Value-Conscious Growth

Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0041080/00001

Material Information

Title: Value-Conscious Growth A Case Study of Pittsburgh's First Community Benefits Agreement
Physical Description: 1 online resource (209 p.)
Language: english
Creator: Cain, Colleen
Publisher: University of Florida
Place of Publication: Gainesville, Fla.
Publication Date: 2009


Subjects / Keywords: cba, community, growth, redevelopment, stadium, urban
Sociology -- Dissertations, Academic -- UF
Genre: Sociology thesis, Ph.D.
bibliography   ( marcgt )
theses   ( marcgt )
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent)   ( marcgt )
born-digital   ( sobekcm )
Electronic Thesis or Dissertation


Abstract: VALUE-CONSCIOUS GROWTH: A CASE STUDY OF PITTBURGH'S FIRST COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENT This dissertation is a case study of Pittsburgh's first Community Benefits Agreement (CBA), surrounding the construction of a new hockey arena in the Hill District neighborhood, which borders the city's central business district. CBAs are legally-binding agreements through which communities ensure developer reinvestment in return for public support of a project. Using the Hill District case to explore the phenomenon of CBAs, I address a three-fold research inquiry: 1) Why are communities choosing to negotiate with developers and pursue benefits through CBAs?; 2) How are communities engaging in and securing CBAs?; and 3) What implications do the Hill District CBA, in particular, and CBAs, in general, hold for pro-growth dynamics? Data was generated through interviews with 32 stakeholders, as well as a year-long ethnography. Informed by a grounded theory analysis, my research contributes to the growing body of work on CBAs by presenting a descriptive account of the Hill District campaign and the CBA Coalition's organizational process, structure, and strategies. I consider the perspectives of multiple community- and non-community-based actors, and offer insight into effective components of a CBA campaign. Additionally, I argue that the Hill District community's history of failed urban renewal greatly influenced their decision to pursue benefits. To a lesser extent, local impacts and a large public subsidy for the Penguins hockey franchise also served as driving forces. While these motivations are specific to the Hill District case, they also speak to larger phenomena facing many urban communities within the current era of value-free growth. Connecting the literature on CBAs to that of urban political economy, my study further investigates the ways in which these Agreements have impacted pro-growth dynamics. To the larger body of urban political-economic scholarship, then, I offer a practical and theoretical assessment of CBAs. My research extends prior work suggesting that residents' positions on growth are complex and demonstrates that while CBAs achieve value-conscious growth, they do not fundamentally alter dominant standards of growth or growth machine processes. I conclude by proposing a larger deconstruction of growth that utilizes new standards for city success and raises expectations for private and public sectors.
General Note: In the series University of Florida Digital Collections.
General Note: Includes vita.
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references.
Source of Description: Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page.
Source of Description: This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication. The University of Florida Libraries, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law.
Statement of Responsibility: by Colleen Cain.
Thesis: Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Florida, 2009.
Local: Adviser: Bures, Regina.
Local: Co-adviser: Pena, Milagros.

Record Information

Source Institution: UFRGP
Rights Management: Applicable rights reserved.
Classification: lcc - LD1780 2009
System ID: UFE0041080:00001

Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0041080/00001

Material Information

Title: Value-Conscious Growth A Case Study of Pittsburgh's First Community Benefits Agreement
Physical Description: 1 online resource (209 p.)
Language: english
Creator: Cain, Colleen
Publisher: University of Florida
Place of Publication: Gainesville, Fla.
Publication Date: 2009


Subjects / Keywords: cba, community, growth, redevelopment, stadium, urban
Sociology -- Dissertations, Academic -- UF
Genre: Sociology thesis, Ph.D.
bibliography   ( marcgt )
theses   ( marcgt )
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent)   ( marcgt )
born-digital   ( sobekcm )
Electronic Thesis or Dissertation


Abstract: VALUE-CONSCIOUS GROWTH: A CASE STUDY OF PITTBURGH'S FIRST COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENT This dissertation is a case study of Pittsburgh's first Community Benefits Agreement (CBA), surrounding the construction of a new hockey arena in the Hill District neighborhood, which borders the city's central business district. CBAs are legally-binding agreements through which communities ensure developer reinvestment in return for public support of a project. Using the Hill District case to explore the phenomenon of CBAs, I address a three-fold research inquiry: 1) Why are communities choosing to negotiate with developers and pursue benefits through CBAs?; 2) How are communities engaging in and securing CBAs?; and 3) What implications do the Hill District CBA, in particular, and CBAs, in general, hold for pro-growth dynamics? Data was generated through interviews with 32 stakeholders, as well as a year-long ethnography. Informed by a grounded theory analysis, my research contributes to the growing body of work on CBAs by presenting a descriptive account of the Hill District campaign and the CBA Coalition's organizational process, structure, and strategies. I consider the perspectives of multiple community- and non-community-based actors, and offer insight into effective components of a CBA campaign. Additionally, I argue that the Hill District community's history of failed urban renewal greatly influenced their decision to pursue benefits. To a lesser extent, local impacts and a large public subsidy for the Penguins hockey franchise also served as driving forces. While these motivations are specific to the Hill District case, they also speak to larger phenomena facing many urban communities within the current era of value-free growth. Connecting the literature on CBAs to that of urban political economy, my study further investigates the ways in which these Agreements have impacted pro-growth dynamics. To the larger body of urban political-economic scholarship, then, I offer a practical and theoretical assessment of CBAs. My research extends prior work suggesting that residents' positions on growth are complex and demonstrates that while CBAs achieve value-conscious growth, they do not fundamentally alter dominant standards of growth or growth machine processes. I conclude by proposing a larger deconstruction of growth that utilizes new standards for city success and raises expectations for private and public sectors.
General Note: In the series University of Florida Digital Collections.
General Note: Includes vita.
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references.
Source of Description: Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page.
Source of Description: This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication. The University of Florida Libraries, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law.
Statement of Responsibility: by Colleen Cain.
Thesis: Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Florida, 2009.
Local: Adviser: Bures, Regina.
Local: Co-adviser: Pena, Milagros.

Record Information

Source Institution: UFRGP
Rights Management: Applicable rights reserved.
Classification: lcc - LD1780 2009
System ID: UFE0041080:00001

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2009 Colleen Cain 2


To the memory of Mom West 3


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS None of this research would have been possi ble without the willingness of my participants to share their ideas and experien ces with me. They were the hi ghlight of what can be a very long, tedious, and lonely proce ss. Beyond my manifest research goals, many of them surprised, challenged, entertained, and inspired me with their remarkable stories and commitment to social justice. I especially thank Ann Simms for entrusting me with her box of documents. This would have been an entirely different dissertation, and a less thorough one at that, without her help. I would also like to recognize the help of Ca rl Redwood, who continued to provide information even after our interview was over, as well as Dr. Emma Lucas-Darby and Dr. Bonnie Young Laing, who acted as true mentors in their encouragement and academic advice. My dissertation committee has shaped my gra duate studies and this project in so many ways. Dr. Regina Bures introduced me to a whol e new way of thinking when she suggested that I read Urban Fortunes over two years ago. She has indeed cultivated the urban sociologist in me. She has been an excellent Chair, regularly talking long-distance about the progression of my research and when things got down to the wire, offering challenging and constructive feedback. The highest compliment that one can give he r professors is to choose to take multiple courses from them. This was the case with Dr. Milagros Pea and Dr. Kendal Broad. Throughout my graduate career they have both pr ovided a wealth of information and academic wisdom and taught me to think critically about race, gender, and methodol ogy, especially. If I had been able to pay such a compliment to Dr. Brian Mayer I would have. His course on environmental inequality was one of the most interesting Ive taken and I regret that I did not meet him earlier in my time at the University of Florida. As a comm ittee member, he offered practical advice and asked questions that served to focus the direction of my project from its inception. Lastly, I am grateful that Dr. Sandra Russo agreed to take on my case. From my first 4


meeting with her, she has been a thoughtful lis tener, and source of both insightful comments and upbeat encouragement. Academic mentors from my undergraduate e ducation are in part responsible for the research interests and ca reer path that I have pursued; I esp ecially thank Dr. Mariana Ortega and Dr. Toms Rodrguez who set a remarkable example of pedagogy for me at John Carroll University. Also inspirational in this re gard were Dr. Charles Gattone and Dr. Tanya Koropeckyj-Cox at the University of Florida; as their teaching assistant, I was treated like a colleague even in the beginning of my graduate career. Additionally, I am appreciative of the mentorship and friendship of Dr. Trysh Travis, w ho was instrumental in the formation of this project. I would also like to acknowledge the wo rk of the office staff in the Department of Sociology and Criminology & Law, especially Donna Balkcom and Nadine Gillis whom I always looked forward to seeing when I came through the main office door. I am entirely grateful to my parents, Phyllis and Terrance Cain, whose support I often take for granted because it has been so constant th roughout my entire life. From day one of this project, before I moved back to Pittsburgh, my mother would save relevant clips of local newspapers, sending them to me in Florida, or sharing them with me upon my too infrequent visits back home. My more tech-savvy father al so shared local news w ith me, sending emails with little captions, such as another piece of the puzzle. At one point, he even did some homework for me when I was unable to visit the Carnegie Library myself. Both of my parents not only expressed their interest in my rese arch, but showed it by occasionally attending community events, even when it meant an app earance on the local news! I thank them for teaching me, both in word and by example, the va lue of social responsibility and concern for 5


others. They are also responsible for instilling in me a sense of pride and love for the city of Pittsburgh. Many of my other family members and friends from grade school, high school, and college have offered encouragement during my graduate career and maintained our relationships across long distances. I am especially appreciative of my sisters, Patty and Julie Cain, for listening to me vent when the going got tough, for making me laugh always, and for providing me with a guaranteed source of friendship. My brilliant husband, Jarrod West, has been involv ed in this dissertation as if he were on the committee. So many of the ideas here were aided by his acting as a sounding board, his insightful questions, and knowledge of urban polic y. Additionally, he created the maps that appear at the end of several chapters. Thr oughout our years apart, which were many, and our few years in the same place, he has been an irreplaceable source of support, love, care, and humor. For his unwavering confiden ce in me, I cannot thank him enough. I owe so much to my former dinner/study crew Our evenings together were often more about dinner than about studying, but nevertheless, even after becoming my long-distance-phone call-crew they have remained my strongest a nd most inspirational me ntors. I thank Dana Berkowitz for providing positive (and spastic) energy and a wonderful example of academic productivity balanced with fun. I thank my research and singi ng partner JeffriAnne Wilder for her ability to think of a useful re ference at the drop of a hat and for all she has done to ready this baby bird to fly. And I thank Namita Ma nohar for always being a phone call away and encouraging me, when I needed it the most, to just write the damn thing. Finally, I am grateful for other friends a nd colleagues in the Sociology Department, particularly those who entered the program in the Fall of 2004 (and some that entered thereafter), 6


especially William Jawde, Georgia Bianchi, Je n Towers, Nick Vargas, Louisa Chang, Maura Ryan, and Billy Jeffries. Their kindness, senses of humor, and intelligence have helped me to grow academically, intellectually, and personally. 7


TABLE OF CONTENTS page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...............................................................................................................4 TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................................................8 LIST OF TABLES .........................................................................................................................11 LIST OF FIGURES .......................................................................................................................12 ABSTRACT ...................................................................................................................................13 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................. .15 The Hill District Community Benefits Agreement: A Case Study .........................................18 A Community Benefits Movement .........................................................................................19 Origins .............................................................................................................................21 A Unique Tool .................................................................................................................23 Research Aims ........................................................................................................................24 Dissertation Overview ............................................................................................................25 2 REVIEW OF LITERATURE: SI TUATING COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENTS.....................................................................................................................28 Defining Neighborhood and Community ...............................................................................29 Where Use and Exchange Values Meet ..........................................................................29 The Growth Machine .......................................................................................................30 Neighborhood Vulnerability ...................................................................................................31 Urban Renewal ................................................................................................................32 Gentrification ...................................................................................................................33 Downtown Revitalization ................................................................................................35 Sports Facilities as Revitalization Trend ................................................................................37 Summary: Situating CBAs .....................................................................................................42 3 A CASE STUDY: HIST ORY OF THE HILL.......................................................................44 New Arena Groundbreaking Ceremony: A Narrative ............................................................44 Hill District Beginnings ..........................................................................................................46 Post-WWII History .................................................................................................................48 Amputation of the Lower Hill ......................................................................................50 Community Response to Urban Renewal ........................................................................53 Post-Renewal Changes ....................................................................................................56 Recent History and Present Context .......................................................................................58 Entertaining Redevelopment ...........................................................................................60 8


A New Arena ...................................................................................................................62 Summary .................................................................................................................................63 4 METHODOLOGY.................................................................................................................7 1 A Qualitative Case Study ........................................................................................................71 Conducting Interviews .....................................................................................................74 Ethnographic Fieldwork ..................................................................................................76 Methodological Approach ......................................................................................................78 Entering the Field ...................................................................................................................82 Participant Recruitment ...................................................................................................85 Participant Characteristics ...............................................................................................86 Data Analysis ..........................................................................................................................88 Summary .................................................................................................................................90 5 DESERVED AND NEEDED: DRIVING FORCES..............................................................91 Choosing to Negotiate ............................................................................................................91 Moving Forward and Looking Back .......................................................................................92 Retribution .......................................................................................................................94 Leveraging the Past .........................................................................................................96 Hockey in the Hood? ..............................................................................................................98 Local Impacts ..................................................................................................................99 A Segregated Fan Base ..................................................................................................102 A Sweetheart Deal .............................................................................................................104 Major League Effects ....................................................................................................106 Countering Corporate Welfare ......................................................................................108 Summary: Situating CBA Motivations .................................................................................110 6 ONE HILL, MANY VOICES!: PROCESS AND OUTCOME........................................113 The Formation of a Community Coalition ...........................................................................113 The Dream Fund and Pittsburgh United ........................................................................119 Creating Planks ..............................................................................................................121 Negotiations ..........................................................................................................................122 Applying Pressure .................................................................................................................125 Strategies .......................................................................................................................127 Utilizing Resources .......................................................................................................129 Signing and Initial Implementation ......................................................................................132 Provisions of the CBA ...................................................................................................134 Impressions and Implementation Structure ...................................................................136 Developer Perks .............................................................................................................144 Summary: A Long Road .......................................................................................................145 7 PRO-GROWTH IMPLICATIONS: LEARNIN G FROM THE HILL DISTRICT CBA....149 Residents Positions on Growth ............................................................................................149 How Can We Benefit? ...............................................................................................150 9


Raise Your Hand! No Casino on the Hill ......................................................................152 Changing the Dynamics of Redevelopment .........................................................................154 Community Expectations ..............................................................................................155 A New and Improved Approach ....................................................................................156 Toward Community Empowerment ..............................................................................159 A Challenge That Stops Short ..............................................................................................160 CBAs as Developer Burden ...........................................................................................160 The Path of Least Resistance .........................................................................................163 Growth Coalition Adaptations .......................................................................................165 Summary: Pro-Growth Implications .....................................................................................167 8 TOWARD A DECONSTR UCTION OF GROWTH...........................................................169 Contributions ........................................................................................................................171 The CBA Process ..........................................................................................................172 Lessons from the Hill District CBA ..............................................................................173 A Sign of the Times .......................................................................................................175 Value-Conscious Growth ..............................................................................................177 Deconstructing Growth .........................................................................................................180 Limitations and Suggesti ons for Further Research ...............................................................184 APPENDIX A DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION SHEET.......................................................................187 B INTERVIEW GUIDE...........................................................................................................188 C PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SUMMARY..................................................................192 D ARENA TERM SHEET.......................................................................................................193 LIST OF REFERENCES .............................................................................................................197 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH .......................................................................................................209 10


LIST OF TABLES Table page 2-1 Hill District Population Change 1940-2000 ......................................................................68 11


LIST OF FIGURES Figure page 1-1 Hill District neighborhood .................................................................................................27 3-1 The Lower Hill before land clearance, with Civic Arena overlay .....................................65 3-2 No redevelopment sign placed at Freedom Corner ........................................................65 3-3 The Civic Arena .................................................................................................................66 3-4 Hill District maps ...............................................................................................................67 3-5 Renderings of new arena site .............................................................................................69 3-6 New and old arenas. ...........................................................................................................70 5-1 Hill District as situated between central business district and Oakland ..........................111 5-2 Epiphany Church and surrounding area. ..........................................................................112 6-1 One Hill Coalition marches to Mellon Arena for kick-off public meeting, June 2007 ...147 6-2 One Hill Community Benefits Agreement (CBA) Coalition organizational structure ....147 6-3 CBA signing ceremony at Freedom Corner. ....................................................................148 12


Abstract of Dissertation Pres ented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy VALUE-CONSCIOUS GROWTH: A CASE STUDY OF PITTBURGHS FIRST COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENT By Colleen Cain December 2009 Chair: Regina Bures Cochair: Milagros Pea Major: Sociology This dissertation is a case study of Pittsburghs first Community Benefits Agreement (CBA), surrounding the construction of a new hock ey arena in the Hill District neighborhood, which borders the citys central business district. CBAs ar e legally-binding agreements through which communities ensure developer reinvestment in return for public support of a project. Using the Hill District case to explore the phenomenon of CBAs, I address a three-fold research inquiry: 1) Why are communities choosing to nego tiate with developers and pursue benefits through CBAs?; 2) How are communities engaging in and securing CBAs?; and 3) What implications do the Hill District CBA, in partic ular, and CBAs, in general, hold for pro-growth dynamics? Data was generated through interviews with 32 stakeholders, as well as a year-long ethnography. Informed by a grounded theory analysis, my research contributes to the small, but growing body of work on CBAs by presenting a descriptive account of the Hill District campaign and the CBA Coalitions organizational proc ess, structure, and strategies. I consider the perspectives of multiple co mmunityand non-community-based actors, and offer insight into what makes a CBA campaign successful. A dditionally, I argue that the Hill District 13


communitys history of failed urban renewal greatly influenced their decision to pursue benefits. To a lesser extent, local impacts and a large public subsidy for the Penguins hockey franchise also served as driving forces. While these motiva tions are specific to the Hill District case, they also speak to larger phenomena facing many urba n communities within the current era of valuefree growth. Connecting the literatu re on CBAs to that of urban po litical economy, my study further investigates the ways in which these Agreements have impacted pro-growth dynamics. To the larger body of urban political-economic scholarshi p, then, I offer a practical and theoretical assessment of CBAs. My research extends prior work suggesting that residents positions on growth are complex and demonstrates that while CBAs achieve va lue-conscious growth, they do not fundamentally alter dominant standards of grow th or growth machine processes. I conclude by proposing a larger deconstruction of growth that utilizes new standards for city success and raises expectations for priv ate and public sectors. 14


15 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION And unfortunately in these communities, high minority, or highly impoverished communities, they dont have trust in a nyone. They dont trust citizens in those communities, they dont trust politicians th at reflect that community, and they doggone dont trust developers. Hill District Resident and Political Representative In recent years, scholars have pointed to an interesting and troubling convergence of trends in urban areas throughout the Unit ed States (US). Government at various levels has largely withdrawn from the social and economic problems of cities1; simultaneously, state and local governments have attempted to address some of ci ties fiscal troubles by i nvesting in the private market in order to revitalize downtown areas (Wilson 2007). This allia nce between the public and private sectors has strengthened local grow th coalitions, whose members are intent on achieving value-free growth, or growth at any cost. Their redevelopment decisions are geared toward accommodating middle and upper class residents, while giving little consideration to those low-income and often racial/ethnic minor ity populations who already call urban neighborhoods home. Responding to the ways in which globalization and deindustrialization have negatively affected cities, these trends are part of a neo liberal program intent on scaling back government regulations on pr ivate capital and dema nding little from developers in the way of redistribution (Hackworth 2007; Parks and Warren 2009). Such an agenda gained ground in the 1980s, ma nifest in political-economic rhetoric and policies that promoted indivi dual capabilities and limited government involvement. In the 1990s, this approach was compounded by the glob al trope, defined by Wilson (2007) as the rhetoric surrounding globalization which suggests that citiesspecificall y those in the rust 1 The effects of the recently -elected Obama administration have yet to be seen, although there are indicationssuch as the establishment of the White Hous e Office of Urban Affairsof a renewe d focus on urban social and economic problems.


beltneed strengthening and privatization because they are decaying and in competition with each other to fulfill their potential. The global tr ope has thus served to aid in the value-free agenda of growth coalitions through support for trickle-down redevelopment, retrenchment of social service provisions, and renewed ideas about the unproductive poor (p. ix). For cities to survive, the fragmentation of space by class and racein particular the management and isolation of poor black neighbor hoods and other populations that will impede growth goals becomes normalized and necessary (2007:5). In addition to this fragmentation, cooperation between private and public sector sa foundation of neoliberalism at the local level (Hackworth 2007)and negative perceptions of a nything that stands in the way of their growth agenda has resulted in continued exclus ion of the community sector2 in land use decisions. A boom in the construction of new sports facilities since the 1990s is reflective of the current growth atmosphere. Although such venue s are viewed as potentia l saviors of cities in decline, political-economic analyses suggest otherwise. A growing body of research by economists, sociologists, and political scientists shows that sports facilities are not urban saviors; they stimulate little economic growth and fail to address local social problems (Delaney and Eckstein 2003; 2007). In addition, not only is th e amount of public subsidy devoted to sports facility construction unprecedented, but the financia l rewards are increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few large business operators (2003; Collins and Grineski 2007). Knowing that opposition to such redevelopment decisions stands little chance in the face of strong local growth coalitions, some communities are turning to st rategies of negotiation, such as the Community Benefits Agreement (CBA). 2 The community sector is defined by Ho (20078) as residents and community groups. 16


CBAs are a relatively new tool for community involvement and empowerment in major land use decisions and processes (Marcello 2007; Baxamusa 2008a). These legally binding agreements are usually negotiated between privat e developers and community-based coalitions, with some role played by the local govern ment. In return for public support of the (re)development in their neighborhoods, communiti es often call for target ed hiring (sometimes with a living wage), environmental requireme nts and improvements, job training programs, affordable housing, and funds or facilities for community services and programs (Gross, Leroy, and Janis-Aparicio 2005). Despite increased use since their introduction in the late 1990s, CBAs have not been the focus of much scholarly research (Marcello 2007; Cummings 2007). The body of work that does exist tends to be community-focused and a pplied; it appears most often in policy briefs, legal journals, and nonprofit orga nization/philanthropic publications. Much of the information available on CBAs presents a birds eye view of several Agreements, based on anecdotal data. It is especially uncommon to see a sustained fo cus on one or a few campaigns based on primary data collection. Baxamusas work (2008a; 2008b) is a notable exception, wherein he charts the process of two CBA campaigns and offers a num ber of common features of CBA deliberations. Although extant resources on CBA s are useful, they also necessitate complementary academic research that presents a more in-dep th view of why and how communities are choosing to take this strategy. Responding to this need and inspired by political -economic analyses of urban trends, this dissertation is a case st udy of Pittsburghs first CBA. This Agreement surrounds the construction of a new hockey ar ena in the Hill Dist rict neighborhood, which borders the citys central business district (Fi gure 1-1). Broadly, my research uses the Hill District case to explore the phenomenon of CBAs within the current era of value-free growth. 17


The Hill District Community Benefits Agreement: A Case Study In March of 2007, Pittsburgh city officials a nnounced that a new hockey arena would be built directly across the street from the existi ng one, in time for the 201011 hockey season. It will replace the aging Mellon Arena, a structure with what might be called a burdened history. The Mellon Arena (then the Civic Arena) was built in the late 1950s for the Civic Light Opera, a product of urban renewal policies that amputated an area called the Lo wer Hill District and displaced 8,000 residents, most of whom were African American renters. Despite its crowded nature and poor housing stocksu fficient to be considered bli ghted by the powers that were the Lower Hill District was part of a cultu rally and economically vibrant neighborhood. The Arena created a buffer between downtown and the Lower Hill District and began a gradual period of decline and disinvestment that wa s only exacerbated by the race riots of 1968. Today, geographic definitions of the neighbor hood vary. Using the more comprehensive definition subscribed to by the CBA Coaliti on, the Hill District is made up of about 14,500 people (Perkey and Sheridan 2008). Four out of the six subsets claimed by this definition are now characterized by high levels of poverty, renter-occupied housi ng, and a decreasing population, which has left many properties vacant and deteriorating (Pittsburgh Department of City Planning 2000). The neighborhood is still predominantly African American and exists within a racially segregated city in which African Americans make up 27% of the population (2000). The Hill District neighborhood is widely perceived in Pittsburgh as having problems with drugs and other crime, an underclass, racialized ghetto to be avoided; the reality is that some parts of the neighborhood deal more heavily with these problems than others. Many of those who live in and are familiar with the neighborhoo d today consider it to be on the verge of transition, either racially and economically diversifying or moving toward a more livable place 18


for current residents. Indeed, beginning in the 1990s, new mixed income housing began replacing abandoned buildings and aging public housing projects. More recently, the neighborhood has seen an increasing balance amo ng different types of re development projects (Perkey and Sheridan 2008). Within the last few years, the Hill Distri ct faced its most substantial redevelopment challenges since the 1950s. In 2006, it became one of three sites for a proposed Pittsburgh casino and the operators applicatio n was attached to a new hockey arena. Due in part to a small but vocal anti-casino movement, the application based in the Hill Distri ct was not chosen. Responding to threats of the Penguins hockey fran chise to leave the c ity, however, the City, County, and Commonwealth of Pennsylvania altere d funding and plans for a new arena stayed intact. Because the site for the new arena is not reside ntial, displacement is not an issue to the extent that it was during urban renewal. Nevertheless, residents and members of businesses and organizations in the Hill District were determined not to let history repeat itself. Following more than a year of negotiations, in August 2008 the Hill District CBA was signed by the One Hill Coalition, Pittsburgh City and Allegheny County officials, as well as the Penguins hockey franchise. Currently in its implementation stage, the Agreement legally binds these latter entities to provide various benefits, includ ing a job referral center and f unding toward a grocery store, as well as the inclusion of community input in a neighborhood master planning process. A Community Benefits Movement CBAs have been characterized as a way to lift all boats, to achieve growth with justice (Meyerson 2006), and as the grassroots Davids versus the de veloper Goliaths (Leavitt 2006:258). Julian Gross (2007), dire ctor of the Community Benef its Law Center, offers the following definition for a CBA: a legally binding c ontract (or set of rela ted contracts), setting 19


forth a range of community benefits regardi ng a development project, and resulting from substantial community involvement (par. 11). V ital to his definition is an inclusive organizing effort and the enforceability of the contract. CBA campaigns are increasingly visible in ci ties across the country (Mulligan-Hansel and LeRoy 2008). According to Gross, Leroy and Jani s-Aparicio (2005), CBAs are part of a larger community benefits movement: In the regions where the movement has taken root, the community benefits movement is reframing the public discourse on economic de velopment. No longer limited to narrow discussions of tax revenue, the dialo gue on development policy is now commonly characterized by spirited debates over living wage jobs, park space, affordable housing and proximity to transit co rridors. For the first time in a generation, this movement has caused a broad range of public officials, planne rs, and community-based organizations to recognize the need to play a leadership role in land use planning, and to use public dollars and land use authority in strategic ways to improve job opportunities and the quality of life for low-income communities (P. 6). Nevertheless, CBAs are still relatively novel and rare (Gerber 2007:5). Estimates of the number of CBAs in effect in the United States range from about 25 to near 50, depending on the source (Meyerson 2006; Lavine 2009).3 Although CBAs have been signed in roughly 20 c ities, the state of California boasts the most CBAs to date. According to Salkin a nd Lavine (2007), the abundance of California CBAs likely results from a combination of authorized development agreementswhich are negotiated between local governments and developersand an environment conducive to political activism. In most stateseven t hose in which other CBAs have been negotiated development agreements are not authorized. New York State has the second highest volume, although its CBAs have been fra ught with criticism (2007). 3 This range might be accounted for by the fact that it is difficult to stay abreast of local information about new CBAs and also because, as Cummings (2007) asserts, what is considered a CBA in practice is still being debated. 20


CBAs have been signed in a wide variety of circumstances (LeRoy and Purinton 2005). There are, however, some common projects that prompt CBAs, such as: development by institutions of higher education; sports facilities; housing initia tives; brown field remediation; and those surrounding access to wireless internet (Salkin and Lavine 2007). In general, CBA coalitions are comprised of numerous community groups; in fact, criticis m of New York Citys CBAs is rooted in the fact that they did not meet this criter ion (Bechtel 2007). Further, CBAs are characterized by their focus on a single proj ect and their ability to address a range of community interests, not just immediat e development impacts (Gross 2007). Ho (2007) notes that CBAs are being used most often in mature urban markets, where there is high real estate dema nd and where community-based groups have organizing experience. There is also evidence that some CBAs are b ecoming more regional in orientation (MulliganHansel and LeRoy 2008). This was the case, for example, in Milwaukee, when the Good Jobs and Livable Neighborhoods Coalition was able to secure a CBA at the co unty level. According to Gross (2007), CBAs tend take one of tw o forms: a private CBA, negotiated between community-based organizations and a developer; or a public CBA, which involves an inclusive CBA campaign, but is part of a development agr eement. The major distinction between the two is enforceability, with the private CBA being more ideal in this sense. Public CBAs, however, do provide a framework that encourages particip ation of local government in CBA negotiations, which can be beneficial fo r communities (Salkin 2007). Origins The first CBA was signed in 1998: the Ho llywood and Highland Center CBA in Los Angeles, California (Salkin and Lavine 2007). The 2001 LA Staples Center CBA is often mistaken for the first because it was the first of its kind, i.e. the first full-fledged CBA. Indeed, the latter is often thought of as a model, given its organi zing process and the unprecedented 21


benefits garnered from the developer (Marcello 2007). The community benefits movement has been inspired by a number of rela ted movements and development a pproaches. It is a derivative of various labor-related campaigns, including the living wage movement, which surfaced in the late 1980s (LeRoy and Purinton 2005). This is ev ident in the labor-comm unity collaborations within some CBA coalitions and speaks to a larger trend of alignment between these two interests (Rhomberg and Simmons 2005). As Rhomberg and Simmons (2005) assert, labor unions are aligning with other citizenship movements and looking for new allies in local communities. In recent years, unions have good reason to desire community alliances. Union density has decreased, fewer employers look favorably upon collective bargaining, and legal institutions have failed to protect labor rights (2005). Community-labor coalitions were estab lished in the 1980s, but this second generation of alliances has learned from past mistakes and is more prepared to deal with the kinds of workplace and community issues that low income and working class people face daily (p. 26). In addition, CBAs have been described as the project-specific version of smart growth (LeRoy and Purinton 2005:4). The smart growth approach, which emerged in the 1970s and was more formally named in the 1990s, maintains that development should entail such provisions as mixed use, transit-accessible jobs, affordable housing, and contaminated land reuse. CBA campaigns often desire the same, but they raise specific community priorities, such as local hiring and needed amenities (2005). Moreover, many CBA campaigns draw from the environmental justice movement and sustainable development approaches. In some cases, this results from coalition members former and/ or continuing involvement in such movements (Parks and Warren 2009). At the same time, th ese movements are themselves utilizing CBAs; Agyeman (2005) refers to CBAs as one of th e deliberative tool[s] being used by the 22


environmental justice movement. Similarly, CBAs allow for community empowerment and input, both of which fulfill requirements of a sustainable development approach (Baxamusa 2008a). A Unique Tool CBAs and the community benefits movement differ from other development-related agreements and movements for a number of reas ons. Unlike other private land-use agreements: 1) CBAs entail a coalition with pl ural interests, which must deliberate amongst itself first; 2) CBA demands and the agreement itself are broadbased and not just related to the physical impacts of the coming project; 3) CBAs usually i nvolve direct negotiation with the developer instead of through city/politicians; and 4) CBA s can be amended without legislative action (Baxamusa 2008a). Although public CBAs can be part of larger development agreements (sometimes called public-private pa rtnerships), the two should not be confused (Marcello 2007). Coalitions in California, for example, have benefited from incorporating their CBAs into development agreements, but such agreements are not in and of themselves typically beneficial. As mentioned above, development agreements are negotiated between developers and local government officials or agencies. As a result, development agr eements without CBAs are likely to undermine public participation because th ey are negotiated behind closed doors and bilaterally. By the time the community gets the in formation it needs, it is too late for genuine inclusion. Even when those involved in development agreements ask for community input, they tend to want feedback about physical and operational elements of the development only. CBAs go beyond these aspects to create a dialogue about direct community benefits (Marcello 2007). It is also important to di stinguish CBAs from the not-inmy-backyard (NIMBY) approach (Marcello 2007; Meyerson 2006). Those who take a NIMBY stance are completely opposed to a 23


potential development in their neighborhood, wh ereas CBAs require a communitys support for a development in return for benefits. In fact, CBA s are somewhat defined by the fact that they do not simply oppose a project; they present a pos itive alternative visi on instead (LeRoy and Purinton 2005). As LeRoy and Purinton (2005) state: There is an axiom within the movement to reform economic development that merely bei ng against bad practices is not enough. That is, to remain politically viable, reform coalitions also must stand for a positive reform agenda informed by popular values, even as they criticize ineffective deals or failed policies (p. 18). Research Aims For this dissertation, I relied on two qualitative methods to explore the phenomenon of CBAs. First, interviews were conducted with 32 involved stakeholders, including community activists, local politicians, business owners, a nd residents. Second, the interviews were supplemented by fieldwork, which totaled approximate ly one year. As a participant observer, I attended a variety of relevant meetings and events in the Hill District and th e city at large. In addition, as part of the ethnogra phic component, a number of docum ents and media sources were used as references and as support. These ra nged from published documents (including legal papers, media reports, and press releases) to arch ival records (such as minutes of meetings) to artifacts (items like flyers and meeting announcements used for mobilizing). Analysis of interview and ethnographic data was aided by Atlas.ti. Using grounded theory as an analytic tool, I was able to refine a three-fold research inquiry: Why are communities choosing to negotiate with developers and pursue benefits through CBAs? How are communities engaging in and securing CBAs? What implications do the Hill Di strict CBA, in particular, and CBAs, in general, hold for pro-growth dynamics? 24


The Hill District CBA is one case among many, but it offers important insight into the phenomenon of CBA campaign motivations, processes, and outcomes. To the existing small, but growing body of research on CBAs, I contribute the following: an in-depth study of a CBA campaign that utilizes primary data generation; a consideration for the perspectives of multiple communityand non-community-based stakeholde rs; and insight into what makes a CBA campaign successful. To the la rger body of urban political-economic scholarship, I offer a practical and theoretical assessment of CBAs Not only do I locate CBAs within both local histories and extra-local phenomen on, but I also explore the ways in which these Agreements have impacted pro-growth dynamics. Dissertation Overview The next three chapters set the stage for the remainder of this dissertation. In Chapter Two, I locate CBAs within a larg er body of literature on urban redevelopment, illustrating that CBAs have evolved out ofand respond toa series of urban redevelopment challenges, including a boom in the constructio n of sports facilities. Chapter Three situates the case study within its particular historic al and present context, a cont entious framework in which CBA organizing arose. In Chapter Four, I expound on my methodology, justifying the use of a case study approach, and offering details of data generation and analysis. Three analytic chapters follow, each of which addresses one of the questions raised in the section above. In the first, I examine the motivations behind the Hill District communitys decision to negotiate a CBA. I argue that the communitys history greatl y influenced both their decision not to oppose the new arena and their desire to benefit from it. To a lesser extent, local impacts and a large public subsidy for the Penguins al so served as driving fo rces. I connect these motivations to larger phenomena facing urban communities across the country. Chapter Six addresses the how question by offering a descri ptive account of: the events surrounding the 25


CBA campaign; the One Hill CBA Coalitions organizational process, structure, and strategies; and an assessment of the outcome. In Chapter Seven, I address the third and final inquiry of my research aim: understanding the implications of the Hill District CBA, in pa rticular, and CBAs, in general, for pro-growth dynamics. I first extend prior research sugges ting that residents positions on growth are complex. I then argue that while CBAs ach ieve value-conscious growth, they do not fundamentally alter dominant standards of growth or growth machine proce sses. I conclude the dissertation by summarizing key co ntributions, proposing a larger deconstruction of growth, and suggesting areas for further research. 26


Figure 1-1. Hill District neighborhood. The neighbor hood as centrally located within the city of Pittsburgh. (Source: Pittsburgh Department of City Planning. Map created for author by Jarrod West.) 27


28 CHAPTER 2 REVIEW OF LITERATURE: SITUATING COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENTS In the first chapter, I provided an introduction into the topic a nd setting of this case study. Here, I locate Community Benefits Agreements within a larger body of research on urban redevelopment, particularly th rough a political-economic lens Ho (2007) argues that CBAs have in part evolved out of a history of failed urban redeve lopment policies (par. 89). Baxamusa (2008a) describes the community benefits movement as a reactionary one. As such, it is responding to recent urban trends and postindustrial redevelopment decisions, which have contributed to rising inequality. Similarly, this literature revi ew posits CBAs as having grown out of a history of redevelopment challenges faced by urban communities and responding to those challenges they continue to confront. This history highlights the contentious relationship between residents, who tend to appreciate land in terms of its use value, and members of the growth coalition, who are interested in enhancing its exchange value. First, I briefly clarify what urban sc holars mean by the terms neighborhood and community. Next, I draw heavily from Logan and Molotchs Urban Fortunes (1987) in order to further explain the relationship between use and exchange values, connec ting the latter to the concept of the growth machine. I then focu s on three major forms of redevelopmenturban renewal, gentrification, and dow ntown revitalizationthat have threatened neighborhood fabric, defined by existing residents in terms of use valu e. Because downtown revitalization is most pertinent to the situation in th e Hill District, I give the most attention to that phenomenon. I conclude with a discussion of increasing opposition to sports facilities, a nother issue germane to this case study.


