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1 IDENTIFYING HIGH RISK AREAS FOR CONFRONTATION IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA By EVAN A. BILD A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MAS TER OF ARTS UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2012
2 2012 Evan Bild
3 To my m other and f ather
4 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I thank my parents and wife for their unconditional support in my life and education. I also thank my committee members, especially Professor Brown, for their support during my thesis. I could not have completed this project without them.
5 TABLE OF CONTENTS page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................ ................................ ................................ ............... 4 LIST OF TABLE S ................................ ................................ ................................ ........................... 7 LIST OF FIGURES ................................ ................................ ................................ ......................... 8 ABSTRACT ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 9 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ................................ ................................ ................................ .................. 10 2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ................................ ................................ ........................... 13 Before Hydrocarbon Discovery ................................ ................................ .............................. 13 Claims Reg arding the Paracels and Spratlys ................................ ................................ .......... 15 3 HYDROCARBONS AND CONFLICT ................................ ................................ ................. 19 Oil Vulnerability ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................... 19 Who Owns What and How Might This Lead to Conflict? ................................ ..................... 22 State Behavior towards Hydrocarbon Access ................................ ................................ ......... 25 4 COM PONENTS OF POWER PROJECTION ................................ ................................ ....... 32 ................................ ................................ ................................ 34 Components of Power Projection ................................ ................................ ........................... 35 Looking Forward ................................ ................................ ................................ .................... 37 5 WHERE ARE THE HYDROCARBONS? ................................ ................................ ............ 39 Empirical Data ................................ ................................ ................................ ........................ 39 Methodology ................................ ................................ ................................ ........................... 40 Results ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 41 6 MAPPING POWER PROJECTION ................................ ................................ ...................... 48 Methodology ................................ ................................ ................................ ........................... 48 Mapping Power Projection ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 49 Results ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 50 7 CONCLUSION ................................ ................................ ................................ ....................... 67
6 LIST OF REFERENCES ................................ ................................ ................................ ............... 72 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ................................ ................................ ................................ ......... 75
7 LIST OF TAB LES Table page 5 1 South China Sea hydrocarbon field data ................................ ................................ ............ 47 6 1 Power Projection Distances ................................ ................................ ............................... 52 6 2 China fleet range ................................ ................................ ................................ ................ 55 6 3 Malaysia fleet range ................................ ................................ ................................ ........... 61 6 4 Philippines Fleet Range ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 62 6 5 Vietnam fleet range ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 64 6 6 Total fleet strengths ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 66
8 LIST OF FIGURES Figure page 5 1 Offshore hydrocarbon discovery and production sites per country ................................ ... 44 5 2 South China Sea claims. ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 45 5 3 Hydrocarbon fields of the South China Sea. ................................ ................................ ...... 46 6 1 South China Sea power projection capabilities ................................ ................................ 52 6 2 South China Sea power projection capabilities with hydrocarbon fields .......................... 53 6 3 South China Sea power projection capabilities with hydrocarbon fields and development sites ................................ ................................ ................................ ............... 54
9 Abstract of Thesis Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts IDENTIFYING HIGH RISK AREAS FOR CONFRONTATION IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA By Evan Bild May 2012 Chair: M. Leann Brown Major: Political Science International Relations Uncertainty over territory and resource sovereignty in the South China Sea has led to several confrontations in the South China Sea region. Th e goal of this project is to identify high risk areas for future confrontations in the South China Sea. In order to achieve this goal, I will analyze the predicted locations of hydrocarbons and power projection capabilities of China, Malaysia, Philippines and Vietnam. Areas where hydrocarbons are located and multiple power projection zones overlap will be considered as areas for confrontation. I will use GIS to map both the location of hydrocarbons and power projection zones of each state.
10 CHAPTER 1 IN TRODUCTION Seven states (Brunei, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam) bordering the South China Sea make significant claims to the ownership of its resources. Each justifies its claims through interpretations of the United Nations Con vention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), historical use/events, or a combination of both. Since the method to assert sovereignty differs state by state, many of the claims overlap which makes it difficult to determine who has the rights to what resources. Over the last few decades, uncertainty over territory and resource sovereignty has led to several confrontations in the South China Sea region. The confrontations have ranged from the destruction of survey cables, to warning shots, to outright military cla shes. The most deadly event occurred in 1988, when roughly eighty Vietnamese were killed in an engagement with China over a reef in the Spratly island chain. These confrontations have been unpredictable and have created uncertainty for resource explorati on, shipping traffic, and the region as a whole. The goal of this project is to identify high risk areas for future confrontations in the South China Sea. The purpose is to provide interested parties with a geographic risk assessment of possible confron tations unfolding in the Sea. My intention is not to predict what might occur in a certain spot, on a certain day. Rather, the scope of the project focuses on a bigger picture. The results will provide interested parties with areas of significant uncert ainty. More importantly, they will be able to make better, less risky decisions. intensifies, the importance of hydrocarbons in the South China Sea region has grown signific antly. During the 1990 s, energy consumption for the ten largest economies in East Asia gre w at a rate ten times faster tha
11 energy consumption is predicted to come from Asia (Klare 2001, 110). The demand for more hydrocarbons will force the littoral states of the South China Sea to seek out the more difficult resources to extract. Since territorial sovereignty remains unsettled, the pursuit of these resources could be a contentious endeavor. With the ability to identify high risk areas for confrontation, an assurance could be given to many of the private entities pursuing these resources and states may be alert to where confrontation might occur. The waters of the South China Sea act as a major conduit for international shipping traffic. Forty demonstrates how uncertainty over strategic international shipping lanes can influence the global economy. Beyond concerns regarding shipping lanes, any major confrontation involving littoral states in the South China Sea could have a dramatic impact on the regional and global economy. Also, as China has become a more significant player in geopolitics, their actions and intentions have attracted greater scrutiny. Being able to locate high risk are as for confrontation in the South China Sea will hopefully elucidate potential Chinese actions in one of their most contentious on going disputes. In order to achieve the goal of the project, I will analyze the predicted locations of hydrocarbons and pow er projection capabilities of the four major players involved in the dispute. Areas where multiple power projection zones overlap will be considered as high risk areas for confrontation. The location of hydrocarbons will also be considered. The paper w ill be organized in the following manner. First, I will provide a historical background to familiarize the reader with the dispute in the South China Sea. Second, I will
12 address the literatures of both conflict involving hydrocarbons and power projection This theoretical foundation will provide an understanding of how hydrocarbons may impact conflict and how states project military power. Third, I will analyze where the predicted hydrocarbon resources in the South China Sea are located. Fourth, I will create a spatial model for the power projection capabilities of China, Malaysia, Philippines and Vietnam. These four states are chosen, because they have been most active participants in the historical clashes in the South China Sea dispute. Fifth, by juxtaposing the location of hydrocarbons and power projection capabilities, I will be able to identify where high risk areas for confrontation are most likely to occur Very little of the hydrocarbon resources in the South China Sea have actually been locat ed, quantified and extracted. In this project, the location and quantity of hydrocarbons in the South China Sea will be drawn from data from the United States Geological Survey (USGS) for undiscovered hydrocarbon resources in the South China Sea (2010). The data used from USGS are risk assessed at the 5, 50, and 95 th percentile. Power projection capabilities will be quantified from data provided by the 2007 2008 edition of The source provides a fleet strength, measured by the tota is then divided by the total number of ships amongst all four of the analyzed states in the dispute resul risk areas for confrontation will then be analyzed in the final chapter of the paper.
