Title: Commerce Power
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Title: Commerce Power
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Language: English
Publisher: President's Water Resources Policy Commission
 Subjects
Spatial Coverage: North America -- United States of America -- Florida
 Notes
Abstract: Richard Hamann's Collections - Commerce Power
General Note: Box 12, Folder 9 ( Water Resources Law - Vol #3 - 1950 ), Item 3
Funding: Digitized by the Legal Technology Institute in the Levin College of Law at the University of Florida.
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eopr.e them."1 Ad though the Co titution nowhere de-
clares expressly that these three branches of the Government
shall be separate and independent, it remains true, as a general
rule, that the pwer confided by the~Constitution to one
braincih ciit be eker~ ed by another." Nor is Congress "per-
mitted to abdicate, or to transfer to others, the essential legis-
lati4e functions with which it is thus vested." "
Before turning to a more detailed consideration of te rele-
vant powers delegated to the Federal Government, we should
point rit that Co6n, es is expressly empowered 'to nke all
las "necessary and poper" for carryginmto execution its
expressly delegateI powers and "all other Powers" vested by the
Constitution in the Federal Government." Nor should we
forget, in examining the constitutional powers entrusted to the
Federal Government by the people, that the instrument was
intended to "endure through a long lapse of ages." It was
this charter of government which the people of the United
States established in order:""
to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure
domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence,
promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings
of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity *.

Commerce Power
At the outset, it should be remembered that waterways pro-
vided a principal nteans for conducting commerce in our early J
history." Indeed, the need for central control of commerce
among the colonies was an important factor leading to the
SMartin v. Hunter's Iesse, I Wheat. 804, 829 (U. 8. 1816).
n Ex part Grossman, 26 U. S. 87, 119 (1925) ; Kibour v. Thompson, 1~
U. 8. 168, 191 (1880).
"Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 298 U. S. 388, 421 (1935). For example,
the Supreme Court has said that "Congress cannot transfer its legislative
power to the States-by nature this is non-delegable." Knickerbooker Ice
0o. Stewart 258 U. 8.149, 14 (1920).
1U. S. Cower., ArtI, 8, eL 18
"Martin, Hanter'q LOsse, 1 Wheat. 804, 82 (U. S. 1816).
"U. 8. COOaST, Preaflabe.







calling ofthe Constitutional Convention. And when the Con-
stitution was established, an express power was delegated d the
Congress:'*
To regulate Commrce with foreign Nations, nd
among thn several States, and with the Indian Tribes.
NAVIGTION CoNTrROL.-TheimportanceQfinland waterways
for navigation use and the wisdom of theirimprovemeat had
already been recognized:" Later, the westward growth iofl the
Nation and the corresponding need for water transportation
inspired demands for improvement of waterways, among other
internal improvements.1 But the Congress did not imme-
diately employ the utility of its commerce power for, this
purpose.
Instead, and strangely enough in retrospect, a political con-
troversy arose over the Federal Government's authority under
the spending power to make internal improvements. Although
agreeing that it should assume responsibility for navigation
improvements, some early statesmen believed that the Gov-
ernment lacked constitutional power to undertake them, and
suggested authorization by constitutional amendment On
the other hand, as we shall later see, contemporary treaties and
statutes sought federal assurance of the status of navigable
waters as "public highways." a
Recognition of the adaptability of federal commerce power
was not long delayed, however. With the steamboat came
efforts toward monopoly of steamboat transportation. The
legislature of New York enacted statutes for the purpose of
ji Elot, DESATES ON T=E FIDEbAGL 6C TfrTtiON, 106-119 (i2d ed. 18).
U" S. OomT., Art. I, 8, el. 8.
See, e. g., Marshall, IF! or WASHINroN, p. 11 (1807).
"Bogart and Kemmerer, EotomgOM HIftsai or TEE A9M'miCA PaPLE ,
pp 8311-815 (1942) ; MacG H HimTa or T ANBarBT ATIOn I THm UNrrED
STATUS BErou 1860, pp. 11-136 (1917); 8 McMaster, A HISTOmY OR VE
PBaopz OF THE UnrID STA 465-478 (o188a)<.
For views of Jeferson, Madison-and Monroe, see 1 Bichardson, MBaasAc s
PaD PAPes or sr E PBSIEswTrs 409-410, 456, 497, 567-408, 584; 2 i4. 8,17-18,
144-188, 216 (1896). See also UAited. Stte" v. Gerlach Lee Stook Oo., 889
Sp. -, 788 (190).
See iofra, pp. 74-75.





40
granting to Fulton andLivingston the exclusive right of navi-
gation by steamboat of all the waters within the State, Other
coastal states also passed laws purporting to grant exclusive
rights for use of navigable waters to private interests.2 Ensu-
ing conflicts among the states so hampered the flow of inter-
state commerce as nearly to precipitate civil war."
But these threats of steamboat monopoly were short-lived,
for the Supreme Court of the United States soon called a halt to
such attempts at legislative encroachment by the states upon
the recent exclusive grant of commerce power to the Con-
gress. A conflict arose between Thomas Gj~bo holding a
federal license to engage in coastal trade, and Aaron Ogden
claiming as assignee of the exclusive rights of Fulton and
Livingston to navigation between Elizabethtown and New
York, under their grant of authority by New York. Ogden
succeeded in having Gibbons enjoined from navigating waters
within the territory of New York, and the decree was affirmed
by the highest court of law and equity in New York." When
the case reached the Supreme Court of the United States, the
lower court was reversed in 1824, and Mr. Chief Justice Msbal
handed down the most famous of all opinions on the Commerce
Clause, Gibbomw v. Ogden, saying:
The power of congress comprehends navi-
gation within the limits of every State in the Union, so
far as that aviation m e any m co
Nfth I "commerce :with_. frifn nations, or among the
several States, or with the Indian tribes"
In harmony w this holding, the Court in 1851 rejected a
similar effort to justify construction of a bridge under state
law over the Ohio River obstructing navigation, where such
"4 Beveridgei, LI or Joax MABSHnA., 414 (1919).
"1 Warren, THE SUPREME COURT nw UNITED STATES HISTORY, 598 (rev. ed.
1937).
MCbbon v. Ogden, 17 Johns. 488 (N. Y. 1820).
"9 Wheat. 1, 197 (U. S. 1824). See also 4 Beveridge, LurI or JOHN MAB-
sHA.L, 418 (1919); 2 Warren, THE SUPsME COUBT nr UNITED STATES HIs-
TOBY, 76 (1924). For an earlier decision by Marshall foreshadowing the
(~bbHoM opinion, see The Wilson v. United States, S0 red. oGa No. 17,846
(C. C. D. Va. 1820).







