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1 CULTURE AND LAND TENURE IN YUCATEC MAYAN COMMUNITIES, CAMPECHE, MEXICO By TIMOTEO R. MESH A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2011
2 2011 Timot eo R. Mesh
3 To i j ka ik x achikb ah, atintik l a k s x ook t ani l jtal in s ijil ich ul a k fa milia. Dios bo otik y olal tul akal eh ba a j ka ansme e x
4 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Don Manuel Montoy su sabidura y crtica me sirvieron de referencia para hacer p reguntas validas y ser mucho ms observante con lo que no se ve a simple vista. Doa Lupe y Don Toni, su hospitalidad en Xmaben hicieron que me sintiera en familia. Nancy y Des, muchas gracias por su atencin durante mi estancia. Romeo, no me olvidar del 22 de Diciembre a las 1 1 PM cuando me ofreciste tu hamaca para que no durmiera en el frio p iso. Aparte de que me enseaste a siempre andar con una hamaca en la Pennsula me recordaste que en cada rincn del mundo siempre habr personas b ondadosas En Chunchintoc debo agradecer a Julio, Antonio, Jos, Xubert y Toni; jvenes lderes de su pueblo Su amistad, atencin, y contribucin es inmensamente agra d ecida Doa Vilma y su familia, muchas gracias por su atencin y amistad. Muchas gracias a los comisario s ejidal es y municipales de Xmaben y Chunchintoc por permitir mi estada en sus pueblos. A d on Carlos y tus padres muchas gracias por ofrecer hospedaje en Chunchintoc. Necesito agradec er el apoyo del Lic Carlos durante el verano del 2010. Esta tesis no habra tomado el (agrad able) rumbo que tuvo si no fuese por su conocimiento de la zona de La M ontaa. Gracias por su hospitalidad en Campeche y en Dzibalchn. Para terminar este prrafo debo agradecer la familia Padilla Paz en la c iu dad de Campeche. Siempre me sent en casa cuando estuve en tan linda ciudad. Muchas gracias por c ad a y todos los favo res que hicieron por un amigo ms de su hijo In Gainesville I must acknowledge my thesis committee members Dr. Allan F. Burns, Dr. Eric Keys, and Dr. Grenville Barnes for the observations made to this research. However, I must highlight the critical persp ectives of Dr. Burns whose applied focus made this research more meaningful. Proof of his outstanding mentoring is being
5 recipient of the University of Florida Graduate School 2010 2011 Doctoral Mentoring Award. Mentoring in the Yucatn Peninsula was pro vided by Dr. Luis Arriola from El Colegio de la Frontera Sur (ECOSUR University). On a hot summer day of 2010 I visited Dr. Arriola to request his supervision during my research in the state of Campeche. Without hesitation Dr. Arriola became a mentor and c o ntributed to this research there and then. My m aster studies would not have materialized without the assistantship from the Tropical Conservation and Development Program (TCD) at the Center for Latin American Studies, University of Florida. Be training program i s unique and is valuable in my m degree formation. Fun ding for the second year of my m aster degree was provided by the Department of Anthropology. The opportunity I had to be a teaching and re search assistant in the Department is invaluable. Fieldwork for this research was funded by the Tropical Conservation and Development Field Research Grant during the summer of 2010. In the fall of 2010 it was funded by the J essie B. Dupont/Magid Professors hip Funding is not simply assigning names to figures, much less simply writing out checks; the tedious paper work must be done by someone. For that efficient and competent work I am indebted to the staff of the Department of Anthropology, the Center for L atin American Studies & the TCD Program, and the School of Natural Resources and Environment. Their availability to assist students makes graduate life at UF more pleasant. No puedo terminar esta parte de agradecimientos sin reconocer las grandes amistades de los Latino Americano s y No Latino Americanos en Gainesville. Por
6 supuesto que la vida de estudiante es mucho ms placentera tenindolos como amigos. Las ideas, crticas, ancdotas, et cetera que habremos compartido no son en vano ya que eventualmente nos construye n como ciudadanos de nuestro gran continente y por extensin del mundo. Ya sabrn quines son y muchas gracias por tan grata compaa
7 TABLE OF CONTENTS page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 4 LIST OF TABLES ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 9 LIST OF FIGURES ................................ ................................ ................................ ........ 10 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................ ................................ ........................... 11 ABSTRACT ................................ ................................ ................................ ................... 12 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 14 Background ................................ ................................ ................................ ............. 14 Research Question ................................ ................................ ................................ 18 Chapter Outline ................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 18 2 EVOLUTION OF LAND TENURE IN MEXICO ................................ ....................... 19 Background ................................ ................................ ................................ ............. 19 Land Tenure in Mexico: from Colonial Rule to the Mexican Revolution .................. 19 Land Te nure in the Yucatn Peninsula ................................ ............................ 22 Campeche: from the Revolution to the 1992 Land Tenure Restructuring ......... 24 Post Revolution Politics in Campeche ................................ .............................. 24 From Los Pacficos del Sur to Cardenismo ................................ ............................. 25 Planned Development and the State ................................ ................................ ...... 26 Overview ................................ ................................ ................................ .......... 27 Planned Development in Campeche ................................ ................................ 28 3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ................................ ................................ .............. 33 Background ................................ ................................ ................................ ............. 33 Cultural Control Theory ................................ ................................ ........................... 33 On Ethnicity ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 36 Other Theories ................................ ................................ ................................ ........ 38 Common Pool Resource ................................ ................................ .................. 38 Traditional Ecological Knowledge ................................ ................................ ..... 40 Agency ................................ ................................ ................................ ............. 41 4 METHOD ................................ ................................ ................................ ................ 44 Background ................................ ................................ ................................ ............. 44 Methodology ................................ ................................ ................................ ........... 44
8 Site Selection ................................ ................................ ................................ .......... 46 Xmaben ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 47 Chunchintoc ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 48 Demography and Socio economy ................................ ................................ .... 48 Data Collection ................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 50 Data Analysis ................................ ................................ ................................ .......... 54 Code Book Building ................................ ................................ .......................... 54 Reliability ................................ ................................ ................................ .......... 55 Memoing ................................ ................................ ................................ ........... 56 Summary ................................ ................................ ................................ ................ 57 5 ANALYSIS OF EJIDO AUTONOMY ................................ ................................ ....... 62 Background ................................ ................................ ................................ ............. 62 Rituals and Cultural Control ................................ ................................ .................... 62 Public Rituals ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 67 Governance and Cu ltural Control ................................ ................................ ........... 70 Public Versus Private Adjudication ................................ ................................ ... 77 Illegal Activities and their Meaning ................................ ................................ ... 78 We Rule ................................ ................................ ................................ .................. 81 La Ley del Pueblo ................................ ................................ ............................. 86 Neutralizing the State ................................ ................................ ....................... 87 Asamblea and Acta ................................ ................................ ................................ 89 Status ................................ ................................ ................................ ............... 90 Status and Agency Colluding to High jack the State ................................ ........ 93 Summary of Findings ................................ ................................ .............................. 95 6 IMPLICATIONS ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 100 Alternative Explanations ................................ ................................ ....................... 100 Land Tenure Implications ................................ ................................ ...................... 102 Themes for Consideration ................................ ................................ ..................... 103 APPENDIX: EXCERP T FROM STATE OFFICIAL REPORTS FROM VISITS TO CHUNCHINTOC TO PROMOTE PROCEDE ................................ ....................... 1 07 LIST OF REFERENCES ................................ ................................ ............................. 109 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ................................ ................................ .......................... 116
9 LIST OF TABLES Table page 2 1 Historical summary of state planned development programs in Campeche, MX. ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................... 31 3 1 Fields of culture based on cultural control of elements. ................................ ...... 43 4 1 Population trend of Xmaben, Campeche, MX. ................................ .................... 58 4 2 Population trend of Chunchintoc, Campeche, MX. ................................ ............. 58 4 3 Demographic comparison of Chunchintoc and Xmaben, Campeche, MX. ......... 58 4 4 Socio economic comparison of Chunchintoc and Xmaben, Campeche, MX ...... 59 4 5 State subsidies in Chunchintoc and Xmaben, Campeche, MX. .......................... 59 5 1 Profile of informants in Chunchintoc and Xmaben, Campeche, MX. .................. 97
10 LIST OF FIGURES Figure page 2 1 Satellite image illustrating rice projects established in early 1980s in Chunchintoc and Xmaben, Campeche, MX. Courtesy of Claudia Monzon, University of Florida. ................................ ................................ ........................... 32 4 1 Geographic location of Xmaben and Chunchintoc, Hopelchn Campeche, MX. Courtesy of Claudia Monzon, University of Florida. ................................ .... 60 4 2 Preparing seeds (corn, squash, and black bean) for planting in the traditional kool (Milpa) system, Xmaben, Campeche, MX. ................................ .................. 61 5 1 Occurrence of coded segments of norms and sanctions amongst informants from Xmaben and Chunchintoc, Campeche, MX. ................................ ............... 98 5 2 State investment in Chunchintoc rice project. Source: INEGI (1984); INEGI (1986) ................................ ................................ ................................ ................. 98 5 3 Collage of field research pictures. (A) Traditional Milpa, Xmaben, (B) Cattle production in the meca nizado, Chunchintoc, (C) Infamous calabozo transporting ramn to feed sheep, Xmaben. ................................ ................................ ................................ ............. 99
11 LIST OF ABBREVIATION S BANRURAL Banco Nacional de Crdito Rural; National Bank for Rural Develop ment COMADEP C onsulto r a Mesoamericana de Asistencia y de Desarrollo Popular ; Mesoamerican C onsultancy for Assistance and Popular Development COMPLAMAR Coordinacin General del Plan Nacional de Zonas Deprimidas y Grupos Marginados; General Coordination for the Disadvantaged Sectors and Marginalized Groups CONAFOR Comisin Nacional Forestal, National Forestry Commission IMF International Monetary Fund INEGI Instituto Nacional de Estad stica, Geografa e Informtica; National Institute of Statistics, Geogra phy, and Informatics NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement NGO Non Governmental Organization PES Payment for Environmental Services PIDER Proyecto de Inversiones P blicas para el Desarrollo Rural; Public Investment Project for Rural Development PROCAMP O Pro grama de Apoyo Directo al Campo; Direct Rural Support Program PROCEDE Programa de Certificacin de Derechos Ejidal es y Titulacin de Solares Urbanos; Program for the Certification of Ejido Land Rights and the Titling of Urban House Plots RAN Registro Agrario Nacional; National Agrarian Registry S AM Sistema Alimentaria Mexicano; Mexican Food System S R A Secretara de la Reforma Agraria; Agrarian Reform Ministry
12 Abstract of Thesis Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Science CULTURE AND LAND TENURE IN YUCATEC MAYAN COMMUNITIES, CAMPECHE, MEXICO By Timoteo R. Mesh December 2011 Chair: Allan F. Burns Major: Interdisciplinary Ecology Land tenure restructuring in 1992 was part of the neo liberal policies implemented in the 198 0s and early 199 0s to fully integrate Mexico into the global economy. Proponents of the restructuring argued that this modernization was necessary to increase producti vity of rural Mexico. It was also argued that creating a dynamic land market could address the issue of poverty through the efficient distribution of land. Literature reveals that results of the land tenure restructuring are mixed and in most cases the re structuring failed to achieve the expected results. Research has focused on the institutional factors that affect the land tenure restructuring of th e communal land holding system the ejido Ethnicity is considered one of these internal factors. I conten d that rather than ethnicity, attention should be paid to the autonomy of ejidos to produce and reproduce their specific land tenure regimes. My hypothesis is that more autonomous communities have the capacity to reject, revert from, or co opt land title ba sed tenure systems. Research was conducted in Xmaben and Chunchintoc, Municipio of Hopelchn, Campeche, Mexico during the summer and fall of 2010. Xmaben participated in PROCEDE, while Chunchintoc did not participate. Both communities are of Yucatec
13 Maya n descent. Cultural control theory, as proposed by Bonfil Batalla, was utilized to se study which used participant observation, semi structured interviews, and archival research, further comp lemented by theories of traditional ecological knowledge, common pool resource, and agency. It is concluded that Chunchintoc has more cultural control (autonomy) over its organizational and symbolic cultural elements. To some degree this autonomy enabled i t to refuse participation in the land titling program. Based on this case study, it is possible to state that autonomy of ejidos hold s explanatory power in furthering understanding of the structural factors that implicate land tenure regimes in the Yucate c Maya region of Campeche, Mexico.
14 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Background Neo liberal policies in the 19 8 0s and 199 0s further liberalized the agr icultural sector of Mexico and fully integrate d Mexico into the world economy (De Janvry et al. 1997 ; Lewis 2002 ) Within the negotiations of the North American Free Trade Agreements President Carlos Salinas de Gortari called for the amendment of Article 27 of the Constitution (Assies 2008) In 1992 Article 27 was replaced by the Agrarian Law. Prior to the 1992 Agrarian Law ejido land was inalien able, the state holding official titles to them (Lewis 2002) The ejido system 1 is a community based land holding to which members have usufruct rights for cultivation (Tiedje 2009) it being a product of the 1917 Mexican Constitution. Ejidos could be established through land grants made by the State. Land was granted to existing human settlement or land was granted and then settled as a New Centers of Ejidal Population NCPE (De Janvry et al. 1997 ; Schren 2001 ) The 1992 Agra rian Law made inter alia changes to the ejido (Cornelius and Myhre 1998 :2 4 ) : ejidatarios c ould obtain individual certificates to their land parcels; certified parcels could be traded; certified parcels land c ou ld ejidatarios were no longer required to work their land or risk losing their land rights; and foreign investment could be made in ejidos 1 The Agrarian Law stipulates that ejidatarios are men and women who are ejido right holders. Meanwhile, non ejido right holders that have live d in the settlement nucleus are considered as a vecindado s Avecindados who gain access to land are considered comuneros In La Monta a there is little to no distinction amongst non ejidatarios ; they are all referred to as comuneros Thus, hereafter comuneros is used to refer to both avecindados and com uneros
15 Proponents of the individual titling program argued that the ejido system seemed monolithic and needed to be modernized to increas e the productivity of rural Mexico (Cornelius and Myhre 1998) Others believed that a restructuring of the land tenure regime was necessary to creat e a more effi cient distribution of land and could also address the issue of poverty (Zoomers 2000) However, literature has demonstrated that the results of the 1992 land tenure restructuring are mixed and in most instances restrucutring did not achieve its expected outcomes. An important part of scholarship has analyzed t he shift of agrarian policies and its impact, such as the remov al of price guarantees a nd the gradual reduction of rural agrarian subsides to ease the lifti ng of this established price via PROCAMPO, PROGAN, to name just two. Another part of research has focused on understand ing what the impact of the land tenure restructuring was on ejidos I f any ho w did ejidos react to it and what are the prospects for th ese communal land holdings. Attempts at understanding this phenomenon ha ve focused on the different factors that influence the property rights regime of the ejido Barsimantov et al. ( 2010 emphasis added ) c ite internal and external drivers that influence the evolution of property rights in ejidos in Quintana Roo The authors identify in ternal factors to be local governance structures, meanings of property, livelihood strategies, migration patterns, the communal resource base, and ethnic composition Lewis ( 2002 emphasis added ) also state that the factors that affect the response of an ejido to economic and tenure reforms are types of land access, agricultural management pra ctices, proximity of the ejido to the USA, a history of the agricultural practices and agrarian reform in the region, and the ethnic composition of the ejido
16 Culture, often times juxtaposed with e thnicity, has been analyzed to explore land tenure regimes Ensminger (1996:180) in reviewing land titling in Africa posit s that communities have complex webs of networks and meanings which allow for subsistence via land access and inheritance of land over time. Interest ingly, even where a high percentage of land is titled, databases soon become outdated since communities revert to customary land right regimes thus demonstrat ing that these communities do not rely exclusively on land titles to assert rights (Ensminger 1996 ; Zoomers 2000 ) Scholars propose that communities that reject, revert from, or co opt regimes that have private land title as its principal form of security to property indicate that th ey have complementary forms of land tenure (Ensminger 1996:182) These complementary often times termed informal, customary, endogenous, et cet era. Their autochthonous nature would suggest that social groups (communities), at least to some degree, have control over the production and reproduction of those complementary regimes. It is this degree of control a utonomy w hich gives them the capacity t o reject, revert from, or co opt land title based forms of land tenure. My hypothesis is that more autonomous communities are able to reject a State policy whose ultimate goal is to privatize the communal land holding. I adopt Bonfil Batalla (1988; 1995) cultural control theory to explore autonomy. Bonfil Batalla uses a systematic approach to disentangle the web of elements and relations to understand cultural control. Cultural control, as the author def ines it, is the social decision making capacity over cultural elements. Elements can be material, organizational, knowledge, symbolic, and emotive. It is this definition that I utilize for autonomy. For purposes of this
17 study, communities that have more so cial decision making capacity over cultural elements are considered more autonomous. Upon the closure of PROCEDE in the State of Campeche there were 9 ejidos that rejected the land regularization program (SRA 2006) : f our in the Municipio of Hopelchn, three in Calkin and two in Hecelcha k n all c ejidos This information make s for a compelling argument that indeed ethnicity is linked to the land tenure regimes. However, if ethnicity were one of the internal forces, how can it be explained when communities which are subject to the same forces make opposing decision s on their land tenure regimes? Why would one rejec t PROCEDE while another accept s PROCEDE? As mentioned above, analysis of land tenure restructur ing in the ejido has focused on the internal and external forces that influence these land tenure regimes and has spent much effort on analyzing the institution as Agrawal (2003) criticizes. Though this research us es as starting point questioning the existence of cultural elements and control of those elements by the ejidos to accept or reject PROCEDE, it ultimately tries to establish its autonomy. In efforts to understand autonomy, micro politics become central in analyzing the historical evolution of agency and control over key cultural challenge of expanding inquiry on the other side of the institution I do so by exploring autonomy, status, agency, and to a lesser extent power In exploring autonomy, rather than ethnicity, much can be understood on negotiating their land tenure regimes.
