Citation
The Effects of anxiety on swimming performance

Material Information

Title:
The Effects of anxiety on swimming performance
Creator:
Swoap, Robert Andrew, 1965-
Publication Date:
Language:
English
Physical Description:
vi, 139 leaves : ; 29 cm.

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords:
Academic achievement ( jstor )
Anxiety ( jstor )
Cognitive psychology ( jstor )
Flumes ( jstor )
Heart rate ( jstor )
Psychological assessment ( jstor )
Self esteem ( jstor )
Sports ( jstor )
Sports psychology ( jstor )
Swimming ( jstor )
Anxiety ( mesh )
Department of Clinical and Health Psychology thesis Ph.D ( mesh )
Dissertations, Academic -- College of Health Related Professions -- Department of Clinical and Health Psychology -- UF ( mesh )
Psychomotor Performance ( mesh )
Research ( mesh )
Stress, Psychological ( mesh )
Swimming -- psychology ( mesh )
Genre:
bibliography ( marcgt )
non-fiction ( marcgt )

Notes

Thesis:
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Florida, 1992.
Bibliography:
Bibliography: leaves 119-132.
General Note:
Typescript.
General Note:
Vita.
Statement of Responsibility:
by Robert Andrew Swoap.

Record Information

Source Institution:
University of Florida
Holding Location:
University of Florida
Rights Management:
Copyright [name of dissertation author]. Permission granted to the University of Florida to digitize, archive and distribute this item for non-profit research and educational purposes. Any reuse of this item in excess of fair use or other copyright exemptions requires permission of the copyright holder.
Resource Identifier:
001751945 ( ALEPH )
27961538 ( OCLC )
AJG4884 ( NOTIS )

Downloads

This item has the following downloads:

AA00011782_00001.pdf

AA00011782_00001_0004.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0083.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0057.txt

AA00011782_00001_0127.txt

AA00011782_00001_0108.txt

AA00011782_00001_0037.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0101.txt

AA00011782_00001_0010.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0036.txt

AA00011782_00001_0104.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0003.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0022.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0116.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0091.txt

AA00011782_00001_0109.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0147.txt

AA00011782_00001_0087.txt

AA00011782_00001_0131.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0031.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0043.txt

AA00011782_00001_0012.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0088.txt

AA00011782_00001_0015.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0094.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0131.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0045.txt

AA00011782_00001_0024.txt

AA00011782_00001_0059.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0060.txt

AA00011782_00001_0023.txt

AA00011782_00001_0022.txt

AA00011782_00001_0110.txt

AA00011782_00001_0061.txt

AA00011782_00001_0043.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0049.txt

AA00011782_00001_0036.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0065.txt

AA00011782_00001_0002.txt

AA00011782_00001_0145.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0110.txt

AA00011782_00001_0018.txt

AA00011782_00001_0146.txt

AA00011782_00001_0103.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0117.txt

AA00011782_00001_0054.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0019.txt

AA00011782_00001_0105.txt

AA00011782_00001_0076.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0144.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0073.txt

AA00011782_00001_0035.txt

AA00011782_00001_0034.txt

AA00011782_00001_0089.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0097.txt

AA00011782_00001_0007.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0146.txt

AA00011782_00001_0032.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0072.txt

AA00011782_00001_0120.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0009.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0114.txt

AA00011782_00001_0056.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0033.txt

AA00011782_00001_0117.txt

AA00011782_00001_0113.txt

AA00011782_00001_0003.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0143.txt

AA00011782_00001_0013.txt

AA00011782_00001_0066.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0044.txt

AA00011782_00001_0033.txt

AA00011782_00001_0044.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0108.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0068.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0095.txt

AA00011782_00001_0125.txt

AA00011782_00001_0126.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0037.txt

AA00011782_00001_0064.txt

AA00011782_00001_0040.txt

AA00011782_00001_0096.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0112.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0135.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0038.txt

AA00011782_00001_0147.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0096.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0030.txt

AA00011782_00001_0124.txt

AA00011782_00001_0027.txt

AA00011782_00001_0086.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0010.txt

AA00011782_00001_0060.txt

AA00011782_00001_0107.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0001.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0127.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0132.txt

AA00011782_00001_0140.txt

AA00011782_00001_0142.txt

AA00011782_00001_0048.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0039.txt

AA00011782_00001_0079.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0093.txt

AA00011782_00001_0099.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0042.txt

AA00011782_00001_0025.txt

AA00011782_00001_0114.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0103.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0079.txt

AA00011782_00001_0062.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0016.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0098.txt

AA00011782_00001_0063.txt

AA00011782_00001_0070.txt

AA00011782_00001_0020.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0085.txt

AA00011782_00001_0071.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0018.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0102.txt

AA00011782_00001_0085.txt

AA00011782_00001_0106.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0125.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0054.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0078.txt

AA00011782_00001_0047.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0075.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0056.txt

AA00011782_00001_0092.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0067.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0139.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0021.txt

AA00011782_00001_0029.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0141.txt

AA00011782_00001_0068.txt

AA00011782_00001_0057.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0028.txt

AA00011782_00001_0101.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0058.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0040.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0032.txt

AA00011782_00001_0129.txt

AA00011782_00001_0115.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0026.txt

AA00011782_00001_0021.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0029.txt

AA00011782_00001_0078.txt

AA00011782_00001_0058.txt

AA00011782_00001_0031.txt

AA00011782_00001_0049.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0104.txt

AA00011782_00001_0094.txt

AA00011782_00001_0030.txt

AA00011782_00001_0017.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0015.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0133.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0035.txt

AA00011782_00001_0144.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0123.txt

AA00011782_00001_0118.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0081.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0000.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0071.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0076.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0140.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0053.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0013.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0052.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0115.txt

AA00011782_00001_0072.txt

AA00011782_00001_0006.txt

AA00011782_00001_0038.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0109.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0082.txt

AA00011782_00001_0019.txt

AA00011782_00001_0143.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0145.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0017.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0011.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0087.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0077.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0034.txt

AA00011782_00001_0080.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0111.txt

AA00011782_00001_0052.txt

AA00011782_00001_0102.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0048.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0130.txt

AA00011782_00001_0121.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0080.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0063.txt

AA00011782_00001_0073.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0105.txt

AA00011782_00001_0001.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0113.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0051.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0070.txt

AA00011782_00001_0041.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0129.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0092.txt

AA00011782_00001_0111.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0020.txt

AA00011782_00001_0016.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0089.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0099.txt

AA00011782_00001_0005.txt

AA00011782_00001_0014.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0062.txt

AA00011782_00001_0026.txt

AA00011782_00001_0130.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0008.txt

AA00011782_00001_0088.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0086.txt

AA00011782_00001_0053.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0074.txt

AA00011782_00001_0065.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0025.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0090.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0041.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0002.txt

AA00011782_00001_0093.txt

AA00011782_00001_0132.txt

AA00011782_00001_0134.txt

AA00011782_00001_0051.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0050.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0119.txt

AA00011782_00001_0112.txt

AA00011782_00001_0098.txt

AA00011782_00001_0046.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0126.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0046.txt

AA00011782_00001_0136.txt

AA00011782_00001_0141.txt

AA00011782_00001_0123.txt

AA00011782_00001_0082.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0118.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0137.txt

AA00011782_00001_0028.txt

AA00011782_00001_0067.txt

AA00011782_00001_0045.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0005.txt

AA00011782_00001_0090.txt

AA00011782_00001_pdf.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0027.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0128.txt

AA00011782_00001_0139.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0012.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0107.txt

AA00011782_00001_0097.txt

AA00011782_00001_0009.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0059.txt

AA00011782_00001_0074.txt

AA00011782_00001_0083.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0084.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0106.txt

AA00011782_00001_0100.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0014.txt

AA00011782_00001_0042.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0004.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0007.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0066.txt

AA00011782_00001_0081.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0120.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0024.txt

AA00011782_00001_0137.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0138.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0134.txt

AA00011782_00001_0116.txt

AA00011782_00001_0039.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0023.txt

AA00011782_00001_0095.txt

AA00011782_00001_0122.txt

AA00011782_00001_0084.txt

AA00011782_00001_0128.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0047.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0006.txt

AA00011782_00001_0011.txt

AA00011782_00001_0119.txt

AA00011782_00001_0069.txt

AA00011782_00001_0050.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0136.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0122.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0124.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0055.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0100.txt

AA00011782_00001_0135.txt

AA00011782_00001_0091.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0069.txt

AA00011782_00001_0077.txt

AA00011782_00001_0138.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0064.txt

AA00011782_00001_0055.txt

AA00011782_00001_0008.txt

AA00011782_00001_0075.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0121.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0061.txt

AA00011782_00001_0133.txt

effectsofanxiety00swoa_0142.txt

AA00011782_00001_0148.txt


Full Text













THE EFFECTS OF ANXIETY ON SWIMMING PERFORMANCE


By

ROBERT ANDREW SWOAP





















A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA


1992













ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS


I express my appreciation to the staff of United

States Swimming who provided me with the facilities and

technical support to conduct this study. I would also

like to thank Drs. Shane Murphy, Jay Kearney, and Sara

Smith of the United States Olympic Committee whose

endorsement, assistance and encouragement were vital to

its completion. A special thanks goes to Samantha Ortiz,

who spent many long hours at the video and computer

terminals coding the swimming data. At the University of

Florida, I had the assistance and expertise of five

outstanding committee members: Drs. Bruce Crosson,

Michael Geisser, Anthony Greene, James Johnson, and

Robert Singer. I thank them each for their advice and

instructive contributions to this dissertation. Deep

gratitude is especially given to my doctoral chairman,

Jim Johnson. Dr. Johnson's constant support, advisement

and enthusiasm were indispensable for the completion of

this project. Finally, I extend thanks and appreciation

to my dear friends and family who mean so much to me and

to whom I dedicate this work.















TABLE OF CONTENTS




ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .. ..................................... ii

ABSTRACT ............ .............. .................. v

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW .............................. 1
Statements of the Problem......................... 12
Brief Overview of Study ...................... oo .12
Hypotheses..................... ................. 13
Definitions of Terms....... ..................... 15
Assumptions......................................... 18
Limitations.................................... ... 19
Significance of the Study.......................... 20

REVIEW OF LITERATURE.................................... 22
Concepts and Definitions......................... 22
Anxiety and Stress.......................... 22
Arousal and Activation....................... 30
Summary of Concepts............................. 34
Relationship of Anxiety and Arousal to Performance. 35
Arousal................... ....... ...... ....... 36
Competitive Anxiety............................ 46
Problems with the Literature and Researchers'
Recommendations ........................... 58
Summary of Literature Review and Restatement
of Need for Current Study........................... 63

PROCEDURES... .................... ........ 67
Subjects........................ ...... .. ............ 67
Procedural Overview............................... 68
Measures............................ .. .. ..... .... .. 71
Methodology................ ....... .................. 79

RESULTS................ .......... ...... .... 85
Subjects...... ..... ... ........... ...... ... ....... 85
Effects of Anxiety Manipulations................... 86
Swimming Efficiency.............................. 90
Within-Subject Analyses........................... 93
Effects of Prior Flume Testing.................... 94
Separate Examination of Subjects New to the Flume.. 98


iii












DISCUSSION............................................ 102
Explanation of Findings............................ 102
Summary and Conclusions ............................. 111
Implications for Future Research................... 114

REFERENCES.................................................. 119

APPENDIX ...................... .... .......... .. ...... 133

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH....................................... 139









Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School
of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

THE EFFECTS OF ANXIETY ON SWIMMING PERFORMANCE

By

ROBERT ANDREW SWOAP

AUGUST, 1992

Chairman: James H. Johnson, Ph.D.
Major Department: Clinical and Health Psychology

It was the purpose of this study to examine the effects

of anxiety on skilled motor performance. More specifically,

assessed were the reactions of swimmers to an evaluative

competitive testing situation. It was hypothesized that

swimmers would demonstrate an increase in anxiety under a

stressful evaluative condition as compared to a baseline

assessment. It was also hypothesized that the swimmers'

propelling efficiency would decrease under increasing states

of anxiety.

High school swimmers (N=33) were matched for skill,

age, and competitive trait anxiety. They were tested in a

motorized flume (i.e., a "swimming treadmill") under two

trials. Prior to each trial, swimmers were given self-

report measures to assess their competitive state anxiety,

including cognitive and somatic anxiety, and had their heart

rate taken. During both trials, the subjects were

videotaped underwater to determine their swimming efficiency

using computer-aided biomechanical analyses. A baseline









efficiency measure was obtained during the first swim while

the swimmer was unaware of being filmed. The second trial

was conducted under one of three anxiety conditions (High,

Moderate, or Low anxiety). An attempt to create these

conditions experimentally was made through the use of

different instructions given to the swimmer prior to his or

her second trial.

The results of the study did not confirm a significant

relationship between anxiety and motor performance. This

was primarily due to the probability that the anxiety

manipulations were ineffective in raising the swimmers'

anxiety levels prior to the second testing trial. On the

contrary, the swimmers reported feeling less anxious and

more self-confident after performing their first flume swim.

Not surprisingly, their efficiency in the flume was slightly

improved during the second swim. This improvement appears

to be related to becoming accustomed to swimming in the

flume during the first trial. Thus, the original hypotheses

were not successfully tested. However, it was revealed that

swimmers who had never been tested in the flume reported

more anxiety and less self-confidence than those who had

been previously tested.













INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW


Both research and practice in the area of sport

psychology has increased during the last 10 years. This

is illustrated in the United States by a recent surge in

the formation of sport psychology-related organizations,

such as the Association for the Advancement of Applied

Sport Psychology and Division 47 of the American

Psychological Association (Exercise and Sport

Psychology), in addition to the North American Society

for the Psychology of Sport and Physical Activity. New

sport psychology journals are being published. These

include the Journal of Applied Sport Psychology, The

Sport Psychologist, and the Sport Psvchology Training

Bulletin, in addition to the Journal of Sport and

Exercise Psychology.

Further, it appears that sport psychology services

are being used more frequently in a variety of sectors.

For example, in the mid-1970s there was isolated

involvement of a few national governing bodies (NGBs)

with sport psychologists, but by 1987 over half of the

NGBs in the U.S. were provided with some sport psychology

services for athletes and coaches (Murphy, 1988). A

recent survey documented that 16 of the NGBs now have

formal sport psychology programs, and that all of these

1









programs are integrated within an overall sports science

program (Gould, Tammen, Murphy, & May, 1989). Silva

(1992) writes that there has been "meteoric growth of the

professionalization of sport psychology" (p. 2), within

collegiate, professional, and Olympic sports. According

to Singer (1992), sport psychology is emerging at a swift

rate all around the world, with interventions and

instructional programs being offered by sport

psychologists to athletes and coaches in increasing

numbers. Others concur that the growth of sport

psychology has been substantial in the last decade, but

express concern about what they see as a lack of identity

in the field (Rejeski & Brawley, 1988).

There has also been an increase in sport psychology

research. This can be partially attributed to a growing

recognition that an understanding of relevant

psychological factors is essential to bringing about

improved sports performance. Research in this area has

included the analysis of attentional factors (e.g.,

Singer et al., 1991), burnout (e.g., Dale & Weinberg,

1990), developmental issues (e.g., Brodkin & Weiss,

1990), gender issues (e.g., Allison, 1991), goals (e.g.,

Lewthwaite, 1990), imagery (e.g., Rodgers, Hall, &

Buckholz, 1991), injury (e.g., Brewer, Van Raalte, &

Linder, 1991), mental errors (e.g., Bird & Horn, 1990),

motivation (e.g., Davis, 1991), self-confidence and

efficacy (e.g., Martin & Gill, 1991), skill acquisition









(e.g., Singer, Flora, & Abourezk, 1989), and social

support (e.g., Sarason, Sarason, & Pierce, 1990).

Another major topic which has received much

attention in the literature deals with the relationship

between the constructs of anxiety and arousal and sports

performance (e.g., Burton, 1988; Crocker, Alderman, &

Smith, 1988; Ebbeck & Weiss, 1988; Fenz, 1988; Jones &

Cale, 1989; Landers & Boutcher, 1986; Madden, Summers, &

Brown, 1990; Prapavessis & Grove, 1991; Rodrigo,

Lusiardo, & Pereira, 1990; Williams, Tonymon, & Andersen,

1991). The degree of attention given to this topic is

highlighted by a recent content analysis of 29 sport

psychology books for athletes (Vealey, 1988) which

revealed that anxiety/arousal control techniques were the

second most frequently discussed factors related to the

enhancement of mental skills in sport. (Attentional

control techniques were most frequent.) Furthermore,

Murphy (1988) and Ogilvie et al. (1979) have indicated

that precompetitive tension is the number one problem for

which athletes request assistance. Within applied sport

psychology in the U.S., it has been suggested that some

form of anxiety management is used in the majority of

interventions with athletes (Singer, 1989).

Within the general consensus regarding the negative

effects of "excess" anxiety or arousal on athletic

performance, techniques described as "anxiety management"

and "arousal control" are applied frequently by sport









psychologists with athletes. However, less is known

regarding the efficacy of these various interventions.

Obviously, from a layperson's perspective there is a

common occurrence of athletes "choking" under pressure.

Most sports fans can recite several incidents in which an

athlete or team has not performed as well as expected,

and which may be attributed to the athlete's inability to

cope effectively with a pressure situation (e.g., missing

a two-foot putt to win a major golf championship; false-

starting and disqualification in the finals of a swim

meet). Understanding these failures to perform is

interesting to sports fans and scientists alike. Such

understanding is especially important for the athlete who

is seeking his or her best performance.

If there exists, for example, a zone of anxiety or

arousal within which athletes achieve optimal competitive

performance (cf. Hanin, 1980, 1986) then this knowledge

has special relevance for athletes, coaches, and sport

psychologists. If, however, any increase in anxiety or

arousal is detrimental to performance (cf. Bird & Horn,

1990; Burton, 1988), this has different ramifications for

athletes and those working with them.

Despite the fact that competition-specific anxiety

is a major concern for many athletes, coaches, and sport

psychologists, the research literature dealing with this

topic like that related to other forms of anxiety, is

insufficient to explain the precise relationship between









competitive anxiety and sports performance. To date,

research in this area has been hampered by methodological

problems (e.g., Gould, Petlichkoff, Simons, & Vevera,

1987; McCauley, 1985), statistical problems (cf. Smith,

1989), the use of poor outcome measures (cf., Martens,

Vealey, & Burton, 1990) and definitional inconsistencies

(cf. Gould & Krane, in press; Weinberg, 1990). Clearly,

more methodologically sophisticated research in this area

is needed, as several current sources recommend (e.g.,

Gould & Krane, in press; Jones & Hardy, 1990; Martens,

Vealey, & Burton, 1990; Weinberg, 1990).

Some of the confusion in this area stems from

definitional problems. The terms anxiety, arousal,

somatic anxiety, and stress, for example, have often been

used interchangeably in the basic and applied research

literature (Gould & Krane, in press; Weinberg, 1990).

This has posed more than merely a semantic problem, in

that different constructs have been proposed to have

varying relationships to skilled motor performance. For

example, what is the difference between somatic anxiety

and arousal or between cognitive anxiety and arousal?

And, do they have different effects on sports

performance? Issues pertaining to the definition of

constructs such as anxiety and arousal will be addressed

in a later section.

Apart from strictly definitional problems, another

important issue has to do with the multidimensional









nature of sport-related anxiety, and how different

dimensions of anxiety may relate to skilled sports

performance. Focus on this topic has mainly resulted

from the development of a revised form of the Competitive

State Anxiety Inventory (CSAI-2; Martens, Burton, Vealey,

Bump, & Smith, 1983) which is designed to assess

cognitive and somatic competitive anxiety and self-

confidence. Since the development of the CSAI-2, it has

become a prominent instrument in the assessment of sports

related state anxiety. The authors cite 16 published

empirical studies from 1984-1988 which have included the

CSAI-2 (Martens, Vealey, & Burton, 1990) and there have

been at least this many studies utilizing the CSAI-2 in

the last four years.

In creating the CSAI-2, Martens et al., (1983) with

regard to previous research (e.g., Borkovek, 1976; Doctor

& Altman, 1969; Liebert & Morris, 1967; Morris, Davis, &

Hutchings, 1981) have suggested that the distinction

between cognitive and somatic state anxiety is both

conceptually and practically important in the assessment

of competitive anxiety. Likewise, Morris and his

colleagues (Morris, Brown, & Halbert, 1977; Morris,

Harris, & Rovins, 1981; Morris & Liebert, 1973) have

argued that cognitive and somatic anxiety can be elicited

independently by different antecedents and are separate,

albeit related, components. Martens and his colleagues

have applied these notions to sport psychology and have









suggested that these two anxiety components have

different effects on competitive performance. They

suggest that somatic state anxiety will reach its peak at

the onset of competition and will dissipate once the

contest starts. Thus, they argue, somatic anxiety

(unless very high and attentionally distracting) should

influence performance less than should cognitive anxiety.

Cognitive anxiety, consisting of negative expectations

about success in performing a task, appears to occur both

before and throughout a performance, and thus may be more

important to the outcome (Martens, Vealey, & Burton,

1990).

The principle question regarding anxiety and sports

performance is how athletes react (cognitively,

physiologically, emotionally, behaviorally) to

"stressful" situations (e.g., competing in a loud,

hostile stadium; competing against an opponent that the

athlete knows nothing about; adjusting to a different

climate and race course). Despite definitional,

methodological, and conceptual problems surrounding

athletes' reactions to anxiety, there exists sufficient

research to suggest that anxiety affects athletic

performance. Although this topic will be addressed fully

in the literature review, it is important to briefly

present information on what is known about the potential

effects of anxiety on performance directly, as well as on









physiological, cognitive, and other mediators of athletic

performance.

There is research to suggest that individuals in

competitive situations, including children (Beuter &

Duda, 1985; Lewthwaite, 1990), adolescents (Crocker,

Alderman, & Smith, 1988), adults (Rodrigo, Lusiardo, &

Pereira, 1990), and elite athletes (Scanlan, Stein, &

Ravizza, 1991), are susceptible to "evaluation stress" in

which the resultant anxiety may interfere with

performance. The anxiety reaction appears to be related

to a threat perception, and can be manifested in

behavioral, cognitive, and physiological responses.

It also appears that competitive state anxiety is

dependent upon the nature of the competition, upon the

athlete's tendency to experience anxiety in general (trait

anxiety), and upon the coping skills developed by the

athlete to deal with the anxiety-arousing competition

(Smith & Smoll, 1990). Thus, a major state championship

is potentially more anxiety-provoking than a weekly local

contest, and therefore may present the athlete with a

greater challenge of coping with "nerves" and

"butterflies" surrounding the competition. Similarly, an

athlete with a high amount of competitive trait anxiety

(and poor coping skills) would be more likely to

experience decrements in performance in an important

competition than an athlete who has less trait anxiety,

or than one who has developed effective coping strategies









for pressure-filled competitive situations (Lewthwaite,

1990; Smith & Smoll, 1990).

It also appears that anxiety primarily affects the

athlete in performance-degrading ways (e.g., Burton,

1988; McCann, Murphy, & Raedeke, in press) through

cognitive and attentional factors (e.g., "mental" errors)

(Albrecht & Feltz, 1987; Bird & Horn, 1990; Singer et

al., 1991), and through somatic effects (e.g., too

"pumped-up") (Powell & Verner, 1982; Smith & Smoll,

1990). Anxiety also appears to affect individuals

negatively in a competitive situation via altered motoric

reactions (e.g., Beuter & Duda, 1985; Weinberg, 1990).

As will be demonstrated in the literature review, it

is currently not clear which factors of competition

(e.g., intraindividual pressure, competitors, coaches)

and which mediating factors (e.g., attention,

physiological arousal, cognitive anxiety) are most

relevant to performance in regards to competition

anxiety. Sport psychologists who are evaluating athletes

and the athletes themselves would benefit from more

compelling information regarding how athletes react under

potentially "stressful" competitive situations. A more

precise understanding of the nature of athletes'

responses to stressful situations and how their

performances are affected is needed.

One specific example of a situation which may be

anxiety-producing to athletes, and which may represent an









ideal context within which to investigate many of the

issues discussed here, involves the examination of

swimming speed, efficiency, and stroke mechanics at the

United States Swimming International Center for Aquatic

Research. This facility is unique in providing state of

the art assessments of stroke technique, propelling

efficiency, and swimming economy, while swimmers perform

in a swimming flume (a kind of "swimming treadmill").

Swimmers from around the nation and world come for

testing at the flume at the Olympic Training Center in

Colorado Springs, Colorado.

Despite the excellent information that this facility

can provide to athletes and coaches, it seems likely that

some swimmers approach the somewhat novel procedure of

the flume experience with excessive anxiety and become

unable to reliably demonstrate their characteristic

strokes. The anxiety may derive from varied sources:

performance or evaluative anxiety (e.g., fear of

performing poorly in view of U.S. Swimming coaches or

researchers), anxiety related to the unfamiliarity of the

flume, or anxiety related to swimming in the confined

space of the flume. Thus, the assessment situation may

provide a significant source of anxiety for some

swimmers.

It is possible that the anxious swimmer may not

perform to the best of his or her ability as a result of

focusing on inappropriate cognitions and anxiety-









generating self-statements, and/or as a result of

excessive physiological arousal. Thus, the effects of

arousal and anxiety on swimming performance in the flume

may prevent the most accurate assessment of the swimmers'

techniques. Furthermore, if anxiety-responses could be

experimentally manipulated, then the flume might provide

an ideal setting to study the reactions of athletes to

competitive anxiety. (Data routinely obtained on those

assessed in the flume represent highly quantifiable

dependent measures.)

In the present investigation, the flume was used to

provide a potentially stressful testing situation for

swimmers where psychological, physiological, and

biomechanical variables could be carefully assessed.

Swimmers were chosen as subjects for two main reasons.

First, the flume provides a unique setting for a

controlled assessment of performance (i.e., one in which

an externally valid situation can simultaneously provide

precise performance measurement). Second, swimming is of

a primarily individual nature and allows for direct

assessment of intra-individual effects of anxiety. It

was felt that an investigation with swimmers assessed in

this sort of facility would be ideally suited to provide

useful information regarding the nature of the

relationship between anxiety and sports performance. A

secondary goal of the study was to examine an existing









assessment procedure (i.e., the flume) to determine its

effects on swimmers' anxiety and performance.


Statements of the Problem

There were three primary purposes for conducting

this investigation: (1) to examine and compare the

effects of the components of anxiety (i.e., somatic vs.

cognitive) on swimming performance; (2) to determine how

the swimming stroke (from a biomechanical perspective) is

affected by different levels of externally-induced

anxiety; and (3) to determine whether current assessment

procedures at the International Center for Aquatic

Research are affected by a swimmer's testing history in

the flume.

Brief Overview of Study

High school swimmers (N=33) were matched for skill,

age, and competitive trait anxiety. Each was tested on

two trials in the motorized flume (i.e., "swimming

treadmill"). Prior to each trial, swimmers were given

self-report measures to assess their competitive state

anxiety, including cognitive and somatic anxiety, and had

their heart rate taken. During both trials, the subjects

were videotaped underwater to determine their swimming

efficiency using computer-aided biomechanical analyses.

A baseline efficiency was obtained during the first swim

while the swimmer was unaware of being filmed. The

second trial was conducted under one of three anxiety









conditions (High, Moderate, or Low anxiety). An attempt

to create these conditions experimentally was made

through the use of different instructions given to the

swimmer prior to his or her second trial. Comparisons of

swimming efficiency were made between the two swims based

on group membership and on intra-individual changes in

self-report measures.


Hypotheses

The following research hypotheses were tested:

1. Competitive cognitive state anxiety will be

significantly and negatively related to freestyle

swimming performance (i.e., stroke efficiency). This

relationship is expected to manifest itself such that

swimming performance during the second swim becomes less

efficient as a function of group membership (determined

by repeated measures analyses of variance). That is,

swimmers in the high-anxiety group should show the

greatest decrement in swimming performance, followed by

those in the moderate-anxiety group, and then the low-

anxiety group (whose members are expected to show the

slightest performance decrement during the second

evaluated swim).

It is thus expected that any increase in cognitive

anxiety will have a negative effect on the biomechanical

efficiency of the swimmer. This hypothesis is based in

part on recent sport psychology research findings (e.g.,









Bird and Horn (1990) who found that cognitive anxiety was

positively related to mental errors, and Burton (1988)

who concluded that cognitive anxiety was negatively

related to swimming performance). Cognitive psychology

research (e.g., Wine, 1971, 1980) also lends support and

suggests that with increasing cognitive anxiety,

individuals become more preoccupied with self-evaluation

and possible failure thus disrupting performance.

2. Independent of the groups, performance

decrements will be most pronounced in those swimmers who

demonstrate the greatest increases in cognitive anxiety

from baseline to evaluated swims (determined by

correlational and regression analyses). For these

swimmers, an evaluated flume swim may seem more difficult

and be associated with a greater perceived threat, a more

negative anxiety reaction, and thus a greater decrement

in swimming efficiency (cf. Beuter & Duda, 1985; Brustad

& Weiss, 1987; Lewthwaite, 1990). Testing of this

hypothesis is supported by researchers who suggest that

intra-individual analyses in anxiety-performance research

is meaningful and needed (Gould & Krane, in press;

Sonstroem & Bernardo, 1982; Weinberg, 1990).

3. Cognitive state anxiety will have a more

profound negative effect on performance than somatic

state anxiety. As a result of previous research (Burton,

1988; Feltz, Landers, & Raeder, 1979; Gould et al., 1987;

Martens et al., 1983; Rosenthal, 1968; Sarason, 1975;









Weinberg, Gould, & Jackson, 1979), it was hypothesized

that somatic A-state would likely be greatest before the

swimmer entered the flume and then would dissipate as the

testing began, but that cognitive A-state (especially

anxiety related to evaluation) would likely continue into

the testing and be associated with measurable decrements

in swimming efficiency.

4. If decrements are found in the freestyle stroke,

the most likely stage will be during the "finish" phase

(see below in Definitions of Terms). The finish is the

most powerful stage of the freestyle stroke and is the

stage during which many young swimmers have difficulty

fully completing the armstroke. It is thought that if a

swimmer becomes affected by excessive anxiety he or she

may become less efficient and have to work harder. It

was hypothesized that the finish phase would be the most

affected by evaluative anxiety, in that the swimmer would

have to compensate for the decrease in efficiency using a

higher stroke turnover rate (and thus compromise the

finish phase). This will be assessed by examining

changes in efficiency of the finish phase as a function

of group membership (using a repeated measures ANOVA).



Definitions of Terms

Although within the Review of Literature definitions

and concepts are addressed, the following terms are

defined briefly in order to assist in understanding the









terminology of the present study. To facilitate a better

comprehension of these terms, it is first necessary to

present a brief overview of the freestyle swimming

armstroke. The stroke is made up of three phases (catch,

insweep, and finish). (Recovery, in which the hand

travels from the end of the stroke to reenter the water,

is the fourth phase of the stroke, but is not associated

with the propulsion of the swimmer.) The phases are not

distinct, but are continuous parts of the stroke. Thus,

the swimmer first enters the water, "catching" it and

pulling back and away from the body. Next, the swimmer

begins to bend the elbow more as he or she "sweeps" the

water with the hand in and underneath the body. To

"finish" the stroke, the swimmer pushes the water with

the hand out and back (from underneath the body)

eventually lifting the elbow and hand out of the water

for recovery. From the perspective of the swimmer, the

right arm generally follows the shape of an inverted "S",

while the left arm approximates an "S".


Angle of Pitch (AP) is the angle of the hand in

relation to the swimmer's body at any one time during the

armstroke (90 approximates a hand-shaking position).

Anxiety refers to the experience of negative

thoughts (e.g., worry, self-doubt) and usually

concomitant physiological sensations (e.g., sweaty palms,

racing heart rate) which are induced in response to a









threatening situation (objective or subjective; of

environmental, social or intrapersonal origin).

Arousal is defined as psychological and/or

physiological activation of an organism on a continuum

from deep sleep to extreme activation (e.g., intense

excitement or fear).

Catch is the first phase of the armstroke in which

the swimmer's hand enters the water and begins the

stroke. For analytical purposes, it continues to the

point at which the swimmer's hand is at its widest point

(i.e., furthest point laterally from the body).

DiQitization refers to the process of converting a

video image of an action (e.g., a swimming armstroke)

into two and three dimensional coordinates for

quantitative computer analysis.

Drag is defined as any negative force created during

swimming which acts to slow the body through water

resistance (e.g., during hand entry).

Finish describes the third, final, and most powerful

phase of the armstroke in which the swimmer completes the

stroke cycle. For analytical purposes, it begins at the

point at which the swimmer's hand is at its narrowest

point (i.e., underneath the body) and ends with the

hand's exit from the water.

Flume refers to a "swimming treadmill" in which

subjects are evaluated (filmed via underwater video









cameras) while they swim against a steady stream of

water.

Hand Velocity (HV) is the speed of the hand through

the water in meters per second.

Hydrodynamic Biomechanical Analysis is an overall

process of filming a swimmer with underwater cameras, and

then determining forces and efficiency of the swimmer

(via digitization).

Insweep refers to the middle (second) phase of the

armstroke. For analytical purposes, it begins where the

catch ends (i.e., at the widest point) and continues

until the hand is at the narrowest point (i.e.,

underneath the body and where the finish begins).

Propelling Efficiency (PE) is a measure of how

efficient a swimmer is in moving through the water. It

is the propulsive force (RE) divided by the total force

(R) multiplied by 100 and thus expressed as a percentage.

Propulsive Force (RE) is the force (measured in

newtons) which the swimmer exerts upon the water in order

to propel himself or herself through the water. It is a

component of the total force which the swimmer exerts.

Total Force (R) is the total force (measured in

newtons) which the swimmer exerts upon the water while

swimming.

Assumptions

For the purpose of this investigation, the following

assumptions were made:









1. Subjects would be able to swim the freestyle

stroke in the flume during a testing procedure.

2. The flume would provide an adequate assessment

of swimming technique in high school swimmers.

3. The anxiety manipulations and flume testing

procedure would present a significantly stressful

situation to swimmers (especially for those naive to the

flume). This assumption was made on the basis of

literature which suggests that evaluative situations

involving some threat to perceived ability or skills are

highly anxiety-producing (Beuter & Duda, 1985; Brustad &

Weiss, 1987; Burton, 1988; Gould et al., 1987;

Lewthwaite, 1990; Scanlan, 1984). It was assumed that

subjects' reactions to the flume testing procedures would

be fairly representative of how high school swimmers

react (psychologically, physiologically, and

biomechanically) to varying stressful conditions.

4. Subjects would be able to accurately respond to

paper and pencil questionnaires which assess thoughts of

anxiety.


Limitations

1. Due to limitations placed on the investigator

for data collection by U.S. Swimming, the flume testing

procedure was not novel to approximately one-third of the

subjects. The original intention was to include only

subjects who had not previously experienced the flume.









Therefore, data analyses were somewhat altered and

compromised.

2. In that only high school swimmers were tested,

there may be limited generalizability to a more

competitive group of swimmers (e.g., collegiate or

Olympic-caliber swimmers).


Significance of the Study

A recent survey by Blinde and Tierney (1990)

indicated that U.S. Swimming coaches as a group possess a

moderate to large degree of receptivity to the field of

sport psychology. As the authors correctly point out,

this degree of receptivity is critical in the process of

disseminating applied sport psychology research

information to a sport and its coaches and athletes.

However, a clear obstacle to receptivity is a "limited

knowledge base disseminated from the researcher to the

practitioner" (p. 137). The authors recommend that

researchers focus their attention on practical and

applied studies. Accordingly, a potential contribution

of this study was to conduct research that could be

readily received and used by coaches as well as athletes.

It was expected that this study would have implications

for providing applied research knowledge to the consumer

(e.g., coaches and athletes) through the U.S. Swimming

organization via publications and coaches and athletes'

clinics.









In addition to providing information that could be

useful to swimming, this study was expected to contribute

to the body of knowledge associated with the potential

relationship between anxiety and sports performance. As

will be demonstrated in the following section, there are

significant questions as to how athletes respond to

anxiety in a competitive context. It was expected that a

significant contribution of this study would be to expand

upon and clarify the anxiety-performance relationship.

The current investigation also constituted an

attempt to pool the resources of a sport-specific sports

science team (U.S. Swimming, International Center for

Aquatic Research) with sport psychology in a joint effort

to investigate a specific question (i.e., examining the

accuracy of flume assessments with anxious subjects) and

a larger issue (i.e., investigating the relationship

between anxiety and sports performance). As such, it

reflected an integration of different disciplines within

the sports sciences (e.g., biomechanics, motor control,

physiology, and sport psychology) and was expected to

provide a useful model for future multidisciplinary

projects. In general, then, it was expected that this

study would contribute to the literature concerning the

relationship between anxiety and a specific type of

athletic performance (swimming).













REVIEW OF LITERATURE


Concepts and Definitions

Anxiety and Stress

Anxiety can be differentiated in terms of whether it

is manifested as a transitory experience (state anxiety)

or as a proclivity towards feeling anxious (trait

anxiety). State anxiety has been defined as

Transitory emotional states that consist of
subjective, consciously-experienced feelings of
tension, apprehension, nervousness and worry, and
heightened arousal or activation of the autonomic
nervous systems. These states vary in intensity and
fluctuate over time as a function of the amount of
perceived threat. Thus, perceived threat mediates
the relationship between stressors and the intensity
of state anxiety reactions. (Spielberger, 1982, p.
3)

The anxiety state may consist of a combination of

some of the following characteristics: tension,

nervousness, unpleasant thoughts (worries), and

physiological changes (e.g., dry.mouth, pupil dilation,

faster and more intense breathing, tense muscles)

associated with the increased sympathetic activity of the

autonomic nervous system (Burton, 1988; Spielberger,

1982). In more severe instances of anxiety, as during a

panic attack, symptoms experienced may include:

Shortness of breath dyspneaa) or smothering
sensations; dizziness, unsteady feelings, or
faintness; choking; palpitations or accelerated









heart rate; trembling or shaking; sweating; nausea
or abdominal distress; depersonalization
orderealization; numbness or tingling sensations
(parasthesias); flushes (hot flashes) or chills;
chest pain or discomfort; fear of dying; and fear of
going crazy or of doing something uncontrolled
during the attack. (American Psychiatric
Association, 1987, p. 236)

Smith and Smoll (1990) define anxiety as a

multidimensional construct which involves an aversivee

emotional response and an avoidance motive characterized

by worry and apprehension concerning the possibility of

physical or psychological harm, together with increased

physiological arousal resulting from the appraisal of

threat" (Smith & Smoll, 1990, p. 419). Gould and Krane

(in press) report that anxiety has been viewed as

feelings of nervousness and tension associated with

activation or arousal of the organism.

Eysenck (1982) postulates that the strength of an

individual's anxiety state depends on two main factors:

(1) the degree of external threat and (2) the

individual's susceptibility to anxiety (i.e., anxiety

proneness). It is the second factor that is defined as

trait anxiety or

A motive or acquired behavioral disposition that
predisposes an individual to perceive a wide range
of objectively nondangerous circumstances as
threatening and to respond to these with state
anxiety reactions disproportionate in intensity to
the magnitude of the objective danger. (Spielberger,
1966, p. 17)

Thus, individuals who have a high amount of trait anxiety

will tend to perceive more situations as anxiety-









provoking, and/or experience stronger feelings of anxiety

under a threatening condition. Marten, Vealey, and

Burton (1990) concur and suggest that trait anxiety is

the predisposition to perceive various environmental

stimuli as threatening or nonthreatening and to respond

to these stimuli with corresponding levels of state

anxiety.

An additional differentiation in the definition of

anxiety is that of physiological and cognitive

components. Liebert and Morris (1967) addressed this

point in their examination of test anxiety, which they

contended was a composite of worry and emotionality.

They defined worry as the component of anxiety which is

principally "cognitive concern about the consequences of

failure" (p. 975). Emotionality was described as the

more physiological aspects of anxiety (e.g., the

unpleasant physical feelings of nervousness and tension).

This classification has been supported widely, and is

seen as an important feature of anxiety (Barnes, Sime,

Dienstbier, & Plake, 1986; Borkovek, 1976; Burton, 1988;

Martens, Vealey, & Burton, 1990; Morris, Harris, &

Rovins, 1981; Taylor, 1987). Generally, the

worry/emotionality distinction is described in terms of

cognitive and somatic anxiety. As will be demonstrated,

these two concepts have been examined as to their

independence and interrelatedness.









As applied to participation in sport, anxiety is

frequently operationally defined in terms of "competitive

stress" or "competitive anxiety." Although stress has

been at times been used interchangeably with anxiety, it

is actually a broader term which can be defined at times

as a stimulus, an intervening, or a response variable

(whereas anxiety is almost exclusively described as a

response variable). Thus, these two terms may or may not

be analogous depending on the context in which they are

used.

As a stimulus, the term stressor is usually used to

refer to situations or stimuli that are objectively

characterized by some degree of physical or psychological

danger or threat (Spielberger, 1982). Spielberger

explains that reactions to a stressor are dependent on

whether a particular situation or stimulus is threatening

(i.e., potentially dangerous or harmful). Of course,

this can be both objective and subjective "danger."

Thus, objective dangers (e.g., hurricanes, illness) are

appraised by most people as threatening, whereas for

subjective dangers the same stimulus may be seen as a

threat, a challenge, or as largely irrelevant, depending

on the person's estimation of the threat value of the

stimulus.

Spielberger concludes then that the experience of

threat has two main characteristics: (1) It is future-

oriented, generally involving the anticipation of a









potentially harmful event; and (2) It is mediated by

psychological activities (e.g., perception, thought,

memory, and judgement) which are involved in the

appraisal process. An example comes from some

competitive sports in which athletes strive to perform at

peak levels under circumstances in which an opposing side

aims to restrict such performance (Madden et al., 1990).

The athlete must appraise the potential threat using

mental processing (i.e., accurate perception, careful

thought, recollections of previous interactions, etc.)

and must arrive at a reasonable judgement.

The concept of stress has also been described as an

intervening variable, linking two sets of factors

(stressors and stress reactions) together. Thus, the

stressfulness for an individual of any stressor varies,

depending on how he or she perceives the situation and on

how he or she perceives available coping resources

(Kimble, Garmezy, & Zigler, 1984). Stress has also been

defined very generally as "any behavioral response of an

organism to environmental stimulation" (Fenz, 1988, p.

223).

With regard to sports, Scanlan (1984) states that

competition can be "stressful" due to extensive

evaluation of ability and competence, and that

competitive stress is a negative emotional reaction an

athlete feels when self-esteem is threatened. "It is

his/her perceptions of inadequacy in successfully meeting









the performance demands, and his/her perceptions of the

consequences of failure, that create the threat to self-

esteem which triggers the stress reaction" (Scanlan,

1984, p. 119).

In a more recent paper, Scanlan and her colleagues

(1991) define competitive stress as an encompassing

condition where the athlete experiences negative

emotions, feelings, and thoughts that might occur with

respect to a competitive experience. "These would

include feelings of apprehension, anxiety, muscle

tension, nervousness, physical reactions (such as

butterflies in the stomach, shaking, or nervous

sweating), thoughts centered on worry and self-doubt, and

negative statements to yourself" (Scanlan et al., 1991,

p. 105). Martens, Vealey, and Burton (1990) comment on

how stress is related to anxiety suggesting that stress

occurs under conditions in which failure to meet demands

is perceived as having important consequences and is thus

responded to with increased levels of state anxiety.

Competitive anxiety appears to be solely defined as

a response variable (i.e., an athlete can respond to a

competitive stressor with competitive anxiety).

Competitive anxiety is the more prevalent term in the

literature to describe the reaction to a "stressful"

competitive situation. Utilizing Spielberger's (1966,

1972) and others (Borkovek, 1976; Liebert & Morris, 1967)

suggestions that anxiety is a multidimensional construct,









Martens (1977) suggests that cognitive and somatic

anxiety are two separate components of competitive

anxiety. Burton (1988) writes that

Cognitive anxiety is the mental component of anxiety
caused by negative expectations about success or
negative self-evaluation, whereas somatic anxiety is
the physiological or affective component of anxiety
that is directly related to autonomic arousal.
Cognitive anxiety is characterized by worry,
negative self-talk, and unpleasant visual imagery,
whereas somatic anxiety is reflected in such
responses as rapid heart rate, shortness of breath,
clammy hands, butterflies in the stomach, and tense
muscles. (Burton, 1988, p. 46)

It has been proposed that these two components have

differential effects on performance (e.g., Burton, 1988;

Smith & Smoll, 1990; Weinberg, 1990) and thus the

comprehensive term "competitive anxiety" may not have

exclusively negative or positive effects (see a later

section entitled Relationship between Competitive Anxiety

and Performance).

Although the two components of anxiety are

hypothetically independent, Morris, Davis, and Hutchings

(1981) have suggested that they probably covary in

stressful situations since these situations contain

elements related to the stimulation of both somatic and

cognitive responses. A modest dependence has been

demonstrated in a number of studies (Deffenbacher, 1980;

Martens, Vealey, & Burton, 1990; Morris & Liebert, 1973).

However, conflicting evidence exists that suggests that

cognitive and somatic anxiety are independent, depending

on the situational stressor. That is, high somatic









anxiety can be aroused without eliciting self-evaluation,

while certain conditions which are highly evaluative

elicit cognitive anxiety but not somatic state anxiety

(Burton, 1988; Morris, Harris, and Rovins, 1981).

Competitive anxiety can be further delineated using

state and trait anxiety terms, which have been described

previously. Hence, competitive state anxiety can be

defined as a condition prior to or during a competitive

situation "characterized by feelings of apprehension and

tension and associated with activation of the organism"

(Martens, Vealey, & Burton, 1990, p. 9), while

competitive trait anxiety is defined as a "situation-

specific modification of the more general A-trait

construct a tendency to perceive competitive

situations as threatening and to respond to these

situations with A-state" (p. 11).

Although it may be true that it cannot yet be

adequately explained why some athletes perceive threat in

the sport environment while others regard their sport

experiences as positive or benign (Lewthwaite, 1990) we

can at least define the stress/anxiety terms in a more

straightforward and consistent way. An appropriate

summary of the stress process which has four interrelated

stages is given by Gould and Krane (in press) who adapted

McGrath's (1970) process model of stress to sports.

First, an environmental situation or demand is placed on

the athlete. Second, the athlete must interpret this









situation and determine whether there is a perceived

imbalance between the demands of the situation and the

capabilities of himself or herself. Third, and depending

on this interpretation, the athlete can experience

changes in physiological arousal and/or state anxiety.

Fourth is the outcome of the performance.

This explanation is helpful in that it demonstrates

that competitive stress is a process and that the

emphasis is placed on the athlete's evaluation and

perception of a competitive situation, and not simply the

situation itself. Thus, in this context, competitive

stress may be viewed as positive or negative. This is in

contrast to competitive anxiety which is described as

primarily negative. However, even this is not

indisputable as will be seen in the forthcoming section

on the relationship between anxiety and performance.

Arousal and Activation

The relatedness among terms does not end with

anxiety and its associated terms but continues in the

notion of arousal and activation. Some writers adopt a

parsimonious approach to the topic:

Arousal and activation are used interchangeably by
most motivation theorists, although there are some
who have attempted to make distinctions between the
two concepts. In this text, the two words will be
considered to be synonymous. Emotional, tense, and
anxious are other adjectives that are frequently
used to express the same idea, and in sports,
"psyched-up" conveys the same notion. (Sage, 1984,
p. 345)









Other writers have explained arousal as synonymous

with motivation (Magill, 1989), alertness/readiness (Cox,

1990), and psychic energy (Martens, 1987). Perhaps the

most traditional definition explains arousal as energy

mobilization ranging on a continuum from deep sleep or

coma at one extreme, to panic-stricken terror or great

excitement at the other extreme (Eysenck, 1984; Malmo,

1959). Duffy (1957, 1962) proposed that arousal is

neural/physiological excitation which varies on two

dimensions: intensity and direction. "For Duffy (1962),

any given point on this continuum was determined by 'the

extent of release of potential energy, stored in the

tissues of the organism, as this is shown in activity or

response' (p. 17)" (Neiss, 1988a, p. 345).

As with anxiety, arousal can be described as

multidimensional in nature (Landers, 1980), and has been

suggested to encompass three dimensions: physiological,

behavioral, and cognitive (Borkovek, 1976). The

indicators of increased arousal are manifested and

assessed in a number of ways: self-report,

electrophysiological (e.g., decreases in skin resistance

of galvanic skin response; increases in palmar sweating,

EMG, EEG), respiratory and cardiovascular (e.g.,

increases in ECG, blood pressure, heart rate), and

biochemical (e.g., increases in the release of adrenaline

and noradrenaline) (Gould & Krane, in press; Hackfort &

Schwenkmezger, 1989).









It has been suggested and demonstrated empirically

that the neurophysiological indicators of increased

arousal have poor intercorrelations and low correlations

with self-report scales of arousal (Fahrenberg,

Walschburger, Foerster, Myrtek, & Muller, 1983; Venables,

1984; Zaichkowsky & Takenaka, in press). It is not

clearly understood why this is the case although

suggested reasons are autonomic response stereotypy

(Lacey & Lacey, 1958), differing expectancies (Kirsch &

Weixel, 1988; Neiss, 1990), learning history (Borkovek,

1976; Landers, 1980), and construct validation problems

with arousal (e.g., Neiss, 1988).

In discussing the different measures of arousal,

Hackfort and Schwenkmezger (1989) propose that

physiological indicators of arousal are difficult to

apply in sport psychology research, in that these

parameters often change more as a result of physical

activity than as a result of anxiety-inducing situations.

Behavioral assessments of arousal (e.g., pacing,

avoidance) are less seldom reported in the sport

psychology literature, although Hackfort and

Schwenkmezger (1989) suggest that this is an area which

is particularly important in sport.

Arousal and anxiety are generally discussed in the

same context, but are not necessarily related to each

other. For example, excessive physiological arousal may

be associated with a range of diverse feelings such as









anxiety, sexual excitement, fear or exhilaration (cf.

Apter, 1982). In an early paper discussing the nature

and measurement of anxiety, Cattell (1963) found that the

correlation between heart rate and anxiety is only a

moderately positive one, again suggesting a variable

relationship between arousal and anxiety. Zaichkowsky

and Takenaka (in press) suggest that although anxiety is

typically associated with an increase in arousal, the two

constructs are not the same. Drawing from the previous

discussion of the anxiety concept, it appears more useful

to discuss how the subcomponents of anxiety relate to

arousal rather than trying to establish a relationship

between the broad term anxiety and arousal. Clearly,

cognitive anxiety is unlikely to occur during a highly

arousing condition such as excitement, which is described

by Apter (1984) as a "paratelic state".

On the other hand, cognitive anxiety will likely

occur during what Apter terms a "telic state" (e.g., a

high arousal condition of fear). For example, two rock

climbers (or skydivers, or bull-riders) experience

heightened arousal related to the potential threat

(falling). One feels challenged by the climb and

experiences the situation in the paratelic mode (i.e.,

with excitement). The other, less confident athlete

experiences the situation in the telic mode (i.e., with

fear and anxiety). In both situations, the climbers will

likely experience increases in arousal and report somatic









anxiety. However, only the second individual will report

cognitive anxiety. This distinction is vital, as will be

shown in the following section, in determining the

effects of anxiety and arousal on sports performance.

Summary of Concepts

Activation and arousal are assumed to be synonymous

constructs. The term arousal will be used in this paper

and is defined as a general indicator of physiological

energy and intensity. It is not synonymous with anxiety

as a whole, but is similar to the subcomponent, somatic

anxiety. However, somatic anxiety is not a well-

understood construct. In this paper, somatic anxiety is

operationally defined as (measured by) an individual's

perception of physiological arousal (e.g., how hard my

heart is beating). Further, the definition of somatic

anxiety is not exclusive of cognitive anxiety since an

individual's perceptions of physiological arousal may be

greatly affected by anxious thoughts.

Cognitive anxiety, while able to cause increases in

physiological arousal, is not synonymous with arousal.

Cognitive anxiety can be determined to be either a cause

or result of increased physiological arousal, and in some

cases may be independent of arousal. It is defined in

this paper in terms of negative thoughts associated with

perceptions about success or thoughts involving negative

self-evaluation.








Relationship of Anxiety and Arousal to Performance

In examining the relationship of anxiety and arousal

to skilled motor performance, and more specifically, to

sports performance, researchers have often used terms

(e.g., stress, anxiety, arousal) interchangeably and

inappropriately. According to Gould and Krane (in

press), the inconsistent use of these terms has been a

long-standing problem for this body of literature. A

review of the literature is difficult when trying to

grasp what is being assessed, and whether authors are

referring to arousal or anxiety when they present their

findings. Thus, in this review of the arousal-anxiety /

performance relationship, efforts are made to distinguish

between terms where possible.

Despite the conceptual and definitional

inconsistencies in this area of research, analyses of the

relationships among anxiety, arousal, and sports

performance constitute a large part of the sport

psychology literature (e.g., Jones & Hardy, 1989; Krane &

Williams, 1987; Landers & Boutcher, 1986; Madden,

Summers, & Brown, 1990; Meacci & Price, 1985; Murphy &

Woolfolk, 1987; Poteet & Weinberg, 1980; Raglin, Wise, &

Morgan, 1990; Sonstroem & Bernardo, 1982). This section

of the literature review will examine the various

theories which seek to describe the anxiety-arousal-

performance relationship with a focus on those studies

most relevant to the research in this dissertation.








Arousal

While the concept of arousal is somewhat amorphous,

much attention has been focused on its relationship to

performance. Early hypotheses derived from drive theory

suggested that there was a positive, linear relationship

between arousal and performance (Hull, 1943; Spence,

1951). This view received little empirical support and

has principally been replaced by the inverted-U theory

which posits a curvilinear relationship between arousal

and performance. Increases in arousal are associated

with increases in performance to an optimal level, beyond

which decrements in performance ensue (Easterbrook, 1959;

Yerkes & Dodson, 1908).

The inverted-U concept has been based on the

relationship between arousal, task difficulty, and

performance. The hypothesis arose as a result of

research by Yerkes and Dodson (1908), who discovered that

mice learned to discriminate brightness more quickly with

increases in the strength of an electric shock, as long

as the discrimination task was relatively simple. As the

task became harder, the optimal shock level for learning

was progressively reduced. From this study arose the

Yerkes-Dodson law which can be expressed as follows:

(a) For any task there is an optimal level of
arousal such that performance is related to arousal
in the form of an inverted U.
(b) The optimum level of arousal is a
decreasing monotonic function of the difficulty
of the task. (Hockey, 1979, p. 143)









Easterbrook (1959) explained the inverted-U function

by asserting that "emotional arousal" acts to reduce the

range of cues that an individual uses. That is, the

range of cue utilization shrinks as the use of peripheral

(irrelevant or partially relevant) cues is reduced, while

the use of central (immediately relevant) cues is

maintained. Thus, reduction in the range of cues should

first improve task proficiency (as the irrelevant, non-

essential cues are omitted), but later impair ability.

"It would in fact produce just the sort of up and down

relation between proficiency and drive that is familiar

in connection with the names of Yerkes and Dodson"

(Easterbrook, 1959, p. 193).

In explaining the effects of arousal in sport,

Landers (1980) draws from Yerkes-Dodson (1908) and

Easterbrook (1959) stating that when arousal

increases up to a certain (optimal) level,

perceptual selectivity also increases improving the

individual's performance (presumably because the

athlete tries harder and is more likely to eliminate

task-irrelevant cues). Increases in arousal beyond

this "optimal" point should induce further

perceptual narrowing and a concomitant deterioration

in performance, in accordance with the inverted-U

hypothesis. For example, an "over-aroused"

quarterback in football might be focused too









narrowly to detect receivers open in the periphery,

or more important, a blitzing outside linebacker.

Some feel that the inverted-U hypothesis is not very

useful in understanding the arousal-performance

relationship (Cooke, 1982; Kerr, 1989; Welford, 1976).