Defining Neighborhood and Community The terms neighborhood and community are of ten used interchangeably, although some scholars note a subtle distincti on between the two. As Gottdiene r and Hutchinson (2006) state, a neighborhood refers to any sociospatial enviro nment where primary relations among residents prevail (p. 194). On the other hand, they define community as a connection to local organizations, the structure of which is shaped by urban planners and govern ment officials. As their definitions suggest, both terms have a ge ographic and social connotation. However, the term neighborhood is firstly associated with physi cal space, while the predominant association of community is cultural, emotional, or social ties. An example from Jacobs (1961) further illustrates this distinction. She describes the way in which public safety, achieved by a variety of eyes on the street, sense of belonging, and social cohesiveness help to make a neighborhood a community (LeGates and Stout 1996:103). Where Use and Exchange Values Meet In their seminal work, Urban Fortunes (1987), Logan and Molotch draw from Marxian concepts to characterize the ne ighborhood as a meeting place of use and exchange values. For residents, the land on which they live is a source of use values. These include: the everyday use of local goods and services in order to satisfy concrete needs; a variety of relationships that create networks of informal support; a sense of familiarity and identity, which is often connected to common race/ethnicity; and agglomeration benef its, or those use values which overlap and accumulate. Those who seek exchange values, however, perceive that same land as a real estate commodity. Stemming from these concepts, then, is the seemingly inherent tension between those who view land in terms of its exchange value and those who relate to it more intimately. For those who seek to enhance exchange va lues, the use values of urban residents particularly those with low inco mesare an impediment. These re sidents generate little income 29


from rent and consumption in general, and thei r presence can deter the settling of those with higher incomes in urban neighborhoods (Logan a nd Molotch 1987). And because residents tend to have little control over mark et forces, the result of exchange value-based modification of land use can vary from demographic ch ange to displacement. From th e point of view of residents then, the creation and defense of the use va lues of the neighborhood is the central urban question (p. 99). The future (and fortune) of a neighborhood is thus determined by this intersection between external exchange va lue pressures and internal use values. The Growth Machine Molotch (1976) effectively connected exchange values with pro-growth elites when he forged the concept of the city as growth machine. In doing so, he established the following: progrowth coalitions rule local politics in the United States; their policies revolve around land development and will shape the urban future accordingly (Logan, Whaley, and Crowder 1999). Molotch (1976) originally described the city as growth machine because of the way in which local land-based elites work through politicians to realize growth as the ultimate goal. Growth is manifest in terms of population, basic industry, labor force participation, commerce, financial activity, and land development. Regardless of political affiliation or fragmentation, suggested Molotch, this is one agenda upon wh ich all involved parties agree. In his later work with Logan (1987), the growth machine concept was fine-tuned and described as an apparatus of interlocking progrowth associations and governmental units, united behind the doctrine of value-free developm ent (p. 32). According to this doctrine, land use should be determined by the free market only and at any cost, without consideration for other factors, such as the ways in which growth mi ght impact local residents negatively. The various actors who participate in the growth machine in clude politicians, whose involvement gives rise to political opportunitie s, local mediamore growth mean s an increase in readershipand 30


utility providers (Logan and Molotch 1987). Enti ties that make up auxi liary players include cultural institutions, organized labor, self-employe d professionals, small retailers, and corporate capitalists (p. 81). Extending the work of Logan and Molotch, Delaney and Eckstein (2003) use the term local growth coalition to refer to an institutional alliance between the local corporate community, including media, and the local government. They find the term coalition more appropriate than machine for two reasons: 1) coalitions do not always get their own way, something not implied with the term machine; and 2) it allows for much more empirical variation in the[ir] strength and unity (p. 10). Pro-growth elites argue that new developmen t will improve fiscal health, employment, and income mobility, as well as eliminate social problems and satisfy public taste (Logan and Molotch 1987). Although some of these claims are sometimes true, new development more often results in unfulfilled promises. Most evidence suggests that local growth merely redistributes jobs, and it is hard to tell whether growth simply attracts higher wage workers or actually benefits existing residents (1987). When promised jobs arrive, they tend to offer low wages and low skill jobs; sometimes employees ar e later laid off when the company relocates again (Fuller 2006). Thus, growth may actually ex acerbate segregation and inequality; it is not necessarily in the interest of public good and is more likely to place wealth into the hands of growth elites (Logan and Molotch 1987). The tendency of pro-growth elites toward goals of development rather than redistribution (Loga n, Whaley, and Crowder 1999) has a direct and often detrimental effect on t hose who appreciate land in terms of its use value. Neighborhood Vulnerability Logan and Molotch (1987) assert, Poor peoples neighborhoods are the most vulnerable to social and physical transformation, both by government bureaucrats and by property 31


entrepreneurs (p. 112). Indeed, historical and continuing evidence of their argument is apparent in three major forms of urban redevelopment: urba n renewal; gentrificati on and the back to the city movement; and recent downt own revitalization. These have had detrimental effects for lowincome residents of the city, ranging from the transformation of neighborhood fabric to the uprooting of entire neighborhoods. All illustrate the vulnerability of nei ghborhood use values to the pressures of exchanges values. Urban Renewal In the early 1940s, architects and planners, bus iness interests, and government achieved common ground through the concept of urban rene wal. Using eminent domain, blighted land would be cleared and sold to pr ivate interests for rebuilding that would be publically controlled (Lowe 1967). The Federal Housing Act passed in 1949, Title One of which provided loans and grants that enabled cities to im prove blighted areas (Crowley 2005). Its stated goal was also to provide a decent home and suitable living e nvironment for every American family (Lowe 1967:33). The Act granted local governments th e power and the right to establish public authorities for land acquisition a nd clearance activities (Ferman 1996). A 1954 revision then allowed for the use of urban renewal funds for commercial construction, not just projects of a predominan tly residential character (Crowley 2005). Even though urban renewal was rhetorically linked to a housing-production goal, its realization at the local level and subsequently the national leve l was more focused on renewing the tax base of the central city in order to mo tivate middle and upper income white s to move back after massive post-WWII suburbanization (Henig 1 982:24). Instead of replacing bulldozed blighted areas of the city with affordable housing and maintaining some type of community presence, cities used urban renewal funds to accommodate the corporat e sector and wealthier residents (Gottdiener 32


and Hutchinson 2006). Sometimes this meant the building of sports and other entertainment facilities, as was the case in Pittsburgh. Fainstein (2005) suggests that that displacemen t was often justified by claims that those uprooted would be moving to places with better living conditions; the reality was that it created massive housing crises, especially for low-income families. Even if urban renewal did improve the physical environments of some, it usually did so at the cost of hist oric ties and community cohesion (p. 8). Moreover, it did not affect all neighborhoods equa lly; the sense of threat posed to black neighborhoods especially is captured in the expression urb an removal is Negro removal (Fullilove 2004:61). Pe rhaps it is not surpri sing that resettlement was inadequately planned and the negative impacts on the poor unappreciated, for those who make decisions surrounding removal are not the same ones who face displacement (2004). Gentrification Kennedy and Leonard (2001) suggest that gentrifi cation is currently in its third wave. The first took place during urban renewal of the 1950s and 60s, the second during the beginning of the back to the city movement of the late 1970s and early 80s. The current wave is distinguished by the increasing role of states, as well as globa l capital markets, larg e corporations, and big investors (Bridge 1995; Gotham 2005; Smith and Graves 2005). In addi tion, gentrification is occurring in a variety of sites; it takes many form s, can be commercial in addition to residential, and can involve new construction, no t just renovation (Lees 2003). Baby boomer empty nesters and young profession als have led the most recent movement back to the city (LeRoy and Purinton 2005). Not only is the U.S. population aginga trend referred to as the graying of Americabut th e composition of families is changing as well. Couples are choosing to have fe wer children or no children at all (U.S. Census Bureau 2009). These trendsin addition to an increased preference for urban lifestyles among younger 33


generations (LeRoy and Purinton 2005)have result ed in a renewed need and demand for more dense mixed-use neighborhoods in urban areas (Blackwell and Treuhaft 2008). Given these demographic and geographic shifts, more develo pers are calling urban projects their niche (LeRoy and Purinton 2005). They are some of the growth elites who encourage gentrification because it enhances exchange values. Gentrification increases tax revenues (Kennedy and Leonard 2001), allows for the colle ction of higher rents, and makes the city more attractive to future investors who will continue to promote growth (Logan and Molotch 1987). Scholars are increasingly quick to point out that gentrification does not follow the same trajectory in every city. Much of the literature on the current wave is focused on the specifics of time and place in order to prevent inaccurate assu mptions and generalizations regarding patterns of neighborhood change (e.g., Smith and Graves 2005; Gotham 2005; Van Criekingen and Decroly 2003). This literature incorporates more nuanced experien ces of gentrification that take into account the nature of intera ctions between old and new residents, the potential benefits for the former, and changing demographics of the latter (Freeman 2006; Taylor 2002). Nevertheless, all existing residents feel the vulnerability of use values upon changing street flavor and cultural fabr ic, as well as new community l eadership and institutions brought about by gentrification (Kennedy and Leonard 2001). Although owners may stand to benefit from increased property values (Freeman 2006), renters with no property to sellor otherwise reap benefits fromfeel the most adverse effect s. This phenomenon continues to raise questions about displacement. In some cases, the same residents who faced displacement during urban renewal were decades later pressured to move again, this time under the guise of revitalization (Muiz 1998). Resulting from higher rent, taxe s, and costs of goods and services, involuntary displacement is most likely to affect those who are the poorest. This also means the 34


disproportionate displacement of non-white residents because they make up a significant portion of the urban poor (Kennedy and Leonard 2001). Downtown Revitalization In recent years, government at various levels has largely withdrawn from the social and economic problems of cities (Baxamusa 2008a). At the same time, however, state and local governments have attempted to address some of ci ties fiscal troubles by i nvesting in the private market in order to revitalize downtown areas (W ilson 2007). Illustrating the ways in which local growth processes link-up to exterior poli tical, economic, and social forces (Gotham 2000; Jessop, Peck, and Tickell 1999), such redevelopment decisions are part of a neoliberal agenda intent on scaling back government regulations on private capital and demanding little from developers in the way of redistributi on (Hackworth 2007; Parks and Warren 2009). These trends have been greatly influe nced by processes of globalization and deindustrialization. Because manufacturing and indus try in cities greatly d eclined in the last quarter of the 20th century, the service and consumer-culture i ndustries have grown. As Zukin (1991) suggests, consumption is not necessari ly driving the postindustrial economy, but its organization has just as importa nt an effect on economic and soci al structure as the organization of production (p. 259). As a resu lt, downtown areas have been pr omoted as fun places, where an increasingly educated and affluent middle and upper class population can go for entertainment and cultural activities (Curry, Sc hwirian, and Woldoff 2004:13). This is indicative of the shift toward a symbolic economy based on tourism, media, and entertainment (Zukin 1995). Cities that were once economically dependent on i ndustry are now concer ned with attracting corporations, tourists, and suburban residents to downtown areas through commercial initiatives that engageand seek to reconstitutethe ur ban environment as a multifaceted space of consumption and capital accumulation (Friedman, Andrews, and Silk 2004:121). 35


Led by their respective growth coalitions, citi eseach with their own history and political structurecompete to attract th ese commercial initiatives. According to Wilson (2007), the rhetoric surrounding globalization (t he global trope) suggests that cities, specifically rust belt cities, need strengthening and privatization b ecause they are decaying and in competition with each other to fulfill their potential. Pro-growth el ites are thus persuaded to create attractions and various places of consumption geared toward le isure, sport, and culture in order to stay competitive (2007). In their attempt to lure such attractions, as well as large corporations, they commonly offer substantial subsidy packages (F uller 2006), leading to pub lic-private alliances and even stronger growth coalitions (Logan a nd Molotch 1987; Delaney and Eckstein 2003). This phenomenon has also resulted in what Baxa musa (2008a) refers to as unregulated land use development whereby local governments are gi ving constitutionally protected rights to developers (p. 263). He cites one case, for example, in which a development agreement in West Hollywood limited the power of the local govern ment because it was unable to apply new ordinances to a development that had already begun. The global trope, which gained momentum in the 1990s, has also served to aid in the value-free agenda of growth machines thr ough support for trickle-down redevelopment, retrenchment of social service provisions, and renewed ideas about the unproductive poor (Wilson 2007:ix). The trope implies the explicit and implicit management and isolation of poor black neighborhoods and other populations that will impede these goals (2007). Cooperation between private and public sector sa foundation of neoliberalism at the local level (Hackworth 2007)and negative perceptions of a nything that stands in the way of their growth agenda has resulted in continued excl usion of the community sector in land use decisions. 36


Sports Facilities as Revitalization Trend As indicated above, one physical form that the symbolic economy takes is that of cultural attractions such as museums, parks, and monume nts, especially those that are geared toward more affluent people and groups in the city (Zukin 1995). It is not surprising, then, that there has been a rise in urban stadium and arena construction in recent decades. Further, professional sports are both city based and c ity relevant, as cities provide the labor force, the consumer market, the media, the capital, and the powerful people willing to make it all happen (Curry, Shwirian and Woldoff 2004:11) Sports facilities are even seen as potential saviors of cities still recovering from deindustrialization and populat ion loss. Because Pittsburghs first CBA surrounds the building of a hockey arena, I present below a brief review of the literature on sports facilities as a form of urban redevelopment. More than $20 billion was spent on major lea gue sports facilities during the 20th century (Keating 1999). In the 1990s alone, more than $ 16 billion was spent on stadiums and arenas for both professional and college s ports (Cohen 1999). This financ ing largely comes from public sources, a trend that became common in stadium-building afte r World War II (Zaretsky 2001). As Curry, Schwirian, and Woldoff (2004) state: The public funding of sports facilities is an issue in every major city in the United States, and in many second-ti er cities as well (p. 3). In addition, the number of pr ofessional sports teams has grown in re cent years, but not so much that the demand for them is met. Owners are willing to relocate teams if it m eans new facilities and increased revenue (2004), as evid ent for example, in the move of the original Browns football franchise from Cleveland to Baltimore (which be came the Ravens). Thus, cities go to extreme measures for franchises in order to b ecome or remain major league. Delaney and Eckstein (2003) describe the r ecent boom in stadium development in waves, the first of which took place from roughly 1990-94. This wave relied heavily upon the promises 37


of economic development. According to this lo gic, by helping to put the city on the map, sports facilities make a city more visible to all, but most importantly, to those making decisions regarding investment (Logan and Molotch 1987:80). One strategy that local growth coalitions heavily used in addition to tourism revenue was that of tangible economic benefits for the local community, including new jobs through construc tion and daily operation (Delaney and Eckstein 2003). Logan and Molotch cite one St. Petersbur g, Florida, city official who insisted that building a new stadium would be beneficial beca use When you consider what it would mean in new business for hotels, jobs, pride, tourismth en its a real good deal. We believe for every dollar spent inside a stadium, seven are spent outside (Roderi ck 1984, as cited in Logan and Molotch 1987:80). New sports facilities are also said to create revenue through the accommodation of more wealthy fans (Curry, Schwirian, and Woldoff 20 04). This is made possible through such amenities as an increase in luxury suites, seats on club levels, and venues selling food and merchandise (Fri edman, Andrews and Silk 2004). Economic promises, however, are rarely fulf illed (Swindell and Rosentraub 1998; Wilbur 2000). As Delaney and Eckstein (2003; 2007) a ssert, a growing body of research by economists, sociologists, and political scientis ts almost unanimously shows that sports facilities are not urban saviors; they stimulate little economic growth and fail to address local social problems. Research shows that there is a honeymoon period for new stadiums, but there are very few ripple effects and fewer peopl e are hired once the effect of newness wears off (2003:27). Contrary to the St. Petersbur g city official cited above, the one-stop spending inside stadiums takes away from the revenue of lo cal surrounding businesses (Wilbur 2000). Stadiums and arenas are actually used infrequently, and for short periods of time at that (Delaney and Eckstein 2007), thus creating mostly low-wage a nd part-time jobs with few benefits (p. 348). 38


In addition, the current surge in stadium and arena building is unique not only because the amount of public contribution is unprecedente d, but also because the financial rewards increasingly end up in private pockets (D elaney and Eckstein 2003:2). As Collins and Grineski (2007) observe, sports facilities do not necessarily generate wealth, but rather redistribute it in such a way th at it becomes concentrated in th e hands of a few large business operators. In the second wave of recent stadium build ing beginning in the late 1990s, local growth coalitions began to rely heav ily on the related promises of improved city self-esteem or collective consciousness in order to secure public funding (Delaney and Eckstein 2003:4). Knowing that economic promises were often unful filled, supporters of dow ntown sports facilities began claiming that stadiums help to sell an image of a city as world cl ass and big league. (Curry, Schwirian, and Woldoff 2004; Logan and Molotch 1987). As Logan and Molotch (1987) argue, sports teams have an important ideological use, helping instill civic pride in business through a jingoistic logic (p. 80). Sports that motivate entire cities to pull for the home turf are most useful in boosting a locality, wh ich is why there is less support for more individualistic sports, such as swimming or track, among pro-growth elites (p. 80). According to Curry and his colleagues (2004), community self-es teem promises were realized in Columbus, Ohio, for example, when the building of two spor ts facilities there, a hockey arena and a soccer stadium, aided in transforming the city from a college town to a major le ague sports town. Nevertheless, grassroots opposition to either the bu ilding of sports facilities or their public funding is on the rise, led by taxpayers and urba n residents (Delaney and Eckstein 2007). Bennett and Spirou (2006) argue that pro-growth elites stad ium-building/upgrading plans are often dependent on how well the opposition speaks up and garners political support. In the case 39


of three Chicago stadium project s in the late 1980s and early 1990stwo involving construction and one an upgradethe authors note a co rrelation between the success of neighborhood organizing and socioeconomic makeup. The nei ghborhood able to achieve the most extensive negotiations with the Cubs baseba ll franchise was also the one with a long history of active community organizations and a winning dem ographic profile: home to large numbers of middle-class property owners, including a substantial number of pr ofessional persons (2006:45). The poor and poor-to-working cla ss neighborhoods affected by the other two projects, respectively, were less su ccessful in their attempts to se cure community benefits or halt construction. However, the authors conclude that there does not seem to be a hard and fast rule as to whether neighborhood challenges will suc ceed. A history of activist organizations and higher socioeconomic status helps, but neither necessarily determines success or failure (2006). Delaney and Eckstein (2007) are more pessim istic; they state: Although we would never conclude that grass-roots opposition is a waste of tim e, the empirical data strongly suggest that it matters very little when it comes to stadium initia tive outcomes (p. 350). In fact, drawing from a number of case studies, they conclude that the process of using public dollars for private stadiums is far from democratic (Delaney and Eckstein 2003). The building of two stadiums in Pittsburgh in the late 1990s demonstrates their point. In 1997, voters defeated Plan A, a proposed five percent sales tax increase, part of which would have funded new stadiums. But even the strong, well-financed and visible opposi tion could not stop Plan B, which was led by Pittsburghs powerful and united local growth coal ition (2003). This backup plan was passed in 1998 and involved the reallo cation of funds from th e regional-asset district tax for 30 years (Curry, Shwirian, and Woldoff 2004). Thus, de spite widespread loca l opposition, the money came out of public funds. 40


Regardless of the fact that s ports facilities provide little in the way of long-term economic benefits and urban revitalizati on beyond their immediate surroundings and even though they face increasing opposition, their construction conti nues. A few reasons might account for this contradiction. First, some local elites, particul arly those in the corporate community, are sports fans excited at the prospect of doing business wi th team owners and athletes. Second, stadiums are seen as a recruiting tool for top executives, who are wowed by elites major league city. Lastly, given declining tax bases, local political leaders feel pre ssured to attract more money to their city and see stadiu ms as a means to this end (Delan ey and Eckstein 2007). Perhaps the global trope and the symbolic economy are influen tial enough for cities to be allured by claims of world class status and increased tourism, but it is evident that promises of local economic benefits are rarely fulfilled. Given this, and knowing that opposition may stand little chance in the face of strong local growth coalitions, so me communities are turning to strategies of negotiation. In hopes of ensuring some benefits a nd holding developers accountable, a few communities have negotiated CBAs around sports fac ilities. According to Lavine (2009), three CBAs in effect deal directly with the building of a sports facility (A tlantic Yards, Brooklyn; Yankee Stadium, Bronx; Penguins Arena, Pittsburgh) and another two involve developments that surround existing sports venues (B allpark Village, San Diego a nd Staples Center, LA). CBA campaigns gain leverage if they confront larg e projects with substantia l public subsidies and require specific locations (Mar cello 2007; Salkin 2007). Thus, CBA s are particularly well-suited for the construction of sports facilities, which are increasingly built with public money (Zaretckey 2001) and often demand or de sire a large open space on prime land. 41


Summary: Situating CBAs Throughout this chapter, I have drawn heav ily from political-economic scholarship to illustrate the urban redevelopment challenges out of which CBAs have evolved and to which they respond. The idea of neighborhood as a m eeting place of use and exchange values is manifest in the histories of urban renewal a nd gentrification, and the ever-present push to revitalize downtowns through such ta ctics as the construc tion of sports facili ties. Instead of working within a context of inequality resul ting from post-industrial abandonment, communities are now facing value-free growth conditions with negative side effects: polarization of the labor market, the rise of low wage work, increased pov erty, and the threat of displacement (Cummings 2007; Parks and Warren 2009). CBAs present a new model of community organization whereby broad based coalitions respond to the ways in which increased m obility of capitaltied to globalization and deindustrializationhas affected U.S. cities (Mulligan-Hansel and LeRoy 2008). As part of the new accountable development movement co ined by Parks and Warren (2009), CBAs take advantage of those aspects of the post-i ndustrial, service-sect or economy which are geographically bound. In the case of sports facilities, for exampl e, neither fans nor those who attend to them can be outsourced (2009), there by giving CBA Coalitions more leverage. CBAs also reflect and challenge a neoliberal dynamic by requiring private negot iations to achieve an end of public benefits (2009). Ultimately, CBAs attempt to counter the pe rsistent power imbalance among public, private, and community sectors evidenced th roughout this literature review, inserting neighborhood coalitions into land-use decisions and their outcomes (Ho 2007). In the next chapter, I situate this case studyinvolvi ng one such neighborhood coalitionwithin its 42


particular historical and present context, a contentious framework in which CBA organizing arose. 43


44 CHAPTER 3 A CASE STUDY: HISTORY OF THE HILL Chapter Two provided a review of the literature on urban redevelopment and neighborhood as it relates to Community Benefits Agreements. In this chapter, I situate Pittsburghs first CBA campaign within the historical and present co ntext of the Hill District neighborhood. I begin with a personal narrative describing the new arena groundbreaking ceremony. I offer a brief account of the Hill District pre-World War Two, describing its beginnings, demographic changes, and mounting plans on the part of the ci tys growth coalition fo r its reconstruction. I then present a more lengthy account of its postWorld War Two history, a time period of much relevance to the current situation because of th e devastating effects of urban renewal policies, which were called upon to make room for the Civi c Arena in the late 195 0s. This history is followed by a description of more recent chan ges in the neighborhood, as well as its current demographic make-up and geographic boundaries. La stly, I describe the latest redevelopment context, in which the CBA campaign originated. New Arena Groundbreaking Ceremony: A Narrative 11:00am Thursday, August 14, 2008 There was a tent set up at the entrance to the groundbreaking site where hard hats were being handed out to VIP guests. Of course, they were just for show: no hard hats necessary to be shielded from the dirt of a few shovels made from hockey sticks. Once I got to the top of the gradual hill of dirt and gravel, I ran into people from the One H ill Community Benefits Agreement (CBA) Coalition. As decided at their la st meeting, they were th ere as individuals, not as One Hill representatives, for th e CBA was set to be signed the following week. There were a few hundred people there, lots of young professionals and people of various ages in hockey jerseys, the majority of them white.


As the event was about to begin, people we re chanting, Lets go Pens. The announcer said something about consecrating the land. Th e Boy Scouts presented th e colors, followed by the singing of the National An them, barely audible through a set of scratchy speakers. From where we were standing, behind the rope that designated where the VIP s were sitting, it was hard to tell just how many se ats were filled and who was speaking. Someone from the Sports and Exhibition Authority, the new arena owners, gave a speech. I noti ced that no One Hill Coalition members were clapping like the others. The Mayor eventually took the microphone. He thanked the state level, gaming, and Penguins ownership, as well as some local politicians. Finally unlike Pennsylvanias governor or Allegheny Countys executive who sp oke before himhe thanked the Hill District Community. I dont know if everyone else was clapping or not, probably because the loudest clappers were near me. He said that today wa s also about breaking ground on the future of this community and about connec ting downtown to the Hill. The groundbreaking followed, led by six men: me mbers of a powerful growth coalition of local and state politicians and Penguins leadersh ip. Fans started up their chant again. Afterward, I stuck around for a little while as peop le filtered out of the area. Two professionally dressed white men walked past the group of mostly black One Hill members. One said, Do you know who these people are? The other one replied, I guess theyre Hill people. (As if the fact that most of them were blac k meant that they had to be from the Hill, or the fact that their presence was worthy of questioning.) When much of the crowd was gone, the media swarmed the owners and fans were crossing the Very Important Person (VIP) rope to ge t close to the area where the digging had occurred. A reporter from one local paper inte rviewed the One Hill Coalitions chairperson, 45


who said a few words about how this time the comm unity will be supported by the development. It wasnt until everyone started clearing out and I ducked under the VIP rope that I realized just how many people were seated in this section, underneath tents. I saw some fans collecting dirt from the groundbreaking spot. I guessed then that I did just witness historyone that contrasted sharply from the construction of the Penguins existing arena. Hill District Beginnings Pittsburghs Hill District at one time serv ed as a newcomer neighborhood (Fullilove 2004:61). Bordering the central business district it offered inexpensive housing for a diverse group of immigrants looking to take advantage of the citys economic opportunities during the height of its industria l boom (Crowley 2005). Three separate villages once comprised the neighborhood; they were known as Hayti, which was made up of former slaves who had escaped the South, Laceyville, and Minersville (Toker 1986). During its first one hundred years, the Hill, as it is called by Pittsburghers, was home to mainly German and Scotch-Irish immigrants. It then became a predominantly European immigrant ne ighborhood, with a large Jewish population, in the 1880s (1986). Having lived their entire lives in the Hill, some of my participants referred to the Jew Town area of the neighborhood, which still existed in the mid-1900s, where they would buy fresh produce, chicken and fish. Decline in southern agriculture and the lure of industrial jobs in the north led to the Great Migration of African Americans to the north between 1910 and WWII. At the beginning of this period, African Americans made up less than ten percent of Pittsburghs population, dispersed across a number of neighborhoods (Glasco 2001). It was not until 1930 that African Americans comprised half the population of the Hill District, the largest proportion of any Pittsburgh neighborhood (2001). By the 1940s, the Hill was a majority African American community. The neighborhood maintained stability and prosperity for a time, housing successful businesses and 46


small manufacturers, as well as the Pittsburgh Courier which was at one time the leading black newspaper in the U.S. Lubove (1996) refers to the period of time betw een World Wars as the Hill Districts golden age, reminiscent of the Harlem Renaissance. The neighborhood is known for producing a number of well-known people, especia lly entertainers. This is a part of the neighborhoods history readily shared by residents, who explained that the Hill was home to such artists as August Wilson, and saw the likes of Art Blakey and George Benson perform at local clubs such as the Crawford Grill. According to Fullilove, (2004) pound for pound Pittsburghs Hill District neighbor hood was at one time the most generative black community in the US (p. 29). A description of the Hill thr oughout the first half of the 20th Century, howeverincluding during its most prosperous timeis not comple te without noting its poor environmental and infrastructural conditions. In the early 1900s, the head of the Kingsley House, an institution that was active in housing reform, described the Hill: From the first, I had been conscious of the unsanitary evil conditions within and without the alley tenements . (as cited in Lubove 1969:20). Among other things, this observer noted the problematic presence of a cow stable in close proximity to these densel y populated tenements, and poorly vented, damp basements that served as living quarters for many residents (1969). Along with many of Pittsburghs neighborhoods, the Hill had substandard and in adequate housing, poor ai r quality, a lack of electricity and running water, as well as unsanita ry sewage systems and privy vaults (outhouses) (1969; Bauman and Muller 2006). The situation had not much improved by the late 1930s, when the neighborhood was described as consisting of ramshackle shanties, raw-faced tenements and dank cellars; furthermore, it experienced dispropor tionate levels of disease, crime, and violence (Lubove 1969:84). 47


During the late 1930s and early 1940s, housing in urban areas became an important topic and cities across the country began to address related problems (Bauman and Muller 2006). The decision to build large-scale hous ing projects was motivated by a shortage of low-cost housing, rises in unemployment, and the desire to demolis h slums as a result of further declines in property values (Lubove 1969). In addition, these pr ojects were a response to the growing urban black population, who, because of discrimination and poverty, were often unable to find housing in an unsubsidized market (1969). By 1944, Pittsburghs Housing Authority had built eight housing projects, half of which were located in the Hill Dist rict: Bedford Dwellings; Addison Terrace (or Terrace Village I); Wadsworth Te rrace (or Terrace Villag e II); and Allequippa Terrace (1969). Bedford Dwellings and Terrace Villa ge I and II were the first to be built in the city (Bauman and Muller 2006). Also in the late 1930s, the Pittsburgh Regi onal Planning Association hired a New York consultant, Robert Moses, to ad vise them on how to improve the citys central business district, referred to as the Golden Triangle. The result was a 1939 report in which Moses made a number of suggestions, many of which were already being di scussed by Pittsburgh planners and officials. Among other ideas, he concurred with an existin g suggestion that a cr osstown thoroughfare be constructed, which would require partial clearance of the Lower Hill (Lubove 1969; Bauman and Muller 2006). Moses report marked the dawn of Renaissance I in Pittsbur gh, a series of projects that first centered on highway development, smok e and flood control, as well as the creation of Point Park, situated where the three rivers meet at the tip of the central business district. These projects, however, came to a halt as WWII began (Lubove 1969). Post-WWII History Lubove (1969) describes a crisis atmos phere in Pittsburgh after WWII: no new industries were developing; the citys population was not signif icantly increasing; and some 48


corporations began to move their headquarters elsewhere. Als o, the city still faced problems with smoke, flooding, and sewage. In essence, writes Lubove, the Pittsburgh Renaissance represented a response to a crisis situation, one that pr ecipitated a dramatic expansion of public enterprise and investment to serve corporate needs . (p. 106). In picking up where they left off, the leaders of the Renaissa nce again turned their attention to the Hill District. Although the neighborhood thrived culturally, it also became overcrowded and its structures, residential and otherwise, were in poor shape, as described above. As was the case in many U.S. cities after the war, a loss of manufacturing jobs and the ongoing movement of higher income residents to suburbs contributed to a gradual decrease in property valu es within urban neighborhoods (Crowley 2005). As explained in Chapter Two, in order to alleviate the situation in increasingly poor, minority inner cities, the Federal Housing Act pa ssed in 1949, Title One of which provided loans and grants that enabled cities to improve blighted areas (Crowl ey 2005). In accord with an ecological perspective, blight was understood as an illness plaguing communities and cities: Often, the disease becomes an epidemic, penetrati ng to the core of a stri cken building while at the same time spreading its infection to the surrounding neighborhood (Redevelopment Authority of Allegheny County 1962:6). The Ac t granted local govern ments the power of eminent domain and the right to establish publi c authorities for land acquisition and clearance activities (Ferman 1996). Further, a 1954 revision allowed for the use of urban renewal funds for commercial construction, not just residential projects (Crowley 2005). What followed was a 24year national program of urban renewal that not only displaced families and businesses, but also created a massive urban housing crisis (Fullilove 2004). 49


Fullilove suggests that the damaging conseque nces of urban renewal were insufficiently addressed (2004:69). The government subsidized high-rises meant to replace housing that was torn down were built cheaply and with inadequa te access to childcare, shopping or recreational areas (Hutter 2007). Some of the blighted areas were repl aced by middle-income apartment projects, which the poor and displ aced could not afford. In additi on, these areas were often torn down in favor of corporate offices or entertai nment centers (2007). This was the case in Pittsburghs Hill District during the mid-20th century. Amputation of the Lower Hill Notions of blight, real and imposed, led to urban renewal in the name of progress, forever changing the Hill (Fullilove 2004). A ccording to the plans of the Pittsburgh Regional Planning Association, released in 1947, the Lower Hill was chosen as the site of the proposed arena-auditorium, then called the Pittsburgh Center (Mallett 1992:182); in order to make the area more accessible, a crosstown expressway (a s in Moses 1939 report) was also part of the plan (Crowley 2005). Well-known businessman Edgar Kaufmann had proposed and would partially fund the arena. Although the Hill District was the origina l and preferred site for what was to be a multipurpose arena, other options we re explored only after it became clear that building in the densely populated Lower Hill would present significant financial problems associated with purchasing the land and relocati ng thousands of resident s (Mallett 1992:182). As members of the Allegheny Conference on Community Development warned in a 1949 meeting, the Hill was occupied by thickly built areas presenting a re-housing problem (quoted in Weber 1988:418, n22). One such option was the residential East End, but this was denied, largely due to an oppositional campaign led by the areas middle and upper-class residents (Ferman 1996). Another proposed site was Sc henley Park, later defeated when opponents argued that the project violated the terms on which the land was given to the city (2004). 50


