<%BANNER%>

The Liking-Similarity Effect

Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0045232/00001

Material Information

Title: The Liking-Similarity Effect Perceptions of Similarity as a Function of Liking
Physical Description: 1 online resource (84 p.)
Language: english
Creator: Collisson, Brian D
Publisher: University of Florida
Place of Publication: Gainesville, Fla.
Publication Date: 2013

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords: inference -- liking -- projection -- similarity
Psychology -- Dissertations, Academic -- UF
Genre: Psychology thesis, Ph.D.
bibliography   ( marcgt )
theses   ( marcgt )
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent)   ( marcgt )
born-digital   ( sobekcm )
Electronic Thesis or Dissertation

Notes

Abstract: The current research tests whether the inferences people make about likable and dislikable targets align with the predictions of balance theory. Specifically, I hypothesized that people exhibit a liking-similarity effect by perceiving greater similarity with a likable person than a dislikable person. In Studies 1 and 2, the liking-similarity effect was tested by manipulating the likable or dislikable impression of a target person and then assessing perceptions of similarity with the targets. In Study 1, participants rated themselves on various trait and attitude dimensions and made inferences about two targets – one likable and one dislikable – on those same dimensions.In Study 2, participants inferred the attitudes of a likable and dislikable target in regard to objects that participants had either positive or negative attitudes toward. Across both studies, people exhibited a liking-similarity effect by perceiving greater similarity with a likable than dislikable person.In Study 3, individual differences related to balance theory (i.e., preference for consistency and self-esteem) were tested as moderators of the liking-similarity effect. People with a strong, as compared to weak, preference for consistency were hypothesized to exhibit a greater liking-similarity effect because such inferences maximize cognitive balance. Similarly, people with high, as compared to low, self-esteem were hypothesized to exhibit a greater liking-similarity effect because perceiving similarity with likable targets maximizes balance for people who hold a similarly positive attitude about their own self-worth. Study 3 confirmed these hypotheses. Next, I manipulated participants’ preference for consistency (Study 4) and self-esteem (Study 5) to identify the potential causal relationship these variables may have with the liking-similarity effect.  In Study 4,participants’ preference for consistency was manipulated by writing about the importance of consistency, inconsistency, or an unrelated value. In Study 5,participants’ self-esteem was manipulated via inclusion or exclusion during asocial game. Neither the preference for consistency nor self-esteem manipulation affected the liking-similarity effect. Participants in both studies, regardless of condition, continued to perceive greater similarity with likable, than dislikable, targets. Discussion focuses on the nature of the liking-similarity effect, its resistance to experimental manipulation, as well as possible implications for social cognition and behavior.
General Note: In the series University of Florida Digital Collections.
General Note: Includes vita.
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references.
Source of Description: Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page.
Source of Description: This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication. The University of Florida Libraries, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law.
Statement of Responsibility: by Brian D Collisson.
Thesis: Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Florida, 2013.
Local: Adviser: Chambers, John Robert.
Electronic Access: RESTRICTED TO UF STUDENTS, STAFF, FACULTY, AND ON-CAMPUS USE UNTIL 2015-05-31

Record Information

Source Institution: UFRGP
Rights Management: Applicable rights reserved.
Classification: lcc - LD1780 2013
System ID: UFE0045232:00001

Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0045232/00001

Material Information

Title: The Liking-Similarity Effect Perceptions of Similarity as a Function of Liking
Physical Description: 1 online resource (84 p.)
Language: english
Creator: Collisson, Brian D
Publisher: University of Florida
Place of Publication: Gainesville, Fla.
Publication Date: 2013

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords: inference -- liking -- projection -- similarity
Psychology -- Dissertations, Academic -- UF
Genre: Psychology thesis, Ph.D.
bibliography   ( marcgt )
theses   ( marcgt )
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent)   ( marcgt )
born-digital   ( sobekcm )
Electronic Thesis or Dissertation

Notes

Abstract: The current research tests whether the inferences people make about likable and dislikable targets align with the predictions of balance theory. Specifically, I hypothesized that people exhibit a liking-similarity effect by perceiving greater similarity with a likable person than a dislikable person. In Studies 1 and 2, the liking-similarity effect was tested by manipulating the likable or dislikable impression of a target person and then assessing perceptions of similarity with the targets. In Study 1, participants rated themselves on various trait and attitude dimensions and made inferences about two targets – one likable and one dislikable – on those same dimensions.In Study 2, participants inferred the attitudes of a likable and dislikable target in regard to objects that participants had either positive or negative attitudes toward. Across both studies, people exhibited a liking-similarity effect by perceiving greater similarity with a likable than dislikable person.In Study 3, individual differences related to balance theory (i.e., preference for consistency and self-esteem) were tested as moderators of the liking-similarity effect. People with a strong, as compared to weak, preference for consistency were hypothesized to exhibit a greater liking-similarity effect because such inferences maximize cognitive balance. Similarly, people with high, as compared to low, self-esteem were hypothesized to exhibit a greater liking-similarity effect because perceiving similarity with likable targets maximizes balance for people who hold a similarly positive attitude about their own self-worth. Study 3 confirmed these hypotheses. Next, I manipulated participants’ preference for consistency (Study 4) and self-esteem (Study 5) to identify the potential causal relationship these variables may have with the liking-similarity effect.  In Study 4,participants’ preference for consistency was manipulated by writing about the importance of consistency, inconsistency, or an unrelated value. In Study 5,participants’ self-esteem was manipulated via inclusion or exclusion during asocial game. Neither the preference for consistency nor self-esteem manipulation affected the liking-similarity effect. Participants in both studies, regardless of condition, continued to perceive greater similarity with likable, than dislikable, targets. Discussion focuses on the nature of the liking-similarity effect, its resistance to experimental manipulation, as well as possible implications for social cognition and behavior.
General Note: In the series University of Florida Digital Collections.
General Note: Includes vita.
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references.
Source of Description: Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page.
Source of Description: This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication. The University of Florida Libraries, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law.
Statement of Responsibility: by Brian D Collisson.
Thesis: Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Florida, 2013.
Local: Adviser: Chambers, John Robert.
Electronic Access: RESTRICTED TO UF STUDENTS, STAFF, FACULTY, AND ON-CAMPUS USE UNTIL 2015-05-31

Record Information

Source Institution: UFRGP
Rights Management: Applicable rights reserved.
Classification: lcc - LD1780 2013
System ID: UFE0045232:00001


This item has the following downloads:


Full Text

PAGE 1

1 THE LIKING SIMILARITY EFFECT: PERCEPTIONS OF SIMILARITY AS A FUNCTION OF LIKING By BRIAN DAVID COLLISSON A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREM ENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2013

PAGE 2

2 2013 Brian David Collisson

PAGE 3

3 To all those who have and will always be a part of my life, t his work is a reflection of you

PAGE 4

4 ACKNOWL EDGMENTS I dedicate my dissertation to my faculty mentors, family, and loving girlfriend. First, I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. John Chambers. His guidance, insight, and support allowed me to become the confident, independent social psychologist tha t I am today. I am also grateful to my other faculty mentors, Dr. Ryan Duffy, Dr. James Shepperd, and Dr. Michael Weigold, for their mentorship and feedback on my dissertation. Second, I thank my family for their love and encouragement. Specifically, I tha nk my parents Dean and Joey, my siblings Deanna and Steven, and extended family of surprise by my successes in life. Third, I dedicate my dissertation to my best friend and loving girlfrie nd, Emily Hunt. There are no words I can use to express how much her love and support mean to me. She is my inspiration to continue becoming the best person I can possibly be.

PAGE 5

5 TABLE OF CONTENTS page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................ ................................ ................................ ............... 4 LIST OF TABLES ................................ ................................ ................................ ........................... 7 LIST OF FIGURES ................................ ................................ ................................ ......................... 8 ABSTRACT ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 9 CHAPTER 1 THE LIKING SIMILARITY EFFECT: PERCEPTIONS OF SIMILARITY AS A FUNCTION OF LIKING ................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 11 Balance Theory ................................ ................................ ................................ ....................... 15 The Liking Similarity Effect ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 17 P roposed Moderators of the Liking similarity Effect ................................ ............................. 20 Current Research ................................ ................................ ................................ .................... 23 2 STUDY 1 ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ 27 Method ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 27 Results and Discussion ................................ ................................ ................................ ........... 29 3 STUDY 2 ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ 36 Method ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 36 Results and Discussion ................................ ................................ ................................ ........... 37 4 STUDY 3 ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ 40 Method ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 40 Results and Discussion ................................ ................................ ................................ ........... 41 5 STUDY 4 ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ 46 Method ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 46 Results and Discussion ................................ ................................ ................................ ........... 47 5 STUDY 5 ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ 50 Method ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 51 Results and Discussion ................................ ................................ ................................ ........... 52 7 DISCUSSION ................................ ................................ ................................ ......................... 56

PAGE 6

6 Implications ................................ ................................ ................................ ............................ 61 Future Directions ................................ ................................ ................................ .................... 63 Conclusion ................................ ................................ ................................ .............................. 64 APPENDIX A POLITICAL VALUES ................................ ................................ ................................ ........... 65 B PERSONALITY TRAITS ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 66 C ATTACHMENT STYLES ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 67 D BEHAVIORAL INTENTIONS ................................ ................................ .............................. 68 E SELF OTHER OVERLAP MEASURE ................................ ................................ ................. 69 F SOCIAL INFERENCE VIGNETTES ADAPTED FROM HEIDER (1958) ......................... 70 G PREFERENCE FOR CONSISTENCY SCALE ................................ ................................ .... 71 H SELF ESTEEM ................................ ................................ ................................ ...................... 72 I SELF CONCEPT CLARITY SCALE ................................ ................................ ................... 73 J ADAPTED HEIDER VIGNETTES ................................ ................................ ....................... 74 K MANIPULATION CHECK, SELF ESTEEM, AND MOOD ITEMS ................................ .. 75 LIST OF REFERENCES ................................ ................................ ................................ ............... 76 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ................................ ................................ ................................ ......... 84

PAGE 7

7 LIST OF TABLES Table page 2 1 Sample items and response scales f or self and target inference measures ........................ 32 2 2 Means for likable and dislikable target ratings ................................ ................................ .. 33

PAGE 8

8 LIST OF FIGURES Figure page 1 1 Balanced inferences for a likable and dislikable person. ................................ ................... 26 2 1 Screenshot of actors in the likable and dislikable condition. ................................ ............. 34 2 2 Perceived similarity with likable and dislikable targets in regard to political values, personality traits, attachment styles, behavioral intentions, and for the aggregate liking similarity ef fect (Study 1) ................................ ................................ ....................... 35 3 1 Inferred attitudes of a likable and dislikable other as a function of own attitudinal position (Study 2). ................................ ................................ ................................ .............. 39 4 1 Perceived similarity with likable and dislikable targets as a function of individual preference for consistency (Study 3). ................................ ................................ ................ 44 4 2 Perceived similarity with likable and dislikab le targets as a function of individual self esteem (Study 3). ................................ ................................ ................................ ........ 45 5 1 Perceived similarity with likable and dislikable targets as a function of writing prompt condition (Study 4). ................................ ................................ ............................... 49 6 1 Perceived similarity with likable and dislikable targets as a function of social inclusion (Study 5). ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 55

PAGE 9

9 Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate Sc hool of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy THE LIKING SIMILARITY EFFECT: PERCEPTIONS OF SIMILARITY AS A FUNCTION OF LIKING By Brian David Collisson May 2013 Chair: John Chambers Major: Psychology The current research tests whether the inferences people make about likable and dislikable targets align with the predictions of balance theory. Specifically, I hypothesized that people exhibit a liking similarity effect b y perceiving greater similarity with a likable person than a dislikable person. In Studies 1 and 2, the liking similarity effect was tested by manipulating the likable or dislikable impression of a target person and then assessing perceptions of similarity with the targets. In Study 1, participants rated themselves on various trait and attitude dimensions and made inferences about two targets one likable and one dislikable on those same dimensions. In Study 2, participants inferred the attitudes of a li kable and dislikable target in regard to objects that participants had either positive or negative attitudes toward. Across both studies, people exhibited a liking similarity effect by perceiving greater similarity with a likable than dislikable person. In Study 3, individual differences related to balance theory (i.e., preference for consistency and self esteem) were tested as moderators of the liking similarity effect. People with a strong, as compared to weak, preference for consistency were hypothesized to exhibit a greater liking similarity effect because such inferences maximize cognitive balance. Similarly, people with high, as compared to low, self esteem were hypothesized to exhibit a greater liking similarity effect because perceiving similarity wi th

PAGE 10

10 likable targets maximizes balance for people who hold a similarly positive attitude about their own self preference for consistency (Study 4) and self esteem (Study 5) to ident ify the potential causal relationship these variables may have with the liking preference for consistency was manipulated by writing about the importance of consistency, inconsistency, or an unrelated value. In esteem was manipulated via inclusion or exclusion during a social game. Neither the preference for consistency nor self esteem manipulation affected the liking similarity effect. Participants in both studies, regardless of cond ition, continued to perceive greater similarity with likable, than dislikable, targets. Discussion focuses on the nature of the liking similarity effect, its resistance to experimental manipulation, as well as possible implications for social cognition and behavior.

