e:1t to , . c:..iti " i n :cte J : ' or..,o .' f:o.:. f loo:.. o: ; : s. eJ,.ltt. 1 r.:-o. s '-:.ot li .. i t e. ' tJO >l'O . o:1e 1ts. ::t. .. rcsi..;-Ll.; ' o r:fice so los t co t rol c . e . ..,ri:n : s ;: cros:=-i i :re o1 r-tc.te. : :c;n t s e . r ;'\'.::<:".t s :--n." or •;.1ts en s .le ..... _ _ c.1 :>f , t:.l: 'l"S i n co .. n. c " , t 8:Lr, of (17 o , h ' su-::-:_.e"'t 0"' r:_r:>r'nr;-l.)le. :'.e o:f " rOc8 n r c o f--:,_ i r l :.ot : 1:"'Ve e : 1ti: eJ. i :;} . t of -, lc:.c e . (l.i';:o ::. CO"c' . l.c c : "ll"l o;--)o ne:tt!'; ; c e:1 C' lo i1_ ro)c:'l,mt s . :::.i s .. l:ve J -::< l:i.1it e ' t'J i , -.:co--v)s"'ls o:r t o L l.e c o c 1e "ro •o!?.:l E'.s -: ,o l e . A .',> ,ru " !' 8 ' ' i t , . ._ . . ::t :.'..:.1co: t::or. f o r t o t.o ' : .sec' • .... lC' 1 --1 V"''l le' 8 ' o _. . J . ' , eJ . , 0'1 " " 0"'P.' • -.. _ l _,. ..... \ ., _ _ ....;-_ ,J.. J __ , -........ l , , .. \o.. ( • .,. u ..!-t... ...... t J , ... l_._ v t.:1ey 8 r e i:1 i > c t [:ive: 'l c-: : e c o )-Ortu;;,it::.r r->. l . o : 1 it : a c ::P . n c e t o s t P .te t:lC s c : 0f t e i ::-c : se. I t --oul.:' )e 1.m f ...... i r : 1 o t t o Cl.l1o r • . ?.A IL' :"'e < ' . :: " .1 . r.;t.::-t r . :c:-:1t " t it. E'VfT C1C t E i:'l ".r0 t o cor ' . c --,r•)' o s l:-: 1.r ; o r . ovi ."ence :o t 't. rt It i s crnite ..... _-jle t Te.l:i. " :J.Ce . . , . -s 1l.<•c o i-_. . Ll;-: l o:E: Cf'. S G 'l'..")Cn 1 1 :oY1. e :1 ""rese:" '"l . f,.-l J.-... t o .. " , re r l [.s i s L 8 z-ec o r c ' f O l ' ::. c -t; o , ic +""' "''lJ;,..,. ; . o.P !:.-.r-.+ ,"'. , "',.t-=1C 8 (.-'.r..)\ .. ,.,•e'-....... -v ,.I... --v l...,r.v .. , v . J • .l\J\J""'-.!.. J c.:.. ..C J • "'. _1 . .._.. _ _ • ... l _,_ -,_,_., o:; < . 11co!1f i .'c1t iC1.l .ry c-:1 OT f r o ::t c;. s e c r e t --i t:1'?ss e i s o . 'J l'O ' Je:::. . :.cCJ.rint; J,,,s Jee:1 ac--o e 1 .... { e , eQ . .--!1, .. .,..,rn;JlC" : r "'s -.-re .o.J. V V • JC. . .L. • . • • 1;"0 '-" ; _ _ .._ _, .L C.lo ..J 'C"".;. _ . C ,... J _ to c o1.1rts L1 .. s f0 : to't'.S o f G ovel",:.] ei1t v. A r:'..ic'.:e _ (<', 7) . ... 01.'.S C o f Lo l r ' s (.' e c L , e 6 t'.:."'t ,.,ro. s YJ.O ri_;:1t t o see in : )ecto::--'s :..'e'::o rt, it n e<:-...te ( 9. CRnt e::c }.:r. "n:;lis> : [ . c .. :ti 1 ist:-ative lc;:; (::/3 ) . ::.'ec o f t: . l e Co.:1.. 1 it.te e or. r eco,:n e :'le..: t > , t 'G.1e "lC'..Ctices of c o n f i ( e 1ti" l z-c y O l"t s ,.,.o-... ceTt::-:..: :lr sef:.'1 t::;,e r n l e t:.1c o : 1c to os u.:..1less of ')UJlic i:r: terve:::'l. e6 . • T:'l.e 7-ec' S tc?.tes c 2 .ses L :r l icll..t e t::P . t t ."e of t.: e Arl i (., -:e c a s e is :..1ot la i:: (.:JJ ) . It C < .. .Je s e e.1 .LP . i l u r e to i ntro c-. L1t o t > e e v L ence ::12-:y ,..,, ,c..rty Li. o .f 8 V -• :"' • :'1 .., t., ., . . .... !• . , I + .1. J..., l. lu.c:1ce 1 s cesll"eo . e.c ,:-:i.L11 l,r a \,lV e J O[':::-:' . . v :-:1ay Je t .. :.e.v :...: e T e 1 orv ' 1"' '1 0 t . l 8 81'i c "'.re!"'' 'll ) _ y r . " .rp . rn J . ',"' .t.. 1 . . c e ,., .t.. • , e 1. e C' . t 'lll . c 'r C' .. -J , • c . 1.. -• • t L. v 1. , _.._ u . } l.. . ' J .1. I J "' l . t --• J (1 .... -l y f act ( 51). :uc:'l S D .. '8 l ine of a r_;u;:J.ent "l0l ( 1 . s f o:--c . e 9 833


fc:ilL'.r8 to -")lace all test i rny o f --1 e :teco:tr of t>.e i s o :I"10l'tt.:c..1i t J t o r>..':c F,.. ec:.fic n:::>tice of to l;e c;o!" . is }_r_ s: : i:1'.' _1\ co.l0 . le.c en . it. sel f t e c1e?.:r i:-J ::e::,,:\ : : " to secnet :itller;f8S ;.-..nC. l ' e"1orts if it-'.[s tc-. tec' : _ :it reJ eviC. . e nce e::r.cent, of course, < •.e:1 :ti .. -'_ec::ee. _;o --;or' e r o f : ::;iven J:/ Act. t:1 a t ??.A itself :rit .. 1ess e s d esirL1,:; to testify. Fe:3e r?.l (3'2:) and t :1e T 2:ciff co-.ITi.ssion ( '55 ) ::ave oer of sub;oe::le . • A s President cc:1.l l -(1.iJOn c o .. t.Ji ss ions to -t.lS e r 1Jl'Oc e 'llli es ( 56 ) sl..1b. ;oen<' . 1.7<'. s -)? Act e 1 not :;i ven to The courts :1-ave r e l u.cta:--:. t t o _3ivc ac'1.1inistre.tive ".Jm ies too great o f tl:i s One P.7;rove -T Lwolves an i sSUc".nce of a " o:r n .Ci.ministrn.tive l Jocy. If c>e : Ja:d.y it is tekes n o boC.y c a n a )ly to the courts to co:nel co;_t ,liP . nce r'it:1 L'.e (57). 'l':1e t}leory i s t'lE'.t L 1 e trative OOC. y Can not i t seJ. f ;;unis : . : 11011-COLT;liance •:rit:l its :orocess as t:1i s c' erive an inc1 i vich1.c'J.l of l . 7 i a trial. _ :o .:tore tria l is 11.0., hm-rev er, o.. co.,_,_:: t runishes a -ryerson :for :refusal to o bey its ;J:ocess. T!1e Trace Co . .i : issiOi.l ( 5 7C>) a '):; l y , a?J. .e 0 i scretion to refuse to act were nu:-:1erou s oc c<:1sions in l"'3.A t:1e oower to sub1Joen2.. 1 7 i records ,,rould have of cons i d era".Jl e v alue. Persons a"1:oea::-in c ; "'oefore :iE?A were ;fran}: to unusuc-.. 1 'l1-'1ere yrere ti::-tes when suc:.l fr<:1. nJ..mess would been in ;;reference to testi fyin,;; it often 'l.'!cc S t:, o uc;h t to sEt;l Ol' to f ail to p-;;;eetr In sue>. C(1Ses, es1')ec i all:r .. A . w a s inoui1ni::.-, into i n whic:!:; code had lJeer. ac L'linistered , t:1e su: T')oenc. been .:=t useful A s an 2 . 1 terna ti ve to t:-1e of •:ri tnesses tl1e inves ti of b ool::s ['.:.15 reco::;_-r1s !:ta y oe Tesorted to in 0n atterrrot to build a factua l b2.sis fo:c e.ction. TJ. 1 i s 11o•:er of investit;at ion is consi0.ered le c;i s lati ve ,r:le:ce facts are reorteC:. t o Con g ress, but vr=:-..ere t.1 e facts n . for aO.r:1inistrPtive 2.ction ;:1i::;ht not so treated. fis:lin e::pec.i tions affair s of a strmGer for c '1ance t:12. t c1iscre0.i tc.:"Jl e UlJ 1111,iforw l ,r ( 60). As Con gress c a n not lJUni con cer:nt if its inves ti,;a tio-:1. is not le;3islative ( 61) lilo:ewise G -enera l inouis.itorial i n t.1e :1ands of an n istrative "body severely froT'med U"10l1 (62). T:1e courts exressec1 (.;r ave Cloubts ( Con::_>:Tess) could. deleGate "JOi"ler (to on inquiries) i f it 1;ossesseP. i t -11 (63). .?.A }lac1. :.10 1)0\"Ter to connel testi::10l1Ji in 8 ,Jsence of' e:-..:;ress statutory ( 6c ) it exerciseo. a n analo; ons . il'l reo.uirinc: L)F . t certain ar1 o records oe k e ,) t a.n0 re1Jo:r t s . ua0. e 'to it ( 65). infor!:la tion c ouL} .)e Teoui red as a condition to A.D•;roval, and t :le necessity to ':Jeri of' ically $U1;nl y infor!:1a tion was ex-presslJ s2.ncti oned by s ta tutor: ua:se ( 66) . This d i c l . not :-:1ea:.1 infonJation need not ".Je ju .iciousl y llan'Ues. : .::1.n;y codes r ecoGni z Llis reoui red tha t inforr.1a t ion oe (67).


.,.., '(-N::tA did not req1.1.lre , .,i tnosses to < n oo.t h . nc ... tho r dlc.l th A c t in the administration of that Act an o.:lth ras required ( 6 8). The oath is not tl ought to no11 hav e th d issuasive "T)Orer it did to prevent perjur y . D s1:>it tti, it hn. boon StH!,c;ested that the courts. may r oquiru i t in procee d i1gs.if one _:trt y demand it ( 69). A d :1inistering an oath no oner to puni s h perjury i s quit e barren. } 'ost nitnGsses Yrere u s ually frank in t ostifyinr. Thei r canC::.or often ap.)roach d tl;le 1>oint of sel f i n cri.mination. Occasi naJ ly i f a "'oint coul d be gained a ni tn ss might to leav e an impression not in a c co rdanc e rri th the facts . }!.,o r these situations. a s t a t 1tory requiremen t that n i tnesseo t e s tify L.mo_r.::r o a t h and a . , s t atutory prov L sion for !-'uni shin sho uld h.c'Wo been welcomGd cle .vtces. It ' m i h t b e s a i d th3.t S'\lCh D r O Vi sions WOUld ha. v e defeat eo. the COO'Oerativo --spiti t NRA sought t o creat e . o st honest r1i tn8 soes mit:>ht, h owev er, have pref e rred t his l)rot ectio n frorl those less scrupulous tha t they. question r a ised i n c o n11ection ,i,i t h hearings i s t;1a.t o f the use o f 1v.r i tte n briefs. Does due process of la:w requ i r e oral h e aring s? Whe n the _problem has been the a;,1sw e r has u sually bc.en,no (70). Th e proble m ar se i n t':7o s irj. :.m A. A officsr des iring tc;> save tioe , the r e c o r d f ree from con t rovo rsy or for other reasons, oight ask a \7itness to :;ru t his t estino n;{ i n the form of a brie f (71). Just ' That consideration ras give n thes e briefs can !l Ot b e It :9robably varie d considerably . \Ther e n o • : ra s given, it was likely that litt l e r.1or e accorcled to the huaning itso:J..f. To ma.1y :9r esi .. inc office r s the r e corp_ nas not i 1 n-yortan t. The cior:1inant considerat ion l!as What p r ovisions c erta,in persons ' :;oulcl a gree to. The 'Pro olem of ora l hEaring could arise 1'7her e it ' . 'as sought to ar . 1 end a code by "notice of o pportunit;r to b e h 0 a rc1." h e r e s e t up a t est of "likelihood that a mcbstantial minority or gro u,J ' : rill object --" (72). t est that is sugg(sted fron cur of broad r ovie;., i s the substantial u pon property 11hat the :.orop o s e d rego.lation night }:j.ave had. A nore comprehensive t est ':!as state d by t h e Legal Division for the guidance of its staff (73 ). It see ms to.oore n early the a ttitude the co urts wou l d J?robably a d o pt. Tho use of the d evice of to b e h eard" r este d u pon the feeling tha t it is an afu.1in istrative impossibility to give a h earinr>; u:_oon e v ery :pro:9osal or to d o all acts in r.1eettng n (74). D e s pite thes e s ound considerations full oral p r esentation is u sual\'/ f elt to b e mor e clearly a ' , . guarante e of d u e p-roce s s -of la'.7. If t h e subject natter i s irrmortent a h e?-rint; .rill b e If the subject matte r is n o t so it ':'!Ol_ ,_ld seen t hat the t e r co n lCl . . 1ai t the n ext hearing •aould be held. This dileEr1a s t h[\.t the device :probably shou l d .. have been more limited tn its a J;nlication, that is to such uatters ,..rithout considerations of policy involve d to ',...,hich all i n t e r este d parties c o uld r eadily a;gree. . ' C ertain short coming s h a v e b e o n Cli scove r e d in tl1e h earing s afforded. Possible im!rovements have been discussed. Such a vie:: of h e2 .rings as has been had is d esigne d to the formal guar antee s tha t s h o uld have been e:;;:t ended to interested partie s to have insure d that t h e y be fully 9 838


; 62-I X The basis for the d e t e r mination i s of the utunst importance . It involves _;Jri: 1 e .:cilJ' q1.:.estio:1 s of .=.dmi s s i .bili t y of E.vic ence, t o be :;iven evi denc e , the r e cor(l mac t e , &nc, the which m a y _:_)roperly be m-s:c't. e . Stuclents of ::

111' 01 th ,,i,1<. U L ct' Ct!', ec:. Ill'. n i.n th l;Q!lL'lJCt of t '1el r C.!'ily Dl'C... : •. ore i :-tJOl'i nt Ifnirs. 11 It 11s,101,lt uc r c"ivcd 1c .... .er c'.; it '1') lc' 0c 1 'rlJ (.onr11 (L:). Tn :i.!; th .... L 'YU!' 't. ., .f • 'lt l (' t C i L 1 l. J1 !.i ( 'L?) • If d 1 i v r l .' S 1' i. ' r l ll !;i.;L:•i to 1' Ct.i\e '!' '•" -,t l n:;L r1ot "_l[ 11'. suoj"ct it. t o t.1c t st;1 .of crnss-v"' .. inLJtiun (18 ) l::.' t:10 _; be ::mo.:;t'"lti< 1. lhV tc sti1m ..... ofl.'e1 c, <. t :H tinrf \)!I 'l'Ot.'..!'' it. "s rs . . l')on s b,; .. tl re "'LLg c rtuiiO'J ]'J' in !:'CLeJtin: '>.lCh tcGtinon nltho1.:..-::;h an a 1atter i t c o .. ll{ Jiou;•bl u .JC Ce• te(, 1're Jy. T>te c rj_ lenc c11 r'.lle, 1 o t ::et:. to iJ a lT.le t o strictl.,l <'),,lied. y , it W1f', not fol'Jo":e!). b;y Tl1ere se'113 little .. :ec>.:;nn "L,/ it o J.c• be' u n. G s s u 1,s t ;)ntir.lJ ":7cr.; i lvolvet1 <•nd i t h, s:l.; v:l thP t fPib . .tr t o adJ"ere to n1l c t,}c _o::;ition o f an )o1ty .;;s and l e tters could f'lsc o e freely , cceptect 0,uojcct t n the G li1ai t ations. TRA made frt'e use of s11.Ch evit'.ence. T :;e ln ' i)sence of ob.jection (19) seems I 1 t eres t ecl 11t' rti e s sometimes r;i s a i n conrts t h e :f; ct tktC'l t eviCen c e \as improperly i tte6.. One course t o oll PY t J1e ;":Jossibili of such action chollenging NRA m i h , v e been t o hPve .9l lo":ed the tekin-?: of cYce_. tions to the r•u ,lssi ;)i l i t y o f TJ1e o n these could heve been l?ter b y a SlJecial boar d o f quFtlified. uersons.. v"oul c h :>v e inclic,,ted t o t h e courts thF1t 'Jas 21c u t e l y a C'!r e o f t':e J)l'oblern of <:.vic ence a nc: l1act r::.esire t o {'-t;yone 'uy evic e;ce t o which p roper objectio n had oeen Obj ection, probebJ.y , \>VEJ.s not i n :!RA b e caYtse of tte greet inform2ltty tLRt prevailed. As we s n[lll see ."RA oft e n actect w i tho1 ... t ;::".y ;::-Y1.Jc:>rE'nt factual basi s ( 2C) . was oriefs n e v e r i n L:e ::cec o rC:, L1formal confeie11CEOS: e n C c.:onversc-.tions. Assum ing that t11er e " ;e!'e few Ccses of bac. c-)Ction b;)" :re s e officia .ls there 72.S often li ttJ.e evil ence .:Jvaileble for a cod.rt to cet e r1:1ine tl:le ::o.equecy of the:. f cctl.' basis or r ec:so n a o leness o f the ection. conferences ( 21) r-m-;. confere11Ccs (2?.) were a r e;L1.ler p2:;, t o f r?.A p r . It i s rernc>rkF1bl e .<1sny ill-re<'1.sonecl ano. tic r:rO•JOSEl S '.'er e cu.t 01 , 1. t by these c o: .. fcre:nces . Often, these c onferences erve& as a bc:sis of ( 2:) o r justifice:.tio11 f o r ? r ovi::; ions .-:hi cl J o n t.LlE'ii' fac e : m i ;:1-:t n o t , _))ear to be fully in the ,_Ju. b l i c intere.:;t. In suc:r1 instcnces ;;:he r e subr: tc:'ntial action rested D.Jon confe1ence a . r"eor c should ha1:e b ee:1 leApt . Another anRlogous p r e .ctice was the 11n:ff t l1e record11 C.isC1 i ons. These discussions often conteinet'i. freilk and valuable evic.lence m i ght have :?_;one far to sustain o r even d e t c rrninetions. By f ailing t o i nclucle t his rac:;terif l in the r e c o r d it :n o b a bl;y los t its evic.entiary v a l ue, no matter how )ersuasive it mL;ht :il<.We been l.l?)Ol1 the administr a tor. There been stE,tements tha t ad:ninistrative actio n n ee6 not rest upon the evi in tlie r ecord ( 24). an oc casi o:n. a l c a ma y be fo'J.nd in field.s other than those; <-'Ction i n the exercise o f the police ;_)ower ( 25). In fi eld.s relate d to (as int e r state corrm1erce re,:;J.lation) a s well eS others ( 26) it has bee n hel d the t administrative action rrru.s t have a s in the r e c ord ( 27). The require-ment is s impl e . It is intend.ecl to give notice t o the parties 8:1.<1 afford 9838


. 7 0 a basis U }On vvhich a co1.ut revie ' : -'in_; the case may act (28); The case of U'l S. v. A bilene t . Southern .!:1.;/ (29) s i;,ov1s tl1e court• s atti tud.e. The question j _nvolvec: ' . v e s t h e 1Jro_Hiety of q;rtc;_ i n a n :.1uel reports in the hc:nrJ.s of the Intcr3t e t e Cor_Tt'iission referred. to. by the examiner a t the e.s " no do,..J_bt it will oe neccssC::ry to refer to the annu8.l reports of all the cc;_rriers11 ( 30). The Comuission conte n thet was notice to t!1e .:_,J,s.rtie s unc)_er its R ules of Practice t:hen in forc e ( prior t o J Jecember 10, 1 923). These rules provicLe d that o f all )11ateriol o t l 'er t hr: t on fil e \'1i th t h e Comrni ssion must be offeree::. into the reco r d . f ; i a t eric:l on file could be used if specifically referred t c . After referring to the these were adversa . r y pro ceEoin in s ubs t el1Ce • . Justice Brancle i s speaking fo,r the Court sai c1: "The oh,jection to the use o f the d . ate contained in the ann u a l reports is not L >ck of c:-' J _thentici t y or untn)_st-vvorthiness. It i s t : : . 1 a t the c e .rriers were l eft without notice of the evid.ence v,rith -vvhich they were, in fact, confronted., O S l ater b y the made. The r equ.iremen t th2t in em_ a .dvant a.;g e s of the two cl-c:: s ses of reverse-_::ear 'and the eXJ)ense which the c hehg e-wo u lC.: en tail, and conclo.des, th 1 1 tha t to a certain 'extent the change should-be Bt1.t whe ther the use of-any o r all t y p es of


-71-t' t ( Gill J. () ("/) lTI () t i 'r t 8 1 E:" 1' , t ' J ' 1 • ' i t l: l'E'd 1: J i v .1 JO\' er rL VC'l' (; l r lC'l'i l t l i.:c 1 J.i .1b1 is lLft ll['-:1< .. C !' P.:: c ; L s 1 n .. 1cc ,, ,'"'''XX •nti r 1 •' tr) i .... c:r nee. . c..r) ilpletc-n of Ll"s r . qt •ir tc, >crt I t L j_ (' I) 1 ' • c; ') J t i .1. i )\ t;. C;on : . ; .:Loi.11 s 'J l'C e11 r nclcrs jt v o r1..11 Jt is not L1teat8:. to tll.•t tJ'rre h (). rcii-nc \ .. yen nee orfer-c:: bJ' :intc.rc .ted en:, • 1 0 reRsoe r.rhy tb ._;oyernme11t sl10\1.ld l •o;; i2w ,i,l ; r :to 2n. fintl cvi( m1c:e (;;9) . It ... : auld, of C O' , il;t:coc::lC:(,: i:1to tl1' ' nconL to •.' CE'ive tr 2t11ei1t eviC:t3l c e (..:LCI). ro cc:ca;,e t r o:c. I't ; viC'n t h 1'0 1 .. ust 'ue o:.1El'ole evi er:ce. in thE: :c > cord to n1•. thr :'cminintrrtive .lo .l.n. ,tc-nee t;) evic e:1ce : : e . .;" c , EsiC: ered. <-lro_er b.:J. ... is for ctCtlo n (4_1) , •llile 2;;;re,,r:te rct:ults 11as a " bati t u t e for typical e1 iC.ence i c,; te. 11 ( 42). freq 'ently treated t l1e e.n o.r securlng CJ. full fn.ctual b sis caveli erl,y . ( 4:2a) l'he .s 1 • s t1.:C: y ha:; ' }4; o n t ! is. Tro it saJ' s , 'Nei:e l. 11tbe rarity of orderly cmlvinciN; t ; ti o n . o f f2' ct,hJ. evi ( .ence, 11 2 . 11the cas1. ,.ray ir1 'Nhich L1tricc:.te cocte. . fJro v i s tons wer e passer ove r ,r,itbout rnalysis o r cl2rification. 11 (l_3'). .3ot i . l :.A ancl. t:'ere ror t h i s . C o 1 1tro versy coultl r-l'e]s >rcc:lu.ce a f::.ll recort o:f f:cts. IJ:'l i s was especi all;y true v . .-hc r e .:;rea t ,mi t y q " J ,eared on the )2 . r t o f the memb ers or the applicant ind<-;,stry . seeJtiS to have bden the s i tuotion '7ith the lUJ:1ber i t s cor].e'(t..4.). A si!,dlDr Y!ea'-.:ness wa s the s1..bject of refer ence L1 Cte bri.ef . for the 3c, e cllter C o r p . ( 4t:) . The Gov ern,.1en t cello& a '-"'i tness in tl'te iJ". the lower co'l.l.:rt testifieo. as t o tl1e evi l of The in the testlmon y referreri. to no' COLt J"llill, r er>!3ons o r facts ag[•inst the pr< 'Ctice. a )re: .ctice requirement i s bPseC: . on such fli.:-:1sy o r it ma;, •Je repc:ti l y t>., t the .crJurt-s . ... be hesi t;:':r. t t o a ccept it as a S':.:fr'iciE:'nt ba:;i s . Tl'.:i:> i:> not ref.e l reC: .. t o exum:Jles are 1ot avr. ila .ble in E=--<.A, bu t t o 1).ow c-,st u t e C01.'ll:'}e1 ce.n ori n g s1.1Ch .ve.gknesses to the .::ttention of 2 (;ou:;.t, This _;)ro-bletrt i s of uch i m )ortc-nce that a e:r:ann les a::: f actfilC: L.::; ano. the fB .ctLal basic :for Sfl01.lld be ( 45e.) T]1e e n d F-J.l' Coi e (46) r ,:cov iC:.ecl for the es tc-obli sh1t1en t o f :nininn:un f,e r v ice c.J ( (,?). V < rio'lJ.S c"i vision s of the inC:. us try a:•.:o1 .Jl i c.d f o r 2''>. .rove.l o f tJi ser v ice c :1a r<;c schecl:.1.les. These 1ere all c:r0)roveci. \'7i t L sor::e chan?es. Tbe C8se of the DoG anc-:.. :lair Division is ilh,stra t i v e . T:t"'.is d i v i:::don probabl y p ret:ol1ted tlle best co8t 0 .:t A , and. askeC. for service chal'.Q'es closer to the cost ted 'by_ the a tl1Em any o ther c':.ivis ion (48), Fi?,Ures from ten firms of an LJ, h[,vin:"; from t •ven t y t o t hirty firms were . offc red. Of course the characte r of infu1stry rith its s::nall firms j apinG in and oo.t of bi .. '.Giness made for t h i s . It wa s these small fi nns tha. t JTO babl e coulcl. hilv e fur:1i s2.1ed the lowest co.i3t s had been ( Lz9) . So ' it is : :>een not even II typi c a l11 eviC:.ence was offered. Six i t erns o n the s chedule a..)-pr ove.ct ( 50) had no basis a t all. Fi were not e v e n offe red t o the c ost of 9838


7;2p r o cessi n : these items . At leas t six items 9robably had little basi s i n the f igures snbil!i tteG. ( E:l ) . A couolic8tion was the f eet that p r o c e sses G.iffer ( G2) and t y Jes of '-'vork v;::.ry 1tiC'.ely (53). T h i s schedule, like those of the other c ;_i becarr.e the subject o f f requent viol a tion ancJ. soon fell into c dsuse. The stor y of unifor m co s t a.c coun tin-"; sy:ster:-,s is l so in teres ti ng. At hearing s ther e wa. s usually a brief refe:re1'-c e r:ac ' _ e to the desirability o f such syst ems,-though i t i s doubted i f t!1 i s was a lwa.ys done. Plans were sub m i tt eel t o tl1e Admini s tre tion. S ome t ir.1es hea.rings wer e h e l d upon t hese r > l a n s . A n i1ll.Mineti n,7, inst c.nce i s the hearing (54) f o r the plan o f the Fire :E:xtingui sher l!Iariufactu r i n , g I ncius try (55). The p lan wa s submitted (56), but no t e stin on;; wa s offeree)_ t o justify it. No questio n s v11ere asJ>::ed b;y the r e p r e s entc-tives o f the Divis i o n o f R e s e9-rch and Plru1ning , vrhich c1iv i s ion vve.s iJ.sua.lly c ha rged with the respon sibility of ctppr oving sue[" p la11s. IJ:he p ia:l'l was l a t e r appr o v e d upon this evidentiary basis ( 57). F act-f indin:':; was not a lways relieC:. UJon. Th e Adm i n i strati a n sometime s n l ainlv .a{.mitteft the .. t aG:lroval of i m ; )ortan t nrovi s i ons wa s bas e d upon agre ement within the ranks o f industry (58). The basis of a greemen t between lc:.b o r and industry l'v e . s , probably , the one mos t commonly r esortecl t o in all l e . b o r questions (59). Cong r ess made s ome sta . t ements tha t be construed as s t .snd.arcl s f o r t!1e l a b o r :problems ( 6 0). Perhaps, C o n g ress t ho,J .C)lt thet the a greement of l a b o r and in dustry would .be adequat e . The wri t ' e r has found no on t his point. It r ema i n s that a :;reemen. t was t h e primar'y basis . The Rese a r c h and Plar:.ning Divis i o n did stu d y l abor conditions in the various i n dustries. These s tu0. i e s v e r e som etimes the basis for ecl'!linistrative action. O f t crt the fa. cts mer e l y ser vec1 a s em a ic: t o the L a b o r A dv isor y Board and l a b o r in c a rryi n g o n their b c rga ininr;. A most u n usual c a.s e is that of ma c h ine l i m i t etio n i n the C otto:1 C arded Yarn Indus try . An aoJni n i s t-r.sti ve order wc-s issued, pec uliarl y e n o u :;h, sig ned: authori t a .ti v e l;yb y t h e ijo c"..e A u t ho:c i t y and concurred in b y .:so v e r nme-n t o f ( 61). is no testimo n y in the transcr i p t of hearinc.:; for the Cotton Text .ile ( 6 2 ) , nor h a s any r e c o r d of a n y hoaring been f ound • . Undo"L.btecil;>7 , s trong evidenc e was submitted t o the Adrninistration. an order of suc h e c onomic effect t., _ _ pon business ent e r prices shoct l d hav e bee n fully justified by a h e aring at which a f ull re.c o r d_. was made, w:til e affording any o pnosi tion an o p portunity to set fort h its cas e . Perhcps, e merc,enc y actio n may require a t empo rary' restr.einiw orc!er. Certainly, a hearing should hav e been held a t the fir s t o_;J_ portt.mi ty. Happil y , N R A .'Vas n o t given t o suc h action in its 1!0> ter days. 't'uch damage had been do n e b y then, hovreve r . Once the impression is afield tha t . adm i n i s trative actio n i s hurried, not full y reasoned a nd. g rounded in the facts bef o r e t h e Admi n i s tration, the publi c a s well as court s s t art viewing the action nost critically. ::!:spe ciall y should this have been rememb ered in dealing with the fiel d that comprised NRA1s prOvinc e (63). Too often NRA seemed t 0 a cce_ p t .industries' that anyt hing was 11unfair11 whic h wa s &nnoyinc:, o r di sn_tpti v e Qf established 9838


At the oubljc hear.i..t; fo1 tl :..1e t1ic 1" ,.ht C•e makin ; is not to be confused with the O • )Cr ti01 o.l' a clc;ming ancl C.yeineestc bli Shntent. II ( 64:) Courts in prosecution (tO not evicl.encc., "''G to the pc:tst C'.c:r?..c t e r o f t h e uefenclent, U11 less he .1.Ynts his character i n t o evic1en c e . NRA heari ne;s wer e not crimlna.J. out r.ther J. eorin ,gs t o facts U}>on hich an e c onomic )Ol i c;y coul d be d.evise for n i nclu t r y . To b e l e.;;ally .;ust a ina.>l e the raJ. po1icy and. ct<:'YlClcr<-s for frami n g the det <'i l s should have existed. Tiad they e:xi s tec1 t '1e vrork of f illi n3; i n de-tails m ight' hav e been so obviously < . C ' S to avoi d the use of the c ifficu.l t Emalor.,y to le;il")letion. In _perfomti n::; thi s fun c tion o f mc:G-::in6 for i nc'.us try t h P2 S t h i s tory or ):resent atti tuc:'.e of an inc:u!"t : c y , a trc;de associ::>tion, or an ";rm. t.) mi._.;h t be quite pertinent t o the issu e of ho:, much or whD.t type trc:Cl_e I r"l. ctic e vrovision s shoulc1. be .::;i ven c?!l .Sucl:. a ppears t o hav e been v .luable in tl1e Caf. e of the _Jro Cottonseecl Oil Refining Code. Past ebuse of e m o ')en-.;rice c_:ystem inchcatecl the clis JOSi tion of the i nc .UGtry re.Jort ecl L form;1tion r :nG. the use t o Vihi c'll it be :m t ( 6 5 ) . one vro,_;l c she;l t o clo e his eyes t o suc h obvious fact s as the of Jl'o Josect Co:cn Dry ttillin;g I nd .u str;y b y the 7hecJt :-c'lmu !i i llin:; G o l e A"L"c t uori t y t o come lJ.ncu?r the c o d e o f the latte r ( 66). : i thout com :.1en t i n_; 'lJ._ :)on the chc-.::cacter o f that coc.e authority o r i t s it i s E'):_larent thc:t its aC::mi n i s tratio n was aJropos to this problem. The Fu.r .. a nufact InC. us t r y Code co:.1 t:'ined a mJ.m. be r of r estrictive trade Dractice arovi s ions (67) . of s p okesmen for the ind .ustry stete(._ a t a public hearing ( 68) i nd.ica t e d little SYJ11pathy f o r the consur.1er ( 69). .Sv. cl evidence of a t t i t u c t e shou l d h a v e o een quite r e l e v ant t o rha t 1owers of self-c;ove r nmen t shoul d hav e bee n ext e nded. lJRA d i d t\ttemyt t o establish a factua.l basis i n many inst ances. AO.visers s eeme d mast of the c.lesirabili t y of s u c h action. Aclv i sers o f o ther boc:rcls o r c.i.i vh: i o n s enc -;a i n the eff ort only when they oLJposeo. a o r k new not 1 ing about it. These advisers were often 2 .ble t o dev e lop mai1Y a n g les whic h had litt l e concern t o t h e presichng office r or had not been t o h i s attentio n . In t his a . dvisers wer e early by a r u l e tnat C?.ll questions haO. to b e directe d t h rough the p r esir'.ing office r ( 7 0). ? r;:; officers . 'iho d e sired. t o limit c ontrove rsy o f ten refused t o repeat the questions o r s o c han{;:ed a s t o nullif y their e ffect ( 71). In l a t e r p r actice questioning b y advisers WA. S f r eely allowed and did much to d e v e lop more compl ete trcmscripts. T h e ad_equ.a c y o f t h e questioning d.eyended ::;reatly U)on the indivi d ual a dviser. l\iany advisers p r e f erred t o remain silent at t h e hearing . Others, houever, macl e very substantia l contributions 9 838


-74-toward. c:.eveJ.o pin ; a record. The l\TRA I1J.le t e the contrary -Jractice W c S ne:ver chanc;ed Another hantic2. p J.e . y in the t heor,Y of tc:ci t B J :Hoval relied u pon b y many inC.ustry r;roup s • . A coC:. e j)rovision mi.::;ht "Jrovid .e ior study of a subject or a proi:JosaJ. t o b . e rn.gc_e in accordance 1 1 i t h certain principle or certain probl ems ( 72). r.l'l1ese provisions \iere usually in the form o f an expressed right to petition. It i s C.o ubtec. if t his conferred anything n o t alread;y had. : I n cmstry frequently ur-.:;ed thDt NRA had t acitly a provision of the character set f orth in the charter of study. If NRA has not done t h i s v.rhat wa s tl!e p1.:rr:oo s e of the p rovision industry ask. Frequently NRA woulc1 acceJ t the a r gument and_ approve. the propqsal without further The f actua l basi's in such cases . wa s usually ,;;rossl y inedequate for at the hearing the provis i o n wou l d be passed off as merely allo>vi n::; a st11dy t o be made . any persons in NRA were aware of t h i s subtle means of ob t aining prov1s1ons without subjecti:p. g t hem to such a justific&tion a : s m ight be necessary if presented:vvithqut this 1J r elimina r y step (73). Burden of proof is usually thoug::. .. t t o lie on t:hose persons ap:?lying for action to be taken to s b .ow w:1y wha . t they c.esi re s }wuld. be t1(lne ( 74). In NRA procedure the b urc.en of proof shoul 0 _ h a v e -rested upon the p roponents as far as ther e was t o b e snch a burcten. Aloost w i thmJ_t realizin:::: it the burden was some.tiwes to o ; yoonents of .. the ;Jroposed : orovision ( 75). The attitude of :presicJin.:; officers toward advisers was frequently s i milar. "The i nc'.:nst Q V"ants the provision. Vfby shouldn';t it hc:ve it11, the aclv iser vvoul6. be <:>s . .cecl in effect? The proper procedure vroulC:. have bee n to hav e p l a c ed. the buro.en squarely upon the proponents o r realizinG tha t tl'1.e bur(en could not be met for a : t . $ mpo ra.ry 11periocl of expe1 i ment a l OJ_)eration11 (76). ProjJOsal _ s b y the Acimi n i strati on bring the seme .1roblem. Shoul d there hav e been a C:ut;y upon the AGmin i s tration to prove tha t its proposal was desira.'ble? Certainl.}', 'Nhere the effect was t o nullify provision s g ranted incl..ustr;y t b . i s 1.rvoul d seem to :1.a v e been the prop e r p r oce rure. l v.iere ciet eils woul d nee:c 1 no suc h treatme:11t, but _:_Jrovis ions of a substantive character s1.l.oulcl be as i n ha.rmony vvit:C the requirements of the Act. Until t h e o pinion i n the case of P anam a v. Ryan ( 77) was writte n t l ere h a d neve r been a c lear s t atement i n our law concerning the n ature of an ac1rninist:t. etive rinc'.inc from the standpoint of j_JUDlis h ing the basis for acti on. Cases exi-:-te i n dicating tha. t there need. be n o s-l1c h ( 78). Such ex:.) ressions were made i n c ases whe r e an evidentinry basis wa s not betnt: t o o stroil.:: J y requirenG. i t i s conf:.idered to be a princil)l e of n atura l j ustice th[l.t a p.grty be of the basis for an aQninistrative actio n ( 8 la). 9838

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Tu P<'ll['Ll a e ere ne ntJ,c of );:1" (L ) . 0!1 )f the <,1 trr-:1 : •:rouncl . . of ti.' drci:;ion thrt t .J. Chl.ivc Ord r :: i 11". t 1 • tc.:tt;) th rj .i.1: J"", .!. t r: b'"':JLd . S"id .ir. Chief ,j . .:; t.i. e,1; lOl' t:i1 co 1 t : 11T l. r :::' iH raot: r b jcct t.J t:H. v; -, i1 i t y o.:. t:.(> ro:ti tion l, L ' LL wn b;> t1tC ;J • Clttivf' rc'c r 'l:JC.t'r ::>t..ction 9(c;) . T 1 ! J:JY cth'L' r-dPl' ':'onti..:1s no l.i Jir no st tCJ.t: t -;: t: c -ro l Jlc.; o: . .' t1.!.e Pr si :t::nt1s actio1 i!. t'l (' . . J:G ltJil-iJP. --If it co .lcl 'ue u ttl!' t fx O'L tJ' P fJnr c .. l'f c-._.ct . . t ; n .. ;: c-.!:ible L-:_e.rc .. c . P •lh".. (r!-''"-'11 • :L circ:-• .. t. t ,1ce s or C')r.-u tions '.'1 to .;ovt-rn t 1 xu lse 0f tile .:1::.thnit,y conf rre-('t , ti:t: ) r es2.cil2: t <.;o ,l";.( :1ot net v'"'li<.J .. ' it: . . )11.t :1;'v21 : ,. r : c; t'J t'1o;c I "<..nd. co.1r'i ti on 1 , .A;1,: ::.'i r.cli "'• b,.' <':3 t o th8 e:'-i te11t,;e of the re.:l. i.cea." "'u;-,si G J 1 J!l Nol"ld. bt. ne:cc:::"'sr:' ta in t. :.t ::-ctio:1, fo:r Frw i r;e t'te c,sc of .. chs cretion .?S th. qurLiiic;t:'o .. ! (.' :nti-.. 2i t:;r .ro .• ld be in effectuol. pre 1ot c1elin it:-. "; TJl'i .:ttt'l,) bel• l:C."L :to .;:'YCC1.t.tive ')J.'r:JV.i.:1C.::', ir-, ::10t t':1e !:110 ir:ct of il..c'_i rc if,., tile v)l'6-... c'ltn.:: to f"Pc tive 'J:o J.'e_J8"'t , we are , .. i th. tLc of t.:1e dele of l e :islativc powe r . I f the-i"' to be i r the crime or fl l.:_ isl:;-tlve o r r' nf e n . . offic-er , o r of 8. boE'::.'(' o f c o . tlBsioY< , due y>roccss of r er1'ires t>ct it t:1[,t the 0rd.e 1 is Y!ith i n t:e euthority of the , boBrL or corru-ni s ::i c :1, :-nd , i f p c.t ; o::ci t;l c-;.-: )end.s or'. c .ster tions of ct, t h ose r, must be 11 ( L 3) :.:r. Justice C ; rC:.oza, clissentinrs , too': exc .",tio:1 to !)ortion of t ':.s C'hi t2f J1:Lstice1 :.; o -inion (8-. t ) , T!t i s ;.18 1 : ic; :;ot necessi:lrily universal. It be it •;till be to ur01:1d r eview field::; c' cice o s t-een i 'i1oort::: n t o r ni 1 e:ce crir.1inal penal tie s a r(; involvc.eo. c1 p ., i n t o f the P en.:un a C a s e (87). 'I.:1e involvEs a D6')artr.. 8 n t of t ure of the St<-. t e of p resc:d , cert 0in f r uit and ve,sE.tcbles conteiners 2S thE. s t:.lnJ;o_,:_iL t./ : )e to o e 1..1.sed. It v.ras u rged u pon t:t.e caurt th.s.t no 12:dsts ti.?t f ''!e r e p roperly present to jl.•.stify thE:-eG..:1ini:;tr--.tive Action. S:1icL the cn'.rt: 9838

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7 C -11The contention i s v:i tlJout S'.cpport i n authority or reason, and rests upon ------The question of lexv may, of c ou. r se, a l be raised whether the l e : ; isla t ure povze r to dele.:;ate the authori t;;r e : .:.ercisecl. 11 ( 88 " ) For this proposition court ci tecl. the Pane:na anC.. Schechter (89). The court continued in l rulg'J.age much to put the law upon this subject back t o its st&te in 1934: 11Where the regulation i s v1i t h i:1. the scope of authority lee;all y del t} , e of the existenc e of f acts j"nsti::: 'yin-?: its specific exercise atta.ches alike t o s t a tutes, to municipc:.l or(i:lances, an c1 to orders of aomini s tra . t i ve boc i e s . ------Here there is added reason fo :C' ap:tJlyinc; the pre...: sumption of ve.J.idi t;y; f o r ti:1e re_;;ulation nmv challenged was adopted after notice .::mo. hePrins a s the stG'tute req"Lt i 're'd/ It i s cont ende(1 thet the order is voi d because the aCmi n i s t r e .ti v e made no special fincling s of f act. But the ute c LiC. not re quire special -. Compere Wichit a Rail r oacl and IJicht Company v. Public t tilities Corrm;ission, 260 TJ. S. 48, 585 . 9 ; Eahler v. Eb;y, 264 U . S . 32, 44; Southern Ry -.-C o . v. Vir?;i n i.s: , :Jg :j T j . S . 190, 193, l'J6..:11 ( 90). Er. Justice Br:.:md.eis either i::;n.ores the second point of the Penama c e s e or else he c .efinitely it, citin:'; 2s he c.oes the Wichita Railroad Li:.c;h t C ompa n y v. Public :::tiltties Commission ( 91), and Meh ler ( g;.:;) for t h e p:coposi tion they ri_:;htfully stand. for that a . s t o . t u t o r v reauirernen t of must be complied u -wi t h . i•/Ir. Chief Justice TTuc.;hes oi ted these ceses as e.u thori ty for the second point in the c&se te t:_e fact that t Ley were based upon sta t utory reqn iremsnts n o t 1 n esent i n the Pm!ama case. The citing of Southern :Ry. Co. v. Vir, r :L'.ia ( 9 ; 3 ) c;louC.s the -:eight to be given to Mr. Justice :Sr,:-!ndei s1 st0 tene;:1t Uj_)C:i l the point, as this case does not s tanc-1 for tl.te sam e proposition th2t the othe r s cto. I n spirit it i s nrnch more tha n the others requiring it certain proceC:.ura1 safeguards in absence of ;:my sta.t1:_ t oiJ.' t_:Jrovision. It seems too early no\'! t o to e e the P acific Ste.tes Box and. Bas\:et C o mpany v. White case (g.::). The fields seer1 to be properly analogons. In the P a nana cc::se t here i'l8S n o atteupt to state a factual basis for the exec utive orC .er l e in PPci fi c :Box c ase a hee.ring: had been held. W'.oen the r e h..:t.!i been a he.sri n : ; a co 1rt may pres ume that the adm inistrative action i s U l )On the . Tl1e situation becomes more difficult for the court whe r e it is not eviderit whether the administrative action i $ based u pon any f acts. Of cour se, c>.ll s1ch a ,dministrative action does not require a hearing , but if none i s held the requirement thet the basis of tlle action be set forth s eem s reas onabl e . Certo.inly , the safest p r actice would be t o f ully state a b asis in flncling:s f o r an;y n.G.tni:nistreti ve action t ken ln a field of 9838

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'1';-GOCl'll or ' C) o. ic o1Gli :J• o t 01 l ir l t .. ,'e n. r• ' 'l ;;-in .t judicial ttL> .. it i<-oof. c. r.u.,ini t.r tiv 1,i'! e t o s'!O'" t•: t th a) )ro ch beer. VJCll-c e r cl. Il no t ] '7"'l]j . ( a lllGttcr of :.t"nnl ju.ticc this J.c;ctiet. ' .•JU lC: [(W ... (•l ir"ole. : r:tc.:. of :'i. 1.i1 ;'' , .. s 1LUll\' !n<'l': c b;; t:.wir ( 9G) . .1. L.t L ,. ' re ofte:1 .. c.H. in tlw l ..,,. 1..1<\3 o1 the stctute or in ce1tria toe•: Jhr ses (''6) . .)r Gctic' not f'1voreD by t1te courts( :??) . It Eeem a 'u tte1 1roctice not to 11'3e 1 1.,tilted ler::\1 'r seoL s.J11 but rc:tl r to teJ .1 t .... c >tory of the econ l!tic situ.:-otion (98). proctice ,ot by an,> of in thi., rc ;21rd. ; lt1c type of fi'l i to be 1.1rr:le w&s Dever i <.•.icat CL. Th 01 ly stt'teu at VC:\S t 1t't voul'' be a fim'.ing s t.:t c' in letter of trerL:>1.1i tt.:1l ( 09). t any of tLe v"ere U • 10n lllO!'e f\.1.11 finchn...,s t h a n tho e late.c t l.e essnre OCLc.r,Je 111UCh .gre2ter. '.rhese earl y usually e stc.::te1nent rom the 1'RA anJ one by the PresiC:..ent . Lpter p r : c tice v:-.. :iec'l. In co1.e . not rccr .. :irin.; t b e Presi c:en t 1 s a rov81 Oi'll;>• .., s te tei 1en t t,1e ' i 11 be founc . • :rhe first code, th fine in the executive orO.e r ( 104). t .. st.:: te.1ent oi fin' .in for the Leather InC .. ustr y CoG.e not one r•ord is sai0. r-:tbout the t rade practice pro visions (10:=). Th i s is q_uit e of ,•h;.: t frequently ham)ened. rhese .Li. c-C:. ::.q_uate fL1-:..ings :ere to the court in the brief f o r the ( 106). It wo b.: ,bl" :voulc'. have been r:esirC'ble for the Fresic"1.ent to statec. the b 9 s i s f o r his finc,_ing in some thin;; more than a. ritualistic !na11ner . The a r gumen t of the brief thet neither t' e order of the PresiC.ent nor ti:le letters of tile of Agriculture or the s t ra.tor contains any rec1 sonable sho,"Lv; thc;t 11 trCJi,:h t killin_;11 was an m1fair :net:i.lo .. of CO!ape ti tion is en ti t l to ca ref\..1. 1 consi It must be remembered thct records were made nhich in many instances wou lG. ':.lave substen tiated the action t."'1:::en o r i n effect, t:t1e finC' .. in:?;s ma.d.e thouGh not stated. :r:inc.sight in t h i s is better foresi_z}1t . FRA had little :;ui d.ance in the cases ',7hen its first "lere made. PruC.e:nce and an atte!ltiveness mi_;h t have suggestee. tha t alon.g with a full record., a full stater1ent of the oc:sis for action have been m8de . Such care coul d he.rci.l y lvv.e been exJ.Jected. from early NRA. A future aOJilinistrative bod.y "'Ji t:-.. a uirr.ilar task V . 'ill be '.r.rise to fra11e its findings tl1e s tyle of a juchcia1 opinion, and t o b e c a r ef1.1.l to have r ee6.y for the courts a fully reasoned and. com p lete ste t e;nen t of its finc' .in,.-;s Grounded on recorded evidence. 9838

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-?8Ano tl1er p roblem o f rested in a cce:__)tance by NRA of b y A s t : _ lis also i r-volved t h e question of the >rie t y of the C:.ele:ation it ,..:ill be discus sed in a dealinc with (107) . 9838

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cT TJTIR x p _QI3LEI\! S I PUBLIC .. .riO? ICE , A N D O TlJ!lli ADI..IJTIST ... TIV E C'i'I O s EY IJRA I. PlJBLICATION O:B' STRATIVE REGUL .. \.TI O N S AriD DBAFTSlvl.Al'; S HIP ffi1e1 the famo'\.LS le al fiction that everJ man is urcsumed to lmon the l2.w (1) ri)ened t here was no m ss of administrative legislation \.'i th 11hich to coue . E v a r y man m a y "be p resent in Parliament by his represent2.tive, but one nould hardly say h e is :9resent a t the procee d ings (or the case may be actio n n i thout p roceeQ.ings) o f e v e r y adrai:1i s trative board. The mass .of ndninistrg.ti;.e rules (2) only more acu t ely p resent the same :9roblems t ha.t t l 1e En glish scholar 13 entham so clearl y sau: 1. It is to our morals .to p1.mish a man for disobedienc e .. to a law of '\7hich he had no notice (3) al).d 2 . Publication alone is not enough. Public:"Ltion may . . only tend_ to bewilder (4) if the orders a r e not e asily accessible and clearly drarm. The uroblem has been most acute in the United States. O f ten only a small :9ercentage of the rulings o f an important bureau will b e uub lished (5). Ei:ecutive O:i.'ders (since 1905)may be found in the Depart ment of State and t h e Library of Con g r ess.. This makes t hem far f rom accessible to the public (6). The state of uubli.cation i s ' one o f absolute confusion-(7) in a field where tel times as much law as Congr ess makes exists ' ( 8) • . NRA only serve d to complicate the proble m (9). The g reat mass of industrial legislation resulting from it was brought to the court 1 s attention in the Schechte r case (10)". NRA.t s code record section does not. even have a record of all the purported administrative action (ll). The most :9ublicized example wa s not the responsibility of lTilA out the Petroleum Administration. In connection vri t h the a rgum ent b efore the Su:9reme Court in the Panama case (12) it wa s found that there had been [!, n indictment for the violation of a non-existent provision • . Another inte.resting example lay in the National Labor Board created August 5, 1933 apparently by a p ress release (13). A formal order b y . the President not issued more than four months later (14). Th e sane difficulty faced in Engl and (15), until the passage o f the Rules ]l_ct in 1893 (16) . This act solved the difficulties of t h e there. The more important rules are fully published uhile only a reference is made to the local and less im portant rules (17). is, that some such legislation has long bee:n. s adly needed in the United States (18). Th e problem demanded best conside r ation. Code Record nas an solution. Code Record failed. only where De puties and. wer e negligent or wilfully failed to cooperate . Confusion was such that 1TIRA regulations and codes could not have been expected to have 9838

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-2'):.... always been clear. Explicit instrUctions should have been given and emphasized that only those documents filed with C d e R e c rd had any Effo r -ts---shoUl d have been made t o disc "urage the numerous drafts o f 11c odes11 v1hich circulated 0ftEm as .genuine. Almost as confusing a s the mass o f delegated n and the difficulty cd se-curing access to' it was the variety o f administrative forms and the diffAring uses t o which each were put. ne d 0lving into the mysteries o f NRA sub-legi.slation must ar e stl cwith executive orders, administrative 0rders , office orders, ,.,ffice memoranda, an office manual, and NRA bulletins. The use t o which th0se f rms were put varies. It would serve littlopurpose to point out pracise hi story of each. It must. "be b o rne in ni"ind that these are f orms f ad ministrative action. If it that executive and afu ninistrative orders were generally iegislative this merely means the y affected in.dividuals through a class 0r group. likewise as affecting individuals as a matter of direct: intention unde r some legislative p,.,wer such "'rders might be 6o it is to say where a di-rect effe ct was had upon the interests of indfviduals or classes executive . and administrative orders were employed. They were also employed to d elegatepowcr and sBt Up adininfstrat'ive organization and p rncedur0 under Act. The other fr'rms eriumera were in the most part for int-ernal use within NRA. .Approved by the o r his they carried the f orce of: ,an administrative or.der: . Sometime:::>, eff f'lct 1ip('ln code provinions o r their requirements upo n members . o f industry wor e such that it might be said that the interests of individuals c r classes wero • . Indi z e d . actio n was taken by the various labl"'r agencies s e t up under the N • . l.'R.A.', tho Indu s-trial b.pJ!cal s :B0ard, and by the C ompliance Divi sio:ri in :Blu.e .Eagle removals . Th e latte r : were sent out by: telegram. 'Tt W ould.' s ' eein thatthey"should have had at least the dignity o f an administrative order, since the effect o n property might be no vi tal. Gen eral instru.ctions as t o procedure may be found in compliance field 18tter.s. It is obviou s that to one not. e.xperienced in intric'ac"ies of NRA administrative forms the mass of orders and the variety o f forms in which they mi-ght .appear could well present a hopeless labyrinth. No precisepr0cedure can be outlined. As in England all . orders o f general character and importanc e nhould. b e gener':\lly published. Individual orders would n o t r equire the name distribution, but copies should be sent t o all intereGted parties and k0pt available in specifie d well-known public t or'ies. An effort should be made to clansify administrative act'ion i-n categorie. s as would indicate clearly procedure, powers;' renponsibili ty,, general rules or requirements upo n industry, and special or i:n dividual rules andre quirements. It is not hopcrd t o solv.e the p'rob1em here, but merely t o suggest the vital necesGtty of giving full t o it. A recent statute has take n a s tep t oward the solutio n of this problem. It provides for a which will1 • be analogous to the English rulon publica t i o n system (18a) . . . I 9838

