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Party Leaders, Committee Chairs, and the Ebb and Flow of Actions in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1949-1996

Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0024714/00001

Material Information

Title: Party Leaders, Committee Chairs, and the Ebb and Flow of Actions in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1949-1996
Physical Description: 1 online resource (195 p.)
Language: english
Creator: Bekafigo, Marija
Publisher: University of Florida
Place of Publication: Gainesville, Fla.
Publication Date: 2009

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords: Political Science -- Dissertations, Academic -- UF
Genre: Political Science thesis, Ph.D.
bibliography   ( marcgt )
theses   ( marcgt )
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent)   ( marcgt )
born-digital   ( sobekcm )
Electronic Thesis or Dissertation

Notes

Abstract: The United States Congress is composed of two fundamental organizing units, parties and committees. While the institutions as a whole have been stable throughout history, the power and influence they possess have not. The amount of power that both parties and their leadership and committees and their chairmen have wielded in the U.S. House of Representatives has shifted back and forth with one holding more power in one time period than the other, or so the argument goes. During the post-WWII committee government era in the U.S. House of Representatives (approximately 1945-1970), committees and especially their chairmen ruled the legislative process with virtual autonomy often at the expense of their party and its leadership. During the party government era, (approximately 1980-present) scholars began focusing on the party leadership and the tools that they used to garner influence over committee chairs. First, this study tests these arguments using an original dataset of leadership actions that are gathered from the front pages of the Washington Post. This research shows 1) that scholars have failed to understand how important both party leaders and committee chairs, together, are in the legislative process 2) exactly what types of maneuvers are made by the leadership on a day-to-day basis and 3) that there is a possibility for party leaders and committee chairs to act as parallel leaders performing similar actions.
General Note: In the series University of Florida Digital Collections.
General Note: Includes vita.
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references.
Source of Description: Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page.
Source of Description: This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication. The University of Florida Libraries, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law.
Statement of Responsibility: by Marija Bekafigo.
Thesis: Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Florida, 2009.
Local: Adviser: Dodd, Lawrence C.
Local: Co-adviser: Conley, Richard S.

Record Information

Source Institution: UFRGP
Rights Management: Applicable rights reserved.
Classification: lcc - LD1780 2009
System ID: UFE0024714:00001

Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0024714/00001

Material Information

Title: Party Leaders, Committee Chairs, and the Ebb and Flow of Actions in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1949-1996
Physical Description: 1 online resource (195 p.)
Language: english
Creator: Bekafigo, Marija
Publisher: University of Florida
Place of Publication: Gainesville, Fla.
Publication Date: 2009

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords: Political Science -- Dissertations, Academic -- UF
Genre: Political Science thesis, Ph.D.
bibliography   ( marcgt )
theses   ( marcgt )
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent)   ( marcgt )
born-digital   ( sobekcm )
Electronic Thesis or Dissertation

Notes

Abstract: The United States Congress is composed of two fundamental organizing units, parties and committees. While the institutions as a whole have been stable throughout history, the power and influence they possess have not. The amount of power that both parties and their leadership and committees and their chairmen have wielded in the U.S. House of Representatives has shifted back and forth with one holding more power in one time period than the other, or so the argument goes. During the post-WWII committee government era in the U.S. House of Representatives (approximately 1945-1970), committees and especially their chairmen ruled the legislative process with virtual autonomy often at the expense of their party and its leadership. During the party government era, (approximately 1980-present) scholars began focusing on the party leadership and the tools that they used to garner influence over committee chairs. First, this study tests these arguments using an original dataset of leadership actions that are gathered from the front pages of the Washington Post. This research shows 1) that scholars have failed to understand how important both party leaders and committee chairs, together, are in the legislative process 2) exactly what types of maneuvers are made by the leadership on a day-to-day basis and 3) that there is a possibility for party leaders and committee chairs to act as parallel leaders performing similar actions.
General Note: In the series University of Florida Digital Collections.
General Note: Includes vita.
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references.
Source of Description: Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page.
Source of Description: This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication. The University of Florida Libraries, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law.
Statement of Responsibility: by Marija Bekafigo.
Thesis: Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Florida, 2009.
Local: Adviser: Dodd, Lawrence C.
Local: Co-adviser: Conley, Richard S.

Record Information

Source Institution: UFRGP
Rights Management: Applicable rights reserved.
Classification: lcc - LD1780 2009
System ID: UFE0024714:00001


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PARTY LEADERS, COMMITTEE CHAIRS, AND TH E EBB AND FLOW OF ACTIONS IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1949-1996 By MARIJA ANNA BEKAFIGO A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLOR IDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2009 1

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2009 Marija Anna Bekafigo 2

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This dissertation is dedicated to my grandmaw, Marjorie Tayloe Wooldridge, the best political scientist that I know, and to my mother, Frances W. Bekafigo, who can now stop asking me if I am done. 3

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS A good friend and high school classmate once said to me, Marija, I didnt even think you would go to college. First, that made me really angry as if I did not have the potential to go to college, but then I realized why she may have said it. In high school, I did not really like going to class and rarely stud ied. I did like goofing off though and that was evident when I was voted class clown in my senior year I did not like to read, even the Sunday comics, but I watched A LOT of television. I did so poorly in school that I managed to get a C in the one class where everyone else got an A. That class was Drama. But my mom and grandmaw, the people that I admired most, had gone to college. So I started off at a community college, following in their footsteps, where I still earned mostly Cs. When I began my junior year at the University of South Flor ida, something was different. For me, that difference was political science and one teacher in particular, Kathryn Dunn Tenpas. The first political science class that I ever took was with her and I will neve r forget it. It was because of her, and her teaching, and her mentor ing that I am where I am today. She took me under her wing and helped me become a better stud ent, writer, and now political scientist. To this day I can still call her up and ask her for advice about teaching or research or ask her to read something I have written. One day early in my career, she gave me a great piece of advice. I will paraphrase, Getting a Ph.D. is only about 1% ge nius, the rest is perseverance. From that day on I knew I could do it. I knew I did not ha ve to be the smartest person in the world, but with hard work and determination I could finish my degree. That was the best thing that she could have told me because I always thought that others were smarter than me and that my average brain power would hold me back. I have always thought of her telling me that when I wanted to give up. I would like to thank her for helping me find a subject that I love and a career that I can enjoy. 4

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At the University of Florida, there have been a number of professors who have supported me and my studies. I could not have completed this dissertation without their help. For all the students who have had one of Larry Dodds clas ses then you know that he is a mentor and teacher like no other. It is di fficult to put into words the amount of time he put into me as a student, the encouragement and support that he gave me through words and deeds, and the guidance and wisdom that he shared with me in relation to school, the profession, and life. Most times he would gently nudge me in the right di rection allowing me to find my own way. This helped me to truly become an independent political thinker. At othe r times, he kicked (if needed)! Richard S. Conleys guidance re garding teaching and research has been invaluable and his scholarship is especially one th at I admire. He is the type of person who will encourage you to do your best and then push you to do even better. He is easy to talk to about almost anything and is the type of professor who will have a serious talk with you one minute about your research and then buy you a glass of beaujolais He is the first professor to give me the opportunity to do research with him, and for this I will be eternally grateful. As a young graduate student, this was a priceless gift of self-esteem. Hi s interest in me as a student ga ve me a great deal of confidence that I did not have before. He made me belie ve in myself and my research abilities. Dan Smith is the type of teacher that all students should be so lucky to come across. He is passionate and enthusiastic a bout political science and that clearly comes across in the classroom. He is also the type of mentor whos e candor and sense of humor is refreshing. I will miss him asking me questions about my research su ch as, How does this apply to the Unitarian Universalists? 5

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Beth Rosensons assistance, especially thr oughout the dissertation pr ocess, has been so important to me and my scholar ship. I do not know how she finds the time to always provide timely and thoughtful comments on my work. Her feedback is exhaustiv e and never rushed. You can tell that she truly cares for her students success. Elizabeth Dales historical knowledge and abi lity to tell an engaging story is one that I have not fully tapped. From the first moment th at I walked into her office, I felt a connection with her. I think we were long lost buddies fr om a former life. Although, I am almost certain she did not want to be on yet another committee, she enthusiastically took the job with unwavering support of my research. I am tha nkful to her for putting me at ease during the process. I would also like to thank Rene Johnson for teaching me my first statistics class. She has unending patience to go over a concept again and ag ain in myriad ways until you get it. Leslie Anderson always gave me thoughtful and thorough feedback on my papers that helped me to hone my writing skills. Debbie Wallen and Sue La wless-Yachinsin were great cheerleaders and helped to cut through the bureaucratic red tape of the university system. I will never forget Debbies encouragement when I had to TA my first class and was scared to death. I lived through it just like she said I w ould. Sue was always in the offi ce ready to give me a hug when needed. And last, but not least I would like to thank Michael Martinez who tried to teach me statistics and political behavior, but gave up because I was a pain in the butt. Just kidding, Dr. Martinez. You know how much I love you. You we re always there to answer my emails, phone calls and questions about resear ch, teaching, and job hunting. Your advice and counsel is so appreciated. I hope you do not th ink that you are rid of me no w. 6

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My graduate school years at the University of Florida were especially memorable because of all the friends that I made. I am grateful to Matt Caverly, Dan Ov erbey, Greg Markowski, Yunie Hyun, Jamie Pimlott, Allison Clark Pingle y, Kathryn Oates, Kevin Wagner, Joe Kraus, Nino Chiarello, Jason Kassel, Richard Yon, Ri chard Swilley, Parakh Hoon, Diana Cohen and Bill Cucumber for their friendship. Whether we had classes together, shared rooms at conferences, or had drinks together after a long day at school, their friendship made grad school a time that I will never forget. To Thomas Bieb richerUF Political Science was lucky to have you. Thanks for always being available to lend a helping hand. I am coming to Germany. You cant stop me. To Melinda Negron and Kenly Fe nio We had some good fun in grad school. I appreciate our long talks over the phone about research, teaching, job hunting and more importantly, travel! Your friendship means the world to me. To Jason GainousYou were my biggest cheerleader in grad school. From the fi rst conference we attended together, you always gave me the support that I needed and constructiv e criticism that helped me become a better scholar and teacher. You gave me the motivati on that I needed to start my dissertation and helped me along the way. I never knew why you t ook an interest in me the way that you did, but I am so appreciative of your support. To Ry an BakkerAlthough our friendship got off to a rough start, I truly believe that I could not have finished my di ssertation without your help. You gave me the confidence that I needed in an area where I am weak. I am grateful to you for your encouragement even when you probably wanted to ring my neck. To Matthew K. DesantisI am so glad that you choose the right answer to my first two questions that I asked you. Otherwise, you would have been sent off to obliv ion along with all the othe r liberal, qualitative folk. You were my best friend in grad school and I know that our friendship will continue to grow through the years as long as you know th at I say who, I say wh en, and I say who. 7

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At the University of Connectic ut, where I received my Masters degree, I would like to thank Kathleen M. Moore, Brian Waddell, Richard B. Cole, and especially Howard L. Reiter. At the University of Georgia, Bob Grafstein support ed me financially by givi ng me my first adjunct teaching position when I moved to Athens to be with my boyfriend, now husband. Arnold Fleishmann, Audrey Haynes, Becky Edwards, and Rose Tahash were also a source of support and friendship while at UGA. Vi rginia Benjamin at the UGA library showed me how to use Endnote which made my life a lot easier. To the 578 Crew Robby Luckett, Frank Forts and Buckra-The historians in my life who made living in Athens worth staying. My time in Athens was somewhat depressing until I met these fine folk s. I enjoyed getting together in the morning to write our dissertations, dr inking margaritas, watching FL-G A football together, and singing karaoke. Gators still dominate mentally and physically! I would also like to thank the faculty and staff in the political science department at the University of Southern Mississippi who gave me my first real job. They believed in me by gi ving me a job when I was still ABD. They each encouraged and supported me during the first year through completion of this project. I look forward to many years with them. I would also like to thank the suppe r club folks who I met when I moved to Hattiesburg. I am finally done and now have no excuses for missing dinner. Southern MissTo the top. Several others along the way gave their suppo rt. David R. Mayhew was an approachable scholar and for that I am grateful He went back through his datase t (that I utilized for much of this research) and gathered some additional information for me that I needed. Dot Paul and Big Dorothy gave editorial assistance. Hopefully they will continue to do so long after this dissertation is complete. Amelia Bell is the type of friend that anyone w ould be lucky to have. Her ability to come through when you are in a bi nd is amazing. This dissertation would not have 8

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made it through the editorial process on time without her help. I am lucky to have met her at the Salty Dog that evening. Michae l Strickland and Sam Slater pr ovided emotional and financial support throughout my educational career. If I did not say it enough already, thank you both. Heather Stur helped me at the last minute by sharing her dissertation acknowledgements. Thanks to Sunny Townes for agreeing to format my dissertation when that was the last thing that I wanted to do. Thanks to Bella and Girlie for brightening my days spent working alone at home and thanks to Smokey for getting me outside. Fi nally, thanks to Monica Miller, my BFF, and Carol and Mike Broadus for their friendship. None of this would have been possible wit hout the unconditional l ove and support of my family. Much love and thanks go to Dad and J udi, Rosemary, Jere, Hannah and the rest of the Stambaugh and Cress clan. My husband, Matt St ambaugh, has been an amazing source of love and support. He read all of my chapters and ga ve great feedback on my writing. He even made most of the tables in this rese arch. All errors are his own, not mine. Just kidding. You are the love of my life times a billion. I coul d not have done this without your continuous encouragement. This dissertation is dedicated to my grandmaw, Marjorie Tayloe Wooldridge. She did not live to see the completion of this project but I know she would have been so proud. She and my Aunt Pat are smiling down on me. And finally, to my mother, who likes to get the last word, thank you for your emotional and financial support all these years. Y ou are one of the only people who could have understood staying in school for all this time. I could not have done it without you and your boring, long-winded and meaningless emails. 9

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TABLE OF CONTENTS page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................................................................... 4LIST OF TABLES .........................................................................................................................13LIST OF FIGURES .......................................................................................................................15ABSTRACT ...................................................................................................................... .............16CHAPTER 1 TOWARD A THEORY OF PARALLEL LEADERS ...........................................................18Introduction .................................................................................................................. ...........18Organizing Congress ........................................................................................................... ...20Why Should We Study Parties and Committees Together? ............................................20Why Should We Examine Party Leader s and Committee Chairs Together? ..................22Competing Theories ............................................................................................................ ....24Committee Government Era ............................................................................................25Party Government Era .....................................................................................................27Action Data and Methods ....................................................................................................... 30Toward a Theory of Parallel LeadersThree Postulates .......................................................31Hypotheses .................................................................................................................... ..37Are All Committee Chairs Equal? ...................................................................................39Goals of This Research ...........................................................................................................40Research Overview ............................................................................................................. ....412 PARTY LEADERS AND COMMITTEE CH AIRS IN THREE CONGRESSIONAL ERAS USING MAYHEWS DATA ..................................................................................42Mayhews Data and Method ...................................................................................................42Results .....................................................................................................................................47Types of Actions Performed by Leaders .........................................................................55Who Is Acting? ................................................................................................................56Limitations of Mayhews Data ...............................................................................................59Conclusion .................................................................................................................... ..........613 LEADERSHIP ACTIONS IN THE WASHINGTON POST .................................................63Congressional Eras .................................................................................................................65Canvassing for Actions in the Washington Post .....................................................................68New Action Categories ......................................................................................................... ..73Preliminary Findings .......................................................................................................... ....75Conclusion .................................................................................................................... ..........85 10

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4 COMMITTEE GOVERNMENT ............................................................................................86Introduction .................................................................................................................. ...........86Plan for the Next Two Chapters .............................................................................................87Examining the Committee Government Era Data ..................................................................9181st Congress ...........................................................................................................................93Parliamentary Procedures Actions ..................................................................................98Rules actions ............................................................................................................98Foreign policy actions ............................................................................................103Leadership Interactions .................................................................................................105Summary ....................................................................................................................... .10789th Congress ...................................................................................................................... ...108Investigative Actions .....................................................................................................111Civil Rights Actions ......................................................................................................114Leadership Interactions .................................................................................................116Summary ....................................................................................................................... .119Conclusion .................................................................................................................... ........1205 PARTY GOVERNMENT ERA ...........................................................................................122Introduction .................................................................................................................. .........122Examining the Party Government Era Data .........................................................................12597th Congress ........................................................................................................................125Executive Connections Actions and the Budget Process ..............................................128Legislating Actions ........................................................................................................132Leadership Interactions .................................................................................................133Summary ....................................................................................................................... .134100th Congress ..................................................................................................................... .135Investigative Actions .....................................................................................................138Taking Stands ................................................................................................................139Leadership Interactions .................................................................................................141Summary ....................................................................................................................... .143104th Congress ..................................................................................................................... .143Parliamentary Moves .....................................................................................................145Various Actions .............................................................................................................148Leadership Interactions .................................................................................................151Summary ....................................................................................................................... .1536 DETERMINANTS OF LEADERSHIP ACTIONS .............................................................154Explaining Actions ............................................................................................................ ...155Length of Service ............................................................................................................. .....159Landmark Legislation ...........................................................................................................159Party ID ...................................................................................................................... ...........160Region ........................................................................................................................ ...........160Leadership Type ............................................................................................................... ....161Prestige Committee ...............................................................................................................161 11

