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1 NETWORKING FOR GLOBAL COMMONS: GOVERNANCE OF MARINE PROTECTED AREAS IN THE HIGH SEAS AND THE IMPACT OF NONGOVERNMENTAL ACTORS By BETUL GOKKIR A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2013
2 2013 Betul Gokkir
3 To my family, who has always suppo rted me in every step of my life.
4 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The completion of this project was made possible thanks to the support of my advisors, academics and practitioners of ocean governance, and my friends and family. I owe the biggest thanks to J. Samuel Barkin, who has been answering my unend ing questions since I was a senior at Bilkent University applying for graduate school and mentoring my research during the graduate program Despite the distance and procedural barriers we lived with through the se years, he inspired and supported my intere st in the fields of international organization and ocean governance during the doctoral program. I also must express my gratitude for Laura Sjoberg, who has been an angel to me a nd many other graduate students wh en it was needed most. I am greatly thankful to Badredine Arfi Christopher Mccarty, Leslie P. Thiele and Katrina Z. Schwartz for their encouragement and advising Their feedback has been invaluable throughout the completion of this project. I am also grateful to Giuseppe Notarbartolo di Sciara, J effrey Ardron, and Stephan Lutter for sharing their experiences and providing me with insights about the high seas MPAs policy making process. Our interviews offered me a valuable opportunity to strengthen my understanding of this process and the practice of ocean governance beyond official reports and academic studies. Endless thanks go to my best friends who have always made me feel close to them despite the oceans between us. Our ceaseless conversations and emails somehow managed to convince me that n othing has changed in our lives and the world since we were twelve. They spent their time constantly taking and sending pictures to me during the most important days of their lives just to make feel like I was there. And I always did so.
5 Last, but definite ly foremost, my family has been my biggest source of motivation. I have been blessed with the most loving and supportive parents on earth, a sister like Berna who makes the best of best friends, and a smart brother like Hasancan who is the only person who could outperform me in speaking fast. Thanks for always being there for me, I am lucky to have you.
6 TABLE OF CONTENTS page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 4 LIST OF TABLES ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 9 LIST OF FIGURES ................................ ................................ ................................ ........ 10 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................ ................................ ........................... 11 ABSTRACT ................................ ................................ ................................ ................... 13 CHAPTER 1 ENVIRONMENTAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF OCEAN GOVERNANCE: THE NETWORKED GOVER NANCE OF HIGH SEAS MARINE PROTECTED AREAS ................................ ................................ ................................ .................... 15 Why the High Seas and MPAs? ................................ ................................ .............. 15 The Argument for Networks and NGOs ................................ ................................ .. 19 The Content of T his Project ................................ ................................ .................... 25 2 THE HIGH SEAS AND THE CHALLENGE OF GOVERNING THE COMMONS: NETWORKS, EFFECTIVENESS, AND NGOS IN GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS ................................ ................................ ................................ ............... 28 Oceans and Governance of Global Commons ................................ ....................... 29 Social Networks and Global Environmental Governance ................................ ........ 36 Effectiveness and Global Environmental Governance ................................ ............ 40 IGO NGO Relationship and the Role of NGOs ................................ ....................... 47 The Study of High Seas MPAs Governance at the Intersection of Commons, Networks, Effectiveness, and NGOs ................................ ................................ ... 53 3 THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE GOVERNANCE OF HIGH SEAS MPAS ................................ ......................... 55 MPAs as Tools of the Ecosystem Approach to Environmental Management ......... 56 International Law and Organizations in High Seas MPAs Governance .................. 60 International Environmental Law and the High Seas ................................ ........ 60 Mining and Navigation in the High Seas ................................ ........................... 64 Regional Fisheries Bodies and the FAO ................................ ........................... 66 Gaps in the Prevailing Regime and New Directions ................................ ............... 70 UNGA Resolutions on Deep Sea Fisheries in the High Seas ........................... 72 NGOs in Ocean and High Seas MPAs Governance ................................ ......... 76
7 4 ANALYSIS OF REGIONAL POLICY PROCESSES I: THE ATLANTIC REGIONS ................................ ................................ ................................ ............... 81 Northe ast Atlantic Ocean ................................ ................................ ........................ 82 The Role of Science and Scientific Actors ................................ ........................ 83 The Role of Nongovernmental Actors ................................ .............................. 85 The Current State of Closures in the Northe ast Atlantic Ocean ....................... 90 Northwest Atlantic Ocean ................................ ................................ ....................... 91 The Role of Science and Scientific Actors ................................ ........................ 92 The Role of Nongovernmental Actors ................................ .............................. 93 The Current State of Closures in the Northwest Atlantic Ocean ....................... 97 Southe ast Atlantic Ocean ................................ ................................ ....................... 98 The Role of Science and Scientific Actors ................................ ........................ 99 The Role of Nongovernmental Actors and Other IGOs ................................ .. 103 The Current State of Closures in the Southe a st Atlantic ................................ 105 5 ANALYSIS OF REGIONAL POLICY PROCESSES II: THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA, SOUTHERN OCEAN, AND SOUTHERN INDIAN OCEAN ......................... 107 The Mediterranean Sea Region ................................ ................................ ............ 108 The Role of Science and Scientific Actors ................................ ...................... 110 The Role of Nongovernmental Actors ................................ ............................ 11 1 The Current State of Closures in the Mediterranean Sea Region .................. 113 Southern Ocean ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 115 The Role of Science and Scientific Actors ................................ ...................... 117 The Role of Nongovernmental Actors ................................ ............................ 118 The Current State of MPAs in the Southern Ocean ................................ ........ 121 Southern Indian Ocean ................................ ................................ ......................... 121 The Role of Science and Scientific Actors ................................ ...................... 124 The Role of Nongovernmental Actors ................................ ............................ 126 The Current State of Closures in the Southern Indian Ocean ........................ 127 6 TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL NGOS AS INSTRUMENTS OF GLOBALLY INTEGRATED HIGH SEAS MANAGEMENT AND THE DRIVERS OF ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTIVENESS ................................ ........................... 130 NGOs as Key Actors of Global Ocean Governance ................................ ............. 131 Analysis of Regional Governance Structures and Effectiveness .......................... 144 The Atlantic Way ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 151 Who is beh ind Success International Organizations or Country Contributions? 155 7 ON THE POWER OF NETWORKS, NGOS, AND NATIONAL INTEREST: WHO IS MISSING IN THE HIGH SEAS MPAS GOVERNANCE NETWORKS? ............ 160 What does the High Seas MPAs Case Suggest about the Social Network App roach to the Governance of Commons? ................................ ...................... 161 Effectiveness and Science in the High Seas Governance System ....................... 167
8 Transnational Environmental NGOs as Champion Organizations ........................ 171 What is Missing in the High Seas MPAs Network? On National versus Global Commons ................................ ................................ ................................ .......... 175 The International Legal Institutional Framework and the Ecosystem Approach: Can High Seas MPAs Save the Global Fisheries? ................................ ............ 178 Concluding Comments ................................ ................................ .......................... 182 LIST OF REFE RENCES ................................ ................................ ............................. 186 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ................................ ................................ .......................... 203
9 LIST OF TABLES Table page 3 1 Tools of global oceans regime and their relevance to high seas MPAs governance ................................ ................................ ................................ ......... 69 6 1 Example of actor participation to MPA policy data (2 mode) ............................ 133 6 2 Example of actor affiliation network data (1 mode) ................................ ........... 134 6 3 Centrality analysis of actors ................................ ................................ .............. 139 6 4 Performance review of regions ................................ ................................ ......... 148 6 5 Country level performance evaluation ................................ .............................. 157 7 1 Comparison of major fishing countries ................................ ............................. 176
10 LIST OF FIGURES Figure page 6 1 Actors of global high seas MPAs governance network ................................ ..... 135 6 2 Illustration of centrality measures ................................ ................................ ..... 137 6 3 Actor affiliation network nodes sized with different centrality measures ......... 140 6 4 Analysis of regional frameworks ................................ ................................ ....... 145
11 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ASOC Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition BCC Benguela Current Commission BCMLE Benguela Current Large Marine Ecosystem CCAMLR Commission on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources CGFZ Charlie Gibbs Fracture Zone COFI Committee on Fisheries COLTO Coalition of Legal Toothfish Operators CoML Census of Marine Life CPR Common pool resource DSCC Deep Sea Conservation Coalition EAC Ecological Action Centre EBSA Ecologically and biologically significant area EC European Community EU European Union FAO Food and Agriculture Organization GFCM General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean ICES International Council for the Exploration of the Seas ICFA International Coalition of Fisheries Associations IGO Intergovernmental organization IUU Illegal, unreported, and unregulated IUCN International Union for Conservation of Nature MPA Marine protected area NAFO Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization NEA FC North East Atlantic Fisheries Organization
12 NGO Nongovernmental organization PSSA Particularly sensitive sea area SEAFO South East Atlantic Fisheries Organization SIODFA South Indian Ocean Deepsea Fishers Association SIOFA South Indian Fisheries Agreem ent SPRFMO South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation TAN Transnational advocacy network UN United Nations UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea UNGA United Nations General Assembly VME Vulnerable marine ecosystem WGDEC Wor king Group on Deep Water Ecology WCPA World Comm ission on Protected Areas WWF World Wildlife Fund / World Wide Fund for Nature
13 Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy NETWORKING FOR GLOBAL COMMONS: GOVERNANCE OF MARINE PROTECTED AREAS IN THE HIGH SEAS AND THE IMPACT OF NONGOVERNMENTAL ACTORS By Betul Gokkir August 2013 Chair: Badredine Arfi Major : Political Science This project is a study on the governance of global commons with a focus on the governance of the oceans. It examines the actors and mechanisms effective in the management of marine protected areas (MPAs) in the high seas. High seas MP As are by definition established in zones beyond national jurisdiction. No state or international institution holds absolute authority over these areas. In other words, this is a clear case of governance without government. Moreover, these areas are implem ented with an alternative approach to environmental management. MPAs are sites of an ecosystem based management approach as opposed to approaches focusing on individual elements of the ecosystem. This project argues that the go vernance of high seas MPAs oc cur s as a product of networking between (inter)governmental and nongovernmental actors and that the participation of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) contributes to the effectiveness of this governance system. It applies social network analysis to ma p out the networks developed around th e forty four high seas MPAs that exist in six different regions the Northeast Atlantic, Northwest Atlantic, Southeast Atlantic, Mediterranean Sea, Southern Ocean, and Southern Indian Ocean.
14 Each region examined in this study presents unique challenges and lessons with its particular economic, political, and institutional dynamics. However, a comprehensive analysis of high seas MPAs governance demonstrates that NGOs hold central positions in this governance network. Consi stent with the development of an integrated ocean governance strategy, their central position enables NGOs to disseminate norms, information, and policy experiences across the regions. Furthermore, NGOs fortify institutional and environmental aspects of ef fectiveness thanks to their efforts in capacity building, alliance building, scientific research, and monitoring. Lastly, this project concludes that MPAs provide the necessary tools to save the oceans as global commons; however, it is essential to broaden participation in the present governance network and ensure the full implementation of high seas MPAs by taking advantage of issue linkages across different aspects of ocean governance.
15 CHAPTER 1 ENVIRONMENTAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF OCEAN GOVERNANCE: THE NETWORKED GOVERNANCE OF HIGH SEAS MARINE PROTECTED AREAS Why the High Seas and MPAs? maintaining the biosphere. Indeed, humans depend on healthy seas for producing 20% of the protein we eat and nearl y 50% of the oxygen we breathe. Oceans also play a critical role in the global climate and carbon cycle, absorbing much of the carbon dioxide we emit daily into the atmosphere. Yet, as never before, human activities ar e causing stress to the oceans, and, by extension, to the biosphere. These threats stem from destructive and overzealous fishing practices, that have resulted in a situation where over 75% of the urrently fully exploited, over exploited, or depleted. (IUCN 2012c) While providing fundamental resources for the economic system, human health, and maintaining diverse ecosystems, the oceans are facing irrepara ble damages from human activities. The amount of harm these activities inflict upon the oceans has dramatically increased during recent decades due to changes in technology and rapid globalization. Since the 1970s, the international community has started t o acknowledge the potentially irreversible damage s threatening the oceans. Nevertheless, the situation been insufficient and ineffective. Fisheries resources are particu larly at risk because of economic demand for these fisheries and the environmentally detrimental techniques fishing vessel operators use in meeting this demand. Marine protected areas (MPAs) are designed as ecosystem based management instruments to addres s these serious challenges. The MPA concept has become a more popular policy tool for the management of high seas resources since the mid 2000s. During these years, the United Nations (UN) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the UN started t o emphasize the importance of protected areas
16 for the management of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks. Consistent with the framework that the UN and FAO developed, contemporary international instruments regulating high seas fisheries are guided b y a precautionary principle of acting based on the best available scientific information. They also call for the conservation of marine ecosystems (as opposed to a specific fish stock) and encourage the creation or strengthening of regional fisheries manag ement arrangements to implement these strategies. It is necessary to highlight that the environmental and political challenges of designating MPAs in the high seas are very different in comparison to coastal areas. By nature, the high seas are affect ed by the deep sea fishing activities of vessel operators, most of which are large transnational corporations. Deep sea and bottom trawls can damage, if not completely remove, all living beings in the deep seas and on the surface of the seabed. Many of the areas affected from such practices are vulnerable marine ecosystems (VMEs), which are easily disturbed but difficult to recover in a short time. Considering the impact of deep sea fishing on various elements of marine ecosystems, high seas MPAs as ecosyst em based management tools are designed for the protection of both fisheries and non fisheries resources. Compared to a community of fishermen fishing in coastal areas or national waters, the circumstances in the high seas present large scale problems with differences in the sources and solutions of environmental threats. In the high seas, relatively small communities of fishers and marine ecosystems governed by local, regional and federal agencies are replaced by large ecosystems with limited knowledge of ecological features and limited control over the ecosystem in terms of the users
17 exploiting these resources and the rules determining who can take what from the existing pool within sustainable limits. Furthermore, the outcomes of unsustainable practices a re not felt directly by the public, which reduces their perceptions of costs and immediate risks. As a consequence of these differences, the implementation of protected areas is more common and has a longer history in some countries; nevertheless, the focu s of this project is exclusively MPAs in the high seas. The first examples of high seas MPAs were established in 2006. Today, there are 44 high seas MPAs listed by the FAO (FAO 2013a). The original definition of an MPA allows for a broader and more multif aceted management strategy, but current high seas MPAs are frequently discussed in relation to international fisheries management and spatial management tools. Contemporary examples of high seas MPAs are generally practiced as closure areas that prohibit f ishing in certain areas, during certain time frames, and below predefined depths. These areas are ecologically critical zones either for a specific fish species or for the physical features of this zone, which nurture and sustain the ecosystem surrounding it. In addition to their unique environmental features and challenges, coastal and areas in the coastal areas, territorial waters, or in the exclusive economic zone (E EZ) of a country are managed by a central authority that exercises sovereign powers over these areas. Nevertheless, in high seas MPAs, domestic law and institutions are replaced by international regulatory instruments, which are more difficult to establish implement, monitor, and enforce. From this point of view, the governance of the high seas constitutes one of the ideal cases of truly global commons and governance without
18 government. On the one hand, oceans provide essential resources for global ecologi cal balance and the human population. Therefore, states, producers, and environmentalists have a direct interest in these resources. On the other hand, unlike the citizens of a country, states in international society can choose not to be obliged by laws a nd regulations. The puzzle, then, becomes understanding which actors take part in the governance of these resources, under what conditions they do so, and what is their particular contribution to this governance system. In short, this project focuses on the high seas and MPAs because of the unique environmental and management related challenges of governance in this issue area. First, it presents an opportunity to study the governance of commons in an issue area that is different from most studies on the environmental commons. Second, this project is among the first studies examining the governance of high seas MPAs at the global level High seas MPAs have not been at the center of scholarly debates, especially in relation to the environmental and social sciences interface. This topic is clearly unexplored from such a viewpoint since the impleme ntation of high seas MPAs began less than a decade ago. Nonetheless, the case of high seas governance has the potential to shed light on various essential to pics in global environmental politics. The existing high seas MPAs studies focus on a single region or a specific MPA; however, universe of samples, is a novel and essential study on the governance of commons, governance without government, and ecosystem based or spatial management in international fisheries perspectives
19 The Argument for Networks and NGOs As stated earlier, the study of high seas MPAs from a global environmental politics angle brings significant contributions to essential questions in the field. The first governance of commons (Berkes 2007; Hardin 1968; O strom 1990; Poteete e t al. 2010; Young 2002) aim at bringing about both theoretical and practical solutions to this question. The study of high seas MPAs governance benefits from these approaches, but they prove insufficient to completely grasp ocean governance as a case of go vernance of commons. The notion of institutional diversity and the interplay between the institutions involved in the governance of a common pool resource (CPR) is a point with which many scholars agree. However, the composition of the institutions in the stakeholder matrix varies considerably according to the type and scale of the CPR. This is precisely why the governance without government concept, the second global (e nvironmental) politics puzzle this study tackles, offers an appropriate frame to compreh end the governance of high seas MPAs. In the case of the high seas, diversity of institutions refers to a set of actors that includes global scale intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs), states, repr esentatives of the fishing industry, and transnational nongovernmental scientific and advocacy organizations. This project argues that the governance of high seas MPAs occurs as a product of networking between (inter)governmental and nongovernmental actors and that the participation of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) contributes to the effectiveness of this governance system. It applies social network analysis to map out the networks developed around the 44 high seas MPAs from six high seas regions the Northeast
20 Atlantic, Northwest Atlantic, Southeast Atlantic, Mediterranean Sea, Southern Ocean, and Southern Indian Ocean. There are both theoretical and methodological advantages of using network theory and analysis in this context. First, the argument s tated above can be most effectively proved by addressing the governance system as a whole rather than tackling international agreements, organizations, and policies as separate pieces. The existing conceptual tools such as institutional diversity (Ostrom 2 005), institutional interplay ( Young 2002), and earth system governance (Biermann 2008) reinforce the logic of network theory from various aspects. Additionally, recent studies in the field of international organization (Carpenter 2011; Hafner Burton et al 2009; Ward 2006) and fisheries management (Ekstrom et al. 2009; Hartley 2010) put emphasis on network theory and social networks as a form of governance. In addition to merging the gap between global commons and transnational networks literature, the stu dy of high seas governance can benefit from another advantage of the application of social network analysis, which is allowing the researchers to establish a relati onship between the structure and the outcome. Since the goal is exploring the relationsh ip between the centrality of NGOs and effectiveness, in this project network theory is considered to be the appropriate theoretical framework and network analysis is considere d to be the appropriate tool to grasp and analyze high seas governance. The inter actions among actors attending the same regional events and the interactions among those attending governance processes in different regions can be conceptualized as networking. Likewise, the entire set of connections among the actors can be conceptualized as a network. A
21 comprehensive analysis of global high seas MPAs governance demonstrates that NGOs hold central positions in this governance network. Most NGOs active in high seas governance are transnational environmental NGOs that take part in the policy making process of re gional and global organizations and they join almost every stage of this process, from drafting proposals to performance assessment. They attend the common events and directly communicate with most of the actors in this governance netw ork. Their central position enables NGOs to effectively disseminate norms, information, and policy experiences across the six high seas regions. Each of these regions presents unique challenges and lessons due to their particular economic, political, and i nstitutional dynamics. Despite the significance of such regional factors, this project suggests that NGOs strengthen the institutional and environmental aspects of effectiveness thanks to their efforts in agenda setting, alliance building, capacity buildin g, scientific research, and monitoring. It can be claimed that national level analysis is more appropriate to explain the effectiveness of high seas MPAs governance. Two observations on the role of national actors at regional and global levels demonstrate that the explanations based on the commitment and success of individual countries need to be analyzed carefully along the lines of private versus common goods distinction. At a regional level, some of the states influential in regional high seas MPAs poli cies exhibit similar performance levels as their RFMOs, but the two measures do not overlap in several instances. Many member areas within their sovereign zones and RFMO regulatory areas beyond national EEZs are compared. A global level review, which is not limited to regional policy actors,
22 presents another significant question. Several countries that are among the leading fisheries producers do not even take part in high seas MPAs governance. Similarly, many of these states proved their interest and success in the conservation of resources within their sovereign areas. Observations at both levels suggest that the ch ange in the CPR versus private good perception marks a si gnificant distinction in state behavior. These observations also reaffirm one of the main propositions of this study: global CPRs present unique governance challenges. Future efforts of NGOs and states should focus on supporting strategies that would allo w them to advance both their own interests and the conservation of the high seas marine ecosystems. For example, drawing the attention of global civil society to the destruction that takes place in the deep seas can bring advantages to transnational enviro nmental NGOs. More informed and attentive consumers and citizens can create leverage with producers and policy makers. Furthermore, once such efforts result in policy changes in more powerful states, they can induce other countries to adopt similar environ mental measures. NGOs can more effectively take advantage of such leverage politics tactics if they manage to gather broader support for their cause. Likewise, states that have a direct interest in the sustainability of economic resources of the high seas can benefit from the activities of NGOs. NGOs engage in monitoring and enhance transparency of the policy making process. These efforts d iminish the consequences of prevailing problems in international cooperation. Unregulated and unreported fishing is a major problem for states committed to the sustainability of high seas resources, and NGOs provide useful contributions to the process from this perspective.
23 Finally, beyond the IGO NGO relationship debate and as a response to the question of whether MPAs provide with necessary tools to save the oceans as global commons, this project maintains that MPAs are appropriate management tools to save the oceans. However, in order to achieve this end, participation in the present governance network should be broadened, and high seas MPAs should be strictly implemented by taking advantage of issue linkages across different aspects of ocean governance. Three points need clarificatio n about the thesis of this project concerning the networks and the impact of NGOs. First, the discussion of networks is not based on the assumption that all networks are examples of a non hierarchical form of governance. The proposition that the high seas MPAs governance system can be conceptualized as a network does not presume the equality of each node, i.e. actor, in agenda setting, decision making and implementation of policies. For example, while maintaining that there are connections between actors i n high seas MPAs governance and that they coproduce the outcomes, this study acknowledges the essential functions of RFMOs in comparison to what a business organization or an advocacy organization can achieve. Similarly, the addition of another NGO to the network does not imply that it would necessarily enjoy the same influence as other NGOs over the governance network. Rather, the emphasis of this project is the relationship between the position of actors (i.e. centrality) in the structure (i.e. global gov ernance network) and the outcome (i.e. effectiveness). Second, both broadly in environmental governance and specifically in high seas governance, the role of science and scientific actors is crucial. Scientific knowledge
24 about the state of high seas resources, mainly the fish stocks and VMEs, is considerably limited in many regions. Any attempt to assess effectiveness should avoid bold causality claims and take the scientific aspect of the policy making process into consid eration. Therefore, suggestions about effectiveness, NGOs, and causality do not maintain that all different or complementary explanations are eliminated. Instead, they mean that the regional effectiveness scores confirm the plausibility of the argument tha t the pro environment efforts of NGOs strengthen the ability of regional management structures to address environmental problems. Moreover, the transnational organization of NGOs and their attendance to various regional and global policy platforms improve seas governance framework connecting region level regulatory mechanisms. Third, the argument for NGOs does not propose that all NGOs in every issue area play the s ame role and influence policy at the same level. Yet, it does claim that high seas governance is a field that confirms the beneficial role of nongovernmental institutions in achieving a desired outcome; the conservation of a global scale CPR. The compositi on of the high seas MPAs governance network shows that the fishing industry, states, and RFMOs, which are also shaped by state interest to a certain extent, are the other major stakeholders of high seas governance. Transnational environmental NGOs are the only group of actors who, first, exist outside the national or industrial economic priorities frame, and, second, are capable of influencing a global scale CPR challenge with their broad networks, scientific and policy expertise, and contributions to monit oring and transparency. Therefore, the participation of NGOs in high seas governance is a
25 phenomenon that should be supported for the conservation and sustainable manag ement of high seas resources The Content of T his P roject This study has three major par ts. The first part introduces the scholarly studies and concepts this project speaks to, and presents the evolution of the leg al institutional framework for high seas MPAs governance with its different aspects The second part of the project includes a det ailed examination of all high seas MPAs implemented in the through regional frameworks. Each regional experience is presented first through an introduction of the regional organizations and agreements and the background of the high seas MPAs policies in this region. This first section continues with a discussion focusing on nongovernmental actors and their particular contributions. And next, given the crucial role the scienc e plays in the designation and assessm ent of necessary policy tools, the review of regional processes elaborates on the role of science and scientific actors. Given that high seas MPAs is not a sufficiently explored area, this part of the study also offers a useful introduction to high seas MPAs regard les relation to the mai n argument of this project. The review of regional developments is followed by the third part of the project, which includes a data analysis section and an interpre tation of the findings in relation to the original argument and topics in the governance of commons and transnational networks literature. This project combines qualitative and quantitative research techniques to both carefully examine regional experience s and derive conclusions about the overall structure of high seas MPAs governance. The data used in the analyses sections are primarily obtained from official websites, reports, documents, and the publications of
26 RFMOs with a mandate to manage high seas MP As. Additionally, the reports, press releases, and publications of NGOs involved in high seas governance provided valuable sources to understand the policy making process and to collect data. Given that the implementation of high seas MPAs is a recent deve lopment, the number of scholarly works directly dealing with this issue is limited. Despite this scarcity, academic studies published until the present date constituted the third type of data source used in this project. This first chapter explaine d the s ignificance of this project both environmental and political perspectives. It also clarified the thesis of this project in relation to fundamental questions in global environmental governance. Chapter 2 is dedicated to proving the rel ationship between the topic and argument of this project to international relations and global environmental politics scholarship on subjects such as global commons, social networks, and the role of nongovernmental actors. Chapter 3 introduces the legal in stitutional framework around which the idea and practice of high seas MPAs emerged. This chapter explains how the ecosystem based management approach is different from the preexisting management approaches. It also discusses the scope, mandate, and studies of global scale organizations regulating different aspects of ocean governance. Chapters 4 and 5 engage in a detailed examination of the six regions maintaining high seas MPAs. Chapter 4 elaborates on regional developments in the Northeast Atlantic, North west Atlantic, and Southeast Atlantic. Chapter 5 continues with a detailed examination of the Mediterranean Sea, Southern Ocean, and Southern Indian Ocean regions.
