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1 COOPERATION AND COER C ION: U.S. STRATEGIES FOR COALITION BUILDING IN THE FIRST AND SECOND GULF WARS By PETER M. M c CABE A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 20 10
2 20 10 Peter M. McCabe
3 To my Dad in loving memory
4 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This project and my graduate school studies would not have been possible without the full support o f the International Relations faculty and staff at the University of Florida. I would like to highlight my committee members, Ido Oren, Bryon Moraski, Zach Selden, and Mike Ryngaert for being so generous with their time. My committee chair, Leann Brown, provided a sympathetic ear and critical comments that helped take this project from an abstract idea to fruition. I cannot thank her enough for her strong support. Finally, my biggest thanks are reserved for my wife and two daughters who provided the enc ouragement to finish this project. The views expressed in this d issertation are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or pos ition of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
5 TABLE OF CONTENTS page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 4 LIST OF TABLES ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 7 LIST OF FIGURES ................................ ................................ ................................ .......... 8 ABSTRACT ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................... 9 CHAPTER 1 MILITARY COALITION FORMATION ................................ ................................ ..... 11 Introduction ................................ ................................ ................................ ............. 11 The Theoretical Literature ................................ ................................ ....................... 18 Methodologies ................................ ................................ ................................ ........ 19 Empirical Evidence ................................ ................................ ................................ 27 Plan and Organization ................................ ................................ ............................ 32 2 COALITION THEORY ................................ ................................ ............................. 34 Alliances versus Coalitions ................................ ................................ ..................... 35 Realism and Coalitions ................................ ................................ ........................... 42 U.S. Coalitions ................................ ................................ ................................ ........ 46 Traditional Alliances and Allies ................................ ................................ ............... 48 Foreign Assistance ................................ ................................ ................................ 52 Rhetoric ................................ ................................ ................................ .................. 60 3 TRADITIONAL ALLIANCES AND ALLIES ................................ .............................. 65 First Gulf War ................................ ................................ ................................ .......... 72 Second Gulf War ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 88 4 FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ................................ ................................ ...................... 105 First Gulf War ................................ ................................ ................................ ........ 111 Second Gulf War ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 120 5 RHETORIC ................................ ................................ ................................ ........... 138 First Gulf War ................................ ................................ ................................ ........ 151 Second Gulf War ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 165 6 CONCLUSIONS ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 181 Research Question ................................ ................................ ............................... 184
6 Theory Building ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 185 Major Findings ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 192 Areas for Improvement and Next Steps ................................ ................................ 196 Policy Implications ................................ ................................ ................................ 202 APPENDIX A. FIRST GULF WAR DOCUMENTATION ................................ ............................... 207 B. SECOND GULF WAR DOCUMENTATION ................................ .......................... 229 L IST OF REFERENCES ................................ ................................ ............................. 252 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ................................ ................................ .......................... 266
7 LIST OF TABLES Table page 3 1 Troop co ntributing members ................................ ................................ ............... 80 A 1 Collective Defense Treaties ................................ ................................ .............. 219 A 2 U.N. Resolutions, First Gulf War ................................ ................................ ....... 220 A 3 Total German contributions to First Gulf War Coalition. ................................ ... 221 A 4 Monetary contributions in the First Gulf War. ................................ ................... 222 A 5 First Gulf War coalition notifications ................................ ................................ 223 A 6 U.S. Assistance by year ($ millions) ................................ ................................ 225 A 7 Summati on of findings, salience of argument across cases ............................. 226 A 8 Notional paired comparison of states ................................ ............................... 227 A 9 Largest recipients of U.S total economic and military assistance, 1946 2007, in constant 2007 dollars (deflated) in $ U.S. millions ................................ ......... 228 B 1 List of elite interviews ................................ ................................ ....................... 242 B 2 Troop contributing coalition partners (2003 2006) ................................ ............ 243 B 3 Troop contributing coalition partners in Iraq ................................ ..................... 244 B 4 U.S. Assistance by year, 2001 2007 ($ millions) ................................ .............. 247 B 5 Combined U.S. aid and troop contribution by year, 2002 2006 ........................ 249
8 LIST OF FIGURES Figure page A 1 Warning time line of Iraq Kuwait Crisis ................................ ............................. 207 A 2 Diplomatic strategy for the coalition. ................................ ................................ 208 A 3 Military strategy for the coalition. ................................ ................................ ...... 210 A 4 U.S. Assistance by year country charts ................................ ............................ 212 A 5 Financial assistance from Gulf War coalition members ................................ .... 213 A 6 Public statements by senior leaders in two administrations .............................. 214 A 7 Total U.S. senior leader rhetoric (2 Aug 90 17 Jan 91) ................................ .. 215 A 8 President Bush and rhetoric charts (2 Aug 90 17 Jan 91) ............................. 216 A 9 A Model for the future ................................ ................................ ....................... 218 B 1 Coalition integration process ................................ ................................ ............ 229 B 2 Non U.S. multinational forces in Iraq ................................ ................................ 230 B 3 Executive summary of coalition partners (OEF/OIF) ................................ ........ 231 B 4 Security incidents in Iraq. ................................ ................................ ................. 232 B 5 Prominent terrorist incidents, 1991 2003 ................................ .......................... 233 B 6 Charts U.S. assistance by year, 2001 2007 ................................ ................... 234 B 7 Forei gn assistance summary ................................ ................................ ............ 236 B 8 Combined U.S. aid and coalition troop data charts (2002 2006) ...................... 237 B 9 Total U.S. foreign assistanc e, 2001 2007 ($ millions) ................................ ...... 239 B 10 U.S. senior leader rhetoric (Jan 1 Jun 30, 2003) ................................ ........... 240 B 11 Bush administration rhetoric (Jan 1 Jun 30, 2003) ................................ ........ 241
9 Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy COOPERATION AND COERCION: U.S. STRATEGIES FOR COALITION BUILDING IN THE FIRST AND SECOND GULF WARS By Peter M. McCabe May 2010 Chair: Leann Brown Major: Political Science This dissertation seeks to contribute to understanding the theories of military coalition f ormation. This U.S. foreign policy study will examine, compare, and contrast the formation of the First Gulf War (1991) and Second Gulf War (2003) coalitions to understand U.S. strategies in coalition building. This study will explain how and why U.S. le d coalition formation for the First Gulf War is different from the recent Iraq conflict. Specifically, the research question is how did U.S. military coalition strategies in the post Cold War era change? By examining traditional military partnerships and alliances, economic incentives, and rhetoric by U.S. senior leaders (i.e., p resident and national security establishment), it will be shown how the strategy with which the U.S. forms coalitions changed. The last eight years have seen the U.S. conduct it s war on terror with mixed results. It has attempted to work with its allies and friends on an ad hoc basis using coalitions of the willing. However, unlike the strategy used in building the First Gulf War coalition, the legitimacy of recent coalitions h as suffered from a lack of support from U.S. relying too much on its military dominance. The strategy used to build an international coalition for the Second Gulf War relied less
10 on traditional allies and more on foreign assistance and fear mongering rhetoric. The manner in which the U.S. builds coalitions now and in the future is an important research question to international relations. First, the current IR literature is woefully lacking in addressing military coalition formation. Second, this examination of coalition formation is important because the global war on terror will continue into the future. Finally, the examination of military coalition formation is important to the U.S. government, specifically to agencies such as the d epartments of s tate and d efense. Acknowledging how coalitions have been formed could affect how traditional allies are approached, how future foreign assistance is used, and how rhetorical practices affect coalition building.
11 CHAPTER 1 MILITARY COALITION F ORMATION Introduction The First and Second Gulf W ars 1 demonstrate U.S. resolve in forming military coalitions. The primary research question is how did the U.S. coalition building strategy change from the First Gulf War to th e Second Gulf War? Specifically, this dissertation will explore w hat w ere the U.S. strateg ies for coalition formation in the Gulf w ars? W ere th ese formal strateg ies or based on ad hoc diplomatic/military efforts? Which U.S. government agency took the le ad in forming th ese coalition s and who were the key players in th e process? These questions inform the reasons why I chose this dissertation topic. This introductory chapter will address the dissertation research question and explain it s importan ce to th e i nternational r elations (IR) literature The chapter will then outline how the research question is addressed theoretically, methodologically, and empirically. Finally, the plan and organization of the dissertation will be outlined. T his dissertation seeks to contribute to our understanding of the theories of military coalition formation. 2 the discipline of IR has recently turned its attention away from formal alliance form ation to coalition formation. Such alliances as the North Atlantic Treaty 1 Iraq War. However, this dissertation will always refer to the United States led coalition against Iraq in 1990/1991 as the First Gulf War and the 2003 to present conflict as the Second Gulf War. 2 Bill Clinton used the term in a 1994 interview with ABC anchor Sam Donaldson. See the ibibli o website titled, Interview of the President by Sam Donaldson, ABC, June 5, 1994, http://www.ibiblio.org/pub/archive s/whitehouse papers/1994/Jun/1994 06 05 Presidents ABC Interview on USS George Washington accessed March 11, 2010.
12 Organization (NATO) have been studied extensively by IR scholars; however the same cannot be said for coalitions. Recent IR literature on coalition formation (the First Gulf War, S econd Gulf War, and Afghanistan) is very U.S. centric. This trend mirrors the U.S. emphasis in IR literature in general. Hence, t his dissertation poses a U.S. foreign policy question how did U.S. military coalition strategies in the post Cold War era ch ange from the First to Second Gulf War ? Its application to an i nternational context (how other state s form coalitions) is limited since the majority of states in the international system cannot match U.S. resources. This is not to preclude the possibilit y of future military coalitions being formed by organizations such as the European Union (EU). In fact, the EU has produced a number of such coalitions albeit on a much smaller scale. 3 These coalitions are usually led by France, Germany, or both. The focus of IR coalition literature has centered on the motivations and reliability of U.S. strategies in coalition formation in the post Cold War era. This U.S. foreign policy study will e xamine, compare, and contrast the First Gulf War (1991) and Second Gulf War (2003) coalitions to understand U.S. strategies in coalition building in the post Cold War era This study will explain how U.S. led coalition formation for the First Gulf War is different from the Second Gulf War By examining traditional military partnerships and alliances, economic incentives, and rhetoric by senior U.S. leaders (i.e., the p resident and s ecretaries of s tate and d efense ), it will be shown how the strategy with w hich the U.S. forms coalitions changed. This change is evident in the U.S. approach to its traditional 3 According to the Council of the European Union website titled, Overview of the missions and operations of the European Union, January 201 0, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=268&lang=en accessed January 2010, there are 11 ongoing military operations in the Middle East, Europe, Asia, and Africa. None of these coalitions however, involve combat operations. A typical EU military coalition
13 allies, the manner in which the U.S. executes its foreign assistance programs, and in the rhetoric of U.S. senior leadership. The two Gulf w ars presen ted in this dissertation are well known and have been extensively covered by the mainstream media and academia. What can this dissertation present that has not already been studied, reported, and examined many times over? There are five elements of this study which provide additional insight into the study of U.S. coalition building. First, the history of U.S. military interventions reveals a trend to work multilaterally through coalitions despite its overwhelming advantage in international affairs. T he U.S. needs to learn from its previous strategies of coalition building. Some coalitions have been more successful than others; therefore, the U.S. strategy to form them is an important factor to consider. This dissertation focuses on input from the two lead organizations (departments of state and defense) in coalition building to highlight the differences in approach in the U.S. strategies for the two Gulf w ars. The second element concerns the importance of working with U.S. traditional allies in both w ar and peacetime coalitions. Despite the U.S. dominance in various aspects of national power (diplomatic, economic, information, and military), the U.S. continually chooses to work multilaterally to solve international security issues. The inclusion of t raditional allies in U.S. led coalitions is important for long term post conflict solutions The U.S. often looks to more formal entities (U.N. and NATO) to obtain political legitimacy and traditional allies can assist in this endeavor. The third elemen t to provide additional insight involves economic incentives. While the effect of U.S. foreign assistance has been extensively studied, this dissertation examines the coalition building phase exclusively to determine whether an
14 aid for troop contribution connection existed in both Gulf w ars. Elite interviews with those responsible for building these two coalitions provide a supporting narrative to the departments of state and defense data on U.S. foreign assistance and troop contributions. The unique fea ture of the fourth element resides in the focus of examining U.S. senior leader rhetoric for coalition building. Peacetime and wartime rhetoric has been extensively examined but often with the goal of explaining U.S. public support for an operation. Inst ead of focusing on U.S. public opinion, t his dissertation focuses on how U.S. rhetoric is used in forming coalitions. The intended targets of this rhetoric are those possible troop contributing states in both Gulf w ars. Finally, the fifth element explore s the policy implications of coalition building. Rather than muddle through forming future coalitions that emphasize quantity instead of quality, the U.S. must work collaboratively with partners on priorities and interests with constant consultation in th e spirit of compromise to achieve coalition objectives. The success of future coalition building is dependent on the U.S. traditional ally relationship and less on U.S. foreign assistance and rhetoric. How the U.S. organizes for a military operation need s to be explored. A simplistic way to view how to organize any military operation can be broken down to four choices. First, a state could attempt to accomplish the operation alone. This option is limited to those states that have the resources and capab ility to deploy world wide. Of course, the U.S. has this option and an argument can be made that other states have this capability although with limitations. Second, the military operation can be organized as a coalition of the willing that is U.S. led. America recruits other states along the way but there is no particular structure. Third, an operation can
15 be centered on an existing alliance such as NATO or an international organization such as the United Nations ( U.N. ) that has a permanent struc ture and where states have permanent commitments to each other. This structure is further formalized whe n military and government civilians work daily to prepare decisions for senior leaders. The advantage of this third option is that states have a stake in decisions from the very beginning and alliance led operations provide political legitimacy. The final option is to begin with an alliance but fall back to the coalition option when best efforts fail to operate on a more formal level. The United Stat es chose the more formal route in the First Gulf War by going to the U.N. for political legitimacy but also assembled a coalition of allies and friends for the combat operations The Second Gulf War was different When the attempt to engage the U.N. fail ed, the U.S. chose to use a less formal option and eventually pull ed together a coalition of the willing. A strategy for coalition formation can take many forms. A state can rely on one instrument of diplomatic, informational, military, or economic power to form an international coalition of states. However, such a limited effort is unlikely since any one single instrument of foreign policy can only achieve so much. Instead a state will likely use a combination of or all the instruments of foreign polic y to achieve its end goal of a coalition of states. The U.S. strategy of coalition formation for the two Gulf w ars is different in the three factors (traditional allies, foreign aid, and rhetoric ) mentioned above. The First Gulf War coalition relied on t raditional allies and senior leader rhetoric but did not emphasize U.S. economic incentives. In fact, the majority of coalition members contributed economic assistance to help pay for the First Gulf War. 4 4 According to the Final Report to Congress titled, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, (1 992:634), http://www.ndu.edu/library/epubs/cpgw.pdf accessed March 2009, t otal US incremental costs for
16 D emonizing Iraq and Saddam Hussein was part of t he U.S. government rhetoric In contrast the Second Gulf War coalition was built by a U.S. strategy that de emphasized traditional allies but relied on foreign aid and fear mongering rhetoric Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld indicated this shift in strategy when in 2003 he referred to important to the U.S. in the Second Gulf War coalition, the U.S. strategy emphasized adding those post communist states that were yearning to move closer to the West. U.S. foreign aid provided to states joining the coalition. In addition, the U.S. strategy also included otential coalition partners to solidify and justify their participation. O ne might ask why this topic is important to study and understand? The importance of this research question to i nternational r elations is three fold. First, the current IR literat ure is inadequate in addressing military coalition formation. While the more formal alliance (NATO) literature is robust, there is a gap when addressing recent military coalitions. Past examples of U.S. led coalitions include the Korean War (1950 1953), Vietnam War (1959 1975), Grenada (1983), First Gulf War (1991), Haiti (1991 1994), Somalia (1992 1995), Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001 present), and Second Gulf War (2003 present). Yet while there are many examples of these conflicts, the IR literature rarely makes a distinction between alliances and coalitions, preferring instead to use the terms interchangeably. Aron (196 6 ) and Bennett et al (1994) consider Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm are estimated at $61 billion. Without responsibil ity sharing, the U S would have had to pay these costs either through a tax increase or through deficit spending, adding to the country s fiscal difficulties. Instead, in 1990 and 1991, c oalition states committed almost $54 billion to offset these costs. Roughly two thirds of these commitments were from the Gulf States directly confronted by Iraq, with the other one third coming largely from Japan and Germany.
17 coalitions and alliances at least interrelated if not interchangeable. A ssuming that coalitio ns and alliances are the same in the IR literature results in the nuances of a coalition being lost. Alliances are durable; coalitions are temporary. Alliances provide a set commitment from the members; coalition member contributions are flexible. Allia nces focus on burden sharing; coalitions are usually led by one state which carries the main burden. Carving out a unique role for coalitions in IR literature is crucial to keep these entities separate and unique. This dissertation addresses t his shortf all in the literature Second, this examination of coalition formation is important because international conflicts will continue into the future. While U.S. administrations change every four to eight years with each administration choosing to emphas ize its own U.S. foreign policy approach, global security concerns will likely continue into the future. Recognizing the change in U.S. coalition strategies will contribute to starting the conversation in IR on coalition formation to address future conflicts. Finally, the examination of military coalition formation is important to the U.S. government, specifically to agencies such as the d epartments of s tate and d efense. Acknowledging how coalitions have been formed could affect how traditional allies are a pproached, how future foreign assistance is used, and how rhetorical practices affect the coalition building to be arrayed against future threats Senior civil servants, political appointees, and military officers can and should learn from these lessons o f the past and find alternative means of coalition formation that do not rely on economic incentives and fear mongering. These alternative means of coalition formation will require relying allies. Emphasizing public diplomacy efforts that complement and support formal
18 diplomatic efforts will accomplish more than relying on traditional allies, economic incentives, and/or rhetoric The Theoretical Literature Starting with t he traditional IR focus on alliances, Stephen Walt (1987) in The Origins of Alliances posits that those able to attract allies are advantaged while those with others allied against them are at a disadvantage. While this statement seems simplistic, it rev eals the importance of understanding the forces that shape international alliances and/or coalitions. Walt initially argues that states balance rather than joining the more powerful state, termed bandwagon ing, and that states balance against threats and n ot against power alone. The second part of : 5) solidarity would seem like a logical factor in alliance formation but Walt finds that many a lliances are actually forms of balancing behavior. He also finds that states sharing the same ideology are often competitive which hinders alliance formation. An example of competition that hinders alliance formation is the failure of pan Arabism. Coop eration among Arab states is difficult to sustain despite like minded ideology. The se first two part of his argument requires further study and updating. Walt (5) cludes that neither foreign aid nor political penetration is by itself a powerful cause of alignment." For him states align against threats and not because of any leverage gained through aid or political penetration. Political penetration is described b y Walt (1987 : 46) as the While o ther types of political penetration could include manipulatio
19 and/or espionage, this dissertation will refer to political penetration as the rhetorical stance is very familiar in IR literature. 5 The general argument concludes that a st ate can become an alliance or coalition partner for reasons other than to obtain some type of reward such as economic or military aid or political penetration. One and political manipulation to persuade or coerce another state or states to join a coalition is not advanced as a causal factor in coalition building. This dissertation departs from this argument and hypothesizes that coalition formation in the post Cold War era rel ies on economic incentives and politi cal manipulation. This dissertation contributes to the IR literature on coalition formation and specifically addresses the third A more expanded theoretical discussion will be presented in Chapter 2. Methodolog ies The method empl oyed in this dissertation is straightforward. The principal historical evidence is from two cases of U.S. military coalition formation. These include the First Gulf War coalition that formed in 1990 /1991 and the Second Gulf War coalition of 2003. These cases provide the opportunity to compare U.S. strategies in coalition formation during the post Cold War era This will allow for a comparison of cases and show how U.S. formed coalitions are influenced by traditional allies, U.S. foreign aid, and U.S. rh etorical practices. Another reason for selecting these two cases as opposed to other U.S. led coalitions is that these cases are in the post Cold War era. Much of the literature on alliance formation stems from either a multipolar environment (pre 5 See Baldwin 1969 ; Bueno de Mesquita 1975 ; Lebovic 1988 ; Poe and Meernik 1995 ; Palmer, Wohla nder, and Morgan 2002.
20 World War II) or a bipolar environment (Cold War era ). The post Cold War era provides a unique opportunity to analyze coalition formation in a virtually unipolar environment. While there is much debate within the IR community on whether we live in a unipolar w orld, it cannot be argued that the U.S. is a dominant IR player. As Robert Jervis (2006 : 8 measured in any conceivable way, the United States has a greater Would either of these Gulf w ars ha ve occurred if the United States did not decide to act? Would any other state or organization have had the ability, even if they had the will, to accomplish what the U.S. did in both conflicts? Charles Krauthammer (199 1 : 25 ), in describing the First Gulf War, no one would have stirred The most likely scenario in the First Gulf War is that Kuwait would have been left to fend for itself and Iraq would at most have faced mild protests from around the world. The same can be said for the Second Gulf War; without U.S. prompting, Iraq would not have been invaded. Of course, whether the U.S. is in a unipolar moment is subject to scholarly debate. William Pfaff (1992) states rightly or wrongly, that a single superpower does not exist. Maybe this debate is just mired in a definitional argument where words like unipolar and superpower take on different shades of The distinction is being di scussed here because the two examined cases (First and Second Gulf War s ) take place in the post Cold War environment of unipolarity. This dissertation makes the assumption that U.S. preeminence is a product of its diplomatic, informational, military, and economic dominance. T his does not mean the U.S. always gets its way or is invincible but that U.S. preeminence is based on the ability to be a decisive factor in any situation it finds
21 itself facing. The post Cold War era can be considered a type of uni polarity since the U.S. has the ability to coerce and influence other states while also projecting its power over great distances and sustaining that effort over a long period of time. Arguments to the contrary might highlight the 2008 economic downturn a nd the two conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. These events sap United States economic and military might which jeopard izes any discussion of unipolar ity However, one must consider the current economic downturn as a world wide phenomenon that affects al l U.S. near competitors. Walt (2009 : 92 recent downturn in the U.S. economy, the United States retains a comfortable margin of While challenges from o ther states and regional organizations abound these challenges have a limit ed effect on U.S. strategies. Therefore, this dissertation will consider the post Cold War era as a type of unipolarity that is distinct from the multipolar world before World War II and the bipolar world of the Cold War. Holding the post Cold War era constant among cases allows an examination of the U.S. strategies for coalition formation in the two Gulf w ars Both scholarly literature and mainstream media provide assessments of the post Cold War era. These include what they mean, what implications arise from both events, and pr e scriptions for the future. This dissertation does not provide such assessments but it does hope to demonstrate that U.S. strategies of coalition for mation were different during this period The post Cold War era has been described as a time when America was advantaged Interests (2000 : 1 ) describes these extraordinary adva
22 today is uniquely positioned to shape the international system to promote international The Commission however also highlights the loss of U.S. focus with the d emise of the Soviet Union. Without that threat, American engagement in international relations has become adrift Another reason for selecting these cases is the constant in the geographical location (Iraq) between the First and Second Gulf Wars. Rober t Divine (2000 : 129) describes the First Gulf War as a tactical victory but a strategic failure. United States President George H.W. Bush ended the ground war after 100 hours of fighting leaving the Iraqi forces to retreat north. The end to the First Gulf War was less than what many expected for such a large expenditure of resources and people. Saddam Hussein was still firmly in control of Iraq and many of his elite forces ( the Republican Guard) were still intact. Twelve years later, t he Second Gulf War provides an opportunity to compare the U.S. efforts to form another international coalition against Iraq. This time, however, the focus of forming an international coalition rested on the premises of weapons of mass destruction and Iraq association wi th terrorist organizations. What were the similarities and differences in U.S. strateg ies employed in forming military coalition s during these two Gulf w ars ? The post Cold War era provide s an opportunity to study coalitions under different external con ditions during a period of U.S. how would the U.S. form coalitions? Certainly the NATO model would be inadequate. Even in the Afghanistan coalition, the initial U.S. strategy in 2001 did not include NATO. It wa s not until 2003 that NATO took over the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan Bennett et al (1997 : 3) argue that because alliances will be looser and
23 more ad hoc in the post Cold War international system than they were between 1947 and 1991, findings based largely on one fixed, fairly tight alliance may not generalize to other kinds of security coalitions. If t hese post Cold War coalitions include the First Gulf War, Somalia, Haiti, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Second Gulf War why concen trate on just two U.S. led coalitions and not all six? The coalitions for Somalia, Haiti, and Kosovo each provide reasons for their exclusion. The intervention in Somalia involved actions by an international coalition to prevent in country atrocities. T he civil war among Somali warlords was devastating to the local populace and caused widespread famine. The resulting humanitarian crisis pushed the United Nations to authorize the use of force to ensure relief supplies could aid the population. However, it required the U.S. to form a military coalition and in December 1992 Operation Restore Hope began. A coalition to prevent a humanitarian disaster is quite different from a coalition to confront a state threatening others thus Somalia would provide a po or comparison case of a U.S. led coalition in the post Cold War era. Haiti provides a similar problem. In response to the military coup and ouster of Haitian president Jean Bertrand Aristide, the U.S. in September 1994 formed a U N sponsored multination al force. This move was necessary because of the repressive nature of the military regime toward its own people and the worsening economic conditions in Haiti the most impoverished state in the Western Hemisphere These conditions resulted in a massive flood of Haitians fleeing the country and heading to U.S. shores. Hence, another humanitarian crisis prompted a response from a U.S. led coalition. Neither Somalia nor Haiti threatened their neighbors or were deemed a regional threat. Instead, intervent ion in both cases was the result of
24 a state abusing its own population. These cases do not correspond to the external threat posed by Afghanistan and Iraq. Kosovo is another example of a coalition intervening in the internal affairs of a state. Ethnic tensions within Yugoslavia came to a boil at the end of the Cold War. By 1990, Kosovo attempted to declare itself a state but failed. Serbia reacted by repressing the Kosovo Albanians and a decade of conflict ensued. By 1999, the fighting escalated to the point where NATO decided to step in and restore order. The goal of the NATO forces was to get the Serb forces out of Kosovo, implement a NATO peacekeeping force, and allow refugees to return home. While the U.S. made up the bulk of these forces and it was U.S. leadership at the top military positions, it was still a sanctioned NATO mission. Various NATO member governments had veto power over target selection and U.S. autonomy was not absolute. Thus, t he role of NATO in this operation excludes this coalition from consideration. It should be noted that the stated objective for NATO intervention was the threat that Serbia posed to its neighbors which would make this case similar to Afghanistan and Iraq. However, the only NATO member even remotely th reatened by the Balkan conflict was Greece; hence t here was no other serious threat to the region. Much like Somalia and Haiti, this coalition was motivated by concern for the general population. Claims that Serbs were practicing genocide on Kosovar Alba nians were a strong motivating factor For these reasons, being a NATO operation (not U.S. led) and humanitarian crisis, Kosovo is not considered a suitable case study. The absence of Afghanistan as a case needs to be explained; h owever t here are two re asons why the Afghanistan coalition and the associated strategy are not
25 considered along with the two Iraq coalitions. First t iming is an issue. Operation Enduring Freedom began o n October 7, 2001, less than one month since the terrorist attacks in the United States. Such a short time period between the terrorist attacks and start of the war make it difficult for the U.S. to implement a formal strategy as well as for potential participants to recognize the implementation of a U.S. coalition strategy. U sing Afghanistan as a third case might be fruitful and interesting to explore but s uch a task is more time consuming and complex, so will not be attempted here. Second the operations in Afghanistan, although U.S. led, w ere soon joined in December 2001 b y a U.N. mandated organization t he International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) created to assist the Afghan transitional government with security in and around Kabul. Since August 2003, ISAF has been directed by NATO. The inclusion of ISAF, with NAT O forces, makes using Afghanistan as a case problematic. Attempting to distinguish between U.S. U.N. and NATO strategies in coalition formation would complicate the use of Afghanistan as a case. The United States strategy for coalition formation would not be the only strategy involved in Afghanistan. Finally, t he method s of process tracing and content analysis will be employed to distinguish between U.S. strategies employed in the two Gulf w ars. Process tracing will highlight the coalition formation for Operation Desert Shield in 1990 and what emerged the following year for Operation Desert Storm. The First Gulf War provides an excellent case study. The same geographical region and similar countries involved in the second coalition make comparisons straightforward. In political science, Alexander George and Timothy McKeown (1985) describe process tracing as a method that examines the decision process. According to George and McKeown (1985 : 35 tracing
26 approach attempts to uncover what stimuli the actors attend to; the decision process that makes use of these stimuli to arrive at decisions; the actual behavior that then occurs; the effect of various institutional arrangements on attention, processing, and behavior; and the effect of othe r variables of interest on attention, processing, and George and Bennett (2005 : 6 ) describe process tracing as a method in which sources to see whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes or implies in a case is Process tracing enhances the res earch design by focusing on those key events in the U.S. strategy for coali tion formation that are part of the historical record. Documentary research and first account interviews at the sites of those involved in the chain of events yield th e necessary data. Robert Weber (1990 : 9) explains that content analysis is a research t ool used to for social science research has often been criticized as being unsci entific. Robert Mitchell (1967 : 231) argues that d ata produced by content analysis techniques have been used in many studies primarily for descriptive rather than for hypothesis testing purposes. The challenge of context analysis is to use a consistent co ding scheme throughout the data gathering process to provide reliable and valid results. A main test of any content analysis is the large amount of data that needs to be reduced to a few content categories. The consistency or reliability of these categor ies is crucial. However, reliability can be compromised if ambiguity arises in either the words that are
27 being counted or the content categories associated with them. The validity of content analysis relies on how well what is measured is consistent with the intent of the study. In assessing the U.S. coalition formation strategy of fear mongering, the challenge lies in coding the correct words in a text that convey such meaning. Weber (1990 : 41) identifies several techniques of content analysis that incl ude: word frequency counts, key word in context (KWIC) listing, concordances ( a form of cross reference between and among related words) classification of words into content categories, content category counts, and retrievals based on content categories and co occurrences. For the purposes of this dissertation, word frequency counts will be the primary basis of the content analysis. Empirical Evidence The data collected for this dissertation are obtained from various sources. Documentary research prov ide s the bulk of the evidence supplemented by elite interviews The documentary evidence and interviews were obtained from U.S. Central Command, Office of the Secretary of Defense /Joint Staff the Department of State, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, an d the George H.W. Bush Presidential Library. The United States Central Command in Tampa, Florida is one of six geographic combatant commands. The U.S. is the only country that divides the entire globe into military commands and assigns U.S. military for ces to specific regions worldwide. This practice is outlined in the Unified Command Plan (UCP) 6 According to General David 6 The Goldwater Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 requires the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to conduct a biennial review of the UCP to examine the force structure, missions, and responsibilities, incl uding geographical boundaries of each unified command. The other five geographical combatant commands are Northern, Southern, European, Pacific, and Africa Command.
28 4.6 million square miles and 20 countries, the are a of responsibility contains vital transportation and trade routes, including the Red Sea, the Northern Indian Ocean, and the Arabian Gulf, as well as strategic maritime choke points at the Suez Canal, the Bab 7 Centra l Command was responsible for the conduct of the First Gulf War and is currently executing the Afghanistan and Second Gulf War. Working closely with the Department of State, Central Command was instrumental in building and maintaining coalitions. The cur rent coalition village at MacDill AFB in Tampa is made up of representatives from 50 countries supporting Afghanistan and/or Iraq operations. At its height in operations tempo in November 2003, the coalition village consisted of 72 countries supporting Af ghanistan operations and 67 countries supporting Iraq operations. Data obtained from Central Command consists of coalition contributions to both Iraq w ars which include troops, equipment, over flight permission, basing rights, and financial contributions Th ese data provide evidence of the military focus on traditional and non traditional allies in the two Iraq wars. Other sources of data are located at the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Joint Staff (JS) both of which are located in the Pe ntagon. These two organizations represent the civilian and military leadership and staff for the U.S. armed forces. Both the OSD and JS provide guidance to Central Command and coordinate their efforts to build and maintain international coalitions. The same type s of empirical evidence (troops, equipment, over flight permission, basing rights, and financial 7 rvices Committee, Posture Statement April 1, 2009, http://www.centcom.mil/en/from the commander/commanders statement to senate armed services committee april 1 2009.html accessed July 2009.
29 contributions) reside with in these two organizations. This redundancy allows verification of the data. Another government agency critical to the coa lition building process is the Department of State (DOS). In both Gulf w ars, the DOS was the lead agency in the initial phases of coalition building. However, as these coalitions matured and evolved, much of the day to tions moved to the Department of Defense, specifically Central Command. The final sources of data are from the manuscript archives at the Seeley G. Mudd Library, Princeton, New Jersey and the George H.W. Bush Presidential Library in College Station, Texa s where d ata pertaining to the First Gulf War coalition can be found. While much of the documentation for both Bush p residenc ies is still classified there are memos, directives, and other correspondence that outline the process used to build a military coalition Obviously, more data are available and ha ve been unclassified since the 1990/1 military coalition than for the 2003 coalition. This limitation will be mitigated by the interviews of key a dministration personnel involved in coalition building f or the Second Gulf War. As previously mentioned, data for this dissertation consist of documentary evidence obtained through archival research and from interviews of key players in the process of coalition building for the two Gulf wars. While this type o f social science research is often used, it is not easy and not foolproof George and Bennett (2005 : 94) roblem is focusing solely on U.S. foreign policy. Problems can arise when using archival materials and interviews for sources that might not be reliable. The researcher must always be aware r problem arises when
30 the researcher relies too much on a single, authoritative source of a particular event. The result of such a transgression is that the evidence might favor the stated outcome. This concern is shared by Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba ( 1994 : 228) who caution that These issues are certainly a concern but can be overcome by using archival evidence from multipl e sources. Therefore, this dissertation uses sources (archives and interviews) from those currently in government and those now in the private sector. Both types of evidence are critical to ensure written accounts are verified by those intimately involve d in the process. The s trengths and w eaknesses of process tracing have been considered. T he re are advantages that elite interviewing can have relative to documentary research It gives the researcher the ability to gain information that may not be inclu ded in released documents, and the opportunity to probe individuals with further questions once they have advanced what may be the official version of events. With process tracing, however, the aim of conducting interviews is not to generalize to the po pulation, but rather to uncover specific data from key individuals concerning a particular chain of events. The three factors that will be explored in both Gulf war cases consist of traditional alliances and allies, foreign assistance, and rhetoric. The main source of empirical evidence for all factors will be drawn from the U.S. government archival documentation and interviews. A further discussion of the rhetoric variable needs to occur, specifically the method to collect this data needs to be elabora ted. Weber (19 90 : 5) identifies numerous sources for content analysis includ ing books, magazines, newspapers,
31 speech transcripts, conversations, radio and television programs, and interviews. This usually results in an overabundance of text the analysis of which is extremely time consuming. This is a problem in this study. Attempting to examine all the sources of data available for the U.S. coalition formation strategy on two coalitions would be a major undertaking. Additionally, such a macro level an alysis would cover the U.S. rhetoric directed at possible and actual coalition partners (up to 7 0 countries). For this study, government source s will be selected as a represent ative sample of senior leader rhetoric and key words used to gather data for th e two Gulf wars The speeches and remarks by the holders of the offices of p resident s ecretar y of s tate and secretary of d efense found at government websites and library archives are the primary source for the content analysis. Choosing these three rol es and relying on government websites and library archives over any other actor or source is a matter of expedience for its ease of use. For the purposes of this dissertation, key words will be sought in examining U.S. senior leader speeches and remarks i n the years of coalition building for the two Gulf wars K ey words such as should yield appropriate data for interpretation. While such an analysis could be wide ranging, the depth of analysis for a purely statistical interpretation would be shallow. T assistance and political penetration have no or limited influence on whether a state does or does not join a U.S led coalition. However, I also find that the strategy for the Second Gulf War coalition formed emphasizes different factors Foreign aid and the rhetorical practices of senior leaders are the primary means in the Second Gulf War strategy for coalition formation. Coalition formation in the First Gulf War was less
32 problematic due to Iraqi violations of international law with its invasion of Kuwait. However, the Second Gulf War presented a challenge in coalition formation. So t ying Iraq to the larger gl obal war on terror was critical to U.S. strategy on coalition formation but failed to attract traditional allies The United States sought other means to attract allies hence the importance to explore foreign aid and rhetoric in coalition building The final section describes the plan and organization of the dissertation. Plan and Organization Th is first chapter provides an introduction outlin ing the project and the research design The remaining chapters proceed as follows. C hapter 2 will focus on pr esenting the theoretical gaps and limitations of several bodies of current IR literature on coalitions. The focus on formal alliances will be acknowledged and a summary of the literature on coalitions will be explored. The paucity of literature describin g a change in U.S. strategies for coalition formation provides an opportunity to add to the already limited IR literature on coalitions. This chapter will also explore the theoretical literature of traditional alliances, foreign assistance, and rhetoric. The next three chapters will be formatted in similar manner s They each will focus on a specific factor of U.S. strategy. Each chapter will explore how that factor was or was not causal in the First Gulf War the Second Gulf War or both C hapter 3 foc us es on traditional alli es This factor helps explain the U.S. strategy in the First Gulf War where allies such as the U.K. Germany, and France ha d a major role in the conduct of the war a trend that is reversed in the Second Gulf War. C hapter 4 will p resent the role of foreign assistance in U.S. strategies for both Gulf w ars may need to be updated to reflect how the Second Gulf War was formed. In C hapter 5 the role of rhetoric is explored. Finally,
33 C hapter 6 will discuss what was found and the implications for future U.S. coalition formation strategies.
34 CHAPTER 2 COALITION THEORY This chapter explore s the i nternational r elations literature on coalitions and finds that it is embedded in the IR literature on alliances. The mil itary coalitions of the past have been studied, analyzed, and explained as if they were actual formal alliances such as NATO that we know today. Coalitions have a long history. As long as tribes and groups have warred there have been coalitions. In the IR literature, however, t he earliest examples of military coalitions investigated by IR scholars involve the grand coalitions arrayed against France in general and after 1799, Napoleon in particular Starting with what historians call the First Coalitio n in 1793, various European states as well as the Ottoman Empire join ed and le ft this coalition over a number of years. As explained by Michael Rapport (1998 : 13), t his First Coalition finally ended in 1797 but ing more than a fragile truce shattered less than a year later by the advent of the War of the Second Coalition. A total of seven coalitions (1792 97, 1799 1801, 1805, 1806 07, 1809 1812 1814, 1815 ) of this type (called the Coalitions a gainst France) exi sted and combinations of various powers ended in failure largely due to the lack of cooperation between Vienna, Berlin, St Petersburg, and London, result ing in no common political goals. Phillip Dwyer (2008 : 605) explains that these early coalitions had c ontradictory goals and no overall military strategy. The y also were termed alliance s and remained together, not for the purpose of a generic collective security guarantee but for one specific goal defeat Napoleon and France. The defeat of Napoleon in Russia and the formation of what is Quadruple Alliance) marks the first time all the great powers were finally united against
35 France (Dwyer : 606). This definitional overlap o persists to this day In the next section, we f ind the IR literature dominated by theories of alliances, yet many authors erroneously use coalitions as examples. This lack of precision in the terminology diminishes the analytical validity of both terms and makes it more difficult to distinguish the unique features of each concept. The following section addresses realism and coalitions and how realism presents alliances and coalitions. In short, realists do not mak e a distinction between alliances and coalitions. This is followed by an examination of United States ( U.S. ) coalition literature and its focus on the collective action problem. The next three sections focus on traditional alliances and allies, foreign a ssistance, and rhetoric in the IR literature. In that literature, f oreign assistance is by far the most robust topic with many expla nations of the relationship between foreign assistance and coalition partners. Th e chapter ends with a discussion of where IR theorizing on coalitions could be head ed in the future. Alliance s versus Coalition s A great deal of scholarly attention in IR has been focused on formal alliances. 1 Most scholarship focuses on alliance formation and answering the question of why and how they form. These formal alliances involve traditional allies providing collective security for a region or area but also include alliances of convenience among states that feel threatened. Liska (1962 : es as being reserved for special cases; they help implement either joint political control with friendly postcolonial elites or joint postwar accommodation of wartime allies and 1 See Sabrosky, 198 8 ; Siverson and King, 1980; Morrow, 1991, 1994, 2000; Smith, 1995; Lai and Reiter, 2000; Leeds et al., 2000; Leeds, 2003
36 enemies. At the end of the Cold War, formal alliances such as NATO question ed their because their existence was based on opposing the Warsaw Pact. The IR literature and mainstream media in the 1990s were filled with predictions of future. Many scholars and foreign policy reporters reasoned that NATO cohesio n would be difficult to maintain without a focus. Much of the scholarship focused on the fact that after the end of the C old W ar, the United States faced a different challenge in NATO. United States allies' were insisting on setting their own defense pr iorities instead of following Washington Clarke and Cornish (2002 : 779) contend th e EU's common European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) is a dual edged sword for NATO. On the one hand, ESDP could weaken European ties to NATO and the U.S. while on the other hand, ESDP could be the spark Europeans need to close the capability gap with the U.S. and hence strengthen NATO. Another major theme in the literature concentrates on NATO expansion and questions who should be admitted and why. For example, J oyce Kaufman (1997 : 25) examines what NATO might be in the twenty first century and the growing rift within the alliance, and questions what role NATO should play in the post Cold War world in light of changing political realities. In game theor y analysis o f alliance formation, Alastair Smith (1995 : 419) argues that scholars should be examining the effects of alliances on the behavior of states rather than looking at incidence s of war. This is so because a defensive (formal) alliance could be the reason a st ate does not wage war and hence it is the alliance itself that is changing the behavior. This type of negative outcome is the most difficult problem to explain. Why did the United States and the Soviet Union never directly confront each other during the Cold War? Was it the presence of the NATO and
37 Warsaw Pact alliances? Or was it the existence of nuclear weapons? While most would agree that formal alliances play a major role in preventing conflict there are other factors (economic, political, military informational) that also act as deterren ts One such factor is the use of coalitions to address international relations issues. But formal alliance scholarship does not explain military coalitions. This focus on formal alliances in the IR literature h elps to explain the limited scholarship on military coalitions. In fact, Smith (1995 : three lines of research: the relationship between alliance formation and the occurrence of war, the motivati small segment of the more recent IR literature, when addressing military coalition formation in the post Cold War era, uses the terms alliance and coalition interchangeably. For exa mple, when exploring the First Gulf War, Kendall Stiles (2002) an To confuse the issue even further, m uch of the IR and more general political science literature on coalitions concentr ate on the influence of domestic politics. 2 A more useful distinction can be found in the U.S. military definition of a coalition : an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations [states] for common action. 3 A 2 not apply to military coalitions but to electoral politics As Indridason (2008 : 244) states similar to a much older definition provided by Kelley (1968 : 63) in which a coalition situation is described advance certain policies in a legislature, etc) by combining with other individuals or groups to form a costs of these domestic coalitions are a popular subject in game theor y models as Mershon (1996 : 538) explains: coalition theories in the domestic context assumes that expected costs push politicians away from some behaviors, and expected benefits pull them toward others. These domestic examples of coalition sc holarship are not helpful when attempting to distinguish a coalition from an alliance. 3 See Joint Publication 1 02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms April 12, 2001 (amended May 30,2008), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict accessed June 2009.
