Silence in Police Interviews


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Silence in Police Interviews an Analysis of Structure and Power
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Howard, Sarah E
University of Florida
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University of Florida
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interview -- police -- power -- silence -- speech-act -- transcription -- turn-structure -- voice
Linguistics -- Dissertations, Academic -- UF
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This work argues that while many believe silence to be empty and meaningless, it can function as a responsorial indirect speech act. It claims that this misunderstanding of the phenomenon is what creates the difficulties surrounding silence in the U.S. legal system. By applying Searle's (1969, 1975) theory of direct and indirect speech acts, we establish conversational silence as a response. This work applies our concept of silence to police interviews and examines the role of silence by first applying the data to Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson's (1974) model of turn structure. This provides evidence to silence functioning as a response and suggests modifying the model to include conversational silence as it better represents all participants in the exchange. Next we examine how this theory and model affect our understanding of issues of voice and power in police interviews. This work shows that effective use of silence actually empowers the suspect during the evidentiary police interview in addition to shielding them from coercion.
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by Sarah E Howard.
Thesis (M.A.)--University of Florida, 2014.

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2 2014 Sarah Howard


3 To my sister, a true master of silence


4 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This project owes a great deal of thanks to the Honorable Heather Higbee, who guided me in more ways that I could possibly count and played a huge role in this project coming to fruition. Likewise, I also hugely appreciate the help of the S office of Director R. Wallsh and Ms. Noel Piros. Thank you for working with me so tirelessly. I would also like to thank Dr. Galia Hatav, who provided the inspiration for all of this, as well as Dr. Diana Boxer and Dr. Fiona Mc Laughlin who provided continuous inspiration and guided me through the writing process. I appreciate everyone who helped me along on this project, and I hope you enjoy the fruit of all of our labors.


5 TABLE OF CONTENTS page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 4 ABSTRACT ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................... 6 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 7 2 SILE NCE AND THE UNITED STATES LEGAL SYSTEM ................................ ...... 10 3 METHODOLOGY ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 14 4 SILENCE AND SPEECH ACTS ................................ ................................ .............. 18 Se ................................ ................................ ................... 22 Indirect Speech Acts ................................ ................................ ............................... 24 Discussion ................................ ................................ ................................ .............. 29 5 SILENCE AND TURN STRUCTURE ................................ ................................ ...... 32 6 SILENCE, VOICE, AND POWER ................................ ................................ ........... 46 7 CONCLUSION ................................ ................................ ................................ ........ 57 Limitations ................................ ................................ ................................ ............... 58 Future Research ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 59 APPENDIX: I NTERVIEWS ................................ ................................ ........................... 60 Interview 1 ................................ ................................ ................................ .............. 60 Interview 2 ................................ ................................ ................................ .............. 64 Interview 3 ................................ ................................ ................................ .............. 72 REFERENCES ................................ ................................ ................................ .............. 82 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ................................ ................................ ............................ 85


6 Abstract of Thesis Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requ irements for the Master of Arts SILENCE IN POLICE INTERVIEWS: AN ANALYSIS OF STRUCTURE AND POWER By Sarah Howard May 2014 Chair: Diana Boxer Major: Linguistics This work argues that while many believe silence to be empty and meaningless, it can function as a responsorial indirect speech act. It claims that this misunderstanding of the phenomenon is what creates the difficulties surrounding silence in the U.S. legal establish conversational silence as a response. This work applies our concept of silence to police interviews and examines the role of silence by first applying the data to Sacks, silence functioning as a response and sugge sts modifying the model to include conversational silence as it better represents all participants in the exchange. Next we examine how this theory and model affect our understanding of issues of voice and power in police interviews. This work shows that e ffective use of silence actually empowers the suspect during the evidentiary police interview in addition to shielding them from coercion.


7 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Typically, we do not consider silence to be part of a conversation, or at least not part of a comfortable and felicitous conversation. This is generally due to associating conversation with words, sounds (or a representation of those word and sounds, such as Sign), and meaning. During an exchange, meaning is the most important aspect as any production of sounds or sound patterns that lack meaning is considered separate from the concept of Language and by extension, conversation. Silence, on the other hand, is frequently paired with quiet and with nothingness. It has even been described as a void, an empty conversational space that lacks any outward appearance of meaning (Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson; 1974; Bilmes, 1994; Kurzon, 1995, 1998, 2007). However, if we examine silence more meticulously, we will see that it, in fact, functions consistently as a response. To illustrate this, I will be focusing on the dialogue found in police interviews. The police interview is a very important part of the legal pr ocess, in that what a person says, or does not say, during the interview can change the course of the rest of their lives. This exchange has an immensely high level of importance to at least one of its participants and yet is structured similarly to a dail y, casual conversation. This juxtaposition allows us to analyze aspects of dialogue that otherwise may be difficult to encounter naturally. To demonstrate the complexities of a police interview, consider what must occur during the average conversational e xchange for it to be considered successful or felicitous. Just on a general level, one needs to know when to speak, when not to speak and when to backchannel, all in addition to understanding what is being said or implied.


8 Add to that the stress and import ance of the police interview and you have magnified the need for each of those criteria to be felicitous. Ainsworth (2008) explains that for the most part this is fairly straightforward, so long as the participants understand, or even simply know, the lega 2). Frequently, successful negotiation of daily conversation and discourse involves more either due to indirect speech acts or other contextual clues and phenomena. One of these phenomena is silence, but how silence is used and understood varies from frame to frame. It can be used between friends in daily conversation as a form of humor, as a rejection a fter a request, and at times it can even be meaningless, such as the silence we see in the frame of religious activities and meditation. In the context of a police interview, however, it is meant to act as a linguistic shield (Ainsworth, 2008). In the Uni ted States, silence has a very complex role in the legal system. It is supposed to protect the participants, the process, and the results, as well as be adeptly used in a context where the average participant has little experience. This lack of experience can lead to a participant unintentionally using silence in an infelicitous way, potentially preventing them from accomplishing whatever they were striving for (Ainsworth, 2008). The normal parameters for using silence, as well understanding it, do not seem to apply, most likely because those being questioned are told explicitly that to conversation, however, we are not given explicit instructions on when, or why, to use sile nce. This difference creates a curious shift in its use and understanding that raises many questions.


9 Firstly, we will examine we will examine the mechanics of the exchange by analyzing how silence affects turn structure. If it is indeed a response, this s hould be reflected in the structure of the conversation and we should see some similarities between an intentional usage of silence and the conventional utterance. This will also be show in any repair strategies and negotiation of meaning after silence occ urs in the interview. Next, we will attempt to define what constitutes an effective use of silence within the police interview. Effective usage should act as a linguistic shield. It effectiveness will nd help illustrate who holds the power within the interview. I would like to note that this work does not assume that the analysis of this project will be universal, as it does not take into account data from areas outside of the U.S., nor various subcultu res, where silence may be affected by cultural or legal differences. The rest of the paper will be organized as follows: Chapter 2 will provide a brief history on the highlights of silence in the legal system. Chapter 3 will discuss the methodology of the data collection and its analysis. Following this, Chapter 4 will seek (1974) concept of a lapse (4.1), and can in fact function as an indirect speech act or a response (4.2) In Chapter 5, we will provide an analysis of turn structure in police interviews, applying our theory, developed in Chapter 4. Next, in Chapter 6 we will silence is used. Fi nally, Chapter 7 will provide a final discussion of our findings.


10 CHAPTER 2 SILENCE AND THE UNITED STATES LEGAL SYSTEM The root of the controversy surrounding silence and the U.S. legal system actually arises from the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitut (U.S. Const. amend. V). This section of the amendment was intended to guarantee that American citizens could not be forced, threated, or coerced to sa y or do anything that would incriminate themselves during trial (Butler, 2011). However, this amendment proved to be challenging for the legal system and at times difficult to implement, because the courts not only want to protect the rights of citizens bu t to ensure that justice is, and can be, served (Butler, 2011). Before the creation of the Miranda Warning, there were many cases in which suspects believed that their constitutional rights, specifically their Fifth Amendment rights, had been violated and often, people who were taken into custody may not have known or understood this amendment well enough so as to take full advantage of it and use it while being questioned by the police ( Miranda 1966). This lack of understanding has devastating repercussio ns on a criminal investigation as it could result in removing a confession from the court hearing or trial, if the judge found that the confession had been given under duress. While discussion of the Fifth Amendment is nothing new to the Supreme Court, ou Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In this case, Ernesto Miranda was being prosecuted for the kidnapping and rape of an 18 year old girl in Arizona in 1963. Afte r some investigation, the police interrogated Miranda without informing him that he had a right to legal counsel or that he could not be forced to say anything that would


11 incriminate him. During the course of the interrogation, Miranda confessed to the cha rges. However, his lawyer later objected to use of the confession during the trial on the grounds that his confession was given under coercion. The objection was originally overruled and Miranda was convicted of the charges. Miranda appealed his conviction and his case made its way to the Supreme Court where it was heard along with Vignera v. New York and Westover v. California, both of who were citing similar violations (Miranda, 1966). The Court decided that the prosecution cannot use any statements or co the Miranda Warning. Miranda v. Arizona (1966) sought to provide a preventative solution for future cases by creating the Miranda Warning. While the exact wording of the Miranda Warnings can vary somewhat between officers, the most commonly known script and necessary information is as follows: You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law. You have the right to speak to an attorney, and to have an attorney present during any questioning. If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be provi ded for you at government expense ( Miranda 1966; Butler, 2011) The Supreme Court not only created a warning that explicitly informs the individual in custody that they may employ silence, but required law enforcement to recite these warnings whenever an individual is taken into custody. The idea was that this would not only protect the rights of the citizens and ensure that any of their statements would be made voluntarily, but that it would also protect the judicial process and ensure that future statem ents would be admissible in court (Miranda, 1966,


12 p.1612). If the suspect could shield himself from coercion with silence, then it becomes much more likely that his statements are voluntary. Miranda v. Arizona and the Miranda Warning also explicitly intro duced silence into the frame of the police interview, along with a range of new difficulties. One such situation is found in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976). In this case, after being arrested and mirandized, the defendant chose to remain silent while b eing asked for an explanation of his actions. However, he did choose to share his version of the events during the trial. The prosecution then questioned the defendant as to why he chose to remain silent during his interview but give a statement in court a nd in doing so, questioned the validity of his testimony (Doyle, 1976). The Court found that the and thus should only be seen as an invocation of his Miranda rights (Doy le, 1976). This also meant that his silence could not be used against him in court. The Court stated that using silence against a defendant would then mean that any suspect would be placed between remaining silent, and being assumed to be guilty, or saying something that may be in some way incriminating, even if they are innocent, thereby forcing self incrimination (Doyle, 1976). The debates surrounding the Miranda rights, warnings, and the use of silence continue today, with cases like Salinas v. Texas, 1 33 S.Ct. 2174 (2013) being heard as recently as this past year. Even now, we argue when we are allowed to make inferences from silence and when (or even if) it invokes the Fifth Amendment. In Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010), the defendant rem ained silent for 2 hours and 45 minutes of questioning before starting to answer orally. The Court found


13 that his silence was an invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights for the duration that he remained silent, and therefore was not admissible in court, b ut that the responses given after that time were voluntary and admissible. In Salinas v. Texas (2013), the Court was notably divided on the issue of silence. While voluntarily talking to the police, and without being arrested or mirandized, the defendant was silent following a question about potential ballistic findings in relation to his gun. The Court found that due to the voluntary nature of the interview, because the defendant was free to leave at any time, and, most importantly, because the defendant did not explicitly state that he was invoking his Fifth Amendment rights, that the prosecution was allowed to question the defendant about his silence (Salinas, 2013). While this was the official opinion of the Court, Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Fifth Amendment rights, especially since the court had previously found that there was no formulaic requirement for invoking these rights (Salinas, 2013, p. 2186). Clearly, the use of silence is still a difficult issue for the United States legal system, and it is entirely possible that this is due to our general lack of understanding about the phenomenon itself. I believe that if we examine how silence is employed d uring the police interview and how it affects the dialogue, we should be able to resolve many of the issues seen above.


