Apparatus Theory and Heuretics of Literary Encounters


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Apparatus Theory and Heuretics of Literary Encounters
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Hink, Gary
University of Florida
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Doctorate ( Ph.D.)
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University of Florida
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Ulmer, Gregory L
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Wegner, Phillip E
Bryant, Marsha C
Stenner, Jack


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literature -- philosophy -- rhetoric
English -- Dissertations, Academic -- UF
English thesis, Ph.D.
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As both a study and description of method for scholarly innovation as well as demonstration of experimental work with literature, Apparatus Theory and Heuretics of Literary Encounters explicates theory and practices for disciplinary invention. The approach is guided by the perspectives and writing of poststructuralist philosophy that uses art and particularly literature toward new and significant ends. Understanding this orientation as scholarship in what can be called the "aesthetic paradigm," the methodology first derives and identifies practical rhetoric and poetics for discursive practices in Humanities disciplines. The main exemplar of the study is the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze, and key lessons are drawn from his extensive work with art. With the “case study” of creating concepts through encounters with literature and its particular qualities, the perspective of "pragmatics" reading proceeds from established practices of literary scholarship: as productive alternative to analyzing novels, strategies for invention are identified as well as performed in order to show how meaning is both discovered and invented. Within a general scope of knowledge creation in philosophy, culture, and academic discourse, the specific cases of literary encounters and innovative discourse emphasize the perspective enabling this endeavor; fundamentally, apparatus theory recognizes crucial properties, distinctions, and transitions between types of thought and expression. Moreover, this view is shown valuable in its application in other endeavors, by engaging problems "paradigmatically"—as demonstrated here, considering the reciprocal relationships of Philosophy, Science, and Art, within the historical shift beyond literacy and strictly rational forms of knowledge. The occasion and agency created by encounters, in this case with art, is made evident in the transition from the model of discovery to one of invention, or "heuretics," using the conventions of literature, most importantly narrative. The object of study provides the means for "artisanal praxis"—the original method proposed—in scholarship: the experimental efforts use influential novels by Thomas Pynchon, Kurt Vonnegut, Kathy Acker, Leslie Marmon Silko, Jonathan Safran Foer, and other contemporary American authors. The theory and literary encounters generate a "resonance assemblage" concept and interface, thus showing the outcome of the heuretic attempt and the strategies advocated for inventive disciplinary practices.
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by Gary Hink.
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Florida, 2012.
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2012 Gary M. Hink, Jr. 2


F or my family 3


ACKNOWL EDGMENTS I am profoundly grateful for the experience working with Gregory Ulmer the past four years and for the opportunity to develop a extensive project, which this disse rtation is the start of and which he has guided as an inspirational and encouraging Chair. As he wrote to me, Don't expect to be knocked down in th e public thoroughfare by an illumination! Not that you were. The increments of satisfaction are more subtle as you probably already know. When you are on to something, the tension of rising action emerges all on its own. It is wonderful! We want more of that! And then graduate school seems like th is enormous (infinite?) detour (12 Feb 2008). We have been on to something and it has been an exhilarati ng process, an on-going endeavor indeed: not following in footstep s but still seeking what was s ought (to paraphrase your motto). With signature Keys of G: Rock, Tree, Spiderweb; Spiral, Choragraphy, Oblio; Conatus I thank my committee members Phil Wegner, Mars ha Bryant, and Jack Stenner, who have been supportive and challenging r eadersand whose part icipation has helped me maintain both the theoretical innovation and rigor of this proj ect. As a Graduate Teaching Associate in the Department of English for five years, I also appreciate the professiona l and personal support of Kenneth Kidd, Sidney Dobrin, Laurie Gries, and Terry Harpold. And for their feedback at various stages, I thank Jacob Riley, Kevin Sherman, John Tinnel, and Elise Takehana. Finally, and fundamentally, my familys suppor t can not be overstated, as they have constantly assisted me throughout graduate scho ol in many ways. Thank you most dearly to my mother Donna, my father Gary, my brothers Brian and Andrew, and my partner Alexia. You have continually helped me toward what the gr eatest philosophers of life have sought: because no one knows ahead of time the affects one is capable of, experimentation while having prudence and wisdomincreasing my capacity to be affected and to affect others, perpetually. Resonating 4


TABLE OF CONTENTS page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS...............................................................................................................4 ABSTRACT.....................................................................................................................................8 CHAPTER 1 CONSTRUCTIVISM IN THE AESTHETIC PARADIGM..................................................10 Apparatus Theory: Discourse and Conditions of Possibility..................................................15 Project Frame and Approach (Apparatus Theory)..........................................................16 Fundamental for Method: Understanding the Dispositif .................................................21 Multiple Regimes............................................................................................................28 Engaging the Dispositif : Introducing Pragmatics of the Aesthetic Paradigm.................33 Paradigm Thinking..........................................................................................................38 The Problem of a Concept......................................................................................................42 Apparatus Theory: Philosophy, Science, ArtConstructivism......................................43 Target for Method (Introduction)....................................................................................48 Methodological Perspective: Problematics, Pragmatics, Invention (Introduction).........51 2 PHILOSOPHY AS OPERA WHEN WORKING WITH ART..........................................55 Encounters and Problematized Concepts................................................................................55 Empirical Or ientation......................................................................................................59 Revised Image of Thought..............................................................................................62 Pedagogy of the Concept.............................................................................................69 Art Encounters........................................................................................................................76 Pragmatics of Aesthetic FiguresPercepts....................................................................78 Affects and the Language of Sensations.........................................................................82 Affirming Possibility.......................................................................................................... ....87 MediatorsLessons (Introduction).................................................................................89 Target for Method (Continued).......................................................................................91 3 PRAGMATICS OF LITERARY ENCOUNTERS................................................................95 Developing Encounter Pragmatics (Methodological Study)..................................................95 Deleuzes Literary Mediators..........................................................................................97 The problem of writing..............................................................................................103 Twists, seizes, rends, and wr estsphilosophical discourse..........................................107 Literary Encounters 2: From Series to Assemblage in Pynchons Early Novels.................112 Pynchon Mediators: Serial De tectives, Transversal Signs............................................116 Irresolvable Counter-series........................................................................................122 Deleuzean Method for Literary Pr agmatics (Scholarship Lessons).....................................128 Pragmatics Literary Percepts......................................................................................132 Pragmatics Literary Affects.......................................................................................138 5


Encountering Sensation and Defram ing Style...............................................................144 4 DIAGRAMMING A NOVELISTIC ASSEMBLAGE........................................................150 Study: Invention in Practice..................................................................................................1 52 Artisanal Praxis Observed 1: The Logic of Sense ..........................................................155 Serial Poetics and reading for sense...........................................................................157 Lessons for Method.......................................................................................................162 Pynchon Mediators: Shift from Discovery to Invention.......................................................164 Encountering Temporal Logics: Hot house, Street, Null, Projectile..............................165 Generative Lessons........................................................................................................168 Literary Encounter 3: Inventive Poetics, Gravitys Rainbow Dis-mantling. .....................172 Diagramming Assemblage Edges..................................................................................173 Artisanal Practice: Ellipsistic Bandwidth......................................................................176 Paralipsis (review for praxis)........................................................................................181 5 ASSEMBLAGE INTERFACETHEORY AND PRACTICE..........................................186 Novelistic Philosophy.......................................................................................................... .186 Reading Poetics.............................................................................................................187 Exemplar Study 2: Kafka Experimentation...................................................................189 Abstract Machine, Concrete Lessons............................................................................194 ( Reprise ) Working at the frontiers of our knowledge................................................198 Literary Encounters Assemblage: Atemporal Historiography.............................................202 Writing the Timeless DisasterOutside the Slaughterhouse .......................................203 Historical Rhetorical Choices (1945-2001)...................................................................206 Small-Scale History (Writi ng Time at the Frontier)......................................................211 Imipolexia Interface : Invention Testfire (Pync hon Mediator Concluded)...........................217 Imipolectique Writing....................................................................................................222 Choragraphy 1: Decision Paths (Discovered and Invented).........................................227 6 AFFECTIVE ENCOUNTERS, RESONANCE ASSEMBLAGE........................................232 Literary Encounters (6-8): Inventing with Three Machines of Temporality........................234 Time-lost in Ackers Senseless Empireserial fragments...........................................237 ( Choragraphy 2) Pirate(d) ScenesElegy for Serial Scholarship (Abhor Writes)..240 Time-lost Lessons..........................................................................................................247 Encountering Thanatos in Ceremony Time-lost Storytelling.....................................248 ( Choragraphy 3) Story Interface...................................................................................254 Lessons of W riting Lost Time.......................................................................................256 Expressing Eros and MnemoysyneFoers Machines of Resonance......................258 ( Choragraphy 4) How do you arrange your books?..................................................264 Lessons of Eros..............................................................................................................270 Coda: Heuretics of the Resonance Assemblage...................................................................272 Artisanal Praxis ( reviewed )...........................................................................................272 Philosographic Style Keys of G ..................................................................................275 Apparatus Theory and Encounter Heuretics..................................................................278 6


WORKS CITED .................................................................................................................... ......281 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH.......................................................................................................288 7


Abstract of Dissertation Pres ented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy APPARATUS THEORY AND HEURETI CS OF LITERARY ENCOUNTERS By Gary M. Hink, Jr. August 2012 Chair: Gregory L. Ulmer Major: English As both a study and description of met hod for scholarly innovation as well as demonstration of experiment al work with literature, Apparatus Theory and Heuretics of Literary Encounters explicates theory and practices for disciplinary inventi on. The approach is guided by the perspectives and writing of poststructurali st philosophy that uses art and particularly literature toward new and significan t ends. Understanding this orient ation as scholarship in what can be called the aesthetic paradigm, the methodology first derives and identifies practical rhetoric and poetics for discursive practices in Humanities disciplines. The main exemplar of the study is the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze, and key lessons are drawn from his extensive work with art. W ith the case study of creating concepts through encounters with literature and it s particular qualities, the persp ective of pragmatics reading proceeds from established practices of literary scholarship: as productive a lternative to analyzing novels, strategies for invention are identified as well as performed in order to show how meaning is both discovered and invented. Within a ge neral scope of knowledge creation in philosophy, culture, and academic discourse, the specific cases of literary encounters and innovative discourse emphasize the perspective enabling this endeavor; fundamentally, apparatus theory recognizes crucial properties, distinctions, and transitions between types of thought and 8


9 expression. Moreover, this view is shown valuable in its app lication in other endeavors, by engaging problems paradigmaticallyas demons trated here, consider ing the reciprocal relationships of Philosophy, Science, and Art, within the historical shift beyond literacy and strictly rational fo rms of knowledge. The occasion and agency created by encounters, in this case with art, is made evident in the transition from the model of discovery to one of invention, or heuretics, using the conventions of literature, most importantly narrative. The object of study pr ovides the means for artisanal praxisthe original method proposedin scholarship: the experimental efforts use influential novels by Thomas Pynchon, Kurt Vonnegut, Kathy Acker, Leslie Marmon Silko, Jonathan Safran Foer, and other contemporary American au thors. The theory and literary encounters generate a resonance assemblage concept and interface, thus showing the outcome of the heuretic attempt and the stra tegies advocated for inventive disciplinary practices.


CHAP TER 1 CONSTRUCTIVISM IN THE AESTHETIC PARADIGM Prelude: As a methodological study and experiment in practice, this project connects several issues from multiple related areas of th e Humanities. That it is ambitious, perhaps overly so, in this regard as well as in its scope and aims is an effect of its object of study: art, in this case literature, involves different conditions for what is pos sible and thus expands opportunities for what can be created in thought and in expression. This understanding is a key insight of Apparatus Theory, an inclusive term for philosoph ical perspectives upon pa rticular features of knowledge, discourse, and other practices situated within respective ar rangements recognizable by disciplinary field or epoch. This discerning orientation re cognizes the unique qualities, distinctions, and developments in divisions such as Science, Art, and Philosophy, on a horizontal axis, as well as the historical eras of Orality, Liter acy, and Electracy (post-Literacy); beyond artificial separations or unexamined assumptions, especially important are the affordances and limitations of each apparatuscond itions for possibility, particularly regarding knowledge and expression. In addition to forms of knowledge, the conditions and constraints are evident in institutions, identity experience, and social forms such as communication. In its numerous uses of language, literature offers additional advantages to thought, as mentioned, given certain qualities of aesthetic com position and its functions, effects, and logics. Far from abstract, the compound method evoked he re connects literary studies, rhetoric, and theory toward new knowledge, both concepts and forms of expression, as well as a poetics for continued undertaking and application. Additionally, the target and self -reflexive area of investigation, theory is understood as a particular genre of academic writing and an intermediary knowledge form between philosoph y and an object of study, for instance forms aesthetic, cultural, social, technol ogical, or communicative. The ai m of theoretical work toward 10


practical ends and new possibilitie s thus explores opportunities for invention rather than m erely producing discourse on a topic or case study. Specifically, this pr oject investigates what is possible for and seeks to offer to disciplinary concerns of literatu re and rhetoric alike, beginning in academic practices and extending applicab ly to knowledge creation and expression. Working at the general level of Appa ratus Theory and the specific focus upon a paradigmatic problem, the project both shows th e potential for the innovative praxis proposed and offers a methodology, one that could be emulat ed using other exemplars to different ends. Additionally, the investigation a nd results generated by the philo sophical approach emphasizes the utility of this perspective for future studies and experimental efforts: engaging a problematic consisting of question, problem, and responsewithout simple answer or solution. The problematic of knowledge and the unknown, undertaken in the model of discovery and invention, in a sp ecific case involves the question of how to create ideas following from and employing our encounters; furthermore, as Humanities scholarship, it concerns our encounters with sensations conveyed by aesthetic composition. The conditions for what counts for knowledge and what can be conv eyed bear upon this situation specifically regarding experiential dimensions, including perceptions a nd affectionsprecisely including, rather than discounting or foreclosing, new ways of perceiving, feeling, and thinking. Given their focus upon and innovation working precisely with aesthetic objects of study, the theory of several poststruc turalist philosophers motivates a nd enables this endeavor in significant and productive ways. Recognizing the issues noted a nd approaching a disciplinary concern in this fashion bear this influence f undamentally; beyond granting the inventive value of such philosophy in itself, my work shows precisely the utility of the method that I advocate, in the epistemology, vocabulary, and strategies that appear throughout. The exemplar theorist most 11


influential and advantageous this way, particularly for his inventing philosophically using art, is Gilles Deleu zewhose work is employed extensively in the service of met hod, rather than as a framework for analysis. One such instance, evident in th e overall scope of th is discussion, is the conception of knowledge in the model of discovery and the model of invention: demonstrating the processes of each model, my work shows the shift I advocate at large, to the second while employing certain advantages of the first approa ch. Put otherwise, one progression recognizable through the chapters is the transition from th e student or critic position regarding literature toward the artisan role of crea ting meaning in stylistic forms. This dynamic process undergone correlates as well to the stances that I offer as alternative: encounters rather than interpretations in reading; expression, opposed to arguments in scholarly discourse. Artisanal praxis is the method that I propose and the innovative attempt that I show for creating new ideas and suitable articulations usi ng aesthetic encounters, with the test study undertaking the challeng e of theorizing a concept of sensation. Moreover, this names a discursive strategy for academic work first, potentially applicable mo re broadly (further theorized later), using the conceptual and formal innovation provided by the object of study (literature, for me). Although understated compar ed to the extensive di scussions of philosophy and novels, rhetoric is indeed a crucial understanding for this goal, and the poetics presented can be considered in canonical termsinvention and kairos arrangement and style, delivery. On this point, Apparatus Theory recognizes that only vestiges of memory persist in literacyand decreasingly now, with the databa se as the prevailing form for organizing information. A mere observation in itself, this additional example of utility also opens an area for investigation, concerning the experiential catego ry analogous in post-literate rh etoric, one that is developing underway and that presently needs still to be tested further and theorized extensively. 12


Likewise, important in my pr axis as style and delivery par ticularly, the developments of contemporary literature within ch anging historical and cultural paradigms can be recognized for their innovative formal features and extraordinary uses of language. This view, a new pragmatics derived from Deleuze and Guattari makes use of the literary writing encountered toward inventive endsin ways more productive, I contend and demonstrate, than interpretation or argument. Specifically, the conventions of literary studies this way enable practical application: in this framework, we can make in telligible the sensations experienced in the parallel ways that authors do in their composition strategies. Keeping in mind this greater goal, my pragmatics readings of nove ls encountered focuses on the material levels of writing, including notable uses of textual ecology, mediality, and narrativ e especially. A crucial finding of this approach, most significant for theoretical developments and rhetorical praxis, is the role of interface: narrative functions notably as temporal and sensible mediation, contributing in artisanal production of novelistic philosophy and moreover toward what I propose ultimatelythe resonance assemblage, a concept and interface both intelligible and affective. This compound product of constructivism, one that connects concepts with experience and expression, results from a met hod that I have discovered and invented, in parlance for the process of knowledge. Starting with my point of departure the perspective, orientation, and practices of Apparatus Theory and poststructural ist philosophy are descri bed extensively in the first two chapters. First, the question, rationale, and tasks of method, generally termed invention by art encounters, are presented with specifi c descriptions of the theoretical framework, including issues such as problematic, paradigm, and dispositif (conditions of possibility). The second chapter elaborates the orientation and methodological study derived from Deleuze as the exemplar theorist, introducing his pragmatics reading and use of literary mediators. 13


The pragmatics method for literary encounters is thoroughly explicated in chapters three and four, using examples from Deleuze and s econdary scholarship. Engaging the disciplinary problem and providing an alternative to anal ytic literary critic ism, the methodological description for encounter pragmatics thus focu ses considerably upon the percepts, affects, and sensations mediated by aesthetic composition, reading for sense and multiple logics. In incremental progress and instructive attempts, I test the practice detaile d using the early novels of Thomas Pynchon; influential to my theore tical development, th e novels along with my discernment of Pynchons style assist the shift from the discovery model, in the detective or logocentric critic role, to the invention model of knowledge in the role of creative author. An important strategy emphasized is finding intensive features to use toward inventive efforts the generative and transformative qualities of literary writing, in multiple semiotic regimes. While the methodological study c ontinues in chapters five an d six, I increase the balance of artisanal praxis to theoretical components from Deleu ze; likewise, the crucial lessons of noticing experiential dimensions inscribed, such as passion an d temporality, are presented through literary examples to grea ter extents. Moreover, the integrated and non-linear sequence in the novelistic composition subtly dramatizes the aforementioned shift from clinical-critical scholar to affective artisanwith meaning maki ng beyond the conventions for knowledge in rational discourse. Applying in experimental writi ng practices all the less ons identified, several segments employ formally and conceptually the inten sive features enc ountered toward my artisanal praxis: indicating the Resonance Assemblage (not yet fully developed), they combine sensible and intelligible qualities as the interface for and expression of an affective and temporal concept experienced. Thus I present my method for Heuretics of Literary Encounters, which I have designed and which can be furt her developed through Apparatus Theory. 14


Apparatus Theory: Discourse and Conditions of Possibility A scholarly discourse that resonates the eff ects unique to its object of study will have become situated in the apparatus proper to its conventions. With the production of new knowledge at stake, a Humanities discipline lack ing definitive method and object of study, in this case, requires a reflexive orient ation beyond critical thinking fo r undertaking this task. This discursive approach most certainly pr oceeds by way of clear method, although one fundamentally distinct from Reason (scientific method). The present methodological account and demonstration derives a poetics and explicates a praxis for working with culture, from studying several theorists whose discourse reflects their purposeful an d explicit orientation within contemporary philosophy. On the last point, the first tenet understood for Humanities scholars toward our productive efforts is that a particular d isciplinary situation or perspective of intellectual and aesthetic convergence must be viewed paradigmatically. Specifically, this focus is guided by a cohort of respective theorists labeled poststructuralist, primarily Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, and Mi chel Foucault. Although sometimes grouped with other thinkersJacques Lacan, Julia Kristeva, Jean-Franois Lyotard, Luce Irigarayby ostensibly similar interests in language and semiotics, the homologue applied here to include Maurice Blanchot Roland Barthes, and Hlne Cixous is the evident influence of Nietzsche in terms both philo sophically and methodologically Besides a viewpoint of archeology qua genealogy, a Dionysian orientation of affirmation, and a consideration of rhetorical tropes along with ontol ogical forces, the most patent quality bearing Nietzschean qualities appears th eir anti-Platonism and subversion of metaphysics as established by the Western philosophical tradition (through Kant and Hegel, and up to Heidegger). In general, a poststructuralist perspective emerges to varying degrees across these theorists target areas or objects of study. Concerned with issues of immanence and tran scendence, as well as an 15


analytic of finitude in F oucaults terms ( Order of Things 343)differentiating the relation of the finite and the infinite they chiefly focus on conditions of possibility for a particular (given) paradigm or episteme Given the importance of this topic, it is necessary to distinguish and situate several related terms theorized respec tively, before turning to the main focus of problematics and the guiding exemplar of Gilles Deleuze. Project Frame and Approach (Apparatus Theory) Here is a principle of chorography: do not choose between the different meanings of key terms, but compose by using all the meanings (write the paradigm). Gregory Ulmer, Heuretics (48) Defined respectively and interdependentl y, the range of persp ectives comprising a provisionally-titled Appara tus Theory entail variously the notions episteme, paradigm, apparatus, dispositif regime, and discipline. This scope a ppears most general at the level of Foucaults episteme discussed throughout The Order of Things (1966); he writes, In any given culture and at any given mome nt, there is always only one episteme that defines the conditions of possibility of all knowledge, whethe r expressed in a theory or sile ntly invested in a practice (183). A more specific focus is one of gramma tology, theorized by Derrida and applied by Gregory L. Ulmer; recognizing the apparatus th rough the invention of wr iting, this view is apparent in Derridas critique of Western philosophy since Plato as logocentrism or the metaphysics of presence ( Margins 329). More precisely, Ulmer (1994) similarly perceives a distinct appara tus operating in the modes of Orality, Literacy, and Electracy. In Heuretics: The Logic of Invention he explains, For grammatology, hypermedia is the t echnological aspect of an electronic apparatus (referring to an interactive matrix of t echnology, institutional practices, a nd ideological subject formation) (17); additionally, What is under way in [Electracy ] is the collective inven tion of a new mode of reason (based on a new relationship among tec hnology, institutions, and the human subject) 16


whose sym ptoms it has been one task of gramma tology to describe (93). Important to note is that the apparatus modes both define an epoch an d coincide synchronically, on the one hand; yet, significantly, Electracy is understood particularly in the light of the new possibilities of thought manifested in electr onic technology (17). This theorization of apparatus differs from the Foucauldian sense as defined by Giorgio Agamben (2008)much like the distinction between Foucaults paradigm and the term as employed respectively by Thomas Kuhn (1962) and Flix Guattari (1992) discussed subsequently. Because all senses of these terms operate within this disc ursive orientation and inform the present discussion, it is worthwhile to elucidate and deliber ately apply within my approaching the paradigmatic prob lem evoked at the outset. In this way, Agamben focuses the abstraction of Foucaults genera l theory toward concrete mani festations (incidences?) of dispositif and singularityhis descripti ons of apparatus and paradigm. In the latter case, Agamben presents his understandi ng of Foucaults paradigm in a distinct, even antithetical way to conventional meanings of the term; yet, this pa rticular instance illustrates the general sense of episteme Within an epistemeand qu ite unlike Kunns dis ciplinary matrix of science (11) Agamben states, the paradigm is a singular case that is isolated fr om its context only insofar as, by exhibiting its own singul arity, it makes intelligible a new ensemble ( Method 18).1 On the one hand, the singular case defi nition directs our focus onto the empirical instance or model e.g. the concentration camp and the st ate of exception for Agamben, the prison and the clinic for Foucaultcited significa ntly. Yet, the more instructive point to emphasize here is the logic motivating the theorists exemplar, to make intelligible series of phenomena ( Method 31). At the risk of co mplication, this description appears more akin to 1 This citation refers to a chapter in Signature of All Things: On Method (Zone Books, 2009), distinct from a 2002 lecture also titled What is a Paradi gm? that is slightly different. 17


Ul mers category of Literacy, at the grammatologi cal level of one appara tus among several, than to Agambens use of apparatus to mean Foucaults dispostif A separate understanding, also lessnarrowly applied, emerges in the further cl assification by Agamben: By neutralizing the dichotomy between the general and the particular, it replaces a dichotomous logic with a bipolar analogical model (31); additi onally notable among the six thes es, The historicity of the paradigm lies neither in diachrony nor in synchrony but in a crossing of the two (Method 31). The question evoked in this case co ncerns the character of an apparatus as horizontal (transhistorical), as with Foucault s episteme, or vertical (disci plinary); for now, the compound understanding of paradigm re-d irects the main focus to the matter of epistemology proper, whether filtered reductively or taken in its complexity. For instance, Agamben clarifies how a paradi gm goes from singularity to singularity and [] transforms every singular case into an exemplar of a general rule that can never be stated a priori (22). He elaborates this defi nition more clearly in the conc lusion of an earlier lecture, What is a Paradigm? (2002): In it being and seeming are undecidable. Philosophy and poetry coincide insofar as both are contemplation of phenomenon in the medium of their knowability as examples (par. 18, my emphasis).2 Although these quotes bear taci t relation to the Deleuzean methodology discussed in the next section, the deliberate inclusion of paradigm into Apparatus Theory requires still further illu stration, by way of nuanced examples. Instructing how to write (with) the paradigm as chorographya compound and catalytic neologism named for the term chora which Derrida borrows from Plato ( Heuretics 39)Ulmer emphasizes, I do not choose among possi bilities but enter them into the paradigm of the diegesis, creating a network in which to catch an inventi on (138, my emphasis). To be 2 What is a Paradigm? Lecture at European Graduate School, August 2002. < > 18


clear, the present discussion does not yet perform chorography, but understands first by m eans of Ulmers method two aspects of the problem impli cated within this approach: the concept of paradigm as enacted in the discourse of poststructuralist exemplars, and the utility of this perspective not only for analytic examination but for application in praxis. The first case illustrates the quality of singularity noted by Agamben, recognizing the import of Ulmers proposition that The chorographe r, then, writes with paradigm s (sets), not arguments (38). Working toward a nascent method without being a generic chorography in rhetoric (40), Ulmer cites the inventive precedents by Derrida and Lacan as guides for using the inventio of writing with the paradigm (81). Derrida demons trates the productive us e of image logic, in the case of European topography, as the organizing principle Chora over Topos the dual senses of premises in terms of logic and place, the grounds of reason (48)for paradigm thinking. This gesture performs an aspect notable here as th e first quality of paradigm to highlight: the image opens a c onnection between the particular and the general, Ulmer notes (81). The latter insight similarly appears in th e case of Lacans using Poes The Purloined Letter in his seminar on The Ego; as Ulmer arti culates, The context of the whole seminar is important for chorography [] because it clarifies the specific analogy Lacan wanted to make (100, original emphasis). Thus, the emergent theme of mediating can be classified as an effect of the paradigm as concept, which is still characte rized here too narrowly only in the sense of exemplarto be examined otherwise more productivel y for praxis in the sense of chora. The second quality of paradigmatic theory wr iting emerges in the cas e of chorography as hyperrhetoric for Ulmer in Electracy, linked with the first insofar as The justification for inventing a method to be called chorogr aphy is that it is specifically an electronic rhetoric, one meant to exploit (but not limite d to) the digita l convergence of media in hypermedia (34). As 19


with the examples of De rrida and Lacan, the qualification but not limited to evokes the rationale of method as applied th eory, in that this perspectiv e makes it possible for anyone to write with the paradigm (29). Th e aspect identified here qualifies paradigm as the organizing principle both motivating and facilitating inte llectual discourse through Chora logic, in the practical sense of the making of a pattern (gathe ring a paradigm rather th an following a path) (203)in other words, radically different episte mologically than the Aristotlean tradition of rhetoric in concert with logocen tric Western philosophy at the le vel of theory discourse. Gathering rather than filtering or reductively sorting qua arguing a stance, thus enables the emergent pattern unde rway in this extended explica tion, one that seeks to produce a workable application of poststructuralist method in order to engage subsequently a problematic by using these independent theori zations. Ulmer shows precisely this type of conclusion, while incidentally evoking a potential option for application: [Lyotards term] The differend names an aspect of what is at stake in chorography [] as well: to write the paradigm, or to write the discourses of all the in stitutions of the popcycle, is to negotiate the passages among genres separated by differends (26).3 Most productive for the purpose of guiding innovative research is th at Ulmers chorography, as paradigm discourse, addresses the problemthe search for passages bridging the d ifferend (the lack of translatability between incommensurable genres of disc ourse) (25)without simply re sorting to Kants aesthetic faculty ( The Critique of Judgment) and the incompatible implications therein.4 At the expense of 3 Ulmers quotation from The Differend: Phrases in Dispute (1988) is worth noting in full: Each genre of discourse would be like an island; the faculty of judgment would be, at least in part, like an admiral or like a provisioner of ships who would launch expeditions from one island to the next, intended to present to one island what was found (or invented, in the arch aic sense of the word) in the other, an d which might serve the former as an as-if intuition with which to validate it (Lyotard, 131) ( Heuretics 25). 4 Thus my exclusion of Lyotard from this account of postructur alist Apparatus Theory, using the cohort of Derrida, Foucault, and Deleuze: an orientation post-, non-, or anti- Kantian, regardless of their treatment. 20


lengthy discourse on this point, the question raised by the re lation of chorography to the differend connects imm ediately to another element in the network discussion of paradigm one concerning new possibilities of thought (Ulmer 17, my emphasis). By focusing upon conditions of possibility in the case of Electracy, Ulmers example subtly connects the notion of paradigm as pattern or set a nd the alternative references by Agamben (2008) within the aforementioned discussion, Foucaults concerns of discursive regime (Signature 14) and thresholds of epistemologizat ions (15). With these understandings established, we can recognize how a ddressing conditions of possibility relates ostensibly more to the term dispositif and Agambens translation of the term to apparatus. To keep in mind, the present exploration of terms seeks to produce a paradigmatic web of interconnected concepts that yield the method and object of study, even in th eir semantic distinctions; in other words, not presenting a Foucauldian perspe ctive exclusively, but discerni ng the problem at hand through the poststructuralist orientation demonstrated by several theorists discursive procedures. Fundamental for Method: Understanding the Dispositif As a philosopher for whom I have the greatest respect once said, terminology is the poetic moment of thought. Agamben ( What is an Apparatus? 1) An obstacle to applying the insights of the primary philosophers discussed here seemingly appears in the variety of terms em ployed, particularly by respective theorists presenting unique understandings in their readings (innovative theory); yet, this same ostensible hazard can be for us a catalyst, the means for application. To clarify the rationale for studying these secondary conjectures of philoso phers concepts, I am discerning a method for new scholarly work from formidable applications by theorists in their original efforts toward innovation or examinations of different objects of study; this is not yet an argument so much as a deliberate position and approach. As any approach is subject to epistemological conditions, 21


Apparatus T heory facilitates such work precisely by recognizing and working from within the conditionsevoking, in this case, the strategies a nd limitations operating within Foucaults term for apparatus, dispositif The two exemplary guides thus not on ly illustrate via case study this method for new work, Deleuzes bringing up -to-date and prosp ective trajectory and Agambens genealogical tracing; they also contribute to the comp lex explication of apparatus underway thus far, with distinct insights and implications posed. This connection begins from the simple correspondence of both philosophers pos ing the question What is an apparatus? concerning Foucaults term dispositive. Further, the point of departure proceeds by way of resonance and evocation, supplem enting the theoretical assemblage in development with discussions of Jacques Rancire and Flix Guattari to conclu de this section on Apparatus. In both his elucidating Foucaults concep t and method as well as demonstrating an idiosyncratic reading, Deleuze presents in What is a Dispositif ? a clear and specific sense of apparatus as dispositif providing an approach and task fo r productive work w ith the concept. Defining a dispositif as a multilinear whole (also translat ed as ensemble), Deleuze (1992) states that It is composed of lines of different natures ( Two Regimes 338); his language of dynamic processes identifies concrete dimensions of an apparatus ( dispositif ), describing how each one is composed of lines of visibility, utterances, lines of force, lines of subjectivation, lines of cracking, breaking and ruptures that all intertwine and mix together (342).5 These types of lines articulate conditi ons within a particular dispositif for the respective production of Knowledge, Power and Subjectivity (338) as the relationship or dimension between concrete social manifestations (340), such as possible utterances, for instance. Secondly to note, the general language in this case of a dispositif does not indicate 5 What is a Dispositif ? originally printed in Michel Foucault, Philosopher: Essa ys Translated From the French and German, Ed. Armstrong, Timothy J. (Routledge, 1992): 159-68. My citations refer to Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews, 1975-1995 (Semiotext(e), 2007): 338-48. 22


abstraction. On the contrary, Dele uze explains each type of li ne with regard to Foucaults histor ical specificity: the Subject within Gr eek, Christian, Modern societies (341); the historicity of reason (343); possible utterances dur ing the French and Russian Revolutions (344). Thus, while a certain dispositif identifies conditions with an hi storical perspective, this description more so names a epistemic regime operating upon the creation of Knowledge, Power, and Subjectivity. The first explicit lesson to derive from this point is the qualitative understanding, how lines within a dispositif appear aesthetic, scientific, political or otherwise, across a threshold of a regime (339). An additional implication is that through this perspective and his language, Deleuze resolves the problem of de scribing an apparatus or a dispositif in horizontal or vertical terms, as I have noted, by focusing simultaneously upon the complexity and the specificity of a regime. The consequence for method is the imperative for our withholding judgment by universal criteria, in favor of understanding the unique processes immanent to an apparatus (342). Readily apparent in Deleuzes language is how his perspective and ph ilosophical orientation enables this productive position. For example, in the discourse we can come to understand as Deleuzean, he mentions the variations and ev en mutations of the assemblage, while adding that Each apparatus is therefore a multiplicity where certain processes in becoming are operative and are distinct from those ope rating in another apparatus (342). While this instance might not elucidate matters for those readers unfamiliar with Deleuzes terminology, the instru ctive points to reiterate are two-fold: first, how Deleuze proceeds productively with Foucaults dispositif concept in contradistinc tion to Agamben, in the subsequent discussion; also, how we acquire greater understanding from these secondary readers, with direct methodologi cal consequences. The last po int appears specifically through 23


Deleuzes articulating the repudiat ion of universals as the f irs t consequence for a philosophy to adequately theorize dispositif such as Foucault has: Thinkers like Spinoza and Nietzsche showed long ago that modes of existences had to be weighed according to immanent criteria, according to their content in possibilities, freedom, creativity with no call to transcendental values (343-4). More directly, this second understanding from Deleuzes insight produces a task for theory and a challenge of perspective. One target for examination, by which to decipher the lines of a dispositif as regime, is subjectivity. In this case, Deleuze states that In every apparatus, we have to distinguish between what we are (what we already no longer are) and what we are becoming (345); or, understood in the histor ical terms of Foucault, the task appears that we must untangle the lines of the recent past fr om the lines of the near future (346). In both instances, a methodological and epistemological hazard immediately appears, perhaps in analogous fashion to our confusing means as e nds, with scholars finding it sufficient merely to identify subjectivity as such or even in its particular forms, e.g. the free citizens of the Athenian city-state; or a marginalized existence of the e xcluded (341). On the contrary, undertaking this object of study requires a typology of subjective formations in changing apparatuse s in order to understand the dispositif, as Deleuze articulates, with combinations to be untangled everywhere: productions of subjectiv ity escaping the powers and knowledge of one apparatus to reinvest them selves in another thr ough other forms to be created (342). This work would generate an understanding of the regime only partly through its outcomes, whether subjectivity or another form. More important is the app lication of immanent criteria, in order to bring up-to-date th e identification of a line within the present dispositif undertaking the approach that Deleuze states: When we read Fou caults last books, we must do 24


our best to understand the program he is offering hi s readers (344). Before turning to an examination of immanent criteria with regard to particular regimes, it is worthwhile to review another method in paralle l fashion, particularly for cautionary insights. Besides using transcendental criteria to unproduc tive results, this case also illustrates the outcome of narrowly focusing upon th e subjectivation line of a dispositif a deceptively easy approach much akin to our taking particular forms to be universal or generalizable beyond an apparatus. The example is instructive give n how Agamben (2006) proceeds in What is an Apparatus? from the same point as Deleuzea nd actually quotes a more substantial interview of Foucaults in his recounting dispositif as a heterogeneous set and concrete strategic function, which appears at the intersection of power relations and relations of knowledge ( Apparatus 3). These are immediately recognizable as the aspects that Deleuze describes in terms of ensemble or assemblage, lines or processe s, and dimensions. Thus, the different outcome clearly does not result from dispar ate interpretations, as all the various terms resonate; this includes, Foucaults stating (1977), in the interv iew Agamben cites, The apparatus is precisely this: a set of stra tegies of the relations of forces s upporting, and supported by, certain types of knowledge ( Apparatus 2). My goal in tracing the ultimate disparity is not to advocate one interpretation, particularly given the little invest ment in either case except for the overall benefit to the paradigmatic explication of apparatus in progress; rather, I seek to demonstrate how philosophical outcomes result directly from the point of departure, and cons equently what is at stake in terms of productive tr ajectories and perspectives. On the one hand, Agamben indeed follows F oucault in avoiding the universals while negotiating the general character (7) of the dispositif concept; from his investigation of concrete modes (6), Agamben concludes that A pparatus, then, is first of all a machine that 25


produces su bjectifications, and only as such is it also a machine of governance (20). This conclusion itself is not an obstacle or dilemma, and in fact it elucidat es both processes of subjective formation and governance; however, the logic and perspective employed create problems of incompatibility a nd inconsistency, accounted for by Agamben as an inevitable condition of interpretationremarked upon as the unavoidable moment when the interpreter knows that it is now time to abandon the text th at he is analyzing and to proceed on his own (13). While this forthright statement is helpful in reminding the imperative for reflexivity and deliberation whenever we interpret and develop the text of an author (13), we too must maintain the premises of the original thought wh en undertaking or applying Foucault, Deleuze, or any philosopher. In contrast, Agamben fa shions his understanding and application of dispositif, as though ostensibly Foucault s inherent conception a nd intention, by proceeding by means of etymology as genealogy: beginning w ith the influence upon F oucault of Hyppolites reading Hegel (regarding positivity ), tracing back its meanings to early Christian era theology. The resulting conclusion turns upon Agambe ns directly applying the ancient Greek concept of oikonimia, as an originary management (govern ance) apparatus and inherent term within subsequent translations: The Latin term dispositio from which the French term dispositif or apparatus. derives, comes therefore to take on the complex semantic sphere of the theological oikonomia (11). Granted, Agamben presents the sequence as his respective theological genealogy of economy (8), and th e hermeneutic explicati on is both logical and enlightening. However, we must question Agam bens unequivocally attesting, What is common to all these terms is that they refer back to this oikonomia that is, to a set of practices, bodies of knowledge, measures, and institutions that aim to manage, govern, control, and orientin a way that purports to be usefulthe behaviors, gestures, and thoughts of human beings (12). 26


First, we can question the specious use of an ahistorical (transcen dental) application of the secularized oikonomia (literally: profane) with whic h Agamben concludes the essay (19), on the basis that such a maneuver betrays the immanent criteria condition articulated by Deleuze as a perspective proper to a philosophy of apparatuses (342). While this condition certainly owes to the Deleuzean position of citing Spinoza and Nietzsche, Agambens extracting from a particular dispositif Christian theology, a general statement about every apparatus bears upon the potential for adopting let alone applying his conclusions. We can recognize this hazard in Agambe ns derisory judgment of the present-day apparatus and the reciprocal techno-media subjectivit y (21), quite in contrast to Deleuzes instruction to chart modes of existence instead of judging with gene ral criteria. In the reso lute language addressing the catastrophe of world governance as his conclusion, Agamben insists upon the dispositif narrowly producing the massive processes of des ubjectification and the eclipse of politics (22), accounted for because The capture and su bjectification of this desire [for animalistic happiness] in a separate sphere constitutes the specific power of the apparatus (17). If there is a task for scholars posed by this discussion, it is only by implication: Agambens advocating an imperative to resist ab stractly the general a pparatus of capture and to restore the ideal (pre-appara tus?) subjectification modes. Th is conclusion leaves us without any recourse except to affirm or dispute the fatalistic claims, which amounts to the same response, insofar as any way to proceed with the concept of dispositif is foreclosed, as when Agamben remarks that the problem cannot be pr operly raised within an apparatus (24). By way of provisional explanation, I would accoun t of for this outcome by recognizing that Agamben investigates the creation of the concept ( dispositif ) and its present ma nifestation with this understanding, whereas Deleuz e (albeit ambiguously) offers the means for applying the 27


conception of dispositif relative to object of study (e.g. K nowledge, Subjectivity). Alternatively, we m ight still find a problem to undertake with in Agambens treatise; however, not in his diatribe about desubjectification but in the problem of separation that he articulates. Given the fundamental division insisted upon by oikonomia (16), Agamben seeks to counter (the effects of) the dispositif by addressing its theological grounds: But what has been ritually separated can also be re stored to the profane sphere. Pr ofanation is the counter-apparatus that restores to common use what sacrifice had separated and divided (1 9). This instance might yield a poetic moment for terminol ogy by returning to the premises of dispositif as concrete social relations of power and knowledge, rather than resigning to the transcendental terminology of sacred / separation and profane / common that forecloses rec ourse. By this I mean our intervening in the separation of concepts from experiencewhich appears to me an effort demonstrated by most if not all progressive know ledge discourses regardless of objectin order to engage directly and productively the processes of a dispositif The task specifically concerns scholars who might undertake this problem not only as it bears upon subjectiv ity and visibility, but at the level of apparatus and the conditions for possibilities in the form of processes regarding utterances, legibility (?), Knowledge, and Power. The particular undertaking of remedying subjectivity is left to other endea vours and perhaps other disciplines; addressed presently, the question that emerges precisely concerns how to do this, approaching the problem. Multiple Regimes Could this be the intrinsic aesthetic of modes of existe nce as the ultimate dimension of [ dispositifs ]? Deleuze, What is a Dispositif ? (344) Returning to the paradigmatic problem, at the level of apparatus, reorients our perspective onto the question, the proper one I would add, of the conditions of possibility. In this way, we avoid the stymied progress caught in the bog of examples, in favor of ascertaining the operative 28


problem implicated (within) the exampleprovisionally, a particular dispositif in order to proceed in productively. The productive quality of th is procession is concrete (literal) in terms of creating novel concepts, e.g. Foucaults Subject, Knowle dge, Power, through discursive practices; demonstrative, by illustrating the processes of the regime ( dispostif ) within which we are situated; qualitative, in terms of the posit ive attribute of agency opposed to blocked or foreclosed recourse by the regime. This approach is directly guided by Deleuzes identifying a change in orientation as the second conse quence of apparatus theory in What is a Dispositif ?, which proceeds from the first, the repudiation of universals (342), towa rd turning away from the Eternal to apprehend the new (344). For my purpose, it is less imperative to delineate which aspects indicate or how overall this manifest s Deleuzean or Foucauldian or anothers thought; rather, we can recognize an articulation of a perspect ive that is not nominally poststructuralist but fundamentally at work in the theory and praxis st udied at present. Still concerned with the empirical qualities of a dispositif but avoiding the transcendental assessment of Agamben, Deleuze (1992) directly articulate s this position: The new is not supposed to designate fashion, but on the contrary the variable creativity for the apparatuses: in conformance with the question that began to appear in the 20th century of how the production of something new in the world is possible (344, my emphasis). Proceeding from this point, the followi ng discussion intends to connect several perspectives and terms with regard to conditi ons for production, guided by this parlance: What counts is the newness of the regime of enunciatio n itself, Deleuze writes, continuing that Each apparatus is thus defined by its content of newness and creativity (344). First, understanding the operation of a dispositif might result, in more concrete way pe rtaining to concepts and not strictly subjectivity, by examining in terms of regime. Additi onally, the following examples 29


Rancire, D eleuze and Guattari, an d Guattaricontribute to the grea ter objective of this overall discussion by demonstrating a distinct persp ective, here developed as Apparatus Theory. Given the fundamental objective of pr oducing and disseminating new knowledge (and types of knowledge), the regim e of enunciation focus greatly concerns our disciplinary interest, which it bears upon; we can understand this in general te rms as identifying what can be said or the articulations of whic h we might be capable and not purely possible. Jacques Rancireevoked presently via semantic connec tion to Deleuzes regimedescribes this situation much like Foucaults dispositif as a distribution of the sensible in The Politics of Aesthetics (2000): a delineation process, which produces a system of self-evident facts of perception based on the set horizons and modalities of what is visible and audible as well as what can be said, thought, made, or done (Rockhill, 85).6 As emphasized by Deleuzes explication of dispositif and worth reiterating, each regime operates with (or by?) a distribution of the sensible, which must be understood respectively. The regime in this perspective effectively name s the conditions for possibility as manifested in measures of visibility and i ntelligibility(50). In order to grasp, let alone change these conditions, though, we must connect the modes of inte lligibility (35) relative to a regime with our discursive procedures with an object of study. This simple point evokes a method, deliberately following from the pers pective demonstrated; for exampl e, Rancires remarks that the aesthetic mode of thought is much more than a way of thinking about art. It is an idea of thought, linked to an idea of the distribution of the sensible (45). First, completing the prior point about the implications for enunciation, the particular 6 Rancires original 2000 publication, Le Partage du sensible: Esthtique et politique, is collected with other material for the 2004 publication of the English-translation, The Politics of Aesthetics, from which I cite here. 30


regim e and its mode presupposes (and at worse, determines ) both an intelligibility and a framework for possible articulations. This empiri cal quality is not exclusive to matters of language, to be clear: De leuze (1992) begins with visibility, stating that Each apparatus has its regimen of light [], distributi ng the visible and the invisible (339), and then names regimes of utterances as another defining quality of a dispositif. The general parlance concerns variations of science, literary genre[s], social movement[s]each a line or concrete process within a dispositif Rancire implicitly bears the infl uence of this (Foucauldian) thought, applied effectually in his examining regimes of art and their sensibility-intelligibilityultimately in the service of his objectives concerning politic s and history, but instructive here generally. More specific than Foucaults general episteme categories, and yet in parallel fashion to the epochs, Rancire analyzes within the West ern tradition [of art], three major regimes of identification (20): ethical, concerning conditions for visibili ty of images; the poeticor representativeregime, organized by the principle of reproducing the substance of the content in its ways of doing and making (22). Although this latter regi me appears prevalent during the Classical Age, we know that the mimetic principle of art is not rendered in operative simply by its historical displacement; or rather, the logic of representation (22) still appears at work in cases even today, although another mode emerged in t he Modern Age (vaguely defined by Rancire here, but mostly corresponding with Foucaults modern period as the 19th century). With the primacy of resemblance and the hierarchy of logic (Reason) apparent in scholarly discourse, one might examine Rancire s representative regime as it bears upon discourse similarly to art; yet, the correspond ing conclusion about enunc iation would likely be akin to Agambens despair about subjectivation in the techno-capit alist apparatus. Thus, seeking 31


first to g rasp and then to proceed productively within a given dispositif, the mode of greater interest is Rancires aesthetic regime: the identific ation of art no longer occurs via a division within ways of doing and making, but it is based on distinguishing a sens ible mode of being specific to artistic products (2 2). For the present discussion, th e qualitative designations serve greater purpose than the historical designations of the modesa rati onale that is also evident in Rancires contrasting two types of historicity within the mime tic and aesthetic regimes (24). Indeed, while I ostensibly detach Rancires fr om politics and history through this gesture, the intent is to emphasize the potential of a modes unique quality, which might be overlooked by our focusing too narrowly upon isolated incidents with the privileged perspective of designation. For example, discussing a second type of avant-garde within the aesthetic regime, Rancire recognizes the invention of sensible forms and material structur es for a life to come (29). In keeping with the distinction provis ioning against designation and in favor of immanent modes for qualitative assessment, I further characterize this example of the avantgarde a paragon for much critical scholarship, as an exemplar not in the individual writers actual historical acts, recognized retroactively as significant; ra ther for the mode of thought indicated therein, which demonstrates a line of enunciation within the aesthetic regime. Alain Badiou (2005) articulates bot h distinctions in his r eading of Andr Bretons Arcanum 17 in The Century; the second sense of mode is worth quoting at length: For Breton, the formula names the change of sign, the rebellious passage from suffering to the affirmative intensity of life. A large part of the centurys undertakingspolitical as well as artisti cdevoted themselves to finding the formula, this slightest poin t of attachment to the real of that which announces its novelty; this explosion in language wher eby one word, one word alone, is the same thing as a body. (146-7) For Badiou, this formula fashions the creative act (146) as the effort in art to produce an unknown intensity (147) in the pres ent and for the future. Beyond stri ctly the actual products of 32


Surrealism as Rebellion (143) or reconstruction of love (145), though, the example attests the productive potential of the aesthetic mode of thought for enunciation in a given regime. This recourse can partly be accounted for by Rancires describing the intelligibility and sensibility unique to the aesthetic mode with the logic of his term literarity (La Littrarit ). As a paradigm within the aesthetic regime, in Agambens sense of exemplar literarity evinces the condition and the effect of th e circulation of actual literary locutions (39); like political statements, these locutions, Rancire adds, defin e models of speech or action but also regimes of sensible intensitypotentially with the ability to reconfigure the map of the sensible (39). I describe this concept of literarity in terms of Agambens singular case because it operates both within and as an exceptiona l case of the regime, in its singularity At minimum, literarity as paradigm makes intelligible a new ensemble (18), as Agamben (2006) states; not arbitrarily, Rancire likewise insists that The aesthetic regime asserts the abso lute singularity of art (23). By undermining the imperative for resemblance and meaning in the mimetic regime, the aesthetic regime facilitates furthe r possibilities by maintaining this singularity, or phrased in the particular case of The aesthetic sovereignty of literature (37), free from oppressive conditions. One effect of the alternative dispositifor distribution of the sensible in Rancires termsis a distinct intelligibil ity through the form of fic tion, with both history and stories written under the same regime of truth (38). In this way, Ranci re explains, the logic of stories manifests as material rearrangements of signs and images, relations hips between what is seen and what is said, between what is done and what can be done (39). Engaging the Dispositif : Introducing Pragmatics of the Aesthetic Paradigm One conclusion from this examination, that the singularity of art changes the conditions of the regime, answers the problem for newness and creativity within a regime of enunciation (Deleuze) by providing both methodological perspectiv e and tasks, in the invention of sensible 33


for ms (Rancire). The aim of the preceding mane uver has been toward application, in order to proceed in productive ways upon adequately surv eying the problem and orientation articulated by these related theorists. Indeed, a secondary ar gument emerging consequently is that the proper use of theory is not self-evident (and can not be self-satisfied); nor is it applicable methodologically to diagnose an in tellectual-aesthetic s ituation, with the ne gative effect of limiting or preventing recourse for further work. Th e rationale of catalyzing lines of inquiry and progression partly informs the associative explor ation and creation of a semantic network in favor of explication that is exhaustive, deferring a comprehens ive treatment to the principle object of study in the next section. Likewise, far from an arbitrary magpie-of-t heory approach, the attempt to write the paradigm has intended to illustrate the advantageous quality of this type of experimental work, generalizable toward developi ng the derived poststructuralist orientation and Apparatus Theory on the one hand. Also, we can recognize an a dditional benefit of this work specifically in applying rather than interpreting (or ostensibly arguing with) philosophical concepts: focusing more specifically than the general level of episteme or the abstract language of dispositif or singularity in examining innovative and facili tative examples including Ulmers apparatus, Agambens paradigm and Rancires regime. Despite the relation I ha ve proposed, these terms certainly are not identical, and it is especially imperative not to conflate them. The point here concerns negotiating a specificity of focusavoi ding an easy tactic of examining and concluding from minute exampleswith regard to what we might call discipline once turning to Deleuze and Guattari ultimately. First, it is necessary to review the strategy for innovative enunciation with regard to the regime of signification, wh ich indirectly emphasizes the imperative to go beyond analytic-diagnostic di scourse; this discussion also demonstrates 34


