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1 SEX TRAFFICKING AND THE REPRODUCTION OF EUROPE: IDENTITIES, INTEGRATION, AND THE POLITICS OF PROTECTION By JONATHAN D. WADLEY A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILL MENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2009
2 2009 Jonathan D. Wadley
3 To C offee and C igarettes
4 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS My gratitude is due to all those who helped me complete this project, whether they intended to or not. Th at includes, before all others, my two mentors, Professors Aida Hozic and Sammy Barkin. Dr. Hozic and Dr. Barkin ensured that I never felt alone or afraid while straying far from the safe neighborhoods of conventional political science. That, I believe, is the greatest compliment that can be paid. The encouragement and patience they displayed, and the academic virt they imparted, only adds to my appreciation Dr. Hozic, to her everlasting credit, was willing to help a twenty two year old iconoclast develop a career around an incidental line from a George Orwell book. Few, I believe, posses the imagination for that. Dr. Barkin deserves thanks for among other things, provid ing me with the two most helpful pieces of advice th at a graduate Additional thanks must be given to Professors Leann Brown, Les Thiele, and Kendal Broad. The education they gave me fills these pages, and the comments and advice they offered is the reas on it makes sense This dissertation would have been stillborn if not for the staff of the Department of Political Science at the University of Florida. Debbie Wallen, Sue Lawless Yanchisin, and Andrew Blair posted my bail more times than I care to admi t. They deserve half of the credit for every good thing that comes out of their department. My students, too, have been a tremendous help to me. In particular, those who took my Sexual Politics in Europe seminar deserve special mention. Their hard work and intellectual creativity was inspirational, and their enthusiasm provided me with irrefutable assurance that I was on to something.
5 Joe Kraus provided invaluable help, without which this document would still exist only on my computer screen. H e is als o the only friend I have who is kind of enough to root for a baseball team worse than mine. No small gesture, that. My parents, who are owed more debts than I will ever repay, are now owed one more. Perhaps the best thing that can be said about them is t hat they never cared if I wrote a dissertation or not. When w ould I finish ? They never had to ask and I never had to tell them. This dissertation enframes a period of my life that was performed un scripted by a cast of friends, enemies, hustlers and sain ts Like c omets, they crashed randomly into my world And t he man who survived, like the moon, has been impacted. Most of them are now but vapor trails yet they deserv e reflection and fondness They are the friends who never asked me about my research th e colleagues who had the good sense to spurn domestic beer, and the band mates who played my songs with passion The work here has nothing to do with any of them, but this is the mis sion on which I discovered them and they belong in its log Gratitu de is due too, to my old psychiatrist, Dr. David Hall, for somehow not institutionalizing me back in the good old days when that was clearly the right thing to do. And gratitude is due to the lovers who kept me stable an d especially to those who kept m e unstable. Finally, when the ghosts fade and the comets burn cold, and the laughter of my friends become echoes in a life that is somewhere else, my eternal love is reserved for Link. My kindest teacher, my fearless brother you prowled through life with fierce and resilient joy. It is in your memory that I have the courage to face the noise and the
6 danger. And it is in your debt that I remain for your final and most profound lesson: that you died not because you did not know but because you did.
7 TABLE OF CONTENTS page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 4 LIST OF FIGURES ................................ ................................ ................................ .......... 9 ABSTRACT ................................ ................................ ................................ ................... 10 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 12 Sex Trafficking: An Essentially Contested Concept ................................ ................ 14 Beyon d Discourse: Patriarchal Forces ................................ ................................ .... 16 Capitalist Patriarchy ................................ ................................ ......................... 17 Sex Right Patriarchy ................................ ................................ ........................ 20 Outline of the Project ................................ ................................ .............................. 23 2 GENDERING THE STATE ................................ ................................ ..................... 28 Performativity and Protection in International Security ................................ ............ 28 The State as a (Genderless) Person ................................ ................................ ...... 33 The State as a (Gendered) Process ................................ ................................ ....... 39 Masculinity and Protection ................................ ................................ ...................... 47 3 PERFORMING THE EUROPEAN UNION ................................ .............................. 58 Introduction ................................ ................................ ................................ ............. 58 The Applicability of Statecraft to the European Union ................................ ............. 59 Is There Room for Constructivism? ................................ ................................ ........ 64 Disc ourse and the Meaning of Performance ................................ ........................... 73 Metanarrative: The First Level of Discourse ................................ ........................... 79 Conclusion ................................ ................................ ................................ .............. 84 4 SEX TRAFFICKING IN EUROPE ................................ ................................ ........... 86 Sex Trafficking: The Second Level of Discourse ................................ .................... 87 Sex Traffi cking as a Site of European Identity Formation ................................ ....... 92 Conclusion ................................ ................................ ................................ .............. 98 5 UKRAINE AND THE ROLE OF LIMINALITY ................................ ........................ 101 Introduction ................................ ................................ ................................ ........... 101 Liminality and Collective Identity ................................ ................................ ........... 104 A Note on Case Selection ................................ ................................ ..................... 110 Europe and Ukraine ................................ ................................ .............................. 117
8 Territorial Liminality ................................ ................................ ........................ 119 Temporal Liminal ity ................................ ................................ ........................ 125 Europe and Its Pagans ................................ ................................ ......................... 129 Territorial Liminality ................................ ................................ ........................ 132 Tem poral Liminality ................................ ................................ ........................ 142 Conclusion ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 150 6 PERFORMANCE AND PROTECTION IN SEX TRAFFICKING POLICY ............. 153 Introduction ................................ ................................ ................................ ........... 153 Policies: The Third Level of Discourse ................................ ................................ .. 154 ection ................................ ........................ 157 The Dominance of a Single Discourse ................................ ........................... 157 Employing the Norm of Masculine Protection ................................ ................. 159 Paternalism in European Union Policy ................................ ........................... 162 Conclusion ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 167 7 CONCLUSION ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 170 Summary of the Argument ................................ ................................ .................... 170 The Implications of the Research ................................ ................................ ......... 172 LIST OF REFERENCES ................................ ................................ ............................. 176 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ................................ ................................ .......................... 191
9 LIST OF FIGURES Figure page 3 1 The discursive universe o f sex trafficking in Europe: the metanarrative ............. 85 4 1 The discursive universe of sex trafficking in Europe: two levels ....................... 100 5 1 Wver ................................ ................................ ........... 151 5 2 ................................ ................................ ...... 152 6 1 The discursive universe of sex trafficking in Europe: three l evels ..................... 169
10 Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy SEX TRAFFICKING AND THE REPRODUCTION OF EUROPE: IDENTITIES, INTEGRATION, AND THE POLITICS OF PROTECTION By Jonathan D. Wadley December 2009 Chair: J. Samuel Barkin Cochair: Aida A Hozic Major: Political Science The dissertation, entitled Sex Trafficking and the Reproduction of Europe: Identities, Integration, and the Politics of Protection evolving policies on the issue of sex trafficking. Its central argument is that those policies and the representations they are built upon, fashion the identi t ies of the E uropean Union (EU) Europe, and migrant sex workers. To develop this argument, I provide first a critical evaluation of the concept of state identity in International Relations tialist ontology of states has left them ill equipped to theorize processes of statecraft. By developing a process oriented approach, this study is able to recognize both the reliance of states upon performance for the establishment of their identities, a nd also the essential role that gender plays in making them intelligible as subjects. The study then applies the performative theory of gendered state identity to a case study: the EU Within two discourses of sex trafficking, the EU is observed perfor ming in accord with masculine norms of protection I argue that such performances are particularly productive within the issue of sex trafficking due to the
11 threats that have been discursively attached to that issue: threats posed by migration, evolving s exual mores, and an uncertain relationship with the East. Sex trafficking, as a hyper salient issue for European identity formation, is shown to possess a subtext of identity politics that has consistently influenced what has been taken to be the truth of the issue. The final stage of the analysis consists of a consider ation of EU policies that have been naturalized by the dominant representations of migrant sex workers. Of particular ims, justified as the natural response to the hyper masculine criminals who traffic women. Such policies, understood as EU performances, are shown to reinforce the identities to which they are applied. They are made possible by the liminal identities of both the migrant sex workers involved and the countries from which they come. These liminal identities being at once European and non European stimulate articulations that establish the meanin gs of European and non European and to legitimize EU interv ention on behalf of and more legitimate EU.
12 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION For such a poorly defined and inconsistently used concept, sex trafficking has spurred a flurr y of action. From policies and position papers to movies and educational campaigns, the attempt to combat the phenomenon has overshot all ability to theorize it in a sophisticated and useful manner. There is good reason to doubt that it, as a single phen says too much. And because it contains such an excess of meaning, it has become a ready conduit for loosely connected concerns about migration, sexuality, and the identity of Europe. These same vagaries that surround sex trafficking have enabled the issue to be tremendously productive for the actors involved. The representations attached to the signifier sex trafficking have been powerful in their effects. Victims, protec tors, abusers them front and center within sex trafficking discourse. As a result of the power of the representations, sex trafficking has become an issue that, des pite the good intentions of those who oppose it, is more productive of political subjects than it is of just and equitable policy. That this could occur should come as no surprise. After more than twenty years of constructivist theory in International Re lations (IR), it is not uncommon and do so on a deep level. For example, if a person is consistently portrayed as a threat, it may matter little whether that act or could ever cause harm. The way the state (or other political body) performs in response to the perceived threat will be based on representation and on the knowledge that such representations produce, rather than on
13 any objective truth. The person will be represented and acted upon as a threat, and that may occur to the point where it is through the association with threat that the person becomes intelligible as a political subject. What is less intuitive, and what is much more the focus of this study, is that such representations can produce identities for political bodies, as well. Indeed, they are what make political bodies intelligible in the first place. And if that statement is true, then an issue like sex trafficking, with such violent, prurien t, and powerful representations, would be a place where one would expect such identities to be produced. This study explores the production of identities that occurs, for both humans and polities, within the debate over sex trafficking. It is a debate th at is had predominately within and across two discourses. Each discourse offers a different understanding of the issue and draws upon different representations of the actors involved (or, at times, upon different interpretations of the same representation s). Of particular interest in this study is the effect that sex trafficking discourses have upon the identity of the European Union (EU). The main question posed on this front is twofold: How is the EU being substantiated through its role in the sex traf ficking debate, and what kind of EU is being created. An answer to those questions would be of use beyond the context of sex trafficking. It would provide scholars with more information about an important way in which the EU is able to produce and legiti mize itself. And if the processes through which that occurs are similar to those undergone by states, then the applicability of any insight gained into how the EU produces and legitimizes itself would be applicable to states, as well.
14 In addition to rev ealing some important things about the construction of EU identity, the analysis offered in this study hopes to provide a critical understanding of the relationship between identity and policy. It does this not through an in depth appraisal licies toward sex trafficking, but by examining how current policies have been enabled by the representations upon which they rely. How does policy, in general, the se shaped by macro level identity politics? Before describing how the study proceeds to answer these questions, more should be said about sex trafficking. What follows is a brief description of efforts to define and comba t it. Then, consideration is given to the processes that have produced the sex trafficking debate. These are processes that operate prior to, and outside of, the representational frameworks that are examined throughout the rest of the study. This can b e done only in very general terms, as it amounts to a description of sex trafficking the discussion below posits economic pressure and sexual control as forces that e xist ves can be theorized. Sex Trafficking: An Essentially Contested Concept While there has been much written about the phenomenon that has come to be the scale of t estimated that 500,000 women and children are trafficked into the EU on a yearly basis
15 for the purposes of sexual exploitation (The Press Association Limited 2005). But that number p robably obscures more than it reveals. Attempts to estimate the extent of sex trafficking into the EU are impeded by a number of obstacles. First, the clandestine nature of both trafficking and sex work do not lend themselves well to empirical analysis. Second, definitions of trafficking vary wildly, capturing with one term a broad array of practices that include illegal entry, illegal entry accompanied by the assistance exploitation, and illegal entry coupled with non sexual labor exploitation. Third, (that is, whether or not she was trafficked) is fraught with hazard. Together, these pr oblems have resulted in a marked absence of agreed upon standards for definitions and methods, and an ability to implement those standards and definitions in a way that overcomes the interpretive biases of the researcher, policeman, social worker, or other observer. Given the extent of these impediments, it was not a stretch for Anti Slavery the acceptance of statistics on sex trafficking seem to reflect less their accuracy than the political clout of the citer and the frequency with which a set of numbers has been repeated (Wylie 2006). Given the inconsistency in definitions and methods, i t is not surprising that there is considerable disagreement on the question of why women from abroad are moving into the European sex industry. Within the dominant discourse, they are tricked or kidnapped by traffickers, who themselves are members of tran snational organized crime
16 syndicates. Women are then cowed, enslaved, and subjected to torturous sexual acts that bring great profits to their captors. This is the understanding of trafficking that is most consistently expressed by the EU. An alternativ e understanding of the causes employment, and some are even content with their condi tions of exploitation, as those conditions are preferable to the ones found in their home country. The political stakes ws sex workers from abroad has strong role as protector. Neither of these discourses on sex trafficking have been (or can be) empirically invalidated, for as ment be stated. Some generaliza tions can be made, but only with reservation. From much of the literature on sex trafficking, including the testimonials of the subjects themselves described best as economi c migrants and some women may be described best as subjects of abuse. Beyond Discourse: Patriarchal Forces So that the entirety of this study does not collapse within an economy of representation, it is helpful to examine first what forces have spurred the development of sex trafficking discourse. It may be said that there are two pre discursive forces that act upon women and influences their movement westward into the Member States of
17 the EU. These basic forces can be usefully understood as patriarcha l: a capitalistic patriarchy that disproportionately harms women in developing countries and a sex right patriarchy that grants certain men control over the sexual decisions of women. The first of these, capitalistic patriarchy, has been felt strongly by women living in the poor distinctly modern form of patriarchy and is a product of the very same economic programs that the EU has championed (and gained legitimacy from ch ampioning). Sex right patriarchy manifests itself as women from these regions have access to their sexuality appropriated by men, through either physical force or coercion. These two forces have continued to act upon them in their decisions to migrate. They are a broad conceptualization is useful for capturing the wide range of situati ons that characterize trafficking. It is inclusive of cases where women are forced to move, where women move voluntarily, where women move voluntarily but are exploited in the process, and so on. The consequence of these two forces for Europe has been an unwelcome problem of female migration and a crisis in the sexual order. It is worthwhile to examine each in more depth. Capitalist Patriarchy In the most abusive instances of trafficking for sex work, the connection between patriarchy and capitalism is r eadily apparent. Women contract themselves into slavery by agreeing to migrate and work in conditions over which they have little to no control. If they know that they will be working in the sex industry, then they are agreeing to labor for the pleasure
18 conditions that disproportionately benefit the men who control their labor. Even before migrant women reach their destination, they are put at a disadvantage by the forces of the mar ket. To be trafficked into Europe, women must often pay exorbitant fees. These and to prosecute traffickers, which it understands to be transnational criminal orga nizations. To understand how the connection between patriarchy and capitalism can cause female migration, in addition to structuring the process of it, one must examine the detrimental effects that neoliberal economic policies have had upon most women in the Soviet countries. While such effects have not been felt by women in these regions alone, there is little doubt that there they have been E urope] are not especially higher than those of men, their participation rates especially in the transition economies are lower as opportunities for women in higher paying jobs t. al. (1999) presented the situation for women in Russia, a major source country of migrant and trafficked women, when the mass westward movement of women began in the 1990s. They found that women at that time accounted for two thirds of the unemployed n ationwide and up to ninety percent of the unemployed in some regions. Literacy and education were of little help to them, as they lacked the connections necessary to that is 1999, 49). Sexual harassment was also normalized within Russian capitalist relations,
19 providing further incentive for women to seek better employment opportunities abroad. increases the appeal of emigration for women. Seemingly legitimate offers of employment from Europe (including offers for sex work) become attractive (Goodey 2003). The obs tacles toward finding employment in formal labor sectors guide many women into employment in the informal and unregulated labor market. Operating outside the formal labor market compounds the difficulties women have in migrating. Traffickers then become necessary resources due to a severe lack of legal labor migration opportunities for women from developing countries. due to deteriorated economic conditions in their home country. It is important to stress, however, that harsh economic conditions do not force women to migrate. As Laura Agustn (2003, 32) rightfully points out, most women subjected to similar pressures by economic restructuring choose not room for more subtle issues of desire, aspiration, frustration, anxiety or myriad other lonial representations that deny agency to women from developing countries by reducing them to objects caught in a stream of founded, it would be intellectually dishonest to deny that the decisions tha t women make to migrate occur outside of the structural inequalities that shape their lives (even if those inequalities shape them in different ways and to different degrees). To suggest that neoliberal economic policies have disadvantaged women and that this increased burden has produced pressure for
20 women to migrate to the EU is not to deny the range of other experiences and motivations that play into the decision. Sex Right Patriarchy In response to the economic conditions that disproportionally affect women, as well as the denial of legal channels of migration, smugglers and traffickers provide women with opportunities to migrate into the EU. Whether a woman is a willing participant in her own migration or an enslaved victim of trafficking, or somethin g in between, the opportunity created is a product of societal pressures that assure men right. According to Pateman, sex right underwrites all political orders. In her re casti ng of the origins of the civil order render invisible the prerequisite subjugation of women. Their subjugation is relegated to the private realm of social life and, thus, marked non right still structures political relations. Prostitution is held to be a revealing example of how this rts, either in representation or as live bodies, is central to the sex industry and continually reminds men and women that men exercise the law of male sex right, that they have One can take from Pateman this idea of sex right while denying the conceptual as a critique of the origin stories of civil society. As such, it demonstrates logically the lack of freedom inherent in the contracts that underlie liberal democracies. And because it remains an abstract work of political theory with an eye toward uncovering
21 the logical flaws of contract theorists, her ideas enjoy a degree of immunity from empi rical refutation. This is true especially of the concept that does the most work in her analysis: sex right loses this immunity when she writes of prostitution (chapter 7). This is because she presents prostitution as a daily renewal of the original gendered contract, conferring upon it a universal definition such a way, she exposes it to counter evidence provided by both the differing degrees of sex ual access enjoyed by men and the diverse lived experiences of sex workers. In the European context, counter evidence to her generalizations is abundant. The sexual access that r description, presented as a universal truth about prostitution, does not do justice to the variety of contractual arrangements that characterizes prostitution in Euro pe. While that description provides a suitable description of sex workers confined to a brothel and without any control over the terms of their trade, it leaves no room for sex workers who operate with a far greater degree of agency. These sex workers in clude, for example, entrepreneurial sex workers and independent street prostitutes. These types of sex workers retain significant control over what kinds of service they will provide, how long Davidson 1998). meaning of that access may differ. Sexual access means something different in Sweden, which punishes men who are caught soliciting a prostitute, than it do es in
22 policies relating to prostitution grant the activity a degree of social condoning not Once a nuanced understanding of prostitution is acce sex right can be put to work. While the concept may be broad, it is still valuable. Clearly, there are systemic pressures for men to have sexual access to women and for women to be sexually available for men. If not, then it i s hard to account for the fact that nearly all sex workers are women. This demand for sexual access provides both incentives for women to migrate and for traffickers to force them to do so. The sexual access that customers are granted, however, does not establish such predictable relations of dominance and subordination as Pateman would suggest. That is to say, sex right patriarchy is not reproduced every time a man visits a prostitute. Instead, such relations are only being affirmed to the degree that violence or abuse of the sex worker characterizes the activity. Violence and abuse of sex workers is indeed common, and they carry with them the extra meaning conferred by uninvited sexual dominance. But by no means does it characterize the experience of all sex workers in all transactions. Sex right patriarchy is most visible when it is manifest as the abuse that trafficked women withstand at the hands of their traffickers. Though the frequency of rape is impossible to quantify, it is clear from the acc ounts of many trafficked women that it And the motivation behind it is unambiguousl y the establishment of relations of dominance and subordination. Here, the sex right that men claim over women is a
23 force acting upon an uncertain number of women who are moving into the European sex industry. Through the commonplace violence and abuse of sex workers at the hands of customers and traffickers, sex right patriarchy remains a relevant concept. Thinking of it in this way, rather than as a form of dominance and subordination born of all transactions that occur within the sex industry, retains the usefulness of the concept while preventing it from over determining the movement of women into Europe. It has implications for the broader sexual order of Eu ropean society, is more constitutive of relations between men and women than is trafficking for work in other industries. t embodies this idea. Outline of the Project It is into the context outlined above that the EU assumes its role. And it is through its performances within that context that the EU achieves greater constancy and meaning. To get to a point where one can li nk the patterns and processes described above to the construction of the EU as a legitimate political actor, several theoretical moves must be made. A number of complementary ideas must be introduced and synthesized. Accordingly, this study draws from wo rk that has been done on statecraft, European integration, identity politics, and gender. Synthesizing these topics is a heavy task, as the major ideas of these programs do not intermingle frequently in scholarly texts. Yet, to understand how discourses of sex trafficking coalesce, how they link to specific policies, and how they are productive of collective identities, ideas from complimentary disciplines must be imported. A patient reader will find that, despite the
24 fragmented scholarly universe from w hich they are drawn, the ideas, when combined, provide holistic understanding of an important process. And because of the reflective nature of that process, in which all the identities involved are mutually constitutive, the process cannot be disaggregate d. In the search for an understanding that does justice to the complexity of the process, the hope for a parsimonious explanation must be lost. To make the argument presented as clear as possible, the reader will find that this study is organized from t he macro level to the micro level. It is structured in such a way that each subsequent chapter takes the reader toward increasingly tangible subjects. Thus, it begins with a rather broad analysis of how states become actors and how the EU can become an a ctor through its place within discourse. The, i t zooms in to the discourses on trafficking, which serve as a salient site for processes of EU identity formation. From there, the focus is sharpened further as the role of liminal subjects within traffickin g discourse is examined. Ukrainian sex workers, in particular, fill this role, and in so doing, provide a forum for the production of a number of broader collective identities. Finally, attention is given to the policies that are enabled by the identitie s that have been created. Th e policies considered have been chosen illustratively, rather than systematically, to show how policies can fuel the perpetuation of the identity politics that lie at the heart of the debate. What is offered, then, is a study of three mutually constitutive things: identities, understandings of sex trafficking, and policies. They represent three levels of a discursive structure that enframes the issue. Not one of them can be understood, however, without a prominent focu s on gender. Gender is omnipresent in the structure, infused through each of the three levels, and essential to any analysis of it. Gender
25 explains why sex trafficking is such a powerful issue. It characterizes the identities that are formed, both for i ndividual subjects and for polities like the EU. It gives meaning to carved out for the men and women involved in sex trafficking. The study begins by examining what is known about statecraft within IR. Explorations of macro identity formation through discourse are not very prevalent in the field of European Integration Studies (EIS), so it is necessary to begin outside of that field. Chapter two does this by posing a q uestion that lies at the heart of statecraft: How does a state become a person in the minds of its observers? At root is the anthropological assumption that dominates thinking about states. The chapter argues that that assumption can be held up to scrut iny through a process oriented approach to state identity. When that is done, it becomes clear that a state becomes an anthropomorphized subject in much the same way that a person becomes a subject, through a yoking of the boundaries created by its perfor mances. This is a performative theory of identity, one that has been developed by Judith Butler and rarely applied to states. When that theory is applied to statecraft, an additional and profound idea emerges: Much like people, states can achieve greate r constancy by performing in accord with gender norms. In particular, states can gain an ontological cohesiveness by performing in line with masculine coded notions of protection. Having made the case for a performative theory of state identity, and ha ving reasoned that gender is central to that process, the study proceeds to describe how one would operationalize such an approach to produce insight into EU identity formation. Chapter 3 looks first to how this has been done by other scholars within EIS. It finds
26 that some EIS scholars employ an ontology of constructivism, and a few even adopt an explicitly discursive approach. Overall, however, approaches like that provided here are rare. Yet, a performative theory of the EU can be developed and a us eful way to do so would be way, one can discern the meanings referenced and produced by the performances. To that end, sex trafficking discourse provides a valuable case study. As ch apter 4 explains, the discursive connection of sex trafficking to other salient threats renders it a productive realm for both macro and micro identity formation. Sex trafficking not only enables, but demands, that the EU perform in ways that reference a nd reinforce the distinctions between Europe, non Europe, and what may be termed almost Europe. This yoking of boundaries occurs through the gendered representations present in the discourse. Chapter 5 examines this process as it is experienced by limin al European subjects. To understand trafficking discourse, it is necessary to understand the significance of Europe's East as "almost European." Chief among the liminal actors present in the sex trafficking discourses is Ukraine, on the macro level, and m igrant Ukrainian sex workers, on the micro level. The liminal status of both sets of actors is shown to be mutually legitimizing, so that representations of the one impact the other. Their liminalities are sustained by a host of policies, which themselve s serve as articulations fixing the identity of the actors. And as a result of their status as almost European, the EU is called upon to apply enabled to performatively establish its own identity vis vis the liminal subjects.