38 inational action outside the bounds of established alliances, usually for single occasions or longer cooperation in a narrow sector of 4 The flexibility in structuring a coalition allows the central power forming the coalition an opportun ity to adjust to the existing conditions and not be tied to lesser states. of alliances. Recall that Walt (1987 ) defines an alliance as a formal or informal relationship of securi ty cooperation between two or more sovereign states. This formation. It was Walt (1998 : 29) who also argued that IR comprises one world but many theories. But why foc of the IR literature on alliance and coalition formation, the following reasons explain why his argument provides the best opportunity to illustrate U.S. strategies in coalition formation just three years before the start of Operation Desert Shield, the beginning of the First Gulf War. This is important since the findings of his argument should reinforce the data from the Gulf coalition. I expect to find that Walt is correct that traditional allies play a larger role and that both aid and rhetoric play subordinate roles in determining how states chose their allies in the First Gulf War. John Duffield (1992) agrees with of threat theory to help explain why the First Gulf War coalition arrayed against Iraq. seem the possibility of aggression and the greater allied mili tary preparations are likely 4 Ibid.
39 War. Here I expect to find that traditional allies played a lesser role, but that aid and rhetoric played the dominate role in determini ng how the U.S. secured their allies. military preparations are likely to slacken and force levels to decline, since there is no perceived immediate need to balance Duffield and Walt argue is that threat matters. Not only is it important that a threat exists, but the type of threat also is important. The biggest threat at the beginning of the twenty first century is terro rism. The attacks on the United States prompted America to states, including the U.K. and Russia, have been battling terrorists for many years prior to the 2001 att acks on the United States, but it was that event that clearly demarcated a new era in the fight against terrorism. Organizations pursuing global goals and causes, networking with organized crime, drug trafficking, state sponsors, and others sympathetic to their cause threaten international peace and prosperity. Martin Shaw between an ambitious new coalition of all major states and civil society, against the terrorists and Alexander Wendt posits in his famous 1992 International Organization make of it. Th e way one reacts to anarchy and terrorism is a self imposed behavior. Obviously, all terrorists are not the same and they do not all hold the same goals and objectives. This might explain why so many states rejected the U.S. call for a global war on terr or. A terrorist to one state could be considered a freedom fighter to another.
40 and more conventional nationalist movements particularly facilitates the broad ideolog ical framework of the war on terrorism and its multiple adaptations to the goals of and the crucial role the level of threat plays in how states align within a coalition contributed to the U.S. strategies in coalition formation for both Gulf w ars. This dissertation will show that U.S. coalition building strategies changed because potent ial coalition partners did not share the U.S. assessment of the threat. an alliance is not as rigid as those often used in other scholarly literature on the same topic. severing the relationship or failing to honor the agreement would presumably cost flexibility to work with coalitions, such as the two Gulf War coalitions, formed within the last 20 years. Other definitions of alliances are much more restrictive. The Correlates of War (COW) Formal Alliance data set seeks to identify each formal alliance between at least two states that fall into the categories of defense pact, neutrality or non agg ression treaty, or entente agreement. 5 Identifying alliances with formal agreements precludes the types of coalitions that have dominated recent international relations. 5 See the Correlates of War website titled, Datasets, http://www.correlatesofwar.org accessed June 2009, for expl anations of the COW dataset.
41 le gislative body, the lack of a formal signed agreement among states in a coalition would preclude it from being considered an alliance by the COW definition. Elizabeth Sherwood security commitm ents between two or more nations [and] are the shared recognition of this definition is troublesome for such coalitions as the First and Second Gulf Wars. For example as opposed to such durable alliances as NATO, many states have chosen to join and leave the recent Gulf War coalition over the last seven years. Just as the First Gulf War coalition disbanded once the mission was considered complete, the same will occur of durability could prevent it from being considered an alliance by Sherwood Randall. ag reements, signed by official representatives of at least two independent states, that include promises to aid a partner in the event of military conflict, to remain neutral in the event of conflict, to refrain from military conflict with one another, or to consult/cooperate definition is less restrictive than the COW definition, it still is not as useful as the definition provided by Walt. Finally, the U.S. mil relationship that results from a formal agreement (e.g., treaty) between two or more nations for broad, long term objectives that further the common interests of the 6 While this definition is generic enough to include coalitions, this 6 See Joint Publication 1 02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms April, 12, 2001 (amended May 30, 2008), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/d oddict accessed June 2009.
42 dissertation will use the Walt definition of an alliance, which is flexible enough to encompass the military coalitions addressed here. A more thorough examination of the theoretical literature on coalitions will be presented in the next chapter. M uch of the IR literature on military coalitions focuses on why states join coalitions. What is lacking and what this dissertation addresses is how the U.S. forms coalitions in the two Gulf w ars This dissertation will explore what strategies and what actions the U.S. employs in creating these coalitions. The existing coalition literature is seriously limited by its inattention to subsystemic causal factors. This dissertation will show that three factors, traditional allies, econo mic assistance, and rhetoric, provide a better explanation of U.S. strategies in coalition formation. Realism and Coalitions Coalitions, much like alliances, are a means to an end for those subscribing to the r ealist tradition. In a realist world, an in ternational institution is formed and persist s only as a tool to maximize relative gains. Jae Jung Suh (2007 : 5) explains institutional stick, it is because it is seen to be contributing or at the minimum, neutral to power balancing and the security of states. This view of realism on alliances can also be extended to coalitions. But r ealism is not just a single school of thought rather it can be divided into classical realism, neorealism, and n eoclassical realism many with variations that distinguish each from the other s in The Origins of Alliances are situated in a neoclassical realist camp. By focusing on traditional alliance s and allies, economic assistance, and rhetoric, this project moves beyond the role of power politics and embraces domestic dynamics.
43 S tates in a realist international system are self seeking entities searching for power and security. Stability and war are the concerns of a realist approach. The primary goals of this school of thought are security and of promoting stability The primary assumptions of realism include but are not limited to: an anarchical internat ional system and the importance of relative gains; the distribution of material power determining relations among states; and the notion that the s can be summarized as a parsimonious theory to help explain how material power determines and achieves the national interest (survival) by accumulating, maintaining, and demonstrating power. its lack of explanatory power regarding balance of power calculations. Realism i s often confounded by economic globalization, political democratization, belief systems, and the role of international law and institutions. As a classical realist, Hans Morgenthau (1985) in Politics Among Nations argues that international politics is a natural struggle for power. F or Morgenthau this struggle involves more than numerical military superiority i t also involves the struggle for the and economic and techni cal aid. In this context, economic and technical aid for underdeveloped areas takes on special importance. For such aid differs from mere propaganda exactly in that it is a deed rather than a promise. Rather than telling other peoples what could be don e, or what is being done elsewhere, it makes the promises of propaganda good here and now. 7 7 Morgenthau, Hans. (1985) Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace New York: Alfred Knopf. 345 346.
44 The politics among states described by Morgenthau also involve coalitions 8 that try to transform common interests into common policy/action. Structural realism is a theory that seeks to explain international outcomes, for example, the likelihood of a great power war, the durability of alliances, or the likelihood of international cooperation. Unlike classical realism, structural realism does not investigate human nature but is concerned with the structure of the international system. However, structural realism is not a unitary theory and is divided into offensive and defensive realism. Offensive realism is outlined by John Mearsheimer in The Tragedy of Great Po wer Politics (2001) Mearsheimer argues that the surest way for states to secure their survival is by increasing their power and becoming as strong as possible. of power theory in Theory of International Politics (1979). Waltz and the defensive realists argue that states should avoid trying to maximize power for fear of provoking a balancing of powers against them. Waltz asserts that the fear that others will balance power discourages st ates from maximizing power. Defensive realists believe that states seek security rather than influence Consequently, states will expand their interests abroad when they are threatened. Waltz (1979) argues that alliances are intended to balance power an d that third parties will generally align with the weaker state against the stronger state. As stated asserts that third parties will generally align with the weaker state against the stronger state only if the stronger state is perceived by the third party as a threat. T he realist literature 8 h like coalitions as defined in this dissertation. Once the war objectives have been met, these general alliances (like coalitions) typically dissolve even among traditional allies and friends.
45 does not concern itself only with balancing power against power or threats. The issue of bandwagoning needs to be addressed. As opposed to balancing, bandwagoning i s when states join the stronger, more powerful (threatening) state. This is usually due to the benefits a state gains in joining the stronger state as opposed to trying to balance against it. Walt (1987) concludes that bandwagoning occurs only under cert ain conditions because bandwagoning is dangerous. It increases the resources available to a threatening power and requires placing trust in its continued forbearance. Mearsheimer (2001) argues that bandwagoning is almost always a bad idea because it is c apitulation to the stronger state by the third party. Schweller (1994 : and against assuming that balancing and bandwagoning are designed to achieve the e realist framework by arguing that states must balance their own security and non security interests; when security concerns are less intense, bandwagoning for material gains is rational, and more common than realists realize. 9 The United States encourag es and benefits from bandwagoning when states attempt to meet their security interests (heightened by U.S. fear mongering) and their non security interests (economic incentives). Neoclassical realism, exemplified by the work of Gideon Rose (1998) and Far eed Zakaria (1998) focuses on the effect of domestic factors on the foreign policy behavior of a state. Specifically, the scope and ambition of a foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the international system and by its rela tive material power capabilities. Neoclassical realism interprets and explain s the behavior of an individual 9 See response paper by Ben Goodrich, Alliance Formation and International Relations Theory, 2004, http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~goodrich/IRnotes/Week09/Ben_response.pdf accessed February 2009.
46 state, for example, its military doctrine force posture, alliance preference, foreign economic policy, or the choice of accommodative versus aggre ssive diplomacy. By focusing on traditional alliances and allies, economic assistance, and rhetoric, this project moves beyond the role of power politics and embraces domestic dynamics. A realist views military alliances and especially coalitions as eith er temporary security arrangement s or as means to end s U.S. Coalitions The literature on U.S. led coalitions is embedded in the literature on U.S. led alliances. These coalitions with their ad hoc arrangements while common in the post Cold War era a re not restricted to that timeframe. U.S. led c oalitions formed to deal with regional conflicts such as Korea, Vietnam, and Grenada were all in the Cold War era. These coalitions existed during a time of bipolarity in the international system. All thr ee coalitions were attempts to check communism abroad and challenge perceived threats to U.S. interests. While the scope of and commitment to these coalitions varied widely, there is no doubt that all three coalitions were formed to confront communism. E ven the tiny island of Grenada was a victim of the Cold War struggle between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and its staunch ally Cuba. By overthrowing the government, holding 1,000 U.S. medical students hostage, and declaring martial law, the Marxist Leni nist faction gave the U.S. the excuse they needed for military action. However, the invasion of the island and the rescue mission by U.S. and Caribbean forces cannot compare on any scale to the large coalitions that fought in Korea and Vietnam. These thr ee U.S. led coalitions during the Cold War, while interesting, will not be addressed here. Instead concentrating on U.S. led coalitions in the post Cold War era provides an opportunity to compare coalitions in a unipolar international environment. Post Cold
47 War coalitions are all influenced by the same transformational forces. The end of the Cold War challenged U.S. foreign policy to reevaluate itself and its interaction with the international system. International relations scholars w ere also challeng ed to not only explain the end of the Cold War IR theories (realism, liberalism, and constructivism) as they pertain to the end of the Cold War are important. While ontologically different, the sch olars all agree that the old order of bipolarity and the security it offered had come to an end. The two coalitions studied in this dissertation provide similar cases in this post Cold War era of states wh ich threatened regional neighbors and/or other st ates outside the region. The key difference between the two coalitions is they fall on either side of the global war on terror. By examining these coalitions, a change in U.S. led coalition formation will be highlighted. There is a limited amount of IR literature on these U.S. led coalitions and it is concerned mainly with burden sharing. Who contributes to coalitions? What do they contribute? Why do they contribute? Corbetta and Dixon (2004 : 5) explore the broader debate of why states act unilaterall y or multilaterally and conclude that major powers are substantially more prone to multilateral participation than other states. Other scholars 10 have focused on whether unilateralism or multilateralism is a more appropriate approach to foreign policy. Co alition studies on specific areas or regions have been published by the RAND Corporation. 11 For example, Nora Bensahel (2003) of RAND studies U.S. cooperation with Europe, NATO, and the European Union. Bensahel notes the predominant tendency of the U.S. t o 10 See Keohane and Nye 198 5; Urquhart 1986; Gallarotti 1991; Lake 1992; Ruggie 1992; Patrick and Forman 2002. 11 Others researching coalition politics in specific wars include Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger 1994, 1997; eitsman 2003; Biddle 2005.
48 prefer bilateral agreements rather than using more formal alliances such as NATO. Even with its traditional allies, s he advocates for the U.S. to work bilaterally on military and intelligence matters and multilaterally (through coalitions) on financial and law enforcement matters. Thomas Marshall et al (1997 : ix ) focus on the problems and solutions in future coalition operations by analyzing four aspects of coalition operations: historical and cultural influences, command, technology, and doctrine and training. Steve Yetiv (2004) utilizes an integrated approach to explore U.S. decision making in the First Gulf War The five perspectives outlined by Yetiv are the rational actor model, cognitive approach, domestic politics, groupthink, and government p olitics model. He concludes that with the exception of the government politics model, each of these perspectives holds explanatory power. The U.S. post Cold War era coalition strategy has focused on retaining the flexibility of coalitions by dominating t he decision making process but also by making overtures to allies and friends in order to fight with those with similar training and technology This strategy has been implemented with traditional allies, foreign assistance, and U.S. senior leader rhetor ic all of which will be explored next. Traditional Alliances and Allies According to Henry Kissinger (1969 : 65): alliances, to be effective, must meet four conditions: (1) a common objective usually defense against a common danger; (2) a degree of jo int policy at least sufficient to define the casus belli ; (3) some technical means of cooperation in case common action is decided upon; and (4) a penalty for noncooperation that is, the possibility of being refused assistance must exist otherwise prot ection will be taken for granted and the mutuality of obligation will break down. As
49 previously discussed, past coalitions such as the Korean and Vietnam wars have been analyzed as if they were alliances but there are real distinctions between alliances and coalitions. The level of formality and longevity for a coalition is much less and shorter respectively. In addition, while coalitions are more voluntary in nature these four ge neral conditions for alliances as outlined by Kissinger can also be applied to coalitions. The U.S. goes to great lengths to build coalitions that will support its foreign policy initiatives. Meeting all four of these conditions adds the necessary legit imacy when building a coalition. It will be show n that a ll these conditions were pursued, with varying success, in the two Gulf War coalitions. In the First Gulf War, the common objective was invasion of Kuwait and his threat s to Saudi Arabian oilfields were seen as a common danger to not only the immediate countries involved but to regional neighbors and beyond. Certainly, the U.S. was deeply concerned about the annexation of te rritory that could seriously affect its national interest and undermine the free flow of oil from the Middle East. The second condition was met when the U.N. soon after the Iraqi invasion, passed U.N. Resolution 660 which condemned the invasion and dema nded the withdrawal of Iraqi troops. This was soon followed by U.N. Resolution 661 which placed economic sanctions on Iraq. But it was U.N. Resolution 678 that defined the casus belli. This resolution gave Iraq a deadline of January 15, 1991 to withdr aw from Kuwait and authorized the use of force to enforce U.N. Resolution 660. A coalition was formed that started with Operation Desert Shield as the U.S. and other forces rushed to the region to defend Saudi Arabia. This met the third condition of a su ccessful coalition which gave it common purpose prior to conflict. Operation Desert Storm was
50 implemented as hostilities against Iraq commenced first with a devastating air war followed by a ground war. The coalition for the First Gulf War was dominate d by the U.S. and augmented by Arab states and more traditional U.S. allies. O ther states however, did not participate or participated only minimally. Their noncompliance and the U.S. reaction met the final condition of a coalition. Compared to the Fi rst Gulf War, i n the Second Gulf War the common objective was much less clear. The al Qaeda attacks on the U.S. in 2001 pushed the topic of terrorism as a national security concern to the fore. Certainly prior to 2001, other national security issues had a higher priority. According to the National Security Strategy (2000 : the elements of engagement adapting alliances; encouraging the reorientation of other states, including former adversaries; encouraging democratization, open markets, free trade, and sustainable development; preventing conflict; countering potential regional aggressors; confronting new threats; and steering international peace and stability operations 12 Terrorism is men tioned when outlining a strategy for the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The common objective(s) provided for the 2003 coalition included ending the brutal reign of Saddam Hussein, the possibility that Iraq possess ed WMDs, and the p ossibility that Iraq was supplying terrorist groups with these WMDs. Among the traditional allies, a greement o n this common objective was mixed at best. The second condition of a joint policy to define the offensive operations also encountered problem s. Although attempts were made to follow the blueprint of the First Gulf War, those attempts fell short. Despite working toward a U.N. Security Council 12 See Air War College website for The National Security Strategy titled, A National Security Strategy for a Global Age, December 2000, released in January 2001 http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nss/nss_dec2000_contents.htm accessed July 2009.
51 Resolution similar to Resolution 678, the best the U.S. could obtain was UNSC Resolution 1441 (2002) This document declared Iraq in material breach of its obligations, provided Iraq an opportunity to comply with previous U.N. demands, outlined required cooperation with U.N. face serious consequences as a 13 The lack of further U.N. r esolutions outlining the use of force against Iraq was a major stumbling block in the attempt to convinc e traditional U.S. allies to join the coalition. The third and four th conditions were also pursued but with limited success. The aspect of actually fighting the Second Gulf War was accomplished primarily by a small number of coalition states with the majority of states contributing troops for support rather than combat duties. The lack of unified effort was due partly to a gap in warfighting capability among coalition members and partly to political restraints on coalition deployed troops. Non cooperation on the part of U.S. traditional and nontraditional allies was a contentious issue for the coalition. U.S. relations with those non cooperat ing states were strained and many of those repercussions are still being felt at present The persistence of i nternational alliance s is a topic in IR scholarship because of the many doubts that such a framework would survive the post Cold War era. Many of to changing geopolitical conditions. Jae Jung Suh (2007 : 1) explains that alliances per But what does this 13 See United Nations website titled, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441, November 8, 2002, www .un.org/Docs/scres/2002/sc2002.htm accessed August 2009.
52 mean for the role that alliances and traditional allies play in the formation of international coalitions? Is a coalition just alliance lite? Comparisons of c oalition formation in the two Gulf w ars make a compelling case that the role of alliances and traditional allies are changing The U.S. has collective defense treaties that date to the Cold War era with states mostly in Europe, the Pacific, and South America. 14 The most recent Gulf War, h owever, relied on states not considered traditional all ies or on states not members of traditional alliances. Post communist states from Eastern Europe and Central Asia provided troop contributions in Iraq while more traditional allies such as Germany and France did not. Whether the U.S. continues to rely on its traditional allies or opt to form coalitions with more non traditional allies will be a continuing U.S. foreign policy question. Richard Haas s (2009 : [ I ] am not attracted to calls for a caucus or coalition of democracies; in many cases, we will need to work with nondemocratic governments if we are to succeed in stemming proliferation, thwarting While the IR scholarship on the role of traditional alliances and allies in coalit ion building is limited the same cannot be said for the role of foreign assistance. The next section outlines the IR scholarship on economic assistance as a foreign policy tool. Foreign Assistance United States foreign assistance (financial, military, te chnological, among others ) around the world has never been more important. For example, in fiscal year (FY) 2008 the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development 14 These collective defense treaties include: NATO, ANZUS, U.S. Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty, U.S. Japan Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty, U.S. Korea Mutual Defense Treaty, and the Rio T reaty. These treaties are discussed further in Chapter 3.
53 ( US AID) foreign assistance request was $20.3 billion, a $2.2 billio n or 12 percent increase over FY 2006 enacted levels (House Foreign Affairs Committee Testimony, March 8, 2007). Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, U.S. foreign assistance has played a role in many develop ing states, especially in Southeast Europe and C entral Asia. While the U.S. foreign assistance budget is large, the annual amount is still less than the cost of two months in Iraq. The focus of U.S. foreign assistance is due not so much to the altruistic nature of the United States but to the strateg ic location of recipient states to conflicts crucial to U.S. national interest s The current conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, both centers of gravity in the war on terror, provide the U.S. the challenge of sustaining these operations over a long distanc e. The obvious need for bases of operations, logistic centers, and other areas of operations in the region is not lost on the U.S. or the countries in the region. To this end, this dissertation is concerned with exploring the influence of economic factor s in the creation, maintenance, and strengthening of military coalitions To what degree has the U.S. used foreign assistance to create military coalitions ? The history of U.S. foreign assistance can be broken down into four stages. The first stage was the Marshall Plan, which operated from 1948 to 1951. During this period, Aurelis Morgner (1967 : 65) argues checking the spread of communism in the developed countries of Western Europe by aiding Europeans to r as defined by Morgner (66) U.S. Agency for International Development ( US AID), which was created by the Foreign
54 Assistance Act of 1961. This foreign aid was designed to address problems of the emerging African nations, the rise of Castro to power in Cuba, and the demands of the other Latin America n states. The fourth stage of foreign aid is related to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the newly independent states that emerged from it. Foreign aid for this region, also known as Eurasia, amount ed to over $15 billion from 1961 2001. 15 A case coul d be made that the U.S. has entered a new era of foreign assistance in which a fifth stage of aid exists that is related to fighting terrorism. Although few would deny the connection between aid and influence, there is very little agreement on the precise nature of this connection or on which analytical methods should be used to study the problem. This lack of agreement provides an opportunity to explore the influence of aid on foreign troop support in military coalitions The literature on the topic of t he influence of foreign assistance is divided into three conflicting views. First, there are those who believe economic influence is idealistic rhetoric. As noted by shou ld win friends for the United States and increase our bargaining power in the United (Huntington 1970 : 169). The politics of foreign aid is part of the body of literature that focuses on how Congress and the American people view such aid. The lack of the usual interest group constituency, as other federal budget items have, makes foreign aid an easy target. William Morrow (1968 : 15 See Defense Department website titled, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) FY2008 Global War On Terror Request, 2008, http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2008/fy2007_supplemental/FY2008_Global_War_On_ Terror_Request/pdfs/operation/12_%20DSCA_Supp_OP 5.pdf acces sed September 2009.
55 judged unfavo rable, the theory underlying the entire program is often questioned Samuel Huntington (1970 : 170) states that other scholars are more pragmatic and believe assistance in fa ct, provide s assistance to a government which may or may not be very friendly to the U.S. in return for that government giving us something which we want, e.g., base rights, a U.N. vote, troops in Vietnam, the r (1967) believe influence can be considered a given consequence of foreign assistance. stumbled into on a purely alt ruistic basis. The aid program has always been related to David Baldwin (1969 : 425) demonstrates that the focus of much of the literature concerns links between particular types of aid and what is often called i ntervention and the possibility of functional equivalents for aid that do not involve intervention. This line of argument is touched on by Harry Shaw (1983 : 123) who concludes that U.S. dependency and jeopardiz es U .S. support for countries with more urgent security Historically, the size and shape of the U.S. foreign aid program has come under a dministrative and c ongressional scrutiny. One example includes the 1963 Clay Committee in which President Kenned y asked retired General Lucius D. Clay to head up a ten man committee to re examine foreign aid policies. The Committee published a 22 page report to the p resident and a more detailed report to Congress. Clay's committee offered no bold new approaches to foreign aid but the y recognized that
56 foreign aid emphasis has shifted over the years. Jacob Viner et al (1963 : 342) offer a pragmatic notion of aid that is espoused by the lone dissenting opinion from the Clay Committee Report: The foreign aid and mili tary assistance programs constitute T he extensive financial support by the American people of foreign aid activities conducted by private voluntary agencies is proof this : G iven the importance of wealth as a power base, it would be difficult to imagine a foreign aid transaction that did not change the distribut ion of influence both within and among The third view claims that the U.S. national interest. In his 1963 message to Congress on foreign aid funding, T he richest nation in the world would surely be justified in spending less than one percent of its national income on assistance to its less fortunate sister nations solely as a matter of international responsibility; but inasmuch as these programs are not mer ely the right thing to do, but clearly in our national self 1963 : 321) A study by Apodaca and Stohl (1999 : 193) finds that, in determining whether or not a state receives aid, th e following factors are all statistically significant: aid received in the past, the economic need of the recipient state, and the political stability of the recipient state. However, in determining the amount of aid distributed to a recipient state, pas t aid received and military importance of the state to the U.S. are the only significant influences, while recipient state respect for human rights, need, and economic
57 importance to the U.S. are all deemed insignificant. The literature on foreign assistan ce does not address the connection to troop or basing support for a military coalition For example, d oes the amount of foreign assistance provided by the U.S. to a coalition member depend on the troops or basing provided by a state in a military coalitio n or does a contribution of troops or basing to a U.S. led military coalition depend on the amount of U.S. foreign assistance received ? The lag time between states receiving U.S. foreign assistance and when states provide troops or basing support is key to the causal arrow. An example of this lag time illustrated by Ukraine. The first troops provided by Ukraine for the Operation Iraqi Freedom coalition arrive d in Iraq in August 2003. This was at the very end of FY 2003 and any additional boost to the Ukrainian foreign assistance budget would not take effect until the next fiscal year. This is exactly what happened. In FY 20 total foreign assist ance budget rose from $86.1 million to $159.3 million. 16 While economics play a role in forming military coalitions there are other factors that motivate states to join a coalition Some join from a real or perceived belief that a threat is imminent. So me join even though they do not perceive any threat these states have other political motives for joining which might include winning support for their own enemies (foreign and domestic) or simply to pay back another state for past support. These are o ther factors to keep in mind when studying military coalitions and the changing nature of aid. 16 See Defense Department website titled, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) FY2008 Global War On Terror Request, 2008, http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2008/fy2007_supplemental/FY2008_Global_War_On_ Terror_Request/pdfs/operation/12_%20DSCA_Supp_OP 5.pdf accessed September 2009.
58 the U.S. this idea is based on the foundations of its Judeo Christian backg round where a moral responsibility exists for those better off to help those worse off. Taffett (2007 : 3) U.S. developed a massive European aid program following World War II, and a similar one for Japan. Soon after these aid programs were put in place, both economic, social, and political conditions improved. This simpl e cause and effect, while not scientifically verified, is the image of the value of foreign assistance that still persists today. Roger Riddell (1987 : 3) notes that since its inception, official development assistance (ODA) has been continuously provided on the grounds of morality, w ith governments asserting that they have a moral obligation to grant aid and the general public in donor states support official programs on that basis. After September 11, 2001, h owever, the view of foreign assistance changed as evidenced by a USAID rep ort (2003 : W hen development and governance fail in a country, the consequences engulf entire regions and leap around the 17 This view implies that foreign aid is vital to sec ure domestic peace and reduce the chances of terrorist attack s The argument to reduce or eliminate global poverty is no longer based on altruistic motives; instead, it is a worthwhile endeavor for national preservation. Jeffrey Taffett (2007 : 3) suggests unlikely to become revolutionaries and that economic stability in the U.S. strengthens 17 See USAID website titled, Foreign Assistance in the National Interest: Promoting Freedom, Security, and Opportunity, 2003 http://www.usaid.gov/fani accessed July 2009.
59 precursors of instability and indicator s that c onflict might emerge that could threaten the United States. By promoting democracy and effective government, economic development would be more likely to occur. Prosperity would then strengthen democracy. The elimination of poverty would mean the elimin ation of instability that can lead to terrorism. Robert Zimmerman (1993 : 13) argues that U.S. foreign policy objectives and interests include the physical security of the U.S. the political security and cooperation with strategically important states, an d the promoti on of economic security and growth. U.S. foreign economic aid can advance at least two of these foreign policy objectives: promotion of political security and economic growth. Zimmerman (37) concludes that while U.S. foreign assistance may help modernize infrastructure or transfer some T able A 9 in Appendix A lists the largest recipients of U.S. military and economic aid since World War II and provides strong evidence of U.S. motives regarding aid. Major recipients include Israel and other Middle Eastern states such as Egypt, Iraq, Jord an, and Turkey along with the Philippines (former U.S. possession ), and the Asian states of Vietnam, South Korea, and Taiwan among others. Missing from this list are sub Saharan African states that could benefit from robust U.S. aid. What this table con firms is that U.S. aid is not provided for the development of a society or state since most of the neediest states are not included Instead, U.S. aid is provided as a diplomatic tool to persuade a state to behave in favor of U.S. national interests
60 This view of foreign aid as a vital link to secure domestic peace and reduce the chances of a terrorist attack is similar to the ideas of Walt Rostow (1959) five stages of economic growth which were the traditional society, the preconditions for take off, th e take off, the drive to maturity, and the age of high mass consumption. This modernization theory emphasized the instrument of foreign aid and helped to focus U.S. foreign assistance programs Kimber Pearce (2001 : 26) ar gues the Kennedy a dministration was confronted with the task of selling the foreign aid package as an anti Castro, anticommunist initiative at home, while at the same time working to excite Latin Americans with images of economic progress and Roger Riddell (1987 : 87) also contends that Rostow can be seen as the bridge between the politics and economics of aid, for his economic reasoning was clearly placed within a specific political ideology. It is not just U.S. aid that bridg es with politics, the nature of U.S. rhetoric also bridges with politics Rhetoric Evan Cornog (2004 : 5) reminds us that the essence of presidential power is the to p utilizes presidential speeches and remarks but also those of secretaries of State and Defense as rhetorical devices All three office have a level of legitimacy and authority that allows the office words t o carry weight with foreign leaders. It will be argued in Chapter 5 that U.S. strategies in coalition building employ U.S. senior leader negative rhetoric as one factor of persuasion. This theme of using rhetoric to foster and further foreign policy goal s is touched upon in IR literature. Hans Morgenthau (1985 : gain the support of the public opinion of other states for its foreign and domestic
61 This is accomplished not only with diplomatic and military instruments of power but also with the use of rhetoric to dominate what Morgenthau claims is the struggle for the minds of men. The key to winning this struggle lies in Morgenthau (346) caution of the In other words, to be successful, the political and military policies and strategies have to lead to victory. Other scholars such as Martin Medhurst et al (1990 : 169) view rhetoric as part o f U.S. the other side as the enemy, the conflict as rhetoric during the Cold War of U.S. led coalitions in Korea and Vietnam. However, such IR scholars as Reinhold Niebuhr (1967) argue that Vietnam should be understood as a matter of imperial politics ( U.S. imperialism) and not a holy war between two powerful ideologies (democracy and communism). Niebuhr (55) explain ed why the Vietnam rhetoric was problemat ic as follows : The average voter knows little and cares less about these imperial responsibilities, such as assuring the safety of the non Communist nations on the fringes of Asia, but is moved only by appeals to our democratic idealism, which usually is f ormed by static anti Communism. Our engagement in Vietnam has consequently forced the administration to create a series of obvious fictions or myths calculated to obscure the hiatus between our idealism and our hegemonic responsibilities. However, it was the success of anticommunism rhetoric that Justin Lewis (2001 : 142) describes as [ that ] rested upon decades of ideological work that portrayed communism of any kind as a creed so repressive and so threatening that almost every act of U.S. aggression was U.S. foreign policy in the Cold War era is applicable to the two Gulf w ars and the global war on terror.