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Results ...................................................................................................................................162Determinants of Mayhews Subcategories of Actions .........................................................166Conclusion .................................................................................................................... ........1697 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE PROSPECTS ...................................................................170Future Prospects ....................................................................................................................170Thoughts on Newspaper Data .......................................................................................172Should All Party Leaders Be Treated Equally? .............................................................172Dualism and Dichotomy .......................................................................................................17 4Do Actions Equate with Power and Influence? ....................................................................177Conclusion .................................................................................................................... ........179APPENDIX A MANN-WHITNEY TESTS .................................................................................................181The Mann-Whitney Statistic .................................................................................................181Mayhews Data ................................................................................................................. ....181Mann-Whitney Tests ............................................................................................................182Washington Post data ....................................................................................................182Salient Chairs .................................................................................................................183B DETERMINANTS OF LEADERSHIP ACTIONS MODELS B AND C ...........................185C ACTION PRODUCERS BY CONGRESS ..........................................................................18681st Congress .........................................................................................................................18689th Congress ........................................................................................................................18697th Congress ........................................................................................................................187100th Congress ..................................................................................................................... .187104th Congress ..................................................................................................................... .188LIST OF REFERENCES .............................................................................................................189BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH .......................................................................................................195 12

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LIST OF TABLES Table page 2-1 Numbers of each kind of leader act ion and sub-categories of actions ...............................452-2 Total Actions in Three Eras ............................................................................................... 492-4 Top five action producers using Mayhews data ...............................................................593-1 Differences between Mayhew's data in America's Congress and my own. .......................653-2 New action categories ..................................................................................................... ...743-3 All party leaders and all co mmittee chairs actions by Congress .....................................753-4 Percent actions of party leaders a nd prestigious committe e chairs only ...........................794-1 Number and percent of actions performed by party leaders and prestige committee chairs by congress ............................................................................................................ ..894-2 Party Leader and Committee Chair Actions in the Washington Post. ...............................914-3 Carl Vinson's other actions associat ed with his foreign policy actions. .......................1046-1 Determinants of leadership actions Committee government and party government eras ...................................................................................................................................1556-2 Determinants of subcategory actions-committee government era only ...........................1656-3 Determinants of subcategory actionsParty government era only ..................................1657-1 Action envy: Top ten action producers ............................................................................174A-1 Committee Government Era, 1947-1971, 80th91st Congresses. All party leaders and committee chairs Mayhews data. .................................................................................182A-2 Reform Era, 1971-1979, 92nd-95th Congresses. All party leaders and committee chairs Mayhews Data. ..................................................................................................182A-3 Party Government Era, 1979-1989, 96th-100th Congresses. All party leaders and committee chairs Mayhews Data. ................................................................................182A-4 Committee Government Era, 81st and 89th Congresses. Party l eaders and prestige chairs. ....................................................................................................................... ........183A-5 Party Government Era, 97th, 100th, and 104th Congresses. Party leaders and prestige chairs. ....................................................................................................................... ........183 13

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A-6 Committee Government Era, 81st and 89th Congresses. Party leaders and salient chairs. ....................................................................................................................... ........183B-1 Determinants of total actionsModel B prestige chairs ...................................................185B-2 Determinants of total actionsModel C prestige chairs ...................................................185 14

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LIST OF FIGURES Figure page 2-1 Total Actions Performed in E ach Era Using Mayhews Data ...........................................483-5 Percent of all actions performed by party leaders and prestige chairs. ..............................803-6 Party Leaders and Prestige Chair Actions (A) Parliamentary Moves (B)Foreign Policy Moves (C) Newspaper/Symbolic Moves ................................................................823-7 Party Leader and Committee Chair Actions (A) Congressional Roles (B) Stances (C) Executive Connections .......................................................................................................854-1 Actions Performed by All Party Leaders and All Committee Chairs ................................944-2 Percentage of All Actions Performe d by All Party Leaders and All Committee Chairs. ....................................................................................................................... .........954-3 Top Four Action Producers. ...............................................................................................9 7 15

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Abstract of Dissertation Pres ented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy PARTY LEADERS, COMMITTEE CHAIRS, AND TH E EBB AND FLOW OF ACTIONS IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1949-1996 By Marija Anna Bekafigo August 2009 Chair: Lawrence C. Dodd Cochair: Richard S. Conley Major: Political Science The United States Congress is composed of two fundamental organizing units, parties and committees. While the institutions as a whole have been stable throughout history, the power and influence they possess have not. The amount of power that both parties and their leadership and committees and their chairmen have wielde d in the U.S. House of Representatives has shifted back and forth with one holding more power in one time period than the other, or so the argument goes. During the post-WWII committ ee government era in the U.S. House of Representatives (approximately 1945-1970), committees and especially their chairmen ruled the legislative process with virtual autonomy often at the expense of their party and its leadership. During the party government era, (approximately 1980-present) scholars began focusing on the party leadership and the tools th at they used to garner influe nce over committee chairs. First, this study tests these arguments using an original dataset of leadership ac tions that are gathered from the front pages of the Washington Post. This research shows 1) th at scholars have failed to understand how important both party leaders a nd committee chairs, together, are in the legislative process 2) exactly what types of ma neuvers are made by the leadership on a day-to16

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17 day basis and 3) that there is a possibility for pa rty leaders and committee chairs to act as parallel leaders performing similar actions.

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CHAPTER 1 TOWARD A THEORY OF PARALLEL LEADERS Introduction The United States Congress is composed prim arily of two fundamental organizing units, parties and committees. While the institutions as a whole have been stable throughout history, the power and influence they possess have not The amount of power that both parties and committees have wielded in the U.S. House of Re presentatives has shifted back and forth with one holding more power in one time period than the other. Scholars of Congress, who study parties and committees, focus on two particular time periods, the committee government era (approximately 1920-1970) and the party government era (approximately 1980-present). As these names suggest, committees and their chairmen were more influential in the legislative process during the committee government era and part ies and their leaders were more influential in the party government era. Following the va rious institutional change s and developments in each era, congressional scholarship then pinpointed the winners, or those who seemingly possessed the most power and infl uence, and largely neglected th e losers, or those who had less influence in the legislative process. Ther efore studies examining the committee government era largely concentrated on committee leadersh ip and committee strength. As the center of congressional power changed from a decentral ized committee power structure to a more centralized party organization (lar gely due to the 1970s legislative reforms), so did the research. Studies examining the party government era centered on the resurgence of party and its leadership while committees received minimal atten tion. It is only recent ly that scholars have begun to examine both parties and committees toge ther and is the subject of this research.1 1 One recent example is Al drich and Rohde (2005). 18

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This study reconsiders the role of party lead ers and committee chairs. They are examined in concert by comparing their roles as leaders of the U.S. House of Representatives. The first goal of this research is to systematically test the dominant theories in the literature that were just described. This research answers several questi ons. Are committee chairs more influential than party leaders in the committee government era? Are party le aders more influential than committee chairs in the party governme nt era? If both of those are found to be true, then in what ways are they more influential? The second aim is to test a new theory, that is the possibility that party leaders and committee chairs exude similar am ounts of influence. The thesis is that party leaders and committee chairs are parallel leaders whose roles and performances as leaders of the House can follow a similar path. This research demonstrates that the actions they execute in their leadership positions may at times be termed parallel leadership. This research confirms, at other times, the dominant theories. These findings are significant because they demonstrate the possibility of parallel leaders, but perhaps more importantly th e research systematically tests the dominant theses that others have only hypothesized or tested anecdotally. Ultimately, the research tests old and new theories alike and sh ows that we must reeval uate the common practice of studying party leaders and co mmittee chairs separately. Any basic American government or legislativ e process textbook will point out that it is parties and committees that organize the legislative process. In addition, textbooks also state that it is parties and committees together that provid e legislative outputs. One would not work well without the other. However, scholars have long ignored that fact instead opting to study either parties or committees, either part y leaders or committee chairs. This research examines both. This chapter is divided into four parts. The first part of this chapter explains why we should be studying parties and committees toge ther and by consequent, party leaders and 19

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committee chairs. Next, this chapter will furthe r describe the competing theories that will eventually be tested. The first part of this st udy aims to test those schol ars theories, those who focus on committee chairs because they say they ar e the most influential and those whose studies focus on party leaders because they are more influential. The reader is introduced to some historical background on the committee government era and the party government era in the form of those competing theories. There is not one specific scholar or ar gument that is being tested here. Rather, this study tests an overarching theme in the congressional literature as one will notice below. Third, a new theory of parallel leadership is proposed. Despite the fact that we know that party leaders and committee chairs mu st work together, some scholars contend that one must be more influential or powerful than the other. The theory of parallel leaders suggests that there may be times when both leadership positions are equally influential or that they are influential in different ways. Fi nally, I will discuss the action data and methods that are used to test the dominant hypotheses and the theory of parallel leaders. Organizing Congress Why Should We Study Parties and Committees Together? There has been an ebb and flow in the amount of power and influence that both parties and committees have wielded in the U.S. House of Representatives. In fact, it is difficult to discuss the rise and decline of parties without a concomitant discussion of the rise and decline of committee power. Congressional committees, though not the institu tionalized structures that we recognize today, were utilized in 1789 at the nations Fi rst Congress (Polsby 1968). Their strength was most famously recorded in Woodrow Wilsons Congressional Government which he describes as committee government with imperious author ity controlling virtually all aspects of lawmaking (Wilson 1885). Few scholars bothered to verify Wilsons theory for several years as 20

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they were too busy examining pol itical parties. Scholars ag ain sought to examine committee power during the period of 1920-1970, which is te rmed the era of committee government, when strong committee chairs legislated with vi rtual autonomy (Fenno 1962; Polsby 1968) even holding life-or-death power over legislation (Huitt 1954, 340). The last several decades, beginning in the early 1980s, have seen a decline in the power of committees and their chairmen. While committees have always performed some role in the organization of Congress, they have certainly not always been the most important or influential. Committ ee power has never been absolute. Parties in the House of Representatives have also seen their heyday come and go. Nonexistent during the First Congress, parties slowly arose, along w ith the need for majorities, in order to pass legislation (Aldrich 1995). Fo llowing the Civil War, th e zenith of party power, where strong party line voting in Congress was at its highest, has not reappeared. The party leadership, and the Speakers in particular, enjo yed a great deal of power during Speakers Reed and Cannons terms in the late 1800s and early 1 900s (Strahan 1992). However, their czar rule was short-lived as Cannon was overthrown in 1910. Party strength was challenged in the subsequent years by strong committees and a conser vative coalition of Re publicans and southern Democrats. The strength of those committees too was temporary. Sweeping institutional changes, including the 1970 Legislative Reorga nization Act, weakened the power of the committee chairs resulting in a resurgence in th e strength of congressi onal parties since 1980 (Rohde 1991). As the previous account illustrates, a discussi on on the decline of parties naturally flows into a discussion about the increased power of committees and, therefore, a discussion of weakened committees goes hand in hand with incr easing partisanship. However, scholars have 21

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generally focused on one or the ot her organizing system separately. Moreover, it is especially common to look solely at one system in order to advance the notion that it is more influential, or powerful, than the other. This is not to say that scholars who have studied parties have completely ignored committees, or vice versa, but comparisons between them are typically made on the surface. Little empirica l evidence exists placing parties a nd committees side by side in a comparison. This is especially tr ue with regards to the leaders of these organizing units. Party leaders and committee chairs are said to have different agendas, roles, and functions in the legislative process so rarely are the two compared and contrasted. This research indicates they have some remarkable similarities. Why Should We Examine Party Leaders and Committee Chairs Together? Committees have long been revered as the wor khorses of Congress. They draft bills, hold hearings, markup the proposed legislation an d send the proposed bill to the full chamber for final consideration. Committees are critical to the lawmaking process and it is difficult to imagine how bills would be become laws without them. If committees are the workhorses of the Congr ess, then it is the chairmen of the committees who coordinate the workers. Committee chairmen are the managers of their committee and their primary functi on is to shape legislation. They decide which pieces of legislation will be considered, schedule meetings and hearings, control the budget and the staff, and ultimately get the legislation to the floor for a vote. They have a great deal of power (though not absolute) to get the legislation past their comm ittee if they desire, but they also have negative power to block legislation. In this capacity, they act as gatekeepers. They can let a bill sit on 22

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their desk from the moment they receiv e it, never sending it to subcommittee2 or the full committee for consideration. If the bill does make it in and out of committee, its language and content may still be limited. The legislation has th e potential to be exactly what the full House expected and/or wanted in the bill or very lim ited in scope. Many consider a committee chairs power to block legislation more important and influential than his positive power to push legislation through (Deering and Smith 1997). It is not implau sible that a committee chairs individual desires actually make the final de termination in a bill becoming a law or forever disappearing into the legislative abyss. While committees are instrumental to lawmaking, the Congress would probably not get much done without parties. If committees are where all of the labor is to iled, then it is parties that organize the laborers. The pr imary function of party leaders is to build coalitions so that the legislative process can move more smoothly and efficiently to bene fit their party, pa rticularly in the sense of winning majorities on major legisl ation (Sinclair 1983). Therefore, it would be difficult to discuss the workings of C ongress without also mentioning party. While it is obvious that both party leaders and committee chairs are central to the legislative process, it is also easy to see how they become separated in many congressional studies. If the primary functions described above are insufficient to illustrate why these leaders are often examined independently, another argument is that part y leaders and committee chairs have altogether different goals which are a produ ct of their different constituencies. A party leaders primary constituency is the party ra nk-and-file membership. A committee chairs constituency is his committee memb ers. Party leaders have a br oader clientele to which they must appeal. At the very least they must gain the support of their fellow partisans in order to 2 Some committee chairmen will not even send legislatio n to a subcommittee. They would rather keep the legislation in their own committee in order to watch over it. For example, Wilbur Mills Ways and Means Committee had no subcommittees. See Barone (1990, 362). 23

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have a successful legislative session, but they mu st also try to gain th e support of the whole House. A party leader may fi nd his job challenging enough to rally his own party with its different factions (especially during low party uni ty times) much less the minority party loyalists. It can be argued that committee chairs have a seemingly narrower constituency, that they only need the support of their committee membershi p. Although committees are made up of members from both parties, it might be easier for the chair to rally ten or so members behind a bill than to rally 435 members. Both leadership positions need their parties ra nk-and-file membership, at the very least, in order to be successful. In this sense, the lead ership's goals are more similar than they are different. Their primary goals are to be successful in the legislative process. In order to do that those goals include gaining power promoting policy and being reel ected. It has not been shown that party leaders and committee ch airs goals are different from th ese. While the functions of party leaders as coalition build ers and committee chairs as le gislation shapers may appear different, the end result they would like to achi eve is essentially the same: to ensure that (important) policies pass through the legislative process. More impor tantly for this research, the way in which they accomplish that end result is similar. Competing Theories Testing competing theories of iron fisted committee chairs in the committee era and autocratic party leaders in the pa rty era is the first task of this research. There is not a sole scholar or a singular manuscript that I can point the reader to that is being tested. Rather, the notion that one leadership position is more dominant in the legislative process is a theme that is running throughout the congre ssional leadership scholarship. First, scholars writing about the committee government era, during that time pe riod, were apt to focus their research on committee chairs. In addition, the focus on comm ittee chairs often described those chairs as 24

