A Critical Discourse Analysis of Al-Ahram and Aljazeera's Online Covergae of Egypt's 2011 Revolution

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Title:
A Critical Discourse Analysis of Al-Ahram and Aljazeera's Online Covergae of Egypt's 2011 Revolution
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1 online resource (247 p.)
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english
Creator:
Alhumaidi, Majid M
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University of Florida
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Gainesville, Fla.
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Degree:
Doctorate ( Ph.D.)
Degree Grantor:
University of Florida
Degree Disciplines:
Linguistics
Committee Chair:
BOXER,DIANA
Committee Co-Chair:
MCLAUGHLIN,FIONA
Committee Members:
HADDAD,YOUSSEF A
ARFI,BADREDINE

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Subjects / Keywords:
alahram -- aljazeera -- analysis -- arab -- critical -- discourse -- spring
Linguistics -- Dissertations, Academic -- UF
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Linguistics thesis, Ph.D.
bibliography   ( marcgt )
theses   ( marcgt )
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent)   ( marcgt )
born-digital   ( sobekcm )
Electronic Thesis or Dissertation

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Abstract:
Utilizing a Critical Discourse Analysis approach, this study compares and contrasts Al-Ahram and Aljazeera online coverage of Egypt's 2011 Revolution. Following Fairclough's three-dimensional framework, the study examines how the two outlets represented the protests and the antagonists both textually and discursively from Jan. 25, 2011, the first day of the uprising, until Feb. 14, 2011, three days after President Hosni Mubarak stepped down. It also investigates the social and political context to relate text to context and provide a comprehensive explanation of media discourse during the Revolution.  It employs five analytic tools to analyze the data textually and discursively including lexicalization and predication, presupposition, verbal process, intertextuality, and topics. The study finds differences between Al-Ahram and Aljazeera's coverage on both the textual and discursive level; it also finds that the two outlets had group polarization characteristics in their reporting of the uprising: the ingroup in Al-Ahram's reporting was the Egyptian government and the outgroup was the protesters, while the ingroup in Aljazeera's reporting was the protesters and the outgroup was the Egyptian government. Certain textual and/or discursive practice features, however, were more salient or manifested themselves differently after Feb. 2, 2011, which was considered a turning point in the two outlets' reporting of the event. I examine the immediate social and political context and observe that the shift in Al-Ahram and Aljazeera's reporting strategies was due to two sociopolitical developments during the uprising: 1) the US withdrawal of support to Mubarak's regime and 2) the Battle of the Camel. Despite the role played by the media during Egypt's 2011 Revolution, it is expected that genuine, grass-roots media change in Egypt will depend on political change and consistent steps toward democracy and freedoms.
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In the series University of Florida Digital Collections.
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Includes vita.
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Includes bibliographical references.
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Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page.
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Statement of Responsibility:
by Majid M Alhumaidi.
Thesis:
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Florida, 2013.
Local:
Adviser: BOXER,DIANA.
Local:
Co-adviser: MCLAUGHLIN,FIONA.

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UFE0046068:00001


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1 A CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF AL AHRAM AND ALJAZEERA 'S ONLINE By MAJID ALHUMAIDI A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2013

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2 2013 Majid Alhumaidi

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3 To my Mother and Father

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4 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS First and foremost, I am extremely grateful to Allah the A lmighty for His uncounted blessings. I am also grateful to my chair Professor Diana Boxer, who has supported and guided me from the inception of this project until the end, and made every step of w riting th is dissertati on a very unique learning experience; I owe her my deepest gratitude for her patience and professionalism. I would also like to extend my thanks to my co chair, Dr. Fiona McLaughlin, and to my committee members, Dr. Youssef Haddad and Dr. Badredine Arfi. Their invaluable comments and feedback made the completion of this study possible. I owe inexpressible love and gratitude to my mother, Munirah Alsoghayer, and my father, Mohammed Alhumaidi. To them I dedicate this work. Last but not l east, t his work could have never been achieved without the support and sacrifice of my beloved wife, Arwa Alkhalifah. To her I am tru ly indebted

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5 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................ ................................ ............................... 4 LIST OF TABLES ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 8 LIST OF ABBREV IATIONS ................................ ................................ ........................... 11 ABSTRACT ................................ ................................ ................................ ................... 12 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 14 1.1 Overview ................................ ................................ ................................ ........... 14 1.2 The Event: a Background ................................ ................................ ................. 16 1.3 Review of Literature ................................ ................................ .......................... 21 1.4 Purpose of the Study ................................ ................................ ........................ 28 1.5 Research Questions ................................ ................................ ......................... 30 1.6 Si gnificance of the Study ................................ ................................ .................. 31 1.7 Why Al Ahram ? ................................ ................................ ................................ 34 1.8 Why Aljazeera ? ................................ ................................ ................................ 36 1.9 Dissertation Layout ................................ ................................ ........................... 39 2 TH EORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND DISCURSIVE PRACTICE ............................ 43 2.1 Overview ................................ ................................ ................................ ........... 43 2.2 Theoretical Framework ................................ ................................ ..................... 43 2.2.1 What is CDA? ................................ ................................ ........................ 44 2.2.2 Media Discourse Analysis ................................ ................................ ...... 47 2.2.3 CDA Approaches ................................ ................................ ................... 51 2.2.3.1 ................................ ................................ 52 2.2.3.2 ................................ ................................ .. 55 2.2.3.3 ................................ ............................. 56 2.2.4 Model of Analysis ................................ ................................ ................... 60 2.2.4.1 Lexicalization and predication ................................ ................... 60 2.2.4.2 Presupposition ................................ ................................ .......... 62 2.2.4.3 Verbal process ................................ ................................ .......... 63 2.2.4. 4 Intertextuality ................................ ................................ ............ 65 2.2.4.5 Topics ................................ ................................ ....................... 68 2.3 Discursive practice ................................ ................................ ............................ 71 2.3.1 Ideology ................................ ................................ ................................ 72 2.3.2 Power, Hegemony, and the Role of the Media ................................ ...... 74 3 METHODOLOGY AND TEXTUAL ANALYSIS ................................ ....................... 81 3.1 Overview ................................ ................................ ................................ ........... 81

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6 3.2 Methodology ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 81 3.3 Textual Analysis ................................ ................................ ................................ 82 3.3.1 Le xicalization and Predication ................................ ............................... 83 3.3.1.1 The two sides of the conflict ................................ ...................... 83 3.3.1.2 Death or martyrdom? ................................ ................................ 89 3.3.1.3 A Revolution? ................................ ................................ ........... 91 3.3.1. 4 baltagiyya ................................ ......................... 94 3.3.2 Presupposition ................................ ................................ ....................... 97 3.3.3 Verbal Process ................................ ................................ .................... 100 3.4 Summary ................................ ................................ ................................ ........ 103 4 DISCURSIVE PRA CTICE ANALYSIS ................................ ................................ .. 122 4.1 Overview ................................ ................................ ................................ ......... 122 4.2 Intertextuality ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 123 4.3 Topics ................................ ................................ ................................ ............. 131 4.3.1 The Protests ................................ ................................ ........................ 134 4.3.2 Th e President, Government, and the NDP ................................ .......... 139 4.3.3 The Religious Institution ................................ ................................ ...... 144 4.3.4 The International Community ................................ ............................... 148 4.3.5 The U.S. Position ................................ ................................ ................. 153 4.4 Summary ................................ ................................ ................................ ........ 156 5 DISCUSSION ................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 179 5.1 Overview ................................ ................................ ................................ ......... 179 5.2 Group Polarization on the Textual Level ................................ ......................... 180 5.3 Group Polarization on the Discursive Practice Level ................................ ...... 185 5.4 A Turning Point ................................ ................................ ............................... 193 5.5 Hegemonic and Counter Hegemonic Discourse ................................ ............. 199 5.6 Prospects for the Future of Egyptian Media Landscape ................................ 203 5.7 Summary ................................ ................................ ................................ ........ 206 6 CONCLUSIONS ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 209 6.1 Overview ................................ ................................ ................................ ......... 209 6.2 Theoretical Reflections ................................ ................................ ................... 210 6.3 The Representation of the Protests and the Antagonists ................................ 213 6.3.1 The Representation of the Protests ................................ ..................... 214 6.3.2 The Representation of the Protesters ................................ .................. 215 6.3.3 The Representation of the Egyptian Government ................................ 216 6.4 Competing Discourses at Times of Crisis ................................ ....................... 219 6.5 Study Limitations and Implications for Future Research ................................ 221 APPENDIX A ARTICLES FROM AL AHRAM ................................ ................................ ............. 223 B ARTICLES FROM ALJAZEERA ................................ ................................ ........... 231

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7 LIST OF REFERENCES ................................ ................................ ............................. 236 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ................................ ................................ .......................... 247

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8 LIST OF TABLES Table page 2 1 Describing/attributing positive action: ................................ ................................ 80 2 2 Sayer, Verbal process, and Verbiage example ................................ .................. 80 3 1 Predications used by Al Ahram and Aljazeera to describe opposing groups .... 106 3 2 Al Ahram and Aljazeera naming of the antagonists ................................ ....... 107 3 3 The naming and description of the protests by Al Ahram and Aljazeera .......... 109 3 4 Al Ahram and Aljazeera protests ................................ ................................ ................................ ............. 110 3 5 Al Ahram and Aljazeera departure ................................ ................................ ................................ .......... 111 3 6 Other occurrences of the term martyr in Al Ahram and Aljazeera coverage ..... 111 3 7 Occurrences of the term Revolution in Al Ahram and Aljazeera coverage ....... 112 3 8 ................................ 113 3 9 Al Ahram and Aljazeera use of the term baltagiyya and its derivatives ............ 114 3 10 Al Ahram presuppositions ................................ ................................ ................ 116 3 11 Aljazeera presuppositions ................................ ................................ ................ 117 3 12 Verbal process in Al Ahram and Aljazeera coverage during the first days of the protests ................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 118 3 13 Verbal process in Al Ahram and Aljazeera coverage after Feb. 2 .................... 101 4 1 A sample of voices included in Al Ahram coverage ................................ .......... 159 4 2 Indirect quoting in Al Ahram ................................ ................................ ............. 159 4 3 Aljazeera ............... 160 4 4 A sample of voices included in Aljazeera coverage ................................ .......... 160 4 5 Examples of government voices in Aljazeera ................................ 162 4 6 Aljazeera ................................ .............................. 162

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9 4 7 Aljazeera so called ................. 163 4 8 Aljazeera baltagiyya in the authorial voice by the end of the Revolution ................................ ................................ ................................ ........ 163 4 9 Al Ahram Aljazeera transmission ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 164 4 10 Al Ahram ................................ 164 4 11 Headlines of articles on protests in Al Ahram uprising ................................ ................................ ................................ ............. 164 4 12 Other headlines and lead paragraphs on protests in Al Ahram the outset of the uprising ................................ ................................ .................. 165 4 1 3 Headlines of ar ticles on protests in Al Ahram ................. 165 4 14 Aljazeera ....................... 166 4 15 Headlines on demonstrations outside Egypt in Aljazeera ............... 167 4 16 Aljazeera uprising ................................ ................................ ................................ ............. 167 4 17 Headlines of articles on Mubarak before his stepping down in Al Ahram coverage ................................ ................................ ................................ ........... 168 4 18 Headlines of articles on Mubarak after his stepping down in Al Ahram coverage ................................ ................................ ................................ ........... 168 4 19 Headl ines of articles on government and NDP officials in Al Ahram ................................ ...................... 169 4 20 The NDP in Al Ahr am ................................ ................ 169 4 21 Headlines of articles on Mubarak that emphasized opposing sources in Aljazeera ................................ ................................ ........................ 17 0 4 22 Headlines of other articles on Mubarak in Aljazeera ...................... 170 4 23 Headlines of articles on the Egyptian government and the NDP in Aljazeera coverage ................................ ................................ ................................ ........... 171 4 24 Al Ahram ................................ 171 4 25 Aljazeera ................................ .......... 172 4 26 Al Ahram and Aljazeera Awqaf ........................... 172

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10 4 27 Al Ahram and Aljazeera fatwas on protesting ............................. 173 4 28 Al Ahram ............ 173 4 29 Al Ahram emphasizing of positions against the regime ............................. 174 4 30 Aljazeera ............................ 175 4 31 Aljazeera ........................... 175 4 32 Headlines of articles on President Obama in Al Ahram and Aljazeera coverage ................................ ................................ ................................ ........... 176 4 33 The inclusion of different U.S. sources in Aljazeera ....................... 177 4 34 Al Ahram ....................... 178

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11 L IST O F ABBREVIATIONS T ERM : Definition CDA Critical Discourse Analysis CDS Critical Discourse Studies CIA Central Intelligence Agency CL Critical Linguistics DA Discourse Analysis EU European Union ISA Ideological State Apparatus MB Muslim Brotherhood NDP National Democratic Party RSA Repressive State Apparatus UN United Nations

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12 Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy A CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF AL AHRAM AND ALJAZEERA 'S ONLINE By Majid Alhumaidi December 2013 Chair: Diana Boxer Cochair: Fiona Mc Laughlin Major: Linguistics Utilizing a Critical Discourse Analysis approach, this study compares and contrasts Al Ahram and Aljazeera online coverage of Egypt's 2011 Revolution. Following Fairclough's three dimensional framework, the stu dy examines how the two outlets represented the protests and the antagonists both textually and discursively from Jan. 25, 2011, the first day of the uprising, until Feb. 14, 2011, three days after President Hosni Mubarak stepped down. It also investigates the social and political context to relate text to context and provide a comprehensive explanation of media discourse during the Revolution. It examines five textual and discursive practice features to analyze the data textually and discursively includi ng lexicalization and predication, presupposition, verbal process, intertextuality, and topics. The study finds differences between Al Ahram and Aljazeera 's coverage on both the textual and discursive level; it also finds that the two outlets had group pol arization characteristics in thei r reporting of the uprising: t he ingroup in Al Ahram 's reporting was the Egyptian government and the outgroup was the protesters, while the ingroup in Aljazeera 's reporting was the protesters and the outgroup was the Egyptian government. Certain

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13 textual and/or discursive practice features, however, were more salient or manifested themselves differently after Feb. 2, 2011, which was considered a turning point in t he two outlets' reporting of the event. I examine the immediate social and political context and observe that the shift in Al Ahram and Aljazeera 's reporting strategies was due to two sociopolitical developments during the uprising: 1) the US withdrawal of support to Mubarak's regime and 2) the Battle of the Camel. Despite the role played by the media during Egypt's 2011 Revolution, it is expected that genuine, grass roots media change in Egypt will depend on political change and consistent steps toward dem ocracy and freedoms.

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14 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 Overview On Feb. 11, 2011, Egypt embarked on a new era of its history after a popular uprising overthrew President Hosni Mubarak, who had ruled the country for 30 years. A few days after the Tunisian Jasm ine Revolution that ousted President Ben Ali, Egyptians from different walks of life took to the streets in different Egyptian cities with a unifying demand: t he downfall of the regime. The Revolution took the world by surprise; only a few days before the protests broke out, many analysts and Egyptian elite thought that having a Tunisian style uprising was impossible in Egypt. The media played an integral role in the Egyptian Revolution by reporting the events as they unfolded. The wide array of media outle ts yielded the production of news reports that portrayed one event in many different ways to the extent that it seemed that they were reporting different stories. The variation was primarily due to different ideological stances: o fficial media, on the one hand, represented the voice of the government whose aim, throughout decades, was to promote government practices and maintain dominance through a hegemonic discourse. Counter to this discourse was a more independent discourse represented by transnational m edia outlets such as Aljazeera which had gained prominence in the Arab world by the mid nineties. With the influx of transnational media pioneered by Aljazeera the hegemonic discourse of official media was challenged and uncovered. As El Nawawy and Iska ndar Aljazeera had opened a window to issues Aljazeera has rendered government media discourse less reliable by presenting events from a different perspective and

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15 con events. In other words, the emergence of Aljazeera and other transnational media outlets, broke the official media monopoly of dissemination of information. It also provided a n on Western alternative to official media. Before the proliferation of transnational media networks, only the elite in the Arab world had access to Western media outlets such as CNN and BBC, which presented a non official narrative of their causes and issue s (Seib, 2007). Although these services provided more reliable news coverage than those provided by official media, Arab viewers were frustrated that they received the news about their own context from a Western perspective (Pintak, 2006). Different groups compete to control the media as an instrument of social power, or an Ideological State Apparatus (ISA) in the sense of Althusser (1971), to legitimate between offic ial media discourse and transnational media discourse at times of crisis is the focus of the present study. During the eighteen day Egyptian Revolution, Tahrir Square at the heart of Cairo was the source of breaking news around the world. Official and inde pendent media outlets reported the developments in different narratives by emphasizing certain actions and de emphasizing others and affiliating themselves with either side of the conflict, i.e. the government and the protesters side. The aim of the presen t study is to unveil how discourse was employed by Al Ahram and Aljazeera to shape power relations during the Egyptian uprising by investigating how they represented the protests and antagonists. It seeks to compare and contrast the ideologies of the two m edia outlets during the uprising and shed light on the future of

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16 the media landscape in Egypt in light of the social and political developments that immediately followed the Jan. 25 Revolution 1 1.2 The Event: a Background spontaneous in that it started and accumulated throughout 2010 and before, leading in one way or another to the outbreak of the demonstrations on Jan. 25, 2011. As Joya (2 signs that there was a potential for a mass uprising, although no one was sure when A number of opposition activities were taking place during the year 2010, opposition fr appeals to the U.S. administration to place pressure on the Egyptian government to undertake reforms (C ook, 2012). These activities coincided with the establishment of a number of youth movements and Facebook pages, like the April 6 Youth movement and Facebook page, whose role was decisive before and during the Revolution. Estab lished by Ahmed Maher and Esraa Abdelfattah, the April 6 Youth 1 The study focuses in particular on the developments that immediately followed the ousting of President Mubarak on Feb. 11, 2011 until the June 30, 2013 events that led to the ousting of President Mohammed Morsi. It does not go beyond that to investigate the implications of any other major political or social event that took place in Egypt after the Jan. 25 Revolution as this is beyond its scope.

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17 launched a Facebook page to organize a strike protesting low wages and high food prices in Mahalla al Kobra a large Egyptian industrial and agricultural city. The strike took place on April 6, and security forces cracked down on the dissidents, killing four and arresting 400. After that, the activities of the movement included discussions and debates on its Fa cebook page, which in early 2009 had around 70,000 members who were young and educated, but never had political activities before; their demands were free speech and economic and political reforms. The movement was one of the main active players in the Rev olution (Cook, 2012). We are all Khaled Facebook page, which was launched by Wael Ghunim, a young computer engineer living in Dubai. Khaled Said was an Egyptian blogger from Alexandria who w as beaten to death by two security forces officers on June 6, 2010. His death caused outrage across the country, triggering protests led by political figures, such as Mohammed ElBaradei, former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Facebook p age was a symbol of rejection to all sorts of humiliation, brutality, and suppression practiced by security forces. This rejection developed later into active mobilization of the public; on Jan. 14, 2011, Ghunim posted on the page: January 25: Revolution a gainst Torture, Corruption, Unemployment and Injustice. Jan. 25 i s a national holiday in Egypt to celebrate Police Day. Security forces did not take seriously the mobilization by different Facebook pages for a Revolution. The mobilization was considered a s a call that would end up like previous protests in which a few hundreds would gather and protest for a few hours. Contrary to these calculations, thousands marched in Cairo, Alexandria, Mansura, Tanta, Aswan, and

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18 Assuit calling for change, real change. T he numbers that showed up on that day were not as they were in days to come, but they motivated many to take to the streets and join the demonstrations after viewing posts on Facebook pages. The Ministry of Interior issued a statement on that day blaming t he Muslim Brotherhood (MB) for the unrest that caused the killing of three citizens and a police officer. Two days later, Jan. 27, ElBaradei arrived to Cairo and joined the protests, a move that intensified mobilization of the public. On Jan. 28, President Mubarak gave his first speech in which he announced that he had sacked the government, but was not going to step down. And for the first time, Mubarak appointed a vice president, Omar Suleiman. His speech changed nothing in the scene; protesters were stil l asking for a change of regime, chanting ferent cities where the protests were taking place. More people started flooding to Tahrir Square in Cairo, and stability was a concern for count r ies around the wo rld. On Feb. 1, Mubarak offered more compromise in his second emotional speech by announcing that he would not run for re election in the following presidential elections, but confirmed, as he did in the first speech, that he would not step down from offi ce. After his speech, clashes broke up between his supporters and the protesters, who reached around a million in Tahrir Square on that day. These clashes continued on baltagiyya rode onto camels into Tahrir Square and escalated violence with the protesters; the event was Battle of the Camel Thirty on Jan. 26 for call for the demonstrations on Police Day. He tricked his bosses at work

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19 by telling them that he needed to leave from Dubai to Cairo for personal circumstances, which turned out to be leading the protests on Tahrir Square. He was the leader of the largest opposition group on the first day after 70,00 0 members on his Facebook page, confirmed they would participate in the protests. For unclear reasons, he was released on Feb. 7 (Cook, 2012). Despite the negotiations held between the newly appointed Vice president, Omar Suleima n, and representatives of the opposition, protesters continued flooding in large numbers to Tahrir Square and elsewhere around the country. The army undertook more security measures to protect main facilities such as the Egyptian Museum of Antiquity. Mubar resignation; however, it provided nothing new to ease the situation and rather intensified anger and frustration among the protesters. A day later, Feb. 11, Vice president Omar S A number of factors had accumulated throughout the years leading to the Revolution. With all opposition activities taking place in 2010, Egyptians could not believe their own eyes when they saw an Arab president fl ee his country seeking refuge in another Arab country, Saudi Arabia. The psychological barrier was broken, and they Tunisian factor triggered protests in the whole regio n, not only Egypt. The wave continued later in other Arab countries like Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria. Only eleven days after Ben Ali was ousted, Cairo was the center of attention around the world.

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20 Like almost all revolutions, unemployment, high price s, and political oppression were main causes of the Egyptian Revolution. To begin with, it must be noted that, surprisingly, as the country was witnessing protests that overthrew Mubarak, it was witnessing economic growth that was considered the highest co mpared to other Arab neighboring countries such as Jordan and Syria. GDP grew by 7% between 2005 and 2008, and affected by the global economic crisis, dropped to 5%. According to a 2010 ranging reforms since 2004 had reduced fiscal, monetary, and external vulnerabilities, and improved the of economic However, about 20% of Egyptians were below the poverty line; 44% were either illiterate or semi illiterate; inflation reached 12.8% in 2008; unemployment and underemployment were high; and corruption was common. In an interview with DailyFinance David Schenker, Director of the Program on Arab Politics at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, mentioned that the economic growth the country was witnessing since 2004 was one that an average Egyptian did not benefit from; the economy was doing well only in a wider sense. Beyond a narrow perspectiv e of what the economic situation was right before the Revolution and accounts of why it occurred although the overall economic situation was thirty years in power; it was

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21 president did not achieve progress according to protesters; the country was still reliant on U.S. military aid, which hit $1.3 billion, and ec onomic assistance, which reached $250 million. This aid has been controversial both in the U.S. and Egypt (Cook, 2012). Politically, Mubarak was re elected in a referendum in 1987, 1993, and 1999. Under the Egyptian constitution, after pressure for democratization, the President asked the Assembly to amend the constitution and allow for multi presidential candidates. However, his victory in the elections was largely criticized f or b eing biased and non transparent; t he runner up Ayman Noor, of El Ghad party was convicted of forgery and was sentenced to five years at hard labor. security forces practiced t he most brutal practices against any suspects. The law prohibits any political demonstrations, non governmental political activity, and unregistered donations. Detentions under this law were indefinite and without trials. Despite U.S. pressure to implement war against terrorism, and despite promises to halt the law, Mubarak kept on extending the law ( Williams 2006, May 1 ). 1.3 Review o f Literature Studies on media discourse in the Arab world are diverse, fo cusing on the content of media outlets and utilizing different theoretical frameworks of content analysis such as CDA and framing analysis to depict how certain events were portrayed and investigate ideological stances. Central among these studies are stud ies examining the content of Aljazeera network as a leading transnational network in the Arab world,

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22 These studies have either focused on a certain event such as the Pal estinian Israeli 2011 Revolution (Fornaciari, 2011; Yehia, 2011), and others, or on how Aljazeera framed certain issues or concepts, such as terrorism (Ammar, 2010), in its news coverage and talk shows. In most studies, Aljazeera was compared to leading Western networks such as CNN or the BBC to depict how different outlets portrayed different events and explicate how Aljazeera countered the hegemony of Western media discourse. In other studies, it was compared with U.S. funded Arabic language news networks such as al Hurra In these few studies the aim was to explain why these networks were not as successful and popular as Aljazeera and how Aljazeera represented a challenge to U.S. public diplomacy in the Arab Middle East (Abdel Samei, 2010). Thus, the bulk of work on Aljazeera was geared toward establishing the assumption that the network provided American monopoly of media outlets, such as CNN or the BBC that have dominated the world of 226) because it emphasized an Arab identity that incorporated culture, history, and religion, unlike other networks which Arab audiences considered alien. Abdel Samei (2010) used a CDA framework to compare the coverage of certain international events in the American al Hurra and the Qatari Aljazeera news networks. The study aimed to examine how media networks challenge U.S. public diplomacy in the region and found that the two networks represented two opposing i deologies: al Hurra reflected liberal voices in the region and tended to marginalize the role of religion and history, while Aljazeera promoted pan Arabism with its constituent elements such as history, language, and religion. The study concluded that the popularity of Aljazeera

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23 was due to the fact that it discussed and presented the concerns of its Arab audience unlike al Hurra, which was unwilling to open a dialogue about the U.S. unpopular policies in the region. Aljazeera thus, stood as a challenge to U.S. public diplomacy in the Middle East, and the network that the U.S. established to achieve public diplomacy goals in the region was unable to rise against the challenge presented by Aljazeera Indeed, Aljazeera has sough t to adopt a collective voice that transcends geographic boundaries in the Arab world; it has treated significant causes in the region as causes that concern all Arabs, thereby creating a pan Arab perspective in its news coverage. Hence, the network was ab le not only to construct but also alter Arab reality (Abdel Rahim, 2005). More recently, a number of studies have investigated Aljazeera discourse during the Egyptian Revolution (Fornaciari, 2011; Yehia, 2011). These studies were centered on how t he Revolution was framed by Arab and Western media outlets and the role of social media during the uprising. Interestingly, studies investigating the discourse of Aljazeera results, depending on the language version that was examined. That is, differences were found between Aljazeera Arabic and Aljazeera Revolution. Fornaciari (2011) utilized content analysis to examine how Aljazeera English and the BBC framed the Egyptian Revolution. He found that both networks focused on the attribution of responsibility and conflict frames in their coverage, while downplaying other frames such as human interest, economic and morality frames. However, he reports that, on the one hand, Aljazeera English tended to report on issues by

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24 distancing itself and offering a coverage that does not take a stand towards or provide solutions to the unfolding events or highlight instances of power differentials. On the other hand, the BBC provided a coverage that distinguished between winners and losers in the conflict and provided solutions to the problems reported. about Aljazeera English coverage of the Revolution. He found that Aljazeera Arabic reported the events with an explicit stand that backed the protesters and had a group polarization in its coverage. In its comparison between Aljazeera and CNN framing of the Egyptian Revolution, the study found t hat Aljazeera Arabic framed the Revolution from the perspective of protesters and framed democracy as a notion that c ould only be CNN on the other hand, based its framing of the topic of democracy on U.S. s stand about the future of democracy in Egypt. It also had reluctant and shifting views about President Mubarak as the events unfolded. The two studies on the same event reveal that international networks accom modate their audiences by providing different narratives on the same story. As a matter of fact, a line of research on media discourse analysis has been dedicated to reveal ing whether different networks take their audience into account when devising their editorial policies; that is, whether different events are framed and constructed differently depending on the target audience. In his comparison between English language CNN and Arabic language CNN Elbadri (2010) found considerable differences between t he two at both the macro and micro levels of analysis. Utilizing CDA as a framework for analysis, he found that CNN Arabic and CNN English were

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25 different in topic selection, and the stories they presented were different in lexical choices, sourcing, length foregrounding and backgrounding, and syntactic and functional structures. More interestingly, CNN Arabic and CNN English showed cases CNN Arabic considered as the ingroup was considered the outgroup by C NN English and vice versa. In studies comparing Aljazeera Arabic and Aljazeera English, though, the results reported were inconsistent. Adopting a CDA framework, Barkho (2011) reported that Aljazeera English and the BBC portrayed controversial events such as the war on Gaza differently. He states that Aljazeera between the sides of the conflict by distancing itself from the centers of power and 38). He adds that both the Palestinian and Israeli sid es are treated equally on the discursive and social levels. The BBC, on the other hand, reflects power differentials through discursive disparity with which the protagonists are presented. Nevertheless, Loomis (2009) reported that contrary to the assumpti on that Aljazeera presents a stand that is different from Western news networks, Aljazeera BBC CBS and CNN The only difference between Aljazeera English and other networks with which it was compared was in the lower number of stories with a positive tone towards the U.S. However, no differences were found on the content level. Although Loomis (2009) conclusion differs from Brakho (2011) in that the former did not report differences w ith the BBC while the latter did, the two studies agree that Aljazeera English did not represent a counter hegemonic discourse to the Western media dominant discourse.

