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1 IF MONEY TALKS, HOW CONVINCING IS IT? THE EFFECTS OF PAYMENTS ON CONSERVATION BEHAVIOR IN ESPARZA, COSTA RICA By KOREY JO FORCE A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2013
2 2013 Korey Jo Force
3 To my parents: I would n ever be where I am without you
4 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS First and foremost, I tha nk the respondents of this study who were eager and willing to speak with me about their experiences. I also especially thank the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock agents in Costa Rica that took me under their wing as well as the helpful collaboration from Center for Tropical Agriculture Research and Higher Education Finally, I thank my family for supporting me in every decision I make and every challenge I choose to pursue.
5 TABLE OF CONTENTS page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 4 LIST OF TABLES ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 9 LIST OF FIGURES ................................ ................................ ................................ ........ 11 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................ ................................ ........................... 13 ABSTRACT ................................ ................................ ................................ ................... 14 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 16 2 CONSERVATION BHEAVIOR, PES, AND RISEMP: HISTORICAL AND LITERATURE FOUNDATION ................................ ................................ ................. 22 Behavioral Theory: Motivating Environmentally Responsible Behavior of Individuals ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 22 Knowledge and Behavior ................................ ................................ .................. 23 Intrinsic vs. External Motivations ................................ ................................ ...... 24 Psychology of Decision Making ................................ ................................ ........ 26 Key Components of Environmentally Re sponsible Behavior ............................ 27 Payments for Environmental Services (PES) : A Broad Theory ............................... 28 Positive Potentials of PES ................................ ................................ ................ 29 Negative Potentials of PES ................................ ................................ .............. 30 A Special Kind of PES: Silvopastoral Systems ................................ ....................... 31 T raditional Treatment of Pastureland ................................ ............................... 32 Direct Benefits of Silvopastoral Practices ................................ ......................... 33 Barriers to Adoption ................................ ................................ .......................... 34 The Regional Integrated Silvopastoral Approaches to Ecosystem Management Project (RISEMP) ................................ ................................ ................................ 36 Funding and Partners ................................ ................................ ....................... 37 Purpose ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 37 Program Details ................................ ................................ ................................ 38 Target components ................................ ................................ .................... 38 Design of participant groups ................................ ................................ ...... 39 Measuring: environmental service index (ESI) ................................ ........... 39 Preliminary Results ................................ ................................ .......................... 41 Preliminary results from Nicaragua ................................ ............................ 41 Connections with Costa Rica ................................ ................................ ..... 43 Framework for Discussing the Effects of RISEMP ................................ .................. 44
6 3 INSIDE THE TICO MIND: THE CONTEXT OF ESPARZA, COSTA RICA ............. 54 Costa Rica Cou ntry Profile ................................ ................................ ...................... 54 Geography and Demographics ................................ ................................ ......... 55 Political Development ................................ ................................ ....................... 56 Economic Development ................................ ................................ .................... 56 Social Development ................................ ................................ ......................... 57 A Unique Case of Conservation History ................................ ................................ .. 58 Command and Control ................................ ................................ ..................... 59 A New Era: Pagos por Servicios Ambientales (PSA) ................................ ....... 60 Locating Esparza: A Pr ofile of the Central Pacific Region ................................ ..... 62 Cattle Production ................................ ................................ .............................. 63 Silvopastoral Practices ................................ ................................ ..................... 63 Obstacles to Cattle Production ................................ ................................ ......... 64 Esparza, Costa Rica ................................ ................................ ......................... 65 Partnering Institutions ................................ ................................ ............................. 66 Center for Tropical Research and Higher Education (CATIE) .......................... 66 Mission ................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 66 Relationship with the Esparza community ................................ .................. 67 Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MAG) ................................ ..................... 67 Mission ................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 67 MAG of Esparza ................................ ................................ ......................... 68 RISEMP in Costa Rica ................................ ................................ ............................ 69 Participants ................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 69 Farm Size, Cattle Count, and Location ................................ ............................. 70 Gender ................................ ................................ ................................ ............. 71 Influencing Factors ................................ ................................ ........................... 71 Land tenure ................................ ................................ ................................ 71 Cattle market ................................ ................................ .............................. 72 ................................ ................................ .......... 72 Looking Forward ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 73 4 DATA COLLECTION, PREPARATION, AND PROCESSING ................................ 85 Forms of Data Collection ................................ ................................ ........................ 86 Semi structured interviews ................................ ................................ ............... 86 Selection of participants ................................ ................................ ............. 86 Circumsta nces of interviews ................................ ................................ ...... 87 Questionnaire ................................ ................................ ............................. 88 Key Informants Interviews ................................ ................................ ................ 89 Official RISEMP Data ................................ ................................ ....................... 90 Data Preparation, Processing, and Interpretation ................................ ................... 90 Coding ................................ ................................ ................................ .............. 91 Motivations ................................ ................................ ................................ 91 Practices ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 92 Components ................................ ................................ ............................... 94 Processes ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 95
7 Consequences ................................ ................................ ........................... 97 Construction of Environmental Consciousness Index ................................ ...... 98 Looking Ahead ................................ ................................ ................................ ........ 99 5 SHORT TERM EFFECTS OF THE RISEMP ON CONSERVATION BEHAVIOR 113 Net Changes in the Provis ion of Environmental Services ................................ ..... 114 Net Land Use Changes ................................ ................................ .................. 114 Changes in Rates of Adoption ................................ ................................ ........ 116 Behavioral Factors and Implications ................................ ............................... 117 Changes by Project Groups ................................ ................................ .................. 119 Changes in Mean Point Accumula tion by Project Group ................................ 119 Changes in Rates of Adoption by Project Group ................................ ............ 121 Behavioral Factors and Implications ................................ ............................... 122 Difference between groups A and B2 ................................ ...................... 123 Effects of subjective norms and intrinsic m otivations ............................... 123 Effects of positive external i ncentives ................................ ...................... 126 Effects of habitualization and e nvironmentality ................................ ........ 128 Tying Every thing Together ................................ ................................ .................... 130 6 EFFECTS ON LONG TERM BEHAVIOR CHANGE ................................ ............. 145 Data Notes ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 146 Continued Practices ................................ ................................ .............................. 148 Continued Practices by Project Group ................................ ........................... 149 Continued Practices by Payment Group ................................ ......................... 150 Behavioral Factors and Implications ................................ ............................... 151 Effects of subjective norms and intrinsic motivations ............................... 151 Effects of positive external incentives ................................ ...................... 153 Effects of habitualization and environmentality ................................ ........ 155 New Imp lementation of Practices ................................ ................................ ......... 155 New Implementation by Project Group ................................ ........................... 156 New Implementation by Payment Group ................................ ........................ 157 Behavioral Factors and Implications ................................ ............................... 158 Effects of subjective norms and intrinsic motivations ............................... 158 Effects of positive external incentives ................................ ...................... 159 Effects of habitualization and environmentality ................................ ........ 160 Differences in En vironmental Consciousness ................................ ....................... 161 Breaking Down Environmental Consciousness ................................ .............. 162 Differences in Environmental Consciousness by Projec t Group ..................... 163 Differences in Environmental Consciousness by Payment Group .................. 164 Behavioral Factors and Implications ................................ ............................... 164 Effects of subjective norms and non project exposure ............................. 165 Effects of positive external incentives ................................ ...................... 166 Effects of habitualization and environmentality ................................ ........ 167 Tying Everything Together ................................ ................................ .................... 167
8 7 CONCLUSION: THE EFF ECTS OF THE RISEMP ON CONSERVATION BEHAVIOR ................................ ................................ ................................ ........... 190 APPENDIX A QUESTIONNAIRE FOR GROUPS B AND C ................................ ........................ 198 B QUESTIONNAIRE FOR GROUP A ................................ ................................ ...... 203 REFERENCES ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 206 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ................................ ................................ .......................... 209
9 LIST OF TABLES Table page 2 1 Behavior change theories and key c omponents ................................ ................. 46 2 2 Silvopastoral systems and b enefits ................................ ................................ .... 47 2 3 Initial i nvestment c osts for s elected s ilvopastoral p ractices (USD/Ha): Costa Rica, Colombia and Nicaragua ................................ ................................ ........... 48 2 4 Observable r elationships b etween p roject a spects and b ehavior c hange c omponents ................................ ................................ ................................ ........ 49 2 5 Environmental s ervices i ndex u sed by RISEMP ................................ ................. 50 3 1 GDP g rowth r ate and GDP per capita: Costa Rica and Latin America and the Caribbean ................................ ................................ ................................ ........... 74 3 2 Evolution of p rotected a reas in Costa Rica 1955 1999 ................................ ....... 75 3 3 Farm s ize of t otal RISEMP p ar ticipants and r andom s ample ............................. 76 3 4 Distribution of p articipants by c ommunity ................................ ........................... 77 3 5 World p rice of b eef (US cents/pound) ................................ ................................ 79 4 1 Division of p ayment c lasses ................................ ................................ ............. 101 4 4 Environmental c omponents c ited by r espondents c oded into g eneral c ategories ................................ ................................ ................................ ......... 104 4 5 Environmental p rocesses c ited by r espondents c oded into g eneral p rocesses ................................ ................................ ................................ ......... 105 4 6 Environmental c onsequences c ited by r espondents c ode d into g eneral c onsequence ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 107 5 1 Changes in ESI p oint a ccumulation ................................ ................................ .. 133 5 2 RISEMP e ffects of s ubjective n orms and i ntrinsic m o tivations ......................... 134 5 3 Respondents w ho r eported s ilvopastoral p ractices b efore the RISEMP ........... 135 5 4 RISEMP e ffects of p ositive e xternal i ncentives ................................ ................. 136 5 5 Motivations for p articipation by p roject g roup ................................ ................... 137 5 6 RISEMP e ffects by l ength of i nvolvement ................................ ......................... 138
10 5 7 Effects of the RISEMP d esign on p articipant b ehavior ................................ ..... 139 6 1 Distribution of r espondents by p roject g roup ................................ .................... 170 6 2 Effects of s ubjective n orms and i ntrinsic m otivations on the c ontinuation of s ilvopastoral p ractices ................................ ................................ ...................... 171 6 3 Effects of p ositive e xternal i ncentive s on the c ontinuation of s ilvopastoral p ractices ................................ ................................ ................................ ........... 172 6 4 Motivations for p articipation by p roject g roup ................................ ................... 173 6 5 Effects of s ubje ctive n orms and i ntrinsic m otivations on the n ew i mplementation of s ilvopastoral p ractices ................................ ......................... 174 6 6 Effects of p ositive e xternal i ncentives on the n ew i mplementation of s ilvopastoral p ractices ................................ ................................ ...................... 175 6 7 Effects of l ength of i nvolvement on the n ew i mplementation of s ilvopastoral p ractices ................................ ................................ ................................ ........... 176 6 8 Effects of s ubjective n orm s and i ntrinsic m otivations on e nvironmental c onsciousness ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 177 6 9 Effects of p ositive e xternal i ncentives on e nvironmental c onsciousness .......... 178 6 10 Effects of l ength of i nvolvement on e nvironmental c onsciousness ................... 179 6 11 Respondents w ho r eported s ilvopastoral p ractices b efore the R ISEMP ........... 180
11 LIST OF FIGURES Figure page 2 1 Projected s hare of d eforested land converted to pasture and cropland, 2000 2010 ................................ ................................ ................................ ................... 50 2 2 Typical t ime p rofile s cenerio of b enefits of s ilvopastoral s ystems on 20 h ectare f arm in Nicaragua ................................ ................................ .................. 52 2 3 Adoption b ehavior of PES 2yrs vs. PES 4yrs Nicaragua p ilot s ite ...................... 53 3 1 Political m ap of Costa Rica ................................ ................................ ................. 80 3 2 Trends in HDI 1980 2010 ................................ ................................ ................... 81 3 3 Total c ontract and b udget a llocation for e ach PSA a ctivity (1997 2008) ............ 82 3 4 Esparza, Costa Rica ................................ ................................ ........................... 83 3 5 The f ive d istricts of the Es parza c anton ................................ .............................. 84 4 1 Number of r espondents who r eported f ew, a verage, or h igh n umbers of s ilvopastoral p ractices ................................ ................................ ...................... 108 4 2 Number o f r espondents who r eported l ow, a verage, or h igh a wareness of e nvironmental c omponents ................................ ................................ .............. 109 4 3 Number of r espondents c lassified as l ow, a verage, or h igh a wareness of e nvironmental p rocesses ................................ ................................ .................. 110 4 4 Number of r espondents who r eported l ow, a verage, or h igh a wareness of e nvironmental c onsequences ................................ ................................ ........... 111 5 1 Net c hanges in li ving fences, forest cover, improved pasture, and fodder b anks ................................ ................................ ................................ ................ 140 5 3 Comparison of international beef prices and percent adoption rate of silvopastoral p ractices ................................ ................................ ...................... 142 5 4 Average points accumulated by group and payment i ntervals ......................... 143 5 5 Average r ate of change in ESI p oint a ccumulation per h ectare by g roup e very 2 y ears ................................ ................................ ................................ .............. 144 6 1 Drawing by a respondent of his landholding and the land uses in each hectare ................................ ................................ ................................ ............. 181
12 6 2 Continuation of s ilvopastoral p rac tice by p roject g roup s ince RISEMP by p ercent ................................ ................................ ................................ ............. 182 6 3 Continuation of s ilvopastoral p ractices by p ayment g roup s ince RISEMP by p ercent ................................ ................................ ................................ ............. 183 6 4 b elief that s ilvopastoral p ractices w ere b eneficial in l ife, the w ell b eing of their c attle, the f uture of the c ommunity, and the e nvironment .... 184 6 5 New i mplementa tion of s ilvopastoral p ractices by p roject g roup s ince RISEMP by p ercent ................................ ................................ .......................... 185 6 6 New i mplementation of s ilvopastoral p ractices by p ayment g roup s ince RISEMP by p ercent ................................ ................................ .......................... 186 6 7 Ability of r espondents to r eport a spects of e nvironmental c onsciousness ........ 187 6 8 Environmental c onsciousness by p ercent p roject g roup ................................ ... 188 6 9 Environmental c onsciousness by p ercent p ayment g roup ................................ 189
13 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS CATIE Center for T ropical A griculture R esearch and H igher E ducation ESI E nvironmen tal s ervice i ndex EC E nvironmental c onsciousness MAG Ministry of A griculture and L ivestock PES P ayments for e nvironmental s ervices RISEMP Regional I ntegrated S ilvopastoral A pproaches to E cosystem M anagement P roject TA T echnical a ssistance
14 Abstract of The sis Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts IF MONEY TALKS, HOW CONVINCING IS IT? THE EFFECTS OF PAYMENTS ON CONSERVATION BEHAVIOR IN ESPARZ A, COSTA RICA By Korey Jo Force May 2013 Chair: Marianne Schmink Major: Latin American Studies In studies of Payments for Environmental Services (PES), or monetary compensation for conservation, little attention has been focused on the individual level effects of payments on conservation behavior. This study presents an analysis of the effects of a pilot PES program, the Regional Integrated Silvopastoral Approach to silvopasto ral practices in the Esparza watershed, Costa Rica. Data were collected in the summer of 2012 through semi structured interviews with randomly selected participants of the project. The two primary research questions explored by this study are: 1. To what ext conservation behavior during the project and what factors contributed to these motivations, or lack thereof? 2. te rm conservation behavior and levels of environmental consciousness and what are the factors that contributed to this? This study found no significant difference between incentivized and non incentivized project participants in both the quantity of practic es adopted and levels of environmental consciousness. The conclusions of this study suggest that payments
15 were unnecessary to motivate landowners to adopt silvopastoral practices due to the following conditions: 1. There was a previous, positive, and observa ble exposure to silvopastoral practices 2. There existed a national rhetoric of environmental conservation, payments for environmental services, and agroforestry 3. There were relatively high standards of living, economically, socially, and environmentally 4. Th ere existed relatively high levels of degradation such that the first practices adopted less labor than more intensive practices. Instead, this study suggests that the most motivating incentive was the provision of the physical investments and technical a ssistance necessary to implement a successful silvopastoral system.
16 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION If money talks, how convincing is it? This is one of the major questions offers monetary compensation for environmental conservation through a market for Research to date has evaluated the quantitative results of pilot projects and incipient programs, focusing mainly on the total environmental services provi ded or restored, and the additional income to providers. Relatively little attention has been focused on the individual level effects of payments on conservation behavior. This study presents an analysis of the effects of a pilot PES program, the Regiona l Integrated Silvopastoral Approach to Ecosystems Management Project Esparza watershed, Costa Rica. The two primary research questions explored by this study are: 1. To what ex conservation behavior during the project, what factors contribute to these motivations, or lack thereof, and what are the implications of these findings for future PES programs? 2. To what exte term conservation behavior and levels of environmental consciousness, what are the factors that contribute to this, and what are the implications of these findings for future PES programs? The RISEMP was a pilot PES project funded by the World Bank and Global Environment Facility (GEF), implemented through partnerships with the Center for Tropical Agricultural Research and Higher Education (CATIE) and the Ministry of Agriculture and Live stock (MAG) in Costa Rica. The project was designed to test the
17 practices, or the inclusion of trees in pasture land use systems. Thus, different project groups were created from voluntary small to medium sized landowners in the Esparza watershed, who received either payments alone, or payments combined with technical assistance and participated for either 2 or 4 years. A control group was also created in which participants were not offered incentives but agreed to allow the project to monitor their land use. Thus, the RISEMP was meant to inspire behavior change among landowners, and its design made it ideal for the analysis of the motivations, or lack thereof for these changes. The exact motivat ions for behavior change remain contested among behavior psychologists: some argue that positive external incentives are necessary to create a sense of habit while others argue that motivation must come from an inter nal value base. Behavior change literature identifies key components that are essential responsible behavior, in the case of this study defined as the adoption of silvopas toral practices. According to this literature, once individuals are empowered with information and knowledge about the behavior, they are more likely to engage in environmentally responsible behavior when: his/her values align with a biospheric belief sys tem that credits the importance of a balance with nature; the behavior is habitualized or engaged in frequently; the behavior is one from which an individual receives intrinsic satisfaction; and/or the behavior is one that the individual perceives as posit ive, accepted by members of his/her close social circle, and possible and/or achievable. The RISEMP therefore offers a unique opportunity to explore the effects of external incentives on
18 participants motivations to engage in conservation behavior as wel l as explore the importance of these key components of behavior change. Chapter 2 begins this study by establishing the literature foundation upon which the analysis of the short term and long term effects of the RISEMP are discussed in later chapters. To do this, it begins with a review of behavior change theories, and their components, paying close attention to those that were significant in the project design of the RISEMP; it is these theories, and components, that will be used throughout this study to examine the effects of the RISEMP. This review begins with the discussion of the importance of knowledge and information as a necessary but not sufficient condition for behavior change. It then addresses the disagreement between behavioral psychologis ts concerning the source from which behavior change is motivated and maintained over long periods of time and identifies significant components from psychological theories of decision making to create a key set of characteristics of environmentally respo nsible behavior that are addressed throughout the duration of this study. The chapter then introduces the concept of payments for environmental services (PES), addressing the positive and negative potentials of PES, providing a vocabulary and basis upon w hich to discuss the effects of the RISEMP on project participants. From this discussion, the chapter transitions into a discussion of silvopastoral practices, the direct and indirect benefits of such practices, and the barriers to their adoption. The ch apter concludes with an introduction to the RISEMP addressing the purpose, identifying the funding and partner organizations, specifying the program details, and discussing the preliminary results from another project site in Nicaragua.
19 Chapter 3 paints a picture of the Tico 1 mind, or the unique context in which landowners of the Esparza watershed made behavioral decisions. The chapter begins countries in Latin America, pol itically, economically, socially, and environmentally. Then, the chapter addresses the unique conservation history of the country that has created a population familiarized and well versed in not only the rhetoric of conservation, but also that of payment s for environmental services, something that environmentally responsible behavior. From this discussion, the chapter transitions to focus on the Esparza, Costa Rica, pilot si te, highlighting geographic and demographic environmental services. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the demographics of the RISEMP participants and f actors that may have influenced the controlled implementation of the project. Chapter 4 focuses on the process through which data were collected, prepared, and operationalized for this study. The two largest sources of data utilized by this study were s emi structured random interviews with RISEMP participants in the summer of 2012 and official RISEMP data provided to the author by CATIE. The chapter begins with an explanation of the selection of participants, the circumstances of each interview, and th e questions asked of each respondent. The chapter then transitions into a discussion of the preparation, processing, and interpretation of the data that were used to analyze behavior. Close attention is paid to the operationalization and construction of 1 Tico
20 the environmental consciousness index, silvopastoral practices and their ability to name environmental components, processes, and consequences which is used in Chapter 6 to gauge long term effects on project participant s. The next two chapters are used to analyze the data collected by this study. Chapter 5 addresses the first research question: t o what extent did the RISEMP affect facto rs contribute to these motivations, or lack thereof, and what are the implications of these findings for future PES programs? To answer this question, this chapter begins by discussing the net changes in the provision of environmental services by project participants an indication of beha vior change This discussion pays specific attention to the net land use changes of participants and the overall rates of adoption. The chapter then transitions to an examination of the effects of the incentives offered by the RISEMP by comparing the changes among project groups in both the total provision of environmental services and the rate of adoption of silvopastoral practices. The differences, or lack thereof, of these comparisons are then discussed within the b ehavioral framework introduced in Chapter 2. research question: t engage in long term conservation behavior and leve ls of environmental consciousness, what are the factors that contribute to this, and what are the implications of these findings for future PES programs? The long term effects of the RISEMP are discussed in three dimensions: the continuance of silvopastor al practices after the end of the
21 RISEMP; the new implementation of silvopastoral practices after the end of the Chapter 5 analyzes the short term of the RISEMP incentives thro ugh the official data given to this study, the long term behavioral effects are discussed in terms of the possible relationships between the behavioral theories, discussed in Chapter 2, and current practices, trends, and beliefs, as cited by former partici pants, and what these findings might say about the RISEMP. Chapter 7 serve s to summarize the findings of this study, placing them specifically in the behavioral framework used throughout the study. The chapter discuss es the implications of these findings on several levels. The implications for l ocal landowners in Esparza are addressed, paying specific attention to what the findings of this study might mean for future land use and livelihoods of farmers in the future. The findings are also discussed in th e context of PES as a whole, and what they might suggest for the future design of similar systems and/or projects.
