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1 FEAR MONGERING IN LATE REPUBLICAN ROME, 88 28 BCE By BRENDA MARINA FIELDS A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2012
2 2012 Brenda Marina Fields
3 parentibus meis et meo carissimo Matthaeo
4 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The constant and generous support of my professo rs, my parents, my colleagues, and my friends made this dream a reality. First and foremost, my gratitude goes to Victoria Pagn, the chair of my dissertation committee Her encouragement and praise motivated me to commit to the doctoral program; her own zeal for Classics reminded me th at s o much has yet to be said in our field and that I wanted to be one of the voices that would continue the work. Her classes on Tacitus and Cicero sparked my interest in historiography and oratory. The hours she spent with me laboring over Sallust's fragmentary Histories opened up a new world of inquiry, and I am so thankful that I was able to incorporate ideas generated during that independent study into this dissertation. Whenever my resolve faltered and the work loomed as though ins urmountable, Dr. Pagn was there with her kind words and some much needed perspective. I also thank her for encouraging me in my teaching and for helping to shape my teaching philosophy and method. Our contemporaneous foray into running and all the 5k's we ran together helped me take time for myself: mens sana in corpore sano I also thank Andrew Wolpert for serving on my committee and for helping to inspire my study of the emotions. To Lewis Sussman I offer my thanks for serving on my committee and for ins piring my entire course of study. When I was a junior working on my B.A. he welcomed me into his graduate seminar on Sallust, and in that class I found a passion for Sallust that has sustained me through my graduate education Andrea Sterk deserves thanks for her encouragement of my work, for her many kind words over dinner, and for serving on my committee. I thank her sons, Tim and Tony Louthan; their happy and easy passion for Latin always inspired me, and I can only hope that I brought as much love of L atin into their lives as they brought into mine.
5 In addition to my committee members, I thank Timothy Johnson, who served on my committee before he moved on to greater things at the College of Charleston. He recruited me to stay at the University of Flori da in 2005 for my M.A. and constantly pushed me to do better, even when I wished that he would not. I also thank Robert Wagman and Andrew Nichols for keeping me grounded and reminding me that it is worth taking the time to just chill out. Thanks also go t o my parents, Claudia Fields and Donald Fields, and my brothers, Gregory and David. Without the support and love of my family, this would not have been possible. I thank my mother in law, Julia Stevens, for her encouragement and for reminding me to finish the dissertation first. To Lauren Crampton, I offer my thanks for the countless hours of encouragement she offered in person and on the phone. Kacee Farrar, Samantha Adamczyk, David Hoot, Generosa Sangco Jackson, and Noralil Fores were always there for me; I thank them all and my other friends to o numerous to name. Finally, I thank my husband, Matthew Stevens, for keeping me focused on my work when I need ed to focus, for offering distractions when I needed a break, and for knowing the difference between the two. Omnia vincit amor.
6 TABLE OF CONTENTS page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 4 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................ ................................ ............................. 8 ABSTRACT ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................... 9 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 11 2 GETTING A GRIP ON FEAR ................................ ................................ .................. 14 Selection of Material ................................ ................................ ............................... 18 Fear Defined ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 19 Fear in Psychology and Psychoanalysis ................................ .......................... 21 Seven Deadly Fears: A Latin Lexicon of Fear ................................ ......................... 27 General fear: timor and metus ................................ ................................ .......... 30 Appropriate fear: verec undia ................................ ................................ ............ 41 Excessive fear: terror formido pavor and dirus ................................ .............. 44 The Fear Factory ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 45 3 AUTHORITATIVE VOICE: ON BEHALF OF MURENA ................................ .......... 59 The Trial ................................ ................................ ................................ .................. 61 Auctoritas ................................ ................................ .......... 68 ................................ ................................ ........ 70 ................................ ................................ ............... 76 4 CHARACTER ASSASSINATION: PHILIPPICS AGAINST MARCUS ANTONIUS 3 & 4 ................................ ................................ ................................ ....................... 94 The Background of Philippics 3 & 4 ................................ ................................ ........ 98 The Pretender King of Philippic 3 ................................ ................................ ......... 108 Extra Constitutional Power in Philippics 3 and 4 ................................ ................... 114 5 HOW TO TRADE IN FEAR: SALLUST'S SPEECH OF LEPIDUS ........................ 124 6 CON CLUSION ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 163 APPENDIX A CALCULATING FEAR ................................ ................................ .......................... 166 Timor ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................... 166 Metus ................................ ................................ ................................ .................... 167
7 Verecundia ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 167 Terror ................................ ................................ ................................ .................... 167 Formido ................................ ................................ ................................ ................. 168 Pavor ................................ ................................ ................................ .................... 169 Dirus ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................... 169 B CITED TEXTS AND TRANSLATIONS ................................ ................................ .. 170 LIST OF REFERENCES ................................ ................................ ............................. 171 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ................................ ................................ .......................... 179
8 LIST OF ABBREVIATION S AC LASS Acta Classica AJP American Journal of Philology A NC W Ancient World C L A NT Classical Antiquity CJ Classical Journal CQ Classical Quarterly GRBS Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies HSCP Harvard Studies in Classical Philology JRS Journal of Roman Studies LSJ A Greek English Lexicon Liddell and Scott, eds. M C. Sallusti Crispi Historiarium Relquiae Maurenbrecher ed. MRR Magistrates of the Roman Republi c OED Oxford English Dictionary OLD Oxford Latin Dictionary PHI Packard Humanities Institute RE Pauly Wissowa Real Encyclopdie TAPA Transactions of the American Philological Association YC L S Yale Classical Studies
9 Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy FEAR MONGERING IN LATE REPUBLICA N ROME, 88 28 BCE By Brenda Marina Fields August 2012 Chair: Victoria Pagn Major: Classical Studies This study examines fear mongering, the arousal of fear to influence the thoughts or actions of others towards a particular end in late Republican Rome from 88 28 BCE. Different methods of accomplish ing fear mongering are explored in Cicero 's On Behalf of Murena Cicero 's Philippics Against Marcus Antoni us 3 and 4, and Sallust's speech of Lepidus in the Histories (fr. 1.55M). This project relies on a close reading of these texts with the judicious application of modern approaches to understanding fear and fear mongering. This dissertation presents the res ults of a word study on seven word families used in Latin to express fear : timor metus vercundia terror formido pavor and dirus These terms are compared to the English word for fear, and the Roman conceptualization of fear is considered in light of modern psychology and psychoanalysis. Then, a different method of fear mongering is explored in each selected text. Cicero 's abuse of authority in On Behalf of Murena allows him to make exaggerated claims about the risk of the Catilinarian conspiracy and to distract his audience from his client's guilt. By empl o ying character assassination in Philippics 3 and 4, Cicero turns the consul into an enemy of the state by pai nting Antony as a would be king, a usurper consul, a brigand, and a
10 second Catiline. In Sallust's Histories, the speech of Lepidus reveals how the careful manipulation of language can create emotionally charged rhetoric to influence the thoughts and action of an audience. Through these different methods of fear mongering, orators of late Republican Rome shape the public's perception of events and steer policy in the direction they desire.
11 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION The emotions are a topic of growing importance in classical studies Scholars have long noted the importance of emotional appeals in oratory and historiography; the scholarship on late Republican Rome from 88 28 BCE reflects this importance. In this dissertation I show how Roman orators manipulate their audiences through fear mongering, the arousal of fear to influence the thoughts or actions of others towards a particular end I f ocus on four speeches, two of them paired, to explore ways in which a speaker might accomplish his goal of arousing fear A close reading of Cicero 's On Behalf of Murena Cicero 's Philippics Against Marcus Antonius 3 and 4, and Sallust's speech of Lepidus in the Histories (fr. 1.55M ) is tempered with the judicious application of modern approaches to understanding fear and fear mongering. In Chapter 2 : Getting a Grip on Fear, I explain my choice of time period and how I arrived at my selection of materials through a careful word study of the lexicon of fear in extant Latin literature from 88 28 BCE. I compare the semantic range of timor metus vercund ia terror formido pavor and dirus to our English word fear and trace the understanding of this emotion offered by modern psychology and psychoanalysis. I then describe the specific methods of fear mongering that emerge from the four speeches that are the focus of this study. In Chapter 3 : Authoritative Voice: On Behalf of Murena I show how Cicero uses his authority to justify his use of fear and to make his claims of risk credible to secure acquittal for his client, Lucius Murena, on the charges of e lectoral bribery. By relying on his status as consul, Cicero changes the conversation from one of legal guilt to one of political expediency. He positions the threat of the Catilinarian conspiracy as the primary
12 concern for the safety of Rome and makes the question of electoral bribery seem trivial in comparison. At such a time, a leader such as Cicero can see that the most important concern is that Rome has leaders to protect her against Catiline, not whether one of those leaders attained his office illega lly In Chapter 4 : Character Assassination in Philippics Against Marcus Antonius 3 and 4, I show how Cicero attacks the consul Antony by pain t ing him as a would be king, a usurper consul, a brigand and a second Catiline to drum up fear against Antony and secure formal praise for those who oppose him. By granting such praise, the senate brands Antony an enemy of the state and justifies any otherwise illegal actions taken against him. Cicero engages in this character assassination in two speeches delivered b ack to back, the first in the morning to the senate and the second in the afternoon to the people. In the first he seeks to secure praise for Anthony's enemies and c onsequently censure for Anthony; in the second he announces to the people his success in se curing that praise and seeks support for the senate's decree. I explore how the same orator makes the same case to two separate audiences and what changes in focus that shift entails. In Chapter 5 : How to Trade in Fear: Sallust's Speech of Lep idus I examine a speech e mbedded in a work of history and thus the joint creation of the historical speaker, Lepidus, and the historian Sallust. A close reading of Sallust's speech of Lepidus with special attention to comparatives and superlatives, words dealing with freedom and slaver y as well as republic and tyranny, tone ( especially as revealed through sarcastic adverbs ) fear clauses, a nd agency reveals that Lepidus' speech is a
13 rhetorical tour de force in fear mongering that reflects equally on the political climate of its dramatic date and of its historiographic date.
14 CHAPTER 2 GETTING A GRIP ON FE AR So, first of all, let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have to fear is fear itself nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance. Franklin D. Roosevelt First Inaugural Address 1 Most Americans remember President Franklin D. Roosevelt's famous words The only thing we have to fear is fear itself, addressed to the nation on March 4, 1933. I have heard them so many times and seen the film clip so often that the word fear alone can evoke the image of a black and white Roosevelt pouring forth this profou nd statement, an image made all the more striking by the grainy quality and the vocal distortion of 19 30s news reels I was not alive in 1933, nor were my parents, yet somehow my memory of this speech is an integral part of my identity as an American. I am courageous, bold, free among the free, capable of anything, and these words idealize that spirit. My memory, however, is fundamentally flawed. These words are almost always removed from their context. Those ten words were not spoken in a void; Rooseve lt continued to delimit the fear of which he speaks. He did not censure fear in general, but the specific type of fear that causes a freeze response. He calls this fear terror which paralyzes, and this difference between generic fear and the fear akin to terror implies that fear can mean different things and that perhaps we do not need to fear all manifestations of this emotion. Roosevelt leaves unsaid that we do not have to fear the named, reasoned, justified fear that emboldens our advance. The implicat ion behind Roosevelt's words challenges our immediate perception of fear as a negative emotion and invites us to consider what advantage fear might have 1 Reprinted in Houck 2002, 3
15 for us as individuals and as a society. In his treatise on rhetoric, Aristotle reminds the orator that fear can be a useful tool. In so doing he offers the first exta nt critical discussion of fear in the Greco Roman world ( Rh. 1382a21 26 ): Let fear be a kind of pain or disturbance deriving f r o m an impression of a future evil that is destructive or painful; for not all evils are feared, for example whether one will be unjust or slow, but as many as are productive of great pain or destruction, and these are not distant but rather seem near so as to impend. For things that are remote are not greatly feared. 2 From this definition alone, fear seems like something to be avoided : it causes pain and anticipates evil. 3 Yet, Aristotle argues that fear also makes men deliberate to ensure their safety in the face of approaching evil. 4 Thus, a speaker who wishes to exhort his audience to take a certain course of action may find success by arousing fear. Aristotle stresses that the speaker must make his listeners feel that they are truly in danger and that the evil they face has happened or is happening to those more powerful than themselves and just like themselves. 5 2 Text: Ross 1959 ; translation: Konstan 2006, 130 3 For a full discussion of Aristotle on fear, see Fortenbaugh 1975, 15, 18 22, 64 15, 76, 79 80 ; Nehamas 1990 ; Konstan 2006, 129 155 4 Rh. 1383a6 7. 5 Rh. 1383a8 16.
16 This purposeful act of arousing such fear to influence the thoughts or actions of others towards a particular end is fear mongering. This study of how Romans engaged in fea r mongering and used fear as a political tool contributes to a growing field of study in the Classics dedicated to the emotions. In the last twenty years, t he study of ancient emotions had examined Greek and Roman philosophical works as literature in an ef fort to understand ancient Epicurean and Stoic theories on emotion. In 1993, Brunschwig and Nussbaum edited a volume on philosophies of the mind that focused on the passions in Hellenistic philosophy. In 1996, Gill wrote a chapter on emotions in the ancient world for the volume The Literary Portrayal of Passion Through the Ages A year later, he and Braund edited a volume specifically aimed at the study of Roman emotions The field was ripe for Konstan' s The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and Classical Literature an examination of the emotions defined by Aristotle and Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome a study of the emotions specifically, vercundia, pudor, paenitentia, invidia and fastidium and ethics of the Roman upper class in the late Republic and early Empire. 6 Although Konstan included fear among these Aristotelian emot ions and Kaster explored vercundia a specific type of fear, no book length, systematic study of fear in the ancient world exists. My aim is not to understand ancient perspectives on fear, but to understand fear mongering in action. However, accomplishing this goal requires a master y of the Latin lexicon of fear, to which I will return below. Unlike Konstan, who used Aristotle as a 6 Brunschwig and Nussbaum 1993 ; Gill 1996 ; Braund and Gill 1997 ; Kaster 2005 ; Konstan 2006 Additional general works on the emotions in antiquity include Fortenbaugh 1975 ; Annas 1989 ; Konstan 1999 2000 2001 ; Braund and Most 2003 ; Konstan 2003a b ; Serghidou 2007 ; Munteanu 2010 ; Braund 2011
17 starting point but examined emotions across the spectrum of antiquity, or Kaster, who used a diachronic approach to establish the relative stability of emotions in antiquity, I focus on the unique political circumstances in a short time period to draw substantive conclusions about specific moments of fear mongering in the context of the late Republic. The years 88 28 BCE provide a large enough window to ensure that data are not aberrations and that the conclusions are significant, but a narrow enough one to allow careful attention to detail and to focus on a uniquely turbulent period of Roman history. This period opens with Sulla' s first march in Rome and closes 60 years later just before Octavian and the senate reached their first constitutional settlement (January 13, 27 BCE). During these years p rominent historical figures engaged in fear mongering, and those who in turn became objects of fear themselves would later have their names invoked to arouse terror in the Roman people or to discredit an opponent by association. Land reform, the contest for the composition of the law courts, and recurring civil war provided the hotbed cl imate in which fear mongering tactics thrived. At the extremes of this period, both Sulla and Octavian altered the course of the Roman constitution, as did Pompey and Caesar between them and Catiline tried. Furthermore, this was a time of great unrest and upheaval with the rise of powerful generals, such as Marius, Sulla, Pompey, and Caesar ; later with the fragmentation of the Republic under a new civil war between Pompey and Caesar ; and finally with yet another civil war and the earliest beginnings of a ne w imperial system. Sertorius and Lepidus, rogue members of Roman society, threatened the state from within and without. Spartacus kept alive a persistent fear of the very slaves who supported the Romans witnessed the
18 introduction of mass proscriptions under Sulla in 82 BCE and their return under the Second Triumvirate in 43 BCE. Selection of Material To understand how orators and politicians might tap these potential sources of fear to encourage the popu lace to support their programs, I have chosen four speeches two of them paired that highlight certain ways a fear monger can manipulate his audience and play upon his listeners' emotions. Cicero 's On Behalf of Murena delivered in 63 BCE, attests to the po wer of an individual to make broad claims and dismiss competing views through the use of authority. By stressing his consular authority, Cicero deflects attention from hi s client's illegal activity t o the dangers of the fomenting Catilinarian conspiracy. His Philippics Against Marcus Antonius 3 and 4, delivered in 44 BCE, reveal the impact of character assassination, as Cicero uses fear to cast Marcus Antonius as a threat to the very stability of the R epublic. Sallust's speech of Lepidus from the Histories (fr. 1.55 M) dates towards the end of my selected time period, around 35 BCE, but represents a speech made at its beginning, in 78 BCE just before the death of Sulla. A close reading of this text show s how Lepidus (via Sallust) carefully manipulates his diction, tone, word order, and imagery to arouse among the common people a fear of Sulla and his supporters so great that he spurred a popular uprising in Etruria but also sealed his own fate as an enem y of the state who would be forced to retreat to Sardinia. Lepidus' speech reveals tensions in Rome during his own day that resonate in Sallust's day as well and tells us as much about the 30s as the 80s and 70s. I arrived at this selection of mat erial aft er a survey of all exta nt Latin literature from 88 28 BCE with significant references to fear. To find these references, I first
19 researched the semantics of fear in English and psychoanalytic approa ches to understanding fear. T hen I identified the word families in Latin that directly represent fear to confirm that Roman perceptions of fear are near enough to our own that we can conducted a morphological search on all fear words in extant Latin literature from 88 28BCE. After reading through the 3,249 cit ations, I assembled a list of features common to fear mongering from the approaches of two authors on fear and fear mongering, Glassner, a sociologist and Gardner, a journalist and lecturer. I then read through the passages that seemed particularly signif icant as I went through the citations of fear words, looking for these features. The selections I chose highlight these features, cover the scope of my chosen time period, and are uniquely interesting in and of themselves. Fear Defined Fear is an emotion w e all know. But what precisely is fear? The 1989 online version of the Oxford English Dictionary offers this basic definition: the emotion of pain or uneasiness caused by the sense of impending danger, or by the prospect of some possible evil (2.a). 7 The OED notes that fear is the general term for the full range of the emotion, though it previously applied only to the extreme: alarm, terror, fright, and dread. So, fear is an emotion accompanied by pain or unease and looks towards some future ill, and we m odern English speakers use the label fear to cover the broad spectrum of this emotion. Lazarus, writing about the psychology of fear, observes the same phenomenon. When people use the term 'emotion,' they may have in mind either the whole configuration of one or another of its components 8 We easily blend fear with 7 OED Online. November 2010. Oxford University Press. http://oed.com/ (accessed November 18, 2010). 8 Lazarus 1991, 17
20 alarm, terror, fright, and dread, but also apprehension ( OED 3.a), dread mingled with reverence towards authority, especially God ( OED 3.d), solicitude ( OED 4), and anxiety ( OED 4). Furthermore, there are the physical manifestations of fear in the subject that almost seem synonymous with the fear itself: trembling, shuddering, shrinking. In the phrases for fear of for fear lest and for fear that we weaken the noun to represen t a simple desire to avoid anything, not necessarily something we actually fear ( OED 3.b). For example, they closed their windows for fear that it would rain. Only a phobic person would actually fear the rain; rather, the fear provides the justificatio n for closing the windows that is grounded in caution and avoidance, not fear. The phrase no fear usually indicates the belief that something is not likely to happen ( OED 5). I have no fear that it will rain merely means that I do not expect it to rain This broadening of semantic range reflects the aspect of fear that is concerned with the future and the unknown. The verb to fear receives a definition dependent upon the noun: to feel fear; to regard with fear ( OED fear v. 1 II). A dependent clause of ten follows to indicate the future event feared or avoided: I feared that she would die ( OED II.4.b and 7.b). As with the noun, this use can adhere strictly to the true emotion or may indicate a desire to avoid any future event regardless of the risk of harm: I feared that I would be late. Only serious circumstances would warrant actual fear. The verb may also t ake a direct object to indicate the source of the fear, a person or thing as a source of danger, an anticipated event or state of things as painful or evil ( OED II.5). We can also transfer the fear to an action that we know will result in the thing we fe ar ( OED II.5b). When a child fears crossing the street, what the child really fears is not the street crossing itself,
21 but the car collision that might follow. Like the noun, the verb can sometimes indicate reverence or awe towards God ( OED II.6). When the fear represents an uneasy sense of the probability of (some unwelcome occurrence in the future), it opposes the verb to hope ( OED II.7). In most uses, to be afraid is synonymous with to fear (especially OED II.3 and 5). From these definitions we learn three important things : (1) Fear looks towards some perceived future evil. Even when we fear God, we fear him and respect him because of his power to bring future ill upon us. (2) We can use fear when we do not actually feel the full emotion and rather int end to represent avoidance. The future evil may be a mere annoyance. (3) Fear is the broadest term we use to represent the emotion accompanied by pain at the anticipation of a future evil. Synonyms have stricter ranges, with terror and dread at one extreme and solicitude and anxiety at the other. Fear, however, can represent any of these. Fear in Psychology and Psychoanalysis Sigmund Freud devoted his 25th lecture in Vorlesungen zur Einfhrung in die Psychoanalyse to die Angst (fear). Freud complains that nervousness and fear are often confused, but many people are fearful without being nervous, whereas many people who are nervous are prone to many distress es least of all fear. Freud observes that fear is a loosely used term, just as t he OED' s primary definition notes; h e therefore defines fear for psychoanalytic purposes and labels true fear Realangst : True fear [Realangst] strikes us as something very rational and intelligible. We may say of it that it is a reaction to the perception of an external danger that is, of an injury which is expected and foreseen. It is connected
22 with the flight reflex and it may be regarded as a manifestation of the self preservation instinct 9 Freud then notes that fear is intricately linked to knowledge. Good knowledge allows us to access accurately whether a potential source of fear is actually something we should fear. Lack of knowledge, or bad knowledge, causes one to misinterpret stimuli and fear things not the least bit harmful, such as a solar eclip se. Furthermore, Realangst causes the subject to flee, freeze, or fight, either defensively or aggressively. 10 Freud reserves the freeze response for excessively strong fear; it is this aspect of fear th at Roosevelt highlighted in his inaugural address. Thi s fear, says Freud, proves absolutely useless and arrests all actions. Lazarus includes fear among his goal incongruent (negative) emotions. Goal By defining that fear as anythi explains why I feel the same emotion, though in different degrees, when swimming in shark infested w aters as I do when I make a fool of myself at a dinner party with colleagues. Lazarus divides this fear into fright and anxiety : Fright as I shall henceforth term fear, involves threats that are concrete and sudden; therefore, it is a more primitive react ion that anxiety. The core relational theme is the concrete and sudden danger of imminent physical harm As with anxiety, uncertainty and ambiguity is always a feature of 9 Delivered in 1917, translated from the German by Strachey: Freud 1963, 393 394 Strachey renders die Angst as anxiety and Realangst as realistic anxiety; he notes the anxiety has a di fferent meaning than the colloquial sense and is something best rendered as fear, being frightened, or afraid. For the sake of continuity, I have changed his realistic anxiety to true fear in the quoted translation. 10 Cf. Oatley 1992, 20
23 fright because the harm is always in the future The core relational them e of anxiety is uncertain, existential threat. 11 Lazarus narrows his focus on the fuzzy use of the term to only those instances when we mean the full emotion. He aims to separate the subemotion that anticipates a real, physical danger from that which antici pates a vague one. When a bear is chasing me, I feel the fear called fright but when I fear death, I feel anxiety. Lazarus notes that fright does not last long because of the sudden and immediate nature of the danger. Anxiety, on the other hand, lingers and recurs. 12 Lazarus defines emotions by their action tendency, the type of actions that the subject tends to perform as a direct result of undergoing the emotion. 13 The subemotions fright and anxiety both promote an action tendency towards avoidance and escape, though approach and attack are possible, especially for anxiety. Terms associated with fright include horror terror and fear ; unease, concern, apprehension and worry fall under anxiety's range. Fright and anxiety share dread, alarm, and panic. La zarus believes that horror is often the simultaneous expression of fright and loathing, whereas awe is the mixture of fright and amazement. When fright or anxiety result in dysfunction, the e motion evolves into a pathology that we identify as phobia. 14 Grif fiths and Goldie view fear and anxiety differently. For them, fear is an emotion and anxiety is a mood. 15 Fear as an emotion requires a specific object, but we can be 11 Lazarus 1991, 235 emphases original. 12 Lazarus 1991, 238 This dual nature of emotion as represented by fright and anxiety provides fertile ground for the fear monger to sow the seeds of fear. 13 Lazarus 1991, 59 See also Frijda 1986 1987 14 Lazarus 1991, 239 15 Griffiths 1997, 248 ; Goldie 2000, 17
24 anxious about everything and nothing. 16 Ben Ze'ev also separates fear from anxiety, but he adds anguish to the mix : Fear should be distinguished from anxiety and anguish Fear is an emotion with a specific object; anxiety is an affective disorder which has a more general concern than fear. Anguish takes a middle position between fear and anxiety Unlike anxiety, whose object is not always clear, the object of anguish is the self. In comparison with fear, anguish is concerned with more fundamental problems relating to our very existence; the nature of the self and its future ar e of primary concern in anguish 17 Goldie makes no distinction between fear of an immediate, existential threat and one of vague, remote evil, between say the fear of the snake slithering on the ground in front of you and the fear of growing old. Ben Ze'ev terms the former a cute fear and the latter chronic fear 18 Ben Ze'ev pairs hope and fear and contrasts them to happiness and sadness. Whereas happiness and sadness are concerned with a present good or evil, hope and fear look towards a future good or evil. Ben Ze'ev, howe ver, differs from other philosophers and psychologists who discuss fear, especially Freud, in his belief that the futurity of hope and fear weakens these emotions: the temporal distance existing in hope and fear between the agent and the emotional object reduces emotional intensity 19 A fear must be acute or the threat overwhelming for the fear to be intense. 20 I am unconvinced that this is the case; fear motivates many decisions we make every day and the futurity of the evil gives us the impression that we can do something to 16 Goldie 2000, 17 18 17 Ben Ze'ev 20 00, 484 18 Chronic fear is a sentiment, which is the long term expression of an emotion founded upon constitutive factors rather than occasional ones, Ben Ze'ev 2000, 450 452 and 479 19 Ben Ze'ev 2000, 473 20 Ben Ze'ev 2000, 473 and 479
25 change that future and avoid that evil. This impression enhances the motivational aspect of fear. 21 Ben Ze'ev's proposition removes the teeth from fear mongering; daily observation of news media and political debate asserts the real int ensity of fear. Ben Ze'ev add s to our understanding of fear that although fear generally looks towards the future, it may also look towards any unknown. I may hope that I did well in my written examination, or may fear that I left a bad impression in my job interview 22 Yet our fear hinges more on t he results of the bad interview; the real fear is not being offered a job. We regret our performance in that interview. 23 F ear seems to resist categorization as fully forward looking To follow the argument for uncertainty over futurity, we should turn to Gordon, who defines emotions as either factive or epistemic Factive emotions are reactions to things, persons, or states of affairs that are certain; epistemic ones to those that are uncertain. 24 Because the fut ure is wholly unknown whereas the past and present are known at least in part, fear regularly relates to the future but is not directed at the future per se. Both of the following statements make sense: I fear that the train will arrive late. I fear that t he train has arrived late. 21 On the m otivational component of fear, see Gordon 1987, 73 79 and Lazarus 1991, 238 Ben Ze'ev 2000, 479 also recognizes the motivational potential of fear, but he restricts it to acute fear; fear requires a motivational component which expresses a strong desire and r eadiness to act. Without this motivational component, fear would be resignation, the emotion that results from wishing for something not to happen, but being certain that it will. The absence of uncertainty makes the situation impossible to change and so fear, motivated by avoidance, has no place, Ben Ze'ev 2000, 481 483 and 485 22 Ben Ze'ev 2000, 474 23 Regret is basically a sorrow over a past alternative which was available to us, but which we missed. The more available the alternative was, the more intense is the regret, Ben Ze'ev 2000, 493 24 Gordon 19 87, 25 27, 32 48
26 These statements, however, are only intelligible if I care about the time of the train's arrival and if I do not know whether the train was or is running on time. If I know that the train arrived late, I will feel some other emotion, perhaps anger or regret, both factive. 25 I can fear p only if I do not know p and I do not want p. If I do not know p and I do want p then I feel hope. The difference depends on an attitude I feel based on a belief that p causes q and q is either bad or good. If the late train means my souffl will collapse before my dinner guests arrive, I feel fear. If, however, the late train gives me just enough extra time to get dinner on the table, then I might hope that the train is late. In the above examp le about the train, we recognize the emotion as fear, but this emotion is of a different magnitude than what we emote when we fear for our lives, say during a bomb threat. The former example seems rather bland when compared to the visceral emotion of the l atter, but both are fear and both produce a motivational effect. 26 This effect is vulnerability avoidance, a desire to take control as much as possible to decrease the threat posed by the object of the fear. If I am afraid the train will be late, I can wait to put the souffl in the oven. If I fear an explosion because I see a suspicious man with a suspicious package, I can move, take a defensive posture, or alert authorities. If I fear it will rain, I can take an umbrella. We cannot remove this desire to mi tigate the threat from fear without changing the emotional experience. At the basic level, fear causes us to prepare for flight, especially when we fear death or bodily injury, 25 When we say, I am afraid that the train has arrived late, and we know that the train has indeed arrived late, we are not representing the emotion of fear even though we use that vocabulary. What we really mean is that we are sorry to have to report this information. I am (or I'm ) afraid : often used colloq with that or simple clause, OED afraid. ppl a 1.c. Gordon 1987, 68 calls this use parasitic. 26 Gordon 1987, 66 67
27 but as humans, we have recourse to cognitive though t and our deliberation ofte n so automatic that we are not aware of it might cause us to display courage and fight or might overwhelm us with paralysis. Properly, then, fear is an emotion that hinges on uncertainty, and uncertainty often implies futurity. The uncertain thing or situation must be unwanted because it results in some thing or event that is threatening and harmful. This emotion motivates me to mitigate the effects of the uncertain and unwanted thing so that the threat becomes as minimal as possible. Because that thre at need only be goal incongruent, and our goals in life are shaped by the society and culture in which we live, fear must always be considered within its cultural context. Our culture also determines the fear in which we are socially supposed to or permitt ed to indulge. As an American i n the post 9 11 world, it is reasonable for me to fear a terrorist attack anytime I see something suspicious in a crowded area. Even though the threat is minimal, my fear is grounded in a cultural validation of this fear. Bef ore the events of September 11, 2001 this fear might have been considered paranoia, nor could an ancient Roman have conceived of a fear akin to that of IEDs hidden in the trunks of cars. 27 Each culture has its own rules for what can and should be feared an d how that fear can be shown, and these rules are always under negotiation The emotional core, however, remains consistent even if the changes in cultural circumstance produce a different understanding of the emotion. Seven Deadly Fears: A Latin Lexicon of Fear Like English and Greek, Latin has many words that directly indicate fear and even more that imply fear by denoting the physiological manifestations or symptoms of fear. 27 An IED is an improvised explosive device, or roadside bomb, and is constructed and deployed in a manner other than that of traditional military explosives.