62 The terrorist attack on the United States in 2001 was a critical jun cture in how the U.S. forms military coalitions for a war on terror. Much like the fear mongering rhetoric during the Cold War, the U.S. T he war on terror also allows the U.S. to globalize that fear. Prior to the war on terror, demonizing a particular state or set of states, national leader or leaders, and ideologies allowed the U.S. to rally its populace and allies toward a particular goal. Examples from the past 100 years abound. The U.S. governm ent coerced the U.S. populace into a war with Spain after the sinking of the USS Maine in the Havana Harbor. Calls of U.S. public demand for war. The defeat of Spain in 1898, which led to the acquisition of Cuba, the Phili ppines, Puerto Rico, and Guam, was the first step in the process that allowed the U.S. to think of itself as an international power. The entry of the U.S. in to World War I brought the U.S. more prestige. Much like the Spanish American War, the U.S. entry into World War I was prompted by the to wage unrestricted submarine warfare led to the sinking of the RMS Lusitania which was carrying U.S. citizens. The outrage in the U.S. pushed the U.S. to join the war. While the 1920s and 1930s were years whe n the U.S. pulled back from playing on the international stage, that all ended with the entry of the U.S. into World War II Ironically the ship pattern continues as the U.S. enters World War II because of the Japanese a ttack on Pearl Harbor which resulted in the sinking of numerous warships and the death of thousands of U.S. personnel. The defeat of Germany and Japan and possession of nuclear weapons moved the U.S. into the forefront of international relations. The ri se of the Soviet Union and the ensuing Cold War challenged U.S. hegemony, h owever, d uring this time, the U.S. continued to
63 oppose communism worldwide with conflicts in Korea and Vietnam. The fear of worldwide communist expansion and especially the fear of a communist takeover of the U.S. led to the both domestically and internationally, prompted the initial U.S. forays into two wars in Asia. The end of the Cold War was a time for reevaluation of U.S. f oreign policy. d to claim that title. In the First Gulf War, this role was assumed by Saddam Hussein who was demonized by President George H.W. This ongoing search for a new focus for such alliances as NATO was found in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. In the days following the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York, the Pentagon in Washington and the purpose driven plane crash in rural Pennsylvania, a military coalition began to form with one common goal to eradicate terrorism and those who perpetuate it on a global scale. The war on terror began. So what is different about the way threats are used to induce fear in others especially in U.S. led coalitions? The notion of security before the end of the Cold War was based on a classical realist approach Michael Sheehan (2005) describes this type of security as being fixed, or as military versus the military power of other states. New concepts of security have been introduced that explain the focus on unorthodox approaches to security. Helle Palu (200 7 : 3) argues that the global difficult than search ing for security by orthodox military means, to think or define security in terms of power and violence. Communism wa s portrayed as a global threat
64 and the new threats of the global war on terror that emerged allowed the Bush administration to be unorthodox in its thinking about security. Instead of framing the threat as one state or one particular leader as was done f or the First Gulf War, the U.S. framed the threat for the Afghanistan and Second Gulf War coalitions as a global entity included a web of organizations including al Qaeda. F rank Gadinger (2006 : 1 2 ) argues this point and shows how the U.S. struggled with a lost identity after the Cold War but reframed the threat after the 9/11 attacks using a new security rhetoric of fear mongering. Gadinger believes this now stabilized U.S. powerful and uncontrollable that a foreign policy change in the light of the Iraq disaster might only be possible at the price of a new U.S. Whether the current Iraq coalition has soured possible future coalition s is a topic for IR scholarship to embrace and explore. One thing is certain relations of states within unipolarity are unique and need to be understood. Walt (2009 : fixed, multilateral, and highly institutionalize d structures that depend on permanent overseas deployments, the United States, as the unipolar power, is likely to rely more heavily on ad hoc coalitions, flexible deployments, and bilateral arrangements that maximize its own leverage and freedom of action With this in mind, IR scholars need to focus more attention on theories of military coalition separate and apart from alliance literature. The next chapter focuses on traditional allies in the formation of military coalitions.
65 CHAPTER 3 TRADITIONAL ALLIANCES AND ALLIES Dealing with the enemy is a simple and straight forward matter when contrasted with securing close cooperation with an ally Major General Fox Connor on World War I 1 er to fight allies than to be one of them Lieutenant General Mark Clark, 1944 2 The post Cold War era places the United States ( U.S. ) in a unique position in international relations. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the U.S. is l eft with no immediate peer competitor. Despite this, in the post Cold War era, the U.S. continues to work with coalition partners as exemplified by the First Gulf War onward. The lack of U.S. unilateral military action does not seem logical based on the two quotes above that reflect the historical U.S. experience with coalition partners from the First and Second World Wars. Why continue to work with allies even though the benefits are sometimes overshadowed by the liabilities? The preponderance of U.S. military power should be a convincing reason to act unilaterally and yet the evidence shows it prefers to work with allies. This chapter will demonstrate that U.S. traditional allies are crucial to coalition building strategies. Traditional allies are t hose allies that have historically participated with the U.S. in collective defense alliances. This long term relationship has engendered trust and common practices that make for willing and capable coalition partners. These coalition partners are famili ar with U.S. procedures from participation 1 Freeman, Waldo, Randall Hess, and Manuel Faria. (1992) T he Challenges of Combined Operations. Military Review 62(11): 4. 2 Silkett, Wayne. (1993) Alliance and Coalition Warfare. Parameters Summer 74.
66 with the U.S. in other coalition operations. This familiarity allows the coalition partner to operate with the U.S. in most, if not all, environments and situations. Besides the capability these coalition partne rs bring to the operation, traditional allies are usually loyal states that have previously answered the call to join a U.S. led coalition. Finally, traditional allies are crucial to U.S. coalitions because they provide legitimacy to the operation. This chapter will distinguish between traditional and non traditional allies and examine whether these traditional allies are part of U.S. strategies for the two Gulf w ars. Which states does the U.S. pursue in forming the Gulf War coalitions? Who pursues them and how are they pursued? This chapter also takes into account the strategic environment, specifically the U.S. experience in coalition building in the 1990s. What did the U.S. learn about coalition building in the breakup of Yugoslavia? This chapter s upports the thesis that the U.S. coalition building strategy in the First Gulf War emphasized traditional allies and was deemphasized in the Second Gulf War. But why should the U.S. even pursue coalition partners? The U.S. faces a dilemma because it is a dominant military power. As John Becker (1993 : U.S. is the only international power currently capable of projecting, and sustaining, large this is true, being dominant does not ma ke the U.S. omnipresent. The U.S. military cannot be and do everything everywhere around the globe. Becker (1993) summarizes this dilemma and finds the U.S. incapable of unilaterally using its dominant military force and acknowledges there are strong pol itical and economic reasons why the U.S. can no with allies in coalition operations is a smart choice. One reason is trust another is
67 loyalty, while still another invol ves allies sharing common interests. These and other attributes of a traditional ally will be explored. T he U.S. tactic rel ies upon traditio nal allies to build a military coalition to take advantage of existing institutional commitments; existing institut ional procedures, relationships, and joint training experience; common interests, worldviews, and norms; In general, focusing on traditional allies, a state hopes to avoid or at least minimize those p oints of friction that historically affect coalitions. States with institutional commitments ( political, economic, or military) to each other have common operating principles already established that make coalition building easier. Marshall et al (1997 : develop and coordinate such agreements on common principles include NATO [ and ] procedures, relationships, and training are what hold a military force together. When combining different militaries with in a coalition, having equivalent capabilities within these areas limits points of friction. Traditional allies, especially NATO allies, possess the advantage of common goals, logistics, and capabilities. Cultural differences (religion, class, tolerance, work ethic, and national tradition s ) could hamper an international coalition. These differences can be minimized within a coalition by focusing on traditional allies. A level of understanding and cultural tolerance exists among these states that enhance cooperative efforts. Marshall et al (1997 : 11) coalition partners, the smoother the ope same argument applies to the trust and loyalty among traditional allies. Trust and
68 loyalty are precious commodities in international relations with every state concerned about its national interests. Yet, traditional allies provide each other with trust and Some Western Europe an states, especially the United Kingdom and the U.S. have such a connection. This connection has been strained, h owever, by the post Cold War era wars and conflicts. The years since the 9/11 terrorist attacks have strained this Europe an U.S. connection which will become evident later in this chapter as the role of traditional allies is analyzed in both Gulf w ars. Much like the democratic peace theory, traditional allies are assumed to be immune to conflict with one another while at the same time being ideal partners for coalitions. There are two main parts to the democratic peace theory. First, democracies do not fight o ther democracies (or only do so rarely, according to some author s 3 ), and second, democracies have the least foreign and domestic violence. Russett and ONeal (2001 : three cornered intellectual constr uct of the structure of a peaceful world, which he believed was dependent on democracy, economic interdependence, and international Michael Mandelbaum (2005 : 294) argues this point in which the broad allegiance to peace, democracy, a nd free markets affects the international community so that disputes within the community do not lead to armed conflict. The role of traditional alliances and allies in coalition operations is analyzed in much the same way. Any state, especially the U.S. would prefer to fight alongside those states it 3 See Siverson and Emmons (1991), Barnett and Levy (1991), Siverson and Starr (1991), Bueno de Mesquita a nd Lalman (1992), and Maoz and Siverson (2008) as examples of those who test the impact of democracy on alliance choices.
69 can trust the most. The case is often made that the U.S. and U.K. have an alliance because they are both liberal democracies (Simon and Gartzke 1996). The validity of the democratic peace theory will not be debated here but the premise of trust applies to traditional allies and must be acknowledged if we are to look at how U.S. strategies in coalition building utilize traditional allies in the post Cold War era. Walt (2009 : 117) these coalitions which are needed less for the capabilities they produce than for the appearance of legitimacy they convey the unipole will what makes one stat e an ally while another state not identified as an ally is also not considered an enemy? What makes the United Kingdom a stalwart ally to the U.S. while a state like Norway is not? The answer resides in the definition of what makes an ally an ally. Ru ssett and ONeal (2001 : 103) note that allies do not usually fight or threaten one another with military action and because they are allies they share common strategic and security interests. Dan Reiter (1994 : 490) acknowledges that to international relations: they are the primary foreign policy means by which states increase their security, and they are crucial determinants of the state an ally and t hese arrangements are documented in treaties that formalize the alliance among allies. The U.S. Department of State 2009 Treaties in Force 4 (TIF) is a list of treaties and other international agreements of the United States in force. This particular lis ting 4 United States Department of State, Treaties in Force (TIF) as of January 1, 2009 (Washington, DC: Office of the Legal Advisor, U.S. Dept. of State, 1950). This annual publication lists and very briefly summarizes all US treaties and agreements still in force, arranged by country and subject. Includes both bilateral and multilateral treaties. The primary use of TIF is verification of the existence of a treaty.
70 contains thousands of bilateral and multilateral treaties signed by the United States. The TIF (2009 : i) ned by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related treaty to explore coalition formation will not be very useful since the U.S. has some type of treaty with almost every state in the world. Just because the U.S. has a treaty with another state does not mean that state is an ally of the United States. Rather, it just means the U.S. has a common interest on a particular item with that state. Therefore, some other criteria will be need ed to help determine who is an ally. Since this paper is concerned with military coalitions, the logical solution is to look at collective defense treaties because it is with these states the U.S. ei ther will work together to avoid conflict or if necessary fight alongside on the battlefield. While other treaties are concerned with diplomatic and/or economic issues, collective defense treaties involve committing a Coal ition partners are then determined by the willingness of a state to commit troops for collective security. Table A 1 in Appendix A summarizes the historical U.S. collective defense treaties with other states. In whole or in part, some of these treaties a re no longer in force. For example, the Rio Treaty, originally signed in 1947 includes Cuba. Obviously, the U.S. currently does not have a defense obligation with Cuba although many of the other states from Central and South America listed in the treat y remain tied to the United States. As an example of these coalition defense th (2001), just three days after the terrorist 5 5
71 States enter int o these formal alliances for collective security, as a way to balance the power within the international relations of states, and to further their own self interests. Alan Sabrosky (1988 : 2) contends that alliances are an instrument used by states to advan ce their interests or goals, usually in the area of security or defense. When it comes to gathering allies together to form a coalition, it is important to gather states that have a common goal and purpose. Otherwise the coalition could fracture due to d iversified interests and agreement could be difficult to reach. This chapter will assess traditional allies in U.S. coalition building strategies for the two case studies of the First and Second Gulf Wars. It will be shown that for the First Gulf War, s uch traditional allies as the U.K. France, Turkey, Germany, and Japan played major role s in the U.S. strategy for building an international coalition. This will then be contrasted with the U.S. coalition strategy ( traditional allies ) for the Second Gulf War. For this second coalition, the U.S. Kissinger (1969 : 11) argues that an intense and direct threat is normally required to produce a timely, united response while lack of agreement on t he threat weakens a coalition. This is evident in the wide support for U.S. efforts against Iraq after the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the world wide support for U.S. efforts to overthrow the Taliban government in Afghanistan in 2001. Yet th at same level of agreement was absent from U.S. efforts against Saddam Hussein in Iraq in 2003 because there was a definite lack of agreement on the threat and coalition goals for the Second Gulf War. with Prime Minister John Howard of Australia in Crawford, Texas, May 3, 2003, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP 2003 book1/pdf/PPP 2003 book1 doc pg421.pdf accessed September 2009.
72 The next section will explore U.S. employment of strategies of traditional allies to build coalitions First Gulf War The events that unfolded in 1990 that led to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait are well known and documented by many scholars (Summers 1995, Gay 1996, Head and Tilford 1996, Bennett et al 1997, Moham edou 1998). A full accounting of those events, their implications, and various permutations will not be elaborated here. It is important, however n 1990 was not the random act of a madman. Jasem Karam (2005 : 1937, the next was by President Abdul Kareem Qasim in 1961, and the final claim was made by Saddam Hussein, when h initially involved claims of access to the Persian Gulf and later claims on oil fields. The August 2, 1990 invasion of Kuwait was preceded by a period of hostile Iraqi rhetoric. sian Gulf prompted a U.S. Department of State (DOS) cable dated July 24, 1990 to recommend U.S. embassies in the Persian Gulf region to brief host country governments on the regional threat. 6 The concern revolved around threats made toward both Kuwait an d the United Arab Emirates. The DOS cable emphasized [the U.S. ] take no position on the border delineation issue raised by Iraq with respect to Kuwait, or on other bilateral disputes, Iraqi statements suggest an intention to resolve outstan ding disagreements by the use of force, an approach which 6 Department of State cable titled, U S Reaction to Iraqi threats in Gulf, July 24, 1990, ID # CF01937 003, WHORM: Subject File, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.
73 is contrary to U.N. 7 This U.S. concern about threats of violence in the Persian Gulf has a long history. United States policy toward the Persian Gulf has traditionally focused on regional stability and emphasized the free flow of oil. The concern by the U.S. for regional stability increased with the British withdrawal from the region forty years ago. J.C. Hurewitz (1972 : government in January 1968 announced that it would withdraw from the Persian Gulf before the end of 1971, American security planners on the Middle East became p resident of the United States to direct nati onal security studies in 1969, 1973, 1976, and 1982. 8 The common element among all these National Security Council memorand a is the examination of U.S. political and strategic goals in the Persian Gulf. The purpose of these national security studies was to develop policy alternatives with particular emphasis on Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. United States involvement in the Persian Gulf increased in the 1980s in response to increased Iranian attacks on neutral shipping and threats to the Gulf stat es. In 1984 President Ronald Reagan approved political and military consultations with U.S. allies and the Gulf states on security cooperation to respond to these threats. In April 1987 President Reagan authorized U.S. naval protection for Kuwaiti tanke rs under the U.S. flag, which required a major augmentation of U.S. naval forces in the Gulf and North Arabian Sea. Finally, with the August 1988 Iran/Iraq ceasefire in effect, the U.S. government began a gradual 7 Ibid. 8 National Security Memorandums 66 (July 12 1969), 181 (May 10 1973), 238 (February 13 1976), and National Security Study Directive 4 82 (March 19 1982). ID num bers CF01937 006 and CF01937 003. WHORM: Subject File, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.
74 reduction of U.S. forces in the Gulf, in c onsultation with European allies and the Gulf states. Based on this historical concern for the region, the United States assessment of the Persian Gulf in the July 24, 1990 DOS cable is certainly justified. Whether the U.S. should have taken a more proa ctive stance concerning the border disputes is certainly debatable but this stance is consistent with the role the U.S. historically has taken in the Persian Gulf. U.S. security relations with states in the region range from strong (Saudi Arabia) to non existent (Iran). In fact, the United States has no legally binding commitment to provide U.S. forces to defend any state in the Gulf region although a U.S. S ecurity R elations, C ommitments, and I claims by the states in the region as de facto commitments of U.S. 9 For example, in 1957 Congress pas sed a joint resolution known as the Eisenhower Doctrine declaring a vital U.S. national interest in the independence and integrity of the states of the Middle East. 10 This doctrine was reiterated by p residents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon. In January 198 0, the Persian Gulf region was placed under a more specific U.S. security gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests o f the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any 9 0 04. WHORM: Subject File, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library. 10 Fordham University website titled, The Eisenhower Doctrine on the Middle East, A Message to Congress, http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1957eisenhowerdoctrine.html accessed June 2009.
75 11 In this instance, the outside force referred to the Soviet Union. Similarly, President Reagan in 1984 and 1985 stated that the U.S. w ould take whatever measures were necessary to prevent interference with freedom of navigation in the Gulf (Richman 1987). In addition, a number of p residential letters have been sent to Gulf rulers over the years expressing a U.S. interest in the security of the Gulf states generally. 12 For all of these reasons, it would be contrary to U.S. interests to permit any power, including Iraq, to gain dominance over Gulf oil supplies. D ominance by a single state would enable it to dictate oil prices and produc tion, placing the economies of the U.S. and its allies in an extremely vulnerable position that would become more precarious as Western dependence on Gulf oil continue d to grow. Therefore, the United States monitored the Iraq Kuwait dispute closely. As a n example, Figure A 1 in Appendix A depicts a National Security Council produced timeline of the Iraq Kuwait events leading up to the August 2, 1990 invasion. However, to monitor a situation and to tak e steps to prevent it from occurring are not the same While the U.S. was aware of Iraq belligerent rhetoric and movement of forces toward the Kuwaiti border, nothing of consequence was implemented to prevent the eventual invasion. Many within the foreign policy community believed that Iraq was simply us ing coercive tactics to get Kuwait to the bargaining table. However, as Kendall Stiles (2002 : 124) describes August 2, 1990, the Iraqi army, fourth largest in the world, led by more than 4,000 tanks, 11 1980, http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/speeches/su80jec.phtml accessed June 2009. 12 D #CF01937 004. WHORM: Subject File, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.
76 poured across the Kuwait border to overrun a nat Even though pre invasion Iraqi military movements were being monitored, the scale and swiftness of the invasion took many by surprise. Marshall et al (1997 : to overcome a common threat or situation that an individual nation could not face Jeffrey Yaeger (1992 : 60) contends that the two most critical factors in keeping th e First Gulf Wa r coalition and any other coalition together were present: a pronounced threat and a workable framework on which to build the coalition. The serious threat came from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The workable framework came in the form of diplomatic com mand and control. Freeman et al (1992 : 4) argues that it is vital that allies choose a single leader or at least reach an agreement on how operations will be coordinated to achieve a semblance of unity. For the First Gulf War, no single supreme commander existed. 13 coalition, but not be subordinate to the United States. The threat of what Saddam Hussein was doing and might do in the future was powerful glue in building a coalition of states to stand against him. By the third of August the seeds of an opposing coalition of states were being planted The United States led this effort and immediately made contact with Arab and European leaders. A review of President George H.W. B provides a glimpse into the role that traditional allies ha d in forming the First Gulf War 13 There was a tandem operational command with General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of all U.S. forces, and Saudi Lieutenant General Khalid bin Sultan, c ommander of all Saudi and Arab forces. All allied forces in the Gulf War were under one or the other headquarters. See Chapter 14 from COL On Strategy II: A critical analysis of the Gulf War New York: Dell Publishing.
77 coalition. Carlisle (2003 : vacation to Kennebunkport, Maine, and while ther e placed more than 60 phone calls to world Bush chose his telephone calls very carefully Abdul Fahd (Saudi Arabia), Talal Hussein (Jordan), Hosni Mubarak (Egypt), and Ali Saleh (Yemen) in the speaking to such tradition al allies as Margaret Thatcher ( U.K. ), Francois Mitterand (France), Helmut Kohl (Germany), Turgut Ozal (Turkey), and Toshiki Kaifu (Japan). 14 Also revealing is t he order of these telephone calls. Among the Western traditional allies and Middle East friend s, Prime Minister Thatcher is the first international leader consulted by President Bush. President Turgut Ozal of Turkey is the second called at 1:58 pm ; Prime Minister Thatcher of the U.K. receive d a second call at 3:03 pm, then President Mitterand of France at 4:32 pm, Chancellor Kohl of Germany at 6:01 pm, and finally Prime Minister Kaifu of Japan at 8 pm. 15 The call to President Ozal is essential since Turkey is at the crossroads of Europe and the Middle Eas t and an important NATO partner Presid ent Ozal committed to calling King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, President Rafsanjani of Iran, and President Assad of Syria. This interaction by Turkey with Iran and Syria on behalf of the United States prove d helpful to the eventual coalition as Iran remained ( relatively) neutral during the crisis while Syria eventually contributed troops to the coalition. The following day, President Bush phoned President Ozal and confirmed that he had Francois Mitterand, and Helmut Kohl [ and ] al l agree with us that Iraq must withdraw from Kuwait and that the [ Kuwaiti ] [ E ] very Western country, and 14 Memorandum of Conversations dated August 3, 1990 (various times), ID numbers CF01478 027 and CF01478 028. WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library. 15 Ibid.
78 Japan too 16 President Ozal then provided a summary of his conversations with the leaders of Iran, Syria, Egypt, Ku wait, and Jordan. He relayed [ that ] [ T ] o pay, he [ T ] 17 While join the U.S. led coalition stemmed from the belief of Jord solution to the Gulf crisis and Iraqi Palestinian refugees who Iraqi behavior in fact was more about economics than about being loyal to the Palestinian or Iraqi causes. 18 Bush and Scowcroft (1998 : [ from Iraq and ] Despit e friendly U.S. Jordan relations and U.S. attempts to accommodate concerns, it refused to join the U.S. led coalition. The initial strategy to form an international coalition was discussed at a National Security Council meeting held on August 4. At this meeting intelligence updates and military options were discussed that outline d an initial two part plan of deterrence and war fighting. This plan eventually evolve d into Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm. The idea for a coalitio n of the willing was formed in this meeting as the 16 Telephone call to President Turgut Ozal of Turkey, A ugust 4, 1990, 4:39 5:05 pm, ID# CF01478 026, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library. 17 Ibid. 18 POTUS to King Hussein letter, September, 1990, ID# CF01478 019, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.
79 following conversation between General Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, President Bush, and Richard Haass, Special Assistant to the President illustrates: 19 General Powell : If we get [a] re quest from [the] Saudis, it would be wise that there not just be a U.S. flag. President Bush : It is too much to expect NATO to extend itself. Richard Haass : But we may be able to do something along the lines of the Korea war model of a U.S. led multi nat ional force. This idea of not fighting alone is a critical part of the U.S. strategy. T he U.S. did not wish to be seen as the aggressor or as the hegemon fighting for oil. The inclusion of both traditional (Western) allies and non traditional (Arab) alli es in a coalition was the preferred solution. Freeman et al (1992 : 3) note s [ American ] Revolution to Operation Desert Storm, the American Army, with few exceptions, has fought its wars with allies, and our track record, though uneven, inclu des a number of highly successful combined efforts Table 3 1 lists the 28 troop contributing members of the First Gulf War coalition separated into traditional allies and non traditional allies. These states contributed to the First Gulf War coalition in many ways All 28 states contribut ed troops but also contributed diplomatic and economic support Other allies that did not contribute troops were also part of the coalition lending their dipl omatic and economic support. For example, Turkey provided political support and a strategic operating location for U.S. forces while Germany provided financial support. 19 National Security Council meeting, August 4, 1990, 8:00 10:00 am, ID# CF01478 030, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.
80 Table 3 1 Troop contributing members Traditional Allies Non Traditional Allies Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom Bahrain, Bangladesh, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Kuwait, Morocco, Niger, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Syria, United Arab Emirates Discussions among the leaders of the U.S. U.K. France, Turkey, Germany, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait centered on what initial steps to take in respon se to on three steps as a suitable i nitial reaction. First, economic sanctions on Iraq would be imposed but only if they were collective and effective. As Prime Minister Thatcher told T omorrow we will try to persuade our European partners to adopt collectiv e and comprehensive 20 Second, Iraqi assets would be frozen, and third, military forces (naval) would be moved to the area as a show of force. From the outset, France stood with the U.S. T o see Saddam 21 O ur representatives are working together at [and] our representatives will speak in the same manner at the 22 The time between August 2, 1990 and January 16, 1991 is commonly referred to as the diplomatic phase of the First Gulf War. While i t is also the time period in which Operation Desert Shield took place more importantly for the purposes of this paper it is 20 Telephone call to PM Margaret Thatcher of the Unite d Kingdom, August 3, 1990, 3:03 3:10 pm, ID# CF01478 027, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library. 21 Telephone call to President Mitterand of France, August 3, 1990, 4:32 4:57 pm, ID # CF01478 027, WHORM: Worki ng Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library. 22 Ibid.
81 the time in which the U.S. strategy for forming an international coalition was formulated and put into practice. The initial steps taken by the Bush a dministration to garner support from traditional allies such as the U.K. France, Germany, Turkey, and Japan involve d continuous communications among these state leaders during the month of August. While Turkey did not contribute troops to the coalition efforts, as noted above the importance of Turkey to the coalition cannot be ignored. At a September 24, 1990 White House background briefing to the press, it was acknowledged that President Ozal W as one of the first international leaders President Bush contacted, an d they [N] o leader has [had] more frequent contact 23 These consultations were also important for those non traditional allies such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait wh o were the leaders of states with the most to lose if the Iraqi invasion was not reversed. Western support arrayed against Iraq was highlighted by Presidential Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater on August 11, 1990 mes the participation of forces from so many countries in our joint efforts to fight the [M] ilitary participation by Canada, Australia, West Germany, France, Belgium, and the United Kingdom signal s 24 Th e initial outlines of this strategy were documented in National Security Directive (NSD) 45, titled U.S. Policy in Response to the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait and dated 23 Background briefing by Senior Administration Official, September 24, 1990, ID# CF01478 019, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library. 24 Weekly compilation of Presidential Documents, Excerpts of a statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on the Persian Gulf Crisis, August 11, 1990, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.
82 August 20, 1990. This directive outlined the following four principles that guided U.S. strategy throughout the crisis: 1. The immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait; 2. regime installed by Iraq; 3. A commitment to the security and stabi lity of the Persian Gulf; and, 4. The protection of the lives of American citizens abroad. 25 Diplomatic, economic, energy, and military measures were outlined in NSD 45. It T he Secretary of State to work bilaterally with our allies and friends, and i n concert with the international community through the United Nations and other fora, to 26 The directive also directs the appropriate U.S. agenci es to work with allies and friends on such issues as economic sanctions, the coordinated drawdown of the strategic petroleum reserve, and the establish ment of multinational forces for the defense of Saudi Arabia and enforc ing U.N. mandated sanctions. This effort by the U.S. for burden sharing among allies and f riends of the U.S. was outlined by President Bush in an August 30, 1990 other governments, including Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Federal Republic of Ge rmany, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) free Kuwait, and others, to 25 National Security Direc tive 45, U.S. Policy in Response to the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait, August 20, 1990, ID# CF01478 030, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library. 26 Ibid.
83 join us in making available financial and, where appropriate, energy resources to 27 By December 1990 the U.S. strategy for the coalition had matured as outlined by the diplomatic and military steps shown in Figures A 2 and A 3 in Appendix A. A main component of the diplomatic efforts focused on maintaining the current coalition and strengthening this body of st ates. Four months of economic sanctions aimed at isolating Iraq, the military buildup in the region, and diplomatic efforts to convince Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait placed a strain on the coalition. In addition, the U.S. diplomatic strategy focused on in creasing the Chinese and Russian support of coalition goals For example, in November 1990, President Bush sent a letter to Chinese leaders (President Yang Shangkun, General Secretary Jiang Zemin, and Premier Li Peng) seeking Chinese support on U.N. resol It is my firm belief that any break in Perm Five [the U.N. security council] solidarity would only lead 28 Overtures to the Soviets conti nued and at this point in the coalition formation, the possibility of Soviet troop participation was still an available option. In addition, U.S. Soviet cooperation was highlighted in a December 2, 1990 letter from President Bush to President Gorbachev. U.S. Soviet cooperation on this [ Iraq ] issue since early August has been a crucial factor in cementing the multinational coalition and 27 News Conference on the Persian Gulf Crisis, August 30, 1990, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library. 28 Cable from Secretary of State to American Embassy Beijing, Presidential letter to Chinese Leaders, November 2 7, 1990, ID# CF01584 028, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.
84 29 The othe r permanent members of the United Nations Security Council ( the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China ) were the focus of U.S. diplomatic efforts. The goal was to work as one to show unity within the United Nations. This was accomplished by passing a dozen U.N. resolutions condemning the actions of Iraq. A summary of those U.N. resolutions can be found in Table A 2 of Appendix A. The vote count reveals the U.S. was successful in holding the coalition together and preventing potentially adversarial Ch ina and the Soviet Union from vetoing passage of any U.N. resolution concerning Iraq. The final U.N. R esolution 678 concerning the setting of a January 15, 1991, deadline for Iraq to comply with the previous eleven U.N. resolutions and authorizing the u se of force prompted the Chinese to abstain. Otherwise, Table A 2 shows a consistent record of either unanimous votes for the resolutions or majority votes with only Cuba and Yemen abstaining. Additional U.S. diplomatic strategies included coordinating with all of the coalition members the timing of breaking off diplomatic relations with Iraq. This show of solidarity was a necessary step as the U.N. deadline of January 15 approached. This coordination was crucial to withdraw embassy personnel within Ir aq and Kuwait to avoid endangering coalition member personnel once force was implemented. Mitigating fractures in the coalition was a U.S. priority. Another diplomatic strategy was to renew efforts to increase burden sharing among coalition members. As Bennett et al (1997 : 4) note U.S. force commitments ultimately totaling over 500,000 29 Cable from Secretary of State to American Embassy Moscow, Presidential letter to President Gorbachev, December 2, 1990, ID# CF01584 026, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.
85 troops, there was still almost no free riding; more than forty countries collectively s effort was on Germany, Japan, and the Gulf states. Neither Germany nor Japan contribute d troops to the coalition effort. For both, c onstitutional restraints resulting from their defeat in the World War II limited their direct military participation. H owever, to avoid the perception that both states were free riding on Persian Gulf security provided by the United States and its coalition members, the U.S. sought further financial contributions. In total, Germany provided DM 17.2 billion ( $11.5 billion ) to the coalition, of which 60 percent went to the United States. Table A 3 in Appendix A provides a breakdown of these contributions. Even with this robust contribution, the perception of a reluctant and distracted ally remained. Bennett et al (170) a T hroughout this period the German foreign policy establishment was preoccupied with wrapping up the external aspects of A similar accusation of free riding was faced by Japan. Stile s (2002, 128) notes next offer of $4 billion for the U.S. U.S. diplomatic efforts pushed Japan to provid e even more financial contributions. On January 24, 1991, the Japanese government announced an additional $9 billion contribution. All told, Japan provided a total of $10 billion to the coalition. This total was only exceeded by the two Gulf states of S audi Arabia and Kuwait each of which contributed more than $16 billion to the First Gulf War. Clearly, these two states were contributing to the effort since their territories were threatened by Iraq. Kuwait was currently occupied and Saudi Arabia had I raqi troops amassed on its
86 border. The complete breakdown of foreign contributions to the First Gulf War is provided in Table A 4 in Appendix A. The contributions used in Table A 4 are approximations since they were collated for a report published in Apr il 1992 and final figures for coalition contributions had yet to be finalized. However, these figures do show the burden on the traditional allies (Germany, Japan, and Korea) who did not contribute troops to the First Gulf War. The burden on those non tr aditional allies (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE) who were being defended by the coalition forces was much greater but not surprising. Even the Soviets, while not contributing funds or troops, provided diplomatic support by acting as an intermediary b etween the U.S. and Iraq; in addition, Soviet support in the U.N. Security Council was very helpful. As the U.N. deadline of January 15, 1991 approached, the coalition was still being maintained by the United States. One sign that some coalition member s were more important to the effort than others can be found in a December 28, 1990 memo from Admiral David Jeremiah, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This memorandum recommends a particular order for pre hostility consultations with coalition following order: the United Kingdom, France, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Bahrain, A ny country with forces on the groun 30 The actual listing of which countries were contacted, mode of communication, by/to whom, and when can be found in Table A 5 in Appendix A. This listing highlights that the first five traditional allies 30 December 28, 1990, ID# CF01584 022, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Recor ds, George Bush Library.
87 be ing notified include the U.K. France, Turkey, Israel, and Australia. However, it should be noted that Germany and Japan also received private channel notification one hour prior to hostilities starting. The first five non traditional allies notified inc lude Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, and Qatar. The Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev received notification in a phone call from President Bush one hour prior to the war commencing while the Chinese received a cable when the war started. While this study focuses on the initial strategies necessary to create a coalition, t he importance of maintaining coalition unity through the uncertain conditions of combat was acknowledged by the Bush a dministration. A State Department cable dated December 30 1990 argue d military action after January 15 would be intended to accomplish and what terms Iraq 31 These consultations on war aims were s forces withdrew from Kuwait and coalition goals were being met. The United States strategy for military coalition formation in the First Gulf War is clear. The focus combined traditional allies ( U.K. France, Germany, Turkey, and Japan) with friends in the Persian Gulf region (Saudi Arabia and Kuwait). The solidarity among traditional allies, however, was the key element in the coalition. Without U.K. and French support in the U.N. agreeing to sanctions on Iraq and providing troops, the coalition would not have formed. Without Turkish support acting as a liaison to states such as Syria, Iran, and others in the region, the coalition would not have been as U.S. forces to 31 025, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bu sh Presidential Library.
88 op erate from its territory only strengthened its part in the coalition. Finally, Germany and Japan blunted criticism of their nonmilitary role in the coalition by supporting the coalition financially. The next section on the Second Gulf War provides an opp ortunity to explore whether this same reliance on traditional allies can be obtained Second Gulf War The Second Gulf War, also known as Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), poses a unique challenge for historians, political scientists, and other social scient ists. The war began in 2003 and democratic elections have been implemented, the U.S. led coalition remained together for a few years before slowly coming apart. Analyzing the U.S. strategies for coalition formation in the Second Gulf War does not provide the same opportunities in access to evidence and passage of time as in the First Gulf War. Has enough time elapsed to make credible hypotheses and does sufficient evidence exist to reconstruct st rategies decision makers employ? The answer to those questions is a qualified yes. The evidence of these strategies is formulated from a combination of elite interviews 32 and archived coalition documentation. Of course, highlighting and acknowledging the challenges for such an endeavor are important. George and Bennett (2005 : 98) argue U.S. foreign policy must be sensitive to the likelihood that important data may not be available and cannot be easily retrieved fo r documentation, especially for an on going operation, makes collection of data very difficult, if not impossible. This problem has been somewhat addressed by seeking 32 A total of eleven interviews were conducted. A complete listing of these interviews can be found in Figure B 1, Appendix B.
89 other means to illustrate the U.S. strategies employed. While some archival research at the United States Central Command headquarters in Tampa, F lorida was accomplished; this has been supplemented by access to former and current U.S. government personne l involved in forming the Iraq coalition in 2003. The limitations and credibility of such access will be discussed as evidence is presented. This section on the Second Gulf War will provide the historical background on the inter Gulf War period that help s to explain U.S. coalition strategies, what strategies were considered and employed in 2003. When compared to the First Gulf War, t he Second Gulf War presents a compelling case study. In both conflicts, the United States formed an international coaliti on that eventually invaded Iraq. While the goals of the two wars were different, in both cases the U.S. still found itself having to convince states to join an international coalition and accept U.S. leadership. The strategies employed by the U.S. in bot h cases consisted of three elements: traditional allies, foreign assistance, and negative rhetoric /persuasion For each of the Gulf wars, h ow these elements w ere emphasized by the U.S. differed Also, just as the Iraq i invasion of Kuwait in 1990 was mor e than just the actions of a madman (Saddam Hussein), the invasion s of Iraq in 1991 and 2003 w ere more than just the wishes of one person To understand the U.S. strategies employed to form a military coalition in 2003, one must understand the post Gulf W ar environment in the 1990s. The success of the coalition formed in 1990 was evidenced by a swift victory in the air and on the ground in Kuwait and Iraq. The coalition had held together through a dozen U.N. resolutions, months of economic sanctions, ta ctical ballistic missile (SCUD)
90 attacks on Israel, and Iraqi claims of coalition attacks on civilians. The success of the First Gulf War coalition can be attributed to two main factors; first, although the U.S. still provided the majority of troops to the effort, coalition troop contributions were fairly robust. 33 Second, those states not providing troops found other ways to contribute including diplomatic and economic means. This provided the U.S. with the legitimacy it sought to focus the coalition eff orts on removing Iraq from Kuwait. The U.S. government went to great lengths to ensure the First Gulf War coalition was not perceived as a West versus Arab encounter or as a U.S. grab for oil. Even so, the success and cooperation of the First Gulf War c oalition did not last for long. Even before the land offensive was launched, the first cracks in solidarity were beginning to form. Two weeks prior to the beginning of the ground war, the American embassy in Paris sent a DOS cable back to Washington citi ng the French concern that the U.S. would seek to shut France (and the rest of the international community) out of a post war settlement. Specifically, the cable outline d war role and was status as a permanent member of the UNSC and its self 34 The French concern about any post war settlement was motivated by economic, cultural, and political interests it held in the region. This concer n, therefore, was about preserving which persisted during in the 33 Non U.S. coalition ground troops consisted of 160,000 personnel and increased to approximately 240,000 when maritime and air force personnel are included. This data can be found in Appendix I of the Final Report to Congress: Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (April 1992). 34 Cable from AmEmbassy Paris to SECSTATE, Trouble Brewing With France Over Post War Settlement, February 15, 1991, ID# CF01584 003, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.
91 interwar period between the two Gulf w ars. Once the First Gulf War goals were obtained and Iraq was out of Kuwait, the coalition weakened and eventually disbanded. International relations scholars have studied t he 1990s most characterizing it as an era of change in the international environment. Palmer and Morgan (2006 : 63) propose that since 1990, two significant events are seen as defin ing the American role in the world the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. The end of the Cold War 35 in which rival superpowers no longer compe ted for regional influence around the world. Instead, a sense of international cooperation was fostered although not always realized. And yet, this new world order also presents other threats such as ethnic tensions, nationalism, and terrorism. Immedi ately after terminating hostilities in the First Gulf War, t he U.S. faced all these threats m any of these emanated from Iraq itself. In a background note, the U.S. DOS stated, U.N. Security Council required the Iraqi regime to surrender its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and submit to U.N. cooperate with the U.N. inspections, the Security Council employed sanctions to prevent further WMD development and compel Iraqi adherence to international 36 Although regime change in Iraq was not an official objective of the First Gulf W ar but an anticipated consequence, the Shiite population in the south and Kurdish population in the north rose up to trigger a that ultimately fai led. 35 The origins of this term are not clear, however, it is generally attributed to the numerous times it has been evoked by Pre sident George W. Bush in speeches and press conferences leading up to, during, and after the First Gulf War. The general meaning of the term refers to a future where international cooperation (led by the U.N.) would peacefully resolve disputes. 36 Departme nt of State website titled, Background note: Iraq, February 2008, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6804.htm accessed June 2009.