It appears that this stance has been taken since

"performance-degrading dysphoric psychobiological states

and performance-enhancing euphoric ones can occur at

equal arousal levels. Global arousal, then, could only

serve to obscure the profound individual differences with

which humans approach important motor performances"

(Neiss, 1988b, p. 154). Eysenck (1982) points out that

the singular notion of arousal is inadequate and must be

replaced by more complex conceptualizations. Kerr (1989)

similarly feels that the optimal arousal theory is

limited in its singular optimal state and homeostatic

basis. He cites several notable psychologists who are

opposed to the basic principles of the homeostatic

construct (cf. Allport, 1960; Buhler, 1959; Frankl, 1969;

Harlow, 1953; Maslow, 1954). Apter (1982), for example,

identifies four terms (anxiety, excitement, boredom, and

relaxation), "which are reflections of pleasant,

unpleasant, and high and low arousal, questioning the

ability of optimal arousal theory to distinguish between

them" (Kerr, 1989, p. 140).

In a recent series of articles, Neiss and Anderson

(Anderson, 1990; Neiss, 1988a, 1990) engage in the debate









as to whether arousal is a useful concept. Neiss (1988a)

conducted a review of the research which demonstrated the

effects of various psychobiological arousal states on

motor performance. He reported that their is little

support for the inverted-U hypothesis especially due to

difficulties in interpreting the actual influence of

arousal on an unsuccessful performance. He also states

that

The inverted-U hypothesis [as a causal hypothesis]
has not received clear support from a single
study... If, recast in psychological terms, the
inverted-U hypothesis reveals only that the
motivated outperform the apathetic and the
terrified, it should be consigned to the true-but-
trivial category. (Neiss, 1988a, p. 355)

Neiss claimed that the inverted-U hypothesis is

basically irrefutable due to the inability to specify its

parameters and the variability of optimal arousal across

tasks, and that the global term arousal is thus a

hindrance to understanding the relationship of human

motor performance to emotional states. This criticism is

not dissimilar to Eysenck's (1982) claim that one is

hard-pressed to disprove the predicted inverted-U

relationship because two-thirds of studies investigating

this relationship (and utilizing three distinct arousal

levels) would obtain supportive evidence by chance alone.

Eysenck explains that if three levels of arousal are

compared, there are six possible orderings of the three

levels with respect to performance, only two of which are

inconsistent with the Yerkes-Dodson law (the two in which









the medium level of arousal is associated with the worst

performance). Similarly, Baddeley (1972) is critical of

the optimal arousal theory and suggests it can account

for almost any result so long as the exact location on

the inverted-U curve is not specified in advance.

Anderson (1990) takes issue with Neiss' suggestion

to abandon arousal, the inverted-U, and the Yerkes-Dodson

law. She writes that Neiss' objections are neither

logically nor empirically warranted, challenging his

evidence as limited. However, she focuses primarily on

the relationship between arousal and cognition, not motor

performance. Indeed, her documentation of studies

supporting the inverted-U relationship between

information processing and arousal appears to be less

relevant to Neiss' stance. In a rebuttal, Neiss (1990)

indicates that an abundance of empirical findings from

diverse research areas challenges the conception of

unidimensional arousal, and that methodological advances

permit the investigation of discrete psychobiological

states in their cognitive, affective, and physiological

manifestations.

An additional problem with the arousal literature is

that a major aspect of the inverted-U hypothesis has

largely been ignored. The hypothesis suggests that at

low levels of arousal, performance should suffer.

Broadbent (1971) argued that there is no difficulty in

explaining why low arousal leads to poor performance as









postulated by the inverted-U: "Response simply fails to

occur on occasions when it should do so. The typical

decrement produced by sleeplessness is that of the pause

in which no reaction occurs" (p. 425). Yet aside from

research examining sleep-deprived individuals (Kjellberg,

1977; Wilkinson, 1961) there have been few examinations

of subjects' performances under conditions of low

arousal. Moreover, many researchers report that the

inverted-U relationship was validated in their study,

when in actuality, only the component suggesting that

excessive arousal is detrimental to performance is

validated. This is especially important in sport

psychology investigations, where much of the research

regarding the arousal-sport relationship examines

athletes' experience of anxiety and overarousal. There

is much ancillary and anecdotal evidence suggesting that

a team that plays "flat" or "without emotion" will

experience a decrease in performance. This might easily

be described under the inverted-U model and yet has not

been fully examined under empirical conditions.

Despite these criticisms of the inverted-U as a

useful and accurate description of the relationship

between arousal and performance, there are many studies

that have examined this theory. Early researchers,

conducting primarily laboratory studies, seemingly

support the inverted-U and Yerkes-Dodson hypotheses

(Broadhurst, 1957; Duffy, 1962; Matarazzo, Ulett, &









Saslow, 1955; Stennett, 1957). For example, Broadhurst

(1957) suspected that rats placed in a situation of

intense motivation (oxygen deprivation) would

consequently demonstrate fear and arousal affecting the

learning task. He hypothesized that under the stressful

condition, rats would learn faster on the easy task, but

more slowly on the hard task. His results confirmed the

task complexity aspect of the Yerkes-Dodson law in that

"the optimum motivation for a discrimination task

demonstrably decreases with increasing difficulty of the

task" (p. 348).

In addition to changes with task complexity,

increases in "drive" (emotional arousal or general covert

excitement) are associated with a reduction in the range

of cue use (Easterbrook, 1959). Bahrick, Fitts, and

Rankin (1952) tested the hypothesis that an increase in

incentive causes increased perceptual selectiveness

favoring those parts of the stimulus field deemed by the

subject as most relevant to the expected reward. The

researchers utilized a continuous central-tracking task,

with intermittent stimuli detectable in the periphery.

It was discovered that while increasing motivation with

incentives (monetary bonuses) was beneficial for tracking

the central task, peripheral proficiency declined.

Easterbrook explained that "the effect of added drive

cannot be described unequivocally as either facilitation

or disruption, but it can certainly be described as a









reduction in the range of cue utilization" (1959, p.

185).

Bursill (1958) investigated subjects' attention to

peripheral stimuli while they were engaged in a

continuous central task under both normal conditions and

conditions of high temperature (thermal stress). He

reported that the subjects in the high stress condition

had a tendency to funnel their field of awareness towards

the center, and thus missed signals presented on the

periphery (i.e., signals presented at greater eccentric

angles had a greater probability of being missed in the

hotter condition). Stennett (1957) also studied the

relationship of performance level to level of arousal.

Using EMG recordings as a measure of arousal, and an

auditory tracking task as a performance measure, Stennett

obtained results supporting the inverted-U relationship.

Oxendine (1970, 1980) has been a proponent of

applying these hypotheses to sport. He indicates that a

high level of arousal is optimal in gross motor

activities involving strength, endurance, and speed

(e.g., many track events, weight lifting, football

blocking). Alternatively, a high level of arousal should

interfere with performance involving complex skills, fine

muscle movements, steadiness, and general concentration

(e.g., archery, shooting, golf putting).

Hanin (1980, 1986) has extended the inverted-U

theory and reported that arousal is related to athletic









performance at an individual level; that is, each athlete

has a particular arousal level where performance is

optimal, regardless of the absolute level which can be

low, medium, or high. This level has been declared the

"zone of optimal functioning" (ZOF). The ZOF theory is

generally endorsed by Jones and Hardy (1989) who suggest

that in explaining or predicting sport performance, one

should take into account the nature of the stressor, the

mental demands of the competitive task, and the

psychological characteristics of the athlete.

In two studies purporting to examine the ZOF theory,

Raglin and his associates (Raglin & Morgan, 1988; Raglin,

Wise, & Morgan, 1990) demonstrated that swimmers reported

increased state anxiety (the authors' measure of arousal)

before competition, and significantly more anxiety prior

to a difficult meet as compared to an easy one.

Interestingly, swimmers who had the most successful

performances were best at predicting their pre-

competitive anxiety levels 24 to 48 hours in advance of

actual competition. The researchers conclude in support

for Hanin's ZOF theory and reject the inverted-U

hypothesis which they suggest does not take into account

individual differences. This is not an appropriate

conclusion because of their misinterpretation of the

inverted-U hypothesis. Raglin, Wise, and Morgan (1990)

state that "the inverted U-theory [sic] is the most well-

known theory of anxiety and sport performance, and this









theory implies that a moderate level of anxiety is best

for performance" (p. 5). Yet, clearly the inverted-U

hypothesis is one describing the relationship between

arousal and performance, not anxiety and performance. It

becomes confusing to the reader when a group of

researchers appears to inappropriately use these two

terms (anxiety and arousal) as synonymous. In a recent

chapter, Morgan (an author of the previously-reported

studies) and Ellickson (1989) write that Hanin's theory

should not be dismissed as a reiteration of the inverted-

U explanation, in that "ZOF theory does not argue that a

moderate level of arousal is superior to low or high

levels... [but] predicts that some individuals will have

their best performances when highly aroused, others when

deeply relaxed, and others when moderately aroused" (p.

168). In this case, Morgan discusses the inverted-U

hypothesis in terms of arousal.

There is a common problem in sport psychology

research examining the relationship among anxiety,

arousal, and performance. There are many investigations

which claim to investigate the relationship between

arousal and sports performance which are misleading since

the measurement of "arousal" is typically a measurement

of competitive anxiety (as the studies conducted by

Raglin and his associates exemplify). In fact, there are

very few studies which examine the arousal-sports

performance relationship. The studies that support the









inverted-U hypotheses are primarily those of a more basic

research nature (e.g., Bursill, 1958; Stennett, 1957).

It appears that the question of the effects of

arousal on sports performance has not been addressed

adequately. Adapting Neiss' (1988a) position, one could

argue that it is fairly obvious that athletes who are

unmotivated (and underaroused) will not achieve their

competitive potential. However, it is not as simple with

the highly-aroused athlete. Just as high arousal in an

individual can be manifested similarly by two very

different stimulus situations (e.g., sexual excitement

versus fear), an athlete could demonstrate high arousal

when thrilled about the potential of catching a touchdown

pass or when terrified of missing a field goal in front

of 85,000 spectators. These two similar arousal levels

may have quite different effects on the performance

outcome. What appears to be more important than

physiological arousal is the athlete's interpretation of

this arousal and the competitive situation. The

following studies address this issue by examining the

relationship between competitive anxiety and sports

performance.

Competitive Anxiety

In this section, the relationship of competitive

anxiety to sports performance is highlighted. Again,

some of the researchers who have investigated this

relationship have done so from the perspective of









assessing arousal. These studies are included in this

section rather than the previous one because of the

actual measurements conducted (i.e., primarily self-

reported anxiety), and not how the researchers identified

the constructs (arousal vs. anxiety). The issue of the

nature of the relationship that exists between anxiety

and sports performance (e.g., inverted-U, linear

negative, unrelated) is thus presented.

Trait and state anxiety

The relationship between competitive trait anxiety

and sports performance has been investigated under both

laboratory and field conditions. According to Martens,

Vealey, and Burton (1990), laboratory studies have

generally failed to demonstrate a consistent relationship

between competitive A-trait and sports performance (e.g.,

Martens, Gill, & Scanlan, 1976; Murphy & Woolfolk, 1987;

Poteet & Weinberg, 1980). Indeed, some studies which

purport to analyze the relationship between trait anxiety

and performance are not interpretable since there is an

inappropriate use of the trait measure (i.e., the Sport

Competition Anxiety Test (SCAT); Martens, 1977). For

example, administering the SCAT as a precompetitive

measure of anxiety is incorrect (cf. Gerson & Deshaies,

1978; Thirer & O'Donnell, 1980) and assesses the

relationship between state anxiety and performance rather

than trait anxiety and performance.









There have been more productive investigations

utilizing authentic competitive situations. These have

focused on the relationship between competitive trait

anxiety, competitive state anxiety, and athletic

performance on the field, in the pool, and so forth. For

example, Klavora (1978) reported that high school

basketball players had different "optimal arousal" levels

which correlated with their self-reported competitive

trait anxiety, where optimal arousal is defined as the

level of self-reported state anxiety at which the athlete

performs most successfully. Thus, low-trait anxious

players performed better when reporting low state

anxiety, while high-trait anxious players actually did

better when reporting a higher amount of state anxiety.

Smith and Smoll (1990) interpret Klavora's results as

suggesting "the possibility that optimal performance may

occur at a level of arousal that is similar to athletes'

customary level of anxiety rather than at a normative

level defined by the anxiety distribution for all

subjects" (p. 440).

Sonstroem and Bernardo (1982) investigated the

inverted-U theory with female collegiate basketball

players who had been assessed on both competitive trait

and state anxiety. Competitive trait anxiety was not

found to have a significant main effect on performance;

however, their results suggested that after controlling

for individual differences in competitive A-state, an









inverted-U function could describe the relationship

between competitive A-trait and basketball performance on

an intraindividual basis. In a similar study utilizing

golfers, Weinberg and Genuchi (1980) found that the

athletes lowest in competitive trait anxiety performed

better than moderate and high competitive A-trait golfers

(although there was no difference in performance between

the latter two groups). Also, competitive A-state was a

better predictor of performance than was competitive A-

trait.

Investigators have increasingly focused on the

effects of competitive state anxiety on performance.

Smith and Smoll (1990) assert that competitive state

anxiety is moderated by three factors. First is the

nature of the sporting situation in which the athlete is

competing (e.g., strength of opponents, significance of

the event, presence of spectators or significant others,

and social support from coaches or teammates). Second is

the magnitude of the athlete's competitive trait anxiety.

Third are the "psychological defenses that the athlete

may have developed to cope with anxiety-arousing

competitive situations" (p. 421). Furthermore, these

three factors are assumed to jointly influence the

athlete's appraisal processes. These processes include:

Appraisal of the situational demands; appraisal of
the resources available to deal with them; appraisal
of the nature and likelihood of the potential
consequences if the demands are not met (that is,
the expectancies and valances [sic] relating to









potential consequences); and the personal meaning
that the consequences have for the individual.
(Smith & Smoll, 1990, p. 422)

It is clear that higher levels of competitive state

anxiety are typically found under competitive conditions

as compared to practice conditions (Bird & Horn, 1990;

Klavora, 1978). However, it is not clear how competitive

anxiety actually affects performance. In an attempt to

clarify this situation, an additional conceptualization

is examined.

Cognitive and somatic anxiety

As described earlier, multidimensional anxiety

theory postulates that competitive anxiety is comprised

of two major components: cognitive anxiety and somatic

anxiety. Cognitive anxiety may be composed of worry,

negative self-talk, fear of evaluation, and so forth. As

such, and in its strict sense, cognitive anxiety is

experienced as a negative emotion. Thus, some have

postulated the relationship of competitive state anxiety

to performance as one of a negative, linear nature

(Burton, 1988; Martens et al., 1983), whereas the somatic

component of competitive anxiety (considered similar to

"arousal") may demonstrate an inverted-U relationship to

performance. This may be because "somatic anxiety" is

simply a perception of physiological arousal. Adopting

this conceptualization, an athlete who feels the classic

"butterflies in the stomach" may perform better than when

he or she either perceives no physiological arousal (and









may be unmotivated) or when he perceives his heart to be

pounding so hard that he becomes too distracted to

perform successfully.

Research in cognitive psychology supports the

contention that the effect of competitive anxiety on

performance may be described using a negative, linear

function. For example, Easterbrook's (1959) hypothesis

regarding the peripheral narrowing which occurs as

arousal increases (although generally cited to support

the inverted-U relationship between arousal and

performance) can be applied in understanding the

cognitive anxiety/performance relationship. Here, any

increase in worry or cognitive anxiety is associated with

attention to irrelevant cues (e.g., "I'm not going to do

well; All these people are watching me"). Thus, as

cognitive anxiety increases, more internal, irrelevant

cues and negative self-statements are created, and there

is an increased tendency for the individual to pay

attention to his own internal thoughts and cues rather

than to the task (Mandler, 1975). This would

theoretically affect performance in a negative linear

fashion.

This issue has been examined in the test anxiety

literature. Sarason (1975), for example, argues that

test anxiety is primarily a function of cognitive worry

(e.g., "I am stupid; I'll never pass this test") and

physiological reactivity. Sarason writes that saying the









negative self-statements "during a test might interfere

considerably with attention to the task at hand, be it

one that requires learning or figuring out the answers to

certain questions. Worry is unmistakably an

attentionally demanding and emotionally arousing

cognitive activity" (p. 28). In a review of selective

attention, Wine (1971) indicated that high test anxious

individuals respond with personalized task-irrelevant

responses. Furthermore, Deffenbacher (1980) and Morris,

Davis, and Hutchings (1981) have shown in their review of

the literature that cognitive anxiety is more

consistently and strongly related to test performance

than is somatic anxiety.

Utilizing the theories from cognitive psychology

(e.g., test anxiety research), sport psychology and motor

performance researchers have hypothesized that cognitive

anxiety is more strongly related to sport and motor

performance than is somatic anxiety (Barnes, Sime,

Dienstbier, & Plake, 1986; Martens, Vealey, & Burton,

1990; Morris, Smith, Andrews, & Morris, 1975). One

explanation is that

Somatic anxiety should influence performance less
than cognitive anxiety because it reaches its peak
at the onset of a competitive event and dissipates
over the course of the competition. Cognitive state
anxiety increases during competition, however,
because it is linked to increases in social and
self-evaluation that occur during the event and
hence causes stronger and more consistent
performance decrements. (Gould et al., 1987, p. 34)









Despite the intuitive appeal of the cognitive

anxiety/performance relationship, studies which have

investigated the multidimensional influences of anxiety

(i.e., cognitive worry and somatic anxiety) in

competitive settings have provided mixed results

regarding the strength and nature of the relationship.

For instance, Gould et al. (1987) studied police officers

performing in a pistol shooting competition, and

concluded that the cognitive component of competitive

anxiety was unrelated to shooting outcome. However, the

somatic component was found to influence performance so

that "a quadratic function best explained the somatic

anxiety/performance relationship" (Gould et al., 1987, p.

40). In this case, the authors explain the somatic

component as being more predictive because pistol

shooting depends on fine neuromuscular control easily

disrupted by slight physiological changes.

Although this is certainly true, Burton (1988)

suggests that there also may have been methodological

reasons for the nonsignificant relationship between

cognitive anxiety and shooting performance. First, Gould

and his colleagues used the average scores of a single

competition (as opposed to a season average) as the

comparison to a specific round, and thus gained a less

reliable assessment of anxiety-mediated performance

fluctuations. Also, the subjects may have had low ego-

involvement with the task, as it was an elaborate









experimenter designed competition and "may have lacked

sufficient external validity" (Burton, 1988, p. 49).

McCauley (1985) found no relationship between either

cognitive or somatic competitive anxiety and golf

performance over 10 rounds of tournament golf. However,

as Bird and Horn (1990) and Gould et al. (1987) point

out, McCauley's findings of nonsignificance may have been

confounded by changing task demands (i.e., different golf

courses). A recent study also did not demonstrate any

significant relationship between competitive state

anxiety (both cognitive and somatic) and cycling

performance on stationary bicycles (Caruso, Dzewaltowski,

Gill, & McElroy, 1990). Once again, the authors admit

that "the task in the present study was not cognitively

demanding nor did it require complex motor skills that

would lead to performance impairment as a result of

anxiety. Additionally, the contrived competition did not

induce high levels of anxiety" (p. 18).

Karteroliotis and Gill (1987) examined the

relationships of cognitive worry, somatic anxiety, and

self-confidence to motor performance during a simulated

laboratory competition on a pegboard task. This study

revealed little support for their predicted inverse

relationship between cognitive worry and performance. It

was also concluded that both self-reported somatic

anxiety and physiological arousal were unrelated to motor

performance at any stage of the experiment. However,









similar to Caruso et al. (1990) and Gould et al. (1987),

this task had little external validity and the subjects

likely had low ego involvement. Furthermore, as the

authors acknowledge, due to the simplicity of the

pegboard task, complex motor skills were not required

which might be impaired by cognitive anxiety.

On the other hand, several researchers have

demonstrated a relationship between cognitive anxiety and

sports performance in field studies. For example, Powell

and Verner (1982) found that linear increases in state

anxiety and fear estimates (roughly cognitive worry) were

significantly and negatively related to sport parachuting

performance. Unexpectedly, heart rate (physiological

arousal) was also negatively related (in a linear

fashion) to performance.

More recently, McCann, Murphy, and Raedeke (in

press), studied national level cyclists under laboratory

(cycling ergometer) and field (time-trial road race)

conditions. The investigators found that self-reported

anxiety was strongly related to cycling performance, with

the strongest relationships occurring under the field

condition. High cognitive anxiety and somatic anxiety

were associated with weak performance, while high self-

confidence was associated with a stronger performance.

Also, only cognitive anxiety was significantly related to

performance under the cycling ergometer laboratory

setting. This study had many strengths: (1) It employed









a timely and appropriate measure of anxiety; the

Competitive State Anxiety Inventory-2 (CSAI-2) was given

10 min prior to the road race. (2) An adequate aspect

of performance was assessed. (3) Subjects were fairly

homogeneous in skill level and ability. (4) The meaning

and significance of the field setting task was probably

quite high to the subjects since it involved a time trial

race. A drawback to the study was its correlational

design, making an empirical test of the nature of the

anxiety-performance relationship unfeasible.

Additionally, the authors acknowledge that even stronger

results may have been obtained had an intraindividual

design and analysis been utilized.

Another pertinent study was conducted by Burton

(1988), who administered the CSAI-2 to collegiate

swimmers prior to different situations (e.g., early

season meet, mid-season meet, and conference

championships), using race event times as performance

outcome measures. Burton, in drawing from the cognitive

psychology literature (e.g., Easterbrook, 1959; Wine,

1971) hypothesized that cognitive anxiety would misdirect

attention from task-relevant cues to irrelevant cues

(e.g., social evaluative cues), and thus would cause

performance to decrease linearly. On the other hand,

somatic anxiety was hypothesized to demonstrate the more

traditional inverted-U relationship with performance

(although it is difficult to discern whether Burton's









"low arousal" division was truly underarousal, a

necessary component for fully supporting an inverted-U

relationship between anxiety and performance, or whether

it was simply a lack of reported anxiety). The results

of Burton's investigation indicated that cognitive

anxiety was more consistently and strongly (negatively

and linearly) related to swimmers' performance than was

somatic anxiety (i.e., self-reported arousal).

A slightly different approach was taken by Bird and

Horn (1990) who tested the relationship between level of

competitive anxiety and mental errors in a sport setting

(i.e., softball game). Prior to a game, the athletes

completed the CSAI-2. Their anxiety levels were examined

after classifying the players into two groups as a

function of mental errors committed during the game (as

assessed by their coach). The investigators found that

players in the two groups (high vs. low mental errors)

differed only on pre-game cognitive anxiety, and not on

somatic anxiety. This finding is not surprising as the

outcome measure of mental errors seems intuitively most

related to cognitive anxiety. Comprehensive performance

was not examined in which certain aspects (e.g.,

overrunning a fly ball) may be more related to somatic

anxiety.









Problems with the Literature and Researchers'

Recommendations

Bird and Horn (1990) address the question of why

there has been such inconclusive research in the area of

competitive anxiety and sport performance. They

entertain the notion that there could be problems with

the assessment of competition anxiety. However, they

conclude that the CSAI-2 has been the most extensively

used instrument and has been well-validated as measuring

the three constructs of cognitive anxiety, somatic

anxiety, and self-confidence. Next, there could be

problems with the methodology of the field studies. This

was evident in studies in which external validity was

questionable (Gould et al., 1987), opponents varied

(Gould, Petlichkoff, & Weinberg, 1984), and in which

situational characteristics differed (McCauley, 1985).

In addition to the comments from Bird and Horn

(1990) regarding the inconsistent anxiety/performance

relationship findings, Gould and his colleagues have

addressed this issue (Gould et al., 1987; Gould & Krane,

in press). Gould and Krane propose that investigators

must meet four conditions in an attempt to explain the

arousal/performance relationship. In these

recommendations, Gould and Krane use the term "arousal"

where "anxiety" is the more appropriate term. In the

present discussion, the term "anxiety" is substituted.

It is recommended that the investigators must (1)









adequately assess anxiety and related states, (2) utilize

more adequate measures of athletic performance, (3)

employ intraindividual anxiety analyses, and (4) create

at least three distinct levels of anxiety when testing

nonlinear predictions.

Gould and Krane's first recommendation is a broad

one, but basically involves carefully defining what one

is measuring, utilizing conceptual frameworks (e.g.,

multidimensional components of anxiety), and using

reliable and valid measures of anxiety. The second plea

is for the investigator to adequately measure athletic

performance. Many studies have relied upon

nonstandardized performance measures (cf. Gould et al.,

1984, McCauley, 1985) which fluctuated according to task

demands. Furthermore, the utilization of outcome

measures (e.g., win-loss, comparing game scores) is

discouraged. Gould and Krane cite Burton (1988) as a

positive example in which the author assessed best times

in a swimming event relative to previous times in that

event. However, even an assessment such as this has

limitations. True, it may provide a general idea of

variations in performance associated with changes in

anxiety. However, this type of outcome measure may not

adequately provide information regarding the process of

performance change in a particular sport.

Instead of focusing on the outcome of a competitive

performance, a more process-oriented focus is desirable.









Thus, the manner in which individuals organize their

motions in the execution of motor skills is the crux of

the investigation (cf. Beuter & Duda, 1985; Weinberg &

Hunt, 1976; Weinberg, 1978). Martens, Vealey, and Burton

(1990) concur and recommend that one way to improve the

predictive ability for the relationship between anxiety

and performance is to focus on qualitative aspects of

performance as opposed to quantitative. Thus, using

electromyographic or kinematic measures, for example, may

more sufficiently address the question of how sport

performance is affected by anxiety.

A study specifically relevant to this recommendation

(and to the current investigation) involved examining the

effects of anxiety on the motor performance of children

during a stepping task over three obstacles (Beuter &

Duda, 1985). The investigators created two conditions

for each subject during the stepping task: (1) an

informal assessment or low anxiety condition, and (2) a

high anxiety condition which involved creating a

stressful social situation that incorporated evaluation,

competition, and threat to self-esteem. Using digitized

videotaped recordings of the subjects' stepping motions

to examine the kinematic characteristics of motion and a

within-subjects design, it was demonstrated that the two

anxiety conditions created significantly different

movements in the ankle joint.









Beuter and Duda (1985) suggested that under the high

anxiety condition, what was once automatic and smooth

came under volitional control (likely due to the

evaluative and competitive anxiety) and became less

smooth and efficient. Once again, a problem with the

study is that Beuter and Duda created different anxiety

conditions, but described them as arousal levels, and

used a general measure of arousal (heart rate taken prior

to the two trials) to assess the manipulation. That is,

self-report measures of anxiety were not utilized (e.g.,

State-Trait Anxiety Inventory for Children) to assess the

anxiety manipulation.

The third recommendation of Gould and Krane is to

employ intraindividual analyses (e.g., Beuter & Duda,

1985). They write that Sonstroem and Bernardo's (1982)

study of basketball players is an excellent example of

this method. Without having controlled for each player's

own state anxiety scores, the researchers would have

mistakenly concluded that there was no significant

relationship between competitive anxiety and basketball

performance. Instead, as mentioned previously, Sonstroem

and Bernardo discovered that an inverted-U relationship

existed between state anxiety and performance across all

subjects. Furthermore, other investigators (Landers &

Boutcher, 1986; Neiss, 1988b) have suggested that there

is a need to analyze intra-individual changes in arousal

and anxiety measures when relating them to performance.









The final recommendation to create at least three

levels of anxiety when investigating the anxiety-

performance relationship is one that has been made by

several researchers (Eysenck, 1982; Gould & Krane, in

press; Martens, 1977). Gould and Krane correctly assert

that not only do the levels of anxiety need to be

statistically significantly different, but also

conceptually or clinically distinct. For example, three

scores on an anxiety measure could be statistically

different, and yet fall within a clinically

indistinguishable range of anxiety. Typically,

researchers have not created anxiety levels, but have

either relied upon self-report anxiety scores to place

subjects in different anxiety levels or have performed

strictly correlational analyses (cf. Brustad & Weiss,

1987; Burton, 1988; Madden, Summers, & Brown, 1990;

Martin & Gill, 1991; McCann, Murphy, & Raedeke, in press;

Raglin, Wise, & Morgan, 1990). However, these two

methods may be unavoidable when conducting field research

during actual competitions.

The preceding recommendations appear to be

appropriate and necessary. It is clear from the existing

literature that researchers have usually fallen short in

one or more areas. Even the relatively superior studies

in this area (e.g., Beuter & Duda, 1985; Burton, 1988;

McCann et al., in press; Sonstroem & Bernardo, 1982) are

diminished by specific and acknowledged shortcomings. It









is likely due to the conceptual and methodological

problems that there is no consensus as to the nature of

the relationship of competitive anxiety to competitive

performance.

To recapitulate, it has been suggested that

competitive anxiety be recognized as having both state

and trait components, and both cognitive and somatic

components. It is accepted that state competitive

anxiety is more closely related to performance than is

trait competitive anxiety. However, beyond this obvious

conclusion, there is no definite evidence as to the

relationship among the rest of the factors. Depending on

the study, it has been suggested that cognitive anxiety

is more associated with sports performance than is

somatic anxiety (and vice-versa). It has been suggested

that the relationship between somatic (and/or cognitive)

anxiety and performance is of an inverted-U nature, is

negatively linear, or is irrelevant. In the next

section, this issue will addressed in demonstrating the

need for the current study.


Summary of Literature Review and Restatement
of Need for Current Study


Anxiety can be defined as the experience of

distressing thoughts (e.g., fear of evaluation, worry,

self-doubt) and usually physiological sensations (e.g.,

dry mouth, racing heart rate) which are induced in









response to a threatening situation. This threat can be

an objective or subjective one, and can be of

environmental, social or intrapersonal origin. The

dimensions of anxiety include state and trait, and

cognitive and somatic. Each of the dimensions has been

suggested to have different effects on competing

athletes.

For example, competitive trait anxiety is primarily

an intervening variable which directly affects the amount

of state anxiety that an athlete may perceive in a

specific sport situation. Cognitive and somatic anxiety

(as interrelated components of competitive state anxiety)

are also thought to have different effects on

performance. Competitive cognitive anxiety in its strict

sense will generally be detrimental to performance. As

an athlete's cognitive anxiety rises during a

competition, it is suggested that his or her performance

will suffer accordingly and in a linear fashion. This

seems to be due primarily to a focus on irrelevant cues

(e.g., negative self-talk, the spectators).

The relationship between somatic anxiety and sport

performance is often thought to be one of an inverted-U

nature. This hypothesis is drawn from the research that

suggests that this type of relationship exists between

arousal and performance. Somatic anxiety and arousal,

though not identical, can be seen as similar constructs.

The primary difference is that somatic anxiety appears to









have a perceptual component. That is, an individual's

arousal level is basically a measurable entity (e.g.,

EMG, EEG, palmar sweating, heart rate, respiration) while

somatic anxiety is assessed by self-report and thus is a

subjective measure of the individual's perceived arousal.

It has been suggested that there exists an optimal level

of physiological arousal (and the related somatic

anxiety) for athletes, which is dependent on the sport's

tasks (e.g., attention demands, strength requirements),

and on individual differences.

As demonstrated in this review, the manner in which

anxiety and arousal are related to sport and motor

performance has not been consistently demonstrated.

Although the inverted-U hypothesis has been a prevalent

theory in explaining the relationship between arousal

(and somatic anxiety) and motor performance, it has its

detractors (cf. Eysenck, 1982; Karteroliotis & Gill,

1987; Kerr, 1989; Neiss 1988a, 1988b, 1990; Powell &

Verner, 1982). Similarly, although the relationship of

cognitive anxiety or worry to performance has been

suggested to be a linear, negative one, this has been by

no means established.

In this author's view, many of the problems with

this literature are related to the faulty methodology and

conceptualization of the issue. This is an unfortunate

state of the literature and field since there is a need

for both basic researchers and sport psychology consumers









(e.g., coaches, parents, athletes, clinical sport

psychologists) to understand the relationship between

anxiety and competitive performance. Therefore, the

current investigation has attempted to more clearly

assess the effects of anxiety on sport performance

(swimming), specifically examining the influence of

cognitive and somatic factors. Consistent with the

recommendations of Gould and Krane (in press) and

Weinberg (1990), the current study used an adequate

assessment of anxiety and related states, measured

athletic performance accurately and in a process-oriented

fashion, employed intra-individual analyses, and

attempted to create three distinct ranges of anxiety.

Also to overcome the limitation of poor external validity

(cf. Caruso et al., 1990; Gould et al., 1987;

Karteroliotis & Gill, 1987), the current investigation

utilized an externally valid setting which was expected

to induce high ego-involvement, while not sacrificing the

controlled nature of the experiment. It was hoped that

the current investigation would fulfill the need for more

consistent and useful information regarding the anxiety-

performance relationship.













PROCEDURES

Subjects


Subjects were 33 swimmers assessed at the

International Center for Aquatic Research (ICAR), United

States Swimming, Colorado Springs, Colorado. The

subjects, males (N=7) and females (H=26) ranged in age

from 13-18 years (M=15.30) and were recruited from two

local high school swim teams. An attempt was made to

recruit female subjects exclusively. However, only 26

were able to participate and thus seven males were

recruited to increase the sample to at least a minimum of

30.

A goal of assessing 45 swimmers (to obtain 15

swimmers per group) was not met because of time

limitations placed on the principal investigator by U.S.

Swimming (due to the heavy use of the flume). The

principal investigator was therefore given approval to

assess approximately 30 subjects. Additionally, there

was a very short time period in which to recruit

subjects. In this recruiting period, the principal

investigator was unable to obtain only swimmers naive to

the flume and thus 13 of the subjects had undergone

previous testing.









The subjects were average high school swimmers

(based on the swimmers' best 100 yard freestyle times

during the current season, M=59.76 seconds). All

subjects provided consent to complete self-report

psychological assessments, to be videotaped at various

times in the flume, and to have their heart rate taken in

the course of the study. The study was granted approval

by the Human Subjects Committee of the Institutional

Review Board of the University of Florida, by the Sports

Science Review Board of United States Swimming, and by

the Sports Science Department of the United States

Olympic Committee.


Procedural Overview

The following is an overview of the framework of the

study. A more complete description of the measures and

methodology is presented in the two subsequent sections.

Pre-Flume Testing Procedures

(1) A brief explanation of the study was provided by the

investigator and informed consents were obtained. The

investigator purposely did not mention anxiety as an

aspect of the study or that subjects would swim under an

"anxiety-condition." Rather, subjects were told that the

study involved swimming in the flume on two trials,

before which they would complete several self-report

questionnaires related to how they felt about swimming in

the flume. (It was only directly prior to each swim that









the swimmer received any instructions regarding

performance expectations and conditions {see methodology

section).)

After obtaining consent, the Sport Anxiety Scale

(SAS; Smith, Smoll, & Schutz, 1990), which assesses the

tendency to experience anxiety within competitive sport

situations, was administered. Each swimmers' best 100 yd

freestyle time over the past season (by self-report and

cross validation with the swimmer's coach) was also

recorded.

(2) Subjects were assigned to one of three groups and

were equivalent on scores of the SAS, age, and best

freestyle time (see Table 1, p. 88).

Flume Testing Procedures

(3) Two psychological questionnaires were administered:

the State component of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory

(SAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970) which

measures transitory emotional responses to a specific

situation, and the Competitive State Anxiety Inventory

(CSAI-2; Martens, Burton, et al., 1990) which measures

cognitive and somatic components of sport-specific state

anxiety, as well as self-confidence. Also, a one-item

Likert scale regarding the perceived importance of the

pending flume test was administered (i.e., "How important

to you is the upcoming flume evaluation on a scale of 1

to 10 [very important]?").

(4) Resting heart rate (RHR) was taken.









(5) The swimmer warmed up in the flume for 21/2 min,

then was assessed for baseline freestyle efficiency at

approximately 80% of his or her maximum swimming speed.

(6) Exertional heart rate (EHR) and Ratings of Perceived

Exertion (RPE; Borg, 1962) were taken immediately

following the baseline swim.

(7) Instructions were provided regarding task demands

for the upcoming flume test. Instructions were designed

to create three anxiety conditions, and therefore three

groups (low, moderate, and high anxiety), prior to being

evaluated on the flume test.

(8) Psychological questionnaires (SAI, CSAI-2) were

administered to assess state anxiety following the

instructional manipulation.

(9) Resting heart rate was taken following a brief

recapitulation of the instructional manipulation.

(10) The swimmer warmed up in the flume for 1 min, and

then was assessed for freestyle efficiency at

approximately 80% of his or her maximum swimming speed.

It was during this phase that the swimmer was aware of

the filming.

(11) Exertional heart rate and Ratings of Perceived

Exertion were taken immediately following the evaluated

swim.

(12) Swimmers were debriefed after all had completed

their tests.









Measures

This section contains descriptions of swimming

performance variables, physiological indices, and

psychological measures.

Performance and Physiological Indices

Flume evaluation

Each swimmer was instructed to swim freestyle in the

flume, during which time they were videotaped in order to

assess swimming efficiency. Analyzing the arm stroke is

vital to evaluating the swimmer's technique. Reilly,

Kame, Termin, Tendesco, and Pendergast (1990) describe

the basic mechanics of swimming as follows:

In swimming, a propulsive force equal to or greater
than the water resistance (body drag) must be
generated by the swimmer to maintain a constant
speed or to accelerate The propulsive force
is provided by a combination of arm stroke and leg
kick, although it would appear that the arm stroke
is more important than the leg kick in freestyle
swimming. (Reilly et al., 1990, p. 19)

Subjects were filmed with two genlocked video

cameras in underwater housings (Pulnix 740 cameras, 60

Hz.) These cameras provided videotape to be digitized

for hydrodynamic biomechanical analysis. For digitizing,

one representative armstroke was chosen for analysis.

According to standard protocol of the flume, the

representative armstroke to be digitized for the

biomechanical analysis was approximately five strokes

from the end of the swim. Frames in each camera were

synchronized using the right arm entry. The following









six landmarks were digitized in both cameras of the

underwater video during one stroke cycle: fingertip,

wrist, thumb, little finger, elbow, and shoulder. Three-

dimensional arm and hand coordinates were calculated

using the Direct Linear Transformation method (Abdel-Aziz

& Karara, 1971).

This analysis was then used to determine propulsive

forces of the swimmers. From the arm position data, hand

reaction forces were calculated (Schleihauf, 1979). This

method calculates lift and drag forces based upon hand

orientation and hand velocity. The resultant force is

calculated by the addition of the lift and drag forces.

The effective (or propulsive) component of the stroke is

the projection of the resultant force on the forward

direction.

For more detailed information, the stroke was

divided into the catch phase (from hand entry to the

widest point of the initial outsweep), the insweep phase

(from the widest point of the outsweep to the narrowest

point under the body), and the finish phase (the

narrowest point until hand exit). During these phases,

the resultant force, effective force, hand velocity and

angle of pitch were averaged, and a phase-specific

propelling efficiency was calculated. An overall

propelling efficiency of the swimmer was also calculated.

The digitization of the videotapes was performed by

an undergraduate psychology major student under the









training and supervision of the Biomechanics Department

of the Sports Science Division of the United States

Olympic Committee. The director of the Biomechanics

Department of United States Swimming also provided

assistance to the digitizer and to the principal

investigator. The utilization of only one digitizer was

designed to increase the reliability of the biomechanical

analyses across and within subjects. The digitizer was

blind to the conditions of the study, and only worked for

2-3 hour sessions. PEAK Performance equipment was used

for the digitizing.

Heart rate

Heart rate was assessed by the principal

investigator by palpating the radial or carotid artery

for 15 sees and extrapolating to obtain heart rate as the

number of beats per minute (bpm). To obtain resting

heart rates, subjects sat quietly for 10 min prior to a

reading, and remained motionless while their heart rate

was assessed. To obtain exertional heart rates, the

swimmers' carotid artery was palpated for the 15 sees

directly following a swim in the flume (while the swimmer

was still in the water). Heart rate was used for two

purposes. The first was to compare resting heart rates

prior to the unevaluatedd" warm-up and prior to the post-

instructional flume evaluation. This was to provide an

indicator of reactivity to different evaluative and

stressful conditions. The second was to monitor heart









rates following the two swims allowing a comparison of

exertion. Since the time and speed were identical for

the two swims, any changes in exertional heart rate could

help determine the contributions of anxiety and/or

differences in swim stroke technique.

PsycholoQical Questionnaires

Sport Anxiety Scale (SAS; Smith et al., 1990).

This 21-item scale is designed to measure sport-

specific trait anxiety. It is composed of three

subscales: somatic anxiety, worry, and concentration

disruption. The SAS scale and its subscales have high

internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha = .92, .86, and

.81, for the three subscales) despite the relatively

small number of items. The scales also appear to have

adequate reliability (7-day test-retest reliabilities

exceeded .85 for all three scales). In a study of 71

football players, the SAS successfully discriminated

between groups of athletes who differed in performance

level, with the poorer performers having higher total

scores than the best performers [F(1,46) = 4.93, p<.05]

(Smith et al., 1990).

This scale was chosen as a measure of trait anxiety

because of its capacity to determine the tendency of

individuals to experience anxiety within a particular

class of situations, i.e., competitive sport situations

(Smith & Smoll, 1990). Smith and Smoll (1990) report

that research strongly suggests that "situation-specific









anxiety measures would relate more strongly to behavior

in the critical situations than would general

transituational anxiety" (p. 420). Therefore, the SAS

was chosen rather than Spielberger's Trait Anxiety Scale

(Spielberger et al., 1970), since the latter is a general

measure of trait anxiety and is thought to be less

predictive of trait anxiety in sport than the SAS.

The SAS was also chosen instead of the Sport

Competition Anxiety Test (SCAT; Martens, 1977) since the

latter only provides a unidimensional measure of sport-

specific trait anxiety (primarily somatic anxiety),

whereas the SAS provides a multidimensional measurement

of the construct (i.e., somatic anxiety, worry, and

concentration disruption, across competitive sport

situations). A multidimensional assessment is desirable

since "anxiety involves three separate and largely

independent cognitive, physiological, and behavioral

response dimensions.... [and] that these dimensions may

differentially affect behavior" (Smith & Smoll, 1990, p.

420). It was important to know which component of

anxiety, if either, would most affect swimmers in the

flume.

Finally, this scale was used to predict the

intensity of anxiety which may be experienced in the

flume across differing evaluative conditions (see

following measure). Spielberger (1972) writes that

"situation-specific trait anxiety measures are better









predictors of elevation in A-state [state anxiety] for a

particular class of stress situations than are general A-

trait [trait anxiety] measures" (p. 490).

Competitive State Anxiety Inventory (CSAI-2; Martens,

Vealey, & Burton, 1990)

This 27-item measure is designed to assess sport-

specific state anxiety and has three subscales: cognitive

anxiety, somatic anxiety, and self-confidence. One study

examining the construct validity of this test with male

elite college swimmers indicated that cognitive anxiety

(but not somatic anxiety) was a significant predictor of

performance levels (Barnes, Sime, Dienstbier, & Plake,

1986). The reliability (i.e., internal consistency) of

each of the subscales is satisfactory (Cronbach's alpha

ranging from .79 .90). Evidence supporting the

construct validity of the CSAI-2 as a measure of sport

specific state anxiety (cognitive and somatic) and self-

confidence was demonstrated by the authors in a series of

four studies (Martens et al., 1990). Finally, the

authors provide extensive norms for the CSAI-2 by

competitive level, gender, and sport.

In the current experiment, the scale was slightly

modified in that the items relevant to a "competition"

were altered to refer to a procedure (i.e., the flume

evaluation). There were also two additional items which

assessed anxiety associated with the swimmers' reactions

to the flume apparatus itself. These slight









modifications were not expected to alter reliability or

validity of the instrument. The instrument was used to

assess state anxiety levels in a relatively anxiety-free

situation (i.e., baseline testing) and just prior to the

evaluative flume test.

State Anxiety Inventory (SAI; from the State-Trait

Anxiety Inventory; Spielberger et al., 1970)

This 20-item self-report questionnaire assesses

state anxiety, and has been well established as a

research tool in the study of anxiety. It has excellent

construct validity and internal consistency, and is easy

to administer. In this study, only the 20-item state

anxiety component was administered since the SAS was used

for sport specific trait anxiety. Sport psychology

research with this instrument "has included

investigations of football, basketball, badminton,

racquetball and tennis players, swimmers, runners,

gymnasts, fencers, jugglers, and persons engaged in a

variety of physical activities, ranging from routine

exercise to climbing ladders, riding bicycles, and

performing on treadmills" (Spielberger, 1982, p. 10).

In the current study, this instrument was used to

provide additional data regarding state anxiety levels

under different evaluative conditions. It was also used

for a comparison with the CSAI-2, which provides three

separate components of competitive state anxiety (i.e.,

somatic anxiety, cognitive anxiety, and self-confidence).









Correlations can be performed to determine which of these

components is most highly related to the overall state

anxiety from the SAI.

Ratings of Perceived Exertion scale (RPE; Borg, 1962)

This one-item scale quantifies an individual's

rating of exertion level from 6 (no exertion or "very,

very light") to 20 (maximal exertion or "very, very

hard"), and was used to assess a swimmer's perception of

exertion in the flume. This scale was developed by

Gunnar Borg, a psychologist who was interested in

relating sensations of effort to quantifiable physical

stimuli (Noble, 1986). Test-retest reliability is good,

with coefficients from .78 .99. The construct validity

has been established since RPE is essentially linearly

related to heart rate, oxygen consumption, and lactic

acid accumulation in most exercise tasks (Noble, 1986),

with correlations between exercise intensity and RPE

approximately .85 (Borg & Noble, 1974).

In the current study, the RPE was used to determine

the swimmers' perceptions of effort under two separate

swimming conditions (i.e., baseline and evaluated test).

Since the flume speed was identical under both conditions

for any one swimmer, any differences in RPE would be

important in understanding the effects of anxiety on

swimming performance and perceived exertion.









Methodology

Prior to the study in the flume, the experimenter

traveled to the swimmers' training pools and obtained

informed consent from each of them indicating that during

the study he or she would be videotaped at various times

in the flume, complete several self-report

questionnaires, and have their heart rate taken. They

were then administered the Sport Anxiety Scale (SAS) to

determine sport-specific trait anxiety. At this time,

skill level was determined by obtaining each swimmer's

best 100 yd freestyle time during the past competitive

season by self-report and cross validation with the

swimmer's coach. These two variables were used along

with age for group assignment such that the three groups

(i.e., low, moderate, and high anxiety; described

subsequently) were equivalent on three variables (SAS,

best freestyle time, and age). Additionally, subjects

were assigned so that each group would have two or three

males and eight or nine females (11 total in each group).

Upon arriving at the U.S. Swimming center, each

swimmer was administered the State Anxiety Inventory

(SAI), the Competitive State Anxiety Inventory (CSAI-2),

and the one-item measure of the importance that the

swimmer attributed to the upcoming flume test. After the

completion of these measures, heart rate was taken as

specified in the measures section to provide a resting

heart rate (RHR) measure. Next, swimmers participated in









what was described as a "familiarizing practice session"

in the flume. Here, swimmers were instructed to swim

freestyle to warm-up at a very easy pace (50% of maximum

speed for a 100 yard freestyle event) for approximately

21/2 min.

The swimmers were then instructed that the speed of

the flume would be increased (to 80% of the swimmer's

best time) "so that you can get the feel of the flume's

speed as it will be when you are tested." They were then

instructed to swim for 30 sees at this speed. In this

phase, no mention was made of videotaping, although the

swimmers were filmed to provide the experimenter a

reliable baseline assessment of freestyle mechanics which

was as unaffected as possible by evaluative performance

anxiety. As stated in the measures section, the segment

of the video which was digitized for hydrodynamic

biomechanical analysis was approximately five strokes

from the end of the swim, providing an accurate and

stable baseline assessment (J. M. Cappaert, Sport Science

Biomechanist, personal communication, 1990). Immediately

after the swimmer completed the 80% swim, exertional

heart rate (EHR) was taken and the subject completed the

Ratings of Perceived Exertion scale (RPE).

Following the baseline filming phase, the

experimenter read to each subject one of three sets of

instructions designed to experimentally manipulate the

amount of anxiety that the swimmer experienced. The









moderate and high anxiety instructions were designed to

create evaluative anxiety and were based on research

suggesting that "situations involving potential failure

or threats to self-esteem are more potent sources of

threat than are potentially physically harmful

situations" (Martens et al., 1990, p. 14). Scanlan

(1984) further confirms that competitive situations can

be stressful due to extensive evaluation of ability and

competence. They involve perceptions of inadequacy in

successfully meeting the performance demands, and

perceptions of the consequences of failure, possibly

leading to a threat to self-esteem.

In this experiment, the threat to self-esteem was

expected to emerge from the swimmer's awareness of being

evaluated by a coach or USS official who could

potentially judge a swimmer as having a "poor" or

"inadequate" swimming style. Although there were no

overt consequences of failure, it was expected that the

swimmers would be concerned about "failing" (i.e., not

performing well in the flume; not having a "good enough"

stroke). The instructional sets were as follows:

(1) Low anxiety. "During this flume test, you will be

videotaped as you swim freestyle. The taping and

analysis of your stroke will be discussed with you and at

a later time with your coach, and will only be used for

your own stroke improvement. Try to swim relaxed and

enjoy yourself. This will be just the same as your warm-









up swim. Do not be concerned with the cameras; the video

will only be used for your benefit."

(2) Moderate anxiety. "During this flume test, you will

be videotaped as you swim freestyle. The taping and

analysis of your stroke will be discussed with you and

your coach(s), and will be used to determine your

relative strength in freestyle as compared to your

teammates. The test will be quite similar to your warm-

up swim. However, please try to swim your best, as it is

important that we get an accurate measurement of your

skills." (During these instructions, the cameras in the

flume were displayed to the swimmer, as were the VCRs for

the recording of the subject's swim.)

(3) High Anxiety. "During this flume test, you will be

videotaped as you swim freestyle. The taping and

analysis of your stroke will be analyzed and evaluated by

the U.S. Swimming Biomechanics staff, officials, and

coaches. Also, during this swim a U.S. Swimming official

will be examining your stroke through the underwater

observation windows. Please attempt to swim your very

best, as the evaluation will be important in determining

your relative standing among other swimmers at your level

who have previously been evaluated in the flume. We will

use the test analysis to decide the areas in which you

need the most improvement." (During these instructions,

the cameras in the flume, the VCRs, and the underwater

observation window were displayed to the swimmer; also, a









television monitor of the flume was activated and

displayed.)

Upon receiving one of the set of instructions

swimmers were then administered the state anxiety

component (SAI) of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory and

the Competition State Anxiety Inventory (CSAI-2) for the

second time. These questionnaires were to be used to

determine the level of anxiety that swimmers reported

directly prior to the flume session, and compared to

their baseline report. Resting heart rate was taken

subsequently to obtain a physiological measure of arousal

(this was following a standardized period of 10 min from

the end of the 30 sec swim). Each swimmer then underwent

the standard freestyle assessment in the flume to

evaluate propelling efficiency (knowing that he or she

would be filmed). The subject warmed up again for 1 min

at 50% of best time, then paused as the flume's speed was

increased to 80% of best time. Each subject then swam

for 30 secs, during which time he or she was videotaped.

The filming and digitization procedures (biomechanical

analysis) were identical to the baseline procedure as

described earlier. Immediately after the swimmer

completed this swim, exertional heart rate was taken and

the subject completed the Ratings of Perceived Exertion

scale (RPE).

Since the swimmers performed in the flume alone,

they were told not to discuss the study with any other





84


swimmers who had not yet undergone their testing.

Swimmers were fully debriefed at the end of the study so

that the nature of the study could be explained without

affecting other swimmers approach to the testing. During

this debriefing, technical feedback was provided to each

swimmer by U.S. Swimming. Questions about freestyle

stroke technique, racing strategies, and so forth were

answered at this time.












RESULTS


The primary purpose of the analyses was to determine

the effects of different imposed degrees of anxiety on

performance as well as the nature of the relationship

among the various measures of anxiety, physiological

arousal, and the sport performance outcome measure (i.e.,

freestyle swimming efficiency). In all analyses, an

alpha level of .05 was set as the criterion for

determining statistical significance. All significance

tests were examined using a conservative two-tailed

approach, despite having directional predictions. This

offset slightly the less conservative approach of

utilizing the alpha level of .05 in multiple analyses.


Subjects
As mentioned in the methodology section, swimmers

were assigned to one of three groups to ensure that each

group would have a subject composition that was

equivalent on trait anxiety in sport (Sport Anxiety Scale

scores), skill level (best freestyle time), and age.

This procedure was followed (instead of utilizing

randomization for subject assignment) due to the small

subject sample size and in order to increase the power of

statistical analyses by eliminating the need for









covariate-based analyses. Statistical equivalency of the

group assignment variables was confirmed utilizing three

one-way ANOVAs to assess best time (F=.03, E=ns), trait

anxiety (SAS; F=.20, R=ns), and age (F=1.08, E=ns). (See

Table 1 for means and standard deviations by group.)

It was also determined that each group of swimmers

perceived an equal amount of importance for the flume

testing. Finally, the groups were almost equivalent by

sex (two groups had nine females and two males, and the

other group had eight females and three males).


Effects of Anxiety Manipulations

Before examining the anxiety-performance

relationship, it was important to first determine the

effects of the anxiety manipulations on the swimmers'

cognitive/affective and physiological reactions to the

flume testing. This analysis was conducted to test the

argument for and efficacy of the experimental

manipulation. First, a multivariate analysis of variance

(MANOVA) revealed no significant differences at baseline

between groups on the four psychological variables (A-

state, cognitive anxiety, somatic anxiety, and self-

confidence), [F(2,30)=.50, E=ns]. A one-way ANOVA also

indicated that there were no significant differences

between groups on resting heart rate [F(2,30)=2.6, R=ns].

The next analyses determined the effect of group

membership on changes in the five variables following the










TABLE 1

Equivalency of Groups on Three Variables Used for Group
Assignment

GROUP M (SD) M (SD) M (SD


Best Time *

59.6 (3.0)

60.1 (4.5)

59.6 (2.8)

59.8 (3.4)


Trait Anxiety*

46.5 (7.1)

46.5 (11.2)

47.3 (11.2)

46.8 (9.7)


Age

15.2 (1.8)

15.5 (1.8)

15.3 (1.4)

15.3 (1.6)


Fastest time (in seconds) in a 100 yard freestyle
race (current season).

As measured by the Sport Anxiety Scale.


Low

Mod

High

TOTAL


~









anxiety manipulation. A repeated measures MANOVA

(examining A-state, cognitive anxiety, somatic anxiety,

and self-confidence) revealed no significant main effect

for anxiety-induced conditions [Wilk's Lambda = .89;

F(2,30)=.40, E=ns] or significant interaction effect

(i.e., Group X Time) [Wilk's Lambda = .61; F(2,30)=1.9,

R=ns]. However, a significant effect for Time was

revealed [Wilk's Lambda = .69; F(2,30)=3.1, R<.05] as

subjects generally reported feeling less anxious and more

self-confident after performing the first flume swim

(i.e., directly prior to the second evaluated swim).

Follow-up univariate repeated measures ANOVAs indicated

no significant interaction effects. However, these

ANOVAs showed time effects indicating that CSAI-Cog

[F=4.0, E=.05] and CSAI-Som [F=9.2, R<.01] decreased

following the baseline swim, while self-confidence (CSAI-

SC) increased [F=7.1, E=.01].

A repeated measures ANOVA conducted on resting heart

rate revealed a significant time effect, as resting heart

rate increased prior to the second flume swim [F=5.1,

E<.05]. A repeated measures ANOVA conducted on ratings

of perceived exertion (RPE; i.e., how difficult the flume

swim was perceived to be) revealed a significant time

effect and indicated that RPE increased significantly for

the second (evaluated) flume swim [F=8.8, R<.01]. Table

2 presents the means of these variables before and after

the instructional manipulation by group.