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Draft<>man h i p w a an i mrnrt'ln t u r n b lcm. C l o u dy lan rucl{ ; e wa:> som t i .cs o ugl t by i ndurt r i hopine; tn bctt r th i r no_ i tinn by int r p retati o n l a t r . The Legal Divi.ion gav i t R tnff of the vit a l nc:t u r of h i p (19). In the c-r day:; of N_.:U. a study of the p r oblem waco m:td by a memb e r of the Divi i nn . It i d ifficult t l a y a fing r upn n a n y 0f the ill" a r i f rom thin ource . .Ambiguity w n the 1 i....f diffi'cul ty and t h i wa r efl..., t e d when q u."'tions o f inte r r t ati n a r :;c (20). If NRA c ould h a v P don e m o r it would h a v b e n o:r.J.y t o l:ave in reas d a n d e mpha..-:. z e d its warninc;. It mie;h t also have cha r ,t-d thoR v iew nr orne o agency with the ""U P . r v i "'i n o f dra f tsman_,hip. II. NOTICE AND F.ARTI I ?ATI O N I N INDUSTRIE S ' ACTIVITIES T h e f r e a s nab l e notic e o n e o f t h e firs t requirements of administrative d u e p roc ss ( 2 1 ) . p robll:)m i::; oft e n viewed a s a t chnica l o n o sinc e .it _seldom i s b r o u g h t up c'lse (22). Requir e m .nts v a:ry . I n " m(; f i alds ther e nGe d be n o n otice o r only the bare s t k ind (23) . I n th. fie l d tha t dea l t with a full a n d reaso n able notice mus t b as t o the mat t e r s t o be The f o r m o f a notice must r eaQo n ably r e l a t e t q the actio n t be t aken (24 ) . The time g iven s h ould allow a :9c'lr s o n t n be p resent a nd t o some r e a so n ab l e e ffor t s t o p r-;par e a case and secur e e vidence (2.5) . What persons a r e e n t itled t o n o tic ? Mr. Justic 2 Hol m e s ha3 '!JO i n ted out tha t it i s i m possible t o the full p r o t::ctio n c f a meetin g " ( 2 6 ) . Y et, ;vhen substanti a l p r opert y -rig h t s n r e ' e . ffccted e v ery reaso n able p r e cauti o l sho u l d hav e that any person a ffect e d should h a v e r e ceived adequate noti . e . I f CJ. per s n i s entitled t o r..n individual n otice he all o wed t o mak:.:; G . positive s hovring in the c ourts tha t he recciv8d n o n e ( 2 7 ) . Offi c i a l s t a t emen t s n ever fully set f orth the degree o f n tice necessar y . S t a tements wer e mad upo n t h e f orm and pro c edur0 t o b e f ollovrecl and est ablishing an official 'bulletin bo ard ( 28) . Full n otice could hardl y b e f ound in p ublicc.tio n u p on a b"'.ll l etin board. NRA w a s concerne d w ith the manne r o f g i v i n g n o t ice, t h a t i s h o w t o get ou t w ide n o tice . It did n o t concer n itself with the p roblem o f jus t v1hat persons had t o be given n otic e . T h i s i s no critic ism o f w h a t w a s dD.nf9, but rather a pointing out o f t h e as dlstinguishe d f rom the one courts V.F<)uld p r o b ably use. Actuall y , m a d e serio u s efforts t o widel y d istribute n otice. The r egu.l a r c o u rse w a s ;tA.Js end. n otices t o l a b o r unions, the l a b.-,r gov cr!1Tne n t offic i a l s , the press, tra de assccia t i o n ? u blicati0 n s , S t a t e 1TRA offices, R e sident Adjuste r s and Regi o n a l Director, Class Post Cffices, a spe c i a l list, plus a n y a d d i t i onal p e r s ons whom the D e puty r (29 ) . T h e Deputy Administra t o r s , usually , t o secur from indust:y mem b e r s vri t h w h orr. the y were nE)g otiating a s full a lis t as p ossible o f all known m cmbero o f the industry . Still, in s cm0 i:.ldu "tries it i a obvious that it vro u l d b e impos">ible t c e v e r mak e a. crmp l c t e lis t o f all m ember s (30). In such cac0 s if eve r:v r oaso:::1abl -ffrr t w e r e mad e t o n otify all inte r ested p a rties, if the indu stry w a s p r o p e rly represent ative , and i f a t y-pical v i ewpoint ?Tid '3videnco w e r 3 fully p resente d f o r each econum i c int e r e s t the courts mi gl: t con side r tha t sufficient notice a n d hearing (31) h a d b e e n given. Thi s is only speculation as t o wha t m i g h t be. called reaso n able . 98 38

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-c.2 The Legal Division gave some serious thou[ht to this :'_)roblem. It issued a very sound guide b-:r J anuary of the first ye&r of ( 32). There must be f a .ir notice as to the subject matter to be heard, and a reasonable relation to the subject matter actually acted u 9on. The other thes i s of the memorandum was: a . hearing should be ::tdjourned to keep open the notice as to any modifica ,tion inacle . Althoug11 the writer has found no cases suggesting t h e need for this technicality no har m can be seen in it. The important thing would seem to be wnether notice -ras given in regard to any substa.iltiv.e r ee,u l ations or provisions to be made. These could be chan ged in form but not in. substance it would seem and the notice w o uld still be goof.. L o .ter the Legal Division stated it would accept a notice if it had b een public proper.ty fo:c seven days (33) • . This e xpression came as the result of administrativ e pressure and not sound thought, Seven 4ays .as public property might be far from adequate to allow a manufacturer on the P acific Coast t . o gather some bits of evidence togetner and arrive ip. Washington in ttme for c: .. hearing. .As to the persons wh o should receive notice the Legal Division came to much the sam e conclusion a s the writer ( 34) -there shou.ld be reasonEJ ble no.t'ic e in every case where it was p r_actica1, and. thC>o t only convincing reasons should cause relaxation of the requirement ( 3 5) • . The Legal Division's expression upon the. statement of the subjec. t m atte r contained. in notices is ambigu.ous.It s a;vs that it need not pe mad.8 11vYitb conroleteness; but it is nec essary to s t a t . e it in such m0 !}.1181: as to shOV' '7hft subject matter is under .consideration. 11 ( 3 6 ). It might more clec-r to say that the stEJtement rm1st be such t h o t one would reason ably exue c t the subject matter to be treated considered ( 3 7). It would not be ex-oected to find many objections of f ailure to receive notice in the transcri:pts for anyone e .ttending a meeting must have h a d notice, its char a .cter might not be ouestionable. There must h ave been :in B t ance3 even though not recoroed. Thc>re are some instances where notice was cla i med to be short or iha1.C:.'.lstr y GoJ.e tho::-c: ' •P. s ? to the def:i t.i.01: b y 'i.n(':lud.:'Ln$ . wc ... J.s . which m ight 'Or a ) _c).l1 U te sc.:J:;)8 o f the code ( 4 C i 9 . It y;:ras nut I i kely t h o t ::. ersorls a ffected would receive noti : .. :L 11 they did, proposal was s o _subt],y worded that the intent was far from clea r (n). All all, t h e notice in this procedure should h ave been more clec:r th:m it oft e n w a s . The ina d e q u a c y of such notices and the e ase with Y vhich they could inad.e q uc. te another argument agains t the use of procedura l device of 11notice of op-portunity to be heard11 unless g reatly limited and. i mpr oved ov e r its form in NR.A. 9838

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A problem in notice h 't. a l s o t.a" u ju iJ"l 1 ' t c;)ect (42 ) lie., in tle question: , _...,er e me1.1be1. •J.f indust yen :tlcd to notic-e of .:1nd to be c.llowed t p rtici"Jc. t in ol code;;,? The Leg.::l Divis i ) n na co nee ne' , i tL the ruly sent: ti ve ell !' a c ter of p roponents ( :1:2). night .7ell be: areued the t v.h ere <-• pronose i:nuortr nt t:nflt :hi s jurisy:ruoenti a l concept of law wa s tha t o f the decisions of the :i.n the inC .ividua l cases (45). In early .ttA tssuecl interpretetions in which a c oui-e cecl (46). Later, reaL.:ec. L1a t the u :'.."oblem wcs one for administra tive action, and instructed ir.1terpra t e . tions (47). Inter :Pretations ere reguired b' stated -r.rocedura to .so the usu['ll internal (other than notice and h e arinc) required for. e.mendments or ner.., codes. T!!e Advisory Cm:;.ncil r ecognizj_ng. the i1nportance of interpretations str,ont:, recqmmend" .tions. : . n this r ega. :rd .(48). The Legal Division itself Interpretations it felt shoulu. not be :cetroactive if lmfa:irness v:ould result (49). 1Jhen rules reg .:i:'ding interpret ations became more strict re. ort was h a d to "opinions" in a t least one with the intent tha t they be used b y the industry a s interpreta t ions ( 4 9 a). officers sometimes d isregard .for tne legislative n ature of interpretations. :It should hav.e been }3A1 s purpos e to have avoided as much inter-:::>retati:on -a:s p,ossible o:,r lucid draftsmanship , and to h ave furnished a basis .for as ma.r:,y 2 .ngles of the: problem a s possible in the discussions P t :public.-heering. One instanc e is enlightening. An interested m er:1ber of industr y asked the meaning of c: proposal at the public he?.ring. The officer ansv.rered, "Until a co( e is b y the President, n o one, c a . n give you a t.e interp r e t ation of a ::'articula r or 2ny sect.ion" (50). T h e s t atement wa"probably true if a bindinb ''ilc...S Tha.t should not have precluded full dis cussi o n and a general agreem e n t . as to intent. An problem i n interpretation as presented by a section of t h e Bclcin,s Industry Code tint; the g iving of premiums o r coupons by m embe r s (51). This section wc:J.s extend e d h y inte rpretation several times to i n ::::lude rnotter not a t . the l1earing , but 1 o gi ce.ll,,.r coming r i t 1in the word:, and intent of the provision (52). L a .ter (53)) i t "7L S ) rO}!Osed to ext end the -::revision t o -lJrohib i t a wholesale baker loaning breed . . racks t.o its custol:'.ers bea r j _ng the v10rding 11w e re-. com..rnend ( name . ) crec:.d. 11 The of ( 54 ) contained no testimony show i n g the: t sue}. use of the provi.:,ion w::. s ever contem:9l a ted. In f act the t estimony throughout lookeu. to given to u l t imete consumers (55) while a. l ater :provision of same cod e indicated tha t the "distribution of articles COillr.1only used for shou l d not be banned a s "commercial bribery" (56). The :9roposed \vas 9838

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s top:;)e d by t h e B.e vie'.7 Div i s ion . LE.. ter ( 5_7) , it u p cgai n w i t h t h e onl y additio n a l sup::port o f 8 . qode_ provis_ion agains t subterfuge (58). This prop osal was finally v.,-i thci.r a.wn : (59 . ) . Interpretations w e r e som e times u s e d to e. c ode 1 s jur i s diction. This was in effect Na i vely it was t hought that by using interpretation the o u estion o f' representation once passed upon could be i gnored. Such w a s the c ase in the. Steel C astings Industry ( 60). The Cod e Authority firs t sought to 8.ct by commercial resolution (61). L ater, NRA sou<_J)1 t to i s s u e an inte r p retation e ven broader tha n tha t of the industry1 s wes hotly con -tested. Many firms under other code s contende d there w a s no proper representation upon which to such a prop osal . (63 ) . The .Schechter decision• CUt the m atter short SO it 'l"!ill never be k no w n ho w the matter would h ave been decided (64). Amendment ' s more o bviously are leg i s l ation ( 65). The sam e nroce d ure w a s resorted to for them as for proposed codes e xcep t the 11notice o f op portunity to be hee.rd11 procedure w c . s more freo u ently u s e d in the c ase of amendments . This e xception .cre e . tecl the greates t . ci.ifficul t y procedurally. The inadequacy of this procedur . e both a s notic e ( 6 6 ) and a s hearing (67) h 2 . s been discussed . Th e l)rocedure imploying favorable action b y the administration wa s usually r esorted t o before t h e advice of the Advisory Bo ards w a s sought (63). This put the a d m i nistration in the position of giving a t e .cit a p:JrOv a l without full consideration b y i t-s own m achinery. Administration amendme n t s a t roublesome TJroblern. NitA agencies desiring to propose amendme n t s were long kep t in the d ark a s to procedure. When the Deputy Administrator desired to amend the code full notice w a s not always given to the industry. The Adv i sory Council m a d e som e e x .cellent recommendations upon this (69 ) . It also sugge sted that any a d ministration propo-sal shoulc1 be m a d e only a t a publi c . ,hearing ( 70). Thi s would see m desirable e xcep t ::!e:-chap s in matte r s o f where the need for the provision wa. s urgent. Fublic he2 rinG '172'?> es.irable procedure. . . Exempt ions and e xcerltions 1 i k e ' i v ise involv e the ieg i s l a ti v e e..nd adjudicatory proces.=:e s . S..ometi'rpes the effect o f e xemption s was so broa d the t the operation o f a n entire cod e was delayed , o r aga i n the .su-.srension mi ght apply only to a particu l a r provision o f 0 . particula r class. Exceptions were designed to to s pecific c ases o f individuals. Although applying classes or indiv i d u a l s the y e r e a n alogous to private b ill legislation in regc:r d to numbers affected. T h e y prov i d e a h i ghly de sirable means of alleviating t h e h a rsh eff ect o f gener a l policy if properly controlle d b y the st2 .tute (71). The Leg l D i v i sion felt that public hearing s e s a b a sis f o r s u c h action wa s highly d esirable (72) al -thoug h the y w e r e seldom held unless the problem involved wa s most import ant. NRA officially s t e tecl t h e n e e d f o r e . . findi n b of fac t u pon which t o b e s e such s . c tion ( 73 ) . :res1)ite t his de!J"Ll.ties d i d n o t a l ways furnish advisers a n y factua l b 2 . s i s u p -on to ( 7 4 ) . . The v alue o f e xemption s a n d exception_ s i s icc: ted b y t heir use b y the Indu stria l A ppeP . l s B o a r d (75). T hese d e vices serv e d to mitigate h a rsh rules c:nd allow for an evolution ary process o f becomi n g e . ble t o 983 8

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comol y .. with code re uiremcmt . The pro e r u_,C' o i'1es devices vr> not. <:lv;rDy und0rstoo' l , ;>nc: sonetirne t 8mnt :1errm : e to t hem to the t a l r of amennments ( 7G). The hvs .llo 1ed to action N " S continuinb and clid not, once !0\nd or c •ll, vest r ie;ht ( 77). lEA used the procedu_e of st< y . It h r d t,'Vo as1.ects: 1 . A temporary release ?nd 2 . the force of n n wnenrl..ent cut tin! ; out -; code provision (78). In either c e:se "here ve ted 1Jiere to be affected n full fr..ctua1 bP..s i s for action . ho 1ld h.;ve existed. I f no interes t s he'd yet ve, tc:d t!1e r>cti on would in effect "Je nee; ativo , such a full basis :vould not be required though it '."'onl u be desirc.'..b l . . I V . SPEEDY DET:iilll.:I -N:e IOrJS The notion of a 11 tr i a l11 i used in the sense o f a criminal prosecution (79). There , . _,eJ. e in N"ttA of purposeful del ays tha t effected ri l:ltr . F:com our '"'tudy (Gn), it would seem if the delays '.;>ere in actin,_, u:oon neY. ::1onC:amus 1f!ould not lie to force consideration. t:1.e1e -,ere del:"ws j_n :9e r forming formal action follov: ing the !nel-ing of decisions m'"'ndnmus } )resuming tha t the courts d i d not exenr. _ , t f3.A u Jon the groun' s it .vc: s an agent of the Preside1t. Dilc:>torv inaction doe no t meet the courts' a:o:9roval. Cases c a n be envisaged whe r e the courts , ,vould
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56 . . NRA procedure c alled for advi.sen: to wri t reports u pon the mme clr.s1.fts of codes unless there 11ere no mate11i a l char_ges in the c.raft in the individual adviser's h a n ,ls and that transmitted b y the De:9uty (89). Discretion was g i ven to the to determ ine if the changes . ? ere This proceG.ure we.s : not a l ways follo :ve d , o r rather there are examples of abuse of discretion b y Deputies. One c a s e involves the deletion of the " secretly" out of a n originc . l "secret rebate" pro vision (90). Deputies . were k nown to e .sk tha t reports b e riela . y e d iri the meantime sending the code through for approve.l (91). Other ex: .. rnples there were of NR.A violating its o w n procedure which shall be reviewed (92). 1ffiA should have relentless care and issued other explicit instructions such action. 'I 9838

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-.7-PROBLELS S"u:=vT.AYI'IVE !-_., CF LA'! .A.Di r I STRAJ.'IO:i I. The "due u rocess of la\711 concc.Jt ilrs t11n interest in r ecent ':7hon the cou:rts have ePT Dlo"ed. it to substa:.tive cmestio:J.s. T 1e :orocedural as,•ects h:we been Th.:.s c .. oes nut !Tloan that tl.e/ can e disroga ded. Th b'lrde n of this has been to s ho.-r just tl e op:9osi te. :But , it is in tho of a rea.'1S o:r \7hich the courts h v e testocl tl.e ,,ro-) iet..,-o:Z socic.l econo.1iC le islntion, both by the Stc.>. tes a1i.d the feciC'ra l r;ovorm.Je-nt, th"" t the "due :oroce s s 11 concep t has beco::-.1e. :n J\111., The orO')riet;r of this use of the cone pt is not a ouGstion :fo1 cunsi'ioration her e . i:c:n: st;udonts and lanyers have \/ri t ten upon both of th8 issue. Eere, i t is only to be reco'=""ni z ec l that t 10 courts still i J EW e::w1cise such revieu '7hether it be couc 1ecl in due of l a n in the sense of p o11ers g r anted, or o.n y .i2n[ J,1J.ett;e. The judges have oeen accused. of substituting their juci0nent for 'that of the legislator. This sto.tem ent ma.y not be precise. Perhaps , t:'le viens o . the judt;e s coillcicle u i t h the traditions. of society and its judg,ment t!"e jud;es j_ntend to appl y . vested interests loom le..rc:;e :::'. favo:ed of our system (1). provide a n sanction \!l:ich , rei :.):.s u.;?on the courts . There are g rave consider!?.t ions of policy 2-gainst too y disturbing settled ( 2). . The evidence indicates tl1at oroblens '.7ould. h a v e orovided a rich field for employment of the subste,ntive " d u e process" Labor regulations trade. :practices are inextricabl y tied u p F ith the nost vi te.l "'9ropert;;,• i nte:tests. are subjects of uses o: the " due process" co:1ce p t . T}l e C[',se of \Tillar1ette VC'.lley Lu..lJlber Cou"0any v . . atzel-: ( 3) shons the t:y-pe of :oroblen c oul0. have bee n ex9ected to arise. The \"illanette Lu r.1'oer Compcmy , at. t:.1e tin e o f t i1e a: oprova l of the Lumber Code ( 4) , hc:td.. been ouer n tint; f9r about ten ; 2 .rs; the . est oort L1unbe r C ompe . n y for anout ei -hteen These nills had for some. U3)0 : 1 e. d.o' e s hift basis. Less the. n sevent:r o : the severi h1..mdred odcl mills in the cl_ivision h:->,d ever o ."lere. te:l.. UDOn this basis. A c onsiderably feper mmber. so ope:c ating in 1933 ( 5 ) . These tno nill's invol vod. aoo e ;'red to h, --we develooec1 the tno shift ooere. tion to -1.. • .... such a.n efficient J)Oint the.t com :oe t ed . :ith C a11ad i(U1. n;i.lls for the China, .:-m unusua l t hing for Am.erican nills . Lumber sentiment on the P acific Coast did not favor the d .oubles hift ;ills. P ...... '1 order made under the provisions of the Lumb e r Code ( 6 ) t e effect of cutting the oper ations of s iagle s hift ercen t . f"l.nd double s hift o lan ts b r m o:e tha:r:. sixt• Jercen t fran hour s ooerateo. ..J r -under the President' s = These :->r e the bC'.sic f a c t s . T h e situation uas further corrrplic:-.ted s1.1.C h ;::;__llet:;,!',tions as; the relz-tion betneen uroduction r:.nd s2.le of lumbe r o n nrlic h tile orde:r no.s based .... s ::9rice not being fully th,'),t hostile business interests doElin ated b1e code activit3r t h rough pror ,1inent •')ositions '7ith the Code Authority or its comr:1i ttees whic h put the and. the a:?peal; t he. t obsolete, inope r ative, inefficient raills ,_.,ere civen the s ame o_uota a s efficiently nilJ.s, 1.7i th the cor:sec:uent ne':.r li:.:e given the farner; that substantial contracts involvins the ""illaoette n i l l 9838

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t:.8 existed; that C0! ! 1peti tors hy for tine for u...noue:r.:;.ted nills '7ere able to oper::>..te their mills on 2. Dore th8.2! single shift. .ri thout as suminG to '7eig};l the 111eri ts of these alleg<:tions nre each of a nost vi t a l l1C'.ture, containing c>.s do of u.nfnirness 211d un reason0bleness. District Judge I.Ic!iar:• refused. the contention s of the Willamette Conpany CJ.fter trro ap:peals to the adi:linistrative agencies h8.d failed. The o pinion . . of Judge eD:phasized thn.t 111-Tot all inequalities are reg.:-.rded in laTI a s 2.rbi trary a n d eli scri!Jina "out such ?-S are b ased. on unjust Pnd. inadequate cletermining principles. n Theo pinion continues rrith a cr1.ref1. :tl revie':'T of t h e :9roblems of_the inc.ustr;i (7). It . concludes that the regl ,_la tion "does not, in the judgl!lent of the court, arbitrarilz r d.iscrinin;::de against an:' : 1ill unit" (8). the court did not see "confiscation" (9). The t hinl:; rrhich i s to be ernphasized is the willingness of the judg e in this situation to judge the arbitrary and discrininatory character of the deternining The cation is strong .thc'.t had the judg e co21cludedc1ifferentl] as to the char2.cter of these basic ::?rinci:,9les, c>. n Lijunction uould have issued. Judge l.iclJary, though u:-pholdinr; the 'acL .1inistration, W t '.s the test of .substantive "clue IJrocess of lc>xr" (10). The prop,ert3r affectation of contracts by FRA 2.ction brh1g s uu the question in another vite..l forrJ. Tl1e n o covering the problen of ttforrr<:!.rd" contra cts -contrac.ts made with delivery to be had at a future d<:>.te or 6.<.tes. Some of the early codes ( 11) contained st<".tements urg:i:ng the ad.justment of forr'Tard con tracts. The major in:roor tr;.nce of t h e YJroblem '.Vas given it the President's Agreement, A s ac'l1ihistrative legislation and a s contre.cts with the President the problera presents differences. Th e r.1ain con.sideration of inter.ference rTi th existL1 g contracts is the sar:.1e frorJ both angles. As first ore sen ted the problem arose .fron the Presitient' s early stc>.temen t upon lf.RA urging t of "for',72.rc1". contrarts ( 12). The statement was included in_ the P Tesic:tent's ? .een:olo;;:nent Abree neiJ.t (13) . This seemed to furnish a ':'TholesEtle excuse for !ersons to relieve them selves of onerous contracts, a...11c1 t o t o l c e ndve.>'ltage of the increases going on in the ear1y c.a;;•s of T'. 7 0 ouestions arise. this contract have any influenc e a buyer 1:.rho c3.ic. not sign the Pres'ident's :?.eenployment A g ree:::1e nt? a:1srrer 1.:ould seeo to be Secondly , what effect if any clid. s u c h contracts hC'.Ye u:9on signers in a buyer-seller relation? There are t':'..-o t o t}lis C'_uestion. 1. Can beneficiaries. suf? to enforce provision s of a contr2.ct to \7hi ch they are not a 2. :."'. S contract a crm.::p contract nade in consideration of the oth8rs -rri t l u:ro!:ti ses :runnL1 g to and. froiJ the other signers? Unless there uas relief u pon one o f oases there rmuld seer1 n o for failure to adjust contrc.:.cts .1o defe;.1se for a breach of a foruard As to P1d to others if a contract could. not be ST)elled. out there rrould seera t o be no defense for breach of a foruard contract. of i r 1:9ossibility is not :90pular with the courts ( 1 4); and , .. _ .. \TS ( 15) , strikes ( 1 6) , C'nd embarc;oes ( 17) have been held to offer no The code =orovisions adjustment of fornarcl contracts c .ttem})tin c ; to cover not agreeing t o the chu nge of t h e contract r aises the due process of laTI Here the courts rrould have to C.ecic1e if the orovision ue. s unreasonable and confiscatory. 9838

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..... Code i)rovi('!ions rerul...,tint; 11snJ.cs11 o.fton , :it. h the . .n intent <, chcc to the.'1 of "co-nt r D.ct to sell" (1" • T1tJ noble 1 Jri\fas one i::1 lct.,Pl Suc:1 1J:ovisio s h. ve :t.n in effect nhen interu:r:et d in the le, aJ. sense 0 t:1e rrord "sele". The effec t np:r have -eon to 1e void . J.J. contro.rts to sell t'l.t ,. a f i :-:ed nrice, L. th<-'.t -.,rice cUd not coincide ni th the price 0uoted ,.-r:1en deliver: • \7._\ s o had in the strict lec;a l sense ( 19). The Legal :Uivision reco,"r!ized the 01.' tle sltuntion ( 20). It, vcr..-reasonably, the bo inte:,;>retcd accordinr; to the settled ru.les of inter-_pr et:--t ion. I . resul t j ne,; ii1ter-!retation D.S -u:nifestl: ' unjust exe:rotion to thJSo in1Jroperl• r c:f<'ect.ecl rms S'l'l(!: es ted in the in teriru period bm. ore d 1 c.l.lTlendncm t to renedy the situation could ue h[l.d. I f s a -,rocedure aot follorred clue uro cess of lau c:no tion< froM both the su1)strl.l1tlve ::.nd. I>rocec.h .::.ral angles r1ould P.rise. Ir.ap r o1!er in:c e rp:: eta.tion of a .n,ovision r1hich the transcript of sho• .ts ..lJressed in such r.otable c r ses .::ts All?e''er v . ( 34 ) , An t , T:h8ro t:: e so of the statute (the L e v e r Act) ' .'!as to f i x a fr'.ir <)rice o;1e 1.1iC1 enoug h to enco,uRg e the econonic of rm.A control took tn".l OU"'O s i te tas::: the of ; 1 i nir:rw:1 -orices . The reason-. ableness of such c:-.ctio; 1 \'!hen adversel .. , 2-f'fcctlnt; ' .-roulo. seeru to be a. t i1e.t the conTts J: esune t o C:.ecic:le. I I . A PEOBLEI I Il T Ani: ST?.AT::: 0 I So far i n ti.1i s t:ne a--J•Jroac:l h2 s 1Jocn r.''t vided into individua l 2 .drainistrative lcL':T A case of .. O.nin i strc-.tion in action uc..:y serve to point the h ot' ths:c.rose. The .. t the uc.nner of c-. dr:1inicotr.::--.tion bo::. o a -"W' .iT:/ rel,--,tion to the l ecali of the Act rre s zec l •Jub l the General Counsel . H e said: 98:.38 11C o:1sti tutiQ w.l rii.:;hts r .re !10t :9roclrmations, or st::>.te:oent s of :9olicy, or eve:1 r.;ralJ.t s or p oncr to neet needs. 2.r e o :r the of force t o t2ke a a l ibert= or a right

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-9J. of which he ma:r not be d.eprived. Let me say norr end that the 1Jational :?..ecovery AdmL 1istrc-.tio:1 expects to o">Jerate so fa.r outside the boundaries of constitutional uo11er that judicial dete r mi nation, even of bordering cases, not be necessary." ( 30) The ad. ministration o:!: the Ice Industr,..r Code ( 31) fu:rnishes an excellent subject for review (32). The code contained certain :orovisions (to be more fully o.iscussed) of a ouestionable character. The De0uty Admi nistrator (30) answered the obJections to these provisions not b :• any positive finding of f act or statement of hou he felt these Hould oe administered. Ratner he sought to avoid the burden of the official for the findings. He chose to upon a special memorandum by the Legal Adviser (34) statin6 that the pro posals were not objectionable (35). Article XI uroviding for a certificate of 11:public necessi t . and convenience11 to be issued before any new or additional ice producing or storag e facilities be installed provided the main vroblem ih adninistration. Almost as soon as the code was approved for such certificates came in to the l i fRA. For more t lla.n five months ( 36) the De:?uty acted informall:r in. these matters. He did not consult ui th sor.1e of his interested advisers. He did J;lOt in any advise them of his activities (37). His action upon the applications rras not L.1. uith lrrt.A procedure, s parse as it was. All the applications anyrovec or clenied b y letter. There is no record of disa:oorovals or for this at the Code Sect ion ( 38) , ;_;r rrere hef' .ri;g s had uuon any of these The Code Au thori :proceeded to create certain loc&..t aclnini s trat ive agencies under a uoner to esta.blish "Local Con:mi ttees of Arbi tr' .. tion and Appe al" nith authority r rto interpret and a'.:_Jnlication of the code subject to the Administrator's. aoproval" (40). :Tecord exists of the Afu.1inistrator formally any of the interpretations or rulings issued by these "committees." These actions talmn ui th the knoTiledge of the Deput : r Yrho clid not raise a voice against \7ha-t \ .'as done. The early adopted the procedure of turning the for certificates over t.o the "Co mmittees" through the Code or in forning the applicants to apply to the "Co; ;mi ttees." There is no official I!ecord of tho number of such a)plications available ( 41). The Code Authority issued a bulletin proposing to establish the urocedure for handling applications (42). These cor:1mittees were cor1posed of industry members, often prospective or then com } Jeti tors of the They were instructed to r . 1aJ:e investigations and to ..;i ve tl1e aoplicant a hearing . The committee Rfter a hear inc its reconmendation. nas forwarded to the 3.e gional Adviser of the CocL e Authori uho uould add hi::; r:econmend ation. Next the accm:mlation to Code Authority vrhich added its recommendation end fornc. :cded it \ lith the rest to the Deputy. The Deputy revieTied the on each case. He then wrote to the Code Authority authorizing it to grant or den: the a } ?plicatiole 9838

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There is no re ore:. o .. tllf' !111'!'111 o f l1[ ndlcd !30 freol?. T.te Code ...... c o cl :Jivisi•)r" .oi :. .) : e rl)rd, l .t otL.c. sources nunbcr C'U1 , e :Jlr c c. C'.t "'.1'0 1 r ... d .mi.ldrcCI. ( • P:..j or to D.f , the actio;. of tho Pst ...... b2.1.shi l . tlon :rin. u r "10rl1[1. l ['I'er's11 ( . s mb10\r' . \Ti tl1 . t:13 ion or t \ c :Do 1 t-th0 <' :YJO intnl""ll t of a nou one (.t:.::5) Cl 11 od _or 'ctJ c •lrOCCL."t"lf: rrhc ncr DO"•)lt., c alled in r-11 hi"' ['iYiser s . o •):.. )CC,C Lt!o • . it.Ll r: .e j 'eG"..llt 'T.:..; tl e initi::.tio:1 o .. tic o r ctice o '1oldi .. t "0 ;1forenccs 'lith "'.dvi.Jers to cor. sider 2J.l .-u -.i)1ist:r-tive tnc C:l'"?lic:--tiOl.S ior 1 e•. or i:1c t ; v . The fe-lt tlnt 1ma .... ,ini tJ of the ed:iscrs mtltl [;O : :.: ; : to cLlTG d8fects. '!:i.s traini . "C..S <1Ct such tl:at be uoul d . .l. eel the :necG. for o . full record nn.d the of )roc er: l.l'[\.1 s<.. to into:: : cst :cu ties. Still, there r:ere no forrml s •::ac.e of ioL , < tl10 C o :l c Authori 0.en ied or granted e:r:>1llic;:--tions U"'0!1 J .-:--,,_t,-r lr; F.dvice. S Q:le ;ere so llr>nc.lod. ( 46). -T..:.e first officin l qttentior. . . rrc'lor: ' .::.s in JUl1e , 1934 ( 4 7) . Until t his ti: e t:1e D'Y--,':.i c s .:r:J.'•J to fo!'l.J tiw i r orm )ro cedure to clue •rocess ol ;rJ,ich t.Le Fere not c>..":"'are c e:tain . ;e ;10:rc:2. :i:er;..ii. .. snc h a s the use of Code ?.ecord to cive acti oE :.n official Ordel' a cedure .:c:. s wovided: ( ct) A-cr;J1ications s>c:,lt be v i tr.c c-:.Y.•ro Jrie:te Comi ttee of A rbi t:r2 t io?. Ao •eaJ. s . (b) The Conruittee st.o'.1.lcl :1olC.. a he . : :Llr on tho R::?plic.?..tion. (c) :J'o l_lo•.•in.:; the :1ec:-ring , the o.:.._,)lic:.t io-:., of he,ring an. d Te cor :uend.2.tion :'): con :itteo s .1ou l d be ser>t to the ?.eri o . 1al o:; tl e Cor"'..e ( ci) The ?.ecio11C..l Ac> .. s:.1o.llf'. Li.e file, '.:i th l e;tC2 .tio11, -:o Code (e) T : 1e Cocle c:.:1.c>J:z e ti1e file, "Jr ocu:re a n ;r ad.C.i tionn l L1for no.t io:1 i t o e l i 0ved . .......:1G. <)re s ent the c:1tire fiJ.e to the its reco:o::1erLdation. (f) 'l1ne Ac"lll1i::. i s t r a tor should. co2 1 ;i(ler the c-..nc3. issue 2.D"•J:.:'O ):r iate inst!"'J.ctior.s -to the CoC:. e ).uthorit;, .:>S to ;/n2.t be clone . ( < W ) This .Jrocedur e Tias in. effect t '..ll stc:.te:r.u;;nt of nhS!.t ,:as t!:en the yractice oDi tti:n.t; nentio;:1 t ::.? co!lfenonc o o::.: c .Ci. visers. As <"" result of t:.1e official sta:-::9 :-:;ive ... t:1 c 1:roccd.ure 2 ::eelinc; that ro.Jorts of r..dvisors be 6.esirable --;r err '-.1:n . -Jr nct:.ce o : L su:;nittinr; s u c h :.r. s ,:i th the estr-:.b}.ishr.lent of t h e cedure. ':lr!O i:!ont11s Lt.e:c r2.c t ice .of a :forE!e.l d..:>cket , inclu:hng suc h re1Jorts, I.'E's ed. L:. :1o:1t il the firss f orm a l order 1r o o n an a:'?plicr -.ti o n -:.ras u:rlc ( . ,_::g) . 'l 'he us eel in ' .. as for two n ::mth s Octo".)e:r , 9838

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93 -A-oplici"'tions for the establishment of "b2 ,sic or norr:12,l :-J ...... _r!::eting ::ore. still ha:1dlec1 b'' the o f ad.visers'1 :iethod. Adm i nistrative uere i ssuec1_ ir.. thirty-one cases ( 51) ...... nd no c:.ction . -ras tal: en ir.. six. T ll e great authority e;i ve:n to locu l comni t tees of interested_ oersons c o:used o. serious ,;roblen in fe.ct-g:::. therLv;. I'2.cts others Disinte r?reted, 0cl still others ( 52). tors of 2. successful a -rnlicantcoulcl not be exoectec:L to t:1e iElpartial jucUcia l :1ind (53). One i nst-::.nce to inJress ti1is uqm1the Ad.."Jini s An nr . . s n: : .de in Se pten"uer, 1904 to "build 2.n ice in Portlct.Yld., Ore-gon. The local coqni t tee ::.ecoEnended t hr-,t the 2.)plication be denied t his upon tl1e so-callecl ''f:-tcts" th2.t there E t daily "Droduct: i ve ca} tzr of s i tons, <'-d.:dl•r of less than three-huncl:;.ec1 tons, nere fai. r Ct.nd :re asonable, there -r;e_e n o or El. greements ::)rice. s and a ne:r -:ould , _-nreck the e::istinc Jlants fin2..ncially . Inte: . -ested )Ublic uinded persons sb_o'.7ec1, on the th2.t there e xisted _ an o per2 .ting ve o f three llunclrec1 t':7en t tons; :qrices Tier e as nmch as double tha t in other -)l nces; one cor.:lpc.ny donin ...... tec1 the controllinc; t n o h1.mdred fift:r-tl!o tons ve caqaci t•r; evidence of e:;-:isted; 2J.1c:. that the ice :) ::toclucers of '.:ere il1 excellent financial tion. ' ' ' a i th the trr'.nsfer of the Cod e to still a third i1;, Octo, er the e:;reo..test chaiJ. ges took The :Jroce0.ure n oTI b e ce:1e one c;onducted D 2 r the government, c ;ivin::; clue con sid.,.erf'.tion to the De1oers, than on.e conductpcl n:1cl d o n in2.te0.. the ind.ustr;r ;eobers. iJ:ne .DeJ YL1t y O:Utlinec1 2. r8.ther o rOC'3C1ure ':J hich is S uc.ted in the forn of nineteen (54). Tht? of the are: appliCe,tions to be sent to the :Je)Ut:r Ad::.linistrato:r for first action in--'-' steac:. of t h e J,.ocal comnittee. r i'he Cocle .ttnthoritz• :1e :::t c-;r:_ve certa i n ad-vice and to the :Ue-Juty. tl1 t his o.s e.. b asis it 1:1ight be unnecessa r y to holc1 a heo..rine ; L1 ' :rhich c ase the Advisor: • ':7ere consul ted. If a b,et' .ring l! a s one no1.,_lc. be conducted the Assistant De1)1.1ty _ o.ssisted. b : • t11e "Local Coi!ln i ttee o f Arbitration c-tnd fro1.:1 the ComJ.ittee to t h e Cocl e Authori n e): t The then a dig est on e ach case he dtstributed to his acivisers. Leetinc-;s of the Advisers uere helcl .and recommendations '.'e::ce mac .. e inc1i each _.:,.ctviser i n m emor a ndum form. 1rhe Cod e Authori again cor.:es into the ]icture being the De Du,ty Adn i nistrator of :1is ci .. ecision fort:=--eight h ours to it be inc orficiall2 r issued. If the Code t :r Tias to the decision nncle b : " the :Ue :mt: r Adi1inistrC'.tor . one ; r eel: 112.s alloned i n 1:hich it nig h t file briefs :::.1al::e :9erson<;.l .. i"l.ce. the order '.7a s finally issued, the Deputy Ac1.n i:;-;.istrator notifiec l both the Code Authori t 3 r P .nd. t h e aplicant. There rrere about one hund.recl old a?plicf',tions u '?o: ha..'Yld. I t uas felt the. t s peedv consicler<.tion 1:i'2.S r.10re needed the:u:. the _ull consideration c_;i ven the. outlined. These '::ere upo::1 the b asi, s of f.::>cts Gn the red a c :ue s t ionnaire drafted br the :Oi vision o f :1esec:.rc ... 1 211d Plan:1ing . 9038

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The cha n_:;e 01 the CO'l. trol 0 .. noceclurc .Lroll t1le 'l;l)l( r; 01 inclus trv to those o f t: e 00V'rn:wnt did 10.?-l t!1[t l')''Ocr:'C"'S11 flJU1 6 .. be autourticc.ll: su "J.ieo. . As h."f> JI1 t:10 ovC'":"ldO('lit oftc1, .lnd ital rr.ct., . Loco.L situ['.tios ec s1c' th.,t it s .l1ost i1oossible for ,'\ celltrulizecl [' e .. tv tlle :..eel J.O Ci..'.l cone i tions. . Sonetines sucll. :u:I.'Ol'T 't.tion . u ur.cov erod th'.t ,; e .. vn doubts a.., to t:1e <.'..rrt to the '1i:;hl:r technical nn.turQ o":' )rob l e to .. e certific?te. or 11..:.' }.i.e necL-ssitr 2n co enience sugs:;ests a utility cor:n i s s io"l , 1.7i v::tlua tion e 1 rinC'ers O / severn l k inds , r:--Ld ,::.i tici u:.,tLJ" i..F'C) oth side"'. :Dill seekine to de."'.l .ri th a inclustr_r c o erin.::; the c.1tire count1;;r \.'C'S l10t 0 . G :.rcll equiuped a? utili t;y Through C>ccident t l design several nttorneys =-11.C:. scve:cal -. e:,:sons Tii utili t : r e:::-).crience ':rere used . To clet0rnine t'_e issues )resenter. 8. ; lrnned course Do..s. necossc r3r. In .lr.rch , l9::3b this fact nr.s sur ;cested to the .AC::.I1i :".istrc.tion (56). Certa i n :;:'e1.cto1 :(l.ich s houlct ccms ''!el.'e Joiated There r.1ust be d.eterninec".. \Thether sufficient faciJ.i ties exist in t e "'
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94 untrained in the n r oblems of 1;rocecl.ure, is not the one m lst needful of attention . The e ase of s hiftins t h e burd.e n t o t h e Cod e Authority did not nea n f airness nor it desicnecl to j u dicial reouirements. r_rhe of c lelegation to t l1e Code Authol'i and its agen.oies as 2.part fron procedure is t"1e subject of le:'.ter con sidyration (62). III. LiALFEASAHCE (63) An c?.c3.ministration h a s a to t h e pu"blic r<.n.d to t hose ni th nhom it has cUrect dec:1lings t h e lwnest;7, s l:ill a:.1d the neeli gence of its e,geJ;Lts and those-to Tihom it entru.sts p oD'er (64). In its e arly days NRA had little check over the 8.ctivities of its Code Authorities ( 65). This rras 1?F1rtly clue to haste in coL,Pleting 8l1 organization c.>.nd the lJrevC" .lence of t h e industry self-government l10tion, with its corollary that li:'lA should c1iscourage the appearance of control over code authori t i?s• The v alue tha t could h ave b een had fro11 the.clevice of administration members upon code authorities nas never fully realized of c;de authority c?.ctivity rTa s demanded. by the vast of government redelegated to t h e cod.e authorities (67). Th a t NRA recognized the need for such a check is in cHe ated by.the creation of the office of Code Ac1ministrc:.tion Director ( 68) and the issuance of orders to to be alert for abuses of p0'7er (69). A cannon form of abuse l1:1y in code e,uthori t y i nterpretations of code provisions T7ithout N ?.A (70). The anowalous yosition code authorities gave to these "inter:;>retationsll the force of laTI in the ninds of nost members. Illustrative are a series of code authority ruling s for the California Sf.'.rdine Processing Industry ( 71). T hese rulings attempt to do such things c-.s establish TI<.rehousing and other charges (72), give the code authority a control over the figuring of cost for contracts (73), set up a formula to deternine depreciation in figuring cost (74), and prevent publicity being given to price lists (75). There nas no basis in the code or approved cost-2.ccounting s ystem for the action 2.ttemptec1 these ruling s (76). :?..esponsible J:TRA officials nere sometimes connectecl :7ith such activity. Usually interested officials knen i 7hat action h a d been tnJ.;;:en b;,r the code authority. It was their :0c:.rticuiar res1;onsibili t y to know. l:norrledg e and quiet ac0uiescence or disinterest in n h a t the code autn.ori ty did r r i thout actual knorTledg e are both o pen to severe critic ism. Even P1ore ouest ionable r:o..s the <>.ction of officials to ap}Jrove ruling s or lending sc?.nction their 9resence a t the tin e of action to the authorities r activities uhen regular lffiA :::>rocedure '\72..S not folloned. Ruling s L1[1.d.e ni thout authority , nhen the Aciwi nis never delegated the porrer to maJc e such rulings, or Dhere urocedure called for c onsul tat ion of 2 .dvisers .:md publice.tion t lrrou::;h Code ::-'.ecord. The i1all Paper Code ( 77) that t h e "failure to l lr'..L1 t ain an c:clequate differential in selling prices to the ':".'holesc?. l e r o..nd retP..iler11. is an unfa i r ' method o f cor : roet i tion ( 7 8). In July , 1934 the v e Con-; 1 i ttee o f the Hall Paper i .Ianufacturers a nd. W 1olesale Codes net. Tr:o lT?.A officials uere uresent (79). As a result o f t his con f erence a ruling UG. S 1 1.?.de U pon the question of an ll:,deq u ate (tifferentialll to be 11binding 9 838

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upon the and to be observed by all rna 1uf'1ctur .rs11 (80). I t ''<:'..s not l..lLltiJ. nir!e TllOnths r tha t :JiA 1.1., on this rulin -;. It then it ( 81). The sf\ m indu try iss ued l ther ruling s upon import2nt nwttE'rs uner simile r conditions . Otl,e::.. g rnve exces8es of pome r Oo...;currcd . Tr e Paper Napkin Indus cry assume(i to act a r . an inde-:_1endent su1Jdivi'""'ion of the Peper and Pul p Indust ry (83) [J..lthoug h it had n e vel' b e e n '"i \ r e n u divi siona. l code b;r t h e lTRA ( 84). Tb.e Shipbuilclins and . Industry ( 85) feeling that an lc.bor sit;. at ion in t h e f all of 1933 allo\"'Ted. of the indust::..y to' the mo.xhmm hour provl'""lOns of the code (86). :rhe D e mt;y f o r tl e industry was p r sent a t m eetings o f the Cod e A uthority and kne u that such action vrras taken ( 87). The industry neve r requested Q.Il exeiT • )tion or amen dment to ello,, thi r. practice, end it was not until Janua17 1935 that the Administrction evinced cm; y interest in these open violation s of the ( 8 8). The 1-.ien' s Clotning Indu
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-96Proyi sions s t a ted i n gene r a l langua g e capab l e of numerous interqre t ations s e r v e d a s clubs t o b e held ove r the heads o f o r uniforme d i nd .ustry menbers who could n o t afford to h a v e t .roub l e b y challe n g i n g the cod e authority (104). Officials of NRA in addition to the s i t u ation already p o i n t e d out d id. n o t o.l1ays f Lllly live u p to t h e responsibilities of their positions. O n e :proble m bring i n g u p thi s poi:r-'.; was t h e syst e m o f ''sel e ctiv e justice " use d by NrtA in violators (105). The usual of j ustice is tha t ' '7' h e n are brou g h t t o the a ttention o f ::. res ponsib l e administration they will. b e pros e cuted. N o s i n g l e off i c i [ l or o f officials can b.e held to be rem i s s f o r t h i s . I'h i s nas policy for the A6minist r ation a . s a whole was responsible . NRA officials knevr of a thre a t tn:::td e b y persons associate d w ith cocLe aut.hori ty to push old c T i mina.l char .g;es aga i n s t the executive s ec of s rival code authority unl e s s he resigned h i s position ( 106). Th e e x ecutive secretary r efused. t o res i gri . • H e ."'as ar:te s t ed, but t h e cha r ges V?ere dropped a s the f acts ino .ica ted the r e h a d been n o r eal crime CO!i1L1itted. l JRA never took any act i on t o p r e v e n t suc h persons, a s t h o s e making the threats, from serviw ; u p o n a code a u t h o r ity. Th e mos t honestly conceive
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. 7 CP API''ER XII CC.J 1PLIAFCE .A :E ThA u r CPdure 1.1.s=H:l in this fiPl d tr r.LPn l, R thAn that in tl o codP m ld nrore>s.. it is 11oro d1.fficult to g i VP ;:m acrurP tP dPsrri, . C l'tr: ::.n in.h"'r<=>r:t 1 imi t<' t ions rhouJ d be> obse>rvPd . ThP. r.l8S"' o ndministr:>tiv8 tion 'IV<\ S sn trP l"'ndous that ,-;: c-,-, it contPinod. r""CI>'11Rnts '"'hich 'f'!!PrP. hi.zh e r tl1"n the> common u rccticP P-n o r cem . n t reps r:.ruirod (l), • . '_. c strovP. to r"iSP both tr, d P J b 01; nnrticnl.arly the> lP.ttor, s tandards. JihRt roJTlondous aMount 0f onf0rc 1"ln.t Pnd activity nP.cessa. r y to make thP. structure> er e>ctiv"' cl01J80 in thR. t t he> incroC'l sing a rmy of insue>ctors did. n0t k<=><"n )pCP. r.ri th the> d .emC'nds ri'}Eld.A unon it. A comul iancP. d i vi!:: i o n '"<' s firs t 0 rgrmi zPd nvPr six lTlonth . Pftor lT ..,_ . • A . "Wf'lS initietRd. Non-corn)J.iP nce> hao the n brnken domn T'lan;v code>s ( ?). Even aftP-r thP. Corrrolie ncP. Divisior.. cmnP. it Jong occuo i""d an irrmotPnt ucsition (3 ) . Much of N.R.A. t s u uruoso could bP"'n P .ccor-:D1 ishCld ,.,i thout the torrific COJTil')lie. n c R -,_rob lP. m . It ' ''<'S tho inCl:ustriP.s or trr>O. P S COITIDOS"'d almost P.nt iro ly o:f srn<"'ll units th<' t "0rP.sP.n tPd sur;h te>r:i bJe> rocorCl s of n n-com')li;:mcP.. es to rnp1cR H lJU blic .jo kR 0f H . R . A. coo.e> roo l.-iire>ri'}Pnts (4). It T'dP., the> :rotnil f<"'ocl and grooe>r y t :n.,de, th9 rP.sta.urPnt businPss, :-1utomotivP. _ m .rts C'lnd tra .de . t he> industry t }1at g re>flt masses o f violations arosP. through i gnorr-mce, rofusPl to bP. r :r:"'E?lll ting fro!"l unre:-1 . sonablR code> urovisil)ns, or dP.sire> to e:ain Pdv entr-'9 S t hrnuR:h Labor or n r pr.ticP.s t o a c of-bP-tto r or _.,anizAd tors ( 5) . S1tua t ion ,...,hPrP. no in comrne>rce> could bP. found Plso 'Jrqse>nte>d bpffline; D roble>ms to offic8r s (6). th8Y me>re> usually contP-nt to }At PP-11 en UlSh alo!lP. . ' The inndequacv of the> staff num8rir.P.lJ y np.. s vi mat tAr what thP. treinin Or 8bili ty Of individualS tr1ring to S<3CUT9 COr1Dlianco ma. S, thAr"'l "T8rP. !lOt the> physicP.l lllLT":lb9!'S to C0-")8 rnith thP. major Viola .tions, 1 ot alono thP myripil nf "IAt t.y Ino .us trio,s ce.n b9 charg"'\d mi th a g ropt o f ros)0nsibility . Either fRiling to thq nat""J.rP. o f 1...,"7 e .nd nr i n the>ir g re>o(l_ to strr->ipht-ja ck"?.t indus tri3l u r Pr.ticq countlPss and>nforcP.nble> 1-:lrovisions "TAre> mad.e l e''T• C u r re>cPnt P.XD"'ri<:>nce> with national ; rl) h i bit ion s h 0u1 d> f urnishe>o. a It nrps hP.od.o(l_ by fon. As a th"' violetiC'n s we>r8 so n1.1!:1e>:rous thPt the> foclRra. l eli strict P.. tt('rn--=ws F\.nd t h o DP.partrnP.nt of Justice w ould have> smanued b y 1-J. R.A. nrosecutions a lonE'! had ev"'lry violBtion boon tPk9n to court (?). o,-m Law cr"'Pt"'s nPw urobl8ms of int"'r-0r"'\tPtiC'r.. It is doubtful if anyon"' concqivod tho vPst numbqr of C1U"'stions this nc,-r lpw moulo . eng"'lndor. As fiqJ.d r1e>n could. not issue> i nte>r'Jrotpti<"'ns the mhol8 oroce>s s of 8nforc ement rPn into Pn administr:o.ti >r"" "bott lP. nP.c k in that such r:1at t""rs had to cl<=!Pr bG. cl':: throug h tho "1rshington officq (8). LikP.'•is q fiAld ffiP n werq fpr from fully eauiuDP.d -rri th mate>rial rolating to the> 1?'"7 thP.•r 9838

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-98to enforce. It quite th2 t did not evAn have of codes werP. to h e l n administP.r. Th8 nroblPm of the field acljustAr a .nd his in , t Aven ha. d h e gbren all a .ssistencA desira-ol e in form of internrAtFl.ti()ns, of (g). Th esA 'had to both find fHcts and the law to thosA The first a0tivity had to do '"lith P ,R.A. • . AgPn,cies knov rrn a . s 11L0ca. l N.:S..A. ComDliance Boards" 'q)'erq (10). Here the anproach was one 0f t ing to 1 iVA u u to the agreAment ( 11) . T h -is means mF.l. s short-lived and "7Fl s s oon rqDJ.a . c e d . by the Corrrol Di vision. charter for Code Comnl iancA is found in 1111anua l for thA Ac.just ment of Comula.ints11(12). ThA rAst of tha t titlA rARCl.s 11by State Directors i11-d Cod e Authori tiAs11 • It oDpea .rs the . t '7f1. S to b A ed not a1one b J r government but b;.r Authori t iAs. In this was stFltAd lJOlic' r of thA AclrllinistrFttion (13). It is TJtTell rocog n.i zed. thr, t P0.1 ' 1i n i t i vo icn req_uirs a stRnCI. A .rd o f • ')rOcAdUTF\J d:;J.P. Dror.ess of la,.,. than adrrlinistra ti ve legislation ( J.4). NP.A, b>r its very ff!c8CI t n:robl8m of enforcing law mar3.8 b > r F.t. najori tv will of t ind ::.stry nDon a dissenting minority (15). If sRme lam had b,r stFltU tA mould have bAAn this majority-minority s uli t, 'l)ut the feAling T)TObPbly m ould not b""'""n FlS intAnso h11. d . Con;rAss n?s sAd thq l P .'I'IT as in 8. . grOUD Of C0rril')e t i tors tho J.A,-. b>r --:>Ati'tion t0 NRA. As ha;:o. ted the N • I • R.A. 1 s DrOcAdural scheme was entirely UR'"'• Its Anforc"!ment "Tas no P.XCeDtion. ThA only crimAs b > r Act '"'ArR violations of administrative action Code .ttorneys (1.7). NRA U D elaborate but for P of littl8 effort to usA methods of P.nforcement u roiridAc3 . in the Act ( 18). NRA ur8J. the SlJ P.ctacle of an attem11t to enforce deleg?ted l"!P:islation b y conciliation, arbitrC"tion B .ncl a.ll othP.r wa.ys thean thosA sueci.fied in the Act (19). ThPre \'flas creptod a vast s yst<:=lrn of r,trith no stPtutory bPsis th8 t long re:olac8Cl. thP. Methocls 0f tho Ar.t ( 20). T'TflS not h a d ag?.inst F111 kno"rn viol8.tors of tho Act. Instead thrP.flts, Dr0mises, and wora the COP.1m0n Only in thP. oxtraorCI.in8r;'l C 8 se was r""sort had to P.nforcP"1P.nt, so tha t the could be rightf11ll;r c .o:'!.llP.d onA of 11s e1Active justic811, ( ?1): ActuPl 8nd. -oossible meth0ds of 11comDlir-tncP.11 urosent thP.msalvP.s i n bomildAring array. NRA codP. s woro frO"'l O ' l A Fl.ST)P.r.t liCAUS0 s grPn tad bv tho Pro siCI.ent (or b y NRA). As such, thP.y could havo bean susuonded or for urOpPT CRUSP. ( 8?). Vne 111eth0d -rrhi r.h COUJ d have 0 o n uso(l_ to ob8CI. iPnCA from lJP.rsons or firms tinf! fro111 the codes w0uld have been t0 have suspended th8 code o f the industr y . The was that this would not securP. cor•r 0li8 nco fr\ITTJ , )orsons or firms n0t intorest8d in thA code and not assPnting to it, nor it qven conformity 9838

