Title: The County's Duty To Maintain Roads
CITATION THUMBNAILS PAGE IMAGE ZOOMABLE
Full Citation
STANDARD VIEW MARC VIEW
Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/WL00003026/00001
 Material Information
Title: The County's Duty To Maintain Roads
Physical Description: Book
Language: English
Publisher: Frank E. Maloney, Attorney At Law
 Subjects
Spatial Coverage: North America -- United States of America -- Florida
 Notes
Abstract: Richard Hamann's Collection - The County's Duty To Maintain Roads
General Note: Box 12, Folder 5 ( Legal Ramifications of Implementation of the Interim Action Program in Golden Gate Estates, Collier County, Florida - 1979 ), Item 5The County's Duty To Maintain Roads
Funding: Digitized by the Legal Technology Institute in the Levin College of Law at the University of Florida.
 Record Information
Bibliographic ID: WL00003026
Volume ID: VID00001
Source Institution: Levin College of Law, University of Florida
Holding Location: Levin College of Law, University of Florida
Rights Management: All rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.

Full Text






V. THE COUNTY'S DUTY TO MAINTAIN ROADS


An examination of the applicable statutory authority is a necessary

preface. Florida Statutes, section 125.011 (1977) provides:

The legislative and governing body of a
county shall have the power to carry on
county government. To the extent not incon-
sistent with general or special law, this
power shall include, but shall not be restricted
to, the power to:

(m) provide and regulate arterial, toll, and other
roads, bridges, tunnels, and related facilities;
eliminate grade crossings; provide and regulate
parking facilities; and develop and enforce plans
for the control of traffic and parking.

Additionally, section 336.02 states:

The county commissioners are invested with the
general superintendence and control of the
county roads and structures within their respect-
ive counties and may establish new roads, change
and discontinue old roads, and keep the same in
good repair in the manner herein provided.

While the statutory language quoted above speaks in permissive

terms, a few cases have interpreted similar language to imply a duty of

maintenance by the county. In State ex. rel. Garrison v. County Com-

missioners of Putnam Co., 3 So. 164 (Fla. 1887) the plaintiff, an abutting

property owner, sought a writ of mandamus to compel the county to repair

a road which had been obstructed by the construction of a railway. The

county contended that responsibility for maintenance and repair rested

with the railroad company. In finding mandamus a proper remedy in this

situation, the Florida Supreme Court spoke broadly of the county commis-

sion's statutory "duty" to maintain county roads, and held that the duty

could not be relieved through delegation to the railroad. Later, in White

v. McGibbon, 84 So. 91 (Fla. 1920), the Court was asked to determine a


-50-








county's authority to purchase certain clay deposits as a source or road-

building materials. Within this context, the Court noted:

Under our statutes, the boards of county commis-
sioners are given plenary power and authority
over the location, building, repairing, and keep-
ing in order the public roads in their respective
counties, and it is made one of their continuous
duties so to locate, build, repair, and keep said
roads in good order. [emphasis added

However, given the circumstances of the case being decided, the quoted

statement may be regarded as mere dicta.

In the only other discoverable interpretation of the applicable

statutes, the Florida Attorney General was asked to determine a county

commission's authority to fix minimum construction standards for roads

built by private developers. Atty.Gen.Op. 057-292. The opinion looked

to the wording of Florida Statutes, section 125.01 (1955) and found that,

in view of the statutory powers and duties, reasonable minimum construction

standards could be required since,"it would seem that the county commission-

ers would have the ultimate duty of maintaining roads and streets built by

private individuals in subdivisions in the county, when such roads and

streets, as dedicated, have been accepted by the county." However, Florida

Statutes, section 125.01 has since been amended to eliminate the explicit

duty to repair and maintain county roads.

It must also be noted that under current law the county has the power

to abandon old roads. Fla. Stat. 336.02 (1977). In addition, Florida

Statutes, section 336.09(1).empowers county commissioners "in their own

discretion" to,

(a) vacate, abandon, discontinue and close any
existing public or private street, alleyway, road,
highway, or other place used for travel or any
portion thereof, other than a state or federal
highway, and to renounce and disclaim any right of
the county and the public in and to any land in
connection therewith.


-51-

--









This authorization extends to roads acquired by dedication, 336.09(1)(b),

and to those apparent on any map or plat as well, 336.09(1)(c).

In light of this authorization, it would seem that where a county

follows the proper procedure for vacation of highways, no action to

compel road maintenance could logically be sustained under the statute.

Thus, the County's liability for failure to maintain roads within its

jurisdiction is countered, if not completely obviated, by its concomitant

power of abandonment.

The more pressing problem concerns interference with the right of

property owners to have access to their property. It probably does not

matter whether access is lost because the County fails to maintain roads

or affirmatively abandons them. The legal question in either case would

be whether the County has unconstitutionally taken the right of access.


Liability for Blocking Access

County Commissioners have been deemed to possess a "wide latitude of

discretion" in the exercise of the power to abandon roads. Wedner v.

Escambia Chemical Corp., 102 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1958); Central

and Southern Florida Flood Control District v. Scott, 169 So. 2d 368

(Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1964). However, where the abandonment of a highway inter-

feres with a property owner's right of access, it might constitute a

taking of property for which compensation must be paid. See generally,

Nichols, Law of Eminent Domain, 6.32; 26 Am. Jur. 2d 199.

r Early decisions in Florida concerning the question of access arose

from changes in the grade or elevation of streets relative to private

property. In Selden v. City of Jacksonville, 10 So. 457 (Fla. 1891), the

City had apparently built an overpass over some railroad tracks. As a


'52-


-I




~1


result, the access of adjoining landowners was completely blocked unless

they built, at their own expense, a way up to the level of the new road.