Table 2

Means and Standard Deviations of Psychological and

Physiological Reactions to the Flume by Group

MEASURE GROUP
Low Moderate High

State Anxiety (SAI)

Pre 39.0 (7.6) 38.8 (12.5) 38.5 (7.0)

Post 31.2 (6.2) 37.6 (9.4) 36.8 (10.7)

Cognitive Anxiety (CSAI-Cog)

Pre 16.7 (3.9) 16.6 (5.9) 15.3 (2.9)

Post 13.6 (3.7) 14.8 (4.6) 15.9 (4.3)

Somatic Anxiety (CSAI-Som)

Pre 16.2 (5.8) 17.5 (7.8) 17.4 (4.9)

Post 12.0 (2.2) 14.0 (4.1) 15.1 (6.5)

Self-Confidence (CSAI-SC)

Pre 23.9 (5.3) 24.0 (6.1) 25.4 (4.1)

Post 27.7 (4.9) 26.5 (6.1) 25.9 (6.1)

Resting Heart Rate (RHR)

Pre 76.3 (11.5) 69.3 (7.3) 79.6 (13.3)

Post 79.1 (6.4) 77.3 (15.1) 79.6 (13.1)

Ratings of Perceived Exertion (RPE)

Pre 11.2 (1.5) 11.2 (1.2) 10.9 (1.6)

Post 11.9 (1.8) 11.7 (2.2) 12.0 (1.6)









Swimming Efficiency

The next major analysis was the comparison of

freestyle swimming efficiency in the flume by group. For

this analysis, the freestyle arm stroke was examined to

determine its efficiency to propel the swimmer forward

through the water. First, overall propelling efficiency

was examined. As described in the measures section,

propelling efficiency can be defined as the amount of arm

force used to propel the body forward (RE, or effective

force) divided by the total force that the swimmer's arm

is producing (R, or total force), and is expressed as a

percentage. In this analysis, video data for one subject

in the Moderate anxiety group was missing for the post-

swim.

There was no significant difference among the groups

on baseline propelling efficiency as determined by a one-

way ANOVA [F(2,29)=.07, 2=.93]. A repeated measures

ANOVA was then conducted to examine the effect of the

experimental manipulation on changes in freestyle

propelling efficiency across the three groups. Thus,

changes in efficiency from baseline unevaluatedd swim) to

the second swim (which followed the instructional

manipulation) were determined and compared across the

three groups. This analysis was designed to determine

the extent to which performance was a function of group

membership (i.e., different anxiety conditions). The

analysis revealed neither a significant between-subjects









(i.e. group) effect [F=.43, R=.66] nor a significant

interaction (i.e., Group X Time) effect [F=.11, R=.9].

However, a significant main effect for Time was indicated

[F=5.5, R<.05]. Swimmers as a whole became more

efficient during their second swim as compared to their

baseline swim.

The next analysis examined a subcomponent of the

freestyle stroke -- the "finish phase." This phase was

chosen for analysis in that it provides the most force

during the armstroke cycle, and because it had been

hypothesized that if there was one part of the stroke

which would be most affected by evaluative anxiety, it

would be the finish. This subanalysis had initially been

planned to help determine where the variance in the

overall stroke efficiency occurred under different

conditions of anxiety. Although there was little overall

variance, this analysis was still conducted to detect

less obvious changes in efficiency. However, a repeated

measures ANOVA revealed no significant main or

interaction effects [Group -- F(2,29)=.55, R=.58; Time --

F(2,29)=.02, R=.89; Group X Time -- F(2,29)=.37, D=.70].

Table 3 reports the means and standard deviations by

group of overall and finish efficiency for the two swims

(i.e., before and after the instructional manipulation).











Table 3

Means and Standard Deviations of Swimming Efficiency

MEASURE GROUP
Low Moderate High


Overall Efficiency (%)

Pre 57.2 (11.8)

Post 60.0 (6.3)

Finish Phase Efficiency (%)

Pre 84.6 (12.0)

Post 82.1 (10.2)


55.4 (14.7)

63.4 (8.7)



85.2 (11.2)

86.4 (5.2)


55.1 (17.0)

59.4 (9.9)



86.5 (6.1)

87.0 (9.1)









Within-Subiect Analyses

Regression analyses were used to examine the

relationship between freestyle swimming efficiency and

the anxiety measures (independent of group membership),

while controlling for swimming skill and competitive

trait anxiety. A multiple regression model was

constructed to determine the individual and interactive

effects of anxiety (state measures of anxiety) and

physiological arousal (resting heart rate prior to

baseline swim) on swimming stroke efficiency. A mixed

model of regression was used, first forcing the swimmers'

best time in the 100 yard freestyle and scores on the SAS

into the equation (thus controlling for skill level and

competitive trait anxiety). Then a stepwise approach was

used in an attempt to enter state anxiety (SAI),

competitive cognitive anxiety (CSAI-Cog), competitive

somatic anxiety (CSAI-Som), competitive self-confidence

(CSAI-SC), and/or resting heart rate (RHR). However,

none of these variables accounted for a significant

portion of the variance in baseline swimming efficiency

when controlling for skill level and trait sport anxiety.

This same analysis was conducted using the post-scores

and second swim, but also did not provide a useful

predictive model.

Simple Pearson's correlation coefficients were also

calculated for baseline variables. Most of the

significant correlations are between the self-report









psychological questionnaires. However, two measures are

also significantly correlated with the swimmers' best

freestyle time (Competitive Self-Confidence, r=-.54,

R<.001; and State Anxiety, r=.42, R<.01). This suggests

that the better swimmers are more self-confident and less

anxious directly prior to the flume test. However, self-

confidence and state anxiety were not correlated with the

more immediate measure of freestyle swimming efficiency

in the flume (see Table 4).


Effects of Prior Flume Testing

Originally, the study was to include only subjects

who had never been tested in the flume before (NFlumed).

However, due to limited recruitment time, the actual

study included 13 swimmers who had been tested previously

at the flume (Flumed). Thus, it was important to examine

any differences between these two groups.

First, there were no significant differences between

Flumed (N=13) and NFlumed (N=20) subjects for age, skill

level, sport trait-anxiety, baseline resting heart rate,

or ratings of perceived exertion. However, a one-way

ANOVA showed that NFlumed subjects attributed

significantly more importance to the flume test than did

the Flumed subjects [F(1,32)=4.1, R=.05]. Next, a MANOVA

conducted on the four psychological variables at baseline

was not significant [F=2.57, E=.06] and therefore not

interpretable. However, exploratory analyses were




Full Text
DISCUSSION 102
Explanation of Findings 102
Summary and Conclusions Ill
Implications for Future Research 114
REFERENCES 119
APPENDIX 133
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 139


121
Buhler, C. (1959). Theoretical observations about
life's basic tendencies. American Journal of
Psychotherapy. 13, 561-581.
Bursill, A. E. (1958). The restriction of peripheral
vision during exposure to hot and humid conditions.
The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology. 10,
113-129.
Burton, D. (1988). Do anxious swimmers swim slower?
Reexamining the elusive anxiety-performance
relationship. Journal of Sport and Exercise
Psychology. 10, 45-61.
Caruso, C. M., Dzewaltowski, D. A., Gill, D. L., &
McElroy, M. A. (1990). Psychological and
physiological changes in competitive state anxiety
during noncompetition and competitive success and
failure. Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology.
12, 6-20.
Cattell, R. B. (1963). The nature and measurement of
anxiety. Scientific American. 208. 96-104.
Cooke, L. E. (1982). Stress and anxiety in sport.
Sports Council Research Project. Sheffield, England:
Sheffield City Polytechnic.
Cox, R. H. (1990). Sport psychology: Concepts and
applications (2nd ed.). Dubuque, IA: Brown.
Crocker, P. E., Alderman, R. B., & Smith, F. M. (1988).
Cognitive-affective stress management training with
high performance youth volleyball players: Effects on
affect, cognition, and performance. Journal of Sport
and Exercise Psychology. 10, 448-460.
Dale, J., & Weinberg, R. (1990). Burnout in sport: A
review and critique. Journal of Applied Sport
Psychology. 2, 67-83.
Davis, H. (1991). Criterion validity of the Athletic
Motivation Inventory: Issues in professional sport.
Journal of Applied Sport Psychology. 3, 176-182.
Deffenbacher, J. L. (1980). Worry and emotionality in
test anxiety. In I. G. Sarason (Ed.), Test anxiety;
Theory, research, and applications (pp. 111-128).
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Doctor, R. M., & Altman, F. (1969). Worry and
emotionality as components of test anxiety:
Replication and further data. Psychological Reports.
24, 563-568.


DISCUSSION
Explanation of Findings
The primary purpose of this study was to evaluate
the effects of anxiety on swimming performance.
Specifically, this study examined 33 high school swimmers
who were tested in a flume, a type of "swimming
treadmill," used at the U.S. Olympic Training Center to
evaluate the performance of competitive swimmers. The
experiment was designed to assess the specific ways in
which anxiety may impact on swimming performance in a
situation which might simulate an important competition
due to the experiencing of high levels of anxiety. Here,
an experimental instructional manipulation was provided
to subjects in an attempt to create three conditions
during which evaluation of swimming performance in the
flume would be conducted. Various measures of anxiety
were obtained in order to assess the impact of the
manipulation in conjunction with the potential stress of
being tested in the flume. More important, the
relationship between certain anxiety measures and
swimming performance was examined.
It was predicted that anxiety experienced as a
result of the experimental manipulation would be
significantly and negatively related to freestyle
102


31
Other writers have explained arousal as synonymous
with motivation (Magill, 1989), alertness/readiness (Cox,
1990), and psychic energy (Martens, 1987). Perhaps the
most traditional definition explains arousal as energy
mobilization ranging on a continuum from deep sleep or
coma at one extreme, to panic-stricken terror or great
excitement at the other extreme (Eysenck, 1984; Malmo,
1959). Duffy (1957, 1962) proposed that arousal is
neural/physiological excitation which varies on two
dimensions: intensity and direction. "For Duffy (1962),
any given point on this continuum was determined by /the
extent of release of potential energy, stored in the
tissues of the organism, as this is shown in activity or
response7 (p. 17)" (Neiss, 1988a, p. 345).
As with anxiety, arousal can be described as
multidimensional in nature (Landers, 1980), and has been
suggested to encompass three dimensions: physiological,
behavioral, and cognitive (Borkovek, 1976). The
indicators of increased arousal are manifested and
assessed in a number of ways: self-report,
electrophysiological (e.g., decreases in skin resistance
of galvanic skin response; increases in palmar sweating,
EMG, EEG), respiratory and cardiovascular (e.g.,
increases in ECG, blood pressure, heart rate), and
biochemical (e.g., increases in the release of adrenaline
and noradrenaline) (Gould & Krane, in press; Hackfort &
Schwenkmezger, 1989).


4
psychologists with athletes. However, less is known
regarding the efficacy of these various interventions.
Obviously, from a layperson's perspective there is a
common occurrence of athletes "choking" under pressure.
Most sports fans can recite several incidents in which an
athlete or team has not performed as well as expected,
and which may be attributed to the athlete's inability to
cope effectively with a pressure situation (e.g., missing
a two-foot putt to win a major golf championship; false-
starting and disqualification in the finals of a swim
meet). Understanding these failures to perform is
interesting to sports fans and scientists alike. Such
understanding is especially important for the athlete who
is seeking his or her best performance.
If there exists, for example, a zone of anxiety or
arousal within which athletes achieve optimal competitive
performance (cf. Hanin, 1980, 1986) then this knowledge
has special relevance for athletes, coaches, and sport
psychologists. If, however, any increase in anxiety or
arousal is detrimental to performance (cf. Bird & Horn,
1990; Burton, 1988), this has different ramifications for
athletes and those working with them.
Despite the fact that competition-specific anxiety
is a major concern for many athletes, coaches, and sport
psychologists, the research literature dealing with this
topic like that related to other forms of anxiety, is
insufficient to explain the precise relationship between


98
Separate Examination of Subjects New to the Flume
Because there were significant differences between
NFlumed and Flumed subjects, another series of analyses
was conducted. Only the NFlumed subjects (N=20) were
examined in the following analyses (which were very
similar to the analyses run on the entire subject
sample). Although swimmers were not assigned to groups
according to prior testing history, an equal number of
NFlumed subjects were in each group and did not differ on
skill level, competitive trait anxiety, or age.
The effects of the instructional manipulations on
the reactions to the flume testing was examined on
this subset of swimmers. A repeated measures MANOVA
conducted on the four psychological variables (A-state,
cognitive anxiety, somatic anxiety, and self-confidence)
revealed a significant Group X Time interaction [Wilk's
Lambda = .32; F=2.7, pc.05]. Despite this significant
multivariate Group X Time interaction, there were no
significant Group X Time interactions for the univariate
repeated measure ANOVAs.
Follow-up univariate repeated measures ANOVAs
indicated that a significant Time effect occurred for the
three subtests of the CSAI-2, as in the entire sample.
Cognitive and somatic competitive anxiety decreased and
self-confidence increased prior to the second swim [CSAI-
Cog, (F=8.7, E<-01); CSAI-Som (F=10.27, pc.Ol) and CSAI-
SC (F=8.92, pc.01). Still, changes in cognitive anxiety


103
swimming performance, both as a function of group membership
and independent of the groups, as assessed by self-report
measures of competitive and state anxiety. Thus, it had
been predicted that performance decrements would be most
pronounced in those swimmers who demonstrated the greatest
increases in cognitive anxiety from baseline to evaluated
swims. It had also been predicted that cognitive state
anxiety would have a more profound negative effect on
performance than somatic state anxiety. Finally, it had
been anticipated that any decrements found in the freestyle
stroke would most likely occur during the "finish", the
phase of the stroke in which maximal propulsion is created.
The results indicated that swimmers did not report an
increase in anxiety following the experimental manipulation.
That is, instead of increasing the subjects' self-reports of
anxiety, subjects as a whole reported experiencing less
anxiety prior to the second flume swim. Specifically,
ANOVAs showed that cognitive and somatic anxiety decreased
following the baseline swim, while self-confidence
increased. Thus, the experimental manipulation was
ineffective in increasing the subjects' anxiety. However,
there were some trends that indicate that the reduction in
anxiety was greatest in the low-anxiety manipulation group,
suggesting that the three sets of instructions were
qualitatively different. Upon examination of Table 2 (p.
90), it can be seen that the differences between self-report
scores from baseline to post-test were greatest (though not


81
moderate and high anxiety instructions were designed to
create evaluative anxiety and were based on research
suggesting that "situations involving potential failure
or threats to self-esteem are more potent sources of
threat than are potentially physically harmful
situations" (Martens et al., 1990, p. 14). Scanlan
(1984) further confirms that competitive situations can
be stressful due to extensive evaluation of ability and
competence. They involve perceptions of inadequacy in
successfully meeting the performance demands, and
perceptions of the consequences of failure, possibly
leading to a threat to self-esteem.
In this experiment, the threat to self-esteem was
expected to emerge from the swimmer's awareness of being
evaluated by a coach or USS official who could
potentially judge a swimmer as having a "poor" or
"inadequate" swimming style. Although there were no
overt consequences of failure, it was expected that the
swimmers would be concerned about "failing" (i.e., not
performing well in the flume; not having a "good enough"
stroke). The instructional sets were as follows:
(1) Low anxiety. "During this flume test, you will be
videotaped as you swim freestyle. The taping and
analysis of your stroke will be discussed with you and at
a later time with your coach, and will only be used for
your own stroke improvement. Try to swim relaxed and
enjoy yourself. This will be just the same as your warm-


125
Lewthwaite, R. (1990). Threat perception in competitive
trait anxiety: The endangerment of important goals.
Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology. 12, 280-
300.
Liebert, R. M., & Morris, L. W. (1967). Cognitive and
emotional components of test anxiety: A distinction
and some initial data. Psychological Reports. 20,
975-978.
Madden, C. C., Summers, J. J., & Brown, D. F. (1990).
The influence of perceived stress on coping with
competitive basketball. International Journal of
Sport Psychology. 21, 21-35.
Magill, R. A. (1989). Motor learning: Concepts and
applications (3rd ed.). Dubuque, IA: Brown.
Malmo, R. B. (1959). Activation: A neuropsychological
dimension. Psychological Review. 66, 367-386.
Mandler, G. (1975). Mind and emotion. London: Wiley.
Martens, R. (1977). Sport Competition Anxiety Test.
Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics.
Martens, R. (1987).
Champaign, IL:
Coaches guide to sport psychology.
Human Kinetics.
Martens, R., Burton, D., Vealey, R. S., Bump, L. A. &
Smith, D. E. (1990) Development and validation of
the Competitive State Anxiety Inventory-2. In R.
Martens, R. S. Vealey, & D. Burton (Eds.),
Competitive anxiety in sport (pp. 117-190).
Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics.
Martens, R., Burton, D., Vealey, R., Bump, L., & Smith,
D. (1983). The development of the Competitive State
Anxiety Inventory 2 fCSAI-2). Unpublished
manuscript, University of Illinois.
Martens, R., Gill, D. L., & Scanlan, T. K. (1976).
Competitive trait anxiety, success-failure and sex as
determinants of motor performance. Perceptual and
Motor Skills. 43, 1199-1208.
Martens, R., Vealey, R. S., & Burton, D. (1990).
Competitive anxiety in sport. Champaign, IL: Human
Kinetics.
Martin, J. J., & Gill, D. L. (1991). The relationships
among competitive orientation, sport-confidence,
self-efficacy, anxiety, and performance. Journal of
Sport and Exercise Psychology. 13, 149-159.


6
nature of sport-related anxiety, and how different
dimensions of anxiety may relate to skilled sports
performance. Focus on this topic has mainly resulted
from the development of a revised form of the Competitive
State Anxiety Inventory (CSAI-2; Martens, Burton, Vealey,
Bump, & Smith, 1983) which is designed to assess
cognitive and somatic competitive anxiety and self-
confidence. Since the development of the CSAI-2, it has
become a prominent instrument in the assessment of sports
related state anxiety. The authors cite 16 published
empirical studies from 1984-1988 which have included the
CSAI-2 (Martens, Vealey, & Burton, 1990) and there have
been at least this many studies utilizing the CSAI-2 in
the last four years.
In creating the CSAI-2, Martens et al., (1983) with
regard to previous research (e.g., Borkovek, 1976; Doctor
& Altman, 1969; Liebert & Morris, 1967; Morris, Davis, &
Hutchings, 1981) have suggested that the distinction
between cognitive and somatic state anxiety is both
conceptually and practically important in the assessment
of competitive anxiety. Likewise, Morris and his
colleagues (Morris, Brown, & Halbert, 1977; Morris,
Harris, & Rovins, 1981; Morris & Liebert, 1973) have
argued that cognitive and somatic anxiety can be elicited
independently by different antecedents and are separate,
albeit related, components. Martens and his colleagues
have applied these notions to sport psychology and have


9
for pressure-filled competitive situations (Lewthwaite,
1990; Smith & Smoll, 1990).
It also appears that anxiety primarily affects the
athlete in performance-degrading ways (e.g., Burton,
1988; McCann, Murphy, & Raedeke, in press) through
cognitive and attentional factors (e.g., "mental" errors)
(Albrecht & Feltz, 1987; Bird & Horn, 1990; Singer et
al., 1991), and through somatic effects (e.g., too
"pumped-up") (Powell & Verner, 1982; Smith & Smoll,
1990). Anxiety also appears to affect individuals
negatively in a competitive situation via altered motoric
reactions (e.g., Beuter & Duda, 1985; Weinberg, 1990).
As will be demonstrated in the literature review, it
is currently not clear which factors of competition
(e.g., intraindividual pressure, competitors, coaches)
and which mediating factors (e.g., attention,
physiological arousal, cognitive anxiety) are most
relevant to performance in regards to competition
anxiety. Sport psychologists who are evaluating athletes
and the athletes themselves would benefit from more
compelling information regarding how athletes react under
potentially "stressful" competitive situations. A more
precise understanding of the nature of athletes'
responses to stressful situations and how their
performances are affected is needed.
One specific example of a situation which may be
anxiety-producing to athletes, and which may represent an


18
cameras) while they swim against a steady stream of
water.
Hand Velocity CHV) is the speed of the hand through
the water in meters per second.
Hydrodynamic Biomechanical Analysis is an overall
process of filming a swimmer with underwater cameras, and
then determining forces and efficiency of the swimmer
(via digitization).
Insweep refers to the middle (second) phase of the
armstroke. For analytical purposes, it begins where the
catch ends (i.e., at the widest point) and continues
until the hand is at the narrowest point (i.e.,
underneath the body and where the finish begins).
Propelling Efficiency (PE) is a measure of how
efficient a swimmer is in moving through the water. It
is the propulsive force (RE) divided by the total force
(R) multiplied by 100 and thus expressed as a percentage.
Propulsive Force (RE) is the force (measured in
newtons) which the swimmer exerts upon the water in order
to propel himself or herself through the water. It is a
component of the total force which the swimmer exerts.
Total Force (R) is the total force (measured in
newtons) which the swimmer exerts upon the water while
swimming.
Assumptions
For the purpose of this investigation, the following
assumptions were made:


53
Despite the intuitive appeal of the cognitive
anxiety/performance relationship, studies which have
investigated the multidimensional influences of anxiety
(i.e., cognitive worry and somatic anxiety) in
competitive settings have provided mixed results
regarding the strength and nature of the relationship.
For instance, Gould et al. (1987) studied police officers
performing in a pistol shooting competition, and
concluded that the cognitive component of competitive
anxiety was unrelated to shooting outcome. However, the
somatic component was found to influence performance so
that "a quadratic function best explained the somatic
anxiety/performance relationship" (Gould et al., 1987, p.
40). In this case, the authors explain the somatic
component as being more predictive because pistol
shooting depends on fine neuromuscular control easily
disrupted by slight physiological changes.
Although this is certainly true, Burton (1988)
suggests that there also may have been methodological
reasons for the nonsignificant relationship between
cognitive anxiety and shooting performance. First, Gould
and his colleagues used the average scores of a single
competition (as opposed to a season average) as the
comparison to a specific round, and thus gained a less
reliable assessment of anxiety-mediated performance
fluctuations. Also, the subjects may have had low ego-
involvement with the task, as it was an elaborate


17
threatening situation (objective or subjective; of
environmental, social or intrapersonal origin).
Arousal is defined as psychological and/or
physiological activation of an organism on a continuum
from deep sleep to extreme activation (e.g., intense
excitement or fear).
Catch is the first phase of the armstroke in which
the swimmer's hand enters the water and begins the
stroke. For analytical purposes, it continues to the
point at which the swimmer's hand is at its widest point
(i.e., furthest point laterally from the body).
Digitization refers to the process of converting a
video image of an action (e.g., a swimming armstroke)
into two and three dimensional coordinates for
quantitative computer analysis.
Drag is defined as any negative force created during
swimming which acts to slow the body through water
resistance (e.g., during hand entry).
Finish describes the third, final, and most powerful
phase of the armstroke in which the swimmer completes the
stroke cycle. For analytical purposes, it begins at the
point at which the swimmer's hand is at its narrowest
point (i.e., underneath the body) and ends with the
hand's exit from the water.
Flume refers to a "swimming treadmill" in which
subjects are evaluated (filmed via underwater video


16
terminology of the present study. To facilitate a better
comprehension of these terms, it is first necessary to
present a brief overview of the freestyle swimming
armstroke. The stroke is made up of three phases (catch,
insweep, and finish). (Recovery, in which the hand
travels from the end of the stroke to reenter the water,
is the fourth phase of the stroke, but is not associated
with the propulsion of the swimmer.) The phases are not
distinct, but are continuous parts of the stroke. Thus,
the swimmer first enters the water, "catching" it and
pulling back and away from the body. Next, the swimmer
begins to bend the elbow more as he or she "sweeps" the
water with the hand in and underneath the body. To
"finish" the stroke, the swimmer pushes the water with
the hand out and back (from underneath the body)
eventually lifting the elbow and hand out of the water
for recovery. From the perspective of the swimmer, the
right arm generally follows the shape of an inverted "S",
while the left arm approximates an "S".
Angle of Pitch (AP) is the angle of the hand in
relation to the swimmer's body at any one time during the
armstroke (90 approximates a hand-shaking position).
Anxiety refers to the experience of negative
thoughts (e.g., worry, self-doubt) and usually
concomitant physiological sensations (e.g., sweaty palms,
racing heart rate) which are induced in response to a


104
statistically significantly) for the Low Anxiety
manipulation group. Thus, the instructions to "try to swim
relaxed and enjoy yourself" were apparently less stressful
than those in the moderate and high anxiety groups in which
efforts were made to elicit anxiety responses.
Despite the trends that indicated the instructional
sets were different, they did not increase anxiety prior to
the second swim. One conclusion could be that the anxiety
manipulation produced less anxiety than do many actual
competitive situations. Indeed, the subjects' post
manipulation anxiety scores were below the mean as compared
to a normative sample of high school athletes, and as
compared to a normative sample of competitive swimmers prior
to a competition (Martens, Vealey, & Burton, 1990).
However, it would have been difficult to increase the
potential threat of the high anxiety group instructions
without becoming unethical or unbelievable.
Furthermore, despite the observation that the
instructions were less effective than had been hypothesized,
it appears that the problem did not lie with the
instructions as much as it did with the testing situation
itself. Most of the swimmers did not appear to be overly
concerned with the testing in general. Their initial
competitive state anxiety scores, which were expected to be
somewhat elevated, were also below the mean as compared to a
normative sample of high school athletes, and as compared to
a normative sample of competitive swimmers prior to a


55
similar to Caruso et al. (1990) and Gould et al. (1987),
this task had little external validity and the subjects
likely had low ego involvement. Furthermore, as the
authors acknowledge, due to the simplicity of the
pegboard task, complex motor skills were not required
which might be impaired by cognitive anxiety.
On the other hand, several researchers have
demonstrated a relationship between cognitive anxiety and
sports performance in field studies. For example, Powell
and Verner (1982) found that linear increases in state
anxiety and fear estimates (roughly cognitive worry) were
significantly and negatively related to sport parachuting
performance. Unexpectedly, heart rate (physiological
arousal) was also negatively related (in a linear
fashion) to performance.
More recently, McCann, Murphy, and Raedeke (in
press), studied national level cyclists under laboratory
(cycling ergometer) and field (time-trial road race)
conditions. The investigators found that self-reported
anxiety was strongly related to cycling performance, with
the strongest relationships occurring under the field
condition. High cognitive anxiety and somatic anxiety
were associated with weak performance, while high self-
confidence was associated with a stronger performance.
Also, only cognitive anxiety was significantly related to
performance under the cycling ergometer laboratory
setting. This study had many strengths: (1) It employed


37
Easterbrook (1959) explained the inverted-U function
by asserting that "emotional arousal" acts to reduce the
range of cues that an individual uses. That is, the
range of cue utilization shrinks as the use of peripheral
(irrelevant or partially relevant) cues is reduced, while
the use of central (immediately relevant) cues is
maintained. Thus, reduction in the range of cues should
first improve task proficiency (as the irrelevant, non-
essential cues are omitted), but later impair ability.
"It would in fact produce just the sort of up and down
relation between proficiency and drive that is familiar
in connection with the names of Yerkes and Dodson"
(Easterbrook, 1959, p. 193).
In explaining the effects of arousal in sport,
Landers (1980) draws from Yerkes-Dodson (1908) and
Easterbrook (1959) stating that when arousal
increases up to a certain (optimal) level,
perceptual selectivity also increases improving the
individual's performance (presumably because the
athlete tries harder and is more likely to eliminate
task-irrelevant cues). Increases in arousal beyond
this "optimal" point should induce further
perceptual narrowing and a concomitant deterioration
in performance, in accordance with the inverted-U
hypothesis. For example, an "over-aroused"
quarterback in football might be focused too


30
situation and determine whether there is a perceived
imbalance between the demands of the situation and the
capabilities of himself or herself. Third, and depending
on this interpretation, the athlete can experience
changes in physiological arousal and/or state anxiety.
Fourth is the outcome of the performance.
This explanation is helpful in that it demonstrates
that competitive stress is a process and that the
emphasis is placed on the athlete's evaluation and
perception of a competitive situation, and not simply the
situation itself. Thus, in this context, competitive
stress may be viewed as positive or negative. This is in
contrast to competitive anxiety which is described as
primarily negative. However, even this is not
indisputable as will be seen in the forthcoming section
on the relationship between anxiety and performance.
Arousal and Activation
The relatedness among terms does not end with
anxiety and its associated terms but continues in the
notion of arousal and activation. Some writers adopt a
parsimonious approach to the topic:
Arousal and activation are used interchangeably by
most motivation theorists, although there are some
who have attempted to make distinctions between the
two concepts. In this text, the two words will be
considered to be synonymous. Emotional, tense, and
anxious are other adjectives that are frequently
used to express the same idea, and in sports,
"psyched-up" conveys the same notion. (Sage, 1984,
p. 345)


ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I express my appreciation to the staff of United
States Swimming who provided me with the facilities and
technical support to conduct this study. I would also
like to thank Drs. Shane Murphy, Jay Kearney, and Sara
Smith of the United States Olympic Committee whose
endorsement, assistance and encouragement were vital to
its completion. A special thanks goes to Samantha Ortiz,
who spent many long hours at the video and computer
terminals coding the swimming data. At the University of
Florida, I had the assistance and expertise of five
outstanding committee members: Drs. Bruce Crosson,
Michael Geisser, Anthony Greene, James Johnson, and
Robert Singer. I thank them each for their advice and
instructive contributions to this dissertation. Deep
gratitude is especially given to my doctoral chairman,
Jim Johnson. Dr. Johnson's constant support, advisement
and enthusiasm were indispensable for the completion of
this project. Finally, I extend thanks and appreciation
to my dear friends and family who mean so much to me and
to whom I dedicate this work.
ii


BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
Robert Andrew Swoap was born in New Brunswick, New
Jersey, on October 28, 1965. He is the second of the four
sons of Joan and J.R. Swoap, and was raised in Houston and
Conroe, Texas. From 1983-1987, Bob attended Duke University
(and became a devoted follower of Blue Devil basketball)
graduating cum laude with a Bachelor of Arts degree in
psychology in May 1987. Four months later, Bob began
doctoral studies at the University of Florida where he
studied clinical and health psychology. Bob pursued a
special interest in sport psychology at the United States
Olympic Training Center as a clinical research assistant
from August 1990-July 1991. In September of 1991, Bob began
a predoctoral clinical psychology internship at the Medical
University of South Carolina. Beginning in September, 1992,
Bob will work at Duke University Medical Center in the
Behavioral Medicine Program as a Clinical Associate-
Postdoctoral fellow.
139


12
assessment procedure (i.e., the flume) to determine its
effects on swimmers' anxiety and performance.
Statements of the Problem
There were three primary purposes for conducting
this investigation: (1) to examine and compare the
effects of the components of anxiety (i.e., somatic vs.
cognitive) on swimming performance; (2) to determine how
the swimming stroke (from a biomechanical perspective) is
affected by different levels of externally-induced
anxiety; and (3) to determine whether current assessment
procedures at the International Center for Aquatic
Research are affected by a swimmer's testing history in
the flume.
Brief Overview of Study
High school swimmers (N=33) were matched for skill,
age, and competitive trait anxiety. Each was tested on
two trials in the motorized flume (i.e., "swimming
treadmill"). Prior to each trial, swimmers were given
self-report measures to assess their competitive state
anxiety, including cognitive and somatic anxiety, and had
their heart rate taken. During both trials, the subjects
were videotaped underwater to determine their swimming
efficiency using computer-aided biomechanical analyses.
A baseline efficiency was obtained during the first swim
while the swimmer was unaware of being filmed. The
second trial was conducted under one of three anxiety


I certify that I have read this study and that in my
opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly
presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality,
as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
Jam
H. Jo,
ison, Chair
Professor ofjciinical and
Health Psychology
I certify that I have read this study and that in my
opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly
presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality,
as a dissertation for the degree of-poctor^o£^hilosophy.
'EJrxice A. Crosson
Professor of Clinical and
Health Psychology
I certify that I have read this study and that in my
opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly
presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality,
as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
Michael E. Geisser
Assistant Professor of Clinical
and Health Psychology
I certify that I have read this study and that in my
opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly
presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality,
as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
Anthony f. (Greene
Assistant Professor of Clinical
and Health Psychology


97
Table 5
Means and Standard Deviations of Psychological Reactions
to the Flume by Prior Testing History
MEASURE GROUP
NFlumed Filmed
State Anxiety (SAI)
Pre
41.4 (9.4)
34.7
(7.1)
Post
36.2 (9.5)
33.7
(8.6)
Cognitive Anxiety (CSAI-Cog)
Pre
17.6 (4.3)
14.2
(3.6)
Post
15.1 (4.2)
14.3
(4.3)
Somatic Anxiety
(CSAI-Som)
Pre
19.3 (6.3)
13.6
(4.1)
Post
14.1 (4.7)
13.2
(4.8)
Self-Confidence
(CSAI-SC)
Pre
23.0 (5.1)
26.8
(4.4)
Post
26.5 (5.9)
27.1
(5.3)


48
There have been more productive investigations
utilizing authentic competitive situations. These have
focused on the relationship between competitive trait
anxiety, competitive state anxiety, and athletic
performance on the field, in the pool, and so forth. For
example, Klavora (1978) reported that high school
basketball players had different "optimal arousal" levels
which correlated with their self-reported competitive
trait anxiety, where optimal arousal is defined as the
level of self-reported state anxiety at which the athlete
performs most successfully. Thus, low-trait anxious
players performed better when reporting low state
anxiety, while high-trait anxious players actually did
better when reporting a higher amount of state anxiety.
Smith and Smoll (1990) interpret Klavora's results as
suggesting "the possibility that optimal performance may
occur at a level of arousal that is similar to athletes'
customary level of anxiety rather than at a normative
level defined by the anxiety distribution for all
subjects" (p. 440).
Sonstroem and Bernardo (1982) investigated the
inverted-U theory with female collegiate basketball
players who had been assessed on both competitive trait
and state anxiety. Competitive trait anxiety was not
found to have a significant main effect on performance;
however, their results suggested that after controlling
for individual differences in competitive A-state, an


99
appear to be related to group membership and indeed the
interaction term approached significance [F=3.43, p=.06].
Table 6 reports the means of these variables, and that of
Ratings of Perceived Exertion which also demonstrated a
significant Time effect [F=6.33, pc.05] in a repeated
measures ANOVA. Swimming efficiency is also reported in
this table although no significant difference among
groups was discovered for this subset of the sample
(using a repeated measures ANOVA).
Finally, regression analyses identical to those
conducted on the entire sample were similarly
unproductive in providing a model predictive of swimming
efficiency. As before, a mixed model of regression was
used, first forcing the swimmers' best time in the 100
yard freestyle and scores on the SAS into the equation
(thus controlling for skill level and competitive trait
anxiety). Then a stepwise approach was used in an
attempt to enter state anxiety (SAI), competitive
cognitive anxiety (CSAI-Cog), competitive somatic anxiety
(CSAI-Som), competitive self-confidence (CSAI-SC), and/or
resting heart rate (RHR). Again, in this novice subset
of the sample, none of these variables accounted for a
significant portion of the variance in baseline swimming
efficiency when controlling for skill level and trait
sport anxiety. Finally, correlational analyses in this
subset were similar to the overall sample, except that
resting heart rate prior to the first swim was


70
(5) The swimmer warmed up in the flume for 2V2 min,
then was assessed for baseline freestyle efficiency at
approximately 80% of his or her maximum swimming speed.
(6) Exertional heart rate (EHR) and Ratings of Perceived
Exertion (RPE; Borg, 1962) were taken immediately
following the baseline swim.
(7) Instructions were provided regarding task demands
for the upcoming flume test. Instructions were designed
to create three anxiety conditions, and therefore three
groups (low, moderate, and high anxiety), prior to being
evaluated on the flume test.
(8) Psychological questionnaires (SAI, CSAI-2) were
administered to assess state anxiety following the
instructional manipulation.
(9) Resting heart rate was taken following a brief
recapitulation of the instructional manipulation.
(10) The swimmer warmed up in the flume for 1 min, and
then was assessed for freestyle efficiency at
approximately 80% of his or her maximum swimming speed.
It was during this phase that the swimmer was aware of
the filming.
(11) Exertional heart rate and Ratings of Perceived
Exertion were taken immediately following the evaluated
swim.
(12) Swimmers were debriefed after all had completed
their tests.


29
anxiety can be aroused without eliciting self-evaluation,
while certain conditions which are highly evaluative
elicit cognitive anxiety but not somatic state anxiety
(Burton, 1988; Morris, Harris, and Rovins, 1981).
Competitive anxiety can be further delineated using
state and trait anxiety terms, which have been described
previously. Hence, competitive state anxiety can be
defined as a condition prior to or during a competitive
situation "characterized by feelings of apprehension and
tension and associated with activation of the organism"
(Martens, Vealey, & Burton, 1990, p. 9), while
competitive trait anxiety is defined as a "situation-
specific modification of the more general A-trait
construct ... a tendency to perceive competitive
situations as threatening and to respond to these
situations with A-state" (p. 11).
Although it may be true that it cannot yet be
adequately explained why some athletes perceive threat in
the sport environment while others regard their sport
experiences as positive or benign (Lewthwaite, 1990) we
can at least define the stress/anxiety terms in a more
straightforward and consistent way. An appropriate
summary of the stress process which has four interrelated
stages is given by Gould and Krane (in press) who adapted
McGrath's (1970) process model of stress to sports.
First, an environmental situation or demand is placed on
the athlete. Second, the athlete must interpret this


28
Martens (1977) suggests that cognitive and somatic
anxiety are two separate components of competitive
anxiety. Burton (1988) writes that
Cognitive anxiety is the mental component of anxiety
caused by negative expectations about success or
negative self-evaluation, whereas somatic anxiety is
the physiological or affective component of anxiety
that is directly related to autonomic arousal.
Cognitive anxiety is characterized by worry,
negative self-talk, and unpleasant visual imagery,
whereas somatic anxiety is reflected in such
responses as rapid heart rate, shortness of breath,
clammy hands, butterflies in the stomach, and tense
muscles. (Burton, 1988, p. 46)
It has been proposed that these two components have
differential effects on performance (e.g., Burton, 1988;
Smith & Smoll, 1990; Weinberg, 1990) and thus the
comprehensive term "competitive anxiety" may not have
exclusively negative or positive effects (see a later
section entitled Relationship between Competitive Anxiety
and Performance).
Although the two components of anxiety are
hypothetically independent, Morris, Davis, and Hutchings
(1981) have suggested that they probably covary in
stressful situations since these situations contain
elements related to the stimulation of both somatic and
cognitive responses. A modest dependence has been
demonstrated in a number of studies (Deffenbacher, 1980;
Martens, Vealey, & Burton, 1990; Morris & Liebert, 1973).
However, conflicting evidence exists that suggests that
cognitive and somatic anxiety are independent, depending
on the situational stressor. That is, high somatic


83
television monitor of the flume was activated and
displayed.)
Upon receiving one of the set of instructions
swimmers were then administered the state anxiety
component (SAI) of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory and
the Competition State Anxiety Inventory (CSAI-2) for the
second time. These questionnaires were to be used to
determine the level of anxiety that swimmers reported
directly prior to the flume session, and compared to
their baseline report. Resting heart rate was taken
subsequently to obtain a physiological measure of arousal
(this was following a standardized period of 10 min from
the end of the 30 sec swim). Each swimmer then underwent
the standard freestyle assessment in the flume to
evaluate propelling efficiency (knowing that he or she
would be filmed). The subject warmed up again for 1 min
at 50% of best time, then paused as the flume's speed was
increased to 80% of best time. Each subject then swam
for 30 secs, during which time he or she was videotaped.
The filming and digitization procedures (biomechanical
analysis) were identical to the baseline procedure as
described earlier. Immediately after the swimmer
completed this swim, exertional heart rate was taken and
the subject completed the Ratings of Perceived Exertion
scale (RPE).
Since the swimmers performed in the flume alone,
they were told not to discuss the study with any other


INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
Both research and practice in the area of sport
psychology has increased during the last 10 years. This
is illustrated in the United States by a recent surge in
the formation of sport psychology-related organizations,
such as the Association for the Advancement of Applied
Sport Psychology and Division 47 of the American
Psychological Association (Exercise and Sport
Psychology), in addition to the North American Society
for the Psychology of Sport and Physical Activity. New
sport psychology journals are being published. These
include the Journal of Applied Sport Psychology. The
Sport Psychologist, and the Sport Psychology Training
Bulletin, in addition to the Journal of Sport and
Exercise Psychology.
Further, it appears that sport psychology services
are being used more frequently in a variety of sectors.
For example, in the mid-1970s there was isolated
involvement of a few national governing bodies (NGBs)
with sport psychologists, but by 1987 over half of the
NGBs in the U.S. were provided with some sport psychology
services for athletes and coaches (Murphy, 1988). A
recent survey documented that 16 of the NGBs now have
formal sport psychology programs, and that all of these
1


26
potentially harmful event; and (2) It is mediated by
psychological activities (e.g., perception, thought,
memory, and judgement) which are involved in the
appraisal process. An example comes from some
competitive sports in which athletes strive to perform at
peak levels under circumstances in which an opposing side
aims to restrict such performance (Madden et al., 1990).
The athlete must appraise the potential threat using
mental processing (i.e., accurate perception, careful
thought, recollections of previous interactions, etc.)
and must arrive at a reasonable judgement.
The concept of stress has also been described as an
intervening variable, linking two sets of factors
(stressors and stress reactions) together. Thus, the
stressfulness for an individual of any stressor varies,
depending on how he or she perceives the situation and on
how he or she perceives available coping resources
(Kimble, Garmezy, & Zigler, 1984). Stress has also been
defined very generally as "any behavioral response of an
organism to environmental stimulation" (Fenz, 1988, p.
223) .
With regard to sports, Scanlan (1984) states that
competition can be "stressful" due to extensive
evaluation of ability and competence, and that
competitive stress is a negative emotional reaction an
athlete feels when self-esteem is threatened. "It is
his/her perceptions of inadequacy in successfully meeting


114
Implications for Future Research
Although this study was designed to elicit anxiety in a
controlled measurable setting, the swimmers did not report
excessive anxiety prior to either swim. Thus, the situation
in which testing took place and/or the instructional sets
may not have been threatening enough to the swimmers' self
esteem to impact on performance. Here, it can be noted that
threat to self-esteem appears to be the most important
aspect of cognitive anxiety in sports performance
(Lewthwaite, 1990; Scanlan et al., 1991). The problem
appears to be that the flume, despite its being a practical
and useful setting to obtain quantifiable data on swimming
efficiency, is apparently only threatening before one has
warmed-up in it. It could be suggested that underwater
filming which takes place in a regular pool during a
competitive swim would be a more realistic assessment of a
swimmer in a potentially anxiety-provoking situation. While
this can be done relatively easily for qualitative
assessment of stroke performance, it would be much more
difficult to calculate propelling efficiency via this method
(due to the necessity of having a large three dimensional
figure underwater as a reference point).
In this study, anecdotal information obtained during
the debriefing suggested that the manipulation and flume
testing were not a major threat to self-esteem. In fact,
several subjects indicated that the testing situation was
not challenging enough. Thus, it could be suggested that


50
potential consequences); and the personal meaning
that the consequences have for the individual.
(Smith & Smoll, 1990, p. 422)
It is clear that higher levels of competitive state
anxiety are typically found under competitive conditions
as compared to practice conditions (Bird & Horn, 1990;
Klavora, 1978). However, it is not clear how competitive
anxiety actually affects performance. In an attempt to
clarify this situation, an additional conceptualization
is examined.
Cognitive and somatic anxiety
As described earlier, multidimensional anxiety
theory postulates that competitive anxiety is comprised
of two major components: cognitive anxiety and somatic
anxiety. Cognitive anxiety may be composed of worry,
negative self-talk, fear of evaluation, and so forth. As
such, and in its strict sense, cognitive anxiety is
experienced as a negative emotion. Thus, some have
postulated the relationship of competitive state anxiety
to performance as one of a negative, linear nature
(Burton, 1988; Martens et al., 1983), whereas the somatic
component of competitive anxiety (considered similar to
"arousal") may demonstrate an inverted-U relationship to
performance. This may be because "somatic anxiety" is
simply a perception of physiological arousal. Adopting
this conceptualization, an athlete who feels the classic
"butterflies in the stomach" may perform better than when
he or she either perceives no physiological arousal (and


Ill
(and the other psychological variables) were not significant
predictors of efficiency in the flume, they were
significantly related to the swimmers7 best time. That is,
the best swimmers reported the lowest anxiety and highest
self-confidence prior to the flume evaluation. This
correlational finding makes intuitive sense and is likely
due to a combination of experience level and mastery. That
is, the better swimmers have likely had more experience and
success in competitive situations as compared to those with
worse times. Therefore, they may approach competitive
situations (or a simulated competitive experience such as
the flume) with more confidence and less anxiety.
Interestingly, though, there was no significant relationship
between the swimmers7 skill level (best time) and their
immediate performance (propelling efficiency) in the flume.
It is unclear as to why a significant relationship was not
demonstrated. As suggested earlier, it is possible that the
biomechanical efficiency measures obtained during an 80%
flume speed test are less related to skill level than are
those obtained at a higher flume speed (e.g., 95%).
Summary and Conclusions
It was intended that the current study would contribute
to knowledge regarding the anxiety-sports performance
relationship in two important ways. First, the flume
provided a unique setting in which to examine the anxiety-
performance relationship. There are no existing studies


107
low. It is possible that propelling efficiency measures
obtained during an 80% flume speed test are less prone to
effects of anxiety than are those obtained at a higher flume
speed (e.g., 95%). This latter speed was not utilized in
the present study because it was deemed more important to
obtain one and only one trial per flume test. That is, if
the speed of the flume had been set to 95% of the swimmer's
maximum speed (a more difficult and potentially more
anxiety-inducing level), more than one trial would have
likely been needed to obtain a clean trial (i.e., not
affected by false starts and multiple practice).
Differences in the number of trials needed to obtain a clean
trial would likely have influenced effects of evaluative
anxiety. It would have been difficult to determine whether
changes in anxiety and efficiency were related more to how
many trials it took the swimmer to get used to the full-
speed flume, or more dependent on the instructional
manipulation.
Thus, under the 80% flume speed testing protocol,
swimmers may have felt that they could accomplish the task
without much problem regardless of the instructions that
they received and thus demonstrated minimal anxiety. This
may also have been the case with those swimmers who had
never been in the flume before. That is, there were
probably no anxiety-inducing instructions that could have
overcome the anxiety-reducing effect of having swum
successfully in the flume once, and realizing that it was


TABLE OF CONTENTS
gage
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ii
ABSTRACT V
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 1
Statements of the Problem 12
Brief Overview of Study 12
Hypotheses 13
Definitions of Terms 15
Assumptions 18
Limitations 19
Significance of the Study 20
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 22
Concepts and Definitions 22
Anxiety and Stress 22
Arousal and Activation 3 0
Summary of Concepts 34
Relationship of Anxiety and Arousal to Performance. 35
Arousal 3 6
Competitive Anxiety 46
Problems with the Literature and Researchers'
Recommendations 58
Summary of Literature Review and Restatement
of Need for Current Study 63
PROCEDURES 67
Subjects 67
Procedural Overview 68
Measures 71
Methodology 79
RESULTS 85
Subjects 85
Effects of Anxiety Manipulations 86
Swimming Efficiency 90
Within-Subject Analyses 93
Effects of Prior Flume Testing 94
Separate Examination of Subjects New to the Flume.. 98
iii


7
suggested that these two anxiety components have
different effects on competitive performance. They
suggest that somatic state anxiety will reach its peak at
the onset of competition and will dissipate once the
contest starts. Thus, they argue, somatic anxiety
(unless very high and attentionally distracting) should
influence performance less than should cognitive anxiety.
Cognitive anxiety, consisting of negative expectations
about success in performing a task, appears to occur both
before and throughout a performance, and thus may be more
important to the outcome (Martens, Vealey, & Burton,
1990).
The principle question regarding anxiety and sports
performance is how athletes react (cognitively,
physiologically, emotionally, behaviorally) to
"stressful" situations (e.g., competing in a loud,
hostile stadium; competing against an opponent that the
athlete knows nothing about; adjusting to a different
climate and race course). Despite definitional,
methodological, and conceptual problems surrounding
athletes' reactions to anxiety, there exists sufficient
research to suggest that anxiety affects athletic
performance. Although this topic will be addressed fully
in the literature review, it is important to briefly
present information on what is known about the potential
effects of anxiety on performance directly, as well as on


60
Thus, the manner in which individuals organize their
motions in the execution of motor skills is the crux of
the investigation (cf. Beuter & Duda, 1985; Weinberg &
Hunt, 1976; Weinberg, 1978). Martens, Vealey, and Burton
(1990) concur and recommend that one way to improve the
predictive ability for the relationship between anxiety
and performance is to focus on qualitative aspects of
performance as opposed to quantitative. Thus, using
electromyographic or kinematic measures, for example, may
more sufficiently address the question of how sport
performance is affected by anxiety.
A study specifically relevant to this recommendation
(and to the current investigation) involved examining the
effects of anxiety on the motor performance of children
during a stepping task over three obstacles (Beuter &
Duda, 1985). The investigators created two conditions
for each subject during the stepping task: (1) an
informal assessment or low anxiety condition, and (2) a
high anxiety condition which involved creating a
stressful social situation that incorporated evaluation,
competition, and threat to self-esteem. Using digitized
videotaped recordings of the subjects' stepping motions
to examine the kinematic characteristics of motion and a
within-subjects design, it was demonstrated that the two
anxiety conditions created significantly different
movements in the ankle joint.


27
the performance demands, and his/her perceptions of the
consequences of failure, that create the threat to self
esteem which triggers the stress reaction" (Scanlan,
1984, p. 119).
In a more recent paper, Scanlan and her colleagues
(1991) define competitive stress as an encompassing
condition where the athlete experiences negative
emotions, feelings, and thoughts that might occur with
respect to a competitive experience. "These would
include feelings of apprehension, anxiety, muscle
tension, nervousness, physical reactions (such as
butterflies in the stomach, shaking, or nervous
sweating), thoughts centered on worry and self-doubt, and
negative statements to yourself" (Scanlan et al., 1991,
p. 105). Martens, Vealey, and Burton (1990) comment on
how stress is related to anxiety suggesting that stress
occurs under conditions in which failure to meet demands
is perceived as having important consequences and is thus
responded to with increased levels of state anxiety.
Competitive anxiety appears to be solely defined as
a response variable (i.e., an athlete can respond to a
competitive stressor with competitive anxiety).
Competitive anxiety is the more prevalent term in the
literature to describe the reaction to a "stressful"
competitive situation. Utilizing Spielberger's (1966,
1972) and others (Borkovek, 1976; Liebert & Morris, 1967)
suggestions that anxiety is a multidimensional construct,


38
narrowly to detect receivers open in the periphery,
or more important, a blitzing outside linebacker.
Some feel that the inverted-U hypothesis is not very
useful in understanding the arousal-performance
relationship (Cooke, 1982; Kerr, 1989; Welford, 1976).
It appears that this stance has been taken since
"performance-degrading dysphoric psychobiological states
and performance-enhancing euphoric ones can occur at
equal arousal levels. Global arousal, then, could only
serve to obscure the profound individual differences with
which humans approach important motor performances"
(Neiss, 1988b, p. 154). Eysenck (1982) points out that
the singular notion of arousal is inadequate and must be
replaced by more complex conceptualizations. Kerr (1989)
similarly feels that the optimal arousal theory is
limited in its singular optimal state and homeostatic
basis. He cites several notable psychologists who are
opposed to the basic principles of the homeostatic
construct (cf. Allport, 1960; Buhler, 1959; Frankl, 1969;
Harlow, 1953; Maslow, 1954). Apter (1982), for example,
identifies four terms (anxiety, excitement, boredom, and
relaxation), "which are reflections of pleasant,
unpleasant, and high and low arousal, questioning the
ability of optimal arousal theory to distinguish between
them" (Kerr, 1989, p. 140).
In a recent series of articles, Neiss and Anderson
(Anderson, 1990; Neiss, 1988a, 1990) engage in the debate


REFERENCES
Abdel-Aziz, Y. I., & Karara, H. M. (1971). Direct linear
transformation: From comparator coordinates into
object coordinates in close-range photogrammetry.
Proceedings of the ASPUI Symposium of the American
Society of Photogrammetry, Church Falls, VA.
Albrecht, R. R., & Felt, D. L. (1987). Generality and
specificity of attention related to competitive
anxiety and sport performance. Journal of Sport
Psychology. 9, 231-248.
Allison, M. T. (1991). Role conflict and the female
athlete: Preoccupations with little grounding.
Journal of Applied Sport Psychology. 2 49-60.
Allport, G. W. (1960). Personality and social encounter.
Boston: Beacon Press.
American Psychiatric Association (1987). Diagnostic and
statistical manual of mental disorders, third edition
revised. Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric
Association.
Anderson, K. J. (1990). Arousal and the inverted-U
hypothesis: A critique of Neiss's "Reconceptualizing
Arousal." Psychological Bulletin. 107. 96-100.
Apter, M. J. (1982). The experience of motivation: The
theory of psychological reversals. London: Academic
Press.
Apter, M. J. (1984). Reversal theory and personality: A
review. Journal of Research in Personality. 18, 265-
288.
Baddeley, A. D. (1972). Selective attention and
performance in dangerous environments. British
Journal of Psychology. 63. 537-546.
Bahrick, H. P, Fitts, P. M., & Rankin, R. E. (1952).
Effect of incentives upon reactions to peripheral
stimuli. Journal of Experimental Psychology. 44.,
400-406.
119


120
Barnes, M. W. Sime, W. Dienstbier, R., & Plake, B.
(1986). A test of construct validity of the CSAI-2
questionnaire on male elite college swimmers.
International Journal of Sport Psychology. 17. 364-
374.
Beuter, A., & Duda, J. L. (1985). Analysis of the
arousal/motor performance relationship in children
using movement kinematics. Journal of Sport
Psychology. 7, 229-243.
Bird, A. M., & Horn, M. A. (1990). Cognitive anxiety and
mental errors in sport. Journal of Sport and
Exercise Psychology. 12, 217-222.
Blinde, E. M., & Tierney, J. E. (1990). Diffusion of
sport psychology into elite U.S. Swimming programs.
The Sport Psychologist. 4, 130-144.
Borg, G. (1962). Physical performance and perceived
exertion. Lund, Sweden: Gleerup.
Borg, G., & Noble, B. J. (1974). Perceived exertion. In
J. Wilmore (Ed.), Exercise and sport sciences reviews
(pp. 131-153). New York: Academic Press.
Borkovek, T. D. (1976). Physiological and cognitive
processes in the regulation of anxiety. In G.
Schwartz & D. Shapiro (Eds.), Consciousness and self
regulation: Advances in research (Vol. 1, pp. 261-
312). New York: Plenum Press.
Brewer, B. W., Van Raalte, J. L., & Linder, D. E. (1991).
Role of the sport psychologist in treating injured
athletes: A survey of sports medicine providers.
Journal of Applied Sport Psychology. 3, 183-190.
Broadbent, D. E. (1971). Decision and stress. London:
Academic Press.
Broadhurst, P. L. (1957). Emotionality and the Yerkes-
Dodson law. Journal of Experimental Psychology. 54,
345-352.
Brodkin, P., & Weiss, M. R. (1990). Developmental
differences in motivation for partipating in
competitive swimming. Journal of Sport and Exercise
Psychology. 12, 248-263.
Brustad, R., & Weiss, M. R. (1987). Competence
perceptions and sources of worry in high, medium and
low competitive trait-anxious young athletes.
Journal of Sport Psychology. 9, 97-105.


58
Problems with the Literature and Researchers'
Recommendations
Bird and Horn (1990) address the question of why
there has been such inconclusive research in the area of
competitive anxiety and sport performance. They
entertain the notion that there could be problems with
the assessment of competition anxiety. However, they
conclude that the CSAI-2 has been the most extensively
used instrument and has been well-validated as measuring
the three constructs of cognitive anxiety, somatic
anxiety, and self-confidence. Next, there could be
problems with the methodology of the field studies. This
was evident in studies in which external validity was
questionable (Gould et al., 1987), opponents varied
(Gould, Petlichkoff, & Weinberg, 1984), and in which
situational characteristics differed (McCauley, 1985).
In addition to the comments from Bird and Horn
(1990) regarding the inconsistent anxiety/performance
relationship findings, Gould and his colleagues have
addressed this issue (Gould et al., 1987; Gould & Krane,
in press). Gould and Krane propose that investigators
must meet four conditions in an attempt to explain the
arousal/performance relationship. In these
recommendations, Gould and Krane use the term "arousal"
where "anxiety" is the more appropriate term. In the
present discussion, the term "anxiety" is substituted.
It is recommended that the investigators must (1)


34
anxiety. However, only the second individual will report
cognitive anxiety. This distinction is vital, as will be
shown in the following section, in determining the
effects of anxiety and arousal on sports performance.
Summary of Concepts
Activation and arousal are assumed to be synonymous
constructs. The term arousal will be used in this paper
and is defined as a general indicator of physiological
energy and intensity. It is not synonymous with anxiety
as a whole, but is similar to the subcomponent, somatic
anxiety. However, somatic anxiety is not a well-
understood construct. In this paper, somatic anxiety is
operationally defined as (measured by) an individual's
perception of physiological arousal (e.g., how hard my
heart is beating). Further, the definition of somatic
anxiety is not exclusive of cognitive anxiety since an
individual's perceptions of physiological arousal may be
greatly affected by anxious thoughts.
Cognitive anxiety, while able to cause increases in
physiological arousal, is not synonymous with arousal.
Cognitive anxiety can be determined to be either a cause
or result of increased physiological arousal, and in some
cases may be independent of arousal. It is defined in
this paper in terms of negative thoughts associated with
perceptions about success or thoughts involving negative
self-evaluation.


