<%BANNER%>

Texts as Technobodies

Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0042650/00001

Material Information

Title: Texts as Technobodies Post (Re)Readwriting
Physical Description: 1 online resource (41 p.)
Language: english
Creator: Lemieux, Steven
Publisher: University of Florida
Place of Publication: Gainesville, Fla.
Publication Date: 2010

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords: derrida, posthuman, technology
English -- Dissertations, Academic -- UF
Genre: English thesis, M.A.
bibliography   ( marcgt )
theses   ( marcgt )
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent)   ( marcgt )
born-digital   ( sobekcm )
Electronic Thesis or Dissertation

Notes

Abstract: Through this thesis I abandon common humanistic and human-centered conceptions of animate and inanimate bodies. The border between animate/inanimate has become increasingly porous, and technology has begun to more obviously permeate this borderland?not as mediator but as body?simultaneously equal to and different from any other body. Amidst postexceptionalism all bodies are laid out horizontally. The status of animate can no longer be used as a mean of organizing bodies. To enter fully into unorganized relationships with all those bodies around us we have to become curious about the symbiotic relationships that compose our own bodies. Reading and writing, as technobodies are as present and deeply imbedded in our bodies as any bacterium. Writing (and the simultaneous reading that always occurs) is a physical impression of the multiplicity implicit in these relationships, and the text, contrary to Plato, responds. As technobody it engages in becoming-reader/writing as reader/writer moves towards becoming-text, and it is impossible to read/write the same sentence twice or even once?it moves and changes along our reading. Throughout this piece I engage with Derrida?s text The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond (1979). ?Envois? acts as both trace and guide in this endeavor.
General Note: In the series University of Florida Digital Collections.
General Note: Includes vita.
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references.
Source of Description: Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page.
Source of Description: This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication. The University of Florida Libraries, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law.
Statement of Responsibility: by Steven Lemieux.
Thesis: Thesis (M.A.)--University of Florida, 2010.
Local: Adviser: Leavey, John P.
Electronic Access: RESTRICTED TO UF STUDENTS, STAFF, FACULTY, AND ON-CAMPUS USE UNTIL 2011-12-31

Record Information

Source Institution: UFRGP
Rights Management: Applicable rights reserved.
Classification: lcc - LD1780 2010
System ID: UFE0042650:00001

Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0042650/00001

Material Information

Title: Texts as Technobodies Post (Re)Readwriting
Physical Description: 1 online resource (41 p.)
Language: english
Creator: Lemieux, Steven
Publisher: University of Florida
Place of Publication: Gainesville, Fla.
Publication Date: 2010

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords: derrida, posthuman, technology
English -- Dissertations, Academic -- UF
Genre: English thesis, M.A.
bibliography   ( marcgt )
theses   ( marcgt )
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent)   ( marcgt )
born-digital   ( sobekcm )
Electronic Thesis or Dissertation

Notes

Abstract: Through this thesis I abandon common humanistic and human-centered conceptions of animate and inanimate bodies. The border between animate/inanimate has become increasingly porous, and technology has begun to more obviously permeate this borderland?not as mediator but as body?simultaneously equal to and different from any other body. Amidst postexceptionalism all bodies are laid out horizontally. The status of animate can no longer be used as a mean of organizing bodies. To enter fully into unorganized relationships with all those bodies around us we have to become curious about the symbiotic relationships that compose our own bodies. Reading and writing, as technobodies are as present and deeply imbedded in our bodies as any bacterium. Writing (and the simultaneous reading that always occurs) is a physical impression of the multiplicity implicit in these relationships, and the text, contrary to Plato, responds. As technobody it engages in becoming-reader/writing as reader/writer moves towards becoming-text, and it is impossible to read/write the same sentence twice or even once?it moves and changes along our reading. Throughout this piece I engage with Derrida?s text The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond (1979). ?Envois? acts as both trace and guide in this endeavor.
General Note: In the series University of Florida Digital Collections.
General Note: Includes vita.
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references.
Source of Description: Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page.
Source of Description: This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication. The University of Florida Libraries, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law.
Statement of Responsibility: by Steven Lemieux.
Thesis: Thesis (M.A.)--University of Florida, 2010.
Local: Adviser: Leavey, John P.
Electronic Access: RESTRICTED TO UF STUDENTS, STAFF, FACULTY, AND ON-CAMPUS USE UNTIL 2011-12-31

Record Information

Source Institution: UFRGP
Rights Management: Applicable rights reserved.
Classification: lcc - LD1780 2010
System ID: UFE0042650:00001


This item has the following downloads:


Full Text

PAGE 1

TEXTS AS TECHNOBODIES: POST (RE)READWRITING By STEVEN JEFFREY LEMIEUX A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORID A IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2010 1

PAGE 2

2010 Steven Jeffrey LeMieux 2

PAGE 3

For bodies everywhere 3

PAGE 4

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank John Leavey for a ll of his advice and support throughout the writing of this thesis; its direction is, in large part, due to his guidance. Much thanks also to Ral Snchez for his continued support and invo lvement. Many thanks to Stephanie Boluk for her multiple and thoughtful edits and to Patrick LeMieux for the bountiful conversations around these issues. 4

PAGE 5

TABLE OF CONTENTS page ACKNOWLEDG MENTS..................................................................................................4ABSTRACT .....................................................................................................................6 CHAPTER 1 POST SC RIPT..........................................................................................................82 CONSUMPTION/C ONVERSAT ION.......................................................................123 POSTEXCEPT IONALISM.......................................................................................174 TECHNOBO DIES...................................................................................................265 POST (RE)READ WRITING....................................................................................35 LIST OF RE FERENCES...............................................................................................39BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ............................................................................................41 5

PAGE 6

Abstract of Thesis Pres ented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degr ee of Master of Arts TEXTS AS TECHNOBODIES: POST (RE)READWRITING By Steven Jeffrey LeMieux December 2010 Chair: John Leavey Major: English Through this thesis I abandon comm on humanistic and human-centered conceptions of animate and inanimate bodi es. The border between animate/inanimate has become increasingly porous, and technology has begun to more obviously permeate this borderlandnot as mediator but as bodysimultaneously equal to and different from any other body. Amidst pos texceptionalism all bodies are laid out horizontally. The status of animate c an no longer be used as a mean of organizing bodies. To enter fully into unorganized relationships with all those bodies around us we have to become curious about the symbiotic relationships that compose our own bodies. Reading and writing, as technobodies are as present and deeply imbedded in our bodies as any bacterium. Writing (and the simultaneous reading that always occurs) is a physical impression of the multiplicity implicit in these relationships, and the text, contrary to Plato, responds. As technobody it engages in becoming-reader/writing as reader/writer moves towards becoming-text, and it is impossible to read/write the same sentence twice or even onceit moves and changes along our reading. Throughout this piece I 6

