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1 VERZERRTES BILD: WORLD WAR II AND THE POSTWAR RECONSTRUCTION OF SPATIAL IDENTITY By MATTHEW D. MINGUS A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2011
2 2011 Matthew D. Mingus
3 To Lindsey
4 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I imagine that lonely people tend to write lousy essays. I hope this thesis is a testament to the support provided to me by a number of individuals in various capacities. My thesis advisors, Peter Bergmann and Geoffrey Giles, were integral to this project from the beginning. I am deeply appreciative of their patience, guidance, and knowledge the driving forces behind my intellectual and scholastic development. I am also deeply indebted to Sheryl Kroen for her emphasis on good writing, her generosity with source material, and her constant enthusiasm for this project. I am grateful to Alice Freifeld, who offered helpful comments on portions of this work (whether she knows it or not). Jeremy Crampton and the anonymous reviewers from Cartographica offered me a great deal of feedback on parts of this thesis, as did Paige Andrew and the anonymous reviewers at the Journal of Map & Geography Libraries Wesley Beal, Lisa Booth, Tammy Bowman, Christopher Burkett, Jordan Dominy, Paige Fowler, Clarence Patrick McHenry, Johanna Mellis, John Moser, Katalin Rac, Rachel Rothstein, Christina Van Houten, and Wil liam Vaughan all, perhaps unknowingly, served as continuous sources of inspiration and intellectual support. I owe the completion of this project to you all. Any errors, omissions, or misinterpretations are, of course, mine alone. I also owe a great de al to my parents, Martin and Rebecca Mingus, who were my first (and perhaps best) teachers. I hope that this project proves to them that the sacrifices they made for my early education and well being were not in vain. I am most deeply indebted to my par tner, Lindsey. Her support for this project has never wavered, but it has been nice to spend so much time with someone who
5 constantly reminds me just how small the stakes in academia really are. Du machst mich springen
6 T ABLE OF CONTENTS page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................ ................................ ................................ 4 LIST OF FIGURES ................................ ................................ ................................ ........ 7 ABSTRACT ................................ ................................ ................................ .................... 8 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 9 2 ................................ 18 3 MAPPING GERMANY DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR ............................. 29 4 ORIENTING A POSTWAR GERMANY ................................ ................................ 46 5 HOW TO DISSEMINATE YOUR MAP ................................ ................................ ... 63 6 HOW TO SELL YOUR MAP ................................ ................................ .................. 78 7 CONCLUSION ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 89 APPENDIX: THE MAPS / IMAGES ................................ ................................ ............. 95 REFERENCES ................................ ................................ ................................ .......... 115 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ................................ ................................ ......................... 122
7 LIST OF FIGURES Figure page 1 1 Studienrat Kurt Schmidt [map] ................................ ................................ ........... 95 2 1 Territorial Provisions of the Treaty of Versailles (1928) [map] ............................ 96 2 2 Frankreichs Bndnispolitik (Franc ........................... 97 2 3 Untitled [map] ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 98 3 1 Daraiya Area [map] ................................ ................................ ........................... 99 3 2 Captured by Intell OSS AAI. Bandenlage Mittel Italien [map] ......................... 100 3 3 Aerotopograph Radial Triangulator ........ 101 3 4 ................................ ............... 101 4 1 1946: Ein Jahr der Versprechungen [map] ................................ ...................... 102 4 2 Emigration Process [chart] ................................ ................................ .............. 103 4 3 Bremen Enclave [map] ................................ ................................ .................... 104 6 1 German Coke Production, 1938 [map] ................................ ............................ 105 6 2 Wie die direkte und die indirekte ERP Hilfe 19 48/49 verteilt wird [diagram] ..... 106 6 3 Untitled [map] ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 107 6 4 Amerika Hilft Europa, Europa Hilft Sich Selbst [pamphlet] ............................... 108 6 5 Germany: boundaries of 1937 [map ] ................................ ............................... 109 6 6 Germany [map] ................................ ................................ ............................... 110 6 7 German Borders after 1945 [map] ................................ ................................ ... 111 6 8 Westdeutschland Bodennutzung, 23 [map] ................................ ..................... 112 7 1 Sample 1 [ms. map] ................................ ................................ ........................ 113 7 2 Sample 2 [ms. map] ................................ ................................ ........................ 114
8 Abstract of Thesis Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts VERZERRTES BILD: WORLD WAR II AND THE POSTWAR RECONSTRUCTION OF SPATIAL IDENTITY By Mat thew D. Mingus May 2011 Chair: Peter Bergmann Coc hair: Geoffrey Giles Major: History This essay proposes a history about maps, the interests behind their (re)production, and the consequences they generate. Particularly, this is a story about one of the largest mapmaking and map dissemination projects in the history of the world a moment which literally re defined Germany and emphasized the value of cartography to the governments, corporations, and people operating within its borders (and sometimes problematically, on them). My focus, then, is on the production of maps during World War II and the reproduction of German mapped space after the war. I investigate this reproduction through both the postwar American occupation of West Germany and the relationship between the West German government and public relations firms. I also discuss the importance of postwar map dissemination and the role government agencies (such as the Army Map Service) and public relations firms played in distributing partic ular cartographies. I argue that Germany serves as a perfect historical example for studying and understanding the fluid and narrative nature of maps because of its unique cartographic history, the constant spatial (re)negotiations it has consistently gr appled with, the radical shift in cartographic control it experienced after losing the war, and the re production of its space by an occupying military force.
9 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Soon enough we have forgotten [the map] is a picture someone has arran ged for us (chopped and manipulated, selected and coded). Soon enough it is the world, it is real, it is reality. 1 On the fifth of December 1948, a young German named Theodor typed a letter to his teacher, Mr. Schmidt. In broken English, The odor thanked his teacher for a recently just within the Hesse region and, as of 1945 the American zone of occupation. Attached to the letter is a hand drawn map ( Figure 1 1 ). 2 The map is simple; its assertion is obvious: here is where Mr. Schmidt lives. It was drawn to show someone how to get somewhere. Indeed, this is what maps do : they offer propositions. 3 There is ace. Nor can his map accurately operate within any mathematical projections. Yet the map, as is the case with all maps, makes a claim. In a sense, the map is unique a subjective and abstract proposition of real, lived space. It is the place of Mr. Sc hmidt according to Theodor. This map is unique in another sense as well: it is a surviving representation of late 1940s German space as produced by a German. Whereas the vast majority of German maps from this period in history were created by agents of t 1 Denis Wood. The Power of Maps (New York: Guilford Press, 1992), 70. 2 In my citations of maps, I will attempt to adhere as consistently as possible to the standards established Cartographic Citations: A Style Guide, Second Edition Chicago: American Library Associat ion, 2010. 3 Rethinking Maps: New Frontiers in Cartographic Theory ed. Martin Dodge, Rob Kitchin, and Chris Perkins (New York: Routledge, 2009), 198 199.
10 map as blatantly unscientific as it is stands as a stark reminder that Germans could and did map their own spaces. However, as an occupational force the Allied powers had a vested interest in controlling the reconstruction and re mapping of German space. From the earliest days of the Second World War, the creation and maintenance of a carefully plotted German spatial identity was a priority for the Allied military and, throughout the postwar era, became a serious point of c ontention between the Germans and their Allied occupiers. This essay proposes a history about maps, the interests behind their (re)production, and the consequences they generate. Particularly, this is a story about one of the largest mapmaking and map d issemination projects in the history of the world a moment which literally re defined Germany and emphasized the value of cartography to the governments, corporations, and people operating within its borders (and sometimes, problematically, on them). It should come as no surprise that this moment occurs alongside the Second World War, one of the largest conflicts in history (both geographically and militarily). As John K. Wright, the International Geographical Union President on the Committee of Cartogr aphy, so astutely observed in 1949, 4 Wright might have also mentioned that those forces most heavily invested in modern war were also those most interested in the subsequent stimulatio n of mobility. Obviously, the nation state with the greatest interest in all postwar German cartographic projects was the United States, the most powerful military and economic force involved in the German occupation. Yet the beginning of the Second Worl d War caught the American military 4 Highlights in American Cartography, 1939 Comptes Rendus du Congrs International de Gographie: Lisbon 1949 Vol. 1 (Lisbon: Centro Tip. Colonial, 1950), 299.
11 spatially off guard. With practically no maps with which to wage the massive conflict they had committed to, the United States became obsessed with standardizing and centralizing its mapmaking efforts. The consequences of this prioritization were two incredibly well funded and highly respected military mapping agencies: the Army Map collect, analyze, and produce maps of the various world r egions in which the United States was militarily involved on a scale never before realized. Whereas the United States had produced roughly 9,000,000 maps during the First World War (few, if any, of which were ever catalogued or stored by the government af ter the end of the conflict), they would produce over 500,000,000 maps between 1941 and 1945. 5 But it was not simply the Second World War itself which spurred the production of maps. The postwar period in which the American military, alongside the French, British, and Soviet forces, demanded the re territorializing of a defeated Germany prompted th e difficult process of drafting, interpreting, and publicly explaining a very consciously constructed cartographic narrative. Furthermore, freshly proposed projections of this newly oriented Germany needed to be disseminated to the rest of the world. Per haps most important, however, was the dissemination of mapped material to the United an insurance that never again would the U.S. military be caught with their cartographic pants down. The government, however, was not the only agent of map dissemination after World War II. The rise of international public relations firms in the early twentieth century provided a unique outlet through which to effectively 5 Federal Government M ap Collecting: A Brief History ed. Richard W. Stephenson (Washington, D.C.: Special Libraries Association, 1969), 3.
1 2 convince the world and its nation upled together, the efforts of the American military, the postwar German government(s), and the PR firms they hired would attempt to impose a purposeful and carefully prepared cartographic narrative tailored to perpetuate a cultural occupation of spatial p erception. As much as this is a story of American history, it is just as much a story of an active and continuously self mapping Germany, a nation state and culture with a long and influential cartographic history. While many colonies and previously unexp lored regions were exploited through becoming mapped for the first time by an occupying force, Germany had been one of the most technologically advanced nation states to consistently contribute to the creation of the cartographic and geographic disciplines Its mapmakers, government land surveyors, and academic cartographers/geographers are all vitally important to this study if we are to understand how a nation state is authoritatively and (for the most part) unquestionably re drawn Moreover, it is only through a study of postwar Germany that we can begin to see the cultural effects that radical cartographic change at a level never before attempted can have on individuals who suddenly do not know (in the abstract sense) where they are, but have long been taught to defer to the authority of the map. In order to achieve such insight without abandoning narrative continuity, I will address this issue chronologically and episodically, focusing on particular moments in an effort to tease out larger cartograph ic trends. First I will offer the historical context within which German maps prior to the nation state on the modern map will be explored. Once these contexts have been m ade apparent, the various agents, associations, and governments involved in
13 collecting and re creating literal maps of Germany during and after World War II, as well as the problems they faced and the consequences of their maps, can more easily be assessed Next I will investigate the planning and enacting of one of the largest movements of cartographic material in history the Army Map Depository Program. 6 Finally, the transition of postwar mapping from the military to public relations firms and the cons equences of that development will be studied. By evaluating the spatial relationships of governments, universities, private corporations, and other institutions in such a way, I hope to emphasize the importance of understanding history in spatial terms an d force historians of all stripes to recognize not only the constant spatial narratives within which they operate, but also those narratives (both past and present) within which their histories take shape. The discipline of history is spatializing itsel f and it would be misleading to suggest that this thesis offers a new methodological approach to studying the past. As contemporary culture grows increasingly dependent on location based media and an ever cognize the importance of spatial constructions when building their respective narratives. Of particular interest are the early modern and modern periods eras in which a cartographic explosion of navigational charts, colonialism, and nation state buildi ng demanded the abstraction, production, and dissemination of real space through the instrumental medium of the map. While ancient Greek and Roman societies could (and did) use maps to orient themselves and exploit natural resources, and while various re ligions took turns 6 In a somewhat different form, this section of the paper has been published elsewhere as: Matthew D. Mingus. Journal of Map & Geography Libraries Vol. 7, No. 2 (Summer 2011).
14 depicting the medieval world according to their heavenly (and truly) imagined communities, it was only during the European Enlightenment that cartography gained the scientific confidence it defends to this day. Moreover, the necessity o f disseminating cartographic material and, consequently, popularizing particular orientations only became imperative in the modern world where to be left off of the space. 7 Many historians have understood t he importance of studying these spatial developments and have investigated them through several different thematic lenses. The history of cartography as an academic discipline, as an art, as a technological development, and as an instrument of exploration (and, subsequently, exploitation) has become the subject of hundreds, if not thousands, of published histories. Space itself has also recently been a well worn subject of interest, invoking the concepts of borders, bodies, geopolitics, environmental hist ory, and (perhaps most relevant to this project) imperialism. Journals such as Imago Mundi Cartographica and The Portolan (among others) have provided an academic forum in which to investigate these particular issues. Maps, however, have also appealed to a more broadly theoretical body of scholarship. Henri Production of Space geographies are a few of the more famous and interdisciplinary examples of useful academic exercises undertaken so as to deconstruct our respective perceptions of our environments. More recently, the geographers Neil Smith, Dalia Varanka, and Jeremy 7 In fact, one scholar has argued (correctly, in sense of the term that we understand today. The function of the map as a site of discourse and contention directly coincides with the production of the early modern state, an institution that necess arily Rethinking the Power of Maps (New York: Guilford Press, 2010), pp. 22 25.