27 Turning more explicitly to the performances enabled by such representations, c hapter 6 analyzes the trend in EU policy toward sex trafficking. It finds that the policies, regardless of which discourse they are built upon, have a common denominator in the form of protection. This is significant because of the masculine norms through which such protection is interpreted. As revealed by the initia l discussion of gender and protection in chapter two political bodies can gain a stable and legitimate subject hood by performing in accordance with dominant masculine norms. It follows that by performing as a masculine protector, the EU is better able t o position itself as a substantial actor.
28 CHAPTER 2 GENDERING THE STATE Performativity and Protection in International Security For analytical purposes, scholars of International Relations tend to treat the state as if it were a person. It is assumed to most scholars, it seems per fectly natural common sense, even to speak of the state in this way. Indeed, so commonplace is the attribution of personhood that it is hard to think of the state without appropriating the language used to describe the beliefs, emotions, motivations, and actions of individual human beings. Such naturalness is reflected in the fact that metaphors of personhood are not restricted to one or two almost everything i s contested, this seems to be one thing on which almost all of us (Wendt 2004, 289 ) And yet, despite the stubbornness of these metaphors and the consistency with which they are used, rarely are they reflected upon. Surprisingly few studies have c onsidered explicitly the ontological status of the state and the degree to which it may be said to exist as if it were a person. Even fewer scholars have looked at this foundational assumption through a gender lens. 1 When one does, one thing becomes abund antly clear: The state, though understood as a person, remains a strangely ungendered being. 1 See Kantola 2007; Weber 1998. Peterson and Runyan 1993; Steans 1998.
29 For anyone who wishes to bring a more thorough consideration of gender into the study of international relations, this should set off alarm bells. Feminists ha ve shown that it is problematic to study actors as if they are genderless things. Ignoring gender too often means elevating the masculine subject to universal status, leading to the production of theories that not only are partial, but that mask their par tiality through claims to universality. In IR, ignoring gender means not recognizing the ways in which key actors are defined and differentiated by their relationship to norms of masculinity and femininity. Leaders, states, international organizations all of these act in accord with gender norms, albeit in different ways at different times. Additionally, by ignoring gender, the analyst remains blind to processes through which these gendered identities are produced processes that are in many ways cent ral to the operation of world politics. The arenas in which the actors engage each other are saturated with gendered Laura Sjober g (2009) has symbolic meaning that creates social hierarchies based on perceived association with actors, but a system through which those acto rs are constituted and positioned relative to each other. A great contribution of feminist IR has been to draw the attention of other incorporate gender into the process es they are attempting to explain. Given the work that has been done to demonstrate the dangers of theorizing without gender, it is highly questionable for the bulk of IR scholars to write about the state as if it is not gendered, especially when it is un derstood, conceptually, to exist and act as if it were a person
30 conceptualizing the state as a generic, non gendered actor does not make it so. Yet, the field has been slow to incorporate the study of gender, even though almost twenty years have passed since J. Ann Tickner (1992) criticized its dominant international behavior of states. Within realism, she argued, the state has been conceptualized through an historical worldview that privileges the experiences of men. O ther approaches can be, and have been, criticized on the same grounds, offering similarly partial theories owing to the assumes the political actor is a man. The proliferation of constructivist and post structuralist scholarship over the last twenty years has, despite much promise, brought little help, largely sidestepping questions of gender. Nonetheless, the epistemological pluralism of IR today means that the field is much more amenable to approaches that incorporate gender, and that incorporate it in new ways, than it was at the time when feminists within IR first raised these concerns. The argument that states are produced within, and not outside of, their environment is no longer esoteric. Security and insecurity are understood by many to be interpretations made within an intersubjective realm of interaction among states, rather than the absence or presence of objective threats (Lipschutz 1995). And the role of representation, speech acts, and discursive structures in outlining the parameters of security practices and giving them meaning is
31 better appreciated, as well. 2 As a result of these developments, IR scholars are better positioned to theorize the role of gender in innovative ways. The analysis presented genderless persons by exploring the role of gender in the performances of states. In so doing, it draws upon the concept of performativity the idea that, in the words of Judith Butler (1999, the performances of states much like performances within the daily lives of people, carry no intrinsic meaning, but must be made sense Through such performances, identities become salient, and masculine and feminine subjects are created. While this process is less palpable for states than it is for humans, it is none theless observable in broad patterns. States can be observed reifying themselves, nowhere better than through those performances that establish them as stable and masculine protectors. Recent work on the politics of protection, particularly that done by Didier Bigo (2006) suggests the constitutive effects that protection has upon both providers and recipients. It stops short, however, of recognizing that these effects may be enabled by the gendered meaning that different forms of protection carry. When such meanings are considered, it becomes evident that other international actors and gain legitimacy from their domestic audiences. This means that states are gend ered, and are gendered in much the same way as people are: through repeated performances. When state identity is viewed in this 2 Buzan, Wver, and de Wilde 1998; Campbell 1992; Doty 1993; Huysmans 2006; Wver 1995; Weldes et al.1999.
32 light, the anthropomorphic assumption, as it is commonly used, appears woefully inadequate. To be clear, it is not being sugge sted that drawing parallels between human subjects and state subjects is bad in and of itself. Indeed, useful parallels can be drawn, despite (or, perhaps, because of The troub le lies in assuming that states, or people, are constituted outside processes of interaction, and that either can be made sense of without considering the relational identities they take on through the systems of symbolic meaning through which they operate Anthropomorphic assumptions tend to treat the state as a genderless, unitary actor often, one that is ontologically primitive to its interactions is an effect of iterated, gend ered performances By viewing state performances with an eye towards their constitutive effects, and by moving gender to the center of that analysis, one gains not only a richer understanding of how states reproduce themselves (i.e. where their person lik hierarchical relations that exist among states and between states and domestic populations. This chapter begins with a consideration of how the state has been conceived of as a person throughout the discipline, arguing that such practices almost always import an inadequate understanding of how people are constituted. In both cases conceptualizing states and conceptualizing humans this is a result, largely, of substance oriented, as opposed to pr ocess oriented, approaches. It argues that b y making processes, rather than substances, the core of research, scholars will be able to more fully explain how states reproduce themselves as actors in world politics, how they
33 garner power for themselves (in relation to other international actors, particularly states), and how they gain legitimacy from their subjects Following that, the chapter argues that a theory of performativity can fill this need, especially in the realm of security studies in which s ex trafficking is often placed. Moreover, such a theory would facilitate the study of gender within these processes and shed light on the incentives states have to behave as masculine actors. The final section of the chapter offers, tentatively, a way fo rward for scholars who wish to bring empirical research to bear on the theoretical security in ways that cast them as unitary, masculine actors. It is this model that will be applied in subsequent chapters to interpret the performances of the E uropean U nion in the realm of sex trafficking. The State as a (Genderless) Person Most IR scholars ha ve not understood states to be gendered presumably because they have not been focused on how states are made and how gender works. The state is typically believed to posses its core identity prior to interaction with others. Gender is, therefore, given no room within the theory to have a constitutive relationship performances. This happe ns largely because most scholars adhere, in Patrick (1999, 291) typology, to some form of substantialism. entitie s exist before interaction and all relations should be
34 conceived as relations between entities 3 Substantialism ranges from the belief that states possess internally generated interests or ideas and are, as a result, self motivated (which Jackson and Nexo common view that interaction changes the variable attributes of states, but not the that substantialism characteriz es approaches as seemingly incompatible as rational choice, which fits under the self action label, and constructivism, which is a form of inter action substantialism. Common to both approaches, however, is a belief that interaction does not change those qualities which make a state, a state (Jackson and Nexon 1999, 297) As for why this belief covers such a broad theoretical terrain in IR, Jackson and Nexon offer three rea sons. First, substantialism has been a central part of the Western philosophy from which IR theories are derived. Social entities have been granted essences since ancient Greece, and this practice has been reproduced in the self other boundaries that hav e organized social thought since Descartes. Second, everyday language contains biases toward reification (as epitomized by the phrase, prevalent spacio temporal ordering of the world has been to view societies and states as containers, each possessing different norms, rules, and structures (Jackson and Nexon 1999, 299 300) The anthropomorphic assumption in IR goes hand in hand with the substantialist assumption. The ant ecedent of the anthropomorphic assumption may be traced back to 3 Jackson and Nexon are paraphrasing a definition offered in Mustafa Emirbayer 1997.
35 antiquity, where one finds an association of the citizen warrior with the public realm of the Greek city state. This association continues today, so that i n times of war, the state itself bec omes a citizen warrior: military commanders refer to the enemy as a singular (Tickner 1992, 41) 4 More directly, the anthropomorphic assumption is a product of Medieval Christian theology and its lasting effects upon the political imaginary of dynast ic subjects. But this leaves unanswered an important question: Why has this anthropomorphic form maintained its currency in our modern day, when, unlike in the man? N o doubt, the frequent recourse of IR theory to state of nature theorizing has played a role. Theorists of all stripes have extended descriptions of the conditions of society at the time of state formation to the international realm. Often treating the na rratives of Hobbes and Locke as analogies, they have cast states into the role of men acting absent an overarching sovereign power. According to Iver Neumann (2004, 265 6) it is not the humanness of the metaphors that are so appealing, but their organic ism. Viewing the state as an belong either to the organism or to the realm ex ternal to it. The state becomes a container, of a sort, and as a result the world becomes much more categorizable. Also, such metaphors give the state a telos (survival and adaptation) and the state system a mode (evolution), which corresponds well with prominent social thought in other 4 See also Grant 1991. V. Spike Peterson (1992) points out that the consolidation of the state and the gendering of the state were concomitant processes. Th at argument parallels closely the one made here. The anthropomorphization of the state is tied inextricably to these processes, simultaneously reinforcing them and resulting from them. Given that, the personhood of the state should be investigated rather than assumed.
36 disciplines (e.g. with Durkheimian frameworks). Neumann does not explain why states are so consistently thought of as humans nor does he try to, but his observations raise an important point: There is no necessary connect ion between substantialist ontologies and the person hood of the state. One could theorize the state as a unitary actor possessing a pre social identity without imagining it to be analogous to a person. Other metaphors, organic or not, could be used. Add itionally, there is no necessary connection between anthropomorphization and substantialism because one could anthropomorphize the state without recourse to substantialist beliefs. This would be accomplished by adopting a performative or purely structural theory of human identity, in which the latter is an effect and then transferring that theory onto the state. Recasting identity as, before all else, an effect, breaks the connection between substantialism and anthropomorphization, enabling one to view t he state as a person, while viewing neither as a preformed entity. Still, these beliefs appear to be mutually reinforcing. Viewing the state as a person transfers the habit of seeing people as unitary, already understanding of st ates. And conversely, theorizing the state as an entity facilitates (even if it does not necessitate ) the analogy of personhood by making it possible for a anthropomorphization is c Social Theory of International Politics (1999a) Wendt, more than anyone else in the discipline, has brought the ontological status of the state to center stage and has done much to draw attention to relational components of s tate identity. His theory, however, strongly reinforces the connection between substantialism and anthropomorphization, going so far as to build
3 7 claims, and the rami fication of this claim is that they may be treated as ontologically primitive entities (as humans most often are) (Wendt 1999 a 194). Every state has, by Although Wendt places can legitimately attribute anthropomorphic qualities like desires, beliefs, and a 197) 5 to advance the argument that states are ontologically prior to the state system (substantialism), which, in turn, allows him to perform the systemic level analysi s that is (Wendt 1999 a 198) he attributes to it five properties, or parts of the legal order, (2) an organization cla iming a monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence, (3) an organization with sovereignty, (4) a society, (Wendt 1999 a 202) personal or corporate identity. This is not the only iden tity that states have, but is the precursor to other, more social identities. Once these social identities are stripped away, it is what remains. Wendt (1999 b 86) elaborates: Two things are left if we strip away those properties of the self which presup pose interaction with others. The first is the material substrate of agency, including its intrinsic capabilities. For human beings, this is the body; for states, it is an 5 inverted commas [quotations] must be lapses, for he insists that he is not discussing the state as if it had away with, and it should therefore be a correlate that Wendt should have done away with the inverted
38 organizational apparatus of governance. In effect, I am suggesting for rhetorical purposes that the raw material out of which members of the state system are constituted is created by domestic society before states enter the constitutive process of international society, although this process implies neither stable territoriality nor s overeignty, which are internationally negotiated terms of individuality. The second is a desire to preserve this material substrate, to survive. motivational disp (Wendt 1999a, 197) The problem is not so much tha t Wendt is attempting to operationalize the analogy, but that he is attempting to do so in regards to the actors rather than the process. (1992, 8) formulation, in which the same analogy is made, but arrived at from the similarity of the processes in which states and states, the identity of each is performatively constituted. Moreover, the constitution of identity is achieved through the inscription of boundaries which serve to demarcate an Ultimately, the inscriptions and demarcations are the result of ongoing political processes, ones that states have great interest in successfully reproducing. For those who study statecraft practices and activities that engender the eff ect called the sovereign state (Berman 2003, 59) this is a familiar point. It is through statecraft that social in substantialist accounts, is carved out and reified. If the state is posited as a person (metaphorical or not) who exists in some meaningful sense prior to social interaction, then much of this is missed. One may still recognize the state to be a partially socialized entity, as Wendt does, but many of those processes which construct the state as a subject will be left out of the analysis.
39 The State as a (Gendered) Process Drawing on the scholarship within feminist IR one sees quickly how the story components to be gend ered in some way, and to become so through security performances undertaken by the state. Society, for instance, is often reconstituted in gendered terms through war, which has long been viewed as a means of masculinizing a people. Through war, power is valorized and identified with a heroic kind of masculinity (Tickner 2001) saw the Spanish American War as a way to re (1998, 144 5). Jean Bethke Elshtain (1992) demonstrates that the will to selfhood, and that this will is most fully recognized in war. 6 War a means through which states and individuals are craf ted together can impart upon its performers a masculinity that cannot be accomplished through other means. This is what Ralph Pettman (1998, 174) activities and warmaking has long been a way o f defining and demonstrating a range of (1992, 91) whose work contains little discussion on gender, observes nevertheless that societies have a history of being viewed in feminine terms in relat ion to the masculine leaders who control them: 6 Importantly, Elshtain notes that both masculine and feminine gender roles are created and reinforced in the sacrifices of war.
40 War has the ability to masculinize leaders, as well. It helped George H.W. Bush overcome t man (at least temporarily). Likewise, George W. Bush appears to have been rescued from a less heroic corporate masculinity (suited to the managerial duties of, say, a global CEO) by the events of September 11 th (Scott 2002). This phenomenon is relatively easy to understand: War is, to a significant degree, performed by the leaders who participate in it. War provides for a leader the opportunity to perform in ways that are in acco rdance with recurring masculine ideas. He may do so through a number of means, such as associating himself with the men who are fighting the war or simply by demonstrating traits characterized as masculine (such as decisiveness, an embrace of violence, or (quoted in S cott 2002). Though it is beyond the bounds of this study to submit each possible component feminism and feminist IR to indicate that this could be done. Territory may b e gendered, as is evident when one considers the shared symbolism of intervention and rape. As Cynthia Weber (1995, 125) ents or legal order that Wendt considers to be a component order constitutes a public realm that marginalizes women (by relegating them to the
41 private realm of the family), establishes men as the political and civil subjects, and all generally considered to be masculine qualities (Brown 1995, 183) 7 Sovereignty a th ird has proven equally problematic when viewed through a gender lens. The idea that sovereignty is an ordered realm, set apart from the dangers of the state system, has been called into question by the particular vulnerabil ities of women within states, and the connection between those vulnerabilities and the wider power relations that extend into the international realm (Tickner 1992) Instead, some scholars have argued that the state project, operating within and beyond bor ders, makes possible the inside/outside, order/anarchy distinction, which then produces the 8 an organization claiming a monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence may be usefully examined as an effect, thereby denaturalizing its presumed status as a pre social characteristic of states. By studying how performances of protection in international relations reestablish the prerogative power, or claim to violence, of the state, this c omponent of the state body can be embedded in processes that it has been posited to proceed. All this points to the idea that the creation of the state as a unitary, person like actor in international relations is an ongoing process, rather than somethin g that has been accomplished before international relations begin. Such an observation need not devalue the work done within feminism on the domestic structures or the internal organization of the state. 9 Indeed, as much research shows, these are importan t 7 See also MacKinnon 1989 and Pateman 1988). 8 Most notably, see Walker 1993 9 Valuable contributions include Brown 1995; Grant 1991; Niva 1998.
42 sources of masculinism and patriarchy. But it does remove the assumptions that reify the state, abstract it from the processes of its own reproduction, and obscure the contestation over its meaning. It does this by foregrounding the processes through w hich those structures are given meaning as domestic structures processes that simultaneously carve out the space for the state that is said to contain them. And it is consistent with a belief recurrent in much feminist work, that a more complete underst anding of the forces perpetuating the hierarchical relations between masculine and feminine subjects must incorporate those processes that transcend (and produce) the context of the state. 10 To replace essentialist ontologies, Jackson and Nexon (1999) propo se a processual relational approach to international relations. In contrast to substantialism, processual relationalism treats states (and all other entities) as entire ly embedded. Social interaction, rather than the entities doing the interacting, becomes the starting point of analysis. Within that interaction, the state appears as a particular pattern of ties or processes or, as Jackson and Nexon label it, a projec t At that level, the state may exists in the minds of most people. It is through an additional process, termed yoking that the state achieves such status. Through yoking, the myriad sites of difference (i.e. the boundaries) among projects within the patterns of processes are connected, then rationalized (in the Weberian sense of being made more formal and abstract), resulting in entity formation. Jackson and Nexon draw two important implications from this 10 ions, and abandoning causal theory in favor of constitutive theory. See Doty 1996.
43 process of state formation. First, the process of yoking, which is necessary for the state to appear as a substance, implies that the production and reproduction of boundaries is necessary for the creation of the does not happen randomly the connections formed through yoking must be intersubjectively meaningful; they must cohere in the eyes of the audience, thus giving meaning to the various activities that produce the state. The effect is the appearance of a distinct, unitary actor, possessing purpose and capable of exercising agency in common usage, a state. (1999) theory of ho w human subjects are made. For her, neither subjects nor their bodies exist pre socially in any meaningful sense. Instead, they are constituted and reconstituted performatively within broader matrices of relations, prominent among (1999, 22) conformity with reco then, that is not already gendered. This runs counter to common conceptions of the relationship between the subject and gender, in which the former is assumed to exist (in the form of a s exed body) before the latter is acquired (through socialization). In exist gendering processes, nor can the gender neither the culturally. On this point there is much convergence with the processual relational approach described above. Much
44 approach. The focus, then, turns to the processes through which the subject (human or state) is constituted. 11 Butler (1993, 2) terms this process performativity It is m produces the actor. Performativity is conceptualized, then, as repetitive imitations of a subject, a r (1999, 33) in modifying a quote from Friedrich Nietzsche, sums up the ontological commitment this despite being a performatively generated effect, the actor maintains the appearance of continuity and solidity. This is not due to any essential characteristics the actor (Butler 1999, 23) For instance, within the dominant hetero sexual matrix and the norms of intelligibility it Again the similarities between a theory of performativity for humans and a processual relational approach for states are apparent. For a state to emerge out of a 11 It is worth noting that the shared ontologies of Butler and Jackson/Nexon come despite differences in the ir beliefs over the role of theory. Whereas Butler employs theory as a political tool for destabilizing dichotomous identities and promoting new, hybrid ones, Jackson and Nexon approach theory as typifying moral and ethical comm to Patrick Thaddeus Jackson.
45 web of relations, it must follow a process that is intersubjectively meaningful to its audience. 12 For this reason, the boundar ies that are drawn in the yoking process are (Jackson and Nexon 1999, 316) 13 making a state without which the process lacks unity and the state cannot gain the appearance of being an entity (Jackson and Nexon 1999, 316). Thus, boundaries must be drawn in meaningful ways for the state to become inte lligible as a subject. This is quite intelligible subjects exists. That recipe, however, includes gender (among other, related constructions like race) as it is r egulated by a compulsory, naturalized, and normative heterosexuality. The cultural grid of heterosexuality structures the meanings that gender performances must assume to make sense. As a result, a subject must be performatively constituted as a heterose xual masculine subject or a heterosexual feminine subject to be intelligible within the heterosexual matrix. But whether the international relations, sovereignty), th e point is that the subject can only be constituted through its relations to those norms. constitution of states in international relations can be helpful. If states ar e intelligible as people, then her theory, which explains how people become intelligible, can be used to 12 T he distinction itself is an outcome of the process ; the creation of the audience is intrinsic to the process of state formation. 13 With this point, the authors are drawing upon Nic holas Rescher 1996.
46 better understand states. It can shed light not only on the processes through which states are naturalized, but also on the unacknowledged relationshi ps that exist among states by virtue of the norms through which they become intelligible. Gender must be attempting to abstract gender from it, is to argue that states are gen dered, and that their gendering is no more metaphorical than is the gendering of humans. Because both oriented, both forms of subjects humans and states can be studied as discur sively constituted effects, formed within a cultural grid that contains ideas about gender and that productions, performatively established in relation to gender norms of intel ligibility, though seldom recognized as such. This assumes, of course, that there are norms of intelligibility shaping the conceptualization of the state. On the one hand, the pervasiveness of the anthropomorphic assumption within IR implies that there must be. If people cannot be conceptualized without gender, and states are conceived of as people, then that conception must contain gender within it, even if implicitly so. The details of such a conceptualization, and the norms of gender upon which it draws, will vary by local context. Specific, interrelated discourses of gender and statehood will determine the ways in which the state is gendered. Meanwhile, the pervasiveness of those discourses will determine who shares that conception. There is val uable work that has been done by examining how states become gendered within specific discourses. Cynthia Weber (1999)
47 performativity to US Caribbean relations. 14 She argues that within discourses on the US role vis vis Caribbean countries, US foreign policy has been geared toward the production of a straight, masculine, hegemonic identity where one no longer exists. Within some of the same discourses, Jutta Weldes (1999, 211) considers briefly how, States not only had to be strong, courageous, determined, and firm, it also had (2003) examines performances of the US security state within post 9/11 discourses of danger and finds that they masculinize the state while feminizing the population. By approaching the idea of gendered states within the confines of specific discourses, th ese works reflect well upon the sentiment that t he relations between gender and the state cannot be studied in general terms instead, attention must be on the construction of gender within specific state discourses and practices" (Kantola 2007, 278) Ma sculinity and Protection But can it be said that states are gendered in recognizable ways, in general ? If so, then through what kind of performances, and through what gendered norms of intelligibility? The rest of this chapter offers a preliminary answer to these questions by suggesting that certain security performances gender the state through the widely held norm of masculine protection. While the precise forms that this protection takes, and norms through which the performances are read are culturally pervasive enough to be theorized as masculinizing 14 sovereignty in particular, see Weber (1998)
48 or feminizing. 15 find a benchmark for the meaning of such performances. And wh ile one must be careful not to homogenize state identities when viewing them in relation to system wide norms, a project focused on the masculinizing effects of performances of protection can elucidate how states naturalize their status and improve their s tanding among other states. In applying society level theories, like those offered by Butler and Connell, to the gender norms is much thinner there than it is within l ocal contexts. But this does not render those norms ineffectual. The qualities that compose them account for some of the basic, relational identities that recur in the international realm. Although a more complete understanding of those identities requi res situating them within local discourses, they may be observed relationally and in broad terms to connect to more global discourses on gender. Connell (1998) for instance, proposes that a model oping in response to globalization. As a global model, it does not supplant local and regional masculinities. Instead, it reveals some broad, gendered qualities that are in play. These qualities can then be studied with attention to how models of masculi nity are articulated through each other across levels. Often, the qualities of gender norms are structured as dichotomous pairs. As signifiers of identity, they establish hierarchy among the actors upon which they are 15 here are other ways in which these performa nces may be read, so that a state can perform in ways that complicates its identity to norms of masculinity and femininity.
