Reflections on the Caribbean economic community


Material Information

Reflections on the Caribbean economic community
Physical Description:
39 p. ; ǂc 22 cm.
Williams, Eric Eustace


General Note:
A series of seven articles / ǂc by Eric Williams. Caribbean Area ǂx Economic integration.

Record Information

Source Institution:
UF Latin American Collections
Holding Location:
University of Florida
Rights Management:
All rights reserved by the source institution.
Resource Identifier:
aleph - 25442769
oclc - 07027109
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Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago,
Political Leader of the People's National Movement

Reprinted from The NATION 14-9-65 to 12-11-1965



'Pa rt I

raZAi .,4r ~M6, when Jamaica 1
cede. fram: the -Federation- of
CL at. a...Special 'Convention, ,call
unanimouslyy. that it -would proi
Wn, would take no part in ,t
lling to .consider on terms.and
ipplicationiwnrom .any- of theD ot
porationm in the, unitary state (
mOUld- in any ,case work toward
bean Economic- Community
varies and national identifieatia
After more than three year,
Uieved no particularly striking
ncipal explanations of this, is. f
rib.bean affairs.

Imperi liss peri

IBBEAN :.national bound- eith<
ies -as we know them today
Been the .result. -of four 0
'ies of. Xivalry between the Stat
s ,of' Europe and the United -the.
of America for ownership mar
ribbean, territory, -which, to 186';
dd- -.of t:ofhe 18th ,.Century, min
ierzted the most valuablee of
alj paasssions... For-- g-lTea- -.
many-of: the wars m fught by Ricc
European powers :and the afte
i States, of America: related war
est, Indian, matters and the 0
Eunopean policy of destoy- was.
Ie Spanish monopoly ,of. :the .be^t
bean. wand, .the, new. -world .ui
..Spain claimedd .as a result
.:...iscovery by. :Columbw. in
Thus it was that Cromwoll's enti
tern design- three .hundred *
rs ago; took Jamaica from
in and made it' ritish. stri]
Thus- it was, that Triidad "the
roil -rm,-h ,f, -M.rif h ,Brit

iad officially decided to
. the West Indies, the
6ed for the, purpose, de-
oeed to independence on
ie truncated: Federation,
conditions o be :agreed
ier -British. territories for
)f Trinidad and Tobago,
is the- achievement.,,-of a
cutting across .political

s, :P..M.'s. Poicy has
Ssuticess. ,ne :of -the
foreign interference in

mission in, 1797. .after. :a. long
od of diplomacy :in which
ain._,had .been .prepared. to
isfer -Gibraltar to -Spain or
er Trinidad 'or puerto. Rico.
Thus it was that the .United
es of America purchased
Virgin Islands.: from-. Den-
k in, 1917 after: failing. i
Sto purchase Santo Do-
go from Spain.
Thus it was that Puerto
became American in -1898
r the .Spanish American

Thus it. was' that, St!. Kitts
,for: ;a long time divided
veen. .Britain and France
i t..herT eace Treaty-after the
.of the. Spanish-. Succession
1718- transferred the island
rely to British ownership.
[hus.-it was that ii 1763
amn-and Prance came within
kin-g distance of a war over
salt' of 'the Turks Islands,
ai igivimg: rance an ulti-

matum to withdraw
nine days.
* Thus it was that, al
the cost of threateniOg
mendous political uphei
British party :.politics,.
decided after the Sever
War with France to tal
Canada instead of Guac
* Thus it was that in t
Century the islands of ti
Indies changed nations

within establishing the United
of America as the doi
ost at power in thl Caribbean
a tre- throughout the .20th Cc
ral in has been regarded .a
ritain: American Mediterranean.
Years This American dream ,%
over mally erected into Ai
loupe, policy when, after the Ai
, 18th intervention in the British
West Venezuela boundary disj
flags 1895, Theodore ROoseve

.. ...... .- -... W m I lnU Im vwII
who are subject to her
heodore Roosevelt's plan THIS was the first -basic influ-
bbean integration under ence from outside behind the
lemony of the United movement for West Indian feder-
I America, as expounded ation. The second came from the
*tter, reads as follows: united Kingdom itself which, in
uld myself like to shape 1947 considering colonial inde-
reign oolley with a pur- n,,J3 .. .., ^ +. l;, ...

ontinent every European kderatij
SI would begin ith for a lo
and in the end would of its g
11 other European nations, ndies a
ng England.' glorified
trown c
orialist Arena In
ment fo
context the British in- the B1
re for a federation of the actuated
lies was an attempt at In- with ad
i to block the advance of of sea
ted States of America in Britain's
bbean In 1942 the United tivated
ad compelled the United federati
i to accept an Anglo- Islands
n Caribbean Commission Leeward
with the accession of express
and the Netherlands in Secretar
the end of the war, be- nies to
e Caribbean Commission. 'n. May
!aribbean Commission was "N
la in which the European vai
fought against the grow- fer
lerican encroachment in ne
t Indies. To this extent Mc
tish Government had the pe(
of those West Indian na- of
s who saw in politics ind
han agitation, Mauvaise shc
nd bacchanal. A Jamaican anm
Dr. Meikle, had written en
in 1912. not particularly que
1, in which he had ad- wa
West Indian federation ma
rnly alternative to Ameri- PON

uI Llte moun, saw in
on only an opportunity
ng deferred rationalisation
government of the West
nd the establishment of a
SWest Indian federal
47, in initiating the move-
r West Indian federation-
ritish Government was
'by the same concern
Iministrative consolidation
rate Governments to suit
purposes which had mo-
the British policy of a
on of the Windward
'including Tobago) and the
Islands with Barbados as
d in a despatch from the
y of State for the Colo-
the Governor of Barbados
1st, 1873, as follows :
o one can dispute the ad-
ntage, for purposes of de-
ice, of union between weak
ighbouring communities.
Dreover. it cannot be ex-
cted that the governments
a number of small Islands
dependent of each other
Duld possess the experience
d information necessary to
able them to deal with
estions which in times of
r or other emergencies
ly arise with foreign
wers, and on which there

jIuay uCt 11V UFYy1 Lualuy I
fer home for instruction
must be apparent to al
colonists under your Go
meant that the imperial
ernment may justly call
them to adopt any imi
ments in their system c
ministration which wi
prejudicing their local
ests may increase the
ency of the Colonial Go
ment in reference to
serious matter".
That is the explanation, o
underfed bastard which the
tish, with the assistance of.
Indian politicians, excludinE
P.N.M, tried to foist on the
Indian people. P.N.M. came
existence challenging this al
ity, which had been foreshad
by the'proposal of West I
rationalists at a conferen
Dominica in 1932 attended t
West Indian islands except
maica, in which the leading
was Captain Cipriani of Trir


THE principal feature of
West Indian proposals,
colonial mentality reading str
ly today were as follows:
(1) A.single chamber legis]
comprised of 27 elected
six official members.
(2) A Federal Executive
prised of a Governor
eral, three officials
nated by the Crown, an
elected members e]
by and from the Fe
(3) The, Governor-Genera]
to act on the advice ol
Federal Executive and
functions now exercise

to re- mre Loluuiul viuce in
ns. It tion to the British West
.1 the dies Colonies shall, as fa
vern- practicable, be transfer
Gov- to him.
upon .4) "Reconstitution of I,
)rove- Legislatures. It is neces
)f ad- and desirable that in
without island the nominated and
inter- official element should
effici- appear and be replace
vern- elected members; and
these the number of elected r
bers should be increase
f th? as to provide for a
Bri- elected majority; in cas
West conflict between Island
g the ernment and the LD
West Legislature in any matte
into paramount importance
)surd- issue to be referred to
lcwejd Governor-General."
ndian (5) The qualifications for i
ce in bership of island' legisla
)y all were to be a clear ar
SJa- income of $960.00, or ov
spirit ship of real property c
lidad. least $2,400 clear of
charges and encumbra
or occupation of land o
annual rental value o
least $240.
these (6) "Qualifications of Voter
the For the time being the
range- tion of voters' qualifica
shall be left to *the
nature Legislatures, it being au
I and stood that no adult who
any direct tax shall be
com. prived of a vote, and
-Gen- any property cr in
nomi- qualification that may bE
d six posed shall be suffici
elected low to provide for the
deall expression of opinion o
classes, and that adult
I was chise is the ultimate ail
f the the Federation: The c
"the fications of voters to b<
d by viewed triennially in

with a view to bringing adult
unit sufferage gradually
into operation."
(7) The establishment of Muni-
cipal Councils or Boards in
all towns or villages, "with
a controlling elective, ele-
ment, wherever practicable
the enjoyment of a full
measure of municipal auto-
nomy by, every centre of
population of being regard-
ed as essential to the' ulti-
mate realization of Domin-
ion Status.




