This item has the following downloads:
1 FROM SANCTIONS TO ENGAGEMENT: NORMS AND AMERICA N ECONOMIC STATECRAFT TOWARD CHINA AFTER TIANANMEN By CHI HUNG WEI A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE R EQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2013
2 2013 Chi hung Wei
3 To my family
4 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS My sincere thanks and gratitude are due to all the people who have led m e here. Many thanks go to the people in the Department of Political Science at the University of Florida. I am especially indebted to my advisor, Professor Aida A. Hozic. She has helped to guide m e professionally these past few ye ars Her intellectual rigo r a nd discipline are inspiring I also thank the other professors from whom I have learned tremendously, whether in the course of writing this dissertation, in seminars, or otherwise. Professors Sammy Barkin and Ido Oren almost always had an open door I am also grateful to Professors Zackary Selden and Mathew Jacobs for their helpful insig hts and assistance. The seminar and conversa tions I have had with Professor Philip J. Williams have been an invaluable part of my journey. I also thank Sue Lawless Yanch isin Patricia A. Root, and Debbie Wallen, all of whom have helped me a lot in the past six years. In addition I could not have done without the frie nds I have made in Gainesville, including Kevin Funk, Nic Knowlton, Audrey Flemming, Ann Wainscott, Magda Giurcanu and Levy Odera, Finally, I thank my family. My Dad, Mom, brother, and sister are the best family I could hope for. While I am deeply grateful for the education I have received, one of my biggest regrets is that its pursuit has taken me far from the m
5 TABLE OF CONTENTS page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................ ................................ ................................ ............... 4 LIST OF TABLES ................................ ................................ ................................ ........................... 7 ABSTRACT ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 8 1 INTRODUCTION ................................ ................................ ................................ .................. 10 ................................ ................................ ............... 10 The Argument in Brief ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 13 Alternative E xplanations ................................ ................................ ................................ ........ 20 The Changing Images of China ................................ ................................ .............................. 24 Outline of Chapters ................................ ................................ ................................ ................. 29 2 NORMS AND ECONOMIC STATECRAFT ................................ ................................ ........ 36 Economic Statecraft ................................ ................................ ................................ ................ 39 The Realist Tradition ................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 39 Norms and Economic Sanctions ................................ ................................ ...................... 44 Liberal Constructivism ................................ ................................ ................................ ........... 47 A Model of Strategic Co Constitution ................................ ................................ .................... 50 Limited Construction: Political or Economic Reductionism ................................ .................. 61 3 AMERICAN ECONOMIC POLICY TOWARD CHINA BEFORE TIANANMEN ........... 66 The Open Door Policy ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 66 The China Embargo ................................ ................................ ................................ ................ 73 American Economic Policy toward China in the 1970s and 1980s ................................ ........ 81 4 THE TIANANMEN SANCTIONS ................................ ................................ ........................ 96 Proponents of Sanctions ................................ ................................ ................................ ......... 96 ................................ ................................ ............................ 101 Codification of the Tiananmen Sanctions ................................ ................................ ............. 106 5 THE MOST FAVORED NATION ( MFN ) DEBATE ................................ ........................ 114 Arms Control and Trade ................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 114 Arms Control ................................ ................................ ................................ ................. 114 Bila teral Trade ................................ ................................ ................................ ............... 119 ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 123 ................................ ................................ ................................ 131 6 THE 1993 LINKAGE POLICY ................................ ................................ ........................... 144
6 Campaign Strategy ................................ ................................ ................................ ................ 144 Executive Legislative Politics ................................ ................................ .............................. 147 ................................ ........................ 151 Containing the Rise of China? ................................ ................................ .............................. 154 7 THE 1994 DELINKAGE POLICY ................................ ................................ ...................... 159 ................................ ................................ ... 159 Reviving the Normative Discourse of Free Trade ................................ ................................ 167 American Businesses ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 168 Economic Agencies ................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 171 Non Governmental For eign Policy Experts ................................ ................................ .. 174 Moderate Members of Congress ................................ ................................ ................... 177 Clinton and Delinkage ................................ ................................ ................................ .......... 180 Congressional Vote for Trade with China ................................ ................................ ............ 185 8 CONCLUSION ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................... 192 Anti Sanctions Discourses in Comparative Perspec tives ................................ ..................... 194 Implications for the Future of America China Relations ................................ ..................... 197 LIST OF REFERENCES ................................ ................................ ................................ ............. 202 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 211
7 LIST OF TABLES Table page 1 1 American Economic Statecraft toward China in the 1990s ................................ ............... 15 1 2 America China Bilateral Trade, 1971 2000 ................................ ................................ ...... 23 3 1 American Economic Policies toward China in the Twentieth Century ............................. 95 8 1 Norms and American Economic Statecraft toward China ................................ ............... 193
8 Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partia l Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy FROM SANCTIONS TO ENGAGEMENT: NORMS A ND AMERICAN ECONOMIC STATECRAFT TOWARD CHINA AFTER TIANANMEN By Chi hung Wei August 2013 Chair: Aida A. Hozic Major: Political Science This dissertation explains why states lift economic sanctions and instead proffer economic engagement toward a target who has not engaged in desired behavior change. China policy in the 1990s, I argue that Washington made a sanctions engagem ent policy reversal toward China because a pro engagement coalition, concerned about American security and economic interests, attached moralistic and liberal values to a n American foreign economic policy that had previously only emphasized the role of Chi na in serving the American strategy of balancing Soviet power. At a time when sanctions were urged to address s China policy by arguing th at open trade could make China not only prosperous and democratic at home but also play by the rules of the liberal world order abroad. Thus, I argue that the paradigmatic debate between realism and constructivism is overdrawn: realism and moralism are mea ningless without each other. I also argue that the economic interdependence thesis embraced by liberals is ahistorical. It is not that the engagers sought to engage China because China was manageable, but rather that the engagers from time to time
9 portraye d China a s manageable to justify their engagement policy. The image of China as malleable was a product, rath policy practice s
10 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION This study has two aims, one empirical and the other theoretical. T he empirical aspiration is to explain w hy s tates lift economic sanctions and instead proffer economi c engagement toward a target that has not engaged in desired behavior change. T he theoretical ambition is twofold. First, I examine the paradigmatic debate between realism and con structivism. Second, I seek dialogue with International Relations (IR) liberals, defensive realists, and of fensive realists concerning the changing images of China. China Policy after Tiananmen After the end of the Cold War, the U.S. China strategic alignment that had formed since the early 1970s was eroding. At the same time, China was on the rise and expected to become ad. As a result, U.S. China relations became tense. To complicate U.S. China relations further, Washington became increasingly C hina had engaged in during its rise First, a fter the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, Washington imposed what was known as t to coerce China to improve its human rights policy. Second, China was reported to have proliferated nuclear weapons and missile technologies abroad; as a result, Washington imposed ano ther wave of economic sanctions. Third, U.S. tr ade deficits with China had also skyrocketed Washington thus became threatened to impose punitive tariffs on Chinese products. To address regarding h uman rights abuses, arms pro liferation and unfair trade practices, Washington frequently used, or threatened to use, negative forms of economic instruments
11 In particular, congressional critics of China repeatedly sought to revoke or condition favored nation (MFN) trea tmen t on human rights, arms control, and fair trade. 1 Despite his codification of the Tiananmen sanctions, President George H. W. Bush made efforts status (hereafter In 1992, he vetoed two bills that would impose condit e it in even though China had made no such human rights progress (hereafter the delinkage policy). 2 After wards, he even stepped up efforts to engage China economically by integrating it into the World Trade Organization (WTO), despite the fact that several crises continued to strain U.S. China relations. 3 In November 1999, the United States and China finally reached a trade agreement that would grant China access to the WTO. In 2000, despite its criticism of China and status that exempted China from the annual review of its MFN treatment. In 2001, China finally entered the WTO. Why did Washington abandon the use of economic sanctions in favor of economic engagement toward a rising China that had violated international norms of human rights, arms 1 Chapter 3 will analyze the origin and development of MFN conditionality as required by th e Jackson Vanik Amendment to the 1974 Trade Act. 2 The linkage policy was a negative form of economic instruments, while the delinkage policy was a positive one. 3 abuses, arms proliferation and unfair trade practices several other incidents brought a chill to U.S. China relations including the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995 1996, the alleged Chinese theft of sensitive U.S. technologies, and e embassy in Belgrade These crises will be discussed briefly in chapter 7.
12 control, and fair trad a moral hazard problem, particularly when dealing with potential adversaries. No government 4 In Cohen d escribes such a moral hazard problem: Engagement, the pursuit of a working relationship with a disagreeable regime, has rarely been attractive to Americans of any political persuasion If a government is certifiably nasty, if its leaders are openly hosti le to American values and frequently pursue policies contrary to the interests of the United States, Americans are not easily persuaded of the value of befriending it. . During the Cold War, they grudgingly accepted the fact that the American governmen t developed strategic partnerships with a wide range of reprehensible regimes including that of Mao Zedong, as it struggled to contain the Soviet empire. In the 1990s, with no apparent threat to the security of the United States, it was much more difficul t to provide a compellin 5 Indeed, it is conventional wisdom that the sender state makes a sanctions engagement policy reversal after succeeding in getting the target state to do something it otherwise wo uld not do 6 namely, that the target example, several Western countries lifted sanctions against Myanmar in 2012 after it moved toward political reform. The puzzle, then, is why Wash ington switch ed from sanctions to engagement in dealing with a rising, intransigent China behavior regarding human rights, ar ms control, and fair trade why had Washington first relied on the use and threat of sanctions whereas it la ter switched to engagement? How and why did the United States choose between sanctions and engagement toward China? 4 Edward D. Mansfield and Brian Pollins, eds., Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: New Perspectives on an Enduring Debate (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2003), p. 179. 5 Warren Cohen, American Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), p. 262. 6 On Behavioral Science Vol. 2, No. 3 (July 1957), pp. 201 215.
13 The Argument in Brief To explain how and why Washington used economic statecraft toward China, I develop a constructivist model that focuses on two groups of actors i n U.S domestic politics with different positions toward China : pro sanctions and pro engagement. This model emphasizes the mutual constitution of agents and structures but grants agents the logic of consequences. 7 I argue that th e two groups used norms strategically when wrestling for control of China policy. Their strategic normative contestation experienced four phases: the Tiananmen sanctions of 1989, the MFN debate of 1990 1992, the 1993 linkage policy, and the 1994 delinkage policy. After Tiananmen, domestic political goals motivated a Democrat controlled Congress and Clinton to push the normative issues of human rights, arms control, and fair trade to the fore in order to attack the Bush administration The y al so urged sanctions against China as a better way to address U.S. human rights, security, and economic concerns. In particular, they placed significant emphasis on human rights, arguing that China would neither proliferate weapons abroad nor adopt a restric tive trade policy if it became humane and even democratic first T here was no contradiction they argued, between U.S. security and economic interests in China, on the one hand, and human rights and even democracy in China, on the other, because the former could be advanced if the latter were promoted first. For these pro sanctions actors, therefore, the United States should grant priority to pushing China toward democratization through the use of economic sanctions. I argue that Washington abandoned sancti ons in favor of engagement because a pro engagement coalition sharing security and economic concerns with the pro sanctions coalition, attach ed moralistic and liberal values to a U.S. foreign economic policy that had previously only 7 For the distinction between the logic of consequences and the logic of appropriateness, see James G. March and International Organization Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 943 969.
14 emphasized the role of China in serving the U.S. balancing strategy against Soviet power. A t a time when sanctions were put at the fore front of U.S. efforts to deal with s engagement actors reversed the course of U.S. China policy by arguing that open trade could not only induce China to abide by the rules of the liberal world order abroad but could also make China prosperous and therefore democratic at home. In their free trade based normative discourse, there was no conflict between U .S. China trade, on the one hand and U.S. security, economic, and human rights interests in China on the other because the former, if advanced first, could simultaneously b oost the latter. In particular, while the United States had political economic refo rm as an endogenous process in the 1980s, pro engagement actors now argued that the best way to bolster political reform in China was to br ing economic prosperity to the country from the outside through higher levels of bilateral trade. For them, cutting o ff U.S. China trade would unwittingly undermine human rights progress in China by discouraging the market oriented reform that could serve as the engine for political reform. I argue that the free trade based normative discourse became dominant in U.S. do mestic politics through of agents and structures Specifically, three stages of strategic co constitution brought the normative discourse to triumph (see Table 1 1). First Bush t ook the lead in linking behavior at home and abroad, arguing that preserving U.S. China trade could provi de China with incentives to abide by international norms of human rights, arms control, and fair trade. W hile he had codified the Tian anmen sanctions because a unified Congress had left him no room for presidential vetoes, he was able to win the MFN debate when Senate support allowed him to veto two conditional MFN bills. Second, a lthough the normative discourse faded after Bush lost the 1992 presidential election, it was revived in 1994 as American businesses that had stakes in the
15 Chinese market non governmental foreign policy experts and moderate members of Congress presented the normative discourse to Clinto n at a time when security and economic concerns were growing in the United States after it became clear that China had resisted the linkage polic y. While Clinton had strategically raised human rights issues during 1992 1993, he accepted the normative disco urse that Bush had articulated to justify his delinkage decision Third, while C ongress had strategically moved the normative issues of human rights, arms control, and fair trade to the fore and urged sanctions during 1989 1993, it overw helmingly voted for PNTR status after 1994 and articulated the Table 1 1. American Economic Statecraft toward China in the 1990s Forms of Economic Means Dominant Norm ative D iscourse Pro Sanctions Actors Pro Engagement Actors The Tiananmen Sanctions Negative Human rights Democrat controlled Congress The Bush administration The MFN Debate of 1990 1992 Positive Free trade Democrat controlled Congress, especially the H ouse The Bush administration The 1993 Linkage Policy Negative Human rights Congress and the Clinton administration In decline The 1994 Delinkage Policy Positive Free trade In decline American businesses, economic bureaucrats, non governmental f oreign policy exper ts, moderate lawmakers and the Clinton administration.
16 Three notes are in order. First, the normative discourse of free trade, as I call it here, was different from free trade norms themselves. The engagers strategically linked free tr ade to the proliferation, and unfair trade practices. The content of their normative discourse thus moved beyond free trade norms themselves. Second, the distinction bet ween the pro sanctions coalition and the pro engagement one is used only for analytical convenience and must be understood in the context of the four phases examined in this study. As demonstrated above, some actors cut across the two coalitions due to the strategic co constitutions of agents and structures. Bush, for example, leaned toward engagement but was forced to codify the Tiananmen sanctions. By the same token, Clinton and Congress had first stood for sanctions but eventually switched to engagement. The strength of the pro sanctions coalition was even in decline in the second half of the 1990s. Therefore, labeling some actors as pro sanctions or pro engagement is only for analytical convenience and should be understood contextually. Third table 1 1 shows that the form of economic statecraft during the MFN debate of 1990 1992 was positive. Indeed, Bush vetoed two conditional MFN bills in 1992. Despite his success improving ov erall U.S. China relations. He thus fell short of moving beyo nd renewing MFN to bringing China into the world economy which Clinton would later accomplish. Theoreti cally, this study suggests that the paradigmatic debate between realism and constructiv ism is overdrawn B oth realist and constructivist variables are needed when scholars explain both political and normative change. From a realist perspe ctive, states have inherent interests in deploying economic statecraft, especially when they possess subs tantial economic
17 capabilities. However, I argue that realist variables are underdetermined with regard to the forms, negative or positive, of economic statecraft. While capabilities shape intentions, one cannot reasonably infer that states having capabilit ies will use economic statecraft, or assume that their economic statecraft will be of a specific form. To explain how states choose between sanctions and engagement toward a rising and intransigent target, I pay attention to the dynamics of the strategic n ormative contestation between pro sanctions and pro engagement actors. While human rights, security affairs, and economic exchanges remained the principle concerns in U.S. China policy throughout the 1990s, the pro sanctions and pro engagement coalitions c ompeted with each other over China policy by framing their respective normative discourses in a way that harmoniously linked one of the three issue areas to the other two. While the pro sanctions coalition argued that a humane, democratic C hina would also serve U.S. security and economic interests, the pro engagement coalition stressed the positive spill over effects of economic exchanges on the other two issue areas. Though embracing different forms of economic instruments, both sides argued that these thr ee issue areas could be simultaneously advanced when one of them was promoted first. In particular, at a time when regarding human rights abuses, arms proliferation and unfair trade practice the countered the pro sanctions coalition by bringing moralistic and liberal values in to U.S. China trade which had only served U.S. geopolitical and geostrategic interests before Tiananmen. T o the extent that engaging a rising and intransigen t China would raise a moral hazard ), the engagers avoided a possible reputation of arguing that engagement could work better than sanctions in correcting abroad. In addition, to the extent that engaging
18 case for engaging China in the post Cold War era 8 Therefore, the sanctions engagement policy ealism and moralism, as Carr argues, are meaningless without each other 9 Norms are not peripheral to international rela tions; instead norms are an integral component of great power politics, especially between the United States and China. From a constr uctivist perspective, 10 persuade their audiences to comply with norms that are persuasive, liberal, or resonant with preexisting understandings of what is appropriate However, this study challenges the rigid distinction between norm entrepreneurs and norm audiences. First, a their own normative discours es. During the MFN debate, for example, Bush argued that trade previously put into law the Tiananmen sanctions in response to strong congressional human rights claims. Second, norm entrepreneurs do not just promote may also be subject to another social (re)construction process for consequentialist reasons. For example, once outspoken human rights claimants like Clinton proved to be open to the normative discou rse of 8 For the American missionary tradition of saving China, see John K. Fairbank, The Missionary Enterprise in China and America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974); Suzanne Wilso n Barnett and John K. Fairbank, eds. Christianity in China: Early Protestant Missionary Writings (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985) ; Cohen, ; Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1987); and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Patterns in the Dust: Chinese American Relations and the Recognition Controversy 1949 1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983). 9 Edward H. Carr, sis, 1919 1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (London, Macmillan and co., limited, 1962). Also see Stefano Guzzini, Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy: The Continuing Story of a Death Foretold ( New York: Routledge, 1998). 10 For discussions of norm entrepreneurs, see International Organization Vol. 44, No. 4 (Autumn 1990), pp. 479 526; Martha Finne International Organization Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 887 917.
19 free trade would run counter to U.S. security and economic interests Because actors and structures constitute each other strategically the distinction between norm ent repreneurs and norm audiences remains fluid. In particular, under strategic co constitutio n, human rights may not be as lasting as conventionally argued by liberal constructivists. While having codified the Tiananmen sanctions based on that he had previously linked the two issues together. Only by granting agents the logic of consequen ces can a constructivist model explain such a normative change that led to the sanctions engagement policy reversal. It should be noted that to the extent that realism and constructivism are paradigmatically compatible, this study stands at the intersectio n of neoclassical realism and constructivism. N eoclassical realis ts argue that domestic politics is an intervening variable through which systemic forces are translated into the foreign policy behavior of individual states. 11 Indeed, domestic politics provi des a clue to explain why Washington engaged China at a time of rising Chin ese power. However, what this study explores is not so much domestic politics as domestic construction I examine the strategic co constitutions in U.S. domestic politics that influ enced U.S. foreign policy toward China. This is why this study stands at the intersection of neoclassical realism and constructivism. 11 World Politics Vol. 51, No. 1 (October 1998), pp. 144 International Security Vol. 25, No. 3 (Winter 2000/2001), pp. 128 161.
20 Alternative Explanations There are at least three alternative explanations for U.S. economic engagement with China. Fi rst, a significant portion of the literature argues that U.S. China policy has been hijacked by American businesses In this view, U.S. economic engagement with China reflects the preference s and interests of the dominant business community 12 However, mere ly focusing on business pressure is too narrow. As mentioned above, the American business community was only one member of the pro engagement coalition Moreover, security concerns also motivated Washington to engage China. This explanation also cannot ac count for why the stated purpose of rights, ar ms control, and fair trade Although this explanation points to domestic politics, it pays little attention to the domestic (re) construction processes that redefined U. S. China policy toward engagement. Second, some scholars argue that security and economic concerns motivated Washington to engage China. 13 Indeed, as mentioned above, the engagers were concerned about U.S. s ecurity and economic interests in China. However, security and economic concerns alone are underdetermined with regard to how Washington chose between sanctions and engagement. In 12 For scholars who argue that U. S. economic policy toward China has been hijacked by business interests, see Bernstein and Munro, The Coming Conflict with China (New York: A.A. Knopf: Distributed by Random House, Finance Minister: Clinton Ends China Quarterly No. 139 (September 1994), pp. 597 621; Robert G. Sutter, U.S. Policy toward China: An Introduction to the Role of Interest Groups (Lanham, MD.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998); I.M. Destler, American Trade Politics (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1995), p. 234; Charan Devereaux, Robert Z. Lawrence, and Michael D. Watkins, Case Studies in US Trade Negotiation, Volume 1: Making the Rules (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Review of Politics Vol. 63, No. 3 (Summer 2001), pp. 421 U.S. China Policy, 1989 Making China Policy: Lessons from the Bush and Clinton Administrations (Lanham, MD.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001), pp. 1 Policy: Clinton an Presidential Studies Quarterly Vol. 29, No. 2 (June 1999), pp. 280 296. 13 Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1 998), p. 18; and Foreign Affairs Vol. 74, No. 1 (January/February 1995), pp. 53 54
21 addition to human rights, China was accused of violating international norms of arms control and fair trade t hrough out the 1990s. T herefore Washington was concerned about its security and economic interests. When making the 1993 linkage policy, the Clinton administration had attempted to ad dress these interests. But it believed t hat U.S. security and economi c interests could be served if China first became humane and de mocratic. Because security and economic concerns remained constant in the 1990s, they cannot account for the sanctions engagement policy reversal. Third, the lite rature also attributes U.S. economic engagement with China to economic interdependence 14 However, this explanation is not convincing. First, economic engagement should not be confused with interstate cooperation. While interstate cooperation is a functiona l consequence of economic interdependence, economic engagement is a form of statecraft that deliberately expands economic interdependence to achieve foreign policy goals. In other words, while Washington hoped that economic interdependence could induce Chi nese cooperation, it manipulated economic interdependence as a tool to its own advantage. 15 Second, table 1 2 shows that U.S. China trade had expanded significantly since the late 1970s when the normalization of U.S. China relations progressed. Because U .S. China trade experienced little up and down variation, economic interdependence cannot consistently explain the sanctions engagement policy reversal in the 1990s. Moreover, economic interdependence may be underdetermined with regard to the forms negati ve or positive, of economic statecraft. 14 See, for example, Susan C. Morris, Trade and Human Rights: The Ethical Dimension in U.S. China Relations (Burlington, V.T.: Ashgate, Foreign Affairs Vol. 87, No. 5 (September/October 2008), p. 59. 15 Three approaches have been widely employed to explain American foreign economic policy: society centered, system centered, and state centered. The explanation that focuses on American business pressure is a society centered one, while the explanation that focuses on economic interdependence is a system centered one. See G. John Ikenberry, David A. L International Organization Vol. 42, No. 1 (Winter 1988), pp. 1 14.
22 16 Indeed, the use or threat of economic sanct ions will be feasible only after the sender has deliberately expanded economic ties with the target. Economic interdependence thus has no inherent logic with regard to the forms of economic statecraft. If economic interdependence can lead to both sanctions and engagement, how explanatory can that factor be? Third, table 1 2 shows that U.S. China economic relations were actually asymmetrical ly interdependent in favor of Washington. Beijing was more dependent than Washington upon U.S. China trade From a rea list perspective asymmetrical interdependence tends to create favorable positions for the sender to influence target behavior by threatening to interrupt bilateral commercial ties. 17 backg round against which the pro sanctions coalition attempted to wield the MFN weapon. Asymmetrical interdependence thus cannot explain why Washington eventually backed away from the MFN threat. 16 Zachary Selden, Economic Sanctions as Instruments of American Foreign Policy (We stport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999), p. 3. 17 Albert O. Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1945). Also see Robert Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence (New York: Longman, 2001 ).
23 Table 1 2. America China Bilateral Trade, 1971 2000 U. S. imports from China U.S. exports to China Total bilateral trade U.S. trade balance Percent of total U.S. trade Percent of total Chinese trade 1971 5 0 5 5 0.0 0.1 1972 35.2 64 99.2 28.8 0.1 1.6 1973 68.2 690 758.2 621.8 0.5 6.9 1974 123.1 807 930.1 683.9 0.4 6.4 1975 171 304 475 133 0.2 3.2 1976 222.5 135 357.5 87.5 0.1 2.7 1977 224.4 171.3 395.7 53.1 0.1 2.7 1978 357.3 721.1 1078.4 363.8 0.3 5.2 1979 656.4 1856.6 2513 1200.2 0.6 8.6 1980 1164.4 3830.2 4994.6 2665.8 1.0 13.3 1981 2062.4 4682 .4 6744.8 2620 1.3 15.6 1982 2502.4 4304.6 6807 1802.2 1.5 16.7 1983 2476.8 2753 5229.8 276.2 1.1 12.0 1984 3381.4 3837.1 7218.5 455.7 1.3 14.2 1985 4224.2 5198.7 9422.9 974.5 1.6 13.5 1986 5240.6 4718.2 9958.8 522.4 1.6 13.3 1987 6910.4 4835.6 1174 6 2074.8 1.7 14.2 1988 9261.3 6633 15894.3 2628.3 2.0 15.4 1989 12901 7863.59 20764.59 5037.41 2.4 18.5 1990 16295.8 6591.02 22886.82 9704.78 2.5 19.6 1991 20305.1 8010.28 28315.38 12294.82 3.0 20.8 1992 27412.5 8902.7 36315.2 18509.8 3.6 21.7 1993 33512.7 10632.8 44145.5 22879.9 4.1 22.6 1994 41362.4 13976.7 55339.1 27385.7 4.6 23.4 1995 48520.7 16123.2 64643.9 32397.5 4.8 23.0 1996 54408.9 16178.9 70587.8 38230 4.9 24.3 1997 65831.7 16289.8 82121.5 49541.9 5.2 25.3 1998 75109.2 16997 .3 92106.5 58111.9 5.7 28.4 1999 98677.5 32317.72 130995.22 66359.78 7.5 35.9 2000 119416.6 37045.38 156461.98 82371.22 7.8 32.7 Source: Katherine Barbieri and Omar Keshk. 2012. Correlates of War Project Trade Data Set Codebook, Version 3.0. Online : http://correlatesofwar.org Exports and imports are in current U.S. millions of dollars.
24 The Changing Images of China L iberals like Deudney and Ikenberry argue that China, once deeply enmeshed in a web of eco nomic interdependence, will become more prosp erous and democratic at home as well as peaceful abroad to the extent of embracing a status quo based on U.S. unipolarity. 18 Trade, a ccording to the liberal logic stands at the top of the list of factors that br ing about prosperity, democracy, and peace. 19 What Friedberg calls liberal optimists thus believe that t he rise of China can be manageable under the U.S. policy of economic engagement. 20 Interestingly, a defensive realist analysis of U.S. economic engagement with China is also predicated on the liberal logic. While defensive realists have emphasized East Asian bipolarity and the nuclear revolution as the countervailing mechanisms that will lessen the security dilemma between Washington and Beijing, 21 they poin t to the pacifying effects of economic interdependence on the rise of China when analyzing the political economy of U.S. China relations. Mastanduno for example, e mploy s balance of threat theory to explain U.S. security strategy in the post Cold War era. i t ting 18 Daniel Deudney and G. Foreign Affairs Vol. 88, No. 1 (Ja nuary/February 2009), pp. 77 93. 19 For this liberal logic, also see G. Foreign Affairs Vol. 87, No. 1 (January/February 2008), pp. 29 30; G. John Ikenberry The Rise of China: Power, Institutions, and in Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng, eds., the Future of International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), pp. 89 114; Foreign Affairs Vol. 74, No. 4 (July/August 1995), pp. 90 102; Stephen M. Walt, Foreign Policy No. 110 (Spring 1998), p. 40. Robert S. Foreign Policy 104 (Autumn 1996), pp. 18 25; Foreign Affairs Vol. 83, No. 3 (May/June 2004), pp. 96 109. 20 The Future of U.S. China Rel International Security Vol. 30, No. 2 (Fall 2005), pp. 7 45. 21 For the stabilizing effects of East Asian bipolarity between the United States and Chi Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty International Security Vol. 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999), pp. 81 Expectatio International Security Vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter 1997/98), p. 70.
25 22 Because China may not be a threat, he argues, Washington economy in the hop e that China can be turned into a status quo power. interdependent world economy positive economic relationships are an important instrument in 23 In the l iberal and defensive real ist analyses, however, a manageable and non threatening China is assumed presupposes [emphasis added] that the target state is not unalterably revisionist, and that if it is not currently a status qu 24 In his typology, Schweller also argues that the 25 In a similar vein, p art of the literature on international political economy (IPE) has explored whether or under what conditions states trade 26 However, o ne may wonder why a country is considered undecided, manage able, a limited aims revisionis t, an enemy, or an ally? 22 International Security Vol. 21, No. 4 ( Spring 1997), p. 63. 23 International Organization Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), p. 845. 24 25 in Johnston and Robert S. Ross, eds ., Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power (New York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 1 31. 26 In the literature, the conditions under which state s t rade with enemies or potentia l enemies include multipolarity and domestic politics in the target (internation alist or nationalist) American Political Science Review Vol. 83, No. 4 (December 1989), pp. 1245 1256; Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1994); Paul Papayoanou Secu rity Studies Vol. 9, No. 1 2 (1999), pp. 157 International Security Vol. 21, No. 1 (Summer, 1996), pp. 147 175.
26 In particular, why is China considered manageable and non threatening? Is such an image of 27 In fact, China was vie wed unfavorably after Tiananmen, and Chinese leaders were referred to as t he 28 A repressive China was widely believed to be the real China. 29 In 1993, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake even put China into his list of states which included North Korea, Iran, and Iraq 30 If China w ere malleable, as liberals and defensive realists claim, where did such an image come from? More broadly, why and how did U.S. perceptions of China change in the context of the sanctions engagement t ransition? Liberals and defensive realists cannot answer these questions because they simply take a malleable China for granted. 31 By tracing the change in U.S. economic statecraft toward China from sanctions to engagement in the 1990s, t his study problema tize s the presupposition that China i s manageable and non attaching moralistic and liberal values to U.S. China trade in order to counter the pro sanctions coalition and ju stify the engagement policy. I also demonstrate that t he discursive change from human rights to free trade shifted the images of China from a pariah state to a malleable power, despite the fact that China had not changed its b ehavior in ways that met U.S. expectations. 27 the Aberration in the Liberalization Over a Decade or in the New York Times New Yor k Times June 27, 1989, p. A6. 28 New York Times December 12, 1989, p. A24. 29 30 U .S. Department of State Dispatch Vol. 4, No. 39 (September 27, 1993), pp. 658 664. 31 see Carola McGiffert, eds. China in the American Political Imagination (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2003).
27 While Oren traces the changing U.S. perceptions of Imperial Germany to the subjectivity of the democratic peace, 32 I trace the changing U.S. perceptions of China to the changing intersub jectivities from human rights to free trade Therefore, I argue that the economic interdependence thesis embraced by liberals and defensive realists is ahistorical. I t is not that the engagers advocated economically engaging China because China was manageable and not a threat, but rather that the engagers from time to time portrayed China as malleable to justify their engagement policy. To the extent that China has been perceived as malleable, such a n image of China is a product, rather than a determinant, of U.S. policy practices. ot be understood apart from normative discourses. W hether China is a status quo power remains a highly debated question among scholars 33 but I argue that a malleable China, as viewed by liberals and defensive realists, is merely a discursive construct In particular, liberals overlook the fact that U.S. economic policy toward China before Tiananmen had only carried geopolitical and geostrategic purposes without moralistic attempts urposes of U.S. economic policy toward China were context sensitive. Liberals also overlook the fact that in the 1980s, the United States believed that democracy and prosperity in China would grow from within if China continued with economic reform. It was not until after Tiananmen that moralistic and liberal values were brought into U.S. China trade by the engagers to justify their engagement policy. By integrating China into the world economy, the engagers argued, the United States 32 International Security Vol. 20, No. 2 (Autumn 1995), pp. 147 184. 33 For di International Security Vol. 27, No. 4 (Spring 2003), pp. 5 56; Scott L. Kastner and Phillip C. evisionist State? Leadership Travel as an Empirical Indicator of Foreign International Studies Quarterly Vol. 56, No. 1 (March 2012), pp. 163 177.