The 1949 Federal Housing Act presented a solu tion to some of the financial problems associated with redevelopment of the Hill in par ticular. Under the Act, land could be razed and sold to private developers with the federal gov ernment covering two-thirds of the cost of the purchasing and clearance (Mallett 1992). Thus, in 1953 an even more extensive redevelopment plan emerged, which redefined the arena as the anchor for a large cultural district, a Center for the Arts, featuri ngin addition to an arenasuch at tractions as theaters, an opera and symphony house, and an art museum (1992 3). At the time, a cultural and physical transformation of the Hill District was attractive to a local government trying to rid itself of its smoky city image. Moreover, redevelopment woul d raise real estate values in the central business district and the Hill District, as well as begin the creation of a more fluid and better looking connection between the central business di strict and Oakland, an other viable business district and home to many unive rsities and colleges (1992). Notions of Lower Hill demolition especially appealed to the Allegheny C onference on Community Development and the Pittsburgh Chamber of Commerce, which saw the poor state of the Hill as a potential harm to the central business district and their plans for the Golden Triangle (Crowley 2005). When demolition began in order to make way for the arena and proposed cultural district, it was the first renewal project to affect a residential area in Pittsburgh and the largest renewal undertaking in the country (Figure 3-1) (Crowley 2005; Ferman 1996). The Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA) coordinated land clearance, which began in 1956. Established ten years earlier to address Pittsburghs postWWII crises, the URA had aligned local economic and political elites (board seats were filled by both), and thus provided a strong institutional foundation for the citys growth machine (F erman 1996). Land clearance continued until 1959 and construction of the arena began in March of 1957 (Crowley 2005). Named the Civic Arena, 51


the structure was an architectural wonder with a first of its kind retractable roof. At the time, it was the worlds largest dome (415 feet in diameter) and able to hold 18,000 people (Toker 1986). Initially, the Civic Light Opera was the Ci vic Arenas main tenant. It was not until 1967 that the arena became home to the Pittsburgh Penguins hockey team. That year, Pittsburgh was granted an NHL expansion team to replace th e AHL (minor league) hockey team called the Pittsburgh Hornets (PittsburghHockey.net 2009). By the time the arena opened in 1961, 413 bus inesses and 8,000 residents in a 100-acre area were displaced (1,551 families according to Ferman 1996) (Toker 1986). The majority of those displaced were African-American ( 1986), about 1,240 families (Pittsburgh Neighborhood Alliance 1977). These residents were predomin antly renters and received little relocation compensation, with minimal benefits coming from the federal government (1977:2), in part because a large number of them le ft the area, in anticipation of displacement, before the city approved the project. Nevertheless, even those that did stay longer before moving hardly fared better. Thirty-five percent of the displaced families moved into public housing (1977) even though more than 70% of them were eligible. Many of these families moved into other parts of the Hill and the East Liberty area, as well as the Homewood-Br ushton area, which went from 22% African American in 1950 to 66% in 1960 (Ferman 1996). Around 30% of former Hill residents moved to private rental proper ty, and 8% bought homes upon moving. About 90 families refused to move and wound up in substandard housing (Pittsburgh Neighborhood Alliance 1977:2).1 According to Glasco (2001), the project be came a disaster, w ith destruction moving more rapidly than the constr uction of new housing. The net supply of low-cost housing, in 1 This is the most detailed information I was able to find on post-renewal relocation. The meaning of substandard housing is unclear, as is to where the remaining percentage moved. 52


particular, decreased as urba n renewal progressed (Lubove 1969). Because of both post-renewal overcrowding and fears that more clearance would take place, some property owners in the Hill District allowed their buildings and houses to become even mo re neglected and deteriorated (Mallett 1992). Between 1950 and 1970, the popul ation of the Hill District dropped from 62,597 to 33,751 a decrease of 46% percent (Perkey and Sheridan 2008). Community Response to Urban Renewal Relative to the scope of urban renewal, the community-organized responseespecially in the early stageswas not significant (Crowley 2005). Part of the reason for this is that some residents, given the state of housing and other bu ildings in the Lower Hill, supported the project and looked forward to the better housing promised to them (Glasco 2001). Pittsburghs project was undertaken in the early stages of urban rene wal policy and residents may have believed what they were told: that this was the only solution to the problem of infrastruc tural decay in the area, and that they would be given relocation assist ance into the new housing (Mallett 1992). An early publication of the Redeve lopment Authority of Allegheny County reiterated this intent: Will the Authority help me to find new housing? Yes. You will be afforded every assistance to insure that your new home is satisfactory to you. Our relocation specialist will maintain a list of vacancies assembled by contacting real estate fi rms and property owners. Referrals to you of these listings will be another aid provided by th e relocation staff (1962:66). Even the local African American newspaper, The Courier, implied that it supported re newal, with the exception of its city editor (Glasco 2001). Further, those who were against renewal might have thought themselves powerless to reverse the decision, keeping in mind that this was before the Civil Rights Movement (Crowley 2005). Beginning in 1958, however, a movement did fo rm among the white parishioners of St. Peters in the Lower Hill (Crowley 2005). Worri ed that their church was slated for demolition, 53


they distributed 30,000 flyers about their message and circulated a petition advocat ing that the church be spared, but the city council claimed that the Urban Redevelopment Authority was the only decision-making entity in this situation. Th e bishop had sold the church and so the legal case that was put forth by parishioners was lo st; St. Peters was razed in October 1960 (2005). Plans for the Arts Center fluctuated in the early 1960s, with various ideas being suggested and planned and then dropped from the blue print (Mallett 1992). The fundersHoward Heinz and Buhl Foundations, and the A.W. Mellon Educational and Charitable Trust envisioned the area to the east of the Civic Arena in different ways. Howard Heinz Foundation money was dependent on two things: 1) commitmen t by the city to develop the full Center for the Arts and 2) more land clearance further into the Hill. In fact, the larger proposed cultural district transformation they imagined woul d have required around 50 more blocks of redevelopment beyond what was already demolishe d, heading eastward into the Middle Hill District (1992; Glasco 2001). Local officials worried that pr oximity to a perceived slum could be detrimental to theater attendance. High a ttendance was especially necessary in order to ensure that top productions would come through the city, helping to generate prestige. In one memo, the Urban Redevelopment Authority suggest ed some ways to protect the new cultural center from the Hill District: one was to clear more land and build a public park between them; another was to construct a new residential area; a third was to actually build a wall (Mallett 1992). In response to the threat of mo re land clearance, the community was able to organize more effectively than in the initial phase of renewal. According to Mallett (1992), this shift in the political climate was apparent in 1963. That year, the Citizen Committee for Hill District Renewal was formed and The Courier became more vocal against further redevelopment, 54


warning of changes in the racial makeup of the Hill. In addition, the ci ty planning department met with community groups to discuss their pl ans to construct a major boulevard through the Hill in order to better connect Oakland with the cen tral business district. City planning also tried to link urban renewal with other programs, su ch as those to alleviate poverty, and make improvements in health, education, and employ ment (1992). The caution displayed by the planning department and the fact that they even consulted community gr oups shows a divergence from earlier policies. Also during this time, a number of residents and ac tivists came together, saying, Not another inch (Glasco 2001). They strategically placed a sign that read, No redevelopment beyond this point at the corner of Centre Avenue and Crawford Street, where the initial destruction had en ded (Figure 3-2). This site is now called Freedom Corner and has since then served as a gathering point for marches and other social ju stice causes. Fittingly, the Community Benefits Agreement was signed there in 2008. The downside of organizing against further de velopment was that it caused a stalemate, leaving much of the land surrounding the Civi c Arena undeveloped (Figure 3-3). A plan to construct three upscale reside ntial towers with a total of 935 units was approved in 1959, although it was not until 1964 that one of them called Washington Plaza, was completed (Lubove 1969; Mallett 1992). Mallett (1992) contends that when the original developer ran into financial problems, a new developer, Alco a, took over. Alcoa, however, was pessimistic about completing the project when it became appare nt that more land would not be cleared. The plan was later aborted with just one of three towers constructed. No t only was there little demand for upscale housing in that areaeven afte r five years, the l one-standing tower was never fully occupiedbut residents also became more critical of such plans in the face of their need for more affordable housing (1992). 55


The land immediately surrounding the Civic Arena remained undeveloped and largely servedand continues to serveas surface park ing for arena-goers and downtown workers. Thus, along with the creation of wide roads, the Civic Arena and accompanying parking lots created a buffer between downtow n and the ghetto (Fullilove 2004:65). The African American community became further alienated from the larger city as a result of the land on which they once lived being turned over for purposes of wh ite entertainment (as whites were the primary CLO audience) and the destruction of peoples homes without ever de veloping the remaining cleared land. Post-Renewal Changes Over time, the Hill has become known for its radi cal tendencies. At the earliest, this was manifest in Abolition work ; later, the Hill became a place for Civil Rights activism, and also where race riots occurred in 1968 (Toker 1986). Although the riots in Pittsburgh only lasted a few days and were mild compared to thos e in other cities (Ma llett 1992), they had a devastating effect on the neighbor hood. Fires destroyed much of the business district, driving business owners away or forcing them to clos e entirely (Glasco 2001). Afterward, the dwindling plans for the cultural center were all but let go, as city planners decided to stick with safer areas for such a development (Mallett 1992). As one participant described it, the destruction that began with urban renewal was only exacerbated by the riots: The ones who remained [after urban renewal] were cut off from the lower half of their body, so the damage was severe with the disloc ation of that many people. Then the riots happened and a half-amputated body responded to the riots and it took another stage where people who had any means at all who were still in the Hill District took the option to leave. So you had the earlier period l eading up to the dislocation, then you had the dislocation from say until about 15 years, and that was a meager existence for the second half of the amputated body; then from after the riots, it took another de teriorating turn that lasted all the way up to 56


This participant, a lifelong resident, refers to the 1990s as a turning point; indeed, during this time, some changes, mainly in the area of housing, began to occur in the Hill District. To illustrate, since 1990 the Urban Redevelopment Authority of Pittsburgh has invested over $200 million to develop housing there (Boren 2008c). One major initiative was the construction of the first residential development since urban renewal. This 18-acre housing development, called Crawford Square, is located in the Lower Hill District, just east of the Mellon Arena and its surface parking lots. The Hill Community Development Corporation began this mixed income housing effort, phase one of which was completed in the early 1990s (Bright 2000). By embarking on this project, the URA hoped to attract businesses, as well as middle-class and professional residents to the Hill District; in turn this would ideally (for the URA) raise surrounding property values and change the neighborhoods image (Lubove 1996). To some extent it has. One non-resident participant had recently driven through Crawford Square: When you look at some of those streets, youre like wow; you think youre in Boston or something like that, or like in a different world. Its just am azing. I mean just think if you could extend that housing up a couple more blocks, that whol e neighborhood you wouldnt even know. This, however, is exactly why some residents are skepti cal of the development. Rent increases every year, according to another participant whom I interviewed in her Crawford Square home, and there is also speculation that rental units will become market rate fo r-sale units in the near future. In addition to some smaller-scale housing development that took place during the 1990s, another change was the introdu ction of the Homeownership and Opportunity for People Everywhere (HOPE) VI program into the nei ghborhood. With funding from this program, both the Bedford Dwellings Additions and the Alle quippa Terrace public hous ing projects were demolished (Perkey and Sheridan 2008). By the early to mid-2000s, new and refurbished units 57


replaced the housing projects. Like Crawford Square, these units are a mix of public housing, mixed-income rental, and homes for sale (both affordable and market rate) (2008; Jones 2007). A community center was also built, called Bedfor d Hope. Unlike during urban renewal, this redevelopment was only carried out after residents were informed and asked for their input and approval. In addition, residents were able to stay in their hom es until newer units were built; seniority was used to determine which residents would move first (Murphy 2004). After a series of delays and disagreements over land use and Un iversity of Pittsburgh expansion, a final phase of the Allequippa Terrace project is to begin in the Fall of 2009 and will consist of new mixed income, rental and owner-occupied housing, as well as some office and retail space. The University will be developing athletic facili ties nearby, where the Robinson Court area of Allequippa Terrace once stood (Lord 2009). Recent History and Present Context The geographic definition of the Hill District t oday varies greatly; the City of Pittsburghs definition differs from that of many residents, w hose definitions conflict as well. According to the City, the Hill is made of up of five areas or neighborhood subsets: Crawford Roberts, Bedford Dwellings, Middle Hill, Terrace Village, and Upper Hill (Perkey and Sheridan 2008). The broader definition, used by the One Hill CBA Coalition and more often by residents, also incorporates an area close to the central business district where the new arena will sit, a census tract referred to as Uptown/Bluff (Figure 3-4). Residents more often refer to the Lower, Middle, and Upper Hill, than the specific terms used by the Department of City Planning. A recent study dealt with this confusion by distinguishing betw een the Hill District, the more restrictive definition, and the Greater Hill District the more expansive one (2008). This lack of consensus was apparent during my interviews; upon aski ng participants where they considered the existing and new arenas to sit, they responded with a variety of answers. 58


Most often, they were in agreement that the Mell on Arena is located in the Hill District, but the area where the new arena will sit was referred to as the Lower Hill District, Uptown and simply the Hill District. When prompted, some distin guished between Uptown and the rest of the Hill; others stated that Uptown is part of the Hill District. Perhaps one participant summarized this pattern bestit really comes dow n to ones point of view: Well, depends on which way you look at it. If youre looking from downtown up to the Hill, youre going to say the aren a is part of downtown, but if youre looking from the Hill District downtown, then youre going to say th e arena belongs to the Hill, so I mean, it depends what side of the fence youre standing on. The neighborhood is widely perceived in Pitt sburgh as having problems with drugs and other crime, an underclass, raciali zed ghetto to be avoided; the re ality is that some parts of the neighborhood deal more heavily with these problems than others. Many of those who live in and are familiar with the neighborhood today consider it to be on the verge of transition, either racially and economically divers ifying or moving toward a more livable place for current residents via the recently begun community-driven master planning process. I return to community perceptions in the next chapter, but he re describe the demographic setting, as well as the series of events lead ing up to CBA organizing. Four out of those six sub-sets of the Great er Hill District are now characterized by high levels of poverty, renter-occupied housing, a nd a decreasing populati on, which has left many properties vacant and deteriorating (Pittsbur gh Department of City Planning 2000). The percentage of renters in the Greater Hill ranged from 32% to 96% in 2000; this compares to the overall rate of 48% in the City of Pittsburgh at large (2000). The overall population decrease that began in the 1950s continues (Table 2-1) According to the 2000 Census, there were 18,276 people living in the Greater Hill District. Because the 2010 Census data is not yet available, the current population might only be estimated, but using a population model, researchers Perkey 59


and Sheridan suggest that the Greater Hill District population for 2007 was 14, 509 (2008). The majority of this population continues to be Af rican American/black. Although the Uptown area population was only 13% black in 2000, the rema ining five areas ranged from 87% to 96% black. This illustrates the segregation that still exists in Pittsburgh, the population of which was 68% white and 27% black in 2000. As these numbers imply, in the Hill Distri ct and in the larger city, those who identify with ot her racial categories make up only a very small percentage of the population (Pittsburgh Department of City Planning 2000). According to Perkey and Sheridan (2008), wher eas in the recent past, development projects in the Hill District were most likely to involve housing, there is now more balance among different areas of development. They identify more than 20 current pr ojects in the areas of community centers, economic development, e ducation, housing, recreation, and religious & cultural institutions (2008). More specifically, these include : a new YMCA and the renovation and expansion of an existing one, which provides low-income housing; improvements to a local sports field; a landslide community farm; a green print, which includ es a city overlook; a grocery store (part of the CBA); renovation of so me storefronts; the di scovery and use of a geothermal water source; a new (replacement) lib rary; University of Pittsburgh expansion; and the establishment of a University Preparatory school. In addition to the major housing developments mentioned above, community deve lopment corporations are working on smallerscale housing. Most recently, the Hill District wa s a proposed site for a casino, in addition to the new arena. This recent history is vital to unde rstanding the CBA campaign. Entertaining Redevelopment In 2006, the Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board was in the process of awarding one casino license in Pittsburgh. The three bidders, all vying for different sites in the city, were: PITG Gaming; Isle of Capri; and Harrahs/Forest City. Isle of Capri would have placed its 60


casino in the Hill District, and its proposal was intertwined with the new arena. Collaboration between the Penguins Franchise, Isle of Capr i casinos, and Nationwide Reality was deemed Pittsburgh First and these partners would have paid for a new arena in its entirety, as well as provide Hill District redevel opment funding. In order to avoid an unfair advantage, Pennsylvanias Governor Rendell th en required all three of the co mpeting casinos to give money toward a new arena in the Hill District, regardle ss of whether or not their casino would be placed there. PITG Gaming, however, had also incl uded a $3 million commitment to Hill District redevelopment, particularly in the 28 acres wh ere the Mellon Arena now stands (Belko 2008a). In response to the proposed casino, some local development entities, including the Hill House, a community social serv ice agency established in th e 1960s, and the Hill Community Development Corporation convened a Gaming Ta sk Force. The Task Force provided information to the community with regards to the local impact of casinos. They expressed a desire for reinvestment to c ounter possible negative impacts, but did not take a strong stance against the proposed development. The Raise Your Hand: No Casino on the Hill! Campaign, however, did. It had the support of many of the neighborhoods ministers, and its leaders circulated a petition which was se nt to the Gaming Control Board, among other tactics. Due in part to this small but vocal anti-casino movement the Hill District site was not chosen. On December 20, 2006 the Gaming Contro l Board announced that the winner of the bid was PITG Gaming. Beyond Hill District opposition, PITG Ga mings proposal was most attractive to the Board because of a statewide study done in the previous month which suggested that, of the three, it would offer the most returns for the state and its taxpayers (Conte 2006). Its proposed location on Pittsburghs North Side near PNC Park and Heinz Field, was also more appealing to the Board than the other proposed casino locations (Toland 2006). 61


A New Arena When the decision was made, community leader s and activists were exhausted, but their work was far from complete. The Penguins owne rs began threatening to leave Pittsburgh for Kansas City, presumably because their origin al Pittsburgh First proposal was no longer an option. Knowing that no politician wants to be in office when a sports team relocates, the team had the upper hand. In early 2007, word spread that the Penguins were negotiating for the rights to develop the 28 acres where the Mellon Arena and surface parking lots now sit as part of their deal to remain in Pittsburgh. Co mmunity leaders were determined not to let local officials give away the Lower Hill District and thus began a new cause. In March of 2007, state and city officials formally announced that different funding sources had been secured and a new hockey arena would indeed be built. In September of the same year, the Sports and Exhibition Author ity of Pittsburgh and Allegheny County (SEA) and the Lemieux Group, LP (the Penguins ownership) signed a 29.5-year sublease, which begins when the arena opens. As part of this lease, the Penguins were in fact given the development rights to the 28 acres. This means that they will have the right to redevelop, sell, or lease that acreage even though they have not technically purchased it from the SEA (Sublease Agreement, September 18, 2007). The sublease requires that the Penguins develop a portion of the land every year and that the land be fully developed within ten years. If the required portion is not developed each year, they will forfeit the development rights to that portion. However, if by then the Penguins have not received $15 million through development, sale, or lease, then the SEA will pay them the shortfall in cash (Pitts burgh Arena Term Sheet 2007). Consistent with the zoning for that space, its use can be varied. Residential, office or retail space, parking, and/or hotels are allowed (Trans Associ ates Engineering Consultants 2007) As part of the CBA, a 62


community-led committee has until February of 2010 to come up with a master plan that will inform the Penguins development decisions. The new arena, recently named the Consol Energy Center, will have just over 18,000 seats for hockey, a number which varies slightly base d on the event. There are 2,000 club seats, 236 loge boxes, 62 suites, and 4 party suites. This is in contrast to the Mellon Arena, which had fewer suites and club seats and no loge boxes; howe ver, it is in line with other new stadiums which are increasingly geared toward more affluent attendees. The Consol Energy Center is also gearing up to be the first Leadership in Ener gy and Environmental Design (LEED) Gold certified arena in the National Hockey League (Pitts burgh Penguins 2009). A 500-space parking garage will be connected to the arena, with 50 spots set aside for Penguins officials; the remainder will be used for both daytime commuters and evenin g event-goers (Trans Associates Engineering Consultants 2007). Figures 3-5 a nd 3-6 depict the new arena s ite and its proximity to the existing arena. Prior to construction, in 2007 about a dozen build ings were razed in order to make room for the arena. The largest demolished building was vacant; some of the smaller buildings housed businesses, but were compensated (Boren 2008a). This was also the case with a synagogue, which was built in the 1960s. Thus, the site is not residential and displacement is not an issue to the extent that it was in the 1950s. Nevertheless, residents and members of businesses and organizations in the Hill District were determined to benefit this time aro und. It is within this contentious historical and current transitiona l framework that community organizing around the new arena arose. Summary In this chapter, I traced the history of the Hi ll District from its beginnings as an immigrant neighborhood, to its heyday as a haven for Afri can American culture and business, from its 63


devastation upon the amputation of the Lower Hill, to the beginning of its intended rebirth in the 1990s. I followed that history w ith a characterization of the Hill District today in terms of its contested boundaries and demogr aphic make-up. Finally, I situated the CBA campaign within the Hills most recent redevelopment challenges, in cluding the new arena. In the next chapter, I set the stage for my case study in another wa y, by describing my research methodology. 64


Figure 3-1: The Lower Hill before land clea rance, with Civic Arena overlay. (Source: Photographer Unknown, Courtesy of the Pennsylvania Room. Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh. 1956.) Figure 3-2: No redevelopment sign placed at Freedom Corner. (Source: Peter Diana, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette April 16, 1999.) 65


Figure 3-3: The Civic Arena. After land clea rance the buffer between the Civic Arena and the Hill District, in the foreground of this phot ograph, is apparent. (Source: Photographer Unknown, Courtesy of the Pennsylvania R oom. Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh. 1961.) 66


67Figure 3-4. Hill District maps. A) Sma ller definition. B) More expansive definiti on (Source: Pittsburgh Department of City Pl anning. Map adapted from Sheridan and Perkey 2008, created for author by Jarrod West.) A B


68 Table 2-1. Hill District Population Change 1940-2000. (Source: Adapted from Perkey and Sheridan 2008) Neighborhood Subset 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 %Pop. Loss 1940 2000 Bedford Dwellings 2663 3870 4915 3800 2878 2317 2109 21% Crawford Roberts 17045 17334 10277 5938 3558 2459 2724 84% Middle Hill 17029 14929 11849 7681 4262 2829 2143 87% Terrace Village 4054 11631 10520 7766 6550 5073 2631 35% Upper Hill 6071 5884 5216 4187 3190 2590 2246 63% Hill District Total 46,862 53,648 42,777 29,372 20,438 15,268 11,853 75% Uptown 9391 8949 5955 4379 4723 3220 6423 32% Greater Hill District Total 56,253 62,597 48,732 33,751 25,161 18,488 18,276 68% City of Pittsburgh 671,657 676,805 615,242 523,417 438,138 369,879 333,527 50%


Figure 3-5. Renderings of new aren a site. Site A marks the Mellon Arena. Site B marks the new Consol Energy Center. The shaded area to the south and east is the Hill District neighborhood. (Source: Pittsburgh Department of City Planning. Map created for author by Jarrod West.) 69


Figure 3-6. New and old arenas. The view from the Hill District, facing west toward downtown. Mellon Arena is on the right; Consol Ener gy Center construction across the street. (Photograph taken by author. May, 2009). 70


71 CHAPTER 4 METHODOLOGY In the previous chapter, I pr ovided the historical context a nd details leading up to the CBA campaign. I also described the present neighbo rhood setting in terms of the Hill Districts geographic boundaries and demographi c characteristics. In this ch apter, I set the stage for the interpretation of my data and the exploration of my threefol d research inquiry: 1) Why are communities choosing to negotiate with develope rs and pursue benefits through CBAs?; 2) How are communities engaging in and securing CBAs?; and 3) What implications do the Hill District CBA, in particular, and CBAs, in general, hold for pro-growth dynamics? Here, I explain my methodology, which includes both data generating tec hniques and approaches to them. I begin with a description of and justif ication for my methods, then move on to a more detailed account of my approach, entry into the field, and particip ant characteristics. I end the chapter with an explanation of my analytic approach and process. A Qualitative Case Study This dissertation is a qualitative case study that draws upon 32 in-depth interviews with stakeholders (local officials, businesspeopl e, community activists, and residents) and ethnographic field research totali ng approximately one year. Pa rticipant observation took place at a variety of relevant meetings and events in the Hill District a nd the city at large. I conducted and transcribed all interviews; and analysis of interview and ethnograp hic data was aided by Atlas.ti. In her recent work, Black on the Block (2007), Mary Pattillo ta kes a similar approach, using ethnography and interviewing to study st akeholders in one Chicago neighborhood. Although she is interested in relations among community reside nts, the broader study of stakeholders allows her to be tter understand the various laye rs of public (governmental and civic) decisions that frame what is preferable and what is possi ble (p. 21). Likewise, although


this case study is most focused on the community coalition that negotiated the CBA, the One Hill Coalition, understanding the perspe ctives of other stakeholders he lped to frame their work and create a more holistic picture of the situation. Using a case study to research the process a nd outcome of Pittsburghs first CBA allowed for a thorough examination of the aspects, dynami cs, and tensions of community organizing and negotiation. Along these lines, cas e studies are often used to provide detailed evidence of environmental inequality (e.g., Roberts and Toffo lon-Weiss 2001), as well as chart the struggle of various opposition movements (Crowley 2005; Capek 1993), sometimes specifically regarding the construction of sports facilities (e.g., Curry, Shwiri an, and Woldoff. 2004). Single qualitative case studies aid the researcher in making generalizations not necessarily about a population, but about a particular social phenomenon (Orum, Feagin, and Sjoberg 1991). They allow for holistic assessment of social action, offe r insight into peoples motivations, and help to understand the creation of personal as well as collective lives ( p. 11). On the other hand, one must be cautious when drawing from a single case study, especially give n the particulars of place, time, region, and history. Although time and funding constraints dictated my dissertation research, a comparative study using multiple cases may be a future project and would certainly improve analytical breadth and generalizability. Utilizing the methods of interviewing a nd ethnographic field work was mutually supportive. Interviews allowed me to inquire about impressions of the neighborhood, the CBA, and both arenas, as well as understand personal motives, goals, and histories beyond what I learned from ethnographic work. Participant observation, on the other hand, complemented interviews by allowing me to better understand group dynamics and recurring group themes. As part of my ethnographic work, I also consulted a variety of doc uments (including print media) 72


which served as references and support. One of my participants was exceptionally generous in this regard: in exchange for helping her to orga nize and file a large box of related documents, I was able to borrow them for my research. Th ese included a number of documents that I would not have otherwise been able to access. This allowed me to read up on information and processrelated details I was not privy to while in Florida, as well as triangulate what was said in meetings and interviews. Triangulation, or the use of multiple methods, provides an alternative to validation when using qualitative methods (Denzin and Lincoln 2003:8). By using multiple methods and information sources, I achieved rig or, breadth, complexity, richness, and depth, benefits of triangula tion identified by Denzin and Lincoln (p. 8). The following anecdote illustrates the useful ness of complementing interviews with ethnographic work: one of my participants runs a real estate company which owns several parcels of land in the Uptown area of the Hill District. During our interview, he was upbeat about the CBA and shared his development plan fo r the next several years, which involves the consolidation of several surface lots into one parking garage, and developing on those former lots. Despite my efforts to remain neutral, I ha d picked up some of my pa rticipants mistrust of developer promises. However, after attending an Uptown Partners community meeting, I found out that his plan was supported and motivated by their organizing. No t only was he at the meeting, but he had recently reached a compromise with this group; he agreed pay the city to plant new trees and improve landscaping in the ar ea, as well as develop on his parking lots within a six-year timeframe. He was also rec ognized at the meeting for recently erecting a small park and having a mural painted on a nearby wall. Several months later, th ere was an article in the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette detailing this very plan and how it came about through the communitys organizing (Belko 2009). In this in stance, and in others, the use of ethnographic 73


fieldwork and interviews provided information that allowed me to gather the most holistic and accurate picture than would have been possible by using either approach as a stand-alone method. Conducting Interviews Interviews lasted approximately one to tw o hours, although a few went on for close to three hours. Before beginning, I requested that participants fill out a brief demographic information sheet (see Appendix A) and asked them to read and sign the informed consent. The conversation that followed was steered by a flexib le interview guide with open-ended questions (see Appendix B). Although the guide was slightly different depending on the stakeholder, in general I asked about: ties to Pittsburgh and the Hill District; perceptions of the neighborhood; involvement (or lack of) in the CBA organizing; thoughts on the process and outcome of the CBA; and participants opinions on the new arena and its impacts, both personal and for the Hill District and city at large. At the end of each interview, I asked for names (and sometimes contact information) of others who might be willing to meet w ith me. Finally, I asked if they had any questions for me, which they often did. In accord with the active interview appr oach (Holstein and Gubrium 1997), I made comments, offered encouragement, and asked further clarifying questions when appropriate. Interviews were carried out in a variety of places: in participants homes and offices; in some of the Hill Districts open air meeting spaces; in re staurants; and in coffee shops outside of the neighborhood (since there are none in the neighborhood; something noted by more than a few 74


participants). The majority of interviews were carried out individually and all were conducted face-to-face. In two instances, I interviewed two people simultane ously. In one case, the dualparticipants were a remarkable (in their 80s) ma rried couple whom I interviewed in their Hill District home. In the other, the participants bo th headed a local organi zation and suggested that they be interviewed together. The interviews were audio recorded with a di gital recorder upon part icipant permission. I transcribed all of the interviews verbatim. Transcribing was a long and tedious process, but with invaluable returns. Not only did this process make me intimately familiar with my data, but because I was transcribing after ev ery interview, it also allowed me to reflect on (and critique) my interviewing style. By lis tening to, and not simply reading the interview again, I was constantly making note of improvements to be made: I should have asked a follow-up question there, talked slower here, reword ed this question, gotten rid of th at question all together, etc. I am confident that in the long r un, the transcribing process made me a better interviewer, refined my interview guide, and made for a smoother analyt ic process. As mentioned above, following a feminist approach and in an e ffort to empower participants in some way, I also e-mailed, mailed, or dropped off transcripts to/for participants once they were complete. I figured that this would either give them piece of mind, allow them to make changes to the transcript, or both. Many participants were happy to receive a copy of the transcript and seemed impressed by the gesture, but only six participan ts took advantage of the opportuni ty to make changes, some in content, others in minor details. Given this low return rate, I often questioned the worth of sending the transcripts. It was es pecially frustrating when there were totally irrelevant sections that I felt I had to transcribe since the participan t would see the finished pr oduct. Further, if the transcripts did not need to be polished for part icipants, I might have worked out typos as I 75


noticed them during analysis. Instead, I sp ent between one and two hours proofing each transcript before giving it to the participant. Ethnographic Fieldwork Beginning in the spring of 2007, Community Benefits Agreement organizing and negotiations ensued for over a year until the CBA was signed by all parties in August of 2008. I initially observed a few meetings related to th e CBA in May and June of 2007; three of these were One Hill CBA Coalition meetings and one wa s a large Kick-Off Public Meeting hosted by the Department of City Planning, the SEA, a nd the Penguins. In May of 2008, I returned to Pittsburgh just in time to observe a press conference at which One Hill announced that its members had voted in favor of the drafted CBA. Over the next several months, I attended a total of 31 events and meetings relevant to the CBA, the new arena, and in a few instances, the neighborhood in general. Most frequently, I at tended meetings of the One Hill CBA Coalition and the Hill District Consensu s Group, a community-wide group of organizational and political representatives who meet monthl y to inform each other of vari ous events and services taking place in the community. I also attended meeti ngs about other local happenings such as the coming grocery store and opportunities for local gr ants, as well as an update on arena hiring and design hosted by the SEA and the Penguins. Lastly, I was able to observe the grand opening of a new library in the Hill District; a first annua l neighborhood conference call ed Build the Hill; the groundbreaking ceremony for the new arena; and the public CBA signing. At the earliest meetings I attended, I introduced myself as a graduate student originally from Pittsburgh, specifically naming the lowe r-middle class, predominantly white, city neighborhood in which I grew up. I explained that I was interest ed in what was going on in the Coalition and in Pittsburgh regarding the arena, but that unfortunately I had one year left of classes, and would not be back again until the fo llowing May. During those meetings, I was very 76


much a participant observer. When the meeting facilitato r asked us to break into small groups, I participated in icebreakers a nd acted as a recorder for my group as they refined neighborhood priorities for the CBA. Upon returning to Pittsburgh, I was open about my identity as a researcher. At some meetings, I introduced myself as such in indi vidual conversations; in others, I shared this with everyone as we went around the table introducing ourselves. Over the course of the last year, I felt like more of an observer than a participant, however. Although I greeted and chatted with people I knew before and after meetings, I always remained quiet during meetings, and often stayed on the outsk irts, sitting in back ro ws or on chairs that stood farther back from a main table. On one occasion I remember debating whether or not to even speak up when Coalition members were trying to plan an event and chose a time when another important meeting was taking place; lu ckily, someone else caught the mistake. I recorded fieldnotes as I saw fit for each partic ular situation; usually this meant having a notebook out and taking rigorous note s at meetings; at other events I tended to record fewer details. One thing I did very consistently was sketch a diagram of the field site and counted (when possible) the number of pe ople present, often taking note of presumed race and gender as well. As part of my ethnographic work, I supplemen ted participant observa tion and interviewing with a variety of documents and media sour ces. These ranged from published documents (including legal papers, media repor ts, and press releases) to archiv al records (such as minutes of meetings) to artifacts (items like flyers and meeting announcements used for mobilizing). I collected some of these myself; ot hers were lent to me by one of my participants who was very involved in the Coalition, as mentioned above. I used these sources for a few different purposes: they served as a window into th e parts of the CBA process I was unable to observe firsthand; 77


they helped to round out, challenge, and verify interview and observation data; and they provided specific information regarding da tes, funding, and other details. Methodological Approach My methodological approach was heavily infl uenced by the work of feminist scholars. This created challenges, however, when it became cl ear that gender was less salient a factor than race or class in this particular case study; I retu rn to this below. Feminist methodology does not refer to a specific type of data gathering/gene rating technique; rather, it refers to a way of theorizing about research practic e (DeVault 1996:31). As such, it concerns ones approach to the practices and techniques used in the research process. Feminist sc holars stress the fluidity between researcher and researched, insider a nd outsider. Feminist methodology recognizes the fact that no research can in fact be value-free, that there is no such thing as pure objectivity (Wolf 1996). Feminist researchers are encouraged to be reflexive, the meaning of which has changed over time (Fonow and Cook 2005). Reflexivity now incorporates writing oneself into the text, the audiences reactions to/reflections on the meaning of the research, th e social location of the researcher, and the analysis of disciplines as s ites of knowledge production (Fonow and Cook 2005:2219). It has also taken the form of participatory research in which the subjects play a role in production of knowledge and the researcher trie s to be more transparent (2005). For Naples, reflective practice should involve both self-assessment of ones individual biases, privileges and interactions, and collective examination of rese arch strategies (2003). In my interpretation, being reflexive involves considering the way in which each of our worldviews is shaped by a particular socio-historical perspective. Certainly, my soci al location as a young, formally educated white woman who calls Pittsburgh home affected the choi ce of my dissertation topic, 78


my approach to fieldwork and interviewing, how others perceived and received me, and ultimately, my data analysis. Racially and geographically, I was an outside r to the Hill District community. To compensate and better relate to my particip ants who lived or worked in the neighborhood, I found myself being (probably unne cessarily) vocal about my having grown up in Pittsburgh and about my anti-racist worldview, the latter having been instilled by my parents, and reinforced through my sociological education. I was also an outsider to those non-community based CBA stakeholders, but found that no amount of positioni ng based on local roots or even educational status helped in gaining access to those in the most powerful positions. I think that many participants, regardless of stake holder position, were simply curious as to my interest in the CBA. Answering this question honestly helped to establish legitimacy and rapport. My youth probably helped in this regard as well; I was younger than all of my participants, and appear very young. As a result, I benefited from their per ception of me as a nonthreatening, inquisitive young person ready to learn from them. Additionally, as I explain in the next few paragraphs, knowing that some participants were interested in reading the dissert ation upon its completion inevitably influenced, at least to some extent, its composition. Feminist methodology is also concerned with unequal power relations (e.g., Acker, Barry, and Esseveld 1991; Naples 2003). According to Wolf (1996), there are three interrelated dimensions of power in the research process: th at of the social locati on of researchers versus those they research; that which is exerted during fieldwork in te rms of defining relationships and unequal exchange; and that which is evident du ring the process of writing and presenting, after fieldwork is complete. In response to these power dynamics, feminist methodologists have tried to minimize harm and control during the res earch process (Devault 1996). They have 79


demonstrated a commitment to empathy, respect, a nd care, thus humanizing participants (Collins 2000; Fonow and Cook 1991). This is, of course, easier said than done. In my experience, the writing phase, in particul ar, has raised a difficult set of challenges. In attempting to empower participants in so me way, I not only allowed them to revise transcriptssomething I discuss belowI also ag reed, and in some cases offered, to send them the final product or parts of it. Some wanted to see how their input was being used before deciding whether or not to use a pseudonym; others were simply interested in my project. Knowing the potential audience, I found myself constantly e nvisioning the reception of my writing. This has the benefit of keeping one honest and the disadvantage of becoming too preoccupied with this reception. I am positive that for some, what I write will not be critical enough of the process or outcome of the CBA; for ot hers, it will be too crit ical. I found that two participants could perceive the exact same event in entirely different ways and that the intentions of those perceived as adversaries were usually mo re complex than they were made out to be. Feminist methodology, though, is about an approac h, not a guarantee of success or a fail-safe analytic procedure. In the end, I was able to reconcile these poten tial criticisms. By using the tools of triangulation, a thorough an alytic process, and a healthy dos e of self-doubt, I have, to the best of my ability, interpreted the ideas and opinions of my part icipants within an ethic of caring and personal accountabil ity (Collins 2000). Reinharz (1992) and Acker a nd her colleagues (1991) have pointed out that feminist methodology is both guided by feminist theory a nd connected to the womens movement. To this end, some have described it as research fo r women and meaningful to their lives (Harding 1987; DeVault 1990), leading to so cial change or action bene ficial to women (DeVault 1996:33). This is where my ability to employ fe minist methodology became complicated. As I 80


entered the field, I utilized the insights of inte rsectionality to think a bout the ways in which gender, race, and class and their related oppressions might be inte rtwined in this case study of community organizing and urban redevelopment. Certainly race and class were obvious factors from the beginning. They were evident in the history explained in Chapter Three, as well as the present day demographics of the Hill District, which starkly contrast with that of those who represented development and the corporate world. I thought I might obser ve gender inequality, or at least a gender influence, in studying the community leadership or the anticipated impacts of the arena. This was seldom the case, however, as race and class dynamics were most salient. As Ward (2004) so aptly explains, the signi ficance of various forms of oppression rotates according to situation and context. Being aware of gender as omnipresent is important, but it is not always the most important factor. Appropriate fo r this dissertati on, Molotch (1999) addresses the critique of where is gender? in growth mach ine theory by suggesting that urban theory need not cover every theo retical agenda, whether it be Marx ist, feminist, or otherwise. Because people are in cities, he asserts, urba n theory will incorporate people, but the question becomes whether or not their behavi ors or interactions are uniquely urban: The question is what does the urban have to do with these issues (o r any other) and sometimes the answer may be not very much; the obligation is to explore the issues, not to gua rantee that all aspects of them will be covered (p. 256). Perhaps a study conducted once the new arenas impacts have been felt can better speak to the role of gender, par ticularly with respect to whether job opportunities will be provided for both men and women equally at the new arena and during the redevelopment of the 28 acres across from it. I was faced then with a question: can one claim feminist methodol ogy without meeting the specific research for womenor at least resear ch about gendered power relationscriteria? 81