PAGE 11

11 CHAPTER 1 THE LIKING SIMILARITY EFFECT: PERCEPTIONS OF SIMILARITY AS A FUNCTION OF LIKING People are intuitive mind readers. They can quickly and effortlessly infer what other people think, intend, desire, and feel (Ames, 2004). Such casual i nferences allow people to successfully interact with, and predict the behavior of, other people (Epley & Waytz, 2010). To illustrate this point, imagine hosting a party that your friends and family would enjoy. What kind of food, drinks, and music would yo u expect to be the biggest hit at the party? Answering this love for wine or distaste for country music would allow the host to cater his or her party to the gue social world (Kagan, 1972). Social inferences are not limi ted to people that individuals already know well. In many situations, people make inferences about others that they know little or nothing about. For example, students make inferences about professors on the first day of class. Dating couples make inferenc es about their partner after a single date. And voters make inferences about a given little information about him or her? When little or nothing is known about a nother person, people engage in social projection processes (Epley & Waytz, 2010). Information people have about themselves (such as personal preferences or traits) is egocentrically used as a starting point for making inferences about others (Dawes & Mulf ord, 1996; Krueger, 2000; Krueger & Stanke, 2001).They assume that other people are similar as themselves and thus think and behave as they would. Therefore, when little

PAGE 12

12 or nothing is known about another person, people tend to project their own attitudes, beliefs, values, and personality traits onto the other person (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977). As demonstrated within the social projection literature, the self plays a pivotal role in social inference processes (Clement & Krueger, 2000). In a seminal study Ross and colleagues (1977) had people infer the prevalence of their own attitudes within the larger population. Specifically, participants were asked to estimate the percentage of other people who shared their own attitudes and preferences towards travel ling abroad, playing sports, and other topics. Results revealed that participants greatly overestimated the percentage of other people who shared their own attitudes and preferences. That is, they projected their own attitudes and preferences onto others a nd therefore perceived a false consensus. In addition to projecting preferences and traits, people also project their uncommon and unique attributes. Suls & Wan (1987) had participants who were and were not fearful of spiders estimate the percentage of ot her who were fearful of spiders. Even though a small percentage of people feared spiders (35%), people who were afraid estimated that 52% of people shared their fears. People unafraid of spiders, however, estimated that only 43% of people possessed such a fear. These findings illustrate the robustness of projection (Krueger & Clement, 1994). People perceive that their own attributes, even uncommon attributes such as a fear of spiders, are more prevalent in the population than they actually are. As highligh ted above, social projection is a widespread phenomenon (Robbins & Krueger, 2005). It has been demonstrated within a variety of domains (Caprara, Vecchione, Bararanelli, & Fraley, 2007, Krueger & Clement, 1994, Suls & Wan, 1987, Weller & Watson, 2009) as w ell as for many different targets (see Robbins & Krueger, 2005). There are conditions, however, that dictate when projection is more (or less) likely to occur. For instance, social

PAGE 13

13 categorization moderates projection (Clement & Krueger, 2002). People tend to project their own preferences and traits onto members of their own group more than members of different groups perceptions of another person as belonging to a n ingroup or outgroup can affect the degree to which people project similar traits and attitudes. In the case of social projection, people perceive similarity rather than actually detect it. That is, they construe the ambiguous or unknown attitudes of othe rs to be similar to their own. In some situations, however, people are aware of the actual preferences and traits of others. A large body of literature within social psychology reflects this point. As demonstrated within a recent meta analysis, the study o f actual similarity and its effects have received far more empirical attention than perceived similarity (Montoya, Horton, & Kirchner, 2008). Therefore, to better understand the causes and possible interpersonal consequences of perceiving (dis)similarity w ith others, I review briefly the research on actual similarity and liking. A rich body of literature shows that people report more favorable evaluations of people who are similar, rather than dissimilar, to themselves (Byrne, 1961). That is, similarity br eeds liking. For instance, people tend to like people who share similar attitudes (Byrne, Bond, & Diamond, 1969), personality traits (Byrnes, Griffit, & Stefaniak, 1967), economic status (Byrne, Clore, Worchel, 1966), and even names or birthdates as themse lves (Jones, Pelham, Carvallo, & Mirenberg, 2004). Just as similarity breeds liking (Byrne, 1961), dissimilarity also breeds disliking (Rosenbaum, 1986). People report less favorable evaluations of people who possess dissimilar values (Rokeach, 1960), beli efs (Chambers, Schlenker, & Collisson, in press), and attitudes (Chen & Kenrick, 2002) as themselves. The effect of (dis)similarity on liking is one of

PAGE 14

14 the most robust and consistent findings within social psychology (Byrne, 1997; Montoya, Horton, & Kirchn er, 2008). Many of the effects of actual similarity on liking were demonstrated using a phantom other technique (Smith, 1957). Typically, participants first convey information about themselves (e.g., their attitudes, personality traits, political values) and then judge how likable an unknown target person appears to be. Before judging the target person, however, participants learn that the target possesses a large proportion of similar or dissimilar attitudes as themselves. Given such information, particip ants then judge how likable the target appears to be. The results from studies using phantom other techniques consistently reveal that similar targets are liked more than dissimilar targets. This effect is so well documented that some researchers suggest that similarity liking may a basic law within the social sciences (Byrne, 1997). In a similar vein as the similarity liking effect, Rosenbaum (1986) proposed that dissimilarity breeds disliking (i.e., the repulsion hypothesis). He suggested that people dis like a person whose attitudes are dissimilar to their own (also see Rokeach, 1960). To test the role of attitude dissimilarity (rather than similarity) on liking, Rosenbaum (1986) conducted a modified version of the commonly used phantom other paradigm. In stead of having participants judge how likable a person with similar or dissimilar attitudes is, Rosenbaum added a third (control) condition in which participants viewed a picture of a person in the absence of any attitude information. Findings from this s tudy revealed that people dislike a person with dissimilar attitudes more than a person whose attitudes were unknown. In this study, Rosenbaum also found that people did not like a person with similar attitudes more than a person whose attitudes were unkn own. Therefore, he concluded that dissimilarity has a greater effect than similarity on liking. However, Byrne and colleagues later

PAGE 15

15 of the effect of similarity o n liking (Byrne, Clore, & Smeaton, 1986). Using a target person with unknown attitudes was a poor comparison to test the strength of actual similarity on liking because people tend to perceive similarity in the absence of any other information. When an unk nown other was control condition was used as a basis of comparison, the effect of similarity was underestimated and the effect of dissimilarity was overestimated. Regardless of this both similarity and dissimilarity affect liking (Montoya, Horton, & Kirchner, 2008). Balance Theory Why does similarity breed liking and dissimilarity breed disliking? A prominent theory used to explain why people like similar others, and dislike dissimila r others, is balance theory (Heider, 1958). Balance theory suggests that sentiments (positive or negative attitudes) exist among a variety of stimuli, such as people and objects. For instance, a person (P) may have a positive or negative attitude towards a nother person (O) and an object (X). The connections between an individual, other person, and object are referred to as unit relations. The crux of balance theory suggests that among unit relations, people are motivated to maintain balanced sentiments and thus achieve a harmonious state of cognitive consistency. Balance is achieved when unit relations exist without stress or pressure of change. If the sentiments among unit relations are unbalanced, people experience discomfort and are motivated to achieve c onsonance among unit relations. To illustrate the central tenets of balance theory, consider the following instances. If one person holds a favorable attitude towards an object (P L X) and is aware that a second person also holds a favorable attitude towa rds the same object (O L X), he or she can create cognitive balance by liking the other person (P L O). Also, if one person holds an unfavorable attitude

PAGE 16

16 towards an object (P DL X) and is aware that a second person holds a favorable attitude towards the sa me object (O L X), he or she can create cognitive balance by disliking the other person (P DL O). Stated differently, people can achieve cognitive consistency by liking (disliking) another person who shares similar (dissimilar) attitudes as oneself. In th e scenarios previously described, similarity bred liking. However, balance theory also predicts that cognitive balance can be achieved by the inferences people make towards a likable or dislikable person. When people are unaware of the attitudes of a lika ble (or dislikable) person, people may perceive similarity (or dissimilarity) with others to facilitate balance (Amodio & Showers, 2005; Sampson & Insko, 1964; Wyer, 1974). In the same way that similarity breeds liking, liking may also breed perceived simi larity. This process can be demonstrated using the unit relations among two hypothetical people (Person A and Person B) and an object. If Person A likes Person B (P L O), the liking evaluation should affect the inferences Person A makes about Person B. If Person A holds a favorable attitude towards an object (P L X), he or she would presumably infer that Person B shares a similar favorable attitude (O L X). And if Person A holds an unfavorable attitude towards an object (P DL X), he or she would presumably infer that Person B shares a similar unfavorable attitude (O DL X). To conceptualize this point, assume that Person A likes Coca Cola and dislikes Elvis Presley. If Person A likes Person B, Person A should infer that Person B also likes Coca Cola and disl ikes Elvis Presley. According to balance theory, social inferences should reverse for a dislikable person. If a person is dislikable, people should infer that the dislikable person does not share similar attitude towards an object. That is, if Person A di slikes Person B (P DL O) and has a favorable attitude towards an object (P L X), Person A would infer that Person B has an unfavorable attitude

PAGE 17

17 towards the same object (O DL X). Conversely, if Person A has an unfavorable attitude towards an object, Person A would infer that Person B has a favorable attitude towards the same object (O L X). Stated differently, when one person dislikes another, he or she should perceive the other as be ing dissimilar as oneself. See F igure 1 1 for a list of balanced social in ferences of a likable and dislikable person. The Liking Similarity Effect According to balance theory, the inferences people make about others are predictable. per son (P L or DL O) and their personal attitudes towards the object of inference (P L or DL X). Therefore, I expect that people infer that likable target persons are similar, and dislikable target persons are dissimilar, to themselves. Specifically, I hypoth esize that people will perceive greater similarity with likable than dislikable target persons a pattern I describe as the liking similarity effect. Several studies offer indirect support for the liking similarity effect. Weller and Watson (2009) had p articipants report the degree to which they were similar to a likable or dislikable person. Specifically, they had participants indicate their own personality traits as well as the traits of their best friend (likable target) and worst enemy (dislikable ta rget). As predicted by those of other studies, I describe pe rceiving greater similarity with a likable than dislikable person as the liking similarity effect. The liking similarity effect has been further supported by other quasi experimental manipulations of liking. Horowitz and colleagues (1951) had people in a d iscussion group rank order members of the group from least to most likable and then judge how similar they were to

PAGE 18

18 each member. Illustrating the liking similarity effect, group members consistently rated likable members as more similar to themselves than d islikable members (Horowitz, Lyons, & Perlmutter, 1951). In a similar design, fraternity members selected the most liked and disliked member of their fraternity and made similarity inferences about each person. Again, fraternity members perceived the most liked fraternity member as more similar to themselves than the most disliked fraternity member (Fiedler, Warrington, & Blaisdell, 1952). Although findings from these studies provide preliminary evidence for the liking similarity effect, they share a comm on limitation. Participants made inferences about a likable or dislikable person that they self selected. Perceiving similarity with a likable person and dissimilarity with a dislikable person could be caused by an accurate perception of reality (Watson, H ubbard, & Wiese, 2000). In these studies, actual similarity is confounded with (dissimilar) to themselves. Therefore, it is still unclear if liking has a c ausal effect on social inferences. Interestingly, a finding similar to the liking similarity effect occurs within romantic relationships. Murray and colleagues (2002) asked married couples that were, or were not, satisfied with their relationship to indic qualities, values, and feelings. Importantly, each spouse indicated their responses without seeing how the other spouse responded. After controlling for actual similarity among couples, Murray and colle agues found that couples that were satisfied with their relationship perceived greater similarity with their spouse than was truly present. Furthermore, couples that projected their own qualities, values, and feelings onto their partner felt more understoo d by their spouse than those that did not project. These findings relate to the liking similarity effect because couples that were