28 could make in terms of prosperity and democracy. This is what Madsen 34 Indeed, offensive realists like Mearsheimer have called the economic engagement policy democratic it may become, will translate its economic might into military might and challenge American hegemony. 35 For scholars who view U.S. China relations from a zero sum perspective U.S. economic engagement with China has un wisely encouraged Chinese e conomic power in ways that can harm U.S. national interests in the future. T hus, t hey argue that U.S. economic engagement with China is doomed to fail and that t adopting a neomercantilist internati onal economic policy. 36 Simply calling the engagement policy misguided, however, leaves the origin and sum continued rise later in the same decade m 37 Offensive rea lists cannot ignore this puzzle because they claim 34 Richard Madsen, China and the American Dream: A Moral Inquiry (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1995). 35 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), pp. 397 Foreign Affairs Vol. 80, No. 5 (September/October 2001), pp. 46 61. For power transition t heory see Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987); Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Po (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998). 36 For scholars who view U.S. China relations from a zero sum perspective see Bernstein and Munro, The Coming Conflict with China Washington Post May 15, 2005; Aaron L. Commentary Vol. 110, No. 4 (November 2000), pp. 17 26; and y, ed., The Rise of China in Asia (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002), pp. 24 48. For scholars who argue that the United States will and should adopt a neomercantilist economic policy toward China, see, for example, Christopher Layn e International Security Vol. 22, No. 1 (Summer 1997), pp. 86 124. 37 International Security Vol.31, No. 1 (Summer 2006), p. 102.
29 that their theory is suited not only for political military issues but also for international political economy 38 If offens ive realists simply view U.S. economic engagement with China as an unwise policy inattentive to relative gains, 39 they would violate their own theoretical tenet. To the extent that U.S. economic engagement with China has been misguided, I argue, such misg uidance can be explained by the strategic co constitutions in U.S. domestic politics that produced an image of China as malleable under the condition of economic interdependence. At a time of rising Chinese power, the engagers portrayed China as malleable in order to justify the sanctions engagement policy reversa l. Their rhetoric thus misdirected U.S. efforts to search for the real China. Outline of Chapters It shou ld be noted at the outset what this study is not about. I focus on U.S. foreign policy behavior especially on U.S. economic statecraft toward China by examining U.S. domestic construction are beyond the scope of this study I do not explain in detail why Chin a refused to kowtow to U.S. human rights pressure, especially during 1993 1994. human rights intransigence as a given tha t forced both pro sanctions and pro engagement actors to reconsider how to use economic statecraft towar d China. A model of U.S. China relations, after all, would be more complicated than a model of U.S. foreign policy behavior. C hapter 2 focuses on theory. I first deal with terminological issues related to both constructivism and economic statecraft, inclu ding such terms as norms, discourses, rhetoric, economic sanctions, and economic engagement. I then review the literature on economic 38 Joseph Grieco, Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Non Tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca: Cornell tional Power: Life on the Pareto World Politics Vol. 43, No. 3 (April 1991), pp. 336 International Security Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/1995), pp. 5 49. 39 For relative gains, see Grieco, Cooperation among Nations
30 statecraft in general and econo mic sanctions in particular. This literature is primarily realist and rationalist as it em phasizes inherent state interests in using economic statecraft. Although the sanctions literature pays some attention to norms, it does not treat norms in the same way as constructivists as it assumes rather than explains norms. I then review the few cons tructivist works that emphasize the translation of norms into sanctions. The constructivist variant they use, I find, is liberal constructivism. Therefore, I move on to the broader literature on liberal constructivism However, I demonstrate the methodolog ical weaknesses of liberal constructivism. I also argue that liberal constructivism cannot explain a sanctions engagement policy reversal toward an intransigent target if the sender has applied sanctions against such a target for reasons of appropriateness In the rest of chapter 2, I develop a constructivist model that centers on the mutual constitut ion of agents and structures but grants agents the logic of consequences. This lows for co constitution. In the model of strategic co constitution, actors, while having construct ed a normative structure may open themselves to another normative structure and use it to avoid a moral hazard problem coming from policy change. This model thus displays a path of normative development different from what liberal constructivists have suggested. After developing this model, I examine how this model is methodologically different from liberal constructivist model s I also analyze the eclectic t rend that synthesizes different paradigms in the study of international relations. Finally, I explore the application of con structivism to the study of IPE by examining political reductionism and economic reductionism. Chapter 3 puts U.S. China policy into historical comparative context by discussing U.S. economic policy toward China before Tiananmen. Three cases are examined: the open door
31 policy in the first half of the twentieth century, the China embargo after the Korean War, and U.S. economic poli cy toward China in the 1970s and 1980s. They are compared in terms of three dimensions: the forms of economic instruments (positive or negative), the purposes of economic instruments (material interests or moralistic goals or both), and U.S. policy concer or both). In particular, I pay attention to whether these three U.S. econ om ic policies carried missionary and moralistic was weak and divided in the first half of the twentieth century, U.S. policy makers formulated and continued t he open door policy and hoped for a democratic, prosperous, and stable China that fit the American image. That was the background against which th e American missionary However, Washington became disillusioned with its missionary efforts to save China at the peak of the Chinese Civil War. After the Korean War, U.S. officials even came to view Communist China as so evil and incurable that it should be isolated from the international community. When U.S. China rapprochement unfolded after the early 1970s, U.S. economic policy toward China was only based on geopolitical and geostrategic purposes without moralistic efforts to reshape China into the American image. In the 1980s, however, U.S. policymakers strategically articulated a liberal discourse that morally justified China as a Cold War ally of the United States. This liberal discourse, similar to modernization theory, maintained that a China fitting the American image would grow from within if it continued with econ omic reform. This discourse emphasized the endogenous process in China instead of exogenous forces from the United States. It was not until after Ti ananmen that the United States became disillusioned with the endogenous process in China and began
32 emphasizing the role of U.S. economic instruments in influencing the course of development in China. Chapters 4 7 examine respectively the Tiananmen sa nctions, the MFN debate of 1990 1992, the 1993 linkage policy, and the 1994 delinkage policy. These four empirical chapters demonstrate the three stages of strategic co constitution that brought the normative discourse of free trade to triumph in U.S. dome stic politics In each chapter, I examine what both pro sanctions and pro engagement actors said about U. S. economic policy toward China. I also illustrate their logic of consequences by examining the circumstances that forced them to articulate their res pective normative discourses or accept the ones articulated by the other Chapter 4 discusses the Tiananmen sanctions. Immediately after Tiananmen, a Democrat controlled Congress pressured the Republican administration to influence C political reform from the outside by means of economic sanctions. Bush, by contrast, defended U.S. China trade on the geopolitical and geostrategic grounds that had guided U.S. policy toward China since the early 1970s To morally justify his stance, his rhetorical strategy was to argue that preserving U.S. China economic relations was essential to human rights progress in China. However, Congress was unified enough to leave Bush litt le room for presidential vetoes. As a result, Bush was fo sanctions. Chapter 5 discusses the MFN debate of 1990 1992 It should be noted that t he MFN debate actually rage d throughout the 1990s in U.S. domestic politics. Chapter 5 thus only focuses on the MFN debate during the Bush years. It begins by briefly analyzin g U.S. concerns about arms control and trade With human rights, arms control, and fair trade
33 becoming issues of vital concern to Washington, Congress made a b roader interpretation of MFN conditionality for China in ways that included these three iss ue areas a step that moved beyond mere emigration freedom as required by the Jackson Vanik Amendment to the 1974 Trade Act. In particular, Congress paid significan t attention to human rights conditions, arguing that China would abide by international norms of arms control and fair trade if it first became humane and even demo cratic end of the Cold War, the geopolitical and geostrategic rationale that had guided U.S. economic policy toward China was eroding, but Bush added the normative issues of arms control and fair trade to U.S. economic policy as Congress did. Unlike Congress, B ush argued that continuing MFN ms control, and fair trade In particular, he developed a more complete explanation for the positive association between trade and human righ ts. What would link trade to human rights progress, prosperity was thus brought into U.S. economic policy toward China. During his tenure, Bush won the MFN debate by a cquiring Senate support to sustain his vetoes of two conditional MFN bills, despite the fact that he had previously codified the Tiananmen sanct ions based on human rights. Chapter 6 discusses the 1993 linkage policy The 1992 presidential election changed the direction of the strategic normative contestation between the pro sanctions and the pro engagement coalitions. During the 1992 presidential campaign, Clinton criticized Bush policy and After taking office Clinton r efrained from conflict with Congress over China policy thereby follow ing through on his
34 campaign promise The process from candidacy to presidency that Clinton went through during 1992 1993 thus translated human rights in to the linkage p olicy Like Congress, the Clinton administration a rgued that a humane, democratic China would simultaneously abide by international norms of arms cont rol and trade. Chapter 7 discusses the 1994 delinkage decision. When it became clear that China had resi sted U.S. human rights pressure, security an d economic concerns grew in the United States new dynamic thus emerged as American businesses with stakes in China eam, non normative discourse of free trade and presented it to Clinton. At the same time, the Clinton administration sought but found them infeasible. Such a circumstance explain s why C linton accept ed t he normative discourse that Bush had first articulated, despite the fact that he had previously translated human rights into t he 1993 linkage policy. Chapter 7 also demonstrate s the increasing strength of the normative discourse of free trade in Congress after the 1994 delinkage decision Anti China sentiment raged in Capitol Hill in the second half of the 1990s, but t he dynamics that had led to the delinkage decision also recons tructed Congress toward overwhelming ly voting status. The normative discourse was thus used by pro engagement lawmakers to justify their support for Chapter 8 concludes this study. I first provide a table summarizing the findings of this study. I then briefly analyze the discourses that U.S. policymakers articulated when opposing sanctions against Jap an during the 1930s and South Africa in the 1980s. These two cases are
35 compared with the U.S. disco urse of economic engagement with China. While U.S. policymakers had argued that open trade could make Japan more peace ful Washington argued that open trade could make South Africa more prosperous and therefore democratic at home The U.S. discourse about China in contrast, emphasized the positive effects of open trade on home and abroad. After comparing these three cases, I analyze the implications of this study for the future of U.S. China relations. Fro m a historical perspective, I emphasize the danger of liberalism in guiding U.S. foreign policy toward China, especially when economic interdependency is merely a normative discourse, rather than a scientific law.
36 CHAPTER 2 NORMS AND ECONOMIC STATECRAF T This chapter aims to provide a theoretical framework to explain why states lift economic sanctions and instead proffer economic engagement toward a target that has not engaged in desired behavior change. It begins by reviewing the literature on economic statecraft in general and economic sanctions in particular. It then reviews the constructivist literature. After the literature review, I develop a constructivist model that centers on the mutual constitution of agents and structures and grants agents the strategic translati on of different normative discourses into different forms of economic statecraft, namely, sanctions or engagement. Finally, I explore the application of constructivism to the study of I PE. It is necessary to clarify terminological issues at the outset. First, following Finnemore, Katzenstein, and Klotz, I define norms as shared, social, or intersubjective expectations about appropriate behavior. 1 From a constructivist perspective norm s are held collectively by group members and define their interests, identities, or preferences. 2 With regard to economic statecraft, norms define when and how states should use economic statecraft, in what forms, and for what purposes. However, claims tha t norms define th e use of economic statecraft explain little about why the forms of economic statecraft change. Such a constructivist approach would 1 See Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press), p. 5; Audie Klotz, Norms in International Relations: the Struggle against Apartheid (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), p. 14. 2 International Security Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998), pp. 171 the World Hang Toge ther? Neo International Organization Vol. 52, No. 4, (Autumn 1998), pp. 855 International Orga nization Vol. 50, No. 2 (Spring 1996), pp. 325 347.
37 be static unless we grant agents the logic of consequences, as will be explained in greater detail below Norms do not appear out of thin air; rather they form when actors use discourse s or rhetoric to name, interpret or dramatize issues. In other words, norms are embodied by discourse s of the ways to prove the existence of norms. 3 Therefore, I use discourse analyses t o indicate the existence of norms I focus on what the pro sanctions an d the pro engagement coalitions said about behavior and U.S economic policy toward China. I w ill discuss the methodological tools of discourse analyses later. 4 Economic statecraft, simply defined, is an economic technique of managing s tate affa irs and maneuvering power politics in the international system. A ccording to 5 The use of international economic relatio ns, according 6 By manipulating economic transactions and market exchanges, the sender can proffer economic benefits to or inflict costs on the target i n order to influence target behavior. Scholars of economic statecraft have also provided definitions of economic sanctions and economi c engagement. E inspired 3 There are two additional ways to prove the existence of norms: violating norms brings about social criticism and norms create patterned behavior in line with their prescriptions. See Finnemore, Nationa l Interests in International Society pp. 22 24. 4 Joshua S. Goldstein and Jon C. Pevehouse, International Relations (New York: Pearson Longman, 2011), p. 31. 5 Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade p. ix. 6 David Baldwin, Econ omic Statecraft (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 13 14.
38 withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal 7 Through the denial of customary economic exchanges, economic sanctions act as negative forms of economic statecraft. It should be noted that in this definition, merely threatening to withdraw customary economi not actually carried out, was a case of economic sanctions. E conomic engagement by contrast, is a positive form of economic statecraft According 8 He also distinguishes between two positive forms of economic statecraft: t actical linkage and structural linkage. The former involves the promise of well specified economic concessions in exchange for political concessions from the target. The latter, by contrast, involves the use of sustained economic engagement to restructure the balance of political interests within the target. Unlike tactical linkage, structural linkage is unconditional because its promised benefits are not turned on and off depending on target behavior. Instead, it is deployed for a systemic transformation o f the 9 The U.S. policy of economic engagement with China through the WTO was a policy of structural linkage. In its efforts to integrate China into the free trade regime, Washington hoped tha t a steady, long term stre borders could strengthen the hands of Chinese internationalists who favored political economic reform relative to Chinese nationalists who leaned toward Marxist Leninist rule. When China became pro sperous and open 7 Gary C. Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, Kimberly Ann Elliot, and Barbara Oegg, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered (Washington, D.C.: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2007), p. 3. 8 Security Studies Vol. 9, No. 1 2 (Autumn 1999), p. 303. 9 Ibid., pp. 303 304.
39 at home, f rom a U.S. perspective it could become a constructive strategic partner of the United States. Economic Statecraft This section review s the literature on economic statecraft in general and economic sanctions in particular. I f irst analyze the realist tradition inherent in the economic statecraft literature. I then review the relationship between norms and economic sanctions. The Realist Tradition In his pioneering study of economic statecraft, Hirschman quotes a letter writ ten by silk or about the art of wool, either about profits or about losses, it befits me to reason about the omplete failure of Machiavelli to perceive any 10 Since Hirschman, scholars of economic statecraft have examined politics and economics in an integrated manner. 11 On the one hand, they argue that economic exchange relationship s may carry power implications 12 In the eyes of the economist, market exchanges occur simply when both buyers and sellers perceive bilateral trade as beneficial. In this utilitarian world, economic actors are neither malevolent nor benevolent. They simply pursue economic interests 10 Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of F oreign Trade p. ix. For other pioneering studies of economic of Militar Makers of Modern Strategy: Military T hought from Machiavelli to Hitler (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1943), pp. 117 World Politics Vol. 1, No. 1 (October 1948) pp. 1 29; Klaus Eugen Knorr, The Power of Nations: The Political Economy of International Relations (New York: Basic Books, 1975); and Carr, 11 ity in Statecraft and 12 World Politics Vol. 24, No. 1 (October 1971), pp. 19 American Political Science Review Vol. 72, No. 4 (December 1978), pp. 1229 1242.
40 without any political motivations to dominate others at the expense of their own economic welfare. 13 However, scholars of economic statecraft view power relations as embedded in economic relations. As Hirschman argues, twofold results of bilat eral trade In particular, when country A and country B develop asymmetrical trade rela tions in favor of the former, country A can acquire influence or power positions in country B by threatening to interrupt bilateral commercial ties. 14 On the other hand, scholars of economic statecraft have argued that national power policies should also include the strategic use of international economic relations. Because economic relations may have power implications, a big country (the sender) that pursues power can deliberately expand its commercial ties with a small country (the target) and therefore create conditions of asymmetrical interdependence to its own advantage. A textbook for the mo dern but also chapters on economic statecraft. 15 With a few notable exceptions, 16 the economic statecraft literature has largely reflected the realist tradition bo th classical and structural From a classical realist perspective it is fundamentally the nature of man that pushes states to deploy economic statecraft. As Hirschman nterrupt trade with any country at its own will, the contest for more national power permeates trade 13 Baldwin provides an analysis of the difference between economic liberals and mercantilists. See Baldwin, Economic Statecraft pp. 72 87. 14 See Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade ; Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdepen dence 15 Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade p. ix. 16 Neoliberal institutionalist analyses of economic statecraft include Lisa L. Martin, Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions (Princeton, N.J.: Prince ton University Press, 1992. Constructivist analyses of economic statecraft include Audie Klotz, Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995).
41 relations, and foreign trade provides an opportunity for power which it will be tempting to 17 inue to exist, statesmen will make 18 For Hirschman and Baldwin, states have innate interests in deploying economic statecraft to satisfy their appetite for power. In particular, s tates have growing interest s in deploying economic statecraft when they have substantial economic capabilities. In other words, capabilities shape intentions. As Carr weapon for the military weapon . is a symptom not so much of super 19 When states have substantial economic capabilities, they can turn their wealth into political influence through economic instruments. This is particular true for the United States. Hufbauer, Schott, Elliot, and Oegg document 174 cases of economic sanctions worldwide during 1914 2000 and find that the United States, either alone or in cooperation with its allies, has deployed sanctions 109 times. 20 Indeed, there has been a substantial body of literature on the use of e conomic sanctions as instruments of U.S. foreign policy. 21 Besides economic sanctions, the United States has frequently used eco nomic engagement for example, with Western Europe and some East Asi an countries after World War II As Baldwin observes free tra de itself is one form of economic 17 Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Fore ign Trade p. 40. 18 Baldwin, Economic Statecraft p. 27. 19 Carr, p. 129. 20 Hufbauer, Schott, Elliot, and Oegg, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered p. 17. 21 See, for example, Ibid.; Selden, Economic Sanctions as Instruments of Ame rican Foreign Policy ; Richard N. Haass, eds. Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998).
42 statecraft, and the United States has deliberately used free trade to pursue various foreign policy objectives. 22 From a structural realist perspective it is anarchy that pushes states to deploy economic statecraft. Baldwi n for example, ll international economic relations are pathological because the international order is anarchical. 23 In his study of the relative risk of economic carrots compared to economic sticks, Drezner re not feasible because of the high transaction costs involved in making political exchanges in an 24 For him, anarchy forces states to prefer the use of economic sanctions to economic inducements. 25 In addition, Mastanduno emphasizes the imp act of polarity on U.S. use of economic statecraft. 26 The economic statecraft literature, however, says little about why s tates lift economic sanctions and instead proffer economi c engagement toward a target that has not engaged in desired behavior change. From a realist perspective states do have interes ts in using economic statecraft, and they do use economic statecraft when they have substantial economic capabilities It is also conventional wisdom that the sender makes a sanctions engagement policy rev ersal then, is why states make a sanctions engagement policy reversal when the target remains intransigent. 22 Baldwin, Economic Statecraft p. 44. 23 Ibid., 60. 24 Conflict Expectations, and Economic Security Studies Vol. 9, No. 1 2 (Autumn 1999), p. 190. 25 Ibid. 26 Michael Mastanduno, Economic Containment: CoCom and the Politics of East West Trade (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
43 In fact, the economic statecraft literature has paid mo re attention to economic sanctions than to economic engagement. 27 From a realist perspective economic sanctions reflect the conflictual nature of international politics, and therefore economic engagement is simply an epiphenomenon of power politics. Some s cholars of economic statecraft even view economic engagement as rare. Drezner, for example, employs a rational choice approach and argues that anarchy produces such high transaction costs that it prevents the sender from proffering economic carrots for fea anticipates frequent conflicts with the target. Economic inducements, he continues to argue, are used only when economic sanctions fail to generate compliance from the target. He thus argues that economic inducements are simply a second best option. 28 In his rational choice framework, der is pre given and even fixed; therefore economic oward a target with which the sender anticipates frequent conflicts. 29 In the case of U.S. economic statecraft toward China, however, economic engagement has taken precedence over economic sanctions on the U.S. China policy priority list since the mid 1990s competitor in the years ahead. In the United States, those in favor of using economic sanctions to reap political concessions from Beijing have become less powerful. Even supp orters of using punitive tariffs to reap economic concessions from Beijing on currency issues, politically 27 Journal of Peace Research Vol. 43, No. 5 (September 2006), p. 523. 28 29 What Drezne
44 palatable though they may be, are not popular, at least insofar as the present U.S. China relationship is concerned. 30 It is true that Washington prim arily used econo mic sanctions to behavior in the early 1990s. It is also true that Washington engaged China because economic sanctions did not work. However, economic engagement has proven to be the number one policy option for Washington, not a second best one. In this respect, U.S. preferences concerning the forms of economic statecraft toward China have changed. 31 Norms and Economic Sanctions Because econo mic sanctions have received significant attention in the economic s tatecraft liter ature, scholars have provided various reasons why states use economic sanctions when other states violate internationally held norms. Conventional wisdom in the literature maintains that economic sanctions in most cases do not work in changing target behavior. 32 However, state leaders still deploy economic sanctions regardless. To explain why state leaders apply economic sanctions even when they believe that sanctions may be ineffective, the literature distinguishes between instrumental and expressive sanctions. While instrumental 30 Revaluation: The Wrong Approach to the U.S. Foreign Affairs (January/February 2008), pp. 57 66; Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Yee Wong, and Ketki Sheth, US China Trade Disputes: Rising Tide, Rising Stakes (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 2006); Wayne M. Morrison, China U.S. Trade Issues (Congressional Research Service May 21, 2012). 31 Indeed, several scholars have argued that engagement with China works better than sanctions. See, for example, 185; A. Cooper Drury and Policy Analysis, Vol. 2, No. 4 (October 2006), pp. 307 When Engagement Would Be More Effective: Attaining Bett International Studies Perspectives Vol. 5, No. 4 (November 2004), pp. 378 394. 32 International Security Vol. 22, No. 2 (Autumn, 1997), pp. 90 136; Robert International Security Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer, 1998), pp. 66 International Security Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998), pp. 50 65. For scholars who argue that Security Studies Vol. 9, No. 1 2 (Autumn 1999), pp. 254 287.
45 sanctions are used in order to influence target behavior, expressive sanctions are deployed to release 33 In this view, expressive sanctions serve moralistic purposes. States use economic sanctions neither because they continue to exist nor because war remains a possibility but because th e target violates norms In this respect, the e conomic sanctions literature, while primarily emphasizing state interests, does not ignore the role of norms in driving s tates to use economic sanctions Sanctions scholars who pay attention to norms are not necessarily constructivists, however. In large measure, this is because concepts central to constructivism intersubjectivity and the mutual constitution of agents and st ructures are missing in most sanctions analyses. Martin, for example, begins her coercive cooperation theory by admitting that states apply sanctions because the target domestic or foreign acts morally un acceptable. 34 Similarly, Nossal argues that w state has violated norms of moral behavior valued by the sender and thus deserves not only 35 For him, san ctions act as a form of punishment become intersubjective and translate into sanctions. As Klotz criticizes, most sanctions analyses assume rather than explain norms. 36 Such an omission is 33 For the difference between World Politics Vol. 19, No. 3 (April 1967), pp. 378 416. 34 Martin, Coercive Cooperation p. 16. 35 K No. 2 (Spring 1989), p. 306. 36 Klotz, Norms in International Relations p. 6.
46 not surprising because the most frequently addressed question in the sanctions literature is whether or under what conditions sanctions can work. 37 Because most sanction s scholars do not treat norms with constructivist lo gic, they pay little attention to discourses or rhetoric In the literature, conventional wisdom holds that according to the literature, words are too economic sanctions are likely to be more effective than other means of registering disapproval is so abundant that it is deeply embedded in such everyday . Incu rring costs 38 39 Hufbauer et al. also argue that the imposition of sancti ons conveys a signal 40 A constructivist explanation of economic sanctions has been pioneered by Klotz. She explains the international sanctions against South Africa apartheid regime in terms of racial equality no rms promoted by transnational anti apartheid advocates. While Martin emphasizes the role of international institutions in coordinating multilateral sanctions, 41 Klotz stresses the role of norms in changing state interests toward applying sanctions. As she a 37 For other sanctions analyses that emphasize norms but do not t re at norms with constructivist logic, see Hufbauer, Schott, Elliot, and Oegg, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered Baldwin, Economic Statecraft ; Daniel W. Drezner, Inte rnational Organization Vol. 54, No. 1 (Winter 2000), pp. 73 102; William H. Kaempfer and Anton D. Lowenberg, International Economic Sanctions: A Public Choice Perspective (Boulder, C.O.: Westview, 1992). 38 Baldwin, Economic Statecraft p. 107. 39 Neta C and Audie Klotz, eds., How Sanctions Work: Lessons from South Africa 40 Hufbauer, Schott, Elliot, and Oegg, Econo mic Sanctions Reconsidered p. 7. 41 Martin, Coercive Cooperation
47 racial equality plays crucial roles in defining identity and interest, rather than simply functioning 42 With its focus on the translation of norms into economic sa nctions, constructivism provides a clue to explain why Washington threatened China with sanctions in the early 1990s. After Tiananmen, t he pro sanctions coalition persistently accused China of violating international norms of human rights, arm s control, an d fair trade and made efforts to translate these normative issues into sanctions China for its U.S. sanctions against China culminated when Clinton, after reaching a consensus with Congress, linked human rights to China M issing in such a constructivist explanation however, is why Washington shifted from sanctions to engagement in dealing with a China that remained intransigent. Why did framework is not satisfactory because it cannot explain such a sanctions engagement policy reversal. Moreover, what is the relationship between norms and economic engagement ? Can constructivism explain economic engage ment, as it has explained economic sanctions? Unfortunately, t he existing literature has not answered these questions. This is not surprising because as mentioned above, little scholarly attention has been paid to economic engagement, let alone to the tra nsformation of economic statecraft from sanctions to engagement. Liberal Constructivism In the constructivist literature, a key qu estion is where do norms come from? Addressing this question can help explain why and how a specific norm becomes dominant wh ereas others do not. A predominant explanation has been proposed by liberal constructivists. From a lib eral constructivist perspective a norm becomes dominant when norm entrepreneurs persuade, teach, 42 Klotz, Norms in International Relations p. 9.
48 or socialize their audiences to accept it. In this view persuasion, teaching, or socialization are the primary mechanism s 43 Persuasion, teaching, or socialization can work, according to li beral constructivists, because the norms conveyed by norms entrepreneurs are persuasive, liberal, or resonant with pre existing understandings of what is appropriate. Finnemore, for example, argues that 44 In this view, the quality of norms matters. The audiences may at first be obsessed with their material interests and not know what is appropriate. A fter being persuaded, taught, or socialized by norm entrepreneurs, however, they may adopt a The liberal constructivist model has also been employed by constructivists who study economic sanctions, though constructivist work on sanctions is still rare. In her study of the South African case, for example, Klotz argues that sanctions themselves are norm enforcing and contribute to socializing the target. 45 She also argues that racial equality norms originate from 43 works that emphasize persuas ion, teaching, or socialization, see Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998); Neta C. Crawford, Argument and Change in World Politics: Ethics, Decolonization, and Humanitarian Intervention International Organization Vol. 54, No. 1 (Winter 2000), pp. 1 rnational Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and International Organization Vol. 47, No. 4 (Autumn 1993), pp. 565 597; Finnemore, National Interests in International Society ; International Organization Vol. 55, No. 3 (June 2001), pp. 553 World P olitics Vol. 52, No. 3 (April 2000), pp. 275 312. 44 Finnemore, National Interests in International Society Studies Quarterly, Vol. 48, No. 4 (December 2004), pp. 779 804; Thomas Risse, Stephe n C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds. The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 45 Klotz, Norms in International Relations p. 164.
49 pre existing liberal social institutions. 46 Crawford and Klotz also emp hasize the socialization condemnation, may provoke a reassessment of fundamental assumptions about national interests and the legitimate means of pursuing them. 47 The liberal constructivist model, however, has three methodological weaknesses. The first weakness concerns how to operationalize persuasion, teaching, or socialization. Finnemore and Sikkink emphasi ze these as the mechanism s through which norm entrepreneurs promote norms. But they also present a staged analysis of the interplay between normative commitment s and strategic action: norm entrepreneurs promote norms for either normative or strategic reaso ns, 48 However, we cannot methodologically label a mechanism of normative influence as persuasion, teaching, or socialization, nor can we label it as strategizing, when norm entrepreneurs actually use norms b oth persuasively and strategically throughout the norm life cycle. This is because persuasive and strategic uses of norms are different mechanisms of normative influence. As Krebs and Jackson stress, one of the m ethodological issues facing constructivists is to use a mechanism of normative influence highlighting either strategic action or normative commitment s throughout the entire episode. 49 Second, how can we conclude that the audiences accept normative prescriptions for reasons of appropriateness? The audiences may adopt new norms for strategic reasons but 46 Ibid., pp. 22 23. 47 eds., How Sanctions Work p. 32. 48 911. 49 European Journal of International Relations Vol. 13, No. 1 (March 2007), pp. 40 41
50 deceptively claim that they are persuaded and convinced of appropriate behavior. Therefore, it is difficult for researchers to methodologically distinguish beliefs sincerely embraced from those adopt ed for strategic reasons. 50 Third, the argument that persuasive norms will prevail is unfalsifiable and tautological. 51 How can we methodologically prove that a normative claim is persuasive? Can we objectively measure the quality of norms? Liberal construct ivists provide no answer; instead, they simply assume normative persuasiveness. As Bially Mattern argues when examining soft power, persuasiveness in liberal constructivist arguments naturalness or on a particular type of circular logic characteristic of Habermasian approaches to 52 Because liberal constructivists assume normative persuasiveness, they explain very little about why a particular normative claim becomes dominant whereas others do not. A Mo del of Strategic Co C onstitution Besides these three methodological weaknesses, the liberal constructivist model cannot explain normative change In the liberal constructivist model, n orm entrep identities, or preferences of their audiences, but their interests, identities, or preferences are usually pre given and exogenous to social interaction. 53 As a result, the audiences and their interests, identities, or preferences may be socially (re)constructed, but norm entrepreneurs will 50 European Journal of International Relations Vol. 7, No. 1 (March 2001), p. 41. 51 Perspectives on Politics Vol. 3, No. 3 (September 2005), pp. 597 609. 52 Millennium: Journal of International Studies Vol. 33, No. 3 (June 2005), p. 585. 53 Jennifer Sterling International Studies Quarterly Vol. 44, No. 1 (March 2000), p. 105
51 not be subject ed to any social (re)construction processes. 54 In the liberal constructivist model, agents are granted ontological priority over structures, and therefore the constructivist concept of co consti tution is missing. 55 Without co constitution, after conveyed by norm entrepreneurs and accepted by their audiences for reasons of appropriateness sm, for example, explains the change in the postwar economic order as a norm governed change that revolves around free trade norms as social norms (normative framew 56 Similarly, Finnemore argues that the patterns of humanitarian intervention over the past two centuries can only be understood through human rights norms which have a progressive development trajectory. The targets of humanitarian interv ention, for example, have extended from white Christians to non white and non Christian groups. 57 In the case of U.S. economic statecraft toward China human rights became of significant concern to the United States after Tiananmen Congress persistently pushed human rights to the fore, leading Bush to ratify the T iananmen sanctions During 1992 1993, the process from candidacy to presidency that Clinton went through also translated human rights to the linkage policy. The liberal constructivist model would predict that both Bush and Clinton would keep conforming to the logic of appropriateness and sti China. The model would also predict that hum an rights norms would be durable in U.S. 54 55 World Politics Vol. 50, No. 2 (January 1998), pp. 324 348. 56 John G. International Organization Vol. 36, No. 2 (Spring 1982), p. 384. 57 Martha Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Us e of Force (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003).