22 CHAPTER 2 CONSERVATION BEHAVIOR PES, AND RISEMP: HISTORICAL AND LITERATURE FOUNDATION This chapter begins to lay the foundation upon which the analysis of the short and long term effects of the Regional Integrated Silvopastoral Approaches to Ecosystem Management Project (RISEMP ) are discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. To do this, it begins with a review of behavior change theories, and thei r components, paying close attention to those that were significant in the project design of t he RISEMP; it is these theories and components that will be used throughout this study to examine the effects of the RISEMP. This chapter then introduces the con cept of payments for environmental services (PES), a system of environme ntal valuation and compensation upon which the RISEMP was based in 2002. From this explanation the chapter transitions into a discussion of silvopastoral practices (the inclusion of trees in pastureland), the direct and indirect benefits of such practices, and the barriers to their adoption. The chapter concludes with an introduction to the RISEMP addressing the purpose, identifying the funding and partner organizations, specifying the program details, and discussing the preliminary results from another project site in Nicaragua. Behavioral Theory: Motivating Environmentally Responsible Behavior of Individuals The world is talking about the importance of the environment more than e ver before, but unsustainable environmental exploitation, degradation, and depletion continue at a seemingly un bounded rate. The question that behavior psychologists confront is: how do we bridge the gap between environmental concern and action so that i ndividuals engage in environmentally responsible behavior? While knowledge and access to information have proven to play an enabling role (Schultz, 2002) scholars
23 reject the claim that a causal relationship exists between access to information and environ mentally responsible behavior. S ome scholars credit a value base within individuals that values ecological components and processes such that the individual fears damage to said components (Stern, 2000), while others claim that the creation of incentivized behavioral habits are the necessary first steps to long term behavior change (Geller, 2002). The following discussion will explore these theories and the factors identified within them by behavioral psychologists as necessary for behavior change to creat e a framework for the analysis of PES and RISEMP. Knowledge and Behavior Early behavioral psychologists who placed extreme faith in the Rational Decision Making rhetoric of economists, or basic cost benefit analysis by individuals as the determinant of behavior, believed that a simple increase in knowledge was all that was necessary for individuals to understand the importance of the environment, realize what they were doing wrong, and make a behavior change accordingly (Kilbert et al 2012). Schultz ( 2002) discussed this theory in the Kowledge Deficit Model which argues that response, leads to an increase of the appropriate behavior. Although intuitive and credible at f ace value, the causal relationship between knowledge and behavior has thus far remained insignificant in behavioral studies. It is important to note however, studies involv ing recycling behavior, the lack of knowledge served as a barrier for individuals to engage in the behavior (Schultz, 2002). One reason for this is the way in which individuals listen to, interpret, and store the information that they are exposed to. Be havioral psychology shows that humans
24 tend to seek information that supports existing beliefs, de sires, or emotions: a search that often leads to the avoidance, dismissal, and/or forgetting of information that requires them to change their minds, and in ma ny cases, their behavior (Center for Research on Environmental Decisions (CRED), that people have strong preferences for retaining their own mental models, which often leads them to misinterpret data presented to them (CRED, 2009) Thus, in the process of encouraging and changing behavior, knowledge is necessary to enable behavior but is rarely acts as a motivator Intrinsic vs. External Motivations S cholars theorize in one of two general directions about how long te rm behavior change at the individual level should be motivated: intrinsically or externally. Stern (2000) argues in the Value Belief Norm (VBN) theory that long term behavior change should be intrinsically motivated, or come from a shift in values strong enough to motivate a permanent change in behavior. The VBN Theory purports that actions are at the end of a chain which begins with a value base, which leads to a belief system, which leads to personal norms, which finally lead to a behavior. Stern argue s that environmentally responsible behavior occurs when an individual has a value base that is rooted in the well being of the biosphere and an ecological belief system in which achieving a balance with nature and striving for sustainability is necessary ( 2000). This then leads to the creation of a personal norm, or a standard that an individual feels obligated to follow, concerning appropriate and or necessary treatment of the environment, and in this obligation the individual engages in environmentally r esponsible behavior.
25 Other scholars argue, however, that long term behavior change should be motivated by external factors until the said behavior becomes internalized either through habit or through a value system change. Geller (2002) argues that interv entions should p. 528). Under this rationale, Geller argues that external factors are the key to improving performance and that interventions should focus on incentives, or positive consequences, to motivate desired behaviors (2002). Once behaviors are repeated frequently enough, individuals will either incorporate the behavior into their habitual routines or incorporate it into their value system, something Agrawal refers to in the conservation field as While in theory this approach can be ideal for both recipients and providers, especially in the case of payments for environmental services, findings on the effectiveness of incentives are mixed. In gene ral, studies on material incentives and positive external motivation show that these approaches only motivate behavior while the incentives remain in place, and removing them is followed by a termination in behavior (DeYoung, 1993). Katz and Kahn (1978) maintain that extrinsic motivation (positive or coercive in nature), only results in small levels of compliance due to the undesirable side effect in which too much attention is focused on the intervention, or incentive, and not enough attention is focused on other motives or the behavior itself (DeYoung, 1993). This means that in many cases, people are only willing to change the target behavior when an obvious and easy incentive is present, and limit their behavior to that which is targeted. These possi ble unintended side effects can lead to questions
26 of durability and the willingness of individuals to explore related and untargeted pro environmental behavior changes (DeYoung, 1993). Psychology of Decision Making While these theoretical differences crea te the base for understanding behavior change, other literature deals more specifically with the motivating psychology of behavior change. DeYoung (2000) discusses the importance of intrinsic satisfactions, or self serving returns, in explaining an indivi describes three important and significant sources of personal satisfaction among respondents of a study about recycling: 1.) striving for behavioral competence, or feeling like one is capable and successful at a given behav ior; 2.) frugal, thoughtful participation in maintaining a community, or remaining part of and accepted by a social unit. Ajzen relatedly argues in the Theory of Plan ned Behavior (1991), that the strength of factors: 1.) the attitude toward the behavior; 2.) the subjective norm; and 3.) perceived control. Firstly, Azjen (1991) asserts that an ind ividual must have a positive attitude about the behavior and the outcome of the action, and therefore feel that something that he/she values will be threatened if he/she refuses to act. Azjen (1991) also shows that the subjective norm, or the actions that an individual perceives as important or valued satisfaction, individuals must have a sense of perceived control, or the belief that his/her
27 actions will have a direct effect on an outcome and that he/she has the ability to successfully engage in the action Key Components of Environmentally Responsible Behavior From this behavioral literature, we can identify key components that are essential behavior. Once individuals are empowered with information and knowledge, they are more likely to engage in environ mentally responsible behavior when: his/her values align with a biospheric belief system that credits the importance of a balance with nature; the behavior is habitualized or engaged in frequently; the behavior is one from which an individual receives intr insic satisfaction; the behavior is one that the individual perceives as positive, accepted by members of his/her close social circle, and possible and/or achievable. Table 2 1 shows a list of these behavior change components that are explored in this stu framework that we can shift into a discussion of payments for environmental services and their placement within changing behavior. It is important to note that the majority of behavior theories are based in a Western context: one referred to as post materialist (Inglehart, 1981). According to Inglehart (1981), post materialist societies are ones in which basic material needs are met and secure, and individuals are therefore able to address concerns beyond those of survival; basic material needs are defined as the physiological 1 and safety 2 needs 1 Maslow identif ied the following physiological human needs: food; water; shelter; warmth (Inglehart, 1981). 2 Maslow identified the following safety human needs: security; stability; and freedom from fear (Inglehart, 1981).
28 identified at the bottom of hierarchy of needs. Con cern and actions based on global concepts of environmental conservation and sustainability are considered second physiological and safety needs are not met, behavioral theorists expect behavior that strives, first and foremost, to secure these needs. The implications of this limitation will be buffered by the focus of this study in Costa Rica, one of the most developed countries in Latin America, and by the status of participants as landowners. T his study's application of behavioral psychology applies only to individuals who have their basic material needs met and does not address decision making processes that involve individuals who struggle for survival. This will be discuss ed further in Chapter 3. Payments for Environmental Services: A Broad Theory Conservation efforts in Costa Rica, and all over the world, have often fallen within a command and control approach in which landowners and inhabitants are required to follow cons ervation rules, guidelines, or practices outlined by a higher political power (Evans, 1999). Payments for Environmental Services (PES) which began to gain popularity in the latter part of the 1980's, however, offered financial incentives to conserve Envir onmental Services (ES) or what the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment provisioning services, such as food, water, and/or timber; regulating services, such as regulation of climate, flood, and or water quality; cultural services, such as recreation, aesthetic enjoyment, and/or spiritual enjoyment; and supporting services, such as soil formation, pollination, and/or nutrient cycl ing (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005).
29 In contra st to command and voluntary transaction where a well defined ES (or a land use likely to secure that service) is being one) ES buyer from a (minimum one) ES provider if and only if the ES provi der secures ES provision ( (Wunder, 2005, 3). These innovative programs often seek to integrate the conservation of environmental services with the market primarily through either area based schemes, which regulate land or resource use wit hin s pecified land areas, or product based schemes, which add a 2005). Currently, four main environmental service strategies stand out within the relevant literature on PES: carbon sequestration and storage; biodiversity protection; watershed protection; and landscape beauty (Wunder, 2005; Pagiola, Arcenas, & Platais, 2005). Positive Potentials of PES Advocates of PES are found among market economists and behavioral ps ychologists that agree with the Rational Choice Theory that defines individuals as behavior change which encourages the use of positive incentives to motivate behavior change. Market economists claim these programs to be more effective because individuals will be able to maximize their incomes. Furthermore, PES bases payments to service providers on payments from service users, creating a structural feedback mechanism in whic h service users have strong incentives to help regulate and enforce the provision and conservation of the ES for which they are paying (Pagiola, Arcenas, & Platais, 2005). Behavioral psychologists, like Geller (2002), believe that incentives such
30 as payme Since the early 1990's, there has been a shift in PES programs from a cons ervation focus to a more people oriented approac h that strives to integrate PES with development goals. While integrated conservation projects and sustainable forest management programs have targeted development goals, striving to increase income while simultaneously conserving the environment, they ha ve fallen short of achieving major shifts in tropical land use (Wunder, 2005). The failures of these command and control programs help justify the rationale and promise of establishing norms for PES. Pagiola (2007) suggests that PES offers a potential li nk with development. Pagiola presents two realities of PES that he uses to suggest a potential link: 1.) PES offer payments for environmental services, a source of income; and 2.) some of the most degraded areas also have the highest poverty rates. The l ink between development and PES, however, remains unclear and will be discussed later in this study (Pagiola, 2007). Negative Potentials of PES As promising as some believe it to be, the market oriented approach suggested by PES has strong critics. Conse rvationists argue that PES can lead to problems referred to as leakage and/or additionality (Wunder, 2005). Leakage refers to the unanticipated diversion of the degradation of environmental services and natural resources to other areas, in essence leading to no net gain in the environmental services, while additionality refers to the market inefficiency of paying for services that would have been provided regardless of payments. Conservationists further doubt both the sustainability and stability of trans forming conservation of environmental services
31 into a commodity. Once positive incentives, in the form of payments, are stopped or another land use practice becomes more profitable, what will motivate people to continue providing an environmental service? Geller (2002) argues that the continual practice of a behavior is what is necessary to ensure long term behavioral change at the individual level, while Stern (2000) argues that if the values of an individual are not targeted and changed initially, then the effects of incentives are superficial and fleeting Individuals will only engage in the practices to obtain payments, and according to Stern (2000), without an initial focus on values so that a behavior is intrinsically motivated, long term behavior change is impossible with sporadic PES programs. A Special Kind of PES: Silvopastoral Systems To explore these questions of the effects of PES on behavior change, this study focuses on silvopastoral practices, a unique form of environmental services. Sil vopastoral practices most generally refer to the inclusion of trees in pastured areas, an environmentally responsible alternative to the traditional belief that pastureland must be completely cleared of trees. Table 2 2 describes four prominent types of si lvopastoral systems identified by Pagiola et al and provides a description of each (2004). Silvopastoral practices are unique in that they provide benefits beyond those considered public goods, such as carbon sequestration, and therefore have the potenti al to simultaneously provide direct benefits to landowners. Despite this potential, silvopastoral practices are not widely utilized in Latin America. Not only is a culture of lags before increased profitability, and modest returns on practices have also presented barriers to the adoption of these practices. Nevertheless, the individual returns received
32 from silvopastoral practices are essential to address in the analysis of R ISEMP and in the speculation about its potential as a tool for long term behavior change in Costa Rica. Traditional Treatment of Pastureland Traditional treatment of pastureland for cattle production entails the expansion of pasture at the expense of standing forest; forest is cleared to allow for maximized cattle grazing (White, 2001). This disappearance of forest due to pasture expansion and degradation has been an increasingly habitual and rising phenomenon for the past 60 years (Kaimowitz, 1996). S everal key factors have motivated this land use behavior, the most important of which for this study are government interventions and policies and characteristics of livestock production that make it attractive to farmers (White, 2001). Government int erventions and policies have played a large role in establishing land tenure systems that require landowners to demonstrate the use of their l and to maintain property rights and to access subsidies for livestock credit; likewise, policies that hold timber values low make forest management a less profitable land use, further making deforestation and pasture conversion an attractive behavior for land owners (Kaimowitz, 1996; White, 2001). The characteristics of cattle production help to explain its populari ty and continued expansion as markets for cattle products rise in favorability. Kaimowitz (1996) cites these characteristics as: low labor, input, and management requirements; value in cultural prestige; ease of transport; and the attractive attributes of a biologically flexible and easily liquidated financial asset (Kaimowitz, 1996; White, 2001). Figure 2 1 shows a 2006 FAO projection of the share of deforested land converted to pasture between 2000 and 2010. Limitations in specifications, collection, a nd compilation of data required to calculate land Livestock Policy Brief
33 projection the most up to date information available. This projection shows the expected favorability of converting forest to pasture, over that of cro ps, from 2000 to 2010 in select Latin American countries (FAO, 2006). Trends in land conversion, the continually rising demand for beef products, and the favorable characteristics of cattle production make it unlikely that actual trends varied greatly fro m the FAO projections (2006). This traditional establishment and treatment of pastureland has negative environmental implications. Pasture conversion itself has led and often continues to lead to the waste of large amounts of wood and non timber forest pr oducts (Kaimowitz, 1996). Soil degradation, biodiversity loss, and the loss of sources of carbon sequestration and storage are also environmental consequences of clearing forest for pastureland (Kaimowitz, 1996; White, 2001; Pagiola et al 2004). Not only is this traditional land use environmentally destructive, it also creates a pasture that is unable to sustain sufficient nutritional value for cattle for more than a couple of years without intensive management (Kaimowitz, 1996). Direct Benefits of Silvop astoral Practices While many environmental services are in the form of public goods that are hard to see and regulate, such as carbon sequestration and biodiversity services, silvopastoral practices have the potential to provide direct and tangible return s to individuals practicing them, in addition to the public goods. 3 Table 2 2 describes the potential direct benefits for landholders that result from each silvopastoral system. For 3 Silvopastoral systems provide public goods su ch as carbon sequestration, biodiversity conservation, and watershed/water source management (Kaimowitz, 1996; White, 2001; Pagiola et al, 2004).
34 the individual, the main direct benefits come in the form of the additio nal production from the trees (foliage, fruit, firewood etc.), increased pasture productivity, animal shade, the diversification of products, and overall contributions to the farming system as sources of fodder or income at times when other sources are un available (Pagiola et al., 2004). For some individuals, silvopastoral practices can return the additional benefits of water protection and protection against landslides on sloped surfaces (Pagiola et al., 2004). The existence of these direct benefits has implications in the analysis of the conservation behavior of landowners that will be discussed in Chapter 5 and 6. Practices that offer direct benefits make it impossible to control solely for the value systems or positive external incentives that are inv olved in the RISEMP project design. If practicing a certain behavior is proven to bring a valued benefit to an individual, this, in itself, can serve as an incentive for a short and/or long term behavior change in which it is difficult to determine the ef fects of other variables. Barriers to Adoption Despite the potential for direct on site benefits of silvopastoral practices, the barriers to their adoption help to explain why higher numbers of livestock owners are not moving away from traditional manageme nt of pastureland with no or low tree density and unimproved pasture. Both White (2001) and Pagiola et al (2004) maintain that one of the primary barriers to adoption of silvopastoral practices is economic: the high initial costs associated with establis hing a silvopastoral system. Other barriers such as time lags in the rates of financial return, modest profitability, and increased labor demands, further exacerbate this initial economic barrier.
35 The initial costs of silvopastoral practices are high be cause they most commonly require the purchase of physical investments (in the form of seeds and/or trees), their transportation, and the labor required to establish and maintain them in pastures. Tab le 2 3 shows the initial investment costs for five selec ted silvopastoral practices in each of the watersheds chosen for the RISEMP (Pagiola et al 2004). The costs of increasing cattle numbers to take advantage of increased fodder availability present additional investment barriers to those faced during the initial stages of implementing a silvopastoral system. These high initial investments become even higher opportunity costs due to the time lags that it takes for silvopastoral systems to become productive. In a cost benefit scenario explored by Pagiola et al (2007), the authors speculated the return rates on switching 3 hectares of unimproved pasture to improved, and establishing a 0.75 hectare fodder bank on a 20 hectare farm in Nicaragua (See Figure 2 2 ) Once the silvopastoral system had been establ ished, it was estimated that the net farm income would increase by 50% (Pagiola et al 2007). In the first few years of the installation of the silvopastoral system, however, farm income was projected to be significantly lower due to the high initial inv estments and the time required for the trees to grow sufficiently to provide benefits. Pagiola et al (2007) projected that it wasn't until the fifth year of the silvopastoral system that net farm income would rise above p re system income This means tha t landowners must be willing to commit time, labor, and money that they might have spent on another income earning activity. Low rates of return are generally typical because of the labor and financial investment required and the limited number and type of silvopastoral practices that
36 landowners are able to adopt. White et al. (2001) found that for landowners in Esparza, Costa Rica, rates of return on adoption of improved pasture were between 9% and 12%. It is important to remember, however, that White et derived from an incentivized project, most likely increasing rates of adoption. This has two implications: rates of return most likely reached profitable levels sooner because lower individual investment on the part of the f armer was possible ; and farmers were most likely able to adopt more practices, therefore increasing the returns on their land. R ates of return depend on many factors including location, the specific land use type, and the type of silvopastoral practice ad opted; if landowners are only able to adopt one minor practice, returns can be very low. Projections for the RISEMP estimated rates of return between 4% and 14%, depending on the country, type of farm, and practices adopted (Pagiola et al 2007). E stima tes of returns are independent of biodiversity conservation and carbon sequestration benefits; in other words, they assume that non making process (Pagiola et al 2007). The Regional Integrated Silvopastoral Approaches to Ecosystem Management Project (RISEMP) The previous sections of this chapter create context from which the RISEMP will be introduced, discussed, and framed within this study. The RISEMP was a quasi PES 4 pilot project that took place in the Esparza watershed from 2002 to 2007. The project was designed to incentivize a conservation oriented behavior change among small to medium sized landowners in the Esparza watershed through the adoption of 4 estab lished by Wunder (2005) in which a service provider is paid by a service consumer. The RISEMP was a project funded by the World Bank and GEF, therefore the consumers of environmental services were not responsible for compensating the landowners providing them.
37 silvopastoral practices. It is essen tial to discuss the details of the program, the preliminary results from other project sites, and the framework that this study derives from this information. Funding and Partners The Regional Integrated Silvopastoral Approaches to Ecosystem Management Project (RISEMP) was a pilot payments for environmental services program prepared with the support of the Livestock, Environment and Development Initiative (LEDI) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). Funding was provided by the Global Environm ent Facility, and the initiative was managed by the World Bank from 2002 to January 2008 with the coordination of the Center for Tropical Agriculture Research and Education (CATIE) (Global Environment Facility (GEF) Evaluation Office, 2009). Purpose The RI SEMP targeted microwatersheds in three different countries: Colombia (Quindo); Costa Rica (Esparza); and Nicaragua (Matigus Ro Blanco). The project was designed to demonstrate and measure two outcomes: 1. T he effects of the introduction of PES on farmer s, based on their adoption of integrated silvopastoral farming systems in degraded pasture lands 2. T he resulting improvements in ecosystems functioning, global environmental benefits, and local socio economic gains resulting from the provision of these servi ces (GEF Evaluation Office, 2009). According to the GEF Evaluation Office, the RISEMP Operational Manual cited four main hypothesis surrounding payments for environmental services and conservation behavior: 1. The adoption of silvopastoral practices can be a ttributed to PES
38 2. The adoption of silvopastoral practices can be attributed to Technical Assistance 3. The adoption of silvopastoral practices can be attributed to both PES and Technical Assistance 4. Different payment schemes (2 years and 4 years) would affect t he speed and intensity of adoption behavior (GEF Evaluation Office, 2009, 9). The RISEMP program projected that to take advantage of the limited time frame of PES, participants of two years would invest more heavily in their farms than those who participat ed for 4 years while payments lasted. When payment ceased after two years, it was expected that 2 year participants would invest less in their farms. (GEF Evaluation Office, 2009) Program Details Target components According to the GEF Evaluation Office (2 009), the pilot project included four target components. The first was to strengthen local institutions and organizations to better equip them to assist farmers in implementing and maintaining silvopastoral systems on their lands. This capacity building was especially focused on the managing Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs): the Center for Research in Sustainable Agriculture Production Systems (CIPAV) in Colombia, CATIE in Costa Rica, and Nitlapn in Nicaragua. Secondly, the project strove to develo p and establish an systems in providing global environmental services and local socio (GEF Evaluation Office, 2009, 5 6). The third target component of the project was to develop and implement an effective and efficient payment mechanism that provided incentives for establishing and maintaining improved silvopastoral systems on farms.
39 Fourthly, the project strove to develop a strategy for replication tha t included an term sustainability of Design of participant groups Landowners within each country were offered voluntary contracts in one of sev received only payments for environmental services based on the proportional increase in environmental services relative to the baseline measures conducted in 2002 (Pagiola et al 2004). The second group received this PES as well as technical assistance. in the form of presentations and workshops about silvopastoral practices, and ad vice and consultation about best practices. The third treatment group was used as a control population, and received neither payments, with the exception of an initial baseline payment, nor technical assistance. Measuring: environmental service index ( ESI ) In efforts to compensate providers for environmental benefits that are hard to define and measure, payments for environmental services programs have tended to pay for land uses that are most hospitable to environmental services, such as biodiversity c onservation (Pagiola et al 2004). Furthermore, programs have typically failed to differentiate payments based on the quantity and/ o r quality of environmental services provided. Pagiola et al (2004) emphasize the importance of understanding the quantit y and/or quality of environmental services as existing on a spectrum that ranges from relatively hospitable systems such as organic coffee grown under a diverse shade o f
40 Costa Rica's national Payments for Environmental Services Program (PSA) for example, pays landowners to conserve standing forest and pays all participants the same amount (Pagiola et al 2004). This system, although easily calcul able, presents a potential market failure in which there is either an under payment for desirable land use changes or an over payment for the less desirable (Pagiola et al 2004). The RISEMP attempted to mediate these potential pitfalls by developing a p oint system in which specific land uses were ass igned differing point levels and using it to determine payment (Pagiola et al 2004). Two separate indices were developed to measure specific environmental services of each land use: biodiversity conservatio n and carbon sequestration. 5 These two indices were then combined to create an Environmental Service Index (ESI) which was used to calculate payments (Pagioal et al 2004). Table 2 5 shows the biodiversity conservation and carbon sequestration indices. The biodiversity conservation index exists on a scale from 0.0 to 1.0; 0 represents the most biodiversity poor land use (in this case annual crops) and 1.0 represents the most biodiversity rich land use (in this case primary forest) (Pagiola et al 2004) The points assigned to each land use were determined by a panel of experts who consid ered the potential of each land use to maintain the original biodiversity of the area; Pagiola et al explain that several factors were taken into consideration includi 5 According to Pagiola et al (2004), a water index was not included for two reasons: 1.) there was a lack of data necessary to construct it; and 2.) improved water flows are considered national benefits and therefore cannot received funding from the GEF.