28 Of course, these words for fear do not correlate to the English words perfect ly We cannot, for example, assume that the Latin timor can always be translated with the English fear T he Latin words we regularly translate as fear must each be considered individually and in relation to each other if we are to understand Roman attitude s towards fear and how that social construct affects the arousal of fear within that society A focus on extant literature from 88 28 BCE ensures that those attitudes accurately reflect and are accurately reflected by instances of fear mongering during that period The 3,249 citations for fear words belonging to seven distinct word families present a comprehensive view of fear within the period in question 28 I began my lexical study with metus the word I expected to correlate most closely with English fear and to be the most common. I also included timor and pavor But t i mor outstrips metus in frequency, al though different authors show different preference s ; pavor is rarely used in my time period Terror demanded study as the direct cognate of the English word denoting an extreme of fear. Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome highlights verecundia as a specific type of fear that encompasses respect and ion to others, both people and divinities. 29 Formido His lexicon embraces pavor ; metus and metuere ; timor and pertimescere ; formido ; terror and ; and vereor 30 All his words are on my li st, but unlike Riggsby, I find 28 Citations were found with a morphological search of the PHI disk 5 using Diogenes 3.1.6 for Mac. Headwords were selected from the Oxford Latin Dictionary and supplemented with additional compounds suggested by Diogenes. Exact counts are given in the Appen dix. 29 Kaster 2005, 13 27 30 Riggsby, A. 2009. The Lexicon of Fear. A Paper Presented at Fear in the Ancient World, November 14, 2009, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL
29 that these words can and often do have a positive connotation in the Latin texts of 88 28 BCE My last word, dirus terms for fear in Greek. 31 I exclude words that ca n denote fear only by analogy, such as those indicating a state of fear by reference to physiological symptoms. Thus, I have not studied horror and its derivatives since this word group deals properly with things that stand stiff, such as hair and limbs. B ecause fear often causes paralysis and therefore the stiffness associated with a shaggy beard, horror and its derivatives come to be associated with fear, but are not properly about fear itself. 32 Following the same reasoning, I exclude words for trembling, shuddering, stiffening, growing pale, and the weakening of limbs. 33 My fear words, separated into seven families, are: and extimescere 34 and metuens 35 verecundia, ve and and and 36 and 37 31 Dirus is included by MacKay 1961, 310 311 in his list of fear words in Latin epic: dirus formido horreo metuo palleo paveo periculum terreo timeo tremo trepido vereor and the and Konstan 2006, 153 155 32 OLD s.v. horreo, horror, horridus horribilis et al 33 Cf. Konstan 2006, 153 who rejects Zaborowski 2002 and as fear words on the ground that they refer to acts such as shrinking back or trembling, and hence designate symptoms of fear (or of other emotions) rather than fear itself. 34 Tim and pertimefactus produced no results. 35 produced no results. 36 and produced no results. 37 and Paventia (the name of a goddess) produced no results.
30 dirus From a study of every occurrence of these words in extant Latin literature from 88 28 BCE, several conclusions emerge about fear in the Lat in language at that time. Some words are neutral in scope. Although fear is a negatively felt emotion that produces pain, it can be positive or negative in its effect. Some of these fears are appropriate for a Roman to feel and some are not. Timor and metu s embrace this full spectrum of positive and negative, socially appro priate and inappropriate fear. Verecundia only covers those fears that are always appropriate to feel and are always positive in effect through social restraint, though this is not true o f the verb vereri Threats range in strength from the mundane to the life threatening, and responses range in strength from non existent to irrational. Terror and pavor usually denote extreme manifestations of fear that are felt too strongly. Thi ngs that are dirus also produce the exaggerated expression of fear G eneral f ear: t imor and m etus Timor and metus and their denominatives timere and metu ere both represent fear in its broadest sense. Varro, a contemporary Latin lexicographer during the Late Republic identifies metus as the basic term for fear ( L. 6.45): quod frigidus timor, 'tremuisti' timuisti. tremo dictum a similitudine vocis, quae tunc cum valde tremunt appar et, cum etiam in corpore pili, ut arista in spica
31 when even the hairs on the body bristle up li ke the beard on an ear of bar ley. 38 Varro slips immediately from the discussion of fear proper to related symptoms, yet even his manner of doing so reveals that metus is the key term and these other words are peripheral. Varro subsumes timor under metus but he bases this on a false d erivation of timor from tremor Varro also helps us establish a broad semantic range for metus ( L. 6.48): metuere a quodam motu animi, cum id quod malum casurum putat refugit mens. cum vehementius in movendo ut ab se abeat foras fertur, formido; Metuere to fear,' from a certain motus 'emotion of the spirit, when the mind shrinks back from tha t misfortune which it thinks w ill fall upon it. When from excessiv e violence of the emotion it is borne foras 'forth so as to go out of itself, there is formido 'terror'; when partum movetur the emotion is not very strong,' it pavet dreads,' and from this comes pavor 'dread.' 39 t of the mind (an emotion ) that presupposes some future evil and attempts to avoid it corresponds well with our psychological definition for fear. He defines metus as specifically that movement that occurs when the mind reels at the thought of a future e vil. He establishes formido as a subtype at one extreme; the corruption of the text can only make us wonder what Varro meant to say here about pavor Varro again defines metus as the anticipation of something you do not want and offers spes as its opposite : the anticipation of something you do want ( L. 6.73) : etiam spes a sponte potest esse declinata, quod tum sperat, cum quod volt fieri putat: nam quod non volt si putat, metuit, non sperat. 38 Text: Goetz and Scholl 1910 ; translation: Kent 1938 39 Translation accepts the e mendation of pavet et to parum movetur
32 Spes 'hope is perhaps als o derived from sponte inclination,' because a person then sperat hopes,' when he thinks that what he wishes is coming true ; for if he thinks that what he does not wish is coming true, he fears, not hopes. This distinction between metus /fear and spes /hope as correlat ive emotions that look towards a future uncertainty, the former towards an evil and the latter towards a good, corresponds to our modern psychological understanding of these emotions and finds support in Cicero as well ( Tusc 4.80): metus quoque est diffident ia expectati et impendentis mali, et si spes est expectatio boni, mali expectationem esse necesse est metum. ut igitur metus, sic reliquae perturbationes sunt in malo. D iffidence is a fear of an expected and impending evil; and if hope is an expectation of good, fear must, of course, be an expectation of evil. Thus fear and other perturbations are evils. 40 The chiasmus of expectatio boni, mali expectationem draws focus to the opposing nature of good and bad and to the distance between hope and fear on the e motional spectrum a distance emphasized by the polypto ton of metus, expectatio, and malum Elsewhere in the Tusculan Disputations especially book 4, Cicero contrasts fear not with hope but with grief ( dolor or aegritudo ), joy ( laetitia ), and lust ( libido ), all of which are bad ( Tusc 4.14): est ergo aegritudo opinio recens mali praesentis, in quo demitti contrahique animo rectum esse videatur, laetitia opinio recens boni praesentis, in quo ecferri rectum esse videatur, metus opinio impendentis mali, quod intolerabile esse videatur, libido opinio venturi boni, quod sit ex usu iam praesens esse atque adesse. Grief, then, is a recent opinion of some present evil, in which it seems to be right that the mind should shrink and be dejected. Joy is a recent opinio n of a present good, in which it seems to be right that the mind should be elated. Fear is an opinion of an impending evil which we apprehend will be 40 Text: Pohlenz 1918 ; translation: Yonge 1877
33 intolerable. Lust is an opinion of a good to come, which would be of advantage were it already come, and p resent with us. Cicero outlines four major emotions that parallel each other in two distinct respects: temporal domain and goal congruency. Laetitia pairs with aegritudo as emotions concerned with the present, libido with metus as emotions relating to the future. Laetitia and libido both concern something good; aegritudo and metus concern something bad. Depending on point of view, any of these emotions can be the opposite of any other, and metus is what we have come to expect: a negative emotion that concerns the future. Although Cicero prefers metus when he discusses these four emotions, he uses timor synonymously ( Tusc. 3.14): atqui, in quem cadit aegritudo, in eundem timor; quarum enim rerum praesentia sumus in aegritudine, easdem inpendentes et ve nientes timemus. Now, whoever is subject to grief is subject to fear; for whatever things we grieve at when present we dread when hanging over us and approaching Just like metus, timor contrasts aegritudo and looks towards coming evils. Like Cicero Lucr etius also uses timor and metus interchangeably and as general terms for fear. 41 Most notable is fear of death, which Lucretius renders variously with morte timendum (1.111 and 3.866), mortis timores (2.45), timor mortis (5.1180), mortis metu (6.1212), and in mortis timentis (6.1239), and implies at the sacrifice of Iphigenia (muta metu terram genibus summissa petebat 1.92), at the gates of the underworld ( et metus ille foras praeceps Acheruntis agendus, 3.37), in comparison to the fear of sickness and dish onor ( nam quod saepe homines morbos magis esse timendos / infamemque ferunt 41 Fo r a discussion of fear in Lucretius, see Segal 1990, esp. 187 188 on the fear of death.
34 vitam quam Tartara leti 3.41), and at the threat of punishment after death ( in morte gravescant, 3.1023). Any difference between metus and timor seems, at least for the Late Republic, to have to do more with false etymologies, such as that by Varro above ( L. 6.48 ) or authorial preference than with any systematic difference between the two. Lucretius despises the fear of death, even its pragmatic ability to regulate the behavior of individuals. The practical advantages of fear, however, are not lost on his contemporaries Even Cicero whose career spans three quarters of 88 28 BCE although censorious of fear in the Tusculan Disputations applauds the ability of metus to inspire people to act virtuously. Whereas he prefers virtue for virtue sake, he recognizes the practicality of fear of the gods ( metus/timor deorum ), fear of laws ( metus legum ), and fear of the courts ( metus iudici ). 42 Alt hough Cicero believes that th e gods do not need to be feared Epicurus has proven that the gods are not concerned with troubling men ( Nat. D. 1.56) he recognizes that the fear of divine punishment has recalled many men from a wicked life ( Leg 2.16). 43 Cicero asks what the Roman people could possibly do with Verres, when he flaunts his lack of religion and fear of the courts ( Verr 2.2.40). 44 metus iudici to extort money from the Sicilians he governs ( Verr. 2.3.34 and 2.3 .55). He also employs fearful violence ( vis et metus ), fear of beatings ( metus virgarum ), and fear 42 On virtue inspired by fear as not real virtue, see De or. 1.247; Leg. 1.40 41, .51; Parad 5.41; Fin 2.71, .73; Tusc 4.46; Off. 3.104. 43 Cf. Nat. D. 1.45. 44 See also 2.3.131, 2.4.18, 2.4.75, 2.4.102, and 2.5.74.
35 of death ( metus mortis ) to force men to give him money and statues and to compel men not to speak out against him. 45 This dual ability of metus to inspire men to virtue and force them into submission reveals the complexity of this emotion and Cicero 's vacillation between positive and negative attitudes towards fear reflects the difficulty inherent in negotiating the wide semantic range of metus and timor Fear must be felt appropriately and must be aroused appropriately; its manifestation must follow societal rules and reflect ethical standards. When fear keeps men in check, it serves a positive function and contributes to a peaceful society; when fear is abuse d, however, it increases the tension in a society, and those who manipulate the emotional environment may act without restraint. The ones who should feel fear men like Verres are instead forcing others to fear them. Furthermore, fear must be felt with prop er moderation. Take for example Horace ( S 2.3.53 59): est genus unum stultitiae nihilum metuenda timentis, ut ignis, ut rupes fluviosque in campo obstare queratur; alterum et huic varum et nihilo sapientius ignis per medios fluviosque ruentis: clamet amic a mater, honesta soror cum cognatis, pater, uxor: 'hic fossa est ingens, hic rupes maxima: serva!' Lamenting that flames, rocks, rivers, obstruct their way: Another differing, but no more wisely, rushes on Through fire and flood. Though a dear mother, a noble 46 45 Vis et metus : 2.2.14, 2.2.145, 2.2.150, 2.3.145, 2.3.152, 2.3.153, 2.4.14, 2.4.140, and 2.4.147; metus vigarum : 2.3.70 and 2.5.117; metus mortis : 2.5.160. 46 Text: Klingner 1959 ; translation: Kline 2005
36 To feel no fear, to have no caution, is just as bad as feeling to o much fear. Fear should be the result of the proper valuation of threat and should motivate one to take the appropriate actions to mitigate that threat. Rocks and rivers should not paralyze, but one should not rush forward without taking care to negotiate them properly. When the emotion reigns without recourse to rational thought, fear is destructive; when Cicero waxes philosophical about the evils of metus he highlights this aspect of fear ( Tusc 4.13): [cautio] quae autem sine ratione et cum exanimatione humili atque fracta, n ominetur metus est igitur metus ratione aversa cautio. B ut that caution which is not under the guidance of reason, but is attended with a base and low dejection, is called fear. Fear is, therefore, caution destitute of reason. Once the emotion is divor ced of reason, deliberation becomes impossible. In practical terms, fear is useful for disabling the political machinery of a Republic but philosophically, fear is repugnant and leads Cicero to argue that one cannot be happy if he is afraid, even if his f ears are only small ( Tusc 5.41). At other times, however, Cicero attests to the positive role of fear, such as when he acknowledges metus as his own stimulus for making an oration. Instead of shrinking in fear like the Sicilians against Verres, Cicero fig hts back. When Cicero fears Catiline, he demands that Catiline leave the city: Magno me metu liberaveris, modo inter me atque te murus intersit ( Catil. 1.10). Not only does Cicero a cknowledge his fear, but his deictic word order places him ( me ) in great fe ar ( ), strengthening the gravity of his situation. Later, Cicero again acknowledges his fear and the threat of Catiline ( Catil. 1.18):
37 nunc vero me totam esse in metu propter unum te, quicquid increpuerit, Catilinam timeri, nullum videri contra me consilium iniri posse quod a tuo scelere abhorreat, non est ferendum. But now that I should be wholly occupied with fear of you alone, that at every sound I should dread Catiline, that no design should seem possible to be entertained against me which do es not proceed from your wickedness, this is no longer endurable. 47 This is indeed a very serious fear if Cicero is so anxious that any noise brings his fear back to the fore, and the emotional tone rises with totam timeri scelere and abhorreat Once again, Cicero proposes that Catiline leave Rome and thereby remove the source of these fears, for although the fear is appropriate to have to feel such fear must not be tolerated ( non est ferendum ). In his speech On Behalf of Murena Cicero regards his fear of Catiline in hindsight ( Mur 52): descendi in campum cum firmissimo praesidio fortissimorum virorum et cum illa lata insignique lorica, non quae me tegeret etenim sciebam Catilinam non latus aut ventrem sed caput et collum solere petere verum u t omnes boni animadverterent et, cum in metu et periculo consulem viderent, id quod est factum, ad opem praesidiumque concurrerent. I went to the Campus Martius with a strong bodyguard of valiant men and displayed that broad cuirass, not to protect myself for I knew t hat it was Ca t i stomach but for all loyal citizens to observe and, seeing the fear and danger in which their consul was placed, to rush to his help and defense; and this is wh at they did. 48 Cicero felt fear himself, and the Roman people saw that he, their consul, was afraid and in danger. This metus motivated both Cicero and the Roman people, who rushed to his aid. 47 Text: Clark 1905 ; translation: Yonge 1856 48 Text: Clark 1905 ; translation: MacDonald 1982
38 Fear motivates Cicero once again when he sees that the attack o n Murena will leave Rome without one of her consuls when two are needed most to resist the threat posed by the followers of Catiline still at large in Rome. He first applauds himself for removing the direct danger of Catiline but reminds the people that Ca be feared ( Mur. 79) and that all Romans will live in fear with only one consul ( Mur 85): versabitur
39 the external threat posed specifica lly by Carthage, Romans reformed their ways and Rome prospered. Only when this fear of the enemy was taken too far did Rome destroy her enemy and resign herself to a future of in fighting that would culminate, for Sallust, in the Catilinarian c onspiracy. 51 Once again, the importance of moderation in how fear is felt and responded to reveals the complex nature of this emotion. We should not be surprised to see fear viewed with total derision at one moment and applauded the next even by the same author. This c omplexity is evident in the maxims of Publilius Syrus. At one moment, Syrus reproves fear ( Sent. V. 29): Virtutis omnis impedimentum est timor. Fear is a hindrance to every virtue. 52 At other times, however, he highlights the importance of fear felt in mod eration (Q 65): 53 Quod est timendum, decipit si neglegas. That which must be feared dupes you if you ignore it. and (S. 15): Si nihil v e l i s timere, metuas omnia. praesentia defendebat, pro bono ducebatur. As Wood 1995 178 notes, in the War with Jugurtha Sallust suggests that Romans originally possessed good morals, but in the Histories he changes his stance. The nature o f men is always inclined towards strife and immorality, but the Punic Wars provided the impetus to reform those ways ( Hist. 1.8 9). Once Carthage had been destroyed, men returned to their former ways ( Hist 1.13). 51 Cato the Elder believed that the threat to Carthage had to be eliminated; Scipio Nasica, however, believed that Carthage should stand so that Rome would always be moderated by fear of that enemy (App. Pun. 10.69). On the decline of Roman morals that lead to the Catilinarian c onspiracy: Cat 5 14 with specific reference to the removal of the threat of Carthage at 10.1. 52 Text: Meyer 1880 ; translation: my own. 53 See also V 6: Ub i nihil timetur, quod timeatur nascitur.
40 If you should want to fear noth ing, you would fear everything. In both these maxims, Syrus acknowledges that there are legitimate source s of fear. However one must be moderate in the expression of fear and only fear those things that are truly threatening. Ignoring threats is not avoiding them, while showing proper fear can enable one to do jus t that (S. 24): Semper metuendo sapiens evitat malum. A wise man escap es evil by always being afraid. Although Syrus seems to contradict his other statement that fear impedes all virtue, he plays upon the complexity of timor and metus type fears to show t hat fear felt appropriately, such as by a wise man, is advantageous, even though we and he regard fear negatively when we think about those too prone to fear or who feel fear too strongly. Such a person is timidus liable to fear, displays timidita s a proneness to fear, and acts timid e in the manner of one affected by fear 54 Timidita s is not the emotion, but rather the nature of a person towards feeling the emotion of timor/metus The timidus person is dispositionally fearful instead of acutely fearf ul. In the face of fear, the timidus man shows cowardice and shrinks back, choosing flight or freeze over fight. Furthermore, his deliberation may be faulty, causing him to misjudge the threat posed by the things he fears (Pub. Sent P. 3): Pericla timidus etiam quae non sunt videt. The timid man se es dangers even which are not there. 54 Definition of timidus : OLD 1; of : OLD ; of : OLD 1. is positive or negative depending on circumstance. It can mean cautiously ( OLD 2) in an appropriate manner, as when Cicero claims to speak in court because he does not want to overreach or offend or because he believes speaking his case is a risky thing for him to do when the opposition is so powerful ( Quinct 51.3, Leg Man 47, Clu 51, Sull 80, Flac. 13, Planc. 24, Phil 12.24).
41 The ability of fear timidus is balanced by its ability to reveal the contrasting virtue of courage/manliness, virtus Although S yrus claims that fear impedes virtus fear actually allows virtus to be displayed. Courage is not the absence of fear but rather the display of manliness under the threat of something fearful. A man in battle, for instance, judges his opponent and recogniz es that his enemy is formidable. This deliberation might cause him to react by fleeing or by standing his ground. In both cases, however, he still feels fear, but his choice between timiditas and virtus reveals his moral excellence. By regularly displaying timiditas a man becomes by inclination increasingly timidus ; by regularly displa y ing virtus a man become increasingly virilis manly. To feel no fear while in danger is no virtue, but rather the result of improper deliberation mor e akin to audacia than virtus 55 Despite repeated rejections of fear as represented by metus and timor especially in the philosophical works of Lucretius and Cicero Latin semantics leaves room for positive fear. Fear when felt appropriately can inspire co urage; fear can compel people to obey human and divine laws, to take action against wrong doers, and to work harmoniously to resist foreign threats. This power to restrain and to shape conduct also resides in a specific type of fear rendered in Latin by ve recundia. Appropriate f ear: v erecundia Unlike metus and timor which can be appropriate or inappropriate for a Roman to experience depending on the situation, verecundia is essentially appropriate. A person who feels verecundia is verecundus Kaster proves that verecundia is the type of fear 55 Sallust contrasts audacia to virtus in the prologue of the Cat (3.4): Nam pro pudore, pro abstinentia, pro virtute audacia, largitio, avaritia vigebant The anaphora and chiasmus emphasizes the contrast between audicia and virtus
42 best rendered in English by wary and worry : a mild and strategic sort of fear, which manifests itself above all in circumspection and the wish to avoid drawing attention to oneself in an improper way or an improper degree. 56 The proper expression of verecundia is a social virtue and ensures that Romans avoid offending others and avoid improper assertion of the self. Furthermore, Kaster notes that the physical symptoms of verecundia mark it as distinct from metus and timor ; the former produce a blush while the latter pair produce pallor. 57 This type of fear, then, approximates the emotion of shame. It also manifests itself in both vertical and horizontal relationships, reminding men to recognize their place in hier archies above or below others and keeping men of comparable status in line with each other. 58 Thus, Cicero hedges against giving offense for speaking against Fabius as he defends Marcus Tullius ( Tul 5): Nunc cum coactus dicam, si quid forte dicam, tamen id ipsum verecunde modiceque faciam, tantum ut, quoniam sibi me non esse inimicum potuit priore actione Fabius iudicare, nunc M. Tullio fidelem certumque amicum esse cognoscat. Now that I am speaking under compulsion, if I say anything strong, still I will d o even that with decency and moderation, and only in such a way that, as he could not consider me hostile to him at the former trial, so he may now know that I am a faithful and trustworthy friend to Marcus Tullius. 59 Cicero still a young politician at the time, wishes the jury to know that feels verecundia in speaking against the reputation of a man like Fabius. 60 He acknowledges that he 56 Kaster 2005, 16 57 Kaster 2005, 19 See for example Hor. Ep. 17.21 58 Kaster 2005, 19 27 59 Text: Clark 1911 ; translation Yonge 1856 60 This speech was like ly delivered in 71 BCE, Gelzer 1969, 33 n.43
43 must assume too much space for himself, but he will try to do so with restraint so as to preserve as best as possible Fab ius' reputation and his own Both verecundia and its adjective verecundus derive from the verb vere ri establishing verecundia semantically as a type of fear. This relationship is evident in uses of vereri meaning to respect or show reverence, as when Cice ro acknowledges his defendant Plancius' respectful fear of his father as if his father were a god ( Planc 29): Omitto illa quae, si minus in scaena sunt, at certe, cum sunt prolata, laudantur, ut vivat cum suis, primum cum parente nam meo iudicio pietas f undamentum est omnium virtutum quem veretur ut deum neque enim multo secus est parens liberis amat vero ut sodalem, ut fratrem, ut aequalem. I say nothing of those things which if they are less brought on the stage than others, still at all events are alw ays praised when they do come to light; for instance, how he lives among his own relations; in the first place with his father, (for in my opinion filial affection is the foundation of all the virtues,) whom he venerates as a god, (and indeed a parent does not stand in a very different relation to his children,) but loves as a companion, as a brother, as a friend of his own age. In this passage v ereri reflects the vertical hierarchies that vercundia helps to maintain and reminds us that the verb is more gen eric than the noun and adjective formed from it. In fact, vereri often acts as a synonym to metuere and timere and its usage in expressions denoting fear of the gods emphasizes this overlap. Yet, the synonymy between vereri, metuere, and timere manifests itself as well when Caesar uses the verb to express fear concerning the movements of the Gauls, when Sallust's Adherbal tells Romans senators that he fears Jugurtha's influence among them, or when Vergil's Lycidas confesses his fears that the nig ht will bring rain and force him and Moeris to return home and end their singing. 61 In all these cases, however, the 61 Caes Gal 5.5.4; Sal. Jug 14.20; Verg. Ecl. 9.63 64.
44 individuals are right to be fearful. With some words for fear, this affect and its expression are not appropriate. Excessive fear: terror formido pavor and dirus Some fears are inappropriate for a Roman to feel, either because a free Roman should never have to feel such a powerful sense of fear or because that Roman has not appropriately evaluated the situation and is not responding with t he correct degree of emotion. In elaborating on varieties of fear Cicero highlights some of these excessive types of fear ( Tusc 4.18 19): Quae autem subiecta sunt sub metum, ea sic definiunt : terrorem metum concutientem, ex quo fit ut terrore m pallor et tremor et dentium crepitus consequatur, timorem metum mali adpropinquantis, pavorem metum mentem loco moventem, ex quo illud Ennius: 'tum pavor sapientiam omnem mi exanimato expectorat', exanimationem metum subsequentem et quasi comitem pavoris conturbationem metum excutientem cogitata, formidinem metum permanentem. But those feelings which are included under fear, they define thus: t here is terror, which affect [s] the body hence a paleness, and tremor, and chattering of the teeth attend terror cowardice, which is an apprehension of some approaching evil; dread, a fear that unhinges the mind, whence comes that line of Ennius, Then dread discharged all wisdom from my mind; fainting is the associate and constant attendant on dread; confusion, a fear that drives away all thought; alarm, a continued fear. Terror pavor and formido do not enable men to act. They overwhelm a man, making him physically ill and removing his ability to thi nk clearly. Thus, a Roman under the sway of these extreme versions of fear cannot deliberate and cannot accurately access risk or how to prevent it. A fear monger must take care not to raise so much alarm that fear becomes terror, pavor, or formido lest h is audience be unable to take action to help him achieve his goals. Lepidus laments that he submitted to Sulla out of dread, formido but has cast off such crushing fear in place of a fear that compels him to resist
45 Sulla and to roll back his changes to th e Roman constitution (1.55M.18). He urges his listeners to turn their dread into useful fear as well (1.55M.24). Likewise, the adjective dirus represents an excessive degree of fear, as when Cicero writes to his friend Atticus about how ruinous Pompey's l oss to Caesar would be ( Att. 10.8.7): non fuisset illa nox tam acerba Africano, sapientissimo viro, non tam dirus ille dies Sullanus callidissimo viro, C. Mario, si nihil utrumque eorum fefellisset. Africanus would have been spared that cruel night, and th at master of craft C. Marius the fateful day of Sulla's triumph, if nothing had ever escaped their calculations 62 The sense that the day of Sulla's triumph was fateful to Marius reflects the use of dirus to represent something feared but about which noth ing can be done, such as an omen. Unlike neutral forms of fear, a fear characterized by dirus cannot produce the positive effect of fear to encourage men to action to avoid the threat; the object of this type of fear cannot be avoided. Like Marius against Sulla, a loss for Pompey against Caesar would precipitate unavoidable evil. These are not the types of fear useful for the fear monger and remind us that fear must be aroused judiciously. The Fear Factory In the proem of the On the Nature of Things Lucret ius laments that Memmius (or the imagined reader) will one day abandon his reasoned life and fear death ( 1. 102 111): Tutemet a nobis iam quovis tempore vatum terriloquis victus dictis desciscere quaeres. quippe etenim quam multa tibi iam fingere possunt s omnia, quae vitae rationes vertere possint fortunasque tuas omnis turbare timore! et merito; nam si certam finem esse viderent 62 Text: Shackleton Bailey 1965 1970 ; tr anslation: Winstedt 1921
46 aerumnarum homines, aliqua ratione valerent religionibus atque minis obsistere vatum. nunc ratio nulla est restandi, nulla facult as, aeternas quoniam poenas in morte timendum. You too, someday, will try to turn deserted, Taken by so called prophets and their ravings. To overthrow your reasoned way of life And stir up fear and trouble all your fortune! They know their trade for if men could see that hardships Have their sure end, made strong by reason, they Might then withstand those superficial threats. But now no reason, no force can stand and fight: We fear perpetual torments after death. 63 Lucretius' compound terri loquis a hapax legomenon, may be the closest we come to a Latin term for fear mongering and labels the prophets as active purveyors of fear. Reason falters against the ir fear mongering words, their made up dreams, and their threats about the afterlife. No reason, Lucretius says, no means of fighting exist (110). Men continue to fear the tortures imagined for their afterlife. At first it seems that Lucretius has forfeited; the prophets have won, and he cannot sway the opinion of men with reason. Yet, the entire poem attests to his confidence that knowledge and reason Lucretius faces an uphill battle in which he must present an argument based on logic that is compelling enough to override emotion. The human brain processes information through two systems, one based on rules of thumb and the other on learned rules. One system has been called associative, experiential, and intuitive 64 This system processes unconscious 63 Text: Martin 1969 ; translation: Esolen 1995 64 Associative: Sloman 1996 ; experiential: Epstein 1994 ; intuitive: Kahneman and Frederick 2002 Further labels are compiled by Epstein 1994, 710 : There is no dearth of evidence in every day life that people apprehend reality in two fundamentally different ways, one variously labeled intuitive, automatic, natural, non verbal, narrative, and experiential, and the other analytical, deliberative, verbal, and rational.
47 thought; it operates quickly and behind the scenes. When we make associations based on similarity and contiguity, we use our personal experience as our source of knowledge, and we base representation on images, stereotypes, and featur e sets. 65 I have seen a lion before, and this unfamiliar animal chasing after me looks like a lion; lions can eat me; RUN! Of course, this entire process is subconscious and in many ways it relies on our experiences. We hold assumptions to be true based on these experiences because they have proven true in the past and are likely to be true in the future. Such assumptions allow one to get through the day without double checking every fact and analyzing every stimulus. Operating simultaneously, but independ ently, is the rule based, rational system, analogous to reason 66 This form of reasoning depends on learned knowledge from langua ge, culture, and formal systems and often depends on abstract concepts and relationships based on causation, hierarchies, and logic. This system embraces deliberation and formal analysis and produces results that can be explained, verified, or gut and head reflect how we conceptualize these two systems 67 We conventionally locate certain judg ments in the belly, stomach, liver, or heart and other judgments in the head. Imagine the person on a plane who knows that flying is safe but feels sick to his stomach with fear that the plane will crash. Although he thinks that his fear comes f ro m his sto mach, the brain simultaneously produces both 65 See Sloman 1996 7 for a chart listing the characteristics of System 1 (his associative system ) and System 2 (his orga nizes these systems by principle s of operation, source of knowledge, nature of representation (basic units and relations), nature of processing, and illustrative cognitive features. 66 Rule based: Sloman 1996 ; rational: Epstein 199 4 ; reason: Kahneman and Frederick 2002 67 Gardner 2008 26
48 judgments, that of fear and that of safety, and sends signals to the abdomen to respond physiologically to the brain based emotion. Neither system, intuitive or rational, is intrinsically superior to the other. Both serve different functions, and both can lead one astray. Deliberation does not profit the man who gets eaten while debating whether to stay in the water with sharks. Gazzaniga, however, has shown that people think that their thought processes are gov erned by reason. People are uncomfortable when they are unable to explain why they hold certain beliefs or draw certain conclusion, and they are prone to rationalize decisions made intuitively 68 A Roman might cling to ideas about the punishments await ing h im in the afterlife as a way to rationalize the fear of death Countering fear produced through intuition by appealing to reason is not impossible, but it is difficult. This is the task Lucretius sets for himself in On the Nature of Things but even if he succeeds in arguing away the rationalization concernin g punishments which is made by reasoning he still has not addressed the underlying emotion embedded in the gut Unlike Lu cretius, the fear mongering prophets have an easy job. Appeals to intuition work quickly because once the emotion sets in, it is hard to remove. The prophets can tap into a listener's emotions with vivid imagery and stereotypes. A few anecdotes about Sisyphus, Cerberus, and rivers of fire trigger cognitive functions of fantasy, creati vity, and imagination; repeat these refrains enough and a deep seat ed fear of death takes root. Lucretius' iterative desciscere implies that the prophets' 68 The human propensity to rationalize decisions we cannot explain has been documented by Gazzaniga 1988 13 in his research on split brain patients. In one experiment, the word walk was presented to the left brain, which pro cessed language and to which the command had not been presented, rationalized an answer. He responded, I wanted to go get a Coke.