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from mP.mbF>r s 0 f t.h A i n rust.r.v e1n 0 ' m l"'s' tho br.ll ;mr.A of b ' . n Afi ts to thP. incl1s r v C'Ut""'i }1'd t h"' u . dPn ('+' th"' nrti0n O"'sirod. f simil?cr '"'<"' tho o f 11b luf"J f"l "'11• G•m o r n l JohnSOn Vf8o ""ith thA iQACl O f thP. Tffih 0 l of a g rAf\t MOr['l c:tu:::>?d'"' f0r , o ttor co!l d i ti0ns in in ustr r lf1bor, "'0 th t its ,. i thd: cp.-qn w o uln oJ.. C"' a n unb :'1r"' 1:. s t if"TTJP UY10 n a n ron"' th<=l right to dis'Jl?v it. This m irht s omP. of thP AP"1 difficulty 0 f D OT'TArs (,...,3). L;=ttAr, it , ... FI s"'n n thC't o a morP. t ochnir.p l but just p s s Arious n aturP could ht=1 r o 0ut of this mPthod. Aft<=lr ellomin USA ind u stry, ha tho F!OV"'rn m<=lnt ? DrC'tortablP. intorost in thn "lAr : , a n d i it did , wf1s i t on"' could b o C P Drir.iC'US-exprcis<=l ? From tho TTJOrt=ll RSn<=lct t h 8 , ,othC' c l to P.njo . "'Rrlv but ,hAn thA SFIT'r'l0 11 l u o P. .P-:1<=!11 ,.ithcJra-rn for nAtty trt " d e prA.ctice infrt=lctions in vrhich 1 )Ublic scwr nr<=l CAUS<=l, it lost much of its si nific?nc<=l. Thnn too, FIS tho forvor of tr"' crusRdP. n('r8 off, consum<=lrs cl id not c .'"' rofully inq'.lirn rrhPth"'r ch"'PU<=lr of liko articles was mRdP. ['nd sold. undAr th<=l 11bluA This discussion, also, a uplies to thP. USC! of NP.A l a .bels for 11 i ancP.11 uurD OS"'S. t1ore uracti cc>l , but 2 s unusual w a s by Her q tC' lot to lonr nho had not signP.d a . cprtifiC< "'t"' of com,,liFtncP. (?4). ComptrollA r C P.nAr a l1 s dA cision uuon this method m8r"' nAv""r ( 2 5). D e . J.'tG this i t ..,,Yll l d hav"l only bP."'n Af fActivo a g P inst indu.striP.s and inc.Uviclua1 comDAni"1s "ThO moul0. hav"' soriousl" fo 1 t th<=l of t businP. s s . Th8 VO'l }UC! of this CO'lOl i ancP. form vrill Drob< bly nAvor 1-:nor:n ( ?5a). As has boon suggost"ld ''FIS C.!'ljolory , uorsuasion, throat<=lning, and r.ruch loud talk a n d th8 fact that it 'ITas Y:no'r'!n that th8 courts did not look ':""i t h fF1vor u 0on soTTJe of thes"l m<=lthods (26). There C'TAr<=l efforts r>t 11 com u l i ance11 thP.t a .lmost amnunt"1o to a n at teffiDt b y WRA. to lift i tsoJ:f by its ' )ootstrFJD S. Provisions wP.r<=l pla.c8d in codes that CodP. mi ght su8 to collP.ct d8linouP.nt ass"lssl"l"'nts (27). This was d .P.lP. gPtC!d rri thcut thP 11c18l8gA . tP.d11• rras an attemut to AnforcP. sub-legislt=l.tinn and not euthorizAd sub-lAgislation, unless thA methods o f thP. Act mqrC! not in t"lnded to be V"'. Ano such moans wer"1 thP. codP. '0rovi sions allowing liC1 u i d .atod derna g o ov ino.ustry DP.sDitP. an o0inion by th<=l condPTY"Jning 8 . simile.:r orar.tic"1 b;r th8 Alcoho 1 Control Admini stretion e s unC1:u.thcri?.:ecl by Ar.t ( 28), NRA n cti "ll;r this mo.thod until th"' suring of 1935. " Comol iFtncA11, cen ' J o ntt:::i b u t"1d i 1 u a .rt to i!lao.equa c of th<=l 11 P.nforc8m"1nt 11 nrovid8d bv thA Act. ThA . Commissi o n "PS n0t ropdy to eny vioJa .tion an"unfair of comD"1ti tion" "l'i thin the J11P.aning of tho. FC!dC!r-3. 1 T ran.P. Commission Ac t (?9). Ev"1n had it boon ,.,.illing, -it is doubtful i f it ''ITC'Uld_ hav"1 a .fforded a succ8ssful TTJC!thod (30). A s-o"lcial aclministrRtive c0urt m ight havP. b"1"1ll a h"llDful ? f '"lncv (31), but thA of th"' short-liv8d comm"1rC<=l court shculd not forgotten (3?). At 8rrrot s of AclministrRtion to a.llorr individuals to or of 983 8

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lt1Gindividuals to sue, and in fAr.t ' a.ctirit:y i.;!10rAd. 2 strong line of CFlS"S Psteblishod th9 a .nti-trust lavrs to thP. effP.ct tha t only s 7Jrnvided t h A Act m ight b e U S Ad ( 34). Not only did such 8Ctivitios iF:;n nro this 1in_P. of casPs, but it aonarent ly the principlA statod by courts in rP.fArencA t o the NRA ( 35) • Tho SA orAvAnt ed D Ar sons fror11 suing to thA statuto; they d . i d so 0n the announcAd. orinci0lA th::>t nrtlY thA rArnodios of the Act wero a v nilC'blA, Finally thA P.mphasi s mFts shifted_ to Anforcement ( 36) • This did not immed .iate l y 1 ift 8 .11 cloud from NRA activit iA s in this fiAld. Althoug h it h a s beA n l aw thB. t CongrAs s metv makA th8 violption of an a .dministrc?tivA rogu_ l at..ion a penal offl=ln S"'l (37), th8 uso of dis cr"'tion in th"l annlication of Anf orcAmAnt still quostion able (38) as "'l'e r o thP. uso 0f M8t .hods not authorized b y thA statute. A snecified aid to t hP. rAauirornont of rAnorts and keAping of nP.s "'lStC?blishoo_ b y thA Act (39), but as has bP.<=>n sugg"'ld its US8 should hav"'l b"'l"'ln Mado sparin{d y Anr m i th an to thA decisions of thP. c0urts (40). Complaints originatod from snurcos outsio_q nf NRA (41). ThAy r>"ere usually in or sAnt in th"'l form 0f R lettor bv pArson. This pArson mi ght bA an Am-JloyeP. mho t that he hAd bean wrongAd, an interostP.d_ norson o ."'lsirin.o; to secure justicA :f'or Pn ee, a comuAtitor, or evon a NPA mad8 no qf:f'orts to sP.curA co:r1ulaints 'until in its final staP.'as it ina ugurPtAd . drivos 0f 11mass comnliance" whero b v pn industry '•as sAlect"'ld 8 .nd insDActors a s s ignAd to ca.rAfully check the comY)li a ncA in thet uarticulp r industry. Com ola.ints might n.lso come from code Fl.uthori t v af""'lnts rrh0 bar. bo!:>n unn.bl8 to aojust tho COffiD l aint bV tho '')rOC8SS0S tho C00.0 PUthority . Roughly, comulaints mi ght bA clividP.d as 75;6 concArnin.e: lAbor nr0•isions a nd _ thA rAma .inde:r conc<>rning tr!lrP. nrar.t ir.o Y'Jr0vi sions. In thP. case of industries having no trP.dP. Dr?. .cticP._ corr>')l aints COT'Jr:J.i tteos, corrr')laints 1'78r8 rC\fP.r:r"'ld to th"'l Ad.T'linistrPti0n dir"'lctlv . In a<3. o .ition, if thA corn '_9lainant or thA rAS1JOndE=mt fAl t woul0 . not rAceiv"'l Droner attAntion at 'the hands of cod"'l authority , he coulcl dAmand that officArs of ComoliancP. Division handl"'l thA mattAr. AftA r thA comnlaints caMP. in th8y w erP. r"'ldUcAd to a suAcific form as a mattP.r of administrative convAniP.ncP., ThAy wArP. thA n analyzed to determine 111That -orovision of a DarticulAT codA hac. oAan violat"ld. If . ther"'l were no substp ncP. to t h8 com"', P.i thP.r s a mat t Ar of l aw or evidencP.. or if it mqro obviously a 11crank11 comoJ.aint, it m ight be rejected. If it 'I"TerA not Anonymous it moulcl urobably b e r"'lturned to thA. s Ander ".''ri th the AXDlana t irn of thA rAe> son it hFld bRAn so tr<=>ated. A com p l aint tht=1t ''ITA. s acceptAd wa, s next ulac8d. u pon thA docket. This meant tha t some forma l dislJosi tion had to bP. of such c a .sos. TherA were m any CCl.sAs placP.:d uuon the docket in mhich no formal action 'I"Tfl S eve r t aken. This mi ght r Asul t from thA fpct that thA c orm l aints in volved difficult quP.stions of int"'lrpretatirn which had nevP.r bAon sAt. tlP.d. Ther .. A a . numb A r of r•herP. SUS1JA ndA d CClS0S be came s o old and such a burden lll')On AfficiP.n t adr'lini strP t i0n the . t the. w erP. w iped off the o . od-:At in T'!hOlP.sP. lP. lots. Aftor thP. com u l aint '"l'PS turned ovor to th"'l ' 1 rouor official, 8i thAr 9838

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. J.-hA comnlaints o or tho tTrc1P. offic"'r , it r•o s :-ss ign•c1 to c-m '"ltjust ...... his NljU "'.C'l'l0S "' " i.mon in t h-=-schP.m0 • of COT1'1 1 iancP hr:> r"'1 )roson t o( 1 th'"l firs t cont,,ct of g o o rnmP.nt nith thP inoivi URl . ' lho ? Clju.Jto-J d S"'llC [' lr:>tto r to tho rF;Js-ryondP.nt, stP in t.h,.,. '-'1-)ir.h mc'""t. dr.. a r o .inst him ano t'skin g hin to C"ns,hf'tlv"r thP. c.h['rf"P •va ... or not, < n-1. to st('lto, i f t:ru.P., T"ha. t hafl bopn don"' to thn violn.ti n , end. if not t Str>tP hi v c •siOn nf ' • A C(Yn y 0 thn r.o(lo Pncl. an o ::ola n tio n n f tho '!r:>Rning o . en.1r nr0vision in olvod mi E;ht .,...,nt ?lonf' .-r; this ]Pttor. A t> SC'IJ11.1!l tbl0 tho nt .,..,..,S notifir:>c1 . that Fln invosti PtioP '"'<'S 1 i1'1,f' Iil .r:> e1n0. tll ; ' t , h<=l mnu1t1 bP in ormr:> o"!' its If no r ul r "'"S ho('l:-0 :frnM this lr:>ttor, tno othor lP.ttors ,-.P.r<=l seont, thP ] C'lst On" infOJ' t hFit thP. coiTOle .in t "0Uld. b" r "fo:rr-=to tho iA t innFI 1 nr Rop;ionFIJ :JirP.ctor. Af 8r thA adjustA_ h". P.nt<=lrr:>(1 into nptoti?tinns 'I'Ti th rqs'l"')C'lndP.nt , hr:> had to detr:>rT"J.inA to h i s C',"n thr:> o had. br:>on a violation of t 1q • . I'L.on, :m1"'ss thr:> _ r:>suondP.nt would irunr:>diatr:>ly agrP.o tO a SPt"t;J.o;"lr:>nt, it Dr:>C0S S P ; "'f tO t_1r tO 'Q0rS1.l<3cl. 8 hiT'l tO S0ttJ.r:> . Horq it CIS CIUito nAtUrPl :fnr t ,ho r . justor to C"'rtc in a rgumr:>nts as to thr:> dP.sirabiJ.ity nf so.t t J omr:>nt O .P.S")i tr:> thP ff'r.t thrlt h"'l nTF'S undAr a duty to ad .visP. th8 TPSDond."'lnt of his r i-:;l1 t to er:ro8fll. It 'l'f7:s dosir abJ.q to sAttl"'l thosq "lDny C8S'-1S v.rhic_l a.s 0c'1rly as,ossi 1 .lr:>, and to do this thA r mi ght t1Pt int.,. such a oroblr:>m aris"'l and romain unsottl"'lo ,..,.ould cost loss of businr:>ss o r prr:>stigr:> in his comrrrunit,r . Br:> might :futt"'lr sugpas t thP of th"'l Blue Ee .glA econnmict:1lly <'nd noint outthr:> costliness 0f i)roc"'ldurA. Thes"'l arguments 'l'f7era 811 matto. s 0f infor:'Tla . l nP gotif•.ti0n. Thr:> adjustors in the main conc"'liV"'lO . their functinn 8S one of o.dUCi'tion. In tho. labor quAstions usual rA.quir0P1Pnt ''IT?..s thAt J,TIOnetP:rv bA madP. and a of co':lnlianco siF:nod . , '"l1ilr:> in t r E 0r:> n r a cti0.r:> in lations tho. usu;:l rr:>o , ,irr:>Mr:>nt thr>t Fl. r, f future compliance b"'l signed. Ho'<"7evr:>r, A i in J.abor or trade. )rar.tice violations, tho. viole. t ion mFl s 0r of tC'o od.icus P th"'l adjustr:>r and his imTTP.o.iato rofu.s"'l. to sP.ttlP. th"'l matter in thr:> indicP t"'ld. In casP. a sP.t '"8 s nC' t :r"' r.h"'c1, th"'l st"'lD s to ro.fqr thr:> T"lattor to tho N ation0 J Corrrol i anco. o:r i:!1 iato::. d.qys , eftor en Affort t o vrard doco.nt.,... n .lizFltion T';J('l. S T"ladP., to tho 3.of:ional Corrr0l i a ncP. Di rr:>ctor . This >)orson c1."'lcidr:>ci th"'l coursr:> of pctinn to bo H8 T'light decide that litigPtion shoulo This might bo. h?.ci es 21. rr:>sult of thr:> 'NIBA o r some Stato s=mablin,c; statut8. Th thA . t it •as a urou o.r casr:> to br:> rofqrrod. to th"'l Trado ComT'1ission . This 'l')ro c edur"'l r.ras usco in a vory fa'-. instencos . AnC'th-:.r course of action l'!Tas -prr:>sant"'ld in thr:> rr:>"'lC'VRl o f tho :Blu"'l In tho Of C"'lrtain sorviC"'l it ,ctor to thA but this 1.)()'"'0:' ' ' ' <"S 0 .0lP.gRtr:>o . to thr:> St?t"'l DirPctor. Throughout this ro.s)ondr:>nt np s not ifio.o. of his to auuoal. Be1ancr:>Cl. ageinst his nust b o tho . tio.s thB t such a orocP.cluro nffo:rod. Asic .r:> froT'l thr:> s ? .. r.tinns Pnd rrossure 9838

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pr8ssur8 which mtgh t bP. u : Jon r P.sn0 !. d."mt s i n thP. 8 ?rl: r s t 8 .trP. of the complianc8 or invo s t Dro .his rights a . s such not until litig P .tion ,:.rPs r.or'lr'1P.nco.cL i n tho. c0urt. There must r , the of tho. of tho. Blue EaglP.. 'WhAthP.r . such a dADri vo.fl. a n ind.i vicluaJ. 0f JrOlJo.rty will bP. considered shortly. the r o.s u0ndo.nt haCI to bo. br0ught into court bt:? fore a fin8 or Dt:?nalty could bP.' legC1lly assessP.d. aP.Pinst hi'11, he had an onuortunity in most inst.!'lnCPS to quAstions of substance and. , , mhich he thought irrro0rtent to his CRS0 • It b"" considerP.d., howevo.r, tha. t . :the USI"r of SC1.nCtiO!lS in P.C!.rlier stagP.s rri thout author i of la, r:rFJ. s . . o nen to sorious o:uo.stion. a . n d rni ght actually urojud.icP. rlghts cf a rosnondent. As th8' casP.s in thP.i:r d .iso stPt"',. it is P.:Y:trP.m<=>ly difficul t to 1JrP.dir.t T'Th?..t •irocP. dure l duP. , J:rbcess ma y In 11narrow fi 1)Fl.I't tRXCl.t i0n, a hearinf.: C'l. n y tim e beforo. thP. f ina. l collect i0n o f t b .P. t8:x:, ' or even _ tha . t i f it h ? s paid in othP.r ano. sl')o.cified of is sufficiAnt due D rOCP.SSe (42) . . B y analcgy, it must b;,. thAt is a pOOr COJillJarativA bas .is tax collo.ct\on and. businP.SS regulation, itmight . . thPt due D:-coce ss is t ho.. hAP:ring hAC!. in thP. court or thA Trad.o. Comniss i o n sfi P.d duo. rt:? quirement . :This . . is tho TP.T'lOVCl. l Qf . tho. 11blue which if its use T-l78 . s tro.PtP.o . P s a ; Jro-9P.rty right, dAma n qo.d full notict:? and. O-pDortunity to stat"'! P cpso. ::1. s ''"e:t. l as oth<01r safP.guards th"" 8ourts night feo.l fcdrness "'7ould. .(43) . But due of lam cen T1P.<"n much mo:rP. th8n oHro. It can mean fairness 8 .nd good. adrninistrr->tive l) r . a c ticA. havo. felt that justicA d Amanded. a mor"" clos"" control by uro. ana. htgho.r stRnda. : rds of thP.y haye not for ms. When thP. courts thP.m of D rOc"1dr"'!luctant to act. InvP.stigation to find violations ,-:rould SP.0El a lJrOD
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al:V 0 V 0 t' 0 I . :FElL C:::O C: I T 1 8

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l c "AFT.lli' X I I I A number of t ... w p J W G.1. s :,r:tA s o uc;;l1t to exerc ise a rP. s :oecifically enw er.-.. ted in the Act (1). I t s t arts off wi t h a declaration o f polic y , which is not a 90\7er, but 1 be called a . limit a tion, in the form of standards, u_)on e ow rs bJ'."l"l .nte.:l ( 2). Su.1.)reme .:;ourt refused to consider as ;;.. : n ' oper s tandard. or limit ticn U )on the exercise of deleGated ( 3). Act l ) r o v i 1es for cre a tion of administrative ugencies by the ?resiJent ( n. AlthouGh t h i s vo.s a novel practice it does not seem t o b e a s objecti onabl e as wany forrns of )ower. i s true d e s pite the fact some St.:1 t e courts challenged val1dit y of a dele,;ation of l)OWe r t o an executive t o create an office ( 5). T i e :yr e vailing vie1.1 i s contra r y t o thi s , as Cl.encmds of administration mo. J r c a s ona'u l y re<[Uire the delegation o f power. T : 1 . i s is no abdic.s.tion a.s suc : 1, thou.g:1 it rnny be t :1e instrumen t t h r o ugh substantive :_)owe r s are abdica t ed. Th e powe r s t c approve codes of fair (6), a g r eements (7), and t o impose licenses ( 8 ) or limited c o d e Q of labor provisions (9) were t h e real :nea t of t:.1 e delegation, sta ndards aside. The effect of e xem yting from the operations o f the ro1ti-trust laws wa s corollary but of utmost p r actical ii:nportance. As i ncidenta l t o e1ese powers, t r : o rnet:.1ods o f p r o c edure wer e specified. T >lese were the dual enforce ment p r ocedur e of ap:,?lying to t h e federal district courts or 1!'edaral Trade Ccmmi ssion (10) and the investigatory :;;>rocedure o f t h e Tariff Co nrni ssion ( ll). T h e ?resident wa s given the poY!ers t o dele;ate ori ty t o the ad..'1linistration of the A gricultura l Adjust men t Act (12), to p rohibit transportatio n in i n t e r s t ate and f o r e ign com. merce certain petroleum products (13 ) and to ini ti'.l.te p r oceeding s before t:1e Inters t ate Comnerc e Co.nrnission leading to the regul ation of r ates for the trans)ortation of petroleum products (14). T"he ?resident was given the s:;>ecific power t o r equire re)orts to b e m ade and accounts ke• )t, as c onditions to h i s of prop osed codes (15). In addition tne Act atternyted to set u:p c ertain standards for Actninistra t i c n (16) and the industries (17) and others that b e called negative s tandards i n o.t it was mandatory that be found no t to exist before c o uld b e a yrO":?er given t o a code (18). In addition t o these powe r s s)ecific ally t?;ran ter l OLler sources of :)ewers exif-!ted. Cert ain n1ino r a r e incidental t o and. a normal o f t ::e iila i n srant of (19). These a r e necessar y to efficient a d.m1nistration. o t : uer powers m a y be Ln)lied. I n the administr ative field as in the munici:;_Jal field, tne L n ) lication mus t come after a c1eleb::ttion by the legislature ( 20). T h i s weakens the 9838

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ticn of a cl::ti.J: o J i11Jli d wit h U 8 c yurts. S im)l it i. • s'i' In'l..' JfC, r in.Jis.)cn..,; blc, n . t •::1('1'81 "j' cnnven.i. 'nt. St t 'ent. of < :u i ;irat i.Vl' 81 t / t11ink in terms of t i u t ion l l: w . They c c ome to t w brond use of it;plied •o .,rers 1:1ade by G'1' cf Jl ...,t.ive , , , :r tall, lli:. co1le. 'l . ;uct;, end justice!" i1 l.n).ilrt in; u . ) t>c fe era 1QVter. 3ut ru L. in liecl >ewers <'r e not t v cc.nfllsctl im)liecl cla1m to E xi aft u r a b f onbrvss. 1711 sceJn t J llO!e clo-=>v'l..y d.naJ.og') s to the 1eris ati'Jn found in municiJ')al lnw. ,-o co.... .. c.jvc or t 1 , c "o \ .. ')1'' F.A c l r i t lCd ::1. c i l ioLi. • • .1. J. •> • • C. ' .-..,; o J - • ' or .. cic'.ert::-o.J.. ir :lCcosa ;. to -:..: ir stu( . • So, c fm•r o:f those m::1.;:l :->:o::.'i '.:ebl .. be Mo._t:.onud . InJ.crprJtLtirll js \O inc icc:. t o t ' o tho Ac';:o. t ii. n .. 'olt si:culC be i vCi: t}:o Act ::>n.' cocl.os m::.clo I t is so o t o thPt it c o ulC' oo to b:1c al:rea{;> ir. Ace , ;.1or e r e tl n other ve . r i m .... s : :.? A tic s ri t.:o1 . d, 1 ( .82) . T11n of co"1t r i'Ju. ... 1-:o_ o.i "'>S"SC1"'1lts 8. 1 ")roolo .. (::;;:;,) . -Jl .. ;., .. c' ..p-lrl.., . ..., r.)lo' OS,.,, ro t'1G"" Sor>1"' " ... -•-,_, -•--• ._-, 1.:_ .f "" • _r_ • ' b !:_, --• V " .__j _, 1 1 • _ , ,; ici::ont ::'.l a.i:::' Tin 0f' Co,' . o Ac.\'iCJri t.r members, !10' '8 Vt)l', is not sucl f'. clc8 . : ' "ore : . As t '_:; . Coc' o :problor.: rests >)Oi. dou tf1..:l :cot this tiol'.. \ oul ' seem to l'CYol vo 11pon the docisio:t1 of CoC.o 'Gy As lor< .. :-. s COL1. C tic s e.s .. ror:1ne:1t :o. c:::ol o f --:orso ni'le l =/0'.1.10 . e s sential. Af-nc"i co t,,_.., teo (':1 .. " "! t'"'r> ro ''lcTVle"lt of' t l""n c ""'ra e --'-' l--•:::, .L.. '-'-" ., I..J ..••• l. r'-J . u l-'--Jticcs co:1t: .:ary to tpcci l'ic o r t.110 .Act y;o"t-:.1(. seem to mve littlJ in S Q : .c r, . l.lO'.'G oi' cl1ese )roblems considered below. After the of 1-1 . I . _-.... A . e . nw.1b e r o i' writers ox,.rosscd. foelLl:... it be consti tutione.l ( 2 5). r.::J.lled. i n the ths of nomic eli "'2.s to1 it se ::1ed o u t one short s te:p l et;o..l l y for tl18 cm..'.:.t to Let. -::m1 r:ri so naive c>. s to fool it P'S COl".Stit utioile.l i:n t1Le t.1en st2t.: of tl1e c2.s c s . Pc.e.tho r t11::::j t i t h-:'.6. -ueen S.J the cot'.rt b, ; c. ::1ere forv•c>. r . cou::.c' u.phol.scs, vc1e exi>rossions O.L !.O)O (csire. T1 e illo;::;ice. l .. )art o:.C' the s i tu::ttio n le.y i:1 t h o fact t r.a t ii' t!1is ne11 a:, enc;y ir.proveC.. e conomic circtunstP.n8ef, , the con tio21s ;)ressL:._, i'or ths u:ph olc'.ii1 , o::L tJ.1e Act ,_.-o,J.lC'. no lancer be so !'?.A sl:oulc1. '1::-ve early :-:.12.c'.e 2 . Cf' reful an::. lysi s of t: o. cons ti tu tio:nl c'.ocLL1 e s L:.c Act. r.-oulc1 l1evo 2.ffora.ed B. , . ,0:0.'8 ii':tcllic oasis \ . n icJ.l to :lroceeG_ , -> rCSDJniY'.[, tffit 1T?.A cles irGCI. tle A c t to be u-:)holcl. amon; these c'..octrinc s was the . qu.Jstio;._ of i ters t a to corw!mr,::e . Po re:ts o f fec.er2 . l govcrnrne11 t the Conunercc cla ".Ge ( 26 ) rele. tcci i n cases to the 116.t: .. e of lf'.Yv11 (27). Ti1e a-::;roach t o t:w TLlcstion is fc>.ci li tc>. te.:: if tl"J.e co .rt' s c:. t-':. i tuie :'.. s : .:e u t hl . • Con ncrcc po':.ror VJO.s the 'Jortio::.l o-f.' :tiTF.A' s consti tu9t' 38

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1 0 6 -tioYlal fmmC:.a tio n ( 28). A cursory L;lance at so m e o f tile leading com merce c 2 . s e s rrill afford a basis u:pon rT11icl.1 to f orm e . ener e . l view of the com:-:1erce concept. I n Gi-bbons v. O F ,c1.en (29) t!;.e of the court v!as to broac1en co!PJnerce fro m cartel', sa.le, D.Ed traC:.e to i nclu(_e t1e .nsportetion. S2. i d the court, 11The for t ile appellee • : o ulc: _ limit it to ht:t. yint:, Ol' sellin.; o : m o1e interchan g e of " t t " .._ J 1 t t , .._ " ( ,...o ) corrun o c l lGS, anr. co no ao.nll u cnE . l com:._orel enc._s n B .Vl\ aulon o • And e.l thm1[,h :0urely loca l t1ansactions v:ere .w t e . :9art o f L 1 te::.,st e .te corrunerce, the Q.icta o i the court i ncli c e .ted a willing n ess t o juc\g ; e this q11.esti o n i n terms o f conve :..1ience a.nL necessity ( 31). This open-mindec.ness to pla. cecl upon .. rnen t c l1ara.ct erized this early court. I n f..icCulloch v. Chief Justice I , 'ars:b..all s tron;ly condemned. a rule of construction tr.tE. t not in to co n sidG:i.' a tion. chant;i:1 g ancJ .. im1nec.Ua t e ci rcums te. nces c'.ifferL1g from those nt the tirre of the g of the Constitution ( 02). A s a r esult t}J.e concelJt of corrunerce w a.s far more for the feo . eral g o vernment of the early nineteenth century thE . n it is, consi :3.ering the economic facts, for the t:,overnment of the t\r.rentieth centlJ .. ry. :Before })rocesding , it is ,_.,ell to re)eat Chie f J1..1.stice famous c:.efin i tion of commerce: 11Corru-nerce is intercourse; one of its mos t ordinary ingreclients is traffic. It i s inconceiv able t:h.--3. t the power to e.uthorize this traffic y:hen given in the most cor:rpi,ehensive t er!Ils , v.rith the intent tha t its efficacy be complete, cease a t the noin.t Y ihen its cor_,_tinu.B.nce is i nc'.ispenscble to its v alue.n (33) Later cou:cts have n o t bee:,1 so Tea.dy to justify :cegulations of interst e .te commerce (34:) i:n_ tJ.1e libht of existin g facts (35). Today it is in the field o f tr2.:i1s oorta.ti'on that the interstate commerce is m o s t secure. This, indeed, is an unusuc" l s i tuat:Lo n from that existing e.t the of Gibbons v. Of:;C..en (36) Fo dera.l ra.ilroad regule.tion is firmly established (37). The co11..rts seen tile n e c essity for e 1 1 system ac1equate to the needs of the co1:mtry11 ( 38). The cases do n o t sto}J at positive regul Htion, but extent to freeing transportation from loce. l restraints. (39) Nor cloes tra11S:90:ttation stop v d th r ailroads, but rathe1"' it estends to t elegre.:ph lines (40), pipe line s (41) smcl. other forms ( 42). Another use o f the commerce has been to . b;(l.fld. a _ {f,' -d eral police (43). Con bress successful where tho p1rr pose vr2. s protection or promotion of corrunerce i n the s ense of trans porta.tion v rher e injurious commoditie s or illicit transactions were (ei.1iec. tho nse o f channels of commerce ( or where there 79.s a n atter1r_:_Jt t o a i d the Sta t e police (46). coL.nts have consciousl y tried to re:nove v:ha t the._i felt to be im:?ecl.iments to the free flow o f commerce b y prohibi t in; ed Sta to 1 egula tions ( 47). The an t laws furnished a n addition-9838

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l ? ... t.c co"L'_t t s e Liviti ... r. i 1 1 (t8) . Jlhis ir. n ru in l" . : CD."'OS i.nt"icnte r i 1 0 ' iti 0''. UOOl! the -..,rrt t1.o r ou.--Ls to ''\) 0 .. '1r.:crci'l.l "'.i.t. t}:c lrv,c t / ' t coulc J10t e c"'ll-.f. L1 tho s .::so o f the 1::--n t. e Schcr.htcr c,oci ion (:)0). n:n'-' ( volopmc::-.t of t '1e "st .. r n " the o f offc:.ccl m1 !.1 oncon.:. c Lr.n t tv tJ.1oso L. iJ.i116 to roc !ilEA 1:..phold. It ;Ps tllOU_,ilt v . u . I ._t.c>:.f 'ore'. v . ::n.l_l"'.C:C I r.d Boa:..\,1. of r,:-acle v . ls.n .l""'Ct rx'.C.C' t!tc vic.-rs L". Sl.l.Ch ca;:;; e..s i:ill v . .;e.ll<1.Ce u . s . v . :::. c. Kni C'J. (G.J, . Vii t11 e libcr"..l vit, r i 2.J..:0 1. b:r t i n 1 crcmt DSOS 'oGI, C::::t1l'O.rcr: ;c.: cvil'.cnco en. i;,c'icfd,ioll t:r t coo'1e:c.0ti c .. c -,_ ot":uct ioH coP.trol activit; r..i'-ht c " lustilied .. J.r;tJ.J' Coals case ( 57), all ..;,e.vo creC' .enco to ..... t U"c court rro. s :. .. e .i:i.'l r<.;a0.y t o embe.:d:. \'. 01 t'i ro sea a corr.:-.1 r o CN'.copt. ::_j1.1. t , hose been . .. .'. i:. Lw o::. c:ec.isionc, in t ! c co 1.rt felt it v:8.s ctL' . CO!'!; o;;-iic.:cro :m. tions. tt.e CO'\..ll't ':'1 L ' nr, i' :H•s itc:co to 1:.!-.tCSG bl'O aclcnecl VJ..e\:rS J.., ... ,,C'l c,qc::e n Tc 'rl l b ' ' ' J r U c-(-,cl) , . . ,.:c ' -' • . J :... v : .. S .w l\...:' .:..0 o I \ o ...,(. -lL -.:..-'.J. "' v gave much fe. lse . 1ope .... in tr.=. S0hechter: ce .se (j9). It y;:o. s :I.e f'or th8 co,cl 'ts to 'uloncLcn tl1e views c:x-prossec. i n these c:>ces to encoy . ..,e.s s t t: i.T.I.?... A . Lont o f t horn cliC!. no t v rc f..., :c to c'.o o ( 60) • It . • ! u s t thrt t::.m::;_h it is c".i:t'i'ir..:'\ to a d iRtL1ct lin e , t1lE..t tLe co,nts clearly c t h i n.:;s \7Crc :ot Lrtorstf'!.te c omr:lercG (Gl). 1--..f>JJr,er v . ( 62 ) ilh , .s t1:e v i m: t!Jat fec1.er0. J .. e l ' cc. n ;.::>t be to i tO m S . 0 ::' tlClltSO.Ct iOTIS 210 t o r [' e;ener::1. ll;y re C Qf,llizecl ill iCit cha.r8-ctor. There existeC'. a b elief t !'ie "stream11 cases i n e f fect c ,_t :r.mch of t!1e r.aseC' of; case. li0vert:b..elos s1 it rre. s clca_ l"r o 2 n t ;_. t s case 2. ".:l1e line i t v1ere the ones o:.. o verro. led .... ,:ts t o be T:he c omner c e C01'1ccnt is 1:.ot :r.l?.c. e mor e cloar a s t ud.y o f cases i::.vo lvL:. Ste.te ezercise of ) O ':er. It ir. '.7ell :t:oc ognized tJ.1::1t till' t::: o.r t'he -=-t"'+"" t..,e r"'"'''l l,q torv ""'O\''"'r .... ' • --E.. • J.. 1 •• • -::.. v......., ..1. J.J. ; \.;;ob ...... r:..' l.J v O f tire {:.;overnme:J.t (63 ) • Jusi n ess :n8 . }1.-ve bot> l o c e . l anc . intcrzt:::te :->_, = n e c t s ::1 .... :-' +a, T;l.; s ; s true ..... -. ( _'") _ .. v ..L J ........ .J.' \1 -J\. ..:. \,._ • . ..; -=• . ... ..... to.. pe.rticularl; y o f ) o ' :.rer (G-1) 2 .m' .g8 . s (65), a::c.1. the o:yer3.tion of l"' .:r s ( 6 :-:) . Cert e . i n of such 2. loc-::. 1 c:rE.racte1 ( 6';' ) tfl.:: t St:--. t e ' s 1 i.:_:Lt to t c onc;.er tl:e :::,>alice :::one_ i s 1:.eve r cp.wstic:i.1 .( (GS). othe1 il:str :.ces the v i tal l o cal o1.1.t .,ei;)-1 tl1e "'.?..ct o f .:om:lGrciP.l r>ver71ent (69). :i.i'C?.r !!lore st2.tutes fed.e:ce. 1 '.J ot:l : umerically a:1e' L : terr.1s o f ::;ercen tfl-t:.:e, i.ID.v bee!:. ehallei.1_.::. e c . e s P.:1 L 1 terferenco '::i L:. t_-;,e )TO:!:>E:;l' flo\': of commel'ce. i s ::. ty to :feG.era l stetutes v1hicil i s not e . hr,_ y s carrie(_ b/ Ste.te stptutes. Then too, feo.eral t i o:l r..a.s not C'o ofte::1 ta.::e:'t r'o1T.1 o:f -•. ur{enin;;; co;'!l.-

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-102 m e rce, nor has it sr.1ac:.:ec. of governrn e n t e . l mecld l i n:;_; to the exte:.1 t tnat the h e . v e :fe l t s ome s t E.t e sta tutes cli d ( 7 0 } • . Some o f the e , n alyses mEt c t e b y ?rofesso_ (71) , _ ,ou lc'. sor v e t o l enc 1 some t o e.n c haos. I t clears o .: t h o U,hts t o realize thE't co n t r a d ictc:..J--lan t, -u.abe c.o e s not mea1 1 contraci_i c to:i-7 case s . T h e court s l' m o r e one theory e . p t o t ypes of c ases. T :1e. t o n e c e .se i s : )hrasecl i n t h e l a n,:;"Lw.:;;e o f e : t l eory c'.oes not r'lean that 2 . r e l ated or even c o n ctor y theory h8.s b e e n a b 2 . nd.oned. T:i o : ce t ho . n likel y it is qui etly a we.i tin g its t o be c.u stecl o f f 2,11(1. o .sed. t o f urnish t h e basis for E m , imno r to.n t co:nsti tutio:na l .decis ion. This is s a ic-:. w it_ n o intenti o n to ... oe flippe.nt i n clea.iin2 , w ith o n e o.f o u ::c . great cl.ivisions o f g over nment. It i s only ne.tru.a . l to ex:_1:ces s v i e w s i n t e r m s w hich may ; o a good deal farther than t h e v iews o n -the pa:cticula _ r c a s e . T his judicial techn:j.q"J. e m u s t be reco;nizecl, especially t h e t y o f theo r i e s availabl e for the co-cJ.rt s 1 sel ection . An ex cellent e xam} l e o f t{lis i s illustre. t ed . ir. t h e coctri n e s o f e .nc1 "narrow reviev 1 " d i s c usse d e a rlie r i n t h i s s t uc 1 .y . S u c h vari ation i:n ffi.::".2.h2 . v e a f a i r l y uni f i ec. expl a . P r o fessor Con.r L 1 out th!.'l. t f ecle r alism11 :m2. y i n -part b e e::-::') l a ined bv t:J.e 1 c : . esi res t o o r o teet vested interests .... CJ a11c1 t o the strea.m o f c o m merce froi ; l i mped iments than t o . exte11 c l o r cl.elim i t sove;rnme:0-te.l p ovJers 72). The comnerce concept :1as !Jeei. 1 far static. I t could no t r eme. i n still , anc, yet serve n e e d s of c;r o w i n g I n t h e case o f this the g::-owth v.ras u m e . struggl e to mE'.}::e cowiD.erce mean i n t e rstate _ there r...a. s developed a situation where t h e effort is nov7 t o Deke com m erce mean aDythin,; b u t . inters ta. t e t:ce.ns:po::.. t a tion( 73). As cases ste. rted t o shove e.s icl.e t h i s n a r r o v 1 concept of c ommerce, i t v-1as :possibl e to visuc:lize a n idealized NBA as consti tutio E'. 1 An d a s t h e neec1s of t h e co untrv hom e t o t h e court th2. t t o " foster, l)rotect, and p rom o t e co m merc e mi ght c1ema.r>. d rcgt.1.lation it w a s poss i q l e t l1.8, t t h e courts misht r elinqui s h its lon g t,'lw.r6. i e .nsn i p t o the l e g isla ture (75). I f l otte ries, _ . o -pium , 2.11c1 illicit t:.. e .ffic in v mmen ITIE\Y invo k e a hitherto non -t.::xistiJ.1 t; police coul c . i t not b e e X lJectccl t b..a. t grievo u s e vils i n i nc lust:ry trac".e m i g h t like, _,is e invol::e such r er , 1ecUes ? ( ? 6 ) }qRA fLo u l d h e . v e clearl y realized t:O.a. t the Act and its 2 c O J 1 1 i n ietre. t ion b ear hee. vily the no tioE th2.t loca l busine s s mr:-.y seriousl y affect interste. te b usines s (77). :Du t the c m t h u s i _asm f o r c odes l e d IJ?.A so far afi e lcl. that counsel o::J:)oseci. to t h e c;o v e rnmeJ.1 t i n t h e Schec h ter case could. mak e an L1.:_en imJ.S b u t y owerful arg umen t a c 9 .ins t the interstate character o f co merel y 'b; y n am i nt., s ome of t hem ( 7 8). The in t h e S c h e c h t e r c e . s e ars"L'-ec 1 that the ,Ne v J Yorl c p rice e . f f e cted the price -ove r e31tiro country (79). Althou g h the r e may b e som e a r gument tha t traC.e : )ractice s loc e . l problems e .ffcc t :price or a c c e ss to rne.r l:et , t h e governmen t ' s a r g urr\Gnt on this -point is not luci d . rrhe bUT( e l'. the [;OVernrn e n t Wf?,S t o ShOW SUC ( ircct a ffectati o n o f b y i nC:.ust:i.'ie s to convince the c ourt thR.t t:1o bes t i n t e r e s t s of our econo m y L l.emanc1od suc h a s ystem ( 78 a). 98 3 8

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f!.ctivitio s o:.l l::'A \7f'rc co closcl :eel---tee: to thot o f the :-o ... :-::!-e.'.c t:::"t t o ..... tic o f LA.volvL1L , it cf'..n not i.:.,norcLl . ':.h' .... ross has ' . l in c' cft.i.. i' ste. t11tc J1ltCh nol'C , aft 1 L1tClT'rt.:tr.tion b,.r tl1c cou.1'cG, th:-n 1::..'.' c once•:.ts or t1:-<:.c.'c lm.r (CO) . ':!.'he nn.lT0 ' . .' C['r.c. , l::...,itii:.G t!lC ve.riour, ncC'c."l to c'.iscus"'io;.1 ( 'il). The 0 -DO libe:,:el Cr.-s e s t.1 tLis. They atte.r"tec'. to 8Et!'l.blis•l <;t-2-:l P . l' : s , cust01ns, r-. n C . rec ulE'. tio:.s a : 2 1 :1::-. tuE:' OV3':..' !1inute business O .ete.ils. . . . o::.' tl:ose lw.•.c e . c.,li H'.ble L1 i tsclf, but a . s an ll'lm;:ai:.:-metho( o1 cor1_9ctitic111 llfC. little basis histo1ic:--.lly, e .nc'1. y:i.'o'Jaol: (87). r:! co'l '.l( not, exce:pt fo:c e. fm1 1:2vc loi. as r.mcL llOi.'r: t:,_ee.tment t :1en tho o:1 I-2.s received. B . f r . ' ul.' . to suste.incc'. e .ll i t s trec . e ( J::). The notion llbusincss e.ffectocl. v•ith e :qublic int(;rest11 ha . s "uoe:1, lilt L1 rece:1t It is El. useful i nst:i."'U.ment by vrhi c h t:1c cou:.ts forestall ce1t?. ii1'.os i J.-e.blc J.ost:dctive :ccs;ule.tion s (89). ' _ill!is bacd. u:9o11 the m i s t::>.J:en ree.' 'Jy Ch ief Justice ':'Je. i te i il :i1m v . Illinois (90) of Lon:. }{ale' s De Pcrtibus (91), now le.i. e L1 t11e l arr of b1.1.siness regule. tion ( 92). The ::e.s one of tnose rcgul2. tioE l..eve had. to face }18.d not the Sc!lCchter c .ccision inte:i.' Venec . Tr ... e YlOY7 famoUf' Cfl. of :Peo)le v . ( 94) much to sone of the rarsh e .nc". more questionable sic'.es of tho intel'est" suc h f'..s freedon i n mak i.16 '):i.'icos f?.nc'. cont::.acts (95). The 11liberty" o f the l 8'J01s anc'. lSOO' s seo . .1s to been . ( 96). Ir:. e.nnounci nt; t!1r. t is 11no closed • • ce.te gory of O'l'..siness affcctec'. v.'i th a };ublic i n terest", the cot:ct r :a6 .. e 2. D'Jsitive contritution to the usefulness of the con (97).; t.eflatcd the.t :'!rice can not be con trollz-:.'.er any cirC'l1Inste.nces ( 98), 'tho court turneci. to the process o:-1 2 .':' concept e.s usee'. h 1 tne f of treie l aw . Le .;isla tive C:.ecleratio::.' s of :::;olic;y sh0ulC.. not 'be hastily overruled by the jucliciar.'. Sah'. tl1e couit: 9838 11So f a:c e.s te o f C!.ue process is concerned, e.nd i n the abse :1ce of co nstitution2.1 restrictions, e . ste.te is free to aG.opt r l'lB.tever econor.1ic polic;y m0. : . ' re0.sonably be deemed. to ,Jro mote j}Ublic, e .nc.". t o enforce t:1B.t by lebis-

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-110 -lc?.tio n to its .. )ur)OSe. Tne COU:i.'tS are 'Ii tli authority either to ceclare such or it is b y tl:e l e [: i sla to it. If tho lav-r s lJas sec l seen to 2 . reaeon-2.ble rel2.tion t o 2. leg i 'slative :_JU:C:')0S e1 anC. noitl1e1 8 .. rbit1ar;y nor C.iscrir{iL 1ato :ry , there qL.,_iremen.ts of c'.ue are s atisfied.. 1 ' ( 9S) t this d . i C. 110 t mean t h2 . t the due process c6nceu t will no lon[,er b e .convenientl;r e.t hmid whe r e in a pe.rticular leGislation 2 -}T;_Jeais to be unreas onable (100). Perh?-ps, the most it moe.ns is that the iron I.lB.nC. will henceforth wee.r e. silken glove . Fri e nds o f a t the time of the :::.ecision of the l'iebbia case were U.l1du+y oytimistic. They f , 2 ,ilec1 to co:n .sider wha.t has been pointed out tl"'-9. t the court d id. not saJ ' it vroulc1 . .i:;.-1 t h e future unquestion c .cce , t l et;'isl9.tive;s or .declaration of but on the. . . r.y inc.icat@cl a keen a warene. s s of-controllint:; economic fa.cts, .e. ric . tllfi.t the Gase involvec1' the poiicy poyv'er of e . State. .Anc. s o iJc vre.s .. the. t co1.1,.nse i to the [ ;overnment in the Schechter case c i .i( not. meet an. u:nres)onsive court when the concey t of " b\.1.sL1ess affoctecl with a public interest" were to it (101). The lCJ.bor aspectp of the U.I.R.A. presented the most obvious l y questio:;.;table tL.1.tionfll bf>_sis which the Act relied. While t h e UP.A vias. in :i,. t s early stag e s 2 .1:-d writers y :ere declaring tha t t:1e .A.ct vvoulc1.' be .u;_ohe.ld, ci.. .WB: s e::cpresseci .s..s t O certain of the labor pe.rti c . u i a .rly wage 2-nc. minimum wa.:-e fixing . ( 102). G o rie i :J. J J though sceL1c :.10 for failure in t h e fact, t h::-. t 11P.A no.t 0:o or.t substantive l e .bor i n the courts i:.'C . i:r:J.3--Jen,::.l t::.es11• (103) Section 7 (c:. ) (: L04) 'of.-thr_, w.e. s to fit it to the Ji':B.n'( t.:n:> .. .. s,.-c1.sD. It involved a f i e lcl. ove r v rhich -l.;h:; CQUl''i:.'i:l :ha cl. shovw a tio n to exorcise a s t r oi1b control ( :::.Ofi ) the f e c :erf>. l . g o v e rnment had. been ro stricteC:. L 1 lc:. bor rogule.tion to s ystems (106), the coul't s hEto . shov v n .. hcsi f\nc\inb s\l;ch :=. n affocta tion of in t o r ste.te cornnierce as to justify i-:::J.junct'ions where labor activities affectec. busil1e s s usually' co11si dered. locftl (107). A more liberal note to nard thehanc.lins-qd l abor problems b y . the federal g over.runent he.d. been struck. in recent. years (108). Such cases &ave considera able holJe to defenclers of the N.I.Ll..A . • I n fact, the Go_,;.: ernmont in its brief in the Schechter case la. ic. strone; emphasis on the case of Loce.l 1 67, etc. v. S. .(109). T'his involyec3. a p1ocooding in equity und e r t h e Sherman Act against whole s a l e slaughter house operators, an associatiOi: o f marketma.n, 2 . 116. tvm la.bor unions a nd. certain of theL: mor:iers. Tho combina.tion conspired to allocate to y ; holese. lers an{ to increase yrices. Although the ccrnmerce point, the c ase within feclere. l jurisdiction s not clear (110), t h e court fol t tha t such a restraint upon business shoulcl be removed. Seeming l y the most powerful argument a t t l1.e Government 1 s co m m a n d v1as the. t l abor matters vvere used as methods of corrrpoti tion, anc a . s such, e .nd a s pe, r t of the cost of production and tre.nS l )ortation a 983 8

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-ll (ire .ten( stro.'' c.:' crt -:-s 1.0J ' 1.': O ' : . J . t •lc-Vtc c r.1 . 1 :rcc ( ... 11) . '1.':1\ ) GovcJ.:ne::1i att ")to( t o i tsc1 f o f vic :.• ( l:i. b u t nurc:rcd f...o-.'. i t L t oo .•. 1•t 0"'.\.. of"l.!.'i m A : s t o t.. i,,t , , 1 to _ u ... ll.C'."'i :.. Jov. ;.L . -:. t :_o d , })05, t5.r(. • . r L1t.)J.' S t ['t<' E'51C G t ( 1".. .... ). rJl<' 11C'r' 1 e r o:rc , 11 -i_:. 8 CtS i.l \ O l' C \._,1 • c.l .... to s t rcn .. t } ci :;: COi1S t i tl. L t i sis ( 11':) . fTih.1. r rosu 1 t r :--:; : ot v :110., L c Sun::;. oi.1C Co1. r t occc.:::• i •::t t o .... o nriCc:.. suc:1 (1J.::Y) . I t lon;. o cc. t.101.1. ;_t tl. t ::>.:'. 11c : .c r._ OilCJ11 .ill l ' •s4 r-.c.,tl ,.,.,,., .. u c J1.rt ot'r''.t .-, _so Ju::-. t i 'ia."Ll o (li.6 ) . en. S').C' t )'lc vl.l .... 0 . , . . • • . S Q 1..; t::r v:.. o . i:l_; C'1.'.t o:: t:!' :c ; : l :::: l ' _.C c , . .._.i .:.t co this v i "'' ( l2.7). l a t f n rt. s•:;s t::. Av _ e _ 1 _ t _ C[sc ( 11 3 ) L l:-ic.::-toc1 . :->J, 11 ..,-...,c C""C''" h t .n1 J o "'1 c;:t c s i "' o ---Jo :c r s (llS). • • --.. _, "--t.\ --"-' .. ...L. • • -. ... _ _ .... v . ... : L!Y :_Q")L; e.lolt. li:lf• '.;as C::f.10Shcc 0:' t llc v01".!' t . I t J" 7..:.-_:->t LJI''.J. s:i-:cl: t!=-C 11cr ! l c l ; c:'.c y11 af;.:.:-. c bc cr>uso llcmc n o h m,_ c _ .. cxiL toe'. L c 1 mi: r•l1on the deci :. o .. : ; _ . 'l\lc lo.::e "J. 02.S i C for lle_s seS<:!r:: l .t.S11 •J:..'CSCJ.l.tS E'.J:Otl1Cl' ir.T}Ol't!=>.'i..t Juro l' r:t t ... t:J.(;i.: O i s n o .;oil:-'v in C<>. l l ii.: . . ..!-. c;; l. t;_xos . ref t o .. r s j _ h .1'.tioll Y!i1 .l'G im'.iJ.St.Ly :.1orn-vrco :;os'-ec' +c "o .-.J . .. l o , J e 'o" to bop U .l.i.l , l. J.'-• v "'..LltJ. L_l.J l v 4' .'lL1 \,_ .. ) 1 • OJ..;.v -".I.. t:1cD, an(' not ncr o l y t l 1 2 . t ' L 9 ::c .. S' >el-:-. t ers to 2 v olunte.ry I t "n"-'o'"' .;:-. t :=tsc;e 1 t.--c:+ ..... !'> coce "10'11 c b e lc.-!=>. l l v \.... • . • ' i..t...t,..;,J. \J l.j _.,._ .'V\.. . oJ-- • " ,.,; C ._J v\' -"' . V \.- • VQ.-t.-DOU.i. : . t o; r assc s:e,'. co(e (l,Y'). =--.__,_t tl!is v 1 e . s t::.c t?,;enere. l t::con\.'l. ir: i!?..A. t::s n c c o s f i t : c t he-: 11 s e ss1en ts 11 must .;e :m2. c ' .e c o:: : p u l A 3 . i ,1 "u0 Ca_'\} . f . c of tho 'LU 1US.11P.l scl: e r :1C o f milf ; t l..:e L .SGi... I n Inst i h ,_te 0.::-?!:'t eJ_ V "" tre cP 0'1 t '1e .i .1.-lJ ..t:...p J • i.. ... , , Q\.1 . ,;:_, ---, ,. \..I..V •• ' l. . _ . .J. J. .:.._ :cy .-::Are P a r lim(::: t me. _e n o Teo vi sioi'l fo:..' :::-e.i sing l ( lm:. o y to .. on t:_::; e .ctivit i e s o f tle Institu t e , :1o::: rae J . o ste. tu.tory _:-_re.nt tr2. t it ::m s t ll:.". ve il! t h " . t t !1c b e r a i seC:. the I n s ti tu. t e w.1c'.or the [.;8'1 Ci."2.l '"90ViTe::cs sivon it, sL1c e P<:=.:cli'.rnen t raf1.lizo5. t.e.t t h e e . c tivitie s to• .lt :rorr tl:8 _::.t etL.<.tc :ouli.'_ ; ,lo: wy (13.:::;). LiJ;:9 v 7 isc t:r1e li.I.?... A . J.:.)t )rovic'.e for or :.lone;{ to c .efre.y co(e a1.:.tl1ori t e : q :Jens es. It". be e . r c _;u.ecl .e. s i n the locb:'Toocl c . no tl:::. t IIC;o n::_::cess l y :12. r c fail eel t o rocoe:;ni zo t hat tr1e a c c::1 cies to i'i J::o r : : the PresicLent pm-rer i;,evita o l y i nCUl' oxpcns e s11.(12 3 ) 'l;!::i s :."cco bni tio : 1 v . a s not r.c c e s s2 . iily so :cea., " . il;{ e x i s te11t as one •,vri tL.,-; e. t t::" e tir::e of t:1e fu:'..l s:::1o :.;c. e .cti vi t i e s o f coC.e 8 . utho r i ties m i ght ;;he Act Y l2.S so i nc".E::fir!.ite that thL=: v majority t}:le.t . it e s v ;ell 2 . s :-1an y v.r!1o s , )onsorec. it j.'l..eve r visUE.lizo d the .c:i::-:. _ o: tio : 1 e.! :., :. ts r e s u l til:.,._; :-9:oble ras t h e . t ' i'ou l { e..rise. It is : ;.ot to be cioubtc r . i f tl. e i 2."1 use of e.utl:.:::>r i tie s b'3m.J. ti'" e forese e ,.,_ t s o r ,1e e f:f o:.t ;.roul( been . to fine.nceC.. o:. l)i'OYiC:.e e . mctho .. fo}: fin2.Y::ci:.1::_ t 1:eir activi tics, or L1 l i e u of that t:-!e ar[:;e.r.leEt in tile Locl:\mocl. C ? .se mi g h t l12.v e boc.1 I'.1.lly te-nable. A s stJ.B.ll b e seen L1 e . cli2 ::.'tcr (124) it is op3:: to c:_.:.estio: Co:i: evoi' a t time of the :;ass e . .:_; e c: ( t r .e Act C'l' e .ssm1teo. to the coc'e fl.ntl:ori t ;/ systor.1 as it F oy:ever, if tl1e coC:.e sybtei:1 liE. b e e n ?.nc. b y Con,:-;ross , C OUl(i. have h e.( to the doctrL1e 9808