SPAIN, basing itself on the
Papal dispensation of 1493, had.
organised a Caribbean Economic
Community, the first and last time
that one has existed. It was based
on the complete domination of
all the West Indian, islands by
Spain and their development, cr
arrested development, in, the in-
terest of Spain or based on tfi
limifati-n of Spanish resources.
ThIle European powers had carved
up the Caribbean chickes over
many centuries one took the
breast, the other had the thighs,
one, wanted white meat, the other
had dark meat; those' who weie
too small to qualify had to be
content with the 'Pope's nose";

the least fortunate of all had to
pick up the bones that were
thrown away by the larger po-
Then rame the American dread
of a Caribbean Economic Com-
munity under American control
and direction, beginning with the
Republics who were incorporated
into the Latin American system,
and seeking to add by backdoor
methods the smaller territories
who were not to be fully incor-
porated into the American system,
because as President Franklin
Roosevelt said, they would mean
two million headaches for the
United States, more black, people
coming into the United States and
more subsidies from the Ameri-
can treasury.
Here British and American poli-.
cies coincided. Much of the dis-
cussions on British West Indian
Federation were based on British
anxiety, where West Indian
support (principally Trinidadian
before the P.N.M.) to deny the
West Indian case for subsidies.
Later onr with the flood of West
Indian immigrants into Britain
from all the British West Indies
except Trinidad, the British
haste ifor West Indian "indepen-
dence" was motivated by the de-
sire to relieve Britain of her con.
stitutioral responsibility for her
dependent territories and to ban
Commonwealth migration, where
black people were concerned.
This was- what P.N.M. chal.
lenged in January 1962,

FROM its inception the
fluence in the propose
It began its career by ca
tives at the Federation
1956 to repudiate the
Crown Colony and ple
work for the established
was through the P.N.M.
who is now Trinidad ai
the United Kingdom, tha

Part 2

P.N.M. challenged this foreign
;ed federation of the West Ii
lling on all West Indian repreE
Conference in London in Jai
conception of a glorified fede
dged itself, if elected to pow(
mnt of an independent federation
member of the Federal Goverr
nd Tobago's High Commission
it the P.N.M. moved, within the

S4r subjective, that is to say his-
ir l Structure torical, cultural or other
iext example -of foreign activity of the time can be
.erence related, to the expected to overcome this
hy of the Federal struc- heritage, Only a powerful
rinidad and Tobago had and centrally directed eco-
'eat thought to this, and nomic coordination and inter-
Federation Conference in depedence can credae the
1957 had given notice of true foundations of a nation.
king by proposing that Barbados will not unLy with
I development, which had St. Kitts, or Trinidad wl)h
n L .. I -- @a -

s to that date, should be wiT
d on the Concurrent Legis- kni
ist, as a matter for bo:h the
and Territorial action. Cer
mber the surprise which thi
%opcsition elicited in 1957, coa
fly from the Jamaica dele- In
but our proposition was mo
d. It wa
dad and Tobago thereafter shrine
led to think out more com- strong
lively its ideas of federa- full
d produced The Economics Cour
ionhood. Our Paper pro- Toba
a new division between Gove
on and Unit Governments 1958
Legislative lists, called for Cons
increase in federal re- docu
through the intervention by t
Federal Government in in- ment
ax and import duties, ad- for
the establishment of a that
union as an essential re- a pu
nt of the Federation, and diifi
4 a policy for making any
to the less developed ter- appr4
underlying philosophy was prise
ed in the following para- coun
"These islands have a long top r
story of insularity, even of the
atton, rooted in the his- Gene
cal development of their Ame:

S#*=.***w `-w. 71 =--
t together only through
ir common allegiance to a
itral Government. Any-
ng else will discredit the
iception of Federation, and
the end leave the islands
re divided than before".
Ls with this document, en-
ing the philosophy of a
g Central Government, after
debate in our Legislative
Lcil, that Trinidad and
go approached the Inter-
rnmental Conference of
to review the Federal
titution. We put out the
ment for consideration
he West Indian Govern-
:s involved. We never
one moment expected
its acceptance would be
sh-over. We anticipated
culties, but were not by
means inflexible in our
coach to the question.
)u can imagine my sur-
, however, when I en-
tered the first reaction
our proposals from a
gn source-one of the
nen in what was then
United States Consulate
ral. I met him at an
rican cocktail party

given for somebody or o
and he greeted me as
lows: "Well, you have bi
up the West Indian Fe
tion!" I asked him, in
surprise, just what he m
His reply was that, by
ing fundamental issues,
were making it impossib
achieve a compromise
were jeopardising the
promise we had reached
1956 before the P. N. M.
into power. 9

I was really angry. I to
that he had no damned ri
interfere in West Indian
and that the P.N.M. Govei
did not take orders fro
United States of Ameri
asked him what would hav
opened to the American I
Constitution if Madison
Hamilton had not argued p
the nature and scope of Am
federal system, and I told hi

Aher, Inter-
oke n Government
some Conference
rais- |F this was foreign inter
we even before the 'Inter-1
le to mental Conference started
and foreign interference at th(
com- Governmental Conference
d in even worse. With the ft
got port of the Government oJ
dad and Tobago, the
d him Kingdom, as a party to thi
eight to ration, was invited to se.
observer to the Conferenc
a observer happened to be
m whom I knew quite well tI
ica. I connection with the former
bean Commission; he was
e hap latively junior civil sen
federall the hierarchy.
ublical The Conference ran imn
erica's ly into the difficulties crei
that Jamaica's demand that th
rpsontatirt. icsiin chniilri hi

I would be prepared to argue l-e-O f.t,. I" the.resulv t
with him in public at any time if led first, In the resulting
he agreed to have a Rederalist fusion and antagonism, the
for the West Indies dad and Tobago delegation
a large part in securing
This otsid frencment to Jamaica's claim. J
This outside interference 4he p t argue
with our federal discussions, then proceeded to arguesenta
now from America, now from the Federal Parliament she
Britain, was to dog the whole based On population The:
federal exercise, and is in my again confusion and antag
opinion one of tha principal But throughout it all the4
reasons for the failure to tion of Trinidad and Tobag
achieve a satisfactory Wed its head and began to cc
Indian compromise, ways and means' by which
Looking back on our own ex- Jamaican Government's pi
perience in this matter, I can might be accommodated.
well understand the difficulties To our complete astonisl
that have developed in Nigeria, as we were working out C
the break-up of the Malaysian promise in our delegatic
Federation with the secession of British official came to u:
Singapore, and the failure to get proposed that the conf
the project of the East African should be adjourned. We
Federation off the ground, him why. He replied th

wished to avoid a breakdown of
the Conference. The Trinidad and
Tobago delegation was most hos
tile to this outside interference.
and told him sharply that we
had found a compromise which
would satisfy Jamaica. I had never
seen a man who looked'
All he was thinking of, like his
American counterpart, was sonie
patchwork which would serve as
an apology for a federation that
British and American interests
wanted instead of separate Go-
varnments. The idea that West
Indians could face up to and deal
with their own basic problem had
river once entered his mind,
and throughout the long- and ar-
duous exercise both in Trinidad
and in London, one of the basic
difficulties that Trinidad and To.
bago always had to face was
British interference, throwing its
weight now here, now there, seek-
ing only to maintain a patchwork
to allow Britain to get out of its
West Indian responsibilities and
proceed to join the European
Common Market.


Common Market

F OR quite early in the game
Trinidad and Tobago recog-
nised that this was Britain's prin-
cipal concern. It was we in Tri-
nidad and Tobago who had to in-
sist that the West Indies should
not be left out of the discussions
Britain was holding with Common-
wealth territories.
We were in London when thel
British Government announced
that Minister 'X' was going to
Australia, Minister 'Y' was going

to India, Minister 'Z' was going
to West Africa. There was not
the slightest reference to the
West Indies. We raised hell with
the Secretary of State for the
colonies who was then Mr.
Trinidad and Tobago had al-
ready challenged Mr. Macleod on
this matter at a meeting he had
had in Trinidad with representa-
tives of the West Indian Govern-
ments. And we were particularly
disturbed by his evasive answers.
It was only as a result of our in-
sistence that Britain, as an after-
thought, sent a junior Minister to
hold discussions in Trinidad with
the Federal and West Indian Go-
vernments, and then our delega-
tion was completely taken aback
by the fact that at one point in
the Conference, when Trinidad
and Tobago alone had anything to
say, the British Minister came
over and held long private dis-
cussions with the Trinidad and
Tobago delegation seeking to
convince us and to get us to
agree to some wishy-washy for-
mula which meant nothing to
I was satisfied in that Confer-
ence that the West Indian Federa-
tion was a British device to con-
coct a federal government that was
not expected to last, that would
be from the start in the American
sphere of influence, but which
would serve as a alibi for Britain
slipping out of its West Indies re-
sponsibilities and taking the
plunge that they had already de-
cided to take and go into the
European Common Market. I had
no objection to their going into
the European Common Market but
I was not going to sit ip any con-
ference and agree, if I was asked


to agree, to any solution of thi,
nature which did not provide safe.
guards and guarantees for the
West Indian people.