On the former point of focus, first, from an example in A Thousand Plateaus taken out of context relatively simply: when Deleuze and Gua ttari (1980) insist that there can not be any general semiology (136)7 they instantiate the principle of concrete theoretical discourse instead of transcendental (ideal, abstra ct, universal) claims. We can recognize this deliberate action similarly in the examples thus far mentioned, such the processes of a dispositif ; even ostensibly general statements might indicate their finite derivation, as with Derridas fundamental analysis of Western Philosophy as logocentric concluded from an analysis of binary logic in presence and writing ( Margins ). In order to describe and understand ad equately the various semiotic regimes they recognize, Deleuze and Gua ttari substitute pragmatics and its tetrad of tasks: [1] making a tracing of the mixed semiotics, under the generative component; [2] making the transformational map of the regimes, with their possibilities for translation and creation, for budding along th e lines of the tracings; [3] making the diagram of the abstract machines that are in play in each case, either as potentialities or as effectiv e emergences; [4] outlining the program of the assemblages that distribute everything a nd bring a circulation of movement with alternatives, jumps, and mutations. ( ATP 146-7) In this case, pragmatics as method serves their purpose of addressing the four components, the object of Pragmatics (145) of a pa rticular regime of signs, in a way not based in linguistics. The means of this study directly results consequent ly from their premisean argument itself, too complex to summarize herethat regimes are not stri ctly linguistic in nature, whether more or less than language (and simulta neously). Expressing the logic of dispositif, every regime of signs effectuates the condition of possibility of language []; Deleuze and Guattari add, As Foucault clearly shows, regimes of signs are only functions of existence of language [] (140). Without needing to explore the full extent of their theorization of pragmatics, we can recognize the effectiveness of the approach in th eir analysis (immanent criteria), in a way 7 Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus (1980). Trans. Brian Massumi (Minnesota UP, 1987). 35


neither tautological nor teleol ogical. The em phasis of this point hinges upon my understanding the use of regime by Deleuze and Guttari in this instance to be akin to dispositif This term is described markedly through its nega tive effects in the case of the signifying regime, for instance manifested through religion and psychoanalysis (121 passim ). Moreover, the regime of signs (451) is stated in another context even more adversely like Agambens (2006) terminal diagnosis of the present appara tusas it bears upon subjecfification within the apparatus of the nation-state and capitalism (457-8). With this said, I am not overstating the import of their conclusion about the four regimes given there is little use in adopting, in order to further recognize, the horrors of the signifying regime that Deleuze and Guattari discuss. (And such a strategy would be simply attempted, given that this is the most prevalent regime.) Rather, more advantageous is attending to the product of pragmatics, and the evocations, describing respectively at least f our of many regimes, which are all mixed in various instances (119): signifying; primitive, presignifying (117); countersignifying (118); postsignifying (119). A task qua philosophical question emerges, stated as a concluding propos ition: given the premise I have set, that regimes of si gns operate in the same manner as the dispositif concept that Deleuze (1992) describes; and given the concrete processes respective to a regime and its conditions; then, we might explor e what manifests in a particular regime in forms such as Knowledge, Discourse, subjectiv ityespecially querying the postsignifying regime. In this chapter, Deleuze and Guattari ex plicate thoroughly the last form, in terms of subjectification; far from exhausted, a line of research remains to be explored and articulated newly, examining through pragmatics any signifying regime and its concrete processes. With the perspective of Apparatus Theor y, I have begun this inquiry by positioning the aesthetic mode of thought as a paradigm with in the inchoate, as-yet unnamed apparatus: a 36


postsign ifying regime is not (simply) brought to bear upon but is engaged toward producing uniquely new forms of intellig ibility and enunciation of knowledge. The rationale for this approach is found in the exemplar of Deleuze and Guattari, which suggests a trajectory to be followed in parallel fashion. By this I refer to the development proceeding from the point of departure in the postsignifying regime, which De leuze (1992) articulates: [Because] they escape the dimensions of knowledge and power, lines of subjectivation seem particularly apt to trace paths of creation, which are constantly aborted bu t also taken up again and modified until the old apparatus breaks ( Dispostif 345). Without surveying its entir e development, we can clearly recognize the logical end-point of a theorization of subjectivity regarding an emergent regime, in the final work of Flix Guattari, Chaosmosis (1992).8 To be clear, the a pparent objective in this perspective is not to work in manners redundant ( e.g. additional recognition) or contrary ( e.g. ostensibly oppositional instances); rather, di scerning the method from the novel theorization and prospective praxis articulated by Guatta ri guides a similar approach to new work. Although briefly summarizing the complex th eory and unique discourse that Guattari presents in Chaosmosis is difficult to present toward the a im of elucidating, several key points can demonstrate the aforementioned purpose and su ffice for a lesson. In the concluding chapter, The Ecosophic Object, Guattaris ultimate objective and conclusion concernsfundamentally and radically definednothings less than the production of subjectivity (133).9 For him, the means to this end, as it were (itself a means ), appear in the conditions of the aesthetic 8 Flix Guattari, Chaosmosis: an ethico-aesthetic paradigm (1992). Trans. Bains and Pefanis (Indiana UP, 1995). I would indeed call this the effective conclusion to the Capitalism and Schizophrenia project, with elements derived from What is Philosophy? (1991) and partly from Deleuzes late works on Foucault (1986) and Leibniz (1988). 9 Without overstatement, Guattari asserts the conclusion of his schizoanalytic pragmatics: The future of contemporary subjectivity is not to live indefinitely under the regime of self-withdrawal, of mass mediatic infantilisation, of ignorance of diff erence and alterity []. Its modes of subjectivation will get out of their homogenetic entrapment only if creative objectives appear wi thin their reach. What is at stake here is the finality of the ensemble of human activities. Beyond material a nd political demands, what emerges is an aspiration for individual and collective reappropriation of the production of subjectivity (133). 37


paradigm discussed by Guattari homologously to the postsignifying regime and to R ancires aesthetic regime Certain parlance echoes the potential enabled by reconfigured conditions : The work of art, for those who us e it, is an activity of unframing, of rupturing sense of baroque proliferation or extreme impoverishment, which l eads to a recreation and a reinvention of the subject itself. [] The event of its encounter can i rreversibly date the cour se of an existence and generate fields of the possible far from the equilibria of everyday life (Guattari 131, my emphasis). Indeed, by charting the apparatu s, through pragmatics, we can proceed. Paradigm Thinking Freed from a fixation upon meaning (denotation), pragmatics can recognize the effects of an artistic rupture with signifi cation and pose the more crucial question, whether a work leads effectively to a mutant production of enunciation (Guattari 131)now a manifest engagement with the aforementioned condition of possibility within a regime generally. In The New Aesthetic Paradigm chapter, Guattari de scribes Science, technology, philosophy, art and human affairs as each operating in the apparatus/ dispositif sense of paradigm: they confront respectively the constraints and re sistances of specific materialsthe finite modes and concrete processes of a paradigm through codes, know-how and historical teachings (100). For art, unlike the paradigms of philosophy and techno-science, the finit ude of the sensible material becomes a support for the production of affects a nd percepts (Guattari 10 0-1). As the former point refers to a distinct objectiv e of Guattaris in this chapter, renegotiating the infinite and the finite, the latter implication of arts production relates more to the present concern of invention. For example, Simon OSullivan (2010) describes ove rall how the aesthetic paradigm might be thought of as an expanded field of creative life practices that are not n ecessarily restricted to 38


what is typically considered art [] (258-9).10 With this focus on the paradigm, I have not presented even a cursory account of Guattaris conjecturing the concre te forms of processes of creation in the aesthetic paradigm (106), including new enunciation and ethics (107) as well as subjec tivity production (108). Rather, as part of the compound methodology devel oping in this chapter, I have sought to emphasize the perspective employed, as well as th e discernible mode or paradigm that most highlights the variable creativity for the a pparatusesaddressing the fundamental question how the production of something new in the world is possible (Deleuze Regimes 344). In this regard, one of Guattaris key discursive strategies appears his describing how the paradigms operate by assemblages of varying types (qualitative and quan titative), which is an instructive lesson for method. A consequence of this theori zation, Guattaris complex description of the paradigms through pragmatics avoi ds the epistemological pitfalls of any totalizing discourse or Likewise, there is a solid benef it to the nuance describing the resp ective types of assemblage and recognizing that any of the three might be operati ve at present (105): this rigor resolves the discursive need to posit in rigid terms of successive period or peremptory break. Two brief examples, and their direct implica tions for method, illustrate this contrast. The first sense of demarcation and period can be seen in the Thomas S. Kuhn (1970) The Structure Of Scientific Revolutions which includes at least 21 different meanings of paradigm (Zima 193)and the paradigm shift as a break in the condition of knowledge (Conte 8). Viewed in general, this recognition does not pose a serious hazard for theory discourse. However, the 10 Additionally worth noting is that in his examining the ontology and politics of Chaosmosis OSullivan markedly explores Guattaris modelling of a processual and ecological subjectivity [] in which asignifying components become crucial [] and in which aesthetic practices play a privileged role (257). A second quote, which relates to my discussing the problematics of Philosophy and Art in a later chapter, conveys OSullivans perspicacious approach to Guattaris text: we experience and produce the [aesthetic paradigm] through a number of distinct practices [:] each of which operates as an interface between the finite and infinite (259, my emphasis). 39


perilous outcom e can be seen in liberal ar ts scholars uncritically adopting scientific developments as the given situation of the ch anged apparatustaken in the totalizing sense of a new epistemewithout adequately positioning within a paradigm. A patent instance of this outcome in recent decades, likely overshadowed soon by posthumanism in cultural studies,11 is the attempted application of scientific chaos and complexity theory to literary scholarship Following N. Katherine Hayles (1990)and representative of this scholarly trend, beginning with Hayles Chaos Bound and including work by Rice (1997) and Best and Kellner (2001) Joseph M. Conte soundly reasons chaotics (17) as an exemplary approach for the interdisciplinary knowledge of the paradigm shift into postmodernism (13). 12 Surely, chaos theory as an historical devel opment in science is indisputablejust as the output by these writers is novel, granted. Howeve r, without digressing into this contentious detour fully, I must point out the implication of this sort of work: such scholarship in this parlance operates strictly within the dispositif acting upon discourse (Knowledge), without a developed (or even clear) understanding of the pres ent apparatus, the shifted paradigm as it 11 Although contemporaneous with and perhaps originating from the same illogical point as importing chaos theory, posthumanism in cultural studies certainly appears a cr itical wave continuing this decade. For example in The Routledge Companion to Literature and Science, Neil Badmington (2010) surveys the sheer range of academic disciplines in which posthumanist concerns have been addressed (375). Works that lack the distinct orientation of Cary Wolfes What is Posthumanism? (2009), for example, suggest that this misplaced effort w ith art objects is unworkableevident merely in publications titles, e.g. Posthuman Metamorphosis: Narrative And Systems (Fordham UP, 2008) or Nature In Literary And Cultural Studies: Tr ansatlantic Conversations On Ecocriticism (Rodopi, 2006). In any case, my contention questions the futility of any discourse that lapses into merely referential (denotative) exercises, with a convoluted focus lacking discernable method or object of study, as I continue below. 12 Conte, Design & Debris: A Chaotics of Postmodern American Fiction (Alabama UP, 2002). Hayles, Chaos Bound (Cornell UP, 1990); also, editor of Chaos and order: complex dynamics in literature and science (Chicago UP, 1991). Best and Kellners The Postmodern Adventure (Guilford, 2001) succeed s their earlier work Postmodern Theory (Guilford, 1991) and The Postmodern Turn (Guilford, 1997). Separately, Thomas Jackson Rices Joyce, Chaos, and Complexity (Illinois UP, 1997); which differs by continuing a line of thought unrelated to chaos discourse, Umberto Ecos (1966) The Aesthetics of Chaosmos (Harvard UP, 1989). Concerning the above argument, I contend Ecos working in the aesthetic regime, markedly evident in his describi ng Joyces expressive form in Ulysses in favor of hermeneutics; likewise with reflexive orientation, Eco fashions Finnegans Wake with regard to contemporary science as a grandiose epistemological metaphor (74). 40


were; consequently, it yields little if any m eans for possible new (forms of) enunciation, by remaining strictly within the signif ying regime of referential discourse. The second example that contrasts Guattari s assemblage-paradigm discourse is more well-known, although less obviously specious, precisely for its focus on forms of discourse. In The Postmodern Condition, Jean-Franois Lyotard (1979) employs Wittgensteins language games as his perspective (10) for examini ng narrative knowledge & scientific knowledge, and the modality of statements, as they function by and as legitimation. In a representative conclusion about the new apparatus, he evokes the impact on the status of knowledge (38) by the historical (apparatus) shift in the 20th century: In contemporary society and culture postindustrial society, postmodern culturethe question of the legitimation of knowledge is formulated in different terms. The grand narra tive has lost its credibility, regardless of what mode of unification it uses, regard less of whether it is a speculati ve narrative or a narrative of emancipation (37). Overall, Lyotard analyzes the disc ourses of knowledgemodes and limits of enunciation, effectivelystrictly based upon the criterion of legitimation. In my context, this criterion can be understood ma inly as an effect of a dispositif; furthermore, Lyotards description only diagnoses without offering rec ourse within the apparatus, presented not only as given but irrevocable. Indeed, in a later appendix, Lyotard (1984) describes postmodernism explicitly by the status of Ideas of which no presentation is possible due to the limited capacity of the separate faculties (78): They remain inexplicable without the incommensura bility of reality to concept which is implied in the Kantian philosophy of the sublime (79). In a subordinate current emerging here, which connects both to Guattari and to the relation of philosophy and art 41


addressed in the next sec tion, Lyotards recourse to the sub lime demonstrates his aporetic view of the differend between the infinite and the finite (Zima 179). Returning to Guattaris model following th ese contrasting instances, there appear two lessons for method consequently. The imperative to situate knowledge discourse within a defined paradigm (and first discipline, even) emerges as the relative condition for efficacy; in this case, work with cultural objects best proceeds within the aesthetic paradigm especially concerning the postsignifying regime Attending to the complexity of an apparatus view, pragmatics recognizes the types of processes and assembla ges that operate respective to the paradigm charted. Historicity shows one aspect how an a pparatus theorization is contingent, along with attention to mode, most importa ntlyand while this view offers how to negotiate level of specificity and generality, the question of relating the finite and the infinite remains secondary and deferred for now. With these points, I turn to an examination of discipline as presented by Deleuze & Guattari, toward the method of study and exemplar of my overall aims in this work. The Problem of a Concept the rule is that the interfering discip line must proceed with its own methods. Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy? (217) With a complex perspective of conditions Apparatus Theory recognizes not only the epistemic shifts that occur but the new problema tics created, as well; for respective disciplines, the consequences of both for their output will vary by paradigm (or dispositif ). Rather than accept a general period label, we must consid er more scrupulously the epistemological conditions within a Humanities discipline that whos e focus and aim are to create new (forms of ) knowledge. Generally in terms of thought, Philosophy within the new apparatus is at least postEnlightenment and most likely Post-Kantian, n on-transcendental; anti-P latonist, not Idealist, as empirical and materialist. Art, as ae sthetic composition and expression, appears non42


repres entational, multimodal and heterogeneous opposed to conventionally defined forms or genre; and not limited to signi fication (meaning), indicating a postsignifying regime Admittedly, such attempts remain too genera l and abstract without an object of study or the concrete processes of a dispositif to consider. As a provisional wa y to address both aspects, I posit the status of the con cept as such today; in What is Philosophy? Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1991) conjecture, If the three ages of the concept are the encyclopedia, pedagogy, and commercial professional training, only the second can safeguard us from falling from the heights of the first into the disaster of the thirdan ab solute disaster for thought whatever its benefits might be, of course, from the view point of universal capitalism (12).13 Although this conjecture might seem overstated, we can not underestimat e what is at stake in the creation of new knowledge and enunciation. The nature of this cr eation requires extensiv e understanding of the respective discipline, which Deleuze and Guattari present in What is Philosophy? and which I summarize next to this enda simple yet crucia l determination, as Agamben (2006) states, given There is no method that would be valid for ever y domain, just as there is no logic that can set aside its objects (7). The additi onal benefit of this goa l bears directly upon a discipline invested in novel forms of knowledge and confronted with problems of interference (216), in Deleuze and Guattaris terms, as when Philosophy attempts to create the concept of a sensation (217). Apparatus Theory: Philosophy, Science, ArtConstructivism Although analogous problems are posed for each [discipline] (216), this situation appears to me precisely the task facing Humanities work with culture toward new enunciations of concepts. To these ends, I shall summarize effi ciently yet systematically the way Deleuze and Guattari explicate their notion of Philosophy in relation to elements of Science and Art, in order 13 Deleuze, Gilles and Flix Guattari What is Philosophy? (1991). Trans. Tomlinson and Burchell. (Columbia. UP, 1994). Note, in all subsequent quotations, the emphasis is the authors except when noted. 43


to illustrate the schem a and problems of all three disciplines. Taken broadly, Philosophy is a constructivism with two qualitatively diffe rent complementary aspects: the creation of concepts and the laying out of a plane (35-6). The greater issu es and implications concern epistemological problems, insofar that Planes mu st be constructed and problems posed, just as concepts must be created (27). Deleu ze and Guattari focus extensively upon concepts defining Philosophy as the art of forming, inventi ng, and fabricating concepts (2), producing knowledge through pure concepts (7). Emphasizing the latter quality, th ey differentiate its status from scientific functions and artistic sensations, emphasizing that the concept is real without being actual, ideal without being abstract (22), its virtuality: the concept itself speaks the event, not the essence or the thingpure Event, a haecceity, an entity (22). The three characteristics of the concept are its relation to other concepts (19); its accumulation of components as pure and simp le singularity (20); most importantly, its render[ing] components inseparable within itself (19). The latter point defines consistency of the concepts, its endoconsistency, in that the compone nts are distinct, heterogeneous, and yet not separable (19). This integral consistency without homogenization manifests nondiscursive resonance between the heterogeneous components, in that concepts are centers of vibration (23). Additionally, the nature of the consistency is the inseparability of a finite number of heterogeneous components traversed by a point of absolute survey at infinite speed (21)what Deleuze and Guattari describe as heteroge nesis of the components within zones of neighborhood (20). Closely relate d, although more distinct, are th e conceptual personae that operate in philosophy. In any of their five possi ble manifestations, for Deleuze and Guattari, conceptual personae carry out the movements that describe the authors plane of immanence, and they play a part in the very creation of the authors concepts (63). The conceptual personae 44


are the powers of concepts (65) in this sense, as well as points of view (75); m ore significantly, The role of conceptual personae is to show thoughts territories, its absolute deterritorializations and reterritorializations (69). A key distinction for understa nding this and the other two sc hema are that none of these elements is originary or deriva tive or consequential for Deleuze and Guattari (40). Rather, there is coadaption between th e three elements that philosophy pres ents in its constructivism (77): the prephilosophical plane it must lay out (immanence) [] personae it must invent and bring to life (insistence) and the philosophical concepts it must create (consistency ) (76). The consistency that occurs with the infinity of possibl e concepts on a plane [that] resonate and connect (76) does not produce hom ogeneity, but rather maintains variations (202). This characteristic displays both Philosophys posi tive and generative relati on with chaos (208) and its effort to preserve the infinite, To give consistency without losing anything of the infinite (42); in both cases, Philosophy s eeks to retain infinite speed s while gaining consistency, by giving the virtual a cons istency specific to it (118). This is the plane of consistency that Philosophy institutes or casts over chaos (202), in an effort not against chaos but against opinion ( doxa ) (203). This point manifests as a fundamental undertaking and quality of the discipline; also, the view of a plane clearly distinguishes the disciplines a nd their processes. First, as a specific plane of immanence particular to an epoch (39) and to a case of Philosophys institu ting (41), the plane of immanence or consistency (118) can be understood as the plane of consistency and as the plane of immanence of concepts, the planomenon (36). The planomenon is described uniquely: it is formless, unlimited absolute, neither surface nor volume but always fractal; the absolute horizon, of purely conceptual events; the indivisible milieu in which concep ts are distributed (36). As the plane that 45


Philosophy institu tes, like the plane of reference by Science and plane of composition by Art, the planomenon is the image of thought, the image [that] thought gives itself of what it means to think, to make use of thought, to find ones bearings in thought (37); furt hermore, It is not a method [] Neither is it a state of knowledge (37) This description differentiates it from a general planethe pure plane of immanence of a Being-thought, of a Nature-thought (88)on which events are the reality of the virtual, forms of a thought-Nat ure that survey every possible universe (178). Distinct from Philosophys ima ge of thought, Deleuze and Guattari explain, THE plane of immanence is, at the same time, th at which must be thought and that which cannot be thought. It is the nonthought within thought. It is the base of all planes [] the most intimate within thought and yet the absolute outs ide (59). Consequently, the supreme act of philosophy regarding THE plane is to show it is there, unthought in every plane [] the outside and inside of thought (59-60). Only in this way would Philosophy thus engage with immanence as conceived by Spinozathe best plane of immanence, which does not restore any transcendent (60). Thus we again see the imperative for pragma tics to qualify processes in terms of modes, as in the case of Philosophys deploying transc endence or engaging w ith immanence in its creation of a plane; indeed, the appeal to tr anscendence appears a quality of Philosophy, like other types of thought such as religion, throughout much of its history and today. In a mode distinct from Philosophy and Art, Science institutes a plane of reference regarding the virtual (118) and chaos (202); it is this quality, not that affirms or deploys transcendence (125), which Deleuze and Guattari present as culpable and de trimental to new types of thought. Specifically in this regard, Science relinquishes the infi nite, infinite speed, in order to gain a reference able to actualize the virtual (118)whereas chaos precisely exists as this infinite speed (118). First, 46


this point inf orms my deliberate position agains t the limiting characteristic of denotative and referential discourse, such as the conf used attempt to describe literature ( aesthetic paradigm ) in the fashion or parlance of Science. As Deleuze and Guattari further ex plain, this slowing down in the chaos or the threshol d of suspension of the infin ite (119) is a function of limits ( e.g. in the form of numbers), and these limits or borders give the plane its references (120); these are the first functives, the limit and the variable (118). In contrast to concepts (Philosophy) and sensations (Art), the object Science creates is functions : elements of functions are called functives A scientific notion is define d not by concepts but by func tions or propositions (117). Whereas a philosophical concept expresses an event that gives consistency to the virtual on a plane of immanence, a scientific function d etermines a state of affairs, thing, body that actualizes the virtual on plane of reference (133). A function thus illustrates a different paradigm, in the problems and plane that Science institutes as a discipline of equal creation akin to the other two (127). To clarify, the term function appears in What is Philosophy? relative to the scientific discip line, without reference to a philosophical question of literary functions, the sort of which Deleuze and Guattari pose in earlier texts.14 This understanding, like Lyotards modes of statements, might be erroneously inferre d, especially from the discussion of functions in discursive systems (117) and in the form of logical propositions (156). However, the focus here maintains the disciplinary distinctions, c onsistently, except when Deleuze and Guattari mention the parallel prospect of a new, specifi cally philosophical type of function (141). In Science, integral to the creation of functives are partial observers, for example proper names (24). As necessary intercessors as respective subjects of enunciation (129) and points of view in things themselves (132), Deleuze and Guattari explain, the ideal partial 14 Deleuze and Guattari (1975), Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature; Deleuze (1972), Proust and Signs ; Deleuze (1993) Essays Critical and Clinical These are all discussed in the next tw o chapters, regarding literary function. 47


observes are the perceptions or sensor y affections of f unc tives themselves (131). These observers correspond to conceptual personae and aesthetic figures in the respective disciplines, as sensibilia that are doubles of the f unctives (131). This quality is the basis of the relationship between [the three disciplines], such that we can say that a function is beautiful and a concept is beautiful (132). Thus, while a ne gative connotation about Science might be evoked, particularly in its overall referent ial-limiting function and its producing variables from chaos (202), Deleuze and Guattari ultimately present th e discipline as a respective epistemology, which creates ( functions) and institutes a plane ( reference ). Their pragmatics perspective guides the way to regard an issue in parall el and in conjunction, evident in specific postulates; for example, The special perceptions and aff ections of science or philosophy n ecessarily connect up with the percepts and affects of art, those of scien ce just as much as those of philosophy (132). Target for Method (Introduction) Unique to the discipline of Art, percepts and affects are the sensations that artists extract from lived experienceperceptions and a ffections regarding states of affairswhich they preserve (167) and express through aesthetic figures (177). In the rela tive category, these are analogous to conceptspersonae and functionsobservers. Independent from individuals experience, the compounds or blocs of sensations (164) distinguish this conception and vital status of Art: the work of art is a monument but not something commemorating a past [;] it is a bloc of present sensations that owe their preservation to themselves and that provide the event with the compound (167). The passage featuri ng this quote emphasizes the significance of sensations: the vibration and/or resonance of sensations (168) occu r in the sonorous blocs colors, postures, soundsof aes thetic figures (184). Uniquel y, these figures exist within the refrain the being of sensation (184)and indee d, Deleuze and Guattari remark paradoxically that everything begins with refrains (189). 48


Although simply one effectual process within the schemata of Deleuze and Guattari, these descriptions of the aesthetic paradigm bear great significance and fertile implication for the method under discussion presently. First, like the heter ogeneity of concepts (endoconsistency), the quality of refrain does not elide or normalize difference( s) but inheres precisely through the varieties (202) that artists maintain through chao tic variability, composing works of chaosmos (204). In this sense, Art for Deleuze and Guattari engages chaos in the most productive way of the disciplines in its varieties : Art indeed struggles with chaos, but it does so in order to bring forth a vision th at illuminates it for an instant, a Sensation (204). The varieties thus composed through chaos manifest in aesthetic figures such as the re lations of counterpoint and the compounds of sensations (188)insofar as no art and no sensation have ever been representational (193). Consequently, a feature to note for me thod, it is through this process that Art employs the finite in order to rediscover, to restore the infinite (197, my emphasis). From the pragmatics of constructivism that De leuze and Guattari exp licate, there appear several lessons and tasks for the cr eation of concepts pertaining to the aesthetic paradigm. First, to clarify the paradigmatic or structural view, they remind that Thinking is thought through concepts, functions, or sensations and no one of th ese thoughts is better th an another, or more fully, completely, or synthetically thought (1 98). If our investment is the creation and articulation of new knowledge, then our objective is not to confront concepts, functions, or sensations but the condition of the doxa, (non-thinking, consensus, uncritical opinion): a disciplines struggle with chao s is only the instrument of a more profound struggle against opinion (206). Indeed, chaoswhether taken as variations, variables or varieties (202)is not a problem to be solved in conventional te rms; neither, likewise, is the relation of the 49


discip lines. Proceeding from the latter point, a Hu manities discipline such as English can be understood as situated between Philosophy and Art. In terms of working with the aesthetic paradigm, this can not be interdisciplinary insofar as we would not manage to undertake the problem of a concept or the singularity of art re spectively and unique to their modesespecially in the dilemma of our attempts to create the concept of a sensation (217). Reviewing the tasks presented by Deleuze and Guattari envisions an apt trajectory for such work, the principle objective of which being to create concepts. A correlative aim is to lay out a planedetermining the type of which, Planomenon, Re ference, or Composition, by disciplineor to chart the appa ratus and distinguish the paradigm, as I have phrased. A subordinate issue implicated in this endeavour is our identifying with in the apparatus the unthought plane of immanence (in this parlance). Finally, in an effort connecting both concept and plane we must pose a problem, articulated adequa tely to the concept and planefor when they are stated, it is no longer a matter of discus sing but rather one of creating concepts for the undiscussable problem posed (28). The first two objectives identify the central concern of my project, evoking the question and method of how to create concepts with heterogeneous consistency ( resonance ), which do not limit referentially but inhere and express adequately the variety of sensation; the answer, but not yet or ever a solution, appears in the aes thetic paradigm, through our encounters with Art in its singularity. Even with its virtual status, an ontic concept thus created would not limit but incorporate the chaotic variety of sensation; in this way, the aesthetic mode precisely manages the problem of how to maintain or restore the infinite by means of the finite in this case the material composition of aesthetic figures. Yet, gi ven the imperative to pose the problem of a 50


concept, an exam ination of the multiple regimes within the aesthetic pa radigm requires further consideration of the operative a pparatusa perspective in this regard named problematics. Methodological Perspective: Problematics, Pragmatics, Invention (Introduction) The 'problematic' is a state of the worl d, a dimension of the system, and even its horizon or its home: it designate s precisely the objectivity of Ideas, the reality of the virtual. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition (280) As I have proposed, Apparatus Theory recognizes the epistemic shiftpostEnlightenment philosophy, non-representational artand generates a method for how to work with emergent currents in theory & cultural obj ects of study. Toward th e aim of producing new knowledge discourse, apt concepts must be crea ted; these concepts address philosophical problems, which might be unstated, without solving or closing the problem in the sense of a denotative statement or referential question. This perspective is another facet of the poststructuralist orient ation that I have desc ribed thus far, a cruc ial consideration for a disciplinary procedure, and one that Foucault and Deleuze articulate uniquely in response to Kant. Addressing the stance th at Deleuze exhibits in Difference and Repetition (1968), which I apply in detail in the next chapter, Foucault (1999) articulates the general view of this programme in his 1970 review essay on Dele uze, Theatrum Philosophicum: We must think problematically rather than question and answer dialectically (359, my emphasis). Just as Foucault recognizes, Deleuze serv es as the exemplar for methodologytreating concepts and problems on a part icular plane. Describing wha t happens when Deleuze reads other philosophers, as well as works of art (256 ), Jean-Jacques Lecercle (2002) emphasizes the compound methodology at work in Deleuzes cons tructivist project: by extracting a problem and constructing a concept, often ag ainst the grain of the text [] he reads for style. He extracts the problem and constructs the concept that will express the specific philosophical gesture of the text, its philosophical and literary style ( Deleuze and Language 256). Instructive for the present 51


discussion, Lecercle here identifies the funda mental step for constr uctivism, in practical parlance echoing the imperatives to institute a plane an d pose a problem from Deleuze and Guattari; in order to work like Deleuze, we must first ascertain the problem addressed. Directly guided by Deleuzes method, new discursive productions can result through the extraction of a problem (37). For example, in order to produce a concept of language (68), Lercercle recognizes that his scho larly task will invol ve constructing language in Deleuze as a problem in the strict sense that he gives to this c oncept (3, original empha sis). In another case, by adequately recognizing the paradigm of his concepts the plane of immanence Branka Arsic (2003) can assert how The possibility of a Deleuzean reading of Bartleby emerges (144): she writes, There is no answer to his question because Bartleby is neither a literary character nor a figure; neither a metaphor nor a proper name; neither a que stion nor an answer but a problem; a problem in the Deleuzean sense of the word. ( Between Deleuze and Derrida 135). A corollary to this perspec tive concerns the undertaking of specific concepts that Deleuze creates, which implicitly evoke a unique problem addressed. In the case of his working with particular art forms, concepts that involve aesthetic figures a nd sensation address a problem on the plane of composition; such an application would thus require the attendant opposition to interpretation, the signifying regime of representation, any refere ntial or limiting discourse, and appeals or applications of transcendence. With in this context, for example, Brian Massumi (2002) posits that Deleuzes logic of seriality and potential is what allows him to make sense of asignifying expression. In turn, it is the idea of asignifying expr ession that allows him to argue that speech and gesture can be literally [] creative: ontoge netic; adding to reality ( A Shock to Thought 24). In this idea is a funda mental problem inherent in the Deleuzean concepts, which addresses the aesthetic paradigm in terms of the postsignifying regime Furthermore, the notion 52


of asignifying expression nam es the object of study undertaken in my examination, relating to Deleuzes description of literatures functi oning though aesthetic figu res of sensation. Considering the general task of knowledge production, a propositional description of the dilemma in the present appara tus can be sketched. Fundamentally posed with creating new knowledge and perhaps new types of discourse, disciplines employ denotative or referential language to posit ideas. When the aim is further characterized by seeking to express experience through conceptswhich to me appears the inve stment and struggle of most contemporary discordant currents, especially with concerns of identity and politicsthe resorting to transcendental discourse is not only inadequate but misguided. This error is exacerbated in cases when scholarship seeks to work with cultural forms (Art) in productive ways: at minimum, given the further detachment from the encounter; at worst, incidentally proceeding in antithetical fashion, by capturing or limiting (aesthetic) sensa tion through referential discourse. Thus, there emerges the question of how to create con cepts expressive of experience (encounters). An alternative way to work: Deleuzes propose d image for the philosopher is that of the artisan, Lercercle notes; this system of concepts is a box of tools. Deleuze takes this conception seriously: each new book demands a new se t of tools, or concept; they are needed to extract the problem that is the object of the book (100). Considering the full implications of this perspective, my project proceeds with two prim ary tasks: fundamentally explicating Deleuzes constructivist methodology for inventing philoso phical concepts through encounters with art; demonstrating this procedure of working with litera ry texts, in order to illustrate the disciplinary relevance and to explore the philosophical pr oblem immanent within Deleuzian concepts pertaining to literature. On the latter point, I undertake the problem addressed by Deleuzes 53


54 prevalent work with literature as a pragmatics of the postsignifying regime Presenting a research traject ory for scholars, Deleuze (1977 ) asserts that philosophy is born or produced outside by the painter, the musici an, the writer, each time that the melodic line draws along the sound, or the pure traced line colour or the written line the articulated voice ( Dialogues 74). An additional issue implicated within th is method for creating concepts concerns the nature of encounters. Given the overall fr amework discussed thus far, I will contend the paramount importance for scholars: whether our work functions to capture or limit the object of study, in the signifying regime or referentia l paradigm; or to inve nt apt concepts through variety provided to us by the sensory compositi on of aesthetic figures. To this end, the next chapter explicates an unders tanding of concepts and enc ounters in Deleuzes philosophy, understanding his work as constructivism and expressionism before applying this method.


CHAP TER 2 PHILOSOPHY AS OPERA WH EN WORKING WITH ART Encounters and Problematized Concepts Suppose we say instead that the movement goes not from the hypothetical to the apodictic but from the probl ematical to the question Deleuze, Difference and Repetition (197) Proceeding from the problem articulated at the prior chapters conclusion, considering the implications of Apparatus Theory for scholarly method, involves elliptical progress: before attempting the application and invention of novel concepts, careful study of primary works is necessary in order to ascertain thoroughly the method for invention working with art, beginning now and continuing throughout the next several chapters. The first poi nt of clarification raised by this endeavor concerns the disciplinary conve ntion and Humanities orientation grounded in philosophy; insofar as this project is positioned not as philosophy proper but as an intersection of theory, method, and art or culture (s pecifically literature), the proviso for my work is that we can study philosophers method without adopting their wholesale ontol ogy. The latter point emerges paramount within the scope of my aims, applying toward schola rly invention and discourse the insights derived from studying elucidative wo rks from the oeuvre of Gilles Deleuze. Without exaggerationand without further de laying the progression of this discussion by needlessly qualifying with substantial citationGilles Deleuze remains one of, if not the most original contemporary philosopher in terms of novel concepts. Re garding the breadth of objects of study as well as the range of distinct materi als with which he worked, Deleuze presents a viable and productive guide fo r invention, respective to di sciplinary endeavor: beyond the voluminous output in recent decades, I will show qualitatively the rationale for Deleuzes work motivating scholars continued efforts to across fields and contexts. Beyond this incidental gesture, my examination and application seeks to present Deleuze as a highly instructive model 55


for invention of com plex concepts concerned wi th Art, thereby addressing the question and problem of creating scholarly discourse within the changing epistemological regime and cultural paradigm within the present inchoate apparatus. In this chapter, I first re view in detail Deleuzes method, as he discusses it in terms of encounter and as he describes the qual ities of concepts as explained in Difference and Repetition and What is Philosophy?.1 As foundation for subsequent examination, topics and passages are selected with regard to the presen t study; they are necessarily detailed, while not comprehensiveafter all, this review works main ly to establish both the method and orientation that appears throughout his oeuvre. Before engaging directly with ex amples of Deleuzes literary readings and then presenting initial attempts to em ulate his perspective, in this chapters separate interlude, I provide fundamental de scriptions of literature as orie nted by Deleuze and Guattari in the distinct discipline of Art, introduced earlier. Imperative for any such scholarly experiment that apprentices to primary philosophy, this understanding enables our successfully employing the method and concepts in dynamic and construc tive ways, rather than deploying in simple fashion or toward pernicious ends by reinforci ng the hegemonic regime of thought and discourse. This chapter thus begins the st udy that continues for the durati on of my project: discerning an understanding of Deleuzes style as connecting constr uctivism and expressionism, in order to emulate the method displayed by his prodigious output of highly original philosophy. Calling Difference and Repetition part detective novel and part science fiction, Deleuze explains that empiricism treats the concept as an object of an encounter; he adds, I make, remake and unmake my concepts along a moving horizon, from an always decentered center, from an always displaced periphery whic h repeats and differentiates them (xx-xxi). As 1 Difference and Repetition (1968). Trans. Paul Patton (Colombia UP, 1994). Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari. What is Philosophy? (1991). Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (Columbia UP, 1994). 56


an aside, it is this rem ark that di rects my arranging into single focus both Difference and Repetition and What is Philosophy?principal bookend texts of a prolific twenty-five-year spanin order both to gauge Deleuzes sense of this horizon and to emphasize his emergent method with regard to concept creation through en counters. More signifi cantly to note, my study is less invested in reinforcing the nomenclature of transcendental empirici sm, or in privileging narrowly Deleuzes early work at the expense of a more inclusive and observant perspective. Instead, I seek to extrapolate th e method most beneficial to c onstructivismone more suitable, in the sense of problematic, to the question of creating co ncepts through encounters. Two disparate passages, both indicating a similar desire for learning fr om Deleuze this way, reveal the necessity for deliberation in ones point of departur e; in this way, I mean that scholarly discourse must be oriented properly upon beginning so as not to veer incidentally or consequentially into an incompatible paradigm (e.g. reference, verification). Constantin V. Boundas (2009) implicitly e vokes the issue I earlier broached, in the introduction to Gilles Deleuze: The Intensive Reduction : Gilles Deleuze taught us that philosophy is the creation of concepts aiming, in a precarious manner, to impose, consistency upon a chaos that he hims elf preferred to see as the [Unlimited] rather than as a void and a naught. He placed plenty of demands on the creating philosopher: he asked her to face he r canvas, and, like an artist, to begin by wiping away the cliches and the ready-mades of the doxa that stand in the way of her creation; to suspend the chattiness that the dominant ideology of communication encourages, and to opt for the desert of thinking and writing []. The result of this condition, he promised, is not a dreaded aphasia, but rather the creative glossolalia of indirect discourse. As for the veracity of this glossolalia, Deleuze dares us to find it in the interesting and remarkable concepts that w ould punctuate and sustai n itin other words, in their ability to offer solutions to thei r parent problems orperhaps the same thingin their ability to make existing problems resonate together. (1, original emphasis) Although most of the points that Boundas presents are ostensibly accurate, despite the convoluted arrangement, the trouble in this case is the specious circular logic and subordination posed thus: to create concepts that are interesting and remarkab le, which thereby confirm the 57


truth or reality of the creative gloss olalia of indirect discourse by which we create varied concepts. Of course, the imperative for thought against the consensus and ideology of argument accurately articulates Deleuze s position; however, beyond the logical flaw, the danger of this approach lies in our privileging simply a value or interest in multiplicity (or diversity, or difference) itself. The latter quality can not be a condition for successful work, as suggested by Boundas, given that this point of departure ca lls merely for identific ation (verification). Certainly, from the perspective of Apparatus Theory and problematics, concepts must be more than interesting and remarkable as qualif ied by their multiplicity or the difference that they illustratethe second lesson discerned, a summary of which I will present at sections end. In contrast to the product, an additional warni ng concerns precisely the desire to outline a Deleuzian methodology, as Simon OSullivan (2008) states; he argues, One might be able to extract such a method or system but this would be to render Deleuzes thought inoperative, to freeze it in, and as, a particular image of t hought, to capture its movement, precisely to represent it (3). This hazard indeed concerns my project underway, and OSullivan rightly identifies the crucial importance of scholarly process informed and oriented in the manner appropriate to the exemplar. OSullivan thus describes his book Art Encounters Deleuze and Guattari (2008): In order to avoid this system atization of Deleuze the book pr oceeds in a rather piecemeal fashion, jumping from one aspect of Deleuzes thought to another, picking up the same threads in different contexts and repeating key notions with different emphases. Indeed, rather than giving a systematic overview of Deleuze, the volume offers a series of thought experimentsdifferent attempts at br inging Deleuze into contact with different milieus. In fact, the volume [] might be said to attend to certain resonances between the field of philosophy [] and the field of art and art history []. (3, original emphasis) I am indeed attentive to avoiding the precarious outcome that OSullivan states in the former case; concurrently, I seek both to make operable Deleuzes t hought and, more importantly for broader disciplinary stakes, to explicate encounter constructivism for applied practice. 58


To resolve the issue of method, then, in te rms not specific to Deleuzian parlance or philosophy. First, I will not interpret Deleuze s writing, nor interpret li terature by means of Deleuzes philosophy; rather, I at tempt to work with Deleuzes concepts in the service of invention, testing the viability or application of specific ideas and his method as exemplar. Composing a lucid methodology additionally produ ces generalizable lessons for scholarship, extrapolated from Deleuzes creating philosophy in conjunction with Art, Science, and other disciplines. Regarding seriously the critical import ance to keep alive a certain style of Deleuzes thought without over-academicising [ sic ] his writings or endlessly re peating his own words (3), as OSullivan states, the outcome of this examin ation might very well enable scholarly work and discourse in the mode suited to the aesthetic pa radigm. Underscoring my approach, he continues: We need to repeat the energy and style of hi s writings without merely representing his thought. For me this difficult project [] entails giving attention to the pragmatic and constructive nature of Deleuzes thought whilst at the same time creatively bringing it into cont act with other worlds and always with our own projec ts and our own lives (3). Empirical Orientation Something in the world forces us to think. This something is an object not of recognition but of a fundamental encounter. ( Difference and Repetition 139) A practical reason, beside the scope of this project, for marginalizing Deleuzes metaphysics in favor of his poetics is that ma ny elements of the philosophy he presents are nominally inconsistent if not ant ithetical to such an attempt: specifically, much of his ontology is explicitly oriented and e xplicated respective of ( i.e. before or beside or beyond) human subjectivitychiefly all of his major theorizations concerning temporality, which is fundamental within his philosophy as one centered upon events And yet, given that my concern is not primarily Philosophy discourse proper but the ph ilosophical gesture of c onstructivism, we can 59


distin ctly examine Deleuze as a thinker in proces s in order to repeat the energy and style of his writings in OSullivans terms. Moreover, a prudent balance accommodating Deleuzes theory and his inventive gestures can effectively guide our emulating his working as an artistana quality increasingly and markedly evident in The Logic of Sense (1969) and A Thousand Plateaus (1980), both discussed in later chapters. For now, we might begin with the simple empirical notion the individuals experience, conjectured by Dele uze: On the basis of which signs within sensibility, by wh ich treasures of the memory, under torsions determined by the singularities of which Idea will thought be ar oused? We never know in advance how someone will learn: by means of what loves someone b ecomes good at Latin, what encounters make them a philosopher, or in what dicti onaries they learn to think ( DR 165). In the case of thought if sensibility, memory and torsions are attributed to an individual, then the correlative terms signs, treasures, and singularities register ontic and supremely im portant in the dynamic of an encounter that produces thoughtand these are not objects of our recognition. A key distinction from the point of view of an empirical exercise of the senses ( DR 140) concerns signs and their unique relation to the faculty of sensibility, a lternative to the notion of object[s] which can be recalled, imagined or conceived in the mode of recognition (139). Rather than understand strictly and simply in te rms of our interpretive faculty, Deleuze asserts that The object of encounter, on the other hand, really gives rise to sensibility with regard to a given sense (139). Therefore, the relational term s to consider in terms of thoughtwhich I will elaborate subsequentlyare signs, sensibility, and encounters; before describing the type of signs specific to art in the next section, it is valuable to review further Deleuzes theorization of encounter, as a crucial premise both of his followi ng work and the present line of reasoning. 60


Chiefly, Deleuze posits, it is the fortuit ousness or the contingency of the encounter which guarantees the necessity of that which it forces to be thought ( DR 145). This contingency compels our focusing on the encounter itself, in Deleuzes view, in or der to acknowledge and examine sufficiently that which forces thought to raise up and educate the absolute necessity of an act of thought or a pa ssion to think (139). Deleu ze expounds this process: In effect, the intensive or difference in in tensity is at once bo th the object of the encounter and the object to which the enc ounter raises sensib ility. [] What we encounter are the demons, the sign-bearers: pow ers of the leap, the in terval, the intensive and the instant; powers which only cover differe nce with more difference. What is most important, however, is thatbetween sensibility and imagination, between imagination and memory, between memory and thoughtwhen each disjointed faculty communicates to another the violence which carries it to its own limit, every time it is a free form of difference which awakens the faculty []. (145) Thus, we can discern both the importance of diffe rence as a quality of th e object encountered, as well as the relative connection betw een encounters and a certain faculty (in this case sensibility); both attributes must be considered significan tly henceforth, regardi ng distinct sensible encounters. Incidentally, this passage complements an aspect of the problem introduced earlier in the book, then described as the principle of a repe tition which is no longer that of the Same, but involves the Other and involves difference (23); Deleuze adds, moreover, To learn is indeed to constitute this space of an encounter with signs, in wh ich the distinctive points renew themselves in each other, and repetition takes shape while disguising itself (23). Setting aside the metaphysics of repetition and the imperceptibility in recognition (140), we might understand learning in general term s as catalyzed by an encounter: the inverse perspective of purely cognition-base d interpretation, sign-objects affect us at least to the extent of forcing thought by their unique qualities of difference. Conse quently, the type of thought evoked relates crucially to the sign encountered, by the difference which awakens the faculty 61


reorientin g the situation as one to examin e with a perspective of complementarity and contingency rather than subordi nation of objects to faculties. Returning to Deleuzes asking On the basis of which signs within sensibility [] will thought be aroused? (165) now re garding the primacy of differ ence, we can understand how to accommodate adequately the object of study in to a method for invention, acknowledging or promoting it on the basis of contingency. This is the case for singular concept creation through signs as well as for disciplinary discourse more ge nerally. Deleuze and Guatta ri (1991) articulate the both points in What is Philosophy? : In short, philosophy does have a principle, but it is a synthe tic and contingent principle an encounter, a conjunction It is not sufficient by itself but contingent in itself. Even in the concept, the principle depends upon a connection of components that could have been different, with different nei ghborhoods. The principle of reas on [] is a principle of contingent reason and is put like this: there is no good reason but contingent reason; there is no universal history except of contingency. (93, my emphasis) The tenet of conditional and relational concepts, seemingly banal or axiomatic, indeed guides my study overall in significant fash ionparticularly, as a factor motivating the shift from the problematic to the questi on as Deleuze states ( DR 197). To reiterate, the developing effort toward working in the aesthetic paradigm unde rtakes the problem and question of creating concepts through the intensive or difference enc ountered in the sensible qualities of aesthetic figures. An additional lesson given the con tingency of encounters thus demands the reconsideration of the conception of thought itself, one of Deleuzes main overall efforts. Revised Image of Thought More important than thought is what lead s to thought; more important than the philosopher is the poet Deleuze, Proust and Signs (95) Concerning the primacy of re presentation and the subordinati on of difference historically, Deleuzefollowing Nietzsche, and directly intervening into the disciplinary developments following Kantasserts that The task of modern philosophy has been defined: to overturn 62


Platonism ( DR 59). Beside the expansive scope of hi story and thought, along with Derrida and Foucault, the interest for Appa ratus Theory in developing a method for new constructivism lies in Deleuzes conjecturing an image of thought within a paradigm different from that of Reason. Specifically applicable to this e nd, he states that The conditions of a true critique and a true creation are the same: the destru ction of an image of thought wh ich presupposes itself and the genesis of the act of thinking in thought itself (139). This alteration revises the conception of thought as being inherently or necessarily gr ounded in truth, reason or common sense, and cognitiona dogmatic, orthodox or moral image (132). The latter point, the moral image of thought reflects the understa nding specific to the development of Western epistemology from Gr eek philosophy, following Plato and Aristotle. With a viewpoint of episteme or dispositif, we see that this concepti on is contingent and thus subject to revision (re-concepti on) with regard to a particular paradigm, either historically or qualitatively different. Deleuze dedicates much effort exploring this other conception within Difference and Repetition and The Logic of Sense illuminating alternativ es to Platonism ranging from the Stoics and Pre-Socratic Greek thinke rs; to Leibniz and Spi noza; to Nietzsche and Bergson. This endeavor and perspective appear throughout his oeuvre, engaged directly in What is Philosophy? ultimately. Just as Deleuze focuses on the genesis of the act of thinking and the sense of truth and falsehood ( DR 158) in these earlier books, he and Gua ttari interrogate the epistemological processes of paradigms in What is Philosophy? as part of their examination of Philosophy, Science, and Art as distinct apparatus system s concerning knowledge and discourse. Informing our approach by elucidating th e modern episteme, their desc riptions enable our better undertaking the problem of a concep t and the task of constructivism appropriate to the particular 63


apparatus, th e aesthetic paradigm in the case of my project. The main premise and guiding principle for this approach follows Deleuze and Guattari in their succinctly stating, As Nietzsche succeeded in making us understand, thought is creation, not will to truth ( WP 54). As explained in the prior chapter, a particular dispositif manifests concretely in institutions, identity, and forms of visibility or utterance (knowledge discourse, technology), which we can recognize through pragmatics or typology of these processes. This lesson derived from Deleuze and Guattari is genera lizable and broadly applicable to scholarly discourse, both evident in their insights and able to be practiced toward productive ends. Concerning types of thought, they distinguish fr om the Greek and Classical models the modern image of thought through three ch aracteristics. Given that the relationship of thought to truth [] has never been a simple, let alone constant, matter ( WP 54), they write, the first quality is the complete renunciation of this relationship so as to regard truth as solely the creation of thought, taking into account the plane of immanen ce that it takes as its presupposition, and all this planes features [] (54). This attribute is complicated by the second aspect postulated, following Nietzsche, in that there is no will to tr uth but only possibility of thinking (54): rather than the subjective cogito the encounter that catalyzes thought is drawn in to relief in this case, with Deleuze and Guattari asking what violence must be exerted on thought for us to become capable of thinking (55). Beside the shift in perspectivethe altern ative to an anthropocentric basis, which interests scholars with other aimsonto the cond itions of thought, the third characteristic evokes a complex and important aspect of the modern im age. If this condition is an Inca pacity of thought, which remains at its core even after it has acquired the capacity determinable as creation, Deleuze and Guattari write, then a set of ambiguous signs arise, which become 64


diagrammatic features or infinite movements ( WP 55, m y emphasis). The third characteristic stated succinctly here is that these features take on a value by right, whereas in the other images of thought they were simple, derisory facts ex cluded from selection (55)in other words, qualities included within the modern image of thought. Relating to and reinforcing the second trait, the description that Deleuze and Guattari provide is slightly oblique: as Kleist or Artaud suggests, thought as such begins to exhibit snarls, squeals, stammers; it talks in tongues and screams, which leads it to create, or to try to (55). More lucid and comprehensible for us to apply is their perspective of pragmatics, demonstrated in this passage and intricate chapter of What is Philosophy? This discussion contrasting the modern image of thought to those of prior epistemes provides two exemplary efforts, which aid the overall project underway. First, the case of diagrammatic features elucidates the explication of par ticular philosophical planes, the parlance of Deleuze and Guattari approximate ly foralthough not synonymous withwhat I have termed dispositif or apparatus thus far. This explanat ion leads directly to the proper focus, additionally, that we can concl ude and thus proceed onto the main task adequately. In both cases, the central topic of philosophi cal planes supplements the ba sic understanding of respective images of thought, as there are varied and di stinct planes of immanence that, depending upon which infinite movements are retained and sele cted, succeed and contest each other in history for instance, for the Greeks, in th e seventeenth century, and today (WP 39). Deleuze and Guattari clarify, The plane of immanence is not a concept that is or can be thought but rather the image of thought, the image thought gives itself of what it mean s to think, to make use of thought, to find ones bearings in thought (37). 65


This constitutes a crucial distinction fo r understanding Deleuze and Guattari, and the orientation of their nuanced points: for instance, Wh at thought claims by right what it selects, is infinite movement or the movement of the infi nite. It is this that constitutes the image of thought (WP 37). We can thus follow their further disti nguishing that elements of the plane are diagrammatic features (39), which are movements of the infinite, independent from the intensive ordinates of concep ts (40). Their parlance reflects the relative orientation by discipline or apparatusPhilos ophy, Science, Artpertaining to its engagement with chaos (pure multiplicity, variability, difference). Philosophy operates in the specific mode of thought insofar as, Deleuze and Guattari explain, F rom chaos the plane of immanence takes the determinations with which it makes its infinite movements or its diagrammatic features (50) the variability of which concepts retain and re flect, without renounci ng infinite speed (42). With a focus upon how philosophers draw up a particular plane, the examples that Deleuze and Guattari provide for the respective images of thought proceed from this typology or pragmatics of the episteme Shifting from the problema tical to the question (DR 197), they ask, Can the history of philosophy be presented fr om the viewpoint of th e instituting of a plane of immanence? ( WP 44): transcendence in Plato and Chri stian philosophy (44-5); subsequently, Beginning with Descartes, and then with Kant a nd Husserl, the cogito makes it possible to treat the plane of immanence as a field of consciousness (46).2 More patent is the principle feature exemplifying the classical image of thought, dem onstrated by Descartes (although traced back to Socrates): Error is the infi nite movement that gathers toge ther the whole of the negative 2 As the coexistence of planes, not the succession of systems ( WP 59), philosophical history remains a matter of relative constructivism: In the end, does not every great philosopher lay out a new plane of immanence, introduce a new substance of being and draw up a new image of thought, so that there could not be two great philosophers on the same plane? Moreover, it seems that each plane of immanence can only claim to be unique, to be the plane, by reconstituting the chaos it had to ward off: the choice is between transcendence and chaos. ( WP 51) 66


(52). Overall, changes in both concep ts and the image of thought reflect the diagrammatic features of different planes; for example, Deleuze a nd Guattari recognize that in the eighteenth century occurs the substitution of belief for knowledgethat is, a new infinite movement implying another image of thought (53).3 Attempting pragmatics in order to comprehend the modern image of thought, then, involves our querying the diagrammatic features or infinite movements analogous to error and belief in prior epistemes of the respective plane, that wh ich has been drawn up by postEnlightenment and contemporary philosophy. This could indeed be the work of constructivist concept creation, without necessarily instituting a new plane: given the features of the plane (third characteristic), rather than confusing or convoluting our orientation, we might explore what thought results from encounters (second trait) without truth (first trait) being the primary or supreme relation to thought. Deleuz e and Guattari provide the rationale, implicitly in their model to follow, and the task, explicitly stated; the former case takes into account that they do not draw up another plane but indeed attempt to e ngage immanence itself as a prephilosophical plane ( WP 40), following Spinoza. They declare Spi noza, the infinite becoming-philosopher: he showed, drew up, and thought the best plane of immanencethat is, the purest, the one that does not hand itself over to the tran scendent or restore any transce ndent, the one that inspires the fewest illusions, bad feelings, and erroneous perceptions (60). Stated another way, ric Alliez 3 Helpful here is a passage extending this reference: Under what conditions can belief be legitimate when it has become secular? This question will be answered only with the creation of the great empiricist concepts (association, relation, habit, probability, convention). But conversely, these concepts, including the concept of belief itself, presuppose diagrammatic features that make belief an infinite movement independent of religion and traversing the new plane of immanence[;] (religious belief, on the othe r hand, will become a conceptualizable case, the legitimacy or illegitimacy of which can be measured in accordance with the order of the infinite). ( WP 53) 67


(2005) rem arks that for Deleuze (and Guattari), no one better th an Spinoza showed what are the conditions of constructivism qua real experience of thought (12). Distinguished from the plane of im manence of concepts, the planomenon ( WP 35), the Spinozist plane names for Deleuze and Guattari a problematic (with inherent question and solution) with which and within which they workgiven how it avoids transcendence and illusion in favor of true thought of infinite becoming (59). Rather than delve into Spinozas ontology, for now we can ascertain important insi ght about the perspectiv e demonstrated; two key passages guide this study. First, Deleuze and Guattari expound the best plane: THE plane of immanence is, at the same time, that which must be thought and that which cannot be thought. It is the nonthought within thought It is the base of all planes, immanent to every thinkable plane that does not succeed in thinking it. It is the most intimate within thought and yet the absolute outside []: it is immanence intimacy as the Outside, the exterior become the intrusion that stifles, and the re versal of both the one and the other [(quoting Blanchot)] [] infinite movement. (59, my emphasis) This theorization reflects a pragmatics of the apparatus or episteme at the most fundamental level. In this way, Deleuze and Guattari articula te a stance shared with Blanchot, Foucault, and Derrida, in the poststructura list viewpoint and method I ha ve posited; specifically, they reference Blanchot (The Infinite Conversation ) and Foucault ( The Order of Things) directly regarding the unthought, as I discussed in chapter 1. Finally, we can understand the imperative principle posed, the supreme act of philosophy, which Deleuze and Guattari assert: not so much to think THE plane of immanence as to show it is there, unthought in every plane, and to think it in this way as the outside and inside of thought, as the not-e xternal outside and th e not-internal insidet hat which cannot be thought and yet must be thought (59-60). This focus on the unt hought (the plane) escapes the inapt criterion of truth and the misguided efforts of recognition and interpretation toward the 68


means rath er than self-sufficient ends of beginning the constructiv ist endeavor of concept creation with a sense-able if not sensible and inte lligible image of thought. Pedagogy of the Concept If the three ages of the concept are th e encyclopedia, pedagogy, and commercial professional training, only the second can safeguard us from falling from the heights of the first into the disaster of the thirdan absolute disaster for thought whatever its benefits might be, of c ourse, from the viewpoint of universal capitalism. Deleuze and Guatari, What is Philosophy? (12) Examining and taking into account t he unthought of an apparatus or episteme we can focus aptly (correctly) on the philosophical problem rather than re gard concepts as mere effect or process of a dispositif One such shift from the problemat ical to the question evokes the approach that Deleuze and Gua ttari convey in asking, what rela tionship is there between the movements or diagrammatic features of an image of thought and the movements or sociohistorical features of an age? ( WP 58). Another way to approach concept creation through pragmatics, as mentioned, would involve an i nquiry surveying the modern image of thought in terms of its features or movements, whic h subsist and inhere through encounters; these moments both catalyze thought a nd convey the unthought plane uni quely. No longer excluding as in other epistemes such as the classical im agebut integrating varied features as (qualities of) multiplicity or difference, this effort involves taking on the more modest task of a pedagogy of the concept, which would have to analyze th e conditions of creation as factors of always singular moments ( WP 12). This instruction recalls and reiterates t he problem of a concept, re-establishing the perspective in Deleuzes term s that Ideas are problems, but problems only furnish the conditions under which the faculties attain their superior exercise ( DR 146). Beyond the examination of conditions and the concurrent integration of diagrammatic features the effort implied names and requires an empirical exerci se: but one of creation rather than recognition 69


( e.g. toward verif ication or identification or similar aims), one which treats the concept as object of an encounter (DR xx). On the basis that constructivism manifests in the disciplines of Philosophy, Science, and Art as creative activities respectively, there is a craft and thus method for concept creation; such craf t thus implicates a particular problematic through epistemology we might consider aesthetic in terms both artisanal and sensibility (the sentiendum ). Deleuze states plainly, Empiricism is by no means a reaction against concepts, nor a simple appeal to lived experience. On the contrary, it undertakes the most insane creation of concepts ever seen or heard ( DR xx)4. Consulting further Difference and Repetition as well as scholarship on Deleuze assists this undertaking. For in stance, Alliez states that In practice, the question is that of a theory of thought capable of dia gnosing in our becomings the ontol ogical conditions for the real experience of thought ( Signature of the World 2); however, we must go beyond diagnosing. In practice indeed, the empirical exer cise of two-fold constructivism consists of our creating concepts that include a nd reflect the conditions of the pl ane: as ontic objects, produced through encounters, conveying the powers of sensib ility as much as those of the other faculties. Such a product would incorporate the conditions and features of the plane (modern image), and this sort of concept would address the philosophical proble m implicatedor, more properly, posed by the constructivist effort. The latter point enables our escaping circular logic or the impasse of infinite regress: for Deleuze as for Bergson, to pose the problem is instead to invent and not only to dis-cover; it is to create in the same movement, both the problem and its solution. [Bergson states] And I call a philosopher someone who creates the solution, which is 4 Only an empiricist could say: concepts are indeed thin gs, Deleuze declares. The full passage of these remarks are worth quoting, for context and for the pertinence to the subsequent paragraph. Empiricism is by no means a reaction against concepts, nor a simple appeal to lived e xperience. On the contrary, it undertakes the most insane creation of concepts ever seen or heard. Empiricism is a mysticism and a mathematicism of concepts, but precisely one which treats the concept as object of an encounter, as a here-and-now, or rather as an Erewhon from which emerge inexhaustibly ever new, differently distributed heres and nows' ( DR xx) 70


then necessarily unique, of the problem that he has newly posed, with the new sense which words assum e in the new conception of the problem, Alliez explains ( Signature of the World 113). An empirical exercise, again, the task c onsists not merely in asking Why, through what necessity, and for what use must concepts, and always new concepts, be created? ( WP 8); rather, the problematic (questionproblemsolu tion) posed by great cons tructivists warrants our querying that which is addressed by the concep t. In other words, this names the line of inquiry and provides the guide for creating concepts that ad equate address the problem. As with most of Deleuzes monographs that expound his or iginal philosophy, Difference and Repetition appears exemplary in this way. In the quote earlier referenced, he remarks that A book of philosophy should be in part a very particular species of detective nove l, in part a kind of science fiction ( DR xx). This proposition and Deleuzes ex plication both warrant examination for their appeal to the creative endeavor discussed thus far in the double sense of constructivist and artisanal. Vitally important to qualify, regarding both points is that Deleuze describes philosophy by way of these comparisons pr ecisely within a discussion about the notion of a problem and the earlier-quoted statement about empi ricism as equally immanent and creative. By detective novel we mean that concepts, wi th their zones of presence, should intervene to resolve local situations. They themselves change along with the problems. They have spheres of influence where [] they operate in relation to dramas and by means of a certain cruelty. They must have a cohe rence among themselves, but that coherence must not come from themselves. ( DR xx) To clarify the last point, I understand Deleuze to mean coherence strictly in terms of the particular problem, as in a certain apparatus, given that he describes his empiricism as one which treats the concept as object of an encounter, as a here-and-now (xx, my emphasis). Certainly the genre of detec tive novel does not imply a herm eneutic search for Truth or meaning; rather, this stance relates again to th e contingency and specificity of concepts and 71


respective p roblems. Or understand simply, that each new book demands a new set of tools, or concept (100), as Lecercle stat es: Deleuzes proposed image for the philosopher is that of the artisan and a system of c oncepts is a box of tools ( Deleuze and Language 100). The second novelistic genre, Science fiction in yet another sense ( DR xxi), articulates the empirical exercise in a a nother way, in creative terms: How else can one write but of those things which one doesn't know, or knows badly? It is precisely there that we imagine having somethi ng to say. We write only at the frontiers of our knowledge, at the border which sepa rates our knowledge from our ignorance and transforms the one into the other. Only in th is manner are we resolved to write. To satisfy ignorance is to put off writing until tomo rrowor rather, to make it impossible. ( DR xxi) This description reiterates the earlier-cited no tion of the modern imag e of thought, reinforcing subtly the importance of thought catalyzed by the forces of an encounter. Additionally distinguishing from the classical image, De leuze subverts the conve ntional movement of ignorance toward knowledge. Whereas the former conception assigns to k nowledge the value of Truth or significance in transce ndental terms, privileging through universal Ideal, writing at the frontier/border reorients the priority onto the activity of creating contingently for the particular problem. Dorothea Olkowski assist s indirectly our comprehending th is sense of science fiction; she addresses the matter of frontiers of knowledge, partly by means of the detective novel. Discussing the importance of posing a problem ad equatelyfor it to be problematizedin Gilles Deleuze and the Ruin of Representation Olkowski explains that the Detective-SciFi activity requires invention; it give s way to something new, in this case to the intuition of the being of becoming [] (179). Pu t another way, we can see that the classical image of thought and the subordination of ignorance distort the real problem by stat ing it in terms that can never lead to a resolution (Olkowski 178). 72


To remind, this discussion does not yet enga ge the chief problem of interference and the task of creating concept(s) of a sensation; rather, all of th is description still serves to characterize philosophy as a constr uctivist exercise in terms of aesthetic practice This strategy deliberately takes into account th e imperative for properly and ade quately orienting an approach and method, regarding carefully how, in Olkowsk is terms, Everything depends on how we ask the question, what we take the problem to be, the pragmatics of our situation that brings into the performative this or that particular sense ( Ruin of Representation 233). The question through what necessity we must create new concepts, ask Deleuze and Guattari put forward, directs ones inquiry on a particular and limited course: proceeding this way risks neglecting the pedagogy of the concept by focusing erroneousl y, even if inadverten tly, on the ignoranceknowledge relation from the perspective of the cl assical image; or, on the product at the expense of an empirical exercise that undertakes the question most suitable in terms of pragmatics. One such dynamic question, articulated in p roblematized fashion, is Alliezs asking, What becomes of art when it is regarded from the perspective of a vitalist ontology of the sensible? ( Signature of the World 69). Although relevant, the quest ion stated this way entails a divergent exploration, in that it would require Alliez to theori ze, via Deleuze and Guattaris philosophy, arts rendering Life sensible in its zones of indeterminacy (69), as he concludes. For now, we must still undertak e the more modest taskquerying the concept within the problematic of the modern image of thought and examining the conditions of creation. One term that Deleuze and Guattari use rega rding this process is heterogenesis (WP 12), which provides provisionally a label for the pedagogy-ta sk and names the pragmatics therein. As Alliez states, in parlance independent Deleuze and Guattari, There follows a triple genesis of the concept: as an open, consistent and intensive multiplicity ( Signature of the World 81). This 73


description is helpful, as the term heterogenesi s appears within the third of six conclusions about the nature of the concept ( WP 19) that Deleuze and Guattari posit. Linked with the first two conclusions, the third quality in my view presents the greate st opportunity for constructivism of the six attributes, (some of which will guide my discussion at later points in the project). As the point of coincidence, condensati on, or accumulation of components, a concept constantly traverses its componentsthe thir d conclusionin a state of survey (20); moreover, the concept renders components inseparable within itself ( WP 19, original emphasis), Deleuze and Guattari explain as the second quality. They add two crucial descriptions to each point: Components, or what defines the consistency of the concept, its endoconsistency, are distinct, heterogeneous, and ye t not separable in that each pa rtially overlaps, has a zone of neighborhood, or a threshold of indiscernibility, with anothe r one (19); this defines the relationship of the concepts compone nts as one of pure and simple variations ordered according to their neighborhood rather than as constant-variable or genus-species ( WP 20), for example. From this, we must understand components as each being an intensive feature that is unique in its singularityresul ting in the paradoxical endocon sistency among heterogeneous features. This principle is fundamental for unders tanding, let alone working with the declarations that Deleuze and Guattari posit, such as their insisting that it is self-referential, has no reference insofar as it is defined by its consistency ( WP 22). As a creative enterprise within the new apparatus or with the modern image of thought, Philosophy is able to theorize a product that previously or otherwise-thought would be paradoxical and thus inva lid (or untrue etc): The concept is defined by the inseparability of a finite num ber of heterogeneous components traversed by a point of abso lute survey at infinite speed ( WP 21). 74