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l-12 ofincidenta l :,oowers to support assessments. (125). Still it shouJ.d be remembered that an administrative body is held much mor2 closely 'to their statutory charters than Con gress has been to the Constitution. It might be that on such reasoning the courts would refuse to follow the Lockwood case. It is not to be doubted that 11assessments11 could haYe been made taxes by act of Congress p resuming tha t the of the Act had been fou.."'l.d to be a valid public purpose. License fees, inspection fees, and other, taxes, and charc;es falling upon those the regulation and its benefits have long been sustained in our law (126). Statutes of this character by the federal government are not U11con1mon ( 127). Thel'e is no need to mention the tyyJes of code ,revisions (128). Some were voluntary, but the do minant policy of NRA was to make them compulsory as best they could be • . Re fusal to allow participation in a code binding upon an industry, withholding the use of insignia as well a s other method s were indirect means to make nassessments11 mandatory. 1TAA did attemo t to prevent the collectio n cf "assessments11 as u..'Yliess the made non-l_)ayment a cede violation and an itemized budget and basis of contribution had been approved Although the placing of a provision in the Co0.e ma!.dng non-payment a violation of the Cof.te was thought to offer a soluticn to the difficulty is not easy to see it did. Aside from the 11incidential11 powers doctrine which has been considered and which if applicable would not require a code provision, little basis for legality can be seen in the fact that non-payment was made a ccC..e viclation. Th ere was no such magic in qalling any action an "unfair method of competi tion11 tha. t the courts would withhold a critical eye. Perhaps, a legislative declaration would carry such_poten c y (even here it it is cLoubtful), but certainly the finding of an administrative body engaged in sub-<-legis_lation W01)_ld not receive s1ich respect. That the courts 1.1ould allow punishment of non-payment-o f ari 11assessment" is hard to believe, unless solTle real u..'Ylfair effect upon competition could. be visualized. by them. Although the cases are few, it w ould seem probable the't the courts woulc1 not allow fees or taxes to be charged by an administrative agency not based upon some positive statutory bases. Despite the unusual case of Hruuilton v. Dillin (131) in which such a fee was charged as part of the P:cesident1 s power to license com nercial intercourse with the South d:D..ring the civil War, it is doubtful th2.t IUandatory "assessm ents11 woulcl.. be cat led _9rcperly grounded without specific went ion in the statute lELA anc1 the l HRA Tiere born in time s of stress. If in the c 'nfusion of these days some thought had been g iven to the pests of the law, it n ight have been possible to have avoided much that irritated the courts L1 less trving days, while yet accomplishing much. It is not meant t0 ccntend for an instant that our present Suprem e Court would have upheld the N rtA if this had been done, but rathe r tha t the would have done all in its power to harmonize with the judicial tech niq:ue rrhile yet attempting to accomplish its objectives. " 9838

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. . 'DELEG A ' TivN B Y CC "1GRESS ;The f'l:cirn t ho t d l _ trnted ,cr c:3n 1C't be hns lonn; f' .1 C"'. l .emple for students tc use . i n the senF.Jration o f o o,..,ers t ... 1arr y anc' the tri-pF.Jitite division of rsov ernrnent . t rr, n <'re discern ir.,-s stud.ents san in t he great mass of Stote c Ases, nvolving r::.unicipal corporations p;,:rticularly , S01".1(">. real existence and eat in theory 0f non-c,_eJ.eD bi l i ty of po'.'1e rs. :maxim fltA -p0testl"ls ncn dele -:;nrin ( 2) has A l0ng nd cu::..icus history . It hDs been traced in antig:-:t.ity to Justjian's irest (3) as a . reference t ju::..isdiction, A n d its use in in h:3t sense has been the subject of more com::1ent. Professor D..1i'f i n a chrl::-orly 8rticle has pointed. out that t h j s ma. x im nhich has been so ully nccelJted in our larr the a,.:tthority of Bracton, har ... no basis n Jrr>cton but owed its existence tc an omitted cornma, "the f e sixteenth century printer" (4). So, these words of BrF.Jcton u pon cor1e to mean 11the King's pov7er is not diminished by dele etir:i to others" (5). T11is interprettfl-tion of the la'' ' is borne out by he of Pro clamD .tions passed. in 1539, which delegated tremendous O'.icrs tr Henry VIII (6). But to erase the maxim1s basis in Bractcn oes net destroy it. Professcr C o r r-rin finds the source and f orm having eal sie-.nificance for our law in Locke 1 s Treatise on Civil Government. 7). If this maxim, which has been paid lir,-service in this country for o long , hod been strictly a pplied in our constitutional law t4e fficiency of our e;-;overnmental system 'JOuld :b..ave been strangled ( 8). n feet, its upon the develop m ent of ad.TJlinistration ha. s "been li6httt (S). iJith the vast srovrth of adr.linistration and the gro1.7th of deleg8ted c1uestions of delegation became more important. This Tif:IS rt' .. e in earlier than i n this ccuntrJ ( 10). The old maxim non potest delc;.ga ri_" was dusted off and used a . s a in attacking statutes g rc::mti n , s sub-legislative U0\7er. In this delegation is seen as a due ])recess of la'.'.' problem (11). his '.701.lid seem to be FJ r1ore justifiable use of the conceut, as in olving a broad question of con.stitutionb l p r ocedure,: than the more ubsta"ntive probler1s to Tihich the "d,.:te precess n co ncep t has been uplied. In the mgss of legal upon the I.R.A., were een as but c1elegation was thought to present little diffiulty (12). In 1825, the court could. say that nt:1e line has n e t been xactly drarm which se1Jarates those importan t subjects which must be ntirely regu.lated by the legislature itself, and those of less interest, n nhich a general provision may be mF.Jde, and p o wer given to those 1}:'"ho to act under such general provisions to fill up the details". (13 ) 1838

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-114-T his , _7.:JS the state of the cases in JAnuary, 1935. As one commentator said, ":tJo delegation of p o::rer by Con g r ess has ever oeen i nvalidated.; suc cessive delegations, each greater than the preced. ing, have been upheld.n (14 ) T his was the important fPct to most cf the subject (15). Th e legal t heory of delegation has been suggested in an early chapter (16). The legisla.ture states the policy . The administrative body finds facts conditioning the application of the policy . Statutes invclvin g delegated legislative power are subject to classification. l. may declare the policy but leave its enforcement dormant until the a .cl.ministration makes it effective by finding cert,gin facts (17). The f8 cts to be found may allow a considerable exercise o f discreticn. This was one of the earliest f orms. 2. Congress outlines the oene r a l policies but leaves to the administration the prcblem of filling in details details (18 ) . This mode is particularly valuable where detail not in volving broad policies is needed, where expert kno wledg e will furnish technica. l knowledge, or where Congress can not foresee the many conti n gencies. 3. Involving ma1:w of the same reasons as the preceding category a .re situations where a certain measure of discretion must be given to t h e Administrc:Jtion (19). This is m .ore true n hen delegations are wade involving subject matter not readily reducible to trea.tment by nrecise Tnese cases a the line of legislation most (20). Rate-making power, until recently, has been the out sta.nding example. A survey of a.ll the ca.seshere would serve no useful purpose (21). Suffice it to say tha.t in a long line of cases the Supreme Court never founci a delegation until the ;panRma Refining Case (22). T,_-o questicns are of importance. The court ,could have questioned the standard a . s being too indefinite, or it could }fave said this is a non-delega.ble power. Even todaY: the court ha. s never said that :::lny pC!rticula.r atteu2,1ts to delegate ] JOwers of Ccngress are bad as the -powers non-delegeble. This line of approach. shou;Ld not bei.:thought to be closed, however (23). In light of the decisions the iinporto?n t question is how definite :t1ust a . stenda. rcl be. In Field" . + . Clark ( 21-1) if the President found the si tua.tion as tc a . n y COuntry in co nne ctfo n : v .ri th certain i terns flrecip rOCC!lly unequal and unrea.sona.ble" .he was .req-llired ."to suspend the free list. Though this might not present a very problem the standard was not stated in terms, and. though manda .torily stated, by placing the poner in the President's hands it became discretionary. A similar standard, thoug h not to be exercised by the President, is found in the power given the Secretary o f W a . r to require changes or alterations in a bridge over a. navigable stream if he finds that it is "an unrea.sonable obstruction to the free navigation of such waters!! (25). But Tihere terms of general na.ture used in a. standard such as one for the 8pprov81 of film s found to be IJof ' a mora.l, educational, or amusing and harmless character11, the standard would seem to be a pproaching the realm of indefinite ncrns. Th e Supreme Ccurt did not object to this stRndard, though (26). Even the genera. l t e rm " public interestn was treated a.s a proper standard, the court seeing it as limited as the act "was designed to better assure adequa c y i n transportation service" (27). A similar standard is found . in the rrords •••• in the interest of the public and of comm.erce" found in Avent v. u.s. (28). A st
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J.l 'resident t0 me1ce exce})t ion s "in th '1ubl i c in tl r a s t " to the r ule fer ;nle c ... c:lien propert. to the hiLhe<-t b i dC:er at a uubJ.ic s:Jle. Such c >rrvisc hCJs nr gre,') t e r renuiremcnt th:m tnet DreP.1lJued t n c • 1Pli cl b n i n mplci!lg n . It can oasiJ.;r be underst0on, fro1 1 these few exn .. o l e s . wby the Jlroble, o f stAndords t.':'ns no1 : . he '-\ . .:1 t t o pre sent any serious oro blem. ...,;Ven ,,hen o bje c v.•n s t"i:'e assumption of p0 ie r unr.1e ccnst r 1ctive th ught upo n the question of LeleE;;ation • .JrOJ tlese c oses it w , s 1Jossible to set UJ' certc:lin tests het delegation shoul d mee t to e s cvpe criticism ( 31). A s the presented its c G s e t o the Su_ u reme Court t w o o f the stan de>rds ,f the Act i e r e negntive i n charf1cte r (3:-) . These ' . lllere the ;hat 1 . there b e no i ne(luitable restrlctiC'n upon admission t o •1embersh i p md the reqni:.emen t tht tLe be trul , r rep resentativ-.:, ::1nd 2 . ;ha t t he c edes sh<"'1J.ld not Dnrote F l c::lODClies or eli m inate or onur ess ;mall e: ter prises (36). :a> merely s:rr . in<:.'; 11hot ced e s could not. be, no ;tanciards were s e t up tc P,uide the President i n aopr cving codes. For a 10sitive guidance r esort mus t b"' hod. to t lle third s t a ndard suggested b y ;he s brief t h e eccLe s must tend to e ffectuate the policy .eid a.oun in the Act (37). rhe Decla ratic n o f Policy s eem s t o be CJ. brocJd. 1re:>i :ible ( 0 B). The objective s o f the Act cne stated. i n broad Flnd Dossibl y terms. h'ia inly is made to industry and labor, rit i.1cut restricting these to CJny con cept of interstate commerce . iug:;estio:..1s as to the method to accomnlish t hese brm d objectives Tiere tot fcund in the Act. Broad hAv e 'been approved but never hC'l.d ;c many ancl. !JC' ssi bljc ontradictory ones been co ntaine d in one Act ' :.'hich .ndicated n o basic or underlying plan. It wns obvious that the CC'ngress Lid net lmow ''hat 7ould be do ne, nor did the Administration. Here V:S lbdicaticn. The C ongress hacl SC'lid, tl=lke over the r>roblems of industry md la.bcr, p h rasing it i n p latitudinous Despite what a mal;;,-sis uould have s h0vm at e>ny time, t h e P?na. m a decision ( 39) :a!i1e as a . distinct surprise to most i n f o r med -persons. Delegations in had go n e much farther than they hc.d in this country, the English being without judicial review have had difficulty in curbing t hem :40) . Delegations in the Uni tecl States h aving been s 0 bread as has just )een seen, it seems t ha t in t he PEmama case the maxim directe d a . ga .inst iele[.,c:ticn nrises as a ghost t o hamper" ( 41) go vernment. That t his ma.xim vhich had been kept alive by the Stf1t e cour t s as part of the unwritten ::onstitution (42) ''?O u l d cor.:e tr: ;Jla_3,ue the f ederal Cong r ess had been seen b y 2 few students (43), But Chief Justice opi nion in the :?na. a Case gave flesh and ste>t ure to this s k eleton ' 7hich had so long rattled in ou11 ccnstitutional c lose t s . Here vras a case that that h ? d been intimat e d there were caees where the judges would G.ra.w the Line ( 44) . The co urt felt a--lparently thFlt if it u phel d the de f :.e e as it was from stand a r d s , "it be idle t c pretend that anything Yould. oe left of 1 ir:1i tat ions upon t h e powe r o f Con gress to d.elegate laTI nak ing functions" (45). J ustice Cardoza c ontended against the C hief 3 838

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1 1 6 -Justice that the policy of the Act becar. 1 e t h e stan dards f o r 9(c) (46), al thn_,_gh later in the Schechter Cas e he did not feel t hpt it provided. El. standard f e r 3(a ) (47). The most precise reeding ' c!ill hArdly discover tha.11 here , a.s a delegation in a field where t h e c o1:rt felt teo broe. d standards undesirable. 9838

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1? XV D:CLE ATI In the t i!1:-.f:"nr.e "clninirtr"ti0: L "X,'rci•;c of ri l01 : t cl ro':lcr (1). It ''l"'c i<-t.L"'r c\ i!1t ; tl io of' ;7,o•:rc.rr-fwl, ti01 o . O"rd o_ O"J•lisciol1 i'l gi c pm.rer it in l'-IX c'. trt t1ic O\'C-ill be (:.--rci;cll:;t su crtli: t ::;. TL mcrau0r" 'f 10:rd or co li'lL. i o' or t>."' •. i:-;tl' Lor (if one :1""1 : ..... on tire 1"'ibi 1 . i t ) rt.:'"'}JOl'"'i' l0 i'o. t "' of t:i.1 .... -.ltl-lrity, '.t th3. cxc.:>'Jt L : L1c 10 t 11i:'t0r i1: t, 11crforf'l. t_._..,_c M;ri;-.(1 of c:et ilo rr '"-1r1Lti:-tl' ticm f.'1.ti i; tr.le e dutie::: ., . .., riled U.D )! t .C 1 w .• crc Coj: t : r c ..,s :1 1 r ll.r L1tcndec to t1.1.r _ t:_,.,. ''>.Ltcr ove-r to excc,ltivc :ecir;io:1 (j). T:_cre bGc1 r'o unifor to . ; w< ctice in c;t; .ti":g ocr or :i:)O"'er s C') l-l.hl 1: e ::.e.'.c lc:-ted, s--,ec::. l l .r r.rllGre it :;ee:n t > t t!::.e r:ill c rf-:nmco . y cubordhl".tes (4). The r e i t ic power vrill t: l ' ecloloe;r-.tcc ' to i!loffir.i , _ st-tutos h".ve , .Gn :-:1or o (r-. ) . I n t}l..; c 'Y:ntc it . ..> oocn s e er. t>r t c:i.o lG[.;t' .ti'): by Congre('s >'.c.. : 1cr c1 quc .... of lYt1.:.:1i-:.-': L l t::::;:c.--.t until recentl y . 'i'r . i s i s tr .e of the -:rob l c r n of 1'0"/Gr ... b,r t -'nnn .... Y nL-l l'11 ,._:. v . 'v\' b .. ... , . _,_. ... ') vv i:.;')t... .. .. v --. '-'\.,-'"v ..... J..L -- • lirdtr-i s t>.e :l OTJ7l" l im:) lic:--tio;;_ firc-t CClC0'.t io:-to "'-Jrli!'listr::.tio: • Tw quc::;th,I'. :;.r1; " ".rirc s C01J_lcl r C i }' iont of t':"c :po .. •,rs from Co11LJC"S o I".l' i 'u.:; t:.:.t L lt' Cf1Ur t s '.rou _ll_ i:wolm tho m"'.xLn 11d.olef..:rt<'. 'otcstes • m: oot c c t ,_aloe r i11? It --oul-J s ec;: 1 t : thi s mi{-'..'lC _r_-,,en . I f t1l8 st tutor,, --,:;:cticc. i s to S) cific-l l, mention to ltt"'.''c. -+:.o "' . nJt Circctl,r"::.;-Jo:lsibl e to ... ..,# \,. u L:.:> .-... y _ eccivL!.l;. Llc r,o-..t l er'st eli,_: ::-wt --,::.olo " : 1.ot , ,)e cific ..... llJ b;: it • . " r c >:_;the <:>.c_e!l.c;{ or ,..,(.;rso:: rccoi vint, b•J.t t,!(: .. ,rGG<'UJ'O of YJor L tton rcso:. t to s t:::.ff "'"'.-::l rs t_•,; c: l. c: ., ..... . C 'l,.-, ...... C ltr> / • i cot _l. c or' "clnil o'b-' '-" JoJ ._ .-... ' v ....... _ ;_ .L. l L u V ..., _.. .-,;> v • ' -',J .L ' joct_;_0:'l trh; ;''YOl.U1d not :-.r i s e . r_r};_i s i s ['.S lons -s r nt cxcrcisec. <'j ,cJ. ._., .... _..., ros)_10::si'Jl o f e r pouors dc1o .... t o it, no q_--1estio. vJO-;,:.lC:. G<..!em lE:-.l.l to come U } ) • S') with the n i s fu:r_cti;r::s t o --c r i;:et Clfic<.;l' or ot!:.Cl' offici--.1' for i::.1; u : ::us;.lf.l s i tu_ .... _ t io1l suc h porsc:1 s m ic;ht be :::'J:;. sidor e c 1 T':.rt of 1 i s s t ..,f f . Tl1i s }Jro-Dlem is il: the r e.lrn. of . l')e 'culp. t i ., n , : 10 c'.i roct , 0 1_;_t coll:,t or:-1 i1 tho c sc s . I t woul d ecm lo,;ic" 1 to c::_::•oct : : c sy.JO:..lsibili ty f'Ll"_l 6.e ter.:!L"!rotiol:. t o ctr. y i n L 1e l)erson o r :-.ce:1cy recei vinl; t::.c :J'Jwo r f:oY:'l C o:1' _ rcss. As Ll t h e q1J.cs of L o-.-Con[: r e s:: t hore not be .... .-i__,di c ,".tio n . I t i;t.," . y be t.l.".t oi':'-'et c:--.;.1 l;c too :rt.,li:-...n c c oo i !1t;_; g ive d to t : C r0CO t oi' r < l V iSO!.': :-,[_.e:"lCiCS 1 bv.t i s :-'. of t!lC huPl -"', n eau:-.Gi Oi1 r ".-.'.ily t rc. .s r, ctcr ')l l:'.w • (5) Ti1e N IRA speci f ic l lJr st<-tet1. t'.: t t'1c:. .ni:: t t h e c-O'''rr.-. -.; c, 'r-il l.:•_ + o 11o-;f l c "' "'•lCl <....-.,.noloy...,ec:-11 (7 ) . u..J...L v . _ .._ L. _ ) v ...> c._; ..1- • _ v \.;..; t .. ..__ .. '-' t .... _ '-" u I t die ... ilot r'.ut'1o :::.'ize b;• tbc:t. The ?rcsi d i6. est ..... blish mor e ti1o u: .:Gc l' t _ o t:: of the A c t (3). e...,e --.:;;encies vrerc not t o but ,.d.Ju"l c t or '1.cies o f eq_1'..."'.l s t'.tus t o t l ... e President i :l r' . t:1c .c\.ct . T : i e s t .... o f

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-113. . such <'{;encies w .--..s never c1e".r (9), b1..:.t r> s 's wer e cre<'.tod by . the President co :1ot quostiojl of rcr .tot e • J:ho d.eleg::.tions m2.l: e ':;y executive .".ro oncn to 't}'}is qu.estion o i t-,1 e r (10). T:1ey, t oo , vrerc .'..uti.1orized ti. c s.f:"e r ovisio:1 of the Act. ? e legr. tio11 the N.HA, horcvec, opc::1 t o q r.estion. Power wc:. s r cd.e1ef:;".tcd ty t h e rJ.tiorlc. l I nl'.ustri:.:.l :;:kcovc:? 3o<.'.rd to the D &puty AG.minist:c-tor for (11) fer .Al::-. s J : r. ( 12) to exercise the poners b ;)" Prcsi (,e:J.t to t!1c rise LK AC:.minis ::.r ..... tor r ccle1ec:--.teC:.. p owe r t o the :::-:•eputy .A.:ID.il1istr.tnr of t !e Servic& Tr<'des S ectiol. to '-:•lJ:;rove tr.:-.cle<' . s c.::1 : : . reL.tcd (13) <'.r..d to .A.dministr::tor of the j)i stri tuti:tl?.; Trc-des S ection to <'-1Jprove c ert::-.i11 loc,_l code t 'ies ncJ. cour..;ils (14). :Sven more q1."Lestion C'.b1e vvr. s the V ".s t l' e dolego.tion (15) to Code Autnori tics (16) by !.IRA. Those. redelegc:.tions wore not usUr':'..lly in t !K form of offici.:->.1 orders (17). Power VJ<:'.s given, n : 1 ( gi vc11 by tnc code p rovisions conto.inL1 g 'such J f Whe!: the o f )OWer W['. S :--. by t:w A:. m iaisJcr.::. tor r.-thsr th" .r: the ? r::sident tnc r ede1eg.tion ques-tion becomes more c .cuto. First t.'.1e Prv sic!..::llt hod. d.cleg<'.ted ti.1e }Jowerto c ert., thi i1(S to the A .-.o il1istr t o r '.':l1c i;_ tur n de1egr.ted it to the Coc, e .Authority, Tcd c : lGP'-.ted t,.. G o>Je r t o so!:J.e com mittee or d..ivisio:. 1 :"1 o r regio:J:•.J. x. t (18 ) is no rule cc.n bo :'.:.-l}J1ie d t o ct.c. t ol"T!lir:c is too :!.'c.;noto .-. c' • 5ut hore it c:--.::.1 c.::rt"_inly be s.". i d nn::.c:1 :f"..:rrtl1cr L1 nu1nber of rod.e1cgc.tiojlS th.".'il i s conmon test t"1e courts vould <'!='\)l y Fo n lc' . b,.; t':lc D:ro--d o--l.c us d L:. so r . " .:ly ..,_clr::inistr-.tive L:;;w problems, "Is .. ... y-r .etice?11• Such remote rede1 e[;;'.tion s n o t re:co,;nizcG. " rould seem to be u n6 .esir2.b 1 e Wncn. t!1e : .ub1ic, :fee2.inG Le effects o:t' the r>,G.ministr . " .tion o:f the lHRA , C.:".r:lC t o rc:-.lize :•.riv.:--.te o f Lltercsted o-cr sons n e r o exorcisinc co-al ( effect its soci-l .::-nd e c . onomic future . , no lo:l['cr looked upol1 t:1ese croups ,_s :-.::.e:1t s of the President, t:1en it wou l d .0. s :n . . tter o. 0<1-ministr,..tivo p rt:-.cticc d elegr.tion t.;onc too f".r. V;1J.1ci_ tho off ct o f .::'.ctio:. o:• such :3r oups the fLl: .. l e x ,:reisc o f -oowcr, over which only ineffective C'.:1d . fo:rrnc-.1 cor:.tro1 \ 'Tr'.S n-int.':'..ineCi., tl:1-.;;11 it might be .., r t'lle .-.,.Jrnl ;, 1. c• j-r . t l. 1 , ''(' c o i vi. ,." ( •-1 ; "!:.:-... o ,...,,.,,.,.,...<:. 1.., .. d "bdi c " .ted <...--b ,. 4-'-lV ,. ..L •• ,!.. , __ _._C.• --'--' . ...., ....... ,.(_"'\ \J,\...._-.l.C.., C .. tl'ie exercise o i' those L _ L ' . V _,r of c r 1.ns the 1egis l.::.ture . :Jolic-:,r o f 11S clf-Gnv cr-;l.! ,,nt of W<'-S not co::. --. si"-'tOl1t wit!. 1 simple of 1,10\'v.tG of ficiJ . l S wl1or e t:lo Co;.1._T e-ss so ( :n): W.l..s cl cid.ed lli1doa; the ctre""' o f v P , r , but o'u.jcctio c, '!. ' 0 soun to ', st"tc offici".l tJ.1cr o i s n othi:.:.,., in h i s r:t.".t o duties or ties i:J.CO'!:sistcnt \1i th his .), rfo rra-J.1Cc d::ttio s .'Ji vcn him. 'l'o w1d.c-cs t 1...' .Lee;.)_ ,, r o 1"..tio:'l tn some Gi, u.e;ht 9838 f tnc coC.e utho::i t y blom in c e:1 t o L1e ture of cod.o

PAGE 146

-11 ... s . C o2L ..,.._tt 1ritic" " .Ia i!. c ;., 1 d .... llc::?;i '"'.:'.co '.'.".lCn th'-' C otl c ty m '1'1 01 ""iv, ;1 t ' •, 0"/...:1 of '"' t.uJic '.., ci''Ct' t'. 'ut f it:lfull: to C''"T:J ott .c st iitcrof : : ::.,ovc.rn .::'1t .. s ., it. Y t s . . i c:u"'t.. ;; :1 t') t:1c ii1L'l8t--: t o .vl}J it. p,c 1.1 .. 0 t ' . possitly I02. '"'Ct :.iH i tc c-tr) "'Cil1t"'lY, r till !1ir ''hole tr i::.'.l..'.: votJcl 1< . ! i r . to f r l i s i si.iC JC: ":1 t:: tcly ::;,'!'1-• t; zc ct. 1 t s , r6 b lcrt>.s. T t 1j i1 : i r i.'!.rl • s t l ' Y 1 i, l ''!. t,' :-r t r .!o11lc. be ::irst :it1::. 1i"' era ::'jr • . < " ' . ,,] )'vV11. t;Jo, ft::vr c:1 h ro .osGilJly .JC' Jot!.l f ..... L : .:. imp rti...,l , .10 us::. i . t .. c o:: s"l".r: T-• L 1 > , .•• \):. o; t-1'-' fo1 svrv .l.cGs co;._;;. sGcl ". cod(' : . . '.:hie> ... ,,_, s J:r the A.O::.mi rlistr. t ion, ".1:.c'.. t . e r G Vl''.S E :to its iY:1ds powers t o effect tll8 S : .1:: TGSUl t i : Of COde r'\'!.O:LitJ t}rG tJ.lS t errp tc.' ;r, s too for t o c .. rc-:-.t co:'lf-clsio::.. n;;, llted. . At t:1e t irr:o o : Sci-:oc':':.t o r (.o cisio': t >.crc still cod::. "Ut!wri t y ' .7iL'l Ol' ;:.c t ':. 'e::o . cing 7 ollowed by L 1c'.ustrics. t::is 6.i:.'iic u lty. I t s ,:_:;ff'orts t ; it took tno for;7ls: 1. --ov"' . l o_:r t .:.; 1o ".l :--: :.visor t!1e Yri forme',l ;y ::ov-• . 1 O Y t '!.c :rc b 1!"'. . _-,.L-;:. __ o r i t , , ; . / .".S r'_l c o -.1.1" (--,7) .. ri 2 c . . .1 v !! ..... eru \ G ' , _,ll, ... e .L 8 ..,-;ore see t L .c c o c . 0 tics were truly .ti v e to S ... t,c. 1 f ' ro,..., t c !':."'., C l . +i ,., ... ., f':'l.S) L-_, _ _ _. v ..... .._,d LL v_.. J..L '"' "-\ • e C 'Jd.e <'.•::..L lo: itie s wcro : t o L lVcstict o c .... ses :--.:.1d. r e COJT.::le:.:d r.c t (.'2'?) • 'r :1o s c c::. '.'. t i o::s rm r , ; . ::cc .t l y r c l i cd by l IFJ\.. 'ce fore it become .1cccl to it E __ , :to b lens. thouch ls code t y :.ttiol to c.:i re:n L 1 c ocle (30) or not, L:c CC)d.e ".utho::i tio s 1 r tti V.'" . S :-.s j_Jersu.:.sive b;,r sano \7' : .::; tP:o wh c--:. code tic s r oco; .nc:Ddod i:1 rec;--rG. to ... --1C, " S , -cr:.,..,71'0 .'S <:::+ V S 1. .l.J.." .1 .. V ....... v v ..... v -;::. _ _ . _ _ ' L;."\.. ......... v ' 'c. t ..__l,\J' 11c o'.!Jcrci".l rulii 1;;:s ,11 -:.:.( c,c e n " ,l'':1 t'jo:1ts ( 3 1 ) . 9-38

PAGE 147

L1 t11cir rcl tio:.:_ with L w < '('_:1inistr .'cion_ L :-: code :-:c .. t !lorities { . :(.)osi rrere vil .. .:re-:-. cocle :-.. ori ty cauls ... ctero i !l".t 1.0n of t:Eci r : Jro .;h e (32), nJ.1ero t:-lG cor:'..e -.ut::o:.ity fL1 '.1 u:-:lcss tl1.c ACnil1istr . tor i t :,her e tho coclo p l:--. ccc1 :-.i.1 oq_t.u . l position vti t:1e A rninistr.:-.tor L:. :ceviewLlt; . . ction by . or" .:'lc h c o : n:1i ttoe o : : C'Jr t .L-1 of tri:'lgL-:g aew or iC.l e : •roc.uctive > r o d ucti.o11 ( 34) • . 1.7her o cod0 outlL:od l s u: ; o : . V " . r ious subjects to be b ;l c ocle r>:u .. thori tics :..:1( . . by--L 1 e rresic:e:.1t or A c m L 1 -i str'tor ( 35 ) it becomes ".]""",re:;.t v1ill oc no resort t o fi:..ldL the h.:.ncl s of coCl.e :.utl'wri t;y-. V\G1o t!ler tile coC.e : o.uthori t y 'N':' . S give: . l )O'.rc r to t.."' re-r;-.ul"J._l1"' +-< 10 o+-t >-. c ocoe -, . . ;,e'-'nnr 1'J.. "ssw-Jed , '-'' • t.. --;:, .l v-. -\J .. • lJ 1 . J.. .. lo..; , 00 ) ' _ . v -"-' u , , pov w r s it w:. s :'. l mos t iLllJOssi b l c f o: r Ar'.:-n.L.1istn.tion. to l::eelJ "ny ff t , ' 1 ' t 1 I r C ) .. .., .., t' ' t ' d c 1rc c : .:.oc:.: UJ.::-'01.1 ' i H1:. r r t ' . s C.LOl'l_C ,,,.'Jo:. • . ... coc: . e " U .1or1 lGS use r cc; i 0!1 or d i v i coL1r-1 i t tee s : , e ".C.mi::.1i s t:r t i v c '-. _ cncics, the pos. sibili ties of cf1cd:: i l1s "'. ctio : 1 .. unC..o: c the r-:uise of cover:..1..r:te1.1t aut!lori ty b c c t' l ite e ver, n o rr:J :coi:tote ( 3 ?). i'his cli fficul ty YiC.s eviC:.o:1t L ! t11o of b'-f .. e C OlD:;Jl:.:-.L-:.t :-roced...;re. ':he:.1 no ".JJpe c .ls r r c r c t l':c: .. ' , :_y r cssu:ce , o r -J the co: : m i t teo wou lr'. :;:lOt b e ) To;.: t ( 3 8 ) . '.L':r::. H21A coulcl 1' c :J.ecl:::eCl. v r o n:-\ve J ; C!l t::> : 1 ve :;:equirec "full r e cord o f t!.1e JJroccoC...i:v; s to b e . submi ttcd to it or be:: Lo1d c.v".il " .ble . f o r i t s i n s :..,ection. ''. --,rocess v!O-l.U d b een L 1 no! le:r t o L1e cod8 ty L1. the recor ds,. t o :.::RA in erso:r1el. 'full r e c o r c l s •Ncr e : r) y l.::e:--'t of mor e t Le & e:..1 e r c . l st:e-ps . t:--. lcen. I n t iue it b o cr'J!le -rac ti ceto t llEn mr8.1J:-a0-le-' to ;..TRA. AcJ n i nistr.:--.t ion cliO., i n tino , :r::-equire l'c-::-.orts fron , code l.tles t'Il"' OL'J "Of "l)l "l-ts ,--,-c_' -.tl1,-,l' roompll."i1Ce vL. • ... --1..:. • , ..... .: . ,::. V1. V-. ....., -!.1 • . _ .,. _ . v .J.. V _ '-' _ ., tivities11 (39). These r elJ'rts, were ofte: 1 i n:-, ::umber of st tu;-.tio;::.s none --.t < ' .11 w ere :-rnc'.e. Unc vc.s t vrc:.;_ c tei t 0 '.S soci;--._ t io11s of bus i:i.1 Gss r.1e11 ( 40). C oclo r c -roso'-1tccl t:l<:) of business :-clo:.:c lines of r:';l:tiY. soci rosult _,_i 6 .. : 1ot .. rmonize wiL1 trw notio'-1 o:: l coo)c:t .ti o : 1 yr::_ L 1 u u s L;, oss, f J r to busi:wss r.1en t h i s f :n1itio: 1 of 11m oro busircss i:a c;over:.l loss C_'OV i:t iJ1.1si:.1ess .11 ]or e 0l..'..Sil:.OSS L 1811 tho 1 J lC',i1 Y /C'..S O:i.1 8 of sol :l r;o roJ.':..,_ C!lt f-w 1ctio::1 of t" c \'i"S l ' - • r '-,c:.t c+l.Ol1 (4--)) t ..:J _ .L _ l _ _ l '-""-' .l ... 0 J •--. _\.. L _ J v -CJ • .1 c.. .. o.ssoci: ' .tio,_ l s h::'...c1 lo: 1g do}lO t:i.1is. :J1. . . .t. .r-e;_l c oc:e : :.dvc.nced L 1to t h o :ccC'.l E 1 of 11co:r.1j ;li' .!1C G11 c:.! 'o dmc: l ::--';'1 L1ei:. rospective L1dustries t;: 1 0 f t.L1..ctio:.1 seerlio d m re . -erit:.ble of inspectors Y..ri th . m)re O J : less } ) (4:3). _..,l .... poL1tec .._.:--coc.c ties exercised cio, :.s .;ovcn-:1..1el:.t:.l L: (_/.!:). It \/ O-;)..ld . be f'.i ' f:co u , oJ_;cr to . . s sum e c-• .::;;e:1cies c .n 9838

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not r r r'or1 nu. , c.:.utie; '"':.c: d1u •. t .i.on J ' of "'•ccifi .-l' .... • r,:::; i(" ct t 1.1 b; t J {ro.f l'DiiK.n t . T ncr ccc o :--l:. +-i.o"' ::ltt . r o r:1 nt 1ciro. C1 o::. t vrl:i ot --it-.. t.l.Oi1'"' 0.. l. t l -;' L ... te; '"'E; ci. ti"l!L ; , rr.l.r :)')",1' to Ll(' t}1 r: J''-'-' !'.1i. )::' u lul. l'ofcori:m I. co1, 1ct , . •• i\ ctic:. f 1 ulc..,. J.: ;li"''i1 c; r.r cir" ,-r l i J,::-:1 C"' :c)' t li" • 1 1Vl'"'1'\ ( _:...) . 1-1. O' r .... o:( .... os, J.:' -. '11 _iv tG Jt' t_)::., l.' •. ic.i>l v<....: t::.c ':.i1..:.rt ,_()1 oi " •\"':!. k " ( ) . 'Ll\. c' tr,"" t.d.. t. .... bn 1 Cl " 1 :-'l-.. r rl,;ir.:inc ;_)Or>:. . "It ir.: 7 l i;1 ,11 t C'J'Q.t , 11t :.t t c o:cc-: :1. n j,_r.ici'.l O\ Jr. ir. Cr'l.l-, t'. '.:)t10 ,,,"'_ro:."' 7,1 1 ) ''C.' t C.)l't•it, ,! .... 1 : !"\. : 1ot .r-.. .. .., ••••••• 11 t:? I-_, Sv"tvr , r:c::.. ,u.r .. cclic J .1 '.J.,; • 0 0:1 ci!e. ( " 8 ) . _;1CGC "':. llini < . . :.clr, 1."/ e "...'CC.' t ]!U lie • c::1cicn (.'):0 • .n 11)t 10r ro::.'enr i'l. vi .r . -. is t:1c 1 , ..• :. :!y .te r-t -,_[: rr:: i -r teC:. .r.:, cr.; 'If t •.o o r r s s ci s c lc n'J'7t-l'S ovc itc:. l"Cl L:cr"' (3C). F "1 t of i)O"cr: t•J r t1:-:mc m'.st :row out o f t : 0 t::-"'::. tio:cicl pl c f J. .n., c::s s o f .. e co,:..rt •11 ?hie-: rot t : ; 'L 3i :..en t ' ... rr.:; )::': . . clic.L S)Cietic:-;. r J:x CIJ",_tYtS h".-/0 :lOt t:l:'iCC:. 4-,,_ "ZG t '- • ','OO::_e; :'l i ". l 1TIS Of .. "e::cie:::; r-: • . :po.erc. r:I.K : v '<:v".., C!:. L: t:> .'.'.0: s lf1 c. : r.1 . t i o:; u: t.-.eso p rofossi o __ a-li)'•.sl:r yn.1J lic J: ' i s it"' ... {.e .e .. c.cte r of .-:: : . • Oi.-t, i' t_.j_s t . c nl ).ic ::.:. s li i .. , J .:. , ul 0i: :-::oi'cssi. 1 s . "''' -.. +. .... 'J. \ ... . 0.o::.: lice:. s , .. ct 1''=-s t') . ' o:C: L . c>c o f c-rr:L'..t" o11.t tho : ct , . ._,-' 8 u-:lt l o<;t , ...,t::": c .. , or iloeles::--''Xcess coll.:-ctlCl s tc bo c o f'0r Gln'orci;;. _ __. :.ct. s --.c t '-'.:'1. t t o t . . c :.T:c.i tcr-;, .':os (._;,]_). L: [.'. t r r e e : ::-.::;e ., ir. J,-:_:;ticc o :lC ,, : c v1 .. • v-:.s c3.ov c ted to r:uotL:{': the, t : : e :.ct 'fi''.S '2:1; CO'l"cJ"t n'Jt d isCl1.SS ;:-r;ble;m ')f cirin.; sr: c':1 • or:e l'S to r. iz".tiou, r"Ller it .:o:.1..,idcrC(1 . t:., c--. s o t: _:; due --...,rG coss o f view. It :1e l l. t .:.:'t st:.-t"J..te :c<; •:rcs'11 ted "'. rJ.icJ. exercise of t :1e =;ow e r . -::'he C o:. )or '.tio_, C o :t'nissio::.: of Yr::-.s 7ir o ; 1 poYTe::. by st..,_ tutc to : ror,_.te oil, tiJ o:c suc b . . with C (JO".sent r_-!: ra".:; be Eecess -:-y t o c::.f0rc e L1e Ac': . • : (52) C c : u.::cd. inf'Jl'dc.tion 4 s -L)C.sis f o r c-.ctio;1 -oy -:o -lX. ers S 8l"VLl:: n:.t11')1_2t J' , ".c'. :'J. 'U.r.pir o \'i.Ll')S8 n:-.icJ. -...,.t iT'. , c f:-. l l t o:;:' . J.c& i s l:o. ti v e ;_-nl"oJr i --.t i 011. co'\.:t:d r e f used i o l 'Fk'. t i 011 Yierf' 1 v < s c o" its so--.rrc e , b u t _ i t'..L t L.s or(cr Ll\ u c srtO'iVl'l f'"'.Ct to be ,..,... 1 'l-;-,+ ,..,rlc r c (1;..-..:) "'e J. -..vJ,... "-:. . • _\._ >J .-1.J. .. J t.' \,;..l v v 1..!...J..... 1 ... vv _ "-' • -.1-q'.CStiO'' o:':' :r<:-! so;.:s c"oLlG --cts t .:.. t vo,. uc' wit.1 e:..t 0: ot::.e r _.Je:, so::-1s s..:om to 1v.. v o ". iJorc l existcc.c e L. t:1is c . e t : 1:: : i.: t>.e ot: er C "-:s co: :s.crcd :1erc. Still fLY.l c.:eterof •)olicy is ;t L :rol7 .d., :--.:.C:. )xiv; te c ct i:'l :10 c:,re " t e r yJo sit i o: t ., . .,_::.-_ c o LL c. c c o r s o:::. f , .c t s , c!:. t S" i o:1 c auld tre . t .-.s it :!is:wG. . Joi:tt stoci: for o•-r.::.ed o --ct ?838 1,-,-,: , _ L,_c s t o c1::s OJ . :1:' .'le bee:::1 s .Jscr. becl :'-ers'J;.J.s, zocl_ t t o f s tr.tute, . . e:t s f J l ' ':. :-:.e ; .:o.fc t L':. L:h1(; s c eel. l o1.;.1 s •

PAGE 149

-. . l .tJ :., -questi 0:a of t:heir-riv:>. t e s a c e:1 cor:siC.erod by co-.t:i.'ts little J -bjt.;cti0 ! . lie tc the use of 2 v . i v ."'t e CO Jr}:t3 l o."n s Y!1Cr e t1lC'CC is no r:-:"!}::i';1g pov;e r ['.!1d. :r: o -K c i .::1 il: t e :ce s t s ,_:). o::. ;. -::>.rt o-.; t : e .. r . t i o a:.. l -.J. .. c. h:::. n:; : .. c:rrd tted. t0 en.;.. ::;e iY. wiv:-.t u f u:,.c-; ions 2.s r .cting .. s tT -,_stee i nj•.ny to ".r::>.cte r ( G 5 ) . Activities of--:;cveTi'll.lentr. l by -r.Lv=-.te •)o:;rsons c>.re foo.1J.1C. L 1 t'.'') core L . t.:resti:1l, c ... ses. Ll Fl:;r:10utl: Co. v . Pe"1'1s y l V"', ( 56 ) no.obj ecti:-::. ':. ' 2.s -t:,y t':e court t o tl e o"" tll"' c' t > o.r -b. --"'rl "'i ' ll r 1 ... C"-J. "'es " ' '0 ' 1' eT"\-nloyed o r ....., YV--v-L ..L _,.J.._ v_ _ ,.., .l -....J • ., ___ _L __ '-'c) .. -• v -. L.:...LJ cJ the S t:-. t e t'.".f. e;1gineers of ovmers. The court vievm d q u e stion ---s ':'.. s u.:, 01:13 of effec t u:--o p :_oye_ t y , r.nd 0: c of L-,e porsor..s cxercisi:1g yO\ er (57). L 1 St. L ouis hno11 :=ty. Co. v. 0::::-'.ylor (58) tne Co'Lut C J i-lSicier c d L;e CO? it•_"'..tio:.-, : . y o::: Sec.Li0!1 5 o f tna r Act o f 1893 (50 ) t:.1:.t "..ite:.' dtc n< .:--.1ed or:.l.. c,.rs V!i t h c lro. cft•o.r s 0 f f 0 n:.1 llG -be :.A.sed. L:. i:1 t erst_:. te Tl1.e st[; l c l:.rd fol' heittht ""--s t'J uc fixeo_ ilO.Y Associr.tioi'l; the L1te 1 '2k.te C0J1r.1erce CO!.:missim: :.r:.s to ,:-;ive n::>tice to all com:mor. c.:-.rri e 1s . I t cont s:r;_deG. t:1t s ... > :::.:1 improper dele g2.tio11 o:f :!O': 'ic r -b,/ L-:,e court little -out t : is con te:<:tion . court viewed. •n"Jvi;:iJE --s ". r 1 t'UT.l L.1tentior.. to dimL:ish ecoi1omic l osse3 (60). L 1 , b o t h t:;cse c::-. sP-s tne IP2.tters :7re purely t o t:(lc L ::ro l 7eC. . effect co lld be felt by :r.T•er:-1 ru=-.lic t.,,.., -1--. b,... -ro•e i11 ot -J.L ,;, ....... --__ ., u • ,....;'/t..:; __ ..Lv_,o..AJ.... __ \ c:: r.ct c":1c: promulg['..te . cocies set tint, f ortl: f o:. t:1 e .::' electric2..l equipment (6;_-q -been :C"elcl c:el-::(;:--.tions o f poHcr to _ _ riv2.t e 0 rG:'.11 i za c i • ':'J'lc:.c the ::!.eg--..1 of c.oG.e :..:.L-:o:cities? 7!;,-Jir )riv['.te i s evic,_c:,:t, yet rr::.;,;yr o: t:.'leir ftnc y;rere of F.'. ublic !.l.::ture. C oc.e r.uti1orities 'Here . ":L::!.m1cd. c-: n"'.tv :.r:d to sue oe sued. T1 i s Ci')en s un Vli":-.t... v istc . of i s ".. c .:: : . o-"tion " . ment:-:'.1 r.:ency. f.--.cts o:' i:c r-'.:'r"tio:l .:l.d the po'.':er to sue b..; sued :'._c::o i:l.diCt"'-t i 7 G of '•. _.-.t-,: T e , o f c ourse C"'. n be e by c:ufficie!lt f 'Ct. o:f c:i.l.: \'Ctcr . 0 li; of code t--x::-ti o .• •.,il l l and mucli2, t . ot o.:l y off icG•.'s, uut<:l 2 ... c exoffi!'l t from St<'.te incon.c t r.2:e n (r-:4) . Fedi.'rc: l ties such ."" .... oro.tio:tls of V("'_,rious t.;;S L::i=:..;. l"'n
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-1:\-Jn th other h['.nc. :>ri v.:-t u C'ons i: o :tn1 ; ubl ic tU1ct ion"' b en hclcl tEl:.: .Jlc ( cf) . In v . I 'i ch811 ( ::. t '\S h8lc1 th, t a 'ii'l1 () .. co-.!",_; _tiL; cni.'"'"'G tl."." rl: ''"'f' :at y OJ.' contin.1.ous CYl ;,.., , n "U-Jli.:: . r,, t) l . ()1'.: t ::t l .icr" t. e -c c ct t lw t : 111 n o :t l e i" "'. • 1 i c t : J': 0i.fe:.::. et t::e : , intE1 r:.t of ov-D:i.'IT'lY1t. ':'he 1 f"'lO'"cCC'S t.c i6c:;; ') t P1l..:e c • ; t i "1 Ci rnc".. -' . . , :1'.t h • .: ,_< . , n (-;-o) Joc' .. 0 ten,_,.r,-, C"n: Jr,'o2.c:rtcc" l.c;.. tin. Lilcc--h-2 , t.1c ;; c_. c l, "uy O f ::.oul''":e, "u. .... is' ; ot e:i•J,. iL t_ c :-1it ht be s: iC:. .o thc: 1 .... .,_,_olic '\'C:':Cie r . Tl!'; r c;'.l.l.t,r; , rc 1" t l1c:-no.1C". lous. : o:f t:l. nt t l c:of C". ic .. L1 t tc cod.e -8t, ib, s c i : . 1".1t ,:-1_<.cvotc Llc.i:L.' :;"u:t: cine to "Oc'e <.'".lt}'." .-'-. .,c t .r • oJ' ,,.,. ' J c:. oc-"' v .... \.I " ' .. -l . . . -c, .• v .. < J. !.,_ \.:#.. ,.1 ;;,) L .. J... v.... ... 'ro"'it. It[".: t;.L t co.:.r-::c: n C.e U.? .ru.blic "-)ut in ..... n 10 10 ... t ' . : t \.:.0 .o "•i.t .• . O:L' S not "'l'O"l t <::c>tion c s n'Jli <, ( 71.) . In G. :.ieno:-rn::.ur: C.L:cctar:. 7 . t;,c ",:o:-( . e--' o ."' coc\.e aut.horities rere _j't1..'...l i c o:C:"'ices, IJe-:;=.1 tl:--r. tJ:1ey •ere :tot (72). Co6.e : Je:1-:.1cs c:ce of t :Le 1jnitc:;c.1 Stc:t.t'."'ithi n tl1 e; of II, Section 2 of tl:c Constitution, .... vcs t c E1.".?:9u int;Jen.t o:f ::n1c:1 in t.le P:::-r s iten t , in the :ourts of lc:, o:r t ! le o.r':9 .. -.:. t ,.1ent:' l heC"tc (73) . . .---cl'e coC.e r.uthorities crec..te6. "u:' O:i' c .ele-;c-tec"_ J.ecisl2-tion look . .::; to P: :izte1ce (75) . :1c:. n"r o':' t ' w :;o,er::. e:::ercised COCt.8 autho:.•i tiC2 --ee in i12tUl'e o::-80","8:. eic;n i\mctio:1s _:)rO-_)erly ;na'Jle to <' officG: ('(6) . A jubl.ic o:l"::icGl' :mst ['CcountJ e +o : ove•Ylrtent (77 ) ,,,t'110 e(" 1.. n t.'le e,ly o "' . .,v_ v --.L.!. __ • , V _.._ < _ v "'' __ J.. <.-.. -c-. ; .. , e:c seen. ; s o-: i"!.c'.u,...t:.-:-.ccount. "l-lc to il".c'u:>tl:, 2s ti: 1 e 0' ,C 'c'(1 .1.0 l-,olr J.'P' 1 tO ')"'0 1.'11 ---u ,. --v -v_ ... __._ .. .J. '"' .L L.4. .. . • n.. _ ... • ... -"t::. I iv: +c 'frcons .... ; . , ... --o . r,-, .. 111e.-;t--l .o:o,u.nctlo,s J.;::, l.,..l..:;:) "...s.. •. • . ... "' t1lor•l 'tl'ec c'o 'lQ+ CC>el J .o •-::>••e ,eC " ' l ('"t"hs r r ••;"l1'c :;&.L..,. l .; VI>.:: ; ... lJ J.C'.;V ... ,_; • , . C.. Jj_ -\.... •J. c i:::-. e t.1 e le,::;:--1 fu.nctio:"!.s o : : ''J"U;Jlic c.s to eLcou:-n-;e coo)erL. 2 cio::1 on t l :.e Jcrt )f ( '(f!,) . .hleil fu:1ctions 0 :7 ';TOE' . : m .. :.l.JJ.ic c:lE'.:.';}.Cter t:1.:-n ee .''ivc,-, ' o ; COC"E-... .t'i r;.<""' r-..... ... -v l. c .. -_ _ c.. .. _ _ _ --._. ..L ...;) _ • _ v ., . , t "-'-\.I _ v c.. J J ... • .. LJ.l. t • t G!I9t:U.on 1J:::>on to t e :o :e:r iven ]1i'1 <'.Sr. ),n cot'(' t!"' ( ,"\ i .L' (.> ')0' •-re"e '10t • r' J • .... e -'(...,l.,.v.... .J...JtJJ _, .., ...... V1-\-J. . . -c_ •. .l ... .• , "• ...>lJ --•.J .,J..,:) rron tL e c:cces-2 . t o :"'roi.1 his to finaJ.l:r c. .ec.ic-. e i : 1 vi 2::"'ectL-. :1is co:J (7 9 ) . TL1e Co-:..::.nsG1 v f in } o:..:-. 1 a:c ;L'.::Jent be:.:ore the S-c :9:C'OI.28 Court in the Schect e r c:e C.i . not ::eco.r;ni?.C this of • Ee .:--s1:c:.::.., c::n:. l-oc 2. st-nc.r t!1:-.;: tLJ.c-. t 2C'.o:9tec!. by those it t:r:c :1sclvr:s ?11 It li.c..'; been :. ecor;-l.'n+e-n"'r-"ec' "O''"O . , ... ;--r '"t): al:-> c (c'1) • \.1 J.. \ v .....,,_ v -""" ..... "-' . _ ..,_ OJ .. _ -"c.. .,) .... c .. Vv J. r.. , , .-.C u..... G :-a.:.:ticulrrl:, in the o:: co::;t y:o-..ri. io:1S a:.. it for the o:: P.;lr cl.['s;; i:o.t2j:est to in::'li.te;nce cocle c:>.utl-wr i t a(J .. i n.i s t :i"C.t i o 1 . s:-'-:es e is ions " e:oft c::::. s t c-ccc. t those to Je 11out o:C 1 L.e. 11 ['.G 1)rouc.;ht to th<:1. t there , :oulC:. :in2.t ioil o :7 tl:eii:' cooks , -:_J:cosecsttion,". o ( 82). ':2he 2.s s u: 1ec. ove r r.:w.n : fi elC.f. o:r the co0.e thori ties in :1r.l:inr; rosoh:.tions 11 :..'
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t11at could not be achie ved_ b : r code provisions Cede authorities ' ;rere not al'.:ays the most d.esiT<."ule cies for t :-e hardling of statistics, reports, and. infor. 1.: .tio ! 1 . A!l com petitor on t h e code authority often \7nu l d b e come L 1fo:cr.1ecl o f vi t a l and secret clet ail s of his com:'}eti tor's business ( 8 4). Just r :.s ir1portar.t, but of an i te char<::.cter, r ras t l 1e ref-llsaJ o f coCl.e autl:10ri tie s to publish price lists, or delay 0 2 -the c ode m1thori in s :1ir_.g t hem because i t felt :prices ':7ere too low ( 85). The p o':"'er to collect sti c s ofte!l bec2::1l:: tbe basis for a general 11fi shing ex•)edi tioi . l 11 y:;lich rrould ::.1evo r been sanctioned by the courts (86). . Lik e cUfficulties ne1'e fou...."1.d :i,.:n traC:.e practice complaints committees that often ass• . uned inver,ti or j"l1.d.icial functions rather than mecU.D.tor3r ones ( 87). The Ice Industry p resentr>, for a of time, the beautiful of interested members of industry r1::.ling u;;on the bring ing of ner: aG.ct i tional capaci t3r i nto the industry ( 8 3). It C<':tn h e rd.J.y be that an inclusti"J membe r Hould welcome a competito r Yti O'llt [:tretched ( 89). The diffi cul t;y is so obvious that as one CE..n Fell eJ':_Pect i t became the target for colunr.. ii-:;'is opposed to the Administration ( 90). The force of indust1'3' interests u_Jon the code authori t;:;r ;-ra s qui t e i n this industry . In a letter ,-rri tte n to 11All Re gional Acvi a.:ncl CoT!rrrd ttees of Arbitration a11d A plJee.l, 11 A:'Jril 'Z?, 1935, the Code Aut}wri t2r Ch3:irnan stated t he..t t h e National Industrial Recovsry Boa r d . hE:.d. to not disturb Article II (91), despite tho f act t h a t a new procedure '-ro.s E:.lmost immediately authorized \Thich ha.cl_ the effect of de utroying I7lUCh Of the Val "-Ie of thiS 2rti cle to the inclustrj (9la). Cocte a1.:\-t horitie s })rive .te R c e ncie s manzr deficie;1.cies both as instrumer .. ts acbnini stering pnblic l a'J c:i1.o. as inC.u strie. l agencies (92). Uhat effect had t his of inte rest :t.l::'On the legal position of cocl e authorities? It is a nell-l :no1;'n naxim o f lc..'\7 tha t "no man be a in his onn ca;:1se." (c-1: . . ) Interest disqualifies a judge (94). Pecunif:' . r y interest 6 a :te ;?arti c ularl;y frmvr..ed_ u-oon. IJo m<:. t t e r h o'.7 small the p e cuni<: . r 7 interest, it c";.i s qualifies . Other interets m u s t 1Je more substantia l (S15). English l aw has losiC8 .lly ex'Gend.ecl t'lis r ule as to juc'-l_:;es to admini strntive officers ( 9 6). Ar,_ci c:t.lthoug h have not been found doing this i n the United States, there can b e s 0 e n no re.:-.son why it is not a prolJer 11due process of law " requiremeTt. It is co ,lsidered as one of the foremos t principles of natur['l. l justice in EnglancL ( 97), and the very of in tlli s country t estify to its accept ance here. There are State cc. ses saying that a g rc-mt of ri t hout. rcs11onsi bi li t y to the [;Overnment can not 1Je made to a pubJ.ic official (98). The of recovering for the malfeasance of al". : .1.c.n i n i str.!'.t i v G office r in this country is no \'!ell knonn, tha t leading schol".r Q lon" urged t h e of Di t s "rule of larr11 in fa.vor o f a moc.\.ifi cfl_ droit 2 dmini stratif. If an administrative office r using eli screti is Oi.lly to be lia'J l e for m alicious neglLgence or wilful d .isregarc3 of tho richts of others ( 9 9), the r of trusting this irrum..1.'!.1ity to an int,_rested person is Briefly stated the legal position of code aut;wri ties \ 7C'. s o:pen to serious questions. Admittedly , they ,_.,ere of a private character com osed. o f lJri v2 .te functions yet the: r uere enc ,oY:-ecl with l)Ublic functions. The fe\7, but s11.c h a s the7 P-re _ i d not indicate tha t ve.te a gencies could aclmini s t e r public l aw . In every case the f.:wts involved mwh a problem the &:-)reme Court h a d ignored the question. 9838