PAGE 19

19 satisfied with their relationship presumably like their partner a great deal. Couples that were dissatisfied with their relat ionship (and presumably dislike their partner) did not show the same degree of projection. Additional research regarding perceptions of similarity among romantic couples supports nships perceive greater similarity with their spouse than couples that are dissatisfied with their relationships (Morry, 2005; 2007; Morry, Kito, & Ortiz, 2011). Priming relationship satisfaction among couples also leads to increases in perceived similarit y (Morry, 2005; Singh & Ho, 2000). Couples who were asked to reflect on the most positive and satisfying moments in their relationship perceived their spouse to be more similar to themselves than couples that did not. This pattern of results is referred to as the attraction similarity hypothesis (Morry, 2005). The attraction similarity hypothesis found among romantic couples differs substantially from the liking similarity effect. The attraction similarity hypothesis has been examined primarily in regard to ongoing social relationships (e.g., friends or romantic couples). The liking similarity effect, on the other hand, applies to impressions formed of unknown others, in particular, strangers. When the only information known about a person is that he or she is either likable or dislikable, the liking similarity effect would be illustrated if people perceive a likable stranger to be more similar to themselves than a dislikable stranger. Another problem with the attraction similarity hypothesis, of course, is t hat it is impossible to disentangle the effect of perceived similarity on liking from the effect of liking on perceived similarity. Over time, couples that develop greater liking for one another may also begin to notice their similarities. It is plausible that couples that notice their similarities may develop greater liking for one another. This chicken and egg problem does not apply to the

PAGE 20

20 liking similarity effect. In the paradigm I used to test the liking similarity effect, liking is manipulated orthogon ally from similarity. People first form a liking or disliking evaluation of another person and then infer his or her attitudes. Proposed Moderators of the Liking similarity Effect Despite the ubiquity of consistency motives (Festinger, 1957; Heider, 1946 Newcomb, 1953), people differ in the degree to which they think and act consistently, are perceived by others as consistent, and view others as consistent (Aronson & Festinger, 1958). Some people are especially motivated to think and behave consistently in an effort to alleviate the stress, tension, and discomfort associated with inconsistency (Brehm & Cohen, 1962; Carlsmith & Aronson, 1963; McGuire, 1960; Zajonc, 1960). Individual differences in the importance people place on achieving and maintaining co gnitive balance is referred to as the preference for consistency (Cialdini, Trost, & Newsom, 1995). Cialdini and colleagues (Brown, Asher, & Cialdini, 2005; Cialdini, Trost, & Newsom, 1995; Guadagno & Cialdini, 2010) have found that individual differences for consistency predict various cognitive balance phenomena. One such phenomenon occurs within the anticipated interaction paradigm (Darley & Berscheid, 1967). When people anticipate interacting with someone in the future, they form a bond or unit relation with the other person. However, when people do not anticipate seeing another person again, they do not form a bond or unit relation. According to cognitive balance theories, people hold a favorable attitude towards a person that th ey have a unit relation with (i.e., anticipate seeing again) because it is balanced with the favorable attitude most people hold of themselves (Baumeister, Tice, & Hutton, 1989). When there is no unit relation with another person, however, there is no need to achieve cognitive balance by holding a favorable attitude of the person.

PAGE 21

21 Cialdini and his collaborators (1995) speculated that the anticipated interaction st rong, as compared to weak, preference for consistency should demonstrate the anticipated interaction phenomenon to a greater degree because they place an especially high value on balanced unit relations. Overall, participants reported more favorable, and t hus balanced, attitudes towards the target person they anticipated meeting again. But as expected by Cialdini and colleagues, this effect was more pronounced among participants with a strong, rather than weak, preference for consistency. Because people wit h a strong preference for consistency are especially motivated to achieve cognitive balance, they may be most likely to make inferences about other people that achieve balance. Presumably, such cognitively balanced inferences are easiest to make under cond itions where social inferences are relatively unrestrained. That is, when little to no and achieve cognitive balance. Maximum balance can be achieved by inferr ing greater similarity with a likable than dislikable person (i.e., exhibit the liking similarity effect). Therefore, I expect that people with a strong, as compared to weak, preference for consistency will exhibit a stronger liking similarity effect. In a ddition to the preference for consistency, there may be other individual differences that moderate the liking similarity effect. According to the basic tenets of balance theory, balance first stems from sentiments among unit relations (e.g., P L O). At the beginning of this unit relation is an individual (P) who forms a liking or disliking evaluation of another person (O). The way that an individual (P) feels about himself may affect the unit relation he forms with others. For instance, an individual who ho lds a positive attitude towards himself (i.e., possesses

PAGE 22

22 high self esteem) may form unit relations with other likable targets by perceiving similarity. People with high self esteem may reject unit relations with dislikable targets by perceiving dissimilari ty. Conversely, an individual who holds a negative attitude toward himself (i.e., possesses low self esteem), he may reject unit relations with likable targets and achieve balance by perceiving dissimilarity, rather than similarity, with likable targets. attitudes towards themselves (i.e., self esteem) may affect balance principles. He suggests that unit relations with a likable person (P L O) are only balanced if people h old a positive attitude towards themselves (P L P). Conversely, unit relations with a dislikable person (P DL O) may be balanced if people hold a negative attitude towards themselves (P DL P). Heider further explains this reasoning by stating: The possibil ity of a negative attitude towards the self (P DL P) must also be considered. One would expect it to play a role contrary to that of (P L P). If P dislikes himself, he might reject a positive X as too good for him; a negative P and a positive X do not make (liking ) relation would also be disrupted; if p dislikes himself, he might easily think that O dislikes him too, especially if he likes O (pp. 210). Self esteem may moderate the liking similarity effe ct. For people with low self esteem, the typical inferences of likable and targets might differ because the (P L O) and (P DL O) are unbalanced unit relations. Instead, people with low self esteem may achieve balance by inferring that dislikable targets ar e similar and likable targets are dissimilar. Historically, self related attitudes have moderated phenomena grounded in cognitive balance theory (Newcomb, Turner, & Converse, 1965). Aronson and Carlsmith (1962) demonstrated this by experimentally manipulat performance on a given task. Afterwards, participants received external feedback that was either consistent or inconsistent with their self evaluations. The feedback maintained a balanced state

PAGE 23

23 for participan ts whose feedback matched their self evaluation but created an unbalanced state for participants whose feedback did not match their self evaluation. Similar findings are shown within the research area of self verification. Attitudes people hold about thems elves can motivate people to think and act in a manner that creates and maintains balance (Swann, 1997). Current Research The current research has two primary aims. First, the present studies empirically test the liking similarity effect. Importantly, the present studies address limitations of previous research examining perceptions of similarity with preexisting, likable and dislikable targets. As illustrated in the literature review, several studies related to the liking similarity effect asked people to make inferences about a target person who they had already formed a liking or disliking attitude towards. Although earlier studies support the liking similarity effect, they fail to establish a causal relation between liking and perceived similarity. The present studies address earlier limitations. In the current research, people first formed either a liking or disliking impression of two interview of a target person whose nonverbal behavior conveyed a likable or dislikable in a variety of domains (e.g., political values, personality traits, etc.). Study 2 further strengthens the internal validity of the liking similarity effect by In Study 2, participants imagined a hypothetical scenario which described a likable and dislikable target person. Participants then inferred the attitudes of the targets in regard to objects that participants had either positive or negative attitudes toward. Across all studies, I hypothesize

PAGE 24

24 that participants will exhibit the liking similari ty effect by perceiving greater similarity with likable, than dislikable, targets. The second aim of the current research is to identify individual differences that moderate the liking similarity effect. Studies 3, 4, and 5 tested preference for consistenc y and self esteem as potential moderators of the liking similarity effect. Study 3 utilized a similar experimental paradigm as Study 2 but also included several individual difference measures, including self esteem and preference for consistency. In regar d to preference for consistency, I expected that people with a strong, as compared to weak, preference for consistency exhibit the liking similarity effect to a greater degree. I also expected that people with high self esteem will exhibit a greater liking similarity effect than people with low self esteem. To further identify the potential causal relationships that preference for consistency and self esteem may have on the liking similarity effect, Studies 4 and 5 were conducted. In Study 4, cognitive cons istency was manipulated using an essay writing paradigm. Participants were asked to write a brief essay about how important the value of consistency, inconsistency, or an unrelated value is within their lives. I expected that participants who wrote about t he value of consistency would exhibit a greater liking similarity effect than participants who wrote about either inconsistency or an unrelated value. In Study 5, self esteem was manipulated using a popular social connectedness manipulation, known as Cyber ball (Williams & Jarvis, 2006). During Cyberball, participants engage in a ball toss game with ostensible, other participants who either include participants in the game (and thus raise their self esteem) or exclude participants from the game (and thus low er their self esteem). I hypothesized that participants who were included in the game, and thus had

PAGE 25

25 high self esteem, exhibit a greater liking similarity effect than participants who were excluded, and thus have comparatively low self esteem.

PAGE 26

26 Figure 1 1. Balanced inferences for a likable and dislikable person.

PAGE 27

27 CHAPTER 2 STUDY 1 Previous research has demonstrated that people can form liking or disliking evaluations of others based on nonverbal behavior (Macrae & Quadflieg, 2010). For instanc e, a person who smiles and nods frequently, holds a steady gaze, and sits in an open and inviting posture tends to be liked by others (Bernieri, Gillis, Davis, & Grahe, 1996; Brunswick, 1956; Gifford, 1994). Conversely, a person who behaves in an opposing fashion, such as shaking his or her head, appearing stern and disinterested, and sitting in a a slouched posture, tends to be disliked by others. In Study 1, participants made inferences about a target whose nonverbal behavior indicated that he or she was likable or dislikable. Method Participants. Students enrolled in an introductory psychology (55 female, 44 male) course at the University of Florida participated as part of a course research participation years ( M = 19.1). The sample was diverse in terms of ethnicity (54% Caucasian, 14% Hispanic, 10% Asian, 13% African American, 9% Other). Procedure. On arrival at the study, participants completed a questionnaire assessing their political values (Chambers, Baron, & Inman, 2006), personality traits (John & Srivastava, 1999), attachment styles (Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991), and behavioral intentions (see Appendices A D). The measures were presented in counterbalanced order. See Table 1 for sample items and re sponse scales for each measure. After participants completed their self ratings, they viewed a brief video clip (approximately thirty seconds) of another participant purportedly interviewed in a related study a few months prior. The person in the video cli p was actually a professional, college age actor.

PAGE 28

28 The audio was removed from the video and each participant was instructed to make inferences disliking evaluation of the actor being interviewed, each actor engaged in either positive or negative nonverbal behavior. Actors in the likable condition smiled and nodding frequently; actors in the dislikable condition frowned and had their arms crossed (Bernieri, Gillis, D avis, & Grahe, 1996; Brunswick, 1956; Gifford, 1994). Screen shots from the likable and disli kable video clips are shown in F igure 2 1 To address stimulus sampling issues (Wells & Windschitl, 1999), six actors (3 males, 3 females) were filmed for both t he likable and dislikable conditions. Each participant saw a total of two actors one likable and one dislikable. Participants were randomly assigned to view a likable and dislikable actor who was of the same gender as themselves. The likable and dislikab le actors were presented in counterbalanced order. Participants also never saw the same person acting in the likable and dislikable condition. received a blank questio nnaire that contained the same political values, personality trait, attachment style, and behavioral intention questions that they had completed earlier. Participants were instructed to mark how they thought the likable or dislikable actor would complete t he questionnaire. Participants also indicated how likable the actor seemed and the degree to which they were similar to the actor in general on a scale from 1 to 11. Participants also rated how much their self concept overlapped with the actor on a scale f rom 1 to 7 (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992; Appendices E and F). After participants had inferred the ratings of the likable or dislikable actor, they then viewed the video clip of the second actor. If participants saw a likable actor first, the second

PAGE 29

29 video clip was of the dislikable actor and vice versa. After watching the second video clip, participants again were given a blank questionnaire containing political values, personality trait, attachment style, and behavioral intention questions. Again, they wer e instructed to infer how the actor would complete the questionnaire. After completing the questionnaire, they also indicated how likable the actor seemed, how similar they were to the actor, and how much they believed their sense of self overlapped with t he actors. At the end of the study, participants were thoroughly debriefed and excused. Results and Discussion Manipulation check. Participants rated how likable the actors were for both the likable and dislikable conditions. They also indicated whether or not they knew any of the actors shown in the videos. Results indicated that the liking manipulation was effective. Participants rated the actor in the likable condition as more likable ( M = 9.6) than the actor in the dislikable condition ( M = 3.7), t (92) = 22.9, p < .001, d = 4.8. Five participants were excluded from subsequent analyses because they knew the actor or failed the manipulation check by rating the dislikable actor as more likable than the likable actor. Analysis. To preserve scale level diffe rences between self and target, the personality trait and behavioral intention measures were rescaled to match the 11 point scales of the political value and attachment styles measures (Dawes, 2008). Absolute difference scores were then created between sel f and the likable target, as well as self and the dislikable target, for each item ratings were subtracted from as then calculated and averaged to create a perceived similarity score each scale. Finally, the perceived similarity scores for each scale were averaged to create two perceived similarity scores one for the likable and