Returning to the notion of heterogenesis, we can see that any pedagogy of the concept must proceed by way of pragmatics co ncerning both the image of thought (modern) and the object of study (concept prope r), in order to proceed adeq uately and suitably with an empirical exerciseunlike the quantitative functions and ordinates of Science. Deleuze and Guattari assert that A concept is a heterogenesis[] an ordering of its components by zones of neighborhood and that It is an ordinal an intension [intensionality, i.e. not extensional ] present in all the features that make it up ( WP 20, my emphasis). A simple understanding is that they distinguish the concepts properties as qualitative rather than quantitative, contrasting Science and logical-linguistic philosophy; the latter both are i nhibited by their the mode and primacy of reference ( e.g. extensional propositions). And yet, this shift enables and re-orients the empirical exercise, as Alliez separately states: Fortified by this conceptual vitalism, thought acquires a pedagogy of the concept that starts to function in the manner of a natural history (84, original emphasis)a natural hi story that we write, as with producing a concept, by means of qualities, (conceptual vitalism implying vitalist concepts ). This view recognizes the concepts evental power [ puissance dvnement ], Alliez explains: a power that must befall the thought that creates it in order to act directly upon the brain, displacing the line between the concrete and the abstract, the sensible and the in telligible; that is, engendering the interference on a background of non-dialectical disp arityof art, science and philo sophy (84, original emphasis). Both quotes by Alliez evoke the sense of artisanal practice for constructivism, learning from a revised notion of concepts in the mode rn image of thought and then creating concepts with both sensible and intelligible faculties. One such possibility appears that if concepts have inseparable endoconsistency of he terogeneous components, then pe rhaps this qualitative nature indicates an unthought aspect of our episteme or modern image; at the very least, the prospect 75


seem s likely in terms of the plane on which concepts operate. A dditionally, the notion of an aesthetic epistemology and empirical exercise opens effectiv ely the line of inquiry regarding the interference between intelligibility and sensibil ity, toward the concept of a sensation. The history of philosophy is comparable to the art of the portrait, Deleuze and Guattari write; These are mental, noetic, and machinic portra its. Although they are usually created with philosophical tools, they can al so be produced aesthetically ( WP 55). To this end, the next section examines further the aesthe tic objects encounteredprecisely heterogeneous intensive features with which we might infuse concepts createdbefore concluding with a summary of the key lessons for the method under development. The chapters separate interlude segment then shifts to studying the specific art form of literature in this manner. Art Encounters that which can only be sensed (the sentiendum or the being of the sensible) moves the soul, perplexes itin other wo rds, forces it to pose a problem: as though the object of encounter, the sign, were the bearer of a problemas though it were a problem. ( Difference and Repetition 140) Certainly we could identify several types of interference as creative enterprises to undertake, beyond mere thought experiment: the sc ientific function of a concept, or of a sensation, as Deleuze and Guatta ri ask, are there functionspr operly scientific functionsof concepts?( WP 162); the aesthetic sensation of a concept, or of a function; the philosophical concept of a function, or of a sensation. The latter prevails as my exclus ive focus, leaving the five other types to respectiv e projects and disciplines.5 The hypothesis following Deleuze and Guattari, that we can create aesthetic concepts through encounters with art, is premised upon the view of Art as operating through, or in the mode of sensation, distin ct from Philosophy and 5 We might consider as example Manuel Delandas Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy (Continuum, 2002); also see the Special Issue of Paragraph 29.2 (2006) Deleuze and Science for other explicative efforts. 76


Science. This view presents the ob ject of study in terms of the aesthetic compositions that we encounter: signs, figures, percepts, affects. As co mplement to the problem of a concept discussed in the prior section, a detailed ex amination of arts typology is e ssential in order to take full account of the encountered disciplines respectiv e operation and proceed w ith the constructivist study. First, I must make clear that this focus is not merely incidental or ar bitrary; rather, integral to Deleuzes method and philosophy generally, th e study of objects encountered is necessary given that the extra-noumenal elements are essential for creating concepts. In Negotiations Deleuze emphasizes this necessity : Now concepts dont move only among other concepts [], they also move amo ng things and within us: they bring us new percepts and new affects that amount to philosophys own nonphilosophical understanding. And philosophy requires nonphilosophical understanding just as much as it requires philosophical understanding (164). Albeit vaguely stated and quot ed out of context presen tly, this principle in the abstract sense underscores the earlier discussion of any catalysts to tho ught; moreover, this view now distinguishes furtherby way of pra gmatics (beyond typology)the qualities of that which is encountered. The la tter point will prove crucial, indeed, in the process described and attempted later, the empirical exercise of constructivism no longer hypothetical. Specifically, the three poles of philosophi cal style are concepts or new ways of thinking; percepts, or new ways of seeing and construing; and aff ects, or new ways of feeling ( Negotiations 165). Discussing Spinozas style, which he emulates overtly, Deleuze emphasizes these as the philosophical trinity, ph ilosophy as opera: you need all three to get things moving ( Negotiations 165, original emphasis). Thus, the process is characterized once more in terms of the artisanal endeavor, beyond incidental interfe rence of disciplines ; additionally, we can 77


recognize the rationale for exam ining varieties of percepts and affects. Understood simply, yet a fundamental premise: the concept creat ed is contingent upon these types. Pragmatics of Aesthetic FiguresPercepts The chapter Percept, A ffect, and Concept in What is Philosophy? presents extensive theorization of Art as the aesthetic composition of sensation, the discussion of which correlates and expounds Deleuzes independent work.6 As understanding thoroughly the specific treatment of Art is essential for subsequent investigations and discussions, detaile d yet efficient summary of the key points follows. Specifically describing painting, music, and l iterature, Deleuze and Guattari characterize Art generally in two ways overall: as sensation, rath er than representation, and in terms of percepts and aff ects; the salient relation of the two categories is made explicit in the term aesthetic figures. In the perspective of Apparatus Theory, Art as a distinct discipline thus involves its own typology of aesthetic figures or composed sensationsparallel to concepts in Philosophy and to functions in Sciencethat reflect and engage the particular plane, as a respective type of thought: Every thing (including technique) takes place between compounds of sensation and the aesthetic plane of com position, Deleuze and Guattari assert ( WP 196). The fundamental and stark poi nt of departure for understand ing Art in these terms, in pragmatics, is that no art and no sensa tion have ever been representational ( WP 193). A similar claim, although perhaps equally radical, that might serve as premise is Deleuze and Guattaris positing, The work of art is a being of sensation and nothing el se: it exists in itself (164). Such a premise is necessary in order to un dertake a study of Art and regard its particular mode, or ontology in this case; this way, the mode is discernibl e in its implicati ons for artistic 6 From my studying most of Deleuzes oeuvre, I find neither cause nor reason to differentiate stringently his work with Guattari from his solitary authorship in this context. Rather, as begun in this section, I will discussmuch like Alliez in The Signature of the World in the service of methodology the related theorizations in What is Philosophy? along with those in Negotiations Proust and Signs, and Essays Critical Clinical 78


aim s and aesthetic effects, for example, which are respective and must not be confused with those of Philosophy or of Science. Viewed this way, Deleuze and Gua ttari describe Art as working to preserve, insofar as What is preservedthe thi ng or the work of artis a bloc of sensations, [] a compound of percepts and affects (164). The aesthetic monument thus composed preserves, or more accurately consists of sens ations (168); to this end, the crucia l task for artists becomes the aim of extracting and conveying sensations or forces (or simply Life). One rationale for this study of Art concerns the process of constructivism by encounters, regarding se riously the artisanal production, immensely effective, of new monuments Deleuze and Guattari articulate subtly this stance, in other terms: If there is progress in art, it is because art can live only by creating new percepts and affects as so many detours, retu rns, dividing lines, changes of level and scale (193). The ultimate value and implication for this view will be reviewed subsequently, after further examining the particular pragmatics of Art. Considering that a work of art is a bl oc of present sensations consisting of a compound of percepts and affects ( WP 164), the main principle to understand is how sensation operates within Art, in the mode of expressi on rather than in the mode of representation, reference, or denotation (again, not semiotics or semantics but prag matics). In lieu of explicating a comprehensive rationale or posing a polemical argument, I can most assuredly posit that applying the views of conventional semiotics or linguistics serves only to obstruct ones understanding Deleuze and Guatta ri on this topic and in met hodological terms. Also, as the artistic employ of writing will be treated in further detail in subsequent chapters, I qualify for now language as the material of aesthetic comp osition for writers, as discussed by Deleuze and 79


Guattar i in their general system of Art, insofa r as We paint, sculpt, compose, and write with sensationsindeed, We paint, sculpt compose, and write sensations ( WP 166). In this way, aesthetic figures express those sensations that artists extract from lived experience, in the particular forms of percepts and affects ( WP 177). Percepts are no longer perceptions; they are independent of a state of those who experience them. Affects are no longer feelings or affects; they go beyond the strength of those who undergo them, Deleuze and Guattari explain; furthermore, Sensations, percepts, and affects are beings whose validity lies in themselves and exceeds any lived (164). Herein emerges the crucial re-orientation of perspective, delineating percepts and affects in aesthetic composition as independent from any subjects experience conventiona lly conceived. Consequently, blocs of sensation must be understood, rather than as signifi cation, in their particular sign ificanceranging from nature, as with songbirds, to the most technical of arts given that aesthetic c onstruction implies the emergence of pure sensory qualities, of sensibilia that cease to be merely functional and become expressive features (183). The shift to a view of Art as non-representational thus en tails examining via pragmatics how artists particularly write sensations, co mposing a monument that preserves and conveys the perceptions and affections that they have ex tracted from Life. Procee ding in this way requires our understanding what Deleuze and Guattari mean when theorizing literature in terms of the work of novelists, specificall y, as operating in a mode beyond signification. One way that Art succeeds will be considered thoroughly: In each case, style is neededthe writers syntax, the musicians modes and rhythms, the painters line s and colorsto raise lived perceptions to the percept and lived affect ions to the affect ( WP 170). Style in writing, thus serves for Deleuze and Guattari the effective alternative to conventiona l understanding of literature; in other words, the 80


novel is composed and operates by the aesthetic fi gures of percepts and af fects, against rather than through individual m emor y, experienceour perceptions and affections, our memories and archives, our travels and fa ntasies, our children and parents observation, imagination, opinion, characters (170). As the im plications and the specific ex amples cited are investigated further in the separate interlude section of the chapter, the present question appears how the artist, including the novelist, goes beyond the perceptual states and affective transitions of the livedas Deleuze and Guattari state, T he artist is a seer, a becomer (171). The examination of literature as object of study offers a model that is salient to consider and attempt, particularly against the conventional epistemology of significationor simply in terms of writers not merely repo rting their perceptions and aff ections with language. In other words, these cases make apparent the degree to which Art, through style, functions as expression beyond signification. Like the ocean ic percepts of Melville and th e urban percepts of Woolf, Deleuze and Guattari identify the success of Tolstoy, Chekov, and Faulkner in composing percepts of the landscape: great writers, they st ate, create these bei ngs of sensation, which preserve in themselves the hour of a day, a moments degree of warmth ( WP 169). The parlance of painting and reference to Czanne are instructive, as Deleuze and Guattari further describe the percept as the landscape before man, in the ab sence of man (169); aesthetic material thus becomes the means toward non-representational or non-individuated style, including those characters which have passed into the landscape and are themselves part of the compound of sensations (169). Although seemingly most cont entious toward literary theory, Deleuze and Guattari diverge from the perspective of psychos ocial models more so in their emphasizing the nature of Art that exceeds individuals (or humanity ): as observed in Balzac, Flaubert, Joyce, and 81


Beckett, Percepts can b e telescopic or micros copic, giving characters and landscapes giant dimensions as if they were swollen by a lif e that no lived percepti on can attain (171). Earlier in this section, I began the investiga tion of Arts typology in the view of Deleuze and Guattari from the premise that artists compose monuments, which both preserve and express sensation; these stylisti c creations offer the opportunity for encountering original ways of seeing and feeling, perhaps not foreseen or imagined. Even in summary, we can recognize that the matter is complicated by those non-indivi dual qualities of Art, thus demanding that we discern the specific types and operations of aesthetic figures. Fi rst, the category of percepts answers and implicates the problem of preservation in aesthetic monuments ; Deleuze and Guattari ask, How can a moment of the world be rendered durabl e or made to exist by itself? ( WP 172). They elaborate, Virginia Woolf provides an answer that is as valid for painting and music as it is for writing: Saturate every atom [] and keep only the saturation that gives us the percept. It must include nonsense, fact, sordidity: but made transparent [] (172). Artists not only succeed in the effort to extract, preserve and express the sensations and forces of Life, but they also compose stylistica lly those percepts and affects th at attain to levels or modes beyond individual ( i.e. ones own) experience. Indeed, A gr eat novelist is above all an artist who invents unknown or unrecognized affects and bri ngs them to light as the becoming of his characters [] (174); Deleuze and Guattari further explain that art ists are presenters of affects, the inventors and creators of affects (175, my emphasis). Beyond strictly artisanal epistemology, Art as true constructivism this way evokes a compelling inquiry for study. Affects and the Language of Sensations To clarify, Deleuze and Guattari do not ar range their categoriespercepts, affects, sensationsin the way that I have ostensibly presented; however, I am deferring a detailed study of aesthetic figures and novelistic affects in favor of emphasizing the mode of Art as expression, 82


in order to understand the part icular value and function of ar tistic creatio n. Both Alliez and Simon OSullivan guide this perspectiv e with their extensive readings of What is Philosophy? directing attention aptly onto aesthetic blocs of sensations and positioning Art as expressive. A new vocabulary is needed a vocabulary not from semiotics, not to do with representation, and Deleuze and Guattari give us one, OSullivan writes ( Art Encounters 54); indeed, productive work with their vocabulary proceeds from fo cusing upon Arts operation and modality in terms of sensible forces, as Alliez emphasizes ( Signature 70). Expressed by artists style and composition, affects can be understood as a specific type of sensation within Deleuze and Gu attaris taxonomy, pertaining to nonhuman becomings of man ( WP 169) and relating in parallel to percepts both of which exceed individual lived experience and inhere preserved in Art. This subordinate category is implied when Deleuze and Guattari identify harmony, consonance, and dissonance as affects ( WP 164): the primacy of aesthetic compounds of sensation (188) emer ges through their prevalent discussion of counterpoint and refrain The whole of the refrain is the be ing of sensation, they write (184); and as all this parlance is neith er metaphorical nor respective to artistic medium, the perspective of Deleuze and Guattari primarily concerns modalityexpression and sensibilia, positing that Monuments are refrains (184). In the prior quote about counterpoint and co mpounds of sensation, Deleuze and Guattari reference the work of novelis tsciting Dostoyevsky, Dos Passos, and Proust especiallyto convey that which they have ex tracted through the percepts and affects of aesthetic figures, including characters, particularly wi thin relations of counterpoint ( WP 188). This type demonstrates what Deleuze and Guattari indica te when they write, Whether through words, colors, sounds, or stone, art is th e language of sensations (176): specifically, in their aesthetic 83


com position, writers make words pass into sensa tion that makes the stan dard language stammer, tremble, cry, or even sing: this is the style, th e tone, the language of sensations, or the foreign language within language [] (176). In this way, what can be provisionally termed artistic writing operates in the expressive mode of se nsation, beyond denotative or communicative functions in semantics or semiotics. Markedly distinguished from linguistics in this case, Deleuze and Guattari describe literature precisely within the context of Art, akin to painting and musicfor instance in their identifying the task for all artists, to ex tract and create new harmonies, new plastic or melodi c landscapes, and new rhythmic ch aracters (176). Thus it is to this end, rather than for any semantic or refere ntial purpose, that The writer twists language, makes it vibrate, seizes hold of it, and rends it in order to wrest the percept from percepts, the affect from affections, the se nsation from opinion [] (176).7 Those writers who make language vibrate could be understood as effectively composing aesthetic monuments that are refrains in the terms of Deleuze and Guattari. Far from being abstract, though, such an operation indicates the types or varieti es of sensationslike affects of harmony or counterpoint that they identify within art: the vibration which characterizes the simple sensation; the embrace or the clinch (when two sensations re sonate in each other []); withdrawal, division, distension (when, on the contrary, two se nsations two draw apart, release themselves [but are] brought together by the light, th e air, or the void []) ( WP 176). These types of sensation provide not only the new vocabulary beyond signification, as OSullivan evokes, but a way of th inking about the unique mode and processes of Art in parallel distinction to the concepts of Philosophy and the functions of Science. Moreover, these 7 This differentiation is crucial for our understanding their perspective, and I have only avoided a comprehensive explanation in favor of continuing the discussion specific to artistic expression and sensation. In one of many instances that emphasizes their pragmatics of literary stylewhich I reprise in later chaptersDeleuze and Guattari explicitly state, Aesthetic figures, and the style that cr eates them, have nothing to do with rhetoric. They are sensations: percepts and affects, landscap es and faces, visions and becomings (177). 84


catego ries elucidate the notion of affect beyond an individuals expe rience; we can certainly comprehend how artists indeed convey the clinch or the withdrawal of respective sensations, which operate aesthetically by sensibiliaunlike in telligible concepts and functions. In music, Deleuze and Guattari identify three m odalities of a being of sensation, for the air [refrain] is a vibration, the motif [melody and counterpoint] is a clinch, a coupling, whereas the theme does not close without also unclenching, sp litting, and opening (190, my emphasis). The typology of sensation does not imply a general analysis of artistic expression regardless of medium; on the c ontrary, as in the example of music, discerning the type of sensation directly involves our cons idering the specificity of materi al like Deleuze and Guattari. On the one hand, they state, The relationship of sensation with the material must therefore be assessed within the limits of the duration, whatever this may be (WP 193). And yet, beyond the persistence in the terms of the monument Deleuze and Guattari further posit the relation of material and sensation in aesthe tic expression. Analogous to painting and music, they write, It is characteristic of modern literature fo r words and syntax to rise up into the plane of composition and hollow it out rather than carry out the operation of putting it into perspective (195, my emphasis). Recognizing words and syntax as the materi al of literature, akin to color in painting and sound in music, we can see these as the m eans for artistic technique concerning the earlier emphasis of stylebeyond strictly viewing a medium in its technical properties. Matthew Fullers reading of What is Philosophy? in Art Methodologies in Media Ecology assists in comprehending the relation of co mposition, in material and stylistic terms, and sensation by which aesthetics operates uniquel y. Fuller expounds upon the three types of sensation: These mark spatial and sensual forces of arrangement the fluctuating dist ribution of closeness 85


providing a mom ent of sheer tran sit, or a gasp, a pause, a sh udder that opens up thought and serenity or the clenching that sends shocks from one element in the composition to another [] ( Production of the New 49, my emphasis). Besides reinforcing the turn away form abstraction, the descri ption of spatial and sensual forces by Fuller turns our attention to anot her important way in which Deleuze and Guattari describe art forms in terms both specific to medium and generally pertaining to aesthetic operation. Although I have been discussing sensa tion with limited reference to affect, the theorizations of percepts feature equally importa nt. For instance, considering the question that Deleuze and Guattari pose: Is this not the definition of the percept itselfto make perceptible the imperceptible forces that populate the world, affect us, and make us become? ( WP 182). In their view, art forms effectively convey particul ar sensations in unique ways: in the geometry and color of painting, the forces of gravity and its dynamic effects; music make[s] the sonorous force of time audible; time becomes legible and conceiva ble in literature (182). Thus, what we encounter in aesthetica lly composed percepts are sensations ( sensibilia ) experienced as forces, now able to be thought ( intelligible) ; for instance, finding in or rather through Proust the forces, of pure time that have now become perceptibl e (189). The evocative case of time accentuates the ability of Art to en able, through percepts and affects, our thinking sensory forces as legible and conceivable concep ts. In addition to their identifying this great potential generally, Deleuze and Guattari show the imperative for understanding art forms in their own right, as we might say, or more lite rally in terms of the particular operations by aesthetic compositions. On one hand, the question shifts from one merely of quantitative or qualitative typology to one of discerning how style a nd material operate within the apparatus of Art. Specifically, 86


Deleuze and Guattari write, It is on this condi tion that m atter becomes expressive: either the compound of sensations is realized in the materi al, or the material passes into the compound, but always in such a way as to be situated on a specifically aesthetic plane of composition ( WP 196, my emphasis). The prior case of Proust elucidates how the compound of sensations attains a greater salience beyond reiter ating (or re-presenting, i.e. denoting) a single perception or affection, an instance expe riencing the force of time either lost or regained (189). Significantly, the aesthetic plane names the unthought of the appara tus, in one way, as well as the problematic for Art uniquely, in te rms of finding what monument to erect on this plane, or what plane to slide under this monument (196)the problem addressed by aesthetic composition and expression. Only with a simultaneous perspective of the general op eration of Art as well as the particular function of style and material can we effectively undertake the theorization that Deleuze and Guattari posit: Everything (incl uding technique) takes place between compounds of sensation and the aesthetic plane of co mposition (196). The question and problematic implicated herein concerns not only our treat ment of Artanalytic, anagogical, heuristic, empirical, experientialbut our relating to concepts the qualities of sensib ility (the sensible) offered by percepts and affects, which pr ovide uniquely those unthought sensations. Affirming Possibility Resonance constitutes the truth of a probl em as such, in which the imperative is tested, even though the problem itself is born of the imperative. Once chance is affirmed, all arbitrariness is abolished ev ery time [and] divergence itself is the object of affirmation within a problem. ( Difference and Repetition 198) The effect of supplementing phi losophical concepts with the percepts and affects of Art entails the modification (or expa nsion) of the limits to thought; this consequence is merely ideal (or idealistic), but empirically exercised th rough creative praxis. On this point, my invoking discussions of Deleuzean theory as it bears upon artistic practices, by Matthew Fuller and Simon 87


OSullivan, appeals to an orien tation that is grou nded in a constructivism that avoids abstraction. In this way, the augmentation of the conditions of possibility by means of Art occurs actually, effectively through the very nature of the aesthetic plane OSullivan expounds this process: Such an encounter, or accessing of the even t, might involve what Henri Bergson calls attention; the suspension of normal motor activity wh ich in itself allows other planes of reality to become perceivable (this is an opening up to the world beyond u tilitarian interests) []. The event then emerges from the world but from a world usually imperceptible. ( Art Encounters 45, original parenthetical note). The effect of making sensible and legible the forces of the world, as established, is one aspect of Art encounter ed in aesthetic compositionsactual sensations. Additionally and alternatively, Deleuze and Gu attari describe how aesthetic universes affirm the existence of the possible by incorporating th e virtual event ( WP 177). The modality of the virtual is distinguished crucially: It is the virtual that is dist inct from the actual, but a virtual that is no longer chaotic, that has become consistent or real on the plane of immanence that wrests it from the chaosit is a virtual that is real withou t being actual, ideal without being abstract (WP 156). In this way, their conception of virtuality does not entail simulation, reference, or transcendental status but an ontic category of its ownand mo re directly this quote articulates an axiom of Deleu zes entire philosophy. Furthermore, premised upon the notion that the aesthetic plane of composition incorporates the virtual, possi bility (the possible) thus functions equally real in art fo rms, such as literature, as those actual forces of the world, such as percepts of gravity in painti ng and affects of harmony in music. This is not to suggest a false opposition between virtual and actu al modes within Art; rather, the principle with which to proceed in working with art forms is that both modes are equally ontic for Deleuze and Guattari. In developing concepts that are conti ngent upon the typology of aesthetic composition 88


percepts, affects, sensationst hrough our encounters, the im plic ations for pragmatics require our attending to art forms suitably. In my view this approach addresses the problematic of artisanal constructivism more effectively than the limited angle posed by Daniel Smith: The properly Deleuzian question would ther efore be: What are the ontological conditions under which something new can appear in the world? [ ] what exactly does it mean to speak of the conditions of the new? ( Production of the New 151, original emphasis). MediatorsLessons (Introduction) Returning to the scope of Apparatus Theor y, several conclusions can be drawn, toward provisional principles of constr uctivism through art encounters. Em erging at the end of the prior discussion, the first premise gene rally might be that art does not so much offer up a set of knowledges as set up the conditions we might say the contours, for future knowledges still to come; OSullivan continues, It is in this sense also that art i nvolves the posing of new questions and as such will always make demands on any already existing audience ( Art Encounters 146). In specific art forms, I would say that aesthetic composition not only poses new questions but in fact asse rts the mode of possibility, ve ry much in the sense of the problematicnot a question to be answered nor a problem to be solved. In this way, the form of literature can be understood as functioning through the expression of sensations both actual and virtual, conveying the fo rces of percepts and affects and maintaining virtuality (the possible) on the aesthetic plane of composition The latter point evokes the question of virtual aesthetic blocs which certainly escape th e impasse of classifying art forms as strictly fabulation or lived perceptions and affections. In any case, the mode of Art in this context fashions literature as both conveying sensations and maintaining the virtual the possible as aesthetic category, th e existence of the possible ( WP 177)as well, both of which we encounter. As OSullivan elsewhere asserts, The crucial factor he re is the production of 89


som ething different, but also our encounter and engagement with this difference ( Production of the New 99, original emphasis). In the early sections of the chapter, I established that constructivist concepts are contingent upon the percepts and affects encounte red, whether in nature or artwith which we invent new philosophical thought just as new aesthetic compositions, by means of encountering difference both actual and virtual. This contingency is integral w ithin the first two of the five lessons for the artisanal method that I have explicated in this chapter, which are worth enumerating before concluding. With the pr emise that we can adopt the methodology of philosophers and artists without th eir ontology wholesale, an empiri cal exercise of invention can operate as both detective novel and science fiction, in Deleuzes view: artisnal products whether philosophical or artistic are respectiv e to a problem; additionally, creation is not exclusive to the powers of the intellect but occu rs through sensibility as well. In both cases, systemization, denotation, and re ferencein the mode of Scie nceare avoided in favor of creativity, by means of attempting to repeat the energy and style of the exemplar, in OSullivans terms ( Art Encounters 3). These qualities fashion as problematized the artisanal product, insofar as it addresses the pa rticular problem of an apparatus. The second lesson proceeds directly from the first, if we now work with a revised Image of Thoughtmethod and object of study being particular historically to the modern episteme and respectively to the aesthetic paradigm. A cha nged conception of thought expands the conditions of possibility, specifically the limits of what is considered thought. R ecognizing that encounters affect both the intellect and the senses, the for ces encountered register as both catalysts to thought, as well as unique factors in the type of thought produced. For instance, whereas in other systems the following statement would be inco mprehensible, we can understand within the 90


revised apparatus of knowledge (dispositif ) when Deleuze and Guattari describe that The concept is defined by the inseparability of a finite num ber of heterogeneous components traversed by a point of abso lute su rvey at infinite speed ( WP 21, original emphasis). No longer regarded as purel y intellectual ( noumenal ), concepts themselves have empirical properties described in terms of dynamics, forces, movements. This consequence occurs partly as a result of the revised apparatus (or plane ), and yet partly contingent upon nonphilosophical factors. Target for Method (Continued) The phrase and perspective philosophy as opera ( Negotiations 165) articulated by Deleuze not only names provisionally the nascent method in non-figurative te rms; it also links all five lessons under discussion, in terms of mediators (the fifth idea), insofar as philosophy requires nonphilosophical understanding ( Negotiations 164). This view connects rather than differentiates the method and implications for Ph ilosophy in the former class with the pragmatics of Art in the latter. Although I am somewhat taking liberty with the Apparatus Theory of What is Philosophy? in making this connection, the rationa le for explicating and attempting a constructivist methodology emerges in the effort to parlay Deleuzes energy and style into artisanal production. This effort establishes ap tly the potential for aesthetic epistemology to exceed (and escape) the limitations placed upon thought by the m ode of Science, wherein Philosophy consists no more than of denotation or refere nce. The necessity for the composite artisanal endeavour is implied by Alliez when he describes philosoph y as the expression of a constructivism that would be mere protocol or procedure were it not for the Event that exceeds it, and which, in a manner that is not immediately discursive, annou nces the concept in the processual immanence of its self-positing ( Signature 15). Indeed, Alliez explic itly references in this case the OperaMachine with regard to the weaving of a plane in other words, artisanal. 91


More concretely, the complementary part s to thought in the Opera-Machinewhich enable, fashion, and characterize artisanal productionserve as mediators to the process. Mediators are fundamental, De leuze says: Creations all a bout mediators. Without them nothing happens. They can be peoplefor a philos opher, artists or scientists; for a scientist, philosophers or artistsbut things too, even plants or animals []. Whether theyre real or imaginary, animate or inanimate, you have to form your mediators. Its a series ( Negotiations 125).8 This perspective articulates precisely the logic for artisanal cr eation through encounters with nonphilosophical elements as well as the means for expression philosophical or otherwise. By this I mean to pos it the aesthetic mode as vital to constructivis mnot that this is imperative for the process Deleuze and Guattari de scribeinsofar as the c onditions of possibility change by creating through series and by encountering sensations that catalyze thought. Although the latter point has been established an d explained thus far, it is important to recontextualize as the third and fourth lessons the productive potential for encounters with aesthetic composition. To reiterate the first, Art that operates in the mode of expression, rather than that of representation or reference, consists of compounds of sensations; in the view of Deleuze and Guattari, these aesthetic monuments function to preserve and convey at present the sensations, forces, perceptions and affections that artists ex tract from life. Herein lies the prospect for novel encounters, especially when regarding given that artists are the inventors and creators of affects (WP 175, my emphasis), as they do. On e function by artists is thus presenting actual forces of the world, made sens ible, through aesthetic pe rcepts and affects. 8 The title of this selection is Mediators, a co nversation with Antoine Dulaure and Claire Parnet, L'Autrejournal 8 (October 1985); appears in Negotiations: 1972-1990. Trans. Martin Joughin. (Columbia. UP, 1995): 121-34. Perhaps due to the format, a lthough worth noting regardless, Deleuze frank ly elaborates: I need my mediators to express myself, and they'd never express themselves withou t me: you're always working in a group, even when you seem to be on your own. And still more when it's apparen t: Felix Guattari and I are one another's mediators (125). 92


Additionally, and the fourth lesson to cons ider, Art succeedsbetter than Philosophy and Science, Deleuze and Guattari argueat managing to create, on the aesthetic plane of composition by means of virtuality. Affirming possibility, The monume nt does not actualize the virtual event but incorporates or embodies it: gives it a body, a life, a universe ( WP 177). Indeed, my study explores in the next three chap ters the pragmatics of sensation and virtuality within Art, specifically the form of literaturethe prospect that Art can involve the actualization of a specifically different set of vi rtualities; the production of a different kind of world, as OSullivan asserts (Production 98). The five principles summarized here compri se a nascent poetics fo r constructivist work, concept invention through encounters, following and connecting the method as well as the Apparatus Theory articulated by Deleuze a nd Guattari. This methodology bears promise regarding two features of the problematic under c onsideration. First, as I introduced in chapter one, Art works and succeeds to create the finite that restores the infinite by its encountering chaos (pure difference) and virtuali ty in productive fashion, with the aesthetic plane of composition ( WP 197). This premise motivates the hypothesis I am positing, following Deleuze and Guattari, along with the explicit problema tic: for Philosophy this involves attempting to save the infinite by giving it consistency, but a paradoxical consistency of heterogeneity, rather than how Science relinquishes the infinite in order to gain reference over chaos (WP 197). Beyond this problem at the level of Apparatus Th eory, the implications for heterogeneity bear upon concept creation insofar as the intensive features are a nd must remain diverse, as introduced in this chapter; a clue for method emerges in the parallelism that Deleuze and Guattari state, adding how Conceptual becoming is heterogeneity grasped in an absolute form; sensory becoming is otherness caug ht in a matter of expression ( WP 177). From a review of 93


94 their aesthetic theory, we can now understand how this difference or nove ltychaos, virtuality, actual forcesoperates within Art, preserved and expressed in the monument. The developing hypothesis for constructivism re gards seriously that we encounter not only the results of artists incorporating chaos and virtuality in artisanal production but the sensations and forces, both actual and virtual, expressed by aesthetic composition. Concept creation that proceeds in this fashion thus promises to invent by means of and preserve precisely heterogeneity and intensive features. Consequent ly, the result addresses and plausibly enacts the second feature of the problematic for Philos ophy, thought and concepts by means of Art: The composite sensation, made up of percepts and affects, deterritorializes the system of opinion that brought together dominant perceptions and affecti ons within a natural, historical, and social milieu ( WP 197). As ideology and belief impede or pe rhaps foreclose thought antithetical to invention, this great capab ility of Art is not merely an underc urrent to the aims of Deleuze and Guattari. Indeed, undertaking the problem of i nterference, creating phi losophically a concept of (a) sensation, the next chapter further examin es what and how Art deterritorializes by means of aesthetic compositionspecificall y, the form of literature and the functions of writing. In this way I seek to emphasize the import of Deleuzes task for constructivist philosophy, as when he remarks, What we should in fact do, is stop a llowing philosophers to reflect on things. The philosopher creates, he doesnt reflect ( Negotiations 122).


CHAP TER 3 PRAGMATICS OF LITERARY ENCOUNTERS The most difficult thing is to make chance an object of affirmation, but it is the sense of the imperative and the questions that it launches. Ideas emanate from it just as singularities emanate from that aleatory point which every time condenses the whole of chance into one time. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition (198) Developing Encounter Pragmat ics (Methodological Study) Continuing the nascent methodology of cons tructivism through encounters, the present discussion surveys Deleuzes treatment of and work with literature as a model for practices of creativity toward philosophical or scholarly aims. Applying to this end the lessons of Apparatus Theory from the prior chapter, one hypothesis guidi ng this section is Deleuzes emphasis upon mediatorsthose nonphilosophical elements enc ountered that serve as both the catalyst and the expression of new forms of thought, with the logic of the se ries. While we can discern the productive evidence from Deleuzes entire oeuvre, there also appears a pa rticular rationale for this approach regarding the lim its upon invention in terms of dispositif and the conditions of possibility. In the same 1985 essay Mediators, Deleuze remarks We have to see creation as tracing a path between impossibilities ( Negotiations 134); citing Kafka writing in German and Pierre Perrault writing in Frenc h, Deleuze adds that we have to work on the wall, because without a set of impossibilities, [one] wont have the line of flight the exit that is creation, the power of falsity that is truth (134, my emphasis). Considering the prospect of creating a concept of sensation, the problem of interference that I have posed, from a perspective of Scie nce or logocentric Philosophy, the hegemony of Reason emerges markedly as the conditions up on creationint elligibility, articulation and iterability, denotation or reference. And while th e issues of degree and implications will be treated at other points in my pr oject, for now I must qualify that creating a concept of sensation is not an act of translation or adaptation; rather, the interfer ence in this problematic occurs 95


between the f aculties, intelligibility and sensib ility, as well as between disciplines. More specifically, additional difficulty and nuance occu rs with respect to material, given that language serves as the medium (form) and practice ( techn ) for both rational communication and artistic writing. At the expense of a thorough disc ursus on this point but in favor of progressing the present topic, I consider Deleuzes prevalent claim that certain artistic writers fashion a new syntax [that] is a foreign la nguage within the language ( Negotiations 134). That Deleuze evokes this pers pective within the c ontext of creation a nd impossibility in Mediators bolsters the theoretical recourse for constructivism to his theorizations of intensive language in writing. In other words, by employing th is foreign language, artistic writing (literature) operates by means of othe r modes of thought within the dominant dispositif : aesthetic practices, particularly style, thus situate writing within multiple apparatusesArt affirms virtuality as ontic, as established. Indeed, OSu llivan addresses precisely this prospect: art involves a new combination, a ne w dice throw as perhaps Deleu ze would say. Such art does not so much offer up a set of knowledges as set up the conditions, we might say the contours, for future knowledges still to come. It is in this sense also that art involves the posing of new questions and as such will always make demands on any already existing audience ( Art Encounters 146, my emphasis). The problematic as well as the opportunity that emerges, which I am advocating and engaging, expressly involves the frontiers of our knowledge ( DR xxi), at which we write and create, Dele uze states, as I earlier cited. Proceeding with this fecund view of Art generally, bearing in mind the previouslydiscussed properties of the aesthetic plane of composition, this chaptera link between studying theory and applying its lessons in propositional fashion examines further the form of literary writing as the mediator for constructivist output, both for Deleuze and for emulative 96


attem pts. The discussion proceeds from a considera tion of Deleuzes literary mediators and his idiosyncratic reading: concluding with descript ion and clarification of pragmatics concerning literary percepts and affects, w ith a review of secondary scholar ship on this topic, the second section tests the method for read ing in my first two encounters with novels as mediators. Keeping in mind, the limits upon what can be producedthe concepts thought or expressedinclude not only opini on, belief, and ideology, but tw o other operations of the dispositif upon knowledge in scholarshi p: the alterity and distin ct apparatus of creating philosophical concepts and discour se, without the means or aims of aesthetic composition; also, the implications of denotation within literary language for acts of in terpretation. The latter condition involves the inherent ri sk of enacting hermeneutics as the sort of limitation that Deleuze and Guattari describe, creating the plane of reference of Science, or in the simpler fashion of descriptive logic, for instance. Th is problem is treated partly here and then circumvented through alternative strategies for rhet oric and literary scholarship: this chapter and the next three introduce and expl ain additional topics necessary for engaging sufficiently and avoiding the issue of capture and limitation, beyond the basic notions of translation or adaptation, toward a concept of sensation. Continuing the di scussion of pragmatics for now, intensive language is the object of st udy within the constructivist procedure. Evoking indirectly the first difficulty of the dispositif stated prior, Ronald Bogue (1996) notes that Deleuze does not attempt to paint and sing through words, as do literary writers, but he does push language to its limits as he tries to say the unsayable a nd think the unthinkable ( Deleuzes Style 264). Deleuzes Literary Mediators Certainly, Philosophy might be catalyzed by other nonphilosophical understanding besides ArtScience or Nature, another appara tusand by art forms other than literature, 97


including notably for Deleu ze painting, film and music.1 Another project could indeed investigate those concepts that Deleuze crea tes through mediators from natural sciences, mathematics, or architecture; likewise, scholarsh ip on visual arts has pr oliferated, occasionally with apt method and toward inventive ends. Any re search must keep in mind that philosophy is born or produced outside by the painter, the musici an, the writer, each time that the melodic line draws along the sound, or the pure traced line colour or the written line the articulated voice, Deleuze asserts; moreover, it is necessarily produ ced where each activity gives rise to its line of deterritorialization (Dialogues 74). To this end, my study overall focuses upon Deleuzes work with narrative literature in order to discern firs t his literary pragmatics as well as the problematic to which certain concepts respondboth concer ning the methodological aim of constructivist invention with my chosen object of study. Additi onally, the particular investigation of literary writing is positioned against the challenge for scho larship and artistic language alike, whether or the degree to whichthe composition succeed s as creation. In this way, Deleuze directly informs the approach and articulates the stakes: Writing is very simple. Either it is a way of reterritorializing oneself, conforming to a code of dominant utterances, to a territory of established states of things. [] Or else, on the other hand, it is becoming [] something other than writing ( Dialogues 74, my emphasis). The hypothesis motivating a study of his constr uctivist method with Art is that Deleuze fashions the resulting concept w ithin a series consisting of th e aesthetic mediatorsthought and philosophical discourse particular to its catalysts and demonstrativ e of their properties, as Bogue attempts to theorize in his article Deleuzes St yle. This effort appear s to address the question (or problem) whether new knowle dge in rational language, operat ing by the intellectual faculty, 1 As just one example, see Arkady Plotnitskys Algeb ras, Geometries, and Topologies of the Fold: Deleuze, Derrida and Quasi-Mathemat ical Thinking (with Leibniz and Mallarme) in Between Deleuze and Derrida (98-119). 98


can avoid (re)territorializing or limiting the object of study; or, whether there are other possibilities for discursive practices beyond rem ain ing strictly referentia l, incorporating or appealing to other faculties such as sensibil ity. In the same passage quoted prior, Deleuze remarks, Not every becoming passes through writing, but everything which becomes is an object of writing, painting or music. Everything which becomes is a pure line which ceases to represent whatever it may be ( Dialogues 74). Although greatly compact, this instance articulates two methodological and philosophical aims: for intellectual discourse to enact, if only to a degree, creative effort via becoming deterritorializ ationbeyond denotation, dominant utterances; for this discourse not to represent but to express the qualities of its particular catalyst, for example the intensive features. Continually averting a false opposition, we must recall and keep in mind the asser tion by Deleuze and Guattari in What is Philosophy? that Philosophy is equally creative as Art and Science. Taking all these points into account, we can understand that in his en deavor to construct intensive concepts and adequate discourse provisionally labeled, Deleuze employs as me diators the art forms apt to problematic. While increasingly evident in his later work, Deleuze consistently composes his inventive thought using the work of literary writers as mediators, or in other parlance as vehicle or interface. This can be considered a feature of methodology, regardless of the number of texts that I addressin fact, twelve of his twenty three texts markedly use literary works, including even Foucault (1986) and The Fold (1988)or the prevalence of re ferences. Additionally, this perspective is one angle for discerning and e ngaging the overall character of Deleuzes method implied when he remarks, I make, remake and unmake my concepts along a moving horizon ( DR xx). In the scope of Deleuzes oeuvre, we can observe no limiting or fixed horizon of the encounter-constructivist problematic in his working with litera ture: from Proust and Sacher99

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Masoch in h is early divergent texts; to Borges and Lewis Carroll in his first experimental works, Difference and Repetition (1968) and The Logic of Sense (1969); to the increased number and variety of authors in A Thousand Plateaus (1980) and Essays Critical and Clinical (1993), most notably Kafka, Beckett, Woolf, Kleist, D.H. Lawrence, and Melville.2 In this context, the horizon of concepts pert aining to literature refe rs more to the use of pragmatics and aesthetic in terface than to the limited set of authors discussed or points reiterated. By the former I mean that we should consider Deleuzes literary mediators by their function in his philosophical discourse: Borges, regarding Leibniz and the Baroque; Carroll and nonsense; Kafka, Beckett, and Kleist for their composed affects and becomings; likewise percepts and forces in Proust, Melville, and Woolf; the intensive languagewhich is carved through a linguistic procedure ( ECC 9)of Artaud, Whitman, Wolfson, R oussel, Brisset, and D.H. Lawrence. An efficient review of several exam ples suffices to demonstrate this methodological principle; however, because certain topics a nd texts require thorough tr eatment in order to ascertain and apply effectively, I discuss in subs equent chapters literatu re by Carroll and Kafka in terms of series and deterrito rialization. The present survey examines two key instances of Deleuzes using Borges as well representative examples in Essays Critical and Clinical Besides charting Deleuezes oeuvre and method acr oss periods, this discussion throughout demonstrates the key principle to discern: the nonphilosophical material of literature as the catalyst and means for creating intensive concepts and philosophical discourse, working with Art that deterritorializes th e system of opinion ( WP 197), as established. 2 Proust and Signs (1964) trans. Howard (Minnesota UP, 2000); Coldness and Cruelty in Masochism (1967) trans. Charles Stivale (Zone Books, 1989). Indeed, Deleuzes middle and later periods feature increased work with art forms, beginning with Anti-Oedipus (1972) and Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature (1975), both written with Guattari, as well as On the Superiority of Anglo-American Literature (1977) in Dialogues (Columbia UP, 2002). 100

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Although arbitrary in one view, beginning with Deleuzes use of Jorge Luis Borges in his work appears apt when considering the context of the first appearance. Deleuze first evokes Borges and his story Pierre Menard, Au thor of the Quixote in the Preface to Difference and Repetition, within precisely the passag es I have cited regarding the creation of philosophical texts ( philos-o-graphy ?) as part Detective N ovel and part Science Fiction. In Deleuzes view, Borges goes further when he considers a real book, such as Don Quixote as though it were an imaginary book, itself reproduced by an imaginar y author, Pierre Menard, who in turn he considers to be real. In this case, the most exact, the most strict repetition has as its correlate the maximum of difference ( DR xxii). Implied here is that this composition succeeds toward what Deleuze posits should be the aims of new commentaries upon historical philosophy texts; moreover, the recourse to the logic of fiction vi a Borges follows Deleuzes calling for, instead of reproduction, ones writing a real book of past philosophy as if it were an imaginary and feigned book (xxi-ii, my emphasis). However, promising though this recourse appears, the later passage from The Garden of Forking Paths introduces the principal use of Borges that recurs in two later texts: On this question of the ga me of repetition and difference as governed by the death instinct, no one has gone further than Borges, throughout his astonishing work (115). The philosophical inquires into the Ideal Game and the Eternal Return consist of Deleuzes engaging the modal logic of Leibni z, through Borges, beginning in Difference and Repetition. Subsequently elaborating the conditions of a problem in The Logic of Sense Deleuze sharpens his focus in terms of incompossibility; significantly, he employs the logic of fiction when stating, The incompossible worlds b ecome the variants of the same story ( Logic 115). One view of his quoting The Garden of Forking Pa ths might be that Deleuze elucidates points through literature, shifting fr om the philosophical parlance of aleatory point and 101

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singularity for instance, writing, In Tsui Pe ns work, all possible solutions occur, each one being the point of departur e for other bifurcations ( Logic 113). Alternative to this simplistic view, we can observe that the logic of fiction not only serves as the vehicle for theory but also informs Deleuzes thinking in The Logic of Sense the stories of Lewis Carroll especially. This understanding is underscored partly by Deleuzes later engaging the modal logic of Leibniz with the theoretical interface of aesthetics, particular ly the music, architecture, and design of the Baroque period. In The Non-Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, Gregg Lambert expresses the latter view, first noting the similarity of Difference and Repetition to Borges story The Library of Babel (75) and then asserting that Borges has prefigured the solu tion that Deleuze later discovers in The Fold (76). Although a nuanced reading, La mbert ultimately privileges Borges, the Baroque Detective, to the extent of this ra dical conclusion: that Borg es is the precursor of Leibniz; that it was not possible for Deleu ze to read Leibniz without Borges (89).3 Regardless of interpreting literature simply as vehicle or deterministically as schema for Deleuze, the more important lesson from the case of Borges and Leibniz is the salient function of the logic of fiction in philosophical artisanal practice And just as I earlie r exalted Art as the catalyst to thought in the aesthetic paradigm, Lambert reconciles his over-estimating the influence of Borges upon Deleuzes reading by describing the Borgesian solution for modal logic as distinctly literary (90) : indeed, Deleuze fashions an aesthetico-philosophical species of repetition that is deployed by a process of readin g that now belongs to the concept of modern literature (76). In other words, the properties of literature within the apparatus of Art offer 3 For context, and to underscore the fairness of my quotation, Lamberts pa ssage is worth notin g in full: In my discussion of Deleuze & Leibniz, what I argued is something so simple and at the same time Borgesean, that in conclusion I want to return to emphasize it again: that Borges is the precursor of Leibniz; that it was not possible for Deleuze to read Leibniz without Borges. This is something so simple and yet evident, that Deleuze himself did not often see it, or did not choose to see it exactly in that way, perhaps due to an anxiety of influence, and this caused him to locate Borges still in terms of his own earlier reading of Borges as a player in the absolute game of chance, the game without rules (Fold 63) ( Non-Philosophy 89). 102

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Deleuze the non-philosophical com plement for i nvention, the artisanal philosophy-as-opera. I regard this as a means for Deleuzes creative pr actice rather as bearing any inherent connection between Borges and Leibniz; this relation is distinct from the topical discussions of The Fold, in which the counterpart to Leibnizs thought appears in the Baroque sensibility expressed in the arts, in Ronald Bogues terms ( Intensive 31). In The New Harmony, Bogue effectively iden tifies this perspective: An especially intriguing and instructive instance of the philosophy-arts parallels established in The Fold is that which Deleuze draws between Leibniz's concep t of harmony and the ha rmonic practices of Baroque composers ( Intensive 31). Ultimately, while scholars of certain expertise or motivation might parse and dispute Deleuzes composite perspective, more significant for this methodological study is how Dele uze creates his concept of the fold through Borges fiction as well as Baroque aestheticshow he can enter the Leibnizian universe ( 99), Alliez writes, a way of addressing the modern image of thought ( Signature 100). Finally, we might thus see Lamberts recourse to Borges as a Deleu zean strategy for innova tion, his insight made convoluted due to using the same author to different ends.4 The problem of writing Whereas the fiction of Borges enables conceptual invention as t hought experiments, the majority of literary mediators for Deleuze provide the means for avoiding and disrupting the code of dominant utterances ( Dialogues 74), analytic denotative di scourse, through technique and intensive language. Deleuzes encounters and c onstructivist work with aesthetic composition in this regard are evident in his coll aborations with Gua ttari, particularly Kafka (1975) and A 4 Also intriguing for poststructuralist methodology: Like Kafka, Borgess signature underwrites philosophical projects of Deleuze, Foucault (hence the citation [] in the preface to The Order of Things ) and Derrida (can one even conceive of the process of deconstruction of the text of Western Metaphysics without the precursor of Borgess total library?) ( Non-Philosophy 81). cf. essays by Lambert and Arsi in Between Deleuze and Derrida 103

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Thousand Plateaus (198 0), in which the pragmatics of literature emerges prominently. The latter is the perspective markedly apparent when Deleu ze directly treats the pro blem of writing later in Essays Critical and Clinical : the interrogation becomes a matter of whether writing operates either as reterritorializing or as beco ming a pure line which ceases to represent ( Dialogues 74). However, before or rather instead of simplifying the problem and object of study in these terms, we must keep in mind the intricate philosophical position and aest hetic theorization that inform this perspective, developed progressively since Proust and Signs in 1964 and 1972. Indeed, while in this text Proust provides an in terface with the philosophical topics explicated respectively by Leibniz and Bergson, Deleuze refi nes the constructivist pragmatics that is apparent more patently in later texts, the tenor articulated more explicitly in Dialogues and Negotiations The direct programme and nuanced perspective are clear in What is Philosophy? : Art does not have opinions. Art undoes th e triple organization of perceptions, affections, and opinions in order to subs titute a monument composed of percepts, affects, and blocs of sensa tions that take the place of language. The writer uses words, but by creating a syntax that makes them pass into sensation that makes the standard language stammer, tremble, cr y, or even sing: this is the style, the tone, the language of sensations, or the foreign language within language []. The writer twists language, makes it vibrate, seizes hold of it, and rends it in order to wrest the percept from perceptions, th e affect from affections, the sensation from opinion []. ( WP 176, my emphasis) In the service of examin ing the vivid examples in Essays Critical and Clinical, I have quoted this passage for the instruct ive principles that contribute to a pragmatics of literature; as stated, this appears to be the perspective that enab les inventive results, at least to the extent that is evident in Deleuzes wor k, I am positing. This typology complements the tasks of pragmatics stated in A Thousand Plateaus, to make first a tracing of the mixed semiotics, under the generative component and second the transformational map of the regimes, with their possibilities for transl ation and creation (ATP 146). In this way, Deleuze could be said to map 104

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and then inv ent with the countersignifying (118) and postsignifying (119) regimes of aesthetic composition, working with certain literature. As introduced earlier, the foreign language within language appears in this view the opportunity and means for creation within the constraints or conditions ( impossibilities) of the dispositif; or in other terms, style in the aesthetic paradigm fashions language into sensati on, rather than reverting to the dominant code of signification and mimesis. It is this quality that offers a rich potential for constructivism. Inventing this foreign language is the problematic that writers address, Deleuze begins Essays Critical and Clinical : They bring to light new grammati cal or syntactic powers. They force language outside its customary functions, they make it delirious [ dlirer ] (lv). Before discussing two instances of Deleuzes inventive work with literary mediators, it is worthwhile to review the illustrative ex amples of writing that twists, seizes hold, rends and wrests language makes it vibrate, in other words, infuses with in tensity. On this point, I would also clarify that the essays on literature in Essays Critical and Clinical can ostensibly be read in two ways, particularly from the first chapter Literature and Life: the second and obvious view regards the writer as a physician of himself and of the worl d, concerning literature as symptoms and an enterprise of health (3).5 This perspective informs the E nglish title and the introduction by Daniel Smith, regarding these essa ys within Deleuzes critique et clinique proj ect (xvii) and literature as deliri um, derived from Anti-Oedipus (xl). However, the exploration of the problem of writing, as I have pres ented, supersedes this narrow view of artists as clinicians or diagnosticians, literature as symptomatology (li), and interpretati ons as critical or 5 The eighteen essays are split fairly evenly between disc ussions of literary and philosophical works, in terms of topic and objects of study, often with insights and asser tions about both appearing throughout, constituting overlap for instance the essay on Spinoza by means of Nietzsche, D.H. Lawrence, Kafka, Artaud, To Have Done with Judgment. Overall, this collection is characteristic of Deleuze for appearing syncretic; my selective treatment of the literature theorization is deliberate, in the service of the on-going discussion. 105

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clin icalscholarly maneuvers reterritorializing aesthetic composition into the dominant code and signification regime of denotation. In contrast, through his pragmatics readings Deleuze recognizes how an author carves out the foreign language ( ECC 71); this results through a linguistic procedure (9) by Wolfson, Roussel, and Brisset (9), and is evident as well as in the work of D.H. Lawrence, Kleist, and Gherasim Luca (110). Discussing th e first three authors, Deleuze describes a procedure that treats an ordinary la nguage, a standard language, in a matter that makes it render an original and unknown language (72). This description appears in the essay on Melville, who carves out a similar effect throu gh his formulaneither an affirmation nor a negation (71)in Bartleby, the Scrivener As it hollows out language toward counteror post-signification the formula will also send language into flight, it will open up a zone of indetermination or indiscernibility in which neith er words nor characters can be distinguished (76). The main technique that pr oduces this effect is Melvilles dramatizing or composing with the disruption of signification: vers us self-referential and constative speech acts, It is this double system of references that Bartle by ravages with a new logic (73) As this aspect of the novella does not appear ostensibly to be a matter of Form, we can only follow Deleuzes unconventional reading of stylistic indiscernibility as with the man without re ferences (74)if we are to regard productively the procedure of Melville s writing that succeeds as intensive composition, becoming something other than signification, the non-repr esentative pure line.6 This point bears consideration as an instru ctive strategy for unders tanding and emulating Deleuzes treatment of literature, grasping the insights and generative work in favor of 6 One example of ambitious yet limited attempts at work ing like Deleuze suffices. The possibility of a Deleuzean reading of Bartleby emerges, Branka Arsi writes: the fact that Bartleby is living on a rhizome could be interpreted now as a compossibility of two series that th rough contractions and habits produce another rhizome, the rhizome of Bartlebys body, the becoming-rhizome of Bartleby that enables the local renovations of his body. ( Between Deleuze and Derrida 144). This type of reading is limited by remaining in the regime of signification. 106

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classifying to support some other ends. In this way, although Deleuze discusses quantitatively more Franco phone writersBalzac, Hugo, Rimbaud, Pr oust; Roussel, Brisset, Genet, Dhotel, Le Clzio; poets including Pguy, Michaux, and Lucathe qualitativ e import of the pragmatic readings demonstrate the more significant features. Deleuze unequivocally posits the schizophrenic vocation of American literature : to make the English language, by means of driftings, deviations, de-taxes a nd sur-taxes (as opposed to the st andard syntax) slip in this manner (72); in the essay on Whitm an, discussing his technique of the fragment Deleuze similarly posits that American writers have to dismantle the E nglish language and send it racing along a line of flight, renderi ng language convulsive (58). From theses readings, the principle for recognizing counterand post-signification aesthetics thus entails di scerning those techniques that work to intensify language beyond ordinary use, sending it in to flight, pushing it to its very limit in order to discover its Outside, silence or music (72). Twists, seizes, rends, and wrestsphilosophical discourse I began this chapter by introducing the view that literary mediators provide Deleuze the means for escaping the dominant code of philo sophical discourse, in addition to catalyzing new and particular types of t hought. The literary pragmatics evid ent in several texts further illustrates the qualities upon which conceptual de velopments are contingent; additionally, some products of constructivis t encounters show more markedly how Deleuze produces generative work through the aesthetic paradigm and its pa rticular properties or modes, accentuating the view of Philosophy as a creativ e enterprise. Three works in Essays Critical and Clinical illustrate formally the literary-constructivist poetics of philosography and a fourth, To Have Done with Judgment, demonstrates subtly the in ventive work of this method. In the latter essay, Deleuze recognizes in place of judgment the relations of forces, such as combat, in the four great disciples of Spinoza: evident in Niet zsches aphorisms, Kafkas parables, Artauds 107

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aesthe tic cruelty, and D.H. La wrences apocalyptic symbols ( ECC 134). In the perspective that I am contending, however, designating this exegesis as recognition is inapt ad rem ; rather, more suitable is our regarding how Deleuze invents his unique Spinoza-as-concept, much like Kafkaas-concept, through these literary mediators. Like wise, he similarly refashions and composes a distinctive version of Dionysus and the labyrinth as affirmative in The Mystery of Ariadne, according to Nietzsche (1987), along with Dele uzes conception of Kafka with Guattari. More concrete and patent instances of Deleuzes philos ophical poetics appear in On Four Poetic Formulas that Might Summarize Kantian Philosophy (1984) and The Greatest Irish Film (1986). While slightly less creativ e formally, the essay on Kant epitomizes the method of artisanal practice discussed earlier regarding Borges and Leibniz. In this case, Deleuze uses several literary references from Shakespeare, Borges, Rimbaud, Beckett, and Kafka to engage four Kantian notionstime, consciousness, the law, the faculties. On the last point, for example, Deleuze notes the unregulated exercise of all the faculties, which was to define future philosophy, just as for Rimbaud the disorder of all the senses would defi ne the poetry of the future (35). Although this correspondence might a ppear to have been artificially produced by Deleuze, the four epigrams from Shakespeare, Kafka, and Rimbaud respectively serve as the interface and the vehicles that enable his productive innova tions on Kants ideas, with remarkable precision and economy. Indeed, in the first case, the problem of time out of joint is treated as a matter of the aesthetic plane of composition : first evoking Borges labyrinth, as well as Oedipus according to Hlderlin & Nietzsch e, Deleuze posits how Hamlet completes the emancipation of time (28). A similar recourse to aesthetic com position concerns the modulation of consciousness, about which Deleuze remarks that it is as if in Kant, one could already hear Beethoven, and soon Wagners continuous variation (30). 108

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Beyond mere variation, the insights and new th eorizations of Kants ideas discussed in this brief essay emphasize the aesthetic dispositif operating in artisanal practice : it is through literature that Deleuze renders intense the es tablished and perhaps reified concepts, the aesthetic mode that makes it vibrate. A corollar y point is that Deleuze s literary approach in method is particularly apposite to the object of study. By this I do not mean simply that the literature invoked serves as apt re ference or correspondence, in depicting Kants concepts, as for instance in Hamlet or Murphy; rather, Deleuze undertakes the Ka ntian problematic by means of the Four Poetic Formulas in his prioritizing the third Critique, even noting a Shakespearean aspect of Kant (35). One unders tanding is that he resolves the dead-end line of reasoning, which refers only to Kants explicati ons of the four concepts, by innovating with the gesture and import of The Critique of Judgment : an aesthetic of The Sublime, in which the sensible takes on autonomous value (34)that which brings th e various faculties into play (34). The artisanal poetics for creativity, even if only innova tion in this case, are evoked philosophically in that the aesthetic plane is inherent within the pr oblematic (to which Kants concept of The Sublime is a response). In another sense, the particular dispositif of aesthetics situates the concept for Kant and the constructivist endeavor for Deleuze in terms of conditions for and the recourse to creativitythus the fourth epigram, from Rimbaud, To attain the unknown by disorganizing all the senses a long, boundless, and systematized disorganization of all the senses (33). Finally, Deleuze articulates not only a rationale but this fertile line for creation in his acknowledging how the four literary formulas might be arbitrary in relation to Kant, but not arbitrary in relation to what Kant has left us for the present and future (35). The artisanal poetics in The Greatest Irish Film likewis e show this logic, rather than a strictly arbitrary application, in composi ng philosophical thought via recourse to the aesthetic 109