90
Swimming Efficiency
The next major analysis was the comparison of
freestyle swimming efficiency in the flume by group. For
this analysis, the freestyle arm stroke was examined to
determine its efficiency to propel the swimmer forward
through the water. First, overall propelling efficiency
was examined. As described in the measures section,
propelling efficiency can be defined as the amount of arm
force used to propel the body forward (RE, or effective
force) divided by the total force that the swimmer's arm
is producing (R, or total force), and is expressed as a
percentage. In this analysis, video data for one subject
in the Moderate anxiety group was missing for the post
swim.
There was no significant difference among the groups
on baseline propelling efficiency as determined by a one
way ANOVA [F(2,29)=.07, p=.93]. A repeated measures
ANOVA was then conducted to examine the effect of the
experimental manipulation on changes in freestyle
propelling efficiency across the three groups. Thus,
changes in efficiency from baseline (unevaluated swim) to
the second swim (which followed the instructional
manipulation) were determined and compared across the
three groups. This analysis was designed to determine
the extent to which performance was a function of group
membership (i.e., different anxiety conditions). The
analysis revealed neither a significant between-subjects


I certify that I have read this study and that in my
opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly
presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality,
as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
Robert N.^E&ftger
Professor of Exercise and
Sport Sciences
This dissertation was submitted to the Graduate Faculty
of the College of Health Related Professions and to the
Graduate School and was accepted as partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
August 1992
y
Dean, College of Health Related
Professions
Dean, Graduate School


118
worthwhile to attempt this study under more advantageous
circumstances. Perhaps the implementation of a more
powerful anxiety manipulation, combined with the use of all
naive subjects, would provide more valuable data. It is
maintained, then, that conducting research within the
anxiety-performance area is a viable and justifiable
endeavor, with the potential for the gathering and
evaluating of valuable information.


21
In addition to providing information that could be
useful to swimming, this study was expected to contribute
to the body of knowledge associated with the potential
relationship between anxiety and sports performance. As
will be demonstrated in the following section, there are
significant questions as to how athletes respond to
anxiety in a competitive context. It was expected that a
significant contribution of this study would be to expand
upon and clarify the anxiety-performance relationship.
The current investigation also constituted an
attempt to pool the resources of a sport-specific sports
science team (U.S. Swimming, International Center for
Aquatic Research) with sport psychology in a joint effort
to investigate a specific question (i.e., examining the
accuracy of flume assessments with anxious subjects) and
a larger issue (i.e., investigating the relationship
between anxiety and sports performance). As such, it
reflected an integration of different disciplines within
the sports sciences (e.g., biomechanics, motor control,
physiology, and sport psychology) and was expected to
provide a useful model for future multidisciplinary
projects. In general, then, it was expected that this
study would contribute to the literature concerning the
relationship between anxiety and a specific type of
athletic performance (swimming).


80
what was described as a "familiarizing practice session"
in the flume. Here, swimmers were instructed to swim
freestyle to warm-up at a very easy pace (50% of maximum
speed for a 100 yard freestyle event) for approximately
21/2 min.
The swimmers were then instructed that the speed of
the flume would be increased (to 80% of the swimmer's
best time) "so that you can get the feel of the flume's
speed as it will be when you are tested." They were then
instructed to swim for 30 secs at this speed. In this
phase, no mention was made of videotaping, although the
swimmers were filmed to provide the experimenter a
reliable baseline assessment of freestyle mechanics which
was as unaffected as possible by evaluative performance
anxiety. As stated in the measures section, the segment
of the video which was digitized for hydrodynamic
biomechanical analysis was approximately five strokes
from the end of the swim, providing an accurate and
stable baseline assessment (J. M. Cappaert, Sport Science
Biomechanist, personal communication, 1990). Immediately
after the swimmer completed the 80% swim, exertional
heart rate (EHR) was taken and the subject completed the
Ratings of Perceived Exertion scale (RPE).
Following the baseline filming phase, the
experimenter read to each subject one of three sets of
instructions designed to experimentally manipulate the
amount of anxiety that the swimmer experienced. The


54
experimenter designed competition and "may have lacked
sufficient external validity" (Burton, 1988, p. 49).
McCauley (1985) found no relationship between either
cognitive or somatic competitive anxiety and golf
performance over 10 rounds of tournament golf. However,
as Bird and Horn (1990) and Gould et al. (1987) point
out, McCauley's findings of nonsignificance may have been
confounded by changing task demands (i.e., different golf
courses). A recent study also did not demonstrate any
significant relationship between competitive state
anxiety (both cognitive and somatic) and cycling
performance on stationary bicycles (Caruso, Dzewaltowski,
Gill, & McElroy, 1990). Once again, the authors admit
that "the task in the present study was not cognitively
demanding nor did it require complex motor skills that
would lead to performance impairment as a result of
anxiety. Additionally, the contrived competition did not
induce high levels of anxiety" (p. 18).
Karteroliotis and Gill (1987) examined the
relationships of cognitive worry, somatic anxiety, and
self-confidence to motor performance during a simulated
laboratory competition on a pegboard task. This study
revealed little support for their predicted inverse
relationship between cognitive worry and performance. It
was also concluded that both self-reported somatic
anxiety and physiological arousal were unrelated to motor
performance at any stage of the experiment. However,


101
significantly related to overall propelling efficiency
(r=.52, p<.01).


134
11. My heart races.
12. I feel my stomach sinking.
13. I'm concerned about performing poorly.
14. I have lapses in concentration during competition
because of nervousness.
15. I sometimes find myself trembling before or during
a competitive event.
16. I'm worried about reaching my goal.
17. My body feels tight.
18. I'm concerned that others will be disappointed
with my performance.
19. My stomach gets upset before or during
competition.
20. I'm concerned I won't be able to concentrate.
21. My heart pounds before competition.


136
Competitive State Anxiety Inventory 2
Directions: A number of statements which athletes have used
to describe their feelings before undergoing testing in the
flume are given below. Read each statement and indicate how
you feel right now at this moment, using the following
scale. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend
too much time on any one statement, but choose the answere
which describes you feelings right now.
1 = Not at all
2 = Somewhat
3 = Moderately so
4 = Very much so
1. I am concerned about the flume testing.
2. I feel nervous.
3. I feel at ease.
4. I have self-doubts.
5. I feel jittery.
6. I feel comfortable.
7. I am concerned that I may not do as well in
this testing as I could.
8. My body feels tense.
9. I feel self-confident.
10. I am concerned about doing worse than others.
11. I feel tense in my stomach.
12. I feel secure.
13. I am concerned about choking under pressure.
14. My body feels relaxed.
15. I'm confident I can meet the challenge.
16. I'm concerned about performing poorly.
17. My heart is racing.
18. I'm confident about performing well.


42
Saslow, 1955; Stennett, 1957). For example, Broadhurst
(1957) suspected that rats placed in a situation of
intense motivation (oxygen deprivation) would
consequently demonstrate fear and arousal affecting the
learning task. He hypothesized that under the stressful
condition, rats would learn faster on the easy task, but
more slowly on the hard task. His results confirmed the
task complexity aspect of the Yerkes-Dodson law in that
"the optimum motivation for a discrimination task
demonstrably decreases with increasing difficulty of the
task" (p. 348) .
In addition to changes with task complexity,
increases in "drive" (emotional arousal or general covert
excitement) are associated with a reduction in the range
of cue use (Easterbrook, 1959). Bahrick, Fitts, and
Rankin (1952) tested the hypothesis that an increase in
incentive causes increased perceptual selectiveness
favoring those parts of the stimulus field deemed by the
subject as most relevant to the expected reward. The
researchers utilized a continuous central-tracking task,
with intermittent stimuli detectable in the periphery.
It was discovered that while increasing motivation with
incentives (monetary bonuses) was beneficial for tracking
the central task, peripheral proficiency declined.
Easterbrook explained that "the effect of added drive
cannot be described unequivocally as either facilitation
or disruption, but it can certainly be described as a


73
training and supervision of the Biomechanics Department
of the Sports Science Division of the United States
Olympic Committee. The director of the Biomechanics
Department of United States Swimming also provided
assistance to the digitizer and to the principal
investigator. The utilization of only one digitizer was
designed to increase the reliability of the biomechanical
analyses across and within subjects. The digitizer was
blind to the conditions of the study, and only worked for
2-3 hour sessions. PEAK Performance equipment was used
for the digitizing.
Heart rate
Heart rate was assessed by the principal
investigator by palpating the radial or carotid artery
for 15 secs and extrapolating to obtain heart rate as the
number of beats per minute (bpm). To obtain resting
heart rates, subjects sat quietly for 10 min prior to a
reading, and remained motionless while their heart rate
was assessed. To obtain exertional heart rates, the
swimmers' carotid artery was palpated for the 15 secs
directly following a swim in the flume (while the swimmer
was still in the water). Heart rate was used for two
purposes. The first was to compare resting heart rates
prior to the "unevaluated" warm-up and prior to the post-
instructional flume evaluation. This was to provide an
indicator of reactivity to different evaluative and
stressful conditions. The second was to monitor heart


93
Within-Subiect Analyses
Regression analyses were used to examine the
relationship between freestyle swimming efficiency and
the anxiety measures (independent of group membership),
while controlling for swimming skill and competitive
trait anxiety. A multiple regression model was
constructed to determine the individual and interactive
effects of anxiety (state measures of anxiety) and
physiological arousal (resting heart rate prior to
baseline swim) on swimming stroke efficiency. A mixed
model of regression was used, first forcing the swimmers7
best time in the 100 yard freestyle and scores on the SAS
into the equation (thus controlling for skill level and
competitive trait anxiety). Then a stepwise approach was
used in an attempt to enter state anxiety (SAI),
competitive cognitive anxiety (CSAI-Cog), competitive
somatic anxiety (CSAI-Som), competitive self-confidence
(CSAI-SC), and/or resting heart rate (RHR). However,
none of these variables accounted for a significant
portion of the variance in baseline swimming efficiency
when controlling for skill level and trait sport anxiety.
This same analysis was conducted using the post-scores
and second swim, but also did not provide a useful
predictive model.
Simple Pearson's correlation coefficients were also
calculated for baseline variables. Most of the
significant correlations are between the self-report


19
1. Subjects would be able to swim the freestyle
stroke in the flume during a testing procedure.
2. The flume would provide an adequate assessment
of swimming technique in high school swimmers.
3. The anxiety manipulations and flume testing
procedure would present a significantly stressful
situation to swimmers (especially for those naive to the
flume). This assumption was made on the basis of
literature which suggests that evaluative situations
involving some threat to perceived ability or skills are
highly anxiety-producing (Beuter & Duda, 1985; Brustad &
Weiss, 1987; Burton, 1988; Gould et al., 1987;
Lewthwaite, 1990; Scanlan, 1984). It was assumed that
subjects' reactions to the flume testing procedures would
be fairly representative of how high school swimmers
react (psychologically, physiologically, and
biomechanically) to varying stressful conditions.
4. Subjects would be able to accurately respond to
paper and pencil questionnaires which assess thoughts of
anxiety.
Limitations
1. Due to limitations placed on the investigator
for data collection by U.S. Swimming, the flume testing
procedure was not novel to approximately one-third of the
subjects. The original intention was to include only
subjects who had not previously experienced the flume.


108
not as difficult as it may have appeared. This appears to
be the main reason that the instructional manipulations were
ineffective. Post-study interviews and debriefings
confirmed that many of the swimmers (primarily those novice
to the flume) had felt a bit anxious prior to the first
swim, but that they had not worried much about who was
watching them or about the use of the videotapes during the
second swim, since they felt that they had quickly mastered
swimming in the flume.
It has been suggested that task difficulty is an
important component of the arousal-motor performance
relationship. According to the Yerkes-Dodson law: "The
optimum level of arousal is a decreasing monotonic function
of the difficulty of the task" (Hockey, 1979, p. 143). This
function has not been demonstrated to apply to the
relationship between anxiety and motor performance, although
some have suggested that task difficulty is important in
determining the nature of the relationship in sports (Hanin,
1980, 1986; Jones & Hardy, 1989; Oxendine, 1970, 1980). In
the current study, a case could be made that the task
difficulty was low and that the subjects were neither
aroused greatly nor anxious, as suggested by the normative
data presented earlier.
Another factor which potentially diminished any effects
was the skill level of the subjects (average high school
swimmer). It is clear that their freestyle strokes are not
as finely tuned as a swimmer of Olympic-caliber (whose


56
a timely and appropriate measure of anxiety; the
Competitive State Anxiety Inventory-2 (CSAI-2) was given
10 min prior to the road race. (2) An adequate aspect
of performance was assessed. (3) Subjects were fairly
homogeneous in skill level and ability. (4) The meaning
and significance of the field setting task was probably
quite high to the subjects since it involved a time trial
race. A drawback to the study was its correlational
design, making an empirical test of the nature of the
anxiety-performance relationship unfeasible.
Additionally, the authors acknowledge that even stronger
results may have been obtained had an intraindividual
design and analysis been utilized.
Another pertinent study was conducted by Burton
(1988), who administered the CSAI-2 to collegiate
swimmers prior to different situations (e.g., early
season meet, mid-season meet, and conference
championships), using race event times as performance
outcome measures. Burton, in drawing from the cognitive
psychology literature (e.g., Easterbrook, 1959; Wine,
1971) hypothesized that cognitive anxiety would misdirect
attention from task-relevant cues to irrelevant cues
(e.g., social evaluative cues), and thus would cause
performance to decrease linearly. On the other hand,
somatic anxiety was hypothesized to demonstrate the more
traditional inverted-U relationship with performance
(although it is difficult to discern whether Burton's


57
"low arousal" division was truly underarousal, a
necessary component for fully supporting an inverted-U
relationship between anxiety and performance, or whether
it was simply a lack of reported anxiety). The results
of Burton's investigation indicated that cognitive
anxiety was more consistently and strongly (negatively
and linearly) related to swimmers' performance than was
somatic anxiety (i.e., self-reported arousal).
A slightly different approach was taken by Bird and
Horn (1990) who tested the relationship between level of
competitive anxiety and mental errors in a sport setting
(i.e., softball game). Prior to a game, the athletes
completed the CSAI-2. Their anxiety levels were examined
after classifying the players into two groups as a
function of mental errors committed during the game (as
assessed by their coach). The investigators found that
players in the two groups (high vs. low mental errors)
differed only on pre-game cognitive anxiety, and not on
somatic anxiety. This finding is not surprising as the
outcome measure of mental errors seems intuitively most
related to cognitive anxiety. Comprehensive performance
was not examined in which certain aspects (e.g.,
overrunning a fly ball) may be more related to somatic
anxiety.


64
response to a threatening situation. This threat can be
an objective or subjective one, and can be of
environmental, social or intrapersonal origin. The
dimensions of anxiety include state and trait, and
cognitive and somatic. Each of the dimensions has been
suggested to have different effects on competing
athletes.
For example, competitive trait anxiety is primarily
an intervening variable which directly affects the amount
of state anxiety that an athlete may perceive in a
specific sport situation. Cognitive and somatic anxiety
(as interrelated components of competitive state anxiety)
are also thought to have different effects on
performance. Competitive cognitive anxiety in its strict
sense will generally be detrimental to performance. As
an athlete's cognitive anxiety rises during a
competition, it is suggested that his or her performance
will suffer accordingly and in a linear fashion. This
seems to be due primarily to a focus on irrelevant cues
(e.g., negative self-talk, the spectators).
The relationship between somatic anxiety and sport
performance is often thought to be one of an inverted-U
nature. This hypothesis is drawn from the research that
suggests that this type of relationship exists between
arousal and performance. Somatic anxiety and arousal,
though not identical, can be seen as similar constructs.
The primary difference is that somatic anxiety appears to


14
Bird and Horn (1990) who found that cognitive anxiety was
positively related to mental errors, and Burton (1988)
who concluded that cognitive anxiety was negatively
related to swimming performance). Cognitive psychology
research (e.g., Wine, 1971, 1980) also lends support and
suggests that with increasing cognitive anxiety,
individuals become more preoccupied with self-evaluation
and possible failure thus disrupting performance.
2. Independent of the groups, performance
decrements will be most pronounced in those swimmers who
demonstrate the greatest increases in cognitive anxiety
from baseline to evaluated swims (determined by
correlational and regression analyses). For these
swimmers, an evaluated flume swim may seem more difficult
and be associated with a greater perceived threat, a more
negative anxiety reaction, and thus a greater decrement
in swimming efficiency (cf. Beuter & Duda, 1985; Brustad
& Weiss, 1987; Lewthwaite, 1990). Testing of this
hypothesis is supported by researchers who suggest that
intra-individual analyses in anxiety-performance research
is meaningful and needed (Gould & Krane, in press;
Sonstroem & Bernardo, 1982; Weinberg, 1990).
3. Cognitive state anxiety will have a more
profound negative effect on performance than somatic
state anxiety. As a result of previous research (Burton,
1988; Feltz, Landers, & Raeder, 1979; Gould et al., 1987;
Martens et al., 1983; Rosenthal, 1968; Sarason, 1975;


65
have a perceptual component. That is, an individual's
arousal level is basically a measurable entity (e.g.,
EMG, EEG, palmar sweating, heart rate, respiration) while
somatic anxiety is assessed by self-report and thus is a
subjective measure of the individual's perceived arousal.
It has been suggested that there exists an optimal level
of physiological arousal (and the related somatic
anxiety) for athletes, which is dependent on the sport's
tasks (e.g., attention demands, strength requirements),
and on individual differences.
As demonstrated in this review, the manner in which
anxiety and arousal are related to sport and motor
performance has not been consistently demonstrated.
Although the inverted-U hypothesis has been a prevalent
theory in explaining the relationship between arousal
(and somatic anxiety) and motor performance, it has its
detractors (cf. Eysenck, 1982; Karteroliotis & Gill,
1987; Kerr, 1989; Neiss 1988a, 1988b, 1990; Powell &
Verner, 1982). Similarly, although the relationship of
cognitive anxiety or worry to performance has been
suggested to be a linear, negative one, this has been by
no means established.
In this author's view, many of the problems with
this literature are related to the faulty methodology and
conceptualization of the issue. This is an unfortunate
state of the literature and field since there is a need
for both basic researchers and sport psychology consumers


79
Methodology
Prior to the study in the flume, the experimenter
traveled to the swimmers' training pools and obtained
informed consent from each of them indicating that during
the study he or she would be videotaped at various times
in the flume, complete several self-report
questionnaires, and have their heart rate taken. They
were then administered the Sport Anxiety Scale (SAS) to
determine sport-specific trait anxiety. At this time,
skill level was determined by obtaining each swimmer's
best 100 yd freestyle time during the past competitive
season by self-report and cross validation with the
swimmer's coach. These two variables were used along
with age for group assignment such that the three groups
(i.e., low, moderate, and high anxiety; described
subsequently) were equivalent on three variables (SAS,
best freestyle time, and age). Additionally, subjects
were assigned so that each group would have two or three
males and eight or nine females (11 total in each group).
Upon arriving at the U.S. Swimming center, each
swimmer was administered the State Anxiety Inventory
(SAI), the Competitive State Anxiety Inventory (CSAI-2),
and the one-item measure of the importance that the
swimmer attributed to the upcoming flume test. After the
completion of these measures, heart rate was taken as
specified in the measures section to provide a resting
heart rate (RHR) measure. Next, swimmers participated in


100
Table 6
Means and Standard Deviations of Reactions to the Flume
by Group
MEASURE
Low
GROUP
Moderate
Hiah
State Anxiety (SAI)
Pre
43.7
(6.2)
41.3
(13.8)
39.4
(6.7)
Post
32.0
(6.4)
38.4
(11.4)
37.6
(10.0)
Cognitive
Anxiety (CSAI-Cog)
Pre
18.0
(3.9)
19.0
(5.9)
15.7
(2.1)
Post
12.8
(2.4)
16.0
(5.1)
16.1
(4.3)
Somatic Anxiety (CSAI
-Som)
Pre
19.5
(5.2)
20.3
(8.6)
18.0
(5.0)
Post
13.0
(2.1)
14.4
(5.0)
14.6
(6.4)
Self-Confidence (CSAI
-SC)
Pre
21.8
(3.9)
22.6
(7.1)
24.3
(3.9)
Post
27.7
(4.5)
26.6
(7.2)
25.4
(6.3)
Ratings of
Perceived
Exertion
(RPE)
Pre
11.5
(0.5)
11.0
(2.5)
11.6
(1.6)
Post
12.5
(2.3)
11.9
(2.5)
12.4
(1.5)
Swimming Efficiency (%)
Pre
57.4
(8.0)
53.2
(17.4)
58.3
(10.5)
Post
60.6
(4.8)
60.5
(10.0)
58.9
(9.2)


41
postulated by the inverted-U: "Response simply fails to
occur on occasions when it should do so. The typical
decrement produced by sleeplessness is that of the pause
in which no reaction occurs" (p. 425). Yet aside from
research examining sleep-deprived individuals (Kjellberg,
1977; Wilkinson, 1961) there have been few examinations
of subjects' performances under conditions of low
arousal. Moreover, many researchers report that the
inverted-U relationship was validated in their study,
when in actuality, only the component suggesting that
excessive arousal is detrimental to performance is
validated. This is especially important in sport
psychology investigations, where much of the research
regarding the arousal-sport relationship examines
athletes' experience of anxiety and overarousal. There
is much ancillary and anecdotal evidence suggesting that
a team that plays "flat" or "without emotion" will
experience a decrease in performance. This might easily
be described under the inverted-U model and yet has not
been fully examined under empirical conditions.
Despite these criticisms of the inverted-U as a
useful and accurate description of the relationship
between arousal and performance, there are many studies
that have examined this theory. Early researchers,
conducting primarily laboratory studies, seemingly
support the inverted-U and Yerkes-Dodson hypotheses
(Broadhurst, 1957; Duffy, 1962; Matarazzo, Ulett, &


86
covariate-based analyses. Statistical equivalency of the
group assignment variables was confirmed utilizing three
one-way ANOVAs to assess best time (F=.03, p=ns), trait
anxiety (SAS; F=.20, p=ns), and age (F=1.08, p=ns). (See
Table 1 for means and standard deviations by group.)
It was also determined that each group of swimmers
perceived an equal amount of importance for the flume
testing. Finally, the groups were almost equivalent by
sex (two groups had nine females and two males, and the
other group had eight females and three males).
Effects of Anxiety Manipulations
Before examining the anxiety-performance
relationship, it was important to first determine the
effects of the anxiety manipulations on the swimmers'
cognitive/affective and physiological reactions to the
flume testing. This analysis was conducted to test the
argument for and efficacy of the experimental
manipulation. First, a multivariate analysis of variance
(MANOVA) revealed no significant differences at baseline
between groups on the four psychological variables (A-
state, cognitive anxiety, somatic anxiety, and self-
confidence) [F(2,30)=.50, p=ns]. A one-way ANOVA also
indicated that there were no significant differences
between groups on resting heart rate [F(2,30)=2.6, p=ns].
The next analyses determined the effect of group
membership on changes in the five variables following the


23
heart rate; trembling or shaking; sweating; nausea
or abdominal distress; depersonalization
orderealization; numbness or tingling sensations
(parasthesias); flushes (hot flashes) or chills;
chest pain or discomfort; fear of dying; and fear of
going crazy or of doing something uncontrolled
during the attack. (American Psychiatric
Association, 1987, p. 236)
Smith and Smoll (1990) define anxiety as a
multidimensional construct which involves an "aversive
emotional response and an avoidance motive characterized
by worry and apprehension concerning the possibility of
physical or psychological harm, together with increased
physiological arousal resulting from the appraisal of
threat" (Smith & Smoll, 1990, p. 419). Gould and Krane
(in press) report that anxiety has been viewed as
feelings of nervousness and tension associated with
activation or arousal of the organism.
Eysenck (1982) postulates that the strength of an
individual's anxiety state depends on two main factors:
(1) the degree of external threat and (2) the
individual's susceptibility to anxiety (i.e., anxiety
proneness). It is the second factor that is defined as
trait anxiety or
A motive or acquired behavioral disposition that
predisposes an individual to perceive a wide range
of objectively nondangerous circumstances as
threatening and to respond to these with state
anxiety reactions disproportionate in intensity to
the magnitude of the objective danger. (Spielberger,
1966, p. 17)
Thus, individuals who have a high amount of trait anxiety
will tend to perceive more situations as anxiety-


62
The final recommendation to create at least three
levels of anxiety when investigating the anxiety-
performance relationship is one that has been made by
several researchers (Eysenck, 1982; Gould & Krane, in
press; Martens, 1977). Gould and Krane correctly assert
that not only do the levels of anxiety need to be
statistically significantly different, but also
conceptually or clinically distinct. For example, three
scores on an anxiety measure could be statistically
different, and yet fall within a clinically
indistinguishable range of anxiety. Typically,
researchers have not created anxiety levels, but have
either relied upon self-report anxiety scores to place
subjects in different anxiety levels or have performed
strictly correlational analyses (cf. Brustad & Weiss,
1987; Burton, 1988; Madden, Summers, & Brown, 1990;
Martin & Gill, 1991; McCann, Murphy, & Raedeke, in press;
Raglin, Wise, & Morgan, 1990). However, these two
methods may be unavoidable when conducting field research
during actual competitions.
The preceding recommendations appear to be
appropriate and necessary. It is clear from the existing
literature that researchers have usually fallen short in
one or more areas. Even the relatively superior studies
in this area (e.g., Beuter & Duda, 1985; Burton, 1988;
McCann et al., in press; Sonstroem & Bernardo, 1982) are
diminished by specific and acknowledged shortcomings. It


51
may be unmotivated) or when he perceives his heart to be
pounding so hard that he becomes too distracted to
perform successfully.
Research in cognitive psychology supports the
contention that the effect of competitive anxiety on
performance may be described using a negative, linear
function. For example, Easterbrook's (1959) hypothesis
regarding the peripheral narrowing which occurs as
arousal increases (although generally cited to support
the inverted-U relationship between arousal and
performance) can be applied in understanding the
cognitive anxiety/performance relationship. Here, any
increase in worry or cognitive anxiety is associated with
attention to irrelevant cues (e.g., "I'm not going to do
well; All these people are watching me"). Thus, as
cognitive anxiety increases, more internal, irrelevant
cues and negative self-statements are created, and there
is an increased tendency for the individual to pay
attention to his own internal thoughts and cues rather
than to the task (Mandler, 1975). This would
theoretically affect performance in a negative linear
fashion.
This issue has been examined in the test anxiety
literature. Sarason (1975), for example, argues that
test anxiety is primarily a function of cognitive worry
(e.g., "I am stupid; I'll never pass this test") and
physiological reactivity. Sarason writes that saying the


Table 4
Baseline Correlations
BESTTIME
SAS
SAI
CSAICOG
CSAISOM
CSAISC
RHR
SAS
.16
SAI
.42*
. 17
CSAICOG
.26
. 13
.71**
CSAISOM
.35
.22
.90**
.63**
CSAISC
-.54**
-.28
-.82**
-.68**
-.71**
RHR
-.06
.16
. 05
. 01
-.09
-.17
RPE
.05
-.12
. 16
. 07
.03
-.08
.27
EFI
-.16
-.10
-.04
-.27
-.13
.15
.26
Note. p<. 01 ** pc.001
BESTTIME =
SAS =
SAI =
CSAICOG =
CSAISOM =
CSAISC =
RHR =
RPE =
EFI =
fastest time in 100 yard freestyle
Sport Anxiety Scale (competitive trait anxiety)
State Anxiety Scale
competitive cognitive anxiety (from CSAI-2)
competitive somatic anxiety (from CSAI-2)
competitive self-confidence (from CSAI-2)
resting heart rate
ratings of perceived exertion
freestyle swimming efficiency


123
Gould, D., Petlichkoff, L., Simons, J., & Vevera, M.
(1987). Relationship between Competitive State
Anxiety Inventory-2 subscale scores and pistol
shooting performance. Journal of Sport Psychology,
9, 33-42.
Gould, D., Tammen, V. Murphy, S., & May, J. (1989). An
examination of U.S. Olympic sport psychology
consultants and the services they provide. The Sport
Psychologist. 3., 300-312.
Hackfort, D., & Schwenkmezger, P. (1989). Measuring
anxiety in sports: Perspectives and problems. In D.
Hackfort & C. D. Spielberger (Eds.), Anxiety in
sports: An international perpective (pp. 55-74).
New York: Hemisphere.
Hanin, Y. L. (1980). A study of anxiety in sports. In
W. F. Straub (Ed.), Sport psychology: An analysis of
athlete behavior (pp. 236-249). Ithaca, NY:
Mouvement Publications.
Hanin, Y. L. (1986). State-trait anxiety research on
sports in the USSR. In C. D. Spielberger and R. Diaz
(Eds.), Cross-cultural anxiety (Vol. 3) (pp. 45-64).
New York: Hemisphere.
Harlow, M. F. (1953) Motivation as a factor in the
acquisition of new responses. In M. R. Jones (Ed.),
Current theory and research in motivation: A
symposium (pp. 24-29). Lincoln, NE: University of
Nebraska Press.
Hockey, R. (1979). Stress and the cognitive components
of skilled performance. In V. Hamilton & D.
Warburton (Eds.), Human stress and cognition: An
information processing approach (pp. 141-177).
Chichester: Wiley & Sons.
Hull, C. L. (1943). Principles of behavior. New York:
Appleton-Century.
Jones, J. G., & Cale, A. (1989). Relationships between
multidimensional competitive state anxiety and
cogntive and motor subcomponents of performance.
Journal of Sports Sciences. 7, 229-240.
Jones, J. G., & Hardy, L. (1989). Stress and cognitive
functioning in sport. Journal of Sports Sciences. 7,
41-63.
Jones, J. G., & Hardy, L. (1990). Anxiety and sport.
London: Wiley & Sons.


109
propelling efficiency is significantly greater). It is
possible that anxiety might have affected a more finely
tuned stroke. However, in one study examining the effects
of anxiety on kinematic measures of performance (Beuter &
Duda, 1985; see p. 59), deleterious effects were noted in
children who did not have "finely tuned" motor skills.
The subjects in this study also did not exert
themselves to fatigue. It is well-known that fatigue is a
major factor in longer-distance events in swimming. It has
been suggested that anxiety affects performance more at
times when subjects are fatigued (Krane & Stanford, 1991).
To date, there have been no experimental studies examining
the differential effects of anxiety on fatigued vs. non
fat igued athletes. However, it could be that when fatigued,
an athlete's attentional focus wanes, and that this
condition may be amplified by cognitive anxiety (e.g., self
statements such as "I'll never be able to finish this race,"
"I'm so tired that everyone will see that I'm out of
shape").
Because there were no increases in state anxiety
resulting from the experimental manipulation, the first
three hypotheses could not be tested. Restated, these were
that (1) competitive cognitive state anxiety would
demonstrate a negative linear relationship with freestyle
swimming performance as a function of group membership. It
had been expected that swimming performance during the
second swim would become less efficient by group as the


15
Weinberg, Gould, & Jackson, 1979), it was hypothesized
that somatic A-state would likely be greatest before the
swimmer entered the flume and then would dissipate as the
testing began, but that cognitive A-state (especially
anxiety related to evaluation) would likely continue into
the testing and be associated with measurable decrements
in swimming efficiency.
4. If decrements are found in the freestyle stroke,
the most likely stage will be during the "finish" phase
(see below in Definitions of Terms). The finish is the
most powerful stage of the freestyle stroke and is the
stage during which many young swimmers have difficulty
fully completing the armstroke. It is thought that if a
swimmer becomes affected by excessive anxiety he or she
may become less efficient and have to work harder. It
was hypothesized that the finish phase would be the most
affected by evaluative anxiety, in that the swimmer would
have to compensate for the decrease in efficiency using a
higher stroke turnover rate (and thus compromise the
finish phase). This will be assessed by examining
changes in efficiency of the finish phase as a function
of group membership (using a repeated measures ANOVA).
Definitions of Terms
Although within the Review of Literature definitions
and concepts are addressed, the following terms are
defined briefly in order to assist in understanding the


72
six landmarks were digitized in both cameras of the
underwater video during one stroke cycle: fingertip,
wrist, thumb, little finger, elbow, and shoulder. Three-
dimensional arm and hand coordinates were calculated
using the Direct Linear Transformation method (Abdel-Aziz
& Karara, 1971).
This analysis was then used to determine propulsive
forces of the swimmers. From the arm position data, hand
reaction forces were calculated (Schleihauf, 1979). This
method calculates lift and drag forces based upon hand
orientation and hand velocity. The resultant force is
calculated by the addition of the lift and drag forces.
The effective (or propulsive) component of the stroke is
the projection of the resultant force on the forward
direction.
For more detailed information, the stroke was
divided into the catch phase (from hand entry to the
widest point of the initial outsweep), the insweep phase
(from the widest point of the outsweep to the narrowest
point under the body), and the finish phase (the
narrowest point until hand exit). During these phases,
the resultant force, effective force, hand velocity and
angle of pitch were averaged, and a phase-specific
propelling efficiency was calculated. An overall
propelling efficiency of the swimmer was also calculated.
The digitization of the videotapes was performed by
an undergraduate psychology major student under the


52
negative self-statements "during a test might interfere
considerably with attention to the task at hand, be it
one that requires learning or figuring out the answers to
certain questions. Worry is unmistakably an
attentionally demanding and emotionally arousing
cognitive activity" (p. 28). In a review of selective
attention, Wine (1971) indicated that high test anxious
individuals respond with personalized task-irrelevant
responses. Furthermore, Deffenbacher (1980) and Morris,
Davis, and Hutchings (1981) have shown in their review of
the literature that cognitive anxiety is more
consistently and strongly related to test performance
than is somatic anxiety.
Utilizing the theories from cognitive psychology
(e.g., test anxiety research), sport psychology and motor
performance researchers have hypothesized that cognitive
anxiety is more strongly related to sport and motor
performance than is somatic anxiety (Barnes, Sime,
Dienstbier, & Plake, 1986; Martens, Vealey, & Burton,
1990; Morris, Smith, Andrews, & Morris, 1975). One
explanation is that
Somatic anxiety should influence performance less
than cognitive anxiety because it reaches its peak
at the onset of a competitive event and dissipates
over the course of the competition. Cognitive state
anxiety increases during competition, however,
because it is linked to increases in social and
self-evaluation that occur during the event and
hence causes stronger and more consistent
performance decrements. (Gould et al., 1987, p. 34)


25
As applied to participation in sport, anxiety is
frequently operationally defined in terms of "competitive
stress" or "competitive anxiety." Although stress has
been at times been used interchangeably with anxiety, it
is actually a broader term which can be defined at times
as a stimulus, an intervening, or a response variable
(whereas anxiety is almost exclusively described as a
response variable). Thus, these two terms may or may not
be analogous depending on the context in which they are
used.
As a stimulus, the term stressor is usually used to
refer to situations or stimuli that are objectively
characterized by some degree of physical or psychological
danger or threat (Spielberger, 1982). Spielberger
explains that reactions to a stressor are dependent on
whether a particular situation or stimulus is threatening
(i.e., potentially dangerous or harmful). Of course,
this can be both objective and subjective "danger."
Thus, objective dangers (e.g., hurricanes, illness) are
appraised by most people as threatening, whereas for
subjective dangers the same stimulus may be seen as a
threat, a challenge, or as largely irrelevant, depending
on the person's estimation of the threat value of the
stimulus.
Spielberger concludes then that the experience of
threat has two main characteristics: (1) It is future-
oriented, generally involving the anticipation of a


43
reduction in the range of cue utilization" (1959, p.
185) .
Bursill (1958) investigated subjects' attention to
peripheral stimuli while they were engaged in a
continuous central task under both normal conditions and
conditions of high temperature (thermal stress). He
reported that the subjects in the high stress condition
had a tendency to funnel their field of awareness towards
the center, and thus missed signals presented on the
periphery (i.e., signals presented at greater eccentric
angles had a greater probability of being missed in the
hotter condition). Stennett (1957) also studied the
relationship of performance level to level of arousal.
Using EMG recordings as a measure of arousal, and an
auditory tracking task as a performance measure, Stennett
obtained results supporting the inverted-U relationship.
Oxendine (1970, 1980) has been a proponent of
applying these hypotheses to sport. He indicates that a
high level of arousal is optimal in gross motor
activities involving strength, endurance, and speed
(e.g., many track events, weight lifting, football
blocking). Alternatively, a high level of arousal should
interfere with performance involving complex skills, fine
muscle movements, steadiness, and general concentration
(e.g., archery, shooting, golf putting).
Hanin (1980, 1986) has extended the inverted-U
theory and reported that arousal is related to athletic


88
anxiety manipulation. A repeated measures MANOVA
(examining A-state, cognitive anxiety, somatic anxiety,
and self-confidence) revealed no significant main effect
for anxiety-induced conditions [Wilk's Lambda = .89;
F(2,30)=.40, p=ns] or significant interaction effect
(i.e., Group X Time) [Wilk's Lambda = .61; F(2,30)=1.9,
p=ns]. However, a significant effect for Time was
revealed [Wilk's Lambda = .69; F(2,30)=3.1, p<.05] as
subjects generally reported feeling less anxious and more
self-confident after performing the first flume swim
(i.e., directly prior to the second evaluated swim).
Follow-up univariate repeated measures ANOVAs indicated
no significant interaction effects. However, these
ANOVAs showed time effects indicating that CSAI-Cog
[F=4.0, p=.05] and CSAI-Som [F=9.2, p<.01] decreased
following the baseline swim, while self-confidence (CSAI-
SC) increased [F=7.1, p=.01].
A repeated measures ANOVA conducted on resting heart
rate revealed a significant time effect, as resting heart
rate increased prior to the second flume swim [F=5.1,
E<.05]. A repeated measures ANOVA conducted on ratings
of perceived exertion (RPE; i.e., how difficult the flume
swim was perceived to be) revealed a significant time
effect and indicated that RPE increased significantly for
the second (evaluated) flume swim [F=8.8, pc.01]. Table
2 presents the means of these variables before and after
the instructional manipulation by group.


24
provoking, and/or experience stronger feelings of anxiety
under a threatening condition. Marten, Vealey, and
Burton (1990) concur and suggest that trait anxiety is
the predisposition to perceive various environmental
stimuli as threatening or nonthreatening and to respond
to these stimuli with corresponding levels of state
anxiety.
An additional differentiation in the definition of
anxiety is that of physiological and cognitive
components. Liebert and Morris (1967) addressed this
point in their examination of test anxiety, which they
contended was a composite of worry and emotionality.
They defined worry as the component of anxiety which is
principally "cognitive concern about the consequences of
failure" (p. 975). Emotionality was described as the
more physiological aspects of anxiety (e.g., the
unpleasant physical feelings of nervousness and tension).
This classification has been supported widely, and is
seen as an important feature of anxiety (Barnes, Sime,
Dienstbier, & Plake, 1986; Borkovek, 1976; Burton, 1988;
Martens, Vealey, & Burton, 1990; Morris, Harris, &
Rovins, 1981; Taylor, 1987). Generally, the
worry/emotionality distinction is described in terms of
cognitive and somatic anxiety. As will be demonstrated,
these two concepts have been examined as to their
independence and interrelatedness.


11
generating self-statements, and/or as a result of
excessive physiological arousal. Thus, the effects of
arousal and anxiety on swimming performance in the flume
may prevent the most accurate assessment of the swimmers'
techniques. Furthermore, if anxiety-responses could be
experimentally manipulated, then the flume might provide
an ideal setting to study the reactions of athletes to
competitive anxiety. (Data routinely obtained on those
assessed in the flume represent highly quantifiable
dependent measures.)
In the present investigation, the flume was used to
provide a potentially stressful testing situation for
swimmers where psychological, physiological, and
biomechanical variables could be carefully assessed.
Swimmers were chosen as subjects for two main reasons.
First, the flume provides a unique setting for a
controlled assessment of performance (i.e., one in which
an externally valid situation can simultaneously provide
precise performance measurement). Second, swimming is of
a primarily individual nature and allows for direct
assessment of intra-individual effects of anxiety. It
was felt that an investigation with swimmers assessed in
this sort of facility would be ideally suited to provide
useful information regarding the nature of the
relationship between anxiety and sports performance. A
secondary goal of the study was to examine an existing


138
Ratings of Perceived Exertion
Please point to a number on the scale which describes how
you are feeling at this time about the intensity of the swim
that you just completed.
6
7 Very, very light
8
9 Very light
10
11 Fairly light
12
13 Somewhat hard
14
15 Hard
16
17 Very hard
18
19 Very, very hard
20


112
examining this relationship that have employed such an ideal
performance outcome measure (i.e., flume-assessed propelling
efficiency). Previous sport psychology investigations have
relied upon outcome measures (e.g., times, accuracy,
distance) which can be affected by many and diverse external
factors, and which may provide less precise information.
Martens, Burton, and Vealey (1990) suggest that many studies
which examine the anxiety-performance relationship have
likely accounted for such a small amount of total variance
in performance (e.g., 10% combining somatic and cognitive
anxiety) due to the problems associated with measuring
performance accurately.
Thus, a goal of this study was to facilitate a more
valid and compelling description of the anxiety-sport
performance relationship, utilizing state-of-the-art
performance measures. It satisfied both Gould and Krane's
(in press) and Weinberg's (1990) recommendations to assess
performance with process-oriented measures (e.g., propelling
efficiency) rather than outcome-oriented markers (e.g.,
time). However, despite using a process-oriented
performance measure, between-group and intraindividual
analyses, and a multidimensional assessment of anxiety, a
goal of the study which was a prerequisite for hypothesis
testing was not met. That is, differing levels of anxiety
were not found to result from the instructional
manipulation, thus precluding an assessment of the
relationship between experimentally induced anxiety and


66
(e.g., coaches, parents, athletes, clinical sport
psychologists) to understand the relationship between
anxiety and competitive performance. Therefore, the
current investigation has attempted to more clearly
assess the effects of anxiety on sport performance
(swimming), specifically examining the influence of
cognitive and somatic factors. Consistent with the
recommendations of Gould and Krane (in press) and
Weinberg (1990), the current study used an adequate
assessment of anxiety and related states, measured
athletic performance accurately and in a process-oriented
fashion, employed intra-individual analyses, and
attempted to create three distinct ranges of anxiety.
Also to overcome the limitation of poor external validity
(cf. Caruso et al., 1990; Gould et al., 1987;
Karteroliotis & Gill, 1987) the current investigation
utilized an externally valid setting which was expected
to induce high ego-involvement, while not sacrificing the
controlled nature of the experiment. It was hoped that
the current investigation would fulfill the need for more
consistent and useful information regarding the anxiety-
performance relationship.


efficiency measure was obtained during the first swim while
the swimmer was unaware of being filmed. The second trial
was conducted under one of three anxiety conditions (High,
Moderate, or Low anxiety). An attempt to create these
conditions experimentally was made through the use of
different instructions given to the swimmer prior to his or
her second trial.
The results of the study did not confirm a significant
relationship between anxiety and motor performance. This
was primarily due to the probability that the anxiety
manipulations were ineffective in raising the swimmers'
anxiety levels prior to the second testing trial. On the
contrary, the swimmers reported feeling less anxious and
more self-confident after performing their first flume swim.
Not surprisingly, their efficiency in the flume was slightly
improved during the second swim. This improvement appears
to be related to becoming accustomed to swimming in the
flume during the first trial. Thus, the original hypotheses
were not successfully tested. However, it was revealed that
swimmers who had never been tested in the flume reported
more anxiety and less self-confidence than those who had
been previously tested.
vi


32
It has been suggested and demonstrated empirically
that the neurophysiological indicators of increased
arousal have poor intercorrelations and low correlations
with self-report scales of arousal (Fahrenberg,
Walschburger, Foerster, Myrtek, & Muller, 1983; Venables
1984; Zaichkowsky & Takenaka, in press). It is not
clearly understood why this is the case although
suggested reasons are autonomic response stereotypy
(Lacey & Lacey, 1958), differing expectancies (Kirsch &
Weixel, 1988; Neiss, 1990), learning history (Borkovek,
1976; Landers, 1980), and construct validation problems
with arousal (e.g., Neiss, 1988).
In discussing the different measures of arousal,
Hackfort and Schwenkmezger (1989) propose that
physiological indicators of arousal are difficult to
apply in sport psychology research, in that these
parameters often change more as a result of physical
activity than as a result of anxiety-inducing situations
Behavioral assessments of arousal (e.g., pacing,
avoidance) are less seldom reported in the sport
psychology literature, although Hackfort and
Schwenkmezger (1989) suggest that this is an area which
is particularly important in sport.
Arousal and anxiety are generally discussed in the
same context, but are not necessarily related to each
other. For example, excessive physiological arousal may
be associated with a range of diverse feelings such as


13
conditions (High, Moderate, or Low anxiety). An attempt
to create these conditions experimentally was made
through the use of different instructions given to the
swimmer prior to his or her second trial. Comparisons of
swimming efficiency were made between the two swims based
on group membership and on intra-individual changes in
self-report measures.
Hypotheses
The following research hypotheses were tested:
1. Competitive cognitive state anxiety will be
significantly and negatively related to freestyle
swimming performance (i.e., stroke efficiency). This
relationship is expected to manifest itself such that
swimming performance during the second swim becomes less
efficient as a function of group membership (determined
by repeated measures analyses of variance). That is,
swimmers in the high-anxiety group should show the
greatest decrement in swimming performance, followed by
those in the moderate-anxiety group, and then the low-
anxiety group (whose members are expected to show the
slightest performance decrement during the second
evaluated swim).
It is thus expected that any increase in cognitive
anxiety will have a negative effect on the biomechanical
efficiency of the swimmer. This hypothesis is based in
part on recent sport psychology research findings (e.g.,


137
19. I'm worried about reaching my goal.
20. I feel my stomach sinking.
21. I feel mentally relaxed.
22. I'm concerned that others will be disappointed
with my performance.
23. My hands are clammy.
24. I'm confident because I mentally picture
myself reaching my goal.
25. I'm concerned I won't be able to concentrate.
26. My body feels tight.
27. I'm confident of coming through under
pressure.
28. The flume apparatus appears confining.
29. I am worried about swimming at the correct
speed in the flume.


74
rates following the two swims allowing a comparison of
exertion. Since the time and speed were identical for
the two swims, any changes in exertional heart rate could
help determine the contributions of anxiety and/or
differences in swim stroke technique.
Psychological Questionnaires
Sport Anxiety Scale (SAS; Smith et al., 1990).
This 21-item scale is designed to measure sport-
specific trait anxiety. It is composed of three
subscales: somatic anxiety, worry, and concentration
disruption. The SAS scale and its subscales have high
internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha = .92, .86, and
.81, for the three subscales) despite the relatively
small number of items. The scales also appear to have
adequate reliability (7-day test-retest reliabilities
exceeded .85 for all three scales). In a study of 71
football players, the SAS successfully discriminated
between groups of athletes who differed in performance
level, with the poorer performers having higher total
scores than the best performers [F(l,46) = 4.93, p<.05]
(Smith et al., 1990).
This scale was chosen as a measure of trait anxiety
because of its capacity to determine the tendency of
individuals to experience anxiety within a particular
class of situations, i.e., competitive sport situations
(Smith & Smoll, 1990). Smith and Smoll (1990) report
that research strongly suggests that "situation-specific


46
inverted-U hypotheses are primarily those of a more basic
research nature (e.g., Bursill, 1958; Stennett, 1957).
It appears that the question of the effects of
arousal on sports performance has not been addressed
adequately. Adapting Neiss' (1988a) position, one could
argue that it is fairly obvious that athletes who are
unmotivated (and underaroused) will not achieve their
competitive potential. However, it is not as simple with
the highly-aroused athlete. Just as high arousal in an
individual can be manifested similarly by two very
different stimulus situations (e.g., sexual excitement
versus fear), an athlete could demonstrate high arousal
when thrilled about the potential of catching a touchdown
pass or when terrified of missing a field goal in front
of 85,000 spectators. These two similar arousal levels
may have quite different effects on the performance
outcome. What appears to be more important than
physiological arousal is the athlete's interpretation of
this arousal and the competitive situation. The
following studies address this issue by examining the
relationship between competitive anxiety and sports
performance.
Competitive Anxiety
In this section, the relationship of competitive
anxiety to sports performance is highlighted. Again,
some of the researchers who have investigated this
relationship have done so from the perspective of


Table 4
Baseline Correlations
BESTTIME
SAS
SAI
CSAICOG
CSAISOM
CSAISC
RHR
SAS
.16
SAI
.42*
. 17
CSAICOG
.26
. 13
.71**
CSAISOM
.35
.22
.90**
.63**
CSAISC
-.54**
-.28
-.82**
-.68**
-.71**
RHR
-.06
.16
. 05
. 01
-.09
-.17
RPE
.05
-.12
. 16
. 07
.03
-.08
.27
EFI
-.16
-.10
-.04
-.27
-.13
.15
.26
Note. p<. 01 ** pc.001
BESTTIME =
SAS =
SAI =
CSAICOG =
CSAISOM =
CSAISC =
RHR =
RPE =
EFI =
fastest time in 100 yard freestyle
Sport Anxiety Scale (competitive trait anxiety)
State Anxiety Scale
competitive cognitive anxiety (from CSAI-2)
competitive somatic anxiety (from CSAI-2)
competitive self-confidence (from CSAI-2)
resting heart rate
ratings of perceived exertion
freestyle swimming efficiency


115
future studies of this nature would benefit from a more
potent anxiety-inducing manipulation. However, the current
manipulations were thought to be as strong a potential
verbal manipulation as possible (and which would still be
ethically permissible and believable to the subjects).
Furthermore, the manipulation took into account input from
the subjects of the pilot study. For example, an aspect of
the high anxiety condition (having an observer watch through
the underwater windows) was directly taken from the
suggestions of pilot subjects who indicated that live
observation of the underwater stroke by a U.S.S. official
would be most anxiety-inducing. In subsequent
investigations, believability ratings might also be included
in the main study as a check on the manipulation.
As noted earlier, it appears that a problem with the
current study was the relatively slow speed of the flume.
The speed had been assessed in the pilot study during which
the subjects had to attempt multiple trials at approximately
90% of maximum speed. On consultation with the U.S.
Swimming Staff, it was determined that 80% would be a
reasonably challenging speed which all subjects should be
able to achieve on one and only one trial. Unfortunately,
it appears that the baseline swim buffered the effects of
the anxiety manipulation. As stated earlier, the swimmers
likely gained a mastery experience during the baseline swim
such that the attempt to create anxiety for the second swim
was ineffectual.


PROCEDURES
Subjects
Subjects were 33 swimmers assessed at the
International Center for Aquatic Research (ICAR), United
States Swimming, Colorado Springs, Colorado. The
subjects, males (N=7) and females (N=26) ranged in age
from 13-18 years (M=15.30) and were recruited from two
local high school swim teams. An attempt was made to
recruit female subjects exclusively. However, only 26
were able to participate and thus seven males were
recruited to increase the sample to at least a minimum of
30.
A goal of assessing 45 swimmers (to obtain 15
swimmers per group) was not met because of time
limitations placed on the principal investigator by U.S.
Swimming (due to the heavy use of the flume). The
principal investigator was therefore given approval to
assess approximately 30 subjects. Additionally, there
was a very short time period in which to recruit
subjects. In this recruiting period, the principal
investigator was unable to obtain only swimmers naive to
the flume and thus 13 of the subjects had undergone
previous testing.
67


THE EFFECTS OF ANXIETY ON SWIMMING PERFORMANCE
By
ROBERT ANDREW SWOAP
A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
1992


35
Relationship of Anxiety and Arousal to Performance
In examining the relationship of anxiety and arousal
to skilled motor performance, and more specifically, to
sports performance, researchers have often used terms
(e.g., stress, anxiety, arousal) interchangeably and
inappropriately. According to Gould and Krane (in
press), the inconsistent use of these terms has been a
long-standing problem for this body of literature. A
review of the literature is difficult when trying to
grasp what is being assessed, and whether authors are
referring to arousal or anxiety when they present their
findings. Thus, in this review of the arousal-anxiety /
performance relationship, efforts are made to distinguish
between terms where possible.
Despite the conceptual and definitional
inconsistencies in this area of research, analyses of the
relationships among anxiety, arousal, and sports
performance constitute a large part of the sport
psychology literature (e.g., Jones & Hardy, 1989; Krane &
Williams, 1987; Landers & Boutcher, 1986; Madden,
Summers, & Brown, 1990; Meacci & Price, 1985; Murphy &
Woolfolk, 1987; Poteet & Weinberg, 1980; Raglin, Wise, &
Morgan, 1990; Sonstroem & Bernardo, 1982). This section
of the literature review will examine the various
theories which seek to describe the anxiety-arousal-
performance relationship with a focus on those studies
most relevant to the research in this dissertation.


105
competition (Martens, Vealey, & Burton, 1990). This
suggests that the flume testing may have not provided a
sufficiently anxiety-provoking situation. Following the
warm-up swim, these subjects may have been even less
concerned, having experienced the flume swim. They perhaps
achieved a mastery experience and had little reason to
experience anxiety in response to a task which they realized
they could perform with relative ease.
A second possibility exploring why the subjects as a
group may not have been significantly anxious in the flume
testing situation is because approximately one-third had
been tested in the flume before. This was an unplanned
aspect of the study in that it had originally been intended
to use only subjects naive to the flume. However,
limitations placed on the investigator by U.S. Swimming
necessitated a compromise so that to obtain a minimum number
of subjects (i.e., 30), some were drawn from a group of
swimmers who had been previously tested. While this had not
been originally planned, it is noteworthy that the inclusion
of experienced (previously Flumed) swimmers created an
opportunity to examine prior experience in the flume as it
related to anxiety. Exploratory univariate analyses
(conducted following a nearly significant MANOVA, p<.06 (see
p. 92}) suggested that when facing the initial flume
testing, subjects naive to the flume reported more state
anxiety [SAI; F(1,31)=4.8, g<.05], more competitive
cognitive anxiety [CSAI-Cog; F(1,31)=5.5, pc.05], more


10
ideal context within which to investigate many of the
issues discussed here, involves the examination of
swimming speed, efficiency, and stroke mechanics at the
United States Swimming International Center for Aquatic
Research. This facility is unique in providing state of
the art assessments of stroke technique, propelling
efficiency, and swimming economy, while swimmers perform
in a swimming flume (a kind of "swimming treadmill").
Swimmers from around the nation and world come for
testing at the flume at the Olympic Training Center in
Colorado Springs, Colorado.
Despite the excellent information that this facility
can provide to athletes and coaches, it seems likely that
some swimmers approach the somewhat novel procedure of
the flume experience with excessive anxiety and become
unable to reliably demonstrate their characteristic
strokes. The anxiety may derive from varied sources:
performance or evaluative anxiety (e.g., fear of
performing poorly in view of U.S. Swimming coaches or
researchers), anxiety related to the unfamiliarity of the
flume, or anxiety related to swimming in the confined
space of the flume. Thus, the assessment situation may
provide a significant source of anxiety for some
swimmers.
It is possible that the anxious swimmer may not
perform to the best of his or her ability as a result of
focusing on inappropriate cognitions and anxiety-


Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School
of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
THE EFFECTS OF ANXIETY ON SWIMMING PERFORMANCE
By
ROBERT ANDREW SWOAP
AUGUST, 1992
Chairman: James H. Johnson, Ph.D.
Major Department: Clinical and Health Psychology
It was the purpose of this study to examine the effects
of anxiety on skilled motor performance. More specifically,
assessed were the reactions of swimmers to an evaluative
competitive testing situation. It was hypothesized that
swimmers would demonstrate an increase in anxiety under a
stressful evaluative condition as compared to a baseline
assessment. It was also hypothesized that the swimmers'
propelling efficiency would decrease under increasing states
of anxiety.
High school swimmers (N=33) were matched for skill,
age, and competitive trait anxiety. They were tested in a
motorized flume (i.e., a "swimming treadmill") under two
trials. Prior to each trial, swimmers were given self-
report measures to assess their competitive state anxiety,
including cognitive and somatic anxiety, and had their heart
rate taken. During both trials, the subjects were
videotaped underwater to determine their swimming efficiency
using computer-aided biomechanical analyses. A baseline
v


8
physiological, cognitive, and other mediators of athletic
performance.
There is research to suggest that individuals in
competitive situations, including children (Beuter &
Duda, 1985; Lewthwaite, 1990), adolescents (Crocker,
Alderman, & Smith, 1988), adults (Rodrigo, Lusiardo, &
Pereira, 1990), and elite athletes (Scanlan, Stein, &
Ravizza, 1991), are susceptible to "evaluation stress" in
which the resultant anxiety may interfere with
performance. The anxiety reaction appears to be related
to a threat perception, and can be manifested in
behavioral, cognitive, and physiological responses.
It also appears that competitive state anxiety is
dependent upon the nature of the competition, upon the
athlete's tendency to experiece anxiety in general (trait
anxiety), and upon the coping skills developed by the
athlete to deal with the anxiety-arousing competition
(Smith & Smoll, 1990). Thus, a major state championship
is potentially more anxiety-provoking than a weekly local
contest, and therefore may present the athlete with a
greater challenge of coping with "nerves" and
"butterflies" surrounding the competition. Similarly, an
athlete with a high amount of competitive trait anxiety
(and poor coping skills) would be more likely to
experience decrements in performance in an important
competition than an athlete who has less trait anxiety,
or than one who has developed effective coping strategies


20
Therefore, data analyses were somewhat altered and
compromised.
2. In that only high school swimmers were tested,
there may be limited generalizability to a more
competitive group of swimmers (e.g., collegiate or
Olympic-caliber swimmers).
Significance of the Study
A recent survey by Blinde and Tierney (1990)
indicated that U.S. Swimming coaches as a group possess a
moderate to large degree of receptivity to the field of
sport psychology. As the authors correctly point out,
this degree of receptivity is critical in the process of
disseminating applied sport psychology research
information to a sport and its coaches and athletes.
However, a clear obstacle to receptivity is a "limited
knowledge base disseminated from the researcher to the
practitioner" (p. 137). The authors recommend that
researchers focus their attention on practical and
applied studies. Accordingly, a potential contribution
of this study was to conduct research that could be
readily received and used by coaches as well as athletes.
It was expected that this study would have implications
for providing applied research knowledge to the consumer
(e.g., coaches and athletes) through the U.S. Swimming
organization via publications and coaches and athletes'
clinics.