49 repetition is effective in producing repeated abandonment of reason. Lucretius may reason that there is nothing to fear in death, but emotion can erode that reasoning Implanting such a fear depends not on creating logical arguments about risk, but rather on activ ating certain built in rules of intuition through emotionally charged rhetoric. These rules, called heuristics are different than the learned rules of logic that we rationally use to process information. As Slovic explains : Affect is a subtle form of emotion, defined as positive (like) or negative (dislike) evaluative feelings towar emotion is a quicker, easier and more efficient way [than deliberation and analysis] to navigate in a complex, uncertain and sometimes dangerous world. 69 Th e affect h euristic says that current affect the current experience of an emotion alters our decisions. Alt hough this is usually good and allows one to make quick decisions bas ed on personal experience, the affect h euristic also makes one easy prey for a ma nipulative speaker. perception: if we can be made to feel a negative emotion, we will perceive risks as more serious; if we are made to feel a positive emotion, we will perceive risks as less s erious. To complicate situations, strong, emotional responses linger even when factual knowledge contradicts the decisions we reached under affect. 70 Rhetoric does matter, and appeals to affect can change the way people think. The representative heuristic states that we base judgments about probability on resemblance, not statistics. Psychologists Khaneman and Tversky gave subjects a profile of a woman named Linda: Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very 69 Slovic 2000 xxxi 70 Zajonc 1980 157 argues that this is because we tend to trust our feelings and because affec tive judgments implicate the self.
50 bright. She majored in philosophy. As a s tudent, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti nuclear demonstrations. They then asked the subjects to rank additional descriptions by how likely it is that they apply to Linda. Among the d escriptions were that Linda (1) is a bank teller and (2) is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement. 71 Although it is logically impossible for it to be more likely that Linda is both a bank teller and anything else than that she is just a bank teller, 85% of respondents ranked is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement as more likely than is a bank teller. Kahneman and Tversky concluded that people made this error in judgment because the second option seemed to fit more with the original profile. 72 When people fall prey to the representative h euristic, they look only for points of comparison between the data and the hypothesis, and they ignore data that does not correlate with the hypothesis. Nothing in the profile suggested that Linda might be a bank teller, but many things suggest she might fit the stereotype of a feminist; intuition clings to that connection. Fear mongers can activate this intuitive cognition to make judgments by the representative h euristic through character as sassination and stigmatization. Once a perception of a person or a group is formed, that representation sticks, and if it is emotionally charged, the affect attached to that representation rei nforces such judgments. If, for example, Cicero can cast Antony as seen in light of this characterization. Preexisting emotions felt towards Carthage, 71 Kahneman et al. 1982, 32 47 Other descriptions were: (1) is a teacher in elementary school, (2) works in a bookstore and takes yoga classes, (3) is active in the feminist movement, (4) is a psychiatric social worker, (5) is a member of the League of Women Voters, (6) is an insurance sales person. 72 This specific error produced by the representative heuristic is called the conjunction fallacy The probability of two events occurring in conjunction must be less than or equal to the probability of either
51 Spartacus, Catiline, and Tarquinius Superbus map onto Antony and the state becomes justified in taking any and all actions against Antony previously deemed reasonable against those other enemies. Intuitive cognitio n can also be activated by the availability h euristic. 73 According to this heuristic, the readiness of examp les, especially vivid, unusual, or emotionally charged ones, influences predictions and estimates of probability. The easier it is to think of examples of something, the more common that something must be. Only ease of recall matters; number and substance do not. A person whose grandfather smoked his whole life and lived to 100 before dying of a brain tumor might despite all science to the contrary believe that smoking is not so bad for you. This unusual anecdote does not conform to the majority of situat ions, but it is the readily available example. If a Roman can readily think of people who lost their parents and property during the proscriptions, he might think proscriptions are more likely to occur than if he could not generate those examples. To play on this, an orator might mention a few of the proscribed or ask his listeners to remember some for themselves. Repetition also plays a role in activating the availability h euristic since we remember more easily what we are most exposed to; those memories a re easier to recall while we make unconscious judgments. Thus, the more Lepidus calls Sulla a tyrant, the more likely the label will stick A number of methods for distorting information and skewing perception for example, character assassination and repe tition can activate these heuristics. Also advantageous is the establishment of an authoritative voice. People trust information that comes from a trustworthy source. We trust experts over lay people, our parents 73 First identified by Tversky and Kahneman 1973
52 over strangers. Roman citizens trust their consuls, whom they endow with consular authority. This effect becomes more powerful the more ambiguous the stimulus is: if we do not readily perceive something as good or bad such as the consulship of Murena we look to an authority such as Cicero to v alue it for us. But what happens when either the authority abus es that trust or the authority figure is not really an authority at all? Glassner explores the role of this authority bias in his discussion over the fear of drug abuse promoted by three decade s of presidents and by the news media. 74 Although the abuse of legal drugs was more prevalent than illegal drug use, Americans as a whole trusted the sensational reports that illegal drugs were destroying the fabric of their society. They therefore directed public funds inappropriately. Americans bought into the myth of the crack baby and ignored more serious socio economic problems afflicting the children born to drug addicts. The trust they placed in their authority figures enabled those authorities to mis Such deflection, as Glassner notes, works cyclically. Each act of misdirection diverts attention towards a new object of fear, which makes that object more frightening, thereby further distracting attention. This pattern makes misdirection not only a powerful tool of the fear monger, but also an important aim of the fear monger. By wielding his authority to misdirect the Roman people from Murena's bribery during the consular election to a fear of Catiline, Cic ero proves that a trusted figure can manipulate the perception of risk and accomplish his own gains through fear mongering. These different tools for dist ortion character assassination repetition, use of authority, and misdirection do not exist in isolati on. 74 Glassner 1999 [reprint 2009], 131 150
53 One can build upon another as different heuristics are activated, sometimes simultaneously, to put emotionally charged cognition to work. In pursuit of fear mongering, the arous al of fear to influence the thoughts or actions of others towards a partic ular end in late Republican Rome, I examine three primary sources through the lens of these three heuristics: Cicero 's speech On Behalf of Murena his Philippics Against Marcus Antonius 3 and 4, and Sallust's speech of Lepidus in the Histories (fr. 1.55M) The affect heuristic is activated in all three speeches; the very act of fear mongering requires creating an emotionally charged atmosphere, specifically one in which the dominant emotion is fear. To increase that sense of fear, each speaker elevates his audience's perception of risk. Gardner has identified eighteen risk perception buttons, of which the following are most applicable to the speeches central to my study: 75 Catastrophic potential: If fatalities would occur in large numbers in a single event i nstead of in small numbers disbursed over time our perception of risk rises. Familiarity: Un familiar or novel risks make us worry more. Personal control: If we feel the potential for harm is beyond our control like passengers in an airplane we worry more t han if we feel in control the driver of a car. Children: It's much worse if kids are involved. Future generations: If the risk threatens future generation, we worry more. Victim identity: Identifiable victims rather than statistical abstractions make the s ense of risk rise. Accident history: Bad events in the past boost the sense of risk. Equity: If the benefits go to some and the dangers to other, we raise the risk ranking. 75 These are quoted directly from Gardner 2008, 65 66 Other risk perception buttons are understanding, voluntariness, dread, trust, media attention, benefits, and origin.
54 Reversibility: If the effects of something going wrong cannot be reversed, risk rises. Personal risk: If the risk endangers me, it's riskier. Timing: More immediate threats loom larger while those in the future tend to be discounted. By promoting his authority in his speech On Behalf of Murena Cicero can make his claims about such ri sks seem reasonable; he is the trusted authority, and so as the risks rise, so does the fear, until Murena's guilt or innocence is irrelevant in the face of the mass death of citizens, the irreversible destruction of the Republic, and the personal danger e ach Roman begins to imagine himself to face. 76 Cicero 's ability to harness his persuasive power amplified by his status as consul allows him to deflect attention away from legitimate risk, the subversion of the Roman electoral system through bribery. Glassn er has shown that such misdirection is one of the key aims of the fear monger, yet also one of his tools. 77 The misdirection of attention from the legal question of Murena's electoral bribery onto the Catilinarian conspiracy allows Cicero to sidestep his de fendant's likely guilt. The emphasis added to the unrelated conspiracy elevates the fear surrounding that conspiracy. As he deflects attention away from the question of bribery, Cicero steadily increases his fearful tone and makes his audience seek someone to trust in this moment of crisis. Cicero positions himself and Murena as the best people to trust, regardless of electoral bribery. In Cicero 's Philippics Against Marcus Antonius 3 and 4, paired speeches delivered to the senate and the people, Cicero 's m ost powerful tool for distorting information and arousing fear is character assassination. He paints Antony as a king, a usurper consul, 76 On the misuse of authority, see Glassner 1999 [reprint 2009], 129 150 77 Glassner 1999 [reprint 2009], 85 106
55 a brigand, and a second Catiline These portraits depend on repetition to make the probability of their likelihood rise Cicero links Antony to disreputable men and his opponents to reputable men to make Antony sppear a villain and his enemies seem to be saviors of the Republic. With continuous claims that Antony would destroy the Republic and that the freedom of Romans ha ngs in the balance, with no time to waste, Cicero raises fear and exhorts his listeners to action to prevent this fear from manifesting. These risk perception buttons can help an orator like Sallust's Lepidus activate the representative heuristic. Since li steners are prone to judge based on the probability of resemblance, if Lepidus can show that Sulla fits the model of a tyrant, he can argue that Sulla is in fact a tyrant. To do so, he highlights the potential for new mass proscriptions, a risk made real b y its having happened already; the iniquity of select individuals of disreputable character to benefit while the average Roman becomes enslaved; the loss of property and status suffered by those not yet born; and the lack of personal control that individua ls have in a future in which liberty is no longer each Roman's possession. Many of these same risks simultaneously trigger the availability heuristic; Lepidus' ready examples of such iniquity, the repeated diction of slavery, and Sulla's tyrannical behavio r make it seem more probable these events will occur again. All three speeches highlight tensions in Rome during the late Republic. On Behalf of Murena reflects anxieties about declining morality and fear of conspiracy while raising questions about expedie ncy and pragmatism versus principles. Delivered in the midst of the four speeches Against Catiline this speech depends on the mounting fear of conspiracy to change the terms of debate to one of expediency; yet as much as Cicero
56 relies on that fear to help him make his case, he also relies on the opportunity to defend Murena to help him maintain the tense atmosphere that dominates the city and justifies his extreme actions. Until the Allobroges provided Cicero with the proof he needed, doubts were rising ab out the scale of the Catilinarian threat and the need for severity. The Phillipics 3 and 4 offer a unique opportunity to see a case made to two different audiences. In the first speech, Cicero addresses the senate, encouraging its members to effectively brand Antony an enemy of the state by decreeing formal praise to Decimus Brutus and Octavian, among others, for their open and armed resistance to Antony, their consul. Cicero no longer consul as he was when he defended Murena, cannot rely on consular authority to force his case, though his influence remains strong. Rather, he must tear down whatever authority Antony has and turn a legal consul into an enemy of the state. In so doing, he highlights fears of kingship and tyranny, concerns th at the Republic would not long stand, tensions between ever changing political factions, and the threat of civil war between Antony and Octavian. Unlike his famous invective Philippic 2 which was never delivered Philippics 3 and 4 were intended for and d elivered to large audiences. Yet, the audiences differed, and the content of these two speeches reflects the compositions of the senate and of the people crowding the forum. In the wake of Caesar's assassination, Cicero takes greater care concerning tyrann icides and kings before the people than before the senate. Lepidus raises concerns about land redistribution and the fate of those displaced, veteran soldiers flooding the city and countryside, the exercise of extra constitutional power s and the threat o f continued civil war. Following a decade of civil strife between Marius and Sulla, the Social Wars against Rome's allied towns in Latium and Italy, and
57 Sulla's prolonged dictatorship, these concerns were pressing matters. For Sallust, composing his versio n of Lepidus' speech in the 30s BCE, these concerns were alive again, and framing them in terms of the 80s and 70s allows Sallust to write about them from a comfortable vantage point. Rome had again been through a series of civil wars, still recovering fro m that of Pompey and Caesar and that between the Second Triumvirate and Caesar's assassins. A cold war, too, was brewing between Antony and Octavian. Rome had suffered renewed proscriptions under the Second Triumvirate, and veterans were again receiving th e confiscated land of Roman citizens as their pay for service. Furthermore, Lepidus' ultimate failure allows Sallust to highlight the risks of fear mongering, as Lepidus' words had two audiences: the one he inspired to follow him and the one that saw him a s an object of fear and took action to defeat him. These four speeches reflect the scope of the period 88 28 BCE: the dates of the selections from Cicero fall in the middle of these 60 years, in 63 and 44, sandwiched between the dramatic date of t he speech of Lepidus, 78, and its date of composition, approximately 35; furthermore, these speeches capture the essence of the fear and anxieties plaguing Rome in the late Republic. The narrow scope of this study, limited to 60 years and three moments of fear mongering, does not present a long view, but it does offer a snapshot of fear mongering during a specific period and permits great attention to detail. Since much of the extant literature from the late Republic belongs to the Cicero nian corpus, this s tudy necessarily focuses on Cicero In counterpoise to Cicero Sallust provides the balance, the control that shows that Cicero 's methods of fear mongering were not unique to him or to the period of his career. These three selections also reflect the varie ty of oratory practiced in Rome. Cicero 's On Behalf of
58 Murena is a judicial speech delivered before a jury. His Phillipic 3 is a deliberative senatorial address. Cicero 's Philippic 4 and Sallust's speech of Lepidus are both contiones show speeches deliver ed to the people. The three speeches from Cicero serve as primary documents; though likely edited before publication, they come as close as possible to representing the actual words spoken and heard in Rome. From Sallust, we get something much different: a recreation of a speech delivered almost a half a century earlier that must be accurate in essentials though not in word. It is a product both of Lepidus' time and Sallust's and informs our understanding of both generations. Taken together, these three mom ents of fear mongering provide insight into the workings of the Roman political system and allow us to witness two millennia years later the manipulation of emotions that affected real decisions with lasting effects on the history of Rome.
59 CHAPTER 3 AUTHOR ITATIVE VOICE: ON BEHALF OF MURENA The authoritarian relation between the one who commands and the one who obeys rests neither on common reason nor on the power of the one who commands; what they have in common is the hierarchy itself, whose rightness and legitimacy both recognize and where both have their predetermined stable place. Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future 1 In her essay What Is A uthority? political theorist Hannah Arendt attempts to d efine authority for a society she believes has abandone d it. She places authority between persuasion and force and looks back to the Greco Roman world for the model of this type of power. In her view authority depends on a hierarchy mutually reinforced and respected by those at the top and at the bottom. In th is regard her statement accurately reflects the reality in Cicero 's day; he wields authority only so long as the people grant him the right to do so. The fear monger must operate prudently or he risks losing the trust of his audience. Our word authority de rives from the Latin auctoritas but unlike the Latin abstract noun, authority can mean both a person, an authority or expert, or an abstraction, the authority that a person in power wields over others. Auctoritas is a substantive denoting the quality of a n auctor the agent of the verb augere which in its most basic sense means to increase. 2 Romulus is the source of auctoritas for the rulers or Rome, first the kings, then the consuls, and finally the emperors; the auctoritas of the senate, in 1 Arendt 1961, 93 2 Heinze 1925 349 350 offers a more detailed discussion of the derivation of auctoritas
60 turn, come s from the original patres 3 Likewise, the auctoritas of the father in each family flows from the earliest known male descendent, with Iulus for example being the auctor of the Julian family. 4 Those who initiated laws were considered the auctores of those laws, and the laws were named after the nomen gentilicium of the proposer. 5 As experts authorities in the modern sense these proposers of laws could speak with auctoritas on matters concerning the laws they proposed and carried. All these auctores handed down their auctoritas to future generations, whether subsequent magistrates or heads of household, and as superiors, inspired not obedience but deference. Furthermore, they are not so much authorities as sources of authority, and those who wield t hat authority after them are not auctores themselves unless they contributed substantially to the permanence and continuance of that authority Formally in Roman law there are four types of auctoritas : the authority of the senate, of the emperor, of a guar dian, and of a seller in certain types of transactions. 6 As Lincoln notes, in all four cases auctoritas represents the capacity to produce consequential speech, quelling doubts and winning the trust of the audiences whom [the speakers] engage 7 This defi nition holds true when auctoritas manifests itself beyond 3 For Romulus as auctor of Rome, see Liv. 5.24 ( Romulo, dei filio, parente et auctore urb is Romae ), but also Liv. 1.10 and Cic. Balb. 31. See also Watt 1982 11 12 For the patres as auctores and on their auctoritas see Liv. 1.17, .22, .32, .49, 2.8, and Cic. Rep. 2.14. 4 Liv. 1.3: ( quem Iulum eundem Iulia gens auctorem nominis sui nuncupat ). See also Ov. Fas t. 3.97 8. 5 See for example Liv. 2.44. 6 Auctoritas partum or senatus, auctoritas principis, auctoritas tutoris, and auctoritas venditoris The last is the oldest, dating back to the Twelve Tables and applies to the guarantee of the seller that the proper ty is his to sell during the mancipation of slaves, livestock, and land. See Lincoln 1 994, 2 3 I focus on authority in the Roman context; for a discussion of authority in both Greek and Roman historiography, see Marincola 1997, esp. 3 11 7 Lincoln 1994, 4 rule rested in the people and in magistrates. The right of the people was potestas and of certain magistrates imperium See Watt 1982 12
61 the confines of its legal usage though it has been persuaded, but actual argumentation is not necessary. The identity of the speaker is enou gh to inspire the trust in his audience. Once explanations are demanded or given, Lincoln argues that the dynamic changes in subtle, yet important ways; authority is suspended at least temporarily. 8 The same holds true when the implicit threat of force pr ogresses into physical violence. When force is used or the threat of force seems too real, authority becomes authoritarian. 9 It is this delicate balance between persuasion and coercion that Cicero must maintain in his speech On Behalf of Murena The Trial At the end of his consular year, 63 BCE, Cicero proposed the Tullian Law on Electoral Bribery ( Lex Tullia de a mbitu ) in anticipation of prosecuting Lucius Sergius Catilina (Catiline) for bribery were he to win the consular elections for 62. 10 T o the existing laws on bribery Cicero ten 11 Catiline, however, did not win but Marcus Porcius Cato (Cato) had promised to prosecute the consuls elect under the new law. Thus, in late November or early December, Servius prosecuted Murena for bribery. Cicero found himself defending Murena against charges 8 Lincoln 1994, 5 6 9 For a detailed investigation of the difference between authority and authoritarianism, see Watt 1982 19 25 10 For details on this law and the charge of ambitus see Fascione 1984 Linderski 1985 Lintott 1990 and Riggsby 1999 21 49 11 Dio Cass. 37.29. Dio claims that Catiline knew this legislation was targeted specifically at him and that morning of the elections.
62 brought under his very own law. 12 colleague in law, escaped prosecution. 13 Cases of electoral bribery were tried before the qu a estio de ambitu a special criminal court and one of the four standing courts dealing with improper conduct in public life. 14 The quaestio de ambitu e xisted as early as 116 BCE, when Marius was accused of electoral bribery while standing for the praetorship. 15 After 70 BCE, the court for a quaestio de ambitu consisted of a special magistrate and a panel of 50 to 75 jurors. While speaking, the prosecutor or advocate stood in the f orum and faced the magistrate and jury. or prosecutors not currently speaking, sat behind the speaker while a corona of bystanders stood around the entire court. This crowd of spectators could fill the forum during high 12 The date of the trial falls between November 10 and December 2, after Cicero delivered Cat. 2 (Nov. 9), but before Cat. 3 (Dec. 3). Cato and Sulpicius were joined in their prosecution by a certain Ser. Sulpicius unknown outside of the speech (56 57) and C. Postumus, also unknown oustside the speech (54, 56, 57, 69). Ser. Sulpicius may be the son of Ser. Sulpicius Rufus, one of the main accusers, but such a relationship can only be inferred from the titulus given by Cicero before 58: De Postumi criminibus, de Servi adulescentis Details on the trial are listed by Alexander 1990, 111 112 trial no. 224. See also MacDonald 1982, xxviii xxxiii For a review of the argument about the iden tification of Ser. Sulpicius, see Alexander 2002, 121 122 13 Plut. Cato 21. 14 The other three standing courts qu aestiones perpe t u ae dealt with charges of extortion, treason, and peculation. Three additional courts handled crimes of private life: assassinations and poisonings, personal violence, and false t estimony. On qu a estiones in the time of Cicero, see Lintott 2004 15 Marius was acquitted (Val. Max. 6.9.14; Plut. Mar 5). In the same year, M. Aemelius Scaurus was unsucces sfully prosecuted for bribery in the consular elections by his competitor, P. Rutilius Rufus (Cic. Orat. 2.280, Brut. 113; Tac. Ann. 3.66 ) Lintott 1990 6 notes that the court that tried Marius may not have yet been a quaestio perpetua like the qu aestio de repetundis with a full jury but may instead have been conducted by a magistrate and council. By the time of the Sullan r eforms of 81, however, it probably took bribery were the L ex Calpurnia L ex Tullia (63), the L ex Licinia (55), and additional measu res by Pompey and Caesar. For a list of trials between 116 and 63, see Shackleton Bailey 1970, 163 164
63 profile trials. 16 The jury consisted of men equally divided between senators, equites and tribuni aerarii The tribuni aerarii, tribunes of the treasury, w ere equites in all but official enrollment. The se men were often as wealthy as equites and Cicero himself an eques lumps them in with the equites when addressing the jury. 17 While Murena was being prosecuted in Rome by Cato and Sulpicius, Catiline roamed the Italian countrys ide. Drive n out after Cicero Against Catiline h e had not yet joined the forces raised by Gaius Manlius at Faesulae, nor had Cicero yet identified through the help of the Allobroges the conspirators still in the city, though he suspected that they existed. 18 There were doubts about how serious the threat of the Catilinarian c onspiracy was; t ension s were high, and Cicero was in question. 19 If Catiline did not act soon, Cicero might look the fool. Cicero had to make the threat appear real He may have believed it was, but his reputation and auctoritas depended on convincing others that things were as he said. Having to explain himself would constitute a loss of authority, and so Cicero was at his most vulnerable when Cato chose to strike against Mu rena 20 If Cicero did not advocate for Murena, then 16 The court easily consisted of up to a hundred people, not counting the crowd in the f orum. See Powell and Paterson 2004 5 n.18 Cicero attests to how crowded the f orum could be during a trial at Fla c. 66, noting that the Aurelian steps were filled with spectators. The location and identification of the Aurelian steps are not secure. 17 According to Lintot t 2004, 75 the tribunes of the treasury probably regarded themselves as equites as well. Cicero speaks of them as if equites at Font. 36, Clu. 121, Fla c. 4 and 96, Planc. 41, and Rab. Post. 14, but separately at Cat. 4.15 and Rab. Perd. 27 ( Lintott 2004, 75 n. 51 ). 18 Catiline left after the first speech. Throughout both speeches, Cicero refers to the conspirators at large in the city, and i n the second speech, he laments that Catiline did not take all of them with him: Cat. 2. 4, Mur. 78, 84, and 85. 19 These doubts persist even today. See Seager 1973 20 Paterson 2004 89 90 this influenced Cato's choice to initiate the prosecution. Cato want ed to be able to claim that Cicero was displaying arrogantia in using his influence to secure the acquittal of a guilty man.
64 Rome would be deprived of one consul at the time when Cicero claimed in his first two speeches Against Catiline that the safety of the Republic was at the greatest risk. Advocating for Murena allowed him to reinforce his auctoritas reestablish the severity of the Catilinarian threat, and provide for the safety of the Republic Cicero wanted Rome to have two consuls when the new year began, and he desperatel y needed the people to share his belief in t he severity of the threat whether because Catiline was that dangerous or because his own reputation was at risk. Cicero therefore, promotes a fear of Catiline that only the acquittal of Murena can mitigate. 21 Marcus Licinius Crassus (Crassus) and Quintus Hortensius Hortalus (Hortensius) joined Cicero in his defense of Murena Although Murena may have been guilty, this mattered not to his defenders ; the importance of the case was political, not judicial. 22 According to Roman custom, the prosecution spoke first. 23 As the principal complainant, Sulpicius had the honor of opening the trial. According to Cicero who is our only source for the content of the prosecution speeches Sulpicius attacked not Murena, but Cicero first Sulpicius believed he needed to we aken the sway that Cicero as con sul, would have over the jurors; he needed to undermine Cicero A s a political ally of Sulpicius who had rallied support for him during the elections, Cicero should not, argued Sulpicius, desert his friend now ( Mur. 7 8). Sulpicius hoped to show that Cicero was inconsistent, a char ge that would throw him in stark relief against Cato, 21 He simultaneously minimizes the authority of Cato and Sulpicius, Stem 2006, 213 22 Freese 1930 xx xxi and Quint. Inst. 6.1.35. Prill 1986 102 103 argues that esponsible for an exordium that Stem 2006, 212 notes, e rested on expediency, not guilt or innocence ( Flac 98). Here, Cicero also claims that the vote to acquit was unanimous. 23 More detailed information about the prosecution spee ches, the responses by Hortensi u s and Crassus, and the testimonies given are of fered by Husband 1916 Ayers 1954 and Alexander 2002, 121 127
65 famous for his integrity and constancy Sulpicius focused his attack against Murena on character, arguing that Muren a was a man who would resort to bribery and that his conduct was so reprehensible that he could not possibly be elected to office unless he bought his votes. bad character rested in his presumed mis conduct in Asia, a province known fo r inducing men to luxury and immoral behavior (11 12, 20). Sulpicius then compared Murena to himself in a contentio dignitatis in an effort to show that he would have the favor of the voters and not Murena. A key point in his argument was that voters favored candidates of noble birth; since Sulpicius was a patrician and Murena a plebeian, Sulpicius should have had the advantage (15, 17). Murena could only overcome that advantage by bribing the electorate. Sulpicius furthered his argument by tracing the history of electoral success es he had against Murena for the qu a estorship and the praetorship. 24 Success in the consular elections should have followed those previous successes (18, 35). Moreover, while Murena had been abroad sullying his reputation in Asi a, Sulpicius was in Rome ma king a name for himself in the f orum (18 23). As the first speaker, Sulpicius presumably outlined the charges of bribery as well. 25 The taking of evide nce and the speeches of the two junior prosecutors ( subscriptores ) 24 Murena and Sulpicius both stood for the qu a estorship in 74 and the praetorship in 65. In both election s Sulpicius received the required number of votes to secure election before Murena did. 25 Cicero and Hortensius began their professional relationship as opponents in the trial of Publius Quinctius in 81 or 80 BCE. On the trial, see Alexander 1990, 65 trial no. 126 n. 1. Cicero prosecuted Verres, defended by Hortensius, in 70. Hortensius and Cicero worked together as advocates for Rabirius (65), Murena (63), P. Sulla (62), Flaccus (59), P. Sestius (56). In all the se trials, Hortensius yielded the right to speak last to Cicero, indicating that Cicero was the superior orator.
66 Gaius Postumus (Postumus) and Servius Sulpicius Rufus (Servius) followed Of these speeches, little is known but we can reconstruct the following information Postumus discussed his fami he joined the prosecution not out of any hatred for Murena, but rather out of regard for the law (56). of money. Su ch an amount of money would only be ready in cash if it were being used illegally. T hese agents were taken into custody and p erhaps informed against Murena to avoid prosecution (54). However, that these men were informers depends upon the reading of de dev isorum indiciis If read as the disclosures of the financial agents, Cicero would be responding to evidence given by informants. 26 If Cicero instead means that Postumus spoke about then perhaps Postumus did no t have testimony to support his charges against Murena, but rather more circumstantial evidence aimed at creating guilt by association 27 speech, Cicero attests only to a charge about the centuries of the equites (54). Servius presumably arg ued that Murena had been especially active in canvassing the equites who voted early in the election and could sway the centuries that voted after them. Murena attempted to garner their support by inviting them to dinners and by giving them seats at the games acts that were both in violation of the Tullian Law (73). Crassus responded to both of the junior prosecutors, and the taking of further evidence may have followed his speech. 26 Translation by MacDonald 1982 27 Translation by Husband 1916 109 who believes this is the s tronger reading.
67 The final speech of the prosecution was delivered by Cato, whom Cicero ca lled the root and core of the whole prosecution. 28 Cato spoke last as the most influential of the prosecution team. auctoritas at the time is evident in the sway he held over the senate a few weeks later during the debate concerning the punishment of the Catilinarian conspirators. It was not Cicero but Cato, who finally argument for clemency. 29 competed with Cicero Cicero woul d attempt to influence the jurors. 30 Like Sulpicius, Cato presented little specific, concrete evidence that Murena committed bribery. He attacked Cicero hoping like Sulpicius to deflate Cicero Cicero (3): 31 Negat fuisse rectum Cato me et consulem et legis ambitus latorem et tam severe gesto consulatu causam L. Murenae attingere. Cato says that it was not a right act because I am consul, have carried a law against elector al corruption and have displayed such severity during my consulship. Rectum the word Cicero translation of the Greek 32 Rectum represents a duty or obligation to act in a correct wa Cicero it to appeal to Stoic sensibilities of absolute right and wrong and to make general, philosophical arguments about universal themes. On 28 Fundamentum ac robus totius accusationis (58). 29 Sal. Cat. 52 55; Ayers 1954 248 30 This is a normal feature of Roman legal speeches, and Cicero uses this tactic in Sul. 2 and Arch 14 and 28 See Paterson 2004 82 31 See also Mur. 6 and 67. 32 See Cic. Off. 1.8.
68 specifics, C that no popularity could come from service in Asia anyway since the Asians fought like women (31) and that Murena was a dancer (13) Cato also declared that the s enatorial support for the Tulli an Law was in effect a declaration of the senate and Murena were committing these crimes and a law needed to be passed under which to punish them both (54). Murena hired people to greet him when he returned from Asia and to be present whenever he appeared in public, that he had given out free seats at gladiatorial games, and that he had given free banquets to the public (68, 70, 72 73). Cato concluded his speech with a return t o his Stoic princip l e s. Cato argued that seeking election through bribery, no matter the intent, contradicted any love one might claim for the Republic and that bribery was i ncompatible with the general welfare of the state (74 76, 78). Thus, not have engaged in bribery and Cicero should not defend him Cicero Defense of his Auctoritas The main prosecutors, Sulpicius and Cato both spoke little on the evidence of bribery; this was left to the junior prosecutors Postumus and Servius. Sulpicius spoke e vidence that implied bribery had taken place. Both men, however, attacked Cicero in an effort to discredit the most influential speaker for the defense. The charges against Cicero were that he had betrayed a friend, should not as consul use his influence i n the courts, should not defend someone accused under a law he had proposed, and was acting at odds with his normal moral severity.