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plane Unlike the essay on Kant, the rationale or di scernm ent for this approach appears in other instances when Deleuze explicates the intensive foreign language of artistic style; he posits in the Melville essay, for example, that writing with the fragment tries to finds a music in its stuttering language, a pure sound and unknown chords in language itself ( ECC 89). Theorizing further theses implications and uses of language in The Exhausted (199 2), the last chapter of Essays Critical and Clinical, Deleuze thoroughly discusses B ecketts works, particularly Quad, Ghost Trio, and Nact und Nacht In his reading, Beck etts creativity exhausts the possible with three types of language, ultimately producing a thirda language of images (159)that surpasses those of names and voices, types of metalanguage. Invoking Blanchot, Deleuze proposes that this exhausted language forces speech to become image, movement, song, poem (159); no l onger a representation of an object (169), its form and force free itself from memo ry and reason (159). The latter point emphasizes a manifest strain of thought that Deleuze ha s theorized throughout hi s career, to this late discussion, particularly in his referencing The Logic of Sense explicitly: Becketts imagelanguage frees itself from its obj ect in order to become a process itself, that is, an event as a possible that no longer even n eeds to be realized in a body or an object, somewhat like the smile without a cat in Lewis Carroll (168). Th is way of understandi ng regards intensive or expressive literature as not an object but a process (159)like Carrolls Surface nonsense, operating like the Radiance of pure events (22). Articulating a pragmatics of the postsignifying regime in The Exhausted, Deleuze asserts that the image-language is p ure intensity (170), comprised of forces as a ritornello whether visual or aural ( ECC 159), in the case of Beckett: The image is precisely this: not a representation of an object but a movement in the world of the mind (169). Bearing this 110

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perspective in m ind, we can observe the applied poetics in The Greatest Irish Film, in which Deleuze employs Becketts styleand not even literal textto propose in brief fragments a theoretical film, one that would resolve Bishop Berkeleys problematic of perception in favor of a Deleuzean invention, becoming imperceptible (26). Proceeding from The History, The Cond ition, and The Givens of the Problem of being perceived, Deleuze proposes a fictiona l treatmenteven casting Buster Keaton as Berkeley in his imaginary film (23)through cine matographic descriptions of The Wall and the Staircase, Action (24); The Ro om, Perception (25); and The Rocking Chair, Affection in which the camera reveals the perception of affec tion, that is, the perceptio n of the self by itself, or pure Affect (25). Engaging the problematic through the logic of aesthetics, both the cinematographic sequence and the n on-resolution of Beckett, Deleu ze asks, Is this not precisely what is needed, to cease to be in order to become imperceptible, according to [Berkeleys] conditions? (25). Indeed, the interminable qual ity of Becketts aforementioned image-language, which alters the conditions of possibility, provi des for Deleuze The General Solutionthat which facilitates the concept of becoming imperceptible without cessation or condition (26).7 Creative in senses both generative and aesthetic, these essays On Four Poetic Formulas that Might Summarize Kantian Philosophy and The Greatest Irish Film demonstrate the particular way that Deleuze engages establ ished philosophical issues, toward innovative ends, by means of the aesthetic plane That his composition sometimes appears in a markedly literary fashion directly evokes the question of the dispositif for thought and writing. To be 7 Of course, Deleuze had already invented this notion earlier in A Thousand Plateaus (1980) with Guattari; however, without digressing to account fully, it is worth noting that in this essay, it takes on the property of aesthetic means, for resolving Berkeleys problematic, rather than an end itself as a type of deterritorialized rhizomatic relation between bodies. Left to another project to explore fully, the relation of cinema as catalyst and conduit for Deleuzes thought in this regard, as evident in The Movement-Image and The Time-Image, can not be overstated. Alternatively, also see Garin Dowd Abstract machines: Samuel Beckett and ph ilosophy after Deleuze and Guattari (Rodopi, 2007). 111

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clear, the recourse to aesthe tics does not im ply that crea tivity requires switching (from philosophy) to the apparatus of Artas though Be rkeleys problematic of perception could only be resolved through an actual film for instance. Rather, what I have thus far termed artisanal practice for philosophical discours e involves integrally the mediators of constructivism at the conceptual and rhetorical levels of invention. In view of his oeuvre, this relation and technique emerges patently as Deleuzes method and styleranging to these late es says, beginning from The Logic of Sense through A Thousand Plateaus In these cases of mediators includi ng Borges, Melville, Rimbaud, Beckett, et al., what must be emphasized as a fundamental principl e of methodology is that philosophical innovation or invention by Deleuze is enabled by his pragmatic s of literature in the first place. With this said, I engage the problematic of the unknown and the creation of philosophical discourse ( philosography ) as part Detective Novel and part Science Fiction: beginning with the discovery model, as in the Baroque detectiv e of Borges, invention like Deleuzes work on Kant via Beckett is enabled by mapping the multipl e semiotic regimes and sensations or senses encountered, as he finds in the work of Carro ll and Kafka. In my experiment, Thomas Pynchon this way provides literary mediators for the discovery model first, introduced in the next section, as well as the generative means for experiencing and inventing new knowledge, presented in the next three chaptersencountering and di agramming intensive features, toward a novelistic assemblage in theory and practice. Literary Encounters 2: From Series to Assemblage in Pynchons Early Novels when novelists install themselves in th is aleatory point, this imperative and questioning blind spot from which the work develops like a problem by making divergent series resonate [] they make the work a process of learning or experimentation ( Difference and Repetition 199, my emphasis) 112

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From this extended review and careful c onsideration for method, I can now proceed to apply and test the strategies detailed and proposed, at least in one brief section here and continued henceforth. The rationale for the met hodological study has been to discern lessons that can be applied, in apt experimental praxiseven if the results require further development in later work. On this point, the compound view motiv ates and guides my appr oach to working with literature, specifically novels with multiple semiotic regimes, toward demonstrating artisanal praxis and potentially inventing an experienced concept of sensa tion. Thomas Pynchon is the author in whose work I have encountered generative and transformative writing, first and most compellingly concerning the logic and production of serieseven though his novels are highly episodic in narrative as well. This aesthetic mode of narrative offers potential for the constructivist method undertaken from Deleuze, specifically to i nvestigate given the inherently temporal properties of terms and their bearing upon invention. Expanding the pragmatics of percepts the Deleuzean vocabulary of point, line, series, and transversal relation additionally enables a view of Pync hons work that recognizes literary expression and composition through signifying and c ounter-signifying regime s; this way, we can discern other productions of sens e and other logics at work in the aesthetic paradigm. As one consequent insight, I am conjec turing a shift demonstrated in Pynchons first three novels V. (1961), The Crying of Lot 49 (1965), and Gravitys Rainbow (1973)from serial logic to assemblage style, in both thought and writing. This shift is less important for my purposes as an aesthetic observation (disciplinar y argument) than as a cataly st for and guiding influence of my project. Incidentally, it is a similar progression in thought from the series model and literary readings of The Logic of Sense and Proust and Signs to the assemblage-style concept-making by Deleuze in his later oeuvre, from A Thousand Plateaus through What is Philosophy? 113

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In addition to the methodological terms thus far developed, Pynchons three novels provide promising diegesis for invention, whic h I am using experimentally akin to how the works of Borges, Carroll, and Kafka are innovat ion mediators for Deleuze. Concerning this phrasing of diegesis in scholarship, I am attempting a poetics of artisanal praxis in the compelling language of novelistic philosophy: De leuze remarks, Philo sophys like a novel: you have to ask What's going to happen?, What's happened?. Except the characters are concepts, and the settings, the scenes, are space-times. One s always writing to bring something to life, to free life from where its trapped, to trace lines of flight ( Negotiations 140-1). Finding the space-times for invention in Pynchons novels the narrative and char acter analogues in artisanal expression will be treated subsequently, using li terary mediators from other authors. Furthermore, this perspective guides how I am using Pynchons novels particularly encountered, toward invention rather than exegesis or other ends. The principle for innovati on within the restrictive dispositif (rational discourse) emulates similarly how Deleuze employs Carroll and Kafka fo r renderings of nonsense and of desire in his writing. In order to foreground the position of fir st-person role in constructivist encounters, rather than remain or become abstract, an additi onal value of these first en counter texts is their dramatizing the very process th at they catalyze in my projec t. To this end, although perhaps ultimately ending up a detour, I begin with literary structural portraits of the narrative of discovery within a trajectory of invention. In Heuretics, Ulmer points out how the language about method since Francis Bacon indicates a convention for scientific inquiry in Western knowle dge systems associated with the metaphor of the voyager (24); comm on spatial language inflecting the discovery of knowledge rhetoric includes voyaging explor er, travel, frontier, adventur e, pioneers, visionaries, 114

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trailb lazers (26) Of course, the process of invention also unfolds as a narrative (7), as Ulmer notes in Internet Invention itself an unconventional textbook on method and praxis structured by series and progression, a model for my presen t attempt. In my work with Pynchon here and subsequently, two general principles emerge and are dramatized in the narrative process: most obviously, the classification of knowledge and the discovery process within and contingent to the Modern Episteme and Literate Apparatus, which is not universal; also, the experienced (firstperson) story of the invention proce ss, particularly in the absence of logocentric Meaning or Truth in the postmodern episteme. The latter bega n long before this project, first encountering The Crying of Lot 49 and theorizing a rhizomatic or netw ork epistemology as alternative to hermeneutic readings of binary oppositions a prologue to the present work, indeed. In a structural portrait use, adopted from Roland Barthes, the literary text serves as simulation of the immediate position of articul ation, in order to stage an utterance, not an analysis ( A Lovers Discourse 3). For example, Barthes employs Werther as a structural portrait (3) for the amorous subject, a discursive role: this identification with literary charactersfor him, Werther and Heinrich, the madman (130-1)he explains, is not a psychological process [but] a pure structural operation (129). With the rationale of composing figures of amorous feeling (4), within a knowledge milieu dominated by psychoanalytic and Marxist theory, Barthess insights motivate his producing affective writing within a dispositif that seemingly precludes su ch scholarly discourse. This is quite notable for my pur poses, extending the principle from amorous subject to the subject and experience of di scovery and invention. Specifically, one understanding toward this aim is how the figure takes its departure from a turn of phrase, a kind of verse, refrain, or cantillation (5); in Ba rthess estimation, Each figure explodes, vibrates in and of itself like a 115

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sound severed from any tuneor is repeated to satiety, like the motif of a hovering music (6). Although certainly a practice for composing the eventual artisanal concept I temper my use of literary fragments in my methodological study for now, in favor of using Pynchons work as instructive example here and as inventive di egesis subsequently: intensive language use, generative or transformative beyond signification. Pynchon Mediators: Serial Detectives, Transversal Signs The first literary encounter with serial logic percepts and the two structural portraits for my initial position are Pynchons novels V. and The Crying of Lot 49 : the seriality of proliferating signs and meanings, in the signifyin g regime, connects markedly with the narratives of quest and investigation in both. For clarity a nd efficiency, I will mostly discuss the latter and then conclude briefly with dia grammatic speculation for inven tion; also, although my process begins with the irresolvable a lternatives and non-ending of Lot 49 I start with V. given the critical discourse and yet discuss the novels toge ther whenever possible for expediency. Most obviously, both novels present the hermeneutic detective role, thr ough prevailing quest narratives: the question of what V. is, for minor ch aracter Sidney Stencil; as well, the ostensible mystery and investigation by protagonist Oedipa Maas into the relation and meanings of the muted post-horn symbol, W.A.S.T.E., Trystero (o r the Tristero, or other variants), and legacy in Lot 49 Pynchons plot structures and narrative discourse (or sjuzet ) invite readers structural identification and par anoid stance toward signs and references, as I discuss second, across lines of stories and levels of fiction and hist orical reality. Encount ered thus, the works prompt our consideringespecially in a project of inventionthe par ticular epistemological approach of interpretation and trajectory, with its assumptio ns about discovery and meaning. The paranoid reader, paralleling the narratives of Stencil and Oedipa, proceeds likewise in the rational paradigm with the metaphysics of presence, in Derridas terms for the dominant 116

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Western epistem e, and with investment in th e voyage of discovery. Pynchons works employ conventions of narrative closur e and reader expectations spec ifically in dramatizing these characters travel, motivated by quest and investig ation, in plot progressi on; the detective role begins assuming transcendent Truth or Meaning ex ists, albeit absent or elsewhere, and that it might be found or become disclosed revealed as though hidden. Th e metonymic clues imply a mystery to investigate and solve, not a problematic in which to work: V., an identity located elsewhere and in the past time of Stencils fath er; Trystero prevalent ostensibly everywhere, persisting as vestigal and elided operation, if Oedipas findings and deductions are true. Despite the conventional and flawed epistemological base s, and perhaps all the more compelling despite Pynchons refusal of closure-solution to the detec tive role, the structural portrait is worth briefly examining given the profuse academic interest and the counter-signifying regimes encountered. The serial logic of Pynchons composition, accentuated in counterpoint by episodic storytelling, unfolds most in the accounts of Sten cils and Oedipas hermeneutic quests; this mode also compels interest for methodology and rhetoric, given the conventions for meaningmaking and the limited alternatives. Unlike Lot 49 s plot and sequential discourse, the detective narrative of Stencil is only one interpreti ve option, as Molly Hite points out (Ideas of Order 489), for engaging V. a highly episodic novel; however, an exegetical treatment of the novels content identifies with this struct ural role as with Oedipa, that logocentric critic for whom signifiers stand to be decoded in order to yiel d a precise meaning (Hassan 88, my emphasis). Moreover, selecting (however unconscious ly) this role not only makes evident our filtering material progressively toward singular conclusion, using deduction in the rational dispositif ; this perspective also regards i nherent and observed connections as transversal relations across the narrative lines of th e present-time story and the historical episodes. Indeed, 117

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this inclusive view of the novels ostensibly disparate storiesBenny Profane and the W hole Sick Crew set in New York in 1956; intern ational espionage across Europe and Africa, periodically during year s 1898-1943results by recognizing, as Seed articulates, that they are linked by the search of one Herbert Stencil for a mysterious figure called V. ( Labyrinths 71). By invoking these scholars, I mean not onl y to consider discip linary conventions and these astute readings but as well to keep in mind th e exegetical orientation that the novels entice. For example, in an early critical ac count of the obsessi ve quest (1971s City of Words ), Tony Tanner describes Stencil as the novels key figure ( Mindful Pleasures 58), particularly given the mode of inference proceeding with both very little and far too much to go on, [because] he is bound to find clues everywhe re (58), like the novels hermen eutic reader. Indeed, Stencil articulates late in V. how in this search the motive is part of the quarry (Pynchon 415); this endeavor might be motivated by boredom and desi re for intrigue, or n eed[ing] a mystery, any sense of pursuit to keep an active metabolism (415)8, very much like the characterization plotpropulsion of Lot 49 Just as Stencils inference-treatment of evidence into cabals (159), Oedipas investigating a myriad of signs, like the reader of iterations, illustrates how, in Hites terms, the invitation to play literary detective is duplicitous. Too many cl ues turn out to be red herrings ( Ideas 49, my emphasis). More signif icantly, I would argue, is th at the detective role in all three cases proceeds with investment in discovery and with inferential meaning-making of the series encountered, whether grouping or filtering toward conclusion. 8 Parenthetical citations refer to the 199 9 Harper Perennial Classics edition of V. (J. B. Lippincott 1963) and the 2006 Harper Perennial edition of The Crying of Lot 49 (J. B. Lippincott 1966). Pagination differences can be remedied easily, one way, by consulting <>. I have not consulted this resource extensively for this discussion; and yet, this in stance indicates a secondary an d reflexive concern of my projectacademic research and writing in the electronic a pparatus of searchable databases and digital books. Tangentially, my 2006 paperback of Lot 49 has a detail that I view as incredulously as Oedipa Maas examining stamps and The Couriers Tragedy : Cover design by Aesthetic Apparatus (yet, I have not investigated further). 118

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The semiotic series that proliferate throughout the novels emphasize the prominence of the signifying regime in Pynchons compos ition as well as the components effectively countersignifying for the detective role, seeking a singular tr uth or meaning to discover. First, the equivocal list of V. symbols and V. words (Hite 48, 53) includes identitiesQueen Victoria, Victoria Wren, Vera Meroving, Veronica Mang anese, Veronica (rat)in addition to the anonymous V. agent; places, chiefly Valletta, the V-Note bar (55), and Ve nezuela or Vesuvius volcano, both possibly encoded Vheissu in on e case (207); concepts referenced, including virt (209), virginity and sacrifice (59 passim ), and Vheissu, mythical place and/or dream of annihilation (217) and/or symptom (517). Gr anted, the narrative of He rbert Stencil does not include all of these variations; however, althoug h no one V-word encapsulates the significance of the letter V (Hite 53), the signs tempt deductive conclusi on by the detective reader who adopts Stencils desideratum the kabbalist truth about the V. agent character (or characters) in the historical episodes and na rrative of Stencils father. In Lot 49 Pynchon creates the inverse situation for Oedipa and the structural role of logocentric critic, wi th meaning sought by interpreting re lation among a heterogeneous set of signs: the estate and legacy of Pi erce Inverarity; private couriers in Europe and the U.S. (77), the muted post-horn graphic graphic (38) and motto, And Tacit lies the gol d once-knotted horn (58); the acronym W.A.S.T.E. ( 70); the Tristero system (31) and/or the signifi er Trystero (58). This semiotic set extends in Oedipas va ntage to include esoterica such as U.S. postal reform (143) and stamp forgeries (144), as well as the Jacobean revenge play, The Courier's Tragedy (48) and textual variants. Further, the readers perspective incorporates references to multiple anarchist groups, in Russia and Mexico; the Holy Roman Empire, Pr otestants, and Calvinism; Germany history, 119

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including the Thurn and Taxis postal com pa ny and prevalent Nazi elements, notably Buchenwald and Auschwitz (111-2); battles in the French Revolution, at Austerlitz, in the Civil War, in Turkey and Italy during World Wars I and II.9 In this view, the readers identification with Oedipa exceeds her detective role by applying her surname, Maas with its foreign etymology of web or net ( her metaphysical interpretation of the Remedios Varo painting Bornando el Ma nto Terrestre (Embroi dering the Earths Mantle), insofar as the tapestry was the world with no escape (11). The question becomes whether we seek a uni fying sign (Trystero?) and meaning from this varied network an arrangement recognizable in th e narrators noting circuit-resembling streets (14), railroad tracks a nd freight cars, a web of teleph one wires (149): a secret potentially deciphered by the miracle of co mmunication (149) in li nking signifiers with singular referent. The detective role is faced with meaning-making in view of proliferating series and assortment alike; further, it is not as though Pynchons works merely parody the mythic journey in V. (Seed Labyrinths 87) and the genre of quest narrative (Hite Ideas 73) in Lot 49 Creating both parody and diegetic integrity (an irresolv able issue), Pynchon composes with and calls attention to percep tions, whether it is the signifying or counter-signifying regime encountered by the detective role. The issue of how best to proceed must be considered given the meaning-obscuring qualities, as several cri tics have discussed about Lot 49 extensivelynotably including John Johnston, Wail Hassan, and William Gleason. In additi on to Hites cautionary observation about the signs Oedipa that misses or discounts because she is on a quest ( Ideas 80), which entices 9 The German V-2 missiles referenced off-handedly in Lot 49 (112) continue the series begun in V. with its characters developing at Peenemunde the Vergeltungswaffe Eins and Zwei (241)German for vengeance weapon one and two (PynchonWiki Index Page V. < >). This relation is not Stencils The magic initial!, but an intrinsic link and acceleration toward Gravitys Rainbow 120

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our seeking obscure or opaque c onnections (as in the prior paragr aph), we must further question the m ode of detective search unde rway in the structural role. Sp ecifically, as signs are no less uncertain for the reader as for Oedipa (Johnsto n 52): in Toward the Sc hizo-Text: Paranoia as Semiotic Regime in The Crying of Lot 49 Johnston observes that si gns proliferate with an ambiguous, insistent, and even seductive logic ( 50). Seduced thusly, lik e Stencils paranoiac mode of secret history (McHale 91), the investigation proceeds as though the unknown is a mystery to solve, rather than a problematic to engage, which motivates the search for Meaning and Truth; a paranoid mode consists, in J ohnstons terms, of rec ognizing and interpreting signs, given the detectives presumption of and at tribution of significance to signs not overtly meaningful (Schizo-Text 73). Paranoia literally beyond, besi de, or against ( para) the mind ( nous ) is integral (perhaps even against good sense ?) to the hermeneutic search, considering how Oedipa distinguishes signs personally significant, concerning Tryst ero; readers likewise identify meaningful elements with reductive lo gic, excluding or incorporating details toward an interpretive conclusion, whether embroidering or sorting (as in the diegesis of Lot 49 ). In the paranoid mode, Oedipa interprets signs of Trystero, the muted post horn and W.A.S.T.E., as the clues that promise revelati on (Hassan 89). And yet, in Hassans view, the novelboth its narrative and our experience with it conveys the failure of the positivism that informs reading and interpretation in their effort to make sense of the text (Not a Novel 97). After all, Oedipa switches investigations from bone-charcoal cigarette filters ( Lot 45-7) in the executrix narrative to the more seductive mystery of the Trystero thing (63) that is related coincidentally. While deductive readers appro ach the text as implying or suggesting the disclosure of meaning or truth about either/both/ any aspect, the inherent problem, William Gleason points out, for the detective role is that the central truth might ultimately be lost, 121

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leaving only clues (Postm ode rn Labyrinths 87). The clues operate by the signifying and counter-signifying regimes for both, the role dramatized when Oedipalike Stencil in V. with his fathers journalresearches a spoken reference in textual varian ts in paperbacks (61) and in footnotes (82), and in a simple example, when sh e wonders about an ostens ible clue, A cross? Or the initial T? (71). Readers receive at least minimal satisfact ion of revelation by certifying any of the abundant references, through research, and especially by diegetic clarificati ons of signs such as D.E.A.T.H ., Dont Ever Antagonize the Horn (98), I.A., Inamorati Anonymous (91), and finally W.A.S.T.E.: We Await Silent Tristeros Empire, printed on a stamp with the title Tristero Rapid Post (139). However, Pynchon evokes self-reflection: You guys, youre like Puritans about the Bible (62), a character tells Oedipa and readers by extension (in plural address)the logocentric critic expecting or even forging (a forgery ?) unified and transcendental Meaning or Truth from a heterogeneous assemblage. Just as Oedipas quest to make connections motivates the pl ot (92), Gleason notes, so too can this narrative be described as exploring rhizomatic labyrinths (96) by the structural role of detective. Irresolvable Counter-series You didnt see the thing because you dont know how to look And you dont know how to look because you dont know the names. Don DeLillo Underworld (540, my emphasis) Everyday things represent the most overlooked knowledge. These names are vital to your progress. Quotidian things. If they werent important, we wouldnt use such a gorgeous Latinate word. ( Underworld 542) At this point in the process, Pynchons seri al production using the signifying and countersignifying regimes has created an impasse for the hermeneutic detective rolethe structural position having too much and too little to go on. Indeed, Truth depends on an encounter with something that forces us to th ink and to seek the truth ( Proust and Signs 14), Deleuze writes, 122

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about Proust, in a salient text for this project hitherto unrem ar ked. The truth of the matter might be the end of the line for the detective, although we are ju st getting started. The structural role of Stencil and of Oedi pa conveys the position of waiting for a symmetry of choices to break down, to go skew ( Lot 150, my emphasis)a temporal experience encountering the series, lines, and transversals of the literary percepts a nd mixed-semiotic assemblage. Of course, the logocentric critic does not yet work with or think in terms of multiplicity in that Binary logic is the spirituality of the root-[book] ( Thousand Plateaus 5), Deleuze and Guattari assert. This condition of the logophile accounts for this impasse in two ways, beginning with overlooked knowledge in a sense other than the pure signal, Oedipas lost epileptic Word (95). In order to produce a diagrammatic understanding of the generative or transformative elements and to posit Pynchons work as a diegesis for invention, I briefly discuss next what I recognize as the impediment to a productive encounter, toward an alternative explored in the next chapter regarding Gravitys Rainbow : escaping the false binary between Another mode of meaning behind the obvious, or none (Lot 150) as well as the mistaken belief in knowledge discovery as spatial trajectory and not temporal process. 10 The structural roles and textua l elements as well as conventio nal scholarship assist to this end; secondarily, I will attempt to use both to demonstrate the poeti cs of my inventive process. First, just as V. and Lot 49 are described as epistemological quest or even a detective story [] blown up to gargantuan pr oportions (McHale 21), so too are the novels noted for the particular condition or effect created, especially beginning in the middle period of Pynchon scholarship (the 1980s): the irre solvable state of dualities e.g. by the proliferating 10 In this case having forgotten the fourth dimension in the product of artisanal praxis ; like Pynchons detectives, mistakenly seeking Al theia truth that is revealed, rather than Lth (Greek) forgetfulness, concealment, oblivion (as described by Blanchot and Heidegger; cf. < >.) 123

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duplications (Hite 66) of signsa nd the uncertainty, an in escapab le and ultimate effect of Pynchons writing (Cooper 174). Readers face a margin of confusion or uncertainty created by proliferation and multiplicity (Seed 115), not onl y at narratives ends but prevalent in both novels as well. The prominent them e in scholarship concerning the irresolvable meanings and the unknown (unknowable) mysteries aptly reflects the experience of reading, gesturing toward pragmatics in articulating the textual qualities th us. However, I am deliberately approaching a problematic rather than a puzzle to solve (or abandon) by singling up all lines ( Lot 20) in Pynchonian terms; the novels irresolvable qualities and their na rrative endings, as well as the metaphysical orientation of conven tional treatment in scholarship, al l call this into relief. The narrative trajectory of V. toward discovery and knowledge integrally relates both the condition of uncertainty a nd the critical approach that remains exegetical, while transformative elements identifiable in the novel and in Lot 49 suggest an alternative: not only meta-commentary on the human need for order, as Kerry Grant remarks, but also providing a degree of exhilaration it affords the reader who tunes in to its most postmodern frequencies ( Companion to V. xiv). In the detective narrative, Sten cil seeks the singular truth behind (and semantically over) the myriad of V.-itera tions, specifically the Ka bbalist revelation of historical conspiracies, most es pecially his fathers death. Most reductively, there are One of two conclusions, Hite articulates: Either the lady V. exists, in which case the Plot Which Has No Name dominates the fictional present, or the lady V. does not exists, and Stencil has hypothesized or even hallucinated re lations between random events. In the first case, a repressive order manipulates events; in the second, a pparent order veils real chaos (47). This artificial symmetry of choices motivat es the plot toward confirming one option, specifically by the voyage toward truth, located some place. Just as the Epilogue recounts the 124

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senior Stencils fated trip to Malta, so do Sten cil and Profane travel th ere during the quest plot: But he stayed off Malta. He had pi eces of thread: cl ues. Young Stencil has been in all her cities, chased her down till faulty memories or vanished buildings defeated him. All her cities but Valletta. His father died in Valletta. He tried to tell himself meeting V. a nd dying were separate and unconnected [] You are expecting to fi nd this chick in Malta? Profane said. Or how your father died? Or something? Wha. ( V. 416) The logocentric assumption of closure through discovery, or through disclosure of meaning, reveals the spatial epistemology dominant in this paradigm.11 As structural role, Stencil, traveling to Malta and then to Stockholm (487) tracing clues, de monstrates our archaeological expectation that a real reconstruc tible story or theme lies latent in the local intractabilities of the narrative, in Kowaleskis apt description (qtd. by Grant xii). Although more subtle in its plot ending, the language of Lot 49 regarding the symmetry of choices likewise underscores the spatial orientation toward truth/meaning for the detective role. Concerning the ostensible mystery discer ned, Oedipa deduces four possibilities for interpreting the signs and narrative developments of her investigati on: the W.A.S.T.E. system of postal communication exists; she is hallucinating it (141); the cl ues all reveal a conspiracy against and implicating her, design ed by Pierce Inverarity ; or, she is fantasying some such plot (141), in which case she is crazylike marginali zed characters Mucho Maas and Dr. Hilarius. Viewing these symmetrical four options, she mentions, but does not interrogate, that Every access route to the Tristero could be traced also back to the Inverarity estate (140, my emphasis). Moreover, after investig ating articles and stamp forger ies (142-4), as the logocentric critic, Oedipa ultimately invests in the promis e of revelation, as the detective who explores various localities of Southern California througho ut the novel. 11 The paradigm of knowledge discovery by voyaging seeker; as earlier stated this feature correlates with the Modern Episteme and Literate-Scientific Apparatusmanifesting in the dispositif of Reason, for Truth/Meaning. 125

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Like Stencils seeking knowledge about V. on Malta, Oedipa as the voyager role assumes discovery of evidence, some confirmation one wa y or otherindeed seeking her target, her enemy, perhaps her proof (152). Like the tower and mantle of Vaross painting and the lakesubmerged bones, this final location of the auction-house room, the culminating position but interminable path, conveys Oedipas spatial ep istemology toward truth or meaning. Specifically, such a view of the unknown mystery extends the x -variable of Tristero and dispossession throughout her Republic (148): from Kinneret-Among-The-Pines, Berkeley, and Orange County (California), South to Mexico City, perhap s East to Cornell (Ithac a); certainly Northeast to the Low Countries around the Meuse (Maas?) river, then S outh to Italy, toward the Vatican and Lago di Piet, and onward boundlessly. Unlike the diegesis of V. in which the text privileges spatially-located truth by the final chapter and Epilogue in Valetta (Mal ta), the narrative discourse of Lot 49 proliferates with signifying and counter-signifying series without conclusive truth or meaning in either regime. Ending with the absence of appearance by the m ysterious bidder [who] may be from Tristero (145), the plots terminus drives the hermeneutic detective to inte rpretive impasse or even full circle into some paranoia (151)truth not only deferred but forestalled, a final position like V. and Stencil Sr. dying on Malta, and Oedipa sitting in the locked auction-house room.12 Thus far, I have been mapping the diagrammatic components of these novels, in order to chart the regimes encountered and to convey the experience of thinking hermeneutically as well as writing 12 Author of The Locked Room Paul Auster dramatizes the condition for wr iter and critic alike, providing structural portrait in Oracle Night : I opened the notebook, and when I glanced down at the page in front of me, I realized that I was lost, that I didnt know what I was doing anymore. I had put Bowen into the room. I had locked the door and turned out the light, and now I didnt have the faintest idea of how to get him out of there. Dozens of solutions sprang to mind, but they all seemed trite, mechanical, du ll. Trapping Nick in the u nderground bomb shelter was a compelling idea to meboth terrifying and mysterious, beyond all rational explanationand I didnt want to let go of it. But once Id pushed the story in that direction, I had diverged from the original premise of the exercise. (108) 126

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partly in the aesthetic paradi gm ; although belaboring the former the disciplinary conventions help identify generative or transformative elements toward the latter, still yet reached. Two final points work to this end, aided first by Pynchons textual lessonnot a theme or logicof entropy : the concept in Thermodynamics and Info rmation Theory is only ostensibly similar ( Lot 85-7) in the legible formulas Besides demonstrating an irresolvable condition, this fact subverts the signifying regime, which doe s not produce a Kabbalist Truth or Meaning of dispossession. For instance, just as Stencil remarks that V.s is a country of coincidence, ruled by a ministry of myth ( V. 485), so too does Oedipa recognize The dead man [Inverarity], like Maxwell's Demon, was the linking feature in a coincidence ( Lot 98, my emphasis). And yet both detective characters, like exeg etical critics, mistake a diffe rent logic for the absence of sense; moreover, denotative language emerges as the (only?) solution to overlooked knowledge, as in the earlier-cited pa ssage from DeLillo. This recourse is evident even in highly apt descriptions of Pynchons mixed-semiotic co mpositions, as in Hites pluralistic conception of multiple and conflicting ideas of order (10); and when, similarly, Gleason notes, The irresolvability of Lot 49 s polar oppositions enforces uncerta inty; multiple possibility displaces binary order (93). Despite an a ffinity, I hesitate to translate th e novel this way to the level of denotation. Rather, in pragmaticsconstructivism, the aesthetic l ogic encountered in the novels catalyzes and enables new work, as I have posited. We must keep in mind that entropy, in this example, is an actual scientific conceptused as signifier-reference by Pynchon and as a heuristic by literary critics.13 More importantly, the 13 For example, Stephen P. Schuber surveys entropic readings in Rereading Pynchon: Negative Entropy and Entropy, Pynchon Notes 13 (Oct. 1983). Whether coincidence or confirmation bias, 1983 was A very good year for Pynchon criticism, with two excellent books and a strong book-length collection of orig inal essays on this writer who lends himself to academic study (313), Jerome Klinko witz asserts in American Literary Scholarship: An Annual / 1983 a text I selected from a discard pile given the coincidence of my birth year. Also citing Cooper's Signs and Symptoms and Approaches to Gravitys Rainbow Klinkowitz notably articulates a persistent scholarly view discussing Hites work: these novels experiment with ordering devices themselves; by contrasting 127

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legib le coincidence and the concurrent knowledg e overlooked reminds that there are other series at work: focalization via the detective-role characters ignores the parallel lines or contrapuntal relation of generative elements In my view, this accounts for the limited conception, as in the symmetr ical choices, and limited inno vation beyond observations of uncertainty. The second lesson connects with th e first this way, and it potentially remedies the type of critical treatment that further classifies or mystifies literature with the dispositif of reason. For example, like Hite, McHale regards both the ending of V. and the unresolved possibilities in Lot 49 as leaving epistemological sk epticism [] suspended, finally unresolved (22): he claims, Oed ipa does not break through the closed circle of her solipsism in the pages of this novel; nor does Pynchon break through here to a mode of fiction beyond modernism and its epistemological premises (24)only accomplishing an ontological orientation in Gravitys Rainbow (25). Describing the effect of V. how we are left not with an ontological projection but an epis temological puzzle (68), McHale notes diegetic solutions epistemological and ontological (24); these might pe rtain equally to the mythical land of Vheissu as to the conspiracy or dispossessed-Republic of Tristero. However, substituting a metaphysical grounding in space (world or being) for a problematic of the unknown remains inert toward new knowledge, as in the detective ro les: truth lost at sea or on Malta, and revelation deferred in the locked room. Stalled for now in the discovery process, the projects present progress in the detective model pauses in order to review the me thodology further, as well as several attempts in recent scholarship, before continuing toward inve ntion progressively in subsequent chapters. Deleuzean Method for Literary Pr agmatics (Scholarship Lessons) The goal of invention through encounters mo tivates the scholarly genre of methodology external authority with internal chaos, Pynchon generates a myth of origins for both freedom and language, which he then plays against reader expectations to show how meanings often create themselves (313, my emphasis). 128

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that I am developing; beyond identifying principl es for method, part of my study tests whether pragmatics reading is beneficial toward invention, and thus whether similarly recognizing percepts, affects, and sensations in literary compositions enables new thinking or expression. An additional rationale in describi ng how Deleuze works in produc tive fashion with literature concerns the issue of disciplinary conventions, particularly the use of Deleuzean philosophyas with theory generallyas a pers pective and vocabulary for analysis. Generally, the objective of constructivism clarifies and refocuses the activity of aesthetic encounters toward creative practice, rather than denotati ve or descriptive discourse. Mo re specifically, Deleuzes work provides example and poetics for artisanal practic es using the aesthetic paradigm, something remarkably few scholars have discerned or artic ulated thoroughly. Working in the Humanities, this discussion of applied theory directly involves and contributes to the discip linary endeavors of both rhetoric and literary st udies, particularly with these artistic and cultural mediators. In the prior two decades, th e proliferation of scholarship treating the philosophy of Deleuze in relation to cultural forms has demonstr ated that the methodologica l question is hardly resolved, univocal, or thoroughly engaged. Indeed, on the contrary, a variety of perspectives and approaches have emerged among Humanities and Cu ltural Studies scholars. One type of work attempts to treat cultural objects as Deleuze might with his implicit approach directly guiding the procedurereading literature for new results, as he does in Proust and Signs, Kafka A Thousand Plateaus, and Essays Critical and Clinical. A different point of departure follows Deleuzes axiom, Experiment, never interpret ( Dialogues 48): privileging novelty, variations and even divergences motivate a new approach, no t anchored to Deleuzes actual procedures but licensed to work like Deleuze more creatively. 129

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The continued scholarship connecting Dele uze and cultural-aesthetic works compels consideration of this focus, especially given th at scholars undertake a ce rtain problematic when working with concepts and perspectives pertaini ng to literature specifically. Although ambitious efforts to work with Deleuzean ideas, seve ral texts show the resu lts of overlooking or disregarding this perspective of the problema tic, such as works by Hughes, Zamberlin, Monaco, and Bourassa.14 Indeed, applying philosophical terms of deterritorialization or of percepts and affects when analyzing literature requires focusing upon the unique conditions or qualities addressed, I contend. In the case of aesthetic composition, the question of expression as sensation and its functions or effects inheres: as I have proposed, following scholars like OSullivan, the potential consequently emerges for our encountering asignifying forces and responding in the productive fashion of philosophical constructivism. The earlier discussion of Deleuzes literary mediators and his readi ngs calls attention to the problematic, as explained in th e prior chapter, that consists of his theorizations as well as the conditions of the dispositif upon philosophical discourse. More a pparent, the scho larly collection Deleuze and Literature (2000) names indirectly the new appa ratus of modern literature and contemporary philosophy, the episteme in which Deleuzes constructivist method proceeds from his encounters with sensations in aesthetic composition. To reitera te, I am drawing attention to epistemological-discursive conditions perh aps overlooked (given, unthought). One 14 John Hughes, Lines of Flight Reading Deleuze with Hardy, Gissing, Conrad, Woolf (Continuum, 1997); Mary F. Zamberlin, Rhizosphere: Gilles Deleuze and the Minor Americ an Writings of William James, W.E.B. Du Bois, Gertrude Stein, Jean Toomer, and William Faulkner (Routledge, 2006); Beatrice Monaco, Machinic Modernism: The Deleuzian Literary Machines of Woolf, Lawrence and Joyce (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Alan Bourassa, Deleuze and American Literature: Affect and Virtua lity in Faulkner, Wharton, Ellison, and McCarthy (Macmillan, 2009). These texts are repres entative examples of using Deleuze mostly as an interpretive vocabulary. 130

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additional benefit, albeit idealistic, is that focusing on m ethod eschews the question of orthodoxy in favor of identifying an apt a nd feasible practice derived from Deleuze. While the contributors to Deleuze and Literature (2000) generally reflect the positions staked as disciplinary treatment, five respectiv e views express the intent of my latter point, how to relate Deleuzean philosophy a nd literature toward the aim of inventive outcomes. Drawing upon the transcendental empiricism that Deleuze explicates in Difference & Repetition Andr Pierre Colombat reiterates th e practice of producing concepts through encount ers with signs and forces ( Deleuze and Literature 29). With apt parlance, Bruce Baugh articulates a revolutionary pragmatics (34), a promising way for experiment al work with literatur e in the fashion of Deleuze. A variation of this approach is Tom Conleys regarding litera ture as precisely the difference, the domain of comparative styles, that serves to philosophers as generative practice (263)aesthetic styl e both encountered and potentially emulated. T. Hugh Crawford similarly presents a perspective of Deleuze focu sed not on interpretation but on poetics, in that literature is a source for his philosophical c oncepts and mode of argumentation (56). The reciprocity in this dynamic is not hermeneutic but generative of novel types of thought, given how literature functions with and plugs into the larger desiring machine he calls philosophy (Crawford 56). Finally, another sense of the re lation between philosophy a nd literature can be understood according to John Marks as entretien, which literally mean s conversation or discussion but also indicates that which is between, an inte rrelational space (80). With a limited scope, Marks theoretical configuration provides a practical way for scholars to work toward philosophic al and literary insights, as de monstrated in recent work such as Monacos and Bourassas texts. However, scholarship like these entails considerable effort in the entretien toward descriptive discourseeffort that makes difficult other results, such as 131

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invention, as I am demonstrating first-hand. This prevalent critical-rhetorical strategy underscores the necessity of orienting deliberately and aptly ones point of departure: thus my reviewing and the utility of these other stances from Deleuze and Literature (2000), older stances perhaps neglected or forgottenones even prec eding this publication, such as Lamberts Deleuzian Critique of Pure Fiction, Marks Vitalism and Multiplicity and Colombats Deleuze and the Three Powers of Literature.15 Indeed, the perspectives of Deleuzean method articulated by Baugh and Conley appear markedly in the discursive procedure by Jon Clay in his recent book Sensation, Contemporary Poetry and Deleuze (2010). In the terms of Lecercle and Alliez discu ssed in chapter two, both Bourassa and Clay undertake the problem of Deleuzean aesthetic theory as an encounter with expressions of forces, particularly deterritorialization as literary function and effect; how ever, they vary in their work as entretien and as constructivist pragmatics. Among rele vant scholarship, Clays and Bourassas texts apply most directly to my study, whether in topical or methodological terms; when including these works in my discussion, I intend to illustrate the respective ways of working with literature in the style of Deleuze, in order to highlight the effectivenes s of discursive choices regarding scholars objects of study. Pragmatics Literary Percepts In the hopes of avoiding and clarifying the convolution of compound scholarly work, Deleuze and Literature as a problematic, the ne xt two sections presen t a pragmatics treatment of salient topics in the context of literary mediators toward constructivism: I explicate the philosophical term from Deleu ze, literary examples encounter ed, and the potential lesson for 15 These are important early contributions, all still compelli ng for scholars to consider, I contend: Gregg Lambert, The Deleuzian Critique of Pure Fiction ( SubStance 26.3 1997); John Marks, Vitalism and Multiplicity (Pluto Press 1998); Colombat, Deleuze and the Three Powers of Litera ture and Philosophy: To Demystify, to Experiment, to Create in A Deleuzian Century? Ed. Buchanan (Duke UP, 1999). 132

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constructivism consequently deri ved. Also, to be clear: fo r now, I separately discuss percepts affec ts and sensations ; henceforth beginning with the next ch apter, I more suitably treat fiction within the framework of the plane of composition and the aesthetic figures of literature, those elements that function as the relations of counterpoint and the compounds of sensations ( What is Philosophy? 188). To elucidate and make viable De leuzes instructive results is the aim of this systematic discussion, one more nuanced than the earlier sect ionswith delay of the projects progression also servi ng to demonstrate an important constituent aspect of the pragmatics-constructivist approach. Earlier in the chapter, I described Deleuz es pragmatics regarding the intensive use of language in literature, particular ly the post-signifying logic and expression by Borges, Melville, and Beckett. This relation between aesthetic co mposition and his work extends further to the notable case of literary percepts, intr oduced in the prior chapter. In both Essays Critical and Clinical and What is Philosophy? Deleuze remarks upon the sensible forces composed by Proust, Melville, and Woolf; this notion generall y evokes the definition of the percept itselfto make perceptible the imperceptible forces that populate the world ( WP 182). Beyond this general idea, the specific literary cases encountered serve to illu strate obliquely the particular or contingent role for Deleuzes invention. On the one hand, descriptions of Melvilles oceanic percepts and Woolfs urban percepts ( WP 169) are exceedingly specif ic; likewise, Prousts aesthetic composition of temporal forces is too significant to Deleuzes thought to be treated brieflyindeed, this encountered percept appe ars throughout the durati on of my project. The creation of landscape percepts by Tolstoy, Chekov, and Faulkner ( WP 169) is a promising example, and yet one that is not re spective to literature, applied analogously from Czanne. This is characteristic of Deleuzes di scourse, though, with visual description indicating 133

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how thought is im age within the aesthetic plane and new apparatus. For instance, subsequently referencing T.E. Lawrence, Proust, and Melville, Deleuze asserts that The finest writers have singular conditions of perception that allow them to draw on or shape aesthetic percepts like veritable visions, even if they re turn from them with red eyes ( ECC 116). In this way, Deleuzes work instructs how to thi nk this way, to consider by adjusting our focus upon aesthetic concepts. This is not to insist an understanding of percepts as being visual, the narrow or literal extension of perception however: while these examples are ma rkedly optical (ocular) percepts telescopic or microscopic ( WP 171)even with shifting or confla ted sensibilia, the perceptual qualities accentuate the ae sthetic mode of thought. Continuing with the earlier-cited essay on Melville, Deleuze extols the affirmation of a world in process ( ECC 86) evident in American literature with its fragmentary features; he ex plains, This requires a new perspective, an archipelago-perspectivism that conjugates the panoramic shot & the tracking shot ( ECC 87). Although difficulty to recognize this case as a particular percept Deleuze here provides a distinct principle of his aesthetic logic, encounte red in literature. The cinematic description is an interface for thought, akin to the ones offere d by architecture, painting, and music: in What is Philosophy?, the auditory percepts of counterpoint, polyphony, and refrain feature prominently in the description of deterritorialization (187-8), fashioning this concept distinctly within the aesthetic paradigm. Generally discussing literatu re, Deleuze and Guattari remark, What matters is not, as in bad novels, the opini ons held by characters in accordance with their social type and characteristics but rather the relations of counterpoint into wh ich they enter ( WP 188). In this case, distinct from the compounds of sensations com posed, counterpoint in literary works is a percept that Deleuze and Guattari recognize through pragmatics. In their discussing the deframing operation of Art, deterritorialization that occurs within the aesthetic 134

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apparatus, they discern in Dostoyevsky the coexistence of contra puntal, polyphonic, and plurivocal com pounds with an architectonic or symphonic plane of composition ( WP 188, my emphasis). This description emphasizes precise ly how novelistsDostoyevsky, Dos Passos, and Proust notably for Deleuze and Guattarirender se nsible the imperceptible forces as percepts, legible in literature and thus enabling inte lligibility. Moreover, beyond stating any denotation or signification, such descriptions ex press the aesthetic mode and its deframing vector for thought. For example, Deleuze and Guattari posit, Dos Passos achieves an extraordinary art of counterpoint in the compounds he forms with char acters, current events, biographies, and camera eyes, at the same time as a plane of compos ition is expanded to infinity so as to sweep everything up into Life, into Death, the town cosmos ( WP 188). Keeping in mind in the contingent qu ality of chance encounters, methodological lessons can be extrapolated concerning these percepts of archipelago-perspectivism and counterpoint with aesthetic composition enabling and mediating philosophical concepts. First, as evident in the earlier discussions, percepts ch ange the conditions for possible perspectives: no longer is thought confined to either subjectivism or objectivism, fundament allythus Deleuzes new theorizations about Leibniz, Kant, and Barkeley through Borges Beckett, and other writers. Like literary characters who have pa ssed into the landscape of sensation ( WP 169), concepts too can be infused with dynamic forces and e ffects, as with the rhythm and melody of counterpoint. The aesthetic mode of thinking ap pears patently in the pragmatics readings of Dostoyevsky and Dos Passos; moreover, this encounter finds in literary composition the means of duration how percepts wrested from particular perceptions are preserved in artistic material. By understanding the percept as aesthet ic thought generally, with particular artistic compositions, the categories of viewpoint-landsca pes and characters appear as means of making 135

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sensible the forces observed. This case of language offers prom ising means for scholarly constructivism, using percepts to create and mediate the heteroge neous components of a concept; in this way, thought itself is ch aracterized in its non-totalizing consistency across fragmentsa crucial principle developed henceforth in my study of Deleuzes pragmatics-constructivism. A second question for method concerning archipelago-perspectivism and counterpoint emerges concerning the product of artisana l practice contingent upon distinctly literary expression of sensible-intelligible forces One account for Deleuzes thought is the free indirect style that he encounters in liter ature, with instances appe aring throughout his oeuvre. In Vitalism and Multiplicity John Marks proposes, Deleuzes deconstr uctive method is best considered as a project of free indirect discours e. Deleuze seeks to work with ot her thinkers and artists so that his own voice and the voice of the author become indistinct. In this way, he institutes a zone of indiscernibility between himself and the auth ors with whom he works (25). Foregoing a comprehensive review of Deleuzes mediators in this regard, for the sake of focusing upon method, the topic of free indirect style in the context of pragmatics directly reflects aesthetic thinking, a literary mode fashioned through non-si gnifying language use and applied in concept creation and description. The per cept, perception without subjective perceiver, of counterpoint in Deleuzes reading of Dostoyevsky and Dos Passos might be considered this way, akin to this type of discourse, eviden t in the phrase and notion symphonic plane of composition The musical and cinematic quality of their work is probably understood more clearly through the synonymous term melodic landscape ( WP 176), which evokes the non-fixed perspectivism of free indirect style in literature. This type of discourse show s potential for artisanal practice in creative scholarship: evident in both Deleuzes literary mediators and his philosophical concepts, free indirect style is 136

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a techn ique native to the aesthetic paradigm, co extensive with modern literary theory and scholarship on Modernist literature.16 However promising, we must caution not to skew the conversation, Marks term entretien, between literature and ph ilosophy toward hermeneutic ends one way or another. For instance, as Marks later asserts: Deleuze an d Guattari might have extended Bakhtins analysis to a contemporar y postmodern novel such as Don DeLillos Libra (1998). DeLillo explores the polyphonic aspects of narration, and also the free indirect discourse of conspiracy, information and ideology ( Vitalism and Multiplicity 106). Learning from the cases of Deleuzes readings, noted prior, and applying the insights of pragmatics would mean inventing (or at leas t innovating) ideas in scholarly discourse using the free indirect style encountered in DeLillos novel by Marks, pe rcepts that enable aesthetic thought, like archipelago-perspectivism and counterpoint In other words, as I have established, literary discourseespecially countersignifiying or postsignifying regimes of languagecan be the means (as catalyst and mediator) for invention in a new paradigm, rather th an strictly the object of analysis within a Deleuzean reading, interpreting the novel using his terms toward an end goal of description or signification. A final, composite point about literary percepts, important to remember, is that the language that preserves percepti ons and renders forces sensible also expresses the forces observed or experienced, however subject-less the position in the aesthetic composition. An instance of a literally post-signifying use of language would be the preservationthe duration of percepts, affects, and sensations in the aesthetic monu ment beyond strictly 16 In Narrative fiction: Contemporary Poetics (Routledge, 2002), the update to her 1983 study, Shlomith RimmonKenan explains the treatment of free indirect discourse in scholarship: Although the study of this phenomenon received a special impetus in the last ten years, there are earlier descriptions which s hould be mentioned. [] In France it was called style indirect libre and studied mainly by Bally (1912) and Lips (1926). Ullman (1957) was the first to introduce the term free indirect style into English criticism. [] (163-4). 137

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communicating (whether locutionary or narrative) or representing (m imetically) the perceptions or affections undergone directly or indirectly. In Deleuzes term s, the melodic landscape in the absence of man ( WP 169) clarifies this proces s: percepts and affects endure within aesthetic composition by the work of artis ts through their material and technique, whether from their encounters or their creative fabulation ( WP 169). Although free indirect style functions this way, akin to archipelago-perspectivism and counterpoint the psychology of a work must be revised, as the latter terms remind, from the literate -rational paradigm to the aesthetic paradigm. The novelist goes beyond the perceptual states a nd affective transitions of the lived, Deleuze and Guattari assert (WP 171); this occurs precisely through the composition, preservation, and expression of the aesthetic monu ment, literature, by authors conveying through post-signifying or intensive language the percepts th at separate from cognitive perception.17 At the risk of understating this point by glossing the topic, the lesson for artisana l practice is to think and work in the aesthetic mode using techniques cinematic or musical, as Deleuze has. Pragmatics Literary Affects Rich concepts with which to think, such as the melodic landscape indeed reflect his encounters and constructivism with literary percepts and unique modes of discourse; however, we must be careful not to overestimate a non-subject prospecta s when Marks writes, Literature is characterised by the force of the impersonal, freeing us from the first and second person ( Vitalism 125). I have emphasized thus far that writers render sensible, and potentially intelligible, the forces that they perceive and experience, by their aesthetic means like 17In this section I reference extensively, Deleuze and Guattari elaborate this conception of the aesthetic monument that persists and mediates the percepts and affects beyond single subjectivity, (although not impersonal meaning non-personal). For instance, with parlance and points that likely give rise to much misinterpretation they posit that phenomenology must become the phenomenology of art b ecause the immanence of the lived to a transcendent subject must be expressed in transcendent functions that not only determine experience in general but traverse the lived itself here and now, and are embodied in it by constituting lived sensations (178, my emphases). 138

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perspec tive and characters. While the latter part of Marks statement pe rtains to work with percepts through pragmatics and en counters, the focus and privil eging of the force of the impersonal relates more to Deleu ze and Guattaris theorization of affects a particularly difficult conception or framework for scholars, as indicated in much scholarship on literature, film, and cultural studies. Toward developing this met hodology (study of method) and identifying workable principles, I will review and clarify the topic of literary affects, in order to conclude with lessons for artisan al practice with literary mediators. In the context of aesthetic composition, rather than a socio-biological perspective, a key designation by Deleuze and Guattari principally frames our unders tanding: in re lation to the percepts or visions they give us, artists are presenters of affects, the inventors and creators of affects. They not only create them in their work, th ey give them to us and make us become with them, they draw us into the compound ( WP 175, my emphasis). Like with percepts, writers compose the material that preserves, with duratio n, the relational sensatio ns observed or invented through aesthetic figures, such as characters. In th e particular case of a ffects, instances of going beyond affections consist not [in] the passage from one lived state to another but [in] mans nonhuman becoming ( WP 173); along with the term becoming, th is language likely gives rise to scholars misunderstanding or misuse, which is potentially compounded by the discussion of literary characters in this context.18 18 Without digressing to review thoroughly the trend (or tr ace the lineage) in scholarship, a cautionary point in this regard appears in the overwhelming prevalen ce of references that cite passages in A Thousand Plateaus, particularly chapter 10 730: Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible and use the terms becoming-woman and becoming-animal far out of proportion or even relation to their original context. As in numerous journal articles, unceasingly, these terms are used narrowly for literary analyses, as seen in texts as Bourassas e.g. becoming-wolf in Cormac McCarthy. Part of my goal in this discussion is remedying the limited use of Deleuzean vocabulary and method toward productive ends, upon our encountering affects in literature and cultural works generally. To this end, and demonstrating methodological coherence, I examine points specifically concerning art in What is Philosophy?, rather than evoking and resorting to the universal scope of A Thousand Plateaus in which aesthetic examples illustrate the ontological theses by Deleuze and Guattari. 139

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First, a becoming names a zone of indetermination or indiscernibility between tw o beings: neither imitation nor identification, becoming is an extreme contiguity within a coupling of two sensations without resemblance, or, on contrary, in the distance of a light that captures bo th of them in a single reflection ( WP 173, my emphasis). Although occurring in the natural wo rld, this dynamic can be created by artists with in the virtual ontology (real without being actu al) of aesthetic composition; that we can encounter in literature such affects previ ously unknown or unrecognized ma kes possible new effects and responses, whether epistemological at minimum or c onstructivist in best ca ses. I say best cases on the empirical premise of Deleuze and Guattaris vi ew, as when they articulate that The artist is always adding new varieties to the world; more over, Beings of sensation are varieties, just as the concepts beings are variations, a nd the functions beings are variables ( WP 175). Understanding the notions of affect and becoming in this sense of varieties, we can better recognize artists as inventors and creators in their composing aesthetic expressions of sensation. In pragmatics, literary techniques can be discerned this way, initially; for example, Deleuze and Guattari extol Kleist [as] no doubt th e author who most wrote with affects, using them like stones or weapons, seizing them in becomings of sudden petr ification or infinite acceleration (WP 169). Like their references to Melville and Andr Dhotel one way Kleist composes in this fashion is through his use of characters. As nothing in Deleuze and Guattaris discussion suggests that all aut hors characters convey affect sbecomings, indiscernibility, sensationbeyond psycho-social affections, we might regard a special case of intensive use, in the earlier parlance, in which certain characters and dynamics exceed the signification of moralpsychological opinions or consciousness ( WP 188). 140

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Indeed, they posit, A great novelist is above all an ar tist who invents unknown or unrecognized affects and brings them to lig ht as the becoming of his characters ( WP 174)a view enabled by their pragmatics of literature, unlike critics attempting what psychoanalysis does, analyzing (or diagnosing) ch aracters. Just as this criteri on conveys the aesthetic principle of going beyond affections to preserve affects, so too does such composition add ontic (if virtual) varieties of sensation inventeda s in works by Chrtien de Troyes, Mme. de Lafayette, Zola, Proust, Beckett, and Faulkner (174-5). More help ful are illustrative inst ances, like Prousts descriptions of jealousy: Whe n Emily Bronte traces the bond be tween Heathcliff and Catherine, she invents a violent affect like a kinship between two wolv es, which above all should not be mistaken for love (175, my emphasis). This co mprehension of affect within the context aesthetic composition, particularly the pragmatics of characters as intensive figures, resolves a question and misapplication of disciplinary efforts. Returning to the problematic Deleuze and literature earlier e voked and how best to work, the implications comp el reconsideration of the entretien approach that John Marks describes: discovering impersonal forces in novels, positioned in-between both, A literary reading of this sort should also aim to provide new ways of activating and evaluating concepts used by Deleuze, to put these conc epts into a new kind of motion ( Deleuze and Literature 81). Although promising in an ideal sense, this appr oach is complicated in practice in terms of producing innovative scholarshi p (concept variation) using rather than about literature (sensation varieties)especia lly regarding the Deleuzean treatment of aesthetic affect. To this end, descriptive sc holarship analyzing cultural works using the philosophical vocabulary or concepts of Deleu ze and Guattari might entail limited potential for or practice of invention. A recent illustration of this entretien effortand an instructiv e example regarding my 141

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work with litera tureis Deleuze and American Literature (2009), in which Alan Bourassa examines the philosophical concepts of the human and the nonhuman vis--vis an extended theorization of aesthetic character. Through analyses of ten American novels and their defining features of the novelistic character (24), B ourassa proposes a new taxonomy that transitions from six qualities of the human manifest in fictionemotion, inte riority, individuality, experience, potential, and meaning (23)t oward an understanding of the nonhuman as a problem characterized by Deleuzean concepts: Aff ect, the Event, Force, Singularity, the Outside, and the Virtual (24-38).19 A key lesson for method in the context of my present discussion appears in Bourassas prevalent attention to affect in novels. Speci fically, he analyzes characters in taxonomical fashion: Lily Bart, in Edith Whartons The House of Mirth exhibits active and passive types (48); the Becoming-Temporal of Quentin in Faulkners Absalom, Absalom! (166), and Billy Parham as Becoming-Wolf in Cormac McCarthys The Crossing (110); Ralph Ellisons narrator-character in Invisible Man with the novels conjuncti on of history-affect-race and three affective movements (67-8). This work perhaps indicates Bourassas beginning with a perspective of pragmatics, as when he notes, It would be the work of a book-length study to map out all of the affective movements of Invisible Man so I will restrict myself to three: what I will call the affective movement of sensation and energy, the history of invisibility, and the transformation of class to mass (68, my emphasis). Such laborious effort analyzing characters this way shows not only the limitation of descript ive discourse, as I ment ioned earlier, regarding innovation but also the hazard of restric ting pragmatics to (just another) typology. 19 Deleuze scholars will immediately recognize that these con cepts are not contingent to literature or native to the aesthetic plane of composition, thus my describing this as demonstrating Marks entretien Overall, Bourassa attempts to use these terms as the means for new insights about both literature and the nonhuman specifically by linking to manifestations in the novels, mos tly in the form of characters as representations. 142

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Instead, the method I advocate begins by r ecognizing the generative or transformative components encountered, like affects for Boura ssa, and then creating new ideas by means of literary elementsmost especially those in counterand post-signifying regimes. In the model of Deleuze and Guattari, intensive language and aesthe tic affects composed are the latter type, as OSullivan reminds: Affects then are not to do w ith signification or meaning as such. Indeed, they occur on a different, asignifying register ( Art Encounters 43).20 Literary scholarship performing applied theory, such as Bourassaswho seeks to produce a new understanding, if not a new concept, of the nonhumaninvolves th e vital importance of method, the need to proceed deliberately and suitably if ones goa l is constructivist rath er than hermeneutic. This understanding of affects pertaining to ch aracters is crucial for proceeding through pragmatics, distinguishing signifying and post-signifying elements of literature, toward constructivism from encounters. In other words, the approach refrains from encoding these aesthetic figures of sensation in to the signifying regime, as t hough mimetic; likewis e, from using Deleuzean vocabulary for analyses of characters as psycho-social persons in strictly descriptive (or worse, clinical diagnostic) discourse. Works composed through intensive language rather than the style in bad novels, as referenced ear lierthus fashion characte rs as aesthetic figures of sensation: rather than psyc hology or opinions of the social fi gures composed, new varieties of percepts, such as counterpoint, and of affects, as in dynamics of intensity (becomings, indiscernibility). 20 On the one hand, OSullivan differentiates art from lan guage on the basis of the asignifying register, such as affectsa questionable distinction to make rigidly, further complicated by stating From a deconstructive perspective it might be argued that affects are only mean ingful within language (43). Yet, as I am advocating throughout, this is reconciled by a qualitative view of intensive use in aesthetic composition versus communication. Ultimately OSullivan demonstrates the a lternative-seeking position fundamentally compelled by Deleuze and Guattari, rather than zealously a ligning with binary pos itions, by qualifying aesthetic affects; he also remarks that we have an affective relationship with writing as Deleuze often reminds us (43). 143