18 Research Question What are the cultural elements that are present in an ejido that influence its decision to either accept or reject PROCEDE? Chapter Outline This thesis has s ix C hapters. Chapter 1 introduces the research problem, question and its relevance to land tenure. The following Chapter 2 provides a review of t he evolution of land tenure at the national, state, and regional land level. It also provides a review of State development programs implemented in the state of Campeche. Chapter 3 provides a liter ature review of the theories of (a) cultural control, (b) c ommon pool resource, (c) traditional ecological knowledge, (d) agency, and (e) ethnicity. Chapter 4 reports on the method utilized to collect and analyze data for this research. Chapter 5 analyzes the data collected to establish the autonomy of each commun ity based on the theoretical underpinnings. The last Chapter Chapter 6, describes the implication of the research and the considerations that should be made for future land tenure research in Campeche.
19 CHAPTER 2 EVOLUTION OF LAND TE NURE IN MEXICO Backg round This Chapter reviews the evolution of land tenure from colonial period to the 1992 land tenure restructuring. Land tenure review is made at three scales : the country, the Yucatn Peninsula, and the State of Campeche. A review of State development pro gram s in Campeche is made to offer the reader an understanding of the State in r ural Mexico/Campeche. This Chapter also illustrates the economic conditions within which land tenure restructuring happened in the 198 0s and early 199 0s The Chapter closes by focusing on the research site and how it was incorporated into the State development program. Land Tenure in Mexico: from Colonial Rule to the Mexican Revolution From 1519 to 1785 the Spanish Crown granted large tracts of land as a form of reward to the s oldiers under the Encomienda system (Assies 2008; Hervik 2003) The Encomenderos were required to educate, protect and Christianize the indigenous populations and use their services and goods (Hervik 2003) A mixture of social impact caused by the Encomienda system led to the passage of legislation in 1542 to regulate and terminate it (Assies 2008) Nonetheless, th e State still kept control over the indigenous population by resettling them into Pueblos de Indios and forcing them to work for the Crown ( Assies 2008; Gabbert 2004 ) The Spanish Crown iss ued land deeds to these resettled communities as ejidos (Assies 2008) Gabbert ( 2004 : 52) Indigenous communal property the ejidos was fiscally motivated, to continue the collection of colonizers
20 continued to appropriate land through royal grants, confirmation of de facto occupation, sales, or usurpation (Assies 2008) Extractive and productive activities such as mining, grain production, and cattle ranching gave rise to the Hacienda system. The use of forced labor, land appropriation and consequent rent or sharecrop ping regimes by the Haciendas led to new tensions between the Spanish and Mestizo c olonizers and the Commoner 1 i ndigenous population ( Assies 2008; Gabbert 2004 ) Alexander (2003 ) argues that land tenure, the Hacienda system being one of them, had distinct configurations in different parts of Mesoamerica. Competition for land and labor was among the Church, the State, the Spanish entrepreneurs and the i ndigenous nobility. Regardless of the appropriator or the appropriation means, land was consolidated into a few hands (Assies 2008) little changed with respect to land dist ribution and ownership. In fact, post independence liberal governments enacted policies that further consolidated the Haciendas into L atifundios (large landholdings) (Assies 2008 ). During the rule of General Porf ri o D az from 1877 to 1910 unclaimed land was measured and became property of the State; a part was granted to the companies that demarcated these lands. The new property of the State was traded to companies and large land owners (Assies 2008) Estimates are that 87 % of rural landholdings were owned by 0.2 % of the landowners. Throughout this process adjudication was possible if the possessor of the land had legitimate claim over the unproductive lands. Few communities and owners had documentation of ownership, resulting in the loss of their land. 1 Efforts to dominate the Indigenous population was achieved through alliances between the Spanish Colonizers and the Indigenous elite see (Alexander 2003; Gabbert 2004; Hervik 2003)
21 Disproportionate distribution of land led to the Mexican Revolution in 1911. In 1915 Venustiano Carranza issued a decree to return village and community lands that had been los t as a result of The Lerdo Law of 1857. T he Lerdo L aw did not include ejidos from the inalienability making way for their purchase by private parties that claimed to have rented them (Assies 2008) Various proposa ls and decrees were the essence of Article 27 of the 1917 Mexican Const itution; from this point onward land belonged to the State (Assies 2008) Large landholding s were expropriated and distributed to populations t hat lacked land and/or water. A limit on the amount of land that could be owned as private property was established. The Church, which owned large tracts of land, could not own land According to De Janvry et al. ( 1997) the ejido was designed to fulfill multiple objectives of political control including organizing production and serving as a body of peasant representation. The au thor states that under the post revolutionary constitution individuals could acquire l and via the following four mechanisms: (a) the right of land restitution for the indigenous communities that had legal documentation over land occupation; (b) living in a settlement that had available land for distribution; (c) re locating to a colonization zone and the establishment of a new population center; and (d) existing ejidos obtaining extension to land to incorporate new ejidatarios Indigenous communities, due to displacement during the colon ial period, did not have the ju dic i al proof over their l and occupation (Tiedje 2009 ) Thus, even in areas where the indigenous population was high there were few comunidades agrarias 2 I ndigenous 2 Comunidades agrarias was the legal term util ized for land restituted to indigenous communities.
22 communities opted for the ejido as a means to obtain access and rights over land (Assies 2008; Tiedje 2009) Land Tenure in the Yucatn Peninsula Upon the arrival of the Spanish the Yucatn Peninsula 3 was divided into at least sixteen polities which were ruled by halach winik (real men) who w ere also the batab (local leaders) (Gabbert 2004) These polities were stratified into the noble, the c ommoners, and the slaves ( Gabbert 2004; Hervik 2003) In 1552 the c olonizers reorganized the communities into Pueblos de Indios At the beginning of the eighteenth century, Gabbert ( 2004) estimates that two thirds of these Pueblos de Indios had been abandoned. The author argues that this was an effort to evade tributes in the form of taxes and labor to both the Crown and the local nobility. Parallel to this, the practice of swidden agriculture also increased the distance fro m these settlement centers which made community members relocate to areas where land for cultivation was available. During the seventeenth to the mid eighteenth centuries estancias (small cattle ranches) in the Yucatn required only a few laborers. During this period the Indigenous population is alleged to have maintain ed access to land and conducted Milpa production. However, population growth in the Yucatn, Veracruz and Havana led to the demand for grains and meat ; activities until then considered unpr ofitable. According to Gabbert (2004); H ervik ( 2003 ) ; and Patch ( 1991) during the 183 0s and 184 0s Hacienda sys tem onto i ndigenous communal lands. As Gabbert (2004 ) states it made 3 Yucatn hereafter is used to refer to the Yucatn Peninsula including the States of Campeche, Quintana Roo and Yucatn, unless otherwise noted.
23 it progressively easier to transfer supposedly uncultivated public lands ( terrenos b aldos ) to private hands, thereby gradually strip p ing away the legal protection of Indian claims to soil. [Gabbert 2004:40] According to these authors, agricultural expansion to accommodate grains, sugar, h enequen, cattle, amongst others result ed in a debt peonage system on the Haciendas Those that remained on th e communal lands and practiced Milpa had to pay rent, provide in kind labor or pay with a percentage of their produce (Gonzlez Navarro 1973  ; Zavala and Miranda 1973  ) Gabbert ( 2004) provides a synthesis of the Henequen industry in the Yucatn. Henequen became the most important export commodity when the preferential regional markets for sugar and beef were severed after independence. Th e principal market was the United States. Introduction of the mechanized harvesters increased output resulting in a demand for more land and labor. According to the author, land accommodated for Milpa production was reduced resulting in the proletarianizat ion of most Mayans in the West and North of the Yucatn. The outbreak of the Caste War has been labeled as an ideological battle between the elites of the Yucatn either in support of a Centrist or a Federalist regime of government. It was also a duel bet ween the elites of Campeche and the state of Yucatn. According to Gabbert (2004 ) promised the Mayan masses the abolition or reduction of taxes and the reparti tion of land that had been usurped by the Haciendas At the onset of the Mexican Revolution, which was at the end of the Caste War in the Yucatn (1843 1902), 96.4 % of families in the state of Yucatn had no land. In the state of Campeche communal lands were rare forcing Mayans to either be farm laborers or tenants of landowners (Schren 2001 )
24 Campeche: from the Revolution to the 1992 Land Tenure Restructuring of land. Campeche was not exempt from this wave of land consolidation conducted by foreign companies during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Schren 2001) Forest concessions were g ranted to foreign companies to extract timber ( m ahogany, Sxietenia macrophyla King; Spanish cedar, Cedrela odorata L.), logwood ( Haematoxylum campechianum L.) and c hicle ( Manilkara zapota ). According to Ramayo Lanza 10, 000 km 2 granted as concessions to five American companies (Porter Bolland 2001) According to data presented by Schren ( 2001) in 1885 72 % of the peasants were farmers; thi s was dramatically reduced to 13 % in 1910. This proves his thesis that commercial agriculture from henequen, sugar, maize, cotton, cattle, amongst others, displaced farmers and made them peon s. Working conditions o n the Haciendas and Monteras (forest cam ps for forest product extractions) were repressive (Schren 2001) According to the author, the bosses had judicial, executive and criminal jurisdiction over the peons. Post R evolution P olitics in Campeche Lukewarm p ositions and policies adopted by appointed and elected g overnors of Campeche slowed Revolutionary objectives (Schren 2001 ) The administration of General Joaquin Mucel (1914 1919) implemented legislation that reduc ed the power that the large landholder wielded; however, he failed to address the issues of high land concentration in Campeche (Schren 2001) .Though Mucel abolished the debt peonage system in the Haciendas and Monter as of Campeche the peons remained landless
25 Schren ( 2001) his b elief that improving working conditions on the large landholders to increase production was more efficient and modern. Ram n F l ix Flores came to power in 1921. D uring his two year s as governor was the first time that the was addre ssed on a limited scale. Approaches adopted by the successive presidents between 1917 1934 did little to address the problems of the landless (Assies 2008) Of course this trickled to the State level. The visit of President L zaro C rdenas to Campeche pushed Eduardo Mena C rdova to make changes i n the State agrarian reform policies. Failure to do so was threatened with destitution (Schren 2001) Assies (2008) and D e Janvry et al. ( 1997 ) state that during the p residency of L zaro C rdenas there was a surge in land grants and expansion of existing ejido lands an epoch now dubbed Cardenismo (1934 1940). From Los Pacficos del Sur t o Cardenismo The Pacficos del Sur (Peaceful of the South) was a group of rebels escaping the front lines of the Case War and also evading tax payments from the g overnment of signing of a Peace Treaty with the Yucatn g overnment in 1853 ( Angel 1997; Gabbert 2004) The significance of this treaty is the staunch refusal of the payment of the head tax (Angel 1997) Conditional to the indefinite exemption of the head tax payment was the acceptance of priests to administer the Sacraments. With the exception of periodic suspicion that t he rebels had contact with the e aster n r eb els (in Quintana Roo) on the one hand, and that the Government would terminate the tax exemption on the other, the Treaty was honored by both parties (Angel 1997) Fro m a population of approximately 12,000 in 1853 (Angel 1997) the population of the Pacficos del Sur was 8 000 by 1910 (Dumond
26 1997) The Pacficos del Sur eventually integrated into the s tate of Campeche because of commerc ial ties and the conn ection of roads to this region via Hopelchn (Gabbert 2004) After the Mexican Revolution Haciendas in Hopelchn were abandoned and share cropped by some former Hacienda workers (Gabbert 2004) Meanwhile other farmers abandoned the Haciendas completely to start settling in communities. This loss of farm labor caused large landholders to find other commercial activities. Some ventured into c hicle ext raction with capital provided by foreign investors Schren ( 2001; 2003) Labor for c hicle extraction was provided by the liberated farmhands and out of s tate c hicleros. Hopelchn and Dzibalchn we re the major centers for c hicle extraction in the 1930s. Lands for the legal establishment of ejidos in the Municipio of Hopelchn were granted between 1927 and 1935. Second expansion to most, if not all, ejidos of Hopelchn was in 1938 & 1939. Large trac ts of land, in the five digits, were granted in the third, and presumably the last, expansion for the same ejidos in 1940. See (Schren 2001: 311 13 ) for details of the grants and expansions. Planned Development and t he State Land tenure in Campeche is difficult to understand without taking into account the intervention of the State in the rural sector. It is argued that unsustained growth of the Mexican economy was as a result of a long history of the import substitut ion model and the monopolization of export by o il in the 197 0s The oil price plunge in 1981 was all that was required to push the government into default. As per normal, loans from the International Monetary Fund implied structural adjustments with regard s to public spending and an economic liberalization (Gates 1993) The author states that for most of the 198 0s especially the latter part, the public sector investment in the agricultural
27 sector dropped by 80 % red uction of loans to the rural sector was cut by 50 % and the guaranteed price for ten major st aple products fell by almost 50 % Gates ( 1993) s tates that it was during this economic condition that the government took the daunting task of revitalizing the agricultural sector. De Janvry et al. ( 1997 ) and Gates (1993 ) argue that to a large extent, efforts by the State to address the debt crisis of 1982 eventually resulted in the 1992 restructuring of land tenure 4 in Mexico. In the following section I describe the a grarian policies in Campeche which eventually involved both Xmaben and Chunchintoc. Focus is placed on the years that le d to th e Mexican debt crisis and its implications on the rural sector. Extensive analysis is provided by the classic work of Gates 1993 In Default Overview Post Cardenismo (1940 1965) saw the development of dual s tate p olicies toward the agrarian sector ( De Janvry et al. 1997; G ates 1993 ) On the one hand s tate development agencies catered to the need of the rural poor and on the other h and they were promoting commercial agriculture. Green Revolution technology and public infrastructure gave rise to the Mexican Miracle (Gates 1993) Throughout the rest of the 19 6 0s despite foreign investment, in creased State intervention stagnated commercial agriculture. This also meant a reduction of public investment in agriculture (Gates 1993) President Luis Echeverr a Alvarez (1970 the agriculture (Gates 1993) With World Bank funding the PIDER and COPLAMAR projects 4 Changes brought by the 1992 Agrarian Law, which some authors refer to as Agrarian Reform, is consideration the definition of agrarian ref orm by Deere and Len (2000:75) and observations made by thesis committee members.
28 were established to address the imbalance (Assies 2008; Gates 1993) Likewise, d uring his tenure national lands were distributed to peasants. The economic policy of import substitution showed its effect with increased inflation. During th e latter part of the 197 0s there was an economic crisis; however, this was temporarily addressed with the discovery of petroleum and public debt. During this turmoil the SAM was created with the objective of increasing productivity in rain fed areas with t he State sharing the risks of the investment. Between 1976 and 1982, according to Gates ( 1993) an increase in ejido managed occurred. Even after the 1982 debt crisis, the following administrations kept promoting agricultural productivity with an emphasis on staple foods. 1994) intensified debt restructuring while liberalizing the Mexican economy via NAFTA. Consequently th e agricultural sector was opened with protection limited to corn, beans, meat, and powdered milk (De Janvry et al. 1997) Gates (1993: 274) states that during this austerity an d liberalizing phase the State retreated from the rural sector Within this period the restructuring of land tenure in Mexico took place ( Barnes 2009 ; Gates 1993 ) a result of the 1992 Agrarian Law. Consequently, PROCEDE was established to operationalize the land regularization seen as necessary for the full integration of Mexico into the world economy (Cornelius and Myhre 1998) Planned D ev elopment in Campeche Infrastructural development during the Mexican Miracle years created socia l unrest by displacing peasants xample Veracruz 194 1, Tabasco 1966,
29 and Oaxaca 1974 (Gates 1 993 ) In Campeche Gates ( 1993) describes the State planned development as having four phases. During the 196 0s the s outhern parts of the State w ere seen as a frontier for the relocation of landless peasants from the central part of Mexico. At the turn of the 19 7 0s the State shifted toward transferring middle to small scale technology to ejidos in the Mayan region of Campeche. In 1973 th e Alfredo V. Bonfil ejido in the Edzna valley saw the development of large mechanized agriculture as part of a national resettlement project. And finally, in 1978 the Yohalt n, in the same valley, saw the State increasing its grip o n the rural sector by pu rsuing agribusiness with rice production on ejido lands. In the middle of the turmoil of inflation, devaluation and the actual default of the Mexican government Xmaben and Chunchintoc were Table 2 1 provides a summary of the State p lanned d evelopment in Campeche. Ironically the last attempt of the p lanned d evelopment of the State culminates with rice projects in Xmaben and Chunchintoc. In 1985 the State ma de the last expenditure on the Chunchintoc Ri ce project (INEGI 1990) As Gates (1993) predicted, after the state programs were discontinued, these lands transitioned to cattle production, either by design or by default. In Xma ben the 500 hectares of rice might have been sown once by the State enterprise. After the project was abandoned, a cattle cooperative was formed, and the mecanizado 5 that is closer to the community was fenced. Johnson and Guinea grass seeds in the rice did not require investment for pasture establishment. Chunchintoc saw 10,000 hectares of forest felled. Schren (2001) reports that only 5,000 hectares of the land were utilized for rice 5 Mecanizado is the local term used to make reference to the area where forest was felled and mechanized for the rice project s.
