Title: Memorandum of Law: Water Rights, Consumptive Use of Spring Flow
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Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/WL00002262/00001
 Material Information
Title: Memorandum of Law: Water Rights, Consumptive Use of Spring Flow
Physical Description: Book
Language: English
Spatial Coverage: North America -- United States of America -- Florida
Abstract: Memorandum of Law: Water Rights, Consumptive Use of Spring Flow
General Note: Box 10, Folder 12 ( SF Water Rights-Water Crop - 1973, 1976-77 ), Item 26
Funding: Digitized by the Legal Technology Institute in the Levin College of Law at the University of Florida.
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Bibliographic ID: WL00002262
Volume ID: VID00001
Source Institution: Levin College of Law, University of Florida
Holding Location: Levin College of Law, University of Florida
Rights Management: All rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.

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Prepared by: LMB

FACTS: Our client owns a large tract of land through

which a creek flows. Contained entirely upon our client's land

are three springs. In their natural state the water from these

springs flows through small creeks into the creek flowing through

our client's property. The entire flow way of water from each of

these springs to the point where it joins the main creek is

contained within contiguous. property owned by our client. For

many years, our client has pumped water flowing from one of these

springs through a pipeline to an industrial plant owned and

operated by the client at another location. Our client now

*desires, and is now installing, pipelines which will tie in

the other two springs with the spring from which water is already

.being pumped,. An individual owning property below our client's

property and through which the creek flows has notified our.

client that he has knowledge of their plans to take water from

these other two springs and that any reduction in the flow of

water through this creek and through his property will result

in damage to him. This lower property owner does not use the

water from this creek for any purpose.

QUESTION: What is the principle of law governing such

water rights?


Two years ago the Third District Court of Appeals

considered certain general principles of law governing water

rights and, in affirming the trial court, held that the Chancellor's

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conclusions of law, based upon his findings of fact, had not

been demonstrated to have been in error and, therefore, his

conclusions were approved. Lamb v Dade County, 159 So. 2d 477.

In the Lamb case, the District Court sets forth a portion of
the Chancellor's findings verbatim, including the Rilowing:

"It is universally held as a general
principle of law of waters governing
water courses that the proprietor below
has the right to receive from the
proprietor above the usual flow of water
substantially undiminished in quantity
and that the upper proprietor has no right
unreasonably to interrupt or obstruct the
natural flow of water to the injury of the
lower proprietor. Tampa Water Works
C nmpany v Cline, 37 Fla. 586, 20 0o. 2d 780
33 L.R.A. 37b; and 56 Am. Jur. Waters, 1324.
The ownership of the canal channel or water
course through which the water flows does not
of itself vest the owner with the legal
right to obstruct or cut off the flow of
water unreasonably. In this instance, the
Public Health and Welfare require that the
natural flow of water should not be
unnecessarily stopped or obstructed, partiou-
larly since the canal has served as an
integral part of the primary water control
system of the county for more than the
prescriptive period of twenty years." ID. at
The Iepa Water Works case cited above, even though
decided seventy years ago, appears to still be the controlling

case in this area. This case is very lengthy and involves a

utespute over tae rights to water flowing into Magbee Springs in

lfllsborough kCaonty. This spring had previously been used for

many years as an abundant supply of good water. Tampa Water

Works Company -hd a contract with the City of Tampa to furnish
the'city with water for fire, sanitary and domestic purposes.

%he water iasulng from this natural spring is supplied by a

well-marked and defined subterranean stream. The defendants

in the action owned the property immediately above the spring
property and had excavated a large hole which penetrated the

water of the subterranean stream flowing into the spring. The
Water Works Company alleged that this activity would cause the


(%* n^ i

water of the spring to become polluted and totally worthless'

for the purposes for which the water works company had
purchased the land.

For purposes of this memorandum, the Ohio classification
of water as used in the Tampa Water Works case is omitted.

The subterranean flow of water in a permanent, distinct and

well-defined channel may be treated the same as surface streams

which flow in permanent, distinct and well-defined channels.