14 CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY While much of the linguistic discussion on silence is based on a strong theoretical background, many of the works make a number of assumptions and do not always supply the appropriate amount of data, and discussion of that data, to help to cement their theories. This analysis hopes to provide the necessary data and discussion in order to provide support for many of t hese hypotheses or to alter them where needed. I will combine two different approaches to analyzing the data. First, I will take an explicit conversation analytical approach to the data while examining turn taking and conversation structure so as to provi de a solid foundation for the following critical discourse analysis on power and voice in an effort to confirm previous assumptions or illuminate aspects of silence and police interviews that may have been overlooked. The data was taken from three separat e recorded interviews from central Florida,. All individuals being questioned were mirandized (i.e. received the Miranda Warnings ) either before the interview or immediately upon commencing. All names and identifying information have been changed. These pa rticular interviews were selected because they were video recorded and past all levels of adjudication. I chose to use video recordings instead of audio recordings to allow for a potential examination of body language, if applicable, and make it possible t o separate instances of gesture from to be an instance of silence. Recordings range from 1.5 hours to 7.5 hours. All participants being interviewed are labeled as S1, S 2, or S3 and interviewers as P1, P2, P3, etc.


15 small changes. The data will be analyzed on a turn by turn basis, with silences being assigned to a specific participant and ofte n being given their own conversational turn. In pure Jefferson notation, intervals of silence are not attributed to one speaker or another. Clearly, this would cause confusion within the discussion, so when an interval of silence is clearly attributed, thr ough my own analysis, to one party or another it will be noted in the following way: 1 Speaker A: (0.0) Assigning the silence to a specific speaker will allow a discussion of silence in terms of speaker ownership and note possible durational differences b etween silences and pausing. Genuine instances of what Sacks et al. (1974) label as gaps and lapses will still be unassigned in the transcription. This is done to distinguish those instances from intentional silences. In order to do so, lapses and gaps wil l be given their own line within the transcription. In an additional effort to ensure that we can easily distinguish between lapses and silences every line is attributed to a participant. The following hypothetical example shows why this is necessary: 1 SA: twinkle twinkle little star how I wonder what you are 2 SA: up above the clouds so high, like a diamond in the sky 3 SA: twinkle twinkle little star how I wonder what you are 4 (1.3) 5 SB: nice job Conventionally, the speaker is only identified at the onset of he r/his turn, but if the transcription only identifies Speaker A at line 1, it might seem as if the lapse in line 4 is an intentional silence that is being attributed to Speaker A, instead of a lapse in the conversation. Therefore, each line of transcription will identify the speaker.


16 informal styles as opposed to a phonetic change. Therefore, the analysis puts more emphasis on stylistic changes and differences and the reader should see these as reflecting a change in register. This analysis will also follow Sacks, Schegloff, and Jeffe explanation of turn taking and conversation structure. They explain conversation structure to be context free, due to the fact that it remains consistent regardless of subject matter, and participants and at the same time context sensitive (p 699). It is context sensitive in that the smaller details that may have changed slightly in the overall structure become salient markers for certain contexts (p. 700). We have already stated that while silence in a police interview functions similarly to casual and/or daily conversation, it has some minute, but important differences. Therefore, this analysis assumes that the turn structure of the police interview is roughly the same as the Sacks et al. (1974) concept of conversation, but that silence is t he small detail that functions differently within this particular context. However, one of the structural rules from their analysis needs to be amended in order to accommodate silence. They state that a conversational turn may consist of phrases, sentence s, clauses or words. This work expands on that idea by claiming that a turn is simply equal to an utterance. Conventionally, silence is not considered an utterance. However, we will show silence as capable of being a response (Chapter 4) and in a police i nterview, the suspect is explicitly told that he or she is allowed to remain silent, thus making it a conversational device to be used within that frame. Therefore, in


17 the realm of a police interview, a turn may be filled by a silence, as well as phrases a nd words, and considering it an utterance will allow it to be seen as fulfilled conversational turn.


18 CHAPTER 4 SILENCE AND SPEECH ACTS Simply introducing silence into the frame of police interviews does not necessarily elevate it to a form of utterance. H owever, we should not only consider the use of silence in police interviews as a response, but that it already functions this way in daily conversation, making it even more likely to function similarly in a similarly patterned frame. Earlier, we mentioned that people are not quick to pair the concept of silence with conversation as conversations are normally thought to require words, which require sounds (or a representation of those sounds), and meaning, and it is this aspect of meaning that I stated to b e the most essential. For example, production of sounds or sound patterns that lack semantic meaning, like what we see in the animal kingdom, is not considered language. Silence is normally equated with nothingness or a void (Bilmes, 1994). Sacks, Scheglo ff, and Jefferson (1974) label silence as either a gap between conversational turns or an overall lapse in the conversation. They feel that it highlights problems in properly negotiating turns in conversation. While gaps and lapses in conversation most cer tainly occur with a great deal of frequency in conversation, Sacks et al. (1974) do not consider the possibility that a participant in a conversation may intentionally use silence within the interaction. In this section, I argue that the concept of silence as a meaningless conversational void is often a false assumption. To first illustrate that silence not only can, but also often does, have meaning, let 88) system for determining preference, we can state the response


19 deemed an acceptable answer (though it is not always appreciated). Remaining silent, however, would not only se words are spoken, yet meaning is inferred, and a strong meaning at that. This example of a possible response choice lacked sounds, but it the quality of nothingness was far from applicable. How suc h silences have meaning and are understood in conversation Cooperation Principle (1975). Firstly, however, I will define what this investigation means by silence. I am not suggesting that all silence is communicative. Silence can most certainly be the complete absence of words, sounds, and meaning. We see such examples in the many religious who have taken vows of silence, in those who are meditating, or even those who are s imply sitting quietly (Bilmes, 1994; Kurzon 2007). For the purposes of this paper, I am following Bilmes (1994) example and categorizing silence into several different types. Kurzon (1995, 1998, 2007) makes the distinction between intentional and unintenti onal silence. Unintentional silences are what Sacks et al. (1974) would consider to be lapses and gaps, as well as pauses. They can illustrate difficulty in negotiating conversation, and well as processing thoughts or planning a response. It is also worthw hile to note that these silences do not carry any intended meaning and are often what contribute to the common perception that silence is meaningless. Intentional silence is exactly that, silence used intentionally and this can be for a multitude of reas ons, some of which will follow shortly. Kurzon (1998) points out that concept of intentional silence can be broken down into even more distinct categories.


20 Bilmes (1994) further distinguishes between two types of what Kurzon would label as intentional sile nce. The first is absolute silence which is characterized by an absence of speech and meaning, has no communicative intent, but is also employed intentionally. This form of silence can be found among the many religious who have taken vows of silence, in t hose who are meditating, or even those who are simply sitting quietly (Bilmes, 1994, p. 74 5). In this category of silence, there is not only an absence of speech and a lack of meaning, but there is also no intention to communicate. My previous example of an intentional silence following a question should be considered the type of silence that Bilmes has named conversational silence (1994, p.73). He stipulates that conversational silence only occurs when speaking is pertinent (p. 74). I am taking his idea f urther to say that this form of silence is only found when someone is expected to speak, and knows this, but chooses not to, therefore making it a form of response. explanatio n for two reasons. First, the term conversational silence suggests the presence of a conversation, which cannot be started by silence. For example, assume that I am in an elevator with someone and this person did not greet me right away, though I would hav e expected them to do so. I would then greet said person myself, under the assumption they expect me to initiate the greeting. In this context, we do not have silence, but rather a negotiation of conversational turn. After my greeting, if the person choose s not to respond, then we have conversational silence. Also, if I had


21 chosen not to greet this person and no attempt at conversation had occurred, I would not take their silence to have any meaning but rather to be an occurrence of absolute silence. Expli citly stating that conversational silence is a response eliminates any possibility of misperceiving it as an infelicitous negotiation of conversational turn. Bilmes (1994) supports this idea of conversational silence as a response by illustrating that an i nstance of conversational silence is often assigned to the particular member of a conversation that remains silent during their conversational turn in his examination of Schegloff and Sacks (1974). In that study, silence was not assigned to a particular sp eaker and thus not examined as something intentional. By not doing that, this study had huge potential to misinterpret the meta messages of the individual conversational turns, as well as misrepresent the structure of the conversation, as mentioned in Chap ter 3. My second reason for explicitly adding these terms is to help distinguish conversational silence from pausing. Even though, during a pause, speech is not present when expected, the person that is pausing does eventually intend to speak. Conversation al silence is a choice the speaker makes when there is no intention to speak. Referring back to the end of my hypothetical elevator ride, my companion has chosen not speak, as opposed to having paused while considering which way to respond. These distincti ons are key parts of the definition of conversational silence, and this will become apparent as we apply different aspects of speech acts to this concept.


22 conversational tur n and not belonging to Speaker B. This would remove any possibility of silence having meaning, though we have already seen such meanings to exist. They also did not distinguish between pausing and silence, assuming one to be the same as the other, similarl y to Schegloff and Sacks (1974). Crown and Fieldstein (1985) did not consider silence to be something one would choose as a tool in conversation. Therefore, to highlight these features (response and intent) and to prevent the same misconceptions, I have ex plicitly included them in my definition. To summarize, what this paper will be calling conversational silence is the intentionally chosen response to some other speech act. For this section, it should be assumed that when I use the term silence, I am refe rring to the conversational type. Any other category of silence will be explicitly named, as will conversational silence when deemed necessary. With a firm classification of conversational silence now in place, we can begin to e the belief that a conversation is actually a carrying out of different actions in accordance with certain rules (1969, p. 29). These actions are commonly called speech ac ts. Searle considers them to be the basic unit of linguistic communication, and further defines In accordance with Searle, it is not enough to say that speech acts are govern ed


23 constitutive rules, X counts as Y in context C we can posit that an utterance (X) counts as a request (Y) in the context of an attempt to make the addressee do some act (C) (p. 36). We have already discussed silence in much the same way. We defined conversational silence as the intentionally chosen response, to some other speech act, of refraining from speech. This can easily be reformatted to say that silence (X) counts as conversational silence (Y) in the context of a response with in a conversation (C). By the same token we can state that silence (X) counts as absolute silence (Y) in the explanation of constitutive rules, they do not serve to establish silence as a speech act, only as a subcategory of an overarching theme of silence. In these exa mples, we are only defining the larger categories of silence, and not explaining how silence can perform as a specific speech act, such as a refusal. The challenge comes in attempting to create such a rule as all attempts conflict with our notion of silen ce. For example, we may say any of the following: 1. Conversational silence counts as an utterance in the context that no sounds are produced. 2. Conversational silence counts as communication in the context of conversational response. 3. Silence counts as an asser tion in the context of an attempt to prevent the addressee from doing something. None of these examples establish silence as an independently functioning speech act. Example (1) serves to relate the concepts of utterance and conversational silence, or perh aps even establish conversational silence as a type of utterance in much