30 production. Decrease of the price of rice, mismanagement, and a reduction of S tate mecanizado was also fenced and the land was gradually converted to pasture. The satellite image below (Figure 2 1) illust rates the areas where the rice projects were established; the image was taken two years after the project was halted. In Chunchintoc it is the upper left of the ejido polygon; in Xmaben it is the lower section bordering the ejido polygon.
31 Table 2 1. Hi storical summary of state planned development programs in Campeche, MX Year Location Model Land Tenure System Goal/s 1963 Candelaria Tropical frontier colonization Establishment of 6 town sites. 5,000 ha of ejido land per town. Balanced commercial produ ction of foods, cattle and lumber; extensive mechanization, irrigation, technical assistance & extension. 1969 Maya Region Small scale transfer of intermediate technology 60 100 ha in collective production on ejido land Secure livelihood via intensive a griculture via irrigate high value crops 1973 Alfredo V. Bonfil, Edzna Valley Large scale agricultural and resettlement project 20,000 ha ejidos ; 10 ha individual/family plots and the remainder as collective land Intensive, heavily mechanized, diversifie d agriculture with irrigation planned for 50% for rice and 50% for cattle 1978 Yohaltn, Edzna Valley State agribusiness enterprise 75,000 ha organized in 7 ejidos as production units Rice production on ejido land without directly involving the ejidatari os 1981 Chunchintoc State agribusiness enterprise 10,000 ha of ejido land Rice production on ejido land without directly involving the ejidatarios 1981? Xmaben State agribusiness enterprise 500 ha of ejido land Rice production on ejido land without direc tly involving the ejidatarios Source: Adapted from Gates (1993:65 72;169)
32 Figure 2 1 Satellite image illustrating rice projects established in early 1980s in Chunchintoc and Xmaben, Campeche, MX. Courtesy of Claudia Monzon, University of Florida.
33 CHAPTER 3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWOR K Background Based on my hypothesis that more autonomous communities will b e able to reject a State policy in this case PROCEDE I find that the use of Cultural Control Theory relevant t o define that autonomy. For purposes of this study the degree of c ultural c ontrol over these elements defines the degree of autonomy. Bonfil Batalla ( 1995) states most communities find themselves on a con tinuum from an autonomous culture to an imposed culture. Common Pool Resource Theory and Traditional Ecological Knowledge are describe d below. Both theories are central in the analysis for this research T heir framework was essential in identifying constr ucts and variables that were incorporated in the interview guide. Since I argue that it is the decision making capacity of the com munity over cultural elements a utonomy t hat is essential in determining the acceptance or rejection of PROCEDE and not ethnici ty the reader is provided with a brief description of ethnicity and how it is approached in this study. Agency is described as well. Agency is used fo r its explanatory power and its direct relation with Common Pool Resource, TEK and the interactions of th e individual with the various At the end of this Chapter it is hoped that the reader understand s the principal and secondary theories that influenced the structure of the thesis and why they are essential in the discussion of the results. Cultura l Control Theory Cultural control theory as the author defines the social decision making capacity (Bonfil Batalla 1988 ; 1 995) For the author cultural
34 elements are the components that are necessary to be in play to conduct all and each social action: to maintain daily life meet needs define and solve problems formulate and try to fulfill aspirations The cultural element s are divided into the following (the definitions are translated word for word to maintain definitions as original thesis): M ATERIAL A re all objects that are either in their natural state or transformed by human labor which a group i s able to make use of at a given moment of its historical becoming : land raw materials energy sources, tools and utensils natural and manufactured products, e t cetera O RGANIZATIONAL. A re systematized forms of social relations through which members of a group can participate, and whose intervention is necessary to accomplish the action K NOWLEDGE. T he assimilated and systematized experiences that are produced, which are accumulate d and transmitted from generation to generation and within which new knowl edge is generate d and incorporate d SYMBOLIC. A re the different codes that allow for the necessary communication between the participants at the various stages of an action. Language is the fundamental code, but there are other symbolic systems that must b e shared to make efficient and possible certain actions EMOTIVE. C an be referred to as subjective. It is the collective representation, beliefs and integrated values which motivate participation and/or acceptance of actions: subjectivity as an essential cultural element. According to Bonfil Batalla ( 1988) when the cultural elements are in play to conduct an action it is necessary to have the capacity to make decision s over those elements. These decision s can be made at an individual level, household level, communal level, specialized group level, and at macro scales. Autonomous culture is one where the group makes decisions over cultural elements. These elements are native since they are produce d by a gr oup of social actors and they are preserved as pre existing patrimony. Examples the author provides are medicinal knowledge where the knowledge, the language of communication the
35 specifics of the ailment, and the decision to consult and provide this trad itional knowledge are native. Another example is the production of Milpa where the knowledge of land selection, plant species, rituals, organization of labor are all elements over which the local community exert s decision. Local forms of adjudication over daily life are another component of autonomous culture ( Bonfil Batalla 1988) The other extreme of the continuum, as can be observed above, is imposed culture where neither the elements nor decisions over those elements are native to the social group. An example provided is the imposition of elementary education where the parents are obligated by law to keep children in school. The content of the education (material, language in non o fficial l anguage spe aking communities, etc) is not decided by the social group. Appropriated culture is the sphere where the social group gains control over foreign elements and makes decisions over those elements. A contemporary example is the appropriation of agro technolo gy ( e.g. agrochemicals) and their us e in traditional Milpas. Though the element is foreign its form of use is decided by the social group (individual or household). Bonfil Batalla ( 1988) provides other e xamples such as making adjustments to internal social organizations based on external appropriation of social structures. On the other hand, alienated culture is when the social group loses control over elements that are of their patrimony. Examples provid ed are cultural alienation o r folklorization of ceremonies and feasts where the social group does not have control over its production. For a more graphic illustration of the four types of culture mentioned above see Table 3 1 below. For Bonfil Batalla, an ethnic group is the group of relatively stable individuals that maintain historical continuity since they can biologically reproduce themselves and
36 because the members of that group establish among themselves a dist inct social identity. They generally con sider themselves of a political unit that has exclusive control over cultural elements that are native to them. Decisions are considered propias ( autochthonous) when they generally involve cultural elements that are native and which ha ve legitimacy within the group. It is admissible that there are limitations to this framework of analysis. It is arguable that it is a form too static for the analysis of culture and its autonomy. Nonetheless Bonfil Batalla ( 1995) argues that Cultural Control Theory can be useful to analyze autonomy when culture is seen as a fluid process and not one that is monolithic parameters and rhythms O n Ethnicity Throughout the history of social science ethnicity has been influenced by two major schools of thought, the primordialist and the instrumentalist. The primodialist see s (Nederveen Pieterse 1996:2 7 ) where they can Comaroff ( 1996: 165 ) states that there is a more neo primordialist school of thought that posit s that ethnic consciousness is lat ent and is objectified only when the integrity or intentions of the ethnic group is threatened. Nederveen Pieterse ( 1996) argues that ethnicity is an unstable category one that i s plural and contested betw een the enclosure of the ethnic category and the contradictor pressure of competition to alter the boundaries of the ethnic category. For Comaroff ( 1996: 166 ) ethnic identities are relations whose content is prod uced in the particularities of their historical construction. Similar to Nederveen Pieterse (1996 ) the author posits that identity originates where there is inequality either over
37 material, political or s ymbolical power. The author also states that from the assemblage of symbols, values, and meaning which occur in daily life the construction of ethnic identity happens. After the ethnic identities are constructed they are reified. However, what contribute s in the construction of these identities is not necessarily what sustains them (Comaroff 1996: 166 ) In the Yucatn according to Gabbert ( 2001 a ; 2001 c; 2004 ) possibly until the beginning of the twentieth century there was very limited differentiation among the of those of Spanish descent, the Creoles or the Mestizos (what in modern day are categor ized as Yucatec Maya). Gabbert ( 2001 b ) argues that the term Maya was not in the imagin ed consciousness of the population of the Yucatn as an ethnic identity; he argues that the term Maya as a social category ori ginated in academia in the twentieth century. Though Gabbert convincingly argues that there are symbolic characteristics (language, clothing, surname) that creates an ethnic category how it is negotiated by the subjects in a conscious or unconscious manner. His thesis that symbols are Nederveen Pieterse 's ( 1996: 38 ) state ment that evelopment does not eliminate ethnicity but makes for its refiguration The above observations bolster the argument that et hnicity i n its primordial paradigm and as often utiliz ed in land tenure literature is misconstrued (or is a misnomer at least) land.
38 With the propositions above by John Comaroff and Jan Nederveen Pieterse, e thnicity in the Yucatn is not something that should be freely utilized to lump groups of people into eth nic categories. If we utilized the more neo primordialist view that ethnic identities are latent and given then it is easy to fall into the conventionality to state that a group of peo ple are Yucatec Mayans. This position is evidently contradictory even f or the title of this study which assumes that the subjects studied are from an ethnic group/category. However, it is necessary to be transparent to the reader on this front. I acknowledge that Cultural Control Theory can be criticized as being primordiali st for seemingly taking ethnic group as a given and portraying them as static and monolithic. However, Bonfil Batalla ( 1988 ) argued that it is not the categorization of the elements or the groups that is essential in his theory, but the analysis of the decision making capacity in every action or circumstance. However, my interest is not to argue for or against the primordialist view. Cultural C ontrol T heory as Bonfil Batalla argues, helps with analyzing t he ial of decision making. The framework facilitates the ability to determine which community is autonomous versus one that is less autonomous. Other Theories Common P ool R esource The Mexican ejido as established by the law, is a form of C ommon Pool Resource (CPR). Ostrom ( 1990: 30 ) defines CPR s as a natural or man made resource system that is sufficiently large to make it costly to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits from its use Common Property Resource (CPR), as defined by Stevenson ( 1991: 40 ) has the following characteristics:
39 The resource has bounds that are determined by social, biological and physical characteristics. There is a well defined group of users who are distinct from the person s who are excluded from the resource use. Multiple included users participate in the extraction of resources. Explicit or implicit well understood rules exist among users regarding their rights a nd their duties to one another about resource extraction. Users share joint, nonexclusive entitlements to the in situ or fugitive resource prior to its capture or use. Users compete for the resources, and thereby impose negative externalities on one anoth er. A well delineated group of rights holders exist s which may or may not coincide with the group of users. In a review and critique of CPR s, Agrawal ( 2003) summarizes the four sets of variables that have been ident ified over the years by scholars : (a) characteristics of the resource, (b) the nature of the groups that depend on the resource, (c) particular institutional regimes through which the resource is managed, and (d) the nature of the relationship between a gr oup and external forces and authorities. An extensive description can be found in page 249 of the same article. One of the observations that Stevenson ( 1991: 40 ) makes is the reference of CPR s as social institu tions, where in traditional societies the users themselves put in place the institutional structure to govern and manage the resources. Likewise Agrawal ( 2003:24 4 ) making reference to Schlager & Ostrom ( 1992 ) criti cizes most theorists take on property right s institutions as being best described as sets of rules that define access, use, exclusion, management, monitoring, sanctioning, and arbitration behavior of users.
40 Ejidos for this study are considered CPR inst itution s Social institution is the variable t hat is relevant to this study more precisely the management of the (forest/land) in the communities of this study. As Stevenson ( 1991) has pointed out, there are explicit and implicit (cultural) norms that exist to regulate CPR s. In ejidos norms can be from the area of land where a comunero or ejidatario has access, the ejido assembly and so on In the Chapter 5 the value of CPR theory can be appreciated and better understood. Traditional Ecological Knowledge Scholars converge that traditional ecological knowledge (TEK) is a knowledge practice belief complex, as noted by Berkes ( 1999 :13 ) T he Milpa system can illustrate traditional ecological knowledge. I t is the detailed knowledge of corn varieties, soil type, pests, et cetera ; the practice of specific agronomic behaviors such as the combination of squash, bean s, and c orn; an elaborate belief system of performing rituals to request permission to use the land ; and the giving of gratitude for a harvest. Berkes (1999:12 13) theorize s that TEK is interrelated at four levels: (a) l ocal knowledge (b) resource management syst ems (c) social institutions, and (d) world view Literature has noted that the reproduction of knowledge does not conform to a linear pattern from generation to generation, or from year to year for that matter. As farmers become less isolated their live lihood strategies respond to both local and non local forces. This has led scholars to argue that the production and reproduction of knowledge is becoming less traditional but more technical; thus, :275 ) proposition of indigenous technic al knowledge. The author refers to farmers/peasants as situated agents. Farmers generate, incorporate, and
41 livelihood strategies based on cultur al economic, agroecological and sociopolitical contexts as argued by Bebbington ( 1993:275 ) Ejidatarios can be considered as situated agents in plotting a livelihood. Retaking the Milpa system as mentioned above, the State rice project s introduced mechanization technology in the region of study. Farmers perform rituals in these mechanized Milpas which can have local or hybrid varieties of corn. In their efforts to make more efficient use of time and capital, farmers apply agrochemicals (herbicide and fertilizers), encouraged by the State subsidies, for example PROCAMPO (Schren 2001 a ) in structures that are local and non local while producing and reconfigur ing knowledge. In the Yucatn, ejidatarios are indeed situated agents. It is this concept ual framework which is used for this research. Agency According to Ortner ( 2006:1 43 14 4 ) the most widely used definition of agency is the power that people have at their disposal, their ability to act on their own behalf, influence other people and events, and maintain some kind of control over their lives. The author makes a distincti on that agency h as two meanin g On the one On the other, it defines agency as power, about acting within relations of social inequality, asymmetry and force. Ortner ( 2006) discu ses three components of agency that of intentionality, its cultural construct ion and its relation to power. Ortner points out the extreme description s of intentionality. On the one hand theor eticians believe that intentionality comes out of routine practice. Intentionality is a given, unconsciously framed by socio
42 cultural ability of humans to act, or that outcomes are unintended consequences of action. On the other extreme are those that posi t that intentionality is an explicit manifestation of act ion toward a goal. the ways in which action is cognitively and emotionally pointed toward (Ortner 2006:1 34 ) According to Ortner ( 2006:1 36 ) agency is considered to be a universal part of is always culturally and historically constructed. In her thesis of power inequality, spe cifically of resistance and domination, Ortner identifies the as the author puts it). It goes from outright rebellion on one end foot dragging, to complex and ambivalent accepta nce of domination which is changed upon acceptance on the other extreme Ortner ( 2006: 137 ) states that a gency is differentially shaped, and also nourished or stunted under different regimes of power. Agency in th e sense of power is founded around the ax is of domination and resistance as defined by the dominant party. Agency in the pursuit of projects is defined by local logics of the good and the de sirable and how to pursue them. arying even in the most unbalanced power relations.