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26 Other studies, however, maintain that Aljazeera English portrayed critical events in the region such as the Israeli Palestinian conflict in the same way its Arabic counterpart did. De Graaf (2008) compared the coverage of Aljazeera English and CNN of the withdrawal of the Jewish settlers from the Gaza Strip in August 2005 to investigate wheth er Aljazeera English produces a counter ideology that opposes the dominating Western worldview of news. Utilizing a CDA framework for the analysis, the study found that Aljazeera English did present a counter ideology that was either exhibited explicitly o r implicitly. The two networks had an ingroup and outgroup polarization: the ingroup in Aljazeera English's covera ge was the Palestinians and the outgroup the Israelis, while the opposite was true for CNN The reason for the discrepancy in find ings on Aljazeera English is far from clear: critical events in the region, while others claim that it had group polarization in its reporting. The only interpretation for such discrepancy is that Aljazeera English might have adjusted its editorial policies given that there is consistency in the findings of recent studies (i.e. Loomis, 2009; Fornaciari, 2011; and Barkho, 2011) compared with investigated an event that took place in 2005. Studies investigating the Egyptian daily Al Ahram within a CDA or framing analysis framework were not as common as Aljazeera These studies were mainly focused on how certain social groups were portrayed by ma instream official media in Egypt and how state controlled media have employed discourses that maintain the dominance of the ruling group. Pasha (2011) used CDA to examine how Islamists, particularly the MB were represented in front page news articles in A l Ahram online

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27 website in the years 2000 and 2005. He found that the Egyptian regime has consistently excluded the MB from the Egyptian political arena either through sheer power or soft power through negative presentation in official media. He claims that this exclusion is because the group is the strongest and most organized political group that could cause threats to the ruling regime in Egypt. Other studies have focused on the Coptic situation in Egypt and how Christian Egyptians and their causes are d ealt with in mainstream media. Iskandar (2012) investigated the discourse of Al Ahram to illuminate how Egyptian Muslim Christian relations are presented. She found that the main discourse used by Al Ahram is the discourse of national unity, which although it might seem positive, she argues, is not necessarily constructive since it does not address the needs of a section of a community. She claims that the Egyptian regime maintained social stability by reinforcing a discourse that was not supported by pract ical strategies and policies. Al Ahram vis the coverage of independent and social media in Egypt. Using framing analysis as a tool of analysis, Hamdy and Gomaa (2012) compared Egyptian stat e run, independent, and social media coverage during the Egyptian Revolution. They found that state run media, including Al Ahram framed the uprising as a conspiracy against Egypt, while social media framed it as a Revolution of freedom and justice. Indep endent newspapers, however, used an intermediate frame that combined the two other frames. This brief overview of studies on media discourse analysis in the Arab world, particularly those involving Aljazeera and Al Ahram shows that CDA, as well as other frameworks of content analysis, have been useful tools in understanding how critical

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28 social and political issues in the Arab world have been portrayed by the media. Of course, Aljazeera as an influential network that has changed the media landscape in the were centered on the question of whether Aljazeera presented a counter ideological and counter hegemonic discourse to Western media by comparing its content with that of leading Western networks at a certain point of time or during a major event in the region. Although such studies have been insightful in that they revealed perspectives about the hidden ideological battle, or lack thereof between Arab and Western transnational networks, they have all been geared toward one direc tion: Arab versu s Western media at times of crisis. There is a gap in the literature on how Aljazeera compares and contrasts with other Arab media, especially off icial media in the Arab context in general, and Egyptian in particular. The challenge that Aljazeera represented to Arab official media, before international news networks, was enormous and has even caused mainstream media to relatively change their strate gies and become more open and transparent about certain issues. Yet no study, to the best of my knowledge, has investigated the difference in news coverage between official, controlled media and transnational, semi independent media in the Arab world. One of the aims of this study is to fill this gap in the literature. 1.4 Purpose of the S tudy Utilizing a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) approach, the present study aims to compare and contrast how the Egyptian Revolution was portrayed by online news articles o f two leading media outlets representing official and semi independent media in the Arab world: Al Ahram and Aljazeera In so doing, the study reveals the

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29 ideological 2 differences between controlled and independent media in reporting events at times of con of the ongoing political change. The study examines a corpus of online news articles published by Al Ahram and Aljazeera during the days of the uprising ranging between Jan. 25, 2 011, the first day of the Revolution, and Feb. 15, 2011, four days after President Mubarak stepped down. CDA differs from other frameworks of discourse analysis in that it is not only centered on textual, linguistic analysis, but goes further to incorporat e the historical, political, social, and cultural context that surrounds text production and consumption. Therefore, micro level of social action, which primarily deals w ith linguistic strategies, and macro level social structure, which draws on the sociopolitical and cultural context, to link discourse to society and text to context. A comprehensive multilayered analysis that links the textual to the social should yield a better understanding of the subtle ideologies of the examined media institutions and account for the potential difference between the outlets in representing the protests and portraying the two sides of the conflict; it gives insights into how unequal rel reporting of the uprising. Ideological S quare where the representation of ideological groups is based on an Us/Them dichotomy and an identificatio n of an ingroup and an outgroup. It, therefore, attempts to depict how Al 2 I use ideology in its critical concepti on as ideas and beliefs employed to establish and sustain unequal relations of power and dominance in a society. I elaborate on the notion of ideology and its different conceptions in 2.3.1

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30 Ahram and Aljazeera formed ingroup and outgroup identities by their presentation of different sides of the conflict and how linguistic features were utilized in doing so. Moreover, t he study endeavors to draw consistent themes in the news articles of both outlets and explicate those themes by relating them to the wider social and political Egyptian and Arab context. Since the study compares and contrasts official and independent me dia in terms of their linguistic portrayal of the Egyptian Revolution, the results of the comparison will be expanded to discuss the implications for the future of media landscape in post revolutionary Egypt. That is, the study concludes by investigating t he interrelation between media change and political change in autocratic states and highlights the different views on the controversial causal relation between political change and free press. It also discusses the future of official media in light of the recent changes in Egypt and the region. 1.5 Research Q uestions Al Ahram and Aljazeera covered the Egyptian Revolution by investigating how they represented the protests and portrayed the dimensional framework, these representations are investigated both textually, by analyzing lexicalization and predication, verbal processes and presupposition, and discursively, by analyzing intertextuality and t opics Further, the study explores the sociopolitical context to provide a nuanced explanation of discourse as it pertains to society and tackles the implications of the results for the future of media landscape in Egypt.

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31 Specifically, the study aims at answering the following research questions: 1. How were the protests represented in Al Ahram and Aljazeera news coverage of the Egyptian Revolution? 2. How were the protesters represented in Al Ahram and Aljazeera news coverage of the Egyptian Revolution? 3. How were the Egyptian government, President, and ruling party represented in Al Ahram and Aljazeera news coverage of the Egyptian Revolution? 4. Given any differences between the news coverage of Al Ahram and Aljazeera what are the discursive and sociopolit ical practices that can explain these differences? 5. What are the implications for the future of the media situation in Egypt? To answer the three research questions, the following sub questions are addressed to provide a textual and discursive analysis of t he coverage: 1. What kind of lexicalization and predication is utilized in the coverage of Al Ahram and Aljazeera ? 2. Which verbal processes can be depicted in the news coverage of Al Ahram and Aljazeera ? 3. What types of presuppositions are used in the news cover age of Al Ahram and Aljazeera ? 4. What kind of intertextuality is employed in the news coverage of Al Ahram and Aljazeera ? 5. What topics did Al Ahram and Aljazeera address in their coverage of the Egyptian Revolution? 1.6 Significance of the Study The Egyptian Rev olution and toppling of President Mubarak is one of the main and his National Democratic Party (NDP) have maintained control over local media, whether official or pri vate. Although opposition parties were allowed to have their own police assaults and raids, detentions, even torture

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32 in Egypt is not a ccurate (Iskander, 2006; Sakr, 2010; Black, 2008; Cooper, 2008). Egypt were aware of and could not cross (Cooper, 2008; Elmasry, 2011). However, the Aljazeera network, causing tensions in diplomatic relations between Egypt and Qatar, the host and sponsor of Aljazeera (Seib, 2008). As the protests broke out, Egyptian local media and transnational media reported the events with different ideological stances. The significance of the present study is that it is the first, to the best of my knowledge, that compares and contrasts official, controlled media with transnational media in the Egyptian context at a very decisiv e point in the history of Egypt. The two media outlets investigated in the study Al Ahram and Aljazeera represent two different types of media, newspaper and television, respectively. Yet, each of these outlets has its online news website that provides round the clock coverage of news around the world. El Gody (2007) found that the online news websites of Aljazeera and Al Ahram were among the top viewed websites in the Arab world. They came second after search engines such as the Arabic version of Google and Yahoo in terms of number of views. Analyzing the online news articles of Al Ahram and Aljazeera all ows for a comparison between the two as pioneer media institutions, representing two sides of the media spectrum in Egypt: Al Ahram is the most widely circulated official newspaper in Egypt and second oldest and Aljazeera is the first Arab semi independent news network and most widely viewed in the Arab Middle East (Seib, 2007). This is significant in that, on the one hand, it adds to the body of research on the two media outlets and, on the other hand, sheds light on the content

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33 of one of the main sources of news in the Internet age, online news (Salwen, 2005), and telecasts (Loomis, 2009). One of the shortcomings of qualitative studies in Arabic sociolinguistics is that there is a residual spac e between Arabic sociolinguistics and other disciplines due to the compartmentalization of disciplines, and the dismissive attitude towards interdisciplinarity (Suleiman, 2011). T he study adds to the body of qualitative research on Arabic sociolinguistics to further bridge the gap between the linguistic, on the one hand, and the media, social and political, on the other hand, in studies on the Arab Middle East. The study compares hegemonic and counter hegemonic discourse in the Egyptian context and addresse s the implications of the coverage of the Egyptian Revolution for the future of media in post revolutionary Egypt. Thus, it goes beyond a linguistic description of news stories to examine the interrelation between political change and media change in post revolutionary Egypt. The present study also fills a gap in research on media discourse analysis in that it addresses an area that, to the best of my knowledge, has not been addressed before: revolutions. Studies on media discourse analysis employing a CDA approach have addressed different critical issues that reveal relations of power, struggle, and dominance in different societies; yet, no study has investigated media discourse during revolutions. Moreover, the study fills a gap in the literature on revol utions. Despite the different topics addressed in studies on revolutions, only a few studies have touched on the connection between revolutions and discourse (e.g., Moaddel, 1992; Apter and

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34 Saich, 1998; Ileto, 1998), and where discourse was investigated, t he focus was on the discourse of revolutions, not that of the media during revolutions. Last but not least, the study is timely as it deals with a recent historic event in Egypt, the Arab world and the world. 1.7 Why Al Ahram ? Established in 1875, Al Ahram is a semi official newspaper that is owned by the Egyptian government, and is considered the most widely circulated Egyptian daily and second oldest. Cooper (2008) estimates that Al Ahram was between 500.000 and 600.000. The Forbes Middle East a leading international source for business news, has listed Al Ahram news website as the most popular news website during a one year span time from August 2011 to August 2012 (Ahram O nline, 2013 D ecember 27 ). The daily was established as an independent publication, but when the media were nationalized under President Gamal Abdul Nasser, Al Ahram became the the pap (Pasha, 2011). In his study that investigated news production in Egyptian press during consensus amo ng Al Ahram reporters, with whom he had interviews, that the editorial policy of Al Ahram orted a tongue of the condition of the government. What the government wants to say it says allowed for critical opi nions about the government in opinion pieces, but news reports

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35 remained uncritical and representative of the government side (ibid). Cooper (2008) suggests that the paper was in particular the voice of the ruling party, the NDP; he reports Mohammed Samir, a managing editor of Almasry, a private Egyptian newspaper, as saying that Al Ahram has been traditionally been the organ of the ruling party and its journalists consider the paper as representing the NDP. Opposition groups and parties were silenced in Al Ahram news reports. The only voices reported were those representing the government (Cooper, 2008; Pasha, 2011). Any group that could compete with the elite voice or cause a threat to the ruling party was excluded and even presented negatively. Among the groups that were negatively portrayed by Al Ahram was the MB as the nightmare of the people (Paha, 2011: 250). The topics covered by Al Ahram were also restricted in that they did not include topics that wo uld trigger public opinion against the government such as corruption, human rights, domestic issues and poverty and only relied on government officials as sources. Independent newspapers such as Almasry and the Daily News were more likely to address such s ensitive topics (Cooper, 2008). It goes without saying that the paper, like all other Egyptian papers, also drew limits on reporting on the personal life, about whom nothing could be reported unless with a press release sent or permission granted (Elmasry, 2011). Al Ahram represents one end of the media spectrum in the Egyptian context, which this study aims to compare and contrast with the other end of the media spectrum re presented by Aljazeera Given the above background about Al Ahram as an official

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36 times of conflict and crises. Comparing such discourse with more independent media discourse should reveal how complex the media situation is in Egypt and how it is bound to sociopolitical factors which are also addressed by the study. 1.8 Why Aljazeera ? The Qatar bas ed Aljazeera news network is the leading news network in the Arab world that has attracted both world and regional attention since its establishment in 1996. It was the first Arab network to provide 24 hour uncensored news service to its viewers and is the most popular Arab news channel according to different polls, reports, and recognition from influential institutions (Pareene, 2011; Wikileaks/Twitter, 2011). Adopting Western style journalism, Aljazeera is viewed as breaking ground in Arab news reporting Nawawy, 2003; Dresner, 2006). Aljazeera has been controversial in both the West and Arab world, adding value to its credibility. On the one hand, the U.S. has accused Aljazeera of anti A mericanism and aiding terrorists, especially during its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in the aftermath of the Sep. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks (Mekay, 2004; Pintak and Ginges, 2008; Fahmy and Johnson, 2007). On the other hand, Arab governments accuse it of b eing an agent of the CIA, serving American interests in the region (Zayani & Ayish, 2006). Arab governments have not been accepting the fact that controlled, censored media which served their interests for decades was challenged, and, consequently, they cl osed their embassies in Qatar and temporarily shut down Aljazeera offices in their countries (Fahmy and Johnson, 2007). Despite such pressure, the Qatari government rejected

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37 intervening in the editorial policy of the network (El Nawawy and Iskandar, 2002) El Nawawy (2003) argues that the common understanding in news business is that you must be doing something right if you are not convincing to both sides. once said when he visited Aljazeera February 7 ; E l Menshawy, 2005 December 29 ). The relationship between Aljazeera and the Egyptian government under Mubarak was controversial and Egyptian officials have repeatedly raised concerns over Aljazeera Egypt. In 2000, Aljazeera uction towards Egypt (El Nawawy and Iskandar, 2002). Aljazeera officials denied such claims and confirmed that they were given guarantees from Egyptian officials that t here would be no intervention in editorial policies. The free zone agreement was a win win deal that had nothing to do with editorial decisions; the Egyptian government, on the one hand, viewed the zone from an economic perspective that would enhance media production business in Egypt and needed the prestige of a network like Aljazeera On the other hand, Aljazeera was able to expand in one of the most important states in the region (ibid). Indeed, the editorial policies did not change toward Egypt. In the 2005 presidential and parliamentary elections in Egypt, Aljazeera was at the forefront of Arab and international news outlets reporting electoral violations and protests against these violations while state run media was disregarding these events and broad casting

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38 coverage of the Egyptian political developments, Salama Ahmed Salama, a prominent Al Ahram Aljazeera has initiated a transformation in Egyptian soc iety. We would not have known about these violations if it wasn't for Aljazeera l Menshawy, 2005 December 29 brutality against Aljazeera lity was rocketing. With the emergence of the Egyptian Movement for Change, better known as Kefaya (Enough!), in 2004 with reformist plans and aspirations to remove the Mubarak regime, Aljazeera n Dec. summer of 2005, the movement organized seventeen protests against torture, harassment, and unemployment (Fahmy and Johnson, 2007 ), and all were given emphasis in Al jazeera anti government protests led by different movements and social groups between 2004 and 2011. When the April 6 movement formed in 2008 evolving from Kefaya movement, Aljazeera also prov ided full coverage of the strikes organized by the movement on April 6, 2008 and April 6, 2009 and was a platform for young activists and bloggers who later played an integral role in mobilizing people on Jan. 25, 2011. During the decisive eighteen days o f the Egyptian Revolution, Aljazeera played a very influential role so that some analysts have gone as far as to call the Egyptian Aljazeera Clinton testified before the Senate For eign Relations Committee that Aljazeera is

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39 Aljazeera has been the leader in that they are es. And like it or hate it, it is reall Clinton stated (Bauder 2011 March 5 ). After the Egyptian Revolution, Wikileaks the room: Aljazeera (Wikileaks/Twitter, 2011). unfolded and saw a remarkable increase in page views and search attempts after the Internet was switched back on Feb. 2: Alexa a web information company, reports that online viewership of Aljazeera.net hit a record du ring the Egyptian uprising by 2 500% (Aouragh and Alexander, 2011) and its Twitter accounts provided live coverage of the events instantly. Aljazeera was the only Arab or Western news outlet who se journalists and offices were attacked and transmission interrupted by Egyptian authorities; its Arab and Western counterparts such as Al Arabiya CNN and BBC did not go through the same hardships (Hussain, 2011). Given the controversial nature of the relationship between Aljazeera and the Egyptian regime under Mubarak and its advocacy of the demands of civil groups and movements, Aljazeera demonstrates a discourse counter to the official media discourse in the Egyp tian context. Analyzing this discourse vis vis official discourse during this critical stage of history both adds to the wide literature on Aljazeera and reveals the underlying conflict between discourses and ideologies during the Revolution. 1.9 Dissertatio n Layout In Chapter 2 I discuss the theoretical framework for the study and the discursive practices that govern the production of discourse with particular focus on the Egyptian context. I focus in particular on Fairclough's three dimensional framework, which is

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40 adopted in the study, and discuss the analytical tools that are used to examine the data textually and discursively. Since the analysis is multilayered in that it goes beyond micro textual analysis to explain organizational routines of discourse p roduction and sociocultural practices, which constitute the larger scale macro analysis, I address three notions that are central in CDA studies: ideology, power, and hegemony. I also show the relevance of these notions to the present study by shedding lig ht on the institutional and political constraints that influence news production in Egypt and providing an overview of the media landscape under Mubarak. In Chapter 3 I discuss the methodology for the study, including data collection, sampling, and transla tion. After that, I analyze the data textually by explicating how linguistic concepts, such as lexicalization and predication, presuppositions, and verbal processes, were used by the two outlets to represent the protests and the antagonists. In my discussi on of lexicalization and predication, I explain the variation in the two outlets' utilization of certain controversial terms, such as baltagiyya and how they referred to the two sides differently. I also show how negative and/or positive predications were employed with each side of the conflict. Under presupposition, I discuss how Al Ahram and Aljazeera employed this feature to present proposition as commonsensical and taken for granted. Finally, in my discussion of verbal process I explain how the two out lets reported the antagonists with an attitude; that is, how they employed positive, neutral, and negative verbal processes differently. In Chapter 4 I analyze the data discursively by explaining how intertextuality and topic selection were used in the coverage of Al Ahram and Aljazeera Specifically, I explain the inclusion and exclusion of different voices throughout the event, and explain

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41 how different types of reporting, such as direct reporting, indirect reporting, and strategic reporting, were use d with each side differently. Following that I thoroughly discuss the topics included and excluded in each outlets' coverage, and how certain themes were emphasized and others marginalized by Al Ahram and Aljazeera The main topics that are addressed under topic selection are: 1) the protests; 2) the President, government, and the NDP; 3) the religious institution; 4) the international community; and 5) the U.S. position. Throughout my textual and discursive practice analysis in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 I a ttempt to observe whether or not the use of different features was consistent in each outlets' reporting or whether there were points in time during the uprising where there were shifts in using different features. Overall, Feb. 2 marked a transition in Al Ahram and Aljazeera 's reporting strategies both textually and discursively; certain features were more salient or manifested themselves differently after that date. I expand the insights of textual and discursive practice analysis in Chapter 5 to investigate the wider sociopolitical context. After addressing the 'how' in my analysis, I turn to the 'why' : w hy did Al Ahram and Aljazeera address the Egyptian Jan. 25 Revolution the way they did? What are the social and political aspects that help understand discourse? I specifically address textual and discursive group polarization characteristics in the reporting of the two outlets in light of van Dijk's (1995) ideological square. In my critical analysis which examines the sociopolitical context to explain discourse, I address aspects such as the nature of the relationship between the state and the religious institution in Egypt; Fatwas Islamic rulings, during the Revolution; the role of the Mosque in the (de)mobilization of people through the Mi nistry of Religious

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42 Endowments; the Israeli stance and how the two outlets utilized the representation of Israel in the Arab context in their coverage; and the U.S. stance during the days of the protests and its implications for theories on revolution. I a lso investigate the immediate social and political context to account for why Al Ahram and Aljazeera changed their reporting strategies by Feb. 2, which was one of the main findings of textual and discursive practice analysis. I conclude Chapter 5 by brief ly discussing the prospects for media transition in Egypt in light of its 2011 Revolution. In Chapter 6 I conclude the study by summarizing its findings and highlighting the main factors that contributed to the contrast between official and semi independe nt media discourse. I also point out the study limitations and implications for future research.

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43 CHAPTER 2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND DISCURSIVE PRACTICE 2.1 Overview The present Chapter lays down the theoretical framework for the study and, dimensional framework, sheds light on the relevant discursive and social practices. As to the theoretical framework, I define CDA with a focus on its application s to media discourse. Following that, I introduce the t hree main approach by explicating its three main dimensions: text, discursive practice, and soc iocultural practice. I conclude this segment of the Chapter by discussing the five analytic tools used in the study, including lexicalization and predication, presupposition, verbal process, intertextuality, and topics. Discursive practice is concerned with how the news is produced and with the role of the media in sustaining or challenging relations of power and dominance Thus, the secon d part of the Chapter first explains the meaning of ideology in the present research and notions of power, dominance, and hegemony in CDA research. Following that, it addresses the media situation in Egypt with relevance to its social and political context. Specifically, it discusses the relationship between the media and the ruling elite le played by transnational media in Egypt. 2.2 Theoretical Framework In this section, I introduce the theoretical framework of the present research by first defining CDA and spelling out its main features as a tool for analyzing media discourse with a critica l stance. Second, I present the three main approaches to CDA:

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44 approach main dimensions, as it is the framework adopted in the study. I conclude the section by thoroughly addressing the analytic tools that are utilized in th e analysis of media discourse. 2.2.1 What is CDA? Much of the success of CDA can be attributed to the works of analysts such as Nor man Fairclough, Teun van Dijk, and Ruth Wodak (Billing, 2002; Blommaert, 2005). The field that emerged in the early 1990s stemmed from the work of Fowler, Hodge and Kress (1979) on language, power, ideology, and control, on the one hand, and Michael Hallid functional linguistics, on the other hand (Blommaert, 2005). The term CDA replaced Critical Linguistics (CL), which originated in the 1970s with a concern for incorporating the social context in the study of language rather than a scientific description of language that isolated it from its context. It attempted to bridge the gap between the linguistic, on the one hand, and the social, political, cultural, and historical, on the other hand. The terms CDA and CL are used interchangeably, altho ugh the former seems to be preferred and used to refer to the same theory formerly known as CL (Wodak, 2001); however, some researchers still use the term Critical Linguistics, and, more recently, some scholars have used the term Critical Discourse Studies (CDS) to refer to CDA (ibid). the German and Central European context, on the one hand, and the English speaking world, on the other hand. In the former a distinction is made

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45 tion with Discourses can be interdiscursive since they are not restricted to one field when addressing a certain topic. Reisigl and Wodak (2009) argue that discourses are linked to each other in different ways, and if we assume that they are topic related, we would observe that a discourse on climate change, for example, would include topics and sub topics of other fields, such as finance and health. Thus, discourses are hybrid and open as new sub topics are formed and incorporated into the main topic. What distinguishes CDA from other approaches to Discourse Analysis (DA) is its critical aspect; it is critical of present social order and social relations and their connections to power, dominance, discrimination, and ideology. It makes a stance on different social issues by demystifying ways in which language is manipulated in relations of power and dominance; it relates text to context to investigate social and ideological language effects that are sometimes overlooked or simply considered (Wodak, 2001; Fairclough, 2001) One of the ways the elite secure unequal relations of power and dominance is through normalizing discourse and introducing concepts and propositions that are favorable to them as givens. CDA takes an explicit stance toward such unequal relations of power and attempts to depict ideological traces, criticize them, and remedy them (Blommaert, 2005) Since CDA is concerned with language in use, it first identifies a social problem and critically analyses power relations and those responsible for unequal power relations in a society. Hence, the targets of CDA are power elites that sustain social

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46 inequal Autocrat ic regimes normalize their dominance by controlling discourse and access to its production in society. One of the means to achieve this is by controlling the media and filtering its content to maintain power. Instead of acting as a watchdog of th e system, state run media serve as a tool for securing the interests of the ruling elite. In so doing, they reinforce the hegemony of one social group and deflect attention away from the failures of that group and the system as a whole; they are mobilized in the ser vice of this group. Thus, a critical analysis of power relations and how they play out in official discourse is important for exposing such power abuse. As a form of social practice, the relationship between discourse and a social event, institution, or st ructure is dialectal in that it shapes them and is shaped by them (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997). To fully understand discourse, the surrounding social, political, ideological and historical context must be taken into account. Because of this interdisciplina rity of CDA, the field lends itself to different areas of social science, including, political science, anthropology, education, sociology, and psychology. Media discourse production in Egypt was bound to social and political restrictions such as the mono poly of the government or groups close to the government over media institutions. On the other hand, transnational media discourse in the Arab world enjoys more freedom, although it is still constrained by certain political restrictions. Thus, understandin g the discourse produced by different Arab media institutions must take into account how these restrictions, or lack thereof, affect the production and

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47 consumption of discourse. It ought also to consider the overall political situation and power balances i n a society as well as the regional and international context. 2.2.2 Media D iscourse A nalysis Little attention was given to the analysis of media discourse in the 1970s and 1980s. van Dijk (1985) attributes this lack of classical mass media research in the fiel d of linguistics to three reasons: First, linguistics itself did not have much to offer to those interested in media discourse analysis because linguistic grammars were not concerned abstract descriptions of isolated sentences. Second, since media research was in areas of social sciences, such as political science and sociology, the focus was on macro phenomena such as institutions, the public, large scale processes of effect, or overa ll functions of media in society. Third, the nature of questions in mass communication research required the analysis of large amounts of message data, for which only quantitative methods were available. However, since the late 1980s and early 1990s a con siderable number of studies we re dedicated to studying relations of power and uncovering issues of dominance, discrimination, race, and power abuse in the press utilizing CDA. The reason for this interest in the media in particular is because it is the dom ain where social reality is shaped and commonsensical ideologies are normalized (Richardson, 2007). Book length works have attempted to draw the attention to the importance of media language in studying social and cultural change (van Dijk, 1988a, 1988b; B ell, 1991; Fairclough, 1992, 1995; Matheson, 2005; Richardson, 2007; among others). In spite of the merits of quantitative methods of analysis such as content analysis in that they highlight the formal characteristics of media content in terms of what has

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48 been said and with what effect (Richardson, 2007), they still miss many features that could only be captured within a qualitative framework of analysis such as CDA. First, content analysis does not take the social and institutional factors into account a s its primary focus is the manifest content; it does not address the limitation is accounted for by qualitative methods such as CDA as it incorporates and analyzes differe nt aspects of text production and consumption, including the social and institutional. As a matter of fact, two of the dimensions of analysis in the present study, discursive practice and social practice, deal with these factors that are downplayed by cont ent analysis. Second, content analysis ignores connotative meanings of words and assumes that decoders equally understand the content the way the producer intended it. CDA accounts for this shortcoming by dealing with the issue of meaning thoroughly by in vestigating what is present in the text and by also examining why certain features are absent in a text, a feature that has meaningful implications in and of itself. Consider for examples the absence of the agent in certain syntactic structures which is so metimes utilized in media texts, as well as other texts, to deemphasize negative actions of the ingroup or positive actions of the outgroup. Within media discourse analysis, a distinction is made between different types of media: press, radio, and TV. The obvious difference between the three types is their channel of communication: the press is written; the radio is oral; and the TV is both visual and oral. Fairclough (1995) explains that this difference in channel of communication has meaning potential imp lications. That is, press is the least personal

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49 since it is written and TV is the most personal since it is both visual and oral, while radio is in the middle of the spectrum. The present study is concerned with a press genre of media discourse: online ne ws articles. In his book The Language of News Media Bell (1991) addresses some of the main topics that relate to the interaction between language and media with a focus on methodological aspects of media discourse analysis. He points out that anything i include service information, opinion, and news. News reports or news articles are one of the main genres of media discourse. Although they are not as subjective as editorials, still biased and driven by policies of media institutions. Otherwise, all news would be relatively reported in the same way by all media outlets. Hall (1982) holds that the notion of representation is different from reflection in that it involves "the active work of selecting and presenting, of structuring and shaping; not merely the transmitting of an already existing meaning, b ut the more active labor of media to produce and reproduce their interpretations of events and portrayal of different social groups. The more recurrent these representations a re, the more likely they become naturalized and turn into cognitive concepts. The study of the content of online news websites to understand the ways through which different media outlets construct their representations of reality is common in recent studi es on media discourse. Even if the content of these websites does not

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5 0 exactly mirror that of TV broadcast or newspaper print, it includes a wide range of topics and maintains the same editorial line of the main medium, TV or newspaper. A former CNN writer exactly mirror what is broadcast, it nonetheless carries the same range of topics in a Aljazeera Net also holds the same values and objectives of its counterpart, Aljazeera TV. Former site manager, Mahmood Abdulhadi, told The Wall Street Journal Aljazeera.net is the electronic version of Aljazeera maintains its editorial policy in its coverage. Speaking about the editing process, he mentions that Aljazeera.net as a different type of media edits news according to news (Grenier, 2001). Diff erent studies have shown the social impact of online news services at times of conflict, disasters and outstanding events because of their immediacy. Salwen (2005) reports that online news sites were overwhelmed during the week after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Millions of users turned to online news sites from their offices some serve r 69), which caused many offline news outlets, such as CNN the BBC and The New York Times to add extra servers to satisfy the increasing demand. Many Americans have also viewed international news sites, like Aljazeera During Aljazeera of the war on Afghanistan in 2001 and the war on Iraq in 2003, the website was jammed due to extensive demand. The number of

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51 page views during Aljazeera million page views per month. During the war on Ira q, the number of visitors hit one billion with 14 million page views. After Aljazeera became the 45 th most visited website in the entire World Wide Web (Abd Elatti, 2003 cited in Abdel Rahim, 2005). Likewise, the deve lopments during the Egyptian Revolution were very rapid, given the short period of time the uprising lasted. During the eighteen days of the Revolution breaking news were reported constantly and people across the world, and in the Arab world in particular were eager to keep up with the latest developments. Accessibility to TVs or radio was not possible at certain times or places and newspapers lack immediacy when it comes to the unfolding of events. Thus, news websites were jammed with users waiting for t he latest news throughout the day. They even have advantages over newspapers in that they are not constrained by space limitations, which allows for thorough coverage and interaction and providing content that is not provided by the offline service. A ccess ibility of online new s websites during times of crisi stimulate public debate about issues, and emerge as important news media and social 2.2.3 CDA A pp roaches Meyer (2001) introduces a wide range of theories that are borrowed from larger theoretical traditions and adopted as approaches to discourse. Among these are middle range theories, which focus on society and power and their relation to discourse (F airclough); linguistics theories, which try to describe patterns of language systems

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52 and verbal communication (Wodak); and socio psychological theories, which focus on the social conditions of emotions and cognition (van Dijk). In the present study I foll discoursal approach. My choice of this approach is because it addresses all levels that are crucial for a fully fledged analysis of media discourse. The approach considers elements that examine the relationship between text and disco urse, on the one hand, and discourse and society, on the other, to arrive at a full understanding of discourse in society. The framework has been widely employed to analyze media discourse as it draws upon a number of critical social theories and is the mo st comprehensive framework of CDA. Nevertheless, the Revolution. In the following I addres s each of the three theoretical frameworks with a dimensional approach. 2.2.3.1 three dimensions: discourse, cognition, and society conceptual triangle involves an interpretation of linguistic aspects of discourse, such as syntax, local semantics, lexicon, topics, etc., while social analysis is concerned with the social context of discourse. He foc uses on the relation between discourse and social structure through cognition. Thus, to understand a macro level social notion such as power and dominance, and a micro level notion such as discourse, one must consider mental representations that are social ly shared and personal models that are based on personal experiences. The construction of meaning will always depend on how these representations and models are cognitively shaped.

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53 There are three types of belief under this framework: knowledge, opinions and attitudes, and ideologies First, knowledge can either be shared by a specific group or be common throughout the society; the latter is referred to as Common Ground Knowledge, which is usually presupposed in discourse and taken for granted. Some factu outside the group, they are not considered knowledge, but belief. Second, opinions and attitudes are beliefs that are shared on the basis of evaluative criteria (good vs. bad) rather than truth criteria. Finally, ideologies must apply to many different attitudes in different social domains (van Dijk 2001). They are considered a special type of social belief in that, unlike other social beliefs such as sociocultural knowle dge or social attitudes, they are responsible for shaping mental representations and models that define different groups. They are sometimes shared so widely that they seem to have become part of the opinions, or common sense. They represent social characteristics of a group such as their identity, values, and resources (van Dijk, 1995). van Dijk (1995) focuses on the effects of media discourse in formulating models and social representations based on his framework. He explains that the public will largely rely on the media to construct models and mental representations, especially in iss ues where such personal models are lacking. The diversity of such models and mental representations in a society depends on the diversity of information in mass media. Therefore, access to public discourse is restricted to those who serve the

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54 interests and ideologies of media institutions. van Dijk calls those the elite because of their control of text and talk and their preferential and active access to public discourse. are biased towards the reproduction of a limited set of domina Dijk, 1998:188). State run media in Egypt is a symbol of soft power controlled by the ruling elite; it constructs models that reproduce government dominance through th e exclusion of other groups. This type of media was especially influential at times where an alternative was not available; the public was only exposed to one narrative that constructed mental representations to serve the interests of one social group. How ever, with the diversity of information in the media more recently, namely after the emergence of transnational media, access to public discourse became available to other competing groups, creating different models and different representations of reality and social actors. During the Egyptian Revolution, this diversity was reflected in the discourse of media outlets such as Al Ahram and Aljazeera which represented different ideologies. v emphasizes a self interested group opinion, perspective or position, especially in a broader socio p olitical context of social struggle, is a candidate for special attention in 23). van Dijk employs a number of discourse structures to identify ideologies and reveal group struggles. These discourse structu res include: lexical items, propositions, implications, presuppositions descriptions, sematic moves and other discourse structures (van Dijk, 1995, 1998).