52 China policy due to t heir persuasive quality. However, the fact was that Bush, while having ratified the Tiananmen sanctions based on human rights, vetoed bills that would condition arms control, and fair trade Furthermore, Clinton, while having l the two issues in 1994. Even congressional voices for human rights were in decline in the second half of the 1990s. Why were human rights norms turned on and off ? Why were they lo sing ground ? Liberal cons tructivists in general and Klotz in particular cannot explain such a life cycle of human rights norms. Ironically, because they emphasize the logic of appropriateness and view as durable they suffer from the lack of transformational logic t hat Ruggie ascribes to structural realists 58 To explain the change in U.S. economic statecraft toward China, this study develops a constructivist model that centers on the strategic co constitution of agents and structures. I focus on U.S. domestic politics and examine two groups of actors: pro sanctions and pro engagement. In this model, both groups used norms s trategically and competed with each other over China policy. On the one hand, one group strategically arti culated its own normative discours es to the other and constructed a social structure. On the other hand, it accep discourses when doing so was cost efficient and therefore subjected itself to a social (re)construction process. Such a strategic co constitution proce ss (re)defined U.S. economic statecraft toward China 59 58 World Politics Vol. 35, No. 2 (January 1983), pp. 261 285. 59 The mutual constitution of agents and World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press 1989), p. 36.
5 3 After Tiananmen, Congress and Clinton, for political goals that targeted Bush policy persistently pushed to the fore the normative issues of human rights, arms control, and fair trade. U.S China policy revolved around how to advanc e U.S. human rights concerns as well as security and economic interests. Unlike Bush, Congress and Clinton argued that sanctions should be deployed behavior regarding human rights abuses, arms proliferation and unfair trade practices To this end, Congress made a broader interpretation of MFN conditionality in ways that included general human rights principles, arms control, and trade, a step that moved beyond the freedom of emigration a s required by the Jackson Vanik Amendment. In particular, Congress and Clinton put significant emphasis on human rights, arguing that a humane, democratic China would simultaneously abide by international norms of arms control and trade. In their normative discourse, pushing China toward more respect for human rights and principles of democracy could simultaneously boost U.S. security and economic interests. A group of pro engagement actors by contrast, countered the pro sanctions coalition. It shared secu rity and economic concerns w ith the pro sanctions coalition but argued for engagement. To reverse the course of U.S. China policy its strategy was to attach liberal and moralistic values to a U.S. foreign economic policy that had previously only emphasize d the role of China in serving the U.S. balancing strategy against Soviet power. Bush took the lead in defending engagement with China by arguing that preserving and even broadening U.S. China trade could make China not only abide by the rules of the liber al world order abroad but also become pr osperous and therefore democratic at home Although the normative discourse of free trade faded after Bush lost the 1992 presidential election, it was revived in the spring of 1994 when American businesses with stak es in China governmental
54 foreign policy experts, and moderate member s of Congress joined the fray and presented the discourse to Clinton. I argue that Washington switched its China policy from s anctions to engagement becaus e three stages of strategic co constitution brought the normative discourse of free trade to triumph in U.S. domestic politics. First, while Bush had ratified the Tiananmen sanctions because Congress was unified enough to deny him any room for presidential vetoes, he and his normative discourse of free trade were able to win the MFN debate beca use Senate support created room for him to veto two conditional MFN bills Second, while Clinton had strategically raised human rights during 1992 1993, he switched to the on human rights grounds would not serve U.S. security and economic interests Third, while C ongress had moved human rights, arms control, and trade to the fore and urged sanctions during 1989 1993, it overw PNTR status after 1994 and articulated the Through these three stages of strategic co constitution, the normative discourse of free trade became dominant in U.S. domestic politics and translated into U.S. economic engagement with China through the WTO. By emphasizing strategic co constitution this constructivist model ch allenges the rigid distinction between norms entrepreneurs and their audiences. On the one hand, an audience that has been subject to a social construction process may in turn lead another social (re)construction human rights claims and ratified the Tiananmen sanctions, Bush took the lead in proposing the normative discourse of free trade to justify his who have led a social
55 construction process may be subject to another social (re)construction process. O nce outspoken human rights claimants like Clinton and members of Congress who had supported sanctions against China proved to be open to the normative discourse of free trad e for consequentialist reas ons. Because agents and structures constitute each other the distinction between norm entrepreneurs and audiences remain s fluid. This study also demonstrates that the change in U.S. economic statecraft toward China involved normative developments differe nt from what liberal constructivists have suggested. When Bush proposed the normative discourse of free trade, the human rights norms that had been translated into the Tiananmen sanctions were fading. Similarly, w hen Clinton and Congress switched to the no rmative discourse, human rights were delinked and proved not to be as durable as conventionally suggested by liberal constructivists. Only by granting agents the logic of consequences can a constructivist model explain the historically contingent nature of human rights norms in U.S. foreign policy toward China. In terms of methodology, the constructivist model of strategic co constitution is also different from the liberal constructivist model. First, I argue that the quality of the norms in question is un derdetermined with regard to whether they will be accepted by actors. Both human rights and free trade fit within the American liberal tradition. Their normative quality thus cannot explain how and why the pro sanctions and the pro engagement actors chose one over the other. Second, I use a mechanism of normative influence highlighting strategic action throughout the entire normative contestation between the pro sanctions and the pro engagement coalitions. I examine the strategic circumstances that motivat ed each of the two groups to articulate its own normative discourses. As will be examined in the following empirical chapters such domestic political factors as legislative executive, partisan, and electoral politics motivated
56 the pro sanctions coalition to raise human rights concerns Bush, by contrast, first linked trade to human rights progress for geopolitical and geostrategic reasons. After the end of the Cold War, he did the same for security and economic reasons. I also examine the strategic circumstances that motivated each of the two groups to chang e its original normative stance As will be examined later, human rights claims w hen a unified Congress left him no room for vetoes. Conversely, Bush was able to insist on his free trade stance when Senate support allowed him to veto conditional MFN bills. Similarly, when China had resisted the linkage policy, the Clinton administration sought several alternatives to the natives were considered infeasible did Clinton accept the normative discourse that Bush had first artic ulated to justify his delinkage decision. Such situational explanations for normative developments have been employed by some constructivists. Krebs an d Jackson, for example, argue that actors adopt new norms when they are left 60 Similarly, Bially 61 For constructivists, situational explanations and constructivism are compatible with each other. As Dessler and from pursuing situational 62 More importantly, a constructivist model that is combined with situational analyses has more explanatory power. Dessler and Owen examine the relationship between agency and 60 Ibid., p. 36 61 62
57 structure in rationalist and constructiv ist accounts of international relations. In rationalist action. This approach makes if 63 For them, a constructivist model that c enters on situational behavior can avoid the tautological analysis ascribed to liberal constructivists. In the following empirical chapters, therefore, I use situational analyses to examine the strategic circumstances under which the two groups of actors chose and changed their normative stances. I do not explore whether agents conform to the logic of appropriateness because their normative motives are methodologically unanswerable. 64 As will be examined later when Bush was forced by Congress to broaden th e sanctions in 1989, he argued that he did so for reasons of appropriateness. Similarly, when using the normative discourse of free trade to justify his delinkage decision, Clinton argued that he was persuaded by the appropriateness of the normative discou rse. Claims based on the logic of appropriateness thus may simply be a cloak used to rationalize strategic action In two res pect s the constructivist model of strategic co constitution is different from 65 First, while normative commitments and strategic action coexist in their model of strategic social construction my model of strategic co constitution disregards normative commitments and instead only focuses on strategic action. Second, alt hough admitting that norms strategically, Finnemore and Sikki nk grant ontological priority to agents (i.e., norm entrepreneurs ) ; therefore co constitution is given less attention in their model of strategic social 63 64 65 m Dynamics and Political Change.
58 con struction By contrast, the model of strategic co constitution gives equal ontological status to agents and structures. N orm entrepreneurs who have strategically promoted norms may be subject to a s ocial (re)construction process for instrumental reasons Besides situational analyses, another methodology used in this study is discourse analysi s. Indeed, discourse analysis is a necessary methodology for constructivism as it provides tools to read foreign policy texts According to Hansen, linking and differ entiation are two methodolog ical tools for discourse analysi s. L policy, is a process through which the Self designates a series of signs to himself/herself such as civilized democratic, and justified, whi le attaching another series of signs to the Other such as evil, dictator, and murderer. At the same time, s uch a linking process differentiates the Self from the Other as it constructs the Other as contrary to the Self. 66 Linking and differentiation thus a re two mutually reinforcing processes and construct the dichotomy between Self and Other differentiation between Self and Other is a matter of degree because the Other may be transformed by the Self. In their conquests of the Americas, for example, the Spanish developed two competing discourses about the the Indians as savages and therefore as incapable of being converted into Christian redemption. The other also constructed the Indians as savages b ut considered them as prone to transformation and salvation. Accompanying t hese two different views of the Indians were different policies toward them While the first discourse legitimized the annihilation of the Indians, the second one pushed the Spanish to conver t the Indians to Christianity 67 66 Lene Hansen, Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War (London; New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 37 41. 67 Ibid., pp. 37 38. Also see Tzvetan Todorov The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other (New York : Harper & Row, 1985 ).
59 Methodologically, this study identifies l inking and differentiation and examine s what the pro sanctions and pro toward Ch ina. In their normative discourses, b oth pro sanctions and pro engagement actors unfair trade practices. As such, both sides constructed a China that stood in con trary to the American image. Despite such a constructed differentiation between th e United States and China, the pro sanctions and pro engagement actors agreed that China was an Other that should However, both sides diverged on the forms of economic instruments to be used toward China. While the pro sanctions c oalition urged to transform China through coercion, the pro engagement coalition emphasized the use of inducement. In particular, the pro sanctions discourse linked human right trade, while the pro engagement discourse stressed the positive spill over effect s of open trade ms control, and fair trade Theoretically, this study fits within an emerging literature that employs both realist and constructivist approaches to e xplain political and normative change. 68 On the one hand, a a transformational l ogic and thus can explain a political c hange that involves a change f another On the other hand, t he engagers reversed the course of U.S. China policy by attaching moralistic and liberal values to U.S. China trade in order to fill the moral vacuum that would 68 For works that synthesize realism and constructivism, see, for example, J. Samuel Barkin, Social Construction and the Logic of Money: Financial Predominance and Internat ional Economic Leadership (Albany: State International Security Vol. 33, No. 3 (Winter 2008/2009), pp. 110 142. Jennife r A. Sterling Folker, Theories of International Cooperation and the Primacy of Anarchy: Explaining U.S. International Policy Making after Bretton Woods (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002). J. Samuel Barkin, Realist Constructivism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Jennifer A. Sterling International Studies Review Vol. 4, No. 1 (Spring 2002), pp. 73 97.
60 come from the sanctions engagement policy reversal Realism is meaningless without moralism. Therefore, the paradigmatic debate between realism and constructivism is overdrawn. It should be noted that to the extent that realism and constructivism are paradigmatically compatible, this study stands at the intersection of neoclassical realism and constructivism. I explore the influence of the domestic (re)construction on U.S. economic statecraft toward China. This study thus develops an eclectic approach that synthesizes neoclassical realism and constructivism. h, while the ontological theme of constructivism is co constitution, the boundaries between constructivism For them, engaging in the disciplinary war of paradigms overlook s the commonalities that constructivism shares with o ther intellectual camps leading to miss ed opportunities to learn from each other. 69 Finally, this study also makes contributions to the economic statecraft li terature by emphasizing the translation of different norms in to different forms of economic statec raft toward an intransigent target. While the economic statecraft literature has explored the interplay between politics and economics, I suggest a trinity of politics, economics, and norms. These three factors should be understood in an integrated manner. Besides economic sanctions, constructivi sm provides a clue to explain not only economic engagement but also a sanctions engagement policy reversal toward an intransigent target In particular, t o the extent that U.S. China ra re under international anarchy or in the age 69 Audie Klotz and Cecelia M. Lynch, Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations (Armonk, N. Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2007).
61 of rising Chinese power, the domestic (re)construction processes that produced the free trade based normative discourse have made it possible In addition, I demonstrate that how normative discou rses are framed determines the forms of economic statecraft. At a time when U.S. China policy revolved around how to use economic instruments to human rights, ar ms control, and fair trade the pro sanctions and pro enga gement coalitions framed their respective normative discourses in a way that harmoniously linked one of the three issue areas to the other two. translation of norms into economic statecraft. As such, a constructivist model that grants actors the logic of consequences i s more compatible with the study of economic statecraft than the liberal constructivist model. After all, the economic statecraft literature a s reviewed above, is primarily realist and emp hasizes acto strategic use of economic instruments thus argue, a textbook for the modern prince should also in clude chapters on the strategic use of norms. When used strategically, norms work wit h politics and economics as the three chapters for the modern prince. Limited Construction: Political or Economic Reduction ism Unlike realists and neo liberals, constructivists refuse to take interests, identities, or preferences as given and instead proble matize them Constructivism thus is widely viewed as an approach relying on an anti founda tionalist epistemology. In her review of the constructivist works of Wendt, Kratochwil, and Onuf however, Zehfuss finds that these three constructivists agree on the assumption of limited construction She argues that their constructivist analys e s epistemologically start with some reality that has already been made and is taken as given. Wendt for example, adopts a process centered approach to analyze the social cons truction of identities but his constructivis t approach excludes consideration of the genesis of state actors
62 and instead merely views state identities as given in the first place. Zehfuss essentiali st because his starting point of analysis is a priori existence of states and their identities. 70 Foundationalist epistemology is also inevitable in the study of political economy. The crucial questions in the study of political economy are the relationshi p between the state and the market and their relative influence s over time and in different circumstances. W hile the logic of the market is to allocate recourses in efficient and productive ways through price mechanisms, the logic of the state is to manage the pace of economic growth and capital accumulation. 71 The mission of the political economist is thus to explore whether the logic of the state determines the logic of the market or vice versa ; that is, whether politics is reduced to economics or vice ve rsa. Although the two logics can be compatible at times, as evidenced by the existence of mixed economic regimes, an inevitable analytical tendency for the political economist is to take one logic as the epistemological foundation and then explore h ow it a ffects the other In other words, the choice is between political reductionism and economic reductionism. Without one logic as an a priori ground, the analysis of political economy would be difficul t, if not impossible Because both constructivism and the study of political economy rely on a foundationalist epistemology, the constructivist study of IPE is no exception, though constructivist work on IPE is still rare. When studying IPE, constructivists inevitably take either the logic of the state or the log ic of the market as given in the first place. On the one hand, some constructivists have adopted the logic of the market as their epistemological foundation. In his study of international economic leadership, for example, Barkin views a socially constructe d market/monetary 70 Maja Zehfuss, Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 71 See Gilpi n, The Political Economy of International Relations p. 25.
63 exchange system as an internal inherent logic. Starting with the economic logic, he then proceeds to explain whether countries with substantial economic capabilities will choose to lead the international economic order and how they will l ead. 72 Similarly, Ruggie adopts the logic of the market as his epistemological foundation. In his study of embedded liberalism, he takes the logic of free trade as given in the first place. For him, there is an inherent economic logic after the logic of fre e trade is socially constructed as a social purpose. Only after the socially constructed logic of free trade is examined can we proceed to discuss the formation and transformation of international trade and monetary regimes. 73 On the other hand, other const ructivists start epistemologically with the logic of the state. Sterling Folker, for example, denies any inherent economic logic and instead assumes the logic of the s tate as given For her, there is no functional relationship between economic interdepende nce and interstate cooperation. Instead, whether interstate cooperation will occur in the backdrop of economic interdependence depends on the institutional contexts of the state. 74 Similarly, Helleiner denies any inherent economic logic concerning the exist ence of territorial currencies. Through a historical perspective he argues that currency is a social construct without given and fixed values. Standing on the logic of the state, he argues that the emergence of territorial currencies was largely linked to political motivations to create national markets, control the domestic money supply for macroeconomic purposes, finan ce the expanding fiscal needs of the state, and strengthen national identities. 75 72 Barkin, Social Construction and the Logic of Money 73 74 Sterling Folker, Theories of International Cooperation and the Primacy of An archy 75 Eric Helleiner, The Making of National Money: Territorial Currencies in Historical Perspective (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003).
64 reductionism. For him, there is no inherent economic logic in international monetary relations. He instead argues that the reconciliation of the impossible trinity capital mobility, full employment, and monetary stability economic crises by means of Keynesian, neoclassical, or classical ideas. 76 The study of economic statecraft is a subfield within IPE. A constructivist approach to the study of economic stat ecraft thus inevitably begins with either political reductionism or economic reductionism. I argue that there is no inherent economic logic concerning the use of sanctions or engagement. First, there is no logical relationship between economic capabilities and t he forms of economic statecraft to be used. One cannot assume that great powers with substantial economic capabilities will manipulate international economic relations in a specific form. Second, there is no logical relationship between economic inte rdependence and the forms of econo mic statecraft to be used, as explained in the first chapter. I thus adopt the logic of the state as the epistemological foundation for this study. Specifically, I examine a socially constructed political logic as an inte rnal inherent logic. At a time when the pro sanctions coalition persistently pushed to the fore the normative issues of human rights, arms control, and fair trade, U.S. China policy revolved around how to use economic instruments negative or positive, to addres s U.S. human rights concerns as well as security and economic interests. The pro engagement coalition shared its security and economic concerns with the pro sanctions coalition but argued that trade could not only advance U.S. security and economic interests but also promote human rights in China. Only after the se three policy goals were reconciled through normative discourses could a socially constructed political 76 Mone International Studies Quarterly Vol. 48, No. 2 (June 2004), pp. 433 453.
65 logic come into being. W hat for ms of economic instruments would be deployed thus were ep istemologically reduced to a socially constructed political logic. It should be noted that U.S. geopolitical and geostrategic interests are treated by this study as an objective given, rather than as a socially cons tructed given as are U.S. security and economic interests. In 1989, Bush continued the geopolitical and geostrategic grounds that had dominated U.S. China policy since the early 1970s and therefore strategically linked U.S. China trade to human rights progress in China. In this respect, th is study is somewhat essentialist because I view U.S. geopolitical and geostrategic interests as objectively given in the first place. As reviewed above, however, a starting point of analysis that assumes a priori existence of states and their identities o r interests is inevitable even for constructivist works. Moreover, U.S. geopolitical and geostrategic interests disappeared from the scene after the end of the Cold War. In the post Cold War era, U.S policy goals toward China shifted to human rights as we ll as security and economic interests. These three policy goals would be socially constructed as the political logic that determined the forms of U.S. economic statecraft toward China.
66 CHAPTER 3 AMERICAN ECONOMIC POLICY TOWARD CHINA BEFORE TIANANMEN This chapter discusses U.S. economic policy toward China before the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. I examine three cases: the open door policy in the first half of the twentieth century, the China embargo after the Korean War, and U.S. economic policy t oward China in the 1970s and 1980s. I compare these three cases in terms of three dimensions: the forms of economic instruments (positive or negative), the purposes of economic policy (material interests or moralistic goals or both), and U.S. policy concer foreign policy behavior or both). The Open Door Policy On July 3, 1844, the United States and China signed their first bilateral treaty, the Treaty of Wanghia. Signed after China was defeated in the Anglo Chines e War of 1839 1842, the Treaty of Wanghia provided the United States with a MFN clause guaranteeing that whatever treaty rights other great powers gained in China with respect to trade, tariffs, residence, religious activities, or other commercial regulati ons would automatically accrue to the United States. The MFN clause was reconfirmed in the 1858 Treaty of Tientsin and the 1868 Burlingame Treaty. 1 Through these three U.S. China treaties, equality of trading rights in China became the fundamental principl e underlying U.S. foreign policy toward China. The American principle of equal commercial opportunity in China, however, became increasingly under challenge in the late nineteenth century. The challenge came not from China but from European and Japanese im perialists who had gained spheres of influence in China. For U.S. administration officials and businesses, European and Japanese imperialists might discriminate against American commerce within their own spheres of influence and therefore 1 For the three U.S. China treaties signed in the nineteenth century, see U.S. Department of State, The China White Paper, August 1949 (Stanford University Press, 1967), pp. 1 2.
67 endanger the libe ral American ideology of free trade. At the same time, the United States became a power in East Asia after it acquired the Philippine Islands from Spain in 1898, which allowed the United States to extend its economic activities to China. To protect and eve n expand U.S. economic interests in China, therefore, U.S. administration officials began considering a vigorous China policy. 2 In 1899, U.S. Secretary of State John Hay sent the so powers that had acquired spheres of infl uence in China, asking them to promise that in their respective spheres they would not discriminate against commercial rights of other countries in matters of tariffs, railroad charges, and harbor dues The open door notes restated the principle of equal c ommercial opportunity that had been set forth in the three U.S. China treaties signed in the nineteenth century. Since the United States had no sphere of influence in China, U.S. commercial interests in China would be better protected if the goods of all n ations were assured equal treatment in all parts of China. Although the European powers and the Japanese replied to the open door notes in an equivocal tone, Hay announced that the open door policy had been accepted by the great powers. 3 After the 1898 1900 Chinese Boxer Rebellion, which expedited the imperialist partition of China, Hay further sent a circular note to the European powers and the Japanese, stating that difficulties in 4 From a U.S. perspective the balance of power in China was essential to U.S. economic interests because the 2 For the background against which the American government formulated the open door policy, see Warren Cohen, American Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), pp. 26 41. 3 See U.S. Department of State, The China White Paper p. 2. 4 Ibid.
68 domination of China by any one power would endanger the principle of equal commercial opportunity. The United States thus insisted that the balance of power in China should be administration officials, a stable, secure, an d strong China that could resist imperialism fit well within U.S. interests. To this end, the United States was willing to help China modernize. For example, when the Boxer Protocol required China to pay an indemnity of 333 million dollars over 40 years fo r the destruction of property and the loss of foreign lives in the course of the Boxer Rebellion, the United States returned 18 million dollars, out of its total indemnity of 25 million dollars, to the Chinese government in the form of a trust fund for the education of Chinese students in China and the United States. 5 The American government also encouraged missionary activities in China, in hopes of not only the spread of Protestant Christianity but also the cultivation of science and democracy through the establishment of modern universities and hospitals. 6 territorial and administrative integrity became the twin principles underlying the open door policy. On the one han d, at a time when the European powers and Japan struggled for imperialistic dominance in China, Washington attempted to establish its influence in China in the form of economic presence, instead of spheres of influence. Equality of commercial opportunity i n China thus would help the United States advance its economic interests and maintain the plight and thus made moralistic and missionary efforts to save China. Throu gh its economic 5 Ibid., p. 3. 6 For U.S. missionary efforts in China, see John K. Fairbank, The Missionary Enterprise in China and America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974); Suzanne Wilso n Barnett and John K. Fairbank, eds. Christianity in China: Early Protestant Missionary Writings (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985).
69 presence in China, the United States believed that it could maintain the balance of power in administrative integrity. It also hoped for a China whose dome stic features could be converted into the American image in terms of modernism, prosperity, Christianity, free trade, science, and democracy. 7 In the 1940s, Senator Kenneth S. Wherry of Nebraska made the most moralistic, though paternalistic, expression of 8 Of course, this moralistic objective was a consequence of the U.S. pursuit of economic interests. From a U.S. perspective there was no contradiction between U.S. economic interests in China and U.S. moralistic expedition in China because the former, when achieved, could benefit the latter. The open door policy, however, was still under challenge by the imperial po wers, especially Japan and Russia. In subsequent years, therefore, the American government made efforts to restate and reconfirm the open door policy with the imperial powers. For example, after the Russo Japanese War of 1904 1905, which was fought primari ly in Manchuria, President Theodore Roosevelt invited Japan and Russia to conduct peace negotiations. In the resultant Treaty of Portsmouth, Japan and Russia pledged to restore Manchuria to China and to play by in the commerce and industry of Manchuria. 9 The open door policy was also restated in the 1908 Root Takahira Agreement between the United 7 For U.S. moralistic attempts to save China, see ibid.; Cohen, ; Michael H. Hun t, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1987); and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Patterns in the Dust: Chinese American Relations and the Recognition Controversy 1949 1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983). 8 Qu oted in Foster Rhea Dulles, American Policy toward Communist China, 1949 1969 (New York, NY: Crowell, 1972), p. 20. 9 U.S. Department of State, The China White Paper p. 5.
70 Knox, the 1917 Lansing Ishi i Agreement between the United States and Japan, and the 1922 Nine Power Treaty. 10 In the first half of the twentieth century, President William Howard Taft was the American president who had the most fervent support for the open door policy. Applyin g his dollar diplomacy to China, Taft believed that by facilitating the flow of capital to China, the United States could increase its commercial interests in China, check Japanese aggression, and promote the stability and economic prosperity of China. 11 O f course, one cannot overestimate the moralistic purpose of the open door policy. U.S. Indeed, the United States was anti interventionist and mainly concern ed about economic problems at home before entering World War II. Moreover, U.S. foreign policy was preoccupied with European affairs, with Asian affairs being secondary. When dealing with Asian affairs, the United States took a policy of appeasement toward Japan before the late 1930s, believing that U.S. interests in China was limited and not vital, compared to those of Japan, and therefore not worth the risk of antagonizing Japan. Even President Woodrow Wilson, who had strongly advocated the principle of s elf determination, sacrificed Chinese sovereign rights in the 1919 Paris Peace Conference when he yielded to the Japanese claims to the former German sphere of influence in Shantung Province. Because U.S. interests in China were commercial only, a Japanese guarantee of equal treatment for American goods would be satisfactory, and therefore 10 See ibid., pp. 3 9. 11 e V. Scholes, The Foreign Policies of the Taft Administration (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1970).
71 expense of U.S. relations with Japan. 12 By maintaining its economic presence in China, however, the American government at least attempted to influence the course of development in China. At a time when various Chinese warlords struggled for power in the first two decades following the collapse of the Qing Dynasty in 1912, Washington hoped that its economic ties with China could strength Chinese technocrats who were capable of relieving the American government from its nominal responsibility of defending Chinese sovereignty. To some U.S. administration officials, Chiang Kai shek, head of the Chinese Nationalists, was the most competent candidate. Chiang, some U.S. administration officials believed, was a strong leader who had a progressive, modern outlook, became converted to Christianity, and was capable of unifying and def ending China. 13 When Chiang achieved a degree of unifying China in 1928, therefore, the United States immediately extended recognition to the Chiang government and reached with it a treaty restoring tariff autonomy to China. 14 A China that fit within the American image was especially attractive to the United States after the two countries wartime capabilities, the American government, under the authority of the Lend Lease Act, began pro viding the Chiang government with lend lease assistance in 1941, which was aimed particularly at improving the Burma Road, the only route connecting unoccupied China to the 12 pp. 75 81. 13 U.S. Policy Planning Staff Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1948, Vol. VIII: The Far East: China (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 149. 14 U.S. Department of State, The China White Paper p. 12.
72 outside world. From 1941 to 1945, a large amount of U.S. military and financial aid flowed to China, though U.S. aid to China was less than that to Europe. 15 It was in the context of U.S. China wartime alliance that the American government began considering Chinese foreign policy behavior. Specifically, when it became clear that the Allie s would win World War II, Washington began considering the role of China in world peace. President Franklin D. Roosevelt believed that with U.S. help, China would be a stable, democratic force in East Asia after World War II. 16 On December 15, 1945, Preside nt Harry Government that a strong, united and democratic China is of the utmost importance to the success of world peace. A China disorganized and divide d eithe r by foreign aggression . or by 17 From a U.S. perspective only when the domestic features of China were consistent with the American image foreign p olicy behavior make contributions to world peace. To help China make contributions to world peace, the American government was willing as a member of the great power club. First, he insisted that China be included as a signatory, together with the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, of the Declaration of Four Nations on General Security. Second, Roosevelt invited Chiang to attend the Cairo Co nference despite opposition from Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin. 18 From a U.S. 15 For American aid to China, see Ibid., pp. 28 33. 16 Cohen, pp. 131 134. 17 Department of Sta te Bulletin Vol. 13, No. 338 (December 16, 1945), pp. 945 946. 18 U.S. Department of State, The China White Paper p. 12.
73 perspective a China that fit within the American image and a China as a constructive member of the international community would reinforce each other. In sum, the open door policy carried positive forms of economic instruments and aimed to pursue both material interests and moralistic purposes. On the one hand, at a time of the European and Japanese imperialistic expedition in China, the policy sought to advance U.S. economi c interests and maintain the balance of power in China. On the other hand, the United States hope d for a China whose domestic features could be converted into the American image in terms of independence, modernism, prosperity, Christianity, free trade, sci ence, and democracy. outlined the role of China in contributing to world peace in the postwar international order. The China Embargo The American government soon b ecame disillusioned with China and the Chiang government after the end of World War II. In September 1948 when the Chinese Civil War was at its peak, George Kennan, then Director of the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State, finished a report re defining U.S. policy toward China. The report first claimed that the 19 First, U.S. China trade had been limited, and therefore the Unit marginal standard of living, China was not the fabulous potential market that American traders though it was; in the 1930s, our trade with that country was about 4 perc ent of our total foreign 20 Second, U.S. missionary efforts to save China and spread the American way of life to 19 20 Ibid.
74 comparatively indifferent to Christian proselytizat 21 Third, the Chiang government was so corrupt and weak that it could neither resist communist rebellion nor develop sufficient unity and 22 Issued at a time when the Cold War betwee n the United States and the Soviet Union just began 23 To this end, the report still advocated main taining U.S. economic presence in China as the open door policy had long sponsored. However, U.S. economic policy toward China, according to the report, should serve U.S. geopolitical rather than economic, interests in China by drawing China closer to the American side. More importantly, the report detached from U.S. foreign economic policy any open door policy had been too idealistic, and therefore U.S. China policy should be realistic. 24 The report also suggested that the American government have the flexibility to give or withhold ar and favor always have and still do control 25 In dealing with the Chiang government, however, the American government began ance of the National 21 Ibid. 22 Ib id. 23 Ibid., p. 154. 24 George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900 1950 (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1951), pp. 22, 36. 25
75 Government . 26 On August 5, 1949, the Department of State published the so called China White Paper In the document, Secretary of State Dean Acheson at the ominous result of the Civil War in China was beyond the control of the government of the United States. Nothing that this country did or could have done within the reasonable limits of its capabilities co uld have changed that result. . It was th e product of internal Chinese forces, forces which this country tried to 27 In 1945 1946, Truman had attempted to control the Chinese Civil War and therefore sent General George C. Marshall to mediate between the Nationalists and th e Chinese Communists. After the mediation became a failure, however, the American government 28 litics was so chaotic that the United States could do little to influence the course of development in China. At the time, the realistic concern to U.S. officials was the foreign policy orientation of Communist China (used interchangeably with China herea fter). To prevent China from becoming an adjunct of the Soviet Union, the Truman administration was willing to provide the Communists with economic aid, especially when the Soviet Union had no sufficient economic capabilities to help China. 29 United States and China. 30 On November 2, 1948, Chinese Communist troops entered Mukden 26 Ibid., 15 1. 27 U.S. Department of State, The China White Paper p. XVI. 28 For U.S. policy toward China in the Chinese Civil War, see Tucker, Patterns in the Dust 29 Shuguang Zhang, Soviet Allianc e, 1949 1963 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001), pp. 20 21. 30 For the Ward case, see Jian Chen American Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 33 38.