legislation conflicted with legislation by Congress regulating
commerce among the states carried on upon the River.` In
1865, the Court further expounded the navigation scope of that
power over commerce in Gilman v. Philadelphia, saying: M
Commerce includes navigation. The power to regu-
late commerce comprehends the control for that pur-
pose, and to the extent necessary, of all the navigable
waters of the United States which are -cessible from a
State other than those in which they lie. For thispur-
po~i thnjy. nrr tihr pu iMn prn .- t th nt action, an'suD-
ject to ,ill1 t -- ,iik L- oa.*'nn k, Congre This
necessarily includes the power to keep them open and
free from any obstruction to their navigation, inter-
posed by the States or otherwise; to, remove such ob-
structions when they exist; and to provide, by such
sanctions as they may deem proper, against the oc-
currence of the evil and for the punishment of offenders.
For these purposes, Congress possesses all the powers
which existed in the States before the adoption of the
national Constitution, and which have always existed in
the Parliament in England.
Such a view required a conclusion that federal power over
navigable waters may not be limited even by a.compact between
states made prior to their adoption of the Federal Constitution,
as the Court held a few years later in South Carolina v.
Georgia." The exercise of federal commerce
tect navigation, including mneprevenon of interfere
and obtu iucnloa Hi ii0i^-- n hSe created uder pior
state or ied1 a n 411 0Iw ullj H.Ua.mt.. 'I- s-1 -
ssw an hi; eetn;ig & Belmont Bridge Co., 13 How. 518, 505&
(U. s. 1851).
WaL. 713, 724-725 (U. 1865).
"98 U. 8. 4,8 (1876).
SSee, e. g., Bridge Co. v. United States, 105 U. 8. 470. (1881). united
States v. Rio Orande Irrigatfon Co., 174 U. S. 690 (1899); United States v.
BeUlingham Bay Booi Co., 176 U., 211 (1900); Union Bridge Co. V. United
States, 204 U. S. 864 (1907) ; Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States, 216
U. 8.177 (1910); HanombalBridge Co. v. United States, 221 k. 194 (1911);







spondingly, exercise of that power iq the ep C~struion of navi
gable channels and the panama Canal was upheld."
On the other hand, repeated decisions made it clear that the
sta av pt cotrover v le ater an
Sbeds, subject to ngos confer- uponq he Federal Government
bythe.Constit L Accor rdn lfy,1 whethrtitle tteo e d
of navigable rivers is in the state or in the owners of the riparian
lands depends upon state law.
WATMBs UNDZR TZE COMMunBOe Ju~MSWCTrIo OF CONMeBss.-
I this becomes important to consider judicial criteria for de-
terming what constitutes waters subject to the jurisdiction
of Congress under the Commerce Clause, since resolution of
nminy conflicts between federal rights and state or private rights
depends on that determination.
: AraTvigable Waterte o the United States.-The scope of navi-
gi&tn control under ilib ommercepower, it was early estab-
e, brins within the jurisdiction of Congress "all navigable

Philadelphia Co. v. timwstn, tS U.. 0i05 4i11); LooivUWie Brige Co. v.
United states, 242 U. 8. o0 (1917); BRosomy i4p Coo. v. United States,
256 U. S. 113 (1921).
"Wisconsin v. Duluth, 96 U. S. 379 (1877); Wison v. Shaw, 204 U. S. 24
(197).
SSee, e. ., AMqti v. Weaddell, 16 Pet. 867, 41 (U. S, 1842); Pollrd's
Lessee v. Hagan, 3 flW 212, 229-230 (U. 1885); BSmith :State of iary-
lad, 18 How. 71, 74-75- (U. 8. 1855); Miumanrfd V. VWatwen, 6 Wal. 423,
486 (U. e 36867) S10. eekouk, 94 U. S.32, 838 1i 878) Paelek v. Bird,
18TSV, i, 887 e(1891t epin v. JordKan, 140 U. S. 31,: 381-382 (1891);
Illinois Central B. Co. y Itnoeis, l14 U. S. 387, 435-487 (1892); Shvely
v. Bowlby, 152 U. 1, 57-i8 (1894) ; Mobile Transportation Co. v. Moa e,
18t ti S.416, 4; (1903) ; editora v. Ross, 215 U. S. TO, 1940 (1 0) ; Soo#
v. a4ttig, 227 U. k 229, 242-248 (1913); Oklahomta v. Teaas, 25& U. 8. 574,
5883 (1922); United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U. S. 49, 54-55 (1926);
f.saohiuetsts-v y. e w York, 271 U. S. 65,89 (1926); Uslse4 States v. Utah,
288 U. S. 64, 75 (1931); United States v. Oregon, 295 U. S. 1, 14 (1985);
United States v. Arizona, 295 U. S. 174,183 (1935) ; Ash~wander v. Tennessee
Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 837-338 (196) ;.James v. Dravo Contracting
Co, 302 U. S. 134, 140-141 (1987); United States v. Appalachian Electrio
Power Co., 311 U. S. 877, 423-424 (1940); reh. den., 312 U. S. 712 (1941);
United States v. COifornia. 882 U. S. 19, 30-31 (1947), decree expanded,
332 U. 804 (1947).,
ep. U.. Unpsste Stess vOkandler-.Pun ar Co., 229 U. 8.53 0 (191S8),







iateom of the United States." Especil si gnifidance attaches
nre o tthe Supreme J alaasiudeanitioin nthe eaeE of The

Those rivers must beirega*ded a pubi navigal rivers
inaw which are naviAable in fct. 'And they rayi-
gable in fact when they are, ued, or are susceptible of
being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for
commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be
conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel
.: on water. And they constitute navigable watets.of the
o United States within the EaM!a to C h- .
gress mn contrWI ano in from the avig-abl w-ae tof
the States, when they form in their ordinary ondi
e or by uti with nthr mtat n .-
tinued highway over wh'k CiMM"P iA Wn m.O K r-
r; ied on with other States for ein countries in the ci*-

w a ter._ .. : *t" : .. .. .
Unde thait defiitio, ice those waterway which are
navigable in fact are navigable in l~w, actual use most clearly
demonstrates navigability. If the actu. e F ia nii n eweiMW
of transportation ot persons or property in interstate com-
merce, the waterway a navigable water of the United States.