43 Table 3 1. Fields of culture based on cultural control of elements. Cultural elements Decisions Native Alien Native ( propio ) Autonomous culture Alienated cult ure Alien ( ajeno ) Appropriated culture Imposed culture Source: Bonfil Batalla (1988)
44 CHAPTER 4 METHOD Background The data analyzed and presented in this research w ere collected over a fifteen week p eriod spent in three phases during 2010. During the first week of May I visited the capital city of Campeche to identify a local supervisor D r. Luis Arriola; who eventually became part of my t hesis c ommittee. Another objective of that week was visiting gov ernment entities and NGOs that have presence in the region. After identifying the two communities, with the help of a State official, I returned in m i d M ay to spend a total of 12 weeks in the field six in each communit y Both communities are in the Munici pio of Hopelchn, Campeche, Mexico. It was during the summer of 2010 that I conducted interviews with informants, ethnography, and archival research at RAN and the State Archives in the city of Campeche. During the month of December, I returned for two wee ks to these communities to complement and corroborate data. Analysis was conducted in the field (with field note recordings) and continued in Gainesville, F L with the assistance of MAXQDA My grea t grandparents fled the Caste War from the Yucatn and went south, via Petn into the then Colony of British Honduras. In my research I try to be as reflexive as possible. Thus, it is possible that the collection of data, and consequently my results, coul d be biased since I am both them Methodology This research utilized a case study approach to respond to the question that was established. Case study, as the Sage Reference Online ( 2010) def ines it, is inquiry
45 about a bounded unit. For Yin (2009 ) a case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real life context, especially when the boundaries bet ween phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. In this study I intend t o respond to a question that is relevant in the historical context, from 1997 to approximately 2005 when the Procuradura Agraria made the last attempts to convince Chunchintoc to accept PROCEDE. Case study is relevant for this research since I analyze the contemporary cultural dynamics of each community to understand the different degrees of autonomy between both. Yin ( 2009:219) adds that a case study has the benefit of having documents, artifacts, interviews, and observations that enrich inquiry. I utilized these tools to analyze the existence of c ultural elements in the present as indicators of autonomy. It is a comparative case study si nce the research design was framed to analyze the acceptance of a State program. For this research the unit of analysi s is at the ejido level. Results are presented at an ejido level, but, as the reader will find in Chapter 5, effort is made to make compa risons between both ejidos to see the explanatory power of the case study design. Research tools utilized are ethnography, semi structured interviews, and archival research. The semi structured interview included items that address the constructs and vari ables from Traditional Ecological Knowledge and the management of Common Pool Resource. Both comuneros and ejidatarios were also asked questions that described their attitudes on land tenure. Another section of the question naire addressed the influence of partisan politics and religion on the functions of the ejido as a political unit, as an a ssembly
46 Site Selection As mentioned above, the site selection was conducted during the first wee k of May of 2010. A Paralegal Officer from the Procuradura Agraria, one of the many people that visited c ommunities to promote PROC EDE, recommend ed ejidos where the research could be conducted T he characteristics of the communities were discussed with the Officer and the selection was consequently made. The characteristi cs that both communities had were relatively the same population, speak ing the same language, be ing within the same geographic region, and hav ing the same land use. One community rejected PROCEDE while the other accepted PROCEDE. Xmaben, the ejido that a ccepted PROCEDE, has had a long history of development interventions by NGOs. Local and foreign researchers visit the community throughout the year. It is possible that Xmaben is the most researched community of La Monta a. Unfortunately very few research products a re available for consultation. On the other hand, Chunchintoc scant i ly appear s in research literature. Community members do not mention any past presence of researchers in their community. However, Schren ( 2 001 c ) make s reference to interviews made with the comisario ejidal of Chunchintoc in his historical and ethnographic analysis of the Milpa system of Hopelchn. The principal reason for selecting these communities is that they fulfilled a ll the criteri a me ntioned above. In addition, they had the advantage of being relatively accessible. Figure 4 1 illustrates the location of Xmaben and Chunchintoc. Further below Xmaben and Chunchintoc are described from archival research, online consultations, complemented with ethnographic observation.
47 Xmaben Xmaben appears in the literature of the pre Caste War era. During the Caste War emissaries from Merida Yucatn visited the community in 1864. In 1865 the local commanders of the now Peaceful Rebels gathered in Xmaben i n November to declare themselves an independent State with their local Governor and Commander (Dumond 1997: 282 ) It seems as if Xmaben was the front line and stronghold of the Pacficos del Sur against the nascent S tate of Campeche the State of Yucatn and the eastern r ebels of nowadays Quintana Roo. Oral history has that the community got its name from Xn u uk Ben (Mrs Ben). Xnuuk Ben accidentally came across a well that her cattle had found in its search for water. This led her to establish her new home in the area. The natural wells are said to be constructed by the (the ancestors) with the help of (hunchbacks). The (the elderly) of Xmaben believe that the first settlers of Xmab en came from Mesa Pich, the abandoned capital of the Pacficos del Sur during the Caste War ( Angel 1997:525 549; Dumond 1997:57 1) Porter Bolland et al. ( 2005:19) st ate that the hamlet was established by Chicleros during the seventeenth century. Population (Gabbert 2004:252) as seen in Table 4 1 and Table 4 2 fluctuated after the Caste War. During the twentieth century Xm aben experienced migration to the southern communities of Xkanh, Bel Ha, and Zoh Laguna, and other larger settlements of the Yucatn 1 In 1929 fifty one community members were granted 2,448 ha of land, formally establishing the ejido Consequently, two ex pansions of the ejido 1 Personal communication with Mr. Manuel Montoy on July 7, 2010. Mr. Montoy is a local historian.
48 lands in 1939 and 1940 added 2,400 hectares and 44,800 hectares respectively. After demarcation, via PROCEDE, the ejido had 36,808 hectares ; a difference of 12,840 hectares land could not be accounted for between what was granted b y Presidential decrees and what INEGI demarcated on the ground (Porter Bolland et al. 2005:19) Chunchintoc Chunchintoc appears scantl i y in the pre and post Caste War literature. Seemingly, Chunchintoc was the frontier between the States of Yucatn and Campeche. After several military skirmishes the State of Yucatn ceded the settlement to Campeche ( Gabbert 2004:252; Reed 1964:30 8) Since 1872 the state of Campeche ackn owledges the presence of Chunchintoc and finances the first rural school in this community (Dumond 1997:571) However, as the author alleges, it is questionable whether this school was operational due to its remoten ess and State presence. With data presented by (Dumond 1997:571) it is possible that the community was established between 1861 and 1872. The name of the community, according to local oral history, is from the abu ndance of the plant species ( Giaiacum sanctum L.); and from the abundance of a type of rock called to In 1927 the State granted 4,128 hectares of land to officially establish the ejido Unlike other ejidos in Hopelchn, Chunchintoc had a t hird ejido expansion in 1977. This placed the total land granted in 1927, 1938, 1940 and 1977 to 38,918 hectares Demography and Socio economy Data published by INEGI ( 2010 ) reveal that Xmaben has more Maya speakers, see Ta ble 4 3 Unlike Chunchintoc, Maya is widely sp oken by the children in Xmaben. In all four churches of Xmaben spiritual leaders conduct services in Maya. Sermons are
49 M aya and finish a sermon in that language. Interesting to note is that Maya is used in the public domain in churches where local community members are tasked with performing the service. On the other hand, I did not observe any church activity being perform ed in Maya in Chunchintoc. A higher percentage of population of Xmaben is bilingual. Ninety two percent of the population of Chunchintoc report practic ing Catholicism, compared to 57 % in Xmaben. More than 40 % Christian Prot estant denomination. In that community there is one Catholic Church, two Pentecostal Evangelical Churches, and one Presbyterian Church. Chunchintoc has one Catholic Church and one Evangelical Pentecostal Church. Both communities have almost the same perce nt age of its population complet ing secondary education. However, Chunchintoc has more people continue attending an educational institution after high school. This is in part explained by the proximity of Chunchintoc to Dzibalchn. As the census data reveal Chunchintoc has a slightly better socio economic standard of living. I mproved economic conditions of families in Table 4 4 provides a description of the socio economic differences between Chunc hintoc and Xmaben. In Xmaben a significant percentage of households have motorcycles which are used as the principal mode of transportation to Milpas and nearby communities. This mode of transportation is not accounted for in the census data.
50 Data obtaine d from the regional office of SAGARPA in the town of Dzibalchn indicate that Chunchintoc is subsidized more hectares of corn, either as Milpa or as m echanized Milpa. Lik ewise, in 2009 approximately 50 % of the ejidatarios in Chunchintoc received subsidies for livestock (PROGAN) from the State 2 The reliability of data reporting and collection has been questioned in other instances. However, observations in the field do indicate that Chunchintoc has more cattle and corn production. Recorded productivityof me chanized Milpa in Chunchintoc is 2 2.5 ton/ hectare 3 Meanwhile, traditional Milpa in Xmaben has a recorded productivity of 0.5 0.8 ton/ hectare Chunchintoc has mechanized agriculture as an unintended consequence of the failed rice projects of the 198 0 s in the community and Milpa was mechanized. As an ejidatario recalls s ome have been doing [it] for far longer [than 15 years] because it was since the mechanization began. That was being done by mac hines. They found the Kakab 4 and harrowed it. 5 In Xmaben, there is no mention of machinery remaining in the community, thus the reduced acreage of mechanized Milpa. Data Collection Most researchers write about the n iceties and challenges of field work due to the cultural shock, the living adventures, and the rapport that is established with informants 2 3 Personal communication with Ing Jorge Yeh Gongora on August 5, 2010. Centro de Apoyo para el Desarrollo Rural Cader Dzibalch n SAGARPA, Hopelchn, Campeche. 4 Kakab is a deep brownish yellowish soil tha t has good drainage. For an extensive description of the Mayan names for soil types and their description see (Porter Bolland 2001:14 15) 5 Interview with an ejidatario, Chunchintoc, August 5, 2010.
51 In my case, I was struck by the lengthy process it took to establish rapport with the community members. Despite speaking Maya, I was treated as an outsider which I was. In the case of Xmaben, I could not start making interviews until I was formally presented to the ejidatarios at an a ssembly a couple of weeks after being in the community. Before then m y data collection was limited to field notes and theori zing about the consumption of Gamesa and Coca Cola in these communities. In Chunchintoc, though I had the blessing of the comisario ejidal to do interviews it took a while to conduct the first interview. Interestingly, I was recommended by both local peop le and outsiders (State Officials and other village leaders) to interview X persons; these people would outright reject my request for an interview. Even after conducting some interviews other community members would be very hesitant and ended up refusing to be interviewed. The irony i s that many, in Xmaben, fondly related about anthropologist s that had been living in the community. From their conversations it seems as if their acceptance of non Mayan anthropologist s is far more embracing Semi structured interviews were applied to 2 4 community members and one State Milpa and/or cattle pasture had been visited. All interviews were conducted in the community, at homes, a t the Palacio Municipal s and at the worksite s of those that had jobs within the community. Ideally the groups of ejidatarios sampled were to be within the follow ing categor ies : two below 24.9 years; two between 25 34.9 years, two between 35 49.9 years and three above 50 years. At least two comuneros were interviewed in each community. As seen in Table 5 1 this did not conform to the desired criteria.
52 Where reference to an informant becomes necessary pseudonyms are utilized. Throughout the document i nterviews will be referenced as a footnote which will include the social position (comunero, ejidatario, etc) of the informant, t he community and the date the interview was conducted. In instances where the identity of a person can be easily d identified. It is important to reassure the informants t hat in no circumstance was their names, or any description which might reveal their identity, recorded in field notes, audio files, transcribed interviews, a nd consent forms. The following is an e thn ographic diary entry, Xmaben, 06 / 26 /2010 Mr. A has left Xmaben for Campeche, I did not need the alarm clock. It is 4:45 AM, I am sitting in front of the rural clinic waiting for Mr. Z. I met Mr. Z at the ejido asse mbly where I was presented to the ejidatarios by the comisario ejidal At first he was not too excited to have me come to his k ool (milpa). After wait all morning yesterday and find out that they left for their farm without me, I visited him last night a round 8:30 PM to request him to take me along with them to their kool to help them plant corn. It rained there yesterday and that is why everyone is going to plant today. We broke the silence of the morning with the pickup truck when we crossed the village to pickup his son in law who was also going to plant his kool Before reaching the kool one of Mr. Z son alighted the vehicle to open a two stranded wire gate so that we can make it into their kool where the corn planting took place. When we got i nto the kool which is around 20 kilometers away. Mr. Z mixed the box buul (black bean) ixim (corn) and sikil (squash) to get it ready for planting See Figure 4 2 He gave me a chu h (gourd) and a stake. Mr. Z said that we had 14 mecates to plant today. He left the iib (jack bean) to plant on the flat land that had deeper soil. He said that the iib grow best in that type of soil. Before I started to plant Mr. Z told me that his faam ilya a (wife) had prepared some food for me and urged me to have breakfast before planting. I asked how comes I would be the only one to eat; he said that they had breakfast before leaving for the kool (before 4:30 AM!). I was given (gibnut) and corn tortilla s wrapped in a hand embroidered cloth. Days before the actual pl anting Mr. Z and his sons demarcated the kool into mecates This is facilitated by the cuadros that they do to demarcate the kool area even before the forest is felled. E, the youngest son of Mr. Z, explained to me how to plant. It is done in blocks the mecates Each
53 planter would take a block and plant in a ring like, an inward concentric ring. Since we were planting the xmejen naal (small corn) the distance was 1 meter between rows and approximately 80 cm between plants. By 10 AM my right hand was blist ered. If it were soft soil my hand would not have these blisters and I might have planted more mecates They were teasing me that my mecate would not germinate. Around 11 AM Mr. Z called everyone for a break. It was time to drink 6 I expected the t raditional ground corn; instead, J got out the water, the plastic container, and corn starch Maseca. Mr. Z 7 mixed the water and Maseca and served it to all three of us. Along with the k aare, did term elections in Mexico for governors and legislators, this is discussed during k breaks. J asked where the iib was going to be planted. Mr. Z told him that it was going to be on the last mecate right where the pathway to the k ool leads. The soil is deeper and it is on a higher ground. Mr. Z, went ahead to planted the iib J, E and I returned to planting the last 2 and a half mecate that remained. By the time I was done with my half of mecate Mr. Z was done with the iib He told his sons to finish their mecate and when they were done to place the stakes at the entrance of the Kool s pathway. If W, his eldest son that was planting in a plot maybe 300 yards from their plot was not done with his planting they would return tomorrow to help him. He took me for a walk. In the lowest corner of the kool he has a haguey With the help of the municipal government they were able to construct this pond. Some of the corn was at leas t a foot tall, in some areas one and a half. He said that he planted them about a month ago when the first rains came. Near the haguey there is grass which they had planted. He does not plant corn their anymore. Where there is less grass he plants corn but there is a lot of vines. Mr. Z told me that if they were caught up by the planting and the rains kept coming he will have to apply Esteron (2,4 D) to get ahead of the 6 To and made into corn dough balls for the people to take to the kool. At the kool the ground corn dough ball is diluted into a thick drink taken during breaks example 7 I noted that it would always be the eldest male (generally the father) that would be the one to prepare the k The only case where this did not happen was in Chunchintoc where the son asked his father if he was going to prepare the drink, his father told him that he could go ahead and prepare it. In all the Milpas that I visited, where we worked (planting, cleaning a pasture, or even purchasing cattle) we had In all cases in Xmaben where I had k it was out of Maseca. On the other hand, in Chunchintoc it was made of ground corn. In Chunchintoc there is a female that sells ground corn every day, except on Sundays.
54 vines. Getting rid of the vines manually takes too much time and they destroy the corn i f it is not done with care. I eventually heard coming from the other extreme of the k ool It was E and J announcing to his eldest brother, his brother in law and his padrino that we were ready to head back home All the other men and childr en joined in the chorus of The three kids that went to plant cannot be older than 12 years, as young as 8 9 years. As per normal, they were bragging how many mecates each had planted. Thirteen men in all went to plant in 4 different kool s It star ted drizzling around 1 PM when we were actually returning. The talk had evolved into the community member who was almost sent to the eventually became less noisy; one of the kids even fell asleep. When we aligh ted the pickup Mr. Z told me to come by his place for lunch. In a long time had I tasted s uch a great caldo (soup). Data Analysis Transcription of the interview was done with f4 software. This process culminated with the importation of text files into MAX QDA for its respective coding and analysis. File attributes which were constructed in the field were also aggregated in the software. Cod e Book Building Coding, an actual process of data analysis (Miles and Hube rman 1994:56 ) is t he discover y of patterns among the data; patterns that point to theoretical understandings (Babbie 2010:530) Codebook for the analysis of data took the inductive and deductive approach as recom mended by Bernard and Ryan ( 2010) C hunks of text w ere coded from the snippets of information as it arises from the text resembling grounded theory This led to the proliferation of c odes, termed splitting. The second step was to analyze the codes and identify which could be lumped to have fewer codes. This does not mean however, that the process was merel y to reduce the number of codes It was a process to refine the definitions of codes. The following is an over simplified example ; the crops that ejidatarios planted were coded as corn,
55 beans, squash, pumpkin, pepper, habanero et cetera Another code was modes of production; the codes were: mechanized, traditional, small machinery, livestock, agrochemicals, et cetera The decision was made to place the Milpa crops planted by farmers under traditional mode of production. However, crops like habanero w ere placed under mechanized operation since farmers mechanized land to plant habanero After refining the codebook eight principal codes remained : networks that the farmers have monitoring the fulfillment of cultural norms sanctions levied against acceptable behavior access to land rituals and their practice religious tolerance of rituals an d status in these communities. N o code was kept for Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK). The justification for this is that where traditional and mechanized Milpa is practiced it is highly likely that the farmer knows of land selection, seed selection, and all the other practices that are required to harvest the Milpa. Reliability I utilized Kappa to establish the reliability of my coding. Kappa much better than chance is the agreement between a pair of coders with regard t o the (Bernard and Ryan 2010 :302 ) The formula to calculate Kappa is: K = observed chance 1 chance To calculate chance the formula is : ( a + b ) ( a + c ) + ( c + d ) ( b + d ) n n n n a = number of times tha t both coder 1 and coder 2 agree that the code appears in the text b = number of times that only coder 1 a gree that a code appear s in the text
56 c = number of times that only coder 2 agree that a code appear s in the text d = number of times that both coder 1 and coder 2 agree that the code does not appear in the text To facilitate the test, I adopted the binary approach to establish if a code was present in the text. The standard for the process was to spend approximately twenty minutes with the seco nd and t hird coder to explain in grand terms what the research is about and the general structure of ejidos During this time frame I would present printed definitions of the codes and gave a brief explanation of them. With this information the coder would scribbl e a ll the codes that appear on either side of the sheet. It was understood th at codes that were not noted on the sheet were not present. Contrary to coder number three, coder number two has no knowledge of land tenure in Mexico. A total of 83 text segments ranging from a couple of sentences to half a page in length, were provided to the two coders for the reliability test. Raw agreement between all three coders was 61 % With the 83 text segments Kappa was 0.2153. Accord ing to as Bernard and Ryan ( 2010) state my inter coder reliability with two other cod ers fe ll in the category of fair. Memoing Memoing is another crucial component of text a nalysis. Miles & Huberman (1994: 72) state that m of data into a recognizable cluster, often to show that those data are instances of a general concept Miles and Huberm an ( 1994 ) and Bernard and Ryan ( 2010) agree that there are three types of codes: personal/code memos, methodological/operational memos, and substantive/theory memos. However, these types of memos, in the thick
57 of the analysis do not conform to neat lab els. Take the example below, which is a theoretical memo and a personal memo, documented 03/30/2011 in MAXQDA To this ejidatario and many others, participation in the asamblea is by m starting to believe that status is elemental in the process of voicing an What remains in the air is female representation/participation. Why does status not function to their favor to voice an opinion during asambleas (ejido assemblies/meetings) ? The above memo formed part of my findings with regards to participation in the asambleas and how status is linked to voicing those opinions. It goes to show that indeed, as Ch armaz has defined it, (Bernard and Ryan 2010) Coding and memoing go han d in hand. C odes discover the patterns whil e memos are where the coder theorizes about those patterns. As Miles and Huberman (1994:74 ) state, memos interactions Summary The inform ation above describes to the reader the method utilized for this research. It also points out the limitations and challenges of utilizing text analysis to conduct a research of this nature. I n future research quantitative data can be used to bolster the f indings that are made with this case study approach.