24 null morpheme s in morphology and null heads in syntax. While this helps to circumvent the problems the term utterance could potentially cause (a speech act is frequently defined as a type of utterance) in equating silence with speech acts, it does nothing to establish silence as a speech act in its own right. In the much the same vein, (2) only serves to establish as a form of communication and while this is yet again helpful, it does not actually create a specific speech act that is conversational silence. Finally, (3) also fails to establish silence as its own speech act although it does associate it with an already existing speech act. These few examples of constitutive rules help to suggest that a constitutive rule cannot be made to establish silence as a new form of speech act behavior. Searle stated that failure to create a satisfactory constitutive rule is evidence against the speech act hypothesis (1969, p. 37). For Searle, this was in regard to his theory of speech act as a whole, for which he was able to success fully create the necessary rules to support his hypothesis. In this instance however, the lack of a constitutive rule that could establish conversational silence as its own form of speech act suggests that is it not a speech act in its own right. Indirect Speech Acts It is important to remember that just because conversational silence could not be established as its own form of speech act does not mean that it has no relation to speech act theory. There are actually two main categories of speech acts, dire ct and indirect. Direct speech acts are defined as having only one illocutionary force and that force matches the literal meaning of what has been said (Searle, 1975). To contrast, the illocutionary force of indirect speech acts does not match the literal meaning.


25 this is perhaps why many do not assume silence to carry any linguistic weight. However, as we saw earlier, there is still meaning taken from that silence. That meaning, regardless of its interpretation, is the primary force. This explanation alone is enough to illustrate that what we have established as conversational s ilence does not exist within the limits of a direct speech act. A direct speech act requires that the literal utterance and illocutionary force be one in the same, but this cannot be true of conversational silence. If it were, there would be no illocutionary force since there was no literal utterance. However, if we reexamine example (3), silence counts as an assertion in the context of an attempt to prevent the addressee from doing something we see even further evidence that conversational silence does in fact function in accordance with indirect speech acts. Firstly, the constitutive rule (which is also the essential condition) for a warning is simply that an utterance (X) counts as a warning (Y) in the context of an attempt to prevent the addressee from doing something (C). The on ly difference in the essential condition of a warning and example (3) is the use of utterance instead of silence. In following that both statements are true, this suggests that an utterance and conversational silence are parts of the same entity. In fact, this potential equality has already been established in example (1) that states conversational silence counts as an utterance in the context that no sounds are produced. It therefore follows that since silence is now established as a form of utterance, it can replace the essential form to create the more specified behavior we see in example (3).


26 Indirect speech acts also rely heavily on negotiation of the Cooperative Principle trate this 63 ). In the example below, I follow the same process that Searle (1975) uses, substituting conversational sile nce for any other indirect illocutionary act. Step 1 : I have made a proposal to Y, and in response he has not said anything ( Facts about the conversation ). Step 2 : I assume that Y is participating in the conversation and that therefore his remark is intended to be relevant ( principles of conversational cooperation ). Step 3 : A relevant response must be on of acceptance, rejection, counterproposal, further discussion, etc. ( th eory of speech acts ). Step 4 : But his literal response was not one of these, and so was not a relevant response ( inference from Steps 1 and 3 ). Step 5 : Therefore, he probably means more than he says. Assuming that his silence is relevant, his primary illo cutionary point must differ from his literal one ( inference from Steps 2 and 4 ). These few steps illustrate how an addressee can come to the conclusion that he has com e to a specific explanation of how the indirect speech act is understood, but the complete understanding of the rest of this process requires that for the moment we maxims have addressee is examining how the speaker has flouted the maxim of quantity and in Step 7 relating that analysis back to the situation.


27 This is somewhat challenging with silence as almos t all of the maxims are flouted. The maxim of quantity requires that the speaker give their contribution as much information as is required, which the speaker has not done in that they have not literally contributed any information. The maxim of quality ha s been violated in sense of lying by omission. While the speaker has not responded falsely, they have not responded with truth either, and thus silence counts as a violation. The maxim of Manner is violated, as conversational silence is ambiguous and obscu re. As always, the maxim of relation gives us a certain amount of difficulty, and that is mainly because it lacks a clear definition. Lack of definition aside, silence could easily be said to be relevant, because nothing was said that was irrelevant, and the reverse is also possible, as nothing relevant was said either. However, in my earlier decision on the maxim of quality, we set a precedent of omission counting as a flouting of the maxim. By the same standard, we will say that the maxim of relation wa s flouted as nothing relevant was contributed. This follows Reinhart (1980) as irrelevance is frequently found when the maxims of quantity and manner have been violated. there is no salient maxim to examine in order to understand the primary illocutionary force. The addressee must instead examine the conditions for text coherence as well as t he conditions for derived interpretation. According to Reinhart (1980), a coherent text must have cohesion, consistency and relevance. However, even when the relevance conditions have been violated, one can still interpret a given text so long as the


28 cond itions for cohesion are upheld (p. 165). Essentially, as long as no new topic is introduced, the addressee can still successfully interpret the primary illocutionary force with relative ease. This brings us to the sixth and seventh steps, which are as fol lows: Step 6 was introduced (conditions for derived interpretation). Step 7 : Therefore, the primary force is a response to my proposal. I have explicitly stated Step 7 to show that c onversational silence is understood as a form of utterance and not as a pause or as absolute silence. How this form of utterance is interpreted may appear to be dependent on the psychology of the addressee. However, conversational silence is actually inter preted by what conversation analysts call type R preference (Bilmes, 1988). The general notion of preference stipulates that there are at least three alternative responses to an utterance. There is at the one preferred response (X), at least one non prefe rred response (Y), and a response that does not involve X or Y (N). Type R preference is simply where if X is preferred, N implies Y (Bilmes 1988). With these stipulations in mind, if acceptance is the preferred response to a proposal, and therefore counts as X, then conversational silence would be seen as N and imply (p.166). This not onl y holds true for proposals/invitations, but also for requests for


29 to type R prefere as Y, because it is the non preferred response. Silence would count as N since it is neither X nor Y and when used would imply Y. Thus, we can see how someone would to silence functioning as an indirect speech act, because it shows conversational silence as functioning in another category. Therefore, we need finally finish our process for understanding an indirect speech act, so that we can see the final steps in how conversational silence is understood. Step 8: The preferred response to my proposal would be acceptance. mary illocutionary force is probably to reject the proposal (inference from Steps 8 and 9). Discussion speech act, he was able to mainly rely on speech act theory and inference. W ith conversational silence, this has not been the case. The process quickly became increasingly complex, and required the inclusion of at least two more pragmatic theories to begin to illustrate it. That being said, it does provide a solid foundation for u nderstanding conversational silence as a type of utterance and as a response in a daily conversation. While to many, it seems strange to equate silence to a speech act, since it is clearly not speech; it may be helpful to think of this type of indirect spe ech act to make use of anti speech, instead of making use of silence. As we showed above, this type of


30 silence is communicative and can be applied to speech act theory, so while our terminology is awkward at best, our application and realizations are sound and should not be discredited due to a lack of creative nomenclature. When relating silence and our expansions of speech act theory to the frame of police interviews, my theoretical analysis still holds true, though the introduction of a new speech event requires direct explanation. silences found in police interviews. When a person chooses to remain silent during a police interview, it is clearly intentional, so I am not debating that aspect; it is also responsorial as it follows a statement or response directed at the participant. However, I am assuming the interlocutor is not intending to communicate or to impart any information, whatsoever. Although it is possible that informat ion could still be inferred, the data will show that this is not usually the case. This does not mean that the intentional silences we see during the police interview, however, are devoid of any meaning. Kurzon (1995) examines silence in the legal system as part of an adjacency sequence. He explains how its meaning is interpreted by relating the intention behind silence to the concept of intentions in speech not tell yo does not give any of the requested information (Kurzon, 1995). Therefore the intentional silences seen in police interviews seem to fall into a grey area. They are simil ar to conversational silence in that they are responsorial and intentionally employed during the conversational turn and that they do in fact have some


31 meaning. At the same time, these intentional silences are similar to absolute silence in that it does no t intend to supply any of the requested information. This confusion is commented on by Kurzon (2007) and Bruneau (1973) who agree that psychological silences, which we can interpret as those pauses, gaps, and lapses we see in Sacks et al. (1974) and possi bly even as instances of absolute silence, are often difficult to separate from interactive silences, which is what we are calling conversational silence. If we return to our formula for what constitutes conversational silence and what constitutes absolute examination of intended meaning, we can actually suggest a solution to this conundrum. For conversational silence, silence (X) counts as conversational silence (Y) in the context of an intentional response within a conversation (C); and for absolute silence, silence (X) counts as absolute silence (Y) in the context that it is intentional and lacks communication (C). When we examine it this way, we can clearly see that the silences we encounter in police interviews ca nnot actually fit into both contexts. Because Kurzon (1995) explained the interpreted meanings of silences in police interrogations, we cannot say that these examples lack communication; they simply lack the preferred information. Since these examples are to some degree, communicative, they still fall within the realm of conversational silence. To summarize, what this analysis will be calling conversational silence is the intentionally chosen response to some other speech act of refraining from speech. F or the remainder of this work, it should be assumed that when I use the term silence, I am referring to the conversational type. Any other category of silence will be explicitly named, as will conversational silence when deemed necessary.