15 Crampton have offered important histories of how s ociety has mapped itself. Critical cartographers such as Denis Wood, John Krygier, John Pickles, and Mark Monmonier have chosen to focus on the institutionalization, professionalization, and political/economic interests involved in mapmaking and the acade mic disciplines of geography and cartography. By undertaking deconstructive projects, historians, scientism into question. As I will point out throughout this essay, m any scholars (in German and in English) have examined the cartographic history of Germany. So far as I can tell, however, few have examined its postwar developments and none have discussed these developments within the context of American occupation. 8 Th e lack of attention to postwar Germany is surprising. The history of cartographic development throughout Europe and its role in determining sovereignty, defining the concept of the nation state, and coping with contentious territories has been fruitful. Yet there is still much to be done, and while I cannot offer a comprehensive analysis of postwar German cartography here, I can (and will) attempt to answer some important questions raised by other scholars studying other historical periods and geographic areas. How, for example, have particular nation states relied upon maps for development? Does a map matter if no one grants it any authority? How is a public convinced state re assert its place on the map, and how can it convince foreign powers that it belongs there? These are not original 8 The Continuities of German History: Nation, Religion, and Race across the Long Nineteenth Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 47
16 questions. I will be relying on the efforts of previous historians and geographers. I will however, be applying their deconstructive insight to what I believe to be an exceptional period of obvious cartographic fluidity, a period in which a country full of incredibly skilled modern mapmakers was re mapped by a foreign occupation force. While my access to sources is limited, I hope that this project will serve as the foundation for further research. Much more needs to be done on this particular period and region so that we might better understand the relationship between governance and maps. S uch critical approaches to cartographic history are hardly universal. While many historians, particularly those interested in the modern era, might understand their creating subject s, 9 too often cartographies are overlooked in favor of more traditional literary forms. Furthermore, the contemporary student of history is hard pressed to find any scholastic work in which early modern or modern maps are used as explanatory narratives al ongside text and, simultaneously, cited as narratives The geospatial information and software utilized to create such narratives, the mathematical projections assumed, and the professionals or amateur cartographers who drew the narratives are rarely ever exposed. Rather, the map is too often used as an aesthetic representation spatial abstraction, cartographic objectivity, and Truth. Spatial relationships are tricky, especially when they are being mediated by an occupying force. The means by which such relationships were forged, their continuous renegotia tion, and the perpetuation of these relationships into our contemporary era 9 Carla Hesse. The Other Enlightenment: How French Women Became Modern (Prinction, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001), xii.
17 shed light on how the narratives within which we find our respective places are built and maintained. Maps, the United States, and Germany blended into a triune which would recast and redefine one another in a complex orgy of manipulation, politics, war, and capital. This is one spatial relationship, during one historical period, which saturated the world with maps and, through constant self affirmation, erected a new world. The result would be an artificial rendering of the real, a deeply interested proposition created for mass consumption and rooted in the cartographic development of Europe: it is the world in which we find ourselves today but it did not have to be. And that is the most important part of (this) history.
18 CHAPTER 2 While the outbreak of the Second World War offered interesting new cartographic opportunities for the Allied and Axis Powers in the mid twentieth century, Germans had making itself. Their ability to map resources (particularly forests), 1 publish the largest number of historical atlases in Europe, 2 and create early mathematical projections for the sake of navigation (both on sea and on land) 3 contributions to the development of mapping. As a conglomeration of typically small territorial landholdings, German s tates were in a unique position to help shape the development of state sponsored cadastral (i.e. multi property) maps. Unlike many of the other well established European territories, pre twentieth century German states would often represent both a politic al unit and private estate simultaneously, especially prior to the 1806 collapse of the Holy Roman Empire. 4 The small size of these states/estates made the impetus for solidifying claims of land ownership urgent. Yet several other factors also led many o governments to investigate mapping strategies. of financial collapse by the mid seventeenth century. Moreover, the subsequent need 1 Roger J.P. Kain and Elizabeth Baigent. The Cadastral Map in the Service of the Stat e: A History of Property Mapping (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 132. 2 Acta Poloniae Historica Vol. 37 (1978), 175. 3 John P. Snyder. Map Projections A Working Manu al (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1987), 48, 76, 98, 104, 182, 249, and 253. 4 Kain, 125 126 and 120.
19 for maintaining a standing army forced many small German states to recognize their need for a continuous source of reliable income. After reorganizing and centralizing their financial ministries, several states (particularly Bavaria, Brunswick, Hessen, and Saxony Weimar) undertook cartographic projects for the purpose of accurate and efficient taxation maps that could, in effect, be used to combat the local control of finances by various estate owners. 5 For many regions, opposition from the nobility was the crucial obstacle to d rawing a complete, state wide cadastral map. Wealthy residents were reluctant to cede their respective spatial narratives to the state (especially if it potentially meant higher taxes). For many governments, any type of comprehensive cartographic enterpr ise would have to be postponed until the nineteenth century. 6 Many of the smaller states within the Holy Roman Empire had actually been mapped during the seventeenth and eight eenth centuries by previous ruling governments. Sweden had drafted nearly comprehensive cadastral surveys of Western Pomerania and Mecklenberg; France had produced maps of Westphalia, the Rhineland, and (unsurprisingly) Alsace Lorraine; Denmark had create d partial maps of the Schleswig Holstein territory. 7 While several full 1840s, 8 and while several states (particularly Prussia) had adopted fairly accurate 5 Ibid., 146 147. 6 Ibid., 160. 7 Ibid., 120 121. 8 Guntram Henrik Herb. Under the Map of Germany: Nationalism and Propagan da 1918 1945 (New York: Routledge, 1997), 9.
20 French and Dutch methods and technology, 9 only after the Second Reich could Germany itself produce an autonomous territorial narrative. 10 In fact by 1900, each individual Reich state had installed its own respective mapping program. 11 Furthermore, several German thinkers became extrem ely prominent in the fields of cartography and geography. One of these Max Eckert laid the academic groundwork for the eventual autonomous establishment of cartography as 12 The German geographer Albrecht Penck prop osed the first ever International Map of the World. 13 Several international thinkers such as these prior to the First World War. 14 centralized, self mapped geopolitical nation state made its neighbors nervous. At the Paris 1900 Exposition perception (one which was legally and internationally acknowledged by these three nations) of its territorial boundaries. The Russian map, for example, emphasized English and the French (of course!) embraced this representation in hopes of ending 9 Kain, 170. 10 Ibid., 166. 11 Cartography and Geographic Information Science Vol. 29, No. 3 (2002), 155. 12 Wolfgang S Kartenwissenshaft Imago Mundi Vol. 38 (1986), pp. 61 66. 13 Cartography and Geographic Information Science Vol. 29, No. 3 (2002), 209 210. 14 Ibid., 218.
21 Germanism became the norm rather than the exception (especially in France) during the early twentieth century prior to the First World War. 15 World War I changed everyt hing not only in terms of how German academicians were treated and how Germans undertook cartographic activity, but also the map of Germany itself. During and after the War, international communities of geospatial theorists and practitioners criticized 16 German cartographers further lost face during the postwar Paris Peace Conference by failing to propose any concrete territorial claims i n time to be considered before the Allied Powers had signed the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. 17 Prior to the Treaty, the majority of mapping programs had been funded and operated by their respective state militaries. On 18 June 1919 (ten days before the s igning of the Treaty of Versailles) cartographic responsibilities were ceded to a civilian branch of the government known as the Federal Land Survey Office ( Reichsamt fr Landesaufnahme ). This Office was charged with 18 While all German states were required to adhere to the standards and framework of the new Survey Office, the southern states in particular (i.e. Bavaria, Wrttemberg, Hessen, and Baden) established their own individual mapping agencies and continued to largely 15 Ibid., 212. 16 Ibid., 218. 17 Under the Map of Germany 27. 18 Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau Vol. 6 (1955), 267.
22 control their own geospatial information and, therefore, the maps on which such information was represented without any significant threat of federal reprimand. 19 While the study of cartography continued to expand in German speaking nations, 20 the results of the Treaty were devastating for the German public. A significant portion of their national territory had been ceded to several foreign powers ( Figure 2 1 ). Indeed, some of the techniques established by the Germans during the War (such as a technique which allowed for the transfer of cartographic detail, by eye, fr om aerial photography to a gridded map) had been adopted by the Allies after the war, 21 and it can be reasonably assumed that these cartographic practices were used to revise their postwar maps of Europe. The Treaty of Versailles, then, marked a significan t turning point in how German cartographers approached their discipline. Many of them understood the treaty as a spatial attempt at revisionism which they themselves could adopt in order to combat the cartographic constructions of the Allied Powers. Thus maps became a force with which consequence, the discourse on German national 22 While a few American intellectuals (notably Dr. Walter Ristow, the Chief of the New 19 Department of the Army Technical Manual No. 5 248: Foreign Maps (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 12 June 1956), 206. 20 Century American Academic Cartography and Geographic Inform ation Science Vol. 30, No. 1 (2003), 82. 21 Collier, 161. 22 Under the Map of Germany 33.
23 Section) attempted to instill the importance of maps in the publics at large, 23 nearly all German geographers and cartographers focused their makers turned a critical eye toward the activity to which they had dedicated their live s. This was to be a very public two fold deconstruction 24 A popular means through which to undertake this project was the concept of Geopolitik Perhaps one of the most serious failures in the historiography surrounding t wentieth century German cartography has been the assumption that Nazism and the concept of Geopolitik were complementary and that a fusion of the two was made manifest in a massive, concerted effort to systematically distribute maps as tools of propaganda. 25 In fact, as pointed out by two of the leading scholars on this topic (David Thomas Murphy and Guntram Henrik Herb), the opposite is true. Geopolitical concepts were much more popular during the Weimar era than during that of the Nazis. Weimar Germany created an atmosphere in which anyone, regardless of political affiliation, would be tempted to accept the concept of Geopolitik 26 The Weimar governments 23 Bulletin: Special Libraries Association Geography and Map Division No. 182 ( Spring 1996), 17. 24 David Murphy. The Heroic Earth: Geopolitical Thought in Weimar Germany, 1918 1933 (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1997), 17. 25 For more on how the myth of centralized Nazi geopolitical dissemination became popularized, especial German Geopolitics in U.S. Political Discourse, 1939 Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1996. 26 David Murphy, 2.
24 cared little about centralized cartographic undertakings and nearly all of the material from the 1920 s and early 1930s was created by isolated individuals. 27 Many of the maps distributed during this time focused on convincing the German public that the Germany was goi ng to have to confront. 28 They would typically emphasize that surrounding them. 29 new post WWI shape, its core w as more vulnerable to foreign invasion. 30 31 Whil e there was no sustained, was largely based upon trial and error, the isolated depictions of the German nation state were hugely successful and increased in popularity throug hout the 1920s and 1930s. 32 When the Nazi government took power in 1933, they made good use of 33 While a few 27 Under the Map of Germany 40. 28 David Murphy, 165. 29 Under the Map of Germany 51. 30 Ibid., 61 62. 31 Ibid., 78. 32 Ibid., 88, 91, 93. 33 Geopolitik Political Geography Quarterly Vol. 8, No. 3 (July 1989), 294.
25 established mapmakers helped the National Socialists with this effort, mo st of the maps produced for the use of propaganda were not created by prominent Germans committed to the concept of Geopolitik 34 This allowed for an important difference between geopolitical maps and Nazi maps to be made evident: Nazi cartography was only Geopolitik had always emphasized the importance of linguistic and cultural values when mapping nation states ( Figure 2 2 and Figure 2 3 ). Moreover, the Nazi maps were y the adherents of geopolitics. 35 While both National Socialism and Geopolitik had common interests, Nazism manifest geopolitical ideas in an aggressive assertion of pl ace both domestically (through the compulsory hanging of approved maps in schools) and abroad (through invasion). There was, it should be noted, no centralized or specialized channel through which the Nazis funneled their maps. To cite a pair of American professors who had worked closely with German geographers before and immediately after World War II: Recent analyses of the German war effort have indicated that the general economic and military mobilization under the Nazis was not as complete during the early years of the war as had previously been believed. This is true also of geography. 36 Reichsforschungsrat until 1943 and even then such undertakings were rarely 34 Ibid., 299. 35 Ibid., 300. 36 Geographical Review Vol. 36, No. 6 (July 1946), 405.
26 approved. 37 It should also be noted that the infamous German geographer Karl Haushofer had little influence on the wartime cartography of his nation state, serving in no official capacity to any of the mapmaking institutions and only rarely being cited by German geog raphers and cartographers during the war. 38 Yet, while there was no systematic dissemination of propaganda which specifically emphasized maps by the Nazi leadership, they were certainly more than happy to encourage and popularize the individuals drawing th em. 39 This is not to say that maps were not produced by the Third Germany as any other modern Western nation state. These maps, however, were not drawn using the hyper raciali As maps could be more easily re produced and disseminated by a centralized government (or, as argued later below, a public relations strategy), the European cultural concept of space itself began to cha nge. No longer was space a container in which individuals acted or simply a Kantian a priori framework in which perception took place, but rather space itself became a product 40 Moreover, as various nation states 37 Ibid., 404. 38 The World of General Haushofer: Geopolitics in Action New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1942. For more on how the Allied Powers, particularly the United States, may have understood Briton Invented, the Germans Used and Americans Life (21 December 1942), pp. 106 115. 39 40 A wonderful example of this development in the United States can be traced through the history of state road maps. Although never seriously undertaken at the federal level prior to the 1950s, road maps were obvious constructions made possible only through the merger of state governments and commercial cartographers. They were also widely distributed and, by 1926, were often given out for free. It should be no surpri se that, like many European nation states, the state governments often used these maps to Well worn Path: Cartographic Commercialism, Highway Promotion, a nd Automobile Tourism in the United States, 1880 Cartographica Vol. 30, No. 1 (Spring 1993), pp. 10 20.