"10 WalL 557, 583 (U. S. 1870). In this connection, It should be noted
that the only deniLtion of navigable water prescribed'b v Wttgre
tn the ReBer rower Act. A oI 'Mae 1o, itO3, 88 41 Stat. 1008,as
-.r. lr). In large measure a combinatlonr of defltilds
appearing n opinions of ate Supreme Court taar time to time, the -Aetf
deglitlan is: merigable waters megns thoRe parts' of treates or otiei
bodle of water ovew M *m8 rW t to
I among"t aorta a ong erl Ma
r, a rp .Wa.ters am
iM a nd deasrruge, -*rqaxed e or suitable tor ise
merce, Including erein a, -- terrupting all o ra .

mended to Oongress for 'such mprovdment ifte nviestlatibfh under ita
authority."U i






14
But such actual use ne4i.tim a nntipU rM" and past as well
as present use will peree' td establish a waterway's status
[And the present lack of water traffic is not decisive, for "When,
i-n fInrmd to hb n4vipabl, a waterway remains so." "
Status as a navigable water may be shown by actual use
by any kind of a vesmLe- Necessarily, account must also be
taken of use even for the rafting or floating of logs."' While
the waterway must afford a channel for useful commerce,
limited navigation use in relation tbo tade and travel in the
vicinity is sufficient." However, the use need not be com-
mT ma l-ntyn rt iP Hence, usetperlVn nal or private boats
may demonstrate the availability of the waterway for the
simpler ty08s of comn ercial navigation."
"U ited States v. Utah, fS SU S.. 64, 87 (1931); Arizona v. California,
288 U. 8. 42-8 452-454 (1981)? United States v. Appalachian Bleotrio Power
Co., 811 U. S. 877,409 (1940),~reh de,.812 U. S. 712.-(I ).' :
"w onomy Light Co. v. United 8Jtci.5S U. 11.118, 123-124 (1921);
ArLsona v. California, 283 1t. S. 42~ I- (1931).
m'*i ritate* -. A aL 'S Powoer 'Co., 311 U. S. 377, 408
(1940), reh. den., 312 U. S. 712 I) ; BooZomy Light Co. v. United states,
256 U. 8. 113, 118, 12 (1921) ; Arisna V, Calfornia, 283 U. 8. 2., 453-454
(1931); Oklahmaav. Atkinson, 313 U. S. 56B't W M).
"Veseels of any kind that can lokt' er, whether propelled
aJ3aliaal power, ly .the wind, or. bl tlJe' steam, are, or may
b mcoe, the mode by yhiei a vast conmerc 4it*W vondwited, and it would
be a mischievous rule that would exclude eitblin determining the aab
gallty of a river." ie Montelo, 20 Wall. 480,442 (U. 1874)._ See
also TAe Mow<(M Powfr 0(9. v. Federal Psfer Q e.eao Gsae C o. 14000, T
I D d., decided October 4. 0. 1:(
In- legal principle, .qggin and r.til*,pee, inditinguishable._lu
transportation by boats In determining navigablity. i .,l'20 y.
I i.; ,B. Anthony fWa. Water Power Co. v.SR. PIW
Watqr Otupse4oWrW, M0. U. S. 340, a:.(1B67) t'United States v. Aspp
ysIn. EJlectro Power as;. 311 U. S. T37t,01-D06 (1940), rel. den., 812
U. 8. 712 (1941); Wisconsin Public Service Corp. v. Federal Power OOqi-
mission, 147 F. 2d 743 747 (C. A. 7, 194), eert. den., 325U 1. S. 880 (1945).
f. United tates v. Jbeo rande Irrigation Co., 174 U. S. 690, 098 (1899).
*"-nite Osatetv. Holt t ate IBan, 270 0. S. 49, 56-57 (1926). Cf.
O lhomai Teeas, 258 U. S. 574, 51 (1922); United ttes v. Utah, 283
U. S. 64 82 (1931).
SUnited States v. Utah, 283U8. s. 8,82 (1931).
t" Unae Stahtes v. Appalsacia Electri Po*9)r (O,, 11 U. S. 377, 0:9-417
(1940), reh. den., 312 U. 8. 712 (1941).







-,~ setbal use is not th 6~aly (tetiri at. For regardless
eI mteit or maaner of k6thi-uhe: thse *aterwaya caep
S 4 oMeptabele offe i r*ti^ ublo[r ir I&rfo

of t nted States.` Nor is a waterway, 6erSestable
W, vFPUWl Q T, f1momt tht eldatfi nation nierelyc because
aatiitalids muistmaim, ihe highway. suitable for use before /
oelasmeil navigation may be undertaken."0 Thus, dip .v
teauiung navigability, "it is proper to consider the ieosibiiy
of, interstate use after aaeanable improvement& which might
bemg ', "4 Moreover, dout has never existed '"that th taavi
p**St referred to inAhe m was a fviability despite the
obstructions of falls, rapids, sd bars, curries, -or shifting
currents.""
..th s-It should not be inferred from what has been
9 7W'lWe5 w at the aptiicabhiity of. the .owmm'r.p power
Wttteft Tte etrtatietrto Bidi a na*Wbe as W =Lft of -hp,
t~i t l ee; ii ig settld thfat' federB ommerce iuthor-
a."ie 1nfel Ba ,10 Wal. 57. 68 (U. 84 187) gt nfto, 20 Wall.
430, 441-J4 (U..8. 1874) ; Parker v. Bird, 137 U. S. 661, 1891); United
&Staes Wikt 2U88. 0.. 8. 814 a (1M98).
U* itL fft tua v. Appa eS_.n fBltrib JPoster Co.,' 811 U.-V 3.f77, 407
(1940) reden., 1 the adjec-
ti~e "&iMmary" and Yntral" as apptlng to a trter4W's condio, ie'
idaTho.b az l ai. 10 L WLatfl D5u ,a 1ra: Twe!Mono, 20 wau.
4.0,.4f4-48, (p. 1874); Uis*asf O.q g 2P0 Us 8L1, 1.1985).
In elkqmi v. ?eneweee Vie A41 iAt o 27 U8. W.8, 320 (1936), the
-GOrt ldLb d "WLhe, In Its .mreseb cendton, tie tl e e ttflee ver is not
are a m u to oncl .* thr th ng nm'i l t.OW of
- evpen[ N a important waiteway V *'." Wao The Montana
Pwr u. V. 9 .; G.......t q"I1. 10200, f, A. D. (1 decided
October 4, 1950.
'U Jtes states v. Appdlaehia Electroi Powe C Uo., 11 i77, 400
(0")), e. dea.,312 U. 8. 12 (194). 8ealso ThiMe nte Po~wer Co. v.
FudegW Power .0aempeaaips Case No. 102000, 0. 4A ., deeded October
4, i*6O.
"811 U. S. at 40d,lcltng 'Te ,ei*M, do WSTn. 43k, 442-443 (U. 1874);
Rconom i ght Co v. United Blate, 256 U. S. 11,. 122 (1921); United
States v. Utah, 28 U. S. 04, 88 (1981). See also Mr. Jsce McLea'u In
Spoomer v. Mooomael, 22 Fed. Cas. 939,944, No. 13, 245 (0. C. D. io 1838) ;
and The Monte"n Power Co. v. Federal Power Comanessio, 0ase No. 'f200,
C. A. D. C., decided October 4, 190.
9111-u1----8