69 In response, Cicero focuses his exordium on his own character and service, especially in protecting Rome from Catiline and his conspirators. Cicero uses his introduction and scattered references throughout the speech to reassert his auctoritas and establish his authoritative voice (2): Et quoniam in hoc officio studium meae defensionis ab accusatoribus atque etiam ipsa suscept io causae reprensa est, ante quam pro L. Murena dicere instituo, pro me ipso pauca dicam, non quo mihi potior hoc quidem tempore sit offici mei quam huiusce salutis defensio, sed ut meo facto vobis probato maiore auctoritate ab huius honore fama fortunisqu e omnibus inimicorum impetus propulsare possim. Because in this fulfillment of my obligation I have been attacked by the prosecution for the vigour of my defense and even for the fact that I have s defense, I shall say a few words on my own behalf. I do so, not because I fee l at this moment that self justification is more important than acquittal of my client, but so that by winning your approval for my conduct I may be able to repel with greater a uthority the attacks of his enemies upon his public honour, his good name and his whole position. 33 With these words Cicero sets forth the purpose of his exordium His appeal to the jurors relies less on praising them and more on convincing them to yield to his auctoritas 34 By doing this he obviates the auctoritas the jurors will act as if persuaded and will defer to his judgment. Cicero acknowledges this when he tells the jurors that he intends to use his maior auctoritas greater authority to defend Murena. Furthermore, Hortensius and Crassus presented Cicero is free to 33 Text: Clark 1905 ; translation: MacDonald 1982 34 Cerutti 1996, 101 notes t hat the exordium of Mur. through the use of authority in a judicial context. S ee also Leeman 1982 However, in non forensic speeches, Cicero had already established auctoritas as an important component of his ethos, his ethical auctoritas in Cat. 1, see Batstone 1994 On auctoritas May 1988, esp. 8 12, 49 87 in which May explores this ethos specifically
70 summarily review the main points made by the other two advocates and focus instead on the larger themes and implications of the trial. 35 Cicero justification of his advocacy and assertion of his authority in effect replace any argument for acquittal, but to accomplish his goals Cicero must address the complaints of Su lpicius and Cato and renew the fear of Catiline he had so successfully aroused in the first and second speech es Against Catiline Cicero Sulpicius attempted to undermine Cicero influence by casting doubts on his respect for the bo nds of political friendship ( amicitia ). Cicero handles this charge quickly. He reminds the jurors and Sulpicius that he zealously and eagerly assisted Sulpiciu s in his canvass and candidacy but that this is another matter (7). Su l picius lost the election, and Cicero cannot help him acquire the consulship at the expense of an innocent man. Cicero claims that he would defend even a stranger against a friend, provided that the stranger be innocent (8). Murena, however, is no stranger; in fact, Murena is also a friend of Cicero Although the friendship with Murena could be put Cicero could not do the same in so important a trial. 36 By putting aside such a close friendship to defend Murena, Cicero implies that Murena is innocent He is guided by his integrity and respect for innocence, not by emotional appeals to friendship. 35 Cicero acknowledges this at Mur. 48: Atque ex omnibus illa plaga est iniect a petitioni tuae non tacente me maxima, de qua ab homine ingeniosissimo et copiosissimo,
71 Cicero defends his auctoritas against Sulpicius once more when he addresses a charge Sulpicius formally leveled against Murena, but which would have resonated against Cicero as well. Sulpicius argued that he surpasses Murena in worth because he comes from a consular family and Murena is a plebeian. Cicero reminds Sulpicius that family had produced many great Romans though none were consuls (15). Furthermore, Cicero C icero himself a new man, the son of a Roman equ es would not expect accusers to speak against the newness of family around him. A jury composed mostly of equites and tribuni aerarii probably sympathized with Cicero he opened the consulship to new men, a return to how the consulship had been among their ancestors. Cicero reminds the jurors that since he defeated two men of noble birth Catiline and Publius Sulpicius Galba (Galba) to become consul, there is no reason Murena could not do the same against Catiline and Sulpicius (17). Cicero surpassed Catiline in worth and Galba in popularity; Murena too surpassed Catiline in worth, Sulpicius in popularity. As Cicero s family, he proposes other considerations, especially frightening threats to Rome. Not only does Cicero want two consuls in office on January 1, he wants them to be consuls able to defend Rome against Catiline. Cicero proposes Murena as the superior choic e by 20). While Sulpicius endured the folly of the crowds and served the will of others in Rome, Murena commanded an army, fought in battle against the enemy, and put the enemy to rout.
72 Cicero grants that sometimes a consul needs to be able to sway the minds of the senate and people, but a consul must also be able to control the tribunes, calm the excited masses, and resist corruption (24). As consul, Cicero he requisite skills come from military service. The skills Sulpicius has acquired in his profession are those of arguing over trivial differences in wording and settling disputes through technicalities (26 29). Cicero offers a few examples of the type of a rgumentation men like Sulpicius are accustomed to make, and the humor these Lest Cicero accidently diminish his own statue by attacking the legal profession, he reminds Sulpicius and the jurors that there is a difference between a lawyer and an orator. Cicero profession serve to balance the terms of the contentio dignitatis but the specific way in which he elevates Murena plays into his larger theme of fear. He establishes Murena as an able bodied military commander and then drums up the threat of the Catilinarian conspiracy, necessitating the need for such a commander. Part of this tactic involves Cicero invit es the jurors to reflect on Mithridates power how he tried to unite the Atlantic and the Black Sea under his one kingdom, and his attempts to join his fo rces with those of Sertorius (32 ). Furthermore, the Roman people would not have given such great honors to Lucius Licinius Lucullus (Lucullus) nor would they have entrusted command to Pompey if Mithridates were n ot a serious threat to Rome. Cicero
73 during his service in the East; he implies that since Murena served as a legate against such an enemy, he must have shown himself to be courageous, skilled, and determine d (34). Cicero present at the trial, his public dispatches of praise were entered into evidence, and he may have given testimony (20). Once Cicero has established Murena as an integral player in abating the threat of Mithridates and alleviating that fear for the Roman people, he argues that Murena would do that same in regards to Catiline. Sulpicius, on the other hand, through his neglect and abandonment of his canvass while pursuing Mur ena in court, made the Roman people fear lest Catiline win the consulship (48). To minimize that risk, anyone who wished to repel Catiline supported Murena (52); not even Catiline considered Sulpicius his competitor (49). Cicero allows him to make trustworthy claims about He reprises many arguments from the first two speeches Against Catiline to remind the jurors of the extent of the threat posed by Catiline. Take the meeting of N ovember 6 that Cicero revealed to the senate two days later (50): 37 Quibus rebus qui timor bonis omnibus iniectus sit quantaque desperatio rei publicae, si ille factus esset, nolite a me commoneri velle; vosmet ipsi vobiscum recordamini. Meministis enim, cu m illius nefarii gladiatoris voces percrebruissent quas habuisse in contione domestica dicebatur, cum miserorum fidelem defensorem negasset inveniri posse nisi eum qui ipse miser esset; integrorum et fortunatorum promissis saucios et miseros credere non op ortere; qua re qui consumpta replere, erepta reciperare vellent, spectarent quid ipse deberet, quid possideret, quid auderet; minime 37 The dating of the events leading up to Against Catiline 1 and of the speech itself are insecure. I follow Dyck 2008 xvii, 243 244
74 timidum et valde calamitosum esse oportere eum qui esset futurus dux et signifer calamitosorum. Do not ask me to remind you of the fear that was inspired in all loyal citizens by these events or the despair that overtook the Republic at the Recall it for yourselves. You remember how the report of a speech which that evil cut throat was said t o have made in a meeting at his home spread throughout the city: that the only trustworthy protector of the poor able to be found was poor himself; that broken men and those down on their luck should not trust the promises of the prosperous and successful; that those who wished to replace what they had spent and to recover what had been taken from them had only to consider the debts; that the man who was to be the standard bearer and leader of ruined men should himself be the least timid and the most comple tely ruined. By asking the jurors to remember for themselves the fear and desperation that fell upon the citizens of Rome, Cicero taps into the emotional register of each listener. As boni themselves, that fear is their own, that desperation is their own. Cicero ramps up the emotional tone by speaking for Catiline, calling Catiline a wicked gladiator and characterizing the meeting at the house of Marcus Laeca with the oxymoron contio domestica. The subversion of a public address for private purposes underm ines the social fabric of the Roman political system and threatens the social hierarchies reinforced by the contio 38 These social hierarchies are further threatened by the notion that debts should be cancelled and that only the poor can champion the poor. invites them to remember the details of that meeting: Catiline had divided up the territories of Italy, had marked regions of the city for fire, and had found men to kill Cicer o later that very night. 39 Because the conspirators made a direct attempt on Cicero primary authority on the severity of the threat. Unlike 38 On the contio see Morstein Marx 2004 and Tan 2008 39 Cic. Cat. 1.9 and Sal. Cat. 27.2 4.
75 the rest of the Romans, who are threatened as a group, he has been singled out. This assa plans. Cicero called for a delay in the consular elections, during which delay he delivered Against Catiline 1 and 2. In the second speech, a contio Cicero detailed the chara 10). Cicero On Behalf of Murena 50 recalls the more detailed description of his previous speech. When Cicero calls Catiline a gladiator, he hearkens back to the school of gladiators of Against Catiline 2 ( in ludo gladiatorio 2.9). The cancellation of debts reminds the jurors that Catiline attracted every person not only in Rome but in the whole of Italy who was overwhelmed by debt ( Catil. 2.8). With the speeches delivered and elections resumed, all who wished to beat away the plague of Catiline turned towards Murena and Murena won ( Mur 52). Cicero influence that electoral bribery might have had on the elections otherwise. Alt hough the people reacted appropriately to the state of fear inspired by Catiline and elected Murena, the senate, says Cicero did not do enough, even after Catiline incriminated himself (51): Congemuit senatus frequens neque tamen satis severe pro rei indignitate decrevit; nam partim ideo fortes in decernendo non erant, quia nihil timebant, partim, quia
76 acknowledges that too much fear can be paralyzing. 40 Cicero and the Roman voters, however, found the courage to act. Cicero donned his military garb and went down to the Campus Martius; when the people of Rome saw their consul in fear and dang er, they rushed to his aid (52). They saw that Sulpicius was too busy with his prosecution and so put their hopes in Murena. Cicero presents Murena as the leader for those who want to fight back, who do not want to freeze or flee in the face of danger. Cic ero provides the jurors with a similar agency: by voting for acquittal they can be instrumental in protecting their own lives and liberties. Cicero Unlike Sulpicius, who attacked Cicero for failing in his duties as a fr ie nd, Cato attacke d Cicero 's consular responsibility. Cato argued that i t was wrong for Cicero to bring his consular authority to bear in a forensic case. Cicero does not remind the jurors or Cato that i t was normal for magistrates, even consuls, to take part in forensic tr ials during their terms, but common practice was on his side: no law prevented Cicero from serving as an advocate while consul. In fact he had already done so in the defense of Gaius Rabirius and possibly Gaius Calpunius Piso. 41 Likewise, in 95, the consul Lucius Licinius Crassus defended Quintus Servilius Caepio. 42 Cicero does, however, argue that the consul is the perfect person to defend a consul elect, for who else ought to defend him than the man who declared him consul and who is most concerned for the future 40 This passage alludes to Cic. Cat 1.30, when he accuses certain senators of pretending not to believe in the conspiracy and of urging Catiline on wit h their weak decisions: Quamquam non nulli sunt in hoc ordine qui aut ea quae imminent non videant aut ea quae vident dissimulent; qui spem Catilinae mollibus sententiis aluerunt coniurationemque nascentem non credendo conroboraverunt. 41 Evidence that Cice ro spoke in defense of Piso: Cic. Flac. 98 and Sal. Cat. 49.2. 42 See Alexander 1990, 45 46 trial no. 88.
77 welfare of the Republic (3)? To emphasize his point, Cicero calls directly upon the very auctoritas Cato claimed he abuses (4): Ac si, ut non nullis in civitatibus fieri solet, patronus huic causae publice constitueretur, is potissimum summo honore adfecto defensor daretur qui eodem honore praeditus non minus adferret ad dicendum auctoritatis quam facultatis. If, as is the practice in some states, an advocate were officially appointed for this case, it would be most appropriate that a man elected to the highest office should be granted counsel who by virtue of holding that same office would plead with as much authority as eloquence. Cicero defend consuls, that the experience of a consul would make him the perfect choice. He would by the very nature of his position use his authority appropriately. He also acknowledg es that in court authority can be as important as and perhaps more important than oratorical skill and argumentation. Cicero then invokes the metaphor of the ship of state to support this claim (4): Quod si e portu solventibus ei qui iam in portum ex alt o invehuntur praecipere summo studio solent et tempestatum rationem et praedonum et locorum, quod natura adfert ut eis faveamus qui eadem pericula quibus nos perfuncti sumus ingrediantur, quo tandem me esse animo oportet prope iam ex magna iactatione terra m videntem in hunc cui video maximas rei publicae tempestates esse subeundas? Sailors who are just putting into harbour from the high seas are usually eager to give those weighing anchor an account of storms, pirates and places of danger, because nature in clines us to help those who are entering the dangers through which we have ourselves passed. Such, I can tell you, are the feelings that I, who am now in sight of land after a severe buffeting, have for this man who has to face the most violent political s torms. Cicero like the helmsman of a ship coming into harbor, knows how to judge the risks ahead for the incoming consul. 43 Cicero applies diction of sea travel, inherently 43 For the ship of state allegory in Cicero, see Innes 1987 322 This allegory first a ppears in extant literature in Alcaeus frs. 6, 208, and 249. Aeschylus opens Seven Against Thebes with Eteocles affirming
78 the fears related to dangers ( pericula ), storms ( tempestates ), and pirates ( praedones ) to bear on the political climate of Rome. The consul must guide the Republic safely though the troubled waters of political unrest, waters haunted by the pirate Catiline 44 By synecdoche, the safety of the helmsman becomes the safety of the ship; the safety of the consul becomes the safety of the state. Cicero has already avoided an assassination attempt, and now Murena must sail through the waters of prosecution before he can sail through a difficult consulship ahead. Without its helmsman its consul the ship of the Roman Republic will crash upon the crags of conspiracy. Cicero alone understands the true dangers that the new consul must face. He alone can judge who is prepa red to handle this task, and that person is Murena. Cicero returns to this metaphor in his peroratio this time speaking directly to Cato (81): Atque ad haec mala, iudices, quid accedat aliud non videtis? Te, te appello, Cato; nonne prospicis tempestatem anni tui? Do you not see, gentlemen, what further disaster is being added to this list? It is you, Cato, you to whom I am speaking. Do you not look out to a storm in your year of office? On December 10, Cato would enter his term as tribune, and one of his colleagues, Quintus Caecilius Metellus Nepos (Metellus), had embarked on a campaign against Cicero and was rousing up the people to recall Pompey to Rome to handle the his duty to direct the ship of state (1 4). Plato compares the governing a Republic to directing a ship through troubled waters ( Rep. 6.488). The allegory also appears in Hor. Od. 1.14. 44 On the imagery or pirates (and bandits in general) in Ciceronian oratory, see Habinek 2001 69 87
79 Catilinarian conspirators. 45 According to Cicero the good men of Rome invited Cato to st and for the tribuneship specifically to oppose Metellus (81). Whatever evils already await the state, Metellus would make them worse, and Cato should welcome a consul like Murena, not reject him. In this regard, Cicero shows remarkable foresight. In late 6 3, perhaps before but probably after this trial and after the execution of the Catilinarian conspirators, Metellus used armed men, gladiators and slaves to help push through his proposal to recall Pompey and his army. 46 In 62, the violence of Metellus agai nst Cato reached such a head that Murena personally defended Cato against physical attacks by Metellus and his supporters. 47 Cicero attaches the threat posed by Metellus to that of Catiline to create an image of storms attacking the state from every directi on and to link the safety of Murena not only to himself, but also to Cato. Cicero claims that the enemies of Rome who wish to remove Murena from the guardianship of the Republic would remove Cato as well if only they could contrive to do so (82). He streng thens this Vident quantum in te sit animi, quantum ingeni, quantum auctoritatis, quantum rei publicae praesidi; sed, cum consulari auctoritate et auxilio spoliatam vim tribuniciam viderint, tum se facilius inermem et debilitatum te oppressuros arbitrantur. They see the extent of your courage, of your ability, your authority, and the deprived of the and unarmed he will be crushed more easily. 45 See Plut. Cat. army to Rome, see Gruen 1974, 58, 83 84, 289, 440 After his inauguration, Metellus Nepos attacked Cicero for improperly executing the Catilinarian conspirators and prevented Cicero from addressing the people on his last day in office. 46 See also Cic. Sest. 62, Dio 37.42 43, and Plut. Cat. Jul. 16. 47 Plut. Cat. 26
80 Cato cannot provide sufficient protection for the Republic. Only a second consul can provide that surety, and the enemies of Rome know that there will n ot be time to elect a replacement for Murena before they strike. This discussion of tribunicial and consular authority reminds the jurors of Cicero Cicero auctoritas not his argument, that Cicero fears. Cicero auctoritas three times in two sections the term only appears fifteen times in the entire spee ch. 48 He begs the jurors not to let Although Cicero at first seems to he takes a different stance. He claims that it is not the use of a uthority in the courts that is wrong, but rather the use of authority in prosecution. He reminds the jurors that popular opinion is on his side with two historical exempla: the people did not allow the authority of even Scipio Aemilianus to overwhelm Luciu s Aurelius Cotta, nor did they allow the authority of Cato the Elder to overwhelm the defense of Servius Sulpicius Galba. Here, Cicero appeals to the vanity of the jurors and binds their opinion to his own (59): Semper in hac civita te nimis magnis accusatorum opibus et populus universus et sapientes ac multum in posterum prospicientes iudices restiterunt. Nolo accusator in iudicium potentiam adferat, non vim maiorem aliquam, non auctoritatem excellentem, non nimiam gratiam. In Rome, the whole people and its wise and far sighted jurors have always resisted prosecutors with too much power. I do not like a prosecutor to come into court with overweening power, an excessive force, overwhelming influence or too much popularity. 48 2, 4, 13, 33, 38, 47, 58 (twice), 59, 67, 73, 74, 82, 86, 90. Citations were found with a morphological search of the PHI disk 5 using Diogenes 3.1.6 for Mac.
81 Such assets, says Cicero should only be used to protect the innocent. Cicero anticipates the objection some jurors might have that Cato would only use his authority in this way if he truly believed Murena was guilty. It would be unjust for the opinion of a prosecutor to carry the weight of a full legal investigation before one were conducted (60). 49 Cicero presents his use of auctoritas contentio auctoritatis to contentio dignitatis On the latter, Cicero standing with a humorous attack not against Sulpicius himself, but against his vocational field of jurisprudence (19 21). The trial of Murena rests as much on wheth er Cato or Cicero could sway the jurors as whether Sulpicius or Murena could sway the voters. For Cicero Stoic principles. Cicero departing momentarily from his fear and playing on a different emotional register. Throughout sections 58 83, Cicero unrealistic. The attack falls primarily on Stoicism and not on Cato himself, who was an important ally of Cicero Cicero 65); Stoics in general are reasonable, but Cato misunderstands their teaching (62, 65 49 Despite making a name for himself as a prosecutor against Verres ( Ver. 1 2) Cicero generally held to this principle in his own conduct, only once serving as a prosecutor du ring or after his consular year (among known speeches). In 52 or 51, Cicero accused Titus Munatius Plancus Bursa on charges of political violence ( vis ) for burning down the senate house. Cato served as a juror and prevented Pompey from giving a speech of p extant ; see Alexander 1990, 159 trial no. 327.
82 mos maiorum (66). 50 Embraced in this section of the speech is Cicero levied by Cat o against Murena (67 inconsistent with Roman practice because he has deduced from common practice, not specific behavior, that inappropriate behavior has taken place. Only someone as severe as Cato would think i t impossible for so many men to come to greet a candidate for the consulship on his return from the province without being bribed (68) or that they would follow him to Rome (70). Cicero claims that Cato would deprive the lower classes of their right to sho w their love for Murena (71) and would deny them their customary spectacles (72). 51 Cicero puts the burden of proof that these things were done illegally instead of according to Roman custom on Cato and Sulpicius and declares that Murena is protected by the authority of the senate ( ab senatus auctoritate ) against unsupported charges of bribery (73). His humor makes room for Murena and his supporters to follow Roman custom more closely than they follow the letter of the law, and he brings this point home when he reminds Cato not to be, as Craig puts it, more Stoic than Roman (74 76). 52 Before Cicero transitions from his humorous take on Stoicism back to fear 50 Craig 1986 especially 232 See also Stem 2006 51 Leeman 1982 223 We should note, however, that it is impossible to prove that something did not happen, and unless Cato and Sulpicius really did have the lacuna between se ctions 72 and 73 and we can only speculate as to whether Cicero offered any evidence of innocence in the missing text. 52 Craig 1986 238 Cicero uses the exemplum of Quintus Aelius Tubero to make his point.
83 'Quippe' inquit 'tu mihi summum imperium, tu summam auctoritatem, tu gubernacula rei publicae petas fovendis hominum sensibus et deleniendis animis et adhibendis voluptatibus? Vtrum lenocinium' inquit 'a grege delicatae iuventutis, an orbis terrarum imperi um a populo Romano petebas?' Horribilis oratio; sed eam usus, vita, mores, civitas ipsa respuit. Am I, says he, going to have you seek supreme power, supreme bewitching their minds and plying them with pleasures? Were you asking, he says, a gang of spoilt youths for a job as a pimp or the Roman people for world dominion? What marvelous talk! It is repugnant to our practice, our lives, our customs, the very spirit of Rome herself. appetites. Cicero quiets that fear by reminding Cato and the jurors that Romans know how to separate their times for work and their times for play. Rome herself spits on such an allegation that a Roman could not both enjoy himself and govern well. Cato wastes his energy an d his severity on such unimportant concerns. Cicero on the other hand, presents real sources of fear. Cato is mistaken in thinking that his prosecution benefits the Republic (78). While Cato frets about banquets, spectacles, and crowds, Cicero worries abo laughter quickly gives way to fear as Cicero Stoic principles to the turmoil in Rome (78): Audite, audite consulem, iudices, nihil dicam adrogantius, tantum dicam totos dies atque n octes de re publica cogitantem! Non usque eo L. Catilina rem publicam despexit atque contempsit ut ea copia quam secum eduxit se hanc civitatem oppressurum arbitraretur. Latius patet illius sceleris contagio quam quisquam putat, ad pluris pertinet. Intus, intus, inquam, est equus Troianus; a quo numquam me consule dormientes opprimemini. Listen, gentlemen, listen to a consul I shall not claim too much but this much I shall say a consul who spends all his days and nights thinking about the Republic! Lucius C atilina did not so despise and disregard the Republic as to think that he would overthrow our institutions with the force that marched out with him. The infection of his crime is more widely spread and affects more people than anyone imagines. The Trojan h orse is within
84 our walls, yes, within our very walls; but never while I am consul will you be surprised in your sleep. His tone becomes urgent with his repeated imperatives. As consul, Cicero seems to have special knowledge of the conspiracy, and he demand s that the jurors yield to his authority, that they trust him when he says that the threat is real. As Paterson notes, Cicero more palatable to the jurors. 53 He thereby makes t he jurors more susceptible to his fear mongering. Cicero capitalizes on three elements of the Catilinarian threat that make the risk seem great: unfamiliarity, catastrophic proportion, and irreversibility. 54 No one except Cicero can imagine how serious the threat is. The image of the Trojan horse calls to mind total destruction, indiscriminate in its target. Women, children, men, and slaves all suffered when Troy fell. Furthermore, the Romans as inheritors of the Trojan tradition should be especially sensit ive to the parallel between the Trojan horse and the Catilinarian conspiracy. They should be ever vigilant, like Cicero against the threat hiding in their midst. Cicero draws back, however, and assures his listeners that the threat is under control. He mu st walk a careful line: the threat must be real, but it must be manageable. He presents himself as the very person capable of managing that threat, but his assurance comes with a caveat. The Romans will not be surprised in their sleep so long as Cicero is consul. In the context of the current speech, no one could miss the implication: Cicero 53 Paterson 2004 91 54 On risk perception, see Gardner 2008, 65 66
85 the jurors to ask themselves who could take over that role, who could be entrusted to safeguard the city. While Cicero throws back in made light of Catiline in his own speech (79): Quaeris a me ecquid ego Catilinam metuam. You ask me what I fear in Catiline. Apparently, p conspiracy. Cato must have recognized the threat, but subordinated it to the concern for upholding the law. Cicero threat to the lives of Roman citizens trumps the theoretical threat to the stability of the state posed by bribery. Cicero Cicero to dismiss the very fear of Catiline he just aroused. He claims t hat he has taken supporters still in the city, Cicero repeats, are a cause for alarm. In the lull between Catiline leaving the city and definitively taking up arms to march on Rome, Cicero does not want the jurors to fall into a false sense of security as Cato has. Cicero then empowers the jurors to help Cicero secure their own safety by acquitting Murena (79): Quorum ego ferrum et audaciam reieci in campo, debilitavi in foro, compressi etiam domi meae saepe, iudices, his vos si alterum consulem tradideritis, plus multo erunt vestris sententiis quam suis gladiis consecuti. Magni interest, iudices, id quod ego multis repugnantibus egi atque perfeci, esse Kalendis Ianuari is in re publica duo consules. If you hand over one of the two consuls to these men whose armed aggression, gentlemen, I have repelled in the Campus Martius, crippled in the Forum, crushed time and again in my own home, they will have achieved much more by your verdict than by their own daggers. It is vital gentlemen, that there be two consuls in the State on the 1 st of January and
86 that is what in the face of strong opposition I have worked so hard to achieve. This call to action directly invites the jurors to put their own best interest their safety and that of the Republic consuls on the first of January from section 5 provides closure to the confutatio as Cicero begins the transition into a pero ratio wholly unconcerned with the charges. When Cicero is done with Cato three sections later, he returns again to this agency, reminding the jurors that the power rests with them (83). Cicero was on the grounds that Cicero had proposed the Tullian Law on Electoral Bribery (3). Cicero responds that he does not defend actions done contrary to the law; he maintains that nothing illegal was done (5). Therefore, his role in proposing the law is no obstacle to his advocacy. Accor ding to Roman custom, as the auctor of the Tullian Law, Cicero formally possesses auctoritas to speak about bribery. If anyone should recognize a violation of this law, it should be Cicero (67): Quid accusas, Cato, quid adfers ad iudicium, quid arguis? Amb itum accusas; non defendo. Me reprehendis, quod idem defendam quod lege punierim. Punivi ambitum, non innocentiam; ambitum vero ipsum vel tecum accusabo, si voles. What accusation do you make, Cato, what allegation are you bringing into court, what is your charge? Bribery? I do not defend it. You censure me for defending the very offence for which I have fixed penalties in my law. I fixed penalties for bribery, not for innocence. I shall certainly join you in prosecuting a real case of bribery, if you wish. Cicero uses his matter of perfectly capable of distinguishing bribery from innocence. By offering to join Cato in prosecuting real cases of bribery, Cicero le aligning himself on the side of law and order. After all, whether anything was done
87 contrary to the law is heatedly debated ( vehementer quaeritur ), but as Cicero said before, no one would doubt that such things were carried out against the law if they w ere carried out. Elsewhere, Cicero behavior in prosecuting an innocent man and even in demanding that Cicero propose the legislation in the first place. According to Cicero the new punishments for bribery 47). Cicero motives in demanding that Cicero propose such a law when his candidatur e was beginning to fail. Cicero charges Sulpicius with abandoning his attempts at a proper canvass in favor of seeking the consulship through the courts. The people, he argues, Sed tota illa lex accusationem tuam, s i haberes nocentem reum, fortasse armasset; petitioni vero refragata est. That law as a whole would perhaps have put teeth into your prosecution, if you had a guilty defendant; but in fact it wrecked your campaign. By turning to the courts, Sulpicius admitted defeat and lost whatever popularity he had among the voters. Furthermore, many Romans were indignant that Sulpicius demanded such serious penalties for bribery (47) and thereby struck a heavy blow at his own hop es of success (48). On the charge of severity, Cato claimed that the defense of Murena conflicted with Cicero Catiline from the city. Cicero responds that severity is not his default mo de. The character of severity and seriousness is one he readily shoulders when the Republic demands it of him although he is by nature inclined towards clemency and leniency. The
88 peril Rome faced when Catiline was in the city compelled Cicero to be severe: he was as severe as he was forced to be, not as he wished to be (6). Since Murena poses no threat to the security of Rome, Cicero finds no reason to be severe with him. More important to Cicero advocating for Murena is his duty to his fellow man. His good will towards Murena ought to move the good will of the jurors as well. At the close of the exordium he claims he would be arrogant if he failed the consul (10): Ego vero, iudices, ipse me existimarem nefa rium si amico, crudelem si misero, superbum si consuli defuissem. For my part, gentlemen, I would think myself beyond t he pale had I failed a friend, hard hea r ted had I failed a man in trouble, arrogant had I failed a consul. With consuli Cicero refers to Murena, but the lack of specification leaves room for Cicero to imply that failing the consul is failing himself; additionally, the mere mention of the office reminds the jurors that Cicero is the current consul. His tone elevates his role from that of a mere advocate to that of a man acting in accordance with what is truly Cicero complementary roles as consul and as the defender of Rome against Catiline rely on and contribute to his ability to evoke fear in the jurors. As the proposer of the Tullian Law on electoral b ribery and as a good political ally to Murena and Sulpicius, Cicero abates any fears that Murena has acted contrary to the laws or that he, Cicero has abandoned his principle s. Together, these sources of authority allow Cicero to promote Murena as the perfect choice for the consul who must stand against Catiline and protect Rome. As consul and defender of the state, Cicero plays on the fear of Catiline to misdirect attention from the judicial question onto the political one: does
89 Rome need a consul on the first of January, even at the cost of a fair election? Cicero answer is a definitive yes. 55 Mure na in this case, they would not only condemn Mure na, they would put him to death. Cicero begs the jurors not to play into the hands of the conspirators. In the peroratio Cicero returns to his authority as consul (86): vos pro mea summa et vobis cognita in re publica diligentia moneo, pro auctoritate consulari hortor, pro magnitudine periculi obtestor, ut otio, ut paci, ut saluti, ut vitae vestrae et ceterorum civium consulatis. As a notable and ardent patriot I warn you, with my authority as consul I exhor t you, alert to the extent of the danger I implore you, to assure tranquility, peace, security, your own lives and those of other citizens. Cicero as consul, is the ultimate authority to judge the severity of the dangers that face Rome. His personal exper ience authority. W ho better could know how real the threat is than a man whom Catiline tried to assassinate and who has uncovered the entire plot? Cicero knows Rome needs a protector in the pe rson of a second consul, Murena. Cicero closes his confutatio by mixing the allegory of the ship of state with his When he previously employed the ship metaphor, he spoke generally of the dangers of the consulship, leaving unsaid but impl ied that the Catilinarian conspiracy made these dangers all the greater. Now, he turns to Cato, tribune elect for 62 (81): nonne prospicis tempestatem anni tui? Iam enim
90 quo a L. Catilina et Cn. Pisone initum consilium senatus interficiendi scitis esse, in hos dies, i n hos mensis, in hoc tempus erumpunt. Do you not look out to a storm in your year of office? meeting there was already thundering the sinister voice of one, a tribune designate like yourself, against whom your own decision and all the loyal citizens who urged you to stand for the tribunate have taken elaborate precautions. All the plots hatched over the past three years, ever since the time when, as you know, Lucius Catilina and Gnaeus Piso formed a plan to massacre the Senate, are com ing to the boil during these days, these months, this very moment. Cicero demands that Cato acknowledge the palpable danger that he and the other Roman senators face. He shames Cato, putting on display his cavalier attitude towards the conspiracy in blocki He casts Cato as a pawn in the Republic bereft of a consul while warning Cato that the conspirators will turn on him and that he is paving the way for his own destruction (82). Cicero also stresses t hat the conspirators are only beginning to act: the worst is yet ahead. New, bigger, unparalleled dangers await the magistrates about to embark on their offices. Not only are these dangers novel, they are irreversible (84): In discrimen extremum venimus; n ihil est iam unde nos reficiamus aut ubi lapsi resistamus. We have come to the end of the road. There is no longer any reserve from which to make good our losses or place in which to rise again when we have fallen. The jurors must decide on behalf of the R epublic how to react to the threat before them. Cicero reminds them that the enemy is not on the banks of the Anio, as Hannibal was, but rather in Rome itself, in the f orum, in the sacred temples, and in the very senate house. Cicero renews the alarm of Against Catiline 1 that Catiline would dare enter the senate house ( Catil. 1. 2) and is planning the destruction of the world, the city, and the government (9). The narrowing of the focus from the city to the senate house is
91 reversed a section later, when C icero expands the lens from the local level to encompass the whole of Italy ( Mur. 85): illa pestis immanis importuna Catilinae prorumpet, qua po minatur; in agros suburbanos repente advolabit; versabitur
92 enemy was so great that only Pompey could be entrusted with delivering the finishing blow (34). By establishing Mithridates as a serious threat to the safety of Rome, Cicero elevates the virtues of those who stood against him, including the elder Lucius M urena and his son, Cicero which was a great aid for him in attracting the good will of the people and in winning the election (38). Sulpicius, on the other hand, has no distinguished milita ry service to Catiline. Cicero shifts attention away from the crime of electoral bribery and onto the Catilinarian conspiracy. The threat of leaving bribery unpunished pales in comparison to the threat of handicapping Rome with only one consul on the first of January. Cicero closes wit h one final appeal to his authority and with a vision of Murena standing firm against Catiline (90): Quem ego vobis, si quid habet aut momenti commendatio aut auctoritatis confirmatio mea, consul consulem, iudices, ita commendo
93 virtues necessary for the service of the Republic The final image of Murena versus the conspirators arouses fear of rebellion, conspiracy, and collapse, but offers Murena as the hope for the suppression of such threats and for the salvation of the state. Cicero misuse of his authority to direct attention away from the judicial questi on and onto a political one depends on his ability to arouse this fear, and as the fear incre ased so too did the very aucto r i tas employed to create it. Through this reciprocal cycle, Cicero secures his own prestige
94 CHAPTER 4 CHARACTER ASSASSINAT ION: PHILIPPICS AGAINST M ARCUS ANTONIUS 3 & 4 Character assassination is their s tock and trade. Guilt by association is their motto. They have created such a wave of fear and uncertainty that their attacks upon our liberties go almost unchallenged. Man y people are growing frightened Stop and think where this is leading us. Harry S. Truman, Address at the Dedication of the New Washington Headquarters of the American Legion 1 In his remarks about McCarthyism to the American Legion on August 14, 1951, President Harry S. Truman reveal ed the power of character assassination to inspire a fear so overwhelming that it compels people into submission even though the foundations of their social contract are under attack. In this nationally broadcasted speech, Truman, an American Legion member a nd past recipient of its Distinguished Service Medal addresses the Legion from an ad hoc stand in front of the new Legion offices in Washington, DC. Throughout the speech the President commends his fellow Legionnaires for pledging to defend the Constituti on and urges them to fulfill that promise by taking a stand against those who would use the brand of communism to discredit Americans without any proof of communist sympathies. He presents such behavior as an assault on the Constitution and a misrepresenta tion of Americanism, not an exercise of free speech, but an abuse of it. Truman asks the members of the American Legion to stand up against the hysteria and demand fair play Although the politics of Cold War America and late Republican Rome differ substan tively the McCarthyism against which Truman warns resembles character assassination during the late Republic. Whereas McCarthy might use charges of communist sympathies 1 Truman 1951
95 against his political enemies, someone like Cicero might use charges of regal ambition s or tyrannical sympathies against his. Such character assassination, through the arousal of fear, can override logical argument and blind an audience to fact. In Roman discourse, such character assassination often appears in the for malized rhetoric of in vective. In this field, however, the Romans owe much to the Greeks, who regularly employed abusive lan guage in the courts and in the a ssembly. Language and accusation that we might consider slanderous today were acceptable, even expected additions to argu ments of probability and character. 2 Although Aristotle censures such techniques, Roman authors of rhetorical handbooks recommend such character assassination, a facet of the larger genre of invective. 3 Cicero calls praise and blame ( vituperatio ) the purp ose of epideictic oratory ( Inv 1 .5 ). He also identifies the loci for praise various virtues of the mind, of the body, and of external circumstance and claims those of blame as their op posite (2.117). These principle s upon which arguments can be made ( ar gumentandi ratio 2.118 ) recall those of the anonymous Rhetoric to Herennius dating to the 80s BCE: external circumstances, physical attributes, and qualities of character (3.10 15). The author of the Rhetoric to Herrenius like Cicero expands upon these categories to give examples of praiseworthy traits and notes that their opposites are blameworthy, providing evidence for an established Roman system in which praise and blame are diametrically opposed. 2 See Hunter 1990 ; Carey 1994 ; Worman 2004 3 Arist. Rh. 1415b9.