76 and detained Angus Ward, U.S. consul general in Mukden. In retaliation, the Truman administration withheld economic favor to China. For example, Edmund Clubb, consul general in Beijing, reported to Acheson that Zhou Enlai, one of the Chinese Communist leaders, sent a message that China desperately needed American aid, 31 but U.S. ambassador to China John Leighton Stuart argued such developments as present treatment [of] our Consular officers in China, particularly 32 In February 1949, the U.S. Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) also stopped di stributing aid in Communist held North China. 33 Under the authority of the Export Control Act of 1949, the Truman administration also imposed selective trade controls on China in February 1949. Serving as an instrument of national security in peacetime, t he law restricted the global export of U.S. commodities under the importance. 34 However, China was only one of the targets of the export control measures because the law p rimarily aimed to weaken military potentials of the Soviet Union by limiting the export of strategic materials to China and other Soviet satellites. In other words, the selective export controls on China were merely a product of overall U.S. Cold War strat egies. 35 In fact, U.S. administration officials were ready to accommodate Communist China in the 31 Hi storians in both America and China have argued that the message from Zhou might have been fabricated. See ibid., p. 56. 32 FRUS 1949, Vol. VIII, p. 372. 33 Walter Sull New York Times February 3, 1949, p. 14. 34 For the law, see Michael Mastanduno, Economic Containment: CoCom and the Politics of East West Trade (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992), p. 69. 35 Zha ng, Economic Cold War p. 23.
77 with China in order to prevent it from leaning toward the Soviet U nion. In an outline of Far 36 In particular, U.S. administration officials were opposed to ec onomic warfare against 37 of all Chinese ports and prohibited the entry of all foreign ships into Communist held territory. However, Acheson 38 In particular, he protested in November when three American merchant ships were attacked by Chinese Nationalist warships off Shanghai. While saying that American vessels entering those blockaded waters did so at their own ri 39 40 T he American government, however, became disillusioned with China after the breakout of the Korean War and the resulting Chinese involvement. After Beijing sent its troops into of which China was invited to discuss the Korean issue, U. S. Representative Warren Austin said, 36 FRUS 1949, Vol. VII, pp. 1210 1214. 37 38 Department of State Bulletin Vol. 21, No. 546 (December 19, 1949), p. 945. 39 Ibid. 40 Ib id.
78 then withdrew the facts came to our knowledge which would justify the use of the word, dire ction of my Government. 41 breakers in 42 In his speech on the Korean War on April 11, 43 The primary U.S. goal in the Korean War was not to enter an all out war again st China but to force China to end the war. 44 To this end, the Truman administration not only sent troops 3, 1950, the Department of Commerce issued an order subjecting all American exports to China or to Hong Kong and Macao (as possible transshipment points) to screening procedures. On December 6, Commerce issued another order tightening the movement of stra tegic as well as non strategic materials to China, Hong Kong, and Macao. On December 8, Commerce issued Transportation Order T 1 dictating that no person should transport arms, ammunitions, and commodities controlled under the Atomic Energy Act to China, H ong Kong, and Macao. On December 16, the Department of State froze Chinese Communist assets and funds within U.S. jurisdiction. The Department also 41 Department of State Bulletin Vol. 21, No. 546 (December 11, 1950), p. 929. 42 Department of State Bulletin Vol. 23, No. 597 (December 11, 1950), p. 927. 43 http://www.faulkner.edu/academics/artsandsciences/socialandbehavioral/readings/hy/truman.asp 44 Ibid.
79 prohibited ships of U.S. registry from calling at Chinese ports. 45 Through these economic sanctions, a total economic embargo against China took effect, and the Truman administration completely terminated exports to and imports from China by the end of 1950. 46 In September 1951, Tru under the authority of the Trade Agreements Extensio n Act of 1951, which denied Communist countries MFN treatment. 47 The United States also sought the auspices of the United Nations to formulate multilateral sanctions against China. On May 18, 1951, the General Assembly passed a U.S. draft resolution demandi ng every state to ban the export of strategic materials to China. 48 In July, the United States also cooperated with the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and Japan to establish a China Committee (Chincom) as a working group of the Coordinating Committee for M ultilateral Export Controls (CoCom), which had been established in November 1949 in Paris to control trade of strategic materials with the Soviet Union. 49 After the Korean War, and until the late 1960s, the United States maintained a policy of isolating Com munist China from the international community. Accompanying the China embargo was a belief that Communist China was a Red menac e that ran contrary to every value the Americans cherished In the postwar McCarthy ist era, the 45 Ambassador Department of State Bulletin Vol. 25, No. 628 (July 9, 1951), p. 55. 46 ed., China Trade Prospects and U.S. Policy (New York, P ublished for the National Committee on United States China Relations by Praeger, 1971), pp. 1 University of Pennsylvania Law Review Vol. 107, No. 3 (January 1959), pp 331 362. 47 UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs Vol. 3, No. 3 (Spring/Summer 1998), p. 28. 48 For t he resolution, see http://daccess dds ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/744/47/IMG/NR074447.pdf?OpenElement 49 For CoCom and Chincom, see Mastanduno, Economic Containment
80 d a China that defected from the American image and sat in China in the most dramatic light possible: It was a threat to everything Americans held dear, the most 50 From a U.S. perspective Communist China was such an evil country that it could not be converted into the American image, and therefore the United States had moralistic obligations to defend Ameri can values by isolating China from the international society. As Oksenberg and Oxnam argued when Zhou Enlai at the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina, Communist 51 Such a policy of isolation was a sort of U.S. moralism backed up by force. 52 In sum, U.S. economic policy toward China after the late 1940s pursued both material interests and moralistic purposes. On the one hand, U.S. officials first emphasized the role of China in the Cold War balance of power and attempted to use positive forms of economic instruments to draw China closer to the American si de. After the Korean War, however, the China embargo was deployed and reflected the balance of threat logic and the conflictual nature of U.S. China relations. On the other hand, the China embargo carried the moralistic objective of defending American valu ge. 50 Madsen, China and the American Dream p. 6. 51 Michel Oksenberg and Robert B. Oxnam, China and America: Past and Future (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1977), p. 16. 52 Ibid., pp. 15 16.
81 American Economic Policy toward China in the 1970s and 1980s After taking office, President Richard Nixon relaxed the ban on travelling to China in 1969 and then reopened U.S. trade with China in 1971. The two decade China embargo thus was brought to an end. 53 In 1972, he made a groundbreaking visit to China and met Chinese leader Mao Zedong. In 1973, the United States and China established the U.S. Liaison Office (USLO) in Beijing and a counterpart Chinese office in Washington, DC. In 1975, President Gerald Ford also visited China. On January 1, 1979, the two countries eventually established diplomatic relations when President Jimmy Carter granted China diplomatic recognition. 54 As in the late 1940s and until the Korean War, geopolitical and geostrateg ic concerns guided U.S. policy toward China in the 1970s and 1980s. In the bipolarity of the Cold War better U.S. China relations would enable the United States to push the Soviet Union toward dtente and therefore give Washington the pivotal position in the Washington Beijing Moscow strategic triangle. 55 When Moscow walked away from dtente, China could also be a strategic asset for the United States to balance Soviet power. This balance of power logic became especially dominant after the Soviet Union inva ded Afghanistan in 1979. As National Security 56 53 Most Favored Journal of Northeast Asian Studies Vol. 9, No. 1 (Spring 1990), p. 42. 54 For the normalization of U.S. China relations, see Robert S. Ross, Negotiating Cooperation: The United States and China, 1969 1989 (Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1995). 55 Foreign Affairs 46 (October 1967), pp. 111 125. In the early er the Vietnam War, however, the broader strategic framework was the rationale for U.S. policy toward China. 56 Department of State Bulletin Vol. 79, No. 2023 (February 1979), p. 19.
82 With geopolitical and geostrategic concerns in mind, the American government took aside ideological differences between the United States and China, and therefore the anti communist ideology that had dominated U.S. China policy since the Korean War began to fade. As Nixon argu system and we believe just as deeply in our system. It is not our common beliefs that have 57 In particular, the American government separated human righ ts from U.S. China strategic cooperation. At a time when human rights abuses were rampant in China during the Cultural Revolution (1966 1976), human rights issues never gained relevance in U.S. China negotiations. In 1978 1979, the Democracy Wall Movement spread across Chinese cities and then was suppressed after several Chinese dissidents were arrested. Despite his strong advocates for human rights diplomacy, however, Carter said little about the Chinese pro democracy movement when negotiating U.S. China d iplomatic recognition. From a U.S. perspective human rights China ideologies and econ omic an d political systems. . We harbor neither the hope nor the desire that 58 In sum, s trategic imperatives forced the American government to turn a blind eye to human rights issues in China. Similarly, President Bush took aside human rights issues when dealing with China. When he visited China in February 1989, U.S. ambassador Winston Lord made a guest list for a 57 ou En Lai, Peking, February 25, White House Press Release (Peking) Dated Department of State Bulletin Vol. 66, No. 1707 (March 20, 1972), p. 424. 58
83 reciprocal banquet to be hosted by the American s ide. The guest list included Fang Lizhi, a vocal critic of Deng Xiaoping and the Chinese government, and then was sent to White House Chinese government saw t he guest list as provocative and used security forces to intercept Fang on his way to the banquet. After returning to Washington, National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft blamed Lord for inviting Fang and said that Chinese concerns about inviting Fang was 59 At a time when overall U.S. C hina policy carried geopolitical concerns, U.S. economic policy toward China was no exception. In the 1970s and 1980s, U.S. officials viewed U.S. China economic relations as a means to st rengthen the U.S. China strategic alignment. 60 As stated in the 1972 U.S. 61 Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Aff airs, discussed U.S. by private American firms may prove to be an especially significant arena for building mutual 62 During the Cold War, U.S. economic ties with China we re an integral component of overall U.S. efforts to draw China closer to the American side. As one prominent in the development of U.S. China relations, and th e success or failure of the two countries in 59 For the Fang inc ident, see Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen pp. 24 28. 60 For the strategic purposes of U.S. economic policy toward China in the 1970s and 1980s, see William J. Long, International Studies Quarterly Vol. 40, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 90 Favored 61 Department of State Bulletin Vol. 66, No. 1707 (March 20, 1972), p. 438 62 Department of State Bulletin Vol. 67, No. 1740 (October 30, 1972), p. 490.
84 their efforts to build lasting economic ties will have a major influence on long term political and 63 After establishing diplomatic relations, the United States and China began negotiati ng MFN treatment. MFN non discriminatory treatment was one of the most important principles underlying the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In the United States, goods imported from MFN countries were subject to duty at the lowest available r ates. Most Communist countries, however, were denied MFN treatment due to the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951. The Jackson Vanik Amendment to the 1974 Trade Act stipulated that Communist countries could be granted MFN only if they allowed for the fr eedom of emigration, in particular of Jews from the Soviet Union. American presidents could grant a one year waiver of the application of emigration freedom if they determined that extension of the waiver would promote emigration freedom in Communist count ries. 64 At first, the Carter administration attempted to grant MFN to both the Soviet Union and China at the same time. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, for example, argued that the American government should be evenhanded in its MFN policy toward t hese two major Communist countries. As a supporter for dtente with the Soviet Union, Vance emphasized that granting China MFN while excluding the Soviet Union would result in an imbalance in the overall Washington Beijing Moscow relationship. Brzezinski, however, advocated a MFN policy that tilted toward China in order to play the China card and balance against Soviet power. Eventually, 63 A. Doak Barnett (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1981), p. 495. 64 Favored U.S. Department of State Dispatch Vol. 1, No. 3 (September 17, 1990), p. 106.
85 China MFN without waiting f or the Soviet Union. 65 In July 1979, the United States and China signed a trade agreement that granted each other MFN. Besides providing for mutual extension of MFN, the trade agreement also included provisions that dealt with commercial disputes, finan cial transactions, government commercial offices, and protection for industrial property rights, industrial processes, and copyrights. 66 In particular, the American government granted China other economic benefits that had long been denied to the Soviet Uni on, including Export Import Bank financing and an easing of export controls. 67 After the Carter administration received assurances from Beijing concerning freedom of emigration, Congress approved the trade agreement by overwhelming majorities in January 198 0: 294 88 in the House and 74 8 in the Senate. 68 In a a nondiscriminatory framework for our bilateral trade relations, and thus strengthen both economic and political rel ations between the United States and t . It will also give further impetus to the progress we have made in our overall relationship since 69 For the Carter admini stration, 65 For the decision making process Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (University of Arkansas Press, 1995), pp. 201 211. For the dynamics of bureaucratic infighting between Vance and Brzezinski, see Madsen, China and the American Dream pp. 124 12 5. 66 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Vol. 15, No. 43 (October 29, 1979), p. 2000. 67 James Man n, About Face: (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1999), p. 108. 68 Favored 69 2000.
86 granting China MFN was an economic means to bring U.S. China relations closer in the bipolarity of the Cold War. Besides MFN, the American government began selling China military related technologies, which would be suspended shortly after Tianan men. After receiving nuclear nonproliferation commitments from China, the Reagan administration signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with China in 1985, which allowed U.S. companies to sell nuclear related power infrastru cture. In the same year, the administration approved a $98 million sale of equipment for the construction of a munitions factory. 70 In 1988, it also permitted the export to China of U.S. satellites for the first time. 71 American technology transfers to China increased from $8 million in 1984 to $106.2 million in 1989. 72 Under the broader strategic framework, U.S. economic policy toward China carried no moralistic attempts to reshape China into the American image. Like the open door policy, U.S. economic policy toward China in the 1970s and 1980s was a positive form of economic instruments. Unlike the open door policy, however, U.S. economic policy toward China in the 1970s and 1980s carried no moralistic objectives. This does not mean, however, that the Amer ican government was not concerned about the course of development in China. By the mid 1970s, China had been mired in the fanatic domestic features could support the ki nd of Chinese foreign policy behavior that was sufficient to balance Soviet power. For U.S. administration officials, a chaotic China would not be able to 70 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (June 10, 1989), pp. 1412 13. 71 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (Ju ly 11, 1998), pp. 1889. 72 For American arms sales to China, see Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China since 1972 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1992), pp. 162 169.
87 to w 73 as Carter argued when meeting Deng on January 31, 1979. Similarly, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher argued, as he would repeatedly do again in the early 1990s when severing as Secretary of State under the Clin ton administration, 74 At the time of the Cold War, a strong, secure, and stable China would serv e U.S. geostrategic interests. In the 1970s and 1980s, however, U.S. officials believed that the course of development in China could only be a consequence of internal forces in China, instead of external forces from the United States. As argued by Oksen berg, who served on the National Security Council under . will rest primarily on internal Chinese conditions and policy decisions. The outside world can have only a marginal impact on the 75 Perhaps due to the failure of the open door policy, the American government had been suspicious of its ability to use economic instruments In terms of Chinese economic modernization, U.S. officials believed that economic prosperity could only grow from within. When discussing U.S. China trade before China embarked on economic reform, Oksenberg argued that U.S. lea 73 Department of State Bulletin Vol. 79, No. 2024 (March 1979), p. 5. 74 Department of State Bulletin Vol. 80, No. 2034 (January 1980), p. 9. 75 Oksenberg and Oxnam, China and Amer ica: Past and Future p. 11.
88 76 For the American government, a prosperous China would not doubt serve American interests, but whether China would embark on economic reform could only be a consequence of the endogenous process in China. In terms of human rights, the Carter administration beli eved that the best way to influence the Chinese government to improve its human rights policy was to leave human rights issues out of U.S. China negotiations. 77 For U.S. administration officials, only when China was free from U.S. human rights pressure woul d it become confident in improving its human rights 78 From a U.S. perspective human rights progress in China, if any, could only grow from i nside, not from the outside Of course, some members of Congress expressed a hope that U.S. economic ties with China could help human rights progress in China. Representative Charles Vanik was the most vocal proponent of this view, ope that . the extension of MFN to the PRC would stimula te a broadening of human rights. . Seeds of democracy are growing in 79 Indeed, the Carter administration could not grant China MFN until it ensured that China allowed for emigration fre edom. By granting China MFN, some members of Congress believed, Washington could induce Beijing to improve its human rights policy. Deng in the White House on January 30, 1 979, Carter raised the subject of the Jackson Vanik 76 Ibid., p. 67. 77 Madsen, China and the American Dream p. 132. 78 Quoted in Ibid. 79 Quoted in ibid., p. 133.
89 80 At a time when China began its programs of economic reform and opening to the o utside world, permitting its citizens to travel at will was not so much a consequence of U.S. human rights pressure as one of domestic transformation. More importantly, a reforming China seemed to deserve MFN. From the perspective of U.S. administration o fficials, human rights record was not satisfactory, but China merited MFN because its economic reform, if continued, would inevitably contribute to human s had undergone sweeping changes: Mao Zedong had died; the Cultural Revolution had ended; the Gang of Four had been purged; Deng had resumed power; the political climate had been liberalized, compared to that during the Mao years; and, more importantly, ec onomic modernization had been granted priority over ideological contestation since the third plenary session of the eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in December 1978. Due to these positive developments in China, a predominant U.S. discourse about China in the 1980s was that China would someday become American like if it continued economic modernization. In this American euphoria, such elements of the American image as modernism, the free market, economic prosperity, freedom, and eve n democracy would grow from within if China continued economic modernization. In a New York Times article published a few weeks after Tiananmen, Bernstein described, n emerging: that it was becoming a pro Western semi democracy, a place that almost inevitably would, with the passage of time, an increase in contacts and greater prosperity, become ever more relaxed, open and even free. The country had improved so much si nce the Maoist years, 80 Carter, Keeping Faith p. 209.
90 81 According to this liberal discourse about China, economic, sociocultural, and political freedom s were so intimately interconnected as to reinforce each other. In the 1980s, therefore, hope was growing in the United States that China On November 15, 1979, for example, Warren Christopher expressed an optimistic view Chinese Government is determined to develop a legal system that would prevent the unchecked 82 For him, China was gradually de veloping in the direction of liberalization. The liberal discourse about China migh t be traced to U.S. geopolitical interests in China. Because the United States cooperated with China to balance Soviet power, U.S. officials were ready to articulate the li beral discourse in order to morally rationalize the U.S. China strategic alignment. As Madsen criticizes when discussin and within elite circles of American society that China would steadily, inevitably, and naturally 83 The liberal discourse about China was even articulated by some Republicans who had strongly opposed communism before the 198 American conservative community persuaded themselves that China would be the first Communist country to renounce Marxism, embrace capitalism, and possibly even adopt 81 s Felt Threatened and Dreaded New York Times June 27, 1989, p. A6. 82 83 Madsen, China and the American Dream p. 133.
91 84 In particular, Preside nt Rona ld Reagan was the most vocal Republican for the liberal discourse about China. In an interview aboard Air Force One when he was was necessary for us to impo allowing more farmers and workers to keep and sell some of the fruits of their own labor. This first injecti on of free market spirit has already enlivened the Chinese economy. I believe it has For him, the endogenous process of economic reform in China had already prod uced not only economic prosperity but also political liberalization. He thus redefined China as not really 85 For him, a reforming China would become more prosperous and liberal and therefore move toward the Ame rican image. U.S. policy toward China. From Nixon to Carter, the United States had normalized its relations erefore put aside ideological moral justification for dealing with the Chinese leadership, in a way that Nixon did not. His solution was to suggest that its rul 86 called China relations were based not merely on strategic alliance s but also on ideological affiliations in terms of the American image. 84 Harding, A Fragile Relationship p. 17. 85 Washington Post May 2, 1984, A8. 86 Mann, About Face p. 147.
92 In the 1980s, Deng was widely portrayed as a reform minded leader by the American press. The Wall Street Journal for example, praised Deng for modernizing the Chinese economy and lifting millions of Chinese people out of poverty. 87 Time magazine named Deng man of the year for 1985, the second time since 1977. 88 1980s, each important br eakthrough in Chinese economic reform was followed by a new wave of enthusiasm in the American press, and 89 Of course, China experienced some difficulties in the reform process, including rising popular discontents over inflation and corruption and the division within the leadership over economic policy. From a U.S. perspective however, these difficulties were minor and temporary because Deng was the unchallenged author ity who was totally in charge of the country. As Mann 90 Such euphoria, howe ver, would prove to be false in June 1989. In sum, U.S. economic policy toward China in the 1970s and 1980s only emphasized the geopolitical role of China in serving U.S. balancing strategy against Soviet power. Although U.S. officials were also concer development as an endogenous process. U.S. economic policy toward China in the 1970s and 87 Harding, A Fragile Relationship p. 169. 88 89 Ibid., p. 169. 90 Ma nn, About Face p. 174.
93 however, Chinese economic reform allowed U.S. officials to articulate the liberal discourse that with economic reform. Table 3 1 summarizes five cases of U.S. economic policy toward China in the twentieth cent ury. It includes the three cases discussed in this chapter: the open door policy, the China embargo, and U.S. economic policy toward China in the 1970s and 1980s. It also includes the sanctions policy in the early 1990s and the engagement policy after the mid 1990s. These five cases are compared in terms of three dimensions: the forms of economic instruments, the purposes of economic policy, and U.S. policy concerns about China. Seeing the open door policy as a failure, Washington began refraining fr om using Chinese Civil War was at its peak. After the Korean War, Washington even embarked on embargo measures against China and held out no hope for a China that co uld be converted into the American image. After taking a policy of rapprochement with China and normalized U.S. China relations, the American government did view a China whose domestic features fit with the American image as consistent with overall U.S. Co of development as only a consequence of the endogenous process in China, instead of external economic forces from the United States. In particular, the 1980s witnessed the liberal discourse that economic, poli tical, and sociocultural freedoms would come together in China if China continued economic modernization. Only after Tiananmen did the United States become disillusioned with the liberal discourse, believing that the endogenous process in China was not suf ficient to bring China into the American image and that the United States should influence from the outside through economic instruments.
94 After Tiananmen and in the early 1990s, the American government primarily relied on the use a nd threat of economic sanctions to pressure China toward more respect for human rights. Only after economic coercion failed did the American government delink human rights from U.S. China economic cooperation. While the American government had maintained i n the 1980s that human rights progress would be an endogenous process in China, the engagers argued the in discourse, also liberal, emphasized exogeneity, while the liberal discourse prevailing in the 1980s stressed endogeneity. lar, the open door policy and the economic engagement policy are worth comparison. In the first half of the twentieth century, especially during World War II, the United States believed that U.S. economic ties with China could reshape China not only into t he American image but also into a constructive member of the international system that could resist imperialism and contribute to world peace. In this view, a China that fit within the American image and a China as a constructive member of the internationa l community would be mutually supporting. Such a belief was also reflected in the economic engagement policy. By integrating China into the international trading system, U.S. officials believed that China would become not only prosperous and democratic at home but also a constructive strategic partner of America. The economic engagement policy, however, was different from the open door policy in that the contexts against which the two U.S. policies toward China took shape were different. At a time when Ch ina was weak, chaotic, and divided, the open door policy was adopted for a stable, secure, and strong China. By contrast, the economic engagement policy was employed at
95 a t ime of rising Chinese power. Its purpose was to manage the rise of China. The origin of t he policy shift from sanctions to engagement in the 1990s thus merits an explanation, to which I turn in the following four chapters. Table 3 1. American Economic Policies toward China in the Twentieth Century Forms of Economic Tools Purposes of U.S. Economic Statecraft U.S. Policy Concerns about China The Open Door Policy Positive Strategic: U.S. economic interests. Balance of power in China. Moralistic: Saving China into the American image. Foreign policy: A China resisting imperialism and contributing to world peace. Domestic features: A China that fit with the American image (through economic ties). The China Embargo Negative Strategic: Isolating a threatening China. Moralistic: Defending American values. Foreign policy: Ending a ggression in Korea. Domestic features: No hope for a China that fit with the American image. Economic Policy in the 1970s and 1980s Positive Strategic: U.S. geostrategic interests in China. Moralistic: None. Foreign policy: A Cold War ally of Am erica. Domestic features: A China that fit with the American image (without U.S. help). U.S. Sanctions in the early 1990s Negative Strategic: U.S. economic and security interests in China. Moralistic: rights. Foreign policy: Obeying international norms of arms control and trade. Domestic features: A China that fit with the American image (through economic coercion). U.S. Engagement after the mid 1990s Positive Strategic: Managing the rise of China. Moralistic: Promoting rights. Bringing China into the liberal world order. Foreign policy: A constructive strategic partner of America. Domestic features: A China that fit with the American image (through economic engagement).
96 CHAPTER 4 THE TIANANMEN SANCTIO NS Tiananmen triggered a significant change in U.S. foreign policy toward China. It shattered the American euphoria that the endogenous process of Chinese economic reform had the potential to bring China into the American image. Instead, it produced a sen se of disillusionment with China in the United States. After Tiananmen, therefore, critics of China from the outside by using economic instruments, a goal that had bee n missing in U.S. economic policy toward China since the late 1940s. This resulted in the Tiananmen sanctions. Proponents of Sanctions In April 1989, Chinese students began banding together in Beijing and other Chinese cities to demonstrate against the C hinese government. 1 In Washington, U.S. officials had urged both Chinese officials and students to act with restraint. 2 On June 3 when the news that the Chinese government began suppressing the demonstrations by force arrived in Washington, Bush issued a c demonstrators an d the consequent loss of life . I urge a return to non violent means for dealing 3 On the same day, Secretary of State James Bak er, in a TV interview, 1 by Andrew J. Nathan and Perry Link), The Tiananmen Papers (New York: Public Affairs, 2001). 2 Department of State Bulletin Vol. 89, No. 2148 (July 1989), p. 48. 3 Department of State Bulletin Vol. 89, No. 2149 (August 1989), p. 75.
97 twice about possible U.S. response to the Tiananmen crackdown, he declined to say whether the Bush administration would punish China by m eans of economic sanctions. 4 The Tiananmen crackdown, however, was widely broadcast on American television, and therefore negative images of China began to grow significantly in the United States. According to several estimates, while 72 percent of America ns viewed China favorably in February 1989, the figure dramatically dropped to 31 percent in July 1989. Unfavorable views of China also rose from 13 percent to 58 percent in the same period. 5 More importantly, American public opinion began urging the Bush administration to impose economic sanctions against China in retaliation for its human rights violations. In a letter to Bush shortly after the crackdown, for example, Freedom House argued that to punish China suspend economic and military cooperation between Washington and Beijing. 6 Other human rights groups, including Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, also became critical of policy after Tiananmen and urged economic sanctions. 7 Because Chinese political modernization could not grow from within, in their view, the United States should influence the course of political reform in China from the outside and economic sanctions wer e the means. The American outrage over Tiananmen was not without international origins. While the Communist regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe moved toward democratization in 4 Department of State Bulletin Vol. 89, No. 2149 (August 1989), p. 67. 5 See Jaw ling Joanne Chang, United States China Normalization: An Evaluation of Foreign Policy Decision Making (Denver, Colo.: Graduate School of International Stu dies, University of Denver, 1986), p. 126; Harding, A Fragile Relationship p. 372. 6 New York Times June 4, 1989, p. 21. 7 Tao Xie, U.S. China Relations: China Policy on Capitol Hill (New York: Routl edge, 2009), p. 106.
98 the late 1980s, Communist China suppressed the Tiananmen demonstratio ns by force. Such a contrast within the Communist bloc thus raised a sense of frustration with China among those Americans who believed in the superiority and universality of American values, especially at a time when an American victory in the Cold War wo uld soon become clear. Under such an endure, as argued by former U.S. ambassador to China Winston Lord, who left the Bush administration before Tiananmen and then be policy. 8 Because the triumph of American values was inevitable, many Americans believed, the United States should play a role in facilitating the dissolution of Chinese Communism and 9 Even Chinese students who studied in the United States also urged the American government to apply sanctions against China. 10 Of course, prolonging their stays in the United 11 Chinese dissidents who fled China after Tiananmen also urged sanctions against Beijing. 12 Under such a climate, Congress saw an opportunity to wrestle for control of China policy from the hands of the executive branch Before Tiananmen, the legisla tive branch had mostly been willing to give the executive a relatively free hand in formulating and implementing China 8 Foreign Affairs Vol. 68, No. 4 (Fall, 1989), pp. 1 26. 9 The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 10 New York Times June 10, 1989, p. 6; New York Times June 11, 1989, p. 16. 11 In June, Representative Nancy Pelosi introduced the E mergency Chinese Adjustment of Status Facilitation Act of Pelosi bill, see Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen pp. 95 96. 12 New York Times July 13, 1989, p. A8.
99 policy. Although Congress took the lead in passing the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979, 13 both the executive and legislative acknowledged the strategic importance of China to the United States and reached a consensus on developing strategic relations with China. As Lord argued in 1990, consensus on dealin 14 With strategic concerns in mind, therefore, Congress had been relatively silent on human rights policy as had the executive. It ights and began requiring the State Department to submit annual human rights reports on China. buses in two rounds of hearings held in 1982 and 1985. 15 rights abuses and thus sought to seize the initiative on China policy. On June 3, 1989, for example, Senator Je sse Helms (R N.C.), the ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations 16 Known for his anti communist stance, Helms ar gued 13 For the legislative process related to the Taiwan Relations Act, see Harding, A Fragile Relationship pp. 82 87. 14 Favored ic of China: Hearings before the Subcommittees on Human Rights and International Organizations, Asian and Pacific Affairs, and on International Economic Policy and Trade of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred First Congr ess, second session, Rights and International Organizations (Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1990), p. 7. 15 Xie, U.S. China Relations p. 102. 16
100 17 Similarly, Representative Stephen J. Solarz (D N.Y.), chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, ar gued for curtailing political 18 roduced in Congress from 1973 introduced in 1989 alone. 19 Another factor that led Congress to wrestle for control of China policy was partisan politics. During the Bush y ears, Congress was overwhelmingly controlled by the Democratic Party: 259 174 in the House and 55 45 in the Senate during the 101 st Congress of 1989 1991, for example. 20 While the Republican administr ation was reluctant to take toug h action against China, t he Democrat controlled Congress persistently pushed human rights issues to the fore. As Mann administration and know, with certainty, that they had public opinion on their side. If George 21 In sum, partisan politics complicated the executive legislative battle over U.S. policy toward China after Tiananmen. 17 Ibid. 18 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (June 10, 1989), pp. 1411 1414. 19 Xie, U.S. China Relations p. 105. 20 Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen p. 23. 21 Mann, About Face p. 199.