27 and cultures began to become more aware o f their geopolitical environment and the need to interact with one another both culturally and economically the imperative to make spatial structures absolute became more urgent. Somewhat ironically, such efforts made even clearer the understanding of 41 Yet in the modern era the only period in which maps could saturate the imaginative landscapes of any particular citizenry the natural ness of space became integ ral to its own production and, furthermore, to the existence of the state which perpetuated it. The French theorist Henri Lefebvre claimed reality despite the fact t ha The modern nation state had 42 state has been incredibly successful at making the concreteness of its spatiality real its natural ness seemingly inherent A shift, however, began to take place in the mid twentieth century. Plenty of maps prior to this period were created by individual ent repreneurs, land owners, and commercial entities. Many states were also more than happy to fund private enterprise mapping projects, so long as they adhered to the instructions of each at any not even cartographic undertakings produced by governments (and the Third Reich was no exception) had explicit and centralized marketing plans. None, that is, until one of the 41 Neil Smith. Uneven Development: Nature, Capital, and the Production of Space Third Edition (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2008) 116 117. 42 Henri Lefebvre. The Production of Space trans. Donald Nicholson Smith (New York: Blackwell, 2008), 94.
28 most massive nation building ventures in world history collided with the emergence of dawn of the twentieth century, and while marketing in some form or other had always played an important part in early modern mapping projects, the merge r between public relations marketing and government sponsored state building after the Second World War would seek to re configure a map of Europe which had experienced a near total upheaval. Getting to that postwar point, however, would demand a very del iberate series of re orientations.
29 CHAPTER 3 MAPPING GERMANY DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR The somewhat abrupt entry of the United States into the Second World War left the American military with little time to prepare cartographically for a worldwide conflict. Even after the explicit reliance of Allied Powers on maps during World War I, the United cataloging. Captured maps from the Central Powers were largely disc arded or allowed to be clumsily stored in various unidentified libraries throughout the world. Even if the U.S. military had cared to begin building a major cartographic archive after the Great Versailles. 1 Shortly before (and certainly after) the United States Congress declared war against the Axis Powers in December 1941, a state o f near cartographic panic enveloped all branches of the United States military as they realized that they needed to 2 It was almost immediately clear that the American mi litary was not even bureaucratically prepared for the acquisition and production of the much needed Plant the organization initially responsible for map collection and dissem ination was dated and relatively 1 Federal Government Map Collecting: A Brief History ed. Richard W. Ste phenson (Washington, D.C.: Special Libraries Association, 1969), 1. 2 Bulletin: Special Library Association, Geography and Map Division No. 182 (Spring 1996), 2.
30 small facility at the Army War College in Pennsylvania to a new, much larger plant in Brookmont, Maryland, a few months after the announcement of war. Over th e next few years, its staff would expand from 150 servicemen and women to 3500. 3 Charged with mapping what would eventually become the most geographically extensive military conflict ever undertaken, the initial acquisition procedure of the Army Map Servi ce 4 The most obvious domestic source for recent foreign maps were large public and university libraries, many of which had departments or divisions dedicated to cartography and geography. In fact, during the build Section had already begun making isolated requests for maps from libraries to use during various Army maneuvers in the fall of 1941. 5 They had also begun borrowing m early as August 1941. Unfortunately most, if not all, of the maps received from libraries were somewhat out dated. For example, the two most well used and authoritative Plan von Gross Berlin (dated 1938) and the London Times Atlas (dated 1922), both of which were considered to be 6 To make matters worse, the material being lent to the military by various libraries was under constant demand by regular patrons, 3 A Brief History of U.S. Military Mapmaking and the First Decade of the Defense Mapping Agency (Washington D.C.: Defense Mapping Agency, July 1982), 11. 4 Mary Murphy, 2. 5 Historical Historical Geography Vol. 29 (2001), 80. 6 Hudson, 9.
31 particularly those immigrants from Czechoslovakia and the Sudeten area who, after the crisis of 1938, were hard pressed to discover their exact political status for the pur poses of naturalization, voting, and Social Security registration. 7 Moreover, the lack of authoritative cartographic resources and their seemingly random placement in libraries between London and Berlin to both guard their own territorial representations and gain 8 Such efforts took a serious toll on those librarians and archivists expected to keep map materials accessible to th e public and their own military while simultaneously scouring their resources for potentially dangerous cartographic information. Fortunately, individuals were another source of valuable (and sometimes not so valuable) cartographies. So desperate was the American military for material during the first few months of 1942 that Major General William J. Donovan, Director of Strategic Services (the institutional predecessor to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency) made a nationwide appeal for maps on the radio. The response was overwhelming and lasted throughout the War. 9 Among these were Austrian American veterans of the First World War who sent Italian maps they had used in collaboration with the German military 10 and a seemingly overzealous Italian American w 7 Ibid., 13 14. 8 Geographical Review Vol. 39, No. 2 (April 1949), 298. An interesting example of the consequences of ar addresses. For more on this see Hudson, 11. 9 Wilson, 302. 10 4, 1943), NARA RG 226, Stack 190 5/30/7, Box #229.
32 of Aquila). 11 The military often replied to such responses with gratitude, thanking various 12 these maps were unable to translate and/or understand foreign mapping processes. Very few American geographers and cartographers had any experience with different methods of creating cartographies. Often, the military requested irrelevant maps simply because it misunde 13 Such requests added an unnecessary burden to the already overworked staffs of map collections and prompted several attempts to collect and organize all of the major mapmaking nation rtographic systems into one publication. One of these projects, Foreign Maps by Everett C. Olson and Agnes Whitmarch, even made explicit of the urgent wartime need for 14 Fortunately, several other Allied Powers (particularly the British, French, and Dutch) had a more eclectic and cosmopolitan understanding of cartography. Throughout the war, the United States would consistently turn to a variety of 11 Letter from B.J. De Chanso to the War Department (November 6, 1943), NARA RG 165, Stack 390 35/22/05 07, Box #784. 12 Letter from C.C. Jadwin to Lt. R.S.G. Hall (22 September 1943), NARA RG 165, Stack 390 35/22/05 07, Box #784. 13 Wilson, 298 and 307. 14 Everett C. Olson and Agnes Whitmarsh. Foreign Maps (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1944), xi.
33 international sources for its maps including the Netherlands Economic Mission, 15 the French military ( Figure 3 1 ), 16 and the British Geographical Section, General Staff. In ully apparent that the British supplied the United States with a limited collection of their map sets while also providing them with the equipment, material, and data needed to reproduce any maps which they could not, at the time, spare. 17 So, then, w hile historians have typically portrayed the U.S. as the Allied pillar of production during the Second World War, this was certainly not the case regarding maps. The Americans were irrevocably dependent upon the cartographic expertise and experience of th eir veterans, libraries, and European counterparts. The coordination of mapped materials, however, was not the only way in which Germany and the nation states it occupied could be mapped. By the end of the Second World War, Germany would be in a state of cartographic disarray in part because of cartographic sabotage. Not only would its national territory become occupied by four different foreign governments, but its geographic memory had been decimated. It should come as no surprise that the United St ates and the other Allied Powers had a 15 This Mission had a branch in New York City, where it happened to keep a set of Dutch atlases which ( 13 April 1944), NARA RG 226, Stack 190 5/30/7, Box #229. 16 17 Wilson, 303.
34 as to improve their cartographic intelligence and test the information they had already truthing [that invading a particular territory. 18 The U.S. military would occasionally re distribute these captured maps to various agencies and military units in order to confirm their European orientation. According to mil itary records, some of these captured German maps included roadmaps of Russia, Italy, and Czechoslovakia ( Europisches Russland Strassenkarte Strassenkarte von Italien Deutsche Reich, Germany and Czechoslovakia Strassenkarte Fliegerkarte und deutsche Weltkarte World, Fliegerkarte Osteuropa Sdeuropa, Ostblatt 19 Of course, the Axis Powers also participated in the capture and re distribution of maps, sometimes making re claimed cartographic information incredibly difficult to read. In July 1943, a little less than a year before the Allied invasion of Normandy, maps smuggled out of German occupied Cherbourg retained both their original French calligraphy and the German cartographic abbreviations which had been added to them material had been re 20 Sometimes re enemies cartographically underst ood their surroundings. A German map of central Italy ( Figure 3 2 ) captured by the Office of Strategic Services in July 1944 seems to suggest 18 An derson, 82 83. 19 20 Letter to Lester C. Houck from Dr. S.A. Callisen (16 July 1943), NARA RG 226, Stack 190 5/30/7, Box #229.
35 that resistance groups had been causing enough trouble for the occupation forces that they were worth the time and energy necessary to draw up a strategic map pinpointing their locations. The map is also well labeled and clearly dated (31 March 1944), giving the Allied cartographic liberators a sense of how German mapmaking had been develo ping (including the evolution of cartographic semiotics), what the German occupation forces were focusing on, and the timeframe within which they were working. By October 1944, the United States Military Intelligence Division of the Office of the Chief of Engineers of the Army had enlisted the expertise of geodesy specialist Floyd Hough to sift through the maps and cartographic material of the European theater (with special emphasis, of course, on Germany). Hough and his top secret twenty one member HOUGH 21 Some of these pieces of equipment may well have included various versions of the aerocartograph and types of airc raft cameras. 22 By the end of the Second World War the United States alone would capture over nine hundred tons of German and Japanese mapped material ( Figure 3 3 and Figure 3 4 ). 23 Not all of the maps made available to the Allied Forces of their belligerent counterparts were captured. As governments in exile escaped their respective continental nation states and poured into London, their geographic data was 21 John Cloud. Cartography and Geographic Information Science Vol. 29, No. 3 (2002), 264. 22 The Map & Geography Department of NARA has a collection of military photographs displaying hundreds of captured pie ces of equipment from German cartographers and their institutions. NARA RG 77, Stack 3331 76/04/04. 23 Mary Murphy, 3.
36 the Cartography Section of the [Office of Strategic Services] maps was to aid in the military struggle against Germany, copies were always provided to the exiled governments long term relationships and data exchanges between the OSS Map Division and European governments. 24 Spies were also an essential instrument in making foreign maps accessible to the Allies. Throu would draw maps to accompany their reports to the Allies from within German occupied zones. Often, these would be the only way the Allied military could stay up to date on the construction of German shelters or defense mechanisms. 25 Even the famous Allied secret agent Fritz Kolbe regularly attached maps to his reports perhaps the most 26 The potential negative effects of the loss, capture, and distribution o f some of the academic and community programs. An explosion of creative research was underta particular themes like literacy or income to geography), the founding of several new 24 Wilson, 305. Many of these relationships lasted well into the postwar world and provided the OSS with opportunities to expand their fi eld operations. 25 5/30/7, Box #229. 26 Prologue Vol. 34, No. 1 (Spring 2002), 17.
37 of cart ography, Kartographische Nachrichten 27 The success of the HOUGHTEAM, the OSS Map Division, and the cartographic saboteurs living under German occupation created mixed results in the United States. an geospatial technology and data began to make the Soviet Union a nation state which had had its maps copied extensively by German invaders during the war nervous, 28 it also created an explosion of academic graduate programs in the United States. More over, cartography began to become a more established discipline in the U.S. separate from geography. 29 While America would doubtless rely on geographers throughout the postwar era, 30 it would also acknowledge the usefulness of mapping specialists. The im portance of these cartographers became obvious at the dawn of the American entry into the Second World War geographers might study the shapes of the world and the imaginary structures of its human inhabitants, but the cartographers were the ones who coul d literally draw the lines. Ergo, after acquiring enough cartographic information to serve as a foundation upon which to build (or, that is, trace), the Allied Powers quickly began to project their own propositional cartographies onto the established map of Germany. Such tasks, however, could only be legitimately undertaken if done so 27 Sar Century American Academic Cartography and Geographic Information Science Vol. 30, No. 1 (2003), 82 83. 28 Cloud, 264 267. 29 Robert McMaster Century American Academic Cartography and Geographic Information Science Vol. 29, No. 3 (2002), 309. 30 Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003.
38 systematically and within an established bureaucratic/military structure which had the authority to re he boundaries of Europe. Research & Analysis (R&A) Branch. As an institution, the OSS employed 129 geographers and cartographers during World War II most of whom worked within its Map Division. 31 Research & Analysis Branch had been organized in November 1941 to centralize the OSS. 32 material, constantly reminding unit commanders to only request and utilize maps which had been approved by and sent to them by the Map Division. 33 They were also instrumenta l in both acquiring necessary maps for the government and armed services should other cartographic media (such as atlases, spies, etc.) be unavailable, 34 and drafting maps which indicated the locations of various secret intelligence agents. 35 The Geography D ivision was a fairly insular department, requiring little interdisciplinary or inter agency conversation. However, in January 1943 the R&A 31 Office of Strategic Service, 1941 Journal of Historical Geography Vol. 32 (2006), 150. 32 Wilson 298 299. 33 5/30/7, Box #229. 34 For an example of this acquisition process see Letter to Mr. Whitney Shepardson from George G. Shor (3 February 1944), NARA RG 22 6, Stack 190 5/30/7, Box #229. 35 Stack 190 5/30/7, Box #229.
39 Branch was reorganized and Geography was no longer an autonomous division but one of many within the Map Division based, problem oriented science model [within which] geographers [and cartographers] were compelled to interact with others, 36 This re organization brough t with it a great deal of internal dispute, a well established occurrence between the R&A administrators and the academicians working for them. One such dispute, which might be of interest to the historian, was a particularly telling disagreement between Richard Hartshorne, Chair of the Projects Committee (which gave OSS reports final approval for publication). In June 1945, a report in part authored by Herbert Marcuse was released by the su 37 The authors of the report argued that, in fact, no standards had eve r been made clear to them and that such an oversight reflected the poor institutional leadership with the R&A Branch. Carl Schorske (a former acting director of the Europe Africa Division) wrote to the Director of the R&A without omplaining about the subjective nature of the Project by the OSS. 38 Such disputes make clear the internal dissatisfaction many within the 36 tional within the Research & Analysis Branch. 37 B arnes, 156. 38 Ibid.