41 mammals, and insects), their spatial arrangement, stratification, plot size, and fruit 6 Preliminary Results Preliminary results from N icaragua While there were three project sit es in the RISEMP, only the Matigus, Nicaragua site received follow up evaluation. Evaluation showed several positive changes attributable to the presence of the RISEMP, suggesting that the project was successful in achieving conservation and development goals (GEF Evaluation Office, 2009; Pagiola, Arcenas, & Rios, 2007). According to Gomez (2009), the PES schemes of the RISEMP encouraged the increased use of silvopastoral practices in more than 24% of the total area as well as a substantial increase in t ree density, fodder banks, and living fences. Additionally, the total area of degraded pastureland fell by 80% during the RISEMP (TRANSLINKS, 2009). Pagiola, Rios, and Arcenas (2007) argue that the project was also successful in human development in that poorer households were able to participate in the program, sometimes to a greater extent than households of higher income. Furthermore, although some RISEMP participants reverted back to pre RISEMP practices after the PES scheme ended, most were pleased with the benefits of increased productivity received from the silvopastoral practices and planned to continue the practices in the future (Gomez, 2009). The comparison between project groups was less clear, as selection bias and unintended behavioral eff ects plagued much of the project's control. The GEF Evaluation Office (2009) however, cited several valid differences between the PES 6 The ESI measures the environmental benefits of all land uses, not just those provided by silvopastoral practices (Pagiola et al 2004).
42 g roup of 2 and 4 years. Figure 2 3 shows the adoption behavior of silvopastoral practices of the 2 year PES group and th e 4 year PES group by the average incremental points per farmer per year relative to the previous year. The trend of adoption appears to support the RISEMP hypothesis in that the rate of adoption behavior was initially higher in the 2 year PES group and s ubstantially declined over the last two years when the payments stopped 7 (GEF Evaluation Office, 2009). The GEF Evaluation Office (2009) cites the end of payment incentives and the failure of landowners to be convinced of the long term direct economic adv antages of silvopastoral practices as the roots of these trends. The end of the economic incentives to engage in silvopastoral practices for two years, in the form of payments, explains both the higher rate of adoption of the 2 year PES group, as they wan ted to accumulate as many ESI points as possible before their payments ended, and the severe decline after payments ceased, indicating that their only incentives to engage in the silvopastoral practices were financial. The GEF Evaluation Office (2009) exp ands upon this point as it explains that many 2 year PES group participants were not yet convinced of the direct financial benefits of silvopastoral practices, and thus decreased the amount of money and labor they invested in the practices; this would lead to the overall decline in incremental ESI poi nts (GEF Evaluation Office, 2009). The GEF Evaluation Office was unable to conclude any valid differences between the other project groups (control, PES only, and PES plus technical assistance) due to problems with the experimental design of the project that resulted in 7 Among the 2 year PES group, the incremental Environmental Service Index score became negative in the last t wo years of the project; this indicates a severe decline in the ecological value of the farm (GEF Evaluation Office, 2009).
43 unintended behavioral responses and difficulty in distinguishing un biased differences between experimental groups (2009). Much of the control group for example, didn't meet the selection crite ria of the project, weren't familiar with other conservation projects like other participants in the PES groups were and had lost interest in the project but were asked to join anyway. The Nicaragua project site also experienced problems of contagion in that farmers that weren't receiving any technical assistance directly from the project, were gaining exposure through other means by attending project meetings anyway, talking with participants who were receiving technical assistance, and accessing other r esources from institutions in the area. There were a string of potential unintended behavioral pressures created through the project that included: subjective pressure to comply with the project due to a close relationship between participants and institu tions; contractual pressure that restricted burning and deforestation; behavioral incentives for control group participation; and harbored resentment on the part of participants towards group selections In Nicaragua, participants of the control group wer e offered perks to participate and many of the participants showed signs of resentment of not being part of a PES group and therefore worked to show the project that they could improve without support. These complications resulted in the low validity of c omparing the means of each project group (GEF Evaluation Office, 2009) Connections with Costa Rica The GEF Evaluation Office observed in its evaluation report (2009) of the Nicaragua pilot site that the PES + TA (PES and Technical Assistance) groups in Co sta Rica and Colombia showed higher values of incremental change compared to Nicaragua. It is suggested that this may indicate that the combination of PES and
44 Technical Assistance was more effective than sole payments (GEF Evaluation Office, 2009). It is these types of relationships, those between project incentives and measurable behavior, which this study strives to uncover in the Esparza, Costa Rica pilot site. Framework for Discussing the Effects of RISEMP The design of the RISEMP presents the potenti al to examine the effects of project incentives on the motivations to engage in the conservation behavior discussed above. The literature discussed in this chapter can be used to create a framework through which to accomplish this analysis. Table 2 4 sho ws this framework: the observable relationships between characteristics of the project design and behavior change components. motivations. Because the participants in this project group were not offered incentives to adopt silvopastoral practices, actions on the part of participants can be considered independent of external motivations. An increased adoption of silvopastoral pr actices would suggest that participants were motivated internally, most likely through either subjective norms or intrinsic motivations. A failure to adopt silvopastoral practices by the Control Group would suggest either the absence or weakness of intrin sic motivations and/or subjective norms. The PES and PES plus technical assistance groups present the opportunity to observe the effects of positive external incentives through payments, and knowledge a nd information through technical assistance. Any c hanges by the PES only group would be attributed to the payments as an external motivation. Changes in the PES
45 and technical assistance group allows for the analysis of the role of knowledge and information, in the form of technical assistance. Since bot h groups were offered payments, significant differences in the rates of adoption by participants in each group can be attributed to the absence or presence of technical assistance. The length of involvement presents a similar control: time. Because 2 year participants and 4 year participants were offered the same incentives, significant differences in the rate of adoption between the two groups can be attributed to the length of time that participants received external incentives. This allows for the disc environmentality, which assume that the longer a person engages in a behavior, the more likely he/she is to continue engaging in said behavior. This chapter helped to create the fra mework this study uses to address the two main research questions: 1. conservation behavior during the project, what factors contribute to these motivations, or lack thereof, and what are the implications of these findings for future PES programs? 2. term conservation behavior and levels of environmental consciousness, what are the factors that contribute to this, and what are the implications of these findings for future PES programs? Chapter 3 continue s to strengthen this base by discussing the Cost Rican context, with specific regard to the rhetoric of conservation, and the specifics of the Esparza pr oject site. Chapter 4 then address es collection and preparation. Finally, Chapters 5 and 6 address es the two research questions outlined by this study and data analysis from the RISEMP official data, and data collec ted by the author.
46 Table 2 1 Behavior c hange t heories and k ey c omponents Behavioral Theory Behavior Change Component Knowledge Deficit Theory (Schultz, 2002) Knowledge and Information Value Belief Norm (VBN) Theory (Stern, 2000) Values and Belief System Behavioral Analysis Approach & Environmentality (Geller, 2002; Agrawal, 2005) External Incentives Motive of Intrinsic Satisfaction (DeYoung, 1993) Intrinsic Motivations Theory of Planned Behavior (Azjen, 1991) Subjective Norms
47 Table 2 2 Silvopastoral s ystems and b enefits Silvopastoral System Description Potential Direct Benefit to Landholder Trees & Shrubs T rees and shrubs are planted in pastures. Provides shade and diet supplements while protecting the soil from packing and eros ion. Cut & Carry Fodder Replace grazing in open pasturelands with stables in which livestock are fed with the foliage of different trees and shrubs specifically planted in areas formerly used fo r other agricultural practices. Provides diet supplements w hile sequestering carbon and holding nutrients in the soil. Living Fences & Wind Screens The use of fast growing trees and shrubs for fencing and wind breaks Provides an inexpensive alternative for fencing and supplements livestock diets It can also p rovide firewood. Forest Plantation Livestock Grazing Livestock are allowed to graze in forest plantations. Used to control invasion of native and exotic grasses, thus reducing the management costs of the plantation. Pagiola, S., Agostini, P., Gobbi, J., de Haan, C., Ibrahim, M., Murgueitio, E., Ramrez, E., et.al. (2004). Paying for biodiversity conservation services in agricultural landscapes. Environment Department Papers: Environment Economics Series, 96. Retrieved from ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/nonfao/lead/x6154e/x6154e00.pdf
48 Table 2 3 Initial i nvestment c osts for s elected s ilvopastoral p ractic es (USD/h a) : Costa Rica, Colombia and Nicaragua Esparza, Costa Rica Quindo, Colombia Matigus Ro Blanco, Nicaragua Improved Pasture 250 375 265 Planting 100 trees in improved pastu re 50 55 265 Planting 100 leuceana trees n/a 1000 n/a Live fencing 610 700 390 TOTAL (if practices are combined) 910 2130 920 Pagiola, S., Agostini, P., Gobbi, J., de Haan, C., Ibrahim, M., Murgueitio, E., Ramrez, E., et.al. (2004). Paying for biodiversity conservation services in agricultural landscapes. Environment Department Papers: Environment Economics Series, 9 6. Retrieved from ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/nonfao/lead/x6154e/x6154e00.pdf
49 Table 2 4 Observable r elationships b etween p roject a spects and b ehavior c hange c om ponents Aspect of Project Design Behavior Change Component Control group Subjective norms Intrinsic motivations PES only group Positive external incentive PES and TA group Knowledge and Information 2 and 4 year participation groups Habitualization & Environmentality Intrinsic values and norms
50 Table 2 5 Environmental s ervices i ndex u sed by RISEMP Pagiola, S., Agostini, P., Gobbi, J., de Haan, C., Ibrahim, M., Murgueitio, E., Ramrez, E., et.al. (2004). Paying for biodiversity conservation services in agricultural landscapes. Environment Department Papers: Environment Economics Series, 96. Retrieved from ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/nonfao/lead/x6154e/x6154e00.pdf
51 Figure 2 1 Projected s hare of d eforested land converted to pasture and cropland, 2000 2010 Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). (2005). Livestock Policy Brief 03. Retrieved from ht tp://www.fao.org.
52 Figure 2 2 T ypical t ime p rofile s cenerio of b enefits of s ilvopastoral s ystems on 20 h ectare f arm in Nicaragua Pagiola, S., Rios, A., & Arcenas, A. (2007). Can the poor participate in Payments for Environmental Services?: Lessons from the Silvopastoral Project in Nicaragua. The World Bank. Retrieved from http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/ENVIRONMENT/EXTEE I/0, ,contentMDK:21648051~isCURL:Y~menuPK:1187844~pagePK:210058~piPK:21 0062~ theSitePK:408050,00.html
53 Figure 2 3 Adoption b ehavior of PES 2yrs vs. PES 4yrs Nicaragua p ilot s ite 1 Global Environment Facility (GEF) Evaluation Office. ( August 2009). Assessing the potential for experimental evaluation of intervention effects: The case of the Regional Integrated Approaches to Ecosystem Management Project (RISEMP). Impact Evaluation Information Document No. 15. Retrieved from http://www. thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/documents/Impact_Eval_Infodoc1 5.pdf 1 Average incremental points per farmer per year in relation to previous year (GEF Evaluation Office, 2009, 27).
54 CHAPTER 3 T HE TICO CONTEXT : ESPARZA, COSTA RICA Chapter 2 focuse d on concepts of behavior change, payments for environmental services (PES), and the RISEMP, while this chapter strives to outline the unique context in which the Tico 1 landowners of Esparza, Costa Rica, make decisions. It discusses the unique frame through which participants of the RISEMP entered and participated in the project. It will begin with a discussion of C osta as one of the most developed countries in Latin America, politically economically, socially, and environmentally, a position that places it appropriately within the behavioral literature that has focused primarily on post material Western societies. It will then address the unique conservation history of the country, wh ich has created a population familiarized and well versed in not only the rhetoric of conservation as a whole, but also that of payments for environmental services, something that behavioral theories suggest can an environmentally responsible behavior. The chapter will then transition into a discussion of the Esparza, Costa Rica, project site, highlighting geographic and demographically relevant information, and specifically sure to silvopastoral practices. Finally, this chapter will discuss the available demographics on the RISEMP participants, and factors that may have influenced the implementation of the project. Costa Rica Country Profile Costa Rica is hailed as one of t he most develo ped countries in Latin America, politically, economically, socially, and environme ntally. This level of development 1 Tico is a slang t
55 makes it an appropriate country of study for the behavioral theories developed in post materialist s ocieties discussed in Cha pter 2 and their application to behavior change in Esparza, Costa Rica. According to Inglehart (1981), post materialist societies are ones in which basic physiological and safety material needs are met and secure, and individuals are therefore able to add ress concerns beyond those of survival such as environmental conservation and sustainability Particularly in the case of the RISEMP, only people with land, cattle, and land tenure were accepted as participants; this population tends to have greater fina ncial security and exist above the poverty line, without a day to day worry about survival. Thus the level of development of Costa Rica, although not necessarily a post materialist society to the same extent as the United States or countries of Europe, pr esents the potential for the application of the behavioral theories discussed in Chapter 2. Geography and Demographics Costa Rica is a Central American country with an area of 51,100 square kilometers that shares a northern border with Nicaragua and a sout hern with Panama (See Figure 3 1 and subtropical with two main seasons: dry and rainy. The coastal plains are separated by a north to south mountain chain that includes over 100 volcani c cones, several of which are active (CIA Worldfactbook, 2013). Over 50% of Costa Rica is under forest biodiversity (UNDP, 2011). Costa Rica is home to 4.5 million peop le, approximately 94% of which are reported as white or mestizo, 3% as black, 1% as Amerindian, 1% as Chinese, and 1% as other (CIA Worldfactbook, 2013). While a large majority of the country is reported as
56 Roman Catholic, 76%, Costa Rica has a relatively large population classified as Evangelical, 13% (CIA Worldfactbook, 2013). Costa Rica maintains a 64% urbanization rate, a low number relative to the 80% rate of Latin America as a region, and a literacy rate of 94.9% (CIA Worldfactbook, 2013; UN Human S ettlement Program, 2012). Political Development the most peaceful and stable in Latin America. Costa Rica gained its independence from Spain in 1821 in a non violent movemen t, and with the exception of a 44 day civil war in 1948, has never experienced any armed conflicts (CIA Worldfactbook, 2013). In 1949, Costa Rica instituted the constitution that exists today, one that abolished the national army and declared Costa Rica a democratic republic (CIA Worldfactbook,2013). Despite several complaints about unjust defamation char ges brought against journalists and challenging bureaucratic processes, the Freedom House ranks Costa Rica as a free nation (Freedom House, 2012). Eco nomic Development Although Costa Rica was one of the poorest parts of the Spanish empire, it has enjoyed relatively stable economic success for the past 30 years. While the backbone of the economy is composed of traditional agricultural exports 2 a divers ification of the economy that includes industrialized and specialized agricultural products, high value added goods, and tourism has helped to strengthen exports (CIA Worldfactbook, 2013). The green energy and ecotourism industries have become some of the most widely developed in the world and are responsible for dramatically boosting foreign direct 2 Worldfactbook, 2013).
57 investment (CIA Worldfactbook, 2013). Costa Rica is ranked 13 th in the world for installed capacity to produce hydroelectric energy (CIA Worldfactbook, 2013). Table 3 1 shows the relatively stable growth in both in real GDP and GDP per capita compared to Latin America as a whole. Since 1990, Costa Rica has maintained GDP real growth NDP, 2011; World Bank, 2013). The GDP is composed 6.3% from agriculture, 21.7% from industry, and 72% from services (CIA Worldfactbook, 2013). By occupation, 14% of the labor force is employed in agriculture, 22% in industry, and 64% in services; the high concentration of the workforce in the service industry and its large contribution to the GDP show that Costa Rica has an efficient and value adding workforce relative to other countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. Further more unlike its neighbori ng countries, remittances only compose approximately 2% of the total GDP (CIA Worldfactbook, 2013). It is for the se reasons that the World Bank (2013) classifies Costa Rica as an upper middle class nation. Social Development Development indicators show t hat Costa Rica maintains higher levels of development than both the average for Latin America and the Caribbean (0.731) and the average for the world (0.676). The country has a Human Development Index (HDI) 3 of 0.744 which ranks it 69 out of 187 countries with sufficient data (United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 2011). Figure 3 2 shows the high HDI scores of Costa 3 to reflect a well rounded measure of national well being. The HDI is a composite measure of health, education, and income indicators (UNDP, 2011).
58 Rica in relation to the average for Latin America, and the world, since 1980 (UNDP, 2011). Costa Rica has a Gross Domestic Product (GD P) per capita of 11,900, ranking it 100 th in the world (CIA Worldfactbook, 2011). Although the population living below the poverty line has remained relatively constant for nearly 20 years, at a rate of 20 25% (CIA Worldfactbook, 2013), less than 1% of the population lives in extreme poverty 4 (UNDP, 2011). Furthermore, the World Bank estimates that 91% of the rural population has access to an improved water source 5 (World Bank, 2011). Infant mortality rate is reported at 9.2 per 1000 births, the 4 th lowes t rate in Latin America, and maternal mortality rate at 44 per 100,000 births (CIA Worldfactbook, 2013; UNDP, 2011). Although development indicators remain high relative to other nations in the region, inequality exists as a problem in Costa Rica. The c ountry has a Gini Coefficient, 6 a measure of inequality in the distribution of family income, of 55.3, ranking it the 22 nd most unequal nation in the world, according to the UNDP (2011). duces Costa A Unique Case of Conservation History To understand the framework from which landholders in the Esparza watershed entered, participated, and completed the RISEMP, it is essential to briefly address the history of conservation in Costa Rica. The relationship between conservation and the average landholder in Costa Rica differs significantly from that of other nations because 4 The UNDP defines extreme poverty as living on less than 1.25 USD (purchasing power parity) per day (2013). 5 It is estimated that 100% of the urban population has access to an improved water source. 6 erfect equality and a score of 100 the existence of perfect inequality (UNDP, 2011).
59 of the ex tensive history of conservation and the establishment of a national PES program specifically PES plays a role in the ways in which landhold ers think, talk, and act toward the environment. Command and Control Costa Rica has been long hailed as a country deeply in terested and motivated by conservation, tracing its first conservation initiatives to the 1800's and earning the successful conservation history: the country's unique biogeography that rendered it isolated from the rest of the Spanish empire; a history of scientific inquiry that can be traced to the mid 1800's; and an agricultural society built upon smaller land hold ings relative to other Latin American land distribution systems. Despite these differentiations, Costa Rica entered a period of severe environmental degradation in the late 1800's in the pursuit of export agriculture, timber, and cattle raising. This imm ense environmental degradation and resulting economic crisis, claims Evans, shocked the country into the pursuit of conservation beginning in the late 1960's. The solution pursued was an era of command and control national park creation, reflected in Table 3 2 just over 25% of Costa Rica lies within protected areas, a relatively large proportion of national territory. In addition to creating national parks, the Costa Rican government began is suing subsidies to landowners who maintained standing forests (Rojas & Aylward, 2003).
60 The transition from command and control conservation came as Costa Rica approached the 1990's and faced several challenges to its conservation initiatives. The land ap propriations undertaken by the government to create the national park system had left the budget of the Ministry of Environment drained of capital and had created animosity within local communities (Porras, 2010). This animosity was creating an land that surrounded national parks to prevent government appropriation At the same time, the concept of sustainability was gaining increasing international popularity and attenti on after the Rio Conference in 1990 and the Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1992. This initiative demanded a more people oriented approach in the faced by the C osta Rican government by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to cut government subsidy programs that offered credits to those who engaged in conservation practices, a program that resembles the national payments for environmental services program, Pagos por Servicios Ambientales (PSA), in place today (Rojas & Aylward, 2003; Pagiola, Rios, & Arcenas, 2007 ; Porras, 2010). A New Era: Pagos por Servicios Ambientales (PSA) These pressures led to the restructuring of the conservation agenda within Costa Rica be tween 1995 and 1996. The most important new policies came in the form of: the prohibited land cover change in forested areas; and the 1995 Environment Law 7554 and 19 resources, respectively (Snchez Azofeifa, Pfaff, Boomhower, & Robalino, 2007).
61 Together, these laws were responsible for establishing the foundation upon which the nation's current Pagos por Servicios Ambientales (payments for environmental services) (PSA) program was built. Most importantly, these laws established the National Fund for Forest Fi nance (FONAFIFO) and legally recognized four environmental services worthy of economic compensation. FONAFIFO stands as a semi autonomous body responsible for the regulation and facilitation of contracts with landowners for the environmental services that their lands provide (Rojas & Aylward, 2003; Pagiola, Rios, & Arcenas, 2007 ; Snchez Azofeifa, Pfaff, & Boomhower, 2007; Porras, 2010). FONAFIFO thus became the body responsible for recognizing the services defined by the Foresty Law 7575 which include, a s cited by FONAFIFO (2012): ...the mitigation of greenhouse gases; protection of water for urban, rural, or hydroelectric use; protection of biodiversity and other forms of life through both conservation and its use as a sustainable resource, scientific or pharmaceutical research, and bio genetic research; and natural scenic beauty for the purposes of tourism and science. Today, the PSA program is in its third phase and is funded primarily through government tax revenue, private and public non governmental funding, and contracts with select service consumers (FONAFIFO, 2012). The program offers payments for three different land practices: conservation; reforestation; and, most recently, agroforestry (Rojas & Aylward, 2003; Pagiola, Rios, & Arcenas, 2007). Figure 3 3 shows the total budget and contract allocation for each land use that qualifies for Costa Rica's PSA program.
62 PSA contract or compose large proportions of the programs allocation of funds, it is important to note the existence of a payments system for agroforestry practices that pre dates the RISEMP. 7 This previous exposure to the rhetoric of agroforestry, payments for environmental services, and conservation, is important to under stand because it creates awareness about the practices and programs, something that behavioral theory suggests could increase the likelihood of behavioral adoption. The rhetoric of agroforestry and conservation is also important because it creates an atmo sphere in sustainability, and the environmental services provided by the environment, another suggested motivation for conservation behavior as discussed by Stern (2000). Th e illegality of forest cover change is also important because of its potential effects on behavior choices. It is possible that this policy could deter landowners from reforesting areas of their land, in the fear that, once restored, they would never be a llowed to clear it. It is also possible that a fear of sanctions from this policy is the motivation to maintain forest cover that exists, as opposed to a biospheric value system that values forest for its conservation benefits. Locating Esparza: A Profi le of the Central Pacific Region Central Pacific region in the province of Puntarenas (See Figure 3.4). The Central Pacific Region has been a main agricultural hub of the nation s ince its settlement, and continues to maintain an economy and culture that revolves around this way of life. The 7 Silvopastoral practices are considered agroforestry practices (Nair 1993 ).