Mr. MacMillan's


British interference reached its
peak with the visit of the
British Prime Minister to the
West Indies, Mr. Harold MacMil-
lan, I had a long private chat with
him on this matter. By then it
was clear that the West Indian
Federation had run into
serious difficulties. We in Trini-
dad and Tobago had always felt
that the principal reason for the
confusion with Manley's decision to
remain in Jamaica and not be-
come Federal Prime Minister. I
have frequently told Manley so.
Anticipating a light over the
Prime Ministership, I had clearly
indicated from aS far back as Oc-
tober 1957 that Trinidad and To-
bago was not a competitor for the
post. I remember saying this at a
public meeting in Jackson Square
when fighting a municipal cam-
paign for Sabga-Aboud in the
Northern Ward.
Manley was in Trinidad at the
time, and was a guest speaker at
the meeting. I remember the
surprise that he showed at my an-
nouncement. He told me after
the meeting that he had not ex-
pected that I would make up my

s mind so quickly. The top members
of our Party had been discussing
the matter for some time, and we,
had all agreed that as far as we
were concerned, with a Party just
a little older than one year and a
Government one year old, we
could not be expected to disrupt
the important task of reconstruc-
tion in Trinidad and Tobago to
take on the burdens of the office
of Prime Minister of the West
Mr. MacMillan's principal
concern was to seek to persuade
me that I should be the Prime
Minister of the West Indies. It
was clear that even then Britain
was envisaging the departure of
Jamaica from the Federation. He
told me all about the problems of
distance and the difficulties Man-
ley's Government was facing in
Jamaica with the Opposition, that
Manley had too many problems on
his hands.
He ended up by indicating that
in his view the Fedaration should
be restricted to nine territories
without Jamaica and that I should
be the Prime Minister. I let him
know that Trinidad and Tobago
was having none of that. It was
all or none. As I put it later,
nine from ten leaves zero, but I
knew theh that the Federation
was on its death-bed. And I was
further satisfied then that Britain
would accept anything, but anyi
thing, in order to expedite its
abdication of its responsibilities
to the West Indies


run a

laguaramas issue represented the most important
n most dramatic manifestation of the problem of the
nent of a Caribbean Economic Community, with
r reference to the question of foreignismm"', to use
itiful word which appeared in a letter from a cor-
nt to me this morning.

s 1956 Election Manifesto the P.N.M. undertook to
he international commitments of Trinidad and To-
ecifically the 99-year lease of various areas of Tri-
ritory under the 1941 Anglo-American Agreement.
however, the first result of the selection of Trinidad
- nf fthp iFTPrirl ( nitfl un ; fIhp rldeicqinn nf tfh

.ICtil Ik. UVVUII IIIUI C3'0 Ll n La, %_/a
Chaguaramas, and that the Am
requested to surrender Chaguar

SProblems ed that t
I Americans
vision immediately rais- in the abs
problems. On the one Tobago. '
was in conflict witH don, my ai
election Manifesto. On Ambassad(
hand it was widely Permanent
id even more widely United Na
at the decision of the caution to
an Governments was a selection
rarelyy set for the PNM. -ments re
,amas was not available transaction
eral Capital, the report in 1941.
he question of the Fe-
tal site would be re- Ey

M thus found itself on I read th
of a dilemma: how before t
t one and at the same hardly belj
ict its election pledges for the fi:
ull support to its West dous pres
leagues however much Americans
suspect their motives ? Trinidad a
t thought in this situa. position o
D take no overt part in Sir Huber
sions with the Ameri- er propose
conference was fixed in be estabi
r the middle of 1957. Swamp wl
Tnr r-f ^^1 'm11->-^---_ ffI'II% iCto^* 6 -

FitCli blIVUUJU C; bLtCJ"
iericans should there-
he discussions with the
would be meaningless
;ence of Trinidad and
So I went along to Lon.
adviser being our present
)r to Washington and
t Representative to the
itionst I took the pre-
carry along with me a
of the files and docu-
lating to the original
I involving Chaguaramas

le Opener
e documents in London
he Conference. I could
ieve my eyes. I learned
rst time of the tremen,
sures exercised by the
on the Government of
and Tobago, of the op-
df the then Governor,
t Young, and his count-
al that the, Base should
Wished in the Caroni
ich should be reclaimed
,1-1 ^CA rrr V +Ck,,

from the West Indian
Bermuda and Newfour
the Anglo-American Con
London in 1941, of the
refusal to make any p
all for the areas cede
American insistence on
ritcorial jurisdiction to a
confrontations in the W
Accordingly I immed
posed to my Federal (
the British Secretary of
the Colonies, and the
Ambassador to London,
blishment of a four-pa:
mission-the United
America, the United
the Federal Government
and Tobago-to find a
five site for the Naval
Chaguaramas. It was.
difficulty, that involved
lantic consultations be
United Kingdom and t
States, that I was able
proposal accepted; li
know then that I had
the PNM to a struggle
to last well over three
Bo.h the West India
ment and Trinidad an
came up against the t
culty that we lacked
expert staff for the exe
But I had ac
major object-I had
ed that the 1941 Agr
years, or no 99 yeai
sacrosanct and tha
be renegoatiafed.
In the long struggle
four principal obstacles

U.S. Resist
IE first obstacle
strong resistance of
States of America. For
were under fire in mar
the world-in Libya, it

territories, the Panama Canal, Gu;
idland at Bay in Cuba, the Philip
iference iu was clear that the A
American were looking not only at
payment at ramas but at the fact 1
d, of the rearrangement at Chaj
extra ter. would involve other area
void racial the world. Thus they r
est Indies, one single effort to n
lately pro- West Indian case, and 1
colleagues, Indian Federation was
State for its career as a new non-:
American nation in the context of
the esta- to achieve even its owr
rty Com- because a foreign power
States of on keeping the area as
Kingdom, Base. This was the
, Trinidad point that came to domi
n alterna- entire proceedings: who
I Base at claim to West Indian s
with some Government of the We
Strans-At- people or a foreign power
tween the its claim on a 99-year
he United Agreement with another
to get my country ?
ttle did I
ttle did The Americans claimed
ch Chaguaramas Base was es:
whch as 'the defence of the Panax
Years at a time when they wer
d Govebr- down Bases all over th
d Tobo because of changes i,
asic ai- technology and naval
cisdeq e They claimed that Cha
Base was a considerable
hieved my asset to Trinidad and
Sestablish- though employment had
eement,99 declined and was to de(
rs, was not further Far from seeki
it it could duce what limited impor
Base might have had ev
we faced they sought to increase
ding a Missile Tracking
They claimed that the co
a nce viding comparable install
another part of Trinidad-
was the gested Irois Bay -was p:
the United and could not be entertai
eign Bases by insisting on their
ly parts of flesh under the 1941 A,
1 Morocco, they were, if only by im


r on their territorial rights I rer
y in Trinidad but also in fuss th
arts of the West Indies. on the
trol of

Indifference sent de
second hurdle we had to with u
come was the United began
n Government. Not only sions
receive no assistance from senior
We encountered such saw t
resistance that, if it had event;
British instead of an Am- I made
Base, they could hardly started
me better. I saw this in al pro
7 Conference in London. read ir
lis in the work of the Cor- to use
to find alternative site. will all
I agreed to the appoint- word-
Sir Charles Arden Clarke to exti
rman thinking that, as on Chn
Governor of the Gold I
I let
rho had witnessed the rise c
rumah, we would get a while
letic hearing,. When he which
before his departure that sought
ericans would not yield settled
t I should seek some cor- issue
with them whereby they ss
4mas an
Ye asked to assist in meet- m late
In late
cost of the location of a
Capital elsewhere, I vo
or any
hat we had been relying support
oken reed. meant.
was the signal for our time th
al assessment of Britain's British
o the West Indies. As we stand
since the world economic until it
on and even before that, Govern
had written off the West this; it
except in so far as the to me,
idles could be used as being
pawns in British diplo- Confer(
toves in other parts of the
We were ready to make Fed
Ilowances for this, but it
lorse of a different colour TH
le British actually tried to was
e our own independent Slowly
USn iq

member for example the
e British sought to make
question of Ministerial con-
the Police Force. They
wn Mr. Amery, a junior
r, to discuss the matter
is. Mr. Amery came and
all sorts of private discus-
with the Governor and
civil servants before he
he Ministers. When he
ally condescended to see me
it plain before he even
that I saw no constitution-
blem involved and that I
ito his mission an attempt
a bogus-if my friend Busta
ow me to use his favourite
constitutional issue in order
ract a concession from us

him know that I would not
Chaguaramas on any terms
the constitutional issue
he and his Government
to fabricate remained un-
When he settled the
;hen we spoke of Chaguara-
d I let him have my views.
r discussions, whether they
d the hazards of radiation
Sbther matter, we got no
t from the British Govern-
That was not the last
iat I Was to learn that the
Government would take no
on any Caribbean issue
Shad consulted the Ameri-
ment. It is not that I say
is that this has been told
the most recent occasion
the last Prime Ministers'

eral Hostility
third obstacle in our way
the Federal Government.
but surely it dawned upon
k1^ DTIYMM +1k 0+ ni n+h a

principal purposes the Federal
Government was designed to serve
was to be a brake on the PNM.
Some of our most acriminious cor-
respondence in these years was
with the Federal Government
on the question of Chagua-
ramas. And when, behind the
back of the Trinidad and To-
bago Government, as we were
pursuing our own moves in the
complex game, the Federal Gov-
ernment unilaterally announc-
ed giving me a couple
of hours notice that it had ac-
cepted an American assurance that
the Americans would be prepared
to reconsider the position of the
Chaguaramas Base "in, say, 10
years", relations between the
Federal and Trinidad Governments
reached breaking point, and I knew
that it was only a question of
time before the final nails were
driven into the coffin of West
Indian nationalism on a Federal
The support we received from
West Indian Governments as such
was infinitesimal and not worth
speaking about; here and there
they sought to bargain support
for our stand on Chaguaramas in
return for some other concession,
the very people who were ulti-
mately to benefit, in a way they had
never envisaged, from Trinidad
and Tobago's successful renegotia-
tion of the 1941 Agreement. Our
stand on this matter, as on so
many others, was NO DEALS.