40 Research & Analysis Branch had wit h their administrative supervisors, as well as how quickly a supervisor could be overthrown if the right individuals got involved. The OSS Map Division, however, expanded a great deal during the Second World War, both financially and geographically. Its leadership remained constant (Arthur H. Robinson served as its Chief from October 1941 through the end of the war) and, by the R&A reorganization in 1943, its value was so widely recognized that the Map Division was granted equal status with every other i ntelligence subdivision of the R&A Branch. 39 Paris, Vienna, Bari [an Italian city on the Adriatic Sea], Bern Biebrich Cairo, Algiers, Kandy [a city in Sri Lanka], New Delhi, and Kunming [a city in southwest 40 systematic application, and funding of war 41 allowed the Map Division of the OSS (and, subse quently, the Central Intelligence Agency) to achieve geographic footholds throughout much of the world, regulating and evaluating states. The most active mapping organization in the United States military however, and (arguably) the most important was the Army Map Service (AMS). A subsection of the Army Corp of Engineers, the AMS was responsible for the initial analysis of every map captured in the field. Whereas the Map Division of the OSS Research & A nalysis Branch drafted, reproduced, analyzed, and distributed maps deemed necessary for intelligence operations, the AMS designated which maps were important enough to 39 Ibid., 162. 40 Wilson, 306. 41 Barnes, 150.
41 forward to the OSS, which could be discarded, and which needed to be kept in the Army Ma p Service Library for storage. 42 The AMS was also the largest producer and copies of more than 40,000 different maps The Normandy invasi 43 Needless to say, the production capacity of the AMS was massive and its staff was constantly working to project an up to date and accurate world picture to the Unit ed States military. Shortly before the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor, the freshly re organized AMS was instructed to focus on foreign maps and the creation of a standardized system with which Allied cartographers could easily read and reproduce such map s. The foreign maps which served as the foundation for Allied military operations maps had usually been borrowed from domestic libraries or individuals, captured, or leaked to Allied mapmakers. Many of these maps had initially been created as parts of la rger map series and could only serve as partial representations of the land. The AMS, then, had to construct a system which would allow for various partial map series to be combined and redrawn into a new and cohesive map, while remaining as accurate and readable as possible. 44 Moreover, different nation states and, in fact, different agencies within the same nation state would often use different mathematical projections for depicting the three dimensional world onto a two dimensional sheet of paper or cl oth. It 42 Mary Murphy, 3. 43 A Brief History of U.S. Military Mapping 12. 44 AMS Memorandum No. 443, (January 1945): Notes on Map Identification (Washington, D.C.: War Department, 1945), 2.
42 became necessary, then, for the AMS to devise a method in which to standardize projections, grids, and magnetic declinations (the projected angle between magnetic 45 These complex semiotic and mathematical systems took year s to devise and still had not been universally adopted by every mapmaking agency 46 maps, all foreign maps which were being used in combat operations during the war even those created or reproduced by the OSS Map Division had to adhere to the approval. 47 These would be the maps which would literally project Germany into the minds of the Ameri can military and a large part of the Allied forces, in general. Of course, Germany had institutional counterparts to the Army Map Service and OSS Map Division. While Germany had, in the same way as the Allies, scrambled to find maps after the outbreak of war, it had a much deeper domestic cartographic tradition than many of the Allies (especially the Americans). By 1937, the German military had universally standardized its maps and had established the Reichsamt fr Landesaufnahme to take over map producti on from the various German states (although this office had been publishing cartographic histories and historical maps as 45 AMS Memorandum No. 425, (February 1945): Grids and Magnetic Declinations (Fourth Edition) Washington, D.C.: War Department, 1945. 46 revisions from January 1943 through the end of the Second World War. To see this evolution, take a look at Notes on Map Identification: Series, Editions, & Is sues, AMS Memo 443 (November 1945), NARA RG 77, Stack 331 76/04/05, Box #1. 47 03, Box #2.
43 early as 1933). 48 By 1944, the Reichsamt fr Landesaufnahme was regulating entirety. 49 Militarily, three German agencies hired the most cartographers/geographers and produced the bulk of Militrische Geographie Marine Geographie Forschungstaffel of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (Supreme Command of the Armed Forces). The Mil Geo, which was the largest mapping organization in the German military, created fold out maps for military handbooks ( Militrgeographische Angaben ) which th ey published and distributed to troops entering newly invaded or occupied territory. 50 While the Mil Geo had been established prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, the Mar Geo geographical maps of selected coastal areas not found on existing to pographical northern Germany and the Netherlands after the British Royal Air Force bombed the Walcheren dikes in 1944. 51 The third agency, the Forschungsstaffel prima rily dealt with aerial photography and the mapping of terrain elevation. It had its own airplanes, cartographic equipment, and ground reconnaissance vehicles. By early 1943, the Forschungsstaffel completed the most comprehensive physical atlas of Germany ever 48 Emilie Neunhffer. Beitrge zur Geschichte der Karten des Rhein Main Gebietes unter besonderer Bercksichtigu ng der Arbeiten von Johann Heinrich Hass Frankfurt: Johann Wolfgang Goethe Universitt, 1933. 49 Notes on G.S.G.S. Maps of Germany, Denmark, and Central Europe 28 (1942), NARA RG 77, Stack 331 76/04/05, Box #1. 50 Smith/Black, 398 399. 51 Ibid., 400.
44 published. 52 In effect, both Germany and the Allies were creating some of their most accurate and most beautiful maps in an effort to produce a particular world picture. Their respective visions may have been different, but the methods through which they were attempting to accomplish this task were eerily similar. After the Second World War, the concepts of geopolitics and geodeterminism continued to have many American and European adherents, even after the Third Reich had utilized them in its massive attempt at Lebensraum 53 Land use information systems became huge ly popular during the late 1960s 54 and such instruments of geospatial data have yet to see any of their rapid popularity, perceived objectivity, and strangle hold on government sponsored mapping projects diminish. 55 In fact, the impetus for global standardi zation of cartographic data and general reference maps and the reliance on the private sector for such material has significantly increased since the Second World War. The various American and European politicians who attempt to grapple with such prob lems are usually quick to justify their decisions and arguments by deferring to cartographic experts who a mere century before would have had to compete for funding from an academic geography department. 56 In the postwar 52 Ib id., 401 402. 53 David Murphy. The Heroic Earth: Geopolitical Thought in Weimar Germany, 1918 1933 (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1997), 251 252. 54 Carto The American Cartographer Vol. 15, No. 3 (July 1988), pp. 301 310. 55 Beyond Maps: GIS and Decision Making in Local Government Redlands, CA: ESRI Press, 2003. Als GEO: connexion Vol. 6, No. 3 (March 2007), pp. 32 34. 56 1989 Contemporary European History
45 era, however, cartography had just begun to become a very profitable business particularly for the United States and its status as a discipline in its own right of space, place, and power. Cartography c ould not accomplish this task alone not, at least, on a grand scale. It needed a medium through which to disseminate and produce its maps. It needed to gain legitimacy through publication in authoritative journals, popular magazines, and schoolrooms. I t needed, in a word, a salesman Internationa l Yearbook of Cartography Vol. 22 (1982), pp. 42 47.
46 CHAPTER 4 ORIENTING A POSTWAR GERMANY A little advertising goes a long way. Arthur H. Robinson 1 unsurprisingly, the United States government. As the Allied forces reclaimed and redistributed the abstract territorial renderings of European nation states, very real individuals suddenly found themselves living radically different cartographic propositions ( Figure 4 1 ) Moreover, each Allied power had very different ideas about how these lines should be drawn on the postwar world map. Potentially catastrophic consequences of re unforeseen by the American chief o f the OSS Map Division, Arthur H. Robinson. By 1944 Robinson was writing letters to the Director of OSS Research & Analysis, William Langer, arguing that the R&A Branch needed to be more direct when presenting to the Joint Chiefs of Staff justification fo r their administrative existence in a postwar peace intelligence work is likely to be was bound to have in redrafting the bord ers of Poland, the Balkans, Turkey, and China hand in hand with the Soviet Union. 2 While Robinson was concerned with such issues, he was also anxious about the United States maintaining a continuous cartographic presence in Europe and Asia. The day befor e submitting his suggestions above to William Langer, Robinson sent the 1 Letter to Dr. William L. Langer from Arthur H. Robinson (9 August 1944), NARA RG 226, Stack 190 03/02/7, Box #9. 2 Ibid.
47 Division: 1) t o have Map Division representatives on hand at the eventual Peace Conference of the Second World War and 2) to establish the Map Division as a permanent government agency. In favor of his first objective, Robinson argued that ago preliminary plans were laid for the development of a 3 To deny attendance at such a conference to the Map Division would be antithetical to one of its original reasons for organizati on: to re map a postwar Europe. Robinson went on to justify his aim at permanently establishing the Map Division as a quasi independent intelligence program, claiming that map intelligence throughout the Second World War inistered [The Map Division has] had ample opportunity to examine the shortcomings of the [mapping intelligence within the] military needed but one separate from the mili tary which could objectively critique military map collection, creation, and storage. He realized this would be a difficult sell to the Joint come from the JCS [Joint Chiefs 4 presented to the Joint Chiefs on 16 August 1944 included the recommendation to begin ate their 3 Letter to Dr. William L. Langer from Arthur H. Robinson (8 August 1944), NARA RG 226, Stack 190 03/02/7, Box #9. 4 Ibid.
48 Russian borderlands, and the Balkan territories, among others. 5 Two days later, on 18 August, ng: the agreed that cartographical issues such as the German Polish borderland, the Sudetenland, and the Italian Yugoslav border needed to eventually be addressed, the J Canal (the German canal that links the Baltic Sea with the North Sea), control of E ast Indian waters, Iran and the Persian Gulf, and the location of Latin American air and 6 And so the Map Division had its new assignment and some reasserted value to the postwar efforts of the Allies str aight from the Joint Chiefs: Delimination and demarcation of new boundary lines raise problems of major military as well as political importance, requiring detailed studies preparatory to settlement. Such studies should be undertaken at the earliest poss ible moment for all project boundary areas. 7 And the planning began. The postwar reconstruction of Germany was an obvious priority for the Allied forces and by 1945 the Map Division had drawn a series of seventy five administrative maps, each depicting a 5 190 03/02/7, Box #9. 6 190 03/02/7, Box #9. 7 Ibid.
49 8 Unfortunately, neither Robinson nor Langer could have anticipated the problems the Allies would face during the four power occupation of Germany and how unprepared their maps truly were. As much as nation state boundaries mattered during the Second World War, they seemed to have become all the more important when the war came to an end. Emigration was, unsurprisingly, a difficult issue for the various consulates in Germany, complicated even more by the lack of communication and cooperation between the French, British, American, and Soviet governments ( Figure 4 2 ) In many cases, geography would become the only factor deciding whether or not a family or individual could emigrate and, if they could, where they were allowed to emigrate. As noted by one American consulate staffer: It is one thing to say to a man in Ham burg that he can not go to America although his friend in Frankfurt can; it is quite another thing to say to a man in Berlin Wilmersdorf that he cannot go to America while his friend and neighbor one half or one fourth or one eighth of a mile away in Be rlin Schoeneberg can. And it is near tragedy to say, as has actually occurred in several instances, that one family on the south side of a street may qualify, while their friends and neighbors on the north side of the street, which happens to be the Briti sh sector, may not 9 Originally, in September 1945, the United States military had split its respective occupation zone which largely consisted of southern German states into three provisional Lnder (excluding Berlin): one encompassing nearly th e entire state of Bavaria according to its pre occupation administrative boundaries and the other two incorporating sections of Wrttemberg Baden, Hesse, and Bremen with little regard for 8 NARA Microfilm M1949, Roll #8. 9
50 10 But by March 1946, the U.S. St ate Department had established six consular districts meant to make resettlement within Germany and Directive (22 December 1945) which emphasized the importance of allowing Europe an displaced persons to apply for emigration to the United States. The new consulate offices were based in Berlin, Hamburg, Bremen, Frankfurt, Stuttgart, and Munich which, in theory, allowed for the expanded ability of the United States to cope with terri torially sensitive issues (i.e. resettlement and emigration). 11 The fluid nature of these provisional administrative boundaries, however, often resulted in confusion for the administrators and frustration for those individuals living within the artificia l lines. For example, one particularly problematic section of Germany occupation zone. The U.S. had requested control of Bremen because the city state acted as a convenien t port on the Weser River, which flowed into the North Sea, giving the American military a foothold in northern Germany. Prior to 10 January 1946, the American surrounding districts : Osterholtz, Wesermarsch, and Wesermnde. After January 10 th the administrative authority over these three districts was transferred to the British Military Government and, subsequently, became subject to British resettlement and immigration policies. Problematically, however, many individuals living in the 10 many Territorial Reorganization: Statement by the Head of the U.S. The Council of Foreign Ministers: Documents on Germany, Sessions I VI, 1945 1949 (Washington, D.C.: Division of Historical Policy Research, Department of State, March 1950), NARA RG 84, Stack 350 57/30/05 07, Box #3. 11
51 Osterholtz, Wesermarsch, and Wesermnde districts appealed to the U.S. consulate in territorial reorganization) for immi gration to the United States on the basis that they had been occupied by the American Military Government when the Truman Directive was issued in December 1945. After all, it was typical American military policy to accept the registrations and visas from 12 Apparently, the and requested from his supe riors information on the actual boundaries of American occupied Bremen. He was told to concern himself only with those persons living within which had in December 1945 b een under American occupation were no longer eligible to be considered for immigration to the United States, despite what the immigration policy might have been elsewhere in Germany. A map was, of course, sent to the Consul General, clearly delineating th serve as a bit of cartographic memory and make clear exactly what territories were no longer under American control ( Figure 4 3 ). 13 By the spring of 1947 the immediacy of establis hing administrative control over Germany had waned. Having etched into the German map their respective occupation zones, the four Allied powers sent foreign policy representatives (named, appropriately s in which they were charged with 12 Letter to John Stone from George Haering (15 June 1946), NARA RG 84, Stack 350 58/11/05, Box #2. 13 Letter to Travers from Haering (8 April 1946) and Letter from Altaffer to Haering (10 April 1946), NARA RG 84, Stack 350 58/11/05, Box #2.