49 other things: rationality/irrationality, civilized/barbaric, autonomous/dependent, active/passive, and powerful/weak all of which map onto the dominant signifier pair of masculine/feminine. 16 The examination of gender dichotomies such as these has been he lpful in accounting for how unequal, relational identities have been maintained and how they have privileged some actors and marginalized others. However, there are limits to this kind of analysis. By viewing relational gender identities in dichotomous t erms, one risks neglecting the variation that exists within those categories. 17 Simply put, there are different and unequal types of masculinity and femininity. Within the range of masculinities, there are dominant and subordinate types. There is often a dominant model of masculinity that exercises a normative effect upon hegemonic masculinity one can study it. 18 A hegemonic masculinity is an idealized, relational, and historical model of masculinity one to which other forms of masculinity are subordinate. Although the qualities associated with it characterize a small percentage of masculine actors, its idealization and cultural pervasiveness require other actors to position themselves in relation to it ( Connell 2005 ) And while it is continually evolving, incorporating other forms of masculinity even as it subordinates them, it remains identifiable. Charlotte Hooper (2001, 62) explains: 16 Of course, masculine/feminine is not the only binary oppositional pair established among states. Others can include parent/child, white/colored, and Western/non Western. See Connell 1987; Hunt 1987; Said 1979. 17 18 relations discourse. For elaboration on the con cept of hegemonic masculinity, see Maruska 2009.
50 Hegemonic masculinity can then be seen not as a fixed set of domina nt traits but as a constantly negotiated construct that draws on a pool of available characteristics, which, although they may be mutually contradictory can be put together in different combinations depending on circumstances. Different pools of character pool of available characteristics is also subject to gradual change over time, and characteristics of subordinate masculinities can be plundered to reinvigorate hegemonic masculinity while previously hegemonic characteristics can be dropped or devalued. By performing in accordance with a dominant model of masculinity, states can constitute (and thus, position) themselves relationally as powerful subjects. For Connell (2005, 841) t his kind of positioning is at the heart of the concept of masculinity, to such p men who are recognized and claim a certain form of masculinity, for the sake of being more valued, more serious, and the protectors of/and controllers of those people who are less masculine (Cohn and Enloe 2003, 1192) Whi le few can live up to the hegemonic ideal, their position to it vis vis other actors is nonetheless an important component of their power. A comparable process occurs among states. As with men, the more that states are able to constitute themselves in alliance with the norms of the hegemonic masculinity, the more they will improve their position and boost their credibility (1998, 46) Thus, states have constant incentives to perform in ways that not only are masculine, but that constitute them as a cert ain form of masculine actor, one who embodies the elements of the hegemonic masculinity. Performances that masculinize states by positioning them closer to the ideal of the hegemonic masculinity are likely to be most effective in the realm of security. This is because security performances are central to the production of the state as a unitary
51 subject and because, so often, security performances are rendered intelligible by highly pronounced ideas about masculinity and femininity. War, in particular, demonstrates this claim. Long ago, Kenneth Waltz observed that in times of war the state is united (and, therefore, a single entity) to a greater degree than at any other time (Waltz 2001, 179) 19 Tickner (2001, 41) makes a similar observation but conclude s that gender plays a big role in producing state unity: the state becomes a citizen warrior in times of war. Jean Bethke Elshtain (1992) and Susan Jeffords (1989) go one step further, arguing that collective identities are constructed through the types of men and women that war creates or brings out. But absent war, security performances are still crucial for state production and reproduction. 20 By taking dangers, threats, and other signs of insecurity to be their objects, security performances reproduce t he boundaries between a secure self and a dangerous other. Boundary reproduction is central to processes of statecraft, discursively challenged, often in an explicit manner. Whether such threats are internal or external, the effect is the same. Indeed, the distinction often collapses. One effect of successful performances, then, is the appearance of the state as a unitary, continuous actor, and one who can claim legitima An additional effect of successful performances is the constitution of the state as an actor who is hierarchically dominant to certain other international actors, frequently states. Both of these can be accomplished by per forming security in accord with the 19 Of course, Waltz does not view this unity as an effect of the representational practices enabled by the discursive context of war. 20 security. Rather, a performance becomes a security performance only if it is interpreted as such, which will depend upon the discourses through which the performance is interpreted
52 norms of the hegemonic masculinity. The relational quality of gender ensures that any performances that give the state the appearance of personhood will necessarily position its personhood in relation to other states. A ny gendered construction of the state, even (Connell 2005, 848); thus, the gender norms that make a state intelligible as a subject also situate it relationally to other actors. This argument may be operationalized by first determining the dominant form of ways that align with it. For the first step, there is good reason to believe that a model of masculinity centered on protection has achieved dominant, if not hegemonic, status. While the question of its hegemonic status will have to be settled empirically, protection a ppears to be both clearly masculine and sufficiently widespread. And although studies of the idea of protection are rare within IR, there is enough work that has been done on its normative force, evolving meaning, and the growing range of performances tha t it regulates to merit consideration. Work on these different aspects of protection could be usefully combined to reveal an overarching process one through which scholars can study the gendering of the state that takes place at the systemic level. Over the last few decades, only a few feminist scholars have theorized protection as a masculinizing performance. Judith Stiehm (1982) and Iris Marion Young (2003) in particular, have offered important formulations of its logic and effects. 21 From these works protection emerges as a pervasive model of masculinity. Although they are not 21 See also Peterson 1992.
53 cast in the language of performativity, these works take performances that embody this ideal (i.e. the giving of protection) to be constitutive of relational identities that pr ivilege masculine subjects and subordinate feminine subjects. Stiehm focuses principally on protection at the hands of male dominated militaries, and her conceptualization of the protector and the protected remains mostly at the level of individuals (offic ials, soldiers, and so on). Her central argument is that men have reserved the role of protector for themselves, relegating women to the status of dependents a move that not only subordinates women but leaves them vulnerable to the dangers posed by masc uline (2003, 2) uses the same logic to characterize the security state as the protector and the citizenry as the protected. Importantly, she maintains that these roles are naturalized through their conne ction to the protector/protected relationship that defines the patriarchal household. In her words: An exposition of the gendered logic of the masculine role of protector in relation to women and children illuminates the meaning and effective appeal of a security state that wages war abroad and expects obedience and loyalty at home. In this patriarchal logic, the role of the masculine protector puts those protected, paradigmatically women and children, in a subordinate position of dependence and obedience To the extent that citizens of a democratic state allow their leaders to adopt a stance of protectors toward them, these citizens come to occupy a subordinate status like that of women in the patriarchal household. We are to accept a more authoritarian and paternalistic state power, which gets its support partly from the unity a threat produces and our gratitude for protection. The strength of both these models is that they allow for an analysis of protection that transverses conventional levels of ana lysis and highlights the variety of arenas in which protection is performed. Moreover, they capture performances that occur in myriad sites throughout the world, yet are united by a common logic. As Young claims, every state is at least partially a secur ity state, and the legitimacy it derives from performances
54 of protection can be explained by the fact that the same logic legitimates unequal relationships in the personal lives of men and women everywhere. In this formulation, protection does not have a ny essential meaning. In fact, both authors emphasize that the protection offered, while beneficial in specific instances, is a bad arrangement for the protected. Protection is, therefore, less about what is provided than it is about the effects of the p erformances undertaken in its name. This is evident today as states form policies for the protection of trafficked women. On that issue, protection may entail practices as divergent as temporary asylum, abolitionist policies towards sex work, educational campaigns, operations targeting transnational organized criminal networks, border control, and deportation. A significant effect of the performances, regardless of what forms they take, is the production of unequal, gendered identities in the form of pro tector and protected. 22 With protection stripped of its essentialized meaning, it follows that the identities of protector and protected do not describe accurately any traits possessed by the state or the citizens. Instead, the identities are relational, e stablished by the performances of protection even though they (2003, 13) the gendered meaning of the positions and the association of familial caring they carry Protec tion does not have an essential meaning, but it does have a political rationality, a plan that provides overall coherence to the various forms that protection (2000; 2006) work has sought to 22 Even when protection is rejected, the process is constitutive. For example, a woman who rejects the mes a
55 understan d this rationality, as well as the different meanings of protection and the technologies of governance that are guided by it T o accomplish this, he proposes studying protection at the point of application, namely within the field of security professional s. In so doing, he finds three etymologies of protection to be informing the technologies in use. His etymologies of protection serve as ideal types, and though Bigo fails to observe it, each gathers its meaning (at least partially) through a connection to gender. The first of these etymologies, tegere represents a non passive form of protection, one in which the protected both desires protection and maintains subj ect is grateful for the protection she/he receives. Within the other etymologies, praesidere and tutore the asymmetry is more pronounced. P raesidere invokes the guaranteeing of security and survival by someone else. This is a meaning of protection that is familiar to security scholars in IR, as it is often reflected in understandings of sovereignty, security, and borders. It is also the kind of protection that the military T utore is a form of protection that is carr ied out through profiling: monitoring and surveillance, the identification of risks, the obedience of the protected. The protector operates not out of obligation, as in tegere but out of love. Young, in observing the internal surveillance that character izes the protection offered by the security state, references implicitly this etymology of protection. It merits mention that each of these meanings that protection can acquire is dependent upon an asymmetric relationship between the protector and the pro tected. Among these, t egere characterizes those performances of protection that are the least constitutive of unequal relations
56 tegere appears also as the least relevant for the co ntemporary forms that protection he protected has difficulty overcoming the relation to regain voice and the capacity of acting politically (2006, 93). Bigo does not consider that the rationality of protection may be better understood deduce that rationality to be the reproduction of gendered identities through the unequal relations that produce th work explored how technologies of security, reflecting the different meanings that protection can take, establish gendered identities in the form of protector and protected, ld have a more complete picture of the systemic incentives that perpetuate these performances, as well as the identities that are at stake in the outcome. That such analysis would be worthwhile is underscored by the similarities between the meanings of protection that Bigo provides and the qualities reflected in the models of masculinity described by Charlotte Hooper (2001) The Judeo Christian ideal of masculinity, which centers on responsibility, ownership, and paternal authority, is featured prominen tly in protection when protection is performed as either praesidere or tutore The silencing of agency, the restriction on movement, the claiming of knowledge about threats that the protected does not possess when viewed in relation to dominant forms of masculinity, it is apparent that such performances establish not only asymmetric relations, but relations that are asymmetric because of their relations to gender norms. Additionally, the bourgeois rationalist model, recognizable as the
57 dominant model of tutore With gendered meaning to those performances of protection that occur through the profiling of risk. These similarities suggest that a newly hegemonic masculinity may be operating as the regulative ideal of security performances. Combining elements of earlier hegemonies, it appears not as a rupture in the symbolic structure of gendered meaning, bu t as a continuation of that structure. Reflecting its continuation with earlier dominant, then those wishing to examine the masculinizing performances of states can start with the assumption that states have strong motivation to perform security in ways that approximate this ideal. As performances of protection increasingly come to domina nt masculine ideal s must be taken into account. As chapter 6 will show, a rational protector model of masculinity is useful for understanding EU performances on the issue of sex trafficking. Before then, however, it is necessary to establish the applicab ility of the observations made here to the EU, the value of sex trafficking discourse for observing such performances, and the existence of feminized subjects
58 CHAPTER 3 PERFORMING THE EUROP EAN UNION Int roduction This chapter will focus on one particular subject that is being constituted through gendered performances: The European Union. Th ough th e EU is seldom viewed as a gendered entity, its identity is established nonetheless through performances that resonate with masculine and feminine norms. As the previous chapter suggested, a substantialist approach to identity can offer, at best, only a partial explanation of how the EU is becoming an actor. To account for more than the variable attributes of t he EU that is, to explain how the EU becomes an anthropomorphized entity in the first place more is needed. A process oriented approach is useful for that purpose. The previous chapter argued, too, that a process oriented approach can be of greater v alue assumes the constitutive role of gender. The usefulness of such an assumption about gender is two fold. In addition to orienting the researcher towards EU performa nces force of gender will be able to offer a framework for understanding how those performances embody and gender the EU. In other words, studying the EU through a ge nder lens suggests not only where to look, but also the significance of what one finds there. In sum, to understand how the EU establishes itself as an actor, it is helpful to do two things. First, one should develop a process oriented approach to studyi ng the EU
59 where it will be argued that the EU genders itself by per forming as a masculine protector within the issue area of trafficking in women. Before those performances are considered, the EU must be situated first within the process oriented framework that has been established. It is not automatically clear that th e processes of identity formation considered so far would apply to the EU. And if they do apply, it is not obvious how compatible they would be with existing research on the EU. The following sections address this matter by situating the process oriented approach within the field of European Integration Studies (EIS). They will demonstrate that while processual approaches flow outside of the mainstream of the field, they do not lie in uncharted territory. Existing studies that adopt an ontology of criti cal constructivism are quite compatible with them and, thus, with the research provided here. Furthermore, the operationalization of a constructivist ontology through the method of discourse analysis, as performed by some EIS scholars, suggests a useful w ay to bring a process oriented approach to the field. The Applicability of Statecraft to the European Union The process oriented approach implemented in this study has been derived largely from state centered scholarship. Many of the IR scholars who hav e been, and will be, considered here have focused on the processes of creating states, and on the particular kinds of states born from those processes. This point raises immediately some concern over typological error. Can theories of statecraft be appli ed to the EU? After all, regardless of how one categorizes the EU, very rarely is it called a state. If the conceptualizations of statecraft developed by IR scholars are to reveal anything about
60 the EU, it can be only because the EU undergoes a set of pr ocesses similar to those undergone by states. It is important to note that while most of the authors considered here are analyzing states, they are all, to varying degrees, redefining what a state is. James Caporaso does this by breaking down the concep t of the state into three stylized forms (the Westphalian state, the regulatory state, and the postmodern state) and arguing that the EU is a combination of each. One of these dimensions, the postmodern one, appears to be process oriented. Caporaso (1996 34) characterizes it as a form of lacking in clear spatial (geographical) as well as functional (issue area) lines of y be categorized as substantialist; that is, they define the EU as a thing with attributes both in line and out of line with those of states, traditionally understood. His claim, then, is that the EU is different things. This is a moderate and useful way of bringing a processual, state and it starts by complicating the concept of the state. Efforts like that are taken further by EU scholars like Jacqueline B erman and Elizabeth Prgl, who see the EU as a kind of international state, one that produces certain kinds of citizens (trafficking victims and women, respectively) and, in so doing, reproduces its own identity (as either integrated or patriarchal). Simi lar reconceptualizations of the state have been offered, outside the context of EIS, by scholars such as Patrick Jackson and Daniel Nexon, Cynthia Weber, and David Campbell. Though writing about states, each abandons the substantialist foundation that tie s the state to objective characteristics, like territory or an institutional
61 treating it not as an objective, prediscursive fact but as an intersubjectively generated eff ect. Given that reformulation, one can apply the approach to more than just states. Indeed, the work of these scholars cannot apply only to states, as the state has been detached from its positivist moorings. With the barriers between categories no long er absolute, one is left with an empirical question: Are similar processes of construction underway between states and the EU, and do they have similar effects? This project argues that the answer is yes on both counts. The EU, like any given state, is a n anthropomorphized and, thus, gendered entity, and it becomes so through performance. But regardless of whether the reader finds the evidence convincing, it is important to observe that the examination of the EU through process oriented theories of state craft is not rendered moot at the outset by any conceptual distinctions between the states and the EU. Indeed, a related set of conceptual distinctions has been problematized already in this study. In the previous chapter, it was shown that, in ways signi ficant for our understanding of identity, states and people come into being in much the same fashion. gh this marriage of process oriented theories, it could be explained how levels of analysis collapse on an intersubjective, and largely unacknowledged, level. As a result, states come to be seen as persons, they come to be seen as particular types of pers ons (masculine or feminine), and their agency, l egitimacy, and naturalness are a ffected. The collapse of the distinction can be explained by the existence of a shared process at the heart of
62 identity formation for both people and states: yoking. Yoking, which refers to the connection and rationalization of sites of difference to produce the appearance of substance, is necessary for the creation of both kinds of subjects. And subjects remain bounded and sustained only to the degree that they successfully recreate meaning around those sites of difference. While the term yoking is not found in the popular lexicon of IR what it describes is. The assignation of meaning to difference and, through that, the production of unity is a theme that has been around in IR for quite some time. Significantly, it has been used to make sense of identity formation not just of states, but of suprastate and nonstate entities. For example, Bradley Klein (1990 ), Roxanne Doty (1996), and Patrick Jackson (2003 ) have illustrate d the substantiation of like process of identity formation. The claim that process oriented theories, which have been developed in context of states, can be used to understand the identity forma tion of the EU is made credible by building measures similar to those used by states could comprise an effective strategy for establishing the EU as a political entity and e ndowing it with legitimacy and authority. Cris Shore (2000) identifies four sites where this has been attempted: the creation of new Europeanize higher education, and the representation of women. His research reveals a wide range of proposals that EU elites have offered the level of everyday life. Some of these, such as the European emblem and flag, have
63 been adopted. Other proposals have included the creation of European passports, stamps, birth certificates, holidays, and Europe focused university courses. Throughout these efforts, gender persists. It manifes building efforts in direct and indirect ways. At times, the EU acts directly upon women ficking, but also in more mundane cultural realms. An example of EU efforts in the latter is the Women of Europe Award, previous two years, has helped to increase European integration among the citizens of Shore, 2000 : 60). The winners represent the (2000, 61) describes Marit Paulsen, the 1996 winner, thusly: to figure whose birth and childhood symbolise reconciliation between nations divided by nationalism and war arguably the strongest, most enduring of the shared emotions that underlie popular pro Europeanism. She is also a transnational European worker who has taken up permanent residence in another member state; a farmer whose work experience symbolically traverses each of the major areas of common policy (fishing, iron ore and agriculture) that lie at the heart of the integration project, a champion of goo Even when the European Commission is not strategically targeting women, its identity building project may incorporate gender indirectly. For example, one may consider the which sought to uncover a more effective branding strategy for the EU. The recommendations of the report seem to rely upon a
64 55). 1 Efforts like those made by the European Commission seek to replicate the top down nation building ventures that political elites have been engaged in for centuries. This strategy has met, however, with mixed results. I t has not been as effective as its designers intended and the EU has fallen well short of attaining a prominent place in the minds of the public. Nonetheless, the adoption of such measures indicates an explicit recognition on the part of the EU that gende red performances matter, and a belief that they matter for the EU in much the same way as they do for states. Is There Room for Constructivism? To study the effectiveness of efforts like those described above, it is helpful to make a few assumptions. Firs t, one can adopt an ontology of social constructivism. Doing so would provide room to examine the constitutive power of ideas and representations. Second, one can posit the existence of a discursive structure, which provides specific articulations with m eaning and, thus, enables the audience to construct a shared understanding of reality. By mapping the structure of the relevant discourses, one could then explain what meaning specific articulations would have. To clarify these points, it may be useful t o apply them to the cultural measures described above. A constructivist ontology would allow that those policy proposals may serve to produce and reproduce the very body (first the European Community and now the 1 This feminine Europe, which the Commission is promoting for the purpose of ensuring that the EU is embraced by citizens of the Member States, will stand in stark contrast to the masculine Europe one finds in the realm of trafficking The re from the East.
65 European Union) that is understood to have authored them. And, as this chapter will later explain, they may do this in a somewhat indirect manner by producing and meaning in which Europe and the EU are embedded would suggest how the audience they are likely to have. So while a constructivist ontology would claim that representations matter and thus, symbolic performa nces can create Europe and the EU, a discursive approach would suggest what type of Europe and what type of EU they would create. Process oriented approaches fit well into this framework. They rest upon an ontology of social constructivism and can be oper ationalized by the study of discourse. Jackson and Nexon (1999) has not been adopted by scholars of European Integration Studies. To get an idea of where it would fit in the field, as well as what EU centere d research might look like if it adopted such an approach, one does best to look at the track record of social constructivism and discourse analysis in EIS. Thus, to gauge the potential of process oriented approaches to shape future contributions to the f ield, it is useful to first situate social constructivism and discourse analysis among other approaches that have tried to make sense of the EU. Social constructivism entered EIS in the 1990s, representing something of a paradigmatic transfusion from Inte rnational Relations. The so in IR had introduced a fresh set of ontological (and in some cases, epistemological)
66 orientated that program. B ut while the arrival of social constructivism is a recent development, it follows an established trend: since the end of World War II, theories of integration have reflected the evolution of their subject (Diez 2004). After decades criticism. As a result, the field opened more broadly to the normative concerns found in critical th eory ( Diez 2004 ). And as the political institutions became more firmly established, there was a shift toward approaching European integration through the models of Comparative Politics. Theories of multi level systems (e.g. Marks et. al. 1996) network g overnance (Jachtenfuchs 2001) and various brands of institutionalism proliferated, developing sophisticated research programs that have continued up to the present day. Additionally, new theories of how integration and governance could be conceptualized g ained prominence (Jachtenfuchs 2001) specifically built around sociological models of interaction. Because the advent of social constructivism marks a relatively new direction in s. Two of the most influential approaches, intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism, have been prominent since the early stages of integration. Intergovernmentalism, like its realist forbearer in IR, has acted as the centerpiece in debates over the meri ts and costs of rationalist theory. Its rationalist ontology and positivist epistemology have been decried frequently by those favoring a more sociological framework for explaining integration. Certainly, it has made itself an easy target. In its first incarnation, intergovernmentalism (Hoffman 1966) reduced integration to the output of the preference functions of member
67 states. Assuming the identities and interests of member states to be exogenous to interaction and stable over time, the integration pr ocess became one of strategic bargaining, driven solely by state interests and power. European institutions served as the instruments of states, designed for the pursuance of predefined interests and having no role in constraining the capacities of their creators. In the early 1990s, this model made a significant advancement with the evolution of liberal intergovernmentalism. While maintaining many of the core assumptions of (realist) intergovernmentalism, liberal intergovernmentalism adds, in the words of Frank Schimmelfennig (2004, 75) a much more sophisticated and rigorous theoretical underpinning refinement theory of state interests, liberal intergovernme ntalism endogenizes interest formation to within the member states. Domestic groups, which had little inclusion in the original policy goals. Once these goals are formula ted, the state centric model kicks in. Interstate bargaining is carried out among states who know what they want. The bargaining occurs through the European institutions they create, with no independent (or necessary) role for the domestic social groups on the international stage. Domestic social groups remain relevant players, however, as their interests may shift. Those shifts are reflected themselves in the shifting preference orderings of the member states. Liberal intergovernmentalism, then, embod a liberal theory of national preference formation and an intergovernmentalist analysis of interstate bargaining and institutional creation" (Moravscik 1993 480). It is a marriage that has enabled intergovernmentalism to achieve a hig h station within EIS.
68 A second rationalist approach to European integration, and one that was less cemented when social constructivism arrived, is neofunctionalism. Developed by Ernst Haas in the 1950s, neofunctionalism offered a prolonged challenge to in tergovernmentalism, particularly on the possibility of transformative change. Contrary to the rather static vision of integration offered by intergovernmentalism (where the same game of power politics continues among rational unitary actors), and free of the provides a theory of gradual transformation (Schmitter 2004). 2 The possibility of transformation is rooted in the different ontological assumptions that neofunctionalism makes about states. Contrary to the materialist ontology of intergovernmentalism, neofunctionalism theorizes states as deriving their interests from values (which can include a value for material interests). While these values are themselves a product of domestic contestation, they are subject to being reshaped in the course of interaction. of contention between neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism. As a resul t of the belief in the transformative effects of interaction, neofunctionalism grants considerably more stature to the role of organizations in the process of integration. Furthermore, its ling to cede more authority to more organizations as the decades unfolded: The coordination occurring on for further integration to resolve any tensions that arose from that process. Thus, after 2 It was indeed a theory, as efforts began in the 1970s to apply it to regional integration outside of the European context. This forced concessions to be made w original approach, to the degree that integration was no longer a given (Haas 2001).