27 Chapter 6 quantitatively summarizes the qualitative work conducted throughout the precedin g two chapters. Through social network analysis, this chapter identifies the central actors in global high seas MPAs governance. It also demonstrates that regions with higher NGO participation in their policy processes are more successful in reaching envir onmental goals. These analyses also verify the achievements of NGOs in transferring norms, information, and policy experiences across regions thanks to their transnational and transregional connections. Chapter 7 concludes this study with a discussion of h ow findings from the specific field of high seas MPAs enhance our understanding of governance challenges in truly global commons. This chapter also revisits the existing arguments on the topics discussed in Chapter 2 and evaluates them with reference to th e findings of this project. Additionally, building on the framework reviewed in Chapter 3, Chapter 7 argues for the benefits of adopting ecosystem based management strat egies, which suggests taking various aspects of ocean governance into consideration as future issues beyond a focus on fisheries management
28 CHAPTER 2 THE HIGH SEAS AND THE CHALLENGE OF GOVERNING THE COMMONS: NETWORKS, EFFECTIVENESS, AND NGOS IN GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS The study of the governance of high seas MPAs enhances the understanding of the contemporary global governance system and presents an opportunity to reassess some prevailing arguments in international relations and global environmental politics scholarship. This study approaches ocean governance as a case of g overnance of global commons. Earlier studies on the governance of the commons provide some insights into understanding ocean governance, but they do not fully address high seas governance due to mismatches in scale and the structure of these governance sys tems. more broadly in political science. The social networks approach and the analyses of connections between various actors and en tities, ranging from individuals to international regimes, are applied in many recent scholarly works. This study maintains that the global high seas MPAs governance system can be most accurately understood and analyzed as a network. The fundamental question this project pursues is the rela tionship between the structure of the network and the success of governance mechanisms in achieving their goals. The success of a governance mechanism which can be discussed in relation to effectiveness, is defined in several ways. Differences between def initions of effectiveness prove especially critical in environmental politics. The assessment of effectiveness in pursuit of institutional vs. environmental goals may suggest two separate, if not contradictory, conclusions about the management of environme ntal challenges in a given issue area. The efforts of nongovernmental actors are useful in
29 improving both institutional and environmental effectiveness. In the particular case of high seas MPAs governance, transnational environmental NGOs similar to the we ll known notion of transnationa l advocacy networks (TANs) contribute to effectiveness through their specializat ion in the issue area, agenda setting, alliance building, and capacity building powers, and monitoring activities Oceans and Governance of Glob al Commons The analysis of high seas MPAs governance presents an opportunity to enhance the current approaches to the governance of global commons with a recent development and a specific issue area that is not studied from this perspective. Before an intr oduction to the existing approaches to the study of governance in the global in this project. Governance can be understood as routinized arrangeme nts of a prevailing sys tem and regulatory mech anisms in a sphere of activity (Rosenau 1992, 4 these definitions are ta ken as a reference, the global governance of oceans can be delineated as a worldwide scale order, processes, and routinized arrangements pertaining to the oceans. The major puzzle in the field of international organization, understanding how governance. Most of the debates surrounding the issue of global governance tackle the 1992) directly or indirectly. The absence of a central and binding authority at the global level makes it more challenging to understand who governs global affairs and through which mechanisms. Issues such
30 as rule making, monitoring, and compliance become complicated questions given the fact that there is no world government. Despite this complexity, actors in global politics take part in the creation and practice of routinized arrangements and regulatory mechanisms in various issue areas through several means. Thus, the puzzle becomes understanding the motivations of actors in their communication, collective action, and other forms of interaction at the global level. The key to comprehending both the challenges and motivations of actors in ocean governance is the concept of common pool resources and the idea of a global commons. Oceans, and especially the high seas, are common pool resources (CPRs) at a global level. The two dimensions of CPRs as a type of economic good are open access and extractability. The first dimension suggests that CPRs are resources that ev erybody can extract. They are open access resources, meaning that it is difficult, if not impossible, to exclude users or restrict their ability and right to exploit such resources. Oceans, and more specifically the high seas, 1 are open access resources th at are used collectively and without predefined property rights. This practice is justified by international law, modern philosophical approaches, customs, and norms. Hugo Grotius being the foundation name with his writings on the free sea; his philosophie s regarding resources common to all actors influenced the modern understanding of the rights and liberties of actors operating within the high seas. His thoughts are based on the idea that the oceans are common to all and proper to none, which suggests tha t no state exerts sovereign authority or ownership of the seas. The Grotian view of the oceans is: 1 The difference between oceans and the high seas according to international law are discussed in detail in Chapter 3
31 which in the laws called publica juris gentium : that is, common to all and proper to none. Of this kind the air is for a double reason, both because it ca nnot be possessed and also because it oweth a common use to men. And for the same cause the element of the sea is common to all, to wit, so infinite that it cannot be possessed and applied to all uses, whether we respect navigation or fishing. (2004, 25) This Grotian view of the freedom of the high seas became well recognized by the 17 th century. Much like the conception of international law in the 21 st conceded the high seas had to be distinguished from inland seas, straits and bays, th e core of the freedom of the high seas doctrine had become well accepted and reflected Freedom on the high seas is applied as both a freedom to navigate and a freedom to fish Navigation and the right of free access are fundamental to the contemporary international trade system. The right to fish is also deemed to be inalienable from a Grotian perspective. This aspect relates to the second dimension of CPRs extractability. As one user extracts from them, ocean resources, primarily fisheries, become less available to others. The open access exploitation of high seas fisheries has resulted in a competition between fishing vessels using more advanced technology in the era of globa unsustainable because common property perceptions lead to competition for resources philosophy is inevitably unsustain able since modern fishing practices destroy the marine ecosystem and deplete the fisheries at a pace faster than these fisheries and ecosystems can renew themselves. Similar to many other environmental CPRs, the high seas are overexploited because of compe tition over these limited resources.
32 The global commons nature of the high seas appears to be the main reason why high seas marine resources are overexploited. Nevertheless, the global commons characteristic of the high seas creates incentives for the d evelopment of cooperative mechanisms for the preservation of high seas resources. CPRs can provide incentives for cooperation among states despite the absence of a binding central authority requiring states, organizations, or individuals to cooperate. Acco rding to Barkin and Shambaugh (1999), CPRs generate the dynamics of bargaining and collective action strategies due to rivalry over the consumption of exhaustible resources. Data gathered by fishery and environmental experts confirms that several economica lly critical species in the high seas are overexploited (FAO 2009b). However, political and economic actors sustain their demand for th ese diminishing resources. C onsequently the sustainability of the CPRs advocacy groups are interested in the conservation of high seas resources. These various actors demonstrate a willingness to interact with each other around the governance of high seas MPAs. It is agreed that t he long term sustainability of CP Rs is in the interest of local, national, and international actors Yet the question of how to govern the CPRs is open to debate There are different approaches to the governance of the global commons. A foundational study in the global commons discussion The Tragedy of the Commons Hardin discusses the challenges of uncontrolled prove insufficient with the ongoing population trends. In order to prevent such a tragedy, Hardin calls for population con
33 propositions are open to criticism from most theoretical, philosophical, moral, and religious perspectives, but his work drew needed attention to the tragedy of the commons as exemplified by the deleteri ous contemporary status of high seas fisheries. Another well known argument about the governance of commons is introduced by Elinor Ostrom and the students of her school ( Dietz et al. 2003 ; Ostrom 1990; Ostrom et al. 1999 ). Ostrom takes the governance of commons debate beyond the conventional policy prescriptions Hardin discussed. According to Ostrom, the two conventional policy prescriptions to govern the commons central government versus privatization are not capable of producing efficient outcomes. She proposes a third approach that breaks the private versus public dichotomy and proposes a self governance system in which participants design, implement, and enforce cooperative mechanisms without an external or single central entity imposing policies. Ost institutional approach advocates the evolution of self organizing institutions in which relevant actors directly engage in the formation, monitoring, and enforcement of CPR management rules. Neither privatization nor centralization is a plausible met hod for most global commons, including the high seas. Therefore, what is needed is an 25). This theory of collective action puts an emphasis on the capability of individual actors to design and maintain new institutional arrangements and achieve effective cooperative action.
34 In addition to the argument for self evolving management system collective action theory underlines the importance of institutional diversity. Ostrom et al. scale resources that depend on international cooperation, such a s fresh water in international basins or large marine ecosystems. Institutional diversity may be as important as biological diversity for our long 278). Examples of CPRs may vary from a small river basin to entire oceans. Concepts lik e principals and stakeholders also vary in accordance with the issue area. For example, local administrative organizations, population, knowledge, and customs might be the important actors or elements to take into account in a small river basin or a pastur e in a village. Many contemporary global commons scenarios address a different set of principals and institutions to engage in cooperation. More recent applications of impo rtance of taking the interplay between institutions into consideration, developing pluralistic frameworks, initiating dialogue between interested parties and scientists, and creating adaptive governance systems (Berkes 2007 ; Dietz et al. 2003 ). There i conclusions to a global scale issue like ocean governance. Students of this school analyze and draw conclusions from a comprehensive collection of local and small scale experiences from d ifferent parts of the world. It is correct that their projects present a rare opportunity to understand the challenges of governing several environmental resources in different contexts that can be deemed our global commons. However, can we take a theory d eveloped for and the lessons drawn from small scale systems and
35 local problems and apply them to global ocean governance? Oran Young (2002) also recognizes the risks that can emerge from the application of small scale experiences to global scale problems. Young agrees with the importance of institutions in environmental governance and tackles the two dimensions of institutional interplay, horizontal interplay and vertical interplay. Horizontal interplay consists of interactions that take place between insti tutions of the same level of social organization. Local, regional, national, and international levels are some major examples of different levels of social organization. The analysis of horizontal interplay deals with the interactions with, for example, in ternational organizations that are likely to have functional interdependencies and overlaps in their goals and interests. Vertical interplay, on the other hand, refers to the interactions that take place between institutions on differ ent levels (Young 2002 ). Small scale or local experiences include a more extensive examination of vertical interplay ( Dietz et al. 2003 ; Ostrom 1990; Ostrom et al. 1999 ). Nevertheless, horizontal interplay is more relevant to global challenges such as the oceans or high seas M PAs governance. Vertical interplay is not completely out of the picture; the interaction between national and international levels is clearly a part of high seas MPAs governance. Nonetheless, most of the interaction, cooperation, and connections between ac tors occur between international organizations. This provides the students of high seas governance with necessary and practical reasons to revisit global challenges. One of the contributions of this project is to respond to these concerns.
36 Despite these questions, the idea of institutional diversity is definitely essential to the governance of oceans as a type of global commons. States, global IGOs, regional or ganizations, the fishing industry, and environmental NGOs are the principal actors of the global governance of high seas MPAs. The participation and representation of each group of principals is important to the long The most appropriate method of conceptualizing institutional diversity in high seas MPAs governance is to approach this governa nce system as a social network Social Networks and Global Environmental Governance Social network analysis analyzes the relatio nships or connections between individuals or entities under examination. Network analysis offers an appropriate tool for studying global (environmental) governance because approaching an actor or an institution in a manner that ignores the wider web of act ors and institutions fails to provide a complete understanding of governance systems. Particularly in this era of dense relations and complex interdependencies, connections between actors are critical tools of communication, information flow, and use of is sue linkages. In addition to enabling contact between different actors and institutions, networks contribute to the creation of new rules and institutions of environmental politics. Studies of Galaz et al. (2008), Schneider et al. (2003), and Underdal (200 8) confirm that social networks as an approach and method can enhance the understanding and implementation of governance systems. Underdal particularly suggests that the network approach seems to be one promising path for understanding global environmental governance (2008, 57). Scholarly works in international relations and, more specifically, global environmental politics use social network analysis to analyze different forms of relations,
37 such as international trade connections between states. Th ese works measure the number of common international regimes and organizations countries are connected through, transnational terrorist organizations and networks of activists, NGOs, and public organizations. Even though they contribute to different resear ch areas from different perspectives, these studies are examples of depicting complex relations between actors that are effectively and efficiently represented thanks to social network analysis. Moreover, network analysis allows the researchers to go beyon d descriptive mapping of network ties and enables them to establish causal relations between the position of an actor in the network and the dependent vari able under study (Hafner Burton et al. 2009, 577). The measures obtained from social networks analysi s can also be used in statistical tests (Dorussen and Ward 2008; Schneider et al. 2003). Network analysis as a method provides two prominent advantages to the study of international relations that are also used in this project. First, a precise definition and ideas can be represented as a whole through this technique. Being able to see the full picture and interpret both the whole and pieces in a meaningful way are benefits unique to social network analysis. For example, finding key individuals or institutions with which to transfer norms and information, deliver humanitarian aid or stop crime are possible only with an understanding of the entire picture and the connections between actors. From a policy prescription perspective, these key actors can be either weakened or strengthened depending on the desirability o f these network s (Hafner Burton et al. 2009, 575). In the case of global environmental governance, collective action in support
38 of sustainability is a desired outcome and the findings of such an analysis can provide guidance about what types of actors and institutions sh ould be bolstered in the pursuit of environmental sustainability. Hugh Ward (2006) presents an example of studies taking advantage of this property of social network analysis. Ward conceptualizes the international governance system as a network and sugges ts a positive relation between the environmental effectiveness of a country and the centrality of that country in the overall network of issue focus of international environmental regimes is not system of regimes has a structure that is not reducible to the properties of individual system of governance rather than analyzing regimes as single and independent units. The second advantage of social network analysis is its ability to reflect the dynamic nature of international systems and the diversity of actors in contemporary world politics. Most studies a nalyzing the international system are restricted to the analysis of relations between states or their memberships to IGOs. In fact, even within network theory studies, research questions addressing topics such as inter state trade and conflict or regime th eory necessarily locate states in the center of the analysis as the main actors (Maoz 2006; Ward 2006). Such studies are exclusively state centric. However, as Hafner Burton et al. also confirm, IGO membership offers a static picture of world politics as opposed to the emphasis in network analy sis on dynamic structures (2009, 579); however, IGO membership is a rarely changing feature.
39 The recent international relations literature using network analysis goes beyond the state centric study of networks; it d iscusses the role of nongovernmental actors and their relationships with states and IGOs to capture the different aspects of a policy or management system. Two types of social network analysis studies are particularly relevant to the purpose of understandi ng high seas MPAs governance. The first cluster of relevant literature consists of research on transnational networks of governmental and nongovernmental actors. For example, Charli R. Carpenter (2011) examines transnational advocacy campaigns to explain t he variation of arms control norms in different cases. She elaborates on the significance of the issue selection process within NGOs and IGOs with higher centrality measures in the human security network to explain norm creation in world politics. Likewise Monica Di Gregorio (2012) studies the networks of social movement organizations in environmental governance as discourse coalitions. She suggests that dense communication networks produce robust and substantive alliances thanks to their similarities in v alues and shared discourse. The second line of social networks literature this project speaks to includes the studies on the governance of environmental commons. Schneider et al. (2003) explores how community based and consensual management structures deve lop in the governance of environmental commons. Through an analysis of the Tampa Bay National Estuary Program in Florida, they maintain that networks involving different layers of institutions and different types of actors such as experts, bureaucrats, and other local stakeholders facilitate communication and build trust and legitimacy between the parties. Such networks also lay the groundwork for non coercive and cooperative governance mechanisms. Similarly, Hartley (2010) argues that fisheries management is
40 composed of a range of stakeholders and is a multifaceted field with social, political, economic, and scientific aspects. According to Hartley, fisheries governance can be approached as a network which has a horizontally and vertically integrated struc ture comprising actors from public, private, and nonprofit institutions. The first group of social network analysis studies captures the transnational dimension and the second group addresses the environmental commons and management question. This study m erges these two dimensions to strengthen the study of global level commons problems and the application of the networks approach to international organization. It aims at bringing in the theoretical and methodological aspects of recent international relati ons scholarship by combining the social networks approach to the governance of global commons and network analysis as a method to analyze complex systems beyond state centric studies. The capability and influence of networks of scientists, advocacy groups, and business associations enhance global environmental governance. The new focus of research should be larger systems of formal institutions. The systems of governance appr oach presents an opportunity to study global environmental governance more accurately in the era of rapid globalization. In addition, from a more normative standpoint consideration for non state mechanisms can make a governance system more adaptive to cha nges and more participatory, which should add to the accountability and legitimacy, and therefore to the effectiveness, of the system Effectiveness and Global Environmental Governance Several definitions of effectiveness exist in the literature. O ran Young (1999) and Arild Underdal (1992) introduced classifications and aspects of, and the conditions for,
41 the effectiveness of international regimes and institutions; the arguments they introduced also provide the basis for discussions in more recent s cholarly debates. This project on high seas governance primarily deals with two definitions of effectiveness: institutional and environmental effectiveness. Institutional effectiveness looks at the institutional arrangements in effect and their impact on a actors around a certain purpose like developing agreements, resolutions, organizations, or different forms of regulatory mechanisms can be interpreted as the first step of institutional effectiveness. This first step ensures t hat the relevant actors engage in communication and agree on which necessary measures to put into practice. The behavior; in other words, the implementation of predef ined measures and compliance. The presence of international regulatory instruments and even their full implementation may not ensure progress in the solution of environmental problems. Environmental effectiveness focuses on the impact of regimes on the st ate of environmental problems rather than the creation of, and compliance to, new environmental policies and agreements. The three steps of institutional effectiveness and environmental effectiveness can be summarized as outputs, outcomes, and impacts (Und erdal 2008 ; Young 1999 ). The new environmental management arrangements correspond to outputs; they are the products of discussions, negotiations, and decision making processes. Outcomes are changes in the behavior of relevant actors in accordance with the outputs. Impacts, on t solving capability in that they involve effects measured in terms of the concerns that
42 A prominent argument about institutional effectiveness focuses on the capacity, institutions, and interests of the states parties to the issue political arrangement. To a large extent, outputs are products of intergovernmental agreements on certain plans and measures. Keohane et al. (1993) identify three conditions of institutional effectiveness i concern, contractual environment, and capacity should be strong enough for effective management. Governmental concern stimulates member states to devote resources for the solution of environ mental problems. Additionally, the contractual environment should be favorable to developing joint action plans and, to this end, international mechanisms should facilitate credible commitments and monitoring. Lastly, states should have the political and a dministrative capacity to implement international policies. International institutions can more easily reach their environmental goals when these three conditions are met (Keohane et al. 1993, 18 23). According to this perspective, outcomes and outputs are expected to have causal influence on impacts. Another important aspect of this approach is its emphasis on the effect of state level factors. Both concern and capacity are related to the interest and power of states in the issue area. Governmental concern implies a commitment to take political action regarding environmental challenges. But what creates and strengthens governmental concern? popular support or the severity of th e problem felt in that country. Interest based explanations to international environmental policy suggest that concern and the commitment of states to international environmental policies depend on the ecological vulnerability of that country and the cost s of negotiated terms (Sprinz and Vaahtoranta
43 1994; 2002). States are assumed to be rational actors pursuing their individual interest. From this point of view, countries that are (1) facing higher risks, and (2) expected to pay lower costs for implementat ion, are expected to be leaders, or pushers, in international environmental negotiations. On the contrary, governments associated with less severe environmental threats and higher economic costs of implementation tend to be the draggers of international en vironmental negotiations. Thomas Bernauer (2009) study the impact of national instituti ons on international climate change policies to explain the provision of global public goods. Their findings affirm that democracies perform better in the output of policy. In other words, democracies join international negotiations and adopt climate chang e policies more often than non democracies. Nevertheless, this regime type distinction becomes less relevant when the dependent variable is policy outcome. There is a gap between promises governments make and actual emission trends. Another important facto international environmental policy outcomes. It is argued that countries, democratic or otherwise, demonstrate higher performance in the implication of domestic environmental governance of high seas MPAs, especially with respect to the question of which states are represented in the global high seas MPAs governance network and which are absent.
44 After outputs and outcomes, impacts are the third step of effectiveness analysis as they pertain to environmental effectiveness. There are two significant expressions in the definition of environmental effectiveness, or impacts. These expressions are When applied to the case of high seas MPAs, problem solving can be interpreted as achieving sustainable fisheries and preventing the occurrence or irreversible destruction o f VMEs. The second term can be interpreted as measuring the change in fish stocks, which is the original concern that led the actors. In reference to the high seas MPAs case, improvement in fish stocks or VMEs could be a consequence of MPA implementation, another development, or a natural process. Problem solving and causality claims are critical and debatable issues in global environmental governance due to the role of scientific knowledge and uncertainty. Scientific expertise and uncertainty become even more prevalent when considering high seas MPAs. Currently, there is not enough scientific information about the high seas ecosystems, especially VMEs. Indeed, this constitutes a major problem even before the outputs stage. When there is not enough data and evidence, it becomes difficult to agree on the necessity of adopting new regulatory mechanisms or when, where, and how to do so. Scientific uncertainty is one of the common excuses for inaction in environmental politics. The skeptical argument, claiming a lack of evidence, against adopting climate change related policies is undeniably an important and well known example of such a situation at the global level. Similar skeptical debates also take place in the fisheries management organizations during the di scussions of MPA proposals. Furthermore, once adopted and implemented, it is again a demanding task
45 to measure the impact of protected area measures and proving the causality between outcomes and impacts. Causality, scientific expertise, and uncertainty factors attribute a fundamental role to scientists. High seas MPAs policies are negotiated and implemented through RFMOs. Each regional organization has a scientific committee or an external independent scientific organization that functions as the primary source of scientific expertise. Some organizations do not oblige themselves to follow the recommendations of the scientific committee or advisory bodies. Nevertheless, even in these circumstances, consulting scientific bodies is a step all RFMOs take befo re concluding MPA related measures. The role of scientific actors in high seas governance presents discusses epistemic communities as groups of experts producing scientific knowledge relevant to policies governing that issue area. 2 The community of experts in regional scientific and advisory bodies, the UN, and in the FAO aims at preventing the depletion of deep seas fish stocks and the destruction of vulnerable ecosystems in the high seas. NGOs are the secondary, but rich, sources of expertise that present their data, research, and findings to policy makers at different institutions. The second scholarly argument relevant to the science, policy, and effectiveness question is the causality and scientific uncertainty factor. Scientific uncertainty affects environmental governance and effectiveness in two respects. First, when there is not 2 The definition of epistemic communities also suggests that the members of an epistemic community share a belief in a common set of ca use and effect relationships and a set of common values. Shared beliefs and common values are topics that are open to discussion from different international relations, and even philosophy of science, perspectives. This project avoids engaging in a sociolo gy of science debate and regards the epistemic communities concept as communities of scientists and experts producing scientific knowledge guiding high seas MPAs policies in order to conserve deep seas species and vulnerable ecosystems.
46 enough scientific evidence about a problem and its solutions, states or institutions tend to be more reluctant to adopt conservation measures or to change their course of action (Mitchell 2006, 81). High seas species are particularly hard to manage effectively in this quotas, etc. varies across species and that variation is likely to influence the types and levels of regulatory restraints states accept and the degree to which they subsequently reduce itment, assessing the success of a policy in terms of the measurement of environmental effectiveness poses a serious challenge. As explained earlier, the conservation goals of MPAs are technical not possible to operationalize without an in depth understand ing of the marine ecosystem and proof that it is destroyed as a result of deep sea fishing and bottom trawling. Some participants in negotiations support delays or complete rejection of conservation measures unless it is proven that the designation of MPAs will save the fisheries and VMEs. Indeed, most relevant authorities in high seas governance officially adopt the precautionary principle. According to this standard, the best available information should guide policy. However, some parties to the high sea s MPAs negotiations still use the justifications discussed above to excuse inaction. social arrangements do play important roles in shaping behavior and outcomes, no extensive research is needed to find regimes and organizations that make, at best, only a marginal Understanding the causal impact that in stitutional arrangements create requires further attention. Several socially, politically, and physical ly relevant variables may come into play as these consequences occur.
47 (Underdal 200 8, 66). This causality and effectiveness relationship can be evaluated more accurately in connection with the social networks approach. These joint effects institutions coproduce, much like the institutional interplay argument, can be best studied through social network analysis, a method that leans itself to the analysis both the structure as a whole and th e links between specific actors IGO NGO Relationship and the Role of NGOs The rise of globalization and interdependence strengthened the debates on the main actors of international relations assumption. The role of nonstate or nongovernmental actors and their relationships with the traditional main actors, i.e. nation states, has become a more popular discussion. The power and influence of NGOs, global c ivil society, and transnational networks of activists are specific examples of the topics that drew more attention in the post Cold War era (Keck and Sikkink 1999; Matthews 1997 ; Wapner 1995). The terminology may vary from source to source, but for the pur poses of this project, non state actors refers to IGOs and nongovernmental actors, and the term nongovernmental actors encompasses a wide range of entities, such as multinational corporations, business or industrial associations, advocacy NGOs, and transna tional networks of scientists and activists. Although they may often pursue contradictory goals, governmental and nongovernmental actors do not necessarily Thanks to their sovereign authority, states hold the exclusive right to sign, implement, and enforce international treaties; thus, states are conventionally considered to be main actors in world politics. However, in the contemporary global system,
48 nongovernmental actors have increased in bo th number and influence, and they also perform public goods functions such as environmental protection. NGOs perform this function in coordination or cooperation with governmental actors. According to international law, only states and IGOs become parties of international treaties, but NGOs can conclude agreements with states, IGOs, and other NGOs (Lindblom 2005). Moreover, IGOs and NGOs can develop cooperative ties. For instance, the UN cooperates with national or international NGOs through project agreeme nts, and the The UN system provides an umbrella structure for the governance of the oceans. International legal instruments and global scale platforms, such as the UN General Assembly and FAO, operate under this umbrella structure. Though some argue against the influence or relevance of NGO participation in the UN system, with the new millennium the UN started to r ecognize NGOs as partners. 3 The UN leaders, programs, and documents increasingly iterate the importance of NGO IGO partnerships. Both Kofi 1999 Global Compact Proposal and the 2003 Cardoso Report aim at turning the UN into a platform that facilita tes humanitarian, social, economic, and environmental goals and policies through dialogue and partnership with nongovernmental actors (Mingst 2009, 27). The strengthening role of non state actors in global affairs creates a system in which public and pr ivate spheres are intertwined and government takes form of 3 In this conte xt, the term NGOs is used to address both civil society organizations and MNCs.
49 extensive reregulation, or formalisation of regulation, and the emergence of global regulatory networks, intermingling With this understanding, a recent method adopted by the UN is the public policy network approach. The UN explicitly recognizes the fundamental role of building networks that include governments and non go vernmental actors and demonstrates its commitment to enhance these networks. The UN aims to provide timely and appropriate responses to demand for institutional change through global public policy networks (Reinicke et al. 2000). The UN global public polic y networks are designed to set global standards in various areas including the environment, the creation and deepening of the markets, and the dissemination of knowledge through the participation of actors from civil society and private businesses. Within or outside the UN framework, NGOs influence international policies through various means and methods. Participation in international negotiations is one important example of these methods. According to Corell and Betsill, NGO influence in international env NGOs directly communicate with several parties when they participate in negotiations, the relationship between participation and influence is crucial. Representatives of NGOs communicate with states, IGOs, and other NGOs that attend multilateral negotiations in an issue area. Most multilateral negotiations regarding high seas MPAs take place in RFMOs. Relevant FAO and UN events are other venues for such communication to take place. They offer unique opportunities for NGOs to discuss regional and global
50 scale deep seas marine ecosys tems and fish stocks management issues together with most, if not all, relevant actors. NGO participation in negotiations influences international environmental negotiations both during the negotiation process and in negotiation outcomes. NGOs affect th e negotiation process by shaping the issue framing, agenda setting, and terms of the debate which eventually affects the positions of key actors. Moreover, NGO presence during the negotiations frame the outcome by developing a new regulatory arrangement th at is, first, reflecting NGO goals, and second, specifying the roles of NGOs in implementation and future participation (Corell and Betsill 2008, 34 35). NGO representatives attending the RFMO, FAO, and UN events concerning high seas governance also use th ese methods to produce negotiation outputs that support their conservation goals. Their influence is most evident in issue framing, agenda setting, and the reshaping of negotiation outcomes. As stated earlier, participation in multilateral negotiat ions is one of the leading methods through which NGOs affect high seas MPAs governance, however, their role is not limited to the negotiation process. Indeed, most environmental NGOs influential in the high seas MPAs governance fit into the definition of t ransnational advocacy internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common kink 1999, 89). TANs include examples such as transnational NGOs and their cooperation with other NGOs, media, scientists, activists, and even some public institutions. The transnational environmental NGOs, or TANs, effective in high seas gove rnance are
51 po werful in capacity building 4 thanks to their connections with other actors with similar purposes and common sets of values. They use cooperative strategies to enhance their capacity. The most prominent example of environmental NGOs of this type is the Worl d Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), formerly the World Wildlife Fund. WWF International is a global organization with national offices, such as WWF US, that collaborate with each other and other organizations, governmental or otherwise, on a wide range of enviro nmental campaigns and policy is sues (Doh et al. 2003, 66 68). With internal and external cooperation, they can develop networks specific to and appropriate for the relevant issue area. The environmental TANs are more flexible, dynamic, and adaptive as comp ared with the static structure of inter state environmental negotiations and cooperation. Keck and Sikkink outline the four main tactics TANs use. These are informational politics, symbolic politics, leverage politics, and accountability politics. Informa tional politics refers to the ability to quickly transfer politically relevant and useful information. attention to the importance and legitimacy of their cause. Symbolic pol itics is a tactic used to influence actors by using symbolic events or images to deliver the message more powerfully. The anniversary of a significant historical development and an 4 The terms capacity and capacity building are discussed by international organization and global environmental politics scholars in relation to economic, bur eaucratic, and ad ministrative capabilities and scientific technological expertise (Chayes et al. 1995; Keohane et al. 1993). It is observed that the lack of capacity in these aspects results in ineffective policy implementation and noncompliance. In this project, the capa city building function of NGOs refers to their ability to create scientific and administrative capabilities, which also complement their agenda setting, alliance building, and monitoring functions. Chapters 4 and 5 explicate the scientific contributions of NGOs to high seas MPAs policies. Moreover, these chapters clarify that NGOs strengthen administrative capacity by drafting MPA proposals, facilitating intergovernmental cooperation in support of conservation measures, and monitoring the implementation of these measures.