13 CHAPTER 2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUN D Before Hydrocarbon Discovery At the core of the Sou th China Sea Dispute are the sovereignty rights over the Paracel and Spratly island chains. Six states (Brunei, China, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam) claim some or all of the islands, reefs, banks or shoals in the chains. The seventh state in the dispute, Indonesia, only has territorial claims over water in the southwest corner of the South China Sea. Justifications range from historical use, discovery and/or international law. To date, no precedent has been able to establish who truly has th e rights to these territories. In this section, the focus will be on historical relationship between the islands and the states involved in the South China Sea Dispute. I will begin with their sovereignty justifications and move on to the contention betw een states into the late 1990s. The islands in the South China Sea have been found in Chinese texts dating back to the 13 th century (Bennett 1992, 434; Cheng 1975, 272). For the next seven centuries, Chinese fishermen temporarily frequented the small is lands (Bennett 1992, 434). The historical use of other state claiming to have contact with the islands before the 20 th century was Vietnam. They occupied some of the Paracel Islands starting in 1816 (Cheng 1975, 268). The French, while colonizing Indo China, would eventually use this temporary occupation to justify their claim to the Paracel Islands. From the beginning of the 1900s into the 1920s, the French expressed interest in both the Paracel and Spratly island chains. By the early 1930s, they were making formal territorial claims (Cheng 1975, 268). China responded to the claims with a written warning to the French Foreign Ministry and a visit to the Pa racels by a navy admiral. In 1930, the French occupied its first
14 island in the Spratlys and five more by 1933 (Bennett 1992, 437; Cheng 1975, 268). Japan bel army swept into the South China Sea and occupied the Spratlys along with most of the other ands as military outposts until their eventual surrender of World War Two (WWII) in 1945. After WWII, the Chinese briefly occupied a few islands they had previously claimed, but withdrew by 1950 with the beginning of their own civil war (Bennett 1992, 438 ). As China tended to its domestic issues, the French essentially removed themselves from the dispute. The 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty stripped Japan on its rights to the islands, leaving the question of sovereignty unresolved. After WWII, a few more states began staking claims in the dispute. Filipino explorer, Tomas Clomas discovered the Spratly islands in 1956. The Filipino government made no formal sovereignty claim upon the discovery and Clomas left shortly after (Bennett 1992, 438). In the same year, Taiwan occupied Itu Abu (or Taiping Island) and South Vietnam occupied the Spratly Island, an island in the Spratly chain (Bennett 1992, 438 9). Itu Abu is the largest in the South China Sea and Taiwan has maintained a military garrison there since the 1956 occupation. South region. At the end of the 1950s, four states made claims over islands in the South China Sea -China, Taiwan, Philippines and Sou th Vietnam. The islands had been used as military outposts in WWII by Japan, but no occupier since had used them for such a strategic purpose. For the most part, fish and guano constituted the only monetary value for the islands (Bennett 1992, 439). Che ng (1972, 270) argues that from WWII to 1967 the islands were for the most part
15 claims. In the late 1960 s, surveys indicated the potential for vast quantities of untapped hydrocarbon reserves beneath the South China Sea (Cheng 1972, 265). The potential for hydrocarbons fundamentally altered the whole dispute. Since no method had been devised or agreed upon to resolve the dispute, states began to aggressively pu rsue the islands on their own. Claims Regarding the Paracels and Spratlys This section, will discuss the pursuit of claims by littoral states of the South China Sea. carbon resources of the sea but rather the likelihood of North Vietnam occupying some of the Paracel Islands. The United States had just withdrawn from South Vietnam and China began to worry airs. South Vietnam still maintained control of the islands in question, but China feared that with the end of hostilities, 1992, 1001). China decided it must have control of the Paracels in order avoid a Soviet stranglehold. The preemptive decision led to the 1974 clash between South Vietnam and China in the Paracel Island chain. Eighteen troops from Vietnam were killed an d China gained control of the territory (EIA 2008, 5). For the next ten years, the Chinese fortified the Paracel Islands with permanent military structures. Although the Vietnamese still officially claim the island chain, China has remained in physical c ontrol since 1974. were discovered, the Philippines started to claim the islands in the Spratly chain closest to their and formally announced its annexation of the
16 Taiwanese exit Itu Abu. Taiwan responded by claiming two more islands that neighbored Itu Abu. In 1973, South Vietnam h ad already awarded oil contracts to Western oil companies to explore for oil in the water off its shores (Guan 2000, 202). But after the 1974 clash, South Vietnam lost all its island holdings in the sea. They responded by occupying six islands in the Spr atlys, which were eventually taken over by North Vietnam in 1975 (Garver 1992, 1005). Malaysia occupied one atoll in 1983 and three more in 1991. In the same year, Brunei staked its first claim with no occupation (Bennett 1992, 440). All of the present day involved states had now officially staked in claims in the sea. Garver (1992, 1008 tly Islands throughout the 1980s. China spent the early 1980 s surveying large portions of the sea. From 1980 1983, China h ad boats patrolling the area, with planes conducting aerial photography. They made their first exploratory mission to James Shoal, near the coast of Malaysia and nearly 1000 miles away from their own shores, in 1983. These missions were almost solely for survey and exploratory purposes. China had always claimed the entire chain, but did not actually occupy a single island in the Spratlys until 1987 (Bennett 1992, 440). From this point forward, China maintained a in the Spratlys (Garver 1992, 1009). 1988, China had 17 ships in the Spratlys and began the search for more islands to occupy. In a matter of five years, China wen t from sending out survey crews to building significant structures. Fiery Cross Reef saw a major renovation. For nine days explosives were used to blast channels through coral for ships to pass into the reef. Dredges then entered and pulled up enough c oral to form 8,080 shaped reinforced concrete buildings were built on top of these caissons, one serving as the observation station, the other as
17 living quarters. In May installation of instruments and equipment began, and the 1011 2). The repeated confrontations sunk a Vietnam naval freighter and killed almost 80 (Garver 1992, 1013). China continued to survey the sea near the Spratlys. In 1989 China declared that the area and weather stations and survey ships Spratlys, including Fiery Cross, Subi, Caurteron, Johnson, Gaven, Eldad and Dongmen reefs. All Chinese holdings reportedly had power generation, cold storage, water storage and recreational facil to the U.S. Crestone Energy Corporation to explore for oil in the Vanguard Bank and guaranteed their protection with military force. China was the first country to explore for resources in the Spratlys (Garver 1992, 1017). In 1995, China made arguably the most audacious move yet. A Filipino fishing vessel discovered that the Chinese had begun building structures on Mischief Reef. The significance of this development was that shores (Storey 1999, 97). The action not only demonstrated a complete disregard for the sovereig nty claims in the sea. Upon the discovery of the structure, the Philippines were militarily incapable of a formidable counter. The two states eventually agreed to a code of
18 conduct, which stated similar actions would not occur in the future (Storey 1999, 97). It was apparent within the year that China would not honor the code of conduct. More structures were appearing and the ones on Mischief Reef were only becoming more sophisticated. A gun battle between the two states ensued in 1996. Storey (1999, strategies when it came to building structures on the islands: number of reefs. To consolidate its hold over these reefs, facilities capable of h ousing military personnel and berthing naval vessels have been constructed. These facilities are built in three stages. The first stage consists of a small hut on stilts. This hut is then upgraded to a more complex structure of three to four octagonal bunk ers (such as the kind constructed on Mischief Reef). The final stage involved the construction of a large brick fortress capable of housing more than fifty men. ent s to the late 1990s established a new policy towards the South China Sea. China was not going to yield ground in the territorial dispute and made that clear by increasing their military presence in the region. In the next chapter, the focus will turn to the how hydrocarbons play a role in conflict. A ill allow for a better understanding of how hydrocarbons might play a role in the South China Dispute.
19 CHAPTER 3 HYDROCARBONS AND CON FLICT Since the end of the Cold War, a burgeoning literature examining the relationship between natural resources and co nflict has developed. Several resources (hydrocarbons, diamonds, water, timber, etc.) have been explored in regards to their role of spurring conflict on multiple scales. A portion of the literature diverges away from interstate conflict towards the deve loping world, non hydrocarbon resources, and civil conflict (Humphreys 2005, Homer Dixon 1994), which is of little consequence to this study. Rather, the main focus of this chapter concentrates on hydrocarbon energy security, emphasizing vulnerability, wh ich might lead to potential interstate conflict. Also, I will provide historical cases to illustrate when hydrocarbons were a factor in conflict. This section will review the literature discussing the relationship between hydrocarbons and conflict. Firs t, I will briefly examine the topic of peak oil, which will in turn lead to a short discussion of resource vulnerability and demand. Second, I will discuss how states gain the right of ownership to hydrocarbons and how it might become problematic. Finall interstate tension and conflict. Oil Vulnerability Peak oil, a concept coined by M. King Hubbert, is thought to be the point at which half the een produced. From that peak point, the production of oil will never be higher. More importantly, unless demand wanes with extraction levels, production will be unable to meet the demands of the world economy. Although somewhat imperfect, a bell curve is used to model the concept. Most estimates had the predicted the peak between 2006 and 2016 (Hirsch 2005, 9). The event has yet to occur.