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more influential than party leaders in the legislat ive process in the U.S. House. Second, scholars now focus on party leaders for the same reasons. That is, party leaders are thought to be more influential in the process. Finally, scholars writing about todays congr essional proceedings and the party government era (appr oximately 1980-present) seem to perpetuate the problem by beginning their arguments with the experiences of yesteryear and strong committee chairs. Those who pick up a book or article on congressiona l leadership will easily see the pattern that has been described. This section of the study will serve as an introductio n to the literature or dominant theories in the comm ittee and party government eras. Committee Government Era Following World War II, scholars examined th e strength of committees, and especially their chairs, who ruled th e legislative process with virtual auto nomy often at the expense of their party and its leadership. Duri ng this period committee chairmen were the most influential leaders in the Congress (Deering and Smith 1997; Dodd and Oppenheimer 1977; Fenno 1966; Fenno 1973; Manley 1970). Committee chair assi gnments were virtually guaranteed because they were awarded based on seniority. The norm of seniority in selection of committee chairs was rarely broken. The member of the committ ee that served the longe st would receive the chairmanship. Party loyalty was usually disregarde d in the selection proce ss of chairs and as a result party leaders were hard pressed to influence them or their autonomy. In short, party leaders took a backbench to committee chairmens power and legislative au thority. Numerous scholars have documented the powers that comm ittee chairs had during this time. Others decreed the partys over which became the d eclaration that exemplified the period (Broder 1972). Cooper and Brady observed that political scie ntists writing about the House in the 1940s and 1950semphasized themes [such as] the disper sed and kaleidoscopic character of power in 25

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the House, not the authority and responsibilities of party leaders; the role of committee chairmen as autonomous and autocratic chieftains, not th eir operation as loyal party lieutenants (Cooper and Brady 1981, 419).3 Cooper and Brady also studied the House leadership during Rayburns tenure. They emphasized committees as feudal baronies with party leaders tip-toeing around them asking politely for their support on party initiatives. Party leaders often were found negotiating deals Speaker Unc le Joe Cannon would never have tolerated (Cooper and Brady 1981, 419). Several other examples will serve to illu strate how committees and their chairs were portrayed during this period. George Galloway argued in 1953: Just as the standing committees control legisl ative action, so the chai rmen are masters of their committees. Selected on the basis of seniority, locally elected and locally responsible, these lord-proprietors hold key pos itions in the power stru cture of Congress. They arrange the agenda of the committees, ap point the subcommittees, and refer bills to them. They decide what pending measures shall be considered and when, call committee meetings, and decide whether or not to hold hearings and when. They approve lists of scheduled witnesses, select their staffs and authorize staff studies and preside at committee hearings. They handle reported bills on the floor and particip ate as principal mangers in conference committees. They are in a position to expedite measures they favor and to retard or pigeonhole those they dislike. Strong chairmen can often induce in executive sessions the kind of committee actio ns that they desire. In th e House of Representatives, where debate is limited, the chairman in charge of a bill allots time to whomever he pleases during debate on the floor; he also has the right to open and close the debate on bills reported by his committee; and he may move th e previous question whenever he thinks best. In short, committee chairmen exercise crucial powers over the legislative process (Galloway 1953, 289). Along the same vein, Samuel P. Hunti ngton argued that the 1946 Legislative Reorganization Act should have been cal led the committee reorganization act: The dispersion of power to the committees of Congress was intensified by the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. In essence, th is act was a committee reorganization act making the committees stronger and more eff ectivethe net effectw as to further the dispersion of power, to strengthen and to institutionalize committee authority, and to circumscribe still more the influence of the central leadership (Huntington 1973, 24-25). 3 Cooper and Brady were referring to two books in particular. One is Roland Young, This is Congress, and the other is Bertram Gross The Legislative Struggle (Gross 1953; Young 1943). 26

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More recently, scholarship, although focusing on the strength of the party leadership, continues to intimate the previous strength of committee chairs in the committee government with little evidence to the contrary. The curren t research continues to spread an idea that has been little tested systematically. For example, Rohde introduces his research on the resurgence of party and party leadership in the 80s and 90s by discussing parties lack of strength during Speaker Sam Rayburns tenure in the 1940s (Rohde 1991). He argues, committees a nd committee chairmen became a rival power center to the party leadership, a nd [the party leadership] were compelled to deal with committee leaders. They were rarely in a position to fo rce the committees to do anything (Rohde 1991, 5). Cox and McCubbins also quickly introduce the idea of committee government in their research even though their primary focus is the re newed strength of party leaders as legislative cartels (Cox and McCubbins 2007). They argue The standard wisdom on the postwar Congress was that it had been an exercise first in committee government, then in subcommittee government. Party government us ually received mention only as something conspicuously absent (Cox and McCubbins 2007, 1). Interestingly, sc holars have found a resurgence of party leader strength beginning in the 1980s, but have not co nsidered that party leaders may have also played a more significant role that was previously thought in the era of strong committee chairs. Party Government Era Arguments along these lines continued into th e early 1970s when scholars were made to rethink their theories as the 1970 Legislative Re organization Act restruct ured the legislative 27

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process.4 Nearly a decade after the 1970 congressiona l reforms scholars had renewed interest in the strength of parties an d the party leadership. The research focus was usually to the detriment of committees and their chairmen. This is term ed the party government era. During this time period, it is argued that majority party leaders had become the mo st influential leaders in the legislative process and the scholarship has follo wed by focusing on them and the resources they utilize to produce policy that falls in line with majority part y interests (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Rohde 1991; Sinclair 1983, 1995). The party leadership makes committee assignments based on who is most likely to vote with the majority party positi on and the legislative process is highly influenced by these majority leadership stra tegies. In this era, the party leaders were responding to the wishes of their partys rank-and-file. In turn, the majority party rank-and-file membership provided the leadership with a variety of tools needed to lead, such as a harmonious membership that is able to agree with some amou nt of ease on a policy age nda. If a majority of like-minded individuals were able to come to a general consensus on policy, those same individuals gave the leadership the power to align those few who may not be allied with the majority party. In the era of party government much of the power lies with the majority party leadership rather than the committee chairs, or so the argument goes. Several examples will serve to illustrate. Cox and McCubbins theorize that the majority pa rty leadership is like a legislative cartel seizing power to favor legislative outcomes that are in line with majority party interests (Cox and McCubbins 1993). While the authors primary ar gument is one of party government they do not neglect committees altogether. They illust rate how party leaders use the committee system 4 For more information on the 1970 Legislative Reorganization Act and the subsequent changes in the House see David W. Rohdes book Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House (Rohde 1991). The 1970 Act was not the only reason changes took place in the House, but it is one of the primary reasons. 28

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to their advantage primarily by stacking it with party loyal chairs and members who will promote the partys agenda. Rohdes study examines the House leadership following the 1970s reforms. He attributes the growth in partisanship in the House to those reforms (Rohde 1991). He argues that this resurgence in partisanship and homogenous memb ership in turn strengthened the Democratic leadership so they could assert more influence in the process on behalf of the majority. Party leaders were provided certain tools, such as ch anges in appointment to the Rules Committee and a greater ability to control the flow of legislation. Not only were party leadership powers enhanced, but committee chairs were expected to stay out of their way in producing majority supported policies (Rohde 1991, 31). In sum, scholarship examining the committee government era has largely concentrated on committee chair power and influence while emph asizing their independence from the party leadership as a result of the seni ority system (among other things). 5 Consequently, the party leadership often gets overlooked in analyses. Research examining the party government era has focused on the renewed strength and influence of party leaders as a result of institutional reforms and homogenous membership but, committee chair leader ship is studied far less. Scholars have focused on the strength of committ ee chairs and party leaders in their respective eras while only giving the other leadership position a perfunctory investigatio n. Their differences are intimated with little systematic eviden ce. In addition, few comparisons are made between the party leadership and committee chairs within each of these eras, much less between the two eras.6 A 5 Other arguments focus on the decentralized nature of the committee system including the fact that non-committee members often defer to the committee on legislation, after all they are the experts in that particular area, unless they have some reason not to (Huntington 1973, 22-23). 6 Barbara Hinckley makes a comparison of party leaders and committee chairs from 1947-66 but this obviously only spans the era of committee government and during the weakening of committee government at that. See Barbara Hinckley (1970). 29

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comprehensive look at Congress is incomplete until we examine the differences between these two leadership positions. Action Data and Methods This research is a case study of five individual Congresses, the 81st, 89th, 97th, 100th, and the 104th. The approach employs both quantitative and qualitative me thods to understand congressional leadership.7 It is also a longitudinal study in which party leaders and committee chairs are compared within those individual C ongresses and across two co ngressional eras, the committee and party government eras. This study fills a void in the literature by examining the two rarely compared formal leader ship positions together in the U. S. House of Representatives. In order to determine the similarities and di fferences between party leaders and committee chairmen I examine congressional actions as observed by David R. Mayhew in his book Americas Congress: Actions in the Public Sphere, James Madison through Newt Gingrich ( 2000a ) .8 Actions are defined as moves by members of Congress, or more simply, when members of Congress do something (Mayhew 2000a, x and 37). For example, members of Congress are shown to be proposing policies, taking stands on legislation, making speeches, campaigning and the like. Mayhew canvasses various historical accounts in order to determine what actions members of Congress perform in their legislative positions. He argues that each of these actions are important because they are pe rformed autonomously and with consequence. Each action that is carried out a nd noticed by the public, or at the very least the historians writing about them, has meaning for legislative history a nd affairs, the public, an d sometimes the greater 7 I say this research is primarily a case study of five Congresse s because the data utilized in Chapter Two includes twenty-one Congresses. However, Chapter Two is only a preview of the research. The primary study is in the chapters that follow. 8 I am grateful to Professor Mayhew for updating his data set with the authors and page numbers that correspond to each action from his historical sources. 30

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political world.9 While Mayhew's research focuses on all members of Congress, the congressional leadership are is olated for this study. If Ma yhews primary objective is to illustrate that members of Congress matter, here it is shown that party leaders and committee chairs matter regardle ss of the congressiona l era they are dire cting (Bianco 2002). First, Mayhews collection of action data are e xplored. The analysis of his data can be found in Chapter Two of this research. However, some limitations were discovered in his data set which lead to the collection of or iginal data from another source, the Washington Post. I collected an original data set of leadership actio ns from the front pages of the newspaper. These data and methods are detailed in Chapters Two and Three. In Chapter Two, Mayhews data are thoroughly discussed and analyzed. The limitations of his data are also discussed. In Chapter Three, those limitations are addressed by gatheri ng original data. I bu ild on Mayhews strategy and collect additional leadership actions from the newspaper source. The approach used for data collection is also explained and th e results are revealed from the Washington Post analysis. Toward a Theory of Parallel LeadersThree Postulates There are numerous similarities and differences between party leaders and committee chairs in the U.S. Congress. As the primary leaders of the legislature, they are ra rely compared. Publications abound which study one or the other as separate entities of the Congress. They are rarely studied together because scholars primarily see them as performing different roles with contrasting goals. Their similarities are overl ooked, their animosities toward one another are highlighted,10 and their differences scrutinized. I argue that party leaders and committee chairs in the U.S. Congress cannot be examined separately because of their assumed differences. We 9 More on Mayhews argument for why these actions in the pu blic realm matter see especia lly Chapter 1 of his book. For more on his data set and how he used it see Chapter 2 of this dissertation. 10 One scholar has made this observation at the state level. See Wayne L. Francis, Leadership, Party Caucuses, and Committees in the US Stat e Legislatures (1985). 31

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must first determine what those differences are while at the same time searching for possible similarities. A theory of parallel leaders suggests that the comparison of party leaders and committee chairs is not only an option, but a necessity to fully comprehend the collaboration taking place in the legislative process. Barbara Hinckley argue s that explication of th e relation between these two congressional subsystems seems important for a complete understanding of the structure of congressional leadership (Hinckley 1970, 268). The primary functions they perform as leaders of the Congress may be distinctly different, but the goals they set for themselves, their party, the legislature, and their constituents can be seen as similar. There are three axioms for st udying party leaders and committee chairs together. First, they are members of the same party, and the majority party at that, so they share similar party goals. Second, party leaders and committee ch airs depend on each other to pass legislation. Finally, both party leaders and co mmittee chairs are agents of the rank-and-file membership. Each will be examined in turn. First, all members of the majority party, including the leadership are likely to have some of the same goals. Both groups are dependent on thei r party holding majority status in order to have effective legislative power. The goals of the party leadership and committee chairs are often described as being at odds with one anot her, but that is not necessarily the case. Committee chairs cannot be chairs unless their pa rty wins control of the chamber and the party leadership will find it difficult to have much po wer if it is in the minority. Even if the two leadership positions disagree on the partys agenda, they will act in similar ways in order to maintain majority status. Party leaders and co mmittee chairs have worked far more in concert 32

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toward party goals than scholars have heretofore noted. Some initial evidence can be found in a study by Unekis and Riselbach (1982). Unekis and Riselbach examine roll-call data fo r chairmen of nine standing committees in order to determine what type of leadership qualiti es they exhibit in partisan terms. Chairs are found to exude the qualities of one of three partisan leadership cat egories. The extremity and middleman11 patterns represent chairmen whose ideological preference s are far to the left (only Democratic chairs are examined) or in the id eological middle, respectively. Not only do these leadership typologies suggest that chairs will ag ree with the party position, but they also will rally other committee members to join the cause. According to their study, we might expect committee chairs to exhibit behavior that is inline with party preferences 68%12 of the time (Unekis and Rieselbach 1982).13 Another piece of evidence that party leaders and committee chairs might be willing or able to work towa rd party goals can be found in a study by Cooper and Brady (Cooper and Brady 1981). While conventional wisdom suggests that committee chairs may have held much of the power from 1945-1970, th e party leadership was able to exert some influence. Cooper and Brady, writing speci fically about the Raybur n Speakership (1940-45, 1949-51, 1955-61), argue the party leadership was not entirely crippled but power was dispersed among many actors. The institutio nal context meant that party le aders and Rayburn in particular would need to use his bargaining skills: The party leadership retained substantial abilit y to influence and even control outcomes in the House. If party voting decreased, the pa rty bond remained important both because of the degree of agreement still present and becau se of the interest most members had in establishing some kind of part y record. Thus, though the leadership could no longer rule 11 The middleman pattern is defined as a partisan position. 12 This number is obtained by adding together the two lead ership styles that are most in line with advancing party goals, the extremity and middleman leadership styles. Un ekis and Riselbach argue that the middleman style is a partisan position. 13 Obviously, this is just an estimate as we do not have committee voting data prior to 1971. Although, the primary period of interest here would be prior to 1971, I still believe this study is relevant to my argument. 33

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the House on the basis of votes drawn from its own party, it could st ill usually count on a large and stable reservoir of support from its fellow partisans (Mayhew, 1966). In addition, party leaders continue d to derive leverage from other sources. The formal powers remaining to the Speaker aided their ability to control access to the floor and proceedings on the floor. (Cooper and Brady 1981, 419). Not only are party leaders and committee chairs dependent on one another to make policy, but a majority of the power lies in their hands al one. Christine A. DeGregorio argues that real power rests in the hands of a small covey of el ected leaders (party bosses and committee barons) who dictate the solutions for others to follow (DeGregorio 1997, 3). The author examines both formal and non-formal leaders and finds that ther e is a reason why cert ain members are elected to leadership positions; they are most often reco gnized by the House membership as being strong leaders. While DeGregorio acknowledges that th ere are some members of Congress who take an informal leadership role in the policy process, she also states that formal leadership roles are still one of the most important components: That the positions one holds in the institution come up nonetheless as an important predictor of leadership recogniti on is not a disappointment. It affirms that scholars are not misguided in focusing on prominent power brokers in Congress (DeGregorio 1997, 134). If much of the power in the H ouse rests with these two leader ship positions together then they should be studied together. To separate th em in congressional studies means that important nuances may be overlooked that may not be le arned by examining them individually. Although most scholars do not study party l eaders or committee chairs altoge ther separately, researchers primary focus has been on one leader ship entity or the other. The second reason to examine party leaders and committee chairs together in research is the fact that they are dependent upon each other in order to pass legislation (Sinclair 1995). At the most basic level, party leaders use chairs and their committees in order to promote the partys policy agenda (Cox and McCubbins 1993), but mutual cooperation and compromise is required if policy recommendations are to be turned into laws. Agreements are not always seen by the 34

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public or even made verbally among the leader s, they can be implicit (Manley 1970). Even leaders who are widely recognized as extremely powerful and autonomous have seen the benefits derived from teamwork and bargaining. Wilbur D. Mills is a good example of someone who exhibits this ability to be flexible. Mills, who was Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee from 1957-1975, is widely recognized as one of the most, if not the most, powerful committee chairman in the history of the U.S. Congress (Deering and Smith 1997). As one of the most powerful chairmen tenured during a time when his seniority status would permit him to manage his committee in almost anyway he saw fit, he was known as an instrumental and affective leader (Manle y 1970, 101). In what can be described as the Henry Clay compromiser of his day, Mills succeeded not only in shaping policy via his committee, but he did so in a manner that promoted a pleasant working environment rather than discord. It has been ove rstated that committees and their chairmen were entirely independent, autocrat ic, and self-serving (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2007). They have built coalitions and created majorities on bills that can be likened to the role that party leaders play (Manley 1970).14 Manley argues that Mills would compromise, bargain, cajole, swap, bend, plea, amend, coax, and unite until as much of the controversy as possible is drained from the bill, and as many members from the Comm ittee as possible support it (Manley 1969, 445). Even with the rise of the Conservative Coalition and autonomous committee chairs following the New Deal, there were some policy pos itions that almost all Democrats could agree upon. For example, Social Security and minimum wage were issues that were central to the partys identity and principles. Moreover, that the Democrats remain in agreement over these issues was important to their electoral success. Early in the postwar pe riod, Democrats tended to be hawkish on matters of defense so party leaders and committee ch airs may have looked similar 14 See especially Chapter 5, The Committee and the House. 35