96 Alt hough the author of the Rhetoric to Herennius and Cicero single out the mind, body, and external circumstance as sources for the material of praise and blame, we should consider invective more broadly. These three loci indeed are so broad that anything a speaker might wish to criticize probably falls within one of them yet Craig, who has published extensively on the loci Any speech that demonstrates in its target the opposite of the four card inal virtues is an invective in its broadest sense. 4 The goal is to demonstrate that elements of a person's mind, body, or external circumstances stand in opposition to the virtues of prudence, justice, self control, and courage. 5 When Cicero attacks Piso for his gluttony and drunkenness, the invective centers on his physical body and highlights his lack of self control ( Pis 13). Yet Roman orators and theorists narrowed the domain of invective to a set of standard loci appropriate for formal invective. C raig has assembled the various loci into one master list of seventeen: embarrassing family origin; being unworthy of one's family; physical appearance; eccentricity of dress; gluttony and drunkenness, possibly leading to acts of crudelitas and libido ; hypo crisy for appearing virtuous; avarice, possibly linked with prodigality; taking bribes; pretentiousness; sexual misconduct; hostility to family ( misophilia ); cowardice in war; squandering of one's patrimony/financial embarrassment; aspiring to regnum or ty ranny associated with vis, libido, superbia, and crudelitas ; cruelty to citizens and allies; plunder of private and public property; and 4 Craig 2004, 189 See also Craig 1990 2007 5 Prudentia, iustitia, temperantia and fortitudo are the standard four cardinal virtues in the Republican era Sometimes, wisdo m ( sapientia ) or reason ( ratio ) replaced prudence. As McDonnell 2006, 129 notes, Cicero regualrly rearranges and redefines these virtues to suit his case.
97 oratorical ineptitude. 6 By adhering to these loci and covering as many as possible, the orator might arouse in the educated audience a connoisseur's appreciation for familiar themes effectively used. 7 The recognitio n of the use of these stock themes would not however, decrease their effectiveness or be considered proof of insincerity. Rather, both the uneducated and educated listener would consider the comparative status of the orator and his victim: whether the statements are true or not, the possibility of veritable assertion elevates the orator and denigrates the object of his invective. Verisimilitude is more im portant than truth, concludes Gotoff. 8 Furthermore, these loci also allow the orator to label h is opponent, Corbeill argues, as someone who stands apart from the community and does not share the values essential to the way a Roman of the late Republic de fined himself in relation to the community. 9 The key function of abusive language such as formal invective was and remains the arousal of emotions. As Arena puts it, highlighting an individual's faults in an abusive or humourous manner provided a powerful means of manipulating the audience's emotions. 10 Doing so successfully requires that the orator establish the victim as a member of the community so that he may be exposed to assault and marginalized, be capable of manipulating emotion, and exploi t those biases already 6 Reproduced from Craig 2004, 190 without his examples keyed from In Pisonem Craig's list is based in part on previous lists of loci by Nisbet 1961, 192 197 ; Merrill 1975, 203 204 ; Sss 1975, 245 262 For the associations of regnum and tyranny with vis libido superbia and crudelitas see Dunkle 1967 7 Craig 2004, 189 8 Gotoff 1993, 313 See also Syme 1939 [reprint 2002] ; Riggsby 1997, 149 9 Corbeill 1996, 5 Corbeill's concern throughout his book is to connect aggressive humor with political invective to illuminate how preexisting prejudices and the values of the elite were rein forced and negotiated through invective and were used to label the object of invective as an individual who has no place in society (4). Corbeill assumes that the Romans believed the statements made in invective. 10 Arena 2007, 150
98 present in the audience. 11 When an orator takes this invective a step f a rther and abandons the pretense of humor, the audience can no longer laugh, or at least cannot laugh comfortably. Instead, the overriding emotional tone turns awa y from ridicule and towards anger, hatred, and fear. Perhaps this is why Cicero 's most virulent attacks are not invective proper, that is to say not speeches of direct attacks on individuals delivered as epideictic orations, but rather occur in judicial an d deliberative speeches, such as his speeches Against Verres Against Catiline, and select Philippics Against Marcus Antonius The invective gives way to wholesale character assassination. Cicero is thus able to present the crisis in black and white terms; the threat to the state and its salvation stand in stark contrast. In the case of the Philippics those opposed forces are Antony and the Republic. Cicero presents the Republic as represented by Cicero himself, Octavian, Decimus Brutus, the legions and p rovinces in support of Octavian and Decimus Brutus, and with any success the very senators and people he addresses in Philippics Against Marcus Antonius 3 and 4. Cicero casts Antony as an enemy of Rome and an object of fear by casting him in roles traditio nally opposed to the Republic: a king, a usurper consul, a brigand, and a second Catiline. Before considering these portraits, however, some background is in order The Background of Philippics 3 & 4 The assassination of Gaius Julius Caesar (Caesar) on Ma rch 15, 44, left a power vacuum in Rome. The conspirators thought the Republic would be restored, but the 11 Arena 2007, 155
99 survival of Marcus Antonius (Antony) way as would their own inaction. Marcus Junius Brutus (Brutus ) 12 Gaius Cassius Longinus (Cassius) and Decimus Junius Brutus Albinus (Decimus Brutus) received less support from the senate and the people than they expected. 13 At a contio on the afternoon of the a ssassination, the crowd in the f orum responded to Brutus and Cassius at first with cheers, but then with silence. The assassins removed themselves to the Capitoline Hill and ignored Cicero rand Caesar a tyrant. Publius Cornelius Dolabella (Dolabe lla) whom Caesar had previously arranged to take up his consular seat when he embarked on his Parthian campaign, ass umed the consulship while his consular colleague Antony sought from Caesar's widow Calpurnia ury. On March 17, Brutus addressed the people from the Capitoline and was again received with silence. Antony called a meeting of the senate in the Temple of Tellus; the conspirators remained on the Capitoline, but Tiberius Claudius Nero (Tiberius) a nd Cic ero took up their cause. the assassins as tyrannicides but agreed to Cicero The senate simultaneously confirmed the acta of Caesar and granted the assassins amnesty. Brutus and Cassius 12 him and his name became Quintus Servilius Caepio Brutus. At some later date, he reverted to his birth name. By 42 BCE, Brutus reclaimed his adoptive name, perhaps to connect him to his ancestor Gaius Servilius Ahala, the tyrannicide who killed Spurius Mael ius in 439 BCE (Liv. 4.13 15; Plut. Brut actions positively (Cic. Cat .1.3; Mil 3; Sen 56), but at the time, the death was regarded as murder; Ahala was forced into exile (Cic. Rep 1.6; Dom. 86; Val. Max. 5.3.2 ). 13 Att. 14.10; Nic. Dam. Vit. Aug. ; Liv. Per. 116; Vell. Pat. 2.57 60; Plut. Ant. 14 15, Brut 17 21; App. B.Civ. 2.116 149; Dio 44.13 53. Manuwald 2007 9 13 provides an excellent summary of these events, and her n.11 reviews the major scholarship on the historical accounts of this time period.
100 din ed that evening with Antony and Marcus Aemilius Lepidus (Lepidus). It seemed a stalemate had been reached and everyone would re tain his respective office The tide turned against the conspirat ors the next day. Antony ordered that ed an d read. When the people learned that Caesar had bequeathed to them his suburban gardens as a public park and 300 sesterces per person, their sympathies for him rose along with their displea sure for the assassins. Antony too confronted his own setback: Caes ar had named his grandnephew Gaius Octavius Thurinus (Octavian) his adoptive son and heir. Lucius Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus in law, proposed that the senate approve the will in its entirety and grant Caesar a public funeral. And so five days after the assassination, on March 20, Antony addressed the people at where popular resentment against the conspirators grew as Antony aroused their anger with rhetorical flourish. In the subsequent months, Brutus and Cassius l eft Rome for Asia and Silicia, where as praetors they were to secure the grain supply. Decimus Brutus fled to Gaul. to Rome sought to change his proconsular province for the year 43. His province was to be Macedonia, but a law passed by the Tribal Assembly in June appointed him instead to both Nearer and Further Gaul for a tenure of five years. 14 Antony also took control of oved to Brundisium. 15 14 Cicero argued that his law, the Lex de provinciis consularibus acta and was therefore illegal. See Phil 1.6, 8, 19; 2.108 109; and Att. 14.14.4. 15 Brundisium were the Marital Legion, Fourth Legion, Second Legion, and Thirty Fifth Legion. Of the remaining two le
101 Meanwhile, Cicero retired from Rome in hopes of visiting his son in Greece with the ulterior motive of avoiding the political turmoil until the consuls for 43 were inaugurated. In Cicero n position as inheritance. At a contio in May, he presented himself to the people and thereby publicly to be Cicero letters indicate he favored Octavian. 16 Inclement weather interrupted Cicero ; after learning that Piso had railed against Antony in the senate and observing the growing support for Octavian, Cicero determined to return to Rome. Cicero arrived in the city on August 31 or September 1 but was, so he claimed, too fatigued from his travels to attend a meeting of the senate on September 1. 17 Antony believed that Cicero purposefully avoided the meeting as an act of defiance against or additional honors to Caesar. 18 He threatened the absent Cicero who responded on the next day by delivering Philippic 1 before the senate. This time, it was Antony who was absent. Cicero defended his own absence from Rome, explained the reasons for his r eturn, and exhorted Antony and Dolabella to act in the best interests of the Republic. His speech provoked Antony into a response in the senate on September 19, but Cicero again was not present, having retired to the countryside. By 16 See esp. Att. 16.1.1. 17 Cic. Phil 1.11 12, 28; 5.19; Plut. Cic. 43.6. 18 Cic. Phil. 1.11 12; 5.19; Plut. Cic. 43.7.
102 the end of October, Cic ero reciprocated with a pamphlet, Philippic 2, which was at this point only privately circulated. 19 While Cicero was busy composing Philippic 2, Antony and Octavian maneuvered Mac edonian legions and recruit veterans in Campania along the way. Finding some of his soldiers of wavering allegiance, Antony executed some of them at Suessa and about 300 centurions of the Martial Legion and possibly some citizens at Brundisium. Octavian, t oo, recruited veterans in Campania, mostly by promising them more money than Antony, and he sought to inveigle the Martial and Fourth Legions drew Cicero Cicero began to take the young Octavian mo re se riously and in November started back to Rome once more. Antony returned to Rome in November as well, planning to hold a meeting of the senate on November 24 to have Octavian branded a public enemy. The news, however, of the defections of his legions t o Octavian and the subsequent change in the balance of power caused Antony to delay the meeting four days and to change his tactics. He instead assigned new praetorian provinces and attempted to curry the favor of Lepidus. Antony immediately left for Gaul to join the two Macedonian legions still loyal to him and to begin his governorship about a month early. Upon arrival in Gaul he met resistance from Decimus Brutus, who had no intention of handing over his province and his legions. Decimus Brutus fled to t he safety of his province in the weeks following 19 On the private circulation of Phil 2, see Att 15.13 and 16.11. In 15, Cicero urges Atticus to keep the pamphlet safe until he thinks it best to publish it. In Att. 16.11.1, dated November 5 ( Shackleton Bailey 1965 1970, Vol. 4, 189 ), evidence we have for Phil. 2. Atticus may not have published it until Cicero was dead.
103 resentment still raged against the conspirators. Antony responded by laying siege to Decimus Brutus at Mutina. This news further emboldened Cicero who encouraged Decimus Brutus to continue his resistance. Although Cicero had not planned to attend the senate until January 1, he chose to speak at a special meeting on December 20. The tribunes had convened this meeting to discuss sec urity arrangements for the first meeting of the new year, at which Aulus Hirtius (Hirtius) and Gaius Vibius Pansa Caetronianus (Pansa) partisans of Caesar and friends of Cicero would enter the consulship. Cicero attendance drew a large crowd, and he was the first to speak. When he rose, Cicero gave more than his opinion; he delivered Philippic 3, a speech in praise of Decimus Brutus, Octavian, the mutinous legions, and Cisalpine Gaul. He reviewed the events of the preceding months, railed against Anto ny, and asked the senate to formalize his thanks with a decree of praise. Upon completion of that speech and the senate Cicero went directly to the forum and delivered Philippic 4, a shorter speech which recounted the same events a nd argued that the decree just passed effectively branded Antony a public enemy. In December, Antony arrived in Gaul after a series of setbacks. Upon returning to Rome from Brundisium, he had planned to hold a meeting of the senate on November 28, but on that day the Fourth Legion defected to Octavian. Anto ny cancelled the senate meeting but allocated various magistrates to certain provinces in accorda nce with appointments he previously outlined in April, much to Cicero 20 Antony claimed 20 Cic. Att 14.14: Quae scribis Kal. Iun. Antonium de provinciis relaturum, ut et ipse Gallias habeat et utrisque dies prorogetur, licebitne decerni libere?
104 these were the wishes of Caesar as outlined in the acta and compelled the senate to approve the appointments. Antony assigned to himself the province of Cisalpi ne Gaul; he left for this province the following morning. In Philippic 3, Cicero condenses events to make i t seem as if Antony were marching straight from Brundisium towards Rome to take the city when he learned of the defections and changed his path towa rds Gaul. Cicero Rome. This allows him to cast Octavian in the roll of savior because his actions diverted Antony's march against the city and to disregard the legality of Antony's governorship of Gaul, a governorship decreed b y the senate. Decimus Brutus was already in Gaul as praetor peregrinus acta played a key role: Decimus Brutus ha d escorted Caesar to the senate on the Ides of March and had dealt the third blow. Cicero paints Decimus Brutus as valiantly resisting Antony on behalf of the Roman people, though Decimus Brutus was more likely preparing to defend himself against any repri sals for the murder of Caesar. Cicero also ignores Decimus Antony had legal right to Gaul, and the senate had ordered Brutus to surrender the province. Brutus had no legal authority upon which to refuse Antony entry into Gaul and when he did so, Antony responded by laying siege to Mutina. In the wake of this conflict, Cicero urged the senate in Philippic 3 Although Cicero had already composed two Philippics, only the first one had been delivered The second was presumably still in private hands, though many of Cicero claims from that speech are repeated in Philippics 3 and 4. In total Cicero wrote
105 fourteen speeches against Antony. In a letter to Brutus, Cicero called these speeches Philippics Ad Brut. 2.3.4). In his speeches, Demosthenes urged his fellow Athenians to recognize Philip as a threat, as an enemy of Athens. 21 Cicero too, wants to style his enemy, Antony, as an enemy of the state, and this is the tactic that dominates Philippics 3 and 4. His orations, however, do not take the form of invective, but rather of panegyric speeches in honor of Brutus and Octavian and of deliberative spee ches advocating a senatorial decree to formalize his panegyric. Cicero balances the panegyric and the invective through a dilemma, pitting Octavian (here, Caesar ) against Antony in a zero sum game ( Phil 3.21): Necesse erat enim alter utrum esse hostem; nec poterat aliter de adversariis ducibus iudicari. Si igitur Caesar hostis, cur consul nihil refert ad senatum? Sin ille a senatu notandus non fuit, quid potest dicere quin, cum de illo tacuerit, se hostem confessus sit? Quem in edictis Spartacum appella t, hunc in senatu ne improbum quidem dicere audet. For one of the two had to be an enemy; no other judgment was possible on two opposing commanders. If Caesar was the enemy, why does the consul not refer to the Senate? But if Caesar was not to be censured by the Senate, what can he say except that by keeping silent about Caesar he admitted himself to be the enemy? He calls Caesar a Spartacus in his manifestos, but in the Senate he dares not so much as call him disloyal. 22 Craig has identified this argument as a conditional dilemma with alternate questions. 23 In Roman oratory this dilemma is impossible to counter. One of the two propositions must be accepted: either Octavian is an enemy of the state or he is not. If the imagined 21 Wooten 1983, 58 has identified Demosthenes' tactic of presenting acquiescence to Philip of Macedon and the existence of a free, democratic Athens as two mutually exclusive systems as the disjunctive mode, a mode that dom inates the Dem. Olynthiacs (Dem. 1 3) and First Philippic (Dem. 4) and serves as the model for Cic. Phil 3, 4, 5, and 6. 22 Text and translation: Shackleton Bailey 1986 23 Craig 1993, 208
106 Antony responds that Octavian i s an enemy, then Antony did not follow proper procedure; he did not make a motion to the senate to have Octavian officially branded a hostis He cannot bring himself to say in front of the senate the same slanders he bandies about to everyone else. If, how ever, Octavian is not an enemy of the state, then Antony must admit that he himself is, for only one of them can represent Rome in their struggle against each other. Through the dilemma Cicero makes it impossible for Antony to reclaim lost ground in the senate. His image is tarnished. Either he follows improper procedure and fails in his consular duties or he is an enemy of Rome. Which will it be? Since Antony cannot respond, nor is he intend ed to, Cicero answers for him with the positive portrait he paints of Octavian throughout Philippic 3. madness and cruelty, Cicero like wisdom and courage (3). By spending his inheritance on rallying the Caesarian v eterans, Octavian prevented them from joining Antony and marching with him from Brundisium to Rome (4). Martial and Fourth legions attests to his excellence an d his role as a savior of the Republic (6 7). Because Cicero has cast Octavian as a defender of Rome, the person he fights against must be a threat to Rome, and that person is Antony. Antony is not present to defend himself, so Cicero is free to persuade t he senate that if either Octavian or Antony is an enemy, it must be Antony. Cicero simultaneously highlights and sidesteps one of the difficulties a society faces during civil war: how to balance the competing roles of hostis and civis Normally mutually e xclusive, now the hostis and the civis can be the same person. Yet, such a
107 contradiction cannot be maintained, so Antony and Octavian must be put into one box or the other ; they cannot occupy the same space. If Octavian is a defender of Rome, then Antony m ust be her adversary. The dilemma reveals that casting Antony as an enemy of the state is as much the goal of Philippic 3 as is the praise for Octavian, for if the senate passes his decree they in effect accept the conditions of the dilemma and brand Anto ny as hostis Antony however, is consul. Somehow, Cicero must overwhelm the portrait of Antony as a consul wielding legal consular authority with a portrait of him as an enemy waging war on the very state he claims to champion. Cicero cannot rely only on the subtleties of dilemma, and so the character assassination of Antony at times overshadows the panegyric of Octavian, Brutus, the legions, and Gaul. The two tactics are interdependent: Octavian, Brutus, the legions, and Gaul only deserve praise if their enemy is formidable and Rome faces a palpable threat. At the same time, however, Cicero must present the situation as under control, the threat as abated, so that the praise is already due. Once the praise is given, Antony becomes the very enemy necessary to justify the praise. This fine balancing act is the same that Cicero negotiates in Against Catiline 1, in which Cicero must characterize Catiline as a serious threat, near ly impossible to control, yet Cicero himself must be provident in his knowledge of capable of imposing his will on Catiline. 24 Cicero must appear scared to death, yet also courageous, calm, and collected. Likewise, though the threat of Antony must be great, Octavian and Brutus must appear to have abated that thr eat while maintaining that 24 See Batstone 1994
108 further military action is still needed. In Against Catiline 1, Cicero accomplished this by divine providence. Likewise in Philippics 3 and 4, b y balancing the right amount of fear with the right amount of assurance, Cicero can establish Antony as a real enough threat that the senate and the people will follow his lead while maintaining calm in the city for a people confident in the future success of Rome ag ainst Antony. Cicero portrays Antony as a threat still at large, yet nothing to worry about by casting him as an ineffective leader with false trapping s of command, especially as contrasted to Octavian and Brutus and evident in his loss of support from the Martial and Fourth Legions and the province of Gaul. Cicero develops this portrait of Antony by embracing numerous, sometimes contradictory characterizations of different types of enemy who are all a threat to constitutional liberty The most frightening of these characterizations is that of the pretender king, but images of Antony as a usurper consul, a brigand, and an inferior Catiline all elevate the emotional tone of his speech and contribute to the damning portrait of Antony as an enemy decidedly non Roman. The Pretender King of Philippic 3 The image of pretender king is central to Philippic 3. Before the senate, Cicero of the tyrannicide Lucius Junius Brutus, who ou sted Tarquinius Superbus, had refused to hand over Gaul to Antony. Historical exempla provided Cicero with the perfect means by which to reverse the legality of these affairs ( Phil 3.8): hoc vero recens edictum D. Bruti quod paulo ante propositum est cert e silentio non potest praeteriri. Pollicetur enim se provinciam Galliam retenturum in senatus populique Romani potestate. O civem natum rei publicae, memorem sui nominis imitatoremque maiorum!
109 d. Assuredly it must not be passed over in silence. He promises to keep the province of Gaul in the control of the Senate and the People of Rome. A citizen born for the Commonwealth, mindful of his name, following in the footsteps of his ancestors! Cicero dresses Decimus a stretch perhaps, but one that inflates the threat Antony poses to Rome. 25 Any steps a Roman like Decimus Brutus takes to unseat Antony the king suddenly seem patriotic and just ified. Legality becomes secondary to pragmatic expediency as Cicero turns Decimus retinenda 3.8). Decimus Cicero turns Atque ille Tarquinius quem maiores nostri non tulerunt non crudelis, non non tulit: D. Brutus sceleratum atque impium regnare patietu r Antonium? Quid Tarquinius tale qualia innumerabilia et facit et fecit Antonius? The Tarquin that our ancestors did not endure was reckoned and called the Proud, not the Cruel or the Impious a proud king: shall Decimus Brutus suffer a felon and traitor to reign? What did Tarquin ever do to compare with the countless deeds and doings of Antonius? Antony would make a worse king than Tarquin did; he would be not Antonius Superbus, but Antonius Crudelis or Antonius Impius. 26 If pride were enough cause for Lucius Brutus, how could Decimus Brutus not act against this new perversion of a king? Cicero then enumerates the wicked and impious acts of Antony. Whereas the kings consulted 25 On kings and tyranny in Rom an political polemic, see Opelt 1965, 128 131, 16 6 168 26 Cicero alludes to Antonius Crudelis and expands upon the evils of his tyranny at 34: Nemo est tam stultus qui non intellegat, si indormierimus huic tempori, non modo crudelem superbamque dominationem nobis sed ignominiosam etiam et flagitiosam ferendam esse
11 0 the senate, Antony does not. When Antony does ca ll the senate, he brings a bodyguard of armed barbarians. Worst of all, Antony claims to be a consul and an augur while ignoring the auspices, a thing the kings never did. Cicero reminds the senators that Antony passed laws in violation of the auspices and even falsified them in order to make Publius Cornelius Dolabella his co consul. Cicero takes care not to publicly impugn Dolabella, his former son in law. 27 It was Antony who put Dolabella at fault ( conlega quem ipse ementitis auspiciis vitiosum fecerat 3.9). Cicero develops the portrait of Antony as a pretender king by making his actions even worse than those of the real kings. Antony sells off the offices and provinces of Su essa and Brundusium (10). The execution of Roman soldiers at Suessa Aurunca provides another point of comparison between Antony and Tarquinius Superbus, who sacked Suessa Pometia, a Volscian city no longer occupied in Cicero 28 Tarquin ended ongoing conflict between Rome and her closest neighbors and sealed this new alliance with an attack by the combined Roman and Latin forces against the Volsci at Suessa Pometia. His victory brought glory to the Roman people and earned the king a triumph. 29 Tarquin u sed the spoils to renew construction of the Temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus on the Capitoline. 30 27 (February 45) from complications due to the birth of their second son. Cicero and Dolabella remained political allies after the divorce and allied himself with Antony and abandoned the Republican cause. 28 Suessa Pometia, a Volscian city, was in southern Latium; Suessa Arunca, a colony established in 313 BCE, was on the southwe st slopes of the Roccamonfina volcano, RE s.v. Suessa s.v. Suessa Pometia ; Ave ry 1972, 273 and 319 29 Liv. 1.53 ; Degrassi 1947, 91 30 DH 4.61, Liv. 1.53, and Tac. Hist. 3.72.
111 however, served not to unite but to divide. Antony, a Roman, executed other Romans, military captives suspected of mutinous spirit. Rather than bring harmony to Rome and her allies, Antony at Brundisium and Suessa heightened the tension within Roman society. Although a general such as Antony retains the right to decimate his troops, Cicero as the lawless slaughter of Roman citizens. 31 By twice calling the soldiers cives Cicero turns mutinous soldiers into loyal civilians, murdered by a man leading an army against Rome. 32 Cicero closes the analogy between Lucius Brutus and Tarquin Decimus Br utus and Postremo Tarquinius pro populo Romano bellum gerebat tum cum est expulsus: Antonius contra populum Romanum exercitum adducebat tum cum a legionibus relictus nomen Ca esaris exercitumque pertimuit neglectisque sacrificiis sollemnibus ante lucem vota ea quae numquam solveret nuncupavit, et hoc tempore in provinciam populi Romani conatur invadere. Finally, at the time when Tarquin was driven out, he was waging war on beha lf of the Roman People; Antonius was leading an army against the Roman People when he was deserted by the legions and, in terror of vows before daybreak which he will never discharge; and at this moment he is attempting to invade a province of the Roman People. Cicero from pro to contra The relati onship between the Roman people and Tarquin is positive, between the people 31 App ian says that Antony followed the procedures of decimation as allowed by military law but reduced the scale to strike fear into his men more quickly ( B.Civ. 3.43). According to Plutarch, Antony carried out a full decimation on his allied troops after a los s during his Part h ian campaigns in 36 BCE ( Ant. 39). The practice can be traced back to 471 during the war against the Volsci (Liv. 2.59). 32 Cicero reverses soldier citizen relationship rumored to have been made by Caesar, who shamed his soldiers on the br ink of mutiny into following him to Africa by addressing them as citizens, Quirites (Luc. 5.358 and Suet. Jul. 70). Although Cicero and Caesar have different aims in branding soldiers citizens, the comparison shows that a Roman in his capacity as soldier was subject to different rules than one in his capacity as a citizen and reminds us that Antony wielded capital powe r over his troops.
112 and Antony, negative. By abandoning Antony, the legions, like Decimus Brutus shirk off the cloak of tyranny in a metaphorical expulsion of the king. Once expelled from the state, like Tarquin before him, Antony is no longer a Roman, but rather an enemy attempting to invade the Roman province of Gaul, another act of aggression against the sovereignty of the Roman people. Cicero takes a negative exemplum, Tarquin, and measures Antony against it; the result is that Tarquin looks positive. turned on its head. religion, an d his abuse of the senate single him out as a pretender king crueler and more wicked than even the worst of the seven historical kings. In this way, Cicero makes the enemies of Antony here, Decimus Brutus appear more virtuous than even Lucius Brutus and in case the senators missed the point, Cicero emphasizes the superior nature of this contemporary expulsion of a king (11): Maius igitur a D. Bruto beneficium populus Romanus et habet et exspectat quam maiores nostri acceperunt a L. Bruto, principe huius m axime conservandi generis et nominis. So the Roman People has and expects a greater boon from Decimus Brutus than our ancestors received from Lucius Brutus, who founded this race and name above all others to be cherished. However much praise the senators m ight bestow on Lucius Brutus Decimus Brutus deserves even more This supreme elevation of Decimus Brutus above a historical hero throws into stark relief the depraved, regal, un Roman behavior of Antony. The higher Brutus rises, the f a rther Antony falls. The greater the hope in Brutus, the greater the fear of Antony. By drawing a parallel between th e two Bruti, Cicero runs a risk Cicero might make another available parallel between Brutus the tyrannicide and his
113 descenda nt Decimus Brutus The y might see Julius Caesar, not Antony, as Tarquinius Superbus. Reactions to the assassination of Caesar remained mixed; nine months before, Tiberius Nero had asked the same senate to honor Decimus Brutus as a tyrannicide and to brand Caesar a tyrant, and T ac i t us claims that whether the murder was treason or patriotism remained uncertain even into the reign of Tiberius. 33 Partisans of Caesar rejected the model of tyrannicide evoked by the assassins and would have been offended to see the historical exemplum r ear its ugly head in defense of those assassins. To avoid arousing hate, indignation, or anger towards Brutus instead of fear of Antony, Cicero must quickly substitute Antony for Tarquin before the audience infers Caesar as tyrant Antony himself was pers onally res ponsible for turning the tide of public opinion against the assassins during the funeral oration in honor of Caesar. Senators who make the mental leap from Tarquin to Caesar and not to Antony might then remember that Decimus Brutus is a murderer who ran away to Gaul to protect himself and that Antony Cicero chooses to ignore the Tarquin Caesar parallel, a decision which mirrors the current political situation in Rome. While Octavian and Antony vie for control of the Caesarian sympathizers, the question of the assassination remains open. Marcus Brutus, Cassius, and the other assassins Decimus Brutus among them have been pardoned for their crime, but future repercussions remain a possibility. Whether these assassins were tyrannicides in the image of Lucius Brutus freeing Romans from the tyrant Caesar is a question ignored until the struggles between Antony and Octavian come to a close. Likewise, Cicero 33 Tac. Ann. 1.8: cum occisus dictator Caesar aliis pessimum aliis pulcherrimum facinus videretur.