52 14 Furthermore, they were commissioned to of May 1, 1947, indicating boundaries of be an easy accomplishment, especially when they were required to only solidify cartographic propositions of Germany that were met with approval from all four Allied powers. 15 On 15 March 1947, the Control Counci l met for the first time with position papers in hand. From the outset it was clear that problems were going to arise even before the mapping could begin. The delegation from the Soviet Union began their statement by railing against what they perceived to be the conceptual basis behind territorial re allocation by the British. According to the Soviets, the U.K. had made it clear during an Zone were determined in such a way that the Lands should not be very small and delegates found this type of attitude wholly unacceptable. In their eyes, the British were ne the future structure of the State of Germany in the direction territorialization even begin to take place if the British were already trying to rig the eventual political environment in a way 14 in The Council of Foreign Ministers: Documents on Germany, Sessions I VI, 1945 1949 (Washington, D.C.: Division of Historical Policy Research, Department of State, March 1950), NARA RG 84, Stack 350 57/30/05 07, Box #3. 15 The Council of Foreign Ministers: Documents on Germany, Sessions I VI, 1945 1949 (Washington, D.C.: Division of Historical Policy Research, Department of State, March 1950), pg. 299, NARA RG 84, Stack 350 57/30/05 07, Box #3.
53 favorab le to their own ideology? 16 Yet the French released a statement not one week later supporting the British position and emphasizing the necessity of a German map which would encourage de 17 Somewhat surprisingly, ho wever, the United States agreed with the Soviet delegation that Germany should eventually be free to determine its own political environment and that all amendments to the German map had to be met with unanimous consent. 18 Having not really at all resolved the various underlying sentiments of each Allied power regarding German re territorialization, the Control Council trudg ed on to more tangible problems One such concern was the Polish German border. It had already been established at the Potsdam Confere nce (July August 1945) that Poland would gain a considerable amount of eastern German territory. What still needed to be worked out how and where to draw the final line so as to avoid unnecessary and unjustified economic upset and to minimize inescap Allies projected that some sixty six million people would be residing in Germany by 1950 and were concerned about squeezing them all into a smaller nation state. Simultaneously, however, the Allies easily admitt ed that Poland needed to be 16 Germany, Statement by the Soviet The Council of Foreign Ministers: Documents on Germany, Sessions I VI, 1945 1949 (Washington, D.C.: Division of Historical Policy Research, Department of State, March 1950), pg. 106, NARA RG 84, Stack 350 57/30/05 07, Box #3. 17 The Council of Foreign Ministers: Documents on Ger many, Sessions I VI, 1945 1949 (Washington, D.C.: Division of Historical Policy Research, Department of State, March 1950), pg. 205, NARA RG 84, Stack 350 57/30/05 07, Box #3. 18 The Council of Foreign Minist ers: Documents on Germany, Sessions I VI, 1945 1949 (Washington, D.C.: Division of Historical Policy Research, Department of State, March 1950), pg. 239, NARA RG 84, Stack 350 57/30/05 07, Box #3.
54 compensated for what had happened to it during the Second World War and for its most eastern territory which had been permanently consumed by the Soviet government. Thus, the Council agreed to cede southern East Prussia and Ger man Upper Silesia to Poland, effectively granting Poland all German territory east of the Oder River. 19 The French delegation was willing to go along with such cartographic addenda so long as the other Powers supported the transfer of German territories wh ich would be advantageous to them. The Saar territory (or, as it would be known after this date and until 1957, the Saar Protectorate) was ceded to France in April 1947, its large deposits of coal downplayed by the French who claimed that such an act of r e 20 In fact, if the French delegation was to be believed, France only ever y 21 Somehow, though, France could not help but benefit by playing world savior along with the Americans, British, and Soviets. They managed to gain substantial economic advantages in the Ruhr region and alon g the Rhine River, pushing for their internationalization under the watchful eye of the French 19 legation, Polish 1947) in The Council of Foreign Ministers: Documents on Germany, Sessions I VI, 1945 1949 (Washington, D.C.: Division of Historical Policy Research, Department of State, March 1950), pp. 359 362, NARA RG 84, Stac k 350 57/30/05 07, Box #3. 20 April 1947) in The Council of Foreign Ministers: Documents on Germany, Sessions I VI, 1945 1949 (Washington, D.C.: Division of Histor ical Policy Research, Department of State, March 1950), pg. 365, NARA RG 84, Stack 350 57/30/05 07, Box #3. 21 The Council of For eign Ministers: Documents on Germany, Sessions I VI, 1945 1949 (Washington, D.C.: Division of Historical Policy Research, Department of State, March 1950), pp. 362 365, NARA RG 84, Stack 350 57/30/05 07, Box #3.
55 government. 22 Even when supporting the claims to territory by other Allied nation states such as Belgian settlement claims and the re drafting of Czechoslovaki an borders to their 1938 boundaries Franco aggressive G ermans. 23 Such an attitude on the part of the French would create territorial problems later after out the early 1950s. 24 accordance with their mandate. Talks lasted well into the fall of 1947, but few things changed (including each nation he Control Council officially concluded territorial talks, allocating any further re mapping problems 25 What followed, 22 Ibid. 23 tatement by the Head of the French Delegation in Regard to Frontier The Council of Foreign Ministers: Documents on Germany, Sessions I VI, 1945 1949 (Washington, D.C.: Division of Histo rical Policy Research, Department of State, March 1950), pp. 413 415, NARA RG 84, Stack 350 57/30/05 07, Box #3. 24 631 46/43/05, Box #1. 25 Ministers (Questions relating to Germany): Frontiers of Germany, Proposal of the The Council of Foreign Ministers: Documents on Germany, Sessions I VI, 1945 1949 (Washington, D.C.: Division of Historical Policy Resea rch, Department of State, March 1950), pg. 516, NARA RG 84, Stack 350 57/30/05 Ministers: Questions Relating to Germany: Preparation of the German Peace Treaty Frontiers, Statement Made by M. Georges Bidault, Chie The Council of Foreign Ministers: Documents on Germany, Sessions I VI, 1945 1949 (Washington, D.C.: Division of Historical Policy Research, Department of State, March 1950), pp. 511 515, NARA RG 84, Stack 350 57/30/05 07, Box #3.
56 obviously, would permanently divide Germany into two states. The Berlin B lockade of 1948 and the subsequent year Germany as its own nation state, separate from the West. 26 This is a familiar story, but how did the Americans, British, and French respond administratively to t his permanent division? How did they utilize their influence in West Germany and the polarization of East West European politics to their advantage? What happened after the division? While I will deal primarily with West Germany and only peripherally wi th its Eastern counterpart, I hope to eventually incorporate more about the GDR into a larger project on this topic in the future. Most historians recognize 1949 as the year West Germany became a sovereign nation state. If this true, then there must be d unfamiliar with because both East and West Germany were clearly still administratively had been prior to 1946. By 1951, West G ermany had clearly regained some semblance of sovereignty. On 9 July, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France all terminated their states of war with Germany 27 and by October 1951 they had seriously relaxed their commercial oversight of the count ry per an agreement signed between Allied Foreign Ministers in September 1950. 28 None of this, of course, meant that West Germany had been relieved of Allied military government control, but such quasi 26 Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944 1949 New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 27 46/43/05, Box #1. 28 631 46/43/05, Box #1.
57 independence lent itself to problematic circumstances particularly in regard to mapmaking. The ability for a modern nation state to map itself is an issue of sovereignty, self preservation, and administrative control. As has been explained above, unt il the 1950s Germany was not mapping itself but, rather, being cartographically controlled by its Allied occupiers. As Allied regulations relaxed and as quasi sovereignty was granted to the government of West Germany, it seems understandable that the gove rnment would wish to begin mapping itself, especially in a cultural and academic environment which had, before World War II, been on the cutting edge of geographic and cartographic research. Academically, German map making and map studying professors had begun to be re employed by their educational institutions in the summer of 1945 and, in fact, many quickly found postwar employment in private companies and bureaucratic t attempting to hold academic conferences. 29 By the 1950s, aerial photography had become an indispensible aspect of producing large scale topographic maps. Since the end of the wa r, German cartographers had been compiling and using aerial photographs in close cooperation with the Allied Civil Aviation Board. By 1953 the al photographs which were to be followed by both the 29 Thomas R. Smith and Lloyd D. Black Geographical Review Vol. 36, No. 6 (July 1946), 405 & 407. This was an explicit organizing effort. Walter Behrmann and Hermann Lautensach were in charge of the Soviet Zone, Carl Troll was in charge o f the British Zone, Emil Meynen was in charge of Northern Bavaria, Wilhelm Credner was in charge of Southern Bavaria, Gerhart Bartsch was in charge of Hesse, and Heinrich Schmitthenner was in charge of Baden Wrttemberg.
58 Allied Powers and the German government. After the Allied Civil Aviation Board was dissolved in May 1955, the German government was still more than happy to work alongside the Allied powers in producing aerial photos, so long as everyone followed the clear procedures as laid out by the Ministry of Transport. 30 This worked out incredibly well, without any complaints from either side until the British and Americans began to get nervous about Cold War tensi ons and the possibility of aerial photographs falling into the hands of a hostile world power. On 30 November 1955, the Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers in Europe explaining how important it was for aerial photographs to be given a certain level of protection. 31 The American and British forces promised that they were not interested in aerial photographs, but they did feel as though they needed to begin supervising the production and dissemination of aerial photographs taken around certain areas of Germany in which the Western Allies had a particular interest. Any such activities the 32 The Germans, however, did not approve. Nor did the Germans become more receptive when, in December 1955, a British delegate demanded that the German laws surr ounding aerial photography become 30 de by the German Delegate at the Meeting of the Steering 07, Box #7. 31 07, Box #1. 32 German Forces Arrangements 07, Box #14.
59 of prints or negatives in any way quire Allied approval of any sensitive 33 In effect, the British delegate was demanding that the German aerial photographers be constantly subject to Allied sec urity clearance and supervision. In response, the Germans argued that to re draft their aerial photography laws would be a violation of their sovereignty. Moreover, they claimed, laws concerning the protection of aerial photography already existed under be evaluated. 34 The Allies found the Aviation Law acceptable, for the most part, and understood the German desire to control their own maps. H owever, a compromise was reached on 11 April 1956, after months of negotiations, requiring the mutual exchange States to make its own map surveys of West Germany under Germ an supervision, if the Germans so desired (unless, of course, the Allies wanted to make these maps in secret then they were allowed to do so according to the new agreement). 35 Eventually this agreement was amended, renamed, and ratified in July 1957 as t German 33 G 84, Stack 350 57/30/05 07, Box #1. 34 57/30/05 07, Box #1. 35 07, Box #14.
60 36 which required little more aerial photography licenses which the German authorities intend to ap Allied Forces for review. The Allies could, at any time and for any reason, veto a license. 37 Germany which allowed for fly over aerial photographs to be taken by both the Soviet Union and the U.S./U.K. as an act of mutual confidence in one another. 38 These German sovereignty and eventually resulted in the reunification of East and West Germany. If a nation state must have control over its own mapping projects (including the mapping of its own territory) in order to truly be a sovereign state, then it could be argued that West Germany was never truly sovereign. The division of Germany into East and West was a striking consequence of the territorial re historical geographic context. For most of its history, the German balance of power oscillated between North (Prussia) and South (Bavaria and Austria) and was largely a self conscious juxtaposition based on cultural differences and ethnocentrism. The East/West divide cartographically cont ributed to the Cold War between Eastern and 36 Tel 57/30/05 07, Box #1. 37 84, Stack 350 57/30/05 07, Box #1. 38 Letter to David K. Bruce from Ray L. Thurston (12 March 1958), NARA RG 84, Stack 350 56/35/04, Box #1.
61 Western Europe. Ironically, the United States was initially concerned about restoring Germany to its pre WWII boundaries because of its central position in Europe a prime 39 In reality, as the Soviet Union political and cartographic juxtaposition off of each other so as to benefit themselves. The Three Power Alli ance in West Germany (the U.S., the U.K., and France) had a difficult time creating a consistent narrative into which they could fit a divided Germany. In 1950, the Three propaganda weapons of the DDR Government and of the Soviets in Germany at present are, the progress of the Two and Five Year Economic Plans and the call for 40 Moreover, the Allies wished to emphasize the importance (referred to, a much more imperative relationship to forge than any semblance of solidarity with its other half. 41 Yet, not two years later the Allies were pushing hard for German re unification and spinning the East/West split as some kind of geographic Soviet scheme to infiltrate the West. 42 This type of cartographic schizophrenia not only laid the terrain for the Cold War, but fueled an understanding of insurmountable hemispheric conflict and cultural difference. In this sens e, maps and geographic orientation were used to 39 ack 490 8/35/03 07, Box #1. 40 NARA RG 84, Stack 350 57/31/02, Box #4. 41 46/43/05, Box #1. 42 46/43/05, Box #1.