58 Table 4 1. Population trend of Xmaben, Campeche, MX. Year Population Description Source 1861 387 Rancho Campeche Census a 1915 < 800 Ranchera Campeche State Decree b 1927 167 Secretara de Refor ma Agraria c 1957 200 800 Ranchera Campeche State Decree d 1981 1,000 3,000 Pueblo Campeche State Decree e 1990 675 Pueblo INEGI f 2000 941 Pueblo INEGI f 2010 1228 Pueblo INEGI f a (Dumond 1997) b (Gobierno del Estado de Campeche 1915) c (RAN N.d.b) d (Gobierno del Estado de Campeche 1957) e (Gobierno del Estado de Campeche 1981) f (INEGI 2010) Table 4 2. Population trend of Chunchintoc, Campeche, MX. Year Population Description Source 1905 285 Rancho Campeche Ce nsus a 1915 < 800 Ranchera Campeche State Decree b 1957 > 800 Pueblo Campeche State Decree c 1981 1,000 3,000 Pueblo Campeche State Decree d 1990 877 Pueblo INEGI e 2000 972 Pueblo INEGI e 2010 1,086 Pueblo INEGI e a (Dumond 1997) b (Gobierno del Estado de Campeche 1915) c (Gobierno del Estado de Campeche 1957 ; RAN N.d.b) d (Gobierno del Estado de Campeche 1981) e (INEGI 2010) Table 4 3. Demographic comparison of Chunchintoc and Xmaben, Campeche, MX. Ejido Pop. Lang uage ------Religion -------Education Maya > 5 yrs (M & S) a Cath Protest Non Relig. HS b > 3 yrs Post HS Chunchintoc 1086 78.4 74.5 92.3 4.1 3.4 19.2 8.2 Xmaben 1228 83.5 86.6 56.9 40.8 14.9 20.3 5.9 a M: Maya; S: Spanish. b HS: H igh school Source: INEGI (2010) Census.
59 Table 4 4. Socio economic comparison of Chunchintoc and Xmaben, Campeche, MX Ejido Total Pop. Indi. / HH a Non earth flooring b TV Refrig. WM c Vehicle Cell. -----------------------% of households ----------------Chunchintoc 1086 4.2 93.0 85.9 36.7 39.8 16.4 5.9 Xmaben 1228 5.1 83.2 62.9 30.9 38.7 10.2 2.7 a Indi./HH: Individual per household. b Households with flooring that are not of earth. c WM: Washing Machine. Source: INEGI ( 2010 ) Census. Table 4 5. State subsidies in Chunchintoc and Xmaben, Campeche, MX. Chunchintoc Xmaben 1998 2009 1998 2009 PROCAMPO Total h ectare of c orn 500 774 320 520 Number of f armers 216 216 155 150 Ha /farmer 2.3 3.6 2.1 3.5 Of the total ha mechanized 264 332 n.a. 150 PROGAN Farmers 105 25
60 Figure 4 1. Geographic location of Xmaben and Chunchintoc, Hopelchn, Campeche, MX. Courtesy of Claudia Monzon, University of Florida.
61 Figure 4 2. Preparing seeds (corn, squash, and black bean) for planting in the traditional kool (Milpa) system, Xmaben, Campeche, MX.
62 CHAPTER 5 ANALYSIS OF EJIDO AUTONOMY Background As Yin ( 2009: 15 ) argues, case studies are not a sample; the purpose of case studies is to expand and generalize theories, what the author terms analytic generalizations, and not to enumerate frequencies statistical generalizations. Th at is precisely what this research did and is being presented here. It explore s C ultural C ontrol T heory to establish the autonomy of communities Common Pool R esource theory makes for the thick component for the discussion of the coded segments me ntioned above. Discussion of findings and obser vations is complemented with the theory of agency. Chapter Where necessary, pseudonyms are used to maintain confidentiality of informants. In more than one occasion controversial quotes are cited wit hout providing the community of the informant to give one more layer of confidentiality to the informant. At the end of each subsection a summarizing paragraph is included to make the necessary theoretical arguments. Rituals and Cultural Control Of the 2 4 informants interviewed during both field visits 12 report performing rituals Five informants are from Xmaben and seven are from Chunchintoc. The rituals are and Waaji Kool 1 Both ceremonies are practiced by individuals in their Solars 2 and/ or M ilpa. Five of the informants that report practicing these rituals are 3 6 1 is a ceremony where a drink is prepared fro m boiled corn. Waaji Kool is another ceremony where food chicken or pib corn cakes is offered to the gods of the forest. 2 Solar is home garden/patio/yard.
63 or below 36 years o ld ( see Table 5 1 ) Informants that are older seem to most naturally practice these rituals. Older inf ormants in both communities who perform these ceremonies do th em as part of routine practice. In the past these rituals were practiced when all the principal agronomic activities were conducted such as : plot identification, delineating the plot land clearing, burning of felled forest, planting, flowerin g of the co rn, and harvesting. Contemporarily, or Waaji Kool is only performed after planting and upon harvesting. The purpose of these rituals upon planting is to request for blessing and protection of the Milpa from natural disasters and pests. In the case of Chunchintoc, it is important to note that these rituals are practiced in traditional Milpa and mechanized Milpa. Upon harvesting, rituals are performed to give thanks to Jaajal Dios (God Almighty) for ts that are either 36 or below 36 years o ld two report performing the rituals during every Milpa cycle. The other three Xmaben that reports offering in his s ol ar. He offered the day he moved into his new home. In that instance the offering had two purposes, being grateful for his house and to request protection from the (bad spirits). He recently offered ; he was advised to do so by a t raditional healer who attended his ailing daughter. Chunchintoc. During a conversation with his uncle T omas mentions his frustration with poor harvests
64 and absconding bees. His uncle had ceded him the land since he had Milpa elsewhere. He was told by his uncle that t he land gets used to its little re minding you to offer its drink. 3 Upon hearing that there was a historical practice of making offerings to the land, they took a baked chicken on their next visit to check on the bees. Tomas stated, the rosary and left the chicken there 4 On the other ha nd, Ricardo reports offering been worked 5 As mentioned above, Juan, Tomas, and Ricardo do not perform the rituals along or within th e Milpa production cycle despite doing Milpa. All 12 inform ants who perform rituals report practicing Catholicism. The ritual s, at least to those that perform the ritual s on an individual basis, are a syncretism of Catholic rituals and Mayan r ituals. A 20 year old ejidatario in Chunchintoc summarizes this syncretism as You pray your rosary; that would be it, nothing more 6 Another stated that p rayers are recited as it is being o ffered to God Almighty 7 When I inquired why does the Cat holic Church tole rate the practice a 60 year old ejidatario from Xmaben who performs these rituals responded [t hose that perform the rituals] they go to the Iglesia They have their faith [in the Catholic Church] in that case. Like I was telling you, it could be that 3 Field notes, Chunchintoc, July 2010. 4 Field notes, Chunchintoc, July 2010. 5 Field notes, Chunchintoc, December 2010. 6 Interview with an ejidatario, Chunchintoc, December 22, 2010. 7 Interview with an ejidatario, Xmaben, June 26, 2010.
65 we are doing something good? Or it could be that we are doing something bad? But I have even seen in the Bible that it is, it is true 8 For a comunero from Chunchintoc, those that perform the rituals do so [they] have faith in two person, two gods, two things. It has been a long time since the grandfather of my grandfa ther did that. They did not ..., t here was no c hurch here, there was no p riests, there was nothing. They were, they were, how could I tell yo u? Without thinking of anything else, they do it because [they want] to give thanks for their Milpa 9 All informants trace the knowledge of the rituals to their grandparents who thought their parents (generally their father). The process of transferring th at knowledge is what is intriguing in the case of Gustavo a comunero Gustavo does not know how to perform the ritual because he spent his teen years in formal education institutions According to him there is a time for someone to learn and be taught thos e rituals. He relates his interaction with his father during these rituals at a young age Gustavo: When we take it, we take everything. We get there (to the Milpa) he takes it out (the gourds and food) he opens it. We are talking and stuff. "Prepare thi s and we prepare it and all. And he leaves to go prepare his sticks [ for the Altar], and he puts everything on it. And so he says, "I will return right now. Wait for me here So he takes it and he stays there for a while. A while, and then he returns. Tim : H ow does one learn if one s father does not take one to the actual ceremony and hear the rezoh (prayers)? Gustavo : [ Pause .] Well, because, uhm, he talks a lot of the elves, that they get used to see one or they perjudica (affect you) at times, th at is what he says. He does not want us to get involved in that. Because apparently, sometimes the wind, all of that, the wind becomes ... it can get i nto someone and it can make you sick. That is why he did not want to ... [ Chuckles ] he did not want us t o go there [where the ritual is being performed]. 10 8 Interview with an ejidatario, Xmaben, June 26, 2010. 9 Interview with a comunero, Chunchintoc, August 5, 2 010. 10 Interview with a comunero, Chunchintoc, August 5, 2010.
66 It is evident that the transfer of th is with p arents. Gustavo reports that his olde r brother, who did not attend high school, knows how to perform the Jo 11 Though the practice is dwindling in both communities Chunchintoc seem s to have more people that practice these rituals. Mayan communities have appropriated symbols and rituals (cultural elements) from Catholicism and incorporated them into their religion ( Early 2006; Watanabe 1990 ) Early ( 2006: 263 ) define s the distinct interaction and reaction of Mayan communities to different religions : C hristianity believed and understood; Christianity is misunderstood; resistance to Christianity; apostasy where the conversion occurs and then some form of resistance toward Christianity is adopted definitions acknow ledge instances where the religion of communities is transformed, but most notably, communities reconfig ure the appropriated elements. It is important to bear in mind that no community is homogeneous as has been pointed out by social scientists; this pro position applies t o the contemporary practice of religious faith. It is worthy reminding the reader that 92 % of the population of Chunchintoc reports p racticing Catholicism versus 57 % in Xmaben. Forty one percent practice a protestant Christian faith in X maben Rodrguez Balam (2006:344 ) states that protestant Chris tians see Catholics incurring fault by not fulfilling one of the Ten Commandments That is, n idol of yourself, whether in the shape of anything in the heavens above or on the earth below or in the waters under the 11 is not simply offering the drinks and food on the ground, it requires the elaborate knowledge of constructing an altar and laying out the gourds with their respective cardinal points When Gustavo is
67 earth. You must not b ow down to them or worship them 12 Based on an interview with one of the pastor s it becomes evident why the pra ctice of these rituals has dramatically decreased with the presence of the protestant Christian faiths As the pastor puts it o nce you are Christ's servant you will not practice rituals of the pueblos not even out of tradition from our fathers because now you are going to serve God 13 When I made the observation that the rituals are considered giving gratitude to god or praying to god his response was m any people use the name of God to d o something [rituals] like that. Everything is permissible, but not everything is helpful. Everything is permissible, but not everything builds up. 1 Corinthians 10:23 14 It is very likely that the intolerance of these rituals by the protestant Christian faiths ha s r educed the practice of rituals especially in Xmaben. Pu blic R ituals In June w hile I was conducting field research in Xmaben Chunchintoc was busy preparing a Chac 15 I had not visited the community by then. According to anecdotes amongst the informants th is ritual had been abandoned for almost a decade. I n June of 2010 the issue was raised during an ejido a ssembly by the comisario ejidal Well, the Authority gave his part because, what is it called ? He saw how the crisis was coming. S o it was said, "Let us do something, there is some 12 Exodus 20:3 5. Source: Holman Christian Standard Bible. 13 Field notes, August 2010. 14 Field notes, August 2010. 15 is an elabo rate ceremony to request the [gods] for rain to have a good harvest. It takes more than one day which includes the collection of sacred water for food preparation, food preparation and the construction of an altar to make the offerings. For a more extensive description see (Domnguez Ak 1996)
68 funds. If it is not en ough with that fund, let us collaborate [with] x amount to complete it And that was it, it happened. 16 nt that the local leader [ saw ] the crisis was coming I rregular weather patterns r esult in m aalas (crop failures). Farmers in both Xmaben and Chunchintoc spoke about the last three years of m aalas. Maalas start with the Yook Paakalo [the official planting date] methodically followed but the San Juan (June 24 th ) rains do not come. If the Milp a is planted on a later date when it rains it is generally attack ed by caterpillars that hatch when the corn is small 17 For the last three years even if the Milpa has grown, it has failed to produce because of late droughts that would either stunt or k ill the corn. For example, Xmaben reported to SAGARPA that all the Milpa planted in 2009 was lost 18 Suffice to state that all informants interviewed, with the exception of two, plant corn for their gasto (consumption). Indeed it is a crisis when the maala s loom. Various local farmers cr edit the unpredictable weather to climate change brought about by deforestation, pollution of cars and because traditio ns are being forgotten. As an ejidatario in Chunchintoc states [Public rituals were] usually done. In t he past, I do not know how many years ago I t was done on a yearly basis. The thing is that with this one, I do not know how many years went by without one being done. That is why. P eople think that that is why, since [the ] it is not being don e, that i s why [the rains] does not come. 19 16 Interview with an ejidatario, Chunchintoc, July 30, 2010. 17 Interview with an ejidatario Chunchintoc, July 25, 2010. 18 Personal communication with Ing Jorge Yeh Gongora on August 5, 2010. Centro de Apoyo para el Desarrollo Rural Cader Dzibalch n SAGARPA, Hopelchn, Campeche. 19 Interview with an ejidatario, Chunchintoc, July 27, 2010.
69 Th is is where the difference lies between the two communities. In Xmaben farmers talk of the irregular weather patterns and link it to the discontinuity of rituals that request for the rains. However, it would be unthinkable to organize and fund a with money from the ejido coffers It is possible that this is a result of the high percentage of protestant Christians who tend to view these rituals as idolatry (Rodrguez Balam 2006 ) On the other hand, in Chunchintoc the planning, assigning of roles for the actual ceremony, and the establi shment of the contributions (P$20.00, US $1.58) 20 is planned during an ejido a ssembly Ejidatarios in Chunchintoc are ex pected to make financial contribution as part of their collective obligations. Besides providing money ejidatarios and comuneros take pride in providing 21 turkey, chicken, corn dough, honey, to mention a few of the materials offered during the cere mony. Men, as tradition holds, are the ones to prepare all the materials for the Volunteering time is highly valued. As a comunero told me, most of the ejido fund was used to pay for the services and cost s of bring ing a ( Mayan Priest ) fr om Bolonchn de Reg n 22 A comunero was the one to donate time and assets to bring the Interestingly, for this ceremony there is little distinction between ejidatarios and comuneros Returning to the C ultural Control T heory being utilized for this a nalysis; with the above description it is possible to venture and state that Chunchintoc has cultural control over at least one public ritual the As an ejido it has decision 20 Exchange rate of 06/16/2010, www.oanda.com 21 is a paste made o f ground corn made into a liquefied dough that is mixed with achiote ( Bixia orellana ). Tamales is a corn tortilla, and meat wrapped in banana leaf and cooked. 22 Field notes, August 2010.