PAGE 30

30 one for the dislikable target. 1 Sco res indicate the degree to which participants perceive similarity with each target. Smaller scores indicate greater perceived similarity. To test whether people perceived greater similarity with a likable than dislikable target, I conducted a paired sample s t test using the perceived similarity scores for the likable and dislikable targets. Results showed that people exhibit a liking similarity effect, t (93) = 5.93, p < .001, d = .78. Specifically, people perceived themselves as more similar to a likable target than a dislikable target for the combined measures. other overlap for the likable and dislikable target. Findings further supported the liking similarity effect. People pe rceived a likable other as more similar to themselves in general than a dislikable other, t (95) = 5.4, p < .001, d = .8. They also perceived a greater overlap between themselves and the likable target than the dislikable target, t (92) = 7.0, p < .001, d = 1.0. 1 Mean ratings for the likable and dislikable targets can be found in Table 2 2 and within Figure 2 2 To test the process underlying the liking similarity effect, I conducted meditational analyses. I suspected that perceptions of general similari ty would mediate the effect of liking on perceived similarity of attitudes, traits, and values. I expected that people exposed to the likable (dislikable) target may perceive general similarity (dissimilarity) and thus project their specific responses onto testing within participant mediation, I first established the relation between general similarity and projection for each condition. People who perceived themselves as similar to t he likable target tended to project their responses onto target, F (1, 92) = 4.5, p < .05, R 2 = .05. Also, 1 I further analyzed the liking similarity effect separately for each measure. People exhibited an liking similarity effect in regard to political values, t (92) = 7.2, p < .001, d = .8, personality traits, t (92) = 4.9, p < .001, d = .8, attachment styles, t (92) = 1.9, p = .06, d = .3, but not for behavioral intentions, t (92) = 0.2, p = .93, d = .0. In regard to political values, personality traits, and attachment sty les, a likable target was perceived as more similar than a dislikable target.

PAGE 31

31 people who perceived themselves as similar to the dislikable target tended to not project their responses onto the target, F (1, 92) = 13.1, p < .01, R 2 = .12. The primary test of mediation assesses whether differences in perceptions of similarity with the likable and dislikable targets predicts differences in projection between the targets. As expected, general similarity mediated the effect of likab ility on projection, F (1, 91) = 5.7, p < .01, r 2 = .11. People who perceived greater general similarity with the likable, than dislikable, target also projected greater similarity in regard to their own traits, attitudes, and values, .33, t = 3.0, p < .01. 2 The results of Study 1 suggest that people do exhibit the liking similarity effect. After people form a likable or dislikable impression of another person, they perceive general (dis)similarity and thus project (or fail to pr oject) their individual political values, personality traits, and attachment styles onto the target. Difference scores are common metrics for studying social projection (Eyal & Epley, 2010; Epley & Waytz, 2010); however, greater confidence in the robustnes s of the liking similarity effect can be demonstrated using alternate methods. attitude toward an object and ask them to infer the attitude that a likable or dislika ble target has regarding the same object. If participants have favorable (unfavorable) attitudes themselves, inferring that a likable or dislikable target shares a similar favorable (unfavorable) attitude is evidence of projection. Study 2 used this approa ch. 2 I also conducted within participant meditational analyses separately for each measure. Similarity in general mediated the effect of liking on projection for political values, .25, F (1,94) = 6.3, p < .01, r 2 = .06, personality .29, F (1,94) = 8.9, p < .001, r 2 .21, F (1,94) = 4.4, p < .05, r 2 .12, F (1,94) = 4.4, p = .23, r 2 = .02.

PAGE 32

32 Table 2 1. Sample items and response scales for self and target inference measures Measure Sample Item Response Scales Political Values Indicate your feelings or beliefs toward promoting a strong military and national defense 1 (Strongly opposed to) to 11(Strongly in favor of) Personality Traits I see myself as someone who is outgoing and sociable. 1 (Disagree strongly) to 5 (Agree Strongly) Attachment Styles It is relatively easy for me to become emotionally close to others. I am comfortable depending on others and about being alone or having others not accept me. 1 (Not at all characteristic of me) to 11 (Extremely characteristic of me) Behavioral Intentions How likely are you to honk at someone tha t cuts you off in traffic? How likely are you to give change to the homeless? 1 (Extremely unlikely) to 7 (Extremely likely)

PAGE 33

33 Table 2 2. Means for likable and dislikable target ratings Rating Likable Target Mean (SD) Dislikable Target Mean (SD) Effect S ize Liking 9.56 (1.24) 3.73 (2.02) 4.80 Liking similarity Effect 2.79 (.75) 3.49 (1.02) 0.78 Political Values 2.23 (.99) 3.07 (1.12) 0.80 Personality Traits 3.04 (1.09) 4.01 (1.50) 0.80 Attachment Styles 3.03 (1.50) 3.45 (1.89) 0.30 Behavioral Intentions 3.45 (1.67) 3.67 (1.45) 0.00 General Similarity 6.74 (2.14) 4.94 (2.48) 0.80 Self Other Overlap 3.74 (1.26) 2.48 (1.20) 1.00

PAGE 34

34 Figure 2 1 Screenshot of actors in the likable and dislikable condition.

PAGE 35

35 Figure 2 2 Pe rceived similarity with likable and dislikable targets in regard to political values, personality traits, attachment styles, behavioral intentions and for the aggregate liking similarity effect (Study 1)

PAGE 36

36 CHAPTER 3 STUDY 2 Study 2 assessed the liking sim ilarity effect using an approach adapted from Fritz Heider an unknown object (e.g., Object A). Then, participants inferred what a likable and dislikable s attitudes are on the same object. Study 2 also improves Study 1 in regard to generalizability. Participants in Study 1 were limited to undergraduate students; therefore, previous findings may not generalize to broader, more diverse populations (Sears, 1 986). Study 2 addresses this concern by recruiting participants who are more representative of the larger population in terms of age and location. Method Participants. (Buhrmester, Kwang & Gosling, 2011; Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010) participated for a M = 35). The sample was predominantly White (78%) with slight ethnic diversity (8% Asian, 6% Black, 5% Hispa nic). Procedure. as well as personal favorability towards an impersonal object. In these vignettes, participants read that they either like or dislike a hypothetical target (e.g. Person A) and that they personally hold a favorable or unfavorable attitude towards an object (e.g., object X). They then inferred the point Likert type sca le ranging from 1 (Strongly opposed to object X) to 11 (Strongly in favor of object X). The scale midpoint (6) was also labeled (Neither in favor or opposed to object X). Vignettes were presented in counterbalanced order.

PAGE 37

37 Results and Discussion A 2 (Targe t evaluation: likable other, dislikable other) X 2 (Object evaluation: favorable attitude, unfavorable attitude) repeated measures ANOVA was used to analyze the data. Both the target evaluation and object evaluation factors were within person variables. As predicted, there was a significant interaction between target and object evaluation, F (1,93) = 96.3, p 2 = .51. Follow up analyses revealed that when participants hold a favorable attitude toward an object, they infer that a likable targe t shares a more similar, positive attitude toward the object than a dislikable target, t(95) = 10.6, p < .001, d = 1.8. Congruently, when participants hold a unfavorable attitude toward an object, they infer that a likable target shares a more similar, neg ative attitude toward the object than a dislikable target, t(93) = 6.7, p < .001, d = 1.0. The mean inferred attitudes for each condition are shown in Figure 3 1 Although the previous analysis demonstrated mean differences in perceived similarity betwe en likable and dislikable targets, it did not directly test the inferred attitudinal positions for likable and dislikable others. To provide a more stringent test of the liking similarity effect, the onditions were compared to the scale midpoint (6), which represented a neutral attitude. Results supported the liking similarity effect. Participants judged the likable target to have favorable attitudes towards objects that they themselves liked, ( M = 8.3 6), t (97) = 2.36, p < .001. Participants also judged the likable target to have more unfavorable attitudes towards object that they themselves disliked ( M = 4.81), t (97) = 6.12, p < .001. Conversely, participants judged the dislikable target to have unfav orable attitudes towards objects that they themselves liked, ( M = 5.18), t (97) = 4.17, p < .001. Participants also judged the dislikable target to have favorable attitudes towards objects that they themselves disliked ( M = 6.92), t (96) = 3.86, p < .001.

PAGE 38

38 Recall that the first aim of the current research was to experimentally manipulate liking and assess whether people demonstrate the liking similarity effect. Study 1 provided initial support for the liking similarity effect. Study 2 provided further suppor t by replicating the liking similarity effect within a judgment paradigm. In both Studies 1 and 2, people consistently perceived greater similarity with a likable, rather than dislikable, person. The current research now turns to the second aim of identif ying whether preference for consistency and self esteem moderate the liking similarity effect. Study 3 tests whether chronic individual differences in preference for consistency and self esteem moderate the liking similarity effect. Study 4 tests whether manipulating self esteem affects perceptions of similarity with likable and dislikable targets. As mentioned previously, I expect that people with a strong, as compared to weak, preference for consistency and high, as compared to low, self esteem and will exhibit a stronger liking similarity effect.

PAGE 39

39 Figure 3 1 Inferred attitudes of a likable and dislikable other as a function of own attitudinal position (Study 2).Note: For own attitudes that are favorable, greater similarity is indicated by inferrin g that the other is also in favor. For own attitudes that are unfavorable, greater similarity is indicated by inferring that the other is also opposed. Error bars indicate 95% confidence interval. The midpoint of the scale (6) represents a neutral attitude and is represented by a horizontal line.

PAGE 40

40 CHAPTER 4 STUDY 3 Method Participants. Turk (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010) participated for a small mo M = 33). The majority of the sample was White (75%) with little diversity (10% Asian, 5% Multiracial, 5%). Procedure. Respondents were led to believe that they were participating in a follow up social perception study. Specifically, participants read: Researchers at the University of Florida have recently conducted a study in which many members of the community were interviewed and given a battery of res on these tests, two people have been identified. One person has been identified as one of the most likable people in the sample and the other as one of the most dislikable people in the sample. Participants were then given minimal demographic data abou t each target suggesting that he or she was of the same gender as themselves. Next, participants rated the likable and dislikable Srivastava, 1999), attachment styles (B artholomew & Horowitz, 1991), and behavioral as in Study 1, participants indicated how likable the target seemed and the degree of general similarity the y felt with the targets on a 1 to 11 scale. Participants also indicated how much their self concept overlapped with the target (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992) on a scale from 1 to 7. The response scale for self concept overlap can be seen in Appendix E. Fin ally, participants indicated their own political values, personality traits, attachment styles, and behavioral intentions using the same scales mentioned previously. Participants also completed the following individual difference measures in counterbalance d order: preference for

PAGE 41

41 and self Individual difference measures can be fou nd in Appendices H J. The preference for consistency measure assesses the degree to which people are want to be described by others as a stable and predictable p esteem scale measures trait level self understanding of themselves. A prototypical concept clarity was not mentioned previously, it was included along with preference for consistency and self esteem because knowledge about oneself may b e related to projection. For participants to project their attitudes and traits onto the targets, they may need to first have a clear understanding and knowledge of themselves. Results and Discussion Manipulation check. As in Study 1, participants rated the degree to which the targets were likable from 1 (very dislikable) to 11 (very likable). A paired samples t test comparing Participants perceived the likable target ( M = 9.5) as more likable than the dislikable target ( M = 2.7, t (174) = 33.0, p < .001, d = 4.1. Analysis. Liking similarity effect indices were calculated in the same fashion as they were in Study 1. First, the personality trait and behavioral intention measures were rescaled to match the political value and attachment style scales. Second, absolute difference scores between self and the likable target, as well as self and the dislikable target, were calculated for each item. The absolute differ ence scores were then averaged together for each target, creating two indices

PAGE 42

42 of perceived similarity, one for the likable and one for the dislikable target. Smaller scores indicate greater similarity. A paired samples t test was used to assess whether pe ople perceived greater similarity with a likable than dislikable target. Results revealed that participants exhibited a liking similarity effect, t (174) = 15.7, p < .001, d = 1.75. People perceived a likable target as more similar to themselves ( M = 2.3) than a dislikable target ( M how similar in general the likable and dislikable target seemed to themselves were compared. Results were congruent with the previous analysis. People perceived a likable target to be more similar to themselves ( M = 7.3) than a dislikable target ( M = 3.0, t (171) = 15.1, p < .001, d = concept overlapped with the likable and dislikable target was analyzed. Findings revealed that people rate a likable ( M = 3.7) target as sharing a greater self other overlap with themselves than a dislikable target ( M = 1.7, t (155) = 12.1, p < .001, d = 1.4. Next, mediation was assessed. In Study 1, general similarity mediated the effect of liking on projection of attitudes and traits. This result was replicated again in the current study. Perceptions of general similarity mediated the effect of liking on projection, F (1, 170) = 118.7, p < .001, r 2 = .41 The crucial hypothesis of Study 3, however, was whether preference for consistency, self esteem, and self concept clarity predict the liking similarity effect. To test this hypothesis, persons moderation were used. All three individual d ifference measures were entered simultaneously into a multiple regression analysis to predict the difference in projection of attitudes and traits for the likable and dislikable targets. The three individual difference measures accounted for a significant proportion of the variance in the liking similarity effect, F (3, 170) = 7.0, p < .001, r 2 = .11).