The Tampa Water-Works case holds that the owner of the
land above, through which water flows, may not divert-or destroy

it, to the injury of the person below, but the riparian rights

to the ordinary use of water flowing past land extend to the

supplying of natural wants, including the use of the water for
domestic purposes of home or farm, such as for drinking, washing

and cooking or for stock of the proprietor. Many authorities

state that if necessaryy for the purposes mentioned, all the water

of the stream may be so consumed. The Court pointed out that there

are other uses, than those mentioned, to which flowing water in

well-defined and distinct channels may be applied, but the

disposition of the Tampa Water Works case dil -not require a

further statemast as to the rights of adjoining proprietora

to such running surface water.

The Court did hold that the upper owner may open p a
water supply on his own land if done in such anne.r that it does

not interfere with the legal rights of adjoining owners. He may

also make a reasonable application of the water. In this case

it was not contended that the upper owner would divert sufficientt

quantities-of water to the damage of the water works company but,

in concluding, the Court held that, while; the upper owner may make

legitimate use of his own property as he pleases, he must do soa

in a manner not to divert or pollute the stream of water flowing

through his property.

I 1 1 k I U_ I;I


Labruzzo v Atlantic Dredging and Construction Company,

54 So. 2d 673 (Fla., 1951) does not deal with a problem involving
a proprietary competition over the water itself but the dicta and

legal principles laid down are of interest to this memorandum.

The Court, relying on non-Florida cases, states:

".. the present trend among the Courts
of this country is away from the old common
law rule of unqualified and absolute right
of a landowner to intercept and draw from
his land the percolating waters therein;
and the later cases hold that the right of
a landowner to subterranean waters percolating
through his own and his neighbor's land is
limited to a reasonable and beneficial use of
such water." ID. at 675.

In 1956 the Supreme Court of Florida dealt with a
problem presented by development of the Mecca Well Field

by the Board ofCounty Commissioners of Pinellas County. The

unsuccessful -plaintiff in Chancery owned 2,600 contiguous acres

of land which he claimed would become a desert waste if the county

were not restrained from pumping daily three million gallons

(3,000,000) of percolating water from wells situated nearby
on a small tzwet of land of less than four acres. The Chancellor

dismissed the complaint and on appeal the Supreme Court reversed

the decree with directions to reinstate the complaint and to

proceed from that point. Koch v Wick, 87 So. 2d 47. In dicta,

ite Court accepted the pronouncement in the Labruzzo oese that

American courts have receded from the old common law Tual that

an owner had an unrestricted right to draw percolating water

from his land, explaining that this right is bounded by

reasonableness and beneficial use of the land. In the Koch

case, the Court refused to consider the matter of extracting the

water for the beneficial use of the land and would only consider

the question of whether or not the extraction of so much water

was reasonable, stating: "We think that in the face of the

pleadings, the appellant should have been given the opportunity


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of producing evidence to substantiate his charge that it was not."
After exhaustive research in an attempt to find controlling

statutory or case law governing the use of water flowing from a
spring, it becomes all too apparent that the good Dean Frank E.

Maloney and Professor Sheldon J. Plager, in their infinite

wisdom may have included an understatement in their learned

treatise on water rights when they state:
"The state of development of the Florida
Law insofar as withdrawals for consumptive
uses are concerned is not too clear."10
U.Fla.L. Rev. 294, 305.

A portion of this Law Review article warrants verbatim

inclusion herein and a xerox copy is attached and marked -

,.Appendix '"A".
Dean Maloney authored an earlier article in the

ssae Jlaw Review entitled "Florida's New Water Resources aw',

10 U. '3a. L. -ev. 119, in which he compares the riparian
doctrine to fhe prior appropriation system devdoped in the West

to provide the earlier goldminers with large quantities of water.
!be riparian doctrine was adopted from the common law of-England

and provided that the lower riparian owner was entitled *o
wsubitantially the full flow of a water course on which he has

riparian rights. Dean Maloney explains that this means that an

pper riparian awner may not alter the natural flow of the water

course except to make use of the water'for purely domestic purposes.

This has been modified in many eastern jurisdictions by what is

known as the "reasonable use" doctrine under which the lower owner

ls entitled to protection only when diversion by an upper owner
unreasonably interferes with his use of the water. This permits

full use of the available water supply, allowing each riparian
owner to make beneficial use of the water for any purpose to the

extent that his use does not-unreasonably interfere with beneficial

uses of others. While this position has not been spelled ~ut in
recent case law by the Florida courts, it appears to be the

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position that one might expect the Florida courts to take
today. No Florida cases could be located which deal with a
similar factual situation.
It has been stated that where a stream,created by a

spring, flows in a natural channel across the lands of several
persons, the owner of the land on which the spring is has only
the usual rights of a riparian owner; but a spring not constituting
the source of a water course belongs to the owner of the land.