20 As noted in Bardi (2009), there are disagreements about what effect the mid way point of oil production will have on energy markets. Some believe the free market will deal with uneven supply and demand with a rise in prices. Others say the peak will produce no real change on the market at this time since the reserves are so huge (Bardi 2009, 324). What is certain i s that the peak discovery of oil happened in the 1960s, making peak production an inevitable event (Bardi years. Klare (2001b, 19) argues that if we take into a ccount the predicted per year 2% increase in oil demand, we will more likely run out of oil in 25 30 years. However, technological improvements and new supply discoveries could push this date forward. Regardless of whether the theoretical consequences o f peak oil occur, the world will soon consume half of its total oil deposits. The second half will be depleted much quicker than the first. Most importantly, an abundant, reasonably priced, secure supply of oil will be harder to come by for all importing states. A peak oil scenario will not be the first time states scrambled to protect resources. and power, at the core of which were overseas resources and mari 2004, 2). Timber, for naval ships, became a crucial resource to European powers from the 15 th century to 18 th century (Le Billon 2004, 3). Without it, the prospects for expansion, economic growth and success at war were slim. In the early 20 th century, one of the first major confrontations for oil occurred. Azerbaijan, ignificantly leading up to the war, between the years of 1917 and 1918 Azerbaijan had the militaries of Russia, Germany,
21 played a crucial role in slowing d The fields played a similar role in World War II. After the Russian/Germany Non ying that, if he failed to take the oil fields of the Caucasus, he WWII incident, the U.S. oil embargo on Japan played a major role in Japanese reasoning behind the at tack of Pearl Harbor in 1941. A detailed description of these historical cases is not as important as the generalizations to be drawn from them. In the past, states have taken substantial measures to protect critical resources. However, there is a com ponent of peak oil that is very different from these (or any) past examples. There are now two challenges for states when it comes to acquisition of the world pressu re for states to secure reasonably priced oil will become more difficult than ever. The One of the m ost important aspects of demand are the barriers to alter it. Hirsch (2005, 5) rld consumption was exceeding discoveries by about around 15 billion barrels per year (Hirsch 2005, 7). The transportation system. From 2009 to 2010, the world saw its sec ond largest year to year vehicle increase ever from 980 million to 1.015 billion units (Sousanis 2011). For a sector so slow to
22 change, vast efficiencies will have to be made if states want to decrease demand any time soon. Until this happens, states wil l need to be able to secure an ever increasing quantity of oil. Who Owns What and How Might This Lead to Conflict? Over the last century as states became well demarcated entities on maps, the question of oil ownership has spurred several confrontations. As definitive as the lines drawn on paper appear, they are not the most effective tools for determining complicated resource ownership questions. The past century has provided several ad hoc methods in settling disputes over resource ownership. However there are still gaps that have left some cases open to interpretation and in some cases, confrontation. When so much is at stake, competing states are not going to easily give up possible oil deposits. When ownership is in question, the stability of area weakens considerably (Klare 2001b). It is important to discuss the ownership of oil resources, because a lack of clarity on this issue can lead to potential conflict. When there is no defined owner of a resource, competition for that resource will escal ate quickly. For the purpose of this study, I will mostly focus on ownership disputes for offshore oil deposits. However, an example of a land based boundary dispute would be between Saudi Arabia and Yemen, which was mitigated through several renditions of the Treaty of Taif. Although its effectiveness for promoting a peaceful agreement has sometimes been in doubt since its inception in 1932, it remains the basis for resolving the boundary dispute today between the two states (Murphy 2006). The United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is the foundation for almost all offshore resource dispute decisions. For the purpose of oil exploration, there are three boundary limits I will discuss. First, a state has exclusive rights to the first 1 2 miles off its coast. These first 12 miles are essentially viewed as an extension of land from the bordering state.
23 States practically have complete control over this territory. Second, a state has an Exclusive Economic Zone extending 200 miles offshore. A state has the right to the resources within this its continenta l shelf for up to 350 miles only if the shelf is a natural prolongation from land. The territory between 200 (the EEZ cutoff) and 350 miles only grants permission to resources within the continental shelf itself, most importantly, hydrocarbons. When mutu al agreement cannot be made under UNCLOS, alternative methods have been utilized. One of them being, submitting the dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The dispute of the Gulf of Maine between the U.S. and Canada or the continental shelf dispute between Libya and Malta are examples of cases submitted to the ICJ (Hsuing 2005, 516). Interstate agreements or treaties have also been established to determine offshore resources. Notable examples would be between the five littoral states over th e Caspian Sea and Iran and the United Arab Emirates over Abu Musa Island (Murphy 2006). Even with a large repertoire of possible settlement processes, there are some disputes that have been quite complex or unsolvable. Following the break up of the USSR, the Caspian Sea, and its supposed vast oil supplies, added three new littoral states: Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. Long before the USSR dissolution, a treaty between the USSR and Iran settled ownership to the rights of resources under the Cas pian. The three new states refused to honor this agreement without their own share. With three new states classifying the Caspian as a sea and Iran and Russia classifying it as a lake, tension grew quickly. An eventual state by state agreement was made, but not all parties have completely made peace with each other.
24 To this date, three disputes remain unresolved in Southeast Asia: the East China Sea dispute, the Kuril Islands dispute, and, of course, the South China Sea dispute. All of these have islan ds involved, which have proven to make a potential agreement very difficult. The East China Sea dispute is exceptionally tricky for a number of reasons. First, the Chinese and Japanese have used different interpretations of the Law of the Sea to explain their case (Hsiung 2005). Second, there are the disputed Senkaku islands, of which both declare ownership. The ownership of these islands, and the inclusion of Taiwan and parts of Okinawa, would alter the division line significantly. Even if they both a greed to the same terms under the Law of the Sea, these islands would complicate matters significantly. Third, the history of conflict between China and Japan adds a nationalistic aspect to the dispute that adds significant tension. The East China Sea a nd Caspian Sea are very relevant cases with regards to the South China Sea dispute. Like the South China Sea dispute, neither case has been resolved by international law. In addition, in both cases states began to explore and extract hydrocarbons before a settlement was concluded. The following section will go into more detail about the behavior of states and will hopefully help explain decisions that states make in situations like these. Before moving on, it is important to touch on when confrontatio n or conflict might occur given the adjudication methods available to states. From the literature, there are three main ways perceived or actual oil resources (e. g. Gulf War I). Second, when the boundary surrounding an oil deposit remains undefined (Saudi v. Yemen or the East China Sea case). Third, when states are unwilling to place the dispute under the jurisdiction of some form international law, whether
25 it be through UNCLOS, ICJ or treaty (East China Sea). The South China Sea dispute possesses all three of these possible exacerbating factors. State Behavior towards Hydrocarbon Access Scholars who study the relationship between hydrocarbons and conflict poin t to the importance of industrialization and economic might when it comes to state strength. In order to maintain and grow these measures of strength, a secure access to oil is a requirement. Therefore, measures are taken by states to protect the free fl ow of it into their economies. The literature define the new global order (Russett 1982, Klare 2001a, Klare 2001b). Second, some analyze hydrocarbons as they s pur conflict or coercive behavior by states (Peters 2004, Le Billon 2004, and Cervantes 2009). Both Russett and Klare argue that resources are altering the landsca pe of geopolitics. Although influenced by different events (Russett by the 1973 and 1979 oil embargos and Klare by the first Gulf War and instability in regions with major oil supplies), they have the same conclusion; most major, future world conflicts wil l be caused by the demand of resources. Russett (1982) credits the changing global order towards neo mercantilist behavior caused by burgeoning demand. He points to the run up to WWI has a similar time in world history. Colonial powers were growing quic kly and so was there need for resources for their ambitions in that region not, Russett believes a war was inevitable due to confrontations over resource procurement (1982, 47). The undefined ownership of these resource rich lands led to increased tension. With
26 colonies and their rulers, powers to acquire resources on their own become increasi ngly important (Russett 1982, 48). The growing hunger for resources had begun a new world economic order. One that was diverting away from a liberal free market and moving towards a neo mercantilist resource grab. Russett argued that both the Soviet Uni on and U.S. were using similar methods to garner These tensions will then likely lead to potential conflict. Although taking on a slightly different approach, Klare also believes tensions around oil will eventually lead to inc reased likelihood of conflict. Klare (2001b, 27 50) suggests three crucial factors will lead up to oil based conflict. First, the politics of oil security have created a climate where any oil disruption has now become a major national security issue, mos t notably for the United States. He traces the historical roots for the securitization of oil by detailing certain events of WWI, WWII, the oil embargos of the 1970s and finally the Gulf War. He e use of force against any adversary foreign policy throughout the 1990s (Klare 2001b, 33). Second, Klare labels the next factor behind the rise of oil conflic unable to meet demand in the coming decades.