62 narrative itself) to fit into that same story. The maps of government agencies were only one medium of cartographic na rrative building and while it would take the cooperation of the government with private enterprise to shape (and distribute) an entirely different projection of the world, the most obvious medium through which to disseminate such maps were public libraries
63 CHAPTER 5 HOW TO DISSEMINATE YOUR MAP Shortly after engaging in the Second World War and realizing the inadequacy of its cartographic holdings, the American military recognized the importance of centralizing its maps and making sure that they would be easily accessible, well maintained, and accurately catalogued. While public relations firms and other corporate entities offered a convenient medium through which to distribute copies of its maps, the U.S. military wanted a more systematized and orderly dissemination of its cartographic information. In fact, any dissemination of this kind, if it was going to accomplish what the military wanted, would need to be the most well organized and executed allocation of mapped material in the history of the world While the institutionalization of cartography may have occurred alongside the invention of the modern nation state, the necessity of institutionalizing the continuous dissemination of maps was only recognized val. As is so often the case in historical studies which attempt to poke and prod at massive government undertakings, this essay cannot hope to comprehensively deal with this project. Certainly, though, by contextualizing even one thread one case stud y of its execution, the largest and most well thought through movement of mapped material in the world becomes not simply more easily understood, but also more interesting, more provocative, and more likely to inspire further academic conversation and re search. Having only established a building to house its collective holdings in 1925 and suffering from the economic problems of the Great Depression, the system was small,
64 und over 4,000,000 books, in 1925 that figure was sitting stagnant at 40,000. 1 The past and present appear to be even more at odds when comparing the map holdings of the u niversity in the early twentieth century with the contemporary Map & Imagery Library a center which, with over 500,000 catalogued maps, is the largest cartographic library in the southeastern United States and the second largest university map library in the country. 2 our map collection. We, unfortunately, have no maps, or so few that it is best to say we 3 The name of this potential donor was John C. Cooper, Jr. a fellow of the American Geographical Society and Vice President of the New York City based Pan American Airways, Inc. (or Pan Am, as it was known until its 1991 collapse). 4 Cooper had a deep appreciation and interest in cartography and owned a home in Florida where he kept various maps, most of which represented the state. Some of these were incredibly rare and valuable at the time, including a sixteenth Theatrum Orbis Terrarum depicting Florida and an 1806 map of Florida dra wn by John Carey. 5 In total, Cooper loaned at least thirty six maps to the University of Florida from early 1934 through the spring of 1935, 6 allowing the library staff to hold several exhibits 1 George A. Smathers web site: http://www.uflib.ufl.edu/msl/LibraryHistory.html 2 Christopher J.J. Thiry, ed. Guide to U.S. Map Resources, Third Edition (Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2006), 74 75 and 309. 3 Letter to Mr. John C. Cooper, Jr. from Cora Miltimore (14 March 1934), UFUA Series 08a, Box #3. 4 Letter to Miss Cora Miltimore from Mr. John C. Cooper, Jr. (5 October 1934), UFUA Series 08a, Box #3. 5 193 4), UFUA Series 08a, Box #3. 6 Letter to Mr. John C. Cooper, Jr. from Cora Miltimore (21 September 1934), UFUA Series 08a, Box #3.
65 of Florida maps and slowly building an institutional apprecia tion for cartography in general. 7 It would take about ten more years, however, before the University of Florida would again commit to the collection of cartographic information. As one of the more prominent universities in the state of Florida, the Unive rsity of Florida had become a Regional Depository Library for the United States government in 1907. Established by the 1895 Printing Act, the depository program of the Government Printing Office was responsible for efficiently distributing government docu ments to 8 For a university interested in expanding its library collections, such a program offered a great deal of opportunity. As vernment documents in particular are reliable, up to date and inexpensive sources of information 9 The year this statement was written, the University of Florida library system received over 500 documents a month through this program. 10 Moreover, the library had agreed to keep a collection of the Library of risk of misplacing or losing material). By early 1943 the University of Fl orida, which had agreed to catalogue 50,000 cards a year, was attempting to file nearly 12,500 a month 7 Letter to Miss Cora Miltimore from Mr. John C. Cooper, Jr. (6 June 1934) and Letter to Mr. J.C. Cooper, Jr. from Cora Milti also influenced into an appreciation of cartography by her father. She would go on to become a fairly well known poet (who had an obituary in the New York Times on 9 Novemb er 2007) and wrote a collection named Maps And Windows (New York: MacMillan, 1974). 8 http://libraries.ou.edu/locations/docs/govdocs/federal.ppt (Accessed 29 January 2011) 9 Memorandum to the Members of the Library Committee from H.W. Chandler (28 May 1942) with an attached report written by Walter J. Matherly, pg. 1 of report. University of Florida University Archive (Gainesville, Florida) Series 124, Box #1. 10 Memora ndum to the Members of the Library Committee from H.W. Chandler (28 May 1942) with an attached report written by Walter J. Matherly, pg. 1 of report. UFUA Series 124, Box #1.
66 an impossible feat for their small staff (which consisted of one part time and three full time cataloguers). 11 Such circumstances brought about the add ition of a full time government Depository Cards and documents. 12 The hiring was not done a moment too soon, as the amount of documents flowing from the federal governm ent to the University of Florida was increasing at an incredible level as each year of the Second World War passed. From September 1943 through June 1944, the Library received 5607 documents through the depository program. 13 The next year that number in creased to 7477. 14 Very little of the information being processed through the depository program, however, had anything to do with maps or mapped material. However, soon after the end of the war the Army Map Service, under the leadership of Colonel A.G. M atthews, 15 emulated the organizational structure and dissemination model of the United States Federal Depository Program in order to re allocate the maps that they had reproduced, captured, and sometimes even hand drawn during the war. By doing so they hoped to pro tect the cartographic information of the United States and to project a particular mapped narrative of the world so intensely that its acceptance would seem common 11 Series 17, Box #1. 12 June 1944), UFUA Series 17, Box #1. 13 Ibid., pg. 4. 14 June 1945), UFUA Series 17, Box #1. 15 Marvin W. Sears. Effectiveness of the Army Map Service Map Depository Program and Methods for Promoting Map Use Dissertation for the Catholic University of America (July 1960), 4.
67 place and unquestionable. After all, military mapping agencies had been established to, in part, help re map a postwar Europe. 16 Rather than keep their maps locked up and protected from the scrutiny of its populace, the goal of the American Army Map Service was to inundate the public with its maps in order to make its spatial orientations so ac cessible that there would be no question concerning their authority and accuracy. declared war on Germany, keeping maps on hand made sense. 17 Moreover, the naturalizat ion of migrs 18 and the postwar division of Germany made the production and distribution of government maps imperative. It must have been exciting, then, for Nelle Barmore, Acting Librarian at the University of Florida since early 1945, to receive a lette r from the Army Map Service in September of that same year requesting that her library act as a depository for the thousands of maps and charts produced and captured by the AMS during the Second World War. Certainly, the excitement of participating in bui lding a stronger cartographic attractive (particularly, of course, when such an offer includ ed the delivery and 16 Letter to Dr. William L. Langer from Arthur H. Robinson (8 August 1944), NARA RG 226, Stack 190 03/02/7, Box #9. 17 Geographical Review Vol. 39, No. 2 (April 1949), 298. 18 Bulletin: Special Library Association, Geography and Map Division No. 182 (Spring 1996), 13 14.
68 19 She would almost immediately respond to them and agree to the following terms, as outlined by the AMS: To index or catalog and place in an active file all items which we ship to your instit ution. To hold the material for necessary reference purposes making it available through your normal circulation channel and loan facilities. To not copy or distribute material received from the Army Map Service without prior approval of the AMS. Likewise to handle the material in accordance with any protective security regulations imposed by the Army Map Service. acquisitions of maps and geographical data by means of complete acce ssions lists. To make available to the Army Map Service duplicate copies (beyond your needs) of maps and geographical data which your institution may receive from sources other than the U.S. Government. 20 While their conditions seemed to suggest that the A MS was more interested in University of Florida was available for public consumption and, often, for loan. In 1942 Barmore had moved from her position as the Librarian of the Rockefeller Foundation in New York to become the Head Cataloguer at the University of Florida. 21 Yet, after nearly three years at the University of Florida Library as Hea d Cataloguer (and, as one of her co 19 ida University Archive (Gainesville, Florida) Series 08a, Box #6. 20 Ibid. 21 Bulletin of the Medical Library Association Vol. 45, No. 3 (July 1957), 456.
69 22 University Library, she had not been allowed to apply for the permanent Direc torship. The President of the university at the time, John Tigert, had made it clear to Barmore simply acting in that capacity until a man for the position could be found. She took great personal offense to this and eventually cited such sentiment as the reason she would leave her post in 1946. 23 It should be noted, however, that Barmore laid much of the Library by On 1 November 1945 Barmore received a letter from the AMS stating that the th of that month. According to the letter, this distrib ution would take three years and would involve around 50,000 maps (to the University of Florida library alone). Obviously, the sheer number of maps needing cataloging and storage was monumental. Barmore and her staff urgently searched for inexpensive fil ing cabinets and drawer units to hold the coming acquisitions. 24 Unfortunately, the University of Florida library staff was not the only one collection. In fact, about f orty five other major universities had joined the AMS 22 27, 1979), 8. SPOHP Digital Collections: http://www.uflib.ufl.edu/ufdc/?b=UF00006019&v=00001 23 http://www.uflib.ufl.edu/ufdc/?b=UF00006019&v=00001 ith Ms. Frances 21. SPOHP Digital Collections: http://www.uflib.ufl.edu/ufdc/?b=UF00005936&v=00001 24 Letter to Librarian, University of Florida from W.D. Wilne (1 November 1945), UFUA Series 08a, Box #6.
70 Depository Program 25 and many had complained about the unforeseen expenses they were expected to cope with in order to participate. In January 1946 the American Library Association created an Army Map S ervice committee to deal with questions and complaints Depository Program library staffs might have. The most pressing, of course, was how to inexpensively acquire shelves and cabinets for all of the maps they were receiving. By June 1946 the Committee s ent out its report on the matter: To libraries receiving Army Map Service maps: The Committee on the Army Map Service project has corresponded with leading manufacturers of map filing equipment and has the following report to make: 1) No manufacturer of m ap files is willing to negotiate on a cooperative purchasing arrangement. 2) No manufacturer is willing to enter into a 5 year contract guaranteeing delivery and price. 3) No manufacturer is willing to design special equipment for this project This leaves no choice except to recommend that equipment be bought on the open market through regular channels of trade. 26 For the University of Florida Library, funding was starting to run out and this kind of news seemed devastating especially as more and m ore government institutions and programs began sending their cartographic information to member libraries of the AMS Depository Program. From 1946 1951, the University of Florida added more material (including maps) to its library than nearly any other pu blic university in the United States. 27 While an inter library loan system was set up for the most interesting maps (particularly, those captured by Allied forces during the War), the vast majority of the 25 Federal Government Map Collecting: A Brief History ed. Richard W. Stephenson (Washington, D.C.: Special Libraries Association, 1969), 4. 26 Letter to Libraries Receiving Army Map Service Maps from Homer Hal vorson (5 June 1946), UFUA Series 08a, Box #6. 27 California, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Iowa State, Louisiana State, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio State, Purdue, Texas, Washington (Seattle), and Wisconsin.
71 maps being disseminated by the AMS and other govern ment agencies were largely uninteresting to most students and members of the public, but were still required to be kept in storage and accessible 28 unless expressed permission from the AMS was received to destroy them. 29 Besides the Army Map Service, perhaps the most active contributor of Office which had been sending the university its regular bibliographic shipments of books and card catalogs as a U.S. Document D epository. In June 1946, shortly before leaving the University of Florida to become the Librarian of the Communicable Disease Center in Atlanta, 30 Barmore received a letter from Luther H. Evans (the tenth Librarian or wartime American soldiers killed because 31 confirming that the University of Florida three years for storage. While these should never be used for planning or be so filed and serviced as 32 28 Letter to Gentlemen from Charles F. Steele (23 January 1946), University of Florida University Archive (Gainesville, Florida) Series 08a, Box #6. 29 Bulletin: Geography and Map Division No. 86 (December 1971), 7. 30 Cramer, 456. 31 Luther H. Evans. The Reminiscences of Luther Evans (New York: Oral History Research Office, Columbia University, 1972), 190. 32 Letter to Librarian, University of Florida from Luther H. Evans (7 June 1946), UFUA Series 08a, Box #6.
72 The Library of Congress also established a Foreign Acquisitions program, through which it fed the university the various maps, atlases, and charts it had somehow acquired from fo reign sources. Prior to 1946, the Library of Congress had failed to send anything foreign to the University of Florida through its U.S. Depository Program. 33 Congress Co alone over 2800 foreign documents were allocated to the University, 34 many of which material. 35 The result of this relationship between the university and the Library of Congress was, however, underwhelming. By July 1947, the Library Committee received word that the Foreign Acquisitions Project was running out of money and needed some fu nding from the universities utilizing it in order to continue functioning. After surveying the acquisitions received by the University of Florida, the have been selected i Committee voted against sending any funds to the Library of Congress and only tentatively continued its relationship with the Foreign Acquisitions Project, which ended entirely within the next few years. 36 33 UA Series 08a, Box #3. 34 Box #3. 35 Acquisition of Recent Fo 36
73 The AMS Map Depository Program, however, continued to play a primary role in the acquisition of foreign and domestic cartographic material, despite the many name changes and organizational re structuring that occurred within the cartographic bu reaucracies of the United States. In 1969 the Army Map Service was reorganized into the U.S. Army Topographic Command, an action on which Depository libraries were kept up to date. 37 In only three years the government agency operating the Depository progr am was again re structured into the Defense Mapping Agency and was operating a network of 195 map depositories. 38 By this time the University of Florida Library had accrued an estimated 250,000 maps through the depository programs it had taken part in 39 and had been singled out by Map Depository program administrators as a model of participatory excellence. 40 However, only about 125,000 of their maps had been catalogued when the University of Florida officially established its Map Library in 1973 and hired D 41 Armstrong immediately implemented national cataloguing standards for maps and successfully she wa s asked to contribute an article describing her methods and experience to one of 37 Series 08d, B ox #17. 38 Nicoletti, 3. 39 Archive (Gainesville, Florida) Series 08d, Box #17. 40 Nicoletti, 5. 41 A Survey of the Holdings of the University of Florida Lib raries (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida, 1974), 21.