93 C.J.S. Waters, 91. The editors explain that the owner of
the land may improve and enlarge the spring or may sell the
water or grant the right to draw from the spring but this is

subject to the rights of the riparian owners. The lower riparian
owner, while entitled to have the water flow in its course through
-his land and to use the water subject to the rights of riparian
pproprietars below him, is not entitled to tap the spring with

a pipe .ant its source. The owner of land on which a spring is
situated is entitled to any increase in the flow of the spring

resulting from its being enlarged by him.
The am~er resources law was adopted by the Florida

legislature .in 1957 and subsequently amended to its present
form is set forth in Sections 373.071 through 373.241, Florida

Statutes. Saction 373.101 provides:
"Ite purposes of this law are to implement
the declared water policy of this State
by effecting the maximum beneficial
utilitization, development and conservation
of the water resources of the State in the
best interest of all its people and to
prevent the waste and unreasonable use
of said resources; however, the present
property rights of persons owning land and
exercising existing water rights appertaining
thereto shall be respected and such rights
shall not be restricted without due process
of law nor divested without payment of just
compensation; and there shall be no authorization
to divert water from springs (or downstream
therefrom), now developed and operating for
recreational purposes or as tourist attractions,
to a degree that will materially interfere with
such use."(Emphasis added.)


l~i J;,, i L I J 1, a III
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The preceding section was contained in Section 4 of
Chapter 57-380, Laws of Florida. In 1963, the Legislature
adopted a new declaration of policy w;*.ch is set forth in

Section 373.072. Sub-paragraph (3) provides that' "The
changing wants and constantly increasing need of the people
of the State may require the water resources of the State
to be put to beneficial uses to the extent of which they
are most reasonably capable and therefore the waste and un-
reasonable use of water should be prevented and the conservation
of water should be accomplihed." Sub-paragraph (6) provides that
the 1963 Declarations of Policy shall not be construed to amend
or modify the purposes set forth in Section 373.101 which was
adopted in 1957.

This water resources law deals primarily with the
collecting and storing of excess water and the establishment
of water management districts. It gives little guidance to
the consumptive use of water.

It seems apparent that presently in Florida under the
reasonable use concept, a landowner is permi-tted to mai e a

use of the w-mers to which he has access which s reasonable in
relation% to other uses being made of the same supply of water.
Since both springs are located :etirely -on our allat'.s
property and tbe flow therefrom Xios the creek flowing through
the property at Junction points entirely upon our client's
property, it would appear reasonable that this water be used for
industrial purposes. However, if this would o materially diminish
the flow of the creek where it leaves the client's property
the lower riparian owners may have sufficient grounds to restrain
our client from diverting the entire flow from these springs. In
this case, the burden would be on the lower property owner to show
that our client's use of the water was unreasonable in relation
to other uses being made of the water. This position is not

substantiated by clear and concise case law but it appears that
a reasonable argument along these lines could be expected to prevail.













ing power to acquire. by eminent domain proceedings, land on the
opposite side against which his dam will abut. The act also provides
for the acquisition of surrounding lands that would be overflowed
by the erection of the dam. It has been held that statutory author.
nation for the construction of such dams does not prevent or limit
liability for injury resulting therefrom.' The Mill Acts concern
themselves solely with construction of 4da ts for water power pur-
poses; there are no specific provisions dealing with construction of
dams for irrigation, industrial, or similar uses. In 1957 the Florida
.Legislature enacted a bill which permits the Trustees of the Internal
Improvement Fund to authorize riparian owners to "construct, main.
tain and operate structures and facilities on, in and under the bed
of any navigable stream ... for the purpose of providing water of
a suitable quality for industrial, domestic or other use."" Although
the act does not provide condemnation powers, and does not mentibn
dams specifically, a broad interpretation might find dam construction
within the scope of the statute.
In periods of drought, such as the state recently experienced, the
problem is not one of inundation but of deprivation. Studies indicate
that impounding of water, for irrigation or other purposes, by dam.
ming has resulted in loss by downstream owners of their source of
water. In a number of instances this has meant inadequate water
supply for irrigation" and watering of stock,? and in some extreme
cases total drying up of the lower stream bed with the accompanying
loss of water for any purpose.** If this type of activity is deemed an
unreasonable .use, injunctive relief may be available to the injured
lower owner, although the equitable remedy may be refused on the
balance of convenience doctrine."