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1'J.e no s t lo i c . l c n n e r "''C"!! s t o b e t .t• t ').Ci ,tc r :t c -.,1o'l): bl.y le,;r . l M e nr.. :ror t l 1 e e.clJlinistrC'tion of mil o r r 'l'lttions, t:1e :.c. D .tr:r 0 f ,hi . h o"tLld n o t b e open !'".criou p u b i c1i ;)' r-ucl as .::ctivi t i e ... , fo_ t'ie hC'.n .lino f Ju re\{ ir..t ' l ; f 'r,i ;, of n n ncl. tst!:: re tin0 on thG u ... e o f vJqJvrt a n d lil e\! i se i "1' n o (l"L r;tion: f ut'lbl e ocin o r o c o noni The anonrtl J continu s \/'1e n i t i .... . i ove:.: e . tl1n t there .. r e c e rt L t e c hni <. 1 let:.r1..l _ equ i erne t s a t to e )O;,itio n of of:.i c e r or c ... ..., \1hich the octo :J.Ut o lti--s cid . ot fu.l. ill. Coup lt:Jd .rit':. t'1eir e harcctc r , 7 llj . c!t micl t l t .... wo been , r eC., 1 D . the inte r ec;t e d c ' c r:: t r o _ code Althoueh \' in c e rtain ins tun .es tl1< t the inter c:teu ,.Jw n.ctur o f cod e ties m i.c l1t di squ<'lif y t l e n i n m ..... k i i G clc i sion"', the 1 . n . A . PC:G.J. D i vi ;.ion 7C.S content t o scratch t . surface L:.nd o . l l a u1;h : n i ties n i ,... o.e ris,as ii' t l i s ex;>J.o.i1 eel. their legal s tc-tus . ( lOt)) i>ldicrtc d ::n the of e c lto . e und.or J :?i:r._; ] T . I . R .A . J.:.n.s een a:-:en : 1e r e ( 1.01). he c o d e o.uthor i ti n strUJ"l e n t : n s not been l.ond e m n u d s ne'.-r, In r:1c..n r espects i t -as uscfu.l , but it;, disabiliti e s 0Ut'roi:;hed the .clvo.nta;::cs it offe red. . I t Jnl(t be t:,,, t cod. a;lthor i!;ies es o 1TRA., Tii t:1c 0 f a f.e i.J minor f'".nC tions o f t h e t y p e ) r evious: r co l d .uct3d b y t! a c . e e ssoci0.t i o n s le:-aJl' , e.: isted n i tho".l t the sanction of aw. I t may hmr e been y ossiblo b.,r a e volution t o hav e dev e l o yod rivcte agenci e s in t h i s t.o tn:.;:e on nore functi o ;1s of a public harc:'..cte r e..nd hanc, . l e t hem in c.n e f : icie n t ma:m e r . Th i s hav e r e quired lo: development to 86encies courts to t h e .se <:'. l Jd. v alue o f n e . : f<.m ctions. But :::iA llorrecl. for no s.1c h orc l .erly .e elO')nent • The probl e m 'TD.S :ph1.ced o l US t.eri n gly ' b efn:re th'3 p u bliC anc l the o u rts in a s : 10t space o f l e s s t han t \r o yct::.r s . It came 1Jef8re these ritics in i t TI"o r s t 11Inc"..u.str • r ,el f g ov o r nner..t11 a t I i r s t mea:;,1 t o.'bG.i to code ties ( 1 0 ) • A s C:i.o -ot s uer e expresseO.. [1 s t o i:.f:e pro riet:r o f unsu:9ervised cmt:1 oritie s , efforts :,e r e 0 3 r i-211\. to r1ore ;...ref'l'..l.l:r 2..nd. cloE"el j; control t : lGce c:,bm:cies (103) . Code c. uthori ties Tie r e eL1g t :reeted a s hc:vins a resp o : . s i b ili t y shoj,tlv r b efore the o . e c i sio n ( 104). t;1i s C'.eci sion the court
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-126 A similar s .bdication b y the Pre'sident of l1is adr:1inistrative duties in enforcing and adrnini s t oring coc could have hardly been treated more gently had_ the court u') the point. Uhat standaro . s nere set u p to .:;u icle the code authorities in t'1e per formance of their adninistrative functions? the set up b3r Con g r ess in the NIRA. should h a v e co.1tlnued to govern in any event (106). It is im p o ssible in legal contem:9lation for an administration in the United States to g o contrary to the stan:l__arc. s of a statute it is administering PS h a s been t h oug.."lt possible in Engla. 1 d unde r the VIr'I clt".uses. 11 (10.?) The same criticism o f the of the !'I?.A in r e l ation to the liTA.apply to-the Act1s relation to code authorities. As a furt:her ste}? it mi ght reasonably be concluded that stanclards for t h e acl ministre.tio n of la'" ' b y code authorities must be more p -recise and det ailed, anci thD . t they shoulC: leave to the code authority no room for e:::ercisine; policy :p.ower. This is merely another w a y of saying code a.ut1orities, not being public [ : ; gencie s, shoulC.. not exerc;' i se public p oTiers of c i scretion. It uould seem perfectly proper that the jiB,A in some instances set up standards for the exercise of code a l..i.thori ty problems. In fe.ct it uould seem highly desirable h a d such a course been pursued. ( 108) This leads again to the same point that the mos t rigorous standards \"lould have been the best p r actice. This is .not to suggest that hig h quality staLd&rds either by Congress or t h e Administration coulct cured tl1e inherent inadequacies of the code authority instrument. Such nor: m s as were cre2.ted should have been in harmon,_v with and furtherance of those st2.ted in the Act. 1-.RA' s practice did not accorcl ui tl1e s e suggestions. Frequently , sheer p o Fer rras redelegat e d without the slightest atter:1pt u pon the part of t h e Administration to guide the channels of its use (109). PoTier 11as given to establish accounting systems (110), 'to make allo\7ances for tradeins (lll), to cha.n g e the period to elapse bet-i.-Jeen the filing nnc3_ effective datesof 1)rice lists (112), establish the maximiJm periods of free credit (113), and fix the amount Qf liquidated C:amage assessments (114). This list is f a r from and w a s foun& the result of the most cursory e xamination of volumes of codes. The set for compliance activity b y the cod.e authority or courts under the enforcement proce dure vrere no different, in many instances ( 115). The greatest stand.ard for code authority excrci se of -poner -,;ms tl1e : -vote of such a body ( 116). T h e power reserved b y the Adminis-trator to ap:prove or di sa: Jprove code authority action ( 117) could. not be ce.lled a sta no.o.rd, although some m ight argue that s uch a . device cured_ the lo.cY.: of stanc'.ards. The value of t his a r gumen t can not b e con e eded whe n such checL:s ofte n served a s a mer e formal control. ':.'hen s t a ndnrds nere set u p b;y lTRA they nere often in such broad tha t they \7holly inad.equate as norms. Code authorities were g i ven the -poner to 11cor.1_7Ute the 101.-rest reasonable cost of production on a f air basis, 11 (118 ) to j Jrnvic':e rules to distinguish c ertain class garments using 11holesa l e prices o f about a c ertain dat e a s a g uid..e, (119) to p o vei aft e r fi-ndin g c ertain circumstances to exist (120), r . n d to require price lists t o be file d if it found that 11the reco nized yractice11 of the Industry had been 11to sell on the b asis of printed net price lists11 (12] These also nere found as the result of a hasty g l ance a t a felT NBA 9838 .

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adopted stc:.ndard set lln or to bn set np by ate L';cn (12:) or b:r other governmental o.genciec o er i7hich it had no control (1 23) . motter h0\7 re ... utable the agency, it C:.oe"' not '"'eem pro-per ... or lJHA to have sanctioned that r:ilich it had not yet seen, and which may be made \Ji thout any reference to the purposes of the Act. Even 11here stc.nd2.rdr al set Ul:> -,ere ado1:> ted a full con...,ideration of t:teir substantive effect have been had. The standnrds problem as related to code authorities presented to tl e courts nas just one step more re1aoved than had ever been called u:pon to consider theretofore. l'ffiA, just as e legislature might act, but \7i thout even the qualifications demanded of legislatures, said \7e recognize a policy of price-fLing to be desirable (124). For reasons of their own thiS as forbi aden. Even had it b een fo!' a l e;:;i colature, J:ffiA, the administrative had forsworn its traditional role of filling in the details of legislative policy , and 1ad assumed the policy making poner of the Even had this escaped the courts' cor.der.mation there i1C.s yet the question of standards to govern the code authorities which assumed the administrative functions as i1ell as legislative functions too. It was the existence of this situation, 11here the administrative had ceased to function as such and had given over its lJroper functions, his to agencies of questionable standing that c aused the Suprene Court for the first time to give such serious conside rr-.tion to the problem of delegation of po'.7er in the Panam'"t Refinin1c; ( 125). In considering the poners e::erci sed b y code authorities no useful pur-pose \70uld be served here b y an attempt at extended analysis a"!fd. class ification (126). Rather it is more productive to survey the gen;ral char&cter of the porrers granted 11ith a vie11 to the public or privo.te administra.tive character based upon the tests already suggested. The l:>oner to require assessments has been considered. by iJRA rli thout statutory specification it l!as questionable. In the h[tnds of code authorities the problem i sintensified. Assuming that the had been cured it 11ould not seem :prope r to allo':J private interested :persons to enter into even the mechanics of assessme:1t administration. Th e relation to the taxing poner is too obvious. Certainly, fixing of .. the basis of assessment is a public question, which was not handled as such merely because HRA he. d to pass upon what industry proposed. The possibility of 11putting something over11 was al':Jays too great. Then too, the psychology was to trea t the recommendations of industry as -orima facie correct. Fot that this nas not true in the grea t mass of instances. But there was no guarantee that the viewpoint of objectives b e tneen industr>J and government nere the same. Even 11here the industry's function to collect statistics as to production which to b ase assessments there i7ould seem to be more desirable agencies such 2.s the Census Bureau • .. A number of different k ind_s of porrers to carry on investigations can be found in the codes. The provision most favorc bly vie\7ed b y lJRA allo\7ed members' records to be inspected by agreement (127). The fact tha t members agreed to lay their books open may h ave cured the public aspect of the problem. HoHever, it may nell be tha t nhen members so agreed it nas uith the feeling that these records to be ins,ected and used as governmental information and that this was not merely an exchang e of trade information. far the greater number of codes, carried broad por!ers 11to investigate11 (128). Related to such provisions nere giv...: ing S}_)ecific power to code authorities to inspect t h e records of members (129 ) 9838

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-128 -or giving that poner to a confidential (130). Tne of investi g . ating record.s has always been looked upon by our courts as being close to the border line which separates public from private interests. Suc h investigations should properly be conducted Tii th .s-pecific govGrnmental poses in mind and, as the courts have said, shouid.not 'be resorted to 2-s mere 11fi shing expedi ticms 11 (131). A s has been pointed out, the 11confio.en tial o .gent11 provision did not alnay s l :eep the information gained. by tl e inYestigation from interested competitors. The of securing confic3.en tial informc.tion seems governmental by nature. It seems extremely questionable to all or: its exercise b;y cocLe authorities, their D.Gent s, :or anyone uho \70\lld allow competitors access to pri va.te records. Povters were given to code authorities to bind tl1eir res1Jective in(ustrie by lJroy.Josed. a .mendr:1ents for Tihich no :9ublic hearing l."as required (132) • Although it rrasnecessary to h2ve a:-9proval of the Pre sid.ent or his properl..,r authorizec1 the effect of these provisions ' ias to give sreot legisl2.tive and _represent ative por:er to the code aut>.ori ties. I . t r.1c-..y be to alloTI a Yiell organized grou1J to speak for d i sorga.nized industry, but this should involve no more than the right of petition and should not be treated as binding u: pon either the g overnme:11t or the industr:-:r until resort has been had to an adequo.te public procedure. In the field of uniform cost s3rstems c ode authorities uere alloned to impose formulae u: pon their ve inCl.ustries ( 133). There \7ere, of course, otper related. t y-pe s of provi sion.s rri th varying shades of authority , it is sufficient here to )Oint out that por:rers of a :public chc.racter 11ere l1eing e::-:erci sect b y an agenc•r COT'T)JO sed of interested. persons. Uniform cost sy-stems bear a very definite relationshi:9 to price and. price control. As such, they are delicC'.te devices 2mc1. if e::::ercised b;y a public n c y woulc3. be subject to the. most c areful cant rol b y the courts. In fact, such provisions hc:we often been helo. lad pe r se. It c a _ n be seen that in t'1e ha11C1. s of a . code authbri t y the courts. nould.. probably trea t such provisions as improper. Classification of customers is of a simila r character. Cod e authorities rrere allowed_ in some inst.:mces to impose U'"9on their industries mandator:' cJ.assific:.tions (134). The courts in the pc?.st treated clo.Ssifj_cation of customers, as a me.tter of agreement, as being und.esiroble. It mi ght be tha t the courts r1ould accede to a legislative judoJTient thc.>. t customer classific2.tion nas needed, but it is doubtful that they nould alloTI the same people who as members of tr::.d e 9-ssociations illegally classified their customers to c1o t his as code authorities. The effect both of uniform cost and customer class fication may be of s erious eco\ b : ic co::..scc• . c: Such yowe r therefore should only be e: :erci sed by public a. ct not priva t e or q uasi-privo .te ones. Th e collectio n a.t"ld clisbu:rsement of liouic3.ated dam2.cse assessments hEls .generally been. held imprOI J e r as a me.tter of trac1e c-.ssociat'ion activit3r. As a menns of enforcing la':'r (135) such devices shoulo., of course, h ave a leg i sla ti ve s. Further than te adrlin i strati on of such provisions is so easily upen to abuse it \701.lid seem :..Jro:per tha t it be performed by public agencies onl .... :-. To '-' i d in the ac1mini s trat ion of the codes, cocl.e autl ori ties ;:ere given the porrer to designate selfg over:..1ing C:.ivisions (136), and to determine are.::. s or zones of activity ( 137). Such :90.1er nas merely incidental to ques tions of a substantive n ature. It vvould seem that as long as code activities nere confined purel y to leGal trade a s sociation activities and to . any other functions which might properl y be performed by interested member s of industry for their ind.ustr;y, that such would. be :proper. TI1ere the effect of o.esignating such divisions or trad.e <::. reo. s might have a profound

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1 3 . economic o socia l Gffect, i t noul d ecm lm )a:'OpL;r to e;i v e ti1i s no .1e into the h a n d s of ode .:tut ho riti n . It :as _ui t e ommon t o 'llo ; cod aut ho rities the s trati ve po ,rer of G aj1ti or This rras true in the of distress m erchancli se ( 138), ons i bnment o f _,.o ods ( 1 39), the operation o f price ( 140) , hours ( 141) , ::age ( 142 ) o-r:perio d ( 14-3) and rest day 1 a bor ( 144) provisions. Her e , lil euise, the test m u s t b e the ch.:tr acte r of the p r o visi o n to 111ich the e J"ceptions or e:::em tions 1ere g r a : 1 t ed. '.Tl e r e t h e effect o f such provisions and their a d mini t atio n rras f elt b e:rond tl1e inmediate bou:1 d s of the industr:;r, it would "'eem i mprope r for a code authority to exercis e no'!ers. In the administration of most of the nrovisions of t1is .the social and econ o mic j_nt 9rests of tle public wocld s eem to be such as to require public adninistration. Code authorities rrere given poPer of a judicio. l n a t11re (145), and in a 5rea t number of instances rmre given the poner to hea r and decide complaints 17i thout referrint:> them to .rJRA ( 146). It might b e urged that quent1y the po1.7er to act judicially nas given only \-:rhere the members of involved a breed to the results of the code authority action. It must be remembered that such egreements and affecteQ 9roperty interest just as substantially as if the members of industry had folloued the procedure of appeal. To the members of industry dealing ui th code aut11ori ties they 11ere faced by an a gency backed \7i th the sanction of the lan. Further .than that, i t \?as knoun that the recommendations of the coo . e authority uould ca.rry great persuasive weigl1t \7i th the Administration. Often of industry agreed to settle the matter lli th the code authori tJr rather than g o to tl1.e e.ig)ense of pursuing it The very poner to cause such inconvenience and to a member of the industry gave to 'the code authori tJ the se of public in charecter. Such poDer of 2.rbi tration, meo.iation e.nd a.12.rd e . s uas desira.ble in the e .dministration of the should been exercis8 d b.,r res:9onsible public officers. Code authorities nere also given the pone r to incor:9orate (147). 1.7hen this is trec;.ted c-. s purelJ an administrative adjunct to the carrying on of its general poners, it seeras perfectly :proper. It cannot be said that the incorporc-t ion is inconsistent \7i th t h e 11a ture of a public a gencyfor numerous example s of incorporc;ted are found in our governmental Such o.gencies as a raih:ay or a financial loan institution engege in business functions and do not administe r laTI in the sense thE.t did. Therefore, the -c>o::er to incorporate P.ould seem inconsistent 11i th the public functions exercised b code authorities. The tion U"")On code authorities of a cl.uty to make recom.rnend ations on s yecific ?roblems does not seem objectionable (148). As has been the right of petition in this countr} is nel:: founC:.ed, and it '.7ou.ld. seem im Jossible to prevent c:.n.,r . group of interesteC:. priv2.te :persons from petitioning the government or a goverl1.rnental agency for certain action. because this is stc. ted in the mand atory form of a duty im:_:>o sed u 'Jon this 6rou:_ J 11ould not seem objectionable from the public viewpoint. The only issue that could be mace rrould be if the code authority it self refused to accept the dut;:,r. TheLe is little need to consider this angle because the problem Tiould never have been raised. The e:::treme number and imoortance of p or:e r s g r anted to code authorities 9838 I

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-l3G became obvious in a short time . Various check s uere resorted to. Action b y coC.. e c:-"uthori ties nas required to be submitted to the Admi n istrator for or the Administrator i'7as given the :por;er to disap prO'Ve (149). Thi : l atte r :poner meant nothing beyond a formal eJqJression of the power ,;:-:-r superior keeps over a subordinate, unless the code authorities are loo_:ed e . s coordinate agencies of equal s t atus to the Administration, because of the President's approval of the codes chartering t hem . It can be reason ably c:.ssurned that the ;president neve r i:nteno.ed t his. Even t h e positive of the Administrator's aoint: full or time administration later, but NRA never capitalized o: the of this device. The individual members usually foun0. it e asie r to float rrith the current, and in absence of strong be.cking enc. yre ci se instructions from NRA. it nas e9 .sier to accede to industry's !Jla.ns anu clr a n their pay from the government. 'rl'lis o.oes not mean that dit not rende.r valuD.ble public s ervice, but ::cathe r cs e. group :LTRA never sought mak e a strong effective instrument of control, althoush i 1 1 direction v:ere being taken at the time the codes died (154). The rec3.ele g ations mac-;.e to the cocle aut horitie s n i t hout sonc tion of It is doubtful i f a s tn.tut e \7ou.ld have cured the 11due lJrocess11 c1if ficulty found in using privc-. t e interested persons to administer lmv u i th a public cha r acter. The 'J 0,.7ers g r anted. ana. t h e stanc1c..rds for their e:::erci se were such that code authorities aD Jear to have been an ... e x tremel y questionable gove r nmental device legally . 9838

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' 1 .. .,,_ -' I V

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l : -:F' OJ.ESTALLING " BhO_\D REV lEW II The desire of c .d111in L trr 't1o n to ti1 "brol d r cvi w n of the courts is more than a. selfish d esire for powe r . New adninistrations are not creat e d to e m ploy people. Th e y a r t e d t o o n idea o r a of them. "Broad w n may take the gui;.-.t;: of a positive course of action. Too ofte n , the p remium is p laced u pon maintenance of the status guo , no m atte r \lh a t the demands of society. It is t his lost aspect of "broad r eview" tl: .:1t administration desire s to avoid.. No m atte r .vl at lofty statements the courts malce of detached inter st i n the law alone the vourts are vitally inte rest e d in th conduct of any administration botl internally a n d externally . This inte r e t has been such a d rag u pon the d evel o pmen t o f needed r:;o v c rrunEJntal forms and methods ( l ) tha t legis l atures have been l d t o try to a v oid. too g reat judicial con t r o l ( 2) . Viewing the N IRA b efor e administration of the Act w a s h a d , i t was not t o say i n the lifht of the c Gse s thnt it would be hel d constituti o n al. T rue, t o say t!lis one h-:..d t o g o one ste:p beyond the cases. any autho r i t i e s f elt that t11is one f . tep ':'h.S the next o n e t o be taken and a one . Admini s t rative w a s gaining a str o nger hol d upon the cour ts. The p o;er h a d been s u bject t o extension s . The "str eam" the o r y h a d aside the narrow Suge r T rust case (3). And the Supreme Court showed a str o n g dispositio n t o r e lax the anti-trus t laws, w ith i t s r efreshin g o pinio n in the Appa lachian Coals case ( 4). Econ omi c unrest lay heavil y upon the COUl1try, and the c ourts seemed r e luctant to block action reason ably designed t o alleviate c onditions. a ttitudes upon the par t of the Supr eme Court ruin e d the p r e d iction s of legal schol ars. One wa s the misgiving s a"'Jout g reatly increased f e d e r a l a uthority, and the other w a s a. feeling t h a t executive p ower had g rown too strong. Wit h the additiona l p roblems that a new f e d e r a l administ r ation sought to cop e , it was im p ossi J l e t o avoi d all appearanc e s that m ight lead to the court develop ing the a t titud e s mentio n ed. A conscious regard for the views o f the courts m ight hav e gone f a r to p r e clude t oo hostile judici a l treatment. Good administra tion, full procedural safeguards, and c ompl e t e l;y reas o n e d action u p o n t h e best evidenc e obtainable might have aide d Greotly . It i s no t _possibl e that storie s of the haste in, and the i njustic e resulting from, the a d .illinistration of NRA did no t reac h the e&rs o f the j u stic .es. If t h ese s tori e s had "bee n differ ent, the court m ight have been more p rone to consider 1ffiA. a ne,tiona.l need. In-s e a d ;ve have suc h cases as the Schechte r c ase (5) limiti n g feder a l p ower, and the P anama ( 6 ) Hum-ohreys ( 7) l iril i ting v e and executive po.v er. A p ossible explanation of the Scheci.1te r case may lie in legislative and admini str2tiv e approach. I f a ctionl1B d ueen c e r e ful and reasone d the possibilit ies o f being sustained would hav e been much h i g h er. I t is not mean t to s u g gest that t h i s a l o n e would h ave cause d a different decision. I t would h a v e afforded the c ourt a much bet t e r basis u pon which 983B

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1 3 , _ to v e c'.ecide d othe r n i oe . Fo r i nstance, i f a n o v o rwhel 1 .1in r e ccn: d is t o sho t h dire t vital r e l ationshilJ o f e n y p roblc : a to intc r s t:-te commerc e , the ourt ould b e m o r e hard put t han t!:eywer0 i:1 the Schcc h t e!_ case to s y this is n o t uch co imaerce P s t o be it. i n the p over of th' f e c l government. It would b e better,c-lso, to .... ve c ourt a p r o? c h tho lJroblem with a i7ar!h feeling o f commen datio n for tl1e excelle n 't administration of t h e a gency than to be un \7ittfn.:;1 .y 'J rejudice d by knouled. , e of a n unjus t conduct of its 9838

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1 34-C HAPTE R XVII ADI.IIN ISTRATIVE SAFEGUARDS AND THE CHALLENGE O F .AJ)ii/II N ISTRATIO N Uore than the practical consideration of escaping "broad revie1111 is involved. There must be a pride developed within administrc,tion. Efficiency, which is the chief merit of the administrative technirJ_ue, must not smother Jur heritage of fc>.irness. The goal of .admini st:.."o, t i o n should be to . provide the best :possible governmental agency. This mec.:.ns that places both for efficiency and fairness must be provid.ed. Administrative is im portant. sumed, h o wever, that government can be made ment of bovernmental forms. The couplet of It cannot be naively as by the developPope is expressive: 11For forms of government let fo8ls contest; Whate'er is best adrninstrld is best.H (l) A proper j?ersonnel is vi tal. IJ.1he success of an administration rests upon the type of personnel it employes (2) if the basic idea is scund. Persons of limited apprcach in positions influencing the administrative policy of an administration, may offer a severe handicap. There V!ere .L_ NRA too many responsible officers 17i th a desire to get things done 17i thout regard to f8.irness or appearances of fairness. An efficient business man is not necessarily an efficient administrator. Even e , business man desiring to. be fair do8s not necessarily provide a fair administrc,tor. I is very proba )le that 1;7i th prope r instruction or advice tha t the personnel of NRA could have met the requirements of llc1ue process of lawN both procedurally and substantively. The conclusion m u s be that tno al terna'bives were open. 1. All responsible positions . c ould have filled by persons experienced in the administrative t echni<}lo 'This, it has been suggested was impossible either through the Civil Service (3) or otherwise. 2. A certain few trained persons, with a prope r feeling for the administrative apprcach, could have been selected to supervise administration and to instruct other officials therein. This sounds almost ludicrous to anyone having observed NRA in its days. This is probably true because the immediacy o f the vision of hustling-bustling NRA obscures oneis vision necessary long range ob jectives. The very notion that NRA was to be temporary must have .had ::. grea t effect upon administrative and personnel policy. It may be that good G-.dministration 1 . -:.ould not have prevented the Supreme Court l3 view in the Schechter case. But had the court approved the basic .'idea , good c ,dministration would have gone far to have made NRA a healtJ:-...y efficient agency of government. Properly trained personnel for all positions or even for t h e key positions are not readily accessible. This does not mean that all 1Jersonnel oust be although in this country our training sources is one way of gaining a proper a ppreciati o n of the lJroblem. Ev e n ex:-_perience is. n o guarantee, however. A persnn 'vhose c o mes fro m a poor administratio n 1 J l i ght fail to apprec iate the ino,dequacies of that administration. tn1at uc>s needed, and vvhat YYill be required agc:dn and again in t le is more than expert training in a single line. A lang range vie w of our problems, grounded on a of our social 9838 all ec ac dt ;! : I il Sl \1] t,] u a

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.. and lcc;"l his tory, coupled ni th sn cifi kno vl dt:e 0 f imm dio.te c on rnrl socinl f--c s , t:1i• i•; sr me of the a resronsiblc adLlini st1.:..ti ve official should h::we ( 4). Truo, the "Ou r c s whi h • r ducc men . e too fC,''• A solution nould be toP ick n •:.oons thuu" :l1t C<"', ;_ ble of ; nd dcvelonin._, a roper administr,,..,.t ive t cl;.i liC:'_uc. ( 5). Then. -persul s shuuld be f:iv n em intensive scl ooling in.; in ini stra t ion by trC'ino d Dersons ( G). 1['1 stly, the g radu te s si1oulcl. 0c c l su"Y)erviscd in the )Cr.!.L)r .. lenc of tl,cir regul;r dutil)s unti:. t'tcy h d d c mon ..,t r ted such nbility tn:t they c o uld "b fitted into the ,li: tus 'ilas cliii'er ent. Some d etached 0.dvi sory agency whose r ecommendations 'H_QulrJ: have received every conside r atio n and commande d respect pave been a n t o the NRA to have seen the l o n g range nroblens, en::;,ulge d as it a s in a sea of imm ciiacies. A conscious .effort to a.J")l y "natural law" o r lldu e r::Jr o c ess concepts" c ould have only VTO:;:lced as M--r:_: nt for good a d ministration (7a). Gene r a l Johnson , retiremen t , seemed to sense a number o f the e .dministrative difficulties of H P.A (8) . Some o f these coin cide i t h difficultie s already oointed out in connection ,,i th subs tD.n ti ve questions of :9olicy (other than-administrative ) which are not within the scope of t his 1 :10rk. Donald Richberg san similar broad admini strati ve c s ( 9) • In the g c n e r e l r eview (1 0 ) •. ding this study c urtain specific diffic1..1J t i c s are l)Oint c d out. R e m edies can n o t a l r.r.!:tyS be s uggeste d . WhLH'o twy Coint out hercvcr possib l e actio n • h ich might have nccn td.:cn . in connection mith each n r ob l cm. the F rosidcnt s aid in tho bc6i nnin.o' NHA p rvscnto d 11a challe1;_t;o to 2 .Cl.rJinistration" (11). Nili\ ans, c rcd it • : ith d uvotc d speedy action . It f.:-. i l cd, ho 'TGVor, to provid e thot stand.nrd of c:1dmini strati v c justice t hc-. t tho courts damcmd a s the of our ci 11challence to administration" vould have o u e n judged by tho In the light of vrha t tho courts h v o done n.nd said this study has tried t o 9oint out h o w they '70U l d hav e treat e d NRA administration . Evon late , is p r c .paring t o ansncr t h e chall e nge of administ:..c:.tion. 9838

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-136 -Its careful self-criticism should noint the 1ay for future administration. The inadequacies and t h e Hill o e foundation stones U1)0n which to build' ane Somed r.y ' nerhan s not immediately , c::;overnment will have to adniniste r the :oroblem s with which was concerned. vYhen this time cnmes, it is our f e r vent hop e . a n d belief that the gov<;rnment w .ill build an adl11inistrRtion fully cauable of efficiently with the com.)lex and irrmortant economic uroolem s of modern society , wl1ile affording justice to every man. . 9 8 3 8

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., ' , .. CJ-TAP R I (1) Tho Nc.. tiona Industria l llecovory 1 r.t, 48 Stnt. 1 f=i. ( 2 -atiom'll RPcovory Adr:1inistrnti0 -RnJletin F o . l,June 1 6 , 1933. 2' Stat. 2 0 9 (Thq S hP rrnan Ac t J ; 38 Stat. 730 (ThA C l ayton Ac t ) ; 38 Stat. 717 (ThP. F e dP _ A l TrPd e Act); F o r further stC1tutP.s ncJ. C !"' S0S U 1"l0 n thor,o l p s g q P , Thq Fodqr e l Antitrust LPtfor"" thl'l dq Dres sion S -rruc h t Plk: r'i SO-CC'l. l lqd 1 i ncl1 ) . S t r iA G . I II (7) Johnson, T h o E:>2:1P. f r 0.,.,1 to Zc>rth (Saturd P . y P ost, 19, 1935), 7 2 : 11]efore t ht1 '1"'1<'1.:r, A r1"lricP n business w e . s a. :r. onqy co m b o.f ,-;rater-tight industria l COm"JPrtments. E b . c h cell -'<'S gt l Arderl. There 'lli!ElS a maximum of cor:met i tion a n(1 e. mi n i F lU:J ,. f R.J..thl8s s and com qtiti()n ,..,.Ps oP.r.r "'Ad l)v t h 8 anc l Clayton Acts . The e r ctan e d that. Th"" Antorqd a contP-st t o S8 mhich coul d the g r Aeton t of its young me.. n hoocl and the amount o f its '10nAy And nro ) A r t . 0 r into thq firo in th"l shortAs t s uace of time . T h e . t ,-as the -;-r"" Y ' t o the ' "'[lr. 11 Thq old hon -::1a. c b ine o f thA U n i torl St. ? to s t D roc3.uc8 thi ngs f ast An0UP'h i>t t:li s r'PC. A to QPS t r G:;r ovor7t r " WP. h a d t() scraD i t . An0. in tho s':lrrt '"""n A'D:>:'il 1, 1917 ; . 2 r d l.(), rembAr, w e literally torR i t p0 art -rmt. it t,...,:: other . • ' G n t h e ca.ll o f G o vo rDI!lent and thA n rAssu r A r f ,;at:ri "'tisJ11, tbn c-l o _ individuAlist battlers ro. r a l bw:r:-:1q en o rr-;er 1 i zqd s quad, all tO""P rd t h o sound o f th"' g,_ U l S . 983 8

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Com"'Jeti tors r"'SO\..l.TC"'S , th"'!ir t:cPd.P. S0/""!T0t S , th"'lir f?'"!ili tios. Industries into group s a n d figur'=lS n i t h the sueP.d. and a l most thP. o f a highlJ . chorus o n a r1usical-comP.d. stagP., and GovP.r:nr:Hmt too}-: charg e o{ 'both lJTOduction an.o . Cj)nSUT'JTJtion and, to a large extP.n t, :pricP.s. It "orkAd. -J<"'U.rACl_ forth a . flood of urod.uction for usPs o f "'aX' as thP. '"'C:rj_cl sP.on in onP. country . It "VOn the ma.r .11 (B) Ibid., 68: "Plants,_ finding . A . s9ant mar}-":P.t for uroducts , b egin frantic.lP. one 1Jlant or one lOcflli t y Tll!hich aCl. o Dt s _this 1'118thoo. cc=:n hrin}; it. cnrentufl.l1:r to a. =hol8 . .. 11That vt=Jr.v thing '" A . s . thP. yrorst C'f this dP.'lJTP.s. :SiNl. . It b og<>n to have its dPstru. c.tivP. in 1929. :Earl y in 1930 , PrAsid.:mt HoovP.r .:mad.e strong to atrest tho dizzy dor.rnn?. . r 0 . s;Jiral in w a . gP.s and em,J loymt=Jnt, but onP. comuq. n y aftP.r .another, in nolfish com Deti tinn for thP. .. ,. d .8clining b u s .iness , cut mFJ.'P.S And, hours. As its .co:r.TnAtito:rl?-r:-erP. obligAd t0 dC' l _ i k e nisP., until all d.icl it in industry afto:r This into !!lael strom -r•ont o n four years. 11 ( 9) Ibid.,, 75: 11 It hanpPned bP.Q<:mse . th"l;.r thP. l aw to unchecked and uncontroll8d comuetition--cloo.mecl b y thP. l am n0t -to ta!{P. comnon counsel, not to rPgPrci . . 8ach unit, a , n d n0t to rogBrcl thq country Cl.S an economic in tP.g"'r in mhich ovpry cit izP.n hac3. an in st and' AVP.ry 8moloyer an obli{;? t i011. ThAy could n0t havq saved VAs, . bP.cBuse any com;Jeny thfl. t in thP. .fight. for a ne,l\T cauacity , conste.ntly in crP..P.sing ion,. the: 0 thf'lr fellow Is market, "'70Uld {!,0 to the "<'78.11. The larrs of Statf'ls sinroly 'Root hog or die. DP.vil take thP. hindmost! 1 and thA devil tookit -all. 1 Th"' biggP.r thqy arP., the hardf'lr thqy fall,'. and this. structurP. first bP.-CA.rnt=J monstrously big and then fell • rith a crash thP t sho0k thA ,,.hol"' '"Or1d.11 (10) Pr-=1ss, Jun8 13, 1935, ' qu.c:tP.s from fl SDP.Pch by Hon . Donald Richbt=Jr g a.t GalPsburg, Illin<"'is, 11Unless mP. havP. fflct :finding agt=JnciP.s a nd . '"ri tors 0f sciAntific ,-rorl : s to T'lhon.leg islativP. and judicial bodies will ac0.0r0 [-1Uth0ri tv, n0m 1TiP.ldAO . to phvsicists 8nd ChP.PliStS, rrq shall haVP. arisA • 1Jrofound of f8.Ct rriJ.l b e de.clarAd Vl!'Ong by. tht:?. courts ••• 11 An auuec:ll continuP.d for a 11cordial alliance of the socia l sciAntist a n d . thA -ora.ctical uoli tic ian to gc=dn for mha t Congrf'lss ha. s won fr0r r { thA 'uni0n of and sciPnce.11 9838

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-139 -(1) il loughb y , .Q_on?t:!.t _t_:o n a l__b._, tho:; i t t d States (New f ork 19 29), 1 6 1 6-1635 ; G o odnm , T h-:-O.!_t t.e A minis t r ative L a w of the Unite d Sta t e s ( N ; York' 1905) IV I .51--i:2 .• rr 1(? rheory of the Seuar 2tion of P o crs in the U itc d • ( v ) Frt:nicfurte r c:nd D avison, C s 0 ' 1 Adm i11istretlve Law (Chicago 193.:..) Appen dix 1. ' l'he S of Po: r s i : 1 S t a t e C o n s t1tutions, 114 9 . Eig h t S t a t e s h a v e mer structura l t r i pu rtit e div1sion. Six r e peat the three d e_;>art men t f o r mula . Six a .:; ror_ i b i tio n r:..e;ainst a d m i x t u r e of po; ers. T ;entys ix provide for s e p . . rc.: t i o n o f p o\7er s with cxceyt ion s . Tlil O r "cognize a.n "ecir:1 i!1istr a t i v eTI in )rovidin[; for s p a r a t o n o f powers. (3) Articles I, I I and III. (') Holm e s , C o llec t e d Legr l (NcVl. York, 1920), Essa y on on tesq_u i eu. S e e !J_rlich, limon t e sq:u i e n and Soc Jurisprud ence 11, 29 Harvard Law R uview 3b2, 592 (19 16) e r e t h e aut'1or s uggest s concerning the chapt e r "De l a Con s tJ.tu.tio n d1_ttng l t e rre", lfThere is n o doubt tha t it i s found.0 d entirel y 0!1 o b s ervc...tion of t h e v w r kint: of the British Con s t itution. Y e t t h ere is still no mention of Greo t Britain in the title c-nd a f e w [ t the n.d of the c h a p t er. Th e q uestion vvith vrhich he i s concer-ne d is not t h e f ra.1e o f t h J3ri t ish Cons ti tut ion, but ho-rvr the C onstitution of a free u e o-ol u :.mst b e f r a.rn 3 d." ( 5) Fra n1. durtc r e n d 37 H a rv. Lc..-.-_ l 0 1 0_092' U : of the r igid of -po .1ers "A Study in S epo.r a t of Powers," Surprise is ex,) r esse d a t p r evalence t h eo r y . (5a) Commi t tee o n i\li n i n t e r1s Poriers .rteqo:tt (C md. 4 0 6 0 , Pre s ente d by the Lor d Chancellor to Parliawcnt in A pril, 1932) S4 -95. T h e Co;ami t t e e comltients on the fs..c t t h a t lithe O.octrine of the separa tion of p owers is not s acros e:;:1ct, tl ::' nd. sta.t es, "the sap3.r ation of p ovvers is merely a rule of r.Jolit1ca l \ ! i s dom, a!ld. ' nust g i v e V ' e Y where sound reasons o f public policy so r e q u ire." (b) See discussio n sro v t h of A d lninl s t:rco.t i v e Law in relation w i t h the d.octrine , i nfra , t his cha9 t er, s octio n e . (7) Bonciy, S eparc:tio n o f Pm: ers (Hew _rork , 1893). A d mi xture of p m;ers end ov erlappiag . PG.rt I r, 41-49; The Legislature and the Courts, P art III, 5; The Lt::g islahrre and the E x ecutive , P art IV, 89; Th e E x ecutive 2nd the Courts, P art V , 105. ( 8 ) Bing' em v. I villler, 17 O hio 'h5 F re.n k furt e r and Davison, o p cit., 51: 1:1 a0..dition to tho h i storica l p r actice the court f elt tha t to "decla r e all t -e consequence s r esulting from it void, is pregn ant 17ith fea r f u l consequences." M a ynard v. Hill-_, 1 2 5 u . S. 190 (1887). Bu t contra, b a s e d on the separ ation of p':'•:ers doctrine see: S p arhaTik v. Sparhawk, 116 M ass. 315 (1874-1875), and D avison , op cit., 46. 9838

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-140 (9) Calder v. Bull, 3 Dc.ll. 386 (1798) despite a dictum at 388, HAn act of the Legislature (for I can.L'J,Qt call it a law) contrary to the first grea t principles of the social cbmpact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislature authority.'' (10) Cooper v. 4 14 (1800). (11) Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet. 627 (1829). (12) Honolulu ].:tapid Transit Co. v. !Iawaii, 211 u.s. 282 (1908), preventing courts to interfere to maintain a rate schedule. (13) Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1 (1825). (14) Article III, S ection 1 and 2. (15) Tutum v. u.s., 270 u.s. 568 (1926) (16) The A.rticle III, S ection 2 /1/ (17) Hayburn1s Case, 2 Dall. 409 (1792); Muskrat v • . u.s., 219 u.s. 346 (1911); and Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Association, 277 U.S. 274 ( 1928). (18) Willis, Parliamentary Powers of English Government Departments, (Harv ard University Press, 1932 ) o; The Author points out tha t the separation of pouers doctrine has never bee n realize d in p r actice. If it could. have been in the early d&ys of our g overnrn ent he d.oesn1t say, but he points out that the ch anges in e conomic society have not forced. upon us other governmental_methods disharoonious with this theory. (19) Goodnow, op. cit., 35. The doctrine does not apply to local governrw.ent. ( 20) Ibid., 34, 37. ( 21) Story, Commentaries on the Constitution (1833)' II, 8: "Whe n we , speak. of the three grec:.t powers of government a nd maintain that t:1e s eparation is indis_yensable to public liberty, we are to understand this ma.."{im in a limited sense. It is not meant to affirm that they must be kept wholly and .entirely separate and distinct and have no common link or connection or dependence, the one upon the other, in the slightest d.egree. The true meaning is that the whole power of the one department Should not be esercised by the same h a nds v'hieh possess the Phole p ower of eithe r 0f the other departmonts.u ( 22 ) Holmes, op cit., 26 3 : "His England-the England of the three fold division of power into legislative, executive and judicial --was a fiction invente d by him, a fiction which mislead Blackstone and D eboline.rt ( 23) Goodno w , ' op cit. , 31-33. ( 24 ) Bentham, Principles of iVIorals and Legislation.(Oxford University Press, 1879), 13. Bentham ridicules the principle the view tha t its history is qoubtful and utility even more so. ( 25 ) Frankfurter a nd Landis, rtpower of Cong r ess ove r Procedure i n Federa l Courts A Study in Separation of Powers", 3 7 Harvard Law R eview 1010 (1924); 9838

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14 1 -( 6) S8e .is u . sin!'l r:t 11• )0 iticcrl 11 i n f r::1, III B lt1chJ.y nnd U;1t"'ln n , i s r:" i v"' Loo-i s l til')n a11d Ac1,jutica tion ( r o okin s I n s ti t uti n , 193L1) . 11Th"' d.nctrino o f so [l:rc•tio n n f 'I)C'nr""rs had not d""VAlOu P d in Unit"' S ()t'"'s , B . s i t in FrAnc'-', in such e . nra" th9 C'r<'l. i n A ' c urts ma;r n n t intorf r o ••i t.h ()rTTlinis t r-ti r o [lets anct. adm inist r"'tivo c nurt" h 0 t o "uo "'lrt , b i. hn.d; but i n S''..Ch a l"Tay thf"t h"" 0 r rin0.r . courts , ""S Acia l nrl')visiC'n is "'lad"! 0tho:r-... w is8, cont r o l tho ad'Ylinist Ption. • • • • • • • ThA 'lJTC'r."'ss of l a .--r c laUS""S of tho fPdArn J C0ns t i t uti0n havo n0t b00"1 t0 b r inP' a mPll out, and syst"''l of adminis trP t ive c:'ldjudi c t i n , but havp US0l u : i m n r i . y as c:. 'lt:>t h o d . of cnn trol ling s u h s t antivA l .CJ'' • 11 (28) F r a nkfurtpr, "The T fls l-0f LCJ, 11 7r:: U n iv'-lrsitv o f P8n sylv[lnia .nPViPm 6 1 4 . 6J_Q_(l 9?.1l: " And s o , t h i s il1egitil'l'Ja t A , 0X O t ic, ad m i n i S t i VP l ?"rn tolo o f its st"'80 . . :T. bv w1. t in t to'Mer . 11 ( 29) Goo dno , Conroara t i V"' Ad.mi n i s t r,.., t i o La'I"'T (i.'Tt:> Yor c 1S03). This i s the f:frst r ocogni tion of 11ac1. m i nistrr:>t;ivo l P ,""" B.S sur. h in t h e E nrslish 'l1hi s nas first 1JUbl i sht:>d in l893. Harriman, " Tht:> DP.velo-oTTlAnt o f Administra t ivt:> La.•'T i11 thP Uni t P d Stnt o s , n 2.1:) Journa l g58 (19 1 6). (30) BP.ard a . nct. 3P.ard, The A!llt:>rican ior k , 1930) • . . ( 31) Frankfurte r , Th e P u bJ.ic a . nc1 its C-ovornm8nt (Ya. l e U ivt:>rsity Pres s , 1930). . ( 32) Ibid. , i 7 . ( 33) Willis, O D . cit., g: " Th i s 8ssP-r i s ,.,.,ith u r ocP.dure--trivial stu;:f', i t m i ght b o t h0us.-ht . :But c o ntro v o r s r prhich a t ur9sant rp.gos 0round d P J.P.gf1t i0n 0:;" i s n0t in e ssen c e conc<'!rne d . w ith "10 r o <:!XCi t i n g thc:m n roc"!dur e . Th a . t s h l "'S r 1 nst be:! clo.a.rt:>(l_ dt:>vices mad e cnl11'0U lsor y in f ar.tcri<'!s has nt:>vt:>r bt:>on in • . iss u e is soJ b y nrha t TJO.?:t:.S shall c a r r y its d8c l art:>d DOl i c y eff P.ct . Itust P P .rliamAnt i t soJ.f d etails--and be metb 0 ds? O r shall a . subordina t8 authority b8 with tho s A d utio.s? How f 8 r shall of thosP. duties b a . d . e p a r t mAnt b e s u pP-r. ,r isAd by the cou rts? Thus statAd, q uestions of uroceduro. b<=:!co'r:1e quP-stions o f 11 a lso, HP.'nart, Tho. l'-0 ' ' Dt:>s-otism ( No.n Y P o.,.o.r s will b 8 found , infra X I V a nd . , XV. ( 36) Bla chly and O a tm an, ou. cit., !=13: 9838

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-14:2-.... 11Its advantages are: of t h e time of the legisl&ture; availability of e:l:pert absence of narti san conflicts concerning cletails; flezibili ty; possibility of correct drafting; com:.>le tion anct clarification of the statutory law , and consequent avoidance of unnecessary litigation. 11Its :9rincipn l clisadvanta,ges, under t h e system now existing in our federal government, are: Possibilities of inharmonious and inconsistent sub-legislation; of s ecrecy; of -improue r influences; o:f' failure to consider the general will; of lack of an adequate statutory basis, ending in the assum:9tion by the cqurts of important and inap:9ropriate sub-leg i slative powers; and. of i ncidental sub-legislation by either the courts or the administrative a u t horities, particularly the great regulatory commissions, in t h o :9rocess of cleciding particular cases. lf' The 1:1ost interesting t hing about these advantages and disadvantages, whe p thus s e t forth side bJr side, is the fact that the adva.n _ta.ges are gen eral, permanent, and inherent in the function of aclminis trat i ve legislation in any system organized with reasonable care; whereas the disadvantages are almost all dependent upon s:pecial conditions and o;f careful organization. T his means that due attention to the gove:rnment structure will eliminate, or .at minimize, the disadvantages of .aclministrati ve legislation, while all its advantages will remain." (37) Yillis, op. cit,, 52: "One of the c h i e f reasons for delegatill..g power to mcl\:e rule s to the department is, put shortly,. to enable questions of detail to be removed from th e consideration of Parliament•'' (38) Laski, "The Limitations of the 'Srpert,11 Harpers, December, (1930). Groenve l t v. :Burwell e t al, C ensors of the College of Physicians, 1 L. D. 454, 471 .(1691). The court the value of expert skill and . . its finding s in a technical problem be not disturbed. (39) Carr, Delegated (Cambridge Press 1921), 19-26: The Case for Delegation. The author mentions, l. the-time element rrhich has in England. since 1832; 2. 11the limitation of aptitudes" citing John Stuart Hill; 3. Parliament does not govern the cou..'Yl.try in the sense of enforcing the law or policy. Therefore, the actual governing a g encies can best fill in the details of that policy, and in certain case s make policy themselves. T his point is difficult to succinctly. Parliament is not a lv1ays in e>:istence, and even if it w e r e , its procedure is sloTI. point is quite similar to the reason Professor Comer assigns to t h e fact that so many example s of delegation can be found in the first session of Congress. (40) Dickinson, Administrative Justice 2nd the Suur emacy ?f in the United States (Harvard University Press, 19?7). T ll e autlor lists advantages o f administration: 1. Initiation by the Goyernment of' efforts to protect the public interest; 2 . Prompt action of a preventive,. and not remedial-nature based on techniQal knowledge; 3. The protection of public interest in a way not' possib l e by laVi suits of private parties; 4 . Flexibility in determining socially hurtful conduct. 9838

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-143 , L c i lo.tion,11 i'ic lip-a n Law 181 (1930)-t :1e rul e uroblt>r'l in. i elds of the g overr.1ent t G onn or "'S"8llt i a l i'nnct:i,ons. (42 ) o.r :.:, on . cit. In !:n--;land l c ,i"ln..tion can b e cuestioneCl judicially rril" reCl.s Acts o:f Pnrliamen t con not be so questioned. ( 4.... I o .tionu l . u . d11ini strati vc Qr zntion (Urbana, Ill. 1923) I . Sec also, P eou1e v . Tremaine, 168 F . E . 817 ( H . : . 1929); and supra, n . 2 . (44) freely r ecog:1ized action. I :urrr.w Tq_ LQ; s .Je v . Hob kQn L .. n_d. ancl I . rprove .. 1en t . Corm any, 18 E ow • 272 (1855) . See also, Goodn oTI, o v . cit., 24-25; Dice y , 'J.1he Law of the Constitution, 8th e d . (Lorden (45) ?29 , 230: the legal istrative the facts Cooley, Consti tution .... l Lini tat 8th ed.. , (:Boston 1927), 11 The lecis1at-ure must o.uclare the -policy of the law and. fiz r:hich are to contr9l in give n cases; but an admin office r or body inv ested the poTie r to asc ertain and conditions to the and ( 46) Sears Roebnc. c an0_ Co. _ v . Federa. l Trade Con m i ssion, 258 F • . 307, 312 (c. c . A . 7th 191.9) . (47), rt.evie1,11 45 Harvf'..rd La•r '754 , 756 (1932). 11Parliarii1ent :1a s been l e d to th departmental jurisdiction because . r evieu of socia l uolicy has been reactiona r y in temper and in I t hFl.s fai l e o . to aplJ r ecic>.te the e l e m ents of :policy TI ... :.i c h is invol ved in, fL' the facts wherever quas i -judicial o;>ro b 1ens e: 11 (48) El::iu v . U . s., 142 _u. s . 6 51-659 (1802). (19) the of court' s revien o f a1m.inistrative c:ction, L:.frc:. . See also Dickinson, 0:9. c i t., XI; and 11Rev1e,: o f A d:r1inistrc:.tive Determinations o f Questions of 'Constitutional Fact111, .80 P.enn .. L a n Revien (1933) 307 -332. (50) T.L1is is the traditional stc;.t er'lent . The or inci:9le , h owev e r , is not L:.:fle::ib1y adhered_to. Dicl..:inson, o p . cit., 50-54. (51) S;Jitll v . 226 U . S . 53, 58 ( 1 9 1 2). The case involved., so. i d the court, a ouest ion of lan nhether a pub1icat ion is a book or 11W e slwn l d . not interfer e ' .7i t h the decision of the Postmc.ster Gen 3 r a+ ur .. les s . of tl1e o p i nion it pas m"ong.11 See also :::Jc. t e s a n d Guild Co. v . P a.rne, 194 106, 107 ( 1S04), '"'here the cburt injected t:P,e that a question of laTI coupled with som e c .iscretion in the Postmaster General existed.