69 setting the terms of the initial interaction, states found control of the process shifting incrementally towards regional organizations, which were better equipped to resolve the tensions among functionally interconnected p olicy areas. A wide spectrum of actors, led by those operating at the regional level, could be expected to shift their allegiances to the European level, resulting in an ever growing degree of Europeanization. Unlike the rival intergovernmentalism, neofun ctionalism gave prominence to the role of ideas and values and recognized the constraining power of European institutions. For these reasons alone, Haas (2001) has stated its compatibility with the school of constructivism Other forms of constructivism, as Haas rightly depiction of actors as pragmatic instrumentalists. Social constructivism, then, can be considered an approach to European integration only in a loose sense of the term. More accurately, it is a broad theoretical orientation, which, depending upon the assumptions of a particular scholar, will be more or less compatible with other approaches. It is best, then, to disaggregate the concept of social constructivism, as scholars in IR have done, so as to better distinguish among those theories that maintain a minimalist foundation, and those that maintain no foundation. Whichever way one parses it, though, constructivism cannot offer a theor y of European integration, as it makes no substantive claims about the process (Risse 2004). Constructivism does, however, offer a fairly consistent set of assumptions that can guide research in EIS. First, constructivism assumes a social ontology. In its simplest terms, a social ontology means that actors (whether humans or states) exist within an environment that shapes their identities and interests. This is in direct contrast to
70 approaches that rely upon methodological individualism, such as i nterg overnmentalism, which sees identities and interests as fixed prior to, or outside of, interaction. The next major assumption of constructivism builds from its social ontology. If the realm of social interaction shapes the identities and interests of acto rs, then it follows logically that rules and norms have more than a constraining effect. Thus, for many constructivists, rules and norms are assumed to regulate the behavior of the actors to a much greater degree than rationalist approaches would allow. At minimum, they help actors to determine what action is appropriate for a given situation ( March and Olsen 1998 ; Risse 2000). The significance of rules and norms may extend even further, however, to such a degree that they are constitutive of the actors involved (Onuf 1989; Kratochwil 1989). If that is the case, they define the actors. This idea is most evident, perhaps, in the norm of sovereignty. Not only does the norm of sovereignty regulate the behavior of states, but it is constitutive of statehoo d itself (Risse 2004 163). Finally, constructivism makes a third assumption in recognizing the mutual constitution of agents and structures. This move follows the development of structuration theory by Anthony Giddons (1984). Thomas Risse (2004, 161) e xplains: relevant social communities. At the same time, human agency creates, reproduces, an d changes culture through our daily practice. Thus, social constructivism occupies a sometimes uneasy ontological middleground between individualism and structuralism by claiming that there are properties of structures and of agents that cannot be coll apsed into each other. 3 3 See also Wendt 1988.
71 assumed by much Marxist theory). These assumptions can provide new ways of answering the common questions of integration studies and suggest new questions, as well. But while these three assumptions are present in most work t hat identifies itself as constructivist, there is disagreement over how much these assumptions matter and how they should be incorporated into the study of politics. The latter point is epistemological, and rests on the question of whether it is possible to create explanatory theories while recognizing constructivist insight is a valuable tool for bringing interpretation into the scientific enterprise (Adler 1997 328). And t hey believe that (political) science benefits greatly from that move. While explanation in the strict sense of the term, may be possible only through a positivist framework, it hits a wall when accounting for those elements of reality (such as interests) that are determined intersubjectively. Constructivism can help in such cases by unveiling how the actors themselves view their social environment. 4 The reasons may the n be incorporated into the explanatory model by being granted causal significance. For example, Jeffrey Checkel (1999) argues that the socialization characterize the E uropean integration process. Understanding how those actors view the relationships in which they are embedded can help researchers explain their behavior. 4 Verstehen
72 170 quoted in Hopf 1998 183), it embodies the hopes of many that it may serve as a way of reconciling the contradictory assumptions of positivism and reflectivism. 5 In this spirit, it has been termed a philosophically principled middle way" (Wendt 1999 a 2 ) ( Dessler 1989; Wendt 1992 ; Finnemore 1996; Adler 1997 ; Checkel 1998 ; Katzenstein 199 6) adds sociological insight to conventional ontologies while maintaining an epistemology that, while falling short of the aspirations of positivism, at least allows for a 6 Within EIS, this strand of constructivism has been represented in studies that cover a range of substantive issues, including the relationship between n ational mindsets and integration (Larsen 1997; Laursen 1997; Jachtenfuchs, Diez, and Jung 1998; Marcussen et al 2001) and new ways of conceptualizing European governance (Christiansen 1997; Jachtenfuchs 1997; Koslowski 2001). As mentioned above, the will ingness of these scholars to adopt a minimally confrontational approach to positivism has left their work fairly compatible with neofunctionalism. But their approach provides a deeper understanding of rovides a more careful consideration of how integration transforms the actors involved (Risse 2004 165). It is, in other words, better situated to study integration as a process Its ability to explain 5 What this study terms reflectivism is alterna tely referred to as post positivism, postmodernism, post structuralism, and (inaccurately) critical theory. Its use here, however, is distinguishable from how Robert Keohane (1988) used the term, as a blanket label for all non rationalist theory (includin g constructivism). 6 Typologies of constructivism grant this style a variety of names: naturalistic (Ruggie 1998), conventional (Hopf 1998; Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner 1998 ), modernist (Wendt 1999), and sociological ( Christiansen, J rgensen and Wiene r 1999 ) When it is referenced in this study the term conventional will be used.
73 change gives it an advantage over some other theori es, since assumes there is no fundamental change and comparativists assume that the fundamental change has already (Christiansen, J rgensen, and Wiener 1999 537 ). Critics like Steve Smith (2001, 191) see this version of con structivism as less of a middle way and more an extension of the rationalist paradigm. The more significance that one grants to ideas and interaction, and the more one chooses to focus on the process of identity construction (rather than what those identi ties do once they are constructed), the further away one gets from the mid level theorizing of conventional constructivism. According to some authors, the abandonment of the traces of positivism marks the boundary of constructivism (e.g. Hix 1998). Anyth ing beyond is termed constructivism. 7 Derian 1987; Ashley and Walker 1990; Connolly 1991; Shapiro 19 92; Campbell 1992; Walker 1995; Weber 1995; Doty 1996) draw attention to the constitution of meaning and identities, with special emphasis on the context of interaction, the role of representation, and the inherent instability of identities and categorizat ions. 8 Discourse and the Meaning of Performance It is within critical constructivism that process oriented theories, like that offered by Jackson and Nexon, belong. The ontological claims of critical constructivism make it a 7 This style, too, has been given a number of monikers: postmodernist (Adler 1997; Katzenstein Keohane and Krasner 1998; Ruggie 1998; Wendt 1999), Wittgensteinian ( Christian sen, Jorgensen and Wiener 1999 ) and critical (Hopf 1998). When it is referenced in this study, the term c ritical will be used. 8 The lineage of critical constructivism includes Derrida 1973; Foucault 1973; Barthes 1974; Hall 1980; Lyotard 1984.
74 necessary choice for studyin assume a minimal foundation, as conventional constructivism does, amounts to holding other construct through w hich bodies become intelligible) can play in the construction of the subject. On questions of identity formation, then, critical constructivism is invaluable. Alternatively, conventional constructivism may be useful for related or subsequent research que stions. If the identity of the EU has achieved a sufficient level of fixity, and if the researcher wishes to shift his or her focus onto the actions that the foundationali sm of conventional constructivism may be of good use. But on the question of substantiation it is less useful, assuming what first must be explained. (gendered) identity is formed, it requires content to become operational. That content, which can be described as discourse has been the subject of much feminist work gender norms give m hierarch ic and his identity is derived. And for Charlotte Hooper, whose work was shown to be important for understandi ng the relevance and meaning of protection, it is found within various ideal types of masculinity. Within EIS, there are a small number of scholars employing discursive approaches to examine discourses that affect integration. It is
75 through these discurs ive approaches that the ongoing construction process of the EU can be understood best. 9 Discursive approaches are comparatively new to EIS. They arrived alongside social constructivism and, to this day, maintain a rather unclear relationship to it. Li ke constructivism itself, discursive approaches do not meet commonly held criteria for (1999, 226) tivism a lack of substantive content. As a result, discursive approaches are best categorized as exactly that: approaches. 10 Some definitional clarity is needed, though, as the terms o minimize confusion, this study will use the term discursive approaches when referring to the theoretical orientation that discourse matters and that studying it is sometimes necessary for a more complete understanding of politics. That term is used here also to reference the group of scholars who study discourse and theorize its operation and effects. Discourse analysis on the other hand, denotes the method of mapping discourses. There is, naturally, a firm connection between theory and method in this matter, between discursive approaches and discourse analysis (Diez 2001 18). Any analysis of discourse is going to be strongly influenced by how the researcher believes 9 While m (2004, 213) suggests that discourse analysis is compatible with some work in intergovernmentalism, as well as in the l egal and co nstitutional debates within EIS It level governance Within IR, works employing discourse analysis (Cohn 1987; Doty 1996; Weber 1999; Weldes 1999; Skonieczny 2001; Hall 2003) ha ve branched across postmodernism, constructivism, feminism, and critical theory (Milliken 1999 remains with constructivism. 10 contrast, contains substantive content, by definition.
76 discourses function. And, of course, nobody is going to employ discourse analysis i f he or she does n o t believe that discourses are important for understanding or explaining some relevant political event. 11 Discursive approaches are joined by a shared understanding among practitioners of what, in its broadest sense, a discourse is. Bui lding principally upon the work of Michel Foucault (1973), Jacques Derrida (1978), and Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (2001), a discourse is commonly understood as a structure through which meaning is constituted and statements are regulated within a gi ven context. While it does not rise to the level of a theory, a discourse is nonetheless much more than a worldview or a series of representations. It is, in the words of Laclau and Mouffe (2001, 105) leveled system of m eaning in which texts, ideas, representations, and performances acting collectively as articulations exist in a web of relations. Through relations to each other, each discursive component derives its meaning. Outside of this web of relations, it los es that meaning (though it possibly gains a new meaning if it is incorporated into a new set of relations). Put simply, an movement from a non EU member state into an EU memb er state for work in the sex industry has little meaning as a social phenomenon in and of itself. But once this movement is linked with testimonials of rape and descriptions of deception, then the seeds of a discourse have been planted: specifically, a di scourse of trafficking as violence against women. Alternately, the same event work in the sex industry can be connected to another set of actions, such as 11 Ole Wver makes a similar distinction (2004: 197).
77 cost/benefit calculations and harassment by the police. If tha t occurs, then the structure of meaning established will make trafficking understandable as migration instead of violence. The discourse into which the established set of relations grows in this example, trafficking as violence or trafficking as migrati on will be a product of the repetition of the necessity of the relations among its components (rather than, say, a product of its inherent logic) (Foucault 1973). The performances of the EU, or any particular political body, may be understood in this w ay. They are articulations that make sense only because of the structure of meaning into which they are born. Therefore, through the study of discursive structures, performances can be understood as articulations, and the meanings afforded to them can be to claim, however, that the reality cannot be understood and addressed without being implanted first into a relational field of differences, thus limiting its meaning to a specific thing. Laclau and Mouffe explain: "The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has nothing to do with whether there is a world external to thought, or with the realism/idealism opposition...What is denied is not that suc h objects exist externally to thought, but the rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside any discursive condition of emergence" (2001 108 ; emphasis in original). Despite some level of inertia, all discourses are inherently unstable and subject to change. That is because discourses, while limiting the range of meanings an articulation can assume, cannot close off that range completely. There is always a surplus of meaning, a number of alternative meanings that a n articulation can have
78 ( Laclau and Mouffe 2001, 113). All discourses exist contingently, open ended and exposed to the possibility of change by the surplus of meaning they cannot contain. And thus, discourses are always shifting and evolving. Even arti culations that further fix the meaning of a discourse transform it to some small degree (Diez 2001 26). broadly, the discursive economy as a whole. 12 To say this another wa y: The yoking process is never final or absolute, and it is threatened and undermined at all times by its inability to fix meaning once and for all. It is possible, then, to change a discourse by re establishing the meaning and relations within it through articulatory practice (Laclau and Mouffe 2001 111). To explanation of how a discourse becomes partially fixed in the first place. They use the term nodal points to describe th discourse by restricting the range of relationships that the components of a discourse can have with each other. Nodal points create a temporary center to the discourse, organizing the components in to a set of relations that gives the discourse coherence. 13 Additionally, the connections each discourse forms to outside discourses are important for establishing its partial fixity. In the early stages of discourse formation, such linkages are particular ly important, as the necessity of the relations within the discourse 12 Others have termed this the play of practice by Foucault (1978/1990, 6 8 9) in reference to all that determines the composition of discourses, 13 This does n ot happen randomly but reflects the power to regulate the dispersal of representations. That power provides an actor with the ability to stabilize (or destabilize) the meaning of events.
79 internal coherence. Metanarrative: The First Level of Discourse Through discourse, meaning is giv en not only to the performance, but to the performer, as well. That is why political thinking is rife with gendered states and not just gendered performances the entity itself is given (gendered) identity through the meaning afforded its behaviors. Thi s idea, that performances make the performer, is consistent with the ontology of critical constructivism and suggests the advantage of starting with an analysis of process, rather than the assumption of substance. But to understand the meaning that is giv en to the EU, as a performer, it is necessary to study its performances within a given discourse. Some discourses center around the question of EU identity itself: what the EU is and what the EU should be. But more often, the EU is not acting with explic it reference to its identity; rather, it is (re)producing its identity exists as the deep structure, or meta narrative, of the discourse. A meta narrative is the broade st set of assumptions that is shared by the discourses on a given issue. When The meta narrative has strong influence over what can be said sensibly about an issue. For that reason, a far range of issues, seemingly unrelated, can be, on a deeper level, very much about Following the insight of much construct ivist scholarship, it is logical to assume that the most basic boundary line that gives meaning to the EU is that which exists
80 explicit political boundaries that separa te EU members from non EU members. The creation of a common market, a zone of unrestricted travel, and an EU wide area of the body of the EU onto the body of its members It follows that to understand how the EU is performatively constituted, one should look at how EU performances (re)create these divisions. Again, this entails more than the study of those discourses that are explicitly about EU identity only; it entail s the study of specific issue areas that may not, on the surface, appear to be about EU identity at all. The meaning given to the performances in those areas may be rooted in a deeper set of representations (a meta narrative) and thus play a significant r ole in the (re)production of EU identity. Sex trafficking is just such an issue area and an examination of it reveals a meta narrative that exists along these lines. Before turning to the issue of sex trafficking, two further theoretical adjustments are necessary to operationalize a study of European identity formation. First, for reasons that will be explained in considerable depth in result is a set of identity relations t hat consists of EU member/would be EU member/non EU member Second, there are two closely related sets of identity relations that structure discourses in ways that have implications for EU identity formation. They are national/almost national/non nationa l and E uropean/almost European/non European Certainly, these three triads of identity relations are not identical. But rarely can the meaning of any one of them be understood without consideration of the others. The meaning each takes, as well as the r elationship among them, is itself discursively produced and maintained. It is achieved through articulations
81 that fix their differences. Together, they form a chain of signifiers, empty of any pre discursive meaning and reliant upon each other to sustain a partial fixity within any given discourse. In this study, these three triads will be considered as one whenever possible, and described often in the short hand of European/almost European/non European There are two reasons for doing so. First, collap sing them serves the interest of conciseness. So long as they are unpacked when necessary, their synthesis within the discourses studied here should not pose any significant theoretical problems. After all, it is not to claim that European, EU, and natio nal identities are the same, only that they are mutually constitutive as the structuring assumptions of some discourses. For example, the identity of a Nigerian migrant living in Germany might be classified as non European, non citizen of the EU, and non German; however, to a considerable and growing extent, that is but one thing. In that instance, each of those categories is deriving meaning from another, with any ultimate meaning indefinitely postponed. Given that, the arguments made in subsequent chap ters will be clearer if one set of terms is used predominately. A second reason for collapsing the three triads is that, while some precision may be lost in doing so, more problems arise in keeping them separate. No small amount of controversy surrounds the precise relations among them and, unfortunately, an answer to that puzzle is beyond the scope of this study. The nature of the relations between national identity and European identity has proven particularly elusive. Opinion is split on whether the se identities are nested, cross cutting, or separate; how researchers can reliably measure them; and whether they even matter for broader questions of
82 integration. 14 From a discursive perspective, the difficulty in pinning down the relationship is no surpri signifiers undergoing constant effort s to fix their meaning s The tenacity of these terms is their ability to mean different things in different contexts. They have a very different relationshi p within, say, a discourse of economic management than they have within a discourse on European drug policy. EU member European many contexts, especially those related to enlargement, the terms are used (2004, 76) explains: The EU, having striven for recognition, is now a powerful part of normative and cognitive structures in co ntemporary Europe. It is deeply embedded in political, social, and economic discourse in Europe. This has been achieved notwithstanding the reified nature of the nation state as a social construction. Identity building has been fostered by membership, t he external projection of an cement provided by the founding values and the addition of EU symbols to Indeed, the Treaty of the European Union states, as one of its few explicit requirements Within the discourses on sex trafficking, trafficking efforts are evidence of this, as is the ability of the EU to produce a seemingly endless number of articulations describing sex 14 For an ambitious and interdisciplinary effort to tackle these questions, see Herrmann, Risse, and Brewer 2004.
83 These articulations take many forms, from the grand (anti trafficking Conventions) to the mundane (interagency m emos and Expert Group reports). Within discursive approaches, such conflations have been useful. Indeed, it is through recognition of the interplay between these categories that discursive approaches within EIS have made impressive strides. For the resea rcher focused on 83). This requires a fair amount of attention to the formation of European and non European iden tities, 15 how they achieve (temporarily) stable meanings, the sites within the political realm at which they do so, and the effects they enable once they are established. The result of this line of inquiry is an increase in leverage for addressing several core questions that surround the integration process. One of these questions is how European governance is legitimized. Markus Jachtenfuchs, Thomas Diez, and Sabine Jung (1998) approached this question, examining how the identity and normative orientatio ns of actors in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom have shaped EU integration to fit what each believes a legitimate EU polity should look like. Others have explored the discursive construction of Europe in order to explain how it has enabled one typ e of foreign policy and not French political culture have regulated its foreign policies with other states on the topic 15 In rare cases, they have considered the role of almost European identities (see Neummann, 1999 and Rytkonen 2002).
84 of integration. Iver Neumann (2001) has done similar work on Norway. 16 Finally, for many of those employing a discursive approach, the construction of Europe is assumed to occur through the establishment of a dichotomous relationship with an o ther (Derrida 1992; Neumann 1996; Strth 2000). 17 Notably, that o the r may take the form of a threat. In a study quite compatible with this one, Ben Rosamond (2001 168 ) deconstructs 1. the re cognition of a particular problem, challenge or threat; 2. the perception of the need and/or right for there to be European level solutions (as opposed to separate national level strategies) and/or for the existing European level governance structure to under go change to address the problem; and 3. the emergence of a consensus about a particular conception of a regional space in the minds of key actors. This simple, three step process identified by Rosamond illustrates nicely the necessity and advantage of recogn izing the interplay between sets of signifiers. National identity, Their relationshi p is summarized in Figure 3 1 Conclusion To summarize, discourses allow the observer to understand how specific performances produce specific identities. A study of discourse can operationalize the process oriented approach discussed in the previous chap ter by bringing to light a web of meaning through which performances will be read. The (re)production of the EU as a 16 For a more thorough discussion of scholars whose work uses discourse analysis to explain foreign policy, see Wver 2004, 205 207. 17 F or a challenge to th is idea, see Habermas 1992.
85 subject can be studied in this way, through its performances within the discourses on specific issues. And if gender is accounted for, it will be found that these performances receive their full meaning only in connection to gender norms. The result is that, for the EU, as for all subjects, subjecthood and gender come as one package. Since discursive approaches are, by themselves, witho ut substantive content, an performances on its identity, can be observed. For that purpose, the issue of sex trafficking provides a useful case study. The chapters that follow will examine how discourses of sex trafficking coalesce, how they link to specific policies of protection, and how all of this produces the EU as a gendered political entity. It is to that task that the effort now turns. Figure 3 1 The d iscu rsive u niverse of s ex t raffickin g in Europe: t he m etanarrative
86 CHAPTER 4 SEX TRAFFICKING IN E UROPE In the debate over sex trafficking, one can observe both the performative nature of the E uropean U nion process. This makes it a useful issue through which to study the methods of identity construction discussed so far. But it is also more than that. There is something about sex trafficking that makes it a particularly fertile site for identity politics. As with other issues that incite moral panics, what is said about sex trafficking and about those involved in it seems to run much deeper than the issue itself. This chapter, along with chapter five, offers some explanations for why that is the case. Sp ecifically, it argues that sex trafficking lies at the nexus of a number of salient issues for (supra)state identity building, specifically gender politics, immigration, and fears of the o ther. Or to put it another way, sex trafficking is understood throu gh discourses that are readily translatable into other discourses that are, themselves, structured by questions of European identity. The close connection between sex trafficking and other hot issues in identity politics makes it useful for the purposes o f EU identity building. The issue carries with it a reservoir of representations that the EU can draw upon to create and legitimize itself as an actor. If one wishes to explore the convergence of performativity, gender, and identity, one would find few b etter realms. Sex trafficking, then, functions as a privileged site in the discursive production of the EU. Within that site, the EU is constructed through a self perpetuating cycle. First, the EU, in concert with other actors, gives meaning and differ ential status to the women European space where EU policies may be applied. Those policies rely upon a rational
87 protector model of masculinity, which establishes the EU a s a masculine protector. As such, it is granted legitimacy in providing meaning and differential status to the women and men involved in the practice, thus beginning the cycle again. The remainder of this study is dedicated to unraveling this complicated and mutually constituting relationship between the EU, sex trafficking, and the women and men involved. This chapter serves that end by outlining the discursive structure of the sex trafficking issue and by revealing that its constitutive power relies in large degree upon its connection with salient representations from related issues. Sex Trafficking : The Second Level of Discourse To understand how sex trafficking operates as a discourse through which gendered subjects, including the EU, are created, it is helpful to build upon the structure outlined in chapter three. Currently, there are two discourses that, together, comprise the discursive universe of th e issue: sex trafficking as violence against women and sex trafficking as migration ( see Figure 4 1 ). 1 These discourses are multi level; they are, however, most coherently fixed (and thus decipherable) on the second level. 2 For sex nodal points of the competing disc ourses. Each centers the meaning of sex trafficking, organizing the relations of the components to a degree that makes it possible to understand what the issue is. Each competing discourse may be thought of as a discourses, taken together, account for most of 1 It is from these two discourses that t he dominant debates over prostitution and trafficking described in chapter one are derived. 2 The portrayal of disc ourses through a multi level chart was done before on a different issue by Ulla Holm (1997).