Consumplilv Uss
Florida's water law has generally deve opcd within the confines

4Sce Hcaley v. Citizens Gas and Elec. Co., 199 Iowa 82, 201 N.W. 118 (1924);
cf. Florida Power Co. v. Cason, 79 Fla. 619, 84 So. 921 (1920).
eFla. Laws 1957, c. 57-325.'
a*1956 REPoRT, supra note 27, at 1, I.AA.4. (Alachua County); id. at 15, IIA.4.
(Columbia County).
"td. at 80. III.A.. (Union County); id. as I, IIIA.4. (C!lsslt Cmunty).
"sd. at 80. IIIA.4. (Union County); id. at 83. IU.A.4. (Walta Couatr; id.
at 78. II.A.4. (Suwannec County).
sSceeMaloncy, The Balance of Convenience Doctrine in the Southe aer States,
Particularly s Applied to Water, 5 S.C.LQ. 159. 167 (1852).




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of the riparian system. The earliest cases put primary emphasis on
the right of riparian owners to have the water flow to them in its
normal course, undiminished in quantity or qualityP The only
uses sanctioned were for domestic and household purposes, including
the watering of farm anijnal, and these uses were generally referred
tp as natural" s, s distinguished from "artificial" uses such as ir-
rigation and manufacturing. As a general rule a riparian owner was
permitted to use such water as was necessary for his natural uses re-
gar4les of the efect on other owners.
As means of electively utilizing water increased, emphasis shifted
to the right of riparian owners to make reasonable uses of the water
for artificial purposes as it flowed by their property; what was rea-
sonable depended on the uses being made by other riparians who had
an equal right to use the water. In some states there is a recent trend
toward de-emphasizing this distinction between natural and artificial
uses and recognizing is riparian owners a common or correlative -
right in a stream, with each owner being entitled to make such natural
or artificial use of the water as is reasonable under the circumstances,
taking into consideration all the uses of other riparian owners." Al.
though this change in conceptual approach itself provides no an.
swers, it perhaps makes the machinery for solution more flexible.
The state of development of the Florida law in so fir as with-
drawals for consumptive uses are concerned is not too clear. In one
early case in which the primary consideration was the pollution of an
"underground stream" then being used as a source of water supply
by the City of Tamspa, the Supreme Court of Florida restated the
riparian rule with the reasonable use modification." The Court did
not indicate, however, the extent to which diversion for so-called
artificial uses such a; irrigation or manufacturing might be permitted
and, since the case was a pollution cae, it did not in any event es-

"See generally Maloney, Florida's New Water Resources Law, 10 U. FI. L
REv. 125. 128 n.40 (1957).
"See discussion in Marquis. Freeman and Heath, The Movement for New
Water Rights Laws in the Tennessee Valley States, 23 TsENN. L Rev. 797. 807
rTampa Waterworks v. Cline, 37 Fla. 586, 5S, 20 So. 780, 782 (1896). The
Coat I aid: "T7e righa te (qh b.eng td and advanta of the water lowing past one
owner's land is sutjec t ae similar rights of aJ pyoprieton on the banks of the
stream to the reasonable enjonta~ of a natural bouilty, and It is therefore only
for aa unauthorlatd and unreasonable We ef a common benefit that any one has
just cause to company."