124
Karteroliotis, C. & Gill, D. G.. (1987). Temporal
changes in psychological and physiological components
of state anxiety. Journal of Sport Psychology. 9,
261-274.
Kerr, J. H. (1989). Anxiety, arousal, and sport
performance: An application of reversal theory. In
D. Hackfort & C. D. Spielberger (Eds.), Anxiety in
sports: An international perpective (pp. 137-151).
New York: Hemisphere.
Kimble, G. A., Garmezy, N., & Zigler, E. (1984).
Principles of psychology (6th ed.). New York: John
Wiley & Sons.
Kirsch, I., & Weixel, L. J. (1988). Double-blind versus
deceptive administration of a placebo. Behavioral
Neuroscience. 102, 319-323.
Kjellberg, A. (1977). Sleep deprivation and some aspects
of performance: Problems of arousal changes. Waking
Sleeping. 1, 139-143.
Klavora, P. (1978). An attempt to derive inverted-U
curves based on the relationship between anxiety and
athletic performance. In D. Landers & R. Christina
(Eds.), Psychology of motor behavior and sport1977
(pp. 369-377). Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics.
Krane, V., & Stanford, A. (1991, October). A
Quantitative investigation of mental states of
competitive swimmers. Poster presented at the
meeting of the Association for the Advancement of
Applied Sport Psychology, Savannah, GA.
Krane, V., & Williams, J. M. (1987). Performance and
somatic anxiety, cognitive anxiety, and confidence
changes prior to competition. Journal of Sport
Behavior. 10, 47-56.
Lacey, J. I., & Lacey, B. (1958). Verification and
extension of the principle of autonomic response-
stereotypy. American Journal of Psychology. 71, 50-
73.
Landers, D. M. (1980). The arousal-performance
relationship revisited. Research Quarterly for
Exercise and Sport. 51, 77-90.
Landers, D. M., & Boutcher, S. H. (1986). Arousal-
performance relationships. In J. M. Williams (Ed.),
Applied sport psychology: Personal growth to peak
performance (pp. 163-184). Palo Alto, CA: Mayfield.


82
up swim. Do not be concerned with the cameras; the video
will only be used for your benefit."
(2) Moderate anxiety. "During this flume test, you will
be videotaped as you swim freestyle. The taping and
analysis of your stroke will be discussed with you and
your coach(s), and will be used to determine your
relative strength in freestyle as compared to your
teammates. The test will be quite similar to your warm
up swim. However, please try to swim your best, as it is
important that we get an accurate measurement of your
skills." (During these instructions, the cameras in the
flume were displayed to the swimmer, as were the VCRs for
the recording of the subject's swim.)
(3) High Anxiety. "During this flume test, you will be
videotaped as you swim freestyle. The taping and
analysis of your stroke will be analyzed and evaluated by
the U.S. Swimming Biomechanics staff, officials, and
coaches. Also, during this swim a U.S. Swimming official
will be examining your stroke through the underwater
observation windows. Please attempt to swim your very
best, as the evaluation will be important in determining
your relative standing among other swimmers at your level
who have previously been evaluated in the flume. We will
use the test analysis to decide the areas in which you
need the most improvement." (During these instructions,
the cameras in the flume, the VCRs, and the underwater
observation window were displayed to the swimmer; also, a


47
assessing arousal. These studies are included in this
section rather than the previous one because of the
actual measurements conducted (i.e., primarily self-
reported anxiety), and not how the researchers identified
the constructs (arousal vs. anxiety). The issue of the
nature of the relationship that exists between anxiety
and sports performance (e.g., inverted-U, linear
negative, unrelated) is thus presented.
Trait and state anxiety
The relationship between competitive trait anxiety
and sports performance has been investigated under both
laboratory and field conditions. According to Martens,
Vealey, and Burton (1990), laboratory studies have
generally failed to demonstrate a consistent relationship
between competitive A-trait and sports performance (e.g.,
Martens, Gill, & Scanlan, 1976; Murphy & Woolfolk, 1987;
Poteet & Weinberg, 1980). Indeed, some studies which
purport to analyze the relationship between trait anxiety
and performance are not interpretable since there is an
inappropriate use of the trait measure (i.e., the Sport
Competition Anxiety Test (SCAT); Martens, 1977). For
example, administering the SCAT as a precompetitive
measure of anxiety is incorrect (cf. Gerson & Deshaies,
1978; Thirer & O'Donnell, 1980) and assesses the
relationship between state anxiety and performance rather
than trait anxiety and performance.


59
adequately assess anxiety and related states, (2) utilize
more adequate measures of athletic performance, (3)
employ intraindividual anxiety analyses, and (4) create
at least three distinct levels of anxiety when testing
nonlinear predictions.
Gould and Krane's first recommendation is a broad
one, but basically involves carefully defining what one
is measuring, utilizing conceptual frameworks (e.g.,
multidimensional components of anxiety), and using
reliable and valid measures of anxiety. The second plea
is for the investigator to adequately measure athletic
performance. Many studies have relied upon
nonstandardized performance measures (cf. Gould et al.,
1984, McCauley, 1985) which fluctuated according to task
demands. Furthermore, the utilization of outcome
measures (e.g., win-loss, comparing game scores) is
discouraged. Gould and Krane cite Burton (1988) as a
positive example in which the author assessed best times
in a swimming event relative to previous times in that
event. However, even an assessment such as this has
limitations. True, it may provide a general idea of
variations in performance associated with changes in
anxiety. However, this type of outcome measure may not
adequately provide information regarding the process of
performance change in a particular sport.
Instead of focusing on the outcome of a competitive
performance, a more process-oriented focus is desirable.


87
TABLE 1
Equivalency of Groups on Three Variables Used for Group
Assignment
GROUP
M
Best
(SD) .
Time
M
Trait
(SD) **
Anxietv
M (SD)
Age
Low
59.6
(3.0)
46.5
(7.1)
15.2
(1.8)
Mod
60.1
(4.5)
46.5
(11.2)
15.5
(1.8)
High
59.6
(2.8)
47.3
(11.2)
15.3
(1.4)
TOTAL
59.8
(3.4)
46.8
(9.7)
15.3
(1.6)
Fastest time (in seconds) in a 100 yard freestyle
race (current season).
As measured by the Sport Anxiety Scale.


126
Maslow, A. H. (1954). Motivation and personality. New
York: Harper & Row.
Matarazzo, J. D., Ulett, G. A., & Saslow, G. (1955).
Human maze performance as a function of increasing
levels of anxiety. Journal of General Psychology.
53, 79-95.
McCauley, E. (1985). State anxiety: Antecedent or result
of sport performance? Journal of Sport Behavior. 8,
71-77.
McCann, S., Murphy, S., & Raedeke, T. (in press). The
effect of performance setting and individual
differences on the anxiety-performance relationship
for elite cyclists. Anxiety, Stress, and Coping; An
International Journal.
McGrath, J. E. (1970). Major methodological issues. In
J. E. McGrath (Ed.), Social and psychological factors
in stress (pp. 19-49). New York: Holt, Reinhart &
Winston.
Meacci, W. G., & Price, E. E. (1985). Acquisition and
retention of golf putting skill through the
relaxation, visualization, and body rehearsal
intervention. Research Quarterly for Exercise and
Sport. 56, 176-179.
Morgan, W. P., & Ellickson, K. A. (1989). Health,
anxiety, and physical exercise. In In D. Hackfort &
C. D. Spielberger (Eds.), Anxiety in sports: An
international perpective (pp. 165-182). New York:
Hemisphere.
Morris, L. W., & Liebert, R. M. (1970). Relationship of
cognitive and emotional components of test anxiety to
physiological arousal and academic performance.
Journal of Counsultinq and Clinical Psychology. 35,
332-337.
Morris, L., & Liebert, R. M. (1973). Effects of negative
feedback, threat of shock, and level of trait anxiety
on the arousal of two components of anxiety. Journal
of Counseling Psychology. 20. 321-326.
Morris, L., Brown, N. R., & Halbert, B. (1977). Effects
of symbolic modeling on the arousal of cognitive and
affective components of anxiety in preschool
children. In C.D. Spielberger and I.G. Sarason
(Eds.), Stress and anxiety (Vol. 4). Washington, DC:
Hemisphere.


128
Poteet, D., & Weinberg, R. (1980). Competition trait
anxiety, state anxiety, and performance. Perceptual
and Motor Skills. 50, 651-654.
Powell, F., & Verner, J. (1982). Anxiety and performance
relationships in first time parachutists. Journal of
Sport Psychology. 4, 184-188.
Prapavessis, H., & Grove, J. R. (1991). Precompetitive
emotions and shooting performance: The mental health
and zone of optimal function models. The Sport
Psychologist. 5, 223-234.
Raglin, J. S., & Morgan, W. P.. (1988). Predicted and
actual pre-competition anxiety college swimmers.
Journal of Swimming Research. 4, 5-7.
Raglin, J. S., Wise, K. J., & Morgan, W. P. (1990).
Predicted and actual pre-competition anxiety in high
school girl swimmers. Journal of Swimming Research.
6, 5-8.
Reilly, M. F., Kame, V. D., Termin, B., Tendesco, M. E.,
& Pendergast, D. R. (1990). Relationship between
freestyle swimming speed and stroke mechanics to
isokinetic muscle function. Journal of Swimming
Research. 6, 16-21.
Rejeski, W. J., & Brawley, L. R. (1988). Defining the
boundaries of sport psychology. The Sport
Psychologist. 2, 231-242.
Rodgers, W., Hall, C., & Buckholz, E. (1991). The effect
of an imagery training program on imagery ability,
imagery use, and figure skating performance. Journal
of Applied Sport Psychology. 2, 109-125.
Rodrigo, G., Lusiardo, M., & Pereira, G. (1990).
Relationship between anxiety and performance in
soccer players. International Journal of Sport
Psychology. 21. 112-120.
Rosenthal, R. (1968). Experimenter expectancy and the
reassuring nature of the self hypothesis decision
procedure. Psychological Bulletin. 70 (Monograph
supplement), 30-47.
Sage, G. H. (1984). Motor learning and control: A
neurophysiological approach. Dubuque, IA: Brown.
Sarason, I. G. (1975). Anxiety and self-preoccupation.
In I. Sarason & C. Spielberger (Eds.), Stress and
anxiety (Vol. 2, pp. 27-44). New York: Wiley &
Sons.


45
theory implies that a moderate level of anxiety is best
for performance" (p. 5). Yet, clearly the inverted-U
hypothesis is one describing the relationship between
arousal and performance, not anxiety and performance. It
becomes confusing to the reader when a group of
researchers appears to inappropriately use these two
terms (anxiety and arousal) as synonymous. In a recent
chapter, Morgan (an author of the previously-reported
studies) and Ellickson (1989) write that Hanin's theory
should not be dismissed as a reiteration of the inverted-
U explanation, in that "ZOF theory does not argue that a
moderate level of arousal is superior to low or high
levels... [but] predicts that some individuals will have
their best performances when highly aroused, others when
deeply relaxed, and others when moderately aroused" (p.
168). In this case, Morgan discusses the inverted-U
hypothesis in terms of arousal.
There is a common problem in sport psychology
research examining the relationship among anxiety,
arousal, and performance. There are many investigations
which claim to investigate the relationship between
arousal and sports performance which are misleading since
the measurement of "arousal" is typically a measurement
of competitive anxiety (as the studies conducted by
Raglin and his associates exemplify). In fact, there are
very few studies which examine the arousal-sports
performance relationship. The studies that support the


106
competitive somatic anxiety [CSAI-Som; F(l,31)=8.1, p<.01],
and less self-confidence [CSAI-SC; F(1,31)=4.9, pc.05] than
did those subjects who had been previously tested.
Still, the possibility that the nonsignificant findings
for the pre-post changes were due to the inclusion of
experienced subjects needs to be considered. That is, did
their inclusion dilute any significant effects in the
overall sample? Separate analyses of swimmers naive to the
flume demonstrated that this subset did not report increases
in anxiety following the instructions. Indeed, there was an
absence of a trend that one would have predicted if the
anxiety manipulation had been effective. Thus, while one
might question whether the absence of significant findings
were due to a lack of power (due to a smaller naive sample),
this was not the case. (Further, there were no significant
relationships between the psychological variables and
swimming performance either at baseline or during the second
swim.) Only a significant interaction effect was revealed
demonstrating that naive subjects reported a significantly
greater decrease in somatic anxiety than did experienced
subjects from the baseline to the evaluated swim. This
suggests that the mastery experience (baseline swim) was
indeed relevant, especially for swimmers naive to the flume.
Third, during the debriefing session, several swimmers
indicated that they felt the swims had not been challenging
enough, and that the flume speed was slower than they had
expected it to be. Thus, the task difficulty may have been


92
Table 3
Means and Standard Deviations of Swimming Efficiency
MEASURE
GROUP
Low Moderate
Overall Efficiency (%)
Pre 57.2 (11.8)
Post 60.0 (6.3)
Finish Phase Efficiency (%)
Pre 84.6 (12.0)
Post 82.1 (10.2)
55.4 (14.7)
63.4 (8.7)
85.2 (11.2)
86.4 (5.2)
High
55.1 (17.0)
59.4 (9.9)
86.5 (6.1)
87.0 (9.1)


40
the medium level of arousal is associated with the worst
performance). Similarly, Baddeley (1972) is critical of
the optimal arousal theory and suggests it can account
for almost any result so long as the exact location on
the inverted-U curve is not specified in advance.
Anderson (1990) takes issue with Neiss' suggestion
to abandon arousal, the inverted-U, and the Yerkes-Dodson
law. She writes that Neiss' objections are neither
logically nor empirically warranted, challenging his
evidence as limited. However, she focuses primarily on
the relationship between arousal and cognition, not motor
performance. Indeed, her documentation of studies
supporting the inverted-U relationship between
information processing and arousal appears to be less
relevant to Neiss' stance. In a rebuttal, Neiss (1990)
indicates that an abundance of empirical findings from
diverse research areas challenges the conception of
unidimensional arousal, and that methodological advances
permit the investigation of discrete psychobiological
states in their cognitive, affective, and physiological
manifestations.
An additional problem with the arousal literature is
that a major aspect of the inverted-U hypothesis has
largely been ignored. The hypothesis suggests that at
low levels of arousal, performance should suffer.
Broadbent (1971) argued that there is no difficulty in
explaining why low arousal leads to poor performance as


130
Smith, R. E., Smoll, F. L., & Schtz, R. W. (1990).
Measurement and correlates of sport-specific
cognitive and somatic trait anxiety: The Sport
Anxiety Scale. Anxiety Research, 2, 263-280.
Sonstroem, R. J., & Bernardo, B. (1982). Intraindividual
pregame state anxiety and basketball performance: A
reexamination of the inverted-U curve. Journal of
Sport Psychology. 4, 235-245.
Spence, K. W. (1951). Theoretical interpretations of
learning. In S. S. Stevens (Ed.), Handbook of
experimental psychology (pp. 690-729). New York:
Wiley.
Spielberger, C. D. (1966). Theory and research on
anxiety. In C.D. Spielberger (Ed.), Anxiety and
behavior (pp. 3-20). New York: Academic Press.
Spielberger, C. D. (1972). Conceptual and methodological
issues in anxiety research. In C. D. Spielberger
(Ed.), Anxiety: Current trends in theory and
research (Vol. 2, pp. 481-493). New York: Academic
Press.
Spielberger, C. D. (April, 1982). State-trait anxiety
and sports psychology. Paper presented at the First
Israeli National Congress on Psychology and Sociology
of Sport and Physical Education. Natanya, Israel.
Spielberger, C. D., Gorsuch, R. L., & Lushene, R. E.
(1970). Manual for the state-trait anxiety
inventory. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists
Press.
Stennett, R. G. (1957). The relationship of performance
level to level of arousal. Journal of Experimental
Psychology. 54, 54-61.
Taylor, J. (1987). Predicting athletic performance with
self-confidence and somatic and cognitive anxiety as
a function of motor and physiological requirements in
six sports. Journal or Personality. 55, 139-153.
Thirer, J., & O'Donnell, L. A. (1980). Female
intercollegiate athletes' trait-anxiety level and
performance in a game. Perceptual and Motor Skills.
50, 18.
Vealey, R. S. (1988). Future directions in psychological
skills training. The Sport Psychologist. 2, 318-336.


135
State Anxiety Inventory
Directions: A number of statements which people use to
describe themselves are given below. Read each statement
and then using the scale below, indicate how you feel RIGHT
NOW, that is, AT THIS MOMENT. There are no right or wrong
answers. Do not spend too much time on any one statement,
but give the answer which seems to describe your present
feelings best.
1 = Not at all
2 = Somewhat
3 = Moderately so
4 = Very much so
1. I feel calm.
2. I feel secure.
3. I am tense.
4. I feel regretful.
5. I feel at ease.
6. I feel upset.
7. I am presently worrying over possible misfortunes.
8. I feel rested.
9. I feel anxious.
10. I feel comfortable.
11. I feel self-confident.
12. I feel nervous.
13. I am jittery.
14. I feel "high strung".
15. I am relaxed.
16. I feel content.
17. I am worried.
18. I am over-excited and rattled.
19. I feel joyful.
20. I feel pleasant.


117
The swimmer would then be exposed to a video which
demonstrated a swimmer struggling to keep up with an
increasing flume speed. In actuality, the subject would be
filmed following the tone which supposedly signifies that
the flume speed will increase momentarily. The speed would
remain at 80% (comparable to the baseline swim) but under a
potentially anxiety-inducing situation (i.e., the threat of
an inability to keep up with the supposed increase in flume
speed). This could potentially be a high anxiety condition
in that the swimmers would anticipate that they would be
subjected to a very difficult task during which they would
be filmed and evaluated. Hitting the gate with one's feet
is a potentially embarrasing situation and one which might
pose a threat to self-esteem.
Additionally, one might increase the speed of the flume
for both baseline and evaluated swims to create a more
difficult (and potentially more anxiety-inducing) situation.
This was considered in the current study and rejected for
previously discussed reasons of obtaining a reliable one
time trial.
To conclude, the examination of the anxiety-performance
relationship in sports is a relevant and interesting one.
However, as has been shown, this area of research is fraught
with difficulties. The challenge to obtain reliable
process-oriented performance measures in a realistic context
is a formidable one. Still, it is thought that the flume
provides such a good measure of performance that it is


76
predictors of elevation in A-state [state anxiety] for a
particular class of stress situations than are general A-
trait [trait anxiety] measures" (p. 490).
Competitive State Anxiety Inventory (CSAI-2; Martens,
Vealey, & Burton, 1990)
This 27-item measure is designed to assess sport-
specific state anxiety and has three subscales: cognitive
anxiety, somatic anxiety, and self-confidence. One study
examining the construct validity of this test with male
elite college swimmers indicated that cognitive anxiety
(but not somatic anxiety) was a significant predictor of
performance levels (Barnes, Sime, Dienstbier, & Plake,
1986). The reliability (i.e., internal consistency) of
each of the subscales is satisfactory (Cronbach's alpha
ranging from .79 .90). Evidence supporting the
construct validity of the CSAI-2 as a measure of sport
specific state anxiety (cognitive and somatic) and self-
confidence was demonstrated by the authors in a series of
four studies (Martens et al., 1990). Finally, the
authors provide extensive norms for the CSAI-2 by
competitive level, gender, and sport.
In the current experiment, the scale was slightly
modified in that the items relevant to a "competition"
were altered to refer to a procedure (i.e., the flume
evaluation). There were also two additional items which
assessed anxiety associated with the swimmers' reactions
to the flume apparatus itself. These slight


REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Concepts and Definitions
Anxiety and Stress
Anxiety can be differentiated in terms of whether it
is manifested as a transitory experience (state anxiety)
or as a proclivity towards feeling anxious (trait
anxiety). State anxiety has been defined as
Transitory emotional states that consist of
subjective, consciously-experienced feelings of
tension, apprehension, nervousness and worry, and
heightened arousal or activation of the autonomic
nervous systems. These states vary in intensity and
fluctuate over time as a function of the amount of
perceived threat. Thus, perceived threat mediates
the relationship between stressors and the intensity
of state anxiety reactions. (Spielberger, 1982, p.
3)
The anxiety state may consist of a combination of
some of the following characteristics: tension,
nervousness, unpleasant thoughts (worries), and
physiological changes (e.g., dry mouth, pupil dilation,
faster and more intense breathing, tense muscles)
associated with the increased sympathetic activity of the
autonomic nervous system (Burton, 1988; Spielberger,
1982). In more severe instances of anxiety, as during a
panic attack, symptoms experienced may include:
Shortness of breath (dyspnea) or smothering
sensations; dizziness, unsteady feelings, or
faintness; choking; palpitations or accelerated
22


61
Beuter and Duda (1985) suggested that under the high
anxiety condition, what was once automatic and smooth
came under volitional control (likely due to the
evaluative and competitive anxiety) and became less
smooth and efficient. Once again, a problem with the
study is that Beuter and Duda created different anxiety
conditions, but described them as arousal levels, and
used a general measure of arousal (heart rate taken prior
to the two trials) to assess the manipulation. That is,
self-report measures of anxiety were not utilized (e.g.,
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory for Children) to assess the
anxiety manipulation.
The third recommendation of Gould and Krane is to
employ intraindividual analyses (e.g., Beuter & Duda,
1985). They write that Sonstroem and Bernardo's (1982)
study of basketball players is an excellent example of
this method. Without having controlled for each player's
own state anxiety scores, the researchers would have
mistakenly concluded that there was no significant
relationship between competitive anxiety and basketball
performance. Instead, as mentioned previously, Sonstroem
and Bernardo discovered that an inverted-U relationship
existed between state anxiety and performance across all
subjects. Furthermore, other investigators (Landers &
Boutcher, 1986; Neiss, 1988b) have suggested that there
is a need to analyze intra-individual changes in arousal
and anxiety measures when relating them to performance.


39
as to whether arousal is a useful concept. Neiss (1988a)
conducted a review of the research which demonstrated the
effects of various psychobiological arousal states on
motor performance. He reported that their is little
support for the inverted-U hypothesis especially due to
difficulties in interpreting the actual influence of
arousal on an unsuccessful performance. He also states
that
The inverted-U hypothesis [as a causal hypothesis]
has not received clear support from a single
study... If, recast in psychological terms, the
inverted-U hypothesis reveals only that the
motivated outperform the apathetic and the
terrified, it should be consigned to the true-but-
trivial category. (Neiss, 1988a, p. 355)
Neiss claimed that the inverted-U hypothesis is
basically irrefutable due to the inability to specify its
parameters and the variability of optimal arousal across
tasks, and that the global term arousal is thus a
hindrance to understanding the relationship of human
motor performance to emotional states. This criticism is
not dissimilar to Eysenck's (1982) claim that one is
hard-pressed to disprove the predicted inverted-U
relationship because two-thirds of studies investigating
this relationship (and utilizing three distinct arousal
levels) would obtain supportive evidence by chance alone.
Eysenck explains that if three levels of arousal are
compared, there are six possible orderings of the three
levels with respect to performance, only two of which are
inconsistent with the Yerkes-Dodson law (the two in which


84
swimmers who had not yet undergone their testing.
Swimmers were fully debriefed at the end of the study so
that the nature of the study could be explained without
affecting other swimmers approach to the testing. During
this debriefing, technical feedback was provided to each
swimmer by U.S. Swimming. Questions about freestyle
stroke technique, racing strategies, and so forth were
answered at this time.


THE EFFECTS OF ANXIETY ON SWIMMING PERFORMANCE
By
ROBERT ANDREW SWOAP
A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
1992

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I express my appreciation to the staff of United
States Swimming who provided me with the facilities and
technical support to conduct this study. I would also
like to thank Drs. Shane Murphy, Jay Kearney, and Sara
Smith of the United States Olympic Committee whose
endorsement, assistance and encouragement were vital to
its completion. A special thanks goes to Samantha Ortiz,
who spent many long hours at the video and computer
terminals coding the swimming data. At the University of
Florida, I had the assistance and expertise of five
outstanding committee members: Drs. Bruce Crosson,
Michael Geisser, Anthony Greene, James Johnson, and
Robert Singer. I thank them each for their advice and
instructive contributions to this dissertation. Deep
gratitude is especially given to my doctoral chairman,
Jim Johnson. Dr. Johnson's constant support, advisement
and enthusiasm were indispensable for the completion of
this project. Finally, I extend thanks and appreciation
to my dear friends and family who mean so much to me and
to whom I dedicate this work.
ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
gage
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ii
ABSTRACT V
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 1
Statements of the Problem 12
Brief Overview of Study 12
Hypotheses 13
Definitions of Terms 15
Assumptions 18
Limitations 19
Significance of the Study 20
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 22
Concepts and Definitions 22
Anxiety and Stress 22
Arousal and Activation 3 0
Summary of Concepts 34
Relationship of Anxiety and Arousal to Performance. 35
Arousal 3 6
Competitive Anxiety 46
Problems with the Literature and Researchers'
Recommendations 58
Summary of Literature Review and Restatement
of Need for Current Study 63
PROCEDURES 67
Subjects 67
Procedural Overview 68
Measures 71
Methodology 79
RESULTS 85
Subjects 85
Effects of Anxiety Manipulations 86
Swimming Efficiency 90
Within-Subject Analyses 93
Effects of Prior Flume Testing 94
Separate Examination of Subjects New to the Flume.. 98
iii

DISCUSSION 102
Explanation of Findings 102
Summary and Conclusions Ill
Implications for Future Research 114
REFERENCES 119
APPENDIX 133
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 139

Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School
of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
THE EFFECTS OF ANXIETY ON SWIMMING PERFORMANCE
By
ROBERT ANDREW SWOAP
AUGUST, 1992
Chairman: James H. Johnson, Ph.D.
Major Department: Clinical and Health Psychology
It was the purpose of this study to examine the effects
of anxiety on skilled motor performance. More specifically,
assessed were the reactions of swimmers to an evaluative
competitive testing situation. It was hypothesized that
swimmers would demonstrate an increase in anxiety under a
stressful evaluative condition as compared to a baseline
assessment. It was also hypothesized that the swimmers'
propelling efficiency would decrease under increasing states
of anxiety.
High school swimmers (N=33) were matched for skill,
age, and competitive trait anxiety. They were tested in a
motorized flume (i.e., a "swimming treadmill") under two
trials. Prior to each trial, swimmers were given self-
report measures to assess their competitive state anxiety,
including cognitive and somatic anxiety, and had their heart
rate taken. During both trials, the subjects were
videotaped underwater to determine their swimming efficiency
using computer-aided biomechanical analyses. A baseline
v

efficiency measure was obtained during the first swim while
the swimmer was unaware of being filmed. The second trial
was conducted under one of three anxiety conditions (High,
Moderate, or Low anxiety). An attempt to create these
conditions experimentally was made through the use of
different instructions given to the swimmer prior to his or
her second trial.
The results of the study did not confirm a significant
relationship between anxiety and motor performance. This
was primarily due to the probability that the anxiety
manipulations were ineffective in raising the swimmers'
anxiety levels prior to the second testing trial. On the
contrary, the swimmers reported feeling less anxious and
more self-confident after performing their first flume swim.
Not surprisingly, their efficiency in the flume was slightly
improved during the second swim. This improvement appears
to be related to becoming accustomed to swimming in the
flume during the first trial. Thus, the original hypotheses
were not successfully tested. However, it was revealed that
swimmers who had never been tested in the flume reported
more anxiety and less self-confidence than those who had
been previously tested.
vi

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
Both research and practice in the area of sport
psychology has increased during the last 10 years. This
is illustrated in the United States by a recent surge in
the formation of sport psychology-related organizations,
such as the Association for the Advancement of Applied
Sport Psychology and Division 47 of the American
Psychological Association (Exercise and Sport
Psychology), in addition to the North American Society
for the Psychology of Sport and Physical Activity. New
sport psychology journals are being published. These
include the Journal of Applied Sport Psychology. The
Sport Psychologist, and the Sport Psychology Training
Bulletin, in addition to the Journal of Sport and
Exercise Psychology.
Further, it appears that sport psychology services
are being used more frequently in a variety of sectors.
For example, in the mid-1970s there was isolated
involvement of a few national governing bodies (NGBs)
with sport psychologists, but by 1987 over half of the
NGBs in the U.S. were provided with some sport psychology
services for athletes and coaches (Murphy, 1988). A
recent survey documented that 16 of the NGBs now have
formal sport psychology programs, and that all of these
1

2
programs are integrated within an overall sports science
program (Gould, Tammen, Murphy, & May, 1989). Silva
(1992) writes that there has been "meteoric growth of the
professionalization of sport psychology" (p. 2), within
collegiate, professional, and Olympic sports. According
to Singer (1992), sport psychology is emerging at a swift
rate all around the world, with interventions and
instructional programs being offered by sport
psychologists to athletes and coaches in increasing
numbers. Others concur that the growth of sport
psychology has been substantial in the last decade, but
express concern about what they see as a lack of identity
in the field (Rejeski & Brawley, 1988).
There has also been an increase in sport psychology
research. This can be partially attributed to a growing
recognition that an understanding of relevant
psychological factors is essential to bringing about
improved sports performance. Research in this area has
included the analysis of attentional factors (e.g.,
Singer et al., 1991), burnout (e.g., Dale & Weinberg,
1990), developmental issues (e.g., Brodkin & Weiss,
1990), gender issues (e.g., Allison, 1991), goals (e.g.,
Lewthwaite, 1990), imagery (e.g., Rodgers, Hall, &
Buckholz, 1991), injury (e.g., Brewer, Van Raalte, &
Linder, 1991), mental errors (e.g., Bird & Horn, 1990),
motivation (e.g., Davis, 1991), self-confidence and
efficacy (e.g., Martin & Gill, 1991), skill acquisition

3
(e.g., Singer, Flora, & Abourezk, 1989), and social
support (e.g., Sarason, Sarason, & Pierce, 1990).
Another major topic which has received much
attention in the literature deals with the relationship
between the constructs of anxiety and arousal and sports
performance (e.g., Burton, 1988; Crocker, Alderman, &
Smith, 1988; Ebbeck & Weiss, 1988; Fenz, 1988; Jones &
Cale, 1989; Landers & Boutcher, 1986; Madden, Summers, &
Brown, 1990; Prapavessis & Grove, 1991; Rodrigo,
Lusiardo, & Pereira, 1990; Williams, Tonymon, & Andersen,
1991). The degree of attention given to this topic is
highlighted by a recent content analysis of 29 sport
psychology books for athletes (Vealey, 1988) which
revealed that anxiety/arousal control techniques were the
second most frequently discussed factors related to the
enhancement of mental skills in sport. (Attentional
control techniques were most frequent.) Furthermore,
Murphy (1988) and Ogilvie et al. (1979) have indicated
that precompetitive tension is the number one problem for
which athletes request assistance. Within applied sport
psychology in the U.S., it has been suggested that some
form of anxiety management is used in the majority of
interventions with athletes (Singer, 1989).
Within the general consensus regarding the negative
effects of "excess" anxiety or arousal on athletic
performance, techniques described as "anxiety management"
and "arousal control" are applied frequently by sport

4
psychologists with athletes. However, less is known
regarding the efficacy of these various interventions.
Obviously, from a layperson's perspective there is a
common occurrence of athletes "choking" under pressure.
Most sports fans can recite several incidents in which an
athlete or team has not performed as well as expected,
and which may be attributed to the athlete's inability to
cope effectively with a pressure situation (e.g., missing
a two-foot putt to win a major golf championship; false-
starting and disqualification in the finals of a swim
meet). Understanding these failures to perform is
interesting to sports fans and scientists alike. Such
understanding is especially important for the athlete who
is seeking his or her best performance.
If there exists, for example, a zone of anxiety or
arousal within which athletes achieve optimal competitive
performance (cf. Hanin, 1980, 1986) then this knowledge
has special relevance for athletes, coaches, and sport
psychologists. If, however, any increase in anxiety or
arousal is detrimental to performance (cf. Bird & Horn,
1990; Burton, 1988), this has different ramifications for
athletes and those working with them.
Despite the fact that competition-specific anxiety
is a major concern for many athletes, coaches, and sport
psychologists, the research literature dealing with this
topic like that related to other forms of anxiety, is
insufficient to explain the precise relationship between

5
competitive anxiety and sports performance. To date,
research in this area has been hampered by methodological
problems (e.g., Gould, Petlichkoff, Simons, & Vevera,
1987; McCauley, 1985), statistical problems (cf. Smith,
1989), the use of poor outcome measures (cf., Martens,
Vealey, & Burton, 1990) and definitional inconsistencies
(cf. Gould & Krane, in press; Weinberg, 1990). Clearly,
more methodologically sophisticated research in this area
is needed, as several current sources recommend (e.g.,
Gould & Krane, in press; Jones & Hardy, 1990; Martens,
Vealey, & Burton, 1990; Weinberg, 1990).
Some of the confusion in this area stems from
definitional problems. The terms anxiety, arousal,
somatic anxiety, and stress, for example, have often been
used interchangeably in the basic and applied research
literature (Gould & Krane, in press; Weinberg, 1990).
This has posed more than merely a semantic problem, in
that different constructs have been proposed to have
varying relationships to skilled motor performance. For
example, what is the difference between somatic anxiety
and arousal or between cognitive anxiety and arousal?
And, do they have different effects on sports
performance? Issues pertaining to the definition of
constructs such as anxiety and arousal will be addressed
in a later section.
Apart from strictly definitional problems, another
important issue has to do with the multidimensional

6
nature of sport-related anxiety, and how different
dimensions of anxiety may relate to skilled sports
performance. Focus on this topic has mainly resulted
from the development of a revised form of the Competitive
State Anxiety Inventory (CSAI-2; Martens, Burton, Vealey,
Bump, & Smith, 1983) which is designed to assess
cognitive and somatic competitive anxiety and self-
confidence. Since the development of the CSAI-2, it has
become a prominent instrument in the assessment of sports
related state anxiety. The authors cite 16 published
empirical studies from 1984-1988 which have included the
CSAI-2 (Martens, Vealey, & Burton, 1990) and there have
been at least this many studies utilizing the CSAI-2 in
the last four years.
In creating the CSAI-2, Martens et al., (1983) with
regard to previous research (e.g., Borkovek, 1976; Doctor
& Altman, 1969; Liebert & Morris, 1967; Morris, Davis, &
Hutchings, 1981) have suggested that the distinction
between cognitive and somatic state anxiety is both
conceptually and practically important in the assessment
of competitive anxiety. Likewise, Morris and his
colleagues (Morris, Brown, & Halbert, 1977; Morris,
Harris, & Rovins, 1981; Morris & Liebert, 1973) have
argued that cognitive and somatic anxiety can be elicited
independently by different antecedents and are separate,
albeit related, components. Martens and his colleagues
have applied these notions to sport psychology and have

7
suggested that these two anxiety components have
different effects on competitive performance. They
suggest that somatic state anxiety will reach its peak at
the onset of competition and will dissipate once the
contest starts. Thus, they argue, somatic anxiety
(unless very high and attentionally distracting) should
influence performance less than should cognitive anxiety.
Cognitive anxiety, consisting of negative expectations
about success in performing a task, appears to occur both
before and throughout a performance, and thus may be more
important to the outcome (Martens, Vealey, & Burton,
1990).
The principle question regarding anxiety and sports
performance is how athletes react (cognitively,
physiologically, emotionally, behaviorally) to
"stressful" situations (e.g., competing in a loud,
hostile stadium; competing against an opponent that the
athlete knows nothing about; adjusting to a different
climate and race course). Despite definitional,
methodological, and conceptual problems surrounding
athletes' reactions to anxiety, there exists sufficient
research to suggest that anxiety affects athletic
performance. Although this topic will be addressed fully
in the literature review, it is important to briefly
present information on what is known about the potential
effects of anxiety on performance directly, as well as on

8
physiological, cognitive, and other mediators of athletic
performance.
There is research to suggest that individuals in
competitive situations, including children (Beuter &
Duda, 1985; Lewthwaite, 1990), adolescents (Crocker,
Alderman, & Smith, 1988), adults (Rodrigo, Lusiardo, &
Pereira, 1990), and elite athletes (Scanlan, Stein, &
Ravizza, 1991), are susceptible to "evaluation stress" in
which the resultant anxiety may interfere with
performance. The anxiety reaction appears to be related
to a threat perception, and can be manifested in
behavioral, cognitive, and physiological responses.
It also appears that competitive state anxiety is
dependent upon the nature of the competition, upon the
athlete's tendency to experiece anxiety in general (trait
anxiety), and upon the coping skills developed by the
athlete to deal with the anxiety-arousing competition
(Smith & Smoll, 1990). Thus, a major state championship
is potentially more anxiety-provoking than a weekly local
contest, and therefore may present the athlete with a
greater challenge of coping with "nerves" and
"butterflies" surrounding the competition. Similarly, an
athlete with a high amount of competitive trait anxiety
(and poor coping skills) would be more likely to
experience decrements in performance in an important
competition than an athlete who has less trait anxiety,
or than one who has developed effective coping strategies

9
for pressure-filled competitive situations (Lewthwaite,
1990; Smith & Smoll, 1990).
It also appears that anxiety primarily affects the
athlete in performance-degrading ways (e.g., Burton,
1988; McCann, Murphy, & Raedeke, in press) through
cognitive and attentional factors (e.g., "mental" errors)
(Albrecht & Feltz, 1987; Bird & Horn, 1990; Singer et
al., 1991), and through somatic effects (e.g., too
"pumped-up") (Powell & Verner, 1982; Smith & Smoll,
1990). Anxiety also appears to affect individuals
negatively in a competitive situation via altered motoric
reactions (e.g., Beuter & Duda, 1985; Weinberg, 1990).
As will be demonstrated in the literature review, it
is currently not clear which factors of competition
(e.g., intraindividual pressure, competitors, coaches)
and which mediating factors (e.g., attention,
physiological arousal, cognitive anxiety) are most
relevant to performance in regards to competition
anxiety. Sport psychologists who are evaluating athletes
and the athletes themselves would benefit from more
compelling information regarding how athletes react under
potentially "stressful" competitive situations. A more
precise understanding of the nature of athletes'
responses to stressful situations and how their
performances are affected is needed.
One specific example of a situation which may be
anxiety-producing to athletes, and which may represent an

10
ideal context within which to investigate many of the
issues discussed here, involves the examination of
swimming speed, efficiency, and stroke mechanics at the
United States Swimming International Center for Aquatic
Research. This facility is unique in providing state of
the art assessments of stroke technique, propelling
efficiency, and swimming economy, while swimmers perform
in a swimming flume (a kind of "swimming treadmill").
Swimmers from around the nation and world come for
testing at the flume at the Olympic Training Center in
Colorado Springs, Colorado.
Despite the excellent information that this facility
can provide to athletes and coaches, it seems likely that
some swimmers approach the somewhat novel procedure of
the flume experience with excessive anxiety and become
unable to reliably demonstrate their characteristic
strokes. The anxiety may derive from varied sources:
performance or evaluative anxiety (e.g., fear of
performing poorly in view of U.S. Swimming coaches or
researchers), anxiety related to the unfamiliarity of the
flume, or anxiety related to swimming in the confined
space of the flume. Thus, the assessment situation may
provide a significant source of anxiety for some
swimmers.
It is possible that the anxious swimmer may not
perform to the best of his or her ability as a result of
focusing on inappropriate cognitions and anxiety-

11
generating self-statements, and/or as a result of
excessive physiological arousal. Thus, the effects of
arousal and anxiety on swimming performance in the flume
may prevent the most accurate assessment of the swimmers'
techniques. Furthermore, if anxiety-responses could be
experimentally manipulated, then the flume might provide
an ideal setting to study the reactions of athletes to
competitive anxiety. (Data routinely obtained on those
assessed in the flume represent highly quantifiable
dependent measures.)
In the present investigation, the flume was used to
provide a potentially stressful testing situation for
swimmers where psychological, physiological, and
biomechanical variables could be carefully assessed.
Swimmers were chosen as subjects for two main reasons.
First, the flume provides a unique setting for a
controlled assessment of performance (i.e., one in which
an externally valid situation can simultaneously provide
precise performance measurement). Second, swimming is of
a primarily individual nature and allows for direct
assessment of intra-individual effects of anxiety. It
was felt that an investigation with swimmers assessed in
this sort of facility would be ideally suited to provide
useful information regarding the nature of the
relationship between anxiety and sports performance. A
secondary goal of the study was to examine an existing

12
assessment procedure (i.e., the flume) to determine its
effects on swimmers' anxiety and performance.
Statements of the Problem
There were three primary purposes for conducting
this investigation: (1) to examine and compare the
effects of the components of anxiety (i.e., somatic vs.
cognitive) on swimming performance; (2) to determine how
the swimming stroke (from a biomechanical perspective) is
affected by different levels of externally-induced
anxiety; and (3) to determine whether current assessment
procedures at the International Center for Aquatic
Research are affected by a swimmer's testing history in
the flume.
Brief Overview of Study
High school swimmers (N=33) were matched for skill,
age, and competitive trait anxiety. Each was tested on
two trials in the motorized flume (i.e., "swimming
treadmill"). Prior to each trial, swimmers were given
self-report measures to assess their competitive state
anxiety, including cognitive and somatic anxiety, and had
their heart rate taken. During both trials, the subjects
were videotaped underwater to determine their swimming
efficiency using computer-aided biomechanical analyses.
A baseline efficiency was obtained during the first swim
while the swimmer was unaware of being filmed. The
second trial was conducted under one of three anxiety

13
conditions (High, Moderate, or Low anxiety). An attempt
to create these conditions experimentally was made
through the use of different instructions given to the
swimmer prior to his or her second trial. Comparisons of
swimming efficiency were made between the two swims based
on group membership and on intra-individual changes in
self-report measures.
Hypotheses
The following research hypotheses were tested:
1. Competitive cognitive state anxiety will be
significantly and negatively related to freestyle
swimming performance (i.e., stroke efficiency). This
relationship is expected to manifest itself such that
swimming performance during the second swim becomes less
efficient as a function of group membership (determined
by repeated measures analyses of variance). That is,
swimmers in the high-anxiety group should show the
greatest decrement in swimming performance, followed by
those in the moderate-anxiety group, and then the low-
anxiety group (whose members are expected to show the
slightest performance decrement during the second
evaluated swim).
It is thus expected that any increase in cognitive
anxiety will have a negative effect on the biomechanical
efficiency of the swimmer. This hypothesis is based in
part on recent sport psychology research findings (e.g.,

14
Bird and Horn (1990) who found that cognitive anxiety was
positively related to mental errors, and Burton (1988)
who concluded that cognitive anxiety was negatively
related to swimming performance). Cognitive psychology
research (e.g., Wine, 1971, 1980) also lends support and
suggests that with increasing cognitive anxiety,
individuals become more preoccupied with self-evaluation
and possible failure thus disrupting performance.
2. Independent of the groups, performance
decrements will be most pronounced in those swimmers who
demonstrate the greatest increases in cognitive anxiety
from baseline to evaluated swims (determined by
correlational and regression analyses). For these
swimmers, an evaluated flume swim may seem more difficult
and be associated with a greater perceived threat, a more
negative anxiety reaction, and thus a greater decrement
in swimming efficiency (cf. Beuter & Duda, 1985; Brustad
& Weiss, 1987; Lewthwaite, 1990). Testing of this
hypothesis is supported by researchers who suggest that
intra-individual analyses in anxiety-performance research
is meaningful and needed (Gould & Krane, in press;
Sonstroem & Bernardo, 1982; Weinberg, 1990).
3. Cognitive state anxiety will have a more
profound negative effect on performance than somatic
state anxiety. As a result of previous research (Burton,
1988; Feltz, Landers, & Raeder, 1979; Gould et al., 1987;
Martens et al., 1983; Rosenthal, 1968; Sarason, 1975;

15
Weinberg, Gould, & Jackson, 1979), it was hypothesized
that somatic A-state would likely be greatest before the
swimmer entered the flume and then would dissipate as the
testing began, but that cognitive A-state (especially
anxiety related to evaluation) would likely continue into
the testing and be associated with measurable decrements
in swimming efficiency.
4. If decrements are found in the freestyle stroke,
the most likely stage will be during the "finish" phase
(see below in Definitions of Terms). The finish is the
most powerful stage of the freestyle stroke and is the
stage during which many young swimmers have difficulty
fully completing the armstroke. It is thought that if a
swimmer becomes affected by excessive anxiety he or she
may become less efficient and have to work harder. It
was hypothesized that the finish phase would be the most
affected by evaluative anxiety, in that the swimmer would
have to compensate for the decrease in efficiency using a
higher stroke turnover rate (and thus compromise the
finish phase). This will be assessed by examining
changes in efficiency of the finish phase as a function
of group membership (using a repeated measures ANOVA).
Definitions of Terms
Although within the Review of Literature definitions
and concepts are addressed, the following terms are
defined briefly in order to assist in understanding the

16
terminology of the present study. To facilitate a better
comprehension of these terms, it is first necessary to
present a brief overview of the freestyle swimming
armstroke. The stroke is made up of three phases (catch,
insweep, and finish). (Recovery, in which the hand
travels from the end of the stroke to reenter the water,
is the fourth phase of the stroke, but is not associated
with the propulsion of the swimmer.) The phases are not
distinct, but are continuous parts of the stroke. Thus,
the swimmer first enters the water, "catching" it and
pulling back and away from the body. Next, the swimmer
begins to bend the elbow more as he or she "sweeps" the
water with the hand in and underneath the body. To
"finish" the stroke, the swimmer pushes the water with
the hand out and back (from underneath the body)
eventually lifting the elbow and hand out of the water
for recovery. From the perspective of the swimmer, the
right arm generally follows the shape of an inverted "S",
while the left arm approximates an "S".
Angle of Pitch (AP) is the angle of the hand in
relation to the swimmer's body at any one time during the
armstroke (90° approximates a hand-shaking position).
Anxiety refers to the experience of negative
thoughts (e.g., worry, self-doubt) and usually
concomitant physiological sensations (e.g., sweaty palms,
racing heart rate) which are induced in response to a

17
threatening situation (objective or subjective; of
environmental, social or intrapersonal origin).
Arousal is defined as psychological and/or
physiological activation of an organism on a continuum
from deep sleep to extreme activation (e.g., intense
excitement or fear).
Catch is the first phase of the armstroke in which
the swimmer's hand enters the water and begins the
stroke. For analytical purposes, it continues to the
point at which the swimmer's hand is at its widest point
(i.e., furthest point laterally from the body).
Digitization refers to the process of converting a
video image of an action (e.g., a swimming armstroke)
into two and three dimensional coordinates for
quantitative computer analysis.
Drag is defined as any negative force created during
swimming which acts to slow the body through water
resistance (e.g., during hand entry).
Finish describes the third, final, and most powerful
phase of the armstroke in which the swimmer completes the
stroke cycle. For analytical purposes, it begins at the
point at which the swimmer's hand is at its narrowest
point (i.e., underneath the body) and ends with the
hand's exit from the water.
Flume refers to a "swimming treadmill" in which
subjects are evaluated (filmed via underwater video

18
cameras) while they swim against a steady stream of
water.
Hand Velocity CHV) is the speed of the hand through
the water in meters per second.
Hydrodynamic Biomechanical Analysis is an overall
process of filming a swimmer with underwater cameras, and
then determining forces and efficiency of the swimmer
(via digitization).
Insweep refers to the middle (second) phase of the
armstroke. For analytical purposes, it begins where the
catch ends (i.e., at the widest point) and continues
until the hand is at the narrowest point (i.e.,
underneath the body and where the finish begins).
Propelling Efficiency (PE) is a measure of how
efficient a swimmer is in moving through the water. It
is the propulsive force (RE) divided by the total force
(R) multiplied by 100 and thus expressed as a percentage.
Propulsive Force (RE) is the force (measured in
newtons) which the swimmer exerts upon the water in order
to propel himself or herself through the water. It is a
component of the total force which the swimmer exerts.
Total Force (R) is the total force (measured in
newtons) which the swimmer exerts upon the water while
swimming.
Assumptions
For the purpose of this investigation, the following
assumptions were made:

19
1. Subjects would be able to swim the freestyle
stroke in the flume during a testing procedure.
2. The flume would provide an adequate assessment
of swimming technique in high school swimmers.
3. The anxiety manipulations and flume testing
procedure would present a significantly stressful
situation to swimmers (especially for those naive to the
flume). This assumption was made on the basis of
literature which suggests that evaluative situations
involving some threat to perceived ability or skills are
highly anxiety-producing (Beuter & Duda, 1985; Brustad &
Weiss, 1987; Burton, 1988; Gould et al., 1987;
Lewthwaite, 1990; Scanlan, 1984). It was assumed that
subjects' reactions to the flume testing procedures would
be fairly representative of how high school swimmers
react (psychologically, physiologically, and
biomechanically) to varying stressful conditions.
4. Subjects would be able to accurately respond to
paper and pencil questionnaires which assess thoughts of
anxiety.
Limitations
1. Due to limitations placed on the investigator
for data collection by U.S. Swimming, the flume testing
procedure was not novel to approximately one-third of the
subjects. The original intention was to include only
subjects who had not previously experienced the flume.

20
Therefore, data analyses were somewhat altered and
compromised.
2. In that only high school swimmers were tested,
there may be limited generalizability to a more
competitive group of swimmers (e.g., collegiate or
Olympic-caliber swimmers).
Significance of the Study
A recent survey by Blinde and Tierney (1990)
indicated that U.S. Swimming coaches as a group possess a
moderate to large degree of receptivity to the field of
sport psychology. As the authors correctly point out,
this degree of receptivity is critical in the process of
disseminating applied sport psychology research
information to a sport and its coaches and athletes.
However, a clear obstacle to receptivity is a "limited
knowledge base disseminated from the researcher to the
practitioner" (p. 137). The authors recommend that
researchers focus their attention on practical and
applied studies. Accordingly, a potential contribution
of this study was to conduct research that could be
readily received and used by coaches as well as athletes.
It was expected that this study would have implications
for providing applied research knowledge to the consumer
(e.g., coaches and athletes) through the U.S. Swimming
organization via publications and coaches and athletes'
clinics.

21
In addition to providing information that could be
useful to swimming, this study was expected to contribute
to the body of knowledge associated with the potential
relationship between anxiety and sports performance. As
will be demonstrated in the following section, there are
significant questions as to how athletes respond to
anxiety in a competitive context. It was expected that a
significant contribution of this study would be to expand
upon and clarify the anxiety-performance relationship.
The current investigation also constituted an
attempt to pool the resources of a sport-specific sports
science team (U.S. Swimming, International Center for
Aquatic Research) with sport psychology in a joint effort
to investigate a specific question (i.e., examining the
accuracy of flume assessments with anxious subjects) and
a larger issue (i.e., investigating the relationship
between anxiety and sports performance). As such, it
reflected an integration of different disciplines within
the sports sciences (e.g., biomechanics, motor control,
physiology, and sport psychology) and was expected to
provide a useful model for future multidisciplinary
projects. In general, then, it was expected that this
study would contribute to the literature concerning the
relationship between anxiety and a specific type of
athletic performance (swimming).

REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Concepts and Definitions
Anxiety and Stress
Anxiety can be differentiated in terms of whether it
is manifested as a transitory experience (state anxiety)
or as a proclivity towards feeling anxious (trait
anxiety). State anxiety has been defined as
Transitory emotional states that consist of
subjective, consciously-experienced feelings of
tension, apprehension, nervousness and worry, and
heightened arousal or activation of the autonomic
nervous systems. These states vary in intensity and
fluctuate over time as a function of the amount of
perceived threat. Thus, perceived threat mediates
the relationship between stressors and the intensity
of state anxiety reactions. (Spielberger, 1982, p.
3)
The anxiety state may consist of a combination of
some of the following characteristics: tension,
nervousness, unpleasant thoughts (worries), and
physiological changes (e.g., dry mouth, pupil dilation,
faster and more intense breathing, tense muscles)
associated with the increased sympathetic activity of the
autonomic nervous system (Burton, 1988; Spielberger,
1982). In more severe instances of anxiety, as during a
panic attack, symptoms experienced may include:
Shortness of breath (dyspnea) or smothering
sensations; dizziness, unsteady feelings, or
faintness; choking; palpitations or accelerated
22

23
heart rate; trembling or shaking; sweating; nausea
or abdominal distress; depersonalization
orderealization; numbness or tingling sensations
(parasthesias); flushes (hot flashes) or chills;
chest pain or discomfort; fear of dying; and fear of
going crazy or of doing something uncontrolled
during the attack. (American Psychiatric
Association, 1987, p. 236)
Smith and Smoll (1990) define anxiety as a
multidimensional construct which involves an "aversive
emotional response and an avoidance motive characterized
by worry and apprehension concerning the possibility of
physical or psychological harm, together with increased
physiological arousal resulting from the appraisal of
threat" (Smith & Smoll, 1990, p. 419). Gould and Krane
(in press) report that anxiety has been viewed as
feelings of nervousness and tension associated with
activation or arousal of the organism.
Eysenck (1982) postulates that the strength of an
individual's anxiety state depends on two main factors:
(1) the degree of external threat and (2) the
individual's susceptibility to anxiety (i.e., anxiety
proneness). It is the second factor that is defined as
trait anxiety or
A motive or acquired behavioral disposition that
predisposes an individual to perceive a wide range
of objectively nondangerous circumstances as
threatening and to respond to these with state
anxiety reactions disproportionate in intensity to
the magnitude of the objective danger. (Spielberger,
1966, p. 17)
Thus, individuals who have a high amount of trait anxiety
will tend to perceive more situations as anxiety-

24
provoking, and/or experience stronger feelings of anxiety
under a threatening condition. Marten, Vealey, and
Burton (1990) concur and suggest that trait anxiety is
the predisposition to perceive various environmental
stimuli as threatening or nonthreatening and to respond
to these stimuli with corresponding levels of state
anxiety.
An additional differentiation in the definition of
anxiety is that of physiological and cognitive
components. Liebert and Morris (1967) addressed this
point in their examination of test anxiety, which they
contended was a composite of worry and emotionality.
They defined worry as the component of anxiety which is
principally "cognitive concern about the consequences of
failure" (p. 975). Emotionality was described as the
more physiological aspects of anxiety (e.g., the
unpleasant physical feelings of nervousness and tension).
This classification has been supported widely, and is
seen as an important feature of anxiety (Barnes, Sime,
Dienstbier, & Plake, 1986; Borkovek, 1976; Burton, 1988;
Martens, Vealey, & Burton, 1990; Morris, Harris, &
Rovins, 1981; Taylor, 1987). Generally, the
worry/emotionality distinction is described in terms of
cognitive and somatic anxiety. As will be demonstrated,
these two concepts have been examined as to their
independence and interrelatedness.