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55 Ideological Square whi ch is expressed in terms of emphasizing the positive actions of what a media institution considers the ingroup and deemphasizing its negative actions, while, on the other hand, deemphasizing the positive actions of the outgroup, and emphasizing its negativ e actions. Thus, the Ideological Square aims to: (i) emphasize positive things about Us ; (ii) emphasize negative things about Them ; (iii) de emphasize negative things about Us ; and (iv) de emphasize positive things about Them van Dijk identifies certain d iscourse structures that are utilized to identify ideological structure; these structures are presented in Table 2 1 The Ideological Square and discourse structures are employed in the present study to show how Al Ahram and Aljazeera identified the ingrou p and the outgroup in the struggle between the government and the demonstrators by emphasizing the positive actions of the ingroup and negative actions of the outgroup and deemphasizing the negative actions of the ingroup and pos itive actions of the outgro up. 2.2.3.2 historical framework places emphasis, as its name implies, on the historical context and its role in the interpretation of texts. This interest in the historical context evolved from her work on anti Semitism in 199 0. With her colleagues, she found that the historical context was crucial in explaining the structure and function of utterances (Wodak, 1995). Like van Dijk, Wodak argues that discourse involves power and ideologies, and that background knowledge plays a role in the interpretation of a discourse. Fundamental to this approach is the concept of social critique, which includes three interconnected aspects (Wodak 2001: 64 65):

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56 1. Text or discourse immanent critique texts or discourses to discover inconsistencies, (self ) contradictions, paradoxes and dilemmas. 2. Socio diagnostic critique' investigates the possibly persuasive or `manipulative' character of discursive practices. In this layer, the analyst relies on his/her background and contextual knowledge within the frame of social and political relations, processes and circumstances. The theory of context is crucial at this point. 3. aims at contributing in improving communication. This is achieved by elaborating guidelines and proposals for reducing language barriers or avoiding certain language use in different spheres. Ideological struggle between ingroups and outgroups, under thi s framework, is discussed in terms of derogation and euphemization Wodak and Koller (2008: 302) reference/nomination, predication, argu mentation, framing/discourse representation, and intensification and/or mitigation 2.2.3.3 1985) which attempts to analyze language based on the social function s it serves (Meyer 2001). Fairclough (1992, 1998) regards language use as a social practice, since discourse is implicated in all various orientations of social practice political, economic, ideological without any of them being reducible to discourse. He introduces a three text ual analysis, discursive practices, and sociocultural practices Textual analysis: Textual analysis deals with the structuring, combining, and sequencing of propositions. In interpretive approaches to discourse such as CDA,

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57 textual analysis is concerned w ith both what is present and what is not present in the can be organized under four main headings: vocabulary, grammar, cohesion, and text structure. Vocabulary dea ls with words at the lowest level of analysis; grammar is concerned with a higher level that deals with how words are combined to form phrases and clauses; a higher level is cohesion which has to do with how clauses and sentences are linked together; and t ext structure deals with large scale organizational properties of texts. Discursive practice : Discursive practice distribution, and consumption, and the nature of these varies between different types of discourse ac becomes discourse analysis rather than textual analysis as it analyses texts in relation to social conditions of production and consumption. Discourse mediates between textual and soc iocultural practice by means of shaping ways in which texts are produced and consumed. Understanding texts, particularly media texts, involves more professional practices and organizational routines Explaining the dialectal relationship between producer and text, on the one hand, and text and consumer, on the other h and, Richardson (2007) mentions that a journalist in a particular news outlet may report a news report and an editorial with the same ideological message; however, the difference between these two genres results in encoding the ideological message in diffe

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58 relationship also exists between text and consumer. On the one hand, the message encoded in a text shapes the understanding of the decoder; this explains the continuous struggle over controlling the media. On the other hand, readers consume texts with understanding or misunderstanding of encoded me anings. Production and consumption of a discourse require an activation of shared mental representations to achieve the highest level of communication. Meaning construction depends on how close or far the mental representations are between the producer of the discourse and its receiver. Discourse production requires the speakers historical, and cultural context of the discourse to make themselves understood, and the interpr eter of the discourse, whether listener or reader, employs the same functions to make sense and construct meaning from the discourse; a mismatch in social representations yields communication breakdown. Hall (1980: 54) argues that the meanings achieved thr ough the processes of encoding and decoding depend on the individual, idiosyncratic dimens ion that draws on personal beliefs and experiences that are responsible for diff erent individual understanding. Sociocultural practice : Sociocultural practice goings 998: 311). According to Fairclough, it could be at different levels of abstraction; that is, it may be involved in

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59 the immediate situational context, the institutional practice within which the event is embedded, or the wider context of society and culture He differentiates between three aspects of sociocultural practice that enter into CDA : economic, political and cultural. The insights of textual and discourse analysis (i.e. the first two dimensions of the framework) are expanded to include the wider soc iety in which the text is produced (Richardson, 2007). At this level the analysis aims at addressing questions pertaining to or breaking down inequalities in a socie ty as well as its impact on social relations. Critical analysis, which is undertaken under this dimension, involves an ethical and political critique of discourse and depiction of features that contribute to power abuse and social inequality. Similar to di scursive practice, the relationship between discourse and society is dialectical in that discourse shapes society and at the same time is constituted by it. The three frameworks of CDA presented above complement each other and are similar in many ways; they mainly differ in the emphasis they place over one aspect or the other. van Dijk and Wodak consider ideology central in meaning construction and how differe main dimensions, but differ in what mediates these dimensions: cognition, according to van Dijk, and discourse practice, according to Fairclough. Wodak and Fairclough share the notion that language manifests and at the same time constitutes social practices. level of analysis.

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60 2.2.4 Model of Analysis dimensions: text discursive practice and sociocultural practice the study first examines textual and discursive practice features to analyze the data textually and discursively ; the third dimension is the critical analysis which is discussed separately after retaining the details of textual and discourse analysis. The choice of textual and discursive practice features that are examined in the stud y was based on the findings of an initial pilot study that showed that three textual strategies and two discursive practice strategies provided the most interesting results. The tools for textual analysis include: lexicalization and predication, presupposi tion, and verbal processes and for discursive practice: intertextuality and topics In the following I shed light on each of these textual and discursive practice features 2.2.4.1 Lexicalization and predication The analysis of lexicalization involves studying the denotations and connotations expressions do not convey exactly the same meaning, or at least have different interrelation between lexicalization and ideology is the use of freedom fighter vs. terrorist (Kress, 1983). Naming, or referential strategy, is one of the lexicalization strategies used in signal the type of relationship between the namer and 49). Reisig l and Wodak (2001) explain that referential strategies establish an

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61 identification of ingroups and outgroups through membership categorization devices. erent possibilities [of naming] signify different assessments by the speaker/writer of his or her relationship with the person referred to or spoken to, and of the formality or intimacy of the outgroup is marginalized by providing little or no detail in their description. Members of the ingroup are also (Blommaert, 2005: 11). The analysis will also focus stereotypical, evaluative attributions of positive or negative traits and implicit or explicit specific forms through which predicat ions are realized which include: forms of reference, attributes, predicates or predicative nouns / adjectives / pronouns, collocations, and explicit comparisons, similes, metaphors and other rhetorical figures. Labeling implies categorization based on ideo logical grounds and also involves a dichotomy between the ingroup and outgroups. Thus, describing different social actors negatively or positively gives insights into group affiliations. Relevant to the distinction between the ingroup and outgroup in ter ms of on positive self presentation and negative other presentation; thus, positive referential and predicational strategies are associated with Us and negative ones are associated with Them (v an Dijk, 1998).

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62 2.2.4.2 Presupposition Presuppositions are what encoders treat as common ground and are known by decoders. In making presuppositions a speaker/writer asserts the content of the utterance and considers it unchallenged a nd taken for granted. Wodak (2007: 214) a cautious interpretive attitude on the part of the hearer, accepted without (much) critical attention (whereas the asserted cont ent and evident implicatures are normally subject to beliefs as well as what they want their recipients to take as a given (van Dijk 1998). Fairclough (2003) distingui shes between three types of presuppositions, or what he calls assumptions: existential, propositional, and value laden Existential assumptions are about what exists; propositional assumptions are about what will happen; and value laden assumptions are abo ut what is considered right or good. Ideological presuppositions are value laden as they make judgments and express values. Richardson (2007: 63) lists four linguistic structures as cues to presupposed meaning he attributes t he first three to Reah (2002 ): f irst, words such as change of state verbs (stop, begin, continue) or implicative verbs such as (manage, forget). For example, the sentence 'The government continued suppressing the protesters' presumes that the government used to suppress the protester s. Second, the definite article ('the ---) and possessive articles ('his/her ---) indicate presuppositions. For example, 'the Egyptian Revolution' presupposes that the Revolution exists and acknowledges it.

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63 Third, 'wh questions' also indicate presupposit ions; for example, a question like 'Which group is responsible for destruction?' presupposes that there is destruction. Fourth, adjectives or nouns that are used to quantify nouns also trigger presuppositions. For example, in the sentence: 'the old way of suppressing protesters,' employing the adjective 'old' presupposes that proteste rs used to be repressed. Levinson (1983) adds other presupposition cues like referential expressions, factives, and cleft sentences. As to referential expressions, the use of the expression inciters in 'The inciters of the protests were arrested' presupp oses that there were inciters. The classic example for referential expressions is 'The King of France example of factives is 'Ghonim regrets the killing of innocent pro testers' which presupposes that protesters were killed, and also involves sympathy with those protesters as they are described as innocent. Finally, cleft sentences are employed to trigger presuppositions by focusing on the agent and taking the action for granted. For example, 'It was the security forces who started the clashes' presupposes that there were clashes. 2.2.4.3 Verbal process Halliday (1994) states that experiential meanings are represented by different processes in the transitivity system. Under his system of transitivity, Halliday identifies six process types: material process, behavioral process, mental process, verbal proce ss, relational process, and existential process. Relevant in this section is verbal 1985:129).

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64 Halliday (1994: 140) identifies three participants in a verbal process: the Sayer the Receiver, and the Verbiage the function that corresponds to what is said. To clarify this, consider the following example that is further explained in Table 2 2 : Barack Obama, the US president, said the move was the beginning, not the end, of the t ransition to democracy in Egypt. ( Aljazeera English Feb. 11, 2011) An analysis of verbal processes in media discourse is important in that it shows how reporters utilize verbal processes to emphasize certain meanings and marginalize others and push reade attention to h ow what people say is transformed: there are clearly conventions for rendering speech newsworthy, for Chen (2004, 2005 ) developed a comprehensive analytic tool of verbal processes. She classified verbal processes into three s ub types: positive, negative, and neutral. Examples of positive verbal processes include: pointed out, announced, explained, declared, indicated, and urged; negative verbal processes include: denied, claimed, admitted, insisted, and complained; and neutral verbal processes include: said, told, described, asked, and commented (Chen, 2004). In the present study, I examine how different verbal processes positive, negative, and neutral played out in the discourse of the two media outlets during the Egypti an Revolution. The analysis ought to reveal how reporters encoded their experiences and understanding of reality and their attitudes toward Sayers representing different sides of the conflict. The claim is that the consistent use of a type of verbal

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65 proces eology about the antagonists. 2.2.4.4 Intertextuality fers to the fact that whenever we speak we produce the words of others, we constantly cite and discursive practice. Fairclough distinguishes between two types of intertextuality: manifest intertextuality, overtly drawing on previous texts, and constitutive intertextuality or interdiscursivity, which means that texts are composed of heterogeneous el ements: generic conventions, discourse types, register, style (Blommaert, 2005). Analyzing how reported speech is selected and included in texts is an important aspect of manifest intertextuality (Baynham and Slembrouck, 1999). Texts are composed of fragme nts of previous texts and cannot be produced or consumed in isolation from these texts (Richardson, 2007). Bell (1991) describes the production of a news story as layered and embedded in that earlier versions of a news article are embedded in newer ones. There are many stages through which a news article is produced starting with a journalist, a translator, or a news agency (e.g. Associated Press or Reuters) to which a media organization is subscribed and ending with the chief editor. In each of the stages of production, earlier versions are icative events which links source events in the public domain to the private domain consumption of

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66 responsible for the different ways in which a news item that could be taken from the same source is reported in different ways, with different emphases on different events. Therefore, a full understanding of a text is only possible when relating it first to other texts and other social practices. Intertextuality is important in media discourse, defined taking place, comments on these events from different sides, ba ckground information about the events, and opinions and views about them; thus, news articles are composed of fragments of other texts. Sourcing, or reported speech, is an important aspect of news reports. By including and excluding voices reported and sel ecting what is to be reported, reporters control the framing and ideologies expressed in reports, even if they were distancing themselves from the content by downplaying their own voice. v an Dijk (1998b) considers sourcing as a means through which hegemon y is the voices of the ingroup are legitimized by attributing them with authoritative quality such as titles and credentials that renders what they say reliable and unquestioned. The outgroup, on the other hand, is not reported as frequently as the ingroup, and when hem or Richardson (2007: 102 06) identifies five ways of reported speech that are most relevant to the study of news journalism. First, reporting speech through direct

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67 quotation. In this common kind of reporting the exac t words of the reported person, directly reported speech will be most influenced by the kind of verbal process employed, as explained earlier. Second, reporting spee ch through strategic quotation, known as certain expressions by reporting them using sc are quotes. Examples of such use mean differen t things for different groups. Relevant to this kind of reporting is the use of expressions like: the so called, the so desc ribed, what they call, and others, which are also employed to keep distance from the content of the reported speech. Third, reporting speech through indirect reporting. In this type of reporting the aid or written, not the actual representing discourse and the represented discourse between the voices of the Fourth, reporting speech through transformed indirect quotation. What distinguishes this kind of reporting from indirect reporting is that it drops reporting clauses such as said, accused, alleged, etc. and replaces it with transitive action (e.g. discover ed) or mental state verbs (e.g. believes) (Richardson, 2007: 104). Finally, reporting speech through ostensible direct quotation. This kind is different from direct quotation in that it is made up to propose that (ibid: 105).

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68 In the present study, it is expected that an analysis of intertextuality will help depict the way reporters of Al Ahram and Aljazeera produced their news stories in terms of selecting what to report and who they considered newsworthy. It would also reveal which group they identified as the ingroup by referring to its members as authoritative social actors and which group they identified as the outgroup by means of marginalization and delegitimization 2.2.4.5 Topics Topic selection is the second tool utilized in the present study to analyze discursive practice. By selecting certain events and leaving out others in their reporting, 29). Topic selection is also important in the creation of preferred ideological models and, consequently, in the confirmation of ideologies (van Dijk, 1998). The value of news when it comes to news selection is relative and depends on the editorial policy of media institutions; that is, what one media outlet considers as significant is not necessarily considered so by another. Fowler (1991) explains that reporting events does not reflect their importance but rather reveals selection criteria that provide u s with a partial view of the world. Also, he explains, the process of transformation of selected topics is influenced by various political, economic, and social factors. The two processes are guided unconsciously by ideas and beliefs that do not necessari

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69 Following Stuart Hall and Greg Philo, news to Fowler is a creation that is centered on news value or news worthiness set by media outlets. In the proces s of selection, journalists take into account the interests of their audience as well as what There is no agreement among media institutions as to what constitutes the criteria for news worthiness; however, in their account of news value criteria and review ten criterion list for news value. They argue that the more an event satisf ies these criteria, the more likely it would be reported; the criteria include: reference to the power elite; reference to celebrity; entertainment; surprise; good news (i.e. rescues or personal triumph); bad news (i.e. tragedy or accident); magnitude; rel evance (i.e. cultural proximity or political Reporting at times of crisis focuses on the development of events as they unfold; hence, most stories are follow up stories. Dep ending on their political, economic, and national interests, media outlets choose to emphasize certain events and deemphasize other s At first sight, Aljazeera seemed to have focused on topics that were either excluded or downplayed in Al Ahram of the Egyptian Revolution and vice versa. Each media outlet focused on topics that served its institutional interests and affiliations with the antagonists. That is, topic selection was based on victim worthiness in the sense that our victims are worthy o f reporting and their victims are unworthy of reporting.

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70 Therefore, investigating topic selection uncovers how the two institutions constructed reality differently and how their topic selection contributed to sustaining or challenging relations of power i n Egyptian society. It also gives insights into understanding the different criteria for news worthiness employed by different media institutions and how they relate to ingroup and outgroup presentation and political and ideological affiliations. In short, it reveals the news agenda of Al Ahram and Aljazeera duri Relevant to the analysis of topic selection is the analysis of the way in which proposition s are emphasized or deemphasized through foregrounding and backgronding. In news artic les, the main idea is introduced at the onset, and what follows is further elaboration on the story which may include reactions of different parties on the story, incidents or events related to it, background information, etc. Fairclough (1995: 72) disting uishes between three elements of a news article structure: paragraph which presents a sort of resolution of the story or some background information. News stories are thus described in terms of an inverted pyramid where the most important is foregrounded and the least backgrounded. In a sense, the title and the first paragraph are viewed as a summary of the story, and what follows is information present ed in a descending order of importance. The five important questions that are addressed in the beginning of the story include who, what, when, where, and why ; these are referred to as the Five Ws in news style.

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71 One of the most important features of hard news articles is that they are written with the assumption that the reader may stop at any point in the text; therefore, Ideological Square strategically by emphasizing their ingroup p ositive actions and the negative actions of the outgroup foregrounding them either in the headline or lead paragraph. They also seek to deemphasize their ingroup negative actions and the outgroup positive actions by backgrounding them either in satellite p aragraphs or the wrap up paragraph. Al Ahram and Aljazeera have utilized the structure of news articles published during the days of the Revolution to emphasize and deemphasize the actions of both sides of the conflict. Understanding how foregrounding and backgrounding were operationalized by the two outlets sheds light on what each institution attempted to process of foregrounding and backgrounding in my discussion of topic s to explain how the structural organization of news articles was intended to achieve ideological purposes. 2.3 Discursive practice concerned with the underlying notions and processes involved in news making. Due to the significance of this aspect, I discuss in this section the factors that govern the production of discourse and the role of the media in establishing and sustaining social practices. Specifically, I address the notions o f ideology, power, and hegemony and how they play out in the media with particular focus on the Egyptian context prior to the Revolution. Since the present study addresses discursive practice as it pertains to news production, not consumption, I first disc uss the different definitions of ideology, and then

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72 explain the institutional and political constraints that influence the production of media discourse in Egypt with reference to the notions of power and hegemony. 2.3.1 Ideology Ideology is one of the most co mplex and fuzzy concepts of philosophical and sociological discussion (Kress, 1985; van Dijk, 1998; Wodak, 2007). The term ideology is not restricted to one unified concept in the field of social sciences; it has been defined from different perspectives th at associate it with either neutral or negative connotations. Neutral conceptions of ideology treat it as a natural social phenomenon that does not serve the interests of particular groups but is rather an aspect of social life. Under this conception, ide ology is available to all social groups and may be used as a weapon to achieve particular goals. It could be present in any political program regardless of its aims and beholders; thus, subordinate groups may hold fundamental beliefs in their struggle agai nst social order in the same way dominant groups hold fundamental beliefs to maintain their domination. This definition of ideology suffices for the type of research that aims to depict different ideologies in discourse without taking a stance toward them or being critical of them (Thompson, 1990). isms anarchism, and others, as well as other catego ries that are attributed to individuals or schools such as Marxism, Leninism, Rooseveltism, and others. Within particular political positions, other ideological categories are also realized such as conservative, progressive, sexism, and others. These ideol ogies are often codified, have a clear origin and pattern of development, and, in some cases, may disappear (ibid). Critical conceptions of ideology, on the other hand, imply that the notion of

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73 ideology is misleading in that it serves the interests of par ticular groups. The one sidedness of ideology in this sense implies a critical stance towards it (Thompson, 1990). Ideology under this conception stands for the ideational aspects of a particular existence. It cannot be (Blommaert, 2005: 159) that may serve to establish and sustain re lations of power and domination. meaning production and reproduction plays an important role in maintaining social order. He focuses on the relation between discourse and ideology in his account of the In his view, each ideology creates its own discourse as a result of group struggle to compete with other discourses for domination. The discourse of the elite is more pow erful, though, as its members have access to means of interpellation such as the media. That being said, Fairclough does not rule out the role of consumers in countering manipulation and their capability of making connections between different practices an d ideologies.

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74 the latter is concealed. In this research, I use ideology in its critical conce ption as ideas and beliefs employed to establish and sustain unequal relations of power and dominance in a society. The aim is to reveal how hidden relations of power played out in Egyptian official media discourse at a time of conflict and to examine how semi independent media discourse represented a counter ideology. To do so, the study investigates how representations that form the basis of social cognition were formulated in the two competing discourses. 2.3.2 Power, Hegemony, and the Role of the M edia Powe r in CDA research refers to the illegitimate use of power, i.e. power abuse or domination. In this sense, power serves the interests of the powerful and is directed against the less powerful, the dominated. Hegemony, on the other hand, refers to treating t he beliefs of the dominant as a given and not subjecting them to contestation. Gramsci (1971) argues that popular consensus, along with coercive power, enables one social group or class to rule a multi cultural society as people are driven to embrace the i deologies that are controlling them. Powerful social groups seek to normalize their discourse by controlling institutions that generate discourse, such as the media, school, and religious institutions, which serve as tools to sustaining hegemony in a socie ty (Blommaert, 2005). Althusser later expanded on the role of government institutions in ideological individuals, but the imaginary relation of those individuals to t he real relations in which the issue of reproduction of dominance in societies by emphasizing the two aspects addressed by Gramsci, i.e. hard power and soft power. He argues that for the state to

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75 maintain its dominance and continue to produce in society, it must reproduce the conditions of production. State power, Althusser posits, is the exercise that secures the reproduction of relations of power. He distinguishes bet ween two types of apparatus that complement one another to achieve this purpose: Repressive State Apparatus (RSA) and Ideological State Apparatus (ISA). RSA has to do with coercive power including the government, army, police, courts, etc., while ISA, whi ch is more relevant to the present study and includes schools, the Church, the legal system, and the media, comprises the soft power, which aims at persuading dominated groups to surrender to unequal relations of power and view them as natural and commonse nsical. The media play a central role in the production of ideologies, and, hence, in sustaining the power of the elite. Although it represents one of the ideological state institutions, such as the school, the Church, and family, it is considered the pri mary locus for shaping social beliefs and representations, especially that the role of other institutions is either reduced or restricted to certain groups (van Dijk, 1998). Revolution 2012 Constitution, stipulates that freedom of expression is guaranteed for every citizen; that confiscating and censoring media institutions is prohibited; and that any group or individual has the right to issue and publish a newspaper or any ot her form era was different from his predecessors, Abdel Nasser and Sadat, in that it witnessed media privatization, the launch of private satellite television channels, t he emergence of private newspapers, and growing Internet accessibility (Khamis, 2011), the media

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76 situation in Egypt before the Jan. 25 Revolution was still an example of government could be argued, were due to changes in the regional and world media landscape as a whole and to political pressures by superpowers and human rights organizations for more democratization and promotion of human rights; otherwise, the attitude towards the media was the same since Abdel Nasser, with different game plans. according to their distance from the government (Peterson, 2011): 1. State newspapers included three newspapers: Al Ahram Al Akhbar Al Gomhoria These newspapers were the voice of the government; they were funded by the government and their editors were appointed by the Ministry of Information. 2. Party newspapers included fourteen small newspapers which were published weekly with the exception of two dailies: Al Wafd and Al Ahrar Although these papers were published by officially sanctioned parties that were anti government on many issues, the fact that they reli ed on subsidies from the government limited their critical tone. Moreover, government practiced control by prosecuting journalists and editors under emergency law that prohibited the reporting of issues relating to the President, his family, the Army, seni or government and ruling party officials, among others. 3. Independent newspapers included newspapers such as Al Masry Al Youm, Al Dostor and El Shorouk Because these papers are referred to as opposition papers and attempt to break the barriers of censorship the State Information Service can revoke the license of these newspapers at any time. To establish a newspaper, owners go through a long process of clearance that includes a number of security and intelligence services and not any owner qualifies, by int elligence and security standards, to receive a license in the first place. Licenses are issued by an authority appointed by the government and it is therefore expected that only people favorable to the regime would be licensed (Pasha, 2011). Thus, rega rdless of the type of the press state, party, or independent it was directly or indirectly controlled by the government. Peterson (2011) also points out to an interesting issue pertaining to censorship: by intimidating journalists and subjecting them t

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77 ld make police show up at their front doors to arrest them. This, consequently, created a state of self censorship, whereby journalists avoided critical issues while the government confidently claimed that it did not practice state censorship. The shift f rom a monolithic to a pluralistic media scene has raised the bar of press freedom, but it was still bound to government intervention. In December 2011, Egypt ranked 127 out of 178 in the Press Freedom Index of Reporters Without Borders, which evaluates bot h print and television (ibid). Access to mainstream media was restricted to groups affiliated with the government while other groups resorted to non mainstream media, such as blogs and more recently to social media networks, to make their voices heard; tra nsnational media networks also served as platforms for dominated groups to express their political thoughts and views. Dominant groups can sustain relations of power and dominance if their ideologies are not countered by other ideologies (van Dijk, 1998). To achieve that, they seek to divide non dominant groups, prevent intra group solidarity and the creation of counter power, and deny other groups access to public discourse. When dominated groups consolidate to protest a shared interest, at least their lac k of power, ideology can be a driving force against the interests of the dominant group. Domination, therefore, involves group social struggle over material and symbolic resources, suggesting that under hegemonic discourse there is always an underlying, hi dden dissident or counter hegemonic discourse that may surface at times of conflict or crises (Blommaert, 2005). While the hegemonic discourse seeks to implicitly reproduce unequal relations of

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78 ng and exposing Aljazeera emerged as the first uncensored news network in the Arab world with the aim of countering the international hegemony of Western media institutions (Seib, 2005) and providing an alternative to official, propagandist media that served as a mouthpiece for governments in the Arab world. It redefined the media context in the Arab world by freeing the flow of informat ion from censorship and re routing it from foreign production (Eickelman and Anderson, 1999). In doing so, the network created an Arab public sphere where the Arab audience was able, for the first time, to discuss its issues and criticize the status quo th rough talk shows that served as forums for individual callers (Sakr, 2005). It was also a platform for opposition movements and dissident voices. dimensional framework to examine how two media outlets representing official and semi independent media in Egypt portrayed the Egyptian Revolution and represented the two sides of the conflict. The reason for opting for this framework is two fold: first, it is a widely adopted framework in CDA studies; second, it emphasizes the discursive and social in addition to the textual. Thus, it addresses meaning from different perspectives providing a Nevertheless, the study also utilizes concepts from other CDA frameworks, such as van of antagonists in the coverage of the two outlets.

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79 (1971) sense of Ideological State Apparatus the study aims to reveal how media discourse was textually and discursively utilized at times of crisis to sustain unequal relations of powe r in a society or counter them.

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80 Table 2 1. Describing/ attrib uting positive action ( van Dijk, 1995: 144) Ingroup Outgroup Emphasis De emphasis Assertion Denial Hyperbole Understatement Topicalizatio De topicalization Sentential (micro) Textual (macro) High, prominent position Low, non prominent position Headlining, summarizing Marginalization Detailed description Vague, overall description Attribution to personality Attribution to context Explicit Implicit Direct Indirect Narrative illustration No storytelling Argumentative support No argumentative support Impression management No impression management Table 2 2 Sayer Verbal process, and Verbiage example Sayer Verbal process Verbiage Barack Obama, the US president Said the move was the beginning, not the end, of the transition to democracy in Egypt.

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81 CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY AND TEXTUAL ANALYSIS 3.1 Overview In this Chapter I first introduce the methodology for the present research. The remainder of the Chapter is concerned with the first dimension of analysis within dimensional framework, textual analysis. Under this dimension, I analyze three textual features, lexicalization and predication, presupposition, and verbal process in Al Ahram and Aljazeera I explain how each contrast with relevant excerpts present ed in tables at the end of the C hapter I conclu de with the main findings of textual analysis. 3.2 Methodology The data for the present study is a corpus of news articles that have been collected from the official websites of Al Ahram and Aljazeera. The search period was Jan. 25, 2011, the first day of the uprising, to Feb. 15, 2011, ousting. The reason for including articles published after former President Mubarak stepped down on Feb.11 was to examine whether or not either or both outlets changed in the way they reported the events after Mubarak stepped dow n The corpus includes a total of 354 articles for Al Ahram and 334 articles for Aljazeera during this time period. Following Elbadry (2010), each article in the corpus was coded by assigning it a letter that indicates the media outlet ( A for Al Ahram and J for Aljazeera ) followed by the date of the article and a number that distinguishes stories published on the same date. For example, a news article coded J Feb. 2 6 is an Aljazeera article published on Feb. 2 and is the sixth article published on that da y.