101 Taking office in January 1989, Bush immediately faced the Tiananmen crisis and the resulting domestic pressure for tough sanctions against China. Besides domestic politics, Bush was also concerned about the int democratization swept Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, Bush was afraid that he might signal a green light for the Communist regimes to use force against their domestic opponents if he responded too softly to the Tiananmen crackdown. 22 On June 5, Bush held a news conference, in which he called the Tiananmen suppression a ng the freedom of expression, freedom of the press, 23 He especially mentioned a TV image in which a single student stood ed U.S. weapons sales to and military exchanges with China in retaliation for the role that His sanctions measures put on hold (1) a $500 million deal that would provide upgraded avionics 8 fighter plane; (2) a $28 million program to modernize production facilities in China for large caliber artillery ammunition; (3) a $62 million sale of AN/TPQ 37 artillery locating radars; and (4) a $10 million sale of a Mark 46 su rface ship and two anti submarine torpedoes. He also suspended licenses for U.S. satellites to be launched on Chinese rockets. 24 22 For the international environment Bush faced, see David M. Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S. China Relations, 1989 2000 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), p. 21 For the third wave of demo cratization, see Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). 23 Department of State Bulletin Vol. 89, No. 2149 (August 1989 ), p. 46. 24
102 Despite suspending U.S. China military cooperation, however, Bush was reluctant to extend the sanctions measures to the comme rcial side. Before the conference, he had talked to Nix on, and the former president . but take a look China trade not be suspended. 25 Indeed, at a time of Soviet China rappr 26 cutting off U.S. China economic relations would only push China away from the American side and drive China into Soviet arms. Serving as head of the U.S. Liaison Office in China during 1974 1975, Bush had participated in the negotiations over U.S. China normalization. Therefore, he understood the strategic importance of China to the United States. This is why he had visited China in February 1989, three months before Gorb achev had a chance to improve Soviet China relations. Therefore, Bush argued that preserving normal economic relations between the United States and China was essential to consolidate the U.S. China strategic alignment. As he said, this relationship, and so have they. I still think that it is in the strategic int erest of the United States.... good relationships with China are in the national interest of the 27 Indeed, the previous administrations from Nixon to Reagan ha d viewed U.S. economic policy toward China from a geostrategic perspective and Bush simply followed suit. Fearful that congressional legislative action might hurt U.S. geostrategic interests, Bush emphasized that it was the executive, not the legislative, that had foreign policy initiatives. As he 25 George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Knopf; Distributed by Random House, 1998), p. 98. 26 In the second half of the 1980s, both Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping and Mikhail Gorbachev attempted to improve Soviet China relations. Their efforts came into fruition when Gorbachev visited Beijing in May 1989. 27 Department of State Bulletin Vol. 89, No. 2150 (September 1989), p. 55.
103 28 At a time when Congress wrestled over China policy, the Bush administration opposed congressional legisla tive action, arguing that the executive should have the necessary flexibility to respond to changing situations in China. 29 In his eff orts to defend U.S. geopolitical interests in China, Bush also emphasized that he was a president who understood China we 30 Because of his China experience, he knew a number of senior Chinese leaders personally, including Deng Xiaoping, who called Bush a lao pengyou an old friend of China. Afte r Tiananmen, the president was his own China desk officer and made efforts to save U.S. China relations. 31 In addition to U.S. geopolitical interests in China, Bush also argued that preserving normal economic relations between the two countries was essentia l to the development of human rights, freedom, and even democracy in China. Bush first presented a possible explanation for the Chinese pro democracy movement. While the American government had hardly attached moralistic goals to U.S. China economic relati ons in the 1970s and 1980s and instead argued that Chinese political reform could only grow from within, Bush attributed the pro democracy movement to U.S. happen to believe that t he commercial contacts have led, in essence, to this quest for more 28 29 Department of State Bulletin Vol. 89, No. 2151 (October 1989), p. 28. 30 31 See Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed pp. 86 111.
104 32 budding of democracy which we have seen in recent weeks owes much to the relationship we 33 the endogenous process in China, that had played the primary role in contributing to the societal demands for democracy in China. 34 Bush thus repeatedly emphasized that in the post Tiananmen context, the United States could better influence the course of political reform in China by continuing U.S. China economic ties, instead of imposin continue to work for restraint and for hum an rights and for democracy.... I would like to encourage them to continue their change 35 Conversely, he continued, pulling U.S. economic forces these kids struggling for democracy and freedom, this would be a bad time for the United States to withdraw and pull back and leave them to the devices of a leadersh ip that might decide to 36 He emphasized t would be a tragedy for all if China were to pull back to its pre 37 In his news conferences held in June, Bush defended his China policy based more on moral grounds than on geostrategic grounds. Indeed, given that Congress and the human rights organizations urged economic sanctions to push China toward more respect for human rights, 32 33 Ibid. 34 Also see Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed p. 89. 35 36 Ibid 37 Ibid., p. 46.
105 Bush had to defend his China policy by articulating how he would achiev e the same goal. He repeatedly argued that he was not playing the China card and that preserving U.S. China freedom, and even democracy. Conversely, he emphasized, th e United States would lose its China. 38 ghts rationale marked a partial but important change in U.S. economic policy toward China. Since Nixon, str ategic rationale had dominated U.S. economic policy toward China, and U.S. officials had stressed political modernization in China as an endogenous process. However, Bush began associating human rights progress with U.S. China economic ties, and therefore human rights issues were brought into the equation. What once had been strategic U.S. economic policy toward China now extended to include moralistic purposes. While adm inistration advocated maintaining economic ties for the same purpose. Bush argued that limiting U.S. sanctions to the military side and avoiding harming the 39 For him, there was no contradiction betwe en U.S. China economic relations, on the one hand, and U.S. geostrategic interests and human rights in China, on the other hand, because preserving the former could promote the latter. As Richard L. Williams, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asia n and Pacific Adminis . is a policy which supports a more open Chinese society, 38 Department of State Bulletin Vol. 89, No. 2150 (September 1989), pp. 54 56. 39
106 recognizes the long term value of the U.S. China rela tionship, and strives to keep our vital 40 Compared to U.S. geostrategic interests and human rights in China, the Bush administration paid little emphasis on U.S. economic interests when making efforts to prese rve U.S. China economic relations. When defending Baker argued we say the relationship is important and that we ought to try a nd preserve the relationship, . we are not suggesting that it is important solely on an econom ic basis. It is important economically, 41 As of 1989, th largest trading partner, 42 but U.S. China economic ties were not as close as they would become i n the 1990s when China stepped up economic reform and trade liberalization. The Bush administration thus was more concerned about geostrategic interests than about economic ones. Codification of the Tiananmen Sanctions Congress was not satisfied with Bus Chinese government continued to arrest the demonstrators after June 4. Many members of Congress believed that Washington should intensify and broaden its economic sanctions measures to force China to take a ccount of U.S. human rights concerns. Congress thus pushed forward legislative measures to punish China. On June 6, both chambers of Congress first passed resolutions calling on the administration to consider additional sanctions. The House adopted its res olution (HConRes136) by 406 0, and the Senate passed its counterpart measure (SRes142) by 40 41 Department of State Bulletin Vol. 89, No. 2150 (September 1989), p. 64. 42
107 100 0. 43 On June 8, Jesse Helms also introduced a bill calling on the administration to suspend trade, investment, and other economic ties with China unless China made toward democracy and human rights. 44 Other members of Congress recommended working with American allies to suspend economic aid to China and recalling the American ambassador from Beijing. 45 For the Bush administration, however, congr essional legislation for economic sanctions action, the Bush administration agreed to extend its sanctions measures to the commercial side. On June 20, the White H ouse declared its opposition to financial assistance to China from the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, affecting over $1 billion in new loans. It also suspended all high level governmental exchanges with China, including a planned July visit by Commerce Secretary Robert A. Mosbacher. 46 Due to congressional pressure, the administration announced these new sanctions but it claimed that they violence and reprisals by the Chinese authorities against those who hav 47 As I pointed out in chapter two when discussing the methodological weaknesses of liberal constructivism, actors may adopt new norms for strategic reasons but deceptively claim that they are persuaded and convinced of appropriate b ehavior The Bush administration was no exception. 43 44 Ibid. 45 Bernard Weinraub, New York Times June 6, 1989, p. A1. 46 New York Times June 21, 1989, p. A1. 47 Department of S tate Bulletin Vol. 89, No. 2149 (August 1989), p. 77.
108 Congress, however, was still unmoved by gestures On June 22, members of Congress sought to curtail exports of computers, weapons, satellites, and financing to China by introduc ing amendments to the fiscal 1990 1991 foreign aid authorization bill. 48 Senate Majority Leader George J. Mitchell (D Maine), one of the sponsors for the I urge the President to condemn these [Chinese] actions personally and i 49 On the same day, the House voted 416 to 0 to approve a resolution calling on the Chinese government to stop executing those arrested in what 50 On June 29, the House sought to put into law the sanctions that Bush had imposed against China by voting 418 to 0 in favor of amending the foreign aid authorization bill (H.R. 2655). It also approved new sanctions, including (1) prohibiting the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (O PIC) from writing political risk insurance for American companies doing business in China; (2) suspending previously authorized funds for trade and economic development projects; (3) imposing a ban on Trade Development Program (TDP) activity in China; and (4) applying tighter restrictions on the sale of nuclear technology that had both military and civilian use. 51 Representative Gus Yatron (D Pa.), chairman of the House Foreign o Beijing 48 New York Times June 23, 1989, p. A5. The foreign aid authorization bill was the venue for major executive legislative stru ggles over foreign policy. 49 Ibid. 50 Ibid. 51 Wall Street Journal June 30, 1989, p. A14.
109 that the loss of private capitals, skills and technological know how is the price it must pay for the 52 On July 14, the Senate also adopted an amendment to the foreign aid authorization bill (S1160) by a vote of 81 10. I t called for additional sanctions, including postponement of Export Import Bank financing of U.S. exports to China and opposition to loans to China by the World Bank and other international financial institutions. 53 On November 7, a Senate House conference committee passed a sanctions package that was attached to the final version of the foreign aid authorization bill. The sanctions package was a combination of the amendments passed by the House and the Senate in June and July, respectively. 54 The Bush admin istration, however, opposed tougher sanctions against China. On July 7, just a month after Tiananmen, the administration waived the ban on the sale of four Boeing jets that carried navigation systems capable of being converted to military uses. 55 In early D ecember, the administration publicly sent National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger to Beijing. That was the first official contact shown in public after Tiananmen but a violation of the previously imposed ban on high level contact between the American and Chinese governments. 56 After the Scowcroft Eagleburger mission, Bush, declaring it in U.S. national interests, waived the restrictions on Export Import Bank loans to U.S. companies doing business in China as well as on the export of three communications 52 Ibid. 53 Washington Post July 15, 1989, p. A1. 54 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (November 11, 1989), pp. 3083 3086. 55 New York Times July 8, 1989, p. 1. 56 For the Scowcroft Eagleburger mission, see Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed pp. 174 178.
110 satellites to China. 57 However, each of these conciliatory moves stirred up congressional criticism, and therefore the administration was forced to retreat. On January 9, 1990, Bush announced his opposition t o the resumption of World Bank loans to China after Congress criticized the Scowcroft Eagleburger mission. 58 Because Congress had overwhelmingly pushed forward with legislating economic sanctions against China, Bush had no room for presidential v etoes and therefore signed the foreign aid authorization bill (H.R. 3792) on February 16, 1990. In his statement, Bush repeated mandated sanctions represent an u 59 But Bush had no choice but to accept the congressionally imposed sanctions package. At his insistence, and after five months of bitter negotiations between the White House and Congr ess, the law stipulated that Bush could lift any or all of the sanctions if he determined that doing so would serve U.S. nationa l interests, or by reporting t o Congress that China had made progress toward 60 Within nine months after Tianan men, the Tiananmen sanctions were put into law. The Chinese government, however, was reluctant to improve its human rights policy under U.S. pressure. According to an estimate, between 1,500 and 2,000 individuals were arrested after the June 4 crackdown an 10,000 and 15,000 were arrested and tried for disturbing the social order. About 300 people were 57 New York Times December 20, 1989, p. 1. 58 Washington Post January 10, 1990, p. A12. 59 Weekly Compil ation of Presidential Documents Vol. 26, No. 7 (February 19, 1990), p. 268. 60 Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams p. 23; Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed p. 158.
111 executed for attempting to overthrow the Chinese government, and thousands more were sent to labor refor m camps. 61 As early as three weeks after the Tiananmen crackdown, Bush had secretly sent Scowcroft and Eagleburger to China. When meeting with Deng, these two U.S. secret envoys said that while Bush acknowledged the strategic importance of U.S. China rela tions, Congress had urged him to broaden economic sanctions against China. They thus urged Deng to stop post Tiananmen crackdowns and grant amnesty for some people arrested at Tiananmen. If China accepted these U.S. requests, they told Deng, the Bush admin istration could persuade Congress to lift the sanctions measures imposed after June 5. Deng, however, accused the American government and media of siding with those who were trying to overthrow the Chinese me that the clash of cultures had created a wide divide between us. The resentment by the We were interested in fr 62 Tiananmen response, kick foreigners out and punish the demonstrators. 63 To be sure, China did ease its post Tiananmen crackdo wns in the face of U.S. sanctions pressure. On January 10, 1990, for example, China lifted martial law that had been put into effect since May 20, 1989. It also allowed the dissident Fang Lizhi to leave the country from the U.S. embassy in Beijing, 64 releas ed 500 political prisoners, and allowed Voice of America reporters to 61 Quoted in Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen p. 90. 62 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Tr ansformed p. 110. 63 Quoted in Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen p. 69. 64 After the Tiananmen crackdown, Fang took refuge in the U.S. embassy in Beijing until June 1990.
112 return to China. 65 From a U.S. perspective however, these Chinese concessions were too small to count as real improvements in human rights. Security forces were still heavily present in many Chinese cities, and post Tiananmen arrests, trials, and executions still continued. Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 7, 1990, Eagleburger admitted that not enough had been done by China in improving its human rights record. 66 The Chinese leaders were hostile toward Western countries, especially the United States. those Chinese leaders who had supported opening China to th e outside world were on the defensive relative to Chinese conservatives. To complicate matters further, the dramatic worry about deliberate Western efforts to ove rthrow the Chinese Communist regime through circumstances, it was not surprising that the Chinese leadership refused to kowtow to U.S. human rights pressure In sum, a normative contestation between human rights and free trade occurred shortly after Tiananmen. On the one hand, American public opinion became critical of China for its human rights violations. Taking advantage of American public opinion, Cong ress pushed human rights to th e fore for political reasons. First, Congress seized the initiative on China policy and pressured the executive to broaden sanctions against China. Second, a Democrat controlled Congress was willing to embarrass the Republican administration by accusing it of being too soft 65 See Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen p. 102. 66 Washington Post February 8, 1990, p. A17.
113 on China. E xecutive legislative and partisan politics th us combined to be the domestic political backgrounds against which Congress raised human rights banners after Tiananmen. On the other hand, Bush stood on the geopolitical grounds that had been established since Nixon and attempted to preserve U.S. China economic relations. Because the issue at stake was human rights, his rhetorical strategy was to attach moralistic goals to a U.S. foreign economic polic y that had previously only emphasized U.S. geostrategic interests in China. His rhetoric stressed that preserving U.S. China economic relations was essential to human rights progress in China. From Tiananmen onward, therefore, U.S. economic policy toward C hina began carrying human rights purposes. Finally, s trategic interactions determined the outcome of the normative contestation. Because Congress was unified enough to leave Bush no room for presidential vetoes, the president had no choice but to accept C sanctions into law
114 CHAPTER 5 THE MFN DEBATE This chapter discusses the MFN debate during 1990 1992. In the post Tiananmen context, Washington egarding arms MFN status on these three issue areas. Bush, by contrast, attempted to narrow sanctions against China in 1989. His rhetorical strategy was to argue that MFN based free trade could transform China into a nation that was prosperous and therefore democratic at home as well as ab iding by international norms of arms control and trade abroad. With Senate support, he succeeded in sustaining his vetoes of two conditional MFN bills, even though he had previously codified the Tiananmen sanctions based on human rights. Such a strategic c o constitution brought free trade norms to triumph during the MFN debate of 1990 1992. Arms Control and Trade The section discusses the backgrounds against which U.S. China disputes over arms control and trade emerged in the early 1990s. I discuss China restrictive trade policy in sequence. Arms Control In fact, China had proliferated weapons abroad since its founding in 1949. In the late 1970s, China began its programs of economic reform and opening to the outside world and therefore needed U.S. technologies to improve its nuclear power infrastructure and other economic modernization programs. This provided Washington with a means of leverage to
115 negotiate arms control with China. In the following years, Washington w arms control policy by permitting or suspending high technology exports to China. 1 U.S. China disputes over arms control first emerged in the mid 1980s when China was accused of supplying Iran with so les. In mid October 1987, Iran launched Silkworm missiles three times and struck several U.S. flagged tankers in the Persian Gulf. In response, the Senate voted to ask the Reagan administration to review $528 million worth of U.S. military technology trans fer to China. Senator Frank H. Murkowski (R Alaska) missiles to Iran may seriously jeopardize U.S. 2 On October 22, therefore, the American go vernment for the first time imposed sanctions against China for its proliferation activities, which suspended the sale of high technology items to China. After several rounds of talks between Washington and Beijing, Chinese officials promised that they wou ld take strict measures to stop silkworm sales to Iran, and therefore the Reagan administration lifted the sanctions in March 1988. 3 Since the mid 1980s, the American government had also attempted to integrate China into international nonproliferation reg imes. By the early 1990s, China had been members of several multilateral nonproliferation regimes, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (1984), the Biological Weapons Convention (1984), the Limited Test Ban (1986), the Treaty on the Non Prolife ration of Nuclear Weapons (1992), and the Chemical Weapons Convention 1 eration Policies and Practices, 1980 2004 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2007), pp. 30 36. 2 Washington Post October 23, 1987, p. A32. 3 Medeiros, Reluctant Rest raint p. 103. Also see Dianne E. Rennack, China: U.S. Economic Sanctions (CRS Report for Congress, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, October 1, 1997), p. 15.
116 (1993). Beijing also agreed to the original guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 1991. 4 The American government, however, was still skeptical about these Chines e nonproliferation commitments because its intelligence agencies continued to detect evidence that China had exported nuclear weapons and missile technologies to such states as Iran, Pakistan, Syria, and Algeria. Although compliance with the norms of arms control would allow China to acquire U.S. technologies needed for its economic modernization programs, two factors complicated the management of arms exports in China. First, at a time of economic reform, the Chinese government cut off military spending an therefore many PLA enterprises became involved in the arms export business to compensate for the sharp declines in government spending. Second, family members of senior Chinese leaders held key positions in th e defense industry. These two factors combined to diminish the Chinese 5 In 1991, it was reported that China had sold two ballistic missile systems the M 9 (600 kilometer range) and the M 11 (290 kilometer rang e) to Syria, Libya, Iran, and Pakistan. Under the authority of the 1990 Missile Control Act, which punished countries that exported MTCR controlled items to non MTCR members, the Bush administration announced a sanctions package on May 27 that suspended th Chinese companies involved in the exports of M 9 and M 11 missile technologies. It also banned high technology computer sales to China and blocked U.S. companies from participating in 4 See Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams p. 83. 5 See Medeiros, Reluctant Restra int
117 future satellite la unches with China. These sanctions measures affected 20 licenses pending for sales worth $30 million. 6 For the United States, however, s uspending h igh technology exports to China involved a trade off between security and economic objectives. On the one han d, high technology exports to China could help China modernize its military infrastructure. Even civilian technology exports to China would be detrimental to U.S. security interests because such civilian technologies as satellites and supercomputers could be converted for military uses. For security reasons, Washington should limit high technology exports to China, especially when it acquired evidence of Chinese proliferation activities. On the other hand, pulling the plug on the lucrative high technology e xports to China would stir up opposition from American high technology industries because such a move would deprive them of business opportunities in China. To avoid harming American high technology industries, the executive branch tended to waiver export controls on satellite export licenses after Tiananmen. However, allowing high technology exports to China, mitments were incredible, would expose the executive to charges from Congress that commerce took precedence over national security in dealing with China. 7 In November, Bush sent Baker to Beijing, and that was the highest ranking American mission to visit C such issues as arms control, human rights, and trade. On the arms control front, the Chinese said 6 U.S. Department of State Dispatch Vol. 2, No. 25 (June 24, 1991), p. 456. 7 For the economics security trade off in U.S. arms export policy toward China, see Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams p p. 90 97.
118 ited States agreed to remove the sanctions measures announced in May. China also promised that it would accede to the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1992. In exchange, the Bush administration lifted the sanctions in March 1992. 8 These Chines e nonproliferation commitments, however, were ambiguous. First, the MTCR only had two parts guidelines and annex, but China did not explain what it meant by 9 memoir as though [Chinese Foreign Minister] Qian Qichen [was] tactfully acknowledging the possibility that some 10 Third, while Baker fer of both M 9 and M 11 missiles, China claimed that its MTCR commitments did not apply to the shorter range M 11 technology that was not covered by the MTCR. 11 In the early 1990s, U.S. intelligence also detected other proliferation activities made by China. In 1991, for example, U.S. satellites detected evidence that China was assisting Algeria in constructing a nuclear reactor. This nuclear deal with Algeria was a violation of the 8 U.S. Department of State Dispatch Vol. 3, No. 10 (March 9, 1992), p. 189. 9 Medeiros, Reluctant Restraint p. 116. 10 James A. Baker III, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, a nd Peace, 1989 1992 (New York: G.P. Putnam, 1995), p. 594. 11 See Medeiros, Reluctant Restraint p. 118. The MTCR regime aimed to prevent the proliferation of missile technologies capable of reaching a range of at least 300 kilometers with a payload of at least 500 kilograms. Because the M 11 was only 290 kilometers in range, China viewed it as not subject to MTCR guidelines.
119 commitments that China had made when joining the International Atomi c Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1984. Similarly, it was reported that China agreed to provide Iran with (1) a machine that could separate isotopes using magnetic forces in 1991; (2) a 20 megawater research reactor in 1992; and (3) two 300 megawater power reactor s in 1993. In the early 1990s, China was also suspected of supplying Pakistan with nuclear materials. 12 In the early 1990s, therefore, the American government received no unequivocal promises from China of observing the international norms of arms control. Among all of the reported Chinese proliferation activities, only the exports of M 9 and M 11 missile technologies in 1991 received U.S. sanctions. In other cases, the American government took no steps in imposing sanctions against China. Under the already imposed sanctions after Tiananmen, any The U.S. China disputes over arms control, therefore, were far from resolved and continued into the Clinton era. Bilate ral Trade In addition to human rights and arms control, trade imbalance became a contentious issue complicating the relationship between Washington and Beijing in the early 1990s. As Table 1 2 (in chapter 1) shows, U.S. trade imbalance with China began to occur in 1986, with a figure of only $0.5 billion. However, it dramatically increased to $22.9 billion in 1993, exceeded only by U.S. deficits with Japan. During the same period, the growth of U.S. exports to China was modest, only increasing from $4.7 bil lion to $10.6 billion. Chinese exports to the United States, by contrast, escalated significantly from $5.2 b illion to $33.5 billion In general, total bilateral trade increased from $10 billion to $44.1 billion in the same period due to tremendous Chinese 12 For all these proliferation activities, see ibid. Also, U.S. officials in 1988 had discovered that China had secretly sold medi um range Dong Feng 3 (2,650 kilometers) missiles to Saudi Arabia.
120 exports to the United States. This thus created a condition of asymmetrical interdependence between the United States and China: total bilateral trade only accounted for 1.6 to 4.1 percent of total U.S. trade, while comprising 13.3 to 22.6 percent of tota l Chinese trade. From a U.S. perspective U.S. trade deficits with China skyrocketed because China had conducted unfair trade practices, including pirating of U.S. software designs and other intellectual property rights (IPR), protection of its dome stic markets through tariff and nontariff barriers to U.S. goods, exports of products made by prison labor, and disguising the origin of goods made in China by shipping them through Hong Kong and other non Chinese ports. 13 These Chinese unfair trade practic es, Washington contended had violated the international norms of trade and put U.S. businesses in a disadvantageous position. In terms of market access, Washington believed that China had been embracing the mercantilist, restrictive trade policy that othe r East Asian export oriented countries h ad adopted to limit U.S. access to their domestic markets. In terms of IPR, software, compact discs, and videos reached $1 billion annually. 14 Accor ding to U.S. Assistant 15 To address unfair trade practices and U.S. China trade imbalance, the American government did not hesitate in using ne gative forms of trade policies toward China. 16 At a time 13 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (July 27, 1991), pp. 2053 2056. 14 The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative U.S. Department of State Dispatch Vol. 6, No. 2 (January 9, 1995), p. 22. 15 China Trade Clash Growing, Product Piracy Issue Has Washington Poised to Washington Post December 28, 1991, p. D01. 16 According to the economic sanctions literature, the use or threat of negative economic instruments for economic purposes sought in trade, financial tax, and commercial negotiations be tween states is usually not categorized as
121 join the GATT/WTO was a lever that the American government could use to force China to accept the internati onal norms of trade. 17 The American government first launched its economic threats against China on April 26, 1991, when the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) named China a Trade and Competitiveness Act of IPR China was 18 On November 26, USTR Carla Hills announced that her ne gotiations with China over IPR was unsatisfactory and that she would impose trade sanctions worth of $1.5 billion on Chinese imports if China did not agree to solve IPR piracy by January 1992. In retaliation, China publicized its own list of American produ cts subject to punitive tariffs. When a U.S. China trade war looked inevitable, however, China made concessions on the eve of the deadline, and therefore both sides reached the U.S. China Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Intellectual Property Rights on January 17. In the MOU, China agreed to promote IPR legislation and to join the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literacy and Artistic Works. Some American industry analysts viewed the of IPR protection. 19 The Bush administration also sought to address market access issues with China. In late 1991, under the authority of the 1974 Trade Act, the Bush administration initiated a section 301 economic sanctions. In other words, economic sanctions are deployed for political rather than economic purposes. See, for example, Hufbauer, Schott, Elliot, and Oegg, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered p. 3. 17 Edwa New York Times July 24, 1994, p. 14. 18 Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen p. 120. 19 For the IPR case, see ibid., p. 132; Devereaux, Lawrence, and Watkins, Case Studies in US Trade Negotiation, p. 25 New York Times November 28, 1991, p. D10.
122 case against China over unfair trading practices t hat had adversely affected U.S. exports to rules. In August 1992, the Bush administration threatened to impose punitive tariffs of 100 percent on $3.9 billi on worth of Chinese goods if China did not agree to remove trade restrictions by October. In retaliation, China threatened to place tariffs on American goods worth $3.9 billion. On the eve of the deadline, however, both sides finally reached the U.S. China Memorandum of Understanding on Market Access. In the MOU, China pledged to remove a broad range of trade barriers to American goods over the next five years, and the Bush administration U.S. officials said that the MOU was a major step toward transforming China toward adopting fair and open trade rules. 20 On August 7, 1992, the American and Chinese government also signed the U.S. China Memorandum of Understanding on Prohibiting the Impo rt and Export of Chinese Prison Labor Products. The MOU, which had both human rights and trade implications, provided for prompt investigation of suspected violations of the laws of each side relating to prison labor products. 21 Despite these three bilatera l MOUs, however, the Bush administration failed to narrow U.S. trade deficits with China. From a U.S. perspective China did not make significant efforts to enforce IPR protection open its markets to foreign products and prohibit the export of prison lab or products. The administration thus came under heavy criticism from Congress and labor 20 For the market access case, see Devereaux, Lawrence, and Watkins, Case Studies in US Trade Negotiation, p. 255; Steven Greenhouse New York Times New York Times October 11, 1992, p. 7. 21 rohibiting the Import and Export of Chinese Prison Labor Products, Arnold Kanter, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Statement at the Signing of the Chinese Prison Labor Memorandum of U.S. Department of S tate Dispatch Vol. 3, No. 33 (August 17, 1992), p. 660.
123 organizations, especially at a time when the American economy was in a recession in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In the early 1990s, debate began to emerge in U.S. domestic politics. The Carter administration granted China MFN treatment in 1980, and the executive had to notify MFN for MFN had been renewed for another year. After 1990, therefore, Congress began pressuring the Bush administration to revoke or condition introduced by Congress from 1973 to 1988, the period of 1989 1993 witnessed 42 such bills. 22 To complicate matters further, the geostrategic backg round against which Washington mentioned in chapter 3, strategic concerns underlay the U.S. policy of extending MFN for China in the 1980s. The end of the Cold War, however, eroded the strategic alignment between the United States and China, and therefore other issues like human rights, arms control, and trade be tough on witho ut worrying about the consequence of losing the China card. Senator Harris Wofford (D 23 22 Xie, U.S. China Relations p. 109. 23 of U.S. Most Favored Nation Treatment to Ch
124 Another factor giving rise to the MFN debate was that the critics of China attempted to China had run widening trade surpluses with the United States s ince 1986, and it was more dependent upon U.S. China trade than Washington was. Such asymmetrical interdependence created a condition that made the interruption of U.S. China economic relations of serious S. tariffs on Chinese products would increase by tenfold, rendering Chinese products more expensive and less competitive in the American market. The 6 percent tariff on Chinese apparel and footwear, for example, would jump to 60 percent and 35 percent, res pectively. 24 The c ritics of China thus attempted to threaten China with a loss of MFN in hopes that China would feel pressures and therefore change its behavior in line with U.S. preferences. ea was embraced by such members of Congress as Nancy Pelosi (D Calif.), Don J. Pease (D Ohio) and Gerald B. H. Solomon (R NY ). In October 1990, Solomon proposed a resolution that requested an outright on ly by a vote of 247 174, short of the two thirds majority for overriding a presidential veto. 25 As a result, a compromise soon emerged and gained support: China could be granted MFN treatment for a nother year but had to meet a series of conditions for futur e renewals. As Pelosi put it, conditional MFN could not only 24 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (June 9, 1990), p. 1775. 25 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (October 20, 1990), p. 3 490.
125 Congress who might be afraid of the consequences of outright revocation, but who wanted to do someth 26 Despite such a compromise from outright revocation to conditional MFN, however, According to the Jackson Vanik Amendment, emigration freedom was the only condition for MFN treatment. However, Congress adopted a broader interpretation of the law to include general human rights conditions. On October 18, 1990, the House voted 384 to 30 in favor of a bill proposed by Pease. According to the Pease bill (H.R. 4939), the administration could not rights; terminating mar tial law (including in Tibet); easing restrictions on freedom of the press and on broadcasts by Voice of America; terminating harassment of Chinese citizens in the United States; removing obstacles to study and travel abroad for students and other citizens ; taking appropriate action to observe internationally recognized human rights, including an end to religious persecution there and in Tibet; and adhering to the Joint Declaration on Hong Kong that was entered into between the United Kingdom and it in 1984 27 In the Pease bill, the conditions required by the Jackson Vanik Amendment. However, the bill expired when the Senate adjourned before acting on it. 28 From 1991 onward, C proliferation activities and restrictive trade policy added fuel to the fire. Congress thus further 26 Quoted in Xie, U.S. China Relations p. 112. 27 Quoted in Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen p. 109. 28 Ibid.
126 broadened MFN conditionality to include arms control and trade, a step that moved beyond the legal requirement of the Jackson Vanik Amendment. First, although the Bush administration imposed economic sanctions against China in May 1991 for its proliferation activities, many members of Congress complained that the scope of the sanctions was only limited to the military side and not able to force China to play by the international norms of arms control. They thus performance. The most outspoken proponent of this MF N nonproliferation linkage was Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr. ( D Del ) chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee. In 1991 when U.S. satellites detected evidence that China was constructing a nuclear reactor in Algeria, Biden China is rapidly becoming a rogue elephant among the community of retaliate with a clear and unequivocal message that they will understand, that is, denying China 29 For him, nonproliferation should be added to the list of practices. Senator Mitchell, for example, prop China to (1) p Chinese market, (3) re duce its trade deficits with the United States by buying more U.S. goods and services, and (4) stop exporting its products via third party ports. 30 For him, Washington could better address U.S. China trade imbalance by means of conditional MFN legislation. 29 Washington Post Apr 20, 1991, p. A17. 30 For the Mitchell bill, see C
127 Linking trade to MFN received widespread support from U.S. industries and labor organizations that suffered from the inflows of cheap Chinese products, such as textiles, toys, sporting goods, electrical appliances, and footwear. For them, the United State s should protect its domestic market s from Chinese products through the MFN weapon. 31 With arms control and trade being added to the condition list that had contained human rights, the MFN debate began to revolve around how the United States should use th e MFN arms control, and trade altogether. For members of Congress who advocated conditional MFN, the United States could better address these three concerns by lin his 1991 Washington Post article, Mitchell argued: people or the people of Tibet reflect even the most minimal respect for basic human rights. The Ch inese government has not honored commitments it made to act responsibly in controlling the proliferation of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons technologies. China has not become a better, fairer or more open trading partner. American interests, as we ll as American ideals, are served by a peaceful world with open trade. But even in this respect, the actions of the Chinese government have not earned favored trade treatment. 32 In mid 1991, members of Congress began to move forward with conditions of human rights, arms control, and trade. While a Solomon sponsored resolution calling for outright revocation of MFN bill on May 2 (H.R. 2212, later known as the United Stat es China Act of 1991). The bill nally recognized human rights, . is engaging in unfair trade practic es against the United States . has not 31 Favored Nation 32 Washingt on Post June 04, 1991, p. A23.