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and acted similar with regards to these policy issu es. Of course, this is not to say that party leaders and chairs found agreement on all issues The Conservative Coalition remained a strong voting force throughout much of the postwar period especially with regards to race issues, executive power, federal ai d to education, and the like.15 The issues on which Democrats were divided have been pronounced, while the issues on which they were united are often overlooked. The third reason why party lead ers and committee chairs should be examined together is because both leadership roles are agents of the congressional membership (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2007; Sinclair 1995). The primar y function that each leadership position performs may appear different, but they both must act in the best interest of their principal. At the very least, their principals are the party cauc us, but they can be the entire membership. At first glance, the primary function of party leaders is to build winning coalitions while committee chairs shape legislation, but both positions must collaborate to assist the membership in reaching their goals, one of which is to make policy. In th at facility, both positions act as agents for the membership at large. Moreover, party leader s and committee chairs have a mutual dependency on one another and the membership has a reci procal relationship with each of them. Rank-and-file members of Congress elect party leaders in order to advance their policy and other goals. In turn, party leader s must build coalitions on proposed legislation if policies are to become law (Sinclair 1983) while committee ch airmen are the principal shapers of that legislation. Chairs have immense power to push legislation through the committee process, or they can allow it to sit on thei r desk without a second thought. Proposed legislation can be given life by a committee chair or, as Woodrow Wils on wrote, given to dim dungeons of silence whence it will never return (Wilson 1885). The majority party membership relies on the two leadership positions to help them reach their goals The leaders also assist in solving collective 15 Larry Dodd helped me identify these arguments (and many others) related to policy positioning. 36

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action problems endemic to large institutions. Not only must the two leader types collaborate with one another in order to produce legislation, but they work in concert to advance members goals. Hypotheses The three postulates above construct the argument for why party leaders and committee chairs should be studied together through the lens of parallel leaders. In addition, two claims are central to the theory and provide the bulk of empirical evidence. Claim 1: Party leaders and committee chai rs will perform a similar number of congressional actions across two congressional eras: the committee government era and the party government era. The dominant theory contends that in the era of committee government, committee chairmen were more powerful than part y leaders. Party lead ers preferences often took a backseat to the preferences of the committee chairs whose seniority status gave them the legislative advantage. If true then committee chairmen should be more visible in the sense of performing more congressional actions than party leaders during this time. I argue that there will not be a significant difference between the numbe r of actions carried out by party leaders and committee chairmen. The leaders desire for similar goals means that they will both continue to perform their usual leadership functions. Rega rdless of the semblance of one leadership type being in a more powerful position than another, it would be rare for any leader to surrender altogether and follow. Claim 2: Party leaders and committee chairs will perform similar t ypes of congressional actions across two congressional eras: the committee government era and the party government era. Given the previous scholarship on strong committee and part y leadership in legislative history, one should expect committee leaders, during the committee government era, to be performing more powerful or more influential actions than party leaders. Powerful or influential 37

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actions are defined as those actions that make one stand out from a crowd as trying to influence legislation, politics, or others, and are suggestive of being a lead er, rather than a follower. Powerful actions either get results that the leader s desire or are percei ved by others as useful toward getting results. If certain leaders do not perform more powerful actions, then at the very least they should be carrying out different actions from one another. In the committee government era, committee chairs are thought to have the uppe r-hand in legislating. If chairs are advantaged in some way over party leaders then the expect ation is that their actions will be easily differentiated from party leaders. Observers of Congress should be able to easily witness the differences between the leaders. For example, in the committee government era it might be expected that committee chairs will meet more often with high level officials than party leaders. On the other hand, it might be expected for party leaders to carry out less pow erful and influential actions such as simply legislating along with other rank -and-file members. The reverse should be anticipated for the party government era; party l eaders should be performing more powerful actions. Given the traditional argument, even if one leadership type does not perform more powerful actions than the other, we might expect, at the very least, for leaders to be perfor ming different types of actions rather than similar ones. However, that is not the argument that is made here. My argument is that party leaders and committee chai rs are parallel leaders and therefore they will carry out similar actions. The potential influence of the leaders' actions on the legislative process are not determined or defined here, although it w ill be alluded to for the reader to make a determination himself. Instead differences and similarities are examined in the actions that are performed. I posit that party leaders and chairs will act very similarly. After all they are both 38

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congressional leaders trying to infl uence the process. It is not expected for the leaders to carry out the exact same actions, but I argue that they w ill be more similar than they are different. For example, one of the most influential things a legi slator can be observed doing is meeting with or advising the president. I expect that both party leaders and co mmittee chairs will be observed doing this and at similar rates, whereas the prevailing scholarship might expect committee chairs during the strong chair period to confer with the presiden t more often on policy. Are All Committee Chairs Equal? The theory of parallel leaders is the basi s for examining these leadership positions together. It also provides the basis for my hypothe ses. In addition, there ar e several theories that help inform the way that committee chairs are exam ined in this research. First, some of this research does generalize to all committee chair po sitions equally. This is especially true in Chapter Two where Mayhews data are explored. His data are already difficult to analyze because of the small size without distinguishin g various committee chairs. However, beginning in Chapter Three and Four where the Washington Post data are analyzed, committee chairs are examined in light of Richard F. Fennos research where variation across committees is considered (Fenno 1973). Committee chairs are grouped together according to whether they are the chair of a power/prestige committee or not in order to determine the differences, if any, among them in the analysis. Fenno found that members who pursue an appointment on the Appropriations and Ways and Means committees seek power, prestige, or importance and most members perceived these committees as being the most powerful or the most important (1973, 2). Since Fennos research, others have a dded the Rules committee to the list of prestige committees (Deering and Smith 1997). The analysis of prestige committ ee chairmen is taken a step further than Fenno originally intended for this research. Different models ar e developed to allow fo r variation in prestige 39

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committees. They follow from three different schools of thought found in the House committee literature. The first school of thought is that the committees that are regarded as prestige committees will change overtime (Young and Heits husen 2003). During different periods of time particular committees are thought to be more influential than others. With the exception of Appropriations, Ways and Means, and Rules, th ere is little consensus in the congressional literature with regards to which other committees ar e consistently thought to be most prestigious. Therefore, different models are presented w ith an eye toward determining how various combinations of prestigious comm ittee chairs actions match up with party leaders actions. The second school of thought is that committees that are deemed exclusive committees by the party caucus are also the most prestigious. Besides, Appropriations, Ways and Means, and the Rules Committees being exclusive, in 1994, the Re publicans deemed Commerce an exclusive committee for their party (Smith and Lawren ce 1997) and the Democrats deemed Energy and Commerce an exclusive committee for their pa rty (Heberlig 2003). When a party caucus identifies a committee as exclusive, members of that committee may not be members of any other standing committee. Finally, the third sch ool of thought follows from the findings of the second. Prestige committees may be different for Republicans and Democrats and will be differentiated in the analys is (Bullock and Sprague 1969; Leighton and Lopez 2002). Goals of This Research The aims of this research are threefold. Th e first goal is descriptive. A descriptive analysis is presented of party leaders and comm ittee chairs actions in the U.S. House. Party leaders and committee chairs performances are then compared within two different congressional eras and across these eras. The second objective is to determine if the two leadership roles can be seen working together to ward common party goals. It will be argued that party leaders and committee chairs should not be studied as separate leadership positions 40

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41 targeting different goals, but they should be examin ed together as parallel leaders with similar objectives, and similar methods of meeting thos e objectives. Finally, I illustrate how party leaders and committee chairs perform their leadersh ip roles by highlighting the actions that they perform. The findings underscore that the l eadership role performed by committee chairs and party leaders may be similar. Committee chairs and party leaders have worked in concert towards common party goals (the primary party goal is to be in the majority so they can have effective control in Congress, even if they disagree on the pa rtys agenda) more often than scholars have heretofore noted. Th is research examines the type of actions that party leaders and committee chairs perform as leaders of the U.S. House. When and why they may do this is beyond the scope of this paper, but will be left for future research. Research Overview Chapter Two presents a comparative analysis of party leaders and committee chairs using the data extracted from Mayhews research as a st arting point for this rese arch. It is quickly determined that Mayhews data are insufficient for my purposes. Those reasons are outlined in Chapter Two. Chapter Three presents an anal ysis of original data collected from the Washington Post that solves some of the limitations in Mayhe ws data. Chapters Four and Five focus on the committee government era which includes the 81st and 89th Congresses and the party government era which includes the 97th, 100th, and 104th Congresses, respectivel y. Each Congress is considered separately before trying to understa nd the Congresses together as a component of each era. In Chapter 6, the data from all the C ongresses are combined and leadership actions are explained by looking at the total number of actions performed as the dependent variable. The concluding chapter explores a que stion of measurement and theor y. The question is asked, what is it that is actually being measuring here by ex amining leadership actions? Moreover, do these actions equate with power and influence?

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CHAPTER 2 PARTY LEADERS AND COMMI TTEE CHAIRS IN THR EE CONGRESSIONAL ERAS USING MAYHEWS DATA Formal leadership in the House of Represen tatives takes two primary forms. The party leadership is elected at the beginning of each session of Congress by the full membership. The vote is almost always split dire ctly down the middle of the party line with all members of the majority party voting against all members of the minority party. Committee chairs too, are elected at the beginning of each c ongressional session, but the manne r in which they are selected has changed. At one time a chair assumed th e position virtually automatically via seniority status. More recently chairs attain their ranks by proving their loyalty to the party. An examination of congressional research pr ovides a great deal of knowledge about party leaders and committee chairs in their leadership roles, but these roles are usually looked at separately as if their tasks and goals are in c onflict with one another. This chapter compares party leaders and committee chairs in three c ongressional eras using Mayhews data. Up until this point only two eras for study have been discussed. However, Mayhews data allow for a brief exploration of the reform era followi ng the 1970 Legislative Reorganization Act, in addition to examining the committee government and party government eras. The reform era is an interesting period of change in which to look for a transformati on in the way that party leaders and committee chairs act. If the traditional scholarship is correct then we can expect for party leaders to begin performing more actions through out this period and committee chairs to perform fewer actions. The thesis here is that party lead ers and committee chairs will be parallel leaders, performing a similar number of acti ons throughout the reform period. Mayhews Data and Method In Americas Congress, David R. Mayhew sets aside the prevailing approaches to the study of Congress that often stop short of illustrating what it is that members of Congress are really do 42

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during their term in office (Mayhew 2000b). While others seek to explai n legislative behavior primarily via roll call votes, Mayhew traces th e moves that members make before, during, and after the vote (or lack thereof) has taken place. He studies congressional actions. Not only does he explore the actions that members perform as legislators inside the C ongress, on the floor, and in committee, but he also examines their actions outside the Congress. In other words, his study examines virtually all aspects of a members activiti es that are made visible to the public as they represent their constituents, make policy, yearn for power, etc. Not only is it a fascinating and in-depth study that is important for the field, but it is also relevant to the citizenry as he illuminates the steps that are exercised, the word s that are spoken, and the maneuvers that are taken to make policy in the U.S. Congress. If a reader were to pick up several books on the United States legislative branch, one might think that the only thing legislators do is to vote on legislation because roll call votes are the primary source of data for many scholars. To be sure, members of Congress vote on legislation, but that is merely one task that they perform during their day. Moreover, some days, make that many days, there is no legislation to vote on. If legislators ar e not casting their vote on a piece of legislation, then what is it that they do? They also make speeches, perform constituency services, and meet with the President. Thos e are the types of mane uvers that this study examines. In this chapter, which is the first part of this study, Mayhews data set of congressional actions are utilized.1 Mayhew collects a members congressional moves or actions from a variety of historical sources including general history books a nd era specific history books.2 In order to collect congressional action data Mayh ew first checked the index of each book in order 1 Mayhews data can be found at http://pantheon.yale.edu/~dmayhew/ 2 His reasoning for using specific books can be found in his Chapter Two. 43

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to find the names of any members of Congress that were mentioned. Once he located a name, he turned to that members name in the history book. If their name was coupl ed with some sort of action then they were noted in his data set. Again, an action was simply doing something. Next, Mayhew read each book in its entirety in order to find any members that may not have made their way into the index. This also served as a check on the first examination by way of the index. There are 2,304 actions in his data set that are performed by various members of Congress from the very first Congress convening in 1789 until the 100th Congress ending in 1989. After carefully reading the historical accounts that he inspects, he develops a list of forty-three individual actions which can be found on Table 2-1 The table al so shows eleven sub-categories of actions which will be utilized for analysis in Chapters Four a nd Five. All but the last one are original to Mayhews study.3 This table also includes eight additional action categories that are original to my own data and research. They are starred and will be discussed in Chapter Three where I present the Washington Post data. This study is interested in the post-World War II time period that includes the committee and party government eras. Therefore, the time period of his data that are drawn on include the 80th Congress (1947-49) through the 100th Congress (19871989) for a total of 42 years and 21 Congresses.4 3 The newspaper/symbolic subcategor y is my own creation. This will be discussed in Chapter Three. 4 Table 2.1 also shows the action categories that I have created based on my needs. A full discussion of my data and these additional action categories can be found in Chapter Three. 44

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Table 2-1. Numbers of each kind of leader action and sub-categories of actions Number of Actions Sub-Categories Number of Actions Sub-Categories Parliamentary moves Executive connections, continued. 380 Legislate 0 Take Appointment 3 Legislative Eponym 0 Big Four Cabinet 0 Make Appointment 7 Presidential Support* 0 Impeach/Censure 29 Presidential Contact* 1 Censure/Expel 18 Presidential Criticism* 49 Rules Extraconstitutional Roles 10 Executive-Legislative Proce dure 1 Non-Congressional Role 79 Investigate 0 Commission Stances Parties and Elections 705 Take Stand 42 President or Vice President (Runs) 16 Big Speech 5 President Selection 1 Filibuster 4 Party Convention 5 Singular Stand 1 Stat e/Local Organizations 1 Tipping Vote 4 Other Party 3 Disclose 0 Mobilization 6 Write 23 Congressional Elections 4 Committee Leader to Talk to Party Leader Rare Kind of Member 0 Party Leader to Talk to Comm ittee Chair* 0 Rare Party/Ideology Congressional Roles 0 Rare Race/Ethnic/Gender 608 Leader Questioned Behavior 1 Run for Leader 24 Dubiousness 480 Committee Chair 0 Is Censured/Expelled 9 Committee Member Various 8 Special Committee 1 Resigns 3 Act as Speaker 0 Other Eponym Foreign Policy 0 Distributive Politics 197 Foreign Policy 39 Unusual Executive Connections Newspaper Specific/Symbolic Action 86 Opposition 187 Headline* 83 Counsel Administration 143 Picture* 13 Speak for Administration Note: The number on the left is the total number of actions performed by all party leader s and all committee chairs in my data set. Starred (*) actions are my own original actions. All others are Mayhew's. 45

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Mayhews study pinpoints any and all members of Congress. This study is only concerned with the party leaders and committee chairs, ther efore all members of the House that were not party leaders or committee chairs in that time pe riod were purged from his data set. Once the leadership was isolated, the data set consisted of 177 different actions, 86 party leaders, and 450 committee chairs. Some leaders appear more than once in the data set and perform multiple actions, but most never perform any actions. During these 42 years only 33 leaders make a mark in the realm of actions out of a possible 536. On the other hand, some leaders perform multiple actions. For example, Thomas P. Tip ONeill (Speaker of the House from 1977-1987) has a total of 36 actions associated w ith him. He began his action career for this data set in 1973 when he was elected as Majority Leader for the Democratic Party. 5 As an example of what an action might entail, ONeills lively action career includes helping President Carter push through an energy bill, stifling welfare reform legislation, and removing Phil Gramm from the Budget Committee. In both Mayhew's data and my own original data from the Post there are a few leaders who perform most of the actions and many leaders who rarely perform at all. Finally, Mayhew and I are only inte rested in actions that memb ers of Congress perform when they are seated in the Congress, not what activ ities they engage in before or after their congressional careers. There is one final note before the findings are discussed. A compar ison of party leaders and committee chairs necessitates that only member s of the majority party are included since only members of the majority party will be chos en by their peers to lead a committee. For purposes of this research party leaders include the Speaker of the House, the majority leader, the majority whip, and the Democratic Caucus chair or Republican Conference chair depending 5 Professor Mayhew uses the term action career and I will con tinue to use it throughout this paper. The term is his own. 46