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82 The data is in Arabic; therefore, relevant excerpts were first translated into English and then analyzed. The aim for opting for a translation conducted by the researcher rather than investigating the originally English data in Aljazeera English, for e xample, is that previous research has shown that the English version of Aljazeera is not equivalent to its Arabic counterpart on all levels (Fornaciari, 2011; Yehia, 2011); Aljazeera English has its own independent editorial policy that targets a different audience. Since the focus of the present study is on news produced with an Arab audience in mind during the Revolution, originally Arabic data were translated into English. The textual and discursive practice features examined in the research consist of five tools that were discussed thoroughly in C hapter 2 ; they are: lexicalization and predication, presupposition, verbal process, intertextuality and topics The first three tools relate to textual analysis, which is the focus of this Chapter and intertextuality and topics are concerned with discursive practice analysis, which will be discussed in Chapter 4 3.3 Textual A nalysis Textual analysis is the first di dimensional framework. To address this aspect, I first explicate how the two outlets used lexicalization and predication in their coverage to refer to the antagonists and describe them. It is assumed that each outlet employed editorial strategies in referring to both sides of the conflict; depicting such strategies gives insights into how Al Ahram and Aljazeera affiliated either with the government or protesters during the uprising. Second, I discuss how presuppositions were e mployed to serve the interests and ideological stance of each institution; particularly, I show how taken for granted

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83 propositions were employed to sustain or challenge power and dominance during the Revolution. This aspect is also expected to show variati on between the two outlets in terms of the kind of presuppositions they make. The questi ons raised in this regard are: w hat ideology does a given presupposition serve? Is it intended to sustain pow er relations or challenge them? Finally, I discuss how ver bal processes neutral, positive, and negative were used by the two outlets in the coverage; the aim is to shed light on how social actors on both sides of the conflict were reported. 3.3.1 Lexicalization and P redication Lexicalization and predication is one of the main features of textual analysis. To offer a nuanced account of this feature, I divide this section into four sub sections relating to different aspects and dealing with different them es; these sub sections are: 1) t he two sides of the conflict; 2 ) Death or martyrdom ?; 3) A Revolution?; and 4) Who are the baltagiyya ? Each of these sub sections is thoroughly discussed in the following. 3.3.1.1 The two sides of the conflict In this section, I discuss how Al Ahram and Aljazeera described opposing groups and the strategies they employed in referring to the two sides of the conflict. I also address how they delineated the protests. First, I explain how the two outlets described the protesters by shedding light on the predications employed by each outlet Table 3 1 presents examples of the use of predication s to describe different groups in Al Ahram and Aljazeera Al Ahram assigns negative predications to groups and movements leading the demonstrations and opposing President Mubara legitimacy and significance. Among these groups and movements are the MB the April

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84 6 Movement, Kefaya The most negatively presented group to which activities of violence were attributed was the MB shown in (a) (d). Throughout the Revolution, with the exception of very few instances, the group was described either as disintegrated or as banned the latter was in most cases. In some cases like (c), only the adje ctive banned was used to refer to the group and its members were referred to as elements as in (d). Other groups, such as the April 6 Movement, Kefaya and the National Commission for Change were descried, as shown in (e) as the so called (f ) s hows that unl ike members of the M B group, members of these groups were referred to as activists although their groups were downgraded by being described as illegal Aljazeera did not use negative predications such as banned and illegal to describe opposing groups, who were presented either neutrally by referring to the names of the groups or positively by describing their members with positive words such as activists and supporters activists to refer t o members of opposition groups differs significantly from Al Ahram elements to refer particularly to members of the MB group. The word activist has positive connotations in Arabic; the Dictionary of Contemporary Arabic defines it as someone w ho works hard to achieve something (Omar, 2008). Thus, the labeling presents opposition groups positively as advocates of political change, implicitly legitimizing their actions. On the other hand, labeling members of the MB as elements them from Egyptian mainstream. It singles them out in a negative way as different and The message of predications in Al Ahram is that the protesters are groups who lack legitimacy and seek to destroy the country and implement the ir own political

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85 agendas; they are involved in a conspiracy with other foreign powers to weaken Egypt and tarnish its image. In referring to the protesters, the paper also employed attributes such as the inciters hidden hands inciters of unrest and destruction and criminal elements the uprising of thieves and criminal elements the hateful the malicious etc. Although issues of corruption, rights, and unemployment were mentioned as reasons that led to the protests, Al Ahram focused on what it thought was an exploitation of the events to achieve personal goals. Aljazeera on the other hand, presented th e different opposing groups as legal groups participating in the demonstrations to make their voices heard; they were presented without the use of negative predications or lexical items that hold negative connotations. Rather, opposition groups were assign ed with descriptions that hold positive connotations, such as activist The Egyptian government or government officials were not assigned negative or positive predications and were described neutrally. Another important aspect that explicates how the two outlets represented the two sides of the conflict is naming. The main questions I address in this regard are: how did the two outlets refer to the antagonists? Did the outlets utilize proper name and position in referring to members of each side? Were mem bers of any side of the conflict excluded or marginalized? Al Ahram uses position, proper name, and sometimes forms of address, i.e. honorifics, like Mr. to refer to Egyptian senior government officials and sometimes even lower ranking off icials as shown in (a) and (b). According to the Dictionary of Contemporary Arabic, the word Mr. signifies respect and higher social status (Omar,

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86 2008). ElAdly and Suleiman were top Egyptian government officials referred to with a politeness term entitled by the prop osed social status. The use of such a term, however, was not consistent in all the articles and the context for using it was not clear; Mr. was not used whenever ElAdly and Suleiman were referred to, for example, and was not used with officials holding hig her positions, such as the President. It was also used once to refer to an opposition figure, Amr Mousa. On the other hand, Al Ahram referred to opposition groups in different ways. In (c), for example, Amr Mousa, former Egyptian Foreign Minister under Mubarak and Arab League Secretary General during the days of the Revolution, was referred to by a term of address, proper name, and off icial position. The same applies to Nobel Prize winner, Ahmed Zewail, who was referred to as the Egyptian scientist Amr Moussa was one of the main political figures who called for a transition of power early in the Revolution. Ahmed Zewail was also a prom inent figure who presented a five step allowing for a transitional government. Yet, they were referred to positively in the article, unlike other opposition figures such as former Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency and president of the National Committee for Change, Mohamed ElBaradei, who was referred to by last name only in (d) and (e). A possible interpretation for this difference in referring to M oussa and Zewail, on the one hand, and ElBaradei, on the other, is that the former were less aggressive in from his residence abroad only to participate in the protests in Tahrir Square, giving momentum to the demonstrations (Khalil, 2012). Moreover, Moussa and Zewail did not belong to any political movements opposing the regime, and only represented

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87 themselves, whereas ElBaradei was the president of one of the main move ments calling to by proper name at least in this article members representing other groups were not, even if they were recognized figures in the opposition who had held positions such as parliament members as in (f). The first instance in which an opposition member was referred to positively in an article was on Feb. 8 after the release of Wael Ghonim from prison and his emotional televised interview where he broke into tears after seeing photos of the casualties of the demonstrations. (g) shows that Ghonim was referred to by proper name and title. Other than these two cases where opposition members ElBaradei and Ghonim were referred to by proper names, the oppositi on represented by different movements and groups were referred to collectively and often assigned with negative p redications as explained above. Aljazeera presented members of opposing groups, such as the National Committee for Change, the MB and Kefa ya differently; they were referred to by proper name and position s that Aljazeera recognized all opposition groups and their representatives as well as independent activists. The different group members were referred to by proper name and official position or by proper name and the word activist recognizing them as a legitimate side i referred to in the same way, i.e. by proper name and position. The analysis of naming and description of the protesters reveals a contrast between the two outlets in t erms of how they affiliated with the antagonists. Al Ahram delegitimized the protesters by playing down the significance of their leaders as political

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88 figures; this was reflected in the lack of reference to these figures by name and in the negative delinea tion of the protesters. Negative attributions of the protesters, however, were traced from the first day until Feb. 3, where the tendency was shifted towards a positive portrayal of the Egyptian government rather than a negative portrayal of the protesters strategy from a focus on negative presentation of the outgroup to a focus on positive presentation of the ingroup. Aljazeera employed positive descriptions to refer to figures on the pr otesters side and referred to these figures by name and position, providing them with legitimacy and recognizing them as political actors. It also referred to Egyptian officials by proper name and position. The delineation of the protests is another imp ortant aspect relating to the representation of the two sides. In the following, I address how the outlets named and described the protests at different points in the Revolution. In the outset of the uprising as in most of the coverage Al Ahram describ ed the demonstrations negatively, raising doubts about the intentions and loyalty of the demonstrators and emphasizing and generalizing negative actions performed by some of them as shown in (a) (c). Al Ahram utilized the negative side of the demonstrat ions, even if it was not the norm, to make generalizations about them and distract from their main purpose; emphasis was on destruction rather than demands to present the protesters negatively, at least in the beginning of the events. Aljazeera on the oth er hand, described the protests with a focus on the demands unrest that accompanied the protests, but did not attribute it to a particular side. Rather, it occurred according to Aljazeera confrontations or clashes

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89 baltagiyya 3.3.1.4 on the other side. Both terms, confrontations and clashes involve two conflicting groups, indicating that there was no particular party in the conflict responsible alone for the violence and chaos that took place during the protes ts. 3.3.1.2 Death or m artyrdom? The process of news production involves choice between seemingly synonymous terms to express propositions. Once a reporter or a news outlet makes a choice between words such as martyrdom and death to refer to one side of a conflict, they are explicitly taking an ideological stance toward an event. In the outset of the protests, Al Ahram employ ed the word martyr as opposed to dead in its articles to refer to the government side of the conflict. Aljazeera however, employed the term th e killed and its derivatives to refer to members on both sides. By Feb. 5, Al Ahram employed the term killed and its derivatives to refer to both sides of the conflict, while Aljazeera continued employing the same term it used since the beginning of the protests, i.e. killed Therefore, there was no contrast between the two outlets in terms of reference to casualties at that point in time, as Table 3 5 shows. Both Al Ahram and Aljazeera employed the term martyr and its derivatives to refer to the protesters at two different points in the Revolution. Table 3 6 provides examples of the occurrences of the term martyr Other than its utilization of the term martyr in the beginning of the upri sing, Al Ahram used the term at two other points in the Revolution. First, on Feb. 8 after the martyrs as shown in (a). Second, a day after Mubarak stepped down, casualties on the prote

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90 side were even presented more positively as in (b). Hence, Al Ahram used martyrdom and its derivatives at three points in the Revolution, attributing it to different sides of the conflict and sometimes to both: (i) casualties on the government side, namely security forces, were described as martyrs in the beginning of the Revolution, (ii) casualties on martyrs on Feb. 8, and (iii) casualties on the as martyrs after the step down of Mubarak. Taking different positions in the conflict indicates the reluctance on Al Ahram side : at the beginning of the protests when the size and effect of the demonstrations were not yet clear, the paper used a term th at indexes a religious frame or a frame of the wave of demonstrations escalated, the neutral term killed or dead was employed to refer to both sides. When Wael Gh onim was released, he appeared in an emotional television interview and broke into tears when seeing pictures of the casualties of the protests. Hundreds of thousands of Egyptians participated in the demonstrations the following day, which was considered a decisive day in the Revolution (Khalil, 2012). In its coverage of the release of Ghonim from prison and his TV interview, Al Ahram referred to the casualties as martyrs for the first time. It then turned back to referring to both sides as dead until the p rotesters finally prevailed and Mubarak announced his stepping down. At that point, the term martyr showed up again to describe the casualties of the protests, associated with other positive attributes such as hero There were also occurrences of the ter m martyr and its derivatives in Aljazeera refers to the casualties of the protests as martyrs

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91 describe Tahri Square, which was the symbol for the Egyptian Revolution. After the ways: Tahrir Square Martyrs Square and Jan. 25 Square These different ways of r eferring to the same referent is a means to establish or rather underscore the connection between the Revolution and the Square, which was the center of gatherings from different parts of Cairo. The labeling Martyrs Square in and of itself holds positi ve connotations about the revolutionaries and can only be understood as referring to them. In sum, the analysis reveals that Al Ahram dead and martyr and their derivatives were inconsistent; the term martyr was blatantly used in t he outset of the events to refer only to the government side, implying that the protesters were more of an enemy rather than citizens demanding change. As the wave of the protests escalated, the strategy became different in that casualties on both sides we re referred to as dead Farther in the Revolution, and as the protesters achieved victory, their casualties were referred to as martyrs Aljazeera was also inconsistent in its use of the two terms; although it referred to casualties on both sides by employ ing the term dead and its derivatives throughout the Revolution, the term martyr was employed after Mubarak was ousted to refer to the casualties of the Revolution, indicating that it took sides with the protesters. 3.3.1.3 A Revolution? Aljazeer a employed the ter m Revolution as early as Jan. 28, the third day of the protests, both in the authorial voice and in reporting on other sources. It also used the term Revolution more frequently than Al Ahram did in its coverage and either described it with a predication li ke popular youth or Egyptian or used it with no predication. In the fourteen times in which the term was employed in a sample data, it was used three

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92 times with no predication and five times with the predication Egyptian or It was used with the predications popular and/or youth six times. Al Ahram employed the term only by Feb. 5, and did not use it as frequently as Aljazeera did; the term was used only twice in Al Ahram Table 3 7 shows examples of the occurrences of the term in t It is worth mentioning that in Al Ahram Revolution it was described as acknowledging the 1919 Revolution and, more importantly, the 1952 Revolution, in which the Farouk and established the modern republic. Since then, generals claimed power until the departure of Mubarak in 2011. Al Ahram acknowledges that Revolution, although implicitly, as Mubarak belongs to the military institution ruling the country since 1952. Thus, the choice between on the one hand, and in its modern era on the other hand, is of ideological significance; choosing the former indicates that the Jan. 25 Revolution is the Revolution, while choosing the latter acknowledges that it is one 1952 Revolution also referred to as the July 23 Revolution.. The term stealing the Revolution as shown in Al Ahram coined during the Revolution and continued to be used after it; yet it is unclear to whom employed by antagonists to accuse each other Stealing the Revolution therefore, is a term that involves group polarization Al Ahram and Aljazeera praised the Revolution and the protesters after the downfall of President Mubarak. Table 3 8 provides examp les of how each outlet The predications used

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93 by Al Ahram to describe the Revolution were great pure popular and the greatest in the history of revolutions which reflect an attitude tota lly different from that realized at the beginning of the uprising. Also, the examples show that Al Ahram seeks to link the Revolution to the youth or people in general. Aljazeera also praised the Revolution and protesters after the downfall of Mubarak; the Revolution was described as the unprecedented in the history of Egypt and as a white Revolution referring to its bloodlessness. Al Ahram and Aljazeera showed similarities and contrasts in employing the term Revolution in their coverage. As to the simila rities, both outlets described the Revolution with the same predications, such as the youth and/or people Revolution Also, both outlets praised the Revolution after the collapse of the Mubarak regime; yet, the praising and positive description of Aljazeer a was softer than that of Al Ahram which went as far as to describe it as the greatest in the history of revolutions; Aljazeera described it as the unprecedented in the history of Egypt and as bloodless. The two outlets differed in the time the term was f Aljazeera employed the term much more than Al Ahram which used the term only by Feb. 5 when it turned out that more protesters were flooding in different cities of Egypt insisting on their demands an d rejecting calls to end the protests. The timing and frequency of employing the term Revolution is of ideological significance. First, the use of the term Revolution implies a massive social movement in which people of different social class participate Tunisian Jasmine Revolution had very recently ended with the departure of Tunisian President Ben Ali at the time the Egyptian up rising initiated. Using the term, thus,

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94 acknowledges the massiveness of the protests and their demand for grassroots social change and triggers the recent Tunisian model. Therefore, Al Ahram tended to avoid using the term until the eleventh day of the protests, while Aljazeera used it on the third day. 3.3.1.4 baltagiyya The word baltagiyya singular baltagy is an Egyptian term, originally Turkish, writer, states that baltagiyya mainly associated with assault for political reasons, but is also used to refer to gangs hired for any purpose. Although the word is not new in the Egyptian lexicon, it has received attention recently because of its frequent use during the Revolution. Al Ahram and Aljazeera used the ter m from the first day, attributing it to different sides of the conflict, making it unclear who the baltagiyya were following a hidden agenda and conspiring against Egypt, its regime, and its peopl e? Or were they hired by the regime to abuse the protesters and abort the demonstrations? Or were there baltagiyya on both sides? Al Ahram used baltagiyya and its derivatives such as baltaga part of the general negative presentation of the protests and protesters that was discussed earlier. In some cases, the paper did not directly state that the protesters were baltagiyya but implied that the intentions of the protesters who belonged to diff erent groups were responsible for baltaga ; in other words, protesters sought to incite chaos, destruction, theft, and baltaga It also reports

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95 that the baltagiyya and gangs exploited the protests for destructive purposes. In other cases, as shown in (b), t he paper was more explicit in stating that the demonstrations were acts of baltaga and that those on the street were a group of baltagiyya exploiting the instability for their own purposes. By stating that there is a difference between peaceful demonstrat ions and baltagiyya exploiting security vacuum, as shown in (c), Al Ahram is pointing out that the event cannot be described as a peaceful demonstration and that protesters were a group of baltagiyya and bandits. The paper also employed the term baltagiyya to refer to the other side of the conflict, the government, but that was through intertextuality. (d) shows that Al Ahram reports on a MB representing the regime responsible for the events on Tahrir Square, including the baltagiyya baltagiyya in a way different than that identified in the other exampl es; the baltagiyya in this context are on the group. After Mubarak stepped dow n, Al Ahram described baltagiyya as representing the government side of the conflict as shown in (e). This time it was not through sourcing Al Ahram referred to baltagiyya as representing the protesters in th e beginning of the Revolution and by the end they were hired by members representing the regime. In between these two attributions, baltagiyya were presented through reporting on other voices as representing the government side of the conflict.

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96 Aljazeera also employed the term to refer to perpetrators of violence during the protests; the term was used in direct or indirect reporting of different sources, with an sho network did not refer to the baltagiyya as representing the protesters. The two sides of the conflict during the uprising were presented as the popular committees, which were formed by the demonstrators, on the one hand, and the baltagiyya on the other hand. baltagiyya who were not presented as protesters or groups within the protes ters. Later in the Revolution and as the events escalated to clashes between supporters of the regime and protesters, Aljazeera employed the term baltagiyya through reporting other baltagiyya supp the Revolution, the term baltagiyya was used in the authorial voice that reveals Aljazeera baltagiyya as being affiliated with the ruling NDP without distancing itself from the claim. Aljazeera employing the term baltagiyya : i n the first stage, which was at the beginning of the protests, the term was use d to refer to gangs causing violence during the demonstrations but did not represent the protesters in any way; rather, these gangs were in conflict with the demonstrators. In the second stage, the term was employed to refer to baltagiyya as supporters of the regime who were abusing protesters; yet, the network distanced itself from the claim by using the word in reported speech, scare quotes, or preceded by expressions such as the so called or the so described In the

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97 final stage, which was after the coll apse of the regime, baltagiyya was used to refer to supporters of the regime in the authorial voice. The analysis of the use of the term baltagiyya during the uprising reveals that it was a controversial term employed to present the outgroup negatively. Al Ahram used the term to refer to one side of the conflict, the protesters, at the beginning of the Revolution, and to the other side, the government, towards the end. This indicates a and a change in what it identified as the ingroup and outgroup. Aljazeera however, used the term to refer only to one side but showed variation in terms of explicitness ; i.e. the p towards the end of the Revolution. 3.3.2 Presupposition Both Al Ahram and Aljazeera employed presupposition strategically in their coverage either by reporting on other sources or in the authorial voice. In the following I discuss Al Ahram ions and then shed light on how Aljazeera utilized the same strategy. Examples (a), (b), and (c) in Table 3 10 show that Al Ahram utilized presupposition strategy to describe the protesters and the protests negatively; the presuppositions include: 1. The inc iters followed a provocative approach 2. The organizers of the gatherings are inciters 3. The opposing groups, especially the MB were presented as practicing their usual criminal actions during the protests. Employing as usual in (c) indicates that destructio n is a permanent group behavior.

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98 The government, on the other hand, was presented positively; a presupposition frequently made was that Egypt was a country of freedom of expression and democracy, and that allowing the protests was part of that democracy. When freedom and democracy are pr esented as one of the demands of the protesters in (e), they were preceded by the quantifier more which presupposes that it is taken for granted that Egypt is a country of freedom and democracy. Later in the uprising, precisely on Feb. 5, Al Ahram on started to gradually change; it presupposed by reporting participants in the demonstrations that prior to Jan. 25 there was a psychological barrier as shown in (g) and that the Egyptian people were not able to demand freedom. This presupposition contrad icts earlier presuppositions that the protests were part of freedom of speech and democracy in Egypt: A few days later, Wael Ghonim was also reported in an article in which he presupposed that the youth were underestimated and not taken seriously by the g overnment. The use of anymore in (h) presupposes that the youth were treated as children prior to the Revolution. Examples of presupposition in Al Ahram articles show the same pattern found in lexicalization and predication: in the beginning of the Revolut ion, the protesters and protests were delineated negatively while the government was presented positively. main themes reported through presupposition were that the prot esters were inciters practicing their usual acts of violence to achieve their questionable goals, while the government is on the track of freedom of expression and democracy. Later in the Revolution the paper started presenting opposite themes through pres upposition such as the lack of freedom. Although these presuppositions were

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99 presented indirectly through reporting other voices, they reveal a change of tone when it Aljazeera also employed presupposit ion to present the Egyptian government negatively and confirm that the protesters want nothing less than the fall of the regime. In doing so, it followed two strategies: in the beginning of the Revolution when it was not yet clear how intensive and decisiv e the demonstrations would be, presupposition was made through sourcing; that is, Aljazeera reported on opposition voices that made presuppositions presenting the government negatively. Later, presuppositions were more explicit utilizing the authorial voice. (a) (d) in Table 3 11 are exam p les of the former and (e) (i) are examples of the latter. The movements and groups reported included April 6 movement, the MB and Kefaya movement. The presuppositions made through reporting other voices in (a) (d) include: 1. The Ministry of Interior is deceptive 2. 3. There is increasing evidence that makes it unacceptable to forgive the regime or allow the President a safe exit 4. The demonstrators insist that Mubarak step down immediately There is political congestion and divide due to violence In presenting these presuppositions, the network employed lexical items such as old more and fu rther In (a) old was used to describe deception presupposing that such practice is habitual by the Egyptian government. In (b) and (d) more was used to modify insistent and political congestions respectively. This strategy implies that the protesters w ere already insistent, and that there had been political congestion and divide in the country. Finally, the adjective further was used to modify the noun evidence indicating that there was previous evidence against Mubarak.

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100 As the events developed, pres uppositions were made more explicit by reporters; these presuppositions revolved around the same themes that were presupposed by reported opposition members. The presuppositions made in (e) (i) include: 1. The demonstrators demand the downfall of the regime 2. Security forces and militia practiced violations against the unarmed demonstrators 3. Egypt witnesses corruption, violations, and freedom restrictions 4. Official media fabricates facts 5. Police forces prevented protesters from protesting in the past It is important to point out, though, that there was no dividing point in the Revolution where Aljazeera started making presuppositions in the authorial voice rather than through sourcing. As can be seen above, there were points in the Revolution perhaps between Feb. 1 and Feb. 5 where both types of presupposition were employed. The generalization that can be made, however, is that presupposition through reporting other voices tended to be more toward the outset of the uprising and authorial voice presu pposition was more towards the end. Nonetheless, Aljazeera was persistent in employing presupposition, whether through reporting or in the authorial 3.3.3 Verbal P rocess Employing verbal processes was another way thro ugh which Al Ahram and Aljazeera presented what they considered the ingroup positively and what they considered the outgroup negatively. The two outlets, however, adopted different strategies of verbal process utilization at different points in the protest, which can be divided into two stages: the first stage is from the outset of the protests until Feb. 2, and the second stag terms of the verbal processes used (i.e. positive, negative, and neutral) and the sides

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101 that were reported. Table 3 12 reveals how the two outlets utilized verbal process in their covera ge early in the protests. When reporting government voices, which were the dominant voices early in the Revolution, Al Ahram utilized either positive or neutral verbs. Examples of positive verbal processes utilized by Al Ahram include confirm and announce shown in (a) (c) in Table 3 12 Aljazeera on the other hand, employed all types of verbal processes positive, negative, and neutral in reporting both sides of the conflict at the beginning of the demonstrations. The negative verb warn for example, was used in reporting April 6 respectively; positive verbal processes such as confirm and announce were also used with both sides ; and neutral ve rbs such as said and mentioned this strategy in the second stage. At this point in the uprising, Al Ahram began reporting opposition voices by employing neutral verbal processes, such as said and called upon In (a) ElBaradei, a main opposition figure during the protests, was reported on by using a neutral verbal process althou gh he was calling for the departure of the President. Voices demanding change and action on the part of the government were also reported using neutral verbal occurrence in (b) and (c); this included the voices of the National Progressive Unionist Party a nd Turkish prime minister. Turkish Prime Minister is not, of course, a member of the opposition; however, his reported speech is in harmony with the demands of the opposition and was reported employing a neutral verbal process in the

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102 background of the stor y. Although rare, positive verbal processes were also used when reporting protesters at around the same time in the protests as in (d). (e) and (f) show that the paper still employed positive verbal processes with government officials and pro government pr otesters at this stage. The first negative presentation of the government through a verbal process was on the day Mubarak stepped down; the verb used to report Egyptian rights groups was accused in (g). Aljazeera coverage shows that the strategy of employi ng different verbal processes with both sides of the conflict continued until Feb. 2. After that date, the network explicitly sided with the protesters by employing either neutral or negative verbal processes to refer to the government side of the conflict There were no negative processes used to report on the government side; they include the verbal processes accused condemned refuted and warned respectively. To sum up, t wo stages are recognized when it comes to Al Ahram verbal processes during the Revolution. In the first stage, which was between the beginning of the Revolution on Jan. 25 and roughly Feb. 2, the verbal processes were used either p ositively or neutrally to report voices representing the government; there were no negative verbal processes employed with opposition voices simply because these voices were absent at the outset of the events. The second stage included the use of neutral or positive verbal processes with members of both sides of the conflict; that is, opposition members and government officials were reported by employing the same verbal processes. However, official voices were s till more dominant in terms of number of occurrences and foregrounding.

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103 Later, verbal processes showed a positive presentation of the demonstrators and negative presentation of (former) government officials. In general, negative verbal processes were not common. This indicates that positive ingroup presentation was more common than negative outgroup presentation in terms of the use of verbal processes in Al Ahram at least at the beginning of the protests, is that t here was a tendency to exclude the voice of the outgroup in the first place, as will be discussed in C hapter 4 The use of verbal processes in the coverage of Aljazeera also reveals two stages: the first stage starts at the beginning of the protests and e nds by Feb. 2; during this stage, Aljazeera employed verbal processes in a balanced manner as both sides of the conflict were reported using the same verbal processes. As a matter of fact, all types of reporting verbs, positive, negative, and neutral, were used with voices representing the government and voices opposing it. Feb. 2 marked the beginning of the second stage where more negative verbs were used in referring to the government side, whose voice was absent during this stage. 3.4 Summary The present te xtual analysis of Al Ahram and Aljazeera articles reveals that the outlets took sides with either side of the conflict: Al Ahram sided with the government and Aljazeera with the protesters. That being said, the degree of explicitness and consistency in sho wing this Us vs. Them dichotomy differed from one outlet to the other and also differed at different points in the protests; Al Ahram tended to be more explicit about its position that was supportive of the regime in the beginning of the protests and Aljaz eera was more explicit about its stance that was supportive of the protesters by the end of the protests.

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104 First, the investigation of lexicalization and predication shows an absolute contrast between Al Ahram and Aljazeera For instance, Al Ahram utilized predications such as the banned and illegal to describe opposing groups; it also used terms such as elements compared to activists to refer to members of those groups. This was not the case with Aljazeera which acknowledged these groups as legitimate po litical groups, referring to its members as activists Similarly, Al Ahram used proper name, position, and even honorifics to refer to government officials or to individuals against the regime who did not belong to any particular group. If mentioned at all members of opposing groups, such as the April 6 movement, the National Commission for Change, and the MB were referred to only by proper name. The two institutions also employed the terms dead and martyr and their derivatives differently; Al Ahram refe rred to casualties on the government side as martyrs and on the protesters side as dead in the beginning of the Revolution. Later in the Revolution it used the term dead and its derivatives to refer to casualties on both n, the term martyr and its derivatives was used to refer to casualties on the p rotesters side of the conflict. Aljazeera was more consistent in its use of the terms during the days of the protests as it employed the term dead and though, it employed the term martyr casualties. Second, the analysis of presupposition indicates that both outlets us ed this strategy to present the ingroup positively and the outgroup negatively. Yet, the way this strategy was employed varied at different points in the protests: Al Ahram presented negative presuppositions about the protesters in the authorial voice at t he beginning of

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105 the uprising, and by the end of it presented negative presuppositions about the government by reporting other sources. Aljazeera was different in that its presuppositions in general tended to represent the government negatively; yet, it was more explicit about its presuppositions by the end of the Revolution as they wer e used in the authorial voice. Finally, the investigation of verbal processes shows that the two outlets followed different strategies in employing positive, neutral, and negative verbal processes before and after Feb. 2. In the beginning of the uprising, Al Ahram utilized positive and neutral verbal processes in reporting governme nt officials and totally excluded representatives of the protesters. After Feb. 2, it started reporting opposition sources using positive and neutral verbal processes. Aljazeera on the other hand, used all types of verbal processes with both sides before Feb. 2. After this date, it employed negative verbal processes to refer to the government and government officials.

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106 Table 3 1 Predications used by Al Ahram and Aljazeera to describe opposing groups Al Ahram Aljazeera (a) ( Al Ahram Jan. 25) (a') violently with the activists and demonstrators who will take to the streets (Aljazeera, Jan. 25) (b) The MB whose activity is Al Ahram Jan. 25) (b') Others organized a demonstration led by tens of Aljazeera Jan. 26) (c) governorates witnessed massive demonstrations on the so called the Friday of Rage, in which tens of thousands of the youth of the banned group, opposition, and political forces participated ( Al Ahram Jan. 29) (c') Activists in Tahrir Square told Aljazeera .... ( Aljazeera Feb. 4) (d) The [Muslim] Brothers elements incited emotions and broke the barrier of commitment to peaceful demonstration ( Al Ahram Jan. 30) (d') MB group mentioned that its activists received security threats ( Aljazeera Jan. 26)

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107 Table 3 1 Continued Al Ahram Aljazeera (e) called April 6 and Kefaya movements as well as the National Commission for Change. ( Al Ahram Jan. 25) (e') The April 6 movement youth, who are leading the call for the demonstration announced that tens of activists were arrested ( Aljazeera Ja n. 26) (f) ( Al Ahram Jan. 30) Table 3 2 Al Ahram and Aljazeera Al Ahram Aljazeera (a) Mr. Interior Minister Habib Al Ahram Jan. 26) (a') President of the National Committee for Change Mohamed ElBaradei Aljazeera Feb. 3) (b) Vice President Mr. Omar Al Ahram Feb. 8) (b') Dr. Mohammed Al Beltagi the ( Aljazeera Jan. 26) (c) The demonstrators chose Mr. Amr Moussa, Secretary General of Arab League, and the Egyptian scientist Ahmed Zewail to present their demands for change ( Al Ahram Feb. 2). (c') Deputy General Guid e of the MB Aljazeera Feb. 3)

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108 Table 3 2 Continued Al Ahram Aljazeera (d) The demonstrators refused to delegate ElBaradei to speak on their behalf ( Al Ahram Feb. 2). (d') Kefaya movement coordinator Hamdi Aljazeera Feb. 3) (e) ElBaradei and the MB group insisted on their part on change ( Al Ahram Feb. 2). (e') The leader in Kefaya movement Aljazeera Feb. 4) (f) members) of banned MB group, especially former parliament members ( Al Ahram Jan. 26) (f') The Egyptian activist Wael Aljazeera Feb. 9) (g) Engineer Wael Ghonim, the Al Ahram Feb. 8) (g') Director of Cairo Security Ismael Elshater said in a statement that Interior Minister ( Aljazeera Jan. 25) (h') Suleiman, the Vice President ( Aljazeera Feb. 4)

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109 Table 3 3 The naming and description of the protests by Al Ahram and Aljazeera Al Ahram Aljazeera (a) succeeded in investing the events and jumping over the legitimate demands of the youth to achieve their personal interests and political goals by destroying the country, and spreading chaos and destruction ( Al Ahram Jan. 30). (a') The protests demanding ( Aljazeera Feb. 1) (b) The demonstrations developed into gatherings of inciters of unrest and destruction and criminal elements ( Al Ahram Jan. 30). (b') The demonstrations demanding the departure of the ( Aljazeera Jan. 30) (c) Peaceful marches calling for reform turned suddenly into outrageous demonstrations that have gone beyond legitimacy, and chaos became a title to what happened ( Al Ahram Jan, 30). (c') between the demonstrators and supporters of President Aljazeera Feb. 3)

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110 Table 3 3 Continued Al Ahram Aljazeera (d') demonstrators and security forces ( Aljazeera Jan. 26) (e') Sources told Aljazeera that violent clashes broke out in Mustafa Mahmoud Square .. between demonstrators and elements described as armed ( Aljazeera Feb. 3) Table 3 4 Al Ahram and Aljazeera the beginning of the protests Al Ahram Aljazeera (a) Martyrdom of a recruit and two young men in Suez ( Al Ahram Jan. 26) (a') Four people, including a security officer, were killed in clashes between demonstrators and security forces ( Aljazeera Jan. 26) (b) A security source stated that recruit Ahmad Aziz of the Central Security Forces died men died/perished ( Al Ahram Jan. 26)

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111 Table 3 5 Al Ahram and Aljazeera departure Al Ahram Aljazeera (a) death of 300 people, according to AFP ( Al Ahram Feb. 2) (a') people died/perished in the protests, while hundreds were wounded ( Aljazeera Feb. 2) (b) Egypt witnessed last Wednesday in which ten were killed ( Al Ahram Feb. 5) (b') Around 300 people were killed during the unrest while he was arrested ( Aljazeera Feb. 9) Table 3 6 Other occurrences of the term martyr in Al Ahram and Aljazeera coverage Al Ahram Aljazeera (a) the latest events ( Al Ahram Feb. 8) (a') and 5 thousand wounded ( Aljazeera Feb. 13) (b) our hero martyrs ( Al Ahram Feb. 12) (b') In Tahrir or Martyrs or Jan. 25 Aljazeera Feb. 13)

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112 Table 3 7 Occurrences of the term Revolution in Al Ahram and Aljazeera coverage Al Ahram Aljazeera (a) move to any place but Tahrir Square, the Square Revolution in its contemporary era ( Al Ahram Feb. 5) (a') No one exactly knows what the Revolution would be .. ( Aljazeera Jan. 28) (b) steal the Revolution of Egyptian youth who are worried about their country ( Al Ahram Feb. 8) (b') The Party [El Ghad Party] confirmed resuming what it called the uprising until the and called upon the youth to ( Aljazeera Jan. 29) (c') The demonstrators confirmed in their chants the popularity and youthfulness of the Revolution ( Aljazeera Feb. 4) (d') ( Aljazeera Feb. 9) (e') its media scene ( Aljazeera Feb. 10)

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113 Table 3 7 Continued Al Ahram Aljazeera (f') The Egyptian youth Revolution ( Aljazeera Feb. 10) (g') The Revolution events ( Aljazeera Feb. 10) Table 3 8 The Al Ahram Aljazeera (a) Not [Muslim] Brothers, not parties, our Revolution is a youth Revolution ( Al Ahram Feb. 11) (a') The popular Revolution that is unprecedented in the history of Egypt ( Aljazeera Feb. 12) (b) Egyptian people for their great Revolution ( Al Ahram Feb. 12) (b') The youth white Revolution ( Aljazeera Feb. 13) (c) Revolution that was led by the cream of Egyptian youth ( Al Ahram Feb. 12) (d) greatest popular Revolution in the history of revolutions ( Al Ahram Feb. 12)

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114 Table 3 9 Al Ahram and Aljazeera use of the term baltagiyya and its derivatives Al Ahram Aljazeera (a) The second goal is that the Egyptian citizen becomes insecure about himself on the street due to the ongoing theft, stealing, baltaga and horrification of citizens ( Al Ahram Jan. 30) (a') between popular committees formed by the inhabitants and baltagiyya Aljazeera Jan. 30) (b) A number of baltagiyya and gangs exploited the situation by breaking into the large shopping center Carrefour ( Al Ahram Jan. 30) (b') Aljazeera reported a media source in Damanhr as saying that what he described as baltagiyya are robbing and stealing ( Aljazeera Jan. 30) (c) There is a difference between peaceful demonstrations that everyone respects and a group of baltagiyya and bandits exploiting security vacuum ( Al Ahram Jan. 30) (c') Media sources accused what they described as elements belonging to the Interior Ministry wearing civilian clothes and the so balt agiay attacking demonstrators in Tahrir Square ( Aljazeera Feb. 3)