70 making and reproduce the ritual. With respect to the rituals that are p erformed by individuals, as described above, their practice varies from individ ual to individual. It seems that these rituals are autonomous and appropriated. It is autonomous in the sense t ha t the performer decides on s. The content of the rezo hs (prayers) for the Waaji Kool and ha ve been appropriated from the recited prayers of the Rosary from the Catholic religion There is an active engagement in both the Christian and na tive religion as Early ( 2006) would concede Individual rituals are practiced in both communities ; in both instances they are both autonomous and appropriated cultures. However, it is very likely that its practice i s higher in Chunchintoc due to higher presence of Catholicism. G overnance and Cultural Control Bonfil Batalla ( 1988:13 53) defines organization as one form of cultural element. F or the author these are t he systematized social relations where members of a group participate to conduct an action. Having this in mind, and influenced by the variables from Common Pool Resource theory as proposed by Agrawal ( 2003:243 262) the day to day management issues of the ejido was analyzed. Coding for this section ended being behavior s (those that are seen as desirable an d the unacceptable) monitoring of established norms, and the sanctions for no n compliance of those norms. Figure 5 1 illustrates the principal norms and s anctions in both ejidos The value of the figure is in illustrat ing the norms that are important to each ejido but more so, the adjudication process preferred and the applications of sanctions for noncompliance wi th a norm. Xmaben place s special emphasis on fulfilling collective obligations such as participating in cleaning of the mensura (boundary line). In the past o pening the mensura was to demonstrate to the State and neighboring ejidos that the land was
71 occu pied. Its purpose and how it is opened t hese days has changed with the participation of Xmaben i n the Payment for Environmental Services (PES) program by CONAFOR. Xmaben was paid for environmental services from 2003 to 2008. The PES appears to have shifted the purpose o f the mensura from being a boundary line for the ejido prograama te oksihenoo Program for the Oxygen During the PES years if an ejidatario did not participate in the mensuras his share of annu al income from the p rogram was reduced. Thus, as seen in Figure 5 1, financial sanctions appear to be the most severe amongst the ejidatarios of Xmaben. Participating in mensuras is still seen as a collective activity; h owever, that obligation has changed from bein g man Chunchintoc entered the CONAFOR PES program in 2009 and will continue through 2013. Similar to Xmaben, ejidatarios are now being held liable to their collective obligation by th e th reat of a reduction in annual income from the PES. In recent years financial incentives are being utilized to do the mensuras (boundary lines of the ejido & fire lines for PES). ejido a ssembly deliberated for two distinct sessions on the daily wage of those that are to participate in the mensura clearing. It was decided that only ejidatarios will be remunerated; if they cannot fulfill their obligations they can hire comuneros ( generally their kin) to take care of their share of mensura Thus, attendance and participation in collective ob ligations and the monitori ng and application of sanction via financial co ercion a ppears to be gaining ground in Chunchintoc as well. After the PES came to an end in Xmaben, the ejido started u tilizing State su bsidy for temporary employment as the source o f fund for the opening of the mensuras If an
72 ejidatario does not participate in the mensura I say that it is noncompliance does not translate in a reduction of annual PES income. Nevertheless, an ejidatar io cannot simply ignore his collective obligations As an ejidatario in Xmaben states, when you do not participate privar (deny) your rights. 23 Participation in c ollective activities, b esides being a norm is also linked to the informal internal rules that the ejido has. An ejidatario that does not participate is not taken into account when programs (PES from NGOs, State subsidies) come to the ejido That right ca n also be placed in jeopardy if attendance is low or null. Attendance is taken in announced/called meetings. Though the law stipulates that at least two weeks of notice should be given to the ejidatarios before a meeting is held it is rarely followed In Xmaben, a day before the meeting is to be held a member of the comite de vigilancia ( supervisory c ommittee) visits each ejidatario to s i ta r (summon) her/him Attendance is jealously monitored by signing a sheet that is on a table up front Ejido meetings a re held in the open space in front of the Palacio Municipal. The sheet is generally managed by a member of the comite de vigilancia the s i ta dor When important d ecisions are being made by the ejido a ssembly an Acta (a resolution) would normally be signe d. Informants report that it is not unusual for Acta signatures to be substituted for the attendance list. I inquired, what if someone do es not agree with the resolution, do es that individual still need to sign the Acta to prove attendance ? R esponse s var y according to the respondent Some say that attendance is taken at the beginning of the assembly by signing or orally Others say that they are co erced to agree with the majority because of 23 Interview with ejidatario, Xmaben, July 1, 2010.
73 the need to sign a sheet which can be substituted for the Acta sig natures Notwithstanding, if attendance is taken separately ejidatarios would leave before signing the Acta It is possible that those that are not in agreement with the resolution are th e ones to leave Monitoring (or coercing) attendance of announced mee ting is blurred by the internal dynamics of ejido a ssembly However, it is evident that it is THE norm that is cautiously followed. Being summoned your attention called upon and being warn ed of an undesirable behavior is the other internal sanct ion that is practiced in Xmaben. Land disputes or unsettled conflict between neighbors would merit a s i ta (summon) from the comisario ejidal The victimizer is called separately by the comisario and told to remedy the situation ; for example, to vacate the land or pay a fee for his cattle d amages on a Milpa. If the victimized is not satisfied with the remedy he returns to the comisario after which both are summoned to resolve the conflict. According to those interviewed it is rare to have a case brought be fore the assembly The comisario ejidal questioned when he is not able to re solve internal conflicts amongst those involved 24 Brecha s (f ire line s) are integral to Milpa practice. Before a farmer fells the trees he demarcates the land, which eventually becomes the fire line. Before burning the felled trees or ju che ( fallow shrub ) the brecha is habitually reopened One of the norms is especially when his Milpa is not ready to be burnt. If there is an escaped fire and the source can be identified 24 Interview with ejidatario, Xmaben, July 7, 2010.
74 are not allowed to do Milpa again 25 In 2009 there was a major forest fire that is described by an el derly Informant: In thirty years that I have been living here, that is the first time that I see something like that. Tim : If you guys were to catch who started the forest fire, what would happen to him? Informant: Well, it is possible that he will be sanctioned. Or if not, his rights to participate in state programs (subsidies) will be taken away. 26 Alienation of agr arian rights or access to land i n the case of comuneros appears to be severe enough of a sanction to enforce this norm. On the other hand Chunchintoc removes or reduces land access when someone goes beyond the established limit of occupation or if someone unduly trade s land Unduly trade means that a person covertly trades land to a waach 27 or a fellow community member, or, due process is not followed to trade the land. Trading includes and bartering of land. Land expropriation, public reprimand and land access are a triad of sanctions that are generally applied when unduly land trade occurs. In 2010 a recent widow return ed to Chunchintoc with a common law husband. (unduly) bought land from an ejidatario to raise cattle. The is sue was raised during an ejido assembly meeting. It was decided that both seller 25 Interview with ejidatario, Xmaben, July 7, 2010. 26 Interview with ejidatario, Xmaben, July 10, 2010. 27 Waach also spelled uach is to refer to a person that is not from the State or from the Yucatn Peninsula. To is utilized translated as not belonging or not from here.
75 and purchaser be summoned to appear befo re the assembly husband was called (summoned) to the a ssembly but he did not show up. But at the a ssembly ot sell the land. You cannot He was made (forced) to return him the money. Yo u cannot sell it (the land) 28 you cannot sell [the land]. You do not have a document where it states that, that it is yours 29 If land is sold, example a parcel of pasture, an ejidatario sel l it to someone from here f or the price of [his] work. The price of the amount of wire it has taken 30 In Chunchintoc there is a norm that is taken to be law. It is the Acta that define the land access limits for a comunero and an ejidatario The following is the narration of an ejidatario of how the Acta came about. W hen the mecanizado was being fenced problems started to arise because there were people that wanted to grab a lot [of land]. Some do not want the other ejidatarios to take. So an agreement w as made amongst the ejidatarios that no more than fifty hectares of mecanizado can be fenced by each ejidatario 31 That Acta also stipulates that comuneros can fence only 25 hectares of land. As the informant states, there was unequal land grabbing that was taking place after the rice project came to an end It would appear that the establishment of the 50 25 norm (50 hectares of mecanizado for ejidatarios and 25 hectares of mecanizado for comuneros) was effective in regulat ing t he amount of land that each person is entitled to have 28 Interview with an ejidatario, Chunchintoc, July 25, 2010. 29 Interview with an ejidatario, Chunchintoc, July 30, 2010. 30 Interview with an ejidatario, Chunchintoc, July 25, 2010. 31 Interview with an ejidatario, Chunchintoc, July 27, 2010.
76 access in the mecanizado According to community members in Chunchintoc, even if someone covertly purchase d land in the mecanizado and went beyond the 50 25 limit [they] run the risk of the land being taken away from [them] 32 I nterestingly, a 1998 assessment by PROCEDE officials r eports that ejido there is a stark irregular distribution of land even if there is no agreement made by the a ssembly on this regard. Said distribution is (RAN N.d. a ) A 2000 report from the same file state s that The area of common use has various ejidatarios with uneven surface areas ; without authorization from the a ssembly The a ssembly is apathetic in trying to solve the var ious conflicts that such situation generates I am not in a position to state if there is indeed uneven land distribution in Chunchintoc. In 2010 fencing land in the mecanizado is a costly adventure because of the fallow forest, unlike fencing grassland i n the late 198 0s or early 199 0s Is this a possible reason why, today, only those that have capi tal are the ones to fence land in the mecanizado and elsewhere? Is this the reason of the alleged irregular land distribution? The 50 25 norm and field observat ions make it difficult to b ring to terms the content of the RAN reports As the data fr om Table 4 5 reveal, there is far more cattle ranching in Chunchintoc than Xmaben. It is then no surprise that fines for cattle damage appear more often in Chunchin toc. In addition, conflict over land occupation and fencing appear to simmer within the ejido Similar to Xmaben, there is preference that conflict between two people be settled private ly However, a comisario ejidal deliberately raises the issue of unresolved conflict between two people during an a ssembly As a comunero illustrates: 32 Interview with an ejidatario, Chunchintoc, July 30, 2010.
77 I f they (the ejido a ssembly ) see that you are in the other person's la nd, that is when they pounce on the one that is damaging ( causing trouble ) That is when all the people descen d on him. He stays in bad standing with the rest. And if he tries to face off with the people and says, "No I have the reason, I have the right He pisses off all the ejidatarios He on ly finds himself more enemies. 33 This brings us to the following sectio n on adjudication. Public Versus Private A djudication Of the 31 coded segments for public adjudication 27 of them are referred to by informants from Chunchintoc. All public adjudications in Chunchintoc are related to unduly land sale or occupation and t he consequent application of the sanction s Interestingly both waach and comuneros can be summoned by the ejido a ssembly when they do not abide with established norm s Land conflicts that involve non right holders are intentionally brought before the a ssembly by the comisario or by an ejidatario for resolution. It appears that locals who infringe on land norms are summoned before the assembly and warned and advised to make reparations for the unacceptable behavior. If the behavior (transaction) is not m ended then their case is solve d with or without their presence As a comunero states He has to do it (return the land). If not, it will have to be by force. It will have to be by force, if they do not do it. If they conduct another a ssembly and they do no t want to do it. Well there will not be anything. 34 If someone does not make reparations to their behavior it seems as if there is a latent threat that their right (if they are ejidatario ) or access to land ( if they are comunero ) can be severed. 33 Interview with a comunero, Chunchintoc, August 5, 2010. 34 Interview with a comunero, Chunchintoc, August 5, 2010.
78 Sixty four percent of the instances where private adjudication is coded in the text are by i nformants from Xmaben. P rivate adjudication is related to disputes over cattle damages on Milpa, asserting land rights, and to a lesser extent peer monitoring of illegal timb er extraction. D isputes are settled amongst farmers and accessing local private adjudication is avoided. As an ejidatario states, Well, we would have to talk about it tranquilamente (peacefully) and then we come to an agreement 35 I n Chunchintoc private adjudication is to establish a fine for the livestock damages In some instances, where Milpa is practiced, a resolution would be a fine or reparation for damages caused C ommunity me mbers in Chunchintoc and Xmaben frequentl y state that [they] try with regards to inter farmer conflicts. Illegal A ctivities and their M eaning In both communities timber and non timber forest products are extracted for personal use. Firewood is brought to the community o n bikes, motorcycles or by truck loads In Xmaben, a ccording to the younger ejidatarios and comuneros written authorization from the comisario ejidal is need ed to extract wood for construction. Older ejidatarios 3 5 to 40 years and older, who seem to have more status among the community members b elieve that wood can be extracted at anytime provided that it is for personal use. In Chunchintoc, authorization s to extract timber or non timber products are not required whatsoever. In both communit ies timber ex traction and sale demonized. However, in Xmaben an Acta was adopted that entitle d ejidatarios to extract and sell one 35 Interview with ejidatario, Xmaben, July 1, 2010.
79 of timber if t hey have an economic emergency. Community members that are held by PROFEPA, the Military or an y other State law enforcement agency can present the authorization from the comisario ejidal and their timber would not be considered illegal. There has not been any report of this happening. Here is where the crux l ies Informants report of ejidatarios a nd comuneros que se hacen de listos who play the fool) and harvest timber on a weekly basis. Ejidatarios and comuneros condemn this behavior since it is reversing past efforts made to protect the forest via the PES Likewise, they believe that unrestrai ned timber extraction places in jeopardy the prospects of participating in future PES program s As an ejidatario Have you seen him (the illegal timber extractor)? 36 Ejido a ssembly discussions on illegal timber e xtraction resulted in a consensus that those that are caught by a State law enforcement agency will be left to the mercy of the law. The ejido will not intervene on their behalf, like it has done in the past. Informants from Chunchintoc do not report ille gal timber extraction. The only semblance of illegal timber harvesting is when ejidatarios who partner with comuneros c ut posts for cattle fence. Nonetheless, being in the business of cutting posts for cattle fencing or paying someone to cut posts is not d eemed unacceptable. On is considered a grave act. An ejidatario relates the case of a brother in law ; another crime of his is [that] he does carpentry. That is a veeery big crime here 37 The informant narrates t hat besides his kin being a waach he he is presumed to be exploiting the 36 Interview with an ejidatario, Xmaben, July 7, 2010. 37 Interview with an ejidatario, Chunchintoc, July 27, 2010.
80 (forest). Regardless of his more than 25 years living in the community, he is not included in State programs such as PROCAMP O Cultural norms that relate to governance of the ejido seem to have sanctions that are autochthonous o r foreign and which are enforced internally or externally. It is my observation that what differ s between both ejidos are the sanctions and the adjudi cation space that is preferred to enforce those sanctions In the case of Xmaben, it has successfully incorporated elements from PES to coerce collective participation. Banning participation from State and NGO programs has also been adopted to enforce com pliance of norms When conflict arises between farmers private resolution is preferred When conflicts arise between an ejidatario or a group of ejidatarios and the ejido a ssembly it seems that there is a lack of naturalized sanctions which the ejido can adopt. This does not mean that the ejido cannot evolve in this direction. Cultural Control T heory, can be termed as appropriated culture. It cannot be termed autonomous since the elements that are necessary to govern d epend on external sources (NGOs and State program ). Chunchintoc similar to the history of Xmaben, is starting to incorporate PES elements to coerce compliance o n collective participation. Nevertheless, it appear s that land acces s (via expropriation and reduction of access) seem s to take precedence as the norm enforcer. Land access sanction s can be enforced only by the ejido a ssembly thus, the existence and practice of effective public adjudication. Private adjudication does take place to resolve farmer farmer conflicts However, when an issue revolves around land public adjudication takes precedence structure
81 can be termed autonomous culture since the source of sanctions that are necessary for governance does not depend on external forces and elements. Land access is managed within the community. We R ule I try to anchor the theoretical propositions of agency, as described by Ortner ( 2006) in an effort to under s propositions of intentionality and cultural construct ion of agency, discussed in Chapter 2 er is what is necessary to highlight in this section As Ortner ( 2006:1 44 ) argues, even where power differential exist s, the less pursued by the more powerful. As seen above with the interface of PES State green markets, both ejidos have advanced their through governance of the common pool resources. Even if they cannot establish the price per metric ton of c arbon sequestered they do influence the outco me an ejidatario has been able to improve his socioeconomic st andard by investing in cattle w ejidatario has be en able to influence the outcome of this unbalanced power relation and advanced his Xmaben because of its geographic position with the Calakmul Biosphere Reserve has had the presence of development agencies since 1993 (Porter Bolland 2001) Interface with NGOs and to a lesser extent the State has brought various diversification programs (honey, sheep, pigs, etc) on to the landscape. Unlike Xmaben,
82 Chunchintoc is not in the priority area of buff er zone of the Calakmul Biosphere Reserve. Its historic relation with the State, in an unequal power relation, has constructed its agency in a distinct manner. With the help of informants and archival data I will try to reconstruct what transpired with th e 1980 rice project. In 1981 ten thousand hectares of land was leveled in Chunchintoc t o establish what Gates (1993 ) term s the State rice agribusiness enterprise. According to the author, despite the various failure s of the State projects Gates (1993:172) conclude s that the top being efficient at the following: i ndiscriminate spending t echnical e rrors m isguided crop selection r ed tape d eterioration of soils i nadequate agricultural experimentation i nadequate extension i nadequate market research s hortage in key inputs e nvironmental deterioration g overnment agency indifference Neither Xmaben nor Ch unchintoc were immune to the mismanagement of the r ice enterprise by the State. On top of all the above inefficiencies, the State intervention was during the debt crisis. Conditional loans from IMF restructured and required withdrawal of the State from r ural Mexi co. Figure 5 2 illustrate s the dramatic economic S tate intervention on the landscape (see Figure 3 1) and quick withdrawal f or multiple reasons from those listed above. What Gates ( 1988) term s provided by the ejidatarios for the State planned development projects occurred in Chunchintoc.