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. -144(52 ) A Prelii?lillBr, -Tre 2 .ti se on th-Lan of =:vi d.ence 1898), See o:p. cit., n . 49; Du i;an v . U.S., 34: Court of Clc;.ir:ls 4 ,58 (1899), helci. ti;.< t the o . Rcision of t :1e Col!l!!lissioner of Interna l :?..evenue a . n officer in char.:;e of 2-u'1st e:r:change is not a retail 0 .ee..l e r is a tecisi or. o f fa.ct in his juri-sdiction and final. Th e Secretc:•,ry o f tho sub::1itteCl. t h e ou8 s tion <:1. s one of 11lan.11 Th e court t s rJ,ot clear nhe t '1e r fL!al i t;y is given to the decision of the Interna l . 2evenue Commissione r bec ause of jurisdict:on or b ecause 11ouestion of fact" Has invoived. See treatTJent of 11q_uestion_s of law11 in conside ration of court's review of a c tion , infra, III. (53) ' L 1 nf,'..lad .am Co. v. lo'8c"._eraJ. Trade Commission, L!-2 F. ( 2d) 430 (C.C.A. 6th, 1930), tl1e q uestion of tl10 s_ci enti:fic and sc:fety character for obesity cure is a o_u.estion of opinion_, not f act. In many field s knoHlsdr_"' e 11 facts" as apD. r . t from 11 0:9inion11 are al:nost finc1. A questio!l involving fizing of prices and lessening of competition in commerce Tinich d e:penCl.ed to a g r eat extent 1..1pon opinion is f0uncl in Federal Trade Corr1ission v. Pacific Coast Associatio:J., 273 U . S. 52, 62 (19 27). Justice Ilutler se,ic1, 11Tl1e ,_;e ight to b e given to the f acts and. circumstances admitted., a s \"ell as the inferenc e s reasonably to be drawn from them, is for commission. 1 1 (Underlining (54:) L;.t erstcte Comr1erce v. Union P acific --• R. Co., 2?2 U.S. 541, 547, 54:8, 550 (1912): 11 fin determining mb:ed questions of law and fact, the court confine s itself to the ultimate ouestion as to nhether the Commission acted within its p o wer. It will not consicler the e::r.:pedience or nisdom of the order, or rrhether, on like testimony , it noulc3 . h2-Ve made a similar rulin;::;. t The findings of the Commission are mad o b y priua Facie true, and this co11rt has ascribed to tl1em the d:u. e to the judgments of a tribunal aDpoint ed l av r and infor: : t 1ed p y <"Xye:J;ience. t Illinois C. R. Co. v. Interstate Com ;1erce ComL1ission, 206 U.S. 4:41. Its conclusion, of course , is subject to revim7, but, , _ -hen s n:puorted by evidence, is accept eo_ as final; • .•• not thD,t its involving , D . s it c t o es, so many and i n t erests, can be su:9 yortecl b J' a m ere scintilla of -,;roof, b1.,_t the courts Fill not eza;,1inE? the ff1,cts fi,lrther than to d eternine whether t lle:..e nas substantial evidence to sustain the order ••••••• that of evidence 9efore them, r a t e e):perts o f acknow-ledged ability and fairness, . q.nd e9-ch acting of the other, may not have reached ic1entically the same conclusion. W e do not .::non whether tho r e sults uould }f2cVe b een t h e s ame . For t here is no oossibili t:r of solvin g the question as t h o Ugh it r rere a mathematical problem to there coulo_ b e one correct ans11er. Still there was in this nass of facts tha. t out of Hl1.ich e:::perts could have named a rate.nt See also N orth,G erroEmLloyd v • . Hedden, 43 ?ed. 17 (1890). (55 ) i .ia:rouez v. Frisbie, 101 U.S. 473, 476 (1879): "The lanF,Uage of t his Court in l.Ioore v. Ro.bbins, cited abov e , is equity will interf ere 'Who:. it is cleet, r that t l1es o officers have, a 1"1istake of the la\7, give n to :1an th land w h i cl , on the facts, belon6ed to a: 1other. t The mf:-:;aning of t his anC. the sound. p rincip l e i s , t 1a t v.rher e it is a mb:ed ou:::stion of lan and. of fact, and 1fThen tl1e court car1not so separate as to see cle a rly nhere the tribunal to rrJ.1ic h t h e lan has conficlecl the matter i s conclusive. 9838

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"But i it can be nrc.1 ntL. D 1 nin to court of 0oui ty that on fa ts c: ut ch is no 0 i" u e , or no re," soHnbl e doubt, thosr. offi ers -e , n oistal-:e 0.1 t:!c lD.\7, deurived a JTk n of 1 is rif;ht, it' wil l give 1 c l i ef. 11 (56) er, nd Da i sor. , ou. cit., P n . vii, for the stateJTient, 11Adninistrative LDn is ; it n8cess,rily is still crudely en:pirice.l, I t is r .calin._, rri t l ne: nroblems, c..:.lling for nen social i::ve tions or fresh o f old e:;:periences,ll 9'13 8

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-146FOT;ES FO CRAFTER III ( 1) Dicey, The Law of the Constitution, 8th ed. ( Loi.1don 1927); see also DicJ.d 1 1son, Ad.rni_nistrc,ti ve Justice a;.1 d the Su"Jremacy of Law in the United States (Harvard University Press, 1927); and Little v. Barreme, 2 Cranch 170 (1804). ( 2 ) Comer, Legislative Functions -Jf } Tation a l Administrative Authori t v ( Few 1927) ' 187: "A study of the Statutes at Larg e reveals, however, that ['_lthoug h Co:c1gress has from the first demanded an occasional accow1ting to itself by its agents who wield legislative this demand ap•!ears only spasmodically." (3) Radio Act of 1927, 4 4 Stat. 1174 ; and Comrnunications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1064. ( 4 ) Blachly e..nd Oatman, Administrative L e sislatio1 1 a;.1d Adjudication (Brooking s I nstitution, 1934), 235: "In respect to a n increasing m.unber of administrative determinations, there is no statutory }!rovision for review. For example, J )rovisions for any adequate review are a lmost entirely lacking in the laws estc:.blishin-.:, the liRA e.nd the .AA..A. Sometimes no judicial remedy of any sort is available, although in instances an administrative review is allowed." (5) Act Barch 20, 1933 , C. 3, Title I, 5, 48 Stat. 9: "All decisions rendered b y the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs under the ],')rovisiol1S of this Chapter, or the regulations issued pursuant thereto, shall b e final and conclusive on all questions of law and fact, and no other official or Court of the United S t ates she .ll have jurisdiction to review by mandamus or otherwise any such decisions." ( 6) Infra, this chapter and. IV (7) Willis, Parliamentary Po\lvers of Eni.;lish Gov er11men t Deuartments (Harvard University Press, 1932). The last Chapter, 11Postscr i : t", deals with the Rel)Ort of the Conu;-d. ttee o n : i nisters 1 Powers ( E md. 4 0 6 0 , Pres ented by Lord Ch al1Cellor to Parliament i n April, 1932), vhich the Author says come\'i a s a complete c:nswer to Lord Emr:rart 1 s of abuse. (7a ) Hum]Jhrey1s Executor v. U.S., 295 U.S. 602 (1935). (7b) U.S. v. Myers, 272 r;.s. r-?. (1926). (7c) Pound, C. U., L1 The Grov vth of Ame r i c a n Administrative La', (Thomas L aw Co., 1923) 113: 9838 , \

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14 : 7 " The' whol e subject of adninistrati vc i s , o n thC; tLrcshold, one or constitutio.1rolity, but 1:> yord that, it to th field of i.l.nd not of la\'1 as adn1inistcrC'd in cou1ts . 11 (?d) mhc "cw DeSTWti m (L0!1don 19?.9) , VI , Dcnartmen t 83-104. (?c) Letter..; f:com Profc so1 L . i!ott of t'1 c Ancrican Lct;islator1s Association, C hicac; o , writton in i'ay, 1931 and ii r . Gcorbc C . S • .Bens o :i1 of the s ai1C in (?f) 1ctter s from th l'ew Y ol'k L e(:i s l ati\e Librari a n , Iir. \7illia m E . Hannai1 written to the writer in ay, 1931 ar:d F ebruary, 1936. (7t_,) G eneral of t!assachuvctts ( ter. Eel.) 'ch:--pte r 30, sectionG 5 , 3 2 , 37. This information was furnish8d by the i ,assachusetts State Libr'ariro.n, Mr. Edvvar d E . Redstd:t:e in l e tter s v7:ri t tcn to the write r in i'i a y , 1931 a;.1d Februar y , 1936. (?h ) G e n.,r a l Lav;s o f I:as;;-;a . c husctts, ibic't.., cJlc:'Jter 30, section 32: "All a l reports 'required bJr lew:' to b e mc:.C:e iJy state officers and departments o r heads t r H;reof sh& ll, e:z:.cept a s otherwise expressly :provided, cover t }.e _-_)l'eceed i n .. .; fi s e a l year and , oxce1')t for facts or s::)ecifically required 1;;./ law, sl1all 'oc a brief summary o f the said year 1 s work, tot, e ther with r e c ommendations for the succeedi::s f isce..l year. All such shall, exce1)t as otherwise provided, oe deposited with the s t'a.te s e cre't ary a .nd by him transmitte& _to General Court o n or before the t h ird Wednesday ii1 Januar y." (?i) L etters f r o m Dr. Edwi n..:, . tl1en of the Wisconsin Le gislative Referm1ce LPJrary on 1 a.:nd 1 2 , 1931; and e . l etter from vir. Howard ? . O rilli o f the V:i :Gc.:_. i s l:::-1.t i vc Referenc e Library in Februar y , 1936. (8) J acooson v . : rassachuse t t.s , 1_9 7 U.S. 11 (1905) . The l ef,islative may choose one o{ OJT'10 s i n_; medico.l. theo:r i es as the '!Ja s i s for a v accination statute. (9) 11J ud. i c i e l :!:tcviev. : of Adr.!LJ.i s t:::El, tive Action, 11 35 Harvard L aw Revien 1 2 7 (19.21). (10) Pa;.1aoa RefL:in,;, v . hyan 29Z. U.S. 388 (1935) . (11) De l 8; _ated IJ<::. _islatior!. \Com' r i d,:se University Press, 1931), 5 . (13) L:.stitute of Pe. t e;.1t AF-,ents v . Lockwood, A . C . 347 ( House of Lo rds 1894:), But see, d iscussion of' ultra vires -:-:En&chl e y a.nd Oo..tman, cit., VI ; where the < .. uthors }')OL:t out that <'.clrJinist r ative E'.djucLice.don. has been forrna..lly rec o z eci in Fra:1c c , Ge rmany a;.1d. other cou.ritri es, a1J.d definite taken to establish i t a.s a system fro m the Cou rts, which are 1 i m i ted t o vat e l aw . 9838

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148(13 ) The Federalist (Ch icag o , 1894). Hadison , e . t pat; e 2 7 5 , speaks of the legisla ture as th;ous h circumsta n ces, while t h e judiciary is defined b y lan"d.marl: s less cert a i n . C o r w i n , 11The j?rog ress of Constitutional T h e ory 3etween the of L 1 d e-penden c e a 1 1d the J..'e-et int::s of the P hilade l:ohia Con vention," 3 0 Ar. 1 . H i stoi-y R e v i e w 511 (1S2 5 ) , treats the earl y h i s tory of judicia l r eview . ( 1 4 ) Corwin, "The 1H i cher Law 1 Ba .. .Jq;round of Ame rican Consti t u tional L aw ,11 4 2 Harv a r d Law Review, 149-1 35, 3 65-409 ( 1928). (15) De Le2; i b u s e t Sonsuetudin bus A n gliae , (T r aver s T w i s s ed. Lon do n , 1878), 1, .. 1 3 21, whe r e a full d i s cuss i o n o f natura l law i s had (16 ) Corw i n , on . cit., 175. ( 17) CorW i n , o p . cit., 109. Pro fesso r Cor w i n o f Coke 1 s ho p e •• flto restor e to Ent;l and the cons titution o f the ear l y cent erin 5 about t h e i1a m e and fame o f L a g n a Char t a , where'"' f the courts, and especially the Hig h Co-q.rt of Parliament, wer e t h e chose n guardiansn as b eing 0118 of the 11wel:t-s;;rin g s of OUr OWn C Ol:sti tutional theory" • • • 11.A. c urren t which has im:;arte d an ent irely diffe rent co lora tion to the tradition" is foun d i n Montes q uieu ' s doctrin e o f the sc:;_Jaration o f powers. 12 Cok e R ep. 75; 12 Coke Reu. 82, 8 4 ; 12 C oke Re -, . 85. (18 ) 3 Dallas 3 8 6 (179,). M aggs , 11The Constitution a;.1d t h e R ecovery Let::;isla.tion ; The Roles o f D ocumer:t, Doctrine and Judges, 11 1 U niversity of Chicab o Lq,w R eyievv 6 65, 6 6 9 (1934). Corw i n , "Basic Doctrin e of Arne:cica n Constituti onal . Law", 1 2 ll.iich i gan Law Review, 2 4 7 (1914), 250-252. . (19 ) Corwin , ibid •.. Willoughby, Constitut ional L a w of the United States York. l 9 2 9 ) 1 692-1693; . and Ritch i e , I Z a t u r a l R i g hts ( I ew York 1895). ( 20) This is a l s o tru e i n E n g l and. Willis , o p . cit., 68 : 11They alon e amon{:, :f::.'lglish c ourts, r efra ined from standL1c: i n the way of administrative decision o f d isputes, from confu s i n g the cou r s e of Common L aw l ) r with ' n atur a l justice , ' fro m sacrifici n g r e ason a n d justice to e x popt f a cto Whether their ability to s e e thro u g h the boo k s to t : e realit i e s is t h e resu l t of occasional .,..,articil a tion i n d e"uat e , or of a:r: acqua i n t a n c e with other s ystems or" law the Judicia l C o m m ittee, i t i s difficul t to say, "Qut t here can b e n o tloubt t h.:-. t t h o foundations of our modern system o f 60Vernment h a v e been preser v e d U11sh..,t:e n because of the d ecisions o f the Law Lords. tt B o ard of Education v . Rice , (19 11 ) A.C. 179; E x p a rte Yaffe , (1931 ) A.C. 4 9 4 . ( 21) Loca l Goverr imen t B o a r d v . A rlidge, A.C. 120 (House of L ords 1 9 1 5). Frankfurter a:1d D a . v is'o n , Cases o n Admi :i.1istrativc L a w (Chicabo, 1932), 376 ,586. Lord S haw of Dunfe rline: 9838 11I f i t (th e Administrati v e 3 o c . rd) i s left w ithout eJq:lr ess g u idance it mus t still act h onestly and by h onest means ••• the tha t the t.1ethod o f natur a l justic e are ex n e cessi t a t e t hose o f

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31 G : Courts of Justice i s wholly ia TlrP a s l y to ste11 s or 'Jro ccclu r e of :t'orm, o f lJ e adin • 11 . o f 1.a ' .;ur.:.:.l Justice, 11 "The jUlist s 'ho believe in :_a . t u T a l lCLw s eem t o r.1c to be i D tha t n a i vc st'lte o f mind. tha. t a .cccpt s wha t has o e ei1 fanilia r a: n d accepted b y t h e m a ncl their n e it;h bor s CLS s ome thin;-., th . t r.lUs t be accep t c d b y all m e n everywhe r e." Of tho arne philosor>hical basis, s e e "'ietzsche, 11Jeyon d Good c:md Evil 11, (Translation by H c l er Zinuncrn, Few York, 1924. ) ('33) fab_;s , o p . cit., " : '1atura l Justicell is still im-)orta:nt in En.;land. Re,Jort o f Committee on M i nisters' Powers (Cmd. 40 6 0 . Presented by Lord Ch ancellor to i n A:Jril, 1932) '75G O . (24) Willou6hby, cit., 168 3 : 11It is a very remarkabl e fc::.ct that not until our w :1itten Constitution was more tha n half a centurv old did the nhrase r eceive an interpre tation and which a:r:' )roximates t h a t which it has toct.ay, and not, inde ed., until a hundred years had passed C.Vtay was r esort had to it as the usual d evices of those disa p:;Jrovin;; of the acts of their leg i s latures." (25) The Reviva l of LaturA.l Law Concents, (Harvard Studies in Jurisprudence, 1 9.-0) V, Fatural Law. (26) Corwin, 11T h e Doctrine of Du e Process o f Law before the Civil War", 24 liarvard Law Review 366-385 , 460-479 , ( 1 9 17). ( 27) i).l.rray 1 s Lessee v. tioboken Land and Im7lrove!11ent Co., 18 How. 272 (1855); Story, Commentaries on the Constitution , (1 847), 68: 9838 "This clause (the due process of law clause), in effect, affirms the right of trial, t o the process anci of the common law." This and a few other lines are the only refe r ence in this large and exhaustive work." Cor win, op. cit., 74, 95, 11 8-19 : !!Coke, in his L 1 sti tutes, defines due 21rocess of l8.w as 11 indictmen t or p resentment of good and. l awful • • • or by writ orig inal o f tr_c comr.10n lc-1.w," a t page 7 4 . " When the Fifth Amendment was added to the Consti tutior. i n 17 92 , no one, so f a r as I am aware, hc. d ever that t h e term 1due process of law' had any other than its anciently established and s elf-evident meaning of correct procedure; not was such a suggestion to be accepted by any court, in any jurisdiction, for many years to come." at page 95 ,

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"As wP.s )Ointed out in the -nrevious cha Jter, no one at the tim e of the f r aming and P..d.o Dti, o n of the Constitution hc;,d any idea that this clause did more than consecrate a method of -procedure against nccused persons , : :md the doc trine of due 1Jrocess of the mos t irrmortant single b 2 s i _ s o f judicinl today , could never have been l aid down e:;::ce n t in defianc e of histor,:,r. 11 at Dac;es 118-119. (28) o , ; . cit., 669: "The h ave held since the latter •JP.rt of the nineteenth cen-tury tha t certain clauses of t h e clocument (The Consti tutim1) authorize the1 n to oronounce doctrines not r].educible oy co::.1struction dr inter:;='reta ti9:.1 of the The due :;:>recess cla u ses of. t11e Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, they hold, aut-1ori z e them to de-clare invalid '1,U1Consti tutional statute, not specifically by other clauses of the document, w:i.1ic_h they d eem 2 .rbi trary, ious, or un:c eP.sone . ble. Und . e l' t:_eL1, jud5es uronounce doctrines 2 . s to UllrP.::;sonableness of stc..t utes rel2tinb to pro-.. _ :.Jceclure, to judisdiction to to tl)-f; of 0ublic utility rates, to ar..y c:;nd every subject doctl'ines consti tutin6 in no sens e of the work constructi nn or i t ion of in the writ t e:1 do cwnen t. " (29' ) J!r.<;i_Scq__t_t v. Sand:[Q.rcl, 19 393, 450. O pinion of lir . . Chief Justice Teney (1857). (30) 12 Wall. 457 (1871). :But ser:, the 16 Vlall. 36,. 64 ( 1873') .where the court r efused to c':nl y it t . o a statute in the State polic e newer. (32) Justice :Brm 1cleis, in Whitney v. California, 27-1 U. s. 356, 373 (1927) l. 11Des, ) i te arc,urnen t s to t h e contrary which seemed to m e Dersuasive; it i s settled tha t the due nroces s clause of the Four-. . . . ' teenth Amendment a,...,plies to matters of substc.:mtive law as well .::s to matters of 11 T h e Court u nhelcl a C alifornia Crim inal Syndicalism .Act. -Hr-dnes, o rJ. cit., V. T"neories ,..,nd Due Proces of L0.w, 104-149, '))articularly 2.t iJ2-se 106. Hout;h, "Due Proces s of L .'tw Today", .21. ..,'ilfll:.Y.P.rQ.._Ls.\!_:g_e_-y:;lJ:Y._Q.E].. _(J.QlU. ( 33) See o :1Jinion of Brev1er, J. i n __ 4E -v. P OWEir.., 201, u. s. 245, 295 (1906). (34) v . . :Q.Q..nn
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-, _ .... 'ian y of these fon.uln nre nccentr<.l ';, n o f our l..,w today w tl no ,r:ci e crlstit,''t " J -L) is. ( v. _;,i _ 281 U . s . '"36 , 595 ( . Cor w L 1 , o p . cit. , 69 7 0 : (37) ' 1Th c t e rm 'due ,lrocess of low' ::;inf)ly dro ,-:s out o f tne con3titutionc:l clause :n3r ic made in it f oJ. t l e doctrine o f est'cl ri.;ht..,; ,::nd, it oo c.ddcd , the • h orcl s 1life1 and 'liberty' do li):e Ytise." o . cit., 122-139, s u Gges tfi that the doctrine is used to '"'Ust cdn reac tionary interests. L erner, " The Court and American i to.lism", .1_:Csle __ and CorwL1, 11T-.w sunrer.1 e Court t>nd the F ourteenth Amendr.1ent11, 7 _ _ :.iiQ.:}.i (r:uch o f rae1tcr i a l is now found in his "The o f t_1c SUi Jreme Court11, o p . cit., nnd h i s "Social Planning unde r the Constituti0:1-A Study in ?ers2Jectives11, 2. .. J . ( 38) .7i ll L>, o ) . cit. , 8 : 11To the snecic:: t l of the Enc.;lish lJl•oble:n k'..Len up in this essey there c o n be no American a r allel --suc h i s the u o wer of the F'Ourteenth Amendment. A rule of s t atutory finality is unthink able in a country Vh1ere an Act may not even g o so far a s to make the determinations of a commissioner final Oi1 questions of fact, but mus t ' go on to exclude 'jurisdictional f act' from tha t finality; any legisl ature which sought to nrevent the courtco from p-?..ssing on the question of ultra vires would be told tha t by so it was deprivine; the individ.u...,l adversely c;ffecte d of 1due process', of. R constitutional ri;:;ht to 1 illegc:l usurpp ,tion of power' before the courts." (39) Jlo_flr_nd De.vison, O y J . cit., 572, 574: Lord Lore.burn, L. C. 11The :Board is in the n P .ture of the nr-bi tra l tribu.Y1aJ., and a Court of law has no to lle < . ;.r a•;neals from the determination either • . L u pon law or u non fact. Bu t if the Court i s satisfied either tha t the :Board h ave not ?.cted in the ,-:ay I h cve described, or have not deterruined the question , H hich tl1ey a r e require d by the Act to determine, then there is a remedy b y m ;:ndc:mms or certiorari." This i s our p rocedur a l dJ.e process conceut. See the, and intra vires d iscussion nnd discussion on natural law, infra, this chapter. (40) v. P-Jlil_l_iDs 35 T. L. . 46, (Court of Apne als, 1 918): 9838 Scrutton, L. J. 11 A 172.r could not oe co.rrie d out according to the :)rinciples of L agna Charta. Very rid. e "'JO !ers had been given the Executive The res :oonsibili ty for (';iving those p oriers rested not vri th the Judges, but with the re,Jresmltati ves of the in P arliP.rnen t. 11

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-152-( 41 ) Co r-r i n , op • cit . : '"Judicia l review in the sense of judicial discretion has devoured its pro t;eny , cons ti tut ionc.l lc.w; c.nd by the same sign, 1 due process of is no monster tha t rides dom1 les islation in defiance of its creator1s it is the servant of the Court's let;islative judgment." a t n ar;e 86 . 11In spe2. king of the of the Court r dth state legis l ation through the GUise of the Fourteenth,Amendment, Professor Corwin says: lfThe result is tha t t h e Court is able today to ai) prOR Ch the question of f actua l justification from either one of t w o O ' J]JO sed ant;les, according 2.S it W ishes to SUSt ain a statute or ot overtu-rn it' and i s able ,to cite n n amole 2 .rrc?..y or precedents in justification of either B.Tlproa ch.-11 a t nas e 101. It might be s u g gested tha t t h i s a , l _ s o an . plies to administrative revie .v 2nd interference with Feder2 l c-. d minis t r 2 .tive lesisl:-.tiol""L. . . . . . . (43) Corwin, op. cit., 111: Profes sor Corwin that ConGress has repeatedly m1dertaken 11to decLlre lpw H i th the definite intention of b L1dinG the courts. 11 ( 44) Dickinson, AQ.m:!-_J.1i _ _ $..trr!.-t_i_"l{.e __ _S:.J.:.e_qs_c.x _i..rt.the :Uni tt?.Q._S.tat_es. (H a .rvard unJ. /ersi t"y Press, 1927), 105: The author indicates that the Jblt_r__ _ _ vj.res c loct;ci n e is a lih 1itation oath the le&is 'lature and. the adr'ninistrative bodies. (45) Ibid. ( 46) l JcFarl and,. J_w3:_i_c_i_a:,l_ _Q.o_nJ_l-:_o_l _ _ _ _ _ __ _-:' .Irtt_$_r:s_t?, ( H arva rc. University Press, 1933), 28: . 11r Jhe n the courts do mbre than hold the commissioners to the out-. ' lines of their authority or demand the existence of evidence which justifies the exercise of authority , t hen the leg a l e.xpert i n terferes with the administrative s::>ecialists w ho cotnrise t h e uer sonnel of the Interstate Cammer . ce Com .ui ssion 2 . . 1 1d the Federal Trade Commission. II ( 4 7 ) Infra, IV , . 3 . ( 48) :r i 11 i s , o p . cit . , I I. 4 7 : 9838 "Owi n g to the e xistence of a great number of s e mi-c?J ,:ttonomous bodies, the Guardians of the Poor, the Enclosure Cormnissio 1ers, t:md the licensing justices , for instance, whose discretion w a s vithin its limits absolute, by the courts h e s a l r<:>..y s tt-l -en the form of defining those limits, c:tnd the judbes in order to put into force their ideas of how the machine should run_....; and t hat is a f actor to be reckoned with, if w e follow the school of iurintsr -have b een forced to 6orrect the decisio n s of thes e bodies on the

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ground that tl ey erred in law in mi stuking the lirai t s of their powers. Th law of ultra vires is curious not only for the very d ifferent uses to which it has bee n put, anything fro .1 the testing of a State statute by the standard of the Constitution of the United States to the testing of the issue of new shares by t:i1e corporate charter, but a l s o because in it the c o urts stand as it were apart from the body whose actions they ...:>'ass in review. 11 (49) willis, o p . cit., 2?-, 2 3 : In searching thro ue;h the statu.t es from 1848 to 1 9 31, the Author states that he has discovered ove r one hundred and fifty instances of this t YPe (50) A . C. 347 ( House of Lords 1 894), Frankfurter and D avidson, op. cit., 513. (51) Frankfurter and Da v ison, op. cit., 5 1 9 • . (52) . Re g . ( Cleeland) v. Pha rrnaceutical Society of Ireland, 2. I. R. 268 (189 6). Although the Court did not decide t h e case upon the question of ultra vires, the problem loomed large, and t hree justices gave it considerable attention. The statute was simila r to that involved in the Institute of Patent .Agents v. Loc kwood in that it provided -"all :re:;ulations mad e under the authority of this Act" when properly laid before Parliament become 11of the lik e force and effect as if they had been enacted i n t his Act. ll rtrt is somewha t alarming tha t it should b e in t h e p ower of any body of by means of an obscure and unnoticed formality; a t t h e suggcstio:l, it may be, of private interest, to srrrw::;gle through Parliamen t illegal r es-ulations, affecting.the rights of thepublic, and to invest them with the force of law; and if we admit the answer given by Lord Harschell in his judgment, tha t the regulations in that case were made by a public authority, nrunely, the Board of Trade, in which the law wouldbe sppposed to place confidence, yet this argument must be co nfined to the question whether the ought to be considered intra vires., and yet the more general question a s to their effect assumes tha t in the instance under consicleration the authority wa s transgressed. 11 See also Willis, op. cit., 70; and Committee-on . Ministers' Po wers Report, o p . cit., 40-41, and at 61-62: 11We are of opinion that in delegating legislative functions to a Minister, Parliament should be careful to preserve in all but the very exceptiona l cases, vvhich we describe below, the jurisdiction of the Courts of Law to decide whether in any purported exercise of those functions the Minister has acted wi t h i n the limits of his delegated p ower. The ru.le of law requires that all regul ations shou1d be open to challeng e in the Courts e xcep t when Parliament deliberately comes to the con,clusion tha t it is essentia l in the public interest to create an exception and to confer on a M i nister the powe r of legislating with irrmunity from challenge."

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154(53) 2 K. B. 98 (1930), A. C. 494 (House of Lords 1931). (54) op. 82: "I venture to suggest that words of this nature will protect any rule bona fide Dade to carry our the objects of the s ection which defines the rule-making power, and directed in the opinion of the Court towards effectuating the general r 4rpo ses of the Act to be gathered from the terms of the Act as a whole. The same test would be appli ca.ble to a power to make orders , except as regards orders con fin1ling schemes. There the words would have at least the force. claimed for them by Slesser, L. J., and would validate order legally intra vires but administratively irr.perfect; and perhaps an order made according to a course of procedure not strictly in accordance with the te. rms of the Act, but affording equally good protection to the individual owner. Beyondthat, in the 1ightof Yaffe's Case ; it is impossible'to hazard a guess. It (55) I. C. c. v. Union Pac=fic 222 u. s. 541, 547 (1912), ru1d Intermountain Rate Cases, 234 U. S. 476, 490, 491, ( 1914). . (56) Dickinson, op._ 310-311, 315 . . , .. (57) A section on jurisdictional fact and fact _is included in the consideration of Administrative Final. i ty and the cases, IV. (58) Ma .... King v. Blair; 271 u. s. 479 . (1926 ),. (59) Dickinson, ,cit., at 315 especially. (60) Dickinson, op. cit.;, 55: IIIn truth, the distinction between . ; questions a f law' and 'questions of facti r;)c.lly gives little help in determin_ing how far the courts will review; and for the good reason that there is no fixed They are not t vvo mutually exclu'sive kinds of que:stions,. based-upon a of subject-r:1!3.tter. Matters b : {=law grow downward into roots of fact, and matters of fact reach upward,. without a breaic, into of law. The knife of polic y alone effects an artificial cleavage at the point whElre the court c hooses to draw the line. between public ;interest and private right. It 'would seem that t h e courts are 'W1willing to review, they are tempted to ex-plain by the device of calling the question one of 1fact'; and otherwise disposed, they say that it is a question of 'law'. while the reasonableness of a rate is said to he a matter of fact ahd.'not reviewable, yet when the rate-fixing body has omitted totruc e into 9onsideration some element or factor which the COUrt thinks ought to have be.en included, error of iaw is promptly held to have been and the power to review is exercised." 9838

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l . ( 6 1) Infr a , IV. In .Ameri c ,m School_Qf ;< etic H v . of ./nbnetic :ealL t: v . : I c.Annu a l tJ, 1 8 7 U . S . 94, 109 , 1 1 1 ( 1902), spoke of the problem as a question of law t llro'llgl10u t the out at' one p l a c e s aid: "W'e d o not 1. eun t o p r e clude e clefm dant f rom show in on the trial, i f h e C.?t11, t l a t te business complaincmt s , a s i n fact conducted" was a v iolation o f the. s tatutes. ( 6 l a ) (62) Comer, Legislative Functions o f n ational Administrative A u t hori t y , ( N e w Yor k 1927), 137 • . (63) Thayer, Preliminary Treatice o n t he. Law of Eviden c e (Boston, 1 8 9 8), a)2: t judges have alw a y s answered a multi t ude of of w hich forms part of the issue. It is true thf-:lt t his is ofte n disg uise d by callin g t:he m questions of law. "1 This c a n also be found quoted .':cF9-:rl nd, o p . cit., 25, n. 62 ( 64) Smith v. Hitchcock , 2 2 6 1.:. S. 5 3 . (1912). _ icFarland, op. cit., 26, e xpresses t his 0-S rec;ard s the I nterstate Commerce and the F edera l Trade Commissi9n. (65) Federa l Trad e Comr;1issio J l v . . iVestern Heat Co., 272 U . S. 554 (1926); Federal Trad e v. Curtiss Publisl Co., 260 U. S. 5ca (1922). (66) Fec.era l Trade Commission v. Gratz. 253 U. S. 421 (1920), and Frisc:her & Co., v.:Bakelite Corp., 39 F. ( 2d) ?'??, 259 (Ct. Gust. & Pat. App . 1930). (67) Gegio'! Uhl, 239 s. 3 The Court treated as a "question of law " t h e decision t!mt nliens -;vere to become public charges" where t h e Commissioner's actio n was based on t h e condition of the labor market at Portland, Oi. egon, t h e Aliens 1 destination. Likewise in Hanson v. Haff, 291 U. S. 559 (1934) the Court reviewed the facts, reversed t h e admini strati ve determination ( presume .bly -u:pon the existence of a question of law), and held that o n alien woma n w ho had entered the country and left it to g o on a trip with a L1c?.Jl with whom sl1e w a s having illicit s e x relations was not barred.from returning under the statutory prohibition of entry into the . cou.11try ttfor the purpose of prostitution or any 'ot1er im moral purpose" where facts indicated a paramount object of entering to follow a le6 i tima.te occupation • . (68) 14. Pet. 497 (1840). (69) For the distinction between e .nd discretionary acts see: Ke n d all v. Stokes, 3 Eow • . 87, (1839); B r ashea r v . M,s.son, 6 B o w , 92 (1845); Reeside v. Wal ker, ll H o w . 272 (1848); Commissioner of Patents v. 'Jhiteley, 4 W all 522 (1867); U. S. v. Sea.J:Ian, 17 How; 224 , (1855)'; U. S. v. Gutll.rie , 17 How . 284 (1855); U. S. v • . Commissioner .. 5 W all 563 (1867); G nines v. Thorrroson 7 Wall 437 (1869). ; Secretary v. 9 Wall 298 (1870); Marquez v. Frischie, 101 U . S. 433 (1879); U.S. v. Churz 102 U. S. 378 (1879); B utterworth v. Hoe 112 U.S. 50 (1884); and U. S. v. :Black 128 U. S. 40 (1888). -9838

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(70) Kansas Assoc.iati
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( -.)!-) ' . Fee' \". roth'i.'"'S , ?'"'C] U . S . 2:;1) (1j))) . 151 ?oc. 4 v . Inc :ust ir-1 Con1ission, U :vp. r v . 4 (2d) EO (C . C . A . :t., 1;?h); v . _.; n 1 Rc:.dio 5-;;7 :::'. (20.) 5 35 (1)31); .:m'. Gene:ta1 ]rcad Srster1 . I'edc ... 2_l__;:';_•(io Con-i_BiO.l, 47 :. (2 L . ) ft2b (lS,31). ( S6 ) cit., 323: 11T .. c.if'icl..'..1 t CS8S ;: r.., t:wse OCC1-:. : Phen the C.oubt <:\.rises .L:..o:.1 the lo{;ic<'l or il.i)OS:3ibilit:.r of the inference, no fro::1 the totc l or eYi{_ but fion i'ts n"e;--.c;er and uns" ::.11 ( g 7) -. '"' 1 ' . t ')9 '0 rnl A t' " . 1;__ c1 • , c:. -_; • .dll? '.1 l10l' __ nue:s: 11A1 thm.v;:i.1 t:1e o.c facts iR "-.r":li tteclly the fu:.1ctio:i! the con}issios , e:-oerience has sho n t,iL.t. juc.iciol e::.:-:1L:.,::.tio:-1 the c 7 i ' .ence u:_)on ryhich ec' . n inistrctive P .ction i s co--:.:..ts f rec_u cntl:y o ust , j u c ' I:nont 2m-:.. suostituto the ooinions of juC.:;es . II (88) Chief Justico _:'J.: hec, in the lie "fork Tine:-., 1 3 , 1 931, 11T'1e .)o:re:c o/ bo(ies to r:1::D;:e :!:' s of fact may oe trec:.tec-;, co:1 ch:sive, "ue ei &.ence b oth '-rays , is a po,:er of enol!lous 11 ( go ) u., ,.er1an .... \r 3alr,,.,l"" ?9 -z u c 1c J h5 Su" C t _) .:lc,......... ...._ c...L.l. •. h ..... V ... .J• ' • . ....._,t •• v . ..::,, '-. . J . • U e \.) t ...1 _/ • • 7 (19 3 4 ) ; Prenti s v . Atlanti c C L ine, 21 1 U . S . 2 1 0 ( 1908); StanleY et a l v . Peo..ooc . v Co2 1 Supp. G ; 2 (:'J.C. S . D . Ill. 1933); C h i c2r':o , .;_.I. t; P. R;,r. Co. v . S tete Fi--:l]-"2'T Co!7'.n i ssio:o. or 322 419 (1S25); .:me. "J't:ite v . :'ecler <'l Co.r;icsi ob_ (2C.) 113 (19 2 8). ( 91) Golr i th v . U . S . ... . .:-'.: : A-oner:-1 :;;_) 2 7 0 TJ. S . 117 ( 1926) ; v . L Tl.:isv ille :.,: :_)___r .lS3 S . (lS02); "-.nc_ c.ld_ v • o" S t::::-eet 1'J7 :.:::. lS29). (92) :::'inl:elstein. 11Ju.( i c i a l Se} _ f.:_LL1i tc. t ion, 11 )7 Lm-:r Re vie': T38 (1<:"!24). Ar.d. :::rr , 53, l327-1)3G. ( 93 ) DuJ:e o f s C l a i n to Ll'3 Cro"n, 5 P ar. 375 (1460) (94) Oetjen v . Ce:.trBl L9ather Co. 246 U . S . ( 1918). The Can st i tu t io:n., A rticle I Y , S e c t ion The c:.lso is a o:1ie d i n E 1 " L . S '-'"' ') (, "1) 212: C?.nG... u :tuer v . ) • . .J. J )c. " )c:. . • ( S 5 ) Lu tber v . :Jolc-:..en, 7 1 ( a .:.d. P:1.cific Ste.tes Teleuhone c:nC. Co_. v . Oregon, __ 223 S . 11S (1)12).

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-158-( 96) The Constttution , J.J'ticle III , Section 2 . Se e ... ein, o J . cit., s1.1:9ra, Cho.:1ter II, :1. 17. (97) Keller v . Potomac 2lectric Forrer Co., 26 1 'J. s . 428 (1922) . ( 98 ) :.-i l l il1g v . Chicap;:o .AuC.itor iur1 Co., 277 U . s . 274 (1928 ) . ( 99 ) P o uno. , ?.evie1111, 4 1 1 . ,3.. 113, 111 (1927), o f ads n i n i s trati v e law i sions a s 1 1 a "::i lcierne ss o f single ins tance's, am-biguity abel. L1c . onsl.s tenc:" of 1rinciiles. 1 1 (100) Willis, cit., 172-173: the :Jr e sen. t a w h ich t it sel f Ymuld n e v e:r have cJ.reoJ: 1 ec1 o f auL1ori ,:nv co ntinue for unchallenged, if t e chnicalities or t h e o f -.;ersons agc.:rieveG. orevents the issue. from b e r a ised befor8 a CO"Lll't, while a rule rlh ich t o the e u-e of som r , 1on sen s e is -,.) l a i n l y r;!i t h i n tl1e Jurvierr o f the Act fall before a n t h e tic o r I::i sinform e d tribunal. I t is s o haDhazard. \ihen a S'to ,te rna:-/ force its. t o r u les :0? its executive a r m , a n d late r through its . juC.iciary mulet h i1:1 w;hat 'Yas held out to h i m as binding law , s O P1ething i s 1irrong . A. rule t be eithe r legnl or illeg al. \Thy should t h e issue in dGU bt until i t to 'Je r aised in the course o f an i:uC:::_ i v idual l i ti go..n t, an
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-1..-(104) For to thL clar , 1 1r'i'hc Cn1s titttio ' ent. 'I " _,_ "71""'\

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-160 -luTES TG CHAPTER IV. (l) A gcod general statement of the f o rmula is found in Pittsour g h C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Br1ckus : 154 U.S. 4 21 (1894). ( 2 ) Dickinson, Administrative Justice a.nd t he Sup remacy o f LaTI in the United States (Harvard University Press, 1 927, 59. ( 3 ) Dickinson, ibid, X , 263-306; The subjeot is court revieTI of made in the of the busin ess of government. ( 4 ) Dickinson, op. cit., 265, et seq. (5) U. S. v. Fisher, 109 U.S. 143 (1883) (6) Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920); and O'Donohue v. U.S. 289 u.s. 516 (1932)-.-(7) Humphrey's Executor v. U . 295 U.S. 6 0 2 (1935). ( 8 ) Ex pa.rte He::1.nen, 1 3 Pet. 230 (1839). ( S ) Act of June 10, 1890, Chapter 407, 26 Str1t. a t Large 131. (J D ) Shurtleff v. U. S • . 189 U.S. 311 (1903). See also Reagan v. u. s., 1 8 2 u.s. 419 (ll) Kei!n v. U.S., 177 U.S. 290 (1900); U.S. ex rel Redfield v. 137 U.S. 636 (1891); U. S. ex rel Dunlaw v. Black, 128 U.S. 40 -(1888); JJ.S. ex rel Boynton v. ]3l aine, 139 U.S. 306 (1890); ;:md U. S. ex rel McBride v. Schurz, 102 U. s. 398 (1879). (12 ) Meyers v. U. S., 272 u.s. 52 (1926). (13) Humphrey's Executor v. U . S., 295 U.S. 602 (1935). (14) An gelus v. Sullivan, 246 F. 54 (1917), 57, Judge Rogers; Boitanc v. District Board, Northern Dist. No. 3, S a c ramento, C al., 250 F. 812 (1918). (15) Blake v. U. S., 103 U.S. 227 (1881). (16) Cren sha1 , 7 v. U. S., 134 U.S. 99 (1889) (17) S mith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167 (1886). Dicl'"inson, op. cit., 268 et seq. Se e FRirlie, "AdLlinistrFJtive Legislation " , 18 La : w Revi e r 1 8 1 (1930) for a discussion of the of the a . dmL 1is r1.:ue and the vast fields the3 r cover. Professc r Fairlie served in the Judg e Advocate C-enerAl' s office d uring the World War. 9838

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(18 ) 220 u . s. 506 (19 1 0 ) . (19) 18 H e . 272 (1855). ( 20 ) I i d . , 277 27 • -1 '1-( 20a) Gen e r Al l y , of ta_ money under pretest is the prrceclur e eDen to the t Aa-paye r . I n the case of i n c t 'T'le, estate And gift tax!:>ticn an appea l from the determ i nation of t h e Cern _issione r of Internal R e veilue tc the Board of Tax Appeals lies prior to the A ssessment of Y31Y ment cf t"ln tax m ey. The Re enu e Act of 1924, Secti n 900; and T h e Reve:1u e Act of 1926, Section 1 0 0 0 (21) Ibid., 2 8 0 ( 22) Louisiana v . _ ;cAdoo, 234, u . s . 627 ( 1 914). ( 23) Eisner v. comber, 252 u. s. 189 (1920). (24) u . s. v . Babcock, 250 u . s. 328 (1919). (25) Bartlett v. Kane, 1 6 H o11, 263 ( 1 8 53). (26) Auffnordt v. Reddin, 137 u . S,. 3 1 0 ( 1B90). (27) LouisiAn a v. UcAdoo, 234 u . s. 627' 632 (1914). (28 ) U . S. v. 200 Chests of Tea1 9 Jheat.430 (1824); B8rloTI v. U.S., 7 Pet. 404 (1833); U.S. v. 112 of S u gar. 8 P et. 277 (1834); De Forest v . La11re nce, 13 How. 274.(1851); H aillard v. 16 I=0 7 e 251 (1853). . (29) u . s. v . Passavant , 1 69 u . s. 16, (1898 ) . (30) v . Curtis, 3 How. 2 36 ( 1845). (31) 1 37 u. s . 310 (1890). (32) Ibid at pag e 324. (33) Dick inson, o p . • .l-' Cl vo, 277 et seq . (34) Knight v . United Association, 142 U . s. 161 (1891); U . S. ex rel Riverside .oil Co. v • . Hitchcock, 190 U.S. 316 (1903); Find IVarn e:c Va.1le7 Stoc:: k Co. v . _ S mith, 165 U . S. 28 '(18 99). (35) Marquez v. Frisbie, 101 U. S. 473 (1879); U . S. ex rel Internati onal Contracting Co., v. Lamont 155 U . S. 303 (1894); v. Silliman:, 6 -:iheat 5 98 (1821). (36) U . S. e x r e l Gil Co. v. H ichcock, 190 U . S . 316 ( 1903). 9838

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-162(37) 234 u. s. 669' 710 (1914) ( 38 ) St. Louis S r nel ting etc. Co. v. Kemp, 104 u. s. 636 (1882) (39) Burke v. Southern P acific R. R . Co. , 234 u . s. 669 (1914) (40) Noble v. Union Lor;g ing Co., 1 4'7 u. s. 165 (1893) (41) VFlnce v. Burb.gnl$:, 101 u. s. 514 (1880) ( 42) Steel v. St. Louis Sine 1 t i ng e t c . Co. 106 c . s. 447 (1882) (43) French v. Fryan, 93 U. S. 169 (18 7 6); Marquez y. Frisbie, 1 0 1 U.S. 473 (1879); and Johnson v. Towsley, 13 'Jall. 72.(1871). (44) Newhallv. Sanger, 92 7 6 1 (1875); rmd .DorilRn v. Cerr, 125 U.S. 618 (1887), 17hich involves the ClUestion of. ry.he.ther certain vrhere there exists. a claim of title bEJ se d on kiexican or Spanish grcmts, are nlJUblic lands". (45) Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Pet. 498 (1839); and :Surfenning v. Chi., St. Paul etc. R. Co., 163 U.S. 319 (1896). (46) 138 u. s. 573 (1891). (47) Supra.,III. Decatur v. Paulding\ : 1 4 Pet. 497 (1840). Se e also U.S. ex rel Dunlap v. :Slack, 128 U. s. 40 (1888). (48) :Sutter::rorth v. Hoe, 112 U. S. '50 (1884). See als, o Philadelp:1i a & Trenton R.R. v. Stimpson-:-14 Pet. 448, 458 (1831). The c0urt said i n pa.rt, "It is not ••••• necessAry for the patent to contain any recitPls that the prerequisites to the grant of it have been duly for the }.a.w makes the presumption. n (49) MArquette University v. F ....... eral Radio CoiW,lission 47 F. ( 2d) 406 (1931), the Commission refuses to increase a staticn's poner "the ccurt ,-Till hesi t 0te to set aside a finding (as to f.gct) of the Conr.1ission unless it appears to be manifestly contrary to the eVidence. (50) Infra, this chapte.r, section 2 • . (51) SCJrlo v. Pulaski;v, 88 S.W. 953 (.Ar k . 1 905!. (52) :Srou g hmh . v :Slan ten M f g . Co. 249 U • . S . . 495 ( 1 9 19). Po wer is limited t o admission, exclusion anc1 expulsion. Keller v. U. S., 213 u.S. 138 (19 0 9). (53) The right to exclude was early r e co gnized. The C hinese Ex.Clusion Case, 130 U. S. 581 (18.89). (54 ) Hurray v. Schooner' Charming Betsy, 2 CrRnch 64 (1804). 9838

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-1 . ( 5 5 ) u . S. v . Ju Toy, 198 U . S . 2k 3 (19 0 . ) . (56 ) ;.-ishimurA Ekiu v . 1 4 2 U . S . 651 (1892). ( 57) i.iilwaukee Pu'blishi p_LCo . v . 255 U . S . 407 (1921). (58 ) l\l"g Fung Ho v . 'Jhi te, 259 u. S. 276 ( 1922). (5S) an Vl ecl , A d m inisJ c rative C cntrnl f Aliens, York, 1932). (60) Braune v. Zurbrick, 45 Fed. (2d) 931 (C.C.A. 6th, 1930) suggests thpt Imm i g r Ation Act 1929, 46 St!3t. 41, by mAkin attempt of deuorted alien to return a felon y will cause g reater due p rocess of L'l.\7 See "Regui sites of an Admi nistrative Hearing", 80 PC'!. Lan Revieu 878 (1932). ( 61) U . S. v . W illiams, 194 U . S. 279 (1904), and Tad v . WRld.:IC'In, 266 U.s. 113 (1934); v. Skeffing'ton, 26 5 F ed. 17 (D.C. iflss. 1920);and u.s. e:xrren Pana v • .J2a.y, 45 F. (2d) 435 (D. C. S. D . N . L .1930) . (62) Eanson v. Haff, 291 U. S. 559 (1934). (63) o p . cit., 27, indicates the i ncrease in the Government 1 s [l.cti vi ty in supplying p u blic services. (64) Fairlie, o p . cit., isl. (65) Public Clearing House v. Coyne , 194. U. S. 497 .(1904). (66) Bates and Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U. S. 106 (1904) • . . . ( 67 ) .American School of MR,.o:;netlc Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94 (1S02). (68) Leach v. Carlile, U. S. 138 (19 2 2). (69) American School v. McAnnulty, 1 87_ U. 94. (1902) See the d issenting o pinion. (70) i tilwaukee Publishing Co. v. 255 U. S. 407 (1921) lJrc0.bly a n ;unusual case because Q f .the v:rar colori:ng the fects. (71).. rDid. (72) National Life v. l'Jaticnal Life, 209 U . S. 317 (1908). (73) Alberts.7crth, 11Judicial R eview of Administrative Action_!_" 35 lia.rvard L aw Revie 127, 153 (1921); W tfuen the government is dispensing a bountj;, r he n it is admitting aliens, a proper b alanCii'fg of the ' i n volved. lea.ds. the Suprem e Court to give liberty to the executive offici::1l; uhen vested rights, or persona l liberty are i nvolved, a no r e

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-164-rigid control is kept over executive officers. This results in having rules of cne kind for the exercise of the police power, of another for taxa.tion, of another for aliens, of still a .nother for the operAtion o f va.ricus kinds of .pu.nlic business. n (74) Blackly.and Oatman, Administrative Le gislation and Adjudication ( Broo: :in[ ; s Institution, 1934) 7: " When, on the other hand, the state attempts to exercise a da.y-by-day regulation over privr:Jte economic enterprise, it is confronted wit:Q very difficult administrative problems, Inste,q. d f f a greeing on terms, or controlling the internal rnanAgef!le n t f its C\Tfl business, it is regulating and controlling a b usiness which it does not onn, the internal mana gement of ' I vhich is entrusted to individuals, the fiscal relationships of ':rhich must meet the necessities of profit as well as the req_uirements of publtc ser'ice," (75) Dickinson, op. ci-t., 216: "A sufficient e xcuse for distrust of the operation of law in fields of cl,gshing social o pinions is afforded by actua. l . eJqJerience of the fAilures of the law in these fields, or wha.t is worse, its occasiona. l perversion into an instrument of injustice. 'rhe trouble, it is submitted, does not g o so much to the applicability of la11 as to the improper manner of its a pplic.ation,ll ( 76) Frankfurter and La .ndis , . The Bu,sine s . s of the Supreme Court (New York, 1927), 173: "Co:urts are less than ever technical expounders of technica. l provisions of the Constitution. The y arbiters of the economic and social life of vast regiops and at t.imes of the nhole --The wisdom of debBtable policies, like the proper scope for competition or for policies. never susceptible to qua .nti ta ti ve judgments, is for their ultimate decision. n (77) Texas and R. Co. v. I. C. c., 62 U. S. 197 (1896); Frankfurter and Landis, ibid., 164 n. 86. In the first t wenty-three c21ses the Interstate Commerce Ccm;nission sough t the aid of the co urt, it Wc:JS reversed in t1'1enty-one; and Sharfman, The Interstate Commerce C or mission (:r:e D York, 1931), Vol. II, Chapter X. (78) 34 Stat. at L. 584. (79) Interstate Commerce Co: ,lPission v. Dela'?'are, Lack a iYanna D:: Western R. Co., U. S. 235 . (1911);. Interstate Commerce Con1issicn v. Illinc;is Central R. R • . Co., 215 U.S. 452 (19 1 0); v. Louisville 8. Na.shvi1le R. Co., 235 U.S. 314 (1914). Dickinson, op. cit,, 159-167 (80) Avent v. U.S., 26 6 U.S. 127, 131 (1924), U.S. v. Grimaud. ( 82) 222 U. S. 541 (1912): "l'l'ot tha. t its decision, i nvolv ing e s it does sc and such vast public interests can b e supported b y a mere scintilla of proof, but the courts 1 : vill not examine the f acts furt:1er to deter:::1ine whether there vva s subs tr:m tial evidence t c sustain the order. 11 9 8 38 ' o

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16 ' (83) I. c . C. v . Alabama R . Co., 1 8 U . S . 144 (1897); I. c . c . v _Illinois C ntral R . ., "'15 U . S . 452 ( 1 9 10); Texas and Co. vI. C . C., 1 62 U . S . 1 97 (1896); S nuthern P cific Co. v . I . c . C., 2 1 9 U . S . 43S (1911 ; I. C . C. v . L. and W. R . 220 u . s . 235 (1911). (84) I. C. C . v Unio n Fa 222 U . S . 541 , 548 (1912) . (85) 227 u . s . 88 ( 1913). (86) Florida East Coqst R . Co. v. U.S., 234 U.S. J67 (1913) ( 87 ) Dickinson, o p .cit., 175. ( 88) i\icFarland, Judicial Control of the Feder a l Tr:::tde Comrni ssion :::tnd the Interstate Commerce Commission, 10-1930 Uni versity Press, 1933), 1 67-168: The sparing control of the courts is undoubtedly one of the more im portant factors which made the Interstate Commerce Commission t t 1 e foremost example of administrative justice in the United States." (90) Wisconsin Railroad Commission v. Chicago B .. & 0 R. Co., 257 U.S. 563, 589 (1922). Congress was thP court declared, "to make the system adequate to the needs of t he country. 11 See Sharfman, op.cit., Vol.I. (91) McFarland, o p.cit., 170-171. (92) This does not mean that no remedy existed if the expert was clearly wrong, or if there w.g,s a ques-tionable statutory basis for the proposed application. (9:3) Handler, "Jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission . . False Advertising , 11 31 Colu:nbia Law Review 527 '(1931). ( 94) Comment, 11Judicial Review of strat i ve Grders under NRA and AAA,11 43 Yale La w Journal 599 (1934), 600 n. 9. Of 719, cease and desist orders between 1915-1928, 22 were sustained by the ircuit Court of Appe als, 2 by Su p reme Court, and only 17 were reversed. In regard to ne w standards established by the Commission, it has n o t been so successful. vf 97 orders over the same period, 3 were sustained by the Circuit Court of Appeals, 2 b y t h e Su p reme 8ourt, and the Commission was reversed 26 and 11 times respectively. rhese figures are taken from t he National Industrial Conference Board, ?ublic Regulati on of Competitive Practices (Rev.ed. 1929). See also op.cit., III, 93. Th e summarizes the Qilfair methods )f competition treated by the Commission in t he Courts, r'alse or misleading advertising , misbranding of products, or other misleading 3ales practices. In this field the Commission has d one its greatest work. (95) McFarland, op.cit., 94-97, states t :1a , t the commission has l ad little success wi t11 commercial bri.bery, although this practice often of fraud and unfairness. The orders concerning interference .n the channels of trade and distribution have been sustained only 9838

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-166-where associated or concerted c=tction was s h own, which element probablw came from the common law doctrine of conspiracy _and its weight in making a practice unfair which might not be so. Re-sale price maintenance orders were freely o.modified. and the Commission finally gave up attempting to regulate. this prA.ctice. In this field particularly, the Court evinced a desire to establish the law as against any disposition to let the Commission establish it. Gther p r actices were imitation of competitor's trade, misre-pre sentation of competitor's proCl.ucts or ability to serve price fixing, time contracts, price discrimination, and full line forcing. Handler, op.cit. See table of cases on this cited at the end of the article. (96) McFarland, op.cit., 8, 96: ''The Federal Trade Commission has been restricted to the exercise. of a preliminary investigating power by the decisions, while the Courts do not ordinarily interfere with tDe authority exercised by the Interstate Commerce Commission ....• "In connection w1th all cases, the courts deterrYJine the sufficiency of the pleadings (although this appears to have been the sole ground of decision in only one instance), what shall constitute proof and what conclusions shall be drawn from the evidence, when the matter is of public interest, what amounts to interference with competition, ru1d when monopoly exists or is fostered. If an order of the commission is successful in passing this minute scrutiny, in some collrts there is still the troublesome question of enforceMent." (97) 253 u.s. 421 (1920). (98) 260 u.s. 568 (1922). ( 99 ) Supra, n.94. McFarland, op.cit., 178, suggests that the inadequacy of the Federal Trade Commission has probably been partly responsible for the with w hich t h e Commission has been reversed... See also Di cJ.:J.nson, op. cit., 24()-250; comment"Judicial P.eview of A.dil1ini Gtrati ve Gr ders under NRA a.nd A..A...A, 11 43 Yale Law Journal 59 9 (1934}_. (100) Ibid., 580. (101) Now 8 p8 cial (in t he Anti Trust Division) to the Attorney GeneraJ. o f t h ,; U nj_ ted States Bnd somet ime attorney for t h e Federal Trade Cu:JJmi::.,sion. (102) McFarl::t.nci, O'J. cit., 29. (103) Ibid., :<:"l, (104) Ibj.d", 1.', 11111e orCl0rs o f the FeC."'rc=tl Trade Commis-sion are subj9ct L r.., on ti.1e rcc-Jrd taken before the trade comrai ss.;.c18:C.' s , vlh::.J e v1'll2.l:::: of the Ir. -cersta te Commerce Commission are suuj8c t t o be set aside only for excess of authority or 9838