SLiblish a binding precedent concerning consumptive use. The decision in most areas the surce streams carry more than enough water for
indicates, however, that when the problem is squarely presented to irrigation of immediately adjacent land, the broad definition of ri-
*;I the Court it will probably ado t ., ronabl aspct of the parian land, or at least a definition that would allow the use of the
I C \riparian doctrine Tpermi aiversions iat do not unreasonably. water on a reasonable amount of adjacent land, would be preferable.
I 'i Iinterfere with use by other riparian owners. T a certain extent the 1957 Florida Legislature alleviated this
:t Assuming the application of the reasonable use doctrine to the aspect of the olm. The Water sources Law enacted in that
Si : normal flow of Florida's watercourses, two problems arise: Is a ri. year" psrides mackhiery et a riparian owner to conduct the
1 parian owner entitled to use water for artificial uses only on his ri. water trom a watierumr for use beyond the boundaries of his ri-
: 1 parian land, or is he entitled to conduct the water to lands not ripar. parian holdings. The authority for granting such diversions ias
: ian; and in periods of shortage to what extent will the law recogize vested in sth state Board of Conservation and is subject to specified
I priorities for use among domestic, agricultural, and industrial users limitations.'* Thus by obtaining permission for specific diversions,
i Under strict riparian doctrine it is unlawful to divert water for the riparian owner can obviate the necessity for determining the ex-
Suse on nonriparian land; riparian owners are not excepted." -. ent o his riparian laad. Further clarification of the-depthk f pariian
: .- thoug-there is -an--abundance of statute idr case law concerning land might nevertheless be desirable.
; aFlorida's riparian lands, the statutes and cases are primarily con- The second problem, that of priorities of use among domestic, .
C cerned with techniques for acquiring title to land in and around agricultural, and industrial users in times of drought, is by no means
f natural watercourses rather than the inland limits to which a ri. academic; conflicts or potential conflicts exist today in a number of
I : *parian owner's rights extend. Several approach to this problem Florida communities." There is legislation in Floridi giving mu./ I
:i .have been developed in jurisdictions in which a shortage of.,water nicipaities a degree of preference." This legislation was not enacted
SI I for irrigation exists. Since many of these jurisdictions follow.ihe i.- for the purpose of establishing priorities, however, but to allow mu-
S 1 parian doctrine, the inland extent of riparian land assumes con. nicipalities the right to take necessary water through eminent do-
j. siderable importance. Use of water for irrigation may be severely main proceedings. There is a complete absence of case law on priori1-
limited by restricting riparian land to the smallest tract held under ties among users during dry periods, or indeed even during periods
|' f one title in the chain of titles leading to the present owner." Under of normal fow. In this area Kentucky has taken the lead in legisla-
S1 this rule a parcel of land detached from a riparian tract and no tie clarification. Legislation similar to that in Kentucky, establish.
longer touching the stream loses its riparian status; on the other ing a priority for domestic purposes, which in that jurisdiction is de-
SI hand, inland additions to a riparian tract cannot be made riparian find to include "water for household purposes, drinking water for
i" by coming under the ownership of the owner of the land lying e. livestock, pputtry and 'domstic animals" might be advisable. If this
Sa tween the newly acquired land and the stream." A broader approach legislation j 4C e sita4 in Florida, "domestic animals" should per-
| a.would entitle an owner of land contiguous to a stream to riparian h*ps he defined in iuch a way as to prevent the possibility of the
f rights in all of the land without regard to its extent ai froma whom
title was acquired." Some jurisdictions hae adopted this broader ..-" 19 .. (I)( ().
Approach with the limitation that the land be confined to kth water- .Law195, s o. t 4.
watralon supra note 55. at 141. 144.
{ i f shed of the stream involved." It would seem that in Florida, where 95`6 Itro., supr note 27, at 28. II.A.4. (Gadsden County); 195t Ruoar.
Iup'| sa note 27, IIIA.4., problems I (Alachua County). 2 (Bradford County). 4
e I nSce 1 KINtEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW or IR=ICATRON 11516.17 (2d ed. 1912). (Charlotte County). 5 (Clay County), 15 (Nassau County), 19 (Sumter County)
L See also sMalony. supra note 55, at 131. (agricultural.domestic); id. problem 4 (Charlotte County) (agricultural.municipal):
SSee Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail. 11 Cal.2d 501. 81 P.2d 533 (1938). Id. proPlewt II (Holmes County) (donaestic-manufacturin): id. problem 14 (Marion
SI | yoYearley v. Cater. 149 Wash. 285. 270 Pac. 5i (1928). -i) a rs- tl-)"
I < u ) See Jones v. Conn, S9 Ore. 30. 64 Pac. 0, rerh4ing denied, 39 pOr. 46. 65 fl F4. r. llU 9 ~5-). I i(.6, (Qj).
'i Pac. 106S 1901). 9Sce iV. 5r. SY. 5 4 I ( ((tSS9) Thls is a section of the Kentucky
I ,Clark v. Allaman. 71 Kan. 206. 80 Pac. 571 (105). Water Conservtlion law of 1054. See Mateisq, suprA note 55. at 132.

||" |-' *. Y -i

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owner of a large herd of commercial feeder cattle using the flow of
a stream to the extent that he deprives those downstream of water
for household purposes.

