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United States policy and activities in Haiti

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United States policy and activities in Haiti hearing before the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fourth Congress, first session, February 24, 1995
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UNITED STATES POLICY AND

ACTIVITIES IN HAITI









HEARING
BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

FEBRUARY 24, 1995

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations





ALUMB A UNIVEI7RSTY
LAW LIBR-?.-,'Y



U. S. DEPOSITORY
COPY,

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
90-899 WASHINGTON : 1995

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
ISBN 0-16-047349-7


f -1 I


























COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman


WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa
TOBY ROTH, Wisconsin
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
DAN BURTON, Indiana
JAN MEYERS, Kansas
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
PETER T. KING, New York
JAY KIM, California
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
DAVID FUNDERBURK, North Carolina
STEVEN J. CHABOT, Ohio
MARSHALL "MARK" SANFORD, South
Carolina
MATT SALMON, Arizona
AMO HOUGHTON, New York


LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana
SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
TOM LANTOS, California
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
HARRY JOHNSTON, Florida
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
Samoa
MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
ALBERT RUSSELL WYNN, Maryland
MICHAEL R. McNULTY, New York
JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia
VICTOR O. FRAZER, Virgin Islands (Ind.)


RICHARD J. GARON, Chief of Staff
MICHAEL H. VAN DUSEN, Democratic Chief of Staff
ROGER F. NORIEGA, Republican Professional Staff Member
PARKER H. BRENT, Staff Associate

(II)


d~r


tistJ ~ \















CONTENTS


WITNESS
Page
The Honorable Charles B. Rangel, a Representative in Congress from the
State of N ew Y ork 2
The Honorable Porter J. Goss, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Florida 4
The Honorable Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State 7
The Honorable Walter B. Slocombe, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 9
Bernard Aronson, former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American
A affairs 35
Prof. Allen Weinstein, president, the Center for Democracy 38
Peter Johnson, executive director, Caribbean Latin American Action 41
Major F. Andy Messing, Jr., USAR (Ret.), executive director, National De-
fense Council Foundation 44

APPENDIX
Prepared statements:
The Honorable Charles B. Rangel 61
The H onorable Porter J. Goss 65
The Honorable Strobe Talbott 68
The Honorable Walter B. Slocombe . 84
Bernard Aronson . 88
Prof. Allen W einstein 91
Peter Johnson 96
The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman 106
The Honorable Donald M. Payne 110
The Honorable Christopher H. Smith 112
The Honorable Cynthia A. McKinney 113
Article entitled "A Peacekeeping Job Half-Done", by F. Andy Messing, Jr.,
Los Angeles Times, February 21, 1995 . 114
Article entitled "No Time for Defense Downsizing", by F. Andy Messing
Jr., "The World and I" 115
Responses to questions from the Department of State 121
Responses to questions from the Department of Defense 125

(III)











UNITED STATES POLICY AND ACTIVITIES IN
HAITI

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 1995
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to other business, at 9:48 a.m. in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A. Gil-
man (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Chairman GILMAN. The subject of today's hearing is Haiti, a tiny
Caribbean nation where the United States has made an extraor-
dinary investment of military resources, international credibility,
and $850 million in tax dollars.
The task before our committee is to assess whether the adminis-
tration's strategy promises the best and most effective return on
our investment. I would like to offer a few observations and rec-
ommendations that I hope would serve as a basis for a bipartisan,
sustainable Haiti policy that, quite frankly, does not now exist.
I submit we cannot truly help nations by making them depend-
ent on aid programs with short-term, short-lived benefits. Imme-
diate incentives for the private sector are urgently needed to create
sustainable jobs in Haiti and to meet high expectations among Hai-
ti's desperate poor.
Many of our colleagues and I are disappointed that this key sec-
tor was virtually ignored in the initial U.S. emergency aid plans.
Since the occupation, some new programs are being developed and
will soon be announced.
We must also strengthen all of Haiti's democratic institutions so
that democrats who struggled in vain for decades finally get the
chance to rebuild their own nation. That, after all, is why President
Clinton rushed to invade, occupy, and effectively run Haiti without
seeking any congressional authorization.
Not all of Haiti's democrats serve in the executive branch or fol-
low the Lavalas movement. To the extent that any Haitian per-
ceives U.S. favoritism, the stated objective of institutionalizing de-
mocracy is undermined.
Regarding the elections, immediate steps should be taken to help
ensure a level playing field and a secure environment leading up
to parliamentary and presidential elections this year. I am pleased
to note that the delegation of former President Carter, Senator
Sam Nunn, and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin
Powell is in Haiti this very day pursuing this and other issues.
Regarding the professionalism of Haiti's new security force, its
leaders and members should be chosen based on merit alone, not







loyalty to any particular political movement. It should also meet at
least minimal human rights standards.
I encourage the administration's efforts to ensure the integrity of
these programs and will continue to monitor those developments
closely. These are just a few key issues that I hope our witnesses
will be able to address this morning. Progress in these areas will
be scrutinized as Congress evaluates the soundness of a sustain-
able Haiti policy.
We are pleased that we have several Congressional witnesses
this morning. Our first witnesses are Congressman Charles Rangel
of New York and Congressman Poter Goss, two of the most knowl-
edgeable Members of Congress on the issue of Haiti. We are
pleased to welcome them this morning. We invite you to make brief
statements and submit any written statements for the record, but
before proceeding, I would like to recognize our ranking minority
member, Mr. Hamilton.
Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I have no statement, I would just welcome Mr. Rangel to the
committee this morning. We are delighted to have you with us,
Charlie, and likewise Porter Goss, although I don't see him at the
moment. We look forward to your testimony.
Chairman GILMAN. Before allowing our witnesses to proceed, are
there any opening comments that any of our members would like
to make?
If not, Mr. Rangel, please proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES RANGEL, A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Chairman, I would like permission to submit
my testimony and just highlight my thoughts.
Assuming that permission is granted, I want to thank you, Mr.
Gilman and Mr. Hamilton for the sensitivity that you have shared
over the years, but more particularly the last few years with regard
to this fragile country.
Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Rangel, could we ask you to move the
mike a little closer to you. It is voice activated.
Mr. RANGEL. Ever since I can remember, Haiti was always de-
scribed as a beautiful country but the poverty was so devastating
that people just did not want to leave their hotel or leave the
beaches to even see it. For a variety of political reasons, dictator-
ships have just sapped the blood out of this country; Yet dramati-
cally, when given an opportunity to vote for democracy, I can think
of no time in recent history, where people actually were killed; and
they still came out to vote even though the military was doing all
that they could to stop that vote.
Finally one of our Ambassadors decided that he was going to con-
vince the military that it was in the best interest of Haiti to allow
the elections; while it was true that the United States had a dif-
ferent candidate, President Aristide received the overwhelming
support of the people in Haiti. I don't think that that set politically
well within our State Department, but nevertheless he had to be
supported and to a certain degree he was.
For whatever reason, the military took over that country, and we
saw a reign of absolute terror. To my surprise, there was substan-







tial support for the military regime right within our own State De-
partment; but because of you, Mr. Gilman and Mr. Hamilton, other
Members of Congress, including the members of the Congressional
Black Caucus, we knew that we could not tolerate in this hemi-
sphere seeing democracy overturned by ambitious military leaders.
I got the impression that it wasn't just Haiti we were talking
about, we were talking about the reputation of the United States
of America where President Bush and President Clinton had indi-
cated that we would not tolerate that in this hemisphere. Even
though there was very little political support for the use of the
military in Haiti to restore Aristide and democracy, President Clin-
ton exercised extraordinary courage by doing this; it was one of the
most successful excursions and intrusions into another country in
terms of seeing democracy returned. I was pleased to see that
Speaker Gingrich had spoken publicly about the success of this
venture.
I cannot think of a more proud day that I felt as an American
than when I had the deep honor and high privilege to return to
Haiti with President Aristide. I witnessed the unharnessed love
and emotion extended to those who alit from the plane saying Unit-
ed States of America. I saw the love and deep appreciation the Hai-
tian people extended to our courageous military forces, who too felt
so proud that they played a part in the restoration of democracy
to Haiti.
I have talked with the new Prime Minister, and it is just unbe-
lievable the talent that exists in Haiti. This talent is rarely ac-
knowledged because we only have the media to share with us the
many bright people and leaders that we do have in this country.
I have spoken with businesspeople and well over half of those
that were in Haiti before the coup have started back into business.
I think one of the greatest things that has happened, and I think
Congressman Torricelli certainly has had more experience in these
international matters than I, was to see the CARICOM nations
come together on anything in support of Haiti, to see the Organiza-
tion of American States actually make an appeal to the United Na-
tions for help; and to see the United Nations going in with the
United States to lead the course in attempting to resolve this very
sensitive question.
I think Haiti is coming back. I think all of the nations of the
world are cooperating under our leadership and investing so that
we can see our roads, infrastructure, and businesses restored, be-
cause the name of the game, of course, is the economic recovery.
No democracy can survive with the people not working. But I think
that this committee should be proud of itself for the work that its
leadership has done in knowing that in our lifetime we can say
that we actually witnessed and was a part of restoring a President
to his country and to see that the support that was promised was
actually given. We hope to soon return to Haiti, under the leader-
ship of Chairman Gilman, as the President and the people of Haiti
have invited us to formally thank us for actually bringing liberty
back to them.
And so, distinguished members of this committee, I thank you for
what has been done; but I would also like to remind all of us that
we have some very sensitive days in front of us. I hope that we will







all be able to find some way to put our differences of how best to
have approached this problem behind us and to have the U.S. Con-
gress and our President clearly on the record in supporting this
fragile country in returning to some type of economic independence.
And I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rangel appears in the appendix.]
Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Rangel, we thank you for your comments.
We know you have been spending a great deal of your time and
efforts in the Congress in support of the Aristide regime and to try
to put Haiti back on its feet.
Do you have any major recommendation that you would like this
committee to explore with regard to trying to enhance the future
of Haiti?
Mr. RANGEL. Yes. I don't understand why there seems to be a di-
vision between reports done by the Central Intelligence Agency and
the State Department. Over the last several years it was as though
I was working with two different governments, and I don't know
whether this has stopped or not.
There have been reports that have been given by the CIA that
has portrayed President Aristide in such a way that anyone just
reading those reports would have the man committed, indicted, and
sent away; yet the State Department would say that they have
checked out everything, and they have convinced the President
that this doesn't exist.
I don't know how this can happen in our country because I have
talked with the people in the CIA, and they said their opinions
haven't changed. True, they haven't got any facts, but that is not
their job to be accurate. All they do is gather information and dis-
perse it. I don't think the time is right to have these allegations
made public when they are not based on fact; and I don't really
think that we have heard enough from the Congress in a positive
way saying, "If you can't prove it, don't say it." Certainly not the
CIA.
I hope that we could do this in such a way that it doesn't cause
any embarrassment to our Government. I think you know exactly
the reports that I am talking about.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Rangel.
I would like to ask Mr. Goss, who we are pleased to have before
us, would you care to do your statement now or would you want
to vote first and come back and do the statement? Whichever you
prefer.
Mr. Goss. Whichever the chairman prefers, of course.
Chairman GILMAN. Well, we want to accommodate you.
Mr. Goss. Mr. Chairman, in that case, may I submit my full
statement for the record at this time and make a few brief re-
marks.
Chairman GILMAN. We will be pleased to accept it. Why don't
you proceed, Mr. Goss.
STATEMENT OF HON. PORTER GOSS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA
Mr. Goss. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman,
I have a statement, and I am going to go beyond it because in addi-
tion to that, I have just read the report again.







Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Goss, will you put the mike closer to you.
Mr. Goss. I will be happy to. Is that a little better?
I have just had a chance to read the February 8 report, quarterly
report, and I feel that a serious number of questions have been
raised by that report. It is somewhat retrospective in reporting
what has happened, and to quote it, it says, "This report docu-
ments the success of our operation in Haiti to date."
As a good American, I am delighted we have had some success,
and I agree we have, but as a good American with oversight re-
sponsibility, I would suggest it is not all a record of success and
the report does leave some very clear questions on matters that I
would consider not to be too successful so far.
The report goes on to say that "we have restored the legitimate
democratically elected government of Haiti to power." It is that
type of delusion that is causing us a problem. We have just had an
exchange on that here. We are focusing on Aristide. Aristide is not
the Government of Haiti. Aristide is part of the Government of
Haiti. We have a serious problem with the parliament, getting a
parliamentary election taken care of there, and I am afraid that
what has happened is there has been so much time focused on the
debate over Aristide and getting him off the dole in the United
States and back into Haiti and getting him back in power as Presi-
dent, as the duly elected and popularly elected President by 70 per-
cent of the people, which is a wonderful accomplishment, but it is
not the end game of what we are trying to achieve in Haiti.
When I went through this report, I found a number of problems
that really derive from that. They go to the actual costs of this pro-
gram, which are extremely high, and are going to continue for some
period of time. I am not sure we are entirely on focus in the way
we are delivering our aid. There are immense aid packages that
any Congressman or woman would be delighted to have coming
into their districts, great efforts being done to rev up the economy,
and that is a wonderful thing.
I am not so sure it isn't being done at the wrong level. The peo-
ple I am talking to at the bottom level, the people who are in the
front lines of commerce, are not experiencing the same kinds of
success as is being reported in this document, and I think we need
to refocus our ideas there.
Talking to the parliamentarians and others there-and I will
close with this comment-I find that there is a very deep concern
that the U.S. program there, as good as it is, is very much biased
toward a pro-Lavalas side, and that is causing many of the others
who are participating in democracy there to have concern and to
have worry that we in fact are not going to achieve the stability
and security and the opportunity for economic investment that we
are all hoping for and frankly spending an awful lot of money on
right now.
Mr. Chairman, I hope I would be able to come back and pursue
some further questions on this with some of your other witnesses
if possible.
Chairman GILMAN. We would welcome that.
Mr. Goss. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Goss appears in the appendix.]
Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Rangel, will you be able to return?







Mr. RANGEL. Yes, but I would like to say, as I indicated before
Mr. Goss got here, that it was abundantly clear that the United
States of America unfortunately was backing a candidate in the
last election other than Mr. Aristide. I would hope that in the next
election that we just mind our own business and let the people of
Haiti decide who their President should be.
Mr. Goss. May I respond to that briefly, and just simply say the
next election is a parliamentary election, and we want to make cer-
tain that it has an across-the-board pluralistic atmosphere to it. I
would agree we should not be backing a presidential candidate, but
we should be backing democracy, and if we just back the pro-
Lavalas side, we are not doing that.
Chairman GILMAN. If both our panelists are willing to return, we
will stand in recess until the vote is over.
[Recess.]
Mr. BURTON [presiding]. Chairman Gilman had to go to a leader-
ship meeting, and he has asked me to chair this hearing until his
return.
Due to time constraints, we are going to go ahead with the sec-
ond panel because Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott I un-
derstand has to leave by noon.
Is that correct, Mr. Talbott?
Mr. TALBOTT. Yes, sir.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BURTON. Yes, sir.
Mr. LANTOS. Will you indulge me for a moment?
Mr. BURTON. Yes, sir.
Mr. LANTOS. I thank you very much.
Mr. Secretary, even though these are turbulent times, there is a
touch of civility and compassion left in this body, and I would like
to ask you on behalf of all of us to carry to Secretary Christopher
our warmest wishes for his speedy recovery. I have a card which
I will pass around in the firm knowledge that all Republicans and
Democrats will sign it. This will not be one of those cases where
we wish him well by a vote of 6 to 5. We publicly want to acknowl-
edge his enormous contributions to the foreign policy, the national
security of this Nation, and we hope he will return in full strength
very soon.
Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Lantos. I concur in that and I am
sure everybody on the Republican side as well.
Our administration witnesses this morning are Mr. Strobe
Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State, and Walter Slocombe, Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy. We received your written state-
ments which we will make a part of the record, and we invite you
to be brief in your opening remarks to allow ample opportunity for
Members' questions.
We also understand that along with Mr. Talbott we have Mr.
David Rothkopf of the Commerce Department, who heads the Haiti
Economic Development Working Group, who may be available to
answer questions, along with Mr. Mark Schneider, USAID Assist-
ant Administrator for Latin America and the Caribbean, and a
pretty nice fellow.
Mr. TALBOTT.







STATEMENT OF HON. STROBE TALBOTT, DEPUTY SECRETARY
OF STATE
Mr. TALBOTT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I might add
that I am also joined by Ambassador James Dobbins, who is the
coordinator of our programs in Haiti, and I would hope that you
might also extend your hospitality to him.
Mr. BURTON. We certainly do. I am sorry for that oversight. I
didn't have his name on our list here. So, Mr. Ambassador, wel-
come.
Mr. TALBOTT. Before going to the matter at hand, let me thank
you, Mr. Chairman and Congressman Lantos, and indeed all of
you, for your collective sentiment, your good wishes to Secretary
Christopher. As it happens, I spoke with Secretary Christopher by
telephone a little over an hour ago. He is, as you know, in Ottawa,
although he is returning to Washington today. He sounded fine. He
sounded slightly annoyed at this development because he has a lot
of important work to do. He is eager to get back both to Washing-
ton and to work, including the good work that he is doing with you
and with this committee and with your colleagues in the Congress.
But I will certainly convey your good wishes to him.
Under Secretary Slocombe and I welcome the chance to give you
a progress report on the U.S.-led, 31-nation effort that has rescued
a neighboring country from disaster, shored up stability in our re-
gion, and defended our Nation's values and interests. Operation
Uphold Democracy has peacefully ousted Haiti's brutal dictators,
restored its legitimate government, established a secure and stable
environment and is now preparing to pass the baton to a U.N. force
under a United States commander.
Had it not been for the deployment of the U.S.-led multinational
force on September 19 last year, your committee might well be
holding a very different sort of hearing today, a hearing to survey
the damage sustained and the damage to come as a result of a cri-
sis allowed to fester.
Think for a moment where we would likely be today had it not
been for the intervention last September. The dictators would still
be in power, and their campaign of murder and terror against the
Haitian people would be continuing. Tens of thousands of Haitians
would be seeking refuge abroad, posing a threat to America's bor-
ders and to regional stability. The U.S. Navy and Coast Guard
would still be diverting massive resources on an open-ended, if not
permanent basis to manage migrant interdiction and refugee proc-
essing along our own coastline.
Instead, thanks to Operation Uphold Democracy, life in Haiti is
generally secure today. The simple activities of everyday life, street
vendors plying their wares, children going to school, and families
attending church services have come alive again. Thousands of
men, women, and children who were in hiding or in exile during
the dark days of military rule, from members of Parliament to
mayors to clergy to entrepreneurs, have resumed normal lives.
The flood of migrants from Haiti which hit a high of over 3,000
per day in July, last year has virtually stopped. When our troops
arrived in Haiti there were an average of 10 to 15 serious incidents
of organized political violence reported each week. Today there are
virtually none.







Over 3,000 members of the interim public security force, trained
and recruited by our multinational force, are now on the streets of
Haiti and acting as public servants rather than as official thugs.
The interim forces are monitored and assisted by more than 600
international police monitors, or IPM's, spread throughout the
country. The IPM's are police officers recruited from more than 20
countries on 6 continents and they are under the leadership of
former New York Police Commissioner Ray Kelly.
As for the Haitian Armed Forces, we are ready to work with the
Haitian Government officials to make sure that the process of de-
mobilization, however far it may go, takes place in an orderly and
equitable fashion, consistent with President Aristide's emphasis on
reconciliation. To that end, more than 2,000 former soldiers have
been enrolled in a program of counseling and job training funded
by USAID.
Mr. Chairman, one measure of the security of the situation in
Haiti is the pace with which we are moving to turn the multi-
national forces responsibilities over to the U.N. mission. I am
pleased to report that we are on schedule.
The U.N. force in Haiti will take over on March 31. It will be
commanded by an American, Maj. Gen. Joseph Kinzer, and include
about 2,400 American troops as part of a total force of 6,000. The
United Nations will assume the costs for the American and inter-
national forces and the international police, costs that the United
States has been paying up until now.
Mr. Chairman, from the beginning our primary goal has been to
promote the process of democracy. Here, too, we are on schedule.
We are working with the U.N. mission and the Organization of
American States to ensure that the June legislative and local elec-
tions, as well as the Presidential elections in December, are as
open and fair as possible.
With this objective in mind, the responsibilities of the U.N. mis-
sion will end by February 1996 with the inauguration of President
Aristide's democratically elected successor. However, we all know
that no matter how successful the Haitian people are at establish-
ing a secure environment or building democratic institutions, sta-
bility will allude them without strong, steady, broad-based eco-
nomic growth.
For its part, the international community is doing its share by
funding programs that provide temporary jobs as well as emer-
gency food and medical care, that strengthen key democratic and
legal institutions and that spur economic growth.
At a meeting in Paris last month, international donors pledged
$1.2 billion. Non-American donors and lenders will provide over 75
percent of these funds, making this from an American standpoint
the most successful instance of burden sharing in the history of the
hemisphere. This demonstrates that American leadership can le-
verage tremendous power and resources on behalf of a common
good.
Haiti's real economic future, however, lies in the private sector.
That is why President Aristide has committed his government to
far-reaching programs of free market reform.
On March 7-8, I will lead a delegation of several dozen corporate
CEO's to Haiti to explore ways to spur private investment. I am







pleased that Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney will be accom-
panying us on that mission. So, too, will Peter Johnson, Executive
Director of Caribbean and Latin American Action, who will be ad-
dressing your committee later this morning.
We are also organizing nearly a dozen sector-specific business
missions to Haiti, bringing more than 200 United States business
executives in direct contact with Haitian businesses and Govern-
ment decisionmakers. In view of the significant overhaul needed for
Haiti's infrastructure and manufacturing sectors, these missions
will concentrate on telecommunications, power generation, trans-
portation, and the environment.
Mr. Chairman, our intervention in Haiti made sense for reasons
of American self-interest. That includes our economic self-interest.
Of course the operation has been costly, but these costs must be
judged in context, and that means, among other things, against the
costs we would have incurred had we continued with inaction.
Since September 19 the U.S. Government has spent about $700
million on Operation Uphold Democracy, most of which are one-
time-only costs, instead of continuing to pay some $300 million a
year for the costs of nonintervention. In Haiti we have made an in-
vestment that protects our borders, that has helped consolidate de-
mocracy in our hemisphere and that will help Haiti become a good
neighbor and stable partner in diplomacy and trade. Our interven-
tion also does justice to America's core values and principles.
The best defense of our Haiti policy is simple. We intervened be-
cause it was in our national interest, we intervened after every
other alternative had been exhausted, and we intervened because
it was the right thing to do. We cannot say yet mission accom-
plished, but we can say so far so good.
Five months after President Clinton sent our troops to their
country, Haitians are constructing roads to advance commerce and
build a civil society rather than roads to escape terror. Now we
must see the job through and that means until the completion of
the U.N. mission 12 months from now.
Much of the credit that we have seen so far goes to Generals
Shelton, Meade, and Fisher, to their officers, and to the troops
under their command.
With that in mind, I would like to turn the microphone over to
Under Secretary Slocombe who has some opening remarks of his
own.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Talbott appears in the appendix.]
Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Slocombe.

STATEMENT OF HON. WALTER B. SLOCOMBE, UNDER SEC-
RETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, ACCOMPANIED BY MARK
SCHNEIDER, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR LATIN AMER-
ICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, USAID
Mr. SLOCOMBE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again, like my colleague from the State Department, I appreciate
the opportunity to be here to update the committee on develop-
ments in Haiti, particularly from the point of view of the role of
the U.S. military. You have my prepared statement, and with your







permission I will summarize it, focusing particularly on the plans
for the transition to the U.N. force.
The United States military forces entered Haiti, as you all know,
on September 19, 1994, as part of a multinational force, authorized
by U.N. Security Council resolution to use all necessary means to
secure the departure of the coup leaders, to restore the legitimate
democratically elected Government of Haiti, and to create a secure
and stable environment that would allow the Haitian people to re-
sume responsibility for building their own country.
After less than a month, the coup leaders departed, and Presi-
dent Aristide returned to Haiti to assume control of his Govern-
ment. In the period before that transition, the U.S. military forces,
with the participation of other countries, had begun the process of
establishing their presence throughout the country to promote a
more secure environment and to make it possible to create a con-
text which was possible for international humanitarian assistance
to flow freely.
Although we recognized from the outset that it was not feasible
to attempt to search out every weapon in Haiti, the MNF has
seized nearly 30,000 weapons of various categories, including gre-
nades and explosives, as well as the entire very modest inventory
of heavy weapons possessed by the former Haitian army.
Essential public services such as electric power have been re-
stored in key areas, although there is still work to do in this area.
The military has provided limited assistance to Haitian Govern-
ment ministries by military civil affairs specialists whose role has
been key in helping those ministries on the process of reestablish-
ing functional governments. As conditions improved, it became pos-
sible to repatriate over 13,000 Haitians who had been at Guanta-
namo after fleeing Haiti under the military regime.
Throughout this process the problem of establishing a local pub-
lic security force has been central. The Government of Haiti, with
the assistance of the United States, has established an interim
public security force of approximately 3,000 people who used to be
in the Haitian Army, the FAd'H, who have been vetted, that is re-
viewed by both the Haitian authorities and the United States, and
about 1,000 people who had been trained from among the refugees
at Guantanamo.
With routine attrition there are now about 3,800 people in the
IPSF. That is now the police force in Haiti. Their purpose is to pro-
vide a transitional police presence. They operate under the general
supervision of something over 600 international police monitors.
They will continue this function until the new civilian Haitian na-
tional police is trained.
That Haitian police is to be comprised of about 4,000 people. The
first class has entered the police academy, which has been set up
for the purpose of training them. In addition, about 250 former
FAd'H have been assigned to a Presidential security detachment
which is being trained to provide a personal security for the Presi-
dent of the country.
FAd'H personnel who failed the vetting process have been reas-
signed to nondefense ministries or offered 6-month career transi-
tional training with pay under a contract program administered by







the USAID. Thus far, 2,000 screened out FAd'H members have
signed up for the training.
The new Haitian national police will be deployed incrementally
over the next 18 months. The first class entered training at the
first of this month with a similar number to begin training each
month until the force is fully staffed. The IPSF, that is the interim
police force, will be incrementally retired as the new national police
force takes over.
The accomplishments of the U.S. military are, I think, a subject
of which we can all be proud. They are accomplishments in a novel
environment and with a need to make literally within hours a shift
from a forcible entry to an entry pursuant to an agreement but into
a potentially hostile atmosphere, and their work since that time
has been a tribute to the professionalism and dedication of our
Armed Forces. The military has acted decisively, responsibly, hu-
manely, and effectively in a difficult and complex mission.
Though U.S. forces lead this mission, high appreciation and simi-
lar acknowledgment should go to the other 27 nations whose con-
tributions have made Operation Uphold Democracy a model for
international cooperation. We believe that same spirit of coopera-
tion will continue as we transition from the multinational force to
the U.N. so-called UNMIH mission.
This transition has always been planned to take place at about
this timeframe, and on January 30 U.N. Security Council passed
a resolution which in effect recognizes that the MNF sent to Haiti
has accomplished its tasks and it is now appropriate to transition
responsibilities to the U.N. mission in Haiti.
The U.N. Security Council resolution passed at the end of last
month specifies that this transition is to be completed by March 31,
and we have every expectation that that will, in fact, be the date.
Much remains to be done in Haiti, particularly as Secretary
Talbott's statement made clear on the economic front, but the mili-
tary role is largely completed, although there will be a continuing
need for military presence. The security environment throughout
the country, although far from perfect, continues to improve.
Common criminal activity and Haitian on Haitian violence con-
tinues, but reported incidents are declining. The tragic incident
with the American soldier killed at the toll booth sometime ago in-
dicates that an operation like this is never without risk, but we
know of no organized group capable of seriously threatening the
Haitian Government or the international presence, including the
American forces.
Nevertheless, the MNF security posture remains alert and pre-
pared to respond as necessary while preparations continue to tran-
sition responsibilities to the U.N. mission in Haiti. For several
months we have been consulting with the U.N. to determine how
the United States can best contribute to the UNMIH mission and
to promote continued recovery of Haiti's democratic institutions.
While there are still a few details to be concluded, I can provide
a general outline of how that force will operate. The force will be
authorized 6,000 troops. The United States is prepared to contrib-
ute approximately 2,500. About a dozen other countries are ex-
pected to provide the remaining 3,500 forces. Most of these are al-
ready a part of the MNF and will continue their participation in