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d ise p p . r d of inc:ufii iE>n ;r of tnE>mselvt=-s h.;vP' n i nve s tigative b dy p1d o 1 1 -1 7f'V lden . e . The r com'TlissicnP s vicn t • 1,t. t . e commis ion is a n ) , o o r 1.!1 n. c•,Jecial fiC'l d." S e e also Ht=>n ercon, .:'hf' Ferkr: . \ .'l-.'1" 0 . G 2_!11_::1}."'jon ( Y a l e Uni v e r sity Presr, 1924), 7'1, rLJ.1'' " prCl'flCd.l' t c t11e Circuit C o urts of Appeals. (105 ) o p.cit., ...,. , 170-JBJ , n. 2 ; "According l y , wno. t extensions w i 11 b P m . e f rom t.:1P evid nee depends 1.mon t he judicia l a t titud e towar d t h e leg i s l9.t.ion adTTJinis t ered . UlJvious l y , without som co ncerytion of> p urposes a n d dPsired legal situation, R>nt o f tnt=evidence mus t meander into ineffectivt=-ness. 11 (106 ) Ibid., 175 . (107) Ibid . i 176-177. (108 ) Ibid., V: 11(Jnt=> item of trad e commission process, however, has bee n sing l e d o-...t for particular criticism--the inA.dequacy of the ooinions an& findings of t h e commissioners. Although t h e courts themselve s h ave not remarked the absence of argument a t i Tre opinions even flhere finding s are made either i gnored them or have subjected them to an almost metaphysical consideration, the absence of an extend e d admi nistrative re"9ort on e ach confirms wnat, in some cases, is a judicial conviction that administrative is 9A.rticularly open to t h e suspicion that c areful consideration has not been given the evidence. Where the courts -poin t cut a lack of findings, they have no hesitancy in drawinr: their conclllsions from the record. In comparison, the decisions or repo:ts of t n e Interstate Commerce Commission ar-e c arefully drar n nnd. treat thP evidence fully, although tne Supreme Court has oronounce d t tlat t.t1 e courts hFtve no concern with the soundness of t h e reason1ng , tt1e ap 9lica t i on of administrative pre cedents, or t h e wisdom o f thP of t ne Interstate Commerce Commission. Gn occasion, ho pever, t ne commerce commiss1on has been admonished to state in its reports t h e f acts and . reasons for its conclusions to facilitate judicia l r eview. Apparently, while the courts in their regular course of procedure may render decision by memorandum or deny relief "for want of eqllity,11 administrative decisions must be clotned in the garb of judicial opinion before they will be acce-pted oy the b ench as bona fide adjudications. Herein the federal trade commissior1ers h a ve undoubtedl y been remiss. 11 (ln9) Ibid. , V : "'I'he form of the legislative of authority for each is much the The delegation of authority is in terms of legal stA.ndard such as 'reasonable rates' or 'tending to create 1 the standard, thus clothed with authority of law, is given a moral color--'unfair competition, 1 1undue prejuQice, 1 'unjust discrimination. 1 But thPse standards, as between t n e two commissions, differ in scope or particularly of subjec-t matter. The standards which the Interstate Commerce Commission must -appl y are more specifically related to--particular situations--9838

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168-rates, services , facilities, so on. But the standard entrusted to the Federa l Commission -the maintenance o f competition or prevention of monopoly -embr a ces the whole commercial field; 1 (110) See discussion of the Interstate supra, this section. (111) .Supra, n . . 94. Hq,ndler, op.cit., state s that the statutory standar d s in the :Ii'ederal Trade Cornmi ssion Act, 88 St::tt. 719 (1914 ) was pur9osely indefinite to insure flexibility and tation to new situations. (112). op.cit., 20, 21: 11T hese if such they may be called , are not the l!laterials of e.drainistra tion of nor is it tha t the legi.slature h:id a definit e legal order in mind--rather, has been granted to the administrative agency to work out the 9roblem thus specified. "Nevertheless, because of this very ch::tracter of the Federal Trade Commission Act the courts assume complete authorit: . . If, as is the case with the Federal Trade Act, it i s :or the courts 'ultimately to determine as a matter of law' what ..... J.e standard methods of competition' means, then the courts an=either exercising the delegated authority or, by fiction, convert a general expression or specification of delegated power into substantive law . Although t h e proolem has been deleg,_ted to a specialized. tribunal, the courts of law have set themselves in the place of t h e administrators, means to many people that the "':)UrpOsP o f the entire scheme is set aside --the classical politics anQ economics of judges prevail in full. " (113) Ibid., 185: 11The field of trade and commerce regulation is no exception to the rule of e.:x--perience that there are no sharp turns in government. 11 (114) In the narrow fields it has been observed in this study that finality extended to a field such as alien determinations might be circumvented b y the courts. (115) McFarland, on. cit., 188: 11To vitalize the regulation of trade and industry, Congress and the executiv e have yet to nrc vide a capable body of administrA-tors, and now the statutes must be revised. In the substantive nortions of such legislation a policy must be stated and maintained as administration prog resses. O n the procedural side, if the regulation is to be administratiye and not judicial, the determinations of the administrative R.gency must be m ade effective without resort to t h e courts. Thi s was the legis l ative prog ram which revived the regulation of interstate transpor-tation in 1906 and 1910." tll6 ) . Federal Trade Commission v . Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 2 1 2 (1933). See also, Federal Trade Commission v. G oodgrape Co., 4 5 F. ( 2d ) 70 (C.C.A . 6th, 1930). For'an earlier case see, Federal Trade Commission v. Pacific Coast Paper. Ass1n., 273 U.S. 52 (1927) 9838

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-1 (11'?) Federnl 'I'r.:td Com,is .... lon v. L mber Co., 291 U . S . 67 (1 934). (118) Federal T rade CoP'lnistlon v . Ke:nJ•:>el, 2 9 1 U . S . 304 (1934.) . ( 11 9 ) Ibid . , 3n9 . (120 ) Ibid., 3 . 1 2 . (121) Ibid., 314 . Note esnecially t he citation of a case involving t he Intersta t e (122) Dickinson, o p.cit., 67. (123 ) Lawton v. Steele, 152 , U.S. 133, 140-141 (1894). (1 24) North Germa..'1 Lloyd v. Hedden, 43 F. 17, 25 (1890): 11It was perhap s . . • that I should have done. more than acquiesce in the doctrines ... announced, and support the validity o f the Act ..• without further discussion, but the large amount of money involved in the prPsent actions, and the earnestness and force wit. which t h e plaintiff's claims have been pressed, have induced me to m.::tke a more extended presentation o f them than was at first designed. 11 (Underlining mine). (1 25 ) Davidson v. Federal Radio Commissi on , 61 F.(2d) 401 (1932). See also, 11Po wer of Federal Radio Commis sion" 28, III. Law Review 409 (1932); Chicago Federation of Labor v. Federal Radio Com mission, 41 F . (2d) 422 (1930); Strawbridge & Clothier v. Federal Radio Commission, 57 F. (2d) 434 (1932). (126) White v. Federal Radio Commission, 29 F. (2d) 113 (1928). (127) Great Lakes Co. v. Federal Radio Commission 37 F. (2d) 993 (1930). Certiorari denied, 281 U.S 706 (1930); Journal Co. y. Federal R adio Commission, 48 F. (2d) 461 (1931). (128) Dickinson, o p.cit., 67. (129) Citv of Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co., 212 U.S. l, 18 ( 190 9). (l3n) Merchants Exchange v. Missouri, 248 U.S. 305 (1919), held a statute prohibiting weighing 6f grain or hay by private weigh ers where public ones are. present is not a denial of property without. due process of law. (131) Infra, XIII . (132) State v. Gullatt Cleaning & Garment Co,; Same v. Garfield, C. P. CT., Hamilton Count y , vhio, Nos. A-4216607, May 5, 1934, (Mathews, J.); and 9838

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-l7S -United S tate s v. et. al. ( D.C. W . D . Mo.) Dec.. 27, 1934, Eq. No.2552. !Otis D.J.). (133 ) Heg eman Farmer s C o r u . v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 1 63 , 55 S up . Ct . 7 (1934). (134) People v. Nebbia, 291 U.S. 5 0 2 (1934). (135) See infra XI--discussion of U.S. v. S potle s s Dollar Cleaners ers, 6 F ea . Su9p . 725 (D. E. D. N . Y. 1934). (136 ) San D1ego a nd Co. v. National C ity, 17 4 U.S. 739 (18 89); Sam Diego L a nd n.nd T . . ' n Co. v. J a sper, 189 U.S. 439,441 (1903); see also Dickinson, op. cit., 177. (137) This is self-limitation under the se paration of p o wers doctrine. (138 ) "It (the statute) de prives t h e Company of its right to a judicial i nvestigation, b y due process of l aw, underthe forms and with the machinery provided by the wisdom of successiv e ages for the investig ation judicially of the truth of a in co ntroversy, and substitutes t herefor, as an absolute finality , the a c tion of a R ailroad Commission which, in view of t h e pow ers co nceded to it by the State co urt, cannot be regar ded as clothed wit11 judicial fllnctions or possessing t h e machinery of a court of justice . ..... The question of t he reasonableness r ate of charge.for by a railroad com"9any, involving as 1t does the element of reA-sonable ness both a s regards t h e company and a s regar d s t h e public, is e minently a question for judicial investig a tion, requ.iring due oroces s of law for its determination. 11 11If tJ'1.P company is de prived of t h e p o wer of char g i ng reasonable rate s for t h e use of its property, and. such de privation take s in the absence of an investigation by judicia l machinery , it is de prl ved o f l awful use of its property , and . t hus, in substance and effect, o f t h e property its-elf,. w i thout due process of law. " Se e Willough"by , Constitutional La.w o f t he United Sta t es,, (New Yor k 1929) p . 1703. (139 ) flmyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 4 66 (18 98); S t . Louis & O'Fallon U.S., 27 9 U.S. 46 1 (1929). (140) An extrem e c ase is United Rqilw a y o f Bal"timore v . W est, 280 U.S., 23 4 (1930) which sugl:!ested that a return of l e s s thR.Il 7 .44fo w a s confiscatory . (1 41) G hio Valley Wate r Co. v. Ben Avon Borough , 253, U.S. 287 (1 920). See contra, New York & Q ,lleens Gas Co. v. McCall, 24 5 U.S. ( 1 9 1 7). ( 142) Dickinson, o p.cit., 1 95 . 9838

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-1?1Ghi o Val l y Co., v . Avon 103 A t l . 744 (Pa. l-:11 8 ) . ( 1 44 A t (145 ) G eorg i a R y . 62 5 (1923) . Cq_., v . Pai lroad Comr.ission , 26 U . S . (1 46 ) Se e Wilc o x v . J a ckson, 1 3 P e t . 498 ( 1 8 3 9 ) as t o use of doctrine in ca e. of disputed jur i d1ction be t w een Sta t e a n d FPde r a l courts. (147) Cro well v . 285 U . S . 22 ( 1 932) . (1 48 ) 2 59 U.S. 2 7 6 ( 1 S22 ) See also United State s v . Ju Toy , 198 u . s . 2 5 3 ( 1905) . G r oenvelt v . Bur w e l l , 1 Ld. R aymond 454, 46 7 ( 1 6 9 1 ) . ( 150 ) & e ad R y . v . Di Donato, 2 5 6 U . S . 3 27, 328 (1 920), involved t_le qu.estion whet her a flag man at a railwa y c rossing whPfe b o t h . inters atP. uitrastat P t raing p8.s s e.C.:. w a s eng Bf.ted i n 11interstatP c ornne r c e . 11 Dic!dns on, o p . c i t., 5 2 : "To allow an executi ve body t hus to deter n i n e co n c l usivel y the lim its o f its own 'ju risdiction' look s suspiciousl y like allowing i t to determin e a ' m a t t e r of law. 1 11 (151) Indemnity Co. v . Pillsbury, 1 5 1 Pac. 398 (Cal. 19 2 4) . The court a l lowe d finality to t h e board's determination, but apnarently on l y becaus e t h e cowt a t nroved it. ( 1 5 2 ) Employers Insura nce Corn. v . I n d u s t rial Accident Commission , 151 Pac. 423 (Cal. 1 9 1 5 ) . (153) Kansas Associati on v . Wilder , 23 Pac. 1 06 1 ( X an.l8 90). (154) . . 1 ill e r v . Horton , _ 26 E. 1 n 0 The de was handed down by1 Justic e -EolmPs; w h o later refused t o rec o gnize t he doc trine a s urg e d u p on t h e court in U . S . v . [ u T o y . (155 ) Peopl e v . Pub l i c Service C ommission , 195 N.Y. 1 57 ( 1 909). (156) B r ou gham v . B l a n t o n Mfg. Co., 249 U.S. 495 ( 1 9 19). ( 1 57) 1 98 u . s . 253 ( 1 905). ( 159) Van V leck, Administrative Cont r o l of Alien s (New Yor k 1932) . (160 ) 259 . u.s . 27 6 (:1922}; s e e a lso V a n Vleck, o p . c i t . ,189. (1 6 1 ) v. Uhl , 239 U.S. 3 ( 1 9 1 5) ; als o H&J.son v . Hof f , 291 u .s. 5 5 9 ( 1 93 4). 9838

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1 7 2 (10 2) 253 u.s. 287 (1920). (163) Supra, section 2, this chapter. (164 ) Dickinson, "Review of Administrative Determination of questions of 'Constitutional Fact'", 80 Penn. Law Review 1055 (1932), 1072: "The doctrine of constitutional fact is the doctrine of jurisdictional fact in a special form. tutionali ty is a question of p ower to act, a n d when it is held to depend on the presence of a fact, the situation is the same as when what is called the 1 jurisd.iction' of a n administrative body is made to turn on a fact issue. The difference is only that in one case the limitation is deduced from the Constitution and in the other from the statute creating the body w hose power is in the issue. 11 (165) Dickinson, ibid., 1061: "It is well settled t hat when there is provision for a proper administrative he Fuing , t:le individual affected is not entitled to another a nd second he aring in the revie1N proceeding at law. 11 (166) Dickinson, Administrative Justice a n . d the Supremacy of Law in the United States, o p.cit., 200 et.seq. (167) Dickinson, tfRevie'"l of Administrative Determination of Questions of 1 Constitutional Fact, 1 11 op. cit. , 1059-1060: "It (the _doctrine) holds that when statutory authority to decide deoends on the actual existence of a fact, then the existence or non-existence of that fact must be independently decided in Court in order to enable the Court to determine whether or not as a matter of law the Administrative decision is ultra vires and void. What the doc means in practice is that on those facts which are held to be !jurisdictional, 1 the administrative tribunal reaches a finding corresponding to that which a Court will later reach on different evidence, the administrative decision will be over-thrown as in excess of jurisdiction. 11 (168)285 U.S.221\(l932); see Wheeling Corrugating Co., v. Mcmanigal, 41 F.(2d) 593 (C.C.A. 4th, 1930), whicn was overruled by Crowell v. Benson. (169) This does not mean to suggest the doctrine had never been -1-pplied to federal agencies. See discussion of Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922). (170) Ibid., 60. (171) Ibid., 93. (172) Dickinson, Review of Administrative Determination of Q.uestions of 'Constitutional Fact"' op. cit., 105 8 , n. 12. 9838

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-1 (170 ) Dickin on , ibLa., 1081; A.lso Comm nt, "The Federal Long sharemen 1 s Ha-bor 1 Act, 11 4' Y lE" Law Journal 640 (1934 ; s f' Vocil i•. Jnd_mnl tv_ In.)U!'!mc, CoMpMy of North .Ame ica. , "'88 U . S . l , lGo ( lJ' (174 ) St: . t C ol1__ge v. Chittenden, 107 N . ' .f . 500 ( 1 06 1Vi c.) Mplo;yers 1 In ''Ur'1nc e Corp o r at on v. Industria l Accident C o:'lmis ion, 1 : 1 4 ? 3 (192o Cal.); 'ivestern Indemnity Co. v . Pac. 398 (1926 C a l .). (175) San Diego L ;md a n d Town Co. v. J1.sper, 189 U.S. 439, 441 447 (1903). (176) Note, 11Due Process Requirements o f 1\lotice "lnd He.::tring s in Ad-ministrative Proceedings, 11 34 Columbia L!3X! Review, 332 ( 1934). (177) Brown, "Book Review, 11 41 H;uva.rd L::>w Revie111 113, 114 ( 1934). (178) Consider t hP confidentia l report in Local Government Board v. A. C. 120, ( House o f Lords 1 915), and the lnxity of requirem e nts in the R1?0rai sal of imported goods; Origet v. Bedden, 155 u.s. 228, 237 (1894). ( 179 ) North American Cole Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908); Neff v • . Fad . dock, 26 W i s . 546 (1870). (180) .Supra, chapter, section I. (181) vriget v. Hedden 155 U.S. 228 (1894). (182) Palmer v. t f c Mahon, 133 U.S. b6() (1890); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 589 Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co. 1 8 How. 272 (1855). (183) Van Vleck, "Ad ministrative Justice in the Enforcement of Quasi-Criminal L a w, 11 1 Geo rge Washington Law Review 18 (1932) 45-46. (184 ) Van Vleck, ioid., 46. (185) Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100-101 (1903); see also Nishimura Ekiu U.S., 142 U.S., 651, b59 (1892). (186 Chin Yow v. 208 U.S. 8 (1908). (187) Gonzales v. Zurbrick, 45 F. (2d) 934 C . C • .A. 6th, 1 930)_ . (188) Ex oarte Bun.ii Une, 41 F. (2d) 239(S.D. CaL., 1930). (189) S mith v. Hitchcock, 226 U.S. 53, (1912); see also the op1n1 on in. the lcwer court, 34 App. D . C. 521 ( 1910) ; Not. e Necessity o:( a Notice A.nd Hearing in A dministrative 80 University of Pennsylvqnia Law 96 (1931) • . 9838

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-171:-(190) Communications Act of 1934, 48 State. 1064 . ':. ;;1 (1 91) Radio. Act of 1927, 4 4 1174. (19 2 ) Courier Journal C o. v. Federal Radio Commission, 46 F . ( 2d) 614 (Ct. of App. D. C.'l931). _(19 3 ) 'Southern R ailway Co. v. Virginia, 290 U.S. 19 0 (1 933); $abre R . Co., 85 At 1 . 693 ( Vt . 1913). (194) Sta .te Railroad T ax Gases, 92 U.S. 575, 6fl9, ( 1876), in re fusing to such requirPments said: "Th e main function of t1:1is BoA.rd is to equalize these A.SSPSS ments over tne wholP State. If t hey find. that a co unty hn.s had _its propert y assessed too high in reference to t".'1 e generB.l standard, they may reduce its valuation; if it has been fixed too low , the y raise it to tha t standard. When t h e y raise i t i n aiq county , they necessarily raise it on tne property of every individual who owns any in that county. Must each one of t h ese hr-we notice and a se'!)a rate hearing? If a. railroad compan y is by ln.w entitled to s uch not ice, surely every individua l i s equally entitled. to it. Yet if this be so, the e xpense of notice, the delay of hParing e{)ch indiviclue.l, would render t h e exercise o f the mt=dn function of this Board impossible." Accord see: :Bi Metallic Investment Co. v. State Bo9.rd of Equ ali zation, 2 3 9 U.S. 44 (1915). For cases the req irement see Kuntz v. Sumvtion, 19 N.E. 1 (Ind. 1888); Londoner v. Denver, 210 u.s. 6 2 7 (1914) (195) Lanaer v. Mercantile Bank, 186 u.s. 458 (1902); San Diego land a nd Town Co. v. National City, 174 U.S. 739 (1899) ; Pittsburgh etc. R. Co. v. Backus, 154 U.S. 421 (189 4). (196) Erie R. R. v. City of P aterson, 76 Atl. 10 6 5 ( N.J.l910). (197) Supra, n. 195. (198) Huhli_gg v. Ehrich, 5 5 IJ.E. 636 (111.1899). (199 ) Supra, 194. (2no ) Hagar v. Reclamation District, 111 U.S. 701 (1884). e201) Bi Metallic Investment Co. v. State B o ard of 239 U . . S. 441 (1915); and North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 p. s . . 306 (l9ns). . ( 20 2 ) In C h i _cag o Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258 (1924) Justice Brandeis 'lists notice of hearing required under the Hepburn Act of 1906 and the Transportation Act of 1 S20. In the cases o f .unreasonable rates, discriminatory ' rates, switching connections, division of joint r ates, pooling , railway control o f 'Vater carriers, tion, e x tension of time for new and a bandonment. Notice of hearing 1J1ras 'not necessary, however, for the issuance of securities. 9838

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-]7:--(?03) Joto 111 , ir-it . ..., J:;,' " R . 878 (19'\2) . ( v04) ....rQ lcl s . ' . TT • S . -:g_:) . :'70 U . S . 117 (1926); Stoeh1 v . __;;_ll. •\" .. """' "": :;,) ( )1); U . S . ex r e l ::loop v . Dou .. -la, 1 9 D . C. 9.1 (lf91 )). S E n L0nd Tow n Co. v . National City, 174 U . S . 739 (1899). conferen e m,y he, ing. ( 20o) Fit t, bur2:11 S tc. ] . v :Bac kus, 154 U . S. 421, 4264?. 7 ( 1894) : 11 A hearint; b efor_; judgment, -,i th full o : h9o:..tuni t ;,r to p resent all evid nee and the ars-uments which t ile deem3 i!"lportant i s all that Cf'n 1 e c ".dj ncl.t;:cd vi tal ..•.•• If t3 sin_:;le hetring is no t clue process, doublinb it aill not it so ..• 11 (207) .. :ar k and v. I!tc CA.ll, 24E U. S. 345 (1917); Chin v . UJ!.., 208 U . S. 8 (1908); Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U . S . 454 (1920). Dic1{.inson, Adr:1inistrative Justice n.nd. Suorernacy of Law in _:the United. St-:_t8:;, op. cit., 106, n . ::,. (.:.:08) :;_,..w:i:"'n Products Co_ . v. p. S., 288 U.S. 294 ( 1 9 3 3 ) • 1 71, 177 (19 1 3); 107 N . W . 500 477 ( 1 9 13). (210) :Br!i:t.J;_::m v. C h:mr:Uer, 260 U . S . 110 (1922); Gage v . Censors of N e w : .:efi.i a l Socie t y , 63 N . H. 92 ( 1884) . ( 211) 3-:=Jrf'islci. v. U. S. ex r e l 3 2 App. D . C. 153 (lS08). (212) J ,m Pat v. Vv:"lite, 253 U. S. 454 U. S . ex rel :Bilokums .. cy v. 263 U. S. 1:9 ( 1924); F ederal Trade Commissioll v . Good grap e Co., 45 ?eel. (2d) 70 (C.C ... .• 1930). ( 213) Chambe r of Comrr;erce of !\:!inn. v. Federal Trade C01:uni s sian, 280 :?. 45 (C. C. A . 8t, 1922) 14S: "A is .:;r anted. before t h e Commission, and ultimate revi ew b y t'i1e Circuit Court of Appe als is provided; therefore there is no deni a l of due process. Th e Federal Trade Commission exercise s administrative, not jud.icial, p owers. The act provides no fenalties, nor has the Comnission p ower to make more than a finding of fact s , v.rhich require s confirmation by this court b efore any burden is c ast upon the :parties subjected_ to (21 3 a ) Note-The Necessity of a l'"otice r:nd Hearing in Administrative Determinatio11s, 80 Unive:rsity of Law 96 , 97 ( 1931): 11Notice and hea :.n:3, h owever, detract to some extent from administrative efficiency. involve delay and exrense. Publicit:r may deter gover::.L!lcmt frnm frankl y repo::ting a harsh truth, or disturb the relationsh i p confid nee and d iscipline between inferior and superior T'ne o f Tax .Appeals and the Court of Custan s and Patent Appec.l s excellent examples . :But see, 9838

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-17 E,( 2 1 4 ) :Frankfurter and Landis, o p . cit., IV: ill-fatea. Com:nerce court were. not so g o .od as courts.11 E l achly&Oatman, op. cit., 11. '' Tl:te fort.11nes of t h e of other ( 215) of .American Ear Association, of the Committee on AdministTative L'aw, (Ealti.wore, 1 9'33, 1934) :.LVIII, 203-204, LIX, 539, sug0est t hat rule making and the prosecutions functions should be in separa t e hand.s c>nd speaks ilighly of s p e .ialized courts such as the Board of Ta"< :A.pp e als. Blachly 8: O atman, cit., 215: 116 . '\tYhere administrative adjudication is separated from active a .d.ministratton, it .. is possib1e to away from the control of the ordinary cou..i'ts over adnli:nistration a11d to substitute a system of control by administrative courts. In case administrative adjudication results from the process , t w o objectiona:bl e features app e ar. . First, the administrative process is n:ot surrounded by the s afeguard s ;for prqper ad.jud.ication. Second, the act of the administration is. not trolled b;'/ an' impart ia. l out side au thGri ty •11 ' • • ' ' I .. ' ' .. 9838

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-1, .-v (l) "Poli tJ.c t.l :::,occts f t ht. w Jeal", 28 Am. Pol. Sci.Rev.l97, 11 the ( I ar-d _ . 'lre t.e m o s t extreme and striki n g illustration of the d e gree to which admi ni strati ve au.tho ;i t y h a s -oeen expAnde d witn the recovery prog rrun. 11 and Landis, Business of tne Supreme Court, Yor k , 1 927), at 9age 17 3 e:xpresses the doubt that Cont;resa ever entrust to five men the given.the Commerce Court. Its short existence (Februa r y 1 911October 1 913 ) resulted from the shar p rebuffs handed it by the Sup-reme Court. Blachley anQ. vatman, Administrative Legislation and. A d judication, ( Brooking s Institution 1 934). ( 2 ) The such was the c ase co mes from person_in high officia l nosi tion throughout t h e early 9art o f the Act 1 s a d ministration. H e h?s not given his ) errni ssion to be quoted. ( 3) Brookings Ins t i tut ion, T i le National Recovery Administration an Analysis and Appraisal, 47, suggests NRA as a matter of organization had. broken with trn.d1tional (4) \Iillis, P arliamentary P omrers of Eng lisl:,l Government Dep.q,rtments, Harvard University Press 19 2 2 ) . IV,. deals . with p riv.q,te bill legislation. (5) Jbid. 59: . ..• -"Delegated legislation in England fails, like parliamentary legislation, into two main classes, that which:corresponds to. a genera l Act, the rule-naking pov1er, and that which is in the nature of a private Act, the :po wer o f confirming schemes by order." (6) This entire procedure is fully dascribed, ibid.,l33-135. (7) Ibid.,IV. (8) The of Health (ex parte Yakke), 2 K.B. 98 (1931J), ancl A C 494 (1931). (9) Willis, o p . cit., 137: 9838 11vnly after the World War is this procedure by moulded to the task for which it se. ems destined, the a:gll lication of adoptive socialistic mea,sures to the groups or Areas illing to try t he e x9eriment. The Electricity Sup ply Act permits L1e Commissioners to divide i nto districts Rnd Ps t.q,blish electricity authorities in t hem; t h e Mining Act 9rov i des for cases where the

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(HI ) -1?8of o w ner.s in r:J, d i s t rict wish to ::unalgRma te but .q,re unable to bring in the s mall minority whose ation is essential f o r success ; the Marketing Act enables tradin g b o a rds to be set up by . . Therei n the underlying principles of and private Acts are reconciled. S upra, 8. ' (ll) Henderson, The Trade Commission, (Yale University Press , 1 9 _ 24). (12 ) Flexible Tariff Arit, _ 4 2 Stat. 858, 941-943 . (13 ) :Brooking s Instituti"on; o p . cit., 4, s ue-,gests that the -ore cedents a v ailable were to b e f ound in the Intersta t e Commerce Comm i s s i on , Public Utility l abor lB.WS, trade o r a c tice conference agree ments, anCi. the corporate bodies of t h e wartir ae. T r ad e u."rJ.i ons, coo:9e r atJ.ves a n d tra de associations h ad all been variously used b y t h e Ame rican :o 'I ., •' public. : ! (14) Infra, VI (15) Title I, Section 2 ( a ) and (b). (16 ) Cochnower v U.S . , 248 U . S. 407, 40 8 (1919). The creation of offices and assig nment of compensation is a legislative function. Although denying the p o wer claime d in t h e case , the cqurt recogniz e d that such a power could b e delegated by 11clear e xpress .ion or implication. 11 See also Childs v . . State, 113 Pac. 5 4 5 (Okl. ,1910); and Carson v.M eLe ad , 148 S. E. 584 (Ga.,. 1929). (17) Brooking s Institution, o p . cit. , 43, 1 6 2: ''The machinery t h e President h a s set u p is a b.q,lanced sort of e xecutive-legislative-judicial tribunal. It is not a bureau and it not one. It is rathe r a forlim for cooper ation. It will d u plicate no e xisting g o vernment machine r y . It h a s the a c t i v e a n d vi tal guidance, coo pera t i on, and s up )ort of every g overnment department, a nd on its b o a r d of directors sits every C abinet office r whose d e p artment i s affecte d or can h e lp. 1 1 NRA Relea s e N o . 11, June 25 , 1 9 3 3 . (18 ) Brooking s Institution, 0 9 . 9 6 9 7 outline s three step s in c o de -making : l. ' The prelimina r y c h e c k ing, c lassification assign m ent; 2 . Preliminary conferences qnd hearing s ; 3 . F inal negotiat i ons leading t o 9838

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-l7 -(19) Johnson, The Bl e Eaele. from Esg to Earth, S a urday Evening Post, J a n qry 2G, (1 9r 5) . P-i e 85: 3 . "i i thin 'ffi.A i ff'lf were m3de u u of qccredite o f the hree conflictino interPsts: (a) Ind stry; (b) Labor; (c) Consumers. 'It v' s to be their business to point out ever y Code pto-posal which they t hought might bear harshly or unfairly on t h e inte r ests they reoresented . They voiced ancl sup oorted their -protest and, be assured, tney did it. "The B o:.l.rds not only were to do this themselves but they were t o activate And as"'ist all public or urivate ,groups of simil a r interest to their cases. 11 (20) Field, The Effect of Rn Unconstitutional Statute, tMinneapolis 1 935) 305. ( 21) Brooking s Institution, ou. cit., 31. ( 22 ) Infra. , XI I (23) Norwegian Nitroge n Products Co. v. U.S., 288 U.S.294 (1933). ( 24) Legal M emorandum No. 54, July 30, 19 3 4 directed to the Legal D ivision from. Blackyvell S mith, Acting General Counsel, quoting a memorandum from Robert P. Reeder on rrNotice and Hearing:" 11In l e gislative matters the requirement of an opuor tunity to be heard rests upon and not upon the Constitution. Yet, as the Supreme Court held in the flexible tariff case ( Norwegian Nitro,e:en Products Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 321) data may be plRced in the record otherwise than at public hearings and may be treated as confidential; the record may include letters, reports of confidential. investigations, other governmenta l reports and trade joQrnals; a nd the right to a hearing coes not include a right to have access to s uch data or the right to cross examine witnesses. In that case the court said: 'If .it was under a duty to give the kind of hearing that was fair in all the circumstances, it was free to shape its course within reasonable limits by its own conception of the promptings of policy and f airness. It have kept within the statute even though it had made the hearings private and had refrained fron the publication of anyt hing , either the recDrds of its agents or t h e testimony of witnesses. 1 11 This last sentence, on its face, is dictum. It is also interesting to note that this is t he earliest statement of t h e precedents the Legal Division felt NRA was acting under, that the writer h a s .found. This statement is dated over a year after the NRA began op erations. 9838

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-180( 25 ) Tariff Act of 1922, 42 Stat. 858, 941-943. (26) Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. U.S., 288 U.S . 294 305, ( 1930). (27) Tariff Act o f 1 922 , 42 Stat. 858, 941-943: "Investigations to assist t h e President .in ascertaining differences in costs of production under this section shall be made by the United States Tariff Commission, and no proclamation shall be issued under this section until such investigation shall have been made. The commission shall give reason-. able public notice of its h e aring s and shall give reasonable op:oortuni ty to parties interested to be present, to produce evidence, and to he heard • . The commission is q,uthorized to adopt such re.q,sonable procedure, rules, and regulations as it may deem ne ce s s.q,ry. 11 (28) Nor wegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. U.S. 294, 303-315 (1933). (29 ) Ibid., 318: 11It is very different, however, when orders are directed against public service corporations limiting their powers in the transaction of their business." (30) Ibid., 321; also 307: "The statute does not say that t h e y are to have .q,n ouDortunity to produce evidence A : nd to be h eard to whatever extent they may desire. It says that they are to have a reasonable op portunity, and this subject to the power of the Co111rnission to adopt such reasonable procedure, rules .qnd regulations a s it may deem necessary. Nothing in thA statute suggests a belief of the law-makers that every 9roducer or importer is to be viewed, like a party to a la.1111 s uit, as the ad versary of every other., with the privileg e o f examin.q,tion and cross7'lexamination extended through the series. 'There must be a limit to individual argument in such matters if the government is to g o on. 1 Holm es, J. in Eietallic Co. v. Colorado, 23 9 U.S. 441, 445.11 (1915) (31) Ibid, 3 12, and see 317: 9838 "The answer will not be found in the definitions of a hearing lifted from setting and then applied to new conditions. The answer will be found in a consideration o f the ends to be achieved in the particu lar condi tions that were expected or foreseen. To know. 'wh;at they

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-1"1a r e , t he r e m st bP recourse o a l l th qids Avai l ab J .e i n t he roces 0f 0 hi tory analogy and p r:1c l.ce as wel l 1.s to th diction8.r y . 11 ( 32) Su r . I V , l. ( 32a) Whe n t h i e!1 ire prob lem wn.s s t a t ed to Tq.ri f f Commiss i o n attorn e y , h r . F . G . he i mTllediate l ,, fPlt a g rPPt difference between the prob lem o f the N IRA the F lexi ble T ariff Act exi s t e d in the conce 1Jts. While it i s conceded tnat no one hA.s any rie;ht in a rate of duty, it is not li"ke Pise conced e d th8.t the "v ested interests" of an established industry will not de!TI.::ln d both procedural and s b tantiv e 11due process . 11 137 u .s. 310 (1890). (34 ) Supra N .2S. ( 3 5) T i t 1 e I , Section 2 (b) . ( 36) Executive Order No. 6543-A, September: 30, 1933. (37) Hampton v. U . S . , 276 U.S. 394 (1928). (38) American Stores Co. v. U.S., .58 Dec. 6 (1930). (39) Glassie, 11some Leg a l Aspects of the Flexible TAriff," 11 VA. Law Rev i ew, 329 , 4 4 2 (1 925): "Litigation iJ;l.volves the conc8n t of actor qnd reus, and of a right infringed or a duty broken. But an investigation by the Tariff Commission is not for the purpose o f ascertaining whether somebody's right, w1der the has been infringed. It is for the purpose of whether ther e shall be a change in the law." (40) Harriman v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 211 U.S. 407 (1908); Infra VIII. (41) Luce, Le._islative Procedure (Boston & York, 1922), 142-148. (42) Yates v. Yilwaukee, 10 iVall 497 (1870); Hammer v . Dagenhart, 274 u .s. 25 1 (1918). (43) Freund, Administrative Powers over Persons and Property (University of Chicago Press 1926), 84; 9 8 38 "If uublic policy requires the exercise of a medi ating discretion whic 1 1 cannot be turned into an expert discretion, it seems on the whole t hat it shoul d be exercised by a politically constituted authority, i.e.,

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-182 -normally by the legislature; from t his of view the delegation by Congress to t h e Interstate Commerce Commission of the power to fix a fair return a ppears as an anomaly." (44) Dickinson, Administrative Justice and the Suprem acy of the La1117 i n the United States ( Harvard University Press 1 92 7 ) 1 8 . (45) Freund, op.cit. 84. ( 46) Ibid., 154-155: "Provision for some kind of notice and hearing, which in the case of a rei?;Ulation is at best a matter of legislative requirement in the interest of equity and intelligent action, becomes in the case of an order a constitutional requirement under t h e C:.ue process clctuse of the :E'ourteenth Amendment. 11 (And the Fifteenth Amendr.1ent). (47) Frischer & Co. v. Bakelite Cor p., 3 9 F (2d) & Pat. App. 1930); Federal Trad e Commission v. Curtis Publishing Co., 260 u.s. 568 (1922). ( 48) Freund, o p . cit.;. 108: "Th e combination of e.. provision for hearing with a provlSlOn for c ompetitors becoming parties. to the application preceding, may thus turn the l atter into a contest of a semi-judicial The hearing requirement is however, the exception r a t her than the rule; and ordinarily competitors have not the requisite locus standi to contest the grru1t of an apulication. "It remains to be seen whether the hearing reauirement will become a permanent feature of licensing 1)rovi sions; it may be appropriate a s a prerequisite to refusal; but there is little in it a prerequisi "te to a g rFtnt u..n.less a definite righ t to contest the a"?ulication is given t o other interested parties, and t his is no t "d.onP even by the Transportation Act. 11 See also Chicag o Junction Case, 264, U.S. 258 ( 1924). See also Freund, op. cit., 108: If in the absence o f such a substantial showing and finding the ap plication is nevertheless granted, there is a technical illegality which may remain The Supreme Court h as, however, held that a competing carrier may be permitted to intervene; and, thus becoming a party to the proceeding , it may contest the consent order (Chicago Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258; see also People v. Public Service Commission, 195 N.Y., 157)11 (49) Title I, Section 3. 9838

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(50) Pan a Refinin Co. v . R. All, U . S . 388 (1935 . , and Railway Co. v . Virginia, U . S . 1 0 (19 ( 50-}A) "EXECUTIVE u 1 D.B;R. Nu 6205B 11CuDES uF FAIR CulVlPETITION "Pursuant to the a thority vested in me by Title I of the National In u strial Recovery Act , approved June 1 6 , 1933 , 11I hereby prescriof> he following regul1.tion, modifyin any revious order inconsistent therewith: 11A..r1 code of fair competition apuroved by m P shall. be deemed full force A nd effect on the effective date as stated in the code; ut f ter the anoroval of a code and as an incident to the immediate • 4 enforcement thereof, hearings mav be g ive:n by the Administrator or his designated r epresentative to persons (hereby defined to include n atura l persons, partnerships, a s sociations or corporations who have not in person or by a representative participated in establishinb or consenting t o a co r e , but w ho are directly affected t he reby, and who claim tha t applications of the code in p;,rticulA.r instances are unjus t to them and who apply for an exemption to, or e xemption from, or modification of the code. Such persons so applying, within ten days after the effective date o f the co4e, shall be given an opportunity for a hearing and determination of the issues prior to incurring any liability to enforcement of the code, and t he Administrator shall, if justice requires, stay the application of the code to all similarly affected pending a determination by me of the issues raised. "The ifu ite House , July 15, 1933. Approval Recommended: riugh s. Jormson. 11 "FRANKLIN D . ROOSEVltLT" (51) Blachley and Oatman , op. cit., 8 9 ; spea_'l{ of NRA and AAA legislative but do not havE=> t his problem in mind. (52) In Louisville & Nashville R.R.Co. v. Garrett, 231 U.S. 298 , 305 , 307 (1913), Mr. Justice Hughes spoke of the rate-making power as legislative. he continued the procedure may properly conduct inquiries, giving notice and hearing , even "Necessarily" (underlining mine) doing this. Brookings Institution, o p.cit., 33, U.S.: ThE=> a...tthor finds a stron g resemblance b e tvveen NRA Rnd the Interstate Commerce and agencies o f that l. The notion of business affected ,, i tl1 the )Ublic interest is i nvolved, and it is a resort to general concepts of 'fair', 'reasonable', etc. 9838

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-184 2. The a d ministrative regulations havP the force of law and effect of law. 3. The authority has been e xtended over the whole area of trade a ,nci industry. 4. The power is based upon the federal authority over Interstate Commerce Commission. (53) Berle, ''The E xpansion of American Administrative Law," 30 Harvard Law Review 430-440 (1917t, points out how Interstate Commerce Commission exercises all three powers. ( 54) Dickinson, Adninistrative Justice and the Supremacy of L a in the United States, o p . cit. , 19-20: 11'I'he whole discussion should go to demonstL'\'bethe futility of trying to classi.fy a particula r e xercise of administrative nower as either wholly legislative or wholly judicial. T h e tendency o f the Administrative procedure is to foreshorten both f unctions into continuous governmental act. 11 See also Blachley a nd G a t man, o p . cit . • , 167, 225. (55 ) B lachl;" and Gatm an, o p.cit., 256-57: "In respect to agencies c onnected nith or under the NRA which, during the ,year, hav e acted almost exclusively a s administrative, mediating, and conciliatory .authorities, there was at first a dire confusion .of functions, with little recognition of the fact t hat there is a separate and distinct function of administrative adjudication. This fr1.ct no w seem s to be recognized, it is probable that the will soon provide for bette r organi zed administ rative adjudication agPncies. 1 • 1 (56 ) Southern Railway Co. v. Virginia, 290 U.S. 1 90, 1 97 (1933). ( 57) 264 U.S. 258 (1924). This cas e was earlie r than the Nor1r J8gian i:h trogen Case, supra, n. 26. The cas e is referred to above its requirements where the statute rlrovides for a hearing . (58) Chicago Junction Case 264 U.S. 258, 264-265 (1924): "Con gress by using the. phrase the Commission is of the o pinion, after hearing', p r escribed quazi judicial action. Upon ap plication of a carrier, t he Commission must form a judgrnPnt whether tne acquisition proposed w;i.ll be in the public interest. It may form this juqg ment only after hearing. T h e provision_ for a hearing i mplies both t h e .pr1 vi lege of introducing evidence and t h e duty o f deciding in accordance with it. To refuse to conside r evidence introduced or to make an essentia l finding vvi t hout sup p o r .ting evidence is arbitrary action." (59 ) Executive urder No. 6202-A (Administrative for Industrial Recovery). 9838

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(.:59a) Inf r a , Fo rcin g Issuance or i1es 8ooe • (59b) This .1.l'gumen t oeelt nci.v anceC. by Dr . R . }1,. B l a c hly i n metl or:-J10.'U.iil :.Lo:n-:1 and in c onve rsation s ith the r r rite r . J'hic; i r also t h e vimr e ::•_Jres e d oy th L et:a l S UT)r a n . 24 . But sec Legan t;em O r :'nd'lU!l, j.Jo. 7 , r e Functions of the Legnl D i v i sian, January 4 , 1934 , r 'hich a:Jp l i e s o r dinary concepts o f aomi n istrative 1':\.r: t o the codem a k ing p rocess: 11( b ) As to Con stitutionu lit;r: 11l1l1e questi o n o.t constituti on a l v aJidity o f co des comes do'/lll p r i m a r ily to ...., Q_uestio n of due proces s . I f the p r operty of a membe r o f the in dustr y or a labore r i s t k e n v•i thout d u e proces s of la• under t h e t e r:.-..1s of the code, J..t i s s ubject t o a t t a c k on Con stitutiona l g rounds . 11 I n det ermining this q uestion the m atter d.ene n d .. s u pon the tation of the fects rel a .. t i v e to the eme rgency of the p articula r i ndustry "9l u s reesonc;. b l e ness in m eeti n._ the need. If prov i sions 'Tfhich VI'Ould no.r mally constitut e a deprivation o f " i thout d u e process a s to a paJ. tic u l n r member .of the a r e e s s entia l t o meet the erne r genc : r o f the .rhole country, the n they can probably be " U stained , i f not arbi trflr y in foriJ, met h o d s of .ado ption. 11Th i s a . g ain require s evidenc e o f f a cts i n t l e r e c ord upon hich the Admin istrator can reasonably find that the dem and. s the s ions il1 c_u e stio n . 11 I t e1l s o r e q u ires a full opportunity for aggrieve d .. t o b e heard so tha t if t h e r e a r e f a cts c on trary t o the o ther evi denc e i n tl1e reco r d he may bring it out. If at e r ful l t o all inte:test e d parties, to b e h e ard such a p:covis i on s eem s and. the lX .. icu l a r one seems the m o s t reasonably devised t o m e e t the neecL , i t u i l l stand . 11Hcre again lega l a dvice i s very ( 59 c ) Sup r a , P a r t I . (596...) Sup r a , I V , 11. (S9e) i .urra v ' s L e s see v . Hobok e n Lane . and L:nnrove m ent Compa.n:,, 1 8 Ho11. 2 7 2 ( 1853 ) . ( 5 Sf) See particularl y Carr , Del e gated L e . ...,i s l ation (Cambridg e Uni v ersi Press , 1921 ) . ( 59g ) I bid. . ( 59 h ) Dickinson, Administrative Justice and t h e Supr e m acy of tl1e L a , o:J. cit . , 21. 19-20. 9838

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136 ( 59j) Supra, IV, 11. . . . (59k) Investigation for the purp o s e of l e gislation is a proper function of the Congress. v. Dau gherty , 273 U. s. 135 (1 926). But see Kilbourne v. Thompson, u. S. 168 (1880). ( 591) Infra, VI I I. ( 59 1i1) In fact each field is treated indi vid.ually. Precedents useo_ fror, 1 other fields when the courts feel they are helpful. IV. See also, Stephens, Administrative Tribunal and the Rules of :=::vidence (Harvard University Press , 19 33), 101: "Discrimination must b e ct mad e oet,. ,een the commissions themselves. The proceeding s of the Inter-r.t state C ommerce Commission are clearly the most dependable." (59n) Dissent in Springer v. G overnment of the Philippine Islands, 277 u. s. 189' 210-211 ( 1928). (59o) Supra n. (27). (59 p ) Carl Zeiss, Inc. v. United States, 7 6 Fed. (2d) (19 3 5 ) which interestingly limits the President's reliance upon evidence not in conformity 17ith the statutoryprocedure. See also r. D. 45673 to 45 6 77; and T. D.46086. (59q) Pacific States Box and Compeny v. Tihite, 80 Law Ed. ( Adv. Op s ) 133 ( 1935 ) • (59r) Ibid. at pag e 139: It is urged that this rebuttable presumption of the existence of a state of facts sufficient to justify the exertion of the police po er attaches onl;y to acts of legislature: and that nhere the regulation is the act of an administrativ8 bod.y, no such pr8sumption exists, so that the burden of proving thA,justifying of acts is upon him who seeks to sustain thB validity of thP. r"'lgulatio.n. The contP.ntion is "Vi thout sup:port in authority or reason, and rests upon misconception. Every exertion of the police p0111T"'lr, either on th"l l"'lgislature or b y a!l administrative body is an exercise of delegated pow"lr •........• But where the regula tion is within the scope of authority l"'lgally delegated, the tion of thP. exis. t .ence of the acts justifying its specific exercise attaches alike to statutes, to munici:pat ordinancAs, and to orders of administrative bodies. 11Here there is ao_ded reason for a pplying thP. presum:ption of validity; for the regulation now challenged was adoptedaftP.r notice and public hearing as the statute required." (UndP.rlining mine (60) Mississinni v. Johnson, 4 Wall 175 (1867). Willoug hby, o p . cit., 1497-1500. The author p0ints out that in Harbur• r v. Madison, the court stated that the Secretary of State ould b"'l subject to mandamus in the performance of a purely ministerial ctut ; r, but when acting as the a gent of the President in carrying out his discretion, that such a writ not issue. At the trial of Aaron Burr, Jefferson 9838

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-lc7 -rP.fu P.d to an .,o a surn dur.P.s te urn. Chiof Justico ... ':l..rshall i s rPportec1 t0 h r o s a i d , 11 I n c 'ls"' 0 f thi 1:.i n h o court bo required tc nr0r.l"lo d a 0-i s t thP. residPnt as a a inst 0rdinar individua • . h e o j Actio'l"ls to suc h a a r A so stron and obvious tha t all l"lUSt a .l m 1'!1lndg"l t!1P. .•.• In t his c a s A , how"'v 8r, the h a s assi ned n reason w h a t RvPr f0r mithholdine thP. p a uer callP.d for. The u r uriot; r of withholr i n i must bP. dl=lr.id8d ' ' himself, not bv another fC'r him. Of tho TI0iF'ht o _ for and agains p rC' ducin it hP. i s 1 P. udgo. 11 arguP.d. tha t thP Prl'lsidP.nt, becauso o his office , a s "above t h o process 0f c:tny r.ourt, or thP. juriscliction of an C urt, to bri'1P: bin to account as PrAsident.11 ThP. court bAld that the act-of tho Presi P.nt <"S ex:RcutivP. and as such vras not t0 judgment of thP. Court. Dickinson rP. JusticP. n thP. S of Lam in the United StatP.s, ou. cit., 262, N . 2 2 and SAe aJso, v. BissP.ll, 19 Ill. ?.?9 (1857) t here r.itod. (61) A. L.A. Sr.hochtP.r Coro •• U . S. U . S. 495 (1935). (62 ) KendPll v. U. S . ex .. StokP.s, 12 Pet. 524 (1838); Butterworth v. FoP. , 112 U . S • 50 ( 18 8 4) ; !L__ S. I'! x _ r 1. H cB rid A v . SP.hurz, 102 J. S. (J.879); soe also tho cUctum in Ma:rburr r v • . J.B.dison, 1 Cr . • 137 (180:3). ou. r.i t., 1501. (63) Int"'rstate Commerce C0mmission v . FumbP.ldt S. S. Co., 224 s . 474 (1912). (64) An interesti"lr -sit1at i c m arosP. 1n thA Inland TI'ater Carrier Trc:tde in tho Eastern Divisi0n of United States via the e,..,. York Canal S , a uuroved CodA No. ?66. In thP. Suring of 1934 the Code (Art. VIII) the to p ropose a tariff schedulP.. This the industrv did. The schedulP. propos8d included an 11 arbitrary", ,..,.hich is in the naturPof a It 'was the understanding that if there were no objections fro m the inr.ustry or Administrati0n, that the TIOul d go into effect ten davs after it was received. Later a represente..tive of the Legal Division orally stated that the scheQule becamP. Affective the instant it nut into the mail box Tiith out any of prior Administrative review . Th8 industru is corrrposed . of tMo elemP.nts: the tow boats and b2rges and the motor shiDs. The motor ship peoule felt that the proposed. tariff ? s unfair -to them and asked to havA it suspendP.d. The Deputy Administrator's. officP. drew up a suspension oraer which was forti'TardP.d to General Johnson for action. Shortly thereafter the. Deputy Adminis-rator called a mePting o : interested nP.rsons in NAIT York City, ing to get the elements 0f .thl=l to agree upon a course of action. this meP.ting was in progress GenAral Johnson thA suspension ordAr. The Admi -nistrator ur8ferred to the tariff schedule rP.main in P.ffect, si:ncP. the various elements of the had P .greP.d to r.rork cut some amicE!ble arrangemP.n t. To he publir.Btion of tho or er tho Detmtv b . teleuhonetold an assistant to it being made public until he arrived back in cshington. According to the procedurP. then in P.ffect, the DP.put .

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. -188-.Admini strator was to notify the .code authority of t h e ino.ustry b y telephone im m e diately 1..1p0n the i of any strati ve orders .R-ffecting it. This the f<;t-iled to d.o. In add.i on, h e prevailed upon Cod e Record Section to delay publication o f t his order for nearly fifteen cLays, approximately nine d a y s more than thG delay which nould have been entaile d due to the pressure of then upon Cod e Record . Duri,n. g nll this time the industry was going ahead c hart; ing t ariff, uhe n in fo..ct this tnriff had. b een susp enc l ed . . . . Finally a Ca.l'lcellation order was clr a rm up and plac.ed with the sp.spensio n orde r in som e NRA file. The f act remains that neither of these orders V-T
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-1 o _ l C/J::S S T C VI ( 2 ) Blaclley and Oatman, Adninistrativ:J L 0r;isl t i o n nnll A d judication , (:a rookinbs Ipsti t u t i o n 203: 11T-1.e deci sicns of t _e autl1or i conn\;c t c d v1i tl1 t:le :rational Recov r y Admini str a t i .)n almost of n e cessit y mu ; t b e made in har mony wi t h t:i.1e ah1s c f tl.e p rogrnm of indu strial recov o r y . Such au.tho r i ties a r o not acl2 ninis t c r i n g an a b stract lavv , b u t a r e adm i n i s t e r i n g a so cial and e c onomic pol i c y." Th e difficulty i n cbin; tl1is can be reac.lily seen , with tJ.1eories as nume r ous as t : , 1ey v1ere . (3) An of trlC flexibilit y can furni s h is illustra t e d by the N.3.A O f fice Lla:nua l . 3838 "Code AdministratiJ n III-4000 Enfo r.c ement III-4113 . • 7 11(g) R estitu tion t o A l l :Smployees "A r e spondent m u s t o r dinarily make r estitutio n to all h i s e,np loyees ent itled to restitution and n o t m e r e ly to those v{no made c o m p laint o r who a r e t l'le subje c t o f t:1e eviden c e o f f inding o r v iola.tis ni n t 1 l e ular case. I n many cases, an examina tic-n o f the s b o oks, account s , r ecords or e m 2 )loyees by the Sta t e Director's O f f ice o r an accountant will b e n e c e s sary t o clet e rmine t h e amount o f restitution." ( 4 ) Brie f f'Jr A . L . A. Corporation, in v. U. S. Brooking s Institutio n , op . cit., 37. (5) Bro o king s Institutio n , cit., 37. (6) I b::.d , 46; s ugt;est s t :1a t tv!O methods presented t l1e:nselve s to that of 11 slow a cademic stucly of all the complications and c ontingencies t o b e ; ne t in code drafting punctua ted by eX}_)ert testimony and orient e d i n the l o n g-te r m e ffects o f those cl1anges i n e c onomic bala11c e that 'i1ould inevitably result from the new r e c o v e r y s et-Ul) --that is, in the opinio n of men who, howe v e r rich in academic learning, never kne w the weight o f a bus iness r e spop s i bili t y in their whole lives .