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It is in this way that, from one writer to another, great creativ e affects can link up or diverge, within compounds of sens ations that transform themselves, vibrate, couple, or split apart Deleuze and Guattari assert; furthermore, it is these beings of sensation that account for the artists relationship with a public, for the rela tion between different works by the same artist, or even for a possible affinity between artist s (175, my emphasis). Besides clarifying the uncertain or equivocal approach es of literary scholarship, th is compound quote provides two lessons for a method of pragmatics and construc tivism. First, we encounter and recognize, without capturing (by encoding), the post-signifying affectsin tense instances of vibrating, coupling, splitting, experiencing jealousy or viol ence or otherwisecreated and expressed by writers through characters; consequently, we might innovate thought in the aesthetic paradigm and invent new concepts through these unknown or unrecognized forces.21 Encountering Sensation and Deframing Style Whether individually or with Guattari, De leuze works withrather than works on aesthetic compositions and literary mediators that consist of and express sensations. Whether the forces composed in percepts and affects can be recognized in any art work, as the myriad examples might suggest, or only in certain forms is less a concern for method; admittedly, one might equally argue that Deleuze perceives for ces in his idiosyncrati c way across objects of study, as well that he selectively discusses works of personal import. Rather than contest these matters, inconsequential except for debates of orthodoxy, a position that follows Deleuze feasibly in practice regards pragmatics as the pe rspective for discerning types of regimes with respective forces and selects for literary mediat ors those works that aff ect thoughtcatalysts and 21 Important to note here is a key distinc tion by Deleuze and Guattari: characters are aesthetic figures which express sensations and sensory becoming ( plane of composition ), Art); these are not the conceptual becoming expressed by conceptual personae in concepts (Philosophy). They write, Conceptual becoming is heterogeneity grasped in an absolute form; sensory becoming is otherness caught in a matter of expression (177)an important disctinction relevant to the prospects for artisanal practice in knowledge discourses (scholarship or theory, if not philosophy). 144

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m eans for invention from encounters, rather than objects selected for analysis. Working this way undertakes the revolutionary pragmatics that Bruce Baugh describes, regarding Deleuzes procedure: An experimental a pproach is thus innovative, re sults-oriented (pragmatic) and experiential (empirical), [] new in ways that could not have been pred icted or determined in advance [] in order to discover what effects can be produced ( Deleuze and Literature 35-6, original emphasis). In light of the challenge working with asignifying expression encountered, such as percepts and affects as discussed, I advocate Baughs account because it encompasses in concert the positions articulated by Colombat Conley, and Crawford; it accentuates the constructivist orientati on and goal; and, not insign ificantly, it includes the experiential dimension of scholarship, which indisputably charac terizes Deleuzes thought and discourse. Before concluding this chapter, it is worth reviewing an example that demonstrates the latter two motivating reasons and the successf ul practice of the en counter-constructivist approach, understood and enacted in Baughs terms. In Sensation, Contemporary Poetry and Deleuze: Transformative Intensities (2010), Jon Clay stages a p rocedure toward theorizing aesthetic deterritorialization by working with innovative cont emporary poetry. Evident in the title, the chapter Deleuzean Aest hetics: Reading Innovative Poetries functions as the keystone component to Clays success, following from the fundamentally crucial an d informed premise of poetry as non-represenational, as ontic and encountered in its own right (3 7-8). This is how Clay effectively formulates an inspired theory of encountering poems and their deterritorializing functions or effects, insofar as These forces and intensities cannot be adequately grasped by readings that assume that an innovative poem is simply a representati onal signifying regime regarded instead as sensation (49-50). 145

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The result is the transformative change in the reader evident in Clay himself, an entailment following from the procedure set into motion at the outset: Readi ng this poetry is not just an experience but an encounter Not only the first time but every time, which is part of its value: while the initial force of the poetry might diminish with increasing familiarity, the material impact, the sensations, will remain ( 2, original emphasis). Although poetry, with its similarity to music as asigni fying expression, raises the quest ion of object encountered, nothing here precludes comparable work with prose fiction, encountering forces composed in percepts of time and space or affects of intense relations between characters. On the last point, Clays detailing the transformative effects of poetry addresses three levels of concerns, ranging from philosophical implications of encounters with sensation and disciplinary treatment of the formal aesthetics, to the socio-political sali ence of transformation as function and effect. The motivated study persists throughout regarding enc ounters with aesthetic sensation, even when shifting contexts. In othe r words, Clay maintains the method modeled on Deleuze and explicitly established, with variations as additional qualities or valences of the key conceptfor example, understanding Virtual and Actual categories through Performance Theory (52, 72) and likewise through the intensive affects and percepts of becoming (145-7). This deliberate consistency throughout various contexts and dual focus is worth citing at length: Each poem is a unique object, one that is active and even, given that an actualized poem is always in conjunction with a living reader, alive: this latter is true of all poetry, but innovative poetry, as always-re newed experimentation, is therefore always-renewed experimentation with life and with potentialities for living []. This is why every innovative poem, whatever the political desires apparent in its composition, is in some sense revolutionary and will, when the experiments are successful, leave a residue of ch ange in the reader. (Clay 183) The key point to emphasize for future practice is th at certain literature, as sensation varieties, poses opportunities to encounter transformative intensities toward new effects and outcomes. 146

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For exam ple, noted in the chap ter Innovative Poetry as Social Thought, the works of Denise Riley and J.H. Prynne, like those by Paul Cela n, act upon the material conditions of readers through the singularities and trans formational effects of poetry (Clay 87). More immediate than the external social milieu, aesthetic expressi on functions to deterritorialize readers directly in our encounters (116), as Clay posits about on subjectivity regardi ng three poets works. Mostly working to theorize the actual func tions of poetry, Clay expounds specifically the resonance and disruption effects of sensation as deterritoriali zation (171), demonstrating Baughs experimental pragmatics through his reading tw o poems about the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, for example. Finally, connecting the aesthetic and social persp ectives produces the compelling result of Chapter 6, The Significance of Sens ation: The Politics of Contemporary Innovative Poetry; this undertakes the radical ambiti ons advocated by Deleuze and Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus (162) regarding the intensive powers of artthe theoretical recourse offered by What is Philosophy? as I have presented throughout my st udy. Moreover, although only proposing the transformative potential of poetry, Clay shows th e productive effect of undergoing first-hand the encounters with asignifying expression and the consequent change in the dispostif for thought and discourse, much like OSullivan does in Art Encounters Deleuze and Guattari: Thought beyond Representation In terms of scholarship, besides epistemological innovation, I highlight these works for their showing the valuable effect of pragmatics as a re ading strategyone that can further emulate Deleuze by working with aesthetically-composed forces and multiple semiotic regimes toward invention. Toward a concept of a sensation: This detailed review of Deleuzes work with literature and various approaches for emulating his model has sought to identify and make clear the key principles for a method of pragmatics-constructivism: how best to work from our encounters 147

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with sensations express ed through aesthetic composition in various forms, including the challenge of post-signifying uses of language. I have emphasized Deleuze and Guattaris pragmatics as a feasible and suitable perspective for discerning aesthetic figures as forces made sensible by artists, such as in percepts and a ffects; the prospect for new thought emerges in the legible and intelligible nature of the encountered forces, ones perhaps previously unthought or unrecognized. The value of this view to a cons tructivist project is our suitably treating the respective regimes and intensive features of literature, rather than translating or transferring (encoding) into the signifying regime in anal ytic discourse, which would privilege meaning over the forces of asignifying expression. This issu e persists as a disciplinary difficulty, more so than a true philosophical problematic, as evid ent by the several examples noted; my work attempts to clarify and provide a workable strategy for artisanal practice with literature, emulating the method demonstrated by Deleuze in my pragmatics readings of Pynchons novels. Specifically, this chapter further develops an important aspect and identifies the stakes of the constructivist project working with any art fo rms, particularly the unique challenge posed by literature and the various uses of language. The focus on pragma tics and on literary mediators assists toward the aim of creating new concep tsa concept of sensa tion, the problem of interference between Philosophy and Artas the means to innovate thought and expression, within the seeming impossibility of the rational dispositif Henceforth, I develop the pragmaticsconstructivist method, an alternative to the discovery model for knowledge, primarily through conceptual and formal innovation and partly by examining Deleuzes inventive style in two important works. The goal remains a methodol ogy discerned from his Deleuze for poetics of artisanal praxis which can be applied in scholarship as rhetoric and composing practices. Specifically working with post-signi fying aspects and intensive featur es of literature, this effort 148

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149 entails a diagrammatism of the multiple regimes encountered, in order to innovate in scholarly discourse through the transformativ e and generative elements in literature. Continuing with Deleuzes theorizations and uses stylistically of intensive literary writing, I next establish in practice an idea of the novelistic assemblage as well as the inventive results of using the method and this concept in my encounters with multiple authors.

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CHAP TER 4 DIAGRAMMING A NOVELISTIC ASSEMBLAGE It is at about this point in the play [] that things really get peculiar, and a gentle chill, an ambiguity, begins to creep in among the words. Heretofore the naming of names has gone on either liter ally or as metaphor. But now, [] a new mode of expression takes over. It can onl y be called a kind of ritual reluctance. Certain things, it is made clear, will not be spoken aloud; certain events will not be shown onstage; though it is difficult to imagine, given the excesses of the preceding acts, what these things could possibly be. Thomas Pynchon, The Crying of Lot 49 (55) Thus far I have established the rationale fo r and productive role of literary mediators within constructivism, regarding the problem of interference: employing the aesthetic paradigm in order to create a ( noumenal ) concept of ( sensible ) sensationthrough the method I am calling artisanal practice for scholarshipincreases the cond itions for possibility within the dispositif the limits upon knowledge and expression. Fo llowing the exemplar of Deleuzes using literary mediators in his philosophical innovati on, the challenges and the broader stakes addressed by my project emerge in my a ttempting to emulate the method advocated in productive literary encounters: wh ether scholarship remains analyt ical, with the inherent risk of capturing the literary works ( aesthetic paradigm ) into the signifying regime of denotative or referential discourse; or imposes interpretation and by extension, ideological or other transcendental claims, worse insofar as limiting c onditions of possibility would be a negative act by the dispositif. The alternative is what I advocate and test, both generally and particularly here, guided by Deleuzes patent invention throug hout his oeuvre (and with Guattari). To this end, furthermore, new elements and examples serve to expand and clarify the approach previously described, progressing from recognizing generative and transformative elements in pragmatics reading to Deleuze and Guattaris diagrammatic perspective toward invention. The rationale for this premise is that such an understanding might best enable our treating a mixed ecology of semiotic regimesranging from signifiying to asignifying elementsin 150

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literature, balancing h ermeneutic (interpretive) and heuretic (inventive) maneuvers and working toward the latter ends. This goal remain s attendant to the proble matic introduced in the first chapter, a problematic that calls for concepts adequate to th e sensations encountered in art and that consists of thought and expression ch aracterized by a paradigm of knowledge different from that of analytic reason a nd mimesis. I continue exploring henceforth the prospect and qualities of a scholarly rhetoric that supports and resounds in its discourse the unique thought and expression of the aesthetic paradigm, as enc ountered in the particular operations of literary writing and use of language. As with the prior chap ter, but to limited extent, the method attempted and its consequences reported subseq uently is provided by the productive work by Deleuze with literature, includ ing specific concepts that help go beyond hermeneutic discourse terms that moreover reflect the strong link between concept, method, and expression, which assists the greater aims of outlining a rhetoric of innovative philosography. I thus begin with a final revi ew of his artisanal praxis, in three specific and helpful cases, before presenting my encounter pragmatics an d then my continued attempts at the method being developed: finding and us ing generative elements for invention (constructivism) in novels by Kurt Vonnegut, Kathy Acker, Leslie Silko, and Jonathan Safran Foerbeginning in the second section, continuing my diagrammatic work with Pynchons novels. Presenting my proposed artisanal praxis and the encounter-invention method for creating an adequate concept of sensation, I also include sc holarly conventions of working on (and with) narrative fiction and provide an heuretic alte rnative to the disciplinary dispositif of hermeneutics. As the assemblage model for thought and expression provi des this recourse, I discuss throughout this chapter the method and conceptual-discursive style of Deleuze and Guattari, which is evident early in Deleuzes career in The Logic of Sense 151

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Study: Invention in Practice Before examining the specific exemplars that I will attempt to emulate in practice subsequently, I must first clarify the method I ha ve thus far described as the new pragmatics from Deleuze and Guattari. I ended the prior chapter noting the challenge for treating the multiple semiotic regimes in literature, including any non-signi fying uses of language, in productive ways; the goal and ope rating principle remains finding the generative and transformative elements in literary texts encountered and maintaining their properties of the aesthetic paradigm in knowledge discourserat her than capturing and transferring into the rational dispositif Discussing the various uses of Ameri can language today, Deleuze directly explains in Dialogues the method of study that I describe and apply: To take account of these alternatives, we must introduce a third component which is no longer simply generative or transformational, but diagrammatic or pragmatic. We must discover in every regime and every assemblage the specific value of the existing li nes of flight [. .](118, original emphasis). Not only does this third conception descri be his work with literary language in The Logic of Sense and in Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature ; Deleuze also provides practical tasks for innovating as he has and for producing concepts in the aesthetic paradigm. Notably, these instructions appear in a chapter ( Dead Psychoanalysis: Analyze) of Dialogues that addresses how we might escape in thought a nd produce knowledge discourse al ternative to linguistics and hermeneuticsthus, contextually apt and salient for my purposes.1 The first task is to study 1 A clinic without psychoanalysis or interpretation, a criticism without linguistics or significance, Deleuze states ( Dialogues 120). Because this is a paramount issue of Kafka I discuss it further in the later section. Worth noting to this end, though, is Deleuzes reflexive methodological asid e: this is what I wanted to do when I worked on some writers, Sacher-Masoch, Proust or Lewis Carroll. What interested me [. .] was not the psychoanalysis, or the psychiatry, or the linguistics, but the regimes of signs of a given author. Th is only became clear to us when Flix arrived, and we did a book on Kafka (119). Although self-contradictory regarding the author as individual subject, as opposed to the proper name as one or several assemblages (120), Deleuze articulates an understated principle for artisanal praxis : Give back to an author of little of the joy, th e energy, the life of love and politics that he knew how to give and invent (119) i.e. aesthetic paradigm, rather than dispositif of tyrannical Reason. 152

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the sem iotic regimes of an author, finding the generative component as well as what the flux of writing is connected with (121). The latter point is particularly important in understanding writing as an assemblage rather than as the linguistic vehi cle of an individu al subject of enunciation (120); throughout th is discussion Deleuze notes as examples the writing of Charlotte Bront, Virginia Woolf, Sach er-Masoch, Kafka, and Proust (120-22). The second task, in my understanding, obser ves how authors compose assemblages with a multitude of regimes of signs, using the transformational component, as exemplified for Deleuze by Proust: he writes, each time new re gimes are produced, where what was expression in the earlier ones becomes content in relation to forms of expression; a new usage of the language-system excavates a new language-system in language (122). This quality appears both as the intensive feature discussed in the prior chapter as the foreign language within the language or deterritorialization ; moreover, as alternative to lingui stic or mimetic orders, writing that consists of fluxes of e xpression as assemblage (121).2 Indeed, crucial for method, in this diagrammatic or pragmatic treatment of literature Deleuze asserts that there is no longer any fixed distinction between c ontent and expression (122). Beyond the modal logic of Borges, diagr ammatism would seem more to concern intensive writing uses such as in Melvilles formula and Becketts image-language, to reconsider the examples described in the pr ior chapter. The description in Dialogues, highly valuable for its self-reflexive perspectiv e, further elucidates the method that I am discerning, by which Deleuze 2 For the sake of a clear methodological description, I have in this instance separated two interconnected points by Deleuze and elided the second: it is the regime of sign s itself that will determine a particular assemblage of enunciation in the fluxes of expression and a particular assemblage of desire in the fluxes of content (121, my emphasis). The latter point refers to the author as assemb lage-function, not subject of enunciation, in Deleuzes thought; this is actually the first distinction Deleuze makes in this section for criticism, which would simply be a matter of knowing three things (120). I have glossed this matter in order to focus more productively for outlining diagrammatism of mixed semiotics here, with the rationale that the alternative of assemblage to subjectivity relates more to the radical ontology and epistemology described in Anti-Oedipus Kafka, and A Thousand Plateaus 153

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invents aesthetic concepts in sev eral of his works: Virgi nia Woolfs Wave, Lovecrafts Hypersphere, Prousts Spider Web, Kleists Pr ogramme, Kafkas K-function, the Rhizosphere (122), to which I would add Me lvilles Bartleby-formula and Carrolls paradox-nonsense. The third task, beyond recognizing the generative and transformative el ements encountered, seemingly consists of ones thinking of the work encounter ed as assemblageforming an assemblage with the literary work encountered, the dynamic fundamentally reconfigured, but even more simply in ones regarding the multip le semiotic regimes and their functions. I will identify and explain how this orientation appear s to have proven highly productive for Deleuze, thus presenting an inventive alternative to he rmeneutic discourse indifferent to encounters. Finally, to clarify, I have provi sionally stated seemingly cons ists of in this description because the lesson discerned is conveyed oblique ly by Deleuze, not only in his demonstrations but even in this passage. Discussing assemblage writing by authorsindeed quoting Woolf, and using her parlance of saturate each atom (122) and not necessarily scholars, Deleuze writes that Diagrammatism consists in pushing a langu age to the plane where immanent variation no longer depends on a structure or development, but on the combination of mutating fluxes, on their productions of speed, on their combinations of particles [. .] (119). Regardless, significant for my purposes is that Deleuze throughout is thinking in the aesthetic paradigm and explaining through Woolf, Kafka, Kleist, and Nathalie Sarraute : this is indeed an aesthetic mode, alternative to analysis specific, psychoanalysis or linguistics, and generally hermeneutic. The point to emphasize for method is the inventive pros pect in our discovering in assemblages with multiple semiotic regimes the specific value of the existing lines of flight (118, my emphasis). Generative, transformative, and diagrammatic elements are thus all employed in practice. 154

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Artisanal P raxis Observed 1: The Logic of Sense I have several times thus far noted Deleuze s use of Lewis Carrols literary work toward inventive ends in The Logic of Sense (1969); and although accurate, any such statement about this work is fractional, overly-limited, perh aps astray, and surely reductive. Along with Difference and Repetition Deleuze presents his radical me taphysics with complexity of both thought and compositionphilosophical style, as I have suggested. With the earlier established principle of emulating method without necessarily adopting wholesale a philosophers ontology, we can gain purchase on this text and extract pr inciples for poetics later applied; fundamentally, this reasoning accounts for my using The Logic of Sense selectively as exemplar of artisanal praxis invention through the aesthet ic paradigm. One of few to note the constructivist double heading of these two works by Deleuze, Alliez observes the dazzling play of conceptual variation [. .] taken up again and thought through as such: Spinoza filtered through Cervantes, Borges through Bergson; Nietzsche, unfastened from Heidegger, meets Lewis Carroll before being delivered over to the becomings-ani mal of his poietic metamorphoses ( Signature 5). This broad but valuable summary indicates partly my approach herein: verily, the writing of Modernist authors provide Deleu ze the alternative to the signif ying regimes and epistemological constraints of Platonism, psychoanalysis, and linguistics. Working on the problem of languageor problematic, entailing question posed and concept createdis the specific aim of Deleu ze, within his greater project opposing both Platonism and Analytic Philosophy. With comp ound development of both Sense and Event, Deleuze employs as generative the ideas of paradox and nonsense, particularly that of literary language, i.e. composition within the aesthetic para digm. In addition to logocentrism and contemporary philosophy of language, this endeavor engages the epistemological orientations of Plato ( height ), Nietzsche ( depth ), and the Stoics ( surface ), as well as the thinking of Leibniz, 155

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Sartre, Husserl, Kant, Sp inoza, Blanchot, Heid egger, Freud, and Lacan, to respective degrees. Any or all of these references can be considered a dispositif within which Deleuze works, with imposed conditions for intelligibility and legibility (or articulation). Significant to note, and the first of the three main principles for poetics, is that the thirty-four series, through which Deleuze presents his innovative philosophy, fashion The Logic of Sense as a logical and psychological novel (xiv), as desc ribed evocatively in the Preface. Viewed this way, the fragmented, non-seque ntial, and complex qualities of both each series and the overall collection reflect obliquely a literary style of writing : this is especially evident through any statements or language al ternative and/or contrary to logics of verification, denotation, significati on. One possible example, the event is sense itself (22), indicates the anti-Platonic conceptual equivalence between Sens e, Event, and Expression, which is further complicated in that the surface serves as the locus of sens e and expression (104). Deleuze asserts, Sense is the f ourth dimension of the proposition. The Stoics discovered it along with the event: sense, the expressed of the proposition, is an incorporeal, complex, and irreducible entity, at the surface of things, a pure event which inheres or subsists in the proposition (19, original emphasis). The inherent circular logi c violates the prohibition of such by Reason, a dispositif that Deleuze likewise counters in its opposition between sense and nonsenseoperating instead with the logic of paradox one of the two verbal figures of nonsense (81). The connection of the conten t of Deleuzes thought and the form of his expression in The Logic of Sense joins this first component to the second principle for method in my discussion: employing in constructivism the pa rticular logic and intensive use of language in literary writing, most especially for Deleuze the paradox and nonsen se of Lewis Carroll. 156

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Serial Poetics and reading for sen se Besides the specific case using Carrolls text s, Deleuzes working more broadly within and via the aesthetic paradigm is ev ident in the literary material that appears throughout, additionally including works by Artaud, Sade, Proust, Borges, Stephen Crane, Fitzgerald, Malcolm Lowry, and others. In a minor instance that emphasizes the aesthetic logic of his temporal metaphysics, for example, Deleuze rega rds the chaosmos of Ja mes Joyce in terms of Nietzsches eternal return; the composite chaodyssey ( chao-errance ) (264) that he identifies indicates the circular time outsi de Rational Sense and verifiabl e language, reflecting instead the Dionysian sense-producing m achine (107) noted elsewhere. Another selective example is Deleuzes positing humor, the co-extensiveness of sense with nonsens e (141), as the logic prevailing after the irony theorized by Pl ato, Kant, and Romanticism respectively and sequentially. On one hand this could be considered a case of diagrammatism locating an alternative to the dominant regime(s) of langua ge previously subordina te, minor, unnoticed. In any case, humor in expression is transformative for Deleuze as the art of surface, singularity, static genesis, pure event, and four pers on singular in his metaphysicsas with every signification, denotation, and manifestation suspended, all height and depth abolished (141). Although not the same, an affinity readily appears between this specific description of humor and the exemplar of paradox, the general operation of nonsense. Moreover, the logic of aesthetic language might even be considered more significan t for Deleuze than as recourse or means for alternative philosophy. In Chapter 1 of this project, I presented an important point of guidance from Jean-Jacques Lecercle, who Deleuzes method as extracti ng a problem and constructing a concept ( Deleuze and Language 256). It is worth noting that while Lecercle discusses The Logic of Sense in terms of engaging a problematic of language, he focu ses far more specifically in recognizing the 157

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significant role of Carrolls li terature for Deleuzes encounter -constructivism (as I have called it) : The problem extracted from Carroll, therefor e, bears the name of th e two concepts created to extract it: sense and event ( Deleuze and Language 101). Although exceptionally narrow, this case aligns The Logic of Sense within the consistency that Lecercle establishes of Deleuzes greater method, in recognizing how he extracts pr oblem in Carroll just as he has done earlier with Nietzsche, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Proust. This insight is valuable for emphasizing the method evident as much as the broader metaphysics, for instance the Deleuzean problem of the event and that Lecercle characterizes events as problems and problems as events (101). While Lecercle seeks specifically to produce a concept of language (68), he articula tes an alternative to conduct[ing] a Deleuzean interpretation, more importantly: What Deleuze allows us to do, on the other hand, is read for senseto become awar e of the faint traces[,] the aura of sense that envelops the text [and] disseminates in it (153). Although res onant with the problem extracted, this understanding remains limited to the first compone nt for method, diagrammatic reading; from encounter pragmatics, constructivism further entails application of the aesthetic paradigm in praxis, as Deleuze does conceptually and formally with Carrolls literature. Perhaps the significance of Carrolls literature will have been overstatedfor instance, in Lecercles citing the source of a problematic extracte d, or as I am presenting it, in the case of recourse for philosophical invention, specifically the intensive use of language in literary nonsense. After all, Deleuze certainly presents intelligib le concepts in The Logic of Sense with readers reaction that the text is ostensibly nonsense remaining a condition of limited understanding, rather than an epistemological alternative to Rational Sense (Reason). For example, distinguishing clearly in the Eleventh Series of Nonsense he declares, Nonsense is that which has no sense, and that which, as such and as it enacts the donation of sense, is 158

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opposed to the absence o f sense (70)positing between sense and nonsense an original type of intrinsic relation (68). On the other hand, I am identifying in this work a poetics for artisanal praxisthe beginning of the radi cal experimentation of discur sive style observed later, culminating particularly in A Thousand Plateaus as part of my on-going methodology. Just as Deleuze employed the literature of Borges to enga ge the philosophy of Leibniz, as with the three authors and Kant, like Beckett and Bishop Berkeley, so can we regard his using Carroll to work on the problematic of language. Viewed this way, the aesthetic logic of paradox appears to serve similarly as the intensive procedure with language by Wolfson and Brisset; or perhaps better still, as Melvilles formula, in th e conceptual figures of Ahab and Bartleby. Beyond this comparison, another view of Carrolls function, less direct but equally compelling for method, perceives its unique role for philosophy in the taxono my of fiction: with the characters of The Logic of Sense appearing primarily in Plato, Nietzsche, and the Stoics, the concepts developed substitute for narrative; Carrolls literary language thus provides a setting, as Deleuze rema rks, the first great mise en scene of the paradoxes of sense (xiii). The diegesis and corresponding story logic invoke a dispositif wholly different from Analytic Philosophy, to name one prevailing regime upon language, and thus enable Deleuzes thinking and expressing through an aesthetic paradigm with respective conditions for intelligibility. The key strategy for encountering text s in this productive fashion fo r invention, as I am proposing and which I attempt, is diagrammatic reading. Deleuze finds in Carrolls writing counterand post-signifying regimes of expression. In a remark indicative of his method, he states that C arrolls entire logical work is directly about signification implications, and conclusions, and only indirectly about senseprecisely, through the paradoxes which signification does not resolve, or indeed wh ich it creates. On the contrary, 159

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[his] fantastic work is im mediately concerned with sense and attaches the power of paradox directly to it (22, origin al emphasis). Before concluding with th e third principle fo r poetics, it is worthwhile to examine quickly both some illustra tive examples that Deleuze finds as well as the philosographical form of paradox and its ep istemological structure (composition). This review is important for method so as to emulat e the inventive results rather than strictly replicating, using Deleuze as hermen eutic lens, as I will reiterate in the separate discussion of Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature As I have noted, the key line of flight for inventing a concept of sense, by recourse to another paradigm, is paradox: although a part ial view of The Logic of Sense this generative means for expression appears as both a salien t concept and form in his own writing and in Deleuzes reading of Carrolls literary works. For example, describing the fourth dimension of sense and expression, he referenc es Carrolls poem The Hunting of the Snark and notes, Perhaps the dimension is the hunt itself, and sense is the Snark (20); this relates to the earlier point, how Humor is the art of the surface, whic h is opposed to the old irony, the art of depths and heights (9), insofar as Par adox appears as a dismissal of depth, a display of events at the surface, and a deployment of langua ge along this limit (9). In this case, the sense-mode of surface or width becomes clear by considerin g the logic or structure of paradox, as when Deleuze writes, The strange word Snark is the frontier which is stretched as it is drawn by both series (26, my emphasis). The transformative language operation by Carroll is evident in the portmanteauSnark, like frumious (67)or esoteric word; the paradoxical element of expression is undecidable between sense or nonsense, being instead an operation of both sense and nonsense in its non-signification. 160

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This shift away from regimes of signifi cation or denotation in language and nonsense accounts for much of the way Deleuze explicates his concept of sense; beginning with Carrolls What the Tortoise Said to Achilles, the salie nce and function are more readily observable in the literary references, especially Alice's Adventures in Wonderland and Through the LookingGlass The mode of indiscernibility is recognizable in the aesthe tic figures of simultaneity: In the singularity of paradoxes, nothing beings or ends, everything proceeds at once in the direction of both past and future (80). Referencing Alice and Humpty Dumpty, Deleuze likewise finds the two senses or two directions of the beco ming-mad in the characters Mad Hatter and March Hare, like Tweedledee and Tweedledum (79), and in the temporality of battle scenes (101). These are specific diegetic and linguistic instances of the general mode presented as alternative to the spatio-temporal epistemo logy of semantics, a simultaneity of becoming (1) as Deleuze remarks: Good sense affirms that in all things there is a determinable sense or direction ( sens ); but paradox is the affirmation of both senses or directions at the same time (1, my emphasis). To clarify this pointa matter further comp licated when Deleuze discusses paradoxes of both signification and sense (75)about simultaneity and becoming: I find in the concepts in The Logic of Sense a fundamentally temporal orientation, even when semantically spatial as in surface and directions. The key insight about para dox as generative and transformative style, in thought and expression, connects sense and event with its structure of series First, understanding that the event is se nse itself (22) is established by Deleuzes premise: Sense is the fourth dimension of the proposition. The Stoics discovered it along with the event: sense, the expressed of the proposition, is an incorporeal, complex, and i rreducible entity, at the surface of things, a pure event which inheres or subsists in the proposition (19, original emphases). Without explicating this new image of thought and paradoxical consti tution (xiv), we can 161

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recognize that paradox consists of tw o series, undecidable and simultaneous rather than resolvable with singular meaning; in this arrangement, the paradoxical element, as in the example of Carrolls portmanteaux, functions to traverse heterogeneous series, to coordinate them, to make them resonate and converge (66). This operation produces the expressed sense no longer rational-sense or non-sensein the series, even if nonsense, at th e surface (81). This orientation is apparent in Deleuzes recognizing two resonating series in place of psychological and moral char acters (55) in Carrolls Sylve and Bruno for example; his qualifying that We can speak of events only as singularities employed in a problematic field (56) situates the expression and sense in terms of resonating series in time, in my understanding. Lessons for Method Although not exclusive to literatur e or language, situated within a greater contextDeleuzes two conceptions of time, Chronos and Aionthe use of paradox eluc idates both the original philosophy invented and the practice for method. On the latter, this is indeed the third component for artisanal praxis: to begin, read in temporal terms of points, lines and series, finding any resonance by reading for expressed-sense, as Le cercle notes, rather than for signification with rational-sense. The aesthetic paradigm for thought and expressi on, in my terms, thus escapes the logic of Reason and its logocentrism by beginning with diagrammatic reading encounters. For example, in the floating signifier and signified of Carrolls portmanteau Snark, like onomatopoeiae for the Stoics (66), Deleuze finds the characteristics that make heterogeneous series resonate and communicate and form a tangled tale (67) coordinating the series in a relation of sense, unlike the relation between true and false (68). Just as when he defines sense in terms of quantity, quality, modality, relation, and type (101), his creating a concept beyond true/false is markedly apparent in the Fifth Series of Sense, by way of four paradoxes: of regress, or of 162

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indefinite proliferation (28); of sterile division, or of dry reiteration (31); of neutrality, or of essences th ird estate (32); of the absurd, or of the impossible objects (35). In the taxonomy of novelistic philosophy earlier introduced, heteroge neous series might thus be the narrative lines of concepts. This analogue gains additional salience insofar as for Deleuze, Everything happens through the resonance of dispar ates, point of view on a point of view, displacement of perspective, differentiation of difference, and not through the identity of contraries (175). Besides the diagrammatic reading of texts both literary and philosophical, we can observe an aesthetic and intensive presentation of the c oncept of sense, using signifying and counter-signifying elements.. To reiterate, the artisanal poetics discerned throughout consists of expressing the qualities of a concept through styl e, rather than thr ough denotationa single, verifiable (true/false) statementin argumentative discourse. For Deleuze, this entails composing thought in The Logic of Sense beyond the opposition between sense and nonsense that Reason would demand, generally, and instea d employing the aesthetic paradigm in his logical and psychological novel sp ecifically. Considering how [t]he force of paradoxes is that they are not contradictory; they ra ther allow us to be present at the genesis of the contradiction (74), the result of this style is to express a concept sensed or encountered in its non-signifying operation. Finally, this type of reading and th e salience of paradox that I have discussed are underscored throughout, as well as e xplicitly stated: Sense is thus inseparable from a new kind of paradoxes [ sic ] which mark the presence of nonsense within sense, just as the preceding paradoxes marked the presence of nonsense within signification (70, my emphasis). As noted in the chapter-series of Sense, Nonsense, and Paradox, the temporal orientation of key qualities enables both new understandi ng and innovation, thinking and composing in terms of lines, singularities, heterogeneous series and resonance. On one hand, this view better 163

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enables ou r comprehending when Lecercle states that for Deleuze, the highest task of literature is not to represent the event [. .] but to be the event itself ( Deleuze and Language 130). Additionally, and more pr actically for praxis I would say, is that three related principles discerned for method relate sense and event to the quality of experi enced concepts, in their temporality, rather than remaining abstract and noumenal. As Deleuze explains, The logic of sense is inspired in its entirety by empiricism. Only empi ricism knows how to transcend the experiential dimensions of the visible without falling into Idea s, and how to track down, invoke, and perhaps produce a phantom and the limit of a lengthened or unfolded experience (20, my emphasis). With my goal of extracting a method and producing a poetics for artisanal practice, seeking to invent an experienced concept of sensation through encounters with literature, this review of The Logic of Sense has added a component to the constructivis m methodology, significant philosophically and promising for pr axis: style, in thought and expression, through series; with resonance, occurring as a post-signifying operatio n and a sensible-empirical mode. Pynchon Mediators: Shift from Discovery to Invention Resuming my pragmatics reading of the prior chapter with this in mind, serial logic in thought and writing evokes the question and problem of the discovery model for knowledge, whether I am proceeding toward ideas in a trajectory. The unconventional logics of multiple senses, established in the previous section, pr ovides an alternative to the epistemological grounding in space and in the rational dispositif: specifically, diagrammatic reading finds intensive elements that enable engaging the problematic of the unknown otherw iseexperienced temporal concepts, in encounters, by which to produce new knowledge. Thus, artisanal praxis applies in style the conceptual a nd formal features encountered: th is way, I shift to theoretical and rhetorical practices of invention from the discovery model and the detective roles, the 164

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logocentric paradigm in which truth is locate d someplace, or perhaps lost at sea; and information is deferred, presumed as though it is hidden or concealed in a locked room Encountering Temporal Logics: Ho thouse, Street, Null, Projectile In the latter case, reprising the conc lusion of Chapter Threes reading section, The Crying of Lot 49 ends with Oedipa settling into the locked room, to await the crying of lot 49 (152, my emphasis). The second lesson from studying P ynchons first two novels, with which to shift toward now, emerges from a diagrammatic reading of the other series, which comprises a counter-signifying logic and a temporal orientation. Reconsideri ng the detective role, a compelling clue emerges in V. in which Stencil contemplates the phrase, Events seem to be ordered into an ominous logic (Pynchon 484, my emphasis).3 Implicitly relating to this point, Seed articulates an obvious yet salient fact of the interpretive position: If we try to reorder [the] chapters we run the risk of Ste ncilizing events and damage th e way in which Pynchon plays off historical time against novelistic chronology ( Labyrinths 111). In his latt er phrasing, Seed identifies a key aspect of Pynchons st yle, which I later employ creatively. Rather than examining thoroughly the tem poral settings of the main narrative and historical episodes, I am noting briefly the novelistic time in the novels as the catalyst toward the new understanding and the next section. For instance, V. includes references to mirror-time (243), null-time of human love (441), a nd a hothouse sense of time (53). The latter description by Stencil takes on additional resonance when, echoing Pynchons earlier story Entropy (1958), the character de scribes his V.-obsession as a hot house: constant temperature, 3 My emphasis notably differs from Stencils, as the narrator here remarks upon the act of creative pondering: A phrase [. .] kept cycling round and round, preconsciously, just under the threshold of lip and tongue movement: Events seem to be ordered into an ominous logic. It repeated itself automatically and Stencil improved on it each time, placing emphasis on different wordsevents seem ; seem to be ordered ; ominous logicpronouncing them differently, changing the tone of voice [. .]. Events seem to be ordered into an ominous logic. He found paper and pencil and began to write the se ntence in varying hands and type faces ( V. 484-5, original emphasis). 165

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windless, too crowded with particolored sports, unnatural bloom s (483). Pynchon later expounds a fuller sense of the asynchronic (or n on-seasonal) duration, im plied specifically by unnatural blooms, in the intolerable double vision noted by Stencil Sr. as the hothouse of the past for the Right and the dreamscape of th e future for the Left in the street (506); this is later amended in free-indirect narration as, No time in Valle tta. No history, all history at once (524).4 With two notable exceptions, The Crying of Lot 49 much less overtly concerns temporal orientations other than the irrevocable time of the past retrievable as information. Yet, this case still features the lesson I have noted, particularly that we experience sense or meaningmaking in time (and not strictly in space). To be clear, I am not positing a temporal a lternative to the spatial interpretation of narrative, in simple opposition; rather, I am atte mpting to explore the particular aesthetic logic encounteredthe unique temporality of literary machines, as I employ in the last chapter. Worth recalling is the disregard for the possible historical dimension of synchronic analysis and a tendency to view the internal, temporal sequ ence of narrative as a spatial or structural organization, as Currie recounts; he continues, In theory [, ] structuralist narratology was neither ahistorical nor disinterested in the tem poral organization of narrative, but in practice anything temporal was quickly translated into spatial relationships or differences ( Postmodern Narrative 77). Given as well that it is always tempting to dechronologize and logicize in Structuralist analysis, in Ricurs view, we mu st be attentive to the opposition of narrative temporality to simple chronology ( Volume 2 47), within the unique spat io-temporal qualities of 4 Notably, the narrative discourse of the Epilogue reflects the spatio-temporal orientation of both the historical episodes and the narrative of Stencil an d Profane, although set in 1919 in Malta. Most evocative are the last two iterations, both concerning Stencil Sr. and Veronica Manganese: Absolute upheaval, a nostalgic smile: that is your way, Victoria, of course, (527) Stencil begins; the narrator adds, The street and the hothouse; in V. were resolved, by some magic, the two extremes. She frightened him (527). Last is the hothouse-time of Veronica and Stencil together, an alienation from time, much as Malta itself was alienated from any history in which cause precedes effect (529). Indeed, Pynchons next two novels dramatize experiencing effects first, discontinuously. 166

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the dieg esis. Lot 49 calls attention to the imperative for treating the heterogeneous configurationswith greater nuance than McHales epistemologyor -ontology schema suitably, with terms or views beyond Bakhtins chronotope category: for example, Dannenbergs ontological plotting and temporal orchestration ( Coincidence 45), like Pundays noting the dynamic relation between space, time, and materiality (After Deconstruction 107). In order to conclude the pr esent investigation without addi tional delay, I further discuss this reference in the subsequent chapters, c onjecturing the utility of certain narratological perspectives and the prospects of a performa tive rather than a cons tative narratology, in Curries terms (52). Toward invention, the detectiv e reader-writer will have forced himself into the real present, perhaps aware it would be his last time there ( V. 531), as Stencil Sr. ruminates in V. s Epilogue. The lost time of the pa st reverberates in the present of Lot 49 intelligibly as information and sensibly as affectas in phe nomena like the dandelion wine plucked from a roadside cemetery (79) beco ming seasonably cloudy, unlike the hothouse-past logic. Although the latter, as transversal relation across series, sugges ts inventive potential, I forgo this in favor of the lesson inferred by tw o notable examples of the former, in concluding this inquiry into a diegesis for invention. An easily overlooked character, marginalized by Oedipas hermeneutic quest narrative, articulate s one peculiar conception: Mucho Maas remarks nonsensically (while on LSD), Everybody who sa ys the same words is the same person if the spectra are the same only they happen differently in time, you dig? But the time is arbitrary You pick your zero point anywhere you want, that way you can shuffle each persons time line sideways till they all coincide ( Lot 116-7, my emphasis).5 This view evokes not only another 5 The logic of Muchos chorus sensibilia is non-rational, indeed: he continues, you hear and see things, even smell them, taste like you never could. Because the world is so abundant. No end to it, baby. Youre an antenna, sending your pattern out across a million lives a night, and theyre your lives too. [. .] The songs, its not just that they say something, they are something in the pure sound Something new (118, my emphasis). 167

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mode of m eaning behind the obvious (150) bu t how while interpreting the novel, We try to read diachronically and synchronically, Gleason notes (90). The arbitrary, coinciding, and asynchronic qualities of non-linear temporality complement indirectly the logocentric search for meaning: ostensibly ret rievable, rather than irrevocable as lost time of the past, within a database of information. The logic of information, beyond the promise of communication, is refl ected in the narrative discourse throughout, beginning with the resemblance of suburban sprawl of houses and streets to a circuit card and Oedipas inferring in both outward patterns a hieroglyphic sense of concealed meaning, of an intent to communicate (14). The mediated-ele ctronic sense of time is implicit in Pynchons composing with the signifying regime of technol ogy throughout, including explicit references to computing, particularly the IBM 7094 and its t welve microseconds of decision-making (93); and generally, the binary logic (zeroes and ones) in the mat rices of a great digital computer (150). Whether necessarily intel ligible though the tempor ality of data, pre sent in time and space, database experience is expressed. Moreover, Johnston describes Lot 49 in Information Multiplicity as the first novel about information in the contemporary sense of the word. For the first time in American fiction, the idea of informa tion is not only treated th ematically but is also deployed to generate a fictional story rich in mu ltivalent meanings, the historical implications of which Pynchon investigates more fully in his next novel, Gravitys Rainbow (7). Generative Lessons It is the second lesson, as I have posited, a bout temporality that en ables an intelligible transition in the abrupt sensory break to the next phase, encountering Gravitys Rainbow one that precisely concerns interval logic Unlike the asynchronic tim e of information in the database conception, Oedipa also notes the experience dimension beyond signification, in the metaphor of delirium tremens after realizing so much could be lost, even the quantity of 168

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hallucination (104). W ith the associative logi c of the entropy formulae, she links the sign DT to the time differential of calculus: a vanishingly small instant in which change had to be confronted at last for what it was, where it could no longer disguise itself as something innocuous like an average rate; where velocity dw elled in the projectile though the projectile be frozen in midflight [. .] (105). First, the concrete understanding of the small instant which notably demands our confronting change, evokes in one sense the interval or duration calculated, phenomenon made intelligible, as well as the inherently diachronic process. This conception contrasts the atemporal database or asynchrony of information transmission, most obviously; and yet, the unus ual phrasing that conc ludes the description, where death dwelled in the ce ll though the cell be l ooked in on at its most quick (105), seems to evoke the former. Irresolvable, I reitera te that it is the diegetic context of metaphor in which this heterogeneous discourse appears, and thus we encounter in Pynchon a logic of language, like in Carroll, and not strictly ma thematical laws of reason (or good sense ). Indeed, the narrative voice acknowledges seeming disorientation, insofar as The act of metaphor then was a thrust at truth and a lie, depending where you were: inside safe, or outside, lost Oedipa did not know where she was (105). On the one hand, the detour in the present i nvestigation concludes as the dead end as for the detective roles. In this last point, we have surely enco untered Pynchons serial logic and poetics, finding directly in the logic of metaphor two series, supposedly opposite directions, as Deleuze finds in Carrolls paradox structure. Viewed another way, the processaided by my structural portraitsdoes not result by closing full circle into some paranoia (151), in that I abandoned the detective quest in favor of a pragmatics-encounter with Pynchons style. Moreover, the process has meant not an alienation from time ( V. 529) but due consideration of 169

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tem porality, particularly by interrogating wh ether Events seem to be ordered into an ominous logic (V. 484, my emphasis) one contingent upon the hermeneutic discovery trajectory. In any case, another ordering of the material with regard to Pynchons style could have explored the counter-signifying regime in the compositions, such as jokes, names, and songs, the nonsensical quality of which all appear in Pynchons first th ree novels. Perhaps a diagrammatic study of these elements might have found a dieg esis for invention; here, the structural portraits have at least expressed a condition and catal yzed a shift to another mode, for both reading and constructivism. Th is shift avoids an outcome that Lot 49 describes: Oedipa wondered whether, at the end of this (if it were supposed to end), she too might not be left with only compiled memories of clues, announcements, intimations, but never the central truth itself, which must somehow each time be too bright for memory to hold (76) The project underway has reached a certain edge of the assemblage, Pynchons literary machines of sense-production, pa rticularly by considering the st yle of multiple regimes and the second axis of time, in Deleuze and Guattaris sense ( Plateaus 88).6 The next section begins the subsequent work with other semiotic regi mes, testing the method and experimenting with Pynchons diegesis for invention, beyond diagrammatic recognition of postsignifying elements in Gravitys Rainbow On the first, now an important methodological component, Lecercle reminds that Deleuze defines the problem of the Proustian oeuvre as the problem of signs, thus invoking the concept of style : the treatment of materials that turns the work into a work of art; it is the establishment of unknown or unexpected relations betw een objects, through the organization of materials (Deleuze and Language 219). 6 I have referenced this passage with the edges of the assemblage, the two axes of which I use in approaching Gravitys Rainbow The assemblage is collective and machinic horizontally, and the vertical axis of process, temporal in my reading, includes the cutting edges of deterritorialization ( ATP 88). Thus, a line of invention? 170

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While this provides a general point of inquiry for reading Pynchon and others, the theorization in Proust and Signs brings together the two concerns directly, in that Prousts style for Deleuze is transversality Specifically, this notion accoun ts not only for a unity of heterogeneous fragments w ithout totality (168), but time as the transversal of all possible spaces (130)the whole of these parts without totalizing them, the unity of these parts without unifying ( Proust 169, original emphasis). This conception of transversality and time brings to attention the literary p roduction machine, the second axis of the assemblage encountered in pragmatics-constructivism, as I explore with th e subsequent authors work. Finally, Prousts new linguistic convention, the transversal structure (168), corres ponds for Deleuze to the poetics of Carrolls paradox and Kafkas assembla ge; thus, I encounter Pynchon attentive to his style, provisionally devised as serial-transveral assemblage Inventive Interlude : A simple recollection of Deleuz es method and vocabulary also produces an inventive gesture to ward the next development and attempted praxis: the term line of flight is a process of deterritorialization, which can be abbreviated DT. Separately, Pynchons texts suggest a composition by the logic of differential time (or T), as Ursula K. Heise describes in Chronoschisms even titling her chapter five delta-t : times assembly in Gravitys Rainbow .7 With this chance simila ritylike the oste nsible resemblance of entropys legible formula in Thermodynamics and Inform ation Theory, noted in Pynchons 1958 story Entropy and The Crying of Lot 49 there emerges a new possibili ty, thinking in the aesthetic paradigm: T = DT, in other words ., differential time as deterritorialization This is a prospect to explore, adding dete rritorialization to the series th at Oedipa Maas observes in her linking delirium tremens and differential time: because there was that high magic to low puns, 7 Although I have not quoted Heise, her work is worth consulting, along with Dannenberg and Punday, for studies of unconventional temporality in novels: Chronoschisms: Time, Narrative, and Postmodernism (Cambridge UP, 1997). 171

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because DT's m ust give access to dt's of spectra beyond the known sun music made purely of Antarctic loneliness and fright ( Lot 49 105, my emphasis). A transver se line, by the sensible order beyond the metaphysics of vision or pr esencefrom Antarctic annihilation in V. (217) to the Panorama (419) of Gravitys Rainbow Literary Encounter 3: Inventive Poetics, Gravitys Rainbow Dis-mantling. [. .] a theatre of multiplicities opposed in every respect to the theatre of representation, which leaves intact neither the identity of th e thing represented, nor author, nor spectator, nor character, nor representation which, through the vicissitudes of the play, can become th e object of a production of knowledge or final recognition. Instead, a theatre of problems and always open questions which draws spectator, setting and ch aracters into [. .]. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition (192, my emphasis) .an assemblage, both machinic expression of desire and collective enunciation to paraphrase Deleuze and Guattari ( Plateaus 22). Perhaps drawn into the Orpheus Theatrethe problems diegetic coordinates simultaneously Germany, 1 945 and Los Angeles, 1970(?)explicitly by the concluding Now everybody of the narration: or, if song must find you, here's one They never taught anyone to sing, a hymn by Willia m Slothrop (760, original ellipsis).8 And yet, although this response might remedy the pitfalls of the structural ro le trajectory and its hermeneutic dead end, I have also learned to he sitate from too quickly rendering a novel in the assemblage configuration and vo cabulary, as emphasized throughout th is and the prior chapter. In other words, I am still attempting the reading and writing strategy of diagramming the elements encountered, as well as testing the poeti cs of first finding a diegesis for invention in Gravitys Rainbow This deliberate applicati on of the method discerned seeks to avoid certain limited (or counter-productive) outcomes, name ly constative narratology, in favor of accelerating the process, particul arly toward proposing conceptual analogs to characters and 8 Parenthetical citations refer to the 1995 Penguin Classics edition of Gravitys Rainbow (Viking Press 1973). To clarify, my elliptical truncations of dir ect quotes appear in brackets, as above, while Pynchons original uses do not. 172

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narrativ e in the next chapter. In the first case, Pynchons style as object of study and focalizer facilitates thinking and working in the aesthetic paradigm indeed; thus, further describing the former will better introduce my particular use or scholar ly treatment of the novel in the latter sense, in my experimental attempts of artisanal praxis Diagramming Assemblage Edges Provisionally, the notion of transversality describes Pynchons writing aptly, in the way Deleuze regards Proust; by this I mean the relation a nd/or intersection of disp arate lines or series, in the sense geometric rather than numerical (as in sets), specifica lly in non-signifying relation. Although potentially extending this description in further digression, the musical terminology of harmony and count erpoint better elucidates by analogy. For example, as cited earlier, Deleuze describes novelis ts working at this aleatory point, this imperative and questioning blind spot from which th e work develops like a problem by making divergent series resonate ( Difference 199, my emphasis)with transversality of disparate lines. The latter premise evokes my view of P ynchons style and my approach to the novels discussed. Beyond coincidences and corresponden ces in semiotic series, as I noted in V. and Lot 49, transversality as style can be recognized as well in Pynchons composing markedly with lines actual-historical and fictional: relati ons both prevalent and not easily discerned or distinguished, in both the narrative strategies and the ecology of his material. Important to reiterate is that my encountering literature, in Deleuzes method, does not distinguish real and fictional but instead recognizes in va rious semiotic regimes any elements generative, transformative, or diagrammatic intensive use of la nguage in writing, lines of flight toward deterritorialization The latter case appears to be how Deleu ze understands the counte rand post-signifying production of effects, such as temporality, in Prousts writing, and thus how we might read 173

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multiple se miotic regimes in greater nuance. Keeping in mind that there is no longer any fixed distinction between content and expression ( Dialogues 122), we can equally regard historical and fictional material in P ynchons writing as potentially generative in innovating expression beyond the rationale dispositif and constative language; transformative configuring into assemblage; diagrammatic, dismantling the assemblage into intensive expression, postsignifying or non-referential writing, and finally deterritorialization of thought and expression. My aim is proposing means for conceptual i nvention and discursive innovation, though, beyond strictly identifying these novelis tic elements encountered. On one hand, Deleuzes terms and (to lesser extent) method have been used to describe Pynchons work in new fashion, for example by Johnston and Mattessich. When efficient and usef ul, I include several sc holars points in my diagrammatic work with Gravitys Rainbow careful about confusing ends and means in scholarship, as so much diligent treatment of this novel in the latter sense reminds. Transversality as stylein practice, beyond analys isaddresses several methodological concerns, beginning with the question whether a lexiphile can compose is ways and with rhetoric other than that of th e logocentric critic.9 Aided by the exemplar of Pynchons polymath writing style, much like Deleuze, and guided inst ead by this feature inst ead of their erudition, working with Gravitys Rainbow in post-structuralist fashion will entail creative treatment of 9 Lexi- here used in th e manner of the French lexis rather than the American spelling lexo-phile in the fashion of logophile Apropos the present discussion, and the source of my variation, Barthes (1966) asserts that today, writing is not telling but saying that one is telling and assi gning all the referent (what one says) to this act of locution; which is why part of contempor ary literature is no longer descriptive, but transitive, striving to accomplish so pure a present in its language that the whole of the di scourse is identified with the act of its delivery, the whole logos being brought down or extended to a lexis ( Image-Music-Text 114). This point extends textually backward to Genette, in his footnote, and forward to Paul DeMans 1990 article, Roland Barthes and the Limits of Structuralism. Noting the liberation of the signifier from the constraints of referential meaning, DeMan elaborates, like Derrida, the inherent tension that shapes literary languagepolarities such as content /form, logos (that which is being said) and lexis (the manner of saying it), meaning/sign, message/code, langue/parole signifi / signifiant voice/writing [. .]the implicit valorization has always privileged the first terms and considered the second as an auxiliary, an adjunc t in the service of the former ( Yale French Studies 77 1990, 180). 174

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m aterial from various databases and discourses, in the aesthetic logic of the novel. One feature of this formal quality discernible by using the perspective of Deleuze and Guttari is that the lines actual-historical and fictional, which th ey elaborate elsewhere about Kafkas work, might both operate at the cutting edges of deterritorialization on the vertical axis ( Plateaus 88). In other words, the assemblage conception replaces a narrow view of Pync hons writing, as in finding series 1: historical and series 2: fictional; the former is necessarily territorial for being actual or referential, the nega tive regime of si gns explained in A Thousand Plateaus The tetravalence of the assemblage (89) t hus keeps in mind that writing strategies or stylistic formulae might produce intensive functionsagainst signifyin g-territorializing usein language within the aesthetic paradigm. And a lthough obfuscated, Stivale indirectly reinforces my understanding of a point largel y overlooked: On [the horizontal] axis, the literary element serves an exemplary function, of revealing more clearly the abstract concepts suggested by the rhizomatic process. The machinic assemblage [. .] develops in direction relation to transformation [ sic ] unfolding [. .] as collective assemblages of enunciation ( Two-Fold Thought 109). The present tasks necessitate my sid e-stepping this intriguing orientation which requires theorizing more logically the literary element being situated on the vertical rather than the horizontal axisas well as the temptation to bookmatch Gravitys Rainbow with A Thousand Plateaus thusly, as McHoul and Wills attemp t with Derrida in their inventive and prototype work, Writing Pynchon Yet, the tetravalence view has obscured the theatre of problems that is crucial to engage as promising diegesis. In stead, it is intensive writing and transversality that have fourfold importance for encountering Pynchon: the post-signifying regime, the temporal orientation(s), resonatin g series, and effective deterritorialization all bear upon my study. 175

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Moreover, what I want to test, putting tran sversality into practice and demonstrating the poetics of method, is an experimental composition using the novels logic and formal strategies. Indeed, few critics have engage d Pynchons work for its value as writing practice, as McHoul and Wills note (1), excepting to limited extent Johnston in Information Multiplicity and Mattessichs Lines of Flight. And while the latter pur ports to emphasiz[e] a practice of writing that conjures the object of its analysis through its own production (Mattessi ch 12), the results of all three are less significant for their respectiv e outcomes than for their innovative attempts most especially Writing Pynchon guided similarly by poststructuralist method. The specific efforts by McHoul and Wills to innovate include bookmatching Pynchon and Derrida (10 ff.), as well as reading by using the mise en abyme model through material typonymy (54) and parable-parabola (59), for ex ample. Although creativ e endeavors, more instructive is their rationale fo r the post-rhetor ical supplanting of dualisms in Pynchons three novels (62). This approach relates to my non-in terpretive or counter-analytic exploration in the next section: exploring akin to Pynchon s polymath style, ideally, rather than the voyager metaphorworking in the aesthetic pa radigm and recalling the lesson of apparatus theory. Specifically, paradigm-writing or Choragraphy, Ulmer explains, is designed to introduce into the narratives and arguments of the print apparatus a Heuretic code [of invention], to supplement and replace the Hermeneutic code and its drive to reduce enigmas to truth. The rationale for disengaging curiosity from truth this way derives from the transformation of literacy underway in the electroni c [post-literate] apparatus ( Heuretics 106). Artisanal Practice: Ellipsistic Bandwidth ellipsistic, derived from ellipsis A species of blank interval, a nod or fugue in which he was [. .] struggling to fi nish a thought nor to begin one. Merely between. Jonathan Lethem, Chronic City (3) 176

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Investigating, by positing, the diegesis of a theatre of multiplicities does not in fact begin in the Orpheus Theatre at the arrested conclusion of Gravitys Rainbow Unlike with the hermeneutic search trajectories in V. and Lot 49 the approach does not us e a structural role to simulate the quest plot toward knowledge discov ery; although there are questsparticularly for the 00001 rocket (Schwarzgert ), by characters like Slothrop, Blicero, Enzian, and their pursuers (e.g. Major Marvy, Tchitcherine)in several narratives, the litera ry assemblage encountered can not adequately be treated in a characterologica l reading (McHoul 37) of the earlier sort. A paranoid serial progression and treatment of proliferating signs or connections, as with detectives Stencil and Oedipa, would not effectiv ely grasp let alone employ the aesthetic logic(s) offered by Pynchons writing. Moreover, I might keep in mind a cautionary point from the text directly, as when Slothrops dumb idling heart sez: The Schwartzgert is no Grail, Ace, thats not what the G in Imipolex G stands for. And you are no knightly hero ( Gravitys 364). Instead, recalling the transformative qualities earlier discovered posits an al ternative approach a nd at least two points with which to begin. Fundamentally, Pynchons formula or intensive writing has transformed the material and literary compos ition into an assemblage; the latter includes components that function as dismantling in lines of flight, particularly the post-signifying regime, in Deleuzes terms. Thus, the logocentric critic and hermeneutic detectives alike have missed a clueor better, misperceive a generative understanding of a serial narrative effect. Changing the premise that knowledge is discovered to the view that meaning is made, in the production of sense or sensation, by the literary machines in Pynchons composition, not only provides expressions of but catalyzes new situations experienced: inchoate perceptual, affective, non-rational. While not suggesting any deliber ate succession, the progression through Pynchons 177

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first th ree novels this way entails a productive and intelligible transition in forms of knowledge and discourse (perhaps worth exploring further in another context). For my purposes, I am able to discern at least one formal logic of Gravitys Rainbow from my encounters thus far: first, V. becomes a remarkably scattered concept ( V. 418) for characters and re aders; this recognition relates subtly to the temporality of information a nd particularly Oedipas investment in retrievalas-discovery. The novels narrator explicitly drama tizes her faith in gemlike clues, chiefly the post-horn symbol, for communicatio n and knowledge, and describes them as only some kind of compensation. To make up for her having lost th e direct, epileptic Wor d, the cry that might abolish the night ( Lot 95). While the latter clause pe rtains to my second point, this compensation lament underscores the narrative of search-and-discover Truth by Stencil and Oedipa and their unexamined methodsparticul arly Oedipas not attempting to use the W.A.S.T.E. postal system and fi xating only on one word in resear ch, like Stencil. More to the point, the structural properties of information and co mmunication pertaining to technology evokes other temporal configurations, as non-chronological of the database described earlier. The first insight (if not inroad) conseque nt of this review c oncerns the non-rational aesthetic logic created and employed in Gravitys Rainbow ; this focus is more particular, and accelerates the conductive logic of transversal st yle, than discussing generally the presenttense narration throughout the novel. Without overestimating the narrative significance or textual coincidence with V. the notion of temporal bandwidth is presented to account for how Slothrop has begun to thin, to scatter as seri al effect late in the novel: Kurt Mondaugen, an electrical engineer character from V., explains that Personal density [. .] is directly proportional to temporal bandwidth (509). Altho ugh this effect-explanation account is not great 178