88 Europe will tend to occur within the parameters of the discursive structures portrayed in Figure 4 1. That is not t o say that it is impossible to articulate the issue from a point outside. Indeed, that is precisely what is required to change the composition of the discursive universe. But the totalized quality of discourses means that it is difficult to do so and tha t such articulations are unlikely to resonate with the audience. There are two immediate implications of this. First, it will be difficult for a person who understands sex trafficking through one discourse (say, as violence against women) to learn from the articulation of somebody who understands sex trafficking through the other discourse (as migration). Second, and more pronounced, it would be difficult for either of those people to learn from the articulations of somebody who understands sex traffick ing through discourses outside of the framework. Those articulations would not fit within the patterns of meaning provided by either of the discourses and, as a result, would be hard to incorporate into either structure. Nonetheless, it is important to e monopoly, and not a complete one, over the meaning of trafficking. The experience of a woman, who, through either of the two discourses, is brought into the debate ove r trafficking, contains elements that have meaning beyond the reach of each individual discourse, and perhaps beyond the reach of the discursive universe presented here. The two sex trafficking discourses, while inherently unstable, have their instabil ity compounded by two interrelated factors. First, the two discourses on sex trafficking share a high degree of translatability meaning that there is high possibility for an actor to make sense of an articulation from a different discursive position" ( D iez 2001, 26)
89 Many elements of sex trafficking that are understood within a migration discourse can be understood easily through a violence discourse, and vice versa. When a news report describes how a female sex worker was forced to turn over most of t he money she had earned to her controlling pimp (e.g. Synovitz 2005 ), this may be interpreted as either economic violence or as a typical part of the migration experience (it is likely to be decried, either way). The translatability of events like this ca n be explained by the lack of concrete meaning held by frequently invoked floating signifiers within the trafficking debates. Floating signifiers are those elements that have not been fixed within a discourse, and thus can be articulated outside of a sing le discursive chain (Laclau and Mouffe 2001 113). Within much to be attached exclusively to violence or exclusively to migration. In fact, the negotiations over the definition of trafficking to be included in the U nited N ations Protocol on Trafficking in Human Beings featured an explicit debate over what, exactly, Those who viewed trafficking within the violence discourse (represented by the umbrella organization International Human Rights Network ) argued that exploitation i s the movement of women into the sex industry, as the sex industry, it was argued, is built u pon sexual violence. A competing bloc, represented by the Human Rights Caucus and claiming that much of what is understood as trafficking is in which the migrant was separated from the act of migration itself. The result of the struggle over the
90 upon definition of the decision on what constitutes exploitation to the discretion of the signatory states wou ld continue to float. The implication of this example for a discursive approach to sex trafficking is that a fair amount of interplay between the two discourses may be expected. Many events will find meaning simultaneously in both discourses. Disco urses of sex trafficking are translatable not only to each other, but to structures outside of the discursive universe, as well. A brief genealogy of the dominant sex trafficking discourse, which frames trafficking as violence against women, bears out thi s claim. The trafficking as violence discourse which has left a longer paper trail, connects most clearly to the human rights discourse of the mid 1990s. A key wider and more intense response from the European Parliament (which made the connection explicit in two resolutions it passed in 1993 and 1994) (Locher 2007). Because trafficking could be translated into a discourse on human rights, it was able to assume a meaning that demanded action. Those at the forefront of the anti trafficking efforts found even m ore success following the Fourth World Conference on Human metanarrative that lent conceptual clarity to trafficking by fixing its meaning around broad and powerful 2;
91 Locher 2007). 3 rights language only further solidified the coherence that trafficking achieved from being linked to both. Because o metanarrative, trafficking could be understood through reference to the same partially fixed signifiers that centered the discourse on, for example, domestic abuse. Their translatability was enhanced by a s hared metanarrative. This represents the second reason that there is a large amount of interplay between the two discourses of sex trafficking: their shared metanarrative. The competing discourses on sex trafficking give meaning to the term by att aching discourses outside the issue. Though the process is the same within each discourse, the resultant meanings that sex trafficking attain differ. This observati on is important for understanding the contours of the debate over sex trafficking. Equally important, however, are the similarities between the different meanings of sex trafficking. Indeed, all meanings that it receives share a common denominator: Europ ean identity. They are built upon, and constrained by, partial fixations of European, almost European, and non European identity. 4 These fixations constitute the deep structure, or metanarrative 3 portrayed in Figure 4 1 for two reasons. First, that niverse of sex trafficking. Second, the point of this study is to shed light upon, among other things, the reliance of all te its relative absence in this study, serves nonetheless as a reminder that a discursive universe is not self contained, but remains perpetually open to, and is thus subverted by, connections it cannot contain. 4 As explained in chapter three, European id entity is increasingly appropriated by the EU through the Europeanization of sex trafficking policies ensures that national differences are spoken for in terms of European identity, within this issue.
92 of the discourses. They represent the broadest set of assu mptions that is shared by the discourses and as such, determine their conceptual limits. Symbiotically, those identities that structure the meaning of sex trafficking European, almost European, and non European rely upon the issue to serve as a pr there is a two way relationship between the metanarrative of European identity and the meanings of sex trafficking. Sex trafficking discourses limit the potential meanings of Europe and allow the concept to achieve some level of coherence. Sometimes these articulations on European identity are a part of the purposeful strategies of actors. Appeals to European identity can be an effective way to rouse sentiment and generat e action on an issue. This has been a fairly common occurrence within the European E uropean P arliament 1997, q uoted in Locher 2007, 285 ). Other times, the discourse on European identity acts silently as a structuring mechanism limiting the range of the debates over trafficking. As from Sex T rafficking as a S ite of European I dentity F ormation European identity can be expected to serve as a metanarrative for a number of issues. In that regard, sex trafficking is not unique. On any given day, there are myriad reasons that account for why sex trafficking is not just another issue built upon a
93 difference of identities but is, instead, an extraordinarily productive site for European identity formation. T hese are the discursive connections that sex trafficking has with women, with migrants, and with a vaguely defined foreign o ther. Each of these is potentially destabilizing of European identity and while, at first glance, each may seem to constitute a dis tinct threat, it is, in the end, impossible to separate them They form a chain of signifiers, women migrants o thers that represents an unresolved (and unresolvable) threat to European identity. Like all chains of signifiers, this one chases its tail, s o that those involved in sex trafficking can be understood only by oscillating That women would be the center of such productive discourse is no surprise. Feminist research has taught us to pay attention to the unique role that women play in the establishment of collective identities. A growing number of scholars have taken notice of the tendency for women to act (and be acted on) as reproducers of national difference. Nira Yuval Davis and Floya Anthias (1989) discuss fiv e such ways this occurs: through women serving as biological reproducers of the nation, reproducers of normative boundaries between groups, transmitters of culture, participants in the 5 This last role is the most applicable to the case considered here, and it reveals that it is not unusual for a threat centered on women to be linked to threats posed by migrants and o thers. Tamar Mayer (2000, 10) alist tropes, notes, o ther there emerges a profound distinction not only between us and them but also more pointedly, between our women 5 See also Nagel 1998.
94 and theirs. in the self/other dichotomy (cited in Neumann 1999, 4 5). Their group differences (or purported differences) are taken as indicatory of national differences. Whether these beliefs are empirically valid or not, they serve to constitut e national identity all the same. Within the social movements literature, similar dynamics have been observed. It is well established that gender sweeps into identity movements, even ones that are not focused on women. Verta Taylor (1999, 23) for examp le, has written on the effectiveness of gender symbolism in mobilizing collective action. In many cases, the (Nagel 1998, 255 6). Increased recognition of this process m ay be reflected in the number of works that employ it as a theme (Enloe 1989; Ahmed 1992; Hoganson 1998; Kapur 2002). From this body of work, one learns that it is crucial to pay attention to how ther women are represented. Such representations revea l efforts by nations to (re)establish their own collective identities. It is telling, then, that so many representations of ther women, including many of those that describe sex trafficking, occur within a narrative of victimhood. Chandra Mohanty (199 1) calls attention to this phenomenon in her article, implicit goal of such representation s has been not to uncover the contextual forces that A homogenous notion of the oppressi on of women as a group is assumed, which,
95 world woman leads an essentially truncated life based on her feminine gender uneducated, tradition bound, domestic, family oriented, victimized, etc.). This, I suggest, is in contrast to the (implicit) self representation of Western women as educated, as modern, as having control over their own bodies and s exualities, and the freedom to make their own decisions (56). Third world women figure strongly in trafficking discourses, particularly through like brothel, the lured or deceived female victim, an prominence is explained more by the repetition they enjoy as articulations than by any objective truth they rev eal about sex trafficking. After all, brothels employ many European prostitutes. Moreover, captivity is not a state of being that is unique to third world women. Nandita Sharma (2005, 65) criticizes such rhetoric for falsely freedom as diametrically opposed states of existence, with the former characterizing non Europeans and the latter characterizing Europeans. One quote from a Ukrainian woman exemplifies how these captivity narratives are used to establish the image of the women and get away with it? Sometimes I sit here and ask myself if that really victim narrative is in the headli ( Specter 1998 Karpacheva 1 998 ). Another common way in which innocence is established is through an emphasis (2000, 644) go es so far as to suggest that poverty leads to a psychological condition with loss of self which, in turn, leads to a loss of
96 agency. The net effect is that the sex worker is rec ast as a victim of trafficking an innocent girl, powerless, stripped of agency and in need of rescue. As an effect, the European (non migrant) prostitute is constituted uniquely as a subject capable of making rational, free choices. These examples ill applied to women are key mechanisms for the (re)constitution of o thers. Those o thers are not just the women who have victimhood written upon them, but the collective identities for whom their bo been easier to recognize how the construction of European identity can occur through the debates over sex trafficking. Articulations on sex trafficking provide a particular understanding of so Europe itself. This is possible because both sex trafficking discourses provide symbolically rich subject positions for non European sex workers. Attempts to fix the identities of such worker s serve inevitably to fix the meaning of European almost European and non European Taking this logic further, sex trafficking can be understood as an issue that is about not only women, but sex, too. Therefore, the ways in which it is represented have implications for the sexual organization of European societies. The consumption of the services provided by sex workers, whether they are willing providers or not, affects not only patterns of relations among men and women, but the spatial and tempor al ordering of sexuality in the city, as well. Given that, the presence of immigrant sex workers alone Europe has experienced. But add to that the dilemma of Europe an depopulation,
97 expressed in the pronatalist policies that states are adopting to encourage procreative (rather than strictly recreational ) sex, and sex trafficking becomes an issue of serious consequence to the future of Europe. Much of the impetus for the current moral panic surrounding trafficked women can be attributed to the large scale migration of Eastern women into EU countries. This, too, is a case of old wine in new bottles: The nineteenth century campaigns against the White Slave Trade were l argely reflecting racialized fears of immigration. The speed with which the current trafficking narratives have proliferated suggest that (Grittner 1990, 120), brought on t o a significant extent by the increased presence of migrants. Those who are women, migrants, and sex workers become a symbolically significant site for the re inscription of boundaries, for the yoking that is necessary for the production of political subj ecthood. This explains the recent commotion in Germany news surfaced that, a few years earlier, thousands of visa applications were approved by the German consulate i n Kiev without the requisite background checks. Opposition parties hammered the government while stories ran in the German press with headlines Country Invaded by East European Prostitutes brought about by Ukrain requirements for EU citizens. In this case, lax visa procedures on the part of Germany and other western E uropean countries every year
98 Moral panics, and the boundary crises they reflect, often result not from new people, but from new norms, especially of the sexual variety. According to Grittner (1990, 66) that tendency accounted for the paranoia surrou nding the White Slave Trade in nineteenth century Europe, as well as early twentieth century United States. rved to differentiate sexuality that was safe and appropriate from that which was dangerous and inappropriate. Over the last twenty years, new norms towards prostitution have developed, reflected in its growing normalization. 6 Certainly, this is less sign ificant a change in sexual norms than that experienced in nineteenth century Europe, but it likely accounts for some of the intensity of the current anti trafficking campaigns. And it partly explains why migrant sex workers are assumed to be victims withi and more as entrepreneurs, and as the victimization of sex work itself is less assumed, then there are fewer women for state bodies to protect or to rescue. The incentives to generate a discourse centered on the victimization of migrant sex workers increases. Conclusion Articulations made within the current discourses of trafficking will draw inevitably upon European identity. To some degree, t his reliance of sex trafficking upon European identity reflects the power of the inside/outside logic of political communities. It is, after all, very difficult to speak of international issues without (re)producing, and thus 6 Of course, there has been a counter mobilization against the normalization of sex work, evident most e towards the practice. This stance, however, was taken largely as a response to the sex trafficking discourse, which is itself a response to changing sexual norms. As such, it antedates the growing acceptance of sex work throughout Europe.
99 essentializing, differences b etween self and o ther. But, as this chapter has sought to demonstrate, sex trafficking is more than that. Because of its attachment to migration (those who have come) and o thers (those who may come), it is an issue that draws heavily from the identity di stinctions that comprise its metanarrative. Because of its attachment to women and sexuality, which are themselves important symbolic media for the representation of differences between collective identities, articulations within the discourses are more l ikely to have an effect. And because the woman migrant o ther chain links to other discourses that signify a threat to European identity, there is an incessant demand to know more, to say more, and to act decisively in short, to perform. The EU has res ponded to this call for performance, producing a mountain of research aimed at uncovering the truth about sex trafficking. In so doing, it has engaged in a process of self reification that better establishes itself as an actor and Europe as a domain for i ts actions. Chapter six will show how some of its performances have helped constitute it as a masculine actor. Before that, however, it is useful to look with more depth at how sex trafficking establishes specific identities. Chapter five does this in t wo ways. First, it complicates the self/other orientation common to research on identity by introducing the concept of the liminal That allows for a more accurate understanding of the discursive positioning of the subjects created through sex traffickin g discourse s Second, it focuses on the parallel construction of Ukraine and Ukrainian sex workers to show how their representation is productive of Europe and how that representation demands masculine performances from the EU
100 Figure 4 1 The d is cursive u niverse of s ex t rafficking in Europe : t wo l evels
101 CHAPTER 5 UKRAINE AND THE ROLE OF LIMINALITY Introduction In Kievan Russia there was a term for those nomads who settled on the borderlands of Russian territory, became agriculturalists, and in al liance with Russian princes took part in campaigns against their own nomadic kin: they were pogany pogany pogany (Lotman 1990, 137). A useful, yet unrecognized way to study the identity formation of political bodies is through the concept of liminality. The application of this concept compliments and expands the study of identity carried out thus far. The previous chapter portrayed a number of subject positions that have been carved out within sex trafficking discourse. It argued that those positions are filled not only by women, but by the collective identities for which women are proxies. Those positions can be underst ood using the conventional s elf/ o ther dichotomy that has been prevalent in feminist and constructivist work on identity. 1 Within sex trafficking discourse, the story was shown to be much the same, with a dichotomy of agent/victim forming on the individual level and Europe/East on the collective level. Yet, that characterization, while useful, is incomplete. The binary differentiation of those identities, while a necessary part of the process, is unnecessarily restrictive in the European context. While t he repeated contrast between the Western sex worker and the Eastern sex slave is useful for the construction of Europe, there is a complimentary dynamic driving the creation of a European zone vis vis the East. That dynamic centers around the ambiguous identities that exist between th o se binaries identities 1 See chapter two for more discussion of such work.
102 that fall between s elf and o ther. These ambiguous identities are captured by the concept of liminality. Referring to the paradoxical state of belonging simultaneously to two seemingly mutually exc lusive orders, liminality is a concept that has been underappreciated by IR scholars, even those writing about the discursive construction of the nation through the dichotomous establishment of a self and an other. Challenging this neglect, the argument h ere will frame liminality as a central component in the constitutive process that occurs through sex trafficking discourse. This chapter, then, is about the production of liminal identities within sex trafficking discourse. The study of liminal identities is useful for understanding the gendered production of the E uropean U nion for several reasons. First, it reveals the kind of representations that are most salient for collective identity building: representations of liminality. Second, it observes a par adox at the heart of the yoking process; specifically, that the incomplete drawing of boundaries through discourse can be more useful than a completed process. Third, the case study offered here describes the creation of Europe as a knowable space of rule The creation of European space is crucial for the EU. Such space generates the demand for EU performance and serves as an are n a in which EU performances will be self referencing. The liminality of the subjects in whose name it performs ensures that ce rtain kind s of performances will be prevalent performances that are protection oriented. Within the realm of sex trafficking, protection oriented performances can be expected to have a masculinizing effect. To build the argument that liminal identities are useful for the performative production of the EU, the research here draws upon the writings of Anne Norton. Norton offers a template for understanding the role that liminality plays in the
103 construction of collective identity. Her template will be app lied to the parallel stories of two actors who have privileged roles in the process of European identity formation: Ukraine and migrant Ukrainian sex workers. Both will be discussed as liminal figures existing simultaneously within and outside the idea of Europe. Their prominent position in the sex trafficking discourse serves a useful function. Through the representations of them, and the performance of policies aimed at their regulation, a European space is concurrently demanded and constituted. This function assumes greater importance when one considers the position of Europe today. Indeed, it may be said that Europe needs its pagans more than ever. Cold War world. Traditional geopolitical markers now mean less, too. Many of the countries of the Near Abroad are positioning themselves for potential EU membership, and in so doing, coming to re changes it is becoming even harder to say with any certainty where Europe ends and not Europe begins. Where one would expect to find the traditional indicators of such a bound ary different economic systems, political allegiances, or geographical features a sphere of activity in which its operation as a political ac tor is naturalized. The ability of the EU to create a European space will depend to a significant extent upon the degree to which it is recognized as acting on behalf of a common people who face common threats In keeping with the constructivist framewor k of this project, it is paramount then to map where and how these common
104 people, and the common threats they face, are being established. And so the attention turns to the ambiguous boundaries of Europe. Liminality and Collective Identity The questions surrounding the relations between Europe and its East reveal an entrenched ambiguity: Should Ukraine soon be granted membership into the EU? How far should NATO expand? Should Europe embrace Russia, or is the latter destined to return to its czarist past? For the establishment collective identities, this ambiguity serves a purpose. It represents much more than the failure to demarcate clearly the boundaries of competing political orders. Rather, when one explores this ambiguity, one finds that it create s, reproduces, and reflects the meaning of the political orders that it, at first glance, appears to complicate. It indicates a paradox, and those actors who lie at the heart of this ambiguity are similarly paradoxical. How their paradoxical existence tr anslates into collective identity formation is the subject of this section. The concept of liminality and its function in the social order has been popularized by the anthropological work of Victor Turner (1969, 94 130). He conceives of it as a phase in th e rites of passage of all cultural groups. Subjects undergoing a transition to a higher social position pass through the liminal stage on the way to reaching their new, ascribed status. While passing through this phase, their characteristics are ambiguou s they have been separated from their stable, earlier status and they have yet to take on the characteristics appropriate to their coming state. Temporarily, they exist outside (95). They appear sexless and anonymous, wearing no markings of status or identity. They are submissive, silent, and often humiliated by the community. The intended
105 that they may be molded into their new role (103). Turner infers from his observations of this process that the existence of liminal figures is important for the construction of the social group itself. The social group consists of a b alance between structure and hierarchy on the one hand, community and non differentiation on the other. These two liminal, a period during which formal rules and statuses of the group become intertwined with the egalitarian social bond that they usually subsume. During the liminal phase, that social bond, which in another context could be threatening to the hierarchical structure of the group, is expressed and contained t hrough ritual. The result is the mutual constitution of both models: the social bond is affirmed through a process of establishing status for a subject, and status is given meaning and legitimacy through a phase characterized by non differentiation. Turne Anne Norton has written about the special role of liminars in the constructi on of national identity. I n her book, Reflections on Political Identity she offers a concise, useful desc (1988, 53). For Norton, as for Turner, liminars pl ay a privileged role in the construction of collective identities. However, they do so in ways different than Turner imagined. Whereas Turner defined the liminar as a transitory figure awaiting a future status that is clear and assured, Norton presents t he liminar as a constantly ambiguous being. Like a fish without scales (to which she compares it), the liminal figure is not passing through a transitory stage; it simply exists
106 in contradiction. For the social groups, which are, in her study, nations, i ts anomalous coding is too useful to be resolved. She posits multiple species of liminars, three of which receive extended consideration. In each case, the liminar is recognized as bearing traits that simultaneously mark it as similar to, and different f rom, the nation. Territorial liminars are those who live on the geographic boundaries of the nation. Norton considers the archetype of the territorial liminal to be the frontiersman: fiercely independent, beyond the reach of the law, yet willing to sacri fice for the nation. Intellectual liminars reject the sacred doctrines of the state. Those who fall into this category include madmen, traitors, reformers, and bohemians. Structural liminars are mic, social, and political (74). Among these Norton counts women, the poor, and ethnic minorities. The three species ( and sub species) of liminality are not exclusive; often, the liminality of a group will be derived from several sources. For exa mple, it is not uncommon for the territorially liminal (those living in the hinterlands) to be ethnically liminal as well (marked with traits of a competing nationality). Significantly, each of these liminars is marked by the presence of contradictory tra its. Each bears the markings of competing orders and, as a result, signifies too much to be incorporated wholly into any of the competing a subject marked by the a bsence of all identifying traits. suggests that the liminal stage in rites of passage provides the opportunity for the community to temporarily subsume its hierarchic al organization and nourish the egalitarian social bond lying at the heart of the community. Likewise, Norton believes
107 that the central importance of the liminal stems from their role in the formation of a collective ( national ) identity. But the opportun ity provided by the liminar is one of reflection not, as Turner believes, one of structural inversion. T heir constitutive role results from the mere acknowledgment of their existence (which is the recognition of their in between status) by the non liminal members of the nation. In this regard, t the same time, the difference between the two leads to reflection among the masses, recognition of what unites them, and ultimately, the founding of the nation (57). In recognizing the liminar, then, the nation is establishing a triadic relationship: co nsciously differentiating between itself, an object of likeness (the liminar) and an object of difference (the other) (54). This is the constitutive moment for the nation born as Norton observes, out of contradiction. This process requires an act of ab straction on the part of the masses. In their recognition of the liminal, they are deciding upon those (54). Such a decision, occurring at a high degree of abstraction, is not only the foundational moment for the nation, but for the legitimacy of the ruling regime. Norton (53) explains: The recognition of qualities that distinguish the polity from all others entails the propagation of abstract principles against which the conduct of the regime and co nstitution of the nation may henceforth be measured. The qualities definitive of the nation are abstracted from it and made objective. The citizens, having before them an objective principle of nationality, may thereafter determine whether the regime, or the regime's actions, are appropriate to the nation. This is the beginning of legitimac y. It is not, however, the final form that legitimacy takes. The initial act of abstraction, which produces the ideal image of the nation, results in the alienation o f the people from
108 the nation. This alienation is destined to grow as the state becomes increasingly formal and rational a process that lengthens the distance between the phenomenal and subjective experience of the nation and the ideal, objectified natio n (54). In the latter, legitimacy finds its home, as it is there that the definitive characteristics of the nation have been posited. Where this leads (though it is not explored by Norton) is clear: The legitimacy of state action becomes separated from i ts effects upon lived experience and unaccountable to those upon whom it impinges. Instead, legitimacy is achieved through observance of the liminal is ongoing, invoking a constant appraisal and redefinition of the s elf. Thus, the frequent reassertion, and periodic renegotiation, of boundaries is to be expected. This is the template that Norton provides. It is useful in foregrounding the role that liminality plays in th e constitution of the nation. And it suggests a way that legitimacy follows from the constitutive act. By amending this template, much of the insight it provides can be applied to the subject of this study. Three modifications, in particular, are requir level of analysis than the one employed here. While she focuses primarily upon groups within a nation, this chapter will discuss different constellations of actors. Europe, however i t is defined, does not constitute a nation; thus, the liminars discussed in this chapter (Ukraine and Ukrainian migrant sex workers) are not constituted as the liminars of a nation, but of a larger and (usually) less salient collective identity: European. survive this change of context. Identity formation should proceed along the same lines
109 in regards to supranational identities, though one might expect the process to be l ess intense and complete. Second, Norton does not consider in any depth the role of the state in the the state in guiding the process of identity formation. Yet, if t he state gains and maintains legitimacy through reference to the ideal traits of the nation and the state is in a privileged position of authorship in the representation of the traits that mark the l iminal, the o ther, and the self then the state is in a p osition to discursively reproduce itself. Any actual discrepancies between what it represents as the nation and what s ability to articulate the characteristics of the East, the qualities of the European, and the mark of the liminal, within that issue area, afford it the privilege of self authorship. the possibility that specific representations of s elf, l iminar, and o ther may go beyond constituting the nation; they may themselves confer power upon the state. They do this by first masculinizing the state, discursively, and then demanding the exercise of power that such masculinity legitimizes. For example, if the o ther is constituted as feminine, and the liminal is recognized as androgynous, then not only is it likely that the s elf will be constituted as masculine, but that masculine behavior (such as the protection of Wendy Brown (1995) has argued, confer prerogative power (and with it, legitimacy) upon the state. It would have authority to act because it is masculine. Thus, the act of
110 constitution, occurring through representation, is not enough to draw conclusions about the future subject hood of the state. The identities themselves, and their gender, must be considered first. The trajectory Norton posits from recogn ition of the liminar to the establishment of a legitimate, naturalized, state may be too direct. But by amending between the representation of the liminal and the crea tion of embodied actors can be traced. A Note on Case Selection The remainder of this chapter is dedicated to applying the ideas of th e previous section to two actors who figure prominently in the sex trafficking debate: Ukraine and migrant Ukra inian sex workers. It is worth discussing briefly why this chapter focuses on these two actors. The attention given here to Ukraine is not intended to suggest that ambigu frontier of Europe. Countries like Ukraine, Moldova, Russia, and Turkey all enjoy, or have enjoyed, liminal European status in varying degrees at various times. They shift from Eur opean, to almost European, to not European as the need arises and new discourses are established. But such fluid possibilities for each country do not necessarily exist within a given discourse. Rather, a single discourse may constitute one country as ut terly European and another country as entirely non European. The cumulative effect of multiple discourses (that is, the ultimate relation of one of these countries to Europe) may not be so clear. So to argue that Ukraine is a liminal figure is not to pre clude other countries from holding that status.