92 This forced the U.S. to organize no fly zones in the south and north of Iraq to protect those ethnic groups from annihilation by Iraqi forces. The U.S. led coalition in the First Gulf War did not push on to Baghdad to remove Saddam Hussein from power because of U.S. concern s about a negative reaction by other members of the coalition Steve Yetiv (2004 : 220) argues that after the U.S. achieved its critical objectives, it did not want to lose Arab support and find itself in the same type of trouble tha t U.S. forces faced in the terror bombings in Saudi Arabia in 1996 In the 1990s, Yetiv (220) concludes that U.N. inspection regime in history unwavering U.S. military contai nment, and virtually is new world order extended beyond the Gulf region compounded mainly by post communist states in transition. The breakup of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia is consid ered a momentous occasion in international relations, not because Soviet communism failed but for the first, second, and third order effects on the international system. The end results were t he large number of independent states that formed, the rise of nationalism, and the seeming triumph of liberal principles As such the dominance of the U.S. was evident because no peer competitor existed The threat of global war was significantly 989) and others calling for continued leadership and international engagement. Yet despite a growing U.S. economy, Stiles (2002 : North American Free Trade Agreement which took advantage of its strong position relative to Canada and Mexico, and repeatedly pressured Japan to allow increased amounts of U.S.
93 imports with specific targets for market shares in semiconductors, autos, and in U.S. behavior as the world hegemon in the 1990s is the promotion of liberal ideals which include the promotion and sustainment of repr ession of students in 1989; support for Somalis, Kurds, and Bosnians fighting against authoritarian enemies; and admission of Haitian refugees into the United States : 116). Multilateral approaches to security concerns were a staple of U.S. foreign policy at this time The breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991 unleashed nationalist demands by ethnic groups in the Balkans and tested the validity of multilateral approaches. The U.S. and international community of security organ izations were unable to effectively address Balkan unrest T he international community was ill prepared to intervene in this situation, coming as it did during the collapse of the Soviet Union and the general restructuring of int : 230). NATO was not able to assis and the Council for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was also ineffective as a security organization due to its requirement for unanimous decisions. Finally, the U.N. did not initially I t was not until September [ 1991 ] that the Security Council began to issue a series of resolutions Efforts by the Unit ed Nations and the NATO alliance to promote a settlement of these
94 disputes proved ineffective until the summer of 1995 (Sodaro 2008 : 165). The U.S. and NATO allies launched air attacks that finally forced a settlement known as the Dayton P eace A ccords. Mu ltilateralism was also attempted to resolv e security issues in Somalia and Haiti in the 1990s both of which also resulted in less than optimal solutions. The new world order after the First Gulf War was not living up to its promise of international coope ration to peacefully resolve disputes. The success of the First Gulf War coalition could not be extrapolated to other international security concerns. The lack of multilateral success in the 1990s had the effect of diminishing U.S. trust in institutions of collective security. Hence, U.S. strategies for forming a Second Gulf War coalition were influenced by the U.S. experience in the inter Gulf War period. There were two distinct strategies employed for the Second Gulf War. The first strategy attempted to use the First Gulf War coalition as a model. However, following this strategy was problematic since the threat assessment and political conditions were not the same. The First Gulf War strategy consisted of a two part plan of deterrence and war fighti ng. This was executed in two operations, Desert Shield and Desert Storm. For the Second Gulf War, Iraq was not occupying a country I nstead it was being accused by the U.S. of threatening its neighbors and the world with WMDs In theory, WMD possessio n should be more dangerous than the occupation of one state by another. However, for some of the traditional allies (France, Germany ) the same sense of urgency that existed in the First Gulf War did not exist for the Second Gulf War and this complicated the U.S. coalition building strategy Additionally, the First Gulf War strategy called for a U.S. led multinational force that included both Western and non traditional (Arab) allies. Emulating this strategy a second time proved difficult since the
95 U.S. relationship with both traditional and non traditional allies had changed in the intervening dozen years. This change in relationship s with traditional allies can be attributed to their experiences in other coalition operations such as Operation Allied F orce (OAF) in the Balkans Th at 1999 NATO air campaign was initiated to compel Serbian compliance with NATO demands to cease the conflict in Kosovo. While OAF was a successful air campaign and highlighted a transformed NATO, the results of the coalition interoperability were damaging to future coalitions. John Peters et al (2001 : F ewer countries will want to join a U.S. dominated coalition if they see few direct threats to their interests, as was the case in Kosovo, and if they fear be result, traditional Western allies (France, Germany) required more information on and justification for any U.S. led operation to counter domestic opposition to milita ry intervention. The relationship of non traditional allies and the U.S. in the First Gulf War is also difficult to duplicate. In 1990, t he Arab response and involvement in the coalition provided the U.S. with the international legitimacy it needed for the coalition to succeed. However, the U.S. relationship with these coalition Arab states deteriorated over time. This was due to a variety of factors including Arab Israeli relations and terrorism. While U.S. support for Israel certainly harm ed Arab U .S. relations, this one factor alone does not explain the decline in the relationship. Rather, the continued U.S. presence in the Middle East after the First Gulf War and the subsequent terrorist attacks against the U.S. were the chief cause of the declin : 40) study on explaining suicide terrorism found that between 1996 and 2003, al Qaeda conducted 21 terrorist
96 attacks against the U.S. and allies killing 3,661 people. Pape argues that these attacks are not driven by religion but b y nationalism and the goal of this terrorism is to drive U.S. forces out of the Middle East. Pape (46) concludes that the purpose of suicide terrorists consider to be the U.S. military move out of Saudi Arabia ( once home to Osama bin Laden), but the mov e of U.S. Central Command operations to Qatar and the keeping of forces in Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, and UAE calls into question the Saudi Arabia is of more religious significance than other Gulf states as the keeper of various holy sites in Mecca and Medina. Therefore the U.S. military move out of Saudi Arabia can be attributed to acknowledging this connectio n to religion. The second U.S. strategy for the Second Gulf War is a much more limited version of the first strategy. Ambassador Marc Grossman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from 2001 to 2005, describes the strategy for Operation Iraqi Fr eedom ( OIF ) as d epartments of State and Defense that competed for prominence. There was a State Department desire to try to recreate the coalition that had been formed for the First Gulf War that State Secreta ry Powell felt was a model for accomplish ing this type of warfare. The pattern of this s trategy involved the U.S. going to the U.N. to seek a resolution condemn ing the Iraqi violation followed by U.S. attempt s to obtain a second resolution authoriz ing fo rce For the Second Gulf War, t he first U.N. R esolution 1441 obtained in November 2002 stated e to
97 cooperate with United Nations inspectors and the IAEA [ International Atomic Energy Agency ] and to complete the actions required under paragraphs 8 to 13 of resolution 37 To this end, the State Department sought to assemble the broadest an d most effective coalition possible to deal with Saddam Hussein. That strategy ended on January 20, 2003 when the French declared there would never be a second resolution. Just like the First Gulf War, the U.S. sought a second resolution that would auth orize the use of force. Ambassador Grossman describes a simultaneous DOD effort to limit the number of coalition members as much as possible because the Defense Department had taken the lesson from Bosnia that coalitions were constraining rather than enh ancing, reinforcing, force multiplying events. The DOD objective was to have as few coalition members as possible 38 This the DOD ide ntified as being obstructive during the Bosnia campaign. The DOD did wish to have the British involved due to their obvious advantages in capability, interoperability, and political support. Additionally, the DOD sought Turkish support to allow the U.S. to move the Fourth Infantry Division into Iraq from Turkey to create a northern front. Once conflict began in 2003 there was an attempt by the U.S. to create a and second, to call on certain niche capabilities to help the U.S. in Iraq. For example, the Czech Republic deployed a Consequence Management team that would be vital in case chemical weapons were employed. The problem was the U.S. put together a coalit ion 37 United Nations Security Council w ebsite titled, U.N. Security Council Resolutions for 2002, http://www.un.org/docs/scres/2002/sc2002.htm accessed August 2009: 38 Author interview with Ambassador Marc Grossman, April 30, 2009.
98 that involved contributions that varied in size and capability This strategy soon became a transparent attempt to build a public relations coalition rather than a warfighting coalition. This type of approach stems from the lack of national command authority direction concerning OIF ever hear the President of the United States say, write or send out: here is my plan for creating a coalition to fight Saddam in OIF I would say the answer to that question is no One of the big differences between the first Gulf War and the second was that the first President Bush sought, as his major national objective, to fight with the largest coalition that he could get and to do so with U.N. Security Counci l resolutions The wrong lesson drawn by very senior people ( c hiefs of military services and Joint Staff) at the Pentagon was that Kosovo/Bosnia showed that coalitions were a bad thing and not 39 The different strategies employed by the d epart ments of s tate and d efense in the initial stages of coalition building led to an initial constraint on the number of coalition members which was then followed by the pursuit of any state (however small or incapable) willing to contribute troops to the eff ort. The difference in philosophy of the two a dministrations in each Gulf war was a n important factor in the U.S. strategies for coalition building. In the First Gulf War, President H.W. Bush set the tone with his desire to have a large and effective co alition. The main effort to create a coalition was led by the White House and National Security Council (NSC). In the Second Gulf War, the lack of direction from the White House and NSC staff on building a coalition led to the departments of s tate and d e fense at odds with each other. Ambassador Lincoln Bloomfield, t he DOS lead, and Ms. Debra Cagan, 39 Author interview with Ambassador Marc Grossman, April 30, 2009.
99 who held senior positions in both the DOS and DOD, pursued a robust coalition despite reluctance on the part of the White House and Pentagon. Ms. Cagan argue s that the flaw in I f you do not respect, train, and equip coalition partners as if they were your own, the coalition will not 40 This dysfunctional staff work did not go unnoticed by states being pursued as coalition members. For example, France provided troops in the First Gulf War but not the second. Fundamentally, it had to do with objectives and U.S. a dministration commitment. The U.S. objective and commitment in the First Gulf War, remov e Saddam from Kuwait, was clear and unwavering. The same cannot be said, h owever, for removing Saddam from power in 2003. French opposition to the war centered on the belief that any Saddam replacement could be worse and the French were un convinced by the U.S. justifications for war. France preferred maintaining the status quo since it was better (economically, politically) for France in the long term. Stability of the region was of paramount consideration. The commitment of Bush 41 to international support for U.S. operations was not a priority for his son, Bush 43. Since it was a diplomatic effort, t he process of recruiting allies for the coalition usually began with a State Department cable but this was followed by U.S. Central, Eur opean, and Pacific Command military officers meeting with their military counterparts to work out the details of how states would flow into the coalition. Negotiations usually followed one of two tracks although a combination of the two was also possible The first track involve d recruiting those states that would provide troops for either combat or support operations. British and Australian troops were the first to 40 Author interview with Ms. Debra Cagan, May 7, 2009.
100 be pursued while reluctant traditional allies (France, Germany) remained unconvinced by U.S. arguments on Iraq. The other initial troop contributing states included Bulgaria, Czech Republic Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine. The second track involve d other support that a state might provide such as access to basing, overfli ght, and/or resupply. These states provided important support to the war effort but this often was perceived by the U.S. as not enough since troop contributions were valued more than other support For example, France provided overflight rights so U.S. Air Force B 52s could fly from Royal Air Force Base Fairford in the U.K. over France on their way to Iraq. The coalition integration process difficult and time consuming is illustrated in Figure B 1 in Appendix B. A complete listing of troop contributi ng coalition partners ( 37 ) from 2003 to 2006 and the number of troops provided to the coalitions in Iraq and Afghanistan can be found in Table B 2 in Appendix B. A chart depicting the total number of non U.S. multinational forces in Iraq that summarizes t he information in Table B 2 is presented in Figure B 2 in Appendix B. Not surprisingly, the focus on which states to recruit centered on those that possessed c hemical, b iological, r adiological, and n uclear (CBRN) capabilit ies This meant the U.S. focused on Central and Eastern European states from the former Warsaw Pact. Th o se states still practiced and trained for these contingencies. Recruiting efforts also focused on states with a willingness to work with the United States. Ms. Cagan identifies three reasons why Eastern and Central European states were initially pursued as part of the U.S. strategy in coalition formation. First, it allowed the U.S. to have capable partners and avoid accusations of unilateralism; second, many of these states believed they owed their freedom to U.S. support during their difficult
101 transition from communism; and finally, th o se states believed the Iraqi people deserved a chance to pursue democracy just as they had. 41 C oalition formation, deployment, and execution ran into d ifficulties in the overall ability to move forces and equipment from Europe into the Iraqi theater of operations. Some states were so adamantly against the Iraq war that moving equipment through th ose state s was extremely difficult. Ms. Cagan relates a p articular incident in which a an Defense Minister went out to one of the Belgi an rail yards and threatened to lay his body on the tracks to block the tanks we [ the U.S. ] were trying to move out of the 42 Instead, the U.S. moved the tanks n orth through Amsterdam to get the equipment to Iraq. This is a strong indication that the U.S. led coalition of the willing did not have the full support of its traditional allies and friends. Other related coalition information can be found in Table B 3 in Appendix B which depicts the major states that contributed troops to the coalition effort in OIF The states shown in Table B 3 are sequenced in descending order from the largest contingent ( U.K. ) to the smallest ( Kazakhstan ). Figure B 3 in Appe ndix B depicts the total coalition from Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom) and Iraq ( OIF ). This time frame (March 2005) was selected to illustrate the largest number of coalition partners garnered since the two wars began. Many coalition partners l eft the coalition as casualties and terrorist attacks increased in Iraq. Figure B 4 in Appendix B depicts this increase in terrorist attacks which began in 2005 and peaked in the summer of 2007 show ing the effect of terr orism on the fragile coalition. 41 Author interview with Ms. Cagan, May 7, 2009. 42 Ibid.
102 The U.S. is currently engaged in a protracted struggle against violent extremists that will continue into the foreseeable future. A chart depicting prominent terrorist incidents between 1991 and 2003 can be found in Figure B 5 in Appendix B. Summarizing the results of this chapter on traditional allies might be useful to highlight how the U.S. coalition building strategy changed from the First to Second Gulf Wars. Any U.S. strategy to use traditional allies to build a mi litary coalition seeks to take advantage of the institutional commitments, procedures, relationships, and connections between the U.S. and these states. Traditional allies, such as NATO allies, possess common goals, logistics, and capabilities. This comm onality minimizes the friction that can occur within a military coalition. For the First Gulf War, the U.S. President H.W. Bush began the process of coalition building with personal phone calls to the leaders of the U.K., France, Germany, Turkey, and Japan. These calls were supplemented by phone calls to the leaders of the two states most directly affected by U.K., France, and Germany support in the United Nations was evident in the numerous resolutions condemning Iraq. Other traditional allies providing military support include Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain. The U.S. coali tion building strategy was led by the White House buttressed by the departments of state and defense. This robust support from traditional allies in the First Gulf War is in contrast with the tepid support received during the Second Gulf War. In 2003, P resident W. Bush sought to build an international coalition of states to The initial wartime coalition
103 was small and consisted of the U.K., Australia, Poland, and the United States. The post confl ict coalition was larger but consisted mostly of non traditional states. The traditional allies in Europe were taken for granted and instead post communist and Central Asian states were the states that mattered. As will be shown in the next chapter, U.S. foreign assistance was one aspect to build the military coalition. The lack of a unified U.S. strategy helps explain the difficulty of building the Second Gulf War coalition The departments of state and defense initially worked at cross purposes in bui lding the coalition with DOS working to be inclusive and DOD trying to limit the coalition partners. Additionally, like the First Gulf War, the U.S. initially sought U.N. support to contain Iraq. However, once it was apparent that traditional allies, Ger many and France, would not support a U.N. resolution endorsing force, the U.S. proceeded ahead without a second resolution and instead went to war based on the legitimacy of an earlier resolution. Even those traditional allies that eventually sent troops (Italy and Spain) did not stay long in Iraq. Unlike the First Gulf War, traditional allies were unconvinced of the need to strike at Iraq because the sense of urgency was not there. As shown in Chapter 5, the U.S. senior leader rhetoric is another factor to help explain the U.S. strategy for coalition building in both Gulf w ars. The challenge for the United States is to shape the strategic environment by deterring major conflict, precluding the rise of major instability enhancing the governance or milita ry capacity of partner countries, and preparing for catastrophic events. These critical events cannot be accomplished alone They require the assistance of allies and friends. In some cases, a coalition of states will be required to deal with these issu es. The ultimate aim, h owever, is to defuse these strategic
104 problems before they become crises and resolve crises before they reach the stage that requires large scale military operations. Post 9/11, the United States has to form strategies to build coal itions that address this reality. The U.S. coalition building strategy for the Second Gulf War eschewed traditional allies. Initially, the U.S. a traditional allies a connection between Iraq and terrorism. Despite rheto ric to the contrary there was never a direct connection between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda so this was not a sound selling point for states to join the coalition. Over time the argument evolved to include: Saddam has weapons of mass destruction (WMD), Saddam is flouting the U.N. and Iraq is a threat to regional stability. T he war on terror did play a role as the argument was presented to potential especially if he supplie d th o se weapon s to terrorist groups like al Qaeda. Besides trying to enlist traditional allies, the U.S. coalition building strategy also included economic incentives and rhetoric that will be addressed in the next two chapters respectively
105 CHAPTER 4 FOREIGN ASSI STANCE Of the seeming and real innovations which the modern age has introduced into the practice of foreign policy, none has proven more baffling to both understanding and action than foreign aid. Hans Morgenthau, 196 2 1 F oreign direct assistance i s an economic tool of United States foreign policy The foreign assistance provided to Germany and Japa n after World War II and the success of that aid has left an indelible mark that persists today. This link between economic and military assistance and the eventual recovery of the recipient state has been advocated and challenged by governments, academics, and the media. For example, Kendall Stiles (2002 : 115) argues that foreign aid, military deployments and other initiatives are increasingly designed to strengthen liberal regimes and punish autocrats. Less altruistically Francis Adams (2000 : 117 ) describes U.S. foreign assistance goals as being linked (in no particular order) needs of recipient nations, the political obje ctives of donor countries, or the economic Despite this debate, m ost scholars ( Wilhelm and Feinstein 1984, Adams 2000, Browne 2006, Brainard 2007, Taffet 2007 ) agree that reform of U.S. foreign assistance programs would make th os e program s more effective and help achieve U.S. foreign policy goals A final report to Congress in 1992 stated, Since the 1950s, U.S. foreign policy has included a long term commitment to security assistance, which helped develop strong relationships with NATO and c oalition partners ; [S] e curity assistance and defense sales provide compatibility of equipment; the 1 Morgenthau, Hans. (1962) A Political Theory of Foreign Aid. The American Pol itical Science Review 56(2): 301.
106 training that comes with U.S. hardware often leads recipients to adopt U.S. doctrine and tactics, resulting in operational compa 2 This chapter will demonstrate the role that U.S. foreign assistance had in coalition building strategies for the two Gulf w ars. The practice of providing economic and military assistance to other states is not a recent phenomenon. T he reason for providing assistance however is a point of contention among scholars. Brainard (2007:ix) notes, conflict reconstruction and humanitarian disasters have led to a faster rate of expansion of foreign assistance dolla rs in the last six years than at any effectiveness of foreign assistance as a foreign policy tool. This chapter will compare and contrast U.S. foreign assistance data provide d to coalition partners with troop contributions to U.S. led coalitions in the First and Second Gulf Wars. Was U.S. foreign assistance used as a coercive tool to gain troop contributing coalition partners? The data and analysis that follow support the th esis that the U.S. coalition building strategy did not emphasize foreign assistance in the First Gulf War but was emphasized in the Second Gulf War. The p urpose of this chapter is to compare and contrast use of U.S. foreign assistance as a strategy for coa lition building in the First and Second Gulf Wars First, the data employed in this chapter will be presented to distinguish the type s of foreign assistance that are in use. Second, this chapter analyze s the use of U.S. foreign assistance in the First Gu lf War As Bennett et al (1997 : 61) conclude d in their study of burden sharing in the First Gulf War, it was not foreign assistance that brought states to 2 National Defense University website titled, Final Report to Congress. (1992) Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, I 2, http://www.ndu.edu/library/epubs/cpgw.pdf accessed July 2009.
107 the coalition but U.S. interests and obligations to great effe ct. This was certainly true in the First Gulf War as will be shown later in this chapter. However, it will be shown that U.S. leaders in the Second Gulf War were unsuccessful Unite d States Instead, the U.S. relied o n foreign assistance as a coercive tool. This type of assistance comes at a price as noted by Lael Brainard (2007 : 326 ) who argues r epressive governments in order to achieve short term vital interests and promoting open, democratic societies that will better serve U.S. Before analyzing whether assistance is a coercive tool, the type of U.S. foreign assist ance needs to be elaborated. The data used in this chapter, total U.S. o verseas l oans and g rants 3 (ec onomic and military assistance) on the troop contributing states in both Gulf w ars could be legitimately criticized as being too broad a measure. As Jame s Lebovic (1988 : 117) indiscriminately treat it as a single entity and fail to consider the differences in the Nonetheless the pur pose of using the total amount of foreign aid is to take into account the wide variation s found among the states involved. A solid U.S. friend like Poland has needs different from a country like Armenia al U.S. aid package is only $2 million of the total. In fiscal year (FY) 2005, that would have equal ed only 2.5 3 The Greenbook produced by the U.S. Agency for International Development provides summary data of U.S. foreign assistance since 1945. In this instance, foreign assistance, is categorized as either economic or military assistance. Bec ause due to inflation the value of the U S dollar changes over time, and makes it difficult to compare levels of assistance at different time periods. Therefore the Greenbook provides constant dollar data (i.e. inflation adjusted values) to make comp arisons accurate
108 percent of the total aid received from the United States. The rest (97.5 percent) was military aid. The situation is reversed h owever, in Ar menia In FY05 the total amount given to Armenia was $91.9 million. Of that amount, 90.6 percent was economic aid and the remaining 9.4 percent was military aid For the purposes of this dissertation both economic and military aid will be regarded as provi di ng incentive s for a recipient country to become a coalition participant James Lebovic (1988 : 118) conclu des multidimensional, a whole that encompasses distinct forms of assistance that can be directed at distinct o bjectives Yet there are advantages to using foreign aid in its totality. For example, Morgenthau (cited in Richardson and Kegley 1980 : 198) argues when assistance assumes the form of a transaction in which economic rewards are exchanged for political concessions figure of the total amount of U.S. foreign assistance concerns the benefits of disparate types of aid. Different types o f aid may be exchanged for one another. For examp promote infrastructural development for security ends or military assistance can have economic benefit s; and either economic assistance or military assistance can be used and Mughan 1984 : 4). The data for this chapter is extracted from the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) database ca lled the Greenbook (see footnote 3 ) but there are problems with that data, includ ing missing data and summing errors. To minimize these inadequacies a crosscheck of data was made between the Greenbook and the
109 Department of State Account Tables. The mos t common missing data in the Greenbook involved supplemental funding for some but not all troop contributing states. The most egregious omission was the 2003 missing supplemental for Turkey that amounted to one billion dollars. 4 Other errors were found for some but not all states. The 2002 total for Georgia is one example and it was off by $23 million. 5 All data for troop contributing coalition members that receive d U.S. foreign assistance were crosschecked and updated. The figures and charts refere nced in this chapter reflect th at updated data. The data on international coalition forces assisting the U.S. in both Gulf w ars have discrepancies originating from various agencies and governmental organizations. These variations include how a country w as identified as a willing member of the coalition and if that country was only committing to the combat operations post war reconstruction or both In the data, t he war time participation of a state can range from boots on the ground military reinforce ments, diplomatic letters of support, providing personnel in nearby countries, to monetary support. The data used in this chapter contain the most consistent level of troop contributions supporting U.S. operations in both Gulf w ars. This includes troops a state provided or provides to either operation But t his restriction has its drawbacks. For example, a country is credit ed for supporting the U.S. even if troop 4 When asked about this discrepancy, Jennifer Torres, a senior economist with USAID Economic Analysis and Data Services, replied that the 2003 ESF supplemental to Turkey was eventually rescinded in 2005 due to the terms of the agreement n ot being followed by Turkey. Hence, the Greenbook and DOS Account Tables were in conflict. 5 When asked about this discrepancy, Jennifer Torres, a senior economist with USAID Economic Analysis and Data Services replied that it was a problem with the progr amming generating the selection list of programs/accounts. Ms. Torres thanked the author for pointing the discrepancy out and replied that it only affected a limited number of accounts and might have gone unnoticed for years. This programming problem in the Greenbook has since been corrected.
110 the same weight as Georg A transportation support company is also given the same weight as an infantry or mine clearing company. While all troops contribute in their own way to an overall mission, the U.S. would rat her have combat troops to contribute to the force protection mission. For this dissertation, the size and composition of the coalition troops are not the major issue s Instead the focus is on U.S. strategies in coalition building : comparing U.S. use of aid to build coalitions in the First and Second Gulf War. F oreign assistance was and is one tool in the U.S. foreign policy toolbox to assist friends and allies but also used to influence and sometimes coerce those states. Brainard (2007 : ix) notes tha But it is not just since September 11, 2001 that foreign assistance has become important. Jeffrey Taffet (2007 : 2) write s achieve their larger aims of dominating, pacifying, protecting, strengthening, or : 122) agree and assert that icient tool for bringing about desired changes in the international During the post Cold War period, the U.S. has fought two very different Gulf w ars Consequently, the role of foreign assistance in building U.S. led coalitions needs to be e xplored How d id the U.S. strategy for the First Gulf War coalition us e foreign assistance as a coercive tool? The next section will focus on troop contributing coalition states and the U.S. foreign assistance received before, during, and after the confl ict.
111 First Gulf War In relation to other international events t he timing of the First Gulf War is an important factor in explaining the U.S. strategy for building the Gulf coalition The end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s encompass the terminati on of communist rule in many states in Central and Eastern Europe as well as Central Asia. The fall of the victory in Poland, and the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia mark the beginning of fledgling liberal democraci es in former communis t states The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 occurred during the time of German reunification in which East and West Germany fused together their economic, political, and social fabrics. During this time, the Soviet Union was in th e midst of a democratic and economic reform movement led by President Mikhail Gorbachev. The beginning of the 1990s mark an era whe n Soviet control of its satellite states was all but lost. By the time the U.S. led coalition expelled Iraqi forces from Ku wait the end of the Soviet Union was near ing By August 1991, communist hard liners attempted a coup against Gorbachev and by the end of the year Gorbachev had resigned, marking the end of the Soviet Union. Those new states emerging from communism were seeking closer ties to the West and specifically with the United States. While a few (including Poland and Czechoslovakia) participate d in the First Gulf War, the majority were too preoccupied with transition issues. A conscious refocus ing of U.S. assist ance dollars in the early 1990s was directed to help ing these new democracies. The list of coalition troop contributing states in the First Gulf War and the associated U.S. foreign assistance received can be found in Table A 6 in Appendix A. The three c harts in Figure A 4 reflect the U.S. assistance data from Table A 6 The first chart depicts the five states receiving the most U.S. foreign assistance (Egypt, Pakistan,
112 Greece, Morocco, and Bangladesh). The states in the second chart receive d the next h ighest totals and include Argentina, Niger, Oman, Poland, and Senegal. The third chart shows the coalition partners (Bahrain, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Kuwait, Spain) who receive a small amount of U.S. foreign assistance. The remaining First Gulf War coal ition members receive no U.S. foreign assistance and are not graphed. These states include Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom. The total amount of economic and military assistance for the troop contributing states increases slightly from 1988 to 1990 which can be explained by ($214 million) over that time This increa se could be explained by m aintenance of the Israeli Egyptian peace treaty and Camp David Accords Additionally, there is a drop in total U.S. assistance to these states in 199 1 that continue d through 1993 The decrease of almost 25 percent in foreign aid spans the high in 1990 of $3.71 billion to the low in 1993 of $2.79 billion Th ese total s alone provide clue s that rewards for coalition participation w ere not realized by most partners and w ere not part of a U.S. strategy for coalition building Analyzing individual states is also instructive. Egypt was a critical coalition partner in the First Gulf War. Brumberg (in Bennett et al 1997 : symbo lic support that was critical to wider Arab participation sent 35,000 troops into action, many of which played an important if circumscribed role in the Despite this critical role, U.S. foreign assistance numbers tell a di fferent tale. Egypt received fewer U.S. dollars each year from a high in 19 90 ($ 2.39
113 b illion ) to a low in 1993 ($ 2.0 6 b illion ). This drop in U.S. foreign assistance also affected other coalition members Greece, Morocco, Niger, Oman, and Pakistan (all t roop contributing states) also experienced a similar drop in assistance. For its coalition participation Egypt h owever U.S. in the form of debt relief In a September 1, 1990 tele phone communication between President G eorge H.W. Bush and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Bush declare d recommending that the entire debt be written off, unconditionally 6 After the Gulf War i n an interview with the Cairo newspaper Al Ahram, President Mubarak expl G ulf W ar at $20 billions in tourism, and revenues from oil exports fell because of increases in consumption by the growing population (Farnsworth 1991). Others states including Canada, several European Economic Community member states, Persian Gulf states and Saudi Arabia and by early November 1990, the total debt cancel lation stood at about $14 million ( U.S. Federal Research Division 1991 : xxvii) So by U.S. foreign assistance it was rewarded by debt forgiveness On the other hand Pakistan did not fare as well Its share of U.S. foreign aid dropped significantly from 1988 to 1993. The initial largess was mainly due to Pakistan emergence as a U.S. Afghanistan F ollowing the withdrawal of Soviet troop s in the late 1980s, assistance to 6 Telephone call to President Mubarak from President Bush, September 1, 1990, ID# CF01478 020, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.
114 Pakistan dropped precipitously 7 The data in Table A 6 shows Pakistan receiving over $726 million in 1988 but only $52 million by 1993. Although in the First Gulf War Pakistan supplied 15,000 troops as part of an arm ored brigade, U.S. foreign assistance dropped 81 percent from 1990 to 1991. Besides Egypt, the only other state to receive a spike in U.S. foreign assistance in 1990 was Poland. In 1989, Poland received just over three million dollars but this jumped to $86 million in 1990 then plunged back to three million dollars in 1991. It is doubtful t his spike in U.S. foreign assistance was due to to the First Gulf War. The country dispatch ed two ships to the Gulf: the Piast class salvage s hip Piast and the Wodnik class training ship Wodnik which had been retrofitted as a hospital ship. 8 Rather, this single year increase in U.S. foreign assistance was more likely a show of support for Lech Walesa, the first popularly elected p resident of P oland. In 1991 Bangladesh too, saw an increase in U.S. foreign assistance when it received a 22 percent increase in aid over the previous year but was returned to previous funding levels the following year. Bangladesh contributed 2,000 troops to the First Gulf War coalition as part of a mechanized infantry battalion While these troops were no doubt appreciated, a better explanation for increased U.S. aid can be traced to the Bangladesh elections about which Craig Baxter (1992 : 164) notes s of foreign observers [ stated ] cyclone had hit the coast of Bangladesh that year prompt ing an additional $24 million in 7 Center for American Progress websit e titled, U.S. Aid to Pakistan by the Numbers, August 21, 2008, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/08/pakistan_aid_numbers.html accessed September 2009. 8 Gr ossman, Mark. (1995) Encyclopedia of The Persian Gulf War Santa Barbara, CA: ABC CLIO. 75.
115 food aid. Clearly the increase in U.S. foreign assistance to coalition troop contribut ing states was not always connected to a U.S. strategy in coalition formation. adequate to bring them into the First Gulf War coalition without the U.S. providing economic incentives. Seeking U.N. approval for diplomatic, economic, and military actions against Iraq was also part of U.S. coalition building strategy. As Table A 6 shows U.S. foreign assistance totals remained consistent before, during, and after the First Gulf War for the remaining troop contributing states. I f a few states were rewarded, what were the consequences for those states that assistance? Jor dan is a good example because President Bush made a concerted effort to bring King Hussein onboard the U.S. led coalition. Early on in the crisis, h owever, it became clear that Jordan would not cooperate. Only two days after the invasion of Kuw ait and after the initial U.S. efforts to build international opposition to said he had 9 This sentiment was repeated two days later in another NS C meeting as economic sanctions on Iraq were being discussed. Secretary of State James Baker noted the Central Bank of Jordan was allowing Iraq to use Jordanian accounts hence skirting the freeze on Iraqi assets. Secretary of the Treasury Nicholas Brady conclude d 10 While President Bush consider ed was 9 National Security Council meeting minutes, August 4, 1990, ID# CF01478 030, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Librar y. 10 National Security Council meeting minutes, August 6, 1990, ID# CF01478 030, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.
116 on seek ing a diplomatic solution that did not conform to either U.S. or U.N. obje ctives for withdrawal 11 coupled by Jordan hosting a conference in Amman attended by what the U.S. believed to be known terrorists. Martin Indyk ( 1990) states [the suspected terrorists ] denunciations of U.S. poli cy and threats of stepped up terrorism by receiving them at the palace and with some 6,000 local Palestinians rallying in Amman in support 12 U.S. foreign assistance to Jordan reflect ing both the hope then disappointment of the U.S. in its attempts to court Jordan to join the coalition manifested itself as follows In 1990, U.S. foreign assistance to Jordan jumped from $14.05 million to $51.84 million but that amount declined over the next two years to $35.82M then $17.87M. In the la tter half of 1990 t h e U.S. hope s of bringing Jordan into the coalition diminished yet the U.S. continued its efforts to help Jordan cope economically from the effects of the Gulf crisis. Figure A 5 in Appendix A shows the commitment to Jordan by the Eur opean Community, Japan, and Korea (at the request of the U.S. ) of $397 million. Jordan did not suffer from its refusal to join the coalition All three charts in Figure A 4 show a downward trend in U.S. assistance to 1993 for those troop contributing co alition partners. This trend is attributed more to the international environment during the First Gulf War than any link to coalition performance. A better explanation is t he so researched and written about by academics and media during this time. The peace dividend refers to the belief that, post Cold War redistributing resources that normally would be used for 11 The four objectives include the immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces the Persian Gulf; and the protection of American citizens abroad. 12 Indyk, Martin. ( 1990 ) Who Lost Jordan? The Washington Institute f or Near East Policy (September 25, 1990) http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2750 accessed August 2009.
117 military purposes could now be shifted to social programs. The collapse of the Soviet only peer compe titor during the Cold War, offered the opportunity for a or dismantling parts of the large military force structure that had existed for forty years. However, the prospect for a lasting peace did not materialize because the superpower rivalry was replaced by international conflicts driven by nationalism and ideologically focused non state actors. The charts in Figure A 4 show the beginnings of a reduction in U.S. forei gn assistance world wide. T his trend, as we w ill see in the section on the Second Gulf War did not hold because U.S. foreign assistance increase d after 2001. Table A 6 and the charts in Figure A 4 show that the U.S. strategy for coalition building in the First Gulf War did not involve using foreign assistance as a coercive or influential tool. Rather, U.S. This is not to discount the large sums of aid that were raised by coalition partners during the First Gulf War. As Figure A 5 shows the U.S. encouraged its friends and allies to contribute monetarily to Gulf War financial assistance. The primary beneficiaries of this effort were Egypt, Turkey, and Jordan and out of these states only Egypt provided troops to the coalition. U nallocat ed funds were collected that w ere intended for general humanitarian assistance. Other states that received funding were Syria, Morocco, Lebanon, Somalia, and Djibouti. Out of these states, only Syria and Morocco contributed troops to the coalition. In s hort these funds were not exclusively used to reward coalition members nor were they part of any U.S. strategy to build the coalition. The U.S. strategy did include working with coalition partners and other states to impose
118 economic sanctions against the Iraqi regime 13 but these measures were enacted separately from the effort to build the coalition. Any public discussion of assisting such states as Egypt, Turkey, and Jordan did not occur until August 30, 1990 at President Persian Gulf Crisis then privately during p residential phone calls with other state leaders. In both the news conference and the phone calls President Bush emphasized that the initiative sought economically by this ende 14 This effort was a coalition maintenance issue not a coalition building issue ; Secretary of State James Baker (1995 : 2 7 9) argue d even more difficult than This assistance was intended to come from sources other than the United States. President Bush sent Baker to Europe and Secretary of the Treasury Nicholas Brady to Europe and Japan to solicit funds. Specifically, the U.S. Korea, the Federal Republic of Germany, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, free Kuwait, and others, to join in making available financial, and, where appropriate, energy resources to 15 by t he Gulf crisis. The major contributor to this effort was Saudi Arabia whose financial support to the coalition involved host country support that included out of country transport costs reaching $2.5 billion in calendar year 1990. Secretary of State Bak er raised the issue of economic assistance 13 See National Security Directive 45 which outlines the U.S. policy response to the Iraqi invasion of Directive 45, August 20, 1990, ID# CF01478 030, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library. 14 Presidential News Conference on the Persian Gulf Crisis, August 30, 1990, ID# CF01478 028, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush P residential Library. 15 Ibid.