In the end, I cautiously say yes. Without a ge nder focus, my methodology is probably more in line with such approaches as those presented in Denzin and Giardinas (2007) Ethical Futures in Qualitative Research This edited work illuminates a variety of ethical dilemmas. Its contributors promote critic al and indigenous counter-m ethodologies and question the applicability of Institutional Review Boards ethi cs models for qualitative research. Similarly, my approach is more in keeping with Char mazs (2006) constructivist grounded theory, which recognizes the researchers subj ectivity and encourages reflex ivity throughout the research process. Charmaz also considers data to be a cr eation of the interaction between participants and researchers; hence the concept of generati ng and not collecting data through ethnography and interviews, and presenting inter pretations, not findings. Nevertheless, the root of these approaches whether they acknowledge it or not, can be traced to feminist contributions. Feminist methodology has offered soci al science researchers the most comprehensive critique of positivism, the most extensive debate regarding relationships with participants, and the most useful, in my opinion, tools upon en tering the field. Moreover, at the core of feminist methodology is a commitment to social justice and change and working toward a more ethical research process, all of which I hope to demonstrate here. Entering the Field What is your interest in the Hill?the pointed question I had alwa ys anticipated and yet was not prepared for when it was finally asked, ha lfway through my interviews. Until that point, everyone at the community level had been so re ceptive and willing to ta lk that the question caught me off guard. I approached this commun ity elder and Civil Rights activist for an interview later in the process, wanting to have a few trustworthy references whose names I could use when he asked who had sent me. Even with three participants names, he was suspicious. How was he to know that I would not just use the community to write a best-seller and then 82


leave? (No, I did not interrupt to tell him t hat sociology dissertations rarely become bestsellers.) The community has been studied, he reminded me, so what will you do for the Hill District? Still trying to sl ow down my pounding heart, I suppose that adrenaline pushed me to answer him bluntly; I said that I was not too nave to think that I was going to change the Hill, or that I would even be able to find employment to stay in Pittsburgh after my research was complete (although that was my intention). I said that I thought my research could have some bearing on future communities who face redevelopment, but if that was not the answer he was looking for, then he didnt have to agree to an interview with me. He replied by saying that he was meeting with another one of my participants that afternoon and would get back to me. In the meantime, I stared into spa ce for a while as I contemplated why I was doing this research in the first place and whether it woul d really impact anyone, etc. I ended up jotting down a better response to his question and decided that if it felt right, I would r ecount this to him when, or if, he called back. A few hours later, he did. In a voice that wa s not enthusiastic, but at least willing, he said, When can you meet? We set up a time and inste ad of recounting what came of my meditation, I simply thanked him for the questions he as ked, said something about blubbering when those questions come up even though they are expecte d, and mentioned that I wrote down some thoughts and we could talk more about it when we met. The following week, I was braced for the worst which in this case meant defending myself into the ground and the whole thing ending in a me ss of tears, guilt, and embarrassment. In the end, although he was as intimidating in person as on the phone, he did answer all my questions. He also asked me several questions about myself before we began, and that was fine with me. He even re-asked about my interest in th e Hill. But this time, I was prepared. 83


The narrative above was adapted from a post-inte rview memo written when I was well into the research process. My interest in the Hill obviously began much ea rlier, in the Spring of 2007. Around that time, my committee co-chair had sent me soul-searching: What drew you to sociology in the first place? she had asked. I kn ew that it was my hometown of Pittsburgh. I have always been fascinated with the city, its many ethnic pockets, deeply held traditions, unique topography, and the pride that many Pittsburghers seem to feel, even if they have moved away. Upon traveling home that summer, I planned to follow three leads in different city neighborhoods, all of which were experiencing so me kind of major change. I made some phone calls and was given a tip about the CBA meetings which had recently begun in the Hill. Having been in higher education, the so-called Ivory Towe r, for the greater part of seven years at that point, I was immediately interested in the real-world impact of the Coalitions actions. At the first meeting I attended, members were working to refine community priorities by writing on large post-its and hanging them on the wa ll. That these would later become the basic provisions of the CBA and hopefu lly mean positive change for the neighborhood inspired me. Although not a part of the direc tly affected community, I was d eeply moved by the work of the Coalition and the memory that many residents ca rry of displacement and the amputation of their neighborhood in the late 1950s. Even t hough I grew upand my parents still livein another city neighborhood which is a few miles away, this was a part of Pittsburghs history of which I was previously unaware. For many year s, my only knowledge of the Hill District was that it was a place to avoid at nigh t, or perhaps a quick way to travel from one business district (downtown) to the other (Oakland) Given its level of disinvest ment, the realities of racial segregation in Pittsburgh, and the very insular na ture of the citys nei ghborhoods in general, I perceived no reason to visit the Hill. Beyond that, I have very few recollections of the 84


neighborhood during my 18 years living in Pittsburgh before leaving for college. At that first community meeting, however, my mind was made up: this CBA would be the topic of my dissertation. While I was in Pittsburgh during May and June of 2007, I attended three more CBAand arena-related meetings. Although I took field notes at those m eetings (which were open to the public), more consistent data generation di d not begin until May of 2008, once my IRB was approved and after I had completed coursework and was able to return to Pittsburgh. During my year away, I followed the CBA story as much as possible through local media. Upon my return, I called up a contact I had made at those early meetings; he let me know about a press conference happening in May and later became my first intervie w participant. I conducted the majority of interviews between July and December of 2008, with a few interviews taking place as late as March of 2009. In addition, the bulk of the mee tings and events that I attended occurred between August and October of 2008. Less frequent observation, however, did continue well into the Spring of 2009. Participant Recruitment I used quota sampling to guide recruitment of interview participants, appropriate because of my interest in talking to a select group of people who we re involved and affected by CBA organizing. Using quota sampling allowed me to not only obtain a relatively diverse group of participants in terms of age, gender, and educational/occupational status, but it also allowed me to consult specific stakeholder groups. Partic ipants were recruited via personal contact at meetings or events, as well as through a snowba ll approach in which I asked participants to suggest other stakeholders who might have an interesting perspective or be particularly knowledgeable about the CBA. This approach reduced selection bias, such as when two participants suggested that I speak with someone from a local foundation. Until that point, I was 85


unaware of the role that local foundations played in the CBA campaign. I directly recruited about a third of my participants, in person at meetings or via telephone or in ternet. Just over half of the sample was recruited by other particip ants, and a few participants (6%) actually volunteered to be interviewed when they overheard me talking a bout my project. I tried to strategically ask participants about their ties to harder-to-acce ss stakeholders, such as asking politicians if they knew anyone from the Sports and Exhibition Authority (SEA), or One Hill members if they knew other active residents who chose not to get involved in this particular cause. Participant Characteristics My study sample includes variou s involved stakeholders: Hill Di strict residents, activists, local officials, and business owners. Keepi ng in mind that many of these groups overlap, I interviewed: 13 members of the One Hill Coalitio n, which negotiated for the CBA (at any given meeting in 2008, there were an average of 16 members in attendance1); five members of another neighborhood entity, the Faith and Justice Alliance (a smaller gr oup of no more than ten people); seven local politicians and/or government officials (one former) who were in some way involved; eight business owners; five residents who were not e ngaged in the organizing, but are active community members (i.e. involved in organi zations or other causes in the Hill District); four local clergy; a member of the local founda tion community, and senior consultant for the Penguins.2 Appendix C synthesizes this participant information. Of the 32 people I interviewed, 19 of them currently live in various parts of the Hill District. The majority of the participants 1 This number fluctuated. When I observed meetings in the Spring of 2007, there were between 25 and 40 people at meetings. Further, there were nearly 40 organizations that eventually signed the CBA as part of One Hill. 2 These groups were the key stakeholders in the CBA. The number of participants in each category was determined by these factors: how many people in total fell into each category; availab ility and access; the point at which the information shared during interviews began to get repe titive; and the point at which snowball sampling resulted in no new potential participants. 86


identified as African American or black (75%); one participant was biraci al (African American and Native American) and the remaining seven part icipants were white. The age, educational backgrounds, and occupations of my participants vary greatly. A high school diploma was the highest education achievement for some; others had gone on to receive Bachelors, Masters, Doctorate, and Law degrees. Lastly, the majority of participants ages ra nged from early 30s to mid-60s, with a few exceptions: a couple in their 80s and a man in his early 90s. I knew that I was nearing the end of the interv iew phase when I would ask for referrals and my participants would say, "Did you talk to so and so...?" Provided that I could say yesmost participants did not want to use a pseudonym3I would say yes. And they would say something like, "You've got the main players." As such, my sample allows me to effectively analyze the process and outcome of the CBA through the words of those who were heavily involved on nearly all sides of the negotiating table. B ecause of the large size of the Hill Districts population, this sample size does not allow me to generalize about th e community at large perhaps what residents think about the CBA or the arenas. However, my ethnographic data does allow me to tap into some of these larger community sentiments given some of the observations I made at functions where a great number of pe ople attended and not just the usual faces. A few limitations exist in term s of the participant population. First, although I spoke with the Penguins senior consultant, the Penguins Pr esident declined an interview and did not connect me to any other Penguins officials. Second, although I spoke with various politicians, the two most heavily involved, the mayor and count y executive, declined interviews themselves. Both, however, did connect me with assistants or other government official s. Similarly, despite 3 As evident in Appendix A, I asked my participants how th ey would like to be identified in my writing. As I began chapter composition, I found that identifying participants even with a pseudonym, or describing them in any detailed way seemed awkward and to take away from the organizationa l focus of the dissertation. In recognizing that they might wish to be identified for their involvement or opinions on the CBA, I do include the namesreal and pseudonymsof my participants in Appendix C so as to acknowledge their contribution to my research. 87


an exhaustive effort, I was unable to secure an interview with a representative of the SEA, the city-county government entity that will own the ne w arena and sublease it to the Penguins. At one point, I even met a representa tive in person; he agreed to an interview, gave me his phone number, and then never answered when I called, several times. Data Analysis I employed a constructivist version of grounde d theory as an abductive strategy to inform data analysis (Charmaz 2006; Dey 2004). This means that instead of following a purely inductive or deductive route, I in stead related observations to theo ry and this resulted in an interpretation (2004). I followed an analytic path largely influenced by the work of both Charmaz (2006) and Strauss and Corbin (1998). According to Charmaz, grounded theory methods consist of systematic, yet flexible guid elines for collecting a nd analyzing qualitative data to construct theories grounded in the data themselves (2006:2). Grounded theory was originally developed by Glaser and Strauss (1967 ), who challenged, among other critiques, the notion that qualitative methods were unsystematic and scientifically inferior to quantitative methods (Charmaz 2006). Their work has since been expanded and altered, most notably by Strauss and Corbin (1990; 1998; 2008), who, inst ead of presuming that one approaches the construction of theory as a tabula rasa expect the researcher to come with some prior knowledge, whether it be from existing literature, or personal and professional experiences. I utilized Atlas.ti during the an alytic process, for all of the interviews and some of the fieldnotes as well. Because I had composed the fieldnotes coding them involved less interpretation on my part than coding interview data. So while coding the former was more straightforward, the latter produ ced greater variety and a more thought-provoking set of codes. Using the qualitative software package, I was able to begin by coding data openly (Strauss and Corbin 1998). As opposed to a line-by-line or paragraph-by-paragraph approach used by some 88


researchers, I coded by topics and themes. So if in one response, a participant discussed both a desire to tear down the old arena and the park ing problems created by new arena construction, I would code these as wanting to tear down old arena, and new arena creating parking problems, respectively. Simultaneously, I created and added to existing code families, performing another level of coding referred to as axial by Strauss and Corbin (1998). Thus, I placed the first code into a family called old arena fate and the second in to a family named new arena impacts. I consistently defined code families as they we re created and also found myself making codes more specific as I went along. This required me to return to previously coded transcripts and read through them so as to re-code some of that data. A process of revision also took place with regard to family codes, which were renamed a nd sometimes divided into more than one family along the way. I often expounded upon code family de finitions in order to write more thoughtful or perhaps question-filled memos (1998) and composed lengthy memo s upon returning from interviews as well. One very useful feature of A tlas.ti is the network view, which allows the researcher to visually organize code families. Following Charmazs (2006) suggestion, I diagrammed each family code so as to make connections among codes. I then redrew these diagrams on paper, in order to brainstorm and jot down more details about the relationship between codes within a particular code family. In addi tion, I created one diagram of only family codes, which served as a third level of coding and aided in the creation of major themes for the composition of the three chapters that follow. Here, I veered from the path of Strauss and Corb in (1990; 1998; 2008) who suggest that data be integrated into one centr al category around which theory can be built. 89


Because I found the concrete details of the CBA campaign to be as important as emerging theory, I chose to focus on both. Summary Using the data generating methods of in-d epth interviewing and ethnographic fieldwork that incorporated the use of pertinent documen ts, I was able to achieve the benefits of triangulation in working toward research aims that have both pract ical and theoretical implications. Although I struggled with the a pplicability of feminist methodology, I ultimately credit its contributions to social science research and commitment to social justice as the basis of my approach. As my narrative on entering the field illustrates, I engaged in reflexivity by identifying my research motives and relations hip to the topic of my case study. With the assistance of Atlas.ti and informed by grounded theory, I carried out a lengthy and thorough analytic process. The next chapter is the first of three data interpretation chapters. In it, I focus on one major theme that emerged from my data, the driving forces behind the CBA campaign. 90


91 CHAPTER 5 DESERVED AND NEEDED: DRIVING FORCES In the last chapter I offered a detailed acc ount of my methodology and analytic process. That process allowed me to arrive at major themes that would become the topics of my analytic chapters. This chapter is the first of three data interpretation chapters. Here, I use the case of the Hill District CBA to concentrate on why communities are choosing to negotiate with developers and pursue benefits through CBAs. I address this question in two ways. First, I first briefly discuss why negotiation was a more desirable community approach to arena redevelopment than opposition. I return to this idea again in Chapter Seven. Second, I examine three important driving forces behind the Hill District CBA: 1) retribution for failed urban renewal; 2) compensation for negative impacts of the new ar ena; and 3) a desire to counter corporate welfare. Each of these was evident in the framing1 used by the One Hill Coalition, which eventually negotiated the CBA, during the campaign, something discussed below. I find that the term framing can have a mislead ing connotation of disingenuousness or manipulation; this in no way describes the CBA organizing in Pittsburgh. The frames used were a direct reflection of community sentiment and collective memory. Choosing to Negotiate Negotiating a CBA may have been the only way to ensure what supporters perceived as deserved community reinvestment. By CBA s upporters, I mean those who were part of One Hill, as well as those who agreed with the princi ple of the CBA, regardless of their involvement 1 Framing processes have come to be seen as one of the core dynamics of social movements (Benford and Snow 2000). The term frame originated with the work of Goffman, (1974) who was interested in the ways in which people organized and assigned meaning to their experience s. Later, it was more deliberately connected to social movements and the way in which their actors engage in strategic framing, a process of creating and maintaining meaning for potential supporters and opponents in order to achieve movement goals (Snow et al. 1986; Benford and Snow 2000).


in One Hills campaign.2 Taking an oppositional approach was not a viable or even desirable option in this case. Several reasons account for th is stance. First, Mellon Arena already sits at the foot of the Hill District and no major residential displacement was necessary to make room for the new arena, thus providing fewer grounds on which to oppose the construction.3 Further, as in the 1960s, an oppositional approach could again result in a stalemat e, leaving a sea of parking lots surrounding the new arena and re placing the Mellon Arena upon its demolition. Third, even if the deal for the new arena had not already been brokere d, the perception of my participants was that the commun ity did not feel strongly enough to oppose it. Although the Hill District was largely left out of new arena d ecisions, according to some, the neighborhood was divided as to opinions about it. Some were indifferent; others actually welcomed it as new development, period. Still others questioned why a sports venue should exist on that site at all. What was clear, however, and what the community could agree upon, was the desire to benefit from it. Moving Forward a nd Looking Back The first and most prominent driving force behi nd the Hill District CBA was the desire for retribution for failed urban renewal. In order to better understand th is driving force, I begin this section by providing more details about the neig hborhood context, as described by participants. The Hill District is a neighborhood in transition. R ealities of disinvestment, relative isolation, and violence exist in the mi dst of dramatic changes, including new housing, increasing racial/ethnic and class diversity, and acknowledgem ent of the Hill as prime land. For those who are unfamiliar, the Hill District is perceived as crime-ridden and drug-infested, a place to fear 2 This term also includes members of the Hill Faith and Justice Alliance, another community entity that I discuss in Chapter Six. While they were not aligned with One Hill, they were in support of a CBA. 3 A Rabbi and a few Priests temporarily had to relocat e due to their respective sy nagogue and rectory being demolished. To my knowledge, no othe r residential displacement took place. 92


and avoid that comes with a ll the accompanying code words, such as ghetto and a rough area. While exaggerated and unrepresentative of the entire neighborhood, these perceptions are not entirely unfounded; residents themselves describe problems with drugs and violence, vacant buildings and overgrown lots, hope lessness, and a general lack of investment over time, on the part of the city, the business co mmunity, and other residents. Nevertheless, among my participants rega rdless of stakeholde r positionthe most common description of the neighborhood was not a negative one. Instead, it was of a neighborhood in flux. Evidence that the Hill was being redone included a new library, YMCA, grocery store, and housing. Its unmatched location in the city of Pittsburgh has resulted in part in legal rezoning and attempts to engage in euphemistic renaming. For example, what used to be called the Upper Hill is now being referred to by some as Schenley Heights. One reverend found that he had to use those changes stra tegically: If I want pizza after 6pm, I say I live in Schenley Heights; if I say the Hill, I dont get it. In another example, a woman was troubled by the way in which her residence in th e Lower Hill was being renamed. She found that when she called the management at Crawford Square, the welcome message characterized the housing as being located in Downtown Gardens. As a long time resident, this had always been and would always be the Hill District. In addition, what residents consider the Lowe r Hill was rezoned in 2005 to be considered part of the Golden Triangle, or central business district.4 These changes are indicative of the gradual and persistent effort to better connect the second and third largest areas of economic activity in Pennsylvania: Pittsburghs central business district and Oakland (Figure 5-1). Such changes are often worrisome to long-time resident s, who want to prevent being priced out of 4 This information was provided by the Senior Planner for Zoning and Urban Design at Pittsburghs Department of City Planning, through personal communication, July 29, 2009. 93


their own neighborhood. Another pa stor suggested that affordable housing be built in the 28 acres where the Mellon Arena now stands: Now, if they build hous ing down there and peg them in the $200,000 range, theyre going to change the complexion of the neighborhood. His comment thus conflates economic and racial displacement and speaks to a common fear among gentrifying neighborhoods indigenous residents (Freeman 2006). Retribution The Hill stands on the brink of a major transiti on, the old giving way to the new. The old and the new, however, are intimately in tertwined. The neighborhoodaccording to one participant now a shell of its former selfembodies a tensi on between honoring the past and moving forward, between remembering a neighbor hood as it was and wanting to recreate the past as its future. This relationship between past and future had the greatest influence on the decision to negotiate a CBA. This was eviden t during the CBA campaign in that the community desired benefits for its future, but continually recounted th e past in order to leverage its case. In this sense, they framed the CBA as retributi on for urban renewal and making up for past wrongs. As one participant, an activist and performance artist, recited from a poem she wrote: We have one foot in development/ the other in abandoned lots and buildings./ Were going to hold our government accountable, not just for what they do today, but for the decades of neglect theyve been wielding/ thats why Im unyielding. Deta ils of displacement we re recounted at press conferences and public hearings, and appeared on lo cal news stations. This information was thus distributed to the general public, but it was also used during negotiation meetings. A vibrant past looms large in the collective memory of the community, as does the urban renewal which effectively ended its heyday, the Wylie Avenue Days, as a documentary about the era is named. Although some residents ack nowledged the poor housing stock and sewage that existed in the Lower Hill District, their memories, first-hand and handed-down, were of a 94


Mecca for black economic and social life, where j azz ruled and the people were more refined. They described a safer time and a closer-knit, even multicultural community; Jewtown existed next to Chinatown and Italians were neighbors w ith African Americans, a ll of whom patronized the same local shops and hucksters. At one time, people used to say that Wylie Avenue, then the Hills most bustling corridor, was the only street in the country that began at a church and ended at a jail (John Wesley AME Zion Church and the Allegheny County Jail, respectively). But Wylie, along with two other main corridors that ran all the way to the ce ntral business district, was cut off when land clearance began to make way for the Civic Arena. A few of my participants were directly affected by urban renewal, their families being among the 1,551 that were displaced or their family s businesses one of the 413 that were forced to close or relocate. Some m oved into public housing; others away from the neighborhood. One of them, who now pastors in the Hill, lived in what is now Row G of the Civic Arena. As renters, his family received no compensation: we got nothing and we were just told we had to get out. Thats it. The resolution to raze th e Lower Hill District was reached by local elites members of the citys powerful growth machinewho envisioned a cultural center where the blight once stood. That the decisions of this gr oup were unilateral was il lustrated by one of the Hills current political representatives: I have a newspaper, Pittsburgh Sun Telegraph paper doesnt exis t anymorefrom the s, that outlines the plans for the Hill, and the new arena, and other developments. And it shows all the men who were involved in that process. The only thing black in that paper is the print, which I find illuminating His observation also points to the ways in wh ich elite whites both exerted and maintained the privileges of whiteness through land use decisions. Similar to promises made today, then-Mayor David Lawrence said that the Hill District w ould benefit from and be supported by the Civic Arena. 95


History has proven him wrong; instead of a supportive relationship between downtown and the Hill District, contention and distrust grew and the Mellon Arena has become a symbol of this relationship. According to a life-long resident of the Hill: That arena represents a time in our histor y where we were taken advantage of. Part of our community was destroyed. Symb olically that is almost like a red flag for all of the bad things that have happened to the Hill, the beginning of the downward spiral of the Hill economically, socially. So that is, for me something that is almost like having a confederate flag. By comparing the existing arena to a confederate flag, he indicates this relationships raciallycharged nature. As in the days of Mayor Lawrence, Pittsburghs political and economic leadership continues to be dominated by white men. The city at la rge remains racially segregated and racial disparities between whites and blacks5 are well-documented. In relation to African Americans, whites maintain privileg e in the areas of educational achievement, employment, household income, home ownership, a nd mental health (University of Pittsburgh Center on Race and Social Problems 2007). Leveraging the Past During the CBA campaign, distrust pervaded community relations wi th nonresidents and political officials. An excerpt from field notes taken at the very first public meeting sponsored by the Penguins and the Sports and Exhibition Authority (SEA) illustrates this atmosphere of distrust and contention: Although the purpose of the meeting wa s to discuss the arena design and have Hill District residents, business-owners, and clergy sign up for focus groups about the design, attendees seemed more interested in co mmunity benefits. A lifelong Hill resident says that in the 1950s there were al so agreements and meetings with the developer but that they were 5 As described in Chapter Three, the population of Pittsburgh was 68% white and 27% black in 2000. These numbers illustrate that those who identify with other racial categories make up only a very small percentage of the population (Pittsburgh Department of City Planning 2000). I focus only on white-black relations here because of such statistics and because I am concerned with the racially charged relationship between the predominantly black Hill District and Pittsburghs predominantly white political and economic leadership. 96


lost and not upheld. She warned the community to have it [benefits] in writing, in a legal document. Make that agreement 20 years! she warned. People clapped. This time around, a CBA allowed them to do just that. Although enforceability is a potential problem with these agreements (Gross 2007; Salkin 2007), their legally-binding nature is attractive to communities facing development, especially those such as the Hill District. The pastor whose family had been displaced during urban renewal cl early articulated the re lationship between past deception and the present decision to negotiate a CBA around the arena: Whats always in the back of the minds of people my age who went through the first rehabilitation, or whatever you wa nt to call it, is lack of trus t. We trusted them before and they spit on us, so were not going to let them do that again. You know, dont come and tell me youre going to do great things in th e Hill, when you promised me once before and you didnt do a thing One local official found the persistent use of the neighborhoods past, particularly during negotiations, to be problematic. For him, this approach fueled a sense of entitlement and overlooked the investments made by the City and Count y toward Hill District social services, as well as residential and commercial development (u sually through loans and resale) over the last two decades. As he observed: So all we heard in all the sessions was, You guys destroyed our neighborhood, you guys eviscerated our cultural life, we have su ffered immeasurably, we have never gotten any benefits these super overarching statements. Nevertheless, others perceived use of the past as key to the CBA coalitions legitimacy. The following comments made by a lifelong active resident and a representa tive of the county execu tive, respectively, are typical of this belief: Well, theres some history and I think people understand what the history was and all that occurred down there and how the Civic Arena ca me about. I think somehow or other, their brains was massaged enough to say we really ne ed to look at doing things to include, to do things this way. So I think with all the ba ntering, we were really able to get some information in there, to get people to begin to feel it. I think thats the only way it [the CBA] happened. 97


The Hill District is a specific case becau se I think a lot of people feel that the neighborhood was sorely wronged with the deve lopment of the Civic Arena. Now when [the Civic Arena is] coming down, will the commun ity still face the same fate that it faced 40 years ago? So I think nobody wants to he ar those echoes again 20 years [from now] saying that [Mayor] Ravenstahl and [County Executive] Onorato did no thing to assist the community to redevelop itself so...nobody wants that legacy. In a local newspaper article from 2008, the Mayor expressed a similar sentiment. He was quoted as saying: My belief is that it was a unique situation. It was the result of the prior experiences that they had with the Mellon Arena site that was developed, and the uprooting and dislodging and changing of a neighborhood without any consultation. That's why a community benefits agreement was ultimately reached and why we entered into the dialogue (Togneri 2008). Although the neighborhoods history ma y have thus been the most effective frame, it was not the only impetus behind the CBA. New arena impacts also played a role, a topic to which I now turn. Hockey in the Hood? Neighborhood activists were aw are of the various social, economic, and environmental impacts of an arena and its constructi on. The weight of these impacts as a primary driving force for the CBA, however, was offset by the presence of the existing arena and the fact that major residential clearance for the new arena site had already taken place during urban renewal. To a lesser extent, then, One Hill framed their desire for community benefits not just about the past, but about dealing with the impacts of both the Mellon Arena and the anti cipated impacts of the Consol Energy Center. As such, the CBA was char acterized as both deserved and needed. This was evident, for example, in an editorial written by one of the lawyers on the negotiation team in which he dispelled popular myths about the Hills desire for benefits (Ellis 2008). He argued: Many people cannot relate to the Hills reque sts because their communities have been physically and culturally intact for the last 50 years, with responsive, funded programs and services It is easy to be judgmental, but when you cant sleep because of traffic or take 98


a shower because of decreased water pressu re, when your property values go down or crime increases, the fight for community in vestment takes on a whole new perspective. Local Impacts Even for those living closest to the new arena site, land clearance and construction have had little direct impact, negative or positive. Most residents cited problems with traffic as having the greatest impact on them, the result of a temporar ily closed lane, which al so altered pedestrian traffic. The majority of land clearance involve d the demolition of parking lots and about a dozen buildings, as well as the closing of one small street. Some of the buildings sold to the SEA were vacant; others were occupied by businesses. The single largest building demolished was St. Francis Central Medical Center, which had closed in 2000. A synagogue, Beth Hamedrash Hagadol-Beth Jacob was also demolished, compen sated, and moved into a nearby building. Its small congregation, the only remaining Jewish c ongregation in the Hill, had already relocated once, during urban renewal (Semmes 2008). Lastl y, Epiphany Catholic Church sold to the SEA (via the Diocese of Pitt sburgh) its rectory, a former women s residence called St. Regis, and a former school building (Lowry 2007). At the time, the residence was vacant and the school building served as nonprofit office space and a ha lfway house for paroled ex-convicts. With compensation funds, a new rectory is being cons tructed between the church and the new arena (Figure 5-2). Hill District residents have not benefited economically from this clearance nor new arena construction, as no targeted hiring occurred fo r either in the neighborhood. In terms of environmental impacts, as with any type of demolition or construction work, noise and dirt abound, but some distance does exist between the s ite and even the closest residents. These impacts were relatively minor; as one resident, an ar tist and activist, put it, . the damage was already done with the old arena. Its just putting a new face on an old body. 99

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Residents anticipate the impacts of the Consol Energy Center to be much like those of the existing one. As a result, many ar e pessimistic about potential bene fits and ambivalent about the coming arena. For decades, they have been deal ing with rowdy fans urin ating and littering in yards, as well as parking and traffic conge stion surrounding games and other events; (one resident described the Hill as being encroached upon during these times). They expect these problems to continue; the major congesti on points may simply be altered. Further, although the designers of the new arena intend it to be more integrated into the surrounding buildings than the Mellon Arena is, it will likely remain somewhat disconnected from the rest of the Hill District. The comm unity vocally opposed the first proposed design, criticizing the fact that they f aced a blank wall. As one reverend passionately testif ied at a city planning commission hearing: We want you to look again at your architectural renderings because there is no glass viewing of the Hill. You talk about how pre tty and wonderful and flattering its going to be as you look at downtown; I wa nt you all to look at the Hill where we live and serve and work and so if the glass is there, you can see if youve done a good days work or nothing at all. Since then, changes were made to the design, including the addition of some windows on the side facing the Hill and reduced height (Bel ko 2008b), but according to the most recent renderings, it appears that the community will still face a parking garage and the blandest exterior side (Pittsburgh Depa rtment of City Planning 2008). Some of my participan ts, mainly non-residents, saw the arena as potentiall y benefiting the community by acting as one of several catalysts for Hill District development, particularly in the Uptown area. In his speech at the gr oundbreaking ceremony, the Mayor suggested this by stating that the event was also about breaking gr ound on the future of the Hill. The belief that more fans will visit the new arena, thus incr easing access to revenue for Hill businesses, is exemplified by the thoughts of one local official: 100

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So this is a situation where, will people come and park in the garage and leave? Yes. But will people come two hours early, park downtown, eat dinner? Yes. [. ] This would be a good time to reopen the Crawford Grill [an historic Hill District jazz club]. Eat at the Grill and then come down. So its got the ability to attract. The new arena could also mean potential employment for Hill District residents. The decision to negotiate a CBA with a job resource center as one of its main provisions illustrates this hope. Nevertheless, those jobs might not be ideal. One reverend highlights this skepticism: The truth of the matter is I dont see a whole lot of benef it for the community. Most of your hockey fans are folks who dont live in this area. So they come in, they drive out. Ok? Some folks may get some jobs, many will be part time work; many will be minimum wage ticket sellers and that kind of thing, so no. His prediction is consistent with the work of Delaney and Eckstein (2007), who argue that stadiums fail to have wide-reaching economic benefits and fewer people are hired in new stadiums once the honeymoon period is over. In comparison to other types of structures, sports facilities are used infrequently and for short periods at a time. They tend to create mostly low-wage and part-time jobs with few benefits (2007:48). The argument that growth creates jobs, however, has always been a major selling point of those promoting it (Molotch 1976). Unless the CBA aids Pittsburghs new arena in breaking the mold, the vision of arenainspired Hill District redevelopment is also unlikely. Following Delane y and Eckstein (2003) and Wilbur (2000), sports facili ties increasingly incorporate onestop shopping inside, which has had a negative effect on the revenue of local surrounding businesses. Instead of generating broad-based community development, stadiums are more likely to serve the interests of insiders and concentrate money in the hands of a few, large business operators, further marginalizing poor and minority neighborhoods in the process (Collins and Grineski 2007). For Friedman and his colleagues (2004), th is perfectly illustrates the problem of redevelopment policies that prioritize projectin g civic image over improving citizen welfare (p. 131). Such policies, of course, are in line with a growth coalition geared toward development 101

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rather than redistributional goals (Logan, Whaley, and Crowder 1999:75). Some residents were well-aware and critical of these phenomena. As one political repr esentative who lives in the Hill put it, The money will flow out of the Hill; it wont be flowi ng back. By negotiating a CBA, one of the communitys goals was to counter this out-flow of revenue and move toward a more redistributive end. According to one local landowner who was on the periphery of the organizing, the deserved and needed frame base d on local impacts and lack of benefits began to effectively change public sentiment: And it started off where if you talked to peopl e not just throughout the city, but throughout the county, I think the sentiment might have b een, who do they think they are? But now its like, you know what, those peop le are smart, they really did it right. [. .] Now theyre starting to say, Thats ok, god bl ess them, they deserve it, they live here, they put up with all the traffic and the noise and the garbage. And its really tu rned around and those people who negotiated it and signed th at CBA, I really commend them. A Segregated Fan Base In the Hill District, resident opinions on the pot ential impacts of the new arena as well as their relationship with the existing arena are infl uenced by the fact that the main tenant is a hockey team. Although many of my participants w ho live in the Hill had attended events at the arenamost often concerts, circuses, and c onventions/conferencesthe majority had never attended a hockey game (11 out of 19) and none attended hockey games regularly. There is a widespread belief that hockey is not a black sport. This belief is grounded in the fact that the National Hockey League is dominated by whites, from the players, to coaches and other officials, to fans and team owners (Smith 2007). In addition, some non-white players, particularly African Americans, have experienced overt racism at the hands of hockey fans (Smith 2007). Currently, there is only one black player on the Penguins roster, as several participants were quick to poi nt out. It was both stated and implied that unlike with sports such as basket ball and football, hockey teams have less of a 102

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relationship with the black community. In Pittsburgh, an NHL program called Hockey in the Hood was met with amused skepticism; as one reverend joked, . you know, please, we dont play hockey. Well take those sticks and wear you out! Regardless of stakeholder position, though, the majority of my participants were not Penguins fans. And contrary to popular belief and the sentiment expressed above, a few of the participants who are black said that they were fans of the team and the sport. In addition, some community-based stakeholders who supported th e CBA admitted feeling conflicted about their fan status because of the contentious relati onship between the community and the Penguins, particularly during the negotiations As a result, they made a di stinction between the players and the Penguins organization, which was percei ved negativelydescriptions ranged from uncooperative to arrogantby community activists. Throughout the campaign, some activists also wanted to be clear that th ey were not against the team, but that they were for the neighborhood, th at these were not mutually exclusive. As a member of One Hill who works in the neighbor hood and considers herself a (conflicted) fan suggested, the Coalition and Penguins fans act ually had similar concerns: You want the Penguins to stay in Pittsburgh and have a new arena; we want a new arena for the Penguins that benefits the community. [. ] You want job opportunities fo r Pittsburghers; we want job opportunities for Pittsburghers and Hill District residents. Unfortunately, a disconnect between many hoc key fans and CBA supporters persisted. This same woman described how Mellon Arena-go ers reacted to community activists when a small group of them picketed before a game: We were chanting, We want a CBA! We want it now! and I mean Penguins fans were standing there saying all kinds of shit to us, you know just Go home and a few other not nice things, and We want the Penguins. And at one point, the folks at the arena turned 103

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up the music that they play outside. I mean we were screaming at th e top of our lungs and the music just kept getting louder. A discussion board about the new arena on the Pe nguins website is further evidence of this kind of reception. Those discussion threads havi ng to do with the Agreement and the neighborhood are overwhelming negative; ignorant perceptions of the Hill District abound and inform opinions of the CBA with comments such as: No one cares about the Hill residents greedy demands and Why dont Pens fans show up and c ounter protest? (pe nguins.nhl.com 2008). Perhaps a former political representative from the Hill District characterized this dynamic best when he stated that the Penguins attract a non-sympathetic fan base. There is an obvious racial dimension to the Penguins predominan tly white fan base lacking sympathy for Hill District causes and needs. The contempt evid ent in the comments above is tied to the way in which fans are said to treat the neighborhood on ga me days, as described in the previous section on local impacts. For those fans who block driveways, park, litte r, and get sick on lawns, the Hill District neighborhood might be called a pl ace apart, a phrase that Freeman (2006:188) uses to characterize the excl usion and mistreatment of black inner-city neighborhoods throughout US history. These fans failure to treat the Hill Distri ct as a place worthy of respect only reinforces this status. A Sweetheart Deal In addition to the specific, place-based impact s that CBA supporters set out to address, the large public subsidy being given to the Penguins served as a third motivation and justification for a CBA. Initially, the cost of Pittsburghs new ar ena was estimated at $290 million. This was to be paid for through a 30-year revenue bond backed by annual payments of $19.1 million from the following: $4.1 million annually from Penguins private financing; $7.5 million annually from PITG Gaming private financing (the winne rs of the casino license); and $7.5 million of 104