52 instance of violent treatment to animals may set examples of influential sy mbols. Leverage politics is a strategy to put pressure on powerful actors first, and then lead them to affect less powerful states or entities through their connections. Another example of leverage politics TANs use to persuade policy makers is affecting m edia and political arrangements states assume. TANs monitor state practices to ensu re that they fulfill their promises. If they fail to comply, TANs can expose this information to the broader public and embarrass these governmental actors (Keck and Sikkink 1999, 95 98). These four tactics offer a useful framework with which to identify t he methods TANs use in high seas governance. The identification of these methods is important in understanding the mechanisms through which transnational environmental NGOs make a difference in the conservation of high seas ecosystems. Information politics and accountability politics are the two main tools TANs use in high seas MPAs governance. Leverage and symbolic politics are weaker in this issue area. To a large extent, this can be attributed to the absence of local populations and public interest and i nvolvement in high seas ecosystems, which exist at long distances from coastal areas. Indeed, it is theoretically possible to witness a development concerning the high seas ecosystems to draw broader public attention. Nevertheless, regarding the issue of h igh seas MPAs, this has been the exception. However, thanks to the need for scientific information and the in depth expertise of some environmental NGOs, information politics is frequently used to deliver reliable, useful, and policy relevant knowledge. Th is tacti c also
53 complements the capacity building function of TANs. Monitoring and performance assessments are the primary tools through which TANs serve the goals of accountability politics in ocean governance. TANs carefully keep track of whether global I GOs and RFMOs fulfill their obligations. Moreover, when they fail to do so, TANs share their observations on platforms with broad participation. In short, nongovernmental actors possess the power and willingness to increase the effectiveness of high se as MPAs governance in terms of output, outcome, and impact. These actors increasingly perform and shape international action. Indeed, they operate in, and also transform, a system too comprehensive to be identified as international action. As Kates notes : As to governance while there are 180 international environmental treaties in force to date, they are insufficient to counter the major threats to the governments, and the governance activi ties of advocacy coalitions and the discourses between transnational corporations and international environmental groups can be very substantial in helping to maintain the plane support system. (2003,102) The Study of High Seas MPAs Governance at t he Intersection of Commons, Networks, Effectiveness, and NGOs This project tackles the governance of the ocean as a case concerning the global commons. Put simply, there are two major questions that scholarly works on global governance have aimed at answer ing, and this study offers new answers to these prevailing questions through a case yet to be explored from these perspectives. These two questions are: How can we theorize about the governance of global commons? And, how can we assess the effectiveness of this governance system and draw conclusions for more effective governance of commons systems? There are four key terms to answer these questions in the case of high seas MPAs commons, networks,
54 effectiveness, and NGOs. These four concepts complement each other in understanding high seas MPAs governance. Earlier studies provide useful grounds to develop this comprehension, however, these studies either address different fields or do not bring the pieces together and leave voids. Recent literature on the go vernance of commons leaves the students of international relations with the question of institutional interplay and problems of scale in global, as opposed to local, challenges. An inclusive examination of institutional interplay in global (environmental) governance becomes possible by approaching this governance system as a network of several institutions and actors. The outputs, outcomes, and impacts as dimensions of effectiveness can also be understood better through social network analysis, because each dimension is a product that actors of this governance network coproduce. Expectations regarding outputs and outcomes are contended to be tied to national interest and institutions, and the capacity of members of interests and capacity but pertain to the causal relationship between the creation of new political arrangements and change in the state of high seas marine ecosystems. Such an assessment inevitably leaves significant room for the impact of science and sc ientific actors. This project maintains that the effectiveness of high seas governance increases in terms of outputs, outcomes, and impacts when NGOs participate in the governance network. Most NGOs influential in high seas MPAs governance are tran snational environmental NGOs, which can also be called TANs, capable of enhancing the effectiveness of the ocean governance system with their contributions in alliance building capacity building monitoring, accountability, and scientific expertise.
55 CHAP TER 3 THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE GOVERNANCE OF HIGH SEAS MPAS Throughout the past few decades, numerous international mechanisms were developed to regulate the activities taking place in the oceans and to prevent their environmentally detrimental outcomes. This chapter reviews the fundamental elements of internationa l environmental law and organizations with a specific focus on their aspects related to high seas MPAs governance. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is the fundamental instrument that delineates the rights and responsibilities of states and distinguishes exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and the high seas. The UN Fish Stocks Agreement, Compliance Agreement, Convention of Biological Diversity (CBD), and Convention on the International Trade of Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) a re other international agreements regulating the different facets of high seas MPAs and deep sea fisheries management In addition to international environmental agreements, global and regional organizations affect the high seas governance system. The UN a nd FAO are among the leaders of the efforts to introduce high seas MPAs to the global environmental policies agenda. Regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs) have been mandated to manage high seas fisheries within their regulatory area. RFMOs ar e the main platforms through which high seas MPAs are developed and implemented. It was explicitly recognized by the 2000s that the prevailing management tools and approaches could not achieve sustainability goals. The UN and FAO started to put specific em phasis on ecosystem based management and called for the designation of high seas MPAs after the early 2000s. Studies of the UN and FAO also embody the strategy outlined at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in
56 Johannesburg, South Afri ca. Currently, the FAO acts as the principal institution for ecosystem conservation on the high seas, and the UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions both set the stage for and reinforce the strategies pursued by the FAO. There are both strengths and shortc omings of the current high seas management practices. Transnational environmental NGOs carefully follow and actively participate in regional and global developments in high seas governance, and they hold the capacity to tackle the challenges in the impleme ntation of high seas MPAs with their active involvement in research, agenda setting, and monitoring. MPAs as Tools of the Ecosystem Approach to Environmental Management Protected areas are considered the main tools of biodiversity conservation. According to the 2012 Protected Planet Report, protected areas constitute 12.7% of the 1 (Bertzky et al. 2012). The International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), especially through the World Commi ssion on Protected Areas (WCPA) administered by the IUCN Global Programme on Protected Areas, conducts studies on the definition, categorization, designation, and effective implementation of protected areas around the world. The accepted definition of prot ected areas is managed, through legal or other effective means, to achieve the long term conservation Prote cted areas might be no take zones where no resource use is allowed, or multi use areas where different levels and kinds of resource use are permitted. There are different categories of protected areas, such as strict nature reserves, national parks, natura l 1 This figure includes the areas both within and beyond national jurisdiction.
57 monuments (mainly for conservation of specific natural features), habitat or species management areas, protected landscapes or seascapes, and managed resource protection areas (FAO 2011a, 10). An MPA is a special type of protected area, defined at the Seventh Conference of the Parties to CBD (Decision VII/5) as follows: Marine and Coastal Protected Area means any defined area within or adjacent to the marine environment, together with its overlying waters and associated flora, fauna and historical and cultural features, which has been reserved by legislation or other effective means, including custom, with the effect that its marine and/or coastal biodiversity enjoys a higher level of protection than its surroundings. (CBD 2004) This definition confirms that MPAs are clearly demarcated areas and subjected to special protection measures. Therefore, MPAs are also discussed in relation to spatial management tools. MPAs designated as no take areas are referenced with different names, including: fully protect ed marine areas, marine sanctuaries, ocean sanctuaries, marine parks, fishery closed areas, fisheries refugia, and locally managed marine areas (FAO 2011a, 10). Marine/benthic protected areas or fishery closure areas are the common names used for present h igh seas MPAs. integrated management of land, water and living resources that promotes conservation d areas around the world are areas critical for biodiversity; they support their broader habitat, sometimes including the people living around them. The application of the ecosystem approach to fisheries lly reversing the order of management priorities to start with the ecosystem rather than the target This approach to fisheries management takes into
58 account several factors, from migratory species to food web integrity. Some marine ecosystems are especially sensitive to human activities, and it is difficult to recover from the impacts of these activities. Such sensitive areas are identified as vulnerable marine elated to the likelihood that a population, community, or habitat will experience substantial alteration from short term (FAO 2009a, 4). MPAs constitute appropriate to ols for the conservation of VMEs. MPAs are multi purpose projects by definition. The sustainability of fish stocks, the protection of marine biodiversity, increasing resilience to global climate change, facilitating scientific research, and protection o f cultural and archaeological sites are among the primary objectives of MPAs (FAO 2011a, 14). The leading purpose of most contemporary MPAs is sustainable fisheries management and the protection of marine biodiversity. As the very definition of the ecosyst em approach to fisheries requires, high seas MPAs are designed with the understanding that different elements of the marine ecosystem complement each other. Even if the eventual objective is the conservation of a certain fish species, the interconnection b etween fish stocks, seamounts, coral reefs, (FAO 2011a, 15). A major environmental th reat to high seas marine ecosystems is the bottom trawling used in deep sea fishing. In addition to bycatching non target species, bottom trawling removes the living and non living resources at the surface of the seabed. Consequently, the most common forms of high seas MPAs are area closures
59 that prohibit fishing beyond certain depths or the use of certain gears, particularly bottom contact practices. In accordance with the conclusions of the Seventh Conference of the Parties to CBD, relevant actors and in stitutions of global environmental politics currently pursue 2 to maintain the functioning of the full range of marine and coastal ecosystems while also providing benefits to both present and future generations (CBD 2004). The designation and effective implementation of MPAs in the high seas presents a more complicated puzzle as compared to MPAs within areas under national jurisdiction. This complexity emerges for two reasons. First, scientific knowledge regarding the state of deep sea fisheries is limited in the high seas. The collection of data is challenging given the depth of such areas and distance from the coasts. International institutions also acknowledged this issue an d have initiated studies on a global VMEs database. An assessment of where VMEs occur, or are likely to occur, and how they can be recovered is a significant question to be answered before the identification and implementation of necessary measures. The se cond reason pertains to the governance aspect. High seas governance presents a complex picture along the lines of agency, policy making and legislation, implementation, monitoring, compliance, and enforcement. The current high seas MPAs regime is built on a set of international agreements and organizations with mandates in various areas of fisheries and ecosystem management in the areas beyond national jurisdiction. The elements of this regime can be grouped together under 2 Two or more critical areas may complement each other with respect to their physical, chemical, and biological functions in the entire ecosystem surroundin g them. In such circumstances, creating networks of smaller specially protected areas can serve the purpose of the ecosystem approach better than one large MPA. The idea of MPA networks distinguishes, and takes advantage of, ecological connection between m arine areas (FAO 2011a).
60 the broad rubric of: international legal frameworks, global scale IGOs, regional fisheries bodies, UNGA resolutions providing the basis of action for global and regional organizations, and transnational NGOs. International Law and Organizations in High Seas MPAs Governance International Environmental Law and the High Seas Modern thinking about rights and liberties over the seas is inspired by the writings of Hugo Grotius. The Grotian view of the oceans has also influenced contemporary international law in which the high seas have become a managed common area (Rothwell and Stephens 2010, 146). The most fundamental piece of international law reflecting the Grotian view of the oceans is The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS). The UNCLOS lays down the framework for rights, freedom s, and responsibilities over the seas. The scope of the Convention covers the spaces and defines the distinction between the areas under and beyond national jurisdiction. Acco rding to the UNCLOS, areas under national jurisdiction are the EEZs and continental shelf of each country. The EEZ of a state includes the 200 nautical miles around the coasts of a given state. Every state party to the agreement holds: sovereign rights fo r the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploita tion and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy fro m the water, currents and winds. (UN 2001) In short, both the right to benefit from and the responsibility to protect these areas are ascribed to sovereign states.
61 The UNCLOS identifies the water column beyond the EEZ, or beyond the territorial sea 3 where no EEZ is claimed, as the high seas (UN 2001). This definition is instrumental for the governance of oceans. The sovereign rights and responsibilities in force thr oughout the EEZs disappear in these areas; the high seas are left open to all states and extractors. Every state, or any other actor, is allowed to engage with navigation, fishing, marine scientific research, and construction of pipelines with the conditio n that they protect the marine environment and conserve the living resources in the area. Despite the fact that the line between the high seas and territorial seas is a political rather than a natural distinction, the delineation of the high seas have impo rtant implications for the definition of oceans as a common pool of resources. The high seas become open access areas with exhaustible resources. The absence of a central sovereign authority over these areas strengthens the position of the high seas as glo bal commons. The UNCLOS is the international regime introducing this definition as parallel to the publica juris gentium (common to all and proper to none) notion of Grotius. The management and conservation of fisheries is the leading aspect of ocean gove rnance thanks to its essential relationship with the economy and biodiversity of a sovereign state. The 1995 UN Agreement for the implementation of the Provisions of the Convention relating to the conservation and management of straddling fish stocks and h ighly migratory fish stocks (Fish Stocks Agreement) bolsters the frame provided by the UNCLOS and applies to areas both under and beyond national jurisdiction. The Fish Stocks Agreement is established on the fundamental principle of international cooperati on for the preservation and optimum utilization of fisheries resources both 3 The territorial sea of a c ountry includes the 12 nautical miles from the coasts of that state.
62 within and beyo nd EEZs (UN 2012). The Fish Stock Agreement is directly relevant to protected area falls under the scope of the effective management and conservation of high seas resour ces. Moreover, the creation of the international mechanisms with the capability and mandate to manage the high seas resources, such as the regional fisheries bodies, is a critical requirement of the Fish Stocks Agreement for the implementation of protected areas. Another key instrument of high seas governance is the 1993 FAO Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas (Compliance Agreement). The Compliance Agreement particularl a means of avoiding compliance with applicable conservation and management rules Agreement are requ ired to inspect the activities of all fishing vessels flying their flags or vessels at their ports even if those vessels carry flags of non party countries. The Agreement enables collection of data on vessel activities, and the availability of this data is fundamental for the monitoring, compliance, and enforcement aspects of high seas MPAs policies. All of the oceans governance instruments discussed so far possess legally binding status under international law, as international agreements. Contrary to int ernational agreements, the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (CCRF)
63 is a legally non binding instrument adopted by the FAO Conference through Resolution 4 of 1995. Countries or regional organizations are encouraged to adopt and promote these co des. Legally binding agreements like the Fish Stocks Agreement and the Compliance Agreement endorse CCRF, but the Code does not require a specific action by states to take effect. Provisions of the Code are used as bases of domestic actions such as policy initiatives or legislative provisions (Edeson 2010). All states, regardless of their membership to the FAO, regional or global organizations, all entities producing fisherie s are targeted by the CCRF (Hosch et al. 2011). The CCRF influences MPA policies by two means. First, the Code calls for a special effort to protect and rehabilitate all critical fisheries habitats in marine ecosystems and recommends the adoption of measur es such as closed seasons and fisheries areas when necessary (FAO 1995). These recommendations are essentially the major purpose and tools of adopting protected areas. Second, even though it does not explicitly use the term high seas d a significant impact on the growing trend toward coordinated (Young 2007, 235). The 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) addresses marine biodiversity inc luding, but not limited to, fish species. UNCLOS and CBD are complementary mechanisms for conservation of the marine environment. The CBD recognizes the framework drawn by the UNCLOS and requires party states to identify activities and processes under thei impacts on the deep seabed ecosystems and species beyond national jurisdiction
64 (Kimball 2005). Furthermore, the CBD is the primary global instrument with regards to protected areas. The Convention define s the term protected area including marine protected areas introduces categories of protected areas, and highlights the importance of international cooperation for the conservation of biodiversity in these specially protected areas. In relation to high sea s MPAs governance, the CBD focuses on the ecosystem management approach and ecosystem approaches to fisheries management is the main purpose of high seas MPAs. Nevertheless, even though some CBD provisions address the areas both within and beyond national jurisdiction, most of the high seas MPAs policies are developed and implemented through RFMOs, and the CBD is designed to operate through national implementation (Young 2007, 236 237). Lastly, the Convention on the International Trade of Endangered Spec ies of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) is also a pertinent element of the international high seas regime. The CITES adopts the principles referred to in UNCLOS and details this ving beings of the marine environment like cetaceans, marine turtles, and corals are listed under the endangered species appendices of the CITES. The CITES provisions he species introduced through their ports even though they are brought from areas beyond their national jurisdiction (Kimball 2005). Mining and Navigation in the High Seas Two global scale IGOs operational in the high seas are the International Seabed Authority (ISA) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO). The ISA is an autonomous organization established under the UNCLOS. The ISA regulates exploration and exploitation of mineral resources in or under the seabed; its rule covers
65 the areas bey ond national jurisdiction (UNEP 2010). The UNCLOS names the seabed be common resources of humankind. The ISA holds the authority and responsibility of ng the resources of the Area and to sharing the benefits arising from activities thereof. Activities in the Area include all activities of exploration for and marin e life in the Area. UNCLOS granted the ISA the mandate to take environmental measures to prevent detrimental outcomes of these activities. For example, as a type of deemed ne cessary (UNEP 2010). The IMO is also among the major global scale bodies in ocean governance. The IMO sets global standards of shipping and navigation and addresses maritime safety and environment friendly shipping methods. The IMO standards are close t o global; 170 states around the world are members of the Organization. Given that more than 90% of world trade is carried out through shipping in international waters, the IMO regime is fundamental for international trade. Even though the management of shipping and navigation, many IMO regulations pertain to the protection of the environment and the prevention of marine pollution. Particularly, the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships as modified by the Protocol of 1978, (MARPOL 73/78) outlines the regulations addressing maritime safety and environmental concerns such as tanker accidents, the consequences of accidental and operational oil pollution, pollution by chemicals, goods in packaged form, sew age, garbage, and air pollution (Kimball 2005).
66 The IMO is the competent international body to establish protective measures in areas under risk due to shipping (UNEP 2010). The Organization can declare particularly sensitive sea areas (PSSA) in order to regulate vessel activities in these sensitive areas. Discharges and emissions of certain types are prohibited in PSSAs (Young 2007, 234). The PSSA concept does not fully correspond to a specially protected area designed for conservation of the entire ecosy stem. Nonetheless, domain of the IMO mandate is a venue to support or complement an ecosystem conservation project. International organizations like the ISA and the IMO do not directly participate in high seas MPAs policies. They are relevant competent man agement organizations that can state opinions and exchange information and data with regional fisheries instruments that act as the main platforms of the high seas MPAs policy making process. 4 Regional Fisheries Bodies and the FAO The regional cooperat ion for fisheries management is an idea that became accepted only during the post World War II years, but increasingly grew in popularity in the following decades (Lodge 2010, 159 160). Presently, regional fisheries bodies cover most of the species and are as around the world. Regional fisheries organizations engage in fisheries management along with research, development, and economic issues. The FAO distinguishes between regional fisheries bodies, regional fisheries arrangements, and RFMOs. Some regional f isheries bodies might be advisory organizations that produce scientific and policy relevant information but their 4 An example of such communication is the studies conducted prior to the designation of high seas MPAs in the Northe ast Atlantic. Regional institutions organized meetings and prepared road maps before the adoption of MPAs in the Charlie Gibbs Fracture Zone. These plans required regional bodies to inform other competent authorities such as the ISA and the IMO about the MPA proposals i n order to learn existing measures and available management options for the proposed areas (UNEP 2010, 13).
67 recommendations are not binding for members. RFMOs, on the other hand, are regional fisheries bodies that hold management mandate. Regional fi sheries arrangements are different from regional fisheries bodies in the sense that they do not have a secretariat functioning under a governing body of member states (FAO 2013b). RFMOs are organizations with mandate to design and implement policies high s eas fisheries. These organizations are also the platforms through which protected area measures are negotiated, concluded, and implemented. RFMOs play a significant role in linking the regulations and strategies promoted by global agreements and instrument s with states that have common interests in the sustainability of regional high seas resources (Hoel 2010, 455). By 2013, there were more than 40 regional fisheries bodies around the world, and 20 of them were RFMOs Some of these RFMOs are also the region al fisheries bodies with management power in the regions hosting high seas MPAs. Nevertheless, RFMOs did not exert strong influence on the regulation and sustainability of fisheries resources until the signing of the Fish Stocks Agreement. This agreement calls for the strengthening of the RFMOs. Article 10 of the Fish Stocks Agreement specifies legally binding requirements for states to join, participate in, provide scientific advice and statistical data for, and contribute in effective monitoring, complia nce, and dispute settlement mechanisms through subregional or regional fisheries management organizations and arrangements (Lodge 20 10, 163). Currently, regional organizations and arrangements play a fundamental role in the realization of principles and rules introduced by global ocean governance mechanisms.
68 RFMOs might be established under or outside the FAO constitution. Even though many regional fisheries bodies were originally founded outside the FAO framework, the Organization monitors all regional f isheries bodies and follows their studies. In 2009, the FAO published International Guidelines for the Management of Deep Sea Fisheries in the High Seas to provide a common set of norms and recommended practices for deep sea fisheries fishing in areas beyo nd national jurisdiction. These guidelines aim at preventing the adverse impacts of deep sea fishing on the VMEs (FAO 2009a). Both states and regional fisheries organizations and agreements are addressed in the FAO Guidelines document; nevertheless given that these guidelines are designed for the management of deep sea fisheries in the high seas, RFMOs managing current high seas MPAs are among the main actors to consider and implement the guidelines the management of deep sea fisheries The FAO acts as th e umbrella organization providing coordination between various actors and aspects of high seas governance. The FAO Guidelines affirm that organizations to address common issues s uch as the development of compatible standards, tools and information aimed at facilitating the implementation of these assessments of states and regional bodies, address the nee ds of developing countries, and develop a global database on VMEs (FAO 2009a, 20). Table 3 1 summarizes international organizations and instruments regulating different aspects of the high seas and deep sea fisheries governance.
69 Table 3 1. Tools of global oceans regime and their relevance to high seas MPAs governance Tools of Oceans Regime Relevance to High Seas MPAs Governance UNCLOS Defines EEZs and the high seas UN Fish Stocks Agreement Details fisheries conservation principles and state obligations Compliance Agreement Facilitates data collection and monitoring of vessels fishing in the high seas FAO CCRF Introduces the ecosystem approach and contributes to the harmonization of nation al practices CBD Protects marine biodiversity and participates in the definition, categorization, and implementation of protected areas CITES Protects endangered fisheries species with 'introduction from the sea' norms and data ISA Authorized to declare no mining zones on the seabed IMO Authorized to declare specially protected areas to prevent pollution from shipping and navigation Regional organizations Designate and implement MPAs in the high seas FAO Umbrella organization for regional fisheries management organizations and arrangements UNGA resolutions Calls for the conservation of deep sea fisheries, adoption of high seas MPAs, and performance assessments IUCN Global platform for protected areas research, policy advice, and monitoring All instruments in Table 3 1, with the exception of the UNGA resolutions and the IUCN, affected high seas governance in various ways until the beginning of 2000s, but there were no examples of MPAs in the high seas until the mid 2000s. The idea of high sea s MPAs gained power after the recognition of shortcomings in the pre existing practices and the changes in management approaches.
70 Gaps in the Prevailing Regime and New Directions Several fisheries species were overexploited by the 1980s (FAO 2007b). Stat es and IGOs started to develop policies and regulatory mechanisms to address this problem at the national and international levels. Most of the agreements and organizations examined thus far were also signed or founded during these years. Since then, more and more states have become members of organizations and parties to agreements regulating fisheries management. Nevertheless, it is hard to claim that trends in high seas catches have been reversed to sustainable levels. The high seas catch data from 1950 to 2004 confirm that there is a steady increase in the catch of all types o f high seas species (FAO 2007b, 13 ). The se data are critical since they introduce the state of high seas catches at a time when the high seas MPAs idea started to gain support a nd we re negotiated by the RFMOs. Deep sea species catch increased especially after the 1970s due to technological advances that facili tated fishing in the deep seas (FAO 2007b) During the following decades, t he amount of high seas catches had increased to unsustainable levels despite the regulatory measures that were in effect. Additionally, as another dilemma at the national and international level, various rules and organizations may regulate the same aspect of high seas law, or interrelated aspects of ocean habitats might be regulated by different rules and organizations that have not reached full consistency. For example, state subsidies for fishers may undermine (inter)national efforts to save the fisherie s, or some policies may protect a species or region while shifting fishing efforts to other species or regions (Barkin and DeSombre 2013). In other words, when it comes to handling the marine ecosystem in its entirety, the ocean governance system suffers f rom the fragmentation of legal and functional aspects of
71 management (Ekstrom et al. 2009). Failures in attaining sustainable levels has led the international community to broaden their concept of management by taking the sum of the legal, social, economic, and political arrangements into account (FAO 2007b). The trends in fish stocks and the gaps in the preexisting management approaches became a more obvious issue explicitly recognized by the international community with the beginning of the new millennium. The foremost medium of this recognition was the report of the 2002 WSSD, which took place in Johannesburg, South Africa. The WSSD 2002 marks a major and critical point for setting the agenda in contemporary global environmental politics. With regard to fis heries and ocean governance, the WSSD conclusions responded to the concerns regarding effective implementation of international legal instruments and the fragmentation of different aspects of ocean governance. Additionally, the Johannesburg Summit reaffirm ed the necessity of a shift towards precautionary and ecosystem approaches, and indicated that MPAs were the most effective instruments to realize these new approaches. Resolution 2 of the Johannesburg Summit Report, particularly paragraph 32, promotes su stainable management of the seas and oceans in accordance with Agenda 21 of the previous WSSD in 1992. Paragraph 32 addresses the productivity of and biodiversity in vulnerable marine areas within and beyond national jurisdictions. It suggests that relevan t international instruments need to: develop and facilitate the use of diverse approaches and tools, including the ecosystem approach, the elimination of destructive fishing practices, the establishment of marine protected areas consistent with internation al law and based on scientific information, including representative networks by 2012 and time/area closures for the protection of nursery grounds and periods, proper coastal land use and watershed planning and the integration of marine and coastal areas m anagement into key sectors. (UN 2002, 25)
72 designation of MPAs. No high seas MPAs were in effect at the time 2002 WSSD took place. Nevertheless, this call placed the is sue on the agenda of relevant international organizations; primarily the UN, the FAO, and RFMOs. During the years following the 2002 WSSD, UNGA issued a series of resolutions on sustainable fisheries, implementation of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, deep s ea fisheries, and VMEs. Most of recent FAO and RFMO policies refer to these UNGA resolutions as the basis and criteria of their work. These efforts resulted in the designation of the first high seas MPAs at different regions around the world after the mid 2000s. UNGA Resolutions on Deep Sea Fisheries in the High Seas The main purpose of high seas MPAs is the conservation of vulnerable ecosystems in areas beyond national jurisdiction, and RFMOs are the main forums where MPAs as ecosystem based managemen t tools are discussed and adopted. Since 2004, the UNGA issued a number of resolutions pertaining to VMEs and destructive fishing practices, such as bottom trawl fishing, in the areas beyond national jurisdiction. The first UNGA resolution on Sustainable f isheries, including through the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fi sh Stocks, and related instruments was issued in 2003 (A/RES/58/14). This resolution discusses fish stocks in the high seas but does not directly tackle issues particularly relevant to high seas MPAs. The 2004 UNGA Resolution (A/RES/59/25) is the first t o address the deep seas and MPA related issues more directly. As discussed earlier, the leading challenge to the
73 sustainability of high seas ecosystems is bottom trawling, and the Resolution 59/25 urges regional organizations and arrangements to regulate b ottom fishing in their regulatory area to prevent its adverse impacts on vulnerable ecosystems (UNGA 2005). calls for the designation of such areas in support of the effo rts the FAO carries out (UNGA 2006). Resolution 61/105, issued at the Sixty First Session of UNGA in 2006, demonstrates the strengthening focus of international attention on the role of regional organizations and conservation of high seas fish stocks While recognizing the progressive steps taken, Resolution 61/105 calls for further cooperation through existing regional bodies and encourages the creation of new organizations where necessary. Additionally, UNGA Resolution 61/105 tackles the problem of bottom fishing in high seas with more detail as compared to the previous years (UNGA 2007). Paragraph 83 of the Resolution is particularly instrumental with respect to VMEs and deep sea fishing in the high seas. This paragraph brings about specific measure s for RFMOs to be implemented by December 31, 2008. These measures require further scientific research and the adoption of a precautionary principle based on the best available scientific information. According to Paragraph 83: In respect of areas where vu lnerable marine ecosystems, including seamounts, hydrothermal vents and cold water corals, are known to occur or are likely to occur based on the best available scientific information, to close such areas to bottom fishing and ensure that such activities d o not proceed unless conservation and management measures have been established to prevent significant adverse impacts on vulnerable marine ecosystems. (UNGA 2007, 17) For the regions in which no RFMO to regulate bottom fisheries exists, Paragraph 85:
74 Cal ls upon those States participating in negotiations to establish a regional fisheries management organization or arrangement competent to regulate bottom fisheries to expedite such negotiations and, by no later than 31 December 2007, to adopt and implement interim measures consistent with paragraph 83 of the present resolution and make these measures publicly available. (UNGA 2007, 17) Since the date they were issued, Paragraphs 83 and 85 of the Resolution have guided the policies of various nations on deep sea fisheries and VMEs in the high seas. 5 Negotiations for the creation of regional organizations in the Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean are only some of the examples that Paragraph 85 advocates (UNGA 2011). Pursuant to the measures suggested in Paragraph 8 3, the CCAMLR, NEAFC, NAFO, SEAFO and GFCM took steps toward the closure of vulnerable areas and the regulation of deep sea fishing. UNGA Resolutions in 2007 and 2008, Resolution 62/177 and Resolution 63/112 respectively, reiterated the importance of measu res as suggested in Paragraph 83 of Re solution 61/105 (UNGA 2008; 2009). The progress in achieving 2008 targets was discussed during the Sixty fourth Session of the General Assembly in 2009. The Assembly presented an assessment of RFMO performances in Re solution 64/72. After recognition of the steps taken since 2006, the UNGA underlined the shortcomings of regional fisheries organizations and arrangements in the implementation of paragraphs 80 and 83 to 87 of the Resolution 61/105 (UNGA 2010, 21). These p aragraphs highlight the importance of the precautionary approach, ecosystem approaches, regional actions for the protection of 5 The same statement can be generalized to paragraphs 80 through 90 of Resolution 61/105. These paragraphs are frequently referred in the next resolutions. They urge states and regional organizations and arrangements to conduct research, adopt a precautiona ry principle and ecosystem approach, exchange data, and make these data publicly available. Another significant topic outlined in these paragraphs, especially paragraphs 88 to 90, is the critical role FAO plays in the implementation and monitoring of goals set for states and regional fisheries bodies. In Paragraph 90, FAO is also invited to develop a global database of VMEs in areas beyond national jurisdiction (UNGA 2007, 17 18). In consistence with this call, FAO carried out studies on a global database i n the following years.