32 CHAPTER 5 SILENCE AND TURN STRUCTURE Before any discussion of in police interviews can begin, we must examine its structure and then illustrate why silence is a problem for it. We wil l then begin to apply data, while interpreting silence as a response. focused on partic ipant framework structure. She states that the police prefer a suspect to take on the roles of author, animator and principal, as defined by Goffman (1974). author, in that they, ideally, create the narrative on their own, without influence from the police investigator. The suspect is also considered the animator because they are producing the narrative and the principal because the narrative is produced voluntarily and the suspect is therefore responsible for it. Heydon labels this position as SR3, meaning that the suspect creates and produces the utterances as well as being responsible for the attitudes they express occurs in the form of narrative, with little or no participation from the investigator. Heydon explains that this is preferred as it ensures the confession or testimony was given voluntarily (2004, p.31). The investigator also does not want to influence the suspect in anyway, so they try to keep their participation to a minimum and place all three participant roles on the suspect. Extracts 1 and 2 help to illustrate this framework. In line 3, S1 begins his narration. We can see that he has assumed all three particip


33 that this is the preferred framework for the interview in line 9 where P1 answers with a non verbal gesture. Heydon (2004) points out that interjecting and interrupting during t he interview can prevent the SR3 framework from recurring (p. 42). If, at the conscious or subconscious level, P1 is aware of this, his shrug signifies that he is acknowledging what S1 is saying, but in not verbally communicating he does not do or say anyt hing that could cause S1 relinquish the floor. Lines 3 8 are an example of narration by the possibility that it could generate one or give at least some infor mation. This is why P1 responds with a gesture in line 9, so that S1 can continue in the same fashion. Extract 1 1 2 P1: anything gonna help you out? ((shrugs)) 3 4 S1: even if I m ake a story up for you, 5 S1: and tell you oh yeah look this is what happened, 6 S1: >duh duh duh duh duh< 7 8 9 P1: ((shrug)) 10 S1: (sure) ( may ere and lie to you, 11 12 13 14 S1: 15 16 Where d ha how is even that gonna help me. 17 18 P1: I think you got it. In fact, P1 only interjects when it relates to dishonesty. In lines 11 14, we see a lot of overlap where P1 is clarifying that he wants S1 to give the true sequence of events, and not fabricated or hypothetical ones. In Heydon (2004), there are examples o f investigators interrupting the narration, usually with a question, when they felt they


34 needed the suspect to say some detail on record. It is important to note that in those situations, the investigator had background information. Here this does not seem to be the case. Apart from clarifying that he is looking for the truth, P1 allows S1 to continue until it becomes clear that S1 is implying that his narration is either hypothetical or false. When this happens (lines 15 18), P1 takes on the three particip ant roles and offers his own ideas. Heydon (2004) states that while S3R is the ideal during the police interview, there are interviews where the investigator must take on a more active role. Such an example occurs when the suspect chooses to remain silent Extract 2 illustrates an interview where the suspect invokes their right to silence by using intentional silence and thereby blocks the SR3 framework. As we can see, S1 is no longer fulfilling the S3R framework. In fact, it appears now that the roles ha ve reversed. S1 is only responding with silence and P1 is filling all three roles of author, animator, and principal. While this is clearly not the ideal format, it does highlight the preference for a participant to fill all three roles during that intervi ew. Kidwell and Gonzlez Martnez (2010) discuss a similar approach to police fills all three roles by giving the suspect a hypothetical situation or telling the su spect about himself. In this method the investigator speaks much more than the suspect by portunities to speak. Kidwell and Gonzlez Martnez (2010) state that by limiting the suspect, this


35 either about himself or a hypothetical situation that implies the interviewer has certain condemning knowledge. While Kidwell and Gonzlez Martnez (2010) could be seen to show a similar preference for narrative like that we see in Heydon (2004), a large d ifference is in the amount the two approaches prefer the suspect to speak. Extract 2 1 2 P1: gonna sit here and treat ya like a: like a pu:nk, or like ya know, like 3 4 5 S1: (1.7) 6 P1: but give me the same courtesy. people do stupid things. 7 S1: (4.0) 8 P1: people do stupid things all the time people have bills. people have 9 10 S1: (6.4) 11 12 S1: (2.5) 13 (1.7) ya 14 P1: know, I could (1.1) sympathize at least that people get into a 15 P1: situation 16 P1: of, or maybe they regret what I 17 18 P1: on, is 19 20 21 S1: (4.6) 22 P1: people do stupid things. 23 S1: (18.25) 24 P1: I mean jus jus tell me whats up man, 25 S1: (4.4) 26 In extract 2, we see P1 taking longer turns and providing hypothetical scenarios, fulfilling the roles of author, animator, and principal in an effort to keep the interview


36 4 and 13 20, he is approaching S1 as an equal or as someone who wants to help S1. P1 is displaying his empathy fo r others who have broken the law. Critically, he is not, in this extract, mentioning his previous experiences with similar crimes or suspects. do so, by the turn structure of the exchange. There is some compelling evidence for determining that what we see in lines 5, 7, and 10 are not pauses by P1, but intentional each statement, P1 has exp ressed a complete thought, which has no overt implications of being an opener to a longer statement. Heydon (2011) describes the police interview as being designed to maintain an ect to respond to each statement as if it were the first part of an adjacency pair. Heydon (2011) lines 4, 9, and 20. It is also why the exchange seems closely related to the adjacency pairs and accusation then they must belong to accusation response, as his syntax and intonation show that he is not asking a question toward S1. Instead, P1 offers hypothetical situations that


37 P1 is continuing the adjacency sequence with the first part of accusation pairs in each of his turns and likewise, S1 is completing the second half of t he pair with silence. Previous studies have found that transcription itself can frequently bias data analysis (Ochs, 1979). Ochs (1979) discussed non verbal behaviors being over looked in transcription. Conversational silence is one such example. In Extrac t 2.1, I have transcribed the data from Extract 2 traditionally in order to show the differences in the two methods and we can see the two transcriptions have a distinctly different shape. Extract 2.1 1 2 gonna sit here and treat ya like a: like a pu:nk, or like ya know, 3 4 5 me the same courtesy. people do stupid things. 6 (4.0) 7 P1: people do stupid things all the time people have bills. people 8 9 (6.4) 10 11 make it right, but (1.7) ya know, I could (1.1) sympathize at 12 13 that maybe there not proud of, or maybe they regret 14 sympathize with ven you know, (1.6) think 15 any less than horribly on, is 16 17 18 (4.6) 19 P1: people do stupid t hings. 20 (18.25) 21 P1: I mean jus jus tell me whats up man, 22 (4.4) 23 In this transcription, S1 plays almost no role until the very last line and the adjacency sequence that is clearly visible in Extract 2, is only visible in lines 21 23, though even here it appears infelicitous. Extract 2.1 hides the adjacency sequence and


38 findings where the entire interview is a series of adjacency pairs. Extract 2 is much more capable of highlighting that series. Extract 2.1 also serves to bias the data and solely due to its format is unjust on the side of S1, the suspect. As noted previously (Chapter 2), S1 has been explicitly told that he can remain silent, an d this has turned silence from a passive, subconscious level of activity. It also does not reflect our discussion from Chapter 4, stating that conversational silence is a and to reflect our theory, this paper has broken with convention and transcribed the interviews as in Extracts 1 and 2. Of course, not every moment that lacks speech should be contributed to conv ersational silence. As Kurzon (2007) pointed out, it can be difficult to distinguish absolute silence from conversational silence, potentially making the distinctions discours and pauses we see in Extract 2.1. thought. He explains that memories and thoughts are island like in nature and these islands are reflected in our speech through pauses and other types of hesitations. usually followed by a hesitation. We clearly see this in lines 13 20 of Extract 2. In line


39 is a hesitational, pause filler. We see the same thing occur in line 17, where the filler is followed by a second pause. Though the other pauses in lines 14 and 20 are not immediately followed by fillers, the do occur within one or two words of a pause filler, indicating that they are part of the same hesitation. Following Chafe (1979), these pauses indicate that P1 is linking different memories to gether and the frequency and length of his pauses indicate that they cover either a wide range of time or events. silences. Chafe (1979) explains that when a speaker links multiple i slands together we see the patterns of pausing and hesitations discussed above. However, when a speaker has reached the closing point, of either the thought or the memory, there is typically a falling intonation contour. In the transcription, this contour is indicated with a period. The silences in lines 5, 7, 10, 21 and 23 of Extract 2 are all preceded by a phrase that ends in this contour, and the silences in 5, 7, and 10 all occur after two instances of phrases ending in that contour. In Chafe (1979) ser ies like these are used to indicate that that lines 1 4 and lines 13 20 of Extract 2, there is much leading intonation, marked with a comma, but we do not see the falling intonation, which Chafe (1979) uses to mark the end of a syntactic or semantic unit, until the end of his turn. In Extract 2, the falling intonation is functioning to mark not only a syntactic boundary, but a turn boundary as well. Because P1 has s o clearly closed his turn, we can state that the silences that occur after these boundary markers not only belong to S1, but are his conversational turn as well.


40 Extract 3 29 S3: I have a conscience= 30 P4: = where did he get shot 31 S3: (5.1) 32 in fact if thas al 33 34 35 P5: shot in the car, who put him in the car 36 S3: (6.8) 37 P5: did you at least put him in the car an d try and get him help? 38 S3: (2.6) he ma he got to the hospital 39 P5: did you at least put him in the car and try to get him help. 40 S3: he got to the hospital 41 P5: answer the question. Did you at least put him in the car and 42 P5: try to get him help. Yes or no 43 S3: (49.3) 44 S3: ((looks up)) guess not, he dead 45 46 P5: tried. 47 S3: (8.7) 48 49 S3: (6.9) 50 P5: do you feel like you could have done something diff erently to 51 P5: help him survive? 52 S3: (6.8) 53 one on:e, 54 S3: (3.6) 55 P5: rather than drive him all the way back home? 56 S3: (12.3) 57 S3: what you want me to do pull up to the hospital an:: say that he 58 59 S3: you want? 60 P5: what I 61 62 know his people 63 P5: [ok] Adjacency sequences, preference for the S3R framework, and the application of also find all three phenomena in Extract 3. After briefly illustrating that these phenomena are frequent occurrences, we will use Extract 3 to show how this method of


41 analysis is more in harmony with the Sacks et al. (1974) analysis of turn taking in conversation than analyses that do not assign silence to a conversational turn. The adjacency pairs in Extract 3 are actually eas ier to see than those in Extract One could make the argument that line 31 is actually and lapse instead of silence, conversational silence and not a lapse. The adjacency sequence is also geared toward allowing S3 to take the position of S3R. P4 and P5 primarily ask questions that require more than a yes or no answer. This is to ensure that S3 supplies the desired narration without too much of their influence. In lines 57 5 9 and lines 61 and 62, S3 does appear to be in the beginning stages of narration, primarily because he is not silent and is directly addressing what has been said to him, and at that point the investigators take minimal turns to allow him the floor. Extrac and flow of language. In line 45, we see a pause by P5 that follows an instance of leading intonation, indicating that she is connecting two thoughts. In line 26 we have another paus e, though this time it is from S3 instead of an investigator. Here, S3 is not connecting thoughts, but deciding on a focus for his sentence (Chafe, 1979, p.167). The pause, followed by his cutting off his original start off, indicates that what we see in l ine


42 26 is simply a hesitation rather than an instance of conversational silence, even though it is relatively long compared to the pauses we have seen in previous extracts. This few and brief examples show how the phenomenon discussed for Extract 2 are act ually part of a larger pattern in relation to police interviews. This pattern would also be virtually impossible to discuss without analyzing the exchange within the Sacks et al. (1974) model of turn structure or without recognizing silence as a legitimate response. Similarly to our discussion of Extract 2 and 2.1, Extract 3 is more in harmony with the Sacks et al. (1974) analysis of turn taking in conversation than a more traditional transcription, like the one found Extract 3.1. Extract 3.1 does not overt ly violate the Sacks et al. (1974) model, but Extract 3 is simply a better fit. For the sake of space, we will only discuss the parts where Extract 3 is a distinctly better fit than Extract 3.1. Extract 3 is still preferential in the other areas of the mod el, but the difference is not as notable with this specific data. and no overlap are common. Together with transitions characterized by a slight gap or slight overlap, the 1). In Extract 3.1, gaps appear to be fairly common, and these should not be considered slight either as the shortest is 3.6 seconds. Comparatively, in Extract 3, we only have one poten silence as a response shows the interview to flow much more smoothly than a traditional analysis would be able to indicate. An analysis of Extract 3.1 would have to conclude that t he exchange in a police interview is much more disjointed than that of a