PAGE 7

engage with Derridas text The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond (1979). Envois acts as both trace and guide in this endeavor. 7

PAGE 8

8 CHAPTER 1 POST SCRIPT This project grew out of a desire to begin reading and writing toward indigestion, toward a conscious and physical understanding and response to my consumptive actions. I had intended to explore how Do nna Haraways notions companion species and messmates function when it is the writt en text as equal body that I consume (and that consumes me). Haraway writes in her recent book When Species Meet that there is a simple obligation of companion species: you must become curious about what in this case the text might actually be doing, f eeling, thinking, or perhaps making available [by] looking back at you (20) And toward further clarifying this obligation for my own expressions it can be not ed that there is an ext ended obligation to not anthropomorphize the text, to be curious beyond familiarity. If written bodies respond rather than react, they respond differently than I do, and it is through expectations of an idealized human response that bodies of all sorts are cast as lesser beings. Moving through works by David Wills, Katherine Hayles, and Haraway, and toward several of Jacques Derridas texts, I want to explore the collapse of the animate/inanimate divide. This paper is the expression of that curiosit y, so that while I have not yet fully engaged Harawayss indigestion I have taken steps toward imagining possible means of engaging written bodies. In this thesis I engage Derridas notion of the iterability, developed in large part through "Signature Event Context" and Limited Inc of the mark as the means by which written bodies fully respond rather than mere ly react to encounters with other bodies. Written texts function in a middle gr ound as both supplement and body, and my

PAGE 9

curiosities are driven toward the possibilities and potentialities of relationship with texts as distinct bodies, technobodies t hat blend through the human body. Toward this end I move through a (re)readw riting where, following Derridas moves in Platos Pharmacy, one must then, in a single gesture, but doubled, read and write, so that reading and writing are accomp lished simultaneously, a double gesture of always rereading what is written and rewriting what is read ( Dissemination 65). And in that doubling there is always a retreat, a turning backwards all the while doubled. The text is always encountered from behind, and reading and writi ng always retrace the text that has always already been incorporated in t he body. As I consider iterability as the responsive gesture of a text, then it is along the path of this retreat, through this distancing, that it func tions in relation to a (re)readwriter, and it is this not ion of distinct position and motion without temporal succession. Amidst the others, my main focus lays with Derridas text Envois contained in The Post Card originally published in 1980 and tr anslated in 1987. As I begin to type and retype, my reading of Envois begins in earnest. Envois is a nervous text; indeterminate, it resists a st able, sedate reading, and as I (re )readwrite through it I feel as though motions are always anticipated. Derrida situates Envois as the preface to a book I have not written; it situates me as a second comer, so that it is always at my back even as I (re)readwrite (3). The text, as physical body, too becomes indeterminate and porous as various passages disappear only to be replaced by 52 blank spaces open invitations for rewritings, reimagining s, rememberings with hidden referents. These become gaps to retreat across and in. Earl y in the text the specter of the bad reader is invoked: the reader in a hurry to be determined, decided upon deciding it 9

PAGE 10

is always bad to foretell. It is bad, r eader, no longer to like retracing ones steps (Derrida, Envois 4). It is bad, then, to attempt encounters without a careful curiosity, without watching for the trace to (re)readwrite along. Thes e bad readings, where text is base, familiar other, are what I hope to move against, so as I follow behind Envois I encounter its potential responses as unfamiliar. The Post Card has been encountered by a variety of (r e)readwriters since its initial publication, and, as in this paper, the bulk of attention has been paid to Envois. Gregory Ulmer, in 1981, published an explorator y review, The Post-Age, of the French text. He frames his reading through the antic ipation of a shift, a new object (and mode) of study and communication, and he takes up The Post Card as showing how Derrida himself intends to enter into the question of the media through Heidegger (39-40). He moves toward an understanding of The Post Card as a text in the second stage of grammatology that gestures toward a third stage that must be performed in the double language of film and video (56). David Wills first wrote about The Post Card in a piece published in 1984, Post/Card/Match/Book/ Envois /Derrida. In this text alongs ide traces of love, he focuses on adestination and its affects. Wills reads Envoi s as revealing and holding together the paradox that a post card, due to the functi on of the mark, the di stancing of the mark, carries with it the possibility that it can not arrive (22). Wills takes up The Post Card again in 1995 in his text Prosthesis paying specific attention to ways prosthesis and supplement run through Envois. The mark upon which this reading turns is a right facing parenthetical with no left facing pair. In 2005 Wills published Matchbook a collection of essays predominately written ar ound Envois. In a rewriting of his first 10

PAGE 11

essay on The Post Card he repositions adestination as a reconfiguration of iterability from Signature Event Contex t (45). These essays move through Envois and various notions of death, technology, and distance, along with others. Wills writes that Envois is the determinate text of the Derridean corp us, and its presence is felt as he moves through it alongside a plethor a of Derridas texts. This text, too, moves thr ough Envois, begins to incorporate Envois as I creep toward a possible indigestion of such an inco rporation. As I begi n a consideration of written bodies as potential companion spec ies, specifically exploring possible configurations for human/textual comings together, I engage Envois as a text in motion, reading to incorporate and be incorp orated by the reader. The place of the post card as already in motion but deliverabl e invites a (re)readwriting as any given (re)readwriter is incorporated simultaneously in both positions. Envois is a text that seems to invite indigestion, and through a deliberate curiosity it might be possible to move toward that. 11