25
As applied to participation in sport, anxiety is
frequently operationally defined in terms of "competitive
stress" or "competitive anxiety." Although stress has
been at times been used interchangeably with anxiety, it
is actually a broader term which can be defined at times
as a stimulus, an intervening, or a response variable
(whereas anxiety is almost exclusively described as a
response variable). Thus, these two terms may or may not
be analogous depending on the context in which they are
used.
As a stimulus, the term stressor is usually used to
refer to situations or stimuli that are objectively
characterized by some degree of physical or psychological
danger or threat (Spielberger, 1982). Spielberger
explains that reactions to a stressor are dependent on
whether a particular situation or stimulus is threatening
(i.e., potentially dangerous or harmful). Of course,
this can be both objective and subjective "danger."
Thus, objective dangers (e.g., hurricanes, illness) are
appraised by most people as threatening, whereas for
subjective dangers the same stimulus may be seen as a
threat, a challenge, or as largely irrelevant, depending
on the person's estimation of the threat value of the
stimulus.
Spielberger concludes then that the experience of
threat has two main characteristics: (1) It is future-
oriented, generally involving the anticipation of a

26
potentially harmful event; and (2) It is mediated by
psychological activities (e.g., perception, thought,
memory, and judgement) which are involved in the
appraisal process. An example comes from some
competitive sports in which athletes strive to perform at
peak levels under circumstances in which an opposing side
aims to restrict such performance (Madden et al., 1990).
The athlete must appraise the potential threat using
mental processing (i.e., accurate perception, careful
thought, recollections of previous interactions, etc.)
and must arrive at a reasonable judgement.
The concept of stress has also been described as an
intervening variable, linking two sets of factors
(stressors and stress reactions) together. Thus, the
stressfulness for an individual of any stressor varies,
depending on how he or she perceives the situation and on
how he or she perceives available coping resources
(Kimble, Garmezy, & Zigler, 1984). Stress has also been
defined very generally as "any behavioral response of an
organism to environmental stimulation" (Fenz, 1988, p.
223) .
With regard to sports, Scanlan (1984) states that
competition can be "stressful" due to extensive
evaluation of ability and competence, and that
competitive stress is a negative emotional reaction an
athlete feels when self-esteem is threatened. "It is
his/her perceptions of inadequacy in successfully meeting

27
the performance demands, and his/her perceptions of the
consequences of failure, that create the threat to self¬
esteem which triggers the stress reaction" (Scanlan,
1984, p. 119).
In a more recent paper, Scanlan and her colleagues
(1991) define competitive stress as an encompassing
condition where the athlete experiences negative
emotions, feelings, and thoughts that might occur with
respect to a competitive experience. "These would
include feelings of apprehension, anxiety, muscle
tension, nervousness, physical reactions (such as
butterflies in the stomach, shaking, or nervous
sweating), thoughts centered on worry and self-doubt, and
negative statements to yourself" (Scanlan et al., 1991,
p. 105). Martens, Vealey, and Burton (1990) comment on
how stress is related to anxiety suggesting that stress
occurs under conditions in which failure to meet demands
is perceived as having important consequences and is thus
responded to with increased levels of state anxiety.
Competitive anxiety appears to be solely defined as
a response variable (i.e., an athlete can respond to a
competitive stressor with competitive anxiety).
Competitive anxiety is the more prevalent term in the
literature to describe the reaction to a "stressful"
competitive situation. Utilizing Spielberger's (1966,
1972) and others (Borkovek, 1976; Liebert & Morris, 1967)
suggestions that anxiety is a multidimensional construct,

28
Martens (1977) suggests that cognitive and somatic
anxiety are two separate components of competitive
anxiety. Burton (1988) writes that
Cognitive anxiety is the mental component of anxiety
caused by negative expectations about success or
negative self-evaluation, whereas somatic anxiety is
the physiological or affective component of anxiety
that is directly related to autonomic arousal.
Cognitive anxiety is characterized by worry,
negative self-talk, and unpleasant visual imagery,
whereas somatic anxiety is reflected in such
responses as rapid heart rate, shortness of breath,
clammy hands, butterflies in the stomach, and tense
muscles. (Burton, 1988, p. 46)
It has been proposed that these two components have
differential effects on performance (e.g., Burton, 1988;
Smith & Smoll, 1990; Weinberg, 1990) and thus the
comprehensive term "competitive anxiety" may not have
exclusively negative or positive effects (see a later
section entitled Relationship between Competitive Anxiety
and Performance).
Although the two components of anxiety are
hypothetically independent, Morris, Davis, and Hutchings
(1981) have suggested that they probably covary in
stressful situations since these situations contain
elements related to the stimulation of both somatic and
cognitive responses. A modest dependence has been
demonstrated in a number of studies (Deffenbacher, 1980;
Martens, Vealey, & Burton, 1990; Morris & Liebert, 1973).
However, conflicting evidence exists that suggests that
cognitive and somatic anxiety are independent, depending
on the situational stressor. That is, high somatic

29
anxiety can be aroused without eliciting self-evaluation,
while certain conditions which are highly evaluative
elicit cognitive anxiety but not somatic state anxiety
(Burton, 1988; Morris, Harris, and Rovins, 1981).
Competitive anxiety can be further delineated using
state and trait anxiety terms, which have been described
previously. Hence, competitive state anxiety can be
defined as a condition prior to or during a competitive
situation "characterized by feelings of apprehension and
tension and associated with activation of the organism"
(Martens, Vealey, & Burton, 1990, p. 9), while
competitive trait anxiety is defined as a "situation-
specific modification of the more general A-trait
construct ... a tendency to perceive competitive
situations as threatening and to respond to these
situations with A-state" (p. 11).
Although it may be true that it cannot yet be
adequately explained why some athletes perceive threat in
the sport environment while others regard their sport
experiences as positive or benign (Lewthwaite, 1990) we
can at least define the stress/anxiety terms in a more
straightforward and consistent way. An appropriate
summary of the stress process which has four interrelated
stages is given by Gould and Krane (in press) who adapted
McGrath's (1970) process model of stress to sports.
First, an environmental situation or demand is placed on
the athlete. Second, the athlete must interpret this

30
situation and determine whether there is a perceived
imbalance between the demands of the situation and the
capabilities of himself or herself. Third, and depending
on this interpretation, the athlete can experience
changes in physiological arousal and/or state anxiety.
Fourth is the outcome of the performance.
This explanation is helpful in that it demonstrates
that competitive stress is a process and that the
emphasis is placed on the athlete's evaluation and
perception of a competitive situation, and not simply the
situation itself. Thus, in this context, competitive
stress may be viewed as positive or negative. This is in
contrast to competitive anxiety which is described as
primarily negative. However, even this is not
indisputable as will be seen in the forthcoming section
on the relationship between anxiety and performance.
Arousal and Activation
The relatedness among terms does not end with
anxiety and its associated terms but continues in the
notion of arousal and activation. Some writers adopt a
parsimonious approach to the topic:
Arousal and activation are used interchangeably by
most motivation theorists, although there are some
who have attempted to make distinctions between the
two concepts. In this text, the two words will be
considered to be synonymous. Emotional, tense, and
anxious are other adjectives that are frequently
used to express the same idea, and in sports,
"psyched-up" conveys the same notion. (Sage, 1984,
p. 345)

31
Other writers have explained arousal as synonymous
with motivation (Magill, 1989), alertness/readiness (Cox,
1990), and psychic energy (Martens, 1987). Perhaps the
most traditional definition explains arousal as energy
mobilization ranging on a continuum from deep sleep or
coma at one extreme, to panic-stricken terror or great
excitement at the other extreme (Eysenck, 1984; Malmo,
1959). Duffy (1957, 1962) proposed that arousal is
neural/physiological excitation which varies on two
dimensions: intensity and direction. "For Duffy (1962),
any given point on this continuum was determined by 'the
extent of release of potential energy, stored in the
tissues of the organism, as this is shown in activity or
response' (p. 17)" (Neiss, 1988a, p. 345).
As with anxiety, arousal can be described as
multidimensional in nature (Landers, 1980), and has been
suggested to encompass three dimensions: physiological,
behavioral, and cognitive (Borkovek, 1976). The
indicators of increased arousal are manifested and
assessed in a number of ways: self-report,
electrophysiological (e.g., decreases in skin resistance
of galvanic skin response; increases in palmar sweating,
EMG, EEG), respiratory and cardiovascular (e.g.,
increases in ECG, blood pressure, heart rate), and
biochemical (e.g., increases in the release of adrenaline
and noradrenaline) (Gould & Krane, in press; Hackfort &
Schwenkmezger, 1989).

32
It has been suggested and demonstrated empirically
that the neurophysiological indicators of increased
arousal have poor intercorrelations and low correlations
with self-report scales of arousal (Fahrenberg,
Walschburger, Foerster, Myrtek, & Muller, 1983; Venables
1984; Zaichkowsky & Takenaka, in press). It is not
clearly understood why this is the case although
suggested reasons are autonomic response stereotypy
(Lacey & Lacey, 1958), differing expectancies (Kirsch &
Weixel, 1988; Neiss, 1990), learning history (Borkovek,
1976; Landers, 1980), and construct validation problems
with arousal (e.g., Neiss, 1988).
In discussing the different measures of arousal,
Hackfort and Schwenkmezger (1989) propose that
physiological indicators of arousal are difficult to
apply in sport psychology research, in that these
parameters often change more as a result of physical
activity than as a result of anxiety-inducing situations
Behavioral assessments of arousal (e.g., pacing,
avoidance) are less seldom reported in the sport
psychology literature, although Hackfort and
Schwenkmezger (1989) suggest that this is an area which
is particularly important in sport.
Arousal and anxiety are generally discussed in the
same context, but are not necessarily related to each
other. For example, excessive physiological arousal may
be associated with a range of diverse feelings such as

33
anxiety, sexual excitement, fear or exhilaration (cf.
Apter, 1982). In an early paper discussing the nature
and measurement of anxiety, Cattell (1963) found that the
correlation between heart rate and anxiety is only a
moderately positive one, again suggesting a variable
relationship between arousal and anxiety. Zaichkowsky
and Takenaka (in press) suggest that although anxiety is
typically associated with an increase in arousal, the two
constructs are not the same. Drawing from the previous
discussion of the anxiety concept, it appears more useful
to discuss how the subcomponents of anxiety relate to
arousal rather than trying to establish a relationship
between the broad term anxiety and arousal. Clearly,
cognitive anxiety is unlikely to occur during a highly
arousing condition such as excitement, which is described
by Apter (1984) as a "paratelic state".
On the other hand, cognitive anxiety will likely
occur during what Apter terms a "telic state" (e.g., a
high arousal condition of fear). For example, two rock
climbers (or skydivers, or bull-riders) experience
heightened arousal related to the potential threat
(falling). One feels challenged by the climb and
experiences the situation in the paratelic mode (i.e.,
with excitement). The other, less confident athlete
experiences the situation in the telic mode (i.e., with
fear and anxiety). In both situations, the climbers will
likely experience increases in arousal and report somatic

34
anxiety. However, only the second individual will report
cognitive anxiety. This distinction is vital, as will be
shown in the following section, in determining the
effects of anxiety and arousal on sports performance.
Summary of Concepts
Activation and arousal are assumed to be synonymous
constructs. The term arousal will be used in this paper
and is defined as a general indicator of physiological
energy and intensity. It is not synonymous with anxiety
as a whole, but is similar to the subcomponent, somatic
anxiety. However, somatic anxiety is not a well-
understood construct. In this paper, somatic anxiety is
operationally defined as (measured by) an individual's
perception of physiological arousal (e.g., how hard my
heart is beating). Further, the definition of somatic
anxiety is not exclusive of cognitive anxiety since an
individual's perceptions of physiological arousal may be
greatly affected by anxious thoughts.
Cognitive anxiety, while able to cause increases in
physiological arousal, is not synonymous with arousal.
Cognitive anxiety can be determined to be either a cause
or result of increased physiological arousal, and in some
cases may be independent of arousal. It is defined in
this paper in terms of negative thoughts associated with
perceptions about success or thoughts involving negative
self-evaluation.

35
Relationship of Anxiety and Arousal to Performance
In examining the relationship of anxiety and arousal
to skilled motor performance, and more specifically, to
sports performance, researchers have often used terms
(e.g., stress, anxiety, arousal) interchangeably and
inappropriately. According to Gould and Krane (in
press), the inconsistent use of these terms has been a
long-standing problem for this body of literature. A
review of the literature is difficult when trying to
grasp what is being assessed, and whether authors are
referring to arousal or anxiety when they present their
findings. Thus, in this review of the arousal-anxiety /
performance relationship, efforts are made to distinguish
between terms where possible.
Despite the conceptual and definitional
inconsistencies in this area of research, analyses of the
relationships among anxiety, arousal, and sports
performance constitute a large part of the sport
psychology literature (e.g., Jones & Hardy, 1989; Krane &
Williams, 1987; Landers & Boutcher, 1986; Madden,
Summers, & Brown, 1990; Meacci & Price, 1985; Murphy &
Woolfolk, 1987; Poteet & Weinberg, 1980; Raglin, Wise, &
Morgan, 1990; Sonstroem & Bernardo, 1982). This section
of the literature review will examine the various
theories which seek to describe the anxiety-arousal-
performance relationship with a focus on those studies
most relevant to the research in this dissertation.

36
Arousal
While the concept of arousal is somewhat amorphous,
much attention has been focused on its relationship to
performance. Early hypotheses derived from drive theory
suggested that there was a positive, linear relationship
between arousal and performance (Hull, 1943; Spence,
1951) . This view received little empirical support and
has principally been replaced by the inverted-U theory
which posits a curvilinear relationship between arousal
and performance. Increases in arousal are associated
with increases in performance to an optimal level, beyond
which decrements in performance ensue (Easterbrook, 1959;
Yerkes & Dodson, 1908).
The inverted-U concept has been based on the
relationship between arousal, task difficulty, and
performance. The hypothesis arose as a result of
research by Yerkes and Dodson (1908), who discovered that
mice learned to discriminate brightness more quickly with
increases in the strength of an electric shock, as long
as the discrimination task was relatively simple. As the
task became harder, the optimal shock level for learning
was progressively reduced. From this study arose the
Yerkes-Dodson law which can be expressed as follows:
(a) For any task there is an optimal level of
arousal such that performance is related to arousal
in the form of an inverted U.
(b) The optimum level of arousal is a
decreasing monotonic function of the difficulty
of the task. (Hockey, 1979, p. 143)

37
Easterbrook (1959) explained the inverted-U function
by asserting that "emotional arousal" acts to reduce the
range of cues that an individual uses. That is, the
range of cue utilization shrinks as the use of peripheral
(irrelevant or partially relevant) cues is reduced, while
the use of central (immediately relevant) cues is
maintained. Thus, reduction in the range of cues should
first improve task proficiency (as the irrelevant, non-
essential cues are omitted), but later impair ability.
"It would in fact produce just the sort of up and down
relation between proficiency and drive that is familiar
in connection with the names of Yerkes and Dodson"
(Easterbrook, 1959, p. 193).
In explaining the effects of arousal in sport,
Landers (1980) draws from Yerkes-Dodson (1908) and
Easterbrook (1959) stating that when arousal
increases up to a certain (optimal) level,
perceptual selectivity also increases improving the
individual's performance (presumably because the
athlete tries harder and is more likely to eliminate
task-irrelevant cues). Increases in arousal beyond
this "optimal" point should induce further
perceptual narrowing and a concomitant deterioration
in performance, in accordance with the inverted-U
hypothesis. For example, an "over-aroused"
quarterback in football might be focused too

38
narrowly to detect receivers open in the periphery,
or more important, a blitzing outside linebacker.
Some feel that the inverted-U hypothesis is not very
useful in understanding the arousal-performance
relationship (Cooke, 1982; Kerr, 1989; Welford, 1976).
It appears that this stance has been taken since
"performance-degrading dysphoric psychobiological states
and performance-enhancing euphoric ones can occur at
equal arousal levels. Global arousal, then, could only
serve to obscure the profound individual differences with
which humans approach important motor performances"
(Neiss, 1988b, p. 154). Eysenck (1982) points out that
the singular notion of arousal is inadequate and must be
replaced by more complex conceptualizations. Kerr (1989)
similarly feels that the optimal arousal theory is
limited in its singular optimal state and homeostatic
basis. He cites several notable psychologists who are
opposed to the basic principles of the homeostatic
construct (cf. Allport, 1960; Buhler, 1959; Frankl, 1969;
Harlow, 1953; Maslow, 1954). Apter (1982), for example,
identifies four terms (anxiety, excitement, boredom, and
relaxation), "which are reflections of pleasant,
unpleasant, and high and low arousal, questioning the
ability of optimal arousal theory to distinguish between
them" (Kerr, 1989, p. 140).
In a recent series of articles, Neiss and Anderson
(Anderson, 1990; Neiss, 1988a, 1990) engage in the debate

39
as to whether arousal is a useful concept. Neiss (1988a)
conducted a review of the research which demonstrated the
effects of various psychobiological arousal states on
motor performance. He reported that their is little
support for the inverted-U hypothesis especially due to
difficulties in interpreting the actual influence of
arousal on an unsuccessful performance. He also states
that
The inverted-U hypothesis [as a causal hypothesis]
has not received clear support from a single
study... If, recast in psychological terms, the
inverted-U hypothesis reveals only that the
motivated outperform the apathetic and the
terrified, it should be consigned to the true-but-
trivial category. (Neiss, 1988a, p. 355)
Neiss claimed that the inverted-U hypothesis is
basically irrefutable due to the inability to specify its
parameters and the variability of optimal arousal across
tasks, and that the global term arousal is thus a
hindrance to understanding the relationship of human
motor performance to emotional states. This criticism is
not dissimilar to Eysenck's (1982) claim that one is
hard-pressed to disprove the predicted inverted-U
relationship because two-thirds of studies investigating
this relationship (and utilizing three distinct arousal
levels) would obtain supportive evidence by chance alone.
Eysenck explains that if three levels of arousal are
compared, there are six possible orderings of the three
levels with respect to performance, only two of which are
inconsistent with the Yerkes-Dodson law (the two in which

40
the medium level of arousal is associated with the worst
performance). Similarly, Baddeley (1972) is critical of
the optimal arousal theory and suggests it can account
for almost any result so long as the exact location on
the inverted-U curve is not specified in advance.
Anderson (1990) takes issue with Neiss' suggestion
to abandon arousal, the inverted-U, and the Yerkes-Dodson
law. She writes that Neiss' objections are neither
logically nor empirically warranted, challenging his
evidence as limited. However, she focuses primarily on
the relationship between arousal and cognition, not motor
performance. Indeed, her documentation of studies
supporting the inverted-U relationship between
information processing and arousal appears to be less
relevant to Neiss' stance. In a rebuttal, Neiss (1990)
indicates that an abundance of empirical findings from
diverse research areas challenges the conception of
unidimensional arousal, and that methodological advances
permit the investigation of discrete psychobiological
states in their cognitive, affective, and physiological
manifestations.
An additional problem with the arousal literature is
that a major aspect of the inverted-U hypothesis has
largely been ignored. The hypothesis suggests that at
low levels of arousal, performance should suffer.
Broadbent (1971) argued that there is no difficulty in
explaining why low arousal leads to poor performance as

41
postulated by the inverted-U: "Response simply fails to
occur on occasions when it should do so. The typical
decrement produced by sleeplessness is that of the pause
in which no reaction occurs" (p. 425). Yet aside from
research examining sleep-deprived individuals (Kjellberg,
1977; Wilkinson, 1961) there have been few examinations
of subjects' performances under conditions of low
arousal. Moreover, many researchers report that the
inverted-U relationship was validated in their study,
when in actuality, only the component suggesting that
excessive arousal is detrimental to performance is
validated. This is especially important in sport
psychology investigations, where much of the research
regarding the arousal-sport relationship examines
athletes' experience of anxiety and overarousal. There
is much ancillary and anecdotal evidence suggesting that
a team that plays "flat" or "without emotion" will
experience a decrease in performance. This might easily
be described under the inverted-U model and yet has not
been fully examined under empirical conditions.
Despite these criticisms of the inverted-U as a
useful and accurate description of the relationship
between arousal and performance, there are many studies
that have examined this theory. Early researchers,
conducting primarily laboratory studies, seemingly
support the inverted-U and Yerkes-Dodson hypotheses
(Broadhurst, 1957; Duffy, 1962; Matarazzo, Ulett, &

42
Saslow, 1955; Stennett, 1957). For example, Broadhurst
(1957) suspected that rats placed in a situation of
intense motivation (oxygen deprivation) would
consequently demonstrate fear and arousal affecting the
learning task. He hypothesized that under the stressful
condition, rats would learn faster on the easy task, but
more slowly on the hard task. His results confirmed the
task complexity aspect of the Yerkes-Dodson law in that
"the optimum motivation for a discrimination task
demonstrably decreases with increasing difficulty of the
task" (p. 348) .
In addition to changes with task complexity,
increases in "drive" (emotional arousal or general covert
excitement) are associated with a reduction in the range
of cue use (Easterbrook, 1959). Bahrick, Fitts, and
Rankin (1952) tested the hypothesis that an increase in
incentive causes increased perceptual selectiveness
favoring those parts of the stimulus field deemed by the
subject as most relevant to the expected reward. The
researchers utilized a continuous central-tracking task,
with intermittent stimuli detectable in the periphery.
It was discovered that while increasing motivation with
incentives (monetary bonuses) was beneficial for tracking
the central task, peripheral proficiency declined.
Easterbrook explained that "the effect of added drive
cannot be described unequivocally as either facilitation
or disruption, but it can certainly be described as a

43
reduction in the range of cue utilization" (1959, p.
185) .
Bursill (1958) investigated subjects' attention to
peripheral stimuli while they were engaged in a
continuous central task under both normal conditions and
conditions of high temperature (thermal stress). He
reported that the subjects in the high stress condition
had a tendency to funnel their field of awareness towards
the center, and thus missed signals presented on the
periphery (i.e., signals presented at greater eccentric
angles had a greater probability of being missed in the
hotter condition). Stennett (1957) also studied the
relationship of performance level to level of arousal.
Using EMG recordings as a measure of arousal, and an
auditory tracking task as a performance measure, Stennett
obtained results supporting the inverted-U relationship.
Oxendine (1970, 1980) has been a proponent of
applying these hypotheses to sport. He indicates that a
high level of arousal is optimal in gross motor
activities involving strength, endurance, and speed
(e.g., many track events, weight lifting, football
blocking). Alternatively, a high level of arousal should
interfere with performance involving complex skills, fine
muscle movements, steadiness, and general concentration
(e.g., archery, shooting, golf putting).
Hanin (1980, 1986) has extended the inverted-U
theory and reported that arousal is related to athletic

44
performance at an individual level; that is, each athlete
has a particular arousal level where performance is
optimal, regardless of the absolute level which can be
low, medium, or high. This level has been declared the
"zone of optimal functioning" (ZOF). The ZOF theory is
generally endorsed by Jones and Hardy (1989) who suggest
that in explaining or predicting sport performance, one
should take into account the nature of the stressor, the
mental demands of the competitive task, and the
psychological characteristics of the athlete.
In two studies purporting to examine the ZOF theory,
Raglin and his associates (Raglin & Morgan, 1988; Raglin,
Wise, & Morgan, 1990) demonstrated that swimmers reported
increased state anxiety (the authors' measure of arousal)
before competition, and significantly more anxiety prior
to a difficult meet as compared to an easy one.
Interestingly, swimmers who had the most successful
performances were best at predicting their pre-
competitive anxiety levels 24 to 48 hours in advance of
actual competition. The researchers conclude in support
for Hanin's ZOF theory and reject the inverted-U
hypothesis which they suggest does not take into account
individual differences. This is not an appropriate
conclusion because of their misinterpretation of the
inverted-U hypothesis. Raglin, Wise, and Morgan (1990)
state that "the inverted U-theory [sic] is the most well-
known theory of anxiety and sport performance, and this

45
theory implies that a moderate level of anxiety is best
for performance" (p. 5). Yet, clearly the inverted-U
hypothesis is one describing the relationship between
arousal and performance, not anxiety and performance. It
becomes confusing to the reader when a group of
researchers appears to inappropriately use these two
terms (anxiety and arousal) as synonymous. In a recent
chapter, Morgan (an author of the previously-reported
studies) and Ellickson (1989) write that Hanin's theory
should not be dismissed as a reiteration of the inverted-
U explanation, in that "ZOF theory does not argue that a
moderate level of arousal is superior to low or high
levels... [but] predicts that some individuals will have
their best performances when highly aroused, others when
deeply relaxed, and others when moderately aroused" (p.
168). In this case, Morgan discusses the inverted-U
hypothesis in terms of arousal.
There is a common problem in sport psychology
research examining the relationship among anxiety,
arousal, and performance. There are many investigations
which claim to investigate the relationship between
arousal and sports performance which are misleading since
the measurement of "arousal" is typically a measurement
of competitive anxiety (as the studies conducted by
Raglin and his associates exemplify). In fact, there are
very few studies which examine the arousal-sports
performance relationship. The studies that support the

46
inverted-U hypotheses are primarily those of a more basic
research nature (e.g., Bursill, 1958; Stennett, 1957).
It appears that the question of the effects of
arousal on sports performance has not been addressed
adequately. Adapting Neiss' (1988a) position, one could
argue that it is fairly obvious that athletes who are
unmotivated (and underaroused) will not achieve their
competitive potential. However, it is not as simple with
the highly-aroused athlete. Just as high arousal in an
individual can be manifested similarly by two very
different stimulus situations (e.g., sexual excitement
versus fear), an athlete could demonstrate high arousal
when thrilled about the potential of catching a touchdown
pass or when terrified of missing a field goal in front
of 85,000 spectators. These two similar arousal levels
may have quite different effects on the performance
outcome. What appears to be more important than
physiological arousal is the athlete's interpretation of
this arousal and the competitive situation. The
following studies address this issue by examining the
relationship between competitive anxiety and sports
performance.
Competitive Anxiety
In this section, the relationship of competitive
anxiety to sports performance is highlighted. Again,
some of the researchers who have investigated this
relationship have done so from the perspective of

47
assessing arousal. These studies are included in this
section rather than the previous one because of the
actual measurements conducted (i.e., primarily self-
reported anxiety), and not how the researchers identified
the constructs (arousal vs. anxiety). The issue of the
nature of the relationship that exists between anxiety
and sports performance (e.g., inverted-U, linear
negative, unrelated) is thus presented.
Trait and state anxiety
The relationship between competitive trait anxiety
and sports performance has been investigated under both
laboratory and field conditions. According to Martens,
Vealey, and Burton (1990), laboratory studies have
generally failed to demonstrate a consistent relationship
between competitive A-trait and sports performance (e.g.,
Martens, Gill, & Scanlan, 1976; Murphy & Woolfolk, 1987;
Poteet & Weinberg, 1980). Indeed, some studies which
purport to analyze the relationship between trait anxiety
and performance are not interpretable since there is an
inappropriate use of the trait measure (i.e., the Sport
Competition Anxiety Test (SCAT); Martens, 1977). For
example, administering the SCAT as a precompetitive
measure of anxiety is incorrect (cf. Gerson & Deshaies,
1978; Thirer & O'Donnell, 1980) and assesses the
relationship between state anxiety and performance rather
than trait anxiety and performance.

48
There have been more productive investigations
utilizing authentic competitive situations. These have
focused on the relationship between competitive trait
anxiety, competitive state anxiety, and athletic
performance on the field, in the pool, and so forth. For
example, Klavora (1978) reported that high school
basketball players had different "optimal arousal" levels
which correlated with their self-reported competitive
trait anxiety, where optimal arousal is defined as the
level of self-reported state anxiety at which the athlete
performs most successfully. Thus, low-trait anxious
players performed better when reporting low state
anxiety, while high-trait anxious players actually did
better when reporting a higher amount of state anxiety.
Smith and Smoll (1990) interpret Klavora's results as
suggesting "the possibility that optimal performance may
occur at a level of arousal that is similar to athletes'
customary level of anxiety rather than at a normative
level defined by the anxiety distribution for all
subjects" (p. 440).
Sonstroem and Bernardo (1982) investigated the
inverted-U theory with female collegiate basketball
players who had been assessed on both competitive trait
and state anxiety. Competitive trait anxiety was not
found to have a significant main effect on performance;
however, their results suggested that after controlling
for individual differences in competitive A-state, an

49
inverted-U function could describe the relationship
between competitive A-trait and basketball performance on
an intraindividual basis. In a similar study utilizing
golfers, Weinberg and Genuchi (1980) found that the
athletes lowest in competitive trait anxiety performed
better than moderate and high competitive A-trait golfers
(although there was no difference in performance between
the latter two groups). Also, competitive A-state was a
better predictor of performance than was competitive A-
trait.
Investigators have increasingly focused on the
effects of competitive state anxiety on performance.
Smith and Smoll (1990) assert that competitive state
anxiety is moderated by three factors. First is the
nature of the sporting situation in which the athlete is
competing (e.g., strength of opponents, significance of
the event, presence of spectators or significant others,
and social support from coaches or teammates). Second is
the magnitude of the athlete's competitive trait anxiety.
Third are the "psychological defenses that the athlete
may have developed to cope with anxiety-arousing
competitive situations" (p. 421). Furthermore, these
three factors are assumed to jointly influence the
athlete's appraisal processes. These processes include:
Appraisal of the situational demands; appraisal of
the resources available to deal with them; appraisal
of the nature and likelihood of the potential
consequences if the demands are not met (that is,
the expectancies and valances [sic] relating to

50
potential consequences); and the personal meaning
that the consequences have for the individual.
(Smith & Smoll, 1990, p. 422)
It is clear that higher levels of competitive state
anxiety are typically found under competitive conditions
as compared to practice conditions (Bird & Horn, 1990;
Klavora, 1978). However, it is not clear how competitive
anxiety actually affects performance. In an attempt to
clarify this situation, an additional conceptualization
is examined.
Cognitive and somatic anxiety
As described earlier, multidimensional anxiety
theory postulates that competitive anxiety is comprised
of two major components: cognitive anxiety and somatic
anxiety. Cognitive anxiety may be composed of worry,
negative self-talk, fear of evaluation, and so forth. As
such, and in its strict sense, cognitive anxiety is
experienced as a negative emotion. Thus, some have
postulated the relationship of competitive state anxiety
to performance as one of a negative, linear nature
(Burton, 1988; Martens et al., 1983), whereas the somatic
component of competitive anxiety (considered similar to
"arousal") may demonstrate an inverted-U relationship to
performance. This may be because "somatic anxiety" is
simply a perception of physiological arousal. Adopting
this conceptualization, an athlete who feels the classic
"butterflies in the stomach" may perform better than when
he or she either perceives no physiological arousal (and

51
may be unmotivated) or when he perceives his heart to be
pounding so hard that he becomes too distracted to
perform successfully.
Research in cognitive psychology supports the
contention that the effect of competitive anxiety on
performance may be described using a negative, linear
function. For example, Easterbrook's (1959) hypothesis
regarding the peripheral narrowing which occurs as
arousal increases (although generally cited to support
the inverted-U relationship between arousal and
performance) can be applied in understanding the
cognitive anxiety/performance relationship. Here, any
increase in worry or cognitive anxiety is associated with
attention to irrelevant cues (e.g., "I'm not going to do
well; All these people are watching me"). Thus, as
cognitive anxiety increases, more internal, irrelevant
cues and negative self-statements are created, and there
is an increased tendency for the individual to pay
attention to his own internal thoughts and cues rather
than to the task (Mandler, 1975). This would
theoretically affect performance in a negative linear
fashion.
This issue has been examined in the test anxiety
literature. Sarason (1975), for example, argues that
test anxiety is primarily a function of cognitive worry
(e.g., "I am stupid; I'll never pass this test") and
physiological reactivity. Sarason writes that saying the

52
negative self-statements "during a test might interfere
considerably with attention to the task at hand, be it
one that requires learning or figuring out the answers to
certain questions. Worry is unmistakably an
attentionally demanding and emotionally arousing
cognitive activity" (p. 28). In a review of selective
attention, Wine (1971) indicated that high test anxious
individuals respond with personalized task-irrelevant
responses. Furthermore, Deffenbacher (1980) and Morris,
Davis, and Hutchings (1981) have shown in their review of
the literature that cognitive anxiety is more
consistently and strongly related to test performance
than is somatic anxiety.
Utilizing the theories from cognitive psychology
(e.g., test anxiety research), sport psychology and motor
performance researchers have hypothesized that cognitive
anxiety is more strongly related to sport and motor
performance than is somatic anxiety (Barnes, Sime,
Dienstbier, & Plake, 1986; Martens, Vealey, & Burton,
1990; Morris, Smith, Andrews, & Morris, 1975). One
explanation is that
Somatic anxiety should influence performance less
than cognitive anxiety because it reaches its peak
at the onset of a competitive event and dissipates
over the course of the competition. Cognitive state
anxiety increases during competition, however,
because it is linked to increases in social and
self-evaluation that occur during the event and
hence causes stronger and more consistent
performance decrements. (Gould et al., 1987, p. 34)

53
Despite the intuitive appeal of the cognitive
anxiety/performance relationship, studies which have
investigated the multidimensional influences of anxiety
(i.e., cognitive worry and somatic anxiety) in
competitive settings have provided mixed results
regarding the strength and nature of the relationship.
For instance, Gould et al. (1987) studied police officers
performing in a pistol shooting competition, and
concluded that the cognitive component of competitive
anxiety was unrelated to shooting outcome. However, the
somatic component was found to influence performance so
that "a quadratic function best explained the somatic
anxiety/performance relationship" (Gould et al., 1987, p.
40). In this case, the authors explain the somatic
component as being more predictive because pistol
shooting depends on fine neuromuscular control easily
disrupted by slight physiological changes.
Although this is certainly true, Burton (1988)
suggests that there also may have been methodological
reasons for the nonsignificant relationship between
cognitive anxiety and shooting performance. First, Gould
and his colleagues used the average scores of a single
competition (as opposed to a season average) as the
comparison to a specific round, and thus gained a less
reliable assessment of anxiety-mediated performance
fluctuations. Also, the subjects may have had low ego-
involvement with the task, as it was an elaborate

54
experimenter designed competition and "may have lacked
sufficient external validity" (Burton, 1988, p. 49).
McCauley (1985) found no relationship between either
cognitive or somatic competitive anxiety and golf
performance over 10 rounds of tournament golf. However,
as Bird and Horn (1990) and Gould et al. (1987) point
out, McCauley's findings of nonsignificance may have been
confounded by changing task demands (i.e., different golf
courses). A recent study also did not demonstrate any
significant relationship between competitive state
anxiety (both cognitive and somatic) and cycling
performance on stationary bicycles (Caruso, Dzewaltowski,
Gill, & McElroy, 1990). Once again, the authors admit
that "the task in the present study was not cognitively
demanding nor did it require complex motor skills that
would lead to performance impairment as a result of
anxiety. Additionally, the contrived competition did not
induce high levels of anxiety" (p. 18).
Karteroliotis and Gill (1987) examined the
relationships of cognitive worry, somatic anxiety, and
self-confidence to motor performance during a simulated
laboratory competition on a pegboard task. This study
revealed little support for their predicted inverse
relationship between cognitive worry and performance. It
was also concluded that both self-reported somatic
anxiety and physiological arousal were unrelated to motor
performance at any stage of the experiment. However,

55
similar to Caruso et al. (1990) and Gould et al. (1987),
this task had little external validity and the subjects
likely had low ego involvement. Furthermore, as the
authors acknowledge, due to the simplicity of the
pegboard task, complex motor skills were not required
which might be impaired by cognitive anxiety.
On the other hand, several researchers have
demonstrated a relationship between cognitive anxiety and
sports performance in field studies. For example, Powell
and Verner (1982) found that linear increases in state
anxiety and fear estimates (roughly cognitive worry) were
significantly and negatively related to sport parachuting
performance. Unexpectedly, heart rate (physiological
arousal) was also negatively related (in a linear
fashion) to performance.
More recently, McCann, Murphy, and Raedeke (in
press), studied national level cyclists under laboratory
(cycling ergometer) and field (time-trial road race)
conditions. The investigators found that self-reported
anxiety was strongly related to cycling performance, with
the strongest relationships occurring under the field
condition. High cognitive anxiety and somatic anxiety
were associated with weak performance, while high self-
confidence was associated with a stronger performance.
Also, only cognitive anxiety was significantly related to
performance under the cycling ergometer laboratory
setting. This study had many strengths: (1) It employed

56
a timely and appropriate measure of anxiety; the
Competitive State Anxiety Inventory-2 (CSAI-2) was given
10 min prior to the road race. (2) An adequate aspect
of performance was assessed. (3) Subjects were fairly
homogeneous in skill level and ability. (4) The meaning
and significance of the field setting task was probably
quite high to the subjects since it involved a time trial
race. A drawback to the study was its correlational
design, making an empirical test of the nature of the
anxiety-performance relationship unfeasible.
Additionally, the authors acknowledge that even stronger
results may have been obtained had an intraindividual
design and analysis been utilized.
Another pertinent study was conducted by Burton
(1988), who administered the CSAI-2 to collegiate
swimmers prior to different situations (e.g., early
season meet, mid-season meet, and conference
championships), using race event times as performance
outcome measures. Burton, in drawing from the cognitive
psychology literature (e.g., Easterbrook, 1959; Wine,
1971) hypothesized that cognitive anxiety would misdirect
attention from task-relevant cues to irrelevant cues
(e.g., social evaluative cues), and thus would cause
performance to decrease linearly. On the other hand,
somatic anxiety was hypothesized to demonstrate the more
traditional inverted-U relationship with performance
(although it is difficult to discern whether Burton's

57
"low arousal" division was truly underarousal, a
necessary component for fully supporting an inverted-U
relationship between anxiety and performance, or whether
it was simply a lack of reported anxiety). The results
of Burton's investigation indicated that cognitive
anxiety was more consistently and strongly (negatively
and linearly) related to swimmers' performance than was
somatic anxiety (i.e., self-reported arousal).
A slightly different approach was taken by Bird and
Horn (1990) who tested the relationship between level of
competitive anxiety and mental errors in a sport setting
(i.e., softball game). Prior to a game, the athletes
completed the CSAI-2. Their anxiety levels were examined
after classifying the players into two groups as a
function of mental errors committed during the game (as
assessed by their coach). The investigators found that
players in the two groups (high vs. low mental errors)
differed only on pre-game cognitive anxiety, and not on
somatic anxiety. This finding is not surprising as the
outcome measure of mental errors seems intuitively most
related to cognitive anxiety. Comprehensive performance
was not examined in which certain aspects (e.g.,
overrunning a fly ball) may be more related to somatic
anxiety.

58
Problems with the Literature and Researchers'
Recommendations
Bird and Horn (1990) address the question of why
there has been such inconclusive research in the area of
competitive anxiety and sport performance. They
entertain the notion that there could be problems with
the assessment of competition anxiety. However, they
conclude that the CSAI-2 has been the most extensively
used instrument and has been well-validated as measuring
the three constructs of cognitive anxiety, somatic
anxiety, and self-confidence. Next, there could be
problems with the methodology of the field studies. This
was evident in studies in which external validity was
questionable (Gould et al., 1987), opponents varied
(Gould, Petlichkoff, & Weinberg, 1984), and in which
situational characteristics differed (McCauley, 1985).
In addition to the comments from Bird and Horn
(1990) regarding the inconsistent anxiety/performance
relationship findings, Gould and his colleagues have
addressed this issue (Gould et al., 1987; Gould & Krane,
in press). Gould and Krane propose that investigators
must meet four conditions in an attempt to explain the
arousal/performance relationship. In these
recommendations, Gould and Krane use the term "arousal"
where "anxiety" is the more appropriate term. In the
present discussion, the term "anxiety" is substituted.
It is recommended that the investigators must (1)

59
adequately assess anxiety and related states, (2) utilize
more adequate measures of athletic performance, (3)
employ intraindividual anxiety analyses, and (4) create
at least three distinct levels of anxiety when testing
nonlinear predictions.
Gould and Krane's first recommendation is a broad
one, but basically involves carefully defining what one
is measuring, utilizing conceptual frameworks (e.g.,
multidimensional components of anxiety), and using
reliable and valid measures of anxiety. The second plea
is for the investigator to adequately measure athletic
performance. Many studies have relied upon
nonstandardized performance measures (cf. Gould et al.,
1984, McCauley, 1985) which fluctuated according to task
demands. Furthermore, the utilization of outcome
measures (e.g., win-loss, comparing game scores) is
discouraged. Gould and Krane cite Burton (1988) as a
positive example in which the author assessed best times
in a swimming event relative to previous times in that
event. However, even an assessment such as this has
limitations. True, it may provide a general idea of
variations in performance associated with changes in
anxiety. However, this type of outcome measure may not
adequately provide information regarding the process of
performance change in a particular sport.
Instead of focusing on the outcome of a competitive
performance, a more process-oriented focus is desirable.

60
Thus, the manner in which individuals organize their
motions in the execution of motor skills is the crux of
the investigation (cf. Beuter & Duda, 1985; Weinberg &
Hunt, 1976; Weinberg, 1978). Martens, Vealey, and Burton
(1990) concur and recommend that one way to improve the
predictive ability for the relationship between anxiety
and performance is to focus on qualitative aspects of
performance as opposed to quantitative. Thus, using
electromyographic or kinematic measures, for example, may
more sufficiently address the question of how sport
performance is affected by anxiety.
A study specifically relevant to this recommendation
(and to the current investigation) involved examining the
effects of anxiety on the motor performance of children
during a stepping task over three obstacles (Beuter &
Duda, 1985). The investigators created two conditions
for each subject during the stepping task: (1) an
informal assessment or low anxiety condition, and (2) a
high anxiety condition which involved creating a
stressful social situation that incorporated evaluation,
competition, and threat to self-esteem. Using digitized
videotaped recordings of the subjects' stepping motions
to examine the kinematic characteristics of motion and a
within-subjects design, it was demonstrated that the two
anxiety conditions created significantly different
movements in the ankle joint.

61
Beuter and Duda (1985) suggested that under the high
anxiety condition, what was once automatic and smooth
came under volitional control (likely due to the
evaluative and competitive anxiety) and became less
smooth and efficient. Once again, a problem with the
study is that Beuter and Duda created different anxiety
conditions, but described them as arousal levels, and
used a general measure of arousal (heart rate taken prior
to the two trials) to assess the manipulation. That is,
self-report measures of anxiety were not utilized (e.g.,
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory for Children) to assess the
anxiety manipulation.
The third recommendation of Gould and Krane is to
employ intraindividual analyses (e.g., Beuter & Duda,
1985). They write that Sonstroem and Bernardo's (1982)
study of basketball players is an excellent example of
this method. Without having controlled for each player's
own state anxiety scores, the researchers would have
mistakenly concluded that there was no significant
relationship between competitive anxiety and basketball
performance. Instead, as mentioned previously, Sonstroem
and Bernardo discovered that an inverted-U relationship
existed between state anxiety and performance across all
subjects. Furthermore, other investigators (Landers &
Boutcher, 1986; Neiss, 1988b) have suggested that there
is a need to analyze intra-individual changes in arousal
and anxiety measures when relating them to performance.

62
The final recommendation to create at least three
levels of anxiety when investigating the anxiety-
performance relationship is one that has been made by
several researchers (Eysenck, 1982; Gould & Krane, in
press; Martens, 1977). Gould and Krane correctly assert
that not only do the levels of anxiety need to be
statistically significantly different, but also
conceptually or clinically distinct. For example, three
scores on an anxiety measure could be statistically
different, and yet fall within a clinically
indistinguishable range of anxiety. Typically,
researchers have not created anxiety levels, but have
either relied upon self-report anxiety scores to place
subjects in different anxiety levels or have performed
strictly correlational analyses (cf. Brustad & Weiss,
1987; Burton, 1988; Madden, Summers, & Brown, 1990;
Martin & Gill, 1991; McCann, Murphy, & Raedeke, in press;
Raglin, Wise, & Morgan, 1990). However, these two
methods may be unavoidable when conducting field research
during actual competitions.
The preceding recommendations appear to be
appropriate and necessary. It is clear from the existing
literature that researchers have usually fallen short in
one or more areas. Even the relatively superior studies
in this area (e.g., Beuter & Duda, 1985; Burton, 1988;
McCann et al., in press; Sonstroem & Bernardo, 1982) are
diminished by specific and acknowledged shortcomings. It

63
is likely due to the conceptual and methodological
problems that there is no consensus as to the nature of
the relationship of competitive anxiety to competitive
performance.
To recapitulate, it has been suggested that
competitive anxiety be recognized as having both state
and trait components, and both cognitive and somatic
components. It is accepted that state competitive
anxiety is more closely related to performance than is
trait competitive anxiety. However, beyond this obvious
conclusion, there is no definite evidence as to the
relationship among the rest of the factors. Depending on
the study, it has been suggested that cognitive anxiety
is more associated with sports performance than is
somatic anxiety (and vice-versa). It has been suggested
that the relationship between somatic (and/or cognitive)
anxiety and performance is of an inverted-U nature, is
negatively linear, or is irrelevant. In the next
section, this issue will addressed in demonstrating the
need for the current study.
Summary of Literature Review and Restatement
of Need for Current Study
Anxiety can be defined as the experience of
distressing thoughts (e.g., fear of evaluation, worry,
self-doubt) and usually physiological sensations (e.g.,
dry mouth, racing heart rate) which are induced in

64
response to a threatening situation. This threat can be
an objective or subjective one, and can be of
environmental, social or intrapersonal origin. The
dimensions of anxiety include state and trait, and
cognitive and somatic. Each of the dimensions has been
suggested to have different effects on competing
athletes.
For example, competitive trait anxiety is primarily
an intervening variable which directly affects the amount
of state anxiety that an athlete may perceive in a
specific sport situation. Cognitive and somatic anxiety
(as interrelated components of competitive state anxiety)
are also thought to have different effects on
performance. Competitive cognitive anxiety in its strict
sense will generally be detrimental to performance. As
an athlete's cognitive anxiety rises during a
competition, it is suggested that his or her performance
will suffer accordingly and in a linear fashion. This
seems to be due primarily to a focus on irrelevant cues
(e.g., negative self-talk, the spectators).
The relationship between somatic anxiety and sport
performance is often thought to be one of an inverted-U
nature. This hypothesis is drawn from the research that
suggests that this type of relationship exists between
arousal and performance. Somatic anxiety and arousal,
though not identical, can be seen as similar constructs.
The primary difference is that somatic anxiety appears to

65
have a perceptual component. That is, an individual's
arousal level is basically a measurable entity (e.g.,
EMG, EEG, palmar sweating, heart rate, respiration) while
somatic anxiety is assessed by self-report and thus is a
subjective measure of the individual's perceived arousal.
It has been suggested that there exists an optimal level
of physiological arousal (and the related somatic
anxiety) for athletes, which is dependent on the sport's
tasks (e.g., attention demands, strength requirements),
and on individual differences.
As demonstrated in this review, the manner in which
anxiety and arousal are related to sport and motor
performance has not been consistently demonstrated.
Although the inverted-U hypothesis has been a prevalent
theory in explaining the relationship between arousal
(and somatic anxiety) and motor performance, it has its
detractors (cf. Eysenck, 1982; Karteroliotis & Gill,
1987; Kerr, 1989; Neiss 1988a, 1988b, 1990; Powell &
Verner, 1982). Similarly, although the relationship of
cognitive anxiety or worry to performance has been
suggested to be a linear, negative one, this has been by
no means established.
In this author's view, many of the problems with
this literature are related to the faulty methodology and
conceptualization of the issue. This is an unfortunate
state of the literature and field since there is a need
for both basic researchers and sport psychology consumers

66
(e.g., coaches, parents, athletes, clinical sport
psychologists) to understand the relationship between
anxiety and competitive performance. Therefore, the
current investigation has attempted to more clearly
assess the effects of anxiety on sport performance
(swimming), specifically examining the influence of
cognitive and somatic factors. Consistent with the
recommendations of Gould and Krane (in press) and
Weinberg (1990), the current study used an adequate
assessment of anxiety and related states, measured
athletic performance accurately and in a process-oriented
fashion, employed intra-individual analyses, and
attempted to create three distinct ranges of anxiety.
Also to overcome the limitation of poor external validity
(cf. Caruso et al., 1990; Gould et al., 1987;
Karteroliotis & Gill, 1987), the current investigation
utilized an externally valid setting which was expected
to induce high ego-involvement, while not sacrificing the
controlled nature of the experiment. It was hoped that
the current investigation would fulfill the need for more
consistent and useful information regarding the anxiety-
performance relationship.

PROCEDURES
Subjects
Subjects were 33 swimmers assessed at the
International Center for Aquatic Research (ICAR), United
States Swimming, Colorado Springs, Colorado. The
subjects, males (N=7) and females (N=26) ranged in age
from 13-18 years (M=15.30) and were recruited from two
local high school swim teams. An attempt was made to
recruit female subjects exclusively. However, only 26
were able to participate and thus seven males were
recruited to increase the sample to at least a minimum of
30.
A goal of assessing 45 swimmers (to obtain 15
swimmers per group) was not met because of time
limitations placed on the principal investigator by U.S.
Swimming (due to the heavy use of the flume). The
principal investigator was therefore given approval to
assess approximately 30 subjects. Additionally, there
was a very short time period in which to recruit
subjects. In this recruiting period, the principal
investigator was unable to obtain only swimmers naive to
the flume and thus 13 of the subjects had undergone
previous testing.
67

68
The subjects were average high school swimmers
(based on the swimmers' best 100 yard freestyle times
during the current season, M=59.76 seconds). All
subjects provided consent to complete self-report
psychological assessments, to be videotaped at various
times in the flume, and to have their heart rate taken in
the course of the study. The study was granted approval
by the Human Subjects Committee of the Institutional
Review Board of the University of Florida, by the Sports
Science Review Board of United States Swimming, and by
the Sports Science Department of the United States
Olympic Committee.
Procedural Overview
The following is an overview of the framework of the
study. A more complete description of the measures and
methodology is presented in the two subsequent sections.
Pre-Flume Testing Procedures
(1) A brief explanation of the study was provided by the
investigator and informed consents were obtained. The
investigator purposely did not mention anxiety as an
aspect of the study or that subjects would swim under an
"anxiety-condition." Rather, subjects were told that the
study involved swimming in the flume on two trials,
before which they would complete several self-report
questionnaires related to how they felt about swimming in
the flume. (It was only directly prior to each swim that

69
the swimmer received any instructions regarding
performance expectations and conditions {see methodology
section}.)
After obtaining consent, the Sport Anxiety Scale
(SAS; Smith, Smoll, & Schütz, 1990), which assesses the
tendency to experience anxiety within competitive sport
situations, was administered. Each swimmers' best 100 yd
freestyle time over the past season (by self-report and
cross validation with the swimmer's coach) was also
recorded.
(2) Subjects were assigned to one of three groups and
were equivalent on scores of the SAS, age, and best
freestyle time (see Table 1, p. 88).
Flume Testing Procedures
(3) Two psychological questionnaires were administered:
the State component of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory
(SAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970) which
measures transitory emotional responses to a specific
situation, and the Competitive State Anxiety Inventory
(CSAI-2; Martens, Burton, et al., 1990) which measures
cognitive and somatic components of sport-specific state
anxiety, as well as self-confidence. Also, a one-item
Likert scale regarding the perceived importance of the
pending flume test was administered (i.e., "How important
to you is the upcoming flume evaluation on a scale of 1
to 10 [very important]?").
(4) Resting heart rate (RHR) was taken.

70
(5) The swimmer warmed up in the flume for 2V2 min,
then was assessed for baseline freestyle efficiency at
approximately 80% of his or her maximum swimming speed.
(6) Exertional heart rate (EHR) and Ratings of Perceived
Exertion (RPE; Borg, 1962) were taken immediately
following the baseline swim.
(7) Instructions were provided regarding task demands
for the upcoming flume test. Instructions were designed
to create three anxiety conditions, and therefore three
groups (low, moderate, and high anxiety), prior to being
evaluated on the flume test.
(8) Psychological questionnaires (SAI, CSAI-2) were
administered to assess state anxiety following the
instructional manipulation.
(9) Resting heart rate was taken following a brief
recapitulation of the instructional manipulation.
(10) The swimmer warmed up in the flume for 1 min, and
then was assessed for freestyle efficiency at
approximately 80% of his or her maximum swimming speed.
It was during this phase that the swimmer was aware of
the filming.
(11) Exertional heart rate and Ratings of Perceived
Exertion were taken immediately following the evaluated
swim.
(12) Swimmers were debriefed after all had completed
their tests.