75 VMEs, and restrictions to bottom fishing. In short, in 2009, the UNGA urged regional organizations and arrangements to take furth er action regarding the fundamental concerns behind the designation of high seas MPAs. An important outcome of the Sixty fourth Session is that the General Assembly requested the organization of a two day workshop in 2011 in order to discuss implementati on of the same paragraphs of the Resolution 61/105. Also, the UNGA decided to conduct a second review in 2011 to evaluate the actions taken by states and regional fisheries bodies in response to paragraphs 80 and 83 to 87 (UNGA 2010, 23). The commitment to achieve the goals of Resolutions 61/105 and 64/72 was reiterated in the UNGA 2010 session (UNGA 2011). The 2011 UNGA review concluded that, despite the progress that has been recorded, urgent action should be taken to implement relevant paragraphs of Reso lutions 61/105 and 64/72. According to this review, bottom fishing in the high seas should be regulated and monitored more effectively. Along with reminding the body of the importance of predefined priorities such as full implementation of the precautionar y principle, ecosystem approach, and the assessment of fish stocks and marine ecosystems, the 2011 review emphasized the individual, collective and cumulative impacts, and for making the assessments publicly available, recognizing that doing so can support transparency and capacity building globally This is precisely where NGOs enter the picture and have the potent ial to play an important role. I n a ddition to scientific research and carrying out impact and performance asses sments, NGOs support transparency and engage alliance and capacity building at a global level. Consequently the role
76 NGOs play in the contemporary global high seas governance syst em is necessary and vital NGOs in Ocean and High Seas MPAs Governance Much like other aspects of world politics and global environmental governance, NGOs exert influence in ocean governance as pressure groups by raising awareness, agenda setting, an d monitoring. They also take part in the creation of regulatory instruments by consulting, performing scientific research, and drafting policy recommendations and proposals. Today, several NGOs hold consultative or observer status in intergovernmental mech anisms like the UN, ISA, IMO, and CBD. They are able to attend intergovernmental meetings, state their opinions, and share their scientific expertise for the development of new policies and regulations. For instance, by the early 2000s, Greenpeace Interna tional enjoyed observer or consultative status in around 100 intergovernmental platforms and affected national or international policies on various issues, including the protection of oceans (Greenpeace 2001). Two significant gaps in contemporary high sea s MPAs governance are scientific knowledge and data, and the full implementation of strategies and policies agreed to on paper. NGOs work towards reducing these shortcomings with their involvement in regional and global platforms. For example, a review of international agreements and institutions demonstrated decades long intergovernmental efforts in negotiations, cooperation, and institutionalization for the high seas governance. Despite all these comprehensive and long term efforts, the idea of RFMO perf ormance reviews was originally raised by NGOs. In the early 2000s, transnational NGOs such as WWF, IUCN,
77 and TRAFFIC the wildlife trade monitoring network 6 highlighted the necessity of conducting RFMO performance reviews (Hoel 2010, 455). FAO Meetings and the 2006 UNGA Session responded to this call and supported the implementation of RFMO performance reviews. Even the 2011 UNGA review reminded the internati onal community that there is room for further progress in p erformance review procedures. Before an examination of high seas MPAs management and the role of NGOs in specific regions and MPA decisions, it is necessary to introduce some major transnational NG Os influential in the high seas governance. The first organization that deserves particular attention is the IUCN. 7 The IUCN is the first and largest global environmental organization, with membership of more than 200 governmental and more than 900 nongove rnmental organizations, in addition to almost 11,000 voluntary scientists and experts (IUCN 2012a). It operates as a neutral forum bringing governments, NGOs, and industry representatives together. The IUCN WCPA, overseen by the IUCN Global Programme on Pr otected Areas, exclusively focuses on protected documents on the definition and categorization of protected areas. Its work is not limited to marine protected areas, but the IUCN WCP A carries out comprehensive studies specifically on marine governance and seamounts, which are among the major sites suffering from the consequences of deep sea fishing (IUCN 2012b). The IUCN WCPA 6 TRAFFIC the wildlife trade monitoring network is an NGO headquartered in the UK and operational in approximately 30 countries. TRAFFIC deals with research driven and action oriented solutions to conservation problems. I t is a pa rtner organization of WWF and IUCN, and works in cooperation with the CITES Secretariat (TRAFFIC International 2008). 7 Identification of IUCN as an NGO or hybrid organization is open to discussion. Membership of both governmental and nongovernmental organ izations and the close relationship b etween IUCN and UN institutions make a hybrid organization argument relevant. Nevertheless, such a discussion is beyond the purpose of this project.
78 established the WCPA High Seas MPA Task Force in 2003 and, since then, follows its strategies in collaboration with other members and partner organizations (IUCN 2012c). RFMOs function as the main policy making platforms, but the IUCN is more directly involved in high seas MPA designation in the areas not covered by the RFMOs. The WWF, Greenpeace, Pew (Environment) Group, the Deep Sea Conservation Coalition (DSCC), Census of Marine Life (CoML), and Oceana are other leading nongovernmental entities committed to the conservation of oceans and, more specifically, hi gh seas MPAs. All of these organizations possess large networks composed of offices, researchers, staff, and supporters all around the world. Some of them have a stronger emphasis on advocacy and policy change while others primarily focus on scientific res earch and data collection. For instance, the DSCC is a coalition of more than 70 NGOs and fisheries organizations. Their goal is to stop the consequences of bottom trawling and ensure full implementation of UNGA resolutions on deep sea fisheries and bottom trawling. Many other NGOs influential in the high seas MPAs policies in regional contexts, such as Oceana, Seas at Risk, Ecology Action Center (EAC), Greenpeace, and the Pew Environment Group, are already members of this coalition (DSCC 2013). The CoML, o n the other hand, is a transnational scientific network. The CoML Project is a product of more than 2,700 scientists from more than year international effort undertaken in to assess the diversity (how many differe nt kinds), distribution (where they live), and abundance (how many) of marine life (CoML 2010). Governments, IGOs, NGOs, and private corporations also supported the CoML Project.
79 The prevailing regulatory system for the high seas, the nature of the problem, and the policies proposed in response to these problems make three points clear about the governance of high seas MPAs. First, the detection of VMEs and assessing the state of deep sea fisheries requires exten sive scientific research given the limitations in the existing level of information about high seas marine ecosystems. Second, the protected areas implemented in the high seas lack sub governmental agencies, local administration, and local population dimen sions present in the stakeholder matrix of most other environmental problems and other types of protected areas. In high seas MPAs governance, RFMOs operate as key agents, reconciling national interests and priorities within the principles global IGOs iden tify. The social, local, or individual level is missing to a large extent. Third, given the modest amount of change such organization and mechanisms have achieved so far, a strong emphasis on performance assessments and transparency becomes essential. Tran snational environmental NGOs possess the commitment and capacity to complement the high seas governance in these three respects. Many environmental NGOs have broad research teams and comprehensive data and research projects. Scientific information is cruc ial at a context in which uncertainty can be used as an excuse to justify inaction. Sovereign governments with legal and material capabilities or local populations that can bring their cause to policy makers agendas are missing when it comes to the high se as. Transnational NGOs, however, commit their resources in support of conservationist policies. Additionally, their presence in regional and global policy making processes puts pressure on decision makers to explain and publicize their activities and decis ions. A detailed examination of
80 policy processes in the six regions where high s eas MPAs are located the Northe ast Atlan tic, Northwest Atlantic, Southe ast Atlantic, Mediterranean Sea, Southern Ocean, and Southern Indian Ocean demonstrates how transnational NGOs fulfill these functions.
81 CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS OF REGIONAL POLICY PROCESSES I: THE ATLANTIC REGIONS This chapter examines the regional high seas mana gement frameworks in the Northe ast Atlantic, Northwest Atlantic, and Southe ast Atlantic regions. It delineates the roles and contributions of specific actors in each region. Analysis of each region begins with an introduction of relevant regional management organizations and the processes that led to the designation of high seas MPAs. This in troduction is followed by a closer examination of the role of scientific and nongovernmental actors in each region. Every region has its own experiences and characteristics affecting the creatio n of high seas MPAs. The North East Atlantic Fisheries Commis sion (NEAFC) established the first network of high seas MPAs in the world. The presence and commitment of various regional regulatory mechanisms, stronger institutionalization, and the leadership of NGOs facilitated success in regional high seas governance The 2005 amendments to the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) Treaty remark a significant point in fisheries management in the Northwest Atlantic. These amendments brought about administrative refor ms and adoption of an ecosystem based mana gement approach that laid the background for high seas MPAs policies. It is again in these recent years that the NAFO Commission opened its doors to NGOs as observers. T he last region exami ned in this chapter, the Southe ast Atlantic, hosts a young RFMO tha t stated its commitment to the protection of VMEs since the early years when it was founded. Thus far, there has been considerable cooperation between IGOs, and the contribution of NGOs has proven limited. The South East Atlantic Fisheries Organization (SE AFO) has taken some strong steps but regional governance is still challenged by weak institutionalizat ion and inadequate capabilities
82 Northe ast Atlantic Ocean The NEAFC is the RFMO designed for long term conserva tion of fisheries in the Northe ast Atlantic 1 The five contracting parties of the Organization are the EU, Denmark (on behalf of the Faeroe Islands and Greenland), Iceland, Norway, and the Russian Federation. The four fisheries in the NEAFC area are Norwegian spring spawning herring, macker el, blue whiting, and pelagic redfish (Bjrndal 2009). NEAFC holds the power to establish closed seasons and areas, including high seas MPAs. Also, the Commission is entitled to ban nets beyond certain depths and impose limits on the capture of deep sea sp ecies. Among the committees and working groups under the body of NEAFC, the Working Group on Deep Sea Species played an active role during the process leading to declaration of high seas MPAs in the region. The Convention for the Protection of Marine Envi ronment of North East Atlantic (OSPAR Convention) is another strategic r egulatory instrument the Northe ast Atlantic. The OSPAR Commission aims at developing a network of MPAs to protect the regional marine ecosystem. All states parties to the OSPAR Convent ion, except Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland, are EU members. Therefore, EU policies, such as the EU Maritime Policy and the EU Common Fisheries Policy, provide common ground for most of the regional actors. In addition, a significant portion of the OSPAR Convention area remains at the areas beyond national jurisdiction of member states; protection of these high seas areas necessitates a collective effort of the members and other relevant non state actors. 1 The International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) and the North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization (NASCO) are the two other fisheries management organizations operational in the region. Nevertheless, these organizations focus on single species and they are not the primary instruments of e cosystem based management in high seas MPAs.
83 The idea of creating networks of (marine) protected areas has frequently been underlined by the international community through various opportunities such as the 2002 WSSD and the CBD. The first network of high seas MP As is established in the Northe ast Atlantic. In 2003, the OSPAR Commission and the Helsin ki Commission 2 signed a joint agreement to establish an ecologically coherent network of MPAs by 2010 in the following years. One significant issue regarding MPAs in the areas beyond national jurisdiction was the tools and methods of designing and implementing protected area measures. Some VMEs might be very close to or fall into both sides of the borders of EEZs. Under such circumstances, the coastal state directly co mmits itself to the establishment of high seas MPAs. When such instances are put aside, one of the challenges to the conservation of resources on the high seas was ambiguity regarding the question of whom should take the responsibility and how they should assume leadership. The Role of Science and Scientific Actors Norway was the first to propose the closure of a high seas area, Hatton Bank, to bottom trawling in order to protect cold water corals. However, the NEAFC responded to this first proposal in 2004 with the explanation that there was not enough scientific data to determine the location of vulnerable habitats at the Hatton Bank. The Commission referred this proposal to the International Council for Exploration of the Seas (ICE S) for scientific advice (Durn Muoz and Sayago Gil 2011, 617 618). 2 Commission to the Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area signed, first, in 1974 and revised in 1992.
84 The ICES is an intergovernmental scientific organization with membership that includes all twenty coastal states bordering the North Atlantic Ocean and the Baltic Sea 3 (ICES 2011). The ICES conducts research on oceanography, marine ecosystems, and living marine resources, and maintains one of the largest marine fisheries datasets to date. ICES acts as an advisory body to its member states, the OSPAR Convention, NEAFC, and the European Commission. The Council pro vides assessments of the impact of fishing activities on the marine environment and scientific advice about ecosystem management (UNEP 2010). All MPA proposals need to go through ICES review. The years 2004 to 2010 saw the creation of high seas MPAs in the Hatton Bank area of the Northe ast Atlantic, with the ICES Working Group on Deep Water Ecology (WGDEC) providing guidance and information to NEAFC for identification of coral distributions and areas that need to be taken under special protection. WGDEC col lected data on the location of VMEs in these areas and presented the results as published literature, research cruise reports, personal communications from exp erts, and fishing charts (Durn Muoz and Sayago Gil 2011, 617). In 2006, NEAFC requested data from ICES about Hatton Bank. The next year the European Commission officially applied a ban on the use of bottom gears on all known Lophelia pertusa (a cold water coral type) distributions on the Hatton Bank due to the information ICES presented. Following this decision, in 2008 and 2010 respectively, the NEAFC expanded the areas under closure with contributions from Spain and the UK, along with the agreement of other NEAFC contracting parties 3 These twenty member states are Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and the United States of America (ICES 2011).
85 (Durn Muoz and Sayago Gil 2011). Spain, particularly through t he Spanish Institute of Oceanography (SIO), and the UK contributed in the designation of high seas MPAs in the Northe ast Atlantic with scientific research and data. The SIO is a public research organization and adviser to the Spanish Government with re gard s to fishing policies (SIO N o date). The Institute carried out habitat mapping surveys and science industry surveys in the region. Additionally, in collaboration with its British equivalent, the British Geological Survey, the SIO assisted in the writing of ICES scientific reviews (Durn Muoz and Sayago Gil 2011, 617). The Census of Marine Life (CoML) is an outstanding example of transnational scientific networks. The CoML projects involve more than 2,700 scientists from more than 80 countries around the globe. By 2010, CoML scientists discovered and described 1,200 new species, and they claim that there are another 5,000 or more marine species waiting for formal description ( CoML 2010). In addition to scientific research and publications, the Census prove d to be very influential in the dissemination of knowledge to the general public and raising awareness. Furthermore, they directly communicated with NEAFC and presented a set of talks and videos in the 2010 NEAFC Annual Meeting. These were the products of water projects in the North Atlantic regarding the high seas MPAs particularly in relation to habitats in the mid Atlantic Ridge, the Charlie Gibbs Fracture Z one (CGFZ), and seam ounts in the region (NEAFC 2010 ). The Role of Nongovernmental Actors NGOs actively engage in every stage of the high seas MPAs poli cy making process in the Northe ast Atlantic. They take part in debates, the writing of proposals,
8 6 researc h, and the monitoring and assessment of protected areas. Among many others, WWF, Seas at Risk, the DSCC, and the Pew Foundation regularly attend NEAFC meetings as observers. The WWF has attended the meetings for more than a decade and has he ld observer st atus since 2004. In the 2005 Annual Meeting, NEAFC non contracting parties did not give opening statements, but observers from Seas at Risk and WWF did, expressing their opinions on the steps the NEAFC had taken during the previ ous years (NEAFC 2005 Annex C). Indeed, Seas at Risk had represented the NGO community before WWF became an observer (NEACF 2003). These two organizations also maintained their places in the 2004, 2007, and 2008 regular meetings, and the 2008 extraordinary meeting. In 2009 and 2010, NGOs were represented by DSCC, Seas at Risk, the Pew Group, and WWF. These organizations expressed their opinions about the NEAFC agenda including the high seas MPAs measures (N E AFC 2009; 2010 ). The OSPAR Commission and the NEAFC have generally adopted a positive attitude, welcoming the reports and proposals of NGOs. However, IGOs and NGOs did not always operate in harmony. The former NEAFC President, Stefn smundsson, raised criticisms about the representation of civil society in the Commission. Accord ing to him, regional and local discussions are more likely to reach the correct participation structure compared to international/global meetings, in which the representation of stakeholders that need to face the consequences of measures produced by intern NGOs have a strong presence at international meetings, but as has been noted in other fora the connection between civil society and these large corporate NGOs can be quite
87 its suggestion that bottom fisheries practices in the NEAFC regulatory area did not have significant adverse impacts on VMEs, contrary to what the Commission stated in their response to the Secretary General of the UN 4 According to WWF, there was no scientific basis for making this assertion. In 2011, the NEAFC extended pre existing high seas closures and discussed the designation of new closure areas. In the same year, the Pew Environment Group representatives made an opening statement at the NEAFC annual meeting on behalf of the Pew Group, Seas and Risk, and the DSCC. The Pew Group provided an assessment of high seas fisheries related UNGA resolutions and workshops, and emp hasized the significance of implementing FAO International Guidelines for the Management of Deep Sea Fisheries. They supplied scientific evidence 5 to prove the occurrence of VMEs in the NEAFC regulatory area. In addition the Pew Group criticized NEAFC reg ulations for not being based on sound science and lacking consistency with the UNGA resolutions. They recommended designation of new MPAs at the VMEs on the Mid Atlantic Ridge, Rockall Bank, and Hatton Bank. Lastly, the DSCC previously had issued a report debates at the UNGA workshop on relevant resolutions. Representatives of the Pew Group delivered copies of these documents to the 2011 NEAFC Meeting (NEAFC 2011, Annex F). 4 the Secretary General of the UN on action s taken pursuant to paragr aphs 83 84 of resolution 61/105 (NEAFC 2009, Annex F). 5 The Pew Group scientific review was based on a report of an internat ional scientific workshop, The impact of deep sea fisheries and implementation of the UNGA Resolutions 61/105 and 64/72 organized by t he National Oceanography Centre at Southampton.
88 A large part of the recent NE AFC closures lies at the CGFZ. WWF brought the vulnerable to fishing and other human activities. It is necessary to highlight that NGOs are granted the right to intro du ce MPA proposals for the Northe ast Atlantic high seas; this suggests an exceptional level of NGO authority, even though it is conditional upon the support of a member state. In the CGFZ case, Portugal, France, and the Netherlands are the OSPAR contractin g parties that supported the WWF proposal in initiatives, many contracting parties did not support the early proposals until a detailed and comprehensive scientific report was pre pared. Germany, as the convener of the OSPAR MPA group, directed the issuing of a report to identify specific vulnerable areas and conservation objectives necessary for the sustainability of these vulnerable ecosystems. It was only after these efforts that the OSPAR contracting parties agreed in et al. 2012, 599). fisheries with gear that is likely to contact the seafloor during the normal course of fishing on the Mid Atlantic Ridge to protect VMEs. In addition, fisheries using gillnets, While also recognizing the progressive steps ta ken by the NEAFC, WWF brought additional scientific reports to the consideration of the Commission in 2011. These reports and proposals written by NGO experts were equally considered by the NEAFC at the first regional scientific expert workshop to identify Ecologically and Biologically Significant Areas (EBSAs) in accordance with the CBD decisions (NEAFC 2011, Annex
89 F). Moreover, WWF again underlined the need for the designation of further closure areas. For example, when the NEAFC Permanent Committee on Ma nagement and Science requested scientific support from ICES to assess whether existing closure marine protected areas in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction designated by OSPAR in 2010 whereas for two of these MPAs e.g. the Josephine seamount complex there are 6 In most of the cases, NGOs, and specifically WWF, brings up immediate responses to the many excuses for inaction, such as rational use and scientific uncertainty, used by member states or industry representatives to block or deter action. It is clear that t he most fundamental aspects of policy making and implementation take place through regional inte rgovernmental instruments mainly the NEAFC and the OSPAR Commission. Also, party states make individual contributions to the process through MPA proposals, as Norway and the Netherlands did, scientific research and data, as the UK and Spain did, and leader ship and funding, much like Germany did for different MPAs. Nonetheless, the efforts of transnational NGOs prove to be instrumental in the making of high seas MPA policies. Similarly, they engage in deep sea fisheries conversation with various opportunitie s. For example, Greenpeace led a strong campaign against b ottom trawling in Europe (Durn Muoz and Sayago Gil 2011, 620). 6 The six areas referred in this statement are Charlie Gibbs MPA, Mid Atlantic Ridge, north of the Azores, Milne, Altair, Antialtair, and Josephine seamounts. These are the areas designated by the OSPAR Ministerial Meeting in 2010.
90 WWF involvement in the Northe ast Atlantic high seas policies deserves special consideration. WWF was the first to draw the attention of regional actors to the high seas MPAs issues and to introduce the topic to agendas of the NEAFC and the OSPAR Commission. It acted as another regional leader with regards to the governance of high seas. A significant aspect of their presentation was ho w they manage to follow and aim to connect the efforts and debates taking place in various intergovernmental forums like the UNGA, OSPAR, and NEAFC (NWAFC 2011). Briefly, either through political influence or scientific expertise, NGOs increased the inter est in and motivation for the preservation of deep sea ecosystems and facilitated the decision making process as an issue requiring collective action of states and IGOs without clear scientific and political gains at the outset. T he Current State of Closu res in the Northe ast Atlantic Ocean As a result of the collective efforts of these various types of actors, in 2006 six areas were closed to bottom fishing to protect juvenile fish and coldwater corals on seas MPAs network. Today, eleven vulnerable and ecologically significant areas in the Northeast Atlantic are closed to bottom trawling and subjected to restrictive fishing practices. These closure areas are at the Hatton Bank, Logachev Mounds, Southwest Ro ckall, Northwest Rockall, West Rockall Mounds, Altair Seamount, Antialtair Seamount, Mid Atlantic Ridge (MAR), Northern MAR, Southern MAR, Haddock Box, and the Blue Ling. According to the 2010 Annual Meeting report, the NEAFC closures on MAR and the VMEs on Hatton Bank and Rockall Bank are 355,000 square kilometers; this is more than 7% of the regulatory area at the south of Iceland and more than 50% of
91 fishable areas. Indeed, less than 1% of the regulatory area is open to normal and direct fishing (NEAFC 2010 6). Closures are guaranteed to be in place until 2015, and they might be extended beyond that time. Northwest Atlantic Ocean The Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) is the RFMO holding mandate over the NAFO Convention area beyond national jurisdiction. The NAFO was founded in 1978 by an agreement on multilateral cooperation for the management and conservation of fisheries resources in the region. Canada, Cuba, Denmark (in respect of Faroe Islands and Greenland), the EU, France (in respect of Saint Pierre et Miquelon), Iceland, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Norway, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the USA are NAFO contracting parties (OECD 2009, 88). In 2005, NAFO decided to start a reform process with a set of amendments to the N AFO Convention. These amendments brought about reforms in a broad range of issues pertaining to decision making process, membership, monitoring, control and surveillance, and fisheries management approaches. According to the new management structure, the F isheries Commission is the main decision making body, appointing the executive secretary who oversees the other two management bodies the Secretariat and the Scientific Council (Russell 2010, 253). Moreover, after the 2005 reform, the NAFO and contracting parties started to discuss the need for new conservation approaches. A major conclusion of these discussions and reforms is the adoption of an ecosystem approach to fisheries management and additional measures for the protection of vulnerable species (OECD 2009, 96)
92 The Role of Science and Scientific Actors Unlike the NEAFC, the NAFO has an internal scientific body that provides scientific advice to the Fisheries Commission. The Scientific Council of the NAFO plays the role t hat the ICES does in the Nort he ast Atlantic, and the NAFO resorts to information offered by the Scientific Council before making a decision. According to the NAFO Convention, the Organization should engage in collaboration with the Scientific Council in activities like reviewing the s tatus of fish stocks, collecting and analyzing data, assessing the impacts of fishing on the marine ecosystem, and developing policy guidelines (Russell 2010, 256). The Scientific Council provides the scientific evidence and advice that result in the creat ion of high seas MPAs in the NAFO regulatory area. For instance, the Scientific Council developed the criteria for identifying VMEs in the NAFO regulatory area and highlighted the necessity of conducting further research and impact assessment during the ye ars after designation of the first high seas MPAs in th e area (Russell 2010, 266 268). However, the fact that the NAFO Convention collaboration does not mean that the Fisheries Commission is required to follow the olicy decisions. For example, in 2008, the Fisheries Commission considered eight areas identified as potential VMEs by the Scientific Council but decided to add only the Fogo Seamounts to the closure areas ision to not declare MPAs bey ond the Fogo Seamounts in 2008 indicates that scientific recommendations do not necessarily result in regulatory measures in the presence of some scientific uncertainty. Nevertheless, despite the non binding nature of its recom mendations, the Scientific Council exerted strong influence in high seas MPAs policies independently and engaged in collaboration with other scientific organizations when necessary. For
93 example, before the 2008 NAFO Meeting, ICES and NAFO developed a Joint Working Group on Deepwater Ecology, examining the distribution of corals in the North Atlantic (Russell 201 0, 266). Even though it is not the same level with the Northe ast Atlantic, the ICES provided scientific input to the deep sea ecosystems research in the Northwest Atlantic. The Role of Nongovernmental Actors Direct involvement of NGOs in the decision making process in the Northwest Atlantic is weaker compared to the development s that took place at the Northe ast Atlantic. In 2005, which is the year in which significant reforms took place in the NAFO, is noteworthy that 2006 is the first year in NAFO's history that a non governmental organization, WWF, participated as an ob server at the meetings of the General Council and Fisheries Co the next year two years, NGOs were represented by the Ecology Action Centre (EAC) and WWF (NAFO 2008; 2009). The Pew Group replaced the EAC in 2009 (NAFO 2010a). Rep resentation of NGOs in the NAFO was considerably higher the next year. The WWF, EAC, International Coalition of Fisheries Association (ICFA), the Sierra Club of Canada (SCC) and the Pew Environment Group were granted observer status even though the Pew Gro up representatives were unable to attend the NAFO meetings (NAFO 2011a). In 2011, the EAC, Atlantic Chapter of the SCC, the Pew Group, and WWF represented NGOs at NAFO forums (NAFO 2011b). Participation of NGOs in these meeting is significant since it offe rs an opportunity for NGOs to voice their arguments in front of all members, provide scientific evidence to limit the use of scientific uncertainty as an excuse to not to take action, and put pressure on policy makers. Broadly, at a more theoretical level, the
94 NGO presence adds to transparency in policy making by reducing the chances of behind closed doors deals between national and industrial representatives. During the years before the adoption of the ecosystem based management approach, many NGOs iss ued reports criticizing the NAFO for not being able to fulfill sustainability goals. Particularly, WWF and Greenpeace published reports calling for stricter fishing regulations on the Grand Banks (Lane 2008, 121). WWF also played a key role in the region w ith its support for the protection of VMEs and provided leadership in policy initiatives during the process before the 2010 NAFO Annual Meeting. WWF examined total catches, bycatches, and recovery rates, and concluded that there is need for further commitm ent and effort to achieve targeted recovery rates. numbers are still near historic lows, and scientific projections from the latest stock assessments clearly demonstrate th at continued failure to control excessive bycatch will and other vulnerable areas to deep sea f In addition to their studies before the 2010 Annual Meeting, the WWF also bycatch and applying the precautionary approach to rebuild the Southern Gran d Banks cod, (2) using fisheries management plans, impact assessments, and non invasive sampling methods to ensure the long term protection of VMEs, (3) increasing the making process, and (4) conductin g transparent and independent performance reviews on a regular basis (WWF
95 2010d). The NAFO decisions after the Meeting met the expectations of the WWF. The Organization decided to establish a working group of scientists and managers to develop new strategi es in accordance with the precautionary principle and adopted criteria for its first independent performance review based on the UN Fish Stocks Agreement. NAFO members also agreed to extend protection of Orphan Knoll, Fogo Seamounts (1 and 2), Corner Seamo unts, Newfoundland Seamounts, and New England Seamounts and closed these MPAs to bottom fishing activities until 2014 (WWF 2010a). The DSCC perform ed a similar role in the Northe ast Atlantic, by engaging in research and monitoring to examine the state of d eep sea resources in the NAFO followed the developments after the NAFO meetings and agreements to see if these decisions are properly implemented (DSCC 2008a). Also, the DSCC raised criticisms over NAFO decisions that infringed upon sustainable management principles determined according to scientific criteria. For example, the 2008 NAFO VME Encounter Protocol allowed a fishing vessel to draw live corals as heavy as 100 kilogram s and live sponges as heavy as 1,000 kilograms; these numbers were above the limits suggested by the Scientifi c Council (Russell 2011, 269). The DSCC expressed and not consistent with paragraph 83(d) of the UNGA Resolution 61/105 ( DSCC 2008b). Again, contrary to the same paragraph, years, the DS sea areas on the high
96 seas identified by the NAFO Science Council as containing or likely to contain high All of these criticisms r aised by the DSCC, as well as some other NGOs, were taken into consideration by the NAFO. As discussed above, the NAFO closed six areas to bottom trawling and later extended the clos ure areas decision until 2010. Also in 2010, the NAFO decreased the weight limits those claimed to be ludicrously high by DSCC from 100 to 60 kilograms of live coral and from 1,000 to 800 kilograms of live sponges (NAFO 2010b 19 ). The affiliation between the NGOs and NAFO cannot always be described as a cooperative relationship. In 2009, many NGOs asked for permission to attend the meetings of the Working Group of Fishery Managers and Scientists on Vulnerable Marine Ecosystems (FC WGFMS VME). However, traditionally, these same NGOs have not been permitted to attend G eneral Council and Fisheries Commission Working Group meetings and it has been the cas e for the FC WGFMS VME as well. Furthermore, if some of the contracting parties have objections over the accreditation of an NGO as an observer or the renewal of the obse rver status of an organization these issues can be put to a vote (NAFO 2011b, 59 61). It is also essential to remark that NGOs do not necessarily have identical priorities. For example, as an organization representing the interests of fish and seafood ind ustry associations from major fishing as implementation of further closure areas. The ICFA members represented countries 0. At their opening statement in the 2010 NAFO Meeting, an ICFA representative suggested that, while recognizing the
97 steps taken towards the protection of VMEs, they were willing to see further progress in areas like specification of total allowable catche s and a more effective risk management process that addresses both conservation priorities and economic objectives (Chapman 2010). The Current State of Closures in the Northwest Atlantic Ocean From 2008 to 2012, the NAFO has closed two areas on the Flemi sh Cap to shrimp fisheries during certain times of the year. Also, the NAFO agreed to protect six seamount areas from bottom trawling. In 2006, the first four areas (Orphan Knoll, Newfoundland Seamounts, Corner Seamounts, and New England Seamounts), and in 2008, two additional ones (Fogo Seamounts I and II) were closed to bottom trawling. Some of the six new protected areas are close to the Canadian EEZ; in addition, half of the coral protection zone is within this zone. Therefore, Canada actively joined th e efforts for the designation of new high seas MPAs in the region. Additionally, the NAFO established a coral protection zone in 2007 and closed this region to all fishing activities involving bottom contact gear (FAO 2013). According to the original deci sion, special protection measures on these protected areas were supposed to hold until December of 2010. However, signs of progress particularly in relation to the recovery of Grand Banks cod led to the expectation that protection measures will be continue d in the following years (WWF 2010c). Furthermore, also in year coral monitoring and research program to set in deep sea areas below 2 ,000 meters except exploratory fishing to collect necessary data (NAFO 2008, 7).