PAGE 43

43 Specifically, people with a stronger, as compared to weaker, preference for consistency exhibited a (marginally) significantly greater liking similarity eff ect. ( .14, t = 1.8, p = .07). See Figure 4 1 People with higher, as compared to lower, self esteem exhibited a significantly greater liking .26, t = 3.1, p < .01). See Figure 4 2 Self concept clarity, however, was unrelated t o the liking .07, t = 0.8, p = .42. The findings from Study 3 support the liking People who have a strong preference for consistency exhibited stronger liking similarity effects than p eople who have a weak preference for consistency. This finding fits with previous research suggesting that balance theory phenomena are exhibited by people with a strong preference for consistency (Guadagno & Cialdini, 2010). Study 3 also demonstrates tha t self esteem is related to the liking similarity effect. People with high, rather than low, self esteem were most likely to perceive greater similarity with a likable, rather than a dislikable, person. As mentioned previously, people with high self esteem perceive greater similarity with likable than dislikable targets because it establishes cognitive balance. Presumably, people with low self esteem achieve balance by perceiving greater similarity with a dislikable than likable person. Although Study 3 p rovides initial evidence that preference for cognitive consistency and self esteem are related to the liking similarity effect, a causal relationship cannot yet be established. Study 4 and 5 address this limitation by experimentally manipulating preference for consistency (Study 4) and self and dislikable targets.

PAGE 44

44 Figure 4 1 Perceived similarity with likable and dislikable targets as a function of individual preference for consistency (Study 3).Note: The interaction analysis was conducted using preference for consistency as a continuous variable. However, the preference for consistency variable was dichotomized in the graph at one standard deviation above and below the mean to ease inte rpretation.

PAGE 45

45 Figure 4 2 Perceived similarity with likable and dislikable targets as a function of individual self esteem (Study 3).Note: The interaction analysis was conducted using self esteem as a continuous variable. However, the preference for co nsistency variable was dichotomized in the graph to ease interpretation.

PAGE 46

46 CHAPTER 5 STUDY 4 Although striving for cognitive consistency and balance is a universal human behavior (Brehm & Cohen, 1962; Carlsmith & Aronson, 1963; McGuire, 1960; Zajonc, 1960), consistency striving can be temporarily increased or decreased (Bator & Cialdini, 2006). Study 4 planned to assess the liking and value of consistency. I predicted that people who are led to value consistency will exhibit a greater liking similarity effect than people who are led to value inconsistency or an unrelated value, such as health. Method Participants. parti 19 to 65 years ( M = 32.65). The majority of the sample was White (76%) with little diversity (10% Asian, 5% Multiracial, 4%). Procedure. Online respondents were presen ted with a study regarding their values and attitudes. At the onset of the study, participants were asked to write an essay regarding the value of consistency, inconsistency, or an unrelated value (i.e., health). In the consistency condition, participants inconsistency condition, participants were asked to write about being flexible and not always about. Instead, participants in the inconsistency condition were specifically asked to write about

PAGE 47

47 participants wrote about t he importance of being healthy. Specifically, they were asked to write Afterwards, participants were asked to rate the importance of eight values (e.g., family, justice security). To reduce suspicion, the value of consistency was included in the list of values. Next, participants were asked to indicate their attitudes towards a number of objects, given limited information about others. These questions were used previous ly in Study 2 and served as the main dependent measure of the liking were debriefed and paid for their participation. Results and Discussion Manipulation check. To assess whether the essay writing manipulation affected consistency and health varied as a function of condition. I expected participants in the consistency condition to value consistency more than participants in the inconsistency and unrelated value condition, respectively. I also expected participants in the inconsistency condition to value consistency to a lesser extent than participants in the unrelated value condition. A one way ANOVA revealed that the value of consistency differed between the three conditions, F (2, 309) = 12.52, p 2 = .08. Planned cont rasts revealed that participants who wrote about the value of consistency ( M = 3.97) rated consistency as significantly more important than participants who wrote about the value of inconsistency ( M = 3.34), t (309) = 4.88, p < .001. Participants who wrote about the value of consistency, however, did not rate consistency as significantly more important than the unrelated value of health ( M = 3.77), t (309) = 1.57, p = .118. Participants who wrote about the value of inconsistency did rate

PAGE 48

48 consistency as less important than participants who wrote about the unrelated value of health, t (309) = 3.39, p < .001. The general trend indicates that participants in the consistency condition rated consistency as more important than participants in the inconsistency condi tion. The ratings for participants in the health condition were between the ratings of participants in the consistency and inconsistency conditions. Analysis. A 2 (Liking of target) X 2 (Object evaluation) X 3 (Writing prompt condition: consistency, incons istency, unrelated value) mixed factorial ANOVA was used to analyze the results. Liking of target and object evaluation were within person factors and writing prompt condition was a between person factor. First, I tested whether people exhibited the liking similarity effect, regardless of condition. A repeated measures ANOVA was used to test whether the inferences of a target person were the result of liking and object evaluation. As anticipated, participants exhibited a liking similarity effect by inferrin more similar to their own, F (1,303) = 313.50, p 2 = .51. Next, I tested whether the liking similarity effect varied as a function of writing prompt condition. Contrary to my hypothesis, the liking similarity effect did not differ significantly across conditions, F (1,303) = 0.35, p 2 = .002. As illustrated in Figure 5 1 participants, regardless of condition, exhibited a pattern of results in line with the liking similarity effect. The inferred attitudinal positions of likable and dislikable targets, regarding topics that participants had either favorable or unfavorable evaluations toward, were similar in degree across all conditions.

PAGE 49

49 Figure 5 1 Percei ved similarity with likable and dislikable targets as a function of writing prompt condition (Study 4).

PAGE 50

50 CHAPTER 6 STUDY 5 Study 5 addresses the causal relation between self esteem and the liking similarity effect. According to the basic tenets of balance theory, the positive or negative attitudes people have of themselves, that is self esteem, may affect their unit relations with others (Heider, 1958). Specifically, people with high self esteem achieve cognitive balance by establishing unit relations with likable others and people with low self esteem achieve cognitive balance by establishing unit relations with dislikable others. Therefore in an experimental context, I hypothesized that participants who are led to have high self esteem will exhibit a great er liking similarity effect than participants who are led to have low self esteem. 1 esteem is to fundamental desire to form and maintain positive relationships with other people (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), esteem (Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995). Conversely when people are rejected, excluded, or ostracized, they tend to experience decreases in self esteem. The effect of inclusion versus exclusion on self esteem is quite robust (Baumeister, Brewer, Tice, & Twenge, 2007). Indeed, self esteem may be a direct r Many have argued that self esteem acts like a gas gauge (i.e., sociometer) by alerting people to the quality and degree of their social connectedness. For instance, when people 1 In the Introduction, I stated that people with low self esteem may show a pattern opposite of the liking similarity effect. Specifically, people with low self esteem may perceive similarity with a dislikable, and dissimil arity with a likable person, because such inferences are cognitively balanced. I did not pred ict this exact result in Study 5 I do not anticipate a complete reversal of the liking similarity effect. Rather, I predict that people who receive negative feedb ack will exhibit a weaker liking similarity effect than will people who do not receive any feedback. After people receive negative performance feedback (that will presumably lower their state self esteem level), I expect that on average participants in thi s condition will still have relatively high (but somewhat lowered) self esteem (Twenge, 2006).

PAGE 51

51 experience social rejection or exc lusion, they experience decreased self esteem as a cue signifying that their basic relational needs were thwarted. Conversely when people experience social acceptance or inclusion, they experience increased self esteem and thus become aware that their rela tional needs are being met. Therefore, it is not surprising that many effective manipulations of self relationships. One such manipulation involves participation in an online ball toss game of Cyberball with two other players (Williams & Jarvis, 2006). In reality, there are no other players. The ball toss behavior of the other players is computer generated to either include or exclude participants from the game. In the inclusion condition, p articipants receive a large proportion of the throws throughout the game. In the exclusion condition, participants are initially thrown the ball but they are quickly excluded and spend much of the remaining game time waiting in vain for the other players t o throw them the ball. Results from Cyberball show that included participants report higher self esteem and a greater sense of belonging than excluded participants (Williams, Cheung, Choi, 2000). In light of the previous research, Study 5 uses Cyberball as a manipulation of social esteem before making inferences of likable and dislikable targets. I hypothesized that participants in the inclusion condition will report higher self esteem and exhibit a greater liking similarity effect than participants in the exclusion condition. Method Participants. Students enrolled in an introductory psychology course at the University of Florida participated as part of a course research participation requirement. De mographic data

PAGE 52

52 was not collected. Due to researcher oversight, the demographic questions present in earlier study templates were not carried over to the template of Study 5. Procedure. were led to believe that they would be playing an online, ball toss game of Cyberball with students at other universities across the nation. Participants were also told that if time permitted after the game of Cyberball, they would complete a brief and ost ensibly unrelated study regarding inferences of likable and dislikable people. During the game of Cyberball, participants were randomly assigned to be either included or excluded by the other computer generated players. In the inclusion condition, partici pants were thrown the ball frequently; whereas in the exclusion condition, participants were thrown the ball infrequently. After participants had finished the game, they answered questions designed to measure their current level of self esteem, mood, and h ow effective the manipulation was (see Appendix M; Williams, Cheung, & Choi, 2000). To assess the effectiveness of the manipulation, participants reported how ignored and excluded they felt. They also indicated what proportion of the throws they received f rom the other players. Next, the participants were asked to complete a brief questionnaire regarding their inferences about likable and dislikable targets as part of an unrelated study. These items were used previously in Studies 2 and 4. An example item Finally, participants were thoroughly debriefed and dismissed. Results and Discussion Manipulation check. As expected, part icipants in the exclusion condition ( M = 4.47) reported feeling more ignored ( M = 1.71) than participants in the inclusion condition, t (196) = 20.86, p < .001. Participants in the excluded condition also felt more excluded ( M = 4.43) than

PAGE 53

53 participants in t he inclusion condition t (192) = 20.74, p < .001. Additionally, participants in the exclusion condition reported receiving less throws ( M = 8.10) than participants in the inclusion condition ( M = 31.21), t (190) = 20.61, p < .001. Next, I assessed whether p articipants in the inclusion and exclusion condition differed in regard to their self esteem and mood. First, I created a composite variable for self esteem by reverse scoring and averaging the appropriate items. A composite variable for mood was computed in the same fashion. As anticipated, participants in the inclusion condition ( M = 3.87) reported higher self esteem than participants in the exclusion condition ( M = 2.75), t (197) = 10.11, p < .001. Participants in the inclusion condition also reported mo re positive moods ( M = 4.08) than participants in the exclusion condition ( M = 2.81), t (198) = 12.41, p < .001. Analysis. I used a 2 (Liking of target) X 2 (Object evaluation) X 2 (Social inclusion condition) mixed factorial ANOVA to analyze the results. Liking of target and object evaluation are within person factors and social inclusion the between person factor. First, I expected to replicate the liking similarity effect found in Studies 1 4. The liking similarity effect would be supported by a two wa y interaction between liking of target and object when participants have favorable (unfavorable) attitudes towards the same object. Conversely, participants sh participants have unfavorable (favorable) attitudes towards the same object. This finding was supported, F (1,198) = 279.61, p < .001, partial 2 = .58. Next, I assessed whether the liking similarity effect varied as a function of inclusion condition. Contrary to my hypotheses, participants in the inclusion and exclusion condition did not differ significantly in their perceptions of similarity wi th likable and dislikable targets,

PAGE 54

54 F (1,198) = 0.21, p 2 = .00. As shown in F igure 6 1 it appears that participants in all conditions demonstrated the traditional liking similarity effect to the same degree. This pattern of results remain s the same if mood is entered as a covariate. 2 2 Mood and self esteem were significantly correlated, r (243) = .78, p < .001. When mood is entered as a covariate, the findings remained unchanged. The lik ing similarity effect is again replicated, F (1,197) = 274.90, p < 2 = .58. However, the liking similarity effect is still unaffected by inclusion condition, F (1,197) = 0.02, p 2 = .00.