111 that of most other countries. Of course, each of the countries mentioned above are well represented in this discourse. Th ey are not, however, represented in the same way. Consider Turkey. Certainly, it maintains a liminal European status, and does so through many of the same representations that establish Ukraine as a liminal actor. Several of the characteristics and proc esses described below characteristics and are found also in EU Turkish relations: the inscription of territorial liminality, the schizophrenic allegiances produced by internal political divisions, the maintenance of temporal liminality through promises of future membership. The effect may be the same, as well: the establishment of European identity through the simultaneous reflection and contradiction of it. Similarly, one finds some parallels betwee n these two countries within sex trafficking discourse. Like Ukraine, Turkey is viewed as a major transit and destination country for trafficked women (U.S. State Department 2007). Also, it is claimed that some of the dominant images of the sex trafficki ng narrative specifically, the kidnapping of white women have their origins in Turkey. been occasionally considered a partially European country, it has more often been de picted as an outright non European body. Iver Neumann (1999, 39), arguing precisely this the European state system. He continues, drawing upon the observations of Hedl ey
112 sides that the European powers and Turkey possessed any common interests or e were no common institutions, such as united the European powers, in whose working they co European understandin gs of Turkey in the mid 19 th century. Neumann (1999, 55 63) mentions that this designation elevated Turkey to liminal status by suggesting that it could become European if only Moreover, Turkey became less valuable as an other (and thus, less clearly represented as one) in the early 20 th century. This was due to two events: the emergence of modernizing trends within the country and the emergence of the Soviet Union as a more significant foil for European identity. Ultimately, Neum that current representations are built upon past ones, and that the most powerful representations from the past have portrayed Turkey as other. Among the most prominent of these past representat ions that echo into the present day are the religious membership into the EU often reference this point (and when religion and culture are not discussed, they are often as history, one is left to conclude that Turkey has been more forcefully represented as non European than as quasi European.
113 With in current sex trafficking discourse, Turkish women do not appear as quasi European, either. That it is to say, Turkish women do not appear as a liminal group. In fact, Turkish women do not appear much at all. Their invisibility accounts for their exclu sion from the analysis in this chapter. Ultimately, the argument here is built upon the representations of women. Since Turkish women are not a part of the discourse, it may be presumed that the discourse does not provide them with a role in constructing Europe or the EU. The empirics suggest why they are absent: Turkey is not a source country. 2 And while one must be careful when citing any figures on the nationalities of trafficking victims, competing sources suggest that there are not large numbers of Turkish women being trafficked into Europe. The US State Department (whose methodology is not reported) does not categorize Turkey as a source country (U.S. State Department 2007). Such categorization is supported by a 2002 report for the International O rganization for Migration (Laczko et. al. 2002). Gathering data from NGOs that assist trafficking victims, the authors of the report provide a breakdown by nationality of trafficking victims in multiple countries and regions. For the years reported, Turk ish women did not represent a significant percentage of victims in Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Italy, Kosovo, or Bosnia Herzegovina. 3 For Ukrainian sex workers, the situation is quite different. They appear as a significant group wit Belgium. But it is not their presence in these charts that makes them a useful group to 2 It is recognized that the empirical evidence of sex trafficking is itself a constitutive part of the discourse on sex trafficking and a reflection of it. They are not offered here with the intention of suggesting a bsolute conclusions about the scope or nature of sex trafficking. 3 the size of which varies considerably across the reports.
114 study. Rather, it is their presence in the stories told about sex trafficking that is revealing. D amounting to more than 16% of trafficked women assisted within any country. Yet, they appear with great regularity in the stories told about trafficked women. When trafficking is desc ribed through the story of a nave young girl who mistakenly put her trust in traffickers who promised her a better life in Europe, that girl is often Ukrainian. The frequency with which the story of a young Ukrainian girl is reported (examples of which w ill be discussed later) would suggest a much greater presence of Ukrainian migrants workers in the discourse may be explained by any number of variables. For instance, the large Ukrainian ex patriot community may be more effective at producing and disseminating information about their ethnic kin than other ex patriot communities. This information would include, of course, the phenomenon of sex trafficking. Alternativel y, those writing the stories may be more likely to speak Ukrainian (or Russian) than the languages of victims belonging to other nationalities. If so, they would be better able to gather some basic facts from Ukrainian victims than from, for example, Nige rian migrants, who, even though they appear to represent the largest group of trafficked women in Italy, come from a country that is, in parts, even more linguistically foreign to Europeans than Ukraine. Or, Ukrainian victims may receive more press becaus e it is recognized by the authors that the stories they write will have a greater relevance and impact if the girl is from a country that the audience has heard of and can locate on a map. For this reason, Moldovan girls may garner less attention and empa thy than Ukrainian girls. 4 For academic writings focusing on Ukrainian women, a partial 4 If this is the case, then the liminality of the country itself would be a factor accounting for the production
115 explanation may lie in the research partnerships Western academics have formed with studies of sex trafficking (Hughes 2000; Hughes and Denisova 2002 ) Certainly, the reason behind the overrepresentation of Ukrainian women matters for questions of intentionality, but in regards to identity formation, the effect is the same: The represent Due the overrepresentation of Ukrainian women, the choice to focus on them is justifiable. This project is a study of discourse and Ukrainian women are the most prominent f igures in that discourse. Beyond that reason, focusing on Ukraine and Ukrainian women is useful for two other reasons. First, it allows this chapter to explore how the relationship between these two actors Ukraine and its migrant sex workers sustains the representation of migrant Ukrainian sex workers just as, complementarily, the liminality of these migrant women is assured by those discourses asserting the liminal sta reinforcing. And it is easy to see how their mutual reinforcing statuses can manifest nces, either implicitly or explicitly, the poor state of the Ukrainian economy and its inability to provide opportunities for women. This iteration makes the prospect of Ukrainian membership in the EU increasingly undesirable. 5 Reversing this situation, o ne finds the same process occurring. Because Ukraine is continually represented as not quite of liminal representations of its women. 5 More accurately, it makes postponement of Ukrainian membership in the EU increasingly desirable. Given the liminal status of Ukraine reinforced by this discourse, future membership should seem quite plausible, if not inevitable.
116 European, the obligation of the EU to migrant Ukrainian sex workers remains low. Simply removing the not quite Europeans from Europe becomes an efficient solutio n. Either way, the EU is more clearly delineated. The second purpose served by an emphasis on Ukraine and Ukrainian women is that it allows the analysis here to build upon feminist theories of gendered state building. These theories have explored the way s in which political bodies are built upon of Eastern sex workers conjured through the prism of sex trafficking discourse ha ve had constitutive effects for European wom en and, by extension, for Europe itself. Here, through a focus on a marginalized state and the marginalized women of that state, that argument can be extended further. A more specific identity for Ukraine, built upon more specific representations of its migrant women, can be posited as evidence in support of the framework established by those feminist theorists. This chapter turns now to the discourse surrounding these two groups of liminal actors. Exploring their liminality offers clues to how the mean ing of Europe is made. In particular, two species of liminality have played roles in defining Europe: territorial and dimensions have changed and new sites for these repr esentations have developed. The result remains the same: the liminality of Eastern bodies serves as a mirror for understandings of European identity. The net effect of these representations is to create subjects that enable the EU to act as a masculine p rotector and demand that it does so
117 Europe and Ukraine migration problems (Malynovska 2006). The title reflects a commonly held conception of Ukraine. But what gives peop along which Ukraine has been represented as in between regions two species of liminality that grant Ukraine a significant role in European identity formation. These species are territorial and temporal. The argument of this section builds on the work of Iver Neumann. In his book Neumann (1999) descri bes the constancy with which Europe has defined itself by differentiating itself from its neighbors (others) to the East. In his estimate, no country has played this part better than Russia. Neumann (67) finds indications as far back as the fifteenth and 6 The eighteenth century saw Russia portrayed as a well behaved barbarian on the path of self civilization (74 78). In the nineteenth century, Neumann (95 96) reports on repr civi 102). Weaving 6 ffers from that which informs the arguments of this chapter.
118 R ussia, in each of its many discursive incarnations, has been granted a crucial ambiguity in its relation to Europe. Rather than being represented as precisely non being European, it has always fallen just short of that status. Neumann (110) observes: year history of always just having been tamed, civil, civilized; just having begun to participate in European politics; just h aving become part of Europe away, inscribing varying degrees of Europeanness upon it. The aim from the standpoint of European identity, is not the reconciliation of these contradictory This may be due to the conflation of Russia and Ukraine (both real and imagined) case selection. Regardl ess, it is hard to deny that Ukraine has played a liminal role. Even more so than Russia, Ukraine has been a key battleground in debates over liminality is more consisten t. This is apparent within the dominant discourse on sex trafficking, in which sex trafficking is understood as violence against women. It is networks they establish to tra ffic women defy not only European order, but the sovereign state system itself. Even beyond sex trafficking discourse, whatever liminal
119 status Russia enjoys disappears when Ukraine is inserted into the discourse of European identity. Within the triadic r elationship Russia quickly assumes the status of other, the non leaning Ukraine from the north and the east. Territorial Liminality ituate itself within the region particularly fuzzy historian Andrew Wilson (2000, 285) t of open contention. According to Wilson (285) laces Ukraine in Central Europe At times, this belief is expressed quite literally: Western oriented Ukrainians often claim that the geographic center of Europe is found in the Zakarpattia region, in Southwestern European identity that Wilson (285) national idea Central Europeans, on the other hand, have tended to hold a less certain Mitteleuropa at the turn of the nineteenth century. A century later, parts of Ukraine (up to the river Dnieper) were seen as Mitteleuropis h but the rest was relegated to Hintereuropea When debates over the idea of Central Europe rekindled in the 1980s, Ukraine, still a Soviet Socialist Republic at that time, was markedly absent. Its absence from these debates
120 Eastern neighbors (Neumann 1999, 158). 7 The 1990s found Ukraine no less isolated. Czech president Vaclav Havel st Atlantic region Thus unable to return to a Central Europe of which it was never clearly a part, Ukraine has since been l eft the onerous task of redefining itself as a Central European country ( Wilson 2000, 287 8). Yushchenko. Yushchenko realizes that these efforts complement his hard, ongoing consistently seek integration into European institutions and will do it as soon as (Itar Tass 2007). cou speak in one voice The wording of these comments is notable, as i t suggests that EU membership for Ukraine would unify already a European country. Other pro European politicians have followed the same strategy of disc ursively writing Ukraine into Europe through statements of a similar style. simple. There will just never be a Europe without Ukraine. Without Ukraine there will be on ly a half Europe boldface in original ). 7 into NATO and the EU (Wilson 2000, 287).
121 has pulled the latter away from the idea of Europe, leaving it to be categorized as a hybrid, Eurasian entity. While this tendency was most marked during the lifespan of the Soviet Union, it persisted in the years following Ukrainian independence. A 1993 debate in the pages of Foreign Affairs reveals the difficulty the West has had in reading Ukraine. In that debate, Steven Miller and John Mearsheimer wrestled with the question of what Ukraine should do with the nuclear stockpile it inherited after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Miller (1993) Russia and, thus, could not be trusted to successfully manage a nuclear arsenal. His article offers several revealing excerpts: "Far from being geo graphically distant and highly independent, Ukraine and Russia are neighboring states with borders still described by some in Moscow as administrative ; and they are deeply interdependent, economically and culturally deterrence will not work well when dealing with ambiguous borders or disputed territories a point that may be highly relevant to Russian Ukrainian relations Ukraine may be, in the manner of the two Germanies, particularly vulnerable to espionage, gi ven that Russia and Ukraine share both the Russian language and Slavic back grounds, while millions of people with Russian ancestry reside with in 74). As these excerpts suggest, Miller portrays Ukraine as a country that is not fully independent. More precisely, it is not fully differentiated from Russia (which is represented, not surprisingly, as a non Western, potentially antagonistic actor). 8 This 8 Yet, despite its quasi sovereign status, Ukraine is, according to Miller (1993, 78), a European state. This paradox is not (indeed, cannot ) be resolved.
122 rendering of Ukraine has proven to be more than a temporary effect that lingered thr ough the disruption of the Cold War symbolic order. The perceived lack of differentiation between Ukraine and Russia has continued in the years since its particularly among Americans, but not just Americans ception of Russia: to think of it, to some extent, as a seamless continuity, even if it is a separate identity Such perceptions persist even after the historic elections of Wilson 2000, 283 284). One way to eff proximity to Russia. Using its territorial liminality as an asset, former Ukrainian ed in Wilson 2000, 284). This image of Ukraine as a buffer, perhaps even as a defender, against the Russian hordes defines it as a frontier European nation. Interestingly, this is the very representation offered by John Mearsheimer (1993) in his counterp Foreign Affairs article. According to between Russia and Germany (a function that could be served only if Ukraine retained nuclear weapons). If they stick, s
123 integrationist desires. As Norton (1988, 61) observes, the territorial liminar, as the establish the nationality of the frontiersmen, and their liminal status that is, their significance as the line defining the state prompt those nearest is zealous ly claimed because of what he signifies: Incorporation into a foreign body. Due to this ever present possibility, the liminal figure on the territorial fringes of the political order provide that order with the opportunity to extend itself, if it so desir es. 9 In the case of Ukraine, the values of the European order may be exercised to rescue the country on the frontier (and, symbolically, Europe itself) from conquest and incorporation into the other. Of course, there is no consensus within Ukraine tha t the country should play divisions within the Ukrainian population. Indeed, Ukrainians seem to be having just as hese divisions are reflected in In 2005, thirty two percent of exports went to countries within the European Union; thirty one percent went to Russia and other former Sov iet republics (Bellaby 2005). Within the Ukrainian parliament, leftist parties have staunchly opposed a Europeanized Ukraine. In 2007, they refused to back the pro Western diplomat Volodymyr Ohryzko e on Defense Minister Anatoliy Hrytsenko, an advocate of speedy accession into NATO (UkraineJournal.com 2007) 9 Norton assumes that the nation always desires to extend i tself. This reason for this assumption is unclear. Accordingly, the assumption is not incorporated into the argument of this chapter.
124 e support for that same position today. Pan (east) Slavism remains a very powerful force, evident in the protests in Kiev that broke out during a summit covering the issues of EU and NATO. Opposition to NATO membership is so entrenched that the pro Europ ean faction of the government earmarked five million hryvni from the 2007 budget for campaigns to raise Even alternative conceptions of the link between geography and identity tend to a good example (Wver 2000). He proposes an understanding of European order as consisting of concentric circles (see Figure 7 1 ). The innermost circle signifies dire ct rule and is, not surprisingly, centered on Brussels. Moving from the center outwards, one moves from areas of dominion to areas of hegemony to independent states. He explan ation of European relations after the Cold War. The alternative, Euro skeptic conception of Europe (or fragmentation scenario) conceives of European order as characterized by four eccentric circles representing Russian, German, French, and Anglo Saxon sph eres (see Figure 7 2 ). In both of these scenarios, Ukraine is bisected under European hegemony, while the rest of the country is imagined as independent of Europe an order. In the fragmentation scenario, Ukraine is crisscrossed by Russian, German, and independent orders. These illustrations speak volumes: In two competing
125 visions of Europe, Ukraine is unclassifiable, belonging simultaneously to different categoric al spheres. Temporal Liminality Ukraine Cooperation Council stated that, although th e topic was not to be discussed at (Mineyev 2007). There is no shortage of statements on the part of Europe reaffirming the European orientation of Ukraine, but they are tempered in suc h a way as to suggest that Ukraine is just (Kyiv Post 2005). Through such an emphasis on the future, these st atements present Ukraine as a country in a perpetual state of transition. Not only is it spatially liminal to Europe, occupying the frontier of Europe, but it is temporally liminal as well. With every passing year, it remains chronologically almost Europ ean. 10 While the EU continues to promote the European orientation of Ukraine through vague assurances, it is clear that Ukraine will maintain its ambiguous status for some Ukra ine goals through which it can achieve EU membership, suggesting that perhaps 10 Neumann (1999, 10) observed similar representations of Russia in the five years following the dissolution of the Sovi et Union.
126 indicators. In place of EU membership, the two parties continue to work within the European Neighbo urhood Policy, the broad framework through which action plans are negotiated. (Reflecting its privileged status among the liminars, Ukraine has been at policy framework (quoted in Cole 2007 .) Expecte secondary status that the Neighbourhood Policy implies. Roman Shpek has voiced his same way as non European countries. (European Report 2007). how the temporally liminal identity of Ukrain e and other Eastern countries, as well can serve directly to strengthen the EU. According to Wver (2000, 262 3) the magination of Eastern countries and it will demand that Europe actually integrates (most visibly through a healthy Franco German partnership). However, the appearance of progression is difficult to maintain. It requires a balancing act: not expanding too fast while not slowing down too much. Progression is a temporal concept that, in this case, is destabilizing if it comes too fast and deadly if it stops altogether. Wver argues that this balancing act is achieved through membership promises offered by the EU to its Eastern neighbors. He (263) explains: T he EU policy which reflects the basic concentric circles pattern is to avoid
127 towards the East is not to draw a line between those who are European and potential members and those who are not. With the possibility of drawing on the classical uncertainty about the Eastern boundary of Europe, the EU manages to place nobody as non European but everybody as more or less Eur opean, more or less close to the centre (of Europe and of Europeanness). Applicants are layered, the long queue is mostly to spur more efforts to advance. And as the fir st group (and they start to be more fully structured by the disciplining mechanism), and term If the East is in always advancing towards Europe, what is it moving away from? that presently constitutes Europe as an integrated, secure body. Ukraine, caught between this past and an integrated, E uropean future, may be said to occupy a position of temporal liminality. the Near Abroad countries in the maintenance of liminality for the purpose of the grants itself a future through an Eastward projection of its past (quoted in Larrabee 2005). Those lobbyin g for Ukrainian ascension promote this representation because of the teleological path it implies for Ukraine: If countries to the East are on the path toward Europeanization, then Ukraine is next in line. Of non EU countries, it is the closest to the pre sent. This image reveals itself in a theme put forward by those who wish to see a fully European Ukraine: A historically European c ountry Ukraine lost its way but is now ready to rejoin its ancestral kin. Oleh Zarubinskyi (2005), a Ukrainian
128 MP, express ed this sentiment a few years ago at an ongoing roundtable series titled 11 K yiv Rus was one of the most developed countries in Europe over 1000 years ago. One of the ancient trade routes crossed the territory of Ukraine. state in terms of geography, history, and culture. Now it is time Ukraine regained its place in Europe in terms of developed institutions of democracy and political system (emphasis added). Brzezinski (2005) citing too the central role of Kyivan Rus in early Europe, draws from it European trajectory, and that is all status. Clear articulations, in the form of historical representations and cultural sentiment, merge with performance, in the form of EU Action Plans and Neighborh ood Policies, to construct a peculiar relationship between Europe and Ukraine. While nonetheless kept at arms length. Territorially and temporally, Ukraine defies clas sification, understood as belonging to competing political orders (Europe and non framework, the significance of its liminality is made clear. By having a country that is just beyond Europe, just beyond the full reach of European values, and just behind Europe in its maturity, what it means to be European is better defined. This solidifies e ongoing 11
129 enhanced also through a more direct consequence. The continuous discussio ns with a liminal identity of future membership in the EU grant the EU desirability. Undoubtedly, Ukraine will desire the EU so long as its liminal status continues. Membership in the EU d future. So long as this desire is ongoing, the EU is able to script a past and a future of its own to complement its (blurry) territorial boundary line. Europe and Its Pagans The migrant sex workers who are working in Europe serve much the same function for the EU. Territorially and temporally, they too are liminal figures. Like many migrant groups, their status is ambiguous. The ambiguity provides for the effective enunciation of what it means to be European, and what it means to not be. In this way the migrant women who operate within it. This section explores the discourse that constitutes their liminality and, thus, establishes th at lel discourse is deciphered from a range of representations, including popular depictions, academic writings, and government policies. Together, these myriad factors constitute the migrant sex worker as a liminal European figure, straddling the line betwe en European and non European. Much like the previous section, the analysis offered here is applicable to a population broader than that which is targeted. Not only do Ukrainian sex workers occupy liminal positions, but so sex workers of other nationalit ies, and so do migrant workers in general. Ukrainian sex workers, then, are a subset of other liminal groups. Ukraine, it was argued, is a paradigmatic case of the liminality written upon states par excell ence that best demonstrates
130 the use of the ambiguous boundary for the construction of a European identity. Likewise, Ukrainian migrant sex workers are the paradigmatic case of how the sex trafficking discourse is similarly implicated in the construction o f collective identity. Thus, Ukrainian sex workers are a particularly valuable group to study. Exploring how meaning is made of them can reveal much about the constitutive effects of sex trafficking discourse and the importance of their identities for es tablishing that of the EU. The clarity of the Ukrainian migrant sex worker as a non European appears as a result of her overrepresentation in the discourse. Her frequent presence in the one to expect that many more Ukrainian sex workers are in Europe than the best sources indicate. According to the IOM study cited earlier, Ukrainian women have been found usually to represent between 5% and 15% of women assisted by governments and NGOs. From 2000 2005, the IOM assisted about 2,500 Ukrainian trafficking victims. However, many of these were not sex related: In 2005, for example, 40% of the 446 victims aided by the IOM and subsequently repatriated to Ukraine were trafficked to work in othe r industries (Laczko et. al. 2002). 12 While comprehensive, reliable statistics do not exist, it seems safe to conclude from these numbers that Ukrainian sex workers represent a relevant, but by no means pronounced or dominant, percentage of the sex workers in Europe. 13 Yet, their appearance in the stories about trafficked sex workers is much more 12 This statistic, coupled with the lack of stories being told about the Ukrainians who comprise that 40%, suggests the high degree to which westward migration i nto Europe has been sexualized. 13 According to the national coordinator for the anti trafficking organization, LaStrada Ukraine, Ukrainian women comprise the largest group of women who seek to be rescued from forced sexual activity. This report, from the mid 1990s, would seem to conflict with the rather unremarkable presence of Ukrainian women suggested by the later IOM report. If accurate, however, it would provide a possible explanation for why the stories Ukrainian women are so prevalent ( Jarosewich 199 8).