PAGE 12

12 CHAPTER 2 CONSUMPTION/CONVERSATION Toward the beginning of "Envois" Derrida writ es a short letter directed, misdirected perhaps, at multiple figures. It begins with a gap made clear by a mid-sentenc e start: of course it is to Socrates t hat I am addressing myself at this very moment, you are all a crowd, my sweet love, and you see him reading me at this very instant, already in the course of answering me (67). The first of seven from 7 September 1977, this post card collapses a multiplicity of possi ble readers; it is peppered with disappeared passages and revolves around an unnamed she, delinquencies, death and killing. The post card it self is rendered a means of killing as it is sent through meurtrires [vertical slots in the wall of a fortification for projecting weapons; murderesses] (67-8). It ends, following a gap, "We have never yet seen each other. Only written" (Derrida, "Envois" 68). This closing statemen t can be read between the literal and metaphorical as it gestures toward different possibilities for relation. It can be (re)readwritten with this deat h dealing in mind, and with a shift toward a consumptive killing sender and recipient become a doubl e ouroboros; we, textual and human body, have never yet ever conversed with each other. Only eaten. And while we might initially believe that there is a choice between conv ersing with a body or consuming it, in the end there was really never any choice to be made. All interaction between bodies can be rendered down to a consumptive act. There is of course, a question of the difference between the physical consumpt ion of flesh and the myriad means by which we consume without killing. This distinction, though, is troubl ed as we look toward the relationships that we engage in daily, especially written ones. The (re)readwriter

PAGE 13

inscribes her or his own absence and is consumed, eaten by t he text he or she re)readwrites. You tell me that you too are writing someone dead whom y ou do not know. Therefore you kill me in advance (it is true that often I await your signs like death sentences), but you also bring back to lif e (Derrida, Envois 159). And as Derrida writes to the text itself, it as a body a ssumes the you, and as (re )readwriter I in turn ingest the text as we, both text and (re)readwrit er, take up the you, but in the killing, the conversing, the eating the text, too, consumes and re-embodies. Metaphor and material are muddled as promethean bodies c ontinue to persist through daily devouring, and these bodies are devoured, they are broken down, i ngested and incorporated. Bodies are not fixed to a single physical state, but flow as multiplicities in assemblage with physical and non-physical aspects. Donna Haraway, in her piece A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and SocialistFeminism in the Late Twentieth Century originally published in 1985, begins with a rundown of the collapsing binaries that once established the imaginary of t he pure human body. It is this collapse that allows for the post-human body. The boundary between physical and non-physical is very imprecise for us; bodies are engaged with all manner of machines and forces; they are everywhere and they are invisible (Haraway Cyborgs 153). Bodies are built of multiplicities and redundancies so that while t he difference for the consumed-other rests with the continuation or lack thereof of a particular body (broken down, devoured, incorporated into its consum er or promethean in its duration, all the while eaten by hungry fingers and eyes and tongues only to re form day after day), there is little difference to be found on the other side of the equation. In When Species Meet written 13

PAGE 14

more than twenty years after Cyborg Manife sto, Haraway in conversation with Derrida states that there is no wa y to eat and not to kill, so that even as we devour those bodies that continue to endure we, always as both, simultaneously, killers and killed, are killing and being reborn, reformed as bodies (Haraway, Species 295). We can look toward those human bodies we have grown accustomed to simply consuming as a readily available example (and this positing as example is another consumption): bus drivers, customer support personnel, the immense swaths of hidden laborers, Walmart greeters, teachers. This is not to say that these killings and deaths are trivial; we must move, instead, toward the opposit ethat there is no such thing as a trivial death. All interactions become heavy with death, though not necessarily Hegels life or death struggle, and we should pay careful att ention to it because indigestion becomes apparent through these deaths We do real harm, we cannot stop doing harm to all those bodies we encounter, and the same is done to us. There is no escaping the act of consumpt ion if we, as bodies, are to endure. Haraway as she considers relations of use, bl untly states that dying and killing are not optional; there is no way of getting around the r equirement that we must kill to survive, consumption is not optional, and an attemp ted opting out may be but another form of consumption (Haraway, Specie s 74). Bodies are situated as iterable moments of assemblage by the various intersections at which consumptions occur. It is in those consumptive moments that bodies flash into a grounded state. Consumptionboth devouring others and being devouredis somethi ng so fundamental that outside of the most literal examples it has been hidden behind other means and explanations; it is utterly familiar. Late in his 1988 interview wit h Jean-Luc Nancy, Eating Well, or the 14

PAGE 15

Calculation of the Subject, Derrida moves through a shift from killing (in terms though shalt not kill) to one at the edge of the orifices (of orality, but also of the ear, the eye and all the senses in general) of eating. With consumption the question is no longer one of knowing if it is good to eat the other or if the other is good to eat, nor of knowing which other. One eats him regar dless and lets oneself be eaten by him (Derrida, Eating Well 282). Consumption is largely a simultaneous act; as bodies come together they both consume and ar e consumed. Like the double ouroburos mentioned above there is eati ng all around (and it should be noted that consumption is not a strictly one-to-one affair, multipli cities abound). While consumption is a simultaneous process, it is largely not an equal one; there is almost always one body that lives and one that dies. We are not us ed to eating well. More often than not we consume bodies without giving them a thought beyond their practical value; we create guilt-free meals through a functional hierarchy that sets humans distinctly apart from all other bodies, with those other bodies ordered amidst themse lves. If those bodies we consume cannot respond in the same manner that we imagine we do, then they are fair game. But if we are to begin eating well we must push toward becoming responsible for those bodies we kill and consume. Responsib ility carries within it, and must do so, an essential excessiveness. It r egulates itself neither on the principle of reason nor on any sort of accountancy (Derrida Eating 272) We must be troubled by our consumption. Eating well can never be a trivial act; it is through this excess that we move toward cultivating indigestion. Significantly other to each ot her, in specific different we signify in the flesh a nasty developmental infection called love. This love is a historical aberration and a natural 15

PAGE 16

cultural legacy (Haraway Species 16). In love change takes place. It is a new kind of change that works both ways, left and right rather than straight down. Change has never trickled down too terribly well, anyway; things get clogged up, people become bound up in all those structur es. When bodies come together as companion species, they become-with alongside one another. Haraway, as she begins to close When Species Meet imagines toward a model for eating well. Once we have met, we can never be the same again. Propelled by the ta sty but risky obligation of curiosity among companion species, once we know that we cannot not know. If we know well, searching with fingery eyes, we care. That is how responsibility grows (Haraway Species 287). As we move toward texts, pushed along by cu riosity (never obligat ion, which breeds domination; reading wrought with ought is a violent affair), it is amidst the performance of writing that this coming together fully occurs. After writing together, as companion species we know that we cannot not know that texts and humans sit at the same table, cultivating and (re)readwriting indigestion. 16