ity may be appropriately invoked btth as to the upper nn-

nonnavigable tributaries, if the navigable capacity. of the
navigaoie waterway is affected or interstMae commerce is
otherwIe affected. rx-------
For example, in the 1890 River and Harbor Act. Congress
prohibited the creation o obstruction to the navigable ca-
pacity of any wateis "in respect of which the United States
has jurisdiction." In United States Rio Grande Irrigation
Co., the Supreme Court held tis prohian adequate us-
ta con against the proposed construction of an
irgation project in nonnavigable upper reaches e-md huf-R
grande Nw Mexco uon a n -
tion navi abili ownstram' h C r -
It is not a prohibitionavi~ay obstruction to the navi-
gation, but anuy obstruction the navigable capacity,
and anything, wherever done or however done, within
the limits of the jurisdiction of the United States which
tends ( dstroy the navigable capacity of one of the
navigable waters of the United'States, is within the
; terms of the prohibition.
Commenting als upon the power of each state to chage the
common-law rule entitling every riparian owner to the con-
tinued natural flow of a stream crossing or bordering his lands
and by such change to permit, te appropriation of owing
waters for such purposes as the state deems wiser the Couit
specified two important limitations on such state power:
First, that in the absence of specific authority from
Congress a State cannot by its legislation destroy the
right of the United States, as the owner of lands border-
ing on a stream, to the continued flow of its waters; so
far at least as may be necessary for the beneficial uses
SAct of September 19,1890,26 Stat. 426, 454.
174 U. 8. 690 (1899).
114 U1. 8. at TO,.
*174 Y. S. at 708.


~







sti. Jof the goversnmeatrpropetitt; Sooondj that it itiswlted
iO by the aupem r pow(of the Geaeral. over.m~,nt to
-so ,I ecur ..the uaiBterruptqd naviphbility of all avigable
,A! trpe withinjthe limits of the United States. .
A similar example appears in the 1941 Denison Dhm opinion
fi~4lving the upper nonnavigable: betion of ths. Red v.
TRe up~ tml htvin ^,^Hvn tmril I., .lytB t
river in Oklahoma isnavigble," the Statef f.klahMa
t -to enjo fedjal FR t-
a point in Oklahona Texas. Put the Court rejected Oka-
l I nMntion that theuthoriing ,statute,Was unc"07H
tutional, mfkinr it clear that the commerce authority extends
to the tributaries of navigable streams, just as control aver the

it interests of the navigable portions.52 The Court added
that ever since M''ulloch v. Mryland it had repeatedly
recognized, that: .
; 'the exercise of the granted power of Congress to regulate
Interstate conmnieroe .~ay be aided by appropriate and
I "needful control of activities and agencies which, though
i ttrastateaffeet that commercC.
It should be noted that in the Rio Grande eiiethe threat-
e ie effect on tb iieresis of cinmierie v'~~idiVt rse,6a sub-
stantial Jaipirmentp of navigable capacity; whereas in the
DBenwisoDBa ease the effect was beneficial in eharacts the
provision of flood control, power, and navigation improvement,
SSuch difference is therefore plainly immaterial to the' ap,
pliability of commerce power.,
: 'a aRon ir A4kiw on;i 1 U. g. 508 (109t). In the interim between
the RMo GraMde and DemigO DBm cases, Mrh. Chief JUstie agbhes had. o.
caston to recognize the power of Congress to control the nonnaviga~ b
reaches of a rrlIer to prot~dt and preserve the navigability of navigable
piftmbaa in WiMtd Stlates Utah, 2883U. 9. f 9S (1981).-
Okbihoma v. Texas, 258 U. S. 574, 591 (1922). .
O Oklahoma v. Atkinson, 818i .508, 525 (1941).
4.Wheat.Meirn.-S.lSW. -; '.. ..18'".
H Oklahoma v. Atkison, 313 U. B. 508,426 (1941).
SIn Georgia Power Co. v. Fecerar Power Commiaston, 152 F. 9 908 40. A.
5, 194), the United States Couft of Appeals Sor the Fift circuit held wand


)







i' noor.i CoTwr oid -In- addition i to t gatiwa Donttol, the
Combmnetoie Cue ve'ts ini io Ygesu other authority over
waters fide its jurisdietion. !Thusi, he application of recog-
nized engineering piiciples f"inds s~ai tin iii oisfitutional
doctrine where certain minprotementsfwo navigation are allied
with control of floods, In his message to Coigress bnthel882
Repoit of the Misisissippi RIvr Commission, whieh Tecom-
dfndii 4e Qnl'ov6ements for navigation and protection of the
Iley, president Arthur said, "The constitutionality of a ilw
i g ~appropritions in aid of these objects cai bit be ques-
tionied. At-z ut ipr p Qtourt in 1913 recognized a rela-
Stio n f f ntrol to the "plenary power of the United
S- ,i,;aT-tyL. 4hR ben'elit 7ot navlgauon.""" '"
Similarly, while fe"'point was not directly in issue in the
1940 Niw River tase, the Court there'stated that flood proteo-
tiin and watershed deVelop~k nt ae part of commerce con-
trol." The following year, in disposing of a direct attack upon
the constitutionality if .the statute authorizing construction
of the Denison Dah,~i the Court pointed out that although
the detelopment "is mtltiplepiipe, projet,: it is basically
one for flood control," and recognized it "as part of a compre-
hensive flood-control program- for the. Masissippi, itself""'
Negating any suggestion of constitutiponl impediment to em-
a requirement of fed4a license for proposed construction 1y the comniny
of Ai hidir2ectrite bwei pianit'at t mdam located in nonnaviibible waters
where operationn of fle project would adversely affect navigation, noting
that ex e ,of omerce, authority is not restricted to an adverse e ect
on present navigable capacity, but extends' to navigable capacity &ter
reasonable improvements which might be made a"d Irrespective of whether
the effect is injurious or beneficial. See also Harris v. Central Nebraska
PAbHonfPower, Irgaton Dist., 209 Supp; 425 4 429, (D, Nebr. 1988);
ifM2iRierlDoamw&AwMwity v. Going, 29 P.1 SsP 318, ,(P,C 0. Okla.
M&Richardsont MESSAGES AND PAPEBS OF Tan EPsDwilsB, (1886), But
see the doubts entertained by the National Waterways Commission in 1912,
infra, n. 55, p. 269.
w"Jackson v. United States, 280 U. 1,23 (1913).
a United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 811 U. S. 377, 426
(1940), reh. den., 312 U. 8.1'12 (1941).
S* ACt ~atie l 19,S t;B,52 8tat.21 J 1219. I M
iMOdiCdn anw MDi 's tS W.:&08. 52 .8;ii(5(1948 1 ).