27 Per identified reserves. More importantly, they are all plagued with c onfrontation (Klare 2001b, 50). In addition to these three factors, Klare pays close attention to the disconcerting military build up in these three regions. From 1990 1997 alone, the U.S. had arms agreements with five Persian Gulf states that equated t o roughly US $42 billion (Klare 2001b, 66). In the Caucasus, he discusses the increased military presence by both Russia and the U.S. in order to influence pipeline development in the region (Klare 2001b, 88 97). He begins his book, Resource Wars with t he account of the 1997 U.S. deployment of 500 paratroopers into the mountains of Kazakhstan, with the hopes of creating the peace necessary to build new pipelines out of the Caucasus, bypassing Russia, towards the West. In the South China Sea, Klare deta ils the naval 1988 and 1999 (Klare 2001b, 124). Considering all these factors, Klare makes a convincing Other scholars who look at hydrocarbons as they relate to conflict and/or coercive behavior focus on the topic on a narrower scale. Conflict over oil does not define a new global order within their arguments. Some scholars discuss oi l as it relates to civil conflict. I will attempt to only focus on these authors when they have a notable relevance to international politics. To begin, I will review the scholarly work that assesses how oil plays a role in conflict. Again, although so me of these studies mostly focus on civil conflict, they are relevant on an producing state or region might lead to supply disruptions to major powers. Thi s is turn, could
28 lead to foreign intervention or increased tension within the region at large. Le Billon and over lapping oil producing areas increased from a recent studies that point to a correlation between high oil dependence and oil abundance levels to an increased risk of war. Ross (2008, 2) calculates that although in the same period major civil wars have d tics and economy (Le Billon and Cervantes 837). Le Billon (2004) believes most of the conflict on the civil level is not about securing the physical oil itself. Instead of conflict based on supply disruptions of valuable natural resources, he argues thes e conflicts are more about lust and profiteering for local leaders. However, some of the scholars above are quick to point out they do not believe there is a exace rbates latent tensions and gives governments and their more militant opponents the means conflict. Le Billon (2004, 164) categorizes the direct link between a political ecology approach to looking at oil conflict in which special attention is given to the spatial dimensions to the control and access of resources. For the purpose of this study, he from the central authorities and the resource extraction method is capital intensive and concentrate d. A spatial organization such as this would most likely spur a secessionist
29 unwilling to secure the control of resources through the existing centre of power, po litical movements in resource production areas have an interest in asserting secessionist sovereign not make this conclusion, a comparison could be made here to the naval arms race Klare (2001b) describes taking place in the South China Sea. The next portion of the literature assesses how foreign influence plays a role in oil producing regions. Peters (2004, 187) argues for an increased amount of internation al resource resources along the North strategies for securing energy will intensify, thus be aring the potential to escalate into further alternative energy sources as possible solutions to further conflict. Lee and Kim (2008) do a comparative analysis of the division of seabed resources adjudication process in the Caspian Sea versus East China Sea in order to determine why the former appears to be approaching a resolution and latter is not. Using hegemonic stability theory, they conclude that Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan were able to begin exploring the seabed for resources on their own before a resolution with Russia was completed because they had the backing of the U.S. Before the U.S. got involved, it had appeared Russia would have the upper hand due to their relative strength. When the strongest power in the dispute changed, so did the outcome (Lee and Kim 2008, 806). It was this unequal relationship of powers involved that allowed for the more powerful interests to prevail. Rather, in the East China Sea dispute, two seemingly equal powers are pursuing the same goal. Not only that, trust between the two states is poor due to historical engagements (Lee and Kim 2008, 808). In
30 trasts directly with Peters, who claims U.S. involvement will only escalate resource conflicts. (2004) details the struggle over pipeline development in the Caucasus With its vast suspected reserves, Russia, China, Iran, the U.S. and the EU would all like to see oil pipelines take a different route out of the region. The U.S. has tried hard to develop pipelines that go through states that are not hostile to its int erests. This explains why the U.S. had paratroopers in Kazakhstan in 1997, as Klare noted. Ironically, before 9/11 the U.S. was also in negotiations with the Taliban to have a pipeline go through Afghanistan. Klare (2001b) also notes the importance of s the Persian Gulf have a lot at stake if transport is disrupted due to conflict. As discussed above, scholars are attempting to answer important questions about how hydrocarbons and conflict are related. The urgency to understand how these two interact is exacerbated by burgeoning demand and the ideas underlying peak oil. Similar to the pre WWI era, states are behaving aggressively in order to secure the resources their economies require (Russett 1982). When ownership of resources is in doubt, it only raises the likelihood for potential conflict. Keeping the hydrocarbons flowing is the most crucial goal for major powers. Over the coming decades the most important feature to monitor will be the balance between gaining access to hydrocarbon resources, protecting the flow of hydrocarbon supplies, and the increasing tension as a result from these actions. to this project. First, competition over resources increases when the ownership is unclear.
31 Second, one of the only ways to assure access to hydrocarbons is to make sure that it is within been a 20 percent increase in the amount of conflict that is related in some way with oil resources (Le Billi on and Cervantes 2009).
32 CHAPTER 4 COMPONENTS OF POWER PROJECTION area created by the relatively small rocks emerging from its depths pales in comparison to the empt special attention to how it is achieved at sea. As discussed in the previous section, when the ownership of hydrocarbon reserves is left undefined, it breeds a scenario where confrontation or conflict is likely. The ownership of hydrocarbons beneath the South China Sea has clearly not been settled. Therefore, there are n o definitive boundary lines for all the perspective claimants. So how does one go about determining which state controls a given area without actual occupation? The following section examines the literature discussing how area can be controlled without being occupied Theory of Viability, which posits how power relates to the distance. Second, I will look at how these assumptions may help explain to a dispute similar in nature to that in the South China Sea, the Falklands War. Third, I will analyze the most crucial components of military power Boulding (1962) utilizes economic theory to discuss the likely behavior of rival firms competing over territory or as he calls it, the Theory of Viability. He applies this analysis to further the
33 borders, competition will become str be supposed to be at his maximum power at home (this may be an area rather than a point) but that his competitive power, in the sense of his ability to dominate another, declines the farther from 79). The main justification for the loss in ability is operations. Competition becomes more difficult when the costs o increases. Therefore, the further a state travels from home, the harder it becomes to project its power. The amount by which the competitive power of a party diminishes per mile movement away from home is the loss of power gradient. If this is high, mutual survival is easy, games of ruin are unlikely, and a large number of parties can exist in a given field. As the loss of power gradient falls, conflict is likely to become more acute, games of ruin ensue, and the number of parties decline until there are few enough parties that they can be far enough away from each other to avoid games of ruin; beyond a certain point in the decline of the loss of power gradient, only a single party is viable in the field (Boulding 1962, 79). The loss of strength gradient determines the competition level at in a given area. If no states are able to project power (high project power (low loss of strength gradient), conflict will become more likely. Areas o f equal strength are unstable and multiple parties are unlikely to exist indefinitely. Loss of strength gradients vary from state to state, so a midpoint would not be effective at demonstrating conflict points.