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115 Table 3 9 Continued Al Ahram Aljazeera (d) They [businessmen, parliament members, and NDP members] organized a demonstration supporting the president in Mustafa Mahmoud Square in which laborers in companies owned by the businessmen, laborers fr om the Laborers Union, soccer players, artists, and baltagiyya who were gathered from a number of popular neighborhoods in Cairo and were riding camels, horses, and mules participated; ( Al Ahram Feb. 14) (d') Media reports pointed out that the death toll of confrontations that continued yesterday baltagiyya and protesters reached ten ( Aljazeera F eb. 4) (e') One of the most dramatic scenes in the series of the Egyptian Revolution events was the NDP baltagiyya entering Tahrir Square in Cairo riding camels and horses ( Aljazeera Feb. 10)

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116 Table 3 10 Al Ahram presuppositions Al Ahram Aljazeera (a) In spite of the provocative approach that was adopted by the inciters of the gathering on the 25 th ( Al Ahram Jan. 25) (b) The Ministry of Interior calls on demonstrators not to be misled by false slogans ( Al Ahram Jan. 25) (c) As usual the banned group invested the fact that many security forces were confronting disorder inciters to set police department on fire and seize weapons and documents ( Al Ahram Jan. 30) (d) A security source announced that allowing protest gatherings to express political demands or demands of certain gr oups during the past period is consistent with the democratic track and allowing for freedom of expression ( Al Ahram Jan. 25) (e) A few thousand participated in massive demonstrations in Cairo and a number of governorates yesterday and chanted slogans that called for providing job opportunities, fighting unemployment, controlli ng the rise of prices, and more freedom and democracy ( Al Ahram Jan. 26) (f) ( Al Ahram Jan. 26) (g) The demonstrations included families, youth, and elderly; the participants confirmed that the Egyptian people's psychological barrier has been broken and the people have become able to ask for freedom ( Al Ahram Feb. 5) (h) I hence call upon officials not to treat us as children anymore ( Al Ahram Feb. 8)

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117 Table 3 11 Aljazeera presuppositions Al Ahram Aljazeera (a) A statement issued by the movement [April 6] warned the Ministry of Interior Aljazeera Jan. 25) (b) Protesters gathering in Tahrir Square said they were more insistent on the ( Aljazeera Feb. 3) (c) Deputy General Guide of the MB Rashad Bayoumi confirmed that the assaults on demonstrators on Tahrir Square give further/new evidence that it is not acceptable to forgive the regime or allow President Mubarak safe exit ( Aljazeera Feb. 3) (d) The group warned that acts of violence would only lead to more political congestion and divide ( Aljazeera Feb. 3) (e) The participants [in the demonstration] renewed their demand of the ( Aljazeera Feb. 1) (f) It is worth mentioning that Egyptian authorities cut off Internet and cellular phone services on the first days of the uprising in an attempt to obscure police forces and armed militia violations against armless demonstrators ( Aljazeera F eb. 9)

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118 Table 3 11 Continued Al Ahram Aljazeera (g) In this context, the presenters of the TV show 48 hours on Mehwar Channel sought to tarnish the image of those demanding an end to corruption and violations and calling for restoring freedom by casting doubts about their nationalism and presen ting them as agents serving external interests ( Aljazeera Feb. 10) (h) The editor of the paper, known for his close relation with the government, attempted to distance himself from the incredible fabrication ( Aljazeera Feb. 10) (i) The police force with all its members and capacity was not able, as it did before, to prevent revolutionists from reaching Tahrir Square ( Aljazeera Feb. 13) Table 3 12 Verbal process in Al Ahram and Aljazeera coverage during the first days of the protests Al Ahram Aljazeera (a) The security source confirmed that police forces were committed to securing these protests which started at 11 a.m. ( Al Ahram Jan. 25) (a') April 6 Movement warned Egyptian Ministry of Interior from dealing violently with activists and demonstrators who will take to the streets today ( Aljazeera Jan. 25 ) (b) A security source announced that the recruit Ahmad Aziz of the Central Security Forces died as a martyr ( Al Ahram Jan. 26) (b') On its part the Egyptian government warned against any attempt to break the law ( Aljazeera Jan. 25 )

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119 Table 3 12 Continued Al Ahram Aljazeera (c) The Ministry [of Interior] confirms the necessity of ending the gatherings to avoid whatever might affect general security ( Al Ahram Jan. 25) (c') April 6 Movement Youth who are leading the call for the demonstration announced that tens of activists were arrested ( Aljazeera Jan. 26) (d') confirming (Head of Cairo Security) that the government has sent warnings to the organizers of the protests ( Aljazeera Jan. 25) (e') Head of Cairo Security Ismael ElShaer said in a statement ( Aljazeera Jan. 25) (f') MB group mentioned that its activists received security threats ( Aljazeera Jan. 26)

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120 Table 3 13 Verbal process in Al Ahram and Aljazeera coverage after Feb. 2 Al Ahram Aljazeera (a) ElBaradei said: the president must leave by next Friday ( Al Ahram Feb. 2) (a') Media sources accused in a conversation with Aljazeera what they described as Interior Ministry elements in civil clothes who are described as baltagiyya demonstrators in Tahrir Square ( Aljazeera Feb. 3) (b) The National Progressive Unionist Party called upon Prime Minister Ahmad Shafik to take immediate measures demands ( Al Ahram Feb. 2) (b') The Arab Organization of Human Rights condemned what it called assaults on opposing demonstrators in Tahrir Square ( Aljazeera Feb. 3) (c) Turkish Prime Minister Rajab Teyeb Erdogan called upon President Mubarak to listen to his people and obey their demands that aim to achieve democratic change in the country ( Al Ahram Feb. 2) (c') All eyewitnesses in Tahrir Square refuted these claims on Aljazeera ( Aljazeera Feb. 4)

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121 Table 3 13 Continued Al Ahram Aljazeera (d) The participants confirmed that the psychological barrier for the Egyptian people was broken and they have become able to demand freedom ( Al Ahram Feb. 5) (d') The leader in Kefaya Movement George Ishaq baltagiyya and demonstrators ( Aljazeera Feb. 4) (e) .. confirming [protesters supporting Mubarak] that President Mubarak obeyed the demands of the people and listened to the peaceful protests that were organized by the aware Egyptian youth ( Al Ahram Feb. 3) (f) General Nabeel El Ezaby, governor of Assuit, announced that the demonstrators all raised one slogan (the people demand the stay of the President) and confirms their agreement on the love and appreciation of President Mubarak ( Al Ahram Feb. 3) (g) Egyptian rights groups accused security authorities of launching an organized horrifying assault against demonstrators ( Al Ahram Feb. 11)

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122 CHAPTER 4 DISCURSIVE PRACTICE ANALYSIS 4.1 Overview Discursive practice has to do with the processes involved in t ext production and consumption. However, the focus of the present study is on the institutional practices and organizational routines that govern text production. In their production of texts, reporters take into account the institutional character that involves editorial pr ocedures and guidelines of their media outlet. Thus, the encoding of texts varies due to the variation in editorial procedures and to the targeted audience of each media inst itution. As explained in Chapter 2 two analytic tools are utilized to analyze discursive practice and depict the underlying ideology of Al Ahram and Aljazeera ; these are intertextuality and topics Relevant e xamples on each section are provided in tables at the end of Chapter 2 Simply p ut, intertextuality refers to how texts are produced from already existing texts. It, therefore, pertains to how and why different voices are included or excluded in news items. I start by discuss ing how Al Ahram and Aljazeera reported the antagonists duri ng the Revolution, and whether or not their reporting strategies were consistent throughout the days of the protests. I also discuss whether or not certain voices were emphasiz ed and given prominence and others marginalized and excluded in the coverage of each outlet. In doing so, the aim is to show how hegemony is achieved by allowing certain groups access to media discourse and considering other groups as unreliable sources (van Dijk, 1998b). The analysis of topics on the other hand, gives insights into what constituted new s value for each media outlet. Therefore, I discuss the topics that were emphasized and the topics that were deemphasized, or even neglected, by each media outlet

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123 through processes of foregrounding and backgrounding. To do so, I focus on five main topics on which the coverage centered and show how Al Ahram and Aljazeera dealt with each of these topics; they include: 1) the protests; 2) the President, government, and the NDP s reaction; and 5) the U.S. position. 4.2 Intertextuality Al Ahram tended to include and exclude voices representing different sides of the conflict depending on power balances during the days of the protests. That is, the first days of the Revolution were cha racterized by an emphasis on the official voice and marginalization of the protesters. As the events unfolded and protesters started gaining support, their voices were minimally included along with the government voices, with the latter being the dominant voice. Once President Mubarak was ousted, the only voice reported was that of the protesters. During the first days of the protests, the paper totally excluded the voices of the opposition; the only voices reported were those of government officials such as security sources, the Ministry of the Interior, and official sources. By Feb. 2, an opposition member, Mohammed ElBaradei, leader of the National Association for Change, was reported for the first time; in fact, it was the first time an opposition membe r was given voice. His reported speech was brief and was preceded by a clause that minimizes the importance of what he said. On that same day, the National Progressive Unionist Party was also reported as calling on the Prime Minister to obey the demands of the demonstrators, and the Turkish Prime Minister was reported as calling on President

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124 backgrounded and given less prominence in the article, marked a transition or p erhaps confusion in the pape In spite of this relative change, the prominent voice was still the voice of government representatives or voices supporting the government. Al Ahram continued and included voices such as citizens supporting Mubarak, Egyptian Chamber of Commerce, Governor of Assiut, Egyptian Prime Minister, and Vice President Omar Suleiman. There were few cases of reporting voices against the government, such as a leader in the MB group and protesters and activists such as Wael Ghonim. By the end of the Revolution and as protesters made victory, voices critical of the government were included, such as human rights organizations which had not been referred to throughout the eve nts international media sources, and demonstrators. In an article dated Feb. 11, Al Ahram reported Egyptian rights groups who told the Guardian about violations of Egyptian security forces against the demonstrators. In another article on the same day, la wyers expressing solidarity with the demonstrators were also r eported. T able 4 1 shows the voices included during the Revolution based on a random sample data at different points in the Revolution. Al Ahram employed indirect quotation to report speech; as a matter of fact this was the only type of reported speech used in all the articles, eliminating boundaries between the representing discourse and the represented discourse, or rather between the voice of t he reporter and the voice of the person reported. As Fairclough (1995: 81) about the propositional content of what is said, it is ambivalent about the actual words that

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125 authorial voice and using sources to verbalize truth claims, ideologically loaded words may be employed to serve group interests through indirect reporting. Since Al Ahram most ly reported members of what it considered the ingroup, this effect may not be clear; however, when reporting neutral or outgroup parties, the effect wa s more salient. To explain this, I provide an example. in Table 4 2. Reporting the New York Times on Feb. 5, Al Ahram used the predication banned which is employed whenever the MB group is referred to in its articles. However, it is not clear from the text whether this word is part of the representing urse, the New York Times voice. It is most likely, if not definitely, the voice of the reporter embedded in reported speech for ideological purposes. By opting for indirect reporting, the reporter transforms the actual words to fit easily with her voice (F airclough, 1995). On the other hand, Aljazeera laden in terms of the number of voices included and their diversity. Yet, not all voices were given equal prominence throughout the days of the Revolution. Like Al Ahram Aljazeera includ ed and excluded different voices at different points in the Revolution. When the protests started, both sides of the conflict were equally presented: the coverage included voices representing the opposition and the government as well as neutral voices such as media sources, eyewitnesses, and high ranking officials in other countries. The coverage was also balanced when it comes to the opposition voices reported; it included members of different leading groups in the opposition as well as independent activi sts, and no particular group was given more prominence over the other. Among opposition groups that were reported were the April 6 Movement, MB National Assembly for Change, and Kefaya (enough) movement.

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126 Egyptian government officials, on the other hand, were always reported through other sources such as another media outl et or a statement. As Table 4 3 shows, Habib ElAdly, Minister of the Interior, was reported by referring to an interview with Al Ahram and Head of Cairo Security was reporte d by referring to a statement. This indicates that Aljazeera did not have direct access to government officials, but still sought to include their voices in the coverage by referring to other sources. These voices, however, were excluded by Feb. 3. The data shows that A ljazeera almost reported no government officials or government supporters after eight days of voices such as media sources, eyewitnesses, or international organization s. The following Table 4 4 shows the voices included in a random sample data at dif ferent points in the Revolution. It reveals that until Feb. 7, Aljazeera reported both sides of the annot be assessed by merely noting which voices are represented, and, for instance, how much A closer investigation shows that the voice of the Egyptian government was included in most cases to present it negatively or the protesters positively. The voices can be divided into protagonist and antagonist voices. Table 4 5 reveal s that although the Head of Archeological Sites a nd former secretary of Mubarak were reported as government officials, the speech reported was supportive of the protesters, not the government; some of it, as a matter of fact, was offensive against the government. Another strategy which also creates an i mpression of objectivity but drives interpretations that are favorable to the ingroup ideology is positioning and contextualizing. On the first day of the protests, Aljazeera reported that the Egyptian

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127 government officials such as Interior Minister Habib E lAdly and Head of Cairo Security as threatening to arrest protesters who did not obtain licenses; this was followed by to allow peaceful protests Aljazeera included the voice of the government, the interpretation is influenced by the reporting of an international organization that ges to allow peaceful protests. on the second day, followed by indirect reporting of the MB group and April 6 movement saying that some of their activists were indeed threatened and arrested. On the face of it, the article reported both sides of the conflict, but the context serves an in terpretation that presents the government as suppressi ve and intolerant of criticism. Table 4 4 also shows that Aljazeera has included the voices of other sources, which did not belong to any side of the conflict. The reported voices categorized as Others in the above Table can be subdivided into four sources: 1) international official sources such as U.S. President Barack Obama and U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton; 2) media sources such as Aljazeera correspondents CNN Reuters and AFP ; 3) interna tional organizations such as Amnesty International Organization and Arab Human Rights Organization; and 4) unidentified sources such as eyewitnesses and media reports. The question is: how were these voices employed and how did they play out in terms of r epresenting the two sides of the conflict? The general answer is that they were either neutral in that they described the events as they unfolded or were supportive of the protests and protesters. One of the examples that clearly shows how including voices was utilized to present the demonstrations positively and government negatively is reporting unidentified sources

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128 such as eyewitnesses. Eyewitnesses were reported seven times in a sample data investigated and in six out of these there was emphasis on the positive side of the protesters and negativ e side of the government. The protesters were presented negatively in only one of these instances. Table 4 6 sheds light on how reporting on unidentified sources was geared towards supporting the protesters and present ing the governme nt negatively in the c overage. The last reporting of eyewitnesses did not directly present protesters as perpetrators of a negative action in the sense that they were not introduced as agents of the negative action; however, the government side was presented as being affected by an attack on one of its agencies. Therefore, (e) is not in line with the previous ones in terms of the presentation of the two sides; it was the only exception in Aljazeera Aljazeera employed three types of reported speech in its articles: direct with co ntroversial words or thoughts. v an Ginneken (2002) explains that the difference between quoting complete sent ences and quoting only certain words is that in the former the factualness of the claim is unquestioned, whereas in the latter the content is indirectly being questioned. In other cases, it is used to keep distance from the content of the reported speech. Similar to the use of scare quotes is employing expressions like the so called ' the so described ' what they call ' what they describe and according to him to influence content factualness and to distance the reporter from the implications and tru th claims of certain words and expressions. This strategy has been employed even more than scare quotes in the data investigated and was used with both sides of the

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129 conflict as well as neutral parties. Examples of the utilization of scare quotes and expres sions that achieve distance with the content are provided in Table 4 7. Aljazeera used strategic quotation in reporting both sides. For example, in describing the clashes that erupted between popular committees and baltagiyya in (a), reporters employ strat egic quotation with the phrase law breakers Using scare quotes with law breakers emphasizes the way the phrase is formed rather than the content; by following this strategy, the reporter distances herself from what the expression refers to. Since the firs t day of the protests, the Minister and Ministry of Interior as well as official media referred to the demonstrators as law breakers claiming that they are gathering without obtaining official licenses. Aljazeera treats this phrase as controversial and at tributes its connotations to the source, in this case the Egyptian government. By so doing, it rejects the presupposition made by the government side of the conflict or at least does not take it as a given The network applies the same strategy with the pr propositions. Certain negative predications attributed to the government side of the conflict we re reported by employing scare quotes and distancing the network from the claims made as shown in (b). Scare quotes were also used to re fer to naming of certain the Day of Rage and the naming of Fridays, which were considered special days during the Revolution when it comes to mobilizing people and encoura ging them to join the the Rage Friday the Departure Friday respectively, and were referred to using scare quotes to achieve distance from the naming of these days.

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130 Aljazeera reporters distanced themselves and, perhaps, questioned the truth claims of expressions like law breakers and protesters supporting Mubarak by employing expressions such as what it described as or who were described as as shown in (c) and (d). In (e) and (f), the network also distanced itself from the claims of the protesters by using the same expressions to refer to thugs hired by the NDP a nd armed elements assaulting the protesters By using the expressions what they called and described as above, Aljazeera is not adopting the claim that the ruling NDP has hired armed thugs to assault the protesters, at least not explicitly; it is attributi ng these controversial descriptions to other sources: activists and sources, respectively. However, in later stages in the Revolution, as Table 4 8 shows, these expressions were not used, indicating a more explicit position towards the event. The Day of Ra ge was also used in the authorial voice with no scare quotes or distancing expressions after President Mubarak stepped down; the tone of Aljazeera shifted from a cautious tone seeking balance and objectivity by editorial standards to a more explicit voice backing the protests and the protesters. To sum up, the analysis of intertextuality reveals a variation between Al Ahram and Aljazeera in terms of the sources emphasized in the coverage and the ways these sources were reported. It also shows that both out lets affiliated themselves with one side of the conflict. Al Ahram tended to exclude voices representing the protesters, especially in the beginning of the protests and only reported on government officials. Later in the uprising, particularly by Feb. 2, voices of the opposition were included, but voices reported were those of the protesters. In its reporting, Al Ahram only utilized indirect reporting, a strategy which allo ws for eliminating boundaries between the

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131 representing and represented discourse, making the distinction between the reported speech and authorial voice difficult. In the outset of the protests, Aljazeera was balanced in its reporting of different voices representing the two sides of the conflict, and within the opposition, it did not give prominence to one particular group over the other; all opposition groups were given equal prominence in the coverage. However, by Feb. 2, the network excluded the government side of the conflict and utilized the voices of unidentified sources, such as eyewitnesses, to represent the protesters positively and/or the represent the government negatively. Aljazeera employed th ree kinds of reporting in its coverage: direct reporting, indirect reporting, and strategic reporting. The latter was especially significant in that the network used scare quotes or expressions like the so called with certain terms or claims during the d ays of the protests, but then used the same terms an inconsistency in Aljazeera 4.3 Topics Al Ahram asizing the protests. In the process of news selection, Al Ahram excluded some important negativel y, and emphasized events that presented it positively. I discuss the topics included in Al Ahram One of th e main and significant events that was reported by almost all media

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132 Facebook on the 26 th of January, and shutting down access to the Internet across the country on Januar y 27 th Aljazeera trans mission on Nilesat satellite. Al Ahram refrained from reporting the two steps undertaken by the Egyptian government: blocking the Internet and cutting off Aljazeera transmission Rather, (a) in Table 4 9 shows that on Jan. 27, the paper reported that the government denied blocking Twitter and Facebook, despite different reports confirming the blockage. The paper reported on Feb. 3, as part of its positive presentation of the gove rnment, that Internet services returned in Egypt, as shown in (b) and (c). On Feb. 9, it reported in another story, shown in (d), that Aljazeera transmission has also resumed on Nilesat satellite. Another example that further explains the strategy of exclu sion when it comes to On Jan. 28, the Egyptian authorities arrested Ghonim, who was the admin of one of the most influential Facebook pages during the uprising, as pa rt of its attempts to confront the strong wave of protests and large numbers of protesters flooding to Tahrir Square. The arrest raised concerns over the way the Egyptian government was dealing with the situation and sparked the reaction of different human rights organizations. Al Ahram did not report the arrest but reported his release. The paper also did not report the arrival of Mohamed ElBaradei, former Director General of Atomic Energy Agency and main rticipate in the protests. News like blocking Internet service or transmission outage of one of the main news outlets in the Arab world were very significant during the uprising. As a matter of fact, they were main headlines in the coverage of many media institutions in the Arab

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133 world and elsewhere. Failing to report such news gives insights into what constitutes news value for Al Ahram based on political affiliations and ideological stances. Also, cipation in the protests in Tahrir Square sheds light on who is considered worthy of coverage and who is not in Al Ahram Al Ahram also downplayed one of the main events that took place during the baltagiyya loyal to President Mubarak rode camels and horses and clashed with protesters on Tahrir Square in an attempt to disperse the protests (Holmes, 2012) The clashes caused the death of 11 people and injury of 600 others. Despite the fact that th is event was significant during the uprising, it secondary event within other stories. To explain the marginalization of the events on Tahrir Square in Al Ahram coverage, cons ider (a) and (b) in Table 4 10 ; (a) is a headline that implies that the focus is on protests supporting Mubarak. In the lead paragraph shown in (b), the paper referred to the clashes as part of its description of the marches; in other words, the marches of the primary event addressed in the story. This example among others in the coverage shows how this incident was downplayed by Al Ahram ; the topic was dealt with as a secondary eve nt that did not qualify to be addressed in a separate news article. Rather, it was incorporated in stories focusing on the positive presentation of the government. On the other hand, Aljazeera Al Ahram and showe d a tendency to emphasize the positive actions of the protesters and their voices as well as the negative actions of the government. Except for the arrest of

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134 Wael Ghonim, Aljazeera emphasized all topics that Al Ahram excluded or downplayed in its coverage, including Internet outage, Aljazeera shutdown, the participation of opposition figures, such as ElBaradei, in the protests, As to the topics included, the coverage of Al Ahram and A ljazeera revolved around five main themes: 1) the protests; 2) Mubarak, the government, and the NDP; 3) the religious institution; 4) the international community reaction; and 5) the U.S. reaction. In the following I discuss how Al Ahram and Aljazeera addr e ssed each of these five themes. 4.3.1 The P rotests News articles on this topic were follow up stories reporting the latest developments during the eighteen days of the uprising in a way that was in line with the into two stages based on the events emphasized: the first stage is from the outbreak of the protests until Feb. 1, and the second is from Feb. 2 until Mubarak stepped down. The emphasis of stories during the first stage was on chaos, destruction, robbery, theft, and other negative actions of the protesters. Table 4 11 provides examples of news articles headlines that emphasized these actions. In (a) (e), emphasis was on negative actions. The aim was to distract the audience from the main goal of the protests an d generalize actions that were undertaken by some of the protesters to delineate the protests and protesters as a whole. Actions of violence, destruction, burning assets, and assault might have actually happened, but focus on these negative activities to r eport the main story shows that events that were against the protesters and their cause were of news value to Al Ahram Peaceful protests and the legitimate demands of the protesters such as

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135 demands of reform, employment, and human rights, were given less emphasis during this stage as articles on peaceful protests were significantly fewer than those highlighting the negative consequences of demonstrations. And even in these articles, lead paragraphs often tended to present the protesters negatively. (a) in Table 4 12 is a headline that is different from the headlines in Table 4 11 in that the focus seems to be on demonstrations, not the violence and destruction that accompanied them; yet, the lead paragraph, as shown in (b) delineates the protesters in a wa y similar to headlines in 4 11 certain topics over others, and frame the protests from a perspective that is supportive of the regime and against the protesters. In the second stage, the emphasis shifted fr om representing the protests negatively to representing the voices of protesters who had different demands: supporting President Mubarak and his government and ending the calls for his downfall. In other words, when the negative presentation of the protest ers did not succeed and the number of protesters joining the demonstrations increased day after day, Al Ahram sought to show that protesters had different demands and that there was another side that was against the calls for the government downfall; only two articles emphasized the protests against the government. Examples of article headlines during this stage are in Table 4 13 (a) (d) are examples of headlines that emphasized the protests supporting Mubarak and the steps he undertook as part of his r government and appointing a vice president; reforms in (a) refers to these steps. Only two articles throughout the uprising, (e) and (f), pointed out to the protests against the government. Thus, the fo cus was on counter protests praising Mubarak and supporting

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136 his rule, while the scale and level of protests demanding the downfall of the regime were marginalized, as only a two articles highlighted the large number of protesters and their demands. Storie s on the protests represented the overwhelming majority of stories in Aljazeera 's coverage It reported each development on the ground in different cities and governorates of Egypt with detail and intensity. It emphasized topics s uch as the size and intensity of protests; the protesters and their demands; the violations of the Egyptian government in dealing with the situation; and protests in other countries that expressed solidarity with the Egyptian uprising. Starting on the fi rst day of the Revolution, Aljazeera reported news articles that emphasized the massive number of protesters participating in the uprising. In doing so, especially in the first days of the protests, it provided an alternative narrative that stressed that t he ongoing events were not acts of violence or destruction as claimed by official media, but rather a wide scale uprising, in which people of different walks of life were participating. This is not to say that criminal actions taking place during the Revol ution were excluded in the coverage, but they were deemphasized and attributed to the lack of security caused by the withdrawal of security forces from the streets, as will be explained later. Secondly, in reporting the protests, Aljazeera emphasized the p government chants on Tahrir Square and elsewhere. In the first days of the uprising, the number of protesters estimated were tens of thousands and the demands reported were reform; however, the demands escalated by protesters increased dramatically, according to Aljazeera

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137 Table 4 14 reveals how the network emphasized the protests and the demands of the protesters in its coverage from the first to the last day of the uprising. (a) (h) are only examples of many articles that show Aljazeera demonstrations and the demands of the demonstrators. In the first five days of the uprising, the network reported that protesters were protesting against corruption, unemployment, and torture, as was announced by Facebook groups organizing the downfall. Aljaze era also emphasized demonstrations taking place in other countries that were supportive of the Egyptian uprising as shown in Table 4 15 ; it sought to report how massive and popular the protests were to the extent that Egyptian communities abroad as well as people of different nationalities participated by gathering in front of Egyptian embassies across the world to express the same demands as protesters in Eg ypt. In (a), Aljazeera reported under a multiple subheadings supportive demonstrations and gatherings taking place in France, Norway, the U.S., Britain, Italy, Germany, Spain, Greece, Tunisia, Algeria, Yemen, Jordan, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Lebano n, and Mauritania. It emphasized each of these demonstrations by reporting them with detailed description. (b), (c), and (d) are examples of headlines on stories covering demonstrations that support the Egyptian Revolution in different cities around the wo rld. Aljazeera

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138 demonstra tors and human rights violations; and the security vacancy caused by the withdrawal of security forces from the streets. Examples are provided in Table 4 16. In (a), Aljazeera emphasizes the violent clashes that took place in Tahrir Square and held the Eg yptian government responsible for such events. In these articles and others, the network reported the developments of the events and claimed, by reporting eyewitnesses and journalists, that the baltagiyya horrifying people on Tahrir Square were either secu rity forces or thugs employed by the government for this purpose; Aljazeera so that they abandon their demands and pull out of the streets. In (b) and (c), Aljazeera highlights t he violations of security forces during the Revolution, including the arrest of activists and journalists and facilitating the escape of prisoners to trigger chaos and attribute it to the protesters. The network also addressed other rights violations such as Internet outage and the shutdown of Aljazeera transmission during the first days of the protests, and reported the condemnation of civil rights organizations of human rights violations in Egypt during the uprising. The shutdown of Aljazeera transmission on Nilesat satellite and the hacking of Aljazeera.net Aljazeera coverage, as shown in (d) (f). (g) shows that the network also emphasized the demands and calls of human rights organizations to end human rights violations in Egypt. The analysis of how the two outlets addressed the topic of protests shows that each had its own narrative on the events and sought to report from its own perspective; their reporting and emphas es construct two realities for one event. While Al Ahram portrayed the protests as acts of chaos perpetrated by people conspiring against Egypt,

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139 Aljazeera attributed the chaos to the intentional withdrawal of security forces from important locations and it s release of prisoners to create a situation of fear and panic to deter the protesters Also, at the time Al Ahram was downplaying the size of protests protesters supporting the Presiden t, Aljazeera emphasized the massiveness of the protests in Egypt and elsewhere as well as the insistence of protesters on their demands; it also reported the violations of Egyptian security forces and the negative practices of the Egyptian government. 4.3.2 The President, G overnment, and the NDP Among the recurring topics in Al Ahram and Aljazeera coverage were President Mubarak, his government, and his ruling Party. However, the way in which these topics were addressed was different from an outlet to another In the following I discuss how Al Ahram and Aljazeera addressed the three topics in their coverage. News relating to the President, the government, and ruling NDP were emphasized during the Revolution. In the news articles covering this side of the confl ict, Al Ahram presented the President in a position of control and authority throughout the days of the uprising, underscoring his sacrifice for the country and patriotism. Government officials were also presented as nationalists, who were striving to obey the legitimate and majority party that represents the people. News articles on President Mubarak resembled the typical coverage of state run media of news about leaders, includ ing their meetings, receptions, and statements on different issues. Throughout the crisis, Al Ahram reported news on the President to confirm that he was on top of the situation by holding meetings, appointing ministers,

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140 and giving orders to secure the nee ds of the people; it sought to create an image of him as the powerful, despite the deteriorating situation surrounding him. However, the representation of Mubarak changed after his stepping down; he was then represented as corrupt and as lacking the abilit y to deal with the crisis. Table 4 17 presents examples of headlines of articles on Mubarak before his stepping down. The paper went to the other extreme when dealing with news articles on Mubarak after his resignation on Feb. 11. After being pre sented as the loyal nationalist who was in command of the situation, he was presented differently as shown in Table 4 18. (a) in Table 4 17 is an example of a headline that clearly explains how institutional and professional practices are main factors when it comes to news production. At the time Mubarak was in office, a story like this dealing with the situation changed, production policies and priorities changed as well. T he overall political mood was against the old regime, from which Al Ahram wanted to distance itself; therefore, stories like this, along with similar ones, were reported in spite of the fact that they contradicted the previous editorial line and news value criteria. (b) is an excerpt of the same news article which shows the change in tone when dealing with issues on Mubarak. Although the article distances itself by utilizing direct reporting, which is very rare in Al Ahram sible propositions to report only one day before. Another story, contradicting the image created about Mubarak during the days of the uprising, reported that the President was terrified and not able to make the right decisions at important points in the Revolution; (c) is a headline of an article that described the President as being lost between the advice of his Interior Minister, Habib

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141 ElAdly, and his son, Jamal Mubarak, as shown in (d), and the regime was described as distant from reality and reluctan t in dealing with the situation. The concern of the present analysis is not over the truth value or credibility of the two contradictory propositions about Mubarak during the uprising, but about how these propositions were framed according to surrounding i nstitutional, political, and social factors; Al Ahram introduced Mubarak as the patriot leader before Feb. 11 and as a corrupt, reluct ant president after that date. The same is true for the representation of other senior officials and the NDP. The overall selection of topics prior to Feb. 11 shows a tendency of emphasizing the voice of the Prime Ministers, Nazif and Shafiq, Vice President, Omar Suleiman, and the NDP; Table 4 19 presents examples of some headlines. On the other hand, as explained in the sec tion on intertextuality, the other side of the conflict, the protesters, were excluded in the coverage; news value was determined on the basis of whether or not the voice represented the government side. Yet, by the end of the uprising and the resignation of President Mubarak, articles became critical of former government members and the NDP in the same way they were with the General published after Feb. 11, the NDP, as sh own in Table 4 20 was presented as To sum up, Al Ahram took two contradicting positions when it comes to its representation of President Mubarak, government officials, and members of the NDP: and command of the crisis; they also emphasized the voices and actions of members of the government and the ruling party. However, as soon as the President stepped down,