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on which party holds the majority. The committ ee chairmen included for study are the chairmen of the standing committees only. No subcommittee, special, select, joint or ad-hoc committee chairs are included. Finally, the term leaders or leadership, when not preceded by party is the generic term that will be used to include party leaders and committee chairs collectively as leaders of the House. Results First, some descriptive statis tics are shown to provide a be tter picture of Mayhews data.6 Party leaders and committee chairs are compared in the committee government era, the reform era, and the party government era. Leadership actions are not placed into a historical context here. That is left to Chapters Four and Five. What is most impor tant for this chapter is that up until now scholars have failed to fully understand the legislative process because their focus has been on parties or committees, not both. The schol arship has largely neglected party leaders in the committee government era and committee chairs in the party government era. Party leaders and committee chairs do not legislate in a vacuum without one another. Mayhews action data gathered from historical references harken back to the very first Congress. The period of interest here is only a small portion of that data commencing in 1947 and ending in 1989. Figure 2-1 shows the total number of actions performed by party leaders and committee chairs in the committee government er a, the reform era, and the party government era. In the committee government era, comm ittee chairs perform almost three times more actions than party leaders. In the other two eras, party leaders and committee chairs perform about the same number of actions. 6 Mann-Whitney tests are also performed on Mayhews data. The results of those tests can be found in Appendix I. 47

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Figure 2-1.Total Actions Performed in Each Era Using Mayhews Data Table 2-2 shows a comparison of party leader and committee chair actions in three eras (committee government era, reform era and party gove rnment era) and a total of all the eras in the final two columns. Each i ndividual action that may be perf ormed by a leader is listed on the left-hand side. Under each of the three era listings there are two columns. The first column represents the actions ca rried out by party leaders in that pa rticular era and the second column represents committee chairs. In parentheses, just under the party leader or committee chair designation, is the total number of party leaders or committee ch airs that hold a leadership position during that time period regardless of whethe r they performed a single action or not. For example, in the committee government era, from 1947-1971, there were 50 different party leaders and 245 different committee chairs. Looking at the rows of actions, the first action is legislate. In the same era, party leaders pe rformed 5 legislate actions and committee chairs performed 17 legislate actions.7 7 This table is fairly cumbersome. It is collapsed in futu re chapters using the eleven s ubcategories from Table 2.1. However, I think it is useful to see it in its entirety to fully grasp the data. 48

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Table 2-2.Total Actions in Three Eras Committee Government Era, 1947-1971 Reform Era, 19711979 Party Government Era, 1979-1989 Totals across time, 1947-1989 Leader actions Party leaders (50) Comm chairs (245) Party leaders (16) Comm chairs (89) Party leaders (20) Comm chairs (116) Party leaders (86) Comm. chairs (450) Legislate 5 17 3 4 8 7 16 28 Legislative eponym 3 2 0 5 Make appointments 1 0 1 Impeach/ Censure 1 1 1 1 Censure/Expel 0 0 Rules 2 1 2 4 1 Exec. legis. procedure 0 0 Investigate 5 2 0 7 Take stand 4 7 2 1 4 1 10 9 Big speech 0 0 Filibuster 0 0 Singular stand 0 0 Tipping vote 0 0 Disclose 0 0 Write 0 0 Leader 8 7 9 24 0 Run for leader 2 1 3 0 Committee chair 24 -7 -4 0 35 Committee member 0 0 49

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Table 2-2 Continued Committee Government Era, 1947-1971 Reform Era, 19711979 Party Government Era, 1979-1989 Totals across time, 1947-1989 Leader actions Party leaders (50) Comm chairs (245) Party leaders (16) Comm chairs (89) Party leaders (20) Comm chairs (116) Party leaders (86) Comm. chairs (450) Opposition 1 7 1 4 3 5 11 Foreign policy 1 0 1 Counsel admin. 1 1 1 1 3 1 Speak for administration 0 0 Take appointment 1 0 1 Big four cabinet 0 0 Non-Congress. role 1 0 1 Commission 0 0 President or Vice President 1 1 1 1 Pres. selection 1 0 1 Party convention 1 1 0 State/Local organization 2 0 2 Other party 0 0 Mobilization 0 0 Table 2-2 is particularly usef ul to show why Mayhews data were difficult to analyze for the purposes of this study a nd there was a need to gather original data from the Post One of the first things that is notable is that there are mo re leaders than there are actions being performed. There are 86 party leaders and 450 committee chairs who are only performing 177 actions over 42 years. With so few data points, trying to understand who is acting and what types of actions 50

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they are committing becomes quite difficult. It would be especially difficult to try and generalize about most, much less all, leaders using this data. Table 2-2 also shows each of Mayhews 43 actio n categories. They are listed along the left side. Listed at the bottom of the table are ac tion categories having zero actions performed in each of the three congressional eras. There ar e twenty-one different actions that are never performed by party leaders or committee chairs. For example, part y leaders rarely get marks for being a "committee chair" as they are genera lly not members of committees. The rules generally preclude them from doing so. In a ddition, leaders in the House generally do not filibuster as this is usually an action that is preserved for the Senate. Although in the Washington Post data there is one filibuster performed by John Lesi nski (D-Mi.). Lesinski and several other Northern Congressmen filibustered a Southern cotton bill as an act of revenge. Earlier that week, Southern members used filib ustering tactics on Lesinskis Fair Employment Practices Commission measure, a civil rights bill.8 On the other hand, there is no reason to expect that party leaders and committee chairs sh ould not be carrying out th e other actions. This may mean that there is a difference between the actions leaders perform an d the actions the rankand-file membership performs. It seems apparent that some additional research needs to be done on who is performing which actions especially with regards to leaders versus followers. Although many of the observations in Table 2-2 are spread out or have zero observations, making it difficult to analyze the results, three action categories in particular provide some longitudinally interesting results. These three ac tion categories show that there are some actions that party leaders and committee chairs consistently perform in all c ongressional eras. All leaders legislate, take stands, and oppose the ad ministration. Each action will be discussed in turn. 8 Washington Post January 28, 1950 51

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The action that is carried out the most number of times in each era is legislate. Party leaders and committee chairs combined legislate d more often than any other action. That action alone comprises 25% of a ll actions performed. We should expect this for two reasons. First, legislate is the second most acted upon role in Mayhews original data set of all members of Congress so it is not unexpected for it to also play a significant role here among the leadership. Second, the primary job of a legislator is to legislate. So that the leadership is carrying out that duty with the most vigor is of little surprise. However, we are not talking about ordinary rank-and-file legi slators. This is an examination of party leaders and committee chairs, the leaders of the U.S. House of Representatives. How much legislating should they be doing? Should they be functioning in a different capacity? Does more legislation get passed when leaders legislate more often or ar e their days bette r spent leading?9 This again begs the question of what role leaders a nd followers should play in the legislative system and should be further researched. Taking a stand is the second most implemen ted action here. It comprises 11% of all actions performed by party leaders and committee ch airs combined. This is to be expected because this is the single most carried out action in Mayhews original data set. Thinking again about the role that legislators are expected to perform, taki ng stands runs a close second to legislate. In a different study, David Mayhew argues that position taking, as he identifies the same idea there, is one of three primary activities that members of Congress constantly engage 9 If we take some clues from the business world, it seems like a leader who legislates more often may be analogous to a CEO who micro-manages his firm. The CEO does not let his employees do the work they were hired to do, instead he stands over them doing their work himself. In the end, the CEO does not perform his job of running the company efficiently. Although, efficient may be a poor word choice to anal ogize to a legislature that is was created to run slow, calculated, and de liberate, if inefficient. 52

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(1974).10 The final action that is most often performed here is opposition to the administration. Opposition actions comprise 9% of all the actions performed. Table 2-3 is a portion of data extracted from Table 2-2 on each of these three actions overtime: legislate, take stands, and opposition. This table provides th e first piece of clear evidence in support of the dominant thesis. It empirically illustrates the change overtime from strong committee government to strong party government that scholars have largely theorized. By examining the percentage of each action that is performed there is a shift from committee chairs doing most of the acting in the committee government era to party leaders doing most of the acting in the party government era. Fo r example, committee chairs in the committee government era perform 77% of all the legislate actions. During th e reform era, the percent of legislative actions that they pe rform goes down to 57%. Finally, in the party government era the percentage of legislative actions performed by co mmittee chairs decreases even further to 47%. With each passing era, committee chairs perform progressively fewer legislate actions. The evidence for a shift in time from comm ittee government to party government is even stronger when the committee chairs actions are c ontrasted with the party leaders actions. Focusing again on the legislate action in the committee government era party leaders perform only 23% of all the legislating actions. In the reform era, the percentage of legislate actions increases to 43%. In the party gove rnment era, party leaders legi slate actions increase yet again to 53%. In comparing the legislate actions of party leaders and committee chairs concomitantly it is clear that the percentage of legislate actions being perfor med by party leaders are increasing while the percentage of legislate actions performed by committee chairs are decreasing. The evidence is similar for the other two actions in Table 2-3, take stand and opposition. With 10 The other two activities that Mayhew argues are the primary activities of legislators in the 1974 study, advertising and credit claiming, are interestingly not included in his list of actions for his 2000 study, America's Congress 53

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each passing era, party leaders perform more acti ons while committee chairs perform fewer. The final row in Table 2-3 shows the combined overall percentage of all actions performed in each era by party leaders and committee chairs using Mayhews data. The results are the same. The percent of all actions performed by committee chairs decreases from 76% (Committee Era), to 54% (Reform Era), and finally to 35% (Party Era). The per cent of all actions performed by party leaders increases from 24% to 46% to 65%. Mayhews historical data have shown an im pressive pattern that supports the dominant theories. The individual action percentages from Table 2-3 as well as the percent of all actions performed show a clear shift in who is dominating actions in the public sphere. Committee chairs are most active in the committee government era. As time passes and eras change, their actions become fewer. Not only do committee chairs begin acting less often in the public sphere, but party leaders begin to act more. This s hows a clear shift from committee government to party government as previous scholarship has stated. It is clear that this shift does not fall in line with the thesis of parallel leaders as we examine the data longitudinally. However, an examination of the reform period does provide some evidence for the thesis. The reform era data support the idea that some parallelism between the leadership roles is possible. The total percent of all actions perf ormed by party leaders and committee chairs in the reform era is very similar. Party leaders perform 46.2% of all actions and committee chairs perform 53.8% of all actions. During this era al one there is only a 7.6% di fference in the actions that were performed. Whether 7.6% is a big diffe rence in the quantity of actions taken will be left for the reader to decide, but that decision is made easier when the reform era difference is compared with the other eras. The percentage difference for all actions taken in the party government eras is 30% and the difference for th e committee government era is over 50%. The 54

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reform era shows that there is so me evidence of parallel leadership in the number of actions that are performed. Types of Actions Performed by Leaders The evidence is mixed whether party leaders or committee chairs perform a significantly different number of actions during their careers. There are simply too few observations using Mayhews data to get reliable resu lts. Besides simply looking at the raw number of actions that are performed, we should also look at the type of actions that ar e being performed in order to determine if there is any type of parallel leadership. It is possible that party leaders and committee chairs perform different types of actions in their roles as leaders. This is another piece of the puzzle in determining who has more influence. I argue that it is the more important piece of the puzzle since influence may not be found in how many actions a leader carries out, but what type of actions are carried out. In order to answer questions such as, do part y leaders counsel administrations more than committee chairs, do committee chairs investigate mo re than party leaders, or do party leaders engage in more mobilization activities than co mmittee chairs and the like, we need to examine individual action categories. Unfortunately, when the observations for each action category and each era are separated there is not a very good chan ce of coming up with reli able results with so few observations. From the standpoint of previous scholarship, others might argue that it is not the quantity of actions that makes a difference but the type or quality of actions that make committee chairs more influential in the committee government era and party leaders more influential in the party government era. For ex ample, it could be argued that committee chairs take part in more investigations in their natural role as chairs. Since many investigations can be high profile, and there was an inordinate number of these high profile investigations during the 55

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committee government era, it could be one of th e reasons why scholars saw committee chairs as more influential than party l eaders during that time period. Take David R. Mayhews book Divided We Govern (Mayhew 2005c) as an illustration. His research examines high-publicity investigat ions from 1947-1989, the same time period of interest here. In that time period, thirty-one investigations were conducted by Congress. Twenty-one of them were during the committee government era and only four were during the party government era. Defenders of the str ong committee chairs in th e committee government era theory would probably argue that investigating as an acti on was an important component in strengthening the committee chairs seats. On the other hand, we should expect committee chairs to engage in investigations. After all, that is one of their primary functions. In the following chapters, the Washington Post data are analyzed to argue that the type of actions performed by party leaders and committee chairs ar e not that different fro m one another. Both leadership positions require that leaders perform various types of actions that may be influential throughout their careers. Given th e ever changing context of th e legislature which includes the demographics of the membership, the party in power in the Congress and the White House, and the politics of the day, different action strategies may work at di fferent times and in different contexts. Who Is Acting? Until this point, party leaders and committee chairs have been examined as leadership positions in a congressional institution in the sens e that these individual po sitions are institutions themselves and power and influence is garnered fr om their institutional position. In other words, it is the institution of the leadership position th at matters most for gathering power and influence rather than the individual who occupies that pos t. For example, in the committee government era a proponent of the instituti onalist perspective would argue that a chairs seniority status is the 56

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most important source of their power. With se niority on his side, even the meekest individual can produce key pieces of legisla tion and perform powerful actions as chair of his committee. Alternatively, without job security or the seniority norm, even the most aggressive and selfassured individual committee chair must make compromises if he wants to hold onto his position. The argument for the inst itutionalist perspective for party leaders would be that party leaders can be given the tools by the membership to be effective leaders regardless of individual personality. They have the ability to hire and fire committee chairs who are not loyal to the party and its program or the ability to discharge legislation from the rules committee. Neither is an institutionalist approach or an individualist a pproach being posited here. Rather it is important to scruti nize party leaders and committee ch airs both as institutions and as individuals in order to understand the whole picture. Thus far, the institutionalist approach has been taken, but it important to examine who is ac ting as individuals. If anything, it will lend itself to be a more interesting story. More importantly, individual legislators frequently act with autonomy for themselves, their constituents, or the good of society. They do not only act in accordance with the rules set forth by their institutional status. To that end, I consider which individuals are doing the most acting in the data. Table 2-4 shows the top five action producers utilizing Mayhews data. The first thing to notice is that there is a good mix of party lead ers and committee chairs in the top five. Three party leaders, who were all Speak ers of the House, and two committ ee chairs make the cut. All are from the Democratic Party even though there are two Republican Cong resses included in this data, the 80th and the 83rd. However, it would be difficult at this point to draw any conclusions about which party performs more actions based solely on this information. In Chapter Six, party identification is used as a predictor of action co unt. It is no surprise that Speakers ONeill, 57

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Rayburn, and McCormack are part of the list. It is also no surprise that Chairman Mills and Smith made it. Wilbur Mills is arguably one of the most well-recognized committee chairmen in contemporary history. Mayhew ha s argued, in the twentieth centu ry, Wilbur Mills, Chairman of the House Ways and Mean Committee has rolled of the tongue as if it were one long word (Mayhew 2000a). Mayhew may have left out the word powerful preceding Chairman. Both of these men were also chairman of pow er committees. Smith was chair of the Rules Committee. And, both were chairmen during the committee government era. No chairmen from the party government era make it onto this list. 58