PAGE 17

17 CHAPTER 3 POSTEXCEPTIONALISM Donna Haraway makes the claim in A Cy borg Manifesto that by the late twentieth century, our time, a mythic time, we are all chim eras, theorized and fabricated hybrids of machine and organism; in short, we are cyborgs. And the cyborg, as Haraway further elaborates, as a condens ed image of both imagination and material reality is crucial in under standing consumptive practices (150). As we push into the twenty-first century and as our everyday bodies are blended with nearly instant access to communication networks that grow larger by the minute and with a growing range of machines that inhabit all layers of the hum an body, it not only becomes harder to deny Haraways claims, it becomes more and more apparent that what we had once considered stable, discreet bodies have nev er been wholly human. Our conceptions of what constitutes human and more specific ally a notion of hum an-exceptionalism are reworked along with the histories we tell ourselves and what we call ourselves. Our genealogies are rewritten. Derrida in the second card from 15 March 1979 gestures toward these rewritings through a description of simultaneous sending and receivingmessy substitutions that re sult in bodies in constant flux. and when I write you you continue, you transfigure everything (the transformation comes from behind the words, it operates in silence, simu ltaneously subtle and incalculable, you substitute yourself for me and right up to my tongue you send it to yourself and then I remember those moments when you called me without warning, you came at night at the bottom of my th roat, you came to touch my name with the tip of your tongue. Beneath the surface, it took place beneath the

PAGE 18

surface of the tongue, softly, slo wly, an unheard-of trembling, and I was sure that at that second that it was not coming back, a convulsion of the entire body in the two tongues at onc e, the foreign one and the other one (Envois 183-4). Situated as a guest in our bodies our speech it becomes difficult to speak clearly as our genealogies move to tell themselves. Except ionalism is made obsolete from the inside out, and this notion of exceptionalism, held still against the trembling, is deeply rooted in conceptions of the self that attempt to create an unassailable divide between human bodies and all those other potential bodies animals, plants, machines, technologies, etc. Writing in the late Ninetie s, Katherine Hayles explic itly engages notions of the posthuman in How We Became Posthuman and early on she articulates several assumptions that form the nebulous core of the posthuman: one of these being that the posthuman view thinks of the body as the original prosthesis we all learn to manipulate, so that extending or replacing the body with other prostheses becomes a continuation of a process that began before we were born (3). This notion of an always subverted "natural" human body is key in this exploration as I shift from a notion of the posthuman to a notion of post-exceptional. The posthum an, as it moves agains t distinctly humanist ideals, risks reincorporating the human as central, as Hayles gestures toward ( Posthuman 287). She describes that central human self as being envisioned as grounded in presence, identified with originary guarantees and teleological trajectories, associated with solid f oundations and logical coherence, a nd these are all aspects that other bodies simply cannot possess ( Posthuman 286). For the notion of the pure human 18

PAGE 19

body responding was therefore being held as a faculty that allowed for a certain mode of existence; he (a deliberate he for much of human history) by his own hand was able to perform humanness, and it was a perfo rmance no others could accomplish because in the end they were only able to react, not respond. This self-apparent ability to respond was enough to establish an ascended humanity that acts as a separate kind of body and allows for certain modes of guilt-free consumption of nonhuman bodies, bodies that exist, to the human, as mere fodder. Derrida, in the 1993 interview The Rhetoric of Drugs, begins an exploration of notions of drug use. The war on drugs can be seen as a war fought in defense of an exceptional human body. At our most exceptional, as we bolster the defenses of a supposedly natural body we declare and wage the war on drugs, the war against these artificial, pathogenic, and foreign aggressions, these cr eeping hints that the human body is not pure. Derrida asserts that we find a desire to reconstitute what you just called the ideal body, the perfect body, the fully human body (244). Being conceptually human is rejecting the possibility of those lesser being s (animals, machines, technologies) having any chance of entering into relationships or moments of simultaneous consumption with humans. Their bodies might frighten us but t hey cannot truly trouble the notion of the pure human because by definition it is im penetrableand as such many human bodies are left out of the po ssible wholly human. More so than the possibility for simultaneous consumption or relationships, the notion that a human body might end up in another s stomach is disastrous to the notion of human-exceptionalism. It is in these moments, moments when a human might be fully consumed by another body or bodies, that fear is most potent. The specter of the 19

PAGE 20

man-eater, an animal more potent, more virile, than man dogs our position at the top of the food chain; it raises the notion that we, too, might be fo od. As he examines distinctions drawn between various drugs, De rrida points to the hysteria surrounding drug use, that a person might be fully consum ed by a foreign substance, turning him or her away from human company into a world of simulacrum and fiction (Rhetoric 236). There is similar horror at the prospect of the human disappearing in side the machine, plugged into computer networks or rework ed with mechanized orga ns. These fears are all centered on the prospect of exposing a vulnerable humanness, losing humanexceptionalism, becoming just another body. In a short card written on 1 August 1979 Derrida draws to the forefront these worries. I can see him carpeted in the image, he is looking out, he is pretending to write. We will never know what he is truly in the course of plotting, if he is reading or if he is writing, if he is or is not behind the words, you can die from it (226); you can be consumed by text, and in the physical/metaphorical muddle death, physical and metaphorical, is always a possibility. And if not consumed by the text a body can worry itself to death; caught in the constant concern of whether there is a speaker behind me. On the post ca rd that Derrida examines through Envois this worry can be read on both of Socrates and Platos faces. With the back flap extended their worry is constantly in the cor ner of my eye as I r ead; their worry, caught in the periphery reflects my own. Socrates mouth is pre ssed in a tight frown as he considers the text before him out of the corner of his eye salways either just looking down or ready to look away. Plato, more directly looking forward, carries an even deeper frown and a slightly furrowed brow; his footing seems nervous as he leans forward into Socrates back. Derrida continues in that same card contrary to what I had 20