43 casual conversation, while we can see in Extract 3 that the participants are actually working quite well together, at least on a mechanical level, since S3 is not providing the prefer red responses. Extract 3.1 29 S3: I have a conscience= 30 P4: = where did he get shot 31 (5.1) 32 in fact if thas al 33 34 35 sh ot in the car, who put him in the car 36 (6.8) 37 P5: did you at least put him in the car and try and get him help? 38 S3: (2.6) he ma he got to the hospital 39 P5: did you at least put him in the car and try to get him help. 40 S3: he got to the hospital 41 P5: answer the question. Did you at least put him in the care and 42 try to get him help. Yes or no 43 (49.3) 44 S3: ((looks up)) guess not, he dead 45 46 tried. 47 (8.7) 48 P5: are you blaming 49 (6.9) 50 P5: do you feel like you could have done something differently to 51 help him survive? 52 (6.8) 53 one on:e, 54 (3.6) 55 P5: rather than drive him all the way back home? 56 (12.3) 57 S3: what you want me to do pull up to the hospital an:: say that he 58 59 want? 60 P5: what I 61 62 he know his people P5: [ok]


44 This analysis of part (4) also directly affects parts (12) and (13), regarding the use of turn allocation techniques (Sacks et al., 1974, p.701). In both extracts, there is definite use of speaker selects next. However, in Extract 3.1, the numerous lapses imply that the technique fails in lines 37, 48, 50, 53, and 55 and the speaker has to continue with his turn in order to continue the exchange. Again, in Extract 3, we see that the turn is actually passed to S3. Extract 3 also shows P5 as self selecting fo r all of the turns that follow silence as opposed to being stuck in the same turn. change recurs, or E xtract 3.1 in regard to this part of the model is fairly clear. In Extract 3, we have regularly recurring speaker change, which in this analysis is better understood as the turn being passed to another participant, while in Extract 3.1 speaker change only occurs twice Finally part (14) explains that the model also has repair mechanisms for problems with turn taking (Sacks et al., 1974, p.701). It follows that if the model prefers minimal gaps, their abundance in Extract 3.1 would lead to some form of repair but no mechanism is employed. In Extract 3 there is no need for a repair mechanism since there are no gaps, so it makes sense that we do not find any. Discussion: This transcription of police interviews was designed to better see silence as a response, f current analysis of the turn structure of police interviews shows the necessity of recognizing silence as a response for the speech event in order to understand the true level of participation f rom the suspect. This allows police interviews to better correspond


45 with previous research data and theories. Recognizing silence allows the analyst to fully see and understand the role of the suspect remaining silent as opposed to their role being hidden by traditional methods. Analyzing the data this way also require us to reexamine other aspects of the discourse that lie outside of the scope of structure. Of primary interest in this work is how this structure affects our understanding of power and voice in police interviews. We now need to question who is in control of the interview as well as what this structure can show us about powerless speech during police interviews. We also need to examine if e.


46 CHAPTER 6 SILENCE, VOICE, AND POWER After defining conversational silence as a form of response, we reevaluated our transcription methods so that the turn structure of an exchange would reflect our theory. In doing so we saw a difference in how much th e suspect was participating in the interview and realized that he had a significantly more active role. Further analysis of this structure then revealed that our previous understanding of voice and power needed to be reevaluated. Previously we had based th is understanding on a structure where the suspect was barely present and this new structure then leads us to reevaluate the power relations in a police interview. It is hard to separate any discussion of police interviews from the concept of power. Heydon (2004, 2011), Ainsworth (2008), Haworth (2006), and Shuy (1998) all note that interrogation is in itself coercive by nature because it isolates the suspect from the outside world. The incommunicado setting alone does not make an interrogation coercive; the institutional backing of the police force gives the investigating officer immense power over the suspect. The investigating officer is the representative of the law and thereby represents what controls society. This asymmetry between investigator and susp ect is not lost on the United States legal system. In Miranda v. Arizona the created the Miranda Warning specifically to attenuate this power inequality, but many have argued that it has not given as much power to the suspect nor limited the investigators as much as the Court intended.


47 Ainsworth (2008) argues that within the legal syste m, a speaker needs to fully understand what language is required in order to achieve a desired result, and that acting without that understanding can create various unwanted and unanticipated outcomes (p. 2). In other words, the ability of any speaker to a chieve desired outcomes within in the legal system is an issue of voice. Jan Blommaert defines voice as a speaker to have a voice, in the legal system, they need some knowl edge of what Issues of voice occur when something that functions one way in a particular context either loses that function or gains a new one in a different context. We noted different uses of silence earlier (Chapter 4), many of which imparted meaning but none of which functioned the way silence does in an interview, which is to act as a linguistic shield. While the suspect is not trying to impart information by remaining silent, they are t rying to accomplish something It follows then, that those with less knowledge or training of the legal system would be at a disadvantage, and the Miranda Warning illustrates as much. As stated previously, the Miranda Warning attempts to provide the suspect with the necessary information not only to make an informed decision about speaking or not speaking but how to participate in the interaction as well. It seems straightforward that after being informed of the right to remain silent, the suspect would understand that remaining silent would not waive his Fifth Amendment rights, however, as discussed more in depth in Chapter 2, Salinas v. Texas which occurred as re cently as 2013, illustrates that


48 invoking Fifth Amendment rights and remaining silent are two different things. The Court and that remaining silent only guarantees protect s the suspect for as long as they choose to remain so (Salinas, 2013). The differences between the use of language in everyday contexts versus the use of languages in the frame of the legal system, and specifically in the police interview, create inequal ity between the interviewer and the suspect. Blommaert differences in the use of language are quickly, and quite systematically, translated into inequalities especially true in the pol inequalities to elicit a confession from the suspect. All of the inequalities are able to occur because the suspe ct has left their own speech community and is attempting to communicate in a community where the functions of various speech acts are not only different, but also relatively inaccessible without guidance. Many of the inequalities are psychological in natu re. For example, the suspect is removed from any setting where they may feel in control or comfortable, such as their investigator (Shuy, 1998). The suspect is separated from so ciety and unable to communicate with anyone apart from the investigators or legal counsel (Shuy, 1998). All of this is to take away things that may make the suspect feel empowered or in control of the exchange (Shuy, 1998). All of these factors contribute to an imbalance of power


49 during the interview. Wang (2006) defines power as what allows someone to control another and reach his or her own goals, and this work will be following that concept. Linguistically, the interview is also formatted so that the su spect is in a relatively both participants are able to contribute with out any limitations, but an exchange where the suspect participates in exactly the manner the pol ice officer prefers (Wang, 2006). While the Miranda Warning does attempt to reconcile some the power inequality, the portion of the interview that is focused on obtaining new information or a confession is designed to augment any potential inequalities (Ai nsworth, 2008). As mentioned in Sections 4 and 5, the interview is set up as an adjacency sequence, generally comprised of question and answer pairs (Heydon, 2011; Kurzon, 1995). Wang (2006) contends the more powerful member of the exchange, the investiga tor, uses questions to wield power over the suspect, who is the less powerful member (p. 529). As a result, the suspect typically speaks in a powerless register, meaning their speech contains more hedges, hesitations, and indirect speech acts than the powe rful register (Ainsworth, 2005). The powerless register puts the suspect at a disadvantage, not only because the powerless register is associated with guilt, but also because the Court prefers direct speech acts and because of this, often overlooks indire ct speech acts and conversational implicature (Ainsworth, 2008). This is shown in Extract 4. In Extract 4, we have two instances where the suspect has voiced his desire to make a phone call. In the first example, the suspect mentions the need to call his m other. P4 does not question this need, nor ask why he would want to do so. This


50 suggests that she has inferred why he would like to do so, assumedly to begin the procedu Extract 4 88 S3: I just wanna know if I am under arrest so I can know if I need to 89 S3: call my mom or not. 90 . (96 lines omitted) 186 187 S3: know that. 188 P4: is that not what happened? 189 S3: (1.3) 190 P5: Are we lyin? 191 192 P5: are we lying? 193 194 P5: ok 195 196 197 P5: ] 198 S3: mom so she can get an attorney. 199 (3.4) 200 P5: [[ok 201 S3: [[other than that, 202 P4: well you came here in in ha 203 S3: 204 S3: I came here in handcuffs!= 205 206 207 S3: okay then 208 P5: so what would you like to do 209 S3: (2.4) 210 P4: you gotta talk to us Jimmy. 211 S3: why I gotta talk to you. In the second instance (lines 195 198), which takes place after the Miranda Warning, the suspect expressly mentions an attorney in relation to calling his mother. This time, the investigating officers choose to answer his question about being arrested


51 an d do not directly address his wanting an attorney. After they clarify that he is under arrest the investigators ask what he would like to do. Again, they do not directly mention the attorney but do provide an opportunity for him to ask directly. When S3 re sponds with silence, they ignore previous implications that he would like an attorney present. In neither instance does the suspect directly state the he would like an attorney present during questioning and as a result, the investigators continue with the interview. Ainsworth (2008) gives similar examples where suspects have asked for legal counsel through an indirect speech act, or have implied they do not wish to speak until counsel has arrived, and these indirect utterances were ignored. Conversational implicatures like these are prevalent in casual exchanges, but in the frame of police interviews, they lose their usual function, to request. This functional loss is not explicitly is creates a lack of voice for the suspect, who uses indirect speech acts during the interview to request something, such as legal counsel. The indirect speech acts discussed in Extract 4 support this. Extract 4 suggests that when a suspect uses indirect s peech acts such as those above, or communicates in the powerless register as seen in Ainsworth (2008), they put themselves at a disadvantage in the frame of the police interview. In Extract 4, S3 does not lack voice. His investigators clearly understand h im, as is illustrated when they provide him with the opportunity to directly ask for an attorney, so his ability to make himself understood is intact. Rather, S3 lacks power. He is not able to control his investigators or achieve his goal (acquiring an att orney). Therefore, understood so he still has a voice, albeit weakened. Those indirect speech acts have


52 also placed him in a powerless position where he cannot complet e his goals. as achieve their own (continuing the interview). In Chapter 4, we established that silence can function as an indirect speech act, so it follows that remaini ng silent during the evidentiary interview should continue this trend of powerlessness. Heydon (2006) found that when a suspect does not directly and overtly deny an accusation, the investigator infers said accusation to be the truth. She states that while none of the suspects in her study took advantage of their right to result thus, after encountering conversational silence, the investigator would infer their accusation to be correct. If we apply that to our discussion of voice and power, this the spread of information but instead is used as affirmation. Contrastingly, the data used for th is study does not show this. It also shows that silence, while an indirect speech act, appears to function differently than the indirect speech acts in Ainsworth (2008) in that it does not restrict the suspect to the powerless register. In Extract 4, we st ated that S3 was powerless because he could not achieve his goals and that his investigators were powerful because they controlled him by blocking his goals and achieving their own. If we apply these same criteria to Extract 5, we can see that the inhabita nts of the powerful and powerless positions have changed. Here,


53 responds with a This prevents P2 from achieving his goal. As long as S2 is silent, P2 cannot obtain a confession. Extract 5 132 P2: Eric what happened that night man 133 S2: what night 134 P2: (3.4) that the way is that the road you wanna go down? 135 S2: (5.57) 136 P2: is that the chance is that the gamble you wanna take with the rest 137 P2: of your life? 138 S2: (15.1) 139 140 P2: the one guy out there that ha 141 S2: (10.1) 142 143 only one out of the five people that were 144 145 S2: (5.1) 146 147 S2: (11.73) 148 149 150 S2: (4.4) 151 P2: for whatever reason. 152 S2: (3.78) 153 P2: and you bl you decided to allow Mark 154 P2: Jones to tr ade his life for yours. 155 S2: (13.5) 156 tell what 157 but their makin 158 P2: it sound the best for them as they possibly can, right 159 S2: (5.3) 160 me:, it was Eric Anderson that was 161 P2: it was his deal. 162 S2: (6.5) 163 P2: that what you want a jury to hear? or do you want them to hear 164 P2: your side 165 S2: (27.6) 166