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-19 0 "The e ther was to get the c odes in, mee ting t h e unemploymen t situatio n after some fash ion, cleaning up the work of the economic abuses, putting first things first, letting tlte minor maladjustments fall whe r e t hey might, and dealing wit h t h e long-te r m effects as t:ney b e carne evicien t. "The choice was b etween academic c onjecture and actio n and the decision was for action. Now according_ to plan, NRA steps to take stock o f its shortcomings, to deal with the complaints. T h e work of r efinement begins." See also HRA Release No. 2993, January 25, 1934; address of R ecovery Administrator • . ' (7) Johnson, The Blue Eagle fro m Eg g to Earth (Saturday Ev ening Post, January 1.9, 1935), 15. (8) Brookings Institutio n , op. cit., 89: "At the v ery outset o f the NRA some trepidation was felt as to industrial groups would embrace the voluntary scheme o ffer e d by the government, involv ing,' as vvas supposed, s ome initial sacrifice e n the part of the co-operating groups. r: (9) Brookings Institution, ibi
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-LnBrookin g s Institution, o). cit., 85 . Tl1e ideal unse;. fish sacrifice in J1rulno ting ein_)l oymen t soon gav e way "to t l e realitir'S of an out and out bar gain ing p r1cess in selfish inte rest s wer e against one (12) Johnson, op. cit. , (Januo.ry 26 , 1
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1 9 2 -"Deputy Fuller: I w ould lik e to have the v iew o f t::,.e industry u p on those subjects. Ar e they going to p ass t hem u p enti rely or are f our or t hree units inte rest e d in g etting r entals for machine s o r s ervice s that t:1ey are furnishing , if any, o r is t hat a compet itive situatio n that no one wants to give up? IIMr. K ern: May I ansvver t l1at? "Deputy Fuller: Yes. "il1r. Kern: W e are discussing realities now, Mr. Administrator. Our desire to obtain b enefits is alw a y s t e mper e d by a d e ' sire to main-tain a competitive position. It is d ifficult so metimes to wor k out a formula that will no't have repercussions fro m a co mpetitive point of view . 11.Deputy Fuller: 11Mr. Kern: It is obviously impossible to put in some 0f the c harge s on particular facilities when you have a competitive situation, on a basis which makes it to the interest o f the customer to only have t h e s ervices of one company. A formula has to be d evised, if ;>rou have a com p etitive situation, will not make it to the interest of the customer to use the service of only one company. Otherwise, one company or the o ther will be sacrifice d by the customer. No matter ho w since r e the i ndustry or the Board or the competitor is in 'trying to work out a formula, w e do not always see eye to eye on it as to w h a t the r esult will be. U nques tionably benefits can be obtained in the industry, if we can find a formula t hat will not hurt one company or the other fro m a competitive poin t of view and if the Commission will ap;>rove whate v e r is recom mended b y t h e C ode Authority. ".Deputy Fuller: Even if t h e Commissio n should not approve o f a merger, I sup pose it w ould permit you to abandon some duplicate f acilities, if yo u could work among y ourselve s a proper divisio n o f the income from those facilities. 11Mr. Kern: That can be a gree d upon no w without violatio n o f the Anti-Trust Laws, unde r N.R.A. Code Authority , w h e r e it could not have b een agreed upon b efore. Again, it c o mes down a co m p etitive basis. One pany may give you a different amount t han another company." (16 ) Institution, o p . cit., 131: " Had any d e pU.ty administrato r b ee n so unrealistic a s t o . _lave attempted to functio n in a judicial cap acity duri n g the c o d e making p r o cess--t h a t is, first impartiall y taking the t estim ony offe red by all c o n t ending p artie s an d advisers, and t hen, b y an uninte r rupe d study o f the r e c o r d , f ormulating a final d e cisi o n --he would have found h i m s e l f in an e m barrassing positio n at the e nd of the co d e p r o c ess. "In actual practice t ile deputy n e v e r evaluated the entire code i n t h e ligh t o f a comp r e h e n sive and d igest e d record. c o d e took from , provision b y provi. s i on, out of b a rgaining and Eve n in the attempt to s ecure a g r eemen t b y t his process, the d eputy f ound h i m s elf i n possessio n of a remar k a b l y flimsy s e t o f mat erials to ass i s t him in d e t e r m i n ing and d efending h i s own positio n o n proposals of far-reaching e conomic an d s ocial co n sequenc e 9838

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J I (17) Brookinr;s Institutlon, op. cit., 36, suggests that NRA was not an im .::>artial refe r e e , out ra ti1cr n active proponent of c ertain nds, and I tHat t : 1e barg ining i. arg ly a t of .the fact t l at such indefinite standards wor e st . ..:. t e d a .. to t i1o s,, ends. . But SGe, Nntiona1 Re covery Admini strati )11 Rul e a s e o . 131 in rcs.._Jec t t o tJ.lG l)O s i ti ' n of thu in the code m a1.cing r rocess: "In order to explain tho National Recovery Admini tra t::i c.n one might co : . 1 p it to. a t h r e;.;c.Jr n J red grune in w icl1 J. -=tbor, and the consur.1er are playe r s . Tho Naticnal Recovery Administration is not involved in any attt::mpt t o dir ect any ;?layer, rather it occupies the position of a refc r0e, insuring the cstabli shm e:n.t of p ro:9er rule r.f' :play, and to see t l: a t no payer achievt:s an unfair advantage." (18) Presidin g Of icers chd not feel thf! nee d for a r ecord h0\7ever, See Eearint; on Tel e(; raph C omrmmi cations Industry, February 6, 1935. Pages 10 to 105 indicat e . t}1e attitude o f the A dministration toward codes and code p r ovisions: Fuller: I do not thin'k the fair trade p ractice s are anything thc..t we should c onsider :i1ere . TJ1at is a matte r f o r the industry to a gree upon, that .is, assuminc-t l1at t ! .. ey are legal, Mr. McConnell, " Mr. M c .. :;onnell: All I w n t to l'::now is t o 03 sure that I know exacting what t h e y t o b o snr e t lat e r on, we try to enforce ti1em, we won t be about d i fferent t hings, b ecause thC'..t is the trouble . look all r ig2l t a t the ti::ne e c ode is ap_: ' r v v ed, and t :1c n s omebody gets mad at ano t:1er fellow ancl : . 1e c o m e s r10\'Jn and. wants us to enforce them, ancl we don't agree e n wi.1at they ;nean . " Mr. White : You don't t:utt could b e pos !?ible in tl1is industry, d o you? " Mr. McConnell: Yes , I do. 11 r. Kern: I thhik we ask you to give a thorough considerati:: m t o the fair trade p r actices, -be c ause tha t is the only wa y tha t we can do this t hing ('1. t the p resent time and we e link th;:;. t b y enforcem .. nt of those industry will b e able to do what the A dmtnistration is asking in the matter o f wages and hours. "Divisio n Administratio n Peebles: Th a t is t:1e reason tha t we wanted inter:p_ e ted pro::!e-rly . II (19) Ibid. (20) and Wall CJay Tile llanufacturing Industry Code, No. 92, Codes o f Fair II, 445: 11 Sectio n C -No :r1 mbe r of t :1e Industry si.1alJ. sell second-grade tile in an amount in exces.:; o f t hirty-five percent of the total square footage of glazed tile sold by :1im, n o r in excess of .fifteen percent of the t otal square o f 1-mglaz e d tile sold by him, o r such other reasonable percentage as m u y hereafte r b e decided U)on by a maj o r ity o f t h e Industry , and a:9prov e d by the Arlministr.ator, .from time t o time; provided, however, t hat the Administra t o r on petitio n and aft e r such : 1 earing as he m a y p r escribe may 9838

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-194mo9-ify . t h e and )rmvideo . further any member 0f the Code may parti ci:ya t e in tb.e sions 0f Section D inafter: 'set f f )rtl1.. Th e o f t his Secti.:.n C n o t apply to unglaze d quarry tile. 11 The test :.;r 0vided i s majorit y v ote not a tes t by tl1e Administra for • . (21) !nE?titution, o p . cit., 116-117, indicates the great pressure brought not only upon NRA officials, but other persons in the g o v e :rn ment,. to secure desired cod.e provisions. (22) Ibid., 119-129 discusses the Advisory Boards. It is that the Conslirnert s :Soard did not hav e the :pressure behirtd it t hat the other Boards had. The method, it emj_Jloyed, was to colle c . t hasic economic data, then analyze proposals and evaluate " in terms of t h e general public intsrest.11 The opinion is expressed t hat the method ill-adapted to t:ae code -making :pro c ess . . . (23) Jobnson, op. cit. (February 9, 1935), 81 • . ,; t! "It is true that business descended on NRA faster t han w e could ru man the organization to handle it. It is true tllat I could not g e t space to house the people I had, and that mad congestion. It is true that' many people carne to Washington with r eady-made Code p r o vi si 0ns ? 1 written in their own interest and expected to rush out with an }RA signature on the dotted line without waiting for other follow to be heard from. These thing s made for d e lay, but it should not have been otherwise." (24) America's R ecovery Program, o ) . cit. A. Heath Ontha.nk (As st. to the Executive NRA) said, "Haste at this t ime will pc obably mean waste at a later date. 11 (25) This is formation is commonly thought to be true in NRA, although it is not capable of documentary p r oof. Every statement has been made only after careful consultati0 n with persons in a position to know t h e facts. (26) Oral Argum ent o f Hon. Donald R. Richberg on Behalf of tl1e United St.a t e s in the case of A. 1. A. ter Corporatio n v. U. S. , Friday May 3, 1935, Mr. Richberg made the follovn n g statement indicating the limita tio n o f Congress and the Courts despite fact that the Recovery Administratio n in many instances o perated as if ther e was no such limitation placed upon it: "Congress and the courts canno t know where to draw the line until ti.1ey can survey a com prehensive record of the actual coperati0ns of each trade and the character o f business transact e d in diffe r ent parts of tlle country.11 ( 27) Brookings Institution, op. cit., 96 , suggests extreme confusion existed in tl1e code-making ) r ocess. 9838

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l9t( 28 ) J o •. n on, Of?. (Februa r y ... , H1: 'S \!en:: st_ct .'.d. so t u t t a t t: wert.: explosions. :3;vt_;n two-fd. Ji 1 l • 1 vn one i 1a .p •uared lor t .vo duy in n :imf f . T11e Dudl "Y C a t 8)i o te was njn"'-t0n t .. 1s JVC.cwo 11:. i .:ost astonisl1lnt.; n l , A l v l.n B ro.m :::mc o II von t -cl onna on 1ne11 anc l I .me l t o s Jnd. two of t . te youn ,or away t o l_;r e v vn t ')} y and n !rvo u s collapse. C n c m:1n clr o 1 J8d d,•.cl i n t.t\j coal ne o ti-::ttic n s . Earl col l a-pse d inFt garment .l.Jrt r i n g . S o v,na )f my p rincipal assi s t ants had t o leav e b o c a u::;e the s i 1 n .. 11 y CtJUld n o t s t n P-wsica l strnin. 11 ( ) Cfi i c ' anual , (T .,e follonin g quo tation in ica tes t :1e :1uriy ..,Jr e v.:;.ile d in 1 . R.A. w : er • b y a d v iser s exp8cted to : nal-e r ecom., ende:1. ticn d cspi t e t l 1e fact t 1la t t :ue y :0.1ad n o informatio n:) (?) T::•.e designated ad.v r s w i l l s u 0mi t t _ .. eir p r eliminary r e :'}crts to t:!e VJi f .,in 7::?. . 1ou r s aft,.r r e c G i p t o f _;rc)os e d c ode and lette r 0 f tra nsr.1i ttr l .11 (30) S;e CoLle :rte.v . sion , Liemorc.ndum :ro. l, Ev olub.o n c.f Trade Practice i,. C . inclu1l:r.n;; all account by :2::dwin C. Georg e . ( 31) lAanua l , 11 CoCl.e ! 1 1aJd. n g R n(.L .ArJe n dme n t I I I-1000 Sub stan ti ve Guide s II-1002 ( 3 ) Lloes n o t ::1e a n e vr;r y c e d e in ) T'.;cess n o t a ) prove d a t t h e time of o f a g ener a l 1_)0 l icy must conf orm-i n sence ) f 1ncJ.ucU.nt; the ty-: ; e 0 f 1 r o v i sLn favored o'y :)ol icy. Under cer tain circumstances, i t mi g h t b e manifestly unfair t o s u bstitution of a new clause a f t e r l eng.thy n--gotiations l1.ave fina lly r e sulted in assent by the industry t t J a final for m of tlle c o d e . It would be equally U..Ylfair t o 1.1en1oers o f an i:1dustry t o a :) ) r o v e a )rovl s i o n and tJ.1us c ause tl1em t o a djus t tJ.1e i r ::.)r actices t o conform ther eto, whe n t l 1 e :O_)r o visi o n is so framed as t o r equire subsoq u ent c l o r eliminati0 n." The adr ninistra tion o f Adminis trative O rder "'J o . X-36 suggest s L1e h astiness without d u e con siderati : : m of facts because of t h e w holesal e e x e ml)tio n s w : lich w ere mad13 f r o ,n t l1e provi.sions o f this Order. (32) dustry and 30 , 1934. Transcri:._J t of H e a r ing The Traf:Lic Contro l Signs Be Sig n als InTh e Ad.verti stng r.'etal & Display rAanu f a c turing Indus try IAarch 11De::_m t y Brady: If is n o t hing e l s e to co1ne before this hearing, I am going t o ask t l 1e two c o 1 n
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• H36 -t •her::-.u:-or. I. c; .L-' . . 10'•50 o ' ' c 1,...,r'n t'.1o . . , ... ,rrs • v \J-.. • ,_ • t .... ""'w subje c t + o t'1"e c .1_1 .... ' " t ) " v .... o r ... 1e -"""''1lnls"Lr. or ::.:, t 10: L_) :-. • n . ! . !c:J'-':1-r l.;-.ncl, Judici--.1 C o!:trol "Jf 1':cC:• c tho L1 t E: r st.'.'.; ( Cor . l i o :Cl' l (?:.-..-"1:-T-r::.. -_;;:n 'CE; rs 39: ---113 e (the burc:::.ucr" . t ) best : r :v .'.t is. to be ".LC. the coi1v e n ie::t 'Jf :.'.o:.;lC it' ; he is c::JOTt, :.: cci".l e:-. :: s of e -.t h i s Ylllei.1 :1rin.cip 1e.s Oi 1.:-. ..-: -.::.e L. }').is w-::"::f, he is to be im}Y'.tiont of thon ner e obscructi'1::.so11 ::..nrc l':_::l9.L.. J: t , C ; o -, Yo r :: , 1 C? 31) , 59 • Sec l lso Brook ings cit., Coc:.o str1.tcture 1 just c;revr ' r:'.tl:or t h :'.l'l 2).';rt of :"'li._ .. :;: , : r (35) ;.!O. 1 .:1 16 ' 1 8 ,.. . . ) L).".J 50 ::<;.;1 *3<: 60 ,Jo.n. 4 , J c , n . 12 , . :3 ' ' . 1'. ['..r • 31, Apr. 16,,Y il f , .. \T 1lc •rJ ')t . ' -" ' Ju:;,1o 2 ' Ju:nc .. n , c .,.ul y ...,, ! :.) ' Ju1J July Ap1 ' • ":' 1934 193 1934 1934. 1 93-1 1934 1934 }Or';'I..J True P.EFn'c :,_ o:r... Stc.:..'.rl...:-. rc,_ for Uniform Cost Accounting. Ef: cc t o f ColLe Provisions on Co:.1tr c .. c ts. Coc:es Lc s i s1..., tine fer re-nrese:.nt;cl by tl1c Co&e t:: COl-_tr.ct s for Futv .. :ce Deliv:c'r;T in Ooen Price s.-steJ:'<>. U 0 ti Cv .::,ncl Abuse o f Pormrs of CocLe Autho:ci t y .

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7 '") , -,_ ,) ;oticc. ( ... ,. ) I"bi r l . ' i t , c" , ; * ( N 'J I (08) Src Of . ic l':mor'"'l'...''1Y. !io . ;..328, Juno 7 , l'J34. ('"8::.. ) . '1 i : tc c..sL.,;_.r; .1:..' t1Cl'"ll1.1l d0cu• ,_.1t Chi n is Sc:cl"t<.; :1t 164, S.os i 0 n , Let !.;or fro m tho Rc-c 0"10IY A•:tr. .lj.st1"tor erltitlc , 11EJT lOj"t?'' )I t l.., lT"""tionr, l Roc o ve:: y • • u (39) 110;:1o :Jf t h-. 1 ' l T :o.blc :s ere fo:r : t"lG on by tno c 0 d e c'e lU"' .'''!::' '.;h:.t o:;: . i s co'"c.;_i:::.:; coq1etcr!.'c to c:-1.::.ry o n the ex:1.cti:::..:: no;: : : of c 0"'.o .. ct, J t i-.ti.)ns. r h c YRA :r .. s to c c Jnmr>.:1 t ti1 e scr.ri ccs C..f t ;.).!isho ci. ::e; m t '"'.ti. in their fic lC.s , V19r c t ::'.1'.\.' L l;,: c : J :u l(.) of r c7io::in::; L1 t e r m s of t ho b1 o.L r t.',1: r fran o i n t o f t.I1e . . . .... n"rT01' / 8,... o f '"'-,.., "'•'011" lr rcoe' t i c , J. . . J \,;;1 • ' _..., '_, l j_ ' iJ f::>-"':1-'. 0 • , ' .: v .L ,), ,) c
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-198Authority , :-:',S v1e l :.s for the Pr',j_)er Pulp Associ " ,tion. The y very directly in the of the CoC..e Authority through .1r. Vlhi tney <:>,i.1l Mr. P n r Le r • . Hr. Po,rl.:er, h imself, i s .ma n::>,gL1g directo r of t h e Boo"k P:'-:per ."cmu f ,...,_cture r s 1 o,n d . represent s the Boo}: Division -one of t h o most i m}JOrtf'.nt di visions L1 :-,ll e..Wn.ini s trD,ti ve r e lC',tions. He evi dently succeeded George H. M ec:,d , who w a s formerly m".naging c.irector of t his group b efore b e c ame of the I no. us tri2.l Advisory Bon.rcl. Mr. M ec-el is still vice-chairm::m of the P n:per Indus Authority •11 No in the f orm of n n Administrative or Office Order h ;. s been found which co7er s this sub j ect. ( 4 0 ) R. D. Pa6.c.:ock, Cotton Gc:1rment M , " ,nuf : .cturLv:; I :nrlustry ; We1rd W . P aper Industry; Til!Ik' \!1 B. C < ".nt r ell, Ice W . B. l,\'7son, Cotton Textile Institute; H. 0. King, Industry; W . 1. Fin::;er , Rub e r Association; Mo.x l'Icyer, Millinery IAdustry ; Emil Kekich, Institute; H. B. Li!1.dso.y, Abr8.sice GrL1 '.7heel; E. G. Montgomery, CEtn:1ers Indus try ; John ME', thevvs, Jr., Ameri c:.n Glassware Indus try; A . B . Cotton G a rment; Wo..lter Mitchell, Furniture Manuf;:',Cturers; Reed k,ne, Motor Vehicle Trsd.e. See U. S. v. U. S. 279(1904). ( 4 1 ) J ohnson, Ol'• cit., (Feb• 9 , 1935), 83; 110f course the ch<\rge t h::>.t we sold out to big busiYless. or u:!lduly fn.vored it is the p r ecise reverse of the c hc..rge of bullcLozing it, a:1d is equc.LL y untrue. There is no doubt thz. t some deputies and e..ssisto.nts could neve r r e concile themselves t o the la1)or provisions af the l<'..w 0-nd were not c wrying them out in the spirit t h0 . t nnimated them --not conscious ly, but bEJc ause of long ts o f thoug!1 t i n ::1.. contrnry C:.irEJction. Whenever I f ow1d tho.t .this was true, I l e t such :nen r esign. 11 BrookinGs Institution , Oj). cit., 136-137: "On e f::..ct was of i m oort:>.j_1CG. Most deputies 'HeTe C:.r. ",Vffi from t h e o f business occupo.tions. By virtue o f tTo.ining .:>,nd incli n<,tion they were ther r fore wi t h the busiae s s point of view. This fc:>.ct undol...ibt ed.l y colorecl their views of w h: . t the p r o:p8r content of ''code vm.s t\n d o.ffected the directio n in which their influence W[',s exerted durL;,g code :ncgotiatim1s. The wei.:;hting o f sucl1. bi;:' .. s ['. S deputi8 s 1 1" .0.. is, hov1ever , less to be ch<'..r god D.g<: tins t them tl1Li..n the higher o f of the NRA. The .)Jnlw1t of definitive e:; e gire n them slight. They weT e to oxc .ct a s much <.s possi ole in the of r e -empl oyment; were V'i.gU:.EJl y c.g<-:>.inst pri . c e fixing ; were l e f t to assume th.:. t f'.n cn.nt grou:;_) b1ew rnor o n.bout t h e for its probl ems th:m Oi.1G else; ;:'.nd. v ve: •:a instructed i n n.n y c a s e t o go t c o des comple ted. 1111he one rt.:f',l guide vrhich deputies • : r['I. S \-.rhc. t \7P. s [' lready in o.p J!I'ovect • . The S['.me guid8 w a s 02,1en to "',p:>lic2.nt groups. Since in the 8o.rlies t code s tho }l.RA h:>.d gone f:•.r in grc.nti n g collectives :poy;ers o v e r prices t:.ndj')roduction, prec ondent granted wide scope for concessions 9838

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-1 of pon 1 .11 . .,.,. )'_ , . ( " ) --r '1.'..11 r; t :l .... Prcsi,_cnt Roos'vel t t Feeler .ti )ll :)f :7ecl l Er.11 , St.-•tJ . .. ! , l ' .-1 • .A ,;ritt.c n , •f the I,,_ti:nql lJ;'c s is quot(>C. 'ille "rtic1e rc / .. s in J)"'..rt : 11I'efclc.dnc; L1, .:::e11:"'ti n 'Jf tl1e Dc"'..1 m<'..c:lLlery fror. the !"'erit r. -s:.2.1 , -: .. O"' .. t i:1 elil;iblc reGisters Scnvicc Co"'t i s ior1 VJere :r1o..;.12-;-{o".rs old. Lx::unin :'.tions :1-."'..d not occi: e2.c. for COi.!sider.:'l.1.)2. e .)criocl fo1 m:.Ey G f the rec;istcrs ,.,11:. cmor6enc? ".f;Enci c s •o1 1 d :1 .re to dr"'..w persou.:e 1 , h .cl they b c:1 lc\ ... r C j _vil .Ser7icc. " "t:uncreC.s o f rot •er. ons ':vho lost thei r pas it i t:w O!l "Q.d ee:c1 ; i .rc il .o t y to qu--.lify, 1 1 eJq_')l . ir:ocl . v:'.s duo, 1 e s-. ir', to red 1 c ec. Civil Sc:rvioc 11T: 1e ric:. s not L: " T>ositi.on to su;,•Y' 1 Y the perso11::el n ::yuirecL ti1e -.c; e:'i c.Gs . I t vr:.s obvious, o f course, these --.,6i1Ci e s , J..I the y to Do effec tive , vJOu1d. :'1".ve to begin Ol)Cl"c .tiJ:lS :'..t ':ll'J.C O •11 ( 1_1. _>) 3ro L1s t i tut i op. cit . , lT. 27. ( 46) o: 1 PrOJiOsecl .A:.:o:,:/ t o chc Ce 1nel: t L1 c1.ustry Code , h.:•:Eovc( l-0 • 1'::!5, o: 7ol. III), 11, 1934. Jivisio::. L t.ITr ,'. y : 11Ym.1 r-.ised 1. q_uest.:..on vrhich I thiri!..:: sho1.1.lc1. b.: ::.:,1c ''G. cC::. :1ore :rhile the cucst:'.Oi1 is cle2.. r ir: the mii1ds of those o f v1ho Yoc . h .vc pcrso:c1 r. l Cl.ssur:mce thr. t wiJ.l to CGJ710 !lt code, so fr-.r '' . s my ty extends, t'1--..t c:oes 1:ot :r, .re co:.:plote of the of the industry Yiho be011 uelt.-f;':'.tec-:_ b:r tle inc-;_-,;:_stry to the code . 11 The p ropos2.1s t :c•Jfe:. t o o.s '!JeC:! l m l.cle by groups i:1 the Ac'.mL1istr" .tion :-.: e -Jresent cc. fo discussion just ::..s those Vlhich the of c:coup' '.l !.G. L. no ro.y clo they tho sc:t:lct .. JT: of the .Ad.mL1istrc:.tor ot:1Gl ' t-:12:.1 t .lr t :1e n.;1d tk'l.s seen fit to ci ve :'?o::.rC:.s. advisers, co1 siC.or 'j l_c to tl.1e io:1s 'Jf the their title rrou1c o:.1e to beli:-v e , no yJ.y . a T.:.'l:e t ' 2se in o.n y other I, Sect1.on lO( b ) . ( 48 ) I:1fr:->, I X ,"lltl . I n :"'. . :em o r'l.:' lC.'.un, C.2tcd :Uec ombcr 1 5 , 19'33 to the AC::.risor:-13or,-f:..oL1 2.11 re H eo.ring of the S•_:>rD.y P aintii1g'. FinishL'lc; iiC:.!lull.cturi:lg Ind.ustry a n .J.ccute ex--unp1e of s fes lL1[" is i llus pre siC Ll[; of:ice r showed extre e c..:1;.o::-.:t:ce t <'fvi se1 ' s sU("ges t.:. o " s . 5e interrupted h i m 11 with 9 838

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::;Gv-squ o lchL1 g but not a n g r y quest io:as11, a11 d . fin ;.lly 2 . s !cerl him t o ::_Jut 1 1furt ' _ e r S U G G e s t i ons---in -.. t o b e sub . .1itteC:. t o h i m t h e l 1e-.ri:r>..g." the off i c e r t o l d the. adv i s o r th.1.t his ::-.ctions mre 11embo.rrasL1C t o h i m ('"1.:t1.d t h e (49) J ol.mson, op . cit., (J"'.:i1U"'.ry 1 9 , 1?.05) 7 4 ; i n0.ustr io.l 7 h o 1-:nows r . l l o:o o u t t h e pri c e 2.nC. inventory si tu:--.t i o n i n h i s indu s tryi s [:;oii: c t o L 1 t h e f::>.ct o f an uns u r} J lus .:-.nd. 2 . d.O\'i!1.Wc.r d pric e tre nd. I t not ::1ece ss"...rily r equire 8.n y quo t::. system t o che of c o:s.1trol od yro duction. A l l t h .. i s :weC:.eci. i n i . t r y is full, :'..Ccur:-t e , co.:-rpl e t e .J.n0.. h onest info r m::-.tion o:c1 prices ::"(:. i11.'rentorie s." This d oes not c o ;J.sicler hUl 1l,;e r volUJ."!le G. rove m : n y i nd.ustri-:'. 1 concerns to k'1m'ringl y (50) Bro":lk i n g s Instituti )' r:, cit., 2 73. ( 51) i.Ie mor-:-.ndUI! l t o Cons-t.J.IJers ' A dvisor y :So_<.rC::_ W . 1. Ch:-. n dler June 3 , 1935. "Subject: Some incic l e n t s 3.eflecti:n g t h e Attitud e o f Dep u t ies O t h e r Of fici...:..l s C01i.sur. 1 e r P robl e m s C o, e r s 1 A d.visory Bo.•.:rC. 2 rpre s er:t:.t i r es. " W hen EL. i s d e ! Jil.ty h.::..n dlil':g :?.eL . i l S o J.i d :?u e l :::. s i m iL..:.r c onplJ.c in rega r d to t h a t Cot tem p t o c orcmmnic -.te v v i t h the CoO..e Authori t.,r, b u t h e. ( r e c e i 7 ec_ n o rGlJl ies. ?::o ,.. ;-1o.n to c::-.11 o n t h o of tlc s ci ti '1 The of'.r c "' • v e r ' ' -_,,ictu:e o f the ou_ " -,', s o ,, .. 01. . e r s ;'', " oy . " tions o f t h e C ocle . The C o.::.".e A uthority i1_....c1. t h e . .-_ e t h r e e t i mes, hol. t lle : o rovi sion r e quirL:.g , . 2 0 0 perc ent 0::1 , 1 1 thei r product s , in gene r:.:.l vrer e f ;ett ing _.long spl endicll ' • I believe t h-.t sui t : .. b l c :-._ctio n by t h e r:.s under ' 7 hen tne S u y r eme C o u r t d e c isio n d ovm.11 S e e c,lso l e tter b y i'i.:J.l ter Deputy A c1mi n i s t r;-.tor, to the IV!a y o a : 1o.ize Industry. 11 r.Ir . W . F . 1. Tutt l e , ]' t, July 6 , 1934 C ode Author i t ; y for the S 8 I n dus try 114 E u s t 3Jd Street Nev F . Y. 9838

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111''1.1.<-_-\ i.l t 1 0 i t • I : • \ : . ' \"' '7 , . 111L1 )J: rl.• 1 c ;i1;' • " .( ---t,.,., t • .:.: r!rc; r,c lGfUled fo: J,1l-6t:1 n s ::> c 1. r ':)' _ unti.1. J-oJ.;r 10tl:.'"' >e • L 1{'; i ... fo:c t}.c • l1!. >8S r c i v i g uvid_C'LC• vL:q 'v0 :,. rT: i "'.t t .... J.ow..,. t bll C! t f o:c s o f the isC' ;. .. ceo C.."cc '.Jit1• tLo of the Code. I m fl:.p . -vO i1oto fr m Rclc:-s0 # 7 t : 1 t th0 Industr.r f'l'. r. t s tcpn to co:-c t the vrice s i h .;. t :..on i tsc lf, t h . n .i.)ut the burC:.en o tlis AdmL1i. t r t : on to t c Y•)UT Imtustry. 11qh il_ it i. the '=''Jlic:' of the . t 1.on""l Recovery Ac"':.mListr . tion t J i:1vo':c : ' \1 lie J1.G :..,ov:..::.:i'):."'i j.11' cli.!i.t LOn of ;c -:u.c:1 t'.1c 10l:'.bers of .:.n y 1..., tic1.ll 1 ,_ : ;,_._ b? :.. :,:.-:to follo'iT . ucti 1e ' o2.i c; J.r. 8 .lf -pr•;s ' ' " I t.i.0: 1 fo: t:l[ t 1 ;,c .:-c'. Vll'lol e 1 nhich cloes rcou.i.Tc : m )1. tilf co-l:.:cn c n t . I f : 'o u c 1-: f-...rrnish us '.7i :.. ---o :. l1l J t the .. , l i s t s renov o t'l1e itu. t.;.')J". ir: .. i s'J I11(uf:try , .,,e will b e c l .cl t o th;;; lc I hope th--t I , r . "UC'1 ,.,O.•'U f'I'"tl ' ' 0 1 l)rOl".+-lH ll ... 4cJ --t '.: \:_:; • • J -.. .:: • .l..L. \.J-fJ • V u r : r t -ru l y :r-..1 tcr W hite .Ad JJini s t r -to: • 11 9838

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2 02-NOTE S TO VII (l) Su pra, I II. (2) Supra, n, '7 Uo ( 3) Supra, IV, 2. (4) Title I, Section 3(b). (5) Approved Code i'Jo. 84, Fabrica t e d Hetc:. l s Products M f g . t' etal Coating Ind., Codes of F air Competition, II, 3Z7. (6) Approved Code No. 287, Graphic Arts Industry, Codes of Fair Competition, VII, 1. (7) See J. r.r:. Hadley's Report on tl1 e Graphic Arts Industries, April 3, 1935, to the Consumers 1 Advisory Boe..rd. (8) See transcrip t of he. ? ,ring for the AnimEtl Soft Fair Industry, Dec. 7, 1933 (Approved Code No. 253, Codes of Fair Competition, VI, 97). The industry employed forty-five men a t its Its yearly business was from $200,000 to $300,000 gross. (9) Approved Code No. 9, Lumber t Timber Products Ind., Code of Fair Competition, I, 95. (10) Approved Code No. 116, Mop Stick Ind., Cod e s of F air Competi tion, II, 57. See also the Paper Disc Milk Bottle Cap Code, ap:proved Code No. 246, Codes of Fair Competition, VI, 16; a nd the Sanitary .1ilk Bottle Closure Code, Approved Code No. 371, Codes of Fair VIII, 581. (11) Approved Code No. 25, Oil Burne r Industry, Codes of Fair Corn :.eti tion, I, 339. Brookings Institution, The Nationa l :rtecovery Adminis _An Analysis and an Anuraisal (1935). (12) HeD.ring on Traffic Control Signs Sig n als Industry, Vol. 1, Mar. 30, 1934: 41194 ,(b) and 94(a) have to do with the suo plemental codes for traffic control signs and signals industry and the advertising meta l signs and display m enufacturing which the record shows were originally offered under t h e code o f fair p ractices for the f abricated metals industry and origin 2lly occurred on the preliminary set-up list of the t ecl meta l industry v'.rhich was offered a t the tim e the code was offered to the administretion. In t h e consideration of these t w o there is nothing in to l2bor unde r the a greement reached a t the time the code of f air p r actices for the f abric> ted metal yroduct s manufacturing and finishing industry contained i n supplement2.l codes offered, appearing on the list w o u l d make no chan&es in the provisions of t hc.t basic code, and these, 2 . s w e unders t and it from t h e records, were originally offerecl under t h a t code. In the trcnsfer of this code, it ap1:"'e a r s the t t hese tv;o s up'":llemen t e l codes were in t h e wrong c ategory in going under the m erl..:in: devices ind u stry , c:nd after discussion between t h e Administration and the t w o cod e com.-nittees, this hecring was called to consider removing them from the m arking devices 9838

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indus try c:>n d "'U t t hem metals inluc;try. } , , h e r s tiC,\' r:ome from the fabrico ed ( 14) rtestc-ur< n t Indust:r;; , No. .8....,, of F air Com1Jetition, Vi, 5 1 2 , Art. III , Sec. 1: "Tv; 'resLur n t ind.u:-:-tr;y' es used herein, shall mea n t:e business of o:per eting, directly o r indirectly or through any subdivision, a reste?urc-nt, a s hereino.fte r defined i n Sec. Bclcing Industr y , Code No. 445, Codes o f F air Com.:;et ition, Vol. XI, 7, Art. II, Sec. 1 -"Definitions : "The term 'taking Industry ' or 'Industr y ' s used her sin shall m e o n the manufacture, distribution includ ing trucking , and/or sale, in any manner whe?tsoever, of bakery ::_Jro ducts. S a i d term shall not include ( a ) hote l s , clubs , rest aurants and simila r p l aces where bakery products are manufactured exclusively for cons umption a t the p l ce of m anufacture, (b) wholesale or ertail groceries, provided the o wner or oper ator thereof does not m anufc;cture, directly or indirectly , through a n affiliate unit, or otherwise, any Dart of the bakery products offered for s ale therein. If r.Jholesale or retail . groceries do so man u f acture any pr t of the bakery products offered for sale therein, a s to t her.: sc:.ic: t G rm snall include only the m;:,nufacture, distribution incluu 'ing trucking , a nd/or s ale of the products manufactured bJr them . rr . (15) See Con sumers .h.dvisory :S. o crd Fil3s, :BPking_Industry, Code Summary, 11-12 . ( 16) to A. C. Cook from Con sumers .Ad vi Boa r d re Request of \fnolesale Inclustr; : for E xtension of Exemption from the Plumbing c m d Code: 11Tne wholesale plumbers prefer to sell. to p lumoers or plumbint.S contractors .. sale houses do business with the l atte r and also with r etail hardware stores. 3ec a1ls e of this and other C:.if:ference s in m ethods of doing business, the wholesale plumbers d esire price filing, the wholesalers do not. Why force the l atter to file prices? In addition to this, is the further consideration thu t price filing under distribution offers far greater problem s tha11uncler manufacturing codes, and .. trose distributin; codes with price filing provisions are having considerable difficulty. W e recommend exem ptio n f rom this provision.11 ( 17) Approved Cod.e 160, Fur Trappinf!: Con tractors, Codes of F air Competition, IV, 151. (18) See Title I, Section l and Section 7(a) (b) and (c), indica ting tha t l abor WRS to receive certain benefits from the codes. (19) John M . Keatin[;, l a t e r General Counsel of the Dress Cod e Authority , no w in the private p r actice of la-;v in New York City. (20 ) All the .stor,y tha t can be f ounc; . in ting e xists in the tran scripts of hearing. 9838

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2CA . (21) Consumers' Advisory Board memorandum to D. C. Pilkington re Pump Manufacturing Code, (Approved Code No. 37, Codes of Fair Corrrpeti tion, 1, 673), May 14, 1935. Tne industry tried to include manufacturerQ of dredge pumps, w ho had little relation to the industry. A t least t welve industries or subdivisions were affected b y the broad definition of the industry. (22) Field, The Effect Of' an UncC'.1stituti6nal Statute ( Minneapoiis, 1935) • (23) L ega l M emorandum, No. 16 from Jack Garrett Scott, re Conflict betw e e n Codes and Anti trust Decrees, l1.1arch 31, 1934. (24) Memorandum b y Eugene Culver to the Advisory Board, re Anti-Trust Decrees and June, 19 35 : 11i'Vhile these (some n amed) the oi.1ly codesin which the decree of injunction has been modified, it seems certain that of the 16 9 remaining cases-in which decree s have been entered thL t these defendants are now operating in violation of some cod .e. It is not likely tha t any industry or group of industries, sufficiently large to have been considered a monopolistic menace under the Anti-Trast laws, co uld have escaped codification under the NB.A.. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • The case of the United States vs. Tile Manufacturers Credit Association, et al. involving 13 corporate defendatns and 15 individua l ctefendants is illustrative. There has been no modification of the decree in this case which enjoins 23 specific acts, 12 of which are permitted, in fact required , b y the Floor and Wall Clay Tile Industry Code approved by the President on November 4, 1933. 11The following practices (copied from the decree) are enjoined. • • • • • • • • • • • 9838 (a) To adopt or use a uniform basic price list, or to fix and adopt list prices for their products; (b) To establish or m aintain uniform prices for. their products; *(c) To establish and maintain individual prices that are uni f orm for all/classes of purchasers or dealers and for all sales; I *(d) To establish or maintain rules or regul ations as to the ac ceptanca of orders at prices in effect prior to changes therein; (e) To establish or m aintain uniform extra for builtup l etters, for nurnber s or f o r beveled edges; *(f) T o establish or maintain uniform limitations on the proportiona t e amounts of the lower grade s of tile sold; C s ) To sell tiles f.o.b. f actory with freight equaliz:ed with other factories i n the United Stc:tes manufacturing the same class of tiles;

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(h) To c ompile <'Tid u t e froi'":ht r n t e b ooks for use in makin g :fr e i t *(i) To ... t blis' 1 o r mrti ! r m te1m s of s ale; (j) To estElbli ... h or moL1tn i n uni form o ncli tions on or for the acceptance o f orders; (k) To establish or main tain unif orm cha r ge s forbarre l s , half barrels or bo xes used for shipping tiles; to refuse to allow credit for olrl p ackages r eturned; to quot e price s with package char5e s includ e d , and to char g e :t'or p ackages whether used in shi pment or not; *(l) To establish or m aintain uniform conditions for the furnishing o f tiles for sample purposes; (m) To r efuse to combine l e s s t han carload shipments into carload invoiced to one of the purchasers; (n) To :tefuse to sell to an;r persons or corporations because of any unpaid account or accounts; *(o) To formulate and establish or to r etain in effect any requirements, circumstances, or conditions,nonconformity or noncompliance with which shall e xclude any customer or customers from securing credit.or shall impose any limitations or conditions whatsoever upon the credit granted; •• • # ' • *(p) To restrict s ales oi contrabtors in tile or to establish uniform requirements for classific ation a s dealers or contractors; (q_) To establish sys ter:1 of ooop e r stive purchasing of raw m<:-.t erials or supplies o r of cOOj_"Jer ati ve o wning of the sources of r a q m a t eria ls, elimina t e or tend to eliminate competitio n in tile purchasing o f s aid m aterials or sup plies; (r) To ado p t or to use a common tradem a r k ; (s) To pool orders or to enter joint bids; *(t) To prepare a..11d publish list or lists of d e alers or O . f certified dealers;" Those starred. were listec l lv1r. Culv e r as he..ving been allowed b.,r the Code. (25 ) Brooking s Institution, o p . cit., 78: (Reference i s made to overlapping jurisdiction resulting from the number of regul atory a G encies created by the pres ent administration.) 9838

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2 0 f)-11The jurisdiction of many of these agencies overlaps that of others in many important respects. Even if there is n o o utright overlapping of jurisdiction, the total covera ge is broad tha t ad o ption by o n e agency of a given policy or method may vitally affect the success of anothe r agenc:J• in carrying out previously adopted ::policies •11 As an example of this problem, the rel.ation between codes such a s lumb e r and timber products and the construction code with the activities o f t h e FHA i s given. (26) Mr. W. H. Rastall w ho is making a study on relationships with other government agencies furnished this information in a conv ersation , November 8, 1935. ( 2 7) National Labor Board, National Labor Relations Bo?Jd, and the Department of Labor. ( 28) Hearing on Te'legraphic Co!Thllunications Industry , Feb. 6, 1935. The question of jurisdiction was brought up at page 5 2 . 11 Mr. Vfui te: They (The Federal Communicc .tions Commission) had a hearing on free service here just a few weeks ago. "Deputy Administrator Fuller: They retained jurisdiction over that. "Mr. White: I think pretty generally they have jurisdiction over everything. I tha t is one of the difficulties." (29) M r • . C. H. O sthagon, Deputy Administrntor furnished this info.rmation in a conversation j'.Jovernbe r 8, 19 35. The relationsh i p , he stc t e r., was quite cordialo (30) Se e hearing, Electric Light and Power J an. 12-13, 1930, 10 a. rn., Hall of Nations, Washiniton Hotel, D. C. (31) Approved Code No. 199, Cork Industry , Codes o f Fair Competi tion, V, 45, Merchandising Plan, requiring tha t distributors filev a t h their prices on certain items; see also Amendment No. 2 to Approved Code No. 199, Cork Codes of Fair Competition, Vol. XX, 271, requiring that industry memb ers shall not sell to distributors unless they enter into the contract provided for i n the r1erchandising Plan; see also Approved Code No. 88, :i3usiness Furniture, StoraGe Equ i p ment and Filing Sup p l y , Code s of Fair Competition, Vol. II, 38 0 , Exhibi t C, Art. VI (f), which was once interpreted as requiring resale price mai n tenance. All uniform contracts, Approved Code No. 546, Pacific Coast Dried Fruit Industry , Codes of Fair Competition , Vol. 39; also Approved Code No. 503, Pretzel Industry , Codes of Fair Competition, Vol. XV, 87. ( 32 ) Ibid. ( 33 ) Memorandum b J Blackwell S mith to the L ee;a l Staff, May 24, 193 4 , re Codes Le gislating for Groups not requested Applicants. 9838

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:2C7-" Many of the , ro'blc'ms o! in 'ustri .:s ... 8 lt c to pr D.cticcs of individual.., outside of the j n(iu t J ;, i suci1 < ... s mnlr'lructicc-:; of jo'ubcrs injuring a producin_;; iach: . ...;L-;,r. r..:: i.; t.: ... v .t.)rGf;Jure ... o r elimination of such prRctices even. thL''r ui.::;c <'ut:i ' e o.C the ind.ustry for v1hich the code is ::J.d.opt e . :e nr-: ['S .. Le0 to o this ometiues b: r prohibiting any transactions :een me: be s o , t ' 1 e co clifiecl and members of some group w ho in t;l1e practices of. Sometimes lso the ap plicants seek t c provide for a required a g reement to b e entered into b y the member of the othe r croup in transactions v i th members of the codified ind.ustry. 11 Section 3 ( 0 ) sets up the procedure for codifying a.. 'trade, industry or subdivision thereof' o n a p plicntion of a trade or industrial association or group for such trade or industry or subdivision thereof. Such associa. tions or groups must te truly representati e of sucl 1 trades or industries or subdivisions. When a code is approved its provisions become the stand art.s for the trad.e or industr:r or subdivision. 11The whol e conception is of volunta:('y codification of a particular trade or industr y or subd. i vision thereo f on the opplic'ltion of an association or group tr,Il r reprosentati V G of it. It i s probc-:ole tha t purported codificAtioi1 of one group on applic-tion o f anothe r group under Section 3 (a) is 1il tra vires. In an:r event it i s contrary to the principles underlyin-; the conceptio n of the Act.11 (34) He:-tring for Approveci Code No. 59, Ha rl-:inb Devices Industry Proposed Arnend.meat to Code of Fair Competition, J Dnuar:,r 30, 1935, (Codes of Fair Competition, II, 13) 84 2nd 86. 11Mr. Mr. Aclministrator, this Code for the TrD.ffic Control Signs and Signals Industry, this proposed Cod e , is one of the Codes tha t has been bruited about for man y months in cm effort to secure approvaJ:, and. it he.s been po..ssed throug h the .:teview Division. The Code as a Code is acceptable to the Ad.rninistr tion and is now for approval in its final form. Hovifever, t'1e Review Division h ave questioned the representative of the sponsoring croup and that that m atter be firmly established before Administrative approval will be given •••••. 11A que tionnaire wa s sent t o the lmown members of this industry, replies received from a large majo:ri t2r, and. it clearl:v indic tes tha t the proponents who originally claimed to represent of the industry in truth onl;y represent 2 5 % now . So the t ables, as it were, are turned, and t h e non-association members are more representative of the industry tha n the association members. The association proposing the Code has been properly notified tha t their approval is not sufficient to obtain Administrative approval of the Code •11 (35) See the transcript of hearing, Card Appendix of the Graphic Arts Code, January 10, 1934, 36 et seq. 1rhere appears an indication that U. S. Playing Card Co. cl.esired n o control in the industry and held back in approving the administrative structure for tha t reason. It wa s successful in securing its wisheE. 9838

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2 C 8 In connection with the problem o f assent it m i &ht -oe ar6Ued tha t an assenter would be deny the representative character of the proponents. Answ ers of dures s and secret action and intent mi1,5ht be made. . 9838

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1 V.rE S TC C HAPTER VII I ( 1) The ProcP. d r1 1 h eme nd thf> Fe.1 ring s . (Brookings Institution 1934), 2 1 9 : ".An advantage possessed by administr1.tive tribunals, which, if prop erly sefeguarded , is also an advantage to the public, i s the r e l ative simplicity and flexibility of their methods, -procedures, rules of evidence, .and o f m e ] .dng: decisions. In i1 . n r c; snch tribuna l s are ":iven n o 'lE"T t J ost cbl..ish their 0 ' . ' :1 uro . . PClnro, t o crPa t e their O''rn of evi dence, anc : to c ontrol t o a 1n.r;' , rnrer 1810 ' " S hiJ'"T to nrocee d . i th c: ,-,i thou t examini::.v ; -'"the rulE's of the autho rit:; 1,.-,it"h r-hich he i s c,_ee.lin g . vrhen he c1.oes s o , he J11BV f'incl the rule s so vague and indeffni t e that he : harc'l11• !-:r..o-s .:i. th e .nv de1q;rP.e o f :rha.t is required. . Al severa l cener a l treatises been v1ri tten Oi1 the subject of federo.l and ura c .tice, a s nell as man, ; special treatises dealin6 with the of n articula r a&-!1inistrative adjud icating bodies and administrative tribuna l s , l a v ryer s vrell a s litigant s a r e often at a l oss; the :orop e r s teps to take . o f evi d_ence rang e all the way f ron t h o s e almost as strict as the rules in o r dine . r y judicia l c ourts t o n ractically no rules, e x cept, :9e:.'ha:S , t h ose o f ordinary common sense. I n s ome ad.r.inistrative tri bunals, the he2.ring s are very formal. In other s , they scarcel v more formal tha11 c onversations. Info r mality is generally m o s t p ronounce c in the case of n ixed e .u thorities where the quasi-judicial function is as yet hard ly Yet even b e f ore s ome o f the authorities that are acting as controllinG e .gencies over adm i n i strative action, there i s ver y little f o rmality-m1d the rules o f evidence are almos t negli.gib l e . 11 It should b e pointed out that lll.les of evidence and p rocedur e freouent ly vary rrith the jurisdiction, and. that in priva t e law courts, the attorney 9 838

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-.Gl ) enco1mters the same difficulty as these rules are so different and o f such c i ebe?.te.ble merit, ancl especially in the c ase o f adrn.i n i strati ve boclies where t:1e vary , have S })ec'ial reasons for differing. It would seem t h e authors' criticism, if mean t as such, is not particularly in poi :nt , althoug h it !night be desirable to have some simplification. (3) Van Vleck,-11Administrative in Enforcement of Q,uasi-C:::i minal L aw , 11 l George Vfashing toj}____Law _Review 1 8 ( 1932). The author sut;e::ests that only two references t o ad:ninistrative procedure f o r expulsion o f the Act are mad,e within the Act: (l) P roceedinE_:s begin b y the arrest o f the accused o n a vmrrant issued. by the Secretar, y . ( 2 ) Tile accused r.1ay have bail. The . Admi n i stration worked out its own rules of procedure. See 3ule 19, Rules of , January l , 1930, page 37. ( 4) :Blachly and Oatman, op. cit., 163 . The authors point out t.l_at statutes v a 1 7 as to established urocedure for administrative bodies. The statutes outline procedure for the Interstate Cormnerce Commission, but say little o r :nothing o f the Federal Trade Commissi on. O thers defini give pov1er t o administrative bodies to establish own rules. On this proposition, see Stephens, Administrative Tribunals and the Rules of Evidence, p . 8. (5) Comer, Legislative functions of National Administrative Authori t v ( H eY/ York 1927), 200 : 11In recent years many of the st8.tutes autho-rizing delegated legisla tion h a v e include d provisions to the effect tha-t a hearing must oe held before such legislation can legalli issue." e.g., .37 Stat. 315 Sees. D, n, 7, 8 (1912); 39 Stat. 728, .Sec. 23 (19ln); 41 Stat. 10!;3, Sec. 20 (1920); (2 Stat. 1435, Sec. 3 (1923). (n) Yam o .taya v. Fisher, 189 U. s. 8!; (19 0 3); Bratton v. Chandler, 2f10 U.S. 110 (19.82); State Board o f Health v. McCoy, 1 2 5 Ill. 289, 1 7 N. E. 70!; (1C88) ; v. Board of Works, 14 C. B . CT.S.) 180 (18n3); State v. Chittenden, 1 2 7 Wis. 4S8-107 N. W. 500 (190n); U . S. ex rel Roop_ .v. :Uou,:;;l ass, 19 D. C. 99 (1890). See also, h;cFarl and. , Judicial Control of the Federal Trade Commissio n and the Interstate Commerce Corll miss ion, (Harvard University Press, 1933). ( 7) i i n y e r s , A Hand Book o f N.R.A., 2ncl ed. (New York, 1934), 192: 110n June 27, 1933, at its firs t public hearing, the National Recov e r y Aci J ninistration announced that inasmuch a s the statute laid d own no requirements for any public hear"ing s upo n codes of fair competitio n o r any p r ocedural requirements, it would determine its own urocedure. It the n sta t ed. that s ponsors of codes would b e called u uon to present evi,o;o dencci on the v arious matte r s in Sec"tion 3 (a) resuecting which the President i s required t o 1nalce findings. It further s tated that persons offering objections to o r modifications of any code provision or additional code provisions mus t fil e a specific s t a t e men t in writing requesting s impl y the elimination or addition o f a s pecific p rovision, or a modification in lo.nt;;uage p roposed by the objector." This was quoted i n the Brief for A . 1 . A. Schechter Corporation in Schechter v. U. S., 52. 9838

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(B) See a l s o Inst.i t tion, Rf'covcry Adminis tration a n AnaL __ :.9n,r-,_ i _s'\ (1935 14: "Exce p t in the case of inve procedure requirements a.r e limited to t e specif' 1.tion o+' -public notice A.nd hearing . 11 (9) Title I, Section 4(b). (10) rJ.I.R . _., See 3(a). (11) Brief for A . L. A . Schechter _Cor:_:2_Q!ation, o n . cit., 49 50 : "There is nothing in t his sec+ion 3 (a.) or o ny"''here e lse in the Recovery _ ct wtli c h provides for not ice to per sons in t he industry, particula .rly those not members of the applicant tra d e or industria l association, and no provision whatsoever i s e xpressly made for a hea.ring to determine the provisions in t h e proposed code are properly c o .nt8.ined therein. N o evidence is required to be t aken and no findin g s of fA.ct are required to be mRde by t he President except those 1 .1!fe have mentioned above, which have no relation a t all to the fairness or unfairness of most of the prB.ctices prohibited by the Live Poultry Code. Thus, in this respect the President is free to act in a "QUrely c.rbi trary manner. A trad e o ractice is denominated unfair simply by reA.son o f the the prep ondernnt majority in the industry has ordained it to be such, and this without a ny _ required notice to other members of the industry, without any reauired hearing, without any requirement for evidence and without any requirement for findings of fact or judicial review. Thus, it is p l ain that tne code may be formula ted in a purely arbitra r y qnd capricious for it mAkes no difference that the National Recovery Administration may have customarily held informal public hearings to yolitely listen to the compl aints of 'persons en in other steps of the economic process'. When presented for Etpprov al to the President his action in approving, rejecting_or modifying the same may be utterly arbitrary because he need not say why he ( 12) Supra , V. (13) Brief for A. 1. A. Schechter Cor uoration, op. cit., 51. (14 ) 38 Stat. 717. (15) Brief for A. L. A. Schechter_ Cor poration, cit., 46-54. (16) Infra, XII. 9838 9838

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212-(17) The Blue from Egg to Earth, Evening Post, February 9,. i935), 81: very Act was conceived in controversy--controversy as old as civilization--controversy among la.bor, management and consumers. For reasons recited we organized to make t hat controversy vocal, public and intense. We preferred to the rules for a new economic government of the United States by hearing every side which might have an interest in the result and arriving by compromise at the greatest good 1o the greatest number and the. least possible harm to anybody-.'' (18)' Johnson, ibid., (January 26 , 1935) 88 : "As I have said, my whole theo'ry of administration was to make NRA a ' f orurn of controversy. Nothing short of clairvoyance can pre vision the effect of a Code; first, because, the whole idea is unprecenden.ted; second, because no group of men could be gathered who could know enough about the infinite variety of circumstance in American business to pass in a closet on i ts problems. The only way to get the truth in such a case is to give every adversary and informed interest its day in court." ( 19 ) Supra, V. ( 20) Supra,_ n. 17 and lB. ( 2i) Supra, VI. (22) Freund, Administrative Powers overPersons and Property (University of Chicago .Press 1928), 84, and Chicago Junction Case, 264 u. s. 258 ( 1924) " (23) Tagg Bros. v. u. s., 280 U. s. 430, 432 (1921). ( 24) N. R. A. Release No. 2993, San uary 25, 1934, quoted by Brookings Institution, op. cit., 85, N. 3: "The formula is designed, by controversy of cC!>nflicting interest, to arrive a t truth and composition. This practice has been followed without exception. Without it there wollld be no formula or possi bili ty of ob taining informed opinion on any of the three principal sides of the contrailing questions pertaining to each code. The only alternative to that sort <;>f revelation through controversy is such long inquisitorial aild El. Cademic proceedings as have contributed to the previous failure to control mono-poly by the anti-trust acts." See infra. (25) See NRA Release, June 27, 1933. (26) uffice urder No. 15, August 5, 19 3 3 p. 6 is the only early reference to public hearings (other than Press Releases which C!i.n not be taken as formal policy). The reference mer ely c ontains t h e o utline heading 11VI II Hearing A, Hearing Proper. 11 Immef>ately above, under VI I B, is rather full instructions that the Deputy Administrators 'Vill inform Public Relations Division, if a good publicity story exists and will check the draft of the story pre'Pared by the Public Relations Division with the interested Trade Association. 9838

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. , , .J • • • ( v7) G ffic : nnt :1.1 : (3) During t l P1 bJ:ic .i 'lrinr; t J e o residing officer (See II-2400) will seek to elicit f1.cts fr m t he ooo 1ents :md o r ouonents of specific provlslon of t n )roposed co e, for t h , purpose of brint:;ing out the n ces ity, benefit, or detrimen t o f suc h rovisionn. He will receive suggested questions from his advisor s and will make such use of them as he d eems He will, however, be guided by the line of questioning suggested by his Code Advisor to insQre the legal adequacy of the record of the Public Hearing." ( 28) I bid. , 27 . ( 29) 19, 1933, 27, 1933, Transcrip t of Hearing Electrica l hanufqcturing Industry, July 155-165. Transcript of Rearing Cotton Textile Industry, June 24-25. ( 30 ) AmericR.1s Recoverv (Oxford Press 1 934), 82; See also Brookings Institution, ou. cit., 108-11 2 . (30a) Reco