PAGE 21

indicated to you, I think, he did not commit suicide (one never commits suicide, one has oneself killed; one has oneself consumed by, for example, a suicide note (Envois 227). And this acceptance of ones body as m eal is feared more t han the possibility of conversation, because worse than losing a struggl e or submitting to a powerful force is offering yourself as a consumable body. It is important to note, though, that the sh ift to post-exceptiona l means of relating does not, as Hayles makes clear, really m ean the end of humanity; the human species and human bodies are not at issue, and in becoming cyborg we are not being replaced but altered ( Posthuman 286). She further states that the post-exceptional signals instead the end of a certain conception of the human, a conception that may have applied, at best, to the fr action of humanity who had wealth, power, and leisure to conceptualize themselves as autonomous bei ngs exercising their will through individual agency and choice ( Posthuman 286). Without these notions of agency, choice, rational judgment, and response, the abili ty to differentiate humans from other bodies becomes nigh impossible. These properties are troubl ed as uniquely human traits both because they seem so apparent in ot her bodies and because they seem so fleeting in human ones. And so, as Haraway writes at the beginning of A Cyborg Manifesto, when the last beachheads of uniqueness have been pollu ted if not turned into amusement parkslanguage, tool use, social behaviour, m ental events, nothing really convincingly settles the separation of human and any other body (151-2). I have been conscious (an awkward statemen t, to be sure), perhaps better put as there has been some attempt to make no distinction between, using standard definitions, living and n on-living bodies. This division, perhaps more deeply ingrained as 21

PAGE 22

it is more, at the outset, apparently obvi ous. A human moves and creates; animals, or all sorts, breathe and reproduce, seem to ha ve a real, tangible life; plants grow and flourish and seem to react to stimuli. What, though, of the rocks, the Earth, a myriad of machines, texts. In A Cyborg Manifesto Donna Haraway states that one of the core distinctions currently in the process of breaking down is between animal-human (organism) and machine. As she moves to describe these machines as they are historically seen, she writes that they were not self-moving, self-designing, autonomous. They could not achieve m ans dream, only mock it (152). These distinctions, as Haraway exposed, are porous as well (their nature exposed in part by the initial collapse of humanexceptionalism): late twent ieth-century machines have made thoroughly ambiguous the difference bet ween natural and artificial, mind and body, self-developing and externa lly designed, and many other distinctions that used to apply to organisms and machines (Cyborgs 152). The ambiguity that Haraway raises rests in large part with the fluidity of bodies as they continuously engage in consumption; any sense of origin is lost in a multitude of re-formings. Natural and artificial, as terms that refer to specifics acts of creat ion, lose their meaning when text and rewriter continuously consum e and are embedded withi n one another. As these distinctions between animal and machines have begun to crumble, so too must those that separate animate from supposedly inanimate bodies. That is not to say that a pebble thinks and feel s, and that we must treat pebbles as humans, but that in the end thinking and feeling and gro wing and self are not useful means of establishing distinctions between bodies. Of course a pebble is not a human, but then again, neither is a human. And as Judith Butler writes in the introduction for Bodies That 22

PAGE 23

Matter a text primarily concer ned with how bodies are in scribed with not only with gender but with sex as well, it will be as im portant to think about how and to what end bodies are constructed as is it will be to th ink about how and to what end bodies are not constructed and, further, to ask after how bo dies which fail to materialize provide the necessary outside, if not the necessary s upport, for the bodies whic h, in materializing the norm, qualify as bodies that matter ( 16). To that end any s pecific beginning or natural formationthe wholly humanbecomes impossible to establish. As we move toward a curiosity focused on the specific traces of consumption rather than on bloodlines or on genealogies, hidden relationships, hidden messmates and consumptions, become visible. There are a host of specifical ly configured consumptions that are positively endemic. Our various rela tionships with texts as technobodies are one of these sorts. So that in the end or at the start t he notion of an already formed body or a body untouched by consumption (either consumed or consuming) is a mirage; those bodies that matter are built with a thick, impr egnable skin built, patched perhaps, with the always rendered as hopelessly porous skin of those other bodies. They are devouring machines that have little time for i ndigestion. And as we look toward the other bodies, bodies perhaps wracked with indigestion, we find that stability is perhaps not necessary or desirable. Derrida begins the ca rd from 24 August 1979 with I again tried to decipher the piece of skin. In any ev ent its a failure: I will have succeeded only in transcribing a part of what is printed or printed over on t he subject of the support, but the support itself, which I wanted to deliver naked, we will also burn (Envois 252). This is a move toward the actualizati on of bodies as always already porous, as constantly seeping into one another through various means of consumption 23

PAGE 24

This move toward post-exceptionalism, t hough, is fraught with pitfalls. There is a constant urge toward anthropomorphizing t hose bodies we engage with. James Serpell writes in his short piece People in Dis guise: Anthropomorphi sm and the Human-Pet Relationship, that anthropom orphism appears to have its roots in the human capacity for so-called reflexive consciousnessthat is, the ability to use self-knowledge, knowledge of what it is like to be a person, to understand and anticipate the behavior of others. It is through anthropomorphism, as a specific technology, that humans were able to begin both keeping pets and domesticating animals for consumption (Serpell 123). That we anticipate behavior based on our own becomes even more troubling as we push past any actualized behavior and begin to establish an idyllic humanness. Anthropomorphism builds a solid base on which we can build a case for exceptionalism. Bodies are judged against t he ideal human and their value based on how well they replicate specific human virtues. Rational re sponse, the ability to make a decision concerning your action, has become the basic measuring stick for deciding which bodies we can consume guilt-free. The closer a body is to performing a response, the more we have to justify and think about our consumption of that body. More than anything anthropomorphism allows us to instantly establish a familiarity with other bodies. They are forcefully read and placed in relation to an idyllic humanness and considered known; we are able to calcul ate other bodies because anthropomorphism is a constant they can be judged against. If we are to become pos t-exceptional, then bodies must be taken up on their own terms or in their mix. This isnt a push toward raising all bodies to the st atus of the human, but inst ead this drive moves toward 24

PAGE 25

exposing the human as non-exceptional, as blended and capable of consumption as all other bodies. 25

PAGE 26

26 CHAPTER 4 TECHNOBODIES As she progresses further in A Cyborg Manifesto Donna Haraway writes that textualization of everything in poststructuralist, postmodernist theory has been damned by Marxists and social feminists for its utopian disregard for the lived relations of domination that ground the play of ar bitrary reading (152). This textualization, though, offers a means of creating relationship amidst post-exceptionalism when we can no longer rely on a set hierarchical stru cture to dictate how to treat other bodies. Relationship in this case is built through first acknowledging that curiosity mentioned and through care coming together. Harawa y, pushing against common thoughts of technologically induced lonelines s, writes that far from signaling a walling off of people from other beings, cyborgs signal distur bingly and pleasurably tight couplings, triplings, quadruplings as bodies come toget her as multiplicity (Cyborgs 152). These comings together are disturbi ng when viewed from an excepti onal vantage point as they highlight an inherent le aky quality in bodies. In When Species Meet Haraway begins to seriously disrupt notions of a pure or w hole human. Toward this end she provides research that shows that percent of the cells that occ upy a human body are filled with the genomes of bacteria, fungi, protists, and such (3); the human body, any body, is muddle. As her section heading states we have never been human. And in this complete abandonment of the pure bod,y post-exc eptional relationships push this near wholly other cellular self out ward until your body, built of relations is, as Deleuze and Guattari write about the Body without Or gans, distributed according to crowd phenomena, in Brownian motions, in the form of molecular multiplicities (30). Consumption, if done well, can act as a becoming together indistinguishableas in the