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Table 2-4. Top five action pr oducers using Mayhews data Rank Name Position Action total 1 Thomas P. (Tip) ONeill (D-Ma.) Party Leader 36 2 Wilbur Mills (D-Ar.) (Ways and Means) Committee Chair 23 3 Sam Rayburn (D-Tx.) Party Leader 13 4 Howard Smith (D-Va.) (Rules) Committee Chair 11 5 John W. McCormack (D-Ma.) Party Leader 8 In Chapter Five, the top ten action producers are examined using the Washington Post data. As a preview of what is to come, the thr ee party leaders in the top five here also make it onto the other list of top acti on producers. However, neither Mills nor Smith make it onto the other list. Obviously, Mayhew's study includes many more Congresses whereas there are only five studied here. Therefore not too much should be read into th is. In the future, when more Congresses are added to this rese arch it will be interesting to see who makes the list and if it continues to be these same leaders. Limitations of Mayhews Data Some limitations to Mayhews data have al ready been alluded to which is why it was necessary to gather original leadership action data from the Washington Post 11 Here those limitations will be summarized for the reader. The fi rst limitation of Mayhews data set is that it only goes through 1989. Using his data, only the firs t part of the party government era which precludes the Republican Revolution and any findi ngs related to the 1990s can be studied. However, it is well documented that the party government era was well under way in the 1980s as David Rohdes (1991) book Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House posits.12 Although 11 Mayhew has already acknowledged the limitations to his method in his book. Some of those are further elaborated here. The primary argument here is not that Mayhews data are in adequate for his research question, but rather that they are for mine. 12 For additional documentation see Barbara Sinclair, Majorit y Party Leadership in the House of Representatives: A Reassessment. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C. 59

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the data are not ideal in this se nse, they provide an initial star ting point for the research and an additional means for the validity of the measure. The Washington Post data includes the first House in which the Republicans seiz ed control in forty years. Two additional restrictions of Mayhews data set are interrelated. One, his data yields only a small number of total actions to analyze. Two, his data come from history books. That his data come from history books is the reason why so few actions could be collected, but the source of his data are also a problem for testing my theory. His data set yi elded 177 total actions performed by party leaders and committee chairs in 21 Congresses. Compare this with data collected from the Washington Post which yields 3,280 total actions performed by the leaders in 5 Congresses. The total numb er of actions found was limite d because of Mayhews use of general and era specific history books that do not provide daily cove rage of Congress. With so few actions to analyze it would be difficult to reliably test the hypot hesis or say very much about leadership actions in general. That he used historical acc ounts is a third limitation. The newspaper yields more insight into what it is that leaders ar e doing on a day-to-day basis leading to a mostly comprehensive account of possible actions performed. History books only detail the most important leadership actions of a particular time. While, it is certa inly valid to be intere sted in only the most important congressional actions th at leaders perform (which are f ound in the history books), it is more telling to observe all publically visible actions if that possibility exists That opportunity presents itself in the newspaper. If most ac tions that are witnessed by the public are collected, future research may be able to explain which actions are most important for making policy, winning elections, garnering pow er, and the like. 60

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There are other shortcomings from historical accounts. A history book only has a limited amount of space so that only the most important actio ns, or those that the author thinks are most important, will find their way onto the pages of the book. To be sure, newspapers and front pages of newspapers also have limited space and are subject to what the journalist, or possibly, the editor finds important. However, newspape rs are an ideal source for daily congressional coverage. Moreover, while journalists may detail the events that they find important for that particular day, historians narratives describe not only what th ey believe is important for one day, but they also write retrospectively. In other wo rds, historians look back in time and determine what the most significant actions are for todays readers. It can be argued that there is more subjectivity in their analysis than a newspaper reporter. Simply put, a news reporter does not usually have the foresight to determine which leadership actions today will still be important tomorrow. For historians hindsight is 20/20. It should be clear by now that in order to test the parallel leaders hypo theses there is a need to collect additional data. The restrictions of the time period, actions collected, and history books used all plea for another data source. Th e method by which actions were collected from the Post will be examined in the next chapter. Conclusion One of the primary things to remember about th is chapter is that for the purposes of this study, Mayhews data only give us a cursory look at examini ng the differences between party leaders and committee chairs. The analysis using his data are a good start on the way to understanding the relationship between these two leadership positions. However, his data are vastly different from the Washington Post data collected here. While we both examine actions in the public sphere his data were originally produced to examine all members of Congress. I have since drastically reduced the size of his data set to include the leaders only. In addition, the data 61

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62 that were collected from the Washington Post are more revealing of the relationship between party leaders and committee chairs. This will become more evident beginning with the next chapter. Part Two of this study observes leadership actions from the Washington Post The next chapter addresses the need to de velop a new measure of leadersh ip actions and a new approach that builds on Mayhews analysis of historical accounts. I use the Washington Post to collect those leadership actions.

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CHAPTER 3 LEADERSHIP ACTIONS IN THE WASHINGTON POST In The History of the House of Representatives George B. Galloway contends, strange as it may seem, the role of Congress in the Amer ican system of government has been largely neglected by American historians (Galloway and Wise 1976). Although more than 30 years have passed since Galloway first wrote this, there is still some accuracy to his statement. It is true that much more has been written on the U. S. House, however the role of Congress and in particular the behavior of legislators within that institution is still largely neglected. Whether it be the difficulty of measuring the behavior of 435 distinct members or the ease of calculating roll call votes, what is missing from studies of Congr ess are the actions that members take on a daily basis to perform their duties. We know that me mbers of Congress are primarily interested in reelection, policy, and personal power but those are the products of members actions. They are the ends, not the means. This study examines the means. Unfortunately, the leadership actions that are examined in this research are not readily found in the general or era hist ory books that Mayhew used. The primary problem for this research is that I am interested in a more specific aspect of the U.S. Congress than Mayhew which could not be found in the historical acco unts that his approach takes. Mayhew was concerned with actions in a more general way. In addition, he was not ne cessarily trying to see how members acted and reacted to one another. His primary interest was moves that were made by members individually rather than any sort of collective. This studies concern is not only to explore what leaders do as individuals, but to also provide a narrative of how they work together in their roles. This research originally began by examini ng the differences between party leaders and committee chairs using Mayhews data only. The historical accounts th at Mayhew used were 63

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broad, generalized books that were suitable for his purposes, whereas my goal was to gather more specific accounts of party leaders' and comm ittee chairs' actions and interactions. Recall that while Mayhews data spans a much longer time period his data yielded far fewer total actions which is the primary dependent variable of interest. By collecting original data from the Post, it can be identified what the leadership was doing day-to-day incl uding how it reacted to policy proposals, how and if the l eaders communicated with each ot her, and of course, how they lead the institution. These nuances were not found in the generalized history books used by Mayhew, but they were found in the newspaper. Naturally, the newspaper will allow for a more detailed account of what is going on in the halls of Congress. In addition, who is involved in the policy process is going to be at th e forefront of those accounts. Mayhew argues that the newspaper is th e ideal place to find evidence of congressional actions but an impractical one that he was unwilling to endure: It goes without saying that, approached as a se rious empirical enterprise, this idea of kinds of noticed MC actions raises nightmarish problems of evidence. Ideally, vast ransacking of newspapers over many generations would no doubt be needed to tackle them. In a recent work, Americas Congress, I resorted to a fallback data source (Mayhew 2005a, 16). Mayhews use of historical accounts, the sma ll accumulated data set of actions, and the fact that his data set ends in 1989 are all reasons that original data were gathered from the Washington Post Table 3-1 shows a comparison between Mayhews data and my data. The details shown on the Mayhew side only include th e data on party leaders and committee chairs that were isolated from his original data set of all congressional members. The details of the analysis using Mayhews data can be found in Chapter Two. The remainder of this study will examine party leaders and committee chairs using an original data set of congressional actions collected from the front pages of the Washington Post 64

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Table 3-1. Differences between Mayhew's da ta in America's Congress and my own. Mayhew Bekafigo Source of data History books General and era specific Newspaper Washington Post Data dates 1949-1989 1949-1996 Congresses that are included 80th-100th (21) 81, 89, 97, 100, 104 (5) Total number of Party Leaders 86 20 Total number of Committee Chairs 450 107 Total number of Actions 177 3280 Action Categories 43 51 Congressional Eras In order to determine the differences be tween party leaders and committee chairs, leadership actions are located a nd isolated on the front pages of The Washington Post Before going further into the methods for canvassing the Post, five specific Congresses were studied. Roughly speaking, the committee government era lasted from 1947-1970 and the party government era began around 1978 and c ontinues at least until the 104th Congress and the Republican Revolution (Deering and Smith 1997).1 Many argue that we continue to be in era of party government to this day. Each of those two eras can be further broken down into five additional time periods which are largely compri sed of and represented by the Speakers of the House that are the leaders at the time.2 They are as follows: Committee Government Era Early postwar committee government (approx imately 1945-1962) (Speaker Sam Rayburn) Late postwar committee government (approximately 1960-1970) (Speakers John McCormack and Carl Albert) 1 There is no consensus in the literature regarding the ex act delineations of these eras. For a slightly different delineation see (Davidson 1988; Deering 2003). 2 The Reform Era can be argued to begin around 1970 commencing with the 1970 Legislative Reorganization Act and continuing until 1978 when Tip ONeill becomes Speaker. I briefly address the Reform Era in Chapter Two using Mayhews data. 65

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Party Government Era Post-reform Era (1978-1986) (Speaker Tip ONeill) Conditional Party Government Era (1987-1994) (Speakers Jim Wr ight and Thomas Foley) Republican Revolution (1995-2000) (Speaker s Newt Gingrich and Dennis Hastert) One congressional term within each of these five different time periods is chosen that is representative of the whole time period to exam ine newspaper coverage of the various leaders actions. When we think about the various Congre sses one of the first thin gs that comes to mind is how productive each one has been. After all the primary job of a legislature is to make laws. One of the primary methods of comparing differe nt congressional terms is to examine how much legislation was passed. Therefore, five different Congresses were chosen to examine based on David Mayhews landmark laws (he calls them important enactments) in Divided We Govern (Mayhew 2005b). Beginning with the 80th Congress in 1947, Mayhew has determined the number of important enactments that was passe d in each Congress. Congresses in which the highest number of important enactments were passed were chosen for this study. Those Congresses are as follows and some caveats are listed below: Committee Government Era 81st Congress (1949-51) with 12 total landmark bills (Speaker Rayburn) 89th Congress (1965-66) with 22 total la ndmark bills (Speaker McCormack)3 3 There was a tie between the 65-66 and 69-70 Congresses for total enactments. I chos e 65-66 because they also passed 3 historically important bills as defined by Mayhew and the 69-70 Congress did not pass any. 66

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Party Government Era 97th Congress (1981-82) with 9 total landmark bills (Speaker ONeill) 100th Congress (1987-88) with 12 total landmark bills (Speaker Wright)4 104th Congress (1995-96) with 15 total landmark bills (Speaker Gingrich)5 Finally, I only examined the days in the Washington Post in which the Congress was actually in session, including holiday s, weekends, and summers. Therefore, there are a few days at the end of the year during each session that are not examined. For example, in the 89th Congress, every day of the Post was canvassed from January 4, 1965 through October 22, 1966. Following are the session days for the Congresses that I examine: Session Days6 81st Congress (1/3/1949-1/2/1951) 655 total days 89th Congress (1/4/1965-10/22/1966) 579 total days 97th Congress (1/5/1981-12/23/1982) 680 total days 100th Congress (1/6/1987-10/22/1988) 623 total days 104th Congress (1/4/1985-10/4/1996 ) 641 total days 4 There was a tie for the number of landmark bills in the 100th Congress and the 103rd Congress. I choose the 100th Congress because I was able to continue to use the same format of The Washington Post that I had previously used. I used the Historical Washington Post as shown in the Proquest database. This version of the Post offers full page and article images with searchable full text back to th e first issue. The collection includes digital reproductions providing access to every page from every available issue un til 1991. So up until 1991, I am able to look at the actual page image of the Post Unknowingly, this would become especi ally important since I am only examining the front page. Following 1991, an actual page image is unavailable. While the full text is still available from Proquest, it is impossible to see when the article from the front page jum ps or continues on another page. Therefore, I choose to use the 100th Congress because I was able to see the actual page image and for the 103rd Congress I was not. I believed it was important to continue search the front pages in the same manner that I had already started for increased reliability. 5 Proquest database discontinues posting the actual page images of the Post in 1991, therefore the method of examining the newspaper after that date had to change. For the 104th Congress, I used available Washington Post microfilm to explore the front page images. This naturally will change the reliability of my data set as my eyes are not as reliable as the Proquest search engine. However, I am fairly confident that very few mistakes were made or actions missed. 6 For the purpose of this table, a session's "total days" is defined as the total number of calendar days from the convening date to adjournment date, inclusive. It does not mean the actual number of days that Congress met during that session. This information from this table and the definition of total days was gathered from the historical House information gathered by the Clerk of the House at www.house.gov 67

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Canvassing for Actions in the Washington Post The Washington Post was chosen to canvass for leadership actions because it is a national newspaper based in Washington D.C., with a broa d, stable focus on the legislature. Only the actual front page is examined for actions. If th e front page story is co ntinued on another page, any actions that are continued from the last para graph on the front page ar e included, but not the rest of the story.7 There are two primary re asons why only the front page is scrutinized. First, the argument made here, and by Mayhew in his res earch, is that actions performed in the public sphere are of primary interest. The public sphe re is defined by Mayhew as a realm of shared American consciousness in which government officials and others make moves before an attentive stratum of the public, and in which societys preference formation, politics, and policymaking all substantially take place (May hew 2000a, x). For reasons already discussed, historical accounts were insuffici ent for gathering leader actions so the newspaper was turned to in order to gather actions made by leaders in the public sphere. In addition to the nightly television news and the internet, newspapers are the most obvious choice from which to find congressional actions that are noticed by the public. Finally, the argument can be made that "no study of how and why the citizenry views Congress as it does c ould rightly neglect the daily paper (Tidmarch and Pitney 1985). Some might argue that few people read the newspaper and even fewer read the Post, however it is unnecessary for one to read the newspaper to be aware of leaders actions.8 The 7 I do use the rest of the story as contextual, however I do not collect any actions data from the continuation of the story. 8 According to The Pew Center for the People & the Press, readership of newspapers ha s been declining. A recent study shows that in 1994 as many as 58% of all people polled had read the newspaper the day before they were questioned about their habits. In 2008, that figure had dropped to 34%. The same poll shows that among those who gather their news on a regular basis, as opposed to those who only gather news from time-to-time, 57% read the traditional daily newspaper. Another source of concern for this study is that some may argue that more "older" citizens pay attention to the news than "younger" citizens. This study shows that while 40% of people aged 50-64 and 55% of people aged 65 and over gathered their news from a traditional print newspaper, compared with 15% of 68

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results of this study do not rely on or even requ ire for citizens to read the newspaper or the Post.9 This studys only assumption is th at there is some alert and aw are portion of the citizenry.10 A majority of Americans gather some source of ne ws on a routine basis and those are the people of interest here. Citizens become aware of politics in myriad ways which might include reading the newspaper, watching television, talk ing to friends, or even overhearing a conversation in line at the coffee shop. The point is that what ends up on the front page of the paper is often noticed by that attentive stratum of people that Mayhew is talking about regardless of whether they actually read the paper or not. Few would ar gue that members of Congress are engaging in political actions for the inatten tive segment of the population. Ho wever, it can easily be argued that those who do read the newspaper, whether they read it more or less often, may only read the front page stories. Many only have time to read the front page. They do so because they know that it is the source for the most important ne ws. Moreover, todays newspaper headlines, including the Post, are on the web and are free for anyone who has a computer to read. This is a new trend that has actually stabilized the recent decline in newspaper readership. Many find the medium more accessible and convenient.11 People may be reading fewer newspapers in hardcopy format, but they are reading more of them online.12 A second reason why only the front pages of the Post are analyzed is because this is where the most important stories and headlines are going to be featured. The actions of interest, those that are most often noticed by the public, are mo st likely to be found on the front page of the 18-24 year olds and 24% of 25-34 year olds, those younger citizens are incr easing receiving their news from an online equivalent newspaper. Source: "Key News Audiences now blend Traditional and Online Sources." 9 Another study of newspaper content argues, "Our assumption about the newspaper as the sole source of information is of course not unifor mly realistic because many readers do also tap other information media" (Tidmarch and Pitney 1985). 10 According to the same study in Note 30, 8 out of 10 people polled say that they gather news from some source on a daily basis. Source: "Key News Audiences now blend Traditional and Online Sources." 11 Online papers modestly boost newspaper readership, Th e Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, July 30, 2006. 12 Ibid 69