98 Recently, the NAFO declared that the following areas will remain closed until 2014: Orphan Knoll, Corner Seamounts, Newfoundland Seamounts, New England Seamounts and Fogo Sea mounts (1 and 2), the coral protection zone, and the eleven areas of higher sponge and coral concentrations near the Flemish Cap and the Flemish Pass. Another zone on the Flemish Cap was expanded as well (NAFO 2011b, 44). The Fisheries Commission will revi ew the 18 VMEs for closure in 2014 pending future scientific evidence. Southe ast Atlantic Ocean The Southe ast Atlantic Ocean is under the mandate of the South East Atlantic Fisheries Organization (SEAFO). The SEAFO is a young organization; its Convention was signed in 2001 and came into force in 2003. Namibia led initial negotiations for the cr eation of an RFMO in the Southe ast Atlantic. The Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources in Namibia acted as Interim Secretariat from the signing of the Conventi on from 2001 until 2005, when a permanent SEAFO secretariat was opened in Wal vis Bay, Namibia (SEAFO 2013). Current parties to the SEAFO Convention are Angola, the EU, Japan, Korea, Namibia, Norway, and South Africa. 7 The motivation behind the establishme nt of a regional organization like SEAFO was preventing the repetition of a situation similar to that in the Southern Indian Ocean, in which the absence of a regulatory mechanism in effect at the regional high seas resulted in conservation and management p roblems. According to Currie, a condition for is to anticipate the need for and preempt the establishment of integrated management structures, before the fishing industry actually takes off. In 7 The United States is one of the countries that signed the original Convention in 2001 but it is not at the current list of contracting parties (SEAFO 2013).
99 this regard SEAFO has once again pro vided a desirable precedent original). 8 However, the long period of Namibia led negotiations witnessed significant disagreements between participant countries. Some of the participants, particularly the European Community (EC) and Japan were opposed to proposed convention articles that made direct reference to the UN Fish Stocks Agreement and suggested adopting the principles of this agreement. After a seven year process of informal, technical, and legal consultations, negotiations were finalized with the signing of the 2001 SEAFO Convention, which narrowed down and reduced the detailed rules guided by the UN Fish Stocks Agreement (Sydnes 2001). Three years after the Convention came into effect, in October 2006, SEAFO adopted a conserv sea fishing activities in 10 areas 167). These closure areas are Dampier Seamount, Malahit Guyot Seamount, Molloy Seamount, Schmidt Ott Seamount & Erica Seamount, Africana Seamount, Panzarini Seamount, Vema Seamount, Vut Seamount, Discovery Junoy Shannon Seamounts, and Schwabenland & Herdman Seamounts. The decision on whether to reopen or extend the closures was set for reconsideration in 2010, in a (SEAFO 2006, 33 36). The Role of Science and Scientific Actors The SEAFO Scientific Committee establishes the scientific bases of the ng in the 8 Currie maintains that another example of where intergovernmental institutiona lization was too late is Southe the negotiation process is too complex (2005, 39). Fisheries and Marine Resources at that time.
100 protected areas to carry scientific observers (FAO 2007). This rule was repeated in a 2012 SEAFO measure on bottom fishing activities. According to this measure ry fisheries have a scientific observer on board. Observers shall collect data in accordance 9 SEAFO may require closure of a (potentially) critical area to fishing until the Scient ific Committee states its opinion. The Commission makes the decision to reopen or close recommendations (SEAFO 2012). The Scientific Committee generally acts in accordance with the precautionar y principle and the Commission decisions support this principle. This is not to claim that all recommendations of the Scientific Committee are implemented by the contracting Parties or the Commission. In 2007, the Committee recommended the closure of Mete r seamounts, Valdivia Bank, and Ewing Bank to fishing. However, parties to the Since the early years of the SEA FO, the Commission and the Scientific Committee invited other organizations to engage in cooperation with them to collect data and produce scientific information about marine ecosystems of the SEAFO Area. Two key examples of such cooperative organizations are the CCAMLR and Benguela Current Large Marine Ecosystem (BCMLE) institutions of the Benguela region on the 9 There is an interim protocol in effect until the adoption of the VME Data Collection Protocol. The interim protocol also affirms the details of data collection and monitoring requirements for fishing vessels (SEAFO 2012).
101 southwest coast of Africa. Cooperation between the CCAMLR and SEAFO is influenced by the fact that most of the Parties to the SEAFO Convention are also CCAMLR competence. This proximity brings about common challenges, such as the management of trans boundary species. The SEAFO refers to CCAMLR data and criteria on va rious issues such as IUU fishing data, 10 closure and fishing limits standards, prevention of bycatches, and VME encounter protocols. 11 From 2002 to 2008, three signatories of the SEAFO Convention Namibia, Angola, and South Africa implemented the BCMLE Progra mme to increase their capacity to deal with trans boundary environmental problems in the Benguela region. The BCMLE Programme has conducted several projects that contributed to development of an integrated and sustainable management system for the BCMLE (B CC 2013a). With the background provided by the BCMLE Programme, in 2007, the three cou ntries established the Benguela Current Commission (BCC), a cooperation organization aiming to promote the integrated management, sustainable development, and conservatio n of BCMLE (BCC 2013b). The BCC deals with issues like shared fish stocks, monitoring, and ecosystem information systems, which are all directly related to the application of an ecosystem based management approach in the SEAFO Convention Area. In addition 12 10 Sharing IUU fishing data is a p olicy adopted by various regional fisheries organizations including but not limited to SEAFO and CCAMLR. 11 See SEAFO Commission reports 2005 2011. 12 Another BCMLE related project referred by SEAFO is the Benguela Environment Fisheries Interaction and Trai ning (BENEFIT) Programme. These two programs and BCC support and reinforce each other in terms of purpose, research, and resources.
102 studies for years, the BCC attended the 2009 and 2011 meetings of the SEAFO management with scientific research and the exchange of data. BCC also assists in the development of complementary fisheries management regimes in the EEZs of member states and the SEAFO Regulatory Area (SEAFO 2009; 2011, 62). Another source of scientific inputs to policy processes at SEAFO is the CoML. The SEAFO Commission welcomed the draft for development of a South Atlantic MAR ECO project and invited the project participants to share their findings about the ecosystems and biodiversity of the SEAFO Convention Area (SEAFO 2007; 2008). The original MAR ECO project is a part of the CoML Program. The South Atlantic MAR ECO project came into existence in the following year and the Census suggested another, similar initiative to t he Scientific Committee in 2009 (SEAFO 2009). By 2010, COML and the South Atlantic MAR ECO project became one of the major data sources on deep water habitats and VMEs in the region (SEAFO 2010). One important aspect of the SEAFO closure areas policy is the fact that these areas are also closed for mapping and surveying purposes. The Commission holds mapping be a condition for the resumption of fishing in these areas, and vulnerable habitats remain permanently closed to fishing. This aspect of the closur e policies can address problems like limited information and scientific uncertainty regarding the state of fish stocks and marine ecosystem in the region. Adoption and implementation of necessary measures to ensure long term sustainability is another step to be taken once t he uncertainty is eliminated.
103 The Role of Nongovernmental Actors and Other IGOs Presently, the Southe ast Atlantic is the region exhibiting weakest cooperation with NGOs. Nevertheless, the Southe ast Atlantic presents a case in which coop eration with other RFMOs is more influential in decision making and policy design. This can be traced back to the foundation of the SEAFO; the Convention proposal was largely shaped by the previous experiences of participants in regional fisheries manageme nt. Most of them were already parties to the NEAFC, NAFO, and CCAMLR. Among these, 2001, 360 362). For instance, the SEAFO considered both the NEAFC and CCAMLR models to deve lop its own performance review criteria and the Commission decided to The fourth annual meeting of the Commission, in 2007, was the first instance in which NGOs were represented in the SEAFO meetings. As an influential NGO operating across the high seas regions, the WWF made an opening statement at this Ecosystem Working Group or Sub argued that the WWF had significant experience on this topic thanks to their projects with party states like Namibia, Angola, and South Africa. It should be underscored that the WWF praised the SEAFO with regards to their VME protection measures (SEAFO 20 07, 26 27). These measures obviously include high seas MPAs designated in 2006. The WWF ecosystem approach and in the global move towards offshore marine prot (SEAFO 2007, 27). The WWF was the only NGO representative in the 2008 meeting of
104 Ecosystem Working Group or Sub had taken in fav or of an ecosystem based management approach (SEAFO 2008, 24 25). Much like in earlier years, few NGO community representatives were present at the 2009 SEAFO Commission Meeting (SEAFO 2009, 28). Birdlife International was the only exception to this. Birdl ife International is a global network of NGOs in more than 100 countries with more than 60 autonomous partner organizations. This organization is recognized as the leading authority on the status of birds and their habitats (Birdlife International 2013a). Birdlife International was also present at the following two meetings and involved in collaboration with the Scientific Committee on relevant topics. The WWF and Birdlife conducted projects on the prevention of seabird ki llings as bycatch in the Southe ast Atlantic. SEAFO incorporated WWF Birdlife recommendations into their seabird measures (Birdlife International 20 10). Even though prevention of seabird bycatch can be considered part of ecosystem based management, there is not a direct discussion of the imp acts of these policies on the SEAFO high seas MPAs. During the past few years, the SEAFO has asserted its support for the participation of NGOs and the fishing industry. In 2009, the SEAFO adopted a set of principles, guidelines, and operational proc edures to support the capacity building work of the Organization. One of these principles is extending the participation of a range of stakeholders, including NGOs and the private sector. Their participation is seen as a tool for capacity building since th ese actors can increase awareness and strengt hen member 131).
105 The Current State of Closures in the Southe ast Atlantic In 2010, the SEAFO extended its 2007 decision regarding high seas closures. Th e 2010 resolution also declared eleven areas in which all fishing activities for the fisheries under the SEAFO Convention mandate are prohibited. These areas are Ott Seamoun t, Vema Seamount, Herdman Seamounts, two unnamed seamount areas, an unnamed seamount, and an unnamed area (SEAFO 2010a). When all measures in effect are considered, the current list of SEAFO high seas MPAs include Dampier Seamount, the Malahit Guyot Seamou nt, Molloy Seamount, Vema Seamount, Wust Seamount, Africana Seamount, Schmidt Ott and Erica Seamounts, Panzarini Seamount, the Discovery, Junoy and Shannon Seamounts, and the Schwabenland and Herdman Seamounts (FAO 2013). Most of these areas are currently closed to all forms of bottom fishing. Recently, in a 2011 UN Workshop, the Pew Foundation presented a performance review of RFMOs including the SEAFO. According to this review, the SEAFO failed to, first, designate high seas MPAs in the areas where most of the fishing has occurred over the las t 15 years. Second, SEAFO failed to impose fishing depth restrictions to protect substantial areas of seamounts and ridge systems. The Scientific Committee responded to these criticisms with certain corrections and explanations but also recognized the shor tcomings of their policies in effect (SEAFO 2011, 29 30). A significant aspect of these responses is the fact that they demonstrate the representative could attend due to fundi ng concerns (SEAFO 2011, 29). Overall, recent developments confirm that the SEAFO has been encouraging the involvement of
106 various stakeholders and inter RFMO cooperation. The relatively short history of high sea s MPAs governance in the Southe ast Atlantic h as been occupied with research on the state of the marine habitat, assessment of fish stocks, and development of management rules. The environmental effects of these policies are to be s een in the following years.
107 CHAPTER 5 ANALYSI S OF REGIONAL POLICY PROCESSES II: THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA, SOUTHERN OCEAN, AND SOUTHERN INDIAN OCEAN This chapter reviews the making of high seas MPAs policies in the Mediterranean Sea Region, Southern Ocean, and the Southern Indian Ocean. The Mediterranea n Sea Region illustrates two different policy making processes with distinct stories, motivations, and actors. The Pelagos S anctuary, the first example of Mediterranean high seas MPA s was founded for the protection of marine mammals in the Sanctuary. The initiative came from a nongovernmental research organization at a time when the idea of high seas fisheries management was new to this region, like many others around the world. This case demonstrated how the presence of too many actors with varying intere sts prolongs decision making processes rather than facilitating environmental protection. The second decision to declare protected areas in the region exhibits similarities with such decisions in the North Atlantic regions in terms of the central role of a n RFMO the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM) and the increasing cooperation between the RFMO and NGOs. The Southern Ocean has a particular history of struggles that evolved around environmental activism, mineral search attempts, a nd even sovereignty claims over Antarctica. Regulatory mechanisms within the Antarctic Treaty System are founded on and reshaped thanks to these struggles. The endeavors of nongovernmental actors paved the way for the adoption of an ecosystem approach befo re other regions. In addition, these efforts led to the creation of a system in which industrial actors, advocacy organizations, and governmental actors actively participated in the decision making process. The Southern Indian Ocean has a unique story with regards to leadership. Four deep sea fishing vessel operators created the Southern Indian Ocean
108 Deepsea Fishers Association (SIODFA) and led developments that resulted in the designation of the largest high seas MPAs in the world. The existing regional fi sheries agreement was signed after the designation of Southern Indian Ocean high seas MPAs and the region lacked an RFMO in effect until recently June 2012. Additionally, scientific research behind the selection of areas for protection received criticisms from the representatives of environmental NGOs and scientists. The Mediterranean Sea Region The process of declaring high seas MPAs had been more complicated in the Mediterranean Sea Region. The GFCM is the main regional fisheries instrument effecti ve at the Mediterranean Sea region. This instrument is designed for the conservation of marine resources in the Mediterranean Sea, Black Sea, and connecting waters. The GFCM Agreement was approved in 1949 and ca me into force in 1952 (GFCM 2010). T he Commission currently has 24 members from South Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East. 1 The second key regional instrument for the Mediterranean Sea is the 1995 Protocol of the Barcelona Convention Concerning Mediterranean Specially Protected Areas and Biological Diversity in the Mediterranean (Barcelona Convention or SPA/BD Protocol) This Protocol aims at preventing pollution and loss of biodiversity in the region and maintains a list of the Specially Protected Areas of Medi terranean Importance (SPAMIs). Given t hat high seas MPAs are also a group of protected areas, the inscription of a VME to the SPAMIs is essential. The decision to include an area to 1 Members to the GFCM Commission are Albania, Algeria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, EU, Egypt, France, Greece, Israel, Italy Japan, Lebanon, Libyan, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey (GFCM 2010)
109 the list of SPAMIs requires consensus of the parties to the Barcelona Convention, and such a decision brings abo ut management measures to be implemented by all party states (Eur Lex 1999). The first high seas MPA of the region is the Pelagos Sanctuary, which is an area of about 90,000 square kilometers in the northwest Mediterranean Sea between Italy, con tains the Corsican Island of Italy (Tethys No date). Pelagos Sanctuary is known for its biological diversity, particularly in marine mammals. Research, campaigns, debates, and negotiations around the significance and protection of the Sanctuary continued f or years, from the late 1980s through the 2000s. After long years of negotiations, in 1999, France, Italy, and Monaco proposed the inclusion of the Pelagos Sanctuary to the y inscribed in the SPAMIs list in 2001. The same three countries surrounding the Pelagos Sanctuary signed a 1999 Agreement on the Creation of a Mediterranean Sanctuary for Marine Mammals (The Sanctuary Agreement) that came into force in 2002 (Tethys No dat e). During the following years, GFCM discussions on overexploitation of fisheries and bottom trawling led to the creation of new high seas MPAs in the Mediterranean Sea. Finally, in 2006, three more specific areas were declared as fisheries restricted a reas by the GFCM. According to the 2006 GFCM Recommendations, particularly the Recommendation in GFCM/2006/3, the Commission prohibited fishing with towed dredges and bottom trawl nets and requested all members to protect the Lophelia reef off Capo Santa M aria di Leuca, Eratosthenes Seamount, and the Nile Delta cold
110 hydrocarbon seeps from fishing activities endangering the particular habitats of each region (GFCM 2006). These three areas are closer to the territorial waters of, respectively, Italy, Cyprus, and Egypt. The Role of Science and Scientific Actors The GFCM is composed of four main committees, and the Scientific Advisory Committee (SAC) is one of them. 2 The SAC is required to provide the Commission with independent technical and scientific inform ation regarding conservation and fishery management. Compared to other GFCM committees, the SAC has a larger and more complex institutional structure, with several sub committees and lower level branches (GFCM 2010 ). The SAC constitutes the main source of scientific expertise for GFCM high seas MPAs policies. It is necessary to distinguish the story of the Pelagos Sanctuary and the other three areas the Lophelia reef off Capo Santa Maria di Leuca, Eratosthenes Seamount, and the Nile Delta cold hydrocarbon seeps in terms of the actors who provided them with necessary scientific expertise. In the first case, years of research and data were obtained from the studies of NGOs, principally the Tethys Research Institute. Inscription of the Pelagos Sanctuary to th e list of SPAMIs and the GFMC issued recommendations came years after marine biodiversity explorations research cruises had been carried out in this zone (No tarbartolo di Sciara et al. 2008 93). The decision to restrict fishing at the Lophelia reef off Capo Santa Maria di Leuca, Eratosthenes Seamount, and the Nile Delta cold hydrocarbon seeps typically relies on the advice offere d by the GFCM SAC (GFCM 2006). The Commission made 2 Along with the Scientific Advisory Committee, the GFCM committees are the Committee on Aquaculture, the Compliance Committee, and the Committee on Admin istration and Finance (GFCM 2010 ).
111 references to SAC recommendations when adopting the decision to declare these areas as protected areas; however, scientific cooperation between the SAC and NGOs was expressed great appreciation for the work carried out by SAC, both in terms of qu anti ty (GFCM 2005, 7). It was also suggested that the SAC and its Sub Committee on Marine Environment and Ecosystems should enhance cooperation with other organizations, including the WWF and IUCN (GFCM 2005, 7). Given these two organiz WWF proposals submitted to the SAC, it can be concluded that the WWF and the IUCN made indirect scientific contributions to the policy making process. The Role of Nongovernmental Act ors Environmental NGOs have a long history of involvement with the protection of rich habitats in the Mediterranean Sea, especially in the case of the Pelagos Sanctuary. The Tethys Research Institute acted as the champion organization in this instance and part icipated in research, campaigning, and policy recommendations. The Institute and Greenpeace launched campaigns that e 1980s and 1990s (Hoyt 2005). The Tethys Research Institute was the first to produce a r eserve area project in 1989. They managed to gather support from other NGOs and the public for their project in the early years. The Tethys Institute initially presented its project to the European Association Rotary for the Environment, another NGO active in Italy. Additionally, the Rotary Club chapters in Italy, Monaco, and France sponsored the project in 1990 (No tarbartolo di Sciara et al. 2008 95). Furthermore, international organizations and national leaders, including the IUCN and the Prince of Monac o,
112 In 1993, France, Monaco, and Italy signed a declaration of intent to establish a reserve area. Nevertheless, the project did not make substantial progress until the late 1990s bec ause of the political unwillingness of coastal states. Despite the political deadlock, the Tethys Research Institute maintained its involvement up to and including the signing of the Sanctuary Agreement in 1999. Indeed, during the five years prior to this agreement, the WWF had performed strong lobbying activities. The WWF was also among the NGOs that advocated the reserve area project when this project was first proposed (No tarbartolo di Sciara et al. 2008 97). One significant aspect of these NGO campai gns is that they were launched at a time when the idea of a protected area in the high seas was not a common idea or practice. No specific institutional framework or strategies for areas beyond territorial seas was in practice during these years. The Tethy s Institute's 1989 Project Pelagos stands as a unique example in this regard. Despite the technical differences in the identification of protected areas and the conservation measures adopted 3 high seas MPAs in other ocean regions are designated in the yea rs after the signing of the Sanctuary Agreement. NGOs were active but relatively less influential in the creation of the Mediterranean high seas MPAs established in 2006 as compared with the Pelagos Sanctuary Reserve. Oceana is one of the organiza tions that joined the efforts for protection of Mediterranean high seas MPAs. Oceana is an NGO dedicate d to research and advocacy for oceans exclusively. Oceana and the WWF engaged in research, 3 These differences may lie in the identification of a protected area according to the IUCN categories for protected areas, or according to the content and strictness of regulations. For instanc e, the Pelagos Sanctuary case differs from other high seas MPAs due to its focus on marine mammals (cetaceans). Most other examples of high seas MPAs primarily address deep water or bottom trawling parallel to the framework specified by UNGA and FAO.
113 organized campaigns, and monitored the management of the Erato sthenes Seamount and had a great impact on the early characterization of the environmental stakes of the problem. At present, these two NGOs are still calling for full implementation of GFCM measures by the government of Cyprus. When MNCs launched natural gas explorations within the Cypriot EEZ, and in areas close to the Eratosthenes Seamount, the WWF and Oceana reminded the Cypriot government that the exploitation of hydrocarbon resources might cause irreversible damage to the vulnerable ecosystem of the E ratosthenes Seamount area (Oceana 2011). Unlike the Tethys Research Institute, the WWF and Oceana also attended GFCM meetings. However, until recently, the GFCM annual meeting reports did not demonstrate how effective NGO participation was in the decision making and negotiation process. For example, the NEAFC meeting reports make opening statements and opinions of NGOs publicly available; they also report on how national or RFMO representatives responded to NGOs opinions and criticisms. Another NGO that supported the GFCM closures is the AGCI Pesca organization, an It The Lophelia reef off Capo Santa Maria di Leuca is closest to Italy, in the Ionian Sea. The protection of deep water coral reefs in this area received the act ive support of AGCI Pesca members (Earthdive 2006). Lastly, in addition to their initial support for the idea of a reserve area in the high seas, Greenpeace still maintains interest in the topic and conducts extensive research on biodiversity and VMEs in t he region (Greenpeace 2009). The Current State of Closures in the Mediterranean Sea Region Reaffirming their commitment to the Pelagos Sanctuary Agreement and protection measures in effect, in 2007 the GFCM issued binding recommendations concerning the P elagos Sanctuary for the conservation of marine mammals
114 Recommendation GFCM/31/2007/2. These recommendations recognize the reasons, necessity, and international institutional framework for the conservation measures laid down by the Sanctuary Agreement. Th ey also require cooperation between the Agreement and GFCM in data exchanges (GFCM 2007). Fisheries restrictions at the Lophelia reef off Capo Santa Maria di Leuca, Eratosthenes Seamount, and the Nile Delta cold hydrocarbon seeps are still in effect. The development of an ecologically representative network of high seas MPAs under the Barcelona Convention is another topic discussed in recent years (Bossar et al. 2010). A draft recommendation on management of specially protected areas in the region was disc ussed during the 2011 and 2012 meetings of the GFCM, but this plan has not yet bee n put into practice (GFCM 2011; 2012). 4 Moreover, given that some countries in the region have not defined their EEZs, the delineation of which areas remain in the high seas, is an issue involving potential political conflicts. NGOs maintain their interest in the protection of existing high seas MPAs and the designation of newly protected areas. For example, Greenpeace and the WWF have submitted a proposal for declaration o f high seas marine reserves in the Southern Balearics and the Sicilian Channel (Greenpeace 2009). Similarly, Oceana has submitted a proposal to protect the seamounts in the Mallorca channel; they presented this proposal to the Sub Committee on Marine Envir onment and Ecosystems of the GFCM SAC (Oceana 2010). All of these proposals are products of years long research carried out by the WWF, Greenpeace, and Oceana. It is yet to be seen if these 4 UN Environmental Program Mediterranean Action Plan also supports the draft recommendation.
115 proposals will be accepted by the GFCM. 5 Nevertheless, early and r ecent developments in the region lead to two summary observations. First, past examples like Project Pelagos illustrate how NGO initiatives originally not supported can eventually become a Second, the involvement of NGOs in policy making at the GFCM has been increasing since 2006. 6 Southern Ocean The Southern Ocean is home to the first fully high seas MPA in the world, the South Orkney MPA. The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic M arine Living Resources (CAMLR ) and the Antarctic Treaty are the two major regional regulatory mechanisms, and they hold the authority to create high seas MPAs in the Southern Ocean. The Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) came into force in 1982 as a part of the Antarctic Treaty System. 7 The CCAMLR is the RFMO with the mandate of declaring high seas MPAs in the Southern Ocean. Party states drafting MPA proposals need to receive the approval of the Commission. Regio nal fisheries management agreements generally require the party states to ensure that the conservation measures for areas under national jurisdiction 5 In a 2012 SAC proposal providing necessary information for an eventual decision on the management of demersal stocks, the deep water rose shrimp of the Sicilian C hannel was referred as one of the three special areas and stocks in need of further management measures (GFCM 2012). 6 In addition to research and campaigning, NGO voices can be heard more clearly in recent intergovernmental negotiations. For example, un like earlier reports in which NGO names appear only on a bout the depleted stocks as presented by the SAC and the poor performance of GFCM in implementing the scientific advice through bindi 14). 7 This system comprises several instruments such at the Antarctic Treaty, Environment Protocol, CAMLR Convention, and the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (ATS 2011).
116 protection and conservation of aquatic resources through a stringent application of the ecosystem approach. In this respect, (CCAMLR) arguably may provide for the most adopt an ecosystem approach an d to implement this approach carefully to conserve marine resources in the region. The Antarctic Treaty has a long history of negotiations, debates, and disagreements between party states, which include some of the most powerful countries in the world and claimed sovereignty over the Treaty area the area south of 60 South latitude. After the 1970s, some of the original twelve signatories of the Treaty 8 had disputes over the prospects of future mining in Antarctica and mining rights in the region (NERC BAS 2012). As a consequence of these developments and concerns regarding is in the interest of all mankind that Antarctica shall continue forever to be used exclusivel y for peaceful purposes and shall not become the scene or object of ( Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty 2011, 21). Additionally, Article 7 of the Protocol on Environmental Protection clarifies that resources, other than scientific research, shall be ( Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty 2011, 39). Lastly, regarding the disputes over sovereignty claims and territorial disputes, Article IV of both the CAMLR Convention and the Antarctic Trea ty clarifies the positions of party states pertaining to 8 Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, the French Republic, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Union of South Africa, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America ( Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty 2011, 21).