PAGE 55

55 Figure 6 1 Perceived similarity with likable and dislikable targets as a function of social inclusion (Study 5).

PAGE 56

56 CHAPTER 7 DISCUSSION To predict and understand a social world, people make inferences ab out one another (Ames, 2004). They act as mind readers by inferring the thoughts and feelings of other people on a variety of topics. The current research demonstrated that the inferences people make about a likable and dislikable target person are predict able. People consistently perceived that a likable person was more similar to themselves than a dislikable person. This robust phenomenon was referred to as the liking similarity effect. tical values, personality traits, and other personal information after viewing their nonverbal behavior. The or dislikable. Likable targets smiled, appeared e ngaged, and seemed like a generally likable person. Dislikable targets, however, frowned, sat with their arms crossed, and seemed like a generally dislikable person. The inferences participants made about the likable and dislikable targets confirmed the li king similarity effect. People inferred that a likable target held similar political values, personality traits, attachment styles, and was generally more similar to themselves than a dislikable target. Additional studies demonstrated the robustness of the liking similarity effect. It was not a byproduct of particular stimuli or particular dependent variables. In fact, how likable or dislikable a target appeared was manipulated in three separate ways. In Study 1, participants formed liking or disliking eval uations of a target person based solely on their nonverbal behavior. In Studies 2, 4, and 5, participants were explicitly told that they either liked or disliked a particular target person. In Study 3, participants received second hand knowledge that a tar get person was likable or dislikable. Regardless of how participants formed the liking or disliking

PAGE 57

57 evaluation of the target person, their inferences were similar. People consistently inferred that likable, as compared to dislikable, targets were more simi lar to themselves across a variety of domains. Furthermore, the liking similarity effect was more pronounced for some people than for others. Study 3 illustrated that individual differences in preference for consistency and self esteem were related to the liking similarity effect. People who had a strong, as compared to weak, preference for consistency and high, as compared to low, self esteem were more likely to exhibit the liking similarity effect. These findings can be explained by balance theory (Heide r, 1958). People with a strong preference for consistency are especially motivated to achieve cognitive balance amongst their attitudes. Therefore, people with a strong preference for consistency achieved cognitive balance by perceiving greater similarity with likable, than dislikable, targets. People with a weak preference for consistency were less motivated to achieve balance and therefore exhibited the liking similarity effect to a lesser degree. Balance theory also explains why people with high self est eem exhibited a stronger liking similarity effect than people with low self esteem. Presumably, people can achieve balance by forming a unit relation with a target whose likable or dislikable impression fits the positive or negative attitude people have ab out themselves. That is, people with high self esteem achieve balance by forming a unit relation with likable targets and people with low self esteem achieve balance by forming a unit relation with dislikable targets. In the present study, participants for balance theory, people with high self esteem perceived greater similarity (formed a stronger unit relation) with likable targets, as compared to dislikable targets.

PAGE 58

58 A limita tion of Study 3, however, was its correlational nature. Preference for consistency and self esteem were related to the liking similarity effect but it remained unclear whether preference for consistency or self esteem caused a change in the strength of the liking similarity effect or vice versa. It is equally plausible that exhibiting the liking similarity effect caused people to report a stronger preference for consistency or higher self esteem. Additionally, there may be other, unaccounted variables that concurrently influenced the liking similarity effect, preference for consistency, and self esteem. Studies 4 and 5 were conducted to potentially rule out such alternative explanations by manipulating preference for consistency and self esteem. In Study 4, preference for consistency was manipulated by having participants write about the importance of consistency, inconsistency, or an unrelated value (i.e., health). Presumably, having participants reflect on the importance of consistency would cause them to v alue and strive to achieve consistency during their inferences of likable and dislikable targets. Study 4 revealed that writing about consistency did cause participants to value consistency; however, writing about consistency did not affect their perceptio ns of similarity with likable and dislikable targets. In Study 5, social inclusion was manipulated prior to participants making inferences of esteem following their i nclusion in the social, ball toss game of Cyberball. Participants who were included in the game reported higher self esteem than participants who were excluded in the s did not differ across condition. It appeared that in both Studies 4 and 5, the liking similarity effect was unaltered by manipulations of consistency or self esteem.

PAGE 59

59 Given that balance theory is an appropriate framework to view the liking similarity effe ct, it is somewhat perplexing why manipulations of consistency or self esteem did not alter perceptions of similarity with likable or dislikable targets. Although speculative, the liking similarity effect may be unaffected by consistency and self esteem ma nipulations due to (1) limitations of the manipulation, (2) nature of the liking similarity effect, (3) or limitations in the application of balance theory principles. First, one could argue that the liking similarity effect was unchanged in Studies 4 and 5 because of limitations of the preference for consistency or self esteem manipulation. Indeed, in Study 4 the effect size for the preference for consistency manipulation was small. Perhaps the liking similarity effect may be affected by stronger levels of the consistency manipulation. This point is difficult to assess and compare to previous research, however, because only three studies have claimed to empirically manipulate preference for consistency. Two of these studies (Friedman & Ardnt, 2005; Jonas, G reenberg, & Frey; 2003) did not include any manipulation check items that could be used as a basis for comparison. The third study (Bator & Cialdini, 2006) included a manipulation check item that assessed whether participants noticed the manipulation, rath er than were truly affected by it. Therefore, it is difficult to assess whether other, stronger manipulations of consistency would affect the liking similarity effect. In regard to manipulating self esteem, the effect size argument is untenable. In Study 5 the effect size of the Cyberball manipulation was moderate to large. Also, previous studies repeatedly demonstrate that Cyberball is an effective manipulation of self esteem that is capable of producing desired effects (Leary, 2010; Williams & Jarvis, 20 06). Second, the nature of the liking similarity effect may be especially resistant to manipulation. Indeed, no previous studies have tested whether the liking similarity effect is

PAGE 60

60 affected by social manipulations, as Studies 4 and 5 attempted to do. It ma y be that the tendency to perceive greater similarity with likable than dislikable targets is so pronounced that it occurs despite changes in preference for consistency or self esteem. Although the liking similarity effect is robust, I believe that this ar gument is also untenable. Study 3 demonstrated that people do vary in the degree to which they perceive greater similarity with likable, than dislikable, targets. Identifying factors that cause people to exhibit a stronger or weaker liking similarity effec t can be the aim of future research. Third, the liking similarity effect may have been resistant to changes in consistency or self esteem because of limitations in the application of balance theory. In the seminal work on balance theory, Fritz Heider (1958 ) simply theorized that variables, such as self esteem, would theorizing may be incorrect. It is plausible that the relationship between self esteem and the liking s imilarity effect is spurious. However, it is also conceivable that the link between self esteem and the liking similarity effect may occur in the opposite direction. People who perceive greater similarity with likable, than dislikable, targets may experien ce increased self esteem. A directional link between the liking similarity effect and self esteem is partially supported by research on self image maintenance. According to the self image maintenance theories of basking in reflected glory (BIRGing) and cu tting off reflected failure (CORFing), esteem is affected by manipulating their unit relations with successful or failing groups (Tesser, Millar, & Moore, 1988). In regard to the liking similarity effect, people may maintain a positive self i mage in a similar fashion. Establishing unit relations by perceiving image. Stated differently, perceiving similarity with likable targets may allow people to bask in the

PAGE 61

61 positive impression of likable targets and distance themselves from the negative impression of dislikable targets. A directional link between the liking similarity effect and self esteem is purely speculative at this point. However, it may be a usef ul avenue for future research to pursue. Implications People frequently make inferences about the attitudes of likable and dislikable targets in their everyday lives. For instance, people infer whether politicians share their same values (Krosnick, 1990), whether a rival shares their same intentions (Ames, Weber, & Zou, 2012), or whether a romantic partner shares their same feelings (Murray, et al., 2002). In each of these instances, the extent to which a person appears likable or dislikable may affect the inferences made about him or her. As alluded to previously, the liking similarity effect may have interesting implications for dislikable person may create a self fulfilling prophecy that confirms initial impressions (Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968). People who like another person may selectively inquire, attend to, and have greater memory for information that conveys similarity. Conversely, people who dislike another p erson may selectively seek information that conveys dissimilarity. This notion may be true for both personal relationships and intergroup relations. On a personal relationship level, people may steer interactions with likable or dislikable targets in a way that confirms their expectations of similarity or dissimilarity, respectively. In fact, a rich body of literature on the confirmation bias supports the notion that people selectively seek information that is consistent with their initial hypotheses (Hart et al., 2009). In a specific research study by Snyder and Swann (1978), participants were led to expect that a target person was either extroverted or introverted. They then had participants ask questions to determine the ealed that participants asked questions that confirmed their

PAGE 62

62 initial expectations. When the target was presumed to be extroverted, participants asked about times when the target attended parties or was social. When the target was presumed to be introverted however, participants asked about times when the target avoided social interaction or was isolated. confirmed their initial expectations. The liking similarity effect may have similar behavioral implications. People may seek similarity or dissimilarity during their interactions with likable or dislikable targets, respectively. Currently, this hypothesis is speculative. Studies that apply the liking similarity effect to real world behavioral outcomes may be a promising direction for future research. On an intergroup relation level, people may perceive the values of likable groups as being similar to their own. Conversely, people may perceive the values of dislikable groups a s being dissimilar to their own. Application of balance theory principles may offer another explanation for why groups perceive harmony or conflict. It may be that when people form negative evaluations of a group (e.g., a terrorist cell), they perceive tha t the disliked group possesses values that are dissimilar and conflict with their own. Also, when people form positive evaluations of a group (e.g., a charity organization), they may perceive that the likable group possesses values that are similar to thei r own. Little research has tested perceptions of similarity with likable and dislikable social groups. However within the literature on prejudice, the inverse relationship has been established. People consistently express prejudice (i.e., negative evaluat ions) towards groups who they believe oppose their values (Chambers, Schlenker, Collisson, in press; Rokeach, 1960). Testing

PAGE 63

63 whether the liking similarity effect pertains to intergroup relations is a reasonable extension of the current research. Future Di rections The current research established both preference for consistency and self esteem as potential moderators of the liking similarity effect. However, there may be other personality characteristics and individual differences that also affect the degr ee to which people perceive similarity and dissimilarity with likable and dislikable targets. For instance, people with a strong need for structure, flexible thought patterns, or openness to different cognitive experiences may exhibit the liking similarity effect to differing degrees. It is difficult, but not impossible, to delineate between such related constructs. Future research can further explain the nature of liking similarity effect by empirically testing related constructs. Although the liking simil arity effect was discussed primarily as a cognitive phenomenon, it is also quite possible that it has motivational roots. For instance, inferring that likable targets share more similar attributes than dislikable targets may satisfy and facilitate basic hu man needs, such as need for affiliation and belonging. In this case, people who are especially motivated to form relationships with likable targets, such as individuals with high belongingness needs, may be especially likely to infer greater similarity wit h likable targets as a means of forming positive social connection. Also, people who are motivated to maintain a positive social image may be especially motivated to distance themselves from dislikable targets and thus perceive greater dissimilarity with d islikable targets. It appears that motivational influences may contribute and possibly drive the liking similarity effect. Future studies that measure and manipulate motivational explanations for the liking similarity effect are needed.

PAGE 64

64 Conclusion In sum, the liking similarity effect is a reliable, predictable, and robust phenomenon. Across five studies, people consistently achieved cognitive balance by perceiving greater similarity with a likable person than with a dislikable person. Furthermore, individua l differences in preference for consistency and self esteem were related to the liking similarity effect. People with a strong preference for consistency and high self esteem exhibited a greater liking similarity effect than people with a weak preference f or consistency and low self esteem, respectively. These findings fit well with balance theory. The social inferences people make about likable and dislikable targets create and maintain cognitive balance.

PAGE 65

65 APPENDIX A POLITICAL VALUES Instructions: This que stionnaire assesses attitudes towards a variety of issues. When answering each question, select the option that best indicates your feelings or beliefs. 1. Crime prevention and strict punishment of criminals. 2. Promoting a strong military and national defense. 3. Limited government. 4. Support and funding of public education. 5. Eliminating poverty and social inequality. 6. Protecting the environment. 7. Gun control. 8. Legalized abortion. 9. Capital punishment. 10. Physician assisted suicide (euthanasia). 11. Affirmative action. 12. Legalizin g gay marriage. Responses were recorded on an 11 point scale, ranging from 1 (Strongly opposed) to 11 (Strongly in favor).