63 use of silvopastoral practices and projects incentivizing them pre date the existence of the RISEMP and were estimated to be used by about 10% of landowners in the region in 2007 (Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadera (MAG), 2007). Cattle Production Settlers arrived in the region more than 500 years ago and began developing the region for agriculture, both crop and livestock production (White e t al 2001). According to the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MAG), livestock production is one of the land dedicated to cattle production: 87.8% beef; 3.5% mil k; and 8.7% both milk and beef (2007). The cattle industry, production of milk and beef, brings in approximately 19.5 million USD to the Central Pacific Region per year and provides jobs to more than 4,500 people (MAG, 2007). The average landholding of c attle producers in the Central Pacific region is 50 hectares, compared to a country average of 35 (MAG, 2007). Silvopastoral Practices Although the region is still degraded due to the use of traditional pastures 8 especially on mountain slopes (White et al 2001), MAG (2007) credits the adoption of silvopastoral practices for an increase in total production but a decrease in area under pasture between 2000 and 2007. Between 2000 and 2007, the percentage of area under pasture decreased from 35.19% to 33.75 % while the total cattle count increased by 8,556; this means that the number of cattle supported per hectare increased by 3% (MAG, 2007). MAG cites the use of improved pastures as the primary cause of this inverse relationship (2007). It is important to note that in countries with lower costs of 8 Traditional pastures are those cleared of trees. For a more in depth discussion of tradi tional pastures, refer to chapter 2.
64 land, expansion of pastures rather than intensification has most generally been preferred. In the case of the Central Pacific Region of Costa Rica the price per hectare, 2500 USD, makes silvopastoral practices m ore attractive as a means to intensify a cattle production enterprise (White et al 2001). Obstacles to Cattle Production The primary obstacles faced by cattle producers in the region are degradatio n of pasturelands, limited technical assistance, and the 6 month dry season experienced by much of the region (MAG, 2007). Degraded land lead s to decreased carrying capacity of pastures, and in turn less healthy livestock ; this is then exacerbated by limited technical assistance that would help landowners medi ate and/or reverse land degradation, and a long dry season. Land degradation in the region is further exacerbated by the sloping terrain of many landholdings and the 6 month dry season that strain the land and therefore the livestock (MAG, 2 007). Once trees are removed from sloped terrain, the nutrient rich top soil is easily washed or blown away and virtually irreplaceable ( P.K. Nair, personal communication, January 16, 2013 ). This means that landowners in the area experience low rates of productivity due to the relatively low c arrying capacity of their land Finally, MAG (2007) reports a limited availability of technical assistance for the area ; it estimates that it only benefits about 10% of producers in the Central Pacific Region. 9 Alt hough silvopastoral practices are present in the region, MAG estimated that in 2007, only 10% of landowners engaged in them. 9 MAG (2007) notes that although they do not offer extensive credit opportunities, other governmental bodies do and that credit is therefore accessible by most producers.
65 Esparza, Costa Rica The Esparza Canton is composed of five districts: District of San Jeronimo; District of Espiritu Santo; Distric t of San Juan Grande; District of San Rafael; and District of Macacona (See Figure 3 5 ). Esparza is considered a Tropical Dry Forest climate, with average precipitation of between 63 and 94.5 inches (1600 and 2400 millimeters) per year and a median temper ature of 84.2 degrees Fahrenheit (29 degrees Celsius) (MAG, 2007). The canton experiences two main seasons: a rainy season from May through November and a dry season from November through April. 10 According to a study done by White et al (2001), the aver age farm size of livestock owners in the Esparza canton is 29 hectares. As a large and easily accessible canton 11 Esparza was home to a silvopastoral project funded by Tropileche from 1996 to 1997 (White et al 2001). According to White et al (2001), t he landholders involved improved an average of 15% of their pastures. These improvements ranged from 45% of pastures on smaller farms to 5% of pastures on larger farms, a finding White et al (2001) attributed to the need for small scale farmers to adopt more intensive land use practices. Farmers with small holdings tend to have lower incomes than larger famers and, in these cases, any increase in returns for smaller farmers is a higher proportion of total farm income. The authors also noted that Costa R ica had higher adoption rates than other countries because it had more mature markets with greater points of accessibility (White et al 2001). This mature market meant higher land prices, which removed the option of expanding pastureland to 10 This study was conducted during the rainy sea son. 11 Esparza is located along one of the major cross national highways.
66 increase pro duction, so producers intensified instead. This finding has the potential to account for differences between countries in the RISEMP as well. Partnering Institutions Although funded by the GEF and World Bank, the partnering institutions within Costa Ric The Center for Tropical Research and Higher Education (CATIE) served as the main coordinating body within Costa Rica and was responsible for building capacity of local institutions, one of the projec t goals of the RISEMP. CATIE worked closely with the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MAG) of Esparza during the RISEMP and prepared MAG to continue T he role of each i nstitution within the country and the relationship of each with the communities affected by the RISEMP thus helps to explain the context of Esparza Center for Tropical Research and Higher Education (CATIE) Between 2002 and 2007, CATIE acted as the entry institution into Costa Rica for the RISEMP while MAG acted as the entry institution into Esparza. Thus, CATIE was the partner through which the RISEMP resources were channeled and focused in Costa Rica. Mission CATIE of Costa Rica is one of six locati ons in Central America, and one of seven in all of Latin America. 12 CATIE began in Costa Rica in 1946 as a regional research being and redu ce rural poverty through education, 12 Panama; and Bolivia.
67 research and technical assistance, and to promote the sustainable management of strives for a Latin America and Caribbean which achieves development by competitively and sustainably producing agricultural goods and Relationship with the Esparza c ommunity CATIE exists as a highly respected institution both academically and sociall y, throughout Costa Rica because of its focus on improving rural agricultural livelihoods, and relative success in doing so. MAG of Esparza was the partner institution that facilitated entry in to the Esparza community, and it was the relationship between MAG Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MAG) T he relationship between MAG and the livestock producers of the region affected the circumstances under which the RISEMP and this st udy took place. MAG played an integral part in facilitating the RISEMP and the evaluation done by this study. Thus, MAG has significant influence in the community. MAG officers of Esparza both had and continue to have a good relation ship with producers in the area and serve as resources for technical assistance and information. Mission Although MAG wasn't created until 1960, Costa Rica has maintained a government body responsible for establishing relationships and transferring knowledge and agricultural inputs with agricultural producers since 1910 (MAG, 2012). Today, MAG's mission is to promote the competitiveness and development of the country's agricultural activities and rural landscape while maintaining and protecting the integrity
68 of the natural en vironment and its productive resources (MAG, 2012). This pursuit is intended to allow producers to achieve a higher quality of life by facilitating greater integration into the national and international markets (MAG, 2012). MAG's official vision is one facilitation of high quality services that promote the development of conditions for constant growth, sustainability, and equity for the agricultural producer and the well being of the national population, such that Costa Rica is considered a productive MAG's main influences have been in the form of the provision of education, technical assistance, and financial support for small and medium fa rmers. MAG has agricultural sector (MAG, 2012). In fact, the acting Minister of Agriculture participates in Its most recent initiative, for e xample, helped to create the national Program for the Protection of Sustainable Agricultural Production, in 2004 (MAG, 2012). MAG of Esparza responsible for serving those residi ng in each canton of the region. The Esparza Canton MAG office is one of thirteen offices in the Central Pacific Region and is responsible for serving the five districts within it (see Figure 3 5 ). 13 The office has two officers in charge of extension work : one who works with agronomy and crop production, and the other with large livestock, primarily cattle. Both officers maintain 13 The Esparza Canton MAG Office is responsible for serving the following districts: District of San Jeronimo; District of Espiritu Santo; District of San Juan Grande; District of San Rafael; and District of Macacona.
69 good relationships with the communities in Esparza and are frequently sought for technical assistance and information. These o fficers were responsible for both helping CATIE to recruit participants for RISE MP and to implement the project and aiding the researcher in collecting the data used in this study. RISEMP in Costa Rica The RISEMP worked with CATIE and MAG of Esparza to rec ruit voluntary participants for the project. Participants in the Esparza watershed were accepted activity, and willingness to collaborate with the project. To target improvi ng livelihoods, the RISEMP focused primarily on small to medium sized landowners whose primary income was derived from cattle production. Participants Participants were chosen on a set of eight criteria cited by the GEF Evaluation Office (2009, 15) as: 1. Small and m edium farmers 2. Secure land tenure 3. Livestock as principal income activity 4. Willingness to sign a contract with the project 5. Willingness to collaborate with the project monitoring activities regarding the following information: socio economic, carbon, water, bi odiversity data 6. Willingness to participate in training and receive technical assistance 7. Willingness to develop a farm development plan in order to generate environmental services and improve productivity 8. Willingness to continue to manage silvopastora l sys tems after project closure
70 Farm Size Cattle Count, and Location The average farm size for participants i n the RISEMP was 33.3 hectares; however, 79.6% of the participants owned less than 50 hectares and 47.6% owned less than 20 hectares. The maximum landholding was 261.9 hectares, thus inflating the mean, while the minimum was 2.7 hectares. The random sample of participants interviewed in this study was reflective of these averages. The mean farm size was 31.18 hectares, with 80.5% of respon dents owning less than 50 hectares and 46.3% owning less than 20 hectares. Table 3.3 shows the farm size comparisons between all of the RISEMP participants and those randomly selected for this study. 14 The mean number of cattle owned by surveyed respondent s was 28; however, 76.3% respondents owned 38 or fewer cattle and 55.3% owned 15 or fewer cattle. It is important to note that this study does not have the cattle count of all the participants in the RISEMP, only those interviewed by the author. The maxi mum number of cattle reported was 110, thus inflating the mean, and 4 respondents reported not owning any cattle. Several respondents that reported not owning any cattle at the time of the survey had sold their land, while others were in a period between having just sold their cattle, and purchasing more. T their interview in the summer of 2012. Respondents were asked, however, if they had more, less, or the same number of cattle at the beginn ing of the RISEMP. Of 37 14 These farm s izes are those reported in 2002. A mpletely accurate reflection of current conditions, responses from landholders suggest that there has been little variation.
71 respondents, 73.0% reported that they had either the same number or more cattle in 2002. 15 Table 3 4 shows the geographic distribution of total RISEMP participants compared to the random sample of this study. The communities with the most RISEMP participants were Angostura, Baron, Cerillos, Mesetas, and Miramar with 10.2%, 7.3%, 9.5%, 7.3%, and 6.6% of participants, respectively. The random sample used for this study produced a similar but varied distribution. The communitie s with the most participants as part of the random sample were Baron, Juanilama, Sabana Bonita, and Miramar with 11.9%, 9.5%, 9.5%, and 7.1% of respondents, respectively. Both the smaller sample size of this study and time constraints account for the diff erences in geographic distributions. Gender Although gender will not be addressed in this study because it is out of the scope of the research questions, it is important to note. Only three of the participants interviewed were female because the majority of and men were most commonly the primary implementers of the silvopastoral practices. Thus, even in cases that a female participant was interviewed, her husband served as the main informant because he had been the main imp lementer in the project. Influencing Factors Land tenure T he land tenure requirement of the RISEMP restricted participation and, therefore, generalizability Although Costa Rica has one of the more developed land 15 48.6% of respondents reported that they had the same number of cattle; 24.3% of respondents reported that they had more cattle.
72 tenure systems of Latin America, many far mers continue to use land without holding titles. This means that only landowners who could produce a legal land title were accepted into the project. The extent to which generalizations can be made about the behavior of landowners without land titles in Esparza is thus limited. Cattle market While the RISEMP attempted to control for many variables, it was unable to buffer fluctuations in the cattle market. More specifically, the international price of beef dropped during the introduction of the RISEMP Between 2002 and 2003, world beef price s fell from 101.05 US cents per pound to 85.35 US cents per pound (Indexmundi, 2012). Table 5 shows the world prices of beef in US cents per pound between 2000 and 2012. It is therefore likely that the decision o f landowners to participate in the RISEMP was affected by the belief that the cattle industry was becoming less profitable, leading farmers to seek additional income from RISEMP as security. Many of the landowners in Esparza, both participants and non participants of RISEMP, reported feelings of skepticism and insecurity about the promises made by the program would actually follow through and pay them at the end of each year in return for the work done to increase the provision of environmental services. Those not joining the RISEMP cited this as a significant deterrent. By the time they realized that landholders were actually receiving payments, it was too late to join the program. Those who were participants of RISEMP said that it was this insecurity that kept them from pursuing many changes the first year of the program.
73 Looking Forward This chapter builds upon the literature foundat ion established in Chapter 2 to paint a picture of the unique national, regional, and local context in which landowners in the Esparza watershed made behavioral decisions during the RISEMP. Costa Rica is a Latin American country with relatively high stand ards of living, economically, socially, and environmentally. Furthermore, there exists a national rhetoric of environmental conservation, payments for environmental services, and agroforestry. At the local level of Esparza, a region highly dependent on c attle production, there was a previous, positive, and observable exposure to silvopastoral practices as well as support from and trust of MAG With this context established, Chapter 4 transitions into an explanation of the data collection, preparation, an d processing that leads to the analysis of the short and long term effects of the RISEMP on conservation behavior in Chapters 5 and 6.
74 Table 3 1 GDP g rowth r ate and GDP per capita: Costa Rica and Latin America and the Caribbean Year GDP Growth Rate: C osta Rica GDP Growth Rate: Latin America and the Caribbean GDP per capita PPP (USD): Costa Rica GDP per capita PPP (USD): Latin America and the Caribbean 1990 4.0% n/a 6,223 7,110 2000 3.0% 4.0% 8,113 8,303 2005 5.9% 5.0% 9,002 8,871 2006 7.9% 6.0% 9,642 9,256 2007 6.8% 6.0% 10,247 9,677 2008 2.7% 4.0% 10,374 9,972 2009 1.0% 2.0% 10,085 9,701 2010 4.7% 6.0% 11,600 10,180 2011 4.2% 5.0% 11,900 10,520 United Nations Development Program (UNDP). (2013). Country Profile: Costa Rica. Retrieved from http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=COSTA%20RICA World Bank. (2013). Cos ta Rica at a Glance. Retrieved from http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/cri_aag.pdf
75 Table 3 2 Evolution of p rotected a reas in Costa Rica 1955 1999 Year % National Territory Protected 1955 0.05 1990 16.80 1997 23.80 1999 24.80 2010 2 5.1 Central Intelligence Agency (C IA) WorldFactbook (2013). Costa Rica. Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the world factbook/geos/cs.html Rojas, M. & Aylward, B. (2003). What are we learning from exper iences with markets for environmental services in Costa Rica: A review and critique of the literature. Environmental Economics Programme Retrieved from http://www.ecosystemeconomics.com/Resources_files/ Rojas %20%26%20 Aylward%20(2003)%20CR %20Markets%20for%20Env%20S ervices.pdf
76 Table 3 3 Farm s ize of t otal RISEMP p articipants and r andom s ample Total R ISEMP Participants Random Sample Mean Farm Size (ha) 33.3 31.18 Maximum Farm Size (ha) 261.9 261.9 Minimum Farm Size (ha) 2.7 8.23 % Who Own less than 100 ha 79.6 80.5 % Who own less than 20 ha 47.6 46.3 (RISEMP, 2007)
77 Table 3 4 Distribu tion of p articipants by c ommunity Total Participants % of Participants Community RISEMP Random Sample RISEMP Random Sample Angostura 14 2 10.2 4.8 Artieda 6 4 4.4 9.5 Baron 10 5 7.3 11.9 Cerillos 13 3 9.5 7.1 Guadalupe 6 2 4.4 4.8 Jesus Ma ria 2 2 1.5 4.8 Juaniliama 9 4 6.6 9.5 Macacona 3 1 2.2 2.4 Maranonal 3 2 2.2 4.8 Mesetas 10 2 7.3 4.8 Miramar 9 3 6.6 7.1 Mojon 2 1 1.5 2.4 Nances 1 1 0.7 2.4 Penas Blancas 6 2 4.4 4.8 Sabana Bonita 8 4 5.8 9.5 Salinas 4 2 2.9 4.8 Sa litral 6 0 4.4 0 San Jeronimo 8 1 5.8 2.4 San Juan 5 0 3.6 0 San Juan C 2 0 1.5 0 San Juan Grande 1 0 0.7 0
78 Table 3 4 Continued Total Participants % of Participants RISEMP Random Sample RISEMP Random Sample San Miguel 6 1 4.4 2.4 San Rafael 3 0 2.2 0 (RISEMP, 2007)
79 Table 3 5 World p rice of b eef (US cents/pound) Year Price 2000 88.2 2001 87.81 2002 101.05 2003 85.35 2004 107.06 2005 115.25 2006 113.63 2007 119.25 2008 121.33 2009 114.13 2010 133.88 2011 185.63 2012 190.93 Indexmundi.com. (2013). Beef Daily Price. Retrieved from http://www.indexmundi.com/commodities/?commodity=beef&months=120
80 Figure 3 1 Political m ap of Costa Rica Nationsonline.org. (2013). Political Map of Costa Rica. R etrieved from http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/costa_rica.htm
81 Figure 3 2 Trends in HDI 1980 2010 United Nations Development Program (UNDP). (2013). Country Profile: Costa Rica. Retrieved from http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=COSTA%20RICA
82 Figure 3 3 Total c ontract and b udget a llocation for e ach PSA a ctivity (1997 2008) Porras, I. (2010). Fair and green? Social impacts of payments for environmental services in Costa Rica. International Institute for Environment and Development
83 Figure 3 4 Esparza, Costa Rica Nationsonline.org. (2013). Political Map of Costa Rica. R etrieved from http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/costa_rica.htm
84 Figure 3 5 The five districts of the Esparza c anton Ministry of Livestock and Agriculture (MAG). (2013). Direccin Regional Pacfico Central: Esparza, Puntarenas Retrieved from http://www.mag.go.cr/regionales/pacificocentral.html
85 CHAPTER 4 DATA COLLECTION, PREPARATION, AND PROCESSING The previous chapters provided a necessary context and established a framework through which to analyze behavior change in the specific context of landowners in the Esparza watershed during and after the RISEMP. This chapter explains the methodologies of data collection and preparation used by this study. The two largest sources of data utilized in this study were semi structured random intervi ews with a total of 41 RISEMP participants and official RISEMP data provided to the author. This chapter begins by explaining the methodologies and form s of data collection from eight week s of research in the Esparza watershed, Costa Rica, which included: semi structured random interviews; interviews with key informants; and observations. This explanation addresses the selection of participants, the circumstances of each interview, and the questions asked of each respondent. The chapter then discusses th e preparation and processing of data and the interpretation of results used to create the index of environmental consciousness that is used in Chapter 6. T he GEF (2009) identifies three logical frameworks through which the RISEMP can be studied: effec ts at the field level; institutional effects; and replicatory effects. Field level analysis refer to the analysis of the processes and changes that occur at the project site among project participants. The RISEMP could also be studied at the institution al level, analyzing the effects of the project on the implementing institutions. Finally, the replicatory effects of the project refer to diffusion or spread of the lessons taught by the project and their incorporation into research in the future. It is important to note that this study examines the effects of the RISEMP at the field level, as defined by the GEF (2009).
86 Forms of Data Collection During an eight week investigation in the Esparza watershed, Costa Rica, the majority of semi structured inter landholdings, but several were conducted in offices ( Esparza Ministry of Agricul ture and Livestock Office (MAG) and Esparza Agriculture Cooperative) and residences of other members of the communities. This study in corporates data collected through interviews with key informants who live within the community and helped with the implementation of the RISEMP program between 2002 and 2008 and with other cattle owners who reside in the Esparza watershed. Observations of economic, social, and political factors relevant in the area were also important to this study. Semi structured interviews The bulk of data utilized by this study were collected through semi structured interviews of a total of 41 RISEMP participants: 15 e ach from Groups B (PES + TA 2 4 years) and C (PES 2 4 years) and 11 from Group A (Control). In order to define the methodological foundation of these interviews, this section describes: the method used to select participants from each group; the circumsta nces under which the majority of interviews were conducted; the questionnaire used to guide the interview; and the coding and indexing process that this study used to analyze the data. Selection of participants Selection from Groups B and C (PES + TA and P ES) Gr oups B and C (PES + TA and PES),each of which are later subdivided into those who received payments for 2 years and those for 4 years, were combined to serve as a participant base of 92 from which to generate a random sample. Participants from Group A (Control), the control group, were chosen separately and will be
87 discussed in the next section. Participants were divided into ten classes based on total payments received for the duration of their participation in the RISEMP program; intervals of 500 USD separated each payment class. The total and proportional distribution of participants in each payment class can be seen in Table 4 1 The proportionality of total participants in each payment class was used to generate a proportionally representative sample number of participants from each payment class that totaled 30 participants from Groups B and C (PES + TA and PES), 32.6% of total payment recipients. An online random number generator was used to randomly select participants from each payment clas s. Throughout the study, 12 participants that were initially randomly selected had to be replaced due to death, incarceration, and/or relocation to another area. In these cases, the participants were removed from the list and replaced by a random selecti on of remaining participants in each payment class. Selection from Group A (Control) A random number generator was used to select 15 of the participants from Group A (Control). Four of the participants that were initially selected from Group A (Control) d ied, leaving 11 randomly identified participants or 40.6% of total Group A (Control) participants. Time constraints prevented the selection of four additional participants to replace those that were deceased Circumstances of interviews The majority of s emi structured interviews were conducted on the personal landholdings of each participant who was involved in the RISEMP program. With the exception of three interviews, a Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MAG) agent who had been involved in the recr uitment and implementation of the RISEMP program accompanied me and facilitated the introduction to the landowner. During the three
88 exceptions, a well known member of the community served as my driver and facilitator to these introductions. After the ini tial introductions in the majority of conducted interviews, the extension agent removed himself from the interviews. This facilitation and introduction played a large role in establishing a strong feeling of comfort and trust between myself and the partic ipants. In a small number of cases, the extension agent remained within c lose proximity of the interview and his presence affected the interaction between myself and the participant, by either making the participant nervous about providing an honest respo nse, or serving as a source of conversational distraction for the participant. This is not considered problematic because it occurred in few cases questions utiliz ed by this study. Each participant was asked to spare between 30 and 90 minutes to speak with me about his/her involvement and/or experience with the RISEMP program. Interviews lasted for an average of 45 minutes; it was evident that longer than an hour was fatiguing for participants. Although several participants seemed apprehensive to accept, no participants declined, and the majority seemed happy to have me at or in their homes and to discuss the RISEMP program. In the cases in which I visited t he property of the participant, I was invited to sit in either the corral where ranchers were working when I arrived, on the front porch, or in the kitchen. In the cases in which I was unable to visit the property of the participant, we met and conducted the interview at either the MAG office in central Esparza, or the property of another participant. Questionnaire All participants were asked questions from one of two questionnaires: one for participants in Groups B and C (PES + TA and PES) who received payments and one
89 for participants in Group A (Control) who received no payments (See Appendices A and B). Participants were asked and encouraged to elaborate more when they felt inclined, and many took advantage of this invitation. At the end of the ques tionnaire, participants were asked to share anything that they felt that we hadn't mentioned or discussed satisfactorily. I took detailed notes during the interviews in place of recording; upon arrival it was evident that the presence of recording techno logy made participants uneasy. I also asked several participants to draw their landholdings and illustrate what was done during the RISEMP as well as which silvopastoral practices were still present. Only one participant refused to draw his land; the oth er participants seemed enthused to illustrate their land and practices. Two questionnaires were used: one for Group B and C (PES + TA and PES) participants; and one for Group A (Control) participants. Both questionnaires were revised upon arrival and throu ghout initial interviews. Initial interviews and feedback from MAG agents suggested that I revise the questionnaires to include questions and re phrase others; this accounts for a lack of response to several questions from all participants. These questio ns are noted in Appendices A and B. Key Informants Interviews Five i nterviews were conducted with key informants that included: non randomly selected participants of the RISEMP; ranchers in the Esparza watershed; and employees of the MAG offices of Esparza more specifically agents involved in helping to carry out the project itself.