ployment of tee nLi mmerce power for f.oodoontrol purposes,

; Iu tI'hOiere isiaicctittioaitdesoe^^ly CGpanacier
the towrtU should be blihd to the engineeribig prospects
:: of pwfteeting the naoitin's arteries of oomniirbetteieogh
tn 4 6r of. the waterisheds. There is; no. astitutio al
io reason why Congrecinanot, under the ia ap rs
S treat the watersheds Wtdi ey to flodd Wontr6l on*Lfia
Stable streams and their tributaries. N orr i theeo maOB*
S10 int titutional iaeeity for viewing edeC~ ieiE!re rv poject
'rr in isolation fr m a eo~prehensive plan covering te ma
tireban 0of particulariver.'
EVELOPMENT OF POWE--An other i por i t purpose
serve-rby waters u6ider the jidiction 64 Congress Isthie de
telopment of power. lHe~ to fM! ederaI cofrinerce authority
i*tay 6 ippraotiiately invoked.' It should be nbte ithat as early
A o-7frCi ngt e s k& were the Secietary of the Army to lease
wtriwiP6* at Mline to a privateeomipiny.
'Al6, edphremeCouirt'in 1891 anbidunced'some ofhe rele-
vant principles in the first Green Bay cae, holig tat if a

S318 B. I. at58, Mi* hlgnflcMaptes 0 ra mo rnaBtgable ii tI.Sb&'B adi
tr~iqqn ,o the ipct. pf .)foos upon cpparperce is a paret4 n the fto
lowing statement by the Court: "The contribution which the Bed River
makes to disastrous floods in its basin and in the lower Mississippi if 416fl
peen, recpplied. Hapge crop damage the loss of, buildings. 1der and live-
stok, pollution of fertile fields, the erosion of rich farm fands, IW savings,
ltert rptoi'of -navlgatlo, Injulry of port fatttes,'th&Ceatii of sand
bars in the channels, interruption or stoppage ,g;4f#itpaa,%a*pportation
by rail, truck and motorcar, disease, pestilence and death, rellerof.lhe
honaleps, and destitte- these are ,ow familiar, .costs ,f the -odu on
the I kislsippl. And the story of the Red River va ly .ows tal it baas
oI4, meeplagued by such disasters pd burdeed byq the oqts. g ,,h t
S"Floods pay no resptctb state lines. Their etffoti. QontrtpIn Ut MIs-
ii ,has become increasingly a subject of i"atlpa concern. In
reo ionof the tact that i.I)e sta'is are impotent to cope witI them
effectively" footnotess omiitted)'. S3 b. S. at 52o-522.
Act of Marcb 8,1879, 20 'St .77, 38t. The fArst speMid uthorslation
for construction of a power project in a navigable stUeam-appeared In the
4t rrJly 11~, .23St p, s ee FsT MAnAL T or THE E PERA.
PolviM 06Mionaro4 p. 481921).


__







surplus of water is produced by a lanfediral navigation dam
authorized under a state law, the state may retain to itself te
authority to dispose of the surplus toprivate parties td thus
reimburse itself for the expenses of the improvement." In
the second Green Bay case in 1898, a lower riparian, owner
sought an apportiotument of therow of a navigable river for
power purposes, obijeeting to a, diversion, through navigation
cnals -and around .its (properties; of waters not required for
navigation; but the Court sustained the diversion as founded
on a grant from the United Statesewhich had sole control of he
use and disposal of water power at the federal navigation dam."
Referring to the dominant authoriy of the Federal Government
to erect a navigation dam and avail itself of the incidental water
power, the Cour there said: 6
At whatpoins in the dam and canal the water for
Power may be withdrawn, and the quant y which can
be treated ,as surplus with due e'grd t givigatLp n,
must be deterned by the authority which owns and
controls that navgation. n such matters there can be
no divided empire.
Later, in United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co.; the right of
the Federal Government to dispose of the water power at a
federal navigation dam "w reaffirmed in 1913, the 'eidrt
saying: 6
If the primary purpose is legitimate, we can see no sound
objection to leasing any excess pf power over the needs of
the Government. (

SKaukauna afer Power 7o. v. Green Bay 4 Aias. Canat Co., 142 1. ,.
254 (1891). :
SGreen Bay d bbif. Canal Co. v. Patte Paper Co., 172 T. 8. 6'(1898),
rehl. We-, T73t.Si. 179 (19).
"172 U. S. at 80. This conclusion was reached despite the statement of the
court below that only 1% of the stream was required for navigation, the
diversion of the remaining 99% beilg for the purpose of creating water power.
Green Bay & Miss. Canal 0Co. v. Kaukauna Water Power Co., 90 Wis. 370,398,
401, 61 N. W. 1121, 1122, 1124 (1895).
22% S.. -41Is). See also Waters v, Phuips, 284 Fed. 287,
(0a. A.7,1~). 1.|


_I






And iNiArlona V. 0rifotnkrd,-sadftetgdteid ennltuctioll of
Iw d&n6ta ewVif Asd pbwr, AuM in-' cne6i6 n wRith' ;t
&i id' on PtIjedt' tiarC tifti lfli31'i; s;: 1
8" t'act hat purposes other than navigation will; also
.'be sve could iot invalidate the exercise of the au-
:thyrity conifer even if those other purposes wold
+- to *of alo jutifed an oe'rciie' of .pi gressionl
S .... .r' i 0+" ++ { *, ':' +'++ +r '6;? boh,',, h' "
Similary, in ,t,93l 8 ,,t .oPjnion te Court J*W
1ia.t the Wilso4. Da.oe 6 e .,sepe River was,,YA y
Sitorized in the exercise of the oomipece and war power, and
:hat: .
a!:* The power of falling water was an inevitable incident of
,the i oteQoptFuction of the.dan~ That water power ca~
i iptq the.exclqsive control of he Federal Government.
:; lr vmW _Te iwa?|,ene(-q sonveqtge ipg eletrie
energy, and the water power, the right te.q evert it ijto
electric energy, and electric energy thus produced, con-
"- tut~rope tbelongingt L United States.
In 1940, thp, CqWt cqraiterized "recovery of the cost of im-
provements through utilization of power" as a part of con-
iercer ehit.i," lkfIei~e lveaere a multiple-purpse- dam is
constructed and operated by,,th9 Federal Government pri-
mawily,for. flood control, the Denis. Dam case in 1941 ex-
pressly held that exercise of commercebkuthority for that pur-
pose is not invalidatedwhere generation power, s a pay-
ingDpatner," is one of the ends served.i .
LESt.. G ONFEDERAL n P 9T, F .POiR. ,der
the Gommerce Clause, Congress has also provided'in the Fed-
eral Pb6*r Act for issuance of licenses to nodifederal: Aencies
Sfor development of water power on streams under its juriadic-
288U. S 428,4156 (181M). '
rAihwManMerv. Tennesee Valley Authority, 297 U. 8. 288, 330 (1986)
i ,Urted: tatei iv. App sachian Eectroi Powe' Oo.,;; t 1X3. '8:. 87T, 426
(194M)vveb. dem, 812 U. ;S712 (1941). ; : ; --- .
Oklahom. v. Atrinson, 813 U. 8 508, '5W0-648 (1941);.