119 to Eastern Europe with the Saudis but the majority of funds provided by the Saudis ($1.6 billion) went to Egypt. Although not considered part of the official Gulf War contributions outlined in Figure A 5 the Sa udis provide d $4 billion in financial assistance to the Soviet Union. Baker (1995 : 295) note d U.S. role in arranging the line of credit was instrumental in solidifying Soviet support for the use of force resolution and keeping [the Soviets ] in th also assisted the U.S. by correcting glaring logistical deficiencies in the coalition Arab forces such as the Egyptians, Syrians, and other Gulf Cooperation Council ( GCC ) ground forces. As the Joint Force s Commander General Khaled b in Sultan (1995 : 196) describe d it the Saudis provided logistical support to the Arab coalition and in some cases had to provide complete support to smaller national contingents who arrived with only the clothes on their backs Sharing the burden of the First Gulf War took many forms and was outlined by President Bush as follows: The response of most of our friends and allies has been good. To help defray costs, the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE, the United Ara b Emirates, have pledged to provide our deployed troops with all the food and fuel they need. Generous assistance will also be provided to stalwart front [the U.S. has ] contributed $28 million for relief efforts. Th ere is [ also ] an energy related cost to be borne as well. Oil producing nations are already replacing lost Iraqi and Kuwaiti output. 16 It is clear the U.S. strategy for building an international coalition in the First Gulf War did not involve using U.S. fo reign assistance as an incentive to commit troops to the effort. However, reward in the form of debt relief was offered to the troop contributing states of Egypt and Jordan. T he focus on burden sharing and on traditional 16 President Bush September 11, 1990 address before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit, ID# CF01478 020, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presid ential Library.
120 allies and friends produced a com mitment by those benefitting the most from the security provided by the coalition to provide the resources for those states most at risk politically, economically, and militarily. Freeman et al (1992 : 3) argue that range of reasons, not the least of which is that they create economies of In this respect, the First Gulf War coalition could be counted a qualified success but this same strategy was not employed in the Second Gulf War for reasons that will be expl ain ed in the next section Second Gulf War In relation to other international events t he timing of the Second Gulf War was an important factor in explaining the U.S. strategy in building a Gulf coalition. Just two y ears prior, nineteen al Qaeda operatives high jacked four American owned commercial jets and flew two of them into New York one into the Pentagon and the fourth by the efforts of the passengers, into a rural field in Pennsylvania. This terrorist act was one of a series of terrorist attacks aimed at the U.S. in the post Cold War era. Figure B 5 in Appendix B depicts these major events. In reaction to these events, the U.S. went to war twice. First, it drove the Taliban government from Afghanistan then defeated Saddam forces in Iraq. The U.S. however did not fight these wars alone but with allies and coalition partners Since the war on terror began U.S. foreign assistance has centered on the idea that foreign aid i s vital to secure U.S. domestic peace and reduce the chances of a terrorist attack. This has been accomplished in three ways F irst, by providing economic and military assistance to allies and friends who are assisting in the war on terror and share U.S. cultur al
121 values. Second foreign assistance is provided to those poor ly performing states that to deploy with confidence as conflict within a state often prevents the aid from reaching the intended recipients. In addition, foreign assistance to these states is especially prone to failure. As Goran Hyden (1986 : 246) note d ent on projects and programs Third foreign aid is granted to foreign partners who are capable states but do not necessarily share U.S. values concerning human rights and the rule of law. The challenge her e is to ensure aid is not misdirected by the recipient regime. The universe of states that contributed troops to the Second Gulf War can be assigned to the first and third categor ies Th o se are states that have capable militaries and functioning governme nts that are either allies of or partners with the U.S. in the war on terror. The second category unstable states receiving U.S. foreign assistance will not be addressed. The U.S. strategy for building a Second Gulf War coalition and the role of foreign assistance in that strategy is the topic of this section. As depicted in Table B 2 in Appendix B, since 2003 37 coalition partners have provided troops for operations in Iraq. This table shows the wide diversity of troop contributions among coalition p artners. Some allies including Great Britain and Australia have provid e d large quantit ies of troops and have remain ed in Iraq for several years while other states including Italy have provide d a substantial number of troops for a short period Small er states such as New Zealand and Tonga u nderstandably have provide d a few troops and stay ed a relatively short time. Other small states such as Albania and Estonia
122 have ma d e available a small number of troops but have remain ed in Iraq a long time. This diversity of assist ance helps mak e the case for the influence of U.S. foreign assistance in coalition building because i t show s how the U.S. uses foreign assistance as a reward for joining the coalition and also as an enticement to remain in the coali tion as will be discussed below Identifying qualitative relationships between foreign assistance provided to troop contributing allies and friends and coalition troop contributions as well as the longevity of those troop deployments provide the essential evidence of a U.S. strategy for coalition building The listing of troop contributing states and U.S. foreign assistance to each state between 2001 and 2007 are listed in Table B 4 Appendix B. The year 2001 is used to establish a baseline of foreign ass istance two years prior to the Second Gulf War. Also, 2001 is the year of the Al Qaeda terrorist attacks in the U.S. as well as the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. The Afghanistan coalition was formed in that year and some states have contribut ed troops t o both coalitions (see Table B 2 for a listing of those states and Figure B 3 for a breakout of total support). For example, South Korea provided troops to both coalitions ; Ukraine provided troops only to the Iraq coalition; and such European powers as Fr ance and Germany provided troops only to Afghanistan. Sixteen o f the 37 troop contributing states in the Second Gulf War also contributed troops to Afghanistan. These states are Australia, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Italy, Lithuania, Mongolia, the Nethe rlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, South Korea, and the United Kingdom. While this dissertation is not analyzing the Afghanistan coalition, t he baseline of U.S. foreign assistance for these states must be considered carefull y insofar as their support of the Afghanistan coalition
123 in 2001 might be the result of foreign assistance but also might be the result of the dramatic events of September 11, 2001. Before examining how the U.S. attempts to use foreign aid as a strategy for coalition building we first must understand who receives foreign assistance and why. Foreign assistance has two primary goals, first, to advance the strategic objectives of the donor and second, to assist in the economic, military, and social develo pment of the recipient state. From the perspective of coalition building, the U.S. provides foreign assistance primarily for strategic reasons. D onor states around the world are those developed, industrial ized states that have sufficient available resour ces plus the will necessary to carry out a successful assistance program. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is made up of states that meet that requirement. The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) consists of 23 modern, industrialized states/organizations and is comprise d of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the Unit ed Kingdom, U.S. and the European Commission (OECD 2007 2008) This list of donors helps explain why ten troop contributing states in Table B 4 do not receive U.S. foreign assistance or at least very little. Australia, Denmark, Italy, Japan, the Netherl ands, New Zealand, Norway, South Korea, Spain, and the United Kingdom make up those states that do not receive U.S. assistance while Portugal does receive some International Military Education and Training funding (less than $1 million per year ). Rather than giving foreign assistance t he U.S. rel ies on emphasizing traditional alli ances and rhetoric to influence these states
124 Other states have receive d U.S. foreign assistance. The majority of these states broke away from the Soviet Union in the early 1 990s and they continue to move economically and politically toward the West. Eighteen of the 37 troop contributing states are post communist states and include Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia Herzegovina, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgi a, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and the Ukraine. The other states are from either Latin America or the Asia Pacific region. The four Latin American states are the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua while the Asia Pacific states are Mongolia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Tonga. The post communist states have been receiving U.S. foreign assistance since the late 1980s and this continue s in the present FY 2010 International Affairs budget request, the actual amount spent in 2008 in assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States amounted to more than $293 million plus more than $396 million in assistance for the independent states of the f ormer Sovie t Union. 17 Despite the high cost to the U.S. for the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns, America continues to provide economic and military assistance to its less prosperous allies and friends But has U.S. foreign assistance been a part of the U.S. strategy for coalition building? A comparison of the total amount of U.S. foreign assistance with the total troop contributions between 2003 and 2006 reveals a mixed result. Table B 4 shows that a id fluctuated from $1. 5 6 billion in 2003, the first year of the Ir aq war, t o a high of $ 2.1 2 b illion in 2006, a year when many coalition partners were l eaving Iraq. According to Table B 5 in one year total coalition troops declined from 26,022 in 2005 to 13,951 17 Department of State website titled, U.S. Department of State International Affairs Account Tables, http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/iab/index.htm accessed August 2009.
125 in 2006. This fluctuation in results is illustrated in t he first chart of Figure B 8 in which the amount of U.S. aid decreased in 2004 yet the total number of troops increased th at same year. The opposite took place in 2005 in which total U.S. aid increases while the number of troops decreases. This discrep ancy and others will be discussed next. As previously mentioned, U.S. foreign assistance in a strategy for coalition building for the Second Gulf War is not applied uniformly to every state This instrument of foreign policy must be focused on those state s in which it might have an effect. Traditional European and Asian Pacific allies such as Australia, Denmark, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Korea, Spain, and the United Kingdom do not qualify and will not be discussed here. R ather, the focus will be those states receiving U.S. foreign assistance. Putting the spotlight on the post communist states makes sense since they make up the majority of coalition partners. The first state to consider is Poland, which along with the U. S. Australia, and the United Kingdom, in 2003 provided substantial troop s Poland began with a small contingent of troops that participated in the invasion of Iraq t he only other European state to do so besides the United Kingdom. he Iraq campaign continued and increased during the reconstruction phase. But why show so much support to America while the rest of Europe resisted provid ing troops? The answer might be found in the fact that t he United States provided substantial financ ial support to Poland in the post Cold War era. Between 1990 and 2000, USAID delivered more than $1 billion to support Poland in its transformation from communism to a market oriented democracy 18 The chart on Poland in Figure B 8 of Appendix B shows incr easing aid provided to Poland for its 18 USAID website titled, Europe and Eurasia, http://www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia/countries/pl accessed August 2009.
126 robust coalition support up until 2005. It also shows the decline in U.S. aid in 2006 after Poland reduce d its troops. The spike in U.S. assistance in 2005 coincides with the h troops in the coalition. By February 2005, with Iraq i parliamentary elections held many countries including Poland, contemplated withdrawing their troops. The high cost in lives and money along with the low public opinion polls at home were powerful in centives to rethink coalition participation. Poland had already announced plans to withdraw troops and a 2005 spike in U.S. assistance was intended to slow down or stop those plans. Poland h owever, did reduce its troop contribution in 2006 and eventua lly pulled all of its troops from Iraq in Oct ober 2008. As a result, U.S. FY 2009 International Affairs Budget, the actual amount sent to Poland in 2007 was $30.5 3 million; a slight reduction from 2006. In 2008, U.S. assistance to Poland again was reduced to $28.98 million and the FY 2009 request was the same. The initial drop in U.S. assistance occur red in 2006 and aid was reduced by 59 percent as Polish reduced its troops in Iraq by 30 perce nt. These percentages are just one example of the connection between U.S. foreign assistance and coalition partner troop contribution and are not meant to hold constant across all cases. Rather, the amounts of U.S. foreign assistance given to state X and can vary. There are three reasons for this. First the U.S. goal to obtain cooperation from key allies and friends involve s payment even when troops are not involved. Second, the fiscal realities of two wartime cam paigns affect the amount of resources the U.S. can apply to foreign assistance as a coalition building tool Third as noted earlier, not all coalition troop contributions are equal
127 As the U.S. initiated p rior to the invasion of Iraq, the unpopularity of a second Iraq war reduced the number of potential coalition members. Inducements to join the coalition before, during, and after the the (Richard 2003). One such example was the U.S. effort in late 2002 into early 2003 to persuade Turkey to allow the U.S. entry into northern Iraq from Turkish territory. This would require substantial Turkish suppor t In addition to the use of Turkish bases from which the U.S. would operate convoys of U.S. equipment and troops would have to pass through Turkey. Discussion s within the U.S. administration included providing Turkey with $6 billion of incentives in e xchange for permission and support. While the Turkish parliament eventually rejected the U.S. request, the U.S. did provide $1 billion in economic support funds in 2003. 19 Other allies that received additional incentives to be supportive of the I raq War and yet not provide troops included Israel, Egypt, and Jordan. Comparing the amounts of U.S. aid given to Israel, Egypt, and Jordan for both Gulf w ars is instructive. In fiscal year 1990, Israel received over $4.5 billion, Egypt received over $ 3. 5 billion and Jordan received over $169 million. In fiscal year 2003, Israel received over $ 4.1 billion, Egypt received over $ 1.9 billion, and Jordan received over $1. 9 billion from the U.S. for their cooperation in the Gulf region. Israel and Jordan di d not provide troops to either conflict while Egypt provided troops for the First Gulf War but not the Second Gulf War. For the Second Gulf War, while Israeli troops were not even a consideration the U.S. would have welcomed Egyptian and 19 As noted earlier, the 2003 ESF supplemental of $1 billion t o Turkey was eventually rescinded in 2005 due to the terms of the agreement not being followed by Turkey. The original data can be found in the U.S. Department of State website titled, International Affairs Account Tables, http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/iab/index.htm accessed August 2009.
128 Jordanian troo ps. Compared to the First Gulf War coalition t he limited number of Muslim troops in the Second Gulf War coalition is a glaring deficiency. The only coalition members with sizable Muslim populations were Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. Taken together, these two countries have provide d a total of 180 troops or about 0.1 percent of the coalition total. As discussed earlier, part of the legitimacy of the First Gulf War coalition came from the variety of states providing troops to the effort. The Gulf Coopera tion Council (GCC) members that participated in the First Gulf War prevented Muslim participation in t he Second Gulf War coalition was much more limit ed and hence cast a shadow of doubt on the le gitimacy of the coalition By the time the invasion of Iraq occurred, the U.S. had already been in Afghanistan 18 months. The cost of providing support to U.S. troops in Afghanistan as well as the cost of the ensuing Iraq invasion, occupation, and recons truction posed real fiscal challenges. These economic challenges grew as the conflicts in both theaters continued. For example, in FY 2003, the U.S. allocated over $507 million in foreign assistance to Afghanistan and that amount grew to over $2.6 billion by 2005. 20 The same magnitude of increase in foreign assistance occurred in Iraq as the U.S. attempted to stabilize it For FY 2003, the U.S. provided Iraq with over $274 million in foreign assistance and by FY 2006, the amount was over $1.5 billion. 21 Muc h has been written about the cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and it should be acknowledged here that this dissertation only considers foreign assistance accounted 20 Department of State website titled, U.S. Department of State International Affairs Account Tables, http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/iab/index.htm accessed August 2009. 21 Ibid.
129 for in the State and Defense Department budget s This is important to note since ca lculating the cost for Iraq and Afghanistan by such other U.S. government agencies as the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) Congressional Research Service (CRS) White House Budget Office, and Department of Defense vary considerably. For example, the CRS when calculating the cost of the two war s estimates the allocation of all funds appropriated to deploy troops and their equipment, conduct military operations, provide in country support at bases, provide special pay for deployed personnel, and repair, replace, and upgrade war torn equipment (Belasco 2009 : 2). The numbers presented by CRS are staggering. Belasco (2009 : 8) reports that if the FY 2009 supplemental request was enacted as proposed, total war funding from FY 2001 to 2009 would be allocated as follows: $684 billion for Iraq (73 percent) $223 billion for Afghanistan (24 percent) and $28 billion for enhanced security ( 3 percent) which covers force protection projects d does not consider these other budget items However you consider the costs of the present Iraq war and Afghanistan war the remaining scarce resources for coalition partners assisting the U.S. have to be allocated with care. Hence, there are cases wher e states increase their troop contribution in Iraq yet the amount of U.S. foreign assistance goes down a decrease relative to the overall decrease of the foreign assistance budget. Examining State Department foreign assistance budgets from 2003 to 2006 r eveals two trend s in the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program. These trends are the targeted states receiving funding and the use of supplemental funding. The State U.S. interests
130 around the world by ensuring [that] coalition partners and friendly foreign governments are equipped and trained to work toward common security goals and share burdens in 22 Clearly, the FMF has been an important part of coalition building for both Iraq and Afghanistan. In FY 2003, Europe an and Eurasian states received over $252 million in FMF. Twenty six states received aid that year and all but one of those states were contributing troops or bases to the Iraq or Afghanistan coalition. Ma lta was the lone exception it received $5 million for its role in combating illicit trafficking (arms, drugs, and persons) in the Mediterranean. By FY 2004, only those states (23 in total) assisting the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns receive d funding. Th e majority (18) of those were part of the Iraq coalition. This trend of focusing on the Iraq coalition states continues in FY 2005. Out of the nineteen Europe an and Eurasian states receiving funding, only two Slovenia and Turkey are not part of the Iraq coalition. B y this time h owever, Slovenia was being recruited to join the NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTMI) and Turkey remain ed an important border state with Iraq as coalition convoys transit via the Habur Gate on the Turkish Iraq border. The same nineteen states receive d FMF in FY 2006 with Slovenia joining the NTMI in January of that year The use of supplemental funding is another way for the U.S. to reward coalition partners contributing to the Iraq coalition. In the first year of the Second G ulf War, despite the rising costs of the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns, the U.S. added supplemental funding to Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and the Ukraine. All these 22 Department of State website titled, Summary and Highlights, International Affairs Function 150, Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Request, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/122513.pdf accessed Sep tember 2009.
131 st ates joined the Iraq coalition either before or immediately after the invasion. This trend of supplemental funding also held true for the Philippines which joined the coalition in 2003 and contributed troops. While overall funding decreased over the 200 3 to 2006 timeframe the supplemental funding slowed that decline for these targeted states. This trend of declining foreign assistance can be seen in the charts in Figure B 6 in Appendix B. While 2003 is the only year of supplemental FMF funding for the se states, it is the most important year because the U.S. sought coalition partners for the Second Gulf War. By midyear 2004, after the invasion of Iraq, a number of coalition partners joined the U.S. led effort in the reconstruction efforts and others already there increased their troop contribution s Excluding the two largest contingents ( U.S. and U.K. ) who account ed for 90 percent of all coalition troops deployed, the next five states Italy, Poland, the Ukraine, Spain, and the Netherlands each had between 1,000 and 3,000 troops deployed. Only two Poland and the Ukraine receive d U.S. foreign assistance. The Ukraine joined the Iraq coalition in August 2003 with a robust 1,600 strong mechanized brigade that served with the Polish led multinational division in south central Iraq. The chart in Figure B 8 in Appendix B shows the consistent troop levels provided by the Ukraine over a three year period. During that time, U.S. foreign assistance declined then increase d in 2005. This increase was in r esponse to the January 11 2005 Ukraine parliament (Rada) resolution requesting President Leonid Kuchma (in his final days in office, pending Viktor Yushchenko's inauguration) to order the Defense Ministry to present a plan for bringing all troops home wi thout delay (Socor 2005). By increasing the U.S. hoped to
132 persuade the incoming Ukrain ian leadership to keep troops in Iraq. The U.S. a mbassador to the Ukraine, John Herbst, declared that such an important decis ion should not be taken by an interim government, and Washington is going to talk this and all Ukrainian troops left Iraq by December 2005. Subsequent to this, U.S. foreign assistance to the Ukraine dropped in 2006 by 34 percent to $96.98 million down from the 2005 level of $148.09 million. This example illustrates that U.S. foreign assistance is p art of a strategy to build and maintain a military coalition for selected and targeted s tates Poland is an example of a state that bucked the trend of contin ued declining U.S. foreign assistance dollars over the years from 2001 to 2007. This is illustrated in Figure B 6 in Appendix B as U.S. assistance rose from $ 17.5 million in 2001 peak i ng at $ 92.7 million in 2005. Along with the U.S. the U.K. and Australia Poland joined the Second Gulf War coalition at its inception U.S. foreign assistance to Poland in 2003 was $ 32.1 million (see Table B 4 ) and U.S. assistance continued to climb an d eventually spiked in 2005 to $ 92.7 million an increase of 35 percent This influx of U.S. dollars can be explained by the intent on the part of the Polish government to remove their troops from Iraq by the end of 2005. Unlike the Ukraine h owever, Pol and decided to keep their troops in Iraq but reduced the total number in 2006 A reduction in U.S. foreign assistance to Poland followed. Polish troops eventually left Iraq in October 2008. Another post communist state that was influenced by U.S. fore ign assistance was Georgia. As the chart in Figure B 8 depicts, U.S. foreign aid to Georgia remained fairly constant from 2002 to 2005. In 2005, Georgia increase d their troop s from 200 to 850.
133 Consequently, U.S. aid increase d from just over $100 million in 2005 to just over $400 million in 2006. The increase in Georgian troops was a result of a U.S. led Georgia Train and Equip Program that began in 2002 and was completed in 2004. The formation of these troops was the culmination of U.S. Special Forces and U.S. Marines providing instruction on joint military doctrine, command and control training, and staff and organizational training for the Georgian Ministry of Defense and Land Forces Command in addition to unit level tactical training for the Georgia n commando battalion. 23 The $300 million increase in U.S. assistance to Georgia in 2006 was the result of a jump in economic assistance, specifically in the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) account. According to the MCC website, the U.S. signed the agreement for the increase in economic assistance in 2005 but the agreement was actually implemented in 2006. Georgia, like Poland and Ukraine, received U.S. foreign assistance as part of a U.S. strategy to remain in the coalition with different effects. So if troop contributing states were rewarded, what happened to those states that did not join the coalition? The high profile states that did not contribute to the Second Gulf War coalition included Germany, France, Canada, Egypt, Turkey, Jordan, and Sa udi Arabia. Out of these states, only Egypt Jordan and Turkey receive d U.S. foreign assistance. All three states were energetically pursued by the Bush a dministration as key component s of the Second Gulf War coalition. Egypt participation in the Fir st Gulf War was crucial to legitimizing Arab solidarity against Iraq. Twelve years later h owever, Egypt was reluctant to join another U.S. led coalition without serious 23 U.S. European Command website titled, Georgia Train and Equip Program Transitions to U.S. Marines, November 22, 2002, http://www.eucom.mil/English/FullStory.asp?art=%7BE78619B9 76F4 476C 941B 5D7C108DC7C7%7D accessed September 2009.
134 consideration by the U.S. of the Israeli Palestinian issue. In the run up to the Sec ond Gulf War, violence between the Israelis and Palestinians was escalating. Richard Haass (2009 : 206) principal advisor to Secretary of State Colin Powell from 2001 to 2003, relate d a comment made to him by a senior Egyptian official q, Egypt w as not the only state who wanted to link a Middle East peace plan to the situation in Iraq. Correspondent Simon Marks, in an interview with Bassem Awadallah, Jordan's minister of planning and a close aide to King Abdullah, discover ed the Palestinian link is also strong in Jordan. Awadallah conclude d immedia [T] 24 This link between Egypt and Jordan supporting an Iraq coalition and the U.S. support of a pro Palestinian Middle East peace plan complicate d the U.S. strategy of coalition building. The use of U.S. foreign assistance as an incentive to join the coalition is evident in these states as outlined below Figure B 9 in Appendix B depicts U.S. foreign assistance to Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey between 2001 and 2007 Both Egypt and Jordan realize d an increase in U.S. aid in 2002 and 2003 as the U.S. was building support for a coalition compliance with numerous U.N. decision not to cooperate with the U.S. from the U.S. dropped 29 percent between 2003 and 2005. The rise and fall of U.S. aid 24 Public Broadcasting Service website titled, NewsHour wit h Jim Lehrer transcript, The War Next Door, March 31, 2003, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/jan june03/jordan_03 31.html accessed September 2009.
135 to Jordan is even more dramatic. In 2003, Jordan received 83 percent more U.S. aid than in 2001 but after its non cooperation with the U.S. led coalition, Jordan plummeted by 59 percent in U.S. aid Turkey is another key regional partner that was sought as a coalition member. the U.S. to have a Incirlik Air Base in Turkey as a base of combat operations would reduce the logistic footprint of U.S. forces in the area. However, Turkey was reluctant to participate in a war with its neighbor. The prospect was unpopular with the Turkish people and Turkey was worried about the effect it would have on Kurdish people. The U.S. nearly doubled its aid to Turkey in 2003 compared to 2001 levels giving Turkey a $1 billion supple ment When t he Turkish Parliament rejected a U.S. proposal to allow U.S. forces access to Turkish bases and territory U.S. aid to Turkey dropped by 94 percent by 2005 compared to 2003 levels. While all three states experienced a temporary drop in U.S. a id, overall U.S. assistance eventually increased and by 2007 exceeded 2001 aid levels. U.S. foreign assistance was employed as a tool to encourage these states to join the Iraq coalition and was also an instrument to express U.S. displeasure when they did not comply. Despite this the important geostrategic locations of these states to the region compelled the U.S. to continue to support Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey with U.S. foreign assistance albeit at lower levels, despite their absence from the coalitio n. To summarize the arguments of this chapter, the U.S. strategy for coalition building in the First Gulf War did not include using foreign assistance as a coercive tool. However, in the Second Gulf War, the U.S. did have some limited success by manipulat ing foreign assistance to targeted states. In the First Gulf War, foreign
136 assistance to troop contributing states increased from 1988 to 1990 but then decreased from 1990 to 1993. Rewards for coalition participation were not realized by most troop contri buting states. Egypt provides evidence of this mixed result. Although Egypt provided political and substantial troop support to the U.S. coalition, U.S. foreign assistance to Egypt decreased by $90M from 1990 to 1991. However, for its coalition particip ation, Egypt was rewarded with debt relief by the United States. U.S. foreign assistance to most coalition partners either remained steady or was reduced from 1990 to 1991. Bangladesh was the only partner to receive a significant increase ($37M) from 199 0 to 1991. This can be contrasted with the increases in U.S. foreign assistance during the Second Gulf War. During the critical period of 2003 to 200 6 when the larger post conflict coalition was being built, the U.S. foreign assistance program for most t roop contributing states also remained steady or was reduced. However, the U.S. did target certain post communist and Central Asia states that were critical to adding flags to the coalition. Poland, Georgia, and Ukraine were each enticed with additional aid for either adding more troops or keeping troops in Iraq. The largest aid increase involved adding $300M to Georgia in 2006 for their additional 650 troops. The U.S. coalition building strategy in the Second Gulf War included using foreign assistance as a coercive tool, however, the effect was limited Bridging traditional allies and U.S. foreign assistance in these U.S. strategies is very difficult because most traditional allies do not receive U.S. foreign assistance. For example, in the First Gulf War, Greece was the only traditional ally providing troops that receive d U.S. foreign assistance. From 1990 to 1991, U.S. foreign assistance to Greece remained unchanged. Turkey is an example of a traditional ally that did not
137 provide troops but did prov ide critical support (basing, overflight, logistics) to U.S. efforts in Iraq U.S. foreign assistance to Turkey increased $619M from 1990 to 1991. In the Second Gulf War, none of the traditional allies that provided troops receive d U.S. foreign assistanc e. Therefore, bridging traditional allies and foreign assistance in U.S. coalition building strateg ies is not fruitful Using foreign assistance as a tool to coerc e certainly has its limits. The resources applied to the effort are limited and in most cas es, inadequate. Other foreign policy tools are better suited to influence another state to join a U.S. led coalition. Being a traditional ally of the U.S. is one part of a strategy in coalition building ; using foreign assistance is another ; rhetoric voic ed by a senior U.S. leader is a third. Th e last, rhetoric can be expressed through public or traditional diplomacy ; either way U.S. senior leaders were engaged in a practice to influence and coerce other leaders to join U.S. led coalitions. The next ch apter will explore how senior U.S. leader rhetoric was employed during the First and Second Gulf w ars.
138 CHAPTER 5 RHETORIC In war, the first casualty is truth Senator Hiram Johnson 1917 1 The use of rhetoric in politics is not new. Presidential use of th well documented by academics, the media, and think tanks. According to Jeffrey Tulis (1987) presidential rhetoric can be broken down into three eras. The first era began with the first United States ( U.S. ) P resident, George Washington and lasted until the late 1800s. During this time, presidents rarely spoke in public and rarely addressed Congress directly ( Kennedy Shaffer 2006 ) The second era includes the late 1800s to the early part of the twentieth century. During this era, the use of rhetoric was limited and used to influence policy. Alan Kennedy Shaffer ( 2006 : 24) uses the example of could be used to accompany his major policy pronouncements. T he final era which continues to the present, Kennedy country, attempting to rhetorically persuade Congress and the publ ic of the soundness example of this use of rhetoric. N ot all scholars agree with this framework of presidential rhetoric and argue instead that U.S. Presidents have always enga ged in rhetoric for political purposes For example, Elizabeth Frost (1988 : 1 Conroy, Thomas and Jarice Hanson. (2008) Lanham, MD: Lexington Books 112.
1 39 Reagan presidents have used their office to speak out on every conceivable Of course, presidential rhetori c did not stop with Ronald Reagan; it also applies to the four p 1988 book The Bully Pulpit While the study of rhetoric in domestic politics is quite common, studies of its use in international contexts is less so and studies of i ts use in building international coalitions even less. Whereas Vejai Balasubramaniam (1999 : 2789) finds the use of rhetoric has an important place in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in that case the role of rhetoric encourages non invol vement in coalitions. Martha Medhurst et al (1990 : 14) examine the rhetorical histories (political, social, and economic ) of the Cold War from the standpoint of maintaining a coalition or alliance but not from a coalition formation standpoint. There are studies of the two Gulf w ars that address r hetoric but most focus on the domestic aspect of the issue. While the same rhetoric can be useful for domestic and international consumption, the topic s are often analyzed separately. Th e focus on the domestic side asks how did the U.S. a dministration convince Congress and the public to go to war? One such example is Politics and Propaganda (2004) which studie s the Bush a Iraq. This study n otes the using such concepts as symbolism, rhetoric, and myth but does not address the use of rhetoric in forming a coalition. This chapter will demonstrate the role that U.S. senior leader rh etoric had in coalition building strategies for the two Gulf w ars. Rhetoric as a means to persuade or coerce, can be traced back to ancient Greece and is still used today. This chapter examines the fear mongering rhetoric of U.S. senior leaders in the l ead up to and during
140 the formation of military coalitions for the First and Second Gulf Wars. The target audiences of this rhetoric are those potential troop contributing states that are allies and friends of the United States. Therefore, presidential sp eeches and remarks are analyzed for such rhetoric as well as speeches and remarks from the secretaries of state and defense. This rhetoric does not have to be directed or targeted at specific widely reported in various forums and this di ssertation assumes that intended targets receive the message. By analyzing public statements of U.S. senior leaders, this chapter will support the thesis that the U.S. coalition building strategy emphasized fe ar mongering rhetoric in both the First and Second Gulf Wars. But what is rhetoric and why is it important? Evan Cornog (2004 : 5) argues that [ while ] presidential life stories ar e the most important tools of persuasion in American political Nicholas : 65) states While Medhurst et al (1990 : 8) describe rhetoric as dissertation, the definition provided by John Nelson (1998 : xv) is appropriate for its simplicity and flexibility: rhetoric as stylized persuasion. The definition of rhetoric as stylized persuasion reminds us that rhetoric should be considered an art and not a science because its use and results cannot be duplicated for every situation The examina tion of U.S. senior leader rhetoric in both Gulf wars should reveal the U.S. strategy of using fear mongering rhetoric to persuade other states to join both coalitions.
141 The importance of rhetoric in the international context and specifically for coalition building is inseparable from the sentiment of the quote by Senator Hiram Johnson at the start of this chapter There is no doubt that in both Gulf w ars (as with all wars in the past), the first casualty is truth. As previously mentioned in Chapter 2, th e U.S. and other states ha ve their foreign policy. This chapter examines the use of negative rhetoric in U.S. strategies to build international coalitions against Iraq in both Gulf w ars. Demonstrating t he use of politi cal rhetoric to persuade others to join an international coalition as part of a U.S. strategy in both Gulf w ars is the purpose of this chapter. First, an examination of the U.S. history of the use of rhetoric will present how it has been studied in the pa st. The debate on the use of rhetoric has continued since ancient Greece. R ecent studies of rhetoric have focused on the fine line between persuasion and propaganda. Nicholas Cull et al (2003) examine persuasion and propaganda from a historical perspec tive and find most definitions of propaganda lacking. Instead, Cull et al (2003 : 318 The next section will outlin e the data employed in this chapter to help distinguish among the type s of rhetoric that are in use. The focus for both Gulf w ars will be the fear mongering rhetoric employed by both Bush a dministrations and hence certain key words from certain key actors in the roles of president, secretary of state, and secretary of defense, will be the focus of the analysis. Next we investigate U.S. senior leader use of negative rhetoric in the First Gulf War which demonized Iraq. It will reveal the fear mongering
142 coalition building. The theme of this U.S. future possibility of Iraq invading Saudi Arabia and the threat of Iraq controlling the Gulf oil reserves. This pattern of demonizing Iraq was repeated in the Second Gulf War but with different themes focusing more on the U.S. insistence that Iraq was tied destruction. The theme of U.S. rhetoric leading up to the Second Gulf War of Iraq obtaining nuclear capability that could tip the balance of power in the region as well as lead to weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists. In both Gulf w ars, U.S. rhetoric emphasized the potential of a future threat versus the present threat posed by Iraq as the greatest concern that allies and friends must take into account. Hence, b oth Gulf War coalitions were built on images of what might be and not what was The analysis of rhetoric continues in contemporary social science research. Kimberly Neuendorf (2002 : 27) notes that rhetoric has a long history of use in communication s journ alism, sociology, psychology, and business. In fact, the long history of communication s study can be traced back to its European roots in the 1860s and the important research conducted by scholars including Harold Lasswell (1931) Kurt Lewin (1939) Carl Hovland (1948) and Paul Lazarsfeld (1952 1953) 2 These scholars did most of their writing between the 1930s and 1950s. Lasswell, for example, famous for his research into wartime propaganda develop ed an important 2 These and other important social scientists are outlined in works such as Propaganda and Persuasion A History of Communication Study: A Biographical Approach (1994) by Rogers.
143 communication tool : content analysis. Everett Rogers (1994 : 214) describes content War I and II propaganda messages used by Allied and Axis members, Lasswell distinguish ed ways in which states attempted to divide the enemy, demoralize the enemy, and accuse the enemy of barbaric a trocities. He justified this type of analysis [S] hould the United States become m ore intimately involved in the w ar, it would be important for us to formulate war aims in terms that would strengthen rather [W] e need, therefore, to keep a watchful eye on the role of political symbols in the lives of 3 This focus on political symbols (fear mongering rhetoric) and the concern for potential allies is the cornerstone of this chapter. This is not to suggest that rhetoric is always negative in context In the First Gulf War, the U.S and its allies employed positive rhetoric associated with promoting democracy, protecting state sovereignty and the rights of the Kuwaiti people. The U.S. strategy for coalition building in both Gulf w ars was also aided by a concerted U.S. effort to de monize the enemy using political symbols. Fear mongering rhetoric of Iraq and its leader, Saddam Hussein, was one part of the U.S. strategy to convince states to join the international coalition. This practice of producing powerful messages to achieve po licy objectives has been implemented in the past and will be in the future. As K.P. : 296 ) notes demonology, points to an evolution where in the 1980s concerns over terrorism were transformed into fear s of a third world power acquiring weapons of mass destruction. 3 RG1.1, Series 200R, Box 239, Folder 2852.