Rights of the Public

As stated in the Ferry Pass case, the public has the right to use
water in a navigable watercourse for navigation, fishing, and similar
.nonconsumptive uses. In addition, the public has the right to use
of the riparian land between the high and low water marks. On this
basis a riparian owner in 1909 was denied an injunction by which
he sought to prevent a stranger, engaged in the logging business, from
using the shore in front of the owner's riparian holdings for the
purpose of inspecting and working on the stranger's logs. The Court
indicated that the plaintiff could have relief from a denial of access
to the water, but that he did not have an exclusive right to the use
of either the waters or the shore adjacent to his riparian holding."
Moreover, if a street runs to a navigable stream, the shore and sub.
merged lands at the end of the street apparently belong to the
public rather than to the owner of the fee in the street, and members
of the public have the right of free access to the stream.*
Prior to 1957 a limited right to consumptive use by the public
had been recognized. In 1927, in Tilden p. Smith,7 the Supreme
Court of Florida indicated that flood water from streams that 4 of
no substantial benefit to a riparian owner "may be appropriated
by any person who can lawfully gain access to the stream, and may
be conducted to land not riparian, and even beyond the watershed
of the stream, without the consent of the riparia owner, and without
compensation to him." The General Assembly of Kentucky in 1954
enacted legislation to provide similar guarantees as to surplus water
in periods of heavy flow. An irrigator, in some cases, may acquire a
reasonably reliable supply from this source, and in fact in Kentucky
about half of the irrigators use this method of acquiring and storing
irrigation water." Similarly the Central and Southern Florida Flood
Control District is planning to collect and store excess flood waters,

"Ferry Pass Inspectors' and Shippers' Ass'n v. Whites River Inspectors' and
Shippers Ass'n. 57 Fla. 0S, 48 So. 643 1(31).
"Celger v. Filor. 8 Fla. 825, 3oa (1859) (dictum); cf. Brickl v. Fort Lauderdale.
75 Fla. 22.78 So. 681 (1918).
1"94 Fla.. 50,. ItS So. 708. 711 (17) (dictumn hs on a Californqa case).


and these waters will then become available to irrigators in the Lake
Okeechobee area of the district." The state will thus benefit by the
potential increase in the area under cultivation.
The 1957 Flprida Water Resources Law'' expands the dictum in
(he Tilden case and provi4cs statutory authorization for the capture,
storage, and use of ll water in eiaga of existing reasonable uses and,
as noted above, for diversion of such waters beyond riparian or over-
lying land.
Federal legislation authorizing federal-state flood control projects
provides for sale of surplus waters collected in federally maintained
and operated reservoirs.' The Secretary of the Army may sell the
water in these reservtirs "at such prices and on such terms as he may
deem reasonable."' The legislation authorizing the sales contains a
provision that contracts for the water shall not adversely affect exist-
ing lawful uses of the water, a provision that would "protect irri.
gators who were already operating in an area when a i ood control
project went into operation.


The State Test

The entire structure of riparian rights, and the attendant rights
of the public, depends on a determination that the natural water-
course involved is navigable. Since these rights are common law
rights, the determination will be governed by state law.
The Legislature p Florida has not seen fit to define "navigable"
or to ClaraGcre navigable stream, but Florida cases dating back
tp 1889 have established judicial criteria.' In the early case of Bucki
v, Cone," involvipg injury to a bridge on the Suwannee River near
White Springs, she Flqrida Court, after pointing out that at common
law tidal streams were regarded as navigable, went on to say: *

"[I]n this country all rivers, without regard to the ebb and


(Public Adm'n Clearing Scrv. Studies in Public Adm'n, No. 9, 1933).
tFla. Laws 1957. c. 57-380, 18 (1) (a).
?8 SSTAT. 890 (1944). 33 U.S.C. 1708 (1946).

TrsI Hunt. iipaarin Paihts in fa1frid, 8 U. FA. L. REv. 393, $94 (1955).
"2 a. la. 1. s. S. I6N, 1( i (1 9 'g



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