54 Determining whether or not silence empowers S2 is more difficult. Part of what empowered P4 and P5 in Extract 4 was that they were able to prevent S3 from achieving his own goals. In Extract 5, S2 does that with P2, but to say that S2 has power in the exchange, he must be achieving his own goals. Prev the goal of S2. This is not to say there are not other motivations for silence. S2 could also simply not want to cooperate; making his goal to not do whatever P2 wants him to ing silent, he has achieved his goal. This shows that while spoken indirect speech acts follow Ainsworth (2008) and are representative of powerless language, conversational silence is an example of an indirect speech act that is not powerless. Extract 6 17 18 P1: I think you got it. 19 S1: (5.4) 20 P1: straight from the source. 21 S1: (1.9) 22 23 24 S1: (1.6) 25 P1: you got it from the plant. 26 S1: (10.1) 27 28 S1: hm 29 30 31 P1: (3.5) 32


55 This is idea is strengt as Heydon (2006) suggested, P1 continues as if the accusation from the previous turn was true. However, as l his goals, which are presumably to have S1 make a statement. Also S1 is more powerful position in the exchange. However, when S1 responds orally, the roles immediately reverse. In line 30, S1 denies ownership of the drugs, but does not directly denial. S1 then repeats his denial. S1 has, at least momentarily, lost his power in these two turns because he has been controlled by P1 and helped P1 to achieve his own goals. Extracts 5 and 6 suggest that the most powerful linguistic approach to the police interview is simply to remain silent. As long as the suspect uses silence, they occupy the more powerful position during the exchange. This is opposite of what we intuitively assume. Becau se the police those who enforce the law in high esteem, we expect the police officer to be the more powerful participant during the evidentiary interviews. Ladegaa rd (2009 ) encountered a similar situation between teachers and students. In his study, the teachers were conducting interviews with their students in which the students were forced to participate. He expected the teachers to be more in control of the excha nges than the students, but what he found was that the students


56 used various resistance techniques to undermine the teacher (i.e. low volume, silence, power and occupie d the more powerful position themselves. The present stu dy is similar to Ladegaard (2009 ) in many ways. Firstly, both are examining interviews between powerfully asymmetric participants. For Ladegaard, the teachers have the prestige in society while the st udents do not, and in the present study there is a similar dichotomy between the police officers, who are the socially prestigious party, and the suspects. Also, these interviews are not truly voluntary. In both scenarios, neither the student nor the suspe ct can choose to opt out of the exchange. They are forced to, at least mechanically, participate for as long as the institution requires. Finally, in both works we expect the participant with more social prestige (teachers/police officers) to occupy the mo re powerful role, yet the opposite is true. For both the p resent study and Ladegaard (2009 ), we see that power in the exchange is not determined by social norms. This section has shown that while coercion in police interviews is a real and important concer n, the Miranda Warning has in fact given the suspects a powerful resource. Silence does shield the suspect from the investigator but only for the turn it is employed. In turns where the suspect has responded with silence, we see a power shift in the suspec the investigator.


57 CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION Previous litigation has shown that silence has proven to be a major difficulty to ensuring Fifth Amendment rights, and the present study has argued that it is because silence is little understood and underrepresented. While it is easy to assume that silenc e is devoid of meaning, it has turned out to have numerous and surprising effects on the police interview, if not conversation as a whole that may have more linguistic implications than originally expected. Following the typology of silence established by Bilmes (1994) and Kurzon (1995, 1998, 2007), we sought to establish a theory of conversational silence as a understanding an indirect speech act helped to show not only how silence could be interpreted, but how it could be employed in a general exchange and have many acts provided the foundation for conversational silence to be consid ered as a response. Because silence has not been previously understood as a response, it has also been underrepresented in transcription. In transcribing instances of conversational silence as a conversational turn, following the model presented by Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson (1974), we were able to better represent the suspect during the police interview and illustrated a very different structure for the sections of the interview where conversational silence occurred, as opposed to the conventional str ucture where silence is not assigned to a participant. This new structure suggested that we should reexamine the role of the suspect in the police interview, as they now appeared to have a more prominent and active role.


58 Considering the large amount of pre vious and current litigation created to preserve rights, it is surprising that conversational silence gives the suspect the more powerful position in the interview. However, after the Court established that silence could not be used in court as e vidence against the suspect, the vast majority of cases concerning silence are not actually debating the silences that occur during the interview, but the statements that a suspect made after employing silence for a significant amount of time. This work su ggests that when transcribing any exchange, conversational silence should be assigned to a particular speaker. Conversational silence is an active choice and carries at least superficial meaning. Representing it accurately can alter our entire understandin g of an exchange. It also suggests that while the Miranda Warning has garnered heavy criticism, the linguistic tool it provides is very effective when fully understood and correctly used, though its effectiveness is limited to that specific conversational turn. This could help to solve some of the difficulties the Court is facing when someone has invoked their right to silence. If conversational silence is only effective during the turn it is used, then that right is invoked on a turn by turn basis unless t he suspect directly states that they are invoking their right to silence. Limitations While illuminating, this study does have numerous limitations. Firstly, it could benefit from additional data. While the data used here is strong, it is very possible th at conversational silence has more effects on the police interview than what was seen here, either because they were not present in the data or there was not enough data to recognize the pattern.


59 Also, this work could only make assumptions as to the psych ological motivations of the participants. Future work should attempt to triangulate with participants as their reasoning or thoughts while using/experiencing conversational silence could reveal new aspects of the phenomena. Future Research This work opens up the floor for numerous questions and avenues of research. Firstly, this work has looked solely at silence in police interviews. Future research should also examine the effects of conversational silence in daily and casual conversation. Also, all parti cipants in this study were native English speakers. Future research should reexamine silence in interpreted and bilingual interviews (see Nakane, 2007, 2011). It is possible that the findings presented here are not universal, and if that is the case we nee d to have a better understanding of how silence functions in that context so as to ensure that Fifth Amendment rights are protected for all speakers. Finally, future work should also examine the differences in conversational silences in police interviews when employed by first time offenders versus repeat offenders. All of the suspects in this study were repeat offenders and there was still a difference in ability to successfully employ silence. How first time offenders handle conversational silence in pol ice interviews could not only reveal information about silence in daily conversation, but issues in voice and police interviews as well.


60 APPENDIX INTERVIEW S Interview 1 Interview 1.1 P1: Interviewer S1: Interviewee 1 help me out 2 P1: anything gonna help you out? ((shrugs)) 3 4 S1: even if I make a story up for you, 5 S1: and tell you oh yeah look this is what happened, 6 S1: >duh duh duh duh duh< 7 way. 8 9 P1: ((shrug)) 10 S1: (sure) ( may 11 12 13 14 S1: 15 16 ha how is even that gonna help me. 17 18 P1: I think you got it. 19 S1: (5.4) 20 P1: strait from the source. 21 S1: (1.9) 22 23 24 S1: (1.6) 25 P1: you got it from the plant. 26 S1: (10.1) 27 ight 28 S1: hm 29 30 31 P1: (3.5) 32


61 Interview 1.2 P1: Interviewer S1: Suspect 1 2 gonna sit here and treat ya like a: like a pu:nk, 3 P1: or like ya know, like your some kid 4 5 6 S1: (1.7) 7 P1: but give me the same courtesy. people do st upid things. 8 S1: (4.0) 9 P1: people do stupid things all the time 10 P1: people have bills people have unexpected expenses 11 12 S1: (6.4) 13 14 P1: (2.5) 15 P1: valid excuses ya 16 P1: know, I can, sympathize at least that people get into a 17 18 P1: of, or maybe they regret what I 19 you know, think any less than horribly on, is 20 21 22 23 S1: (4.6) 24 P1: people do stupid things. 25 S1: ( 18.25) 26 P1: I mean jus jus tell me whats up man, 27 S1: (4.4) 28 29 30 S1: (8.1) 31 32 r:e 33 S1: 34


62 Interview 1.3 P1: Interviewer S1: Suspect 1 P1: So threatening 2 what I do and if you happen to be out on 3 P1: bond when it hits you ya happen to be out on bond when it hits 4 5 6 P1: cove (um) 7 S1: (1.14) 8 P1: now would be the time to lay it out there, and we get it all done, 9 P1: you go down there under one bo:nd, and when you bond out (1.7) 10 P1: you still gotta face the trial when it comes an d you still gotta deal 11 P1: with that and you still gotta deal with the consequences. 12 P1: but 13 P1: up to ya one day, tap you on the shoulder and say put your hands 14 P1: behind your back [I gotta warrant ] for your arrest 15 S1: 16 P1: hm 17 18 P1: =I know! 19 day 20 P1: I know 21 S1: all day ery day 22 P1: do you want me showin up at your car wash with an arrest warrant 23 P1: in hand, (to) lock ya up 24 S1: [for what? 25 P1: [f 26 P1: I m ((motions w hands)) 27 28 P1: [[ ye you 29 P1: you would know better than I would. 30 31 P1: well, 32 for weed, (I can tell you that now) 33 34 P1: 35 P1: thas 36 P1: you either got some connections that can get you weight like 37 P1: that, or 38 S1: (4.9) 39 P1: those are the two options those are the only way that works 40 P1: now (you) say thas not you: gearin up for the weekend so you 41 P1: swing by the guy on the corner and say hey man hook me up I


63 42 P1: gonna have some friends over an party this weekend no 43 more an what would be 44 P1: considered a normal amount. 45 S1: (5.9) 46 P1: So 47 weight (and) probably 48 P1: growning. 49 S1: (3.16) 50 51 P1: in Mexico, (and) bailed up and shipped over here. 52 S1: (2.18) 53 54 S1: (4.21) 55 56 57 S1: (8.3) 58 P1: and ta top it all off I know where you live so I know last time 59 P1: where you were doin it at 60 it was like I said, it was at the wrong place at 61 62 P1: [an it an it may be] and that may be 63 64 S1: over there so. never. I do 65 P1: mk 66 (3.7) 67 68 S1: to 3 rd and 23 rd and tell them to lock me up 69 (6.6) 70