114 equation of Antony to Tarquin side assassination. Cicero quick substitution of the morally unambiguous expulsion of Antony for the ambiguous murder of Caesar allows him to maintain the moral high ground while still invoking images of tyrannicide. It is worth noting, however, that Cicero d oes not take this risk in his contio Philippic 4. 34 Among the people, such subtlety might have failed. Extra Constitutional Power in Philippics 3 and 4 In Philippic 4, Cicero leaves any parallels between Antony and Tarquin unsaid, though he hints at Decimus Brutus as a second founder of Rome: If Brutus is savior of the Commonwealth, Antonius is an enemy (4.8). 35 With the contio however, Cicero substitutes other types of extr a constitutional and extra legal power for royal power; these images that merely bolster his portrayal of Antony as un Roman in Philippic 3 constitute this argument in Philippic 4. Cicero compiles the overall portrait of Anthony as an enemy from images of Antony as a usurper consul, a brigand, and a would be Catiline, thereby enhancing the argument of tyranny and kingship in Philippic 3 and replacing it in Philippic 4. Although Cicero avoids styling Antony as a king in his contio he does not refrain from calling Antony a false consul. Cicero does not argue that Antony illegally assumed consular authority and his attempts to maintain that power are usurpation Since Anto ny behaves like an enemy of Rome, he cannot also be its consul, for the two are 34 the Roman people (7). No connection be tween Tarquinius and Antony is hazarded. 35 si conservator rei publicae Brutus, hostis Antonius Cicero also reminds the people that the family and name of Brutus were given to the Republic by the gods to establish and recover the liberty of the Roman peopl e (7).
115 fundamentally opposed. Likewise, through a n alternative dilemma, if Antony is consul, then Decimus Brutus is an enemy, and Cicero d objective for his addresses is to sec ure praise for Decmius Brutus, among other s as a savior of the Republic 36 Antony, therefore, must not be consul. Cicero urges the senate to wield its own authority against Antony and shifts consular authority to the consul elect, Decimus Brutus ( Phil. 4.9 ): Deinceps laudatur provincia Gallia meritoque ornatur verbis amplissimis ab senatu quod resistat Antonio. Quem si consulem illa provincia putaret neque eum reciperet, magno scelere se astringeret: omnes enim in consulis iure et imperio debent esse provin ciae. Negat hoc D. Brutus imperator, consul designatus, natus rei publicae civis; negat Gallia, negat cuncta Italia, negat senatus, negatis vos. Quis illum igitur consulem nisi latrones putant? Next the province of Gaul is commended and deservedly honored in the most ample terms by the Senate because it is resisting Antonius. If that province considered him to be a consul and refused him admittance, it would be guilty of a major crime; for all provinces ought to be under the jurisdiction and authority of a consul. Decimus Brutus, Imperator and Consul Elect, a citizen born for the Commonwealth, denies it, Gaul denies it, all Italy denies it, the Senate denies it you deny it. So who but brigands think him a consul? Gaul cannot be praised and honored for resisting Antony unless Antony deserved to be resisted. be guilty of a major crime, but is not because the protasis of the condition has not been met. Gaul does not consider Antony a consul so Gaul mu st not submit to him. Furthermore, Gaul garners support for its disobedience from all of Italy, the senate, the people in Cicero Alt hough his term would not begin until 42, Brutus's authority as consul el ect 37 36 Phil. 4.8: Si consul Antonius, Brutus hostis: si conservator rei publicae Brutus, hostis Antonius. Num igitur utrum horum sit dubitare possumus? 37 In anticipation of his absence from Rome for his Parthian campaign, Caesar appointed magistrates for the following years. He appointed Decimus Brutus as consul for 42. As Manuwald 2007 444 445 notes,
116 Antony denied that authority to himself, argues Cicero when he thrice offered the crown to Caesar. At the Lupercalia Antony offered Caesar a wh ite diadem, a symbol of regal power in Rome. 38 Caesar tested the response of the people and reacted to their displeasure by refusing the crown. Antony, however, revealed himself as ready to submit to a king (3.13). In Cicero s denunciation of his own legitimacy as a consul, a Roman citizen, a freeman, even a human being. Furthermore, Cicero claims that Antony would only accept Caesar as a king in order to position himself to be king after Caesar. The Lupercalia incident, as W ooten notes, serves as the final proof of Antony's tyrannical leanings. 39 Cicero transfers the fear of kings and tyranny manifested by the crown to Anthony. Before the senate recognized Anto ny as an enemy, the Martial legion declared him such by submitting to the authority of the senate (3.5) When forced to choose whom to follow, the legions abandoned Antony and put themselves at risk of decimation (3.14). Should the senate now abandon thos e soldiers by reaffirming Antony's authority, the senators would be responsible for the death of those men. Soldiers who desert a consul, reminds Cicero deserve to be beaten to death, a reminder of the fate of the soldiers at Suessa and Brundisium. If, ho wever, the senate were to confer authority on the most outstanding generals Octavian, Decimus Brutus, Hirtius, and Pansa there would be hope (3.14): his status as consul designatus has no legal function in relevance to his current actions, but Cicero uses it as a sign of his loyalty to the Republic, his role as a magistrate, and a mark of his status. 38 On this crown, see Ritter 1965 and Lincoln 1994, 40 41 39 Wooten 1983, 64 Cf. Phil. 2.45.
117 Quam ob rem omnia mea sententia complectar, vobis, ut intellego, non invitis,ut et praestantissimis ducib us a nobis detur auctoritas et fortissimis militibus spes ostendatur praemiorum et iudicetur non verbo, sed re non modo non consul sed etiam hostis Antonius. Accordingly, I shall embrace it all in my motion, as I believe will not be disagreeable to you gen tlemen, to provide that authority be given by us to the eminent commanders, hope of rewards held out to brave troops, and Antonius judged, not in word but in fact, to be not only not a consul but a public enemy. Cicero directly links the consular authority of Antony's enemies to the hope of the soldiers, thus linking Antony's authority to the fear of the soldiers. Antony represents death. Not only does the hope of life for the soldiers depend on the senate's decision, but also the hope of life for the Repub lic itself. The veterans and soldiers of the Martial and Fourth Legions recognized Octavian's authority; the senate, by sanctioning that acknowledgement with its own authority would support the zeal of the soldiery for the reestablishment of the Republic ( ad rem publicam recuperandam 7). Cicero 's diction implies that the Republic, under Antony's consulship, has already been lost. It must be recovered. Cicero focuses on the catastrophic potential posed by inaction, thereby increasing the sense of risk and the need for urgency. As the emotional tension rises, passage of Cicero 's proposed decrees becomes more likely. Delay and calm deliberation are ill advised when the very existence of the Republic is at stake. Rome approaches the point of no return; if Anto ny is allowed to continue, the Republic will not be able to be recovered. This irreversibility contributes to the sense of fear pervading the speech. While Cicero and his fellow Romans were fearing ( timeremus ) the deadly and ruinous return of Antony from B rundisium, all hope seemed lost, yet Octavian adopted an unhoped for ( insperatum ) course of action (4.3). He spent his patrimony in raising an
118 army of Julius Caesar's veterans and attracting Antony's mutinous soldiers (3.3, 4.3). Cicero reminds the senate however, that Octavian did not spend his money; he invested it in the safety of the Republic (3.3). Octavian's judicious use of his patrimony highlights not only his benefit to the Republic but also his general praiseworthy character, thereby underscori ng Cicero 's invective against Antony for profligacy. Cicero ranks Antony among gamblers (3.35) and declares that slavery under any condition is awful, but more so under a ruined and desperate ( adflictus et perditus 3.25) man like Antony. Furthermore, in c ontrast to Octavian, Antony emptied Caesar's rich house and used his power to plunder the state (3.30). 40 When taken with the praiseworthy portrait of Octavian throughout Philippics 3 and 4 and the scandalous accounts of profligacy in Philippic 2, these brief mentions of financial mismanagement juxtapose Antony to Octavian. 41 As the home is a microcosm for the state, so the affairs of Rome in the hands of Antony would be yet another cause for fear, especially when authority could instead be confe rred upon Octavian. Where Octavian invests, Antony plunders. This dichotomy not only reflects poorly on Antony but also helps to remove him from the realm of legitimate authority. A consul would not plunder his own state; rather, Antony acts like a brigand out for plunder ( praedam 3.29) and operating beyond the purview of constitutional power. 40 Caesar's rich house: Antony had items transferred to his own home from Caesar's soon after the assassination. What was among this property is uncertain. See also Cic. Phil. 2.35; 2.109; Flor. 2.15.1 3; Plut. Ant. 15.1 2; Cic. 43.8; App. B Civ. 2.125.524; 3.5.16; 3.17.63; 3.20.75; Cass. Dio 45.5.3 4; 45.41.3. Plundering the state: Cicero accuses Antony of selling exemptions, releasing citizens and provinces from their obligations, and selling off provinces for his own financial gain. 41 These are collected b y Craig 2004, 192 : Phil 2.36, 37, 42, 44, 48, 50, 62, 71 7 4, 78, 103.
119 A step down from the hostis an enemy of the state, is the latro a brigand, robber, or bandit. 42 Like the hostis a brigand is not a member of Roman society. As Hab inek notes, unlike the slave or gladiator, the brigand is an outsider whose domain is not the cityscape but the countryside, where Cicero portrays Antony running about Italy attempting to raise an army but being excluded from every city. 43 The brigand neith er respects nor responds to the central authorities, and he is denied access from the very community whose rules and procedures make political debate possible. 44 Antony has no grounds to stand on to make a reply. By labeling Antony a brigand, if successfu l, Cicero accomplishes one of the primary goals of his character assassination: to label his opponent as someone who stands apart from the community and does not share the values Romans consider essential to being Roman. This objectification of Antony cast s him into the realm of the unknown, making fear a likely emotional response to whispers, rumors, and claims about his activities. Shaw has successfully argued that in the Roman world, there was no hero brigand, no Robin Hood, who stood up for the rural po or in a form of social protest. 45 Brigands represented real and present danger for every Roman, especially while traveling. 46 Even wealthy Romans with bodyguards, we 42 OLD s.v. latro 2. The literal meaning is a hired soldier, mercenary ( O LD s.v. latro 1). 43 Habinek 2001 70 71 44 Habinek 2001 71 45 Shaw 1984, 3 6 arguing against Hobsbawm 1959 1969 1973 Shaw's footnotes 4 7 trace the debate over social banditry. 46 For example, Shaw 1984, 5 cites Gal. Anat. 1.2, in which the body of a brigand, killed by a traveler he attacked, was left unburied, contrary to Roman custom, because of the hatred of such brigands. For more on the risks of banditry while traveling, see Shaw 1984, 9 10
120 learn from Pliny, could go missing while traveling. 47 For the audience of Cicero 's contio ba nditry was a daily reality. 48 Before Cicero directly calls Antony a brigand, he positions Antony as a leader of bandits by claiming that, unlike Decimus Brutus and the legions who have resisted Antony's authority, only a few brigands consider him consul (4. 11). Since brigands do not recognize central authority, their acknowledgment as claimed by Cicero of Antony's authority undercuts that very authority. His power must not be legitimate if the illegitimate respect it. Yet again Cicero creates a harsh divide between true Romans and those who support Antony and makes finding common ground impossible. Cicero complicates this divide, however, when he alleges that the Martial legion abandoned Antony because the soldiers considered him an enemy ( hostem ), a brigand ( latronem ), and a traitor to his fatherland ( parricidam patriae 5 ). The enemy cl early operates beyond the state as a recognized, legitimate power against whom Rome wages war. The brigand stands below that, still operating in a sphere outside Roman authority yet not recognized in any official capacity. The traitor, on the other hand, is a member of the community. To betray one's fatherland, that fatherland must be his own, the metaphorical father of the macrocosmic home that is the state. 49 It is impossible to be both hostis and parricida, though latro occupies a liminal space, not responding to or acknowledged formally by Roman authority even when born into the c ommunity. Cicero 47 Plin. Ep. 6.25. This and other telling examples are presented by Shaw 1984, 9 18 along with additional evidence for the ubiquity of banditry in anci ent Rome. 48 Cicero refers to Antony as a brigand in his senatorial address as well, 3.29. 49 A parricide ( parricida ) is strictly the murderer of a near relation, especially through false etymological connections to pater one's father. By extension, a parri cide may be the murderer of a head of state or a traitor to the state, with or without patriae ( OLD s.v. parricida ).
121 spans the full continuum of threats to Roman authority, but in so doing he risks admitting Antony back in to the fold of the Roman community. Invocations, however, of an infamous traitor to Rome, Lucius Sergius Catilina (Catiline), bring su ch powerful negative associations to bear that Antony becomes irredeemable. At the close of his contio Cicero calls Antony a brigand once again, ranking him among assassins and Spartacus (4.15): Est igitur, Quirites, populo Romano, victori omnium gentium omne certamen cum percussore, cum latrone, cum Spartaco. So, Men of Rome, the whole conflict lies between the Roman People, the conqueror of all nations, and an assassin, a bandit, a Spartacus. As Manuwald notes, Cicero 's word order places the struggle ( certamen ) between the Roman people and the unnamed Antony. 50 This contest divides the two parties and excludes Antony from the community. Cicero then emphasizes this exclusion with the anaphoric ascending tricolon of adjectives. The contrast is clear: Rome stands on one side, her enemy on the other, and Rome will once again be the victor. Yet the most damning words are to follow (4.15) : Nam quod se similem esse Catilinae gloriari solet, scelere par est illi, industria inferior. Ille cum exercitum nullum habu isset, repente conflavit: hic eum exercitum quem accepit amisit. He likes to boast of his resemblance to Catiline, but though he is Catiline's equal in criminality, he is inferior in energy. Catiline, without an army, threw one together in a trice: Antoniu s took an army over and lost it. Cicero alleges that Antony himself promotes a comparison to Catiline, whose conspiracy to kill Cicero and select senators and install himself as consul of Rome was revealed and thwarted by Cicero twenty years earlier during his consulship of 63 BCE. 50 Manuwald 2007 531
122 No evidence beyond Cicero 's claim verifies that Antony ever compared himself to Catiline, yet the possibility seems believable on the heels of the rest of the speech. Immediately after connecting Anton y to Catiline, Cicero rejects the comparison. Although Antony is as wicked as Catiline, he cannot measure up to this archetype. 51 According to Cicero Catiline remained ever vigilant for the destruction of the Republic, working day and night to attract cons pirators to his cause, to gain the support of foreign powers, and to raise troops. 52 He had support from disreputable men of all rank; Antony lacks such organization. His army has abandoned him and his only supporters are a band of misfits. As with the comp arison to Tarquin, whatever positive traits may be attributed to a criminal like Catiline are not possessed by Antony. This failure to live up to the standards of a proper criminal qualifies Antony for demotion from hostis to latro. Without the organizati onal framework of a state, an army, or even a proper band of conspirators, Antony becomes a reckless, chaotic brigand, a criminal suited to attacking unsuspecting travelers on their journeys, but not to running Rome or to overturning it, despite his best e fforts. After drumming up intense fear of Antony, Cicero lets it slip into ridicule and disgust. The hope of salvation offered by Octavian and Decimus Brutus, supported by Cicero and the senate, becomes a reality (4.16): longo intervallo me auctore et prin cipe ad spem libertatis exarsimus. After a long interval, with me to prompt and lead, our hearts have kindled to the hope of liberty. 51 On Catiline as an exemplum of the enemy, see Sallust's description ( Sal. Cat 5), upon which Livy modeled his description of Hannibal (Liv. 21.4) and Tacitus that of Sejanus ( Ann 4.1) 52 Cic. Cat. 1.5, 8, 13, and 26. For more o n Catiline's constant activity, see also Sal. Cat. 5, 16, 24, 27, and 32.
123 By playing upon existing tensions in the late Republic concerning the conflic t between the long established r epub lic an system and the rise in formidable individuals who sought to consolidate power under themselves, Cicero arouse d fear that Antony aimed at regal and tyrannical power. He supported this image with characterizations of Antony as a usurper consul, a briga nd, and a second Catiline, further distancing him from his standing within Roman society. In Philippic 3, Cicero used this character assassination to help him secure formal praise for Octavian, Decimus Brutus, the Martial and Fourth legions, and Gaul for t heir actions against Antony, praise which effectively branded Antony an enemy of the state. When Cicero immediately walked outside the senate house and announced to the people in Philippic 4 the senate's decision and the reasons for it, he must have been m et with cheers; his speech reflects no moments of backtracking and enough popular support stayed with the anti Antonian cause that soon the new consuls were sent on a military campaign against Antony at the battle of Mutina. However, w hen Octavian and Anth ony made peace the following year at Brundisium, the fear Cicero worked so hard to establish abated, and his harsh rhetoric against Antony helped secure him a place among the proscribed. Cicero 's Philippics Against Marcus Antonius 3 and 4 show that character assassination can effectively create and enhance fear strong enough to affect state policy, though in this case that character assassination bore an all too real risk for Cicero
124 CHAPTER 5 HOW TO TRADE IN FEAR : SALLUST'S SPEECH OF LEPIDUS I would remind you that extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice! And let me remind you also that moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue! Barry Goldwater, Address at the Cow Palace on Accepting the Nomination of the Republican National Convention 1 With these words Senator Barry Goldwater defended conservative extremism to his political base while accepting the Republican nomination for the p residency on July 16, 1964, at the Republican National Convention in Cow Palace, San Fra ncisco, California. Paired with Goldwater's extreme positions on the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Vietnam and the risk of disarmament, these words helped formalize the split in [the Republican] party and solidify image as a fringe conse rvative in the Republican party thereby making him unappealing to moderates and independents. 2 Factors such as these contributed to Goldwater's loss in the election to the incumbent, Lyndon B. Johnson, who took 486 of the 538 electoral votes. 3 Although Am erican elections and popular politics do not mirror those of the late Republic, Goldwater's words and subsequent defeat reveal that the very sentiments meant to unify a group and defend the use of fear tactics can inspire such distrust and suspicion among members of other groups that the speaker finds himself the object of fear instead of its purveyor. Such is the case for Sallust's Marcus Aemilius Lepidus (Lepidus). His speech in Sallust's Histories, meant to inflame the popular base against 1 Reprinted in Schlesinger and Isr ael 2002, 3664 3670 This quote was suggested to speechwriter Karl Hess by Harry Jaffa, who claimed that the quote was one of Cicero's in defense of his actions against Catiline, Hess 1999, 168 170 No citation to Cicero was ever given, and a comparable quote cannot be found. 2 For the quote, see Schlesinger and Israel 2002, 3664 and for examples of Goldwater's posi tion statements on nuclear weapons, see Schlesinger and Israel 2002, 3679 and 3681 3 Schlesinger and Israel 2002, 3702
125 the political allies of Lucius Cornelius Sulla (Sulla) and the Sullan constitution, though successful in helping to fuel a revolt in Etruria, created such fear among the senatorial class that Lepidus eventually found himself an enemy of the state; he lost in battle agai nst his co consul and was forced into exile on Sardinia, where he soon died. 4 In 79 BCE, Lepidus stood for the consulship. Sulla may have overseen the election as a final act of his dictatorship before abdication; he may, however, have already stepped down but continued to wield his influence through his associates. 5 He was, according to Plutarch, still in Rome at the time of the elections. 6 Although he did not support the bid of Lepidus, no evidence suggests he opposed it Lepidus had perhaps fled the Mari an cause and joined Sulla a few years prior. Sulla, a champion of the aristocracy, needed the support of men with important family names, such as the Aemilii. 7 Syme believes it is no coincidence that one of the first pair of consuls following Sulla's abdic ation was an Aemlius. 8 Plutarch, however, reports that Gnaeus Pompeius (Pompey) supported Lepidus' bid against Sulla's wishes. Sulla's main complaint was that Pompey had done such a good job currying the people's favor for Lepidus that 4 The sentiments of the senatorial elite are expressed in Sallust by Lucius Marcius Philippus in a senatorial address, Hist. 1.77M. On Lepidus' defeat and exile, see App. B. Civ. 1.107. 5 According to MRR 2. 82 Sulla was still dictator, cf. Carcopino 1931, 207 208 ; however, McGushin 1992, Vol. 1, 112 observes that all the sources listed tha t refer to the timing of Sulla's abdication contradict this. See Plut. Sull. 34.3; Suet. Jul. 77; App. B. Civ. 1.3, 103 4; Oros. 5.22.1. McGushin 1992, Vol. 1, 112 concludes that the logical moment for Sulla to step down was the end of his last consular year, the last day of December, 80 BCE. Thus, the consuls Ap. Claudius Pulcher and P. Servilius Vatia presided over the elections in 79 for 78. Keaveney 1983, 197 198 argues that Sulla had left Rome before the elections bu t appeared at the canvass for the consular elections in order to oppose an enemy of his, M. Aemelius Lepidus. Keaveney sees this as normal behavior for a successful Roman politician who had completed his cursus honorum and no longer felt the need to take part in the day to day running of the state. 6 Plut. Sull. 34, Pomp 15. 7 Syme 1964 [reprint 2002], 180 citing App. B. Civ. 1.105 argues that Lepidus was a renegade of the Marian party, but also that in the historical record [Lepidus'] hostility to Sulla tends to be antedated in the light of what occurred subsequent ly. 8 Syme 1964 [reprint 2002], 183
126 Lepidus was advanced above his colleague Quintus Lutatius Catulus (Catulus), the most senseless man in place of the best. 9 If he had truly opposed the election, no doubt he had the power at the time as dictator and through personal influence to block Lepidus' canvas s or to promote another candidate, yet no evidence of a third candidate exists. 10 Whether Lepidus openly opposed Sulla prior to his election remains a mystery, but he made his opposition known as soon as he took office. Sallust places Lepidus' contio decryi ng the evils of the Sullan regime towards the beginning of the consular year, before the death of Sulla in March. Lepidus presents Sulla as very much alive, though also in power, which he was not, but his claims about Sulla's continued influence and threat would have sounded too odd had he already died to justify. Alt hough the speech as it stands in the Histories is a work of Sallust's, in accordance with Roman historiographic practice it must seem authentic and believable. In 35, some would still be alive who would have heard the real speech. 11 For my purposes, whether the speech accurately reflects Lepidus' actual speech or is a fictional work of Sallust's matters little; either way, the speech is a rhetorical tour de force of fear mongering. Through a clos e reading of the text with attention to diction, tone, fear clauses, comparatives and superlatives, sarcasm, agency, and political slogans, we can appreciate how Sallust's Lepidus brings this fear mongering to life. 9 Plut. Sull 34.5: cf. Pomp 15. 10 Syme 1964 [reprint 2002], 185 : It staggers belief that any candidate could stand and succeed in 79 against the will of Sulla. 11 35 is an estimated date for the publication of the Histories and is the safest date, being the terminus ante quem, with Sallust's death in that yea r. For more on the dating of Sallust's life and works, see Syme 19 64 [reprint 2002], 13 14 and McGushin 1992, Vol. 1, 1 4
127 Lepidus focuses on themes of tyranny and servitude under Sulla and contrasts them with the liberty and rule of law that exi s ted in the past His strategy is not to spur a revolution, but rather to urge the people to demand reform and the repeal of the Sullan constitution, especially the limits p laced on the office of tribune. As McGushin notes, Lepidus opens his speech with the tone of a patrician consul counseling the people, not that of a demagogue and revolutionary. 12 He warns his fellow Romans not to let their virtues get the best of them (1 ): Clementia et probitas vestra, Quirites, quibus per ceteras gentis maximi et clari estis, plurimum timoris mihi faciunt adversum tyrannidem L. Sullae, Your clemency and your honesty, fellow citizens, qualities which have made you supreme and renowned thr oughout all other nations, fills me with the greatest fear in dealing with the tyranny of Lucius Sulla. 13 These opening clauses endear Lepidus to his listeners by emphasizing their shared Roman identity as Quirites and thus their shared plight and perspect ive while also flattering them for their renowned mercifulness and honesty. However, this paternal tone belies an emotionally charged undercurrent aimed at arousing fear. Lepidus' open acknowledgment of his fear ( pluri mum timoris ), creates an environment i n which emotional displays by the crowd are welcome; even the speaker has indulged in his emotions. Lepidus gently draws in his audience with flattery for example, the superlative maximi only to quickly shift to the rhetoric of crisis. Clemency and honesty are juxtapose d to fear and tyranny. Lepidus' address to the crowd as Quirites focuses the concerns of his speech on the domestic realm; those things Lepidus fears manifest themselves within the community as a threat among the very people, not a distant, 12 McGushin 1992, Vol. 1, 114 13 Text: Maurenbrecher 1891 ; translation: McGushin 1992
128 f oreign threat. 14 His call to action, too, falls on all the people, not merely those serving in the Roman army. The people of Rome have the power to check Sulla's tyranny. As Cicero labeled Antony a king in Philippic 3 so Sallust via Lepidus, casting Sulla's rule, formally a dictatorship, as a tyranny, conjures up negative associations with absolute power and the rule of the kings of early Rome, fundamentally non Republican constructs that stand in contrast to the direct address to citizens ( Quirite s ). Those renowned Roman virtues of clemency and honesty could distract the citizens from taki ng a stand against this tyranny. Lepidus reveals how these positive traits applied haphazardly could cause the people to discount the risk posed by Sulla. The gre atness of Rome, expressed in the superlative, mirrors Lepidus' fear, also expressed in the superlative. A fear clause follows, in which Lepidus expresses his fears that his fellow Romans would not believe others capable of acts which they themselves find u nspeakable (1): ne quae ipsi nefanda aestimatis, ea parum crede ndo de aliis circumveniamini [ On the one hand I am afraid ] that you may be tricked through not believing others capable of acts which you yourselves consider abominable Lepidus elevates the risk by highlighting the unfamiliarity of the threat; his audience will worry more since it cannot comprehend the novelty of Sulla's and his minions' actions, provided that Lepidus can ensure that they do not disregard these threats as too vile to ever man ifest. 14 OLD s.v. Quirites 1: A name given to the citizens of Rome collectively in the peacetime functions (esp. in solemn addresses and appeals). Romani is the preferred term for Romans in their capacity as nation or a military force. Quirites is a common term of addressed in contiones as it appeals to the shared identity of the speaker and audience and avoids class distinction.
129 By calling such actions nefanda (abominable), Lepidus implies the displeasure of the gods and ratchets up the negative connotation. He then heightens this negativity with a string of comparatives, parum (too little) to describe the people's hesitan cy to believe and peior atque intestabilior (worse and more detestable) to characterize Sulla (1): praesertim cum illi spes omnis in scelere atque perfidia si t neque se aliter tutum putet, quam si peior atque intestabilior metu vestro fuerit, quo captis libertatis curam miseria eximat aut, si provideritis, in tutandis periculis magis quam ulciscendo teneamini. E treachery, and he thinks that he cannot be safe unless he has shown himself even worse and more detestable than you fear, so that when you have been completely duped by him your wretchedness may wipe out your concern for freedom. Then again, if you do take precautions, I fear that you may be more occupied in averting dangers than in exacting retribution for wrongs committed. With this set of comparatives along with the ablative metu (fear), Lepidus contrasts Sulla's hopes ( spes ) with the people's fear. Sulla's safety (represented by tutum ), argues Lepidus, lies in this unprecedented wickedness and the crippling misery he inflicts on the people. The safer he is, the more the people have to fear, and since they cannot imagine how bad and detestable Sulla can be, their sense of fear is height ened. Lepidus highlights the uncertainty that is a necessary component of fear and urges his fellow Romans not to wait until their fear has crippled them and Sulla's safety is assured. Sulla's hopes and the people's fear are correlated; as the one rises, s o does the other. Yet, this very relationship enables the people to reduce Sulla's hopes by bringing their fear down to a manageable level, a level that allows them to hope for themselves and to fight to avert the very things they fear.