igqn." I nwg; apEF appl ^i^iedtSqattionika^^inete
O.that system! the, AZ i ,t tJo4e.ew tivtr dpoib iopiq .1940
specifically ul9 t tq99Fna it qli Aj*, thl. -lidiy .of. )i-
censq, issued thereunder." Moreover, a priIvat comp y op-
eratiig a Ipowetr 'evelo entmin a nav ajejtw i ro United
S at.es, cohstiruCted tror licens-
a Vf `4 thpreuner to, accept a
license with all of its obigaions and conditions..", pr. is such
a company's position different where it claims a preeristing
r1htimader si w arnea r u owr purWe.
t1e' yiniy thi t'ommerce ith ~ilty iif ita& to nb lgation
edritro, tie fSupreme COburti in tie New River case oierved
that the license conditions have a relationship to exercise of
commerce po ey5i~ tfhr the, p:1it'il4 4bstt1tiet1e g avigable
waters may bj'deni&n1d r gtiiee n i tet ii)ti ad 'that it is not
material that the'exertion of commerce AUth6roft ij'ittended
by the'sAie iii'Cdehts Thich attend the exercise'bt sti police
power, saying.: .
n truth apt$rlty1the i Sataea e a
tion of commerce on its waters. That au-
thorit is 'as brbad as the nieids'6f coniierce. '!
t.:i s, t ++ l+ap ,i ,tag. 104~ et' ^ agtfet 286,;-a. j I4 Stat 88.
asamended, 16 U. S.,C..791a-8aSr.
SNew Je rsy v. Iarge, n 6. .8' (1926).
+ t- Sfr #t6 Ap Mappaoaitn M edtrfdPownr Go., 311 9iS.JiT7 (1910),
SPenwsayv~ni. Wotr Power Co. ~. PeaprI P r Commisson, 123 F.
2d !t ('C.'A. D.' t: igtl),'b+.t. den., m++.' 806 ti4'" ,.Iit : 'i! 1
"Niagara Falls Power o. Federal Paei OiaMhiso,. 187 F,.-
787 (0 A. 2,1944, cert. den., reh. den., 820 U. S. 792, l5 (1948).
S7-,e TbY V.pi( n Slec.A Power o., Sif U.'; ,';8 427
19P)ito!idesnw gsi)y 8i2 (SIa 941) iIn Sa:eaditn that the rtigit of
tbe. pnljd Stateitoios.e of wat4e i liplted to navigation, t~e company
re.eu4 upon cert#1n language used in: Kansas v. Colorado, 20Q t. ,. 46,
sb80' (9lO'f00); PtMof /eaftfle v. Oregoft d 'Washinqton R. R. '6o.,j 2 SiU.
56, 63 (1921); United States v. River Rouge Co., 269 U. S. 411, 419 (1926);
Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U. 8. 367, 415 (1929). But the Court expressly
denied that the language-employedin those opinions supports the view that
eonstitutional:power ofthe United States over its waters is limited to navi-
gation control, asserting that on the contrary its:utheorty is as broad as the
needs of commercetir41 U;S.at 4"4642.. i. : : -







SThe polet is, thi4Fa4 igab water ti*aeslubjee t Wtuas
S toional planning and lesool in t brad regulation of
-k, commerce graced Ite Fednel Goverawuet..
Hene, evek if the iceel be compelled unerthe statute at
the esd lof th -liet~i period to swbnit to ae~tiOition of itW
property at es' than fair value, this is no more than the prfde
thWiNtseb mast pay for the ri IIg &f maintaibing its ftai
in waters subject to congressional control." Thus,; ~iittta
charges may be imposed on thelicensee." AlAso vaid; is the
Federal Power 'Act's g tnt to A'B e&ooet--1&4igf to brhng
efrilt t domain proceedings.'" Likewie valid are the Act's
provisions for regulation of licensee's itesstate rates." Simi-
lrly,Litin connection with the Act's provision permitting tihB
United States to take over a licnsed project at the end of the
licenseperiod upon ikfanmeiitbaieWd 6n original coist it should
bei htsdtethat a lidelsee may be lawfully retired to reduce its
capiialisation to the actual legitimate original cost of itis prijet
constructed prior to passage b the Act."
SnME bio a OONR mS ALONI--In the exercise o
the commerce power, am decisions are left exclusively to Con-
gress. or example: *
It is for Congress alone to decide whether a particular
S project, by itself or as part f a more co pehensive
scheme, will have such a beneficial effect on the arteries
of interstate commerce as w j tt it,. That deter-
Smmatin i legitive i character.

S'Sit. S. at'427-4a8. "wen a private company it subJidt td Ucense
couioto by a state, the iftuatiod as to acquisition Is the same. FPo River Co.
v. Relre4 oleadWiawionySi 4U. S.n51 (19!7).
"11 U. S. at 427; Central Nebreaka Pubic Power d Irrigation Dist. v.
Federal Power Commission, 160 F. 2dr-t2,(0 A. 8, 19 7) owt en., 882
Sf,8. 94 (1947).;
SMissouri v. Union Electric Light 4 Power Co., 42 F. 2d 692 (D. 0. Mo.
1980).
Safe Harbor Water Power Corp. v. Federal Power Commisiiotn 179 F.
2d 179 (C. A. ,11949), cert. den., 839 U. & 957 (4900).
"Niagara Falls Power Co. v. Federa.Power poCmmlnefe, 187 F, 2d 787
(C. A. 2,1948), oert. den., reh. den., 820 U. 8. 7815 (1948).
Oklahoma v. Atkinson, 813 U. 508 27 (1941).