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public funding from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvanias Community Development Fund via a gaming tax (Belko 2008c). The cost estimate has since increased, and as of November 2008, the price tag was $321 million. The overrun will be covered by another $15.5 million from the Penguins; $10 million from the commonwealth; a nd $5.5 million from the SEA. As a citycounty government entity, the SEAs share will be paid for by a ticket surcharge for the existing arena on any amount higher than $2 million/year that it generates6; savings from building a parking garage near the arena if it costs less than the projected budget; and possible loans from the Urban Redevelopment Authority and the Redevelopment Authority of Allegheny County (2008c; Boren 2008b). According to the sublease, the Penguins w ill play at the new arena and agree not to relocate through the year 2039. They will make the annual payment to the SEA of $4.1 million, as listed above, and pay for all of the expenses associated with operating and maintaining the arena, concessions within, and new parking garage. In return, the Penguins will receive 100% of the net revenue from: all parking at the new arena garage; NHL tickets and non-NHL events; the outside marquee; sponsor ships and advertising; luxury and premium seating; concession stands; naming rights; the rents of any subleased retail spaces. As mentioned in Chapter Three, the Penguins we re also given the development rights to the 28 acres on which the Mellon Arena and surface parki ng lots now exist and will retain the revenue from parking on the site either until they rede velop it for another use or after ten years, whichever comes first. If the Penguins fail to receive $15 million through development, sale, or 6 When the Pens made it to the Stanley Cup finals in the 2007-08 season, they exceed ed $2 million by $700,000 (Boren 2008a). 105

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lease of that acreage, then the SEA will pay them the shortfall. Within the ten-year timeframe, though, a portion of the land is to be redeveloped every year; if not, the Penguins forfeit the rights to that portion. A term sheet of the sublease is included in Appendix D. Major League Effects Officials and community stakeholders alike r ecognized that this subsidy is a substantial one and that the citys desire to keep the Pe nguins in Pittsburgh meant going to extreme lengths to keep the owners satisfied. Although the ne w arena itself will likely provide few direct benefits to the neighborhood, city of ficials were motivated by their perceptions of a new arena as a major asset to the city and region. A state sena tor discussed why cities are willing to build new facilities despite the cost: Speaking practically, these are important venues that do bring revenue and jobs to the city, and even the amusement ta x. We get a buck or so amusement tax off of each ticket. So were talking about a lot of jobs and money. In another explanation, he combined economic and major league effect arguments: You couldnt put a dollar value on the amount of times that the Penguins and Mario Lemieux in particular, or Crosby, mentions Pittsburgh in that c ontext. So as a municipality, you cant put a dollar value on that marketing name and recognition for Pittsburgh. For Pittsburgh to be a great city and continue to be a great city, which it is, there are a lot of, probably ten important things about our ar ea that are interesting and attractive to residents and business. And in that list of ten is some where the importance of major league sports teams. [. ] And that s our competitive edge; thats why were not a Detroit or a Buffalo or an Akron, because of all those things that we have, natural and otherwise. His description thus draws from common rhetoric of both waves of recen t stadium building, as characterized by Delaney and Eckstein (2003). Th ey argue that in the first wave, during the early 1990s, a typical argument th at local growth coalitions us ed was that stadiums deliver economic benefits and spur investment. Duri ng the second wave, beginning in the late 1990s, local growth coalitions were more likely to rely on the argument that stadiums foster city self esteem by improving their image. 106

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This name recognition argument is a difficult one to refute because it projects a value that is immeasurable. Civic pride and the major league effect are indeed int angible benefits that might explainbut do not necessarily justifythe extent of public subsidies used for sports facility construction (Owen 2006). A local busin ess owner had a similar perspective regarding these intangibles: You can live in a city where they say, Hey, we didnt spend a dime on a hockey arena or for concerts or whatever. We dont have any and we dont care. Well guess what? Nobody wants to go there! [laughs] You bette r have something that makes people go there. We dont have an ocean. I dont know if you noticed, but theres no beach. You know, and our weather isnt that great. Its been great lately, but overall, we dont have weather where people say in Europe, Were going to go vacation in Pittsburgh. You know, maybe Florida and Califor nia have that luxury, and Ha waii, but we got to bring people in. How do you do that? Well, we used to have Steel Mills, well show you a plaque and an old cauldron or whatever that big thing is that holds the molten, hot metal. But thats not going to bring people in. Such benefits, however, are not received equally by all taxpa yers; instead, those fans who frequent games receive more of them than those who do not (Swindell and Rosentraub 1998). Regardless of their personal affi nity toward the team, the politicians nightmare, as the Penguins senior consultant describe d it, is being in office when a major sports team leaves. In Pittsburgh, Penguins owners made very clear their desire for a new arena if the franchise was to stay in the city. Although they never seriously planned on relocatingsomething co-owner and former player Mario Lemieux admitted at th e groundbreaking, saying, Those trips to Kansas City and Las Vegas and other cities were just to go, have a nice dinne r and come backthey used that threat as a bargaining chip in trying to get the best d eal possible in Pittsburgh (Potter 2008). Such threats are common in cities across the U.S. and consistent with the literature on sports facility funding and its relationship to co rporate welfare (Cagan and deMause 1998). As indicated in Chapter Two, local growth coali tions appear biased to ward building publicly 107

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financed stadiums (Delaney and Eckstein 2007). The stronger the local growth coalition is and the more successful it is at connecting new spor ts venues with a clearl y articulated corporatecentric vision of economic growth, the more lik ely that stadium building will not only occur, but will be at least partially funded by public do llars (p. 350). And in fact, the breadth and amount of public contribution in the current surge of stad ium-building is unprecedented (Delaney and Eckstein 2003) and growing (C agan and deMause 1998). As these types of subsidies grow, those geared toward cities social services shrink: Indeed, in an era of increased public and government reluctance to lay out public money for anythingfrom food stamps to the lo cal philharmonicthe eagerness with which cities are offering up hundreds of millions of dollars to build new stadiums is mindboggling. Welfare as we know it may be dead, but corporate welfare is alive and kicking (1998:29). Countering Corporate Welfare CBA supporters were critical of the sweethe art deal signed between the Penguins and the SEA, the benefits of which will continue for years as a result of the 28-acre development rights and the extent of revenue that the Penguins will collect. Ma ny of them thought of community benefits as the least the Hill Di strict could ask for in comparison. The following comment made by a negotiating team lawyer who runs a sma ll practice in the neighborhood illustrates this sentiment: So if the millions and millions and it will end up being billions of dollars that the Penguins organization will make out of this deal if just a miniscul e part of that could or would be devoted to this community, what a differe nce it would make. A nother participant was critical of the double standard surrounding public subsidies: Thats the problem: this whole myth around self-reliance. Nobody else does for themselves. Everybody else is getting subsidies. And the main subsidy persons ar e the Pens and these corporations and these stadiums. Here, she justifies asking for comm unity benefits by reconceptualizing the Penguins subsidy in light of a perv asive pull yourself up by the bootstraps mentality. 108

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In accord with their desire to counter corporate welfare, One Hill portrayed the Penguins as receiving numerous public subs idies, including hidden costs that would be coming out of taxpayers pockets. One Hills chairperson was vocal about the amount of subsidy being provided for the Penguins. He questioned why they would be able to collect so much revenue when they did not actually own the arena or the surrounding land: You rent your house to somebody and then they can collect rent You pay them to rent your house! At one point, he created and distributed a spreadsh eet which detailed the extent of the public subsidy, taking into account costs that the public might have been un aware of, such as site preparation. Along with this, the Penguins were characterized by some as disinvested outsiders. Despite the fact that Mario Lemieux, a former player, co-owns the team they were seen as an investment by this guy, meaning the majority owner, Ron Burkle, who resides in California. In other words, the Penguins would be given this large subsidy only to invest their revenue elsewhere. The Coalition gained leverage by framing th eir campaign (in part) as one critical of corporate welfare. Such leverage has been us ed across the country in other CBA campaigns and is responsible for helping to justify and achieve community returns (Marcello 2007). This was evident in the Pittsburgh case as well. A local political official and state senator, respectively, expressed their belief in benefits when public subsidies are involved: The Penguins are getting ready to get a practic ally free building for the next 30 years and theyre going to get millions from the [. .] revenue, and from all the concessions at the arena. So the community needs to get something and maybe not cash money, but in regards to resources and programs. Now if its a substantially disp roportionate investment of public dollars, and lets say some major hotel that has a restau rant, that has house cleaning, wh atever and it demands an inordinate amount of pub lic investment, then I think its morally if not functionally, for the city, to be very demanding about a CBA. But if its a smaller hotel that is marginal income, its going to be a struggle to make sure the hotel succeeds. With a smaller amount of public investment, I dont know. Those are the ki nds of things I think we need to weigh each time. 109

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These quotations suggest that although the history of the neighborhood was the motivating factor for the mayor (indicated by hi s previously-cited comment), ot her stakeholders opinions to support community benefits may have additionally been shaped by the extent of the public subsidy involved in arena construction. Summary: Situating CBA Motivations Each CBA campaign and (re)development project has its own unique history and originates within a particular so cial, political, and economic context. In this chapter I presented the driving forces behind the Hill District CBA campaign. A legacy of urban renewal and lingering distrust in Pittsburghs Hill District was th e greatest impetus behind the desire for benefits and the choice to negotia te versus oppose the new arena. To a lesser extent, those who supported a CBA were interested in offsetting the negative impacts of the new arena and the large public subsidy the Penguins will receive. Despite the particulars of the Hill District CBA, however, this case offers important insight into why communities are choosing to negotiate w ith developers for community benefits, and the reasons lie in both local historie s and extra-local phenomenon. Re gardless of a history of urban renewal, low-income and predominantly raci al/ethnic minority neighborhoods tend to have common experiences of place-based inequality and discrimination, as evidenced by the extensive body of work on environmental injustice (e.g., Sz asz and Meuser 1997). Thus, the pastdistant and recenthas created an environment of dist rust in many urban communities. These same communities have disproportionately felt the brunt of larger post-industrial trends and neoliberal shifts. While the public and private sectors wo rk together, using cor porate welfare and land deregulation in order to revita lize struggling downtowns, the comm unity sector is not only left out of land use decisions, but simultaneously feels its social services deple ting. In this context, negotiating toward a legally bind ing agreement is not only attractive, but necessary. CBAs allow 110

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communities to counter the power imbalance among sectors, as Ho (2007) suggests, as well as question pro-growth elites insistence on value-fr ee growth. I return to this idea in Chapter Seven, but offer next a detailed account of the CBA campaign, its process and outcome. Figure 5-1. Hill District as s ituated between central business district and Oakland. (Source: Pittsburgh Department of City Planning. Map created for author by Jarrod West.) 111

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A B C Figure 5-2. Epiphany Church and surrounding area. A) Epipha ny Church and School Building (to the right) taken before land clearance for the new arena. (Source: www.epiphany church.net. Last accessed Jul y, 2009). B) New rectory with new arena construction in the background (Church is to the left). (Photograph taken by author. May, 2009). C) Back of Epiphany Church, illustrating proximity to new arena construction. (Photograph taken by author. May, 2009). 112

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113 CHAPTER 6 ONE HILL, MANY VOICES!: PROCESS AND OUTCOME In Chapter Five, I argued that there were thr ee driving forces behind the Hill District CBA campaign. Throughout that chapter, I concentrated on the first pa rt of a three-fold research inquiry. This chapter addresses the second part of that inquiry: how are communities engaging in and securing CBAs? As noted in the introductory chapter, much of the published research and information available on CBAs presents a birds eye view of several Agreements. While this has its meritsLavines (2009) blog is an excellent example of the usefulness of this kind of researchit is often based on anecdotal data and does not necessarily address process and organizational details. In focusing here on the organizing process, campaign structure, and strategies surrounding the Hill District CBA, I complement existing research with a more microscopic view. I begin by discussing details of the CBA process in Pittsburgh: the formation of the CBA Coalition; preparation for negotiations; a pe riod of increased pressure on the Penguins and government entities; and the signing and implem entation of the CBA. At the outset of each process-related subsection I offer an organizational/p ertinent events timeline. This is meant to aid in an understanding of the nuts and bolts of the CBA campai gn, as well as give a sense of the order of important steps. I then present an analysis of th e CBA outcome through the opinions of my participants, who shared mixe d feelings on the final document. The Formation of a Community Coalition 2007, January-April: Hill District leaders convene and meet with county and c ity politicians regarding Lower Hill District redevelopment March: The construction of a new arena is publically announced April: MOA presented to local officials

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May: One Hill meetings begin, community planks devised June: Penguins hold public meeting; Local officials and Penguins send letter of intent to One Hill, expressing interest in negotiating a CBA As described at the end of Chapter Three, several community leaders were already mobilized and working together regarding the pot ential placement of a casino in the Lower Hill District. When Pennsylvanias Gaming Contro l Board made its decision to place the casino elsewhere, the group was expecting a much-needed break; they did not get it. In early 2007, word circulated that the Penguins were negotiating for the rights to develop the 28 acres where the Mellon Arena and surrounding parking lots now sit as part of their deal to remain in Pittsburgh. Community leaders were determined not to let local officials give away the Lower Hill District. The state representa tive of their political district agreed to host a meeting of about ten Hill District stakeholders, including clergy, organizational leaders, and activists. The next day (January 28, 2007), those leaders held a press conference demanding community representation in the redevelopment of the Lower Hill. When the arena deal was struck between th e City, County, and Penguins, these leaders felt pressure to work quickly and to keep the ear of the mayor and county executive, with whom they met the following day. A series of meetings en sued, with the group of community stakeholders doubling in size to about 20 people. They then broke into four committees, including a CBA committee, in order to divide various tasks as their demand for community representation continued. At the beginning of April, th is group presented a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to the mayor and county executive, one te rm of which stated, T he developer(s), SEA, City, and County shall engage in a CBA with the Hill District community as the contractual 114

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partner. Terms and conditions of this CBA sh all be completed between parties within six months (Memorandum of Agreement 2007). The head of the CBA committee, also head of the Hill District Consensus Groupwhich convenes monthly in order to foster c ooperation and communication among agencies, organizations, and businesses in the neighborhoo dreturned to his own organization and began to formulate a more broad-based CBA campaign. Instead of meeting with members of the CBA committee alone, he suggested that they come to that months Consensus Group meeting to discuss the CBA. This did not go over well w ith some members of th e original group, who disliked the idea of having th e CBA process housed under any one existing organization. Thus, the One Hill Coalition was formed, but a community fissure followed, one that persisted throughout the process and was w ithout a doubt detrimental to th e community and the outcome of negotiations.1 Some members of the original group continue d to meet and communi cate with the mayor and county executive and eventually became known as the Hill Faith and Justice Alliance. The Faith and Justice Alliance was comprised of seve ral ministers and other le aders who live in the Hill District, some associated with the struggling Hill Commu nity Development Corporation (CDC). This group was often referred to as the ministers group, a mi sleading characterization since not all members were clergy. Although it wa s only ten or so members strong, the Faith and Justice Alliance was politically influential and ali gned with the districts state representative. The One Hill Coalition, however, ha d the power of numbers and th e support of the districts then-city and county councilpersons. The group was made up of a variety of businesses and 1 Opinions differ as to who was to blame for this commun ity fissure. My point here is not to place blame, but to describe the series of events that led up to the divide. For a first-hand narrative of this community division by a professor who was part of the community organizing, see Lucas-Darby, forthcoming. 115

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organizations, nearly 100 of which were listed as members in April 2008. Some claim that One Hill was representative of the community; others (even those within the Coalition) suggest that perhaps organizations were either created for th e purpose of numbers or we re legit organizations, but not indigenous to the Hill District. Although the community divide is not the focu s of this chapter, it is important to acknowledge and explain because of the large role it played in shaping the CBA process and outcome. Simply stated, the formal (elected ) and informal community leadership was not aligned. In this case they appear to have had differing approaches, but in general they carry with them political, personal, and organizational baggag e. Differing movement approaches resulted in leaders taking different path s, although the agendato make sure that the community was represented in and benefited from Lower Hill redevelopment decisionswas essentially the same. While One Hill pursued a route of negotiation and compromise, the remaining community leadership was perceived as more radical, as putting forth a list of demands. In a few instances, comparisons were made to 1960s mobilization styl es. As one woman, a performance artist and professor who was more aligned with the Hill Faith and Justice Alliance, but participated in One Hill as well, suggested, the Allia nce was interested in strong l eadership moving forward: And Ive had a lot of conversations with people, and some of th em feel like [. .] whats more important is that the community comes together; the community may get less, but at least theyre getting what they say they want. And I just think thats such poor leadership. I think the fact of the matter is the reason why the Civil Rights Movement and the Black Power Movement worked at least to the exte nt that they could was because people who were more informed and more organized were ab le to get together, to be able to utilize their resources, and yes, they provided the community with input, but they had to make informed decisions, they had to make those ha rd decisions and strike those deals on behalf of the community. In this sense, they were following in the footst eps of those movements that had come before. Also similar to the Civil Rights Movement, religi ous leaders were an important force behind the 116

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Faith and Justice Alliance. On the other hand, a professor who was heavily involved in One Hill suggested that a move away from former mob ilization approaches was not only effective, but indicative of the advances made by African Americans: Im tired of the s, Lets go down there and go to jail, because we got other stuff that we can do now. And really looking at who do we have that could just make a telephone call to say, You ought to be ashamed, this is pa thetic? That is a real influence. And really I think there has to be more work to try to build those kinds of alliances and coalitions. I mean that s the way stuff happens. One Hills negotiation format and appeals to non-Hill District allies, which I discuss further below in the subsection on utilizing resour ces, were evidence of this reasoning. Nowhere was a difference in approach more evident than in one major source of contention: a community development fund. Although the once-united group seemed on board to ask for a specific amount of cash, when it became clear that the Penguins, City, and County would never agree to it, One Hill decided to go another route (the Neighborhood Partnership Program). The Hill Faith and Justice Alliance, ho wever, continued to vie for $10 million in cash, a demand that was met with questions of legitim acy, rumors, and accusations of extortion. Their explanation, though, was consistent during interviews : they were running out of time. They were afraid that if they did not act quickly and secu re cash up front, there w ould not be time to put together and negotiate a CBA and the bulldozin g would begin without any kind of commitment from the Penguins or politicians. Although reconciliation was attempted on a fe w occasionsa long meeting, a joint press conference, and a city planning hearingtrue un ity was never achieved. Unfortunately, that their ultimate agenda was the same was not en ough to overcome the division. One Hill leaders 117

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would not recognize the Coalitions origin as part of a united group2 and the Hill Faith and Justice Alliance was uncompromising on the MOA that they had already submitted, even as One Hill grew in numbers. This put the mayor and c ounty executive in a difficult position: they were interested in maintaining the support of the Hill Districts re ligious leadership and state representative, especially crucial for the county ex ecutives political aspira tions (he is expected to run for Governor in 2010). One Hill, howev er, was the larger group and had the support of their then-city and county councilpersons, the form er of which was aligned with the mayor. To complicate matters further, the state representa tive and then-city coun cil representative are political adversaries, whose riva lry stemmed from past issues. As a result, One Hill Coalition meetings were described as hostile environments at times. Some members of the Hill Faith and Justice Alli ance were kicked out of the Coalition and on some occasions they were disruptive during meetings with local officials. A representative from the county executives office described one meeting th at continued late into the night because of one such occurrence: We had a meeting on a Sunday af ternoon; it started at 11 and we didnt get out of there until 2:30 in the morning. [. .] What happe ned was, we were negotiating with One Hill and the ministers showed up, and their conti ngent, and they would not leave until they could sit at the table, so we had to medi ate between both groups to say that, you know, were going to try to hear both concerns, and they didnt leave. They were there until like 11:30 at night. So after that, we had to go b ack to speak to One Hill and deal with their issues. Actually, the mayor and the county ex ecutive stayed the whole time that meeting too. It was unbelievable. Nearly all the participants regardless of stake holder position agreed that the community faction was a major impediment to greater success of th e CBA. It was a detriment to membership and some of my participants found it so distasteful an d time-wasting that they chose to stop attending 2 Only one person in One Hill discussed this history and it was not until meeting with Faith and Justice Alliance members that more details were disclosed. Evidence of th is history was a copy of minutes from those initial united meetings that listed those present, as well as em ails sent out regarding the MOA and committee tasks. 118

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meetings altogether. Because the One Hill Coalition eventually negotiated and signed the CBAdespite the division their or ganizational process is the main focus of this chapter. The Dream Fund and Pittsburgh United In October of 2006, a request for proposals was issued by a handful of locally-based foundations in order to replicate the Califor nia CBA model around development in Pittsburgh, particularly the anticipated casino. Known as the Dream Fund, five local foundations collaborated on this project: the Falk Foundati on, Heinz Endowments, POISE, The Pittsburgh Foundation, and the Women and Girls Foundation of Southwestern PA. The national Ford Foundation matched their grant amount through its F ulfilling the Dream Fund. As written in the request for proposals, the primary goal of th e Dream Fund was to support inventive methods that promote consideration of race and gende r in overcoming discrimination and advancing diversity in education and em ployment. The Falk Foundation was the most active member, having approached the others about a possible collaboration. In conjuncti on with the request for proposals, they held two forums at which they distributed information about CBAs and invited John Goldstein, a CBA expert from the Partnership for Working Families in California, to speak. The collaborative received seven proposals, in cluding one co-authored by the Hill District Consensus Group and the Hill CDC (prior to the arena announcement). However, a new organization called Pittsburgh United was granted th e funds. They were chosen based on the fact that their proposal was the only one with a regional, as opposed to neighborhood-specific, approach. Pittsburgh United was made up of members of several organizations, including the League of Young Voters, Service Employees In ternational Union (SEIU), Unite Here labor union,3 Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN), the Sierra Club, 3 Unite Here represents hospitality, gaming, food service, manufacturing, textile, laundry, and airport workers. 119

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and the Housing Alliance of Pennsylvania. Th ey began working in Pittsburghs North Side, where PITG Gaming was to locate its casino. Soon after, the Chairperson of One Hill approached Pittsburgh United and asked fo r their help; Pittsburgh United agreed. Together, leaders of Pittsburgh United and One Hill began holding weekly open meetings to educate the community on CBAs, most of wh ich knew little to nothing about them. There appeared to be mixed feelings about the presence of both Pitts burgh United and the influence of the foundation community. Although Pittsburgh Unite d provided necessary resources, such as funding for mobilization newsletters and flyers, they were also seen as outsiders, geographically and racially, as the majority of their small sta ff/board of directors was white. According to members of the Hill Faith and Justice Alliance, Pittsburgh United failed to act as unbiased mediators in trying to reconcile the community di vide. Within One Hill, some were critical of the way in which Pittsburgh United tried to lead the process wit hout an extensive knowledge of CBAs or non-union model organizing. To be fair, Pittsburgh United was unsure of its role within One Hill. According to its Executive Director at the time, as their staff attempted to help in the Hill District, they were also juggling thei r work in the North Side and internal issues within their own fl edgling organization. Similarly, perceptions of the foundation co mmunitys role in the CBA and in the establishment of Pittsburgh United varied. A few were skeptical of the funders unusual involvement in the CBA process; two funders in particular attended many meetings, one of whom was from the community. Still others cons idered them to have laid the groundwork for the CBA and to be motivated by a genuine belief in community benefits. According to one of those funders, this was in fact the case. She argued that despite th e risky nature of investing in CBAs, foundations are well-su ited for such a challenge: 120

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They are risky in the sense that many f oundation board members are well connected to political and business interests who might be lieve that CBAs discourage new development in the city. Another issue is the publicity surrounding the acti ons of community coalitions who block the city/county approva l processes for developers or stage protests in the street. I personally believe foundations are in the best position to take risks and push the envelope in finding and implementing best practices to so lve social and economic problems. [. .] At the same time, duplicating models is fraught w ith pitfalls. The best we can do is educate interested parties about what looks promising, what lies (so far) in the realm of possibility, then let their passion and imagination take over. Our potential grant ees have to own the idea-it has to be theirs. LeRoy and Purinton (2005) echo her comments on this risk, particularly for local funders. As a result, they say, CBAs are often initially f unded by national or non-local foundations. The notion that foundations are important to CBA campaigns is supported by Mulligan-Hansel and LeRoy (2008). They assert that foundations have already helped many such campaigns to succeed and have much to offer in the way of direct giving and other forms of support. Creating Planks Despite its pitfalls, the CBA campaign continued. At meetings, organization representatives, business owners, and residents compiled a list of community priorities. Those initial gatherings took place on weekday evenings, and usually in meeting rooms provided by the Hill House Association. At the onset, One Hill leaders were antic ipating having to negotiate two CBAs: one around the new arena, the other around the 28 acres of land where the Mellon Arena stands and that the Penguins were given the ri ghts to develop. Thus, after priorities were compiled, meeting attendees began dividing priorities as to under which CBA they should fall. These priorities were eventually fine-tuned into wh at are called planks, basically provisions of the CBA sponsored by Coalition member busin esses and organizations. After expressing interest, these sponsors met as a working group in order to collaborate when possible and eventually made planks more concrete by s ubmitting a one-page description of their proposed program or funding request. 121

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In early June 2007, the Department of City Planning, Sports and Exhibition Authority (SEA), and Penguins held a Kick-Off Public Meeting. Beforehand, One Hill hosted a press conference at Freedom Corner. At least two local news stations were present as the Chairperson recounted the history of displacem ent in the Lower Hill and stated One Hills desire to negotiate a CBA in order to benefit from the new development. More than 50 members of the Coalition then marched down the block to Mellon Aren a for the meeting, chanting One Hill, Many Voices! They carried signs, and wore hats and tshirts that read One Hill above the image of a fist (Figure 6-1). The purpose of the mee ting was to update the public regarding arena planning efforts and to have community stakeholde rs sign up for focus groups regarding a master plan and traffic impact study. Over 230 pe ople were in attendance, according to the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette (Belko 2007). Despite the f acilitators attempts to stay on track, the atmosphere was tense and the CBA was repeatedly brought up during the question and answer session. A little over a week late r, the mayor, county executive, and Pe nguins sent a letter to community leaders and political representatives confirming their commitment to negotiate a CBA. Negotiations 2007, July: Negotiation team creation and tr aining; community votes on planks August: Introductory meeting is held between Penguins, government officials, and One Hill September: New arena sublease is si gned; Blueprint for a Li vable Hill presented to community October-November: Negotiations and general body meetings continue November: Penguins stop attending negotiations After some debate, it was deci ded that only member organi zations and businesses would be able to vote, thus making up the general body. This meant that unless individuals, even if they were residents, either jo ined an organization or formed one, their influence would only go 122

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as far as their comments during meetings. Th e first matter of voting business was to choose a reliable negotiation team and executive committee, which would later work together as a larger strategy team. A list of candidates was created for each, but the procedures differed slightly. For the executive committee, a representative from each One Hill Coalition business or organization voted for individuals who ran for a particular position. The negotiation team, however, was chosen by way of a slate, a lis t of nominees put forth by the newly elected executive committee that was voted up or down together. Figure 6-2 depicts my interpretation of One Hills organizational structure. The executive committee was made up of a Chair, Vice Chair, Secretary, and Treasurer. The nine-member negotiation team was led by one chief negotiator and each member wa s in charge of a particular ne gotiation point/set of points. The negotiation team began meeting in July of 2007. At their initial training, team members learned about bargaining, set ground rules, established what roles needed to be filled on the team, discussed planks, and learned from a la bor campaign called Justice for Janitors. On one Saturday afternoon near the end of Jul y, the larger community, not just member organizations, was invited to vote on the sponsor ed planks. Those who came to vote, around 130 residents, were given green and re d dots (stickers) and instructed to place them on the specific planks (sponsors were also listed) that they s upported most. The planks were divided into two separate lists: one geared toward money or re sources to be provided by the Penguins, SEA, City and/or County; the othe r solely toward implementation by the Penguins. Red dots were to be used for the former list, which was broken up into the following categories: community and economic development; education and youth se rvices; preservation/greenspace; drug and alcohol/mental health; and arena reuse. Green dots were to be used for the latter list, broken up 123

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into: first source hiring; bidding and contracting; public safety and policy; green spaces, parking and beautification; environment; and education. The first source hiring category received th e most votes. The planks underneath this category had to do with pre-apprenticeship training and targeted hiring of Hill District residents at the new arena. This is not surprising consid ering the fact that employment concerns of job access and quality are central to ma ny CBAs that are already in eff ect. These goals are typically achieved or at least strived for through the ne gotiation of job training, targeted hiring, living wages, and/or the right for workers to unioni ze (Parks and Warren 2009). The community and economic development category came in a close s econd, and included planks regarding a grocery store and community-driven master plan, bot h of which made it into the final CBA. By September of 2007, the negotiation team had held six internal pl anning meetings and had come up with a finalized negotiating platform the Blue Print for a Livable Hill, based on the priorities established by the community vote. The CBA negotiation process, a first for every party involved, was marked by long and tenuous m eetings and a lot of waiting in between. Many participants noted a lack of cooperation on the part of the Penguins, City, and County. The Penguins did not attend meeti ngs regularly and initially sugge sted that the mayor and county executive represented them, something that both politicians denied (Young 2008). As one resident put it, getting the Penguins to negotia te in good faith was like pulling teeth. Soon after signing the sublease for the new arena, th ey stopped attending negotiation meetings and did not return for several months. Government entities often postponed meeti ngs and replies to the community, although unlike the Penguins, they never stopped negotiating al together. The participation of the City and County was, of course, influenced by the commun ity divide and the desire on the part of local 124

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officials to appease both groups. Even without su ch a divide, however, some participants argued that communities are at a disadvantage when deali ng with developers and local officials. As the county councilperson representing the Hill Distri ct suggested, communities need to be in the room from the beginning: The developers and the government usually have a plan and resources; often times community groups dont or theyre funded by the government. Theyre funded by the vested interest. Their only prot ection in many instances comes from the elected officials. But often times we get involved in the back end, when theres a problem. Were not in there negotiating getting involved on the backend, so that were already committed to the developers, were already committed to th e plan. And so here come these community groups and organizations saying, Do this, do that. And the devel opers probably saying, Its really not in the plan, and the government people are saying, Its not a good idea. In an ideal situation, asserted one local offi cial, communities would be better positioned and resourced so as to approach the developer as a pa rtner. In this way, the two parties could enter into negotiations as equal partie s, and not from what he referre d to as the entitled victim perspective. Nevertheless, he ac knowledged that the Hill District di d not seem to have one entity strong or united enough to take this route. Applying Pressure 2007, December: First city planning commission hearing 2008, January: Community rejects local officials first CBA proposal; arena master plan approved without CBA February: One Hill files an appeal to over turn planning commissions decision March: One Hill asks city council for more support April: Penguins return to negotiations Near the end of 2007, the city planning commi ssion held a public hearing before voting on the arena master plan. Due to two hours of testimonies and requests by One Hill and its supporters to wait until a CBA was signed before approving the master plan, the commission 125

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decided to at least postpone its vote until the following months meeting (Lord 2007). In January of 2008, the City and County released a proposed agreement, but did so through a letter to One Hill which was distributed to the media as well, not directly though a negotiation meeting. One Hill responded to the offer and the way in whic h it was communicated with a unified rejection. A member of One Hill made local headlines by burning the proposed agreement, asking Anybody got a match? (Malcolm 2008). One Hill was supported by members of the Hill Faith and Justice Alliance in asserting that the proposed seven-poi nt agreement was inadequate, vague, and not legally binding. Dissatisfied with the first proposed CBA a nd determined to have a signed agreement before the new arena master plan was approved, One Hill then attended the second city planning commission meeting to vocalize its message: No CBA No Master plan! Members of the Hill Faith and Justice Alliance also a ttended in support of One Hills message and to testify. This time, they brought a larger crowd; more than 100 people packed into the meeting, which lasted about seven hours. Despite the communitys at tempts, to the urging of the then-executive director of the Urban Redevelopment Authority and the Mayor, the commission voted 5 to approve the master plan (Bor en 2008c; Lord 2008a). During the public comment session, however, one of the commissioners left to attend a University of Pittsburgh basketball game and return ed only to vote. This turned out to be a blessing in disguise for One Hill, which was able to use such groundsin partto file an appeal with Common Pleas Court the follo wing month in hopes of overturni ng the decision. The appeal was also a response to a lack of public notificat ion on some changes in the parking scheme and the fact that neighborhood benefits were not adequately consid ered (Lord 2008b). One Hills appeal illustrates the way in which an essentia lly private contract, the CBA, is influenced by 126

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local public regulations. It also shows how community coalitions are able to gain leverage by utilizing such regulatory forums as claims-making spaces, as organizing venues, and as political pressure points (Parks and Warren 2009:97). Strategies In my assessment of their campaign, One Hill to ok several strategies in order to garner support and to increase their chances of securing the CBA. Some of these strategies were taken throughout the entire CBA process; others were employed at de liberate pointsthe negotiation phase in particularin order to ga in attention, resources, or allies. As discussed in Chapter Five, One Hill framed the CBA in three ways: as retribution for the past, as deserved and needed, and as a reaction to corporate welfare. But it wa s also defined by other strategies related to mobilization, process, and alliances. These strategiesto negotiate, to aim for a democratic process, and to utilize a variety of resources and expertsare described in the following paragraphs. One Hill aimed to move away from a s mo bilization approach, as described above, in the section on the Coalitions formation. Thei r approach was one of negotiation supplemented mainly by threats to protest. These threats were us ed strategically, as last resorts. For example, in April of 2008 when the Penguins had not been at the table in months, a protest was planned in order to urge them to return and negotiate in good faith. The protest would have complemented an online petition circulated just prior, which was also aimed at the Penguins cooperation. One Hill planned on taking advantage of the national audience they could reach by gathering in front of the arena before a playo ff game. They were all but marching when the protest was cancelled, due to progr ess in talks with the Pengui ns and government officials upon the Penguins return to the bargai ning table (Prine 2008). An arti st and activist w ho lives in the Hill was recruited to help kids in the neighborhood make signs for the protest: 127

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I brought an army of kids. So now we made our little signs, talking about One Hill, and we start marching. Now, were marching through the church; were pr acticing what were going to do around the Civic Arena. [. .] They say, Ok, thats enough. Weve seen all we need to see. [. .] Nobody wanted to see a bunch of kids pumping the signs around. So on national television, you got a bunch of kids with some homemade signs. And you know Im an abstract artist. These werent a ny regular signs. I mean the signs should be collectors items cause we put some artwork into that. Help the Hill: we really went all into it. Another threat to protest was launched closer to the signing, in August 2008, which I discuss below. To the Hill Faith and Justice Alliance an d even some members of One Hill, this strategy of negotiating resulted in too much compromise. There was more give than take, according to them, and the communitys list of dema nds was constantly being narrowed. One Hill also set out to create a democratic pr ocess by sending a message of inclusiveness, by attempting to be representative of the nei ghborhood, and by engaging in a series of votes on everything from committee formation to CBA propos als. As an observer, a member of the foundation community thought the process to be as democratic a process as Id seen in community organizing; others echoed this sentim ent, especially citing One Hills open process and the fact that everybody was invited. A pastor who supported One Hill stated: If theyre not in it or active, its their own fault. It wa snt a closed session thing. They sent out forms. They sent to all organizations and asked them to appoint people to come. And in fact this was the case; according to the calculations of one of the involved foundations, One Hill knocked on 728 doors, made over 2,000 phone calls, sent 7,000 pieces of direct mail, posted 5,000 fliers, and completed 356 surveys of community residents preferences. At meetings, I observed a general concern for those who were absent to be inform ed or for their opinion to be counted before making a decision. A quorum of 20 votes was ne eded; if fewer than 20 voting members were present, other members were polled via telephone. 128

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Whether or not true democracy was really achieved is up for debate, however. Even from within One Hill, questions were raised about vot ing processes, particularly the method of using slates. One participant made some cr itical comparisons in this regard: And they [One Hill members] keep calli ng it democracy and saying, We know were not perfect, but were democratic. And it was like, you guys are democratic like the Third Reich or something like that. [. .] And then they write, heres the slate, vote the whole slate up or down. And it was like where did you ge t this slate from? [. .] And they say, Well we voted; the vote passed. And its like, yeah, you did vote, but your whole premise was undemocratic from the very be ginning. And so the vote ends up being a complete sham in the same way that Mugabe won the vote. A second common criticism, made by both One Hill and Faith and Justice Alliance members, was that some organizations were not legitimate. Although One Hill was a broadbased and large Coalition, some organizations were created in order to be come voting members. At the beginning of the campaign, leaders decided that a cluster of ten pe ople could have their own vote. This was initially in response to re sidents who were not part of an organization or business feeling as though they had no voice in the process. The Democratic Committee, in particular, seemed to take advantage of this; the 5th Ward, for example, was represented by eight separate District organizations (i.e. 5th Ward, 1st District). Five of thos e Districts signed the final CBA, all with the same signature. Some members of One Hill suspected that these groups were not going back to consult their constituency as they were expected to do. However, they also felt that they needed as many members as possible in order to counteract the Faith and Justice Alliance, which was small in number, but politically powerful. Utilizing Resources Throughout the campaign and at specific points, One Hill utilized th e aid and support of a variety of resources and experts. Pittsburgh United and the Hill House provided funding and meeting space, respectively. Given its organizational capacity, Hill House became the administrator for several of the benefits that were eventually secured and its CEO eventually 129