PAGE 27

double ouroboros where both snak es become muddled. And it is toward this becoming muddled that I hope to become in relation to textual bodies Where then does our curiosity lead us in this relationship with writing as both a technology and possible body? At their very inception texts have been besmirched as inanimate other, fit only fo r sustenance. In Platos Phaedrus it is stated that the words signify only one thing, and always the same thi ng (Plato 66). When the text is assumed to be fixed and only capable of delivering a si ngle message, it, most plainly, cannot do anything but repeat its set of words; they are wholly immobile, and no matter their duration absent any alteration they remain ju st as they were first penned. This is the case as far as a certain physical quality is concerned. And it is worth noting that texts are not alone in this charge. As humans are cast as animal toward a guilt-free consumption, animals are cast as text and studied as such. These bodies are utterly and perhaps viciously consumed through a s light of anthropomorphism. They are expected to respond as a human should, and si nce they do not, cannot, they are often then consumed without a second thought.. These expectations, though, are misplac ed. Response, idyllic rational human response, is a sloppy measure by which to gauge a bodys potential for relationship, because a purely human response is never possibleresponse is always mediated. Language has already seeped through our bodies so that any hope of a natural human is made in vain, and it pushes us toward supposedly blank reaction as we move along mechanized linesrunning on the rails language lays out, our responses, in that rationality relies on language, are to a point always rote. Derrida, in The Rhetoric of Drugs engages a discussion of the illusory nature of any sort of natural body; all bodies 27

PAGE 28

are always already mixed through, and with this motion toward the pharmakon he engages Plato and The Phadreaus He writes that according to Socrates the pharmakon writing does not serve the good, aut hentic memory. It is rather the mnemotechnical auxiliary of a bad memory, and if there can be no such thing as an authentic memory, then the question of a good or bad sort slips away (Derrida, Rhetoric 234). Insofar as memory is always a rethinking or rememorizing, our thinking itself is bound up in language, and following these lines then, if pure response is impossible, we can begin to move toward other configurations of the play between bodies engaged in consumptions. Derrida, in T he Rhetoric of Drugs continues on to write that writing, like any good parasite is at once inside and outsidethe outside feeding on the inside (234). This peculiar in side outside state of writing, as a technology, allows for textual bodies and human to blend together. This notion of parasitic blending was raised in Limited Inc written well before The Rhetoric of Drugs. In it he notes that iterability blurs a prio ri the dividing-line that passes between binary terms, contaminating it parasitically (70). In the case of the animate/inanimate split iterability not only blurs the line between t he terms but the bodies engaged in that split, as well. Toward the beginning of Derridas early piece Signature Event Context, bound to Limited Inc through a train of replies, he writes that to write is to produce a mark that will constitute a sort of machine which is productive in turn, and which my future disappearance will not, in princi ple hinder in its functioning, o ffering things and itself to be read and to be rewritten (Derrida Limited 8). Text exists always already apart from the writer, as a body in and of itself; this init ial separation, at the moment of conception, 28

PAGE 29

can be seen as the primary consum ption of the text so that it always carries with it the trace of the writer. Text p roduce[s] effects independently of [the writers] presence and of the present actuality of [the writers] intentions, i ndeed even after [the writers] deatha death caused by the text itself as it consumes the initial force or direction from the writer during t hat initial relationship (a rich rela tionship ripe with possibilities for indigestion as we will examin e soon) between text and writ er[the writers] absence, which moreover belongs to the stru cture of all writing (Derrida, Limited 5). This text is simultaneously an independent body and one tied to the writer through backward looking traces; as machine it produces meaning apart from the intentions of any specific creator or user; while we can encounter spec ific textual bodies, we can never simply pick up or discard language. Human and textual bodies ar e blended together; at this point neither can claim a pure origin. Looking again toward Derridas writ ings in The Rhetoric of Drugs, we can take into account what we might call the technological condition. There is no natural, originary body: technology has not simply added it self, from the outside or after the fact, as a foreign body (244). With the technological condition in mind any potential body could be considered what Derrida terms a text in general as he lays out an understanding of the term in Positions (44) So that even as it consumes direction from a specific writer, meaning is iterable. When Pl ato writes that Socrates says that a written speech ha[s] no idea to whom it should spea k and to whom it shouldnt. Ill-treated and unjustly abused, a speech always needs the help of its father because it is unable by itself to defend or help itself (Plato 66), he imagines an impossible text that fails as a human body rather than a textual one. In conversation with Platos Phaedrus Derrida, in 29

PAGE 30

The Rhetoric of Drugs works through various reasons for some of the reasons behind a general cultural aversion to drug addiction, which can, I believe, be read as the technological condition with writing in particular for this wr iting, He states that it is in the name of this authenticit y that drug addiction is cond emned or deplored. This authenticity can be appropriated either simultaneously (in confusion) or successively (in denial) to the values of a real relati on to true reality (Derrida, Rhetoric 240). This true reality or true response is, of c ourse, an illusion as any sort of true reality demands an authentic body, a pre, ra ther than post, supplementary body. Plato/Socratess imagined te xt is judged as a singular body rather than one wrapped up with others. Their imagined aut hentic or singular text is impotent through their imaginings. N. Katherine Hayless Writing Machines, published in 2002, considers various material dimensions present in texts. As s he begins to lay out a notion of media-specific analysis she notes that texts must always be embodied to exist in the world (31). A written text is always written upon and with. Wr iting, caught up as it is in prepositions, can always be considered alongside its physical body. Pushing this notion of embodiment further I would consider it a double embodiment. Text is always simultaneously both supplement and supplemented. While text s are discrete material objects (book, post card, billboard, email) ), and, as Hayles in Writing Machines writes to further explain her reasoning behind material-specific analysis, the materiality of those embodiments interacts dynamically with linguistic, rhetorical and literary practices to create a sense of fluidity that im bues textual bodies, these bodies are also incorporated in their (re)readwriters (31). An y text acts on both its material position and 30