AS if this combination of Am-
erican resistance, British in.
difference and 'Federal hostility
was not enough for the two-year
old Government of a small coun-

try, the PNM had to face yet a
fourth obstacle-domestic sabo-
tage. Little by little we came up
against the full force of more than
15 years of connivance by our
predecessors in Government and
by the ruling can occupation the commercial
cultivation of citrus, the rearing
of pigs, the bingo parties, the loss
of revenue from sale of duty-free
imports permitted for the use of
troops on the Base, and a whole
host of irritating and deplorable
flou'ings of the laws of Trinidad
and Tobagc. In the vanguard of
this opposition was, as always, the
daily press-the Trinidad Guar-
dian and the Trinidad Chronicle,
both of them ready to hang the
Chief Minister of Trinidad and
Tobago for treason against the
United States Government.

April 22, 1960
WE learried from all this that we
had to depend on our own re-
sources, especially when the late
Mr. Nehru, to whom I had written
on the matter, suggested that we
should take it easy. I do not mean
by this to criticise Mr. Nehru; I
mean only that we realized that it
was our own resources that would
count. Our tremendous April
22nd 1960 demonstration demon-
strated to us and the world how
extensive these resources were;
it made it impossible to deny the
PNM claim for renegotiation of
the Treaty, and it laid the foun-
dations for West Indian indepen-
dent nationhood, in theory if not
in practice.
For by April 22nd, 1960, the
British Government, which in 1957
had ever even given a thought
to the possibility of West Indian
independence, was more anxious


than the federal politicians or
anybody in the West Indies except
the PNM to give the West Indies
independence. They wanted to
join the European Common Mar-
ket, and one essential step in the
process was to rid themselves of
the West Indian millstones round
their neck. So lan Macleod, Sec.-
retary of State for the Colonies,
cadne down to settle outstanding
constitutional issues with the PNM,
to concede full internal self-go-
vernnent, and to urge West In-
dian slackers: "Hurry On to inde-
pendence". But independence
could not be conceived without a
settlement of outstanding inter-
national issues involving the tra-
ditional obligation of an emerging
country to accept existing inter-
national commitments. The PNM
made it clear that it was not ac-
cepting the 1941 Agreement and
that that Agreement had to be re-
So Macleod found his formula
after all, a formula designed to
concede Trinidad's case but to
save the face of the Americans,
the British and the Federal poli-
ticians. The formula was to have
a general four-party discussion in
London, which was to be followed
in the second stage by effective
discussions between Trinidad and,
and the United States in Tobago,
with the United Kingdom and
Federal Governments on the side-
lines. By agreement with my
West Indian colleagues involved,
I rushed over te them at the end
of the Tobago Conference the
bnoad outlines of what was
agreed which they used as a basis
of their own negotiations with the
Americans in St Lucia, Antigua
and Jamaica. ,
The third phase of the exercise
involved in the Macleed formula

was the signing of the new Agree-
ment by the Federal Government
and all the West Indian Govern-
ments. This took place in Port-
of-Spain in February 1961 and
was followed by a ceremony of
the hoisting of the flags at Cha-
guaramas in which the Trinidad
and Tobago Flag, as soon as it
was hoisted and quite appropria-
tely, began to 'saga ting- in the

The Trinidad Case

THE essential features of the
Trinidad case for renegotiation
of the 1941 Agreement were as
follows :

The immediate return of
idle deactivated areas ceded
in 1941-principally Waller
Field and Carlsen Field.-
for use in developing the
agricultural potential cf Tri-
nidad and Tobago.
a Tha cutting down of the
Chaguaramas Naval Sration
to siPe by excising the
Citrus plantation

The establishment in what
was left of the Chaguaramas
Naval Station, of a Joint
Base with American troops
living in peaceful coexist-
ence with the West Indies
Regiment and subsequently
the Trinidad and Tobago
Defence Force

The reduction of the dura-
tfon of the American occu-
pation to a mi nimum
period of 17 years, with
provisions for review at the
end of 5 and at the end of
10 years-in this we follow-
ed largely the prec'eden?


set in discussions between
the United States and
Libyan Gevernments

* A clear understanding ihat
the Chaguramas Base was
not to be used at any time
in pny way contrary to the
interests of the people of
Trinidad and Tobago as ex-
pressed through their Go-

* American economic aid by
way of "reparation" for the
20-year free occupation, in
respect of our Port and
Railway (both of which had
been utilised by the Am-
ericans after 1941), impro-
venment of the road between
Mucurapo and Chaguaramas
and the construction of a
College of Arts and Science
at St. Augustine, equipped
with a suitably endowed
library, as part of the com-
plex of the University of
the West Indies (The Toba-
go Conference almost broke
down on this and led to
a serious split between the
Head of the American dcele-
gation who supported us,
Nd his State Department
advisor who opposed us)

I Short-term assistance by the
Americans in respect of
making the water at Chag-
puaramas available 'to the
people of Diego Martin and
Carenas, establishment of
a beach at Tembladora for
the benefit of the people of
Port0of-Spain, and the con-
structioln of barracks at
Teteron Bay for the use of
the Trinidad and Tobago
Defence Force.

The Abiding

THE long struggle taught us in
the last three abiding les-

The dominant factor in Caribbean
affairs, frustrating Caribbean in-
togration, is jealousy of Trini-
dad and Tobago. There are
people in the West Indies, then
as now, who would prefer to
see the West Indies lose rather
than to see the PNM win; in
much the same way as they
would prefer to see the West In-
dies people lose all the rights
and privileges that had accrued
to them under BWIA as a SUb-
sidiary ca" a foreign airline
rather than have it operated by
the Government of Trinidad and
Tobago as a regional carrier
for the West Indies

The readiness of many people in
the Wesf Indies, then as now,
to negotiate with any foreign
power In order to avoid having
to come to terms with Trinidad
md Tobago

The disgraceful behaviour of dis-
sident PNM elements seeking to
use the PNM for their personal
gain. Many PNM members will
recall the PNM element which
wished to oppose the April 22nd
demonstration because we had
not consulted twe Opposition
In advance and merely invited
them to tae part on the basis
of a decision reached by the

But PNM members have not yet
heard the whole story.
They do not know that that oppo-
sition that Iatlsr developed to


PNM On this isue of Chagua- DISGRACEFUL part of it all:
rams was due to the 'act that The elements who said hardly a
X had wanted to be Political word in support of the 3-year
Adviser to the West Indian old campaign because never for
Prime Minister. They do not a moanent did they believe that
know who Y was who begged it could succeed, but, as soon
and pleaded that Trinidad and as success appeared on the
Tobago should continue' in a horizon, sought too inject into
smaller federation after Ja- the PNM considerations of non.-
maica's secession because he alignmnet and tried to involve
wished to be Governor-Geniral. the PNM In the mess of cold
And they do not know the most war disputation.


for which they Malasi to
mned to eternal problems. Comil
we look at the problems. Comi
ears later, there Indies Federat
ause for surprisendies Federati
ause for surprise 1' e It
launoy qntir Sino

Indies who saw in Federation a
opportunity for political position
and personal gain denied to the]
in individual territories thE
even after the West Indian Fed(
ration had been broken up because
of the Jamaican, Referendum,
is very doubtful whether it woul
have been able to survive it
second 5-year period in the ligH
of the stresses and strains tha
have affected federal systems i
the last three years.