130 But what are those things they fear? Lepidus frames the fear of his audience in terms of liberty and slavery. He introduces this theme here by reminding the people that their concern is for their libertas Libertas freedom is a recurrent political slogan in the speech and re sonates on a personal level and a collective one, marking not only an individual s freedom as opposed to slavery, but also the political independence of a sovereign people. 15 While urging his audience to fear for its freedom, Lepidus advises his listeners to find the proper balance with their fear. He had already implied that too much fear would shatter their resolve, but if they are not careful, they may become so absorbed in ensuring their safety that they neglect revenge. He closes his fear clause with a in tutandis periculis contrasted against tutum ) and demands that they punish Sulla for his previous actions. These two messages, safety balanced with vengeance, open the emotional register to embra ce anger as well as fear: anger at the past, which demands justice; fear for the future, which demands prevention. As Lepidus continues, he shifts his attention to Sulla's minions and makes them an object of fear as well (2): Sate llites quidem eius, homin es maximi nominis opti mis maiorum exemplis, nequeo satis mirari, qui dominationis in vos servitium suum mercedem dant et utrumque per iniuriam malunt quam optimo iure liberi agere. As for his satellites, I cannot adequately express my amazement that men who bear names made great by the most distinguished deeds of their ancestors are willing to pay for dominion over you with their own slavery, and, without regard for equity, prefer this state of affairs to living as free men according to the highest princi ples of justice. 15 OLD s.v. libertas 1 2. McGushin 1992, Vol. 1, 114 On libertas in Roman politics see Wirszubski 1968, esp. 7 30 and 50 52
131 Lepidus' choice of satellites to describe Sulla's followers is inherently biased because the word's connotation is negative and its semantics embrace the range of royal and extra constitutional authority and of criminal activity. 16 He thus reinforces his portrait of Sulla as a tyrant and his argument that Sulla's activities are illegal. These men are his accomplices, a characterization thrown into stark relief by the contemptuous observation that these men bear the names of ancestors who acc ompli shed great things, including the expulsion of the kings. The moral decline of Sulla's minions appears worse in light of the superlatives describing their heritage: maximi (greatest) and optimis (best). By indicating that these men are of noble houses, Lepidus concentrates his attack on the pro Sullan members of the senatorial class His lack of specificity allow s the mind to wander, to imagine untold numbers of minions, yet the restriction to the upper class, of which Lepidus is a member, draws attenti on to the decline in Roman morality, a theme prevalent in Sallust. 17 Furthermore, Lepidus' attack is not against the entire aristocracy, just the guilty. 18 The stigmatization of these minions creates a clear divide, with Lepidus and his audience on one side, Sulla and his satellites on the other. Lepidus' hyperbolic and sarcastic assertion that he cannot marvel enough ( nequeo satis mirari ) at the behavior of these men again strikes the tone of incredulity he imagines the people to express at the imagined futu re behavior of Sulla and his 16 OLD s.v. satelles 1 One of a bodyguard or escort to a prince or despot, henchman, attendant (often contempt.), 2 A (usu. violent) partisan, supporter; (w. gen.) an accomplice (in crime). 17 Earl 1961, 41 59 18 Morstein Marx 2004, 231 argues that it is typical of popularis contiones in Sallust, which we can take as indicators of popularis rhetoric in general, to attack not the senate as an institution or the aristocratic elite as a whole, but rather the moral collapse which select actors symptomized
132 supporters. 19 By joining in their disbelief, he further aligns his own interests and views with theirs, strengthening the in group / out group bias that separates Sulla and his minions from the rest of Roman society. A return to t he language or freedom versus servitude intensifies this divide. Lepidus labels these minions as men willing to submit to slavery to secure their own dominion over other Romans, the citizens Lepidus addresses. Furthermore, they have abandoned equity. Perce ptions of fairness affect perceptions of risk, so as Lepidus creates a paradigm for inequity, a system in which the few benefit while the many suffer, the risk of inaction becomes greater. His audience is left to imagine that they would benefit the least i n a system with Sulla at the top and his minions directly below him, slaves who are themselves masters of their own slaves. By sharing in Sulla's dominion, they willingly lose their personal liberty. Lepidus' shock at this behavior is palpable in the contr ast between free men ( liberi ) living under law ( optimo iure ) and dominion ( dominationis ) paired with servitude ( servitium ). Lepidus' accusation that Sulla's followers make their own payment ( suum mercedem dant ) reveals that they are bought men, men worse than true slaves because they sold themselves into the system. This behavior threatens the Republican constitution, dependent as it is on adherence to the rule of law. 20 Lepidus continues his harangue against the lowly among the nobility by shifting from th e generic satellites to single out three specific families the Bruti, Aemilii, and Lutatii (3): 19 According to Fraenkel 1957, 243 satis especially in the construction of satis iam or iam satis conveys impatience, such as 'enough of it!', 'no m ore of it! This tone is appropriate for Lepidus, who is fed up with the behavior of the elite. 20 See McGushin 1992, Vol. 1, 114 who points to Cat 52.21 to emphasize the importance of ius for the health of the Roman constitution. On ius in the Roman constitution, see Lintott 1999, 4 5
133 praeclara Brutorum atque Aemiliorum et Lutatiorum proles, geniti ad ea quae maiores virtute peperere, subvertenda. Distinguished offspring of the Bruti, Aemili i, and Lutatii, born to overthrow what their ancestors acquired by their prowess! The apostrophic vocative awakens the listener and raises the emotional register. By attacking prominent families, his own among them, Lepidus makes clear that the plague spre ads deep and that he stands with the people despite his own status as a member of the senatorial class His vagueness allows the mind to wander through the members of each house, yet Lepidus' referents can be deduced. McGushin identifies these offspring as Decimus Junius Brutus, Mamarcus Lepidus Vivianus, and Quintus Lutatius Catulus, his colleague and chief adversary. 21 Lepidus further attacks the three unspecified individuals by challenging their right to claim those names, for they have overturned the acc omplishments of their ancestors. Lepidus' verbal subverte nda creates a vivid image of destruction, as if the physical foundations of Rome were overturned with these family legacies. That destruction stands in stark contrast against the verb of generation a nd acquisition used to describe the ancestor's action: peperere from pario This verb draws attention to the language of birth and lineage ( proles geniti and maiores ) that runs through the sentence. To subvert those things acquired by their ancestors through courage ( virtus ) implies that these three aristocrats lack courage, that they lack the resolve to stand up to Sulla and protect their liberty. Like the general pool of minions, they sell their freedom in exchange for safety. Lepidus identifies exac tly what these men have subverted (4): Nam quid a Pyrrho Hannibale Philippoque et Antiocho defensum est aliud quam libertas et suae cuique sedes, neu cui nisi legibus pareremus? 21 McGushin 1992, Vol. 1, 114 Brutus and Vivianus were consuls for the following year, 77, MRR 2. 88.
134 For what did these forefathers defend against Pyrrhus, Hannibal, Philip, and A ntiochus other than our liberty and each his own dwelling place and our right of submitting to nothing but the laws? The rhetorical question invites the audience to participate and defies any answer other than Nothing! Liberty, the right to personal prop erty, and the rule of law were the very things that previous generations fought to preserve. These foreign powers threatened the sovereignty of Rome, yet great men of previous generations like the Bruti, Aemilii, and Lutatii led the fight against them. 22 Th e praise given to the ancestors proves that Lepidus has not abandoned the aristocracy as a whole; rather, he recognizes the faults in certain individual members. Unlike these ancestors, some of Lepidus' fellow members of the senatorial class bow under pres sure from Sulla. This connection ranks Sulla among the enemies of the state, as a hostis as if he were a foreign invader, not a Roman. Only foreign enemies should threaten Roman libertas Lepidus positions himself as the consul who stands in defense of Ro me against an external threat as real as Hannibal while establishing Sulla as one in a long line of frightening foreign enemies. These enemies of old and their contemporary counterpart Sulla threaten not only the libertas of Romans, but also their sedes T his term can refer simply to their homes, which Sulla threatened with his redistribution of land to his veterans, but also to the seat of power of Rome itself. 23 The ability of men to live as free men is threatened, but so is the ability of the state to ope rate in freedom as a sovereign entity. The failure of the 22 Lepidus refers to the Pyrrhic War, 280 275 BCE, in which the citizens of Ta r entum invited Pyrrhus of Epirus to aid them in their struggles against Rome; the Second Punic War, 218 201 BCE, in which Hannibal marched Carthaginian forces from Africa, through Spain and Gaul, and into Italy and devastated the Italian countryside, threat ening Rome itself; the Second Macedonian War, 200 197 BCE, in which Rome waged war against Philip V, who was attempting to expand his control over various Greek cities throughout the Mediterranean; and the Syrian War, 192 188 BCE, between Rome and Antiochu s III of the Seleucid Empire. 23 Sedes as home: OLD s.v. sedes 4; as seat of power: OLD s.v. sedes 7.
135 Bruti, Aemilii, and Lutatii to defend their sedes precipitated Sulla's tyrannical control over the Roman government and put the rule of one man over the authority of law. The slogans libertas and leges contextualize the failure of these nobles to live up to their names and isolate them, as McGushin puts it, as traitors to the ethical and political traditions of their class. 24 Having stigmatized Sulla's followers as satellites and betrayers of thei r families, Lepidus finally narrows his attack on Sulla himself. A connecting relative imports the emotional tone into the subsequent character assassination (5): Quae cuncta scaevos iste Romulus quasi ab externis rapta tenet, non tot excercituum clade neq ue consulum et aliorum principum, quos fortuna belli consumpserat, satiatus, sed tum crudelior, cum plerosque secundae res in miserationem ex ira vertunt. But all of these benefits this caricature of a Romulus of ours holds in his hands as if they had been wrested from foreigners; not fully sated with the destruction of so many armies, consuls, and other leading men whom the fortune of war had destroyed, he shows more cruelty at a time when success turns most men from anger to pity. The adjective scaevos hi nts at divine disapproval of Sulla's conduct and labels him as perverse. 25 This perversity plays on the reversal of the behavior of some of the nobility and heightens the disgust at the misappropriation of a Romulean identity. The derogatory iste emphasizes Lepidus' abhorrence and shows that this Romulus is to be scorned. Sulla had promoted a Romulean ideology to support his reforms of the Roman constitution, as though he were a second founder of Rome. 26 That such a man should hold the rights of Romans in h is hands is repugnant; Romans should possess those 24 McGushin 1992, Vol. 1, 115 25 OLD s.v. scaevus 2 and 3. 26 Sulla's attempts to frame himself in relation to Romulus are detailed by Gisborne 2005, 119 121
136 privileges themselves. Lepidus elevates the disgust with the ironic quasi which highlights the pretension of Sulla's attempt to cast himself as Romulus. 27 This Romulus not only controls the rights of Ro mans, but he imagines that those rights have been seized for foreigners. This continues the connection between Sulla and foreign enemies and reveals that he considers Romans his hostes He does not consider himself a member of t he Roman community but rath er looks on them as something other, so he has no qualms about violently snatching their rights. Lepidus caps this violence with a tricolon embracing the scope of destruction under the Sullan regime: non tot excercituum clade neque consulum et aliorum pri ncipum, quos fortuna belli consumpserat, satiatus Any male Roman in Lepidus' audience could imagine himself as a member of one of these groups, especially since the army was open to all citizens yet meritorious plebeians equites, c onsuls and other lea ding men were destroyed as well. 28 Aliorum (other) on the final element of the tricolon adds to the inclusiveness and invites speculation. 29 The juxtaposition of consumpserat ( had destroyed, literally, consumed ) and satiatus (fully sated) links Sulla to the fickle fortune of war and implies further insatiability, highlighting the prevalence of earlier destruction and future risk. With such a destructive and indiscriminate man in power in Rome, no one is safe. That risk carrie s over into the present because after his successes, Sulla became even more cruel. Lepidus emphasizes that the unbelievable 27 OLD s.v. quasi A2 (ironic) and A1b (common with verbs of pretending). 28 McGushin 1992, Vol. 1, 116 lists four consuls who fell during the Civil War: L. Cornelius Cinna near in Ancona in 89, L. Valeriu s Flaccus in Asia in 86, Marius the Younger at Praeneste in 82, and Cn. Papirius Carbo in Sicily in 82; however, Cinna died in 84 (during a mutiny near Ancona); for sources, see MRR 2. 60. 29 Cf. Pagn 2004, 37 on alia in Sallust's description of Catiline's criminal behavior, Cat 15, 16, and 21.
137 has really happened and that Sulla continues to be a threat because his level of cruelty is unparalleled. When most people ( plerosqu e ) would turn to pity, Sulla let his anger run free. Sulla is an outsider even among cruel men. He fails to recognize the time for pity and indulges in the emotions of a tyrant who does not know how to handle himself after victory ( secundae res ). Sulla's d estructiveness is so pervasive that even future generations are at risk (6): Quin solus omnium post memoriam humani
138 people. Sulla's enormous crimes replay the theme that the threat to Rome is new and novel, and the contrast between his safety and the people's slavery reminds the audience that Sulla's benefit is their disadvantage. Lepidus employs the language of fea r ( metu and terremini ) to remind the audience that Sulla would have them oppressed by their fear, whereas Lepidus would have them emboldened by it. He implies that Romans should be ashamed of being too afraid to recover their liberty. The comparative ( grav iore ) used to describe the cruel slavery they fear hints that things could grow worse. By pairing this comparative with the previous superlative ( pravissime ), Lepidus reveals that the people are right to fear, but that they have channeled their fears in un constructive ways. Lepidus now launches into his first exhortation of the speech (7): Agendum atque obviam eundum est Quirites, ne spolia vestra penes illum sint, non prolatandum neque votis paranda auxilia. Nisi forte speratis taedium iam aut pudorem tyrannidis Sullae esse et eum per scelus occupata periculosius dimissurum. Now is the time for action, citizens; now is the time to face up to the tyrant in order that your spoils may not be bestowed on him. This is not the time for putting things off, nor for looking for help by prayers to the gods unless, perchance, you hope he is now weary or ashamed of his tyranny and that what he has seized through crime he will, with even greater danger to himself, let go. For his fear mongering to be successful, Lepidus must compel the people to act. He expresses the seriousness of his exhortation with the passive periphrastic. This is no request, but a fundamental necessity, a moral duty of the Quirites to stand up to the tyrant. Although the citizens are not agents of the passive periphrastic, their agency is explicit in Lepidus' direct address to them. His demand that they prevent their spoils from becoming Sulla's reminds the audience that Sulla treats them like a foreign enemy, not like the Quirites they are. He also reminds them that the spoils of war are the
139 property of all Rome, not just the victorious general. The phrase penes illum further heightens the disparity in power under Sulla. 31 Penes is a rare preposition that appears in all of Sallust's extant works seven times, four of them in this speech. 32 Although this preposition indicates possession, the power inherent in that po ssession and the physical control it implies underscores Sulla's extralegal authority. Lepidus heightens the necessity for action by reminding his audience that this is not the time to defer. At this moment of crisis the people must act immediately The si tuation, he says, is beyond divine intervention; the people must stop praying for change and effect it themselves. Any hope that things will get better on the ir own is wasted, which Lepidus elucidates with the sarcastic nisi forte (unless, perchance). Iam (already) reminds the listener that if Sulla were going to have misgivings, he has had plenty of opportunity. 33 Even after Sulla abdicat ed his dictatorship, the plague continues, the tyranny lives on Sulla feels no shame for his tyranny, a fact made even m ore reprehensible by the proximity of pudorem and tyrannidis Lepidus calls the reign of Sulla what he believes it is, using a word loaded with associations to Rome's last kings and to non Republican institutions. Tyrants evoke images of tyrannicides, and if Lepidus can make the label stick, he can justify any action taken to reverse the illegal acts of the tyrant. Lepidus indicates the illegality of Sulla's action s by calling his gains those he has seized though crime ( per scelus occupata ) and reminding his audience that they 31 Maurenbrecher and McGushin both accept Corte's emendation of illos in Cod. Vat. Lat. 3864 to illum on the grounds that the stress cle arly lies on Sulla and not on him and his followers. 32 All four occurances of penes in the Historiae are in this speech. The other three time it apepars in Sallust are all in the Jug. (14.1, 17.7, 26.2). These results were found using a morphological searc h of the PHI5 disk with Diogenes 3.1.6 for Mac. 33 Iam often conveys impatience. See n. 19 above.
140 hope in vain if they think he would relinquish power at even greater danger to himself. From this, Lepidus' audience can infer that Sulla's abdication of the dictatorship was for show and that he still directs affairs of the state; after all, his const itution remains in place, one that favors his minions and protects him from danger. A running theme throughout the speech, the safety of the Roman people is contrasted to the safety of Sulla. Lepidus continues this theme by expanding upon Sulla's avoidance of danger and concern for safety (8): At ille eo processit, ut nihil gloriosum nisi tutum et omnia retinendae dominationis honesta aestimet. On the contrary, he has sunk to the point where he regards no position as ill ustrious unless it is safe, and considers every device for retaining his supremacy as honourable. Because Sulla makes his personal safety paramount he thinks his tyranny is glorious and that everything he does to maintain his power is respectable. The jus taposition of dominationis and honesta reveals that this cannot be the case, that supreme power is fundamentally dishonorable. Dominatio bears association with the absolute power of an arbitrary ruler and with despotism, both of which are unacceptable in a Republic. In light of Sulla's willingness to do any and everything ( omnia ) to retain that power, men no longer retain the luxury of inaction (9): Itaque illa quies et otium cum libertate, quae multi probi potius quam laborem cum honoribus capessebant, nul la sunt; And so the state of tranquility and peace combined with freedom, which many good men used to choose rather than an active career with honours as a reward, is a thing of the past; No one is excused from taking up arms to defend the state against S ulla. Otium cum libertate recalls the Optimate party slogan otium cum dignitate perhaps anachronistically; this line was promoted by Cicero in the generation after Lepidus and
141 Sulla. 34 Regardless, this slogan in the mouth of a populist means that the nobil es no longer have the luxury of choos ing a non political career. Otium cannot be maintained without the effort of all. If even members of the senatorial class like Lepidus must act, so must the people. The shift from dignitate to libertate raises the stake s. Personal worth is valuable enough, but freedom is a prized possession of every Roman. Once lost, it could be lost forever. Nulla sunt seals this irreversibility. This moment of crisis represents the point of no return. Lepidus warns his fellow Romans th at they must choose to be their own masters or to be slaves ( hac tempestate serviundum aut imperitandum 10). The return to gerundives emphasizes the moral necessity of their choice. They must wait no longer The stark contrast between serviundum and imperitandum reminds the Romans that the stakes could not be higher. Lepidus follows these gerundives with two more and hangs fear in the balance between them: citizens one must feel fear or inspire it ( habendus metus est aut faciundus, Quirites ). The power to tip the balance of fear is in the hands of Lepidus' audience. If they choose to allow Sulla to stay in safety and not to make him fear them, then they submit themselves to live in fear for the rest of their lives. The two sides cannot be recon ciled, which Lepidus' use of aut makes clear. Aut introduces two logically exclusive alternatives, leaving no room for both Sulla and the people to live free from fear. 35 The address to the Quirites forces Lepidus' audience members to ask themselves which of these alternatives a Roman citizen should choose. Lepidus' rhetorical For what else is left? ( Nam quid ultra? ) finalizes the inevitability of this choice. No other options remain. 34 Cic. Sest. 96 98, Fam 1.9.21. See also Wirszubski 1954 and Balsdon 1960 35 OLD s.v. aut 1.
142 The pessimism of this question highlights how much has already been tak en away and reveals that the only option left to the people is to take charge. The penalty for inaction the voluntary handing over of that only remaining power is total slavery. Lepidus follows this rhetorical question with another (11): Quaeve humana supe rant aut divina impolluta sunt? Populus Romanus, paulo ante gentium moderator, exutus imperio, gloria, iure, agitandi inops despectusque ne servilia quidem alimenta reliqua habet. What human laws are left? What divine laws have not been violated? The Rom an people, a short while ago the rulers of nations, now stripped of power, repute, and rights, without the power to administer its own affairs, an object of contempt, does not even retain the rations of slaves. Sulla stepped beyond human and divine laws by aspiring to tyranny. Again, Lepidus implies divine disapproval. Lepidus expresses outrage and disgust that Sulla would do anything and would violate any law, and he leaves his audience to wonder what terrible things could possibly be in store from a man w ho transgresses all boundaries. Sulla's behavior appears decidedly un Roman when viewed in the context of the greatness of the Roman people, once the rulers of all nations. Sulla has turned the Roman order upside down by stripping them of the power, reputa tion, and law that belong to Rome citizens He has transferred these possessions to himself. The descending tricolon ( imperio, gloria, iure ) mirrors the descent of Roman prestige and freedom under Sulla. This loss of power applies specifically to the pro scribed and to those magistrates whose power the Sullan constitution weakened. First among these are the tribunes, whose loss of authority represents the disempowerment of the common people. No longer do the members of Lepidus' audience have the ability to propose laws or seek a veto through the Tribunate.
143 Lepidus' appeal reaches beyond the common people. As McGushin notes, Lepidus' complaint that the Roman people were once the rulers of the world and are now reduced to servitude are not the words of a rev olutionary but of a Roman aristocract who resents the degradation of Roman political live and imperial rule. 36 Lepidus does not aim to stir up a popular rebellion and to install a new government. Rather, he urges a return to the way things were when Rome w as great. He blames this perceived decline in Roman supremacy and the sovereignty of the people on Sulla. His resentment makes him fear for the future, and he wants the common people to share his fear, hoping to inspire them to join him in open arms if nec essary. By appealing to old Roman values, he aims to attract Optimates as well. As both an aristocrat and a populist, he can appeal to the full sp ectrum of Roman society with his desire not to overturn the Republican system, but to return faithfully to it. The collapse of this system under Sulla is typified with the final image of the sentence: Roman citizens living on less than the rations afforded slaves. With these words Lepidus reminds the plebeians that Sulla abolished the corn dole, leaving the urban poor with less to eat than even a master gives his slaves. This parallel makes Sulla the slave master of the urban poor while also stigmatizing him as the worst type of slave master. Slavery would be unacceptable under any circumstances, but when it comes without the safety and security of food, the fear of a possible future of such slavery becomes unbearable. As Lepidus continues to rail against Sulla's tyranny, he turns to the actions taken against Rome's allies (12): 36 McGushin 1992, Vol. 1, 117
144 Sociorum et Latii magna vis civitate pro multis et egregiis factis a vobis data per unum prohibentur et plebis innoxiae patrias sedes occupavere pauci satellites mercedem scelerum. A considerable part of our allies and of the people of Latium are being debarred by this one man from citizensh ip granted them by you in return for their many and distinguished services, while a few of his underlings, as a reward for their crimes, have taken possession of the ancestral homes of the guiltless common people. Certain communities offered citizenship by the Julian Law in 90 were denied those rights by Sulla. 37 A privilege granted by the Roman people ( a vobis ) was taken away by one man ( per unum ) in an act of despotism Lepidus frames the granting of citizenship as if the very people he addresses had their personal wishes to acknowledge the many and distinguished services of the allies and Latin towns overturned by Sulla. By reminding his audience of those services, h e also reminds them that these are the blameless municipalities, the ones that did not raise arms against Rome. 38 If Sulla would deny them their citizenship, perhaps the citizens of Rome are next. Lepidus then contrasts their distinguished services with the crimes ( scelerum ) of Sulla's minions and invites his audience to identify with the common people of Latium and the Italian towns with the phrase the ancestral homes of the guiltless common people ( plebis innoxiae patrias sedes ). They too are innocent pl ebeians whose homes and possessions Sulla's minions are imagined to possess. That the few ( pauci ) benefit at the expense of the rest of the population revives fear of inequity and allows for further stigmatization of Sulla's minions. The vague scelerum emb races all manner of ill, reminding the crowd that 37 Lex Iulia de civitate Latinis d anda granted Roman citiz enship to the citizens of Italian towns that had not rebelled during the Social War. Sulla denied citizenship to the citizens of those towns that held out against him, Cic. Caec. 102. 38 Although citizenship was originally restricted to the non rebellious c ommunities, Liv. Per. 75 76 attests that the remaining towns of Latium and Italy received citizenship later.
145 landowners across Italy lost their land to Sulla's veterans and that leftover confiscated property was auctioned off to Sulla's supporters. Lepidus emphasizes the harsh reality of this confiscation and this unacceptable behavior with a preponderance of harsh alliteration ( d a t a p er unum p rohi b en t ur et p le b is inno x iae p a t rias se d es o cc u p a v ere p au c i ) Because of Sulla's consolidation of power under his tyranny, affairs of the state that were once the public con cern such as granting citizenship to Rome's allies are in the hands of one man (13): Leges, iudicia, aerarium, provinciae, reges penes unum, denique necis civium et vitae licentia. The laws, the courts, the treasury, the provinces, client kings, nay even the power of life and death over our citizens are in the hands of one man. This second use of penes with unum as its object, reinforces the image of Sulla as an absolute ruler and recalls the charge above that the decision of the many was overturned by a single man. Sulla becomes an absolute ruler lording his power over other absolute rulers, client kings, as if he were some kind of super tyrant. The institutions of Roman political life, the laws, courts, and treasury, are under his control instead of the people's. The asyndeton cements these institutions together under Sulla's control, demanding attention and revealing th e vast scope of Sulla's power. Yet, Sulla's power extends further ; Lepidus tops the preceding sequence with a final element introduced by denique (finally). The unthinkable sweep of his power defies limit; he holds in his hands the power of life and death. This is no abstract threat. Sulla had published proscriptions and had massacred citizens in the Villa Publica while the senate
146 met in th e Temple of Bellona, within hearing distance. 39 Lepidus warns that Sulla could wield this power once more if he so chooses. Lepidus' diction elevates the horror of Sulla's discretion to kill as he pleases. Necis implies not just death but murder, and licent ia in the final position of the sentence, underscores Sulla's immoderate behavior. Roman freedom takes the form of libertas not licentia which has connotations of wantonness, acting as one pleases instead of as one ought and acting without restraint. 40 F inally, the entire claim that Sulla has the power of life and death is a backhanded reference to his dominatio in which Sulla acts as pater familias not pater patriae to the entire citizen body, contrary to Roman law, in which state mandated penalty of de ath for a citizen is relegated to the courts. 41 The reality of citizen death via proscription is manifest when Lepidus calls on his audience to remember human sacrifices and tombs covered with the blood of citizens ( Simul humanas hostias vidistis et sepulcr a infecta sanguine civili 14). Human sacrifices are taboo, having been outlawed by a decree of the senate in 97; describing proscriptions as such transfers all the fear of human sacrifice onto Sulla. 42 At least one specific proscription carried out under S ulla, that against Marcus Marius Gratidianus, deserved such condemnation. Cicero and Sallust both attest that he was executed in the manner of human sacrifice. 43 The language of hostias sepulchra and infecta 39 Plut. Sull. 30; Sen. Clem 1.12.2; Cass. Dio, fr. 109.5. 40 OLD s.v. licentia 1 and 2. See also Wirszubski 1968, 7 9 and Braund 2004 who shows that in Roman satire, licentia represents an exercise of freedom of which the speaker does not approve (409). 41 The pater familias does have this right within his own family, but that right does not translate into one for t he pater patriae over the Roman citizenry. 42 On this decree, see Plin. N.H. 30.12. 43 Cicero alleges that Catiline took part in Gratidianus' execution, Tog. Cand. frs. 2, 9, 10, and 16, with notes by Asc. Tog. ad loc. The execution is described by Sal. Hist 1.44M. Sallust mentions altars
147 emphasizes the religious overtones. The arrange ment of descriptors on the outside, nouns enclosed within, and the verb at the very center draws attention to the active role of the audience and demands that they relive whatever horrors they personally witnessed and to imagine those of which they heard. Tombs stained with civil blood recall the terrors of civil war. The fear of future proscriptions and even human sacrifice, Lepidus argues, demands action (15): Estne viris reliqui aliud quam solvere iniuriam aut mori per virtutem? quoniam quidem unum omnibus finem natura vel ferro saeptis statuit neque quisquam extremam necessitatem nihil ausus nisi muliebri ingenio exspectat. Is there anything left to those who are truly men except to rid themselves of oppression or to die valiantly? For in truth nature has appointed one and the same end for all, even for those flanked by armed might, and no man waits for the final inevitability doing nothing, unless he has the heart of a woman. Again, Lepidus plays on the shame of his audience. Lepidus el icits a fear about the very nature of who they are as Romans and as real men and their place in Roman society in relation to others. 44 His use of vir for man and his exhortation to die with courage ( per virtutem ), as contrasted with muliebri ingenio (the heart of a woman) in the second sentence, casts his argument in stark terms of personal worth. This gender loaded terminology implies that each man would want to shirk off the charge of behaving effeminately. 45 Lepidus wants shame to inspire these cit izens to act like men and to display their manliness ( virtus ). He reminds his audience that the risk of a virtuous death defiled by the blood of suppliants at 1.47M in reference to the aftermath of the Battle at the Colline Gate. Plut. Sull. 31.5 recounts that the bloodshed was so rampant not a single home or altar was undefiled. 44 Th is type of fear is best rendered in Latin by verecundia as the wish to avoid drawing attention to oneself in an improper way or to an improper degree, Kaster 2005, 16 45 OLD s.v. mulie bris 2: Typical of or natural to a woman (esp. in a bad sense); womanish. b. (applied to the actions, appearance, etc., of a man) effeminate.
148 (here represented by mori ) is preferable to the type of death they would find under a continued Sullan regime (represented above by nec is 13). Either way, men will one day meet death, even Sulla, as Lepidus implies when he says, even for those flanked by armed might. He reminds his audience that Sulla will go down fighting and they should too. They should choose a good death. With this Lepidus closes the first exhortation of his speech. The consul then turns his attention to himself at the center of his speech (16): Verum ego seditiosus, uti Sulla ait, qui praemia turbarum queror, et bellum cupiens, qui iura pacis repeto. But Sulla say s that I am a cause of political turmoil because I protest against the rewards paid to inciters of civil disorder; he calls me a lover of war because I seek to restore the rights which apply in times of peace. He defends his dua l role as a n elite who benef it ed from Sulla's regime and a self proclaimed defender of the people. 46 He anticipates that Sulla will accuse him of inciting political turmoil and being a lover of war. His use of verum (but) is dismi ssive and his throwaway comment, as Sulla says, trivi alizes any credence to these charges. He must bring up these charges to dismiss them and to counter Sulla's attempts to deflect fear from himself onto Lepidus. Immediately after asking his audience to lay down their lives if necessary in armed defense of t he Republic, Lepidus strives to avoid the charge that he desires war. He justifies his call to arms in the short term as the assurance of the rule of peace ( iura pacis ) in the long term. Lepidus follows this introductory statement about his own character w ith a fuller defense. He does not desire war for war's sake, but because he wants to protect his audience (17): 46 So McGushin 1992, Vol. 1, 120
149 Scilicet quia non aliter salvi satisque tuti in imperio eritis, nisi Vettius Picens et scriba Cornelius aliena bene parata prodegerint, nisi app robaritis omnes proscriptionem innoxiorum ob divitias, cruciatus virorum illustrium, vastam urbem fuga et caedibus, bona civium miserorum quasi Cimbricam praedam venum aut dono datam. Of course I do, since you will not be safe and fully protected under Sul domination unless Vettius of Picenum and the clerk Cornelius may squander the goods which others have honestly acquired; unless you all approve the proscription of innocent men because of their wealth, the torture of distinguished citizens, a city dep opulated by exile and murder, the goods of wretched citizens sold or given away as if they were the spoils of the Cimbri. Scilicet lends a sarcastic tone to Lepidus' dismissal of Sulla's accusation, yet he is serious in reminding the crowd that men like Ve ttius and Cornelius have benefited from Sulla at the expense of the safety of average Roman citizens. 47 Lepidus positions himself as the protector of Rome who looks after the safety and security of the people he is address ing ; he positions Vettius and Corne lius as two examples of a countless pool of Sulla's minions. Their success, he alleges, comes at the cost of proscriptions, torture, a city abandoned, and Romans treated as conquered foreign enemies. Lepidus' hyperbole is evident in the impossibility that the city has been depopulated by exile and murder since he is currently giving a speech to the assembled people in t he f orum. To whom would he be speaking if the city had been abandoned? Yet, the picture he paints represents not only past ills, but the cat astrophic potential for future ones as well. His statement that innocent men are proscribed on account of their wealth insulated members of the aristocracy like himself from the stain of allegiance to Sulla and reminds 47 Vettius received a villa of Catulus' which he later sold to Cicero (Cic. Att. 2.24.2 and 4; Suet. Jul 17). This same Vettius was used by Caesar to alienate Pompey from Cicero in the so called Vettius Affair of 50 BCE; see Cic. Att 2.24 and McDermott 1949 ; Allen 1950 ; Taylor 1950 ; Brunt 1953 McGushin 1992, Vol. 1, 120 identifies Cornelius as one of 1 0,000 slaves freed by Sulla and quaestor in 44. He cites Cic. Off. 2.29, in which Cicero mentions a clerk under Sulla who was a quaestor under Caesar, but he gives no name.
150 his audience that wealth and privileg ed birth alone are not reproaches against a man, but rather whether they seek to retain their wealth or gain more of it by supporting Sulla. The b light o n Rome that he imagines strikes every level of society, the well born, the meritorious, and the poor. T he crowd can identify with the wretched citizens and wonder if they are next. No matter their rank, however, these people are Roman and should not be treated like the Cimbri. By mentioning the Cimbri, Lepidus opens the possibility that Romans will recall Gaius Marius, Sulla's main political rival before his death in 86. The subliminal Marian message serves to provide hope that a popular leader can defend Rome and that there are options other than Sulla. Furthermore, by alleging that Sulla and his minions t reat Romans like the Cimbri, Lepidus again casts Sulla as a hostis and reminds his audience that Marius treated only foreign enemies, not Romans, like foreign enemies. Lepidus' next line of defense focuses on the charge that he himself benefited under Sull a (18): At obiectat mihi possessiones ex bonis proscriptorum: quod quidem scelerum illius vel maximum est, non me neque quemquam omnium satis tutum fuisse, si recte faceremus. Atque illa, quae tum formidine mercatus sum pretio, soluto iure dominis tamen re stituo, neque pati consilium est ullam ex civibus praedam esse. Sulla charges me with having possessions which are derived from the goods of the proscribed, but in fact the very greatest of his crimes is that neither I nor anyone else would have been sufficiently safe if we were doing what was right. Moreover the property which at the time I bought through fear, I am disposed nevertheless to restore to those who, having paid the price, are their rightful owners; it is not my intention to allow any depredations at the expense of citizens.