83 A necdotes exist of people finding clever ways of increasing the amount of u rea (fertilizer) applied in a day in the rice fi elds to make up for the low wages. Informants relate that it was mis management and a maalas (crop failure) that sent the ejido into default. With a bank loan and no capital the ejido found itself in a financial circumstance it did not create. The b ank sold most of the large machinery (combine harvesters) to recuperate some of the loan. After this episode Chunchintoc was left with some of the tracto rs and their equipments (harrows), which were housed at the on (garage). The financial debacle cause d a communal turmoil in Chunchintoc which goes as follows A group of ejidatarios were at the They were the watchmen that night. They decided that they wanted to keep the machines. It was a group of them. They are socios (business partners) they h ad a bus cooperative. What they did was to drive all the machinery to their solar where they have their meetings. All the machines were taken there. So, the following day the people got together to see what they were going to do about it. Some came by th e community palace. Night was falling. In the middle of the talk someone came up with the idea to go wait for their buses. Around that time they come from Campeche. When the bus arrive s it is taken hostage by the entrance of the village. Don Pedro was ord ered to drive the bus to the (community park) in front of the Palacio. Even the kids were out. One of them was taken and shoved through one of the bus window s and was told to open the back door. The kid opened the door and the bus was stormed. The driver and his cobrador (helper) were taken to the calabozo (dungeon). When news that this had taken place other members of that group, the Iraqs 38 they came out. They were by the corner of the church seeing what was happening. A group of men ran after th em and a couple of them were captured. The calabozo was being filled with Iraqs. It was dark. Men came out; they brought their shotguns because they did not want the other Iraqs to come rescue those that were in the calabozo The re were men on top of the P alacio with shotguns. The Iraqs were kept there for a couple of days. Food was brought to them by the women but they were not 38 Iraq coincides with the 1990 Gulf War. Iraq is b oth ascribed and self ascribed to refer to the group of ejidatarios ejido
84 allowed to see them. At night people would come with buckets of cold water and throw it at them. They were not left in peace. All of a sudden the Presidente Municipal (County President) came to Chunchintoc with a group of people. Some people say that he was sent by the Governor in Campeche. He wanted to rescue the people. But he did not talk about the tractors. He was leaving becaus e he could not do anything. A Xnuk Seora (elderly woman) slapped him and held him. She told the Presidente When the men saw that the Xnuk Seora had the President held they took him to the calabozo His it The secretary returned to Hopelchn. Men came back. This time they brought pistols. People say that t he y also brought cash. One of them went where the Iraqs were and placed a gun on a las buenas o a las malas (through the good way or the bad way you decide) He did not want to give back the tractors. Some people say that he was given the cash. go if you do not return the tractors one of them would be taken out of the calabozo Until all of the machines were returned to where they should be they were all released. That is la le y del pueblo (law of the land). After the chaotic episode, the ejido decided to distribute the tractors amongst subgroup s of ejidatarios A subgroup would have approximately twenty people. These groups were formed based on affinity and kinship. All the t ractors were eventually sold with the exception of two. Both groups that kept the machines paid off the share of the non kin member and they remained as family group s I t is possible that within a decade Chunchintoc transitioned from traditional Milperos of the State a gribusiness system, to cattle ranchers. Rice mechanization technology remained in the community. It was actually adopted ever since the rice project came to Chunchintoc. As an ejidatario notes, Some have b een doing [m echanized Milpa] for far longer, it was since [land] mechanization
85 began 39 After the rice debacle the mecanizado was not converted to Milpa because of the traditional knowledge that the area inundates and that the soil type is un suitable fo r c land ( Kakab ) was found to be destroncado (tree roots uprooted) 40 As quoted above from an ejidatario re collection ejidatarios started fencing the mecanizado and converting it to pasture. It was at this point that the infamo us 50 25 norm of land access for the mecanizado was established. The effect of the rice project was felt well into the 1990s. Rosa Mara Martnez Denegri a l egislator from Campeche, brought the case of Chunchintoc to national prominence by request ing that the C mara de Diputados of Mexi co investigate what transpired in Chunchintoc between S AGARPA ( Secretara de Agricultura y Recursos Hidrulicos ), BANRURAL ( B anco Nacional de Crdito Rural ) an d the shareholders of "Tumbo de la Montaa Information present ed to the Chamber state s that the ejido was (Poder Legislativo Federal 1991) Six years after Martnez Denegri place d the s potlight on Chunchintoc the State return ed now as PROCEDE. For the next eight years more than nudging, the State pressure d the community to accept the land regulariz ation program Appedix A provides excerpts gathered from reports of State official s who v isited Chunchintoc from 1997 to 2005. T he last recorded meeting held on March 13, 2 005 clearly indicates the pressure that was placed on the ejido to decide to participate in PROCEDE. Chunchintoc reject ed the State program based on premises discuss ed belo w. 39 Interview with an ejidatario, Chunchintoc, August 5, 2010. 40 Interview with an ejidatario, Chunchintoc, July 20, 2010.
86 La L ey del Pueblo R econstruct ing la ley del pueblo through the mosaic of narratives from the informants expands on the two fronts of agency which Ortner proposes. On the one hand relations of solidarity and on the other agents are always enmeshed in relations of power, inequality and competition (Ortner 2006:1 31 ) The Iraqs on the one hand, using their political leverage acted in solidarity to influence the outcome of the p ost rice enterprise. Their dramatic move to hold the machine s was to as our interest was to work the mecanizado 41 As agents they were literally acting in an uneven power relation with regards to the majorit y of the ejidatarios who wanted to get rid of all the machinery. ractors for voting during an ejido a ssembly very likely they (the Iraqs) would have lost. Likewise, h olding t he Iraqs hos tage can be seen as acting in an un balanced power field As an ejidatario relates, They were backed by the government and they tho ught that they were the maximum [ authority ] you see 42 The presence of the Municipal President is. It is conceivable that with the backing of the government if the Iraqs were left unchecked the y on the ejido In the end, these competiti ons in uncertain power fields perceived by both sides led to struction of agency Ejidatarios (un)consciously, at least for some time, (re)interpreted or (re)confirmed their perceptions of the State n ow as an indebtor, and at minimum rescuer of its local allies. On the other hand, the Iraqs (re)learned their 41 Interview with a n ejidatario, Chunchintoc, August 5, 2010. 42 Interview with an ejidatario, Chunchintoc, July 27, 2010.
87 roles as community members who are enmeshed in the locality and not so much with the State. As one of the comunero recounts, the Iraqs "I am cure gentlemen. I will not get involved in stupidness again that is what he said. They put him in the dungeon. 43 The la ley del pueblo episode (re)constructed values, symbols and meanings in Chunchintoc For one the institutional structure embodied by the ejido a ssembly gained new meaning. To this day it can be argued that it is THE space for adjud ication ejido is threatened. Respecting and abiding to collective norms is seen not only as necessary but also as valu able, and something to be maintained by community members I ts cultural control over the governance of its comm ons has been the unintended consequence of an uneven power relation of the ejido the local elites, and the State. Gates brilliantly describes the unintended consequence of this power relation Irrespective of the pr oject s uccess or failure, many of the ejidatarios who have participated in the state directed agricultural modernization process have acquired confidence in dealing with the agrarian bureaucracy, gained greater awareness of policies and programs, discovere d how to use institutionalized corruption to their advantage, learned new technical skills, mastered strategies for negotiating a cut of the now limited state resource pie, and, in general, become better able to defend themselves against manipulation by ou tside agencies. [Gates 1993:6] Neutralizing the State I agree with Ortner ( 2006) on her proposition of agency as being historical ly constructed in fields of power. In relations of domination and resistance Ortner defines a continuum from ambivalent acceptance of domination, foot dragging, to outright rebellion. Though the State, embodied by the Dependencia (State Ministry) 43 Interview with a comunero, Chunchintoc, August 5, 2010.
88 representatives, flaunted its power and insist ed that the ejido accept PROCEDE, such power w as neutralized by rebellion. The most effective form of rebellion in this case was absenteeism from the announced meetings to provide information and consent for the Program (PROCEDE) Law. T he law makes provision for minimum attendance for a legal quorum to dec ide the land tenure regimes of an ejido An interviewed State official who visited Chunchintoc to promote PROCEDE had the following to say about the ejido rejection of the land titlin g program : Informant: I tell you that with the comisario I do not have any complaints, but unfortunately when you get to the asamblea that is when the problems begin. Tim : I see. Informant: And the situation is that the people say no, no and no. Like h ow they say it, "Ma' 44 about 2001 2002, I tell you [that it went like that] to (2005) 45 It is difficult to subscribe to the position that apathy is the principal reason why ejidatarios do not attend meetings where information on a State policy is provided, and where they are going to be pressured to provide consent to accept a state policy. What For example, c ontrary to official reports, Chunchintoc has been effective in It would seem that c ultural norms and cost of adjudication of land tenure issues render neo liberal land regularization programs such as PROCEDE, incon sequential in Chunchintoc In the State of Yucatn Baos Ramrez (1998:46 ) also 44 is literally translated as no. However, based on the tone of the enunciation it can be a staunch refusal which is the case at hand. 45 Interview with a State official, Campeche, August 8, 2010. The informant worked with the Procuraduria Agraria, the agency tasked to provide legal advice to ejidos on agrarian law.
89 ejidos are embracing neoliberalism Asamblea and Acta As McCay and Jentoft ( 1998:2 2 3 ) argue influenced by Durkeim, communities are not aggregates of individual s but are corporate s that are capable of making decision s over common resources. In both cases of Xmaben and Ch unchintoc, this ultimate expression is during the asambleas ejidal es According to the Agrarian Law of 1992, the a ssembly is the supreme body of the ejido The law grants it authority to manage ejido resources, manage agrarian rights, decide the land tenur e system, and apply all internal rules. In both communities major decisions are made when the a ssembly is in session. Decisions are mad e via resolutions, established i n Acta s which are signed by the ejidatarios Acta s are used to record agreements, from d eciding to lobby for a State program, establishing limits of access to resourc es, among others. have an agreement at the assembly Acta Xmaben, for example, has established via an Acta that every p easant has the right to use [ forest resources] ( ) when there is a sick person [in his family] then he is authorized to do something to defend himself 46 When timber extraction became problematic the as sembly m ade an Acta which s tate s that if any community member is caught by any State enforcement agency the ejido will not intercede on his behalf. 46 Interview with ejidatario, Xmaben, July 10,2010.
90 On the other hand in Chunchintoc, Acta s are seen as law. As such it provides protection and sanctions. The Acta that establishes land access limits is widely known in the community, among comuneros and recent ejidatarios The infamous Acta states that ejidatarios can fence up to 50 hectares of land in the mecanizado t he abandoned rice project, while comuneros have access to 25 hectares. However, ejidatarios and comuneros alike can fence more land beyond that limit, provided it is not in the mecanizado Two additional Acta s that are enforced in Chunchintoc are the ban on timber extraction and a ban on land sale to outsiders. Communal meetings ( asambleas interchangeably used for the meeting and the legal body), at first sight, would resemble a chaotic ramble of opinions or which is various peop le speaking at the same time. This brings us to the following section. Status Interestingly mul is something done in common or in a community (Bastarrachea Manzano et al. 2003) After informati on has been presented to those attending a communal meeting ( the ) ensues 47 During this period almost everyone would be talking to the person or people right next to him or her. This is essential to the nd vetting. Group s of ejidatarios and comuneros would actively (and passionately) discuss topics brought before the assembly As an informant states There are many decisions that are made by the ejido that are at times right and other times they are not. I have noted that, let us say ... if a decision is made amongst all and everyone is fighting, everyone is talking, everyone is 47 Ejido meetings are attended by both ejidatarios and comuneros In Chunchintoc there is a history of comunero attendance and participation during these communal meetings.
91 giving their idea, it goes well. But, when someone stands up to talk and he is the only one who is heard and the rest do not talk ... it does not go well because it is only his idea. It is not the a ssembly 's idea. We have proved that. We have been through many things. We hav e a lot of history 48 However ej ido a ssembly After the ideas have surfaced there is the need for someone to market them to those in attendance. T communal meeting var y between both communitie idea s ha ve status within the community. The five qualities which I identified are being an ejidatario being a Nukuch Mak (a n elderly), having credibility, good a s locally termed, and having capacidad de gestin (liaison capacity). In both comm unities being an ejidatario gives someone status. With status comes freedom to access land wherever it is available. To the contrary, a comunero either the son or son in law of an ejidatario is expected to work land that is right next to his I asked a male comunero why he wanted to become an ejidatario he Well, because you have a little bit more rights on the decisions that the ejido make on the lands 49 gain status over the years for the accumulated contributions t hey make to the ejido by patrolling the land s, opening boundary lines, et cetera. Moreover, they are credited for the existence of the ejido through their efforts to lobby t he State to make the land grant and the consequent ejido expansions. In addition, as a comunero who rears bees states, They took care of their forest; that is 48 Interview with ejidatario, Chunchintoc, July 27, 2010. 49 In terview with a comunero, Chunchintoc, August 5, 2010.
92 w hy we enjoy the benefits [nowadays] 50 But most importantly are the embodiment of traditional knowledge. I was intrigued by what a good idea is I t turns out th at it is quite straight forward. A good idea is one that benefit s the ejido in grand terms According to the informants, good ideas are given by the people that have experience, those who have the (academic) preparation, or those who understand the State progra ms. Eighty percent of ted by informants from Xmaben For reasons of space I cannot elaborate on gender and agrarian rights in both communities. However, this one instance highlight s the value that education and good ideas have in Xmaben. I noted that women attending communal meetings would not voice (market) their ideas. Reasons provided by male informants are mixed from being among other explanations. Nonetheless, a young e jidataria (female agrarian right holder) is actively engaged in the administrative operation of the ejido She works with an NGO that has development programs in Xmaben and s even other neighboring communitie s. Despite being young and a female she has status among the ejidatarios capacidad de gestin a direct products of her education. Liaising with external institutions requires skill and knowledge of the intricacies of State and NGO bureaucracy. It is not surpris ing that there are key people in each community who are the ones to approach Dependencias they are the ones to do the 50 Interview with a comunero, Ixmaben, July 6, 2010.
93 liaising for those programs to come to the community 51 In Xmaben it seems that the technical assistance of COMADEP ma kes liaising a one man endeavor ; undertaken by the comisario ejidal Nonetheless, 60 % of coded segments for liaison are from informants from Xmaben. In Chunchintoc liaison for the timely disbursement for the PES by a Dependencia sees a delegation of elected ejidatarios non elected ejidatarios and comuneros visit Campeche city. In the case of the comunero for example not having a land right or an elected post overrides the more conventiona l paths of obtaining s tatus. These people acquire status for their skills and contributions to the ejido In Chunchintoc pre selected and evaluated for voting by ej idatarios on the basis of the credibility of the person making the proposition. Credibility is intimately linked with good behaviors such as being tranquilo (peaceful), having patience, not having vices, not being a gossiper, and not being grillera (an agi tator). discredited on the basis of not having kredibilidad (credibility) But how does this help explain anything with regards to PROCEDE? Currently, the explanatory power of status is limited. Howev er, the historical construction at le ast in one of the communities of status can explain the acceptance of PROCEDE in 1998. In the following section I analyze the geographic position of Xmaben and larger development initiatives in La Monta a. Status and Agency Colluding to H igh jack the State Xmaben has had the intervention of NGO since 1993 (Porter Bolland 2001) In 1999 Oxfam/COMADEP established a honey producers cooperative in t he region with 51 Interview with an ejidatario, Chunchintoc, December 22, 2010.