144 This theme will play out again in the Second Gulf War as Iraq becomes associated with the wider war on terror amid the U.S. destruction. M ichael Klare (1995 : 27 28) observes model of a rogue state ruled by an outlaw regime armed with chemical and nuclear These rogue states include d A xis of E It is clear the history of rhetoric as stylized persuasion has explored both the good and bad intent of the spoken word. The strategy of using fear mongering rhetoric by U.S. senior leaders in both Gul f wars is an extension of this emphasis in rhetorical history. In both Gulf wars, the U.S. undeniably employed rhetoric to demonize Iraq and Saddam Hussein. With the advent of computers t he use of content analysis to analyze texts has expanded geometrica lly. Various software programs are available to assist the researcher by providing sophisticated text analysis. Most content analysis studies are quantitative in nature. M any powerful computer programs allow the researcher to identify, sort, and count w ords and phrases in massive amount s of text. This is accomplished by using on board dictionaries for text analysis. These dictionaries provide the researcher a means to measure different concepts. This data can then be gathered into a database that then can be statistically analyzed. As noted in Chapter 1 Weber (1990 : 41) identifies a number of content analysis techniques including : word frequency counts, key word in context (KWIC) listing s concordances ( a form of cross referenc ing between or among r elated words) classification of words into content categories, content category counts, and retrievals based on content categories and co occurrences. Content analysis computer software programs make these techniques
145 manageable for a researcher to analyz e large sample s of texts. Research for t his dissertation did not require very sophisticated software because th is analysis centers on simple word frequency counts and can be accomplished using Microsoft Word and Excel functions However, ju st because a m ethod of data analysis is simple in comparison to statistical analysis does not mean the conclusions are any less valid. Weber (1990 : 12) states Of co urse, whether using sophisticated or simple techniques, certain concerns about content analysis data collection are always an issue. Weber (1990) identifies these concerns as measurement, indication, representation, and interpretation. In content analys is, measurement consists of counting the occurrences of meaning units such as specific words, phrases, content categories, and themes (Weber 1990 : 70). One problem that can occur is when numerous words are counted within a certain category. For example, However, each term (skirmish, battle) might have different value s placed on them by a user and that could skew the results of the analysis. This co ncern is mitigated within this analysis by counting words that stand alone. A problem particular to this analysis however could be that all word s are considered to have equal value which might not be the intent of the user. This possibility could affe ct the meaning of the message being delivered. By collecting data from influential actors in the roles of p resident, s ecretary of state and s ecretary of defense, within the two Bush a dministrations, this effect should be diminished. In addition, countin g words alon e is not enough. David Hays (1967 : 19)
146 properties is insufficient; the content of a message should be analyzed in terms of what has gone before, in terms of th e relationship between the message and what the sender important for the analysis to come. According to Weber ( 1990 : 74) i ndication is the second problem in content analysis because indication the investigator of some unmeasured or latent characteristics of text using numbers that certain key words to show fear mongering rhetoric in bo th Gulf w ars is precisely the issue that Weber identifies. Indication is a major problem when quantification of the data is the major part of the research. To mitigate the effects of indication in this study, the context of the key words will be emphasiz ed and a qualitative analysis of that context will highlight the fear mongering rhetoric. (1990 : 76) third concern is r epresentation which is a problem in content analysis when coding procedures (human or computer) do not richness of language or of specific texts meanings or nuances of words need to be acknowledged and could be a problem when has 41 different meanings in th e Oxford English Dictionary ( 1989 ) K eeping the selection of key words simple and straightforward will reduce the effect of representation. The final problem of content analysis concerns interpretation which set of linguistic or linguistically expressed to another. Meanings of words can change based on the translat or While t his is not an
147 issue in this study the other part of interpretation centers on concerns that two people reading the same text will interpret th at text differently. A as it is true not speak f and provide an objective analysis based on theory. It is only through theory that an appropriate interpretation of the text can be outlined for the reader to accept or reject. It is hoped that concern for interpretation has been taken into account in this chapter Overall, Siobhan McEvoy Levy (2001 : centered approach, when used in conjunction with established foreign policy process models, m ay be a valuable tool for explaining and understanding United States foreign policy [C] urrently, it is undervalued as such a tool but, given the importance of public diplomacy to the survival and effectiveness of administrations, it is particularly useful in a U.S. To empirically assess the use of rhetoric for coalition building, a database was constructed compiling the public statements of selected U.S. foreign policy elites for two distinct periods. The first period from August 2, 1990 to Jan uary 17, 1991 encompasses the time between the Iraq invasion of Kuwait and the start of the First Gulf War. This period is when the U.S. a dministration built a coalition of states to Iraq. The second period from January 1, 2003 to June 30, 2003 encompasses the time from ten weeks prior to the start of the Second Gulf War to approximately 16 weeks after This period is when the U.S. assembled the small coalition for the Iraq invas ion and began to build a larger coalition for post conflict stability operations. Each database totals the frequency
148 of the use of the fear mongering terms dictator and aggression. Choosing which words to focus on in an y content analysis is a difficult but necessary exercise. Words need to be chosen that express the concept being measured. In this case, words need to be chosen that will reflect the fear mongering rhetoric of senior U.S. a apropos of the concern of terrorism in the post Cold War era. Other words such as fear, horror, fright, dread, shock, panic, or alarm could have been used for analysis but would not capture the connection to terroris m that both a dministrations voiced The use between Saddam Hussein and the infamous German dictator by President H.W. Bush in the First Gulf War. Bush and Scowcroft (1998 : 375) note that Preside Saddam to Hitler, with critics accusing me of personalizing the crisis, but I still feel it was the name received in both the media and ac ademia analyzing its use in both Gulf wars is Dictator appropriate synonyms such as ruler, tyrant, despot, autocrat, totalitarian, or authoritarian but it cannot be construed as anything but ne gative and hence connote s fear mongering. dictator to demonize a person, a regime, a system, or a state. In both Gulf w ars, both Bush a dministrations were trying to paint Iraq as a dictatorship and Saddam Hussein as a dictator who r epressed his own people and had evil intentions toward his was specifically chosen for its relation ship to terrorism in general in the post Cold War era. In both Gulf wars, the concern over chem ical, biological, nuclear, and radiological weapons in the
149 hands of a rogue regime or state played a major role in shaping U.S. rhetoric. Th o se presumed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) could fall into the hands of terrorists harboring ill intent toward the United States. frequency count can capture the use of the word whether talking about a particular characteristic nature as promulgated by both Bush a dministrations With its war with Iran and the invasion of Kuwait Iraq had proven over time that it demonstrated real possibility of Iraq possessing WMDs, the fear paint Iraq as being an aggressor in the Middle East region. The selection of any or a ll of these terms could be questioned as being less than optimal to capture fear mongering rhetoric from U.S. senior leaders but each term focuses on a s pecific aspect of that rhetoric and provides a piece of the assemblage of that rhetoric over time. The policy roles chosen for the analysis are the p resident, s ecretary of s tate, and s ecretary of d efense. Analysis of the ir selected public statements gener ates both quantitative and qualitative data for use in answering the research question. For each role slightly different document search methods were used due to the various archiving practices and protocols of the respective agencies. F or the s ecretary of d efense, f ollowing the method used by (2007), the Department of Defense website was searched for all public statements and remarks by the s ecretar ies of d efense Richard Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld containing the term dictat or in search engine. For the Department of State, similar searches were conducted on the archived speeches and remarks of s ecretaries
150 of state James Baker and Colin Powell. A dditional resource s w ere the Seeley G. Mudd Library, Princeton University, and the George Bush Presidential Library, College Station, T exas Regarding presidential speeches, searches with the applicable terms were conducted on the online and hard copy version s of the annually report ed Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents for both Bush 41 and 43 These were supplemented with documentation and searches from the George Bush Presidential Library and The Congressional Record (hardcopy, online and microfiche) For example, in th e First Gulf War period (August 2, 1990 to January 17, 1991), President Bush spoke 504 times and 180 of those remarks related to Iraq. Each of these 180 remarks w as examined and analyzed for fear mongering rhetoric. The same method was employed for the s ecretaries of s tate and d efense as well as for the Second Gulf War senior leaders Where the search engines produced duplicative records of the same statement, where the terms were said by a person other than one of the examined actors ( a reporter, foreig n official or the like ), or where the term was not applicable due to its specific usage ( references not Iraq related ) the data w ere not included. Additionally, the speeches and remarks examined include domestic and international audiences. A speech doe s not have to address a particular coalition member to be effective. Since U.S. senior leader remarks are widely reported, potential coalition members receive U.S. rhetoric whether the remarks are spoken in front of a domestic or international audience. Before moving to the specific instances of fear mongering rhetoric voiced by senior leader s before and during both Gulf wars, an overview of the two time periods is instructive. Figure A 6 in Appendix A shows th e quantity of U.S. foreign policy
151 discours e utilized by policy makers at the highest levels for both Gulf wars. During the two periods examined, both p residents dominate the total amount of fear mongering rhetoric as the respective Gulf coalitions were being formed. More than 75 percent of the f ear mongering public statements were produced by the two p residents. This should not come as a surprise considering the vested interest that both p residents had in the success of their foreign policy objectives for Iraq and the Middle East. The marked in crease in the public statements made by s ecretar ie s Powell and Rumsfeld compared to their predecessors in the First Gulf War indicates the increased effort made the U.S. public of the need for a united effort in I raq. By demonizing Iraq and Saddam Hussein, both a dministrations in both Gulf wars built their coalitions based on fear mongering rhetoric. The specifics of how this was accomplished are outlined in the next two sections. First Gulf War Very early in th e first Gulf crisis, just days after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, U.S. Information Agency Director Bruce Gelb sent a memo to Secretary of State James Baker highlighting the need for an inter agency effort to garner support for U.S. policy. The four major public affairs themes emphasiz ed were: the U.S. sought a universal, multinational effort; the Gulf crisis has a global economic impact; an early and considered response to aggression is necessary; and U.S. ties to Arab states remain important. 4 The firs t theme a universal, multinational effort formed the initial public coalition building arguments. The focus was on highlighting to the world that condemnation of against Kuwait was universal. This was evidenced 4 Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.
152 by U.N. Security Counci l R esolution 660 from August 2, 1990 in which the U.N. Security Council voted 14 to zero ( with Yemen not participating) to condemn Iraq and demand the immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. Emphasis also was placed on demonstrating worldwide support which included such neutral states as Switzerland. Another key part of this theme was aimed at building an international coalition to show that it is not an argument between the U.S. and Iraq or between President Bush and Saddam Hussein. By Aug ust 11, 1990, the U.S. welcomed the participation of forces from many states in a joint effort to fight the aggression of Saddam Hussein. Military participation by Australia, Belgium, France, the U.K. and West Germany signaled a high degree of unity amon g traditional allies of the United States. But the emphasis was not just on traditional allies, as President Bush expressed in his August 29, 1990 njustices in the Persian Gulf region; and we have been a part of a remarkable international commitment to peace 5 The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait needed t o be exposed as a threat to the economic viability ed not just the oil importing states of the West and Japan but on states in the developing world as well. To help alleviate this disruption and show unity against Iraq, on August 11, 1990 the U.S. [the] 5 Radio Address to United States Armed Forces Stationed in the Persian Gulf Region, August 29, 1990, ID# 9006418, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.
153 ability to make up for o 6 An early and considered response to aggression was the third U.S. public affairs theme. It focused on the tenet that aggression unanswered early always leads to catastrophe. Legitimacy was emphasized by s response to Iraqi aggression began as it should have in the United Nations. In addition, the use of force was being de emphasized and shown as being considered only in the face of Iraqi refusals to abide by the terms of the U.N. R esolution 660 and to withdraw from its illegal occupation of Kuwait. This theme withdrawal from Kuwait. The U.S. public affairs theme of U.S. senior leader s rhetoric in their rhetoric is the focus of this chapter. The final theme concerns the U.S. ties to Arab states and the importance of those ties. Despite the unlawful action of Iraq in the Gulf crisis, the U.S. need ed to show it place d the highest value on i ts bilateral relations with Arab countries with which it enjoy ed ties of mutual respect. This theme was bolstered and received legitimacy when Arab states eventually joined the U.S. led coalition and contributed troops to the operation. On August 11, 200 9, President Bush called President Mubarak of Egypt to congratulate him on the successful outcome of the Arab League meeting where passage of a resolution to send Arab troops to participate in the U.S. led multinational force. 7 On August 28 1990, Presid U.S. military forces stand shoulder to shoulder with forces of many Arab and European states to deter, and, if 6 Excerpts of a Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on the Persian Gulf Crisis, August 11, 1990, ID# 9006418, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library 7 Excerpts of a Statement by Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater on the Persian Gulf Crisis, August 11, 1990, ID# 9006418, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.
154 8 The p theme that it is Iraq against the majo rity of the Arab world and Iraq against the rest of the world. The focus for the Bush a the Iraqi regime. This focus is illustrated in Figure A 7 in Appendix A which shows 75 percent of the time in U.S. senior leader rhetoric compared to the other four terms (terror, Hitler, dictator, and weapon) The se five fear mongering terms analyzed during the period of coalition building of the First Gulf War reveals the dominance of th e word aggression by U.S. senior leaders when addressing Iraqi intentions in the region. emphasis on a coalition approach, especially one that included Arab states such as Egypt and Syria, forced the president to play down any intention of removing Saddam [H] is appeal to other nations rested on their common concern over the danger of external aggression; few were likely to agree to the idea of interfering in the (Divine 2000 : 131) The aggressive nature of Iraq and its leader, Saddam Hussein, was not only an issue for the other regional states but the U.S. focus ed attention on the future p ossibility of further aggression that would de stabilize the Middle East region. An unstable region mean t higher energy prices as the price of oil could be controlled by an aggressive Saddam Hussein. Very early on in the crisis, as the coalition was bei ng formed, the U.S. emphasi zed both publicly and privately to regional and world leaders aggressive tendencies President Bush 8 Remarks at a White House Briefing for Members of Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis, August 28, 1990, ID# 9006418, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.
155 talked of the need to deter Iraqi aggression and to get Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait by forming a coalition of willing states from Europe and the Middle East. A coalition form ed, but not immediately. General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a National Security Council meeting on August 4, 1990 Arabia is not doing much to prep 9 President Bush h owever, continued his telephone diplomacy with the leaders of the U.K. France, Germany, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey. President Turgut Ozal of Turkey was an important figure in coalit ion had influence in the region and as a NATO member, Turkey was close to the Western powers. President Bush had numerous private phone calls with President Ozal in wh ich 10 In another call the next day, President Ozal mention ed that he ha d talked to King Fahd of Saudi Arabia and believe d the Saudis were 11 Early in the process of building an international coaliti on t he commitment of U.S. resolve was questioned by many in the Western and Arab world. The Saudis were especially doubtful of U.S. commitment to such a coalition. In a conversation with Turkish President Ozal, President Bush relay ed his comments to Sau 12 His citing of Lebanon refers to 9 Nation Security Council meeting, August 4, 1990, ID# CF01478 030, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidentia l Records, George Bush Presidential Library. 10 Telephone call to President Turgut Ozal of Turkey, August 4, 1990, ID# CF01478 026, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library. 11 Presidential telephone call to Turgut Oz al, August 5, 1990, ID# CF01478 027, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library. 12 Telephone call to President Turgut Ozal of Turkey, August 4, 1990, ID# CF01478 026, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.
156 the 1983 posting of U.S. Marines as a peacekeeping force in Lebanon. The subsequent suicide bombing of the Marine b arracks on October 23, 1983, ultimately led to a withdrawal of U.S. forces. Many states questioned U.S. resolve in a showdown with Iraq especially if U.S. casualties were a possibility. President Bush addressed this issue in remarks at a White House briefing for m embers of Congress on the Gulf crisis. 13 The coalition that was built over the next few months around diplomatic, econ omic, and military actions was outlined in National Security Directive 45 which laid out the U.S. policy response to the Iraq invasion of Kuwait and encouraged the effective expressions of support and the participation of allies and other friendly states to promote mutual interest s in the Persian Gulf region. The primary mutual interest was to stand together against aggression. an all time high in November 1990. Figure A 8 illustrates this spike compared to the other five months in the p the term November 1990 alone represents 35 percent of the time s Bush used the word aggression in a six month period. In one particular speech given by Bush to a Republican campaign rally in Houston, Texas on November 5, 1990, the p times. The p he aggression against Kuwait 13 Remarks at a White House Briefing for Members of Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis, August 28, 1990, ID# 9006418, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.
157 14 Much of the fear mongering rhetoric for the s ecretaries of s tate and d efense are concentrated i n statements made before the U.S. Congress. On September 5, 1990, Sec retary of State James Baker crisis. emphasizing the role the international community need ed to play in opposing ruthl ess, unchecked aggression. The U.S. implemented its 15 Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney provide d during two appearances befor e c ongressional committees. Th ese theme s of turning back aggression and recalling lessons learned on the history o f aggression are reiterated by the Bush a dministration leading up to the First Gulf War. This will be explored next as Bush labels Saddam H ussein a modern day Hitler. The use of the name Bush was controversial and short lived. Many of atrocities Iraq was committing against the people of Kuwait (some of which turned out to be false) began demonizing Saddam Hussein, comparing his deeds to those of Hitler. backfire on building support for an international coalition. In fact the p resident is the 14 George Bush Preside ntial Library website titled, Remarks at a Republican Campaign Rally in Houston, Texas, November 5, 1990, http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php ?id=2406&year=1990&month=11 accessed October 2009. 15 Statement by the Honorable James A. Baker III to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, The Congressional Record, Vol 136, Part 26, 101 st Congress, 2 nd Session, Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 23488.
158 only senior leader to have evoked Hitler Both s ecretar ies Baker and Cheney avoided using the name The p resident referred to Saddam Hussein as Hitler on only ten occasions, for a total of sixteen times, from October 15 to Nove mber 3, 1990. By doing so, the p resident hoped to accomplish two things. First, he hoped to paint the Iraqi leader as an evil, unreasonable, and aggressive dictator who must be opposed. Second, the p resident hoped to remind allies and friends that appea sing Saddam Hussein was not the best policy. There were many states hoping to avoid armed conflict with Iraq who voiced the hope that some type of accommodation could be reached with Iraq. President Bush was adamantly opposed to accommodation and hoped t o draw from the lessons of history regarding the unsuccessful appeasement of Hitler prior to the outbreak of World War II Carrie Chrisco (1995 : remember the 1930s theme constantly reminded [ audiences ] of decisions made by world leaders to grant concessions to Hitler in the early part of his blitzkrieg leading to ed personally attack Saddam Hussein in the early editorials after the invasion and before the Cairo [ Arab ] summit, Saddam is compared to Hitler throughout the pre war and war (Chrisco 1995 : 35). The military aims in the First Gulf War did not include removing Saddam Hussein from power. Negative rhetoric such as mentioning Hitler, by th e president could lead to an escalation of military aims and cause the coalition to break. As Robert Divine (2000 : end the aggression, [ but ] the president knew that an invasion of Iraq would instantly shatter the coalition, but he hoped that at least
159 the U.S. ground offensive would grind down armor and heavy equipment, The first recorded incident of President Bush referring to Hitler and appeasement occur red in early August. This happen ed in a private telephone conversation between Bush and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl a day after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in which Cha of one man 16 In another telephone conversation this time between Bush and French President Francois Mitterrand a day after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, 17 Bush uses the same rhetoric with Prime Minister To shiki Kaifu of Japan when Bush called him on the same day 18 The issue of appeasement is first brought up by Turkish President Ozal during a telephone call on August 3, 19 90 with Bush. President Ozal relates a conversation he had previously with Saudi King Fahd in which he declares that 19 This reference is to the 1938 Munich Agreement in which the European powers acceded to 16 Telephone call to Chancellor Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany, August 3, 1990, ID# CF01478 027, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library. 17 Telephone call to President Mitterand of France, A ugust 3, 1990, ID# CF01478 027, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library. 18 Telephone call with PM Kaifu of Japan, August 3, 1990, ID# CF01478 027, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Pres idential Library. 19 Telephone call to President Turgut Ozal of Turkey, August 3, 1990, ID# CF01478 028, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.
160 demands to take over the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia Any suggestion of appeasing Saddam Hussein by rewarding him in any way for withdrawing from Kuwait was analogous to the failed a ppeasement of Hitler at Munich. President Ozal insisted on not repeating the mistakes made at the beginning of World War II This theme is repeated in a follow up call the next day August 4, 1990 between Bush and Ozal in which Bush declares that 20 During this call, Bush again mentions that others have called Saddam another Hitler. B ush did not just equate Saddam Hussein to Hitler with foreign leaders; he also used this a nalogy in a National Security Council meeting with his top advisors. Bush comment ed 21 associated appeasement is argued by Andrew Bennet t et al (1997 : 60) in which they state: Decisionmakers also drew analogies to World War II and the lessons of Munich when they warned that Iraq would invade Saudi Arabia to control the world oil supply and Middle East politics if it were not stopped. This was particularly true of President Bush who had served in World War II. Bush saw the concessions to Hitler at the 1938 Munich conference as a key step toward World War II, and he was determined to avoid any hint of a similar appeasement in the Gulf even if it cost him the election. Bush even publicly compared Saddam Hussein to Hitler, further emphasizing his concern over a replay of Munich, this time with Kuwait in a role like that of Czechoslovakia in 1938 and Saudi Arabia like Poland in World War II at risk of becoming the next target of Iraqi aggression. 22 20 Telephone call to President Turgut Ozal of Turkey, August 4, 1990, ID# CF01478 026, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library. 21 National Security Council meeting, August 4, 1990, ID# CF01478 030, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library. 22 See also Stephen Wayne, (1993) President Bush Goes to War: A Psychological Interpretation from a Distance in The Political Psychology of the Gulf War: Leaders, Publics, and the Process of Conflict by Stanley Allen Renshon, Pittsburgh: University of Pit tsburgh Press, 39; Ann Devoy, (1990) Bush Likens
161 Although Bush only publicly in the course of ten speeches, the press multiplied its use and questioned the validity of making comparisons between the two. The p hope of making a parallel between current events in Kuwait to the ruthless rule of Nazi Germany diminished and ultimately was abandoned by early November 1990. Instead, the focus remained on the as was sho wn earlier, the Bush a dministration increased the focus on the regime s aggressive tendencies and possibility of future aggression if not first checked But along with the reference s to Hitler, U.S. senior leaders also painted Saddam Hussein as a brutal dictator. As Figure A 7 U.S. senior leaders in speeches and remarks is low compared to the use of more than 9 percent of the total fear mongering rhetoric. Analyzing the data during this period shows a similar pattern for the use of the month of November as depicted in t he chart titled ( Figure A 8 ). November 1990 is a crucial month for the U.S. coalition building efforts. Economic sanctions have been in place since August and by November the Bush a dministration expresse d its disappointment they ha d not had more of an effect. 23 In were part of the U.S. led coalition. The Bush a dministration ha d to deal with those states that were either growing impatient with the coalition or were demanding compensation to remain in the Kuwaitis to Czechs, The Washington Post November 18, A23; also see James Baker, (1995) Politics of Diplomacy New York: G.P. Putnam, 303. 23 Bilateral meeting with Emir of Kuwait, November 21, 1990, ID# CF01 584 028, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.
162 co alition a type of compensation that was addressed in the previous chapter on foreign assistance. More importantly, during the month of November, the U.S. was working hard to pass a U.N. resolution that would authorize force to complete the coalition obje ctives. The increased demonization of Saddam Hussein as a brutal dictator that preys not only on his neighbors but also on his own people was directed at coalition members who might be reluctant to move toward military force as an option to oust Iraq fro m Kuwait. President Bush reiterated this theme throughout the month of November but particularly when addressing allied troops assembled in Saudi Arabia in which he innocent w omen and children unleashing chemical weapons of mass destruction, weapons that were considered unthinkable in the civilized world for over 70 years 24 Secretary Baker as he depict ed Sad armed to the teeth [ and ] 25 Interestingly, Saddam Hussein. The one instance found in a public comment was on December 3, 1990, in testimony to the Senate Committee on Armed Services. The s ecretary made this reference as a passing comment on how authoritarian regimes were able to withstand economic hardship more tha n states with democratic leaders. In the same 24 George Bush Presidential Library website titled Remarks to Allied Armed Forces n ear Dhahran, Saudi Arabia November 22, 1990, http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=2485&year=1990&month=11 accessed October 2009. 25 Statement by the Honorable James A. Baker III, Secretary of State, Before the Senat e Foreign Relations Committee, Washington DC, December 5, 1990, ID# 03418 003, White House Public Affairs, George H.W. Bush Presidential Library.
163 statement t he d efense s times. Clearly the s ecretary chose to emphasize both its neighbors and the threat posed by Sadd destruction rather than demonizing Hussein as a dictator U.S. senior leaders during this six month period is third Bush a dmin istration goal was to depict the Iraq regime as unpredictable, irrational, brutal and in possession of weapons of mass destruction. The chart titled ( Figure A 8 ) shows the continu ing trend of a spike in rhetoric in November 19 90. The majority of these appear in public remarks over a two day period, November 22 and 23. In the same speech to allied troops in Saudi Arabia mentioned earlier, the President makes biological weapons and [Saddam] 26 In a related speech the same day to other U.S. Army troops, Bush declare d sacrifice now, or we can pay an even stiffer price later as Saddam moves to mul tiply his 27 The U.S. strategy continue d not the immediate threat This theme of a future weapons threat was tied to the U.S. claim that Ira q would use th o se weapons or supply th o se weapons to groups promoting terror in the international system. Figure A 7 shows that the word was not one given main emphasis in 26 George Bush Presidential Library website titled Remarks to Allied Armed Forces near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia November 22, 1990, http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=2485&year=1990&month=11 accessed October 2009. 27 Ibid.
164 U.S. leader rhetoric yet the connection between Iraq and terror was made. The distribution of its use over the six month time period is depicted in Figure A 8 in the chart titled, The increas ing rhetoric in November does not include Rather the word is used early (September) and late (J anuary). On one occasion alone, September 21, 1990, the p On e ach occasion, he expressed of terror against the coal ition that was forming When asked by a reporter why Bush was now emphasizing terrorism so much, the p resident replied that irrational people sometimes resort to terror. In addition, the p resident was concerned about a conference held in Jordan and attended by what the U.S. considered as kno wn terrorists. The p [ Saddam ] as will our allies, directly responsible for terrorist 28 rhetoric most likely stemmed from the U.S. go vernment concern for state sponsored terrorism. A d epartment of s lists the following state supporters of terrorism: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Syria. 29 This co use of the word The two s 28 George Bush Presidentia l Library website titled, 1990, http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=2244&year=1990&month=9 accessed October 2009. 29 Office of the Secretary of State, Office of the Coordinator of Counterterrorism website titled, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1990, http://www.fas.org/irp/threat /terror_90/index.html accessed December 2009. Currently, there are four states designated by the U.S. as state sponsors of terrorism. The following lists those states and the date the U.S. designated them: Cuba (March 1, 1982), Iran (January 19, 1984) Sudan (August 12, 1993), and Syria (December 29, 1979). See also Office of the Secretary of State, Office of the Coordinator of Counterterrorism website titled, State Sponsors of Terrorism, http://www. state.gov/s/ct/c14151.htm accessed December 2009.
165 but to a much lesser extent than the p resident. Secretary Baker used it more than Secretary Cheney especially highlight ed and against Western hostages, plus the threat he pose d to his neighbors. In a statement on December 5, 1990, to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he said, [ Saddam ] threatened to 30 Likewise, Secretary Cheney mention ed ats to use terror and chemical weapons against Saudi Arabia and Israel; the brutalizing of Kuwaitis and the looting of their country; and the continued mistreatment of 31 U.S. senior leader rhetoric reinforces the other f ear mongering words including s terms suggest the reasons why states were encouraged to join the U.S. in opposing raditional The U.S. strategy for building a coalition for the Second Gulf War which will be explored next emphasized a different type of fear mongering rhetoric. Second Gulf War Partly to justify U.S. int ervention into two sovereign states in recent years but also to set a course for the future, President George W. Bush in his second inaugural address in 2005 outlined the direction of U.S. foreign policy for his second term: 30 Statement by the Honorable James A. Baker III, Secretary of State, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, December 5, 1990, White House Public Affairs, ID# 03418 003, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library. 31 Statement by the Honorable Richard Cheney, Secretary of Defense, Concerning Operation Desert Shield, before the Committee on Armed Services, December 3, 1990, White House Public Affairs, ID# 03418 004, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.
166 It is the policy of the Un ited States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the mited, but fortunately (Palmer and Morgan 2006 : xiii) In this speech, there is no mention of Iraq, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, or other terms that were used to justify the Second Gulf War. Instead of fear mongering rhetoric, the promotion of democratic values and international cooperation through institutions were major themes of the speech. Is this because the direction the Second Gulf War was taking was reflected in declining poll numbers ? This is most likely, but another reason may be that the Second Gulf War coalition had been assembled and was fairly stable after almost two years in Iraq. Those states that were going to contribute to the second Iraq war had already made their commitment and further U.S. senior leader fear mongering rhetoric was no longer necessary. The importance of U.S. senior leader rhetoric as an instrument of foreign policy is highlighted by McEvoy Lev y (2001 : 3) who states that p eriodically, in times of grave crisis, such as war, and in times of slow breaking crisis, such as international political transformation, the public diplomacy of a President or Secretary of State have deterrence, mediation, thr eat and counter threat, alliance building, and ally supporting This was true during the First Gulf War and is true for its successor David Campbell (1998 : statements about the fulfillment of the republic, the fundamental purpose of the nation, God given rights, moral codes, the principles of European civilization, the fear of cultural and spiritual loss, and the responsibilities and duties thrust upon the gleaming exam ple or negative) has a specific purpose and in both
167 Gulf wars that involved building an international coalition against Iraq. While justification for the two Gulf w ars varies (Iraq invasion of Kuwait versus Iraq purported to possess weapons of mass destruction), the common factor is the use of a dministration fear mongering rhetoric. As Stephen Walt (2009 : 114) notes, international terrorism in the wake of September 11 provides smaller state s with yet The use of fear mongering rhetoric centered on exploiting the worldwide terrorist threat as a tool to build international coalitions. Walt (114) argues that c o operation against al Qaeda or its affiliates may fall well short of full alignment, but the shared fear of terrorism does provide another reason for states to overlook their concerns about U.S. power and their reservations about U.S. policies and instead t o collaborate with The analysis to follow will bolster U.S. senior leader rhetoric. The preponderance of the word mongering r hetoric leading up to the Second Gulf War is illustrated in the table and chart in Figure B 10 and charts in Figure B 1 1 of Appendix B. Totaling and compar ing that to instances of the use of the other four te rms in public speeches and remarks by the p resident, and the s ecretaries of s tate and d efense demonstrates this trend. Approximately 50 percent of the a referenced The other terms and their percentages break out as follo ws: ; 8 1 percent) ; and none ). This focus on terror should not be a great surprise since the events of September 11 happened slightly more than one year before The U.S. government, medi a, academia, and the general
168 public were all focusing on the current and future terrorist threat s to America. However, just looking at the aggregate total of times terms were used is not enough A closer analysis reveal s an interesting dyna mic in U.S. se nior leader rhetoric. The charts in Figure s B 1 0 and B 1 1 depict this use of the term for each senior leader and as a group What is evident and not surprising is the larger amount of fear mongering rhetoric from the p resident compared to either s ecretar y In fact, the total amount of instances of use of the five words used by the p resident (1,175) is 41 percent greater than their combined use by Secretary Powell (431) and Secretary Rumsfeld (265). This is not surprising because t he p resident should and does lead in U.S. foreign policy speeches and remarks. What is more interesting is the balance between the (s) p resident in the first four months studied (Jan Apr 20 03). The p resident averaged 67.75 instances of using and 74.75 instances of using parallel effort is illustrated in Figure B 1 1 The deviation from this trend will be discussed later. T in the first three months needs to be addressed. While the p resident and Secretary Rumsfeld use d y Powell emphasize d a s to co nvince other states of the severity of the Iraqi threat in regard to weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) The build up to a showdown with Iraq on weapon inspections culminated in February 2003 ruary 5, 2003. In his WMDs, current possession of WMDs, and future potential to proliferate WMDs. Powell
169 stated the facts and Iraqis' behavior demonstrate tha t Saddam Hussein and his regime have made no effort to disarm as required by the international regime are concealing their efforts to produce more weapons of mass destruction. 32 previous use of was February is due to the s United Nations. P owell used the specific type of weapon (chemical, biological, or nuclear) or refer red to a WMD in general. This fear pon capability but more importantly to instill an image of Iraq with an abundance of sophisticated WMDs. The imagery also include d an Iraq which ha d used such terrible weapons on his own population and ha d d beyond. But just focusing on an Iraq with weapons does not cover the whole gamut of the a mongering rhetoric An adequate delivery system is required for these weapon types to be a real threat outside the Middle East region. Since Iraq did not possess the long range ballistic missile technology required, an alternat ive delivery system w ould entail Iraq providing weapons to terrorist groups who were willing to use them worldwide However, establishing the link between WMDs and terr orists was not a priority early in coalition building as evidenced by the lag of 32 U.S. Department of State archives website titled, Remarks to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003, http: //2001 2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2003/17300.htm accessed October 2009.
170 three office holders Instead, a ll three pushed the issue of Iraq complying with U.N. Resolution 1441 which required Iraq to disarm its WMDs In an address before a joint session of Congress for the State of the Union Address January 28, 2003, the p take in preventing 33 I n his February address to the U.N. Secretary our concern is not just about these illicit weapons; it's the way that these illicit weapons can be connected to terrorists and terrorist organizations that have no compunction about using such devices against innocent people around the world. 34 The alleged connections between Iraq and various terrorist organizations including al Qaida, Hamas, and Palestine Islami c Jihad were also presented as evidence of this future threat of proliferation of WMDs into nefarious hands. Powell conclude d using themes from the Bush a argument in the following rhetoric: We know that Saddam Hussein is determined to ke ep his weapons of mass destruction, is determined to make more. Given Saddam Hussein's history of aggression, given what we know of his grandiose plans, given what we know of his terrorist associations, and given his determination to exact revenge on thos e who oppose him, should we take the risk that he will not someday use these weapons at a time and a place and in a manner of his choosing, at a time when the world is in a much weaker position to respond? 35 33 National Archives and Records Administration website titled, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Remarks on Improving Counterterrorism Intelligence F ebruary 14, 2003, http://frwebgate4.access.gpo.gov/cgi bin/TEXTgate.cgi?WAISdocID=109387498582+0+1+0&WAISaction=retrieve accessed Octobe r 2009. 34 U.S. Department of State archives website titled, Remarks to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003, http://2001 2009.state.gov/secretary/for mer/powell/remarks/2003/17300.htm accessed October 2009. 35 Ibid.
171 President Bush rhetoric also attempted to link such as Al Qaida. The strategy of the a dministration was to convince U.S. friends and allies of the need to support U.S. diplomatic, economic, and military actions ag ainst Iraq and, domestically, to bolster U.S. public support. A month prior to the start of the Second Gulf War, President Bush declared: This war requires us to understand that terror is broader than one international network, that these terrorist networ ks have got connections, in Iraq. When I speak about the war on terror, I not only talk about Al Qaida. I talk about Iraq, because, after all, Saddam Hussein has got weapons of mas 36 By associat ing p resident ha d completed the three points of the triangle of his argument. Since they are all linked the logical and obvious move was to invade Iraq and neutralize WMDs so they could not be used by terrorist s such as Al Qaida. Bush, therefore declared, For the sake of peace and for the sake of security, the United States and our friends and allies, we will disarm Saddam Hussei n if he will not disarm himself. 37 This rhetoric was the Bush a dministration s last hope of convincing more traditional allies such as France and Germany as well as other friends to join the coalition. The d efense d epartment represented by Paul Wolfowi tz, was also using this same argument: The threat posed by the connection between terrorist networks and states that possess these weapons of mass terror presents us with the danger of a 36 National Archives and Records Administration website titled, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Remarks on Improving Counterterrorism Intelligence, February 14, 2003, http://frwebgate4.access.gpo.gov/cgi bin/TEXTgate.cgi?WAISdocID=109387498582+0+1+0&WAISaction=retrieve accessed October 2009. 37 National Archives and Records Administration website titled Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Remarks at the Congress of Tomorrow Republican Retreat Reception in White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, February 9, 2003, http://frwebgate6.access.gpo.gov/cgi bin/TEXTgate.cgi?WAISdocID=110484272489+0+1+0&WAISaction=retrieve accessed October 2009.
172 catastrophe that could be orders of magnitude worse than September 11 th. 38 This line of argument continued even after the invasion of Iraq on March 19, 2003. The combat operations of the Second Gulf War took about one month. Baghdad fell on April 9 and a week later the coalition declared the combat phase of the operation c omplete. A month later, despite the fact that no WMDs were found, President Bush continued the same three WMDs. Saddam Hussein is no more. The terrorists can no longer find a source of regime is gone forever. 39 As the search for WMDs continued and the lack of success became apparent, Bush modified the ar gument by dropping the reference to WMDs, instead emphasiz ing the link between Al Qaida and Saddam Hussein. turn ed to freedom and democracy as justification for the war but fear mongering rhetoric still prevails fo r the purpose of coalition building. We also waged another battle in the war against terror when we liberated the people of Iraq from the brutal regime of Saddam Hussein. Thanks to our United States military and coalition forces, America is now more secur e; the world will be more peaceful; and the Iraqi people are free. 40 This switch in p resident ial rhetoric from to the Iraqi regime is illustrated in the chart 38 U.S. Department of Defense News website titled, Se cretary Paul Wolfowitz speech, Iraq: What Does Disarmament Look Like? January 23, 2003, http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/index.aspx?mo=1&yr=2003 accessed October 2009. 39 Nation al Archives and Records Administration website titled, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Remarks in Little Rock, Arkansas, May 5, 2003, http://frwebgate4.access.gpo.gov/cgi bin/TEXTgate.cgi?WAISdocID=110055505033+0+1+0&WAISaction=retrieve accessed October 2009. 40 National Archives and Records Administration website titled, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Remarks i n Indianapolis, Indiana, May 13, 2003, http://frwebgate1.access.gpo.gov/cgi bin/TEXTgate.cgi?WAISdocID=110732254171+1+1+0&WAISaction=retri eve accessed October 2009.
173 President Bush Rhetoric ( Figure B 1 1 ) The number of us es from January to April is almost identical but starting in May there is a large divergence that continu es in June whe n the p n (s) point argument is no longer valid to employ in U.S. attempts to convince states to join the coalition in post conflict reconstruction efforts. The general pattern holds for both s ecretaries of s tate and d efense, but there are difference s. From January to March Secretary of State Powell emphasizes in By June, his rhetoric al use He explains this c hange as a function of accepting the reality on the ground. We pushed the weapons argument because that was our concern. But we found no weapons so stopped talking about it. Once his statue fell, there was no dictator to talk about. No weapons, no conne ction of fear to terrorists. They became insurgents. 41 Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld follow ed the general trend set by the p resident but also deviate d from it. In January and February, Rumsfeld utilizes both terms in his rhetoric slightly more in those two months Interestingly, the switch to for him than the p resident or s ecretary of s tate. By to one margin. The other diverge nce between the p resident and the two s ecretaries concerns the total amount of rhetoric produced over that six month period. While the total counts of the five terms analyzed in each month varie d for the p resident, the two s count s of the same terms decline d over time. Not surprisingly, there was an initial buildup for 41 Telephone interview with General (ret.) Colin Powell, former Secretary of State, October 30, 2009. General Powell also commented on
174 all U.S. senior leaders toward the start of combat operations in March then a drop in rhetoric in the March/April timeframe. T he p resident ramps up his rhetoric in May to rally During this same timeframe the two s ecretaries rhetoric drops. These trends are presented in the chart in Figure B 1 0 Bush a dministration r hetoric Compared to the F irst Gulf War t he other three were de emphasized during the Second Gulf War. An obvious lesson was learned by Bush 43 Hussein as a modern day Hitler. Ov er this six month period, none of the three senior leaders associated Saddam Hussein with Hitler. Therefore, that word is a non factor when considering U.S. rhetoric as a tool of fear mongering in a coalition building ever, was evoked by all three senior leaders. Not surprisingly, Bush used it more often (120 times over six months) than either the s ecretary of s tate (23) or the s ecretary of d efense (11). Visually, t he p resident s usage makes a shallow bell curve ( Figu re B 1 1 ) with a slow build up to the start of hostilities in March and then a slow decline as Saddam Hussein is overthrown. Just prior to the start of the war, the p resident attempts to address those states still reluctant to join the U.S. led coalition b dangerous dictator to defy the world and harbor weapons of mass murder and terror is 42 A month after the coalition declared an end to combat operations, the p resident just ifie d the overthrow of Saddam Hussein when he declare d 42 National Archives and Records Administration website titled Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, The http://frwebgate1.access.gpo.gov/cgi bin/T EXTgate.cgi?WAISdocID=110829263631+8+1+0&WAISaction=retrieve accessed October 2009.