90 Official RISEMP Data Official RISEMP data collected between 2002 and 2007 were pr ovided to the author by CATIE; these data offered both individual level and aggregated inform ation about project participants and measure s of environmental service points At the individual level, the data documented the following from each participant : landholding size at the start of the project; the quantity of environmental services provided eve ry year of the project; and the payment size (if any) received per year. The data also provided aggregate measures of the amount of each silvopastoral practice a dopted by participants per year and the total provision of environmental services every yea r of the RISEMP. Data Preparation, Processing, and Interpretation Data processing and interpretation for this study were done using the Statisitcal Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) computer program. Past land use and RISEMP project data provided by the Center for Tropical Agriculture Research and Education (CATIE), one of the partners and managers of the RISEMP program, were combined with the data collected during the study. This information and findings were coded to create indices of environmental consciousness and education that this study uses to analyze the effects of RISEMP PES engage in long term conservation behavior in Chapters 5 and 6. Key informant interviews and observational data were used pri marily for background information and were not included in the statistical analyses of this study. This section discusses the operationalization of key terms used in the data analysis and the construction of the environmental consciousness index used to ga u ge long term behavior change. It begins by discussing the coding of responses. It then
91 explains the process through which these variables were combined to create a measure of environmental consciousness. Coding R esponses from semi str uctured interviews were coded to identify common themes and understandings which were then used to create an operationalized list of responses from which later data analysis occurred. This coding was used to explore: the motivations for participating in the RISEMP; the prim ary silvopastoral practices adopted by each landowner; the components of the environment; the processes of the environment and conservation; and the consequences of environmental degradation. Motivations Each respondent was asked what motivated them to pa rticipate in the RISEMP and, though each response varied, several common motivations were identified. Table 4 2 shows the motivations reported by respondent s and how they were coded into the general motivations used in this study. the project, either due to memory loss associated with old age, or their participation in the control respondents cited included the physical provisions of the RISEMP, such as the seeds
92 were asked by a member of the community whom they respected and with whom they motivation was to learn about how to im plement silvopastoral practices and about their implementing silvopastoral practices, but ha d lacked the financial resources necessary respondents desired to make their landholdings more profitable by implementing desire to help the environment as the primary motivatio n. In the remaining classifications, respondents said that they were unable to identify one motivating factor, but rather joined for several reasons. Practices Respondents were asked what practices they engaged in, and this study categorized these cite d practices into 10 general conservation behaviors. The behaviors were classified on the basis of the goal of the practice, as cited by the respondent, and the type of action involved in achieving it, as defined by the author. These general behaviors wer anti 4 3
93 shows the practices reported by respondents and how they were coded into the general behaviors used in this study. th at trees in his pasture were helpful, and believed that they were instead detrimental to discontinuing a practice that they acknowledged was detrimental to the environment, s which respondents reported protecting the trees on their land, a practice that requires es to respondents who reported actively planting trees, not just protecting the ones that were to responses in which respondents cited taking active measures to prot ect and foster responses in which respondents reported improving their pastures with improved recycling refers to the reuse of any farm materials, in these cases referring to composting to make fertilizer on Th e number of practices reported by respondents is operationalized by this study as a rough measure of the labor commitment that each participant has to silvopastoralism. Although labor commitment can be independent of other measures of environmental consci ousness, it is used to monitor whether respondents actually engage in the behavior that they may or may not discuss. Respondents were assigned
94 a point for every practice named and organized into an ordinal scale in which he/she practiced few, some, or man y silvopastoral practices Figure 4 1 shows the relative number of practices reported by each respondent; this scale provides a comparative measure and was arranged to capture a normal distribution. Components Respondents were asked if they believed the e nvironment was important, and if so, for what reason. The responses were coded into general environmental components mentioned by respondents. These general environmental components 4 4 shows these general environmental components and the frequency and proportion of respondents who cited each; many respondents cited more than one environmental component. which was cited trees outside of forest, such a res responses that mentioned organic practices when talking about the environment. Responses that mentioned flora and fauna, biodiversity, or the biological c orridor, were all includ either soil itself or the vitamins and minerals found in the ground. Those responses that identified aesthetic beauty, recreation, or nature as important environmental compone n mention of temperature and the importance of not burning as environmental h
95 elatively superficial, often connected to the rhetoric of every day conversations about conservation. Thus, many respondents were able to say that trees were an important component of the environment and conservation, but were unable to cite a process or consequence that explained why. In this sense, the ability to name environmental components might be a simple measure of exposure to environmental rhetoric. Respondents were given a point for every component named and organized into an ordinal scale in w hich he/she was able to identify few, some, or many environmental components. Figure 4 2 shows the amount of environmental components cited by each respondent; this scale provides a comparative measure and was arranged to capture a normal distribution. P rocesses Respondents were asked why the environment was important and how the practices pursued during the RISEMP had improved their lives. Respondents answered in two ways: a description of environmental processes; and/or an identification of consequenc es if the environment was not protected. After the first initial interviews, the author probed respondents about their knowledge of each. The environmental processes related to silvopastoral practices cited by respondents were operationalized sequestration benefits chemical 4 5 shows the environmental processes cited by respondents and how each was coded into general processes.
96 corridor or the importance of forest to anim als. Responses that discussed the processes of climate change and/or the atmosphere preventing the depletion of the o identified the processes through which the use of silvopastoral practices improved the land and, in turn, financial returns to landowners. These processes included: an increased carrying capacity of the land; and an increased food and shade supply, leadi discussed the processes and benefits of water were cod Responses that discussed the importance of trees were split into two categories: one that cited the process of carbon sequestration; and the other that cited processes othe r on sequestration benefits responses that identified the relationship between trees and the protection of water, biodiversity, and maintaining nutrients in the soil, all processes outside of carbon cited the carbon intake of trees. Finally, responses that discussed the process through which the application of chemicals could be harmful to the environment were labeled The ability to explain env ironmental processes is considered a more tangible measure of the knowledge, awareness, and consciousness of actual environmental factors because respondents were forced to formulate responses internally; they
97 Respondents were given a point for every process named, and organized into an ordinal scale in which he/she was able to identify few, some, or many environmental processes. Figure 4 3 shows the relative number of processes reported by each respondent; t his scale provides a comparative measure and was arranged to capture a normal distribution. Consequences When respondents were asked why the environment was important and how the practices pursued during the RISEMP had improved their lives, they also answ ered by identifying the consequences of environmental degradation. The environmental consequences cited by respondents were operationalized in the following nine probl actions were not taken to protect it. Res biodiversity as a major consequence, most commonly saying that the destruction of increased pollution of the air and decreased oxygen, as trees were cleared. Responses warming specifically, or the warming of the atmo sphere associated with the included mentions of land degradation, specifically in the contex t of pastureland, as an
98 (interview, June 2012, trans. Korey Force). The ability to ex plain consequences of environmental destruction is also considered a more tangible measure of the knowledge, awareness, and consciousness of actual environmental factors. The consequences of environmental destruction composed an integral part of gauging e nvironmental consciousness and using it to predict behavior. As Stern (2000) discusses, when people feel that something that they value is in danger, they are more likely to act to protect it. Thus, consequences imply knowledge about a process as well as the realization that something that is valued is under threat. Responses were given a point for every consequence named and organized into an ordinal scale in which he/she was able to identify few, some, or many consequences to the environment. Figure 4 4 shows the relative number of consequences reported by each respondent; this scale provides a comparative measure and was arranged to capture a normal distribution. Construction of Environmental Consciousness Index This study operationalized the concept of environmental consciousness (EC) through measures of the number of silvopastoral practices implemented by respondents and their ability to name components of the environment, environmental processes, and the consequences of failing to conserve. Thus, E C was created as a summary index, combining the four independent measures of number of practices, and the ability to cite environmental components, proces se s, and consequences. Figure 4 5 shows the consciousness. All four tasks show a relatively normal distribution of responses,
99 enabling the inclusion of each in a statistical index. All aspects of the index of environmental consciousness are correlated and statisticall y significant at less than a 0.05 level, except for the practices and consequences variables. Because of the other correlations, this study includes the practices and consequences in the same index but notes the insignificant relationship between these tw o variables. The index makes the following four statements true: 1. The more practices cited by respondents, the more likely they were to cite more components and processes. 2. The more components cited by respondents, the more likely they were able to cite mor e practices, processes, and consequences. 3. The more processes cited by respondents, the more likely they were able to cite more practices, components, and consequences. 4. The more consequences cited by respondents, the more likely they were able to cite more components and processes. Looking Ahead This chapter provided an explanation of the methods used by the author in the collectio n, preparation, and processing o f the data. The official data provided by the RISEMP are the primary data source used to analyze the first question of this study in Chapter 5: t conservation behavior during the project, what factors contribute to these motivations, or lack thereof, and what are the implication s of these fi ndings for future PES programs? The semi structured interviews and the index of environmental consciousness then become the primary source of data used to analyze the second question posed by this study in Chapter 6: t o what extent did the RI SEMP affect term conservation behavior and levels of
100 environmental consciousness, what are the factors that contribute to this, and what are the implications of these findings for future PES programs?
101 Table 4 1 Division of p ayment c lasses Class Range (USD) Total # of Participants % of Total Interviews Needed 1 0 500 4 4.34 1 2 501 1000 14 15.22 5 3 1001 1500 18 19.56 6 4 1501 2000 12 13.04 4 5 2001 2500 4 4.34 1 6 2501 3000 6 6.52 2 7 3001 3500 8 8.7 3 8 3501 4000 3 3.26 1 9 4001 4500 22 23.91 7 10 4501 5000 1 1.09 0
102 Table 4 2 Motivations for p articipation r eported by r espondents c oded into g eneral c ategories General Category Motivations Reported by R espondents None No memory Payments Money Payments Incentives Not motivated to be in the group I am (I wanted payments) Make more money Physical Incentives Take advantage of physical assets given by the program (ex. trees, seeds, etc.) Provision of Materials Trees, seeds, etc. Social Norms and Expectations Accepted an invitation Trust in MAG/Project personnel Education Education Education offered by technical assistance To learn more about the practices Lear n about silvopastoral practices Chance to learn and share Financial Empowerment to Improve Land Money to enable conservation Financial help Help Obtain help for small farmers Improving land Motivation to pursue silvopastoral practices To get higher returns off cattle Conservation Conservation Conservation and Payments Conservation and Payments Improvement of Land and Payments Improve land and payments Other A little bit of everything (interviews, May June 2012 tran s. Korey Force)
103 Table 4 3 Practices r eported by r espondents c oded into g eneral b ehaviors General Behavior Practices Reported by Respondents Anti Environmental Cutting trees from pastureland Halting Anti Environmental Halting burning practices Not c utting as many trees Using few chemicals Non Active Carbon Sequestration Maintaining Tree Cover Natural reforestation Protect Trees Protect growth of plants and trees Regen erate the soil Biodiversity Conservation Certified Ecologica l Zones Conserving biodiversity Active Carbon Sequestration Planting Trees Riparian Forest Living Fences Nursery Active Water Protection Protect water Not contaminate water Improved Pastures Improved Pastures Forage Banks Improved fodder (ex caa) Trees in the pasture Rotational grazing Organic Practices Organic production Organic Fertilizer Certified Organic Production Stopping the u se of chemicals Halting chemical use Halting use of herbicides Recyling Composting Other Silos (interviews, May June 2012 tran s. Korey Force)
104 Table 4 4 Env ironmental components c ited by r espondents c oded into g eneral c ategories General Component Environmental Component cited by Respondents Water Water Rivers Trees Trees Tree Cover Forests S hade Organics Organics Biodiversity Biological Corridor Flora and Fauna Biodiversity Soil Soil Vitamins Nature Nature (naturaleza) Recreation/Enjoyment Aesthetic Beauty Heat Not burning Temperature (interviews, May June 2012 trans. K orey Force)
105 Table 4 5 Environmental p rocesses c ited by r espondents c oded into g eneral p rocesses General Process Environmental Process Cited by Respondent Biodiversity Conservation Expansion of biological corridor Forest for animals Climate Change Prevention Preventing Climate Change Preventing Global Warming and depletion of O zone Trees cool down the earth Economic Returns Carrying capacity of land increases Higher rates of production (carrying capacity of land increases) Carrying capacity inc reases; extra land can be used for more trees Animals are prettier and fatter Healthier cattle Food supply helps animal nutrition Improving the lives of animals Vitamins in the pasture make cattle healthier Less cattle fatalities in the summer due to heat exhaustion and hunger Health Benefits Health benefits for people Water Benefits Water is protected Non Sequestration Benefits provided by Trees Planting trees to protect water Different types of biodiversity are attr acted by different types of trees Some trees are better for the soil than others easily Conserving trees and forest conserves biodiversity Trees prevent things from washing away Trees protect water Planting trees leads to more water Planting trees protects the water and animals
106 Table 4 5. Continued General Process Environmental Process Cited by Respondent Carbon Sequestration provided by Trees Carbon sequestration (oxygen) Reforestation adds more oxygen to the air Conservation gives us purer air and leads to less contaminat ion Pollution from Chemicals Organic Production Less herbicides makes the environment better Less contamination Dirty things contaminate water Other The help it gives Projects keep moisture in the air Rotational grazing protects ground from being deg raded Living fences provide a wind breaker (interviews, May June 2012 trans. Korey Force)
107 T able 4 6 Environmental c onsequences c ited by r espondents c oded into g eneral c onsequence General Consequence Environmental Consequences cited by Respondents Water Problems Water Pollution Water Problems Water will dry up if we deforest Water scarcity Water will be contaminated without conservation Tolls on Animals No Animals Air Problems Less oxygen in th e air Without conservation, water and air will be contaminated Food Problems There will be no food Health Problems Sickness from contamination Global Warming Hot Climate Climate change Warming of the planet Without trees we will die from dryness Irreversibility If we destroy it, it will be gone Humans are slowly destroying everything If everyone keeps destroying, our problems will continue to get wo rse The planet will be destroyed Land Degradation Degradation of Pasturelands Land degradation Moral Consequences (interviews, May June 2012 trans. Korey Force)
108 Figure 4 1 Number of r espondents who r eported f ew, a verage, or h igh n umbers of s ilvopastoral p ractices 1 (interviews, May June 2012 ) 1 T his scale provides a comparative measure and was arranged to capture a normal distribution
109 Figure 4 2 Number of r espondents who r eported l ow, a verage, or h igh a wareness of e nvironmental c omponents 2 (interviews, May June 2012 ) 2 T his scale provides a comparative measure and was arranged to capture a normal distribution
110 Figure 4 3 Number of r espo ndents c lassified as l ow, a verage, or h igh a wareness of e nvironmental p rocesses 3 (interviews, May June 2012 ) 3 T his scale provides a comparative measure and was arranged to cap ture a normal distribution
111 Figure 4 4 Number of respondents who r eported l ow, a verage, or h igh a wareness of e nvironmental c onsequences 4 (interviews, May June 2012 ) 4 T his scale provides a comparative measure and was arranged to capture a normal distribution
112 Figure 4 5 Ability of r espondents to report l ow, a verage, or h igh a wareness of a spects of e nvironmental c onsciousness 5 (interviews, May June 2012) 5 T his scale provides a comparative measure and was arranged to capture a normal distribution
113 CHAPTER 5 SHORT TERM EFFECTS OF THE RISEMP ON CONSERVATION BEHAVIOR The previous chapters were u sed to emphasize how the project design of the RISEMP makes it ideal for analyzing the effects of different behavioral incentives and pressures on recipients. This chapter will focus primarily on the first question posed by this study: to what extent did conservation behavior during the project, what factors contribute to these motivations, or lack thereof, and what are the implications of these findings for future PES programs? To answer this questi on, this chapter will discuss the RISEMP in the context of the net changes in the provision of environmental services in overall terms and by project group. Each of these contexts will begin with a statistical analysis of the data and will be followed by a discussion of the behavioral factors and implications. This chapter begins with an analysis of the overall changes that occurred during the RISEMP by addressing the trends in the net land use changes of participants of the RISEMP and the rates of adopti on. The chapter then transitions to a comparison between project groups in mean ESI point accumulation and rates of adoption. The differences, or lack thereof, of these comparisons are then discussed within the behavioral framework introduced in Chapter 2. The data used in this chapter are derived from two sources: the RISEMP official data and data collected by the author. The RISEMP official data included the quantitative measures taken and documented by the project over time, such as the type and rate of silvopastoral practices adopted, the ESI point accumulation by participant, and the payments received by each participant. The second source of data was collected from the semi structured interviews discussed in Chapter 4
114 Net Changes in the Provisio n of Environmental Services This section begins with an analysis of the net changes in the provision of environmental services during the RISEMP. These net changes are then analyzed through a discussion of both net land use changes and the rates of adopti on over time. Finally, data analysis is discussed in the co ntext of the behavioral factors and implications of both the existence and/or lack of trends. Net Land Use Changes Data from the RISEMP indicate that the total environmental service points provide d by participants increased by 3.9% per year between 2002 and 2007. The environmental service points increased from 3727.60 per year at the baseline survey in 2001 to 5173.64 per year in 2007. As shown in Figure 5 1 p rimary land use s that explain this increased accumulation of environmental service points. The total area enclosed by both simple and layered living fences increased by 39.41 hectares and by 225.17 hectares respectively. Although there was a decline in the length of simple living fences b etween 2004 and 2006, interviews suggest that this occurred due to the conversion of simple living fences to layered living fences. The total area of forest cover increased by a total of 21.1 hectares, or 1.8%. The total area of pastures with trees incre ased by 1460.4 hectares, or 215.5%. These trends shows improved pastures and living fences, both simple and layered 1 as the most popularly adopted practices. In fact, these practices were the most commonly cited in interviews as the primary activities pursued during the RISEMP and as those still maintained. The significant and quick rise in the establishment of 1 Simple living fences refer to the us e of single rowed trees or bushes. Layered living fences refer to the combined use of trees and low growing vegetation.
115 improved pasture through the incorporation of trees, is most likely due to the provision of trees by the RISEMP to program participants and a general familiarity with tree planting The increase in living fences was the second most popular activity, most likely because, although it requires large amounts of labor input, it combines carbon sequestration and practicality for landowners. The liv ing fences established were not necessarily new practices, but rather replacements of dead post fences ; once established and properly managed, living fences provide a durable and cost efficient fencing option Additionally, it is important to mention that a tradition of living fences was well established in Costa Rica, and the practice was therefore familiar. Thus, landowners selected this practice to increase ESI point accumulation and over time, reduce labor costs (fences must be built and maintained a nyway, regardless of type). Figure 5 2 shows a living fence in the Esparza watershed in 2012. Other silvopastoral practices, such as fodder banks and forest cover, were also established, although at a slower rate. In the case of fodder banks, landowners indicated that high labor requirements dissuaded them from establishment Many respondents cited an increase in the carrying capacity of the land as enabling an increase in forest cover on their land: less land was needed to raise the same number of cattl e, thus leaving extra land that landowners could then convert to forest. The modesty of the increase in forest cover is due to both the labor requirements of planting his :
116 one land and utilizing all of it for cattle production were lazy and worthless. I t is important to note the relationship between land holding size and total accumulations of ESI points. A regression analysis showed a statistically significant and positive relationship between land size (ha) and total payments (USD); this relationship e xplains 55.7% of variance in payments For every one hectare increase in property size, payments increased by 37.20 USD. The likelihood of finding this relationship by chance is l ess than 0.05 This relationship was not due to an increase in investment per hectare, however. A regression analysis showed no statistically significant relationship between the ESI points accumulated per hectare and property size. Thus, large landowners were paid more because they had more property with which to provide envi ronmental services, but each hectare provided similar quantities of ESI, regardless of property size. Changes in Rates of Adoption Throughout the duration of the project, the average accumulation of ESI points per year, a value operationalized as the ado ption of silvopastoral practices, was consistently positive; the rates of change in accumulation, however, fluctuated tremendously. Table 5 1 shows the rate of adoption of silvopastoral practices through the yearly accumulation of ESI points and the rate of change. After the first year of the project, ESI points increased at a rate of 0.2 from the baseline survey; the highest rate of increase throughout the entirety of the project. Rates of adoption fell significantly between 2004 and 2005 and 2006 and 2007, with a rate of adoption of 0.02. The adoption rate between 2005 and 2006 was 0.12, a rate higher than the years directly preceding and following, but lower than the first year of the project.
117 The relatively high rate of change in ESI point accumulat ion between the base measurements and 2004 is most likely due to the state of degradation of the practices with the quickest returns and/or those practices that landowners were most familiar with The first year of the project marked the first intensive 2 use of silvopastoral practices for many landowners in the RISEMP, which meant that most farmers focused first on establishing improved pastures. This accounts for the 110% increase in improved pastures between the base survey and 2004. The establishment of improved pasture continued to increase for the duration of the project, but at a slower rate: 30% between 2004 and 2005; 11% between 2005 and 2006; and 5% between 2006 a nd 2007. After the initial conversion of improved pastures, other practices were adopted at slower rates due to higher labor requirements as well as time lapses in between implementation and the provision of environmental services. Behavioral Factors and Implications These results show that the RISEMP was successful in positively affecting the motivations of landowners to implement silvopastoral practices on their landholdings and, in so doing, increase their provision of environmental services. It is imp ortant to address the behavioral implications of these overall trends found within the official RISEMP data. From the data that deal with net changes in the provision of environmental services, it is impossible to determine the strength or weakness of eac h incentive; this will be done by the comparison of mean point accumulations and rates of 2 use in this case refers to a commitmen t to the practices that was focused and intensive.