128 demonstrated its willingness and intention to participate as a full and responsible party in good 33 The bill prohibited Bush China ha altogether. On July 10, the bill passed the House by a vote of 313 112, well above the two thirds majority needed to override a president veto. On November 26, the House approve d a conference report on the bill by an overwhelming vote of 409 21. On February 25, 1992, the Senate adopted the conference report by a vote of 59 39, but short of the two thirds majority needed to override a presidential veto. 34 On May 16, 1991, Mitchell also introduced a similar bill to the Senate. It passed the Senate on July 23, but only by a margin of 55 44, short of the two thirds majority. 35 In June (H.R. 5318) Unlike the previous conditional MFN bills, the Pelosi Pease bill only denied Chinese state owned companies MFN in order to garner more congressional support. The bill passed t he House on July 21 by a vote of 339 62 and the Senate on September 14 by voice vote. 36 these conditional MFN bills. It was human rights conditions that gave the MFN de bate much of 33 Quoted in Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen p. 119. 34 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (June 6, 1992), p. 1594. 35 36 See David S. Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report Profile Veto Bait; Abortion, China Trade Washi ngton Post September 15, 1992, p. A09.
129 repeatedly reminded the congressional China critics of the 4 June massacre. It was on moral grounds that the congressional China critics sought to at quo in China is the only moral thing to do. . With all due respect, he is mistaken. There is nothing moral in upholding 37 38 Similarly, Senator Dennis DeConcini (D Ariz.) nt most favored nation s tatus. . 39 For members of MFN as a means of leverage to coerce China toward more respect for human rights. Since Tiananmen, Congress had pushed human rights to the frontlines. However, underlying the Tiananmen sanctions. Shortly after Tiananmen, human rights became of central concern to Congress. In the MFN debate, by contrast, Congress incorporated issues of arms control and trade into its human rights claims in a way that emphasized the positive spill over arms control and trade. As genuine new world order, based on respect for human rights, without which our world will not 37 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (June 8, 1991), pp. 1512 1514. 38 Washington Post May 28, 1991, p. A01. 39 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (May 26, 1990), p. 1686.
130 40 Indeed, the Tiananmen suppression had produced so activities and restrictive trade policy as natural consequences of the authoritarian nature of the Chinese C ommunist regime. For members of Congress who advocated conditional MFN, China would abide by nonproliferation principles and follow fair trade prac tices as long as China became humane and even democratic Although human rights, arms control, and trade were put over the other two issue areas. Human rights conditionality received widespread support from well established human rights organizations, including Amnesty International, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Human Rights Watch Asia, and the Campaign for Tibet. Washington director of Human against China, including 41 For these human rights groups, the MFN weapon should be used to pressure China toward improving its human rights policy. Having criticized the December 1989 Scowcroft 42 Lord also supp orted conditional MFN. In May 1990, he testified before Congress and argued that Bush administration granted them MFN unconditionally. 43 40 41 Favored Nation Status for China: Senate Testimony by Max Baucus, Morton Bahr, Holly J. China Cross Talk: The American Debate over China Policy since Normalization: A Reader (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), p. 127. 42 Washington Post December 19, 1989, p. A23. 43 Favored
131 Chinese dissidents and students who stayed in the United States also joined the fray. As mentioned above, they had urged the Bush administration to impose sanctions against China shortly after Tiananmen. When the MFN debate raged, they also supported conditional MFN for Chi na. Zhao Haiqing, chair of the National Committee on Chinese Student Affairs, which represented around 40,000 Chinese students and scholars in the United States, argued that their 44 In the early 1990s, Chinese student groups actively joined forces with the congressional China critics. In June 1991, for example, Zhao and other Chinese students testified before Congress, arguing t hat China would only improve its human rights record under pressure from the United States and other countries in the West. They Chinese political prisoners and the adoption of freedom of the press and expression. 45 Similarly, Fang Lizhi, coming to the United States after leaving the U.S. embassy in urages the Chinese hard 46 For him, China would be under no pressure to improve human rights if it continued to enjoy MFN without conditions. Although the end of the Cold War had rendered the Chi na card irrelevant, Bush was still concerned about U.S. security interests in China. At a time when Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 44 Washington Post May 28, 1991, p. A05. 45 Was hington Post June 05, 1991, p. A27. 46
132 that authorized the use of force Washington to resolve the conflict in Cambodia and relax tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Moreover, China played a role in influencing the peace and stability of the Asian Pacific region and eve n the entire world. 47 With security concerns in mind, therefore, Bush took the lead in attaching any conditions. c. While he had resisted the Tiananmen sanctions primarily for geostrategic reasons, economics began to enter into the economic confrontation between Washington and Beijing, he emphasized its negative consequences on the American economy, such as businesses (including aircraft and aerospace equipment, grain, industrial machinery, steel products, chemicals, fertilizers, and computers), the loss of American jobs contributing to U.S. exports to China, and higher prices American consumers would have to pay for Chinese products. 48 To counter the congressional action for conditional MFN, the Bush administration began er interpretation of MFN conditionality and the Jackson Vanik 47 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Do cuments Vol. 27, No. 22 (June 3, 1991), pp. 675 676. 48 U.S. Department of State Dispatch Vol. Favored Nation Status to Chin, Whit e House Statement, U.S. Department of State Dispatch Vol. 3, No. 23 (June 8, 1992), pp. 452 Statement bef ore the Subcommittee on Trade of the House Ways and Means Committee, Washington, DC, June 29, U.S. Department of State Dispatch Vol. 3, No. 27 (July 6, 1992), pp. 551 554.
133 49 Similarly, Richard H. Solomon, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, explained MFN in a House he term rather than discriminatory tariffs will apply to bilateral trade. It does not mean that the country 50 Because MFN was not a special favor, he argued, 51 The Bush administration emphasized that even countries such as Iraq, Cuba, and Libya r etained MFN status, despite U.S. economic embargoes against them. 52 For the Bush administration, if conditionality was needed for MFN renewals, that would emigration, 53 For Bush, China would deserve MFN as long as it met the improvements in emigration required by the Jackson Vanik Amendment, and therefore there was no basis for conditioning Chin [Jackson 54 49 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (May 26, 1990), pp. 1684 1685. 50 Favored China Cross Talk p. 120. 51 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (May 26, 1990), p. 1639. 52 53 54
134 the Bush administration even attempted to narrow the t erms of the law. As Bush once murmured 55 Besides d ebating with Congress the legal terms of MFN conditionality and the Jackson Vanik Amendment Bush proceeded to emphasize the positive spill over effects of MFN base d May 27, 1991, he delivered a speech at Yale University in which he comprehensively outlined his China policy. Because human rights issues were central to condi tional MFN legislation relative to the issues of arms control and trade, Bush based his MFN policy on moral grounds, as he had when making efforts to preserve U.S. China normal commercial re lations in 1989. Compared to in 1989, he now developed a more comp lete discourse of morality by articulating what morality meant with regard to the MFN issue. Responding to such members of Congress as itself by dealing with na tions less moral, less just. But this counsel offers up self righteousness 56 For Bush, revoking or l What morality meant, Bush argued was to continue MFN based free trade as a positive way to encourage the pace of to renew MFN and remain engaged in 57 In the debate over U.S. moralistic missions to influence Chinese political reform, Bush repeatedly 55 Mann, About Face p. 107. 56 57 Ibid., p. 676.
135 emphasized that human rights, freedom, and even democracy in China could be better advanced by preser ving MFN to export the ideals of fr eedom and democracy to China. . It is wrong to isolate China if we 58 How could trade advance Chinese political r eform? In the Yale speech, Bush developed a more complete explanation than what he had argued in 1989 The causal mechanisms linking trade to political reform, Bush argued, were economic reform and prosperity He first explained t he course of development i n East Asia, Today, this dynamic region plays an important role in the world economy. As it has grown more prosperous, it has also grown more free. Driven forward by the engine of economic growth and trade, especially with the U.S., South Korea and Taiwa n have shed their once authoritarian rule in favor of democracy and freer trade. 59 In his speech, Bush emphasized that open trade with the United States had brought about democratization in such East Asian countries as Taiwan and South Korea by encouraging the development of the private sector that had resisted bureaucratic authoritarianism. Such a model, he argued, could also apply to China. As he said, Critics who attack MFN today act as if the point is to punish China, as if hurting somehow help the cause of privatization and human rights. The real point is to pursue a policy that has the best chance of changing Chinese behavior. If we withdrew MFN or imposed conditions that would make trade impossible, we would punish South China, in particular, Guangdong Province, the very region where free market reform and the challenge to central authority are the and proving that privatization can work all in South Chi na. Withdraw MFN and their jobs would be in jeopardy. 60 58 Ibid. 59 Ibid., p. 675. 60 Ibid., 676.
136 Bush emphasized that re voking MFN would destroy the thriving, market oriented segment of the Chinese economy a segment which would serve as the engine not only for but also for political reform. He thus argued that continuing and development in those areas of China that were most open to the West. 61 By emphasizing economic prosp erity, Bush attached another moralistic goal, in addition to human rights, to U.S. economic policy toward post Tiananmen China. At a time when Deng was still struggling for power against Chinese conservatives who opposed economic reform and opening to the outside world, Chinese economic reform was not as irreversible as the United States had thought it was in the 1980s, and therefore Bush emphasized that it was crucial for the elopment toward economic reform and modernization. When China became prosperous, Bush argued, political reform would be more likely to ensue. While the United States had viewed Chinese economic reform as an endogenous process in the 1970s and 1980s, Bush e mphasized that the United States should influence the course of Chinese economic reform from the outside through the use of economic engagement. In 1989, Bush had also emphasized the importance of U.S. China commercial ties to U.S. geostrategic interests. In the post Cold War era, however, Bush did not mention the relationship between MFN and U.S. geostrategic interests when defending his MFN policy. Instead, at a time to these two issue areas, as did Pe losi, Pease, and Mitchell Unlike these congressional China 61 xtends Most Favored Nation Status to Chin, White House Statement, Letter to Congress, Report to
137 control and trade by continuing, instead of revoking or conditionin MFN could enable the United States to engage China on a broad range of issues including human rights, arms control, and trade. aimed to address such issues as human rights, nonproliferation, and trade altogether. That was the background against which Bush sent Baker to Beijing in November 1991, the highest ranking American mission to visit China after Tiananmen. targeting specific areas of concern with the appropriate policy instruments to produce the 62 give China sufficient incentives to stay engaged on issues of arms contr ol and trade. For Bush, U.S. policy instruments that sought to address the issues of arms control and trade would be able to extract cooperation from China as long as China continued to have economic stakes in U.S. control and trade. Just as Congress incorporated the issues of arms control and trade into its human rights claim s, so too Bush incorporated the two issues into his free trade claims. Both sides changed the content of their respective normative claims when contexts changed. However, while Congress emphasized the positive spill over effects of democratic governance on regarding arms control and trade, Bush argued that MFN based free trade would create incentives for China to improve its policy on human rights, arms control, and trade altogether. As ntrolling the spread of weapons of mass 62
138 ll be weakened ties to the West and further repression. The end 63 Bush also pointed out that through various policy instruments other than conditional MFN, his administration had received cooperative behavior from China on human rights, arms control, and trade altogether. In terms of human rights, China had taken some steps that responded to U.S. human rights concerns. On May 1, 1990, Beijing lifted martial law in Tibet and restored U.S. c onsular access there; on May 11, it released 211 Tiananmen prisoners and, for the first time, provided their names in order to boost the prospects for MFN renewal; 64 and it released another 97 prisoners after Bush announced his MFN renewal on June 3. 65 In te rms of arms control, China had promised to observe MTCR guidelines and accede to the NPT. In October 1992, China cancelled the sale of a 20 megawatt reactor to Iran after Bush vetoed a bill 8. 66 In addition, China did not vote against a United Nations Security Council resolution that authorized the use of force against Iraq. 67 In terms of the trade imbalance, China had signed the MOUs on IPR, market access, and anti prison labor with the United States. These Chinese cooperative actions, Bush 63 Ibid. 64 65 Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen pp. 109 110. 66 Medeiros, Reluctant Restraint p. 62. 67 In fact, China abstained on the vote.
139 68 Bush thus repeatedly emphasized that China would not cooperate with the United States on human rights, arms c ontrol, and trade if it were deprived of MFN. improved human rights conditions U.S., and it has not made China a more responsible world citizen with respect to arms 69 However, Bush insisted that continuing MFN without imposing conditions would provide the best instrument for correcting China and promoting U.S. interests 70 with China through MFN. In 1990 2, he vetoed two congressional bills (H.R. 2212 and H.R. 5318) that attached conditions of human 71 To avoid congressional overriding of his vetoes, he primarily sought support from the Senate because the House had voted overwhelmingly in favor of conditional MFN. Even the majority of House Republicans voted for conditional MFN: by a vote of 151 14 in approving H.R. 2212, for example. 72 Although the Senate had passed the two conditional MFN bills, it fell short o f the necessary two thirds vote to override presidential vetoes. In 1991 1992, therefore, the Bush administration targeted its 68 69 Washington Post June 26, 1991, p. A09. 70 71 U.S. Department of State Dispatch Vol. 3, No. 40 (October 5, 1992), p. 759. 72 Watkins, Case Studies pp. 257 258.
140 lobbying efforts at the Senate. In 1992, th vetoes of the two conditional MFN bills, with a vot e of 60 38 and of 59 40, respectively. 73 In the Senate, the MFN vote was nearly a party line battle. Among the 44 Senators who voted against the Mitchell bill in 1991, for example, 37 Senators were Republicans. In addition to partisan reasons, some of the 37 Senate Republicans supported unconditional MFN for economic reasons. Senator Slade Gorton (R because the state of Washington had $3.1 billion worth of trade with China in 1990. 74 Only six Senate Republica N.Y.), Jake Garn (R Utah), Jesse Helms, Connie Mack (R Fla.), Robert C. Smith (R N.H.), and Malcolm Wallop (R Wyo.). By contrast, Senate Democrats voted overwhelmingly for conditional MFN. Only seven Sena te Democrats voted against it: Max Baucus (D Mont.), John B. Breaux (D La.), Quentin N. Burdick (D N.D.), Kent Conrad (D N.D.), Jim Exon (D Neb.), J. Bennett Johnston (D La.), and Richard C. Shelby (D Ala.). Most of them came from farm states that had incr easingly exported wheat and fertilizers to China. 75 In particular, Max Baucus worked closely with Minority Leader Bob Dole in maintaining a minimum of 34 Senate votes needed to sustain the presidential vetoes of the two conditional MFN bills 76 The Senators who opposed conditional MFN for China agreed with Bush that revoking or 73 Ibid. 74 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (June 29, 1991), pp. 1738 1739. 75 76 China Business Review Vol. 19, No. 2 (March/April 1992), pp. 12 13.
141 gro wing business ties between China and the United States, devastate US export industries, and 77 He emphasized that the United States could extract Chinese concessions on human rights, arms control, and trade if it continued community was relatively absent. To be sure, American businesses were concerned about the for example, the U.S. China Business Council, a trade association composing of American companies doing business in China, sent a position paper to Congress in mid 1992, arguing that lt in a decrease in U.S. exports to China, jobs, and investment as well as an increase in U.S. trade deficits and consumer prices. The trade association also stood commu 78 In 1990 1992, however, American businesses were not as active as they would become during 1993 1994 when rst, economic policy in post Tiananmen China was primarily made in the hands of Chinese conservatives, and therefore both economic reform and growth in China slowed down. American business opportunities in China thus were far less than they would later bec ome when Deng resumed power in 1992. For example, the U.S. China Business Council lost members rapidly at the time. 79 77 Ibid. 78 China Business Review Vol. 19, No. 4 (July/August 1992), pp. 14 17. 79 Mann, About Face pp. 231 232.
142 because they saw the Tiananmen suppression as morally una cceptable but also because they felt 80 Third, American e of their reputation. 81 In sum, the normative contestation between the pro sanctions coalition and the pro engagement coalition continued during the MFN debate of 1990 1992. On the one hand, the congressional critics of China moved beyond emigration freedo m required by the Jackson Vanik Amendment and made a broader interpretation of MFN conditionality to include general human rights principles, arms control, and trade. In particular, they paid much emphasis on human rights, emphasizing that China would play by the international norms of arms control and trade if it became humane and even democratic first On the other hand, Bush emphasized MFN based free trade between the United States and China. While he had emphasized the positive association between trad e and human rights in 1989, h e emphasized during 1990 1992 that continuing MFN based free trade could help China achieve the kind of economic prosperity conducive to political reform. He also emphasized that maintaining MFN based free trade would provide i ncentives for China to improve its policy on arms control and trade in the post Cold War era. As in the case of the Tiananmen sanctions, s trategic interactions determined the outcome of the normative contestation. While a unified Congress had left Bush no room for presidential vetoes of the Tiananmen sanctions in 1989, Bush won the MFN battle by targeting his lobbying efforts at the Se nate. With Senate support, he acquired some room to resist Congress and 80 Ibid; also see Ka Zeng, Trade Threats, Trade Wars: Bargaining, Retaliation, and American Coercive Dip lomacy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004), pp. 100 107. 81
143 therefore succeeded in sustaining his vetoes of the two congressional bills that attached conditions to China MFN. Such a strategic co constitution thus brought free trade norms to triumph during the MFN debate of 1990 1992.
144 CHAPTER 6 THE 1993 LINKAGE POLICY The 1992 presidential election cha nged the direction of the MFN debate. While Bush had won the MFN debate during his tenure, his loss in the election brought an end to the normative discourse of free trade he had articulated. U.S. China policy thus was in a state of normative vacuum and up This chapter analyzes the origin and content of the linkage policy. It first examines the role of electoral and executive legislative politics in pushing Clinton to translate human rights into th discourse that emphasized the positive spill over effects of human rights and even democracy or regarding arms control and trade a discourse that had first been articulated b y Congress during 1991 1992. Campaign Strategy During the 1992 presidential camp aign, Democratic candidate Clinton primarily attacked his campaign strategy was to c According to Lord Surely, there was a partisan element. Clinton saw that Bush was vulnerable on this [human rights] issue, and it might play well be fore the American people. 1 E lectoral politics thus motivated Clinton to raise human rights issues as a weapon to attack On July 16 for example, Clinton accused Bush of tyrants in his acceptance speech at the Democratic National Convention 2 On Octobe r 1, he 1 See Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, China Confidential: American Diplomats and Sino American Relations since 1945 1996 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), p. 455. 2 See http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25958#axzz1cyqlFcoh
145 3 4 H leaders, though Clinton used it sparingly. 5 More importantly, Clinton advocated linking 6 His position to trad e goods made by prison labor and has failed to make sufficient progress on human 7 conti nue Most Favored Nation status, . 8 erms for China on respect for human rights in China and Tibet, greater market access for US goods, and 3 Quoted in David M. Lampton, Beyond MFN: Trade with China and American Interests (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 1994), p. 10. 4 N ew York Times October 2, 1992, p. A1. 5 Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen p. 471. 6 China Business Review Vol. 20, No. 1 (January/February 1993), p. 18. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid., p. 19.
146 9 However, Clinton primarily criticized China for e idea about China during the campaign was to link human rights to MFN. 10 At first, Clinton advocated denying MFN to the products of all Chinese enterprises. However, he soon moderated his stance by calling for removing MFN from only Chinese state run enterprises. When the Senate approved H.R. 5318 on September 14, Clinton argued that 11 After winning the election, Clint on promised that he would use American power whenever 12 as stated in his inaugural address. In his May 1993 report to Congress on the China issue, Clinton p ledged to 13 He appointed several human rights advocates to key posts in his administration, including Warren Christopher (Secretary of State), Anthony Lake (National Security Advisor), Madeleine Albri ght (U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations), John Shattuck (Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian 9 Ibid. 10 11 12 Review of Politics Vol. 63, No. 3 (Summer 2001), p. 437. 13 s on Most Favored Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Vol. 29, No. 21 (May 31, 1993), pp. 9 14.
147 Affairs), and Winston Lord (Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs). 14 C ampaign rhetoric, as Tucker claims, b ound Clinton to a tough approach to China. 15 Executive Legislative Politics In the spring of 1993, however, the China issue was not at the top of the new f oreign policy missteps in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Haiti. Although the National Security Council issued a policy review directive on China in late January, there were about ninety policy review directives on other foreign countries under conside ration in the spring of 1993. For Asia alone, policy review covered not only China but also Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Cambodia. The administration was even preoccupied with such domestic issues as budget plans, health care reform, and other legisl ation. In particular, Clinton was concerned about whether his first ever budget plan could pass Congress. 16 Congressional pressure, in large measure, pushed Clinton to follow through on his campaign promise. On April 22, Pelosi and Mitchell introduced bill s that sought to attach 17 To extr act support from Congress for his domestic legislation agenda conditionality. For Clinton, domestic issues were of primary importance, and therefore any battle 14 15 Nancy B Making China Policy: Lessons from the Bush and Clinton Administrations (Lanham, MD.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001), p, 48. 16 cker, China Confidential, p. 456. 17 Daniel Southerland, Clinton Sending Fir Washington Post February 27, 1993, p. C01.
148 with Congress over the China issue was unnec essary and unwise. The Clinton administration thus sought to develop a consensus with Congress on China policy. The Department of State was the lead agency in a working group that dealt with China MFN conditionality. In particular, Lord was in charge of consulting with Congress, especially Clinton administration and sought a closer working relationship with Congress on China policy. In early May, Lord even travelled to Beijing and negotiated with the Chinese leadership. He handed the Chinese leadership a list of fourteen items that included such issues as human rights, arms control, and trade. If Beijing made progress on the list, Lord promised, China would be was determined to move ahead with MFN conditionality. 18 In the decision conditionality such economic bureaucracies as Treasury, Commerce, the newly established National Economic Council (NEC), and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative did not share the upper hand that the Department of State enjoyed. From an economic perspective t hese economic agencies opposed but they complained that they were denied a fair enough crack at the decision making process that Lord was in charge of. 19 Neither was the American business community well consulted by Lord. Li ke the economic agencies of the American government, American businesses were opposed to conditional MFN for China. From the start, however, business leaders had gained little access to the China policy review. Although more than 300 companies and business associations sent a 18 21. 19 Tucker, China Confidential, p. 456.
149 American businesses complained that they had not been consulted, at least not until rather late in the process. 20 h Congress, two issues were at stake. First, should MFN conditionality be imposed through legislative means? While Clinton had explicitly supported conditional MFN legislation during the 1992 presidential campaign, the Clinton administration now adjusted i ts policy positions in favor of issuing a presidential executive order. From the issuing an executive order could not only preserve presidential authority over foreign policy but would also leave some flexibility for Clinton to decide o n 21 Such a stance was eventually accepted by Pelosi and Mitchell. that an executive order was a sufficient step and that congre ssional action would be unnecessary. 22 Such moderate members of Congress as Representative Lee H. Hamilton (D Ind.), while emphasizing the importance of U.S. China relations, reluctantly supported issuing an executive order as long as legislative action cou ld be sidestepped. 23 Second, what conditions should be imposed? Should conditionality be limited to human rights or extend to arms control and trade? The conditional MFN bills passed by Congress during the Bush years attached these three conditions altoget her, though human rights lay at the heart of the MFN debate. For the Clinton administration, however, it would be difficult for China to improve its policy on human rights, arms control, and trade altogether within one year. 20 20. 21 22 John R. Cranford, Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (May 29, 1993), p. 1349. 23 Presidential Studies Quarterly Vol. 29, N o. 2 (June 1999), pp. 286 287.
150 Moreover, such a harsh list of conditions, if China failed to follow up on it, would only tie sufficiently concrete to be meaningful, but not so specific and detailed that we would box 24 Finally, a compromise emerged and received support from most members of ca 25 proliferation activities, was displeased upon hearing the compromise but acquiesced. 26 For both the executive and the legislative, limiting conditionality only to human rights would be a workable exercise instead of a feel business community and former colleagues of mine like Kissinger were somewhat pleased over 27 On May 28, 1993, Clinton signed an executive order (No. 12850) that for the first time asked China to improve its human rights policy within the one year grace period bef ore he would he would need a recommendation from Christopher that China had complied with two mandatory conditions: the freedom of emigration as required by the Ja ckson Vanik Amendment and the 1992 U.S. China MOU on prohibiting Chinese prison labor product s. In addition, China had to mak 24 Tucker, China Confidential, p. 454. 25 26 27 Tucker, China Confidential, p. 458.
151 Declaration of Human Ri ghts, releasing and providing a list of political prisoners, allowing access to prisons by international humanitarian and human rights organizations, protecting television broadcasts into China. 28 To emphasize the co nsensual basis of the policy, Clinton unified American policy recognize both the value of China and the values of America. Starting today, the United States will speak with one voice on China pol icy. We no longer have an 29 When Clinton announced his linkage decision, such congressional China critics as Mitchell and Pelosi were present with him, so were some representat ives of the business community (at least serving symbolic purposes for the administration) and Chinese students who stayed in the United States. 30 The While human rights, arms control, and trade remained the principal concerns in U.S. foreign policy toward China, the executive order only imposed human rights conditions, leaving arms control and trade to be handled through other policy instruments. However, the Clinton administration was not so idealistic as t o dismiss U.S. security and economic interests in China. Instead, the broader objective of the linkage policy was to address these three concerns pro market refor 28 Favored Nation Status, U.S. Department of State Dispatch Vol. 4, No. 24 (June 14, 1993), p. 425. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid.
152 31 pressuring China toward more respect for human rights and principles of democracy because Ch ina, once becoming humane and democratic, would necessarily embark on economic reform at home and play by the norms of arms control and trade abroad; in other words, a China whose domestic features were democr atic and prosperous would adopt the foreign pol icy behavior that was consistent with U.S. security and economic interests. Such a logic was repeatedly articulated by his administration officials. First, when sic national interest in a more open, prosperous, and humane China which will also be a more 32 Having v iewed Communist China 33 Lord emphasized that China would be a responsible, constructive member of the intern ational community if it became humane and democratic first. cannot ignore continuing reports of Chinese exports of s ensitive military technology to troubled areas, widespread violations of human rights, or abusive practices that have contributed to a $17 billion trade imbalance between our two nations. Our policy will seek to facilitate a peaceful evolution of China fro m communism to democracy by encouraging the forces of economic and 31 Ibid. 32 be U.S. Department of State Dispatch Vol. 4, No. 24 (June 14, 1993), pp. 427 428. 33
153 34 For Christopher, the U.S. pursuit of security and economic interests in China could be realized when China first became democratic, prosperous at home. Third, Cold War era would be a strategy of enlargement of market democracies. In particular, he argued, democracies that respected human rights would ensure peace and prosperity because they would neither proliferate weapons abroad nor adopt a restrictive trade policy. 35 Speaking of China, Lake labeled China, along with Iraq, Iran, and the United States should conf ront with penalties that raised the costs of repression and aggressive behavior. 36 Such a rhetoric about China, as Kissinger claims, was more pejorative than that of any administration since the 1960s. 37 as an atavistic throwback to the anti communist rhetoric that the United States had adopted after the Korean War. As mentioned in chapter 3, in the postwar McCarthy ist era, Communist China had been cast as an evil country sitting in darkness and the shadow of death. By analogizing China to Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, Lake described a China whose behavior had been satanic, both at home and abroad. However, while the United States had held out no hope for a China that could be converted into the American ima ge in the 1950s and 1960, it threatened China with the loss of MFN in 1993 in administration, China would play by the international norms of arms control and trade if it 34 Warren Christopher, In the Stream of His tory: Shaping Foreign Policy for a New Era (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 31. 35 U.S. Department of State Dispatch Vol. 4, No. 39 (September 27, 1993), pp. 658 664. 36 Ibid. 37 He nry Kissinger, On China (New York: Penguin Press, 2011), p. 467.
1 54 became humane and democratic first, a discourse that had first been articulated by Congress during 1991 1992. Containing the Rise of China? The linkage policy, however, was not the end of a tough U.S. approach to China. In the second half of 1993, the Cli nton administration additionally imposed two economic sanctions measures against China. First, China made tremendous efforts in 1993 to compete to host the 2000 Olympics, U.S. opposition. On July 26, the House passed a res olution by a vote of 287 99 urging the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to human rights. Representative Tom Lantos (D Calif.), a sponsor of the resolution, argu ed that 38 The Senate also wrote the IOC a letter, signed by 60 Senators, expressing its opposition t 39 U.S. human rights groups, such as Human Rights Watch, also began a campaign to urge the IOC to cord, a Beijing based Olympiad is likely to 40 Finally, Beijing lost to Sydney. Of 38 New York Times July 27, 1993, p. B13. 39 Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen p. 170. 40 New York Times August 26, 1993, p. B10.
155 ympic bid was integral to the overall sanctions approach that the American government had adopted since Tiananmen. 41 Second, the Clinton administration imposed economic sanctions against China in August in retaliation for its violation of MTCR guidelines. I n late 1992, the Bush administration had announced that it would sell 150 F 16 fighter jets (worth about $4 billion) to Taiwan. Not surprisingly, China was outraged and saw the F 16 sale as a violation of the U.S. China 1982 Communiqu, in which Washington promised that it would gradually decrease its arms sales to Taiwan. Since then, U.S. intelligence agencies had discovered some evidence that China began to reship the shorter range M 11 to Pakistan, a move that the Clinton administration viewed as retalia tory for the F 16 sale. Based on the 1990 Missile Control Act, the Clinton administration then imposed sanctions that banned exports of high Annex to China. 42 Adding to the U.S. China dispute over arms contr ol was the Yinhe incident. In July 1993, U.S. intelligence agencies received information that the Chinese ship Yinhe (Milky Way) was shipping to Iran a large quantity of chemicals used in the production of the chemical weapons banned by the Chemical Weapon s Convention, which China had signed earlier in the year. The Clinton administration immediately demanded that the ship return to China, but Beijing simply refused. An agreement was finally reached in August between the two sides: the Yinhe could stop in S audi Arabia, and an inspection team of American, Chinese, and Saudi experts would jointly 41 For some scholars of economic statecraft, boycotts of Olympics count as economic sanctions. See Baldwin, Economic Statecraft 42 Medeiros, Reluctant Restraint p. 146.
156 examine the ship. However, it turned out that no chemicals banned by the Chemical Weapons Convention were found, and the Clinton administration never issued an apolog y to China. 43 The year 1993 witnessed a confrontational U.S. China relationship. Through the use and threat of the sanctions announced in 1993, Washington seemed to have adopted a policy of containment against China. Indeed, the U.S. China strategic alignment during the Cold War came to an end after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and therefore U.S. China relations in the post C old War era became increasingly tense. To complicate U.S. China relations further, China began to rise, at least in economi c power competitor in the years ahead. In the spring of 1992, Deng resumed power and embarked ur witnessed one of the most extraordinary periods of rapid economic growth in the world. During 1992 economic growth rates reached 12 and 13 percent, making China the most dynamic center of economic growth in the world. China also attracted a substantial amount of foreign direct investment: from $11 billion in 1992 to $25.75 billion in 1993. 44 In 1993, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) began to calculate national wealth in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP), instead of currency exchang e rates. According to the and China became the third largest economy in the world, narrowly after the United States and Japan. Regardless of its methodological p roblems, the new method constructed an image of 43 For the Yinhe incident, see ibid., p. 137. 44 F or Chinese economic reform initiatives during 1992 1993, see Feng, World Trade Organization pp. 57 60; Nicholas R. Lardy, China in the World Economy (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1994).