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evocative, the narrators ela borating, seem ingly in the voice of Mondaugen, in real-time commentary upon Slothrop is worth quoting for the promising elements invoked: Temporal bandwidth is the width of your present, your now. It is the familiar t considered as a dependent variable. The more you dwell in the past and in the future, the thicker your bandwidth, the more solid your persona. But narrower your sense of Now, the more tenuous you ar e. It may get to where you're having trouble remembering what you were doing fi ve minutes ago, or evenas Slothrop nowwhat you're doing here, at the base of this colossal curved embankment. Uh, he turns slackmouth to Nrrisch, what are we. [. .] You said, What are we then you stopped. Oh. Gee, that was a funny thing to say. As for Nrrisch, hes too locked in to business. He has never seen this great Ellipse any other way but the way he was meant to. (Pynchon GR 509) Not merely promising, the four components scattering delta-t, temporality, ellipsis implicate a paradigm with which to work, di scerning the aesthetic l ogic employed. However, counter-signifying at best, this passage likely functions only as generative and not yet transformative (into assemblage), let alone diagrammatic as deterritorialization. On this point, I will limit my using Deleuzes framework this wa y henceforth, in the interest of the present exercise, while exploring and proposing invent ive poeticsan ellipsis for the interval. Although the narrators describi ng this great Ellipse here likely refers to the geometric perspectivethe jargon Gauss curve (508) relating to the curved embankmentof Test Stand VII at Peenemnde, the familiar conception of ellipsis within the discourse of rhetoric and literary writing evokes the question of what is omitted or what of this account trails off. In this case, Pynchon textually employs ellipsis in multiple ways, both refere ntial and rhetorical as well as for the syntax of narrating and of presenting speech ( i.e. as natural paus es) throughout the novel. Thus it is obvious and yet salient to recognize how Gravitys Rainbow operates not with the the direct, epileptic Word of logocentrism but through its ellipsistic composition. More than just syntactic idiosyncrasy, this feature is worth examining briefly in the paradigmatic 179

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sense, before proposing my diegetic figure for invention in the next section. In the first sense, litera l use of the term appears only once: But where will Leni be now? Where will she have wandered off to, carrying her child, and her dreams that will not grow up? Either we didn't mean to lose hereither it was an ellipsis in our care in what some of us will even swear is our love, or someone has taken her, deliberately, for reason s being kept secret, and Sachsas death is part of it too (Pynchon 218, my emphasis). In this peculiar modulation of voice (Schaub 130), the narrator reflects in the subjunctive mood about Leni Pkler, a charac ter of tertiary significance as wife to Franz Pkler and mother to Ilse, both of whom feature more prominently. Of course, precisely such disregard in our reading is implicated by Pynchon with the self-reflexive irony of switching to the first-person plural narrative voicean ellipsis in our care. ? The issue of narration raised here might be less a matter of an omi ssion of our concern in this sense than it is a moment directing attention precisely to the perspe ctive or focalization, one that shifts throughout the novel. In this regard ellipsis as editing technique relates to the cinematic descriptions of Pynchons writing by se veral criticsmost blatantly in Kittlers remark that Gravitys Rainbow is a film considering the technical and temporal sense[s] ( Reading Matters 163). Thus the non-sequent ial composition unfolds in present tense, through editing or time-axis manipulation (Kittler 164); Moorewho recognizes the novels structure as four filmic reels ( Connectedness 30)likewise describes extensively the framing (33), beyond general focalization, of Pynchons cinematogr aphic style, in ways such as roaming and panning effects along with the diegetic filming (37). Such understandings are beneficial, unlike the scholarly prevalence of excessively discussi ng content such as the abundant movie references and the (relatively) prominent characters German filmmaker Gerhardt von Gll (or Der Springer) and actress Margherita (Greta) Erdmann. Beyond the level of content, or considering 180

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along with style, this view recognizes how Pync hons writing draws attent ion to processes of aesthe tic mediation and media themselves: in this case, it is films methods of organizing information ( Information 132), as Stark notes, by which P ynchon cinematically manipulates time much more frequently than space in distinctly cinematic fashion (140). Although indeed particular to the contemporary media age, with technology connecting the temporality of film and rocketry that Stark, Moore, and most others note, the mediality of filmic writing techniques ( Reading Matters 175), in Johnstons terms, must not simply be yet another (an additional and different) heuristic for analysis, as a discuss subsequently. Notable for pragmatic study, Johnston explains that mediality refers to the ways in which a literary text inscribes in its own language the effects produ ced by other media; furthermore pertinent, The critical task will be to ascertain how these effects are narrativized or can be seen to determine the representation of consciousness as a reading e ffect (175, my emphasis). Thus, rather than using medial heuristic, I cont inue with the paradigm of ellipsis and Pynchons writing with its multiple registersfinding a diagrammatic component, which acts in transversal connection between history and fiction: preterition, as rhetorical ellipsis and as epistemological concept. Avoiding a cinematic jump-cut switch in topi cs, this transition is aided by the textual post-signifying regime and formal logic of interval specifically discerned in hypodiegetic texts and explicitly in the earlier passage: So he re passes for him one more negligence and likewise groweth his Preterition sure. Th ere is no good reason to hope for any turn, any surprise I-see-it not from Slothrop (Pynchon 509, original formatting). Paralipsis (review for praxis) The focus upon preterition and writing also re-orients the discussion to my study of narrative as interface and of diegesis for invention, avoiding as well a structural identification with the narrators shifting ci nematic focalization (upon Slothr op or otherwise). To this end, I 181

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find coincidental and gene rative as sistance: in Narrative as Communication Didier Coste discusses not only a transversal axis of communicat ion (81), an alternative to rhetoric in which assumption of authority is the dominant gesture (82), but rhetorical p reterition (albeit in another context) and fictionality (105). I invoke this understanding not for its coincidental phrasing, certainly, or as counterpo int to mediality, but in complementarity, akin to the X-Y axes of Deleuzes assemblage viewand mo re directly, because I understand Pynchons deploying Preterition fundamentally in terms narratological and rhetorical. Granted, the use is highly referential in Pynchons writing as a concept from Calvinist theology, the Preterite being thos e passed over unlike the Elect However, it is not mere antecedent that relates textually William Slothr op and the authors ancestor William Pynchon, as noted by most scholars, most notab ly Moore concerning interface (Connectedness 136). The utility of this connection extends beyond the anal ytic means critics have found in the Puritans dualism (Stark 123). For example, Sanders links the Calvinist doctrine to Slothrops dissolution, as to to be dropped from cons piracies is to lose all conn ection with past and future (Mindless Pleasures 152): using a freque ntly-cited passage, Sanders fixate s on how paranoia is a secular form of the Puritan consciousness insofar as Slothrop is possessed by a Puritan reflex of seeking other orders behind the visible, also known as paranoia ([ GR ] 188) ( Mindless 144). To be clear, I am identifying a compelling elemen t of the novel not as (yet another) hermeneutic vantage but as diegetic focus on writing the fictional book, William Slothrops On Preterition and the historical publication The Meritorious Price of our Redemption by William Pynchon. By viewing the two 17th-century books of similar orig in as calling attention to the practice of writing, more so than the theme of preterition in Calvinist terms, we can better recognize the generative and transformative effects of Pynchons composing in ways other than 182

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referential or signifying language. A s I am conjecturing, this potentially identifies a writing formula Pynchons polymath style, and one that is apt for the lexiphile to think and write paradigmatically with assemblages. The idea of narrativity names one aspect to this literary assemblage, in fiction and possibly in scholarly rhetoric. Beyond integrating multiple texts in storytelling, the variations and forms of diege tic writing, markedly in Pynchons works, create multiple levels of discourses and regimes within the manifold assemblage. Another helpful angle for grasping preterition-ellips istic style derives from Cost e, who thoroughly expounds Gerald Princes narrativity term, and one of the three definitions of literariness provided: the activation and productive transfo rmation of the nondominant functi ons of an act of discourse, whatever functions of it cannot be dominant in the reception mileu ( Communication 86, original emphasis). In an experimental prag matics discerning Pynchons writing, ellipsis in form, rhetoric, and reference might quite rightly be regarded as a nondominant function of discourse that produces qualities of lit erariness beyond denotative or constative statements. The first major diegetic text occurs in Chapter Eleven of V. Confessions of Fausto Maijstral authored by tertiary character (father of Paola, who is pursued amorously by Pig Bodine in the present-da y narratives), and signed Valletta: 27 August 1956 (372). Although spatial epistemology is foregrounded, Why use the room as introduction to an apologia? (352), the misperception of ontological levels is avoide d by noticing it is phrased in direct address to future recipient (from your father): Maijstral is sealed against the present in order to deal with the past (352) through his writing. The characters accounts of the 1930s in Malta include historical reports, literary re ferences, a vulgar song (349), and even citations of his own writingin Costes terms, polyreference (125) a nd intratextual echo (127), the metafictional qualities of Pynchons writing. Although not ellipsistic rhetorically in stating, Fausto Maijstral 183

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is guilty of murder: a sin of om ission if you will (372), the narration of th is significant event the disassembly of the Bad Priest ( i.e. V.) by children (369)is comp rised within a diegetic letter read by a character, Stencil, in an interval sec ondary to the main discourse. The rhetorical technique of apophasis or paralipsisnot qu ite a portmanteau of ellipsis and preterition but approximately, given the Greek origin paraleipsis is employed in the dramatic narrative of Lot 49 concerning Trystero. On one hand, the device of indirectly invoking a subject, Trystero, by explicit omissi on is not employed in the diegetic play, The Couriers Tragedy that Oedipa viewsa departure from the original text by the company. Indeed, scholar Emory Bortz clarifies to Oedipa th e findings of her investig ating textual variants as logocentric critic: In the text I go along with personally [. .] that other couplet has the last line suppressed The book in the Vatican is only an obscene parody ( Lot 126). In the scholarly view, ostensibly, Trystero is thus preterite textually and thematicallyabsent and silent diegetically in Lot 49 and yet functioning as significant precisely in writing.10 Moreover, it is by this variant edition, which officially should be elided, that P ynchon evokes another frequency (or sector) of the paraleipsis paradigm, the religious writing of William Slothrop qua Willia Pynchon: DAmico thinks this edition was a Scurvhamite project. (127), Bortz remarks, further in the style of scholar ly citation; Robert Scurvham had founded, during the reign of Charles I, a sect of most pure Puritans (128) And while this connection invites decoding Gravitys Rainbow using preterition in the narrowly Pu ritan sense, potentia l invention by the nondominant function of ellipsis turns my attention to te xtuality and writing otherwise. In the m 10 Indeed, another diegetic text prominently features in the proliferation of the Trystero mythology: the appearance in The Couriers Tragedy is accounted for by the auth or, Richard Wharfinger, having used as source material a book titled An Account of the Singular Peregrinations of Dr Diocletian Blobb among the Italians, Illuminated with Exemplary Tales from the True History of That Outlandish And Fantastical Race ( Lot 129). The alleged prevalence of Trystero refashions the notion of peregrinations of Stencil, Oedipa, and Slothrop, linking the novels potentially in choragraphy from quest trajectory to elliptical ellipsis or better yet, ellipsistic ellipse 184

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next chapter, I keep these less ons and rhetorical understandings in m ind as I more directly develop my theorizing and using narrative as an interface and fictional material as diegesis for inventionparticularly encountering sensations expressed by aesthetic composition uniquely. 185

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CHAP TER 5 ASSEMBLAGE INTERFACETHEORY AND PRACTICE Novelistic Philosophy Accelerating in the experiment from the deve lopments in the prior chapter, the present focus undertakes diagramming literary expressions, aesthetic monuments, of sensations and experience more specifically. In concrete social assemblages, literary writing mediates the inchoate dimensions and multiple senses outside rationale thought: as in the cases of desire, for Deleuze and Guattari, and of historical events or moreover the unintel ligible disaster (all discussed here). Although it is feasible and enticing to id entify instances of heterogeneous series and transversal lines using the earlier vocabulary, that I find in novels by Pynchon and other writers, the salience of senses experienced (not yet legible) raises the on-going question of encountering expressed sensati on and progressing toward know ledge (both experienced and created). Specifically, this idea compels not on ly scholarly pragmatics of multiple semiotic regimes first, but as well to apply these aesthetic f eatures in creative practicequite likely a suitable method for encountering postsignifying expression, especially. Before attempting to use novels encountered in this regard, I thus examine an important complementary component, considering what p ragmatics-encounter reading finds expressed by intensive language. In a brief section, I next identify additi onal lessons for method on this topic discerned from Deleuze and Guattaris Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature (1975), including an earlier pitfall usi ng their work. The subsequent lite rary encounters with several novels then re-engages the problematic, the frontier of knowledge from another approach philosophically and rhetorically : beyond the discovery model, in the mode of inventionas a writer, and confronting the limits of writing, ai ded by novelistic expression in the aesthetic paradigm. This progression, particularly in te sting the possibilities for creating new knowledge, 186

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and the initial praxis advances the methodological st udy and discursive experim ent toward the conclusion of the project; creating a concept of sensation, through artisanal praxis using a novelistic assemblage, is thus attuned to dimensi ons temporal as well as affective. Reading Poetics Additionally helpful to these ends is the perspective of Hlne Cixous, a theorist similar to the other poststructuralist exemplars I have invoked thus far given her focus on language. Her attention to functions and effect s of writing beyond signification, diagrammatism in this parlance, elucidates and bolsters both the treatme nt of literature and the encounter method I am developing. Cixouss concerns presente d throughout her collection Readings (1991) relate generally to my project, as well. For example, in the seminar Apprenti ceship and Alienation, she remarks upon the limits of knowledge: The probl em with philosophical discourse is that it can be developed rapidly in an abstract way, in spirals (92). Concerning what of life can be incorporated into forms intelligible, she assert s that To work on what escapes [philosophy] can only be done poetically (92)perh aps through the not-knowing ( non-savoir ) of literary logic, not an ignorant nonknowing but an open know ing, which lets things happen (91). This alternative perspective of Cixousspresented in a context discussing Derrida, Heidegger, and Blanchot, moreove rinvokes the broa der issue of a dispositif and the limits for legitimate knowledge, which frames the specific insights and types of minor readings observable in the works of Cixous as well as Deleuze and Guattari. One new possibility is created by her approach to literature and langua ge, considering corporeal intelligence (53) for example, as Cixous reads in Heinrich von Kleist and Clarice Lispector. Mo re instructive is the statement of method in another seminar, Poetry, Passion, and History: Cixous states, I want to work on passion as path and on the encounter, pe rhaps the struggle, between passion and history. All this, for me, goes through the inscription of passion in writing (110, my emphasis). This 187

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diagrammatic reading of works by Kleist, Lispector, Paul Celan, and Marina Tsvetayeva identifies literary (poeti c) uses that transform language (132), Not strictly poetry proper, Cixous notes that in addition to di ction, we have to pay attention to the technique of storytelling (83), including narrative, dialogue, and characters. Finding in these a true desire that is not expressed (88)as Cixous does reading Lispectors The Foreign Legionmight be a goal too narrowly defined, granted. Yet, this attentiveness to othe r registers or regimes understands intensive language in writing as expressive (or poeti c) communication closer qualitat ively to music or movement, encounters normally disenfranch ised of knowledge (67) by the dispositif of Reason. As Cixous articulates, [I]t is also difficult because we are inhibited, disquiet ed; and communication of movement is something physical, re lated to the body. It scares. It is to make love. But most people resist it. They go back into their selves and become rigid (46). This description extends doubly to scholarly discourse, as I am arguing and seeking to remedy, given the limits upon thought and expression, conveying sensations encounteredperha ps what is incommunicable by signification (46), and yet possible by musico-poetic writing (149) in Cixouss framework. Indeed, she theorizes expression of experien ced or embodied sensation above or beyond signification, which to me appears recourse against the dispostif acting upon knowledge discourses: In music, events are much closer to our reality. One should be able to write the way one sings (29). Viewed another way, these conditions for possibility are thematized in literature as semantic and/or epistemological limits; an intensive procedure might thus be writing bodily gesture or movement (68), or with the noise of the law and aural register as does Joyce (9), unlike Blanchot and Kafka. in her readings. 188

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Describing properties of gesture or music this way might appear figurative when referencing literal instances in literary texts; however, as Cixouss pos tulations indicate, the metalanguage for diagrammatic reading is inadeq uate, especially when discussing qualities beyond signification as e xperienced, encountering expression of sensation. Stated otherwise, working in the aesthetic rather than referential or denotative pa radigm treats the language of sense and event unlike that of good-sense and verifica tion, to repeat. Like Cixous, Deleuze recognizes an experiential regist er in aesthetic expression, includi ng the inscription of passion, by reading literary language for its functions and effect s, particularly in works with Guattari. Declaring that the question becomes: how does it function? What function does it have? ( Kafka 49), they present an explicit and reflex ive principle. In Kafka, they find a minor literature that operates by intensive language, unlike the o rdinary [,] extensive or representative use ( Kafka 20)beginning with a fundamental reworking of the signifying gesture and broader gestus in their new rhetoric [and] new mode of reading (Bensmaa Kafka xii). As extended demonstration of their method a nd explication of key concepts, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature (1975) serves as a case study that pres ents both a marked exemplar for working against a dispositif and a hazard for praxis, which I briefly describe after discussing the former. Exemplar Study 2: Kafka Experimentation Reiterating that the terms used herein are not figurative, pertaining to Kafkas literature as well as to Deleuze and Guttaris con cepts, is important thematically with Kafka and methodologically, in that no referent is privileged or evoked by th is parlance. More directly, and akin with Cixouss sensory-reading, we can unders tand that the chief concern is the concrete level of language and its operation: pragmatics, overtly, fashions th eir reading at levels separate from representation and abstraction, recognizi ng the counterand post-signifying regimes. Significantly, Deleuze and Guattari present complex ideas through aesthetic figures encountered 189

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in Kafka, such as the two states of desire, evident in the image of the raised head or the bent head as an index of submission, the gesture of one who is judged (61, my emphasis). At the broader level of method, in their view Kafka deliberately kills a ll metaphor, all symbolism, all signification, no less than all designation (22). This understa nding compels the treatment of language they insist upon against interpretation: literature consists not of resemblance but of intensity intensives or tensors being any linguistic tool that allows a move toward the limit of a notion or a surpassing of it, marking a move ment of language toward its extremes, toward a reversible beyond or before (22). Although my in terest concerns linguistics less than this discussion might suggest, the appr oach appears to be the point of departure for Deleuze and Guattari, their pragmatics reading th at conceptualizes a particular deterritorialization in Kafka.11 Moreover, the invention of minor literature as concept concerns in tegrally the method of encounter-pragmatics as well as th e understanding of th e literary assemblage and its operations, both equally important to my purposes. First, to clarify, my earl ier discussions of intensive language use in literature relate here to minor literature, whether in specific lines of flight or greater senses of deterritorialization The specific circumstances for Kafkain his combining vernacular Czech and Yiddish, vehicular and refe rential/cultural German, and mythic Hebrew fashion him as exemplar for Deleuze and Guattari However, minor literature concerns issues of socio-political identity less than the act of dete rritorialization, insofar as the task is To make use of polylingualism of ones own language, to make a minor or intensive use of it by which an assemblage comes into play (26-7). Although pos ing great potential and interest for other scholars, in my context this notion is more significant one way, for innovating within the 11 Just as with line of flight the concept does not involve spatial movement literally or figuratively but degrees of intensity, as evident in the intensive use of language in mi nor literature (19). Moreover this functions in assemblages machinic, novelistic, collective, or dismantled (47)immanent points with potential for changing conditions of possibility, as in minor literatures intensive language [] with a high coefficient of deterritorialization (16). 190

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dispositif of the m ajority language; and in another, greater sense that the recourse is the aesthetic paradigm, literary machines in Kafka and for Deleuze and Guattari that generate possibility. Asserting that Language stops being repr esentative in order to now move toward its extremities or its limits (23, original emphasis), for instance, articulates a problematic of deterritorialization evident at levels aesthetic, epistemologica l, and social in the case of Kafka. Beyond the narrow consideration of counter or post-signifying regimes, and minor literature for that matter, this exemplar is valuable for my met hodological study given the specific theorizations of de territorialization and the literary assemblage within constructivist project working with the Kafka-machine (7). Indeed, Deleuze and Guattari describe their work as a Kafka experimentation that is without interp retation or significance and rests only on tests of experience (7). This text explicitly addre sses ways of working with literature, valuable especially for praxis this way as exemplar for innovation with and about Kafkas writing directly raising the earlier questi on of emulating style or using a dispositif As I noted in Chapter Three, recent scholarly texts, such as those by OSullivan and Clay, have emerged as productive methodological counterpoints to st rictly interpretive works. A nd while I cited only a few among many publications that demonstrate the over-em phasis (and frequent misunderstanding) of becomings and lines of flight the hazard of hermeneutic discour se is equally valid to note so as not to incorrectly recognize or encode such c oncepts at the level of signification; in other words, reading ostensible representati ons of terms rather than mapping ( diagramming) the multiple regimes and their functions or effects. On the contrary, encountering experiments in writing fundamentally enables i nnovation beyond simply encoding into a terminological schema. The latter approach could be misinterpreted a bout Deleuze and Guattaris reading authors like 191

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Proust, Beckett, Artaud, as Stivale implies (Two-Fold Thought 44)in w hose view Kafka reveal[s] the possibilitie s of an extended litera ry schizoanalysis (68).12 In another sense, Peter Trnka emphasizes constructivist praxis in his article Experimental Empiricism and the Ethic of Minor Literature, noting the experimentation of minor literature as bachelor production in Kafka; in Trnkas view, this conception enables our connecting concept production and event (56). With the goal of invention, it is this approach I am advocating and describing, in this me thodology of encountering generative and transformative literary f unctions: chiefly, the pragmatics of and innovation with deterritorialization and the literary assemblage, especially given the demands for interpretative discoursea dispositif for scholarly writing. My productive finding an d salient interest are thus the constructivist experimentation with the Kafka-machine by Deleuze and Guattari. Their inventive results specifically displace the three worst themes in many interpretations of Kafka [:] the transcendence of the law, the interiority of guilt, the subject of enunciation (45); adding that these themes are c onnected to all the stupid ities that have been written about allegory, metaphor, and symbolism ( 45), they instead produce a Kafka-concept, or abstract machine in their parlance (48). Just as in his long experi mentation (45), the Kafka text demonstrates an active dismantling (49) in discursive practice as well, presenting alternative perspectives: against a content-form dichotomy, the form of co ntent and of expression (28); against the territo rialized photograph (61), sonorous expr ession (6, 26, 86); against social 12 That Stivale equivocally frames an understanding of Kafka and A Thousand Plateaus in the ostensible original schema of Anti-Oedipus discounts his insights from apt inclusion for praxis in my methodologywhich I qualify reluctantly, given Stivales notable focus upon literary elements in the philosophy Deleuze and Guattari. This notwithstanding, he quotes an intriguing response from Guattari, found in another scholars work: Its not a question of method or doctrine.The book [ Kafka ] ( sic ) is a schizoanalysis of our relation to Kafkas work, but also of the period of Vienna in 1920 and of a certain bureaucratic eros which crystallized in that period, and which fascinated Kafka (1979b, 60; Genosko 1996, 207) (Stivale 68, my emphasis). This is worth noting given its relevance to the lessons for scholarship that I describe from experience and research such as I cite here. 192

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critic ism (58), the novelistic machinic asse mblage (48); against th e transcendental or paranoid law, Schizo-Law (73); against stratified territory, an unlimited field immanence (86); finally, against reified and transcendental machines, abstract machines on the field of immanence as dismantled assemblages (86-7). Beyond reconfiguring a critical perspective or producing a new exegesis of Kafkas oeuvre, which indeed it could be co nsidered, the results produced in Kafka indicate a style in thought and writing by means of the aesthetic paradigmnot simply because Deleuze and Guattari recognize and compose in the fo rm of series, as I earlier described The Logic Of Sense The literary machine of Kafka, more than ot her authors Deleuze encounters, enables in epistemology and discourse the heterogeneous assemblage rather than univo cal Idea governed by exclusion or binary opposition within the dispositif of Reason. We can observe this crucial point for method in perhaps the most salient point of this text: Writing has a double function: to translate everything into assemblages and to dismantle the assemblages (47). A constructivist project could thus integrate this additi onal view beyond pragmatics of semiotic regimes, a prospect for method I will attempt subsequently; moreover, the statement aptly describes Deleuze and Guatta ris as much as Kafkas texts. Viewed from one angle, this function and effect is evident in Kafka as a literary progression: first, machinic indexes signs of the assembly, as in the stories; then, abstract machines series in the novel; and finally, the assemblages of the machine (47-8, original emphasis). In a more concrete sense, the three components of Kafkas machine of writing or of expression are his lette rs, short stories, and major novels: in Deleuze and Guattaris view of these heterogeneous series, Between three elements there is a constant transversal communication (40, my emphasis). 193

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Abstract Machine, Concrete Les sons Before identifying what they find at this transversal dimension, it is important to note for attempting similar diagrammatic readingthat within each component Deleuze and Guattari encounter virtual lines of escape in possible states (7), whic h might actualize as enunciations or expressions (86) and transform the assemblage through deterritorialization Transformative or generative elements appear for example in literary instances of becomings -animal, -woman, and -child, as in the childhood block line of flight against memory (78); in triangulation that works to proliferate series, rather than repress with power (11); in the bachelor machine and artistic machine (70). In the parlance of intensive use Deleuze and Guattari postulate that Kafka attempts to extract from social representations assembla ges of enunciation and machinic assemblages and to dismantle these assemblages (46, my emphasis). For them, the nascent machine of expression by Kafka emerges as one that is all the more social and collective insofar as it is solitary, a bachelor, and that, tracing the line of escap e, is equivalent to a community whose conditions havent yet been es tablished (71); minor literature this way functions in the production of intensive quantities [], prolifer ation of series, [and] polyvalent and collective connections (71). A key lesson fo r method, and a hazard that I have erroneously performed in past work, is to unde rtake the unique and contingent conclusion drawn from precisely the invention strategy that which might be emulat ed, as I have advocated. In the case of Kafka the unique conclusion from diagramming the Kafka assemblage, and the main theme or transversal concept within the Kafka-machine, is desire (in the sense of intensity, not in limited terms of sexuality or psychology). Both the bachelor machine (71) and minor literature (86) in this reading function to th is end: There is no machinic assemblage that is not a social assemblage of desire, no social assemblage of desire th at is not a collective assemblage of enunciation (82). Contingent to their conceptions, this compound description 194

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otherwise conveys Deleuze and Guattaris invention of a Kafka -abstra ct machine Desire this way is what they find resonating as effectno longer within or above or throughout in spatial parlanceof the literary assemblage a post-signifying function of expression actively dismantled in affirmation. Indeed, in one of four questions for evaluating intensive writing they specifically posit, what is the ab ility of a literary machine, an assemblage of enunciation or expression, to form itself into this abstract machine insofar as it is a field of desire? (88). On one hand this inquiry could motivate an entire project, highly compelling for encounter-pragmatics of any object of study. Diagramming the desire expressed by a literary assemblage, or recognizing an inchoate abst ract machine, might this way correspond with Cixouss reading the inscription of passion like Derridas finding a dominant affect, a Stimmung or a pathos, a tone (Acts of Literature 291) in the vibration and event (308) of Ulysses. To wit, I approached Joyce s novel in an earlier project thusly, undertaking the last question of Kafka : using the alternative understandi ngs noted previously, I posited a becomingmusic of the text and its expression of desire, describing its deterrit orialization of mimesis in the affective paradigm through expressed intensity,13 encountered at levels di egetic and corporeal. By recognizing semiotic regimes of mu sic and gesture against photography, employing the binary of affirmation and bent-head guilt from Kafka (5), I proposed a new conception of desire that supplants the territorial izing Pornosophical philotheology (Joyce 353) of discourse generally and dismantles specifically the Oedipal Triangle of captured desire ( Kafka 61). 13 Perhaps this will have been the counter-signifying regime after all, with continued relevance for method in any case. Theorem Seven from A Thousand Plateaus is worth quoting at length for the elucidative value additionally: the deterritorializing element has the relative role of expr ession, and the deterritorialized element the relative role of content (as evident in the arts); but not only does the content have nothing to do with an external subject or object, since it forms an asymmetrical block with the expression, but the deterritorialization carries the expression and the content to a proximity where the distinction between them ceases to be relevant, or where deterritorialization creates their indiscernibility (example: the sound diagonal as the musical form of expression, and becomings-woman, -child, -animal as the contents proper to musi c, as refrains) (Deleuze and Guattari ATP 307). 195

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Approaching the novel with Deleuze and Guattaris ab stract machine conclusion motivated my recognizing and reconfiguring an understanding too narrowly, using the two great points of deterritorialization (Kafka 86): one turning the expressions into a sound that takes flight or into a language or intensities (against the photos) [;] the other taking the contents head over heels and away (against the be nt head of desire) ( Kafka 86). And while this approach certainly finds lines of flight in intensive becomings potentially transformative and immanent within the literary assemblage, the machinic functions and semiotic regimes encountered must be employed in constructivism rather than denot ative discourse. This problem is evoked for instance in my regarding seriously a Stephen-Bl oom-Molly chord of affective pa rallax (as I wrote); likewise in mapping an extant assemblage between reader (me), the Ulysses machinic expression, and the Deleuzean theory machineintegrating in to my study not only the points from Kafka but ethology of intensity from Spinoza: Practical Philosophy as well as the deterritorialization ( e.g. becoming-music) and field of immanence of desire from A Thousand Plateaus (154). To state plainly, although productive fo r new understanding, the procedure mostly appears to have encoded affective relations or encounter ed sensations into Deleuzean philosophy. Although not incorrect or in apt, this effort did not produce a new concept through an encounter-constructivist method. T hus, to parallel Deleuze in method, rather than using as heuristic for ostensibly critic al discourse, remains crucially the key goala lesson as well being to employ terminology productively, toward invention beyond simply identification. To this end, the method for practice to attempt consists of finding the generative a nd transformative elements of multiple semiotic regimes, as well as possible transversal coordination of heterogeneous series; then, diagramming a liter ary assemblage encountered and the dismantled expressed therein, an effect created by its machinic function, such as sensation perhaps. 196

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It is not as though the abstract machine of desire found in Ulysses is not immanent, or that the affective parallax and becoming-music intensity could not be used as the transformative elements within the literary assemblage. Besides the ambivalence noted about encoding the sensations encountered, though, there remains the concern over creating a transcendental concept of desirean idea returni ng the sensible to the in telligible only, by using Deleuze and Guattari as heuris tic. Moreover, although the many semiotic regimes Joyce employs might serve as generative literary machine for reinventing a concept of desire akin to Carolls fiction, the necessary element in the present met hodology is a diegesis for inventing a concept of sensation: that which is encountered and experienced, not exoge nous and applied analytically. Keeping with this contrast, the case of expressed desire might too easily slip from the lines of flight by Joyces intensive writing to the regime of signification, if using mimetic instances, and worse still to levels of abstraction and even territorialization in positing relations between writer and character as ostensibly represent ative, allegorical, or symbolic. More concretely, I am rais ing the issue of method and c onstructivism, specifically whether a transformative elemen t such as the becoming-music deterritorialization that I have diagrammed is suitable for inventing a concept experienced as in this case of desire. The immanent affective parallax in my reading generates a line of flight toward expressive becoming-music, beyond territoria lized signification (f orm), as triangulated desire (content) freed from Oedipal territorialization. This concept could now be inscribed -desire an intensive abbrevia tion that evokes bo th the DT of deterritorialization as well as that of differential time, a key lesson from my worki ng with Pynchons novels. In this way, the noted flaw in my applying Kafka as heuristic for analysis not only emphasizes the utility of pragmatics. Moreover, recalling the perspectiv es of Cixous and Deleuze and Guattari, thinking the entire 197

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paradigm includes an imperative for our incorpor ating the experienced di mensions in the product of artisanal praxis temporal and affectiv e sensation encountered, made intelligible. ( Reprise ) Working at the frontiers of our knowledge In continuing to propose a rhetoric for artisanal praxis expressive scholarly writing in the fashion of its object of st udy, my approach is motivated by and continues applying the lessons derived from my examination of Deleuze s style as exemplar. With the problematic of the unknown, or better, the unknown as problema tic, the question or mystery is occasion and opportunity for invention; rather than strictly answering a question with a solution, a problematic consists of question, problem, and c oncept. To this end, the prior chapters partly demonstrated the limits of the discovery model in the hermeneutic detective, using Pynchons characters and narratives as structu ral portrait for my position as scholar. This approach also addressed the first half of Deleuze s description, in his reflexively stating that A book of philosophy should be in part a very particular species of detective novel, in part a kind of science fictionnot denoting hermen eutics, but reminding that concepts should intervene to resolve local situations ( DR xx) in problematics. Undertaking the prospect that Philosophys like a novel ( Negotiations 140), I have thus far posited analogically Pynchons diegesis for invention in parall el fashion to Deleuzes finding in Carroll a mise en scene of nonsense ( Logic xiii). Additionally, this position corresponds to how novelists, and artisanal composers make the work a process of learning or experimentation by working with the questioning blind spot, in Deleuzes terms ( DR 199). With this in mind, the second part of Deleuzes description might better identify the axis with greater potential for innovati onespecially in our needing to avoid the conventional discovery model for knowledge, when encountering unknown and unintelligible events mediated. 198

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As I introduced in Chapter 2, the fr ontier of knowledge names the coordinates (ostensibly spatio-temporal, for now) for th e process of philosophy generally and encounterscholarship with particular objects of study. Wort h reiterating is that Ol kowski, while discussing problematics (question-problem-concept), notes that the Detective-SciFi writing of philosophy requires invention, with hermeneutics shifting to the intuition of the being of becoming ( Ruin 179, my emphasis). The artisan philosopher in this way approaches the unknown precisely as opportunity for invention, the moment when we imagine having something to say, Deleuze states: We write only at the frontiers of our knowledge, at the border which separates our knowledge from our ignorance and transf orms the one into the other ( DR xxi). Notably, Deleuze describes this epistemologi cal status (or position) for the thinker in the context of philosophical writing as Science Fi ction, in the preface to Difference and Repetition when he emphasizes empiricism as unde rtak[ing] the most insane creation of concepts ( DR xx). Thus keeping in mind that encount er heuretics does not (merely) relay observations, the method for praxis moreover shifts from the classic detective-discovery model to the SciFi-author paradigm for invention, while still maintaining the contingency of concepts to problems (local situations). This shift in orientation, wh ich I have undergone, and dramatized using novelistic elements, poses a compelling opportunity: rather than the hermeneutic-detective model, innovation might em erge by approaching as Sci-Fi author the task of novelistic philosophy that Deleuze elsewh ere assertsyou have to ask What's going to happen?, What's happened? ( Negotiations 140).14 14 This chapter of Negotiations originally published On Philosophy, Conversation with Raymond Bellour and Francois Ewald, Magazine Litteraire 257 (September 1988). I note the sources as significant given the context, contemporaneous with the project with Guattari and appearing between A Thousand Plateaus (1980) and What is Philosophy? (1991)what I have identified earlier as Deleuzes pe riod of increasingly aesthetic objects of study. Additionally, and more applicable presently, is that this remark reprises the typology of narrative lines in ATP : with What happened? characterizing the Novella, What is going to happen? the tale, and elements of both in the novel, the variation of its perpetual living present ( duration ) (192)as I discuss subsequently. 199

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As a second component of novelistic philosophy and artisanal praxis pa rticular to literary encounters, in addition to diegesis, the retrospective-prospective questioning evokes the temporal qualities of narrative. This is both a methodological principl e, provisionally, and a guiding perspective for the present chapter, particular ly considering narrative as apt interface for experience. Applying the literary analog for philosophical di scourse and/or composition is not uncomplicated, though, beyond tenuous extension discursively of the object of encounter to the method of study For instance, Alliez ambi guously re-frames Deleuze and Guattaris work in the aesthetic paradigm, describing how The concept thus becomes narrative and philosophy a new genre of story in which description take s the place of the object, in which the point of view replaces the subject [] (5, my emphasis). For the sake of progressing and avoiding a tangential argument, I continue in the analogical typology that narrative is a rhetorical feature of composing, distinct from concepts and problematic (diegesis correlative to plane, apparatus, dispositif ). Beyond adhering, albeit practical in simplicity, to Deleuzes remarking that the characters are concepts, and the scenes, the settings, are space time (Negotiations 140-1) in this context, I am moreover using narrative for its temporal qualities, as pert ains experience; as well, given that the formal organization and logic (interface) derives from my and is particular to my object of studya contingent choice variable by project and di scipline. With this in mind, the ch aracters of Sci-Fi choragraphy are the concept and the artisan, at least to the degr ee of style individually: the first-person ( experienced ) position of encounter incl udes both the conditions ( dispositif ) and the change ( line of flight ), particularly by employing narrative as an affective and temporal interface. The Sci-Fi author approach, instead of th e detective search, toward the frontier of knowledge draws upon the features of literary writing in the aesthetic paradigm, thus enabling 200

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new types of knowledge. More specifically, the discursive meaning m aking beyond rational knowledge is enabled by identifying and being sensitive to the features expressive of elided dimensions, as Cixous and Deleuze and Guattari have shown. Particularly instructive are their diagrammatic readings of senses and sensations such as passion or desire, deterritorialized that are inscribed and expressed by intensive language, with the literary mediators encountered linking the reader to concrete social assemblages of experience. Toward the aim of discourse that is not merely denotative (o r territorializing), the lessons de rived from Pynchons style thus far also assist with novelistic analogs for scholarly rhetoricmost es pecially in using as diegesis the logic and praxis of paradigm transversality and assemblage As I have emphasized, one key insight for application is finding a nd then using the intensive feature of materiality and textuality, which operate with functions a nd effects at semiotic regimes transformative and diagrammatic Concerning temporality, particularly orientat ions historical and fu ture, the productive means for innovation and expression are found by diagramming features of literary language employed in narrative. This is the interface fo r my encounter with percepts, affects, and sensations in aesthetic compositions mediated always, as opposed to ex perienced directly, just as the artisanal composition will be. In other words, we encounter and thus compose with the temporal sensations of Whats happened? and Whats going to happe n? at the level of writing. Just as Pynchons polymath stylenot just multi-disciplinary, but in ways historical, fictional, and personalmakes intense a dieges is for invention by composing uniquely, so too have other novelists called my attention to writing in their aesthetic monuments compositions of percepts, affects, sensations. Before concluding with my first inventiv e interface attempt, one notable example to examine in th is regard is Kurt Vonneguts Slaughterhouse-Five (1969), with its historical, literary and pe rsonal composition and its textua l ecology of multiple discourses. 201

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Literary En counters Assemblage: Atemporal Historiography Forgetfulness [] refers us to nonhistori cal forms of time, to the other of all tenses, to their eternal or eternally provisional indecision, bereft of destiny, without presence. Blanchot, The Writing of the Disaster (85) During an inconsequential scene in Jonathan Safran Foers Extremely Loud & Incredibly Close (2005), eight-year-old Oskar Schellthe protagonist and one of th ree narratorsgives a class presentation on the bombing of Hiroshima. The episode begi ns with an audio-recorded interview with a survivor who recounts her ex perience seeking and finding her dying daughter, prompted by her interlocutors conventionally remarking Can you describe the events of that morning? (Foer 187) and It must be hard to ta lk about these things (189). After playing the recorded testimony, the character reports his fascinati ng research about sc ientists observing the height and diameter of the blast by obs erving the shadows cast by intervening objects (189); to illustrate how characters were neatly burned out of found documents, he presents a die-cut sheet of paper, with the first page of A Brief History of Time in Japanese (190). Beyond the characterization f unction of the reference, Foer much later bookends the peculiarity and irony of the dual-approach to performative research by Oskar, a boy who perpetually invents scenarios a nd technical solutions (and feels anxiety about this compulsion), when including a diegetic letter-response from Stephen Hawking: addressing the question the boy had posted, What if I never stop inventing?, Hawking both confesses the desire to be a poet and reassures Oskar, Maybe you're not inventing at all (305) In recounting these passages, I mean both to highlight Foers transver sal axis of narrative c onstruction and to evoke by literary encounter the precarious issue of presenting information directly or indirectly constructing knowledge and discourse by m eans of denotation or performance. The issue dramatized in miniature here is th e question of ones selecting an interface in terms of discursive paradigm, mode or logic, and materials; compos ing by semiotic regimes 202

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signifying ( e.g. repres entation, testimony) or otherwis e, including mixed or multimodal typology. This rhetorical decision-making, put plainly, and its inherent dilemma are foregrounded by Kurt Vonnegut in Slaughterhouse-Five, most explicitly in the metafictional framing of chapters one and ten. As Foer later replicates with his device of a character both database-searching (by Google) and imaginative, Vonnegut rhetorically confronts a frontier of knowledge regarding the exceptional case of e xperiencing a disaster first-hand. Writing the Timeless DisasterOutside the Slaughterhouse To be clear from the outset, I am exploring the focus upon creating expression that novelists direct, continuing from the prior chapter my approach of making meaning using an interface Avoiding the issue of testimony given the scope of this project, a key component of encounter heuretics is composi ng expressions and articulations (broadly summarized) of our various types of knowledge making sense of experience, rather than evincing good sense in the rational dispositif In reflexive fashion, Vonneguts working on my famous Dresden book (4) within the very novel calls attention to the choice of materi als, in Costes terms, as a decisive step in the production of narrative, one that is as important indeed as the transformation of these materials by the performances of linguistic synta x, narrative syntax, and aesthetic composition ( Communication 242, my emphasis). Overtly, the knowledge frontier is engaged by Vonneguts including this process, most instructively, in ways explicit and inherent: the metafictional elements, as well as genre c onventions of science fi ction and historiography. What I find most generative in Vonneguts te xt and particularly va luable for method, if not necessarily encountering sensation aesthetically, is the recourse to modes of writing given the inability, literally and philosophi cally, to produce an eye-witness account of the firebombing of Dresden, 13-15 February 1945. Indeed, even though he calls the book a f ailure because it was written by a pillar of salt (28)looking b ack like Lots wifeVonnegut, in his opting 203

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against signification, demonstrat es the value of indirect aesth etic vehicles for expression. Expressing avant la lettre the philosophical m ediations of Maurice Blanchot in The Writing of the Disaster (1980), Vonnegut reflexively addresse s the reader (and his publisher): It is so short and jumbled and ja ngled, Sam, because there is nothing intelligent to say about a massacre. Ever ybody is supposed to be dead, to never say anything or want anything ever again. Everything is supposed to be very quiet after a massacre, and it always is, except for the birds. And what do the birds say? All there is to say about a massacre, things like Poo-tee-weet? (24) Foregoing an extensive theoretical investigation in favor of explor ing the modes of textuality as recourse, I am compelled forward by two points of coincidence that link (paradigmatically?) Vonneguts style and novelistic inve ntion; both of which concern th e respective semiotic regimes and conventions of metafiction, Sci-Fi, a nd historiography included in the novel. First, in the same section describing material choiceslinguistic, cultural, and compositional (242)for narrative, Coste reminds that there are at least two blind spots on the plane of available materi als: the socio-linguistic dispositif of the unutterable and moreover the types of ignorance, such as the forgotten, the uninvented, the unimaginable, the unconceivable, or other faces of memory, experience, and beliefs ( Communication 244). Coste thus names the problematic and the fr ontier facing Vonnegut specifically and artisanal scholars generally in my scope of encounter heuretics, how possible to create types of knowledge(s). One type is addressed directly by Blanchot, evoking Vonneguts poetics, in his asserting, But the experience of the disasterthe experience none ca n have [] obliges us to disengage ourselves from time as irreversible [] (Disaster 78). This is the second co-inciding point, which I discuss to lesser extent after the first, with which I try to connect concerning Vonneguts Sci-Fi invention strategies. For example, noting how Vonnegut avoids representing the disaster and conventional ways of speaking about the unspe akable (48), Klinkowitz highlights techniques 204

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reflecting the tim eless and spaceless dimensions of Tralfamadorian fiction (72), such as Billy Pilgrims space-time travel, like the scie nce fiction writing of Kilgore Trout ( Reforming 72). More importantly, the first pe rspective specifically recognizes the limits and affordances of materials for composition, as I have been as serting about working in the aesthetic paradigm. With the problematic of experience being degrees unintelligible and inexplicable, qualitatively (such as exceptional events) as we ll as progressively during the past sixty years, a specific task and activity for contemporary writers can be cons idered within this general scope summarized by Kittler: The quotidian data flow must be arrest ed before it can become image or sign What is called style in art is only the switchboar d of these scannings and selections ( Gramophone 104). As I earlier posited, an interface for sense making might enable our shift from making sense of the world intelligibly (analytic) to co mposing expression (intel lect and sensation) by using, stylistically and perhaps intensively the available materials to confront the uninvented or the unimaginable (Coste 244). Consideri ng the prior example of Gravitys Rainbow, the cybernetic jamming of the headlin es message of Hiroshima (Moore 225) calls attention to the material, textual, and discursive means fo r sense-making in the newspaper photo of the mushroom cloud and unintelligible caption, MB DRO ROSHI ( Gravitys 693). Just as the discourse of Slothrops final scene (?) is explic itly phrased with sexual associations in free indirect narration, the process of me diation and experienced knowledge is moreover evoked in his learning of the cataclysmic event impossibl y At the instant it happened (694)casually, unaffected, sitting on a curb, while Strips of insulation hang up in the morning fog (693, my emphasis). Similarly, and to greater degrees, Slaughterhouse is comprised of expression variously mediated textually. 205

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Historical Rhetorical Choices (1945-2001) The elements generative and transformative in Slaughterhouse that emerge most notable for my project are the respectiv e types of writing in Vonneguts composition. Thus far I have been avoiding analysis in favor of trying partly the indirect approach he uses as well as the unintelligible disaster paradigm, which ranges at the poles of Vonnegut and Foer from Dresden and Hiroshima 1945, Vietnam and Massachusetts 1968, and New York City 2001. In both ways, the rhetorical choice appears to be using an other historical disaster as vehicle: using Dresden as story and not synecdoche, Vonneguts account(s) indirectly addresses military science in Vietnam in 1968 (268); while the referent in Foers novel motivates the narratives of two significant characters, Grandfathe r and Grandmother, and the devi ce using them as diegetic writers (although not literary authors ), especially in chapters titled Why Im Not Where You Are (108 ff. ) and My Feelings (75 ff.). A simpler account of their poetics might be the the aesthetic pr oblem for Vonnegut as described by Lundquist (1977) in an early article, How to con ceptualize and define the night terrors of an era so unreal, so unbelievable, that the very term fiction seems no longer to have any currency (Bloom 43).15 The re-invented form of the novel that Vonnegut produces through imagery, stylistic syntax, and telegraphic-Tralfa madorian-atomic structure appear to Lundquist to serve as one of the best so lutions we have to the problem of describing the unimaginable (53). Likewise, Klinkowitz later summarizes how the writers art of rearranging the elements [] gives readers the chance to experience the wo rld in fresh new ways, and not be prisoners of any one cultures typical forms of description ( Reforming 105). In this regard, Kittlers 15 James Lundquist (1977), The New Reality of Slaughterhouse-Five ; found in Kurt Vonnegut's SlaughterhouseFive (Chelsea House Publishers, 2001). Although I diverge from his exalting the Tralfamadorian structure as the means to embody a new reality in his novel (45), Lundqu ist like Klinkowitz later is in structive for the focus upon how The process of re-invention is made vivid by Vonneguts style (52), dually concerning the process formally for writers and experientially for individuals in unintelligible society. 206

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switchboard of modes, evident in various text ual discourses, operates notably as Vonneguts style, one that is similar to the formula observe d in Pynchons invention and even more evident. The textual ecology or typology incl udes discourses autobiographical and metafictional, Vonneguts war experience, recoll ection, and novel-writing process; generic of fiction, or fantastical and fabulat ory, including space-time travel (29 ff. ) and alien abduction to the planet Tralfamadore (34), the inhabitants of which see in four dimensions (35); intertextual of literary writing, including Valley of the Dolls (111), The Red Badge of Courage (125-6), and The Brothers Karamazov (128) in the fictional narrative, and works by Roethke and Celine in the frame-chapter (26); and historical, in the refere nces to World War II (and Vietnam) events and locations as well as in the writer-cha racter of Bertram Rumfoord (235). A counterpoint to this Harvard professor and Air Force historian character, Pilgrims favorite author (128) Kilgore Trout appears not only as an obscure science fiction writer of works like Maniacs in the Fourth Dimension (132); he also functions with intra-textual transversality and reflexive intertextuality, f eaturing in several other Vonnegut novels, like Howard Campbell (206), the Nazi ex-patriot playwright, from his 1960 novel Mother Night Notably, chapter eight begins with scenes in 1945 of Billy and Campbell in the P.O.W. camp and transitions to several 1967 episodes featuring Trout before concluding, with Billys recalling he did not travel in time to the experience ( 226)several events of the Dresden bombing and evacuation upon surviving in the meat locker (226-32).16 16 Klinkowitzone of the most prominent Vonnegut scholarsnotes the recycling of Player Piano s setting, Sirens of Titan s Tralfamadorians, Mother Night s Nazi Germany, Cats Cradle s apocalypse as experienced by a writer (65) and of characters from Mr. Rosewater He writes, To keep himself and his fictional characters together, Vonnegut must reinvent the novels form. To help him do this, he looks back on his previous novels to see how their characters have survived his own twenty-year writers block with the matter of Dresden ( Reforming 64). 207

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By not choosing exclusively but instead wr iting with both historical discourse and science-fiction conventions, Vonnegut e ngages and creates by means of the knowledge frontier in multiple ways, without resolving the unima ginable or inexplicable dimensions of the paradigm. Moreover, the ostensibly contra punctal relation, wit hout privileging one discoursea key lesson for readers of this novel, I would addbetween science fiction and historiography produces an inventive result through both the aesth etic and rational paradigms. On one hand, the device of Trout as character-au thor indirectly accounts for the science-fiction genre tropes like time-travel and the Trafalma dorians, while his characterization of total obscurityHe did not think of himself as a writer for the simp le reason that the world had never allowed him to think of himself in this way (215)and sales location of the tawdry bookstore (257) subtly and reflexively undermin e the novels fabulation elements (beyond any simple philistine-bourgeois divi de of literary standards).17 Besides questioning the certainty of the main narrative, given the similarity Pilgrim ostensible experiences to Trouts novels like The Big Board (257), and beyond questions of escapism, the generic conventions like time-travel and the epis odes on Tralfamadore operate in Vonneguts composition only at the signifying regime. By this I mean that that tropes of being unstuck in time (29) and perceiving four dimensions simultaneously or as permanent momentsthe way we can look at a stretch of the Rocky Mountains (34)are presented 17 Another perspective is articulated by McHale, while desc ribing about the interaction between science fiction and postmodernist writing: regarding Breakfast of Champions (1973) he views Trout as Vonneguts self-caricature, [] imagining himself as the more or less straight scienc e-fiction writer that he had started out to be in early novels like Player Piano (1952), The Sirens of Titan (1959), and Cats Cradle (1963) (Postmodernist Fiction 72). Regardless of the romantic irony that McHale reads, th e meeting of author-charact er and character-author in Breakfast is compelling to consider as one of the genres of ontological poetics (72) in metafiction. Another view of this dynamic, and counterintuitive insi ght, appears more recently in Toths The Passing of Postmodernism (2010): While Trouts character typically voices a type of nostalgia for the possibility of truth and stable meaning [] Vonnegut (as narrator) repeatedly suggests that a writer has a responsibility to express the impossibility of truth, meaning, stable categ ories, order (96). 208

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straightforward, using denotative (r epresentative) language for this seem ingly inventive content. This quality provides little recourse for invention, by diagrammatic reading, and instead facilitates conventional wo rk in the limited discourse of inte rpretation. For example, reading the novel using Nietzsches amor fati as perspective, Tally asserts th at in its formal or stylistic organization and in its content or philosophy, [ Slaughterhouse-Five ] functions as an extended meditation upon the eternal return ( Iconography 71). Given the question of encountering sensat ions (percepts, affects) and of changing conditions for invention by the aes thetic paradigm, the recourse to Tralfamadorian stratigraphy appears limited for artisanal praxis concerning historical even ts. Likewise, Vonneguts narratives put into stark relief the shared problem of testimony in the counterpoint of sciencefiction conventions to historiography, accentuat ed in Billy Pilgrims radio reporting about Tralfamadore (32) and his retort, I was there (2 45), to the historian Rumfoord. The alternative, using available materials for sense-making, is more akin to the rhetorical choices we face as scholars, which Vonnegut thematizes (satirical ly, but without irony I w ould say) in narrative using Rumfoord: the Harvard profes sor is ostensibly composing a readable condensation of the twenty-seven volume Official History of the Army Air Force in World War Two, even though there was almost nothing in the twenty-seven volumes about the Dresden raid [] (244). Vonnegut foregrounds the knowledge frontier and our recourse markedly in this way, much like the earlier scene of experiencing the bombing within the shelter of the meat locker (228), emerging later to the surface of the m oonwith its curves smooth only when seen from a distance (229). What is there to say about a massacre? we wonder, much less a secret kept and elided from official history for twenty -three years (244); this ev inces the operation of a dispositif in several ways (institutional, discursive) a nd evokes the rhetorical issue of expression 209

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when having nothing intelligent to say. Like the earlier narrative inclusion of Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds (1841) by Charles Mackay in the reflexive fram e chapter, this section references act ual historical texts, such as The Destruction of Dresden by an Englishman named David Irving (238), as we ll as Trumans announcement of the atomic attack on Hiroshima (237-8). Despite the rational dispostif of referential discourse, the identification of a knowledge fr ontier in the collective ignoran ce of Americans compels the historian who notes Ive got to put something about it in my book. From the official Air Force standpoint, it'll all be new (244). Inventive Interlude: Another transversal line and virtual fork of path we can envision having taken, in resonance heure tics: while on maneuvers in South Carolina, Billy Pilgrim plays an organ in with only thirty-nine keys and two stopsvox huma na and vox celeste (39), as part of his characterization as a chaplains assistant before being deployed to the Battle of the Bulge in 1944 (where my grandfather fought, we think). This organ, Vonnegut mentions curiously, is made by a vacuum-cleaner company in New Jersey (39). Linking by this association, another character from New Jersey Seymour the Swede Levov in Philip Roths (1997) American Pastoral narrowly misses meeting the manly, patriotic challenge [that he] secretly set for himself just after Pearl Harbor of combat in the Marine Corps: He was just finishing up his boot training at Parris Island, South Carolina [] when the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. As a result, the Swede got to spend the rest of hi s hitch as a recreation specialist right ther e on Parris Island (Pastoral 14). Imagining this way that the umpire who announces to Billys company they are all theoret ically dead (39) is instead an umpire of a baseball game: playing against The Swedes team from Parris Island, by way of Newark; imagining an organ with more than two voices, using other frequencies typically excluded 210

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com posing with the aesthetic paradigm, not na vet or idealism but cr eative response at the frontier of knowledge. Small-Scale History (Writing Time at the Frontier) Before concluding by discussing the implicati ons for temporality and transitioning to the next section, I am compelled by this feature of the novel to cons ider the problem of historical writing regarding multiple modes of discourse in practice. Viewed this way in relation, both synechdocal figures of Trouts Sci-Fi conventio ns and Rumfoords historiography evoke the limitations of certain types of writing and rhetorical tropes: most concerning for me is that either view entails an atemporal stat us of the composition, whether th e four-dimensional perception of frozen moments (Tralfamadorian) or the en cyclopedic re-configurat ion of events into readable condensation volumes. Generally stat ed, both cases store knowledge into retrievable database form, which excludes and perhaps preclude s temporal experience in encountering this information, as I have posited. Both this problem and alternative recourse emerge in the textual ecology of Vonneguts composing with discourses and tropes of SciFi, historiography, and metafictionthe latter of which I recognize provisionally as possible solution at least in praxis. First, I must acknowledge that this is my main concern, finding potential means for innovation within the dispositif beyond the disciplinary descriptions of texts; useful to this end, however, are touchstone theorizations about postmodern historiograp hic fiction by Jameson (1984/91) and Hutcheon (1989), which have been employed in more recent years throughout (and can be compounded with) discussions of na rrative temporality, as for example by Currie (1998) and Richardson (2002). Admittedly, this conn ection and present approach arises from an intriguing mention of historical writing by Currie, apt to my reading of Slaugherhouse-Five. Discussing the prospect for perfo rmative rather than a constativ e narratology, as I have been attempting, he notes that through non-noveli stic thinking like historical sources, 211

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historiographic m etafiction of ten does the opposite[:] incorpor ating into the fiction some explicit, constative statement which would tradit ionally belong to the discourses of criticism or theory (Postmodern Narrative 69). Although general, this view links in rhetoricfor praxis, potentiallythe multimodal writing Vonnegut employs, as Jameson and Hutcheon describe. As my focus remains the rhetorical choices of narrative techniques and literary vehicles for expressing experienced concept, through aesthetic composition (percepts, affects, sensations), the problem of novelistic historicity described in simpler cases is help ful toward understanding and using the formula Vonnegut compounds by th e reflexive and metafictional qualities. A particular instance of this perspec tive is the example of Doctorows Ragtime (1975) in Jameson and Hutcheons theorizations, and the use of historical characte rs, unlike Doctorows The Book of Daniel (1971) with its metafictional charact er-author and dual settings like Slaughterhouse As I mentioned generally, Hutcheon identi fies how the histor ical figures in Ragtime challenge our perhaps unexamined notions about what might constitute historical truth (Politics 91); this function both confirms and subverts the power of the representations of history (91). More akin to the composition of Slaughterhouse is the use of histor ical documents in Daniel which stress both the discursive nature of those representations of the past and the narrativized form in which we read them (Hutcheon 84, my emphasis). This insight further describes the textual effect of the Rumfoord-histori ography device in terms of available materials, and yet beyond historicity, there persist the question of temporality at the knowledge gap or SciFi-frontier. At the level of fictional writing, the author characters Rumfoord, Trout, and Vonnegut create an effect of reflexivity that maintain s fundamentally the process and experience of sensemaking regardless of genre/discourse, beyond the level of tropes. Taking license with Jamesons formal descriptions, a performative narratology becomes clearer when considering the two types 212

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of postm odern fantastic hist oriography the he identifies ( Postmodernism 368). The first type, fabulation as chronicle, both uses the form or genre of historiography and transforms historical verisimilitude [] into multiple a lternate patterns (368); Doctorow, like Vonnegut and Pynchon, thus shows rhetorically how the appro ach offers writers the most remarkable and untrammeled movement of invention (368). Alt hough fabulation and its implications of SciFi creation call to mind the fantastical elements a la Trouts novels and Pilgrims episodes, Jameson notably emphasizes how narrative writing by way of its very implausibility becomes the figure of a larger possibility of praxis (369, my emphasis) concer ning actual historical content and experience. And while authors like Doctorow, Pynchon, and Foer might ultimately appear better methodological exem plars for their not having undergone events first-hand like Vonnegut, the formula and possibility articulated by Jameson resounds regardless: agency here steps out of the historical record itself into the process of devising it (369). Directly evoking the important frame device of Slaughterhouse, the reflexive status of writing considered this way connects Jamesons second type of historiographi c metafiction, an invent ed diegesis and plot with historical characters as wellevident in Ragtime likewise as Hutcheon describes. Unlike Ragtime and Gravitys Rainbow (and other postmodern historical novels), Slaugherhouse primarily employs and inscribes historicit y in its settings and events, more so than using historical figures as character s. For instance, Doctorow presents a prisca theologia or secret wisdom ( Ragtime 146) of history as cyclicalreinc arnation, universal patterns of order and repetition (148), occult knowle dge from the Hermetica (149)through caricatures of J.P. Morgan and Henry Ford; whereas in Slaughterhouse, Vonnegut conveys a similar perception strictly through invented char acters and narratives of Trout, Pilgrim, and Tralfamadorians. Resembling Pynch ons narrative contrivances in Lot 49 Doctorow satirizes 213