117 shall be interpreted as a renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously asserted rights of or claims to tensions did not result in direct international military confrontation and the current regime bans any military activity beyond peaceful purposes. Nevertheless, territorial claims over Antarctica are still in effect and scientific research, preservation, and the conservation of living resources are among the limited number of issue areas that allow countries to reassert their sovereignty on legitimate bases. The discussions for the creation of h igh seas MPAs started after a 2005 CCAMLR workshop on MPAs. In accordance with the goals of the WWSD 2002, CCAMLR members agreed to establish a representative system of MPAs after the workshop. The CAMLR and the Antarctic Treaty, in 2006 and 2009 respectiv ely, identified VMEs in the region. Finally, in 2009, the first fully high seas MPA was designated by CCAMLR in the South Orkney Islands region (UNEP 2010, 23 24). Fishing activities and disposals from fishing vessels are currently prohibited in the South Orkney MPA. The Role of Science and Scientific Actors The CCLAMR has two main bodies: the Commission and the Scientific Committee. The Scientific Committee is the main body that the CCLAMR consults for scientific advice. When member states introduce new p roposals, the Commission refers to the Scientific Committee and its reports. Therefore, the Scientific Committee had a critical role in the creation of the South Orkney high seas MPA. During the years prior to the declaration of this MPA, the Scientific Co mmittee drew the attention of the Commission and member states to concerns such as environmental risks and threatened species in the South Orkney Islands. The 2009 Commission decision on
118 South Orkney MPA endorsed the Scientific Committee recommendations (C CAMLR 2009 ). The IUCN supported the designation of high seas MPAs by providing expertise and scientific information about the Southern Ocean. In addition to attending Commission meetings, the IUCN called for further action for implementation of MPAs in the Southern Ocean during the years prior to such a decision. The IUCN in particular responds to questions and concerns of member states about the definition and categorization of MPAs. It also presents scientific support for bioregionalization and biopro specting studies in the region. More recently, joining the efforts of some CCAMLR member states and NGOs, the IUCN frequently underlines the necessity of designating a representative network of MPAs in the Ross Sea reg ion (CCAMLR 2008, 84 85; 2011b). The Role of Nongovernmental Actors NGO participation in environmental conservation has been very strong and influential in the Southern Ocean region. Among several research, industry, and advocacy organizations, the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC ) and the Coalition of Legal Toothfish Operators Inc. (COLTO) are the most effective nongovernmental actors in Antarctica and the Southern Ocean region with respect to environmental conservation. The COLTO and ASOC attended all CCAMLR Commission and Scient ific Committee meetings as observers for an extended period of time, including over the past few years, when the idea of high seas MPAs became more prevalent. The COLTO is an organization of legal toothfish operators fighting the IUU fishing for the toothf ish. COLTO members and supporters represent more than 85% of the total
119 global legal production of toothfish (COLTO 2012). The COLTO clearly explains the steps they take towards environmental protection and the conservation of particular species. Clarity an d specificity are noteworthy features of COLTO statements explaining the marine conservation measures they adopt and the progress they achieve (CCAMLR 2011a). The COLTO fights with the IUU fishing diligently and contributes to monitoring activities as well near zero levels except for the high seas in Subarea 58.4, where CCAMLR have no established fisheries, and limited control over non 2011a, 45). Furthermor e, the CCAMLR Scientific Committee acknowledged that seabird mortality is at negligible levels throughout a large part of the CCAMLR area as a result of the efforts to which the COLTO contributed. Specifically, with respect to the high seas MPAs, the COLTO supports the proposals for the establishment of future MPAs in the Ross Sea and East Antarctica regions within the CCAMLR Conve ntion Area (CCAMLR 2011a, 46). Even though it may recommend to the Commission that it consider minimizing the consequences of cl work supports marine conservation and sustainable fishing in the regional high seas (CCAMLR 2009, 23). The ASOC is a coalition of more than 30 NGOs working for the protection of the Antarctic terrestrial an d marine ecosystems (ASOC No date(a)). The ASOC has a long history of environmental conservation advocacy in Antarctica even prior to gaining observer status in the Antarctic Treaty System in 1991. During the mid 1970s, environmental activists became aware of secret negotiations for mineral and gas prospecting in Antarctica. Until the 1980s, even non consultative parties to the Antarctic
120 Treaty were not allowed to observe the negotiations. This policy was already in effect for NGOs. Through long years of ca mpaigning and struggle, the ASOC exhibited a strong performance, facilitating the signing of the Protocol on Environmental Protection conservation even further, working for the creation of a network of marine protected areas in the Southern Ocean, minimizing pollution from vessels, and mitigating the Transnational environmental NGOs like Greenpeace, the WWF and the Pew Environment Group are members of the ASOC coalition. Among the members of the ASOC coalition, the WWF has been the most influential and active. A research organization the Australian Antarctic Climate and Ecosystem Cooperative Research Centre (ACE CRC) partnered with the WWF in their efforts to establish the South Orkney MPA. In addition, a private tourism company, Peregrine Adventures, cooperated f a circumpolar scale bioregionalisation Commission agreed with this concept in 2007 (UNEP 2010, 23). WWF interest in the region also continued after the establishment of t he South Orkney MPA. A large number of representatives from the WWF/WWF ASOC attended the 2011 Meeting of the Scientific Committee. In addition to its past efforts in the creation of the South Orkney MPA, the WWF also called for the designation of new MPAs in this meeting. For example, WWF South Africa and the South African
121 initiative was begun by WWF in 2008, and the intention is to work toward a jointly managed MPA on new MPAs in the Southern Ocean are still ongoing The Current State of MPAs in the Southern Ocean Currentl y, South Orkney is still the only full MPA in the region. However, the CCAMLR has developed a plan for the designation of MPAs at the eleven areas defined as priority areas. According to this plan, declared at the 2009 Annual Meeting, the Commission and me mber states are expected to identify MPAs and submit their proposals to the Scientific Committee by 2011, and the members are expected to submit their proposals for a representative MPA system to the Commission by 2012 (UNEP 2010, 25). Both regional intergovernmental mechanisms and NGOs still demonstrate strong commitment to the creation of an ecologically representative network of MPAs. One of the proposals supported by many member states is the Ross Sea MPA. This proposal was presented by the USA and New Zealand delegations. The Commission decided not to declare an MPA in the Ross Sea after the 2012 Meeting, but agreed to discuss the proposal again in the future meetings (CCAMLR 2012b) Southern Indian Ocean The Southern Indian Ocean stands as an exceptional example in regards to the history of high seas fisheries conservation and the development of regional regulatory institutions. The five other regions examined in this study had established regional fisheries management agreements and organizations prior to the creation of high seas MPAs in each specific region. Even at the Pelagos Sanctuary case in which the
122 original research, proposal, and preparation of a trilateral agreement were carried out by an NGO there were regional agreeme nts and regulations in effect since the 1950s. However, in the Southern Indian Ocean, a group of for profit fisheries corporations initiated the process that resulted in the designation of the largest high seas MPAs in the world. The history of deep sea fishing is relatively short in the Southern Indian Ocean. From the 1970s to the early 1990s, the Soviet Union and under Ukrainian flags for a short time after the dissolution of the USSR engaged in deep sea fishing in the region. Commercial fishing compan ies increasingly started to fish in the region during the following years (SIODFA No date). By the late 1990s, the consequences of deep sea fishing practices in the Southern Indian Ocean became a salient issue and brought up questions about the management of deep sea fisheries (Japp and Wilkinson 2007, 42). The number of fishing vessels peaked in 2000 2001 and the region experienced an outnumbered the winners: by 2004 the fleet had declined to 5 vessels, more or less the Initial deep sea conservation measures in the Southern Indian Ocean came into being after this gold rush. The first steps were taken by the Southern Indian Ocean Deepsea Fishers Association (SIODFA), which is an organization founded by commercial fishing companies with vessels in the Southern Indian Ocean. This organization is the most influential actor in the creation of high sea s protected areas in the region. The original SIODFA members were Austral Fisheries PTY Ltd, Australia; B&S International Ltd., Denmark; ORAFCO Ltd., Cook Islands; and United Frame
123 Investments Ltd., Cook Islands (subsidiary to Sealord Group, New Zealand). 9 These companies represent the majority of the deep water fleet in the Southern Indian Ocean In a global first SIODFA closed eleven deep sea areas of the southern Indian Ocean to trawling, totaling over 300 000 square kilometers. Announce d jointly with IUCN in 2006, these Benthic Protected areas (BPAs) are one of the largest 10 (IUCN 2010b, emphasis added). The specific names of these BPAs are the Agulhas Plateau, South Indian Ridge, Coral, Bricle, Walters S hoal, Atlantis Bank, Mid Indian Ridge, Rusky, Fools Flat, Gulden Draak, and the East Broken Ridge. The foremost collaborator of the SIODFA has been the IUCN. These two organizations jointly announced the closure of the areas listed above. Moreover, the S IODFA and IUCN signed a cooperation agreement on the sustainability of deep water fisheries with the expectation of finding pragmatic solutions to the impacts of fishing on the marine environment (IUCN 2010a). The two organizations signed a Memorandum of Understanding in September 2009 and approved the election of a SIODFA representative to the Programme Steering Committee of an IUCN program, which focuses on the seamounts and suggests an ecosystem based approach for biologically significant and commercial ly important areas beyond national jurisdiction in the Southern Indian Ocean (SIODFA 2010a). 9 B&S International stopped fishing in the Southern Indian Ocean in 20 11 and a new member, Kanai Fisheries Co. Ltd. of Japan, joined the organization (SIODFA 2010c). 10 A Benthic Protected Area (BPA) is also considered to be a type of Marine Protected Area (MPA).
124 The Role of Science and Scientific Actors The management structure of the SIODFA is not well defined like an RFMO. In addition to a president and executive secreta ry, the Association has a chief scientist (SIODFA 2010c). The SIODFA budget relies solely on contributions from the members, who have expressed their commitment to restrict their fishing techniques and to collect data to further the goal of sustainability in the oceans. Vessels of SIODFA members conducted a voluntary program for the collection of biological data of species targeted by the fishery. 11 Additionally, some SIODFA vessels implemented stock assessment surveys. SIODFA maintains that all vessels of t he Association are equipped with the advanced acoustic systems necessary for such quantitative assessment surveys (SIODFA 2010b). These surveys are instrumental for guiding management measures such as identification of where to design closure areas and whi ch fish species to take under special protection. The IUCN is vigorously involved with scientific resea rch regarding the Indian Ocean. The IUCN is currently carrying out a project, the IUCN Indian Ocean Seamounts Project, concerning the application of an ecosystem based approach to fisheries management with a focus on the seamounts in the Southern Indian Ocean (IUCN 2012b; SIODFA 2010a). Seamounts are generally critical spots in terms of oceanic biodiversity. According to IUCN seamounts in temperate re gions around developed countries have been visited for research, those in more remote regions remain nearly unexplored. This is particularly true for the southern Indian Ocean The existing data about ecological diversity and marine ecosystems in the Southern Indian 11 These species are primarily orange roughy and alfonsino. SIODFA vessels also collected data on bycatch of coldwater corals and deep water sharks (SIODFA 2010b).
125 Ocean are considerably limited and they rely on information obtained from voluntary studies of the fishing industry and national research programs Moreover, these data are not made av ailable to the public to protect commercial confidentiality (IUCN 2012b). Both the identification of necessary conservation measures and the implementation of precautionary and ecosystem approaches become challenging tasks due to this scarcity of scientifi c information. Since there is no RFMO in the region, the FAO directly engaged in research and collaboration with the SIODFA. In 2006, the FAO organized an expert consultation meeting in Bangkok on deep sea fishing in the high seas. Deep sea fisheries in the Southern Indian Ocean were one of the main regions and topics discussed. During this meeting, a representative from the Sealord Group of the SIODFA presented their research on the state of deep sea fisheries and seamounts in the region, and they exp lained the necessary BPA management measures the SIODFA advocated (Patchell 2007, 191 considering the adverse impacts of deep sea fishing and ways to avoid, remedy, or mitigate those impacts instead of closing down entire fisheries (FAO 2007a, 8). An important point brought up at this meeting reflected skepticism about the original moot point that the declarat ion of eleven benthic protected deep sea areas in the Indian the designation of BPAs various organizations and scientists questioned the scientific validity of the SIODFA data and methods used in the selection of protected areas and
126 the expected environmental gains from BPA measures. Additionally, and as more recent example of research r elated FAO studies, the FAO Committee on Fisheries (COFI) asked FAO to develop a program on deep sea fisheries and the high seas. One of the main aspects of this policy is the pilot implementation activities for the enhanced management of deep sea fisherie s in the high seas of the Indian Ocean (Bossar et al. 2010). The Role of Nongovernmental Actors The preceding sections explicate how the designation of high seas MPAs in the Southern Indian Ocean is the story of how nonstate actors like business organizati ons and transnational scientific networks have been deeply involved since the outset. In addition to the fundamental contributions of the SIODFA to IUCN, CoML and the DSCC conducted studies for the protection of VMEs in the high seas of the Southern Indian Ocean. The CoML did not influence the original policy making process at a considerable level. However, the Census carried out a comprehensive survey of marine ecosystems, including seamounts and coral reefs, which are common in the Southern Indian Ocean a nd the Pacific Ocean, and introduced their suggestions about present protection measures. According to the CoML, by 2006, global MPAs covered 18.7% of coral reefs and only 1.6% of the coral reefs, including those identified as MPAs, were prot ected adequate ly. In addition, no ocean region provided sufficient protection to more than 10% of their coral reefs (Mora et al. 2006). Furthermore, the global seamounts survey of the CoML called CenSeam revealed that the Indian Ocean is still an undersampled region wit h scientific uncertainty regarding the identification of the most critical and priority areas to be protected (Consalvey et al. 2010). According to CoML scientists, limited knowledge should not prevent seamount conservation efforts. Given that
127 seamounts ar e undersampled, it is vital to develop the means of predicting what kind of ecosystem communities might occur where (Consalvey et al. 2010, 135). They advocate a precautionary principle of adopting protective measures based on the best available scientific information about seamounts and VMEs. BPAs. The DSCC expressed its skepticism about the environmental impacts of the SIODFA closures. After the SIODFA proposal to stop bottom traw ling in some parts of the Southern Indian Ocean, a regional representative of the DSCC highlighted that the areas in this proposal correspond to only a small fraction of fishing areas in the Ocean and the effectiveness of such a policy will depend on the e cological significance of the proposed closure areas. Moreover, while agreeing to keep working with the industry, they urged policy makers to globally suspend high seas bottom trawling to allow for implication of adequate scientific research about appropri ate high seas management measures (DSCC 2006). To date, transnational environmental NGOs like the CoML and the DSCC have not affected policy decisions; their influence has remained within the borders of research activities and criticisms about why the meas ures in effect are not likely to produce environmentally beneficial outcomes. The Current State of Closures in the Southern Indian Ocean In addition to their efforts for BPAs, SIODFA members proved their interest in the creation of regional fisherie s management institutions. The FAO led multilateral talks, combined with the contributions of the IUCN and SIODFA, resulted in the signing of the Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement (SIOFA) The Agreement was originally signed by the Comoros, France, Kenya, Mozambique, New Zealand, Seychelles, and the European Community (FAO 2006). Currently, Australia, Madagascar, and Mauritius
128 are also parties to the agreement (EUROPA 2012). The SIOFA was developed for the long term conservation and sustainable use of the fishery resources of the Southern Indian Ocean in areas beyond national jurisdiction. 12 It is also considered as a significant step towards the establishment of an RFMO in the areas where no such organization exists, such as the SIOFA Area (EUROPA 20 12). This step is a development in accordance with Article 10 of the Fish Stock Agreement and UNGA resolutions. Nevertheless, it is still remarkable that intergovernmental cooperation came into existence after the voluntary initiatives of for profit organi zations. The eleven Southern Indian Ocean high seas BPAs are still closed to trawling. From the initial period that the SIODFA brought up their closure area proposal through today, several intergovernmental, research, and advocacy organizations have been voicing th eir concerns, if not criticisms, about the criteria for selection of the areas taken under protection. A recent study in seamount classification and scientific design of marine protected area networks (Clark et al. 2011) responds to such concerns by presen ting an assessment of global seamounts, with a specific focus on the Southern Indian Ocean. Seamounts are the common targets of deep sea commercial fishing and in most cases; they host vulnerable marine or benthic ecosystems. Clark et al. (2011) classify seamounts according to their export production, depth of the seamount summit, oxygen levels in the water, and proximity/connectivity between seamounts. 13 These four indicators basically determine the significance of a seamount for the area surroun ding it, 12 SIOFA addresses fishery resources other than tuna, which is managed through the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) and the Commission for the Conser vation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT). 13 the amount of organic carbon that, on average, is likely to be exported from the surface, and so will be available as food to organisms on the sea floor
129 uniqueness of its habitat, and vulnerability of the seamount to human activities. According to their findings, Gulden Draak, Fools Flat, Walters Shoal, and almost all of the Agulhas Plateau and South Indian Ridge BPAs are outside areas with low su mmit depth and high export production ( i.e. organic matter flux). The eleven Southern Indian Ocean BPAs contain 37 seamounts and only 6 of these seamounts are fishable. More than 80% of these areas have summit depths between 1500 3500 meters mostly below fishable depths and where stony corals are likely to be rare (Clark et al. 2011, 31). These findings support that the current closures, regardless of how large they are, do not cover the most ecologically critical areas in the Southern Indian Ocean, and they do not provide necessary regional ecos ystem conserv ation measures.
130 CHAPTER 6 TRANSNATIONAL ENVI RONMENTAL NGOS AS INSTRUMENTS OF GLOBALLY INTEGRATED HIGH SEAS MANAGEMENT AND THE DRIVERS OF ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTIVENESS This chapter presents a comprehensive picture of the regions examined in Chapters 4 and 5. Looking at this comprehensive picture, it ex amines regional structures and inter regional ties in order to (1) indicate the mechanisms for a more integrated global high seas governance system and (2) establish a relationship between regional governance structure and regional effectiveness. These two analyses elucidate the relationship between NGO participation in governance networks and the measures of effectiveness. Next, this chapter revisits two arguments about networks and effectiveness, and evaluates them with reference to observations from high seas governance. In the context of global environmental politics and high seas MPAs governance, effectiveness can be discussed in relation to the institutional and environmental aspects of a policy or organization. The former signifies success in creating institutions and adopting rules and standards in support of environmental protection, and the latter deals with changes in the state of environmental problems. Analyses in this chapter demonstrate that transnational environmental NGOs are capable of incre asing institutional and environmental effectiveness at both global and regional levels. At a global level, environmental NGOs are central actors that can contribute to the building of a more integrated high seas governance system across different ocean reg ions. At a regional level, the participation of environmental NGOs adds to high seas MPAs management thanks to their significant scientific expertise, monitoring efforts, and campaigning and agenda setting studies. RFMOs prove to be more successful in meet ing sustainability goals in regions where NGOs act as
131 champion organizations. Analyses at the two levels complement each other in support of the main argument of this project that the participation of NGOs in the high seas MPAs governance network increase s the effectiveness of this governance system. In addition to discussing definitions of effectiveness, Chapter 2 elaborated on two arguments that can be reassessed through the analyses presented in this chapter. The first one is the argument for the role of networks in the communication and transmission of n orms. Development of a similar IGO N GO relation trend across the regions can be interpreted as an example of norm transmission. Towards the end of the 2000s, high seas MPAs governance starts to exhibit a similar pattern across different ocean regions regarding the participation of NGOs. This rising pattern, referred to in this the characteristics of policy maki ng in the Northe ast Atlantic region. The second argument revisited after the analyses in this chapter discusses the concept of effectiveness with reference to features of states parties to negotiations or policies. The last section of this chapter responds to t he question of whether successes and failures in high seas MPAs governance can be attributed to states rather than international organizations governmental or otherwise. NGOs as Key Actors of Global Ocean Governance Social network analysis helps illustra te the connections between actors and produces various measures of centrality, shedding light on different positions and the roles that actors play individually or in a network. This method provides the appropriate tools to display all the ties between hig h seas MPAs actors and determines the more central actors in critical positions. The data for these governance network maps include
132 all actors that participated in the policy making processes in the six regions reviewed in this project. A small number of states and NGOs are discussed in the examination of regional policy making processes since they are crucial for grasping the context and very recent developments; nonetheless, they are not included in the network analysis section to ensure consistency in t he causal claims regarding network structure and institutional and environmental effectiveness measures. This distinction is determined according to two fundamental criteria. The first criterion is the presence of clear evidence that an actor influenced th e policy making process by, for example, drafting proposals, providing data and expertise, organizing or leading meetings or workshops about the designation of high seas MPAs, or engaging advocacy and monitoring. In other words, an influential regional act or without specific contribution to high seas MPAs policies, or an actor that conducted studies about MPAs but never influenced policy making is not represented in the governance network maps. The second criterion is the timing of an his study presents an assessment of regional performances based on studies from 2010. In order to ensure consistency while proposing a relationship between governance structure and effectiveness, actors represented in network maps are restricted to those w ho joined and affected the process prior to 2010. 1 The role of environmental NGOs in the Southern Indian Ocean illustrates such a case. CoML and DSCC conducted research and stated their opinions about BPAs, but these developments took place after the desig nation of SIODFA BPAs and they did not 1 In accordance with the two criteria, the following are the actors that did not directly and particularly involve in high seas MPAs policies by 2010: The Pew Group, Namibia, South Africa, and Birdlife International in the Southeast Atlantic Ocean; CoML a nd DSCC in the Southern Indian Ocean.
133 lead to policy reforms. Therefore, CoML and DSCC are not treated as actors tied to Southern Indian Ocean. As another example, Namibia obviously acted as the leader during negotiations for the creation of SEAFO and the institutional design of the Organization. However, once the Organization was founded, and while specific decisions about high seas MPAs were being discussed, SEAFO bodies acted on behalf of the Organization rather than referring to leadership of a single country. 2 Figure 6 1 is an affiliation network map representing actors in the six high seas regions and the connections between these actors. An affiliation network consists of a set of actors and a set of events or social occasions, and the connections b etween members are based on co attendance to these events (Wasserman and Faust 2007, 291). Participation in high seas MPAs governance corresponds to participation in an event or social occasion in this definition. In Figure 6 1, each node denotes an actor and the presence of a line between two nodes indicates that these two actors attended the making process). Table 6 1 and Table 6 2 identi fy how the data are coded and the affiliation network in Figu re 6 1 is produced. Table 6 1. Example of actor participation to MPA policy data (2 mode) Actors Events (Regional policy making) Northeast Atlantic Northwest Atlantic Southeast Atlantic Mediterranean Sea Southern Ocean S. Indian Ocean NEAFC 1 0 0 0 0 0 Greenpeace 1 1 0 1 0 0 IUCN 0 0 0 1 1 1 Italy 0 0 0 1 0 0 An actor that attended regional policy making is coded as 1. 2 This does not suggest that an actor failing to meet these two criteria in one region is removed from the global network completely; such an actor might be directly effective in the high seas MPAs policies of other re gions by 2010, and they appear affiliated with these regions in Figure 6 4.
134 Table 6 1 presents an example from the two mode actor by event data matrix. Columns represent the six high seas regions reviewed in Chapters 4 and 5, and each row represents an actor. Cells are coded as 1 if the actor represented in this row participated i n the policy making process in the region indicated at the corresponding column. In Table 6 2, the actor by event matrix is transformed into a one mode, actor by actor, affiliation network. Each cell reports the number of events, i.e. regional policy makin g, two actors co attended. A line between two actors in Figure 6 1 suggests that these actors co attended the making of regional policies; in other words, the number at the intersection of two actors in Table 6 2 is more than 0. Table 6 2. Example of acto r affiliation network data (1 mode) Actors Actors NEAFC Greenpeace IUCN Italy NEAFC 1 1 0 0 Greenpeace 1 3 1 1 IUCN 0 1 3 1 Italy 0 1 1 1 Figures indicate the number of events that the two actors co attended. Actors from the same region cluster around the same area of the map in Figure 6 1. Nodes between several regions are located between these clusters; such nodes are also connected to a higher number of actors. Thanks to their participation in policy making in most of the regions, transnational environmental NGOs are located in the most central positions of the map in Figure 6 1. WWF, Greenpeace, and Oceana are particularly central actors tied to numerous actors from various regions. Regional actors such as R FMOs, regional agreements, states, and national economic and environmental organizations remain at peripheral locations, not connected to many nodes.
135 Figure 6 1. Actors of global high seas MPAs governance network Centrality analysis provides numerical expressions allowing for a meaningful interpretation of the position of an actor in a network. Table 6 3 reports three measures of centrality of an actor in the global high seas MPAs governance network. These three ommunicate with other actors, reach every other actor in the network, and transfer information and resources between the pairs of actors. Degree centrality, closeness centrality, and betweenness centrality capture these three different dimensions of an act In order to explicate the meaning of the three measures of centrality, Figure 6 2 offers four illustrations of a small network composed of 10 actors arranged
136 alphabetically from A to J. Figure 6 2 A displays this network without the application of centrality measures to node size. This map is similar to the global high seas MPAs governance map in Figure 6 1. In Figure 6 2 B, node size is proportional to the degree centrality of an actor. Degree centrality shows the most vi sible actors in a network. If an actor has a high degree centrality score, it should be in direct contact with many other 07, 179). For example, actors F and G have the maximum number of ties, 5, attached to them and they are able to directly communicate with the maximum number of actors in the network. An actor might be connected to a large number of others, which brings ab out a disconnected from most other actors in the network as a whole. Closeness centrality e to all others in the network. This measure of centrality focuses on the distance from each actor to all others direct or indirectly (Hanneman and Riddle 2005). Node size is proportional to closeness centrality in Figure 6 2 C and, for example, the node E is larger in this map since it can reach every other node in a maximum two steps. As another example, nodes E, J, H, and I have the same number of links attached to them; however, closeness centrality of J, H, and I is smaller since these actors need to t ake up to four steps to take the shortest path to, for example, A and B.
137 A B C D A Figure 6 2. Illustration of centrality measures A) Basic network map (without sizing) B) Node size proportional to degree centrality C) Node size proportional to closeness centrality D) Node size proportional to betweenness centrality
138 The third measure of centrality is betweenness centrality, which expresses the extent to which an actor stands in between other pairs of actors. An actor with high betweenness cen trality holds the ability to both connect pairs of actors and prevent 188). In Figur e 6 2 D, node size is proportional to betweenness centrality. Node E is evidently the only node that can enable or prevent flow of information or other relevant resources between the left and right half of the network. On the contrary, nodes J, H, and I ar e extremely small since they are at the margins and there are alternative paths for other actors to reach each other without necessarily contacting them. Table 6 3 pr esents the output s of centrality analysis applied to the high seas MPAs governance ne twork. Also, the three maps in Figure 6 3 show the actors of this governance network as sized according to their relative centrality scores. The first column of Table 6 3 lists the degree centrality scores of high seas MPAs actors. As a quick look at the n etwork in Figure 6 3 A would confirm, transnational environmental NGOs have the highest degree centrality since they are in direct contact with many other actors, which gives them an advantage in delivering their message more effectively. An in depth analy sis of regional decision making processes revealed that organizations like the WWF, Greenpeace, and Oceana affect RFMO agenda, share the findings of their scientific studies, and transfer their experiences obtained through participation on several regional and global policy making platforms. The use of centrality analysis, first, presents a numerical and concise affirmation to this suggestion,
139 and second, gives an indication of which actors can influence high seas governance in the future. Table 6 3. Centra lity analysis of actors Degree Centrality Closeness Centrality Betweenness Centrality AGCI Pesca 32.35 59.65 0.00 ASOC 11.77 53.13 0.00 BCMLE BCC 11.77 52.31 0.00 Canada 26.47 56.67 0.00 CCAMLR 20.59 55.74 0.98 COLTO 11.77 53.13 0.00 CoML 50.00 65.39 3.42 DSCC 55.88 68.00 1.78 EAC 26.47 56.67 0.00 France 32.35 59.65 0.00 Germany 41.18 61.82 0.00 GFCM 32.35 59.65 0.00 Greenpeace 82.35 85.00 13.34 ICES 55.88 68.00 1.78 ICFA 26.47 56.67 0.00 Italy 32.35 59.65 0.00 IUCN 44.12 64.12 8.50 Monaco 32.35 59.65 0.00 NAFO 26.47 56.67 0.00 NEAFC 41.18 61.82 0.00 Netherlands 41.18 61.82 0.00 Norway 41.18 61.82 0.00 Oceana 67.65 75.56 7.10 Ospar Commission 41.18 61.82 0.00 Pew Group 55.88 68.00 1.78 Rotary Club 32.35 59.65 0.00 SEAFO 11.77 52.31 0.00 Seas at Risk 41.18 61.82 0.00 Sierra Club 26.47 56.67 0.00 SIODFA 3.00 40.00 0.00 SPA/BD Protocol 32.35 59.65 0.00 Spain 41.18 61.82 0.00 Tethys Institute 32.35 59.65 0.00 UK 41.18 61.82 0.00 WWF 97.06 97.14 31.37 All scores are normalized and reported on a scale of 0 100. The analysis in this table is run with Ucinet (Borgatti et al. 2002).