157 GATT/WTO. More importantly, it provided the economic basis for portraying China as an emerging power and a potenti al competitor of the United States in the years ahead. 45 Around 1993, therefore, the debate over the rise of China began to emerge, 46 as Foreign Affairs article. 47 At the time of rising Chinese power, especially when China had be en running counter to the international norms of human rights, arms control, and trade, a voice for containing a rising and intransigent China began to emerge. Even the Chinese viewed the U.S. sanctions as a U.S. policy of containment against the rise situation all enemy attention will be concentrated on China. They will use every pretext to cause trouble, to create difficulties and pressures for us....The next three to five years will be extremely 48 For China the use and threat of the sanctions made by the United States since Tiananmen were a deliberate U.S. policy of containment. In sum, the 1992 presidential election chang ed the normative contestation between the pro sanctions and pro engagement coalitions in favor of the former. Clinton first criticized d uring the 1992 presidential campaign and advocated linking human rights office, Clinton refrained from conflict with Congress over China policy and therefore followed through on the campaign promise The process from candidacy to presidency that Clinton underwent in 1992 1993 translated human rig hts into the linkage policy. 45 International Security Vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter 1997 1998), p. 56. 46 Ibid., p, 36. 47 Foreign Affairs Vol. 72, No. 5 (November/December 199 3), pp. 59 74. 48 China Quarterly No. 142 (June 1995), p. 298.
158 Th e Clinton administration also argued that a humane, democratic China would simultaneously abide by the international norms of arms control and trade, a discourse that had first been articulated by Congress during 1991 1992.
159 CHAPTER 7 THE 1994 DELINKA GE POLICY In the sanctions engagement transition, the decision that Clinton made in 1994 to delink discusses the 1994 juncture and examines two stages of strategic co constitution t hat translated the normative discourse of free trade proposed by Bush into U.S. economic engagement with China I first examine the dilemma the Clinton administration faced when China had resisted the U.S. human rights pressure. I then pay attention to a p ro MFN coalition that included American businesses, governmental foreign policy experts, and moderate members of Congress. T normative discourse and presented it to Clinton. To avoid the costs of revo decision. I finally examine policy. Although the congressional voices for denying China MFN had been dominant relative to the ones for unconditional MFN for China, the congressional China critics who stood on human rights grounds was in decline in the second half of the 1990s. Dilemma By 1993, U.S. China relations had witnessed a d ownward spiral. To prevent further deterioration the Clinton administration began seeking a new approach to China. From July to China, a policy that had first been propo sed by Bush. Unlike the linkage policy, which had granted priority to human rights and punitive means, the comprehensive engagement policy considered overall U.S. interests in China and emphasized the use of dialogue and contact in addressing such issues a s economics, security, and human rights. As Lord claimed, the purpose
160 1 Clinton adopted the memorandum in September China. 2 The key element of the comprehensive engagement policy was high level exchanges between the American and Chinese governments. On September 25, Lake and Lord called in Chinese ambassador to Washington Li Daoyu to inform him of the new approach and delivered him a letter from Clinton to Jiang containing an invitation to the first ever APEC (Asia Pacific tle, Washington, in November. 3 Besides the presidential summit at APEC, the comprehensive engagement policy also contained a series of high level American missions to China, including Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs J ohn Shattuck (October 1993 and February 1994), Agriculture Secretary Mike Espy (October 1993), Assistant Defense Secretary Chas Freeman (November 1993), and Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen (January 1994). Christopher also met Qian five times during 1993 1 994. 4 American businesses. For example, he visited the Boeing plant to demonstra te the importance of 1 Term Review of Most Favored U .S. Department of State Dispatch Vol. 5, No. 10 ( March 7, 1994), p. 127. 2 Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams p. 135. 3 Washington Post (November 7, 1993), p. C03. 4 For these American miss
161 the Chinese market to American aircraft companies. 5 Such a Chinese strategy, known as pressure the Clinton administration to back away from the linkage policy, as Chinese officials revoked. The strategy continued into 1994, as China frequently sent purchasing delegations to the United States. 6 During the APEC meeting, Clinton began to realize that China was too big to punish and too important to isolate. 7 In Seattle, he kept telling his advisers that he did not want to isolate 8 Indeed, for a president whose to be revoked. The planned presidential summit between Clinton and Jiang, however, was under heavy inappropriate, especially at a time when China had not improved its human rights record since the May 28 executive order. Besides media cr iticism, 9 Pelosi and 270 members of Congress 5 Mann, About Face p. 292. 6 For the details of Chinese purchasing delegations sent to the United States during 1993 1994, see Lampton, 7 Robert S. Greenberg and Mi Wall Street Journal May 31, 1994, p. A18. 8 Ibid. 9 Washington Post Novemb er 7, 1993, p. C1; Jim Washington Post November 18, 1993, p. A23. The Chinese dissident Wei Jingsheng also sent out an op ed article to the New York Times New York Times No vember 18, 1993, p. A27.
162 summit, the members of C ongress instead urged Clinton to be tough with Jiang at the summit. 10 barrier to the full resolution of normal and complete and constructive relations between our two 11 He stressed to Jiang that human rights progress should be made by June 1 994 if China desired to maintain its MFN status. Besides human rights, Clinton also discussed with Jiang trade imbalance and arms control. 12 After the APEC summit, the Clinton administration intensified its human rights pressure on China. In January 1994, Christopher met Qian in Paris and warned him that China had not respons rights dialogue with the United States. He also invited Christopher and Shattuck to Beijing to discuss human rights issues. 13 On February 1, the Department of State re leased its annual report on human rights and accepted norms as it continued to repress domestic critics and failed to control abuses by its own 14 I n late February, Shattuck visited Beijing to discuss human rights issues with Chinese Foreign Ministry officials. During his stay in Beijing, he privately met the dissident Wei Jingsheng, who had been jailed since 1979 due to his participation in the Democ racy Wall 10 Los Angeles Times November 19, 1993, p. 1. 11 of China Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Vol. 29, No. 47 (November 29, 1993), p. 2413. 12 Ibid. 13 Was hington Post January 25, 1994, p. A16. 14 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (February 5, 1994), p. 258.
163 Movement and was not released until 1993 when Beijing curried world favor in order to win its bid to host the 2000 Olympics. However, Wei was soon arrested after he publicized the meeting to the American press. 15 the Clinton administration and cast To pressure China to improve on human rights, Christopher visited Beijing in March tarif 16 17 During the visit, Christopher wa s convinced that China could not meet the human rights conditions as spelled out in the 1993 executive order. As all the areas outlined in the executive order Although China had resolved all emigration cases and prison labor issues, according to his report, serious human rights abuses continued in China, including the arrest of dissidents and the suppression 18 unds would not serve U.S. interests because it would certainly lead China to retaliate in kind. That would in turn result in decreased economic exchanges between the two countries and disadvantage not only the Chinese economy but also the American economy. 15 See Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen pp. 185 187. 16 Kissinger, On China p 468. 17 Ibid. 18 U.S. Department of State Dispatch Vol. 5, No. 22 (May 30, 1994), p. 346.
164 regarding security affairs and therefore run counter to U.S. strategic interests. When the self imposed deadline approached, there fore, administration officials became softer on the MFN threat and seemed ready to drop the human rights conditionality. On May 4, for example, Lord 19 Another administration offici 20 If administration officials still insisted on the human rights conditionality, they would only tie their own hands and bind themselves to carry out the MFN threat. The Clinton administ ration, however, was also concerned about its policy credibility at home and abroad because failing to pull the MFN trigger, or dropping the human rights admini stration sent an envoy to Beijing, hoping that China could give the administration some minute human rights progress. Beijing finally made some concessions, including releasing two prominent dissidents, agreeing to discuss the jamming of Voice of America, and providing a list o f political prisoners However, China conceded less than what was required to justify MFN renewal. 21 continuing it absent hum an rights progress was feasible, administration officials came up with two alternatives. First, they sought an intermediate option that allowed them In April, Lord and other administration officials began considering t he 19 Washington Post May 12, 1994, p. A1. 20 Ibid. 21 t, May 28, 1994, p. A01.
165 only deny MFN treatment to the products of Chinese state owned companies. 22 By April, administration 23 However, ideas about selective or targeted sanctions were eventually put aside because identifying the products of Chinese state owned companies would be difficult. Moreover, such a half way approach would not prevent China from retaliating, which in turn would sti ll cause damage to the American economy. 24 At first, the congressional China critics, including Pelosi and Mitchell, also advocated selective or targeted sanctions, as they had in 1992 when passing H.R. 5318. Such a half way approach also received support from such Chinese dissidents as Fang Lizhi and Zhao Haiching. 25 After the approach was considered invalid, however, the congressional China critics fell short of coming up with any effective policy alternative. On April 20 when the MFN deadline approached, progress, but he was reluctant to say what 26 Pelosi also conceded that she was reluctant to r MFN. 27 22 For scholarly discussions of selective or targeted sanctions, see David Cortright and George A. Lopez, eds. Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft (Lanham, M.D.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002). 23 24 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (April 30, 1994), pp. 1054 1056. 25 New York Times April 07, 1994, p. A27. 26 Washington Post April 21, 1994, p. a26. 27 Con gressional Quarterly Weekly Report (March 19, 1994), p. 658.
166 human rights progress and therefore would be subject to flexible interpretations for political ignificant progress can be interpreted 28 To justify MFN renewal for China, some administration officials did consider taking advantage of the loophole and writing a report claiming that Ch previous year. Before Christopher reported to Clinton on in late hu man rights practices. For some officials, China had not met all the human rights conditions outlined in the 1993 executive order, but it had occasionally showed willingness to hold human rights dialogue with the United States. Such a Chinese move, they arg ued, was sufficient for 29 Human rights organizations, however, were keeping their eyes open for the ton administration] 30 Under such pressure from human rights organizations, administration officials, especially the human rights advocates in the State Department 31 Lord argued that the administration should not twist the truth 28 29 For the debate, see Mann, About Face pp. 305 306. 30 30. 31
167 things were so wh 32 For these administration officials, overselling human rights progress in China would certainly stir up opposition from human rights groups and therefore cause damage to U.S. human rights stance. Moreover, the administration was afraid of losing American government was so desperate to renew MFN status for China that they were calling 33 Reviving t he Normative Discourse of Free Trade While defensive, the normative discourse of free trade first articulated by Bush reemerged Unlike the Bush years, the spring of 1994 witnessed new and more active proponents of the dis course, governmental foreign policy experts, and moderate members of Congress. These four pro MFN groups had different stakes in U.S. China relations, but they all emphasized the importance of MFN based free trade to U.S. commercial interests. Viewing MFN from a security perspective were non governmental foreign policy experts and moderate members of Congress. To justify their emphasis on U.S. economic and security interests, these four pro MFN groups all attached moralistic goals to MFN, as had Bush, by arguing that the best way to advance human rights in China was to boost Chinese economic reform and pros perity via broader U.S. China trade. 32 Quoted in Mann, About Face pp. 305 306. 33 See Tucker, China Confidential, p. 466.
168 American Businesses hina lobby which, according to Destler, was formidable, pro 34 Their lobbying efforts of Chin 35 Tiananmen. As mentioned in chapters 5 6, American businesses had been relatively silent on d uring the Bush years In the d ecision making process regarding the linkage policy, they had not even been well consulted by the Clinton administration. However, they became active 1994 for three reasons. First, the Chinese economy grew rapidly during 1992 1994, and therefore American businesses had become increasingly tantalized by the Chinese market. Second, state leaders of U.S. allies, including German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, Japanese Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawam, and French Prime Minist er Edouard Balladur visited China during 1993 1994 and returned home with billions worth of Chinese contracts because they expressed their opposition to conditional forms of economic exchanges. 36 inst to be revoked. Third, while Bush had sibility of revoking it no longer 34 Devereaux, Lawrence, and Watkins, Case Studies in US Trade Negotiation p. 259; I.M. Destler, American Trade Politics (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Ec onomics, 1995), p. 212 35 Quoted in Xie, U.S. China Relations p. 120. 36
169 allowed American businesses to remain passive or tolerant of being ignored by the Clinton administration. Not surprisingly, American businesses viewed MFN from an economic perspective For example, the Business Coalition for U.S. Ch ina Trade, composed of more than 400 California companies, sent a letter to Clinton in April, warning him that more than $1.7 billion worth of MFN revoked. It went where the market is for us. . And this is what President Clinton is talking about when he says 37 In an interview with an oral history program, Lord compla ined that the American 38 However, the fact was that American businesses defend on moral grounds by stress ing the positive spill over effects of trade on human rights. For example, the Business Coalition for U.S. China Trade was doing more than just emphasizing U.S. economic interests. The trade association also argued that U.S. trade and investment would or the entrepreneurial forces in Chinese society that advocate further economic and political reform and pose a fundamental long term challenge to the hard Endorsed by such firms as Hewlett Packard, Intel, Atlantic Richfield, and Pacific Telesis, its 37 Los Angeles Times May 15, 1994, p. 3. 38 Quoted in Tucker, China Confidential, p. 460.
170 but believe that revoking MFN would undermine important steps toward greater respect for 39 Sim il arly, nearly 800 companies continued writing to Clinton in the spring of 1994, trade rupture between the United States and China, which in turn would harm U.S. busine sses and jobs. 40 On the human rights front, these companies told Clinton that U.S. companies in China had created better working conditions, living standards, and economic rights for Chinese of economic and political liberalization. 41 The Emergency Committee for American Trade (ECAT), composed of 65 companies with annual sales of $1 trillion, also lobbied on both economic and moral grounds Attending hearings of the Subcommitte e on Trade of the House Committee on Ways in the 21 st 42 On the rights can better be achieved through conditions of economic plenty than of economic 43 The trade association emphasized that U.S. trade ties with China could fuel the development promote human rights in China. 39 40 Washington Post May 6, 1994, p. A19. 41 Washington Post May 27, 1994, p. A28. 42 606. 43 Ibid.
171 U.S. business presence in China grows, so will the attendant human rights of the Chine se 44 Such an argument was also made by 82 U.S. companies doing business in China in a survey issued by the National Association of Manufacturers and sent to Clinton. 45 The American Chamber of Commerce in Beijing also conveyed the same argument to Christopher during his March 1994 trip in China. While complaining that the linkage policy had undermined American business opportunities in China, the chamber argued that it was misguided at the best way to improve human rights in China was to open China to broader international markets. 46 Economic Agencies Standing on its linkage policy from the start, but it had o nly exercised limited influence over China policy in however, decision making power shifted from the State Department to the White House, as a joint team composed of both the National Security Council (NSC) and the National Economic Council (NEC) was formed to take charge of China policy. 47 Although the NSC was also filled m 44 45 Ibid. 46 See Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen p. 188. 47
172 an economic perspective emphasizing the importance of the Chinese market to U.S. commercial interests. National question that absent some unexpected event, China will become the largest economy in the eels 48 In the spring of 1994, the Department of countries, with which the United States should seek to strengthen its e ngagement. Revoking the world market. 49 without conditions because it was a matter of economic security, an unalienable part of national security. 50 In an April 1994 meeting on the China issue, Lake listed some selective sanctions that the administration mig what we ought to be talking about. . Look at some of these inner cities; take a ride ove r to 51 From 48 Washington Post Jan 29, 1994, p. C01. 49 Mann, About Face p. 294. 50 Ibid. 51
173 had to pay higher prices for Chinese products. moralistic objectives to MFN, as did the American business community They argued that it When proposing security will increasingly revolve around our commercial interests, and when economic d 52 through capitalist tools could freedom and human rights be promoted in China. In the eyes of centerpiece of American economic policy toward China. 53 ou discuss U.S. access to the Chinese market and to urge Beijing to comply with the 1992 U.S. China MOU on prisoner labor. After negotiations, China promised that it would allow U.S. Customs officials to inspect five prisons suspected of violating the prisoner labor MOU. That was the background against which Christopher would report to Clinton in May that China had satisfied the prison labor condition, in addition to t he emigration condition, set forth in the 1993 executive order. On the human rights front, Bentsen believed that there was no contradiction 52 Foreign Policy No. 97 (Winter 1994/1995), p. 18. 53 See Morris, Trade and Human Rights p. 441.
174 encourage market reform and tr should encourage economic reforms in China and broader U.S. China trade. 54 Non Governmental Foreign Policy Experts Non governmental foreign policy experts also opposed the linkage policy and viewed U.S. China relations broadly in ways that moved beyond human rights issues. Henry Kissinger and Cyrus Vance, for example, wrote a letter to Clinton, arguing that the United States had broader interests in China and that a single dimension of U.S. interests as human rights should not become the thread running through overall U.S. China relations. 55 On March 15, the Council on Foreign Relations convened televised public hearings in Washington, D.C., with participants including Kissinger, Vance, Oksenberg, Lawrence Eagleb urger, and Paul Wolfowitz national interest in a China that is stable, modernizing, ref orm minded, cohesive, secure, outward looking, and that meets international human rights standards and pursues constructive 56 While the China they hoped for was not different from that embraced by the Clinton administratio n, they emphasized the use of incentives and support, instead of penalties, in shaping such a China. 54 See Mann, About Face Washington Post January 6, 1994, p. D10; Thomas New York Times March 20, 1994, p. 20. 55 56 For the hearings, see Kenneth Lieberthal, The Future of U.S. China Relations: A Proposal for a Sustainable, Bipartisan Policy (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, May 11, 1994), p. 1.
175 governmental foreign policy experts emphasized U.S. commercial interests in China. They arg 57 thousands of Americans; it will give American con 58 For the non governmental foreign policy experts, U.S. economic interests in China would be governmental fo reign policy expert s also viewed MFN from a security perspective Despite the end of the Cold war, they argued, China still carried security implications for the United States in the post Cold War lies in brin g ing China more fully into 59 Second, U.S. security concerns regarding China had moved beyond arms control in the post Cold War period: China was one of the five permanent members of the United Na tions Security Council and thus had veto power over Security Council resolutions; China had various territorial disputes with its neighbors and might drive toward military conflict with them; China was rising due to its rapid economic growth; China had sig nificantly increased its defense budget, much of which was not transparent; and China was one of the few countries that could persuade North Korea to end its nuclear weapons projects. 60 In particular, North Korea became of serious concern to the Clinton adm inistration in the spring of 1994 when the United States asked the United Nations to impose economic 57 Ibid., p. 12 58 Ibid. 59 Ibid., pp. 14 15. 60 Ibid.
176 sanctions against North Korea after months long diplomatic negotiations with Pyongyang over its nuclear weapons projects had collapsed. However, China oppo sed UN authorized economic sanctions against North Korea. 61 Cold War era in the spheres 62 the non governmental foreign policy establis remain cooperative on these security issues. In particular, Kissinger and Vance told Clinton that l and endanger 63 On human rights in China, even those foreign policy experts who were famous for their human rights stances cast doubt on the effectiveness of the linkage policy. Vance, for example, 64 In his meeting with Clinton, Jimmy Carter suggested delinking because the rights. In mid human rights, but Carter simply refused. 65 61 New York Times March 20, 19 94, p. 1. 62 Lieberthal, The Future of United States China Relations p. 14. 63 Washington Post Jun 6, 1994, p. A19. 64 65 Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen p. 196; Mann, About Face p. 307.
177 governme ntal foreign policy community argued that the best way to encourage human rights progress in China was for the United States to expand its trade with China and promote Chinese economic prosperity, xample, argued that revoking growing private economy there. . By giving Chinese men and women access to jobs, more income, better goods and services and ideas, an expanding private economy is the best guarantee of a more pluralistic Chinese 66 onomy, the United States fosters democratic forces and enhances human rights. Rapid economic growth and joint ventures have done more to improve the human rights situation in South China than innumerable threats, demarches, and unilaterally imposed conditi 67 Moderate Members of Congress After the linkage policy, the atmosphere in Congress began to change as a growing number of lawmakers, both Democrats and Republicans, visited China, a move that had been scant since Tiananmen. During the congressional recess from December 1993 to January 1994, for example, around 60 members of Congress travelled to China. Witnessing the economic and social development that had occurred in China, many lawmakers emphasized that the United States had multiple interests in China and that economic and security concerns should be given the same weight as human rights. Even those members of Congress who had supported the 66 67 Foreign Policy No. 94 (Spring 1994), p. 40.
178 Mass.), for exa mple, had been a proponent of the linkage policy but now became supportive of 68 Relaying his thoughts to Clinton the United States and China have changed enough that it is time to begin a ne would help Washington and Beijing deal together with hum an rights security affairs, and economic exchanges. 69 Like the other three pro MFN groups, many members of Congress were worried about the possibility of a U.S. 70 Members of Congress who came from those states having closer economic relations with China, such as California, Washington, and wheat growing states, were particularly fearful of job losses in their districts and the refore opposed d paying 71 Similarly, Representative Jim McDermott (D Wash.) was worried about Boeing jobs in his district and therefore sent Clinton a letter signed by 106 members of Congress calling 72 68 69 70 Financial Times March 16, 1994, p. 7. 71 Washington Post February 4, 1994, p. A19. 72
179 Like the non governmental foreign policy community, many members of Congres s viewed MFN from a secu rity perspective discourage Chinese cooperation with the United States on regional and even global security. Baucus, for example, emphasized the contributions that MFN had made to Chinese cooperation on arms contr 73 For him, targeted sanctions, rather than the MFN threat would with incentives to stay cooperative on arms control. Baucus also emphasized that the United States had security interests in China that moved beyond arms co ntrol in the post proliferation. As the succession to Deng Xiaoping begins, we discredit pro Americ an factions in 74 He thus emphasized that MFN would be the precondition for compreh ensive Chinese cooperation on security affairs. On the human rights front, a growing number of lawmakers emphasized that issuing a public ultimatum on human rights was not an appropriate approach to deal with human rights situations in China. Senato r J. Bennett Johnston (D La.), for example, argued that strip p ing China of its MFN status 73 74 Ibid.
180 during his January 1994 trip to Beijing. 75 Therefore, a growing number of lawmakers called for contin Representative Hamilton, who had reluctantly supported the 1993 executive order, made a speech in the American Enterprise Institute in May 1994 and argued in favor of re newing 76 ck and dark as they thought, . the breadth and depth of economic change means that our leverage 77 During his China trip, he saw Beijing streets dotted by satellite dishes and construction cranes as well as numerous stores stacked with televisions and VCRs. He was als o told by a dissident that facsimile machines allowed news of political arrests to spread in Beijing. en the hands of Chinese d by open trade. 78 Clinton and Delinkage While the four pro MFN groups had presented the normative discourse of free trade to Clinton since the spring of 1994, a short th various actors by the self imposed deadline. Between late April and mid May, Clinton consulted with congressional leaders, his domestic advisors, cabinet level officers, Carter, Kissinger, and Brzezinski While some human rights advocates still insisted 75 76 Chandler and 77 78
181 delinking for the sake of overall U.S. China relations. 79 At a White House meeting in late May, therefore, he first called in Commerce Secretary Brown and Treasury Secretary Bentsen, a nd it was only then that Madeleine Albright, who insisted on human rights, was called in. 80 On May 26, Clinton finally 81 bec how to promote human rights in China, saying, MFN status, let me ask you the same question that I have asked myself over and over these last few weeks as I have studied this issue and consulted people of both parties who have had experience with China over many decades. Will we do more to advance the cause of human rights if China is isolated or if our nations are engaged in a growing web of political and economic cooperation and contacts? 82 persuaded [ emphasis added] 83 that the best path for advancing freedom in China is for t he United State s 84 believe we can do it by engaging the Chinese. . We will have more contacts. We will have 85 79 619. 80 Gr 81 Favored U.S. Department of State Dispatch Vol. 5, No. 22 (May 30, 1994), p. 345. 82 Ibid. 83 Clinton adopted the normative discourse of free trade to justify his delinkage decision but arg ued that he was persuaded by the logic of appropriateness. Situational explanations for why actors accept new norms thus can avoid the methodological weaknesses of liberal construc tivism. 84 Ibid. 85 Ibid.
182 conomic and 86 have taken today to advance our security, to adva nce our prosperity, and to advance our ideals, I believe, are the important and appropriate 87 Each year throughout his tenure emphasized that open trade could not only advance U.S. economic and security interests in China, but could therefore political openness. 88 Those administration officials who had supported the linkage policy, such as Christopher and Lord, also follo wed suit after the delinkage decision. 89 More importantly, the Clinton administration continued to articulate such a discourse when making efforts to integrate China into the WTO. On April 7, 1999, the eve of Chinese Premier Zhu to sign consistent with U.S. interests. To construct such a China, he argued, the United States should 86 Ibid. 87 Ibid. 88 East Asia Strength and Prosperity in the 21 st Century: Remarks to the U.S. Department of State Di spatch Vol. 7, No. 22 (May 27, 1996), pp. 261 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Vol. 36, No. 10 (March 13, 2000), pp. 487 493. 89 For the par Pacific Future, Secretary Christopher, Address to the Asia U.S. Department of State Dispatch Vol. 5, No. 22 (May 30, 1994), pp. 348 Ch ina Relationship, Secretary Christopher, Address before Council on U.S. Department of State Dispatch Vol. 7, No. 22 (May 27, 1996), pp. 264 .S. China Relations, Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Statement before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific U.S. Department of State Dispatc h Vol. 6, No. 13 (March 27, 1995), pp. 245 247.
183 b world trading system, and in seeing it join the World Trade Organization. . that will give us reforms and propelling it toward 90 economies, it [the 1999 U.S. China trade a stake in peace and stability. . While we will continue to have strong disagreements with China over issues ranging from human rights to religious tolerance to foreign policy, we believe that bringing China into the WTO 91 A dvancing the economic agenda alone, according to Clinton, could simultaneously boost U.S. security interests as well as political economic reform in China. Indeed, economic engagement was the policy that the Clinton administration stepped up during its second term. First proposed by Bush and then presented by Lord to Clinton in 1993, the comprehensive engagement policy aimed to regarding human rights, regional and global security, and trade altogether. For the administration, economic engagement could provide China with incentives to stay cooperative with the United States on these issue areas. When articulating his China policy other steps. 92 Indeed, the 90 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Vol. 35, No. 14 (April 12, 1999), pp. 592 594. 91 President C Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Vol. 36, No. 10 (March 13, 2000), p. 493. 92 Minister Howard in Canberra, November 20, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Vol. 32, No. 47 (November 25, 1996), p. 2411.
184 administration made tremendous efforts to integrate China into the WTO. Whe n China refused to 93 and enter the WTO as a developed country that become a founding member of the WTO in 1994. When Chin a retaliated for the U.S. blockade by refusing to comply with the 1992 U.S. China MOU on market access, the administration announced its threats in March 1995 to impose punitive tariffs on Chinese products as a means to coerce China back on track. When Chi China MOU on IPR was not satisfactory, the same threats were announced twice, in 1995 and 1996, by the administration in order to coerce China toward improving IPR protection and enforcement. 94 After the delinkage policy, China began to change. In fact, Foreign Affairs article. 95 In 1995, Assistant Secretary of wro ng to portray China as an enemy. Nor is there reason to believe China must be an enemy in 96 chance of an aggressive China and a 50 percent chance of China becoming a responsible great power in the region. On this hypothesis, to treat China as an enemy now would in effect dis count 50 percent of the future. . Enmity would become a self 97 For him, U.S. 93 WT O U.S. Department of State Dispatch Vol. 7, No. 48 (November 25, 1996), p. 582. 94 For U.S. Case Studies in US Trade Negotiation pp. 241 300; Nicholas R. Lardy, Integrating China into the Global Economy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2002). 95 Foreign Affairs Vol. 73, No. 2 (March/April 1994), pp. 45 55. 96 97 Ibid.
185 China hostility would be what America made of it if the Clinton administration took a policy of isolating or containing Beijing, and therefore the United States should engage China to turn it into a status quo power. Congressional Vote for Trade with China however, anti China sentiment was rising in the Republican controlled Congress. 98 F or C correct altogether On the human rights front, Congress c both the House and the Senate adopted resolutions (SRES45 and HCONRES28) that called on d Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) in Geneva. 99 On the arms control front, when it was reported that a Chinese company had sold 5,000 ring magnets used for uranium enrichment to Pakistan in early 1996, Congress called on the administration to impo se sanctions against Beijing. 100 On the trade front, because U.S. trade deficits with China continued to increase (from $27 billion in 1994 to $66 billion in 1999, see table 1 2), many members of Congress urged the administration to stick to a tough stance o 101 98 After 199 5, Congress was mostly controlled by the Republican Party. See Devereaux, Lawrence, and Watkins, Case Studies in US Trade Negotiation pp. 257 258. 99 Each year from 1990 to 2000 (except 1998), the American government sponsored a UNCHR resolution criticiz ing Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (May 1, 1999), pp. 100 1 1007. 100 Reluctant Restraint pp. 66 70. 101 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (April 26, 1997), pp. 968 969.
186 Besides human rights, arms control, and trade deficits, Congress also criticized China for triggering the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995 1996 and accelerating its buildup of missiles aimed at Taiwan thereafter. Unease was also gro wing in Congress over the status of Hong Kong after it would be reverted to Chinese control after July 1, 1997. China was also accused of illegally funneling campaign donations to the Democratic Party in the 1996 Federal elections, an allegation that was k nown as Chinagate. During 1998 1999, China was also accused of stealing sensitive U.S. military related technologies, an allegation that culminated in the release of the so called Cox Report in May 1999. In 1999, China also opposed the U.S. led Kosovo War. All these events heated up anti China sentiment in Congress. 102 Senator Tim Hutchinson (R Ark.), ategic partner. They view us as a 103 When China engaged in the above s criticized Clinton for being too soft on China. In particular, Congress frequently criticized Clinton f Represented Richard A. Gephardt (D business stance, an idea, a moral belief 104 When Clinton attended a welcoming ceremony in Tiananmen Square and reviewed PLA troops for his 1998 state visit to China, he was under heavy domestic attack for forgetting what had happened there 102 Fo r all these events, see Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen chapters 6 9. 103 104 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (June 28, 1997), pp. 1536 1537.
187 in 1989. Representative Benjamin A. Gilman (R of the Tiananmen massacre is offensive to most Americans. . We should not be so avid for 105 For him, Clinton To register their di critics of China continued anti MFN campaigns. After Clinton announced his delinkage decision in May 1994, the congressional critics of China immediately introduced legislation that sought to outright for all Chinese products, and Mitchell and Pelosi cosponsored anot her bill that would deny MFN to goods produced by Chinese state owned enterprises. How ever, because the overwhelmingly defeated, 75 356 and 158 270, respectively. Conversely, the House passed a bill y a vote of 280 152. 106 Each year during 1995 1997, the House also introduced a resolution disapproving of were defeated by a wide margin: 107 321, 141 286, and 173 259, respectively. Durin g 1998 1999, the House also voted 166 264 and 170 normal trade relations (NTR) to China (MFN had been renamed NTR in 1998 by the Internal 105 Washington Post June 24, 1998, p. A16. 106 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (August 13, 1994), p. 2317.