71
Measures
This section contains descriptions of swimming
performance variables, physiological indices, and
psychological measures.
Performance and Physiological Indices
Flume evaluation
Each swimmer was instructed to swim freestyle in the
flume, during which time they were videotaped in order to
assess swimming efficiency. Analyzing the arm stroke is
vital to evaluating the swimmer's technique. Reilly,
Kame, Termin, Tendesco, and Pendergast (1990) describe
the basic mechanics of swimming as follows:
In swimming, a propulsive force equal to or greater
than the water resistance (body drag) must be
generated by the swimmer to maintain a constant
speed or to accelerate . . . The propulsive force
is provided by a combination of arm stroke and leg
kick, although it would appear that the arm stroke
is more important than the leg kick in freestyle
swimming. (Reilly et al., 1990, p. 19)
Subjects were filmed with two genlocked video
cameras in underwater housings (Pulnix 740 cameras, 60
Hz.) These cameras provided videotape to be digitized
for hydrodynamic biomechanical analysis. For digitizing,
one representative armstroke was chosen for analysis.
According to standard protocol of the flume, the
representative armstroke to be digitized for the
biomechanical analysis was approximately five strokes
from the end of the swim. Frames in each camera were
synchronized using the right arm entry. The following

72
six landmarks were digitized in both cameras of the
underwater video during one stroke cycle: fingertip,
wrist, thumb, little finger, elbow, and shoulder. Three-
dimensional arm and hand coordinates were calculated
using the Direct Linear Transformation method (Abdel-Aziz
& Karara, 1971).
This analysis was then used to determine propulsive
forces of the swimmers. From the arm position data, hand
reaction forces were calculated (Schleihauf, 1979). This
method calculates lift and drag forces based upon hand
orientation and hand velocity. The resultant force is
calculated by the addition of the lift and drag forces.
The effective (or propulsive) component of the stroke is
the projection of the resultant force on the forward
direction.
For more detailed information, the stroke was
divided into the catch phase (from hand entry to the
widest point of the initial outsweep), the insweep phase
(from the widest point of the outsweep to the narrowest
point under the body), and the finish phase (the
narrowest point until hand exit). During these phases,
the resultant force, effective force, hand velocity and
angle of pitch were averaged, and a phase-specific
propelling efficiency was calculated. An overall
propelling efficiency of the swimmer was also calculated.
The digitization of the videotapes was performed by
an undergraduate psychology major student under the

73
training and supervision of the Biomechanics Department
of the Sports Science Division of the United States
Olympic Committee. The director of the Biomechanics
Department of United States Swimming also provided
assistance to the digitizer and to the principal
investigator. The utilization of only one digitizer was
designed to increase the reliability of the biomechanical
analyses across and within subjects. The digitizer was
blind to the conditions of the study, and only worked for
2-3 hour sessions. PEAK Performance equipment was used
for the digitizing.
Heart rate
Heart rate was assessed by the principal
investigator by palpating the radial or carotid artery
for 15 secs and extrapolating to obtain heart rate as the
number of beats per minute (bpm). To obtain resting
heart rates, subjects sat quietly for 10 min prior to a
reading, and remained motionless while their heart rate
was assessed. To obtain exertional heart rates, the
swimmers' carotid artery was palpated for the 15 secs
directly following a swim in the flume (while the swimmer
was still in the water). Heart rate was used for two
purposes. The first was to compare resting heart rates
prior to the "unevaluated" warm-up and prior to the post-
instructional flume evaluation. This was to provide an
indicator of reactivity to different evaluative and
stressful conditions. The second was to monitor heart

74
rates following the two swims allowing a comparison of
exertion. Since the time and speed were identical for
the two swims, any changes in exertional heart rate could
help determine the contributions of anxiety and/or
differences in swim stroke technique.
Psychological Questionnaires
Sport Anxiety Scale (SAS; Smith et al., 1990).
This 21-item scale is designed to measure sport-
specific trait anxiety. It is composed of three
subscales: somatic anxiety, worry, and concentration
disruption. The SAS scale and its subscales have high
internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha = .92, .86, and
.81, for the three subscales) despite the relatively
small number of items. The scales also appear to have
adequate reliability (7-day test-retest reliabilities
exceeded .85 for all three scales). In a study of 71
football players, the SAS successfully discriminated
between groups of athletes who differed in performance
level, with the poorer performers having higher total
scores than the best performers [F(l,46) = 4.93, p<.05]
(Smith et al., 1990).
This scale was chosen as a measure of trait anxiety
because of its capacity to determine the tendency of
individuals to experience anxiety within a particular
class of situations, i.e., competitive sport situations
(Smith & Smoll, 1990). Smith and Smoll (1990) report
that research strongly suggests that "situation-specific

75
anxiety measures would relate more strongly to behavior
in the critical situations than would general
transituational anxiety" (p. 420). Therefore, the SAS
was chosen rather than Spielberger's Trait Anxiety Scale
(Spielberger et al., 1970), since the latter is a general
measure of trait anxiety and is thought to be less
predictive of trait anxiety in sport than the SAS.
The SAS was also chosen instead of the Sport
Competition Anxiety Test (SCAT; Martens, 1977) since the
latter only provides a unidimensional measure of sport-
specific trait anxiety (primarily somatic anxiety),
whereas the SAS provides a multidimensional measurement
of the construct (i.e., somatic anxiety, worry, and
concentration disruption, across competitive sport
situations). A multidimensional assessment is desirable
since "anxiety involves three separate and largely
independent cognitive, physiological, and behavioral
response dimensions.... [and] that these dimensions may
differentially affect behavior" (Smith & Smoll, 1990, p.
420). It was important to know which component of
anxiety, if either, would most affect swimmers in the
flume.
Finally, this scale was used to predict the
intensity of anxiety which may be experienced in the
flume across differing evaluative conditions (see
following measure). Spielberger (1972) writes that
"situation-specific trait anxiety measures are better

76
predictors of elevation in A-state [state anxiety] for a
particular class of stress situations than are general A-
trait [trait anxiety] measures" (p. 490).
Competitive State Anxiety Inventory (CSAI-2; Martens,
Vealey, & Burton, 1990)
This 27-item measure is designed to assess sport-
specific state anxiety and has three subscales: cognitive
anxiety, somatic anxiety, and self-confidence. One study
examining the construct validity of this test with male
elite college swimmers indicated that cognitive anxiety
(but not somatic anxiety) was a significant predictor of
performance levels (Barnes, Sime, Dienstbier, & Plake,
1986). The reliability (i.e., internal consistency) of
each of the subscales is satisfactory (Cronbach's alpha
ranging from .79 - .90). Evidence supporting the
construct validity of the CSAI-2 as a measure of sport
specific state anxiety (cognitive and somatic) and self-
confidence was demonstrated by the authors in a series of
four studies (Martens et al., 1990). Finally, the
authors provide extensive norms for the CSAI-2 by
competitive level, gender, and sport.
In the current experiment, the scale was slightly
modified in that the items relevant to a "competition"
were altered to refer to a procedure (i.e., the flume
evaluation). There were also two additional items which
assessed anxiety associated with the swimmers' reactions
to the flume apparatus itself. These slight

77
modifications were not expected to alter reliability or
validity of the instrument. The instrument was used to
assess state anxiety levels in a relatively anxiety-free
situation (i.e., baseline testing) and just prior to the
evaluative flume test.
State Anxiety Inventory (SAI; from the State-Trait
Anxiety Inventory; Spielberger et al., 1970)
This 20-item self-report questionnaire assesses
state anxiety, and has been well established as a
research tool in the study of anxiety. It has excellent
construct validity and internal consistency, and is easy
to administer. In this study, only the 20-item state
anxiety component was administered since the SAS was used
for sport specific trait anxiety. Sport psychology
research with this instrument "has included
investigations of football, basketball, badminton,
racquetball and tennis players, swimmers, runners,
gymnasts, fencers, jugglers, and persons engaged in a
variety of physical activities, ranging from routine
exercise to climbing ladders, riding bicycles, and
performing on treadmills" (Spielberger, 1982, p. 10).
In the current study, this instrument was used to
provide additional data regarding state anxiety levels
under different evaluative conditions. It was also used
for a comparison with the CSAI-2, which provides three
separate components of competitive state anxiety (i.e.,
somatic anxiety, cognitive anxiety, and self-confidence).

78
Correlations can be performed to determine which of these
components is most highly related to the overall state
anxiety from the SAI.
Ratings of Perceived Exertion scale (RPE; Borg, 1962)
This one-item scale quantifies an individual's
rating of exertion level from 6 (no exertion or "very,
very light") to 20 (maximal exertion or "very, very
hard"), and was used to assess a swimmer's perception of
exertion in the flume. This scale was developed by
Gunnar Borg, a psychologist who was interested in
relating sensations of effort to quantifiable physical
stimuli (Noble, 1986). Test-retest reliability is good,
with coefficients from .78 - .99. The construct validity
has been established since RPE is essentially linearly
related to heart rate, oxygen consumption, and lactic
acid accumulation in most exercise tasks (Noble, 1986),
with correlations between exercise intensity and RPE
approximately .85 (Borg & Noble, 1974).
In the current study, the RPE was used to determine
the swimmers' perceptions of effort under two separate
swimming conditions (i.e., baseline and evaluated test).
Since the flume speed was identical under both conditions
for any one swimmer, any differences in RPE would be
important in understanding the effects of anxiety on
swimming performance and perceived exertion.

79
Methodology
Prior to the study in the flume, the experimenter
traveled to the swimmers' training pools and obtained
informed consent from each of them indicating that during
the study he or she would be videotaped at various times
in the flume, complete several self-report
questionnaires, and have their heart rate taken. They
were then administered the Sport Anxiety Scale (SAS) to
determine sport-specific trait anxiety. At this time,
skill level was determined by obtaining each swimmer's
best 100 yd freestyle time during the past competitive
season by self-report and cross validation with the
swimmer's coach. These two variables were used along
with age for group assignment such that the three groups
(i.e., low, moderate, and high anxiety; described
subsequently) were equivalent on three variables (SAS,
best freestyle time, and age). Additionally, subjects
were assigned so that each group would have two or three
males and eight or nine females (11 total in each group).
Upon arriving at the U.S. Swimming center, each
swimmer was administered the State Anxiety Inventory
(SAI), the Competitive State Anxiety Inventory (CSAI-2),
and the one-item measure of the importance that the
swimmer attributed to the upcoming flume test. After the
completion of these measures, heart rate was taken as
specified in the measures section to provide a resting
heart rate (RHR) measure. Next, swimmers participated in

80
what was described as a "familiarizing practice session"
in the flume. Here, swimmers were instructed to swim
freestyle to warm-up at a very easy pace (50% of maximum
speed for a 100 yard freestyle event) for approximately
21/2 min.
The swimmers were then instructed that the speed of
the flume would be increased (to 80% of the swimmer's
best time) "so that you can get the feel of the flume's
speed as it will be when you are tested." They were then
instructed to swim for 30 secs at this speed. In this
phase, no mention was made of videotaping, although the
swimmers were filmed to provide the experimenter a
reliable baseline assessment of freestyle mechanics which
was as unaffected as possible by evaluative performance
anxiety. As stated in the measures section, the segment
of the video which was digitized for hydrodynamic
biomechanical analysis was approximately five strokes
from the end of the swim, providing an accurate and
stable baseline assessment (J. M. Cappaert, Sport Science
Biomechanist, personal communication, 1990). Immediately
after the swimmer completed the 80% swim, exertional
heart rate (EHR) was taken and the subject completed the
Ratings of Perceived Exertion scale (RPE).
Following the baseline filming phase, the
experimenter read to each subject one of three sets of
instructions designed to experimentally manipulate the
amount of anxiety that the swimmer experienced. The

81
moderate and high anxiety instructions were designed to
create evaluative anxiety and were based on research
suggesting that "situations involving potential failure
or threats to self-esteem are more potent sources of
threat than are potentially physically harmful
situations" (Martens et al., 1990, p. 14). Scanlan
(1984) further confirms that competitive situations can
be stressful due to extensive evaluation of ability and
competence. They involve perceptions of inadequacy in
successfully meeting the performance demands, and
perceptions of the consequences of failure, possibly
leading to a threat to self-esteem.
In this experiment, the threat to self-esteem was
expected to emerge from the swimmer's awareness of being
evaluated by a coach or USS official who could
potentially judge a swimmer as having a "poor" or
"inadequate" swimming style. Although there were no
overt consequences of failure, it was expected that the
swimmers would be concerned about "failing" (i.e., not
performing well in the flume; not having a "good enough"
stroke). The instructional sets were as follows:
(1) Low anxiety. "During this flume test, you will be
videotaped as you swim freestyle. The taping and
analysis of your stroke will be discussed with you and at
a later time with your coach, and will only be used for
your own stroke improvement. Try to swim relaxed and
enjoy yourself. This will be just the same as your warm-

82
up swim. Do not be concerned with the cameras; the video
will only be used for your benefit."
(2) Moderate anxiety. "During this flume test, you will
be videotaped as you swim freestyle. The taping and
analysis of your stroke will be discussed with you and
your coach(s), and will be used to determine your
relative strength in freestyle as compared to your
teammates. The test will be quite similar to your warm¬
up swim. However, please try to swim your best, as it is
important that we get an accurate measurement of your
skills." (During these instructions, the cameras in the
flume were displayed to the swimmer, as were the VCRs for
the recording of the subject's swim.)
(3) High Anxiety. "During this flume test, you will be
videotaped as you swim freestyle. The taping and
analysis of your stroke will be analyzed and evaluated by
the U.S. Swimming Biomechanics staff, officials, and
coaches. Also, during this swim a U.S. Swimming official
will be examining your stroke through the underwater
observation windows. Please attempt to swim your very
best, as the evaluation will be important in determining
your relative standing among other swimmers at your level
who have previously been evaluated in the flume. We will
use the test analysis to decide the areas in which you
need the most improvement." (During these instructions,
the cameras in the flume, the VCRs, and the underwater
observation window were displayed to the swimmer; also, a

83
television monitor of the flume was activated and
displayed.)
Upon receiving one of the set of instructions
swimmers were then administered the state anxiety
component (SAI) of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory and
the Competition State Anxiety Inventory (CSAI-2) for the
second time. These questionnaires were to be used to
determine the level of anxiety that swimmers reported
directly prior to the flume session, and compared to
their baseline report. Resting heart rate was taken
subsequently to obtain a physiological measure of arousal
(this was following a standardized period of 10 min from
the end of the 30 sec swim). Each swimmer then underwent
the standard freestyle assessment in the flume to
evaluate propelling efficiency (knowing that he or she
would be filmed). The subject warmed up again for 1 min
at 50% of best time, then paused as the flume's speed was
increased to 80% of best time. Each subject then swam
for 30 secs, during which time he or she was videotaped.
The filming and digitization procedures (biomechanical
analysis) were identical to the baseline procedure as
described earlier. Immediately after the swimmer
completed this swim, exertional heart rate was taken and
the subject completed the Ratings of Perceived Exertion
scale (RPE).
Since the swimmers performed in the flume alone,
they were told not to discuss the study with any other

84
swimmers who had not yet undergone their testing.
Swimmers were fully debriefed at the end of the study so
that the nature of the study could be explained without
affecting other swimmers approach to the testing. During
this debriefing, technical feedback was provided to each
swimmer by U.S. Swimming. Questions about freestyle
stroke technique, racing strategies, and so forth were
answered at this time.

RESULTS
The primary purpose of the analyses was to determine
the effects of different imposed degrees of anxiety on
performance as well as the nature of the relationship
among the various measures of anxiety, physiological
arousal, and the sport performance outcome measure (i.e.,
freestyle swimming efficiency). In all analyses, an
alpha level of .05 was set as the criterion for
determining statistical significance. All significance
tests were examined using a conservative two-tailed
approach, despite having directional predictions. This
offset slightly the less conservative approach of
utilizing the alpha level of .05 in multiple analyses.
Subjects
As mentioned in the methodology section, swimmers
were assigned to one of three groups to ensure that each
group would have a subject composition that was
equivalent on trait anxiety in sport (Sport Anxiety Scale
scores), skill level (best freestyle time), and age.
This procedure was followed (instead of utilizing
randomization for subject assignment) due to the small
subject sample size and in order to increase the power of
statistical analyses by eliminating the need for
85

86
covariate-based analyses. Statistical equivalency of the
group assignment variables was confirmed utilizing three
one-way ANOVAs to assess best time (F=.03, p=ns), trait
anxiety (SAS; F=.20, p=ns), and age (F=1.08, p=ns). (See
Table 1 for means and standard deviations by group.)
It was also determined that each group of swimmers
perceived an equal amount of importance for the flume
testing. Finally, the groups were almost equivalent by
sex (two groups had nine females and two males, and the
other group had eight females and three males).
Effects of Anxiety Manipulations
Before examining the anxiety-performance
relationship, it was important to first determine the
effects of the anxiety manipulations on the swimmers'
cognitive/affective and physiological reactions to the
flume testing. This analysis was conducted to test the
argument for and efficacy of the experimental
manipulation. First, a multivariate analysis of variance
(MANOVA) revealed no significant differences at baseline
between groups on the four psychological variables (A-
state, cognitive anxiety, somatic anxiety, and self-
confidence) , [F(2,30)=.50, p=ns]. A one-way ANOVA also
indicated that there were no significant differences
between groups on resting heart rate [F(2,30)=2.6, p=ns].
The next analyses determined the effect of group
membership on changes in the five variables following the

87
TABLE 1
Equivalency of Groups on Three Variables Used for Group
Assignment
GROUP
M
Best
(SD) .
Time
M
Trait
(SD) . **
Anxietv
M (SD)
Age
Low
59.6
(3.0)
46.5
(7.1)
15.2
(1.8)
Mod
60.1
(4.5)
46.5
(11.2)
15.5
(1.8)
High
59.6
(2.8)
47.3
(11.2)
15.3
(1.4)
TOTAL
59.8
(3.4)
46.8
(9.7)
15.3
(1.6)
Fastest time (in seconds) in a 100 yard freestyle
race (current season).
As measured by the Sport Anxiety Scale.

88
anxiety manipulation. A repeated measures MANOVA
(examining A-state, cognitive anxiety, somatic anxiety,
and self-confidence) revealed no significant main effect
for anxiety-induced conditions [Wilk's Lambda = .89;
F(2,30)=.40, p=ns] or significant interaction effect
(i.e., Group X Time) [Wilk's Lambda = .61; F(2,30)=1.9,
p=ns]. However, a significant effect for Time was
revealed [Wilk's Lambda = .69; F(2,30)=3.1, p<.05] as
subjects generally reported feeling less anxious and more
self-confident after performing the first flume swim
(i.e., directly prior to the second evaluated swim).
Follow-up univariate repeated measures ANOVAs indicated
no significant interaction effects. However, these
ANOVAs showed time effects indicating that CSAI-Cog
[F=4.0, p=.05] and CSAI-Som [F=9.2, p<.01] decreased
following the baseline swim, while self-confidence (CSAI-
SC) increased [F=7.1, p=.01].
A repeated measures ANOVA conducted on resting heart
rate revealed a significant time effect, as resting heart
rate increased prior to the second flume swim [F=5.1,
E<.05]. A repeated measures ANOVA conducted on ratings
of perceived exertion (RPE; i.e., how difficult the flume
swim was perceived to be) revealed a significant time
effect and indicated that RPE increased significantly for
the second (evaluated) flume swim [F=8.8, pc.01]. Table
2 presents the means of these variables before and after
the instructional manipulation by group.

89
Table 2
Means and Standard Deviations of Psychological and
Physiological Reactions to the Flume by Group
MEASURE
Low
GROUP
Moderate
High
State Anxiety
(SAI)
Pre
39.0
(7.6)
38.8
(12.5)
38.5
(7.0)
Post
31.2
(6.2)
37.6
(9.4)
36.8
(10.7)
Cognitive Anxiety (CSAI-Cog)
Pre
16.7
(3.9)
16.6
(5.9)
15.3
(2.9)
Post
13.6
(3.7)
14.8
(4.6)
15.9
(4.3)
Somatic Anxiety (CSAI
-Som)
Pre
16.2
(5.8)
17.5
(7.8)
17.4
(4.9)
Post
12.0
(2.2)
14.0
(4.1)
15.1
(6.5)
Self-Confidence (CSAI
-SC)
Pre
23.9
(5.3)
24.0
(6.1)
25.4
(4.1)
Post
27.7
(4.9)
26.5
(6.1)
25.9
(6.1)
Resting Heart
Rate (RHR)
Pre
76.3 (11.5)
69.3
(7.3)
79.6
(13.3)
Post
79.1
(6.4)
77.3
(15.1)
79.6
(13.1)
Ratings of Perceived
Exertion
(RPE)
Pre
11.2
(1.5)
11.2
(1.2)
10.9
(1.6)
Post
11.9
(1.8)
11.7
(2.2)
12.0
(1.6)

90
Swimming Efficiency
The next major analysis was the comparison of
freestyle swimming efficiency in the flume by group. For
this analysis, the freestyle arm stroke was examined to
determine its efficiency to propel the swimmer forward
through the water. First, overall propelling efficiency
was examined. As described in the measures section,
propelling efficiency can be defined as the amount of arm
force used to propel the body forward (RE, or effective
force) divided by the total force that the swimmer's arm
is producing (R, or total force), and is expressed as a
percentage. In this analysis, video data for one subject
in the Moderate anxiety group was missing for the post¬
swim.
There was no significant difference among the groups
on baseline propelling efficiency as determined by a one¬
way ANOVA [F(2,29)=.07, p=.93]. A repeated measures
ANOVA was then conducted to examine the effect of the
experimental manipulation on changes in freestyle
propelling efficiency across the three groups. Thus,
changes in efficiency from baseline (unevaluated swim) to
the second swim (which followed the instructional
manipulation) were determined and compared across the
three groups. This analysis was designed to determine
the extent to which performance was a function of group
membership (i.e., different anxiety conditions). The
analysis revealed neither a significant between-subjects

91
(i.e. group) effect [F=.43, p=.66] nor a significant
interaction (i.e., Group X Time) effect [F=.ll, p=.9].
However, a significant main effect for Time was indicated
[F=5.5, pc.05], Swimmers as a whole became more
efficient during their second swim as compared to their
baseline swim.
The next analysis examined a subcomponent of the
freestyle stroke — the "finish phase." This phase was
chosen for analysis in that it provides the most force
during the armstroke cycle, and because it had been
hypothesized that if there was one part of the stroke
which would be most affected by evaluative anxiety, it
would be the finish. This subanalysis had initially been
planned to help determine where the variance in the
overall stroke efficiency occurred under different
conditions of anxiety. Although there was little overall
variance, this analysis was still conducted to detect
less obvious changes in efficiency. However, a repeated
measures ANOVA revealed no significant main or
interaction effects [Group — F(2,29)=.55, p=.58; Time —
F(2,29) = .02, P=.89; Group X Time — F(2,29) = .37, p=.70].
Table 3 reports the means and standard deviations by
group of overall and finish efficiency for the two swims
(i.e., before and after the instructional manipulation).

92
Table 3
Means and Standard Deviations of Swimming Efficiency
MEASURE
Low
GROUP
Moderate
Hiah
Overall Efficiency (%)
Pre
57.2 (11.8)
55.4
(14.7)
55.1
(17.0)
Post
60.0 (6.3)
63.4
(8.7)
59.4
(9.9)
Finish Phase
Efficiency (%)
Pre
84.6 (12.0)
85.2
(11.2)
86.5
(6.1)
Post
82.1 (10.2)
86.4
(5.2)
87.0
(9.1)

93
Within-Subiect Analyses
Regression analyses were used to examine the
relationship between freestyle swimming efficiency and
the anxiety measures (independent of group membership),
while controlling for swimming skill and competitive
trait anxiety. A multiple regression model was
constructed to determine the individual and interactive
effects of anxiety (state measures of anxiety) and
physiological arousal (resting heart rate prior to
baseline swim) on swimming stroke efficiency. A mixed
model of regression was used, first forcing the swimmers7
best time in the 100 yard freestyle and scores on the SAS
into the equation (thus controlling for skill level and
competitive trait anxiety). Then a stepwise approach was
used in an attempt to enter state anxiety (SAI),
competitive cognitive anxiety (CSAI-Cog), competitive
somatic anxiety (CSAI-Som), competitive self-confidence
(CSAI-SC), and/or resting heart rate (RHR). However,
none of these variables accounted for a significant
portion of the variance in baseline swimming efficiency
when controlling for skill level and trait sport anxiety.
This same analysis was conducted using the post-scores
and second swim, but also did not provide a useful
predictive model.
Simple Pearson's correlation coefficients were also
calculated for baseline variables. Most of the
significant correlations are between the self-report

94
psychological questionnaires. However, two measures are
also significantly correlated with the swimmers' best
freestyle time (Competitive Self-Confidence, r=-.54,
p<.001; and State Anxiety, r=.42, pc.01). This suggests
that the better swimmers are more self-confident and less
anxious directly prior to the flume test. However, self-
confidence and state anxiety were not correlated with the
more immediate measure of freestyle swimming efficiency
in the flume (see Table 4).
Effects of Prior Flume Testing
Originally, the study was to include only subjects
who had never been tested in the flume before (NFlumed).
However, due to limited recruitment time, the actual
study included 13 swimmers who had been tested previously
at the flume (Flumed). Thus, it was important to examine
any differences between these two groups.
First, there were no significant differences between
Flumed (N=13) and NFlumed (N=20) subjects for age, skill
level, sport trait-anxiety, baseline resting heart rate,
or ratings of perceived exertion. However, a one-way
ANOVA showed that NFlumed subjects attributed
significantly more importance to the flume test than did
the Flumed subjects [F(l,32)=4.1, p=.05]. Next, a MANOVA
conducted on the four psychological variables at baseline
was not significant [F=2.57, p=.06] and therefore not
interpretable. However, exploratory analyses were

Table 4
Baseline Correlations
BESTTIME
SAS
SAI
CSAICOG
CSAISOM
CSAISC
RHR
SAS
.16
SAI
.42*
. 17
CSAICOG
.26
. 13
.71**
CSAISOM
.35
.22
.90**
.63**
CSAISC
-.54**
-.28
-.82**
-.68**
-.71**
RHR
-.06
.16
. 05
. 01
-.09
-.17
RPE
.05
-.12
. 16
. 07
.03
-.08
.27
EFI
-.16
-.10
-.04
-.27
-.13
.15
.26
Note. * p<. 01 ** pc.001
BESTTIME =
SAS =
SAI =
CSAICOG =
CSAISOM =
CSAISC =
RHR =
RPE =
EFI =
fastest time in 100 yard freestyle
Sport Anxiety Scale (competitive trait anxiety)
State Anxiety Scale
competitive cognitive anxiety (from CSAI-2)
competitive somatic anxiety (from CSAI-2)
competitive self-confidence (from CSAI-2)
resting heart rate
ratings of perceived exertion
freestyle swimming efficiency

Table 4
Baseline Correlations
BESTTIME
SAS
SAI
CSAICOG
CSAISOM
CSAISC
RHR
SAS
.16
SAI
.42*
. 17
CSAICOG
.26
. 13
.71**
CSAISOM
.35
.22
.90**
.63**
CSAISC
-.54**
-.28
-.82**
-.68**
-.71**
RHR
-.06
.16
. 05
. 01
-.09
-.17
RPE
.05
-.12
. 16
. 07
.03
-.08
.27
EFI
-.16
-.10
-.04
-.27
-.13
.15
.26
Note. * p<. 01 ** pc.001
BESTTIME =
SAS =
SAI =
CSAICOG =
CSAISOM =
CSAISC =
RHR =
RPE =
EFI =
fastest time in 100 yard freestyle
Sport Anxiety Scale (competitive trait anxiety)
State Anxiety Scale
competitive cognitive anxiety (from CSAI-2)
competitive somatic anxiety (from CSAI-2)
competitive self-confidence (from CSAI-2)
resting heart rate
ratings of perceived exertion
freestyle swimming efficiency

97
Table 5
Means and Standard Deviations of Psychological Reactions
to the Flume by Prior Testing History
MEASURE GROUP
NFlumed Filmed
State Anxiety (SAI)
Pre
41.4 (9.4)
34.7
(7.1)
Post
36.2 (9.5)
33.7
(8.6)
Cognitive Anxiety (CSAI-Cog)
Pre
17.6 (4.3)
14.2
(3.6)
Post
15.1 (4.2)
14.3
(4.3)
Somatic Anxiety
(CSAI-Som)
Pre
19.3 (6.3)
13.6
(4.1)
Post
14.1 (4.7)
13.2
(4.8)
Self-Confidence
(CSAI-SC)
Pre
23.0 (5.1)
26.8
(4.4)
Post
26.5 (5.9)
27.1
(5.3)

98
Separate Examination of Subjects New to the Flume
Because there were significant differences between
NFlumed and Flumed subjects, another series of analyses
was conducted. Only the NFlumed subjects (N=20) were
examined in the following analyses (which were very
similar to the analyses run on the entire subject
sample). Although swimmers were not assigned to groups
according to prior testing history, an equal number of
NFlumed subjects were in each group and did not differ on
skill level, competitive trait anxiety, or age.
The effects of the instructional manipulations on
the reactions to the flume testing was examined on
this subset of swimmers. A repeated measures MANOVA
conducted on the four psychological variables (A-state,
cognitive anxiety, somatic anxiety, and self-confidence)
revealed a significant Group X Time interaction [Wilk's
Lambda = .32; F=2.7, p<.05]. Despite this significant
multivariate Group X Time interaction, there were no
significant Group X Time interactions for the univariate
repeated measure ANOVAs.
Follow-up univariate repeated measures ANOVAs
indicated that a significant Time effect occurred for the
three subtests of the CSAI-2, as in the entire sample.
Cognitive and somatic competitive anxiety decreased and
self-confidence increased prior to the second swim [CSAI-
Cog, (F=8.7, pc.01); CSAI-Som (F=10.27, pc.Ol) and CSAI-
SC (F=8.92, pc.01). Still, changes in cognitive anxiety

99
appear to be related to group membership and indeed the
interaction term approached significance [F=3.43, p=.06].
Table 6 reports the means of these variables, and that of
Ratings of Perceived Exertion which also demonstrated a
significant Time effect [F=6.33, pc.05] in a repeated
measures ANOVA. Swimming efficiency is also reported in
this table although no significant difference among
groups was discovered for this subset of the sample
(using a repeated measures ANOVA).
Finally, regression analyses identical to those
conducted on the entire sample were similarly
unproductive in providing a model predictive of swimming
efficiency. As before, a mixed model of regression was
used, first forcing the swimmers' best time in the 100
yard freestyle and scores on the SAS into the equation
(thus controlling for skill level and competitive trait
anxiety). Then a stepwise approach was used in an
attempt to enter state anxiety (SAI), competitive
cognitive anxiety (CSAI-Cog), competitive somatic anxiety
(CSAI-Som), competitive self-confidence (CSAI-SC), and/or
resting heart rate (RHR). Again, in this novice subset
of the sample, none of these variables accounted for a
significant portion of the variance in baseline swimming
efficiency when controlling for skill level and trait
sport anxiety. Finally, correlational analyses in this
subset were similar to the overall sample, except that
resting heart rate prior to the first swim was

100
Table 6
Means and Standard Deviations of Reactions to the Flume
by Group
MEASURE
Low
GROUP
Moderate
Hiah
State Anxiety (SAI)
Pre
43.7
(6.2)
41.3
(13.8)
39.4
(6.7)
Post
32.0
(6.4)
38.4
(11.4)
37.6
(10.0)
Cognitive
Anxiety (CSAI-Cog)
Pre
18.0
(3.9)
19.0
(5.9)
15.7
(2.1)
Post
12.8
(2.4)
16.0
(5.1)
16.1
(4.3)
Somatic Anxiety (CSAI
-Som)
Pre
19.5
(5.2)
20.3
(8.6)
18.0
(5.0)
Post
13.0
(2.1)
14.4
(5.0)
14.6
(6.4)
Self-Confidence (CSAI
-SC)
Pre
21.8
(3.9)
22.6
(7.1)
24.3
(3.9)
Post
27.7
(4.5)
26.6
(7.2)
25.4
(6.3)
Ratings of
Perceived
Exertion
(RPE)
Pre
11.5
(0.5)
11.0
(2.5)
11.6
(1.6)
Post
12.5
(2.3)
11.9
(2.5)
12.4
(1.5)
Swimming Efficiency (%)
Pre
57.4
(8.0)
53.2
(17.4)
58.3
(10.5)
Post
60.6
(4.8)
60.5
(10.0)
58.9
(9.2)

101
significantly related to overall propelling efficiency
(r=.52, p<.01).

DISCUSSION
Explanation of Findings
The primary purpose of this study was to evaluate
the effects of anxiety on swimming performance.
Specifically, this study examined 33 high school swimmers
who were tested in a flume, a type of "swimming
treadmill," used at the U.S. Olympic Training Center to
evaluate the performance of competitive swimmers. The
experiment was designed to assess the specific ways in
which anxiety may impact on swimming performance in a
situation which might simulate an important competition
due to the experiencing of high levels of anxiety. Here,
an experimental instructional manipulation was provided
to subjects in an attempt to create three conditions
during which evaluation of swimming performance in the
flume would be conducted. Various measures of anxiety
were obtained in order to assess the impact of the
manipulation in conjunction with the potential stress of
being tested in the flume. More important, the
relationship between certain anxiety measures and
swimming performance was examined.
It was predicted that anxiety experienced as a
result of the experimental manipulation would be
significantly and negatively related to freestyle
102

103
swimming performance, both as a function of group membership
and independent of the groups, as assessed by self-report
measures of competitive and state anxiety. Thus, it had
been predicted that performance decrements would be most
pronounced in those swimmers who demonstrated the greatest
increases in cognitive anxiety from baseline to evaluated
swims. It had also been predicted that cognitive state
anxiety would have a more profound negative effect on
performance than somatic state anxiety. Finally, it had
been anticipated that any decrements found in the freestyle
stroke would most likely occur during the "finish", the
phase of the stroke in which maximal propulsion is created.
The results indicated that swimmers did not report an
increase in anxiety following the experimental manipulation.
That is, instead of increasing the subjects' self-reports of
anxiety, subjects as a whole reported experiencing less
anxiety prior to the second flume swim. Specifically,
ANOVAs showed that cognitive and somatic anxiety decreased
following the baseline swim, while self-confidence
increased. Thus, the experimental manipulation was
ineffective in increasing the subjects' anxiety. However,
there were some trends that indicate that the reduction in
anxiety was greatest in the low-anxiety manipulation group,
suggesting that the three sets of instructions were
qualitatively different. Upon examination of Table 2 (p.
90), it can be seen that the differences between self-report
scores from baseline to post-test were greatest (though not

104
statistically significantly) for the Low Anxiety
manipulation group. Thus, the instructions to "try to swim
relaxed and enjoy yourself" were apparently less stressful
than those in the moderate and high anxiety groups in which
efforts were made to elicit anxiety responses.
Despite the trends that indicated the instructional
sets were different, they did not increase anxiety prior to
the second swim. One conclusion could be that the anxiety
manipulation produced less anxiety than do many actual
competitive situations. Indeed, the subjects' post¬
manipulation anxiety scores were below the mean as compared
to a normative sample of high school athletes, and as
compared to a normative sample of competitive swimmers prior
to a competition (Martens, Vealey, & Burton, 1990).
However, it would have been difficult to increase the
potential threat of the high anxiety group instructions
without becoming unethical or unbelievable.
Furthermore, despite the observation that the
instructions were less effective than had been hypothesized,
it appears that the problem did not lie with the
instructions as much as it did with the testing situation
itself. Most of the swimmers did not appear to be overly
concerned with the testing in general. Their initial
competitive state anxiety scores, which were expected to be
somewhat elevated, were also below the mean as compared to a
normative sample of high school athletes, and as compared to
a normative sample of competitive swimmers prior to a

105
competition (Martens, Vealey, & Burton, 1990). This
suggests that the flume testing may have not provided a
sufficiently anxiety-provoking situation. Following the
warm-up swim, these subjects may have been even less
concerned, having experienced the flume swim. They perhaps
achieved a mastery experience and had little reason to
experience anxiety in response to a task which they realized
they could perform with relative ease.
A second possibility exploring why the subjects as a
group may not have been significantly anxious in the flume
testing situation is because approximately one-third had
been tested in the flume before. This was an unplanned
aspect of the study in that it had originally been intended
to use only subjects naive to the flume. However,
limitations placed on the investigator by U.S. Swimming
necessitated a compromise so that to obtain a minimum number
of subjects (i.e., 30), some were drawn from a group of
swimmers who had been previously tested. While this had not
been originally planned, it is noteworthy that the inclusion
of experienced (previously Flumed) swimmers created an
opportunity to examine prior experience in the flume as it
related to anxiety. Exploratory univariate analyses
(conducted following a nearly significant MANOVA, p<.06 (see
p. 92}) suggested that when facing the initial flume
testing, subjects naive to the flume reported more state
anxiety [SAI; F(1,31)=4.8, g<.05], more competitive
cognitive anxiety [CSAI-Cog; F(1,31)=5.5, pc.05], more

106
competitive somatic anxiety [CSAI-Som; F(l,31)=8.1, p<.01],
and less self-confidence [CSAI-SC; F(1,31)=4.9, pc.05] than
did those subjects who had been previously tested.
Still, the possibility that the nonsignificant findings
for the pre-post changes were due to the inclusion of
experienced subjects needs to be considered. That is, did
their inclusion dilute any significant effects in the
overall sample? Separate analyses of swimmers naive to the
flume demonstrated that this subset did not report increases
in anxiety following the instructions. Indeed, there was an
absence of a trend that one would have predicted if the
anxiety manipulation had been effective. Thus, while one
might question whether the absence of significant findings
were due to a lack of power (due to a smaller naive sample),
this was not the case. (Further, there were no significant
relationships between the psychological variables and
swimming performance either at baseline or during the second
swim.) Only a significant interaction effect was revealed
demonstrating that naive subjects reported a significantly
greater decrease in somatic anxiety than did experienced
subjects from the baseline to the evaluated swim. This
suggests that the mastery experience (baseline swim) was
indeed relevant, especially for swimmers naive to the flume.
Third, during the debriefing session, several swimmers
indicated that they felt the swims had not been challenging
enough, and that the flume speed was slower than they had
expected it to be. Thus, the task difficulty may have been

107
low. It is possible that propelling efficiency measures
obtained during an 80% flume speed test are less prone to
effects of anxiety than are those obtained at a higher flume
speed (e.g., 95%). This latter speed was not utilized in
the present study because it was deemed more important to
obtain one and only one trial per flume test. That is, if
the speed of the flume had been set to 95% of the swimmer's
maximum speed (a more difficult and potentially more
anxiety-inducing level), more than one trial would have
likely been needed to obtain a clean trial (i.e., not
affected by false starts and multiple practice).
Differences in the number of trials needed to obtain a clean
trial would likely have influenced effects of evaluative
anxiety. It would have been difficult to determine whether
changes in anxiety and efficiency were related more to how
many trials it took the swimmer to get used to the full-
speed flume, or more dependent on the instructional
manipulation.
Thus, under the 80% flume speed testing protocol,
swimmers may have felt that they could accomplish the task
without much problem regardless of the instructions that
they received and thus demonstrated minimal anxiety. This
may also have been the case with those swimmers who had
never been in the flume before. That is, there were
probably no anxiety-inducing instructions that could have
overcome the anxiety-reducing effect of having swum
successfully in the flume once, and realizing that it was

108
not as difficult as it may have appeared. This appears to
be the main reason that the instructional manipulations were
ineffective. Post-study interviews and debriefings
confirmed that many of the swimmers (primarily those novice
to the flume) had felt a bit anxious prior to the first
swim, but that they had not worried much about who was
watching them or about the use of the videotapes during the
second swim, since they felt that they had quickly mastered
swimming in the flume.
It has been suggested that task difficulty is an
important component of the arousal-motor performance
relationship. According to the Yerkes-Dodson law: "The
optimum level of arousal is a decreasing monotonic function
of the difficulty of the task" (Hockey, 1979, p. 143). This
function has not been demonstrated to apply to the
relationship between anxiety and motor performance, although
some have suggested that task difficulty is important in
determining the nature of the relationship in sports (Hanin,
1980, 1986; Jones & Hardy, 1989; Oxendine, 1970, 1980). In
the current study, a case could be made that the task
difficulty was low and that the subjects were neither
aroused greatly nor anxious, as suggested by the normative
data presented earlier.
Another factor which potentially diminished any effects
was the skill level of the subjects (average high school
swimmer). It is clear that their freestyle strokes are not
as finely tuned as a swimmer of Olympic-caliber (whose

109
propelling efficiency is significantly greater). It is
possible that anxiety might have affected a more finely
tuned stroke. However, in one study examining the effects
of anxiety on kinematic measures of performance (Beuter &
Duda, 1985; see p. 59), deleterious effects were noted in
children who did not have "finely tuned" motor skills.
The subjects in this study also did not exert
themselves to fatigue. It is well-known that fatigue is a
major factor in longer-distance events in swimming. It has
been suggested that anxiety affects performance more at
times when subjects are fatigued (Krane & Stanford, 1991).
To date, there have been no experimental studies examining
the differential effects of anxiety on fatigued vs. non¬
fat igued athletes. However, it could be that when fatigued,
an athlete's attentional focus wanes, and that this
condition may be amplified by cognitive anxiety (e.g., self¬
statements such as "I'll never be able to finish this race,"
"I'm so tired that everyone will see that I'm out of
shape").
Because there were no increases in state anxiety
resulting from the experimental manipulation, the first
three hypotheses could not be tested. Restated, these were
that (1) competitive cognitive state anxiety would
demonstrate a negative linear relationship with freestyle
swimming performance as a function of group membership. It
had been expected that swimming performance during the
second swim would become less efficient by group as the

110
instructional manipulation became increasingly anxiety-
producing. (2) The greatest performance decrements would
occur in those swimmers who demonstrated the greatest
increases in cognitive anxiety from baseline to evaluated
swims. (3) Cognitive anxiety would be more clearly related
to performance than would somatic anxiety.
Although none of these hypotheses could be tested
directly, the second one could be examined inversely. Here
the question might be stated as follows. Does a trend of
diminishing anxiety lead to better performances? The
findings indicated that there were non-significant increases
in propelling efficiency from baseline to the second swim
(before which the swimmers had reported less anxiety).
However, decreases in anxiety were not significantly related
to increases in propelling efficiency. Rather, it is
thought that these slight changes were a function of a
practice effect. That is, swimming in the flume once
facilitated a slightly more efficient swim during the second
trial.
The fourth hypothesis postulated that significant
decreases in propelling efficiency would most likely be due
to a significant decrement in the finish phase of the
stroke. However, since there were overall increases in the
propelling efficiency, this hypothesis was also untestable.
An interesting correlational finding was that of the
relationship between state anxiety, self-confidence and
skill level. Although these two psychological variables

Ill
(and the other psychological variables) were not significant
predictors of efficiency in the flume, they were
significantly related to the swimmers7 best time. That is,
the best swimmers reported the lowest anxiety and highest
self-confidence prior to the flume evaluation. This
correlational finding makes intuitive sense and is likely
due to a combination of experience level and mastery. That
is, the better swimmers have likely had more experience and
success in competitive situations as compared to those with
worse times. Therefore, they may approach competitive
situations (or a simulated competitive experience such as
the flume) with more confidence and less anxiety.
Interestingly, though, there was no significant relationship
between the swimmers7 skill level (best time) and their
immediate performance (propelling efficiency) in the flume.
It is unclear as to why a significant relationship was not
demonstrated. As suggested earlier, it is possible that the
biomechanical efficiency measures obtained during an 80%
flume speed test are less related to skill level than are
those obtained at a higher flume speed (e.g., 95%).
Summary and Conclusions
It was intended that the current study would contribute
to knowledge regarding the anxiety-sports performance
relationship in two important ways. First, the flume
provided a unique setting in which to examine the anxiety-
performance relationship. There are no existing studies

112
examining this relationship that have employed such an ideal
performance outcome measure (i.e., flume-assessed propelling
efficiency). Previous sport psychology investigations have
relied upon outcome measures (e.g., times, accuracy,
distance) which can be affected by many and diverse external
factors, and which may provide less precise information.
Martens, Burton, and Vealey (1990) suggest that many studies
which examine the anxiety-performance relationship have
likely accounted for such a small amount of total variance
in performance (e.g., 10% combining somatic and cognitive
anxiety) due to the problems associated with measuring
performance accurately.
Thus, a goal of this study was to facilitate a more
valid and compelling description of the anxiety-sport
performance relationship, utilizing state-of-the-art
performance measures. It satisfied both Gould and Krane's
(in press) and Weinberg's (1990) recommendations to assess
performance with process-oriented measures (e.g., propelling
efficiency) rather than outcome-oriented markers (e.g.,
time). However, despite using a process-oriented
performance measure, between-group and intraindividual
analyses, and a multidimensional assessment of anxiety, a
goal of the study which was a prerequisite for hypothesis¬
testing was not met. That is, differing levels of anxiety
were not found to result from the instructional
manipulation, thus precluding an assessment of the
relationship between experimentally induced anxiety and

113
sports performance. Also, the sample that was tested in
this study was relatively small.
This study was also designed to examine the testing
procedures at United States Swimming to discern whether
information obtained on swimmers was affected by excessive
anxiety. Clearly, the analyses in this study did not
confirm any problems related to the assessment of swimming
with regards to anxiety. Indeed, the current findings
suggest that assessment in the flume is likely less anxiety-
producing than most competitive events. However, it was
demonstrated that swimmers new to the flume reported more
anxiety and less self-confidence than did those who had been
previously tested. Despite the fact that these variables
did not significantly predict stroke efficiency for those
swimmers who were more anxious when facing the flume
evaluation, there may have been other factors that were
affected (e.g., maximal oxygen uptake, catecholamines) and
which could be measured in subsequent investigations. Also,
the finding that a difference may exist in the manner in
which some swimmers approach their initial testing session
might be utilized by U.S. Swimming, if only to help
examiners be sensitive to some swimmers' uncomfortable
feelings in approaching the flume evaluation. Obviously,
however, based on the non-significant findings, the results
of the current study provide no basis for recommending
alterations of the testing protocol.

114
Implications for Future Research
Although this study was designed to elicit anxiety in a
controlled measurable setting, the swimmers did not report
excessive anxiety prior to either swim. Thus, the situation
in which testing took place and/or the instructional sets
may not have been threatening enough to the swimmers' self¬
esteem to impact on performance. Here, it can be noted that
threat to self-esteem appears to be the most important
aspect of cognitive anxiety in sports performance
(Lewthwaite, 1990; Scanlan et al., 1991). The problem
appears to be that the flume, despite its being a practical
and useful setting to obtain quantifiable data on swimming
efficiency, is apparently only threatening before one has
warmed-up in it. It could be suggested that underwater
filming which takes place in a regular pool during a
competitive swim would be a more realistic assessment of a
swimmer in a potentially anxiety-provoking situation. While
this can be done relatively easily for qualitative
assessment of stroke performance, it would be much more
difficult to calculate propelling efficiency via this method
(due to the necessity of having a large three dimensional
figure underwater as a reference point).
In this study, anecdotal information obtained during
the debriefing suggested that the manipulation and flume
testing were not a major threat to self-esteem. In fact,
several subjects indicated that the testing situation was
not challenging enough. Thus, it could be suggested that

115
future studies of this nature would benefit from a more
potent anxiety-inducing manipulation. However, the current
manipulations were thought to be as strong a potential
verbal manipulation as possible (and which would still be
ethically permissible and believable to the subjects).
Furthermore, the manipulation took into account input from
the subjects of the pilot study. For example, an aspect of
the high anxiety condition (having an observer watch through
the underwater windows) was directly taken from the
suggestions of pilot subjects who indicated that live
observation of the underwater stroke by a U.S.S. official
would be most anxiety-inducing. In subsequent
investigations, believability ratings might also be included
in the main study as a check on the manipulation.
As noted earlier, it appears that a problem with the
current study was the relatively slow speed of the flume.
The speed had been assessed in the pilot study during which
the subjects had to attempt multiple trials at approximately
90% of maximum speed. On consultation with the U.S.
Swimming Staff, it was determined that 80% would be a
reasonably challenging speed which all subjects should be
able to achieve on one and only one trial. Unfortunately,
it appears that the baseline swim buffered the effects of
the anxiety manipulation. As stated earlier, the swimmers
likely gained a mastery experience during the baseline swim
such that the attempt to create anxiety for the second swim
was ineffectual.

116
Given that the baseline swim appeared to buffer the
anxiety manipulations, it could be suggested to eliminate
the baseline swim and obtain a one-time measure. This had
been considered in the current study but was decided against
in that the investigator would have had to use imprecise
measures of propelling efficiency (e.g., best time) to match
subjects. Thus, one would have had to assume that
propelling efficiency was the same for certain subjects in
order to examine any effects of anxiety on efficiency. This
would prohibit the intraindividual analyses that several
sport psychology researchers have suggested are very
important (Burton, 1988; Gould & Krane, in press; Weinberg,
1990).
It has been suggested that task complexity is
determined by the perceived demands of a skill (Ebbeck &
Weiss, 1988). Thus, a potential modification of the current
study which could still utilize a baseline and test swim
might prove useful. In this case, prior to the second swim,
subjects in the high anxiety group could be instructed that
they would begin their swim at the same speed as the warm-up
baseline swim (80%), but that the speed would increase
shortly following the sound of a tone. "The speed will
increase until you are no longer able to keep up and your
feet touch the gate at the end of the flume. Your task will
be to try to avoid touching the gate for as long as
possible."

117
The swimmer would then be exposed to a video which
demonstrated a swimmer struggling to keep up with an
increasing flume speed. In actuality, the subject would be
filmed following the tone which supposedly signifies that
the flume speed will increase momentarily. The speed would
remain at 80% (comparable to the baseline swim) but under a
potentially anxiety-inducing situation (i.e., the threat of
an inability to keep up with the supposed increase in flume
speed). This could potentially be a high anxiety condition
in that the swimmers would anticipate that they would be
subjected to a very difficult task during which they would
be filmed and evaluated. Hitting the gate with one's feet
is a potentially embarrasing situation and one which might
pose a threat to self-esteem.
Additionally, one might increase the speed of the flume
for both baseline and evaluated swims to create a more
difficult (and potentially more anxiety-inducing) situation.
This was considered in the current study and rejected for
previously discussed reasons of obtaining a reliable one¬
time trial.
To conclude, the examination of the anxiety-performance
relationship in sports is a relevant and interesting one.
However, as has been shown, this area of research is fraught
with difficulties. The challenge to obtain reliable
process-oriented performance measures in a realistic context
is a formidable one. Still, it is thought that the flume
provides such a good measure of performance that it is

118
worthwhile to attempt this study under more advantageous
circumstances. Perhaps the implementation of a more
powerful anxiety manipulation, combined with the use of all
naive subjects, would provide more valuable data. It is
maintained, then, that conducting research within the
anxiety-performance area is a viable and justifiable
endeavor, with the potential for the gathering and
evaluating of valuable information.

REFERENCES
Abdel-Aziz, Y. I., & Karara, H. M. (1971). Direct linear
transformation: From comparator coordinates into
object coordinates in close-range photogrammetry.
Proceedings of the ASPUI Symposium of the American
Society of Photogrammetry, Church Falls, VA.
Albrecht, R. R., & Felt, D. L. (1987). Generality and
specificity of attention related to competitive
anxiety and sport performance. Journal of Sport
Psychology. 9, 231-248.
Allison, M. T. (1991). Role conflict and the female
athlete: Preoccupations with little grounding.
Journal of Applied Sport Psychology. 2» 49-60.
Allport, G. W. (1960). Personality and social encounter.
Boston: Beacon Press.
American Psychiatric Association (1987). Diagnostic and
statistical manual of mental disorders, third edition
— revised. Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric
Association.
Anderson, K. J. (1990). Arousal and the inverted-U
hypothesis: A critique of Neiss's "Reconceptualizing
Arousal." Psychological Bulletin. 107. 96-100.
Apter, M. J. (1982). The experience of motivation: The
theory of psychological reversals. London: Academic
Press.
Apter, M. J. (1984). Reversal theory and personality: A
review. Journal of Research in Personality. 18, 265-
288.
Baddeley, A. D. (1972). Selective attention and
performance in dangerous environments. British
Journal of Psychology. 63. 537-546.
Bahrick, H. P, Fitts, P. M., & Rankin, R. E. (1952).
Effect of incentives upon reactions to peripheral
stimuli. Journal of Experimental Psychology. 44.,
400-406.
119

120
Barnes, M. W., Sime, W. , Dienstbier, R., & Plake, B.
(1986). A test of construct validity of the CSAI-2
questionnaire on male elite college swimmers.
International Journal of Sport Psychology. 17. 364-
374.
Beuter, A., & Duda, J. L. (1985). Analysis of the
arousal/motor performance relationship in children
using movement kinematics. Journal of Sport
Psychology. 7, 229-243.
Bird, A. M., & Horn, M. A. (1990). Cognitive anxiety and
mental errors in sport. Journal of Sport and
Exercise Psychology. 12, 217-222.
Blinde, E. M., & Tierney, J. E. (1990). Diffusion of
sport psychology into elite U.S. Swimming programs.
The Sport Psychologist. 4, 130-144.
Borg, G. (1962). Physical performance and perceived
exertion. Lund, Sweden: Gleerup.
Borg, G., & Noble, B. J. (1974). Perceived exertion. In
J. Wilmore (Ed.), Exercise and sport sciences reviews
(pp. 131-153). New York: Academic Press.
Borkovek, T. D. (1976). Physiological and cognitive
processes in the regulation of anxiety. In G.
Schwartz & D. Shapiro (Eds.), Consciousness and self¬
regulation: Advances in research (Vol. 1, pp. 261-
312). New York: Plenum Press.
Brewer, B. W., Van Raalte, J. L., & Linder, D. E. (1991).
Role of the sport psychologist in treating injured
athletes: A survey of sports medicine providers.
Journal of Applied Sport Psychology. 3, 183-190.
Broadbent, D. E. (1971). Decision and stress. London:
Academic Press.
Broadhurst, P. L. (1957). Emotionality and the Yerkes-
Dodson law. Journal of Experimental Psychology. 54,
345-352.
Brodkin, P., & Weiss, M. R. (1990). Developmental
differences in motivation for partipating in
competitive swimming. Journal of Sport and Exercise
Psychology. 12, 248-263.
Brustad, R., & Weiss, M. R. (1987). Competence
perceptions and sources of worry in high, medium and
low competitive trait-anxious young athletes.
Journal of Sport Psychology. 9, 97-105.

121
Buhler, C. (1959). Theoretical observations about
life's basic tendencies. American Journal of
Psychotherapy. 13, 561-581.
Bursill, A. E. (1958). The restriction of peripheral
vision during exposure to hot and humid conditions.
The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology. 10,
113-129.
Burton, D. (1988). Do anxious swimmers swim slower?
Reexamining the elusive anxiety-performance
relationship. Journal of Sport and Exercise
Psychology. 10, 45-61.
Caruso, C. M., Dzewaltowski, D. A., Gill, D. L., &
McElroy, M. A. (1990). Psychological and
physiological changes in competitive state anxiety
during noncompetition and competitive success and
failure. Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology.
12, 6-20.
Cattell, R. B. (1963). The nature and measurement of
anxiety. Scientific American. 208. 96-104.
Cooke, L. E. (1982). Stress and anxiety in sport.
Sports Council Research Project. Sheffield, England:
Sheffield City Polytechnic.
Cox, R. H. (1990). Sport psychology: Concepts and
applications (2nd ed.). Dubuque, IA: Brown.
Crocker, P. E., Alderman, R. B., & Smith, F. M. (1988).
Cognitive-affective stress management training with
high performance youth volleyball players: Effects on
affect, cognition, and performance. Journal of Sport
and Exercise Psychology. 10, 448-460.
Dale, J., & Weinberg, R. (1990). Burnout in sport: A
review and critique. Journal of Applied Sport
Psychology. 2, 67-83.
Davis, H. (1991). Criterion validity of the Athletic
Motivation Inventory: Issues in professional sport.
Journal of Applied Sport Psychology. 3, 176-182.
Deffenbacher, J. L. (1980). Worry and emotionality in
test anxiety. In I. G. Sarason (Ed.), Test anxiety;
Theory, research, and applications (pp. 111-128).
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Doctor, R. M., & Altman, F. (1969). Worry and
emotionality as components of test anxiety:
Replication and further data. Psychological Reports.
24, 563-568.

122
Duffy, E. (1957). The psychological significance of the
concept of "arousal" or "activation". Psychological
Review. 64, 265-275.
Duffy, E. (1962). Activation and behavior. New York:
Wiley.
Easterbrook, J. A. (1959). The effect of emotion on cue
utilization and the organization of behavior.
Psychological Review. 66, 183-201.
Ebbeck, V., & Weiss, M. R. (1988). The arousal-
performance relationship: Task characteristics and
performance measures in track and field athletics.
The Sport Psychologist. 2, 13-27.
Eysenck, M. W. (1982). Attention and arousal: Cognition
and performance. New York: Springer-Verlag.
Eysenck, M. W. (1984). A handbook of cognitive
psychology. London: LEA publishers.
Fahrenberg, J., Walschburger, P., Foerster, F., Myrtek,
M., & Muller, W. (1983). An evaluation of state,
trait, and reaction aspects of activation processes.
Psychophysiology. 20. 188-194.
Feltz, D. L., Landers, D. M., & Raeder, U. (1979).
Enhancing self-efficacy in high-avoidance motor
tasks: A comparison of modeling technigues. Journal
of Sport Psychology. 1, 112-122.
Fenz, W. D. (1988). Learning to anticipate stressful
events. Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology.
10, 223-228.
Frankl, V. E. (1969). The will to meaning: Foundations
and applications of logotherapy. New York: Plume.
Gerson, R., & Deshaies, P. (1978). Competitive trait
anxiety and performance as predictors of
precompetitive state anxiety. International Journal
of Sport Psychology. 9, 16-26.
Gould, D., & Krane, V. (in press). The arousal-athletic
performance relationship: Current status and future
directions. In T. Horn (Ed.), Advances in sport
psychology. Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics.
Gould, D., Petlichkoff, L., & Weinberg, R. S. (1984).
Antecedents of temporal changes in, and between,
CSAI-2 subcomponents. Journal of Sport Psychology.
6, 289-304.

123
Gould, D., Petlichkoff, L., Simons, J., & Vevera, M.
(1987). Relationship between Competitive State
Anxiety Inventory-2 subscale scores and pistol
shooting performance. Journal of Sport Psychology,
9, 33-42.
Gould, D., Tammen, V., Murphy, S., & May, J. (1989). An
examination of U.S. Olympic sport psychology
consultants and the services they provide. The Sport
Psychologist. 3., 300-312.
Hackfort, D., & Schwenkmezger, P. (1989). Measuring
anxiety in sports: Perspectives and problems. In D.
Hackfort & C. D. Spielberger (Eds.), Anxiety in
sports: An international perpective (pp. 55-74).
New York: Hemisphere.
Hanin, Y. L. (1980). A study of anxiety in sports. In
W. F. Straub (Ed.), Sport psychology: An analysis of
athlete behavior (pp. 236-249). Ithaca, NY:
Mouvement Publications.
Hanin, Y. L. (1986). State-trait anxiety research on
sports in the USSR. In C. D. Spielberger and R. Diaz
(Eds.), Cross-cultural anxiety (Vol. 3) (pp. 45-64).
New York: Hemisphere.
Harlow, M. F. (1953) . Motivation as a factor in the
acquisition of new responses. In M. R. Jones (Ed.),
Current theory and research in motivation: A
symposium (pp. 24-29). Lincoln, NE: University of
Nebraska Press.
Hockey, R. (1979). Stress and the cognitive components
of skilled performance. In V. Hamilton & D.
Warburton (Eds.), Human stress and cognition: An
information processing approach (pp. 141-177).
Chichester: Wiley & Sons.
Hull, C. L. (1943). Principles of behavior. New York:
Appleton-Century.
Jones, J. G., & Cale, A. (1989). Relationships between
multidimensional competitive state anxiety and
cogntive and motor subcomponents of performance.
Journal of Sports Sciences. 7, 229-240.
Jones, J. G., & Hardy, L. (1989). Stress and cognitive
functioning in sport. Journal of Sports Sciences. 7,
41-63.
Jones, J. G., & Hardy, L. (1990). Anxiety and sport.
London: Wiley & Sons.