131 pronounced. As discussed earlier in this chapter, there may be multiple explanations for why Ukrainian women appear so often. Regardless of the reason, the reitera tion of establishes her as the paradigmatic migrant sex worker. She is, among migrant sex workers, perhaps the most significant counterposing figure in the constitution of the European woman (and, by extension, the constitution of Europe itself). Few scholars of sex work have approached the subject of the sex industries prostitution, trafficking, pornography, sex tourism with a perspective that recognizes the limin ality of sex workers. Usually, when the connections between sex workers and collective identities are theorized, the sex worker is understood as the other the abject body against which the self (whether state, city, or society) defines itself. If the w ords Hubbard 1999). One notable exception to th at tendency is the work of Chris Ryan and C. Michael Hall In their book, Sex Tourism: Marginal People and Liminalitie s (2001) they conceptualize prostitution as a thoroughly liminal process. Their understanding of (the tourist) and seller (the sex worker) perform liminal roles, with the important difference being that the seller is stigmatized by her engagement in the ritual while the buyer is not. During the transaction, the tourist and the sex worker are between 1969, 95). Because of their in between status, these liminal figures appear ambiguous in their relation to the established order. Indeed, their role is defined by the sanctioned allowed for engagement in
132 socially accepted and approved activities which seem to deny or ignore the legitimacy of the institutionalized statuses, roles, norms, ordinary life l explore this disruption, and the ambiguity that results for those who partake in it, along its territorial and temporal dimensions. The first of these dimensions reveals the liminality of sex workers in Europe, broadly understood. The second underscore s the pronounced role of Ukrainian migrants in th e process. Territorial L iminality What kinds of spaces characterize sex work, and how significant are those spaces in constituting sex workers as liminal figures? To answer these questions, scholars must st ep onto the turf of political geography. From studies in that field, it quickly becomes clear that sex workers occupy the ritualistic space of the other. There is often as this section argues, any disjunction is rendered ambiguous by the incorporation of these ensure easy and frequent access to these spaces, as well as the melding of t heir economies into the broader economy of the city. When these and other normalizing forces are considered, such spaces are rendered ambiguous in their relation to the normal spaces from which they have been banished. It follows that sex workers who inh Philip Hubbard (1999) provides a useful starting point for understanding the triadic relationship between the spaces of sex workers, the spaces of normality, and the collective identi ty that results. His book, Sex and the City: Geographies of Prostitution in the Urban West offers an extended treatment of the reciprocal relationship between
133 sexuality and space. How a society represents, perceives, and understands sex shapes the geogr aphic organization of the city (Hubbard 1999, 35). Moral orders are mapped onto specific sites, creating zones in which varying sexualities are granted different levels of appropriateness. In this way, beliefs and norms regarding sexuality lend meaning t o the spaces of the city. The causal arrow may be reversed, as well: geography is a grid upon which sexual order is established and understood. Urban spaces make concrete all social processes that occur within the city, sexuality included. As a result, func tion of sex workers, then, it is necessary to understand the urban spaces that shape, and are shaped, by them. The legitimacy of the dominant moral order depends upon the spatial organization of competing sexualities. It is no surprise, therefore, tha t sex workers (and their clients) would be situated in spaces marked by otherness. Th at has been the case throughout European history. In medieval times, prostitutes were seen as polluting bodies and thus spatially marginalized into certain districts. O ften, th o se districts were outside the city. By removing prostitutes from the spaces of respectability, the city was symbolically purifying itself, purging a perceived contaminant to the dominant moral order. While this process re affirmed the boundaries of proper sexual comportment, it also had the effect of reproducing the status of the sex worker by relocating her to areas that were themselves socially, economically, and politically marginal ( Hubbard 1999, 68). In more
134 recent times, the red light dist rict has served the same function. 14 Hubbard (170) interprets the establishment of the red light district as the discursive creation of an immoral landscape psychically and physically distanced from the purified and ordered spaces of the suburb Like the expulsion of prostitutes, the establishment of the red light district gives meaning to the city and to its others through a strategy of spatial dislocation. But it adds a d istinctively modern twist: It locates sex workers in a space that is readily subject to state surveillance. Within red light districts, sex workers may 87), effectively extending the power of the state over their lives. In times of moral panic, such control is particularly useful. It allows the state to readily govern the abject spaces occupied by the others and calibrate the balance between the different moral orders that, together, form the c represent spaces of alternative sexuality where prostitution remains invisible to the sanitized areas of the city. Governments maintain control over these spaces, through the sur veillance that manifests itself in periodic raids, and even through the laws that governments pass to establish them. At times, city governments have been at the forefront of efforts to establish brothels so as to create a space for sex work that keeps it separated from the spaces where dominant norms of sexuality reside. Nineteenth century London exemplifies both the spatial organization of sex work and the constitutive effects of that organization. Judith Walkowitz, a noted historian of prostitution i n that milieu, shows how the boundaries of competing moral orders can be 14
135 policed through cautionary tales. She does so by examining the stories told about Jack the Ripper, a serial killer who murdered five prostitutes without ever being captured. Though different in detail, the imaginative, sensationalist stories that swirled in 1888 The ma ssacred prostitute, representing the consequences awaiting women in the public realm (which, not incidentally, was also the realm of the working class) served as a warning to women that certain spaces were outside the safe realm of sexualized citizenship. In these studies, a common theme is found: European cities have been organized in a manner that consciously separates areas of sex work from the rest of the city. The disjuncture simultaneously creates and reflects different moral orders that are defi ned and sexual disorder in the post modern city, and, as such remains subject to an ev olving range of measures designed to socially and spatially differentiate her from unambiguous self/other dichotomy, is to risk oversimplifying the role of the sex worke r in the modern city. It is to deny the processes that incorporate, legitimize, and normalize the abject bodies. Such processes complicate her relationship to the city, simultaneously attracting and repelling her from the dominant moral order. Her relat ionship, thus, is one of liminality. Explorations of this contradiction can lead to theories that build upon the studies of prostitution and space, while recognizing more
136 identity. liminality, which requires a high level of alterity for the ritualistic space it inhabits. The ritual process that establishes liminality requires the act ors to exist outside the structure of the society. But the brothel or the red light district, while representing a space outside the moral order, becomes entwined with that order through the processes that comprise sex work. Hubbard notes occasionally t he geographic interconnection that exists. During the 19 th century, many of those men who observed and condemned prostitution were themselves dependent upon it. Alexandre Jean Baptiste Paren Duchatelet one of the most influential actors in the purity c ampaigns is a prime example of this. His frequent times, the ritualized movem ent to the abject spaces has enjoyed moral approval from the church and the state. In medieval France, many clergy sanctioned prostitution as an outlet for male sexual energy that would otherwise be diverted into less sanctified practices (such as rape, i ncest, or sodomy). Furthermore, the institution of marriage was believed to require that married men occasionally visit prostitutes; the orderly control of prostitution was the natural response to this requirement. Elsewhere, prostitution was institutiona lized to awaken male desire in hope of combating declining birthrates (70). Thus, for reasons academic, sexual, health related, and moral, the journey of men across the geographies of the moral orders has been celebrated and widely practiced.
137 Today, the forces most responsible for incorporating the abject spaces of prostitution into the identity of the city are economic. By the nature of market transactions, the alternative lifestyle of the sex worker is brought within the capitalist structures that dominate European society (Ryan and Hall 2001, 22). And sex work is, as a whole, a very large set of market transactions. The sex tourism industry is of special significance here: The convergence of a global economy, rising tourism, and consumerist expe ctations has bestowed upon sex workers a prominent place in the the globalized sex industry, while h ardly granting citizenship (in its legal meaning) to sex workers, is nonetheless a powerful force of inclusion. In such a context, it is not the spaces that sex workers inhabit or the sexual norms they embody that determine their status of belonging, it i s their global economic value (or, more precisely, it is their global economic value that determines the meaning of the spaces they inhabit and the sexual norms they embody). Given the inseparable links between space, norms, and identity, this means that sex workers themselves are given meaning through these processes. This follows from the observation, made by Nancy Wonders and Raymond Michalowski (2001, 564 5), that national laws governing sex work are overdetermined by global forces. The regulation of city space in regards to sex work is an ongoing response to global economic patterns. Tho se economic forces, which legitimize sex work by including it into the identity of the city, simultaneously push migrant sex workers in the other direction. Faced with
138 environment, governments face the countervailing incentive to exclude certain sex becomi ng hetero normal public spaces. Th at set of concerns is often complemented by fears that migrant sex workers are disrupting the market by depressing wages, avoiding regulation, overpopulating public space, or appearing unsavory. Consequently, sex workers in general, and migrant sex worker in particular, find themselves marked by competing orders: one that renders them legitimate and incorporates them into the spatial meaning of the city, and one that excludes them by spatially defining them as No city better encapsulates the tendency to render migrant sex workers liminal than Amsterdam. As a global economic city, Amsterdam has been shaped indelibly by the global forces of sex tourism. Those forces have facilitated the production and consumptio n of sex tourism in the city, resulting in 20,000 25,000 prostitutes who are readily accessible to any tourist (Wonders and Michalowski 2001). Sex tourism has developed as a niche market for Amsterdam, a fact reflected in the image people have of the city as a promiscuous playground. The value of sex tourism to the city is considerable, indirectly accounting for much of the money spent by tourists. Wonders and Michalowski (555) summarize the importance of sex tourism to Amsterdam, as well as the guiding role of the global economy in shaping it: plays an increasingly important role in keeping tourism dollars and related tourism industry jobs within the city. It is not the case that the Dutch government or Amsterdam city officials openly embrace the marketing of sex tourism or including the tourism industry, have adjusted to global forces in ways t hat create opportunities for s ex tourism to expand.
139 For the most part, those opportunities for sex tourism to expand have been filled by migrant sex workers. Though estimates vary, it is clear that a high percentage of the sex workers in Amsterdam are mig rants. Ineke Marshall estimated in 1993 that migrant sex workers comprised 60% of all sex workers in Amsterdam. A few years later, a tally by the Amsterdam police revealed that 75% of prostitutes behind windows in the Red Light District were foreigners ( cited in Wonders and Michalowski 2001). Notably, a large percentage of these migrant sex workers are Ukrainian. In the mid 1990s, Ukrainians were estimated to comprise the largest national group of migrant sex workers in the Netherlands. One estimate fr om the Kyiv Post placed them at 33% of all sex workers in the country (cited in Hughes 2000) T his number is much higher than one would expect, given the breakdown of trafficked women assisted by STV (Foundation Against Traffic in Women) (Laczko 2002). I t is also called into question by a Europap survey from 1999 that found Central and Eastern European women as a whole comprised only 18% of prostitutes in the Netherlands (van der Helm 2004). Yet, if the high estimate is even remotely accurate, it suggest s a pre eminent role for Ukrainian migrants in Amsterdam. Given the importance of migrant sex workers to the identity and economy of the order. And indeed, a great degree of normalcy has evolved. 15 Wonders and open 15 several European countries underwent notable development, commercializat ion, and legitimation through
140 crime, a neon atmosphere, and w desk. The Prostitute Information Centre, located in the District, provides information about the prices to expect and st Such measures are designed to ease the transition of the tourist into the District, facilitating his movement across the boundary that marks different ly sexualized spaces. Rather self consciously, the Centre seeks to blur that boundary, further normalizing what would amount to an abject space if not so economy valuable. While efforts like this have been made to bring tourists into ritualistically ot her spaces, legislation hostile to migrant sex workers has sent a very different set of signals. Regulation of brothels was legalized in 2000 by the Dutch Parliament and which was perceived increasingly as a haven for drug addicted migrant prostitutes (Wonders and Michalowski 2001, 557). The new brothel law prohibited the employment of women from outside the EU who did not possess residence permits. Th at step is part of a broader on again, off again effort in the Netherlands to shift the economic model of sex work from individual self employment to industry a move that would likely result in the expulsion of those sex workers (and their employers) who cannot afford the costs of increasing regulation (Brants 1998). Migrant sex workers have also been relocated has been set aside for cheaper, quicker transactions. Before it was shut down in 2004, the Tippelzone functioned to keep marginalized workers outside the city center
141 (Wonders and Michalowski 2001, 558). A writer for Forbes magazine sums up its role: king up (Morais 1996). The Tippelzone, d directly to the global demand for migrant sex workers by paradoxically expelling those same Policies toward prostitution in Europe have tended to follow this kind of confusing pattern. It is n o accident: Decisions over the spaces to be occupied by sex workers are As the meaning of the city, as well as the meaning of the relations that occur within it, are inex the prostitutes has significant ramifications. Unable to be incorporated into the moral order of the city, they cannot be completely expelled, either. The spaces they inha bit must be readily accessible to citizens, tourists, and the state. At the same time, there is a growing effort to differentiate the spaces occupied by migrant sex workers from those occupied by sex workers from the member states of the EU. (In practice this does not sex workers in the Red Light District remained undocumented foreigners.) Th e change places pressure on local officials to differentiate between which women should be in prostitution and which women should not be. The spatial relocations that are likely to follow will further sustain the liminality of the migrant sex worker, denying her incorporation into normalized spaces of sex work.
142 Temporal Liminality Wh ereas territorial liminality is sustained for migrant sex workers as a group, temporal liminality is a result of discursive moves applied much more directly to Eastern European sex workers. This liminality results from representations of temporal differen ce between European sex workers and those migrant sex workers from reflective of, EU policy, cast the latter as the trafficked wom e n o narratives and policie vaguely defined East, apply particularly to migrant Ukrainian sex workers due to their prominence in the discourse. Through these narratives, the Ukrainian sex worker becomes the European w oman that Europe lost: immature, docile, unwillingly mobile, without agency. In other words, she becomes the European woman who has not yet enjoyed the advancements brought by second wave feminism advancements that are at the root of what it means to be a European woman, according to certain feminist groups that have been influential in the trafficking debate. Laura M A Agustn (2003, 31) makes a similar argument about the temporal element found with in the competing representations of women: Because mi grants are usually seen as people from the Third World, the positioning of so many of them as victims of economic restructuring if not of criminal agents nowadays are so o ften women, these natives are constituted as backward, developmentally less than First World women. This is most overt, of course, in or backward. The discursive space they occupy is not that found in colonial narratives. Nor are they understood as modern, autonomous women. They are something in
14 3 between, marked by both of these orders. It is a specific discursive space (i.e. subject position) that was filled by European women in the last decades of the nineteenth century. While excluding migrant prostitutes by representing them as lacking the agency of European prostitutes, the discourse simultaneously re inscribes them with notions of victimizati on and femininity developed during the nineteenth century campaigns to end the White Slave trade. Viewing trafficking through the lenses of Victorian era victim narratives, the story of the trafficked woman is continued, with the role of victim shifted to migrants from the East. Ukrainian prostitutes end up occupying a liminal space in Europe: they are simultaneously the nineteenth century female victim and the foil to the modern European prostitute who enters the profession with the agency of an entrepre e same way that Ukraine has been constituted as a temporally liminal European body, and discursively located on the verge of becoming European throu gh EU sponsored gu idance, the Ukrainian sex worker is placed on the threshold of the twentieth century. These parallel processes of establishing and sustaining liminality have the cumulative effect of delimitating the Captivity nar ratives, some of which were described in the previous chapter, may be reinterpreted here not th century incarnations Frederick Grittner (1990, 18) describes nineteenth century captivity narratives as follows: Five critical elements emerge to distinguish this form of discourse: women are portrayed as moral, non sexual, even virginal; men are amoral, hypersexual;
144 women are cast as victims; violence, coercion and trick are used to ensnare and and, the narrative relies on melodramatic conventions of plot, style, and characterization to convey i ts meaning. Each of these elements is found in modern day narratives of sex trafficking in Europe. The Eastern sex slave is a victim, who has been kidnapped or deceived by organized criminal networks and, through a dramatic journey, has had her sexual pur ity unforgivably stolen. T he discursive space created for the modern trafficked woman is the same 16 The reading of the migrant sex worker as a victim i s of considerable importance, for two reasons. First, it enables (indeed, demands ) performances of protection aimed at affected migrants. Second, by denying the agency understand the trafficked woman, her motivations, and her needs (Kempadoo 2005, xxiv). 17 The discursive construction of the migrant sex worker as victim thus assumes the expertise of the protecting political body and demands that it acts. In so doing, it generates a salient site for identity constituting performances on the part of the state. To the degree that the construction of the victim occurs through internationally sustained representations and trans state cooperation across Europe, the EU is the b eneficiary of this process. So dominant has this discursive construction become that there is currently little space left for alternative understandings of migrant sex workers within the debate. Victimhood has shown to be a firm nodal point fixing the meaning of sex trafficking and 16 For more discussion of the images of the trafficked victim, see Doezema 1998. 17 several of the most important anti trafficking documents (Sanghera 2005, 12).
145 establishing the positions of European and pre European (almost European) women. Ukrainian migrant sex workers, in particular, have had their position in the discourse fixed through the naturalization of their status as the s at naturalization has been achieved through iterated representation s Both organized discussions (such as the September 2004 colloquium at the Chicago Cultural Center ) and newspaper reports (Associated Press Newswires 2005 ) ) have served as sites of dispersal for the image of the victimized sex slave. At times, the repre sentations of Ukrainian migrant sex workers qualities attributed to one to serve in the constitution of the other. In other cases, Ukrainians alone are the subject of the representational pr actices. Either way, a liminal identity for Ukrainian women is established. The former pattern is exemplified by the aforementioned 1998 New York Times expose ( Specter 1998) establishes immed always assumed that her beauty would somehow rescue her from the poverty and hopelessness of First, the Ukrainian sex worker is portrayed as beautiful. This was a common attribute of nineteenth century depictions, which fought the enslavement of, as Charlton Edholm
146 a village girl. This adds a new dynamic to the narrative, allowing it to be read simultaneously as the story of a girl moving from the (Ukrainian) country to the (European) city. Country girls appeared regularly within past discourses, especially within the American variants, reflecting the broader anxieties over the urbanization of (Grittner 1990, 70). Finally, Irina is described as impoverished and hopeless another common theme in accounting for the decisions of women to migrate. This representation carries two implications, both of which deny agency to Ukrainian women and establish thei r victimhood. First, it implies that Ukrainian women have reached an acting rationally. Their choice to migrate is, in that way, not their own. Second, it suggests that Ukrainian women to mi grate. As Agustn (2003, 32) observes, that suggestion ignores the fact that most of them choose not to migrate. Th erefore being acted upon by push factors cannot a Through the constructi on of Conversely, those actors who can offer to intervene to save disempowered victims are themselves empowered by th e process.
147 establishes Irina as the stereotype of the trafficked woman. 18 The stereotyping is creation of the stereotype is an intentional, repeated feature in stories like this, for it allows the writer to combine attention grabbing detail with startling (mostly unreliable) statistics. melodrama And like many of stupid. A stupid girl from a little village. But can peopl e really buy and sell women and get away with it? Sometimes I sit here and ask myself if that really happened to me, if it a demand that law and order be provided to el iminate the unconscionable crimes being committed against nave, vulnerable girls. These narratives have been naturalized to the point where the ordeals of actual women need no longer be referenced. Consider the following story that appeared in a 2006 ed ition of Ukrainian Weekly Written by an English professor, it contains all of the narrative devices described above. And, curiously, it is entirely made up. Imagine a small sleepy town in western Ukraine. The unemployment rate is high. On any given day in the town square, men old and young gather to talk; not one of them has a job. Politics is on every tongue. "We all know what needs to be done!" they cry. "Why is it not done? What is happening in our land in these democratic times?" Imagine a young gir l, Marusia, about 18 years old living in this same town. Her mother is sick, with severe diabetes, and cannot work. There has not been a 18
148 husband at home for some years now. There are two younger siblings. This young girl cannot find any work anywhere in to wn. There is no money for medicines, no possibility of buying new boots for the winter to replace the worn ones. There is no way to finance books for her little brother and sister. There is hardly enough money to pay for utilities. The family does, howeve r, own a television. Images of the West are now regular fare on Ukrainian TV, which Marusia watches to forget her troubles. "Ah, the opulence, the wealth, the luxuries!" said Marusia to her pals as they sit together watching a Western soap opera. "Why it' s like a fairytale!" For many nights, Marusia is unable to sleep. She says to herself: "I'll go work abroad! Mother will understand. So many are doing it now! Perhaps I can find work as a nanny. I'd be able to help everyone at home when I return." She look s for work advertisements and sees a promising one looking for nannies in northern Germany. She goes to Lviv for the interview. Eureka! She is accepted. Several other girls are also hired. What hope! This will certainly open a door! With the adventurous s pirit of the young, Marusia sets out. She cannot conceive of what awaits her upon reaching her destination. When Marusia reaches Berlin, her passport will be confiscated, she will be bonded, bartered and sold as chattel. And, before she can perform the jo b of servicing anywhere from 20 to 50 men a night, she will have to be primed. This consists of a visit into the anteroom of hell where she will have her spirit broken. She will be raped relentlessly, beaten until she will admit to anything and agree to do anything. Sometimes breaking in a girl has involved terrorizing her by making her watch another recalcitrant woman being murdered in her presence. The above is a fictional narrative, but hundreds of thousands of young girls like Marusia are actually suffe ring a similar fate right now (Ponomarenko 2006). There is a clear contrast between the sexual norms embodied by Marusia (and nineteenth century Europeans) and those which characterize the modern European woman. The former are found in the captivity nar ratives; the latter, however, must be (EWL). This influential organization is a useful arbite r of the status of European women. Funded by the EU, it participates in the Advisory Committee on equal opportunities for
149 assists the Commission in for mulating and implementing activ ities aimed at promoting equality betwe en women and men and works through preparing and delivering opinions to the Commission European Commission 2005, 16). In 2005, the EWL authored a lobby position paper titled dern European woman. The opening paragraphs reveal the central role of sexual rights in of sexual and reproductive health related services. They include reproductive rights where the number and spacing of children can be chosen in a free, responsible and informed way. but also their dignity and fre associated with issues of responsibility or risks concerning reproduction. Sexual rights recognise the right to sexual well being and the freedom of choice concerning partner(s), sexual orientation, sexual preferences and the choice of each woman whether or not to have sexual relations The sexual norms adv ocated here are presented as central to the personhood of women. The EWL is claiming to speak for women worldwide, but their analysis of that as one moves further east the sexual rights of women fade. Th at is due, primarily, to the low prevalence of contraceptive methods and high rates of unsafe abortions, ese have long been important indicators: one of the biggest factors explaining the change in sexual mores for women in Europe as they entered the twentieth century was access to contraceptive devices and methods of terminating pregnancy (Anderson and Zinss er 2000, 203). Sexual rights, as they are
150 articulated by the EWL, were established for European women in the period immediately following that of captivity narratives and fears of the white slave trade. On trafficking and prostitution, the report is sim ilarly othering. It comments, undermine the right of freedom and safety of the person, the right to be protected against any act of violence and against bad treatment as we women lack those rights which ensure dignity and freedom for European women. The EWL is posing this argument to lobby for the extension of suc h rights. Few observers status and treatment of women. But in offering a vision of sexual rights that is central to personhood, enjoyed more by European women than by others, and excluding of sex workers who willfully ply their trade, the EWL is marginalizing many of the women from Eastern countries. It is defining a civilized womanhood through exactly those qualities that are denied migrant sex workers by th e captivity narratives narratives that the EWL itself promotes. The victimization of sex trafficking discourse, coupled with this immediately preceding modern European womanhood. Conclusion This chapter has sought to establish that both Ukraine and the migrant sex workers who come from there are liminal figures. Parallel discourses establish and sustain their liminality, making them intelligible only as figures that a re almost European. Territorially and temporally, these two groups are positioned on a boundary, marked by the characteristics of the European self and the non European other. Each
151 group is engaged in, and subjected to, symbolic performances that reitera te its similarity and difference to the European political body. Such performances are key to the performances adds two important contributions to theories of state identity form ation and actor substantiation. First, it expands theories of identity formation beyond their frequent reliance upon a simple self/other dichotomy. It does so by accounting for the role of those actors who are neither self nor other, but are instead best classified as liminal. Second, it illustrates one of the many ways in which state identity relies upon representations of women. Liminal figures like the ones considered in this chapter are well positioned for assistance the kind of assistance that wi ll resolve their transitory state. Whether in the form of Neighbourhood Policies to Europeanize Ukraine or AENEAS funded programs to ensure the sexual rights of Ukrainian migrant sex workers, this assistance will inevitably position the provider as the le gitimate protector of European ideals. The masculinizing effect of such protectionist policies is the subject of the next chapter. Figure 5 1
152 Figure 5 2
153 CHAPTER 6 PERFORMANCE AND PRO TECTION IN SEX TRAFF ICKING POLICY Introduction So far, this study has described two levels of the sex trafficking discourses. The first level consists of the core assumption upon which the prominent understandings of sex trafficking rely. The second lev el is comprised of the key nodal points that (partially) fix the meaning of the phenomenon. It is a level at which rival ontologies of sex trafficking form, often through connection to other discourses. These two levels have been shown to be mutually con stitutive. Representations of sex trafficking, and of those who are a part of it, are structured by broader distinctions between collective identities. Sex trafficking is, in that sense, a symptom of macro identity politics. At the same time, the debate over sex trafficking, occurring within a discursive universe that presents two ways of comprehending the issue, (re)produces the boundaries of key actors (self, liminal, and other). It is a form of yoking that helps the E uropean U nion become a subject, a s opposed to a set of processes. Two key concepts in this study performance and gender have been present throughout the identity building process described. Performances are found in conflicting policies towards migrant sex workers that sus Performances aimed at individuals can even run parallel to performances aimed at the political bodies to which those individuals are discursive ly attached, as the previous chapter showed. Gender has been inescapable in this study, as well. It accounts for M oreover, it is impossible to understand the subject positions of the women and men involved without considera tion of sexual norms. In this
154 chapter, performance and its gendering effects will be considered in a slightly more explicit fashion. This is the logical end point of analysis: If sex trafficking is a salient issue for identity constitution ( c hapter four ) and filled with subjects demanding EU protection ( c hapter five ), then it is worthwhile to see what performances result and what effect they have. Policies: The Third Level of Disc ourse To begin that task, it is us eful to posit a third level to the discursive structure mapped thus far. It is a level that encompasses policies towards sex trafficking. As Figure 6 1 illustrates, specific policies towards sex trafficking connect to one or both of the meanings that sex trafficking carries. Much like the relationship between the first and second levels of the discursive structure, the relationship between the second and third levels is two way. Moving upwards on Figure 6 1, the meaning that sex trafficking assumes as limits the range of policies that can be enacted. Which policies appear natural, logical, or even conceivable is exampl e, if sex trafficking is violence against women, then the subject of sex trafficking is a subject of violence and, as a result, policies of deportation are off the table (as it would be un European to jeopardize her most basic human rights). Conversely, if most of what is termed sex trafficking is understood as migration, then the subject of sex trafficking is, in some capacity, a purpose driven agent. Combating either her means of livelihood (through counter demand measures) or those smuggling her into the EU (through anti transnational organized crime measures) does not follow logically from such an understanding. It is important to emphasize, however, that the second level does not determine the third in any strict sense. Discourses do not exist in the
155 minds of actors, nor do they determine causally how an actor will act. They, like languages, are structures of relations existing between actors. There is, thus, room for both in relation to how [actors] shape a political position in relation to a given discursive position and in how they try to transform the discursive structure itself" (Wver 2004, 199). In their regulative role, discourses makes some policies possible while precluding others, enabling the EU to pass one law but not another, to take one stance relative to migrant sex workers while eschewing others. Policies, in addition to being enabled by the meanings established within a discursive structure, are cons terminology, performative they create that to which they refer (1975, 6). Performance occurs at all levels of the discursive structure, operating through language to produce meanings and identities a trafficked woman existent victimhood, but carving y performance finds a mor e material medium. The performance of a policy itself is an articulation. A brothel raid, for instance, is not only the enforcement of a law but an act of (supra)statecraft, insofar as it establishes the raiding government as a legitimate protector and t he rescued sex workers as protected victims. Additionally, as Michel Foucault (1977) demonstrated through his pioneering work, policies can be understood as productive of identity. In the context of sex trafficking, policies act productively upon a numbe movement restricted, their bodies examined, and themselves deported. Clients of sex
156 workers may be surveilled, incarcerated, and re educated. Traffickers may be imprisoned, a meanings these actions carry, policies are best considered a part of the discursive structure rather than solely an outcome of it. Complicating the situation somewhat is the lik elihood that any sex worker from abroad will be the subject of multiple policies. Understood as a victim of physical violence perpetrated by her traffickers, she may be pressed to testify through policy performances aimed at the elimination of transnation al organized crime. After a trial, or after her refusal to testify at a tr i change. She may be understood then as a migrant, no longer victimized by the capturers from which she has been rescued, and no longer vulnerable enough to justify extended residence in that society. This shift in subject positions, while not malicious or intentional, justifies the application of seemingly irreconcilable policies to the migrant sex worker. And it underscores a precept of discourse analysis: the subject of discourse is not transcendental. The relationship between policy and discourse, as just described, indicates the limits of discursive approaches for making causal statements about policy. Put simply, dis cursive structures cannot explain or predict action. Because they enable, rather than determine, they are better thought of as preconditions for action than as causes of been possible for the EU to focus its resources on policing the criminals rather than
157 st was taken. It is beyond the capabilities of discourse analysis to argue that, for example, trafficking policies are window dressing for the anti immigrant agendas of Mem ber States. But it can suggest how understandings of non Europeans shape the ways in which sex trafficking can be understood. Finally, because policy articulations are a part of discourse, the latter cannot be used as independent variable s (Diez 2001, 24 ). What is left is the possibility of gaining, in Thomas ing of 30). If one wishes for policy reform on th e issue of sex trafficking then such an understanding is invaluable. Without it one risks acting without knowledge of what is required to change the way in which the issue is understood. The E uropean U nion The Dominance of a Single Discourse The policies that the EU has enacted have been enabled by the two d iscourses on sex trafficking. However, those discourses have not had equal influence. The been economic exploitation. And while this trend has been decried by those who seek a broader, more flexible, and more nuanced response to sex trafficking, it has d one a lot of work for the EU. Combating violence rather than exploitation has enabled the EU to position itself against a violent and overt form of patriarchy while avoiding action on the inconvenient effects of its economic policies. And it has set the table for the EU to perform as a paternalistic protector, achieving a greater level of intelligibility and legitimacy through its efforts.