188 Revenue Service overhaul measure that Clin ton signed into law on July 22). 107 During 1994 1999, the Senate never In 2000, a battle was fought on Capitol Hill over whether to permanently waive the Jackson Vanik A mendment for China so that it could be granted PNTR u pon its entry into the WTO. In November 1999, the administration had signed a trade agreement with China that would allow China to enter the WTO. Since then, Congress had been asked to vote on whether to exempt China from the annual review of its trade sta tus. However, the PNTR battle was polarized as both opponents and proponents of PNTR led their respective lobbying campaigns on Capitol Hill. Opponents of PNTR included human rights groups, religious groups, environmentalists, labor unions, and conservativ es. Proponents of PNTR, by contrast, included businesses and farm groups. Finally, both the House and the Senate passed a bill (H.R.4444) that granted China PNTR, by 237 197 and 83 25, respectively. 108 During 1994 2000, the legislative branch voted for the issues ranging from human rights, trade imbalance, arms control, Taiwan, the Chinagate controversy, the alleged Chinese theft of se nsitive U.S. technologies, and the Kosovo War After the delinkage policy, voices that advocated denying China trade status (MFN, NTR, or PNTR) became less powerful in Congress. Therefore, an executive legislative consensus existed on U.S. economic engagem ent with China. 107 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (July 31, 1999), p. 1887. 108 For the PNTR battle, see Devereaux, Lawrence, and Watkins, Case Studies in US Trade N egotiation pp. 277 291.
189 Economic engagement with China was also a bipartisan consensus. During the 1996 ionally. 109 Although Congress was controlled by the Republican Party, most Republicans voted for of economic engagement with China. In the 2000 PNTR vote, for example, some 164 out of 221 House Republicans voted for PNTR, compared to merely 73 out of 211 House Democrats. The 8 and 37 7, respectively. 110 Economic concerns played an important ro largest trading partner in 1997. 111 China, Congress granted prio policy of economic engagement with China. Despite their emphasis on U.S. economic interests, those members of Congress who voted for economic engagement with China did not forget to emphasize t hat there was no contradiction between U.S. economic relations with China, on the one hand, and U.S. security the former were advanced first. As Representative H 109 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (May 4, 1996), p. Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (May 11, 1 996), p. 1316. 110 See Devereaux, Lawrence, and Watkins, Case Studies in US Trade Negotiation pp. 257 258. 111 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (June 6, 1998 ), pp. 1517 1519.
190 112 Similarly, Representative Tim Roemer (D Ind.) argued that rejecting NTR would demonize China a 113 Both Hamilton and Roemer emphasized that the United States should avoid a policy of confrontation because denying China MFN or NTR would seriously damage overall U.S. China relations. In sum, the normative discourse of free trade triu mphed after 1994 through two stages of strategic co constitution. First, w hen China had resisted the U.S. human rights pressure, the Clinton administration und run counter to U.S. economic and security interests. The administration thus sought alternative options but only found them invalid. At the same time, there emerged a pro MFN coalition that wa s concerned about U.S. economic and security interests, including American businesses, governmental foreign policy experts, and moderate members of Congress. Thes e four pro MFN groups told Clinton and economic engagement could work better than economic sanctions in advancing not only U.S. economic and security interests in China but human rights from Chi while at the same time adopting the discourse to justify his delinkage decision. Such a strategic co constitution thus redefined U.S. China policy toward economic engagement to manage China. Second, t he dynamics that led to the delinkage policy al so helped restore a consensus on China policy between the legislative and the executive and even between the Democrats and the Republicans. Although the Republican controlled Congress continued to criticize China and 112 113
191 C i t voted for China As a result, the strength of the congressional China critics was on the decline, as their voices lost ground to the normative discourse of free trade
192 CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION Table 8 1 summarizes the findings of this study. I t demonstrates the three stages of strategic co constitution that transformed U.S. China policy from sanctions to engagement in the 1990s. First, despite his geopolitical concerns over China, Bush c odified the Tiananmen sanctions because a unified Congress left him no room for presidential vetoes During the MFN debate of 1990 1992 however, he took the lead in arguing that open trade could work better than sanctions in correct ing s behavior at home and abroad. With Senate support, he was able to win the MFN debate and veto ed two conditional MFN bills. Second, a lthough the normative discourse of free trade faded after Bush lost the 1992 presidential election, it was revived in 1994 non governmental forei gn policy experts and moderate members of Congress joined the fray and presented the normative discourse to Clinton at a time when security and economic concerns were growing in the United States in response to sure While Clinton had strategically raised human rights and translated them into the linkage policy, he accepted the normative discourse to justify his delinkage decision. Third, while Congress had pushed the normative issues of human rights, arms contro l, and trade to the fore and urged sanctions during 1989 1993, it overwhelmingly status after 1994 and articulated the normative d iscourse to Through these three stages of strategic co constitution, the normative discourse of free trade became dominant in U.S. domestic politics and shifted U.S. economic statecraft toward China from sanctions to engagement. It also became, and continues to be, the normative foundation for U.S. economic engagement with China through the WTO.
193 Table 8 1. Norms and American Economic Statecraft toward China Phases Forms of Economic Means Prevailing Normative Discourse Actors Strategic Uses of Norms The 1989 Tiananmen Sanct ions Negative Human rights Pro sanctions Congress raised human rights due to executive legislative and partisan politics. Pro engagement Bush linked trade to human rights progress but was forced to codify sanctions based on human rights. The M FN Debate of 1990 1992 Positive Free Trade Pro sanctions Congress made a broader interpretation of MFN conditionality to include general human rights principles, arms control, and trade. Pro engagement Bush linked trade to prosperity and brought the issues of arms control and trade into U.S. economic policy. He also resisted Congress when Senate support allowed him to sustain vetoes. The 1993 Linkage Policy Negative Human rights Pro sanctions Clinton raised hu man rights due to electoral and executive legislative politics The 1994 Delinkage Policy Positive Free Trade Pro engagement 1. economic team, non governmental foreign policy experts, and moderate lawmakers argued that open trade could advance not only U.S. security and economic interests, but also prosperity and democracy in China. 2. Without effective alternatives to Clinton used the free trade based normative discourse to justify his delinkage decision. 3. Congress used the normative discourse to justify its votes for and PNTR
194 Anti Sanctions Discourses in Comparative Perspectives In the case of U.S. economic engagement with Ch ina, the engagers countered the pro sanctions coalition and justified their e ngagement policy by arguing that open trade could work better than sanctions both at home and abroad. In fact, U.S. policymakers had long attached moralistic and liberal values to U.S. foreign economic policy when opposing sa nctions against other countries for security, strategic, or economic reasons. On the one hand, t he argument that open trade was a better tool than sanctions in correcting human rights abuses had been articulated by U.S. policy makers when resisting domestic policy. Beginning in 1962, the United Nations General Assembly had passed several resolutions that imposed sanctions against South Africa on a host of economic exchanges ran ging from military sales, trade, and finance. In 1963 and 1978, the United States followed suit with two waves of sanctions against South Africa. 1 However, because South Africa carried geopolitical and economic importance to the United States, U.S. policy m akers were reluctant to broaden sanctions against South Africa. In the spring of 1981, therefore, the Reagan administration previously imposed bans on economic, diplomati c, and military contact between the United States and South Africa A State Department official said, 2 T o morally justify constructive engageme nt with South Africa the Regan administration attached moralistic and liberal values to U.S. foreign economic policy toward South Africa. 1 For the timing of major sanctions against South Africa, see Klotz, Norms in International Relations p. 5. 2 Gary C. H ufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, Kimberly Ann Elliot, and Barbara Oegg, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy (Washington, D.C.: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 1990), p. 221.
195 any U.S. efforts to externally impos e democratic governance on China (see chapter 3), he delivered his first speech on South Africa on July 22, 1986 and argued that the best way to promote racial equality and dismantle apartheid in South Africa was to bring economic prosperity to the country through open trade. 3 As he said, To achieve that, we need not a Western withdrawal, but deeper involvement by the Western business community as agents of change and progress and growth. The international business community needs not only to be support ed in South Africa transformation, one of the best vehicles for change is through the involvement of black South Africans in business, job related activities, and labor union s. 4 On the other hand, the argument that open trade could induce a ri sing power to act peacefully had also been articulated by U.S. policy makers when dealing with the rise of Japan before World War Two. In the 1930s, U.S. policy makers were opposed to sanct ions against Japan for its expansionist activities in East and Southeast Asia. First, although U.S. policy makers were concerned about Japanese expansionism in the Far East, U.S. security interests in the region were minor From a U.S. perspective therefor e, it was not worth applying sanctions at the expense of provoking Japan. Second, American businesses though concerned about the loss of the Chinese market due to Japanese expansion ism were opposed to sanctions against Japan because they had profited fro m the Japanese market. Indeed, at the time of the Great Depression, State Depar tment 3 Of course, there was a difference between Chi na and South Africa. Because China had embarked on economic reform, Reagan had reasons to be optimistic about the endogenous force that could bring about democratic governance in China. By contrast, South Africa was in crisis, both politically and economic ally. This gave Reagan grounds to argue for the exogenous force that could bring about racial equality in South Africa. 4 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Vol. 22, No. 30 (July 28, 1986), pp. 975 980.
196 widesp as one of the reasons against sanctions against Japan 5 While refusing to apply sanctions against Japan the doves in the Roosevelt administration optimistically believed that U.S. economic ties with Japan would strengthen the hands of the moderates in Tokyo and therefore direct the rise of Japan toward a peaceful end. On October 19, 1939, U.S. Ambassador t o Japan Joseph C. Grew delivered a speech at the American Japan Society in Tokyo. He said, Nations are now increasingly dependent on others both for commodities they do not produce themselves and for the disposal of the thing s which they produce in excess . . It is this system of exchange which has not only raised the stander of living everywhere but has made it possible for two or even three persons to live in comfort where but one had lived in discomfort under a simple self contained economy. Not only the benefits of our advanced civilization but the very existence of most of us depends on maintaining in equilibrium a delicately bala nced and complex world economy . postulated upon the ability of nations to buy and sell where they please under condi tions of free competition. 6 For Grew, economic interdependence would advance not only economic exchanges but also political cooperation between the United States and Japan. Under economic interdependence, according to Grew, a rising Japan would become a peaceful power that serve d U.S. interests. s victories in Europe made easy prey of Europea n colonies in Southeast Asia. I n October 1940 Roosevelt told Secretary of State Cordell Hull were not to shut off oil from Japan . and thereby force her into a military expedition against the Dutch East Indies. 7 5 See p. 172. 6 Quoted in Jonathan G. Utley, Going to War with Japan, 1937 1941 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1985), pp. 67 68. 7 Quoted in Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932 1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 242 243.
197 It should be noted that the American government had different policy concerns toward Japan and South Africa. In the Japanese case, o n the one hand, the Roosevelt administration was that open trade could safely bring the rising sun into the regular orbit. In the South African case, on the other hand, the Reagan administration wa s perhaps only rhetorically, and argued that open trade could reshape South Africa toward prosperity and therefore democracy. In the Chinese case, however, the engagers emphasized the positive impacts of o pen trade on both the foreign policy behavior and domestic features of China The engagers shared their security and economic concerns with the pro sanctions coalition but argued that open trade could e international norms of arms control and trade. Although their human rights concerns might also be only rhetorical, the engagers linked open trade to human rights progress in order to counter the pro sanctions coalition. Implications for t he Future of Am erica China Relations From a liberal constructivist perspective, China will be more likely to be socialized into the international community when the country increasingly participates in international institutions that embody liberal norms What Friedberg that toward embracing appropriate behavior prescribed by international norms and expectations For them, liberal norms are so attractive th at China will conform to them in order to be accepted as a modern, responsible member of the world community. 8 Johnston and Evans for example, argue that China has been willing to enter into multilateral international institutions in recent years 8 The Future of U.S. China Rel Interna tional Security Vol. 30, No. 2 (Fall 2005), pp. 7 45.
198 because its leaders are f appearing to be 9 When China accepts and even internalizes liberal norms, according to the liberal constructivist logic, Chinese leaders will be more likely to abandon t he old Chinese realpolitik 10 For c onstructivist optimists or liberal constructivists therefore, socializing China into the international community will make the rise of China peaceful. 11 repeated interactions between the United States and China will reinforce, rather than erode, mutual suspicions and hostilities. For example, rights abuses tend to give credence to the American view that China is an evil challenger to American values. By the same token, r itualized American criticism s ses tend to reinforce the Chinese view that the United States is see king to undermine the rise of China. For constructivist pessimists, such interactions will create a self fulfilling prophesy of eventual confrontation between the two countries. 12 This study shares a pessimistic view of U.S. China relations with const ructivist pessimists, but its pessimism infers from the theoretical framework I have developed to explain engagement policy reversal toward China. I call into question whether 9 in Johnston and Ross, Engaging China p. 265. 10 According to Johnston, i n Chinese culture, there is a tendency in policy for offensive behavior when C hina enjoys military advantages over its enem ies, but C hina becomes defensive when its capabilities diminish. Johnston calls this pattern a parabellum strategic culture, similar to W e stern realpolitik th ought and practice. See Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995). ese Foreign Affairs Vol. 75, No. 5 (September/October 1996), pp. 37 52. 11 Socializing Whom? Complex Engagement in Sino ASEAN Relations, Pacific Review Vol. 19, No. 2 (June 2006), 157 Community Zhu Feng, eds., Secur ity, and the Future of International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), pp. 115 138. 12 The Future of U.S. China Rel 39.
199 China has been socialized to the extent of internalizing liberal norms for reasons of appropriateness. Just as the engagers used or accepted norms strategically, the same may be true of China. In his study of Chinese strategic culture, Johnston explores a Chinese concept quan bian meaning absolute flexibility. cannot be restricted, constrained by, or wedded to self imposed a priori political, military, or s and weigh all relevant factors in a strategic situation 13 Johnston also explores the Chinese notion of within the context of righteou s war, the ends clearly justify the means. Once the ends of war are deemed righteous, then any and all means become righteous by 14 In Chinese strategic culture, a war tha t should be unrighteous will become righteous when infused with moral language by which it is justified. international norms may be strategic as well As Wan attitudes toward multilateralism are instrumental. As a result, she argues, multilateral international institutions s socialization into nor internalization of the nor ms of multilateralism. 15 The U.S. China negotiations strategic acceptance of free trade norms. In the decade long negotiations, the United States 13 For the Chinese notion of quan bian see Johnston, Cultural Realism pp. 102 103. 14 Fo r the Chinese notion of righteous war, see Johnston, Cultural Realism pp. 69 71. 15 Asian Survey Vol. 40, No. 3 (May June 2000), pp. 475 491.
200 insisted that China should a commercially meaningful terms 16 and enter the WTO as a developed country that would largely open its markets to foreign investment and competition. Because the United States had set WTO rules, China eventually made tremendous economic concessions in ways that met WTO principles. As in the end the Chinese had little choice but to accept most of the demands of the United States. 17 Because China has accepted WTO principles strategically, whether it has internalized them and become socialized into the free trade regime is doubtful. Indeed, this is why there has been debate over whether China has complied with its WTO commitments. 18 Furthermore, China may reset international norms and rules when its power grows to the extent that allows it to do so. As a Chinese official shouted WTO membership know we have to play the game your way now, but in ten 19 When China become s capable of rese tt ing WTO rules, a process of strategic co constitution would occur and substitute Chinese principles for American ones. Although this study has only explored strategic co constitution at the domestic level in the United States, the process of strategic co constitution may also apply to China and ha ppen at the international l evel. 16 As Secretary of S World Trade Organization WTO The United States and China: Building a New Era of Cooperation for a New Ce ntury, Address at Fudan University, Shan ghai, U.S. Department of State Dispatch Vol. 7, No. 48 (25 November 1996) p. 582 17 Nicholas R. Lardy, Integrating China into the Global Economy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2002) p. 65. 18 China Economic and Security Review Commission, One Hundred Eighth Congress, s Economic and Securi ty Review Commission (Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 2004). 19 Foreign Affairs Vol. 87, No. 4 (July/August 2008), pp. 57 69, at p. 65. Also see R International Security Vol. 36, No. 1 (Summer 2011), pp. 41 72, at p. 54
201 This study thus is pessimistic about the future of U.S. China relations. Unlike constructivist optimists or liberal constructivists, who emphasize the tendency of China to internalize international norms and become socialized into the interna tional community, I argue that China while having been strategically subjecting itself to social construction processes, may in turn strategically constitute the international system according to its versions of international order, including the dynastic barbarians surrounding the Middle Kingdom. 20 As a result, there is no gua rantee that the U.S. centered world order that has been ac cepted by China will be lasting. The term P NTR may be a misnomer because U.S. economic engagement with China will not necessarily PNTR after all, is just a legal term that cannot reflect the changing characters of international politics. Just as human rights were delinked, the normative discourse of fr ee trade may be historically contin gent as well 20 For the classic description of the tribute system, see Joh n K. Fairbank, ed., The Chinese World Order: Traditional (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968). See also Mark Mancall, China at the Center: 300 Years of Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press, 1984).
202 LIST OF REFERENCES Baker, James A., and Thomas M. DeFrank. 1995. The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace, 1989 1992 Baldwin, David A. 1971. The Power of Posit ive Sanctions. World Politics 24: 19 38. 1978. Power and Social Exchange. American Political Science Review 72: 1229 1242. 1985. Economic Statecraft Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Barkin, J. Samuel. 2010. Realist Constructivism: Re thinking International Relations Theory New York: Cambridge University Press. 2003. Social Construction and the Logic of Money: Financial Predominance and International Economic Leadership Albany: State University of New York Press. Barnett, A. Doak 1981. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution. Baucus, Max. 1992. Developing a China Policy. China Business Review 19: 12. Bernstein, Richard, and Ross H. Munro. 1998. The Coming Conflict with China New York: A.A. Knopf. Bush, George H. W., and Brent Scowcroft. 2011. A World Transformed Random House Digital, Inc. Carr, E. H. 2001. risis 1919 1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations Palgrave Macmillan. Carter, Jimmy. 1995. Ke eping Faith: Memoirs of a President Fayetteville, AR: University of Arkansas Press. Chang, Jaw ling Joanne. 1986. United States China Normalization: An Evaluation of Foreign Policy Decision Making Graduate School of International Studies, University of D enver. Checkel, Jeffrey T. 1998. The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory. World Politics 50: 324 348. 2001. Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change. International Organization 55: 553 588. Chen, Jian. 1994. oad to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino American Confrontation New York: Columbia University Press. Christensen, Thomas J. 2006. Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and U.S. Policy toward East Asia. International Security 31 : 81 126.
203 Christopher, Warren. 1998. In the Stream of History: Shaping Foreign Policy for a New Era Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. Cohen, Jerome Alan, Robert F. Dernberger, and John R. Garson. 1971. China Trade Prospects and U.S. Policy New York: National Committee on United States China Relations, Praeger. Cohen, Warren I. 2010. American Relations New York: Columbia University Press. Drury, A. Cooper, and Yitan Li. 2006. U.S. Economic Sanction Threats Against China: Failing to Leverage Better Human Rights. Foreign Policy Analysis 2: 307 324. Cortright, David, and George A. Lpez. 2002. Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Crawford, Neta C. 2002. Argu ment and Change in World Politics: Ethics, Decolonization, and Humanitarian Intervention New York: Cambridge University Press. Cruz, Consuelo. 2000. Identity and Persuasion: How Nations Remember Their Pasts and Make Their Futures. World Politics 52: 275 3 12. Dahl, Robert A. 1957. The Concept of Power. Behavioral Science 2: 201 215. Dessler, David, and John Owen. 2005. Constructivism and the Problem of Explanation: A Review Article. Perspectives on Politics 3: 597 610. Destler, I. M. 2005. American Trade Po litics Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics. Deudney, Daniel, and G. John Ikenberry. 2009. Myth of the Autocratic Revival: Why Liberal Democracy Will Prevail. Foreign Affairs 88: 77 90. Devereaux, Charan, Robert Z. Lawrence, and Michael Watkins. 2006. Case Studies in US Trade Negotiation: Making the Rules Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics. Dietrich, John W. 1999. Interest Groups and Foreign Policy: Clinton and the China MFN Debates. Presidential Studies Quarterly 29: 280 296. Dittmer, Lowell. 2001. Chinese Human Rights and American Foreign Policy: A Realist Approach. Review of Politics 63: 421 459. Drezner, Daniel W 1999. The Trouble with Carrots: Transaction Costs, Conflict Expectations, and Economic Inducements. Se curity Studies 9: 188 218. 2000. Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions: When is Cooperation Counterproductive? International Organization 54: 73 102.
204 Dulles, Foster Rhea. 1972. American Poli cy toward Communist China, 1949 1969 New Yor k: Crowell. Elliott, Kimberly Ann. 1998. The Sanctions Glass: Half Full or Completely Empty? International Security 23: 50 65. Fairbank, John King, and Suzanne Wilson Barnett. 2002. Christianity in China: Early Protestant Missionary Writings Toronto: Univ ersity of Toronto Press. Feng, Hui. 2006. Dragon Goes Global New York: Taylor & Francis. Finnemore, Martha. 1993. International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Science Policy. International Organization 47: 565 597. 1996a. National Interests in International Society Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1996b. Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insig International Organization 50: 325 347. 2003. The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use Of Force Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. International No rm Dynamics and Political Change. International Organization 52: 887 917. Galtung, Johan. 1967. On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions: With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia. World Politics 19: 378 416. Gilpin, Robert. 1983. War and Change in World Politics New York: Cambridge University Press. Gilpin, Robert, and Jean M. Gilpin. 1987. The Political Economy of International Relations Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press. Goddard, Stacie E. 2008. When Right Makes Might: How Prussia Over turned the European Balance of Power. International Security 33: 110 142. International Security 22: 36 73. Goldstein, Joshua S., and Jon C. Pevehouse. 2012. International Relations: 2010 2011 Update New York: Longman. Gowa, Joanne. 1989. Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and Free Trade. American Political Science Review 83: 1245 1256.
205 1995. Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press. Grie co, Joseph M. 1990. Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America and Non Tariff Barriers to Trade Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Guzzini, Stefano. 1998. Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy: The Continuing Story of a Dea th Foretold New York : Routledge. Haass, Richard. 1998. Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy New York: Council on Foreign Relations. Hale, David D., and Lyric Hughes Hale. 2008. Reconsidering Reevaluation: The Wrong Approach to the U.S. Chinese Trad e Imbalance. Foreign Affairs 87: 57 70. Harding, Harry. 1992. A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China since 1972 Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. Hawkins, Darren. 2004. Explaining Costly International Institutions: Persuasion and Enforceable Human Rights Norms. International Studies Quarterly 48: 779 804. Helleiner, Eric. 2003. The Making of National Money: Territorial Currencies in Historical Perspective Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Hirschman, Albert O. 1980. National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade Berkeley: University of California Press. Hopf, Ted. 1998. The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory. International Security 23: 171 200. Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Yee Wong, and Ketki Sheth. 2006. US C hina Trade Disputes: Rising Tide, Rising Stakes Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics. Hunt, Michael H. 2009. Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy New Heaven: Yale University Press. Ikenberry, G. John. 2008. The Rise of China and the Future o f the West: Can the Liberal System Survive. Foreign Affairs 87: 23 42. Ikenberry, G. John, David A. Lake, and Michael Mastanduno. 1988. Introduction: Approaches to Explaining American Foreign Economic Policy. International Organization 42: 1 14. Johnston, Alastair Iain. 2003. Is China a Status Quo Power? International Security 27: 5 56. Kaempfer, William H., and Anton David Lowenberg. 1992. International Economic Sanctions: A Public Choice Perspective Boulder, CO: Westview. Kahler, Miles, and Scott L. Kast ner. 2006. Strategic Uses of Economic Interdependence: Engagement Policies on the Korean Peninsula and Across the Taiwan Strait. Journal of Peace Research 43: 523 541.
206 Kastner, Scott L., and Phillip C. Saunders. 2012. Is China a Status Quo or Revisionist S tate? Leadership Travel as an Empirical Indicator of Foreign Policy Priorities1. International Studies Quarterly 56: 163 177. Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics Ithaca: Corne ll University Press. Kennan, George Frost. 1984. American Diplomacy Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Kennedy, Scott. 2003. China Cross Talk: The American Debate Over China Policy since Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield. Keoh ane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye. 2011. Power and Interdependence New York: Longman. Kissinger, Henry. 2011. On China New York: Penguin Press. Klotz, Audie. 1999. Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid Ithaca: Cornell Universi ty Press. Knorr, Klaus. 1975. The Power of Nations: The Political Economy of International Relations New York: Basic Books. Krasner, Stephen D. 1991. Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier. World Politics 43: 336 366. Krebs, Ronald R., and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson. 2007. Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power of Political Rhetoric. European Journal of International Relations 13: 35 66. Kristof, Nicholas D. 1993. The Rise of China. Foreign Affairs 72: 59 81. Lake, Antho ny. 1993. From Containment to Enlargement. US Department of State Dispatch 4: 658 677. 1994. Confronting Backlash States. Foreign Affairs 73: 45 63. Ends Linka ge. China Quarterly 139: 597 621. 2002. Same Bed, Different Dreams: Mana ging U.S. China Relations, 1989 2000 Berkeley: University of California Press. Lardy, Nicholas R. 1994. China in the World Economy Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics. 2002. Integrating China into the Global Economy Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics.
207 Strategy. International Security 22: 86 124 Li, Yitan, and A. Cooper Drury. 2004. Threatening Sanctions When Engagement Would Be More Effective: Attaining Better Human Rights in China. International Studies Perspectives 5: 378 394. Liberman, Peter. 1996. Trading with the Enemy: Security and Relati ve Economic Gains. International Security 21: 147 175. Lieberthal, Kenneth. 1994. The Future of United States China Relations: A Proposal for a Sustainable, Bipartisan Policy Washington, D.C.: Policy Panel on U.S. China Relations. Lilley, James. 1994. Fre edom through Trade. Foreign Policy 94: 37 42. Long, William J. 1996. Trade and Technology Incentives and Bilateral Cooperation. International Studies Quarterly 40: 77 106. Lord, Winston. 1989a. China and America: Beyond the Big Chill. Foreign Affairs 68: 1 15. 1989b. Misguided Mission. Washington Post (January 2, 1990) . 1994. Mid Term Review of Most Favored Nation Status for China. US Department of State Dispatch 5: 127 129. Madsen, Richard. 1995. China and the American Dream: A Moral Inquiry Ber keley: University of California Press. Mann, James. 2000. Nixon to Clinton New York: Vintage Books. March, James G., and Johan P. Olsen. 1998. The Institutional Dynamics of Internatio nal Political Orders. International Organization 52: 943 969. Martin, Lisa L. 1993. Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Mastanduno, Michael. 1992. Economic Containment: CoCom and th e Politics of East West Trade Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1997. Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War. International Security 21: 49 88. 1998. Economics and Security in Statecraft and S cholarship. International Organization 52: 825 854. 1999. Economic Statecraft, Interdependence, and National Security: Agendas for Research. Security Studies 9: 288 316.
208 Force and the Sociolinguistic Construction of Attraction in World Politics. Millennium: Journal of International Studies 33: 583 612. McGiffert, Carola. 2003. China in the American Political Imagination CSIS Press, Center for Strategic and International S tudies. Mearsheimer, John J. 1994. The False Promise of International Institutions. International Security 19: 5 49. 2001. The Future of the American Pacifier. Foreign Affairs 80: 46 60. 2003. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics W. W. Norton & C ompany. Medeiros, Evan S. 2009. on Policies and Practices, 1980 2004 Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. Morris, Susan C. 2002. Trade and Human Rights: The Ethical Dimension in U.S. Chin a Relations Burlington, VT: Ashgate. Nathan, Andrew James, and Liang Zhang. 2001. The Tiananmen Papers New York: Public Affairs. Nixon, Richard M. 1967. Asia after Viet Nam. Foreign Affairs 46: 111 130. Nossal, Kim Richard. 1989. International Sanctions as International Punishment. International Organization 43: 301 322. Nye, Joseph S. Jr. 1995. The Case for Deep Engagement. Foreign Affairs 74: 90 105. Oksenberg, Michel, and Robert B. Oxnam. 1977. China and America, past and future New York: Foreign Poli cy Association. Onuf, Nicholas. 2012. World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations New York: Routledge. Imperial Germany. Interna tional Security 20: 147 184. Papayoanou, Paul A., and Scott L. Kastner. 1999. Sleeping with the (Potential) Enemy: Assessing the U.S. Policy of Engagement with China. Security Studies 9: 157 187. Pape, Robert A. 1997. Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work. In ternational Security 22: 90 136. 1998. Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work. International Security 23: 66 77. Payne, Rodger A. 2001. Persuasion, Frames and Norm Construction. European Journal of International Relations 7: 37 61.
209 Rennack, Dianne E 1996. China: U.S. Economic Sanctions Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. International Organization 54: 1 39. Risse, Thomas, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikki nk. 1999. The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change New York: Cambridge University Press. Ross, Robert S. 1995. Negotiating Cooperation: Th e United States and China, 1969 1989 Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 199 6. Enter the Dragon. Foreign Policy 104: 18 25. 1999. The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty First Century. International Security 23: 81 118. Rowe, David M. 1999. Economic Sanctions do Work: Economic Statecraft and the Oil Embargo of Rho desia. Security Studies 9: 254 287. Ruggie, John Gerard. 1982. International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order. International Organization 36: 379 415. 1983. Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis. World Politics 35: 261 285. 1998. What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge. International Organization 52: 855 885. Scholes, Walter Vinton, and Marie V. Scho les. 1970. The Foreign Policies of the Taft Administration Columbia: University of Missouri Press. Selden, Zachary A. 1999. Economic Sanctions as Instruments of American Foreign Policy Westport, Conn.: Praeger Silverstone, Paul H. 1959. The Export Contro l Act of 1949: Extraterritorial Enforcement. University of Pennsylvania Law Review 107: 331 362. Sterling Folker, Jennifer. 2000. Competing Paradigms or Birds of a Feather? Constructivism and Neoliberal Institutionalism Compared. International Studies Quar terly 44: 97 119. 2002a. Realism and the Constructivist Challenge: Rejecting, Reconstructing, or Rereading. International Studies Review 4: 73 97. 2002b. Theories of International Cooperation and the Primacy of Anarchy: Explaining U.S. Internatio nal Policy Making after Bretton Woods Albany : State University of New York Press. Foreign Policy 97: 18 35.
210 Suettinger, Robert L. 2004. Beyond Tiananmen: The Politi cs of U.S. China Relations 1989 2000 Wa shington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. Sutter, Robert G. 1998. U.S. Policy toward China: An Introduction to the Role of Interest Groups Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Tan, Qingshan. 1990. The Politics of U.S. Most Favored Nation Treatment to Chin a: The Cases of 1979 and 1990. Journal of Northeast Asian Studies 9: 41 59. Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf. 1983. Patterns in the Dust: Chinese American Relations and th e Recognition Controversy, 1949 1950 New York: Columbia University Press. 2001. China Con fidential: American Diplomats and Sino American Relations, 1945 1996 New York: Columbia University Press. Viner, Jacob. 1948. Power versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries. World Politics 1: 1 29. Walt, St ephen M. 1998. International Relations: One World, Many Theories. Foreign Policy 110: 29 46. Whiting, Allen S. 1995. Chinese Nationalism and Foreign Policy after Deng. China Quarterly 142: 295 316. Intersubjective Bases of Monetary Cooperation. International Studies Quarterly 48: 433 453. Xie, Tao. 2009. U.S. China Relations: China Policy on Capitol Hill New York: Routledge. Zakaria, Fareed. 1999. From Wealth to Power: The U Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press. Zehfuss, Maja. 2002. Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality New York: Cambridge University Press. Zeng, Ka. 2004. Trade Threats, Trade Wars: Ba rgaining, Retaliation, and American Coercive Diplomacy Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Zhang, Shu Guang. 2001. the Sino Soviet Alliance, 1949 1963 Stanford Cali.: Stanford University Press.
211 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Chi hung Wei r ournalism from Catholic Fu jen University, Taiwan (2000) chi University (2002). His research interests are in international relations theory, U.S. China relations, Chinese politics, and economic statecraft. His research has been published in Issues and Studies and T he China Quarterly