A I


Soialab is the decision'on the necessity for a given improve-
ment of navigable capacity, and th character and extent of
it.8 Likewise asg'to whether a striat r e constitutes a hin-
drance. : A~dt pe ,ofur s lag npjpa, 4 ntry .to a statu-
tory 4ec;ration, that Congress has no purpose to aid naviga-
tin, or. -that ipts a iAtetipq ijo,-u ,the stored waters for
ot*i purposes sopas to defgt a degled primary navigation
85
purpose."
,~To iithe exercise of commner; atl4rity invalidated where
Congress elects therby to serve purposes i addition to navi-
gation, even if such .other purpose;ip, j, not alone justify
an .exercise of congreqsipnal .piw.r" .Also, there is no con-
stitutional barrier.to exercise, by giesp of its commerce
pEiwer to authoriz jiencp fi$ Al1M,_Ige poofederal con-
struction of a danifor,po.werp, ffmderg ris-
diction.87, Correspos tinal
nieesity for viewiu lotion (rou
a comprehensive plan p ofa particviar
river," the decision lu m d effitivenqss
ofa particular proJe :ae a com-
prehensiee pln--is of'e Det-
son Dan opinion:
i' say that no one of th e i be constitu-
tionally au'ib ed'bec pbeft oil floods
inM t Mis pi would ral'would be to
a' the hdtuil r potehti ints of the in-
tegrated system as a whold. v'Sthe n tessiy,
from the constitutional viewpo.i4 oJeavjn to Conress
Sthe decision as to what watershed~R siou be controlled
(and what methods should be employed) in ordet to pro-
":SArton, v. Wheeler, 179 U. S. 141, 168-168 (1(1.
United States v. Appalachian Electrio Power Co., 311 U. S. 3T7, 424
(1940), reh. den., 312 U.,S. 712 (1941).
SArieona v. California, 283 U. S. 423, 456-457 (1931).
"288 U. S. at 456.
"United States v. Appalathian Bleotri Power Co., 811 U. S. 877, 426
(1960), reh. den., 812 U. 712 (1941).
" Olahooma v. ABtewirb, 31 Tj. S. 508? 525-527 (1941).
S818 U. s. at 527-'28.






,;,. tect the various arteries of interstate eipmere frqua te
.' d disasters of flood. .. .-i: ..1 : ,-; i:i
y the same tokenrs; it is$tr Congress to'decide whether a proj-
ect's benefits to commnew0 outweigh the costs of thf.eludei.
taking." .. i
EFreCT O ExmRCSE OF COMMERCE POWER UPON NO"TtiiMAL
INTERESTS.r-. t, it' is important to note the effect of the
exercise of do -hor a an rivt
ilterests. y indicated, a riparian owner may under
S lawbhold: d o er8 an heGov-
riiment, to a pa of a navigable stream's bed, since e epe
Uiif'nsveregn following the American Revolution and thus
heTd 'absolute right to navigable waters and the beds under
them, subject to those rights granted to the Federal Gov-
ei4henit in the Constitution." From this latter paramount
quaifition evolved the general rul al Ihe roVerm~et d'us |l
Uo b w. Wl uupeulsate for destruction of private interests over
ch, at the point of conflict i navitio ease-
inti utnu- The Commerce Clause, the exercise of which occa-
luim it Uamage."
S"The dYmi4i l federal right to improve navigable waters in
Siatetestm "of navigation "extends to the entire bed of a
.te.Mh. includes the lands below ordinary high-water V '

;-of any private property right in such: lands for which
i hus, detruc-
o, 4 j"paain. owner's landing by a navigation improvement
FWa damage mere lymcidental to exercise of te donant
servit ldean n. er n taking of private property for pi
31 U. S. at 528
iw S Se prM; p. 12.
SUnited StateVis OteMi ler-Dwnbar Co., 229 U.. 5 (1913); United States
v. Appalaolan Bleotrio Power Co., 311 U. S. 877 (1940), reh. den., 312 U. S.
712(41941) ;i Uniesd eats v. aommodore Park, Inc., 24 U.. 386 (1945);
United States v. Willow River& Miwr So., 824 U. S. 499 (1945). See also
4Ana' v.V UAfolwa, 298 U. S.:58, 509 (1936).
' U1Tted State s. Chicago, Af., St; P. P PR. (o., 312 U. S. 592, 507(1'9).
SSee also Leiua Biwe Point Oyeter 4o.. v; Brlggs, 2290 S8: a, 88 (1913);
, reenieaf JohS LuM&ber (.; v.rson, 237 U. S. 251, 263 (1915) ; Willink
v. United Sttea 240U. & 578 50('191). i







Stle f S ma;st be nidled Indeed,'"an owner
of land adjacent to navgae waters;- fast lands are left
i*nivad~e~k haos no peivate-riparian ,ght of awess" -for whbio
the. Gveunment nmusta oasensate whaen destroying that access
by an authorized change in the navigable waters."
jr~larly, riparan -. ,is of acc to 'aygab teSf to
do such things aa fighing and boating cannot, aagaint federal
control over ol~nee, be bought m4 sold., An bec1~
of the dominap ekri t igato ip e be4 of the water for
Every purpose w 4 in n ai tiop," destructin of

4 coWnuenable.7 ? deed fo u
' a to a strq p d pavigble water
'*:!l 'P_,irnrtlfyn "fto hxm n*.I lT., W1 avig Aaon.1 A
"taking" of property does not arjse from a requirement .for
alteration of a bridge obstqetpt:q Ayatiop." Even if the
obstruction be created witl .tb ,ggqa ion of a,state, th ,,r
retainwhe same Federal. p to .remove obstur
tp cQrnlmerce is "superior to that of ,te ; te o tod
-the welfare or necessities of their in bitants.'" ,
S ol dipg it "innei.vyable" tl t.; he ,; after. a
great navisabe aseawm is capable of private ownership," t4-
SGibso v. Unite Stat es, 166 U. S. !Igj (18t). See also crdato .;
Wheeler, 179 U. 8 141, 168-14 (1900> ; Sroctbis v. BaltIore 4 :9 .'0t4A
SpedF 9, 20 (4.a aD.N.J. 1887); Haokins Point Light-aHoe e Ose, ,$B eC
f7, 87-88 (0. C.-P. Md. 1889).
sited: lae s v..Oommodore Park, Ic., 324 U. 8. 886, 391 (194). The
odurt'iibi pointefl bt that the United States fiaP6ier to :lloo;inati*att6n
atonespoit -in order to-foster it at anatern. -9to S. at 804. C: United
States v. River Bpe Co., 269 U S. .411, 417-418 (S~ : f,, ..
24 U. S. at 391.
"Lewit Blue Point Oyster "B.J 2 S a U. 8. 82,~8 i191l. In this
couneaf -it W should be noted that Congress has recently provided -that
the C urt of Claims shall have jurisdiction to determine claitmaidoiagtes
to oyster growers upon private or leased lands. or bottoms, arising from
dredging operations in making river and harbor improvements. Act: of
June 26 1948, 1,2 Stat. 941, 28 U. S. C. 1497.
United States v. Ohicago, L., St. P.. & P.- Co., 812 U. 8.5W i,599 (1941).
Hmanibal Bridges 0 v.hUnited Stes,. 21 '. & 194, 206*2I 7 (1,11).
Of.tWeWt Chiptev Street R. B. Co. v. hicago, 201 UoiS. 506i 524 (1906). Li
;,,UMSiaoBridOB Co. t Urlted states. 294U: &3864011(18079 mi
lSanitary District v. United Bttft##eraot Bld.4BS, S h ) 22 A .7