Strong vs Weak


THE dominant issue that face
us in, the West Indies in th
Inter-governmental Conferenc
was the conflict between the pro
ponents of a strong central Sgo\
ernment (Trinidad .and Tobagc
and the advocates of a decentral
ised system organised into a Con
federation (Jamaica).
West Indian political immatm
ity being what it is, the conflict
was not fully appreciated though]
I think it would be true to sa:
that both Jamaica and Trinidac
and Tobago understood what wa
involved. It is not for me to speal
for Jamaica. So I think I had bet
ter confine myself to Trinidad an(
Our concern was to demonstrate(
and emphasise that the power:
you gave or did not give to th(
Federal Government would depend
upon the structure which yot
agreed to for the Federal Govern
ment. For example, we could no:
agree that you could have free
dom of movement of persons ir
a Federation if you did not have
at the same time freedom oj
movement of goods; or ,t(
put it a little differ

in ing to the Federal Government tf
)n power of determining and coi
m trolling the West Indian economy
at (and it is not my intention to sui
e- gest' that Jamaica was wrong (
;e right), then how could you as
it the Trinidad and Tobago Goveri
Id ment to surrender its powers i
ts the field of migration and to pe:
it mit people from the West Indiu
it to enter freely if Trinidad's gooc
n were not free to enter freely th
other sectors of the Federation?
By the same token we could n(
see how you could deny a Federn
Government what We consider
elementary powers in the field c
economics and still insist on thi
d Federal Government having th
o elementary powers in the field c
e foreign affairs. If economics wa
, a sore point for Jamaica, the
. foreign affairs-precisely because
of the Chaguaramas issue-was
I- sore point for Trinidad and T(
n- bago.
In the same way we in Trini
r dad and Toba-go could not undei
at stand how one could consider th
h control of income tax by a Federa
y Government which was limited i:
d its control of and direction of ir
s dustrial development.
k The whole thing goes, together
You either had a Federal Goverr
d meant or you did not have. If yo,
had, it must have the elementary:
e control over economic develop
s ment. If you did not have thi
e elementary control, whatever yoi
d had was not a Federal Govern
U ment.

t Attempt at

fI T was quite obvious to us fron
0 the start that everything de
r- pended upon an accommodation o

the divergent views of Jamaica
and Trinidad and Tobago. Much
of our activities in this Federa-
tion question was therefore de-
voted to finding the basis of such
an accommodation-and I think in
this we *xied much harder than
Jamaica did, IManley was con-
cerned principally with saying he
could not do this and he could
not do that.
It was for this reason that we
concentrated on what eventually
came to be called the Third List-
a list of subjects over which fede-
ral control would be deferred for
a period of years and would be
assumed only on the basis of cer-
tain prescribed procedures. As I
put it to Ian Macleod on his visit
to the West Indies, utilising our
experience in relation to the Hil-
con Hotel which was then being
;Iuilt and where it appeared at
one time that we could not com-
plete the original plan in its en-
tirety, it was like a building where
we had put up all the outside
walls and utilities and what not,
but would complete for immediate
use only a section, leaving the
rest to be filled in and appropri-
ately organized at a later stage.
It was in order to try and work
out this idea which Macleod
jumped at, that Norman Manley
and I met privately i, Antigua,
against a background of a lot of
whi-pering that we were engaged
in a private conspiracy, with all
sorts of people, English and West
Indians., intruding and lobbying
merely in order to preserve what
they considered fo be their per-
sonal interest.
This attempt at a compromise
was not successful partly because
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago
could not agree on the procedures
by which the subjects on the so-
called Third List would eventually

pass into federal control. Trinidad
and Tobago was not able to agree
to what was tantamount to a per-
manent veto by- any one member
S'ate of the Federation.

We could not

W Sought to understand the
Jamaica position though we
disagreed with it. What we could
not understand was the position
of the Federal Government and
the position of the British Gov-
emrment. The Federal Government
wanted, to put it in the simplest
terms, to get control where Trini.
dad and Tobago was concerned
whilst as we saw more clearly
later fully reconciled to, and
possibly even anxious for, Jamai-
ca'swithdrawal from the Federa-
tion. The British Government in
its turn merely wanted any sort
of patchwork to keep the West
Indies together in order to give
them their independence and al.
low Britain in the first place to
join the European Common Mar-
ket and in the second place to
limit West Indian migration to
the United Kingdom.

Economic Aid
THE British were not prepared
to pay the price of this. If
it was West. Indian independence
they wanted on the basis of the
West Indians sleeping together, it
emerged that the British wanted
the West Indies to sleep on the
floor with a patched blanket with
a lot of holes in it. From the time
the P.N.M emerged on Ito the
Federal scene it raised the ques-
tion of British economic aid. We
even did a special study of this
and put out'a specific document


found itself at
use Conference i
which it felt, fro:
ial experience,
ne. It was not ne

ant and that one feel less import- have I taken part in such a
ant and to show it in a variety of funeral cocktail party. The Trini-
ways; I well remember the time dad and Tobago Delegation, so as
when a senior British Minister at not to be discourteous, paid its
the opening of the Conference, respects to the dead bed; we went
which coincided with the an- to the party, stayed in a corner,
nouncement that the dictator had one drink, and walked away
Trujillo in the Dominican Repub- as quietly and as unobstrusively
lic had been assassinated, sought as we had entered.
to persuade me to go on television
to give my views on the develop- W t ndia Party
ment in the Dominican Repubic, W St Ind ry
because, he assured me, "my P l S
words would go all around the Po c
world." I was a little too old in What stands out in all this
this international game to get exercise after all these years
caught up in that tomfoolery, was tht total failure of the
Throughout the Conference we West Indian Governments
spoke only when it was necessary who constituted the Federal
lor us to speak. We sought to re- Government to reach any ac-
main as far as possible in the dommodation whatsoever at
background. When we spoke, on the political level..
the basis of ideas and proposals ) The principal reason for
worked out by the entire Delega- this was the absurdity of the
tion as a team, we spoke pre- Party system expressed
cisely, with the utmost delibera- through the West Indian
tion, without equivocation, with- Federal Labour Party.
out ambiguity, and without leav. The West Indian Federal
ing any loopholes whatsoever for Labour Party had a constitution
subsequent misunderstanding. The limiting membership to socialists
British Government which began governments, thereby excluding
the Conference with serious doubts the P.N.M. until provision was
about what was going to happen made for affiliate membership of
about Jamaica ended up with progressive Parties. Apart from
serious doubts as to what was the obvious absurdity of this so-
going to happen to Trinidad and called West Indian Socialism
Tobago. (about which we seem to have
heard remarkably less in recent
Cocktail Funeral years), we found ourselves virtu-
ally on the side lines.
I REMEMBER the cocktail party This didn't matter too much as
which brought the Conference the West Indian Federal Labour
to an end, brought it to an end Party was never an effective force
on the date and time prescribed as a Political Party. It was we in
by the British Government which Trinidad and Tobago who had to
had already worked out its sche- lead the fight for the summoning
dule of colonial conferences to ac. of the annual conference which
commodate in Lancaster House was required by the Party Consti-
where we were meeting yet tution. That did not get very far,
another colonial territory in the partly because Trinidad and To-
following week. Never in my life bago could always be out-voted,

and partly because if any trend Conference the Trinidad and To-
did appear in the Conference, it bago Delegation, essentially
was a trend that Trinidad and P.N.M. with appropriate advisers
Tobago should bargain for the from non-P.N.M. circles, found
support of the other teritories on ourselves ce more than one oc-
the Chaguaramas issue. I was casiori looking over and winking
P.N.M.'s representative on the at the leader of the Federal op-
W.I.F.L.P. Executive, and I say position, Mr. Ashford Sinanan
with the utmost truth that my who had been invited to form
principal responsibility was to en- part of the Federal Delegation.
sure that releases or recordings We and he were on opposite sides
of Executive decisions were not so of the political fence in Trinidad
twisted as to compromise the and Tobago, but there were is-
position of the P N.M. sues that came up in the Federal
discussions in which Trinidad and
Thus it was that at the Inter. Tobago thought with only one
governmental and Lancaster House mind.


art 5

cazL~j LJLI cV^LAUlZl LaUlllrac
trying to organise the new
presentation in the net. Until Barrow arrived
nent was concerned, bago I had no idea as to w]
ur Lewis arguing wished to see me urgently
aimed was "the gen. But I was quite astonished tc
in thfe other ter h w b
he formula arrived that it was about a nine-te]
ie frmul arrved A.


.s he was encountering and pe
rophesied a disaster for the tei
er federation which has since bu
aken it. m
audling Visit
G pressure came also from the Tr
United Kingdom. Shortly ini
the Jamaica Referendum I mi
privately advised that the co
d Kingdom lawyers were of
[ng on the principle that, in
thstanding the secession of sex
ica, the Federation remained Co
. We let them know without
ambiguity what we thought th;
at legal argument. So the
move was the announcement so(
e new Secretary of State for th(
colonies, Reginald Maudling, Ect
he would visit the West
s in January 1962 neo
mneral Council ..ur
i ntto
Resolution )d
the time Mr. Maudling ar- (
lived on January 13, 1962, State
NM's General Council had (3)
into action and had schedul- bean
special meeting on January ing t
discuss the terms of a Re- Caribl
on which was to be present- (4)
a Special Convention of the ish C
which was summoned for comm
ry 30. The Resolution pre- sible-
d to the General Council Indli
as follows: by th
'Be it therefore resolved that Brltis
inidad and Tobago rKject un- which
uivocally any partialpation in Gover
proposed Federation of the bago
stern Caribbean and proceed
thwith to National Indepeno
nce, without prejudide to the
Wre association in a Unitary
ite of the people of Trinidad T
d Tobago with any Territory I
the Eastern Caribbean whoshsal sp

ople may so desire and on
rms to be mutually agreed,
t in any case providing for the
maximum possible degree of
:al government.
And be it further resolved
at P.N.M's Government in
inidad and Tobago take the
itiative in proposing the
maximum possible measure of
llaboration among the Units
the disintegrated Federation
respect of such common
rvices as the University and
"And be it further resolved
at Trinidad and Tobago de-
Ire their willingness so as-
ciate with all the people of
e Caribbean in a Caribbean
onomic Community and to
ke such action as may be
cessary for the achievement
this objective".
r proposal thus fell broadly
Four parts:
independence for Trinidad
2) expansion of the Unitary
of Trinidad and Tobago;
The achievement of a Carib-
Economic Community includ-
We non-British areas in the
the continuation in the Brit-
aribbean of as many of the
on regional services as pos.
-the University of the West
i, the Federal ships donated
* Canadian Goverment, and
h West Indian Airways
Shad been purchased by thi
nment of Trinidad and To-
from BOAC.