151 Syme calls Lepidus' attempt to defend himself flimsy and derisory, yet Lepi dus found himself in a dilemma. 48 Like the citizens in his audience, he could only ensure his safety by playing along. If he had not benefited from the proscriptions, he would have risked being one of the names on that list. The language of court ( obiectat mihi ) suggests that Sulla has leveled charges against Lepidus based on his character; the crimes, however, are Sulla's, not Lepidus'. Lepidus' only mistake was submitting to Sulla's demands in exchange for safety. He admits that he acted out of fear ( formi dine ), but this type of acute dread is the fear that Lepidus now rejects and wants his audience to reject. In its place he urges a measure of fear that compels them to action. Lepidus acknowledges his mistakes and promises to make amends by restoring the p roperty to its rightful owners even though he paid for it. He will lose the investment that bought his safety because he realizes that this safety is an illusion that masks the slavery Sulla has imposed on him. He refuses to further enjoy spoils ( praedam ) from citizens, yet another reminder that Sulla treats citizens as enemies. The property Lepidus has gained is not legally his, even though he paid for it. By right ( iure ), it belongs to its original owners. If he were to accept it as rightfully his, he wou ld sanction the legality of Sulla's actions. No longer will he endure such a distortion of justice; as he had encouraged his audience, so Lepidus will fight and will refuse to recline under the delusion of safety. As Lepidus continues his defense, he encou rages the people to join him in adopting a better course of action (19): Satis illa fuerint, quae rabie contracta toleravimus, manus conserentis inter se Romanos exercitus et arma ab externis in nosmet vorsa, sceleris et contumeliarum finis sit; quorum Sul lam non poenitet, ut et facta in gloria numeret et, si liceat, avidius fecerit. 48 Syme 1964 [reprint 2002], 186
152 Let it be enough to have endured what our madness has brought upon us Roman armies pitted against each other, our arms turned away from the enemy and against ourselves. Let th ere be an end to crime and outrage of which, however, Sulla is so far from repenting that he counts them among his claims to glory, and, if he were allowed, would even more eagerly do them again. The beauty of Lepidus' acceptance of his own past misdeeds i s that he offers redemption to any Roman who is ready to leave t his madness behind. It is enough to have suffered civil war, which he represents with the pleonasm of Roman armies fighting each other and the weapons of Rome turned against its citizens. The addition, however, of the second phrase replays Sulla's shifting of resources from foreign wars to a war against the Roman citizenry and Sulla's tendency to treat citizens as hostes The identification of Romans as Sulla's enemies and the shock that this s hould be so is reinforced by the emphatic nosmet Lepidus then calls for an end not only to the wicked deeds he has bemoaned throughout the speech, but also the railing abuse ( contumeliam ) he defended himself against in the preceding sections. The shame he feels at being open to such abuse because he remained inactive and the comparable shame he evokes in his audience finds no parallel in Sulla: Sulla is so far from repenting that he counts [his crimes] among his claims to glory. That Sulla in fact consid ers his misdeeds to his credit compounds his lack of shame and presents the possibility that, if allowed, he would continue all the more eagerly. The third appearance of satis brings this insatiability to the fore. The future less vivid protasis of the mix ed condition si liceat, avidius fecerit empowers the citizens to prevent the fulfillment of the condition. The subjunctive leaves room for a different future while the indicative makes clear that inaction means the situation would get worse. The agency of the crowd
153 becomes the defining factor in shaping Rome's future, and it is this agency that the fear monger must appropriate for his own purposes. Lepidus does not question the power of the people to effect the change he desires, but he continues to express concern about their resolve (20): Neque iam quid existimetis de illo, sed quantum audeatis vereor, ne alius alium principem expectantes ante capiamini, non opibus eius, quae futiles et corruptae sunt, sed vestra socordia, qua raptum ire licet et quam aude at, tam videri Felicem. 49 But now, while I no longer have qualms about what you think of him, I do have fears about how far you are prepared to go. My anxiety is that, while you are waiting for someone else to give a lead, you may be caught, not by his fo rces which are unreliable and venal, but through your inaction which allows one to continue on a course of robbery with violence and to appear He believes that Sulla's character is evident. The fear he expressed a t the beginning of his speech that the people were refusing to believe Sulla's intent has faded, to be replaced by a fear that they will not do enough to prevent Sulla from maintaining power and his constitution from remaining in effect. Sulla's own action s and Lepidus' own words have made the case that something must be done, yet at such moments, Lepidus laments, men wait for someone else to take action. Those who wait, he warns, may be taken unawares. We can imagine that Lepidus has aroused a response fro m the crowd, but perhaps the response is not strong enough. 50 He wants the crowd to maintain its furor after his words die down; he wants the hope of reform to spread like a contagion 49 Cod. Vat. Lat. 3864 has quam audeas tam videri felicem which Maurenbrecher, following Corte's emendation, prints w ith audeat and Felicem with the capital to indicate Sulla's nickname. In oration, of course, the word conjures up the association whether it is meant to be implicit or explicit. 50 The audience actively participated at a contio. Morstein Marx 2004, 131 132 argues that those who supported a speaker were more likely to attend his contiones and that part of their motivation was to shout approval. Vocal support would bolster the speaker's claims to represent the will of the people. Speakers may even have hired plants in the crowd to rile up the audience. See Cic. Sest. 106 10 8, 113, 126 127, Dom 89; App. B.Civ. 2.120 121.
154 so that more people will join in as they see the masses mobilize. He does not want them to glance in vain from person to person wondering who will make a move, bystanders instead of actors. To do rouse them to action Lepidus must embolden the people with the prospect of success. This is the risky part. To make victory seem pos sible, to inspire the hope necessary to make fear a positive force for change, Lepidus must strike the right balance between making Sulla and his minions seem threatening and making them seem beatable. He must delegitimize Sulla's strength just enough. He does this by reminding the citizenry that Sulla's greatest strength is not his unreliable and venal resources, but rather their own inaction. The repetition of audeatis and audeat reveals that Sulla's boldness has allowed him to appear fortunate, yet if t he people would only be bold, his luck would wither. With the final word felicem Sulla's nickname of Felix (the Lucky) comes under attack, as Lepidus asserts that Sulla has only the appearance of luck, a cover for his audacity. 51 Lepidus' attack on Sulla's strength and the service of his minions continues (21): Nam praeter satellites commaculatos quis eadem volt aut quis non omnia mutata prae ter victorem ? Scilicet milites quorum sanguine Tarrulae Scirtoque, pessimis servorum, divitiae partae sunt? For, apa rt from his crime stained underlings, who has the same aspirations or who does not desire a complete chance, retaining only the achievement of victory? Is it, think you, the soldiers at the cost of whose blood riches have been won for slaves such as Tarru la and Scirtus? 52 51 On this nickname, see Plut. Sull. 34.2. 52 Translation accepted the emmendation of victorem to victoriam
155 The third mention of satellites labels them as commaculatos ritually unclean, morally defiled, and contaminated. 53 The religious semantics add to the impression of divine disapproval, recalling the tombs stained with civil blood above (14). Lepidus' rhetorical questi o one! No one other than Sulla's minions wishes for the current state of affairs to become the status quo, yet Lepidus allows the people to retain the military victories for which Sulla was responsible or to which he was a major contributor. Lepidus acknowledges that Sulla did some good for Rome, helping to earn victories a gainst Jugurtha, the Cimbri and Teutones, and Mithridates; however, these victories are no excuse for his subsequent behavior in Rome. Lepidus then mentions the very people he argues should be least likely to support the Sullan regime: the Sullan veterans who did the hard work of earning those victories but saw the rewards enjoyed by the worst of slaves, Tarrula and Scritus. Scilicet adds disgust to the very implication that the soldiery should support Sulla. Lepidus hopes to win any Sullan veterans in the crowd to his cause and to reassure them that they owe no allegiance to Sulla just because he led them to victory. The mention by name of two slaves, though they are unknown outside this speech, puts a face on the few who benefit as opposed to the unnamed m asses and the unna med soldiers who lose. Lepidus' word order emphasizes the distance between the soldiers and the riches that should be theirs, riches in the hands of slaves. Lepidus then turns to another group of people who can lay aside any loyalty they may feel for Sulla (22): An quibus praelatus in magistratibus capiendis Fufidius, ancilla turpis, honorum omnium dehonestamentum? Itaque maximam mihi fiduciam parit 53 OLD s.v. commaculatus 1b and c (with this line cited).
156 victor exercitus, cui per tot volnera et labores nihil praeter tyrannum quaesitum est. Or is it those who in seeking office were thought less worthy than Fufidius, a vile wench, the degradation of all honours ? And so I place my greatest confidence in that victorious army which has gained nothing by so many wounds and hardships except a tyrant. The me ritorious plebeians and equites as well as any nobiles in Lepidus' crowd, especially former soldiers, who were passed over for magistracies and office while Sulla advanced his minions above them surely do not support Sulla's regime. His use of an to introduce this alternative question anticipates no and expresses surprise and indignation at the very suggestion. Any who support Sulla under such circumstance should be shamed into reneging upon remembering that someone like Fufudius has been the benefi ciary of their hard work. Fufidius gave Sulla the idea to publish proscriptions, and in return for his loyalty, Sulla made him praetor in 81 and propraetor in 80. 54 Casting Fufidius as a vile wench ( ancilla turpis ) arouses fear of gender and class transgr ession and implies sexual misconduct between Sulla and his slave girl. 55 The figura etymologica of honestum and dehonestamentum highlights the disgrace honorable Romans should feel at the elevation of such a man over the meritorious. Lepidus then shifts all praise for Sulla's military succe sses onto the soldiers whom Sulla slights. It is the army that was the victor ; as thanks for how much they gave ( tot ), they got nothing ( nihil ) s a ve a tyrant, while Sulla's minions raked in the rewards. Each refrain that Sulla is a tyrant makes the charge increasingly believable despite Sulla's absence from Rome and abdication of the dictatorship By focus ing on minions like Fufidius, 54 Oros. 2.21.3, naming an L. Fursidius, is our source that Fufidius urged the proscriptions. On his subsequent offices, see MRR 2. 76 and 81. He was propraetor in Spain, where he suffered defeat against Sertorius. 55 OLD s.v. ancilla c cites this as an exampl e of ancilla applied to a man opprobriously.
157 Lepidus fights any apathy on the part of his audience caused by Sulla's retirement to Puteoli. Although he may be gone, his minions swarm the city. At last Lepidus gets to the heart of his complaint against the Sulla n constitution (23): Nisi forte tribuniciam potestatem eversum profecti sunt per arma, conditam a maioribus suis, utique iura et iudicia sibimet extorquerent, egregia scilicet mercede, cum relegati in paludes et silvas contumeliam atque invidiam suam, prae mia penes paucos intellegerent. Unless perchance their mission was the overthrow by force of arms of the power of the tribunes which their forefathers had established by force of arms, and to rob themselves with their own hands of their rights and jurisdic tion. Extraordinary indeed the reward they received when, banished to swamps and woods, they find that insult and hatred are their portion, that just a few carry off the prizes. The people do not have the power to bring back the proscribed dead, but they do have the power to restore the rights of the tribunate. This is the first and only direct mention of the office Lepidus makes. Another sarcastic nisi forte casts absurdity over the prospect that the soldiery intended to have the tribunate stripped of its authority. The tribunes should represent the ability of the people to participate effectually in their government, yet Sulla has denied them the ability to propose legislation, to veto acts of the senate, and to hold office after their tribunate. No man s eeking to climb the cursus honorum would want to stand as tribune; his political career would be over. The failure of the soldiers to fight to restore the power of the tribunes recalls the failure at the beginning of the speech for nobiles to live up to th eir ancestors. Unwittingly, Sulla's soldiers robbed themselves of their hard earned rights and jurisdiction, a fact stressed by the emphatic sibimet and the vivid extorquerent The recurrence of the slogans iura and iudicia remind the audience that Sulla has contravened established Republican principals. Lepidus then solidifies the disgust
158 aimed at Sulla and the shame on the soldiers with another sarcastic scilicet as he reminds the soldiers that their one reward, land in the Italian countryside, was a pu nishment in disguise. Instead of farmland, which can support a family, they received swamps and woods, yet those displaced from that land were nonetheless angry to be dispossessed. Thus, the veterans arrived at their new home to find useless land and to be met with hatred. All the true rewards, reminds Lepidus, fell to the few. The third use of penes again reinforces the nature of Sulla's dominion, one that favors the few at the expense of the many. His tone of sarcasm and disgust is only amplified by the a lliterative harsh sounds in praemia penes paucos As Lepidus begins to draw his oration to a close, he turns to the foundation of Sull a's power (24): Quare igitur tanto agmine atque animis incedit? Quia secundae res mire sunt vit iis ob tentui, quibus labef actis quam formidatus est, tam contemnetur: nisi forte specie concordiae et pacis, quae sceleri et parricidio suo nomina indidit. Neque aliter rem publicam et belli finem ait, nisi maneat expulsa agris plebes, praeda civilis acerbissima, ius iudiciumque om nium rerum penes se, quod populi Romani fuit. Why then, you might ask, does the tyrant parade around with so great a following and such assurance? Because success is a wonderful screen for vices; but if success falters he will be despised as much as he i s now feared. Or perhaps he acts in this way under the pretext of maintaining peace and harmony, which are the names he has bestowed on his guilt and treason. Furthermore, he declares that the republic cannot otherwise stand firm and the war be ended unles s the common people are permanently driven from their lands, the citizens cruelly plundered, and all rights and jurisdiction which once belonged to the Roman people placed in his own hands. Sulla has relied on his successes to make the people thankful for his military victories and to make the soldiers loyal on account of these same victories and the promise of land. He keeps a crowd of minions around him as protection and to make himself appear popular. By calling this crowd an agmen which often denotes a n army on the
159 march, Lepidus reveals this behavior to be a tactical maneuver. Without a string of military successes and the protection of his bodyguard, Sulla's vices would be readily apparent. The crippling fear he currently inspires would turn to anger, and the people would demand retribution. However much dread he inspires now, that much hatred would he face without his screen of successes. Nisi forte makes it clear that Sulla does not want harmony and peace, but rather wickedness (sceleri ) and treason. Finally, Lepidus asks if the prospect of the safety of the Republic and the end of wars is worth the price the people are paying. Are they willing to be driven from their land, to be plundered, and to put all power in Sulla's hands (represented by a fourt h and final penes )? Lepidus implies that the trend of land confiscations and proscriptions would continue, as would Sulla's tyranny, with all things in the power of one man ( omnium rerum versus penes se ). This uncertain future increases the fearful tone. To remind the citizens once more that the power to prevent this future rests in their own hands, Lepidus asks if this is the peace they want (25): Quae si vobis pax et composita intelleguntur, maxuma turbamenta rei publicae atque exitia probate, adnuite le gibus impositis, accipite otium cum servitio et tradite exemplum posteris ad rem publicam suimet sanguinis mercede circumveniendam! If this seems to you to be peace and order, then show your approval of the utter demoralization and overthrow of the republ ic; assent to the laws that have been imposed on you; accept a peace combined with servitude and hand on to future generations a model of how to ruin their country at the The connecting relative and the repetition of pax keep the pace quick and allow emotions to run high. The superlative maxima implies th a t more disruption is to come Lepidus' switch to imperatives directly involves his audience, while the quick succession of these imperatives, the final three in ascendin g tricolon, keeps them engaged. Lepidus
160 once again demands that the citizens either throw their support wholeheartedly behind Sulla, which he has made a morally repugnant choice by linking it to the destruction of the Republic, or take a stand with him. Ot herwise, in place of the leisure with freedom ( otium cum libertate 9) many wish to enjoy and think they enjoy by standing back will become leisure with slavery ( otium cum servitio ). Lepidus replays previous arguments about the rule of law, the risk to fut ure generations, and the spilled blood of citizens as he accuses his audience of setting a negative example for the futu re even though they were handed positive ones (3 and 23). Unless they resist Sulla, posterity will inherit a Republic covered in blood. Lepidus sets the example for the citizens. Although his private interest is best served by inaction, he has decided that freedom united with danger [is] preferable to peace with slavery (26) a final contrast between libertas and servitium 56 As Lepidus rounds out his conclusion, he calls the people to action once more with two additional imperatives (27): Quae si probatis, adeste, Quirites, et bene iuvantibus divis M. Aemilium consulem ducem et auctorem sequimini ad recipiendam libertatem! If you share t his view, citizens of Rome, rouse yourselves, and with the good help of the gods follow Marcus Aemilius, your consul, who will be your leader and champion in recovering your freedom. If his fellow citizens, addressed here as Quirites just as in the beginni ng, also prefer freedom to slavery, he commands them to be make themselves known and to follow their consul. In this closing, Lepidus finally asserts the consular authority that is his r ight and proves himself dedicated to the restoration of the Republic. The tricolon consulem 56 Mihi quamquam per hoc summum imperium satis quaesitum erat nomini maiorum, dignitati atque etiam praesidio, tamen non fuit consilium privatas opes facere potiorque visa est periculosa libertas quieto servitio (quoted text emphasized).
161 ducem et auctorem establishes the appropriateness that he should lead the people against Sulla. He has the ability to lead and is ready to act. The final imperative sequemini (follow!) enables and emboldens the crowd to take action an d is a final reminder that the future is in their hands. He urges them to channel their fear into fight before closing the oration on the slogan that has been the rallying point for the entire speech: libertas A close reading of Sallust's speech of Lepidu s with special attention to comparatives and superlatives, the diction of freedom and slavery, republic and tyranny, tone, especially as revealed through sarcastic adverbs, fear clauses, a nd agency reveals that Lepidus' speech is a rhetorical tour de force in fear mongering. In fact, if Sallust's speech captures the spirit of Lepidus' original speech, perhaps Lepidus accomplished his goal a little too well. He successfully riled up his own audience, and although he could not foment a popular revolt in the c ity, he did cause an uprising in Etruria. 57 In the city, however, Lepidus aroused great suspicion in the senate. His hostility towards his fellow senators though shrouded in oblique references and claims to uphold the ways of the ancestors, contributed to growing concern for his revolutionary tendencies. After Sulla's death, Lepidus gathered his troops in Etruria and directed them towards Rome, while instructing Marcus Junius Brutus to hold Cisalpine Gaul against Pompey. Brutus quickly capitulated to Pompey who then put Brutus to death before returning to Rome. Catulus and Pompey met Lepidus in battle at the Mulvian Bridge. 58 57 Syme 1964 [reprint 2002], 186 : The or ation led to no immediate action. Not could it have. Lepidus' policy of revolution needs time to develop, aided by chance or pressure of event in the first place, the decease of Sulla. Flor. Epit 2.11 calls Lepidus' revolutions a civil war suppressed as soon as it began and tells us that the senate was alarmed by his repeated harangues. 58 On the events leading up to the battle at the Mulvian Bridge and Lepidus' subsequent flight, see Plut. Pomp 15 16 and App. B.Civ 1.105 107.
162 They immediately drove Lepidus back. Having been declared an enemy of the state, Lepidus fled to Sardinia where he soon died. Lepidus' fate reminds us that the fear monger has at least two audiences, those he directly addresses and those about whom he speaks. Those he does not convert to his cause may end up afraid, but not of the object the fear monger intended. Rather, they ma y fear the fear monger himself. Sallust's Lepidus plays to the fears of his own day and to those of Sallust's. Sallust's audience, like Lepidus', lived in a time of constitutional uncertainty. In the mid 30s, one possible tyrant had been slain, but the fut ure leadership of Rome hung in the balance. The second triumvirate had renewed the proscriptions of the Sullan era, and how the young Octavian would rule was unclear. Would he and Antony continue to share power? Lepidus' own son was a triumvir with Octavia n and Antony; at the time the Historiae were published, he may or may not have retained power. 59 Would Lepidus' namesake and offspring follow in his father's footsteps and seek to defend the political rights of the people? By framing these concerns around t he political upheavals of the 70s, Sallust highlights tensions as relevant to Lepidus' audience as to his own. 59 In 36, Octavian stripped Lepidus of all his powers save the pontificate, App. B. Civ. 5.126.
163 CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION F ear mongering was a powerful political tool in late Rep ublican Rome from 88 28 BCE. The toolbox of a fear mongering orator is vast. He can activate three main heuristic s built in sets of rule s by which the human mind processes though t subconsciously to encourage his audience to make decisions while emotions run high: the affect heuristic, the represent ative heuristic, and the availability heuristic. To activate these heuristics he might press any number of risk perception buttons; he might focus on irreversibility threats to children and future generations, catastrophic potential, known victims, perso nal risk, the history of such threats, the immediacy of the danger, the iniquity of the shared benefits and risks, or the lack of control his audience might feel. A successful fear monger will pick and choose from this list to assemble an arsenal of potent ial threats appropriate to his unique situation, and he can combine them with culturally loaded triggers such as the fear of tyrants, the threat of slavery, or the moral and political decline of republican institutions. By reading speeches of the late Repu blic through the lens of fear mongering and modern approaches to understanding how fear mongering is accomplished, we can better appreciate how Roman orators were able to manipulate the emotions of their fellow Romans to reach their own political goals. We have seen how Cicero used his authority as consul to misdirect attention from the question of whether or not Murena committed electoral bribery by stressing the threat of the Catilinarian conspiracy. This misdirection, though his aim, was also necessary t o maintain the very authority that allowed him to distract the jurors. By placing the Catilinarian threat front and center, he justified his own harsh rhetoric and
164 actions against Catiline at a time when doubts were be ginning to arise, thereby main t ain ing the trust bestowed upon him to speak with authority as consul. Cicero 's Philippics Against Marcus Antonius 3 and 4 provide testimony to the power of character assassination to activate culturally loaded fears which were then projected onto Antony. In speec hes superficially aimed at praising Decimus Brutus, Octavian, the Martial and Fourth Legions, and Gaul, Cicero censures Antony He uses character assassination as a method of fear mongering to turn the legal actions of a consul into the illegal actions of a man aiming at kingship of a usurper consul, and of an outlaw akin to a brigand or the criminal Catiline. All the fears and anxieties associated with such figures map onto Antony as he assumes the role of enemy of the state. In his speech of Lepidus from the Histories (fr. 1.55M), Sallust carefully manipulates language through the use of diction, tone, fear clauses, comparatives and superlatives, sarcasm, agency, and political slogans to raise the emotional register and play upon latent fear s among the co mmon people, both the people imagined as the audience of Lepidus' historical speech in 78 BCE and the those comprising Sallust's readership in approximately 35 BCE. In the dramatic moment of the speech, Lepidus challenges his listeners to take charge and s ecure their own liberty by using fear to motivate them to fight; likewise, Sallust challenges his readers to question the direction of their own government and the future of the republican system. These three examples of fear mongering in late Repub l ican Rome provide us with a snapshot of political life in a narrow window of Roman history especially fraught with uncertainty and full of real threats to the lives and liberties of the Romans. We can now better appreciate how orators were able to capitali ze on this uncertainty and these
165 threats through fear mongering to shape the direction of Roman politics. Yet the fates of Cicero and Lepidus remind us that fear mongering has risks and that there are limits to how far one can push the limits of harsh rhet oric.
166 APPENDIX A CALCULATING FEAR Below are the seven fear word families and the words within each group with counts of citations by author for extant Latin literature from 88 28 BCE. Where dates of publication are debated, texts were included. L esser authors are presented together. Citations were found with a morphological search of the PHI disk 5 using Diogenes 3.1.6 for Mac. Headwords were selected from the Oxford Latin Dictionary and supplemented with additional compounds suggested by Diogenes All 3,249 citations were read to filter out homographs. Timor timor : Cic. (177); Sall. (12); Caes. (70); Lucr. (10 ); Cat. (2); Hor. (2); Verg. (0); Var. (3); Other (27) : Cic. (357); Sall. (14); Caes. (27); Lucr. (12 ); Cat. (3); Hor. (6); Verg. (2 ); Var. (3); Other (37) timens : Cic. (20); Sall. (6); Caes. (11); Lucr. (1 ); Cat. (1); Hor. (3); Verg. (1); Var. (1); Other (3) timefactus : Cic. (1); Sall. (0); Caes. (0); Lucr. (1 ); Cat. (0); Hor. (0); Verg. (0); Var. (0); Other (0) timidus : Cic. (79); Sall. (8); Caes. (3); Lucr. (0 ); Cat. (0); Hor. (1 ); Verg. (6); Var. (1); Other (0 ) : Cic. (23); Sall. (1); Caes. (3); Lucr. (0 ); Cat. (0); Hor. (0 ); Verg. (0); Var. (2); Other (0 ) : Cic. (18); Sall. (0); Caes. (0); Lucr. (0 ); Cat. (0); Hor. (0); Verg. (0); Var. (0); Other ( 0) pertimescere : Cic. (108); Sall. (2); Caes. (0); Lucr. (0 ); Cat. (0); Hor. (0); Verg. (0); Var. (1); Other ( 2) extimescere : Cic. (54); Sall. (0); Caes. (1); Lucr. (0 ); Cat. (0); Hor. (1); Verg. (0); Var. (0); Other ( 2) Total Count: 1129
167 Metus metus : Cic. (414); Sall (62); Caes. (13); Lucr. (18); Cat. (0); Hor. (5); Verg. (2); Var. (4); Other (9) : Cic. (253); Sall (13); Caes. (0); Lucr. (13); Cat. (4); Hor. (8); Verg. (8); Var. (14); Other (12) metuens : Cic. (12); Sall (6); Caes. (0); Lucr. (2); Cat. (0); Hor. (8); Verg. (3); Var. (0); Other (0) Total Count: 883 Verecundia verecundia : Cic. ( 45); Sall (0); Caes. (0); Lucr. (0 ) ; Cat. (0); Hor. (0 ) ; Verg. (0); Var. (0); Other (0) : Cic. ( 366); Sall (8); Caes. (35); Lucr. (2 ) ; Cat. (3); Hor. (3 ) ; Verg. (3); Var. (4); Other (23) verendus : Cic. ( 15); Sall (0); Caes. (0); Lucr. (0 ) ; Cat. (0); Hor. (0 ) ; Verg. (0); Var. (0); Other (0) : Cic. ( 3); Sall (0); Caes. (0); Lucr. (0 ) ; Cat. (0); Hor. (0 ) ; Verg. (0); Var. (0); Other (0) : Cic. ( 22); Sall (0); Caes. (0); Lucr. (0 ) ; Cat. (1); Hor. (1 ) ; Verg. (0); Var. (1); Other (0) : Cic. ( 13); Sall (0); Caes. (0); Lucr. (0 ) ; Cat. (0); Hor. (0 ) ; Verg. (0); Var. (0); Other (0) veretrum : Cic. ( 0); Sall (0); Caes. (0); Lucr. (0 ) ; Cat. (0); Hor. (0 ) ; Verg. (0); Var. (1); Other (0) : Cic. ( 1); Sall (0); Caes. (0); Lucr. (0 ) ; Cat. (0); Hor. (0 ) ; Verg. (0); Var. (0); Other (0) Total Count: 550 Terror terror : Cic. (81); Sall (10); Caes. (22); Lucr. (12 ); Cat. (1); Hor. (0); Verg. (0); Var. (0); Other (7) : Cic. (40); Sall (15); Caes. (13); Lucr. (0 ); Cat. (0); Hor. (4); Verg. (2); Var. (0); Other (1)
168 terribilis : Cic. (16); Sall (1); Caes. (0); Lucr. (2 ); Cat. (0); Ho r. (0); Verg. (0); Var. (1); Other (1) terriloquus : Cic. (0); Sall (0); Caes. (0); Lucr. (1 ); Cat. (0); Hor. (0); Verg. (0); Var. (0); Other (0) : Cic. (2); Sall (0); Caes. (0); Lucr. (1 ); Cat. (0); Hor. (0); Verg. (0); Var. (0); Other (0) dete : Cic. (81); Sall (2); Caes. (6); Lucr. (0 ); Cat. (0); Hor. (1); Verg. (0); Var. (2 ); Other (7) : Cic. (5); Sall (1); Caes. (5); Lucr. (1 ); Cat. (0); Hor. (0); Verg. (4); Var. (2 ); Other (0) : Cic. (46); Sall (1); Caes. (62); Luc r. ( 1); Cat. (0); Hor. (0); Verg. (0); Var. (1 ); Other (17) : Cic. (6); Sall (0); Caes. (0); Lucr. ( 0); Cat. (0); Hor. (0); Verg. (0); Var. (0 ); Other (0) : Cic. (0); Sall (0); Caes. (0); Lucr. ( 2); Cat. (0); Hor. (0); Verg. (0); Var (0 ); Other (0) terrific us : Cic. (0); Sall (0); Caes. (0); Lucr. ( 3); Cat. (0); Hor. (0); Verg. (0); Var. (0 ); Other (0) : Cic. (0); Sall (0); Caes. (4); Lucr. ( 0); Cat. (0); Hor. (0); Verg. (0); Var. (0 ); Other (0) Total Count: 493 Formido : Cic. (28); Sall (19); Caes. (0); Lucr. (11); Cat. (0); Hor. (2); Verg. (4); Var. (3); Other (2) : Cic. (6); Sall (1); Caes. (0); Lucr. (0); Cat. (0); Hor. (2); Verg. (0); Var. (1); Other (1) : Cic. (12); Sall (4); Caes. (0); Lucr. (0); Cat. (0); Hor. (1); Verg. (0); Var. (1); Other (0) Cic. (1); Sall (0); Caes. (0); Lucr. (0); Cat. (0); Hor. (0); Verg. (0); Var. (0); Other (0) : Cic. (26); Sall (0); Caes. (1); Lucr. (0); Cat. (0); Hor (1); Verg. (1); Var. (0); Other (0)
169 : Cic. (1); Sall (0); Caes. (0); Lucr. (0); Cat. (0); Hor. (0); Verg. (0); Var. (0); Other (0) Total Count: 129 Pavor pavor : Cic. (7); Sall (1); Caes. (0); Lucr. (4); Cat. (0); Hor. (2); Verg. (2); Var. (1); Other (0) : Cic. (2); Sall (3); Caes. (0); Lucr. (1); Cat. (0); Hor. (2); Verg. (0); Var. (1); Other (0) pavidus : Cic. (1); Sall (3); Caes. (0); Lucr. (5); Cat. (0); Hor. (2); Verg. (1); Var. (0); Other (0) pavescere : Cic. (0); Sall (1); Cae s. (0); Lucr. (0); Cat. (0); Hor. (0); Verg. (0); Var. (0); Other (0) : Cic. (0); Sall (0); Caes. (0); Lucr. (3); Cat. (0); Hor. (0); Verg. (0); Var. (0); Other (0) Total Count: 42 Dirus dirus : : Cic. (10); Sall (0); Caes. (0); Lucr. (2); Cat. (1 ); Hor. (5) ; Verg. (4); Var. (0); Other (1 ) Total Count: 23
170 APPENDIX B CITED TEXTS AND TRANSLATIO NS Texts and translations are given in a footnote after the first time a text is cited. All texts and translations are also listed below, alphabetical by classical author and then text. Full citations are given in the references. All abbreviations for classical works follow the OLD and LSJ Arist. Rh. text: Ross 1959 translation: Konstan 2006 Cic. Att. t ext: Shackleton Bailey 1965 1970 translation: Winstedt 1921 Cic. Cat il 1 text: Clark 1905 translation: Yonge 1856 Cic. Mur text: Clark 1905 translation: MacDonald 1982 Cic. Tul. text: Clark 1911 translation Yonge 1856 Cic. Tusc text: Pohlenz 1918 translation: Yonge 1877 Hor. S. t ext: Klingne r 1959 translation: Kline 2005 Lucr. text: Martin 1969 translatio n: Esolen 1995 Pub. Sent text: Meyer 1880 translation: my own Sal. Hist. t ext: Maurenbrecher 1891 translation: McGushin 1992 Var. L text: Goetz and Scholl 1910 translation: Kent 1938.
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179 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Brenda Fields grew up in Plantation, Florida. She earned her B.A. in 2005 summa cum laude from the U niversity of Florida in classical s tudies with a mi nor in English In 2007, she earned her M.A. in Latin at the University of Florida While working on her Ph.D. at the University of Florida, she studied at the American Academy in Rome during the Classical Summer School in 2009. She received her Ph .D. in c lassical s tudies in 2012.