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142 the paper took an opposing position on these three parties by addressing critical issues such as corruption and lack of proficiency. In other words, Feb. 11, the day Mubarak was ousted, marked a transition in Al Ahram and news worthiness criteria. Articles on President Mubarak, the Egyptian government, and the ruling NDP were also emphasized in Aljazeer a presented the three parties negatively. To start with, there were two types of articles in Aljazeera emphasized sources opposing him Although this type has to do with intertextuality in that it is concerned with sourcing particular sides of the conflict over others, it also shows what topics constituted news value for Aljazeera ; it reveals what the network considered worthy of reporti ng in its topic selection. The second type was articles in the was dealing with the crisis. Aljazeera gave prominence to voices critical of Mubarak in different article s, whether these voices were from Egypt or outside Egypt. In so doing, the network presented Mubarak as unable to control the situation; as a dictator killing his people during the protests; and as corrupt and isolated and distant from his people. In Tabl e 4 21, (a) shows that in the first few days of the uprising, Aljazeera emphasized in its coverage a Time Magazine analysis of the situation, in which the magazine reported that Mubarak had lost support because of his policies that were inconsiderate of hi s people, and that he has never been a popular leader. Other articles presented Mubarak as a dictator who was killing and terrorizing his people; in these articles Aljazeera emphasized sources such as politicians, intellectuals, actors, religious

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143 figures, and poets opposing Mubarak. In (b), for example, it reported an article for the MB's Supreme Guide criticism of Mubarak, and in (c), Youssef Al Qaradawi, a prominent Egyptian Islamic scholar, was also reported in an article accusing Mubarak of killing his people after the violent events that took place in Tahrir Square on Feb. 2. It also reported on the Guardian in (d) on the Mubarak wealth. In other articles, Aljazeera was expressed through the reporting of articles prese nting the President negatively in the authorial voice Examples of headlines of other articles on Mubarak are in Table 4 22. articles, as in (c) (f), addres sed the way Mubarak was dealing with the crisis and how vulnerable his regime was, as well as his controversial hold of power for thirty years and his intentions to pass down power to his son, Jamal. Mubarak was also presented as elusive, and, thus, losing the trust of his people because of the many promises he did not keep during his rule. And by the end of the Revolution, Aljazeera reported articles Whether through emphasizing voices that were critical of Mubarak or through reporting articles on Mubarak in the authorial voice, topic selection reveals that Aljazeera took an opposing position toward Mubarak from the first day of the uprising until his stepping down. This negative representati on was not restricted to Mubarak, though, but also included members of his government and his party, the NDP. Aljazeera reported articles on the Egyptian government and ruling party that centered on two main themes: human rights violations and the degree of corruption in Egypt. In Table 4 23, (a) (c) are examples of the former and (d) (g) are examples of the latter. In these articles, the network emphasized that people had reason to protest

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144 due to their rage over humiliation and torture in prisons as well as suppression of earlier protests and violations of freedom of expression rights. It condemned in its reports the emergency law that has been effective in the country since Mubarak came to power in 1982 and stressed how the Egyptian government, throu gh the Ministry of Interior, had suppressed earlier protests. It also emphasized topics that tackled the issue of corruption and how the marriage of power and money and un restrict ed authority that some members in the NDP enjoyed had deteriorated the situat ion in Egypt and led to increased corruption. The analysis of how the President, the government, and the NDP were represented by Al Ahram and Aljazeera gives insights into how the representation of social actors is bound to the ideological stances of diff erent media institutions. Taking the case of President Mubarak as an example, Al Ahram and Aljazeera seemed as if they were referring to two different social actors named Hosni Mubarak, the then president of Egypt. On the one hand, Al Ahram portrayed Mubar ak, at least before his downfall, as the powerful, patriotic leader who had sacrificed for his country in war and peace and who was managing the crisis with care and efficiency, seeking the prosperity of his people. On the other hand, Aljazeera represented the former president as a corrupt dictator who lacked leadership and was killing his people; it questioned his legitimacy by raising the issue of fraud in the elections he won, and emphasized his intentions to pass down power to his son. 4.3.3 The R eli gious I nstitution One of the topics emphasized by Al Ahram during the days of the uprising was many articles at different points in the Revolution, the paper reported the co ndemnation

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145 of Al Azhar of the protests and underscored their continuous call for unity among the Egyptian people. Al Azhar also called the honorable Azhar University, represents the top Islamic body in Egypt, and holds a respectable position in the Islamic world as a whole. However, Al Azhar viewed as an official institution whose senior officia ls were appointed by the government and some were even members of the NDP. It sided with the government during the Revolution and sought to convince people to end the protests utilizing a religious discourse. As Table 4 24 shows, Al Ahram emphasized Al Azh ar calls as well as the jection of the demonstrations. Of concern in the present analysis was Al Ahram he religious institution by giving it prominence in its coverage and considering it as valuable news. During the first days of the uprising, Al Azhar and the Coptic Church, represented by their leaders, announced, as shown in (a), their support for the Pre sident and expressed their hope that the country overcomes the crisis. In its attempt to unite different religious groups in the call for ending the crisis, (b) reveals that Al Ahram also reported the Protestant Church condemnation of any attempts to threa ten the security of Egypt and its people. In its support of the government, in (c) Al Azhar also strongly condemned countries, including the United States, calling on Mubarak to consider a transition of power and listen to the demands of his people; it con sidered such statements and positions a flagrant interference in national affairs. On its part, Aljazeera marginalized the calls of the religious institution; in Aljazeera

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146 article on the position of Al Azhar despite the significance of this institution. The network was also critical of the Church and its position toward the events as shown in Table 4 25. Although the headline (b) seems neutral, the lead paragraph in (c) shows Aljazeera criticized the Church for its lack of involvement in the demonstrations, and considered that an abandonment of its national role. Another religious authority that was reported on differently in Al Ahram and Aljazeera Awaqaf the Ministry in c harge of religious endowments. Mosques were focal points for gathering and starting marches in different governorates during the uprising, especially on Fridays. In an attempt to halt such gatherings, the Ministry of Awqaf instructed Imams to utilize religious discourse, especially during Friday sermons to avoid or at least limit marches and protests. Table 4 26 reveals that both outlets reported on th e Ministry of Awqaf as the Al Ahram which are used to call upon people to refrain from p rotesting. The opposite is recognized in Aljazeera independent religious group to counter the Awqaf Al Azhar Clerics originated from Al Azhar in 1946 and was dismantled in 1 999 because of its stances toward different issues that were not in line with the stance of the official religious institution, Al Azhar In 2000, the Front launched its own website and announced its independence from the official religious institution. B y presenting the the lead paragraph, Aljazeera is providing an alternative religious view on protests, one

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147 that the Egyptian regime does not approve of. It is, thus refuting the proposition of the official religious authority that utilizes religious discourse to influence people. Al Ahram based on religious grounds, toward the protests. The aim, it se ems, was to align with another Ideological State Apparatus, the Mosque, in representing protesters not only as lawbreakers, but as sinful and violators of Islamic teachings. Aljazeera reported the position of the religious institution from a different perspective and with different emphasis; it emphasized the calls and fatwas legal opinions on Islamic law issued by specialist Islamic scholars of non official religious scholars. It provided an alternative narrative to Al Ahram of the official religious institution. Table 4 27 shows a contrast between Al Ahram and Aljazeera in dealing with the religious discourse on t he Revolution; Al Ahram emphasized fatwas that called for refraining from protesting and Aljazeera emphasized those calling for protesting against Al Ahram and Aljazeera respectively: Rope of Allah together, by the rope of Allah and be not divided; and remember the favor of Allah which He bestowed upon you when you were enemies and He united your hearts in love, so that by His grace e Imran Chapter 3: Verse104). By employing Quranic discourse, the implication is that demonstrations were a violation of the teachings of the Quran. Aljazeera challenged the fatwas of Al Azhar and the official religiou s institution that forbade demonstrations and considered them sinful acts by reporting a fatwa of an Islamic committee of religious scholars in Jordan that stressed that

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148 demonstrations were not forbidden in Sharia Law and that, to the contrary, they are an act of virtue when organized against brutal regimes. In sum, the way the two outlets dealt with this topic reveals that there was a fatwas Al Ahram and Aljazeera as each outlet attempted to emphasize the Islamic ruling on a controversi al issue like protesting against the ruler by reporting on different Islamic scholars. Al Ahram tended to emphasize fatwas of the official religious institution that prohibits demonstrations, while Aljazeera emphasized fatwas of Islamic scholars outside th e official circle who hail protests against whom they considered a dictator. reported differently by the two outlets: Al Ahram emphasized this position by reporting it Christians constitute around ten percent of the Egyptian population. Aljazeera on the other hand, referred to this position in only one news article in which it w as criticized by portraying it as an abandonment of an impor tant social role. 4.3.4 The International C ommunity Among the prominent topics in Al Ahram and Aljazeera uprising was the world reaction to the events. The two outlets differed, howeve r, in the type of reactions that were emphasized. That is, Al Ahram focused on the reaction of countries that expressed support to Mubarak, and Aljazeera focused on reactions of countries that were critical of Mubarak and his regime. Statements by differen t world leaders or senior officials were emphasized in Al Ahram Al Ahram

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149 regime in its coverage as shown in (a) (e) in Table 4 28. By Feb. 1, however, Al Ahram also started including topics on the reaction of countries that were in support of the protesters, or at least in favor of a transition in Egypt. For example, in (e) it reported the position of the European Union and some European countries that were critical of suppressing protests, or were calling for a tra nsition of authority in Egypt. Nevertheless, reactions against the Egyptian government were not given the same prominence as the reactions of former were not reported separately as main stories, but were rather included with other stories to deemphasize them as Table 4 29 shows The headline in (a) indicates that the article is about the German reactio n towards the events since it quoted German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, and, indeed, the article reported the German position, which called for a peaceful and organized o stay in office until the end of his presidential term. But that was not all; (b) reveals that there was another significant topic embedded within this topic with the aim of deemphasizing it; the position of France, which appeared in satellite paragraphs, was considered a sub topic by Al Ahram criteria because it was explicitly siding with the protesters and calling for an immediate transition of power. In another article on the U.S. position towards the events, voices of other world leaders critical of t he Egyptian government were embedded. The headline of the story as shown in (c). Yet, in satellite paragraphs, the article reported the comments of Turkish Prime Minister, as shown in (d), and Austrian Foreign Minister, as shown in (e), which were calling on Mubarak to step down and demanding an end for the violence in

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150 Egypt; the statements did not qualify to be emphasized in separate news articles, or at least be foregrounded in the headline or lead paragraph. On the face of it, Al Ahram did report the reaction of government officials and leaders supporting Mubarak and those supporting the protesters and calling for a transition of power. However, stories on the former topic were emphasized and on the latter deemphasized. A comparison bet ween the two reveals that an article in which the Italian Minister of Economic Development praises the freedom of expression in Egypt, for example, was introduced as a main story, while s warning of suppressing the demonstrators; Fre were presented as secondary topics embedded within other stories. This shows which topics were of value, and, hence, we re worthy of emphasizing and which were not in Al Ahram Aljazeera on the other hand, reported the reactions of world governments, officials, and organizations in its coverage of the Revolution; however, most emphasis was place d on the Israeli reaction to the developments as they were unfolding. Thus, I divide this segment into two parts: in the first part I shed light on how Aljazeera reflected on the reactions of different world countries, and in the second, I focus exclusivel y on The structure of Aljazeera news articles allows through subheadings for emphasizing a number of topics under one main heading. In its reporting of the reactions of world governments and officials, Aljazeer a utilized subheadings to such reactions by reporting them in separate articles, as was the case with Israeli

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151 reactions. In Table 4 30, (a) is a heading of an article repor ted on the first days of the uprising where Aljazeera included the reactions of four Western world organizations and six countries to the events in Egypt. Under this heading, there were ten subheadings, each emphasizing the stand of a country or an organiz ation toward Egypt; the subheadings were: United Nations, European Union, the U.S., Britain, Germany, Italy, France, Israel, Human Rights Commission, and Amnesty International. Aljazeera reported all positions with equal emphasis, regardless of whether the y were supportive of Mubarak or not. For example, the Italian position that was supportive of Mubarak and the Israeli position that implicitly supported Mubarak and stressed the good relations between Israel and Egypt for over 30 years were given the same prominence as other positions which emphasized the right of freedom of expression and warned of violence against the protesters. A number of other articles utilized the same structure in reporting the attitudes of officials in different countries around t he world and organizations toward the uprising at different points in time. In these articles, however, the positions reported were against the Egyptian government, either demanding that it undertakes genuine reforms, calling for across the board political (f) in Table 4 30 are examples of these articles. In a few other articles, however, Aljazeera emphasized the position of certain world leaders in separate articles. For example, it reported late Venezuelan President, constitute a pattern, and the overall tendency was reporting different position s from around the world under one heading.

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1 52 The Israeli case was an interesting one when it comes to Aljazeera its position. Despite the fact that Israeli reactions were reported under subheadings along with the position of other countries a s explained above, there were many articles that were exclusively emphasizing the Israeli position throughout the uprising, reporting different voices in the Israeli government. Table 4 31 reveals that t he overriding theme of articles on the Israeli reacti on to the situation in Egypt is that Israel was dissatisfied with the Revolution, fearing the reach of groups that could put peace in jeopardy and threaten Egyptian supply of gas to Israel. By losing President Mubarak, Israel was concerned about the future of the Peace Treaty with Egypt signed in 1977 and also concerned, as the articles report, about how to deal with groups such as Hamas, which was isolated from the political scene due to the coordination and cooperation with Mubarak. The articles report Is aba ndonment of Mubarak and present Mubarak as a close friend to different Israeli governments since he came to power in 1982. They also report desperate attempts by me by urging the U.S. administration to support him. demands. Thus, although there is no e xplicit negative presentation of Mubarak in articles on the Israeli position towards the events, contextualizing the production of these articles and taking the audience into account reveals that the intensive coverage of the Israeli position was for a rea son: Aljazeera as a network fueled by pan Arab nationalism ideology, is proposing that Mubarak is a strong ally to Israel, which was and

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153 still is in conflict with Arabs; he is therefore not qualified to be president of Egypt. This also explains why such t opic was excluded in Al Ahram 4.3.5 The U.S. P osition Al Ahram and Aljazeera emphasized the U.S. position toward the events in their coverage, but with varying degrees. In general, Al Ahram only emphasized one source, the U.S. president, in its repo rting of the U.S. position, while Aljazeera gave prominence to the voice of many sources in the U.S. administration, as I explain later, indicating that in general the topic was given more prominence by Aljazeera than it was by Al Ahram The position of the U.S. was unclear in the sense that it first called for democracy, respect of protesters, and reforms, and then gradually started demanding real change by calling for a transitional government that represents all Egyptians. Whether supportive of Mubarak and his government or not, Al Ahram consistently reported given prominence and reported in s eparate news articles from the beginning of the Revolution until the end and beyond in Aljazeera Table 4 32 shows how the two outlets emphasized articles on President Obama. Although it is clear that stories on the U.S. position in Al Ahram consistent in that they were included on almost all days of the uprising, and although the position was reported regardless of whether or not it was on the side of the government, there was a clear tendency to marginalize other voices in t he U.S. administration. The news articles on this topic focused on Obama and his statements, while statements of other U.S. officials, such as Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, White House spokesperson, Robert Gibbs, or others, such as the President of the Senate Foreign

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154 statements were included within stories emphasizing the voice of the President. The implication of this topic selection strategy is that Al Ahram sought to report the U.S. position, which was decisive and crucial in the events, but, at the same time, tended to minimize the number of articles on this topic through embedding the statements of In con trast, Aljazeera emphasized the U.S. position by intensifying its coverage on this topic; the articles on the U.S. position were persistent and were not restricted to certain sources. Rather, the network emphasized different U.S. voices that were placing p ressure on the Egyptian government to take the necessary steps to obey the the U.S. stance toward Mubarak was not decisive at the outbreak of the uprising, its support of protesters and assurance on their right to express their demands was; the of expression and disapproval of violence against protesters. As part of its overall tend ency to support the protesters, Aljazeera prioritized this topic. Thus, unlike Al Ahram the network emphasized many voices in the U.S. administration and Senate. It reported in separate articles the voices of Vice President, Secretary of State, White Hou se spokesperson, and President of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, as in Table 4 33 An important aspect about Aljazeera on this topic was that the inclusion of different U.S. sources and the frequency of articles was more after Feb. 2 th an it was before it. For example, in Aljazeera data, there were seven articles on the U.S. position towards the events before Feb. 2. However, between Feb. 2 and Feb. 11, it reported 19 articles on the U.S. Even if the

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155 number of days in the second stage is more than the number of days in the first, 11 and 8, respectively, articles on this topic were by average one t imes more in the second stage. Al Ahram sought to present the Obama administration negatively as its position that was against Mubarak became mo re explicit as the events unfolded. That is, it reported voices that were critical of Obama in dealing with the crisis, and represented the U.S. as conspiring against Egypt. It also addressed the worsening economic situation in the U.S. and the administrat In examples (a) and (b) in Table 4 34 Al Ahram reported in a separate article former U.S. Vice Mubarak and implicitly criticized the way the Obama administrat ion was dealing with the situation in that its diplomatic effort was public. Emphasizing the voice of a former U.S. official while marginalizing the voice of then current U.S. officials gives insights into what constitutes news value for Al Ahram even if it had included the U.S. position in its coverage. Reporting the voice of Cheney in a separate article while embedding voices of the U.S. administration in a single article explains that the latter was not due to space limitations, for example, but because it did not meet the conditions of what deserves to standards of emphasis. As the U.S. administration started putting more pressure on Mubarak and his government to make ch ange and explicitly called for a transitional government after the violence in Tahri Square, Al Ahram depicted the U.S. as conspiring against the Egyptian people; (c) was a headline of an article on Feb. 5, the same day Obama called for a transitional gove rnment headed by Suleiman. The article presented the U.S. as

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156 conspiring with Iran and the MB to allow the MB to rule in Egypt against the will of the youth who initiated the Revolution. The paper was suspicious of the U.S. change of position by demanding a transitional government at the same time MB leaders and Iranian authority were issuing statements confirming that the Revolution is an Islamic Revolution. The paper also started criticizing Obama not only in the way he was dealing with the Egyptian crisi s, but also in his dealing with domestic issues such as the economy and U.S. debt; (d) is a headline of an article that highlighted the hardships facing Obama in dealing with national debt in his attempt to reelect himself for a second term. By topic selec Al Ahram position toward Obama and its dissatisfaction with his reaction towards the Egyptian regime. Otherwise, it is a domestic U.S. issue that is emphasized at a very critical stage in the histor y of Egypt. In other words, the paper is addressing U.S. economy in the midst of a Revolution for the sake of presenting Obama negatively because of his stand against Mubarak. 4.4 Summary On the whole, discursive practice analysis revealed findings that are similar to those arrived at in textual analysis: in general, Al Ahram sided with the Egyptian government in its coverage and Aljazeera sided with the protesters. Specifically, Al Ahram r eported sources representing the government and totally excluded the voices of opposition groups in the beginning of the protests. It then changed its strategy after Feb. 2 by including opposition voices but still gave prominence government side of the con flict. Aljazeera showed a contrasting tendency: it equally reported on both sides in the outset of the protests, and then totally excluded the government side by Feb. 2. It

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157 also strategically utilized reporting on unidentified sources, such as eyewitnesses to either present the protesters positively or the government negatively; there was a clear was supportive of the protesters. As to topic selection age centered on the same topics: the protesters; the President, government, and the NDP; the religious institution; world reactions; and the U.S. reaction. The difference, though, was in how they addressed these topics and which aspects they emphasized and which aspects they marginalized. As to the protests and protesters, Al Ahram excluded topics that represented the government negatively, such as the Internet blockage, the cut off of Aljazeera ized topics on chaos and destruction, and by Feb. 3 emphasized protests supporting the regime. On the contrary, Aljazeera attributed chaos to the intentional withdrawal of security forces from the streets and intensively covered the size of the protests in Egypt and elsewhere; it also marginalized pro Mubarak protests. Al Ahram and Aljazeera also showed contrast in their reporting of topics on the President, government, and ruling party. On the one hand, Al Ahram emphasized positive traits of Mubarak, his government, and the NDP; many articles emphasized y one day after he was ousted. On the other hand, Aljazeera tackled issues of corruption, human rights violation, and presidential elections violations from the first day of the uprising, and was critical of government officials and members of the NDP thro ughout the Revolution.

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158 Al Ahram emphasized the position of the official religious institution, which expressed solidarity with the regime from the outset of the uprising. It also reported on fatwas and calls of Imams and Preachers upon people to bring an end to the protests. On its part, Aljazeera focused on fatwas of the non official religious institution that praised protesting against dictatorships. As to the international community reactions, Al Ahram tended to emphasize reactions of world leaders and senior officials who rejected the protests and praised Mubarak. It also reported reactions that called for a transition in Egypt, but these were deemphasized and reported as secondary topics; they were reported either in satellite or background paragraphs. In contrast, Aljazeera highlighted the reactions of world leaders, senior officials, and organizations calling upon Mubarak remaining in power and fearful of the future of Israeli Egyptian relations post Mubarak. Finally, Aljazeera gave prominence to the U.S. stance that was respectful of the reported the voic es of different sources in the U.S. administration in separate news articles. Although Al Ahram reported the U.S. position, which cannot be neglected in an other voices s uch as the Secretary of State and the White House spokesperson, among others. Also, it tended to represent the U.S. administration negatively, especially when its stance became more explicit in supporting the protesters and calling upon Mubarak to step dow n; Al Ahram portrayed the Obama administration as conspiring against Egypt and as incapable of solving its own do mestic problems.

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159 Table 4 1 A sample of voices included in Al Ahram coverage Date/voice Government/Government supporters Protesters/Oppositio n/Voices critical of the government Others Jan. 25 Security source Jan. 26 1. Security source 2. Ministry of the Interior Jan. 30 Official source Feb. 2 1. ElBaradei 2. National Progressive Unionist Party 3. Turkish Prime Minister Feb. 3 1. Popular forces 2. Factory and company laborers 3. Chamber of Commerce 4. Governor of Assuit 5. Citizens supporting the regime Feb. 5 1. Egyptian Prime Minister 2. Vice President Participants in the protests Feb. 7 Leader in the MB group Feb. 8 Wael Ghonim Feb. 11 1. Egyptian rights groups 2. Protesters/demonstrat ors 3. Lawyers spokesperson The Guardian newspaper Feb. 12 TV and Radio Union (praising the Revolution) Table 4 2 Indirect quoting in Al Ahram Al Ahram The paper said that the proposal also included that the temporary government calls on a wide range of opposition groups including the banned MB group ( Al Ahram Feb. 5)

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160 T able 4 3 Aljazeera Aljazeera (a) On his part, ElAdly said yesterday in an interview with Al Ahram ( Aljazeera Jan. 25) (b) Aljazeera Jan. 25) Table 4 4 A sample of voices included in Aljazeera coverage Date/Voice Government/Govern ment supporters Protesters/Opposition Others Jan. 25 1. Egyptian Government 2. Head of Cairo Security 3. ElAdly (Interior Minister) April 6 Movement Jan. 26 Security and Medical sources 1. April 6 Movement 2. MB 1. Head of Aljazeera office in Cairo 2. Aljazeera correspondent 3. Sources 4. Eyewitnesses 5. U.S. Secretary of State Jan. 30 1. Security sources 2. Middle East News Agency (official news agency) 1. Activist Omar Jamal 1. Reuters 2. French Press Agency (AFP) 3. Media source 4. Media reports 5. Aljazeera correspondent 6. Eyewitnesses Feb. 1 1. Ministry of Information 2. Security sources 3. Minister of Information 4. Army spokesperson Activists 1. Media sources 2. Aljazeera.net correspondent

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161 Table 4 4 Continued Date/Voice Government/Govern ment supporters Protesters/Opposition Others Feb. 3 Head of Archeological Sites 1. Political activists 2. Deputy General Guide of the MB 3. Opposing powers 4. Demonstrators 5. Activists 6. Political activists 7. Leader of National Assembly for Change 1. Media sources 2. Local sources 3. Arab Organization for Human Rights 4. Sources 5. Aljazeera correspondent 6. Reuters (reporting eyewitnesses) 7. CNN Feb. 4 1. Egyptian Prime Minister 2. Former secretary of Mubarak 1. Leader in Kefaya Movement 2. Activist Ahmed Hamdy 3. Activists 4. Political activist Nawara Najm 5. Lawyer 1. Eyewitnesses 2. Media sources Feb. 7 Prime Minister Amnesty International Organization Feb. 9 Wael Ghonim 1. Journalist Mohammed Aljarhi 2. Mesrawi website Feb. 12 1. A journalist 2. Aljazeera correspondent 3. Reports Feb. 13 1. Ahmed Zewail 2. President Obama

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162 Table 4 5 Examples of government voices in Aljazeera reporting Aljazeera Head of Archeological Sites in Egypt considered in a phone call with Aljazeera the attack on the National Museum in Egypt supported by the regime ( Aljazeera Feb. 3) Table 4 6 Aljazeera Aljazeera (a) An eyewitness said that the protesters attempted to destroy the picture [of Aljazeera Jan. 26) (b) An eyewitness told Aljazeera that there were 12 killed by snipers shooting at demonstrators from a building inside the Ministry [of Interior] ( Aljazeera Jan. 30) (c) Eyewitnesses said that baltagiyya backed by security trucks are gathering to attack Tahrir Square ( Aljazeera Feb. 4) (d) The witnesses confirmed that gatherings of baltagiyya supported by security forces are blocking the reach medicine and food to the protesters with the Aljazeera Feb. 4) (e) Eyewitnesses said that unidentified armed people attacked the building of State Intelligence using RPG bombs this morning ( Aljazeera Feb. 4)

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163 Table 4 7 Aljazeer a so called Aljazeera (a) Aljazeera Jan. 30) (b) Leader in Kefaya baltagiyya from attacking the demonstrators ( Aljazeera Feb. 4) (c) [Armed Forces] arrested what it described as law breakers amidst a rise in the number of killed people ( Aljazeera Jan. 30) (d) control Tahrir Square after clashes with offenders described as supporting the President ( Aljazeera Feb. 3) (e) Political activists protesting in Tahrir Square today confirmed that the confrontations are still ongoing with what they ca lled National Party hirelings a nd security and police elements ( Aljazeera Feb. 3) (f) Sources told Aljazeera that violent clashes erupted in Mustafa Mahmoud Tahrir in Muhandiseen quarter between demonstrators and elements described as armed ( Aljazeera Feb. 3) Table 4 8 Aljazeera baltagiyya in the authorial voice by the end of the Revolution Aljazeera (a) The baltagiyya hired by Aljazeera Feb. 10) (b) Armed people who seemed to be hired by the former regime decided to put Aljazeera Feb. 13)

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164 Table 4 9 Al Ahram Aljazeera transmission Al Ahram (a) Government denies the blockage of Twitter and Facebook ( Al Ahram Jan. 27) (b) Internet revived in Egypt ( Al Ahram Feb. 3) (c) Internet service returned to over 22 million Internet users after a shut down that lasted six days due to the critical situation that the country is witnessing ( Al Ahram Feb. 3) (d) The transmission of the two channels Aljazeera News Network and Aljazeera Live has resumed today, Wednesday, after a transmission outage that lasted around 10 days due to Aljazeera Al Ahram Feb. 9) Table 4 10 Al Ahram Al Ahram (a) Millions support Mubarak in marches in the governorates ( Al Ahram Feb. 3) (b) Cairo and governorates witnessed yesterday marches of millions of people in support of reform. Clashes took place between the protesters in Tahrir Square and supporters [of the regime], who stormed into the Square riding horses and camels ( Al Ahram Feb. 3) Table 4 11 Headlines of articles on protests in Al Ahram uprising Al Ahram (a) Al Ahram Jan. 29) (b) Burning state and Al Ahram Jan. 29)

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165 Table 4 11 Continued Al Ahram (c) Violence, destruction, and intimidation on the streets ( Al Ahram Jan. 30) (d) Looting at government and commercial facilities in Alexandria ( Al Ahram Jan. 30) (e) Arresting 1200 chaos inciters including 200 prisoners ( Al Ahram Feb. 1) Table 4 12 Other headlines and lead paragraphs on protests in Al Ahram the outset of the uprising Al Ahram (a) Demonstrations reoccur in Sweis ( Al Ahram Jan. 28) (b) The governor emphasized that executive and security authorities are in exploited the situation and initiated acts of destruction, theft, and robbery ( Al Ahram Jan. 28) Table 4 13 Headlines of articles on protests in Al Ahram Al Ahram (a) Hundreds of youth support reforms ( Al Ahram Feb. 2) (b) supporting President Mubarak ( Al Ahram Feb. 3) (c) Millions support Mubarak in marches in governorates ( Al Ahram Feb. 3) (d) Most Egyptians support an immediate end to the demonstrations ( Al Ahram Feb. 6)

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166 Table 4 13 Continued Al Ahram (e) Demonstration of a million people demanding change ( Al Ahram Feb. 2) (f) Rage demonstrations in Cairo and governorates ( Al Ahram Feb. 11) Table 4 14 Aljazeera Aljazeera (a) Aljazeera Jan. 28) (b) Millions demonstrate in Egypt and the Army distances itself ( Aljazeera Jan. 31) (c) Millions in rage in Egypt before disobedience ( Aljazeera Jan. 31) (d) General strike in Egypt and a march in millions ( Aljazeera Jan. 31) (e) A gathering of a million people in Tahrir Square ( Aljazeera Feb. 1) (f) Preparations for a demonstration of one million people in Egypt tomorrow ( Aljazeera Feb. 5) (g) Demonstrations of a million people in Egypt intensify pressure ( Aljazeera Feb. 8) (h) Aljazeera Feb. 9)

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167 Table 4 15 Headlines on demonstrations outside Egypt in Aljazeera Aljazeera (a) Demonstrations in the world in solidarity with Egyptians ( Aljazeera Jan. 30) (b) Aljazeera Jan. 31) (c) Aljazeera Feb. 1) (d) Aljazeera Feb. 1) Table 4 16 Aljazeera uprising Aljazeera (a) Armed [people] horrify protesters in Egypt ( Aljazeera Feb. 2) (b) Revealing the violations of security Aljazeera Feb. 7) (c) Aljazeera Feb. 7) (d) Egypt closes Aljazeera office and suspends transmission ( Aljazeera Jan. 30) (e) Aljazeera .net hacked intensively ( Aljazeera Feb. 4) (f) After the suspension of the last Internet provider in Egypt Google allows Egyptians to connect to Twitter ( Aljazeera Feb. 1) (g) A call to respect freedoms in Egypt ( Aljazeera Jan. 30)

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168 Table 4 17 Headlines of articles on Mubarak before his stepping down in Al Ahram coverage Al Ahram (a) Al Ahram Feb. 1) (b) President Mubarak heads an expanded meeting ( Al Ahram Feb. 7) (c) Mubarak holds two meetings to discuss the domestic situation and the execution of political reforms ( Al Ahram Feb. 8) (d) Mubarak: my loyalty is to Egypt only and I wi ll stay in it until death; my fear of chaos is the reason for my stay (Al Ahram, Feb. 4) (e) presidency term ( Al Ahram Feb. 7) Table 4 18 Headlines of articles on Mubarak after his stepping down in Al Ahram coverage Al Ahram (a) Signatures demanding the world to freeze the accounts of leaderships in Al Ahram Feb. 13) (b) Mubarak that lasted 30 years, the money of the Egyptian people was systematically stolen by the regime, businessmen, and those close to the au Al Ahram Feb. 13) (c) Al Ahram Feb. 14)

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169 Table 4 18 Continued Al Ahram (d) They did not understand what was really happening. Official statements did not satisfy people on Tahrir Square or in different Egyptian cities because the mentality of the ruling regime did not change; the stereotype did not change and had nothing to do with reality: they were demonstrations that could be under control if satell ite channels stopped triggering them ( Al Ahram Feb. 14) Table 4 19 Headlines of articles on government and NDP officials in Al Ahram Al Ahram (a) Nazif: We care about freedom of expression ( Al Ahram Jan. 27) (b) Prime Minister tightens the protection on public and private assets ( Al Ahram Jan. 27) (c) Shafiq: I am willing to have a dialogue with the demonstrators ( Al Ahram Feb. 2) (d) Suleiman: Dialogue is the first way to end the crisis and the alternative is a coup ( Al Ahram Feb. 8) (e) demands ( Al Ahram Jan. 26) Table 4 20 The NDP in Al Ahram Al Ahram Secretary General of the NDP and Secretary General of the NDP Policies, Dr. Husam s inability to secure the demands of the people and the priorities of the youth revolution ( Al Ahram Feb. 12)