34 Veering away f rom the loss of strength gradient in the abstract, Webb (2007) discusses how the concept applied to three wars of the 20th century. In addition to discussing the loss of strength gradient, Webb emphasizes the importance of forward basing, which is like ha ving a home away from home. In essence, it is compensating for what is lost from distance by resetting home to a new forward location. States forward base when they build military bases overseas. Webb details how these concepts worked in the Boer War ( 1899 1902), the Gulf War (1990 1991), and the Falklands War (1982). For the purpose of this paper, I will mainly focus on his analysis of the Falklands War since it has similarities to dispute in the South China Sea. Webb discusses the advantages the Brit ish and U.S. had in the Boer and Gulf Wars because of their ability to source essential supplies from local resources. Without this ability, the British and U.S. would have compromised a significant amount of strength in the perspective wars. In the Falk lands War, the British were unable to utilize local resources, because they were required Europe to the South Atlantic, the Falklands were just 400 miles from th 2007, 298). In order to make up for the loss in strength from the voyage, the British were forced to become as resourceful as possible. They were scouting abandoned whaling stations, using tractors from Falkland Island farmers an d refueling from Ascension Island, almost 4,000 miles get enough supplies to the front line. On the final day of the war, the Argentines were actually superior in munitions and could have halted their opponents advance...If their morale had held faced significant challenges to match the strength of an inferior power due to t he lack of forward resources and distance traveled over water. On the other hand, Webb stresses the importance of
35 forward supplies in both the Boer and Gulf Wars. For example, the U.S. drew heavily from resources, especially oil, already stationed in the Middle East. These wars not only reaffirm the struggles of conducting warfare from sea. Webb (2007) stresses the significant impact that the sea has on power pr ojection and warfare in general. Again, Webb notes the Falklands war and how transport costs prevented the problem is that it costs too much and delivers everything they possibly could to the South Atlantic, the British could not afford the luxury of Webb 2007, 303). Not only was airlifting more expensive, but there was really nowhere to land other than Ascension Island (4,000 miles away). While most naval ships can only reliably travel at 20 to 30 knots, it means that the airlift alternative, sealift ing, is a slow and arduous process (Webb 2007, 302). As demonstrated by the British in the Falklands war, states lose strength when distance increases and transport costs rise. This is especially true when at sea. Mearsheimer (2001) also focuses a grea their difficulties of waging war across bodies of water (Mearsheimer 2001, 114). This leads to one of his main conc lusions that no great power can become a true hegemonic global power because of the oceans separating the hemispheres. Components of Power Projection Before analyzing the most essential components of power projection, it is important to have a working de finition of the concept. The U.S. Department of Defense defines it as:
36 The ability of a nation to apply all or some of its elements of national power political, economic, informational, or military to rapidly and effectively deploy and sustain forces i n and from multiple dispersed locations to respond to crises, to contribute to deterrence, and to enhance regional stability. 1 The purpose of this project is to assess what areas of the South China Sea are most at risk for capabilities p rotrude into the sea. Meaning, I will predominately focus on only one of the force projection would probably align more accurately with this project. Attent ion will now focus on the components of power projection. Given the circumstances involved in the South China Sea dispute, I will concentrate first on the range of fleets. Two of the biggest inhibitors to power projection in the South China Sea are the d istance from the islands are too small and boast too few resources to stage major sea control or power projection of war (Fravel 2008, 135). With regards to airpower, in flight refueling capabilities strengthen power projection abilities as well (Hughes, 91; Fravel, 135). 1 F orce and power are interchangeable in literature
37 Hardware is also crucia l to power projection capabilities. In a publication issued by RAND, Allen (1992) assesses the Power Projection Capabilities in the Pacific Region He measures several indicators including: the airlift (includes range) and sealift (number of amphibious s hips) capabilities, number of surface combatants (includes aircraft carriers), number of submarines, and number of forced entry units (ships or aircraft). When it comes to these Fleets train flying, mid ngth (Swaine and Fravel 2011, 6). After the U.S. and South Korea held military exercises in the Yellow Sea in 2010, China quickly responded with exercises of their own in the Yellow and East irect Chinese response to the U.S. fleet. Looking Forward The ultimate goal of this project is to map the power projection capabilities of major similar endeavor with his Geopolitical Force Fields project, hoping to spur more interest in the topic. He too focuses attention on how distance and the ability to deploy power impacts the t this actually entails. This to be given to actual naval capabilities.
38 and distance is a clear impediment. It will become more difficult for a state to project power as it moves further away from its borders. This hindrance w as proven to the British in the Falklands War (Webb 2007). Forward basing can make up for lost ground, but in the South China Sea such opportunities are rare. Therefore, states will have to counter the capabilities lost from distance with actual hard pow er from fleet modernization. The range of fleets will have to be will need to match or better that of its adversaries. These are the capabilities that will be measured later in the paper while mapping state projections of power.
39 CHAPTER 5 WHERE ARE THE HYDROC ARBONS? As noted in the historical section above, the territorial sovereignty of South China Sea became contentious with the discovery of possible hydrocarbons. Two factors are important when discussing the hydrocarbons of the Sea: location and quantity. The goal of this section is to present both of these factors as they relate to hydrocarbons in the South China Sea. Empirical Data While detai ling the locations and quantities of hydrocarbons in the South China Sea, it is important to keep in mind that much of the current data is based upon estimations. Much of the hydrocarbon data used in this project comes from the U.S. Energy Information Adm inistration (EIA) and the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). USGS and EIA data were used due to their analysis of the South China Sea region, rather than each specific country. Their methodology provides a better understanding of both location and quantity fo resources. The unit of analysis for their data is the oil or gas field. The USGS does not provide up to date Geographic Information System (GIS) shapefiles of their oil and gas assessments in the region. However, they do furnish a map of where these fields are located that will suffice for this chapter. Actual, site specific hydrocarbon data used for the analysis were downloaded from Offs hore Petrodata shapfile is used to show country specific sites of discovery and production, not just assessments on oil or gas fields. This section also utilizes the Vlaams Instituut Voor De Zee (VLIZ) Maritime Boundaries Database in order to demonstrate w boundary ends, begins, or is contested. The data used with the Environmental Systems Research spreadsheet format.
40 Methodology Since GIS i s a relatively unexplored tool in the International Relations field, I will give the user to analyze multiple geographically referenced data layers over each other. Generally, each layer is in the shapefile GIS format and has its own data for a given them. The user is able to analyze the geographically referenced data layers using a set of tools provided by the software or through developing an analysis funct ion. The tools and processes used for this analysis will now be explained. pr oduction sites. The WGS_1984 (World Geodetic System) coordinate frame was used to geographically reference all the data for the analysis. The first step of the analysis is to demonstrate how country specific, discovery and production sites compare to a s However, this data does not include explorations for oil, which have also occurred and would lik ely alter the appearance of the map. When adding the Offshore Petrodata layer to ArcGIS, its unit of analysis is discovery and production site. Each site, which is represented by a dot on the map, is tagged with large quantities of other data (e.g. disc overy year, production year, state, type of hydrocarbon reserve, etc.). A detailed description of what data is contained at each site can be found in the codebook elect and visualize all the sites that belong to each individual state involved in the dispute. The process was completed state by
41 data was exported to a new layer and added to the map. state. The VLIZ Maritime Boundary layer was then added. The disputed areas were titled as 1 in the results part of this section. The second and m ost important step of this section is to analyze the location and quantities of the hydrocarbons in the South China Sea. Due to the lack of GIS data provided by the USGS and EIA, ArcGIS was not used to tabulate this data. Excel spreadsheets were used to prepare and illustrate the data and a map from the EIA provides a spatial representation of the hydrocarbon fields in the region. All of this data can be found in the results part of this section. Results production sites in relation to its EEZ, with exceptions of when treaties or a median lines have been established by the respective states. Although disputed areas are illustrated on the map, these boundaries are not the same as the claims made by each state. As one can see from Figure 5 1, states (except China and Philippines) have rarely ventured outside of their EEZs with their hydrocarbon production and discover y sites. China and Taiwan claim Disputed Area A. Vietnam, China and Taiwan claim Disputed Area B. And the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan and China claim Disputed Area C. The claims are displayed in Figure 5 2. The figure shows that almost all S outh China The map shown in Figure 5 Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas Resources of Southeast Asia) illustrates all of hydrocarbon fields in Southeast Asia. For the purpo se of this analysis, only nine fields will be evaluated (Pearl River Mouth Basin, Song Hong Basin, Phu Khanh Basin, Cuu Long Basin, Nam Con Son Basin, South
42 China Sea Platform, Greater Sarawak Basin, Baram Delta/Brunei Sabah Basin, and Palawan Shelf Basin) These nine were chosen because they are located within the disputed areas of the South China Sea. China Sea fields. Table 5 1 details their findings. The names of t he nine fields in the South China Sea are found in the Field Name column. The Field Type column lists whether the field is oil or gas. There are two separate sections in the table: one for oil, measured in millions of barrels of oil (mmbo); and the other is for gas, measured in billions of cubic feet gas (bcfg). The The F95 column indicates a 95% chance of that amount of oil or gas being in the field. The F5 column would then indicate a 5% probability. The former would be considered a more conservative estimate of the amount of undiscovered reserves, while the latter would be a riskier estimate. As Table 5 1 indicates, there are substantial reserves of b oth oil and natural gas in the South China Sea. Approximately seventy percent of the hydrocarbon resources in the South China Sea fields are reportedly natural gas (EIA 2008, 4). To put these potential reserves into perspective, in 2010 China consumed 9.1 89 mmbo a day. That would mean if one were to consider a F50 probability, the total amount of oil in the South China Sea would provide China with a little over 3 years of consumption. As for natural gas, at a consumption rate of 10.3 bcf a day in 2010, t he natural gas of the South China Sea would provide China roughly 35 years of consumption (CIA World Factbook 2010). However, the most important field to consider would be the potential oil reserves in the South China Sea Platform field, which includes the Spratly island chain. This is the field that is
43 the most contested due to the islands. Although no hydrocarbons have been officially discovered around the Spratlys, the USGS estimates that this field has the second greatest potential for both oil and ga s when looking at the F5 column. The South China Sea Platform field would make up approximately 25% of the potential oil and 20% of potential natural gas in the Sea. Another important detail to note is that three of the biggest hydrocarbon fields are loc ated in the southern p ortion of the South China Sea.