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types of knowledge particular to literacy and texts: Ford has already learned everything he needs about reincarnation from a $0.25 book, An Eastern Fakir's Eternal Wisdom, published by the Franklin Novelty Company of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (Ragtime 152); Morgan, by contrast, has employed scholars to trace the origins of the prisca theologia beginning retrospectively from a text he possess, like one of Pynchons characters, a folio of one of the first Rosicrucian text, The Chemical Wedding of Christian Rosencrutz (148). One intratexual irony is that another character Tateh, creates movie books fo r the novelty company initially off the street, quite literally (133), before join ing the film industry a nd prospering (259). The outcome of the literary scholar remains to be seen, whether we adapt to changing conditions and become creators or remain perpetually devo ted to hobbyhorses like Morgans: My scholars have traced for me, like the best detectives, the existence of this idea and of various mysterious organizations to maintain it, in most of the Renaissance cultures, in medieval societies and in an cient Greece. []. The earliest recorded mention [] comes to us through the Greek in the translated writings of the Egyptian priest Hermes Trismegistus. It is Hermes who gives the historical name to this occult knowledge. It is called the Hermetica. (149) The key question for writing appears whethe r the making up of unreal history is a substitute for the making of the real kind, as Jameson posits ( Postmodernism 369); particularly evoking the genre of speculative fiction inventing new multiple or alternate strings of events (Jameson 369) appears limited effectively for en counter heuretics. For example, discussing Philip K. Dicks novel The Man in the High Castle (1962), Dannenberg notes how characters read an alternate-history text called The Grasshopper Lies Heavy (208), and conjectures that Through this device[,] Dick suggests a potentially infinite lands cape of possible counterfactual 214

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worlds (20 9 Coincidence).18 On one hand, I maintain this fict ion is quite different from the expression-vehicle Vonnegut uses, and less applicab le in practice; however, the specific insight about the diegetic novel reinforces the transv ersal potential of multifarious textuality. Another conception of this type of writing is Alternate History and Historiographic Metafiction (Dannenberg 218), such as Roths The Plot Against America (2004). Roth uses not only historical documents (in the Postscript especially) but contem poraneous material and media, notably text Drawn from the Archives of Newarks Newsreel Theatre to narrate critical plot events Tuesday-Friday 06-16 October 1942 ( Plot 301-18). Additionally, in counterpoint, one character in pronounces, History is everything th at happens everywhere. Even here in Newark. Even here on Summit Avenue. Even what happens in his house to an ordinary manthatll be history too someday (180); the characters son, P hilip Roth, later remarks, I wanted nothing to do with history. I wanted to be a boy on the smallest scale possible ( Plot Against 233). Sensemaking for the boy consists not merely in cognitive mapping his nightmarish vision of Americas anti-Semitic fury (343) eastbound to Newark, but in his 1934 National Parks stamp collection emblazoned in a dream with a blac k swastika (43)his available materials for experiencing and narrating unintelligible forces more locally and personally. In the composition of Slaugherhouse-Five, Vonnegut brings hist ory-writing to the smallest scale of experience, much the way Roth does in using his hometown (Newark) even in an alternate history fiction. Besides the thr ee instances appearing in Pilgrims fictional narrative, the last chapter concludes the metafi ctional frame device, beginning with Vonneguts ruminating upon death; this perspective and form al feature poses great potential for practice. 18 Potential poetics of artisanal praxis from Dicks novel instead: The hands of the artificer [] had wu and allowed that wu to flow into this piece. [] I recall a shrine in Hiroshima wherein a shin bone of some medieval saint could be examined. However, this is an artifact and that was a relic. This is alive in the now, whereas that merely remained. By this meditation, conducted by myself at great length since you were last here, I have come to identify the value which this has in opposition to historicity. I am deeply moved, as you may see ( Castle 185). 215

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Tem porality subtly infuses the discourse and imagery, such as the material figure of guns inherited from his father that rust, phrased strikingly in the pres ent tense: oxidation over time, exposure generally like the change to Roths stamps, not impermeable. Notably, he is writing this novel in 1968 following the respectively assass inations of Robert Kennedy (the day after) and Martin Luther King, Jr. (a month later); without commentary, Vonnegut adds that every day my Government gives me a count of corpses created by military science in Vietnam. So it goes ( Slaughterhouse 268)and later includes a prediction of th e worlds population growth to seven billion by the year 2000, given th e net gain of births and d eaths daily (271). Like Pynchon coordinates history, po litical economy, and autobiography in his inventive formula, Vonnegut more overtly inscribes performative qualities, as in an earlier in cidental scene with his daughter: The two little girls and I crossed the Delaware River where George Washington had crossed it, the next morning. We went to the New York World's Fair, saw what the past had been like, according to the Ford Motor Car Company and Walt Disney, saw what the future would be like, according to General Motors. And I asked myself about the present: how wide it was, how deep it was, how much was mine to keep (23, my emphasis) The strategy of composing w ith and precisely expressing a pa rticular temporal instance, as in Vonneguts examples, thus emerges with promise for application, one that might convey experience rather than remain depersonalized and atemporal writing. A lesson from reading Vonneguts style is that I consid er not only creativity at the know ledge frontier, but as well what might enable a patina of discourse, in artisanal praxis no longer insulated from sensations. Although I have not discussed the latter to grea t extent, which I seek to remedy in the next section, Vonneguts writing in modes historical, fantastical, and especial ly metafictional guides practices for performative composition that engage the prob lematicperhaps also addressing the question posed by Blanchot: Would the gift of time be dissonance with all that is in harmony, loss (in time and because of time) of contempor aneity, of synchrony, of community (of that 216

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which assembles and g athers together)? ( Disaster 89-90). I have been a dvocating an alternative for our only making sense of archival materials as spectators, which DeLillo illustratesmore akin presentlyabout our Web-medi ated sensorium at the end of Underworld : watching the 1961 Tsar Bomba detonation, preserved in the computer that helped to build it (826). Like Vonneguts writing at a particular setting, DeLillos narrator of Underworld enacts the process of viewing Web pages, loading the H-bomb home page with Keystroke 2 to conclude the novel ( Underworld 824-5). The paradigm is gathered, like in Gravitys Rainbow with the effect of connecting they are fusion bombs, remember (DeLillo 826, my emphasis)by technology both destruction and progress in c ontemporary society. The paradigm emerges at levels both rhetorical and material: Every thing in your computer, the plas tic, silicon and mylar, every logical operation and processing function, the memo ry, the hardware, the software, the ones and zeroes, the triads inside the pi xels that form the on-screen image it all culminates here (DeLillo 826). Despite the limitations of DeLillos transcendental connotations of cyberspace and afterlife in this passage, the narrative voice in direct address f unctions significantly to remind us (you) that we are encountering a me diated archive, with a decision for how to proceedperhaps finding condi tions alternative to the dispositif Shifting from the proverbial stance that people arent supposed to look back (Vonnegut 28), encountering SlaughterhouseFive provokes a compelling question for invention and method: what if following an experience, especially a catastrophe, we were to ask, whats going to happen ? Imipolexia Interface : Invention Testfire (Pynchon Mediator Concluded) Continuing to explore-invent by means of c onduction using diegetic texts and materials, while also considering the post-signifying regime and formal logic of ellipsis-interval, my experimenting with paradigm-writing poetics fo llows from the prior chapters understanding 217

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Pynchons transform ative stylewhic h facilitates the conclusion of my project. The procedure still attempts partly the application of the me thod derived from Deleuze, particularly his using the texts of Carroll and Kafka for inventi on. Moreover, presenting my last findings in Pynchons work, the diagrammatic elements of Gravitys Rainbow and his paradigm-writing formula are precisely the aesthetic means for in novating and engaging a problematic, an interface within (and one suited to) the theatre of multiplicities Recalling rhetorically the nondominant function, a generative feature potentially, the ellipsis of a diegetic document facilitates my working (thinking and writing) with an entire paradigm. On this latter point, it is not William Slothrops 1634 On Preterition tract (555)referenced in narra tion only, although pertinent to my concluding pointthat reorie nts my approach but a missing text, Document SG-1 (242). Unlike the reading investigations by detec tives Stencil and Oedipathe writings of Sidney Stencil, Fausto, Warfi nger, and Inveraritys testam entSlothrop can not track a peculiar insulation device in th e A4 rocket textually: Claim, pa rt and work numbers all have the same flagnote, which directs Slothrop to a Document SG-1. Flagnote on the flagnote sez [] This is a state secrete, in the meaning of 35 R5138 (242). Moreover, Slothrop not only learns that there are no SG documents (242 ) from Captain Hilary Bounce (a 110% company man)who declares, It's only a wild coincidence, Slothrop (241) about a British-Dutch contract and rockets fire d/guided from The Hague.19 He also discovers a puzzle concerning the 19 Two points to note about Pynchons style at work in this passage: first, it is this cited wild coincidence about which the narrator remarks that Slothrop will learn to hear quote marks in the speech of others (241). Shortly after, the peculiar narrative voice also interjects, Neither have I, Jackson. Oh, me neither folks in the way prevalent throughout the novelresponding to a characters (Bounce) stating, Well, Id never thought of it that way and shifting from wild coincidence to paranoia. The second point of intrigue is the indirect invocation of William Pynchon by this character Bounce, who wears a gold be nzene ring with a formee cr oss in the centerthe IG Farben Award for Meritorious Contributions to Synthetics Res earch (243). This is the nov els sole use of the word Meritoriousas in Williams tract The Meritorious Price of Our Redemption historic antecedent to the diegetic On Preterition Writing paradigmatically, all registers historical and fictional: Puritan, Cartel, Synthetic. Indeed, Jamf has the same symbol on a medal of honor from IG Farben (413), the cross not strictly German but standing for the tetravalency of carbon (413)allegedly, the narration of Pklers dream indeterminable. 218

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insulation device in the m aterials list: Imipolex G, not an obsession reallynot yet (242). An intriguing diegetic material with which to invent, Imipolex G emerges for my experiment with great generativ e potential, even while overlooki ng and excluding other points or lines, for working paradigmatical ly (in choragraphy). This appr oach supplants the hermeneutic quest, just as Slothrop realizes T he Schwartzgert is no Grail ( 64) and that hes been seeker and sought late in the novel: The Imipolex que stion was planted for him by somebody, back at the Casino Hermann Goering, with hopes it would flower into a full Imipolectique with its own potency in the Zone [] (490). Acknowledging Gra il is not what the G in Imipolex G stands for (364), then, I can proceed using Pynchons post-signifying Grapheme with license; the curious Imipolectique in particular evokes the question of work critique or esthtique .20 My Imipolectique apothecary is both textual and material in the diegesis, connecting referentially as well to contex ts historical, political, economic : like Pynchon, I can think-write (with) an entire paradigm including chemistry, phase states, transnational corporate industry, military rocketry, behavioral conditioning, sexuality. A transformative element, into assemblage; the synthetic paradigm and condition of the twentiet h century, the material of the future (488). And while most scholars have noted most of th ese components within this paradigm, sometimes explicitly regarding Imipolex G, no one has yet employed the Imipolectique for invention or even for engaging the referential-diegetic cont ext thus evoked. One issue encountered is the condition within bureaucratic society, just as Deleuze finds in Kafka; as Sanders nicely 20 Apropos style by Pyncho n, characteristically: Informatique rhymes with automatique and the -tique suffix seems to be sufficiently striking and meaningful to produce a new series of creations, of terms generally relating to new technologies and their application, (New words for new technologies 176) writes Stephen Noreiko in French Today: Language in Its Social Context (Cambridge UP, 1993). Thus writing, as Pynchon does, with a boutique of Imipolex, puzzle notwithstanding: a storehouse for invention, insofar as boutique derives from the Greek apotheke or apothecary, a place where things are put away in one sense (< >). 219

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articulates, Pynchon is our m ost accomplished ch ronicler of the structures of thought and feeling that correspond to the experience of living in the administered society ( Mindless 157). In choragraphy, I attempt to use Imipolex G as an apt device for organizing intelligibly the sensations, perceptions, expe riences that are largely inchoate and unintelligible (if not illegible). Considered and employed rhetoric ally this way, it is a figure both diegetic and material that expresses indivi dual position and relation within an incomprehensible assemblage. This use consciously avoids treating the questio n of Pynchons tropologi cal appropriations of science as a narrative tactic, as Mattessich dubiously states ( Lines 19); likewise, nor is it an analytic heuristic, for mechanistic and econom ic interpretations of the novel or phenomenon, as Brownlie finds in Pynchons using Quantum Mechanics ( Subjectivity 132). Stark, another scholar who extensively discusse s numerous such heuristics, reminds that Pynchon is not a frustrated scientist merely leav ing shards of scien tific information strewn around in his novels, particularly in Gravitys Rainbow (73): rather, He assembles these shards [] into a vessel both beautiful and, because it orders and thus explains the world around it useful ( Pynchon's Fictions 73, my emphasis). Such an understanding of poetics is applicable in practice, I am arguing, unlike merely descriptive accounts of the scien tific material for broader classificatory claims. For example, Mendelson treats Pynchons scientificexpert in ballistics, chemistry, and mathematics ( Mindless 164)and cultural writing-formula as evidence for one hexa-valent criteria of the novels encyclopedic character, in the tradition of Goethe, Melville, and Joyce. Rather than strictly scie ntific-economic (industrial), Imipolectique names a greater paradigm and assemblage, with transversal links and both horizontal and vertical lines, by which Pynchon invents and through which we might make intellig ible certain sensations, as dramatized by Slothrop in narrative. The experime nt of writing with multiple semiotic regimes is 220

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precarious, insofar as the signifiying regime and process of reterrito rialization are inherent with the axes of composition. For example, Mattessich ta kes recourse in finding the signifier of an objective irony, positing spur iously that the Rocket se rves figuratively [as] the instrument of writing that produces the singular point of analogic and dialectic coll apse at work in the novel (19 my emphasis). Granting that rockets most obviously function in the signifying regime of Pynchons writing, the use of th e figure remains still only generative at most, as in McHoul and Wills deploying their parable-parabola device, and narrowly hermeneutic (transcendental, logocentric) when positing it chiefl y, as does Mattessich (like mo st critics). Although suggesting a deterritorialization of a technological paradigm results from Pynchons syncretism of art and science (200), Mattessich exalts the Rocket be yond a sign for a creativity or imagination (204) ultimately to its standing at the Cent er of textual subjectivity (205). Admittedly, these examples seem cherry-p icked from scholars without context; however, the lesson of diagrammatism resounds, with the key task of recognizing generative transformative (into assemblage), and diagrammatic (intensive) elements in compositions. The question is how best to put into practice the i nventive stylistic insight s, beyond deconstructive devices (Writing 58) as McHoul and Willis note (in their emulating Derrida and Ulmer). In my view such work remains generative but not yet assemblageor intensivewriting; for example, The parabola is the model therefore for any plot ting of dualisms, and yet The parable is thus undermined (mise en abyme ) by the parabola, by its own internal imprecision (59).21 21 Perhaps a paradigm is invoked, implicitly or inherently: The parable, and hence the choice of word, is also the parabolic; in French for instance, the two senses reside within the same world ( la parabole ). It joins that set of geometrical/rhetorical figures which includes hyperbole and ellipsis (Writing Pynchon 59). As acknowledged, I have used wordplay, like Derrida and Ulmer, as well, to generate my Imipolectique apothecary; however, this is the means (start) of choragraphy, not an end finding. Fina lly, in fairness, McHoul and Wills work paradigmatically otherwise, with the material of film (42)connecting th e politics of Von Goll, IG Farb ens vertical integration, the related chemistry of plastic, Imipolex, and Oneirine; the delta discontinuities of film and rocket flight (42). 221

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Imipolectiq ue Writing Shifting from excessive Critique to the mode Aesthtique, using the apothecary of Imipolectique for choragraphy: Pynchons diegesis of non-sense (unintelligibility) features conditions shaped by contemporary forces, epitomi zed by the Cartel. (Incidentally, and not mere thematic irony, a relatable point is my engaging an institutional dispositif and attempting to use Apparatus Theory to mediate inventive philosop hy and literature toward new means.) Imipolex as rhetorical device first enables ma pping the forces and conditions of the dispositif more specifically regarding the changi ng situation of mid-twentieth cen tury experience. For example, Stark identifies how Pynchon links conceptually, by means of Imipol ex, the chemistry of plastic and the political economy of the car telized state, in that the chemical development also shows the influence of international corporate cartels, [given] Jamf at the time of his discovery worked for IG Farben, and Shell later pa rtially controlle d the patent ( GR 48). The composition formula produces more than merely a plot (narrative and/or conspiracy) of Slothrops discovery, his conditioning by the substance (although evocative, this intimate connection): in creating his diegetic interactions with ch aracters like Captain Bounce, P ynchon expands the assemblage of operating forces beyond the low-lev el or immediate bureaucracy. Administered society experienced by Slothrop features prominently in Book 1 (Beyond the Zero), which charts these forces a nd values by means of emblematic characters: the Firm (British Intelligen ce), ACHTUNG (Allied Cleari ng House, Technical Units, No. Germany) in the office of Tantivy (20); The White Visitation (a former? mental hospital), comprising a catchall agency, PISCESPsychol ogical Intelligence Schemes for Expediting Surrender (34), which employs in variously-defin ed roles characters like Teddy Bloat, Pirate Prentice, Roger Mexico (statistician), Jessica Swanlake, Edward Pointsman (Pavlovian behaviorist). With a dualaxis configuration, Pynchon can convey certain contingent 222

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perceptions and experiences m et onymically, as when Slothrop is transferred inexplicably from ACHTUNG to the White Visitation, in a section beginning notably with a diegetic letters between Slothrop (St. Veronicas hospital, London) and comic-book character, the Kenosha Kid in Wisconsin (60). Increasingly non-sensical are the bureau cratic perceptions pr esented by Operation Black Wingthe Firms latest mania (34)and the Schwarzkommando (African Hereros) in Germany, an initially fictional report which later changes in the diegesis, by their appearance in Nordhausen (286), confirmed a week before V-E Day (276), and their autonomous endeavor to assemble an A4 rocket (326). Like Slothrops thinking newly in terms of IG Farben, Royal Dutch Shell, and Bataafsche Pe troleum upon meeting Bounce, Oberst Enzian, the Herero leader, expands his scope to conjecture that (American) antagonist Major Marvy must be together with the Russians by now, and with General Electri c too (326). Similarly, his half-brother Tchitcherine (Russian intelligen ce) no longer sees defined states or borders in the Zone but a barely-intelligible Rocketstate comprised by IG RaketenA Rocket-cartel. A structure cutting across every agency human and paper that ever touched it. Even to Russia Russia bought from Krupp, didn't she, from Siemens, the IG. (566). Although Slothrop meets a representative of IG Farben, Wimpe, the IG-man (152), a choragraphy of a personal position within a cartel-engineered assemblagewhat Johnston describes as the tentacular growth of the new rocket-state, [] a proliferating international cartel of petrochemical and plastic industries ( Information 80)must be devised in terms other than narrative (episodes) and ot her than signifier (Rocket). Im ipolex G enables thinking and writing by means of assemblage, at the level of paradigm, by its connecting sciences, industry, and individual behavior across text and hist ory. In limited terms, the instrumentality of 223

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chem istry deployed, drugs as a means to control, (Moore 97), is but a simple effect for the subject position, as demonstrated in the cases of Oneirine for Tchitcerine (702) and of Slothrops Pavlovian conditioning to Imipolex (84, 286). However, diagramming Pynchons multiple regimes recognizes the assemblage both composed and employed to compose; this configuration includes all axes (dimensions) an d transverse links across series provisionally in counterpoint to the meta-cartel (566) and the super-cartel that was both horizontal and vertical (284). For instance, the text (narrative voice)not a charact ers voice or consciousnessincludes in an interval between dialogue, Oneirine Jamf Imipolex A4. (464). Thinking horizontally to include time in this series is compelled by Pync hons writing just as much as thinking textually, like the A in rocket designations which stands for aggregate, or IG itself, Interessengemeinschaft, a fellowship of interests. (164, my emphasis). The Imipolectique assemblage connects and considers past, present, and future as well. One strategy, which informs the second, for work ing thus recognizes Pynchons composing with multiple narratives and creating emphatic relation of history to the present diegesis. Through the Family History Conspiracy, most notably, Pync hon reveals the connection of levels nearly incomprehensible, the recognition of which causes Slothrop vertiginous naus ea; in the simplest account, Imipolex connects him personally, by mean s of Jamfs conditioning, to IG Farben via Grssli Chemical Corporation (later Psychochemie AG) (286). Recognizing T.S., (Barring the outside possibility of Tough Shit), as his initials (286), Slothrop realizes he personally is the the referent of the Schwarzknabe enterprise, an asset acquired by Grssli (an IG acquisition) with stipulations of continue[d] surveillance duties (286). Thus sold to IG Farben by his family, he personifies a contractua l liability of the outstanding de bt to Harvard University (for Slothrops education)an expression of the ad ministered capitalist-bureaucratic society, 224

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indeed. Finally, the origin of this transaction seem ingly is the effort of Lyle Bland, who conducted the transaction from Stinnes to Grssli via Jamf. Apparently, Bland had earlier worked to keep official records clear of any hint of weapons procurement banned under the terms of Versailles (285, my emphasis) by prov iding private currency known as Notgeld to Stinnes, contracting sometimes a certain Massachusetts paper milland The name of this contractor was the Slothrop Paper Company, Slot hrop reads without that much surprise (285). The labyrinthine narrative of conspiracy by connectedness for Slothropostensibly motivating the plot of Imipolex G haunting him now (286) in the present, a convention deployed by Pynchonemerges in his reading a dossier on Jamf, except for the narrators idiosyncratic interjection, On the beam, Jack son (284). However compelling the narrative contrivance, Pynchons including th e Paper Company adds another wa y to read, as counterpoint, within the Imipolectique Slothrops earlier discoveriesas Cartel Detective, in one of his myriad identitiesabout the S-Gert and Imipolex concerning IG Farben direct his attention not to people after all, but to the hardware (252).22 Examining instead the materials and parts list might find a nondominant function (Coste 86) and transformative element of Pynchons writing, especially insofar as well, Document SG-1, which is n't supposed to exist, must cover that.... (252), ellipsis once agai n. In other words, the presen t conspiracy plot discerned, deciphered, and disclosed hermeneu tically would only approach a problem to solve ostensibly ( critique ), rather than a problematic ( aesthetique ). Pynchon reflexively calls attention to this by the narrators musing about Slot hrops thoughts: How high does it go? is not even the right kind of question to be asking, because the organi zation charts have all been set up by Them, the 22 A series seemingly proliferates: Schwarzknabe (Slothrop) Schwarzgerat ,(for sale on the black market), Schwarzkommando Yet, Enzian demystifies to Slothrop: Schwa rzgert, Schwarzkommando. Scuffling: suppose somewhere there were an alphabetical list, [] the two names, Blackinstrument, Blackcommand, just happened to be there, juxtaposed. Thats all, an alphabetical coincidence. We wouldn't have to be real, and neither would it, correct? (363). Unlike a paradigm, Pynchon emphasizes th e arbitrariness of literacy and language throughout. 225

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titles and n ames filled in by Them, because Prover bs for Paranoids, 3: If they can get you asking the wrong questions, they don't have to worry about answers (251, modified formatting). A different kind of question, then, might conjecture the uses manifest and alternative of Imipolex G, within the paradigm present and pa st. At least one passage is feasible to cite: Imipolex G has proved to be nothing more or lesssinister than a new plastic, an aromatic heterocyclic polymer, deve loped in 1939, years before its time, by one L. Jamf for IG Farben. It is stable at high temperatures, like up to 900 C., it combines good strength with a low powerlo ss factor. Structurally, it's a stiffened chain of aromatic rings, hexagons [] alte rnating here and there with what are known as heterocyclic rings. The origins of Imipolex G are traceable back to early research done at du Pont. (249) As a transcontinental and three-decade (or six-decade, more accurately) diegesis for choragraphy, this account foregr ounds Imipolex as an interface, one particularly suited for writing with an entire paradigmi ncluding trajectories both actual and virtual, especially in lieu of composition by a state (missing SG-1 docum ent) or industry, as with Jamfs 1934 advertisement for his similarly-developed Kryptosam (71).23 This inventive writing effectively goes further than the edge of this meta-cartel (566) by repurposingrefashioning the material pr operties conceptuallythe plastic as Imipolexia and by re-tracing this origin account to other ends. Now unders tood for an agents (mine) powerloss factor, the conspiratorial view of the cartel is that Imipolex G shows up on a mysterious insulation device on a rocket being fire d with the help of a transmitter on the roof of the headquarters of Dutch Shell, who is co-licensee for marketing the Imipolexa rocket whose propulsion system bears an uncanny resemblance to one developed by British Shell at around the 23 We can imagine Document SG-1 has been composed usin g Kryptosam, a proprietary fo rm of stabilized tyrosine developed by IG Farben as part of a research contract w ith OKW (71); more concretely, material used to render invisible messages (Krypto-) decrypted by semen (-sam en), as Pirate Prentice sh ows (72). Or perhaps the contents are only recognizable during Oneirine hallucinations, a drug the effects of which show[s] a definite narrative continuity, as clearly as, say, the average Reader's Digest articlehauntings that produce a printed diagram which no amount of light will ma ke readable (702). In any case, I work otherwise with this ellipsis, paradigmatically, leaving such speculative-generative play to Derridean writers like McHoul and Wills. 226

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sam e time (251). Abandoning the Rocket as connector(or master-) signifier, not the Grail grapheme anyway, recognizes the tr ue bureaucratic-in dustrial link in the patent : one cross-filed by IG Farben and Psychochemie w ith Shell joining later, through an agreement with Imperial Chemicals dated 1939 (250). Choragraphy 1 : Decision Paths (Discovered and Invented) The function of intellectual property in the twentieth century, an issue befitting of my requisite citations (juridical in the academic dispositif ), is called into relief as artificial and syntheticwriting contingent to conditions of a particular apparatusby Pynchons prevalent use of plastic in the Imipolex diegesis. Illustrative of the centurys condition and perceptions, he explicitly invokes Plasticitys cent ral canon: that chemists were no longer to be at the mercy of Nature (250); moreover expressing the ideals in the material of the future (at present), like technical-instrumental writing, The target prope rty most often seemed to be strengthfirst among Plasticitys virtuous triad of Strength, Stability and Whiteness ( GR 250). Repurposing my Imipolexia interface thus first entails rewriting its trajectory from origin, sensible not in good sense (patent, profit) but in sensing aesthetica lly (sensibility qua style): Plasticity has its grand tradition and main stream, which happens to flow by way of du Pont and their famous employee Carothers, known as The Great S ynthesist in the 1920s (249, my emphasis). The actual corporation du Pont holds a patent (U.S. 3375131) from 1963/68suitably coextensive with Pynchon and Deleuzefor a Flexible Coated Film Structure.24 The third characteristic of Imipolex G reverberates this nomenclature, in its electronic stimulus: the projection, onto the Surface, of an electronic image, analogous to a motion picture (GR 700). Coincidence notwithstanding, the Imipolectic surf ace is explicitly an i nterface (700), more 24 Flexible Coated Film Structure And Process Of Manufacture Therefor Paul Gordon Schmidt et al Filing date: Mar 29, 1963; Issue date: Mar 26, 1968. < > Retrieved 12-Apr 2012. 227

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precisely a m edium, besides this Peculiar Polymer being an erec tile plastic far outside the known phase diagrams (699). Thinking with the entire paradigm discovers that synthetic polymers for military-industrial production are only one possible outcome for du Pont, the founder of which began as a manufacturer of gunpow der: Eleuthre Irne du Pont, who died in Philadelphia, for a time worked in Paris with his fathers printing and publishing business.25 In this choragraphy, Imipolexia emerges liberated from IG Farben by means of transversal deterritorializationdu Ponts disse mination activity in France, contracting the Slothrop Paper Company, both preter ite and ellipsistic within the territorializing international capitalist cartel. Although the refashioned result evokes the question, Doesn't that imply a switching-path of some kind ? a bureaucracy? (410), the preterition paradigm recalls the nondominant function of discourse by the inventive wr iter, as by William Slothrop-Pynchon. The ellipsis of bureaucratic functions and forces proprietary ideas (patents), meta-cartel interest above fellowship (Interessengemeinschaft) via du P onts gunpowderby another powder, titanium oxide (the white pigmentation of paper) changes conditions of possibility, immanent in the fork in the road America never took, the singular point she jumped the wrong way (556). My Imipolexia syncretizes precisely as Slot hrops recognizes that ther e might be a route back, through intensive lines of flight in the deterritorialization interv al Pynchon effects: maybe for a little while all the fences are down, one road as good as another, the whole space of the Zone cleared, depolarized, and somewhere inside the wast e of it a single set of coordinates from which to proceed, without elect, without preterite, without even national ity to fuck it up. (556). 25 From the companys official history, Eleuthre Irne du Pont, born 1771 in Paris, died Philadelphia, 1834; In 1791, after the onset of the French Revolution, he gave up powder-making to assist in his fathers small printing and publishing business. The du Ponts moderate political view s proved a liability in revolutionary France. In 1797 a mob ransacked their printing shop and they were briefl y imprisoned. In late 1799 they fled to America (< itag e/en_US/1802_a_detail.html >). The inverse trajectory of William Slothrop-Pynchon, thus linking a horizontal ax is of the assemblage in equal preterition. 228

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What might happen now? we ask. While this inventiv e conclusion m ight appear a misfiring, circuitous mandala rather than parabola, the findings of an interface with which to work is significant, particular ly in demonstrating the process of identifying a feature not only generative but transformative and diagrammatic within the mixed-semiotic assemblage. Indeed, the precise concept and rhetorical means of interface is salient, discerned he re in this encounter with Pynchon as with Deleuze. On this poi nt, Johnston describes Pynchons writing in Deleuzean terms, identifying how Pynchon invent s an assemblage through mixed semiotics and specifically three devices or textual means: the method of mapping on, the concept of the interface, and a topogr aphical multiplicity [] ( Information 65). Whether I have applied Pynchons poetics to a great extent is less cruc ial than the practice experimentally with the aesthetic paradigm, choragraphy as artisanal practice adding a new and necessary component, an interface for critique and aesthtique composition by thinking-writing an assemblage. Now, the Imipolectique apothecary can be brought to bear upon the original problematic, in the theatre of multiplicites, a nd the initial puzzle in Slothrops narrative. On one hand, Schaub explicitly describes Pynchons style in terms of his composing by means of interfaces in form and in content, in that meaningfulness requires uncertainty ( Ambiguity 107); as a conjunction and an intersec tion (108), Pynchons writing entails narrative strategies that create a threshold experience (112). Beyond an excellent account of Pynchons style at the level of composition, Schaub this way calls attent ion to the question of encounter, in Deleuzes sense, and of working with narra tive; similarly, Johnston identifies Gravitys Rainbow as presenting not only a continuous proliferation of interfaces but an interface with the indeterminate as well ( Information 83). Reconsidering interface as Deleuzean literary assemblage rather than narrowly, as the two side s of the movie screen (Johnston 70), 229

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Imipolexia thus involves the diegetic m a terials properties: from limp rubbery amorphous to amazing perfect tessellation, hardness, brilliant tr ansparency, high resistance to temperature, weather, vacuum, shock of any kind [] ( Gravitys 699). The decision fork appears whether to use as Imipolectic Surface, interface with What lies just beneath [] in the Region of Uncer tainty (700), or as the mysterious insulation device on a rocket (251). Reverberating both Deleuzes language in The Logic of Sense as well as chora as impossible surface, theorized by Derrida and Ulmer, a final passage indicating Pynchons transverse-erudite-par adigm style is worthwhile to consider this way: on the Surface (or even below the outer la yer of Imipolex, down at the interface with What lies just beneath: with What has been inserted or What has actually grown itself a skin of Imipolex G, depending which heresy you embrace. We need not dwell here on the Primary Problem, na mely that everything below the plastic film does after all lie in the Region of Uncertainty, except to emphasize to beginning students who may be prone to Schwrmerei, that terms referring to the Subimipolexity such as Core and Cente r of Internal Energy possess, outside the theoretical, no more reality than do terms such as Supersonic Region or Center of Gravity in other areas of Science). (700, original emphasis) I am seeking to invent by means of conduction, using the paradigm, and yet the polymers thermal conductivity is minima l, with its resistance (up to 900 C.) and tessellation--thus ideal for insulation leaving me unaffected. On the latter, a type of Imipolectic preterition would seem to be precisely an ellipsis in our care (218, my emphasis), inso far as I am insulated against dynamic factors of temperature, speed, forces, or in other words, environmental changes and sensations within the assemblage. Remaining detached or clinical in my work, this device seems apt strictly as conceptu al interface for work in the the paradigm critique However, I am seeking an interface for engaging the problem of interference between philosophy ( noumenal ) and aesthetic composition ( sensibilia), in order to create a concept of sensation and compose by means of perceptions and a ffections in the aesthetic paradigm. 230

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231 Finally, an insulation device for Imipolexia writing must not necessarily be an ellipsis in our care: rather, it can be a means for what a character in V. suggests, to Keep cool, but care (Pynchon 369). Provisionally, narrative is this interface, by which I might compose my encounters with precarious conditions, keeping cool and caring, and include the temporal coordinatesthinking history and th e future in present, capable of being affected by both. From my encounters with the literar y apothecary of his novels, Pync hons inventive style emphasizes the rationale of my proceeding with assemblage writing as interface in artisanal praxis: the paradigm Aesthtique, ultimately from the Greek aisthetikos sensitive, perceptive; as for what to other frequencies, resonatingev en in ellipsis intervals illegible, unutterable, unintelligible.

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CHAP TER 6 AFFECTIVE ENCOUNTERS, RESONANCE ASSEMBLAGE In transitioning from the method of pragma tics reading to an attempt at invention by encounters, I have demonstrated both the pr actical application of the methodological study discerned from Deleuze, as well as the increased potential that results from working with the aesthetic paradigm. In the first case, the encount er pragmatics approach derived has proven apt and productive for reading literature in a lternative ways, specifically by finding the generative transformative, and diagrammatic elements of composition; these features of literary writing enable a new artisanal praxis for scholarship that avoids hermen eutics or other limited critical approaches, which remain constrained by the dispositif for knowledge. Alte rnatively, invention or encounter heuretics by mean s of employing the properties of intensive language changes the conditions for possible knowledge and expression: my initial target or test-case remains creating a concept of sensation, as both an inventive attempt to illustrate the method and to engage the problematic, as well as a new type of scholarship. Indee d, a contingent rhetoric to be developed for the changed apparatus operates as discourse that expr esses both particular encounters and the relation of intell ectual and sensible properties. The general idea of style in inventive discourse, in bot h philosophy and literature, has emerged in my overall project as the prospect ive means for developing and testing this new rhetoric or poetics for creative discourse. As observed by means of pragmatics study, the exemplars of Deleuze and Pynchon highlight the perspective of working (thinking and writing) in terms of paradigm and assemblage particularly. This unde rstanding can be applied specifically to the discip linary issue of method, or artisanal praxis concerning encounter heuretics: the shift from reading to inventing continues the initia l question of whether and how to express my encounters with percepts, affects, and sensations in aesthetic compositions. As 232

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introduced in Chapter 1, this work engages a pro blematic rather than solving a problem closing, disclosing, categorizing meaningor question, encounteri ng in art that which I have not experienced or known directly or that which can not be known or named intelligibly. More specifically, this method and test study attempts newly working with aesthetic sensations to include experience in ways othe r than strictly discursive ( logocentric). In philosophical terms, the approach explores the pros pect of Alliezs declaration, su mmarizing Deleuzes method and oeuvre, that EXPRESSIONI SM = CONSTRUCTIVISM ( Signature 103, original formatting)that which links experience a nd intellect, in knowledge and composition. Discussing the latter further in the final se ction, this chapter first proceeds from the developments of my working with Pynchons nov els by means of paradigm and interface: the resonance assemblage is posited and demonstrated as both a theoretical approach for innovating within the dispositif and a practical rhetoric for poetics and pr axis. In both cases, it serves as the prospective interface for gathering intelligible and sensible qualities encountered in literature uniquely, first noticing and then inventing with percepts, affects, and sensationsconceptually and formally presented in three creative interludes within the following sections. Understanding aesthetic composition in the philosophy of Dele uze and Guattari, I am undertaking the possibility for artisanal praxis as expressionist and constructivist, with the resonance assemblage itself potentially qualifying as a concept of sensation Specifically, I selfreflexively test whether temporal qualities coordinates excluded in rational sense ( dispositif ) and literacy ( apparatus ), like other types of knowle dgecan be included in experienced concept and discourse, not strictly analytic and i ntellectual. Ultimately, I show the results particular to the changed conditions of the aesthetic para digm in my innovating through encounters with intensive writing and temporal qua lities in novels by Kathy Acker, Leslie Silko, and Jonathan 233

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Safran Foer. Before presenting the literary encounters sectio ns, I review the m ethod earlier established and update accordingly for apt invention and discoursedemonstrated next. Literary Encounters (6-8): Inventing wi th Three Machines of Temporality Every sensation is a question, even if the only answer is silence. Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy? (196) Thus far I have been developing ideas about literary writing and pres enting partly in the composition of a literary assemblage using some of the rhetorical techniques discerned from Pynchon and Vonnegut (and Deleuze more generall y). The tertiary conc ern of testing my proposed poetics for artisanal scholarship has mo tivated the application by analogy of writing the problematic for diegesis, concepts as characters and heterogeneous series in the fashion of narrative; as I have argued, the latter form en tails qualities particularly valuable for conveying formally the logic of temporality and experi ence, given the interface for both creating and organizing information. The content of this in formation is the persisting subject of my methodological study, literary encounters as spec ific form of aesthetic composition generally, understood from Deleuze and Guattari in term s of percepts, affects, and sensations. Provisionally attempted, performative narratology includes deliberately the experienced discourse of my pos ition as reader and writer, in analytic as well as inventive fashion by using both pragmatics and heuretics: working in the aesthetic paradigm through repetition of motifs or refrains and through non-linear arrangement, to name two practices, toward assemblage composition. Increasing th is innovation effort, the prior chapter both identified and emulated certain aspects of poetics and effects in Slaughterhouse-Five For instance, referencing the Dresden story out line using his daughters crayons that Vonnegut reflexively describes (6-7), Lundquist speculates how It is as if he rolls the wallpaper into a tube 234

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so all of the characters and inci dents are closely layered; he con tinue s to imagine that The tube then becomes a telescope through which the reader looks into the fourth dimension []. The story goes around and around, yet it s till leads somewhere, and yet th e end is very close to the beginning (Bloom 49).1 Despite the prevailing language of visual perception in both the novel and scholarship about Slaughterhouse-Five I would like to consider this und erstanding as describing at least partly my composition in these later chaptersalthough not in circular return (immobile) but progressing through elliptical or spiraling motion (backward and forward). More importantly, one crucial methodological issue rema ining to be addressed is the heuretics of encounters, beyond pragmatics, concerning aesthetic compositions (percepts, affects, sensations) and experience discourse in artisanal praxis. Ad ditionally, there appears a related disciplinary challenge at which I do not envision succeeding fully in the present project: discussing the achievement and persistence of postmodern temporal strategies, Richardson asserts that The most urgent task of narrative theory is to construct a poetics of nonmimetic fiction that can finally do full justice to the literature of our time ( Dynamics 59). However, a strategy that attempts the form er task, and might incidentally address the latter question, is my composing with the impor tant quality of temporality, as emphasized in Deleuzes earlier works, in the form of narrative for novelistic ph ilosophy. Specifically, I test the proposition that Deleuzes productive work with literature, as I establ ished thoroughly in earlier chapters, provides not only a way to read and vo cabulary to describe but a method for invention as well. Attending to my focus upon aesthetic sensation, I attempt to use in this innovative 1 Foreshadowing, semiotic regimes and temporality discussed next: Deleuze similarly reasons to study by telescope. Proust says as much: at a certain level of essences, what interests him is no longer individuality or detail, but laws, great distances, and major generalities The telescope, not the microscope ( Proust and Signs 82). 235

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fashion the three literary m achines that Dele uze recognizes in Prous ts writingdeliberately, given the textual and temporal qua lities, distinguished from other work with painting or music (let alone formal examples from other discipli nes like architecture, mathematics, or biology). On one hand, this endeavor shows still a tut elage in applying Deleuzes understanding of an authors stylein this case Prousts transversality like Kafkas machinic assemblages rather than diagramming distinctly and uniquely. However, the suitability and value of application is both productive and purposeful given the explicit re lation of transversal logic and style, as I discuss in the la st section regarding concept cr eation; a paradoxical unity of multiplicity and fragments, indeed, without ever reducing the many to the One, without ever gathering up the multiple into a whole ( Signs 126), Deleuze affirms about the antilogos literary work. Concluding the experiment, the fo llowing three sections present both pragmatics and innovationfurther demonstrating my Resonance Assemblage co ncept and interface, performative narratologythrough literary en counters with novels by Ac ker, Silko, and Foer. To this end, I continue attempti ng encounter pragmatics to identify intensive features ( diagrammatic ), with which to compose directly by mu ltiple regimes and diegetic textuality. Beyond analysis, the key device for innovation in the aes thetic paradigm is the respective literary machines with regard to temporality and to perc epts, affects, or sensations encountered. Finally, this experienced praxis transitions fully from the hermeneutic-detective to the artisan creator at the knowledge frontier, particularly using Deleuzes analysis: The entire Search sets three kinds of machines to work in the production of the Book: machines of partial objects (impulses), machines of resonance (Eros), machin es of forced movements (Thanatos) ( Signs 160). 236

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Time-lost in Ackers S enseless Empireserial fragments the essence of art will be less that of rendering visibl e the unseen or the invisible as it intersects a seeing visibility [ ] than of rendering Life sensible in its zones of indeterminacy Alliez, Signature of the World (69) To clarify from the outset, I am not using the entirety of Deleuzes analysis of the literary machines in Proust and Signs (least of all the notions later amended, like truth-orders or Essences); rather, the perspective and voca bulary assists first in pragmatics and then (prospectively) in innovative wor k. To review, the first kind of machine is defined chiefly by a production of partial objects fragments without totality, vessels without communication, partitioned scenesin literary composition ( Signs 150). The corresponding e ffect is lost time by the machines of partial objects (impulses) (160), created by the gen eral law of serial truths in the fragmented compos ition of aesthetic figures, such as characters and narratives. Considering both the temporal d isplacement of the present by serial narrative and the formal disconnection of style, my encounters with the novels of Kathy Acker offer unique lessons for practices with this literary machine. In her novels Blood and Guts in High School (1978) and Empire of the Senseless (1988), Acker has significantly comp elled my attention to literary writing and textuality in senses material, rhetorical, political and disciplinary; her writing likewise emphasizes sense-making of varying types concerning the present context of available materials and the blind-spot of au thorship and identity expression. Unlike, and markedly against the limited logic of repres entation and reference in conventional literature, Ackers writing is co mposed with and operates through features generative toward invention, transformative into assemblage, and diagrammatic as lines of flight ( deterritorialization ), using multiple semiotic regimes. Indeed, the purposeful deployments of language is evident in reflexive passages such as, Language, on one level, constitutes a set of codes and social and historical agreements. Nonsense doesnt per se break down the codes; 237

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speaking precisely that which the codes forbid breaks the codes ( Empire 134). A useful understanding is Deleuzes asserting that Am er ican writers have to dismantle the English language and send it racing along a line of flight, rending language convulsive ( Essays 58); likewise, he elaborates, The founding act of the American novel, like that of the Russian novel, was to take the novel far from the order of reasons particularly concerning characters (81, my emphasis). Moreover, I conjecture, such composition renders sensible though not necessarily intelligible (in codes) forces or sens ationssuch as lost time, by fragmentation of partial objects ( Signs 160). Briefly discussing a pragmatics reading of Empire of the Senseless both illustrates this method and then produces an oppor tunity for innovation with Ackers poetics. First, rather than regarding as signifier s of moral-psychologi cal persons, Abhor and Thivaithe two discernable characters of Empire can be viewed as aesthetic compounds Ackers extracted percepts and affects.2 These function similarly as do the free-indirect discourse narration and the myriad roles anonym ously populating the narratives: parents, pirates, whores, murderers, police, rapists, CIA agents, Terrorists, Algerians, prisoners, doctors, drug dealers, bosses, street musicians. Some char acters appear distinct a lmost to the extent of Abhor and Thivai, such as Thivais brief accompli ce Mark in the chapter I Realize Something. However, an innumerable population operates indistinctly as forces institutional or interpersonal, for instance; this intimated by th e narration, most often in action, whether concretely like They were chas ing me (28); or in vague yet s till active dynamics of Cock on cock and Hot female flesh on hot female fles h (140-1). Because the point to emphasize is Ackers use of non-representational figures, I de liberately avoid overtly characterizing Abhor 2 To reiterate from Chapter 2, drawing upon What is Philosophy? : unique to the discipline of Art, percepts and affects are the sensations that artists extract from lived experience, pe rceptions and affections regarding states of affairs, which they preserve (167) and express through aesthetic figures (Deleuze and Guattari 177). 238

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fe male, part German-Jewish, part robot, and part black, (3)and Thivai, ostensibly a pirate Captain (21), the two most distinct or discernable ( sensible ) figures. A redirected focus ( diagrammatic ) instead understands the idea of sensation compounds, expressed by the many figures employed: charac ters thus composed have passed into the landscape and are themselves part of the compound of sensations (WP 169), in the terms of Deleuze and Guattari. Like characters, narrativ es (or Creative fabula tion) this way do not entail memories or fantasies in th e psychological sense of the author ( WP 171); rather, Everything that novelists must extract from th e perceptions, affections and opinions of their psychosocial models passes entirel y into the percepts and affect s to which the characters must be raised without holding on to any other life (188). The lesson of pragmatics is to avoid fixating upon aesthetic figures as mimetic, or in Ackers case explicit or abhorrent language, in favor of encountering literary elementsunspe akable actions and desc riptionsprecisely as compounds of sensations. The specific forces of lost time are expressed by the serial narration of continual events, as well as in rare instances diverging from the displacing flow, such as the critical discourse curiously inte rjected into the scene of a fight between sailor and tattooer (133): Ten years ago it seemed possible to destroy language through language: to destroy language which normalizes and controls by cutti ng that language. Nonsense would attack the empire-making (empirical) empire of language, the prisons of meaning. But this nonsens e, since it depended upon sense, simply pointed back to the normalizing institutions. (134, my emphasis) With its many narrative fragments and frequent shits in scenes or se tting and genre, the chaotic diegesis and textuality of Empire thus appears Ackers ae sthetic composition of percepts and affects extracted from life. In this way, Acker employs the aesthetic means of literature for conveying the sensationthe rendering sensible of forces in indeterminacy, recalling Alliezof desire capture d within societys forces and of the lost time having passed 239

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due to the fr agmentation and lack of communication w ithin serial progression. Empire additionally compels considering the text ual figures and fragments, in their counter-signifying expression. Again, Acker provokes this perspec tive with the meta-discursive commentary interspersed throughout, like the narrators remarking about the aim to destroy language which normalizes and controls through nonsense and taboo ( Empire 134). One early example also likely indicates Ackers se lf-proclaimed plagiarism3 or appropriation: The German Romantics had to destroy the same bastions as we do. Logocentrism and idealism, theology, all supports of a repressive so ciety. Propertys pillars. Reason which always homogenizes and re duces, represses and unifies phenomena or actuality into what can be percei ved and so controlled. The subjects, us are now stable and socializable. Reason is always in the service of the political and economic masters. It is here that literature strikes, at this base, where the concepts and actings of order impose themselves. ( Empire 12, my emphasis). Particularly in the figure of A bhor and her final narrative fragment, Acker dramatizes textually her reflexive commentary upon signification and meaning (sense-making); this strategy motivates my attempting her pirate writing in th e next section, inscribing critically both my engaging disciplinary practices ( literary scholarship) as well as the lost time of disconnection. ( Choragraphy 2 ) Pirate(d) ScenesElegy for Seri al Scholarship (Abhor Writes) Finding a manuscript, Deleuzean Analysis of Ackers Vitalist Empire by G.M. Hink, Jr. ( Franklin Novelty Company, Philadelphia: 2012) in which to write Abhor blacks out and annotates passages to submit for her final assignme ntin order to pass American Literature in the Age of Non-sensical Theory at The Human ities Institute of Paris. The document begins, 3 cf. Conte, who cites a 1989 interview A Conversation with Kathy Acker, in which she notes, I did use a number of other texts to write [ Empire] ( sic), though the plagiarism is much more covered, hidden. Almost all of the book is taken from other texts ( Design 228-9). Referring to my earlier-cited passage about language codes, Conte conjectures the source material as Foucaults Archeology of Knowledge given partly the similarity of phrasing as well as her familiarity with Foucault as well as Deleuze and Gu attari (227). In any case, I am more interested in such passages for their counter-signifying and reflexive functions as distinct from narration of incessant fictional events. 240

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I found something in m y research interesting and particularly applicable to the current discussion: The Federal Inspection Office for Public ations Harmful to Minors decided at its 333th meeting held on September 18, 1986 that: Acker, Kathy, Tough Girls Dont Cry, ( Blood and Guts in High School ) Pocketbook No. 18/41 of the series Heyne Scene / Wilhelm Heyne Publishing House, Munich to be added to the list of pub lications harmful to minors. ( Hannibal 142, original formatting)4 Then, If I could have spoken to the haircutter at that moment, perh aps I could have been free! ( Empire 112). I am writing now just like I have read that In Violent Acts, Volatile Words: Kathy Ac kers Terrorist Aesthetic, Christina Milletti (2004) posits that Abhor and Thivai [] are th emselves terrorists resisting an institution of power disseminated by the media and govern ed by money, so that Empire refers equally to systems of representation a nd the Western hegemony that governs them (358). The word free means nothing to me. I left. Walking past a pile of rubble was being in a panic. Because rubble was the memory of Thivai. I remembered being pani cked all the time Thivai was my partner. (112) Through Abhor, Acker endorses an essential principle of anar chism, that the impulse to personal freedom more frequently leads to salutary and creative behavior, whereas authoritarian strictures imposed on individua ls more frequently lead to violent and destructive behavior. (Conte 72) True. Since I remember I was nothing, my memory is not hing. To remember is to beat war. (112). According to Punday, Acker develops a pos t-deconstructive narra tive poetics around the idea of textual materiality ( Deconstruction 129) 4 This passage is from the 1986 Immoral ruling about Blood and Guts in High School the full text of which is reproduced in Hannibal Lecter, My Father Ed. Sylvre Lotringer (Semiotext(e ), 1991). The Ca nadian Federal Inspection Office text is formatted like this henceforth, citing parenthe tically the source material in Hannibal Lecter The unattributed quotations are Ackers, citing page numbers from Empire of the Senseless 241

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The structure of the plot is quite difficu lt to understand. It is partially very hard or com pletely impossible for the reader to see whether we are dealing with the protagonists imaginations or real events. ( Hannibal 144) In order to receive a passing grade, I will quote and c ite properly (I think) by the conventions of the Modern Language Association st yle guide, having consulted the MLA Handbook for Writers of Research Papers, 7th edition (2009); a writing tutor has revised, abridged, and corrected my document to excluded any profanity and slang, for example, given the rules about language use in this rhetorical situation of non-intensive writing for ac ademic purposes and not for selfexpression. Acker has shifted her focus from a rath er abstract and gene ralized opposition to language itself, to those stor ies and ways of using language that have been outlawed under historically specific circumstances. Sh e now seeks not to de stroy the realm of language and representation but to expand it, to exploit its own contemporary dynamic of expansion. (Pitchford 96) Look, I was the only end which could be present. If I was an end to the present, and I was: in THE FUTURE there will be no end to human tears. Since I saw NO TEMPORAL POSSIBILITY to other than the present, I saw no possibilities. (113, EMPHASIS MINE, Abhors). While Empire is by no means a conventional narrative its structure is more readily apparent and more chronologically consistent than in the wo rks from Ackers plagiarism period. There is, nevertheless, still plenty of plagiarism in this novel. (Pitchford 94) Death is floating down the Seine. Wheres this future which youre telling me? Wheres this fortune which youre telling me? (116) La Seine as a River Lth w e will have forgotten all this. The scumbling of levels of discourse in the novel reflects Ackers anarchistic methodology, undermining the readers presuppo sitions of dominant-intellectual and subordinate-proletarian cultural positions. (Conte 59) Like I said, Ive always wanted to be a sailor. (113) The textual impediments to Abhors pira te dreams are enforced by the male-invoked power of the statenow once ag ain reified in the form of the Revolutionary Algerian Police. (Pitchford 102) 242

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I have understood the following to m ean the new regime of knowledge we have learned about: The demand for an adequate mode of expression is senseless. Then why is there this searching for an adequa te mode of expression? Was I searching for a social and political paradise? Since all acts, including expressive acts, are interdependent, paradise cannot be an abso lute. THEORY DOESNT WORK. (Kathy Acker, author-construct, page 113) Although, insofar as The artist is a seer, a become r. [] [SHE] has seen somethi ng in life that is too great, too unbearable also, and the mutual embrace of life with what threat ens it, so that the corner of nature or districts of the town that [SHE] sees, along w ith their characters, accede to a vision that, through them, composes th e percepts of that lif e, of that moment, shattering lived perceptions into a sort of cubism, a sort of simultaneism, of harsh or crepuscular light, of purple or blue, whic h have no other object or subject than themselves. ( WP 171) In that moment, There was no one. I panicked. There was no feeling. (113) To write is certainly not to impose a form (of expression) on the matter of lived experience, Deleuze writes ( Essays 1); rather, art goes beyond the matter of any livable or lived experience. It is a process, that is, a passage of Life that traverses both the livable and the lived (1). Hink notes, Deleuze and Guattaris descrip tion applies to Acker: It is always a question of freeing life wherever it is imprisoned, or of tempting it into an uncertain combat ( WP 171). This we can all understand: I had known love in the past, but it was past. Past is dead. (116) For Acker, images are things arrested acts, fatalities of ex perience. The pasts OVER. Its an image. You cant make love to an image (Acker, Models of our Present 62). Because such reductions of force come from steering ones writing into a closed account, she must turn desire into an art that diminish es neither desires nor the artists vitality. (Saltzman 113) Because Im stupid, its taken me half a lifetime [...] for me to learn that I have to say what I want to get what I want. Who. Perhaps if human desire is said out loud, the urban planes, the prisons, the architectural mi rrors, will take off, as airplanes do (112 MY EMPHASIS). Discussing Ackers fiction in The Idiocy of the Event: Between Artaud, Acker and Deleuze, Frida Beckman (2010) observes hw the layering of literature and philosophy 243

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creates subjects without thought s and thoughts without subjects (64); adds, But where is the thought that is without an I? What is the ethics of the thought-event that is beyond the individual subject? We have still not ma naged to determine what such an event of thought would be (66). Lost-time by everything that has brought me to this point. I have been told, At the present you dont love anybody. No one loves you. Without relationships a mans lost at sea. (117) (Side note, to whom it may concern; these two seemingly have an explicit textual relationship): Plundering the classics is also a way for th e female writer to ac hieve penetration, as HER texts crawl on top of his, seducing th e books they host via the female-superior position. (Saltzman 111) Plagiarism, then, is both an attack on the autobiographical I and a strategy of originality: not an abdication of authorial control, but a textualization of it. (Walsh 153) The novel merely mirrors social problem s without being genuinely creative in any way. ( Hannibal 148) By engaging with social reality in ways that reality does not allow, but which are discernibly present in the mentality individua ls relinquish in the process of assimilation, Acker calls into question the values prioritized by society and by our construction of it. (Walsh 142) What I saw, on my way to class ( it is too late by now already): Today only a few old white people whose memories are Stephen King novels sat in wheelchairs on the steps of the re mains of the Grand Hotels. ( Empire 118) I agree completely: they are essentially additional narrative grafts, graced with no more intrinsic legitimacy or honor than the dreams, shards of dialogue, political disputations, or porno graphic tableaus with which they share quarters (Saltzman 112). There seems to be a suggestion in Ackers wo rk that we need to be violently shocked out of our ideological stupor, our passive ac ceptance of the artificial categories that determine our reality. Indeed, we could make the obvious argument that the excessive violence and spectacle in Ac kers texts force us to rec ognize the arbitrariness of our existence. (Toth 173) 244

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I recall: Though the revolution in Paris had eradicated m ost of the middle class, the middleclass cops were left. (119); Beneath this conc rete of repression, the sa ilors and cops loved one another (119). Passages like these are not only youth threatening but also dangerous for adults. According to paragraph 18,3 of the Crimin al Code (StGB) th e distribution of sado-masochistic literature is to be punish ed and by this the legislature made clear that made clear that media containing such materials go far beyond the limits of what is harmful to minors. ( Hannibal 146). In another sense (even if I am not making sense!): Abhors adoption of the nomadic creed expresse s the release or de-institutionalization of the individual from the metallic cocoon of We stern culture. Here Acker appears to draw upon concepts of deterritorialization and s mooth space from [Deleuze and Guattari], especially in their discussi on of the nomad (Conte 74) Today I thought to myself about the woman about whom I had dreamed: What do I want of her? I should adore ifno, I dont want a nything that stupid, that fearful! I really should adore if she was feminine and a motorcycle rider. Tough as any weathered ri der! Then Id be able to ask her what to do! (121). The pocketbook is harmful to minor s according to paragraph 1, 1 of the Law for the Projection of Minors (GjS). It is conf using in terms of sexual ethics and is therefore equal to immoral texts according to paragraph 1,1 GjS. ( Hannibal 145) Here is some good news, if I understand correctly : Acker relies on th e prerogatives of the ongoing process of desiredesire unmitigated by speci fic direction, achieved vantage, or ultimate gratificationto evade logi cal constraints (Saltzman 122). Yes, My Heart said these words. Whatever my h eart now said was absolutely true. (219) However, I dont know what to make of this as they say (who?): Abhors creativity takes the form of rewriting the authoritarian Code as a book called The Arabian Steeds because My Heart said these words. Whatever my heart now said was absolutely true ([Acker] 219). Purpor tedly illiterate, Abhor draws pictographic images over the familiar diamond-shaped warning signs of the Code that are reproduced in the novel, icons of a Western industri alized, petroleum-dependent, contaminated, 245

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asphalt-topped, inflammable society. Abhor converts, deciphers, and perform s a hermeneutical transformation of the warning si gns of an industrialized world in collapse into the vitalism, free will, and Bedouin-nomad ic values of North African cavaliers the motorcycle becomes Arabian steed; the part itioned and industriali zed city of Paris becomes open desert; cold metal becomes hot sand; and masculine becomes feminine. (Conte 73) The chosen elements of style do not enhance the novel to the level of art. A colorful, exciting and yet banal and trivial gutter language in itself cannot relay any artistic qualities within a novel. ( Hannibal 148) At times she makes her text unreadable [ ] She interpolates te xt in Persian, an invasion of the Western lite rary tradition by an Easter n literature Although the Persian text is unknowable for most readers, it still signifie s the arbitrariness of literary conventions. (Conte 61) From my archive, something I wrote before: Personal History Or Memory Otherwise I remember only nausea and I remember ad nauseu m. Is there any other knowledge besides this remembering? ( Empire 48) And here is something Thivai wr ote, in his Letters from Gaol: And his dream rendered, Calm was the night when the galley sailed on a warm, smooth sea. (168) A parable, or an account of an episode: In getting the tattoo, Agone recognizes that one or ot her social text will penetrate his flesh, making it a sign for others to read, and th at this will always i nvolve pain; he claims, at least, the right to exhib it an awareness of this sign-ma kingand the right to introduce a personal or secret meaning, troubling any act of reading his body. (Pitchford 100, original emphasisnot mine or Agones) Finally, I am adding to The Highway Code (1986), Rule 55 h: The tattoo outline was huge roses surrounding a la rger old-fashioned sailing ship. Below the ocean was a water dragon, a carp who had made it through the gate, who rose in folds and loomed over the ship. (139). But what of the dreams which the ocean brings? Have you forgotten, lieutenant? (117)* 246