the UNMIH and a schedule has been established for the rest to ar-
rive.
We are very close to final agreement on the force structure for
UNMIH. The U.S. forces will comprise less than half the total, but
they will represent critical capabilities.
In addition to providing the force commander, the members of
the headquarters staff, we expect to contribute a number of special-
ized forces such as medical, engineers, transportation, military po-
lice, civil affairs, special forces, aviation, and logistics.
In addition, there will be a contingent of combat units for a quick
reaction force. The largest single portion of our contribution to
UNMIH will be special forces units for training and coalition sup-
port, and a reaction force built around approximately just under
1,000 people, about 700 people in the quick reaction force.
Let me explain what the command structure will be. The U.N.
Mission in Haiti force commander will be an American officer. Maj.
Gen. Joseph Kinzer from the U.S. Army has been named as the
commander for U.N. forces in Haiti. He will also be the designated
commander of United States forces in Haiti.
As the UNMIH force commander, General Kinzer will make all
the decisions involving UNMIH military operations. The U.N. Sec-
retary General will, through a representative in Haiti, provide po-
litical direction and guidance.
All U.S. forces assigned to UNMIH will be under the operational
control of General Kinzer. As United States force commander in
Haiti, he will remain under the command of the Commander in
Chief, United States Atlantic Command, General Sheehan, and will
report directly to him. Thus, the chain of command from the Presi-
dent to the lowest United States commander on the ground in Haiti
will remain unbroken.
General Kinzer will also have a United States Army Brigadier
General who will serve as his deputy commander of the U.S. forces
in Haiti. The deputy will carry out the day-to-day management of
the United States contingent for General Kinzer.
It is also worth making the point that we have a clearly defined
end date for our participation in UNMIH. In accordance with the
relevant U.N. resolutions, UNMIH's mandate will end on February
1996. This will be, as Secretary Talbott said, after Haiti's Decem-
ber 1995 Presidential election, and the inauguration of President
Aristide's democratically elected successor.
Because I know it will be of concern to the Congress, let me out-
line a few basic points about the facts about the costs. The incre-
mental costs for United States participation in operations in Haiti
is projected to be out of defense resources $416 million in fiscal
year 1995. This funds U.S. participation in the multinational force
on the transition to the U.N. funded operation.
The fiscal year 1994 costs, that is for the year ending October 1
last year, were about $200 million for Operation Uphold Democracy
and $174 million for maritime interdiction of Haiti and the subse-
quent care, housing, and feeding of Haitian migrants at Guanta-
namo Bay.
The proposed DOD supplemental which is now before the Con-
gress, which covers operations in Haiti, among others, is crucial to
maintaining current levels of training and readiness for our mili-







tary services. This year's shortfall, if not corrected in a timely man-
ner, will have serious results on readiness.
Let me conclude by saying that the way in which the MNF mis-
sion has been planned and executed has incorporated many of the
lessons learned in past operations, both under U.N. auspices and
the operation in Panama. Similarly, as we assume a role in
UNMIH, we intend to apply the same lessons.
We are now entering a new phase of the task we undertook in
September of last year. This mission under the U.N. and the Unit-
ed States role in it will be somewhat different, but our focus on en-
suring a stable and secure environment that will give Haiti the
clear opportunity to revive its economy and rebuild its institutions
of government will remain clear.
I should make the point also that one thing will not change. U.S.
forces and all the other forces in the country will have the full au-
thority to take whatever actions are necessary for their own self-
defense as they carry out their missions.
I am confident that the success achieved in the past months will
continue in the weeks and months ahead as we proceed with the
transition of responsibilities. This is a difficult and challenging
task both for military and for the civilians, for the Americans
there, and for third country people, most of all for the people of
Haiti. We are well on our way toward a significant accomplish-
ment.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Slocombe appears in the appen-
dix.]
Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Slocombe, Mr. Talbott.
I was in Haiti last Friday. The picture that you paint isn't ex-
actly what I saw.
I first of all want to say that General Shelton, General Meade,
General Kinzer are all doing extraordinarily good jobs. The military
down there, every American ought to be proud of what they are
doing, but it is an extremely difficult situation for all of them.
I understand from Mr. Goss's testimony it is going to be about
$1.2 billion that will have been expended by February 1996, and
in your comments you said that a lot of that is going to end very
quickly because we are going to be turning that over to the United
Nations.
According to information that I received, in 1993 we spent-we
paid for 40 percent plus of U.N. peacekeeping operations, and in
1994 it was close to 80 percent, including all of the expenditures
that we paid for through the United Nations.
So saying it is going to be turned over to the United Nations is
kind of misleading because we are paying most of the freight for
these U.N. peacekeeping missions, even if we do turn that over to
someone else.
What I saw when I was down there was that there is a need for
some kind of a generation plant or generation plants, electrical
generation plants, because large parts of the country in Port-au-
Prince are without electricity for long periods of time. There is gar-
bage everywhere.
One of the enlisted men that I met with privately told me that
I should go visit the national prison in Port-au-Prince. They tried







to dissuade me from going, but I insisted, along with my delega-
tion.
Mr. SLOCOMBE. I have been there. It is appalling.
Mr. BURTON. I went into that prison and found that there had
been one cell where 500 prisoners had been housed for 6 months
standing in 6 inches of excrement, and that some of their feet be-
came gangrenous and they had to be amputated and many of them
suffer from hepatitis and other diseases.
That has since been cleaned up in large part by our troops, but
I also witnessed a wall about 30 feet high that had excrement, gar-
bage, and everything else hanging from it down at an angle of
about 30 or 40 feet. And our troops, one sergeant in particular had
been put in charge of cleaning that mess up, and I want to tell you,
he is doing yeoman's service for the people of Haiti and his country,
and fortunately he had some prisoners that were helping him. But
our troops are doing some real extraordinary work down there, and
I wish every American could see what I saw as far as their work
is concerned.
My major concern is that we are pouring all of this money into
that country, and unless there is a marked change in the way the
roads are being handled, American industry and other industries
around this country aren't going to want to go in there because
they can't function because you can't get through the two main ar-
teries of Port-au-Prince. It is bumper to bumper. We had a police
escort and we still had to wait for about 10 minutes in several
parts of that city. So it seems to me that that is one of the things,
along with the port, that have to be dealt with.
When I talked to the AID Director down there, we asked him
about his attempts to get the private sector of this country and
other countries in there to take up the slack so that the American
taxpayer doesn't have to pay the whole freight. His answer to me
was pretty much that they had been hiring people to clean up the
garbage and the mess there, several hundred people, but he didn't
indicate to me there had been any appreciable direction or move-
ment in the direction of getting the private sector involved.
I want to say to Mr. Talbott I am very happy that you are going
down there with a delegation of businessmen to try to get them in-
terested in getting that economy moving, but at the present time
it is an absolute shambles, and I am very concerned about the way
we are going about it. I would rather get the private sector in-
volved, as one Member of Congress, rather than have the American
taxpayer pay the freight for what appears to be an endless amount
of expenses down there.
Now, I had the opportunity at the request of President Aristide
because he had not yet entertained a Republican delegation, and
he was anxious to meet with somebody from the majority, so I did
go over to meet with him with our delegation, and I was concerned
about some of the things that had been brought to my attention
prior to our meeting. One, that Mr. Aristide still has people like
Mr. Cherubin in his inner circle.
Mr. Cherubin, you will recall, was kind of a butcher in Mr.
Aristide's administration and was responsible for many human
rights violations, and alleged murders. Mr. Cherubin is still an ad-
viser to Mr. Aristide, although Mr. Aristide told the Ambassador







who accompanied us after I left that he was going to make a
change.
I would strongly urge the State Department, Mr. Talbott and Mr.
Slocombe, to insist that the people who were perpetrating these
human rights violations in the Aristide administration before he
left the country be replaced because if those people are still in
power or advising Aristide, I am very concerned about long-term
human rights abuses.
I also talked to Mr. Aristide about the necklacing that he talked
about in some of his speeches, and I was happy to hear that he is
now going to try to reconcile the country and bring everybody to-
gether and stop these human rights abuses, and if that is the case,
if he does do that, I think that will be something we can all ap-
plaud.
Now, regarding the national police, I met with Mr. Kelly, whom
you refer to, and I think he is a perfect person to get that police
force in order. The problem is, of the first 1,200 people that had
been approved by the commission, the U.S. and Haitian commis-
sion, of the 1,200 people that had been approved to be members of
that new police force, Mr. Aristide out of hand had dismissed all
of them.
Now, we talked to him about that, and we understand that he
has since relented and said he would accept about 800 of the 1,200.
I think it is extremely important for our Government to make sure
that the police force down there is not of one mind and one think-
ing process because what I am afraid that would lead to is more
human rights abuses and violations.
So I would urge the administration and the Defense Department
and State Department to make sure that the commission rec-
ommendations are observed and that there is a truly independent
police force that is going to administer law and order and justice
in a very fair way. I think that is about all I have to say.
I do have a couple quick questions, and I am sorry I didn't start
my time, Mr. Hamilton, but I will try to conclude here pretty quick-
ly.
Why wasn't jump starting the private sector, particularly the as-
sembly sector, taken into account when USAID was designing its
massive aid program over the last year or more? For example, the
first formal mention of the enterprise development fund was in
Paris on January 31, 3V2 months after the occupation, and you
might want to ask the USAID representative to comment on that.
I might say before he comments or before you respond that I was
disappointed in the answers of the USAID person in charge when
I was down there because his indications to me were not that we
were trying to get private sectors involved but that we were going
to continue to have U.S. Government carry the bulk of this eco-
nomic solution. So that is my question. I will be happy to yield.
Mr. TALBOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be appreciative
if Mark Schneider would join us at the table.
Let me just say while he comes to the microphone, you shared
with us several exhortations, and I can answer you very succinctly
and I hope satisfactorily. The answer is yes. We, too, have had our
concerns about Mr. Cherubin. We have raised them persistently
and insistently with the Government of Haiti, and we are totally







confident that we are going to have a satisfactory resolution of that
issue forthwith.
Also, we are satisfied that, after some wrinkles which you re-
ferred to, proper vetting of the interim public security force is now
taking place and that it will indeed be the kind of broad-based or-
ganization that is consistent with President Aristide's own commit-
ment to reconciliation, and also I might add the commitment of his
Prime Minister Michel.
I don't know if you met with Prime Minister Michel when you
were there. You may know if you did meet with him that there are
representatives of six different Haitian political parties in his Cabi-
net.
Before turning the microphone over to Mr. Schneider, I would
just point out that as for jump starting, as it were, the economy
in the private sector, we had that very much in mind. Our priority
and strategy is very much the same as yours, but of course job one
was establishing a secure and stable environment. That had to
take precedence over everything else.
That said, when several of us visited Haiti very early on after the
intervention, and I went down there with Deputy Secretary of De-
fense Deutch and Deputy National Security Advisor Burger, we
made a point of meeting with representatives of the Haitian pri-
vate sector in order to understand their needs and concerns so that
we could factor that into our decisionmaking back here.
Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
If I could, I would like to go back to your point about Haiti's in-
frastructure and its importance in terms of permitting the private
sector to want to return and reinvest in Haiti. At the beginning,
we basically set ourselves a task of creating an environment that
would induce the private sector to reinvest in Haiti. Then we
looked at the steps necessary to- get there. As you recall, Deputy
Secretary Talbott testified that we have just secured pledges of
some $1.2 billion from a variety of international donors, in what is
probably the most successful effort ever in that regard. And about
187 million worth of those pledges from the World Bank, the IDB,
and the European Union are specifically focused on transportation
infrastructure. There are specific loans that will be used for road
building, bridge construction, ports, and the network of facilities for
the transportation sector. This is obviously crucial to the return of
the private sector.
The second point I would make is that in order for the private
sector to get the loans that it needs to operate, Haiti had to get
back in the good graces of the international financial community.
They were in arrears by some $83 million to the World Bank, the
IDB, and the IMF. We worked with Treasury in a very integrated,
coordinated, fashion, and Treasury put together a collection of do-
nors that helped Haiti clear those arrears and become eligible to
receive the kinds of loans for infrastructure, roads, industry, et
cetera, that will help spur the private sector recovery.
More directly, though, your point about the assembly sector is
something that we have been working on. The Deputy Secretary is
going to Haiti, as he said, in a week or so, and we are working with
OPIC, to produce very quickly a loan guarantee program. OPIC has
indicated they are ready to provide $100 million over the next sev-







eral years, and a portion of that will begin to flow immediately, to
be used to provide the kind of working capital that hopefully most
of the private sector will use to come back in.
The head of the Haitian industrial association, John Baker-
whom you may have met on your trip there and who has been
named by President Aristide to head a Government private sector
commission-indicated that about 32 of those firms have reopened
their doors with a low level of employment at this point, about
5,000. He said, but he does expect that to increase, and we hope
that the OPIC process will encourage that.
I should tell you that so far as USAID directly is concerned,
when you go through the various elements of the private sector, we
expect to be spending this year about $9 million in different pro-
grams aimed at providing credit to small businesses, and direct
support for the Mixed Commission led by John Baker looking at re-
form of the private sector, including the agricultural area.
I should add that since two-thirds of the Haitian labor force is
in agriculture, spuring small farmers and agriculture production is
one of the crucial issues in trying to get the private sector operat-
ing in that country.
One additional point I would like to make, Mr. Chairman, is that
in our view we are now at a point where the private sector is begin-
ning to look at ways in which they can reopen their doors quickly,
and we are looking at ways that we can support them.
Thank you.
Mr. BURTON. Thank you.
I am going to yield now to Mr. Hamilton. Before I do, let me just
say one thing.
OPIC is going to loan, what, $100 million or come up with $100
million, but there is still a lot of concern that private banks will
still be willing to go in there because there are other safer areas
where they may want to go. So it is going to be very important that
OPIC convince them that this is still going to be a safe investment
environment.
You don't need to comment on that right now, so I will yield to
Mr. Hamilton.
Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I see our
chairman has come in. Perhaps I should yield to him if he would
like to proceed.
Chairman GILMAN [presiding]. No, no, go ahead.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your having these
hearings. A couple of quick questions. You now believe that we
have a stable and secure environment in Haiti?
Mr. TALBOTT. Yes, sir, and that view comes in the first instance
from our military commanders there and has been endorsed of
course by the international community.
Mr. HAMILTON. Does President Aristide fully support the time-
tables you have laid out for the United States and the United Na-
tions to complete their responsibilities, the March 31 date and the
February 1996 date?
Mr. TALBOTT. Yes, Congressman Hamilton.
Mr. HAMILTON. Fully supports that?
Mr. TALBOTT. Yes.







Mr. HAMILTON. Let me tell you what worries me more about
Haiti. I am much less worried about Haiti in the next year than
I am what happens to Haiti when the United Nations pulls out.
One of our prominent journals yesterday accused you of timid
globalism. These journalists come up with some great phrases,
don't they, Mr. Talbott? The idea here is that our approach is too
tentative, that we are trying to do too little, that we are going to
get out too quickly, that as soon as the United Nations and the
United States are out, the thugs and the military will come back
in, and Haiti will be a mess within a short period of time.
That is my worry. How do you respond?
Mr. TALBOTT. Thus. First of all, I think it is worth recalling that
there were some prophecies of doom earlier on as well. There were
predictions that the intervention, regardless of whether it was in
a permissive or a nonpermissive environment, would trigger vio-
lence, particularly Haitian-on-Haitian violence. There would be re-
crimination, vengeance, riots, necklacing, and the like.
The Haitian people have made clear, I think, in their response
to Operation Uphold Democracy that they want and are prepared
to take advantage of what it is that we, the United States, leading
the international community, have given them, namely a chance to
continue the work of building a democracy that was taken away
from them with the coup.
What happens after February 1996, you are quite right to worry
about, Mr. Hamilton, but the chances of things going well after
February 1996 will depend in very large measure on how we use
the year ahead of us now, namely to use the year ahead of us in
the ways that we are outlining here, to make sure that there is an
enduring, secure and stable environment, that there is a com-
petent, professional, nonpartisan police force, security force that
will be able to put in the hands- of Haitians the maintenance of a
secure and stable environment, that there are free and fair elec-
tions, that a new parliament comes in that is strong and vigorous,
and that something is done about the economy, and we have al-
ready addressed that.
Mr. HAMILTON. Do you think all of those things can be accom-
plished in a year?
Mr. TALBOTT. I think we can make the necessary good start on
which the Haitian people demonstrating what they have already
demonstrated can then build.
Mr. HAMILTON. How do you define the U.N. mission? When you
come to February 1996, what do you at that point expect to have
accomplished?
Mr. TALBOTT. The principal goal of the U.N. mission in Haiti will
be to maintain the secure and stable environment that now exists
so that in such an environment the work that we are talking about
in the area of politics and economics and the building of a civil soci-
ety can go forward.
Also, the U.N. mission will continue the good work that has
begun by the multinational force, Ray Kelly and the rest, to com-
plete the transition from a dictatorial repressive military to a secu-
rity force under civilian control.
Mr. HAMILTON. Are you reasonably confident that Haiti can ac-
complish these good things?







Mr. TALBOTT. Yes, sir.
Mr. HAMILTON. After the United Nations pulls out?
Mr. TALBOTT. Yes. I have been down there now twice since the
multinational force went in. While my trip, like Congressman Bur-
ton's trip, of course, opened my eyes wide to the immense problems,
the horrible legacy of the past, the magnitude of the challenges
they face, they were also basically encouraging.
Mr. HAMILTON. So, come February 1996 you would expect that
you would have a secure and stable environment that would allow
the Haitian people to assume responsibility for rebuilding their
country?
Mr. TALBOTT. That is correct. I would also not only hope but ex-
pect that Haiti would have gone through what President Aristide
himself said is the most important election with a new democracy,
and that is the second election, that it will have a new President,
it will have a functioning parliament, local governments, a judicial
system which is another important part of the work that we are
doing down there, a private sector that will be up and running to
an extent that it is not now and an international community that
is engaged and prepared to stay the course.
Mr. HAMILTON. And you would anticipate that they would have
a functioning court system, a functioning parliament, and in addi-
tion to that secure environment, that there would be economic
progress, I presume?
Mr. TALBOTT. You are of course-I am giving you affirmative an-
swers, and I don't want to qualify those. I simply want to make
sure that all of us consider the fact that utopian predictions would
be nonsense in this case.
Haiti is far and away the poorest country in this hemisphere. It
was for a very long time before this catastrophe of the coup in 1991
befell it, and the coup in 1991 set the economy even further back.
Congressman Burton provided some vivid images of what they
have to cope with. Unemployment, particularly in the cities, is as-
tronomical, but the Haitian people are proud, they have 200 years
of experience of independence and having their own state, and now
they have an international community that has joined to help them
finally make it, and I think they can do so.
Mr. HAMILTON. When all of this washes out, what we will have
really accomplished, is it not, is giving them an opportunity to pro-
ceed toward a democratic government and improve their economy
and have a stable and secure environment?
Mr. TALBOTT. That is correct. If I could take advantage of what
I think may be an implied invitation to refute a phrase that is
sometimes used in connection with this kind of operation, we are
not engaged in nation building in Haiti. First of all, Haiti was a
nation before. It has been a nation since the early 19th century.
There is, however, a huge challenge of rebuilding that nation
that is before the Haitian people themselves. They need, however,
to have a democracy in order to do that, and they need to have the
support of the international community and they now have both.
Mr. HAMILTON. And at the end of the day, of course, whether
they succeed or not depends not on us but on them?







Mr. TALBOTT. Emphatically, and they know that, and they
wouldn't want it any other way, and President Aristide, Prime
Minister Michel are eloquent on that point.
Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hamilton.
A few brief questions, then I will turn to our colleagues.
Mr. Talbott, what is the total cost of our operation? I note in
your testimony that you indicated some costs for 1995 and some for
1994. What is the total costs to date that we have incurred with
regard to this operation?
Mr. TALBOTT. If you will permit, Mr. Chairman, I will speak to
the costs under the international affairs account and Under Sec-
retary Slocombe will speak to the DOD costs. Is that appropriate?
Chairman GILMAN. Please.
Mr. TALBOTT. Actual obligations in fiscal 1994 were $146.4 mil-
lion. I should say, Mr. Chairman, I would be happy, of course, to
provide you with a full breakdown on these costs, line items.
I can review those in summary orally now, but let me just give
you the bottom-line numbers. Fiscal 1994 we are talking about the
international affairs budget, actual obligations $146.4 million, fis-
cal 1995, estimated obligations $288.8 million, and for fiscal 1996
we have requested $115 million. That is in economic support funds
and Public Law 480.
Under Secretary Slocombe will speak to the defense costs.
Mr. SLOCOMBE. For fiscal year 1995, that is the current year.
Chairman GILMAN. Did we spend any in 1994?
Mr. SLOCOMBE. I will do it in the other order. I was going to
start with fiscal year 1995.
For fiscal year 1995 we expect that the incremental cost of Unit-
ed States participation in operations in Haiti will be $416 million
out of the defense budget. In addition, there will be costs which are
projected for the care, housing, and feeding of Haitian-that is for
the MNF and the U.S. participation in the UNMIH.
In addition, there will be costs for Haitian migrants at Guanta-
namo Naval Base which were originally projected at just under $50
million. That may be somewhat lower because of the relatively
early repatriation of the Haitians.
For fiscal year 1994, the costs for preparing Uphold Democracy
and for the 2 weeks or so when it was carried out in fiscal year
1994 are $201 million and the costs for the maritime interdiction
force and migrant-related operations were $174 million.
In addition, the Department of Defense expended $126 million
under the Food and Forage Act by the Army in fiscal year 1994.
So if my arithmetic is correct the total for Defense Department
expenditures is $967 million.
Chairman GILMAN. That is the overall expenditure from fiscal
year 1994 through to the present time?
Mr. SLOCOMBE. Well, through 1995, projected through 1995.
Chairman GILMAN. It is $967 million.
Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes.
Chairman GILMAN. And the total for State Department then is
approximately?
Mr. TALBOTT. Four hundred and thirty-five point one.
Chairman GILMAN. It is $435 million?







Mr. TALBOTT. Point one.
Mr. Chairman, I am advised by staff that Assistant Secretary of
State for Congressional Relations Wendy Sherman provided the
committee through you a detailed accounting in a letter of Feb-
ruary 3 which I have just been given a copy of.
Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Hamilton.
Mr. HAMILTON. I thank the chairman for yielding.
I want to make one point. I worry about these arbitrary dead-
lines. The task ahead of us and the United Nations for the next
year to February 1996 is a very formidable task by anybody's defi-
nition, and it seems to me the better thing to do, rather than to
say the United Nations is going to be out of there on a certain date,
is to say that we are going to be there long enough to give them
an opportunity to create a stable environment, and then we will get
out.
I know the political pressures that operate on you are very
strong here, some of them coming from this institution, but it just
doesn't seem to me to be sound policy to say we are going to get
out as of a certain date. That is the only point I want to make.
Thank you.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hamilton.
I note then from the figures you gave us we have roughly ex-
pended about $1.4 billion with regard to the Haitian initiative. Is
that about correct, including both DOD and the international oper-
ations?
Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes.
Chairman GILMAN. We are accurate on that?
Now can you tell us exactly how much are we paying third-party
countries for their involvement in Haiti? Have we paid to train
them, to equip them, to deploy them?
Mr. SLOCOMBE. Mr. Chairman, it is a little hard to hear.
Chairman GILMAN. Are we making contributions to third coun-
tries who are involved in the Haitian operation and has that been
included in your estimate of the total costs?
Mr. SLOCOMBE. On the part of the Defense Department, we pro-
vide certain support to other members of the multinational force.
The Department of Defense is reimbursed by the State Department
for that assistance, and we can-
Chairman GILMAN. Well, how much are you paying these third
countries?
Mr. SLOCOMBE. We can get you the exact amount. It is a rel-
atively modest amount, but we can get you the exact amount for
the record.
Chairman GILMAN. According to a December-
Mr. SLOCOMBE. The number I have is something like $8 million
in support of the MNF.
Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Slocombe, according to the President's re-
port of December 31, 1994, your support for foreign forces were $61
million. Is that an accurate statement?
Mr. SLOCOMBE. This is "Annex A"? Yes. What we have-the
numbers I have are for the Army 18, for the Air Force 4, and for
State 40, so it would be $61 million, yes, sir.
Chairman GILMAN. Do we actually pay their salaries while they
are out there?