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became a spokesperson and lead negotiator for One Hill. Once that position was established, their use of the media became more effective; One Hill called upon a few local stations and newspapers regularly to get acro ss messages to the public, and at ti mes to those on the other side of the negotiating table. One Hill ut ilized the support of political allies as well, particularly their city and county council representatives, the latter of whom had re cently proposed CBA-related policy at the county level. In March of 2008, One Hill brought its case to the entire city council, garnering the support of some, who expressed their intent to push for the negotiations to continue with the Penguins in attendance. A team of lawyers was crucial to the CBA campaign, as they were able to draft and interpret the legal language of the agreement. Two of them we re from the Hill District; the other two had experience with union and community law. Periodically, local college students were called upon to pass out flyers. For a time, a gra duate student worked as an intern and was consistent in sending out updates about meetings and cancellations. California-based CBA experts, such as the Partnership for Working Families and Reverend William Smart, provided important information and encouragement as well. Through Pittsburgh United, One Hill was also able to garner the support of SEIU and Unite Here labor unions. Some local officials and a member of the foundation community credited the union support for the successful negotiation of a CBA. As a repr esentative of the county executive suggested, I th ink the community was a little mo re organized than they [the mayor and county executive] anticipated in this pr ocess. Because, one, they [One Hill] had the unions behind them; the unions were pushing, SEIU and them were pushing specific things. If this was just a normal group of people it wouldnt have happened. A member of the foundation community explained why this support was so powerful: 130

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Over 600 SEIU and UNITE HERE union members were residents of th e Hill District. I believe the fact that Pittsburgh United is a re gional organization may be the main reason why the CBA ultimately went through. You ha ve the county executive who wants to run for governor, and so he's not thinking, "Hill Di strict," he's thinking, "the state." And it changes the dynamic now when you're talking about a state-wide uni on, that's SEIU, and SEIU's involved in CBAs around the country. The owners of the Penguins, Yucaipa,4 have a stake in Union pensions; they don't want to get on their bad side. In this way the CBA may have been viewed as bigger than the Hill District Members of the One Hill Coalition, however, were less likely to credit union support and more likely to point out a disc onnect between labor and community activists. A Hill District resident and member of the negotiating team, for example, expressed frustration with the heavily union-based demands and discussions during meetings between stakeh olders. Others alluded to the strained alliance by sugges ting that a better re lationship between the two might have improved the CBA campaign. The perception of union representatives from Pittsburgh United as non-Hill District-based outsiders contributed to this problem as well. This should not come as a surprise; predominantly African American communities tend to perceive unions ambivalently (Young Laing 2009) In some cases, a common social justice agenda, an established relationship, and a plan to work together in the long run have resulted in positive working partnerships between the two (Cummings 2006). In others, unions are perceived with distrust because of past experien ces of racial discrimination, especially in the building and construction trade unions (Trumpbour 2008). Thes e experiences have been and continue to be particularly apparent in the trade unions because of their hiring and firing practices, and the temporary natu re of such work (Benson 2008) According to a negotiating team attorney, racial/ethnic minorities were onl y enrolled in three out of 23 building and construction union pre-apprenticeship programs in Pittsburgh and even gaining access to such 4 Her mention of Yucaipa is a reference to an investment firm owned by Ron Burkle, who is the co-owner of the Penguins franchise and known to be union-friendly. 131

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basic information was very difficult. In a 2008 study sponsored by the Transportation Equity Network, researchers found that African Am ericans in Pittsburgh continue to be underrepresented in construction jobs, while whites are overrepresented (Swanstrom 2008)5. In the Hill District, some of this distrust toward trade unions was projected onto unions in general (Young Laing 2009). Although the servi ce-oriented unions were aligned with One Hill during the CBA campaign, the trade unions were not. The Building and Construction Trades Council had already, in fact, signed a project labor agreement with the SEA. These are typically wide-reaching agreements between a construction owner and unions regarding a variety of workrelated standards to which those involved mu st conform (Minnesota Building and Trades Council 2007). Thus, those unions were vocally s upportive of the arena regardless of a CBA; in early 2008, a leader of the Council sent a letter to the mayor, county executive, and governor expressing criticism of the delays caused by One Hill (Belko 2008d). Simmons and Luce (2009) found the same pattern in the New Haven CBA camp aign. They suggest that lack of trade union support undermines the power of labor-community coalitions and is a common problem because of the eagerness of such unions to begin construction. Signing and Initial Implementation 2008, May: Despite request of Hill Faith and Justic e Alliance to postpone, One Hill Coalition votes to endorse the CBA as is July: One Hill Coalition begins to vote on implementation committees August: New arena groundbreaking ceremony; CBA signing September: Implementation Work Continues 2009, April: Request for proposals sent out regarding master plan 5 An article in the New Pittsburgh Courier stated that only about three percent of the on-site new arena construction jobs were being filled by African Americans and white women as of July 2009 (Morrow 2009). 132

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May: One Hill merges with the Hill District Consensus Group Upon the Penguins return to the table, negotiations continued. In May of 2008, One Hill negotiators felt satisfied with the agreement and rea dy to have the rest of the Coalition ratify the document. A few days before the vote, the Hill Faith and Justice Alliance called a meeting and sent a letter in order to raise their concerns. They expressed three areas of concern: required financial contributions were inad equate; aspects of implementation needed clarification; and the lack of a joint sign off with their organization. Nevertheless the vote occurred as scheduled; the CBA was endorsed by One Hill with 42 me mbers voting for it, 13 against it, and one abstention. During the next few months, One Hill waited fo r a similar process to occur on the part of the Penguins, and city and county officials. In order to draw attention to the fact that the CBA signing was being stalled, One Hill planned to block the entrance to the construction site in a peaceful demonstration very early one morning in August 2008. This was not only for publicitys sake; it could also be very costly for the developer, whos e employees and trucks would be unable to enter the site This protest never happened, however, because local officials signed an intent to sign letter and a date was set for the form al CBA signing, less than a week after the groundbreaking ceremony for the new arena. The following excerpt from my fieldnotes describes the signing ceremony, which took pl ace at Freedom Corner (Figure 6-3). 9:00 am August 19, 2008: CBA Signing Ceremony The CBA signing obviously attracted a diff erent crowd than the groundbreaking ceremony for the new arena. There were maybe 100 people at this famous corner, the starting point for civil rights marches over the years. The Mell on Arena was visible just a block away. The predominantly black crowd included mostly people from the Hill District, many of whom I had 133

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seen at meetings. Several cameras were set up by the media, whose vans parked across the street screamed, There is someth ing news-worthy going on here! A One Hill member opened with a prayer. As its Chairperson moved toward the microphone, chants of One Hill rang out. About 20 people stood behind him, various leaders and members of the coalition. In front of him, seated at a table facing the crowd, were the Penguins president, the mayor, the county execu tive, and the spokesperson for One Hill. A spot was empty where the chairperson had just been sitting. He discu ssed the movement of communities from being re-active to proactive through CBAs. He pointed out that this is not the end, but just the beginning; open air drug trafficking was, after all, taking place just five blocks away. He thanked the city council for their general support of CBAs, as well as the various partners in the CBA. He congratulated One Hill and the crowd clapped. After brief speeches by a well-received city c ouncilperson and the Penguins president, the signing process began, during which nearly 40 organization and busine ss representatives filtered through the line as they were announced. Trucks from the arena construction site noisily passed by. Provisions of the CBA Thus, the CBA was signed and because of th e community sectors involvement, a new kind of history was made around redevelopment in the Lower Hill. The Coalition agreed to drop their appeal regarding the co mmissions planning approval an d to publically support the new arena project. They also pledged not to otherw ise block/litigate against the development of the new arena or 28-acre development. In retu rn, the arena and additional redevelopment will provide several concrete benefits to the resident s of the Hill District. In the order that they appear in the agreement, these include: 134

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Hill District Comprehensive Master Plan: To be funded by the City and County, the master plan will be a broad, flexible template, not an immutable planning document used to guide future Hill District de velopment (Hill District Comm unity Benefits Agreement, August 19, 2008:7). The Penguins agree not to submit a master plan for the 28 acres until the Hill District master plan has been approve d by its steering committee, as long as it is completed by the deadline in early 2010. Community Services Review Process: Using existing resources and staff, the City and County will conduct a review of the social services currentl y being provided to and in the Hill. They will present this analysis to the community for additional feedback. They will then produce a written review addressing wh at can and cannot be done, what will be researched further, and what needs more f unding. Such a review will continue for two years so that gaps or deficienci es in the needed services will be identified and prioritized (p. 8). Grocery store: The Urban Redevelopment Authority will work to esta blish a grocery store operator in the Hill District. If a commit ment is made, the URA and the Penguins will contribute up to $1 million each. The URA is also to assist with obtaining other financing, and with land acquisition. Further, the pri nciples governing the opening and operation of the grocery store should include good faith efforts to ensure that Hill residents are hired (no specifics were listed) (p. 8). The grocer y will be a full service store with a pharmacy. Hill District Resource Center: Th e City, County, and coalition will work to establish a first source referral center to provi de or coordinate job preparation, counseling, training and supportive services, and to serve as a first source referral of qualified Hi ll District residents to employers connected with the New Arena, the New Arena Hotel and the Additional Redevelopment Area, and to othe r employers and jobs as appropr iate (p. 9). The City and County will provide $150,000/ year for a minimu m of two years for the center, funding which may continue after a review. The Coalitio n is to raise additional funds. It will be operated by the Hill House Association and overseen by an advisory committee. Neighborhood Partnership Program (NPP): The coalition and the Penguins will work to build an NPP, to be funded at the maximu m amount, which is $500,000/year for six years, renewable for another six provided that tax credits are still available through Pennsylvanias Neighborhood Assistance Act. The coalition agrees to build a fundable program; the Penguins agree to secure a corporate partner(s). Community Multi-Purpose Center : The City and County, part icularly the URA, and the coalition will assist the YMCA in its devel opment of a community center. The former will assist in obtaining funding and with land acquisition. The YMCA should try in good faith to establish low income membership fees and work with the Resource Center to fill jobs. In very brief paragraphs on the last page, the CBA notes that a LEED Certification Plan is being prepared and diesel fuel emissions laws and regulations are being followed to minimize 135

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impacts on the city in general a nd Hill District residents in pa rticular. These terms did not, however, come about through the CBA; they were already in place. With regards to enforcement and followup, the Penguins will hold business opportunity workshops related to the operation of the new arena for residents. Together with the SEA, they will also arrange quarterly community meetings to provide updates about the development of the arena. The CBA will expire ten years after eith er the opening of the new arena or demolition of the Mellon Arena and its preparation as a temporary parking lot, whichever event comes later. If one of the parties thinks that the other has failed to meet a ny term of the CBA, they should provide written notification. If within sixty days of the original notifi cation no remedy has been achieved through meeting or mediation, court ac tion can be pursued. Although, if the default may result in irreparable injury then court ac tion can be pursued imme diately (Hill District Community Benefits Agreement, August 19, 2008:13). Agents, assigns, and successors in interest of each Party are also bound by the agreement (Hill District Community Benefits Agreement, August 19, 2008:16). This enforcement language suggests that One Hill negotiators had learned from some past mistakes, particularly with respect to future parties CBA commitments. Meyers on (2006), for example, notes that although CBA commitments related to constructi on and permanent jobs have been fairly easy to enforce, retailbased jobs have presented problems since the deve loper often leases out to a variety of retail establishments. Likewise, having every comm unity-based organization sign separately and clearly stating the length of the agreement were wise decisions in the face of potential legal issues (Salkin 2007). Impressions and Implementation Structure Opinions on the outcome of the CBA campaign varied. On the part of community members, the most common criticism was that th e Penguins contribution was lacking. In light 136

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of the public subsidy they received and the revenu e they will continue to collect, the franchise simply could have given more, they argued. A nother major criticism, most often expressed by Hill Faith and Justice Alliance members, was that benefits secured through the agreement were actually non-benefits. The grocery store was already in the works; the YMCA was secured prior and could have been left out of the ag reement. In addition, the NPP was achievable without the CBA because it is an existing stat e program whereby corporate sponsors get a tax break in return for funding community program s. Thus, some argued, this was about the appearance of victory, not an actual victory. On e minor criticism, voiced by only a few, was that perhaps the CBA will not really he lp those who need it most, such as Hill District youth and those who are most destitute. I also observ ed a cautious optimism, as one resident characterized it, on the part of a number of community members, who were withholding judgment of the CBA until they saw the benefits themselves. Not surprisingly, One Hill members and local officials tended to have a more positive outlook on the final CBA than other stakeholders. Although the community was not united, there was a sense of pride among those who did come together and overcame many obstacles. Regardless of concrete benefits, the CBA was view ed positively because of its symbolism. Not only does it signal to developers and investors that the neighborhood is ready for investment (the NPP, grocery store, and master plan), but just by being signed it changes the dynamic of redevelopment. The community stood up for itself, was recognized, and simply getting something on paper was an accomplishment (a point that members of the Hill Faith and Justice Alliance also raised). The community was negotiated with, an achievement to which I return in Chapter Seven. As such, questions loom for developers and local politicians: Will every neighborhood want a CBA now? Are CBAs desirable, feasible, appropriate in every situation? 137

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Most commonly though, One Hill members described the CBA as as good as possible and better than nothing. Th e former assertion was grounded in a number of circumstances which might have limited possibilities. To begin with, the Hill District CBA was the first of its kind signed in the state and thus each party wa s learning as they went along. Second, the persistent community divide was an impediment to a more extensive agreement and a smoother campaign. Third, although One Hill claimed 100 members at one point, less than half that number actually signed the CBA and even fewer re gularly attended meetings, an indication that member participation was lacking. Lastly, the Coalition was up against a strong local growth coalition in which political and corporate (major league sp ort) elites were aligned. This public-private alliance, combined with the neighborhoods histor y and its relationship with the Penguins, also explains why better than nothing was a common phrase. Both phrases were met with criticism from members of the Faith and Justice Alliance who suggested that this was evidence of settling. The Hill Districts state representative and a reverend, respectively, shared this sentiment: For me, I dont want the best th at I can get, I want what th is community actually deserves; and if this process is valid then we fight for wh at it deserves. And if that means we take to the streets, we take to the streets. If that means building across people we consider enemies but we need them in this pro cess, you build the al liances necessary. I guess there are folk who believe that a half lo af is better than any, and my contention for some time is that you none had a loaf for so long, why dont you just hold out for a whole loaf? But Im from old school. Their comments, especially the latter, again i llustrate the notion of differing approaches to mobilizing among community groups. With regard to the specific provisions of the CBA, there was not one comment about the community services review, and very few comm ents about the YMCA. Those who mentioned the latter regarded it as one of those non-benefits On the other hand, the grocery store was often 138

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discussed. It was by most, if not all, acc ounts a major achievement of the CBA, althoughas mentioned above some would argue that a gr ocery store would have been secured even without the agreement. When it was clear that the Penguins and City would each be contri buting $1 million to the store, there was some debate about which fr anchise would be the operator. Although the national chain Save-A-Lot had expressed an intere st in the Hill District in the past, Kuhns, a local and family-owned chain, later gave them some competition. After several months and two related community meetings, Kuhns was chosen. Kuhns was the only full service offer and its proposal included a pharmacy, which was especia lly important to the many seniors in the neighborhood who for years have had to leave the Hill District in order to fi ll prescriptions. For some participants, the construction of a grocery store signals that the neighborhood is not only in transition, but that it has secured an economic an chor that will spur further redevelopment. Three provisions of the CBAthe master pl an, NPP, and resource centerwill require long-term implementation on the part of multiple parties. One woman who works in the Hill District reflected on this commitme nt: I think one of the critical issues from this coalition is its not just getting the community together, identifying what we want in th e CBA, and then having it negotiated, but then theres that other part, and thats the im plementation and watch-dogging the process, and thats years. Thus, post-CBA, the structure of One Hill changed greatly (Figure 64). In anticipation of the CBA being signed, th ree subcommittees were formed, through vote and appointment, for this next stage: the mast er plan steering committee, the neighborhood partnership program application and advisory committees, and the First Source advisory committee. I detail the role of each of these committees below, along with impressions of each benefit. 139

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The master plan, like the grocery store, was one of the less controve rsial winnings of the CBA; most people were hopeful about it. This hope lay in the f act that the master plan is supposed to be community-driven. As such, much is riding on its outcome. If the community plan is taken seriously, it will speak volumes about not only the future of the Hill District, but about how the Penguins relationship with the community may change post-CBA, since they have the 28-acre development rights. The mast er plan steering committee is comprised of: the mayor, county executive, (2) stat e senators, the state representa tive (or their appointees), and four members voted upon by One Hill. Interestingl y, some local politicians placated members of the Hill Faith and Justice Alliance by appointin g them to government seats. Further, some debate ensued over who was elig ible to sit on the committee as community representatives for One Hill. Many members thought that those repres enting the Coalition should be residents of the Hill as well as consistent participants throughout the campaign, but this was not the case with all of the nominees. Eventually, however, the slate was voted up. In April of 2009, a request for proposals was released in order to choose a consultant team to lead the master planning process. The NPP was another major piece of the CBA. This is a state-run program though which a corporate sponsor grants a community up to $500,000 a y ear (renewable for at least five years) to economic development. In return, the sponsor recei ves a substantial tax cred it. I hesitate to call the program an achievement of the agreement fo r reasons already mentioned above: 1) it is an existing program that does not require a CBA and could have been applied for at any time; and 2) despite the large amount of public subsidy they received, the Penguins only connected One Hill with the corporate sponsor, later announced as Bank of New York (BNY) Mellon. They never offered to sponsor the NPP themselves, whic h was the original intent, or at least hope, of the Coalition. To its credit, the NPP process was very transparent; a ten-person application 140

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committee, made up of nine One Hill members and one representative from the Hill House Association, reviewed and sele cted proposals sent by those plank sponsors whose ideas did not make the final CBA. Their recommendations were then passed on to a three-person advisory committee, made up of one person each from One Hill, the Hill Hous e, and BNY Mellon, who approved a final plan before sending the application to the state. Not only did the NPP process encourage a sense of dialogue among community members and other service providers, but it fulfilled some of those planks that were unable to be negotiated in the CBA. Also, the long-term na ture of the program should mean valuable investment each year for at leas t the next six years. In May of 2009, the first installment of funds was distributed to nine organizations whose proposals were selected by the NPP application committee (Rujumba 2009). The Hill District Resource Centers mission is to work with existing resources to provide or coordinate job-related resour ces and benefits, particularly for work at the Consol Energy Center, a planned hotel, and the 28-acre redevelopment. The First Source advisory committee, made up of more than ten people from both On e Hill and the Hill Hous e, began formulating more concrete plans for the Center after th e CBA was signed. Commun ity stakeholders who discussed the Center and the promise of jobs at the new arena expressed mixed feelings. Some were hopeful and considered this provision, espe cially the advance notif ication of job openings to Hill residents, to be an important benefit of the CBA. Others were pessimistic about the monitoring of resident hiring and critical of the way in which the Center drifted from the original plank sponsors vision. Motivated by the underrepresentation of racial/ethni c minorities in the building trade unions, the initial idea was to have both a resource center and a regional training center, modeled after a program based in 141

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Milwaukee called Big Step. According to a repr esentative from the county executives office, as the situation currently stands in Pittsburgh, even though programs are in place, minority recruitment efforts are often hinde red by the fact that those seek ing work cannot meet the basic requirements for the trade union apprenticeship programs, such as having a GED, drivers license, and being drug-free. Among other aims, the original First Source Center would have f acilitated the admission of Hill District residents into building trade un ion apprenticeship training programs by helping them to qualify and prepare for, as well as pa ss, the admissions exam. Although the City and County are still exploring the possibility of establishing a program similar to Big Step, it did not become part of the CBA. Instead, the Center will place more emphasis on referring clients to other service providers for job placement and readiness. A few members of One Hill were especially passionate about th e problem of minority under-repre sentation in trade unions and were thus very critical of this departure from the Centers initial intentions. For them, the Centers effectiveness had diminished and it wo uld not adequately addr ess this deep-seated issue. Others, such as the Penguins senior cons ultant and the reverend, quoted below, were simply left with the question of whether or not the CBA will make a difference for those people who face barriers to employment: And I dont know that weve done, that the CBA or anything else captur es those folks, and those are the folks that we talked about at the [n egotiating] table. Its that dropout, its that single parent, its that guy whos on the fr inges of gang life that everybodys worried about. They havent yet done the horrible thin g; they havent done the horrible thing that will take them out of it forever, but theyre on the fringes of it. And theyre on Centre Avenue right now. How do you get them? And Im not sure that the CBA answers that question. even the first choice of jobs, we do know that most of our Hill people come with so many other luggage issues, that it might be a lo ss even there, becaus e if you have a record, if you have a DWI, if youve been through th e court system, you may not qualify.[ ] So 142

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I pray that at the end of the day that our community will benefit from some of this development. Their questions will not be answered overnight; with diligent monitoring over time, the community will be able to better assess the extent of the Resource Centers benefits. As of this writing, the most recent developm ent has been the merging of One Hill with the Hill District Consensus Group. The idea of a merger was presented by One Hills Chairperson, who heads both organizations, as early as Fa ll 2008. It was brought up again at a One Hill meeting in January 2009, which proved the topic c ontentious. Debate ensued regarding what the purpose of One Hill really was and if it was a conflic t of interest for the Chairperson to head both in the first place. The merger was also que stioned because it only compounded the discontent some participants expressed regarding the hea vy involvement of the Hill House in the CBAs implementation, as the non-profit houses the Consensus Group. On the other hand, the Hill House may have been the only existing neighborhood organization with the capacity to administer the NPP and operate the Resource Center. At any rate, in May 2009 the merger was again propos ed and passed. The three main committees discussed above now report to a nd are governed by the board of the Consensus Group. They are joined by a fourth committee, the General Comp liance Committee. This Committee, appointed by Consensus Group board members, will be respons ible for monitoring other CBA benefits not covered by the three main committees. One Hill will thus become a mobilization arm of the Consensus Group and will only be activated around the 28-acre redevelopment or future large scale developments if necessary. 143

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Developer Perks The CBA was described by some as a win-win situation. Because of its legally-binding nature, the agreement provides a set of formal and clearly-stated commitments for all parties involved. A county level politicia n articulated this opinion: I think a more upfront, transpar ent approach helps relieve a lo t of anxiety on both parts and in those communities where developers and gove rnment and citizens are working together, I think its been proven over and over again, that at the end of the day, even though I believe the community probably still comes up short, for some obvious reasons, theyre in a better position and that the developers are better off. But developers receive more than just clarit y through CBAs. Why do developers, and in this case politicians, eventually sign CBAs? What is in it for them? A number of convincing answers came out of these questions, from de veloper and community perspectives. Through CBAs, developers and involved politicians gain legitimacy in the eyes of the surrounding community and thus receive their support, some times genuine, other times simply mandated by the agreement. As McFarland (2007) points out, this reduces litigation against the development and the costs associated with it. Developers also enjoy a better environment before and after th eir project is complete. In theory at least, they receive the cooperation of the community and avoid protests or other forms of opposition during construction. Having helped to improve the surrounding community, visitors are then more likely enjoy a safer atmo sphere and better quality experience than might have been possible without a CBA. This can lead to continued investment, as the area is now seen as ready for investment. According to th e head of one non-profit or ganization in the Hill District: If we dont get a CBA signed, its going to seem like, oh, you know, theyre fighting, the communitys still outraged, and theres stil l all this turmoil going on and theres no agreement between people. So that will make people a little bit more tentative, which I think will impact development. Whereas if we have the CBA, certain th ings are locked in place, people moving forward on developing, so me of the things are coming through, all 144

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the sudden, people are saying, the Hill? Y ou know, thats where some opportunity is, thats where the opportunity is. Developers and politicians al so receive good publicity. As some pointed out, public relations is part of a professional teams budge t anyway; in the Penguins case, they paid $1 million and ended up looking like good guys. As one political stakeholder suggested: The headline says, Penguins gave a million dollars. Theres nobody protesting outside the arena. [] I mean you might spend a million dollars on advertising and not get as much free publicity that you get on that. For local politicians, who are (a t least in theory) tr ying to balance the demands of developers and their constituents, CBAs provide a means to approval by all sides. Especially in the case of sports facility construction, this seems to allow politicians to be active members of the local growth co alition, yet maintain community support. Not only do politicians gain positive publicity, but the f lipside is also true; by avoidi ng negative media attention, they evade compromising or at least tainti ng their public image and career. In addition, CBAs aid developers and politicians in avoiding protesting and resistance in general. In this light, many participants desc ribed CBAs as buying the peace. In some cases, those clear rules and expectati ons laid out and legally binding in CBAs help developers and politicians to avoid extortion, as the Hill Distri cts then-city council representative suggested. Similarly, Marcello (2007) says that CBAs help to mitigate the potential for blackmailing on the part of communities by virtue of the transparen t, publically acknowledged context in which they are negotiated (p. 666). Summary: A Long Road As this chapters detailed timeline illustrates, from the formation of a CBA coalition to the creation and negotiation of a comm unity platform of wants and n eeds to the strategic use of available resources, the road to Pittsburghs fi rst CBA was tiring, conten tious, and empowering. 145

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The coalition format and negotiating process us ed by One Hill was similar to the trends Baxamusa (2008a) observes though primary and anec dotal data collection on several CBAs. The Hill District CBA process, howev er, did differ from those he describes in a few ways. First, Baxamusa describes the presence of several negotiating t eams organized around specific issue areas. This means that several t eams can be negotiating with the developer at the same time. Also during the deliberations, he not es the potential presence of a moderator who is appointed by elected officials, as well as fr equent visits from a limited number of CBA organization representatives. This was not the case in Pittsburgh, where there was a single ninemember negotiating team that represented the CBA Coalition. Moreover, elected officials did not appoint a moderator; rather, they were activ ely involved in the negotiations, which were held behind closed doors. In addition, Baxamusa explains that devel opers often consult with public agency planners and other governmental entitie s throughout deliberations in order to discuss whether or not their commitments meet with th e existing regulations. Again, in Pittsburgh, those governmental entities and authoriti es that would have offered such information were at the same negotiating table. The differences between thes e accounts point to important differences in CBA processes that require further research, an idea to which I return in the concluding chapter. The Hill District CBAs reception was both positive and negative; the campaigns process and outcome were imperfect, but at the end of the day a legally-binding document was signed and the community sector had created a new hi story and dialogue around redevelopment in the Lower Hill District. What meaning do these change s hold for pro-growth dynamics? It is to this question that I turn in the next chapter. 146

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Figure 6-1. One Hill Coalition marches to Me llon Arena for kick-off public meeting, June 2007. (Source: Violet Law, Pittsburgh City Paper. July 26, 2007). Figure 6-2. One Hill Community Benefits Agreem ent (CBA) Coalition organizational structure. 147

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Figure 6-3. CBA signing ceremony at Freedom Corn er. The President of the Penguins speaks. Seated, from left, are the county executiv e and mayor. Members of One Hill stand in the background (Source: VWH Campbell, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette August 20, 2008). Figure 6-4. CBA implementation structure. 148

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149 CHAPTER 7 PRO-GROWTH IMPLICATIONS: LEARNING FROM THE HILL DISTRICT CBA The preceding chapters analyzed the driving forces behind the Hill District Community Benefits Agreement (CBA) and described in detail its process and outcome. In this chapter I use the case of this CBA campaign to address the third and final i nquiry of my research aim: understanding the implications of the Hill District CBA, in particular, and CBAs, in general, for pro-growth dynamics. Here, I connect CBAs to the growth machine thesis in order to contribute to extant research on community benefits, as well as urban political-economic scholarship. Drawing from the Hill District CBA, I suggest three implications. First, residents positions on growth are complex. An analysis of Hill District re sidents stances on redevelopment extends prior chal lenges to the exchange versus use value dichotomy in the growth machine thesis by suggesting that reside nts interests are depe ndent upon the nature of the proposed project and the neighborhood context. Second, CBAs are a novel approach to the articulation of community intere sts; as such, they are holdi ng developers accountable and empowering communities in redevelopment processe s. Third, while communities such as the Hill District are effectively challenging the value-free growth ideology through CBAsand thus achieving what I call value-conscious growththe se Agreements stop short of fundamentally altering dominant standards of growth or growth machine processes. Residents Positions on Growth The case of the Hill District CBA offers a co mplicated picture of re sidents positions on growth. Taking another look at the details leading up to the One Hill CBA campaign, I compare residents stances toward the arena with those toward the pr oposed casino. This comparison makes it apparent that residents reactions to redevelopment are dependent on the nature of the proposed project and the neighbor hood context, particularly w ith respect to its level of

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(dis)investment. As described in the literature review, a common belief and/or implication in the growth machine literature is th at there is a seemingly inherent contradiction between use and exchange values in cities (Logan and Molotch 1987). Understanding a place as home certainly seems at odds with a conceptual ization of place as commodity. Logan and Molotch (1987) state: With rare exceptions, one issue consistently generates consensus among local elite groups and separates them from pe ople who use the city principally as a place to live and work: the issue of growth (p. 50). For those who depend on the neighborhood for such use values as informal support networks and identity, exchange valuebased changes can be threatening. These threats range from dem ographic change to significant modification of land use to displacement (1987). However, the dichotomy between residents and local elite groups appa rent in the growth machine thesis may not be so clear-cut. Indeed, the Hill District case extends the work of scholars, such as Logan and Rabrenovic (1990) and Troutman (2004), w ho indicate that both resident and local elite positions on growth are more complex than previously thought. In particular, I respond to Logan, Whaley and Crowders (1999) call to pay a ttention to differences in residents growth positions stemming from th eir social and geographic locations. As they argue, these issues are theoretic ally pivotal because they cha llenge the exchange versus usevalue interpretation of growth issues (p. 90). How Can We Benefit? Instead of taking a purely oppositi onal approach to arena redevelopment, residents and organizations in the Hill District chose to negot iate with developers. The official position of community leadersmembers of One Hill and the Faith and Justice Alliance alikewas not that the construction of a new arena should be preven ted, but that the community should benefit from 150

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it. Although the community was left out of init ial arena decisions, resi dents personal opinions on its construction varied. Views on community benefits, however, were co nsistent. At meetings and events, the dominant theme was not how can we stop this ar ena from being built? but rather, how can we benefit? The community did not publically que stion the City-Countys d ecision to build a new arena; and, except for One Hills purpose of attr acting attention to the st alling of CBA signing, it did not pose any challenge to construction. A histor y of disinvestment contributed to this stance, as residents simply wanted to see some kind of development in the Lower Hill. As the head of a large non-profit organization in the neighborhood shared: It wasnt necessarily that [residents] wanted the arena. People wanted to see development and people wanted to see investment happen, but they just wanted to make sure that the community benefit from it. And some people sa w it as an opportunity to reconnect the Hill to downtown again, and the streets and everythi ng else, so if its not blocking direct connection, then maybe theres an opportunity there. This position did not sit well with a preservationis t and member of One Hill, who stated that the community in general had not yet begun to assess development more critically: Some folks see an opportunity for jobs, maybe without having a clear idea what jobs means, but its jobs. Some folks think that doing something, being pr oactive in terms of development, is better than not. Theyre not at a point where they can distinguish between good development and bad development. The lack of pure opposition to arena devel opment by residents and other community stakeholders complicates the rela tionship between use and excha nge values, suggesting that the two are not always at odds. A variety of co mmunity positions on the proposed casino, which was to be built in conjunction with a new arena if its operators had won the gaming license, further illustrate the complexity of residents positions. 151

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Raise Your Hand! No Casino on the Hill When Pennsylvanias Gaming Control Board was in the process of deciding whether or not the Hill District would be the site of a ne w Pittsburgh casino in 2006, some members of the community formed the Hill Distri ct Gaming Task Force to provide residents with information about casino impacts. The Task Force remained neutral about the siting of the casino throughout the decision process, but to some extent, they t ook a similar stance to that which was eventually taken on the arena: if a casino is to be built, reinvestment must o ccur. According to a member of the Task Force: We called it the Hill District Gaming Task Force to basically ma ke sure that residents were informed, that they were getting good info rmation, that there was some research and information that was presented to people about what are the effects th at they could have on the community. We made a deliberate decision not to get behind one or the other in terms of endorsing one of the camps versus the other, although we held a pretty strong stance that if its coming to the Hill, th e reinvestment has to be significant enough that it addresses some of these challenges that it creates. For them, no matter what went in the Lower Hill, there would have to be benefits and reinvestment attached. Others, including the city councilperson who repr esented the Hill District at the time, were vocal in their support of a new cas ino in the Hill District because not only did its operator pledge to pay for the new arena, but would have give n money to the neighborhood as well. Some of these supporters appeared to have a similar ou tlook to those discussed above, who were simply interested in development: It was like everybody, everybody I ran into, even the ones that thought, Well I dont really want it but what other choice do we have? They were rationalizing, We could have a casino because at least well get some development. And quite frankly I cant really knock that opinion because there ha d been so much neglect in the past. Again, we see the notion that perhaps any deve lopment is good development. For those who took this stance, even a casino indicates investment in a comm unity that has experienced the 152

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effects of long-term disinvestment and a post-rene wal stalemate that resulted in a sea of surface parking lots. Still others, however, successfully fought to have the casino placed in one of the other areas in the running. The woman quoted above led this charge through her Raise your Hand! No Casino on the Hill campaign, which utilized on line petitions, letter-writing, and other forms of media to spread its message. Her opinions on the harms of casinos echoed the sentiment of many of my participants and people they knew who wanted no part of a casino in the Hill District. After a visit to Reno, Nevada, she wa s motivated to begin the oppositional campaign: I get to Reno and I see what downtown looks like and Im like, Oh please, this is not what I want Pittsburghs downtown to look like a nd this definitely isnt what I want my neighborhood to look like. Then I saw the University of Nevada, Reno and I saw how close it was to the casinos and I saw th e delineation between how nicely kept the University was and how poorly kept they wererinky-dink hotels and disgusting looking little pawnshops around. And so that line of demarcation reminded me of the line across Crawford [Street, in the Hill District] and I thought, Well, this is our future. If you dont do something more than what youve already don e, this is going to be the future of your neighborhood. And I thought about my moth er who goes on walks, I go on walks, I thought about Miss [M], who walks her dog, a lot about all the people No similar group surfaced to oppose the siting of the new arena, nor did a dialogue about opposition enter the public debate over the aren a redevelopment even though both arena and casino projects similarly exploit exchange values of land; both are constructed with a profit motive and hardly enhance nei ghborhood identity, support networks or other use values that residents typically seek. Nevertheless, those who opposed the casino percei ved it to be much more harmful to the neighborhood than an arena in terms of its social impacts, or at least having less potential for accompanying benefits. Again, the activist who led the Raise your Hand campaign expressed the notion of more harms and fewer benefits: And those of us who worked together, we spen t a lot of time trying to convince people that you can have development without having a ca sino, that you could benefit from the arena 153

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being here and have development sweep up if theres some real concern, then we can do that but no matter what, havi ng a casino here was a bad, bad idea, and lastly that we were not anti-Penguins, we were just pro-the Hill and pro-our neighborhood. In examining neighborhood stances on th e proposed casino and the new arena redevelopment, it is apparent that residents views on growth are more complicated than the initial growth machine thesis suggests. Althoug h Hill District residents were oriented firstly toward use values of land, their positions were not always in opposition to an exchange value agenda. Instead, residents were influenced by their neighborhoods histor y of (dis)investment and weighed the harms and benefits of the proposed projects. Even the use of CBAs illustrates the complexity of residents positions. If the pursuit of use values was always at odds with an exchange value agenda, then opposition to an exchange value threat would appear to be the only attr active route for resident s. By negotiating for benefits and reinvestment, CBAs can demand or cr eate use values from something typically built for its exchange value. For example, in the Hi ll District, out of negotia tions over profit-driven arena redevelopment, funding for a grocery st ore in the neighborhoodsomething of use value for residentsbecame a reality. In this sense, CBAs are able to mediate between use and exchange values. Changing the Dynamics of Redevelopment CBAs have shifted public discourse and debate surrounding major developments from whether or not benefits should be included to wh at kind and amount of benefits residents should receive (Ho 2007; LeRoy and Purinton 2005). In other words, the desi re for the community sector to be considered in redevelopment d ecisions is not necessarily new, but CBAs have allowed for the articulation of community intere sts in novel ways, the se cond implication that I discuss in this chapter. Not only do they address developer accountability, but they also move 154