PAGE 31

any encountered (re)read/writer. They exist as technology in symbiotic assemblage. And as writing is embodied both within and apart from the (re)readwri ter it acts on those bodies it touches equally. David Wills in his text Dorsality works through a conception of how technologies interact with various bodies; those bodies, and in this case the body of the (re)readwriter is therefore receiving a definition fr om a technologization of the body, in a becoming-prosthesis or a becoming-dorsal (9). This technologization acts from behind, but like Wills imagine of the dorsal, it is simultaneously both post and immediate. It is post all around so that it is always behind but always encountered from behind. Text and (re)readwriter are connected ba ck to back, turning one another as they eat. On the 6 September 1977 post card Derri da writes around Ma rtin Heidegger, referring to him both with t he familiar Martin and the formal Heidegger, on Geschick and the objections that Heidegger would raise c oncerning Derridas writing. He goes on to write that the post is no longer a simple metaphor, and is even, as the site of all transferences and all correspondences, the proper possibility of every possible rhetoric. He notes that Heideggar would se e this as a premat ure (?) imposition of tekhn (65). And in one sense it is a premature imposition. Technology, as an always already supplement to any body, and as a body a technobody, is seen from behind so that attached at the back can only be seen from the back. That text s are embodied and specifically created and positioned, though, does not preclude them from existing full and equal bodies in the worldauthentic ity being no longer a requirement for response. Deleuze and Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus echo Spinoza as they reiterate a working definition of a body. A body is not defined by the form that determines it nor 31

PAGE 32

as a determinate substance [it is defi ned only by] affects and local movements, different speeds (260). This definition, as I move it toward a post-exceptional reading, encompasses those bodies that could be read as mere supplement, As Derrida touches on at the beginning of Signature Event Context, writing in its currently accepted senseone which should not and that is essentialbe considered innocent, primitive, or natur al, it can only be seen as a means of communication (3). This currently accepted sense is one that relegates written bodies to a state of fixed supplement, merely delivering rote communica tions. This notion of merely supplement is exactly what is ruptured in the shift to the post-exceptiona l. A body can only be rendered mere through comparison to an excepti on. So writing and text can no more be considered a tool or simple artifact than animals or computers. No potential body is excluded from the possibility of engaging with other bodies as companion species. And written texts persist simultaneously in rela tion to and apart from (r e)read writer. As he works through the fundamental action of writing, an action opposed to writing as a means of communication Derrida states that to be w hat it is, all writing must, therefore, be capable of f unctioning in the radical absence of every empirically determined receiver in general, the death or the possibility of the death of the receiver inscribed in the structure of the mark ( Limited 8). So that writing engages any (re)readwriter it encounters; unbound from an y determined receiver writing has the potentials of all bodies. Text, as inherently iterable, functions as a body amidst other bodies. That is to say that they have the agency to consume (and to be consumed by) those bodies they come in contact with. Text, though nonliving, though explicitly 32

PAGE 33

created, though most often in tended and taught as a simple tool can be engaged as companion species on the same horiz ontal plane as human bodies amidst a postexceptional landscape. Texts act as technobodiessimultaneously embedded in our skin and yet capable of discrete consumption. The human body, too, acts as technobody, an amalgamation of prosthesis that engages in mediated consumption the human as a technology, a vehicleto language. It is through an active (re)readwriter than texts are engendered. A blended iterability as written text and human bodies muddle together replaces discrete, human response. Plato/Socrates through the Phaedrus expect the text to respond just as a human might, with new words and thoughts and clarif icationswith a rational fully-fledged response. The act of (re)readwriting and more specifically, (re)readwriting in concert with a multiplicity of texts, (re)readwriting as part of a community, (re)readwriting as a we rather than an I, is that moment when the written text and human blur into one another. This is a blending that has already begun, it has always already begun before. So that any consumption is a consuming backwards, a reconsumption. Writing, as technobody, is already always present within us, digested, digesting, in indigestion. Bodies are born into consumptions, and the fo rmation of a new body is little more than a new point of digestion. Derridas card fr om 20 June 1978 card bear s the semblance of a response. His writing is woven around quot ed comments concerning him, and in it he writes in a long parenthetical about w hat he calls in Eng lish the logic of pregnancy ; this logic can be read as moving toward this consumptive consumption. He continues: In other words, you are all born, dont forget, and you can write only against your mother who bore within her, along with you, what s he has borne you to write against her, your 33

PAGE 34

writing with which she would be large. And fu ll, you will never get out of it (150). In some sense our encounters with text occur within us, through and beneath our skin. As we (re)readwrite we expand and grow that pa rasite. And while the physical act of writing, the performance, ma ttersto an extent; just as we are always mediated by language, our interactions with writing ar e mediated through materialit is a coming together long in coming, and our consumption follows specif ic patterns. In the same card Derrida continues post parenthetical what I admired the most, then, is rather the overturning, or say rather the final renversement for it might indeed be a question of that, and the English word ( reversed ) puts us on track of the French reverser better, even if it primarily means overturned or inve rted, permuted (150). This overturning, or re, or postconsuming, becomes a means by which the (re)readwriter positions him or herself, through reply, amidst written texts. Because if there is already, pre-encounter, the presence of the technobody, than any res ponse must be made at its back, from behind. 34

PAGE 35

35 CHAPTER 5 POST (RE)READWRITING Writing, as a distinct technobody, has been worming its way through our selves since its inception. It is already embedded just like all those other organisms that make up the human body. Writing about the technological condition in The Rhetoric of Drugs, Derrida plainly states that there is no natural, or iginary body: technology has not simply added itself, from the outside or after the fact, as a foreign body. Or at least this foreign or dangerous supplement is originarily at work and in place in the supposedly ideal interiority of the body and soul. It is i ndeed at the heart of the heart (244). Supplements, technobodi es, cannot be cordoned off or made entirely distinct because they are always present at the turn so that any cons umption is a reply or post consumption. All reading and wr iting is a re reading and a re writing. And as the (re)readwriter encounters a text, both as te chnobodies, they create a rhizome, and respond and consume one another th rough rhizomatic lines of f light. This (re)readwritertext rhizome is not so strange, though; as organisms engage as companion species with one another, they are alter ed so that there is no hint of an originary body; bodies and functions seep through from one species to the next, so that it becomes impossible for that illusory pure body to be located. The orchid deterritorializes by forming an image, a tracing of a wasp; but the wasp rete rritorializes on that image. The wasp is nevertheless deterritorialized, becoming a pi ece in the orchids reproductive apparatus. But it reterritorializes the orchid by trans porting its pollen (Deleuze and Guatarri 10). The rhizome they form can be looked at as a single point on a continual flow of evolution. And while it took eons for the two individual bodi es of wasp and orchid to consume as they do now, the process for (re)r eadwriter and text is immediate. Text, as