44 Figure 5 1. Offshore hydrocarbon discovery and production sites per country
45 Figure 5 2. South China Sea claims. Source: Rosenberg, David
46 Figure 5 3. Hydrocarbon fields of the South China Se a. Source: United States Geological World Petroleum Resources Assessment Project. Accessed at: ht tp://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2010/3015/pdf/FS10 3015.pdf
47 Table 5 1. South China Sea hydrocarbon field data Field Name Field Type Oil (MMBO) Gas (BCFG) F95 F50 F5 Mean F95 F50 F5 Mean Pearl River Mouth Basin Oil 279 567 1079 608 290 694 1526 773 Gas 3279 8078 18047 9035 Song Hong Basin Oil 80 183 399 204 405 945 2112 1061 Gas 5782 10599 18625 11205 Phu Khanh Basin Oil 48 166 593 223 244 854 3152 1162 Gas 4268 10679 23532 11878 Cuu Long B asin Oil 726 1599 3204 1735 1463 3359 7339 3748 Gas 112 487 1750 649 Nam Con Son Basin Oil 321 643 1192 685 1165 2376 4524 2547 Gas 6196 11488 19899 12053 South China Sea Platform Oil 764 2192 5380 2522 3058 88 89 22683 10370 Gas 4609 13151 32381 15149 Greater Sarawak Basin Oil 361 618 1013 643 1435 2529 4233 2641 Gas 18918 33883 57419 35432 Baram Delta/Brunei Sabah Basin Oil 2116 4056 7192 4278 6074 12065 22241 12850 Gas 6289 12645 23718 13525 Palawan Shelf Basin Oil 84 226 609 270 54 147 417 179 Gas 319 984 3035 1229 South China Sea Total 4779 10250 20661 11168 63960 133852 266633 145486 Source: USGS (2008)
48 CHAPTER 6 MAPPING POWER PROJEC TION Methodology Since no existing technique was found in the literature to quantify power projection distance at sea, a new method was devised for this project. I selected two sets of criteria based on the literature review on power p rojection discussed above. Although states can project power with various elements of their entire military, only naval capabilities were considered due to the nature of the dispute in the South China Sea. First, the average range of a fleet was consider ed. A variable denoting range was used in order to account for the distance from home a navy must be able to travel. (2007 2008) provides the range (r) of almost every ship in every fleet 2 The range (r) for every ship was divided b y half (R) in order to account for both a ). Second, the fleet strength was co nsidered. lists the fleet strength of four chosen states for this project were totaled (P t ). This variable measured the total fleet total in order to establish a Fleet Strength Ratio (P r ). A power projection distance (X) for each state was calculated by multiplying the Fleet Strength Ratio (P r a ). The results for Power Projection Distance (X) are found in Table 6 1 shown below. Tables 6 2 (China), 6 3 (Malaysia), 2 If ship rang es were omitted in source, similar ranges from other ships were used. If no similar ship could be found,
49 6 4 (Philippines), and 6 hips and Table 6 6 denoting the Fleet Strengths of each state can all be found at the end of this chapter. Power Projection Variables : r = Range of Ship R = Range of Ship / 2 R a P t = Total Fleet Strength in Reg ion P r = Fleet Strength Ratio X = Power Projection Distance X = R a P r Mapping Power Projection was used. First, the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra Vector Shoreline shapefile was added. This shapefile defines the land boundaries for each state analyzed in the dispute. Next, using data a naval base for each state was chosen. Since each state had multiple na val bases, the base that protruded furthest into the South China Sea was selected. The coordinates for these bases were determined, documented on a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet, imported as a new layer, and were loaded on top of the NOAA land boundary shap efile. In order to map the PPD, these bases were buffered using the Buffer tool in ArcMap with the PPD values listed in Table 6 1 used as the buffer distances. All distances are presented in nautical miles, the unit used in When co mpleted, four power projection zones were mapped as separate shapefiles and loaded onto the map (Figure 6 1). Figure 6 1 was compared with the hydrocarbon analysis that was completed in Chapter 5. The USGS image (Figure 6 3) of the oil fields of Southeas t Asia was overlaid on Figure 6 1 and
50 the Georeference tool was used in order spatially reference the Figure 5 3 image (Figure 6 2). Next, the PRIO Offshore Petrodata and the VLIZ Maritime Boundary shapefiles were added (Figure 6 3). Results As shown in Table 6 6, the PPD of Malaysia, Philippines, and Vietnam are a fraction of is unable to reach is the very southern portion of the South China Sea. projection zone overlaps with power projection zones of Malaysia, Philippines and Vietnam. According to my hypothesis, these would be areas of likely confrontation. Another important finding to highlight is that the South China Sea Platform field has bee n boundaries all would allow for exploration in the South China Sea Platform, they all stop short of power projection zones do no permit them to pursue resources here. Before moving on to the conclusion, it is critical to address the lone Filipi no site in the South China Sea Platform field. The site is located in Reed Bank, the location of the South Reed Bank is not part of the Spratly chain, but jus t west of it. In early 2011, when the Philippines were conducting a seismic survey in the area they were harassed by two Chinese e over the South China Sea Dispute (Storey 2011, 1). In May of 2011, the Philippine Star published that when the Filipino Air Force was conducting a
51 (Laude 20 11, 1). The Philippine Star challenge the intruders, [but] they had to back off and maintain their course as their planes do not Following this skirmish, the Filipino government began referring to the South China Sea as the West Philippine Sea, a clear indication that these confrontations were raising tension levels between the two states. The incident confirms two key conclusions from the results above. The Reed Bank, which lies in the South China Sea Platform field and within an area claimed by the Philippines, is actually controlled by China. Chinese power projection capabilities prevented the Philippines from conducting seism ic surveys (or hydrocarbon exploration) in the area and later forced the assessment of Chinese power projection, but also the lack thereof of the Philippines. The 1995 Mischief Reef incident, already detailed in the historical chapter, is another indication the power projection estimates are reliable. The Chinese had begun building structures on Mischief Reef, only 135 miles off Filipino shores. The data used in this report indicates that the Philippines still cannot project power far enough to protect these interests.
52 Table 6 1. Power Projection Distances State Power Projection Distance (X, in Nautical Miles) China 799.3115302 Malaysia 72.33219056 Phili ppines 70.55464433 Vietnam 100.4195375 Figure 6 1. South China Sea power projection capabilities
53 Figure 6 2. South China Sea power projection capabilities with hydrocarbon fields
54 Figure 6 3. South China Sea power projection capabilities with h ydrocarbon fields and development sites
55 Table 6 2. China fleet range China Fleet Range Type Class Type Range Speed # Range Total Per Class Notes Strategic Missile Submarines Jin Class 6,000 15 4 24000 Range taken from Golf Class Strategic Missile Submarines Xia Class 6,000 15 1 6000 Range taken from Golf Class Strategic Missile Submarines Golf Class 6,000 15 1 6000 Attack Submarines Shang Class 6,000 15 2 12000 Range taken from Golf Class Attack Submarines Han Class 6,000 15 4 24000 Ra nge taken from Golf Class Patrol Submarines Yuan Class 8,000 8 2 16000 Range taken from Ming Class Patrol Submarines Song Class 8,000 8 13 104000 Range taken from Ming Class Patrol Submarines Kilo Class 8,000 8 12 96000 Range taken from Ming Class Patr ol Submarines Ming Class 8,000 8 19 152000 Patrol Submarines Modified Romeo Class 9,000 9 1 9000 Range taken from Ming Class Patrol Submarines Romeo Class 9,000 9 7 63000 Aircraft Carriers Keznetsov Class 8,500 18 1 8500 Destroyers Luzhou Class 4 ,000 14 2 8000 Destroyers Sovremenny Class 4,000 14 4 16000 Range taken from Sovremenny Class Destroyers Luyang I Class 4,500 15 2 9000 Destroyers Luyang II Class 4,500 15 2 9000 Destroyers Luhai Class 4,500 14 1 4500