special convention of the
?.N.M. endorsed this propo.
onsored by the General


Council, with a unanimity which
has never been exceeded in
PNM's history. There was a full
discussion by authorised repre-
sentatives of all thirty constitu-
encies and the discussion
was, particularly noteworthy for
the large number of PNM mem-
bers as Trinidad and Tobago na.
tionals whose country of origin
was one of the smaller islands.
They were almost fanatical in
their endorsement of separate in-
dependence for Trinidad and To-
bago. All PNM members will
remember the eloquent speeches
made by Andrew Rose, who was
then a Federal Minister, urging
participation in the smaller fed-
eration; he was given the maxi-
mum latitude for the presentation
of his case, he was listened to
with the greatest courtesy and
interest, and his views were una-
nimously rejected.

Sheer Nonesense
SUBSEQUENTLY it was to be
said that the British accused
me and the PNM generally of
presenting Maudling with a faith
accompli on his arrival. Grantley
Adams described it as an "unilate-
ral and abrupt action". That is
sheer nonsense. The PNM was
asserting its right to its own inde-
pendent judgment of which it had
given fair warning to the entire
world in its independence demon-
stration on April 22, 1960, and we
had had enough experience in 4
years of what was meant by just
waiting on the British to make de-
cisions for the West Indies.

THUS it was that within a few
months of our special con.
vention, and after our Queen's

Hall discussion on the essentials
of our independence Constitution,
we found ourselves, PNM and
Opposition DLP, sitting around
the table at Marlborough House
with the same Reginald Maudling
in the chair, discussing and sub-
sequently agreeing on the inde-
pendence of Trinidad and Tobago.
By this time we had been told thai
the British Prime Minister,
Harold Macmillan, who was plan-
ning a September meeting of
Prime Ministers to discuss the
European Common Market, had
made it clear that Trinidad and
Tobago must be present at that
Conference in its own right and
not as an appendage to the Sec-
retary of State for the Colonies.

Unitary State

WITH the achievement of inde-
pendence we immediately
proceeded, on the application of
Grenada, to consider the question
of the incorporation of Grenada
into the Unitary State of Trini-
dad and Tobago. In addition to
taking such immediate steps
within our power and within our
resources to assist Grenada by the
provision of technical specialists
in one field or another, we im-
mediately constituted teams of
Trinidad and Tobago experts to
study the implications of the Uni-
tary State in four major fields:
(a) The economic, where such
questions as Trinidad and
Tobago's rate of income
tax, import duties, deve-
lopment planning might
possibly have quite an
adverse effect on Grenada's
(economy that would have
to be appreciated in ad-


(b)....the. Civil Service, here now their reports have been
integration would add to before both Governments, and
the cost of administration Trinidad and Tobago has trans-
in Grenada whilstf, on the mitted them to the Government
other hand, it would ralse of the United Kingdom. In all
the problem of integrating this period we have beard not a
different standards and word from the United Kingdom,
different qualifications in which obviously, as far as we are
the various posts; concerned has the responsibility
(c) the legal :'ield, in such of making such economic assist-
matters as for example our tance available to Grenada as
death duties, and our le- would be required, in the context
gislation on a whole host of her development plan for the
of matters;
island to bring up Grenada's
(d) The preparation of a de. island to bring up Grenada
velopment plan for Gren- infrastructure closer to the level
ada. of Trinidad and Tobago.
There was a fifth matter which
we thought it l6est to defer for As Party members know our
the time being Local Govern- General Council has appointed a
ment, if only to see to what ex- Special Committee to consider the
tent a measure of autonomy larger reports of the teams of experts,.
than that conceded to our Coun. It must be quite obvious to every-
ty Council would be accommodat- body that the constitutional
ed within the Unitary State. change which the Unitary State
United Kin m will involve (which has always
United kingdom been made clear to the represent

Responsibility tatives of the Government of
Grenada will require the widest
THE teams of experts have re- possible area of public discussiolI
ported and for some time in Trinidad and Tobago.

Part 6

OUR next move towards the achievement of a Caribbear
Economic Community, once we had set in motion th(
machinery for appraising and studying the question of the
integration of Grenada into the Unitary State of Trinidac
and Tobago, was to organise what has come to be called
the Conference of Heads of Governments of Commonwealtl
Caribbean Countries. I cleared the way personally for thi
by private and informal discussions with the Prime Ministel
of Jamaica and the Premiers of Barbados and British Guiana
and the first Conference was held in Port-of-Spain in July
1963, with Trinidad and Tobago as the host. The second
Conference was held in Kingston, Jamaica, in January 1964

Commonwealth row, and he was insistent tha
the smaller countries should bI
Caribbean left out, and that if there was
or be any contact with these
Countries smallerr countries, which were at
rhe time seeking to work oul
Took as my model the Organi- with Barbados a smaller Carib
station of African Unity, and bean federation, Barbados would
proposed the limitation of our undertake to be the intermediary
meetings to Heads of independ- through the Regional Council o:
eat and self-governing countries, Ministers.
so as not to be involved in con- Both Jamaica and British Gui
sideration of Britain's responsi- ana also felt that the Conference
ability for the non-self-governing should be limited to fully-govern
countries of the Caribbean. I was ing and independent countries.
also very concerned with avoid- Our own view in Trinidad and
ing any suspicion, whether in Tobago was from the start thai
Britain or in the West Indies, the Conference should be exten-
that Trinidad and Tobago was ded as soon as possible to include
seeking to make a federation of the non-British Caribbean coun.
the smaller territories more diffi- tries in the area which were not
cult than it obviously is without colonies in the strict sense of the
any interference from anybody; word or whose semi-colonial sta
it will be appreciated that the tus would be ignored for present
PNM has had to face the general purposes. We were not prepared,
propaganda that not only was it however, to extend this concept
responsible for the break-up of to the Caribbean republics of
the Federation but also that it Cuba Haiti and Santo Domingo-
was seeking to-prevent the emerg- not at that stage--because of the
ence of a smaller federation, obvious difficulty of associating
I was particularly careful to with regimes which were hostile
check this point with EIrrol Bar- to the democratic processes de.

Trinidad and Tobago, British rT-t lU I UW
Guiana and Barbados. But our AND the Conference idea lina]
colleagues would not go along ly received a mortal blo,
with this thought, and preferred from which perhaps it ha
to limit our Conference to Cornm- not yet recovered when, for a
monwealth countries in the Carib- variety of reasons, it proved im
bean. possible to hold the third meeting
The meetings in Port-of-Spain in Baribados in June '1964, as
and Kingston went fairly well, Trinidad and Tobago was anxious
once the Jamaica point of view to achieve. We in Trinidad an(
was accepted, that nothing should Tobago felt that three urgen
be propagated or done or anti- matters should be cleared at tha
cipated which could suggest an meeting at that time:
attempt to resurrect the Federa- (a) Agreement between Tri
tion of the West Indies. What nidad and Tobago and Ja
was important was not altogether maica on the British Guiani
what we achieved at the Confer- issue (where at the request
ences but the fact that we were of the British Guianese lead
meeting in order to try to find ers, I had been involved il
common ground and in order to attempts at mediation) be
lay the foundations for some fore the Prime Ministers
more comprehensive understand- Conference in the following
ing, if some not more durable months,
association, (b) The agreement reachea
Difficulties between Canada and Trini
dad and Tobago on the occa
3HE difficulties were, not to be ion of my visit in April tha
minimised. At the Kingston a joint Canada-West Indie
meeting, for example, Jamaica Conference should be held ii
and Trinidad and Tobago failed Trinidad in September of las
to see eye to eye on the question year to consider all aspect
of the Commonwealth Sugar of relations between the tw4
Agreement a clear warning of areas,
the difficulties to be encountered, (c) Positive proposals for
the moment one got too far down joint Jamaica-Trinidad and
in the hierarchy from the Head Tobago diplomatic represent
of Government level. But the tataion in Africa, in accord
limitations of the Conference and ance with the broad: princi
its fundamental weakness were pies to which we had agreed
shown up on the question of at the Kingston meeting, am
British Guiana when it proved in th~ context of my Africar
impossible for Jamaica and Tri- tour.
nida'd and Tobago-at one stage
Prime Minister Bustamante at Anti-Climax
another stage myself seeking to
act as honest broker-to persuade THE .third Meeting of the Con
British Guiana really and posi- ference of Heads otfGodVetr.
tively to join in any common front of Commonwealth Caribbear
in the West Indies to salvage Countries was held in 'BritisI