Id. at 465. Despite this substantial impairment of the plaintiff's

existing access, the court held there was no taking. It stated that

although landowners have a "right of egress and ingress from and to the

lot by way of the street," it is "subordinate to the right of the state

... to alter the grade or otherwise improve the streets for street pur-

poses." Id. at 459. See also, Bowden v. City of Jacksonville, 42 So.

394 (Fla. 1906)(existing grade of viaduct raised 18 inches above entrance

to plaintiff's building).

Subsequent cases have emphasized the necessity of providing access

to limited access highways or paying compensation. In Fleming v. State

Road Dept., 25 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 1946), for example, the plaintiff sought

a mandatory injunction to compel the defendant to "construct and maintain

several turnouts and connections between abutting ends of certain platted

and improved streets ... and the hard surfaced highway." Id. at 374.

Holding the complaint wastoo vague to state a cause of action, the court

nevertheless allowed it to be amended and stated that the public authority

may not destroy or materially abridge the abutting owner's ingress and

egress where it is shown to be reasonably necessary and where the owner's

right of access Is not affected by the condemnation or other proceedings

used to acquire the right of way. Id. at 375.

In the case of Weir v. Palm Beach County, 85 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 1956),

however, compensation was denied an owner of commercial property whose

access, except for a "circuitous route," was blocked by construction of

a retaining wall. Id. at 866.

The owner of property abutting a public way has a right



-53-

L








of Ingress to and egress from his property as well
as a right to enjoy the view therefrom. However,
these are rights which are subordinate to the under-
lying right of the public to enjoy the public way to
its fullest extent as well as the right of the public
to have the way improved to meet the demands of
public convenience and necessity. If the improve-
ment for the benefit of the public interferes with
the pre-existing means of ingress and egress and
view enjoyed by the individual property owner, with-
out an actual physical invasion of the land of the
property owner, then again we have a situation where
the individual right is subordinate to the public
good and any alleged damage suffered is damnum absque
injuria. This is so for the simple reason that one
who acquires property abutting a public way acquires
it subject and subordinate to the right of the public
to have the way improved to meet the public need.
Id. at 868-869.

A contrary result was reached in Anhoco v. Florida State Turnpike

Authority, 116 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1959). The plaintiff owned an outdoor

theater which fronted on a public road. The state then constructed an

expressway, blocking the former routes of entrance and exit. Access

still existed "via secondary roads running at right angles to the high-

way in question." Id. 14. The court summarily distinguished the case

from Weir, however, stating that access had been "destroyed" rather than

"regulated" as In Weir. Id.

The case of Pinellas County v. Austin, 323 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 2d D.C.A.

1975), involved the vacation of a road by a county. The plaintiffs lived

on a five acre tract with primary access via a platted dirt road. Other

property owners whose land adjoined the road petitioned the county to

abandon it. The county did so and the plaintiffs sued, claiming that a

taking of their right of access had occurred. Although another access

route over an old wooden bridge remained, it was not suitable for use by

heavy vehicular traffic. The court therefore held that access had been

so impaired as to constitute a taking. Id. at 9.


-54-


Y








The facts of Austin and Anhoco seem distinguishable from those of

Golden Gate Estates on several points. First, a much greater need for

access was shown in the two former cases. In one case, a drive-in

theater was served by the road and In the other a residence. Most of the

roads in Golden Gate Estates, on the other hand, lead to vacant, often

unusable swamplots. Second, there is no consideration of the expense of

maintaining access in any of the decided cases. The enormous waste of

public funds that would be necessary to maintain access roads in Golden

Gate Estates distinguishes that situation from the facts of Anhoco and

Fleming. Third, the ecological disruptions and environmental harm caused

by the present road system in Golden Gate Estates is a significant factor

that apparently was not present in the other cases.

Although the courts have been extremely protective of access rights,

they may be responsive to the distinguishing factors in Golden Gate Estates.

Clearly access could not be completely blocked without payment of compen-

sation. It may be possible, however, to block some of the roads, so long

as access is available over other more circuitous routes. The total length

of roads and thus the expense of maintaining them might thus be lessened.

It may also be possible to downgrade the quality of the roads so that access

would be available only in four wheel drive vehicles. It could then be

argued that access had not been destroyed, but had merely been made less

convenient, as necessitated by the circumstances. Since the right of

access is a property right, it should be subject to some degree of diminu-

ation when necessary to protect the public health, safety and welfare.

See, e.g., Travis v. DOT, 333 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1976).


Creation of a Special Road District

If the County decides to maintain the roads in Golden Gate Estates,


-55-


I _


i_ 1









it may wish to establish a special road district to pay the costs of

doing so. Sections 336.61 .66, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1979) provide

for the establishment of such a district. The practical obstacles to

establishment of such a district in Golden Gate Estates, however, are

probably insurmountable. First, a petition requesting establishment

and signed by persons representing 25 per cent of the votes in the pro-

posed district must be submitted to the County Commission. Each lot

and each resident has one vote. The County Commission is then charged

with the responsibility of holding an election in the proposed district.

For the district to be created, 75 per cent of the eligible votes in the

district must be cast in favor of creation. A district created in this

manner is then empowered to issue bonds and levy special assessments to

pay for the construction and maintenance of roads. The possibility of

such an outcome seems remote at best in Golden Gate Estates.





























-56-


L____________




University of Florida Home Page
© 2004 - 2010 University of Florida George A. Smathers Libraries.
All rights reserved.

Acceptable Use, Copyright, and Disclaimer Statement
Last updated October 10, 2010 - - mvs