64 Interview 2 Interv iew 2.1 Miranda Rights P2: Interviewer S2: Suspect 1 P2: alright ((sitting down)) Eric look up at me for a second man 2 S2: ((sits up and looks toward P2)) 3 4 P2: around with ya or anything I know we talked before when you were 5 P2: in the jail but 6 you prolly saw 7 P2: where Mark was indicted by the grand jury, and the state 8 9 P2: penalty against Mark Jones. ok 10 P2: (1.5) what Mark Jones did with that information was, him and 11 12 P2: take the death penalty off the table if he gives up the other two 13 P2: people that were in the house. 14 15 P2: and not only did he give you up, but, he said yer the shooter. 16 P2: that you shot those kids. if you wanna tell me somethin dif ferent 17 P2: I am 18 P2: believe own life obviously mkay, 19 P2: you have something d different to tell me, I need to tell you what 20 P2: your rights are and we can talk ok but (1.6) we know what 21 P2: happened that night. kay, I kno:w that you ended up havin to give 22 P2: Taylor Johnson your phone that night. I know that you guys had to 23 24 P2: that mu if you 25 P2: have loyalty to Mark Jones he has none. towards you. and that 26 and not ((gestures away from self)) 27 P2: Ya know its no coincidence that this goes on last week and that 28 P2: here we are, now with you ok, 29 P2: so lemmie tell ya what your rights are. 30 (3.5) 31 P2: aight, Eric you have the right to remain silent do you 32 33 S2: ((nods)) 34 P2: can you say it out loud for me 35 S2: mmhm 36 P2: jus say can you say yes = 37 S2: =yes 38 P2: ok. anything you say may be used against you in court, do you


65 39 P2: understand that? 40 S2: ((nods)) 41 P2: can you say it out loud for me 42 S2: yea: 43 P2: kay. you have the right to talk to attorney before and during 44 P2: questioning do you understa nd that. 45 S2: yes sir 46 P2: if you cannot afford an attorney and want one one will be 47 P2: provided for you, before questioning without charge do you 48 P2: understand that? 49 S2: (3.2) you said what? 50 P2: if you cannot afford a lawyer, and want one one will be provided for 51 P2: you before questioning without charge do you understand that 52 S2: ((nods)) yes 53 P2: ok, has anyone threatened you or promised you anything to get 54 P2: you to talk with me 55 56 P2: ok. you wanna tell me your version of what h appened that night 57 P2: Eric? 58 S2: ((drinks water)) 59 S2: that last thing you said was what 60 P2: the last thing I just said? 61 S2: ((nods)) 62 P2: I said do you want to tell me your version, of what happened 63 64 65 P2: the last thing I read, has anyone threatened you or promised you 66 P2: anything, to get you to talk with me. 67 S2: (4.91) 68 S2: (what about) before that 69 P2: ((checks book)) if you cannot afford a lawyer and want one, one 70 P2: will be provided for you, before questioning, without charge. 71 S2: (12.0) 72 S2: I forget what you said 73 P2: Eric you need to do yourself a favor right here big guy, 74 P2: alright 75 S2: (4.3) 76 P2: Mark is trading his life for yers. 77 S2: (3.0) (that 78 S2: if he told his his lawyer that I did, = 79 80 S2: he told the state attorney? 81 P2: mmhm 82 S2: and they said I did it 83 P2: he said not only that you were there, he said that you were the 84 P2: shooter. That i in fact you guys were just supposed to go there to


66 85 you took 86 P2: things to the next level. that was what he said his plan was just go 87 you got outta hand. 88 S2: ((belches)) escuse me 89 S2: (4.8) 90 the other thing you need to know Eric, 91 92 P2: arrested before in his life 93 P2: think 94 95 96 se. ok 97 why would they say I did this 98 P2: (ju) cause you were there. ok. and they know you were there. 99 S2: ((shakes head)) mm mm mm mm 100 S2: (5.08) 101 S2: they was just (pud 102 t you] askin me questions Eric 103 S2: I ] 104 P2: you questions, if you wanna tell me yer version 105 106 107 me questio 108 S2: 109 P2: arrest for the murder of Matt Tennant. and, Mark Jones, 110 P2: fingered you for that. if you wanna tell me, and not only that 111 P2: said you were the shooter. if you wanna t ell me something different 112 very 113 P2: Mark Jones. 114 S2: ((shakes head)) 115 116 S2: (9.44) 117 charged with this 118 S2: (2.28) eh what you 119 without 120 S2: a lawyer here 121 P2: Y 122 S2: =[alright] 123 P2: [a judge ] what we did, we put the facts inside of a warrant, a 124 for murder. 125 P2: for first degree murder. 126 127 S2: so I need a lawyer to talk to yall, or I need a lawyer not to talk to 128 S2: yall 129 P2: i you whether or not you want a lawyer or not. 130


67 (what) 131 P2: the the state will appoint one later on to you 132 (27.2) 133 P2: Eric what happened that night man 134 S2: what night 135 P2: (3.4) that th e way is that the road you wanna go down? 136 S2: (5.57) 137 P2: is that the chance is that the gamble you wanna take with the rest 138 P2: of your life? 139 S2: (15.1) 140 141 P2: the one guy out there 142 S2: (10.1) 143 144 only one out of the five people that were 145 146 S2: (5.1) 147 n. 148 S2: (11.73) 149 150 151 S2: (4.4) 152 P2: for whatever reason. 153 In2: (3.78) 154 P2: and you bl you decided to allow Mark 155 P2: Jon es to trade his life for yours. 156 S2: (13.5) 157 tell what 158 but their makin 159 P2: it sound the best for them as they possibly can, right 160 S2: (5.3) 161 P2: i 162 P2: it was his deal. 163 S2: (6.5) 164 P2: that what you want a jury to hear? or do you want them to hear 165 P2: your side 166 S2: (27.6) 167


68 Interview 2.2 P2: Interviewer S2: Suspect ((returning to room with water)) 1 P2: Eric how old are you 2 S2: ((head down on table)) (6.39) 3 P2: how old are you Eric 4 S2: twenty six 5 P2: twenty: six? 6 S2: (3.6) 7 P2: you are a young man. (2.7) sit up for a second Eric 8 S2: ((sits up)) 9 P2: this is the thing about this. we know the who. we know the what 10 11 S2: (3.7) 12 P2: the pulling of the trigger is what kills people right 13 S2: (2.8) 14 P2: you had no reason to pull that trigger, those people 15 P2 : gonna testify against you, course they were gonna testify against 16 17 P2: who, has got dope charges to get involved in a murder all of a 18 P2: sudden. 19 20 P2: you had well, you had you were in [jail for] dope ((laugh))= 21 S2: [no::] 22 S2: =weed= 23 P2: =weed ((laugh)) yeah. 24 25 P2: right well, I call it dope. you were in there for weed. mkay. 26 P2: you smoke a little, maybe sell a little weed, 27 28 S2: (4.34) 29 P2: but I need you to tell me why you were out there that night. 30 S2: (5.18) 31 32 P2: (3.17) why they were out there, 33 S2: (4.89) 34 that only guy. 35 S2: (20.5) 36 37 S2: with murder now 38 P2: Sam Sam and Casey were charged with being principles (1.3) to 39 P2: murder. cause they were yalls look out. 40 S2: principles 41 P2: right


69 42 (2.27 ) 43 P2: you still spend the rest of your life in prison for it. 44 (3.01) 45 P2: you, Taylor, and Mark are being charged with first degree 46 P2: murder. 47 S2: I aint done nothing (with) Mark 48 (7.9) 49 P2: and you were the last one to get picked up. 50 S2: (5.0) 51 P2: an you d 52 S2: (8.5) 53 na 54 P2: that s went out there 55 P2: to kill people, 56 S2: (4.0) 57 P2: now I can prove that not true. but the rest of why you were 58 P2: out there or what you thought was gonna happen, you need to tell 59 P2: me. 60 S2: (10.46) 61 P2: why were you out there Eric 62 S2: (2.3) 63 P2: what did you think was gonna happen. 64 there 65 P2: I I have too many reasons to not to not believe that. 66 67 P2: there, its not gonna be good for ya. 68 S2: (the thing is) you said I was there cause people said I was there ( I think its) 69 P2: (1.8) not jus I I mean 70 P2: about these cases Eric too, if you go in there with the 71 72 P2: (1.7) they have no reason to lie about you. 73 S2: (9.8) 74 not sitting in a position right now where you can think 75 not ok, 76 77 78 P2: else in this case has. 79 S2: (1:06:57) 80 81 P2: the people that will decide that state attorneys, judges juries 82 P2: I can tell you from experience they wanna see a few things from 83 wha wh what is 84 P2: gonna happen to them. first of all they wanna see honesty 85 86 P2: lies.


70 87 S2: (4.8) 88 P2: you have to take the same steps that everybody else has in this 89 P2: case and tell us what happened that night, why you why 90 91 92 S2: (3.75) 93 P2: I need to know why Eric Anderson was out th ere that night. 94 P2: cause he was! don 95 P2: not gonna work out for ya. 96 S2: (1:14:7) 97 S2: what do immunity mean 98 P2: what does what mean? 99 S2: immunity 100 P2: immunity? immunity means that whatever you say: coul 101 P2: be used against you in court. 102 S2: (5.91) (why then) 103 104 105 P2: tell the truth well one of the things tha 106 P2: immunity, where they can come in and tell the truth and not have 107 P2: to worry about anything that they say u being used against them 108 P2: in court. 109 S2: (9.0) 110 111 S2: (called it that) on tv. 112 P2: oh yea have immunity Eric. 113 114


71 Interview 2.3 P2: Interviewer S2: Suspect 1 2 S2: (2.9) 3 P2: I can only sit here so long and talk with you about why you should 4 P2: ok ultimately its up to you its your decision. If you wanna 5 more 6 P2: than glad to go down that road with 7 8 P2: goin home 9 P2: be there for a long time. ok, you control what happens to you. to a 10 P2: certain degree. but it starts tonight, and it starts with the truth. 11 S2: (5.7) 12 if you wanna roll the dice, that is 13 P2: your decision as well? 14 S2: (5.4) 15 16 17 18 P2: it? (1.5) he gets the most. 19 S2: (4.6) 20 P2: as opposed to the people that are truthful, are remorseful, 21 P2: lik e we talked about. the people that decide what will happen to 22 P2: you they wanna see those things. 23 S2: (5.6) 24 25 you g to 26 27 P2: protect anybody in this case, and you know 28 29 S2: (3.3) 30 Eric. you 31 32 P2: you at this point. 33 S2: (4.9) 34 Eric look at me.