- I

to sucn status and potenual as it terms or an associate
undoubtedly had in the first in- would include Surinai
stance. Guiana, Jamaica, and
Intative and Tobago, though it N
Initiate e to make some c-ncessi
OUTSIDE of the British Carib- pect of the Netherland
bean area, Trinidad and To- Puerto Ri(
bago took the initiative in respect
of discussions with the non-Brit- Locus Sta
ish Caribbean territories. These
discussions related to two points THE second aspect of
in particular: (a) British West cal difficulty was t]
Indian Airways, (b) the Federal ant one that Puerto Ric
ships; in the context of the de- ing to take the initiati
velopment of regional communi- matter of regional co
cations by air and by sea. We held lacks constitutionally
discussions with the Governments standi4 as it is not an it
of Puerto Rico, Surinam and the state. We have no evik
Netherlands Antilles; and we Puerto Rico had receive
kept in contact with the Govern- stitutional entrustment
ment of France in respect of legitimate authority, t]
Martinique and Guadeloupe, after States of America, with
overall and general discussions are required to deal in
which I held with the French ters; over and above i
FLreign Minister in Paris some cal question that in
time ago Puerto Rico is subject
O d C n lict can laws in respect of
ld Conflt navigation, quarantine
THE principal difficulty encoun. port policy, we must i
tered in these discussions assume that Puerto 1B
with the non-British Caribbean cern is more a quest
territories has been political, in expansion of its exp
two senses. The first and more than a question of
important has been the old greater access to its
metropolitan conflict for spheres market.
of influence. We discovered that b~M s at H
Puerto Rico wished to have noth-
ing to do wi'h a Caribbean asso- WE felt most at hman
ciation in which the French ter-. Netherlands Antill
ritories were included. By con. neither constitutionally
trast, the French raised their comically, raises the
eyebrows in respect of any asso. that we face in Put
ciation which included Puerto Constitutionally the N
Rico because behind Puerto Rico Antilles is an equal an
they saw the State Department of part of th tripartite ki
the' United States. In between, the Netherlands, with s
Surinam was reluctant to have in the field of foreign
anything to do with any associa- international relations
tion which included either France cannot possibly be con
or Puerto Rico (the United States be under colonial rul
of America), and thought in economic sense every

has free access to the Nether- all independent states in th'a area
lands Antilles market where that is to say, the United King.
trade is, subject to relatively low domn, the UniSed States, France,
duties, comparatively free. In this the Netherlands with Surinam
connection, however, it is much the Netherlands Antilles, Can-
to be regretted that Trinidad and ada, Jamaica, and Trinidad
Tobago's original proposal cf P- and Tobago to discuss the whole
joint British West Indian exhibi- question of regionalism in th3
tion in the Netherlands Antilles Caribbean and promotion of
failed to materialise, leaving the Canibbean Economic Com-
Trinidad and Tobago several munity.
months behind in the effort to Within this framework, to
promote an, exhibition of Trini- which the British reaction was
dad and Tobago's products and inexplicably timid and unfavour-
manufactures in Curacao and able, we stressed the further
Aruba point, once more, that Britain., if
It was in this context that our necessary in collaboration with
discussion proceeded in respect of the United States and Canada
developing B.W.I.A. as a regional should take urgent steps to pro-
carrier working in collaboration mote the economic viability of
with the Netherlands Antilles the smaller teTritories and should,
and Puerto Rico and the exten- as consistent with reason., aban-
sion of the Federal ships to
Puerto Rico and the Netherlands don the policy that jt has pu-
Antilles to make it a more truly sued heretofore of making econo-
Caribbean service No real pro- mic assistance dependent on
gress has been achieved in either political association in the form
field, except that the British West of a federation.
Indian Governments served by Ray of Light
the Federal ships have agreed to
a Jamaica proposal for a compe- AT long last a little ray of light
tent and objective, appraisal, of seems to have penetrated in-
the suitability of the Canadian to the darkness in which the
ships, over and above Canada's Caribbean area has been left by
understandable reluctance to en- its metropolitan associates who
visage any abandonment cf the have profited so enormously from
present ships as not really suited their connection in previous
to the needs of the area- centuries. The Government o& th.
Prime M ministers' United Kingdom, the United
States and Canada have announ-
Conference ced the initiation of a survey
from Janiuary 1st next year to
ALL these diplomatic initiatives consider the quesiiorn 'of econ.-
and discussions, formal and mic viability in the smaller Is-
informal formed the background lands, It is not much light, ad-
to the proposal advanced by Tri- mittedly. One wondered if another
nidad and Tobago at the 1925 survey was needed; one wonders
session of the Prime Ministers' what will happen to this survey
Conference that, taking into when and if it is completed. But
.. -_ a ,, A# a a 1. & 0 as ., ..... .

Irence of progr

wnvene a Con

Part 7

IN the previous articles in this series I have indicated the
difficulties encountered by the Government of Trinidad
and Tobago in promoting a Caribbean Economic Community,
caught as we have been between the upper millstone of big
power politics and the nether millstone of the incredible
parochialism of small units of Government and production
which are utterly anachronistic in the modern world of super
states and large regional economic groupings. There is little
evidence at this moment of any meaningful change in either
respect. It almost seems to be a law of Caribbean society
and Caribbean economics that everything possible is to be
done to prevent salvation. The Caribbean economy seems
to be not dead, but damned.
Technical Honduras, 3 from Dominica,
from Bahamas and Nevis one
~Acis ton r each from Montserrat and
Assistance Antigua.
Since 1954 55 officers from the
IN this situation Trinidad and smaller islands have received
Tobago has concentrated on training in Prison Administration
pursuing the even tenor of its at the Golden Grove Training
way giving what help its limited School, and senior Prison Officers
resources permit to the very of Trinidad have visited or been
small territories which consistent- seconded" to British Guiana,
ly damn us on the one hand and Dominica, Montserrat and St.
intrigue against us on the other. Lucia. ::
The technical assistance provided
by Trinidad and Tobago in the DoliSe a nd
last decade to the smaller terri. Police and
stories includes the following: Statistics
Customs, Fire, 5INCE 1955, 27 policemen from
Prisons the smaller islands have re-
Prisons ceived training in Trinidad with
SINCE 1957, 59 officers from the the Police Division in special
smaller islands have been given branch work, fingerprint and
training in Trinidad in the course photography; traffic and mechani-
organised by our Customs Divi- cal transport, radio and telecom-
sion--of these 10 have come munications and V.H.F. equip-
from Barbados, 8 each from St. meant. Of these 11-have come from
Kitts and Britfsh Guiana, 6 each St. Vincent, 3 each from Grenada,
from Grenada, St. LUcia, St. Antigua and British Guiana, 2
Vincent, 5 from British each from St. Lucia, Dominica

and St. Kitts and one from Bar.
The Central Statistical Office of
Trinidad and Tobago normally
gives training on request to
appropriate officers from the
other islands, and has provided
specialist assistance in the com-
pilation of the population census
of the Eastern Caribbean and
British Guiana.

Hospitals and

Land Surveyors
pLACES are normally offered
on request for the accommoda-
tion of patients from other islands
at the St. Ann's Hospital, the
Leprosarium and the Caura
Since 1959, 80 students have
received training in Trinidad in
the field of land surveying from
practically all the smaller terri-
Since 1962, 3 students have re-
ceived training in Draughtsman-
ship at the Drawing Office of the'
Lands and Surveys Division. Two
of the students were from St.
Vincent and one from St. Lucia.



JTECHNICANS have received
training and assistance in
Trinidad in the field of electricity
from British Guiana and St. Kitts,
and Trinidad and Tobago per-
sonnel has been seconded on
request to study conditions in
Grenada, St. Lucia and Mont-
Since 1962, 18 students have
received training in Trinidad in

various aspects of Air Traffic
Control. Of these 8 have com.
from Surinam, 4 from St. Lucia,
2 each from British Guiana and
British Virgin Islands and 1 from
The Meteorological Division has
given training to 8 students dur-
ing this period. Five of these
students came from British
Guiana, 2 from British Virgin
Islands and 1 from Grenada.

Printing. and

THE Government Printing Office
has arranged attachments for
6 students since 1962. Two each
came from British Honduras, St.
Lucia and Grenada.
In 1965, 2 students from St.
Vincent studied all aspects of
Immigration Control and Passport
and Visa work at the Immigration
One student from Tortola has
received training in Librarianshipb
at the Central Library.
Over 60 officers from the Prime
Minister's Office, Ministries of
Finance, Health and Housing,
Agriculture and Public Utilities
have visited various territories
and given assistance in their
specific field at the request of the
Governments concerned.