Mr. SLOCOMBE. What we pay, as I understand it, is an amount
with the MNF, for some of the MNF countries equivalent to what
the United Nations pays for peacekeeping forces, which is just
under $1,000 a person a month.
Chairman GILMAN. Would that take into account the increased
number of U.N. people who will be coming in to take the place of
our forces?
Mr. SLOCOMBE. We won't pay it once it becomes a U.N. oper-
ation, the United Nations will pay it. We would pay a share of the
U.N.
Mr. BURTON. Will the chairman yield?
Chairman GILMAN. I would be pleased to yield to the gentleman.
Mr. BURTON. One of the things I found when I was down there,
when I talked to our enlisted men they were very upset because
the U.N. peacekeeping forces when they take over are going to get
something like $35 a day in salary, and that is what I understand
these troops that you are talking about right now are getting, and
our troops are getting much, much less than that, and yet they are
doing the bulk of the work.
I think that that is something that should be looked into by our
Government because they really resent, our troops who are doing
yeoman's service down there, resent being paid so much less than
these international forces who are coming in there under U.N. aus-
pices who are being paid indirectly or directly by the U.S. Govern-
ment at a higher rate than our soldiers are getting.
I would like for them to respond to that, Mr. Chairman, if they
would.
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, would you yield to me briefly on
this point?
Chairman GILMAN. Yes. Can we first get a response to Mr. Bur-
ton's inquiry.
Mr. BEREUTER. I didn't know there was a question.
Chairman GILMAN. Could you respond to Mr. Burton's inquiry.
Mr. SLOCOMBE. The money is paid to the countries involved. I
have no reason to believe that the countries involved pass 100 per-
cent of it through to the troops on the ground. It is intended to re-
imburse the countries for the costs of having the troops there.
If it is passed through by the countries in question, as I say, I
would be surprised, because it is meant to be payment for the costs
of the forces, and after March 31 United States will get it for its
people who are there. We will not pass it through to the soldiers,
they will continue to get their regular pay.
Mr. BURTON. I don't want to prolong this, Mr. Chairman, but if
I could follow up very briefly.
Chairman GILMAN. But time is running.
Mr. BURTON. This is very important because the morale of our
troops is at stake down there. I can tell you, they are very upset
because they have been told that the U.N. peacekeeping forces are
getting $35 a day, which is much more than most of the enlisted
men are getting.
Mr. SLOCOMBE. But, Mr. Burton, as I understand it, it is about
$1,000 a month, so it is about $35 a day, but it doesn't go to the
troops as individuals unless for some reason one of the govern-
ments chose to pay that. And I would be--obviously, to the coun-







tries involved, $35 a day is a fortune. I would be very surprised if
they are paying anything like that as supplemental pay for being
in Haiti.
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, would you yield, please.
Chairman GILMAN. I would be pleased to yield to the gentleman.
Mr. BEREUTER. I thank the Chairman.
My colleagues may remember this is the issue I brought up in
the markup of H.R. 7. That is why the amendment that I offered
on the floor, which was accepted by unanimous consent, attempts
to direct our U.N. mission to examine this issue and come up with
recommendations.
Some countries are basically getting a 1,000 percent markup on
their troops, and believe it or not, surprise, it doesn't go to the
troops' pocket, it goes to the treasury. But I am sure our troops be-
lieve that these troops are getting not $3 a day but $35, but it
ought to be changed.
Thank you.
Mr. SLOCOMBE. But it is not intended simply to compensate for
the salary costs, in any event.
Mr. PAYNE. Would the chairman yield?
Chairman GILMAN. I would be pleased to get into the order in
which you have appeared. We have just got a report that U.N.
sources informed us that for the U.N. operation in Haiti there will
be a cap put on all procurement for American companies as a way
of retaliating against our Nation for its insistence on naming a
United States commander as head of the Haitian operations.
Are any of our panelists aware of any cap or limitation on United
States companies competing for procurement opportunities for the
troops in Haiti?
Mr. TALBOTT. No, sir, not aware of it. Could I ask Ambas-
sador-
Chairman GILMAN. Could I ask our DOD panelist.
Mr. TALBOTT. And also Ambassador Dobbins who may have
something.
Mr. SLOCOMBE. I am not aware of any such arrangement. What
I am trying to confirm is I believe one of the major contractors is
an American firm. I will consult with my aides.
Chairman GILMAN. Do we have any information? This comes to
us from a U.N. source.
Mr. DOBBINS. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman GILMAN. Would you identify yourself, please.
Mr. DOBBINS. I am sorry, my name is James Dobbins with the
Department of State responsible for coordinating Haitian affairs.
I am sure that the United Nations has taken no steps in the
form of a retaliation for naming an American commander to this
operation. I know of no limitations whatsoever on American con-
tractors in this operation. I do know that one of the main contrac-
tors that has been in discussion with the United Nations is an
American company.
Chairman GILMAN. I would welcome if the panelists would pro-
vide us with any information following this hearing.
Now let me go back to our list. Mr. Hastings.







Mr. TALBOTT. Could I just say, could we maybe be in touch at
the staff level to get more information on the assertion and the al-
legation. It will help us be responsive.
Chairman GILMAN. I would welcome it.
Mr. Hastings.
Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you so very much for your testimony, and let
me make just one statement that in spite of the potential bear
traps that may be in Haiti's future, the fact of the matter is that
in my considered opinion the manner in which the United States
Government through its administration has conducted the activity
in Haiti is a spectacular success in terms of where we were as op-
posed to where we are today and where we likely will be after the
UNMIH forces are transferred.
Strobe, I would like to just personally thank you for an outstand-
ing job as well as Secretary Christopher and those at the Depart-
ment of Defense that are deserving of praise as well.
I would like to ask you, Secretary Talbott, if you would agree
with this statement that President Aristide, to his credit, has re-
peatedly counseled national reconciliation to his people and prac-
ticed that himself by reaching out repeatedly to the business com-
munity and to rival political parties.
Mr. TALBOTT. Yes, sir.
Mr. HASTINGS. Do you agree with that statement?
Mr. TALBOTT. I would.
Mr. HASTINGS. Let me ask you, Mr. Slocombe, because I am in
South Florida and we continue to have our immigration problems,
we are constantly concerned about the Haitians who are in Guan-
tanamo as well as others who are there.
Are there children still in Guantanamo? And I direct my question
to you because you mentioned the repatriation of Haitians. Are
there still children in Guantanamo?
Mr. SLOCOMBE. There are about 700 Haitians of all ages and de-
scriptions in Guantanamo. They come under several categories. I
know that one of the major categories and which amounts to sev-
eral hundred is minors.
Mr. HASTINGS. Right. My understanding is that some of those
minors are unattended and are without, you know, any direction as
far as parenting is concerned in Haiti. However, according to var-
ious sources in Miami, there are potential sponsors for those chil-
dren in the United States.
Do we have any plans to either repatriate the children or to
bring them to the United States under appropriate sponsorship?
Mr. SLOCOMBE. The responsibility for that, of course, lies with
the Immigration and Naturalization Service and not with the De-
partment of Defense.
Let me tell you what I know about the subject, but an authori-
tative answer would have to come from INS. Maybe Jim Dobbins,
Ambassador Dobbins knows more about this than I do. Why don't
you try.
Mr. DOBBINS. These unaccompanied minors cases are being re-
viewed on a case-by-case basis to determine where they would re-
ceive the best care. Some of them have family in Haiti, some of
them may not have family in Haiti, some of them may have rel-






atives or people prepared to care for them in the United States or
in third countries. So the process is a case-by-case review of each
one to determine where the child would receive the best care and
based on that determination is made where to send them.
Mr. HASTINGS. Well, to the extent that my urging has any value,
I would urge that those that can, move to expedite this matter as
best we can. It is just an unfortunate situation, should not continue
in the pattern that we are in.
Mr. Chairman, because of the interests of time, I will yield on
any further questions.
Mr. BEREUTER [presiding]. Mr. Salmon.
Mr. SALMON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I do have a couple questions. The first one I don't want to dwell
a lot on, I think it can probably be answered succinctly, but my un-
derstanding of our vital national interests and military interven-
tion in the first place was probably twofold: one, of course, the refu-
gee issue; two, the issue of the humanitarian violations.
Can you expand on that for me? What other vital national inter-
ests were at stake?
Mr. TALBOTT. Haiti is, of course, a neighbor in the most literal
sense. We share an ocean boundary with Haiti. When things go
very, very badly for one of our neighbors, it affects our national in-
terests in several ways, particularly if the catastrophe, the humani-
tarian and human rights catastrophe in a given case results in an
outpouring of refugees, virtually all of whom want to come to the
United States. It confronts us not only with a moral dilemma but
also with a political and practical dilemma which we saw in ex-
treme form last summer.
We also have a national interest in the continuing trend of de-
mocratization in this hemisphere. Haiti was a fledgling democracy
when it had the election in December 1990 that produced President
Aristide by an overwhelming majority. Haiti thus joined a trend
which had swept through the hemisphere.
The reversal of democracy in Haiti was bad not only for Haiti but
also, had it been allowed to stand, would have sent an ominous sig-
nal elsewhere in the hemisphere.
Mr. SALMON. Thank you.
I will leave it at that. I know that we were effective in restoring
Aristide, but how effective were we in the real goal of restoring a
true democracy in that country?
And the follow-up question to that would be, let's say hypo-
thetically that 2 years down the road the democracy goes belly up
and a dictatorship again is in power and economic improvements,
free enterprise improvements that have been made to that point
are completely wiped out. Are we going to then reconsider again
military intervention, or do you have more thoughts? Have we
learned anything from this time that maybe we could possibly im-
prove upon for next time if indeed there is a next time?
Mr. TALBOTT. I might say both by prelude and in parenthesis
that one of the reasons that Operation Uphold Democracy has been
as successful as it has been is because we did draw upon the les-
sons of earlier experiences. We drew upon the lessons of Panama,
of Nicaragua, El Salvador, and the gulf war, and in this respect in
particular we saw this from the beginning not just as a military op-







eration but as a political operation and indeed as an economic oper-
ation.
Closely integrated into the military planning were plans to make
sure that we help the Haitian people reestablish the infrastructure
of democracy. This I think is responsive to your point.
One of the first things that our troops did when they arrived in
Haiti was to put the parliament back in shape so that it could re-
sume work. One of the things that Mark Schneider and AID are
doing is working with the institutions there, not just the par-
liament, which will have of course new members when the elections
are held in June, but also municipal and local bodies as well. That
is one of the reasons that we are optimistic that the hypothetical
that you raise will not occur.
Mr. SALMON. One final point. I see that my time has expired.
The multinational mission to me is somewhat of a misnomer.
How many other countries are paying, not that we are paying the
pay, but how many other countries are actually participating? How
many forces have they sent and when we arrived September 19,
1994, when did the third-country forces arrive?
Mr. TALBOTT. Shortly afterwards, but Under Secretary Slocombe
will respond to that.
Mr. SLOCOMBE. There are now-I am always suspicious of num-
bers to four significant figures-but there are now 1,884 non-U.S.
military personnel participating in the MNF, with Bangladesh as
the largest contingent, just over 1,000. Over 20 countries have a
total of 665 international police monitors in Haiti. The largest con-
tingents there are Jordan, Bolivia, and Argentina and Bangladesh.
My recollection is that the very first third country people were
in in significant numbers within a couple of weeks. I know I went
down to Haiti within less than. a month, and the port security, for
example, at that point was being turned over, I think, to
Bangladeshis. There was a CARICOM, the Caribbean group which
had taken over some of the security in Cape Haitien, so that within
a period of a few days they started to arrive and they were taking
over significant functions within a month.
Mr. TALBOTT. But with the indulgence of the Chair and the red
light, I would just add one thing. One of the many reasons why we
have planned from the beginning and now welcome the imminence
of the hand-off from the multinational force to the U.N. mission is
that the multinational force was overwhelmingly American, both in
personnel and in who was paying for it. The U.N. mission will be
an assessed U.N. operation, of which the United States will only
pay 25 percent rather than virtually all of it, and we will have less
than half the personnel.
That is part of the point here. We are handing this off to a truly
international-
Mr. SALMON. I understand that, and just a quick question. Will
our troops be under the U.N. command then?
Mr. TALBOTT. Our troops will be under American command, as
Under Secretary Slocombe made clear in his opening statement.
Mr. BEREUTER. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentleman from New York, Mr. Engel.
Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.







Let me first make a statement. We have all been hearing a lot
of harping and carping about Haiti and about what we should have
done and what we shouldn't have done, but, you know, if we look
at what we have done and what has happened, I think if we went
back 6, 8, 10 months or a year and look at the position we are at
now, I think it is really miraculous, quite frankly, the constructive
role that we have played in Haiti; the fact that there were virtually
no American casualties in Haiti; the fact that the Haitian people
have welcomed us with open arms. And, I think by all standards
our involvement in Haiti has been a tremendous success.
First, we heard that it wasn't in our national interest, in some
quarters it was said, to get into Haiti. Although I don't know how
anyone-I think Mr. Hastings and some of the others have men-
tioned with refugees coming to our shore in south Florida and
bursting at the seams-how anyone could say that Haiti wasn't in
our national interest or isn't in our national interest just amazes
me.
We are told that we ought not to have incursions on the other
side of the world. Haiti is right in our own hemisphere, so it cer-
tainly seems to me that it is in our national interest.
We also heard last year in some quarters that Aristide wasn't
worth defending. I would say that we are not defending Aristide,
we are defending a democracy. The fact of the matter is that the
United States took the lead in mobilizing international support for
Haiti's democratic election in December 1990. The Haitian people
elected Mr. Aristide-that is not my choice, it is their choice-in a
fair and free election, and therefore I think that we are defending
democracy there.
The last statement I want to make before I ask a couple of ques-
tions is that I don't think that the Somali syndrome, quite frankly,
ought to pervade our foreign policy much the way for so long the
Vietnam syndrome pervaded our foreign policy. I think we have to
take each situation as it comes, and I think Haiti is different from
Somalia. I think the fact that it is very close to our shore makes
it different, the fact that there are so many people who have es-
caped makes it relevant to us, and I think that frankly the Presi-
dent did the absolute right thing and that the operation has been
successful.
Having said that, I would like, Secretary Talbott, if you could
give me your assessment of the job that Mr. Aristide has played.
We tend to either hoist people up as great leaders or knock them
down as villains, I think that those of us who have been involved
in public life understand that leaders usually represent neither ex-
treme and are somewhere in the middle, and all human beings.
But, I would like you to please rate the job that Aristide has done
since he has come back.
Mr. TALBOTT. It is such an important question I don't want to
appear to be giving it short shrift, but in the interests of time I will
try to be very succinct. If you want elaboration I will, of course,
provide it.
The short answer is, he has done a splendid job. He has lived up
not only to our hopes and expectations, but he has lived up to the
promise that he made before going back to be a President who per-
sonified reconciliation. And there were concerns about that, and







those concerns were not entirely baseless. But it is not just what
he said since coming back, it is also what he has done.
He has almost single-handedly forestalled an outbreak of the
kind of retribution and violence that many were concerned about.
By bringing Mr. Michel in as the Prime Minister, he has dem-
onstrated his commitment to a principle that a couple of your col-
leagues have enunciated earlier, and that is the importance of en-
gaging the Haitian private sector, which incidentally, I think it is
fair to say, voted overwhelmingly against President Aristide, unlike
the Haitian populace as a whole, in the December 1994 election,
but Michel is a businessman himself and has reached out to the
business community.
Now, obviously because of the magnitude of the challenges he
faces, there are certainly going to be points on which we are going
to not see the situation the same way that he does, but our rela-
tionship with him is extraordinarily trusting and cooperative. He
listens to us, we listen to him, sometimes he does what we advise
him to do, sometimes he doesn't. But he is the President of that
country, and it is ultimately up to him and all Haitians to make
the key decisions.
Mr. BEREUTER. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. ENGEL. If I could, Mr. Chairman, just very quickly speak to
the concerns that Mr. Hamilton raised earlier in terms of our leav-
ing Haiti prematurely. The same article that he was referring to
mentioned three things that really need to happen before we can
really breathe well: The old army-
Mr. BEREUTER. I remind the gentleman we have five members
here yet.
Mr. ENGEL. But, Mr. Chairman, I have frankly sat here all morn-
ing and listened to people go on for 15, 20 minutes.
Mr. SMITH. There will probably be a second round, and some of
us do have to leave.
Mr. ENGEL. I don't mind. I just wish these things would be ap-
plied uniformly.
Mr. BEREUTER. Would the gentleman continue and just make his
points briefly.
Mr. ENGEL. Thank you.
The old army being fully dismantled, new civilian police force put
in place, credible elections held, and the economy begin to grow.
Would you concur that really those are the four things that need
to be put in place before we can breathe freely in Haiti?
Mr. TALBOTT. Before we can-
Mr. ENGEL. Before we can feel that we have really done what
needs to be done, have created the stability at which point we can
leave?
Mr. TALBOTT. The ultimate status of these institutions is up to
the Haitian people to work out, and surely the new Haitian Par-
liament will have an important role to play in that as well.
Mr. ENGEL. Thank you.
Mr. BEREUTER. The Chair is trying to take into account the fact
that Secretary Talbott needs to leave at 12. We have five members
who have not had a chance. We had some abuses of the process
early which I understand may irritate those of us that remain. It
is the Chair's turn for his time at this moment, according to the







order of appearance, but Mr. Smith has an appointment so I yield
my place in line to him in return.
Mr. SMITH. Very briefly, I really thank my good friend Doug Be-
reuter for yielding. I want to associate myself with Mr. Hastings'
comment about the need for bringing those Haitian children who
are in Guantanamo here, especially if a family member can be
found. I think that ought to be a very, very high priority. I want
to associate myself with his remark.
Very briefly, at the January 29 meeting, the donors meeting, my
understanding is that $1.2 billion was pledged. The Haitian Gov-
ernment has said that justice reform, agriculture, education, public
works, and health are the five primary areas. And perhaps, Mark,
you might be the best one to answer this.
What is the status currently of the children of Haiti as it relates
to illness? Is there any thought being given to a massive vaccina-
tion day to try to catch up on some of those kids who over the last
several years have not gotten their DPT shots and their other
shots, to do what has been done in other countries under UNICEF,
PAHO, and U.S. sponsorship, a day where everyone is vaccinated
to catch up? I yield.
Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you very much, Congressman.
You are right that the health area is one of the gravest chal-
lenges facing the government in Haiti. One out of every 10 children
die before the first birthday.
What we did was just what you are suggesting. On approxi-
mately November 20, President Aristide announced in conjunction
with PAHO, UNICEF, and USAID, a nationwide immunization
campaign, and I am pleased to be able to report that in Port-au-
Prince, 600,000 children have now been vaccinated. It reached
more than 90 percent of the goal.
The objective obviously is to extend this nationwide, with the
hope of completing that level of coverage by June. However, the
vaccination campaign outside Port-au-Prince was disrupted by Hur-
ricane Gordon, and although this resulted in a delay, they are now
catching up. And they now expect-according to the people who are
organizing the campaign with whom I talked in Paris-to reach the
90 percent goal by the end of June. The focus was on measles
which has caused a serious epidemic in the past, but includes the
other childhood diseases as well. It is beginning, in the crucial
health area.
Mr. SMITH. Thank you.
Mr. BEREUTER. I thank the gentleman for his courtesy.
The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Payne.
Mr. PAYNE. Thank you.
It is hard to get seen back here in this corner here. I get glossed
over.
Let me first of all, though, also let me state my deep pride in the
job that has been done by the United States military in Haiti.
First of all, I think that the decision to go, and I sit here and
listen when people talk about why are we moving out so quickly
and why is the United Nations moving out, and you know just a
year or so ago there was absolutely no one other than I guess Con-
gressional Black Caucus and Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Oberstar,
maybe Mr. Dodd and a few others that said we ought to go in. And


90-899 95-2







I am sure that one of the reasons for, it in my opinion, the pre-
mature pullout, is because it was tough enough to get in and I
guess you had to say, Well, we are going to come out more quickly
than we even feel we ought to come out, but a lot of times we kind
of forget history, and the fact that probably one of the most coura-
geous decisions made by any President in the history of this Nation
was made when President Clinton decided that it was the right
thing to do even though there was absolutely no support other than
outside of the few members, the few friends of Haiti, and the Con-
gressional Black Caucus. So I commend him for that decision. I
guess it almost parallels Truman bringing MacArthur back in the
late 1940's, early 1950's when that was an unpopular decision, but
he did it anyway.
But I am so proud of what our troops have done, and I, too, wish
that they were not going to withdraw when they are going to with-
draw. And second, I wish that the United Nations did not have this
time certain because I think time certain and all of our military
men on the ground all indicate that dates certain are not the best
way to go.
But saying all that, let me ask quickly, one, how is the military
down-and finally, in my comments I was one of the few who advo-
cated that the time that President Aristide was out of the country
should have been put out of his term because he really has had
very little time to govern, and the fact that the elections are com-
ing up and they have no provision for reelections I felt was unfair
anyway and that he should have had an opportunity to serve for
the 5 years or whatever the term was, but he will only have half
a term.
Quickly, how is the military downsizing going, and second, how
is the creation of the public sector jobs that was supposed to be a
50,000 number but have not gotten up to that number yet?
Finally, once again, I would like to know how you are doing with
the judicial system which was certainly compromised in the past.
And last, let me just mention that I don't know how much my
colleagues-and I wish Mr. Burton was here, he is my long-time
friend-but it is not uncommon that United States troops supervise
things that are not pleasant. In World War II it was the United
States troops that supervised in every European country the rede-
velopment of those countries. And so I just don't understand why
all of a sudden because United States troops are supervising un-
pleasant tasks in Haiti, it is what the troops that are in charge
have done throughout the history of the military.
But anyway, could you respond to the question about wanting to
downsize and to the 50,000 public sector jobs that were promised?
And, No. 3, what is happening with the prosecutors and judges, I
guess in the 1 minute that I have left.
Mr. SLOCOMBE. Do you want me to respond on the downsizing
first?
We have gone from over 20,000 in the early part of October down
to about 6,000 now. As I said in my statement, the United States
contribution to the U.N. mission in Haiti will be on the order of
2,500 people. We would expect to reach that level not obviously on
the moment of the transition on March 31, but within a few weeks
after that.






The downsizing has gone very well. It is also worth making the
point that there is a rotation. It is not all the same people who ar-
rived at the beginning.
Mr. PAYNE. Also, quickly, the Haiti downsizing of their military.
Mr. SLOCOMBE. The Haitian military is now effectively-the old
FAd'H is effectively gone as an institution. About 3,000 people who
were from the old army. The old army/police have been vetted by
agreement with both the United States and the Haitian authori-
ties. They now constitute the bulk of the interim public security
force.
As was alluded to earlier, we have had a problem about making
sure that the people who were vetted are the ones who are there
and the people who are not vetted are not there. That is being
worked now and I think satisfactorily.
Over time we will be training a civilian police force. The police
academy to do that is open and has had its first class. Over the
period of the next 18 months, that national police will gradually re-
place the interim public security force.
There are transition job training and payment programs for the
people in the old FAd'H, the old army who are not going to be in
either the IPSF or the new police force.
Mr. BEREUTER. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The chairman will take his time at this point.
First I would ask unanimous consent that the opening statement
of Christopher Smith be made a part of the record. We will con-
clude then with the 5 minutes for Ms. McKinney after the chair-
man has his time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith appears in the appendix.]
Mr. BEREUTER. First of all, for the record, I strongly disagree
with the military incursion in Haiti. I continue to disagree with it.
I just want that a part of the record. I think it was ill-advised.
But I would like to make sure we have all the costs down. Sec-
retary Talbott, if you can tell me, the figures that you gave us from
the 150 account, do they include the $56 million plus for this fiscal
year for the U.N. mission costs in Haiti and the $27 million plus
for the voluntary contributions, the peacekeeping operation?
Mr. TALBOTT. For this fiscal year?
Mr. BEREUTER. For this fiscal year.
Mr. TALBOTT. Fiscal 1995. I see that the breakdown I have of the
figures that I gave to Chairman Gilman earlier under the $288.8
million for fiscal year 1995 include $18.2 million for non-U.S. mul-
tinational force. Let me see if Ambassador Dobbins has anything
on that.
Mr. BEREUTER. They don't agree with the figures I have here.
Mr. Slocombe, perhaps you can tell me, what about the 1996 re-
quest from the Defense Department for the peacekeeping activities
in Haiti.
Mr. TALBOTT. Just to clarify, I hope that I was clear both before
and now that I was referring only to the function 150, the inter-
national affairs budget portion. That may possibly get to whatever
discrepancy you are seeing.
Mr. BEREUTER. Now I am switching to fiscal year 1996, Secretary
Slocombe. We have a dash on our information saying "to be pro-





32

vided by the Department of Defense." What will be the cost out of
the Department of Defense fox peacekeeping activities for Haiti?
Mr. SLOCOMBE. I will have to get you that number. There will
obviously be some cost because almost half the year will have been
gone before February 1996.
Mr. BEREUTER. I heard Secretary Talbott say that we will have
a stable and secure environment in Haiti, not only now but in Feb-
ruary of 1996, and I really think you are extraordinarily optimistic.
I hope you are right, but I have my doubts.
When we look at what we are trying to leave there, some ele-
ments of democratic institutions where none have existed for the
most part for the history of the country, I would think that one of
the things we would focus on would be the parliament and the judi-
ciary.
There are indications at least by letters of U.S. AID memoranda,
on December 29, that very little had been done in the way of assist-
ing the parliament. In fact, there is a letter from you dated Decem-
ber 27, Mr. Talbott, that says that of the Parliament they should
take the initiative to develop their own institution rather than
awaiting initiatives from the United States and others. You may
know that the Congress itself has, especially the House, taken
great actions to help the parliaments emerging out of the old War-
saw Pact countries across the face of Central and Eastern Europe.
I would ask any of you what are we doing to assist the par-
liament assume some of their responsibilities because they have of
course a major role in the time that is remaining if we are not to
be moving back to a dictatorship there, and what are we doing to
support and help Haiti's judicial branch, which is badly in need of
assistance?
Mr. TALBOTT. We as a group welcome your question, Mr. Chair-
man, first, because it gives us a chance at least to partially respond
to an unanswered question or two of Congressman Payne's. Second,
because it gives me a chance to reiterate that despite the passage
that you have mentioned from my letter, of course we are, as I in-
dicated earlier, working with the Haitians to develop their par-
liamentary and judicial institutions. But let me turn to Mr. Schnei-
der.
Mr. BEREUTER. If your answer is extensive, I would appreciate
it if you could just summarize it and then give it to us in writing.
It is important. We would like to have it, but I want to give Ms.
McKinney her time.
Mr. TALBOTT. Thank you.
Mr. SCHNEIDER. Two things. First, we began by facilitating the
return of the parliamentarians to Haiti as soon as the crisis was
over. We began to provide immediate assistance-office supplies,
typewriters, radios, et cetera--early on.
There was an initial expectation, that Haiti would have par-
liamentary elections in November, and we designed our parliamen-
tary support program, which is obviously crucial for democratic in-
stitutional strengthening to begin when the new Parliament takes
office.
We are working now with the Congressional Human Rights
Foundation and the Center for Democracy. You will hear from
them later on plans for orientation for the new legislators, training






the permanent staff of the Parliament, providing for a legislative
reference service, computerization, and other support, including
commodities for them. We can go into detail in the written re-
sponse.
Mr. BEREUTER. Would you please provide us that kind of detail
for judicial branch and for the parliament. I would appreciate it.
Mr. SCHNEIDER. Fine. On justice we have a major support pro-
gram. At present, we have 20 judicial mentors in the 15 Haitian
communities where there are trial courts. And the members of
multidonor program met last week to set out the support for the
justice sector.
Mr. BEREUTER. Ms. McKinney, you and I have been very patient.
You have the last 5 minutes. I recognize the gentlelady.
Ms. MCKINNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I ask unanimous consent to insert my statement into the record.
Mr. BEREUTER. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Ms. McKinney appears in the appen-
dix.]
Ms. MCKINNEY. Thank you. I don't think I will take up the entire
5 minutes.
First of all, I would also like to share my pride to Deputy Sec-
retary Talbott and Under Secretary Slocombe and the rest of the
members of the administration on the fine work that you have done
in Haiti. I do have one concern.
Under Secretary Slocombe, you wrote in your statement that no
organized group is capable of seriously threatening the Haitian
Government or the international presence. I am concerned about
the number of weapons that still exist in Haiti that are in the
hands of people who are not friendly to democracy.
I am also concerned about the status of FRAPH and where they
are and what they are doing, and I would also like to know if Em-
manuel Constant is in this country.
Mr. SLOCOMBE. With respect to weapons, as I said, we have
rounded up a large number of weapons, most of them, although not
all, from exactly the groups that you are concerned about. There
is no way to get up all the weapons in Haiti.
The statement in my paper is a fair summary of the views of the
intelligence community and the military there on the state of the
threat. FRAPH, which was this sort of auxiliary group for the coup
leaders, is effectively broken as an institution.
Now that is not to say that there are not plenty of resentful peo-
ple who could do all kinds of very bad and dangerous things. It is
simply that we watched this situation very closely and we don't see
an organized group.
There is a story today that there will be something that will hap-
pen during carnival. It is perfectly possible, but we don't see any
organized force, and we are looking right hard.
With respect to Constant, I think my knowledge of that subject
is largely what I know from the newspapers.
Mr. TALBOTT. I' can do just a sentence or two on that. It is a long
and tangled story that doesn't have a very clear ending. We will
get you the long version if you want it.
The long and short of it is, he got a tourist visa quite sometime
ago which was reinstated when all visas that had been suspended







were reinstated at the time that the sanctions were lifted. The
State Department has revoked his visa.
I think the short answer is, we don't know where he is now, but
he does not have a valid visa. We will get you more on that.
Ms. MCKINNEY. You can get me the long story, too. Thank you.
Mr. TALBOTT. OK. And the ending when we know that.
Mr. BURTON [presiding]. Gentlemen, we have some questions we
would like to submit for the record from some of the members who
weren't here.
I have one more question, then we will let you go because I know
you have to leave just about now.
It has been reported to me that there have been possibly some
incidents of hostility toward our troops down there. Have there
been such incidents in addition to the one we know where the one
soldier was killed and the other, a Ranger, was killed and one was
wounded? Have there been other incidents, and if so, can you give
us a number?
Mr. SLOCOMBE. I better get you the answer to that for the record.
There have certainly been other incidents where there has been fir-
ing and so on in the area. We can get you a complete report. But
the overwhelming response to the American presence is that the
American military are liked and respected in Haiti. It is a country
where you go around and you see signs, signs on the wall, to which
we do not intend to conform, that say "Americans stay for 50
years." We don't intend to do that, but I think that is a fair meas-
ure of the response.
Mr. BURTON. But there have been incidents where our troops
have been shot at?
Mr. SLOCOMBE. There have been a very few. I will get you the
exact record, but overwhelmingly the troops have rightly estab-
lished both that they are there to be helpful and they are not to
be tampered with.
Obviously there was the incident right at the beginning in Cape
Haitien where a group of police made the mistake of pulling a
weapon on an American unit and then a significant number of
them were killed when the American unit fired back. Most of them
were at the beginning, and I will get you a list.
Mr. BURTON. If you could get us as close to an accurate account,
we would really like to know.
Mr. SLOCOMBE. We will get you all we know.
Mr. BURTON. Thank you very much, gentlemen, appreciate it.
We welcome our final panel of distinguished witnesses. I will rec-
ognize each of you for a brief opening statement. We have received
your written statements and your biographies. I understand Mr.
Aronson has some time constraints, so we will let him speak first.
We have Prof. Allen Weinstein, founder and president of the
Center for Democracy, a nonprofit organization created in 1984 to
promote and strengthen the democratic process around the world.
The center continues to play a singular role in the search for peace-
ful and lasting solution in Haiti.
Mr. Peter Johnson is executive director of the Caribbean Latin
American Action, a private nonprofit group that promotes U.S. re-
lations and development in the Caribbean basin. C/LAA and its






Miami conference are unparalleled sparkplugs to regional com-
merce, a rdle they are now playing in Haiti.
Our good friend Mr. Bernard Aronson, former member of the
State Department, has returned to the Hill to relive fond memories
testifying before us.
Are they fond?
Mr. ARONSON. They are, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BURTON. He served 4 remarkable years as Assistant Sec-
retary of State for Inter-American Affairs in the Bush administra-
tion, where he was the architect of the democratic transitions in
Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Haiti.
And my good friend Maj. Andy Messing is executive director of
the National Defense Council Foundation. He is a retired U.S.
Army special forces officer who earned two Purple Hearts in service
in Vietnam. Major Messing has extensive experience in political
transactions and has directed humanitarian and refugee relief op-
erations in many hot spots.
I welcome all of you, and we will start out, Mr. Aronson, with
you. Do you have an opening statement?
STATEMENT OF BERNARD ARONSON, FORMER ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
Mr. ARONSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The issue of Haiti is I think much more complicated than our do-
mestic debate would suggest. As you know, the United States took
the lead in mobilizing the international effort to make the elections
possible. I think we therefore had a stake in defending that out-
come.
Second, it is less well known that Haiti was the first test case
of something called the Santiago Declaration, which the OAS
adopted in June 1991. That was a very important change in hemi-
spheric geopolitics because every nation in the hemisphere commit-
ted themselves collectively to defend democracy in any member
state.
As you well know, for most of this century Latin America prac-
ticed the doctrine of nonintervention and they argued we should
not get involved, even in the cage of Panama where you had a dic-
tatorship that overthrew an election. So there were legitimate is-
sues at stake in Haiti. I would stipulate that there is disagreement
about whether we should have intervened, the manner we did so,
and the decision of the President to do so without consulting Con-
gress. But I think the issue before us today is not whether we
should have gone into Haiti, but what do we do now that we are
there. I think it is important that those who disagreed with the
original decision not express that by a precipitous demand that we
pull out too soon because I think that would in fact be the worst
cutcome. We have now committed our prestige and our Nation.
I will submit my statement for the record, but let me just make
a few suggestions on points that the committee might want to
watch in the interim period.
One, I think we have learned from Panama and El Salvador that
it always takes longer than we predict to recruit and train and
make operational an entirely new police force, and we should build
that into our timetable. Deadlines always slip; it is a very cum-






bersome process. If you give it enough time it can work, as it has
in Panama and El Salvador, but it can't be done quickly. If you try
to do it too quickly, you put on to the streets a force that is really
not up to the job.
Second, the issue of the Haitian Army is being debated now in-
side Haiti, the future of the institution. That is not a decision for
the United States to make, but I hope we do not tilt against what
seems to be the trend, which is the abolition of the army, as was
done in Panama. I think the Haitian people may make a decision
that they want that institution abolished, that they don't need a
standing army.
I happen to think that that is a wise decision. I think if it is
done, we should insist that it be done constitutionally through two
successive votes of the Parliament. If it is done, then I think we
should cooperate in perhaps helping to create some new forces, a
coast guard that could operate under the Ministry of Transpor-
tation, a border patrol that could operate, perhaps, under the Min-
istry of Finance, which could perform functions that the FAd'H
used to perform that are necessary and could satisfy those who feel
that it would be useful to have some balance of forces inside Haiti
without recreating or resurrecting an institution which I think has
been corrupt and antidemocratic.
Third, I agree with the points made by I think Mr. Bereuter and
others that we need to focus attention on judicial reform.
Fourth, I think we should resist any efforts to delay the holding
of Presidential elections in December 1995. It is critical that they
go forward because the real test of our policy will be the peaceful
transition to a successor. Some may argue that the Haitian elec-
toral system is going to be overloaded, because municipal and par-
liamentary elections will be held in June, maybe we should wait
and delay the Presidential elections. I think we should resist that.
I think that could provoke a crisis. I think that election has to take
place as contemplated.
Finally, I think those who cautioned against setting an arbitrary
deadline for withdrawal have a point. One of the lessons I think
we learned from December 1990 is that we celebrated the success
of the elections too quickly and we pulled out the international
monitors too quickly, and Haiti was beginning an experiment in de-
mocracy that it wasn't quite prepared for. In retrospect, had we
kept a civilian international presence after the December 1990 elec-
tions for a period of time, maybe some of this crisis could have been
avoided.
So I would urge that under a U.N. umbrella, some international
presence continue after February 1996, perhaps for as long as a
year. They could be civilian monitors in the human rights area,
they could be police monitors and trainers, but they ought to be
visible, they ought to be in the country, and give the new govern-
ment about a year to get on its feet for a balance of forces to de-
velop inside and for this experiment to take off.
I don't think U.S. troops should be part of any such presence, but
I think it is a mistake to just let a new government begin in Feb-
ruary 1996 with no international presence, given everything that
has happened.







The final point I would just make is that we ought to give some
consideration if budgetary realities would permit to seeing whether
we could create a tax incentive for the assembly sector plants that
were in Haiti prior to the coup and then left as a result of our sanc-
tions and the crisis to see if we could induce them to return. As
you know, Mr. Chairman, all of these companies can enjoy the
same trade preferences under the Caribbean Basin Initiative in
neighboring countries.
I think a lot of them that have left will not come back to Haiti
unless something extra is added, and perhaps with a very minimal
budget impact, some sort of a grace period, a tax relief could be
provided for 10 years for a company that was in Haiti after the
elections and left since then, which would return. That actually
might be a more effective expenditure of our funds than to try to
put in direct aid and create whole new industries. Those are the
only wage-earning jobs really that Haitians have, and I think we
need to make every effort to see if we can start them up again.
President Cristiani of El Salvador was in Washington yesterday.
I happened to see him, and he reminded me of something that I
think we forget, which is that we sometimes put an enormous
amount of our resources and attention in a country when there is
a crisis. Then after we think we have solved it, we tend to forget
it too quickly. El Salvador still needs our help, and I hope we don't
make that mistake in Haiti.
I know this has been a contentious political issue, but we are
there now. The worst outcome would be to pull out too quickly, to
do too little and to leave nothing behind. So I hope we stay the
course without risking American lives unduly, and my sense of the
spirit of the hearing is that there is some consensus to do that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Aronson appears in the appen-
dix.]
Mr. BURTON. Let me just say to the panel, and I hope I can ask
for your patience, I just heard all these bells go off. I think we have
two or three votes coming up altogether. You have to leave, do you,
Bernie?
Mr. ARONSON. No, I am OK, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BURTON. If you wouldn't mind waiting, we will try to get
some of the other panel members back. I have some questions for
you, Mr. Aronson, if it is possible for you to stay.
Mr. ARONSON. My time is actually OK. I didn't know how long
the hearing would run, but I can stay for at least an hour or so.
Mr. BURTON. OK. We will be voting, I will say it will probably
be about 15 to 20 minutes before we return, so please accept our
apology. We have got a lot of things going on on the floor. We will
be back just as soon as possible.
[Recess.]
Chairman GILMAN [presiding]. The committee will come to order.
I apologize to our panelists for keeping them waiting. We regret
we have no control over the House floor proceedings, and there
probably will be another two votes. But we will try to continue
without interruption if we can. We will share responsibility for get-
ting to the floor. Mr. Burton will be with us shortly, and we are
going to do a little tandem running to the floor.






So I am pleased that we have our second panel with us. I under-
stand from my staff that Mr. Aronson has already made his state-
ment. We have Professor Allen Weinstein, founder and president of
the Center for Democracy.
Mr. Weinstein, if you would like to proceed.
STATEMENT OF ALLEN WEINSTEIN, PRESIDENT, THE CENTER
FOR DEMOCRACY
Mr. WEINSTEIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am Allen Weinstein, president of the Center for Democracy, a
nonprofit, nonpartisan foundation created in 1985 to assist in
strengthening the democratic process in countries undergoing a
transition to democracy.
Since 1991, the center has worked in.Haiti with the Haitian Par-
liament. We have cooperated with pro-democratic Haitian business
and political leaders and have assisted municipal officials. My testi-
mony today reflects personal perspectives and is in no snse an or-
ganizational statement on behalf of the center.
America's immediate goal in Haiti, Mr. Chairman, that of restor-
ing President Aristide to power, was achieved 4 months ago. Unfor-
tunately, our larger mission, that of facilitating development in
Haiti of democratic institutions and processes, has proceeded since
then only fitfully and at best unevenly.
The burden of my testimony is to urge this committee, the Con-
gress, and the administration to pursue on a bipartisan basis an
accelerated focus program of support in the 5 weeks ahead prior to
formal transfer of troop authority on the island from United States
to U.N. command on March 31, measures that will lay essential
groundwork for a lasting democratic system.
Now that the United States has returned Jean Bertrand Aristide
to Haiti, it must use its remaining weeks of virtually complete' au-
thority to help the Haitian people pursue the even more difficult
mission of building democratic structures and habits atop the ruins
of tyranny.
A decade ago testifying before the Senate at another watershed
in the struggle for democracy, I noted that the country in question,
prior to an historic election-in that case the Philippines-stood
poised between hope and despair. The words apply to Haiti today.
Haiti confronts in the next critical 5 weeks the departure of half
the remaining United States troop complement, de jure transfer of
authority to U.N. control, and most importantly, a defining moment
of preparation for the parliamentary and municipal elections now
scheduled for June.
This hearing is especially timely, Mr. Chairman, coming 5
months after Operation Uphold Democracy was begun and 4
months after President Aristide's return, in the end, in my view,
assuring that democracy in Haiti has been and will continue to be
in the foreseeable future primarily an American responsibility.
For that reason, the United States military and civil personnel
responsible for coordinating our occupation of Haiti deserve our
gratitude for the skill, tact, and bravery with which they have im-
plemented this policy, whatever their views of it.
As a result, democracy's beachhead has been secured in Haiti,
and at minimal cost thus far in American or Haitian lives. Now,






however, in the 5 weeks remaining prior to turning over primary
responsibility for Haiti to the United Nations, the moment has
come for the United States to lead decisively the process of helping
to consolidate a democratic future for all Haitians.
I believe that four major efforts to be undertaken under Amer-
ican leadership in cooperation with Haitian and U.N. authorities in
this month plus ahead, if achieved, can help to confirm an unprece-
dented politics of hope on the island. If not taken now, however,
the bright promise of a new beginning which U.S. soldiers brought
to Haiti may quickly turn to popular disillusionment. These four
steps are crucial.
One, consolidating democracy for Haiti requires immediately en-
ergizing a sluggish and divisive pre-election process. Electoral con-
ditions minimally acceptable to the broad spectrum of Haitian po-
litical parties and leaders, whether pro- or anti-Aristide, must be
created.
An election constitutionally stipulated in late 1994 now slouches
toward possible achievement in June 1995 under U.N./OAS aus-
pices after President Aristide's recent election decree, despite hor-
rendous procedural difficulties. These include an absence of current
voter rolls and an electoral council comprised largely of political
novices. Political parties remain disorganized and mainly un-
funded. There are no campaign ground rules, and one overriding
concern permeates the entire political atmosphere-a fear for per-
sonal security.
Guaranteeing security for political candidates and their support-
ers remains a Herculean task in a country filled with hidden weap-
onry. In this effort, American leadership will be required to encour-
age consensus among the major political groupings so that they
choose to participate fully without threat of withdrawal on grounds
of unfairness should defeat loom.
Nor is the election of parliamentary and municipal officials in
June the only concern in this respect. Haiti will elect a new Presi-
dent in December, and Jean Bertrand Aristide made a solemn com-
mitment both prior to his return and since then not to be a can-
didate for reelection, something which the Haitian Constitution
proscribes. President Aristide has stated that he will preside over
a fair and free Presidential election, handing over power for the
first time in two centuries of Haitian history to his elected succes-
sor.
The President deserves praise for this pledge, made more gener-
ous still by the years he spent in exile deprived of his office, and
the United States and the international community must help
Aristide assure that such a peaceful transfer of power does occur
at year's end or early in 1996.
Two, in order to reduce the residue of Haiti's historic climate of
fear, ironclad procedures must be installed for verifying that the of-
ficer corps and recruits in the country's new police force now under-
going training respond to professional and not political direction.
Otherwise, we will witness the replacement of the old blatantly op-
pressive military with merely a newer, subtler but no less oppres-
sive police.
Efforts from whatever quarter in Haiti to employ alleged human
rights violators, insert recruits unvetted by American or U.N. ex-







perts or to otherwise undermine professional training procedures
for the new police will badly injure its credibility at the outset and
open the door to future abuses.
Continued close monitoring of the police training process by ex-
perienced U.S. Department of Justice and military personnel
should be the norm. Any Haitian officials or government advisers
incapable of adapting to this demanding standard of police behav-
ior should be replaced.
Preventing the integrity of a largely U.S.-based professional po-
lice training program from being undermined, Mr. Chairman, mem-
bers of the committee, will require special vigilance in the weeks
ahead. Here; as in safeguarding Haiti's fragile and incomplete new
electoral process, American political will and leadership can mean
the difference between nominal and genuine compliance with inter-
national norms.
Three, strengthening and accelerating national reconciliation is
immediately essential to the establishment of democratic habits in
Haiti. For two centuries, Haitian political losers have felt unsafe,
going into hiding or exile but not into domestic opposition. The
practice of protected political opposition haslittle meaning for most
Haitians.
Given the evident absence of security for ordinary Haitians of all
politiced viewpoints, I trust it will not appear hopelessly naive on
my part to suggest that the process of national reconciliation in
Haiti- would benefit from some immediate steps under American
leadership in the remaining weeks of our mandate.
These specific actions could include: (a) convening, as a number
of Haitian leaders have suggested, a national dialogue prior to the
parliamentary municipal elections, one comparable to those which
have helped to develop civic links across party lines in countries
elsewhere with few democratic traditions like Haiti, such as Nica-
ragua; (b) encouraging adoption by consensus of a formal code of
conduct among leaders in Haiti to define the conditions and limits
on political behavior during the two elections which lie ahead, a
code which would deal voluntarily with accepted or acceptable and
prescribed conduct during the campaigns; and (c) recognizing the
institutional legitimacy of the remaining handful of legally elected
Haitian senators, since the entire Chamber of Deputies and all
other senators are now up for election, thus acknowledging the
Haitian Parliament's institutional continuity and importance as an
independent and coequal branch of government rather than ne-
glecting Parliament as the United States has largely done in prac-
tice and assistance to date since President Aristide's return.
These are only some of the practical steps which the United
States could take in the weeks ahead to assist in national reconcili-
ation. They would reaffirm our commitment to the primacy of
democratic process and procedure over personality in Haitian pol-
icy. Such actions would have special relevance today when there
does not exist in Haiti even the beginnings of an independent and
effective judicial system.
Finally, point No. 4: helping the newly resurgent Haitian private
sector, especially the pro-democratic businessmen and women anx-
ious to rejoin the inter-American market system that is vital in de-






veloping Haitian democracy. However, I am going to leave that dis-
cussion for one of my colleagues, on this panel, Mr. Johnson.
I will simply say, Mr. Chairman, that if my friends within Haiti's
business community, which was devastated by the embargo's im-
pact, have a common complaint, it has been with the elephantine
pace of delivering the support measures promised by the various
mega-packages of economic aid periodically announced by this
country.
Surely a country such as ours, which could draft and begin im-
plementing assistance to all of devastated post-World War II Eu-
rope through the Marshall plan in a matter of months, can finally
in the weeks ahead respond to the job-creating proposals of Haiti's
responsible business leaders.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, each of the goals previously de-
scribed can be addressed dramatically and effectively by American
leaders in the 5 weeks remaining prior to handing over our present
unilateral responsibilities to officials representing the United Na-
tion. Each is an interrelated factor in the overall mosaic of democ-
ratization in Haiti, assuring fair and free elections, guaranteeing
personal security under professional police protection, encouraging
genuine national reconciliation, and supporting the revival of a
strong private sector.
Nor is funding the primary problem. Rather, the major difficulty
has been in reassessing the American mission in Haiti to focus on
today's, not yesterday's, realities and imperatives.
If democracy in Haiti is not to be left on the beachhead, the time
has come to move out, to recognize that our initial goal, that of re-
storing President Aristide to power beyond challenge, has long been
achieved. That was then, this is now.
Five weeks from now we must leave as our legacy to the U.N.
command and to the Haitian people a coordinated framework to
sustain and consolidate democratic procedures in the months and
years ahead. Achieving that framework, Mr. Chairman, will re-
quire 5 strenuous weeks of effort between now and the end of
March, a period in which we Americans must confront our prob-
lems in Haiti as candidly as we do our initial success.
In that fashion we can best seize our opportunity to extend and
develop what nascent democracy has already achieved in Haiti dur-
ing its 5 fragile months of existence.
Mr. Chairman, thank you. I have submitted a fuller statement
to the committee.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Weinstein appears in the appen-
dix.]
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Weinstein. The statement
will be accepted as submitted.
We now turn to Peter Johnson, executive director of the Carib-
bean Latin American Action, a private nonprofit group that pro-
motes U.S. relations and development in the Caribbean.
Mr. Johnson.
STATEMENT OF PETER JOHNSON, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
CARIBBEAN LATIN AMERICAN ACTION
Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We appreciate the op-
portunity to testify before this committee on this important issue.







The testimony we have submitted for the record is presuming
that from an organization like ours-
Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Johnson, would you put the mike a little
closer, please.
Mr. JOHNSON. The testimony that we have submitted for the
record is submitted with your understanding that our organization
is supported by some 120 American and largely American but some
Caribbean companies, and that the prespective on the future of
these companies and the role that these companies could play in
the redevelopment of the Haiti political process would be a role ex-
pected of us.
The burden of the testimony therefore is rather sharply on the
role of the private sector and what is being done to get the 85 per-
cent unemployment and underemployment rate in Haiti today
down to something that would reasonably be able to support a
democratic process.
In C/LAA, as you know, Mr. Chairman, there are some 30 or 35
companies which in fact have been involved in Haiti, but this un-
employment figure that I just referred to can only be knocked down
if we can apply the appropriate instruments to return some of
these companies back to Haiti.
I share all of my colleagues' comments about the political future
of Haiti. I simply want to stress as strongly as I can that that polit-
ical future at the end of the day is going to depend on jobs, and
if we can't get those jobs back in, we are aiming for serious prob-
lems.
During the second half of the 1980's, as this committee certainly
knows, and the early 1990's before the embargo and the coup, the
light manufacturing and the agricultural sector in Haiti probably
employed between 100,000 and 150,000 people. Today that figure
is probably closer to 3,000 to 5,000.
Our friend from U.S. AID this morning earlier today mentioned
that some 5,000 were reemployed in the assembly sector, and that
was a bright start. That is just not the right reading. The fact that
there are 4,000 to 5,000 or 3,000 to 5,000 or whatever that figure
is, this reflects some companies which in fact have put a very small
percentage of work on a very low-risk basis back into Haiti.
The companies that I am referring to remained during the em-
bargo period and were largely very banged up by the embargo it-
self. They tried to stay the course through different arrangements
that were made available to them, but when they finally left, for
El Salvador, Honduras or other places, they really were fairly crip-
pled financially.
Now, I would submit and have submitted to the administration
and, Mr. Chairman, we have talked about this ourselves several
times, that there needs to be some kind of a program urgently de-
vised that would in fact help these crippled companies back to
Haiti. You might ask, why these companies, if they are crippled,
why not have other companies come back such as those that might
be involved with Strobe Talbott's mission, that was mentioned
again this morning, on March 7 and 8.
Well, the point is that the political environment and the business
environment and in Haiti is not the kind of an environment where
a new company for Haiti out of Peoria, IL, is going to accept an






invitation to invest in that business environment. We should be
dealing with those companies which are accustomed to the environ'-
ment, which know Haiti, which in fact are interested in returning
to Haiti, knowing all of its problems. By and large, these aren't
large companies.
I know you have a letter from the Kellwood Corp. that we have
received a copy of by virtue of their involvement with us. This is
one of the biggest apparel companies in the country. They have in
fact put a little work in Haiti, but they are not going to do any
more for another 8 to 10 months as stated in that letter until they
see a better business and political environment and things
straighten out somewhat.
There is another letter that came in from a smaller artisan com-
pany from Vermont, and this company is quite different from the
Kellwood example. This is a company that in fact stayed the course
as far as they could in the artisan area, employing 200 or 300 peo-
ple when they were at their best, employing no one today, but
needing some assistance to get back in.
That was again mentioned this morning by the administration.
I think those of us who are following the issue closely are clearly
aware of the U.S. Government's efforts to involve the Overseas Pri-
vate Investment Corporation in some kind of a combination with
two American banks, Bank of Boston and Citibank, both of which
are in Port-au-Prince, to solve this working capital issue, to solve
the problem of these crippled companies.
The problem with this issue, with this conceived program, is two
fold. One is it is not going to be ready for several weeks. More im-
portantly than that, OPIC, adhering to its own responsibilities and
regulatory processes, must fund financially sound enterprises. You
are certainly going to have to say the same thing about Bank of
Boston and Citicorp.
So at the end of the day we are going to be funding companies
to go back to Haiti through that program which have virtually no
experience in Haiti, therefore they are not going to go back in the
short term or we are going to be financing major infrastructural
projects which are fine and very important long term.
The advantage of the companies that I am trying to address here
and identify is that they can probably return without all of this
new infrastructural which really will be necessary for the long term
development of Haiti, but we have got to solve the 85 percent un-
employment problem today.
I think I will end there, Mr. Chairman, because I get more criti-
cal perhaps than I should be and. I have tried to tone down the
written testimony to portray as much detail as I can about this
whole issue of trying to fill jobs in the middle of the society. AID
and the other funders are dealing with the micro side, and with the
infrastructural side.
What I am trying to do is to address a solution which is practical
and which the companies want to capitalize upon if they can to do
something in the middle.
You, Mr. Chairman, in your own experience have a case in your
district that I am aware of called RSK Industries. RSK Industries,
just to put on the record, in the late 1980's and early 1990's em-
ployed 3,000 to 4,000 people in Haiti at better than minimum






wage, good working conditions, and sought very eagerly to return
to Haiti and restart. RSK was very, very beaten up through the
embargo process.
The kind of product they had was not able to be easily trans-
ferred to another country. It was very much Haitian. The company
is in very bad shape today, desperately looking for some develop-
ment help to go back. It would seem to me that a perfect place for
some development resources, fitting perhaps in with OPIC and
with the banks.
So I am not going to try to lay out a scheme, but it would seem
to me that we have a development issue here, and a fundamental
political issue where some development resources on a short-term
working capital guarantee kind of a loan basis could help enor-
mously as we look toward the objectives that Allen Weinstein and
that Strobe Talbott and others speak of that we must be addressing
within a year. I see a fundamental disconnect between our political
objectives over the year and what we are really putting in place in
terms of instruments to solve the unemployment problem in Haiti.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
(The prepared statement of Mr. Johnson appears in the appen-
dix.]
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Johnson.
You certainly focused attention on a very critical need, and we
would like to explore that further with you.
The last speaker on our panel, Maj. Andy Messing, retired Army,
executive director of the National Defense Council Foundation.
Mr. Messing.
I may have to declare further recess if Mr. Burton doesn't return
because we have about 7 minutes remaining on a vote. I may have
to go to the floor, but why don't you start your testimony.
Major MESSING. Would you like to go to the floor right now, sir?
Chairman GILMAN. That might be appropriate. Why don't we de-
clare a 10- or 15-minute recess pending the return of Mr. Burton
and myself. Thank you.
[Recess.]
Mr. BURTON [presiding]. We will reconvene. I don't know who
testified last. Mr. Johnson.
Major Messing, would you like to testify now, then we will get
to questions.
STATEMENT OF MAJ. F. ANDY MESSING, JR. (USAR RETIRED),
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL
FOUNDATION
Major MESSING. Yes, sir, thank you. My name is Major Andy
Messing, National Defense Council Foundation. We are a founda-
tion that looks at low-intensity conflict, special operation low-inten-
sity conflict, and we also do a measure of refugee relief.
We have put 134 tons of food and medicine into the hottest com-
bat areas of the world. The reason we do that as a side bar is be-
cause that gives us entree into some of the most denied areas of
the world, like Somalia and Upper Huanuco Valley of Peru and
places like that. It gives us a little bit of edge on our academic re-
ports because we have what Sir Robert Thompson used to say is
the IWT, "I was there."






Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit two articles for the record,
an op-ed piece that I did on Haiti, which is 3 days ago in the L.A.
Times, which talks about our half effort in Haiti, and also an arti-
cle about "No Time for Defense Downsizing," which was published
in another magazine which talks about how, with the increased
threat against the United States and the free world, that we
shouldn't be taking a meat-ax approach to the downsizing of our
military, and we should be reorganizing our military to meet the
threats and meet the kind of missions that we have going toward
the 21st century, one of them being peacekeeping.
Mr. Chairman, these are the two articles here in case you have
a staff member who wants to get them.
[The articles appear in the appendix.]
Major MESSING. Mr. Chairman, I want to express--I may not
look like it, but I am very outraged. I am very angry. I am angry
as an American, and I use that as a capital A and use it as a small
a American in terms of being a U.S. citizen, and then as a member
of the Western Hemisphere, I am angry in that respect.
I am angry as a former officer of the military; I am angry as a
human being about some of the things that have transpired both
in Somalia and Haiti. And I would like to elaborate on that.
Having worked for over 6 years with Gen. Edward Lansdale as
a protege of his before he died, he taught me a lot of valuable
things about whenever we look at foreign policy and defense, we
should always look at it in a multispectrum kind of way; we should
not just look-as right-of-center people look at economic and secu-
rity concerns, and not allow the liberals on the left to just look at
the social and political concerns; but we should indeed look at the
full spectrum of concerns because, in doing that, that is the only
way you can get a clear picture of what is going on and address
the proper solution to what is transpiring.
When I worked with Richard Nixon on a book called "No More
Vietnams," one of the subjects we discussed was the security of the
Western Hemisphere. And as a matter of fact, I brought General
Lansdale up in a historic meeting in 1986, and the three of us sat
around and just brainstormed about where America was going into
the 21st century; and what we saw was America not with a clear
vision of how to deal with emerging and amorphous threats to our
country.
But one thing that struck me listening to these two historical fig-
ures, General Lansdale and President Nixon, is they always re-
ferred to history. And Mr. Chairman, I want to refer to history. I
want to refer to 30 years ago when the United States parachuted
the 82d Airborne into the Dominican Republic, which is inciden-
tally, as you know, contiguous to Haiti and had a similar situation
with military generals in revolt and a basic, similar environment.
And one of the things that transpired when Lyndon Johnson did
that incursion into Haiti, one of the things that the military did
was take the full-spectrum approach to adjudicating the situation.
They jumped in with rifles and as soon as the situation was stable,
they broke out the shovels.
Indeed, Grenada, indeed Panama, indeed Kuwait, we did that.
And where we have failed in Somalia, in spite of valiant attempts,
in spite of the dedication of the troops, in spite of the fact that not







one but two American Presidents have had a sincere dedication to-
ward adjudicating that particular conflict in Somalia, we failed be-
cause we always kept the rifle and we never picked up the shovel
in Somalia; and I see the same thing happening in Haiti, which
brings me great frustration and great sadness because the Haitian
people are very pro-United States and very wonderful people on an
individual basis. And to see this transpire just breaks my heart,
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to bring to this committee's attention
a book that was written by a very famous general, QGen. Bruce
Palmer, Jr., and in the back of it he cites the commander summary
of the report of stability operations Dominican Republic. And it is
on file at the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA. Obvi-
ously, nobody thought to look at that particular summary when we
did the Somalia operations; and certainly, they have not broken out
the same darned report for our Haiti operations. It causes me great
frustration because our military is not learning by its own history,
by its own famous generals. It is a major failure of leadership that
has been promulgated by those in charge of the executive depart-
ment decisions on these two particular deployments.
Now Strobe Talbott, whom I briefly worked for in the transition
between the Republican and Democratic administrations when I
was working with Rich Armitage at State as a consultant, I heard
him talk here. Rather ironically, I heard him talk when I was at
State about Russia and I disagreed with him about a lot of stuff
that he was articulating then.
So it is no surprise that I adamantly disagree with him now, Mr.
Chairman, when he talks about stability right now, that is, a
misimpression that he is trying to convey to you, the representa-
tives of the people.
I left tact and diplomacy at the doorway, Mr. Chairman, because
I feel that this is a travesty on the American public that things like
42 hostile incidents against American military forces over the past
couple of months haven't been reported to Congress or made avail-
able to the media.
Now, I obtained this information from a retired officer, and I cor-
roborated this with a DOD official, that somewhere these hostile
incidents are not being reported to you, the people's representa-
tives, which indicates the degeneration of our capabilities and in-
fluence and capabilities over the situation. And I am very disturbed
about this because if it was stopped at Army, then that shows
short-sightedness; if it was stopped at DOD, that shows a little bit
of political short-sightedness; if it was stopped at State or NSC, it
shows even a further problem; and if it was stopped-who knows,
even by Bill Clinton.
I was told that one general made the statement that if American
soldiers were not hit in sniping incidents, then it wasn't an inci-
dent. Well, I don't look at it that way, Mr. Chairman. I have been
to 27 different conflicts around the world, as you know, 57 times
into El Salvador alone; and when a bullet goes by me, I get excited.
And I know if my son was on the ground-and I have two children
serving in the military right now, a daughter and a son-very
proud of them; if a bullet came whizzing by their ears, I would







want to know about it. And the failure of DOD or State or NSC
or whoever to be forthright with you is embarrassing at the least.
Say, for the sake of argument, that it hasn't been 42 incidents.
Say it was 21 incidents, OK, say it was 11 incidents; if we cut the
figure down even more conservatively, it still shows that we are
losing a grip on the situation in Haiti.
Mr. BURTON. If I might interrupt, I am going to have to go vote
and in about 5 minutes what I would like to do, Chairman Gilman
will be back, I would like to ask a couple of questions. The first one
I will ask of you. You said there are 42 instances that you heard
of where troops have been fired upon or their lives have been put
in jeopardy.
Major MESSING. Yes, sir, one resulted in the death of an Amer-
ican forces soldier that you are aware of, that you made reference
to earlier, sir.
Mr. BURTON. I asked that question earlier, and they were very
vague; they said they would get me some information. I would like
to see some documentation from you, as well, if I could get that.
Major MESSING. At this point it is an allegation that has been
made to me by an A-1 source and corroborated by a DOD official.
Mr. BURTON. If you could talk to that source and ask them to
give it to me, I would like to talk to them.
You were talking about keeping the troops there until the situa-
tion was stabilized. I was just down there and I don't know that
the economy is going to be able to come back in a year, and maybe
not even 2 years; and the American people, I am not sure-and I
might address this to Mr. Johnson as well. I am not sure that the
American people will tolerate keeping their troops down there, es-
pecially if some unfortunate incidents occur where American troops
are killed, because most people didn't want us to go in there any-
how, and having been there and seeing the lack of infrastructure
and the terrible problems they face in getting businesses back-
and there are less than 500 of 45,000 jobs that have returned, and
many companies will not invest-how can we justify keeping troops
there to stabilize the situation beyond 1 year or 2 years when there
may be no end in sight? And is there any hope of bringing these
jobs back?
Mr. ARONSON. Mr. Chairman, the point I was making is that
some international presence ought to stay following the inaugura-
tion of the new government in February 1996 because I think it is
asking too much for a brandnew government to take office and sud-
denly face an environment in which they have to test all of these
new institutions with absolutely no security blanket. That will be
the acid test. Are the new police loyal? Are they competent? Are
there remnants of the old guard that are going to overthrow them?
I am not advocating that the United States forces stay, but under
U.N. auspices, some visible presence remain in Haiti as a warning
to everybody that the international community remains engaged
and committed. I just think we are testing the system too much to
pull everybody out just as a new government takes office.
That is exactly what we did with President Aristide's govern-
ment; we really pulled out all the international monitors after the
election and, in retrospect, we should have kept them there.







But I am not advocating United States troops; I think we could
design a presence with a significant number of U.N. monitors and
maybe some armed police trainers and monitors from other coun-
tries, Canada and elsewhere, that would be significant enough that
everybody would know that the international community is still in
Haiti. There is a risk in that, clearly; and if they were targeted,
the smaller the force, the more likely somebody might take them
on.
Mr. BURTON. Unfortunately, I have to run and vote. I will run
and vote and come back.
But I would like to say this, Bernie, there was a policeman that
was dragged out of the police force and killed by five people who
were not accepted into the academy just recently, and that hap-
pened just because our troops pulled out of that area after they
thought they had stabilized it, in a fairly stable area, and they said
they thought they would have to go back in for an indeterminate
period of time.
Think about that.
Mr. ARONSON. I am going to have to leave because I have a com-
mitment that I absolutely can't break.
Mr. BURTON. Are you going to be up here on the Hill in the next
2 weeks?
Mr. ARONSON. At your pleasure.
Major MESSING. Mr. Chairman, I would like to finish my re-
marks when you get a chance.
Mr. BURTON. We will be back in just a minute. Would you gentle-
men mind waiting for just a minute? I really apologize. We will be
right back.
[Recess.]
Mr. BURTON. I want to thank you gentlemen for your patience.
I have some questions and I think Congressman Goss has as well.
Major Messing.
Major MESSING. Sir, just to briefly elaborate on one thing. The
42 combat-hostile combat actions against American troops that
have taken place over the past few months, that I referred to, in
theory you should be able to obtain that particular documentation
that you referred to from your previous request earlier to the DOD
representative.
I am just pointing out that this level of incidents indeed has been
masked, and it has been verified to me by a DOD official. And the
point I am trying to make is if, indeed, we are having these levels
of hostile incidents against American troops, it shows that we are
starting to lose a gYip in Haiti and that the tide has turned. And
I would like to elaborate on why I think the tide has turned.
When you approach any peacekeeping mission, just as in the Do-
minican Republic, just as in Grenada, which-as you know, I was
there with you-just as Panama, which I visited after it occurred,
and in the gulf war, Kuwait, which I was there, you have to always
keep in mind as soon as stability occurs, you have to start working
that shovel hard. You have to bring up the ability of the people to
have clean water, to have a postal system, because you cannot have
commerce without a postal system. And believe it or not, the U.S.
Army has reserve units that do nothing but the postal stuff in civil
affairs.






You have to bring, up the medical care of the place. You have to
do a myriad of things to bring-to resuscitate the dead body, or the
body in a coma that you have come upon.
Clean water, you know, 80 percent of infant mortality can be as-
sociated with bad water, as you are well aware from your travels
in El Salvador.
The point I am trying to make is, you have to have a very com-
prehensive plan before you go in. Before, not as you go in or x-num-
ber of months after.
I was appalled-appalled listening to the Government represent-
atives talking about, oh, we are going to do this now and we are
going to do this now. They should have had that in the-front-load-
ed into their planning. Military planners and State Department
planners and NSC planners should have had that front-loaded into
their thinking, and as soon as hostilities ended, they should have
been paving roads. And I have seen them pave a mile a day when
I was in Vietnam.
The engineer brigade should have been digging wells and restor-
ing the electrical grid. They did restore the electrical grid, but to
the point it was a temporary fix. They went down to 30 megawatts
a day and less. I think it is low as 20 megawatts a day. That
means food spoilage, you can't manufacture; it goes on and on.
The point I am trying to make is, without the military going in
there and making an initial fix or attempt at nation-building or in-
frastructure work or whatever you want to call it, then you have
an automatically built-in failure like we had in Somalia.
And I am not denigrating the troops. The troops are magnificent.
I am denigrating the leadership. Let's separate the troops and the
leadership; I want that perfectly clear. Because the troops there,
they go there, they leave their families; because the fact is, they
want to do the right thing, they want to do the honorable thing,
and they suffer the--the 10th Mountain Division is suffering the
highest divorce rates in the military right now because of three
back-to-back deployments, Mr. Chairman: Hurricane Andrew, So-
malia, and now Haiti. And they just pulled out and their division
is in turmoil because of the family problems that have been gen-
erated to this family-oriented volunteer army.
Mr. BURTON. What I think we would like to do, Andy, you have
raised a lot of issues. I think we would like to ask some questions
about that. I know I would. I would also like to, as I said when
I was leaving, ask Mr. Johnson and Mr. Weinstein some questions
as well. But what you all are saying is that what has happened so
far will only lead to failure because they didn't have a plan going
in, or they have not yet developed a full-spectrum plan to deal with
the problems you are talking about?
Major MESSING. I think that is correct and that, coupled with the
fact that nobody wants to talk about the drug aspect of this and
the fact that President Aristide has a $4.5 million bounty on his
head.
Mr. BURTON. Where do you get that figure?
Major MESSING. I got it from people who were protecting him,
who had access to the information. Nobody wants to talk about how
the drug dealers want to knock off President Aristide. America







shouldn't spend $1.6 billion and x number of lives in an effort that
is honorable, not to have it succeed.
Mr. BURTON. Mr. Johnson, you indicated that you didn't think
the 130,000 or 140,000 jobs that were there at the time Mr.
Aristide left and later when our invasion took place-you don't
think that those are likely to return and there are less than 5,000
now. If that is the case, how can this economy-given the infra-
structure problems that you and Major Messing and others have
talked about, how can this economy ever hope to recover; and if it
doesn't recover, it seems if we stay there 1 or 2 or 3 years, it is
not going to change anything.
Mr. JOHNSON. The point I was making, somehow those jobs have
to return. If those jobs don't return, no other jobs will return. Those
are the jobs that are--those employees have been working for com-
panies which have Haitian experience and are the likely ones to re-
turn. Given the environment in Haiti, to expect a company which
is looking for, as all companies do, a good business environment,
a good political environment where there is stability and so on, it
is just unreasonable to expect that a company searching for that
kind of an offshore location is going to go to Haiti.
Mr. BURTON. I think it was you that indicated that there ought
to be tax credits given and tax incentives for American business to
go there or other businesses to go there. To what country are you
talking? And to what country are you asking these tax credits be
given? Haiti can't give the tax credits because they don't have the
money.
Mr. JOHNSON. Bernie Aronson indicated at the end of his re-
marks that some consideration be given to some kind of a tax cred-
it system for companies. I suppose he was talking about American
tax credit for companies that would begin to return to Haiti or in-
vest in Haiti.
I don't quite see how that would work, myself. I don't think that
is really the fundamental need. I think the fundamental need that
we see in the companies that we have surveyed-and we have real-
ly done a survey of the companies and we can supply that informa-
tion to you and the committee-they really do need working cap-
ital. They are small capital companies, that produce in Haiti, and
supply to the major retailers, the WalMarts and the Kmarts. But
they themselves are not major, deep-pocket companies. That com-
bined with the fact that they were very beat up during the embar-
go when they were forced out and had to move their equipment and
sever their employees. For a small company, that was an expensive
proposition.
As they come back now to their banks, the banks are telling
them that you are not in good enough condition to take a $500,000
or $2 million loan to return to Haiti. This is an endemic problem
for virtually all of these companies that we characterize as the kind
of companies that have to return to Haiti if we are going to solve
the problem-if we are going to get anywhere near that 100,000-
150,000 number again.
Mr. BURTON. Let me ask one more question. I see our Chairman
has returned, and we have Mr. Goss with us and Mr. Payne.
I have listened to everybody's testimony, hit and miss, running
back and forth. And after hearing Major Messing saying there was






no plan going in that was going to take care of the necessities that
you have to have to get an economy moving again and to have sta-
bility in a country like this, and because the infrastructure is not
there, and because there really isn't a completely elected govern-
ment, and because Mr. Aristide continues to have his cronies
around him who, before, were a large part of the problem, it seems
to me it is going to be very difficult to return democracy as you
talked about, Mr. Weinstein, and develop an economy that is going
to be able to employ another 140,000 people, because people don't
have the incentives to go back in and there is still a problem with
instability.
I will ask all three of you, how are we going to get this done,
even if we put all this money in there and keep our troops there
a year or 2 years? It seem it is like it is a Gordian knot.
Major MESSING. I would like to address that real quickly. Con-
gress, from the get-go, should have funded this up front. When they
don't fund up front, then the DOD will do it on the cheap. When
this happens, you have to wind up-when you decide that there is
going to be a peacekeeping mission somewhere in the world, you
have to notify DOD that we are going to cooperate with you on
this, because if you don't convey that impression right off the bat,
and they think they are going to have to take a- lot of things out
of hide, then they are going to wind up doing it on the cheap and
not doing a full-spectrum type of thing where they don't deal with
the rifle and the shovel and do the proper infrastructure work that
needs to be done in order to have a successful mission-peacekeep-
ing mission in this case. That is thb first thing.
The second thing is, future peacekeeping missions that you man-
date, the President or the Congress mandate, you have to make
sure that DOD understands that they are going to have the rifle
in one hand and the shovel in the other.
And the third thing is you should, right now, concentrate on di-
recting DOD, State Department-particularly AID and DOD-to
concentrate on the infrastructure while they have the last vestige
of muscle there. They should have done it at 21,000 soldiers, but
now that we are down to 5,000 soldiers, it can still be accom-
plished. We can rotate Reserve and National Guard units in, that
are combat engineer companies, the postal units that I was talking
about, civil affairs units, a lot of them out of Senator Strom Thur-
mond's home State, that have the capability to do it. They were ac-
tivated for Kuwait, and they did it in Panama and Grenada. There
is time to do that before we turn it over to the U.N. mission.
I am offended, as a Monroe Doctrine advocate, that U.N. forces
are in oyr hemisphere; they should be OAS forces, like Gen. Bruce
Palmer talks about. You ought to hear the laudatory remarks
about combined United States-OAS forces; you saw them in Gre-
nada, and that is what we should be having. Bangladeshi soldiers
on the pier at Port-au-Prince, watching the repatriation of Amer-
ican hemisphere Haitians, Americans guarding them, when they
can't speak Creole or English; they don't have the vested interest
as somebody from our hemisphere would have, especially from the
Caribbean grouping. This should be an OAS-we shouldn't be turn-
ing over control to the United Nations. I find this completely bi-
zarre.







Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Andy. I would like to hear from the
other two gentlemen and then recognize the chairman.
Mr. WEINSTEIN. Very briefly, Mr. Chairman, the figure $1.5 or
$1.6 billion was floated about this morning as a figure, a total fig-
ure to date of what this mission has cost. It is not my impression
that the American taxpayer is going to respond to a request for
some huge amount to deal with the Haitian economy and all the
social problems of 200 years.
I tell a story in Haiti that my Haitian friends of all political per-
suasions find amusing and agreeable. There are two solutions to
the Haitian problem; one is realistic and one is utopian. The realis-
tic solution is for 100,000 angels to come down from heaven armed
with Uzis and disarm the island; the utopian solution is, Haitian
political and economic leaders get together and begin to talk
through and work out their problems. And that has been the uto-
pian solution, and we have 5 weeks now, 5 weeks before this is out
of our hands.
I know that is not a popular position to take in Washington
today because, for all we know, President Clinton will be down
there to preside over the transition. I am very proud of the small
role our center played in working with the parliament to get the
amnesty passed. We flew down in a military plane at that point to
try to begin getting the generals out and President Aristide back
and things moving.
But not everything that could have been done in the last 5
months has been done, and we are still harking back to what Haiti
needs. I think you have heard some realistic talk from Peter John-
son here about what Haiti needs economically. I have tried to be
realistic about what it needs politically.
There is no rational way in which all of this can be done in 5
weeks, or between now and next February or whatever, but we
have to make a beginning. And if we do not, it seems to me that
we at least ought to acknowledge that fact and settle for a more
modest set of goals. But at least a beginning, Mr. Chairman.
At least a beginning is the idea that this election that is going
forward can be held, under the circumstances, in as stable a way
as possible and we emerge with an opposition that doesn't have to
fly to Miami or Orlando or the Dominican Republic immediately
after that election, if they lose, but they can stay at home and their
minority rights will be protected.
At least what we have a right to expect is that this police force
will not have hundreds of folks slipped in unvetted, but that it will
be a responsible police force bereft of human rights abusers and not
anybody's political guard.
And finally, Mr. Chairman, since we seem to be venting, I will
vent a little bit myself, if I may. I feel it is important to get on
record the outrage I feel-and surely others in this room-at the
rather shameful response by some Haitians, whether impulsively
or inspired, to the current mission by President Carter, General
Powell, and Senator Nunn. How quickly they forget. An unnamed
advisor to President Aristide is quoted in the Washington Post,
stating about President Aristide's dinner guests, that we know,
quoting, we have to watch all three of them carefully because they
are tricky, sneaky.






One may disagree with the purposes of the mission honorably
and responsibly. President Aristide seems to have been courteous
about their presence, hospitable, but apparently this particular ad-
visor does not recognize how many Haitian and American lives
might have been shed needlessly to obtain the President's return
but for the earlier efforts of President Carter, General Powell, and
Senator Nunn. I think that particular remark has hovered over my
testimony this morning. Thank you for letting me get it off my
chest.
Mr. JOHNSON. You really asked the fundamental question. You
are putting it right there. How are we going to get from here to
there in a year? And we have lost-Major Messing is absolutely
right; there has been a lot of time lost, and we are still losing time.
I have to come back to where I came from in my remarks and
in the written testimony, that the only real fundamental way to
stabilize a democracy, to put the underpinnings to a democracy, is
to get the middle sector of the society cooking again in terms of job
creation.
I don't see any magic wand to do something like this. The Amer-
ican taxpayers are certainly not going to pay for this for very much
more time.
So I think a little invested in business and getting small busi-
nesses going in the middle of the community and in the middle of
society is a very inexpensive price to pay for permanent jobs in
Haiti.
Chairman GILMAN. I want to thank Congressman Burton for tak-
ing on the chairmanship. I have to go over to the Senate. I want
to thank our three panelists. If I am hearing you correctly, the
three most important elements right now are infrastructure, econ-
omy, and political structure. Getting all three done simultaneously
with our limited resources in the short-term is not going to be easy.
But I think we all recognize how important those three factors are.
So again, I want to thank our panelists. I am sorry that you have
been delayed by the interruptions of voting. I thank Dan Burton
for taking on the chairmanship for us. You will forgive me; I have
to go over to the Senate and meet with my counterpart over there.
Mr. BURTON. Mr. Payne.
Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. I also agree that it is a pity
that there is a time put on the removal of our troops rather than
the mission.
I did have some questions regarding the--I think that there was
an attempt initially to try to get people from our hemisphere, as
you mentioned, Major, that OAS and the Monroe Doctrine coun-
tries should be in charge. I think that there was an attempt early
on to get the OAS involved, but there was not very much-since
the main portion of the OAS is run out of Latin America and South
America, there was not too much support, I think, other than Ven-
ezuela was the only Latin American country that showed any sup-
port.
But could you explain a little more about the problem that
Aristide has with the drug dealers? I know that he-under the old
system, it is alleged that the police chief of Port-au-Prince, Michel
Francois ran the drug operation, and his brother, and that Aristide






was always opposed to the drug situation and that was one of the
reasons why the military sort of wanted him out.
Could you just, if you know anything about that, elaborate on
that situation? Because during the time that Aristide was out, the
drug situation did increase. And I wonder now, has it started to de-
crease?
Major MESSING. The experts on this are based out of Miami with
the DEA. There is an individual whose name I will give you after
this hearing that you could consult with to get the full historical
significance of drug trafficking for the past decade in Haiti.
Part of the problem with Aristide before, and one of the reasons
he was removed was because of the fact that he dragged his feet
on the drug trade activity under his first administration. I mean,
it was a compilation of things, but that was one of the factors. Now
that he is back and American forces are back-the American forces
came in, drug traffic went down considerably.
I remember the first time I went into Haiti, which was August
1993-myself and a Frontline TV reporter went-going down to one
of the places to look at where the boats were being built; and from
here-from where I am sitting to where you are sitting were bales
of marijuana and cocaine ready to be transported to the United
States by awaiting boats. I mean, before Aristide and the American
forces-the American forces came in and Aristide was returned to
power, there was considerable amount of transshipment of drugs
through Haiti. That is a fact.
After we came in, it dropped off precipitously to just about zero
for a while, but now it is on the way up, according to the antidrug
forces that I talk to.
But the point is that the economic nomenclatura, or however you
say it, of Haiti and other dark side capitalists, ii conjunction their
Colombian counterparts, have threatened Aristide, according to an
A-1 source that had been in the bodyguard detail of President
Aristide. I will tell you one thing, if that American bodyguard de-
tail leaves Aristide, he is a dead man. He is a dead man. So just
keep that in mind as you are doing your deliberations.
But the point I am trying to make is, the Colombian drug cartels
are interested in getting-by the way, tonight on "NBC Dateline"
they are going to be talking about some of these drug activities and
one of our advisers, a former U.S. Customs Commissioner, Willie
von Raab, is going to be on there talking about the volumes of
drugs that are coming into our country now. But Haiti was a major
transshipment point, and when Haiti was shut down, all the drug
activity went over to the East, to the Dominican Republic and to
Puerto Rico. And the reason it is significant that it went to Puerto
Rico, then containerized cargo is not inspected when it comes back
to the United States. Nobody wants to talk about this drug activity.
I am kind of appalled, personally.
Mr. PAYNE. I couldn't agree with you more. The issue seems like
it has come off the radar screens. We used to have a Select Com-
mittee on Narcotics, but that was eliminated even before the con-
tract. Charlie Rangel did an excellent job of keeping a focus on the
drug problem worldwide, but now that we have saved a few dollars
by eliminating the committee, there is no focus in the Congress at
all on the whole problem of drugs.







But my time has just about expired. I just want to say that I
really think that our troops did such an excellent job in Haiti. It
is almost unbelievable that after 20,000-some-odd personnel that
were sent there, that there has really been only 1 hostile casualty.
I was just reading several months ago of a maneuver in Florida
where we lost five or six personnel by accident, just in that one ma-
neuver, and to have such a large-scale operation and not have lost
any person but one person is just-it is almost mind-boggling.
The other thing, just in conclusion, I heard you talk about the
morale problem, and it is a whole new era, but this whole question
of a military and what do we have a military for or what do people
when they volunteer-when I was a kid they used to draft you, but
when they volunteer for the military, I don't know what the expec-
tations are of a person who is volunteering.
I mean, it is great to be able to stay at home, I guess, or be in
a local place in Maryland, but when you join the military, I guess
whatever happens happens. And you expect the worst, although
you hope it doesn't happen. And I am just a little baffled about the
fact that you were saying that we have some people-I guess we
have been there a year or less, but that there are some-that there
is a bad morale problem and people don't like to be there.
What I am trying to do is come to grips with the new military
and what do we tell them the expectation is? What does a person
in the military expect life to be for the 2 years they join?
Major MESSING. To give you a quick verbal burst, Congressman,
when most people join the military right now, they have a vision
that if they go to Somalia, they go there not to provide security but
also to save lives. They don't go there just to stand around with
a rifle in their hand. They want to build schools. Whether they are
infantry or whether they are combat engineers or whether they are
civil affairs people or whoever, they go there with the idea that
they are leaving their wife and their children with the idea that
they are going to do some altruistic mission. That did not occur.
That created a major morale problem from our forces in Somalia
and, guess what, that happened again in Haiti, except for the
American special forces who were in the South.
But basically everyone goes like this while they wind up doing
their civil action and civil affairs mission as they were trained to
do. But the major conventional force units, which were the pre-
dominant force of Haiti, were precluded from participating or inter-
acting with the Haitians and doing things like building schools,
paving roads, and doing this and they cited budget reasons. Gee
whiz, we are going to spend $1.6 billion and we are not going to
have too much to show for it; and we have had 42 combat-we
have had 42 hostile incidents against the American military force
in the past few months. That is an indicator that people have ex-
pectations, and the expectations are not being filled; and it reflects
in the attitude of our American military. And again you were not
here, sir, when I said, separate the troops from the leadership. The
troops did a great job.
Mr. PAYNE. I saw-
Major MESSING. They believe, they sweat, they sacrifice; they do
what they did when I was in Vietnam, what they did in Grenada,







what they did in Panama and Kuwait-they do what they do best.
It comes to the leadership, sir.
Mr. PAYNE. In Rwanda, in 48 hours, they turned cholera around,
where 5,000 people were dying a day just from drinking the water.
In 48 hours, they dropped the number down to 800. When our
troops go in, they do it well and make me proud to be an American
and to see them in action. I saw them in Rwanda; when the people
were dying in Goma, they turned the water around just like that.
Major MESSING. When you let them do civil action, civil affairs,
and you let our combat engineer units go nuts doing infrastructure
work they are happy troops. A busy troop is a happy troop. More
than that, had we had that attitude, had the military leadership
had that attitude, had they felt that the funding would have been
given them by Congress, front-loaded so they didn't worry about it
being out of hide, and had the executive branch at NSC and State
Department and other places said, have at it, this would be an en-
tirely different situation and you would not have a crabby Andy
Messing here talking about how disappointed I am that we
frittered away $1.6 billion and several lives, one being an American
special forces sergeant.
One other thing. There is an American captain that deserves a
medal, not being admonished, for going down and checking on the
civil rights, the humanitarian rights in that prison. Right now he
is being threatened with a court martial because he decided he
wanted to go there and take a look at things that were happening
in a prison in Port-au-Prince. Half that prison was front-loaded by
people put there by Francois before Aristide came back to power.
Some were Aristide supporters.
He wanted to see the living conditions and what the treatment
was of those prisoners; and this American captain, instead of being
given a medal, he is being slapped and his career is finished and
he is being threatened with a court martial. Unless I don't know
something about this incident, unless he went down there and was
threatening to blow up the place or went naked and was not doing
what he felt morally correct in doing, then this is wrong and this
is a reflection again on our military leadership.
Mr. WEINSTEIN. Mr. Chairman, can I add a footnote related to
the broader discussion we were having earlier?
Congressman Payn'e, good to see you again. There is a real dif-
ference between the status of forces of American troops in Haiti
and some of these other examples you were using. Take Rwanda.
American troops did an extraordinary job there. In Rwanda there
was no government to have a dialog with. The troops were the de
facto government, running the good things in Rwanda; just as
when, during our Revolution, George Washington was the govern-
ment, essentially as he moved about the country making civil deci-
sions. The same was certainly true in Grenada, and the same was
true in Panama; the same assuredly was true in West Germany
and Japan after the Second World War.
You have a situation here, however, where we have terms of ref-
erence that complicate life enormously for American troops. Even
if they want to do something, you have a Haitian Government skel-
etally in operation, many branches of which were assisted by civic






action teams, some of whose leaders I met on one of the six trips
I have taken to Haiti since last September.
You have the United Nations moving around. You have the OAS
moving around. They are going to be monitors. You have the em-
bassy. This hodgepodge of decisionmaking, frankly, sometimes got
in the way of doing good things.
And then you have another problem, something that the chair-
man alluded to earlier, and it is a terrible problem, getting around.
Mostly our troops there drive around very slowly just trying to get
up, at least the ones in Port-au-Prince. So the government, the
Prime Minister is in Petionville, the President is in Port-au-Prince;
the communication process is, to say the least, very rudimentary.
Mr. BURTON. Mr. Goss. You have been very patient.
Mr. Goss. Thank you very much Mr. Chairman.
It has been a long day, and we have had many things interceding
since we started this hearing this morning; and it is good to get
back to the subject. I am delighted to see these witnesses. They
have all corroborated some of the thoughts and information we
have had about the problem of getting on target with the economy
and making it work. I think Mr. Johnson's remarks are on the
mark there.
The costs that Mr. Weinstein has alluded to are staggering, and
I don't think we know them all yet. I think there are clearly more
coming, because we seem to be in there ironclad until February;
and there are a lot of sort of unannounced arrangements that are
going to have to be paid for, and I suspect the American taxpayer
will pay for that.
As the major said, he is extremely frustrated and has shown it
very well with what I would call the misuse of the military in a
situation, in part, which has caused some real morale problems and
left us wondering.
I'have very few questions to address to you gentlemen because
I think you have made yourselves very clear and the testimony you
have given us is valuable. I hope you all have time to read the
fourth report, or the report submitted on February 8-I don't know
whether it was the fourth one or not, by. President Clinton who has
inquired to the Congress on what the situation is in Haiti. I am
sorry I had to miss the questioning of the witnesses from the ad-
ministration earlier today and I would like permission to submit to
you, Mr. Chairman, through this committee, some questions that
strike me as relatively important.
Mr. BURTON. Without objection.
Mr. Goss. I think they have given us a report, which I rec-
ommend for your reading if you haven't seen it, which clearly un-
derscores some of the successes that have been there which we
should, as Americans, be very proud of, the fact that we have tried
very hard on behalf of a friendly neighbor nearby to do something
right to help them develop a viable economy and a stable democ-
racy and peace and freedom, the fact it is a country that has never
known that in its 200 years of existence and it is a very tall order.
What is not in the report from the White House, however, is per-
haps more compelling than what is in. We get back into some of
the cost areas there.






I am not quite sure what the new rules of engagement are going
to be when we get the U.N. peacekeeping in there. We are going
to have some of our military, 2,000, 3,000-something in that area;
there is apparently going to be a double chain of command. The
general in charge is going to report both to the representative of
the Secretary General of the United Nations on the one hand and
to his superior in the U.S. military, which is a somewhat curious
arrangement.
But more than that-whether that is going to work well or not,
we will see-one of the cautions we have in that area in Congress
is that we, I think, all felt a little bit that the Clinton administra-
tion had done an extremely assiduous job of discussing the Haitian
affair with the United Nations, but perhaps had been less diligent
discussing it with the U.S. Congress; and I hope we are not going
to find ourselves back in that situation again.
But when you get down to the U.S. armed personnel-and I pre-
sume armed is the right word-I don't know whether these will be
lightly armed or not armed; I don't know whether they truly are
going into some kind of unarmed civil peacekeeping arrangement
where the only time we can use force is in our defense if we happen
to have it. The report is unclear.
The report is both retrospective and prospective. In the prospec-
tive areas, it says we will have a quick reaction force to provide
backup support for other UNMIH forces. That has a bit of an omi-
nous ring to it. What kind of backup support is that? And what is
going to happen if we have the type of situation that we have read
about since the report from the White House.
This is an AP report, if I may, Mr. Chairman, that talked about
Limbe Haiti where a mob marched in and took over as soon as our
forces left the local police function- there, beat the lieutenant to
death. We can be proud of ourselves for confiscating weapons, but
it is not going to stop the habit in Haiti of beating and burning
people. And this lieutenant was beaten and then burned and then
buried.
The same gentleman who is going to be the top of the chain of
command for United Nations, representing the Secretary, Gen.
Laqueda Rameni-I don't know him; perhaps you do-he has com-
mented and said, well, these are not problems that prevent the
country from moving ahead.
I would suggest that stability is a very serious problem. I think
it is great we have had no major incidents there, and I would ex-
pect we would have none. Sending 20,000 troops to basically an un-
armed country should mean we do pretty well; the odds are quite
good in our favor. We have, in fact, taken over the management of
a small Caribbean nation in my view, and it is not Florida, but
Haiti. We are the power.
The White House report starts very proudly suggesting that the
mission has been accomplished, that we had to use all necessary
means to secure the departure of the coup leaders, that has been
done well and peaceably primarily thanks to the statesmanlike ef-
forts of the three gentlemen who went there and saved the day at
the last minute.






"To restore the legitimate democratically elected Government of
Haiti to power" is an interesting question. I would suggest that the
power in Haiti today is the U.S. military.
And then going on for the third objective, which is the tough one
for the year ahead, which is to create a secure and stable environ-
ment which will allow the Haitian people to resume responsibility
for rebuilding their country. That is what we want to help them in,
but I have to caution-it is not selected Haitian people; it is all
Haitian people and there is a very strong perspective in that coun-
try now that United States aid is all pro-Aristide, and if not pro-
Aristide, it does not matter. We have to overcome that as well.
Going back to the cost questions, I read in this report a very
plaintive request from the administration; and I know it is legiti-
mate because we have just completed the process of the debate and
the vote in the House on the supplemental DOD bill. The state-
ment in this report is, without a timely passage of the supple-
mental appropriations bill, the net effect will be a significant de-
crease in overall military readiness. We are not talking about over-
all military readiness in Haiti, we are talking about the protection
and security of the United States of America.
We have a shortfall here of $2.6 billion. I would hope that we are
not jeopardizing our national security and our readiness capability
for $2.6 billion. Be that as it may, I happened to go back to look
and see that all those Members of Congress who were here, who
advocated the invasion of Haiti and use of troops and this extraor-
dinary commitment of dollars, these same folks could not find it in
their hearts to vote in support of that emergency supplemental, by
and large, that we passed earlier this week, which means there is
a disconnect in the administration's political support on this Hill
and is something they perhaps should look to. It is a fairly impor-
tant disconnect.
The final point is, I read about all these other countries that are
going to help us in the UNMIH operation, and it is quite a bunch.
And on top of that, some of these are folks that are already there
helping us with the multilateral force.
But when I look at the countries, they are small countries, and
in many cases, I know they are countries that we have made ar-
rangements that we are basically paying the troops. So we are in
a position, it seems, where we are paying other countries for merce-
nary troops to give us either the camouflage of a multinational
force in Haiti or the comfort of having other people there. At the
same time, we are threatening the readiness of our own military
forces of the United States of America, so says the White House re-
port.
That is a very curious position to be in, and one, I think, Mr.
Chairman, that your committee ought to pursue diligently in your
role of oversight. Any comments, I would welcome. My desire is to
bring stability and better economy and peace and democracy, but
there are a lot of indicators there that show us we have a very
tough struggle.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BURTON. We need to wrap this up in a few minutes for all
our sakes. I am about to collapse and I have to catch an airplane.







Major MESSING. Congressman Goss, I couldn't agree with you "
more. There is a disconnect, and there is a disconnect of
downsizing the military, at the same time giving them more tasks
and less money, and not focusing them on things that wind up ena-
bling them to accomplish their mission. So your perceptions, sir,
are clear in that respect.
The solution to it is that we have to understand that these kinds
of peacekeeping missions, when authorized by the executive and ci
the legislative branches in a combined way, the legislative branch I
has the obligation to provide a measure of oversight in requiring 4*
the administration, the executive branch, to understand that they
are going to have the money that they need to accomplish the mis- I
sion in a correct manner; and this is part of the problem that has ?
not occurred both in Somalia and here. If you don't front-load the
operation with dough, it ain't going to get done right, and that is
part of the main problem here.
And then we get into a problem where we whiz away money at
a quantum rate and we don't get the job done; and we lose face and
we have to drag in these cover forces. I am appalled, personally,
that U.N. troops are being paid $900 to $1,000 per soldier. Some
of these people, their wage in their own country is $25 a month.
A lot of these people view these nonregional forces coming in here
as mercenaries, as you correctly put it, and a lot of these U.N.
forces send in poorly trained and poorly disciplined troops. That is
another aspect that we haven't addressed, the poorly disciplined
U.N. troops that are engaging in this.
Mr. WEINSTEIN. The Congressman has raised a number of impor-
tant issues. Let me point out the one that is likely to give a few
nightmares to all of us within the next month and a half. United
States becomes UNMIH command on March 31. By mid-April the
election campaign is in full swing, and we have in Haiti 6,000
troops-about half of those United States troops under U.N. com-
mand, the rest, troops from different countries.
We will have the new police trainees beginning to trickle out in
various ways. We will have some OAS election monitors wandering
about. Will we have a plan? Will we have a structure? Will we have
even a 911 number to call if you are getting the heck beaten out
of you in the same town that the Congressmen indicated? This is
not an abstract problem.
What happens then? Who comes from where through the traffic
jams of Port-au-Prince, or do we use my 100,000 angels to deal
with that? That is the concrete issue that I wish we could spend
more time on.
Chairman GILMAN. I thank you for your comments and for your 9
patience. I think is that this is a severe problem that we are going
to have to deal with. We didn't front-load the planning, and hope-
fully it is not too late.
Thank you. This meeting stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:50 p.m., the committee was adjourned to recon-
vene at the call of the Chair.]













APPENDIX




STATEMENT BY

HON. CHARLES B. RANGEL

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

HEARING ON HAITI



FEBRUARY 24, 1995


CHAIRMAN GILMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE, I WANT TO
THANK YOU FOR HOLDING THIS IMPORTANT HEARING AND FOR
INVITING ME TO TESTIFY.

I WISH TO EXTEND MY CONGRATULATIONS TO CHAIRMAN
GILMAN, WHO HAS WORKED WITH THE CONGRESSIONAL BLACK
CAUCUS AND OTHER MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, TO ASSIST IN THE
RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY TO HAITI. I ALSO WISH TO
COMMEND PRESIDENT CLINTON, WHO DESPITE THE ENORMOUS
RESISTANCE IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT, PENTAGON, AND THE CIA,
FOLLOWED THROUGH ON HIS PLEDGE TO RETURN PRESIDENT
ARISTIDE TO HIS CONSTITUTIONAL OFFICE AND ASSISTED IN HAITI'S
ECONOMIC RECOVERY. I ALSO WISH TO EXTEND MY PRAISE TO THE
UNITED NATIONS, COUNTRIES IN THE ORGANIZATION OF
AMERICAN STATES (OAS) WHICH DEMONSTRATED WHAT UNITY IN
THIS HEMISPHERE CAN ACCOMPLISH.

FOR THREE YEARS, THE UNITED STATES AND COUNTRIES AROUND
THE WORLD MAINTAINED A COMMITMENT TO HAITI OF RESTORING
THE DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED GOVERNMENT. AT THE END OF
THAT LONG STRUGGLE ON OCTOBER 15, 1994, I, ALONG WITH
SEVERAL MEMBERS OF HOUSE, HAD THE HONOR OF LEADING A
CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION THAT RETURNED WITH PRESIDENT
ARISTIDE TO PORT-AU-PRINCE. IT WAS A HEART WARMING AND
MEMORABLE JOURNEY. PRESIDENT ARISTIDE ELOQUENTLY SPOKE OF
RECONCILIATION "NO TO VIOLENCE, NO TO VENGEANCE, YES TO
RECONCILIATION" HE UTTERED. THIS WAS A SPECIAL DAY FOR
AMERICANS, BEING PART OF THE SOLUTION FOR A CARIBBEAN
NEIGHBOR RATHER THAN PART OF THE PROBLEM.

(61)


90-899 95-3









RANGEL/HAITI 2

FROM THE BEGINNING OF OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY,
PRESIDENT ARISTIDE'S UNRELENTING CALL FOR RECONCILIATION
HAS BEEN ADHERED TO. IN THE FIVE MONTHS SINCE OUR TROOPS
ENTERED HAITI, WE HAVE LOST ONE AMERICAN SOLDIER. OUR
TROOPS HAVE BEEN WELCOMED BY THE HAITIAN PEOPLE. HAITIAN-
ON-HAITIAN VIOLENCE REMAINED AT AN ALL TIME LOW. ON
JANUARY 30, THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, HAVING DETERMINED
THAT A SECURE AND STABLE ENVIRONMENT EXISTED IN HAITI,
PASSED RESOLUTION 975, PROVIDING FOR THE TRANSITION FROM
THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE (MNF) TO THE UNITED NATIONS
MISSION IN HAITI (UNMIH). THE UNMIH TRANSITION WILL BE
COMPLETED ON MARCH 31. THE NUMBER OF US FORCES IN HAITI
HAS DECLINED FROM 20,000 TO ABOUT 6,100 AT THE PRESENT TIME. IT
IS ESTIMATED THAT APPROXIMATELY 3,000 US TROOPS WILL BE PART
OF THE UN MISSION.

DESPITE THE OBVIOUS SUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS BY THE ARISTIDE
GOVERNMENT TO IMPROVE HUMAN RIGHTS CLIMATE IN THE
COUNTRY, I AM SURPRISED THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT WOULD,
ONCE AGAIN, RELEASE A REPORT MAKING UNSUBSTANTIATED
ALLEGATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. THIS REPORT NOT
ONLY WENT BACK FOUR YEARS TO THE TIME JUST PRIOR TO
ARISTIDE'S ELECTION, IT AGAIN INCLUDED ALLEGATIONS FROM
INDIVIDUALS WHO SUPPORTED THE COUP. FURTHERMORE, IT
FAILED TO REPORT SYSTEMATIC EFFORTS BY THE ARISTIDE
ADMINISTRATION TO CARRY OUT JUDICIAL REFORM, HUMAN
RIGHTS EDUCATION AND PROMOTION AND ACTIONS TO BRING TO
JUSTICE INDIVIDUALS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE THOUSANDS OF
MURDERS COMMITTED DURING AND AFTER THE COUP.

AFTER THE OUSTING OF PRESIDENT ARISTIDE, THE LEVEL OF HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS DID, IN FACT, ESCALATE. DURING THIS TIME,
ATTACHES, FRAPH MEMBERS AND ARMED BANDITS TOOK
ADVANTAGE OF THE CLIMATE TO CARRY OUT POLITICAL AND
CRIMINAL KILLINGS. HOWEVER, AS THE REPORT POINTED OUT,
UNDER "ARISTIDE II" THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION HAS
IMPROVED DRAMATICALLY. FURTHERMORE, FOLLOWING THE
RESTORATION OF THE GOVERNMENT, THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY INITIATED A PROGRAM THAT CREATED AN INTERIM
POLICE FORCE. THE PROGRAM INCLUDED: INTERNATIONAL POLICE
MONITORS (IPM'S), AN INTERIM PUBLIC SECURITY FORCES (IPSF),
POLICE TRAINEES FROM THE US SAFE HAVEN IN GUANTANAMO,
AND A NEW POLICE ACADEMY.





63


RANGEL/HAITI 3

THE INTERIM POLICE FORCE WILL OPERATE IN HAITI UNTIL A
PERMANENT PROFESSIONAL POLICE FORCE CAN BE TRAINED. IN
COOPERATION WITH CANADA AND FRANCE THE US DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE'S INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE TRAINING
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM HAS ESTABLISHED A NATIONAL POLICE
ACADEMY TO TRAIN A PERMANENT PROFESSIONAL POLICE FORCE.
THE FIRST CLASS BEGAN TRAINING ON JANUARY 31. IT IS
ESTIMATED THAT 4,000 INDIVIDUALS WILL BE TRAINED.

THE HAITIAN ECONOMY IS IN THE INITIAL STAGES OF RECOVERY.
THE HAITIAN GOVERNMENT HAS COMMITTED ITSELF TO A VARIETY
OF MEASURES TO IMPROVE THE ECONOMY SUCH AS PRIVATIZATION
OF MOST PUBLIC ENTERPRISES, TRADE LIBERALIZATION, AND
REASSURANCE TO POTENTIAL FOREIGN INVESTORS. I HAVE
RECENTLY MET WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, SMARCK MICHEL, WHO
EXPRESSED HIS CONCERNS ABOUT THE SLOW PROGRESS OF
ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND THE NEED FOR JOB CREATION.

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ALONG WITH THE UNITED
STATES HAVE STRENGTHENED THEIR COMMITMENT TO ECONOMIC
REVITALIZATION. DURING THE JANUARY 30-31 CONSULTATIVE
GROUP MEETING IN PARIS DONORS PLEDGED UP TO $900 MILLION IN -
ASSISTANCE TO HAITI. MAJOR DONOR SUPPORT THAT HAS
ALREADY BEEN APPROVED AND PARTIALLY DISBURSED INCLUDE
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS SUPPORT FROM THE WORLD BANK ($40
MILLION), INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK ($40 MILLION)
AND US GOVERNMENT ($40 MILLION). THE UNITED STATES HAS
COMMITTED $87 MILLION IN ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND $57 MILLION
IN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. IN THE INTEREST OF OUR
MAINTAINING OUR REPUTATION, WE MUST FOLLOW THROUGH ON
THIS PLEDGE.

KEEPING THE COMMITMENT TO ADVANCE COMMERCIAL
REGENERATION IN HAITI, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE, STROBE
TALBOTT, WILL LEAD A PRESIDENTIAL BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT
MISSION IN MARCH. THIS MISSION WILL BE COMPRISED OF SOME 30
US FIRMS FROM A BROAD SPECTRUM OF INDUSTRIES. IN ADDITION,
THE US-HAITI BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL, WHICH WILL BE
INAUGURATED DURING THIS VISIT, WILL PROVIDE A FORUM TO
FOSTER GREATER INTERACTION BETWEEN US AND HAITIAN
OFFICIALS AND BUSINESS REPRESENTATIVE. THE DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE OPENED ITS OFFICE IN HAITI ON FEBRUARY 6.









RANGEL/HAITI 4

US AND FOREIGN COMMERCIAL SERVICE ONE-STOP SHOP CENTER,
LOCATED IN NEW YORK CITY, WILL PROVIDE ON-SITE TRADE AND
INVESTMENT COUNSELING TO US EXPORTERS AND INVESTORS
INTERESTED IN DOING BUSINESS IN HAITI.

THE HAITIAN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT UNDER PRIME MINISTER
SMARCK MICHEL IS FUNCTIONING. THE TRAINING OF JUSTICES OF
THE PEACE WAS LAUNCHED BY THE US ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
PROGRAM ON JANUARY 17 IN COOPERATION WITH THE HAITIAN
JUSTICE MINISTRY. IT IS EXPECTED THAT PARLIAMENTARY
ELECTIONS WILL TAKE PLACE IN JUNE AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
IN NOVEMBER.

INITIALLY, THE US MILITARY PEACEKEEPING PRESENCE IN HAITI WAS
MET WITH A GREAT DEAL OF SKEPTICISM. BUT TODAY, THE UNITED
STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SHOULD BE PROUD
OF WHAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED. I SALUTE PRESIDENT CLINTON
AND CONGRESS FOR BEING PART OF THE SOLUTION FOR A
CARIBBEAN NEIGHBOR. IT IS INCUMBENT UPON US NOT TO ALLOW
LEGITIMATE SECURITY CONCERNS TO SHRINK FROM OUR
RESPONSIBILITY AND TO WORK WITH THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY IN REBUILDING THE ECONOMY OF HAITI.

I URGE THAT CONGRESS CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE
ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY AND THAT WE HONOR OUR PLEDGE TO
THE GOVERNMENT OF HAITI.


THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN











PORTER GOSR GOSw-14

.ASN. of. C U teb Sttt-
2 EUoBRAF Sn 212
It has ben1out or tprtaentatibes U to







It has been 159 days since more than 20,000 U.S. troops occupied

the bills for U.S. operations in Haiti are still mounting and
have now passed the $850 million mark. Despite all of this
manpower and money, little lasting progress has been made toward
an orderly and safe withdrawal of our troops and a shift of
responsibility for the fate of Haiti to the Haitian government.

Recent reports indicate that the Clinton Administration has been
less than candid about operations in Haiti by failing to
acknowledge the genuine fragility of both the security situation
there and the reconstituted Aristide government. The tenuousness
of both of these could lead to deadly consequences for our troops
as the transition to a UN mission is made.

The much-touted "secure and stable" environment is clearly
tenuous. We have seen reports of unrest in Limbe, prison riots in
Port-au-Prince, politically motivated intimidation campaigns,
periodic food rampages, rampant crime, violent land disputes, and
signs of growing frustration about the lack of jobs and progress
in some sectors of Haitian society. Problems that are simmering
today could easily erupt during the transition when the U.N.
plans to rely heavily on Haitians to provide law and order.

The Aristide government isn't up to the job. Today, for example,
it often takes the direct intervention of the Prime Minister or
the President to get a ship offloaded by workers in one of the
government run ports. As a whole, the Aristide government lacks
institutional depth and today our troops are taking up the slack
by providing many governmental functions through out the country.
In instances when our troops have attempted to hand
responsibilities over, such as fuel deliveries for example,
Haitian authorities have been largely unable to follow-through.

The problems the Aristide government faces are being compounded
daily by the flood of refugees being forcibly returned from all
around the Caribbean and the 4,000 Haitians we repatriated
against their will in recent weeks. The refugees are often
disgruntled and frightened and many are camped in Port-au-Prince
demanding jobs from a government that simply cannot deliver.

It is also clear that the Haitian Interim Police Force are not up
to the job of providing for law and order, as it will be called


110SAOYnOsPA.2arrarau~r 22.121 101000






66



upon to do when UNMIH takes over on 31 March. The Haitian IPSF
remain afraid to patrol on their own, generally do not command
the respect of the Haitian people, and are largely lacking in
training. Across the board, while the Aristide government may
have the will to follow-through it does not yet have the ability.

These problems come as no surprise to many of us who maintained
throughout the lead-up to the occupation that moving from the
return of Aristide to a safe and orderly hand-off of Haitian
affairs to Haitians was NOT going to be a short-term. low-cost
venture. The Adminsitration is now talking about having our
soldiers in Haiti as part of the U.N. mission until February of
1996 and pouring untold amounts of money (recent estimates
project $1.6 billion by early 1996) into a small nation that
seems utterly incapable of absorbing that kind of infusion.

How do we make genuine progress from where we are today? The
first priority must be to move the elections process forward at
the earliest possible date. In 1991, President Aristide appeared
not to understand that democracy means shared power rather than
consolidation of power. Today, lack of progress on the elections
means that Aristide rules without any checks or balances. Already
we have seen his willingness to take action by what amounts to
decree. He apparently promulgated his own version of the
electoral law, for example, rather than that passed by the duly
elected National Assembly. You cannot build a democracy without a
parliament. The time for elections is clearly now.

Hand-in-hand with those elections must be concerted effort by
U.S. policymakers to seek a more even-handed approach in aid
programs and political support. Throughout the Haitian crisis,
the Clinton Administration showed a marked tendency to put the
interests of one man (President Aristide) above the Haitian
constitution, above the Haitian parliament and above true
democracy in Haiti.

If you talk to a broad range of Haitians or the OAS observers you
will find that Americans are not considered to be "impartial." We
appear to have taken sides and that cannot continue. I am
particularly concerned about recent reports of Aristide's attempt
to politicize the police force and I hope our Adminsitration will
follow-through on its pledge not to allow him that leeway.

As the election cycle gets underway the need for balance in what
we do in Haiti will become paramount. All political parties will
be looking for signs of unfairness. A failed elections cycle
could jeopardize everything that U.S. soldiers and U.S.
taxdollars have been working for because in Haiti, a contested
election is contested forever.

All of the efforts on "governance" issues will mean nothing if we
-don't redirect current aid programs from "handouts" to programs
designed to bring genuine economic development to Haiti. What
there was of the Haitian economy has been decimated by a complete






67



lack of effective governing and the U.S. led embargo of the past
three years. It is clear that even a few months of relative calm
have not put the economy on the track to recovery. Prices have
not come down. It remains extremely difficult to move goods in
and out of the country. And currency instability, the lack of law
and order, and the lack of meaningful laws to protect private
property stand as significant barriers to the return or start-up
of businesses. Even the economic elites in Haiti who have
traditionally made up the backbone of Haitian commercial activity
are unwilling to take the risks associated with jumpstarting the
economy.

Despite the obstacles, there are American and Haitian businesses
interested in going back to work there. An increased
availability of investment capital and incentives would
facilitate that process. While we are encouraged by signs that
OPIC and U.S.A.I.D. are working on investment programs, time is
clearly of the essence.

As many of you know, I have had fundamental disagreements from
the outset with the Clinton Administration's approach to the
crisis in Haiti. Today the occupation is a fait accompli; the
invasion debate is over; and the United States is now running a
small Caribbean nation. But my bottom line has not changed: we
should move as quickly as possible to get our men and women in
uniform out of Haiti and to handoff the responsibility for that
country to a newly and duly elected parliament and president
because, in the end, only Haitians can solve Haiti's problems.






68


STATEMENT OF

THE HONORABLE STROBE TALBOTT
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE

Mr. Chairman, Under Secretary Slocombe and I welcome the
chance to give you a progress report on the U.S.-led, 31-nation
effort that has rescued a neighboring country from disaster,
restored stability in our region, and defended our nation's
values and interests. Operation Uphold Democracy has fully lived
up to its name. It has peacefully ousted Haiti's brutal
dictators, restored its legitimate government, established a
secure and stable environment, and is now preparing to pass the
baton to a United Nations force under a U.S. Commander.


We cannot yet say "mission accomplished." We have another
year of work ahead of us. But we can say, "So far, so good."
This mission, while still a work in progress, is well on its way
to being a success. Five months after President Clinton sent our
troops to their country, Haitians are constructing roads to
advance commerce and build a civil society rather than boats to
escape terror.

Let me briefly review how far we have come. It was nearly
four years ago that a military coup transformed Haiti's newborn
democracy into a nightmare of repression. A violent regime took
power, one that crushed its opponents and caused tens of
thousands of Haitians to flee from their shores toward ours.
With the support of that regime, paramilitary gangs assassinated
opposition leaders and priests who spoke out. Murder,
mutilation, rape, and the kidnapping of children were not just
officially sanctioned -- often officially perpetrated -- crimes;
they were instruments of rule. They became common tools for
dealing with citizens and families suspected of supporting
democracy. Meanwhile, the economy, long the weakest in the
hemisphere, plummeted deeper into ruin.

For three years, the United States and other countries
around the world tried everything short of force to remove the
coup leaders and restore Haiti's democratically-elected









government. Persuasion, negotiation, mediation, condemnation,
sanctions -- all to no avail. It wasn't until last September,
when the coup leaders knew that the President had ordered U.S.
armed forces into action, that they agreed to give up power
peacefully.


Think for a moment where we would likely be today had we not
acted:


-- The dictators would still be in power, and their campaign
of murder and terror against the Haitian people would be
continuing.


-- Tens of thousands of Haitians would be seeking refuge
abroad, posing a threat to America's borders and to regional
stability as well. The Bahamas and other small island
democracies in the Caribbean would be faced with the
prospect of being overwhelmed by a mounting flood of
desperate humanity.


-- The U.S. Navy and Coast Guard would still be diverting
massive resources, on an open-ended if not permanent basis,
to manage migrant interdiction along our own coastline.
These are resources that would otherwise be available to
stop smuggling, protect our fisheries, reduce the flow of
illegal drugs, and save lives at sea. More generally, we
would be faced with more years like 1994, when we spent
nearly $300 million to deal with Haitian migrants, sanctions
enforcement, and humanitarian relief. These were the costs
of non-intervention, recurrent costs for which -- absent our
willingness to use force -- there was no end in sight.

-- Furthermore, the enemies of democracy elsewhere in the
region -- coup-plotters lurking in the shadows of other
capitals in the hemisphere -- would be more inclined to

2









believe that they could act with impunity; that they, too,
like the Haitian coup leaders of 1991, could overthrow
democratically elected governments.

-- And finally, the United States and the international
community would have failed to fulfill our commitments in
the face of a coup that President Bush described as an
extraordinary threat to our national security; that
Secretary of State Baker said should not stand; and that
President Clinton, the United Nations and the Organization
of American States declared unacceptable.


Had it not been for the deployment of the U.S.-led
Multinational Force on September 19, your Committee, Mr.
Chairman, might well be holding a very different sort of hearing
today -- a hearing to survey the damage sustained, and the damage
to come, as a result of a crisis allowed to fester.

There was, of course, widespread controversy over our
Administration's decision to use force in Haiti. As Deputy
Secretary of Defense Deutch and I made clear when we came before
this Committee on September 27th of last year, we understood the
concern and the skepticism. So did the President. As Commander
in Chief, he considers no responsibility more serious than the
one he assumes when he sends the men and women of the U.S. Armed
Forces into harm's way.


Thanks in the :first instance to the superb performance of
Generals Shelton, Meade, and Fisher, their officers and the
troops under their commands, Operation Uphold Democracy has set a
new standard for the degree of peace and civic order that has
been kept in a peace-keeping operation.

From the moment the armed services began planning, they
demonstrated an extraordinary capacity to adapt to change, to





71


identify and understand the problems, and to solve them
effectively. When the Haitian military dictators agreed to step
down, within minutes we were able to recall our assault forces,
and within hours shift to a force suitable for intervention in a
permissive environment. In the months that have passed, our
military's accomplishments -- which have ranged from quelling
initial outbreaks of Haitian-on-Haitian violence to disarming the
paramilitary gangs to, literally, turning the lights back on in
Haitian cities -- have been truly outstanding.


From the beginning of the operation, President Clinton
instructed the military commanders on the ground that their first
responsibility was to safeguard our men and women in uniform. In
the five months since our troops entered Haiti, we have lost one
brave American soldier in the line of duty; Special Forces
Sergeant Gregory Cardott, who was shot when he went to
investigate a disturbance that arose from an isolated crime at a
toll-collection point.

Mr. Chairman, while we pay tribute to the American soldiers
serving in Haiti, we must also remember that Operation Uphold
Democracy is a truly multinational effort, with participation
from 30 other nations. In this regard, I particularly want to
say a few words about the contributions of the 11 nations of the
Caribbean Community. Haiti's CARICOM neighbors took an
international leadership role by calling for forceful action to
remove the coup leaders, and each of these 11 states has matched
its words with deeds, by contributing soldiers or police, or
both, to the multinational force.

Mr. Chairman, the success to date of Operation Uphold
Democracy was also due to the lessons that we learned from
previous experiences in peacekeeping, multilateral and other
operations:






72


-- From U.S. operations in Grenada and Panama, we learned
the importance of inter-service cooperation, joint and
inter-agency planning and operational flexibility. The
lifting of a U.S. Army division from a U.S. Navy aircraft
carrier took the concept of combined operations to a new
level.


-- And from the Gulf War, we learned how American leadership
in multilateral fora can spur the actions of others, reduce
our burdens, and enhance our effectiveness. UN Security
Council Resolution 940 authorizing "all necessary means,"
the Multinational Force, and the handoff to the United
Nations Mission are all conscious adaptations of the Desert
Storm experience.


Mr. Chairman, credit for the current success of Operation
Democracy is also due to President Aristide, Prime Minister
Smarck Michel, members of the Haitian parliament, Mayor Evans
Paul of Port-au-Prince, and other democratic leaders of Haiti.
And, of course, credit is due to the Haitian people themselves.
Remember, Mr. Chairman, some of the fears and warnings that were
in the air at the time when this mission began: some said that
President Aristide would choose vengeance over reconciliation;
that Haitians would fight, rob and slaughter each other in a
frenzy of lawlessness; and that efforts to rebuild Haiti's
democracy and economy would never get off the ground.

Instead, in overwhelming numbers, the Haitian people have
heeded President Arstide's consistent call for reconciliation.
They are joining together to begin building a new society. They
have shown immense resilience, courage -- and, I might add,
restraint -- in the face of enormous challenges. Moreover, they
have also shown a gratifying and richly deserved degree of
appreciation for our troops. All across the country, from Port-
de-Paix to Lee Cayes, our soldiers are now greeted each day by









signs bearing three simple words: "Thank you, America."

So Under Secretary Slocombe and I come before you with a
sense of confidence and optimism. But we also come with our eyes
open to the magnitude of the challenge that remains -- for us and
for the international community in the coming months, and, more
importantly, for the Haitian people themselves in the coming
years and decades. Before the coup of September 1991, Haiti was,
as I mentioned, the poorest country in the hemisphere; it may
take until the end of this decade for its people to work their
way back even to that level.

A devastated economy is only part of the legacy with which
Haiti must cope. This is a country still struggling to banish
the ghosts of its past. Its people must learn new habits and new
ways of working together as they try to overcome a long history
of social polarization, political instability and
institutionalized b:crtality. As President Aristide so frequently
and memorably puts it, Haitians will have to work hard simply to
move "from misery to poverty with dignity."


But we must also place Haiti's problems in the context of
the extraordinary progress that its people have made in just five
months. All that we've given to the Haitian people is an
opportunity -- an opportunity for them to resume the hard work of
sustaining their democratic institutions and building a viable
market economy. But having been given a second chance -- after
four long, lost years -- the Haitian people are making the most
of that opportunity.


Today, thanks to Operation Uphold Democracy, the Haitian
people live in an environment that is -- in relative terms --
safe, secure and free of political violence. They have made
progress in breathing life back into democratic institutions.
And they have begun to jump start their dead economy, by
6









initiating free market reforms, and by seeking the investments
they need for long-term growth.


Let me examine each of these topics -- security, democracy,
and economics -- in :urn.


When the United States sent its troops to Haiti, our mission
was to restore the legitimate government, and to create a secure
and stable environment in which it could function. Thanks to the
Haitian people's desire to end the violence that has plagued
their nation and the cooperation of our allies in the
multinational force, we have been largely successful.


A few statistics illustrate this point. When our troops
arrived in Haiti, there were an average of 10 to 15 serious
incidents of organized political violence reported each week.
Those have virtually disappeared. Incidents of criminal violence
remain at a very lowr level as well: in Port-au-Prince there are
now an average of 18 violent crimes being reported each week -- a
figure far below those of other cities in the hemisphere with
similar-size populations.


The multinational force has recovered nearly 30,000
individual weapons, through buybacks, by seizing weapons caches,
and by setting up roadblocks. There is no doubt that many
weapons are still in the wrong hands. But the multinational
force made the right decision not to go door to door to try to
root out every criminal, gun, or thug. That was not our mission,
and it would have been impossible -- and indeed illegal under the
Haitian constitution, which protects gun ownership within the
home. Our goals, instead, were to create a generally secure
environment in which the democratic government could take
hold and to establish new civilian-controlled professional
security forces as the first line of protection for the Haitian
people.









In this, we have made good progress. In the three months
following the intervention, over 3,000 recruits for the Haitian
Interim Public Secur:.ity Force received transition training at a
facility provided by the government of Haiti, funded by the
Department of State, managed by the Department of Justice, and
supported by the1U.S. military. Over 900 Haitian migrants
received comparable :raining at the camps in Guantanamo. These
interim security forces are now on the streets of Haiti --
increasingly responsive to the civilian authorities and acting as
public servants, rather than as official thugs.

These interim security forces are monitored and assisted by
more than 600 International Police Monitors, or IPMs, spread
throughout the country. These IPMs are police officers,
recruited from more than 20 countries on 6 continents, under the
leadership of former New York Police Commissioner Ray Kelly.
They are protagonists in one of the great success stories in the
annals of international peacekeeping. Recruited, trained, and
deployed in less than six weeks, the distinctive IPM "yellow
hats" have restored the confidence of the Haitian people that
police exist to serve and protect society, not to brutalize it.


In organizing the Interim Public Security Force we have
worked with the government of Haiti to remove individuals
involved in serious human rights abuses, or narcotics
trafficking. All senior officers of the Haitian army have been
released from active duty. More than 2,000 former soldiers have
been enrolled in a program of counseling and job training funded
by USAID, and run by the International Office of Migration. The
government of Haiti is continuing to pay these soldiers' salaries
as they go through the retraining process.

We have made it clear to the government of Haiti that the
decision whether to retain a military is theirs to make. For our
part, we are ready to work with Haitian government officials to






76


make sure that the process of demobilization, however far it may
go, takes place in an orderly, equitable and constitutional
fashion, consistent with President Aristide's emphasis on
reconciliation.


Mr. Chairman, candidates for a permanent civilian police
force are now being recruited and trained by our Justice
Department, in cooperation with French, Norwegian and Canadian
police, at the new National Police Academy in Camp d'Application,
Port-au-Prince. We have insisted that all trainees enter the
Academy on the basis of merit -- their performance in the
entrance exams -- rather than personal or political affiliation.
We regard the entrance exams as a crucial filter in breaking the
cycle of personal and political security forces that have
dominated Haiti's history.


The first class of Civilian Haitian Police entered in
January and will graduate in May. About 350 graduates will be
deployed each month, building up to a force of at least 4,000
that will replace the Interim Public Security Force. This new,
accountable, professional, apolitical police force will be a
dramatic improvement over the violent, corrupt security forces of
the past.


For all these reasons, life in Haiti is generally secure
today. The simple activities of everyday life -- street vendors
plying their wares, children going to school, and families
attending church services -- have come alive again. Thousands of
men, women and children who were in hiding or in exile during the
dark days of military rule -- from members of Parliament to
mayors to clergy to entrepreneurs -- have resumed normal lives.
The flood of refugees from Haiti -- which hit a high of over
3,000 per day in July of last year -- has virtually stopped.
Since September 19, the Coast Guard has helped more than 13,000
Haitians -- including all but a few hundred at Guantanamo -- to






77


return home.


Another measure of the security of the situation in Haiti is
the pace with which we are moving to turn the Multinational
Force's responsibilities over to the United Nations Mission. We
are right on schedule. On January 20, the MNF Commander, Major
General Meade, and the member states of the multinational force
reported to the UN Security Council that "a secure and stable
environment" had been established. On January 30, the Security
Council passed Resolution 975 authorizing the U.N. Mission in
Haiti (UNMIH) to build up to a force of 6,000 troops and 900
police, and to take over from the Multinational Force by no later
than March 31. The process of transition has already begun, and
will accelerate through next month.


The United Nations Mission is enabling us to continue the
draw down of American forces in Haiti. U.S. forces reached a
peak of 21,000 in early October. Together with their colleagues
from the multinational force, they established 27 bases and made
their presence felt in each of the 133 districts of Haiti. As
the situation began to stabilize in November, we started to
withdraw our troops. Today there are about 5,600 American
soldiers in Haiti. That number will be cut by more than half
when the UN Mission begins at the end of next month.

The United Nations forces in Haiti will be commanded by an
American, Major General Joseph Kinzer, and include about 2,400
American troops. m;o-thirds of the forces that will comprise the
UN Mission will carry over from the Multinational Force, and are
already on the ground in Haiti, including the Bangladeshis, the
Nepalese contingent. and the CARICOM battalion. The largest
contingents still to come are from Pakistan and India. I should
add that the United Nations will assume the costs for the
American and international forces and the international police,
costs that the United States has been paying up until now. This

10









means that the U.S. share of the UNMIH costs will be just over
30% until October 1, and only 25% thereafter. As Secretary
Christopher noted in a broader context, when testifying before
your Committee last nonth, "this is a sensible bargain I know the
American people support."

Our success at helping the Haitian people create a secure
environment has also helped Haitians to strengthen their fragile
political institutions. Let me turn now to that subject.


President Aristide has set the tone of tolerance and
reconciliation for his entire country. He returned to Haiti with
one of the largest democratic mandates of any political leader in
the Western hemisphere. Yet from the beginning, he has reached
out beyond his own enormous constituency. Through his cabinet
and other appointments, President Aristide is building bridges to
all sectors of society, from the elite families to the residents
of the slums of Cite do Soleil.


Immediately upon his return, President Aristide met with
parliamentary leaders from all sides of the political spectrum to
set a common, cooperative agenda. On crucial matters -- such as
appointing a Supreme Court and drafting a new police law and
amnesty legislation -- he has worked with the Haitian Parliament,
not around them. Thanks in large part to President Aristide's
leadership, the Parliament passed the first national budget that
Haiti has had in five years. And he personally helped broker an
agreement among all the political factions on the arrangements
for the national elections that will take place on June 4.


This is a record of which any executive and legislature
could be proud -- even in a country less shattered, polarized,
and traumatized than Haiti. But faced with high expectations,
Haiti's political leadership still confronts daunting challenges.
Aristide's cabinet ministers took over ministries that the









dictators had stripped of basic supplies -- even plumbing. There
are few professionals below the ministerial level to implement
decisions. Haiti's judicial system, which was never strong to
begin with and collapsed under the Cedras regime, must be
completely renovated.

The necessary changes will not be accomplished overnight, or
by any single person or political party. That is one reason why,
from the beginning, nour primary goal has been to promote the
aroceas of democracy To that end, we are working with the
United Nations mission and the Organization of the American
States to ensure that the June legislative and local elections,
as well as the Presidential elections in December, are as open
and fair as possible. With this objective in mind, the
responsibilities of the UN Mission will end by February 1996,
with the inauguration of President Aristide's democratically
elected successor.

However, no matter how successful the Haitian people are at
establishing a secure environment or building democratic and
legal institutions, stability will elude them without strong,
steady, broad-based economic growth. Haiti has a per capita
income of about $250 a year, making it one of the poorest
countries in the world. It also has one of the worst
infrastructures of any country in the world, including the most
expensive, least efficient port in the western hemisphere. Its
roads are almost non-existent, and it has among the world's
fewest telephones per capita. Bringing the economy to life will
be Haiti's most difficult task, for no amount of goodwill can
undo two centuries of damage to natural resources, and no amount
of hard work can replace the national treasures that past despots
have carted away.

For its part, the international community is doing its fair
share by providing aid and technical assistance. Prior to the
12






80


deployment of the MNF. international donors and lenders met in
Paris in August and determined that Haiti would need $650 million
in the first year after democracy was restored. This group met
again in Paris last month to review the progress that has been
made since President Aristide's return, and the general
assessment of this progress was so positive that the donors
actually pledged $1.2 billion, nearly double what had originally
been proposed. It is anticipated that $900 million of that $1.2
billion will be available over the next 12-18 months.


I should note that the non-American donors and lenders have
provided over 75% of these funds, making this, from an American
standpoint, the most successful instance of burdensharing in the
history of the hemisphere. In Haiti, we are demonstrating that
American leadership can leverage tremendous power and resources
on behalf of a common good.


For our part, the United States is contributing, through the
Agency for International Development, approximately $162.2
million for fiscal year 1995. As in previous years, much of our
assistance -- $73.4 million -- will go for humanitarian aid:
supplying medical care for two million Haitians, food for 1.3
million people, and providing 50,000 short term jobs until other
donor job creation programs become operational. Our Jobs
Creation Program will result in 1,100 kilometers of rehabilitated
roads; 31,000 hectares of improved irrigated land; and 1,100
kilometers of restored drainage canals.

We will spend $30.7 million for governance: to support
municipal, parliamentary, and presidential elections; establish
an independent Ministry of Justice; move local governance from a
system of intimidation to one of public participation; provide
jobs and outplacement services to members of FAD'H who have not
been retained as Interim Security Force; strengthen key
institutions such as the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate;





81


assist in conflict resolution and mediation, and provide support
to key ministries. Let me note that the National Democratic
Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI)
have been participants in our democracy program. NDI is
currently actively engaged in preparing for the upcoming
elections, and we hope IRI will also become involved.


$58.1 million of FY 95 AID funds will go to spur economic
growth, by increasing foreign exchange availability; providing
assistance in paying arrears to international financial
institutions; and by supporting activities in agriculture,
education, the environment, and private sector development.

This last item is, of course, particularly crucial Haiti's
real economic future lies in the private sector. That is why
President Aristide has committed his government to a far-reaching
program of free market reform. That program includes the nearly
total abolition of Lariffs; a reduction of the civil service by
up to 501; a fiscally responsible budget; and the privatization
of state-held enterprises. Other steps towards a free market
include the removal of most exchange controls, the modernization
of commercial law provisions, and a decentralization of many
economic powers of the central government. These reforms are far
sighted, based on sound economics, and deserving of international
support.

To encourage private investment, the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation has announced that it is prepared to
provide $100 million in finance and political risk insurance to
support American private investment. It is in the process of
setting up loan facilities with American banks that have operated
in Haiti for many years, and have already identified some good
potential ventures.


At the Paris meeting last month, we proposed the

14









establishment of a multinational enterprise fund, similar to the
ones that we have set up for Eastern Europe and South Africa.
This proposal has attracted substantial international donor
interest; we see it being capitalized at up to $40 million, with
funds provided by the European Community, the World Bank, the
United States, and Japan. We have also asked that the Senate
ratify the bilateral investment treaty with Haiti that is now
before it.


On March 7-8, I will accompany a delegation of several
dozen corporate CEOs to Haiti to explore ways to spur private
investment. The mission will also provide the occasion for the
first meeting of the U.S.-Haiti Business Development Council,
which will bring together business and government representatives
of both countries to strengthen private sector cooperation and
development. We are also organizing nearly a dozen sector-
specific business missions to Haiti, bringing more than 200 U.S.
business executives in direct contact with Haitian businesses and
government decision makers. In view of the significant overhaul
needed for Haiti's infrastructure and manufacturing sectors,
these missions will concentrate on telecommunications, power
generation, transportation and the environment.


There is already evidence that the Haitian private sector is
getting on its feet: more than 35 manufacturing operations have
restarted in Haiti during the past month; exports of mangos and
papayas have resumed; and cruise ships are once again bringing
tourists to Haiti.

Mr. Chairman, I mentioned earlier that our intervention in
Haiti made sense for reasons of American self-interest. That
includes our economic self-interest. Of course the operation has
been costly. But those costs must be judged in context, and that
means, among other things, against the costs of inaction. Since
September 19, the U.S. government has spent about $700 million on






83


Operation Uphold Democracy, most of which are one-time-only-
costs, instead of continuing to pay some $300 million a year for
the costs of non-intervention. This investment protects our
borders, has helped consolidate democracy in our hemisphere, and
will help Haiti become a good neighbor and stable partner in
diplomacy and trade. But our intervention also does justice to
America's core values and principles as well.


Mr. Chairman, the best defense of our Haiti policy is a
simple one: we intervened because it was in our national
interest, we intervened after every other alternative had been
exhausted, and we intervened because it was the right thing to
do.


Mr. Chairman, the American intervention in Haiti has been
successful thus far. Now, we must see the job through, and that
means until the completion of the United Nations mission 12
months from now. As I've already stressed, we cannot solve
Haiti's basic problems -- the Haitian people must solve those
themselves -- but we can help. Indeed, our help is essential:
only we can lead a U.N. effort to maintain security in Haiti
until the Haitian government fields a professional police force
of its own; and only we can lead the international effort to help
Haiti strengthen its democratic institutions and build its
economy.


As Secretary Christopher has told the United Nations General
Assembly, Haiti now has an opportunity "to take its rightful
place in the growing community of democratic states; to work with
the international community to solve the transnational problems
we all face; and to become an inspiration to other nations, not
an outcast." And American leadership in Operation Uphold
Democracy has shown that the United States is willing to stand up
for its own interests and for democracy in the hemisphere, and
that our military ;is second to none, in creativity and

professionalism as well as in strength and courage. This is an
effort of which we, and you, can be proud. Thank you.






84


STATEMENT BY
HONORABLE WALTER B. SLOCOMBE
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
BEFORE
THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FEBRUARY 24, 1995

Since U.S. military forces entered Haiti on September 19 last year, a great deal has
transpired. You will recall that OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY was conducted
against a recalcitrant military regime which had defied international will and demands of
the United Stated Government since 1991 to return the constitutionally elected
government to authority in Haiti.

The United States interests in this action were several:

* The military ouster of President Aristide in 1991, if allowed to stand, threatened to
affect stability and democratic development elsewhere in the region.

* The outflow of Haitians seeking refuge from oppression and poverty not only
threatened social stability throughout the region, but also placed significant strains
on our own national security and hemispheric interests.

In response to these threats, U.S. forces entered Haiti on September 19, 1994, as
part of a Multinational Force (MNF) authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 940
to use all necessary means to secure the departure of the coup leaders; to restore the
legitimate, democratically-elected Government of Haiti; and to create a secure and stable
environment that will allow the Haitian people to assume responsibility for rebuilding
their country. The peaceful entry of the MNF was achieved only after Haiti's de facto
regime realized, literally on the eve of invasion, that they were under imminent threat of
removal by force.

After less than a month the coup leaders departed, and President Aristide returned
to Haiti to assume control of the government. In the months that followed the U.S. and
coalition presence expanded throughout Haiti, providing a more secure environment
and coordinating international humanitarian assistance for the most needy Haitians.
Aggressive weapons control and reduction measures were initiated that seized weapons
posing a threat to the MNF and significantly reduced the number of illegal weapons in
Haiti. Although we recognized from the outset that it was not feasible to attempt to
search out every weapon in Haiti, these measures were clearly in the interest of
promoting overall security for our mission and in establishing a secure and stable
environment. In the process, the MNF has seized nearly 30,000 weapons in various
categories, including grenades and explosives. I should note also that these weapons
will no longer threaten the Haitian people.

Essential public services, such as electrical power, have been restored in key
areas. Direct assistance to Haitian government ministries by military civil affairs
specialists has been key to helping them reestablish functional governance and begin
rebuilding its public institutions. As conditions improved, we repatriated over 13,000
Haitians who had fled Haiti under the military regime.









2

The GOH, with assistance from the United States, has established an Interim
Public Security Force (IPSF) of up to 3,000 vetted FAd'H and up to 1106 GTMO
trainees. With routine attrition, there are now about 3,800 IPSF personnel. Their
purpose is to provide a transitional police presence, under the general supervision of 655
International Police Monitors (IPMs), until a new, civilian Haitian National Police (HNP)
initially to be comprised of 4,000 personnel is recruited and trained. Additionally, 250
former FAd'H are assigned to a Presidential Security Detachment, for which they await
training by MNF personnel.

The IPSF has received basic police training by the Department of Justice
(ICITAP), and are now under the Ministry of Justice rather than the Ministry of Defense.
IPSF have been assigned throughout Haiti. FAd'H personnel who failed the vetting
process have been reassigned to non-defense ministries or offered 6-month career
transitional training (with pay) under a contract program administered by USAID. Thus
far, 2,010 screened-out FAd'H have signed up for such training.

The new Haitian National Police (HNP) will be deployed incrementally over the
next 18 months. They are selected from applicants throughout Haiti on the basis of
rigorous testing. IPSF personnel may apply for the HNP, but most will not likely qualify.
HNP trainees receive a full four-month training program by ICITAP. The first class of
approximately 375 HNP candidates entered training I February, with a similar number to
begin training each month until the force is fully-staffed. IPSF will be incrementally
retired as the HNP is stood up.

These accomplishments are a tribute to the professionalism and dedication of our
armed forces. Our military has acted decisively, responsibly, and humanely in a difficult
and complex mission.

Though U.S. forces led this mission, high appreciation must go to all thirty nations
whose contributions to the Multinational Force have made Operation Uphold
Democracy a model of international cooperation for peace enforcement. That same spirit
of cooperation will continue as we transition from a United States to a United Nations-
led mission.

On January 30, the United Nations Security Council passed UNSCR 975
recognizing that a secure and stable environment now exists in Haiti and authorizing the
UN Secretary General to terminate the mission of the MNF and deploy the United
Nations Mission to Haiti (UNMIH). In effect, this resolution recognizes that the MNF
sent to Haiti under the authority of UNSCR 940, has accomplished all of its tasks and is
now ready to transition responsibilities to UNMIH. UNSCR 975 specifies that this
transition is to be completed by March 31.

We are determined to meet that date. Much remains to be done but the military
role is largely completed. The security environment throughout the country, though far
from perfect, continues to improve as Haitians are growing more accustomed to going
about their daily lives without fear. Though comunon criminal activity and Haitian-on-
Haitian violence continues, the reported incidents are declining. Further, we know of no
organized group capable of seriously threatening the Haitian Government or the
international presence. Nevertheless, the MNF security posture remains alert and






86




prepared to respond as necessary, while preparations continue to transition
responsibilities to UNMIH.

For several months we have been consulting with the UN to determine how we
can best contribute to the UNMIH mission to sustain the secure and stable environment
established by the MNF and to promote continued recovery of Haiti's democratic
institutions. We intend to accomplish as much advance preparation as we can in order
to make the actual transition from the MNF to LNMIH as seamless and as smooth as
possible. In this regard, the Joint Staff has been working closely with our permanent
mission to the United Nations (USUN) and with the UN Department of Peacekeeping
Operations (DPKO). An UNMIH Advance Team is in Haiti operating alongside the MNF
and taking advantage of that mission's experience in an effort to identify requirements
prior to the deployment of UNMIH. While there are still details to be concluded, we
have accomplished the following:

* Of the 6,000 troops authorized for UNMIH by UNSCR 975, we are prepared to
contribute up to 2,524. About a dozen other countries are expected to provide the
remaining nearly 3,500 of the force, most of which already are part of the MNF in
Haiti, and are expected to continue their participation in the UNMIH.

* We are very close to agreement on a final force structure for UNMIH. however.
refinements are ongoing as other participating nations determine their contributions
and requirements. In any event, U.S. forces will comprise less than half of the
UNMIH military force structure, but will represent critical capabilities of the mission.
In addition to providing the Force Commander and 60 members of the headquarters
staff, we expect to contribute a number of specialized forces such as Medical,
Engineers, Transportation, Military Police, Civil Affairs, Special Forces, Aviation.
Logistics, as well as a limited number of combat forces for a Quick Reaction Force.
The largest portion of our contribution to UNMIH will be Special Forces for training
and coalition support and a reaction force built around a light armored cavalry
squadron.

* The UNMIH force commander will be an American officer. Major General Joseph
Kinzer, U.S. Army has been named as the commander of UN Forces in Haiti, and he
will also be designated Commander of U.S. Forces in Haiti (COMUSFORHAITI). The
UNMIH Force Commander, MG Kinzer. will make all decisions involving UNMIH
military operations. The UN Secretary General will provide political direction and
guidance, through his Special Representative, to the UNMIH Force Commander.

* All U.S. forces assigned to UNMIH will be under the operational control of General
Kinzer. As COMUSFORHAITI General Kinzer will remain under the command of
Communander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command and will report directly to him. Thus
the chain of command from the President to the lowest U.S. commander on the
ground in Haiti will remain unbroken. General Kinzer will also have a U.S. Army
Brigadier General who will serve as his Deputy COMUSFORHAITI. The Deputy will
carry out the day-to-day management of the U.S. contingent for General Kinzer.

* We have a clearly defined end date of our participation in UNMIH. In accordance with
UNSCR 940, UNMIH will end in February 1996, after Haiti's December 1995 presidential
elections and the inauguration of Aristide's democratically elected successor.





87


4

The incremental cost for U.S. participation in operations in Haiti is projected to
cost $416 million in FY 1995. This funds U.S. participation in the Multinational Force
(MNF) and a transition to a UN funded operation (UNMIH). The FY 1994 costs were
$200.8 million for Operation Uphold Democracy and $173.9 million for the maritime
interdiction of Haiti and the subsequent care, housing, and feeding of Haitian migrants at
Guantanamo Bay.

The proposed DOD supplemental, which covers operations in Haiti among others.
is crucial to maintaining current levels of training and readiness for all military services.
This year's shortfall of $2.6 billion, if not corrected in a timely manner, will have severe
results. If the supplemental is not passed, commanders will be forced again to curtail
training, reduce spare parts stockage levels, defer depot level and real property
maintenance, and minimize fixed costs. Without a timely passage of the supplemental
appropriations bill, the net effect will be a significant decrease in overall military
readiness.

While the UN operation is an assessed operation, UN reimbursement to the USG
will not fully cover DoD's incremental costs.

Let me conclude by saying that the way in which the MNF mission has been
planned and executed incorporated many of the lessons learned in past operations.
Similarly, as we assume a prominent role in UNMIH we intend to apply the same lessons.
These include:

* A clearly defined mission and objectives, as well as an established exit strategy.

* Planning that integrates all dimensions -- military, political, social, and economic --
critical to the success of such an endeavor.

* A commander on the ground who has been granted the capabilities and operational
flexibility he needs to protect his forces and accomplish his mission.

* Recognition that in face of the challenges involved, and the interests at stake, it is
best for the United States to accept leadership of the mission and to commit the
largest share of forces.

* Finally, ongoing evaluation of the overall mission objectives, activities of our forces,
and their capabilities as the situation on the ground evolves to ensure that these
remain mutually consistent.

These factors have contributed significantly to our success thus far in Haiti. We
are now entering a new phase of the task we undertook in September of last year.
Although the mission, and the U.S. role in it, will be different, our focus on ensuring a
stable and secure environment that will give Haiti the opportunity to revive its economy.
and rebuild its institutions of government, must remain clear. I am confident that this
success will continue in the weeks and months ahead as we proceed with the transition
of responsibilities to the UNMIH and as the Government of Haiti continues to assume
greater responsibility for its own security and governance.









TESTIMONY OF FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS BERNARD ARONSON

The question of Haiti has always been more complicated than our domestic debate
would indicate. The United States took the lead in mobilizing international support for Haiti's
first free and democratic election in December 1990. Thus, we had a stake and an obligation
to defend the integrity of that election following the coup of September 1991.

The coup in Haiti also was the first practical test in the western hemisphere of an
historic and extraordinary new commitment assumed by every member state of the OAS in
June 1991 at the organization's General Assembly held in Santiago, Chile. At that meeting,
the nations of the western hemisphere committed themselves to defend collectively against
any threat or interruption of the democratic process in any member state. That commitment--
-which does not exist in any other region of the world--reversed a century old principle of
non-intervention and committed the United States--and our democratic partners in this
hemisphere--to work together as never before to defend democracy.

The coup in Haiti was the first test case of the Santiago Declaration. Thus, how and
whether the international community met that test was being watched by those in other
nations in our hemisphere who might harbor hopes of overturning democracy as well. And of
course, the crisis in Haiti created a refugee crisis which impacted our country directly and
threatened an unending flow of boat people to our shores. Yet our ability to defend Haiti's
election and meet our obligations under the Santiago Declaration were complicated by the
mistakes and abuses that occurred during the Aristide government.

Honest men and women disagreed--and still disagree--about the degree to which U.S.
interests were at stake in Haiti, about the wisdom of U.S. intervention, and about the
decision of the President to commit U.S. forces without first seeking congressional approval.
I have no doubt that members of the Committee still disagree about these issues.

But that was then and this is now. The question before the Committee and the country
is no longer whether we should have intervened in Haiti. The question is: now that the
United States and the international community have committed our prestige and our word to
helping the Haitian people begin again their democratic experiment: how can we best meet
that responsibility.

It would be a grave mistake, I believe, for those who disagreed with the original
decision to intervene in Haiti to force a precipitous withdrawal from Haiti today. Now that
we are there, we and the international community should stay long enough to give the
Haitian people a fair chance to restart and sustain their nascent democracy.

That does not mean an open-ended commitment. Nor should it mean any change in
the scheduled turnover of authority to a UN peacekeeping force. What it does mean is this:
the worst outcome for Haiti would be to have committed U.S. forces and prestige and then to
pull out so quickly that there is little left behind.

So far, the news from Haiti is good.





89


The transition to UN authority is proceeding smoothly. The recruitment and training
of the new police force is also moving along well. Haiti has cleared its arrears with the
international financial institutions and President Aristide's government has adopted a bold
free market economic program. Perhaps most important of all, the pervasive fear that
smothered Haitian society during the reign of the illegal military regime has been lifted.
Haitians breathe freely and speak freely again. President Aristide, to his credit, has
repeatedly counseled national reconciliation to his people and practiced that, himself, by
reaching out repeatedly to the business community and to rival political parties.

Let me briefly suggest some areas of concern that the Committee might wish to
consider:

Our experience in Panama and El Salvador teaches that it always takes longer than
predicted to recruit, train, and professionalize an entirely new police force. We need to
maintain an international security umbrella long enough to allow the new police force to be
formed and become operational.

The future of the army is a matter for Haitians to decide. I hope that the United
States will not oppose abolition of the army. From my vantage point, Haiti has no need for a
standing army and would be more secure if the institution was abolished as was done in
Panama. If this is done, it should be done through democratic, Constitutional means--by the
vote of 2 successive Parliaments. A new Coast Guard, perhaps under the Minister of
Transportation and a new border guard, perhaps under the Ministry of Finance could be
created to perform the necessary functions that the FAHD used to carry out. This would
create a certain balance of forces internally without maintaining an institution whose
corruption and repression have rendered it incapable of serving the Haitian nation and
people.

Judicial reform and institution building has been delayed by the need to replace the
Minister of Justice. Funds and programs need to flow now to begin this crucial process.

Presidential elections scheduled for December 1995 must go forward as scheduled.
Some may argue that with elections for Parliament and municipalities scheduled for June that
the Haitian system is overloaded and presidential elections must be delayed. This would be a
grave mistake and could provide a new crisis. The test of our policy in Haiti will be the
peaceful, democratic, and Constitutional transfer of Presidential authority in February 1996.

One of the lessons we learned in Haiti is that we celebrated the success of the
elections in December 1990 prematurely and in retrospect the international monitors who
provided security and stability for the elections were withdrawn too soon. We should not
make that mistake again. The UN force is scheduled to leave in February 1996. I believe
some significant international presence should remain in the country for at least the next 12
months to provide an umbrella of security and stability while the new government gets on its
feet and a new internal balance of forces is established. That international presence might
include the civilian human rights monitors and police trainers and monitors. It need not and
probably should not include U.S. forces.





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The Committee should consider some temporary, special tax incentives to lure
assembly sector factories that fled Haiti following the coup to return and re-establish
operations. I know that OPIC is providing loan guarantees and that some assembly sector
plants are back in business. Yet the sad reality is that once relocated many of these plants
may never return since they can enjoy the same trade preferences under CBI in neighboring
countries. Perhaps some temporary tax incentives or relief could be crafted with minimal
budget impact that would provide incentive for those factories to return. These remain among
the few wage earning jobs for ordinary Haitians. Dollar for dollar, this might be a more cost
effective way to promote economic development then direct aid.

One final point. We Americans are an impatient people. Our attention span is
sometimes short. Places and crises that once galvanized the attention of the Congress and
Executive like El Salvador have largely fallen off our national radar screen. But in these
countries, as in Haiti, we need to stay the course given the enormous commitment of U.S.
resources and prestige that has already been expended.

During the crisis in Haiti, much was written about the Haitians who set off in leak%
boats for our shores. But less was written about the vast majority of Haitians who stayed,
many risking their lives and safety, to keep alive the flame of democracy. I remember well
the pride and dignity that one could sense in the air on election day in 1990. And I remember
marvelling as well on inauguration day in February 1991 as ordinary Haitians spontaneously
scrubbed the streets of Port au Prince to celebrate their hard won freedom. The Haitian
people have enormous dignity and talent waiting to be set free for the betterment of their
country. We have an historic opportunity to help them begin their democratic experiment
again. This may not be the most popular issue politically, but that opportunity remains a
calling worthy of a great and noble country like the United States.








Testimony of Allen Weinstein
President and CEO
The Center for Democracy

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee. My name is Allen
Weinstein, and I am President of The Center for Democracy, a non-profit and
non-partisan foundation, Washington-based, created in 1985 to assist in
strengthening the democratic process, especially in countries undergoing a
transition to democracy. Since 1991, the Center has worked in Haiti and, with
Haitian leaders, in the United States to help facilitate democratization in that
country through various programs. We have been working with the Haitian
Parliament, cooperating with pro-democratic Haitian business and political
leaders, and assisting municipal officials. My testimony today reflects personal
perspectives and in no sense is an organizational statement on behalf of The
Center for Democracy.

I have appended to this testimony a description of Center programs related
to Haiti. These efforts have led to a half dozen personal visits, together with
other Center Directors and staff, to that country since last September. Perhaps
my most productive and memorable recent visit occurred shortly after the arrival
of U.S. troops on the island last September. Traveling by military transport and
encouraged by t:he Administration, our staff worked with the newly-reconvened
Haitian Parliament as it debated and passed the amnesty bill, which sped Generals
Cedras and Biamy into exile, clearing the way for President Aristide's return.

At that time, Mr. Chairman, Haiti was the subject of impassioned and
elaborate debate in this country as pro- and anti-Aristide, pro- and anti-
occupation, arguments raged in Congress and in the country. Today, for the
moment, Haiti no longer dominates national debate as an issue; the argument over
intervention has been overtaken by the reality of occupation. America's
immediate goal, that of restoring President Aristide to power, was achieved four
months ago. Unfortunately, our larger mission of facilitating development in
Haiti of democratic institutions and processes, has proceeded since then fitfully
and (at best) unevenly.

The burden of my testimony is to urge this Committee, the Congress and
the Administration to pursue on a bipartisan basis an accelerated and focused
program of support in the five weeks ahead, prior to formal transfer of troop
authority on the island from United States to United Nations command on March
31, measures that will lay essential groundwork for a lasting democratic system.
Now that the United States has returned Jean Bertrand Aristide to Haiti, it must
use its remaining weeks of virtually-complete authority to help the Haitian people
pursue the even more difficult mission of building democratic structures and
habits atop the ruins of tyranny.

A decade ago, testifying before the Senate at another watershed in the
struggle for democracy, I noted that the country in question prior to an historic
election (in that case, the Philippines) stood poised between hope and despair.
The words apply to Haiti today. Haiti confronts in the next critical five weeks
the departure of half the remaining U.S. troop complement, de jur transfer of





92


authority from American to United Nations control and, most importantly, a
defining moment of preparation for the parliamentary and municipal elections now
scheduled for June. Disquieting revelations in the media earlier this week of the
Haitian government's apparent ignoring of the vetting process to screen out
human rights violators, injecting instead hundreds of police trainees without prior
U.S. consultation, has only added to the unresolved questions regarding selection
and control of Haiti's fledgling professional police force. This hearing is
especially timely, Mr. Chairman, coming also while a new mission by President
Carter, General Powell and Senator Nunn conducts its own on-the-ground review
of the Haitian situation five months after "Operation Uphold Democracy" was
begun and four months after President Aristide's return.

On its face, the American restoration of the Aristide government appears
different from earlier U.S. ventures into military-backed democratization. In
Haiti-unlike post-World War II West Germany and Japan, much less our mini-
expeditionary forces to Grenada and Panama during the past decade--the United
States has acted in concert with and under the framework of United Nations
resolutions. In Haiti, also uniquely, the U.S. has shared authority not only with
U.N. officials but with a restored President.

But in the end, as in these other instances, assuring democracy in Haiti has
been and will continue to be in the foreseeable future primarily an American
responsibility. For that reason, the U.S. military and civil personnel responsible
for coordinating our occupation of Haiti in all ranks deserve our gratitude for the
skill, tact and bravery with which they have implemented the policy.

As a result, democracy's beachhead has been secured in Haiti and at
minimal cost thus far in American or Haitian lives. Now, however, in the five
weeks remaining prior to turning over primary responsibility for Haiti to the
United Nations, the moment has come for the United States to lead decisively the
process of helping to consolidate a democratic future for all Haitians. I believe
that four major efforts to be taken under American leadership, in cooperation with
Haitian and U.N. authorities during the month-plus ahead, if achieved, can help
to confirm an unprecedented "politics of hope" on the island. If not taken now,
however, the bright promise of a new beginning which U.S. soldiers brought to
Haiti while dispersing the entrenched oppressors may quickly turn to popular
disillusionment. These four steps are crucial:

1. Consolidating democracy for Haiti requires immediately enernizin a
slueish and divisive ore-election process. Electoral conditions minimally
acceptable to the broad snctrum of Haitian political parties and leaders. whether
pro- or anti-Aristide. must be created. An election constitutionally stipulated in
late-1994 now slouches toward w20ible achievement in June '95 under
U.N./O.A.S. auspices despite horrendous procedural difficulties. These include






93


an absence of current voter rolls and an electoral council comprised largely of
partisan novices. Political parties remain disorganized and mainly unfunded.
There are no campaign groundrules, and one over-riding concern permeates the
entire political atmosphere--a fear for personal security.

Guaranteeing security for political candidates and their supporters remains
a Herculean task in a country filled with hidden weaponry. Dealing with
thousands of disbanded, discredited and largely unemployed former sliders and--
at the other political extreme--angry and potentially-violent "popular" associations
will require a coordinated effort by international observers and military personnel
throughout Haiti. In this effort, American leadership will be required to
encourage consensus among the major political groupings so that they choose to
participate fully, without threat of withdrawal on grounds of unfairness should
defeat loom. Persistent American oversight of every aspect of the electoral
process during the weeks ahead will help to catalyze a process now assigned to
United Nations responsibility.

Nor is the election of parliamentary and municipal officials in June the
only concern in this respect. Haiti will elect a new President in December '95,
and Jean Bertrand Aristide made a solemn commitment both prior to his return
and since then not to be a candidate for re-election (something which the Haitian
constitution proscribes). President Aristide has insisted that he will preside over
a fair and free presidential election, handing over power (for the first time in two
centuries of Haitian history) to his elected successor. The President deserves
praise for this pledge, made more generous still by the years he spent while in
exile deprived of his office. The international community must help Aristide
assure that such a peaceful transfer of power occurs at year's end.

2. In order to reduce the residue of Haiti's historic climate of fear. iron-
clad procedures must be installed for verifying that the officer coros and recruits
in the country's new police force now undergoing training resoond to professional
and not political direction. Otherwise, we will witness the replacement of the
old, blatantly oppressive military with merely a newer, subtler but no less
oppressive "police." Efforts from whatever quarter in Haiti to employ alleged
human rights violators, insert recruits unvetted by American experts, and
otherwise undermine professional training procedures for the new--hopefully,
community-based--police cadre in the country will badly injure its credibility at
the outset and open the road to future abuses.

Continued close monitoring of the police training process by experienced
U.S. Department of Justice and military personnel should be the norm. Any
Haitian officials or government advisors incapable of adapting to this demanding
standard of police behavior should be replaced. The model displayed by
American troops and those of other nations in Haiti toward ordinary citizens-an

3


90-899 95-4





94


exemplary courtesy, restraint and fairness as they pursue quasi-police duties--must
not be subverted in the arduous process of training the new Haitian police force.
Preventing the integrity of a largely-U.S. based professional police training
program from being undermined, Mr. Chairman, will require special vigilance
in the weeks ahead. Here, as in safeguarding Haiti's fragile and incomplete new
electoral process, American political will and leadership can mean the difference
between nominal and genuine compliance with international norms.

3. Snethilu n ain.11ationjl. rc onclitati. is irm-Pa4tl l
essentialalo rhn esm jishmenMiLf ch'bixsin I-iti. For two centuries,
Haitian political losers have felt unsafe, going into hiding or exile-but not into
domestic opposition. The practice of protected political opposition has little
meaning for most Haitians. At a time when there are few political guidelines for
the elections to come and a negligible number of functioning institutions, it is
little wonder that many Haitians-especially those who have opposed Aristide in
the past--assume that the older habits will prevail. Despite the President's
admirable and continuing calls for national reconciliation and not vengeance, the
degree of disbelief among his adversaries has remained high. Comparably
intense, also, is the measure of anxiety among Aristide m~zIpug concerning the
potential for violent assaults upon their ranks from armed and unregenerate
"attaches" or former Haitian soldiers, especially once "the Americans" have gone
or been further reduced in numbers. Given the evident absence of security for
ordinary Haitians of all political viewpoints, I trust it will not appear hopelessly
naive on my part to suggest that the process of national reconciliation in Haiti
would benefit from some immediate steps under American leadership in the
remaining weeks of our mandate. These specific actions could include:

a convening (as a number of Haitian political leaders have suggested) a
"national dialogue" prior to the parliamentary and municipal elections, one
comparable to those which helped to develop civic links across party Lines in
countries elsewhere with few democratic traditions (like Haiti) such as Nicaragua:

o encouraging adoption by consensus of a formal "code of conduct"
among key political, governmental, economic and civic leaders in Haiti to define
the conditions and limits on political behavior during the two elections which lie
ahead this year, a code which deals voluntarily with acceptable-and proscribed--
conduct during the campaign months;

a recognizing the institutional legitimacy (through maintaining official
contacts, for example) of the remaining handful of legally-elected Haitian
Senators (with the entire Chamber of Deputies and all other Senators now up for
election), thus acknowledging the Haitian Parliament's institutional continuity and
importance as an independent and co-equal branch of government (rather than
neglecting Parliament, as the U.S. has largely done since President Aristide's return).









These are only some of the practical steps which the United States could
take in the weeks ahead to assist in national reconciliation. They would reaffirm
our commitment to the primacy of democratic process and procedure over
personality in Haitian policy. Such actions would have special relevance today,
when there does not exist in Haiti even the beginnings of an independent and
effective judicial system.

4. Helpine the newly resurgent Haitian private sector, especially the pro-
democratic businessmen and women anxious to reioin the inter-American market
systems vital in developing Haitian democracy. Although economic discussion
of the Haitian situation falls more properly within the realm of expertise
elsewhere on this panel, it is appropriate for me to point out the courage and
energy of a number of Haitian businessmen and women with whom The Center
for Democracy has worked individually and through organizations such as The
Center for Free Enterprise and Democracy (known by its French acronym
CLED). Not only did they publicly support restoration of President Aristide at
some personal risk prior to his return. Just as importantly, they have rejected the
traditional Haitian "business" pattern of seeking and dispensing government-
supported preferences for politically-favored entrepreneurs. If my friends within
Haiti's business community-which was devastated by the embargo's impact--have
a common complaint, it has been with the elephantine pace of delivering the
support measures promised by the various mega-packages of economic aid
periodically announced by the U.S. and/or the "international community."

Surely a country such as ours, which could draft and begin implementing
assistance to all of devastated post-World War II Europe through the Marshall
Plan in a matter of months, can finally in the weeks ahead respond to the job-
creating proposals of Haiti's responsible business leaders. Otherwise, where do
the unemployed and desperately-poor majority of Haitians turn in pursuit of a
decent economic future, if not to an activated local private sector?

Each of the goals previously described, Mr. Chairman, can be addressed
dramatically and effectively by American leaders in the five weeks remaining
prior to handing over our unilateral responsibilities to officials representing the
United Nations. Each is an interrelated factor in the overall mosaic of
democratization in Haiti: assuring fair and free elections, guaranteeing personal
security under professional police protection, encouraing genuine national
reconciliation, and suoortine the revival of a strong private sector.

Nor is funding the primary problem; rather, the major difficulty has been
in reassessing the American mission in Haiti to focus on today's-not yesterday's--
realities and imperatives. If democracy in Haiti is not to be left on the
beachhead, American leadership must recognize that we have dawdled long
enough. Sadly, we have watched while our Haitian friends did likewise. The
time has come to move out: to recognize that our initial goal, that of restoring
President Aristide to power beyond challenge, has been achieved. That was then;
this is now.

Five weeks from now, we must leave as our legacy to the United Nations
command and to the Haitian people a coordinated framework to sustain and
consolidate democratic procedures in the months and years ahead. Achieving that
framework will require five strenuous weeks of effort between now and the end
of March, a period in which we Americans must confront our problems in Haiti
as candidly as our initial success. In that fashion, we can best seize our
opportunity to extend and develop what nascent democracy has already achieved
in Haiti during its five fragile months of existence.






96


Testimony of
Peter B. Johnson
Executive Director, Caribbean/Latin American Action
Committee on International Relations
U.S. House of Representatives
February 24, 1995

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committees
My name is Peter Johnson. I am executive director of
Caribbean/Latin American Action, a private, non-profit group
dedicated to promoting economic development in the Caribbean and
Latin America. C/LAA is familiar to some of you, since we have
worked together frequently over the years on issues pertaining to
the Caribbean Basin, but I would like to state for the record
that Caribbean/Latin American Action was founded to help people
in Caribbean Basin countries become more prosperous through the
growth of trade, investment and other business activities
reflecting vigorous and progressive private sectors and
supportive public policies.
I am here on behalf of the Board of Trustees of C/LAA to
express our deep concern over the increasingly desperate
unemployment situation in Haiti, and to urge you to consider what
types of actions on the part of the U.S. Government might most
easily and most quickly put Haitians to work. Unless the urgency
of this situation ie recognized and some remedial action is taken
quickly, there is a grave danger that everything the United
States is trying to do in Haiti will be lost.
My testimony today will focus on three things the current
situation and prospects in Haiti, the importance of the assembly
manufacturing and light agricultural sectors for jumpstarting the
Haitian economy, and the need for a more pro-active U.S. approach
toward restarting those sectors.

The Haiti Challenge--An Update
Let us first look briefly at the situation that confronts
U.S. policymakers in Haiti in light of the stated objectives of
the U.S. intervention. Both the military intervention and the
embargo that preceded it were intended to uphold the principle of
democratic government in the Hemisphere by restoring President
Aristide to his elected office and by creating the conditions for
lasting democracy in Haiti. It was clear from the outset that
ousting the military usurpers would be, at best, the beginning
and not the end of that ambitious assignment.
To institutionalize democracy in a nation whose entire
history has been hostile to it, at a time when its always-poor
economy lies in total ruin, is an enormous undertaking, fraught
with uncertainties and defying cheap or quick solutions. No one
can be sure any policy will achieve the desired end. But a well
designed policy can go far toward making success at least
possible, by trying to remove the impediments that make failure
almost inevitable.

In Haiti the survival of democracy translates into simple,
primitive short-term objectives the survival of President
Aristide, the survival of his government throughout its
constitutional term, the survival of the fragile constitutional
process itself by the timely and proper holding of the elections,
and the peaceful transition of power to his successor.




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