175 secure and the world more peaceful was going into Iraq and removing a dictator who had defied resoluti on after resolution after resolution from the international community, a dictator with known terrorist connections, a dictator who had weapons of mass 43 The two s speeches and remar ks. Secretary Powell used it almost exclusively after combat operations had concluded in April. His main usage was to justify the war without when discussing an upcoming U.N. resolution to lift sanctions against Iraq, Powell noted It is a resolution that will bring back together the international community to help the liberated people of Iraq build a better society, a better country, to repair the infrastructure in the country that was devastated, not by the war, but by thirty years of 44 Therefore, the U.S. argument was that states should join the U.S. led be cause of the devastation from the Second Gulf war. This type of rhetoric could explain the reluctance coalition building efforts. Rumsfeld used the word b ut when he did, the same type of argument was pres ented. Iraq was not rebuilding from the devastation of a war but from the 24 years An example of this rhetoric from Rumsfeld is as follows: So, unlike Europe after World War II, for the most part, the people of Iraq do not ha ve 43 National Archives and Records Administration website titled, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Remarks in Omaha, Nebraska, May 12, 2003, http://frwebgate1.access.gpo.gov/cgi bin/TEXTgate.cgi?WAISdocID=110921266478+1+1+0&WAISaction=retrieve accessed October 2009. 44 Department of State archiva l website titled, Press Conference at the French American Press Club, May 22, 2003, http://2001 2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2003/20909.htm access ed October 2009.
176 to rebuild from this recent war as they work to rebuild their country and society after decades of denial (economic/human rights) and brutal dictatorship. 45 Gulf W ar was a leading element of the U.S. strategy in coalition building in 1990/1991, the same cannot be said for the Second Gulf War. This is unsurprising considering the individual circumstances prior to each conflict. The first U.S. led coalition was form ed in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Twelve years later t he same context does not pertain U.N. weapons inspectors and U.N. resolutions to disarm are the initial stated reasons for the second U.S. led coalition to be formed. to endanger its own people and its neighbors re supposed connection to beginning of the Second Gulf War, regime has [ and that ] in a free Ira q, there will be no more wars of aggression against your neighbors, no more poison factories, no more executions of dissidents, no more torture chambers and rape rooms. mass destruction. This argument is rarely mentioned by either s ecretary as they only each over the same six months. The only time Secretary Powell uses the term was during his now discredited remarks to the U.N. 45 Department of Defense website titled Council on Foreign Relations (Transcript) May 27, 2003, http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/spee ch.aspx?speechid=429 accessed on October 2009
177 Security Council in February. Near the end of his presentation, he posits a relationship between weapons of mass destruction, and his connections to terrorist organizations and asks the question, should the world wait until it is in a weaker position to respond? Hence the Bush a dministration continued to emphasize the future threat of Iraq not its current capability. This chapter has focused on the negative rhetoric of U.S. senior leaders during both Gulf wars. It has been shown that this rhetoric focused on fear mongering terms as a strategy for coalition building. In both cases t he goal was to convince reluctant states to join the U.S. in its opposition to Iraq. U.S. leadership also employed positive rhetoric focusing on the benefits of U.S. intervention. These positive themes include d the promotion of democracy, the potential for solidarity with the international community, promotion of global norms, and the economic and technical help provided to the Iraqi people. The decision to focus on the negative rhetoric of U.S. senior leaders relates to the themes discussed earlier in the chapter. T aggression toward its neighbors and its own people and focusing on Iraq as a sponsor of terrorism and its possession of WMDs The First Gulf War coalition was easier to build since with the invasion of Kuwait by Ira q a clear violation of state sovereignty had occurred. The challenge for the U.S. a dministration in the First Gulf War was to convince Arab states to join the coalition to avoid the perception that any diplomatic, economic, or military action was based o n Western designs on Middle East oil or that the coalition was based on ideology or religio n Highlighting s history of brutalizing his own people and enmity toward its Middle East neighbors, the U.S. strategy of employing fear mongering rh etoric attempted to further solidify a U.S. led
178 coalition that was broad based and inclusive. For the most part, the U.S. strategy in the First Gulf War was successful. The main exceptions were lack of participation and the non cooperation by Pa lestinian authorities. As explained in Chapter 3 these exceptions can be attributed to King Hussein belief in an Arab solution to the Gulf Iraqi Palestinian refugees who Ir motivated more by economics than loyal ty to the Palestinian or Iraqi causes because to Iraq. A similar strategy was employed prior to the Second Gulf War The focus howe but on tying the Iraqi regime to such terrorist organizations as Al Qaida and highlighting the fear of Iraqi WMDs falling into the hands of terrorists. This second use of fear mongering as a strategy was not as successfu l because it relied on questionable intelligence data to convinc e states to join the U.S. led coalition. immediate threat from Iraq and felt the economic sanctions were keeping Iraq contained. Nonetheless, the U.S. strategy for coalition building continued its fear mongering rhetoric which shifted over time. Early in the Second Gulf War, the U.S. but when it became obvious that those to be Saddam Hussein to the larger war on terror allowed the U.S. to demonize a brutal building strategy was not as straightforw ard as it was in the First Gulf War, it still was successful enough to form a small coalition for the initial invasion of Iraq and a relatively more robust coalition for the
179 post conflict and reconstruction efforts. U.S. senior leader rhetoric used strat egically, was instrumental in both Gulf wars for coalition building. Bridging the three factors in both Gulf wars provides a glimpse into how they interact and support each other. In the First Gulf War, the U.S. strategy involved focusing on traditional allies and convincing them to join a U.S. led coalition based on fear mongering rhetoric. President H.W. Bush used personal phone calls to great effect with the leaders of U.S. traditional allies immediately after the Iraq invasion of Kuwait. The emphas is in these phone calls was on the possibility that Saddam Hussein would not stop with Kuwait and continue his aggression to other Gulf states with the ultimate goal of controlling the Gulf oil supplies. This type of fear mongering rhetoric also appeared in U.S. government remarks and speeches. The target of this rhetoric was U.S. traditional allies and friends willing to contribute troops to build a largest coalition of states. The U.S. strategy emphasized a broad coalition to counter perceptions of the U.S. against Iraq or the West against Islam Bridging within the Second Gulf War coalition strategy is not as straightforward. The U.S. experience with coalition operations in the 1990s was a factor in the lack of U.S. enthusiasm for traditional all y pa rticipation in the Second Gulf War. The U.S. strategy focused instead on post communist states willing to support the U.S. operation in Iraq. Some states gained from their coalition participation with a temporary increase in U.S. foreign assistance. Alo ng with aid, the U.S. strategy used fear mongering rh etoric to build the coalition. The U.S. its relationship with terrorist organizations. This argument did not convi nce key traditional allies (France and Germany) and other NATO allies The interaction of these
180 three factors in U.S. coalition building strateg ies for both Gulf wars is limited with U.S. fear mongering rhetoric being a common factor
181 CHAPTER 6 CONCLUS ION S Here we are, more than 16 years after the Berlin Wall began to crumble, and this period still lacks a name. Calling it the post Cold War era is an admission that we know what came before but not where we are, much less where we are heading. Richard H aass 1 Armed with a better understanding of how states choose their friends, the goal of maximizing international support (and minimizing opposition) should be greatly simplified. Stephen Walt 2 Richard Haass above highlights the importance of U .S. foreign policy and a clear articulation of its goals and purposes. The same logic applies to reliance on coalitions in the post Cold War era. Should execution of U.S. foreign policy rely on more permanent alliances (NATO, ANZUS, Rio Pact, A SEAN), rely on more flexible coalitions of the willing, or rely on act ing unilaterally? Certainly, the specific context of a situation will help determine the answer but if coalitions are the result then the U.S. needs to learn from it s previous strate gies of coalition building. This concluding chapter begins by discussing the importance of the research question which is how does the U.S. coalition building strategies change for the First and Second Gulf Wars? One only needs to review the history of A interventions in the post Cold War era to reveal a trend to work multilaterally through coalitions. Some coalitions have been more successful than others but the U.S. strategies to form them are an important factor to consider. The deb ate over whether 1 Washington Post January 8, 2006. B04. 2 Walt, Stephen. (1987) The Origins of Alliances Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Pres s. 285.
182 the U.S. should act unilaterally or multilaterally is alive and well. Zoellick (2000 : 69) argues that a modern r epublican foreign policy emphasizes building and sustaining : 134 ) ass essment of unilateralist tendencies promulgated by such media and academic commentators as William Kristol (2002) and Robert Kagan (2006) who argue the case for U.S. hegemony while others such as Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage (2004) talk a bout U.S. preeminence as a force for good. Dibb (2002 : 136) also notes that some U.S. commentators argue that establishing a broad coalition is nothing less than an invitation for paralysis. In early 2000, National Security A dvisor Condoleezza Rice (2000 : 62) wrote that U.S. foreign policy should be firmly grounded in national interests and not in the interests of an illusory international community. Continued examination of U.S. strategies in coalition formation could help in this debate. Th is chapter c ontinue s by reiterat ing the theory of coalition formation that is drawn upon and explores which parts of the theory are confirmed or called into question. The (1987) theory of alliance ( coalition ) formation. Walt concludes that coalitions form to balance a perceived or actual threat and that ideology is less powerful than balancing as a motive for coalitions This present study depart s that it assum es that foreign aid and rhetoric play a role in coalition formation. Next, the major findings of this dissertation are outlined Table A 7 of Appendix A is a simplified representation o f the influence of traditional allies, foreign aid, and rhetoric on the two Gulf War coalitions. While the role s of traditional allies and foreign assistance differed in both Gulf w ars, the role of rhetoric was a factor in both conflicts. Following this t he weaknesses of this dissertation are
183 outlined and help formulat e the next step s on this research agenda. These are broken down into four areas that include the role of traditional allies, troop contributing states, foreign assistance, and the focus on just two cases These areas for improvement are important because of the role coalition building has for th e U.S. in the future. Finally, the policy implications of these findings are explained. As Divine (2000 : Persian Gulf War appears to confirm the oldest of adages about U.S. military involvement the United States always wins the war but l The United States knows how to go to war and does it very well; however the U.S. does not work well with others especially in post conflict situations. A renewed focus is needed on working with our traditional allies in both war and pe acetime coalitions. The importance of learning from the lessons of the past is illustrated by the following quote by Secretary James Baker on September 5, 1990 : Once the present danger passes, however, we must not let its lessons go unheeded. We have res ponsibility to assure the American people that a decade from now, their sons and daughters will not be put in jeopardy because we failed to work toward long run solutions to the problems of the Gulf. 3 In hindsight, h ow prophetic Secretary Baker can be seen in that just over one decade again dealing with Saddam Hussein. The lack of long term solutions in the intervening years on Middle East issues such as weapons proliferation and the Palestin ian quandary, are a result of a lack of U.S. resolve to work with its traditional allies in coalitions with shared burdens 3 Congressional Record Vol 136, Part 26, 101 st Congress, 2 nd Session, Statement by the Honorable James A. Baker III to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 23489.
184 and responsibilities. The importance of the research question is addressed in the next section. Research Question The last eight years have seen the U.S. conduct its war on terror with mixed results. It has attempted to work with its allies and friends on an ad hoc basis using coalitions of the willing. However, unlike the strategy used in building the First Gulf War coalition, the legi timacy of recent coalitions has suffered from a lack of support from and from the U.S. relying too much on its military dominance The strategy used to build an international coalition for the Second Gulf War relied less on tr aditional allies and more on foreign assistance and fear mongering rhetoric. The manner in which the U.S. builds coalitions now and in the future is important. This chapter began with a quote from Stephen Walt that reminds us that international support f or military coalitions can be simplified if we know what works. Knowing how military coalition strategies in the post Cold War era changed from the First to Second Gulf w ars is an important research question to International Relations scholarship for seve ral reasons First, the current IR literature on military coalition formation is woefully inadequate Unlike the literature on alliance formation which is robust and argues that states form alliances to maintain a balance of power that leads to greater security and provides a collective good 4 coalition literature is not as mature. And while there are many examples of past U.S. involve ment in coalitions of the willing, the IR literature treats these instances as forms of alliance s By treating coalitio ns and alliances as if they were synonymous the IR literature glosses over the differences between the two. 4 See for instance Olson and Zec khauser 1966; Murdoch and Sandler 1982; Oneal and Elrod 1989; Conybeare and Sandler 1990; Oneal 1990; Palmer 1990; Sandler 1993.
185 By carving out a unique role for coalitions in IR literature, this dissertation has clearly differentiated between the two Second, examining coa lition formation in the post Cold War era, especially during a time of emphasis on global terrorism, is important because terrorism as a security issue will continue. Due to the flexible nature of coalition structure s, t he future security environment most likely will involve more rather than less reliance on them Finally, an examination of military coalition formation is important to the U.S. government. The leading actors involved with formulating and implementing coalition formation strategies include the p resident and his national security team ( secretaries of s tate and d efense among others ). Examining these strategies from the post Cold War era provides an opportunity to test theories of coalition formation. This analysis provides senior civil serv ants, political appointees, military officers and others an opportunity to learn from the past and consider alternative means of coalition formation. These alternative means are di scussed later in this chapter but first a review of the theory drawn upo n for this research will be discussed. Theory Building This dissertation draws on Stephen Walt The Origins of Alliances (1987) which attempts to correct some common but erroneous, notions on why states align in times of crisis. Walt argues that it is incorrect that states are attracted only to power, that ideology is a powerful source of alignment, and foreign assistance is an incentive to coalition formation. Instead, Walt concludes that states balance against threats and not just power alone, that i deology is not as powerful a motive for alignment as is postulated and finally that neither foreign aid nor political penetration is by itself a powerful cause of alignment. The first two arguments are backed up by confirming examples of state behavior. In both Gulf w ars, the perception of the threat
186 posed by the Iraqi military far outweighed the reality on the ground. In the First Gulf War, (2003 : 36 39 ) explains tha t Iraq spent more than $80 billion on weapons during the Iran Iraq war and its array of conventional munitions included 3,110 artillery pieces, 4,280 tanks, and 2,870 armored personnel carriers. Even after Iraq accepted a U.N. resolution in 1988 to end it s long war with Iran, Iraq was still able to field an impressive troops into the field against any who would try to defend Saudi Arabia or liberate (Carlisle 2003 : 3 9). chemical and nuclear weapons was also well publicized. The fact that Hussein had used chemical weapons against Iran and against his own people increased the perceived threat posed by Iraq. However, much of equipment was in disrepair and the standing army, with the exception of Republic an Guard units, was ill trained er invading Kuwait. Both the Western powers questioned whether the situation was a temporary occupation of Kuwait or a permanent Iraqi solution to its debt problems incurred by the cost of the Iran Iraq war Another world wide fear was the additional influence that Iraq could now exert in terms of oil production and pricing. Western and Middle East fears about the future not the apparent Iraqi power on the ground is what drove coalition formation in the First Gulf War. This perceived threat was also evident in the run up to the Second Gulf War. The threat posed by Iraq in 2002 revolved around two issues: weapons of mass destruction
187 (WMD) and terrorist connections. The claim by the Bush a dministration that Iraq posses s ed or might acquire WMD s was the central claim for intervention. This perception of threat was promulgated by Saddam Hussein himself who wanted to ensure that his neighbors saw Iraq as a strong state militarily with the ability to retaliate with WMDs. H owever, by Iraq hiding the truth about its WMD programs, the country opened the door for the U.S. to make the case that such weapons existed or were being developed. There are numerous instances of this occurring as outlined in Chapter 5 One such occas address to the United ed strength aluminum tubes to enrich uranium for nuclear 5 This sam e claim is also made by Secretary of State Powell in his U.N. address on February 5, 2003. Dana Milbank (2002 : A01) tells of a nother claim by President Bush, in an October 7, 2002 speech to the nation that involved the possibility of unmanned Iraqi aircra ft fitted with WMDs that could target the United States. The problem with the p known Iraqi aircraft did not have the range to reach the United States Another perceived threat concern ed the attempts to connect Iraq with terr orists. Bush a dministration claims of such a connection include Secretary of Defense where he stated, (Drogin and Richter 2002) 2002 rema rks on Meet the Press that [with al 5 Assembly, September 12, 2002, http://georgewbush whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912 1.html accessed November 2009.
188 Qaeda] 6 These examples from both Gulf w ars affirm conclusions that threats (perceived or actual) and not power alone are the cause for states balancing. In the case of the Second Gulf War, the threat perception was enhanced by senior leader rhetoric. Rampton and Stauber (2003 : 78) note that this is an repeated often enough b The second argument ( regarding both Gulf wars. I n the First Gulf War ideology was not a powerful motive for joining a coalition. While Hussein attempted to make the Gulf crisis a West versus Islam issue, joined with the U.S. coalition added legitimacy to the mission and su is less powerful than balancing. While the Second Gulf War coalition contained only a few Muslim state s providing troops (Azerbaijan Albania, and Kazakhstan ) again ideology was not a prime motive for joining the c oalition. neighbors supported the U.S. led economic sanctions and the containment policy on Iraq. The lack of support for invading Iraq was similar to those European powers ( U.S. traditional allies) that were also reluctant to join the coalition. i n his third point, that neither foreign aid nor political penetration is by itself a powerful force for joining a coalition is confirmed in both Gulf wars Where this dissertation deviates from Walt and contributes to the theory on wartime coalitions is that a combination of foreign aid or political penetration with traditional allies is a force 6 Mount Holyoke College website titled, Meet the Pres s (transcript), September 8, 2002, http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/meet.htm accessed October 2009.
189 for joining a coalition. Walt (1987 : 42) notes that when evaluating the importance of economic or military assistance on coalition s we should consider the degree to which conditions that will increase the influence that aid brings. In addition, Walt ( 1987 : 48) argues that if a state the U.S. for ex ample, seeks to encourage alignment in a coalition by manipulating public and its elite s by way of U.S. senior leader rhetoric, then the effectiveness of political penetr ation increases. This is because such rhetoric is low risk com pared to other forms of political penetration such as espionage that are more direct and threatening to a state. This dissertation examined the two Gulf w ars as case studies to show the degree to which traditional allies, foreign aid, and fear mongering rhetoric explain coalition formation. Traditional allies and rhetoric were the contributing factors to successful U.S. coalition building for the First Gulf War whereas foreign assistance and rhetoric were contributing factors to U.S. coalition building for the Second Gulf War. Walt (2009) argues that coalitions are built on those states th at provide legitimacy through their loyalty and compliance. America was successful in Kuwait The tro op contributions of traditional allies ( the U.K. and France ) and the economic contributions of traditional allies ( Germany and Japan ) provided the core group of states in the U.S. led coalition. This coalition was enhanced by Muslim states (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Kuwait) providing both troops and financial assistance. All of these states were encouraged to join the U.S. led coalition by U.S. senior leader rhetoric. Emphasizing urds) provide d the basis for U.S. rhetoric. But emphasizing past and present actions was not
190 enough; the U.S. (against Saudi Arabia) that could de stabilize the Middle East region. This is not to discount the when explain ing their behavior in joining a U.S. led coalition. Certainly, while Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, and Kuwait all act ed in response to perceived threats, this study emphasizes the role that U.S. coalition building strategies ha d on decisions of potential coalition members. Foreign aid and fear mongering rhetoric were contributing elements in the U.S. coalition building strateg y for the Second Gulf War. The evidence presented in c hapters 4 and 5 illustrate how these factors were employed by the Bush 43 a dministration. As Palmer and Morgan (2006 : is a tool of foreign policy states give it because it encourages recipients to take d Gulf War, U.S. foreign assistance had a mixed result. Foreign assistance in a U.S. strategy for coalition building was not applied uniformly across troop contributing sta tes. The U.S. focused their coercive effects on targeted post communist states such as Poland, Ukraine, and Georgia instead of traditional U.S. allies As was shown in Chapter 4, Poland received increasing U.S. foreign assistance from 2001 to 2005. Whil e Poland contemplated removing their troops in 2005 the additional funding was a factor in their decision to keep Polish troops in Iraq but at a reduced number. During the same period, Ukraine received decreasing U.S. assistance until 2005 in which the U .S. aid increased drastically. The timing of this increase coincided with the Ukraine U.S. to coerce Ukraine to change its decision failed. United States assistance to
191 Georgia remained constant from 2001 to 2005. However, in 2005 Georgia increased their troop contribution and the U.S. reciprocated with a significant jump in foreign assistance. These examples illustrate that U.S. foreign assistance was supplied to ta rgeted troop contributing states and reduced for those states that rejected U.S. attempts to encourage them to join the coalition. Likewise, as a function of political penetration U.S. senior leader rhetoric was shown to be a factor in U.S. coalition bu ilding strategy. The p resident and s ecretaries of s tate and d efense employed fear mongering rhetoric to convince states to join and maintain their status in the coalition. The two main foc i of this rhetoric were claims that Iraq possessed WMDs and that S international terrorism. The se two choices presented to the international community by the Bush a dministration involved either joining the U.S. led coalition now and dealing with this threat from weapons and t error or not join the coalition and deal with a much stronger and dangerous Iraqi regime in the future. the viability of foreign aid and political penetration by themselves, as a factor to encourage states to join a coa lition, is not challenged here. Instead, this dissertation argues that either foreign aid or political penetration coupled with a focus on traditional allies are factors in convincing states to join a coalition. Any strate gy for coalition building involves the interaction of political, economic, and military elements. The process to build a coalition cannot be based solely on the threat, ideology, foreign assistance, or political penetration. A coalition building strategy must take into account all of these factors and apply it to the context of the situation. Theory building about wartime coalitions has been advanced by
192 factors into a coal ition building strategy. T he major findings are outlined next. Major Findings A strategy for coalition formation can take many forms. A state can rely solely on diplomatic, informational, military, or economic means to form an international coalition. R elying on any one instrument of foreign policy can only achieve limited goals. Instead, a state must use a combination of means to achieve its end goal of an effective coalition of states. The U.S. employed different strateg ies in the two Gulf wars for coalition formation In the First Gulf War, it relied on its traditional allies and senior leader rhetoric but did not emphasize U.S. foreign assistance Walt (2009 : assembling these coalitions which are needed less for capabilitie s they produce than for the appearance of legitimacy they convey the unipole will naturally prefer to U.S. sought traditional coalition partners that could provide capabilities ( U.K. and France) that were loyal (NATO partners such as Italy, Spain, Turkey) as well as those that provided legitimacy to the operation (Middle East states such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria). By concentrating on traditional allies and friends, the U.S. l ed coalition for the First Gulf War was much more effective than that of the Second Gulf War In the First Gulf War, b urden sharing efforts were more evenly distributed as evidenced by Germany and Japan providing substantial financial support in lieu of troop contributions. Therefore, the First Gulf War reveals little to no influence of U.S. foreign assistance in its coalition building strategy. In fact, of the coalition states that contributed troops, the five states receiving the most U.S. foreign ass istance from 1988 to 1993 (Egypt, Pakistan, Greece, Morocco, and Bangladesh) did not receive an increase in U.S. assistance for their troop
193 contribution s The 10 percent increase ($214 million) received by Egypt from 1988 to 1990 was a result of the Camp David accords and the maintenance of the Egyptian Israeli peace treaty. From 1990 to 1993, the total amount of aid for these states was reduced Clearly, U.S. economic and military assistance to coalition partners was not a factor in the U.S. strategy fo r coalition formation in the First Gulf War. The U.S. did employ fear Kuwait which was obvious to the rest of the world and could not be denied or explained away. President Bush did re but stopped making those references when it became obvious the media backlash was 41 (1998 : caught hell on this comparison of Saddam to Hitler, with critics accusing me of In the Second Gulf War, the U.S. strategy for coalition building de emphasized traditional allies in favor of gathering the largest coa U.S. strategy did however include attempts to garner U.N. Security Council resolutions similar to the ones obtained for the First G ulf War. This strategy included initial U.N. resolution(s) that would hinder the weapons inspectors to verify Iraq disarmament process. I n November 2002 t he first U.N. resolution (1441) was obtained It stated, material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions, including resolution 687 and the International Atomic Energy Agency, and to complete the actions required
194 under paragraphs eight to 13 of 7 However, with the exception of the U.K. and a few others, the inability of the U.S. to effectively work with its traditional allies (France and Germany) doomed any hope of a second resolution that would have authorized the use of force a nd provide the needed legitimacy to the Second Gulf War. Affecting U.S. strategy was the d epartments of s tate and d efense working at cross purposes on coalition building. The s tate d epartment sought to get the broadest and most effective coalition possib le to deal with Saddam Hussein. The d efense d epartment however initially sought to limit the number of coalition members as much as possible because of the belief that coalitions were constraining rather than enhancing, reinforcing, and force multiplyi ng Ignoring concerns of traditional allies and moving ahead without their support made the Second Gulf War coalition less effective. The initial coalition for combat operations in 2003 consisted of only the U.S. the U.K. Australia, and Poland. After the initial combat operations concluded, a second coalition was formed for post conflict and stabilization operations that consisted of numerous states but provid ed ere more important than the capability th ese states provided. The consequences of building a coalition of the willing are many and involve our traditional allies and friends. The United States must address the political and military implications of conducting operations with such coalition s in the future. Does the U.S. have the capabilit y and political will to bear the burden of future coalitions of the willing that exclude our traditional allies? A Council of Foreign Relations task force led by Henry Kissinger and Lawrence Summers (2004 : 5) a ddressed this topic and recommend 7 U.N. Security Council website titled, U.N. Security Council Resolutions for 2 002, http://www.un.org/docs/scres/2002/sc2002.htm accessed August 2009.
195 The United States needs to find other ways to build its coalitions This can be accomplished but not by usin g the Second Gulf War strategy as a model. Instead, the U.S. must look to more formal entities whether they be the U.N. NATO or other alliances, to obtain political legitimacy for an operation. Coercive tactics, whether real or imagined, must be caref ully managed even eschewed to avoid the perception that the next U.S. led operation is made up of mercenaries. While traditional allies were de emphasized in the Second Gulf War, foreign assistance and fear mongering rhetoric were both factor s in the c oalition building strategy. It was shown in Chapter 4 that the U.S. used foreign assistance as a reward for joining the coalition and also as an incentive to remain in the coalition. Of course, this effect was not universal and provided mixed results. A dditionally, this factor only holds for those states that receive U.S. foreign assistance such as the post communist states (Poland, Ukraine, Georgia) that ma d e up the majority of the Second Gulf War coalition partners. American foreign assistance was e mployed as a tool to encourage states to join the Iraq coalition but was also an instrument to express U.S. displeasure when states did not comply. The U.S. was successful in some instances (Georgia) and not in others (Ukraine). Egypt, Jordan, and Turke y were all pursued as strategic partners in the coalition yet none joined Subsequently all three states experienced a temporary drop in U.S. aid but the geostrategic importance of these states compelled the U.S. to continue to support Egypt, Jordan, an d Turkey with foreign assistance despite their absence from the coalition.
196 In addition to using U.S. foreign assistance to persuade cooperation, the U.S. strategy included fear mongering rhetoric to compel cooperation. While the rhetoric for the First G (invasion of Kuwait) the Second Gulf War rhetoric emphasized s and M ore importantly, the focus of the rhetoric was on possible future scen WMDs could fall into terrorists hands. Compared to the other four terms studied (Hitler, dictator, weapon, and aggression), the Bush a dministration (mainly the p resident ial 50 percent of the time. Co mbined with the use of the word a dministration focused on but more importantly to instill an image of Iraq as a state with abundan t sophisticated WMDs. Iraq had used such terrible weapons on his own people and the possibility of using the se weapons on neighbors and states beyond was plausible and emphasized. This fear mongering strategy was not as success ful as it was in the First Gulf War because it relied on questionable intelligence data to convince states to join the U.S. led coalition. These findings provide the major evidence to show the change in U.S. coalition building strategies between the two G ulf wars. While every effort was made to collect and analyze the available evidence, this research project has areas for improvement that will be discussed next. Areas for Improvement and Next Steps There are four areas that need to be addressed. First, traditional allies are presented as one factor in U.S. coalition building. But what is a traditional ally? This dissertation defined a traditional ally as a state that has a current collective defense
197 treaty with the U.S. as listed in Table A 1 in Appen dix A. However, the weakness of this distinction is in the evolving nature of collective defense treaties such as NATO. The original twelve members of NATO in 1949 were the U.S. the U.K. Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg th e Netherlands, Norway, and Portugal The current membership stands at 28 and include the newest members, Croatia and Albania, which joined in April 2009. This begs the question does that make Croatia or Albania a traditional ally of the U.S. by virtue o f its NATO membership? Obviously, it does not. A traditional ally is a state that has a historical relationship with another state that is based on common interests and trust. Examining the original twelve members of NATO reveals a list of states that f ought together in World War II with Italy fighting for a time on the opposite side These original twelve states are also democratic in governance, united in Western ideals and culture, and share a bond to resist tyranny and instability in Europe. These common traits allow coalitions to form among these traditional allies. Over time h owever, others have joined NATO that did not fit these criteria but were also considered traditional allies. Turkey and Greece joined NATO in 1952 and West Germany joined in 1955. Turkey, Greece, and Germany are considered traditional allies yet Turkey is a Muslim country with little in common with fellow NATO members when it comes to Western culture and ideals There are also states outside of collective defense treati es that could be considered traditional U.S. all ies Israel has been supported by the U.S. since it first declared independence in 1948. In fact, the U.S. U.S. Israeli relation ship has grown and current U.S. foreign assistance to Israel in 2007 amount ed to over $2.5 billion ( OECD 2007 ). Yet, the U.S. and Israel do not have a
198 signed collective defense treaty. Is Israel a traditional U.S. ally? That depends on the definition of a traditional ally. For this dissertation, Israel is not but a valid case could be made that it is a traditional ally. The variable nature of what constitutes a traditional ally is evident in this research and has been somewhat mitigated by focusing on those long term traditional allies that have collective defense treaties with the United States. Future research on this topic could start with a list of traditional allies that are determined using a different aperture. The focus could be on those Euro pean, Middle Eastern, and Asian states the U.S. has a vested interest in maintaining economic relations with such as the G 7, G 8, or G 20. All these organizations include industrialized countries that are leading states in globalization. Or the focus c ould be on European Union states traditional allies might lead to other factors to consider besides traditional allies, foreign assistance, and rhetoric. For this dissertation, t he analysis of U.S. strategy in coalition building that involves traditional allies, foreign assistance, and rhetoric has been limited to troop contributing states. A second weakness resides in the narrow focus of examining just troop contributing states. T he total number of states that joined both Gulf coalitions includes states that provided troops as well as those that supplied economic assistance, diplomatic support, basing, and other logi sti cal assistance. For example, Chapter 4 provides analysis of U.S. foreign assi stance on coalition building by comparing that with the number of troops contributed by coalition members. The rational e for such a distinction as explained in Chapter 4 is to capture those states he coalition. States willing to
199 risk their sons and daughters on foreign land are the states that would be the focus of any future U.S. coalition strategy. However, this distinction has its drawbacks. The generous financial assistance granted by Germany and Japan in the First Gulf War played a major role in building and maintaining the coalition. It showed the international and U.S. public as well as the U.S. Congress that burden sharing was an alternative to boots on the ground Although the post Wo rld War II constitutions of those two states prevented them from deploying troops in support of the U.S. led coalition, they nonetheless were able to contribute. Turkey is another example of a state that was considered critical to both Gulf war coalitions but did not contribute troops to either. However, by providing basing support (Incirlik Air Base) for U.S. troops to transit through and over Turkey, the U.S. was able to move troops and equipment to Iraq much easier. In addition, the use of the Hab u r Gate, a Turkish Iraqi border crossing, also was instrumental, especially in the Second Gulf War, to moving supply laden convoys into Iraq. The use of basing and border crossing privileges was a crucial piece of keeping the coalition supplied. Including s tates that provided support to the coalition in other ways would widen the field of states and possibly tease out other conclusions. For example, are troops the most valuable asset to U.S. coalition building or could other types of support (economic, vote s in the U.N. or basing) be equally, even more valuable? The difficulty would be to determine if the U.S. strategy prioritizes such support and devising a method to measure it. The third area for improvement involves the choice when examining U.S. for eign assistance to focus exclusively on economic and military support. As was explained in Chapter 4 this was employed for its ease of use and availability of data. However, the
200 shortcoming of this approach is that many traditional U.S. allies do not re ceive foreign assistance. This required the focus to shift, especially in the Second Gulf War, to the post communist states. This limited the effect of foreign assistance as a factor in a U.S. strategy to build a coalition. Obviously, there are many rea sons why a state would join a coalition. For the wealthier states ( developed states that are traditional U.S. allies), some probably joined the U.S. because there was a belief that Saddam Hussein posed a threat. However, even with these wealthier states, economic rewards or potential negative consequences could still make an impact in their decision of whether or not to join a U.S. led coalition. Future research on this topic could explore other economic levers includ ing trade and investment inducements and the lure of U.S. government contracts and establishment of military bases. For example, the U.S. is the sole country that can exercise an effective veto over World Bank and International Monetary Fund ( IMF ) decisions, another source of potent levera ge (Prusher 2003) 8 The difficulty of using these other economic levers is in trying to determine if the U.S. prioritizes them and which levers are more effective than others. Any future U.S. coalition strategy would have to examine the long term benefit s and drawbacks to rewarding or punishing states when building a coalition. Placing a value on military bases or a World Bank veto in comparison to awarding government contracts is difficult but could provide a more nuanced look at the effect of economic assistance in U.S. coalition building. The final weakness involves the focus on just two cases (First and Second Gulf w ars). Limiting the analysis to just two cases limits what can be explained by U.S. 8 As Turkey hesitated over its decision to allow U S use of its territory to invade Iraq, it was offered not only a larg e U S aid package but hints that if it failed to comply, its IMF bailout package could be cut or eliminated. See The Christian Science Monitor January 21, 2003.
201 strategies for coalition building. Chapter 1 expla ins the rational e for using these two cases as opposed to other coalitions in the post Cold War era such as for Somalia, Haiti, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. However, despite the reasons for excluding these other coalitions from this analysis their inclusi on would allow for a broader analysis of U.S. strategies and the applicability of these strategies for future coalitions. Other research could add one, some, or all of these four other coalitions to the two Iraq coalitions. Do traditional allies, foreign as sistance, and rhetoric have the same effect on coalitions outside of Iraq? Another weakness of focusing on just two cases is the broad view across all the coalition states involved. Future research could include a focus on select U.S. strategies toward s pecific allies and friends. For example, two traditional allies and two non traditional allies could be selected based on whether they participated in either Gulf War. It would be important to select states of both successes and failures in the outcome ( whether they did or did not participat e in a U.S. led coalition) to identify the conditions and variables that may account for differences in outcomes. Table A 8 in Appendix A is a possible example of a paired comparison of states that could focus an anal ysis of U.S. coalition building strategy. The actual selection of states would have to consider such factors as the size of a state economy and the level of troop support available. Comparing similar economies prevents biasing state selection by includ ing a state in desperate need of U.S. foreign assistance. The level of troop support available is important because the U.S. an attractive coalition ally so keeping that factor consistent across states prevents biasing the outcome. All of these areas that could be improved for future research are acknowledged here because
202 coalition building will remain important in the future. The policy implications of this type of research are addressed in the next section. Policy Implications Transatlantic disagreements over the war on terrorism and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have called into question the fundamental nature of the r ole of U.S. led coalitions specifically the role that U.S. traditional allies play in the post Cold War environment. The United States and its traditional allies in Europe and Asia each with its own strengths and weaknesses are confronting uncertain pr ospects even as they remain partners in ensuring global security. There are strategic differences among them on specific issues such as North Korea and Iran, reflecting what many observers cite as a diverging set of values and perspectives on security is sues for the twenty first century. Barring external shocks or major policy initiatives, the U.S. and its traditional allies will likely continue to muddle through these differences in a somewhat disorganized fashion. The potential cost of this for U.S. f oreign policy will be a failure to reach its optimum military and political effectiveness. Rather, what the U.S. requires is a commitment to coalition formation that Zoellick (2000 : [ a ] coalition effectively, [ that ] requires clear eyed judgments about priorities, an Despite the U.S. put together an international coalition that is dominated by it future coalition building will have to focus more on sharing the burden and responsibilities with other states. As Freeman et al (1992 : 3) argue the question of legitimate use of force in a world conscious of the norms of international laws and [states] more interdependent and layered with overlapping international organizations,
203 will drive nations to seek allies to help justify their use of force. While t his conclusion drawn so soon af ter the First Gulf War makes sense this pattern was not followed for the Second Gulf War. The simple model proposed here is to present the key elements of a security relationship to help determine whether the U.S. and its traditional allies are more o r less likely to act within coalitions The two factors presented as key determinants of how the U.S. and its traditional allies will interact on security issues are: 1 ) U.S. commitment to consult with traditional allies and friends and 2 ) each all ie s a bilit ies and resolve to be credible security actor s through effective decision making and military capabilities. Different combinations of the two drivers yield very different scenarios suggesting that the U.S. and its traditional allies will need to wor k closely if they are to establish and develop security and defense policy in the future. The four possible scenarios are graphically depicted in Figure A 9 of Appendix A. Scenario One is termed the Optimum Coalition because this scenario would yield a new strategic partnership between the U.S. and its traditional allies if the U.S. accepts its allies as real military and nonmilitary strategic partners with the power to deal with security challenges. This new partnership could negotiate a strategy on te rrorism, WMDs failed states, and the like sharing would certainly benefit the U.S. influence in the world. Scenario Two involves the U.S. and traditional allies at cross purposes In this scenario, the U.S. traditional ally relationship s would wither if the U.S. pursu e s a
204 their involvement For example, i f the EU continues their own progress toward a more robust European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), it would most likely result in increased challenges to U.S. interests and policy priorities. The EU could then increase its opposition to U.S. policies in EU interest areas such as the Middle East. Scenario Three outlines c oalition s that are possible but ineffective Th is third scenario suggests that dependence on t he U.S. would increase if those allies were unable to summon the political will and create the military capabilities to act as coherent security actor s beyond their borders. If the U.S. chooses to act through a coalition of the willing nal allies would look to the U.S. to take the lead on addressing security concerns without developing any meaningful capabilities on their own. Scenario Four is the worst case scenario in which t raditional a llies are m arginalized The fourth scenario is similar to the second in that allies perceive the U.S. as a unilateral actor, resulting in a withering of th ose partnership s In this scenario, however, those U.S. allies fail to muster their political will and are ineffective in th e security realm. D isengaged allies would be ineffective partner s for any future coalition These marginalized allies would also refuse to cooperate and deny U.S. interventions the legitimacy or relative legitimacy that it has enjoyed in the past. This simple model attempts to look ahead at the future of coalition formation It is not intended to offer definitive predictions or to assess the likelihood of alternative outcomes, but rather to provoke re thinking and re
205 relationshi p s with its traditional allies An important policy implication of this research is that coalitions based solely on economic incentives and fear mongering rhetoric are detrimental to effective coalitions O nly by working with U.S. allies and friends on t heir willingness to offer military assistance and being inclusive in the decision making process will future U.S. led coalition s be successful. Past U.S. led coalitions have been unilateral in policy making and decision making but multilateral in executio n. Future U.S. led coalitions must be multilateral in all aspects to be successful. The consequences of building a coalition of the willing are many and involve traditional allies and friends. The U.S. must address the political and military implication s of conducting operations with such a coalition in the future. T he U.S. likely does not have the capabilities and political will to bear the burden of future coalitions of the willing that exclude our traditional allies The U.S. needs to find other way s to persuade our allies and bring them along. This can be accomplished but not by using the Second Gulf War strategy as a model. Instead, the U.S. must look to more formal entities whether they be the U.N. NATO or others, to obtain political legitim acy for an operation. Coercive tactics, whether real or imagined, must be carefully managed to avoid the perception that the next U.S. led coalition is made up of mercenaries. To help alleviate this possibility, a nother policy implication is the need for political and public legitimacy. Political and public legitimacy refers to the ability of the U.S. and its allies to understand and mitigate the resentment that is directed by the locals toward U.S. led coalitions. Marshall et al (1997 : 14) conclude th prepare the local population to understand and accept the coalition forces operating in
206 population. The need for political a nd public legitimacy is important for the success of any coalition building strategy. Hindsight on the Second Gulf War coalition provides an excellent example of what can happen when this legitimacy is missing. The local population, when confronted with military forces from around the world, requires sufficient assurances that their situation has not been made worse by coalition forces. Marshall et al (1997 : attuned to the local populatio n, and high visibility improvement projects, must be This can be achieved through expanded diplomacy and dialogue at multiple levels. It will require an increase in the U.S. foreign assistance (economic aid) provided to focus states ( at this time, Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan) to ensure employment and opportunities are available for the populace. However, it must be noted that foreign aid cannot be used effectively until certain conditions prevail. The fighting within a state must be complete d or significantly reduced and a responsible government in place. Finally, an expanded public diplomacy campaign could highlight young men ) that the U.S. led coalition is there to hel p and provide an alternative vision of a future that includes partnering with the West. The long term implication s of ignoring political and public legitimacy is the growth of a home grown insurgency. The U.S. strategy for coalition building matters n o t only for winning a war but also for winning the peace.