118 adoption among project and payment groups, which will be discussed in the next section. The extent to which the incentives offered by the RISEMP existed independentl y from other influences such as the fall in beef prices, and existing motivations to engage in silvopastoral practices, remains unclear and is virtually impossible to measure post RISEMP. Figure 5 3 shows the comparison of international beef prices (USD) to the percent rate of adoption of silvopastoral practices. B eef prices returned to their previously high level in 2004 and remained relatively constant for the duration of the project. The percent rate of adoption between the baseline survey and 2004 wa s 20%; this rate fell to 1.8% by 2005 and did not surpass 2.5% for the remainder of the project. While it is probable that the uncertainty in the beef market may have motivated participants decision to join the RISEMP and influenced their behavior after, it is unlikely that it is the sole determining factor of the low rates of adoption after the first year of the project. Interviews with respondents suggested that a more likely explanation for an initially high rate of adoption and subsequently low rates was due to the situation discussed previously in which the easiest and/or least time intensive practices were adopted first on degraded land, leading to a high rate of adoption. After this point, adoption occurred at a slower pace as practices became more intensive. This trend is also suggested in the positive relationship between property size and total payments, but insignificant relationship between ESI point accumulation per hectare and property size. Al though it is probable that larger landowners inv ested more total time, not necessarily time per hectare, it is difficult to measure any differences between the behavior of large and small landowners because it is possible that small
119 landowners would have done the same practices on the same number of hec tares if they had had the choice. Smaller landowners have higher incentives to intensify their land for two reasons: they are unable to expand and must therefore intensify; and their smaller income is more greatly affected by increasing the direct returns of silvopastoral practices. Thus, under normal, economically rational conditions, small landowners would still be motivated to adopt silvopastoral practices at higher rates than large landowners even when beef prices returned to those before the fall in prices in 2003. practices in the first year of the project, they were all similarly slow in adopting more intensive practices in spite of the international beef market pr ices. Changes by Project Groups The analysis and discussion of total project changes in the previous section made it clear that the total amount of environmental services provided by participants in Esparza increased. Thus, the program, overall, was a mo tivation to engage in conservation behavior. In order to understand the differences between different project groups however, this section compares each project group by both mean point accumulation and the rates of adoption. This section concludes with an analysis of the behavioral factors and implications of data analyzed. Changes in Mean Point Accumulation by Project Group The RISEMP data indicates that there were few differences in the mean point accumulation per hectare between project groups after each 2 year payment interval With the exception of two groups after the base survey, Group A (Control) and Group B2 (PSA + TA), a One Wa y Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) found no statistically significant difference between the mean point accumulations of e ach group at different
120 payment intervals. Figure 5 4 shows the mean point accumulation per hectare of each project group after the baseline, 2005, and 2007 surveys. A One Way ANOVA test shows a .031 statistically significant level of difference between the mean ESI points per hectare provided by participants in Group A (Control), and Group B2 (PSA + TA) at the time of the baseline survey. A Bonferonni post hoc test showed that the difference in mean ESI points per hectare between participants in the two groups was statistically significant. This shows that the participants of Group A (Control) were providing higher quantities of environmental services (0.1808 more ESI points) than participants of Group B2 (PSA + TA) at the time of the baseline survey be homogeneity of variance between the mean points per hectare held by participants of the remaining groups after the baseline survey. After the 2005 survey, a One Way ANOVA com parison of means showed no statistically significant difference between the mean points accumulated per hectare by participants of each of the five project groups after 2 years of the project. Furthermore, a 0.336 homogeneity of variance between the mean point accumulations per group. Similarly, a One Way ANOVA comparison of means showed no statistically significant difference between the mean point accumulations per hectare of each group after four years. survey, a 0.541 homogeneity of variance between project groups. It is important to note that the size of Group C2 (PES) and C4 (PES), 12 and 14 respectively, makes statistical mean comparis ons inappropriate. A sample size of at
121 least 30 is recommended for the use of One comparisons between Groups C2 (PES) and C4 (PES), though not statistically significant, are not valid indicators of the presence or absence of a relationship. Changes in Rates of Adoption by Project Group The rates of accumulation of ESI points were positive for all four years of the program for each of the project groups. Figure 5 5 shows the average rate of change in ESI point accumulation by hectare by group every 2 years. This means that regardless of the type of incentive, on average, ESI points continued to increase. With the exception of Group A (Control) and Group B2 (PES + TA) at the baseline survey, there were no statistically signif icant differences between the mean points accumulated by each project at every two year interval, and therefore no significant differences in the rates of adoption. In the case of Group A (Control) and B2 (PES + TA), Group B2 (PES + TA) increased its prov ision of ESI points at a statistically significant faster rate than Group A (Control), increasing at a rate of 2.9 between the baseline survey and 2005; Group A (Control) increased at a rate of 2.25. In the cases of statistically insignificant relationship s, the rate of adoption for Group A (Control) participants was the lowest rate for all four years of the project, with the exception of Group B2 (PES + TA) after the baseline survey. The rates of adoption for groups that received no technical assistance w ere lower than those groups that did receive it. It is important to note however, that Group C4 (PES) had the highest accumulation of ESI points at the end of 4 years.
122 The adoption rates for the 2 year participants 3 were not higher than those of 4 year pa rticipants, counter to RISEMP predictions. Instead, adoption rates for the 2 year participants continued to be similar to those of the 4 year participants 4 and Group B2 (PES + TA) had a greater rate of adoption in the last two years of the project than di d group B4 (PES + TA), despite not receiving payments in the last two years. Adoption rates decreased significantly after the first 2 years; this was anticipated by the project, but the project anticipated that only the rates of the 2 year participants wo uld significantly drop off. However, the 4 year participants showed a similar trend, even showing lower rates of adoption during the last two years than 2 year groups. Behavioral Factors and Implications The data of the previous section show the general absence of a relationship between project groups, given both the mean ESI points accumulated and the rates of adoption. The only exception to this is the statistically significant difference in mean point accumulation between Group A (Control) and Group B2 (PSA + TA) at the time of the baseline survey, and the corresponding difference in rates of adoption in the first two years of the project. The question at the individual level then, is what motivated participants of each group to adopt the practices t hat they did, and what are the project incentives? Thus, this section draws connections between the results of data analysis among the RISEMP project groups and the beha vioral theories introduced in Chapter 2. The effects of positive external incentives, subjective norms, and intrinsic 3 Group B2 (PES + TA) and Group C2 (PES). 4 Group B4 (PES + TA) and Group C4 (PES).
123 motivations are all potentially important in identifying the motivations behind each participant's decision to join the project, and the extent to which he/she changed his/her behavior to implement silvopastoral practices This section addresses the implications of the differences between Group A and B2 at the onset of the project, as well as the absence of a difference between other proje ct groups. Difference between groups A and B2 In the first 2 years of the project, Group A (Control) provided more ESI points at the baseline survey and Group B2 (PSA + TA) had a higher rate of adoption in the first two years; these findings have several possible explanations. First, it is possible that the RISEMP incentives, payments and technical assistance offered to Group B2 (PSA + TA) were more effective in the first two years of the project than those offered to Group A (Control) (none in this case) motivating Group B2 (PSA + TA) to invest more heavily in increasing ESI point provision. This explanation however, does not hold true for the 4 year RISEMP groups (PES and PES + TA), that also received the same project incentives but did not show any st atistically significant difference in the rate of adoption. An alternative explanation, one that accounts for the absence of a statistically significant relationship between other RISEMP project groups, is that the level of degradation of the landholdings of Group B2 (PSA + TA) was greater, leading to a higher return on invested labor than Group A (Control) with regard to the quantity of ESI points accumulated. Effects of s ubjective norms and intrinsic m otivations The analysis of Group A (Control) in rel ation to other project groups, which showed indistinguishable mean point accumulations and rates of adoption (except for the one exception discussed previously), enables a discussion about the relevance of
124 Azjen's (1991) notion of subjective norms and DeYo ung's concept of intrinsic motivations as targeted by the RISEMP. Table 5 2 shows the behavior change components that correspond to Group A (Control) participants and the results that this study can draw. The increase in ESI points by participants in Gro up A (Control) suggests that they were motivated by something besides RISEMP incentives, and the his/her social network) or intrinsic motivations (the satisfaction of striving for behavioral competence, frugality, and/or maintaining a sense of community)? Because members of Group A (Control) were not receiving technical assistance this study assumed that they did not have the same regular interactions with othe r mem bers of the project group that participants in incentive groups had Thus, this study explored the subjective norms of respondents through their relationships with their neighbors. Several of the Group A (Control) members did not even remember the RISEMP occurring in the community, and it was thus impossible to ask several questions concerning their involvement and/or the involvement of their neighbors. This is significant in itself, in that if many respondents could not remember the project, then it is unlikely that they were motivated to improve their land through the subjective pressure of those involved. Th ose who did remember the RISEMP did not report knowing their neighbors or sharing advice and information with their neighbors at a higher incidenc e than respondents of other project groups. Of 10 respondents from Group A (Control) who remembered the project, 8 reported that their land use practices were either similar or very similar to their neighbors. Respondents even reported that they believe d that their land was similar but
125 better conserved than the land of their neighbors. This makes it unlikely that the motivations to improve the land came from the subjective norms of neighbors. Subjective norms motivate individuals when the individual fe els that there is a conflict or difference between what he/she believes that those in his/her significant social circle believe he/she should do, and what he/she is actually doing (Azjen, 1981) Group A (Control) respondents reported that they believed th at their practices were similar to others, and they were therefore unlikely to have been motivated by a subjective norm to improve what they already viewed as a commonality between them. There is greater evidence that the presence of intrinsic motivations proved influential in motivating Group A (Control) to continue improving land at rates similar to other project groups. The statistically significant difference between the land use practices of Group A (Control) and Group B2 (PSA + TA) at the time of RIS EMP's baseline survey, suggests that Group A (Control) participants were already motivated to improve their land more than other members of the region. Furthermore, 9 out of 10 Group A (Control) respondents reported previous exposure and practice of silvo pastoral systems, the highest proportion of respondents asked. Table 5 3 shows the proportion of respondents in each group that reported practicing silvopastoral systems prior to the RISEMP. This suggests that Group A (Control) respondents had stronger i ntrinsic motivations to engage in silvopastoral practices; respondents most commonly reported that their motivation for the use of silvopastoral systems was the effect they had on the health of their cattle and the conservation benefits of more trees. A f urther exploration of intrinsic motivations will be discussed in the next chapter in which the long term effects of RISEMP on levels of environmental awareness are discussed.
126 Effects of positive external i ncentives The project design of the RISEMP enabl ed the analysis of the effects of PES, PES and technical assistance, and length of involvement project participants. Table 5 4 shows the relationship between the positive external incentives offered by RISEMP and the results from the project. The data in dicate that the positive external incentives offered by the project affected participants and motivated the increase in the provision of environmental services. Except for the case of Group A (Control) and Group B2 (PSA + TA), none of these incentives pro ved significantly more effective than the others, and in this case, the externally incentivized project group (Group B2 (PES + TA)) appeared to have adopted at faster rates than the non externally incentivized group (Group A (Control)). Otherwise, the mea n point accumulations per hectare indicated no statistically significant differences between project groups; this means that PES and PES combined with technical assistance were equally effective in motivating conservation behavior. What the project failed to control for was the effect of only technical assistance in comparison to the other incentives, something that the interviews in this study suggest was a more appreciated incentive offered by the RISEMP. During the semi structured interviews, responde nts were asked what motivated them to participate in the project. The distribution of answers by project group can be found in Table 5 5 While 20.5% of respondents cited PES as their motivation for joining the project, an equal proportion listed educati on about silvopastoral practices as the main motivation and over 50% cited motivations that had no association with PES. One respondent from Group B4 (PSA + TA) remarked that the payments were so small that they covered less than 4% of the total annual co sts of his farm; other respondents
127 echoed the feeling that it was unfair to cite the payments as the main incentive when they were so small. Although this sentiment proved more common among larger landowners than smaller ones due to a positive correlatio n between farm size and income, smaller landowners also indicated that although the money was helpful, they didn't view themselves as significantly more prosperous than before. In fact, the positive outcomes of the project that most respondents were eager to talk about were the improvement of their landholdings and the bettered health of their cattle, which meant better returns, not the income from PES. Data from the RISEMP and the results from this study infer that technical assistance was a more appreci ated factor, with many landowners citing its importance over PES. Many respondents remarked that they wouldn't have participated in the project at all without technical assistance, and those who claimed they would have, said that they wouldn't have been a ble to accomplish nearly as much without it. They viewed technical assistance as enabling them to do practices that would improve the quality of their landholding, something that they indicated they would always want. This testimony seems contradictory, however, in light of the fact that motivation levels between Groups B (PES + TA) and C (PES) showed no statistically significant difference. This can be explained by several possibilities about participants from PES only groups 5 : they already had the tec hnical knowledge needed to engage in silvopastoral practices; they were interacting and sharing with participants of groups that did receive it; or they managed to achieve the same level of ESI accumulation, just at higher costs. 5 Groups C2 and C4.
128 Results from the intervi ews suggest that all three factors played a role. Table 5 3 shows the respondents who reported engaging in silvopastoral practices before the RISEMP. In Group C2 (PES) and Group C4 (PES), 57% and 50%, respectively, of respondents reported engaging in sil vopastoral practices before the beginning of RISEMP. This suggests that over half of the participants in PES only groups (both 2 and 4 years) were familiar with silvopastoral systems and had sufficient technical knowledge to implement them. Respondents from PES only groups were the highest proportion of respondents that reported talking and sharing advice with their neighbors frequently. This suggests that PES only participants were talking with participants of groups that received technical assistance for advice. It is also probable that these participants accessed informational resources and advice offered by MAG. Finally, interviews with respondents showed that in some cases, landowners without technical assistance neither knew anything previously n or learned from others, instead expending more labor (because of ill managed establishment and/or maintenance) to get the same returns. One respondent expressed anger and frustration towards the project for not educating him in effective practices. He sa id that he could and would have Effects of habitualization and e nvironmentality The creation of 2 year and 4 year project groups allowed for the analysis of the effects of the length of involvement on each participant and the potential to explore the concepts of habitualization and environmentality discussed in Chapter 2 (Geller, 2002; Agrawal, 2005) As previously discussed, sample size constraints made it difficult to draw statistica l conclusions about the effects of the RISEMP. Table 5 6 shows the relationship between the length of involvement and the results of the project, and the
129 effects of habitualization and environmentality. Surface level observations of the data suggest that there was no difference in the quantity of ESI points accumulated per hectare between project groups of 2 year and 4 year involvement. This lack of difference however, suggests that a motivation existed for 2 year participants after payments (and technic al assistance) had stopped; otherwise, why would they have continued to increase the provision of environmental services at the same rate as 4 year participants? In the discussion of the theories of habitualization (Geller, 2002) and environmentality (Ag rawal, 2005) in Chapter 2, it was suggested that once behaviors are repeated frequently enough, individuals will either incorporate the behavior into their habitual routines or incorporate it into their value system. In interviews with participants, there seemed to be two types of actions: those that required active implementation of new silvopastoral practices; and those that required maintenance of already established silvopastoral practices. The involvement lengths of the project groups, 2 years or 4 y ears, appeared to have been too short for either group to develop a sense of habitualized practices, or beliefs about the environment, in terms of the active implementation of new silvopastoral practices. Most respondents talked about the labor required t o implement the practices, something that they showed no indication of getting used to or, as will be discussed in Chapter 6, continuing. Instead, respondents exhibited a sense of habitualization in the maintenance of the practices on their own land or se eing them on the land of others. Respondents indicated that they were
130 interview, May 2012, trans. Korey Force). Similarly, many respondents remarked that the practice of silvopastoral systems was slowly becoming the way that everyone treated their land. What the interviews from this study suggest was more likely, is tha t respondents had already begun the development of intrinsic motivations and norms that made them prone to adopt the practices enabled by the RISEMP. Many respondents remarked that they had either already begun to implement silvopastoral systems in their pastures, to the extent they were financially able, or that they had wanted to begin silvopastoral practices, but had been financially unable Table 5 3 shows that 7 of 11 respondents from Group B2 and 4 of 7 from Group C2 reported that they had already b egun the use of silvopastoral practices before the RISEMP began. Tying Everything Together The data analyzed in this chapter, both that of RISEMP and that of this author, were used to explore the effects of the aspects of the project design of the RISEMP on participant behavior during the project. This analysis showed that the project was undoubtedly successful in motivating the adoption of silvopastoral practices. The exact otivated this behavior however, still remains unclear because of the relative similarity in project outcomes among different project groups and the impossibility of knowing, in real time, what landowners were thinking before and during the project. Howev er, the outcomes discussed in this chapter suggest that the incentives offered by the RISEMP were more than were necessary to motivate landowners in the Esparza watershed who were already ready and willing to establish silvopastoral systems.
131 The connection s between project outcomes and behavioral theory discussed in this chapter suggest that respondents were not the money economic actors that are present in the strictly economic theory of PES. In fact, the provision of payments seemed to have no greater effect on conservation behavior during the project than any other incentive or non incentive. Similarly, positive external proposed by Geller (200 2) and Agrawal (2005). The achievement of Group A (Control) suggests that intrinsic motivations were more influential in motivating conservation behavior, in the case of Esparza, something attributable to the context in which the project took place. This chapter suggests that several of the contextual conditions discussed in Chapter 3, made payments unnecessary for the adoption of silvopastoral practices in Esparza, Costa Rica. The national rhetoric of conservation, payments for environmental services, a nd agroforestry combined with a local previous, positive, and observable exposure to silvopastoral practices, created a participant base that was ready and willing to adopt silvopastoral practices. In fact, half of the respondents of this study had alread y begun adoption before the RISEMP began in 2002. This would suggest that participants were particip ating not for payments, but to establish, extend, and/or improve practices that they had already thought about and/or began establishing independently. Th the project, a feared flaw of PES discussed in Chapter 2. While this chapter discussed the effects of the RISEMP on short term behavior, or behavior during the project, the next chapte r will address the presence of long term
132 effects. Chapter 6 will address the research question: to what extent did the RISEMP term conservation behavior and levels of environmental consciousness, what are the factors that contributed to this, and what are the implications of these findings for future PES programs? Chapter 6 explores these questions and their implications for an understanding of behavioral change.
133 Table 5 1 Changes in ESI Point a ccumula tion Year Yearly ESI Point Accumulation Rate of Change in ESI Point Accumulation Base 3727.6 2004 4478.22 0.2 2005 4557.29 0.02 2006 5087.95 0.12 2007 5173.64 0.02 (RISEMP, 2007)
134 Table 5 2 RISEMP e ffects of s ubjective n orms and i ntr insic m otivations Aspect of Project Design Behavior Change Component Results from Project Degree of Influence Control group Subjective norms Intrinsic motivations Participants didn't indicate pressure from their neighbors as a motivating factor T he RISEMP results suggest the presence of intrinsic satisfactions that led to an increase in environmental services equal to that of other project groups. Low Higher
135 Table 5 3 Respondents w ho r eported s ilvopastoral p ractices b efore the RISEM P. Group Reported No Reported Yes % Reported Yes A 1 9 90 B2 4 7 64 C2 3 4 57 B4 5 4 44 C4 4 4 50 (interviews, May June 2012 )
136 Table 5 4 RISEMP effects of p ositive external i ncentives Aspect of Project Design Behavior Change Component Re sults from Project Degree of Influence PES only group & PES and TA group Positive external incentives Knowledge and Information Positive incentives motivated the increase in the provision of environmental services. This was only significantly evide nt in the relationship between Group A and Group B2. Technical assistance was not controlled for. Respondents indicated that TA was a motivating factor. No greater than that of other incentives N/A
137 Table 5 5 Motivations for participation by pro ject g roup Group A Group B2 Group C2 Group B4 Group C4 Total Payments n/a 2 1 2 2 7 Socially Motivated n/a 1 1 0 1 3 Physical Incentives n/a 0 0 1 0 1 Education n/a 2 1 4 1 8 Improving Land n/a 2 2 1 1 6 Conservation & Payments n/a 1 2 0 1 4 I mproving Land & Payments n/a 3 0 0 2 5 Other n/a 0 0 1 0 1 Total n/a 11 7 9 8 35 (interviews, May June 2012 )
138 Table 5 6 RISEMP effects by l ength of i nvolvement Aspect of Project Design Behavior Change Component Results from Project Degree of Influ ence 2 and 4 year participation groups Habitualization & Environmentality Intrinsic values and norms Sample size constraints makes conclusions hard to draw. Surface level observation of the data do not indicate differences in the accumulation of ESI points between 2 year participants and 4 year participants. The continued improvement of the 2 year group could suggest the presence of habits and environmentality. The continuation of practices by the 2 year group suggests the presence of i ntrinsic motivations and norms. Low Higher
139 Table 5 7 Effects of the RISEMP d esign on p articipant b ehavior Aspect of Project Design Behavior Change Component Results from Project Degree of Influence Control group Subjective norms Intr insic motivations Participants didn't indicate pressure from their neighbors as a motivating factor The RISEMP results suggest the presence of intrinsic satisfactions that led to an increase in environmental services equal to that of other project groups Low Higher PES only group & PES and TA group Positive external incentives Knowledge and Information Positive incentives motivated the increase in the provision of environmental services. This was only significantly evident in the relation ship between Group A and Group B2. Technical assistance was not controlled for. Respondents indicated that TA was a motivating factor. No greater than that of other incentives N/A 2 and 4 year participation groups Habitualization & Environmenta lity Intrinsic values and norms Sample size constraints make conclusions hard to draw. Surface level observation of the data do not indicate differences in the accumulation of ESI points between 2 year participants and 4 year participants. The continued improvement of the 2 year group could suggest the presence of habits and environmentality. The continuation of practices by the 2 year group suggests the presence of intrinsic motivations and norms. Low Higher
140 Figure 5 1 Net Changes in l iving f ences, f orest c over, i mproved p asture, and f odder b anks (RISEMP, 2007)
141 Figure 5 2 Living f ence in Esparza, Costa Rica (2012)
142 Figure 5 3 Comparison of i nternational b eef p rices and p ercent a doption r ate of s ilvopastoral p ractices (RISEMP, 2007 ) Indexmundi.com. (2013). Beef Daily Price. Retrieved from http://www.indexmundi.com/commodities/?commodity=beef&months=120
143 Figure 5 4 Average p oints a ccumulated by g roup and p ayment i ntervals (RISEMP, 2007)
144 Figure 5 5 Average r ate of c hange in ESI p oint a ccumulation per h ectare by g roup e very 2 y ears (RISEMP, 2007)
145 CH APTER 6 EFFECTS ON LONG TERM BEHAVIOR CHANGE The previous chapter discussed the increase in the provision of environmental services based on the short term analysis of the annual RISEMP land surveys from 2002 to 2007. These data presented only a short ter m analysis of the effect of payments for environmental services (PES), and PES combined with technical assistance, on the conservation behavior of landowners in Esparza, Costa Rica. The long term effects of the incentives introduced by the RISEMP are equa lly, if not more, important for the future of Esparza and as a guide for future projects. This chapter will discuss the long term effects of the RISEMP in three dimensions : the continuance of silvopastoral practices after the end of the RISEMP; the new im plementation of silvopastoral practices after the end of the RISEMP; and the relative levels of environmental consciousness. While the continuance and/or new implementation of silvopastoral practices since the end of the RISEMP deal with current conservat ion behavior, the levels of environmental consciousness deal more directly with the biospheric knowledge, values, and norms discussed in Chapter 2. Chapter 5 analyzed the direct effects of the RISEMP incentives on measurable behaviors, but it is harder to control for the effects of each incentive on long term behavior because of the limited capacity of this follow up study Thus, the b ehavior theory from Chapter 2 will be discussed more in terms of its possible relationships with current practices, trends and beliefs as cited by former participants, and what these findings might say about the RISEMP
146 Data Notes The data used to gauge the long term effects of the RISEMP on conservation behavior came primarily from the semi structured interviews conducted by this author in the summer of 2012; it is important to note the difference between these data and those collected by the RISEMP between 2002 and 2007. Official RISEMP data, collected between 2002 and 2007 provided individual level and aggregated inform ation about participants landholdings, environmental service point accumulations, and payments received. Official RISEMP data provided by CATIE to the researcher were combined with semi structured interviews conducted by the author during the summer of 2 012. The two main questions used to measure the long term effects of the project were: 1. Have you continued the practices that you began during the RISEMP? If so, how many practices? 2. Since the end of the RISEMP, have you implemented any additional practic es to those that you implemented during the project? If so, how many? The nature of these questions is subjective, so the answers given were more difficult to compare to each other than quantitative data, for several reasons. First, the questions lacked structured interviews did not have the capacity to take land surveys like those in the re used as proxies of reality. Thirdly it is possible that respondents claimed to continue more practices than they had in fact continued. These pitfalls were buffered during the interviews by asking respondents what practices they still continued, wher e they continued them, and to what extent the amount and location of practices had changed since the end of the RISEMP; in many cases, respondents were asked to illustrate their property and practices on each hectare with a
147 pen and paper (See Figure 6 1 ). Furthermore, the MAG agents helped in identifying respondents who were being openly dishonest, based on their observations and more in with the data, the author did not dete ct large differences between what respondents reported and their actual behavior. The environmental consciousness index was constructed by counting the number of respondents' silvopastoral practices, and assessing their ability to name environmental comp onents, processes, and consequences, as explained in Chapter 4. Thus, this index was also subjective, created based on answers to questions classified by the researcher. While the subjectivity of this index diminished the ability to talk about respondent this study. The index instead allowed the comparison between groups, which was the purpose of this study. Thus the measures of environmental consciousness were based on responde consequences in comparison to other respondents. Table 6 1 shows t he distribution of this study's sample respondents among project groups. The total number of interviews conducted by this stu dy was 42; however, due to revisions and additions to the study questionnaire, the total number of respondents for some questions was as low as 37. This allowed the utilization of distribution analysis between project groups, but was not large enough to d raw conclusions about statistical significance like those found in Chapter 5. A sample size of 30 is generally cited as the minimum necessary to conduct statistical analysis; when project groups were divided, the numbers fell far below 30. Thus, only whe n the
148 respondents were treated as a single sample, could statistical analysis be run and considered valid. Much of the comparative analysis in this chapter therefore relied on qualitative, subjective measures to complement the statistical analyses. Cont inued Practices The continuation, or lack thereof, of the practices implemented during the RISEMP allowed a superficial measure of the extent to which practices were accepted and viewed as positive land use changes. Many of the practices introduced into p astureland, primarily trees and improved pastures, required labor to reverse. Therefore, the continuation of practices did not necessarily mean that landholders were y should expend the energy to reverse them. This study asked respondents whether or not they continued the practices that they had implemented during the RISEMP, regardless of whether or not they received an incentive. Only 2 of 47 respondents reported th practices that they implemented during the RISEMP. In both of these cases however, the landowners had sold their property and no longer owned pastureland. Since the two landowners that didn't report any continuation of silvopastoral practices did so because they no longer had pastureland in which to practice them, they will not be discussed further except to say that in both cases, respondents reported two things: 1.) if they had the ability to buy pastureland, they woul d establish a silvopastoral system; and 2.) they did not know whether or not the new owners of the land continued silvopastoral practices. Nine respondents reported that they continued some of the practices, but said that some practices were stopped due t o labor costs and/or environmental and management factors that destroyed trees and/or improved pasture. The overwhelming
149 majority of respondents, 36 of 47, reported, however, that they continued most, if not all, of the practices that they implemented dur ing the RISEMP. Continued Practices by Project Group Although statistical comparisons between groups were not useful, the frequency and distribution of respondents' continuati on of silvopastoral practices show s that there was not a large indication that an y one of the controlled incentives offered by the RISEMP proved more effective than another in affecting long term behavior decisions to continue the use of silvopastoral practices. Figure 6 2 shows the proportion of respondents from each project group wh The highest proportion of respondents that reported continuing most, if not all, of the practices were from Group C4 (4 Year PSA), 100%. This however, is nearly indistinguishable from the 89% of respondents from Group B4 (4 Year PSA + TA) and the 80% of respondents from Group A (Control) that reported the same. In all three cases, the same number of respondents reported c ontinuing most, if not all, of the practices, 8 out of 8 from Group C4 (4 Year PSA), 8 out of 9 from Group B4 (4 Year PSA + TA), and 8 out of 10 from Group A (Control). Respondents from Group B2 (2 Year PSA + TA) reported the lowest rate of continuing mos t, if not all, of the practices, the only group from which less than half, 45%, of the respondents reported this. T he proportions from this group of respondents are skewed because two reported selling their property. Thus, of respondents that continued t o own pastureland, 5 out of 9, or 56%, reported that they continued most, if not all, of the practices implemented during the RISEMP.