158 are taking place in a context w here women are subject to a number of patriarchal forces. The analysis provided in the subsequent chapters described how those forces have been cast within a discourse that presents them as one phenomenon with a single truth that can be known with the phr ase, sex trafficking. Th o se forces consist of a capitalistic patriarchy that disproportionately harms women in developing countries, and a sex right patriarchy that grants certain men control over the sexual decisions of problems is revealing. It has implemented policies that follow an additional patriarchal logic, that of paternalism. These policies have been designed to simultaneously counter overt manifestations of sex right patriarchy, in the form of violence agains t women, but have effectively masked manifestations of capitalist patriarchy. Neither these policies nor the discourse of which they are an important part is self consciously patriarchal. Indeed, it is the product of well intentioned policymakers and adv ocates in Europe who wish to lessen the economic vulnerability and abusive sexual conditions that characterize the experience of many trafficked women. The outcome, however, has not been a direct challenge to the lack of fairness in neoliberal economic st ructures that sustain capitalistic patriarchy. to combat sex trafficking without combating capitalist patriarchy. Because the EU achieves much of its identity as a promot er and coordinator of neoliberal economic policies, avoiding the structural inequalities and unequal relations produced by these policies means avoiding a challenge to its own identity.
159 Employing the N orm of M asculine P rotection to performatively reinforce a discourse that demands protection. That response has been manifest in victim centered policies and policy statements. This is a rather new development: the protection of victims has not been always the chief norm referenced by the performances of European actors in their policies against trafficking. Only in the last six years did the protection of victims come to form the rhetorical core of what these actors (chiefly the EU and Member States) are supposed to be doing when t for combating trafficking consisted primarily of building thicker walls around Fortress Europe and disrupting the transnationally organized criminal syndicates held to be responsible for the ac marred by an unhelpful conflation of illegal immigration, transnational organized crime, and violent trafficking. As a result, the humanitarian aspects of combating trafficking have been buried beneath efforts to crack down on criminals, whether those criminals assist ance programs provided for perceived victims of trafficking. In most cases, such her traffickers. When temporary visas have been made available by states, they have las state with its prosecution of traffickers has reached its conclusion, she is likely to be deported. Further reflecting these priorities is the fact that anti traffi cking policies developed initially within the EU were more successful in achieving police training, police and judicial cooperation, and the more rigorous scrutiny of visa applications.
160 Such strategies, which treat trafficking as a problem of illegal migr ation and organized crime, still structure much of what is being done to combat trafficking. But there has been a noticeable shift in policy toward a framework that stresses the urgency and necessity of safeguarding the human rights of the trafficking vic tim. It is a balancing of the focus on the criminal aspects of sex trafficking with a focus on the aspects of victimization. This has not been an easy balance to achieve, and it remains a work in progress. Indeed, EU policy has often reflected an incomp atible mix of concerns. On for societal security, the EU has attempted to develop bette r ways of preventing migration and returning unwanted migrants to their home countr ies On the other hand, being of what are perceived to be vulnerable, violated young wo men and children. Overall, in the thirteen years that trafficking has been a subject for EU intervention, its policies have tilted heavily toward the former set of concerns. But this is changing. The growth of a victim centered approach has provided th e EU with the opportunity to perform in accord with paternalistic masculine norms. That is not to say, however, that there was any nefarious intent or grand, supra state building designs on the part of its proponents. Rather, the early efforts were deriv ative of the broader global shift towards human security. With the state becoming less the referent of security practices, the logic of state protection had been displaced, at least rhetorically, by the growing recognition that human beings have inalienab le rights that transcend the context of the sovereign state system. Thus, it is not surprising that anti trafficking
161 efforts developing around that time focused on the victims of trafficking rather than on the violation of European borders by illegal immi grants and traffickers. Simultaneously, the attention given to the assurance of the rights of trafficking victims can be explained by the success of a group of moral entrepreneurs who were particularly active in the mid 1990s. Led by Anita Gradin, then C ommissioner of Justice and Home Affairs, this group was proactive in moving sex trafficking onto the European agenda. They accomplished this goal in short time by successfully reframing sex trafficking as day form conceptual linkages to issues for which prohibition regimes were already established, member states against trafficking in women (Locher 2007) Tactically, these entrepreneurs relied upon both testimonials from victims and the use of labels, metaphors, and frames to achieve sympathy for victims of trafficking. Those tactics rd the front of the debate. The result of those tactics was to generate momentum for the issue and solidify remedies to trafficked persons and migrant women, and imposed them with a rigour that Traffic in Women 2007, viii). Within such a discourse, patern alist policies are naturalized as a European solution. By 2008, this process had achieved great heights. That date marked the entry into force of the Council of Europe Conven tion on
162 Action against Trafficking in Human Beings. Over the next month, sixteen European states would ratify the treaty, the express purpose of which is to give protection to victims of trafficking and ensure that their rights, as victims, are recognized This be put towards the assistance and protection of trafficking victims. Paternalism in E uropean U nion Policy The paternalistic nature of these policies has not go ne unchallenged, as critics and organizations like the Global Alliance Against Traffic in Women (GAATW) have offered counter discourses which seek to undo the EU subject relations established by the sider the incentives that exist for political bodies to act in accord with masculine norms, they reveal nonetheless the masculine logic of protection at work in EU policies. Specifically, this masculine logic is otection establishes symbolically the role of the EU vis vis trafficked women as that of a father to his daughters. Second, the discourse denies agency to trafficked women. And third, the discourse demands that the restrictions placed on the movement a nd sexuality of trafficked women is done out The first of these points is nowhere clearer than in its development of the Daphne Initiative and, later, the Daphne P rogramme. Begun in 1997 as a one NGO and multisectoral action against violence against women, with anti trafficking strategies serving a prominent role. In 2000, Daphne was turned into a four year program with a budget of twenty million Euros. Daphne II (2004 2008) was granted a budget of fifty million Euros and Daphne III (2007 2013) has seen its budget grow to
163 138.2 million Euros. The vision of the Daphne policies as a vehicle for fatherly protection is clear. website explains, a pure, innocent young woman pursued by the god Apollo who had fallen in love al advances, Daphne called upon her father, the river god Peneus, to help her. As Apollo touched her, the god turned Daphne into a laurel bush, daphne in Greek. The program is explicit in its linking of this kind of paternalism to building a European sty le of governance. It continues: Daphne is very much a European programme. From the outset, its aim was not -centering on the needs of children, young people and women subject to or at risk of violenc e of all sorts -Candidates for funding are asked for information designed to elucidate this contribute b y putting projects in touch with each other, and suggesting more ways As Daphne has developed, participating organizations have reported that they ways of di scussing and working that cut across differing definitions, methods and approaches, cultural specificities, frameworks for action and even language barriers (European Commission, Here, the Daphne Programme is creating a sense of European ne ss around a logic of paternal protection. But policies do not have to accompanied by such revealing analogies as the story of Daphne to still be symbolic and constitutive in their effects (Young 2003). To elaborate on that point, it is useful to revisit the argument made by Iris Marion Young, which was discussed briefly in c hapter two Young is among the few the identity and legitimacy of political bodies. This protecto r role is born out of real policies that affect the freedom and movement of women, but that are simultaneously
164 Masculinist Protection: Reflections on the Current S compelling treatment of this dynamic. Her inspiration is Thomas Hobbes, who she reads as having provided an early theory of state fear of threat and the apparent desire for protection suc 2). She adapts his story to explain how modern states gain legitimacy from activities that limit the freedom of their people in the name of protection. While her analysis framework has value for understanding how the protection of women from traffickers can be a legitimizing exercise for the EU. After all, there is no reason why the exact identity of the external threat need be a state so long as it is "an unpredictable aggressor against which the state needs vigilant defense" (8). Within dominant specified transnational organized crime syndicates that they are held to represent) fit this part quite well. protection not only create relations of dominance and subjugation, but how those relations are both patriarchal and constitutive o f gendered identities. She explains, To the extent that citizens of a democratic state allow their leaders to adopt a stance of protectors toward them, these citizens come to occupy a subordinate status like that of women in the patriarchal household. We are to accept a more authoritarian and paternalistic state power, which gets its support partly from the unity a threat produces and our gratitude for protection (2). protect paternal protection and the ramifications that such protection holds for their ability to
165 of that protection. Restrictions on the movement and sexual choices of women often come as a condition for protection against sex right patriarchy. Women who migrate into Europe 14) explains, virtuous masculinity depends on its constitutive relation to the presumption of evil others. Feminists have much analyzed a correlate dichotomy bet protection of a father or husband, submits to his judgment about what is necessary enough not to have a man willing to protect her, or who refuses such protection by claiming the right to run her own life. In either case, the woman without a male protector is fair game for any man to dominate. There is a bargain implicit in the masculin ity protector role: either submit to my governance or all the bad men out there are liable to approach you, and I will not try to stop them. Whether a trafficked woman chooses to follow paternal restrictions on agency, refuses such protection by claiming the right to run restrictions have ranged from a denial of her will to migrate to confinement in shelters or detention centers. The former is exemplified by billboards posted in those towns from which women migrate, warning them of the harm that awaits trafficked women. It is found also in popular media, such as comic books that similarly seek to deter women from entering the EU. Onc the very core the voice
166 Significantly, the protection that is being offered is protection from the effects of sex right patriarchy, not from the effects of capitalist patriarchy. While both of those sets of relations act detr imentally upon women who move into Europe for work in the sex industry, only the former is featured prominently in the discourse of protection. This is not to suggest that the EU has ignored entirely the economic conditions that act heavily upon the decis ions of many women to migrate. Frequent mention is made of patriarchy is obvious. trafficking victims, the EU has sought simply to make them better workers. To that end, the latter of wh ich will presumably disappear upon the inevitable deportation of the trafficking victim. One effect of representing traffickers as the only significant threat to vulnerable women is to demonize all men who take part in moving women into Europe. Included a mong these are those who smuggle willing female migrants and would be more accurately described, in the words of John migrants ( i.e., women who are not the victims of traffickers, at least not in the ways presumed) are not represented in the dominant discourse and are not granted the female economic migrant is telling, and reveals that it is the exploitative movement
167 of women by (Eastern) men that is the cause of outrage, not the exploitation of women who choose to move. disappearance of the willing female economic migrant masks the development of a consensual black market in migration. Such a market reveals the detrimental effects of ne existence of widespread trafficking to interrogate the structural economic inequalities between women and men, the discourse on trafficking turns it into a much simpler tale. Critiques of liberal policies are effectively swallowed up within a narrative that implies that any woman who seeks to migrate is a victim of male sex right, and that any woman who wishes to escape conditions of exploitation must accept the paternal prot ection of the EU. As a promoter of neoliberal economic policies, especially in the Near Abroad, it should come as no surprise that the EU has focused its attention on the violence created by male sex right. It has been poorly positioned to respond instit utionally to this issue as if it were anything else. And, by placing itself between the trafficked victim and the violent males of the East, it is aligning itself with masculine norms of protection that have been establishing authority for centuries. Conc lusion sex trafficking. The performances they entail play a constitutive role in defining the nature of t he problem. In other words, the politics of protection can themselves be considered productive of efforts to protect victims of trafficking are a response to the discur sive representation of
168 forces affect migrant women, and decides how they are best to be combated. Certainly, this has considerable ramifications for the women and men involved. Through the politics of protection, power acts upon their bodies in very real ways, ranging from confinement to deportation. They become subjects, and subje cts whose a process in which larger collective identities are posited, legitimized, and differentiated from others. Protection, then, is best understood as a consti tutive performance, given meaning through masculine norms a performance that, in this case, creates problem of sex right patriarchy.
169 Figure 6 1. The d iscursive u niverse of s ex t rafficking in Europe : t hree l evels
170 CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION Summary of the Argument The arguments and findings presented in this study may be summarized in t he following terms: Though states appear as people in the minds of their audiences, it takes a lot of work for them to become so. A performative theory of state identity can explain how that result is achieved. By viewing such performances through their relations to gendered norms, it becomes apparent that states, like humans, are rendered intelligible through their correspondence with dominant ideas about masculinity and femininity. One dominant idea that appears to structure much state identity format ion is that masculine actors provide protection for feminine, dependent subjects. Given that theoretical framework, scholars may study the gendered production of states by choosing a state, a set of performances, and a discourse (or discourses) through wh ich the process takes place. Owing to the reciprocal effects of performances, the discourse(s) that one examines can be understood, too, as a product of the process. The analysis that has been provided here is of the European Union. While it is not a st ate, theories of statecraft, including that outlined above, are applicable. Indeed, excellent subject through which to conduct a study of the processes of macro identity for mation. Because performances require (gendered) content to have meaning, this study focused on an issue in which norms of masculinity and femininity could be deciphered and interpreted to illustrate the kind of identity that the EU has been creat ing. Sex trafficking was selected as the issue and it presents itself as an
171 ideal case study. It is a discursively generated phenomenon, rich in powerful representations, that lies atop a number of identity related fault lines. As a result of the Europe anization of the issue and the lead that the EU has taken in addressing it, the naturalizes the appropriateness of EU performance. The Europeanization of the issue m eans also that any conclusions drawn are likely applicable not just to the EU, but to broadly, as the creation of articulations within discourse, then a considerable range of po licies may be considered productive of those actors. This process, as a whole, can be observed even better by focusing on the liminal identities involved. They provide the most productive opportunities for EU performance, as their ambiguous character dem sex trafficking discourse, two sets of liminars are prominent: Ukraine and migrant Ukrainian sex workers. Not only are they key actors in the formation of European bodies, but the representations of one (re)inscribes the liminality of the other. The liminal identities of migrant sex workers, meanwhile, demand performance from (supra)state actors. The EU has responded with policies that amount to masculine performances of protection. Such protect ion ensures the continued marginality of both sex workers and the countries and regions from which they have come. Ultimately, the performances are not mere expressions of discursively established identities, but are productive of those identities, as wel l. Through the performances, the EU becomes defined as a masculine actor.
172 The Implications of t h e Research In her book, Women and Gender in Islam issue is simply the humane and just treatment of women, nothing les s, and nothing it is important to interrogate them if one is to achieve that straightforward, yet ambitious, goal. This leads to the following question: If the proc ess described in this study is accurate, what effect will it have on the abilities of governments to devise policies that ongoing trafficking debate is a proxy war for ot her issues, then efforts to formulate effective policies on the issues of migration, forced labor, and prostitution could be hampered. Dragging the macro identity issues of European politics into the trafficking debate complicates things. Symbolically, t he policies come to mean too much. Moreover, migrant sex workers may find it harder to reach equal legal footing with their European counterparts. This would be the case especially for those who have entered Europe from Ukraine, or from another liminal p olitical body. For those larger political bodies, too, the implications are unkind. In his analysis of European Russian relations, Iver Neumann (1998, 111 representation of Europe is tied to the idea of the Russian other. Since exclu sion is a necessary ingredient of integration, this is in itself no problem. The temptation remains, however, to play up the alterity of Russia in order to increase the integration of the to expect that from that country. With the EU currently emphasizing the need to concentrate on consolidation rather than expansion, this is a legitimate concern The boundaries may
173 be yoked in an increasingly tight fashion, leaving less ambiguity about who is inside and who is outside. Despite the opportunities that liminal identities present for (supra)state building, migrant women and Eastern states may find themselves established even more firmly on the outside, further away from Europe, and subject to more exclusionary policies. More optimistically, it is possible that macro identity issues could facilitate the adoption of fair and just policies on the iss ues of prostitution and trafficking. The prospect of joining Europe could be an effective motivation for Eastern countries, like Ukraine, to better ensure the just treatment and fair living standards of its women. (Whether or not tha t happens in Europe is another story.) If Ukraine finds itself being written out of Europe through its women, then it may undertake efforts to make the more tenuous. One must believe it has th e ability to do so. If there is one point that this study has emphasized, it is that polities will act upon the lives of women when it suits their needs. For those interested in understanding how states establish and legitimize themselves, there are seve ral recommendations that may be drawn from this study. First, to theorize the process of statecraft, whether for nation states or supranational polities like the EU, it is useful to adopt a process oriented, rather than substance oriented, approach. Othe rwise, one begins analyzing the phenomenon after much of the work has already been done. Adopting a process oriented approach forces the scholar to theorize statecraft at the most basic level: where the state becomes a bounded and anthropomorphized subjec t. And, as this study has shown, it is only by
174 starting at such an early stage that one can observe the norms of intelligibility that enable identities to form. Patrick Jackson and Daniel Nexon provide a great, state centric framework for IR scholars to accomplish this. It is likely, however, that further developments along these lines will require an embrace of work that originates outside IR. Though states are written about as if they are human, their identities have not been interrogated as such. Mu ch is to be gained from listening to scholars like Judith Butler, who focus not on state subjects, but on human subjects and the process of their constution. A second recommendation that emerges from this study is that gender should not be negle cted in the study of identity formation. Gender provides norms of intelligibility that are relevant to the formation of any subject. And until people can think of actors without reference to gendered norms, that will continue to be the case. What this m eans, in the field of IR, is that there are gendered states. States (re)constitute themselves in line with gender norms. Rarely is this a conscious plan; the desire to achieve a powerful, legitimate, and stable subject position, and to maintain such a po sition once it is established, is enough to drive the process. Because power, legitimacy, and stability have been appropriated historically by men, one would expect to find states performing more often in masculine, rather than feminine, ways. Nonetheles s, there is nothing in this study that precludes states from substantiating themselves through recourse to feminine norms. Valuable work remains to be done on that front. The call to incorporate gender has gone largely unheeded in IR. Even those scholar s who are amenable to process oriented ontologies omit gender from their
175 analyse s. They operate with frameworks well adapted to theories of performativity, yet stop short of applying the insights of Judith Butler, Cynthia Weber, and other feminists. Thos e within IR whose theoretical innovations have paved the way for a processual relational account of identity Alexander Wendt, David Campbell, Patrick Jackson and Daniel Nexon, to name a few have provided a good starting point for others who wish to go further by considering gender as a central component of those processes. Yet, until more scholars move in this direction, there will be little recognition that the personhood of the state is itself a product of performances read t hrough gendered norms of intelligibility. That is to say, there will be little recognition that the state is not a genderless being. The failure to recognize that, to remain blind to s implications for scholars and citizens alike. The protection offered by the state will not d.
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191 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Jonathan Wadley was born and raised in Jacksonville, Florida. H e received his diploma from Terry Parker High Sc hool. He earned usiness a dministration (f inance) and political science at the University of Florida His most recent work has been published by Routledge in an edited volume titled, Gender and International Security: Feminist Persp ectives