94 its headquarter s in Xmaben. The same organization also financed a food processing facility for women in Xmaben. Financing alternative livelihoods is as a result of the establishment of the Calakmul Biosphere Reserve in 1989. La Monta a is i n the buffer zone of the Reserve. According to the comisario ejidal of Xmaben La Monta a is subdivided into three regions based on marginalization; high, medium and low marginalization. Xmaben is categorized as of medium marginalization. But, h ow is this r elevant? Xmaben, as pointed out above has had working relations with NGOs due to its geographic and socioeconomic peculiarities. Projects have been planned, implemented and s ome have ceased to exist in the community. Over the years it is evident that th is mutualistic NGOs c ommunity relationship has had an organizational impact on the ejido Interface with NGOs, scholars, and to a lesser extent the State has provided some people hav e a better understanding of the bureaucracies of the State and NGOs As a result, people that have these skills have ( un ) consciously been seen to have status; they are abusados (sharp) Xmaben, even if it did not ha ve the abilit y to change the power differentials, has been able to co opt the initiatives of those with whom it has interface d This historically constructed form of agency of the ejido with the help of its gestionadores ( liaison has given Xmaben the abil ity to read programs and influence their outcome. I believe that this is precisely what happened with their acceptance to participate in PROCEDE in 1998 Solidifying this argument is the fact that the ejido opted to join PROCEDE but maintain it s communal f orm of land tenure. Ortner ( 2006:1 44 ) terms this
95 complex and ambivalent acceptance of domination which is changed upon acceptance upon the accept ance of PROCEDE. Summary of Findings As a way of concluding I must remind the reader that I consider myself a Yucatec Maya by race and ethnicity; thus, my findings could be biased. However, I believe that inquiry is both a scientific and personal enterpris e, rich in (un)expected and (un)pleasant findings. Limited to this case study, an ejido that accepted PROCEDE X maben, a nd one that rejected PROCEDE C hunchintoc, it can be concluded that that there are cultural elements, emotive and institutional, that ar e present in the ejido that reject the land regularization program. In Chunchintoc rituals are practiced at the individual level ( and Waaji Kool ) and in the collective domain ( Chak ). In Xmaben r ituals are also reproduced, but its practice is l imited to the individual. Institutional element s of governance ha ve been restructured by way of participation in Payment for Environmental Services. In the case of Chunchintoc, there is a communal practice of public fo rms of adjudication, especially to ad dress issues related to land tenure. In Xmaben there is preference of private adjudication over public adjudication. The distinct trajectory of each ejido has shaped their construction of agency. In each instance, the collective ejido has been able to pur say Within the framework of Cultural Control Theory, Chunchintoc seem s to have more decision capacity over the rituals that are collectively practiced. Likewise, it seems to have much capacity to decide over its instituti onal structure of governance a s of 2010. On the other hand, individuals from Xmaben and Chunchintoc who practice rituals are in part limited by the syncretism with Catholic symbols. The collective ejido of Xmaben has adopted and incorporated elements of PES into its governing structures.
96 Using Cultural Control T the hypothesis that more autonomous communities have the capacity to reject a state policy holds. Limiting a nalysis on two major elements g overnance and control over rituals it is evident that Chunchintoc is more autonomous by having more decision making capacity over these elements. I am not stating, by omission, that Xmaben does not ha ve any autonomy whatsoever. W ithin the framework of C ultural C ontrol T heory, however, explored. As for the purpose of this document, I maintain my position that ethnicity cannot be one m ore label of the internal drivers that influence land tenure regimes in Mayan o r primordialist paradigm. As seen in Chapter 5, locality, agency ( in power relations ) and an of the
97 Table 5 1. Profile of informants in Chunchintoc and Xmaben, Campeche, MX. Community Age Completed High school Religion a P ractices Ritual Milpa (ha) Mechanized Milpa (ha) Chunchintoc 20 No C No 0 0 Chunchintoc 20 No C Yes 0 1 Chunchintoc 28 Yes C No 0 0 Chunchintoc 34 No C Yes 0 2 Chunchintoc 35 No C Yes 3 0 Chunchintoc 36 No C Yes 4 0 Chunchintoc 38 No C No 0 16 Chun chintoc 38 No C No 0 1 Chunchintoc 46 No C No 5 2.5 Chunchintoc 61 No C Yes 0 2 Chunchintoc 62 No C Yes 0 3 Chunchintoc 70 No C Yes 2 0 Xmaben 21 Yes P No 2 0 Xmaben 22 No P No 2 0 Xmaben 24 Yes E No 1 0 Xmaben 26 No C Yes 1 0 Xmaben 29 No P No 1 0 Xmaben 37 No C No 0.5 0 Xmaben 39 No C No 3 0 Xmaben 39 Yes C No 1 0 Xmaben 57 No C Yes 10 0 Xmaben 59 No E No 1 0 Xmaben 60 No C Yes 3 0 Xmaben 60 No C Yes 2 0 a C: Catholic; P: Presbyterian; E: Evangelical.
98 Figure 5 1. Occurrence of coded segments of norms and sanctions amongst informants from Xmaben and Chunchintoc, Campeche, MX. Figure 5 2. State investment in Chunchintoc rice project. Source: INEGI (1984); INEGI (1986)
99 A B C D Figure 5 3 Collage of field research pictures. (A) Traditional Milpa, Xmaben, (B) Cattle production in the mecanizado Chunchintoc, (C) Infamous calabozo transporting ramn to feed sheep, Xmaben
100 CHAPTER 6 IMPLICA TIONS Alternative Explanations Some literature suggest s that the historical interface of an ejido with the State can determine the participation of an ejido in the land titling program. Schren (2001a) reports that th e Xcupil cacab, an ejido in the Municipio of Hopelchn, did not accept PROCEDE since the government had expropriated a part of the ejido lands to establish the Calakmul Biosphere Reserve. Schren (2001a:215) reports th was p u t o n the ejido by to participate in PROCEDE, but it refused However, the SRA (2006) report indicates that Xcupilc ac ab eventually participated in the land titling program. Based on interviews with the informants and non structured interview s with community members from Chunchintoc, it would seem that there are two main reasons why the ejido refused to participate in PROCEDE. First, it seems that ejidatarios had le arned from nearby ejidos example Kancabchn, that when INEGI surveyed the ir land what was found on the ground does not match the land grants and expansions which the Presidential decrees state. This is reported in Xmaben by the comisario ejidal and Porter Bolland (2001) by the government. S ome ejidatarios believe that if the government c ame onto ejido land s to survey it would be in a position to repossess land. Second, there is a strong belief that the document which the ejidatarios have is sufficient to assert their right to the land which they occupy and use. With a few exceptions, there seem s to be a discrediting of the indi spensability of the agrarian certificates which PROCEDE issues to ejidatarios when the community participates in the certification
101 program. In RAN ( N.d .a.) there is from the Procuradura Agraria agents that SAGAR PA technicians were misinforming ejidatarios of Chunchintoc ; that is, that par ticipating in PROCEDE would produce invalid agrarian rights which would not serve as credentials to participate in PROCAMPO This contradict s other cases where ejidatarios were a dvised new agrarian right was necessary to participate in State programs. In fact, an interviewed State official state d that some Dependencias demand a copy of the PROCEDE agrarian rights for paperwork to be conducted specific State programs e sp ecially subsidy programs W eyile (belonging and/or being from here) explain s much with respect to land tenure regimes in the two communities where this research was conducted. Access to land is seen as a given as necessary since agriculture and livestock rearing are central for the sustenance of the household ejidatarios being born o or if [your] generation continues on the land amongst others. N ew comers m en c an gain access to land i he marr ies a girl that is from here, stay and live gains ] the trust of the community requests ] permission to es and/or being a Mayero The ideology re volving on access to land and sustenance of the community has lead to sophisticated mechanisms to guarantee access to those who belong to the social group, and from outsiders. Evidently, new comers to the community have requirements and phases whereby they earn access to the land. Thus, l and regularization programs seem redundant with the existing governance patterns in the communities.
102 The above are alternative explanations to the reasons why a community accept or rejec t participating in PROCEDE. Where PROCEDE was accepted it was done with hesitation, and where rejected, it was done so since the communities were not in dire need of regulariz ing ejido land in the first place. Land Tenure Implications As Agrawal (2003) ha s pointed out, research has not adequately explored the other side of the institutional framework of the commons This study, while limited in scope, tried to shift the focus on autonomy in its effort to understand the social decision making capacity of a group of individuals as subjects embedded in local and non local incorporated some elements of governance of the commons while addressing the micro politics in a historical context to understand decisions made by ejidos with respect to the 199 2 land tenure restructuring of Mexico. This approach explores the historical construction of the collective agency of ejidos in its effort to understand governance, and the interpretation and reaction of ejidos toward land tenure policy. In Campeche, the focus on autonomy and not ethnicity can help us understand the processes of decision making by ejidos potential of explaining why even when communities adopt a State policy, such as the land titling progr am, they still maintain property as a communal land holding. I must reiterate that I am not advocating for as such. To the contrary, as Agrawal calls for, the commons and its evolution can be better understo od by analyzing the inter institution subject dynamic This research does not report on the past and present construction of subjectivities of rights within the ejido However, u nderstanding the underlying dynamics of the ejido deepen s knowledge of the man y factors that establish rights in the communal land
103 holdings. For example, in the ejidos of La Monta a those that are born within the community automatically have usufruct rights to land. Likewise the land mass that is accessible to a right holder and a non right holder is dictated by the legal recognition of agrarian rights by the State. As Ensminger (1996:182 ) argue s these rights are complementary, not mutually exclusive. Understanding how agrarian rights ar e enmeshed in cultural norms to guarantee that right can place research in a bette r position to analyze the evolution of the ejido system. I must remind the reader what trigge r ed my interest in the commons e thnicity. I maintain the position that while ethnic ity might be an indicator to identifying land tenure regimes of communities, it cannot explain the becoming of those regimes. However, the construction and negotiation of ethnic id entity in power differentials as Comarroff states p rovides scholarship with the opportunity to understand the inter institution subject dynamics. This is where its potential to contribute to the theory of the commons lie s Finally, managing the language in which the subjectivities of the commons are constructed and negotiated is fundamental to understanding the ir ideological underpinnings. For too long subjectivities have been researched, theorized and defended on rather obvious fronts and not so much on its intricacies its nuanced meanings Thus, this is one more tool which can complement our understanding of the commons. The mes for Consideration With the many limitations that I find in the methodological approach and the theoretical underpinnings in this research, I propose that these areas be explored:
104 Systematic analysis: A systematic analysis of the nine communities in the State of Campeche that rejected PROCEDE is conducted to identify if there are any commonalit ies Autonomy: Future research on the micro politics of land te nure in communal land holdings, in Campeche or elsewhere, should incorporate other elements to establish the autonomy of these commons. Other elements which can be included are the social and economic network s that the community members have in plotting th eir livelihoods. Autonomy should a lso explore the abil ity of communities to reject, accept, and orces Women: Most of my observations, with the exception of one case, were based on infor mation provided by men. Half or more than half of a world of discovery exist s in ible right by incorporating female voices in future studies that explore ethnicity, land tenure, et cetera in Mayan communities. T hough ethnicity cannot explain much as a theory, it has the capacity of shedding light on the negotiation of the new meanings of the commons. Th ere are (not so new) dimensions to land tenure in the Yucatn Ethnographic work reveal that one of the principal reasons why communities decided to not opt for the indivi dual land title regime is the possibility it opens of land being traded to outsiders w and have land rights in a
105 Migration: Wi th livelihood being sh ifted into the service industry identity is being constructed at the local (rural communities) and non local places (in Cancun, Merida, Canada or the United States of America). The construction of identity is becoming more of a hybri d, even in rural Campeche. Belonging to rural Campeche can mean migrating to urban settings for a few years on end and returning when economic conditions improve. Though the law protects those that migrate, do they return to find themselves with the worst land? Do those that migrate formulate strategies to maintain occupation to establish right over land? Or is land that is historically occupied remain to the migrant, and if so, for how long is the historical occupation respected? These are only some of the internal land ownership dynamics which can change or remain unchanged with new migration patterns in the Yucatn. Migration and identity: With respect to those that migrate; how is their conscious construction of identity altered? Or is their ide ntity not altered since it continues to be nonexistent as Gabbert suggest? Are there (not so new) dimension s to becoming Maya which is less centered on locality and class? H ow is land factored in the (un) conscious construction of ethnic identity if at all ? Maya means abandoning symbols that connote t the loci: Climate change and its policies, such as the Reduction of Emissions by Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) are becoming another fo rce that will make it to these loci. In fact, in the summer of 2010 the leaders of Xmaben, in unison with an NGO, w ere debating which land could be set aside for REDD. Farmers were weighing the benefits of doing Milpa in these places versus ace for PES. As seen in Chapter 5, PES does have impact on the
106 governance of the commons. REDD or any other global meta innovation ts It is in these loci where objective assessments of PES can be analyzed to evaluate their impacts global meta politics of the commons? How will it alter the trajectory of agency of these commons? Climate chan ge: As informants s uggest unpredictable weather pattern is a product of climate change which is caused within and beyond the boundaries of their communities. Nonetheless the se communities bear the cost of this unpredictability through maalas migration, worsening poverty, et cetera There is the need to systematically analyze the impact of climate change, or project its impact, on the ability of communities to govern these commons. Will these impact s be the starting point to disintegrate the commons and n ot a State neo liberal land titling program? Or will it be one more non local factor that will further consolidate the governance of the commons rituals how can scholarshi p understand contemporary Mayan cosmology and its ? The above are observation s made from c lasses, thoughts that are sparked from exchanges with colleagues, or opinions of advisors and colleagues. Nonetheless, I am the one to bear all the errors it may contain and criticism which they could generate
107 APPENDIX EXCERPT FROM STATE OFFICIAL REPORTS FROM VISITS TO C HUNCHINTOC TO PROMOTE PROCEDE Date Attendance Description Excerpt 03/21/1997 2/18 9 1 st Call: Information and Consent The meeting was not held because a legal quorum was not met. Only 2 ejidatarios out of 189 ejidatarios attended. 03/30/1997 8/189 2 nd Call: Information and Consent The meeting was not held due to the apathy of the ejidatarios 09/05/1999 58/10 8 1 st Call: Information and Consent Despite being the third assembly to provide information (by State officials), it is the first time that a large number of ejidatarios attend and are willing to sign an Acta regardless of the decision they make. 03/04/2 005 9/201 1 st Call: Information and Consent After assembly was called to order and by virtue of being the first called assembly and taking into consideration that it is an ordinary assembly it should be ce lebrated with a minimum of 50 % plus one ejidatari o from the ejido consideration that the assembly cannot be legally called to order a second call for assembly is established for March 13, 03/13/2005 45/201 2 nd Call: Information and Consent At the end of the information s ession the ejidatarios made questions and comments emphasizing that they did not want the Program under any circumstance. That the issue not be insisted since they have consistently manifested their rejection of PROCEDE and that it is their will to not par t icipate and maintain the costums of the ejido With this the majority decided to not participate in Program, thus the representative of the Procuradura Agraria signaled that their decision is respected but that a decision should be voted upon to resp ect the orders of the session. W ith the preceding observation, consideration to participate in PROCEDE was submitted for the consent of the a ssembly The ejidatarios showed their discomfort with this being submitted for voting once again since they had decided that their decision
108 is no and they requested that their decision be respected. To this the representative of the Procuradura Agraria exhorted that hands be raised. After insisting, the ejidatarios by a unanimous vote decided to not consent participating in the Program. Source: RAN ( N.d a )
109 LIST OF REFERENCES Agrawal, Arun 2003 Sustainable Governance of Common Pool Resources: Context, Methods, and Politics. Annual Review of Anthropology 32:243 262. Alexander, Rani T. 20 03 Introduction: Haciendas and Agrarian Change in Rural Mesoamerica. Ethnohistory 50(1):3 14 Angel, Barbara 1997 Choosing Sides in War and Peace: The Travels of Herculano Balam among the Pacficos Del Sur. The Americas 53(4): 525 549. Assies, Willem 2008 Land Tenure and Tenure Regimes in Mexico: An Overview. Journal of Agrarian Change 8(1):33 63. Babbie, Earl R. 2010 The Practice of Social Research. 12th ed. Belmont, C A : Wadsworth Cengage. Baos Ramrez, Othn 1998 PROCEDE : Gateway to Modernization of the Ejido ? In The Future Role of the Ejido in Rural Mexico. Richard Snyder and Gabriel Torres, eds. Pp. 31 4 7 La Jolla CA : Center for U.S. Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego. Barnes, Grenville 2009 The Evolution and Resilience of Commu nity Based Land Tenure in Rural Mexico. Land use Policy 26(2):393 400. Barsimantov, James, Alex Racelis, Grenville Barnes, and Maria DiGiano Tenure, Tourism and Timber in Quintana Roo, Mexico : Land Tenure Changes in Forest Ejidos After Agrarian Reforms. International Journal of the Commons 4 no.1 ( 2010 ):293 318. http://www.thecommonsjournal.org/index.php/ijc/article/view/102/105 Bastarrachea Manzano, Juan Ramn, Jorge M anuel Canto Rosado, and Instituto de Cultura de Yucatn 2003 Diccionario Maya Popular: Maya Espaol, Espaol Maya. Mrida, M e xico: Instituto de Cultura de Yucatn. Bebbington, Anthony 1993 Modernization from Below: An Alternative Indigenous Development? T heme 274 292.
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116 BIO GRAPHICAL SKETCH Caste War and settled in British Colony, present day Belize. He was born and raised in Belize. At age fifteen he attend s the University of Belize to pursue an Associate Degree in Agriculture. In 2004 he completed his undergrad uate degree as an Ingeniero Agr nomo at EARTH University, Costa Rica After college he was hired by the Faculty of Science and Technology at the University of Belize. On a separate appointment, h e was the Belize technical assistant to the Integrated Ecosystem Management in Indigenous Communities (PMIIE) Project It was during this period that his interest o n land tenure grew In 2009 he attended the School of Natural Resources and Environment at the University of Florida t o pursue a Master of Science Degree in Interdisciplinary Ecology