207 APPENDIX A FIRST GULF WAR DOCUM ENTATION Figure A 1 Warning t ime l ine of Iraq Kuwait Crisis 1 1 Warning Timeline of Iraq Kuwait Crisis, not dated. ID # CF01937 004. WHORM Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.
208 Figure A 2 Diplomatic s trategy for the coalition. 2 2 Coalition Diplomatic Steps, ID# CF01584 024, WHORM: Working File, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidenti al Library.
209 Figure A 2 (continued) 3 3 Coalition Diplomatic Steps, ID# CF01584 024, WHORM: Working File, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.
210 Figure A 3 Military s trategy for the coalition. 4 4 Military Steps, ID# CF01584 024, WHORM: Working File, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Libra ry.
211 Figure A 3 (continued) 5 5 Military Steps, ID# CF01584 024, WHORM: Working File, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.
212 Figure A 4 U.S. Assistance by y ear c ountry c harts 6 6 Information to depict these charts is taken directly from the data in Table A 6.
213 Figure A 5 Financial a ssistance from Gulf War coalition members 7 7 Gulf Crisis Financial Assistance, 1990 Commitment s and Disbursements table, December 19, 1990, ID# CF01584 018, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.
214 Figure A 6 Public s tatements by s enior l eaders in t wo a d ministrations 8 8 Multiple Sources produced this chart. Source documents include Cheney and Baker Speeches/Persian Gulf, var ious dates, ID# 03418 003 (004), WHORM: Public Affairs, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library; Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Book 1, January June 2003, http://w ww.gpoaccess.gov/wcomp/index.html accessed July 2009 ; Department of Defense website, http:// www.defenselink.mil accessed July 2009 ; and Department of State website, http://ww w.state.gov accessed July 2009
215 Figure A 7 Total U.S. s enior l eader r hetoric (2 Aug 90 17 Jan 91) 9 9 Multiple Sources produced this chart. Source documents include Cheney and Baker Speeches/Persian Gulf, various dates, ID# 03418 003 (004), WHORM: Public Affairs, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Libr ary; Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Book 1, January June 2003, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wcomp/index.html accessed July 2009 ; Department of Defense website, http:// www.defenselink.mil accessed July 2009 ; and Department of State website, http://www.state.gov accessed July 2009
216 Figure A 8 President Bush and r hetoric c harts (2 Aug 90 17 Jan 91) 10 10 Multiple Sources produced this chart. Source documents include Cheney and Ba ker Speeches/Persian Gulf, various dates, ID# 03418 003 (004), WHORM: Public Affairs, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library; Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Book 1, January June 2003, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wcomp/index.html accessed July 2009 ; Department of Defense website, http:// www.defenselink.mil accessed July 2009 ; and Department of State website, http://www.state.gov accessed July 2009
217 Figure A 8 (continued). 11 11 Multiple Sources produced this chart. Source documents include Cheney and Baker Speeches/Persian Gulf, various dates, ID# 03418 003 (004), WHORM: Public Affairs, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library; Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Book 1, January June 2003, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wcomp/index.html accessed July 2009 ; Department of Defense websi te, http:// www.defenselink.mil accessed July 2009 ; and Department of State website, http://www.state.gov accessed July 2009
218 Figure A 9 A Model f or t he f uture 12 12 This figure could have been displayed in a numb er of ways, such as a2x2 box, but it was decided to use the arrows to show there is a continuum of possibilities for both axes. Traditional allies Political Will and Capabilities High Low Scenario I I : US and traditional allies at cross purposes Scenario I: Optimum Coalition Scenario IV: Traditional Allies Marginalized Scenario III: Coalitio n possible but ineffective US acting Unilaterally US acting Multilaterally
219 Table A 1. Collective Defense Treaties 13 Treaty Dates in Effect Parties North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) April 4, 1949 present Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS Pact) 14 September 1, 1951 September 17, 1986 Australia, New Zealand, United States U.S. Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty August 30, 1951 present Philippines, United States U.S. Japan Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty January 19, 1960 present Japan, United States U.S. Korea Mutual Defense Treaty October 1, 1953 present South Korea, United States Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (SEATO) 15 September 8, 1954 June 30, 1977 Australia, France, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, United Kingdom, United States Rio Treaty September 2, 1947 present Argentina, Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela 13 Treaties in Force (TIF) as of January 1, 2009 (Washington, DC: Office of the Legal Advisor, U.S. Dept. of State, 1950). 14 The TIF (2009) notes that as of September 17, 1986, the US suspended obligations under the treaty between the U S and New Zealand but not Australia 15 The TIF (2009) notes that by decision of the SEATO Council of September 24, 1975, the organization cease d to exist as of June 30, 1977. However, the collective defense treaty remains in force.
220 Table A 2 U .N. Resolutions First Gulf War 16 Resolution # Date Purpose Vote 660 August 2, 1990 Condemn Iraq invasion of Kuwait 14 0, Yemen abstaining 661 August 6, 1990 Outlines economic sanctions on Iraq 13 0, Cuba and Yemen abstaining 662 August 9, 1990 Condemn Iraqi invasion again 15 0 664 August 18, 1990 Concerns Iraqi treatment of foreign nationals 15 0 665 August 25, 1990 Interception of maritime shipping in and out of Iraq 13 0, Cuba and Yemen abstaining 666 September 13, 1990 Concerns humanitarian foodst uffs to Iraq 13 2, Cuba and Yemen opposing 667 September 16, 1990 Concerns Iraqi violence against diplomatic personnel and premises 15 0 669 September 24, 1990 Requests of assistance under Article 50 of U.N. Charter 15 0 670 September 25, 1990 Restricti ons on aircraft in and out of Iraq 14 1, Cuba opposed 674 October 29, 1990 third nation hostages 13 0, Cuba and Yemen abstaining 677 November 28, 1990 destruction of Kuwait civil records 15 0 678 November 29, 1 990 Establishes January 15, 1991 as date for Iraq to comply and authorizes use of all necessary means to uphold and implement R es 660 12 2 1, Cuba and Yemen opposed, China abstaining 16 United Nations Resolutions on Desert Storm 1(1): 1 17.
221 Table A 3 Total German c ontributions to First Gulf War Coalition. 17 Type of German Contribution Million DM Military, logistical, and financial support for U.S. U.K. France, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey, Israel, and Egypt 15 317 Financial support for other Allied states and international institutions (Syria, Jordan, Tunis ia, International Red Cross, U.N. ) 587 German share of EC financial support for Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan 326 Extra expenditure for Bundeswehr deployment to Mediterranean and Turkey 308 Extra expenditure for deployment of Bundeswehr minesweepers to Pers ian Gulf 120 Extra expenditure for maintenance of German equipment during Allied airlift 132 Humanitarian aid to Kurdish refugees 430 Total German contribution 17,220 Note: At the start of the F irst Gulf War, January 17, 1991, the currency exchange ra te was 1 DM = 0.65 U.S. dollars. 18 17 Bennett, Andrew, Joseph Lepgold, an d Danny Unger. ( 1997 ) Friends in Need: burden sharing in the Persian Gulf War 18 This historical exchange rate was found at the OANDA website titled, Historical Exchange Rates, http://www.oanda.com/currency/historical rates accessed August 2009.
222 Table A 4 Monetary c ontributions in the First Gulf War. 19 Country Commitment ($ Millions) Receipts ($ Millions) Cash In Kind Total Saudi Arabia 16 839 12 002 4 001 16 003 Kuwait 16 057 16 015 43 16 058 UAE 4 088 3 870 218 4 088 Japan 10 012 9 437 571 10 008 Germany 6 572 5 772 683 6 455 Korea 355 150 101 251 Other 29 7 22 29 Total 53 952 47 254 5 639 52 893 19 Final Report to Congress. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War. April 1992. Appendix P. Washington DC: U.S. Department of Defense.
223 Table A 5 First Gulf War coalition notifications 20 Country Forces 21 Mode of c omm. By/ t o w hom When 22 U. K. A, N, G, b ases Secure p hone Bush PM John Major H 12 Saudi Arabia A, N, G, b ases Call in Scowcroft Bandar H 12 Kuwait A, G Private channel H 6 France A, N, G Phone Bush Pres. Francois Mitterrand H 2 Turkey Bases Phone Bush Pres Turgut Ozal H 2 Israel Secure phone Cheney Arens Scowcroft Shovel H 2 Australia N Phone Bush PM Hawke H 2 Bahrain G, A, b ases Private channel H 1 Oman G, A, b ases Private channel H 1 Qatar G, A, b ases Private channel H 1 UAE G, A, b ases Private channe l H 1 Egypt G Phone Bush Pres. Mubarak H 1 Italy A, N Private channel H 1 Canada A, N Phone Bush PM Mulroney H 1 Spain N, b ases Private channel H 1 20 Coalition Notification Tabl es, ID# CF01584 018, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library. 21 Forces column designates the type of military contribution being made by the coalition partner: G=ground forces; A=air forces; N=naval forces; Bases =military bases made available for US forces. 22 When column designates the timeline of the notification with H hour the start of hostilities; therefore, H 12 is 12 hours prior to the war beginning.
22 4 Table A 5 (continued) 23 Country Forces 24 Mode of c omm. By/ t o w hom When 25 Germany Private channel H 1 Japan Private channel H 1 USSR Phone Bush Pres. Gorbachev H 1 NATO SecGen Private channel H 1 Syria G Private channel H 30 minutes Czechoslovakia G Cable H hour Bangladesh G Cable H hour Morocco G Cable H hour Niger G Cable H hou r Senegal G Cable H hour Pakistan G Cable H hour Belgium N Cable H hour Denmark N Cable H hour Greece N Cable H hour Netherlands N Cable H hour Norway N Cable H hour Argentina N Cable H hour Korea A Cable H hour New Zealand N Cable H ho ur China Cable H hour 23 Coalition Notification Tables, ID# CF01584 018, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library. 24 Forces column designates the type of military contribution being made by the coalition partner: G=ground forces; A=air forces; N=naval forces; Bases=military bases made availabl e for US forces. 25 When column designates the timeline of the notification with H hour the start of hostilities; therefore, H 12 is 12 hours prior to the war beginning.
225 Table A 6 U.S. Assistance by y ear ($ millions) 26 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Argentina 0.4 1.1 1.7 6.2 9.2 20.6 Australia Bahrain 1.10 0.60 Bangladesh 109.60 181.00 125.80 162.60 129.10 112.40 Belgiu m 0.30 0.30 Canada Czechoslovakia 2.60 Denmark Egypt 2,174.90 2,269.70 2,389.30 2,299.80 2,234.80 2,055.80 France 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Greece 344.10 350.70 349.10 350.60 350.30 332.50 Italy Kuwait 0.10 0.30 Morocco 140.30 146.00 126.50 130.10 115.50 113.10 Netherlands New Zealand Niger 40.40 31.70 28.30 39.70 38.40 21.70 Norway Oman 13.20 15.10 12.70 18.70 30.50 1.20 Pakistan 726.60 583. 00 542.40 101.30 23.90 52.70 Poland 6.80 3.30 86.20 3.80 30.10 33.10 Qatar Saudi Arabia Senegal 38.30 59.70 49.20 36.80 74.90 40.70 Spain 5.60 2.10 2.00 1.50 0.90 0.20 Syria 1.20 United Arab Emirates Un ited Kingdom Total 3,600.20 3,643.40 3,713.20 3,151.20 3,039.30 2,788.70 26 USAID Economic Analysis and Data Services website titled, U.S. Overseas Loans and Gra nts, U.S. Bureau of Census (BUCEN) International Database, http://qesdb.usaid.gov/gbk/ accessed August 2009.
226 Table A 7 Summation of f indings salience of argument across cases Traditional Allies Foreign assistance Rhetoric First Gulf War + + Second Gulf War + + Not e: + = evidence for that hypothesis, = absence of strong evidence or that there was evidence to the contrary.
227 Table A 8. Notional p aired c omparison of s tates 27 Alliance t ype State First Gulf War coalition member Second Gulf War coalition member Trad itional a lly United Kingdom Yes Yes Traditional a lly France Yes No Non traditional a lly Ukraine No Yes Non traditional Ally Jordan No No 27 The challenge is to find comparable states that show variation in the outcome. That is, whether or not the state joined or did not join a U.S. led coalition. In two cases (U.K., France), the states joined the First Gulf War while the other pair (Ukraine, Jordan) did not. In two cases (U.K., Ukraine), the states joined the Second Gulf War while the oth er pair (France, Jordan) did not.
228 Table A 9. Largest r ecipients of U.S. t otal e conomic and m ilitary a ssistance, 1946 2007, in constant 2007 dollar s (deflated) in $ U.S. millions 28 Rank Country Total 1946 2007 1 Israel 169,972.300 2 Vietnam 108,937.700 3 Egypt 104,062.900 4 Korea, South 70,740.610 5 United Kingdom 65,685.460 6 Turkey 60,150.210 7 India 59,797.840 8 Franc e 58,736.220 9 Pakistan 44,828.280 10 Iraq 41,101.080 11 Italy 40,484.460 12 Greece 40,391.720 13 China (Taiwan) 39,181.490 14 Germany 36,738.260 15 Japan 26,372.890 16 Philippines 25,429.250 17 Serbia and Montenegro, Fo rmer 19,970.650 18 Afghanistan 19,446.870 19 Indonesia 18,512.210 20 Jordan 18,327.340 28 USAID Economic Analysis and Data Services website titled, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, Obligations and Loan Authorizations (Greenbook ) http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov / accessed December 2009
229 APPENDIX B SECOND GULF WAR DOCUMENTATION Figure B 1. Coalition i ntegration p rocess 1 1 Coalition Integration Process, slide undated, Coalition Coordinating Cell Working File, United States Central Command, Tampa, Florida, accessed May 2009.
230 Figure B 2. Non U.S. m ultin ational f orces in Iraq 2 2 U.S. Central Command chart, Coalition Coordinating Cell Working File, United States Central Command, Tampa, Florida, accessed March 2009.
231 Figure B 3 Executive s ummary of c oalition p artners (OEF/OIF) 3 3 Executive Summary of Coalition Partners, March 30, 2005, Coalition Coordinating Cell Working File, United States Central Command, Tampa, Florida, accessed March 2009.
232 Figure B 4 Security i ncidents in Iraq. 4 4 Security Inciden ts in Iraq, January 24, 2009, Coalition Coordinating Cell Working File, United States Central Command, Tampa, Florida, accessed May 2009.
233 Figure B 5 Prominent terrorist incidents, 1991 2003 5 5 U.S. Central Command presentation titled Coalition Operations, slide not dated, Coalition Coordinating Cell Working File, United States Central Command, Tampa, Florida, accessed May 2009.
234 Figure B 6 Charts U.S. a ssistance by y ear, 2001 2007 6 6 U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook), U.S. Bureau of Census (BUCEN) International Database, USAID Economic Analysis and Data Services, http://qesdb.usaid.gov/gbk accessed August 2009, and U.S. Department of State, International Affairs Account Tables, http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/iab/index.htm accessed August 2009.
235 Figure B 6 (continued) 7 7 U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook), U.S. Bureau of Census (BUCEN) International Database, USAID Economic Analysis and Data Services, http://qesdb.usaid.gov/gbk accessed August 2009, and U.S. Departmen t of State, International Affairs Account Tables, http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/iab/index.htm accessed August 2009.
236 Figure B 7 Foreign a ssistance s ummary 8 8 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development website titled, Donor Aid Charts, http://www.oecd.org/countrylist/0,3349,en_2649_34447_1783495_1_1_1_1,00.html accessed August 2009.
237 Figure B 8 Combined U.S. a id and c oalition t roop d ata c harts (2002 2006)
238 Figure B 8 (continued).
239 State 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Egypt 1,715.6 2,202.2 2,226.1 1,957.6 1,563.2 1,787.2 1,972.1 Turkey 6.5 278.3 1,028.6 50.3 53.6 23.4 29.7 Jor dan 271.9 339.1 1,697.3 638.3 682.7 562.0 560.3 Figure B 9 Total U.S. f oreign a ssistance, 2001 2007 ($ millions) 9 9 U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook) U.S. Bureau of Census (BUCEN) International Database, USAID Economic Analysis and Data Services, http://qesdb.usaid.gov/gbk accessed August 2009, and U.S. Department of State, International Affairs Account Tabl es, http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/iab/index.htm accessed August 2009, and U.S. Central Command, Tampa, FL.
240 Date Jan 03 Feb 03 Mar 03 Apr 03 May 03 Jun 03 Totals Terror 92 148 153 86 283 155 917 Hitler 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 Dictator 11 24 38 37 3 3 11 154 Weapon 155 224 179 79 89 59 785 Aggression 3 3 6 1 0 1 14 Total 271 422 387 203 405 226 1914 Figure B 1 0 U.S. s enior l eader r hetoric (Jan 1 Jun 30, 2003) 10 10 Data for table and figure are taken from multiple sources: Weekly Compilati on of Presidential Documents, Book 1, January June 2003, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wcomp/index.html accessed July 2009 and Department of Defense website, http:// www.defenselink.mil accessed July 2009 ; and Department of State website, http://www.state.gov accessed July 2009
241 Figure B 1 1 Bush a dministration r hetoric (Jan 1 Jun 30, 2003) 11 11 Data for these charts are from multiple sources: Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Book 1, January June 2003, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wcomp/index.html accessed July 2009 ; Department of
242 Tab le B 1. List of e lite i nterviews Name Government Position(s) General (ret.) Colin Powell Secretary of State (01 05) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (89 93) Ambassador Marc Grossman Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (01 05) Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (97 00) U.S. Ambassador to Turkey (94 97) Ambassador Victoria Nuland National War College faculty (current) U.S. Perm Rep to NATO (2005 2008) Principal Deputy National Security Advisor to Vice President Cheney (200 3 2005) Ambassador Lincoln Bloomfield State Department's Envoy for Man Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) Threat Reduction (current) Assistant Secretary of State for Political Military Affairs (2001 2005) Ms. Debra Cagan Senior Research Fellow at t he Center for Technology and National Security Policy, NDU (current) Deputy Assistant, Acting, for Coalition, Peacekeeping and Multinational Cooperation for OSD (2006) Senior Counselor for Coalition Affairs for OSD (2005) Political Advisor to Supreme Allie d Commander Transformation and U.S. Joint Forces Command (2003) DOS lead for international coalition for OIF (2002) Air Vice Marshall Harwood, U.K. RAF U.K. Defense Attach, British Embassy, Washington DC (current) Deployed Operating Base Commander in Ku wait (2003) Air Commodore Graham Wright, U.K. RAF Chief of the Defense Staff Liaison Officer to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington (current) Commander, RAF Coltishall (2007) Mr. Gregory Suchan Deputy Assistant Secretary in the State of Political Military Affairs (2000 2007) Mr. Leo Michel Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies (current) Director for NATO Policy within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) (2002) Mr. Edwa rd Stafford Director, PolMil Office, Iraqi Affairs, U.S. Dept of State (current) Foreign Service Officer Mr. Chris Davy Political Military officer, European Security and Political Affairs, Department of State (current) Defense website, http:// www.defenselink.mil acce ssed July 2009 ; and Department of State website, http://www.state.gov accessed July 2009
243 Table B 2. Troop c ontributing c o alition p artners (2003 2006) 12 STATE / YEAR 2003 2004 2005 2006 COALITION IRQ AFG IRQ AFG IRQ AFG IRQ AFG ALBANIA 72 0 73 0 127 1 123 2 ARMENIA 0 0 0 0 46 0 46 0 AUSTRALIA 284 2 359 4 743 215 1 273 1 AZERBAIJAN 151 0 151 0 154 0 98 0 BOSNIA AN D HER Z EGOVINA 0 0 0 0 36 0 36 0 BULGARIA 471 20 476 7 457 0 157 0 CZECH REPUBLIC 271 0 98 1 108 0 98 1 DENMARK 539 0 539 0 498 276 490 1 DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 303 0 414 0 0 0 0 0 EL SALVADOR 360 0 381 0 381 0 381 0 ESTONIA 43 10 58 5 47 0 41 0 GEORGIA 69 0 205 0 856 0 850 0 HONDURUS 371 0 373 0 0 0 0 0 HUNGARY 296 0 272 0 0 0 0 0 ITALY 2 519 1 3 436 8 3 347 1 3 305 91 JAPAN 0 0 584 0 624 0 582 0 KAZAKHSTAN 29 0 30 0 29 0 29 0 LATVIA 179 0 132 0 137 0 132 0 LITHUANIA 150 3 133 39 115 2 113 0 MACE DONIA 31 0 33 0 39 0 46 0 MOLDOVA 56 0 33 0 12 0 11 0 MONGOLIA 173 13 132 17 132 0 131 21 NETHERLANDS 1 080 2 1 480 0 1 555 249 0 2 NEW ZEALAND 58 174 41 2 0 182 0 3 NICARUAGA 113 0 113 0 0 0 0 0 NORWAY 135 0 152 1 10 85 0 9 PHILIPPINES 87 0 54 0 0 0 0 0 POLAND 2 479 95 2 557 0 2 460 0 1 719 0 PORTUGAL 133 0 133 99 133 102 0 0 ROMANIA 732 432 746 0 879 0 858 0 SLOVAKIA 82 40 103 49 107 40 107 5 SOUTH KOREA 684 205 2 801 211 3 197 211 3 325 212 SPAIN 1 098 0 1 286 0 0 0 0 0 THAILAND 447 0 451 0 0 0 0 0 TONGA 0 0 44 0 0 0 0 0 UKRAINE 1 650 0 1 633 0 1 573 0 0 0 UNITED KINGDOM 10 040 103 9 177 19 8 220 248 7 517 179 TOTAL 25,582 1,395 29,730 1,245 27,114 2,388 21,949 888 12 U.S. Central Command, Coalition Coordinating Cell Working File, United States Central Command, Tampa, Florida, accessed March 2009.
244 Table B 3 Troop c ontributing c oalition p artners in Iraq 13 Country Mis sion Unit Description OIF History Contributions United Kingdom Stability/Peacekeeping Operations 7th Armored Brigade (MND SE) Joined in 2003 with U.S. Poland and Australia left Jul 09 Largest non U.S. troop contributor. Royal AF aircraft Italy Peace keeping Operation Sassari Mechanized Brigade Joined in Mar 03 left in Sep 06 S ecurity patrols, humanitarian aid and projects, mine clearing South Korea Civil Military Operations, Reconstruction Support Infantry Division Joined in Apr 03 and left in Dec 08 Middle Ring security, airlift support, opened a hospital in Nov 05 Poland Peacekeeping Operations Division Headquarters and Brigade Joined with U.S. U.K. and Australia, in 2003 ;l eft in Oct 08 Provides training and stabilization operations. Ukraine P olice and border transition team Tactical group Joined in Apr 03 and left in Dec 05 Police and border training Netherlands Peacekeeping and Police Marines, police unit, logistics team, commando squad Joined in Apr 03 and left in Mar 05 Provided maneuver b attalion Spain Peacekeeping Operations Brigade size force Joined in Sep 03 and left in May 04 Served with Poles in central south sector Australia Peacekeeping Operations and training Training Teams, Protective Security Group, and staff Joined in 2003 wi th U.S. U.K. and Poland left in Jul 09 Air traffic control, force protection, civil military projects Georgia Peacekeeping Operations Light Infantry Battalion Joined in Mar 03 and left in Aug 08. Middle Ring security Romania Peacekeeping Operations V arious unit types Joined in Apr 03 and left in Jul 09 Civil Military projects, Iraqi police training Japan Civil Military Operations and Reconstruction Support Reconstruction Group Joined in Jan 04 and left in Jul 06 Civil military missions. Donated over 1,100 vehicles Denmark Peacekeeping Operations Mechanized Infantry Battalion Joined in May 03 and left in Dec 07 Civil Military projects Bulgaria Security Security Company Joined coalition in 2003 and left in Dec 08 Security patrols Thailand Humanitari an Engineers Joined coalition in Sep 03 and left in Dec 04 Served with Poles in Karbala 13 Current Coalition Summary Iraq, Coalition Coordinating Cell Working File, United States Central Command, Tampa, Florida, accessed March 2006.
245 Table B 3 (continued). 14 Country Mission Unit Description OIF History Contribution Dominican Republic Security Infantry Battalion Joined coalition in Aug 03 and left i n Jun 04 Served under Spanish brigade El Salvador Civil Military and Reconstruction Infantry Battalion Joined coalition in May 03 and left in Jan 09 Security patrols Honduras Reconstruction Infantry Battalion Joined coalition in Aug 03 and left in Jul 04 Served under Spanish brigade Hungary Transportation Infantry Battalion Joined coalition in Aug 03 and left in Dec 04 Served under Polish command Norway Explosive Ordinance Disposal Engineers and Mine clearing Joined coalition in Oct 03 and left in Mar 0 5 Clears unexploded ordinance Azerbaijan Base force protection and security Peacekeeping company Joined coalition in Jun 03 and left in Dec 08 Provides security of Iraqi dam Lithuania Peacekeeping operations Infantry platoon Joined coalition in Apr 03 an d left in Aug 08 Convoy escort and guard force Portugal Security Gendarme force Joined coalition in Sep 03 and left in Feb 05 Provide security and training Latvia Peacekeeping o perations Infantry Company Joined coalition in Mar 03 and left in Nov 08 Prov ides security and training Mongolia Base security Infantry Company Joined coalition in Jun 03 and left in Sep 08 Force protection mission Nicaragua Demining/Humanitarian De mining team Joined coalition in Oct 03 and left in Jul 04 Clears unexploded ordin ance Slovakia Explosive Ordinance Engineer Company Joined coalition in Apr 03 and left in Jan 07 Destruction of explosives Czech Republic Military police training and support Military police company Joined coalition in Apr 03 and left in Dec 08 Police tr aining instruction Albania Security of Mosul Airfield Commando Company Joined coalition in Mar 03 and left in Dec 08 Force protection mission Estonia Peacekeeping operations Infantry platoon Joined coalition in Jun 03 and left in Feb 09 Offensive combat operations Philippines Reconstruction Medics, engineers, and drivers Joined coalition in Dec 03 and left in Jul 04 Humanitarian and civic projects 14 Current Coalition Summary Iraq, Coalition Coordinating Cell Working File, United States Central Comma nd, Tampa, Florida, March 2006.
246 Table B 3 (continued). 15 Country Mission Unit Description OIF History Contribution Armenia Transportation support and de mining Transportation company and de mining team Joined coalition in Jan 05 and left in Oct 08 Transportation missions and convoy escorts Tonga Security Royal Marines Joined coalition in Jun 04 and left in Dec 04 Guard duty returned in 20 07/2008 New Zealand Reconstruction Engineers Joined coalition in Sep 03 and left in Sep 04 Served under U.K. in Basra Bosnia and Herzegovina Explosive Ordinance Disposal EOD Platoon Joined coalition in May 05 and left in Nov 08 Clears unexploded ordinanc e Macedonia Peacekeeping operations Special operations platoon Joined coalition in Apr 03 and left in Nov 08 Patrols in raids, ambushes, and cordon/search Moldova Explosive Ordinance Disposal De mining team and staff Joined coalition in Sep 03 and left i n Oct 08 Clears unexploded ordinance Kazakhstan Explosive Ordinance Disposal EOD Platoon Joined coalition in May 03and left in Oct 08 Clears unexploded ordinance 15 Current Coalition Summary Iraq, Coalition Coordinating Cell Working File, United States Central Command, Tampa, Florida, March 2006.
247 Table B 4 U.S. Assistance by y ear, 2001 2007 ($ millions) 16 State 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Albania 65.3 46 50.5 63.5 48.5 59.2 37.8 Armenia 100.9 99.7 110.1 88.6 91.9 323.9 74.1 Australia 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 Azerbaijan 44.5 58.3 70.6 68.5 62.4 67.5 57.5 Bosnia & Herzegovina 158.2 100.4 79.5 97.8 63.2 64.2 53.4 Bulgaria 5 8.6 59.4 55.2 46.9 48.6 44.0 34.7 Czech Republic 10.6 14.2 29.2 10.2 8.4 14.0 32.3 Denmark 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Dominican Republic 45.4 35.1 37.1 44.0 35.6 43.9 57.4 El Salvador 118.0 134.2 62.1 70.3 58.9 68.1 513.6 Estonia 8 8 11.3 9.4 7.4 9 5 .1 Georgia 117.3 101.0 108.2 116.1 114.1 409.7 98.4 Honduras 51.0 48.1 68.2 63.8 284.9 84.2 59.0 Hungary 13.4 14.3 23.1 13.1 13.6 7.3 9.8 Italy 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 Japan 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Kazakhstan 52.8 63.15 64.3 72.7 56.3 104.7 9 7.3 Korea, South 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.1 13.5 Latvia 6.9 9.3 12.5 10.4 6.7 11.8 15.6 Lithuania 8.4 8.8 14.0 11.3 8.5 6.9 9.9 Macedonia 60.8 74.0 72.3 53.4 50.1 45.6 38.3 Moldova 60.4 44.3 49.9 38.2 30.6 23.9 46.6 Mongolia 17.4 25.8 23.2 31.1 17.2 15. 4 16.8 Netherlands 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 1.5 New Zealand 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 Nicaragua 62.1 53.7 66.8 60.1 94.8 245.3 59.1 Norway 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Philippines 154.8 207.8 232.7 180.9 151.9 195.2 155.6 Poland 17.5 43.9 32.1 36.7 9 2.7 33.8 32.1 Portugal 0.7 0.7 0.9 3.4 1.0 0.8 0.8 16 U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook), U.S. Bureau of Census (BUCEN) Internati onal Database, USAID Economic Analysis and Data Services, http://qesdb.usaid.gov/gbk accessed August 2009, and checked against U.S. Department of State, International Affairs Account Tables, http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/iab/index.htm accessed August 2009, for supplementals. The total amount of U.S. foreign assistance that includes Economic Assistance, Development Assistance (DA), Economic Support Funds (ESF), Assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States (SEED), Assistance for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union (FSA); International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE), International Military Education and Training (IM ET), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO).
248 Table B 4 (continued). State 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Romania 66.9 56.0 66.6 48.9 63.7 53.2 38.2 Slovakia 15.4 11.4 17.0 8.0 13.2 5.8 5.8 Spain 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 2.6 Thailand 34.3 31 .1 33.9 21.9 49.7 52.2 50.0 Tonga 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.7 1.3 1.4 1.5 Ukraine 218.1 212.8 166.5 121.7 182.2 127.8 192.8 United Kingdom 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.3 0.1 20.3 Total 1,569.6 1,562.9 1,559.0 1,392.7 1,661.5 2,119.2 1,831.8
249 Table B 5 Combined U.S. a id a nd t roop c ontribution by y ear, 2002 2006 17 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Albania Aid 41.5 50.8 58.8 42.9 53.6 Troops 72 73 127 123 Armenia Aid 82 75.5 79.9 76.5 321 Troops 0 0 46 46 Australia Aid 0 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.20 Troops 284 359 743 1,273 Azerbaijan Aid 53.8 57.70 60.00 64.00 56.00 Troops 151 151 154 98 BIH Aid 78.7 76.70 85.50 47.30 53.40 Troops 0 0 36 36 Bulgaria Aid 54.9 55.30 43.30 44.20 39.50 Troops 471 476 457 157 Czech Republic Aid 14.2 29.30 10.20 8.30 14.00 Troops 271 98 108 98 Denmark Aid 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Troops 539 539 498 490 Dominican Rep Aid 35.1 38.80 45.30 36.20 47.20 Troops 303 414 0 0 El Salvador Aid 145.3 62.40 70.50 59.20 68.40 Troops 360 381 381 381 Estonia Aid 7.9 11.30 9.40 7.60 9.00 Troops 43 58 47 41 Georgia Aid 190.2 91.80 124.50 105.20 408.60 Troops 69 205 856 850 Honduras Aid 49.9 71.00 66.00 285.20 88.10 Troops 371 373 0 0 Hungary Aid 14.3 23.00 13.20 13.50 7.30 Troops 296 272 0 0 Italy Aid 0 0.00 0.00 0 .10 0.00 Troops 2,519 3,436 3,347 3,305 Japan Aid 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Troops 0 584 624 582 17 U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook), U.S. Bureau of Census (BUCEN) International Database, USAID Economic Analysis and Data Services, http://qesdb.usaid.gov/gbk accessed August 2009, and U.S. Department of State, International Affairs Account Tables, http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/iab/index.htm accessed August 2009, an d U.S. Central Command, Tampa, FL.
250 Table B 5 (continued). 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Kazakhstan Aid 66 61.30 77.50 65.60 109.90 Troops 29 30 29 29 Latvia Aid 9.3 12.40 11.00 7.30 11.90 Troops 179 132 137 132 Lithuania Aid 8.9 14.00 11.30 9.20 6.80 Troops 150 133 115 113 Macedonia Aid 77.4 67.80 49.80 47.80 45.00 Troops 31 33 39 46 Moldova Aid 39.4 39.20 47.30 31.90 27.00 Troops 56 33 12 11 Mongolia Aid 25.8 23.1 0 32.10 19.30 15.30 Troops 173 132 132 131 Netherlands Aid 0 0.00 0.10 0.10 0.00 Troops 1,080 1,480 1,555 0 New Zealand Aid 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Troops 58 41 0 0 Nicaragua Aid 54.5 67.40 61.80 95.40 247.70 Troops 113 113 0 0 Norway Aid 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Troops 135 152 10 0 Philippines Aid 207.8 224.60 238.30 166.50 212.50 Troops 87 54 0 0 Poland Aid 43.9 32.00 37.20 92.70 33.80 Troops 2,479 2,557 2,460 1,719 Portugal Aid 0.72 0.85 3.40 1.00 0.80 Troops 133 133 133 0 Romania Aid 56 66.80 48.80 62.60 53.30 Troops 732 746 879 858 Slovakia Aid 11.9 17.00 8.00 13.20 5.80 Troops 82 103 107 107 South Korea Aid 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Troops 684 2,801 3,197 3,325 Spain Aid 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Troops 1,0 98 1,286 0 0 Thailand Aid 34.9 35.00 23.00 55.60 51.30 Troops 447 451 0 0
251 Table B 5 (continued). 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Tonga Aid 0.12 0.12 1.70 1.30 1.40 Troops 0 44 0 0 Ukraine Aid 170.4 89.70 131.50 149.30 153.70 Troops 1,650 1,63 3 1,573 0 United Kingdom Aid 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Troops 10,040 9,177 8,220 7,517 Total Aid 1,576.20 1,396.10 1,449.40 1,612.90 2,142.70 Troops 25,185 28,683 26,022 13,951
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266 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Colonel Pete McCabe, USAF, is a member of the International Security Studies faculty of the Air War College. He has served in a variety of operational and staff ass ignments, accumulating more than 2500 flight hours in the B 52. He graduated in 1983 from Kent State University in Kent, Ohio with a Bachelor of Science degree in p hysics and received his commission from Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps. Colonel M cCabe earned his wings from Undergraduate Navigator Training at Mather AFB, CA in May 1984. He has completed numerous operational B 52 tours and has flown 25 combat sorties. Additionally, Colonel McCabe has held staff positions at Headquarters Air Combat Command, Headquarters Air Force, and Headquarters U.S. European Command. Colonel McCabe earned a Master of Science degree (1990) in a eronautical s cience from Embry Riddle Aeronautical University and a Master of Arts degree (2002) in National Security Str ategy from the National War College. He also has a Master of Arts degree (2008) in p olitical s cience from the University of Florida