72 Interview 3 Interview 3.1 P4 Interviewer 1 P5 Interviewer 2 P6 Police Officer S3 Suspect ((door opens and P4 and P5 enter)) 1 P4: Kenny 2 S3: yeah 3 P4: sit up please oh, you still have th the cuffs on? 4 S3: yeah(hh) 5 P4: O:h [shit. 6 7 (1.5) 8 P4: hang on a second 9 P4: still had them on 10 (1.6) 11 12 13 P4: =oh they did? 14 S3: ye(h)ah! 15 P4: (hhh) 16 (1.9) 17 S3: I got grass stains (and) everything I get slammed on the ground, 18 S3: put in handcuffs and (thistles) all in my face for what? 19 P4: (2.9) I guess you guys were driving too fast toward them? Who 20 P4: was [driving,] your cousin? 21 S3: [ how ] 22 S3: no! I pulled up 23 S3: around the house 24 P4: Oh ok. So you guys go towards him? 25 26 P5: ((returns w/ P6)) let him take those off, 27 P5: you gotta stand up and (put your back to the door) 28 ((hand cuffs being removed)) 29 S3: thank you 30 P6: yep ((leaves room) 31 P4: alright, can you sit on that chair there [(and slide those over to me) 32 S3: 33 P4: thank you v ery much 34 35 P4: thanks 36 P5: thank you sir


73 37 S3: no problem 38 39 40 S3: 41 P4: [yeah] 42 43 gun in our 44 S3: face,= 45 P4: =well 46 P4: kno:w ya know= 47 S3: =[[ well:]] 48 P5: =[[he ]] he got a little spooked! 49 P4: he got spooked. So then [he um, 50 P5: [then the car came 51 P5: I guess on the grass ( ) 52 P4: yeah= 53 S3: =yeah because he was on the fence um:: and when we pulled in 54 S3: Kevin was like who was that? and I was like, what are you 55 56 S3: fence= 57 58 S3: so he pulled up towards him an: yeah we jumped we was about 59 S3: ta jump out the car, [but] when I opened my door he pulls his gun 60 P4: 61 S3: out 62 P4: yeah 63 S3: then I see all the other cars 64 snatchin for 65 S3: what ? 66 P4: well, you were scared they did 67 68 S3: (hhh) 69 P4: I apologize for that 70 71 (3.9) 72 73 P4: so you had a little excitement. 74 (2.1) 75 S3: so 76 77 78 (4.0) 79 P4: alright. We need to talk and straighten up some of the things we 80 u::h some of it did not pan out. Ok 81 82 P4: so::


74 83 84 P4: >oh here it is< 85 (2.3) 86 P4: damnit ((rustling papers)) 87 (8.5) 88 S3: I just wanna know if I am under arrest so I ca n know if I need to 89 S3: call my mom or not. 90 91 92 S3: 555, 93 P5: mhm 94 S3: 555, 95 P5: mhm 96 S3: 5555. 97 P5: ok(h) and her first name? 98 S3: Mary. 99 P5: Mary? 100 S3: 101 (2.8) 102 P5: you got your phone on you? 103 104 (8.9) 105 106 P5: as far as we know 107 108 S3: what about Kevin 109 P4: [[( ) 110 P5: [[what happened with Kevin? 111 S3: Oh they had him on the ground too! 112 113 (5.9) 114 115 P5: we did 116 S3: I:: was comin! She I told her that I had to go pick up my girlfriend 117 S3: cause I just left probation which I have the paperwork right here. 118 P5: mhm 119 120 S3: house to pick up my girlfriend now, 121 P5: mhm 122 123 S3 : phone. And I even called you. and told you what I was doin. 124 P4: >yeah.<= 125 126 P5: uh, she y 127 gain. 128 (3.1)


75 129 P4: A(h)lright. You ready? 130 (3.5) 131 P4: This is a statement from Kenny Johnstone I always say it wrong 132 133 S3: =no problem= 134 P4: uh, black male date of birth is seven nine of eighty fou:r, person 135 P4: conducting the interview is detective Morrison, location statement 136 P4: is being taken is, u:h Orlando police headquarters CID: room 137 138 P4: eleven, the case number is four nine zero one hundr ed, its in 139 P4: reference to a homicide, other person present during the interview 140 P4: is detective Smith, beginning time, of the statement is 8:58 pm, 141 P4: a:::nd sir can you raise your right hand for me? 142 P4: do you solemnly swear or affirm that the tes timony you shall give in 143 P4: this case shall be the truth the whole truth and nothing but the 144 P4: truth? 145 146 147 P4: talking ok um you have the right to remain silent. Do yo u 148 P4: understand? 149 150 P4: =anything you say may be used against you in court. do you 151 P4: understand? 152 153 P4: you have the right to talk to a lawyer before and during 154 P4: questioning, you understand 155 156 P4: if you cannot a fford a lawyer and want one one will be provided 157 P4: for you prio um before questioning without charge. do you 158 P4: understand? 159 160 P4: has anyone threatened you or promised you anything to get you to 161 P4: talk to us today? 162 163 P4: ok. (2.2) alright, um: basically today Kenny, we would like to get 164 P4: the whole truth from you about what happened yesterday, because 165 P4: we know for sure now that there are some things that you left out, 166 tell us about. 167 168 here (.) for: I 169 170 S3: know that was a long night for me. So yeah, I may not uh 171 S3: remembered every single detail= 172 P4: =well= 173 174


7 6 175 anything 176 P4: wrong why did you leave out all these important informations tha 177 P4: that for example, you were the one that came and knock on 178 P4: the door and told Tammy totake her man to the hospital. Why 179 P4: leave that out know that and I know 180 P4: that. 181 S3: So who told you I did that? 182 P5: we been we know you did it. 183 S3: O:kay 184 P4: ok. is that not an important fact? 185 186 P4: [WITH YOUR FRIEND BEING MURDERED? 187 188 S3: know that. 189 P4: is that not what happened? 190 S3: (1.3) 191 P5: Are we lyin? 192 193 P5: are we lying? 194 195 P5: ok 196 is I wanna know 197 198 P5: ] 199 S3: mom so she can get an attorney. 200 (3.4) 201 P5: [[ok 202 S3: [[other than that, 203 P4: well you came here in 204 S3: 205 S3: I came here in handcuffs!= 206 207 208 S3: okay then 209 P5: so what would you like to do 210 S3: (2.4) 211 P4: you gotta talk t o us Kenny. 212 S3: why I gotta talk to you.


77 Video 3.2 P4 Interviewer1 P5 Interviewer2 P6 Police Officer S3 Suspect 1 2 S3: huh? 3 P5: HUH? 4 S3: I told my probation officer he was what 5 P5: shot in your car 6 7 8 S3: no. what I told her is when I went down there today is that I was 9 10 S3: she 11 S3: asked me what happened I said well, uh Tammy supposedly took 12 S3: him to the hospital, a:nd I heard later on that he was dead. 13 14 S3: what I said 15 S3: you can call her in here. 16 P5: we already talked to her. 17 S3: [Okay! 18 P5: [In fact we know ya left long before you told her ya left. 19 S3: [(is that the)] 20 P5: [we know] exactly when you left 21 S3: ok so when did I leave? 22 P5: between four and fou r fifteen 23 24 from the 25 S3: bank. (1.4) Now: if you ask him, he should have a statement. He 26 S3: went to the bank, and he was su pposed to come back. 27 S3: [I was sitting outside on the curb ] 28 P5: [Your probation officer told us] that you told her, that your good 29 30 S3: I told her that my friend is dead yeah. 31 32 33 34 35 that he was dead so, 36 S3: okay, [you just put two and two together 37 P5: [and you know what you got 38 39


78 40 P5: down your face and ya knew it the whole time. the w hole time we 41 42 S3: Okay. So how do I know? 43 P4: [[cause you drove him 44 P5: [[CAUSE YOU DROVE THE DEAD GUY BACK TO THE HOUSE 45 46 P5: who we did not tell you he died on the way to the hospital= 47 P4: =we did not tell you [such a thing 48 S3: 49 S3: [on the way to the hospital= 50 P4: [we did not tell you such a thing 51 P5:=WE DID NOT 52 S3: okay. 53 P4: alright 54 S3: okay 55 S3: cause I coulda 56 S3: got to the hospital 57 S3: dropped him off. 58 P4: Kenny 59 S3: no, it aint no Kenny because I know where I was at [I know] who 60 P4: [Kenny] 61 S3: w 62 P5: 63 S3: and question me about this so 64 P5: what four guys 65 S3: (1.8) 66 P4: Kenny you have no explanation why: Sal is dead in your car? 67 P4: was it a robbery? 68 S3: (4.7) 69 P4: you told us yesterday that you were taking him to pick up a 70 P4: package. 71 S3: (2.4) 72 P4: did you tell us that or no 73 S3: (3.0) 74 P4: remember that? 75 S3: (4.3) 76 77 P4: us that it was gonna be a drug transaction, 78 79 P5: =yeah ya did 80 P4: you gave us an explanation for what [a package meant to you okay 81 S3: [well I don 82 S3: all that [like I said 83 P4: [where did he actually get shot Kenny, wher:e 84


79 Video 3.3 P4 Interviewer1 P5 Interviewer2 P6 Police Officer S3 Suspect 29 P5: did you set him up? 30 S3: ((looking at P5)) (4.1) 31 P5: yeah I asked you. did you set him up 32 S3: ((looks away)) (5.0) 33 P5: were they supposed to rob him and take the cash and not kill him 34 S3: ((snorts)) you tell me. 35 (3.0) 36 37 S3: alone ? you know how many times I come see him? Why the he ll 38 S3: do I gotta go somewhere and set him up 39 P4: Was he robbed?= 40 if I had] wanted to do it I coulda 41 P4: [did they rob him?] 42 S3: been did it. 43 (3.1) 44 always but I go over th ere a lot 45 46 47 P4: 48 49 S3: 50 51 P4: be such a good friend. 52 S3: I will be there for him 53 54 P4: shooting took place. 55 S3: ah eh(hh) 56 P4: that much Kenny you can tell us if you have a conscience 57 S3: I have a conscience= 58 P4: = where did he get shot 59 S3: (5.1) 60 in fact if thas al 61 62 ot get 63 P5: shot in the car, who put him in the car 64 S3: (6.8) 65 P5: did you at least put him in the car and try and get him help? 66 S3: (2.6) he may he got to the hospital 67 P5: did you at least put him in the car and try to get him help. 68 S3: he got to the hosp ital


80 69 P5: answer the question. Did you at least put him in the care and try 70 P5: to get him help. Yes or no 71 S3: (49.3) 72 S3: ((looks up)) guess not, he dead 73 74 S3: (8.7) 75 P5: are you 76 S3: (6.9) 77 P5: do you feel like you could have done something differently to help 78 P5: him survive? 79 S3: (6.8) 80 one on:e, 81 S3: (3.6) 82 P5: rather than drive him all the way back home? 83 S3: (12.3) 84 S3: what you want me to do pull up to the hospital an:: say that he 85 86 S3: want? 87 P5: what I 88 re he 89 know his people 90 P5: [ok] 91 P5: ok 92 93 P5: ok 94 (3.7) 95 P4: so you were just being a good friend by giving him a ride to do a 96 P4: drug deal.= 97 P5: =just like he asked you to in the room 98 ask me to take him to a drug deal 99 100 101 102 P5: but you and I established yesterday: that you knew what that 103 P5: meant. 104 S3: usually yeah 105 S3: package, I mean 106 P5: you saw a drug transaction in the room, you knew what it meant 107 P5: you knew what you were going to do,= 108 S3: =the package could be money, could be drugs 109 110 P5: kay 111 112 113 know what it is. 114 P5: why did he want you to take him


81 115 S3: because he had a car I mean: the car was there. My girl and his 116 117 P5: 118 119 120 121 S3: he never goes in the eclipse anywhere every time I come over 122 S3: there if he has to go somewhere he asks me to take him. 123 S3: (1.8) and I always take him where ever he needs to go: an: you 124 S3: know bring him back home, you know, when he looked at me like 125 S3: hey can you take me to 126 127 128 P4: so you were supposed to have his back last night 129 130 S3: (7.6) 131 132 P5: murder than you are. Please tell me that. 133 the information that you want 134 P5: ok, you know enough to help us figure it out. 135 P4: you can tell us exactly [w here you took him 136 P5: [we have been working tirelessly on this. 137 138 139 P4: you can do this Kenny. You can help you r friend. 140 141 (hhh) 142 S3: (54.6) 143 144 P4: (.) yep 145 146 147 148 S3: to what you wanna know.


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85 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Sarah majored in linguistics and focused on sociolinguistics, discourse analysis and pragmatics. She graduated with a Master of Arts from the University of Florida in the spring of 2014.