pb rare Coqrt I. 19,3 hlds 4 tht- a governmental change-
primarily for benefitof nav~jation a n ipcideitaly for dyelop-
pea4tosf powe-n I the 4ow o9f tai, 4ay gab *-eam does not
require compensation to 'a riparxu p~ner for depriving, i
af the use of the stream for development of power.10,
However, where a federal navigation imprnmpnt n
aa s.ae stream results in the foodin of land in an
toa nSmm e truty stream, te owners o
along and under the bed of the nonnavigable stream are eftited
V3Wi ."eftB#.~n tor 3.= in.. ,L.- .ta fln, M"enm a-
'.io'i:ir.dired for the 1bs of power h t i
eg -av lB bv a reati e. in the 'l..
eu On the other hand, compensation
l ; be denied for a-reduction in power head caused by a fed-
et ~vigitioh dan raising the levil off navigable stream
o o'i telh-the private owner dops water 'from his dam built
dfifknuniavigable tributary.' The different in' results in
Slt W'sitddtions, according to a recent expldnatioiA by the
(tb6rt, is that the loss of power head in the forget ease was
deon at points beyond 6:the bed of' the naigable stream,
whereas in the latter it occurred within the, bed

Unied States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U. S. 58, 69, 78, 768- 1912)
te. la.sUnled Blates v. Willow River Power Oo., 324 U. S. 499, 508-090
(1945) ; Continental Land Co. v. United States, 88 F. 2d 104, 109-110 (.A. 9,
1). erik den, W80 U. 8. 715 (1987); Wa hington Water Power Co. v.
United States, 135 F. 2d 541, 543 (C. A. 9, 1943), oert. den.. 820 U. L 747
(Z"~S I t f. Grand River Dam AtoriWy v. Grand ,ydro, 835 U. S.
a ~ 94;J~ la.tiao oonectloe, seee refernces to, gielative action con-
,pag waters in the West, infra, pp. 35-50.
U G ,Pe M. Ur.qo 243 U. s. 81~ (1917). See also Bpwy Ford d
S ,t. r, c. aliY. -ii~~ a 2 U, ,8. 3800, 377 (1930);- ~iteA Satee
ra. 4.P. .o,, 312 U.,,f 5*2, 597 (1041); UpiteA States
SX9Pwa ZKve. esywer qopgi.A U. .49 504-507 (1945); Unied States
> 9F ( P44 A a r"-v. W#t49aqiger Power Co 24.. .49B, (1945W, See
-qp U*q;igtfet yv, .pa*-, .C Life Ine. Co,,,338 .U,S. 799, 805, 07.
"I0.afdid Pe v. .q'apitufift l, s. Co., 339 U. 8. 799, 807 (1950.
S But,.ae the vlpws of four dimaUtiag.JaptiAe advoca~ng oerruling of Upied
% tateV. Cress, 243 Ua. 81 (1917), ond saying that It W Wo Mbe tacquroua
to dRn..coqPpeasation to owners qdjass ut to navigpl rivers and reqpkre
it for others bordering their tributaries for like injuries caq~ lu IJe single






28
Having control over water power inherent in a navigabl(F
stream,' the United States "is liable to tno one for itsi7seii or
nonuse. The flow of'a navigable stream is in no sense private
property." 10 Hence, in building a dam in a navigable water,
the Federal Governmenit must "pay the fair value, judicially
determined, f6r the fast land; nothing for the water power." 107
Summarizing a number of the foregoing principles in-fs 1945
Willow River opinion, the supreme Court said: 108
Rights, property or otherwise, which are absolute
against all the world are certainly rare, and water rights
Share not among them. Whatever rights may be as be-
tween equals such as riparian owners, they are not the
measure of riparin rights on a navigable stream relative
to the function of-the Government in improving naviga-
tion. Where these interests conflict they are not to be
reconciled as between equals, but the private interest
must give way to a superior right, or perhaps it would be
more accurate to say that as against the Government
such private interest is not a right at all.
Denial of compensation for deprivation of riparian interests
in the foregoing cases has borne some relation to control of
act of lifting the river's mean level to the high-water mark." 339 U. S.
at 812, 815.
.m United States v. Appolaohian Electrio Power Co., 311 U. S. 877, 424
(1940), reh. den., 312 U. S. 712 (1941).
"311 U. .S at 427, citing Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States,
148 U. S. 312, 827 (1893) and United States v. Chlandler-Datnbar Co., 229
U. S. 53, 66, 76 (1913).
*' United Siates v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U. S. 499, 510 (1945). At
p. 502, the Court makes this exposition of the philosophy underlying the rule
as to compensation, "The fifth Amendment, which requires just compensa-
tioi when private property is taken for puliclese, undertakes to redistribute
certain economic losses inflicted by public improvements so that they will fall
upon the public rather than wholly upon those who happen to lie in the path
of the project. It does not undertake, however, to socialize all losses, but
those only which result from a taking of property. If damages from any
other cause are to be absorbed by the public, they must be assumed by act of
Congress and may not be awarded by the courts merely by implication from
the constitutional provision. But not all economic interests are
'property rights'; only tbose economic advantages are 'rights' whieh have
th~ law back of thAi m *." .;'







navigation.1? -: It remains undecided whether a different rule
musat be applied where such interests are damaged. in a valid
exercise by the United States of commerce authority not-reat-
ing to nayigation. It is never--teTessi s ed, asiwe have
aereiidyseen, that the exercise of commerce authority over
waters under the jurisdiction pf Congress iisnot limited to navi-
gation, but is as broad as the needs of commerce "
S'Finally, it should be noted that the .Stjme Curt has held
that, with respect to a validly aithorizedederal project, a state
cannot:"
:. call a halt to the exercise of the- eminent domain power
; of the federal government because the subsequent flood-
ing df the land taken will obliterate its boundary.' And
Sthe. suggestion that this, project inte;fere B :wi-th the
state's own program for water development and' conr
Sservation is likewise 6f no avail. That program must
lbw before the "superior power', 'f Congress.

Proprietary Power
Additional federal authority concerning water and land re-
sources stems from the Property Clause of the Constitution,
under which Congress has proprietary power: a
to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations
: respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to
the United States *
Tis: clause drew scant'comment in the Constitutional Con-
vention. Indeed; records of the Proceedings ofthe Convention
discise that no comparable provision was included in the draft
of the Plan of a Federal Constitution tendered to tfie CQonen-
tion byiCharles Pinckney of South Carolina.1" Toward the
ind of the Convention, however, the Property Clause was made

U See United States v. Gerk Aive Stock o., 889 U: S. 725,787 (19850).
"' SeeJivru-Mpp..22-St .See altontzfra, p. 47. -
mOlcaBoma v. Atkinson, 13 U. S. 508, 584-535 (1941).
U'. S. Cows,:, A. I J ,.!.el
u' 5 Elliot, DmETEs oN THE uam FUiCoNswTuToiN, 28-32 (rer. d:1845).




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