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170 Table 4 21 Headlines of articles on Mubarak that emphasized opposing sources in Aljazeera Aljazeera (a) Time: Mubarak lost his people ( Aljazeera Jan. 29) (b) Badie: Mubarak is practicing state terrorism ( Aljazeera Jan. 30) (c) Al Qaradawi: Mubarak started killing his people ( Aljazeera Feb. 3) (d) Guardian: the Mubarak wealth in billions ( Aljazeera Feb. 5) Table 4 22 Headlines of other articles on Mubarak in Aljazeera Aljazeera (a) wealth ( Aljazeera Feb. 8) (b) Mubarak secured his wealth during his last days [in office] ( Aljazeera Feb. 13) (c) Mubarak neglected the rules of power transition ( Aljazeera Jan. 31) (d) Mubarak... the time for departure ( Aljazeera Feb. 4) (e) Aljazeera Feb. 8) (f) Egypt.. the people demand the trial of the President ( Aljazeera Feb. 12)

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171 Table 4 23 Headlines of articles on the Egyptian government and the NDP in Aljazeera Aljazeera (a) A record full of right violations in Egypt ( Aljazeera Feb. 2) (b) Accusations of beating protesters to National Party ( Aljazeera Feb. 4) (c) Police violations triggered the Revolution ( Aljazeera Feb. 8) (d) The marriage of authority and money burden Egypt ( Aljazeera Feb. 2) (e) Revealing fortunes of former officials in Egypt ( Aljazeera Feb. 8) (f) The amount of money theft strikes Egyptians ( Aljazeera Feb. 11) (g) Corruption exhausts the Egyptian economy ( Aljazeera Feb. 11) Table 4 24 Al Ahram Al Ahram (a) Al Tayeb and Shenouda confirm their trust in the President ( Al Ahram Jan. 31) (b) Protestants: We call upon all classes of people to consolidate against whoever attempts to harm Egypt ( Al Ahram Feb. 2) (c) Al Azhar condemns Iranian policies and European and American statements that intervene in Egyptian affairs ( Al Ahram Feb. 6)

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172 Table 4 25 Aljazeera Aljazeera (a) Al Azhar criticizes fatwas supporting the protests ( Aljazeera Feb. 7) (b) The Church distances itself from the demonstrations in Egypt ( Aljazeera Jan. 29) (c) The noticeable absence of the Church and the cities of Upper Egypt concerned many observers who viewed the position of the former as known national role of the Christian religious institution ( Aljazeera Jan. 29) Table 4 26 Al Ahram and Aljazeera Awqaf Al Ahram Aljazeera (a) [Ministry of] Awqaf: Friday sermon about rejecting violence ( Al Ahram Feb. 4) (a') [Ministry of] Awqaf warns of the ( Aljazeera Jan. 27) (b) Ministry of Awqaf demanded from appointed and working Imams and Preachers in Friday sermon today in all mosques in the Republic to emphasize the meanings of unity and solidarity between all encouragement of cooperation and rejection of violence ( Al Ahram Feb. 4) (b') The Egyptian Ministry of Awqaf warned of utilizing Friday Prayer for demonstrations called for by opposition groups, while the Front of Al Azhar Clerics (Ulama) called for continuing protests and not adhering to warnings ( Aljazeera Jan. 27)

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173 Table 4 27 Al Ahram and Aljazeera fatwas on protesting Al Ahra m Aljazeera (a) Mosque Imams call upon the people to hold on to their unity ( Al Ahram Jan. 29) (a') Fatwa and activities in support Aljazeera Feb. 3) (b) Mosque Preachers call for an adherence to the rope of Allah ( Al Ahram Jan. 29) (b') The Committee of Sharia Scholars of the Jordanian Islamic Labor Front Party said, in its comments on the ongoing protests in Egypt, that revolting lawful and rewarded religiously, Aljazeer a Feb. 3) Table 4 28 Al Ahram Al Ahram (a) The stability of Egypt is stability to all Arab countries ( Al Ahram Jan. 27) (b) Bahraini monarch King Hamad Bin Isa Al Khalifah stressed in a phone call with President Hosni Mubarak yesterday that the stability of Egypt is st ability to all Arab countries ( Al Ahram Jan. 27) (c) Italian praise of freedom of expression in Egypt ( Al Ahram Jan. 27) (d) Paulo Romani, Italian Minister of Economic Development, emphasized that Egypt and its leadership respect the freedom of expression ( Al Ahram Jan. 27) (e) Berlusconi: Mubarak's remaining in power is important in the transitional stage ( Al Ahram Feb. 5)

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174 Table 4 28 Continued Al Ahram (f) European Union calls for a smooth transition of authority in Egypt ( Al Ahram Feb. 1) (g) Five European countries demand an immediate transition of power ( Al Ahram Feb. 4) Table 4 29 Al Ahram Al Ahram (a) Merkel: Change must be peaceful in Egypt ( Al Ahram Feb. 6) (b) As a continuation of the positions of E uropean leaders towards the ongoing events in Egypt, French President Nicolas Sarkozy stressed the importance of an immediate transition to democracy delay, expressing his support of the demonstrators in Egypt ( Al Ahram Feb. 6) (c) Obama: the Egyptian people have inspired the people of other countries and reform must start now ( Al Ahram Feb. 3) (d) In Ankara, Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, called upon Egyptian Presid ent Hosni Mubarak a day after he announced he will step down next September to take a different step, confirming that the Egyptian people were expecting a totally different decision ( Al Ahram Feb. 3) (e) Austrian Foreign Minister, Michael Spindelegger, described the situation in Egypt as very serious, calling upon Egyptian authorities to refrain from dealing violently with the demonstrators ( Al Ahram Feb. 3)

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175 Table 4 30 Aljazeera Aljazeera (a) (Aljazeera, Jan. 28) (b) International concern over the situation in Egypt ( Aljazeera Jan. 30) (c) World demands Egypt of political reform ( Aljazeera Jan. 30) (d) The West calls for change in Egypt ( Aljazeera Feb. 1) (e) Calls for a real transitional process in Egypt ( Aljazeera Feb. 2) (f) Aljazeera Feb. 11) Table 4 31 Aljazeera Aljazeera (a) The fate of peace and gas exports worries Israel ( Aljazeera Jan. 30) (b) Netanyahu fears the reoccurrence of an Iranian model in Egypt ( Aljazeera Jan. 31) (c) Netanyahu demands Egypt to commit to peace ( Aljazeera Feb. 2) (d) Post Mubarak panics Israel ( Aljazeera Feb. 2) (e) Aljazeera Feb. 12)

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176 Table 4 32 Headlines of articles on President Obama in Al Ahram and Aljazeera coverage Al Ahram Aljazeera (a) Obama calls upon Mubarak to take tangible steps to enhance democracy ( Al Ahram Jan. 30) (a') Obama calls on Mubarak to undertake comprehensive reform ( Aljazeera Jan. 28) (b) Obama: The Egyptian people have inspired the people of other countries and reform must start now ( Al Ahram Feb. 3) (b') Obama: Mubarak realized the inevitability of change ( Aljazeera Feb. 2) (c) Obama prays for the end of violence in Egypt ( Al Ahram Feb. 4) (c') Obama: the future of Egypt is in the hands of its people ( Aljazeera Feb. 5) (d) Obama: I am confident that the next Egyptian government will be a partner of the U.S. and the [Muslim] Brothers do not enjoy a majority ( Al Ahram Feb. 7) (d') Obama renews his call for an orderly transition of power ( Aljazeera Feb. 6) (e) Obama: What Mubarak offered in his statement is not enough ( Al Ahram Feb. 12) (e') Obama: Egypt must obey the demands of people ( Aljazeera Feb. 11)

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177 Table 4 32 Continued Al Ahram Aljazeera (f) Obama: What happened in Egypt is one of the rare moments of life where we witness history unfold ( Al Ahram Feb. 12) (f') commitment to its treaties ( Aljazeera Feb. 13) Table 4 33 The inclusion of different U.S. sources in Aljazeera Aljazeera (a) Biden calls for an orderly transition of power in Egypt ( Aljazeera Feb. 9) (b) Clinton condemns violence against protesters in Egypt ( Aljazeera Feb. 3) (c) President of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee called upon the government of his country to look beyond Mubarak era and form a new policy towards Egypt ( Aljazeera Feb. 2) (d) until the end of his term in September in return for not reelecting himself, White House spokesper son Robert Gibbs said the United Stated wants change now, not in September ( Aljazeera Feb.2) (e) The White House expressed denouncement of attacks on peaceful demonstrations demanding the stepping down of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and expressed concern over attacks on the media ( Aljazeera Feb. 2)

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178 Table 4 34 Al Ahram sentation of the Obama administration Al Ahram (a) Cheney: Mubarak is a good man and his fate is in the hands of his people ( Al Ahram Feb. 7) (b) He said it is important to make diplomatic efforts in secret, adding that it is so difficult for a foreign leader to act on American advice in a visible way ( Al Ahram Feb. 7) (c) Iran, the Brothers, and America: the triplet of jumping to power against the will of the youth ( Al Ahram Feb. 5) (d) Obama between the events in Egypt and U.S. economy ( Al Ahram Feb. 9)

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179 CHAPTER 5 DISCUSSION 5.1 Overview media shows variation on all levels of analysis, and, in cases, it seemed that the two news outlets were reporting two differe nt stories. In this Chapter I expand the insights of textual and discursive practice analysis to investigate the wider sociopolitical context with the aim of depicting features that contribute to power abuse and social inequality. In other words, the pres ent Chapter To do so, I first examine the editorial, institutional, ideological, social, and political aspects that could better our understanding of how the two outlets reported the uprising and portrayed the antagonists. Specifically, I address the ideological structures that ideological square, and discuss group polarization on the discursive practice level with reference to the relevant sociopolitical context. One of the important findings of textual and discursive practice analysis was that the two outlets tended to change their reporting strategies at a certain point in the uprising, particularly around Feb. 2. To accou nt for this change, I investigate the immediate situational context and the developments that took place to provide a sociopolitical explanation for the textual and discursive practice shift. (1971) notion of Ideological State Apparatus, I explain how the investigated discourses represented two competing discourses at a very critical point in the history of Egypt: Al Ahram represented the hegemonic discourse and Aljazeera repre sented the counter

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180 transition in light of the 2011 Revolution as it pertains to the overall political situation. I argue that despite the breakthroughs in the Egyptian media situ ation thus far, media transition does not take place without political change. 5.2 Group Polarization on the Textual L evel Recall that in his account of the Ideological Square van Dijk (1995) proposes that ideologies appear in polarized opinion, thought, act ion, or discourse. Thus, it is assumed that discourse is characterized by Us/Them dichotomy in which the ingroup is represented positively and the outgroup negatively by employing certain ideological structures and strategies. One of the ways to identify i deological structures is to depict discourse structures that involve a positive presentation of self and a negative presentation of the other (see 1.3.1). Textual analysis of Al Ahram and Aljazeera coverage revealed a clear group polarization dividing the antagonists into an ingroup and an outgroup. To explain this polarization on the textual level, I focus on the variation in the way the outlets used ideological structures, such as negative lexical ization and predication, detailed description, attribution to personality, and argumentative support, in their reporting of the events. First, words matter: baltaga (the root for the word baltagiyya ) refers to an improper use of violence. It denotes concepts of bullying, coercing, and looting people and the different social actors it has been employed to refer to in t he Egyptian context gives insights into how controversial the term is and how different groups make sense of it and utilize it for ideological purposes. The word is originally Turkish, and was first used during the Ottoman rule of Egypt. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Egyptian media used the term to refer to Islamist leaders. However, since the mid 1990s, it has

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181 been employed to refer to violence between government agents and young men in popular squares (Ismael, 2006: 140). During the Revolution, the term referred to different referents in Al Ahram and Aljazeera the protests, Al Ahram was persistent in employing the term baltagiyya to refer to the protesters. It attem pted to avoid the political nature of the event as a social movement narrative, the peaceful marches of only a few Egyptian youth were exploited by thugs conspiring with exte rnal powers against Egypt to achieve their goals and comply with their hidden agenda. This strategy of representation, which was adopted by official media in general, seemed to have worked in the beginning of the protests; Ghannam (2012) reports that membe rs of families residing in poor neighborhoods in Cairo who only had access to official media were not sure what was happening and who the protesters were. Some of those residents blamed the protesters for threatening their safety and destabilizing the coun lines offered by government propaganda, describing the protesters as troublemakers who were paid a daily allowance in Euros by outsiders and who were served free meals id: 33). Aljazeera also employed the same term at that point in the Revolution, but with a different narrative; it consistently drew a line between the baltagiyya and the protesters. Its narrative was that there were groups who exploited the events, but their effect was marginal and that they did not represent the protesters in any way; it focused on the event itself, on the protests and protesters.

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182 Square on Feb. 2, i.e. th e Battle of the Camel. Although this topic was marginalized in Al Ahram comments of government officials on it showed a tendency of separating the perpetrators from the regime, a nd ruling out any link or role played by the government in what had happened. Yet, when the old regime was ousted, the paper was explicit in linking the baltagiyya to members of the ruling party. Aljazeera on the other hand, associated the government with the events by reporting that the baltagiyya were hired by members of the regime, and that some of them were even members of the security forces. The network was more explicit about its narrative by the end of the uprising than it was a few days after the Battle of the Camel in the sense that it attributed the claim to other sources in the beginning and reported it in the authorial voice t oward the end of the uprising. reporting of the uprising. For example, Al Ahram used the term martyr and its derivatives, at the beginning of the protests, to refer to the ingroup casualties as opposed to the dead which was used to refer to casualties on the other side. Aljazeera had also employed the t the Revolution. The significance of employing terms like baltagiyya which is socially associated with the use of violence for political purposes, and martyrdom which is socially associated with sacrifice and selflessness, is that they participate in shaping attitudes and positions toward an event through shaping the interpr etations of it (Ghannam, 2012). When reporters express their beliefs and ideologies in news reports, they exhibit their shared social representations in text production (van Dijk, 1996); the term

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183 baltagiyya evokes a socially shared negative representation that was utilized by the two outlets to describe the outgroup or, at least, to distance the ingroup. In contrast, the te rm martyrdom evokes socially shared positive representations to which each outlet associated what it considered the ingroup. As to description, Al Ahram described the protesters as norm and value violators by breaking the law and causing destruction and c haos. They were also presented as halting traffic, throwing stones at security forces, threatening the security of citizens and government headquarters, among other things. Members and leaders of opposing groups were referred to with little or no detail, e ven if they were well known figures. van Dijk (1995) argues that one of the structures used to represent the ingroup positively is detailed description and attribution to personality Government officials and security forces, who represented the ingroup, w ere referred to with detailed descriptions; Al Ahram used proper names and official positions and, in some cases, honorifics to refer to government officials. President Mubarak was also presented in detail by emphasizing his accomplishments and sacrifice f or the country since he was an officer in the Egyptian Air Forces, and his participation in the October 1973 war against Israel. Another strategy employed by Al Ahram was that the negative actions of the ingroup were represented with what van Dijk refers to as argumentative support For protesters, and whenever they are reported as using water cannons or tear gas against protesters, the action was presented as a response to mor e negative actions perpetrated by the protesters, such as throwing stones. Al Ahram started its coverage of the protests by presenting them extremely negatively. The tone, however, softened after Feb. 2 on all levels, a point I elaborate on later in this C hapter ; nevertheless, the

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184 ingroup was still favored and the outgroup was marginalized. As supporters of Mubarak took to the streets to form counter protests after his second speech, Al Ahram started emphasizing the positive actions of the ingroup instead o f the negative actions of the outgroup. This included reporting the size of demonstrations supporting Mubarak and his sacrifices for the country and compromises he made to end the unrest. By the time Mubarak stepped down, Al Ahram drastically redefined the ingroup and the outgroup: it On the other hand, Aljazeera reported both sides of the conflict in the same way at the outset of the Revolution (i.e. until Feb. 2): it did not describe or refer to any side negatively; it employed negative, positive, and neutral verbal processes with both sides; and presuppositions were made through reporting other voices, not in the authorial voice. Yet the position of the protesters was emphasized more and topicalized in the articles, indicating that they were the ingroup. From the eruption of the Revolution, Aljazeera provided detailed descriptions of the protests and protesters; it emphasized the lar ge numbers of protesters and their demands and repeatedly reported their slogans and chants, especially those calling for the departure of President Mubarak. It also referred to certain days in the protests by employing the names chosen by the protesters, such as the Rage Day, the Friday of Rage, and the Friday of Departure. Although they were referred to using scare quotes, reference to these days in and of itself implies some sort of acknowledgement of the was more evident, though, By Feb. 2. First of all, negative presuppositions about the government were more explicit and used in the authorial voice. Secondly, the voice of the government was not included as

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185 frequently as it was before Feb. 2, and when the voice was included, negative or neutral verbal processes were employed. In sum, whether through lexicalization and description, presupposition, or verbal process, Al Ahram and Aljazeera tended to take sides in reporting the uprising by identifying an ingroup and an outgroup, representing what they considered the ingroup positively and what they considered the outgroup negatively. The key discourse structures the two outlets used were neg ative/positive lexicalization, detailed description, attribution to personality, and argumentative support. 5.3 Group Polarization on the Discursive P rac tice L evel ideological square were also found in discursive practice analysis, wh ich included intertextuality and topic selection. Intertextuality refers to the or counter them. Media outlets focus on certain social categories of what Fowler (1991 ) Ahram showed a tendency of including voices of the ingroup, the government, and totally silencing the voice of the outgroup, the protesters and opposition, at least in the beginning of th e Revolution, and even when the outgroup was reported later in the protests, the ingroup was still the dominant voice in terms of number of occurrences and prominence in the text; the outgroup was given less prominent positions in texts such as the backgro und. Aljazeera in contrast, reported the voices of both sides; however, the inclusion of the government voice was positioned and contextualized in ways that would elicit interpretations against the government. The analysis of intertextuality revealed tha t the statements of government officials expressed intolerance of free speech and a tendency to threaten the organizers of the demonstrations despite the claim that freedom of

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186 expression is one of the rights of Egyptians. The network also distanced itself from the so called It also included voices of parties that did not belong to any side of the conflict, such as international organizations and eyewitnesses; these voices we re Goffman's (1981) theory of footing, in which the person who assumes the role of production can adjust "alignment" with an utterance, is helpful in explaining intertextualit y in media discourse. He distinguishes between four speaker roles: Animator or "the person actually producing the talk "; Author or entity responsible for constructing the words and sentences at issue"; Principal or "the party who is socially responsible f or what is said ; and Figure or "a character depicted in the Animator's talk" (Goodwin & Goodwin, 2004: 224) Al Ahram and Aljazeera seem to have assumed three out of the four roles at different points in the Revolution, depending on whether or not they wa nted to take an explicit stand toward the event and the antagonists; these roles were animator, author, and principal. For example, Aljazeera distanced itself from the use of some controversial terms such as baltagiyya or the naming of certain days in the Revolution such as "the Day of Rage" by using them in scare quotes and attributing them to other sources; thus assuming the role of the animator, but not the author or principal. However, the network took an explicit stand toward the event by using the sam e terms in the authorial voice later in the Revolution; it, therefore, played the role of the principal. In other cases it employed indirect quotation to paraphrase the thoughts of other sources, thereby playing the role of author and animator.

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187 News produ ction institutions are governed by economic, social, and political constraints that contribute to the construction of social reality. Therefore, news is not simply gathered and reported, but rather created real world, selection and newsworthiness as well as the identification of worthy and unworthy victims (Herman and Chomsky, 1988) are bound to ideological and institutional criteria set by each media outlet. Accordingly, exclusion of certain topics is not unusual in media practice, especially at times of crisis. Al Ahram excluded a number of important topics in its coverage, ones that were breaking news in the coverage of other media institutions; thes e include Internet cut off, Aljazeera transmission blockage, and, most As to the topics included, the analysis revealed a considerable contrast between the two outlets as to what constituted news value and was worthy of reporting. Al Ahram and Aljazeera constructed reality on certain topics in ways that were consistent with their overall identification of ingroup and outgroup during the conflict; they dealt with the events from their own perspective and conceptualization of reality. For example, Al Ahram attributed chaos and violence that occurred during the days of the uprising to a ame the protests as acts of destruction and the protesters as a whole as perpetrators of these actions; its message was that protests meant unrest. Aljazeera provided a totally different narrative that attributed this violence to the government and security forces in particular. According to this narrative, security forces withdrew from the streets, released prisoners, and paid gangs only to frighten protester s. The difference between

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188 the time when Al Ahram was reporting that supporters of Mubarak turned out in millions to form a counter protest, Aljazeera minimized the effect and size of the protests. News stories about the enormous wealth of Muba rak and his family as well as stories about common. The two outlets also dealt differently with significant matters such as the stance of religious institutions, whethe r official or non official, toward the events. Each outlet emphasized fatwas that served the interests of the ingroup and legitimized its actions. To better understand how Al Ahram and Aljazeera utilized this critical topic to support their ideological ori entations during the Revolution, I shed some light on the nature of the relation between the religious institution and government in Egypt. The Islamic official religious establishment in Egypt can be divided into three institutions: Al Azhar Dar el Ifta the official source of fatwas (i.e. Islamic religious ruling), and the Ministry of Religious Endowments ( Awqaf ); the three institutions are controlled by the government through the appointment of their heads and control over their budgets (Kodmani, 2005). The relationship between Al Azhar and the government is complex, but has always been based on mutual interest: on the one hand, Al Azhar legitimized the policies of the government by endorsing them and securing fatwas that supported them, and, on the othe r hand, the religious institution gained financial resources and control over what the government considered issues of secondary importance; that is, the government granted Al Azhar authority over issues of social life

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189 dom of thought. That said, the government did not hesitate to intervene whenever its vital interests, such as its existence and image both nationally and internationally, were threatened (Barraclough, 1998; Mustafa, 2000; and Kodmani, 2005). By doing so, t he government secured the support of this influential and popular institution. Yet, some of Al Azhar clerics were concerned about the autonomy of Al Azhar Azhari affairs, whether through appointment of its head or control of its funds. Consequently, dissident clerics established the Front of Al Azhar Clerics in 1946 and expanded in number and effect in the 1990s (Kodmani, 2005). The official and non official institutions clashed on a number of issues sin ce the 1990s, and the Revolution, of course, was not an exception. In Islamic Law, there is no clear cut ruling on demonstrations from the Quran or the sayings of Prophet Muhammad, and, like many other issues of daily life on which there is no explicit rul ing from Quran or sayings of Prophet Muhammad, the ruling is bound to the consensus of ulama (i.e. religious clerics) or their Discretion, ijtehad in passing judgments. Throughout the days of the uprising, Al Azhar consistently and explicitly announced it s stance toward the protests: they harm the nation and people should unite under the leadership of the President. On its part, the Front issued a fatwa that called upon people to resume their protests, refuting the fatwa of Al Azhar The other official Isl amic religious institution is the Ministry of Religious Endowments, which is in charge of regulating and supervising the content of religious discourse in Friday sermons. The Minister of Religious Endowments is a member of the cabinet, and his role is cons idered as important as that of the Ministers of Interior and Information (ibid). The role of the Ministry was especially important during the

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190 Revolution, as mosques were very important mobilizing points. The task of controlling these mosques is not an easy one, given that there are around 150,000 to 200,000 mosques across Egypt and unauthorized mosques and unlicensed preachers were not uncommon (Kodmani, 2005). However, the Ministry sought, through its directives to Imams and preachers of mosques, to minimi ze this mobilizing effect by controlling the content of Friday sermons in authorized mosques. In their coverage of the uprising, it has been shown that Al Ahram and Aljazeera were consistent in emphasizing the religious take of one side on the Revolution and fatwas Al Azhar and the Front of Al Azhar Clerics, Al Ahram emphasized the voice of the official religious institution, Al Azhar and Aljazeera highlighted that of the non official relig ious institution, the Front. Also, Al Ahram gave prominence to the voice of the Ministry of Endowments and Imams of mosques in Egypt, while Aljazeera marginalized their voice in its topic selection and gave prominence to other preachers, sometimes even ou tside Egypt, who were supportive of the protests and the protesters. The two outlets also showed variation in their strategy of reporting the reaction of different countries around the world and organizations on the events: Al Ahram emphasized reactions t hat supported Mubarak and Aljazeera emphasized reactions criticizing him and calling for change. They used strategies of foregrounding and backgrounding strategically in emphasizing and deemphasizing the antagonists. Specifically, voices supporting the ing roup were in prominent positions in the text, such as headlines and lead paragraphs, while dissident voices were given non prominent positions, such as satellite or background paragraphs. For instance, in Al Ahram coverage, reactions of world leaders or organizations critical of the regime were

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191 embedded within articles where voices supportive of Mubarak were highlighted; voices calling for transition of power were suppressed in less prominent positions in texts. Aljazeera in contrast, utilized the struct ure of its news articles to emphasize a number of topics under one main topic; that is, by employing subheadings under one heading, different reactions from different world officials were emphasized. Drawing on Arab mental representations, values, assumptions, and beliefs, reflecting on Arab Israeli conflict, the two outlets dealt differently with the Israeli position, eith er through exclusion or overemphasis. The overall reaction of the Israeli stay in power due to the fogginess of the future of Egypt and the Peace Treaty. Thus, statements of Israeli officials were praising Mubarak, describing him as an ally and a close friend to Israel. Despite Al Ahram leaders and officials praising Mubarak, it totally avoided the topic of Israel. Aljazeera however, gave this topic prominence by reporting the statements and reactions of Israeli officials and press throughout the Revolution. This issue is better understood within an extended framework of Aljazeera Palestinian Palestinian Intifada or uprising, Aljazeera has been providing intensive coverage of the Israeli Palestinian conflict, in which it generally sided with the Palestinians (Zayani, 2 anti government behavior in the Arab world, making Arab governments vulnerable to charges and open to criticism that they have not sufficiently supported the Palestinians or Aljazeera Arabism

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192 orientation, emphasis of the Israeli stance toward Mubarak in Aljazeera only be understood within this context: Israel is losing an ally that had long failed t o support Arab causes, especially the Palestinian cause. Due to the important role superpowers play in revolutionary movement, it is no surprise that the U.S. reaction toward the event was among the main topics in the coverage of Al Ahram and Aljazeera re gardless of whether that stance was supportive the Revolution as it was unfolding without any intervention to stop it. Part of the unclear position of the U.S., at least in the beginning of the Revolution, was because the Revolution was not foreseen. This, it appears, is part of the nature of revolutions; they are unpredictable even to the most sophisticated intelligence agencies. At the outset of the uprising, the U.S. d id not take a clear, decisive position toward the event; on the one hand, it supported the protesters and stressed their right of freedom of expression, and, Mubarak to undert ake a wide Egyptian government is stable and is looking for ways to respond to the legitimate the first day of th e uprising, Jan. 25, 2011(Reuters, Jan. 25, 2011). The U.S. calls for a transition of power were not until Feb. 1, when Obama called upon Mubarak to consider a peaceful transition of power, without explicitly calling upon him to step down. The pressure on until Mubarak was forced to step down on Feb. 11. Al Ahram as shown in the analysis, reported articles that were critical of the Obama administration, portraying it as conspiring with other parties such as Iran and the MB against Egypt and its people. It

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193 also emphasized voices that were critical of the Obama administration in dealing with the crisis and in dealing with the domestic economic crisis. The important relevant point here is that such negative pres entation of the U.S. administration was only observed after the U.S. pressure intensified; i.e. after Feb. 1. The criticism raised against the resign. Yet, this negative presen tation did not occur before Feb. 1, when the U.S. was not demanding a transition of power. This reveals how Al Ahram to the developing and rapidly changing political scene during the days of the uprising. Aljazeera on the other hand, intensified its coverage of the U.S. position toward the situation in Egypt and included various U.S. voices after Feb. 1, although the topic was among the main topics in terms of frequency before that date. The analysis revealed that on average there was two times the number of article s on this topic after Feb. 1 than there was before it. This correlation between the frequency of articles and the changing U.S. attitude toward the Egyptian regime is explained in terms of the orientation, siding with the protes regime. 5.4 A Turning P oint Textual and discursive practice analysis uncovered a consistent pattern: Feb. 2 Al Ahra m employed negative attributions and negative presuppositions to describe the protesters and their actions only before Feb. 2. It also shifted from totally excluding the opposition voice before Feb. 2 to reporting opposition sources utilizing neutral verba l process after Feb. 2. As for Aljazeera the network became more explicit about its use of presuppositions after Feb. 2; that is, whereas it employed negative presuppositions

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194 about the government through reporting other sources before Feb. 2, it used pres uppositions in the authorial voice after Feb. 2. The network also showed contrast in its use of verbal process in that it employed all types of verbal process to refer to both sides of the conflict before Feb. 2, but used only negative verbal process to re fer to the government side after that date. On the discursive practice level, Al Ahram excluded the voices of all opposition groups from its coverage before Feb. 2; yet, these voices were minimally included after that date. Aljazeera in contrast, tended to include voices representing the protesters, especially opposition groups, as well as voices representing the government before Feb. 2; the voice of the government, however, was totally excluded after that point in time. As to topic selection, Al Ahram s hifted from reporting articles that emphasized the protests supporting Mubarak. In other words, before Feb. 2, the paper focused on articles representing the protesters negatively, and focused after that date on articles representing the government positively. It also started including articles that reported international voices calling upon Mubarak to step down only after Feb. 2. The question is: why Feb. 2? Two important devel opments took place on Dec. 30 and Feb. 2 that changed the scene both nationally and internationally, and gave momentum to the protesters: 1) the change in the U.S. position; and 2) the Battle of the Camel. I elaborate on each of these factors in the follow ing. First, the significance of the U.S. position toward the events does not only stem from the fact that it represents a superpower in the international community, but also because Egypt is one of the closest allies of the U.S. in the region, receiving an annual aid of more than $ 1.5 billion since signing the Camp David Accords in 1979 (Holmes,

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195 2012). Egypt relies heavily on this aid as it constitutes around 30 40 percent of its overall budget (Lahoud et al. 2011). In general, I distinguish between two U .S. positions during the eighteen days of the uprising: 1) supporting Mubarak from Jan. 25 to Feb. 29; and 2) calling for a transition of power from Jan. 30 to Feb. 11, the day Mubarak stepped down. The main concern expressed in U.S. statements in the outs et of the uprising was the safety of the protesters and guaranteeing their right of expression. Yet, it viewed the uprising as a domestic issue that could be solved through reform and dialogue; transition of power was not even an issue at that point. On th e first day of the uprising, U.S. Secretary of President Mubarak on Jan. 28, the third day of the protests, President Obama told ew York Times, Jan. 28, 2011). On Jan. 30, however, the U.S. started to back off from its full fledged support for Mubarak and called upon him to consider a transition of power as part of a solution to of State Hillary Clinton on Jan. 30. This position was confirmed by President Obama in a phone call with President Mubarak Mubarak to resign and present to the Egyptian people their next government (Holmes, 2012). In his public remarks on the conversation, President Obama said: After his speech tonight, I spoke directly to President Mubarak. He recognizes that the status quo is not sustainable and that a change must tak e place. Indeed, all of us who are privileged to serve in positions of

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196 political power do so at the will of our people. Through thousands of years, Egypt has known many moments of transformation. The voices of the Egyptian people tell us that this is on e of those moments; this is one of those times ( Foyer 2011, Februa ry 1 ). clear in his last speech addressed to the nation only one day before his stepping down in which he a nnounced his rejection of any kind of foreign intervention: The big shame and embarrassment, which I have not done and never will do, would be listening to foreign dictations whatever may be the source or pretext (BBC News, 2011, February 10 ). He stressed his rejection of intervention again in the same speech: We will prove that we are no one's servants, that we do not take instructions from anyone, and that only the demands of the citizens and the pulse of the street take our decisions (ibid). State struct ural theories of revolutions underscore the role foreign pressure plays in toppling sultanic regimes by weakening these regimes, and then withdrawing support from them (Defronzo, 1991; Goldstone, 1994, 2011) In his account of neopatrimonial rulers, or su ltanic regimes, Goldstone (1994) explains that the U.S., as a superpower, plays a role in weakening sultanic regimes by making them rely on it so heavily through financial and military aid, and it encourages its dictatorship practices at certain points. Bu t at the same time, it restricts the authority and power of such regimes by placing limits on coercion and demanding reform and democracy. As these regimes are weakened, the U.S. withdraws its support, a factor that, combined with other factors, could lead to a revolution. The Egyptian case was unique in that the U.S. did not withdraw its support from evertheless, it represents a different version of the state