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away from a rarely-successful oppositional approac h. By using negotiations, they seek to gain access to economic and other benefits. Community Expectations Community expectations of Pittsburghs new arena and surrounding redevelopment were directed at both the developer and local politicians. Residents expressed a desire for the Penguins to be good neighbors, to be more aware of the community theyve invaded, according to a negotiating team lawyer, and to avoid putting up a symbolicand literalwall between themselves and the rest of the communit y. Residents perceived community benefits not as a handout, but as proper reinvestment from an entity which had long neglected its role as a neighbor. The following comment made by a life long resident who supported One Hill but was only peripherally involved in the CBA campaign is typical of this sentim ent: Now that we got their attention, were asking for what any neighbor would ask for: help. Th ats what we need. Were not looking for a handout. These expectations are not entirely novel. As participants pointed out, when the Civic Arena was built, the community, in some capacity, voiced a desire to benefit from urban renewal. As one man, whose family was displa ced during that time, asserted, the City was supposed to financially support the Hill, which th ey didnt do. Then, Mayor Lawrence simply responded yes or no to community needs without any real consideratio n for them and without further discussion or planning. A nother participant, a community activist and resident, recounted how community elders stood up for employment and proper representation last time. But, she noted, being at the table and being truly heard, I dont think that happened. In light of extant expectati ons around urban renewal and rede velopment in general, some participants saw CBAs as a conti nuation or repackaging of old ideas. These agreements reflect needs that communities have fought for over the years, according to two local politicians: 155

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For years, there have always been battles fought between institutional needs versus community needs. Even like the expansi on of housing in Terrace Village [a public housing project in the Hill District], that was like a deal where peopl e were fighting against Pitt who just wanted the area for a soccer field or whatever. So theres a history of advocacy from neighborhood-based organizations in this city The CBA process and what its end results were going to be wasnt far different from what community groups and organizations have hi storically wanted from their government, from developers. In addition, the political tensions CBAs can raise reflect a long-running de bate over the role and responsibilities of government. Perhaps, then, CBAs are simply a new name for an old idea reworked, with greater emphasis, as one participant described them, but this reworking has resulted in a new outlet for community concerns and a unique tool for real izing its expectations for reinvestment. A New and Improved Approach CBAs allow communities to articulate their needs and wants surrounding a redevelopment project in new, more effective ways. As the lo cal politician, a state sena tor who represents the Hill District, stated above, there is a history of neighborhood-based advocacy around redevelopment, but, he added, they were neve r under this kind of marketing, P.R., patronadvocacy, agitation banner of a CBA. In other words, CBAs entail a new approach, and one that is more organized, well-re sourced, and well-connected than past methods. Others defined the CBA campaign model similarly, as benefiting from who you know, and as a more refined approach to the Civil Rights Movement. The broad-based indigenous organizing associ ated with CBAs also contributes to their effectiveness. As the senator went on to explain: I think the fundamentally different thing is the phenomenon of the CBA being something thats very much broad-based, and indigenous to communities; its something that bubbles up from the grassroots and then its much more creative, much more comprehensive. It has a much more progressive vision to it. 156

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Indeed, CBAs connote a social movement, creat ing a forum through which multiple communitybased organizations and stakeholders can work together. One part icipant described the movement for community benefits as the mergi ng of the Civil Rights Movement and the Poor Peoples Campaign that Martin Luther King, Jr began. She reasoned, Theres a direct connection there in terms of workers, the Un ions, social justice and economic justice all together really thats what the CBA is. Moreover, the legally-binding na ture of CBAs provides a means to formalize community concerns and, at the end of the day, have pe ople sign on the dotted line. A member of One Hills negotiation team discussed the way in whic h the legal nature of the agreement demanded the respect of othe r stakeholders: At one point, [. .] it became clear to us th at [the non-community entities] werent looking at it as a binding agreement. So instead of just talking about the concepts, we started putting legal language in front of them and started drafting, a nd I think that was important to get them to see a little bit more clearl y, you know, were not just talking about if you feel like it, you can do xyz, you know? A resident and community activist who was invol ved in both One Hill and the Faith and Justice Alliance made a similar observation regarding the way in which the CBA ensured developer follow-through: Now you mustwere not just going to ask and leave it up to your good willnow you must sweep development up into the neighbor hood and we cannot have the same line of demarcation. All that to say that the Pens of course were like, Oh of course we want to be good neighbors and well work all th at out, but we need to sign th is lease to make sure that our team can stay here and well deal with that later. And we were saying, Oh no you wont. Although Memorandums of Agreement or Unders tanding (MOA or MOUs) can also be legallybinding, they lack the broad-base d coalition described above. They also fail to achieve the media attention sparked by having a large number of people behind a cause. As described in Chapter Six, the One Hill Coalition was ab le to use the media to garner support. 157

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Ultimately, CBAs contribute to a change in th e dynamics of redevelopment. They hold local growth coalitions accountab le by articulating concrete community wants and needs, as well as the reasons why benefits are deserved. As one reverend explained, CBAs inspire a dialogue about accountability that developers are unlikely to begin on their own volition: I mean, what developer would say, Oh, this is th e right thing to do. We need to just give back. I know were going and getting all this but you know, I just cant sleep at night unless I just It doesnt work like that. If I dont have to go through any red tape, any fighting, any obstacles, Im in hog heaven, and pa rticularly in this town, you dont have a lot of a fight. [. .]. You know its confusing for even some political people. [They] say, Why, how can you do this? Its our taxes, its our land, this is our community, you know? So [the CBA] is a new thing, and so it s not maybe the best one, but its beginning to talk about accountability. Another pastor observed a similar conseque nce of CBAs. As heand otherssuggested, the Hill District CBA campaign has and will continue to influence how local politicians relate to the community in light of redevelopment: Back when they built the first arena, I don t know if there was any kind of agreement. Davey Lawrence was mayor and he said this is going to happen and that s it. Well thats not happening now. Mayor Ravenstahl or Da n Onorato, or any of them, cannot stand up and say, Well, this is what were go ing to do and get away with that. By providing an outlet through which communitie s can publically and formally question valuefree development, they make it more difficult for local growth coalitions to make redevelopment decisions without considering lo cal impacts. In this way, CBAs move toward value-conscious growth. The community benefits movement was desc ribed by both local officials and communitybased stakeholders as a new wave that was not go ing away. A member of One Hill regarded this as an achievement of the Hill District CBA: And in hindsight its like, we survived and we came up with this CBA, and we got people to buy in and we had these ideas about what wi ll make a livable Hill and we didnt get all of it, but we got a lot. And nobodys done that in Pennsylvania. I mean not anyone. And even though Mayor Ravenstahl keeps saying hes not going to do another one, its you 158

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dont have a choice! Its the new wave. And if its not a CBA that involves the city, it sure as hell is going to be a CBA that involves the community and a developer. This changing dynamic of redevelopment is clearly not just about the way in which the local growth coalition is held accountable, but about how CBAs affect commu nity organization and self-determination as well. Toward Community Empowerment In the Hill District, the CBA acted as a means of community building, empowerment, and representation. It was most common for members of One Hill to express these sentiments. As its Chairperson repeated often, the CBA was a tool to build and organi ze the community, not the other way around. In this sense, the comm unity would be organized for the long term and prepared to face future redeve lopment challenges. According to a One Hill member and a resident of the Hill, from the CBA campaign emerged a number of dedicated citizens: And really it has made me prize the coalition that did come up toge ther and the coalition thats still sticking together and it makes me want toeven after the CBA is signedto keep trying to build it because I think we need a cadre of people w ho are really focused on making our community better. Indeed, because of the long-term monitoring a nd implementation processes that CBAs require, such a committed group of citizens is necessary. Through the CBA, the community was empowered and represented in de cisions that would impact the future of the neighborhood. As one participant said, the community was finally taking a stand on redevelopmen t through the CBA campaign: I went to see what [a One Hill meeting] was a bout, as an individual, and then I went back and told one of the organizati ons that I belong to, two of th em as a matter of fact, about what was going on because I thought what I was hearing was really exciting. Were finally going to take a stand for something. The negotiation process allows the community sector to be privy toand ideally taken seriously inredevelopment conversations. According to the Hill Districts then-city councilperson, for a 159

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community that was used to not even being as ked about its thoughts on land use decisions, the CBA was truly novel. It meant that the communitys collective voice was heard and respected and appreciated, and thats the biggest gain ou t of this whole thing. Unlike during urban renewal and the building of the ex isting arena, the community had a larger role this time around. But what is the extent of the challenge that CBAs pose? It is to this question that I now turn. A Challenge That Stops Short The case of the Hill District CBA demonstr ates that while communities may effectively challenge the ideology of value-free growth through CBAs, this tool does not fundamentally alter dominant standards of growth or growth machin e processes. As discussed above, members of local growth coalitions appear to be recognizing and respondi ng toor at least reacting to community sector expectations. Across the coun try, this is evidenced by the fact that CBAs are increasingly being signed. Thes e agreements begin to address de veloper accountabil ity, take into account community sector interests, and allow communities access to economic and other benefits. In Pittsburgh, city, county, and state le vel officials whom I interviewed seemed to be on board with a consideration of community intere sts at the least. Others were more explicit about their support for community giveback. As an assistant to the county executive stated, The community deserves some benefit in regards to any time you do a ma jor development like this. CBAs as Developer Burden Despite their interest in community impacts or benefits, however, members of the growth coalition largely recognized CBAs as a burden fo r developers. CBAs represent increased legal and development costs, resulting in a perceived decreased profit margin. In some cases, these opinions were expressed by those with whom I spoke ; in others, participants described the views of growth elites that they knew. According to one local official: 160

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The question is: whats it take to get other pe ople to want to inve st here? And having some zone thats created this new develope r burden, which is how its being perceived, isnt good for the Hill. His position was similar to that of the Hill Districts state repr esentative, who supported the Faith and Justice Alliance in demanding community representation in Lower Hill redevelopment. When I asked about his thoughts on CBAs bei ng put into legislation, he responded: I think it can have its value. I think in places that are hard to deve lop though, if you do this in such a way that it becomes even more bur densome to get developers to develop in, I think that you have to be careful about that. The Hill Districts then-city council representative, a suppor ter of the One Hill Coalition, took a similar stance. While the state repres entative explained that location affects the desirability of CBAs, she focused on the nature of the redevelopment: You could look at it two ways when youre a pa rt of government. You could look at it as, one way, it can stymie development, because you can have developers that say, Id rather walk than pay. It depends on what industry were talking about, because you got a process on the North Side where Continental Re alty wanted to build a hotel, and a hotel can go anywhere, so they can walk if they want to. Its a different scenario when you got the arena needing to stay in Pittsburgh. [. .] So it depends on what industry is actually doing what, but it could actually delay development. On the other hand its a good tool to have to actually gain thi ngs that normally you wouldnt be able to gain through the traditional processes. Both of their comments illustrate an unchalle nged commitment to growth. Because CBAs can burden developers or delay development, the tool itself is called into ques tion, not the fact that growth itself might be undesirabl e or inequitable. While the th en-city council representative noted that CBAs can allow the community new gain s, her assessment does not address the merits of the development in the first place and fails to analyze the traditional processes by which the development was undertaken. Along with perceiving CBAs as burdensome to de velopers, some local and state politicians implied that the community involvement CBAs en tail is potentially problematic. Even though 161

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the county executives assistant, quoted above, t hought that communities dese rve some benefit in the face of major developments, CBAs could also open up a can of worms: If you do it for one [community], then every time you do a major project in a neighborhood, everybodys going to be crying that they want a CBA, so where do you begin and where do you stop? Therefore, it was important that the mayor and county executive did not give away the house: As far as leadership, I think if you give away the house or if you just give in to peoples demands then everybody who knocks at your door will be asking for similar things, so I think you have to hold your ground on certain th ings. But some things have to be a compromise. I think the county executive di d a great job in doing that; I think he understands the dilemma he was in. Again, he supports some level of community giveback, made possible through the CBA. Nevertheless, he conceptualizes community inte rests in such a way that not only privileges growth, but views community sect or expectations as a disturba nce that must be quelled. In contrast, the county council representative with whom I spoke argued that no matter what the situation, the basic concept of CBAscitizen part icipationwas sound. He had recently submitted legislation related to impact an alyses and community benefits for review and presented an exceptional critique of political officials conceptualization of CBAs, in particular, and community involvement, in general: I think government officials have a hard time embracing [CBAs] because theres a feeling that this will slow the project down, that somehow this will a ffect our ability to sell bonds or our ability to get other approvals and we dont want to be delayed with citizens getting involved, the people whom we represent we dont want them i nvolved in the process. In raising the larger point that local government officials are elected by and thus obligated to their constituents, he places into question the alignment between public and private sectors, an alignment that takes away from officials duty to represent the people who vote them into office. This alignment was so strong during the Hill District CBA campaign that local governmentparticularly the mayor and county ex ecutiveand the Penguins were perceived as 162

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the same entity. Together, they were frequently referred to by community stakeholders as the other side. Indeed, this other side had solidified its relations hip and plans to construct a new arena long before the community was informed, let alone asked for input. At one point, the Penguins justified their absence from negotiation meetings by s uggesting that the politicians actually represented them (a claim with which politicians disagreed). Nevertheless, city and county entities contributed to the CBA in ways that are typically fulfilled by the actual developer who is receiving public subsidies. Despite the common perception of CBAs as a bur den for developers and even though they are creating changes in the dynamics of redevelopment, they do not present local growth coalitions with an insurmountable challenge to dominant standards of growth. They require no fundamental questioning of the growth is good ideology or, as the next section explains, the fact that communitiesat least th ose in cities with strong local growth coalitionsare still entering the redevelopment process on the tail end. The Path of Least Resistance CBAs present developers with a path of least resistance. When asked why developers sign CBAs, a preservationist who was a member of One Hill answered: Because it becomes the path of least resistan ce. I think thats th e only reason. Because developers just want to get their developmen t done. [. ] And thats actually what community groups need to do. You have to make it the path of least resistance; thats the only way youre going to get any traction. The same phrase was used by one local official to describe the system of local development: The system, regrettably, is like the path of leas t resistance. Having been on the inside, its like, Ok, ok. [He illustrates idea of repeatedly bumping into something, moving over]. I dont know if this whole pro cess has brought about the ultimate end game, which is how do we share in the risk and reward of a cha nge agenda that is about implementing a vision that we share? 163

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His question alludes to the fact that even with the most successful of CBA campaigns, in cities with strong local growth coalitions, the agreement is still a reactive tool. The vision of CBAs put forth by experts Gross, LeRoy, and Janis-Aparic io (2005) is one of developers using CBAs to gain government approval As they state, developers need community support because they want their projects subs idized, and because virtually all development projects require a wide range of governmental permit approvals, such as building permits, re-zoning and environmental impact statemen ts. Permit approvals almost always have some kind of public approval process, as do most development subsidies. For many projects, the degree of community support or opposition will determine whether the developer will receive the requested approvals and subsidies. (P. 10) In cities with weak local grow th coalitionslikely to have a growing population and to lack a well-established political and economic power structure (Delaney and Eckstein 2003)such community support might be more necessary for de velopers. In cities with strong local growth coalitions, however, such as Pittsburgh (2003), the developer begins with some form of government approval. Various approvals for Pi ttsburghs new arena we re obtainable without community support in part because its owner, th e Sports and Exhibition Authority (SEA), was already an arm of local government. Additiona lly, the city planning commission approved the arena master plan despite community dema nds that a CBA be part of that plan. In such environments, the community sector te nds to enter the scene after at least initial redevelopment decisions are made and work to the point of exhaustion, largely on a volunteer basis. As a tool, CBAs incorporate the commun ity into redevelopment conversations; they do not, however, fundamentally alter the developer-driven redevelopmen t model. According to this model, community sector interests are an aftert hought for profitand growth-driven private and public sectors. The Hill Dist ricts county councilperson, a resi dent of the neighborhood, was one 164

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of many community-based stakehol ders who found this model to be problematic. Continuing the critique begun above, he stated: I think the involvement [of local officials in negotiating the CBA] that you see probably had more to do with the mayor, governor, and chief executive trying to keep the Penguins in Pittsburgh than it did with representing the community, of cutti ng a deal with Lemieux and Burkle. I think on the real side thats what that was ab out, and to that extent you didnt need the community involved in that discussion. What could the community possibly be talking about in th at discussion? And to my knowledge at no time did Mr. Burkle or Mr. Lemieux meet with any community representatives. If anything I think they gave the impression that they didnt see it as being very bene ficial; they werent interested. [. .] And the fact that this community was not in the room and never got in the room, I think made it much more difficult to come up with a CBA and probably weakened what was signed. Indeed, the CBA was a reactive tool in the face of strong public-private sector alignment, unable to change the dominant redevelopment model. The fact that many developers can simply go elsewhere if they find CBAs too burdensome is further evidence that CBAs do not fundamentally alter growth machine processes. As one local official argued, If this creates like a zone of Community Benefits Agreements, then investors will go where that zone isnt, if the in gredients are right. His point echoes a comment made by the then-city councilperson, quoted above, who said that some developers will choose to walk rather than pay. Their line of reas oning also illustrates the way in which growth coalitions can adapt in the face of challenges. Growth Coalition Adaptations When confronted with challenges to their pur suit of value-free grow th, Pittsburghs local growth coalition proved adaptive. Although One Hill marched to the first public meeting sponsored by the Department of City Planning, SE A, and Penguins, and repeatedly asserted that the CBA be considered and discussed, facilita tors would not budge. Th ey insisted that the process for the CBA was quite separate from their public participation process and from that meeting, which was to comment only on the design. They followed through on this belief during 165

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focus group sessions as well. Recorded notes show that participants raised the issue of the CBA and some were even critical of the way in wh ich the focus groups undermined the CBA process (Urban Design Associates Meet ing Memo, August 28, 2007). Nevertheless, this concern was listed only as one of many remarks and was not seri ously entertained, as ev ident by the fact that the two processes remained entirely separate. The Penguins and, at times, governmental offici als, showed a lack of cooperation during the negotiating process. The Penguins comple tely stopped attending meetings for several consecutive months, returning only upon One Hills threats to protest. Although city and county officials continued to communicat e with the Coalition throughout that period, they engaged in stalling by postponing meetings and replies to the community. And even though the City and County eventually agreed to give funding for the Hill District Resource Center and grocery store, contributions were not secured until after they had sent the One Hill Coalition a CBA proposal that the community wholly rejected on the grounds that it was inadequate, vague, and not legally-enforceable. Further, the majority of community-based stakeholders were frustrated by the lack of contribution on th e part of the Penguins. Although the community had high hopes given the amount of the franchises public subs idy, at the end of the day, the Penguins gave much less. In addition, the Penguins and local officials we re still able to follow a developer-driven model, as described above. The community ha d to approach them, not the other way around. A few participants suggested that both public and private sector stakeholders should have been more proactive with regard to initiating commun ity benefits and engageme nt. According to the Penguins senior consultant, local politicians might have approached the community first, and in 166

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doing so could have prevented a characteriza tionresented by some local officialsof community groups taking on an evil govern ment-developer monolith. As he said: I think that it becomes more of a balance if you have your political people playing the political game and saying, Hey, were pro-co mmunity, and let us be the aggressor in terms of demanding or trying to find ways of including the community. [. .] So there were opportunities for the government to be more proactive in making the case that community engagement is positive for everybody. It is understandable, then, w hy some participants described CBAs as simply the path of least resistance for developers. For the Pengui ns, mayor, and county executive, going through these negotiations seemed to be a minor setback in their growth plan and they adjusted to any challenges put forth by the CBA. This reaction supports existing literature describing innovation on the part of growth coalitions. As Troutman (2004) asserts, members of the growth coalition continue to pursue growth even if the value-fr ee ideology is questioned because their fate is linked to it. Among other forms of adaptation, growth coalitions have: called upon the federal government (Molotch and Logan 1984); disciplin ed anti-growth politicians by withholding campaign contributions (Logan and Molotch 1987) ; and created development agreements, which invite public scrutiny only during the final period of approval (Pincetl 1999). Summary: Pro-Growth Implications In this chapter, I addressed the third and fi nal question of my research inquiry by focusing on the pro-growth implications of the Hill Distri ct CBA and CBAs in general. The case of the Hill District CBA, and the negotiation of CBAs alik e, indicates that residents growth positions are complex and not always at odds with an exchange value agenda. In the Hill District, residents were unified in pursui ng benefits from the arena redeve lopment, but their stances on a proposed casino varied. Although the two projects similarly e xploit exchange values, an oppositional dialogue surfaced only around the casino. It became apparent that their positions 167

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were influenced by both the nei ghborhoods level of disinvestment, as well as an assessment of the potential harms and benefits of each. Although CBAs have not marked the birth of community expectations, they are a novel approach to their articulation. They achiev e value-conscious growth by holding developers accountable and have allowed communities acces s to important redevelopment conversations and benefits. The legally-bindi ng and social movement nature of CBAs has also empowered communities in new ways. While all of these are important gains, CBAs nevertheless present a path of least resistance that st ops short of posing a se rious threat to dominan t standards of growth or fundamentally altering devel oper-driven growth machine proce sses. These implications are both practical and theoretical and in the concluding chapter I recount them as one of a few key contributions of this dissertation. I also propose a larger deconstruction of growth and suggest areas for further research. 168

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169 CHAPTER 8 TOWARD A DECONSTRUCTION OF GROWTH Community Benefits Agreements (CBAs) have evolved out of a history of redevelopment challenges faced by urban communities across th e United States (US) and respond to those challenges they continue to confront. During this evolution, exchange -value oriented urban renewal, gentrification, and dow ntown revitalization have th reatened neighborhood fabric, defined by existing residents in terms of use valu e. Low-income and predominantly racial/ethnic minority neighborhoods have disproportionately borne the negative consequences of such urban changes and the environmental and economic inequalities they produce(d). Throughout more than 20 years of urban renewal policies, en tire neighborhoods were uprooted, families and businesses displaced. The sense of threat posed to black neighborhoods especially is captured in the expression urban removal is Negro remova l (Fullilove 2004:61). Instead of replacing bulldozed blighted areas of the city with afford able housing, cities used urban renewal funds to accommodate and attract the corporate sector and wealthier residents. More recently, continuing waves of gentrificat ion have had a gradual effect. All existing residents feel the vulnerability of use values upon changing street flavor and cultural fabric, as well as new community leadership and institutions brought about by gentrification (Kennedy and Leonard 2001). Although owners may stand to bene fit from increased prop erty values (Freeman 2006), low-income renters have much to lose. The urban poor, who are disproportionately nonwhite, are mostly likely to be involuntarily disp laced as a result of the higher rent, taxes, and costs of goods and services that accompany gentrification (Kennedy and Leonard 2001). In recent years, growth elites have focuse d on the revitalization of those downtown areas adversely affected by deindustrializ ation and declining populations. Especially in the rust belt, the global trope has persuaded members of local grow th coalitions to compete with other cities in

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attracting scarce commercial initiatives and accommodating wealthier residents (Wilson 2007). To this end, they commonly offer large subsidy packages (Fuller 2006), scale back government regulations on private capital, and demand little fr om developers in the way of redistribution (Hackworth 2007; Parks and Warren 2009) At the same time, as part of a neoliberal program, government at various levels has largely withdr awn from the social and economic problems of cities (Baxamusa 2008a). So while the public and private sectors work together, forming even stronger growth coalitions, the co mmunity sector is not only left out of land use decisions, but simultaneously feels its social serv ices depleting. In Pittsburgh, fo r example, even as the Consol Energy Center is erected, public libraries ar e experiencing funding problems leading to the anticipated closure of four f acilities in neighborhoods across the city (Hoover and Lord 2009). In fact, a boom in the construction of new s ports facilities since the 1990s is reflective of the current growth atmosphere. These venues are seen as a means to accommodate wealthy fans and revitalize struggling downtowns Instead, they stimulate litt le economic growth and fail to address local social problems (D elaney and Eckstein 2003; 2007). They are more likely to result in a faade of urban revitaliza tion amidst a sea of urban d ecay and disinvestment (Friedman, Andrews, and Silk 2004:130). Even though faci lities and teams financial rewards are increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few large business operato rs, the amount of public subsidy devoted to facility construction is unprecedented (2003; Collins and Grinkeski 2007). As a result of the economic crisis financing the construction of spor ts facilities has become more difficult in the last few years, with some cities projects being stalled, scrapped, or scaled back (Toms 2009). Nevertheless, others continue to build; since 2008, for example, six major league baseball and football stadiums were underway or completed, with another four being planned or negotiated (Basu 2009). 170

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It is not surprising that in this context, communities have looked to legally-binding agreements to ensure developer reinvestment. CBAs reflect and challenge a neoliberal dynamic by requiring private negotiations to achieve an end of public be nefits (Parks and Warren 2009). They also allow the community sector to respond to the ways in which increased mobility of capitaltied to globalization and deindustrializationhas affected U.S. cities (Mulligan-Hansel and LeRoy 2008). As part of the new accountable development movement, CBAs take advantage of those geographically bound aspects of the post-industrial, service-sector economy (Parks and Warren 2009). Further, CBAs attemp t to counter the persis tent power imbalance among public, private, and community sectors, inserting neighborhood coal itions into land-use decisions and their outcomes (Ho 2007), as well as questioning pro-growth elites insistence on value-free growth. The Hill District CBA is one of many Agreem ents increasingly being signed across the country between developers and the communities mo st impacted by their projects. Nevertheless, it offers important insight into CBA campaign motivations, processes, and outcomes. In analyzing the Hill District CBA campaign surrounding the construction of Pittsburghs new hockey arena in the Lower Hill District I contri bute to the small but gr owing body of research on CBAs, as well as the larger body of scholarship on post-industrial growth dynamics. In this concluding chapter, I recount th ese contributions, propose a more fundamental deconstruction of growth, and suggest area s for further research. Contributions In order to use the Hill District case to explore the phenomenon of CBAs within the current era of value-free growt h, I conducted interviews with 32 stakeholders and carried out ethnographic fieldwork that tota led approximately one year. Using grounded theory as an analytic tool, I refined my research inquiry into three specific questions that address why and 171

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how communities are pursuing be nefits through CBAs, as well as the implications of this relatively new tool for pro-growth dynamics: Why are communities choosing to negotiate with developers and pursue benefits through CBAs? How are communities engaging in and securing CBAs? What implications do the Hill Di strict CBA, in particular, and CBAs, in general, hold for pro-growth dynamics? The CBA Process Despite their increasing use by communities fa cing redevelopment, CBAs have not been the focus of much scholarly research. The body of work that does exist tends to be communityfocused and applied. To this literature, my cont ributions are practical. Recall that in Chapter Six, I offer a detailed descriptive analysis of the Hill District CBA process and outcome. This was meant to aid in understanding the nuts and bolts of the CBA campaign, as well as give a sense of the order of importan t steps. The groundwork for the CBA process was set by two important events: 1) earlier organizing in res ponse to a proposed casino that would have been attached to the arena in the Lower Hill; and 2) the work of the local foundation community which sought to replicate the California CBA model in Pittsburgh. Although the CBA campaign was burdened by misaligned political and commun ity leadership, the One Hill Coalition went on to negotiate and secure the CBA and adopted th e broad-based organizing model common to such campaigns. Having invited other organizati ons, mainly from the Hill Di strict, to participate as members of the Coalition, One Hill then voted on its leadership bodies and secured the intention of city, county, and Penguins officials to negotiate the CBA. Members created, sponsored, and prioritized planks, which eventually formed the basis of the Coalitions negotiating platform: the Blueprint for a Livable Hill. When the Pe nguins stopped attending meetings for several 172

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months, the One Hill Coalition and other CBA suppor ters took a number of strategies to gain support and call attention to the stalling of the CBA. They used public approval processes as leverage by attending planning commission heari ngs and even filed an appeal once the arena master plan was approved without a CBA in place. One Hills use of resources and experts from within and outside of the neighborhood was especi ally advantageous. Not only was a legal team crucial to their ability to craft the legally enfo rceable document, but it was also useful in the filing of the aforementioned appeal. Their strate gic use of the media, political allies, union and foundation support also pr oved beneficial. Eventually, the Penguins returned to the ta ble and negotiators arrived at a tentative agreement. After One Hill voted to ratify the CBA as it was, the document was then approved by the other entities and all parties to the agreement signed it during a formal ceremony at the Hill Districts Freedom Corner, a site that holds much significance for civil rights in Pittsburgh. Upon signing the CBA, One Hills organizational st ructure changed greatly. Members began to form committees that would be responsible for fulfilling the communitys role in implementing the agreements major provisions. Although opi nions on the CBA varied and many communitybased stakeholders were disappoi nted with the Penguins contribu tion, at the end of the day a legally-binding document was signed and the comm unity sector had crea ted a new history and dialogue around redevelopment in the Lower Hill District. Lessons from the Hi ll District CBA While much of the research and information av ailable on CBAs presents a birds eye view of multiple Agreements, this dissertation uses prim ary data collection in order to provide a more microscopic view. Its partial focus on the organi zing process, campaign stru cture, and strategies surrounding the Hill District CBA o ffers insight into what makes such a campaign successful. In response to one of my intervie w questions, participants on all sides of the agreement offered 173

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advice for communities headed toward a CBA campaign. Many of their suggestions are corroborated by scholars who have written about CBAs. Not surprisingly, given their experience, the most common advice for a successful campaign had to do with maintaining unity and having unifying leadership, as well as making sure that the campaign is truly community-led. Advice of this nature ranged from addressing community baggage at the outset of the campaign, to making sure the communitys religious leadership was on board, to achieving a consen sus on the communitys wants. According to Salkin (2007), although conflicts ar e likely to arise when organizations that are used to working alone have to work together, a broad-based, indigenous, and united coalition with coherent goals is crucial for a CBA campaign to be fair and effective. Others (G ross 2007; Marcello 2007) are also adamant about a CBA Coalition being as broad as possible, as this will improve its legitimacy and build leverage, especially with polit icians. Related to this is Marcellos (2007) advice on avoiding conflicts of interest and making sure all parties are on the same page through a series of operating principles. One Hill members, in particular, offered or ganizational advice. Some suggested that facilitation training would have been helpful in order for meetings to run more effectively. Formal staffing and not just volunteer work mi ght have also improved communication between, and in preparation for, meetings. Consistent ru les would have also solved some of the problems faced between One Hill and the Faith and Justic e Alliance regarding membership and voting. Also, having sufficient time to form a coalition, draft a negotiating platform and the CBA is of utmost importance. Being in the room ear ly on, as the Hill Districts county council representative put it, helps with this. His suggestion is similar to that of Ho (2007) who says that all stakeholder sectors need to be involved in redevelopment discussions from the outset. 174

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CBA supporters also offered advice regarding m obilization and the use of outside allies. They shared the importance of st arting out with media and mobiliz ation strategies. In addition, some suggested that better relations with the uni ons would have been beneficial. Leavitt (2006) and Simmons and Luce (2009) cite such coalitio n buildingparticularly that of labor and community working togetheras a major factor in the successful negotiation of CBAs in Los Angeles and New Haven, respectively. In particular, participants noted the impor tance of political allies and the foundation community. According to those participants who offered advice on th e topic of political involvement, the best case scenario is if local politicians act as facilita tors and/or partners in the CBA. Gross (2007) shares a similar perspective on the appropriate roles of elected officials. These include: considering the degree of comm unity support when making project decisions; to be informed about the progress of CBA negotia tions; and perhaps to facilitate negotiations through shared information. Moreover, although ther e were some mixed feelings about the role of the foundation community, the financial resources th at this connection provided proved very important to the Hill District CBA. As men tioned in Chapter Six, the foundation community has been a crucial player in the success of many CBA campaigns (Mulligan-Hansel and LeRoy 2008). The money that they provide is vital to the success of CBA development, as well as implementing and monitoring the CBA after it is won (Salkin 2007). A Sign of the Times In discussing the motivations behind the Hill District CBA, I contri bute to urban politicaleconomic literature by situating CBAs within both local histories and extr a-local phenomena. In Chapter Five, I argued that the Hill District communitys decision to negotiate a CBA was heavily influenced by the legacy of failed ur ban renewal during the late 1950s and lingering distrust toward those public and private entities representing downtown. Then, white elites 175

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both exerted and maintained the privileges of whiteness through land-use decisions, unilaterally determining the fate of the predominantly bl ack Lower Hill District. Unfulfilled promises related to the ripple e ffects of the Civic Arena and the development of surrounding land fueled contention and distrust. These sentiments remain and although local poli ticians representing the Hill District are predominantly African American, Pittsburghs political and economic leadership continues to be dominated by white men. Moreover, any major residential displacement that might have been necessary for the new arena had already occurred in or der to make room for the exis ting one, thus providing fewer grounds on which to oppose the proposed construction. An oppositional approach could again result in a stalemate as in the 1960s, leaving a sea of parking lots surr ounding the new arena and replacing the Mellon Arena upon its demolition. Furthe r, even if the deal for the new arena had not already been brokered between the Penguins and local politicians, the perception of my participants was that the community did not feel strongly enough to oppose it. As expounded upon in Chapter Seven, this stance was infl uenced by both the ne ighborhoods level of disinvestment, as well as an assessme nt of potential arena impacts. The community did, however, f eel strongly about be nefiting from the new arena. As One Hills framing illustrates, the close relationship between the communitys memories of its past both the vibrancy and destructionand its hopes fo r the future was also the greatest impetus behind the desire for benefits. In this wa y, the CBA was simultaneously geared toward retribution for the past and the ability of the co mmunity to determine its own future. To a lesser extent, those who supported a CBA were also interested in offsetting both the negative impacts of the new arena and the large public subsidy th e Penguins will receive. These impacts include new inconveniences caused by construction and cha nging traffic patterns, as well as continuing 176

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problems caused by those disrespectful arena-goers who perceive the Hill District as a place apart, a phrase that Freeman (2006:188) uses to characterize the exclusio n and mistreatment of black inner-city neighborhoods throughout US history. At the end of Chapter Five, I acknowledged that each CBA campaign and (re)development project has its own unique history and originates within a pa rticular social, political, and economic context. Nevertheless, we might also draw from the Hill District case in order to think of communities decisions to pursue benefits thro ugh negotiations as a sign of the times. Given histories of place-based inequa lity, racial and cla ss discrimination, and pervasive distrust, negotiating toward a legally binding agreemen t is not only attractive to low-income and racial/ethnic minority communities, but necessary. Turning to such a strategy also allows these communities to respond to a post-in dustrial value-free growth c ontext in which public-private partnerships work to revitalize downtowns, often to their exclusion and detriment. Value-Conscious Growth Through its exploration of the ways in whic h CBAs have impacted pro-growth dynamics, this dissertation holds practical implications for community sector involvement and urban policy, as well as theoretical implicati ons for urban sociology. In Chapter Seven, I determine that CBAs contribute to changes in the dynami cs of redevelopment that appear to be here to stay. They present a novel and effective approach to the artic ulation of community interests. They provide a new outlet through which communities can public ly and formally question value-free development, gaining access to important redevelopment conversations, economic and other benefits. Through CBAs, communities begin to ho ld local growth coalitions accountable and make it more difficult for pro-growth elites to make redevelopment decisions without considering local impacts. In essence, CBAs achieve value-conscious growth. By negotiating for benefits through CBAs, communities also move away from a rarely-successful (and 177

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sometimes undesirable) oppositional approach to re development projects. Their legally-binding and social movement nature has empowered comm unities in new ways. In the Hill District, despite misalignment among its political and orga nizational leaders, the CBA acted as a means of community building, self-det ermination, and representation. Recall also from Chapter Seven that while all of these are important gains for the community sector, CBAs nevertheless stop short of posing a serious threat to dominant standards of growth or fundamentally a ltering developer-driven growth m achine processes. Despite the fact that CBAs are creating changes in the dynamics of redevelopment, they require no significant questioning of the growth is good ideology. Because CBAs can burden developers or delay development, the tool itself was called into question by lo cal officials in Pittsburgh, not for the fact that growth itself might be undesirable or inequitable. Nor do CBAs seriously alter gr owth machine processes, but instead seem to present developers with a path of least resistance. In Pittsburgh, a city with a strong growth coalition, the local governmentparticularly the mayor and county executiveand the Penguins were so aligned that community stakeholde rs referred to them collectively as the other si de. Indeed, this other side had solidified its relationship an d plans to construct a new arena long before the surrounding community was informed, let alone aske d for input. CBAs may have more leverage in cities with weaker growth coalitions, in wh ich politicians are less aligned with the private sector. In such environments as Pittsburgh, however, the CBA was a reactive tool. In the face of the developer-driven redevelopment model, CBAs do not change the fact that the community sector tends to enter the scen e after at least initial redeve lopment decisions are made and coalition members work to the point of e xhaustion, largely on a volunteer basis. 178