PAGE 36

a technobody, is already embedded as l anguage throughout the human body, and the simultaneous blending toward rhizome is enact ed in the very moment of (re)readwriter; the means of consumption is part and parcel with the specific act of becoming companion species. The (re)readwriter engages in a specific, physical, becoming-text, and the text pushes toward becoming-human as it iterates and shapes itself to the specific (re)readwriter. Textuality as a specific technology that has been thoroughly written through humans can act as a model fo r displacing familiarity because it can never be pinned down as a single body; it is impossible to read the same sentence twice. This defamiliarization is a necessary step in the move toward becoming companionable, because what is utterly familiar cannot invoke curiosity. We can never simply write; the notion that we could engage a practice of pure creation is as illusory as the pure human body. As noted above Derrida writes that you will always precede me; you, writing as technology incorporated throughout my body will always be the forward mediator (Derrida, Envois 19). So we are always writing after writing, writing post writ ing, writing double. As Derri da turns toward the Socrates and Plato post card he wor ks through their relation to one another; he writes that S. does not see P. who sees S., but only from the back. There is only the back, seen from the back, in what is written, such is the final word. Everything is played out in retro and a tergo And moreover nothing will ever pr ove, that there was a writing before the rewriting (48). Any hint of original supplem ent or technobody or writ ing is impossible as the motion of the technobody is already su pplemented. Connected back to back, postpre-post, it disappears in t he trace, for we only ever see the broad back of the postscript. We are clouded by our own back, our own post. And in a card, 9 June 1977, 36

PAGE 37

that begins with a doubled distance Derrida writ es that he has to distance myself in order to write to you because the mom ent of (re)readwriting is a retreat, a move backwards t hat retreads ground (28). Later in the same letter, again immediately following a gap, but separated by a capital letter, he writes: In the beginning, in principle, was the post, and I will nev er get over it. But in the end I know it. I become aware of it as our death sentence: it was composed, according to all possible codes and genres and languages, as a declaration of love (29). It is in this declaration and realization that we are killed by the tex t; the body of the rewriter is consumed. As we acknowledge this act our stomach churns; in accepting this loss indigestion sets in. As this consumption occurs, there is a simultaneous shift to t he (re)readwriter, so that writing, already always doub led (or more), is now read as it is writtenthat same reading that enacted the consumption. Tex t, engendered through consumption, is active in the moment (re)readwriting occurs, so that even in the event that a particular text is never picked up again it acts as active body at the muddled moment of conception. This muddling is a becoming-iterabl e of the (re)readwiter. Both bodies are iterable through, behind, the other. Written tex t, as always (re)readwritten, does not acknowledge its creation or supposed-creator, an d so there cannot be any direct access to a text; it cannot be fixed. It operates throu gh a logic of reply, and in Limited Inc Derridas reply to Searle's Reply he writes that the very struct ure of the mark (for example, the minimum of iterability it requires) excl udes the hypothesis of idealization, that is the adequation of a meaning to itself, of a saying to itself, of understanding to a mark in general (61). So that it is along the body of a (re)readw riter and through the absence or distance of that same (re)readwriterboth bodies retr eat or turn away through the act of 37

PAGE 38

consumptionthat the mark f unctions. Even the I, especially the I, cannot locate any specific referent; the functioning of the I, as is well known, is no less iterable or replaceable than any other word. And in any case, whatever singularity its functioning might possess is not of a kind to guar antee any adequation between saying and meaning (Derrida, Limited 62). And as we (re)readwrite the I we can engage it as messmate, and we can eat it well as fellow body, and indigestion begins. 38

PAGE 39

39 LIST OF REFERENCES Barton, John Cryil. Iter ability and the Order-Word Plat eau: A Politics of the Performative in Derrida and Deleuze/Guttari. Critical Horizons 4.2 (2003): 22764. Print. Butler, Judith. Bodies that Matter New York: Routledge, 1993. Print. Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus Trans. Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987. Print. Derrida, Jacques. Disseminations. Trans. Barbara Johnson. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981. Print. ---. Limited Inc. Ed. Gerald Graff. Trans. Sam uel Weber and Jeffrey Mehlman. Evenston, Il: Northwestern Un iversity Press, 1988. Print. ---. Eating Well. Points Ed. Elisabeth Weber. Trans. Peter Connor and Avital Ronell. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995. 255-87. Print. ---. The Rhetoric of Drugs. Points Ed. Elisabeth Weber. Trans. Michael Isreal. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995. 228-54. Print. ---. Positions. Trans. Alan Bass. Chicago: Universi ty of Chicago Press, 1982. Print. ---. The Post Card. Trans. Alan Bass. Chicago: Universi ty of Chicago Press, 1987. Print. Hayles, N. Katherine. How we Became Posthuman Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999. Print. ---. Writing Machines Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002. Print. Haraway, Donna J. Simians, Cyborgs, and Women New York: Routledge, 1991. Print ---. When Species Meet. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008. Print. Plato. Phaedrus Trans. Stephen Scully. Newburyport MA:Focus Publishing, 2003. Print. Serpell, James. People in Disguise : Anthropomorphism and the Human-Pet Relationship. Thinking with Animals Ed. Lorraine Daston and Gregg Mitman. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005. Print. Ulmer, Gregory. Review: The Post-Age. Diacritics 11.3 (1981): 39-56. Print. Wills, David. Dorsality Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008. Print.

PAGE 40

---. Matchbook Stanford: Stanford Univer sity Press, 2005. Print. ---. Post/Card/Match/Book/ Envois /Derrida. SubStance 13.2 (1984): 29-38. Print. ---. Prosthesis Stanford: Stanford Univer sity Press, 1995. Print. 40

PAGE 41

41 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Steven J. LeMieux attended primary schools in Alaska, Texas and Louisiana. He earned a Bachelor of Arts in English and philo sophy at Southwestern University in the spring of 2008. He received a Master of Arts in English at the University of Florida in the fall of 2010.