74 42 Today the University of Florida remains a depository for maps from various federal and state government agencies and, as mentioned earlier, has compiled over 500,000 sheet maps. While this section has primarily dealt with the impact of the Map Depository program on the University of Florida, the program has made (and continues to make) positive contributions to both public and academic libraries across the country. In fact, it has persisted to ser ve as the core source of map acquisition for many institutions to this day. 43 Many large university map libraries have hugely disproportionate map collections in terms of chronology, a likely result of depending upon government depository programs such as that of the Army Map Service. Those institutions with collections consisting largely of maps published after 1940 include: the University of Georgia (94%), 44 the University of California Santa Barbara (95%), 45 the University of Wisconsin Madison (70%), 46 the University of Washington Seattle (89%), 47 the Ohio State University (90%), 48 the University of North Carolina Chapel Hill (93%), 49 the 42 Bulletin: Special Library Association, Geography and Map Division No. 177 (September 1994), pp. 2 34. 43 John Abresch, Ardis Hanson, Susan Heron, and Pete Reehling. Integrating Geographic Information Systems into Library Services: A Guide for Academic Librarians (New York: Information Science Publishing, 2008), 209. 44 Thiry, 78 79. 45 Ibid ., 50 51. 46 Ibid., 285 286. 47 Ibid., 280 281. 48 Ibid., 204 205. 49 Ibid., 189 190
75 University of Michigan (86%), 50 Louisiana State University (80%), 51 and the University of California Los Angeles ( 75%), 52 among others. These are some of the largest and most accessible map libraries in the United States. I do not think it is any coincidence that they are each also depository libraries for the National Geo Spatial Intelligence Agency, the agency whic h continues the program the AMS began after the Second World War. The incredible access to cartographic information the public currently enjoys is largely predicated on the continuation of this map depository program. Prior to the Second World War, the University of Florida Library had a collection 53 By participating in the U.S. Depository Program, the Foreign Acquisitions Program, and especially the AMS Map Deposit ory Program the University of Florida (spurred by the industrious Nelle Barmore) was able to exponentially increase the size of its preclude a recurrence of the situation which obtained at maps 54 movement of mapped materials. Thes e maps are still used today as base maps for various scientific projects, as the arbiters of territorial memory, and as reference maps 50 Ibid., 143 144. 51 Ibid., 123 124. 52 Ibid., 37. 53 Series 124, Box #1. 54 Letter to Librarian, University of Florida from W.D. Phillips (16 October 1946), UFUA Series 08a, Box #6.
76 during natural disasters. 55 It is, of course, no accident that such a symbiotic relationship continues to exist. While t he danger of entering into military combat without accurate and relevant maps has become all but extinct, economic globalization has brought with it the absolute imperative of cartographically asserting the spatial control of the nation state as clearly an d as loudly as possible. Mapped spatial existence, after all, is only useful if it is recognized as authoritative. By creating and sustaining vast collections of cartographic propositions, the United States government has stored up for itself a historica l reference of space and multiple evidential claims to global spaces. It has, in fact, managed to perpetuate the same massive tautological claim of legitimacy every other nation mapp grow more hotly disputed and economically significant, the emphasis on maps and the World War, however, which instigated this emphasis and made the constant survival. While scholars have been quick to recognize this shift and the importance of mapped space, most have failed to study the maps themselves and few (if any) have turned to postwar maps for clarity on this subject. Only by turning to the maps can we 55 Much of the geospatial data used by relief agencies after Hurricane Katrina and the 2010 earthquake in Haiti was based on earlier aerial and satellite imager y. For an example of how earlier spatial data was Environmen tal Geochemistry and Health Vol. 32, No. 5 (September 2010), pp. 379 389. For an example regarding Haiti, see B. Theilen Shaking and Secondary Effects in Southwest Haiti Using Remote Se nsing and GIS Natural Hazards and Earth System Science Vol. 10, No. 6 (June 2010), pp. 1183 1196.
77 see how they propose space in ways that words cannot, and project a carefully crafted image of the world onto a culture of mass consumption.
78 CHAPTER 6 HOW TO SELL YOUR MAP Maps sell in two ways. Maps are, obviously enough, textual commodities that can be produced, re produced, purchased, and sold. More than this, though, they are themselves propositional narratives. 1 In effect, then, they are commodities which can be bought or discarded selling a story which can be bought or discarded. This understanding of cartography has led to a great deal of scholarship on touristic mapping and how spac ( Figure 6 1 ) 2 Most of this entrenched in the creation and diffusion of such maps (although it u sually does harbor fairly staunch critiques of the shades of capitalism which allow such (re)productions). century. Perhaps its most famous adherent was a nephew of Sigmund Freud named Edward Bernays (1891 1995). His 1928 book Propaganda attempted to combine undertaken by those individuals (or governments or corporations) who might seek to 3 During the Second World War, Bernays created a handbook for potential acolytes entitled Speak Up for Democracy! 1 Rethinking Maps: New Frontiers in Cartographic Theory ed. Martin Dodge, Rob Kitchin, and Chris Perkins (New York: Routledge, 2009), 198 199. 2 Mapping Tourism ed. Stephen P. Hanna and Vincent J. Del Casino, Jr. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2003. Also see Jonathan Framing the Sign: Criticism and Its Institutions (Norman, OK: Unive rsity of Oklahoma Press, 1988). 3 Edward Bernays. Propaganda (New York: Ig Publishing, 2004), 44 45.
79 abilities to incorpo rate a kind of public relations strategy which would sell American democracy to those who might seek to sabotage it or those ignorant of its greatness. 4 He concludes his text with an urgent plea: in its current sense. Today we know leadership is largely the result of effective planning, techniques, and methods Democracy depends upon you It is up to you. You will help decide whether Democracy is to live or die. You are the most important figure. You occupy the highest office in the land American citizen. You determine our destiny. Now is the time to act. Speak up for Democracy! 5 In 1952 Bernays produced his book Public Relations which sought to establish the origins o f PR campaigns, the development of public relations throughout the nineteenth individuals for the sake of making a sale. 6 Such publications inspired the creation of man y public relations firms in the United States. Several of them, in fact, could not help but see the postwar era as one of immense opportunity, especially when newly formed West Germany (FRG) decided that f German culture. Public opinion 7 that public opinion played an uncommonly large role in the form ulation of American 4 Edward Bernays. Speak Up for Democracy!: What You Can Do a Practical Plan of Action for Every American Citizen PR!: A Social History of Spin (New York: Basic Books, 1996), 10. 5 Ibid., 80. 6 Edward Bernays. Public Relations (Norman, OK: Oklahoma University Press, 1952), 217. 7 Ibid., 293.
80 foreign policy, and thus reasoned that the manipulation of representations of Germans in the United States should constitute a major element of their broader plan to win 8 Who better to undertake this task than an American PR firm 9 It had been, after all, American PR firms which had first so successfully represented the interests of Germans in the 1930s, attempting to mitigate Associates which had worked on behalf of tourism in the Third Reich and Ivy Lee & T.J. Ross and Associates which had represented I.G. Farben. 10 American businesses and map publishers also already had plenty of experience working with their own government during the Second World War. The Office of Strategic Services had purchased some of the maps it had used for intelligence operations from corporations such as the I nternational Map Company, Inc. 11 and Rand McNally & Co. 12 Of course, such interactions were always done in secret, prompting the repetition of one addendum sentence at the end of each series of correspondence: 8 German Wave, Public Diplomacy and Intercultural Relations in Cold War Decentering America ed. Jessica C.E. Gienow Hecht (Providence, RI: Berghahn Books, 2008), 79. 9 Ibid. 10 Scott M. Cutlip. The Unseen Power: Public Relations. A History (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Assoc iates, 1994), 73 74. 11 Letter to W.L. Rehm from the International Map Company, Inc. (25 August 1942), NARA RG 226, Stack 190 5/30/7, Box #229. 12 Letter to Mr. William M. Drummond from Rand McNally & Co. (12 April 1943), NARA RG 226, Stack 190 5/30/7, Box # 229.
81 13 The American military had begun to use the burgeoning discipline of public relations during World War II as well. District engineers (who, prior to the 1942 organization of the Army Map Service, con trolled the bulk of U.S. Maps) had been among the first members of the military to be assigned a PR officer in May 1941 and were already told prior to the bombing of Pearl Harbor to avoid giving any information to foreign audiences without first consulting Division. 14 By 21 September 1942, the Public Relations Division had been reorganized into the seemingly more efficient and, at the very least, much more authoritatively 15 By 1944, this office was organizing several promotional events concerning cartography and geography, one of which the Map Reproduction Train was a well mounted units [with] both lithographic and photographic field th of August 1944. 16 into the postwar period. Many of the U.S. Eur 13 Letter to Mr. Charles V. Crittenden from D.W.G. (14 December 1943), NARA RG 226, Stack 190 5/30/7, Box #229. 14 (21 November 1941), NARA RG 77, Stac k 390 1/07/02 03, Box #1. 15 Stack 390 1/07/02 03, Box #1. 16 NARA RG 77, Stack 390 1/07/02 03, Box #2.
82 Figure 6 2 Figure 6 3 and Figure 6 4 ) in order to more effe ctively disseminate material which 17 Note, however, that the United States is absent from much of this literature, particularly as a geographic presence. In Figure 6 2 Furthermore, Figure 6 2 is a publication of the United States and discusses the building European nation states but avoids cartogra phically representing America in favor of emphasizing the importance of a self reestablishing Europe (even when such an emphasis is funded by a non European power). Figure 6 4 also attempts to portray a cartographically reconst ructed Europe an American imposition on its continental map. Figure 6 3 is, however, a different example of the use of maps in re spati alizing postwar Europe. Rather than completely leave out the United States, this map portrays (with arrows and ships) the movement of economic assistance from Washington D.C. to Europe. America has drawn itself not as an occupational force, but as a sour ce of economic recovery! None of these maps have any strictly scientific value, but each one counts on the reader to recognize the authority and objectivity of maps so as to establish the spatial reality of various nation states and the movement of econom ic resources to/from those nation states. While the West German government was looking to hire American public relations firms, the United States was more than happy to encourage West German corporations like Inter Nationes (which merged with the Goethe Institut in 2001) to distribute its 17 07, Box #1.
83 information in the U.S. Inter Nationes, which had mastered the art of depicting a carefully constructed West Germany to non German audiences since 1952, was not offici al image of Germany or even the image of Germany per se The reason for this is quite simple: such an image of 18 In the absence of an official picture, the opportunity was left open for the West German government t o cartographically propose a self consciously drawn nation state purposefully produced for mass consumption. freshly quasi autonomous government was more than happy to enterta for West Germany. John Maynahan & Associates, for example, sent the government a fifteen representative, [they could] obtain the greatest effectiveness within the s hortest possible 19 The Hamilton Wright Organization, Inc., which during the war had been forced to stop its activities in continental Europe, 20 German recovery and new 18 Images of Germany: Perc eptions and Conceptions ed. Peter M. Daly, Hans Walter Frischkopf, Trudis E. Goldsmith Reber, and Horst Richter (New York: Peter Lang, 2000), 11. 19 (25 February 1953), Appendix A, Pg. 5. BA B145/777, Bd. I. All of the source information from the Bundesarchive (BA) at Koblenz was generously made available to me by Dr. Sheryl Kroen, a history professor at the University of Florida working on her forthcoming book The Recovery This project would not have been possible without her guidance and assistance. 20 Cutlip, 83.
84 months at the price of $50,000. 21 Stephen Goerl Associates sent in their plan with an attached a rticle from Advertising Age which was written for their client, the German Travel Association. 22 In fact, all of these plans/applications focus on getting prominent Americans to travel to Germany and write favorably about their experiences. The New York T imes Fortune Seventeen and Cosmopolitan are just a few of the publications which regularly show up in their exchanges as being integral to American culture and, therefore, important to influence. Yet by the time most of these applications reached the F RG, the government was already working with the Roy Bernard Company, Inc. This American firm had signed a three month, interim contract (which would later be continuously extended) with the German government beginning on 1 January 1952 for which they woul d be paid $12,500 in advance, with another $12,125 to be given to them for up front printing costs. 23 This contract specified that The Roy Bernard Co., Inc. shall represent the Federal Republic of Germany as public relations counsel in all matters falling within the general area of public relations that shall be considered by The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany conducive to the promotion of harmony, understanding, industrial and cultural intercourse and tourism between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States. 24 21 December 1952), 2 3 [B145/777, Bd. I]. 22 Letter to Willi Ritter, Chief of Press Department Federal Republic of Germany from Stephen Goerl (10 September 1952), 1 2. BA B145/777, Bd. I. 23 1952), 3. BA B145/3226, Bd. I. 24 Ibid., 1. Emphasis added.
85 25 As one can imagine, this included maps. In a 1955 letter to the Press Office for the Emba ssy of the Federal Republic, a Roy Bernard Co. representative lamented the sorry state of German maps in the United newspapers [carried] maps that were copyrighted recommended producing. From its conception, they had envisioned designed to do a very big public relations job, namely, to show the present size of the Federal Republic of Germany and how it has been divided and where the important 26 In other words, to namely create a map which would pr ovoke American sympathy and business. It would cost the Federal Republic $300 to make the printing plates, but the payoff would be worth it. By May of 1956, the Roy Bernard Co. made sure that over 10,000 American schools and libraries received the map ( Figure 6 5 and Figure 6 6 ). The first edition had already been sold out by June. It was one of the only maps produced since the ry. 27 Moreover, the 25 Ibid. 26 Letter to Baron Axel von dem Bussche, Press Office for the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany from Bernard Gittelson (18 July 1955), 1. BA B145/1277, Bd. I. 27 Guntram Henrik Herb. Under the Map of Germany: Nationalism and Propaganda 1918 1945 (New York: Routledge, 1997), 184 185. Only in the 1980s would such maps again become regularly published in the FRG.