PAGE 66

66 APPENDIX B PERSONALITY TRAITS Instructions: Rate how well each of the following statements describes your personality. I see myself 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. imagination Responses were recorded on a 5 point scale, ranging from 1 (Disagree strongly) to 5 (Agree strongly).

PAGE 67

67 APPENDIX C ATTACHMENT STYLES Instructions: Read each of the following paragraph descriptions carefully and select the number that best indic ates how characteristic the description is of you. 1. It is easy for me to become emotionally close to others. I am comfortable depending on accept me. 2. I am comfortable without close emotional relationships. It is very important to me to feel independent and self sufficient, and I prefer not to depend on others or have others depend on me. 3. I want to be completely emotionally intimate with others, but I often find that o thers are reluctant to get as close as I would like. I am uncomfortable being without close 4. I am uncomfortable getting close to others. I want emotionally close relat ionships, but I find it difficult to trust others completely, or to depend on them. I sometimes worry that I will be hurt if I allow myself to become too close to others. Responses were recorded on an 11 point scale, ranging from 1 (Not at all characteris tic of me) to 11 (Completely characteristic of me).

PAGE 68

68 APPENDIX D BEHAVIORAL INTENTIONS Instructions: Read each of the following scenarios closely and select the number that best reflects how likely it is that you would respond in the way described. 1. If you saw another student drop books and papers while walking to class, how likely is it that you would stop and help the student? 2. If you knew someone was having a really bad day, how likely would you be to talk with this person? 3. If you had a writing assignmen t due, how likely would you be to procrastinate and write the paper at the last minute? 4. If you saw someone trip while walking, how likely would you be to laugh at this person? 5. If someone cut you off in traffic, how likely would you be to honk at this pe rson? 6. trash and throw it in the trashcan? 7. If someone told you a secret, how likely would you be to spread the secret by telling others? 8. If a homeless person asked you for some spare change, how likely would you be to give this person money? 9. If you saw someone that looked suspicious, how likely would you be to call the police? 10. If you were standing in line and noticed that the person in line behind you was in a rush, ho w likely would you be to let this person go ahead of you in line? Responses were recorded on a 7 point scale, ranging from 1 (Extremely unlikely) to 7 (Extremely likely).

PAGE 69

69 APPENDIX E SELF OTHER OVERLAP MEASURE Below are seven pairs of circles. The left c ircle represents you. The right circle represents the person you saw in the video. Please select the number of the picture below that best describes how you view you and the person in the video.

PAGE 70

70 APPENDIX F SOCIAL INFERENCE VIGNETTES ADAPTED FROM HEIDER (1958) 1. P L O, P L X You like Person A. You like W. How do you think Person A feels toward W? 2. P L O, P DL X You like Person B. You dislike X. How do you think Person B feels toward X? 3. P DL O, P L X You dislike Person C. You like Y. How do you think Perso n C feels toward Y? 4. P DL O, P DL X You dislike Person D. You dislike Z. How do you think Person D feels toward Z? Responses were recorded on an 11 point scale, ranging from 1 (Person A dislikes W very much) to 11 (Person B likes W very much).

PAGE 71

71 APPENDIX G PREFERENCE FOR CONSISTENCY SCALE Instructions: For each of the statements below, indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with the statement. 1. I prefer to be around people whose reactions I can anticipate. 2. It is important to me that my actions a re consistent with my beliefs. 3. Even if my attitudes and actions seemed consistent with one another to me, it would bother me if they did not seem consistent in the eyes of others. 4. It is important to me that those who know me can predict what I will do. 5. I w ant to be described by others as a stable, predictable person. 6. Admirable people are consistent and predictable. 7. The appearance of consistency is an important part of the image I present to the world. 8. It bothers me when someone I depend upon is unpredictabl e. 9. 10. I get uncomfortable when I find my behavior contradicts my beliefs. 11. An important requirement for any friend of mine is personal consistency 12. I typically prefer to do things the same way. 13. I dislike people w ho are constantly changing their opinions. 14. I want my close friends to be predictable. 15. It is important to me that others view me as a stable person. 16. I make an effort to appear consistent to others. 17. t. 18. Responses were recorded on an 9 point scale, ranging from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 9 (Strongly agree).

PAGE 72

72 APPENDIX H SELF ESTEEM Instructions: Read each of the following statements and indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each statement. 1. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself. 2. At times, I think I am no good at all.* 3. I feel that I have a number of good qualities. 4. I am able to do things as well as most other people. 5. I feel I d o not have much to be proud of.* 6. I certainly feel useless at times.* 7. 8. I wish I could have more respect for myself.* 9. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure.* 10. I take a p ositive attitude toward myself. Responses were recorded on an 4 point scale, ranging from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 4 (Strongly agree).

PAGE 73

73 APPENDIX I SELF CONCEPT CLARITY SCALE Instructions: For each of the statements below, indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with the statement. 1. My beliefs about myself often conflict with one another.* 2. On one day I might have one opinion of myself and on another day I might have a different opinion.* 3. I spend a lot of time wondering about what kind of person I really am.* 4. Sometimes I feel that I am not really the person that I appear to be.* 5. When I think about the kind of person I have been in the past, I'm not sure what I was really like.* 6. I seldom experience conflict between the different asp ects of my personality. 7. Sometimes I think I know other people better than I know myself. 8. My beliefs about myself seem to change very frequently.* 9. If I were asked to describe my personality, my description might end up being different from one da y to another day.* 10. Even if I wanted to, I don't think I could tell someone what I'm really like.* 11. In general, I have a clear sense of who I am and what I am. 12. It is often hard for me to make up my mind about things because I don't really know wh at I want.* Responses were recorded on a 9 point scale, ranging from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 4 (Strongly agree).

PAGE 74

74 APPENDIX J ADAPTED HEIDER VIGNETTES Liking similarity Effect Items 1. Imagine that you like Person A and you like object W. Knowing this, what do you think 2. Imagine that you like Person B and you dislike object X. Knowing this, what do you 3. Imagine that you dislike Person C and you like object Y. Knowing this, wh at do you 4. Imagine that you dislike Person D and you dislike object Z. Knowing this, what do you Filler items 5. Imagine that you like Person E and that Person E likes object S. Knowing this, what do you think your attitude is toward object S? 6. Imagine that you like Person F and that Person F dislikes object T. Knowing this, what do you think your attitude is toward object T? 7. Imagine that you dislike Person G and that Pe rson G likes object U. Knowing this, what do you think your attitude is toward object U/ 8. Imagine that you dislike Person H and that Person H dislikes object V. Knowing this, what do you think your attitude is toward object V? Responses were recorded on an 11 point scale, ranging from 1 (Person A probably dislikes object W very much) to 11 (Person A probably likes object W very much).

PAGE 75

75 APPENDIX K MANIPULATION CHECK, SELF ESTEEM, AND MOOD ITEMS Manipulation Check Items (1 = Not at all, 5 = Extremely) Instr uctions: For the next three questions, please circle the number to the right (or fill in the blank) that best represents the thoughts you had during the game. 1. I was ignored. 2. I was excluded. 3. Assuming the ball should be thrown to each person equally (33% of throws to each player), what percentage of throws did you receive? (0 100%). Self Esteem Items (1 =Not at all, 5 = Extremely) Instructions: For each question, please click the number that best represents the feelings you were experiencing during the g ame. 1. I felt good about myself. 2. My self esteem was high. 3. I felt liked. 4. I felt insecure. Mood Items (1 = Not at all, 5 = Extremely) Instructions: For each question, please click the number that best represents the feelings you were experiencing during the game. 1. Good 2. Bad 3. Friendly 4. Unfriendly 5. Angry 6. Pleasant 7. Happy 8. Sad

PAGE 76

76 LIST OF REFERENCES Amabile, T. M., & Glazebrook, A. H. (1982). A negativity bias in interpersonal evaluation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 18 (1), 1 22. doi:10.1016/0022 1031(82)90 078 6 inference. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87 (3), 340 353. doi:10.1037/0022 3514.87.3.340 Ames, D.R., Weber, E.U., & Zou, X. (2012). Mind reading in strategic interaction: The impact of perceived similarity on projection and stereotyping. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 117 (1), 96 110. doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2011.07.007 role of commitment. Journal of Social and Personal Relationships, 22 (6), 817 836. doi:10.1177/0265407505058701 Aron, A., Aron, E., & Smollan, D. (1992). Inclusion of other in the self scale and the structure of interpe rsonal closeness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63 (4), 596 612. doi:10.1037//0022 3514.63.4.596 Aron son, E. & Carlsmith, J. (1962). Performance expectancy as a determinant of actual performance. The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 65 (3), 178 182. doi:10.1037/h0042291 Aronson, E. & Festinger, L. (1958). Some attempts to measure tolerance for dissonanance. (U.S. Air Force WADC Technical Report No. 58 942). Baron Cohen, S., Wheelwright, S., Hill, J., Raste, Y., & Plumb, I. (2001). Th syndrome or high functioning autism. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 42 (2), 241 251. doi:10.1111/1469 7610.00715 Bartholomew, K. & Horow itz, L.M. (1991). Attachment styles among young adults: A test of a four category model. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 61 (2), 226 244. doi:10.1037//0022 3514.61.2.226 Baumeister, R F., Brewer, L. E., Tice, D. M., & Twenge, J. M. (2007). Th warting the need to belong: Understanding the interpersonal and inner effects of social exclusion. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 1, 506 520. Baumeister, R.F., Tice, D.M., & Hutton, D.G. (1989). Self presentational motivations and personality d ifferences in self esteem. Journal of Personality, 57 (3), 547 579. doi:10.1111/j.1467 6494.1989.tb02384.x

PAGE 77

77 Bernieri, F.J., Gillis, J.S., Davis, J.M., & Grahe, J.E. (1996). Dyad rapport and the accuracy of its judgment across situations: A lens model analysi s. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71 (1), 110 129. doi:10.1037//0022 3514.71.1.110 Bolster, B.I. & Springbett, B.M. (1961). The reaction of interviewers to favorable and unfavorable information. Journal of Applied Psychology, 45 (2), 97 103. d oi:10.1037/h0048316 Brehm, J.W. & Cohen, A.R. (1962). Explorations in cognitive dissonance Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons Inc. doi:10.1037/11622 000 Brown, S.L., Asher, T., & Cialdini, R.B. (2005). Evidence of a positive relationship between age and prefe rence for consistency. Journal of Research in Personality, 39 (5), 517 533. doi:10.1016/j.jrp.2004.07.001 Brunswick, E. (1956). Perception and the representative design of psychological experiments (2 nd Edition). Berkeley, CA. University of California Press Buhrmester, M., Kwang, T., & Gosling, S.D. (20 of inexpensive, yet high quality data? Perspectives on Psychological Science, 6 (1), 3 5. doi:10.1177/1745691610393980 Byrne, D. (1961). Interpersonal attraction as a function of affiliation need and attitude similarity. Human Relations, 14 (3), 283 289. doi:10.1177/0018726761014003 05 Byrne, D. (1997). An overview (and underview) of research and theory within the attraction paradigm. Journal of Social and Personal Relationships, 14 (3), 417 431. doi:10.1177/0265407597143008 Byrne, D., Bond, M.H., & Diamond, M.J. (1969). Response to po litical candidates as a function of attitude similarity dissimilarity. Human Relations, 22 (3), 251 262. doi:10.1177/001872676902200305 Byrne, D., Clore, G.L., & Smeaton, G. (1986). The attraction hypothesis: Do similar attitudes affect anything? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51 (6), 1167 1170. doi:10.1037//0022 3514.51.6.1167 Byrne, D., Clore, G.L., & Worchel, P. (1966). Effect of economic similarity dissimilarity on interpersonal attraction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 4 (2 ), 220 224. doi:10.1037/h0023559 Byrne, D., Griffitt, W., & Stefaniak, D. (1967). Attraction and similarity of personality characteristics. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 5 (1), 82 90. doi:10.1037/h0021198 Byrne, D. & Nelson, D. (1965). Attraction as a linear function of proportion of positive reinf orcements. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1 (6), 659 663. doi:10.1037/h0022073