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All th is makes clear that this novel does not reach the level worthy to be of value to the pluralistic society. The protection of young people takes precedence over the dissemination of this work as art. ( Hannibal 148) The ship is one I would take across the ocean fr om Paris to New Jersey and find on the shore a little dog named Jacques. No roses grow on a sailors grave. (132) Editors Note: The author has been denied clearance for reproduction and must revise to resubmit under current copyright laws. Time-lost Lessons As I have attempted, Ackers writing presen ts narrative and rhetorical strategies applicable for invention, particul arly toward producing effects of deterritorialization Most notable are the composition techniques of materi al-textual qualities a nd non-signifying regimes of language, through fragments and se rial-production effects of lost time; in this way, the prior section drew inspiration formally and theoretically from the conclusion of Empire. After escaping prison in the parodic-plagiaristic Adventures of Huck Finn scene (183-212), Abhor must supplement her motorcycle dr iving instincts with consulting the rules of road behaviour, in The Highway Code (213)the book in which Abhor draws pictures of whatever my heart now said (219-21). Indeed, although much can be made of the non-linguistic and non-Western elements of the text, the point suggesting gr eater potential is Ackers poetic s of discipline and anarchy, expression in ways other than literal or repr esentative: subverting the rational (logocentric) dispositif as noted, the aesthe tic figures comprise compounds of sensations A simple understanding could be the affects (anger or sexual desire) and the percepts (control or freedom) that Acker creates in this text ; for example in the earlier-cit ed instance when Abhor states, Because Im stupid, its taken me half a lifetime [...] for me to learn th at I have to say what I 247

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want to get what I want. W ho. Perhaps if human desire is said out loud, the urban planes, the prisons, the architectural mirrors, will take off, as airplanes do (112, my emphasis). Additionally, certain phrasing such as th is (and other passages I have emphasized) convey the forces or sensations of lost time as an effect of inte nsive writingthe serial production and fragmentation Understood similarly, it is the blocs of sensations ( WP 164) that we encounter, Deleuze and Guattari assert: the work of art is a monument but not something commemorating a past; rather, it is a bloc of present sensations that owe their preservation to themselves and that provide the event with th e compound (167). Thus how we engage and work with sensible forces and temporality, as Acker conveys in the novels under stated conclusion: I stood there, there in the sunlight and thought that I didnt as yet know what I wanted. I now fully knew what I di dnt want and what and whom I hated. That was something. And then I thought that, one day, maybe thereld be a human society in a world which is beautiful, a societ y which wasnt just disgust. ( Empire 227) Encountering Thanatos in Ceremony Time-lost Storytelling In continuing and accelerating my work w ith the three literary machines, a key clarification is apt to note, particularly by way of transition: despite my pragmatics reading of Ackers composed sensations, I must also recall that for Deleuze, the type of aesthetic signs associated with the first literary machin e are interpreted only by the intellect ( Signs 23). Indeed, I am exploring narrative and the temporal literar y machines in the resonance assemblage as suitable interface for encountering both intelligible and sensible qualities. Attentive to intensive features in diagrammatic reading for encounter heuretics, the task appears to find as well percepts and affects, composed sensation: one example includes, in Deleuzes theory, the experience of lost time that has been lost in another way, by amplitude of the forced movement, this loss having then passed into the work and become the condition of its form ( Signs 160). 248

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An exemplary caseone additionally instru ctive in the practice of composing with percepts and affects not directly undergone but extractedof conveying affect and temporality through narrative and aesthetic figures is Leslie Marmon Silkos novel Ceremony (1977). With Silkos directly highlighting types of storytelling and evoking sense(s) of loss, the composition renders sensible the effects of machines of forced movements ( Thanatos ) ( Signs 160), the production of catastrophe (149) and idea of death ( 158); additionally, this literary machine corresponds to the expression of lost time in the second sense (148). As this understanding is somewhat counterintuitive, exp ecting conventionally that narrative recovers time past, the challenge for method is using a different sensibility in order to develop a new understanding of story and memory with this in scription of temporality. Silko compels this reconsideration generally by connecting the content and formal features of the novel in inventive fashion, which I discuss next through several examples; mo re importantly, I test my understanding, whether changed by this productive encounter, in the subsequent application of her composition practices regarding the affect of time lost. In the main narrative of Ceremony Tayos recovery from unnamed maladies (posttraumatic stress disorder, currently diagnosed ) involves healing ritu als conducted by Laguna shamans, which employ mythology in the ritu al. On the one hand, the narration situates storytelling in the paradigm of belief, distinct from Western medicine and rational knowledge; however, rather than question needlessly whether Tayo genuinely shif ts to the mode of belief, we can more productively understand Silkos dramatizing the unintelligible status of past events particularly considering the f unction of story fragments. Emphasized in the narrative of Tayo, the effect also calls attention to readers encounte rs with aesthetic figures and stories. In one of the earliest analyses, Janer (1979) establishes this parallel rela tion: the reader can follow Tayo 249

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from event to event by moving from poetry to pr ose and back again to poetry. Silko juxtaposes the mythic portions of the novel and the story of Tayos efforts by stating the myth in poetic form to contrast with the prose that carries forward contemporary realizations of the meaning stated in poetic sections ( An Act of Attention 39). In the first case, Silko conveys through Tayo the inability to be affected by loss both general, and specific, as in the death of his su rrogate brother Rocky and surrogate father Josiah: the narrator explicitly describe s He didnt feel anything, even though he expects to experience hatred of both the Japanese and Am erican destroyers alike (58).5 Thanatos is fundamentally inscribed in the recollection and impact of disastrous events, Am erican colonization earlier and the Second World War more recently. Just as Tayo tells a V.A. doctor during treatment that He cries because they are dead and everything is dy ing (14), the plot development of his later paralysis by incomprehension suggests an incapacity as existential disorientation at present. A counterpoint Silko presents is a resentment that precludes pers onally making sense of loss and proceeding, given the direct and limited reaction of contempt and self-directed negation: for example, Here they were, trying to bring back th at old feeling, that feel ing they belonged to America the way they felt during the war. They blamed themselves for losing the new feelings [] just like they blamed themselves for lo sing the land the white people took. They never thought to blame white people for any of it; they wanted white people for their friends (39). Separately, Ceremony is composed with a generative and transformative formula in Silkos inventive use of narratives, particularly the traditi onal Laguna stories that she includes throughout the novel. Rather than classify ce rtain ones as myth, an overall collection establishes Silkos multimodal strategy of diegetic and hype r-diegetic stories: Thought 5 Leslie Marmon Silko, Ceremony, 30th Anniversary Edition (Penguin, 2006). A ll citations refer to this edition. 250

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Wom an, Ceremony (frame-story); historic al drought and rain; Spider Woman and Gambler; Fly and Hummingbird ; the Gallup Ceremonials; Shush / Bear; Coyote (Cko'yo magician) and Big Fly; Descheeny and the capti ve Mexican girl; Laguna Witchery; the hunger, Mountain Lion, and Tseh; the Sunrise offering. A simplistic reading would recognize plost causality implicit in the sequenc ing of the Laguna stories and Tayos recovery; for instance, immediately following a fragment of Fly & Hummingbird, Tayo remarks to Robert, Im feeling better Ive been doing okay. I can start help ing you now (97). Yet at this point in the narrative, Tayos ostensible improvement consists of forgetting specifically the deaths of Rocky and Josiah, rather than bei ng affected by signs of universal alteration and death ( Signs 158). Without evaluating the narratives by the true/fal se criteria of reason, the aesthetic figures of stories both mythological and actual can be understood in the function of expressing sensation. In this way, time lost by amplitude of forced movement is conveyed by the interface function of narrative in Sil kos poetics, which not only dr amatizes the question of sensibility (sensitivity?) but conveys an affect of loss precisely to the audience of th e stories. In Deleuzes theorization, the movement of time, from past to present, is doubled by a forced movement of greater amplitude, in the contrary direction, which sw eeps away the two moments, emphasizes the gap between them, and pushes the past still farther back into time ( Signs 159). Silkos aesthetic composition both presents an encounter (by characte r and reader) with and evokes the effect of withdrawal or the id ea of death, in which it is time itself that becomes sensuous ( Signs 160). From this perspective, th e qualitative difference followi ng Tayos healing ritual with Betonie illustrates a crucial insight about the potential of affective encounters by means of aesthetic figures: prior to this story-based ce remony, Tayo is familiar with that hollow feeling 251

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of absence, which is sim ilarly described in physiological terms as the empty space of loss, regret for things which could not be cha nged (67), concerning his mothers death. By understanding Tayos heal ing narrative not as a restoration by fortification of beliefbut as a shift to a different mode of sensibility and experience, we can recognize the factor of the numerous stories in relation to his affective transformation in the later events of the plot.6 Early in the novel, the contrast emerges between the anesthetic hollow feelinga figurative scar tissue or lack of sensibilitya nd the capacity to be affected by experience: The sensitivity remained: the ability to feel what the others were feeling in the belly and chest; words were not necessary, but the messages th e people felt were confused now (63). This difference can also be understood within a cult ural context, as Cart sen (2006) describes: [Silkos] strategy challenges the hegemony of Euro-American cu ltural and literary interpretation that situates the experien ces of Indian peoples within plots of tragedy and defeat. The mythic frame of reference offers an alternative way of interpreting the experiences of tribal i ndividuals; it positions the individual in harmonious relationship with the community and with the cosmos. Silko employs the mythical focus on harmony and beauty to highlight the conflict between EuroAmerican and Native American cosmologi es and ethics. (Storyteller 117) Unlike logocentric (Western ) epistemology, the problem of sensib ility is not resolved by rational hermeneutics insofar as we remain unmoved by our analytic response and argumentative discourse, and moreover inattentive to a ffect or temporality as experienced. Two heterological narratives that accentuate time-lost by Thanatos are the historical accounts of the uranium mine and nuclear tests (226-8) and the mythical stories of European destroyers that Betonie and Tseh relay to Tayo. Underst ood categorically, these parallel views are incommensurate in 6 Like Cartsen, Mitchell discerns in the productive encounter narratives potential to cure some of the hopelessness and despair: noting that Tayo [is] cured by the old stor ies and changing ceremonies, she describes moreover how Silko weaves the old stories and traditions into the contemporary story of Tayo in a way that helps to make the old ways understandable and relevant to the contemporary situation. ( Ceremony as Ritual 28, my emphasis). 252

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the resp ective paradigms of Belief and Reason; the Trinity Site is incomprehensible textually to Tayos Grandma just as the witchery origin is nonsense to rational thinkers (readers). Finally, given my project I must consider how scholarly interpretations of novel, as represented by Cartsen and Mitchell, recognize the unique composition and effects by Silkos composition without necessarily presenting any resu lts of this encounter, even in rhetorical practices. Arnold (1999) similarl y observes a new way of being and knowing as the plot outcome for the protagonist: The fragmentation that characteri zed his mental state and the world around him [] is healed, as the patterns that underlie and interconnect those fragments become visible to him. Tayo relearns a way of seeing he had experienced before the war, listening to Old Grandma tell the time-immemorial stories, visiting the sacred spring of Grandmother Spider (An Ear for the Story 76). In contrast, I seek not only to apply the strategy of narrative interface, working in the aesthetic paradigm, but to express a resultant affective capacity in sensibility. This creative effort is motivated both by the novels poetics and by Deleuzes re-writin g of the Ariadne myth, one discovered by inventing a sonorous la byrinth [as] the song of the earth ( Essays 104).7 Specifically, the following section attempts to c onvey rather than strictly explain that which I have only minimally identified, the sensation of time lost by the machine of Thanatos : The idea of death is henceforth less a severance than an effect of mixture or confusion because the amplitude of the forced movement is as much taken up by the living as by the dead; all are dying, half dead, or racing to the grave (Signs 159). 7 In Deleuzes The Mystery of Ariadne, according to Nietzsche, once Ariadne turns toward Dionysus from Theseus, her song cease[s] to be the expression of ressentiment in order to become an active search, an already affirmative question ( Essays 103). Consequently, The labyrinth is no l onger architectural; it has become sonorous and musical (104)no longer that of knowledge or morality, but the labyrinth of life and of Being as living being (106). The lesson for sensibility is thus my composin g with the ear of Dionysus, the labyrinthine ear (103). 253

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(Choragraphy 3) Story Interface Do we have an ear for the collective din? Serres, The Five Senses (108) To hear well is to hear what is never sa id, what has to be kept silent beyond the message Cixous, Readings (71) They have almost arrived after traveling all day, walking the last 3 miles after receiving rides first from San Fidel and then up from L aguna. It will be dark soon, but the cold is not prohibitive without wind, and the walk means seei ng the last light of the day cast over the pueblo, between the hills. The young man can not visit there now, can only accompany Tayo as he ventures to wait for the mountain lion. You ar e better off not stayi ng in Gallup, along the highway. I will not join you going farther Ea st than we have today, Tayo tells him. Volcanic eruptions, occurring over time, creat ed the landscape we call El Malpais. These lava flows formed unique ecosystems and shaped human perceptions. It is not much farther, the young man ventures. I could not go past the gate earlier, on the way from Grants, to see the rock the rangers mentioned. Tomorrow Id like to reach the reservoir, and then onto the Valley of Fires There is a plane somewhere nearby. Tayo walked silently, not responding until reaching a point, a ledge on the path. I will tell you a story now, of a man a bit younger than you are now. The man could not make any sense of the d eath he had seen, not only family members and other natives but animals and the land of his birth. Often times He cried, trying to release the great pressure that was swelling in side his chest, but he got no relief from crying any more. The pain was solid and consta nt as the beating of his own heart (Silko 35). He felt half-heartedly that he wasted time hearing Betonies stories, and he did not know what to do later after spending days with Kuoosh during the ceremony. This was after he returned, unable to feel any streng th against the unnamed forces overpowering. Still, He never knew how long he had been lost there, in that hospital in Los Angeles. (Silko 213) Tayo stops for awhile, observing the gloaming and recalling Tseh in these very mountains. 254

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Zuni say the bear has healing powers. When faced with conflicts, he helps you m editate to find the answers you need. He resumes the story, and the tone has changed, like a different man speaking, when he mentions hearing his grandmothers storytelling He never lost the feeling he had in his chest when she spoke those words, as she did each time she told them storie s; and he still felt it was tr ue, despite all they had taught him in schoolthat long ago things had been different, and human beings could understand what the animals said, and once th e Gambler had trapped the stormclouds on his mountaintop. (Silko 87). Tayo turns and faces Southwest, where the young man traveled from earlier. You should not visit Cebolleta. Not now, while the canyon is dr y. The mine shafts are exposed, and no animals can reside there. You must know what I mean. Once, almost fifty years ago, the mine floode d and needed to be pumped, with machinery brought from Albuquerque. But later in th e summer the mine flooded again, and this time no pumps or compressors were sent. They had enough of what they needed, and the mine was closed, but the barbed-wire fen ces and guards remained until August 1945. By then they had other sources of uranium, and it was not top secret any more. (Silko 226) Continuing the story of the man who could not proceed, Tayo explains what happened after the man no longer alternated between be lieving and reasoning what he felt. The magnetism of the center spread over hi m smoothly like rainwater down his neck and shoulders; the vacant cool sensation glided over the pain like feather-down wings. It was pulling him back, close to the earth, wher e the core was cool and silent and as mountain stone, and even with the noise and pa in in his head he knew how it would be. (Silko 187). Beginning up the path again, Tayo asks the youn g man where he is from originally. Learning where, he mentions the story of how the ocean lost the moon by Fly and Hummingbird, to recollect another time. The moon is up. The tides will be angry at your home, given its size. The several hundred petroglyphs and 2,000 names inscribed in the sandstone walls of El Morro rock represent 1, 000 years of continuous human use and occupation. 255

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Walking alongside the young man, who is looking North, Tayo asks him to recall the easterly winds. Can you hear them, above the waves breaking, not far from where you sleep? The shoreline will be different tomorrow, gone from today forced into the past. There is nothing for you to read in the sand, whatever has been writt en. It is not like these rocks, here all during the Fifth World. But what can you hear, rhythms and other echoes, as the bear? The young man did not answer, knew not to re ply. He turned southeast and tried not to think, opened himself to the twilight sky. Af ter standing a few minutes, he asked Tayo what happened to him in the end of the story of the man lost, whether able to make sense or understand. He cried the relief he felt at finally s eeing the pattern, the way all the stories fit togetherthe old stories, the war stories, their storiesto become the story that was still being told. He was not crazy; he had never been crazy. He had only seen and heard the world as it always was: no boundaries, only transitions through all distances and time. (Silko 229) When the young man nodded but re mained looking away, Tayo remarked, You can not expect to understand fully while surrounded by plastic. Standing on the sand of the impermanent shore means a different grounding. You will hear someday, with the corrosive salt air winds. Formed from raw clay, the figurine is pa inted by hand then fi red in an outdoor kiln to 2000F. Red hot, it is plunged into a pit with mesquite shavings, igniting a blaze, entirely unique. Lessons of Writing Lost Time Although not entirely successful in c onveying the sensation of time lost by Thanatos the prior section demonstrates as performative narratology the potential of composing with an interface of sensibility: as discerned from S ilkos practices, the related formula like other authors mentioned uses history, fiction/myt h, and personal experien ce to compose (with) encounters. Moreover, the exemplars of Foer, Acke r, and Silko aid in my examining the prospect 256

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for aesthetic com pounds of percepts and aff ects extracted and composed, as opposed to directly experienced (second-orde r). This perspective is valu able in practice generally, in encounter heuretics, and specifically in undertak ing the proposition that one can remain poetic in the very midst of history (Cixous 110): using literary forms and vehicles for temporal effects and for transformative configurations into (or by means of ) an assemblage. Apt to this end, although framed in a different context, is Curries conjecturing, If time and history are being readmitted here, it is an unrecognisable form that destroys the linear sequence of past, present and future with the logic of the trace which understands the components of any sequence as constitutive of each other ( Postmodern Narrative 78, my emphasis). As with prior novels in this chapter, I have encountered in Ceremony the composition of percepts and affects, specifically a sense and sensation of temporality driven by the amplitude of forces Thanatos destruction by the catastrophe, wh ether a marked disaster in event (Vonnegut, Foer) or in society and knowledge dispositif (Acker, Silko). In each case, I have found in the aesthetic paradigm an increased pot ential for sensibility, even and especially if unintelligible, of forces and sensations that can be com posed in aesthetic styl e of expressive or experienced thought. On one hand, th is perspective reca lls a prospect inhe rent in Deleuzes theorization, as I have been te sting: Each art has its interrelated techniques or repetitions, the critical and revolutionary power of which may a ttain the highest degree and lead us from the sad repetitions of habit to the profound repetitions of memory, and then to the ultimate repetitions of death in which our freedom is played out ( DR 93). Beyond recollection as activity of the intellect, though, I seek to propose a method and di scourse for affective expression, as in how I have been testing aesthetic practices for sense-making at the knowledge frontier of experience and encounters. The next section explores not onl y the third literary machine, and its temporality 257

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of tim e regained, regardi ng the destructive forces ( Thanatos ) and recollection ( Mnemosyne ); additionally, this identifies the promise of resonance for assemblage composition, heuretic encounters and artisanal praxis in philosophical discourse, as I describe in the final section. Expressing Eros and MnemoysyneFoers Machines of Resonance Like the several authors I have discussed t hus far, the formula I have identified is markedly apparent in Jonathan Safran Foers first two novels, Everything is Illuminated (2002) and Extremely Loud & Incredibly Close (2005). And while both novels can be understood as functioning by Deleuzes third literary machine, I am focusing on the first given my particular examination of writing and diegetic textuality as intensive features. Besides avoiding the additional pragmatics of multiple regimes, like photographs and mediality of computer technology, in the latter novel, the approach is motivated by the question of literary invention at the knowledge frontier: while both novels feature fictional writers and readers as well as quest plots (detective model), Illuminated includes to greater extent diagrammatic elements of narrative beyond communication or signification regimes. Moreover, Foers compositional practices in both novels present aesthetically certa in percepts, affects, a nd sensations, including not only time lost ( Thanatos ) but time regainedtemporality become sensuous ( Signs 160) by the machine of resonance (Eros) in Deleuzes vocabulary. Most importantly, Illuminated not only presents aesthetic compounds to engage in pragmatics and encounter heuretics; the novel also demonstrates th e possibilities of the narrative assemblage functioning as sensibility interface with history, temporalit y, and experience, at the knowledge frontier of writing. Like Slaughterhouse-Five and Ceremony the novels organization fundamentally contributes to the effects produced at the le vel of composition and literary language. To summarize, the textual arrangement consists of serial chapters narrated (and purportedly composed by) Alexander Perchov, with the additi onal fictional device of the Alex character 258

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corresponding by letters about these chapters with Jonathan Safran Foer, who appears in the quest narrative in m odern-day Ukraine. While th e quasi-picaresque chapters include titles like An Overture to Encountering the Hero, and Then Encountering the Hero (27) and The Very Rigid Search (105), the seven epis tolary interludes are only da ted (20 July 1997 to 22 January 1998) and moreover are only composed by Alex; this ostensibly metafictional preterition is accentuated in commentary from Alex (in the fi ctional device) about Jonathans novelserving as one of few links between the eight quest chap ters and the eighteen mo stly episodic chapters. Also datedRecurrent Secrets, 1791-1943 an d The Thickness of Blood and Drama, 1934 for instancethe latter chapters co mprise narratives set in the shetl of Trachimbrod, or Sofiowka on certain maps (62), concerning Yankel-Sa fran and Brod during the years 1791-1804; and Safran, the character called by the narrator m y grandfather, in ep isodes during 1924-41.8 These temporal settings span the invented lin eage of eight generations by the narrator-au consisting mostly of events respectively invo lving Brodhis great-great-great-great-greatgrandmother (47)and his grandfather, Safra n, who escaped the Nazi raid on Trachimbrod (59); in one instance, an abberant time-setti ng, the narrator referen ces his grandmother and mother, who is age twenty one in 1969, My age as I write these words at present (98). thor, The reflexive focus upon writing directly connects the textual features and compounds with issues of temporality, partic ularly in conveying sensations of time lost and regained ; distinct from (psychological/phenomenological) memory, th is effect occurs be tween (or across) 8 To clarify, the character formerly named Safran (46) is Yankel, Brods adoptive father; in one instance, she renames her husband, the man Shalom-then-Kolker-now-Safra n, unwittingly after her father by something she had readabout which the narrator (metafictional Foer) ambigu ously remarks, And it was this Safran for whom my grandfather, the kneeling groom, was named (115). Although inconsequential, an example of epistolary commentary from the character-author Alex articulates the novels self-reflexivity: As for your story, I will tell you that I was at first a very perplexed person. Who is this new Safran, and Dial, and who is becoming married? Primarily I thought it was the wedding of Brod and Kolker, but when I learned that it was not, I thought, Why did their story not continue? (142)regarding the dual-s etting chapter, The Dial, 1941-1804-1941 (119). 259

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disparate figures in the respective narratives of Brod, Safran, and Jonathan. Considered one way, the resonance m achine that Deleuze describe s does not totalize fragments that come from elsewhere. It extracts its own fragments itself and sets up a resonance among them according to their own finality ( Signs 152). The production by this machine would seem to function beyond simple occurrences of reference (or re-iteration), as when in 1 941 Safran recounts to the Gypsy girlpromising to ask for her he lp when he one day tried to write Trachimbrods historythe story of Brods tragic life (233), or when they see a play featuring her origin story, which begins exactly as does the first chapter, It was March 18, 1791, when Trachim Bs doubleaxle wagon[] (8/172). Additionally, art produces re sonances that are not those of memory, Deleuze explains, which are not limited to involu ntary recollection (most famously) of earlier moments by some similarity at present, but include desire ( Signs 151) and contiguity as well. Besides direct connections or repetitions, Foers narrativ e constructions and relations convey effects of lost time, which introduces distances between contiguous things, and time regained, which creates a contiguity of distant things ( Signs 129). In the first case, lost time and affects of loss are evoked by th e novels content, as in the dest ruction of the en tire shetl of Trachimbrod, as well as specific character deaths su ch as Brods father or Herschel, the best friend to Alexs grandfather, who murdere d him (228)Or what I did was as good as murdering him (247)when the Nazis came to Ko lki, near Trachimbrod, as well. In one of the tranversal lines created, Alex and Jonathan find in the same scene, upon finding Augustine, The Book of Past Occurrences (224), and they (we) read nearly th e same text presented earlier (200) in the Book of Antecedents (The Time of Dyed Hands from the 18th century), which Safran is speculated to have read as a st udent (196). Although this book is archival in the serial quest plot for Alex and Jonathan, in a variety of hi storiographic metafiction, the effect for readers 260

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exceeds simple reference by Foers em ploying the book in numerous forms and narrative instances; moreover, the device doe s not strictly function in the signifying regime, as literally inscribing The Five Generations Between Brod and Safran (210), as mentioned, for example. Rather, as a device of in direct and transversal narra tion, the hypodiegetic book compels reflexive attention to practicesformal, material, rhetori cal, discursivefor sense making at the knowledge frontier, if only generative and to degrees diagrammatic One of the novels most notable sections, for example, reports that The Book of Antecedents, once updated yearly, was now continually updated, and when there was not hing to report, the full-time committee would report its reporting, just to keep th e book moving, expanding, becoming more like life: We are writingWe are writi ngWe are writing (196, original emphasis and ellipsis). Appearing before diegetic excerpts from The Book of Antecedents this passage and the 18th-century texts from the Trachimbrod of Yankel and Brod functions as textual resonance of the past in the present of Safrans narrative, about whom the narrator muses in the subjunctive mood, he too must have skipped from volume to volum e, page to page, searching (196). The unusual temporality, or contemporaneity of past and present is created partly by this shift to narration of stories such as Trachimday, 1796 and The First Rape of Brod D (203) as well as to encyclopedic entries like Art-Artifice-Artifact (202), Objects That Dont Exist (207), and Brods 613 Sadnesse s (211), in typical fashion of the shetl-citiz en characters throughout the novel. Finally, the dual (or mixed) temporal orient ations is highlighted by this transition, from Safran to the Antecedents excerpts for the duration, in this chapter titled Falling in Love, 1934-1941, the same as chapter 21 (along with three others similarly named). Unlike the occasioned (involuntary?) r ecollection of Safrans narrativ e framing Brods in chapter 13, The Dial, 1941-1804-1941 (121), th e temporal shift occurs by the feature of textualityjust as 261

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by The Book of Recurrent Dreams in chapter 23, The Beginning of the World Often Com es, 1942-1791 (272). Having belabored this point somewhat, and summarizing the narrative arrangement that I find particularly generative of resonant effects, I will conclude with tw o notable examples in which Foer composes (having extracted?) using transversal lines on the temporal axis, before turning to my performative narratology attempt in the next section. And although my discussion thus far has not been especially affective or resonant of sensa tions encountered, I have at least provisionally found in Foers na rrative practices how A forced movement has meshed gears with a resonance: the violent c ontradiction between time regained a nd lost time is resolved, in Deleuzes reading, by attach[ing] each of the two to its order of productionthe literary machines of resonance (Eros) and machines of forced movements (Thanatos) ( Signs 152). In one transverse relation, th e scene of watching the televi sed lunar landing includes the 1969 astronauts perceiving something (99), the persistent glow of 1804 Trachimday: From space, astronauts can see people making love as a tiny speck of light. Not light, exactly, but a glow that could be mistaken for lighta coital radiance that takes gene rations to pour like honey through the darkness to the astr onauts eyes (95). Although the affirmative expression, the copulative light of Trachimbrod pe rsisting through time, will say in one and a half centuries. Were here, and were alive (96), this description coincide s with Brods finding the deceased Yankel (97), immediately after having been rape d by Sofiowka (203); this outcome creates at present the echo of past narrat ion and another transver sal, in Brods perceiving in the future a boy and girl reading The Book of Antecedents, specifically The First Rape of Brod D (89).9 Perhaps this fashions the past as contemporan eous with its own presen t, as pre-existing the 9 In a scene of fabulation, Brod g azes into the future by a powerful telescope and discovers not only the Antecedents reading by the children that I have noted, but also the photograph that motivates the search-plot of the novel, which appears to be inscribed with handwriting that looks like hers (88). 262

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passing pres ent and as that which causes the pres ent to pass, as Deleuze theorizes: Virtual objects are shreds of pure past ( DR 101)most especially aesthetic writing, in this case. Likewise, the narrative instance of Safran s wedding-night copulation occurs in 1941 precisely during the nearby bombing (257). This latter scene connects Eros and Thanatos along the temporal axis of 1804-1969, re sonating (or regaining) the fo rmer and contributing to the persistence (retroactively in the novel) in the figure of Safran, as when he released into the universe a copulative light so powerful that if it could have been harnessed and utilized [] the Germans wouldnt have had a chance, he wonde red if one of the bombs hadnt landed on the marriage bed [] and obliterated Trachimbrod ( 257). Perhaps a less litera l instance of Foers joining time lost and time regain ed is the impulse by Safran in 1941 to write Trachimbrods history one day and include the story of Brods tragic life (233), at present sensing the effects of her past reverberating, as in the telescope scene when she experiences that the pageher paper-thin futureis infinitely heavy (89). Toward my ends of pragmatics and heuretics, another understanding of textuality and time is that This is the link between Eros and Mnemosyne. Eros tears virtual objects out of the pure past and gives th em to us in order that they may be lived ( DR 102-3). In lieu of attempting truly inve ntive poetics using narrative resonance in the fashion of Foer, the follo wing section at least presents th is way my encounters with the textual affects of Illuminated through artisanal praxis (performative narratology). 263

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(Choragraphy 4) How do you arrange your books? 08 May 2012 D ear Gary, first, thank you for the wonderful surp rise of the books by Nicole Krauss and Lydia Davis! I look forward to reading them and learning what you write about them (if you have time to share your ideas with me). Also for the CD mix of songs. I know so much better now what you mean saying you think more like music about certain moments and experiences. I too feel this way sometimes, as when I am reading parts of novels. But even this is more like films to me. (You will have to say more about this) As for your last letter, yes! I found th e book you requested! The librarians here at Volyn State University were so surprised t hat you had even known of it, they said they never expected anyone outside Ukraine to read. I have tried to copy as much I can for you, finding parts I think you will like. (How will you use this in your writing?) I must say the book is very hard to follow. The writer describes a novel named Songs We Would Have Heard (this is why you have requested the book?). But there too are about history that do not interest me in my classes (I still have not chosen one concentration, I would like to pursue business law or media journalis m. (when will you next resume working as a teacher? next will you try to become a wr iter of novels or of philosophy? I hope to read your books someday too.) The attachment file to this email is my be st effort to type fo r you the passages, as fast as I could send you. The parts about the novel story I like best and I think you will like too. (It seems very sad and also amazingly joyful too. At ti mes I feel like I might be the granddaughter of Zosha and Safran, had their child survived! These parts felt most important to me personally.) I hope this help s your project as you say and literary research! Good luck and tell me soon what you think. Most sincerely, Sofka p.s. will you now try to find the nov el to read in translation one day? Typed (as best I could) passages from the book History and Typology of Literature from Pre-War Years (Kiev, 2000) ( 2000) Enter music. Beautiful music. Hushed at first. Whispering. No pins are dropped. Only music. Music swelling imperceptibly Pulling itself out of its grave of silence. The orchestra pit fills with swea t. Expectancy. Enter gentle rumble of timpani. Enter piccolo and viola. Intimati ons of crescendo. Ascent of adrenaline, even after so many performances. It still feels new. The music is building, blooming. (Foer 176) 264

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The hero is distressed. Safran lay in bed tryi ng to string the events of his seventeen years into a coherent narrative, something that he could understand, with an order of imagery, an intelligibility of symbolism. Where were the symmetries? The rifts? What was the meaning of what had happened? (260) Around Trachimbrod, Men set up flow charts (which were themselves memories of family trees) in an attempt to make sense of their memories. They tried to follow the line back, like Theseus out of the la byrinth, but only went in deeper, farther. (259) Gary, the book has a picture-draw ing of the flow chart here. S Safran walked around aimlessly, first to The Dial but then quickly away once seeing two former one-time mistresses. He saw anot her man about his age reading The Book of Unlived Recollections under his favorite tree. This Plaque Marks The Spot (Or A Spot Close To The Spot) Where The Wagon Of One Trachim B (We Think) Went In. Shtetl Proclamation, 1791 (Foer 93, formatting modified) from The Book of Unlived Recollections : 2:509The Ghost of What Never Was (Wife) It was inevitable: Yankel fell in love w ith his never-wife. He would wake from sleep to miss the weight that never depre ssed the bed next to him, remember in earnest the weight of gestures she ne ver made (48) making his widowers remembrances that much more convincing and his pain that much more real. He felt that he had lost her. He had lost her. At night he would reread the letters that she had never written him. (Foer 49) 2:510The Memory of the Novel Never Published (XVII) The Story of the Spiraling Here which I finished writing and then misplaced. Now I cannot recall how it begins. 5:020Voices from Another Place (IV) And then Brod heard from her chamber organ She wants to know why her friend saved her wedding ring 265

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Finally, Safran found a place to wait for the wi dow to return home, sitting beside her house. He read, for what felt like an hour al though only minutes passed. He no longer had his watch, or cared to find where hed lost it. September 23, 1803: It occurred to me this afternoon that there is nothing in the world I like so much as writing in my diary. It never misunderstands me and I never misunderstand it. We are like perf ect lovers, like one person. Sometimes I take it to bed with me and hold it as I fall asleep. Sometimes I kiss its pages, one after another. For now, at least, it will have to do (Foer 87) 28 October 1997: I understand what you wr ite when you write that Brod does not love Yankel. It does not signify that she doe s not feel volumes for him, or that she will not be melancholy when he expires. It is something else. Love, in your writing, is the immovability of truth. Br od is not truthful with anything. Not Yankel and not herself. (Foer 100) While there, the young man and the friend Avra approached him with curious excitement. Look what we have found! what someone added to The Book of Antecedents Avra began. Under the re-printed entry for Pinchas T the deceased philosopher Pinchas T, who, in his only notable paper, To the Dust: From Man You Came and to Man You Shall Return, argued it would be possible, in theory, fo r life and art to be reversed (Foer 90). every reminiscence, whether of a town or a woman, is erotic. It is always Eros, the noumenon, who allows us to penetrate this pure past in itself, this virginal repetition which is Mnemosyne. He is th e companion, the fianc, of Mnemosyne. Where does he get this power? Why is th e exploration of th e pure past erotic? Why is it that Eros holds bot h the secret of questions and answers, and the secret of an insistence in all our existence? Unless we have not yet found the last word ( Difference and Repetition 85) We thought, perhaps Safran has written this! Avra added. No, not I, Safran clarified, impatient. But let us look fo r a similar section in this volume, he continued, with a differe nt twinge of intrigue aroused. 266

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Artif ice Artifice is that thing that was art in its conception and ifice in its execution. Look around. Examples are everywhere. (Foer 202) Art Art is that thing having to do only with it selfthe product of a successful attempt to make a work of art. Unfortunately, there ar e no examples of art, nor good reasons to think that it will ever exist. (Everything that has been made has been made with a purpose, everything with an end that exists outside that thing, i.e., I want to sell this, or I want this to make me famous and loved, or I want this to make me whole, or worse, I want this to make others whole. ) And yet we continue to write, paint, sculpt, and compose. Is this foolish of us? (Foer 202) Ifice Ifice is that thing with purpose, created for functions sake, and having to do with the world. Everything is, in some way, an example of ifice. (Foer 202) Artifact An artifact is the product of a succe ssful attempt to make a purposeless, useless, beautiful thing out of a pa st-tensed fact. It can. (Foer 202) Ifact An ifact is a past-tensed fact. For example, many believe that after the destruction of the first Temple, Gods existence became an ifact. (Foer 202) Ifactifice Music is beautiful. Since th e beginning of time, we (t he Jews) have been looking for a new way of speaking. We often bl ame our treatment throughout history on terrible misunderstandings. (Words never mean what we want them to mean.) If we communicated with something like musi c, we would never be misunderstood, because there is nothing in music to unde rstand. This was the origin of Torah chanting and, in all likelihood, Yiddishthe most onom atopoeic of all languages. It is also the reason that the elderly among us, particularly those who survived a pogrom, hum so often, indeed seem unable to stop humming, seem dead set on preventing any silence or linguistic meani ng in. But until we find this new way of speaking, until we can find a nonapproximate vocabulary, nonsense words are the best thing weve got. Ifactifice is one such word. (Foer 203) Safran asked for The Book of Antecedents for the night, borrowing the newest Portable Volume from Avra. When he finished with the widowin whose house he spent only a half hour, with twenty minutes having teahe decided to copy a passage into the Book in the lateafternoon sunlight. 267

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French Poetry I bought you some books in Lutsk, he told her, shutting the d oor on the early evening and the rest of the world. We cant afford these, she said, taking the heavy bag. Ill have to return them tomorrow. But we cant afford not to have them. Which can we not afford more, having them or not having them? As I see it we lose either way. My way, we lose with the books. Youre ridiculous, Yankel. I know, he said, because I also bought you a compass from my architect friend and several books of French poetry. But I dont speak French. What could be a better occasion to learn? Having a French language textbook. Ah yes, I knew there was a reason I bought this! he said, removing a thick brown book from the bottom of the bag. Youre impossible, Yan kel! Im possibly possible. (Foer 81, my formatting) Safran had not cross-referenced the entr ies for Phonautograph and France, or he would have seen that this account had already been recorded (with some variation). The textbook was how Brod (his great-g reat-greatgrandmother) came to add to her library several books written in French (as well as German, Sp anish, and English). But how she acquired the Phonautograph in 1861 is unknown. And most strange is her phonautogram, an inscription of sounds she heard one night coming through the pi pes of her chamber organ between static: She wants to know why her friend saved he r wedding ring when she thought that she would be killed So there would be proof that sh e existed, the hero said. What? Evidence. Documentation. Testimony. I told this to Augustine. But a ring is not needed for this. People can remember without the ring. And when those people forget, or die, then no one will know about the ring. I told this to the hero. But the ring could be a reminder, he said. Every time you see it, you think of her. I told Augustine what the hero said. No, she said. I think it was in case of this. In case someone should come searching one day. (Foer 192) [ static ] This is Trachimbrod, he said. Its also called Sofiowka on certain maps. This is Lutsk. This is Kolki. Its an old map. Mo st of the places were looking for arent on new maps. (Foer 62) Also from The Book of Unlived Recollections : 2:509 Voices from Another Place (IV) For all I know the writing doesnt have a nything to do with th e picture. It could be that he used this for scrap paper. Scrap? Paper thats unimportant. Just something to write on. (Foer 61) As Safran returned home, he saw the Gypsy girl brieflyonly in time to slip her a scrap of paper. Throughout these months, They exchange d notes, like children: Safran made his out 268

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of newspaper clippings and dropped them in her woven baskets, into which he knew only she would dare stick a hand. Meet me under the wooden bridge, and I will show you things you have never, ever seen (232-3) He recalle d a passage from the Unlived Recollections : 3:017: Unwritten Thoughts (XLIX) Fearing his frequent deficienci es of memory, he began writin g fragments of his life story on his bedroom ceiling with one of Brods lips ticks that he found wrapped in a sock in her desk drawer. This way, his life would be the first thing he woul d see when he awoke each morning, and the last thing before going to sleep each night. (Foer 83) He wrote in The Book of Recurrent Dreams: :812The dream of living forever with Brod (84) 12:0910: Unread Books written by Ancestors (Male) Im looking for a book he told the librarian, who ha d cared for the Trachimbrod novels since she was a girl, and was the onl y citizen to have read them all. My greatgrandfather wrote it. What was his name? the librarian asked. Safranbrod, but I think he wrote it under a pseudonym. What was the name of his book? I cant remember the name. [] Hed tell me stories from it to put me to sleep. Whats it about? she asked. Its about love. She laughed. Theyre all about love. (Foer 201-2) There are entries in The Book of Antecedents that Safran still has not read. For example, The Novel, When Everyone Was Convinced He Had One in Him (Foer 201) The Tale of the Lost Book and/or Novel Title Once, Zivka and Anshel had composed a novel t ogether, about their friend Zosha: Songs We Would Have Heard and Th e Story of the Spiraling (H)ear Realization "The only thing more painful than being an active forgetter is to be an inert rememberer (Foer 260) Fear and Confusion at Misr ecognizing Ones Handrwiting (IV) She turns away and turns back, as if in that moment she might have acquired some new perspective, but the room rema ins a puzzle to her. She trie s to piece it together: A halfsmoked cigarette balancing itself on an ashtrays lip. A damp washcloth on the sill. A scrap of paper on the desk, with handwriting that looks like hers: This is me with Augustine, February 21, 1943. (Foer 88) 269

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When he arrived hom e, after a directionless walk fretting over his arrang ed marriage to Zosha, Safran found the Gypsy girl in his room. Your books are arranged by the color of their spines, she said. How stupid (236) He had never thought to arrange them any other way, except for the complicated system at the Ya nkelbrod library. He reopened The Book of Antecedents when she left, thinking to add something about this. Instead he readsBrods 613 Sadnesses (55 anyway, The other 558 sadnesses are lost forever) (Foer 211). Several others have been newly added, we can see: The Sadness of Old Maps. Daily Newspapers Discarded Sadness. The Sadness of Unwritten Stories. Spiral Sadness. Earworm Sadness (when not recalling name). The Sadness of Dreaming the End. Future Sadness for Those I Will N ever Meet. Fictionbecome-True (but Wrong) Sadness. A young soldier tossed the nine volumes of The Book of Recurrent Dreams onto the bonfire of Jews, not noticing, in his hast e to grab and destroy more, that one of the pages fell out of one of the books and descended, coming to rest like a veil on a childs burnt face: 9:613The dream of the end of the world. (Foer 272) We are writing. .We are writing. .We are writing. .We are writing. .We are writing. .We are writing. .We are writing. .We are writing. .We are writing. .We are writing. .We are writing. .We are writing. .We are writing. .We are writing. .We are writing. .We are writing. .We are writing. (Foer 212, original formatting) Lessons of Eros As mentioned, the prior secti on is not entirely su ccessful and affectiv e expression, in my attempt to present in performative fashion my pragmatics reading of intensive features and my encounter with the novel. However, as artisanal praxis it shows significant promise and results in two ways regarding both the approach to working with novels and to using in the fashion writers do the respective literary machines of production and temporality.10 In the latter sense, I 10 Perhaps I did not need to include the authors texts, instead sufficient to identify what could be done in the resonance assemblage later developed; however, as a literatu re scholar, the novels are precisely my available materials for invention at the frontier which I realize only retrospectively an d reflexively by the writing process. 270

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have undertaken by way of Foers practi ces the proposition by Deleuze that st yle sets up a resonance between any two objects and fr om them extracts a precious image, substituting for the determined conditions of an unconscious nat ural product the free conditions of artistic production ( Signs 155, original emphasis). Although perhap s misusing the techniques in narrative contrivance and a limite d context, unlike that of Illuminated I have at the very least considered this prospect in appl ication. Indeed, the point for method to consider is that not only does the resonance produce an aesthetic effect, but the resonance itself can be produced & be [] an artistic effect ( Signs 154, my emphasis); the arti st and the reader, or artisanal scholar disentangles various meanings and functions, Deleuze posits: s etting up a resonance between two objects, he produces the epip hany, releasing the precious im age from the natural conditions that determine it, in order to reincarnate it in the c hosen artistic conditions (156). Beyond the superior viewpoint superior to the two moments distinctly experienced in time (152)that emerges through aesthetic style by using the resonance machine, the process and logic of transversality both includes temporal effects an d connects heteroge neous fragments without totalizing (163). As a speci fic affect, resonance in the firs t way links Eros and Memory in a distinct sense of time regain ed that reverberates at present sensations of the past without being strictly recollection as both a contemporaneity and a new effect. Less strictly accounted for in Deleuzes terms, one simple yet productive insight is that the sensation is not merely a phenomenon narrated about fictional characters: rather, it is experienced by readers and (surely) by authors while composing, in the very fashion of effects produced by aesthetic style. This quality connects with the second prospect of the formal logic, in that the resonance machine corresponds notably with the transversal composition of an assemblage by fragments. As an 271

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effect of writing that exceeds the signifying regi m e, the sensation thus highlights the composition as diagrammatic in its intensive features deterritorializing conventional sense and discourse. In this way, I have been using toward invention the three literary machines as respective types of writing given their productions of effects, pur posefully as practices for sense-making at the knowledge frontier of experience and encounters. To this end, these categorie s native to the aesthetic paradigm pose the means to include, however subtly or obliquely, temporality and experience by inscribing ones process of construc tivism by sensibility, as I have tried to show. Moreover, philosophical perspectives of literatu re, such as Deleuezes theorization, employed both critically (pragmatics) and creatively (h euretics) can also enable a transition from the hermeneutic-detective model for scholarship to the role of affective-artisanal creator While the implications for ones capacity for being aff ected and for affecting others (ethology) has remained an understated concern ( pianissimo ) given the methodological primacy of my project, the results of my encounter study in this chapter foreground the gr eat potential for narrative as a sensibility interface with history, temporality, an d experience. Finally, this knowledge frontier can be engaged as a problematic (questions a nd concepts, without solution) by means of the resonance assemblage the prospect and implications of whic h I describe in the last section, in terms of poetics and praxis in the scholarly dispostif and changing apparatus. Coda: Heuretics of the Resonance Assemblage Theory is interested in what remains. In the invariant. There is nothing in the intellect that has not first been in the senses: something of the sensible remains. Although it has undergone a transformation, ther e is something of the invariant in it. In general we are only interested in what remains, in what survives of the sensual in the intellect. Serres, The Five Senses (327) Artisanal Praxis (reviewed ) In the scope of my project, the proposed resonance assemblage idea is both the result of encountering my objects of study and the interf ace with which to c onceptualize and to 272

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organiz e the effects. On the latter I mean the fo rmal and rhetorical means for the discursive and multi-modal product yet to be invented fully, given the primary aim of my work as a methodological study. To review, the poetics of what I have called artisanal praxis in scholarship would entail the analogous compone nts of novelistic philosophy: a diegesis for discovery and invention, the dispositif and knowledge frontier (plane, apparatus); characters and sensible qualities, the concept(s) and new sense(s) produced; narrative, the spatio-temporal coordinates and position of experience for the arti sanal creator; style, in thought and expression. These categories emerge not simply from the philosophy of Deleuze but more fundamentally from the object of study (literat ure), upon which the organizing elem ents are contingent and to which they are suitablewith variability by di scipline, object encountered, and problematic. More applicable generally, I have ex plained and demonstrated the method of pragmatics for encounters, as discerned from the work of Deleuze (alone and with Guattari) both explicitly and intrinsically. As an alternative to analysisin discourse hermeneutic, descriptive, ideological, or othe rwisethis approach affords great potential for innovative praxis in future work, whether in invention or to other ends, by identifying unique and intensive features (typology): generative, transformative, diagrammatic Besides the opportunity for invention, as I have shown, this method assists a ri pe necessity of scholarship, which still appears ill-equipped for working with formal or semiotic elements of composition that operate at the asignifying register, beyond representation, in the terms and focus of OSullivan ( Art Encounters 43). In contrast, the mediality of literature (and the analog in other art forms), with the superabundance of signifying techno logies in the past century, mi ght be a specific example of such a studyparticularly concerning the lite rary effects of new media beyond narrative and 273

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reference functions. In any case, th e task remains identifying the unique functions and results of aesthetic composition or cultu ral products; a provisional label for this typology is singular rhythms in Muckelbauers term. Proceeding in The Future of Invention with an approach parallel as I have (incidentall y discovered), he conjectures th at intensive, singular rhythms function as a different, affirmative or der of invention: indeed, certain repetitions and forces encountered indicate an unrecognizable or nonidentical dimension of invention, one that must occur before there can be such a thing as thought, in Nietzsches terms (Muckelbauer 34). While my focus of pragmatics examines language in literatu re and philosophy, like Muckelbauers attention to rhetorical traditions and practices of invention, the process of extraction and application of qualitative (as well as quantit ative?) features and effects inherently involves a problem of interference. What Serres describes as the invariant in the cited passage names this process and transform ation in the specific method I have advocated, while calling attention to levels material and experienced more concretely than a general understanding of faculties. Indeed, I have identified the task of creating a concept of sensation, of which resonant assemblage (or assemblage resonance ?) might be considered an example. Short of proposing a specific type, Massumi likewise conjectures th e idea of a sensible concept, which is both corporeal (literally) and affective ( Parables 118); noting the potential an d unanticipated effect in terms of invention explicitly (96), he t oo demonstrates an unconventional approach and productive result in philosophical discourse. What these examples emphasize, as I have advocated from the outset, is the unique capabilities afforded by poststructuralist theory particularly Deleuze and Guattari, for Muck elbauer and Massumi as wellfor new and purposeful disciplinary practices. 274

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On this point, I have identified and availe d the particular orientation of Humanities scholarship and literary studies that is situated between Philosophy and Art, informed by both. Considered this way, we can find yet another occasion for invention, rather than argument (using what proof?), in Deleuzes remarking, It is strange that aesthetics (as the science of the sensible) could be founded on what can be represented in the sensible ( DR 56). With expertise about aesthetic practices of la nguage and writing in terms of modes and media, this position entails a perspective advantageous toward the interference problem regarding a concept of sensation, just as other disciplines are better equi pped by their conventions: to create expressions of concepts or functions (aesthet ically), or to define intelligibly the quantitative attributes of concepts or expressions by way of description or reference (scientifically). And yet, there appear both challenges and means for i nvention within the disciplinary dispositif recalling that Creating concepts is no less diffi cult than creating new visual or aural combinations, or creating scientific functions (Negotiations 125). Philosographic Style Keys of G Thus philosophy, art, and science come in to relations of mutual resonance and exchange, but always for internal reas ons. []we really have to see philosophy, art, and science as sorts of separate mel odic lines in constant interplay with one another. With philosophy having in this no reflective pseudoprimacy nor, equally, any creative inferiority. Deleuze, Negotiations (125) To a lesser extent and less explicitly than my primary concerns, I have discussed style as an important dimension of work of both philoso phical and literary wr itersfrom both of whom much can be derived toward innova tive disciplinary work. More spec ifically, to this end I have recounted instances of Deleuzes work with literary authors and the observable influence or application in his aesthetic t hought and creative discourse. Indee d, my purposeful work with poststructuralist theorists exceeds mere af finity; one could similarly study the literary influences and correspondences in works by Derri da regarding Joyce, Mallarm, and Ponge, for 275

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instance; Cixous and Lispector, Kleist, Tsvetayeva; Blanchot and Rilke, H lderlin, Kafka; Barthes and Brecht, Balzac, Goethe (and many others). Employing the aesthetic paradigm, specifically literature, toward innovating in thought and expressi on, the concept produced thus in artisanal praxis could perhaps be understood in other terms as concetto for being highly stylized; moreover, Deleuze writes because it is folded in the i ndividual subject and projects [propositions] in the images of the cycle or the se ries in the specific case of Baroque aesthetics ( The Fold 126). A focus upon style this way considers mo re fully implications of what I have emphasized precisely about encounter heuretics To reiterate, the compound label names a method entailing both the position of experiencing forces, effects, and sensations as we ll as the invention or output that is consequence (transformed, affected) of and enhanced by the former. More concretely, this relation and prospect can be observed insofa r as, Deleuze states, Style in philosophy is the movement of concepts in writing become dynamic ( Negotiations 140). Related thus, Stivale describes Deleuzes style as a perpetual process of encounter such that he is wil ling to rewrite his pages continually to achieve the desired concept ( Deleuzes ABCs 62, my emphasis); for example, Stivale reports that about The Logic of Sense and A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze maintains that both are nearly musical compositions ( ABCs 62). It is in this way that I mean encounter heuretics as method and artisanal praxis as suitable discourse achieve theoretical effects in practices of writing or compositi on with respective types of fo rm, logic, and arrangement. Thus the connection to the fi rst understanding, inherent in my paradigmatic example of resonance: sensations are encountered, whether directly or in art, and they are relayed distinctly through aesthetic means that not only transmit the effects but include the quality of having been encountered and relayed by someone ( concetto )bearing a signature of style, as I have tried to 276

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convey in my work with literature. T his latter quality might be less a governing claim (written name) than that of a musical key signature ( Stimmung). Just like the rela tion between (but not over) heterogeneous components of an assemblage ( ATP 336), nondiscursive resonance is a transversal occurrence among the non-totalized features of a concept, insofar as Concepts are centers of vibrationswh ich is why they resonate rather than cohere or correspond ( WP 23). This last issue raises the question of whether the sensible concept produced in encounter heuretics can relay on es affective ex perience as the concetto given the fragmented assemblage organization without to talizing feature (the signature?). The problem is not strictly theoretical, though, and nor is it contingent to the philosophical framework of Deleuze ( et al. ); rather, beyond formal or logical questions, the problem of style c oncerns partly what is a stake for knowledge discourse and expression. In a specif ic case, the opposition of performative to constative narratology that I evoke d earlier refers additionally to a metalanguage of scholarly discourse regarding work with literature, cu lture, and art genera lly. Like technology of communication or information, scholarly conventions can be considered a dispositif, one that provides both the means and the constraints for what can be produced in thought and discourse. Recently though, several scholarsbearing th e influence of poststructuralist thinking markedly or implicitlyhave identified more or less directly the potential for expressive scholarly work. For example, considering how i maginative work has an elective affinity with performance (113), McGann calls attention to whether criticism is an informative or deformative activity ( Radiant 114); regardless of potential applicati on, the reflexive consideration of knowledge crea tion and delivery remains importa ntespecially with changing objects of study. Similarly, Culler articulates this concern in The Literary In Theory: One aught in principle to be able to an alyze one's discipline as a discur sive practice, where knowledge is 277

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produced by its ways of writing, a nd in principle one ought to be able to characterize changes in the dis cipline as changes in modes of writing (222). Although beginning my project with seemingly abstract and highly theoretical questions, I have turned my attention increasingly to th is practical issuepartic ularly motivated by the theory I study and by the reflexive qualities of my object of study. Muckelbauer more overtly attends to this question, and his rhetorical focus takes on greater signifiance when noting that he is interested in the repetitive encounters that facilitate scholarship in the humanities ( Future 39) precisely toward the aim of invention. Th e importance of concept creation and innovation more broadly exceed the quality of novelty, certai nly, and yet the perspective throws into relief the implications of the dispositif and the crucial issue of what can be said and thought. Before concluding about this, I am compelled to reinvoke Currie and consider whether my performative narratology has been a meaningf ul and productive endeavor ; likewise, whether it succeeds as what he would call the theoretical fiction or th e narratological narrativethe project of a new kind of literary academic, the writer/critic, who personifies the boundary between fiction and criticism (Postmodern Narrative 49). Apparatus Theory and Encounter Heuretics The more our daily life appears standa rdised, stereotyped and subject to an accelerated reproduction of objects of consum ption, the more art must be injected into it in order to extract from it that little difference which plays simultaneously between other levels of repetition, and ev en in order to make the two extremes resonate Deleuze, Difference & Repetition (293) At the general level of my project, the pers pective of Apparatus Theory enables us both to recognize changing conditions and to employ ne w features in response toward ends necessary (solution) and as ye t unknown. On one hand, literacy names both an episteme, currently in epochal transition, as well as a dispositif of reason or logocentrism (Western knowledge in recognizable forms like hierarchy, patriarchy, trans cendental meaning). Mani fest at levels of 278

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institutions, technology and practic es, and subjectiv ity, this order is not necessarily supplanted (or deterritorialized ) fully by the aesthetic paradigm; how ever, the types of knowledge, logic, and expression particular to this paradigm change the conditions of possibility in which we in Humanities disciplines should be fundamentally invested. Guided by and highlighting the evidence of poststructuralist theo ry, I have endeavored to show the increased potential even in this limited form. Additionally, the recourse of new possibilities means that we might intervene or remedy not only the limitations but the deficiencies of literacy: aesthetic practices and cultural fo rms, I suggest, provide how in th eir features and logics, even if inchoate as experiments. In both cases, the firs t task concerns the rhet oric and practices still necessary to be invented for th e changing apparatusespecially as counterpoint to the technical solution to problems (miscast instead of problematics). The question whether expressionism can become the counterpart to constructivism ( Negotiations 147) is not merely abstract theoretical co njecture or concern. Rather, in witnessing the ossification of practices and reductions of possibilities by institutions, technology, and forcesagainst intelligence let alone sensibilit y (opinion, belief, ideol ogy)increasingly today, the challenge to innovate and expr ess appears all the more difficult and imperative. Thus it seems especially idealistic to purport any rele vance or efficacy of literature in an episteme characterized by images and durations of inst antaneousness. (Indeed, the next task for my encounter pragmatics will be to diagram and invent with the unique features of novels in the new media ecology, given these changing conditions for writing and narrative forms.) All the more idealistic to believe, The literary machine thus becomes the relay for a revolutionary machineto-come, not at all for ideological reasons but b ecause the literary machine alone is determined to fill the conditions of a collective enunciation that is lacking elsewhere in the milieu ( Kafka 17279

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280 8, my emphasis). And yet here precisely is the identification and supplemen t of oversights in the dispositif by the aesthetic paradigmblind spots of temporality, desire, expressions. I have deliberately proposed the resonance assemblage as an interface for inchoate conditions of the problematic, inspired by but less anchored to Deleuze and Guattaris abstract machine possibility for literature. Mo re directly, I proceed with how, Ulmer describes, The choral function, here, is the grid as interface between the sensible and the intelligible ( Heuretics 198, my emphasis)with other organizing form ations including the spiral, wheel and spokes, lattice, branching tree, and rhizome (198). Unwittingly, the spiral (cochlea of ear) has been my style of thought throughout my education. Its dual motion and undecidable status knows on one hand the perfect pitch of affective relation, in Barthess terms ( ALD 168). Elsewise too, Cixous reminds: People do not understand each other. The incomprehensible part of each of us makes up the entire basis of life. Perhaps by reading these texts, we can work toward an effort of mediation on the incomprehensible I do not say that we are going to understand the incomprehensible, but we have to accept it ( Readings 131, my emphasis). A line of flight. Thus composedperhaps as sonorous labyrinth with affects, the aesthetic monument confides to the ear of the future the persistent sensations that embody the event: the constantly renewed suffering of men and women, their re-created protestations, their constantly resumed struggle ( WP 176-7, my emphasis). A transversal assemblage by temporal encounters, our capacity to be affected and to affect others will have increased affirmatively. Resonating .

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BIOGR APHICAL SKETCH Gary Hink, Jr. received his Ph.D. from the University of Florida in August 2012, after earning Master of Arts (2005) in English from th e State University of New York at Buffalo and Bachelor of Arts (2004) in Lite rature and Writing from Richard Stockton College of New Jersey. He currently lives in Albuquerque, where he is teaching and writingworking presently on the manuscript and hypermedia companion of this project. In addition to planning collaborative websites on literary theory and di gital pedagogy, he continues volunt eering on the editorial board of The Journal of Undergraduate Multimedia Projects and as an academic technology consultant. His on-going research and experiments involve heur etics, contemporary American fiction and experimental novels, electrac y, media ecology, digital pedagogy, rhetoric, multimodal composition, Humanities methods, and innova tive scholarship. He is originally from Ocean City, New Jersey, where he regularly visits his family (and beloved dog, Jacques). 288