140 A B Figure 6 3. Actor affiliation network nodes sized with different centrality measures A) Node size proportional to degree centrality B) Node size proportional to closeness centrality C) Node size proportional to betweenness centrality
141 C Figure 6 3. Continued The second column of Table 6 3 lists the closeness centrality scores of high seas MPAs actors. Given that the dataset in this analysis is not very large and there are several actors attending more than one regional event, each actor can reach all others th rough a small number of direct and indirect ties. Therefore, absolute values of closeness centrality in Table 6 3 are generally large. However, a relative assessment of closeness centrality scores is still helpful. The same three NGOs, the WWF, Greenpeace, and Oceana, have the highest scores in closeness centrality measures. These three are followed by other transnational environmental NGOs such as the DSCC and the Pew Group. Evidently, transnational environmental NGOs are closer to all other actors in high seas MPAs governance. The sizes of nodes are similar in Figure 6 3 A and Figure 6 3 B because the rankings of degree and closeness centrality scores are roughly similar. Nonetheless, as
142 Figure 6 3 C demonstrates, betweenness centrality more clearly exhib its the crucial difference of transnational environmental NGOs in influencing global interactions. The third column of Table 6 3 reports betweenness centrality scores. Most of the actors hav e a betweenness score of 0 because they do not necessar ily fall be tween other pairs of actors. On the other hand, four transnational NGOs, the WWF, Greenpeace, IUCN, and Oceana hold critical positions that grant them the particular ability to control interactions between other actors. The majority of actors are effective in only one region but the organizations with high betweenness centrality attend policy making platforms across several regions. They can make unique contributions to alliance building across the regions, as well as enabling the flow of information, scien tific knowledge, and policy experiences. What do these numbers mean in relation to high seas governance? In several events and documents, FAO institutions have emphasized the importance of developing an integrated governance system. The FAO Committee on Fisheries (COFI) discusses the role of the FAO in developing an integrated fisheries governance system. 3 As the Committee emphasizes, the FAO is the leading source of scientific expertise and advice in global fisheries issues. The Organization should conti nue its efforts to work with regional fisheries bodies and to collaborate with NGOs (FAO 2011b, 8). International institutions explicitly recognize the importance of collaboration with RFMOs and NGOs in the development of an integrated global fisheries gov ernance system. 3 This report highlights the role of FAO in the integration of various fisheries related issues, such as aquaculture management and biodiversity protection (FAO 2011b), but this pr oject focuses on fisheries and MPA related aspects.
143 This stance is valid also for the specific topic of high seas MPAs. The FAO COFI noted in its 26 th Meeting in 2005 that issues regarding high seas MPAs governance should be addressed through the interaction of RFMOs and relevant interna tional environmental agreements and institutions (FAO 2005, 17). Communication between organizations and relevant environmental instruments is considered a necessary tool for realizing conservation goals. Furthermore, according to the same COFI Meeting Rep ort, in this Similarly, during the COFI 27 th Meeting in Rome in 2007, some members underscored the benefits of cooperation with NGOs in RFMO performance. I t is evident that the cooperation between intergovernmental and nongovernmental actors is acknowledged by FAO as an instrumental element of high seas MPAs governance. The affiliation network in Figure 6 1 shows how this idea of interaction communicatio n, and cooperation between actors is practiced in contemporary policies. Networking proves to be influential in global environmental governance, particularly given the gaps in the international legal framework for the governance of deep sea fisheries in t he high seas. 4 Also, networking can be approached as a tool of through social network analysis i s the appropriate strategy to understand the current system and identify the potential actors and channels of change. The interpretation of 4 This observation relies on experiences from transnational networking forums such as CBD and CITES t from these experiences can be used to facilitate coordination between regional fisheries bodies.
144 centrality analysis in Table 6 3 is important for determining influential mechanisms that can strengthen future comm unication and interaction between organizations. Analysis of Regional Governance Structures and Effectiveness The previous section provided a broad picture of global high seas MPAs governance without a close examination of specific regions. Moreover, thi s global centrality discussion does not sufficiently explain whether or not the actions of transnational environmental NGOs make a difference. In accordance with international law, RFMOs hold the mandate for the implementation of ecosystem based management in the high seas of each region. The regional institutional framework provides the essential context for addressing high seas related issues. This section elaborates on regional frameworks with respect to the type of champion actors in each region and the performance of RFMOs in institutional and environmental terms. The main argument of this project is twofold: First, high seas MPAs governance occurs as a network of different types of actors, and second, transnational environmental NGOs improve the effect iveness of this governance system. Global and regional level analyses in this chapter complement each other in corroboration of this twofold argument. Figure 6 4 displays each event of regional high seas MPAs governance separately with individual actors making process. Figure 6 4 is produced from the two mode data matrix exemplified in Table 6 1. The presence of a line between an actor and a region suggests that this actor has joined high seas MPAs policies in that region.
145 Figure 6 4. Analysis of regional frameworks In Figure 6 4, black squares represent regional policies, blue circles represent regional fisheries organizations and agreements, blue diamonds represent states, green circles represent envir onmental NGOs, and red circles represent industrial organizations. Industrial organizations might be non profit organizations in definition but they are still representatives of vessel operators or fishermen. All blue nodes denote (inter)governmental actor s. The mandate and responsibility of RFMOs and the proximity making processes. But how does the distribution of colors around each region (i.e. black squares) influence the effectiveness of regional governance?
146 Two specific definitions of effectiveness are particularly relevant to the discussion of high seas MPAs governance. The first definition is an indicator of the success of actors and institutions in enacting and imple menting relevant rules and standards. This definition can be named as institutional effectiveness, and includes outputs and o utcomes of the policy process. The presence of rules, standards, and international agreements does not always ensure progress towar ds a solution to environmental problems. Therefore, the second definition this study examines is the success in achieving desired environmental results. This approach to effectiveness can be interpreted as environmental effectiveness. Environmental effecti veness focuses on the impact of agreements and institutions on the state of environmental problems rather than creation of and compliance to rules and standards. In parallel to these two approaches to effectiveness, S. Cullis Suzuki and D. Pauly (2010) ev aluate two dimensions of RFMO performance. The first one is more theoretical; this dimension measures the extent to which RFMOs meet the recommended management standards. These recommended best standards are defined in a document produced after an independ ent panel held by Chatham House, with the participation of representatives from various regions, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and experts from different disciplines (Lodge et al. 2007). The UN Fish Stocks Agreement attributes fundamental roles and duties to RFMOs; nevertheless, the presence and practices of RFMOs did not prove enough to prevent the decline of fisheries. The Chatham House panel was organized with the acknowledgment that RFMO performance needs to be improved. Recommended Be st Practices for Regional Fisheries Management Organizations document is a product of
147 this perceived necessity, and it addresses RFMO management topics such as economic and conservation goals, allocation of rights, monitoring, compliance and enforcement, d ecision making, settlement of disputes, transparency, special requirements for developing states, and institutional issues (Lodge et al. 2007). 5 Cullis Suzuki and Pauly (2010) assess how well RFMOs performed in reflecting the 26 best practices in the Organ RFMO performance as a theoretical or on paper performance, which corresponds to both the institutional effectiveness idea and the outputs of a policy. The second aspect of RFMO performance is a measure of environmental effectiveness; this score displays how well the stocks under the mandate of an RFMO thrive in comparison to sustainable (1) the existin produces maximum sustainable yield (Cullis Suzuki and Pauly 2010, 1038). Both institutional a nd environmental performance scores are expressed as percentages. Table 6 4 presents a summary comparison of regions in terms of institutional performance, environmental performance, and the nature of champion organizations. According to Table 6 4, the N ortheast Atlantic and the Southern Ocean are the most successful regions in terms of environmental performance. These are also the regions with the most remarkable degree of NGO influence in policy making processes. Among many other influential NGOs, WWF w as active enough to propose high seas MPAs as a state would in the Northeast Atlantic, and ASOC has supported the conservation of the 5 An outline of these standards was presented at the 2007 FAO COFI Meeting and it received feedback from FAO (Lodge et al. 2007 viii).
148 exceptionally positive contributions to the Southern Ocean and South Orkney MPA. Such a transparent and environment friendly business initiative is unique to COLTO. Table 6 4. Performance review of regions Region RFMO Institutional Performance Environmental Performance Type of Champion Actors Northeast Atlantic NEAFC 63 72.2 IGO NGO Northwest Atlantic NAFO 63 53.3 IGO Southeast Atlantic SEAFO 63 ** IGO Mediterranean Sea GFCM 64 33.3 IGO Southern Ocean CCAMLR 58 100 IGO NGO Southern Indian Ocean SIOFA 47 ** Industry **Adequate fish stock data not available. Source of RFMO performance scores: Cullis Suz uki and Pauly (2010). The Northwest Atlantic, Southeast Atlantic, and Mediterranean Sea regions have similar scores in institutional performance. Nevertheless, their environmental performances considerably vary in accordance with the NGO versus government IGO influence relation in each region as detailed in Chapters 4 and 5. Among the three, the Northwest Atlantic is the most environmentally successful region. NAFO introduced an ecosystem based approach to management and increasingly opened its doors to NGOs after the 2005 refor ms. Despite this increase, the structure prior to 2010 was predominantly governmental. SEAFO is a very young organization dealing with the mode of cooperation is inter R FMO cooperation influenced by CCAMLR and, to a lesser extent, NAFO. SEAFO asserted that it welcomes NGO and industry participation, but the influence of NGOs in decision making is still fairly limited. As for the Mediterranean Sea, GFCM proved to be the least environmentally effective RFMO among the regions with similar on paper performance. There is a long
149 history of cooperation in this region and, especially since the mid 2000s, the participation of NGOs in GFCM is increasing. Nonetheless, policy making and implementation is unconstructively influenced by the presence of tens of countries, i.e. governments, in a comparatively small region. Political deadlocks and different governmental priorities frequently occupy the regional agenda. The Pelagos Sanctu ary Reserve was clearly an outcome of years long NGO struggles; however, this case is different from other high seas MPAs. Advocacy and research institutions that affected the Pelagos Sanctuary are national or regional ones as opposed to transnational envi ronmental NGOs with high centrality measures. Additionally, political disagreements and (inter)governmental debates characterized the political process during the 1990s. When all of these factors are taken into account, it is more appropriate to identify regional governance in the Mediterranean Sea as an IGO championed system. Lastly, the unique case of the Southern Indian Ocean exhibits the lowest performance even in theoretical terms. Governments and environmental NGOs did not influence the original p rotected area designation process as much as fishing vessel participation in some UN FAO events are the only accessible cooperation and networking mechanisms. Some environmental N GOs, such as CoML and DSCC, conducted studies and issued skeptical press releases about SIODFA BPAs, but these efforts did not affect the developments before or after the designation of Southern Indian Ocean high seas protected areas. Empirical evidence suggests that it is plausible to propose a relationship between the type of champion actors and environmental effectiveness. The causal effect of NGO
150 participation deserves further explanation. Particularly, transnational environmental NGOs appear to be in fluential in transferring knowledge and expertise and raising awareness in support of primarily environmental causes. Such organizations also exert pressure on states and RFMOs to provide and disclose data, repair their inadequacies, and make the negotiati on and implementation process more open. In short, they add to transparency of the process. The importance of transparency in RFMO policies and the potential contributions of NGOs are already acknowledged in international instruments. In its 27 th Meeting, FAO COFI requested the development of International Guidelines for the Management of Deep sea Fisheries in the High Seas These guidelines still constitute a reference document for the management of high seas deep sea fisheries, which are the main concern s of most high seas closures. Transparency is a frequently mentioned management issue in the guidelines (FAO 2009a). Regarding the transparency issues, Recommended Best Practices for Regional Fisheries Management Organizations report should be afforded an opportunity to participate in meetings on recognize the benefits of the presence of NGO diplomats for transparency. Overall, the analysis presented in th is section verifies that environmental NGOs, many of which operate as transnational research and advocacy networks, hold critical positions in the high seas MPAs governance network. Regions with stronger NGO participation demonstrate higher environmental p erformance. Transnational environmental NGOs engage in the conservation of high seas resources through research, monitoring, and policy assessment beyond a regional focus. For example, it is
151 shown in detail how WWF is the first and most influential NGO int eracting with RFMOs in many regions. In addition to its regional efforts, WWF was the sole nonstate entity that funded the study for the development of the Chatham House report the statement which forms the basis for on paper or institutional effectiveness assessments (Lodge et al. 2007). The Pew Group also took part in high seas conservation policies beyond what is illustrated in the maps. The Group issued recommendations on increasing RFMO performance, particularly in relation to the second UN Fish Sto cks Agreement Review Conference in 2010. These recommendations provide an evaluation of what had been done since the 2006 Review Conference and what the participants should consider during the 2010 Conference (Pew Environment Group 2010). As another exampl e, the UN held a recent workshop, in September of 2011, to discuss the implementation of the UNGA Resolution 61/105 and UNGA Resolution 64/72 paragraphs addressing the impacts of bottom fishing on VMEs and the sustainability of deep sea fish stocks. The Pe w Group representative presented a review of RFMO performances in applying these UNGA resolutions (SEAFO 2011, 29). DSCC was another transnational environmental NGO that joined the Pew Group during this workshop. In sum, transnational environmental NGOs af fect high seas policies not only at regional level but also through global level meetings and conferences. NGOs take advantage of opportunities at both levels to empower the resources and measures committed to biodiversity conservation. The Atlantic Way Each of the six regions examined in this study present a unique story as a result of variations in the pre existing institutional structure, the history of political developments and economic production, and the characteristics of champion act ors in
152 that region. These variations exerted tremendous influence on the starting point of high seas MPAs policies in a region. Given the short history of ecosystem based conservation policies in the high seas, remnants of these differences are still easy to distinguish. Nevertheless, it is possible to talk about the development of a similar pattern in the high seas MPA policy making processes across regions. An assessment of institutional performances of RFMOs also sup ports this suggestion. Table 6 4 displ ays that all of the three Atlantic RFMOs NEAFC, NAFO, and SEAFO have the same level of success in adopting recommended practices. Their policies exhibit similarities despite the wide difference between their abilities to implement the recommended practices and obtain environmentally beneficial results. 6 RFMOs at the Atlantic regions have common member states, EU participation, and common or connected NGOs that can communicate similar perspectives and management approaches on different platforms. These connections allow for the communication and transmiss ion of norms, an argument iterated in relation to the role of governance networks (Carpenter 2011; Di Gregorio 2012; Hartley 2010), across different clusters of actors in global high seas MPAs governance. The original example of this pattern is observ ed in the Northeast Atlantic with NEAFC followed a more open, participatory, and transparent policy in its relationship with NGOs. It is worth again highlighting how the OSPAR C ommission allows NGOs, 6 This can be interpreted as a development reinforcing the environmental policy convergence argument (Holzinger et al. 2008). The EU is member of all three Atlantic RFMOs and these RFMOs are in interaction with each other. Chapter 4 explains how ICES worked in cooperation with both NEAFC and NAFO, and Chapter 5 explains in detail how SEAFO adopted strategies and measures of other organizations like NAFO (after the stronger influence of CCAMLR). When taken together, co membership to various organizations and interactions among these organizations creates a platform for transnational communication, harmonization, and consequently, policy convergence.
153 with the support of a party state, to bring their own MPA proposal. In addition, NEAFC offered opportunities to NGOs to state their opinions on policy issues and responded to their concerns. The Commission made such occasions availab le to the public to a higher extent than other organizations. In the Northwest Atlantic, NGOs did not attend NAFO General Council and Fisheries Commission meetings, and could not enjoy observer status until 2006. WWF was first to represent NGOs in NAFO (NA FO 2007). NGO participation became more powerful in the following years with regards to both the number of organizations and their depth of involvement. 2010 was the year that demonstrated a turning point in these terms (NAFO 2011). The third Atlantic regi on, the Southeast Atlantic, still deals with the consequences of being a young organization. WWF was, again, the first NGO to appear at an RFMO meeting in 2007 (SEAFO 2007). Moreover, SEAFO confirmed its support for the participation of all stakeholders in cluding the NGOs and the private sector (SEAFO 2009). SEAFO started to receive the GFCM on pap Mediterranean Sea MPAs may look different from the Atlantic regions if one focuses on the analysis of the Pelagos Sanctuary. The Tethys Research Institute is unquestionably the architect of this reserve area; nevertheless, the Pelagos Sanctuary constitutes an exception regarding both the type of environmental measures in effect and policy process. The Tethys Institute was outside the intergovernmental processes for many years. Only the 2006 closu re areas exemplify high seas MPAs and IGO NGO cooperation with the understanding UN FAO has been advocating since the mid 2000s.
154 IUCN and WWF in these years, and Oceana and DSCC towards 2010, enhanced NGO participation in GFCM. A review of developments in the four regions affirms that there is a similar pattern originally exemplified by NEAFC and enhancing its zone towards other Atlantic regions. environmental performance varies d ue to political, economic, and institutional factors; but among many other variables that may influence future projections, more NGO involvement should bring about more awareness, research, expertise, monitoring, and transparency in the following years. Th erefore, the Atlantic Way is more likely to increase environmental performance and decrease the gap between these RFMOs in the future. The two exceptions to the Atlantic Way pattern are the Southern Ocean and the Southern Indian Ocean. RFMOs i n these two regions have considerably different on paper performances from the other four RFMOs. In addition to institutional performance, the CCAMLR and SIODFA cases illustrate two extremes regarding environmental performance and the influence of transnat ional environmental NGOs. The Southern state and EEZ related disputes, despite the broad CCAMLR membership, and second, allowed for the stronger participation of repr esentatives of advocacy and industrial organizations. Both ASOC and COLTO were immense and influential coalitions in the region even before the development of the UN FAO framework. NGO participation and environmental performance in the Antarctic are alread y ahead of the Atlantic Way paper performance.
155 In the Southern Indian Ocean, the absence of an RFMO working with other RFMOs under the FAO umbrella constitutes a significant obstacle to the evolution of a simi lar NGO IGO relationship pattern in the region. The signing of SIOFA can be considered as the first step in diminishing this obstacle, but this agreement came into effect only in mid about environmental NGO influence in the making of regional measures. It is yet to be seen if, and when, cooperation with other regions and the UN FAO system will be influential enough to allow an IGO NGO understanding to flourish, as in the Atlantic Way. Who is behind Success International Organizations or Country Contributions? In a discussion of international organizations and their effectiveness, one may pose the question of whether the RFMO performance scores are the products of the interests and Bernauer 2009; Sprinz and Vaahtoranta 1994). For example, it is possible argue that the performance of NEAFC should be attributed to developed and environmentally conscious European cou ntries member to this organization, rather than the organiz ation as an independent actor. A useful method of answering this question would to compare the individual performance score of countries involved in high seas MPAs governance with the performance s core of a RFMO in this high seas MPAs region. Alder et al. (2010) measured the aggregate performance of 53 maritime countries in managing marine ecosystems within their EEZs. Their study introduces fourteen different indicators to calculate the aggregate p erformance of countries. Biodiversity related
156 indicators 7 captured the notion of environmental performance, shown in Table 6 4. The comparison in Table 6 5 principally focuses on three of the fourteen indicators that are exclusively related to biodiversity The purpose here is to ensure consistency in the comparison of country and RFMO level performance scores. The MPA area indicator claimed EEZ. The MPA investment indica expenditure, or maintenance costs, of its MPAs relative to the value of the fisheries zed score in the 0 10 range, proportional to the minimum and maximum values observed (Alder et al. 2010, 469). Lastly, with regards to the comparison of country and RFMO level institutional is assessed on a scale of 0 10. Table 6 4 already presented RFMO level performance in adopting the recommended best practices for RFMOs. FAO CCF addresses states in their own language and defines practices and standards feasible to comparison with Cullis Suzuki paper RFMO performance. Table 6 5 ranks countries according to their performance in an aggregate score of fourteen indicators, 7 The fourteen indicators Alter et al. (2010) use are the following: six biodiversity related indicators (marin e protected area coverage, investment in marine protected areas, change in EEZ area trawled, ecological components of the mariculture sustainability index, seabird protection index, and marine mammal protection index), five value related indicators (landed value relative to GDP, fishmeal consumption by mariculture, compliance with the FAO code of conduct, context adjusted fisheries statistics indicator, good bad subsidies ratio), and job related indicators (catch relative to fuel consumption, subsides relat ive to landed value, and the socioeconomic components of the mariculture sustainability index). Country performance scores in Table 6 5 reflect s the first three biodiversity related indicators and compliance with the FAO CCF document indicator.
157 three specific MPA related conservation indicators, and the on paper or institutional performance in meeting FAO codes of conduct. The table also displays the performance scores of RFMOs through which each country participate d in high seas MPAs governance. The Southern Ocean and Southern Indian Ocean MPAs lacked direct contributions from in dividual states, therefore only four of the six regions are represented in Table 6 5. Lastly, South Africa and Namibia are included in the comparison in Table 6 5 even though they were not represented in the regional governance framework in Figure 6 4 beca use they are prominent members of SEAFO and offer a relevant response to the question examined in this section: is regional regional actors? Table 6 5. Country level performanc e evaluation Environmental Performance (EP) Institutional Performance (IP) MPA RFMO Aggregate Score MPA area MPA Inv. EEZ trawl RFMO EP Country IP RFMO IP Netherlands NEAFC 5.1 1 3 0 72.2 55 63 Norway NEAFC 4.2 0 1 4 72.2 67 63 Germany NEAFC 5.2 2 10 2 72.2 42 63 UK NEAFC 4.8 1 5 4 72.2 52 63 Spain NEAFC 4.5 1 2 4 72.2 52 63 Canada NAFO 4.4 1 4 4 53.3 68 63 France GFCM 4.4 0 1 3 33.3 50 64 Italy GFCM 4 1 3 4 33.3 42 64 Namibia SEAFO 4.4 0 0 3 ** 58 63 South Africa SEAFO 4.8 0 2 4 ** 61 63 ** No data available Source of RFMO performance scores: Cullis Suz uki and Pauly (2010). Source of country performance scores: Alder et al. (2010). The data in Table 6 whether RFMO performance can be explained by the performance of member states. Despite the variation between them, most of the countries that exerted particular effort
158 for high seas MPAs in the Northeast Atlantic are also the countries with higher aggregate scores and MPA related conservation policy performance. Germany and the Netherlands hold the highest aggregate scores, and Germany and the UK are especially committed to ecosy stem protection and MPAs within their EEZs. However, two points deserve further attention. First, countries in a less institutionalized region, like the Southeast Atlantic, are able to compete in aggregate terms with their counterparts in the Northeast Atl antic. Nevertheless, they are constrained by the factors explained in Chapter 5. Additionally, Canada is committed to MPA policies in their EEZs more than most of the countries in the Table 6 5. Second, countries in the Northeast Atlantic are effective on ly in the areas close to their EEZs despite the fact that they are currently members of RMFOs or parties to regional fisheries agreements regulating the regions other than the Northeast Atlantic. This change might be explained by the perception of immediat e and private costs of failing to save the common resources of the high seas when these resources are closer to their sovereign areas. Moreover, it is necessary to emphasize the difference between the concept of the convention area of an RFMO and the regul atory area of an RFMO. The convention area consists of areas in the EEZs of member states and the high seas of the region. Despite the discussions on the development of consistent measures across and beyond EEZs, and a theoretically plausible argument for policy convergence through RFMOs, countries still hold significant sway in implementing country specific MPA measures within their EEZs. However, the regulatory area of an RFMO refers to zones beyond the EEZs of member states but st ill under the convention area. High seas MPAs, fully or sometimes partiall y, lie in the regulatory area. The EEZs of most
159 countries investing in high seas MPAs studies are close to, if not partially within, the protected area they support. The Norwegian proposal and UK research f or the Hatton Bank in the Northeast Atlantic, Canadian involvement with many of the NAFO MPAs (Orphan Knoll and the coral protection zone are some examples), and France and Italy in the Pelagos Sanctuary Reserve of the Mediterranean Sea illustrate such cas es. This discussion on the limited influence of individual states does not lead to an argument in support of exclusively NGO power. On the contrary, looking at the difference between NEAFC and SEAFO or SIOFA, it is reasonable to draw conclusions in fav or of the creation of effective IGOs, or more specifically RFMOs. International organizations pursue an agenda for and invest resources in strategies beyond national interest, which is definitely a step to be welcomed from a protection of commons perspecti ve. Furthermore, if one considers CCAMLR in the Southern Ocean, a long history of institutionalization and the strong commitment of nongovernmental actors including representatives of both advocacy and business organizations appear to be the essential elem ents of maximum environmental performance.
160 CHAPTER 7 ON THE POWER OF NETWORKS, NGOS, AND NATIONAL INTEREST: WHO IS MISSING IN THE HIGH SEAS MPAS GOVERNANCE NETWORKS? A detailed examination of regional policy making processes and an analysis of global structure, inter regional ties, and the relationship between structure and effectiveness present a valuable opportunity to re evaluate the existing perspectives on governance of the commons, social networks, effectiveness, and NGOs. In a ddition to affirming how certain arguments about transnational networks and NGOs also apply to high seas MPAs governance, this project brings new observations to three topics in global environmental governance. First, most studies on the gove rnance of glob al commons do not provide lessons fully applicable to the truly global questions students of international organization tackle. This is primarily because of the risks of scaling up the conclusions drawn from local level experiences. Notions of institutiona l diversity and interplay are still relevant to the discussion of governance of global commons, but these factors have different implications in an area such as ocean governance. The second observation addresses the relationship between causality, science, and effectiveness. The importance of scientific expertise and data are acknowledged in environmental governance in general, but they become even more crucial in the management of high seas resources. Without making a claim regarding the exclusive effect o f high seas MPAs, this project suggests that regions with established scientific institutions exhibit higher environmental performance. Nonetheless, producing scientific knowledge, basing their policies on scientific recommendations, and handling uncertain ty still stand as challenges for, rather than accomplishments of, most RFMOs. The third observation of this project confirms the differences in state behavior due to national versus global commons perceptions. If the goal is ensuring the
161 sustainability of high seas resources, an investigation of which regions and countries are missing in global high seas MPAs governance is as important as understanding which are present and active. The data suggest that the regions with the highest catch levels have yet t o join high seas MPAs efforts, despite the fact that the major fishing states of such regions are advanced democracies with rising economic and political powers and are among the most active countries in national fisheries and MPA policies. Parallel to the original thesis of this project, NGOs provide a potential remedy for the shortcomings discussed above, or at least have the ability to do so. Transnational environmental NGOs reduce the consequences of these deficiencies when they act as campaigners, rese archers, diplomats, and observers of high seas governance. Lastly, from a more policy oriented perspective and with reference to the international legal institutional framework, the final section of this chapter discusses whether high seas MPAs can be effective tools in saving the global fisheries and high seas ecosystems. It maintains that high seas MPAs can serve as effective tools in saving global fisheries, but this is dependent upon the creation of an integrated ocean governance system that can use issue linkages and generate incentives for all actors to participate What does the High Seas MPAs Case Suggest about the Social Network Approach to the Governance of Commons? Many arguments about the governance of global commons agree on the role of institutions and institutional diversity. The question remaining open to debate is how we can understand the relationship between diverse institutions and what kind of institutions are more relevant and influential in the governance of CPRs. Policy pre scriptions, such as complete centralization or privatization, reliance on local
162 practices and knowledge, or focusing on one international regime or organization are all deemed insufficient (Dietz et al. 2003; Ostrom 1990; Schneider et al. 2003; Young 2002) Recent studies underscore the necessity of classifying a set of relevant actors and institutions as a system, involving formal and informal ties and actors of various types and levels. Increasingly, such systems are conceptualized and studied as a networ k (Hafner Burton et al. 2009; Schneider et al. 2003). This project also confirms that high seas MPAs governance should be studied as a network in which IGOs, states, environmental NGOs, and business representatives interact and communicate with each other. Nevertheless, this project also brings new observations to the scale and institutional interplay issues in the governance of global commons. One of the most prominent arguments about social network theory and the network form of governance is that netwo rks facilitate the communication and transmission of information and norms (Carpenter 2011; Di Gregorio 2012). This es about IGO NGO relations have become increasingly similar among Atlantic regions. The original pattern was exemplified by the NEAFC, and later NAFO, SEAFO, and even GFCM started to exhibit similar practices concerning NGO participation. These RFMOs have common member states, and organizations such as the WWF, Greenpeace, and DSCC to which the Pew Group, Oceana, and EAC are already members are common NGOs shaping the institutional norms and policies of each region. By the end of the 2000s, it became eviden t that each organization had adopted a similar attitude with respect to NGO participation in negotiations the meetings of scientific committees, and the commissions
163 of RFMOs. Certainly, there are still disparities between regions regarding IGO NGO relation ships and transparency. The tangible impacts of this process in procedural and practical terms are being seen in the following years. However, when the focus on governance networks is narrowed down to CPRs, this study demonstrates that the experience s and lessons gleaned from small scale and local CPR cases cannot be fully applied to the global scale governance of CPR challenges. The emphasis on institutional diversity and the interaction and mutual feedback between these institutions can be considere d common concerns at both levels (Biermann 2008; Os trom et al. 1999; Young 2002). Nevertheless, the composition of networks varies significantly between the two levels of commons problems. Institutional interplay is examined as vertical interplay and horiz ontal interplay. The vertical interplay between actors of different levels, ranging from local to global, is more relevant to contemporary local or regional CPR problems. In the case of high seas MPAs, national representation is the lowest level. The main framework for high seas governance is already drawn by international agreements and organizations, and high seas MPAs policies are developed and implemented primarily by RFMOs. The local population, knowledge, and institutions are completely out of the pic ture; however, these constitute major aspect s of CPR management in local or small scale commons (Berkes 2007; Ostrom 2005). points to future challenges. Some of these will be in stitutional, such as multilevel institutions that build on and complement local and regional institutions to focus on truly global problem ome truly global challenges may benefit from small
164 scale studies in the implementation of certain int ernational policies at regional or local levels. The comprehensive and years long projects on small scale CPRs unquestionably make invaluable contributions to the field. It is needless to reiterate the well recognized achievements of such studies and their relevance to countless empirical instances. The point this project stresses is that lessons obtained from small scale experiences do not sufficiently address the questions students of international organization aim at answering, such as how to create glob al scale mechanisms without losing depth of cooperation and bolstering the effectiveness of international regimes and organizations. What is needed is to link transnational but not CPR focused analyses with small scale CPR management networks studies. Os trom et al. also recognize the issues that emerge from the application of local lessons to global scale CPR problems. According to them, these issues include the scaling up problem, the challenge of cultural diversity, complications of interlinked CPRs, ac celerating rates of change, the requirement of unanimous agreement as a collective choice rule, and the presence of only one globe with which to experiment (1999, 281 282). This list includes a range of factors relevant to global environmental governance, but this discussion also refers to groups with cultural differences in CPR management and self organization in the face of billions of inhabitants of the world, which do not reflect the language and dynamics of negotiations and international policy discuss ions to create global level biodiversity, fisheries, or climate change regimes. Young (2002) elaborates on the problem of scaling up and emphasizes the differences in the natures of actors in international society in comparison to local, community based co
165 traditional settings in which arrangements for managing the use of CPRs are hard wired (2002; 158). Young also recognizes that environmental challenges do not always fall over one or the other edge, and in any case, the lessons from local level experiences can contribute to our understandin g of global challenges (2002). However, the study o f high seas MPAs suggest that high seas governance is much closer to the international setting edge, as opposed to the local setting edge, and its connection with small scale CPR cases is considerably limited. F urthermore, the appropriate methodology to t ackle the problems of two scales exh ibits significant differences. Elinor Ostrom (2005) and Amy Poteete, Marco Janssen, and Elinor Ostrom (2010) present the findings of their institutional analysis and CPRs re search drawn largely from small scale or region al CPR management examples from different parts of the world. Field studies, experiments, and game theoretical representations of the findings are the main tools they employ to discuss institutional diversity and collective action in the governance of comm ons. Field studies or experiments in the context of a small river basin or coastal fisheries management are not ap plicable to, for example, international climate change regime negotiations. They theory of human action, microinstitutional analysis, and the analysis of broader socio an essential factor for this purpose (Poteete et al. 2010, 245). It might be claimed that ocean fisheries are examples of failure because of limited communication and trust, but there are several factors that affect global fisheries regulations beyond the scope of the beh avioral theory of human
166 action. As stated earlier, while recognizing the importance of communication and institutional diversity, the high seas MPAs case suggests that there is not enough room in thes e discussions to consider topics such as competing sovereignty claims, power relations in the issue area or global p olitics and national interest. T he high seas MPAs case demonstrates that the UN and FAO with global environmental policies, regional IGOs and states with diverse capabilities and priorities, high seas fishing vessel operators with large capacity and advanced technology, and transnational environmental NGOs are the primary agents of c hange in high seas governa nce. Making observations based on direct human nature interaction is not a pplicable to the deep sea ecosystems in the high seas. On the one hand, there are several arguments about the necessity of approaching environmental governance as a coproduct of various actors and institutions, as implied by the frequent use of such terms And many would agree that communication is essential for transferring knowledge and norms, building trust, and ensuring coordination between actors, institutions, or stakeholders. This project also confirms these observations. On the other hand, most studies on the governance of commons are misaligned with the nature of the problems and the composition of actors in a truly global commons such as the high seas. What is needed, then, is to give more serious consideration to the na ture, composition, priorities, and motivations of the actors within these governance networks while also taking advantage of the networks approach discussed in earlier sections and chapters of this project. The implications of missing these aspects and ano ther important strength of the social networks theory making it possible to establish a relationship between the
167 structure and the outcome are further discussed in the context of effectiveness and the role of NGOs and national interest in the high seas MPA s governance network Effectiveness and Science in the High Seas Governance System Chapter 2 elaborated on the definitions of effectiveness and the three steps of policy evaluation outputs, outcomes, and impacts that can be associated with both inst itutional and environmental effectiveness The analysis in Table 6 4 discussed two RFMO performance measures that correspond to outputs and impacts. The on paper or institutional performance analysis reflects the extent to which an RFMO adopted the recomme nded best practices. The decision to adopt the recommended best practices is an outcome of negotiations among members of an RFMO. The environmental performance score is a measure of the impact, obtained from an assessment of the state of fish stocks under the mandate of this RFMO. The declaration of protected areas might be interpreted as one of the outcomes of agreeing on recommended best practices, but there is no clear evidence of such a sequence being followed by RFMOs intentionally. In other words, con cerning the definition of outcomes, states may change their behaviors with regards to fishing in certain locations or below certain depths, but there is no reliable basis for claiming that this change emerged as a result of the adoption of recommended best practices. The consistent measurements in hand correspond to outputs and impacts. There is another institutional variable available for each region consistently, and that is the type of champion organization in each region. The following section of this c hapter elaborates on this relationship between the structure and the outcome. The causal relationship between outputs, outcomes and impacts is an important question in the study of effectiveness in environmental governance, and it relates to
168 another funda mental aspect of this topic the role of science and scientific uncertainty. Also in support of the scaling up question, scientific uncertainty is an especially daunting challenge in a field like high seas governance and deep seas fisheries and ecosystems. As Young maintains: Although surprises are always possible, users of small scale CPRs (e.g., in shore and localized fish stocks) are likely to have a well developed (although not necessarily scientific in the Western sense) understanding of the dynamics o f biophysical systems in which they are embedded. Compare this with efforts to manage human activi ties in large marine ecosystems. (2002, 146) The dynamics of large ecosystems involves higher levels of uncertainty. The Benguela Current Large Marine Ecosystem (BCLME) case is an appropriate example of this situation. The research and conservation efforts for BLME were handled by a multilateral organization, Benguela Current Commission (BCC), founded by South Africa, Namibia and Angola. BCC projects spe nt years assessing the state of the BCMLE and developing a sustainable management system (BCC 2013b). The BCMLE is close to the EEZs of its founding states. It also facilitated the creation of integrated management systems within the EEZs of these three co untries, but the picture becomes complicated with the consideration of deep sea fishing zones far from most EEZs. For example, the scientific validity of the criteria for determining the areas that required special protection in the Southern Indian Ocean h as been a source of criticism from the 2011). Carrying out research surveys to discover where VMEs occur or were more likely MPA agendas.
169 Despite the necessity of further scientific evidence to establish a causal relationship occurring due uniquely to MPAs, 1 a comparison of regions in terms of the influence of science and scientific actors and environmental performance can sti ll shed light on the discussion of the impact of science and scientific actors on effectiveness. Regions with well established scientific institutions prove to be more successful in maintaining sustainable fish stocks levels. The two extreme cases with reg ards to the strength of scientific institutions are the Southern Ocean and Southern Indian Ocean. The Antarctic Treaty System of the Southern Ocean founded decades before many regional fisheries agreements was the first to adopt an ecosystem approach, and this region hosts the most environmentally successful RFMO. The Southern Indian Ocean BPAs, as discussed above, have always been the source of debate regarding the scientific validity of the protection area selection criteria. The region did not have an RF MO in effect until mid 2012 and data were not available to make a reliable assessment of fish stocks. As for the four regions between the two extremes, NEAFC is the RFMO with the second highest environmental performance score and, uniquely, the region has an independent scientific advisory body like ICES. NAFO and GFCM rank in the middle in terms of their environmental performance. The NAFO Commission was criticized for not following scientific advice and the GFCM spent a long time dealing with political c onsensus and implementation issues. Lastly, SEAFO adopted the ecosystem approach shortly after its creation but, as the absence of data on regional stocks 1 For ex ample, success in the fight against illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing might also have some causal effect on the fish stocks.
170 confirms, this RFMO still deals with the consequences of being a recently founded organization. With regards to the epistemic communities argument (Haas 1989), the group of scientists that more directly affected the high seas MPAs policies are also regional scientific committees of advisory bodies. The detailed review of regional processes in C hapters 4 and 5 exemplified how scientific recommendations might be ignored by the RFMO commissions in some cases. In fact, this is not limited to MPA policies. Barkin and DeSombre (2013) show empirical evidence on the violation of scientific committee adv ice on total allowable catch limits. According to them, RFMOs, including the CCAMLR, NAFO, and SEAFO, generally set catch limits above the figures determined in the scientific committee recommendations ( 2013, 71 72). At least as far as the high seas MPAs p olicies are concerned, there is no strong basis for the argument that scientists in their own right could redefine state interests and enable cooperation between governmental representatives. In conclusion, it is necessary to reiterate that scientific res earch, knowledge, and data are fundamental in understanding the problem, designing necessary policies, and conducting assessments on the achievement of a policy in which high seas governance or, more broadly, in environmental governance, is established and enacted. Additionally, as many studies highlighted (Mitchell 2006, 81 83 ; Young 1999, 65 ), there are examples of how scientific uncertainty may be used to justify inaction despite the fact that the precautionary principle advocates taking action based on the best available information. Despite these problems, RFMOs consult scientific recommendations before concluding their policies. It is clearly essential to put more emphasis on scientific
171 research in order to identify and understand the causal relationsh ips within the data available and to strengthe n environmental effectiveness Transnational Environmental NGOs as Champion Organizations Transnational environmental NGOs in high seas governance are operational in various regions and they take advantage of opportunities to communicate with policy makers and each other in regional and global policy platforms. The DSCC and ASOC are already coa litions of tens of environmental NGOs, and CoML is an outstanding example of a transnational network of scientists and scientific organizations. In addition, representatives from different NGOs act cooperatively in the preparation of reports, the presentat ion of NGO studies and joint statements on behalf of the NGO community, and in performance reviews. NGO diplomats (Corell and Betsill 2008) have a strong presence in most recent RFMO meetings. The representatives of NGOs express their opinions and give pre sentations in these meetings on equal par with the member states of the organization. Indeed, sometimes their voice is heard more often and with greater effect than some member states. The transnational and cooperative nature of environmental NGOs active in high seas governance helps these organizations fit the definition of transnational advocacy networks (TANs) (Keck and Sikkink 1999). Among the four tactics that TANs typically employ informational politics, symbolic politics, leverage politics, and acc ountability politics informational and accountability politics are the two prominent strategies used in high seas MPAs governance. Their large networks enable them to collect data and draft proposals for each region and, at the same time, to transfer their research and policy relevant experiences to other regional or global scale organizations. Additionally, accountability politics is another strategy NGOs effectively use in high seas governance.
172 Examples from the WWF and DSCC in NEAFC and NAFO, and the Pew level assessment, demonstrated how these organizations keep track of the statements and commitments of member states. NGOs bring these topics and commitments back to the table for discussion the following year, or at the next relevant oppor tunity, in order to acknowledge the steps taken in pursuit of the established objectives or to remind RFMOs of the shortcomings of their policies, or to do both simultaneously. The proceedings of RFMO meetings and UN and FAO events are generally made avail able to the public. Furthermore, NGOs issue press releases and publish reports independent from IGOs to inform the public about relevant environmental and policy based developments. These strategies add to both the transparency and accountability of states and IGOs. Why do these actions improve environmental performance when NGOs are the champion organizations? NGOs like the WWF, Greenpeace, ASOC and the DSCC possess a considerable amount of specialization and expertise in the issue area and the mere fo cus of this accumulation creates a potent argument for their cause. 2 It is true that governments possess the resources and authority that many NGOs cannot bring to bear; nevertheless, they also have multifaceted agendas, whether in relation to ocean govern ance or not. The long list of state priorities and interests may differ considerably for governments even if they recognize the necessity to take action for the sustainability of fisheries. NGOs, on t state 3 in intern ational 2 This is not to claim that all cases pertaining to a normative cause receive equal representation on the agendas of NGOs (see Carpenter 2011 for examples). Nevertheless, at least in the high seas MPAs case, NGOs pay significant attention to essential topics such as bottom trawling and marine biodiversity and ecosystems. 3 Sprinz and Vaahtoranta (1994; 2002) define four types of states in international environmental negotiations: pushers, intermediates, bystanders, and draggers. Pushers are the countries with high
173 negotiations, unbound by a plethora of competing interests and capable of narrowly focusing and tailoring a specific message. Additionally, an NGO presence can prevent, or at least reduce, the possibility of a decision making process unduly influen ced by member states or industrial organizations, which may prioritize the economic avoid the full implementation of the precautionary principle. There is another reason why NGOs play a critical role in issue areas such as the high seas. For example, when the problem area is extreme air pollution at the country level, the displacement of local people for deforestation or dam construction, or when the livelihood of fisherm en in a coastal area is at risk; in essence, when the human population at the individual or state level is directly influenced by the problem. Despite power disparities, they can speak for themselves by drawing media attention to the problem, using votes o r immediate economic stakes as leverage on governments or other relevant authorities, and bringing the issue to the attention of the state or the global community. High seas MPAs are established in zones far away from public attention, thus, the consequen ces of bottom trawling for the general public, as it is in the examples listed above, are rarely felt. NGOs fill in the gap originating from the absence of local or voter pressure. Even in a case such as the Canadian seal hunt, which did not draw public at tention in the 1960s, the issue was placed on the international agenda only after transnational environmental and animal rights NGOs drew attention to the issue. The change in related policies occurred in the 1980s, after years of campaigns (Wapner 1995). Therefore, in high seas governance, the basic ecological risks and relatively low costs of implementing environmental protection measures. According to the authors, these countries advocate stringent environmental regulations in negotiations.
174 agenda setting and dissemination of information functions of NGOs are critical. Their scientific expertise, specialization in the issue area, participation in negotiations as NGO diplomats, and monitoring and t ransparency efforts add to these basic functions. Consequently, it does matter when NGOs act as champion organizations in high seas MPAs policy processes. influenc e of NGOs. First, the argument here should not be perceived as a generalization for all NGOs in every issue area; however, it does claim that high seas governance is an area confirming the constructive role of NG Os in environmental protection. Second, the conclusions of this project do not produce an argument for the absolute power of NGOs in changing policies, nor do they lead to the claim that NGO influence can replace the position of governmental organizations in world politics. On the contrary, as the S outhern Indian Ocean example articulates, the absence of an (inter)governmental authority exhibits many of the shortcomings inherent in the policy design process. Similarly, as a purely nongovernmental initiative completely within the province of NGO actor s, it took decades for the Pelagos Sanctuary to become an official reserve area. Networks are not necessarily non hierarchical. The presence of ties between two actors should not lead to the assumption that these two actors are equally powerful in shaping the agenda of this network and in influencing the interactions between actors. As Carpenter highlights, even though some studies embrace such an approach, network theory does not necessarily posit an alternative and non hierarchical form of governance in w hich every actor possesses equal access, influence, or power
175 adopted in this project does not imply a non hierarchical form of governance. Quite the opposite, it recognize s that states, RFMOs, and global IGOs are important actors in global high seas MPAs governance. Yet transnational environmental NGOs are not completely but significantly able to remedy many of the shortcomings of the present governance system What is Miss ing in the High Seas MPAs Network? On National versus Global Commons An assessment based on what has already been accomplished may provide a more positive representation of the environmental governance of the global commons than it exists in reality. An an alysis of which actors are missing in the high seas MPAs governance network is as important as understanding which actors have joined the network. This is especially important given the extractability of CPRs, which suggests that the use of such resources by one affects their availability for others. Thus, establishing which actors are within the network, and why some may be outside the high seas governance system is crucial to broadening the network and to ensuring the long term sustainability of common r esources. An appropriate first step to such an analysis is identifying where fisheries production takes place According to statistics (FAO 2007b, 10) the Pacific regions the Northwest Pacific, Southeast Pacific and Western Central Pacific, we re the leaders in capture fisheries production in 2004 The se statistics are crucial in the sense that they represent fisheries production figures in different high seas regions at a time when the high seas MPAs idea became a policy tool explicitly referred to in the UN an d FAO agenda. Nevertheless, t he lea ding capture fisheries producing regions were late in establishing RFMOs with ecosystem management mandates. The conventions founding the
1 76 Western and Central Pacific Ocean Fisheries Commission and the South Paci fic Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (SPRFMO) entered into force in the mid 2000s and early 2010s. These RFMOs are yet to designate and implement high seas MPAs. Moreover there are continuing discussions about the establishment of an RFMO for th e Northwest Pacific fisheries. In addition to t hese developments at the regional level, a closer look at the states missing from the high seas MPAs governance network can further clarify the picture Table 7 1 ranks countries according to their country ag gregated score of marine resource management performance as measured by Alder et al (2010). Table 7 1. Comparison of major fishing countries In the network? Aggregate score MPA area MPA inv. EEZ trawl IP High seas MPAs RFMO memberships New Zealand No 5.5 0 1 3 64 CCAMLR, SIOFA Germany Yes 5.2 2 10 2 42 NEAFC, CCAMLR Netherlands Yes 5.1 1 3 0 55 NEAFC, CCAMLR UK Yes 4.8 1 5 4 52 NEAFC, CCAMLR South Africa No* 4.8 0 2 4 61 SEAFO, CCAMLR USA No 4.8 1 3 4 68 NAFO, CCAMLR Spain Yes 4.5 1 2 4 52 NEAFC, GFCM, CCAMLR Japan No 4.5 0 1 4 63 CCAMLR, GFCM, NAFO, SEAFO Canada Yes 4.4 1 4 4 68 NAFO France Yes 4.4 0 1 3 50 GFCM, NEAFC, CCAMLR, SIOFA, NAFO** Namibia No* 4.4 0 0 3 58 SEAFO, CCAMLR Norway Yes 4.2 0 1 4 67 NEAFC, NAFO, SEAFO, CCAMLR Russia No 4.1 1 0 4 34 CCAMLR, NEAFC, NAFO Italy Yes 4 1 3 4 42 GFCM, NEAFC, CCAMLR China No 3.7 0 0 4 47 CCAMLR *However, the se countries have a prominent role in the regional high seas ecosystems conservation. **In respect of Saint Pierre et Miquelon Source of country performance scores: Alder et al. (2010).
177 Evidently, many countries that are among the leaders in the fishing industry, some of whom are also leaders in international politics and the economy, are notably absent in the high seas MPAs governance network. Significant actors from the regions with the highest fisheries production figures exist outside the game. Another important feature of some of the countries missing from the high seas MPAs governance network is that they have exceptional environmental performance within their own EEZs. China, for in stance, does not have a high aggregate score and this is similar for other fisheries and MPA e United States also deserves particular attention. The United States has one of the highest institutional performance scores in addition to its achievements in MPA related indicators and bottom trawling regulations within its sovereign areas. Despite its leadership in several topics in world politics, the United States does not commit itself to leadership in issues concerning high seas conservation. Japan and Russia are two other states that have high seas fishing vessels in various regions, which explains their membership in a number of RFMOs. Japan has traditionally done a better job in adopting the FAO Code of Conduct and has an When these different observations are tak en together, it becomes clear that the largest powers and advanced democracies in international politics and economics are missing in the high seas MPA governance network, despite the fact that many of them are also most active in depleting the global fish eries.
178 T he missing parts of the global high seas governance network, and the high national performance of many missing actors confirms the relevance and importance of the debate regarding the difference in national and global commons percep tions in high s eas governance. Broadening this network and the implementation of high seas MPAs is a desired outcome from a policy perspective. Achieving these desired outcomes is not possible without understanding the motivations of actors missing in this governance sys ig and Bernauer 2009; Keohane et al. 1993; Sprinz and Vaahtoranta 1994) rather than a base assumption about the nature of a group of stakeholders with more or less the same level of power and similar interests. Such a conversation between two types of lite rature can prove useful to generate a policy relevant discussion on how to save the global commons The International Legal Institutional Framework and the Ecosystem Approach: Can High Seas MPAs Save the Global Fisheries? The review of the international le gal and institutional framework in Chapter 3 revealed how international fisheries management has flourished since the 1980s and how the international community has realized the necessity of adopting ecosystem based fisheries management tools. High seas MPA s are designated with these lessons and goals in mind. Thus far, the focus of MPAs has been on fish stocks, fisheries closures, and bans on deep water trawling to protect VMEs. However, as detailed in the protected areas discussion, MPAs are multi purpose projects. The focus on fisheries related purposes may be shifted or broadened toward different problems such as
179 mining, energy development, and pollution. These problems are also directly affecting marine ecosystems. MPAs are tools of spatial management an It would be a bold statement at this point to suggest that MPAs will save the global fisheries. The reasons behind this view do not pertain to the characteri stics of high seas MPAs or the appropriateness of the ecosystem approach. On the contrary, the reasons at the base of this view regard the inadequate and incomplete implementation of these tools. If one was to explore the regions, organizations, and states missing from global high seas MPAs governance, a quick and simple observation would be that a significant part of the fishing regions and states are outside this picture. Consequently, a fundamental goal for saving global fisheries should be a policy of b roadening participation to a global agenda for high seas MPAs and the strengthening political willingness of actors to implement high seas MPAs. For example, more direct and active participation of Pacific RFMOs and states like the United States, Japan, Ch ina, and Russia can make a big change in favor of this goal. Can NGOs create these changes? NGOs may not be able to immediately and directly strengthen the political willingness of these powerful states. But they can continue their existing studies through RFMOs and also create domestic pressure on governments to change their international environmental policies. For example, the Convention on the Conservation and Management of High Seas Fishery Resources in the South Pacific Ocean the convention which est ablished the SPRFMO, was signed in 2010 and came into force in 2012 (SPRFMO No date). Columbia, Peru, and the United States are the only three countries that have signed but not ratified the Convention yet.
180 Given the power and influence of the United State s in world politics, it may be possible for NGOs to stimulate domestic dynamics to compel politicians to pursue progressive steps in high seas conservation. Earlier studies have shown empirical examples of how the United States affected international envir onmental policy and in doing so required other countries to adopt similar pro environment measures, i.e. export environmentalism, through its economic influence (DeSombre 2000; Garcia Johnson 2000). In such examples, the sensitivity of domestic civil socie ty to an environmental issue induces the government to implement more stringent environmental standards. The domestic economic actors also become interested in the internationalization of environmental standards in order to avoid the consequences of compet itive disadvantage; eventually, the application of the same standards to imports require the trade partners of the United States to adopt more environment friendly production methods. In short, NGOs cannot create a sudden change in the system, but they can trigger the internationalization of environmental standards, which can pave the way for the creation of a regulatory system with broader participation and new incentive structures due to issue linkages. Indeed, aside from the IGO NGO relation debate, issue linkages across different aspects of ocean governance can provide substantial mechanisms for saving global fisheries and high seas ecosystems. The sustainability of fishing also has an economic stake bu t, at least in the short run, high seas MPAs are perceived and implemented as environmental conservation measures. Nevertheless, there are other aspects of ocean governance managed by various organizations. For example, as explained in Chapter 3, the ISA a nd IMO also hold the authority to establish protected or closure areas under
181 risk because of the activities they regulate. Mining and shipping are directly related to economic activities that are vital to most countries. Future efforts should concentrate o n the cultivation of a regulatory system in which economic and environmental concerns reinforce each other. First, such a system can respond to criticisms about fragmentation in ocean governance, as it calls for the application of an integrated and ecosyst em based management approach. Second, this system will necessitate, or provide incentives for, the states to become a part of the regulatory structure. For instance, fishing, which undermines the position of legal toothfish fishing vessel operators. But once they are involved, in addition to fighting IUU fishing, COLTO members managed to reduce seabird bycatch to significantly lower levels. Similarly, even though they are not primarily concerned with the environment, abstaining from an ocean governance system using linkages with shipping and mining activities is not an option most states would like to choose. As a final note the nature of such a regulatory system, ar guments for a global fisheries organization (Barkin and DeSombre 2013) does not correspond to what is advocated in this project for three reasons. First, argument for the use of issue linkages in global ocean governance goes beyond fisheries governance whe reas the global fisheries organization is expected to serve as a central and specialized fisheries agency. Second, given that there is a considerable amount of accumulation and expertise under the UN FAO umbrella, and particularly the FAO COFI, resources t hat would be invested in a global fisheries organization can be used for strengthening existing institutions. These institutions can also communicate and cooperate with
182 several oceans, economy, and environment related organizations affiliated with the UN s ystem. Such communication and cooperation would also reinforce the idea of an integrated ocean governance system taking advantage of issue linkages. Third, any policy prescription involving in creation of a global fisheries organization or another globall y applied regulation on the allocation of fisheries resources, should deal with the political willingness problem. Both in the specific case of high seas MPAs and more broadly the environmental governance of oceans, governments as agents of national polici es or members of international organizations do not sufficiently commit themselves to high seas conservation measures when there are economic costs required in implementing the regulations; they may even completely abstain from becoming parties to the inte rnational agreements and organizations. However, shipping and mining as other aspects of ocean regulation involve short run economic stakes for the governments, which become increasingly hard to quit or violate. This argument does not suggest a choice betw een accepting ocean governance as a whole or alternately quitting the entire system. It rather suggests a system in which fisheries, mining, and shipping organizations act in cooperation to ensure the implementation of ecosystem conservation measures. For example, relevant institutions from each of these vitally important economic field s can jointly designate spatial and ecosystem based management tools, i.e. MPAs, and create sanction mechanisms to jointly respond to violations Concluding Comments This pro ject demonstrated the current structure of the high seas MPAs governance system with a close examination of the six regions hosting these protected areas. It also demonstrated that the participation of transnational environmental NGOs
183 increases the effecti veness of this governance system. This project merged the environmental commons, global governance, and transnational networks frameworks, and maintained that, in the governance of truly global commons, institutional interplay is mostly vertical and the no des, i.e. actors, are not deemed to be non hierarchical. Even though there are disparities between the actors with regards to their authorities and resources, NGOs provide remedies for the present shortcomings of the system. Future efforts of scholars and practitioners should focus on developing a closer understanding of the existing governance structure and the interests, priorities, and capabilities of the actors within this structure. These future efforts should be reinforced with further scientific rese arch and be guided by their findings. NGOs and states can also em ploy future strategies that would advance both their own interests and the conservation of the marine environment. To this end, NGOs should also channel their efforts to draw public attentio n to the destruction caused by deep water and bottom trawling. Bottom trawling has severe impacts on the marine ecosystem and, if articulated and presented effectively, individuals as elements of the global civil society can develop sensitivity to the issu e. As better informed voters and consumers, individuals can create leverage with producers and policy makers by adjusting their preferences accordingly. Moreover, through such efforts, transnational environmental NGOs can create new mechanisms to serve the ir cause. As discussed earlier, TANs can typically employ informational politics, symbolic politics, leverage politics, and accountability politics tactics, but so far informational and accountability politics are the more prominent strategies used in high seas MPAs governance. However, the other two tactics can also become useful strategies to take advantage in
184 high seas MPAs governance. First, symbolic politics constitutes a relevant and effective tool for drawing public support. Second, the reaction from civil society can grant leverage mechanisms for TANs to create pressure on states. Moreover, once they commit themselves to sustainability measures, the powerful states will be more likely to induce less powerful states to adopt similar measures. Add itionally, most states have an interest in engaging cooperation for the sustainability of high seas resources as economic goods. Nonetheless, uncertainty or riders are prevalent conce rns in international cooperation. These concerns can be reduced thanks to the studies of NGOs regarding monitoring and accountability of the policy environment. Like all CPRs, high seas resources are open access and extractable resources that become less a vailable to others as one user extracts them. RFMOs, and activities and to ensure that these resources will be available to all in the future. Strengthening monitorin g and increasing transparency will benefit the countries that are committed to the sustainability of high seas resources but suffering from the unregulated and unreported activities of other actors. Lastly, beyond the IGO NGO relationship question and regarding the ability of MPAs to save the fisheries and high seas ecosystems, MPAs present appropriate tools for ensuring the long term sustainability of the oceans. However, they need to be designated where necessary and implemented fully with the development of an integrated ocean governance system in which relevant competent authorities cooperate,
185 take advantage of issue linkages, and consequently, increase the political and economic interest of state s in the impl ementation of high seas MPAs
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203 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Betul Gokkir was born in Ankara, Turkey. She received her B.A. from the Department of Political Scienc e at Bilkent University in Ankara in 2007. She also studied in Turku, Finland, as an exchange student in 2006. Betul came to the United States to attend graduate school at the Department of Political Science at the University of Florida, where she earned her M .A. degree in international relations in 2010. Betul conducted research and taught courses on international organization and global environmental politics until 2013. She received her Ph.D. in political science from the University of Florida in 2013