150 All other respondents who continued to own their pastureland, reported that they continued at least some of the practices but acknowledged that they were unable to continue most or all. The primary reasons that respondents reported for not continuing silvopastoral practices were the difficulty of high labor requirements, and unexpected environmental factors. Many respondent s reported discontinuing labor intensive practices, such as fodder banks, because they didn't feel that they could afford the labor investment. Other respondents reported unexpected environmental and management factors; one respondent cited a parasitic wo rm that killed most of the improved pasture that he had planted, while another said that his cattle had eaten so much of the small trees before they had time to sufficiently develop, that they died. Continued Practices by Payment Group While each project g roup received different incentives, the quantity of payments received by each landholder varied significantly, depending on baseline ESI points, labor investment, and land holding size. Figure 6 3 shows the proportion of respondents who reported continued practices, to some degree, within each payment group of the RISEMP. At least half of all the respondents in each payment group level (in 1000 USD increments) reported that they continued most, if not all of the practices that they were paid to implement d uring the RISEMP. Although only 50% of respondents in the 0 1000 USD payment group reported that they continued most, if not all of the practices, this number is not statistically significant due to a low sample size. Beyond this comparably low report o f the continuation of most, if not all, practices, by those who received the smallest payments, there is no observable trend within the data. Respondents who fell within the 1001 2000 USD payment group reported continuing a higher proportion of practices than those in both the 2001 3000
1 51 USD payment group and the 3001 4000 USD payment group. Those respondents from the highest payment group reported the highest proportion of continuation, with 86%. The small sample sizes make these differences inconsequent ial and they are treated by this study as insignificant. Behavioral Factors and Implications While counter intuitive, the lack of an identifiable difference among project and payment groups has implications about the effects of the RISEMP on the behavio r of individuals in the Esparza watershed. It allows for the discussion of the effectiveness of the RISEMP in the Esparza watershed, the behavior of incentivized individuals after incentives have ended, and the potential of silvopastoral practices. The r eported continuation of behavior suggests that the RISEMP was successful in facilitating the implementation of silvopastoral practices in the region. Chapter 5 highlighted the increase in silvopastoral practices during the project while data from this st udy show the continuation of those practices After the end of incentives, most landowners reported that they continue d the silvopastoral practices to the extent that they believe d that they were able Both of these trends are attributable to the presenc e of the RISEMP. Effects of subjective norms and intrinsic motivations motivations seem to be more important in the continuation of silvopastoral practices than in the decision to engage in the practices to begin with. Table 6 2 shows the the subjective norm and intrinsic motivation behavior change components. tinuation of practices strongly suggest the presence of
152 these behavioral factors, because payment incentives have stopped. Furthermore, respondents reported feeling that silvopastoral practices were becoming the norm, and openly recognized the benefit of silvopastoral practice for their own life, the life of their cattle, the future of the community, and the environment. It is also important to remember the labor costs involved in reversing the silvopastoral practices which undoubtedly contributed to the continuation of practices. continually commented on the significance of the RISEMP in making silvopastoral practices more commonly seen in the Esparza area. Although respo indicate any open feelings of pressure, many remarked that it was becoming the new was more visible in the aftermath of the project, as landowners saw the practices destruction or discontinuation of these practices would mean a visible deviation from what respondents were beginning to consider the status quo. A deviation like t his would challenge the intrinsic motivation discussed by DeYoung (2000), in which individuals strive to maintain a positive position within a community. motivation to be frugal and thoughtful in practice and consumption are also important to discuss. In this, eliminating practices that individuals viewed as beneficial or frugal would be a behavior that contradicted the need to feel frugal. Respondents were asked a series of questions to gauge the extent to which they believed that silvopastoral practices were beneficial to themselves the community, and the future. Figure 6 4
153 reported that they believed that the silvopastoral practices from the RISEMP had bettered both their own life and the life of their cattle. In most cases, respondents reported these two beliefs as a causal relationship: their lives were bettered because the life of th eir cattle was bettered. Respondents most commonly mentioned that there was more shade, food, and nutrients for the cattle which meant that the cattle weighed more and were healthier throughout the entire year. Respondents easily connected the rhetoric o f conservation with the silvopastoral practices of the RISEMP, with 83% reporting that the well being of the environment was components, processes, and consequences of failing t o conserve, will be discussed later in this chapter. Respondents were less sure however, of the effects of the RISEMP on the future of the community. Many were aware of the positive influence of the practices on themselves and the environment as a whole; they were often unsure of how this was connected to the neighbors with whom they interacted. Conceptualizing and talking about the effects beyond the farm or global level proved difficult. Those who did believe the future of the community was better as a result of the RISEMP, cited the increase in resources to the region as a result of the project, both environmental resources and financial in the form of increased returns on cattle. Effects of positive external incentives The data show that there were n o observable relationships between the reported continuation of silvopastoral practices and the incentive system of the RISEMP. Table 6 3 shows the behavior change component that corresponds to the positive external incentives offered to participants in P ES and PES + TA groups, and the relationship
154 practices. While the positive external incentives ended in 2007, the majority of landholders reported continuing most, if not all of the practices implemented during the RISEMP. The degree of influence that each positive external incentive had on landowners behavioral decisions to continue the practices is indistinguishable; no positive incentive was more motivating than another i n terms of continuing the practices implemented during the RISEMP. These finding s suggest however, several possibilities about the relationship between the positive external incentives offered by the RISEMP and their relationship with the motivations fo r adopting the practices in the first place. The high rates of reported continuation of practices, regardless of project group and/or payment group suggest that participants' motivations to engage in the project in the first place were not solely the pay ments offered, as discussed in Chapter 5. If this had been the case, a more logical trend would be a neglect of the practices once payments were stopped, or a true market response, the halt of environmental services when payment was no longer provided. T able 6 4 shows the motivations reported by respondents in each project group during semi structured interviews. While 20.5% of respondents cited PES as their motivation for joining the project, an equal proportion listed education about silvopastoral prac tices as the main motivation and over 50% cited motivations that had no association with PES. The continuation of the practices after the end of the RISEMP, suggests that respondents were truthful in reporting that they were motivated by incentives other than payments, such as education and improving their land.
155 Effects of habitualization and environmentality silvopastoral practices makes it difficult to draw conclusions about t he relationship between this behavior and habitualization and environmentality. This study shows that 2 year participants continue the silvopastoral practices that they implemented during the project at the same level of those that participated for 4 year s. This could mean that both groups were affected by the habitualization of practices, but that 2 years of practice was enough to create the same level of habitualization as 4 years. Data from Chapter 5 showed that there were no difference s in average ES I point accumulation between groups, even after 2 year participants 1 stopped receiving payments (and technical assistance). This explanation would either not account for Group A (Control) or it would assume that all groups were affected by the same level of habitualization. The latter is probably the most likely because it explains the uniformity in results that has been found in this study. This sense of habitualization and environmentality will be discussed later in the discussion of environmental cons ciousness. New Implementation of Practices The continuation, or lack thereof, of the practices implemented during the RISEMP allows a surface level look at the extent to which practices were accepted and viewed as positive land use changes. Many of the pr actices introduced into pastureland, primarily trees and improved pastures, required labor to reverse, meaning continuation of practices does not necessarily mean that landh olders are in favor of the 1 Groups B2 (PSA + TA) and C2 (PSA)
156 energy to reverse them. The examination of new implementation of practices since the end of the project however, yields a more accurate pictu re of the effects of the RISEMP on conservation behavior and future trends in land use changes. Respondents were asked whether they had implemented any new practices since the end of the RISEMP or just maintained what they had established during the progra m. While the majority of participants reported continuing what they had implemented during the project, much fewer reported implementing anything new. Twenty new practices since t he RISEMP ended. Twelve respondents (26%) reported that they had implemented some new practices, but not many, and 9, 19%, reported that they New Implementation by Project Group A look at the n ew implementation of silvopastoral practices by project group allows for a more accurate discussion o f the effects of the RISEMP on active establishment of new practices. 2 Figure 6 5 shows the proportion of respondents from each project group who reported the implementation of new practices since the end of the RISEMP. Over half of respondents in each group, except for Group A (Control) significance of Group A (Control) then, is that 90% of respondents from Group A (Control) said that they had implemented at least some new practices, while 60% said 2 It is important to note that the new implementation of practi ces is simply a measure of effort to intensify not a measure of total labor put into silvopasture. The continuation of silvopastoral systems requires labor, and the implementation of new practices requires additional. New implementation of practices also does not make any assumptions about the quality of management of those practices.
157 they had implemented many. This proportion is drastically different from the 9% of respondents from Group B2 (2 Year PSA + TA) and the 17% from Group C4 (4 Year PSA) that reported that they had implemented many new practices; the other groups had no respondents that reported this. were drastically hi gher than groups that received incentives, there are no other observable differences between incentive groups. Although Group C4 (4 Year PSA) has slightly higher proportions than the other groups, sample size constraints prevent any statistical analysis o differences beyond that found between Group A and all other Groups; this will be discussed later in the Behavioral Factors and Implications section. New Implementation by Payment Group When res pondents were divided based on payment groups, similar trends emerged in that not many respondents implemented new practices after the RISEMP ended. Figure 6 6 shows the proportion of respondents from each payment group who reported the implementation of new practices since the end of the project. In all cases except respondents who were in the 4001 5000 USD payment group, over half of respondents reported that they had not implemented new practices since the project ended. Although the difference betw een the 4001 5000 USD payment group appears significant, the sample size of this payment level is skewed because participants were not paid over a total of 4500 USD. A similar difference can be seen within the lowest paid respondents, 0 1000 USD; howeve r, only one respondent who was paid under 500 USD was interviewed. Thus, no statistical conclusions can be made about the di fferences shown by these groups
158 Behavioral Factors and Implications The low rates of implementation of new practices since the e nd of RISEMP, but the wide acceptance and continuation of already implemented practices, have several implications about the project as a whole. If respondents were convinced of the benefits inued to implement new practices as they were able? The answer has several financial and behavioral components that will be discussed in more detail in this section. Effects of subjective norms and intrinsic motivations Subjective norms are unlikely to h ave played a role in Group A (Control) is a conflict or difference between what he/ she believes that those in his/her significant social circle believe he/she should do, and what he/she is actually doing. Since Group A (Control) respondents reported that they believed that their practices were similar to others, they were therefore unli kely to have been motivated by a subjective norm to improve what they already viewed as a commonality between them. Respondents in other groups were likely to have felt similar complacency, in the context of subjective norms, in that if they were continui ng the practices that they implemented during the RISEMP, they were already outperforming their neighbors in terms of conservation. motivations played a larger role in their behavior but still not the most significant. Table 6 5 shows the behavior change components of subjective norms and intrinsic
159 motivations an d their relationship to reported implementation of new silvopastoral motivated by factors other than positive external incentives before, throughout, and after the RISEM P. Thus, it is likely that respondents from this group were motivated by a thoughtful and resourceful individual. In this case, the frugality of Group A (Control ) respondents is operationalized through the conservation behavior of adopting new silvopastoral practices. While this is a common motivation that under perfect circumstances would motivate all individuals, this study suggests that the effects of positive external incentives may have inhibited this motivation. This will be discussed in the next section. Effects of positive external incentives Although the provision of positive external incentives ended in 2007, their effect peared to remain. Groups that received incentives had low er rates of implementing new practices, while over half of Group A (Control) respondents reported implementing many new practices. The explanation of this pattern is likely due to the removal of po sitive incentives and financial constraints. Table 6 6 shows the relationship between the positive incentive aspect design of the RISEMP and the behavior change components involved in implementing new practices. Interviews with respondents suggest that the payments may have actually been detrimental to the adoption behavior of respondents of new practices after the payments ended. While respondents continued practices that they had already adopted and implemented, and indicated that they knew of additio nal practices that they could implement on their property, they were hesitant to adopt the practices without
160 payments. Respondents from every project group that received positive external incentives indicated that although they would like to implement mor e practices, they wanted to wait until the same project or a similar project returned to offer them payments. Many respondents, in fact, asked the author, hopefully, if she was there to establish another project. Group A (Control) respondents, however, h ad no reason to wait for payments to implement silvopastoral practices in the first place, indicating this as the explanation for their implementation of new practices even after the RISEMP finished. Although the attitude of respondents toward adopting a behavior for free that they had previously been paid to adopt was influential, it is also important to note financial and labor constraints cited by respondents. Many respondents indicated that they wanted to implement more silvopastoral practices but wer e limited by money and were unable to invest in the necessary inputs to implement new practices. Other participants because labor costs were too high, or they were old and necessary for new behaviors. Effects of habitualization and environmentality While the interviews with respondents indicated that the continuation of practices implemented during the RISEMP became habitual, the new implementation of practices shows no indication of the same. Table 6 7 shows the relationship between the length of involvement in the project, the behavior change component targeted by this project feature, and the new implementation of silvopastoral practices. There wa s no difference between landowners who were involved for two years and those who were involved for four. The habituality and environmentality of continuing practices came from the ability
161 to remain inactive: one had to actively reverse the practices imple mented during the project. As discussed, however, landowners were still very conscious of the fact that they were implementing new practices. The actual act of establishing silvopastoral practices had not become part of their normal routine, and in fact Respondents from Group A (Control) were the most likely to have developed habituality the behaviors yet. hopes that actions will lead to pro environmental values, norms, and behaviors were unobservable in this comparison of the implementation of new practices by different project and payment groups. It is possible that the detrimental effects of positive inc entives during the project on the propensity to begin new practices independently, was masking this trend. The investigation of environmental consciousness in the next section should make it easier to take a closer look at this relationship, or lack there of. Differences in Environmental Consciousness While the continuation and new implementation of silvopastoral practices were indicators of some of the specific behavioral effects of the RISEMP, they shed no light on the internal conceptualization of the en vironment. Although this study operationalized silvopastoral practices as conservation behavior, did respondents conceptualize it the same way? The nature of silvopastoral practices, in that they provide direct returns to landholders, creates the possibi lity that respondents in Esparza
162 analyze the degree to which respondents were knowledgeab le and conscious about the environment, its importance, and their participation in protecting it. In this analysis, it is important to identify the factors that this study uses to define environmental consciousness and the importance of each factor in this definition. Secondly, because the environmental consciousness index of this study is a relative measure, it is important to ask how respondents compare to each other. This section will compare respondents between project groups and between payment group s in attempts to identify the effects of the RISEMP on levels of environmental environmental consciousness, refer to the methodological discussions of Chapter 4. Breaking Down Environmental Consciousness This study operationalizes environmental consciousness through the number of silvopastoral pract ices implemented by respondents and their ability to name components of the environment, environmental processes, and the consequen ces of failing to conserve. Figure 6 7 relatively normal distribution of responses, a distribution that was used to crea te a measure of environmental consciousness compared to other respondents. All aspects of the index of environmental consciousness were correlated, which meant that the more respondents were able to talk about one aspect, the more they were able to talk a bout another. The number of practices reported by respondents presented a rough measure of the labor commitment that each participant had to silvopastoralism. Although this could have been independent of other measures of environmental consciousness, it w as used
163 to create a behavioral measure to monitor whether respondents actually engaged in the behavior that they might or might not discuss. In other words it was used to check if those who The ability to name environmental components proved easiest for all respondents; respondents were able to name more components than any other factor in the environmental consciousness index. The naming of components was relatively superficial because it was often conne cted to the rhetoric of every day conversations about conservation. Thus, many respondents were able to say that trees were an important component of the environment and conservation, but were unable to cite a process or consequence that explained why. I n this sense, the ability to name environmental components was a simple measure of exposure to environmental rhetoric. The ability to explain environmental processes and consequences of environmental destruction proved a more tangible measure of the knowle dge, awareness, and consciousness of actual environmental factors. The consequences of environmental destruction composed an integral part of gauging environmental consciousness and using it to predict behavior. As Stern (2000) discusses, when people fee l that something that they value is in danger, they are more likely to act to protect it. Thus, consequences imply knowledge about a process as well as the realization that something that is valued is under threat. Differences in Environmental Consciousne ss by Project Group Figure 6 8 shows the proportion of respondents within each project group who had a low, average, or high environmental conscious. A Pearson Chi Squared test showed a significance level of 0.654, indicating that the results were statis tically
164 independent. More simply, the state of being in one particular project group was unrelated to the state of having a particular environmental consciousness; this means that there was no relationship. With the exception of Group C2 (2 Year PSA), th e environmental consciousness of respondents followed a normal distribution; this study attributed this deviation to the small sample size from the group. The largest proportion of respondents with a high environmental consciousness was from Group A (Cont rol), 40%. Differences in Environmental Consciousness by Payment Group Figure 6 9 shows the proportion of respondents within each payment group who had a low, average, or high environmental consciousness. A Pearson Chi Squared Test showed that t he payment groups and index of environmental consciousness were statistically independent, with a significance of 0.489. We can see from the distribution that there was no evidence to suggest that there was a correlation between the quantity of payments r espondents received, and their level of environmental consciousness. Respondents in the 4000 5000 USD payment group were the lowest proportion of respondents with a high environmental consciousness, while they were the highest proportion with an average environmental consciousness. Respondents from mid and mid high payment groups, 2001 3000 USD and 3001 4000, had the second highest proportion of respondents with high environmental consciousness. Respondents from the mid low payment group, 1001 2 000 USD, had the highest proportion of respondents with low environmental consciousness. Behavioral Factors and Implications The lack of differences in environmental consciousness between respondents in both project and payment groups has several implica tions about the behavioral effects
165 of the RISEMP. While the data indicate that during the semi structured interview there was no difference in environmental consciousness between project or payment groups, this may not have been the case before the projec t began or during its implementation. Thus, this study cannot say whether or not one project aspect had a greater effect than another, it can simply comment on the current level of environmental consciousness of each respondent and what factors may explai n this level. Effects of subjective norms and non project exposure While it is impossible to measure the trends in environmental consciousness over time, it is unlikely that all project and payment groups achieved indistinguishable levels of environmental consciousness independently. While it is possible to claim that the RISEMP was responsible for raising environmental awareness to a certain level, this only explains cases in which respondents were given technical assistance. What is more likely is that subjective circles, through several channels, facilitated a participant wide distribution of environmental consciousness. Table 6 8 shows the possible relationships between levels of environ mental consciousness and subjective norm and intrinsic motivation behavior change components. education, both about practices and about the environment in general, as one of the most helpful parts of the project. Respondents talked about three primary ways in which they gained information, either during the project or before: by attending information sessions at the MAG office; participating in other MAG programs; and or part icipating in other PES programs. The information sessions provided by the MAG office were open to whomever attended and did not turn participants away; thus, there
166 res pondents (46%) said that they had been part of another PES program and 22 of 46 (48%) said that they had been part of a MAG project in the past. Esparza was the site out side of RISEMP played a large role in raising the environmental consciousness of many participants before, during, or after the end of the RISEMP. Effects of positive external incentives The analysis of the environmental consciousness index suggests that positive any more than any other project component. Table 6 9 shows the possible relationships between the effects of positive external incentives on levels of environm ental consciousness. Although it is impossible to say that the positive external incentives did not affect respondents, it is evident that their effect on environmental consciousness was equal to or less than the effects of other behavioral pressures. In terviews with respondents suggested that technical assistance was more crucial in affecting levels of environmental consciousness. Many respondents indicated that technical assistance was one of the most helpful aspects of the project and taught them an i mmense amount about both silvopastoral practices and the environment in general. Thus, it is unlikely that payments directly affected environmental consciousness, but rather the accompaniment of technical assistance with payments. This however, does not account for the environmental consciousness of PES only groups, which will discussed in the next section.