56 Table 6 2. Continued Chi na Fleet Range Type Class Type Range Speed # Range Total Per Class Notes Destroyers Luhu Class 5,000 15 2 10000 Destroyers Luda Class 2,970 18 12 35640 Destroyers Luda Class II 2,970 18 4 11880 Frigates Jiangkai I Class 3,800 18 2 76 00 Frigates Jiangkai II Clas 3,800 18 4 15200 Frigates Jiangwei I Class 4,000 18 4 16000 Frigates Jiangwei II Class 4,000 18 10 40000 Frigates Jianghu III and IV Classes 4,000 15 3 12000 Frigates Jianghu I and V Classes 4,000 15 27 108000 Frigates Jianghu II Class 4,000 15 1 4000 Patrol Forces Houbei Class 750 18 40 30000 Range taken from Houxin Class Patrol Forces Houxin Class 750 18 16 12000 Patrol Forces Haijiu Class 750 18 2 1500 Patrol Forces Houjian Class 1,800 18 7 12600 Patrol Forces Hainan Class 1,300 15 93 120900 Patrol Forces Huangfen and Hola Class 800 30 15 12000 Patrol Forces Haiqing Class 1,300 15 25 32500
57 Table 6 2. Continued China Fleet Range Type Class Type Range Speed # Range Total Per Class Notes Patrol Forces Haizhui/Shanghai III Class 750 17 18 13500 Patrol Forces Harbour Patrol Craft 700 16.5 4 2800 Range taken from Shanghai II Class Patrol Forces Shanghai II Class 700 16.5 35 24500 Amphibious Forces Yudeng Class 3,000 14 1 3000 Range taken from Yuting II Class Amphibious Forces Typle 071 Class 3,000 14 1 3000 Range taken from Yuting II Class Amphibious Forces Yuting II Class 3,000 14 10 30000 Amphibious Forces Yuting I Class 3,000 14 14 42000 Amphibious Forces Yukan Class 3,000 14 7 21000 Amphibious Forces Yuliang Class 1,500 14 32 48000 Range taken from Yunshu Class Amphibious Forces Yunshu Class 1,500 14 10 15000 Amphibious Forces Yubei Class 1,500 14 10 15000 Range taken from Yunshu Class Amphibious Forces Yuhai Class 1,500 14 13 19500 Range taken from Yunshu Class Amphibious Forces Yunnan Class 500 10 120 60000 Amphibious Forces Yudao Class 1,000 16 1 1000 Amphibious Forces Yuch'in Class 450 11.5 20 9000 Amphibious Forces Jingsah II Class 200 49 1 0 2000 Range taken from Russian Gus Class hovercraft
58 Table 6 2. Continued China Fleet Range Type Class Type Range Speed # Range Total Per Class Notes Amphibious Forces Type 271 Class 500 10 25 12500 Range taken from Yunnan class Mine Warfa re Forces Wozang Class 3,000 10 1 3000 Range taken from T 43 Class Mine Warfare Forces T 43 Class 3,000 10 14 42000 Mine Warfare Forces Wochi Class 3,000 10 2 6000 Range taken from T 43 Class Mine Warfare Forces Wolei Class 7,000 14 1 7000 Mine War fare Forces Wosao Class 500 15 4 2000 Mine Warfare Forces Futi Class 500 15 4 2000 Range taken from Wosao Class Training Ships Shichang Class 8,000 17 1 8000 Training Ships Daxin Class 5,000 15 1 5000 Replenishment Ships Fuqing Class 18,000 14 2 36000 Replenishment Ships Nanyun Class 14,000 14 1 14000 Range taken from average of other two classes of replenishment ships Replenshipment Ships Fuchi Class 10,000 14 2 20000 Icebreakers Yanbing Class 1 0 Icebreakers Yanha Class 3 0 Submarine Support Ships Dajiang Class 6,000 14 3 18000 Range taken from Dazhi Class Submarine Support Ships Dazhi Class 6,000 14 1 6000
59 Table 6 2. Continued China Fleet Range Type Class Type Range Speed # Range Total Per Class Notes Sub marine Support Ships Dalang Class 8,000 14 6 48000 Submarine Support Ships Dazhou Class 7,000 14 2 14000 Range taken as average from Dazhi and Dalang Classes Troop Transport Qiongsha Class 8,000 14 6 48000 Range taken from Dalang Class Salvage and Rep air Dadong and Dadao Class 8,000 14 2 16000 Range taken from Dalang Class Salvage and Repair DSRV 40 2 2 80 Supply Ships Yantai Class 3,000 16 2 6000 Supply Ships Dayun Class 3,000 16 2 6000 Range taken from Yantai Class Supply Ships Dalin Class 2, 500 11 13 32500 Range taken from Hongqi Class Supply Ships Dandao Class 2,500 11 7 17500 Range taken from Hongqi Class Supply Ships Hongqi Class 2,500 11 6 15000 Supply Ships Leizhou Class 1,200 10 10 12000 Supply Ships Fulin Class 1,500 8 20 30000 Supply Ships Shengli Class 2,400 11 2 4800 Supply Ships Jinyou Class 4,000 10 3 12000 Supply Ships Fuzhou Class 1,500 8 26 39000 Range taken from Fulin Class Supply Ships Guangzhou Class 1,500 8 5 7500 Range taken from Fulin Class
60 Table 6 2. C ontinued China Fleet Range Type Class Type Range Speed # Range Total Per Class Notes Supply Ships Yannan Class 800 15 7 5600 Range taken from Yen Pai Class Supply Ships Yen Pai Class 800 15 5 4000 r 1857600 R 928800 R a 1101.779359 Total Ships 843 Ratio of Power (Pr) Ave Range (Ra) Distance (X) 0.72547332 1101.77936 799.3115302
61 Table 6 3. Malaysia fleet range Malaysia Fleet Range Type Class Type Range Speed # Rang e Total Per Class Notes Subs Scorpine Class 6000 8 2 Frigates Lekiu Class 5000 14 2 10000 Corvettes Kasturi Class 5000 14 2 10000 Corvettes Kedah Class 6050 12 6 36300 Corvettes Laksamana Class 2300 18 4 9200 Patrol Forces Handalan Class 1850 14 4 7400 Patrol Forces 31 Metre Patrol Craft 1400 14 18 25200 Patrol Forces Perdana Class 1800 15 4 7200 Patrol Forces Jerong Class 2000 14 6 12000 Amphibious Forces Newport Class 14250 14 1 14250 Mine Warfare Forces Mahamiru Class 200 0 12 4 8000 Survey Ships Survey Vessel 6000 10 1 6000 Survey Ships Survey Vessel 5250 13 1 5250 Survey Ships Survey Vessel 4500 16 1 4500 Training Ships Hang Tuah 4800 15 1 4800 Second Training vessel is sail boat. No range Logistics Support V essels Logistical Support Ships 4000 14 2 8000 r 168100 R 84050 R a 1424.576271 Total Ships 59 Ratio of Power (Pr) Ave Range (Ra) Distance (X) 0.05077453 1424.57627 72.33219056
62 Table 6 4. Philippines Fleet Range Type Class Type Range Speed # Range Total Per Class Notes Frigate Cannon Class 6000 14 1 6000 Corvettes Jacinto Class 2500 17 3 7500 Corvettes Auk Class 5000 14 2 10000 Corvettes PCE 827 Class 6600 11 8 52800 Patr ol Forces Tomas Batilo Class 600 20 8 4800 Patrol Forces PCF 65 Class 1200 12 4 4800 Range taken from Jose Andrada Class due to similar characteristics. Patrol Forces Cyclone Class 2500 12 1 2500 Patrol Forces Jose Andrada Class 1200 12 22 26400 Patrol Forces Aguinaldo Class 1100 18 3 3300 Patrol Forces Kagitingan Class 1100 18 3 3300 Range taken from Aguinaldo Class Range Patrol Forces Conrado Yap Class 290 20 10 2900 Repair Ship Achelous Class 669 12 1 669 Range taken from average ship ra nge of Philippines, could not find comparable ship. Amphibious Forces LCM 450 11.5 16 7200 Range taken from similar Chinese LCM Amphibious Forces LCU 500 10 10 5000 Range taken from similar Chinese LCU Amphibious Forces RUC 475 10.75 14 6650 Range taken from average between LCM and LCUs of Philippines in same section Amphibious Forces LCVP 475 10.75 2 950 Range taken from average between LCM and LCUs of Philippines in same section Amphibious Forces Alamosa Class 6900 15 1 6900
63 Table 6 4. Continued Type Class Type Range Speed # Range Total Per Class Notes Amphibious Forces Transport Vessel 6900 15 1 6900 Amphibious Forces Bacolod City Class 6000 11 2 12000 Amphibious Forces LST 512 1152 Class 6000 11 6 36000 Range taken from Bacolod City Clas s Supply YW Type 3000 10 2 6000 Range taken from Similar Vietnam Tanker Supply Yog Type 3000 10 2 6000 Range taken from Similar Vietnam Tanker r 170569 R 85285 R a 699.0532787 Total Ships 122 Ratio of P ower (Pr) Ave Range (Ra) Distance (X) 0.10499139 672.004098 70.55464433
64 Table 6 5. Vietnam fleet range Type Class Type Range Speed # Range Total Per Class Notes Submarine Yugo Class 550 10 2 1100 Frigates Gepard Glass 5000 10 2 100 00 Frigates Petya Class 4870 10 5 24350 Corvettes BPS 500 Class 2,200 14 2 4400 Corvettes Tarantul Class 2000 20 12 24000 Patrol Forces Svetlyak Class 2200 13 4 8800 Patrol Forces OSA II Class 500 35 8 4000 Patrol Forces Turya Class 1450 14 5 7250 Patrol Forces Shershen Class 850 30 3 2550 Patrol Forces Stolkraft Class 1100 15 4 4400 Range Taken from similar Vietnam vessel (Patrol Force ZhukClass) Patrol Forces Poluchat Class 1500 10 2 3000 Patrol Forces Zhuk Class 1100 15 14 1 5400 Patrol Forces Modified Zhuk Class 1100 15 4 4400 Range taken from normal Zhuk Class Patrol Forces BP 29 12 01 Patrol Craft 1100 15 3 3300 Range Taken from similar Vietnam vessel (Patrol Force ZhukClass) Amphibious Forces Polnochny Class 1000 18 3 3000 Range taken from Russian Polnochny Class Amphibious Force Vessel Amphibious Forces LCM 450 11.5 12 5400 Range taken from similar Chinese LCM vessel Amphibious Forces LCU 500 10 15 7500 Range taken from similar Chinese LCU vessel Amphibious Force s LCVP 475 10.75 3 1425 Range taken from average between LCM and LCUs of Philippines in same section