PAGE 78

78 Campbell, J.D., Trapnell, P.D., Hein e, S.J., Katz, I.M., Lavallee, J.F., & Lehman, D.R. (1996). Self concept clarity: Measurement, personality correlates, and cultural boundaries. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70 (1), 141 156. doi:10.1037//0022 3514.70.1.141 Caprara, G.V., Vec chione, M., Barbaranelli, C., & Fraley, R.C. (2007). When likeness goes with liking: The case of political preference. Political Psychology, 28 (5), 609 632. doi:10.1111/j.1467 9221.2007.00592.x Carlsmith, J.M. & Aronson, E. (1963). Some hedonic consequence s of confirmation and disconfirmation of expectances. The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 66 (2), 151 156. doi:10.1037/h0042692 Chambers, J.R., Baron, R.S., & Inman, M.L. (2006). Misperceptions in intergroup conflict: Disagreeing about what we di sagree about. Psychological Science, 17 (1), 38 45. doi:10.1111/j.1467 9280.2005.01662.x Chambers, J.R., Schlenker, B.R., & Collisson, B. ( i n press). Ideological prejudice and value conflicts. Psychological Science Chen, F.F. & Kenrick, D.T. (2002). Repuls ion or attraction?: Group membership and assumed attitude similarity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83 (1), 111 125. doi:10.1037//0022 3514.83.1.111 Cialdini, R.B., Trost, M.R., & Newsom, J.T. (1995). Preference for consistency: The developm ent of a valid measure and the discovery of surprising behavioral implications. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69 (2), 318 328. doi:10.1037//0022 3514.69.2.318 Clement, R.W. & Krueger, J. (2000). The primacy of self referent information in pe rceptions of social consensus. British Journal of Social Psychology, 39 (2), 279 299. doi:10.1348/014466600164471 Clement, R.W. Kruerger, J. (2002). Social categorization moderates social projection. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 38 (3), 219 2 31. doi:10.1006/jesp.2001.1503 Darley, J.M. & Berscheid, E. (1967). Increased liking as a result of the anticipation of personal contact. Human Relations, 20 (1), 29 40. doi:10.1177/001872676702000103 Dawes, J. (2008). Do data characteristics change according to the number of scal e points used? International Journal of Market Research, 50 (1): 61 77. Dawes, R.M. & Mulford, M. (1996). The false consensus ef fect and overconfidence: Flaws in judgments or flaws in how we study judgment? Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 65 (3), 201 211. doi:10.1006/obhd.1996.0020

PAGE 79

79 Epley, N. & Waytz, A. (2010). Mind perception. In S.T. Fiske, D.T. Giblert, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), Handbook of social psychology (pp. 498 541). Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons Inc. Eyal, T & Epley, N. (2010). How to seem telepathic: Enabling mind reading by matching construal. Psychological Science, 21 (5), 700 705. doi:10.1177/0956797610367754 Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford University Press. Fiedler, F.E., Warrington, W.G., Blaisdell, F.J. (1952). Uncons cious attitudes as correlates of sociometeric choice in a social group. The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 47 (4), 790 796. doi:10.1037/h0054812 Fiske, S.T. (1980). Attention and weight in person perception: The impact of negative and extreme be havior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 38 (6), 889 906. doi:10.1037//0022 3514.38.6.889 Gifford, R. (1994). A lens mapping framework for understanding the encoding and decoding of interpersonal dispositions in nonverbal behavior. Journal of P ersonality and Social Psychology, 66 (2), 398 412. doi:10.1037//0022 3514.66.2.398 Greenwald, A.G. (1980). The totalitarian ego: Fabrication and revision of personal history. American Psychologist, 35 (7), 603 618. doi:10.1037//0003 066X.35.7.603 Guadagno, R .E. & Cialdini, R.B. (2010). Preference for consistency and social influence: A review of current research findings. Social Influence, 5 (3), 152 163. doi:10.1080/15534510903332378 Hamilton, D.L. & Huffman, L.J. (1971). Generality of impression formation pr ocesses for evaluative and nonevaluative judgments. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 20 (2), 200 207. doi:10.1037/h0031698 Hart, W., Albarracin, D., Eagly, A., Brechan, I., Lindberg, M., & Merrill, L. (2009). Feeling validated versus being corr ect: A meta analysis of selective exposure to information. Psychological Bulletin, 135 (4), 555 588. Heider, F. (1946). Attitudes and cognitive organization. Journal of Psychology: Interdisciplinary and Applied, 21 107 112. doi:10.1080/00223980.1946.991727 5 Heider, F. (1958). The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations John Wiley & Sons. Horowitz, M.W., Lyons, J., & Perlmutter, H.V. (1951). Induction of forces in discussion groups. Human Relations, 4 57 76. doi:10.1177/001872675100400103 John, O.P. & Srivas tava, S. (1999). The big five trait taxonomy: History, measurement, and theoretical perspectives. Pervin, Lawrence A. (Ed); John, Oliver P. (Ed). Handbook of personality: Theory and research (2 nd ed.), pp. 102 138. New York, NY. Guilford Press.

PAGE 80

80 Jones, J.T. Pelham, B.W., Carvallo, M., & Mirenberg, M.C. (2004). How do I love thee? Let me count the Js: Implicit egotism and interpersonal attraction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87 (5), 665 683. doi:10.1037/0022 3514.87.5.665 Judd, C.M. & Kenny, D.A. (2010) Data analysis in social psychology: Recent and recurring issues. In S.T. Fiske, D.T. Giblert, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), Handbook of social psychology (pp. 115 142). Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons Inc. Judd, C.M., Kenny, D.A., McClelland, G.H. (2001 ). Estimating and testing mediation and moderation in within subject designs. Psychological Methods, 6 (2), 115 134. doi:10.1037//1082 989X.6.2.115 Kagan, J. (1972). Motives and development. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 22 (1), 51 66. doi:10 .1037/h0032356 hypothesis. Journal of Social issues, 46 (2), 159 182. doi:10.1111/j.1540 4560.1990.tb01928.x Krueger, J. & Clement, R.W. (1994). The truly fal se consensus effect: An ineradicable and egocentric bias in social perception. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67 (4), 596 610. doi:10.1037//0022 3514.67.4.596 Krueger, J. & Stanke, D. (2001). The role of self referent and other referent knowl edge in perceptions of group characteristics. Personality and Social Psychology Bulleting, 27 (7), 878 888. doi:10.1177/0146167201277010 Leary, M. R. (2010). Affiliation, acceptance, and belonging: The pursuit of interpersonal connection. In S.T. Fiske, D. Gilbert, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), Handbook of social psychology (5th ed., Vol. 2, pp. 864 897). New York: McGraw Hill. Macrae, C.N. & Quadflieg, S. (2010). Perceiving people. In S.T. Fiske, D.T. Giblert, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), Handbook of social psychology (pp. 426 463). Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons Inc. McGuire, W.J. (1960). Cognitive consistency and attitude change. The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 60 (3), 345 353. doi:10.1037/h0048563 Mischel, W. & Shoda, Y. (1999). Integrating dispositions and processing dynamics within a unified theory of personality: The cognitive affective personality system. In L.A. Pervin & O.P John (Eds.) Handbook of personality: Theory and research New York, NY: Guilford Press. Montoya, R.M., Horton, R.S., & Kirchner, J (2008). Is actual similarity necessary for attraction? A meta analysis of actual and perceived similarity. Journal of Social and Personal Relationships, 25 (6), 889 922. doi:10.1177/0265407508096700

PAGE 81

81 Morry, M.M. (2005). Relationship satisfaction as a predi ctor of similarity ratings: A test of the attraction similarity hypothesis. Journal of Social and Personal Relationships, 22 (4), 561 584. doi:10.1177/0265407505054524 Morry, M.M. (2007). The attraction similarity hypothesis among cross sex friends: Relatio nship satisfaction, perceived similarities, and self serving perceptions. Journal of Social and Personal Relationships, 24 (1), 117 138. doi:10.1177/0265407507072615 Morry, M.M., Kito, M., & Ortiz, L. (2011). The attraction similarity model and dating coupl es: Projection, perceived similarity, and psychological benefits. Personal Relationships, 18 (1), 125 143. doi:10.1111/j.1475 6811.2010.01293.x Murray, S.L., Holmes, J.G., Bellavia, G., Griffin, D.W., & Dolderman, D. (2002). Kindred spirits? The benefits of egocentrism in close relationships. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82 (4), 5630581. doi:10.1037//0022 3514.82.4.563 Newcomb, T.M. (1953). Social psychology and group processes. Annual Review of Psychology, 4 183 214. doi:10.1146/annurev.ps. 04.020153.001151 Newcomb, T.M., Turner, R.H., & Converse, P.E. (1965). Social Psychology: The Study of Human Interaction. New York, NY. Hold, Rinehart, & Winston, Inc. Paolacci, G., Chandler, J., & Ipeirotis, P.G. (2010). Running experiments on Amazon Mech anical Turk. Judgment and Decision Making, 5 (5), 411 419. doi:10.1145/1869086.1869094 Robbins, J.M. & Krueger, J.I. (2005). Social projection to ingroups and outgroups: A review and meta analysis. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 9 (1), 32 47. doi: 10.1207/s15327957pspr0901_3 Rokeach, M. (1960). The open and closed mind: Investigations into the nature of belief systems and personality systems. Oxford, England. Basic Books. Rosenbaum, M.E. (1986). The repulsion hypothesis: On the nondevelopment of rel ationships. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51 (6), 1156 1166. doi:10.1037//0022 3514.51.6.1156 Rosenberg, M. (1965). Society and the adolescent self image Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Rosenthal, R. & Jacobson, L. (1968). Pygmal ian in the classroom: Teacher expectation and New York, NY. Holt, Rinehart, & Winston. Ross, L., Greene, D., & House, P. (1977). The false consensus effect: An egocentric bias in social perception and attribution processes Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 13 (3), 279 301. doi:10.1016/0022 1031(77)90049 X

PAGE 82

82 Sampson, E.E. & Insko, C.A. (1964). Cognitive consistency and performance in the autokinetic situation. The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 68 (2), 184 192. doi:10.1037/h0041242 Sears, D.O. (1986). College sophomore in the laboratory: Influence of a narrow data base on Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51 (3), 515 530. doi:10.1037//0022 3514.51.3.515 Si ngh, R. & Ho, S.Y. (2000). Attitudes and attraction: A new test of the attraction, repulsion and similarity dissimilarity asymmetry hypotheses. British Journal of Social Psychology, 39 (2), 197 211. doi:10.1348/014466600164426 Smith, A.J. (1957). Similarity of values and its relation to acceptance and the projection of similarity. Journal of Psychology, 43, 251 260. doi:10.1080/00223980.1957.9713070 Snyder, C.R., Lassegard, M., & Ford. C.E. (1986). Distancing after group success and failure: Basking in refle cted glory and cutting off reflected failure. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51 (2), 382 388. Snyder, M. & Swann, W.B. (1978). Hypothesis testing processes in social interaction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 36 (11), 1202 1212 doi:10.1037//0022 3514.36.11.1202 Suls, J. & Wan, C.K. (1987). In search of the false uniqueness phenomenon: Fear and estimates of social consensus. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52 (1), 211 217. doi:10.1037//0022 3514.52.1.211 Swann, W.B. (1997). The trouble with change: Self verification and allegiance to the self. Psychological Science, 8 (3), 177 180. doi :10.1111/j.1467 9280.1997.tb00407.x Swann, W.B. & Bosson, J.K. (2010). Self and identity. In S.T. Fiske, D.T. Giblert, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), Handbook of social psychology (pp. 598 628). Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons Inc. symbiosis with social psychology. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31 (2), 155 165. doi:10.1177/0146167204271591 Twenge, J.M. (2006). assertive, entitled and more miserable than ever before New York, NY. Free Press. Watson, D., Clark, L.A., & Tellegen, A. (1988). Dev elopment and validation of brief measures of positive and negative affect: The PANAS scales. doi:10.1037//0022 3514.54.6.1063 Watson, D., Hubbard, B., & Wiese, D. (2000). Self other agreement in personality and affectivity: The role of acquaintanceship, tr ait visibility, and assumed similarity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78 (3), 546 558. doi:10.1037//0022 3514.78.3.546

PAGE 83

83 Weller, J. & Watson, D. (2009). Friend or foe? Differential use of the self based heuristic as a function of relationship satisfaction. Journal of Personality, 77 (3), 731 760. doi:10.1111/j.1467 6494.2009.00563.x Wells, G.L. & Windschitl, P.D. (1999). Stimulus sampling and social psychological experimentation. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25 (9), 1115 1125. doi: 10.1177/01461672992512005 Wyer, R.S. (1974). Cognitive organization and change: An information processing approach. Oxford, England. Lawrence Erlbaum. Zajonc, R.B. (1960). The concepts of balance, congruity, and dissonance. Public Opinion Quarterly, 24 (2 ), 280 296. doi:10.1086/266949

PAGE 84

84 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Bria n Collisson earned his doctoral degree from the University of Florida in 2013 with an emphasis in social p sychology He also received hi s Masters of Science degree in p sychology from the University of Florida in 2011. In regard to undergraduate education, Brian earned his Bachelors of Arts degree from California State University, San Bernardino in 2009 and his pe rception and judgment, stereotyping and prejudice, and the teaching of psychology.