167 Effects of habitualization and environmentality It is likely that in the participant wide sharing of information through these various channels, habit uality and environmentality were factors that helped to create uniformity in environmental consciousness between project and payment groups. The implementation of silvopastoral practices within a group of individuals who were both already exposed to these practices and even already practiced some on their own property was likely easier because participants had already begun to change their levels of environmental consciousness through their actions and the actions of their neighbors. As discussed in Chapt er 5, over 50% of respondents from each project group reported that they had already used some silvopastoral practices before participating in the RISEMP (See Table 6 1 1). Tying Everything Together The data analysis of this chapter offers several findings about the relationship between the long term effects on conservation behavior and the behavioral literature discussed in Chapter 2. Positive external incentives had no greater effect on i ncentives, and actually had detrimental effects on the propensity to adopt new behaviors after the end of the RISEMP. The continued adoption of silvopastoral practices by Group A (Control) participants suggests that intrinsic motivations motivated respond ents who were striving for feelings of frugality. Although subjective norms did not play a clear and strong role, the indistinguishable difference between the levels of environmental consciousness among respondents suggests that there was social sharing g oing on in the community between members of different project groups.
168 This chapter uses several measures to analyze the long term effects of the RISEMP on conservation behavior: the continuation of practices implemented during the RISEMP; the implementatio n of new practices since the end of the RISEMP; and the levels o f environmental co nsciousness. In this analysis, it appears that the RISEMP served as both a catalyst and enabling tool for the adoption of silvopastoral practices during the project. In a s ense, this effect was long term because of the mass continuation of the practices implemented during the RISEMP, and therefore positive for both the environment and the landowners involved. In another sense, however, this chapter suggests that the positiv e external incentives used to motivate the adoption of these practices during the RISEMP, served as an obstruction to the adoption of additional practices after the project ended in 2007. Group A (Control) was the only group that reported implementing new practices, while respondents from positive external incentive groups expressed that they were waiting to receive more payments before they adopted additional practices. In this sense then, the long term effect of payments on respondents propensity to ad opt new practices was negative for the environment and for the landowners involved to con ceptualize external incentives. For many landowners, the physical incentives (trees, seeds, etc.) and technical assistance proved invaluable, with many respondents reporting that they would not have participated without it. The project design, however, l imits the ability of this study to measure the effects of technical assistance on
169 participants in relation to other incentives because the project did not control for technical assistance alone.
170 Table 6 1 Distribution of respondents by project g roup Group Number of Respondents Group A (Control) 10 Group B2 (PSA + TA) 11 Group C2 (PSA) 7 Group B4 (PSA + TA) 9 Group C4 (PSA) 8 (RISEMP, 2 007; interviews, May June 2012 )
171 Table 6 2 Effects of s ubjective n orms and i ntrinsic m otivations on the c ontinuation of s ilvopastoral p ractices Aspect of Project Design Behavior Change Component Reported Continuation of Silvopastoral Practices Degree of Influence Control group Subjective norms Intrinsic motivations t indicate feeling pressure to continue practices, it was often said adopt silvopastoral practices. intrinsic motivations for three reasons: 1.) they are no longer being incentivized; 2.) they report feelings that silvopastoral practices are becoming the norm; and 3.) they openly recognize the benefit of silvopastoral practice on their own life, the life of their cattle, the future of the community, and the environment High High
172 Table 6 3 Effects of p ositive e xternal i ncentives on the c ontinuation of s ilvopastoral p ractices Aspect of Project Design Behavior Change Component Reported Continuation of Silvopastoral Practices Degree of Influence PES only group & PES and TA group Positive external incentives Knowledge and Information Positive external incentives ended in 2007 and the majority of landholders reported continuing most if not all of the practices implemented during the RISEMP. There are no observable differences in t he continuation of practices by project or payment group. Technical assistance was not controlled for. There was no difference in the reported continuation of practices between groups that received technical assistance and those that did not. Low N/A
173 Table 6 4 Motivations for p articipation by p roject g roup Group A Group B2 Group C2 Group B4 Group C4 Total Payments n/a 2 1 2 2 7 Socially Motivated n/a 1 1 0 1 3 Physical Incentives n/a 0 0 1 0 1 Education n/a 2 1 4 1 8 Impr oving Land n/a 2 2 1 1 6 Conservation & Payments n/a 1 2 0 1 4 Improving Land & Payments n/a 3 0 0 2 5 Other n/a 0 0 1 0 1 Total n/a 11 7 9 8 35 (interviews, May June 2012 )
174 Table 6 5 Effects of s ubjective n orms and i ntrinsic m otivations on the n ew i mplementation of s ilvopastoral p ractices Aspect of Project Design Behavior Change Component Reported New Implementation of Silvopastoral Practices Degree of Influence All Groups Subjective norms Intrinsic motivations Respondents alre ady felt that their land use use was equivalent to or better than their neighbors. This means there would have been no pressure to implement new practices. implementation suggest that intrinsic motivations played a rol e. Low Higher
175 Table 6 6 Effects of positive external i ncentives on the new i mplementation of s ilvopastoral p ractices Aspect of Project Design Behavior Change Component Reported New Implementation of Silvopastoral Practices Degree of Influence PES only group & PES and TA group Positive external incentives Knowledge and Information Groups that received incentives had low rates of implementing new practices. Interviews with respondents indicate the feeling that the previous receipt of pa yments is obstructing the motivation to engage in new ones. Technical assistance was not controlled for. There was no difference in the reported new implementation of practices between groups that received technical assistance and those that did not. H igh N/A
176 Table 6 7 Effects of l ength of i nvolvement on the n ew i mplementation of s ilvopastoral p ractices Aspect of Project Design Behavior Change Component Reported New Implementation of Silvopastoral Practices Degree of Influence 2 and 4 yea r participation groups Habitualization & Environmentality Intrinsic values and norms Sample size constraints makes conclusions hard to draw. Surface level observation of the data do not indicate differences in the accumulation of ESI points betw een 2 year participants and 4 year participants. The continued improvement of the 2 year group could suggest the presence of habits and environmentality. The continuation of practices by the 2 year group suggests the presence of intrinsic motivations and norms. Low Higher
177 Table 6 8 Effects of s ubjective n orms and i ntrinsic m otivations on e nvironmental c onsciousness Aspect of Project Design Behavior Change Component Environmental Consciousness Degree of Influence All Groups Subjectiv e Norms Intrinsic Motivations While it is impossible to measure trends in environmental consciousness over time, it is unlikely that all project and payment groups achieved equivalent levels of environmental consciousness among participants withou t subjective influence. Similarly, it is unlikely that participants achieved indistinguishable levels of environmental consciousness without affecting eachother through interactions motivated by the need to be a part of and maintain a community. Low High
178 Table 6 9 Effects of positive external i ncentives on environmental c onsciousness Aspect of Project Design Behavior Change Component Levels of Environmental Consciousness Degree of Influence PES only group & PES and TA group Positive exte rnal incentives Knowledge and Information The analysis of the environmental consciousness index suggests that positive external incentives did not environmental consciousness any more than any other project component ; their effect on environmental consciousness was equal to or less than the effects of other behavioral pressures. Interviews with respondents suggested that technical assistance was more crucial in affecting levels of environmental consciousness. Low Higher
179 Table 6 1 0. Effects of length of i nvolvement on environmental c onsciousness Aspect of Project Design Behavior Change Component Environmental Consciousness Degree of Influence All Groups Habitualization & Environmentality It is like ly that in the participant wide sharing of information through these various channels, habituality and environmentality were factors that helped to create uniformity in environmental consciousness between project and payment groups. Medium
180 Table 6 1 1. Respondents who reported s ilvopastoral p ractices b efore the RISEMP Group Reported No Reported Yes % Reported Yes A 1 9 90 B2 4 7 64 C2 3 4 57 B4 5 4 44 C4 4 4 50 (interviews, May June 2012 )
181 Figure 6 1 Drawing by a respondent of his landholding and the land uses in each hectare (interview May 11, 2012 )
182 Sample size = 37 Figure 6 2 Continuation of silvopastoral practice by p roject g roup s ince RISEMP by p ercent (interviews, May June 2012 )
183 Figure 6 3 Continuation of s ilvopastoral p ractices by p ayment g roup s ince RISEMP by p ercent (interviews, May June 2012 )
184 Figure 6 4 b elief that s ilvopastoral p ractices w ere b eneficial in l ife, the w ell b eing of their c attle, the f uture of the c ommunity, and the e n vironment (interviews, May June 2012 )
185 Figure 6 5 New i mplementation of s ilvopastoral p ractices by p roject g roup s ince RISEMP by p ercent (interviews, May June 2012 )
186 Figure 6 6 New i mplementation of s ilvopastoral p ractices by p ayment g roup s i nce RISEMP by p ercent (interviews, May June 2012 )
187 Figure 6 7 Ability of r espondents to r eport a spects of e nvironmental c onsciousness (interviews, May June 2012 )
188 Figure 6 8 Environmental c onsciousness by p ercent p roject g roup (interviews, M ay June 2012 )
189 Figure 6 9 Environmental c onsciousness by p ercent p ayment g roup (interviews, May June 2012 )
190 CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION : THE EFFECTS OF THE RISEMP ON CONSERVATION BEHAVIOR This study seeks to analyze how convincingly money talked to partici pants of the RISEMP in Esparza, Costa Rica, and the effects of this conversation after the project ended in 2007. different incentives on the conservation behavior of landholders in bot h the long and short term. To do this, Chapter 5 explores the outcomes of the RISEMP between 2002 and 2007, while Chapter 6 explores the long term effects of the program. The analysis within these chapters shows that it is impossible to separate the data used in this study from the context in which it takes place. Data analysis from Chapter 5 showed that the RISEMP was successful in motivating an increase in the adoption of silvopastoral practices, and therefore environmental se rvices, between 2002 and 20 07. T he total number of environmental service points per year provided by participants increased by an average of 3.9% between 2002 and 2007 The most popular practices adopted by participants were living fences and pasture improved with trees, increasin g by a total of 117.4% and 215.5% respectively. This catalyst for this adoption of silvopastoral practices is attributable to the presence of the RISEMP, though several questions arise within the comparison between groups of this study. The project design behavior. First, it assumed that the more incentives offered to an individual in the project, the more silvopastoral practices he/she would adopt. This would mean that groups would adopt silvopast oral practices in descending magnitudes, with the group receiving the most incentives (B4 (PES + TA)) adopting the most, and the group
191 receiving the least incentives (A (Control) would adopt the least. Second, it assumed that in attempts to maximize acces s to project incentives, participants that were involved for shorter periods of time, would adopt practices at higher rates than those that were involved for longer. Statistical analysis failed to support these assumptions. With the exception of a diffe rence between the mean points per hectare between Group A (Control) and Group B2 (PSA + TA) after the baseline survey in 2002, project groups showed no statistically significant differences in mean point accumulations per hectare or rates of adoption per y ear. The lack of differences suggested that all motivations had effects of similar magnitude on participants, an interesting finding given the fact that Group A (Control) participants were not offered incentives at all. The rates of adoption showed a spi ke of 20% in the first year of the project, but fell to significantly lower levels for the remainder of the RISEMP, never rising above 2.2%. This study suggests that there are several factors that explain the lack of variation between participants who rece ived different behavioral incentives offered by the program. First, the statistically significant greater rate of adoption by Group B2 (PSA + TA) over that of Group A (Control) is most likely explained by a higher level of land degradation of the landhold ings of Group B2 (PSA + TA) participants, giving these participants greater returns on their invested labor. Second, silvopastoral practices provide direct returns to the practitioner, thus presenting a self interested motivation for participants. Third, the RISEMP was not the first program to expose silvopastoral practices to landowners of Esparza. The previous expos ure of landowners in the region, which them aware of the rhetoric of the use of trees in pastureland and the
192 observations of silvopastoral practices by local landowners, either created a desire within them to establish their own silvopastoral systems, or increased the propensity that they would be willing to consider establishing them. Fourth, the motivations for participants to engage in t he behavior were not necessarily driven by the desire for an an d technical assistance offered ( driving them to seek this type of assistance from other sources ) Finally, this study suggests that the spike in rates of adoption the first year of the project and subsequent fall were influenced by both the international beef market and the increased difficulty of intensifying silvopastoral systems. This project showed that positive incentives did motivate the increase in the provision of environmental services, however, only significantly between two groups; otherwise, positive external incentives had no greater influence on behavior than any other project incentive. Unfortunately, technical assistance was not controlled for, though this study suggests that this was one of the most helpful and desired aspects of the project. Findings also showed, to the extent that sample size limitations would allow, that length of involvement in the project made no difference to adoption rates. What is likely in this case, however, is a sense of habituality in the presence of silvopastoral practices in that respond ents often remarked that it is now the new way that everyone is maintaining pastures. The comparison of project groups by length of involvement did suggest the presence of intrinsic biospheric values and norms in 2 year participants that continued to incr ease their provision of environmental services, even after payments had stopped. Finally, this study suggests that Group A (Control) participants were motivated by
193 intrinsic satisfactions to provide environmental services at the same rate as other groups (except B2 (P E S + TA)). term effects of the RISEMP, virtually all landowners reported a continuation of at least some, if not most, of the silvopastoral practices implemented during the project. The implementation of n ew practices showed a different trend. Group A (Control) respondents reported the highest rate of new practices while the next h ighest reports were from Group C4 (PES ) with 17%. The majority of the remaining project RISEMP. In these findings, this study suggests that the provision of payments acted as an obstruction to the adoption of new practices by respondents after the project ended Respondents expressed the belief that because they had been paid once to adopt practices, they should wait until payments came again. The relatively overwhelming (Control) respondents had always been financially responsible for the implementation of new pr actices and therefore were relatively unaffected by the RISEMP; they simply continued their lives as normal. In the continuation of the long term analysis, this study showed that levels of environmental consciousness did not appear to vary among project groups at the time of this study, a finding that has many behavioral implications. While it is impossible to
194 measure trends in environmental consciousness over time, it is unlikely that all project and payment groups achieved equivalent levels of environm ental consciousness without subjective influences and the intrinsic motivation of maintaining a community. This study suggests that positive ex ternal incentives were no more e ffective at changing other project incentive; interviews with respondents suggested that technical assistance and the physical resources were more crucial in affecting the adoption of silvopastoral practices This study suggests that in places, such as Esparza, Costa Rica where the following conditions are met, payments may not be necessary to incentivizing the adoption of silvopastoral practices: 1. There are relatively high standards of living, economically, socially, and environmentally 2. There exists a national rhetoric of environmental conservation, payments for environmental services, and agroforestry 3. There was a previous, positive, and observable exposure to silvopastoral practices 4. Silvopastoral practices return direct benefits to landowners in addition to indirect globa l benefits 5. There exist relatively high levels of degradation such that the first practices adopted a re relatively less labor intensive 6. There is a respected and active agency and/or source of trusted information White et al. (2001) extend upon these condi tions by citing the fact that Costa Rica has relatively high land costs, which forces farmers to intensify their land, rather than simply expand, and therefore makes them more likely to seek the profitable benefits of silvopastoral systems.
195 The connections between project outcomes and behavioral theory discussed in this chapter suggest that respondents were not the money economic actors that are assumed in the strictly economic theory of PES. In fact, the provision of payments as extr a income seemed to have no greater effect on conservation behavior during the project than any other incentive or non incentive. people in by Geller (2002) and Agrawal (2005). The similar achievement of Group A (Control) suggests that intrinsic motivations were more influential in motivating conservation behavior, in the case of Esparza, something attributable to the context in which the pro ject took place. silvopastoral systems are the lack of knowledge and investment capital. As shown in this study, respondents in the Esparza watershed expressed satisfaction with silvopastoral practices and interest in implementing new ones, but cited the investment capital necessary as a barrier. T no role in helping famers implement silvopastoral practices, simply that positive incentives in the form of payments as extra income were unnecessary and limiting to the establishment of new practices in the case of Esparza. Operationalizing the strongest positive external incentive as payments as extra income is an extremely limiting approach to motivating behavior change. Indeed, this study suggests that positive external incentives in the form of investment capital and physical assets were more important in Esparza, Costa Rica.
196 On a larger scale, although this study deals specifically with landowners in the Esparza watershed, it does highlight a key question about the theory of PES. In the strictly economic system of environmental services, the provision of services would follow market rules of supply and demand, and nothi ng would be supplied without demand. In the specific case of Esparza under these theoretical market rules, Group A (Control) would not have increased the provision of environmental services on their land because they were not being compensated for it. Th us, the theory of PES assumes that individuals will only engage in a conservation behavior if they are paid. This study suggests instead that non economic motivations may be far more important, and that payments should be carefully targeted to address nee ded investment costs, instead of creating expectations for on going payments. This study of the RISEMP showed that there needs to be more emphasis placed in the analysis of individual level behavior for two reasons. First, individual behavior analysis all ows a measure of the extent to which a biospheric value system is established so that practices become internalized and therefore have carry over effects. If individuals engage in a particular behavior because they align with the values of that behavior, they are more likely to engage other behaviors that they associate with the same value system. Second, individual analyses help to buffer against the risk of additionality, or paying individuals to adopt a behavior when payments were not required, since t he individual would have adopted the practice with or without payments. New dimensions to consider in the case of Esparza include the role of gender, socio economic status, and non titled landowners. The overwhelming majority of RISEMP participants and th e respondents of this study were male for two main reasons:
197 most property is titled in the name of the male; and even in cases in which the woman was titled, she had not been the main implementer of silvopastoral practices during the RISEMP. This study di d not deal directly with the socio economic status of landowners, though smaller landholdings tend to mean smaller incomes; however, it is important to address the effects of the RISEMP on different socio economic classes. Relatedly, a community wide anal ysis of the Esparza watershed would help to establish larger sample sizes and run more statistically significant tests of the effects of the RISEMP against those who have no affiliation with the project. Another area of future study involves the analysis of the presence or absence of spill over effects of the conservation behavior defined as silvopastoral practices; that is, does the increased practice of this particular conservation behavior lead to an increase in the adoption of other practices?
198 APPENDI X A QUESTIONNAIRE FOR GROUPS B AND C Questions developed and incorporated after arrival and initial interviews. Not all respondents answered. # Questions that were open ended and respondents were asked to elaborate and explain. Note: Answers listed were answers suggested to participants. Actual answers received were noted and categorized; this process is discussed in Data Preparation. 1. How many hectares do you own? 2. Is this value more or less than before the project? 3. How many cattle do you own? 4. Is this m ore or less than before the project? 5. Do you consider your land use before the project healthy or unhealthy for the well being of the environment? # Very unhealthy Unhealthy Neither healthy nor unhealthy Healthy Very Healthy 6. How long did you participate in t he project? 7. What motivated you to participate? # Payments Conservation Benefits for my animals
199 All of my neighbors participated Personal satisfaction Technical assistance Other 8. Do you know your neighbors? 9. Did your neighbors participate in the project? # None Some Many 10. Have you talked about the project with your neighbors? # 11. How often do you and your neighbors share information and advice? # Frequently Sometimes Rarely Never 12. Are the land practices of yourself and your neighbor similar? # Very similar Somewhat si milar Hardly similar Completely different 13. # 14. When you decided to join the project, how many obstacles were there for you and your family? # Many
200 Some Hardly Any None 15. Do you believe that the project has improved your life? # A lot A little Very little Not at all 16. Do you believe that what you did during the project has improved the life of your cattle? # A lot A little Very little Not at all 17. Do you believe that what you did during the pr oject has improved the future of the community? # A lot A little Very little Not at all 18. Do you believe that what you did during the project has improved the well being of the environment? # A lot A little Very little
201 Not at all 19. Have you continued the practic es? # Yes, all of them Yes, most of them Yes, some of them No, not many No, none 20. Since the end of the project, have you started new practices or simply maintained those of the project? # Yes, many Yes, some No, none 21. Are you able to do all of the conservati on practices that you think that you should? # Yes, all of them Yes, the majority of them Yes, only some No, hardly any No, None 22. Have you participated in other payments for environmental services programs? # 23. Have you participated in other MAG projects? # 24. To you, how important is the well being of the environment? Very important Important Slightly important
202 Not important 25. How important do you think conservation is to the community? Very important Important Slightly important Not important 26. How important do yo u think conservation is to the country? Very important Important Slightly important Not important
203 APPENDIX B QUESTIONNAIRE FOR GROUP A Questions developed and incorporated after arrival and initial interviews. Not all respondents answered. # Questions that were open ended and respondents were asked to elaborate and explain. Note: Answers listed were answers suggested to participants. Actual answers received were noted and categorized; this process is discussed in Data Preparation. 1. icipate in one of the payment groups of the project? # 2. Did you want to participate in one of the groups that received payments? # 3. Right now, do you do any of the practices from the project? # 4. How long have you done these practices? # 5. Do you consider your lan d use healthy or unhealthy for the well being of the environment? 6. Do believe that the practices have improved your life? # A lot A little Very little Not at all 7. Do you believe that the practices have improved the life of your cattle? # A lot A little Very little Not at all
204 8. Do you believe that the practices have improved the well being of the environment? # A lot A little Very little Not at all 9. To you, how important is the well being of the environment? # Very important Important Slightly important Not impor tant 10. How important do you think conservation is to the community? # Very important Important Slightly important Not important 11. How important do you think conservation is to the country? # Very important Important Slightly important Not important 12. Are you able to do all of the conservation practices that you think that you should? # Yes, all of them Yes, the majority of them
205 Yes, only some No, hardly any No, None 13. Have you participated in other payments for environmental services programs? # 14. Do you know your n eighbors? 15. Did your neighbors participate in the project? # None Some Many 16. How often do you and your neighbors share information and advice? # Frequently Sometimes Rarely Never 17. Are the land practices of yourself and your neighbor similar? # Very similar Somew hat similar Hardly similar Completely different 18. Since the end of the project, have you started additional practices or simply maintained those that you had or did during the project? #
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209 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Korey Force is the third of four daughters born to Stan and Letty Force. While s during her chi ldhood she spent the majority of her life in the state of Michigan. In 2007, she graduated from Quincy High School as valedictorian, and the same year entered Saginaw Valley State University, Michigan. While at Saginaw Valley, Force traveled to Costa Ri ca, the Dominican Republic, and Mexico for university studies, volunteer initiatives, and grant supported research. In program, traveling to China, Taiwan, and Japan. For ce graduated magna cum laude with a Bachelor of Arts in Spanish a nd i nternational s tudies in 2011 from Saginaw Valley In 2011, Force entered the Master of Arts in Latin American s tudies program at the University Florida, choosing a t ropic al c onservation and d evelopment concentration. At the University of Florida, she was active in the service committee of the T ropical Conservation and Development student group and the Student Association of Latin American Studies, serving as the president from 2012 to 2 013. She conducted the field resea rch for her m orce graduated with her Master of Arts in Latin American s tudies in May 2013.