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newspaper than anywhere else in the paper. To reiterate, it is not necessary for a person to read the newspaper in order to get th e important stories, but the assumption is that an attentive stratum of the population will absorb the info rmation from other sources whether they be television, the internet, or a friend. Some might criticize th e choice of using the Washington Post over the New York Times LA Times Small-Town Times or various other newspapers. Th e most likely criticism is that some papers are more liberal or conservative than others so their re porting is going to be different. While the reporting of individual leaders may be ideologi cally different or biased, the actions being performed by these members of Congress are not ideological.13 Adjectives that a reporter might use to describe one lead er or another are not of interest.14 Furthermore, this study is not concerned with the ideology or even the me rit legislative out put, all things that could be biased in the newspaper accounts. Examples of doing as opposed to being are of primary concern (Mayhew 2000a, 38). In general, legisl ative actions are unbias ed and factual (although it should be noted that some facts can be different than others). Adjectives used by reporters to describe the actions are generally ignored. A leader is either legislating or not, investigating or not, opposing the administration or not. However, there are two particular actions that are associated more with being than doing and that is the leader action and the committee chair action. These two actions are troublesome for several reasons. According to Mayhew, leader is a signifi cant formal or informal leader of a congressional party or bloc or is mentioned as a leader in a report of some other action and committee chair is a significant committee chair or is mentioned as chair in a report of some 13 In Mayhews sweeps of the Washington Post and the New York Times for selecting important legislation, he found that their end of the year wrap-up stories reported what actually happened in Congress in a similar manner (Mayhew 2005b). 14 See the discussion of the leader action below for an exception to the doing not being rule. 70

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other action (Mayhew 2000a). Mayhew intended this action to be only for standing committees since the special committee action is marked for joint, special, sel ect or conference units (Mayhew 2000a, 68). Naturally, one could argue that leader and committee chair are not really actions, but merely labels for the two leadership positio ns, or instances of being rather than doing. Mayhew notes that in his data set, th e leader and committee chair categories typicallytrack attributes of members, although he does not sa y anything further or suggest who might atypically earn the designation (May hew 2000a, 69). This might hold truer for the committee chair action as only those who are co mmittee chairs of the standing committees are marked for this action since, party leaders do not hold committee chair positions nor can they be labeled as committee chairs in any other capacity. (On the other hand, it is possible for committee chairs to be labeled as leaders.)15 Another detail to consider is that not all committee chairs that are mentioned in the Post are referred to as chairs of their committees. Th e important issue is the actions of all committee chairs in each Congress whether they are acting in the capacity of a committee chair position or not, and whether they are mentioned as committee chairs or not. However, a committee chair will only receive a mark for committee chair if he is specifically named as one. For example, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee or Chairman Mills.16 The underlying assumption is that these are all actions that are performed in the public sphere and are noticed by the public. A reader of the Washington Post may or may not know that Wilbur Mills is the Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee unless it is clearly stated. A headline that reads Wilbur Mills attends Kennedy funeral, does not necessarily mean that a read er will recognize Mills as a 15 This point is further explained in the next paragraph. 16 Mayhew does things slightly different in that he says a Chairman may get an auxiliary tick as committee chair for doing something in the specific capacity of a chairman su ch as legislating (p. 70). He says that chairmen are almost always identified as such. In my experience, too, chairs are almo st always identified as such, but only receive a score if they are specifically mentioned as chair. The reasons for doi ng so are stated above. 71

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leader in the Congress much less the chairman of a powerful committee. He could be any number of other political dignitari es or even a family member. As important as it may be that Wilbur Mills is attending a fune ral, if he is not mentioned as a committee chairman it may be unclear who Mills is or how much influence he might wield. I am not just interested in determining how many times a leader is menti oned on the front pages of a highly visible, national newspaper. With powerful search engines, that informa tion would take only seconds to determine and this research would be complete in a week. What is more remarkable is how members act and how they come across to the public as they engage in the world of politics. With that in mind, in order to be sure that leadership actions ar e noticed by the public as being performed by a leader, he must be specifically named as such. Along a similar line of argument, the leader designation is not al ways mentioned along side of a party leaders name in the Post To reiterate, it is possible for a party leader to be acting, but not be mentioned as a leader specific ally. If a party leader is not specifically mentioned as a leader then they do not receiv e a score for the leader designation. However, the leader action is different from the committ ee chair action in that it is possible for chairmen of standing committees to receive a leader mark. Th e reasoning behind this is twofold. First, Mayhew defines the leader action as formal or informal. This is the first suggestion that Mayhew meant for this action to incl ude all types of leaders, not just Speakers or Majority and Minority leaders, bu t also the everyday congressional leaders that show up in the pages of the newspaper. Hillary Clinton is one example of a present day informal leader that comes to mind. Even before her bid for the pres idency, she could be seen and heard in various capacities in her congressi onal role and many may have even t hought that she held an official leadership role. Certainly, powerful committee chai rman may often be term ed leaders, and if 72

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they are then they will receive a score for th e leader action. Second, Mayhew gives several examples in his research where members of Congress are given the leader designation for something other than an official party leadership role. For example, Richard Russell (D-Ga.) was scored as a leader for bei ng the leader of the Southern bloc of civil rights opponents in the Senate (Mayhew 2000a, 66). Finally, it can be argued that the leader and committee chair designations may not be considered actions at all, but at tributes held by certain members of the legislature. First, most, but not all, committee chairs rece ive a committee chair tick, and mo st, but not all, party leaders receive a leader tick. Second, some (very few) committee chairs may also receive a leader tick, but no party leaders receive a committee chair mark. One might argue that these actions should be left out of the analys is altogether, that they are cl ogging up the data set unnecessarily, are confusing, or do not add anythi ng to the analysis. To allevi ate any criticisms on any and all of those points, two different dependent variable s are included to measure the total number of actions performed by each member. One includes th e total number of all actions and the other includes the total number of all actions except th e leader and committee chair actions. Every analysis performed in this research will uti lize both dependent variables to showcase the differences, if any, in the outcome. New Action Categories Mayhew presents a list of forty-three different action categories which was first introduced in Table 2-1. Table 2-1 also displays the tota l number of each type of action performed by party leaders and committee on the left hand side for all Congresses of interest for this study. Notice that some actions are never performed by party le aders or committee chairs in this data set and therefore receive a zero. In addition to thos e forty-three categories eight additional action categories are introduced for a total of 51 possi ble actions. A list of the eight new action 73

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categories and the way they are conceptualized is listed in Table 3-2. Two of the new actions, headline and picture, are born strictly from the nature of examining newspapers rather than history books. The other seven are actions were found to be important in one way or another to the analysis, especially with regards to comparing the leadership positions. This is not to suggest that Mayhews list is inferior or inconclusive rather no two people conducting this research would have the exact same action list. In addition, Mayhews original classification of action categories and subcategories have been maintain ed. They are: parliamentary moves, stances, congressional roles, target or subject, executive connections, extraconstitutional roles, parties and elections, rare kind of member, questioned be havior, and various. My eight new action categories are then positioned into Mayhews classifications with one exception. One additional classification was created to indicate actions that would only be associated with the newspaper called newspaper/symbolic. Table 3-2. New action categories Category Definition Headline is named in the headline or sub-headline on the front page of the Washington Post Pictured is pictured on the front page of the Washington Post Acts as Speaker acts as the Speaker in some capacity, usually a Parliamentary move CC to talk to PL a committee chair initiates a talk with a party leader, generally suggested that the committee chair is looking for direction, guidance, or assistance from the party leadership. PL to talk to CC party leader initiates a talk with a committee chair, generally suggested that the party leadership is looking for direction, guidance, or assistance from the committee chair. Presidential support is supported, praised, or ot herwise complimented by the President for whatever reason, although it is usually with regards to legislation Presidential criticism is criticized or opposed by the President for whatever reason, although it is usually with regards to legislation Presidential contact is contacted by the President in some manner, usually a phone call or a letter Note: With regards to the last three actions, it could be argued that these are not technically party leader or committee chair actions because they are not the ones doing the performing, the president is. However, given that one of the original actions is Opposition to the president, it should be worth examining any contact made by the president to the leadership. I argue that any criticism, support, or contact from the president is going to have some bearing on how the leadership performs. 74

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Preliminary Findings This chapter ends with some broad findings utilizing the Washington Post data set. The next two chapters will examine each congression al era individually in turn. The first and arguably most important finding is that scholars have largely ove rlooked party leaders activities in the committee government era and committee chairs activities in the pa rty government era. Without even scrutinizing specific action counts of who is doing what and when, it is clear from Table 3-3 that party leaders ar e not sitting idly by waiting for independent committee chairs to make their move in the committee government era. Moreover, in the party government era, committee chairs too are acting. Table 3-3 illust rates that both party leaders and committee chairs are in engaged in legislat ive maneuvers which are visible to the public. To be sure, most of these moves are linked to their positions as legislators. The Post does not make a habit of reporting private matters on their front pages. Table 3-3. All party leaders and al l committee chairs actions by Congress 81st Congress 89th Congress 97th Congress 100th Congress 104th Congress Leader Actions PL CC PL CC PL CC PL CC PL CC Legislate 42 147 10 35 40 34 13 11 25 23 Legislative eponym 1 1 2 Take stand 48 135 20 38 82 68 73 36 145 60 Foreign policy 24 79 2 9 5 5 48 11 10 4 Resigns 1 Rare party/ ideology Rare race/ethnic/ gender Run for leader 1 Take appointment Big four cabinet Act as Speaker* 2 1 Make appointment 75

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Table 3-3. Continued. Big speech 2 1 5 1 7 Filibuster 1 Singular stand 1 1 3 Tipping vote 1 Disclose 1 2 Write 1 1 2 2 Exec.-Legis. procedure 4 3 1 2 Special committee 1 1 3 1 1 1 Opposition 2 7 2 8 23 11 13 14 6 Counsel administration 23 13 6 9 5 8 2 16 1 Speak for administration 1 4 1 1 5 1 Commission Pres. or vice pres. (runs) 1 39 2 Is censured/ expelled Dubiousness 5 2 5 12 Headline* 4 31 3 29 11 9 38 8 54 Presidential support* 1 1 1 1 3 Presidential contact* 9 7 4 1 2 1 4 1 Pictured in Front Page* 1 3 5 6 14 11 28 5 55 15 President criticizes* 2 1 5 3 6 2 Distributive politics Unusual 4 8 2 11 3 4 1 6 Other eponym Noncongressional role 1 Leader 131 1 43 119 81 232 1 Presidential selection 1 1 3 Party convention 1 3 76

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Table 3-3. Continued. State/local organization 1 Other party 1 3 Mobilization Congressional elections 2 1 5 1 1 12 1 Party leader to talk to Committee Chair* Rules 14 27 1 4 1 2 Impeach/Censure Censure/Expel 1 Investigate 2 35 1 17 4 7 6 2 4 Committee Chair 226 58 83 49 64 Committee member 2 1 5 1 Committee Chair to talk to Party Leader* 2 1 1 % of Total Actions 31 69 31 69 57 43 72 27 77 23 Totals 324 738 107 241 329 246 372 137 605 181 More specifically, party lead ers and committee chairs alike are engaged in legislating, taking stands, foreign policy, opposing, counseli ng and speaking for the president or his administration, rules changes, and investigations just to name th e ones with the highest counts. This suggests that there is some degree of pa rallelism in the leader ship. Although the raw number of actions performed by party leader s and committee chairs is different than hypothesized, the types of actions th at they perform are very similar. Looking at each individual action row, notice that there are only two ac tions that are exclusively performed by one leadership post, the party leaders.17 They are president ial support and singular stand. Party leaders are the only leaders in five Congresse s that are supported by the president or his 17 First, I mean any rows in which there are more than 5 total observations for all Congresses. Fewer observations would not be an appropriate test. Second, one exception is the committee chair action that signifies that someone was named as a chair. Traditionally, leaders ar e not chairs, although there are exceptions. 77

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administration in some capacity or take a singular stand on some issue. Otherwise, the field of activity is fairly even with respect to all other individual actions. That is, both party leaders and committee chairs alike perform any given action or they do not. There is not a real difference. In addition, it is clear from the 3,280 actions that were found on the front pages of the Washington Post over just five Congresses that the leaders of our House of Representatives are involved in legislative maneuvers of various sorts. Some schol ars have been amiss to ignore these moves made by party leaders in the commi ttee era and committee chairs in the party era. The second to last row of Table 3-3 shows th e percent of total actions performed by all party leaders and committee chai rs. (Committee chairs will be differentiated in the following chapters.) This row is important in that it s hows a shift overtime in which group of leaders are doing the most acting. The percentage of actio ns over time provides empirical evidence in support of the dominant thesis. Reading the percen tages from left to right, there is a shift in which leaders are doing the most acting. First, the committee chairs in the committee era are engaged in the most actions. In the 81st and 89th Congresses committee chairs are performing 69% of all the actions, overshadow ing party leadership actions dur ing this time. However, as committee chairs move into the party government period, their activitie s wane. Their total percentage of actions diminishes from a hei ght of 69% to 43, 27, and finally 23 percent. On the other hand, party leader s gain favor in the realm of actions overtime which lends support to the dominant thesis of increasing pow er and influence for the party leadership overtime. Party leaders in the committee peri od of government only perform 31 percent of all the actions. However, once into the party government period, party leaders prove to be increasingly more active in legislative affairs. The overall percentage of actions performed by 78

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party leaders in the party government era mo re than doubles from the committee government period. Their actions increase from 57 to 72 and finally to 77 percent. Finally, a study of committee chairs would not be complete without differentiating between prestigious and non-prestigious chairs. Table 3-4 begins that investigation by juxtaposing party leaders with pr estigious committee chairs as explained in Chapter One. This table also merges individual action categories fr om Table 3-3 into a grouping of subcategories that Mayhew developed making it easi er to analyze some of the ca tegories with fewer actions. Table 3-4. Percent actions of party leaders and presti gious committee chairs only 81 st Congress 89th Congress 97th Congress 100th Congress 104th Congress Sub-Category of Actions PL (4)* CC (7)* PL (4)* CC (6)* PL (4)* CC (7)* PL (4)* CC (7)* PL (4)* CC (6)* Parliamentary moves 32% 68% 28% 72% 59% 41% 59% 41% 55% 45% Stances 39% 61% 51% 49% 63% 37% 76% 24% 79% 21% Congressional roles 51% 49% 57% 43% 63% 37% 72% 28% 83% 17% Foreign policy 24% 76% 20% 80% 56% 44% 84% 16% 71% 29% Executive connections 66% 34% 70% 30% 70% 30% 94% 6% 90% 10% Extraconstitutional roles Parties and elections 100% 0 14% 86% 75% 25% 100% 0 100% 0 Rare kind of member Questioned behavior 0 3 (.5) 2 2 (.3) 12 (3) Newspaper/ Symbolic 17% 83% 32% 68% 63% 37% 86% 14% 89% 11% Various 44% 56% 67% 33% 43% 57% 100% 0 100% 0 Totals 324 472 107 129 329 194 372 94 605 134 Percent of total actions 41% 59% 45% 55% 63% 37% 80% 20% 82% 18% Overall, Table 3-4 provides some evidence for the dominant thesis and some evidence for the theory of parallel leadership. I will discus s the evidence that supports the dominant thesis, 79

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that there is a shift from str ong committee chair leadership to st rong party leadership, and then the evidence for parallel leaders in turn. First, the total percentage of actions performed by party leaders and prestige committee chairs over time pr ovides evidence for the dominant thesis that is similar to that in Table 3-3. Chairmen of pr estige committees perform most of the leadership actions in the committee government era in to tal and party leaders perform most of the leadership actions in the party governme nt era in total. This shift is also depicted in Figure 3-5. Figure 3-5. Percent of all actions performed by party leaders a nd prestige chairs. The abundance of Washington Post data also allow me to an alyze individual actions. The parliamentary moves, foreign policy, and n ewspaper/symbolic categor ies follow much of the same pattern. These action categories show a clear shift from prestigious committee chairs doing all the action to party lead ers taking the reins of leadership. The newspaper/symbolic category is particularly telling in th e sense that not only is it shown that there is a shift in overall actions performed but it is illustrates that journa lists too have taken noti ce of where the primary seat of action is taking place. This action category seeks to measure who the 80

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newspaper/journalists perceive as the most important actors of the time by placing them in the headlines and putting their picture on the front page. There is a significant shift across time in this important category that supports the dominan t thesis. Figure 3-6 illustrates these action subcategories that support the dominant thesis. 32% 28% 59%59% 55% 68% 72% 41%41% 45% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 81st89th97th100th104th CongressPercentage Party Leaders Prestige Chai A 24% 20% 56% 84% 71% 76% 80% 44% 16% 29% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 81st89th97th100th104th CongressPercentage Party Leaders Prestige Chairs B 81

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17% 32% 63% 86% 89% 83% 68% 37% 14% 11% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 81st89th97th100th104th CongressPercentage Party Leaders Prestige Chairs C Figure 3-6. Party Leaders and Prestige Chair Actions (A) Parliamentary Moves (B)Foreign Policy Moves (C) Newspaper/Symbolic Moves On the other hand, there is also some evidence th at supports that theory of parallel leaders in Table 3-4. The first piece of evidence comes from the 89th Congress in the stances category. Party leaders perform 51% of the stand taking actions while presti ge chairs perform 49%. The leaders are nearly parallel in the percent of stances that they take. Moreover, party leaders seize more of those actions in the committee government era which goes against what the traditional thesis would suggest. In the 81st Congress there is more evidence of parallel leadership in the congressional roles category. Party leaders perform 51% of all congressional role type maneuvers while committee chairs perform 49%. Again, the leaders are nearly equal in the percent of actions that are pe rformed. In addition, party leaders have a slight edge over committee chairs despite the 81st Congress being a part of th e committee government era where the dominant thesis would have committee chairs performing the lions share of the work. Furthermore, in the same categor y of congressional roles, the 89th Congress also shows party leaders acting more often. Part y leaders outperform prestige comm ittee chairs in congressional type roles 57% to 43%. Although th e leaders are not acting as parall el leaders, it is clear that 82

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party leaders are performing most of the congr essional roles type actions in the committee government era. In fact, party leaders surpass pr estige committee chairs in each Congress in this action category. The prevailing l iterature would have one thi nk that party leaders in the committee government were incapable of this type of domination. Figure 3-6 illustrates the evidence for parallel leaders from the stan ces and congressional ro les subcategories. Finally, there is one additional action categor y where party leaders are more active than committee chairs, executive connections. This illustration can be found in Figure 3-7. In every Congress under this study part y leaders have had more contac t with the president and his administration than prestige chairs. Although all of these links to the executive branch of government are not necessarily positive,18 this category may be an important measure of who the president thinks is important or who he thinks ma y be a threat to his agenda. While this is not direct evidence for the theory of parallel leadershi p, this is an indication that scholars have failed to see the importance of party leader s in the committee government era. 18 There is one individual action that looks at cr iticism from the president or his administration. 83

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A B 84

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85 C Figure 3-7. Party Leader and Committee Chair Acti ons (A) Congressional Roles (B) Stances (C) Executive Connections Conclusion While this chapter has provided some striking evidence for the prevailing theory that there has been a shift since the period of committee government in which leadership position has played the most prominent role in the legislative process, all is not lost for the theory of parallel leaders. First, it has been shown that both pa rty leaders and committee ch airs matter irrespective of the era of government in which they rule. A ma jor component of the theory of parallel leaders is that neither leader can manage the affairs of the House without the other. These data show that neither leadership position is going to play an altogether inactive role. Second, there are several instances of parallel leadership. These w ill be explored further in the chapters that follow and begin with the era of committee government.