124
Karteroliotis, C. , & Gill, D. G.. (1987). Temporal
changes in psychological and physiological components
of state anxiety. Journal of Sport Psychology. 9,
261-274.
Kerr, J. H. (1989). Anxiety, arousal, and sport
performance: An application of reversal theory. In
D. Hackfort & C. D. Spielberger (Eds.), Anxiety in
sports: An international perpective (pp. 137-151).
New York: Hemisphere.
Kimble, G. A., Garmezy, N., & Zigler, E. (1984).
Principles of psychology (6th ed.). New York: John
Wiley & Sons.
Kirsch, I., & Weixel, L. J. (1988). Double-blind versus
deceptive administration of a placebo. Behavioral
Neuroscience. 102, 319-323.
Kjellberg, A. (1977). Sleep deprivation and some aspects
of performance: Problems of arousal changes. Waking
Sleeping. 1, 139-143.
Klavora, P. (1978). An attempt to derive inverted-U
curves based on the relationship between anxiety and
athletic performance. In D. Landers & R. Christina
(Eds.), Psychology of motor behavior and sport—1977
(pp. 369-377). Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics.
Krane, V., & Stanford, A. (1991, October). A
Quantitative investigation of mental states of
competitive swimmers. Poster presented at the
meeting of the Association for the Advancement of
Applied Sport Psychology, Savannah, GA.
Krane, V., & Williams, J. M. (1987). Performance and
somatic anxiety, cognitive anxiety, and confidence
changes prior to competition. Journal of Sport
Behavior. 10, 47-56.
Lacey, J. I., & Lacey, B. (1958). Verification and
extension of the principle of autonomic response-
stereotypy. American Journal of Psychology. 71, 50-
73.
Landers, D. M. (1980). The arousal-performance
relationship revisited. Research Quarterly for
Exercise and Sport. 51, 77-90.
Landers, D. M., & Boutcher, S. H. (1986). Arousal-
performance relationships. In J. M. Williams (Ed.),
Applied sport psychology: Personal growth to peak
performance (pp. 163-184). Palo Alto, CA: Mayfield.

125
Lewthwaite, R. (1990). Threat perception in competitive
trait anxiety: The endangerment of important goals.
Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology. 12, 280-
300.
Liebert, R. M., & Morris, L. W. (1967). Cognitive and
emotional components of test anxiety: A distinction
and some initial data. Psychological Reports. 20,
975-978.
Madden, C. C., Summers, J. J., & Brown, D. F. (1990).
The influence of perceived stress on coping with
competitive basketball. International Journal of
Sport Psychology. 21, 21-35.
Magill, R. A. (1989). Motor learning: Concepts and
applications (3rd ed.). Dubuque, IA: Brown.
Malmo, R. B. (1959). Activation: A neuropsychological
dimension. Psychological Review. 66, 367-386.
Mandler, G. (1975). Mind and emotion. London: Wiley.
Martens, R. (1977). Sport Competition Anxiety Test.
Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics.
Martens, R. (1987).
Champaign, IL:
Coaches guide to sport psychology.
Human Kinetics.
Martens, R., Burton, D., Vealey, R. S., Bump, L. A. &
Smith, D. E. (1990) . Development and validation of
the Competitive State Anxiety Inventory-2. In R.
Martens, R. S. Vealey, & D. Burton (Eds.),
Competitive anxiety in sport (pp. 117-190).
Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics.
Martens, R., Burton, D., Vealey, R., Bump, L., & Smith,
D. (1983). The development of the Competitive State
Anxiety Inventory - 2 fCSAI-2). Unpublished
manuscript, University of Illinois.
Martens, R., Gill, D. L., & Scanlan, T. K. (1976).
Competitive trait anxiety, success-failure and sex as
determinants of motor performance. Perceptual and
Motor Skills. 43, 1199-1208.
Martens, R., Vealey, R. S., & Burton, D. (1990).
Competitive anxiety in sport. Champaign, IL: Human
Kinetics.
Martin, J. J., & Gill, D. L. (1991). The relationships
among competitive orientation, sport-confidence,
self-efficacy, anxiety, and performance. Journal of
Sport and Exercise Psychology. 13, 149-159.

126
Maslow, A. H. (1954). Motivation and personality. New
York: Harper & Row.
Matarazzo, J. D., Ulett, G. A., & Saslow, G. (1955).
Human maze performance as a function of increasing
levels of anxiety. Journal of General Psychology.
53, 79-95.
McCauley, E. (1985). State anxiety: Antecedent or result
of sport performance? Journal of Sport Behavior. 8,
71-77.
McCann, S., Murphy, S., & Raedeke, T. (in press). The
effect of performance setting and individual
differences on the anxiety-performance relationship
for elite cyclists. Anxiety, Stress, and Coping; An
International Journal.
McGrath, J. E. (1970). Major methodological issues. In
J. E. McGrath (Ed.), Social and psychological factors
in stress (pp. 19-49). New York: Holt, Reinhart &
Winston.
Meacci, W. G., & Price, E. E. (1985). Acquisition and
retention of golf putting skill through the
relaxation, visualization, and body rehearsal
intervention. Research Quarterly for Exercise and
Sport. 56, 176-179.
Morgan, W. P., & Ellickson, K. A. (1989). Health,
anxiety, and physical exercise. In In D. Hackfort &
C. D. Spielberger (Eds.), Anxiety in sports: An
international perpective (pp. 165-182). New York:
Hemisphere.
Morris, L. W., & Liebert, R. M. (1970). Relationship of
cognitive and emotional components of test anxiety to
physiological arousal and academic performance.
Journal of Counsultinq and Clinical Psychology. 35,
332-337.
Morris, L., & Liebert, R. M. (1973). Effects of negative
feedback, threat of shock, and level of trait anxiety
on the arousal of two components of anxiety. Journal
of Counseling Psychology. 20. 321-326.
Morris, L., Brown, N. R., & Halbert, B. (1977). Effects
of symbolic modeling on the arousal of cognitive and
affective components of anxiety in preschool
children. In C.D. Spielberger and I.G. Sarason
(Eds.), Stress and anxiety (Vol. 4). Washington, DC:
Hemisphere.

127
Morris, L., Davis, D., & Hutchings, C. (1981). Cognitive
and emotional components of anxiety: Literature
review and revised worry-emotionality scale. Journal
of Educational Psychology. 73. 541-555.
Morris, L., Harris, E. W., & Rovins, D. S. (1981).
Interactive effects of generalized and situational
expectancies on cognitive and emotional components of
social anxiety. Journal of Research in Personality.
15, 302-311.
Morris, L., Smith, L. R., Andrews, E. S., & Morris, N. C.
(1975). The relationship of emotionality and worry
components of anxiety to motor skills performance.
Journal of Motor Behavior. 7, 121-130.
Murphy, S. M. (1988). The on-site provision of sport
psychology services at the 1987 U.S. Olympic
Festival. The Sport Psychologist. 2, 337-350.
Murphy, S. M., & Woolfolk, R. L. (1987). The effects of
cognitive interventions on competitive anxiety and
performance on a fine motor skill accuracy task.
International Journal of Psychology. 18, 152-166.
Neiss, R. (1988a). Reconceptualizing arousal:
Psychobiological states in motor performance.
Psychological Bulletin. 103. 345-366.
Neiss, R. (1988b). Reconceptualizing relaxation
treatments: Psychobiological states in sports.
Clinical Psychology Review. 8, 139-159.
Neiss, R. (1990). Ending arousal's reign of error: A
reply to Anderson. Psychological Bulletin. 107,
101-105.
Noble, B. J. (1986). Physiology of exercise and sport.
St. Louis: Times Mirror/Mosby College Publishing.
Ogilvie, B. C., Haase, H., Jokl, E., Krandiotis, D. T.,
Mahoney, M., & Nideffer, R. (1979). Critical issues
in the application of clinical psychology in the
sport setting. International Journal of Sport
Psychology. 10, 178-183.
Oxendine, J. B. (1970). Emotional arousal and motor
performance. Quest. 13, 23-32.
Oxendine, J. B. (1980). Emotional arousal and motor
performance. In R. Suinn (Ed.), Psychology in
sports: Methods and applications (pp. 103-111).
Minneapolis: Burgess.

128
Poteet, D., & Weinberg, R. (1980). Competition trait
anxiety, state anxiety, and performance. Perceptual
and Motor Skills. 50, 651-654.
Powell, F., & Verner, J. (1982). Anxiety and performance
relationships in first time parachutists. Journal of
Sport Psychology. 4, 184-188.
Prapavessis, H., & Grove, J. R. (1991). Precompetitive
emotions and shooting performance: The mental health
and zone of optimal function models. The Sport
Psychologist. 5, 223-234.
Raglin, J. S., & Morgan, W. P.. (1988). Predicted and
actual pre-competition anxiety college swimmers.
Journal of Swimming Research. 4, 5-7.
Raglin, J. S., Wise, K. J., & Morgan, W. P. (1990).
Predicted and actual pre-competition anxiety in high
school girl swimmers. Journal of Swimming Research.
6, 5-8.
Reilly, M. F., Kame, V. D., Termin, B., Tendesco, M. E.,
& Pendergast, D. R. (1990). Relationship between
freestyle swimming speed and stroke mechanics to
isokinetic muscle function. Journal of Swimming
Research. 6, 16-21.
Rejeski, W. J., & Brawley, L. R. (1988). Defining the
boundaries of sport psychology. The Sport
Psychologist. 2, 231-242.
Rodgers, W., Hall, C., & Buckholz, E. (1991). The effect
of an imagery training program on imagery ability,
imagery use, and figure skating performance. Journal
of Applied Sport Psychology. 3, 109-125.
Rodrigo, G., Lusiardo, M., & Pereira, G. (1990).
Relationship between anxiety and performance in
soccer players. International Journal of Sport
Psychology. 21. 112-120.
Rosenthal, R. (1968). Experimenter expectancy and the
reassuring nature of the self hypothesis decision
procedure. Psychological Bulletin. 70 (Monograph
supplement), 30-47.
Sage, G. H. (1984). Motor learning and control: A
neurophysiological approach. Dubuque, IA: Brown.
Sarason, I. G. (1975). Anxiety and self-preoccupation.
In I. Sarason & C. Spielberger (Eds.), Stress and
anxiety (Vol. 2, pp. 27-44). New York: Wiley &
Sons.

129
Sarason, I. G., Sarason, B. R., & Pierce, G. R. (1990).
Social support, personality, and performance.
Journal of Applied Sport Psychology. 2, 117-127.
Scanlan, T. K. (1984). Competitive stress and the child
athlete. In J. Silva & R. Weinberg (Eds.),
Psychological foundations of sport (pp. 118-129).
Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics.
Scanlan, T. K., Stein, G. L., & Ravizza, K. (1991). An
in-depth study of former elite figure skaters III:
Sources of stress. Journal of Sport and Exercise
Psychology. 13. 103-120.
Schleihauf, R. E. (1979). A hydrodynamic analysis of
swimming propulsion. In J. Terauds & W. Bedingfield
(Eds.), Swimming III (pp. 70-109). Baltimore:
University Park Press.
Silva, J. M. (1992). On advancement: An editorial.
Journal of Applied Sport Psychology. 4, 1-9.
Singer, R. N. (1989). Applied sport psychology in the
United States. Journal of Applied Sport Psychology.
1, 61-80.
Singer, R. N. (1992). What in the world is happening in
sport psychology? Journal of Applied Sport
Psychology. 4, 63-76.
Singer, R. N., Cauraugh, J. H., Tennant, L. K., Murphey,
M., Chen, D., & Lidor, R. (1991). Attention and
distractors: Considerations for enhancing sport
performances. International Journal of Sport
Psychology. 22., 95-114.
Singer, R. N., Flora, L. A., & Abourezk, T. L., (1989).
The effect of a five-step cognitive learning strategy
on the acguisition of a complex motor task. Journal
of Applied Sport Psychology. 1, 98-108.
Smith, R. E. (1989). Conceptual and statistical issues
in research involving multidimensional anxiety
scales. Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology.
11. 452-457.
Smith, R. E., & Smoll, F. L. (1990). Sport performance
anxiety. In H. Leitenberg (Ed.), Handbook of social
and evaluation anxiety (417-454). New York: Plenum
Press.

130
Smith, R. E., Smoll, F. L., & Schütz, R. W. (1990).
Measurement and correlates of sport-specific
cognitive and somatic trait anxiety: The Sport
Anxiety Scale. Anxiety Research. 2, 263-280.
Sonstroem, R. J., & Bernardo, B. (1982). Intraindividual
pregame state anxiety and basketball performance: A
reexamination of the inverted-U curve. Journal of
Sport Psychology. 4, 235-245.
Spence, K. W. (1951). Theoretical interpretations of
learning. In S. S. Stevens (Ed.), Handbook of
experimental psychology (pp. 690-729). New York:
Wiley.
Spielberger, C. D. (1966). Theory and research on
anxiety. In C.D. Spielberger (Ed.), Anxiety and
behavior (pp. 3-20). New York: Academic Press.
Spielberger, C. D. (1972). Conceptual and methodological
issues in anxiety research. In C. D. Spielberger
(Ed.), Anxiety: Current trends in theory and
research (Vol. 2, pp. 481-493). New York: Academic
Press.
Spielberger, C. D. (April, 1982). State-trait anxiety
and sports psychology. Paper presented at the First
Israeli National Congress on Psychology and Sociology
of Sport and Physical Education. Natanya, Israel.
Spielberger, C. D., Gorsuch, R. L., & Lushene, R. E.
(1970). Manual for the state-trait anxiety
inventory. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists
Press.
Stennett, R. G. (1957). The relationship of performance
level to level of arousal. Journal of Experimental
Psychology. 54, 54-61.
Taylor, J. (1987). Predicting athletic performance with
self-confidence and somatic and cognitive anxiety as
a function of motor and physiological requirements in
six sports. Journal or Personality. 55, 139-153.
Thirer, J., & O'Donnell, L. A. (1980). Female
intercollegiate athletes' trait-anxiety level and
performance in a game. Perceptual and Motor Skills.
50, 18.
Vealey, R. S. (1988). Future directions in psychological
skills training. The Sport Psychologist. 2, 318-336.

131
Venables, P. H. (1984). Arousal: An examination of its
status as a concept. In M. Coles, J. Jennings, & J.
Stern (Eds.), Psvchophvsiological perspectives:
Festschrift for Beatrice and John Lacev (pp. 134-
142). New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold.
Weinberg, R. S. (1978). The effects of success and
failure on the patterning of neuromuscular energy.
Journal of Motor Behavior. 10, 53-61.
Weinberg, R. S. (1990). Anxiety and motor performance:
Where to from here? Anxiety Research. 2, 227-242.
Weinberg, R. S., & Genuchi, M. (1980). Relationship
between competitive trait anxiety, state anxiety, and
golf performance: A field study. Journal of Sport
Psychology. 2, 148-154.
Weinberg, R. S., Gould, D., & Jackson, A. (1979).
Expectations and performance: An empirical test of
Bandura's self-efficacy theory. Journal of Sport
Psychology. 1, 320-331.
Weinberg, R. S., & Hunt, V. V. (1976). The
interrelationships between anxiety, motor performance
and electromyography. Journal of Motor Behavior. 8,
219-224.
Welford, A. T. (1976). Skilled performance. Brighton,
England: Scott Foresman and Company.
Wilkinson, R. T. (1961). Interaction of lack of sleep
with knowledge of results, repeated testing and
individual differences. Journal of Experimental
Psychology. 62, 263-271.
Williams, J. M., Tonymon, P., & Andersen, M. B. (1991).
The effects of stressors and coping resources on
anxiety and peripheral narrowing. Journal of Applied
Sport Psychology. 3, 126-141.
Wine, J. D. (1971). Test anxiety and direction of
attention. Psychological Bulletin. 76, 92-104.
Wine, J. D. (1980). Cognitive-attentional theory of test
anxiety. In I.G. Sarason (Ed.), Test anxiety:
Theory, research and applications (pp. 349-385).
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Yerkes, R. M., & Dodson, J. D. (1908). The relation of
strength of stimulus to rapidity of habit formation.
Journal of Comparative and Neurological Psychology.
18, 459-482.

132
Zaichkowsky, L. D., & Takenaka, K.
Optimizing arousal levels. In
Murphey, & L. K. Tennant (Eds.)
in sport psychology. New York:
(in press).
R. N. Singer, M.
, Handbook on research
Macmillan.

APPENDIX
QUESTIONNAIRES
Sport Anxiety Scale
A number of statements which athletes have used to
describe their thoughts and feelings before or during
competition are listed below. Read each statement and then
using the scale below, indicate how you usually feel prior
to or during competition. Some athletes feel they should
not admit to feelings or nervousness or worry, but such
reactions are actually quite common, even among professional
athletes. To help us better understand reactions to
competition, we ask you to share your true reactions with
us. There are, therefore, no right or wrong answers. Do
not spend too much time on any one statement, but choose the
answer which describes how you commonly react.
1 = Not at all
2 = Somewhat
3 = Moderately so
4 = Very much so
1.I feel nervous.
2. During competition, I find myself thinking about
unrelated things.
3. I have self-doubts.
4. My body feels tense.
5. I am concerned that I may not do as well in
competition as I could.
6. My mind wanders during sport competition.
7. While performing, I often do not pay attention to
what's going on.
8. I feel tense in my stomach.
9. Thoughts of doing poorly interfere with my
concentration during competition.
10.I am concerned about choking under pressure.
133

134
11. My heart races.
12. I feel my stomach sinking.
13. I'm concerned about performing poorly.
14. I have lapses in concentration during competition
because of nervousness.
15. I sometimes find myself trembling before or during
a competitive event.
16. I'm worried about reaching my goal.
17. My body feels tight.
18. I'm concerned that others will be disappointed
with my performance.
19. My stomach gets upset before or during
competition.
20. I'm concerned I won't be able to concentrate.
21. My heart pounds before competition.

135
State Anxiety Inventory
Directions: A number of statements which people use to
describe themselves are given below. Read each statement
and then using the scale below, indicate how you feel RIGHT
NOW, that is, AT THIS MOMENT. There are no right or wrong
answers. Do not spend too much time on any one statement,
but give the answer which seems to describe your present
feelings best.
1 = Not at all
2 = Somewhat
3 = Moderately so
4 = Very much so
1. I feel calm.
2. I feel secure.
3. I am tense.
4. I feel regretful.
5. I feel at ease.
6. I feel upset.
7. I am presently worrying over possible misfortunes.
8. I feel rested.
9. I feel anxious.
10. I feel comfortable.
11. I feel self-confident.
12. I feel nervous.
13. I am jittery.
14. I feel "high strung".
15. I am relaxed.
16. I feel content.
17. I am worried.
18. I am over-excited and rattled.
19. I feel joyful.
20. I feel pleasant.

136
Competitive State Anxiety Inventory - 2
Directions: A number of statements which athletes have used
to describe their feelings before undergoing testing in the
flume are given below. Read each statement and indicate how
you feel right now - at this moment, using the following
scale. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend
too much time on any one statement, but choose the answere
which describes you feelings right now.
1 = Not at all
2 = Somewhat
3 = Moderately so
4 = Very much so
1. I am concerned about the flume testing.
2. I feel nervous.
3. I feel at ease.
4. I have self-doubts.
5. I feel jittery.
6. I feel comfortable.
7. I am concerned that I may not do as well in
this testing as I could.
8. My body feels tense.
9. I feel self-confident.
10. I am concerned about doing worse than others.
11. I feel tense in my stomach.
12. I feel secure.
13. I am concerned about choking under pressure.
14. My body feels relaxed.
15. I'm confident I can meet the challenge.
16. I'm concerned about performing poorly.
17. My heart is racing.
18. I'm confident about performing well.

137
19. I'm worried about reaching my goal.
20. I feel my stomach sinking.
21. I feel mentally relaxed.
22. I'm concerned that others will be disappointed
with my performance.
23. My hands are clammy.
24. I'm confident because I mentally picture
myself reaching my goal.
25. I'm concerned I won't be able to concentrate.
26. My body feels tight.
27. I'm confident of coming through under
pressure.
28. The flume apparatus appears confining.
29. I am worried about swimming at the correct
speed in the flume.

138
Ratings of Perceived Exertion
Please point to a number on the scale which describes how
you are feeling at this time about the intensity of the swim
that you just completed.
6
7 Very, very light
8
9 Very light
10
11 Fairly light
12
13 Somewhat hard
14
15 Hard
16
17 Very hard
18
19 Very, very hard
20

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
Robert Andrew Swoap was born in New Brunswick, New
Jersey, on October 28, 1965. He is the second of the four
sons of Joan and J.R. Swoap, and was raised in Houston and
Conroe, Texas. From 1983-1987, Bob attended Duke University
(and became a devoted follower of Blue Devil basketball)
graduating cum laude with a Bachelor of Arts degree in
psychology in May 1987. Four months later, Bob began
doctoral studies at the University of Florida where he
studied clinical and health psychology. Bob pursued a
special interest in sport psychology at the United States
Olympic Training Center as a clinical research assistant
from August 1990-July 1991. In September of 1991, Bob began
a predoctoral clinical psychology internship at the Medical
University of South Carolina. Beginning in September, 1992,
Bob will work at Duke University Medical Center in the
Behavioral Medicine Program as a Clinical Associate-
Postdoctoral fellow.
139

I certify that I have read this study and that in my
opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly
presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality,
as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
Jam
H. Jo,
ison, Chair
Professor o'fjciinical and
Health Psychology
I certify that I have read this study and that in my
opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly
presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality,
as a dissertation for the degree of-poctor^o£^hilosophy.
BriceX Crosson
Professor of Clinical and
Health Psychology
I certify that I have read this study and that in my
opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly
presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality,
as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
Michael E. Geisser
Assistant Professor of Clinical
and Health Psychology
I certify that I have read this study and that in my
opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly
presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality,
as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
Anthony f. (Greene
Assistant Professor of Clinical
and Health Psychology

I certify that I have read this study and that in my
opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly
presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality,
as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
Robert N.^E&Mger
Professor of Exercise and
Sport Sciences
This dissertation was submitted to the Graduate Faculty
of the College of Health Related Professions and to the
Graduate School and was accepted as partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
August 1992
y
Dean, College of Health Related
Professions
Dean, Graduate School

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA



APPENDIX
QUESTIONNAIRES
Sport Anxiety Scale
A number of statements which athletes have used to
describe their thoughts and feelings before or during
competition are listed below. Read each statement and then
using the scale below, indicate how you usually feel prior
to or during competition. Some athletes feel they should
not admit to feelings or nervousness or worry, but such
reactions are actually quite common, even among professional
athletes. To help us better understand reactions to
competition, we ask you to share your true reactions with
us. There are, therefore, no right or wrong answers. Do
not spend too much time on any one statement, but choose the
answer which describes how you commonly react.
1 = Not at all
2 = Somewhat
3 = Moderately so
4 = Very much so
1.I feel nervous.
2. During competition, I find myself thinking about
unrelated things.
3. I have self-doubts.
4. My body feels tense.
5. I am concerned that I may not do as well in
competition as I could.
6. My mind wanders during sport competition.
7. While performing, I often do not pay attention to
what's going on.
8. I feel tense in my stomach.
9. Thoughts of doing poorly interfere with my
concentration during competition.
10.I am concerned about choking under pressure.
133


91
(i.e. group) effect [F=.43, p=.66] nor a significant
interaction (i.e., Group X Time) effect [F=.ll, p=.9].
However, a significant main effect for Time was indicated
[F=5.5, pc.05], Swimmers as a whole became more
efficient during their second swim as compared to their
baseline swim.
The next analysis examined a subcomponent of the
freestyle stroke the "finish phase." This phase was
chosen for analysis in that it provides the most force
during the armstroke cycle, and because it had been
hypothesized that if there was one part of the stroke
which would be most affected by evaluative anxiety, it
would be the finish. This subanalysis had initially been
planned to help determine where the variance in the
overall stroke efficiency occurred under different
conditions of anxiety. Although there was little overall
variance, this analysis was still conducted to detect
less obvious changes in efficiency. However, a repeated
measures ANOVA revealed no significant main or
interaction effects [Group F(2,29)=.55, p=.58; Time
F(2,29) = .02, P=.89; Group X Time F(2,29) = .37, p=.70].
Table 3 reports the means and standard deviations by
group of overall and finish efficiency for the two swims
(i.e., before and after the instructional manipulation).


3
(e.g., Singer, Flora, & Abourezk, 1989), and social
support (e.g., Sarason, Sarason, & Pierce, 1990).
Another major topic which has received much
attention in the literature deals with the relationship
between the constructs of anxiety and arousal and sports
performance (e.g., Burton, 1988; Crocker, Alderman, &
Smith, 1988; Ebbeck & Weiss, 1988; Fenz, 1988; Jones &
Cale, 1989; Landers & Boutcher, 1986; Madden, Summers, &
Brown, 1990; Prapavessis & Grove, 1991; Rodrigo,
Lusiardo, & Pereira, 1990; Williams, Tonymon, & Andersen,
1991). The degree of attention given to this topic is
highlighted by a recent content analysis of 29 sport
psychology books for athletes (Vealey, 1988) which
revealed that anxiety/arousal control techniques were the
second most frequently discussed factors related to the
enhancement of mental skills in sport. (Attentional
control techniques were most frequent.) Furthermore,
Murphy (1988) and Ogilvie et al. (1979) have indicated
that precompetitive tension is the number one problem for
which athletes request assistance. Within applied sport
psychology in the U.S., it has been suggested that some
form of anxiety management is used in the majority of
interventions with athletes (Singer, 1989).
Within the general consensus regarding the negative
effects of "excess" anxiety or arousal on athletic
performance, techniques described as "anxiety management"
and "arousal control" are applied frequently by sport


68
The subjects were average high school swimmers
(based on the swimmers' best 100 yard freestyle times
during the current season, M=59.76 seconds). All
subjects provided consent to complete self-report
psychological assessments, to be videotaped at various
times in the flume, and to have their heart rate taken in
the course of the study. The study was granted approval
by the Human Subjects Committee of the Institutional
Review Board of the University of Florida, by the Sports
Science Review Board of United States Swimming, and by
the Sports Science Department of the United States
Olympic Committee.
Procedural Overview
The following is an overview of the framework of the
study. A more complete description of the measures and
methodology is presented in the two subsequent sections.
Pre-Flume Testing Procedures
(1) A brief explanation of the study was provided by the
investigator and informed consents were obtained. The
investigator purposely did not mention anxiety as an
aspect of the study or that subjects would swim under an
"anxiety-condition." Rather, subjects were told that the
study involved swimming in the flume on two trials,
before which they would complete several self-report
questionnaires related to how they felt about swimming in
the flume. (It was only directly prior to each swim that


77
modifications were not expected to alter reliability or
validity of the instrument. The instrument was used to
assess state anxiety levels in a relatively anxiety-free
situation (i.e., baseline testing) and just prior to the
evaluative flume test.
State Anxiety Inventory (SAI; from the State-Trait
Anxiety Inventory; Spielberger et al., 1970)
This 20-item self-report questionnaire assesses
state anxiety, and has been well established as a
research tool in the study of anxiety. It has excellent
construct validity and internal consistency, and is easy
to administer. In this study, only the 20-item state
anxiety component was administered since the SAS was used
for sport specific trait anxiety. Sport psychology
research with this instrument "has included
investigations of football, basketball, badminton,
racquetball and tennis players, swimmers, runners,
gymnasts, fencers, jugglers, and persons engaged in a
variety of physical activities, ranging from routine
exercise to climbing ladders, riding bicycles, and
performing on treadmills" (Spielberger, 1982, p. 10).
In the current study, this instrument was used to
provide additional data regarding state anxiety levels
under different evaluative conditions. It was also used
for a comparison with the CSAI-2, which provides three
separate components of competitive state anxiety (i.e.,
somatic anxiety, cognitive anxiety, and self-confidence).


94
psychological questionnaires. However, two measures are
also significantly correlated with the swimmers' best
freestyle time (Competitive Self-Confidence, r=-.54,
p<.001; and State Anxiety, r=.42, pc.01). This suggests
that the better swimmers are more self-confident and less
anxious directly prior to the flume test. However, self-
confidence and state anxiety were not correlated with the
more immediate measure of freestyle swimming efficiency
in the flume (see Table 4).
Effects of Prior Flume Testing
Originally, the study was to include only subjects
who had never been tested in the flume before (NFlumed).
However, due to limited recruitment time, the actual
study included 13 swimmers who had been tested previously
at the flume (Flumed). Thus, it was important to examine
any differences between these two groups.
First, there were no significant differences between
Flumed (N=13) and NFlumed (N=20) subjects for age, skill
level, sport trait-anxiety, baseline resting heart rate,
or ratings of perceived exertion. However, a one-way
ANOVA showed that NFlumed subjects attributed
significantly more importance to the flume test than did
the Flumed subjects [F(1,32)=4.1, p=.05]. Next, a MANOVA
conducted on the four psychological variables at baseline
was not significant [F=2.57, p=.06] and therefore not
interpretable. However, exploratory analyses were


36
Arousal
While the concept of arousal is somewhat amorphous,
much attention has been focused on its relationship to
performance. Early hypotheses derived from drive theory
suggested that there was a positive, linear relationship
between arousal and performance (Hull, 1943; Spence,
1951) This view received little empirical support and
has principally been replaced by the inverted-U theory
which posits a curvilinear relationship between arousal
and performance. Increases in arousal are associated
with increases in performance to an optimal level, beyond
which decrements in performance ensue (Easterbrook, 1959;
Yerkes & Dodson, 1908).
The inverted-U concept has been based on the
relationship between arousal, task difficulty, and
performance. The hypothesis arose as a result of
research by Yerkes and Dodson (1908), who discovered that
mice learned to discriminate brightness more quickly with
increases in the strength of an electric shock, as long
as the discrimination task was relatively simple. As the
task became harder, the optimal shock level for learning
was progressively reduced. From this study arose the
Yerkes-Dodson law which can be expressed as follows:
(a) For any task there is an optimal level of
arousal such that performance is related to arousal
in the form of an inverted U.
(b) The optimum level of arousal is a
decreasing monotonic function of the difficulty
of the task. (Hockey, 1979, p. 143)


75
anxiety measures would relate more strongly to behavior
in the critical situations than would general
transituational anxiety" (p. 420). Therefore, the SAS
was chosen rather than Spielberger's Trait Anxiety Scale
(Spielberger et al., 1970), since the latter is a general
measure of trait anxiety and is thought to be less
predictive of trait anxiety in sport than the SAS.
The SAS was also chosen instead of the Sport
Competition Anxiety Test (SCAT; Martens, 1977) since the
latter only provides a unidimensional measure of sport-
specific trait anxiety (primarily somatic anxiety),
whereas the SAS provides a multidimensional measurement
of the construct (i.e., somatic anxiety, worry, and
concentration disruption, across competitive sport
situations). A multidimensional assessment is desirable
since "anxiety involves three separate and largely
independent cognitive, physiological, and behavioral
response dimensions.... [and] that these dimensions may
differentially affect behavior" (Smith & Smoll, 1990, p.
420). It was important to know which component of
anxiety, if either, would most affect swimmers in the
flume.
Finally, this scale was used to predict the
intensity of anxiety which may be experienced in the
flume across differing evaluative conditions (see
following measure). Spielberger (1972) writes that
"situation-specific trait anxiety measures are better


131
Venables, P. H. (1984). Arousal: An examination of its
status as a concept. In M. Coles, J. Jennings, & J.
Stern (Eds.), Psvchophvsiological perspectives:
Festschrift for Beatrice and John Lacev (pp. 134-
142). New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold.
Weinberg, R. S. (1978). The effects of success and
failure on the patterning of neuromuscular energy.
Journal of Motor Behavior. 10, 53-61.
Weinberg, R. S. (1990). Anxiety and motor performance:
Where to from here? Anxiety Research. 2, 227-242.
Weinberg, R. S., & Genuchi, M. (1980). Relationship
between competitive trait anxiety, state anxiety, and
golf performance: A field study. Journal of Sport
Psychology. 2, 148-154.
Weinberg, R. S., Gould, D., & Jackson, A. (1979).
Expectations and performance: An empirical test of
Bandura's self-efficacy theory. Journal of Sport
Psychology. 1, 320-331.
Weinberg, R. S., & Hunt, V. V. (1976). The
interrelationships between anxiety, motor performance
and electromyography. Journal of Motor Behavior. 8,
219-224.
Welford, A. T. (1976). Skilled performance. Brighton,
England: Scott Foresman and Company.
Wilkinson, R. T. (1961). Interaction of lack of sleep
with knowledge of results, repeated testing and
individual differences. Journal of Experimental
Psychology. 62, 263-271.
Williams, J. M., Tonymon, P., & Andersen, M. B. (1991).
The effects of stressors and coping resources on
anxiety and peripheral narrowing. Journal of Applied
Sport Psychology. 3, 126-141.
Wine, J. D. (1971). Test anxiety and direction of
attention. Psychological Bulletin. 76, 92-104.
Wine, J. D. (1980). Cognitive-attentional theory of test
anxiety. In I.G. Sarason (Ed.), Test anxiety:
Theory, research and applications (pp. 349-385).
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Yerkes, R. M., & Dodson, J. D. (1908). The relation of
strength of stimulus to rapidity of habit formation.
Journal of Comparative and Neurological Psychology.
18, 459-482.


110
instructional manipulation became increasingly anxiety-
producing. (2) The greatest performance decrements would
occur in those swimmers who demonstrated the greatest
increases in cognitive anxiety from baseline to evaluated
swims. (3) Cognitive anxiety would be more clearly related
to performance than would somatic anxiety.
Although none of these hypotheses could be tested
directly, the second one could be examined inversely. Here
the question might be stated as follows. Does a trend of
diminishing anxiety lead to better performances? The
findings indicated that there were non-significant increases
in propelling efficiency from baseline to the second swim
(before which the swimmers had reported less anxiety).
However, decreases in anxiety were not significantly related
to increases in propelling efficiency. Rather, it is
thought that these slight changes were a function of a
practice effect. That is, swimming in the flume once
facilitated a slightly more efficient swim during the second
trial.
The fourth hypothesis postulated that significant
decreases in propelling efficiency would most likely be due
to a significant decrement in the finish phase of the
stroke. However, since there were overall increases in the
propelling efficiency, this hypothesis was also untestable.
An interesting correlational finding was that of the
relationship between state anxiety, self-confidence and
skill level. Although these two psychological variables


33
anxiety, sexual excitement, fear or exhilaration (cf.
Apter, 1982). In an early paper discussing the nature
and measurement of anxiety, Cattell (1963) found that the
correlation between heart rate and anxiety is only a
moderately positive one, again suggesting a variable
relationship between arousal and anxiety. Zaichkowsky
and Takenaka (in press) suggest that although anxiety is
typically associated with an increase in arousal, the two
constructs are not the same. Drawing from the previous
discussion of the anxiety concept, it appears more useful
to discuss how the subcomponents of anxiety relate to
arousal rather than trying to establish a relationship
between the broad term anxiety and arousal. Clearly,
cognitive anxiety is unlikely to occur during a highly
arousing condition such as excitement, which is described
by Apter (1984) as a "paratelic state".
On the other hand, cognitive anxiety will likely
occur during what Apter terms a "telic state" (e.g., a
high arousal condition of fear). For example, two rock
climbers (or skydivers, or bull-riders) experience
heightened arousal related to the potential threat
(falling). One feels challenged by the climb and
experiences the situation in the paratelic mode (i.e.,
with excitement). The other, less confident athlete
experiences the situation in the telic mode (i.e., with
fear and anxiety). In both situations, the climbers will
likely experience increases in arousal and report somatic


89
Table 2
Means and Standard Deviations of Psychological and
Physiological Reactions to the Flume by Group
MEASURE
Low
GROUP
Moderate
High
State Anxiety
(SAI)
Pre
39.0
(7.6)
38.8
(12.5)
38.5
(7.0)
Post
31.2
(6.2)
37.6
(9.4)
36.8
(10.7)
Cognitive Anxiety (CSAI-Cog)
Pre
16.7
(3.9)
16.6
(5.9)
15.3
(2.9)
Post
13.6
(3.7)
14.8
(4.6)
15.9
(4.3)
Somatic Anxiety (CSAI
-Som)
Pre
16.2
(5.8)
17.5
(7.8)
17.4
(4.9)
Post
12.0
(2.2)
14.0
(4.1)
15.1
(6.5)
Self-Confidence (CSAI
-SC)
Pre
23.9
(5.3)
24.0
(6.1)
25.4
(4.1)
Post
27.7
(4.9)
26.5
(6.1)
25.9
(6.1)
Resting Heart
Rate (RHR)
Pre
76.3 (11.5)
69.3
(7.3)
79.6
(13.3)
Post
79.1
(6.4)
77.3
(15.1)
79.6
(13.1)
Ratings of Perceived
Exertion
(RPE)
Pre
11.2
(1.5)
11.2
(1.2)
10.9
(1.6)
Post
11.9
(1.8)
11.7
(2.2)
12.0
(1.6)


116
Given that the baseline swim appeared to buffer the
anxiety manipulations, it could be suggested to eliminate
the baseline swim and obtain a one-time measure. This had
been considered in the current study but was decided against
in that the investigator would have had to use imprecise
measures of propelling efficiency (e.g., best time) to match
subjects. Thus, one would have had to assume that
propelling efficiency was the same for certain subjects in
order to examine any effects of anxiety on efficiency. This
would prohibit the intraindividual analyses that several
sport psychology researchers have suggested are very
important (Burton, 1988; Gould & Krane, in press; Weinberg,
1990).
It has been suggested that task complexity is
determined by the perceived demands of a skill (Ebbeck &
Weiss, 1988). Thus, a potential modification of the current
study which could still utilize a baseline and test swim
might prove useful. In this case, prior to the second swim,
subjects in the high anxiety group could be instructed that
they would begin their swim at the same speed as the warm-up
baseline swim (80%), but that the speed would increase
shortly following the sound of a tone. "The speed will
increase until you are no longer able to keep up and your
feet touch the gate at the end of the flume. Your task will
be to try to avoid touching the gate for as long as
possible."


78
Correlations can be performed to determine which of these
components is most highly related to the overall state
anxiety from the SAI.
Ratings of Perceived Exertion scale (RPE; Borg, 1962)
This one-item scale quantifies an individual's
rating of exertion level from 6 (no exertion or "very,
very light") to 20 (maximal exertion or "very, very
hard"), and was used to assess a swimmer's perception of
exertion in the flume. This scale was developed by
Gunnar Borg, a psychologist who was interested in
relating sensations of effort to quantifiable physical
stimuli (Noble, 1986). Test-retest reliability is good,
with coefficients from .78 .99. The construct validity
has been established since RPE is essentially linearly
related to heart rate, oxygen consumption, and lactic
acid accumulation in most exercise tasks (Noble, 1986),
with correlations between exercise intensity and RPE
approximately .85 (Borg & Noble, 1974).
In the current study, the RPE was used to determine
the swimmers' perceptions of effort under two separate
swimming conditions (i.e., baseline and evaluated test).
Since the flume speed was identical under both conditions
for any one swimmer, any differences in RPE would be
important in understanding the effects of anxiety on
swimming performance and perceived exertion.


122
Duffy, E. (1957). The psychological significance of the
concept of "arousal" or "activation". Psychological
Review. 64, 265-275.
Duffy, E. (1962). Activation and behavior. New York:
Wiley.
Easterbrook, J. A. (1959). The effect of emotion on cue
utilization and the organization of behavior.
Psychological Review. 66, 183-201.
Ebbeck, V., & Weiss, M. R. (1988). The arousal-
performance relationship: Task characteristics and
performance measures in track and field athletics.
The Sport Psychologist. 2, 13-27.
Eysenck, M. W. (1982). Attention and arousal: Cognition
and performance. New York: Springer-Verlag.
Eysenck, M. W. (1984). A handbook of cognitive
psychology. London: LEA publishers.
Fahrenberg, J., Walschburger, P., Foerster, F., Myrtek,
M., & Muller, W. (1983). An evaluation of state,
trait, and reaction aspects of activation processes.
Psychophysiology. 20. 188-194.
Feltz, D. L., Landers, D. M., & Raeder, U. (1979).
Enhancing self-efficacy in high-avoidance motor
tasks: A comparison of modeling technigues. Journal
of Sport Psychology. 1, 112-122.
Fenz, W. D. (1988). Learning to anticipate stressful
events. Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology.
10, 223-228.
Frankl, V. E. (1969). The will to meaning: Foundations
and applications of logotherapy. New York: Plume.
Gerson, R., & Deshaies, P. (1978). Competitive trait
anxiety and performance as predictors of
precompetitive state anxiety. International Journal
of Sport Psychology. 9, 16-26.
Gould, D., & Krane, V. (in press). The arousal-athletic
performance relationship: Current status and future
directions. In T. Horn (Ed.), Advances in sport
psychology. Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics.
Gould, D., Petlichkoff, L., & Weinberg, R. S. (1984).
Antecedents of temporal changes in, and between,
CSAI-2 subcomponents. Journal of Sport Psychology.
6, 289-304.


5
competitive anxiety and sports performance. To date,
research in this area has been hampered by methodological
problems (e.g., Gould, Petlichkoff, Simons, & Vevera,
1987; McCauley, 1985), statistical problems (cf. Smith,
1989), the use of poor outcome measures (cf., Martens,
Vealey, & Burton, 1990) and definitional inconsistencies
(cf. Gould & Krane, in press; Weinberg, 1990). Clearly,
more methodologically sophisticated research in this area
is needed, as several current sources recommend (e.g.,
Gould & Krane, in press; Jones & Hardy, 1990; Martens,
Vealey, & Burton, 1990; Weinberg, 1990).
Some of the confusion in this area stems from
definitional problems. The terms anxiety, arousal,
somatic anxiety, and stress, for example, have often been
used interchangeably in the basic and applied research
literature (Gould & Krane, in press; Weinberg, 1990).
This has posed more than merely a semantic problem, in
that different constructs have been proposed to have
varying relationships to skilled motor performance. For
example, what is the difference between somatic anxiety
and arousal or between cognitive anxiety and arousal?
And, do they have different effects on sports
performance? Issues pertaining to the definition of
constructs such as anxiety and arousal will be addressed
in a later section.
Apart from strictly definitional problems, another
important issue has to do with the multidimensional


113
sports performance. Also, the sample that was tested in
this study was relatively small.
This study was also designed to examine the testing
procedures at United States Swimming to discern whether
information obtained on swimmers was affected by excessive
anxiety. Clearly, the analyses in this study did not
confirm any problems related to the assessment of swimming
with regards to anxiety. Indeed, the current findings
suggest that assessment in the flume is likely less anxiety-
producing than most competitive events. However, it was
demonstrated that swimmers new to the flume reported more
anxiety and less self-confidence than did those who had been
previously tested. Despite the fact that these variables
did not significantly predict stroke efficiency for those
swimmers who were more anxious when facing the flume
evaluation, there may have been other factors that were
affected (e.g., maximal oxygen uptake, catecholamines) and
which could be measured in subsequent investigations. Also,
the finding that a difference may exist in the manner in
which some swimmers approach their initial testing session
might be utilized by U.S. Swimming, if only to help
examiners be sensitive to some swimmers' uncomfortable
feelings in approaching the flume evaluation. Obviously,
however, based on the non-significant findings, the results
of the current study provide no basis for recommending
alterations of the testing protocol.


63
is likely due to the conceptual and methodological
problems that there is no consensus as to the nature of
the relationship of competitive anxiety to competitive
performance.
To recapitulate, it has been suggested that
competitive anxiety be recognized as having both state
and trait components, and both cognitive and somatic
components. It is accepted that state competitive
anxiety is more closely related to performance than is
trait competitive anxiety. However, beyond this obvious
conclusion, there is no definite evidence as to the
relationship among the rest of the factors. Depending on
the study, it has been suggested that cognitive anxiety
is more associated with sports performance than is
somatic anxiety (and vice-versa). It has been suggested
that the relationship between somatic (and/or cognitive)
anxiety and performance is of an inverted-U nature, is
negatively linear, or is irrelevant. In the next
section, this issue will addressed in demonstrating the
need for the current study.
Summary of Literature Review and Restatement
of Need for Current Study
Anxiety can be defined as the experience of
distressing thoughts (e.g., fear of evaluation, worry,
self-doubt) and usually physiological sensations (e.g.,
dry mouth, racing heart rate) which are induced in


44
performance at an individual level; that is, each athlete
has a particular arousal level where performance is
optimal, regardless of the absolute level which can be
low, medium, or high. This level has been declared the
"zone of optimal functioning" (ZOF). The ZOF theory is
generally endorsed by Jones and Hardy (1989) who suggest
that in explaining or predicting sport performance, one
should take into account the nature of the stressor, the
mental demands of the competitive task, and the
psychological characteristics of the athlete.
In two studies purporting to examine the ZOF theory,
Raglin and his associates (Raglin & Morgan, 1988; Raglin,
Wise, & Morgan, 1990) demonstrated that swimmers reported
increased state anxiety (the authors' measure of arousal)
before competition, and significantly more anxiety prior
to a difficult meet as compared to an easy one.
Interestingly, swimmers who had the most successful
performances were best at predicting their pre-
competitive anxiety levels 24 to 48 hours in advance of
actual competition. The researchers conclude in support
for Hanin's ZOF theory and reject the inverted-U
hypothesis which they suggest does not take into account
individual differences. This is not an appropriate
conclusion because of their misinterpretation of the
inverted-U hypothesis. Raglin, Wise, and Morgan (1990)
state that "the inverted U-theory [sic] is the most well-
known theory of anxiety and sport performance, and this


129
Sarason, I. G., Sarason, B. R., & Pierce, G. R. (1990).
Social support, personality, and performance.
Journal of Applied Sport Psychology. 2, 117-127.
Scanlan, T. K. (1984). Competitive stress and the child
athlete. In J. Silva & R. Weinberg (Eds.),
Psychological foundations of sport (pp. 118-129).
Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics.
Scanlan, T. K., Stein, G. L., & Ravizza, K. (1991). An
in-depth study of former elite figure skaters III:
Sources of stress. Journal of Sport and Exercise
Psychology. 13. 103-120.
Schleihauf, R. E. (1979). A hydrodynamic analysis of
swimming propulsion. In J. Terauds & W. Bedingfield
(Eds.), Swimming III (pp. 70-109). Baltimore:
University Park Press.
Silva, J. M. (1992). On advancement: An editorial.
Journal of Applied Sport Psychology. 4, 1-9.
Singer, R. N. (1989). Applied sport psychology in the
United States. Journal of Applied Sport Psychology.
1, 61-80.
Singer, R. N. (1992). What in the world is happening in
sport psychology? Journal of Applied Sport
Psychology. 4, 63-76.
Singer, R. N., Cauraugh, J. H., Tennant, L. K., Murphey,
M., Chen, D., & Lidor, R. (1991). Attention and
distractors: Considerations for enhancing sport
performances. International Journal of Sport
Psychology. 22., 95-114.
Singer, R. N., Flora, L. A., & Abourezk, T. L., (1989).
The effect of a five-step cognitive learning strategy
on the acguisition of a complex motor task. Journal
of Applied Sport Psychology. 1, 98-108.
Smith, R. E. (1989). Conceptual and statistical issues
in research involving multidimensional anxiety
scales. Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology.
11. 452-457.
Smith, R. E., & Smoll, F. L. (1990). Sport performance
anxiety. In H. Leitenberg (Ed.), Handbook of social
and evaluation anxiety (417-454). New York: Plenum
Press.


RESULTS
The primary purpose of the analyses was to determine
the effects of different imposed degrees of anxiety on
performance as well as the nature of the relationship
among the various measures of anxiety, physiological
arousal, and the sport performance outcome measure (i.e.,
freestyle swimming efficiency). In all analyses, an
alpha level of .05 was set as the criterion for
determining statistical significance. All significance
tests were examined using a conservative two-tailed
approach, despite having directional predictions. This
offset slightly the less conservative approach of
utilizing the alpha level of .05 in multiple analyses.
Subjects
As mentioned in the methodology section, swimmers
were assigned to one of three groups to ensure that each
group would have a subject composition that was
equivalent on trait anxiety in sport (Sport Anxiety Scale
scores), skill level (best freestyle time), and age.
This procedure was followed (instead of utilizing
randomization for subject assignment) due to the small
subject sample size and in order to increase the power of
statistical analyses by eliminating the need for
85


71
Measures
This section contains descriptions of swimming
performance variables, physiological indices, and
psychological measures.
Performance and Physiological Indices
Flume evaluation
Each swimmer was instructed to swim freestyle in the
flume, during which time they were videotaped in order to
assess swimming efficiency. Analyzing the arm stroke is
vital to evaluating the swimmer's technique. Reilly,
Kame, Termin, Tendesco, and Pendergast (1990) describe
the basic mechanics of swimming as follows:
In swimming, a propulsive force equal to or greater
than the water resistance (body drag) must be
generated by the swimmer to maintain a constant
speed or to accelerate . The propulsive force
is provided by a combination of arm stroke and leg
kick, although it would appear that the arm stroke
is more important than the leg kick in freestyle
swimming. (Reilly et al., 1990, p. 19)
Subjects were filmed with two genlocked video
cameras in underwater housings (Pulnix 740 cameras, 60
Hz.) These cameras provided videotape to be digitized
for hydrodynamic biomechanical analysis. For digitizing,
one representative armstroke was chosen for analysis.
According to standard protocol of the flume, the
representative armstroke to be digitized for the
biomechanical analysis was approximately five strokes
from the end of the swim. Frames in each camera were
synchronized using the right arm entry. The following


132
Zaichkowsky, L. D., & Takenaka, K.
Optimizing arousal levels. In
Murphey, & L. K. Tennant (Eds.)
in sport psychology. New York:
(in press).
R. N. Singer, M.
, Handbook on research
Macmillan.


49
inverted-U function could describe the relationship
between competitive A-trait and basketball performance on
an intraindividual basis. In a similar study utilizing
golfers, Weinberg and Genuchi (1980) found that the
athletes lowest in competitive trait anxiety performed
better than moderate and high competitive A-trait golfers
(although there was no difference in performance between
the latter two groups). Also, competitive A-state was a
better predictor of performance than was competitive A-
trait.
Investigators have increasingly focused on the
effects of competitive state anxiety on performance.
Smith and Smoll (1990) assert that competitive state
anxiety is moderated by three factors. First is the
nature of the sporting situation in which the athlete is
competing (e.g., strength of opponents, significance of
the event, presence of spectators or significant others,
and social support from coaches or teammates). Second is
the magnitude of the athlete's competitive trait anxiety.
Third are the "psychological defenses that the athlete
may have developed to cope with anxiety-arousing
competitive situations" (p. 421). Furthermore, these
three factors are assumed to jointly influence the
athlete's appraisal processes. These processes include:
Appraisal of the situational demands; appraisal of
the resources available to deal with them; appraisal
of the nature and likelihood of the potential
consequences if the demands are not met (that is,
the expectancies and valances [sic] relating to


2
programs are integrated within an overall sports science
program (Gould, Tammen, Murphy, & May, 1989). Silva
(1992) writes that there has been "meteoric growth of the
professionalization of sport psychology" (p. 2), within
collegiate, professional, and Olympic sports. According
to Singer (1992), sport psychology is emerging at a swift
rate all around the world, with interventions and
instructional programs being offered by sport
psychologists to athletes and coaches in increasing
numbers. Others concur that the growth of sport
psychology has been substantial in the last decade, but
express concern about what they see as a lack of identity
in the field (Rejeski & Brawley, 1988).
There has also been an increase in sport psychology
research. This can be partially attributed to a growing
recognition that an understanding of relevant
psychological factors is essential to bringing about
improved sports performance. Research in this area has
included the analysis of attentional factors (e.g.,
Singer et al., 1991), burnout (e.g., Dale & Weinberg,
1990), developmental issues (e.g., Brodkin & Weiss,
1990), gender issues (e.g., Allison, 1991), goals (e.g.,
Lewthwaite, 1990), imagery (e.g., Rodgers, Hall, &
Buckholz, 1991), injury (e.g., Brewer, Van Raalte, &
Linder, 1991), mental errors (e.g., Bird & Horn, 1990),
motivation (e.g., Davis, 1991), self-confidence and
efficacy (e.g., Martin & Gill, 1991), skill acquisition


69
the swimmer received any instructions regarding
performance expectations and conditions {see methodology
section}.)
After obtaining consent, the Sport Anxiety Scale
(SAS; Smith, Smoll, & Schtz, 1990), which assesses the
tendency to experience anxiety within competitive sport
situations, was administered. Each swimmers7 best 100 yd
freestyle time over the past season (by self-report and
cross validation with the swimmer's coach) was also
recorded.
(2) Subjects were assigned to one of three groups and
were equivalent on scores of the SAS, age, and best
freestyle time (see Table 1, p. 88).
Flume Testing Procedures
(3) Two psychological questionnaires were administered:
the State component of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory
(SAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970) which
measures transitory emotional responses to a specific
situation, and the Competitive State Anxiety Inventory
(CSAI-2; Martens, Burton, et al., 1990) which measures
cognitive and somatic components of sport-specific state
anxiety, as well as self-confidence. Also, a one-item
Likert scale regarding the perceived importance of the
pending flume test was administered (i.e., "How important
to you is the upcoming flume evaluation on a scale of 1
to 10 [very important]?").
(4) Resting heart rate (RHR) was taken.


127
Morris, L., Davis, D., & Hutchings, C. (1981). Cognitive
and emotional components of anxiety: Literature
review and revised worry-emotionality scale. Journal
of Educational Psychology. 73. 541-555.
Morris, L., Harris, E. W., & Rovins, D. S. (1981).
Interactive effects of generalized and situational
expectancies on cognitive and emotional components of
social anxiety. Journal of Research in Personality.
15, 302-311.
Morris, L., Smith, L. R., Andrews, E. S., & Morris, N. C.
(1975). The relationship of emotionality and worry
components of anxiety to motor skills performance.
Journal of Motor Behavior. 7, 121-130.
Murphy, S. M. (1988). The on-site provision of sport
psychology services at the 1987 U.S. Olympic
Festival. The Sport Psychologist. 2, 337-350.
Murphy, S. M., & Woolfolk, R. L. (1987). The effects of
cognitive interventions on competitive anxiety and
performance on a fine motor skill accuracy task.
International Journal of Psychology. 18, 152-166.
Neiss, R. (1988a). Reconceptualizing arousal:
Psychobiological states in motor performance.
Psychological Bulletin. 103. 345-366.
Neiss, R. (1988b). Reconceptualizing relaxation
treatments: Psychobiological states in sports.
Clinical Psychology Review. 8, 139-159.
Neiss, R. (1990). Ending arousal's reign of error: A
reply to Anderson. Psychological Bulletin. 107,
101-105.
Noble, B. J. (1986). Physiology of exercise and sport.
St. Louis: Times Mirror/Mosby College Publishing.
Ogilvie, B. C., Haase, H., Jokl, E., Krandiotis, D. T.,
Mahoney, M., & Nideffer, R. (1979). Critical issues
in the application of clinical psychology in the
sport setting. International Journal of Sport
Psychology. 10, 178-183.
Oxendine, J. B. (1970). Emotional arousal and motor
performance. Quest. 13, 23-32.
Oxendine, J. B. (1980). Emotional arousal and motor
performance. In R. Suinn (Ed.), Psychology in
sports: Methods and applications (pp. 103-111).
Minneapolis: Burgess.


UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA