Title: WCRWSA vs. SWFWMD - Final Order
CITATION THUMBNAILS PAGE IMAGE ZOOMABLE
Full Citation
STANDARD VIEW MARC VIEW
Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/WL00004012/00001
 Material Information
Title: WCRWSA vs. SWFWMD - Final Order
Physical Description: Book
Language: English
 Subjects
Spatial Coverage: North America -- United States of America -- Florida
 Notes
Abstract: Jake Varn Collection - WCRWSA vs. SWFWMD - Final Order (JDV Box 108)
General Note: Box 16, Folder 11 ( SWFWMD Permits and Final Order - 1997-1998 ), Item 6
Funding: Digitized by the Legal Technology Institute in the Levin College of Law at the University of Florida.
 Record Information
Bibliographic ID: WL00004012
Volume ID: VID00001
Source Institution: Levin College of Law, University of Florida
Holding Location: Levin College of Law, University of Florida
Rights Management: All rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.

Full Text





BEFORE THE GOVERNING BOARD OF THE
SOUTHWEST FLORIDA WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT

ORDER NO. SWF-97-

WEST COAST REGIONAL WATER SUPPLY
AUTHORITY, CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG, P- 8
and PINELLAS COUNTY, i ;..- ;

Petitioners,

vs. DOAH CASE NOS. 95-1520,
95-1521, 95-1522, 95-1523,
SOUTHWEST FLORIDA WATER 95-1525, 95-1526, 95-1527,
MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, and 95-1528

Respondent,

and

PASCO COUNTY and
HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY,

Intervenors.


FINAL ORDER

THIS CAUSE was heard by the Governing Board of the Southwest Florida Water

Management District pursuant to Sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (F.S.) (Supp.

1996), for the purpose of considering the recommended order of the Administrative Law Judge

(ALJ) and the exceptions filed by the parties, and for the purpose of issuing a final order in the

above-styled proceeding.

On May 29, 1997, the Administrative Law Judge issued his recommended order, a copy

of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". Pursuant to Section 120.57(1)(i), F.S. (Supp. 1996),

and Rule 40D-1.564, Florida Administrative Code (F.A.C.), the parties were entitled to submit

written exceptions to the Recommended Order within 15 days of the date of the recommended
c .- f~ \-' -";-`T:







D AFT
order. On June 13, 1997, the parties filed exceptions to the recommended order. All parties

twice agreed to extensions of time for the District to enter the subject final order. The current

deadline for entry of this final order is November 30, 1997.

Throughout this order the following apply. Cosme-Odessa Wellfield will be referred to

as "Cosme-Odessa". Section 21 Wellfield will be referred to as "Section 21". South Pasco

Wellfield will be referred to as "South Pasco". Northwest Hillsborough Regional Wellfield will

be referred to as "NWHRWF". Cosme-Odessa, Section 21 and South Pasco will be collectively

referred to as "the three City wellfields".

The Governing Board has reviewed the recommended order and all exceptions thereto

and finds that it can address each exception in the manner set forth in the Rulings on Exceptions

to Recommended Order, attached hereto as Exhibit "B".

The portions of the recommended order regarding date and place of hearing, appearances

entered at the hearing, statement of the issue, and the preliminary statement are hereby adopted

and incorporated by reference, with one change: In the preliminary statement, page 4, fourth

paragraph, the ALJ erroneously states that the hearing was originally scheduled to begin in

December 1995. Actually, it was scheduled to begin on January 9, 1996.1 See Notice of Hearing

entered on August 3, 1995.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The Governing Board hereby adopts and incorporates by reference Findings of Fact Nos.

in the recommended order. The Governing Board hereby rejects, in whole or in



SThis error is repeated at the bottom of p. 5. "December hearing" should be changed to
"Januarny hearing".
V- .
9- :









part, as not being based upon competent substantial evidence Findings of Fact Nos.

Below, as to each finding of fact which the Governing Board has rejected in whole or in part, the

Governing Board explains the basis for such rejection. Also below, as to some findings of fact

which have not been rejected, the Governing Board offers some explanation.

No. 13 This finding of fact is rejected in part as not being based upon competent

substantial evidence. South Pasco provides its water to the City of St. Petersburg, not the

Authority. See J. Maxwell, Tr-Vol. 1A, p. 46. The ALJ found in Finding of Fact No. 9 that this

wellfield is owned and operated by St. Petersburg. To the extent that Finding of Fact No. 13

finds that South Pasco supplies water to the Authority, it is rejected. The Governing Board

accepts the finding with respect to the quantity of water pumped from the wellfield.

No. 44 The Governing Board rejects)the first sentence of this finding of fact as it relates

to the three City wellfields as not being based upon competent substantial evidence. While it is

true that the Petitioners originally sought issuance of 20 year permits, they later abandoned that

position. In their Joint Notice Clarifying Petitioners' Position in Light of the District's Change of

Position served on July 17, 1996, they stated that they sought renewal permits with all of the

terms and conditions in their current permits.2 For South Pasco, that is a permit duration of 10

years, and for Cosme-Odessa and Section 21, that is a permit duration of 8 years. Therefore, as

to the three City wellfields the Governing Board rejects that portion of Finding of Fact No. 44

which states that the Petitioners seek to have 20 year permits issued. The Governing Board



The Petitioners understood their position to include permit duration. See City of St.
Petersburg's Exceptions to Recommended Order at p. 4. See also Joint Proposed Recommended
Order of the City of St. Petersburg and Pinellas County at p. 78, and Proposed Recommended
Order of the West Coast Regional Water Supply Authority at p. 40.







DRAFT
accepts the first sentence of the finding of fact as it relates to NWHRWF because the Petitioners

sought issuance of a 20 year permit as to that wellfield due to the default issue. See Joint

Proposed Recommended Order of the City of St. Petersburg and Pinellas County at p. 78, and

Proposed Recommended Order of West Coast Regional Water Supply Authority at p. 40. The

Governing Board accepts the second sentence of this finding of fact.

No. 45 The Governing Board accepts this finding of fact because it is true. However, it

is misleading as it relates to South Pasco and NWHRWF. As the ALJ elsewhere found, South

Pasco did not commence operations until 1973 (see Finding of Fact No. 10), and the NWHRWF

did not commence operations until 1984 (see Findings of Fact Nos. 31 and 32).

No. 49 This is in reality a conclusion of law. Prior to 1989, District rules (16J-2.11(5)

and 40D-2.301(4)) allowed the granting of "exceptions" to certain conditions for issuance of

water use permits. The ALJ incorrectly states that District rules provided for the award of

"exemptions." At the hearing, the witnesses overwhelmingly used the word "exception." See

On only two occasions was the word "exemption" used. Once was in a question by one of West

Coast's attorneys, and the other was in an answer by District witness Jim Guida. However, Mr.

Guida used the word "exception" at least nine other times in his testimony. See Therefore, the

Governing Board rejects the use of the word "exemptions" because it is incorrect as a matter of

law, and, further, is not based upon competent substantial evidence. In its place, the Governing

Board inserts the word "exceptions." The finding of fact is otherwise accepted. ') i rv cOL..

No. 50 The ALJ incorrectly states that the permits for Section 21 and Cosme-Odessa

were issued in 1975. Elsewhere in his findings of fact (Nos. 18 and 25), the ALJ correctly finds

that these permits were issued in 1976. See Exhibit Nos. P-62 and P-63. Also, the ALJ

4










incorrectly finds that the District granted "public interest exemptions" when it issued these

permits. Neither the permits (Exhibit Nos. P-64 and P-65) nor the orders which accompanied

them, Order No. 76-1 (Exhibit No. P-62) and Order No. 76-2 (Exhibit No. P-63), indicate that

public interest exemptions were being granted. To the contrary, the orders find that the

environmental permitting criteria were satisfied. Therefore, the first sentence of this finding of

fact isrejecteas not being based upon competent substantial evidence. The Governing Board

accepts the second sentence of this finding of fact.

No. 52 The Governing Board rejectsthe use of the word "exemptions" as being

incorrect as a matter of law and not based upon competent substantial evidence. See discussion

of Finding of Fact No. 49 above. In place of the word "exemptions" the Governing Board inserts

"exceptions." The finding of fact is otherwise accepted.

No. 57 The Governing Board ects the use of the word "exemptions" as being

incorrect as a matter of law and not based upon competent substantial evidence. See discussion

of Finding of Fact No. 49 above. In place of the word "exemptions" the Governing Board inserts

"exceptions." The finding of fact is otherwise accepted.

No. 135 It is clear that the ALJ erroneously wrote "wetlands" when he intended to write

"wellfields". The Governing Board accepts this finding of fact with this clarification.

No. 147 The Governing Board accepts this "finding," with one modification. The need

for a baseline is a matter of law for which the Governing Board has authority to reject or modify

the ALJ's "finding." Section 120.57(1)(), F.S. The Governing Board modifies the ALJ's

"finding" such that the first sentence reads as follows: "Such analysis sometimes requires

establishment of a 'baseline' against which anticipated impacts may be predicted." The


5










Governing Board's position on baseline is more fully explicated in the rejection of Conclusion of

Law No. 299 below.

No. 149 The Governing Board rejects the use of the word "exempted" as being incorrect

as a matter of law and not based upon competent substantial evidence. See discussion of Finding

of Fact No. 49 above. In place of the word "exempted" the Governing Board inserts "excepted".

The finding of fact is otherwise accepted.

No. 150 The Governing Board rejects the use of the words "exempt" and "exemption" as

being incorrect as a matter of law and not based upon competent substantial evidence. See

discussion of Finding of Fact No. 49 above. In place of the words "exempt" and "exemption"

the Governing Board inserts "except" and "exception", respectively. The finding of fact is

otherwise accepted.

No. 151 The Governing Board does not reject this finding of fact. However, as is

explained more fully in the analysis of Conclusion of Law No. 295, because of the expiration of

the permits, past permitting of the impacts is irrelevant.

No. 152 The Governing Board rejects the use of the words "exemptions" and "exempt"

as being incorrect as a matter of law and not based upon competent substantial evidence. See

discussion of Finding of Fact No. 49 above. In place of the words "exemptions" and "exempt"

the Governing Board inserts "exceptions" and "except", respectively. The finding of fact is

otherwise accepted.

No. 153 The Governing Board rejects the second sentence of this finding of fact as not

being based upon competent substantial evidence. Exhibit Nos. D-494-H and D-494-J are

Compliance Notices sent to the Permittees alleging violations of permit conditions at Cosme-








-a k, .1
Odessa and NWHRWF. Thus, at least two of the subject wellfields have been cited for

violations of permit conditions. The Governing Board does not reject the first sentence of this

finding of fact as there never was any adjudication that the Permittees violated any of the permits.

No. 154 The Governing Board accepts this finding of fact, but notes the Compliance

Notices which were sent to the Permittees (Exhibit Nos. D-494-H and D-494-J). See treatment

of Finding of Fact No. 153 above. Moreover, the Governing Board concludes as a matter of law

that Notices of Violation are not provided for under law applicable to the District, and the failure

of the District to send one does not restrict the ability of the District to deny permit applications

for failure to meet rule criteria or to pursue civil or administrative action for violations of

permits.

No. 155 The Governing Board does not reject this finding of fact because the ALJ's

meaning for "permit condition enforcement action" might mean a lawsuit or administrative

complaint, neither of which has the District done. However, the Governing Board notes the

existence of the Compliance Notices which were sent to the Permittees previously. See analysis

of Finding of Fact No. 153 above.

No. 157 The Governing Board does not reject this finding of fact. However, as is

explained more fully in the analysis of Conclusion of Law No. 295, because of the expiration of

the permits, past permitting of the impacts is irrelevant.

No. 158 The Governing Board ec)this "finding" because it is incorrect as a matter of

law. The standard for baseline is a matter of law for which the Governing Board has authority

to reject or modify the ALJ's "finding." Section 120.57(1)(j), F.S. The Governing Board's

position on baseline is set forth in Conclusion of Law No. 299 below.









No. 171 The District rejects this finding to the extent of the Applicants' compliance as a

matter of law with the environmental condition for issuance (Rule 40D-2.301(l)(c)), the water

level condition for issuance (Rule 40D-2.301(1)(d)), the reasonable-beneficial use prong of the

three-prong test (Section 373.223(1)(a)), and the public interest prong of the three-prong test

(Section 373.223(1)(c)). Whether an applicant has met the permitting criteria is a mixed question

of law and fact, for which the Governing Board has greater latitude to reject the ALJ's findings.

Harloffv. City of Sarasota, 575 So.2d 1324, 1328 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Florida Power Corp. v.

State. Dep't of Envtl. Regulation, 638 So.2d 545, 561 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); and McDonald v.

Department of Banking & Finance, 346 So.2d 569, 579 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).

Other findings of fact by the ALJ specifically find that the adverse environmental impacts

caused by the Applicants' withdrawals will continue with continued pumping at current

quantities. See Findings of Fact Nos. 175 and 176. In Conclusions of Law Nos. 304 and 305, the

ALJ found that the types of harm enumerated in Findings of Fact Nos. 175 and 176 constitute

adverse environmental impacts. The existence of adverse environmental impacts is determined

by application of the performance standards in the Basis of Review. See Conclusion of Law No.

292. Section 4.2.A.4.b. provides: "Wetland hydroperiods shall not deviate from their normal

range and duration to the extent that wetlands plant species composition and community zonation

are adversely impacted." In Finding of Fact No. 176, the ALJ found that these harms would

occur with continued pumping at current quantities. Section 4.2.A.4.c. provides: "Wetland

habitat functions, such as providing cover, breeding, and feeding areas for obligate and

facultative wetland animals shall be temporally and spatially maintained, and not adversely

impacted as a result of withdrawals." In Finding of Fact No. 176, the ALJ found that these harms


8









would occur with continued pumping at current quantities. Finally, Section 4.2.B.1. provides:

"Water levels in lakes shall not deviate from the normal rate and range of fluctuation, to the

extent that: a. Water quality, vegetation, or animal populations are adversely impacted..." In

Finding of Fact No. 176, the ALJ found that populationsos of lake...dependent creatures will be

reduced as the water levels remain lowered by the impact of the pumping."

The Governing Board concludes that pumping which causes ongoing adverse

environmental impacts, as found by the ALJ, violates Rule 40D-2.301(1)(c), F.A.C. See Tr-Vol.

26A, p. 76-77, Vol. 27A, p. 41-43, Vol. 28A, p. 34-37 (J. Emery); Vol. 22B, p. 49-53 (L. Bartos).

Rule 40D-2.301(1)(d), F.A.C., prohibits withdrawals of water from causing water levels

to deviate from the ranges set forth in Chapter 40D-8. Other findings of fact and conclusions of

law by the ALJ specifically find that "normal ranges of water level fluctuation [of lakes] have

been impacted." See Findings of Fact Nos. 161, 164 and 167. In Finding of Fact No. 94 he

found that "the current lake water in the area of the wellfields fluctuates within wider ranges, and

at lower levels, than reflected by prepumping data." In Conclusion of Law No. 305 he

concluded: "The permanent lowering of water levels in nearby lakes is an adverse environmental

impact to the lake." (emphasis added) For further analysis on this subject, see the rejection of

Finding of Fact No. 203 below. Section 4.3.1. of the Basis of Review prohibits withdrawals

from causing lake levels to be reduced below the applicable minimum water level established in

Chapter 40D-8, F.A.C. The evidence showed that withdrawals from Section 21, Cosme-Odessa

and South Pasco have violated this restriction. See rejection of Finding of Fact No. 203. The

ALJ found that this would continue with pumping at current amounts. Specifically, he found that

lake water levels will "remain lowered by the impact of the [continued] pumping." See Finding





:~.. *. T '"\ !- -.]


of Fact No. 176. Withdrawals which cause water levels to deviate from the ranges set forth in

Chapter 40D-8 violate Rule 40D-2.301(l)(d), F.A.C.

Withdrawals which cause ongoing adverse impacts to environmental features and

deviation of lake levels from the ranges in Chapter 40D-8 violate the public interest prong of the

three-prong test in Section 373.223(1), F.S. See Florida Power, 638 So.2d at 546 (whether an

impact to a wetland was "not contrary to the public interest" as provided in Section 403.918(2),

F.S., was a policy matter for the agency's determination and not a question of fact to be resolved

by the hearing officer). The public interest is a broad concept which requires this Board to

consider various factors including, but not limited to, the following: the applicant's need for the

water, the effect of the applicant's water withdrawals on others, the ability of the water resource

to sustain the applicant's withdrawals combined with others' withdrawals, and the effect which

the applicant's withdrawals will have upon lakes, wetlands, fish and wildlife and other

environmental features. See City of St. Petersburg v. Southwest Florida Water Management

Dist., 355 So.2d 796, 800 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977); Harloff, 575 So.2d at 1327: Tr-Vol. 6A, p. 44-45

(R. McLean); Vol. 3B, p. 51-53, 85 (A. Adams); Vol. 1B, p. 14, 25-26 (J. Maxwell). The Board

must balance all of these factors to arrive at a determination whether the applicant's use is

consistent with the public interest. The Governing Board concludes that ongoing adverse

environmental impacts of the nature described by the ALJ in Findings of Fact Nos. 175 and 176

are not consistent with the public interest.

For the same reason, the Applicants fail to satisfy the reasonable-beneficial use prong of

the three-prong test in Section 373.223(1)(a), F.S. Tr-Vol. 6A, p. 42-44 (R. McLean).

"Reasonable-beneficial use" as defined in Section 373.019(4), F.S., is: "The use of water in such

1 I'T







.^Ts r : ""** T .- ;
*_1~.^' .: -
quantity as is necessary for economic and efficient utilization for a purpose and in a manner

which is both reasonable and consistent with the public interest." The public interest component

of the reasonable-beneficial use prong is the same as the public interest prong in the three-prong

test. Tr-Vol. 3B, p. 52-53 (A. Adams); Vol. 6A, p. 44-45 (R. McLean). The Governing Board

agrees that the Applicants' use of water is in such quantity as is necessary for economic and

efficient utilization for a purpose which is both reasonable and consistent with the public interest.

However, the Governing Board concludes that the Applicants' withdrawal of water is not done in

a manner which is both reasonable and consistent with the public interest, due to the ongoing

adverse environmental impacts which their withdrawals have caused and will cause in the future.

See Rule 62-40.410(2), F.A.C.

Therefore. Rule 40D-2.301(1)(c) & (d), F.A.C., and Section 373.223(1)(a) & (c), F.S.,

have not been satisfied. The Governing Board, as a matter of law, rejects the ALJ's finding to the

contrary because it is inconsistent with the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the

ALJ and is incorrect as a matter of law. The Governing Board accepts the ALJ's finding as it

relates to Section 373.223(1)(b), F.S., and the other conditions for issuance in Rule 40D-

2.301(1), F.A.C.

No. 173 The Governing Board rejects the ALJ's finding to the extent that it finds that the

Applicants' proposed use is, as a matter of law, a reasonable-beneficial use and is consistent with

the public interest. This is a mixed question of law and fact which the Governing Board has

greater latitude to reject. Harloff, Florida Power and McDonald. As explained in the analysis of

Finding of Fact No. 171 above,.because of the ongoing nature of the adverse impacts to

environmental features caused by the pumping and the deviation of lake levels from the ranges in









Chapter 40D-8, the proposed use is not consistent with the public interest, nor does it qualify as a

reasonable-beneficial use of water. The Governing Board accepts the ALJ's finding that the

proposed use will not interfere with any presently existing legal use of water.

No. 178 The Governing Board rejects the ALJ's finding to the extent that it finds that the

Applicants' proposed use is, as a matter of law, a reasonable and beneficial use of the resource.

This is a mixed question of law and fact which the Governing Board has greater latitude to reject.

Harloff, Florida Power and McDonald. As explained in the analysis of Finding of Fact No. 171

above, because of the ongoing nature of the adverse impacts to environmental features caused by

the pumping and the deviation of lake levels from the ranges in Chapter 40D-8, the proposed use

is not consistent with the public interest, and thus, is not a reasonable-beneficial use as that term

is defined in Section 373.019(4), F.S.

No. 179 The Governing Board rejects the first sentence of this finding to the extent that

it finds that the Applicants' proposed use is, as a matter of law, a reasonable and beneficial use of

the resource. The Governing Board's reasons for doing so are expressed in the analysis of

Findings of Fact Nos. 171 and 178 above. Furthermore, the Governing Board concludes as a

matter of law that the ALJ too narrowly construes the import of Section 373.223(1)(a), F.S.

Certainly said section includes consideration of the purpose for which the water is withdrawn,

however, the ALJ has ignored that aspect of reasonable-beneficial use which involves

consideration of the manner in which withdrawals are made, and the associated impact upon the

water resources, including environmental features. The Governing Board accepts the second

sentence of Finding of Fact No. 179, but notes its willingness to authorize withdrawals by the

Applicants from the subject wellfields by way of an emergency order.


12









No. 182 The Governing Board rejects the ALJ's finding to the extent that it finds that the

Applicants' proposed use is, as a matter of law, consistent with the public interest. This is a

mixed question of law and fact which the Governing Board has greater latitude to reject. Harloff,

Florida Power and McDonald. As explained in the analysis of Finding of Fact No. 171 above.

because of the ongoing nature of the adverse impacts to environmental features caused by the

pumping and the deviation of lake levels from the ranges in Chapter 40D-8, the proposed use is

not consistent with the public interest. The Governing Board accepts the second sentence of this

finding. However, to say that the provision of water to citizens is consistent with the public

interest, while true, does not completely resolve compliance with the public interest prong of the

three-prong test. The public interest includes consideration of a host of factors, including effects

on the environment. See analysis of Finding of Fact No. 171.

No. 190 The District rejects this finding to the extent of the Applicants' compliance as a

matter of law with the environmental condition for issuance (Rule 40D-2.301(1)(c)), the water

level condition for issuance (Rule 40D-2.301(l)(d)), the reasonable-beneficial use prong of the

three-prong test (Section 373.223(1)(a)), and the public interest prong of the three-prong test

(Section 373.223(1)(c)). The ALJ's finding that these criteria have been satisfied is inconsistent

with other findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the ALJ and is incorrect as a matter of

law. See the treatment of Finding of Fact No. 171 above for explanation. The Governing Board

accepts the ALJ's finding as it relates to Section 373.223(1)(b), F.S., and the other conditions for

issuance in Rule 40D-2.301(1), F.A.C.

No. 200 The Governing Board rejects this finding to the extent of the Applicant's

compliance as a matter of law with the environmental condition for issuance (40D-2.301(1)(c)).






"--, -'


This finding is inconsistent with the ALJ's Findings of Fact Nos. 175 and 176. Finding that the

environmental condition for issuance has been satisfied is irreconcilable with findings that

continued pumping will cause continued ecological decline. Therefore, one or the other of these

findings cannot stand. Since Findings of Fact Nos. 175 and 176 are fact intensive, the ALJ is due

deference on these. However, Finding of Fact No. 200--concerning whether a permit criterion

has been satisfied--is a mixed question of law and fact, which the Governing Board has greater

latitude to reject. Harloff, Florida Power and McDonald. Since the Governing Board has

concluded as a matter of law that pumping which causes ongoing adverse environmental impacts

does not satisfy the environmental condition for issuance and the public interest and reasonable-

beneficial use prongs of the three-prong test, this finding by the ALJ must be rejected as a matter

of law.

No. 203 The Governing Board rejects this finding of fact because it is not based upon

competent substantial evidence, and, in fact, is contrary to other findings of fact by the ALJ.

Rule 40D-2.301(l)(d), F.A.C., prohibits withdrawals from causing water levels to deviate from

the ranges set forth in Chapter 40D-8. Findings of Fact Nos. 100, 102 and 103 find that the

levels of Starvation Lake on the Section 21 wellfield have declined as a result of pumping at the

wellfield. Finding of Fact No. 164 finds that Starvation Lake and Lake Jackson have been

adversely impacted by pumping at Section 21, and that "normal ranges of water level fluctuation

have been impacted." Finding of Fact No. 167 finds that pumping at Cosme-Odessa has

adversely impacted Horse Lake, Church Lake, Lake Raleigh and Calm Lake, and that "normal

ranges of water level fluctuation have been impacted." Findings of Fact Nos. 105 and 161 find

that levels at Camp Lake have declined as a result of pumping at South Pasco Wellfield. The










ALJ specifically found in Finding of Fact No. 161 that "normal ranges of water level fluctuation

have been impacted."

In Finding of Fact No. 93 the ALJ found that the withdrawal of water "in the area of the

subject wellfields has resulted in dramatically increased fluctuations in the water levels of area

lakes and wetlands." In Finding of Fact No. 94 he found that "the current lake water in the area

of the wellfields fluctuates within wider ranges, and at lower levels, than reflected by

prepumping data." In Finding of Fact No. 132 he found: "[O]verall lake levels remain lowered,

exposed lake beds are visible, and upland vegetation continues to grow on what was formerly

lake bottom. The former shorelines are visible and clearly delineated by vegetation lines. The

evidence fails to establish that the recent rainfall increase will correct the adverse impacts caused

by the withdrawal of water from the subject wellfields." In Finding of Fact No. 135 he found that

"Despite two years of average to above average rainfall, the lakes at the Section 21 and Cosme

wellfields continued to be substantially below normal." Finally, in Conclusion of Law No. 305

he concluded: "The permanent lowering of water levels in nearby lakes is an adverse

environmental impact to the lake. The reduction of water levels, exposition of shorelines, and

reduction in former animal populations located within the lake habitat are adverse environmental

impacts." (emphasis added) The ALJ found that this harm would continue with continued

pumping at current quantities. He found that lake water levels will "remain lowered by the

impact of the [continued] pumping." See Finding of Fact No. 176.

All of the above-named lakes have levels established for them in Chapter 40D-8, F.A.C.

See Rule 40D-8.624(1)(1) & (t), F.A.C. Section 4.3.1. of the Basis of Review, which explains the

condition for issuance regarding water levels, prohibits withdrawals from causing lake levels to









be reduced below the applicable minimum water level established in Chapter 40D-8, F.A.C.

District witness John Emery provided detailed testimony that Horse Lake and Lake Raleigh (both

located near Cosme-Odessa) and Starvation Lake (located on Section 21) have deviated from

their ranges set forth in Chapter 40D-8 due to wellfield pumping. Specifically, they have been

reduced below their minimum water level. See Tr-Vol. 26B, p. 86-92, 108-109 and Vol. 28A, p.

111-112. District witness Leonard Bartos provided detailed testimony that Camp Lake (located

near South Pasco) has deviated from its ranges set forth in Chapter 40D-8 due to wellfield

pumping. Specifically, it has been reduced below its minimum water level. See Tr-Vol. 22A, p.

87-95; and Exhibit No. 598A-1 CONFIRM WHETHER EXHIBIT WAS ADMITTED. Other

evidence supporting the proposition that the subject wellfields have caused lake levels to deviate

from the ranges set forth in Chapter 40D-8 is at Tr-Vol. 26A, p. 94-96, 99-101, Vol. 26B, p. 11-

15, 20-28, 34-36, 39-41, 44-46, 48-49, 116, 132-133 (J. Emery); Vol. 22B, p. 71-74 (L. Bartos);

Vol. 9B, p. 27 (J. Bays); Vol. 13A, p. 36-37, 47-48 (P. NeSmith); Vol. 14A, p. 44-45 (B.

Ormiston); and Exhibit Nos. A-51, A-52, A-53, A-56, A-110, 596-A, 596-B, 596-C and 596-D.

Clearly, withdrawals at the Section 21, Cosme-Odessa and South Pasco wellfields have

caused and will cause lake levels to deviate from the ranges set forth in Chapter 40D-8. The

ALJ's finding to the contrary is not based upon competent substantial evidence.

No. 204 The Governing Board rejects this finding of fact because it is not based upon

competent substantial evidence for the reasons stated above in the rejection of Finding of Fact

No. 203.

No. 232 The Governing Board notes that the ALJ obviously made a typographical error

when he stated that the maximum withdrawal levels are "49 mpg". This should read "49 mgd".









No. 233 To the extent that this finding of fact finds that pumping at NWHRWF at the

full permitted capacity will cause adverse environmental impacts, it is contrary to other findings

of fact by the ALJ and is not based upon competent substantial evidence. This is so because that

wellfield has been pumping at full permitted capacity in recent years (see Finding of Fact No. 32)

and this wellfield has not caused adverse environmental impacts at the quantities currently being

pumped (see Findings of Fact Nos. 168-170). This finding was likely an oversight on the ALJ's

part. The Governing Board accepts this finding of fact as it applies to the other three wellfields.

238 This finding of fact is rejected as it is not based upon competent substantial

evidence. The District stipulated that withdrawals of the requested quantities from the three City

wellfields will not adversely impact other existing legal withdrawals, if there are monitoring

conditions and the District's standard water use permit conditions. See Jeint Prehearing

Stipulation, paragraph 21.c.iii. The ALJ so concluded in his conclusions of law. See Conclusion

of Law No. 307. As to NWHRWF, the ALJ elsewhere found that withdrawals at the quantities

currently being pumped will not interfere with other existing legal uses (see Findings of Fact

Nos. 173 and 180). Coupled with the ALJ's finding that NWHRWF has been pumping at its

maximum permitted capacity (see Finding of Fact No. 32), it is clear that the ALJ did not intend

to find here that pumping by NWHRWF at the maximum permitted quantity would interfere with

other existing legal uses. Additionally, the District agreed that the condition for issuance

regarding interference with existing legal withdrawals would be satisfied if the permit had a

mitigation condition. See Tr-Vol. 5, p. 115-116, Vol. 6A, p. 41 (R. McLean); Vol. 28B, p. 152-

154 (J. Guida). The ALJ has recommended that such a condition be put on the permit. See

paragraph "d" in the recommendation section of the recommended order. Therefore, this finding









of fact is not based upon competent substantial evidence, and must be rejected.

0- 239 To the extent that this finding of fact finds that pumping at NWHRWF at the full

permitted capacity will cause additional adverse environmental impacts, it is contrary to other

findings of fact by the ALJ and is not based upon competent substantial evidence. This is so

because that wellfield has been pumping at full permitted capacity in recent years (see Finding of

Fact No. 32) and this wellfield has not caused adverse environmental impacts at the quantities

currently being pumped (see Findings of Fact Nos. 168-170). This finding was likely an

oversight on the ALJ's part. The Governing Board accepts this finding of fact as it applies to the

other three wellfields.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The Governing Board hereby adopts and incorporates by reference Conclusions of Law

Nos. in the recommended order. The Governing Board hereby

rejects, in whole or in part, Conclusions of Law Nos.

Below, as to each conclusion of law which the Governing Board has rejected in whole or in part,

the Governing Board explains the basis for such rejection. Also below, as to some conclusions

of law which have been accepted, the Governing Board offers some explanation.

No. 292 The Governing Board accepts this conclusion of law be! se 4~is--tr-ue- O

However, the Governing Board appends the following to this conclusion of law: Additionally,

for renewal applications, where application of the performance standards indicates that adverse

impacts occurred during the prior term of the permit and that continued withdrawals will cause

ongoing adverse impacts, only withdrawals in such quantities as do not result in adverse impacts

will be permitted, and remedial measures for past impacts may be required. Moreover, existing









withdrawals may be disallowed entirely for renewal applications if adverse impacts will continue

unmitigated.

No. 295 The Governing Board oes not reject this conclusion of law. However, the

Governing Board wishes to make clear that even if some environmental impacts were allowed

under prior permits, because of the permit duration those impacts are not allowed in perpetuity.

Tr- Vol. 28B, p. 79-80 (J. Guida). Water use permits have a duration of a set number of years.

See Section 373.236, F.S. There is no entitlement to continued use of water past the expiration

date of a permit. Davey Compressor Co. v. City of Delray Beach, 613 So.2d 60, 62 (Fla. 4th

DCA 1993). Section 373.239(3), F.S., makes clear that applications for renewals of permits are

given as complete a review as applications for initial permits. All of the conditions for issuance

must be met for a renewal permit to be issued. Tr-Vol. 28B, p. 79-80 (J. Guida). Otherwise,

having a permit duration serves no purpose.

Environmental impacts were allowed under the existing permits pursuant to Rule 40D-

2.301(4), F.A.C. (Exhibit No. P-1105), which allowed exceptions to be granted to the rule

criteria. See Finding of Fact No. 52. This provision was deleted in the 1989 amendments to

Chapter 40D-2, F.A.C. (see Finding of Fact No. 57), which is a clear indication that adverse

environmental impacts, even if permitted in the past, would not be allowed in the future. The

notion that because the District permitted environmental impacts in the past therefore it must do

so in the future, which appears to be akin to a finding of estoppel, is at the heart of the ALJ's

recommendation for permit issuance. It is rejected as being contrary to the system of water use

permitting established by the Legislature in Part II of Chapter 373, F.S.

The current rule (Rule 40D-2.301(l)(c), F.A.C.) is unequivocal in not allowing adverse









environmental impacts. Since the ALJ found that the adverse environmental impacts will

continue with the continuation of pumping at current quantities (see Findings of Fact Nos. 175

and 176), the fact that some environmental impacts were permitted in the past is of no

consequence to permitting environmental impacts to continue under a renewal permit.

Thus, while the Governing Board does not reject the ALJ's conclusion that in the past the

District did not find the impacts to be unacceptable, now, at the time of permit renewal, the

Governing Board is finding that the continued adverse environmental impacts are unacceptable.

No. 297 The Governing Board rejects the use of the word "exemptions" as being

incorrect as a matter of law and not based upon competent substantial evidence. See discussion

of Finding of Fact No. 49 above. In place of the word "exemptions" the Governing Board inserts

"exceptions." The conclusion of law is otherwise accepted.

No. 298 The Governing Board accepts this conclusion of law, however, it really is in the

nature of a finding of fact, and the Board will deem it to be such. Below in its rejection of

Conclusion of Law No. 299, the Governing Board expresses its policy with regard to baseline as

a matter of law.

No. 299 The Governing Board rejects this conclusion of law. In its place, the

Governing Board concludes as follows: Baseline, as the subject is discussed in Section 4.2 of the

Basis of Review, is pertinent for new uses and for renewals where no impacts occurred in the

past as a result of the withdrawals. Tr- Vol. 30B, p. 129-130 (A. Adams). Under either of these

circumstances, the applicant is not responsible for adverse environmental impacts which exist at

the time of permit application filing, and thus it is important to determine what the baseline

conditions are.






C. :. ."-


However, for renewal applications where, as a result of the withdrawals, adverse

environmental impacts occurred in the past and are ongoing in nature, the question of baseline

may not be pertinent for purposes of determining compliance with the conditions for issuance.

The Governing Board construes Section 4.2 of the Basis of Review such that ongoing adverse

impacts are deemed to be part of the predicted future impacts expected to occur as a result of

permitting the withdrawal. If a withdrawal is causing unmitigated ongoing adverse

environmental impacts, it does not matter when the impacts began or what degree of the impacts

occurred prior to renewal application filing, thus, there is no need to establish a baseline. This is

so because unmitigated adverse environmental impacts are not allowed under District rules, and

the application will be denied. See Tr-Vol. 28A, p. 34-37, 109-110, Vol. 27A, p. 41-43 (J.

Emery); Vol. 5, p. 69-70, 173-175, Vol. 6A, p. 88-89, 102 (R. McLean); Vol. 24, p. 83-84 (L.

Bartos). Only if an applicant proposes an acceptable mitigation plan for the ongoing adverse

impacts can a permit be issued (assuming all other criteria are met). In such a case it is then

necessary to establish a baseline.

Therefore, ongoing adverse impacts, even if begun under previous permits, do not

become part of the baseline, and the applicant is responsible for them. The District will consider

such ongoing adverse impacts in the review of renewal applications.

No. 301 The Governing Board rejects this conclusion of law because it does not make

sense. The Governing Board's position on baseline is expressed in No. 299 above.

No. 302 The Governing Board accepts this conclusion of law, but also concludes as a

matter of law that adverse impacts are determined by applying the performance standards in

Section 4.2 of the Basis of Review. See Conclusion of Law No. 292. See also Tr- Vol. 13B, p.
"'" : -" ? **" ; T A L









95-96 (K. Stage); Vol. 14B, p. 103 (S. Denton).

No. 308 The District rejects this conclusion to the extent of the Applicants' compliance

as a matter of law with the environmental condition for issuance (Rule 40D-2.301(1)(c)), the

water level condition for issuance (Rule 40D-2.301(1)(d)), the reasonable-beneficial use prong of

the three-prong test (Section 373.223(l)(a)), and the public interest prong of the three-prong test

(Section 373.223(1)(c)). Whether an applicant has met the permitting criteria is a mixed question

of law and fact, for which the Governing Board has greater latitude to reject the ALJ's findings.

Harloff, Florida Power and McDonald.

Other findings of fact by the ALJ specifically find that the adverse environmental impacts

caused by the Applicants' withdrawals will continue with continued pumping at current

quantities. See Findings of Fact Nos. 175 and 176. In Conclusions of Law Nos. 304 and 305, the

ALJ found that the types of harm enumerated in Findings of Fact Nos. 175 and 176 constitute

adverse environmental impacts. The existence of adverse environmental impacts is determined

by application of the performance standards in the Basis of Review. See Conclusion of Law No.
b2W 292. Section 4.2.A.4.b. provides: "Wetland hydroperiods shall not deviate from their normal

range and duration to the extent that wetlands plant species composition and community zonation

are adversely impacted." In Finding of Fact No. 176, the ALJ found that these harms would

occur with continued pumping at current quantities. Section 4.2.A.4.c. provides: "Wetland

habitat functions, such as providing cover, breeding, and feeding areas for obligate and

facultative wetland animals shall be temporally and spatially maintained, and not adversely

impacted as a result of withdrawals." In Finding of Fact No. 176, the ALJ found that these harms

would occur with continued pumping at current quantities. Finally, Section 4.2.B.1. provides:






-- .', "


"Water levels in lakes shall not deviate from the normal rate and range of fluctuation, to the

extent that: a. Water quality, vegetation, or animal populations are adversely impacted..." In

Finding of Fact No. 176, the ALJ found that populationsos of lake...dependent creatures will be

reduced as the water levels remain lowered by the impact of the pumping."

The Governing Board concludes that pumping which causes ongoing adverse

environmental impacts, as found by the ALJ, violates Rule 40D-2.301(l)(c), F.A.C. See Tr-Vol.

26A, p. 76-77, Vol. 27A, p. 41-43, Vol. 28A, p. 34-37 (J. Emery); Vol. 22B, p. 49-53 (L. Bartos).

Rule 40D-2.301(1)(d), F.A.C., prohibits withdrawals of water from causing water levels

to deviate from the ranges set forth in Chapter 40D-8. Other findings of fact and conclusions of

law by the ALJ specifically find that "normal ranges of water level fluctuation [of lakes] have

been impacted." See Findings of Fact Nos. 161, 164 and 167. In Finding of Fact No. 94 he

found that "the current lake water in the area of the wellfields fluctuates within wider ranges, and

at lower levels, than reflected by prepumping data." In Conclusion of Law No. 305 he

concluded: "The permanent lowering of water levels in nearby lakes is an adverse environmental

impact to the lake." (emphasis added) For further analysis on this subject, see the rejection of

Finding of Fact No. 203 above. Section 4.3.1. of the Basis of Review prohibits withdrawals from

causing lake levels to be reduced below the applicable minimum water level established in

Chapter 40D-8, F.A.C. The evidence showed that withdrawals from Section 21, Cosme-Odessa

and South Pasco have violated this restriction. See rejection of Finding of Fact No. 203. The

ALJ found that this would continue with pumping at current amounts. Specifically, he found that

lake water levels will "remain lowered by the impact of the [continued] pumping." See Finding

of Fact No. 176. Withdrawals which cause water levels to deviate from the ranges set forth in









Chapter 40D-8 violate Rule 40D-2.301(1)(d), F.A.C.

Withdrawals which cause ongoing adverse impacts to environmental features and

deviation of lake levels from the ranges in Chapter 40D-8 violate the public interest prong of the

three-prong test in Section 373.223(1), F.S. See Florida Power, 638 So.2d at 546 (whether an

impact to a wetland was "not contrary to the public interest" as provided in Section 403.918(2),

F.S., was a policy matter for the agency's determination and not a question of fact to be resolved

by the hearing officer). The public interest is a broad concept which requires this Board to

consider various factors including, but not limited to, the following: the applicant's need for the

water, the effect of the applicant's water withdrawals on others, the ability of the water resource

to sustain the applicant's withdrawals combined with others' withdrawals, and the effect which

the applicant's withdrawals will have upon lakes, wetlands, fish and wildlife and other

environmental features. See City of St. Petersburg v. Southwest Florida Water Management

Dist., 355 So.2d 796, 800 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977); Harloff, 575 So.2d at 1327; Tr-Vol. 6A, p. 44-45

(R. McLean); Vol. 3B, p. 51-53, 85 (A. Adams); Vol. 1B, p. 14, 25-26 (J. Maxwell). The Board

must balance all of these factors to arrive at a determination whether the applicant's use is

consistent with the public interest. The Governing Board concludes that ongoing adverse

environmental impacts of the nature described by the ALJ in Findings of Fact Nos. 175 and 176

are not consistent with the public interest.

For the same reason, the Applicants fail to satisfy the reasonable-beneficial use prong of

the three-prong test in Section 373.223(1)(a), F.S. Tr-Vol. 6A, p. 42-44 (R. McLean).

"Reasonable-beneficial use" as defined in Section 373.019(4), F.S., is: "The use of water in such

quantity as is necessary for economic and efficient utilization for a purpose and in a manner









which is both reasonable and consistent with the public interest." The public interest component

of the reasonable-beneficial use prong is the same as the public interest prong in the three-prong

test. Tr-Vol. 3B, p. 52-53 (A. Adams); Vol. 6A, p. 44-45 (R. McLean). The Governing Board

agrees that the Applicants' use of water is in such quantity as is necessary for economic and

efficient utilization for a purpose which is both reasonable and consistent with the public interest.

However, the Governing Board concludes that the Applicants' withdrawal of water is not done in

a manner which is both reasonable and consistent with the public interest, due to the ongoing

adverse environmental impacts which their withdrawals have caused and will cause in the future.

See Rule 62-40.410(2), F.A.C.

Therefore, Rule 40D-2.301(1)(c) & (d), F.A.C., and Section 373.223(1)(a) & (c), F.S.,

have not been satisfied. The Governing Board, as a matter of law, rejects the ALJ's conclusion to

the contrary because it is inconsistent with the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by

the ALJ and is incorrect as a matter of law. The Governing Board accepts the ALJ's conclusion

as it relates to Section 373.223(1)(b), F.S., and the other conditions for issuance in Rule 40D-

2.301(1), F.A.C.

No. 310 This conclusion of law is rejected as it is not based upon competent substantial

evidence. The District stipulated that withdrawal of the requested quantities from the three City

wellfields will not adversely impact other existing legal withdrawals, if there are monitoring

conditions and the District's standard water use permit conditions. See Joint Prehearing

Stipulation, paragraph 21.c.iii. The ALJ so concluded in his conclusions of law. See Conclusion

of Law No. 307. As to NWHRWF, the ALJ elsewhere found that withdrawals at the quantities

currently being pumped will not interfere with other existing legal uses (see Findings of Fact









Nos. 173 and 180). Coupled with the ALJ's finding that NWHRWF has been pumping at its

maximum permitted capacity (see Finding of Fact No. 32), it is clear that the ALJ did not intend

to find here that pumping by NWHRWF at the maximum permitted quantity would interfere with

other existing legal uses. Additionally, the District agreed that the condition for issuance

regarding interference with existing legal withdrawals would be satisfied if the permit had a

mitigation condition. See Tr-Vol. 5, p. 115-116, Vol. 6A, p. 41 (R. McLean); Vol. 28B, p. 152-

154 (J. Guida). The ALJ has recommended that such a condition be put on the permit. See

paragraph "d" in the recommendation section of the recommended order. Therefore, this

conclusion of law is not based upon competent substantial evidence, and must be rejected.

No. 311 To the extent that this conclusion of law finds that pumping at NWHRWF at

the full permitted capacity will cause adverse environmental impacts, it is contrary to findings of

fact made by the ALJ and is not based upon competent substantial evidence. This is so because

that wellfield has been pumping at full permitted capacity in recent years (see Finding of Fact

No. 32) and this wellfield has not caused adverse environmental impacts at the quantities

currently being pumped (see Findings of Fact Nos.168-170). This conclusion was likely an

oversight on the ALJ's part. The Governing Board accepts this conclusion of law as it applies to

the other three wellfields.

No. 315 The Governing Board rejects the conclusion that "...the above-cited rules were

determined to be invalid by an Administrative Law Judge..." As the subject conclusion of law is

presently written it could be construed to say that every one of the District's conditions for

issuance of permits in Rule 40D-2.301(1), F.A.C., was declared to be invalid in the SWUCA

hearing, which was not the case. As the ALJ correctly stated in his preliminary statement at page


26
-II"-,-









6, "...a relevant portion of the District's administrative rules were determined to be invalid by

Final Order..." (emphasis added). Furthermore, the ALJ obviously made a typographical error

when he wrote that "...the a number of District rules..." The word "the" should be deleted from

this statement.

ADDITIONAL CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

I. In Findings of Fact Nos. 174 and 199, the ALJ made findings that no new adverse

environmental impacts would result from continued pumping at current quantities. The

Governing Board understands this to mean new kinds of adverse environmental impacts. The

ALJ so stated in Finding of Fact No. 175. Moreover, in Finding of Fact No. 176 he listed several

specific adverse environmental impacts which would occur as a result of continued pumping.

Thus, he could not have meant in Nos. 174 and 199 that no adverse environmental impacts

would occur as a result of continued pumping at current quantities. Moreover, the Governing

Board concludes as a matter of law that District rules do not prohibit only "new kinds of adverse

environmental impacts," or only "new adverse environmental impacts." District Rule 40D-

2.301(l)(c), F.A.C., prohibits any adverse environmental impact.

2. As a supplement to Conclusion of Law No. 299 regarding baseline, the Governing

Board concludes that for renewal applications where adverse environmental impacts occurred in
'I/
the past,(but are not continuing in naturewithdrawals will not be allowed if such withdrawals

would preclude mitigation of the past adverse environmental impacts. For example, continued

withdrawals resulting in a continued low water table thus precluding rehydration which is

necessary to restore or create a wetland, would not be allowed.

3. In Findings of Fact Nos. 191 and 192 the ALJ found that current withdrawals are


27.

S' .. .\ .:.









necessary to meet a certain reasonable demand. The Governing Board has accepted this finding

of fact, but wishes to note as a matter of law that reasonable demand can decrease over time with

expanded availability of reuse water, further conservation measures and the development of new

kinds of conservation measures. Thus, a quantity that is necessary to satisfy reasonable demand

today may not qualify as a reasonable demand quantity in the future, with a static population or

even an increasing population.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Governing Board is

denying the renewal applications for Cosme-Odessa Wellfield, Section 21 Wellfield and South

Pasco Wellfield, and the Governing Board is issuing a ten-year permit for the Northwest

Hillsborough Regional Wellfield under the terms and conditions in the permit attached hereto

and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit "C".

The Governing Board recognizes that it is very likely that the Petitioners will appeal the

subject final order. Therefore, the Governing Board hereby expresses its intention to grant a stay

of the final order upon petition therefore being filed by the Petitioners pursuant to Section

120.68(3), F.S. (Supp. 1996). The Governing Board will condition the stay such that the

Applicants will be allowed to withdraw up to the quantities of water found by the ALJ to be the

actual current quantities. See Findings of Fact Nos. 13, 20, 27, 32 and 35. The Applicants will

not be authorized to withdraw the full requested quantities (except for NWHRWF, where actual

current quantities and full requested quantities are the same), as the ALJ found that they were not

entitled to permit renewal at those quantities.

Additionally, the Governing Board hereby expresses its intention, upon the denials of the -


28
'. -' -'"" ,-" -









three City wellfield permit applications becoming final, to immediately issue an emergency order

authorizing appropriate quantities from those wellfields until such time as those wellfields can

meet the permitting criteria or alternative sources of supply become available.

WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that Water Use Permit Application Nos. 200004.02

(Cosme-Odessa), 200003.02 (Section 21) and 203647.02 (South Pasco) are DENIED, and that

Water Use Permit Application No. 206676.03 (Northwest Hillsborough Regional Wellfield) is

GRANTED under the terms and conditions in the permit attached hereto and incorporated herein

by reference as Exhibit "C".

DONE and ORDERED by the Governing Board of the Southwest Florida Water

Management District this day of November, 1997, in Brooksville, Hemando County,

Florida.


By:
Roy G. Harrell, Jr., Chairman


Attest:
Curtis L. Law, Secretary

(Seal)

Filed this day of
November, 1997.


Agency Clerk


Copies furnished to:





29 L. .




University of Florida Home Page
© 2004 - 2010 University of Florida George A. Smathers Libraries.
All rights reserved.

Acceptable Use, Copyright, and Disclaimer Statement
Last updated October 10, 2010 - - mvs