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The Hill District case also supports existing li terature describing the adaptive nature of growth coalitions. Pittsburghs lo cal growth coalition was innovativ e in the face of challenges to their pursuit of value-free growth. Both the Penguins and politicians engaged in stalling and reverted to other tactics in order to hold off on signing the CBA or to contribute as little as possible to it. For the Penguins, mayor, and c ounty executive, going through these negotiations seemed to be a minor setback in their growth pl an and they adjusted to any challenges put forth by the CBA. In general, many developers can simply go elsewhere if they find CBAs too burdensome, further evidence that CBAs do not funda mentally alter growth machine processes. If CBAs provide some benefits for communities but do not question pro-growth fundamentals, are they a tool worth using? Yes, particularly because of the prevailing environment in which the growth ideology constr ains those who make land-use decisions and prevents them from reaching more progressive alte rnatives to growth at any cost (Lord and Price 1992). Making public benefits of proj ects at least as signif icant as private benefits is one way to address the hegemony of value-free growth ( 1992), and CBAs work toward this end. As illustrated in Chapter Seven, they are able to ex tract use value from those things which are built only to enhance exchange value. Also, CBAs pr esent a concrete and useful tool for existing movements and approaches, such as those working toward sustainable urbanism and environmental justice. More specifically, CBAs might be successfully incorporated into Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design for Neighborhood Developmen t (LEED-ND) certification. Still in its post-pilot phase, LEED-ND proponents are work ing toward greater standardization among redevelopment projects through a rubric for more environmental and social responsibility. Developers accumulate credits for various aspect s of their design and process; once finished, 179

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these credits are totaled in order to determine th e projects level of LEED certification, from the most basic LEED Certified to the most extensive Platinum LEED Certified. LEED-ND incorporates points for such achievements as co mpactness, mixed income and use, connectivity through walking or transit, and community outreach and involvement (U.S. Green Building Council 2007). If CBAs were incorporated into this rubric, this last set of credits for community involvement would not only be achieved but exce eded, furthering the possibilities of the LEED approach. Although some CBAs are solely one-time negotiations with developers, others become part of a larger policy-oriented agenda. As su ch, they advance economic justice strategies that are geared toward public regulati on of redevelopment projects (Parks and Warren 2009). This is especially common with CBA coa litions that are affiliated with the Partnership for Working Families, the California-based organization which also aided in the Hill Districts campaign. After successful negotiation of a CBA, these orga nizations often move on to non-project-specific agendas like wage reform or affordable housi ng (2009). CBAs might also be borrowed from or reshaped entirely into legislation, as the c ounty councilperson to whom I spoke was attempting to do. Thus, while CBAs do not seriously alter domi nant standards of grow th or growth machine processes, the changes that they have brought about, as well as their potential for future impacts, move us one step closer toward a more fundamental deconstruction of growth. Deconstructing Growth I propose, then, that we continuing working to ward value-conscious growth on the road to a larger process of deconstruction. Here, I borrow from critical race theorist s use of this term (e.g., Delgado and Stefanic 2001). They have engaged in the deconstruction of race, challenging preconceived notions and breaking down taken-fo r-granted meanings. Through this process, they not only offer new ideas about race as a social construction, but ask novel questions as well. 180

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I begin this section by describi ng how scholars have begun to dec onstruct growth by envisioning changes to current dynamics. Some urban scholars have argued for a reconc eptualization of economic development. This necessitates changing the current definition attracting businesses in order to drive profit to one that incorporates broad community c oncerns (Marcello 2007). In this way, CBAs will cease to be seen as speed bumps; instead, they will be perceived as vital to the new concept of economic development. This definition encompasse s sustainability principles, as well as living wages that increase residents buy ing power and allow them to pa tronize local businesses (2007). Part of this reframing, then, involves viewi ng communities as imperative to the development process. Ho (2007) goes a step further in th is regard. He argues th at CBAs are not an end goal; no sector has the time or energy to work on a CBA for every proposed project. Instead, there must be systemic changes in the public sector so that publicly subsid ized projects are made to satisfy the issues raised by all major stakeh olders, including the community (2007). Placing legal limitations on subsidies is another public sector option (Molotch 1999). In addition, because increased mobility of capital has guided many of the irr ational and inappropriate landuse decisions of growth coalitions, others have argued for a national pol icy that responds to deindustrialization (Lord and Price 1992:155). Another potential solution to ma king growth more equitable is to get tough withmeaning to demand more fromcapital (Logan and Molotc h 1987; Molotch 1999). In some sense, CBAs have achieved this through their insistence on value-conscious growth. The crux of Logan and Molotchs suggestion, however, is that because of the current state of competition between cities, this tougher stance must happen in very specific lo cales: those places most at tractive to investors. In those places, demand for development is high and so is profit potential. Citizens have more to 181

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bargain with and thus, the ability to change growth conditions through higher expectations, such as growth limitation and increased labor equality requirements. This may then have a trickledown effect; a new standard would be establishe d and investors would have a higher degree of humility wherever they went (Molotch 1999:263). Building on the above ideas, I envision a larg er deconstruction, i nvolving new standards for growth and higher expectations of the public and private sectors. Right now, the dominant growth ideology renders investing public funds in spor ts facilities rather than education, for example, an acceptable norm (Delaney and Eckstein 2003). We commonly measure the success of cities and downtown qualities of life by their profit-potential (Tur ner 1995). By this standard, the unequal impacts of land-use decisions are of little concern. I agree with Delaney and Ecksteins (2003) assertion that Perhaps we ne ed an entirely new vision for what makes an American city a major league city (p. 204). If we are able to transform the way in which we judge redevelopment projects and the success of cities, a purely anti-g rowth stance may not be necessary. There may in fact be a middle ground between growth is good and growth is bad. Molotch (1999) frames this idea in terms of positive, as opposed to regressive, growth. Positive growth would follow a new set of criteria. Instead of prioriti zing economic standards, we need to think first and foremost about social impacts on the area immediately surround ing a project and beyond. We must judge the success of cities by the quality of lif e they provide for all citizens a nd their levels of (in)equality. As these standards gained ground, developers wo uld find it increasingly di fficult to avoid valueconscious growth by simply going where CBAs are not. In the long term such changes would make CBAs obsolete. 182

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We might measure quality of lif e through such things as availa bility of affordable housing and services (Turner 1995), as well as living wage jobs and absence of environmental hazards. In fact, scholars have noted a positive corre lation between the presence of environmental disparities and those of income and quality of lif e (Pellow 2000). One way to measure levels of (in)equality would be to apply th e Gini index at the city, not ju st national, level. The United Nations (UN Habitat 2008) recently broke ground in this regard, comparing major urban centers around the world. At the same time, it is impera tive that we also find waysperhaps building upon the Gini or similar indices to measure what Molotch (1999) calls distributive justice (p. 264). In conjunction with measuring gaps in wealth and income, we have to understand the racialized and gendered aspects of this inequa lity. The publication and dissemination of such data may prove helpful in giving cities something for which to strive, much in the same way that the LEED approach provides incentives for sustainable design. Those ci ties with the lowest levels of inequality should be held in the highest esteem. In all cities, but especially those with strong growth coalitions, we need to invest more energy in holding politicians ac countable to those whom they represent. Community sector interests should be a priority and elected official s must gain the trust of this sector through their actions. As one of my participants stated, In a perfect world you wouldnt need community groups to come together and force a CBA if gove rnment itself was reflecting the[ir] needs and concerns. The first task in this regard may be to educate and challenge lower level politicians, who are strategically positioned. Because they of ten live in the communities that they serve, these representatives are well-connected to both constituents and to higher level officials. Additionally, although it will be the most diffi cult undertaking, we need to challenge the private sector to adopt new st andards of growth. This invol ves informed, public, and rigorous 183

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questioning of developers as to how their project or plan will work to d ecrease inequality. In Pittsburgh, this would have meant asking the most basic question of why the Penguins franchise could not spend fewer dollars in order to update the Mellon Arena instea d of insisting on new construction. The private sector must be pressured to develop a more critical consciousness so that any changes they make will complement those being made in the public sector. Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research Further research on CBAs is necessary in orde r to more fully assess their utility. Such work might focus on best prac tices in terms of changing re development dynamics and making benefits a reality, as well as the shortcomings of CBAs. One limitation of this dissertation is the single case study approach. While the single cas e study has its merits, discussed in Chapter Four, a comparative approach would be even more effective. Focusing in-depth on a few cases would be useful for further exploration of the imp lications suggested in th is dissertation and fall somewhere in between the birds eye view of ex isting research and the microscopic view taken here. Currently, the majority of CBA research is set in the state of California. As CBAs increasingly appear throughout the country, more studies that focu s on other regions would let us know how the assertions put forth in this case study hold up in cities with different redevelopment politics and histories. Pittsburgh is pr obably similar to other rust belt cities in this regard because of common histories of urban renewal, patterns of migration, and the effects of deindustrialization. Since CBA research is still in its early stages, more process-related research is necessary especially that which draws from primary data collectionin order to see how the patterns written about here might vary by location and proj ect. One specific aspect that such research might explore more fully is the complexities of the labor-community alliance. Although it is common to see discussions of th ese partnerships in recent CBA publications, this dynamic 184

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deserves even further examination, which my data did not allow. In particular, this research might focus on labor-community experiences work ing together in other CBA campaigns, as well as the lack of CBA support from trade unions. The literature on CBAs and on growth politic s would greatly benefit from further exploration of growth elites perspectives. Anot her limitation of this research is its lack of access to those primarily responsible for making redevelopment decisions, such as the Penguins owners and other officials, the mayor and county executive. This dissertation only scratched the surface of private and public sector perspectiv es. Gaining access to those leaders of the government-developer monolith was difficult for me, and will continue to present challenges for many researchers because of growth elites high-status positions. Nevertheless, speaking with them directly is critical in order to better understand their positions on growth and decisionmaking processes. Research offering insight into the perspectives of growth elite would also allow us to move past the monolith notion. In my experience, local officials presented more nuanced ideas than they are given credit for in growth machine theo ry. With regard to the public sector, for example, I suspect that that we will see different perspectives as we climb the political ladder. In my research, those closest to the neighborhood leve l, the city and county council representatives, had their fingers on the pulses of both the commun ity and superior officials. Exploring their unique ability to work toward a deconstruc tion of growth would be interesting. Lastly, I have only begun to envision a decons truction of growth. Future research might pick up where this dissertation l eaves off in creating more concrete ways to measure and produce the new standards of city success I have suggested, as well as ways to achieve changes in public and private sector growth ideology and conduct. We must continue wo rking in the realm of 185

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value-conscious growth, but do so with a larger end in mind: a deconstruction of growth that allows for a more just and livable city for all people, regardless of their social location. 186

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187 APPENDIX A DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION SHEET Coalition and Non-Coalition Member Resi dent Demographic Information Sheet Date of Birth: __________ Age: __________ Race/Ethnicity: __________ What is your zip code? __________ Do you rent or own your home? __________ What is your main form of transportation? __________ Highest level of education completed: __________ Occupation: __________ Would you like me to use a fake name to identify you in my research? __________ If so, and if you would like to choose your own name, please specify it here: __________ Non-Coalition Business Owner/ Politician/ Planner Demographic Information Sheet Race/Ethnicity: __________ Occupation: __________ Would you like me to use a fake name to identify you in my research? __________ If so, and if you would like to choose your own name, please specify it here: __________

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APPENDIX B INTERVIEW GUIDE Coalition Member Preliminary Interview Guide1 Personal History: What are your ties to the Hill District ? (grew up there, live there now, etc) How would you describe the Hill to so meone who was not familiar with it? Do you consider where the Mellon Arena now sits to be part of the Hill or downtown? What about where the new one will sit? Do you have any memories (firsthand or through a relative, for ex.) of urban renewal and the building of the Civic Arena? Coalition Work/Thoughts on CBAs: Have you been involved with other gr oups that benefited your community? How did you get involved in the Co alition and what was your role? Tell me about the Coalition and your expe rience within it. (rewarding, tiring, etc) What might have been improved to make th e coalition/the CBA process more effective throughout (and what kind of advice might you give to similar Coalitions in the future?) Why do you think the Coalition decided to work with the Penguins instead of oppose the new arena altogether? What is your opinion on this strategy? Had you heard of CBAs before? What benefit do you think developers/other entities gain from CBAs? (whats in it for them?) Arena Perspectives: Have you attended Penguins Hockey games or ev ents at the Civic Arena? Are you a Penguins fan? Do you think the situation would be different if a football or baseball stadium was being built or if the Steelers/Pirates were involved versus the Pens? Has any of the land clearance already undert aken for the arena had any impact on you personally, for better or worse? 1 Slight adjustments were made to this guide when in terviewing members of the Faith and Justice Alliance and active residents who were not involved in CBA organizing. 188

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Do you foresee the construction of the arena ha ving any impact on you personally, for better or worse? Do you foresee the actual arena (presumably the building itself and the events it holds) having any impact on you personally, for better or worse? How has/will your neighborhood been/be impacted by the construction of the new arena? Prompt if necessary: In economic, social, and environmental terms? What do you think could go in the 28 acres that would be benefi cial to the Hill? Do you feel that your opinions on the construction a nd arena are very different from other people in the coalition or in Pittsburgh? Why? Closing: Any questions for me? Any ideas on who else to interview? Local Politician Preliminary Interview Guide2 Personal History: Did you grow up in Pittsburgh? Where do you live now? Do you have any personal ti es to the H ill District? How would you describe the Hill to so meone who was not familiar with it? Do you consider where the Mellon Arena now sits to be part of the Hill or downtown? What about where the new one will sit? Do you have any memories (firsthand or through a relative, for ex.) of urban renewal and the building of the Civic Arena? Political Perspectives: What is the role of your office/your position in the negotiations between the Penguins and the Coalition? 2 Slight adjustments were made to this guide when interviewing other local officials who were not politicians, as well as the foundation staff member. 189

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Why do you think the Coalition decided to work with the Penguins instead of oppose the new arena altogether? Had you heard of CBAs before? What is your opinion on the use of Community Benefits Agreements in general? In th is particular situation? What do you think the role of local government should be in these kinds of negotiations? What benefit do you think develope rs/other entities gain from CBAs? (aka whats in it for them?) Arena Perspectives: Have you attended Penguins Hockey games or ev ents at the Civic Arena? Are you a Penguins fan? Do you think the situation would be different if a football or baseball stadium was being built or if the Steelers/Pirates were involved versus the Pens? Has any of the land clearance already undert aken for the arena had any impact on you personally, for better or worse? On the city? Do you foresee the construction of the arena ha ving any impact on you personally, for better or worse? On the city? Do you foresee the actual arena (presumably the building itself and the events it holds) having any impact on you personally, for better or worse? On the city? How do you foresee this redevelopment affecting the city? The Hill District? What do you think could go in the 28 acres that w ould be beneficial for th e city? For the Hill? Closing: Any questions for me? Any ideas on who else to interview? Business People Preliminary Interview Guide3 Personal History: Did you grow up in Pittsburgh? Where do you live now? Do you have any personal ti es to the H ill District? 3 Slight adjustments were made to this guide when interviewing the Penguins Senior Consultant. 190

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How would you describe the Hill to so meone who was not familiar with it? Do you consider where the Mellon Arena now sits to be part of the Hill or downtown? What about where the new one will sit? Do you have any memories (firsthand or through a relative, for ex.) of urban renewal and the building of the Civic Arena? Arena and Business Perspectives: Have you attended Penguins Hockey games or ev ents at the Civic Arena? Are you a Penguins fan? Do you think the situation would be different if a football or baseball stadium was being built or if the Steelers/Pirates were involved versus the Pens? What kind of business do you operate own and where is it located? Has any of the land clearance already undertaken for the arena had any impact on your business, for better or worse? Do you foresee the construction of the arena ha ving any impact on your business, for better or worse? Do you foresee the actual arena (presumably the building itself and the events it holds) having any impact on your business, for better or worse? How do you foresee this redevelopment affecting the city? The Hill District? What do you think could go in the 28 acres that w ould be beneficial for th e city? For the Hill? Final: Any questions for me? Any ideas on who else to interview? 191

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192Name Race/Eth (as written) Business OwnerClergy Faith and Justice AllianceFoundation Local OfficialOne HillPenguins Current Hill Resident Cliff Christian AA x x (former)x Tom Hoffman W x (former) Ms. H AA x Mr. C Black x Carl Redwood African x x Dr. Bonnie Young LaingBlack x x Mark Jones AA x Katherine Afr-Amer x x City Council RepresentativeAfrican American xx x Dwayne Cooper Black x x Myrtle Cooper Black x Renee Aldrich AA xx Rev. "G" Af Am xx x Dr. Kim Ellis Black/AAx x x x Tony Williams White x Mr. E White/Jewish x Rev. Johnnie Monroe African American xx Ann Simms White x x x Sala Udin African American former x The Artist Other x x Rev. Dr. Jason Barr AA x Penguins' Senior ConsultantBlack x x County Council Rep. Bill RobinsonAfrican American x x Marimba Milliones Af Amx x x Local foundation memberCaucasion x State Senator Jim Ferlo Caucasion x State Rep. Jake WheatleyBlack x x x Robert R. Lavelle Black x x Ms. Chris AA x Charles Johnson Black x A Pastor African American x Local Offical W x APPENDIX C PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SUMMARY

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193 APPENDIX D ARENA TERM SHEET Pittsburgh Arena Term Sheet (http://www.state.pa.us/papow er/cwp/view.asp?Q=460701&A=11) 1. The Penguins will enter into a 29.5 year lease for the new arena, commencing upon its opening. The lease will obligate the Penguins to play hockey in the ar ena for the term of the lease and contain a non-relocation clause. 2. a. The Penguins will make thirty (30) pa yments of $3.6M/year throughout the term of the new arena lease. b. Upon the opening of the new arena, th e SEA will impose a new surcharge on parking. The first $400,000/year of reve nue generated from the new parking surcharge will be deposited annually into a capital reserve fund established to maintain and improve the new arena. The balance of the proceeds from the new parking surcharge in excess of $400,000/ year shall go to the Penguins. c. Upon the opening of the new arena, the SEA, at its expense, shall promptly demolish Mellon Arena and pave, stripe and in all respects prepare the land under Mellon Arena for use as a parking lot. Upon completion of this work, the Penguins shall pay an additional $200,000/year over the life of the lease. This use shall continue until the land unde r Mellon Arena is developed. 3. The Penguins will manage, operate and maintain the new arena, subject to the terms of its current agreement with SMG, and shall retain all revenues generated from all events at the new arena. 4. Except for the new parking surc harge, all revenue generated from ex isting surcharges shall go to the Penguins and no new surcharges of any kind shall be imposed without the approval of the Penguins. 5. Prior to redevelopment, the Penguins shall manage, operate, maintain and retain all revenues from all current and future parki ng lots on the current Mellon arena site. 6. The SEA will provide a 500 space surface lot ad jacent to the new arena; the Penguins will manage, operate, maintain and retain all revenues from said lot. Alternatively, the Penguins may elect for the SEA to construct a 500 space structured parking garage adjacent and connected to the new arena in exchange for the Penguins paying an additional $500,000 per year throughout the term of the new arena leas e. The parties will agree on a deadline for the Penguins to make such election. If the Penguins inform the SEA of their election to build the garage by May 1, 2007, the SEA will be obligated to complete the garage in time for it to open in conjunction with the opening of the new arena. The Penguins will manage, operate, ma intain and retain all revenues from the garage. 7. The arena construction budget will be set at $290M. The budge t will cover the following matters: o Construction o Design o Soft Costs o Eligible pre-development expenses prev iously incurred by the Penguins in an amount of approximately $6M (Commonwealth and SEA to review and approve the itemized expenses)

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o Acceptable design and construction con tingencies, including a 5% owner contingency o Oversight expenses of the SEA, estimated at approximately $2.5M The new arena will be designed with the goal of assuring that all matters listed in Paragraph 7 do not exceed $290M. The Penguins w ill exercise ultimate control over the design and construction, provided that the Commonwealth and the SEA each shall approve the design. A GMP for the mutually approved arena design will be contracted for at the earliest appropriate time, taking into account the relati onship between design certainty and achieving a cost efficient GMP. If the GMP plus the other matters listed in Paragr aph 7 (GMP+) exceed $290M, the Penguins and the Commonwealth agree to split any excess 50/ 50 up to a GMP+ of $310M. The Penguins will have the right to pay th eir share of the increase in the GMP+ from $290M to up to $310M in the form of increased annua l payments, rather than a lump sum. In the event the GMP+ exceeds $310M, the Penguins shall have the right to terminate their participation in the project without further fina ncial obligation, provided that the parties shall first work together in good faith to redesign and value engineer the arena to lower the GMP+ to a level not exceeding $310M. Once the GMP+ is established, the Penguins sh all be responsible for any cost overruns, provided that the Penguins shall have the right to modify the design of the new arena to mitigate such overruns, subject to the reasonable ove rsight of the Commonwealth and the SEA. The SEA will pay the Penguins $8.5M for the hosp ital site. The parties recognize that it is essential for the SEA to gain access to the property as soon as possible to begin abatement, demolition and other site work. It is anticipat ed that the source of the $8.5M will be from bond proceeds over and above the $290M referenced in Paragraph 7. In the event the SEA must access the property to commence its work before the $8.5M is available, the parties will work together to devise an arrangement acceptable to th e current mortgage holders of the hospital site to enable conveyance of the hospital s ite to the SEA as soon as possible. The Penguins shall be reimbursed for legitim ate predevelopment costs of approximately $6M out of the $290M referenced in Paragraph 7. To the extent any such costs are not reimbursable from the bond proceeds contemplated to fund the $290M, the Commonwealth will develop an alternative mean s of delivering this reimbur sement to the Penguins. To fund marketing expenses incurred by the Penguins in promoting the Team and/or the current or new arena, the Commonwealth will prov ide funds for the direct economic benefit of the Penguins in an amount equal to $2M, which th e parties contemplate will be paid in a lump sum. $3M from the bond proceeds (over and above the $290M construction budget referenced in Paragraph 7) shall be deposited into a capital reserve fund for the new arena. In the event the City of Pittsburgh amusement tax rate is increased or a comparable tax on tickets or admissions is created or increased at any time during the term of the new arena lease, the Penguins shall receive a credit against their fi nancial obligations under the new arena lease or be paid an amount equal to the proceeds from any such new or increased tax on tickets or admissions for arena events. The SEA shall be responsible for all site conditions on the new arena site and shall be responsible for making the site available for cons truction of the new aren a in a clean, buildable condition. Utilities and other infras tructure shall be made availabl e in a manner and in locations consistent with the design of the arena. Development Rights: 194

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o For the value and on the terms set forth in this Paragraph 17, the Penguins shall have development rights to th e entire Mellon Arena site, as well as any portion of the hospital site which is available for development following construction of the new arena and the agreed upon surface or st ructured parking facilities built in connection therewith. o The development rights may be assigned in whole or in part by the Penguins at any time with SEA approval, which sh all not be unreasonably withheld or delayed. o Following execution of the new arena leas e, the Penguins sha ll negotiate, in good faith, terms for PITG Gaming to potentially participate in development rights. o The Penguins and the SEA shall work t ogether to develop a comprehensive redevelopment plan for the development site The parties shall work together in a good faith, collaborative manner to promot e a timely and desirable redevelopment process. The final redevelopment plan(s) shall be subject to SEA approval, which shall not be unreasonably withheld or delayed. o The development site shall have a drawdown period of 10 years, commencing on the first anniversary of the later of: (1) the opening of the new arena and (2) the demolition of Mellon Arena and preparation of the land thereunder for use as a parking lot. Upon the commencement of the drawdown period, the Penguins shall be obligated to develop a pro rata por tion of the development site during each succeeding twelve month period. For example, if the overall development site is 28 acres, the drawdown schedule would cal l for development of 2.8 acres per year. o Upon the Penguins identifying a parcel they wish to be redevelop, the parties shall have the value of the parcel appraised, taking into account its approved use, on a traditional /1/1 appraisal method. o The Penguins are entitled to $15M of cred its from redevelopm ent. Until the entire $15M credit has been received, these credits may be earned in any combination of three ways: first, in the event the Penguins are developing a parcel, the parcel shall be appraised as described above, and the Penguins shall receive a credit against the purchase pri ce in an amount equal to the appraised value; second, the Penguins shall receive the proceeds from the sale or lease of any parcel to a third party, whether by the Penguins or by the SEA; third, at the conclusion of the ten year drawdown peri od, to the extent the Penguins have not earned credits totaling $15M, the SEA shall pay the shortfall in cash. o If, on a cumulative basis, the Penguins fail to perform in a timely fashion on the drawdown schedule, the Penguins shall fo rfeit their development rights with respect to the corr esponding amount of land. For example, if the drawdown schedule calls for development of 2.8 acr es per year and, at the end of any drawdown year, the Penguins have failed to develop land at a rate of 2.8 acres per year, the Penguins would forf eit their development righ ts with respect to the number of acres representing the short fall. In every case, the Penguins shall have the right to designate the lo cation of the land on the development site to which its development rights are forfeited. o Failure to meet the drawdown schedule and/or forfeiture of development rights with respect to any portion of the development site shall not affect the Penguins 195

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right to operate and retain revenue from the present or future parking lots on the Mellon Arena site prior to any such lo t being redeveloped; provided, however, that the Penguins shall fo rfeit their rights with resp ect to parking upon the 10th anniversary of the beginn ing of the drawdown period. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Alleghe ny County and the City of Pittsburgh shall be responsible for the full and timely performance of all public sector obligations. 196

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197 LIST OF REFERENCES Acker, Joan, Kate Barry, and Johanna Essevel d. 1991 Objectivity and Truth: Problems in Doing Feminist Research. Pp. 133 in Beyond methodology: Feminist scholarship as lived research, edited by M. Fonow and J. Cook. Bloomi ngton, IN: Indiana University Press. Agyeman, Julian. 2005. Sustainable Communities and the Cha llenge of Environmental Justice New York: New York University Press. Basu, Anirban. 2009. National Pa stimes: A Cost Analysis. Construction Executive, May. Retrieved November 6, 2009 (http ://www.constructionexec.com). Bauman, John F. and Edward K. Muller. 2006. Before Renaissance: Planning in Pittsburgh, 1889. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press. Baxamusa, Murtaza H. 2008a. Empowering Comm unities through Deliberation: The Model of Community Benefits Agreements. Journal of Planning Education and Research 27:261 276. ------. 2008b. Beyond the Limits to Planning for Equity: The Emergence of Community Benefits Agreements as Empowerment Mode ls in Participatory Processes. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Southe rn California, Los Angeles, CA. Bechtel, Debra. 2007. Forming Entities to Negotiate Community Benefits Agreements. Journal of Affordable Housing & Community Development Law 17:145. Belko, Mark. 2007. Meeting on Arena Attracts Hundreds. Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, June 5. Retrieved July 1, 2009 (http://post-gazette.com). ------. 2008a. Barden Wants to Drop Funding for Hill. Pittsburgh Post-Gazette April 19. Retrieved July 1, 2009 (http://www.post-gazette.com). ------. 2008b. A Neighborly Gesture: Penguins Reduce Arena Height, Refine Design. Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, March 26. Retrieved July 1, 2009 (http://post-gazette.com). ------. 2008c. New Arena's Cost Rises $31 million. Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, November 13. Retrieved July 1, 2009 (http://post-gazette.com). ------. 2008d. Labor Leader Assails Foes of Arena, Casino. Pittsburgh Post-Gazette February 20, A1:2. ------. 2009. Williams Family Helping Redevelop Uptown. Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, February 1, B1:2. Benford, Robert D. and David A. Snow. 2000. F raming Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment. Annual Review of Sociology 26:611.

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Bennett, Larry and Costas Spirou. 2006. Politic al Leadership and Stadium Development in Chicago: Some Cautionary Notes on the Uses of Regime Analysis. I nternational Journal of Urban and Regional Research 30:38. Benson, Herman. 2008. Black and White Can Unite Vs. Construction Discrimination. Union Democracy Review 171:9. Blackwell, Angela Glover and Sarah Treuhaft. 2008. Regional Equity and the Quest for Full Inclusion. Oakland, CA: Policy Link. Retrieved January 1, 2009 (https://www.policyarchive .org/handle/10207/13691). Boren, Jeremy. 2008a. Demolition to Begin to Make Room for New Arena. Tribune Review January 21. Retrieved July 1, 2009 (www.pittsburghlive.com). ------. 2008b. Arena's Price Tag Jumps by $31 Million. Tribune Review, November 14. Retrieved July 1, 2009 (www.pittsburghlive.com). ------. 2008c. Group Says No to Plan for Hill. Tribune Review, January 8, B1:7. Bridge, Gary. 1995. The Space for Class? On Cla ss Analysis in the Study of Gentrification. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 20:236. Bright, Elise M. 2000. Reviving Americas Forgotten Neighb orhoods: An Investigation of Inner City Revitalization New York and London, UK: Garland Publishing. Cagan, Joanna and Neil deMause. 1998. Field of Schemes: How th e great Stadium Swindle Turns Public Money into Private Profit Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press. Campbell, VWH, photographer. 2008. Hill Distri ct Leaders See a New Beginning as Arena Agreement is Signed. Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, August 20. Retrieved July 1, 2009 (http://post-gazette.com). Capek, Stella M. 1993. The Environmental Just ice Frame: A Conceptual Discussion and Application. Social Problems 40:5. Charmaz, Kathy. 2006. Constructing Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide Through Qualitative Analysis London, UK: Sage Publications, Ltd. Civic Arena. 1961. Photographer Unknown, Cour tesy of the Pennsylvania Room. Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Library. Cohen, Warren. 1999. Oysters, Scotch, and Hoops: New Sports Arenas Ar e Dens of Luxury: They May Also Fail. U.S. News and World Report November 15, 92:3. Collins, Patricia Hill. 2000. Black Feminist Thought New York: Routledge. 198

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Collins, Timothy W. and Sara E. Grineski. 2007. Unequal Impacts of Downtown Redevelopment: The Case of Stadiu m Building in Phoenix, Arizona. Journal of Poverty 11:23. Conte, Andrew. 2006. Majestic Star Casino Outshines Rivals in State Study. Tribune Review, November 28. Retrieved July 1, 2009 (www.pittsburghlive.com). Corbin, Juliet and Anselm Strauss. 2008. Basics of Qualitative Research 3rd ed. Thousand Oaks: CA: Sage Publications, Inc. Crowley, Gregory J. 2005. The Politics of Place: Conten tious Urban Redevelopment in Pittsburgh Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press. Cummings, Scott L. 2006. Mobili zation Lawyering: Community Economic Development in the Figueroa Corridor. Pp. 302 in Cause lawyers and social movements edited by A. Sarat and S. Scheingold. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. ------. 20078. The Emergence of Community Benefits Agreements. Journal of Affordable Housing & Community Development Law 17:5. Curry, Timothy Jon, Kent Schwiria n, and Rachel A. Woldoff. 2004. High Stakes: Bigtime Sports & Downtown Redevelopment. Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press. Delaney, Kevin J. and Rick Eckstein. 2003. Public Dollars, Private Stadiums: The Battle over Building Sports Stadiums Rutgers, NJ: Rutgers University Press. ------. 2007. Urban Power Structures a nd Publicly Financed Stadiums. Sociological Forum 22:331. Delgado, Richard and Jean Stefanic. 2001. Critical Race Theory: An Introduction. New York: New York University Press. Denzin, Norman and Michael D. Giardina, eds. 2007. Ethical Futures in Qualitative Research: Decolonizing the Politics of Knowledge Walnut Creek, CA: Left Coast Press. Denzin, Norman and Yvonne Lincoln, eds. 2003. Collecting and Interpreting Qualitative Materials. 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc. DeVault, Marjorie. 1990. Talking and listening fr om womens standpoint: Feminist strategies for interviewing and analysis. Social Problems 37:96. ------. 1996. Talking Back to Sociology: Distinctive Contributions of Feminist Methodology. Annual Review of Sociology 22:29. Dey, Ian. 2004. Grounded Theory. Pp. 80-93 in Qualitative Research in Practice edited by C. Seale, G. Gobo, J. Gubrium, and D. Silver man. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc. 199

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Diana, Peter, photographer. 1999. Reb irth of the Hill: Photo Journal. Pittsburgh Post-Gazette April 16. Retrieved July 1, 2009 (http://post-gazette.com). Ellis, Paul A. Jr. 2008. It's Not a Shakedown. Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, February 27. Retrieved July 1, 2009 (http://post-gazette.com). Epiphany Church. Online Image. n.d. Retrieve d July 1, 2009 (www.ephiphanychurch.net). Fainstein, Susan. 2005. Cities and Diversity: S hould We Want It? Can We Plan For It? Urban Affairs Review 41:3. Ferman, Barbara. 1996. Challenging the Growth Machine: Neighborhood Politics in Chicago and Pittsburgh. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas. Fonow, Margaret and Judith Cook, eds. 1991. Beyond methodology: Feminist scholarship as lived research Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. -----2005. Feminist Methodology: New Applicati ons in the Academy and Public Policy. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 30:2211. Freeman, Lance. 2006. There Goes the Hood: Views of Gentrification from the Ground Up Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. Friedman, Michael T., David L. Andrews, and Michael L. Silk. 2004. Sport and the Faade of Redevelopment in the Postindustrial City. Sociology of Sport Journal 21:119. Fuller, Merrian. 2006. Rethinking Economic Development. In Business 28(1):30. Fullilove, Mindy Thompson. 2004. Root Shock: How Tearing Up City Neighborhoods Hurts America, and What We Can Do about It New York: One World/Ballantine. Gerber, Sandy. 2007. Community Benefits Ag reements: A Tool for More Equitable Development? Community Dividends Retrieved January 1, 2008 (http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publica tions_papers/pub_display.cfm?id=1881). Glasco, Lawrence.2001. The Civil Rights Movement in Pittsburgh: To Make This City Some Place Special. Retrieved January 1, 2009 (www.freedomcorner.org/downloads/glasco.pdf) Glaser, Barney and Anselm Strauss. 1967. The Discovery of Grounded Theory. Chicago, IL: Aldine. Goffman, Erving. 1974. Frame Analysis Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Gotham, Kevin Fox. 2000. Growth Machine Up-links : Urban Renewal and the Rise and Fall of the Pro-Growth Coalition in a U.S. City. Critical Sociology 26:268. ------. 2005. Tourism Gentrification: The Case of New Orleans Vieux Carre (French Quarter). Urban Studies 42:1099. 200

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Gottdiener, Mark and Ray Hutchinson. 2006. The New Urban Sociology 3rd ed. Cambridge, MA: Westview Press. Gross, Julian. 2007. Community Benefits Agreements: Definitions, Values, and Legal Enforceability. Journal of Affordable Housing & Community Development Law 17:35 58. Gross, Julian and Greg LeRoy and Madeline Janis-Aparicio. 2005. Community Benefits Agreements: Making Development Projects Accountable. Washington, D.C. and Los Angeles, CA: Good Jobs First and the Calif ornia Partnership for Working Families. Hackworth, Jason. 2007. The Neoliberal City: Governance, Ideology, and Development in American Urbanism Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Harding, Sandra, ed. 1987. Feminism and Methodology: Social Science Issues Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Henig, Jeffrey R. 1982. Neighborhood Mobilization: Redevelopment and Response New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Hill District Community Benefits Agr eement. August 19, 2008. Pittsburgh, PA. Ho, William. 2007. Community Be nefits Agreements: An Evol ution in Public Benefits Negotiation Processes. Journal of Affordable Housi ng & Community Development Law 17:7. Holstein, James A. and Jaber F. Gubrium. 1997. The Active Interview Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc. Hoover, Bob and Rich Lord. 2009. Board Votes to Cut Carnegie Library Branches, Hours and Staff. Pittsburgh Post-Gazette October 6. Retrieved November 6, 2009 (http://postgazette.com). Hutter, Mark. 2007. Experiencing Cities Boston, MA: Pearso n Education, Inc. Jacobs, Jane. 1961. The Death and Life of Great American Cities New York: Vintage Books. Jessop, Bob, Jamie Peck, and Adam Tickell 1999 Retooling the Machine: Economic Crisis, State Restructuring, and Ur ban Politics. Pp. 141 in The Urban Growth Machine: Critical Perspectives Two Decades Later edited by A. Jonas and D. Wilson. New York: State University of New York Press. Jones, Diana Nelson. 2007. How the Battle of Oak Hill was Finally Won. Pittsburgh PostGazette April 8, B1:3. Keating, Raymond J. 1999. Sports Pork: The Costly Relationship between Major League Sports and Government. Washington, D.C.: Ca to Institute. Retrieved January 2008 (http://www.cato.org/pubs/p as/pa-339es.html). 201

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209 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Originally from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Collee n Cain received her doctorate degree from the Department of Sociology and Criminology & Law at the University of Florida in the fall of 2009. She achieved her bachelors degree in soci ology at John Carroll University, outside of Cleveland, Ohio, in 2004. She then completed he r masters degree in so ciology in 2006 at the University of Florida. Her areas of interest ar e urban sociology, the intersections of race, class, and gender, environmental inequality, and qua litative methodology. She plans to continue applied research on value-consci ous growth in the nonprofit or i ndependent research sector.