86 Germany a map that made its cartographic situation a bit more urgent to the typical Es ist ein Unt erschied, ob man von der Teilung Deutschlands gelegentlich hrt, oder ob man sie sieht 28 Yet the paper also criticized the map for not somehow representing the expulsion of the Germans from the eastern territories and the Sudetenland. This, argued the j ournalist, left the map incomplete ( unvollstndig ). 29 only their existence, but their autonomy and importance although none are as large and bold as the Federal German crest. The most glaring symbols within the version of the map included in the newspaper article are the lines of division in Germany. This, of course, is what the FRG wanted to emphasize at the time, and it is what they paid the Roy Bernard Co. to produce. As 30 Such transparency was, of course, omitted from the map itself and the news article covering its incorporation into American educational institutions. The Roy Bernard Co. had undertaken smaller mapping projects prior to 1955. In a letter written in Aug 28 BA B145/1277, Bd. I. My 29 Ibid., 2. 30 Letter to Bussche from Gittelson, 1. BA B145/1277, Bd. I.
87 Office) to alleviate his fears that Roy Bernard was not doing enough to publicize a friendly Germany in the U.S. As to appear in the pages of newspapers and magazines was put into the works months Esquire Scholastic Cosmopolitan Fortune etc.) which would soon be printing editorials, pictures of the Bavarian Alps, and off to the printer. On the back cover of the booklet was a map of Germany which Campbell wanted to use as a baro meter of cartographic public opinion. Apparently, 31 Undoubtedly the information and subsequent reception would have been used in the four year project that eventually ended up in schools and libraries across the United States. In a cordial effort to assuage any lingering doubts, Ca I have continued confidence in your understanding of this rather delicate business of 32 The Roy Bernard Co. worked with the Federal Republic, filing quarterly reports, due to a growing wave of anti adaptation into a play (1955) and a movie (1959) as well as the Eichmann trial (1961) 31 Letter to Mr. Georg von Lilienf eld from Mr. Charles E. Campbell (20 August 1952), 1 3. BA B145/775, Bd. I. 32 Ibid., 3.
88 33 There had also been some investigative reporting done in 1960 by the American magazine The Reporter which had discussed the Roy Bernard Co. within a less than favorable evaluati on of how foreign governments used private American enterprises to influence public opinion. 34 The FRG dumped Roy Bernard and West Germany was back to mapping itself (under the watchful eye of the American occupation forces). Having to cope with cartogra phic decision making, however, proved to be more Figure 6 7 ). 35 This led to a serious lack in territorial uniformity just as East Germany (GDR) represent Figure 6 8 ). Such poor policy regarding its maps has led one 36 33 Etheridge, 81 and 85. 34 The Reporter (22 December 1960), 17. BA B145/9764, Bd. III. 35 Germany, 1949 Annals of the Association of American Geographers Vol. 94, No. 1 (2004), 149 150. 36 Ibid., 158.
89 CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION broad front. The defenders lacked everything. Losses increased and the enemy was pitiless Things came to an end All states were occupied. The military an d political leaders had fully surrendered. The victors met in Washington, D.C. and conferred about the future of a nation that lay crushed and powerless at their feet. 1 So began a 1952 fictionalized historical account of how the United States lost an alte one of which had been ceded back to Mexico while the other four existed under the occupation forces of the Soviet Union, South America, South Africa, and Canada. The narrati ve continued in great detail, explaining to the reader how various zones were 2 and how American place names were effected (perhaps most alarmin 3 Self unimagina ble humiliation, alienation, and suffering experienced under the very real circumstances a new postwar West German government was attempting to assuage. 4 This account could not depend upon the written word alone. In order to more adequately project the cartographically 1 B145 1277, Bd. I. 2 Ibid., pg. 2. 3 Ibid., pg. 3. 4 Ibid., pg. 6.
90 included. The author provided two such maps to complement this unhappy fiction. The first ( Figure 7 1 ) provided the reader with a clear picture of what a fragmented America might look like. While the boundaries and labels of the old states were clear, so too were the lines which divided them into occupied sectors. In the second map ( Figure 7 2 ), the states as an American audience might know them had been erased, leaving only the labels and boundaries of the occupied zones and two dots meant to signify New York City and Washington D.C. the two cities split between the four occupying great pride was safe from the geographic tyranny of their fo reign invaders. The author of this American dystopia is unknown. It was, however, submitted by Dr. Richard Mnnig to the Roy Bernard Co. for approval and subsequent public dissemination into the psyche of postwar Americans. Dr. Mnnig was employed by th e Inter Nationes public relations firm. Located in Bonn, this firm occasionally worked in tandem with the American based Roy Bernard Co. another public relations Unite 5 but such collaboration between these two firms mirrors the mutually beneficial relationship between the West German government and several private public relations enterprises (most notably, however, was their heavy dependence on the Roy Bernar d Co.). 6 5 Letter from Charles E. Campbell to Dr. Richard Mnnig (16 September 1952). BA B145 1277, Bd. I. 6 B145 9764, Bd. III.
91 things, assert itself cartographically. Only by establishing its territorial place in the imaginations of its domestic citizenry and its foreign audience, could West G ermany fully recover from World War II. Only by legitimizing its territorial orientation could the 7 of the FRG rise from the abstract to the concrete from the mind to the map. This American German postwar cartographic rela tionship was not wholly unique. Other nation states have since utilized public relations firms, map depository programs, and economic/military disasters for the sake of shaping the spatial perception of a chosen audience. 8 Cartographers have also developed several different ways in which to market their craft to private enterprises without dealing directly with public relations. 9 That being said, this essay has attempted to describe a moment in history when the rise of pu blic relations as a legitimate discipline, the autonomy of cartography as an academic field, and the imperative of re mapping and re envisioning a postwar German nation state all came together to produce cartographic narratives drawn by a self conscious co mbination of American private enterprise, a newly sovereign West German government, and an American/Allied military occupation force determined to maintain its cartographic legacy. By recognizing the importance of constructing an absolute space of Germany (particularly, West Germany) on the European map and transmitting that image to the various foreign and domestic audiences that continued to support its 7 Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism Revised Edition. New York: Verso, 2006. 8 Europe Asia Studies Vol. 60, No. 4 (2008), pp. 605 629. 9 Cartography Vol. 15, No. 2 (1986), pp. 112 115.
92 cartographic place, these agents of re spatialization and dissemination utilized the explicit manipula tive influence of mass production and diffusion through corporate public relations and libraries. Perhaps for the first time in history, spatial narratives were imposed through maps onto German and American imaginations through the medium of a state spons ored systematic federal public relations strategy and through the constant re mapping efforts of an occupational power. Arguably, this was necessary for re constructing a postwar West German culture palatable to the American public and subsequently avoidi ng an impending collapse had the United States discontinued financial and political support. It was also arguably necessary for the maintenance of a stable European map. sta tes attempt to retain their territorial sovereignty while simultaneously upholding the European Union. This balance between asserting a kind of nationalism and projecting a European identity is a difficult one, but also an extremely important one. It is budgetary practices, 10 Hungary (a country which has not adopted the Euro, but has depended on bailouts from the EU in the past) has made a strange statement to its European colleagues by imposing an 1848 map of the Habsburg Empire onto the carpet 10 zone policy changes to help stabilize regional The Washington Post (5 February 2011). Available online: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp dyn/content/article/2011/02/04/AR2011020406833.html (Retrieved 5 February 2011).
93 of the European Council building in Brussels. 11 Similarly, Estonia which adopted the Euro on January 1, 2011 has depicted its national territory on its Euro coins, but the 12 Examples such as these make it clear that maps remain cartographers (i.e. Germany) Furthermore, while West Ger many may have been the first modern nation state to have its map explicitly re drawn, publicized, and sold by a foreign corporate entity, it has certainly not been the last. With the emergence of commercial giants such as the Environmental Systems Researc h Institute, NAVTEQ, and Integraph, the geospatial data which determines place within contemporary cartographic propositions is becoming increasingly dependent upon marketing strategies, technology, and corporate interests. Moreover, as maps become more d isplaced from the subjective datasets and cartographers which create them, their self referential and tautological assertions of authority and objectivity flourish. Considering the trends of cartographic development from the individual cadastral maps of land to those sponsored by the state for the purpose of taxation and its evolution (regression?) into a marketed and mass produced narrative, strategically placed into particular publications, libraries, school rooms, and internet browsers for 11 EU Observer (12 January 2011). Available Online: http://euobserver.com/843/31629 (Retrieved 5 February 2011). Thanks to Johanna Mellis for pointing me to this story. 12 Juhan Tere Baltic Course (9 January 2011). Available Online: http://www.baltic course.com/eng/baltic_states_cis/?doc=35797 (Retrieved 5 February 2011).
94 public consumption helps to de mystify the mapped spaces of the nation state. Germany serves as a perfect example for such an undertaking because of its unique cartographic history, the constant spatial (re)negotiations it has consistently grappled with, and the re production of its space by an occupying military force.
95 APPENDIX THE MAPS / IMAGES Fig ure 1 1 Theodor. Studienrat Kurt Schmidt [map]. No scale given. Kestlerbach, Hesse: 5 December 1948. NARA RG 335, Stack 490 8/35/03 07, Box #2.
96 Fig ure 2 1 I saiah Bowman. Territorial Provisions of the Treaty of Versailles (1928) [map]. No scale given. In: Herb, Guntram Henrik. Under the Map of Germany: Nationalism and Propaganda, 1918 1945. New York: Routledge, 1997, p. 32.
97 Fig ure 2 2 Frankreichs Bndnispolitik Volk und Geschichte: Zugleich ein Beistrag zur nationalsozialistischen Erziehung Dortmund: W. Crwell 1937, pg. 105. Note how poorly Nazi mapmakers utilized the actual map, preferring in this case to explain Figure 2 3 for how geopolitical geographers approached the subject of hostile allia nces.
98 Fig ure 2 3 Zeitschrift fr Geopolitik Vol. 11 (1934), pp. 635 652. As in Figure 2 2 the map is tryi ng to make clear the eminent geo uses spatial perception in a much clearer attempt to make its point than the Nazi map in Figure 2 2
99 Fig ure 3 1 Daraiya Area [map]. Sheet B. 1268. No scale given. 16 February 1945. NARA RG 226, Stack 190 5/30/7, Box #230. This is a French map of the Daraya village in Lebanon obtained by the American World War II forces.
100 F ig ure 3 2 Captured by Intell OSS AAI. Bandenlage Mittel Italien [map]. 1:500,000. 31 March 1944. NARA RG 226, Stack 190 5/30/7, Box #229.
101 Figure 3 3 captured by American troops. NARA RG 77, Stack 3331 76/04/04, Picture #11. Figure 3 4 invented by the German Dr. Reinhard Hugershoff and automatically mapped topography by re projecting several overlapping layers of aeria l photographs. NARA RG 77, Stack 3331 76/04/04, Picture #26.
102 Fig ure 4 1 Der Spiegel. 1946: Ein Jahr der Versprechungen [map]. No scale given. In: Der Spiegel 21 December 1946.
103 Fig ure 4 2 Emigration Process [chart]. NARA RG 84, Stack 350 56/35/04, Box #1.
104 Fig ure 4 3 Geographical Section, General Staff. Bremen Enclave [map]. 1:250,000. GSGS 4346(A). NARA RG 84, Stack 350 58/11/05, Box #2.
105 Fig ure 6 1 Geography Division, O.S.S. German Coke Production, 1938 [map]. Map No. 717. 10 July 1942. NARA RG 84, Stack 350 57/30/6, Box #7.
106 Fig ure 6 2 European Recovery Program. Wie die direkte und die indirekte ERP Hilfe 1948/49 verteilt wird [diagram]. No scale given. In: Sie Sollen es besser haben! [pamphlet]. NARA RG 335, Stack 490 8/35/03 07, Box #19. Note: There is no map of the United States.
107 Fig ure 6 3 European Recovery Program. Untitled [map]. No scale given. In: Amerika H ilft Europa, Europa Hilft Sich Selbst [pamphlet]. This map from another European Recovery Program pamphlet (see Fig. 15) emphasized the movement of economic resources across the planet. NARA RG 335, Stack 490 8/35/03 07, Box #19.
108 Fig ure 6 4 European Recovery Program. Amerika Hilft Europa, Europa Hilft Sich Selbst [pamphlet]. NARA RG 335, Stack 490 8/35/03 07, Box #19.
109 Fig ure 6 5 Germany: boundaries of 1937 [map]. Scale 1:3,500,000. Bonn, Germany: Cartography Wilhelm Stollfuss Verlag. BA B145/1227, Bd. I This is sent to the Roy Bernard Co. as an example of the kind of map which was to be published and disseminated in 1956 1 1 This image, compiled from three of computer imaging software.
110 Fig ure 6 6 Germany BA B145/1227, Bd. I This was the p ublished version of the Roy Bernard public relations map
111 Fig ure 6 7 James Tweedie. German Borders after 1945 [map]. 1:3,000,00 0. In: Guntram Henrik Herb. Vision: Territorial Strategies in the Construction of National Identities in Germany, 1949 Annals of the Association of American Geographers Vol. 94, No. 1 (2004), 150. Note the multiple boundary lines. This was a typical practice in the Federa l Republic.
112 Fig ure 6 8 Westdeutschland Bodennutzung, 23 [map]. 1:3,000,000. In: Guntram National Identities in Germany, 1949 Annals of the Associati on of American Geographers Vol. 94, No. 1 (2004), 149 basically ignored any surrounding areas in favor of simply solidifying its own nation state borders.
113 Fig ure 7 1 Sample 1 [ms. map]. No scale given. BA B145 1277 Bd. I. The United States split into occupation zones.
114 Fig ure 7 2 Sample 2 [ms. map]. No scale given. BA B145 1277 Bd. I. A map of occupation without typical American state boundaries.
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122 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Matthew D. Mi ngus received Bachelor of Arts deg rees in history, philosophy, and political s cience from Ashland University in 2008. He has published articles in The Portolan gnovis and the Journal of Map & Geography Libraries and received the 2009 Walter W. Ristow International Prize in the History o f Cartography. His current research interests include maps, euro Germany), the history of cartography and cartographic technologies, place theory, contemporary European philosophy and literary theory ( especially concerning place and technology), and the use of history and cartography as narrative forms. He lives in Gainesville, Florida with his wife Lindsey and his dog Dixie.