65 Table 6 5. Continued Type Class Type Range Speed # Range Total Per Class Notes Amphibious Forces LST 1 510 / LST 512 1152 Classes 6000 10 3 18000 Mi ne Warfare Yurka Class 1500 12 2 3000 Mine Warfare K 8 Class 1500 12 5 7500 Range taken from Yurka Class Mine Warfare Sonya Class 3000 10 4 12000 Mine Warfare Yevganya Class 300 10 2 600 Survey Kamenka Class 4000 10 1 4000 Supply Voda Class 30 00 10 1 3000 Supply Offshore Supply Vessels 3000 10 17 51000 r 233375 R 116687.5 R a 845.5615942 Total Ships 138 Ratio of Power (Pr) Ave Range (Ra) Distance (X) 0.11876076 845.561594 100.419 5375
66 Table 6 6. Total fleet strengths Type China Malaysia Philippines Vietnam Patrol Subs 66 2 2 Aircraft Carriers 1 Destroyers 29 Corvettes 12 13 14 Frigates 51 2 1 7 Patrol Forces 255 32 51 47 Mine Warfare Forces 26 4 13 Amphibious Forces 274 1 52 36 Training Ships 2 1 Troop Transports 6 Submarine Support Ships 12 Salvage and Repair Ships 4 1 Supply Ships 108 4 18 Fleet Replenishment Ships 5 Icebreakers 4 Survey Ships 3 1 Logistical Support Vessels 2 Total per Country 843 59 122 138 Total in SCS (Pt ) 1162 1162 1162 1162 Fleet Strength Ratio (Pr) 0.725473322 0.050774527 0.104991394 0.118760757
67 CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION From the literature review s, factors that had to be considered when mapping where confrontation would be most likely to occur in the South China Sea were identified. Competition over resources, especially large quantities of resources, increases when the ownership over the resourc unstable and multiple parties are unlikely to exist indefinitely within the m. According to the hypothesis of this project, high risk areas for confrontation will be located where two power projection zones overlap. Unfortunately, Malaysia, Philippines, and Vietnam all have Power Projection Distances well within their own EEZs. The locations where areas. However, based on the hydrocarbon development sites of all three of these states, Malaysia, Philippines and Vietnam are clearly a voiding the South China Sea Platform field. Therefore, the evidence suggests that the South China Sea Platform field is the location where confrontation is most likely to occur in the South China Sea. Confrontation would most likely occur under two circum begin to reach into the South China Sea Platform field. Second, if states, as the Philippines did, jection zone. As hydrocarbon demand increases in Southeast Asia, littoral states might be more likely to pursue this area for development. Especially since the South China Sea Platform field is predicted to hold 25 percent of the oil in the Sea and 20 pe rcent of the natural gas. With that in mind, China would likely also be more willing to defend it with force.
68 I would also like to offer a few other possible topics for further research and discussion. First, the hydrocarbon development sites of Malaysi a, Philippines and Vietnam appear to be heavily influenced by the demarcations of oil field boundaries and/or their maritime boundaries. Why is this the case? In the case of the South China Sea Platform field, this project provides conservative exploitation of their other South China Sea boundaries? Upon further inve stigation, Thailand, Vietnam and Indonesia all have agreed upon the maritime boundaries with treaties and median line settlements. In the areas where Malaysia is more conservative with hydrocarbon exploration, their maritime boundaries are disputed. Do disputed boundaries, regardless of EEZs, produce fear in the way states explore for hydrocarbons at sea? The literature review on conflict involving hydrocarbon s indicates that conflict is more likely to occur in areas where boundaries are disputed, but do EEZs reduce uncertainties and the potential for conflict? Second, an exploration of perceived strength based on different types of power would be extremely v aluable in this project. For instance, when it comes to decision making, how does an EEZ sovereignty right relate to a formal territorial claim? Or how do power projection y to defend an area that is within their formal claim, their EEZ, or their power projection zone? This project suggests that states do need appropriate levels of power projection to protect their EEZ interests, but further research is needed. Third, in a ddition to the work completed in this project, another important factor to explore would be the willingness of state actors to instigate confrontation in the South China Sea. Even
69 if Malaysia, Philippines or Vietnam had the ability to actively pursue hydr ocarbon resources in the South China Sea Platform field, would they be willing to engage in a likely naval clash with China? What actions are these states willing to take in order to obtain the hydrocarbon resources of the South China Sea? Fourth, furth er work on quantifying power projection, especially with regards to a gradient, could go a long way in determining where confrontation might occur. A research project on how power projection declines with distance would be a more sincere exploration of Bo concepts. With a power projection gradient, further research might be able to explain why China is able to defend the South China Sea Platform field, but is unable to develop their own hydrocarbon sites. Perhaps they need to increase their powe r projection capabilities in the area in order to exploit the vast resources that are potentially in this field. I would also like to acknowledge a few aspects of this project before I conclude. Creating a new methodology to quantify power projection dis tance at sea was a challenging task. I do acknowledge the methodology used to estimate this variable might suffer from excessive parsimony. However, there exists virtually no established method for quantifying the concept. Kenneth Boulding (1969, 275) d oes offer a limited attempt to measure the distance militaries military powers is taken into account. Other similar attempts are unable to address the distance aspect of the endeavor and simply measure power with a composite indicator. The Correlates of War (C.O.W.) Composite Indicator for National Capabilities is frequently used. A similar project by Buhaug (2010) uses this C.O.W. indicator, but the C.O.W. indicator did not suffice for this project. The logic employed for the methodology used in this project was in part borrowed from the C.O.W., most notably when the Strength of Fleet Ratio was calculated. In order to
70 address the distance aspect of power projection, the range of the fleets had to be considered as well. Utilizing a buffer zone to express power projection distance could be considered problematic since it is assuming that power projection is constant throughout the area. The buffer does not address a d ecrease in power over distance. Also, some might argue that a coefficient be employed to account for both the vertical and horizontal directions of power projection. I acknowledge these issues and counter with the argument that some areas at sea are not o f interest to any party. The ones that are of interest will be given the appropriate level attention by the projecting state. problematic as well. However, I wanted to sel ect the bases that would most likely to be used to project power into the South China Sea. Since the average range per ship of a fleet was used, the Using U.S. data for a project involving hydrocarbons in the South China Sea might seem unsuitable. However, the littoral states of the South China Sea do not currently possess the technology to reach the hydrocarbons beneath the Sea and I have not found a single circumstance where a Western company was not partnered with for exploration. I argue that using a Western data resource for oil quantities and locations is not inappropriate since Western energy companies are substantially invested in the region. In sum, this projec t demonstrates that hydrocarbon development in the South China Sea Dispute is influenced by power projection and spatial demarcations. Two demarcations appear to act as stopping points for hydrocarbon development: hydrocarbon fields and maritime
71 boundarie s. With the ability to map both hydrocarbon locations and power projection, this project was able to identify areas of likely confrontation in the South China Sea.
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75 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Evan Bild graduated from the University of Wisconsin in May of 2009 with a B.S. in p olitical s c ience with a European s tudies c ertificate. He will graduate from the University of Florida in May of 2012 with a M.A. in i nternational relations with an interdisciplinary concentration in g eographic information s ystems (ICGIS).