Loans and Grants

TRRIIDAD and Tobago has'
made a loan of half a million
dollars to St. Kitts in respect of
its development programme and
subscribed another half million
in purchase of debentures to a
loan raised by Grenada.
Frequent assistance has been
given to other territories in re.


sp e ct of hurricane damage
($150,000 to Grenada after
"Janet," $50,000 to Jamaica after
"Flora"). This assistance was
largely reciprocated when Tobago
was struck last year, and this has
encouraged Trinidad and Tobago
to appropriate $42,000 towards a
study to be conducted jointly
with Puerto Rico of the feasibil-
ity of and problems in establish-
ing a Caribbean Hurricane
Insurance Company.
A grant of $24,360 was given
to St. Lucia in 1955 to assist
victims of the fire which de-
vastated the town of Soufriere.


B.W.I.A. not only provides a
particularly valuable service to
all the islands. It makes a direct
ccrtribution to their economy by
jobs and purchases, estimated at
$2.7 million in 1964, approxi-
mately two-thirds of its estimated
sales. Over and above this,
B.W.I.A. will spend $800,000 in
1965 in publicity overseas, parti-
cularly in U.S.A. and Canada, for
all the islands



with Grenada

THE outstanding examples of
technical assistance provided
by Trinidad and Tobago to the
smaller territories was the agree-
ment on economic collaboration
between Trinidad and Tobago
and Grenada reached in June
1964. Apart from dealing with
efforts to promote tourism in
Grenada and to open the Trini-
dad market to Grenada pigs the

agreement covered the following
items :
Assistance in the establish.
m-nt of a Cooca Industry Board
in Grenada.
Reservation of places for
Grenada students at the East-
ern Caribbean Farm Institute,
Mausica Training College, John
S. Donaldson Technical Institute
and the Hotel Catering School.
Advice to Grenada on red.
ring disease in coconuts.
Training in Trinidad and
Tobago for a Grenada fisher-
man, for two mechanics in the
Grenada Printing office, for two
practical nurses, from Grenada,
for one Public Health Inspec.
tor. for one student In thfl
field of factory inspection for
one officer to be brought up-tK
date in the, latest development
with the Water Authority, and
for one officer in the field of
income tax training,
Visi's by the Chief Town
Planner and the Sanitation En-
ain-er to advise on town plan-
ning and the preparation of
Grinada's case to the World
Health Organisation for the
sewering of an area in Grenada
Assi-'ance from Trinidad and
Tobago to Grenada in the pre-
paration of Grenada's case for
United Nations assistance in
costing tha postal services of
Grenada and in obtaining three
United Na'ions Fellowships to
at"-nd the Air Traffic Control
The Grenada Government re-
quested further assistance in res-
pect of the design and prepara-
tion of bills of quantity for a new
hospital block and for a bridge
calling for some intricate engin-
eering, as well as for testing of
poultry feeds produced in Gren-


S rvices Provided From another angle Trinidad
ervces Provided and Tobago has provided train-
THE scope of technical assist- ing for officers from the various
ance provided by Trinidad territories as follows(:
and Tobago and the strain in- 1965
evolved on our own technical and March The Laundry Superin-
administrative services may be tendent and one boiler at-
estimated from the following ser- tendant from Grenada for six
vices provided by Trinidad and weeks training in Trinidad
Tobago in the past fifteen May Two officers from St.
months. Lucia for training at the
1964 Printing Officers for 6 months
July Loan of the Laundry July Four officers from Gren-
Superintendent to Grenada ada participated in a 2
September Loan of an ento. months course for Commun.
mologist to the Windward ity Development Aides
Islands Banana Growers Asso. October The Assistant
ciation in St. Lucia Draughtsman from St. Vin-
October Loan of a Fire Officer cent for training for twelve
to St. Vincent to supervise a months.
fireworks display
December Loan of an entomo- PigS and Rice
logist to Grenada to report
and advise on the control of and Beef
the cocoa beetle
1965 iN addition, Trinidad and To-
January Loan of the Manager bago has provided additional
Jf the Agricultural Credit staff locally to take care* of the
Bank to St. Lucia to assist importation of pigs from Grenada
in the setting ti of an Agri- and St. Vincent Over and above
cultural Credit Bank the continuation of the Rice
February Loan of the Patholo- Agreement with British Guiana
gist to St. Lucia to testify Trinidad and Tobago has taken
in a murder trial steps to make possible a resump-
March Loan of our Netball tion of the former beef trade
Coach to the Grenada Netball with British Guiana, on the con.
Association edition that our country is not
March Loan of the Specialist thereby exposed to the danger
Medical Officer to St. Luqia of foot and mouth disease. An-
to advise on twelve cardiac appropriate technical office from
cases among children our Ministry of Agriculture visi-
April Technical assistance in ted British Guiana for this pur.
the field of printing and pose, and the agreement which
stationery to Grenada is now being worked out envi-
August Loan of the X-Ray sages further annual visits.
overhaul X-Ray equipment
overhaul X-Ray equipment A|ll very well
October Loan of the Senior
Chemist: to St. Vincent to. THIS technical assistance is all
give, evidence before the very well in its way. It not
Supreme Court. only demonstrates the goodwill

of Trinidad and Tobago to the
smaller islands and the. sense o0
responsibility that we actually
feel where they are concerned; it
is also, no doubt of great practi-
cal assistance to these territories,
dismally short as they are of the
necessary technical competence to
carry out their responsibilities in
the field of. administration, and
planning. But. even if. it were
possible for us to ewand the
scale andi scope of this technical
assistance, this. would not be a
rationalisation of the absurd Ca-
ribbean -economics.


TO this end Trinidad and To-
'bago, within the -context of
the proposals- which. are now
being examined for the incor-
iporaiion of..Genadainto the Uni-
ary:State ofTrinidad .and Tobago,
jhas tentatively putt forward some
new thoughts in- the -field of Aas-
.sociation. But briefly our ddea
amounts to .an assanoation of such
smaller tenritries.:as may wish to
consider it with ,Trinidad -mad To-
'bago, drawing ion the experience
of- the different. forms of associa-
tion worked outibetween. Northern
Ireland ,and the (United. Kingdom
ion- the -one hand; ;and -between
the Netherlands .and Suninam and
the Netherlands- Antilles on, the
other. T he, concrete gorm which
his form of association might
tflke may .be summarized as
fortows :
(1) The .~asetiiated 4.;ritories
will be self-ovierning in pure-
ly Jocal matters. on ,he. basis
of a -orm odf self-government
SomeWhgt superior to our
County Council arrange-

mnant; they, will have their
.*wo eelfl ns i. ndi Wfll .akJe
no ,p art .in Trinidad. and To-
bago elections.
(2) An agreed number of
rWdnibers from each associated
territory will sit .in the Tri.
rnidad and Tbbago. Parliament
Whea n -national ,matters. are
considered ,ibr example de.
fence foreign policy, external
relations, thel .national budget,
national economic, legislation
relating to tariffs income tax,
industrial development, reportt
incentives; and similar. ques.
tlons of Ihis. nature.
(3) The. assoiated.. tbrritories
.will similarly participate in
discussions of, the Cabinet of
Trinidad and Tobgo.,on- such
national issues.
(4) ,For .reasons, of- .cnomy,
-and. ,to avoid,,anyr Situation in
which tharwil o." ithe, peple
of Trinidad! emnd Tobago may
4,e frustrated, :ay too exossitv
.a repnrseMatetion from the as-
,sociatedi ~erritories, i. would
S bepreiaerable ,to-*arrangse for
such associationo n on the basis
.of, ~pretimary -grouping of
*te -.Heifies concerned -
such as MAindtwrd Islands and
Le-ewand Islands;

They wilt never

.INCE::these- proposals were ad-
Svmanced tentatively by mT
some:. months ago, the 'only deve-
lopments. have.. been the reports
that, one -tertitory preferred'assoc.
'dition with Britain, whilst
another- group of 'territories has
t -een pU Micly reported as 'having
-sought association with Canada.
These- West Indians will ,never


learn. The crux of the West only result in further parcella-
Indian problem of today is that tion of the Caribbean economy and
America does not want the West is designed solely as an attack on
Indies Canada wants them less, Trinidad and Tobago's position.
and Britain wants them least of
aSo the West Indies continues to British Caribbean
rush down the slippery slope to Free Trade Area
economic and political perdition,
getting nowhere fast. Every ter-
ritory looks on Trinidad and To- IN the midst of all this confusion,
bago either as a market, or as a Jamaica and Trinidad and To-
haven for its surplus population, bago took the lead in encouraging
and in the same breath would not the University of the West Indies,
hesitate to work towards some through its Institute of Social and
economic arrangement with its Economic Research to sponsor an
neighbours seeking to give its investigation into the possibility
neighbours' products some special- of establishing a free trade area
ly favoured position over Trinidad among the countries that used to
products. And budding expatriate belong to the British Caribbean
businessman looking for a quick zone. It is a commendable idea
profit somewhere is always cer- and a laudable effort, but at the
tain to find some welcome in- moment of writing its prospects
some smaller territory-,for some are too dim for any firm conclu-
fly-by-night operation which can sons to be attempted.

Printed oj
P'.N M. Publishing Company Limited
90 Frederick Street


Nir1 22,



I III I 11111 111111
3 1262 05836 0123


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