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197 that foreign pressure may play a role after the outbreak of the uprising (Goldstone, 2011; Holmes, 2012: 401). That was exactly what happened by Jan. 30 and beyond. Nevertheless, the strongest effect that changed power balances and gave momentum to the protests and protesters came a few days later. Despite the huge wave of protests that in some estimates reached a million people in Cairo in the first days of the uprising (Cook, 2012), some Egyptians were skeptical about the uprising and the aims of the protesters (Ghannam, 2012); they preferred res toring normal life especially that businesses were affected by the revolt, since the police withdrawal from the streets on the third day of the protests threatened security. In his first address to the nation on Jan. 28, Mubarak announced that he had sacked the government and appointed Omar Suleiman as vice president, and promised political and economic reforms. Three days later, on Feb. 1, he gave a second emotional speech, in which he persuaded many to sympathize with him ( Kortam 2013 February 3 ; G hannam, 2012). In that speech the President offered to step down in September and promised that he will not pass power to his son: I am now absolutely determined to finish my work for the nation in a way that ensures handing over its safe keeping and bann legitimacy and respecting the constitution. I will work in the remaining months of my term to take the steps to ensure a peaceful transfer of power (The Guardian, Feb. 1, 2011) nvinced many reluctant citizens that the President had offered major concessions, and that resuming destruction, not reform. They thought that the President should be at lea st given the chance to finish his term in September 2011. Others, however, especially those

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198 protesting in the Square, did not trust the President and refused to compromise; and insisted on resuming their protests until he steps down. the step backfired: the assaults tha t were perpetrated by baltagiyya soldiers allowed them onto Tahrir Square (Holmes, 2012) changed the attitudes and views of many citizens who could have oth erwise took side with the regime. This is not to suggest that the Battle of the Camel was the first assault on protesters in Tahrir Square; as a matter of fact, there were more violent attacks that happened before that ng point blank at their own people and in broad though, that the live coverage and footage of these shameless attacks created a visual s. Many intellectuals, members of the elite, and citizens who sympathized with Mubarak only one day before changed their views and started to sympathize with the protesters and endorse their cause after watching live footage of men riding horses and camel s threatening the lives of their fellow citizens. The violent attacks created a confidence crisis betwee n the people and the government. E xplaining how the situation was in Cairo at that point in the Revolution, Ghannam (2012) reports that one of her femal next thing we hear about is the attacks on al Tahrir. How does he expect us to believe

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199 him af Square and even took the lives of some them, it gave them momentum and increased their credibility. The two developments changed the social and political atmosphere both n ationally and internationally. More citizens joined the protests with a total of around 15 million in different parts of Egypt (Holmes, 2012) and more countries began demanding meaningful, political change. The relation between discourse and society is dia lectic Feb. 2 both on the textual and discursive practice level. As protesters gained Al Ahram and Aljazeera adopted different reporting strategies. 5.5 Hegemoni c and Counter Hegemonic D iscourse Powerful social groups seek to normalize their discourse by controlling institutions that generate discourse, such as the media, which serve as tools to sustainin g hegemony in a society (Blommaert, 2005). As an Ideological State Apparatus, Al Ahram was a mouthpiece of the Egyptian government during the days of ferociously criticizing the protesters and backing Mubarak to praising the Revolution and criticizing the former regime. Realizing this apparent bias toward the old regime and in an attempt to establish a new bond with the readers and protesters, Al Ahram officially apologized for it For ; it wrote: for any bias with the corrupt regime, and we pledge to always be biased with the legitimat e demands of the people and continue to be the conscience of the nation. We also express our pride of all the pure bloods

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200 that challenged the forces of backwardness and coercion and hope that the families of the martyrs would forgive us for no matter what we offer does not equal one drop of blood; our only consolation is that they sacrificed their lives for the sake of dignity and pride of the nation. discursive policies of power ho lders (Barkho, 2008). During the days of the protests, some journalists were caught between their own attitudes about objective reporting and the strict guidelines of their institution to the extent that some of them resorted to blogs to practice what they considered journalism while working for state run media. Al Ahram journalists had even written a letter to the editor requesting that the paper report objectively and distance itself from the government, but the request was ignored (Peterson, 2011). Saba h Hamamou, deputy business editor of Al Ahram reported that on Jan. 25, she could see from her window at Al Ahram thousands of demonstrators heading to Tahrir Square. She grabbed her camera and took shots of the demonstrators. Unable to conceal her feelin gs and write what Al Ahram wanted and expected her to write, she created her own Youtube Channel and downloaded her videos of Tahrir Square and guidelines were during the Revol ution. Reporters were expected to report what was dictated upon them, not what they believed was an objective reporting of what they saw. journalists in state run media opted covertly for social media. Commenting on the issue of state intervention in state run media during the Revolution and before, Mohammad al Barghouthi, editor of Al Ahram Tahrir Youth which was issued on the last days of the Revolution coverage of the event, said in an interview with Al Ahram Weekly Al Ahram like

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201 everything else in Egypt, was kidnapped by the regime before the Revolution. I do not deny that it had failed and committed mistakes before and dur have distinguished journalists who were professionally killed by former leaderships who turned Al Ahram same vein, Al Ahram editor in chief, Osama Saraya, who was ousted after the Revolution, claimed that the responsibility was collective and that national press had no choice but to adhere to the dictates of the government. He said in an email exchange with Newsweek ictims of the system, we worked under its shadow and we Aljazeera on the other hand, represented the coun ter hegemonic discourse in though, that it was the only counter hegemonic d iscourse during the uprising, or that its coverage was balanced and neutral; such claims are beyond the scope of the present research. Rather, the point is that Aljazeera gave another perspective on the event, one that challenges government hegemony throug h soft power. After its intensive coverage of the Tunisian Revolution that ousted President Ben Ali only ten days before the outset of the Egyptian Revolution, Aljazeera started raising questions about whether the Tunisian experience could affect Egypt, es pecially that groups such as We are all Khalid Said and the April 6 movement had called for protests against torture, corruption, and injustice on Jan. 25, which was a national holiday in Egypt to celebrate the police day.

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202 The Egyptian government was not tolerant of this counter discourse provided by Aljazeera Al Ahram Aljazeera is spreading its conspiracy against Egypt. State media and gover nment officials openly portrayed the Aljazeera correspondents were abused, threatened, or arrested by security fo rces; they had to hide their identities and work under very stressful circumstances; they were always on the run. On Feb. 2, Aljazeera Nilesat was cut off after orders from Egyptian authorities ( Aljazeera Feb. 2 2011). The network, however, resumed its coverage by uploading podcast and videos to its website and sharing the waves with other Arab networks. Viewers in Egypt continued to receive the signal on the two other satellite providers: the Saudi based Arabsa t and the France based Hotbird (Peterson, 2011). Aljazeera.net also reported on Feb. 4 that there were ongoing coverage of the uprising ( Aljazeera Feb. 4, 2011). As the leading transnational satellit e network in the Arab world, Aljazeera has indeed created challenges for state run media. Despite the fact that the media owned media existed, the government still had a grip on all media institutions. The biggest challenge, thus, came from the outside, from networks like Aljazeera that enjoy relative independence. Propagandistic and hegemonic discourse does not have the same influence it used to have, given that people have al ternatives to test truth claims. As controlled and Western broadcasters have found that they

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203 are at a significant disadvantage in the Arab world because they are not as credible as Aljazeera Lynch (2005) argues that one of the strongest impacts of Aljazeera in the Arab world is its coverage of protests in different Arab countries. He points out that Arab satellite stations were necessary for the wave of reformist enthusiasm in the region. Aljazeera n Revolution put official media on the spot. As the events unfolded, the round the clock coverage of Aljazeera whether on TV or online, supported by footage and videos from the scene created a credibility crisis in terms of run media that were propagandistic and far from reporting the reality. This discrepancy between reality and state apparatus distorted coverage contributed to the loss of trust in state abolish the Ministry of Information after the Revolution (Khamis, 2011). This is not to suggest that the loss of trust occurred only after the protests broke out, but that media credibility, or lack thereof, is most salient at times of crisis when claims can be spontaneously evaluated. Alja zeera news networks, also helped in forming an international public opinion (Peterson, 2011). demand s and insistence on change led to a gradual change in the attitude of the international community from supporting Mubarak and his regime to asking him to step 5.6 Prospects for the Future of Egyptian Media L andscape In light of the situation in post revolutionary Egypt and the social and political changes the state had undergone after Jan. 25 the que stions are: w ill state run media

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204 maintain its status? And what are the implications of the Egyptian Revolution for state media relationships? regarding the future of state run media in Egypt after the Jan. 25 Revolution : first, some intellectuals suggest the abolition of these media institutions or transforming them into private companies that are not controlled by the government in any way. Second, other intellectuals suggest amendments to press law that would guarantee the freedom of the press. Finally, others hips that were dominant before Jan. 25. Jan. 25 Revolution; however, these changes did not last long. For example, a few days after Mubarak was ousted, the Ministry of Information was abolished and state media leadership positions were reshuffled (Peterson. 2011). Only five months later, though, the Min istry was reinstated (Committee to Protect Journalists, July 12, 2011). This was not the first time the Egyptian Ministry of Information was abolished and reinstated though In 1981, President Anwar Al Sadat dismantled the Ministry of Information and reins tated it only one year later in Jan. 1982, and it was unclear then why the Ministry was abolished and why it was reinstated. Also, changes in leadership positions are not a strong indicator of grass root s transformation. Peterson (2011) reports that staff members complain that new leaderships appointed after the Revolution are more comfortable with the traditional media school, and former leaderships are still influential in the media scene as they a re kept as media consultants. No matter how influential th e mass media are, they have never been in the forefront of political change, whether this change was through a revolution or through

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205 peaceful reform (Hafez, 2006). Mass media alone are not capable of bringing transition to democracy; this is not to downpla y its significant role in creating a public sphere, but to stress that change comes first through political reform. The Iranian Revolution was one of the prominent contemporary revolutions in the Middle East. Investigating the outcomes and historical stag es of this Revolution gives insights into the correlation between political change and media change in autocratic states. Evaluating the media situation in Iran five years after the Iranian Revolution in 1979, Beeman (1984) points out that Iranian media wi tnessed huge changes after the Revolution, but settled back to resume their role as a regime mouthpiece with an ideology different than that during the shah era. More recently, Bruno (2009) argues that although there have been improvements in the flow of information in Iran during the last decade, restrictions on media still apply. p ertaining to media freedom, has been achieved by the Iranian Revolution; it only achieved one goal, which is replacing the shah regime with another regime, embracing a different ideology (Sreberny Mojammadi and Mohammadi, 1994). Put simply, Iranian officia l media only changed its ideology, not its practice and strategy. Changes in the media landscape are prone to the political context in any state. Hence, across the board changes in the media landscape are only likely when there is a permissive political co ntext promoting democracy. At this stage of political battle for democratization in Egypt, speculations about the future of media landscape are uncertain. It

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206 hostile environment ful (Sarquis 2012: 871). The media landscape in Egypt will be influenced by transnational, semi independent media and social media, which would impose a more transparent narrative on local media, whethe r official or private. That is, even if Egypt does not witness mainstream and non mainstream media context would render the pre revolutionary discourse shallow and outd ated. The Egyptian people have gone far in the Revolution in terms of demanding rights that a return to the same old way of state media hegemony is unlikely. However, as Khamis (2011: 1168) put it: although media in the Arab world stimulators of change and reform, one should be careful not to assign too much power to them in the trans The future of media in Egypt will depend to a large extent on a shift to democracy with an active civil society and an i nfluential multi party system. 5.7 Summary The aim of the present Chapter was to relate the findings of textual and discursive practice analysis to their sociopolitical context. On the textual level, for example, terms such as baltagiyya and martyrdom which h old negative and positive these terms to present the ingroup positively and outgroup n egatively. Moreover, Al Ahram and Aljazeera employed ideological structures in the sense of van Dijk (1995) such as attribution to personality, detailed description, and argumentative support,

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207 stood for duri ng the uprising. On the discursive practice level, the relationship between the state and the Islamic religious institution; the Arab Israeli conflict; and the role of superpowers in social movements were decisive sociopolitical aspects in to pic selection. For example, Al Azhar and other official Islamic religious institutions, Al Ahram emphasized topics on the official religious t, while Aljazeera emphasized topics that highlighted the dissident voice among the religious institution Revolution. Chapter 5 also attempted to provide an explanation by relating to the immediate situational context, for the shift in Al Ahram and Aljazeera important developments took place during the uprising that changed the track of the Revolution as a whole and, consequently, the repor ting strategies of the two outlets: 1) the change in the U.S. position, and 2) the Battle of the Camel. These two events had a significant influence on the social and political atmosphere, including media coverage. In light of the results from the three d textual analysis, discursive practice analysis, and social practice analysis, the two outlets represented two competing discourses with different stances and ideologies. By controlling media institutions, including Al A hram as important tools for the production and reproduction of ideologies, the former Egyptian government aimed at normalizing its discourse to sustain its dominance. This hegemonic discourse, however, was

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208 countered by the discourse of transnational media in the present case Aljazeera which gave prominence to the voice of dissident groups; thus, challenging state hegemony. As to the future of media landscape in Egypt, many accounts on the interrelation between political reform and media reform suggest that the former feeds the latter. That is, across the board media change and freedom of the press is only likely in democratic states. The history of previous social movements has shown that post revolutionary states witness media reforms th at do not last long. With the lack of crucial political change, such states settle back to their pre revolutionary media situation, only with a different ideology. Therefore, genuine political change in Egypt is decisiv e in grassroots media reform.

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209 CHAPTER 6 CONCLU SION S 6.1 Overview One of the main goals of CDA research is to expose how dominant groups us e the language to maintain dominance and unequal relations of power (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997; van Dijk, 1996, 2001, 2006). Thus, the present research has aimed at inve stigating how issues of ideology, power, and hegemony were enacted and resisted Al Ahram and Aljazeera are on different ends of the media spectrum in Egypt: on the one hand, Al Ahram is the major official newspaper in Egypt with one of the highest official media portray events at times of crisis and how issues of power and dominance play out in their coverage. On the other hand, Aljazeera is one of the main transnational networks in the Arab world whose coverage is considered relatively independent of government influence and, hence, represents free media in the Arab world. To analyze of significance in that it allowed for a contrast between controlled and independent media news reporting in the Arab world. In the following, I start by discussing the theoretical reflections of the present study on CDA. Following that, summarize the findin gs of th e study, with reference to its research questions (see 1.5.), and point out directions for future research on media discourse analysis in the Arab world context. I first summarize the findings of how the protests, protesters, and the government wer e represented in the reporting of Al Ahram and Aljazeera Then I highlight the main factors responsible for the contrast between official and semi

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210 independent media discourse, and their implications for the future of the media situation in Egypt. I conclu de with the study limitations and implications for future research. 6.2 Theoretical Reflections The present study utilized CDA and critical theories of ideology, discourse, and dimensional framework, which takes text as well as discursive and sociopolit ical practices into account to explain discourse. By so doing, the analysis embodies a micro textual level analysis and a macro social structure analysis that critiques the surrounding immediate and sociopolitical context to understand discourse as it pert ains to relations of social power It also drew on the concept of ideology in its critical sense as a system of ideas and beliefs that contribute to hegemony and unequal relations of power ; it refers to commonsensical assumptions about relations of power that make them appear unchallenged and natural (Fairclough, 2001) Gramsci (1971) distinguishes between coercive power and consent as mechanisms of social power. Underscoring the role of discourse in establishing and sustaining relations of power, Foucault (19 91) state s that power is persuasive and diffused, rather than purely coercive. Based on the s e assumption s the study sought to investigate how the media as an Ideological State Apparatus in the sense of Althusser (1971) contributes, through the rep resentation of events and social actors, to producing and/or resisting hegemonic power. Thus, the present study has attempted "to bring together linguistically oriented discourse analysis and social and political thought relevant to discourse and language" (Fairclough, 1992: 92) to understand relations of power and dominance. The first three research questions dealt with textual and discursive practice analysis, the first two

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211 dimensions of Fairclough's approach. In my attempt to answer these questions, I examined text by shedding light on certain linguistic features such as lexicalization and predication, verbal process, and presupposition. I then examined discursive practice as they pertain to text production by analyzing intertextuality and topic selection. The last two research questions (i.e. 4 and 5), take the analysis a step forward by in vestigating the socio political factors that help us understand discourse. In his framework, Fairclough distinguishes between three levels of analysis: 1) description of the formal properties of text; 2) interpretation of the relationship between text and the discursive practice; and 3) explanation of the relationship between discourse and social and cultural reality. In addressing the fourth research question of the study, I attempted to examine the third dimension of Fairclough's approach as the first two were dealt with in the first three research questions. My aim wa s to explain disc ourse by resorting to the sociopolitical context to provide an analysis for the strategies used to 'n orm alize' discourse. Therefore i n Chapter 5, the insights from textual a nd discourse analysis undertaken in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 were investigated in relation to the wider society. That is, a fter addressing the how ? i n my why ? : w hy did Al Ahram and Aljazeera address the Egyptian Jan. 25 Revolution the way they did? What we re the social and political aspects that help us understand discourse? To answer these questions, I first presented reflections of journalists in Al Ahram on their reporting of the protests and how Al Ahram was more of a mouthpiece for the government and the ruling party. I attempted to shed light on the nature of state run media in Egypt and the conditions and constraints under which journalists work. Then I

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212 addressed the tough conditions under which Aljazeera reporters worked and the fact that they were threatened, abused, and arrested by security forces. Investigating the wider sociopolitical context and how it relates to discursive practice I also discussed the relationship between the state and the religious institution in Egypt; Fatwas during the Revolution; t he role of mosques in the (de)mobilization of people through the Min istry of Religious Endowments; t he U.S. stance during the days of the protests and its implications to theorie s on revolution; and t he Israeli stance and how the two outlets utilized the representation of Israel in the Arab context in their coverage. One of the most important findings of the study which utilized the immediate situational context to understand discourse was why certain features manifested themselves differently at a certain point in the uprising, and w hy were there two s tages in each outlet's coverage. To address these point s I attempted to provide an explanation of the immediate context to re veal the underlying factors responsible for the change in the coverage; specifically, I addressed the role of two major events that changed the scene both nationally and internationally and were thought of as game changers: 1) the battle of the camel, and 2) the change of U.S. position. Weiss and Wodak (2003: 7) argue that CDA can be thought of as "a theoretical synthesis of conceptual tools", and that principled eclecticism is seen as one of the strengths of CDA. In the present study, I found that utilizin g van Dijk's approach in particular his concept of the Ideological Square along with Fairclough's approach, which analyzes text, discursive practice, and sociocultural practice, gave further insights into how group polarization characteristics played o ut on both the textual and discursive practice level. In other words features of van Dijk's Ideological Square were helpful in

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213 expanding the discussion on textual and discursive practice analysis, and in addressing data from different perspectives. Moreov er, the integration of CDA theories and critical theories such as the Gramsci's theory of hegemony, Althusser's theory of ideology and Ideological State Apparatus, and Foucault's theory of power has allowed for a nuanced analysis of media discourse during Egypt's 2011 Revolution. 6.3 The Representation of the Protests and the A ntagonists One of the main goals of the study, as implied by its research questions, was to reveal how the two news outlets represented the protests and the antagonists during the eighte en days of the uprising. The significance of such investigation lies in the fact that through their representation of social events and social actors, the media represent and structure their own c reation of reality and meaning. To examine these representat ions, news reports were approached both textually and discursively, utilizing five analytic tools, including lexicalization and predication, presupposition, verbal process, intertextuality and topics to reveal how the two outlets constructed their own meanings about the protests, the protesters, and the government to produce or reproduce their ideologies, and sustain or challenge relations of power and hegemony during the days of the uprising. A polar ized structure of ideologies was realized textually and discursively in Al Ahram and Aljazeera former Egyptian government, on the other hand. That is, the protesters represented the ingroup and t he government the outgroup for Aljazeera while the government represented the ingroup and the protesters the outgroup for Al Ahram That said, the two outlets showed a change in the strategy of reporting the event after Feb. 2, where some textual and disc ursive features became more salient or manifested themselves

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214 differently. Other features, however, were persistent throughout the uprising. Feb. 2 marked a turning point in the uprising because of two sociopolitical developments that were game changers bot h nationally and internationally. First, the U.S. backed off from its support of Mubarak by Jan. 30, and directly in a phone call to consider a transition of power in Egypt a nd obey the demands of the sympathy of many citizens who were skeptical of the uprising and opposing groups after the Battle of the Camel on Feb. 2. Many of those citizens lost their trust in the government and joined the protests after watching live coverage of men riding in on camels, attacking pea ceful protesters with whips, swo rds, and kn ives. Thus, the representation of the protests, protesters, and the government in Al Ahram and Aljazeera Feb. 2 phase and post Feb. 2 phase. 6.3.1 The Representation of the P rotests In the pre Feb. 2 phase, Al Ahram and Aljazeera varied considerably in their representation of the protests on the textual and discursive practice levels. Textually, Al Ahram of violence and conspira cy against the country; it employed lexical items and predications such as destruction chaos violence conspiracy illegal gatherings looting robbery arson and others to describe the protests. Aljazeera on its part, described the protests from the p oint of view of the protesters and dissident groups; it stressed that the protesters were practicing their right of freedom of expression after decades of

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215 network did not e mploy positive lexicalization or predication to refer to the protests, but differed from Al Ahram in that it did not use negative lexicalization and predication. Although it reported criminal assaults during the uprising, it separated those from the protes ts, unlike Al Ahram which framed the protests as acts of violence in and of themselves. On the discursive practice level, the analysis of topic selection has shown that Al Ahram excluded articles that represented the government negatively in dealing wit h the events, such as Internet blackout, the cut off of Aljazeera transmission, and, most importantly, the Battle of the Camel. The news reports on the protests emphasized violence and marginalized the demands of the people; they avoided describing the eve nt as a massive social movement and downplayed its political significance. On the other hand, Aljazeera included all stories that were excluded in Al Ahram and focused on the massiveness of the protests in Egypt and solidarity protests across t he world; it also empha he ouster of the regime. 6.3.2 The Representation of the P rotesters reporting during the pre Feb. 2 phase, Al Ahram utilized predications such as the banned and illegal to describe dissident groups, and used terms such as elements compared to activists to refer to members of the MB Members and leaders of opposition groups were excluded in Al Ahram he negative term baltagiyya was used to refer to the protesters. Al Ahram also employed negative presuppositions about the protesters in the authorial voice in the outset of the protests.

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216 The analysis of verbal processes did not yield any findings at this phase because the protesters and leaders of opposition groups were not given voice in the first place. Aljazeera however, employed textual strategies that were different from Al Ahram First, negative terms such as baltagiyya were not used to refer to th e protesters, and when reporting on government sources who described the protesters as baltagiyya the network distanced itself from such claims by using strategic quotes or expressions such as the so called It also used all types of verbal processes ne gative, neutral, and positive in reporting members of dissident groups, such the April 6 Movement, the National Commission for Change, and the MB As to naming, the network recognized all opposition leaders in its coverage by referring to them by proper name and position, a feature that was not present in Al Ahram On the discursive practice level, the two outlets also showed variation in their representation of the protesters during this phase. Intertextuality analysis revealed that Al Ahram totally excluded the opposition; the sources reported represented only one side of the conflict, the government. The paper also marginalized neutral sources, such as human rights organizations, news agencies, and eyewitnesses. Aljazeera however, intensiv ely reported dissident groups with no exception, and did not tend to emphasize a particular opposition group over other groups. It also reported human rights and eyewitnes ses who reported actions and practices that represented the protesters positively and/or the government negatively. 6.3.3 The Representation of the Egyptian G overnment Al Ahram used the term martyr and its derivatives to refer to casualties on the government s ide, particularly in the first days of the uprising. It also used proper name,

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217 position, and sometimes honorifics to refer to government officials. As to verbal processes, the paper employed positive and neutral verbal processes when reporting the governme nt side, which was in fact the only side reported during this phase. On the discursive practice level, Al Ahram reported articles that represented the President, government officials, and members of the NDP positively. Specifically, these articles emphasiz the official religious institution and the reactions of world leaders and senior officials who we re supportive of Mubarak. Aljazeera contrasted with Al Ahram in some features on both the textual and discursive practice levels regarding its representation of the government d uring the days of the uprising. To start with, the network employed presupposit ions to present the government negatively; these presuppositions, however, were not in the authorial voice, but through reporting other sides. As to naming and verbal process, Aljazeera did not contrast considerably with Al Ahram as it referred to governme nt officials by proper name and position and employed all types of verbal process when reporting those officials. However, i t differed from Al Ahram in this regard in that it did not marginalize the other side of the conflict. With regards to sourcing, Aljazeera reported on members of the Egyptian government, even if that was through other news agencies or media sources. Yet, it dealing with the protests and the It also highlighted fatwas of the non official religious institution that encouraged

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218 protesting against the regime, and intensively reported the world reactions that called upon Mubarak to consider a transition of power. Moreover, the network emphasized the Israeli incitement against the Revolution and its support of Mubarak. Due to the mutually constitutive relationship between discourse and society (Blommaert, 2005), a number of features manifested themselves differently in the two Mubarak and the Battle of the Camel rendered different discourses in the last ten days of the uprising. On the whole, Al Ahram began t o recognize the protesters and their demands, and ceased representing the protesters as thugs and criminals and the protests as a conspiracy. As more citizens started to sympathize with the protesters by Feb. 2 in the aftermath of the events on Tahrir Squa re, the old narrative that portrayed the protesters as baltagiyya and the protests as acts of violence was no longer credible to the audience. Therefore, Al Ahram shifted from representing the protests and protesters negatively to emphasizing counter prote sts that were demanding an end to Al Ahram reporting pre and post Feb. 2 reveals that textual features such as negative lexicalization and negative presuppositions about the prote sters were more sa lient in the pre Feb. 2 phase. After that date, o n the discursive practice level, the paper started reporting on opposition sources, and gradually reporting stories that were critical of the government. Aljazeera represented the opposite and was more explicit about its stance towards the event in the post Feb. 2 phase. For example, it began to employ negative presupposition about the government in the authorial voice rather than through reporting

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219 other voices. It also totally excluded the government voice from its coverage and emphasized voices representing the protesters and opposition leaders. As far as news selection, Aljazeera intensified its reporting of the U.S. position which placed pressure The stepping dow n of President Mubarak also marked another, somewhat expected, shift, particularly in Al Ahram the ingroup and members of the outgroup by praising the Revolution and the protesters and strongly criticizing the ol d regime. In terms of lexicalization, Al Ahram employed the term martyr and its derivatives to refer, for the first time, to the protesters and used positive predications to describe the Revolution. Likewise, the term baltagiyya which was utilized during the days of the protests to refer to protesters, was used to refer to thugs hired by the regime to terrorize protesters and attempt to deter them. It also reported news articles on the corruption of members of the regime, including the President, and membe rs of the NDP. 6.4 Competing Discourses at Times of C risis Al Ahram and Aljazeera embraced different ideologies during the Egyptian uprising, identifying themselves with different sides of the conflict. Their coverage of the historic event revealed a polarized representation of ingroup members and outgroup members with varying degrees of explicitness. As an official media outlet, Al Ahram was more of a mouthpiece of the Egyptian regime, while Aljazeera was more of a platform for the protesters. The coverage of Al Ahram and Aljazeera of the Egyptian Revolution is an example of competing discourses at times of conflict; they reveal the struggle between media antagonists to present different ideologies and establish affiliations with different groups.

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220 Al Ahram represented the hegemonic discourse, which before the information revolution in the past few decades had gone unchallenged, commonsensical, and taken for granted with the lack of a competing discourse. This type of discourse, which is part of the Ideological State Apparatus, is utilized by authoritarian regimes to sustain power and do production and censored content by appointing editors, controlling subsidies, revoking newspapers licenses, and prosecuting journalists. However, with the proliferation of tran snational media, another type of discourse came into being, creating a challenge to the old hegemonic discourse that was dominant in the media scene. Aljazeera represents this type of counter discourse in the Arab Middle East. The present study has shown that in their representation of the uprising, the protesters, and the Egyptian government, Al Ahram and Aljazeera appealed to their audiences in different ways to win their consent. They presented different narratives and framed the event from different p erspectives to serve ideological purposes. As an official media outlet, Al Ahram chose to back the government, but made an abrupt turn as Mubarak stepped down; thus, its credibility, as well as the credibility of state run media as a whole, is at question, and will be viewed as a propaganda device for the ruling elite (Hamdy and Gomaa, 2012), unless genuine change to the Egyptian media landscape takes place. Aljazeera in contrast, represented the voice of the protesters during the uprising as part of its e ndeavor to advocate democracy in the Arab world and serve as a de facto pan Arab opposition (Zayani, 2005). Due to this ideological contrast, the two outlets also utilized sociopolitical aspects differently in their reporting of the Revolution. For exam ple, in a country where religion

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221 plays an important role in social life, each outlet sought to win the ideological contest by reporting different religious stands and views, both Islamic and Christian, on the events. Al Ahram emphasized the stance of the I slamic official religious institutions, Al Azhar and the Ministry of Endowments, which condemned the protests. It also reported the position of the Church, which was supportive of Mubarak. Aljazeera however, attempted to present a counter religious take b y reporting the non official religious institution stance which hailed the protests. Among the reforms the Egyptian people were demanding after the ouster of the old regime was media reform. However, expecting a grass media lan dscape at this point in time is too optimistic as it will all depend on how far the country goes in terms of political change and transition to democracy. Although political changes have taken place since the Revolution, the political process is still opaque and confronted with many challenges in the near and far future, and until genuine, consistent steps toward democr acy and freedoms are undertaken. It is difficult to speculate about genuine change. Othe r experiences, like the Iranian experience, have shown that when autocratic regimes replace other autocratic regimes, the result is falling back to the old practices of suppression and hegemony, only with a change in ideology. 6.5 Study Limitations and Implic ations for Future R esearch The analysis and findings of the present research are limited by three factors. First, it investigated the representation of the Egyptian 2011 uprising and the antagonists by two media institutions, Al Ahram and Aljazeera which represent official and semi independent media outlets in the Egyptian and Arab context. Therefore, the conclusions cannot be extended to other official or semi independent media outlets in

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222 Egypt and the Arab world. Secondly, the study investigated the two reporting of the uprising. Thus, the findings do not necessarily reflect Al Ahram newspaper or Aljazeera limited by time as the analyzed data focused on the period between Jan. 25, 2010 and Feb. 15, 2011, which witnessed Egypt 2011 uprising; they are not generalizable to other events taking place in Egypt before or after this event. The present research opens horizons for future CDA research on the media coverage of revolut ions. In the context of the Egyptian Revolution, future research might study how other official or independent Egyptian media institutions portrayed the uprising and compare those to Al Ahram how other Arab t ransnational media outlets, such as Al Arabiya and Alhurra compared and contrasted with Aljazeera in their reporting of the uprising. Such studies would give a full picture of how the Egyptian uprising was reported. The Arab Spring Revolutions are cri tical and historic events in the Arab world where the media played a significant role. Therefore, a critical analysis of media coverage is crucial both for the documentation of this period and for gaining deeper insights into the outlook of the media situa tion in different Arab countries. Future research may, thus, investigate the official and semi independent media coverage of other Arab Spring Revolutions, including the Tunisian, Libyan, Yemeni, Bahraini, and Syrian Revolutions, to depict patterns and/or contrasts in the reporting of different revolutions in the Arab world.

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223 APPENDIX A ARTICLES FROM AL AHRAM

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224

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225

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226 Figure A 1. An article on Jan. 30, 2011

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228 Figure A 2. An article on Feb. 8, 2011

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229

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230 Figure A 3. An article on Feb. 11, 2011

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231 APPENDIX B ARTICLES FROM ALJAZEERA

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232 Figure B 1 An article on Jan. 30 2011

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233 Figure B 2 An article on Feb. 9 2011

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234

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235 Figure B 3 An article on Feb. 11 2011

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247 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Majid Alhumaidi is a linguist at the College of Languages and Translation, King Saud University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. He earned his Bachelor of Translation Sciences from King Saud University in 2001. He received his Masters of Educational Linguistics from King Saud University in 2008. In 2010 he joined the Department of Linguistics at the University of Florida and earned his doctoral degree in Philosophy in the fall 2013. Alhumaidi's dissertation, A Critical Discourse Analysis of Al Ahram and Aljazeera's online coverage of Egypt's 2011 Revolution was supervised by Dr. Diana Boxer. His research interests are foc used on Critical Discourse Analysis and educational linguistics.