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CHAPTER 4 COMMITTEE GOVERNMENT Introduction As its name suggests, the era of committee govern ment is a period in legislative history in which committees dominated the policy process. Although it is difficult to imagine bills becoming laws without working their way throug h the committee structure in some manner, during the committee government period, committees and especially their chairs are described as controlling the process so much th at the terms baron and czar th at once served to describe overbearing Speakers, resurfaced as adjectives to describe some chairmen. The era commenced with the passage of the 1946 Legislative Reorganization Act which was a direct response to increasing powers of the presidency and al so the inability of Congress to act on its own behalf.1 The intention of the Act was to stre ngthen Congress capacity to legislate and to increase their powers vis--vis the execu tive. Rising executive powers during the Great Depression and World War II lead a bipartisan Congress to take acti on to curb the powers of the president (especially Roosevelt) while finding a way to develop and accumulate powers of their own (Dodd 1977; Schickler 2001). The 1946 Act changed the structure of comm ittees in Congress in numerous ways. The number of committees were dras tically reduced from 49 to 19 in the House (Davidson 1990). The idea was to streamline and consolidate the committee structure. Committee jurisdictions would not shift, but their jurisdictions would be expanded (Schickler 2001). By eliminating some of the minor committees, members woul d have greater access to more important committees. In addition, committee staffs increas ed in size allowing Congress to watch over the 1 For a discussion about the presidents increasing powers during WWII and Congress response see James Sundquists The Decline and Resu rgence of Congress (1981). Also see Dodd (1977) and Schickler (2001). A comprehensive study on the 1946 LRA was done by Roger H. Davidson (1990). 86

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executive and its agencies more carefully. But the most important result, albeit unintended, of the LRA for my concern here is that chairmen became more powerful than ever controlling the committees agendas, structure, procedures, a nd policy outputs (Deeri ng and Smith 1997, 29). In the end, committee chairs emerged as ev en more powerful figures who would dominate congressional politics until the 1970s (Dodd 1977, 287). A further implication is that the party would have a decreased role in policy making. Party leaders could not intimidate committee leaders or the autonomy of their committees. This decreased the role of the part y leadership and made committee members largely unaccountable (Dodd 1977). Seniority also played a large part in making the committee chairs and its members unaccountable and wanting responsibility because the members knew they could not be removed whether they supported or opposed pending le gislation (Dodd 1977). While the Act was intended to give more power to more members, it actually put power in the hands of the very few committee leaders. This is the typical story from the dominant theo ries that recount the days of the committee government era: powerful, autonomous, dominant, committee chairs who lead the legislative process largely unaccountable to the party leader ship. In this chapter, the 81st and the 89th Congresses in the committee government era are examined with a goal toward showing the actions that party leaders and committee chairs pe rformed as leaders in th e public realm. It is shown that party leaders were not as insignificant as previously thought. Plan for the Next Two Chapters As discussed in the methods section in Chap ter Three, specific congresses were chosen because they were the ones in which the most key legislation was produced within the committee and party government eras. Here and in the following chapter, each Congress is discussed in turn to illustrate the individuals that are the party leaders and committee chairs of that time as 87

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well as to illuminate the institut ional and historical context in which those leaders operate. For each Congress four things are accomplished with the goal toward testing the theory of parallel leaders. First, a brief history of each Congress is given to describe the po litical climate. This history is not comprehensive, but it will outlin e the conditions under which the leaders were operating. Second, the first hypothesis is examined by calculating the percentage of actions performed by party leaders and committee chairs for each Congress and for the entire committee government period.2 Here the analysis is presented in tw o different ways. This illustrates that whether parallel leaders exist is dependent upon which committee chairs are included in the analysis. First, party leaders are compared with chairs of prestigious committees. For this analysis prestigious committees are Appropria tions, Ways and Means and Rules, Budget, Foreign Affairs, Armed Services, and Judiciar y. This can be found on Table 4-1. Second, party leaders are compared with the top four action pr oducing committee chairs in each Congress, or what can be called the most salient chairs. Some scholars have argued that just as salient issues are constantly changing, so too ar e the chairmen that are most re levant for the political process (Young and Heitshusen 2003). For the purposes of this research, the argument is that the committee chairs that perform the most actions may be different from Congress to Congress depending on the policy areas or issues that ar e most salient at the time. Therefore, the leadership comparisons that are made here may not be appropriate if the same committee chairs are examined throughout time. Just as committees differ, so too do the salience of those committees and their chairmen. 2 The party government era is left for Chapter Five. 88

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Table 4-1. Number and percent of actions perf ormed by party leaders and prestige committee chairs by congress Note: The total number of party leaders or prestigious comm ittee chairs that served in each Congress. Raw numbers of actions performed are displayed. Below the raw score, the percentage of total actions performed by each leadership group is given. 81 st Congress 89th Congress 97th Congress 100th Congress 104th Congress Sub-Category of Actions PL (4)* CC (7)* PL (4)* CC (6)* PL (4)* CC (7)* PL (4)* CC (7)* PL (4)* CC (6)* Parliamentary moves 62 32% 131 68% 13 28% 33 72% 41 59% 29 41% 20 59% 14 41% 28 55% 23 45% Stances 53 39% 84 61% 21 51% 20 49% 88 63% 52 37% 78 76% 24 24% 154 79% 41 21% Congressional roles 136 51% 132 49% 46 57% 35 43% 119 63% 70 37% 82 72% 32 28% 233 83% 49(8) 17% Foreign Policy 24 24% 76 76% 2 20% 8 80% 5 56% 4 44% 48 84% 9 12% 10 71% 4 29% Executive connections 38 66% 20 34% 14 70% 6 30% 45 70% 19 30% 32 94% 2 6% 36 90% 4 10% Extra-constitutional roles Parties and elections 2 100% 0 0% 1 14% 6 86% 3 75% 1 25% 43 100% 0 0% 17 100% 0 0% Rare kind of member Questioned behavior 0 3 2 2 12 Newspaper/ Symbolic 5 17% 24 83% 8 32% 17 68% 25 63% 15 37% 66 86% 11 14% 109 89% 13 11% Various 4 5 2 1 3 4 1 6 Totals 324 472 107 129 329 194 372 94 605 134 Total percentages 41% 59% 45% 55% 63% 37% 80% 20% 82% 18% Third, individual actions are analyzed to test the second hypothesis that the quality or type of actions performed by party leaders and committee chairs are not different. This is done in two ways. First, Tables 3-3. and 4-1 are revisited a nd individual actions and subcategories of actions are highlighted to determine what maneuvers pa rty leaders and committee chairs make in the public sphere. Then it is determined which of those are similar and which are different. These figures are discussed within the text of the ne xt section that is discussed below. As those individual action figures are assessed, several individual acti ons or subcategories of actions are selected in each C ongress to illustrate the roles th at party leaders and chairs are 89

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performing in a historical contex t. Actions that are shown to be significant in meaning and number are described for each i ndividual Congress in question. Fo r example, rules procedures and changes were at the forefront of congressional policy making in the 81st Congress. Scholars who study congressional rules consistently examine the 81st Congress rules changes and these data show that they are correct in their assess ments. This session of Congress was marked by more rules actions than any other session in the data set. For t hose reasons, rules proceedings in the 81st Congress are examined. Forei gn policy actions were also prevalent in this time period so they are also evaluated. What actions to deta il in my analysis is obviously a partial judgment call especially if a session does not have any part icularly remarkable figures as compared to the other sessions. Only actions that are a part of each individual Congre ss are discussed. In addition to examining several individual actions or subcategories of actions in each Congress to illustrate the roles of party leaders and committ ee chairs, specific actions performed by the leadership in order to pass or prevent from passing specific legislati on are also underscored. Expressly, civil rights legislation in the 89th Congress and the budget process in the 97th Congress are examined. These two events deserve extra attention because of their important nature. Finally, actions are positioned in the context of the relationship th at party leaders and committee chairs have with one another which I call leadership interactions. Throughout the Post, there is a valuable dialogue taking place between the leader ship positions that will be linked through the context of its actions. A leadership intera ction entails observing not only when party leaders and committee chairs did interact, but also when they did not or maybe should have. An interaction betw een party leaders and committee ch airs is not only defined as a direct meeting, discussion, or action between the two, but also when one leader comments on 90

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another. Sometimes a small comment can set off a change of events between the two parties. In addition, it is occasionally noted when leaders do not respond to one another. Often not saying or acting can be as interesting as an action itself, although we are then left to wonder what that person was thinking. Before turn ing to the analysis of the 81st Congress, some more descriptive statistics about the data are discussed. Examining the Committee Government Era Data Table 4-2 shows all the actions performed by party leaders and committee chairs from the Washington Post data. The far left column shows the li st of action categories. This list is slightly different from the one in Chapter Two. Here the eight new action categories are incorporated for this analysis. They are starred so that they may be differentiated from Mayhews original 43. They are listed in Mayhews orig inal order except where the new categories are integrated to fit in his categorizations. Table 4-2. Party Leader and Co mmittee Chair Actions in the Washington Post. Committee Government Era, 1947-1971, 81st and 89th Congresses Party Government Era, 1979-1996, 97th,100th, 104th Congresses Totals for all Congresses 81st, 89 th, 97th, 100 th, and 104 th Leader Actions Party leaders (8) Committee chairs (44) Party leaders (12) Committee chairs (63) Party leaders (20) Committee chairs (107) Legislate 52 182 78 68 130 250 Legislate eponym 1 2 0 3 Make appointment 0 0 Impeach/Censure 0 0 0 0 Censure/Expel 1 0 1 Rules 15 31 1 2 16 33 Executive-Legislative procedure 5 5 5 5 Investigate 3 52 10 14 13 66 Take stand 68 173 300 164 368 337 Big speech 3 12 1 15 0 Filibuster 1 0 1 Singular stand 1 4 5 0 Tipping vote 1 0 1 Disclose 1 2 1 2 Write 1 1 4 5 1 91

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Table 4-2. Continued. Note: Starred actions are my own invention. All ot her actions were original to Mayhews research. Committee Government Era, 1947-1971, 81st and 89th Congresses Party Government Era, 1979-1996, 97th,100th, 104th Congresses Totals for all Congresses 81st, 89 th, 97th, 100 th, and 104 th Leader Actions Party leaders (8) Committee chairs (44) Party leaders (12) Committee chairs (63) Party leaders (20) Committee chairs (107) Committee Leader to talk to Party Leader* 3 1 0 4 Party Leader to talk to Committee Chair* 0 0 Leader 173 1 432 1 605 2 Run for leader 1 1 0 Committee chair 284 196 0 480 Committee member 2 6 1 2 7 Special committee 4 2 1 1 5 3 Act as speaker* 2 1 2 1 Opposition 4 15 50 17 54 33 Foreign policy 27 88 63 20 90 108 Counsel administration 29 13 33 8 62 21 Speak for administration 2 5 5 1 7 6 Take appointment 0 0 Big four cabinet 0 0 Presidential support* 2 5 7 0 Presidential contact* 13 8 7 1 20 9 Presidential criticism* 2 1 13 3 15 5 Non-Congress. role 1 0 1 Commission 0 0 Pres. Or Vice Pres. (runs) 42 42 0 Pres. selection 4 1 4 1 Party convention 4 4 0 State/Local organization 1 0 1 Other party 1 3 1 3 Mobilization 0 0 Congressional elections 2 6 13 2 15 8 Rare party/ideology 0 0 Rare race/ethnic/gender 0 0 Dubiousness 5 14 5 14 10 Is censured/expelled 0 0 Resigns 1 0 1 Other eponym 0 0 Distributive politics 0 0 Unusual 6 19 10 4 16 23 Headline* 7 60 103 17 110 77 Pictured* 6 9 97 31 103 40 Total 431 979 1306 564 1737 1543 92

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Table 4-2 shows every action committed by part y leaders and committee chairs in each of the Congresses that are examined. This comm ittee government and party government eras are combined in this table. The committee government era includes the 81st and 89th Congress and the party government era includes the 97th, 100th, and 104th Congresses. This table shows 1737 actions performed by 20 party leaders and 1543 actions performed by 107 committee chairs. Not every party leader or committee chair that is incl uded performs an action. In other words, some leaders never perform an action that shows up on the front page of the Post but they are included in the total leadership number here. The differences between the Washington Post data and Mayhews data presented in Chapter Two are interesting to compare. The total number of actions from the Post records total 3280 compared to Mayhews 177. However, just like Mayhew's data, the observations here are also a bit spread out. There are still several action categories that have very few, if any, observations which again begs the question, w ho is performing those actions? The action categories that have zero observations are: make appointment, impeach/censure, party leader talks to committee chair, take appoi ntment, big four cabinet*, commission*, mobilization,* rare party ideology*, rare race/ethnic/gender*, i s censured/expelled*, other eponym*, and distribut ive politics. The six starred actions are ones that are not performed by party leaders or committee chai rs in either Mayhews data or my own. 81st Congress The 81st Congress (January 3, 1949January 2, 1 951) kicked off with the Democrats regaining majority status from the Republicans a nd would be the beginning of their 46 year long reign in the House (with the exception of the 83rd Congress) until the Republican Revolution in 1995. Speaker Sam Rayburn (D-Tx.) was not new to the job as he commanded the House beginning in the 76th Congress following the death of Speaker William B. Bankhead (D-Al.) on 93

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September 16, 1940, until the Republ icans took over in the 80th Congress. Not only did the Democrats win back the House at this time, but they also won back the Senate and Harry S. Truman (D) won the presidency in one of the biggest presidential election upsets in history. The 81st Congress is an interesting case study be cause in a time in which conventional scholarship argues that committee chairs hold much of the power and influence, the session begins with a successful attempt by Rayburn and th e party leadership to enact the 21-day rule which would take some power away from th e prestigious Rules Committee chairman, Adolph Sabath (D-Il.). If Sabath were to try and bot tle up legislation, the 21-day rule would give Rayburn the ability to sidestep him and bring anot her committees legislation to the floor. The first hypothesis states th at party leaders and committee chairs will perform a similar number of actions. Figure 4-1 shows the total number of actions performed by all party leaders and committee chairs in each of the Congresses of interest. In the 81st Congress, party leaders performed 324 total actions and committee chai rs performed 738 actions. Committee chairs performed more than twice as many actions as party leaders however, there are more than 5 times the number of committee chairs as there are party leaders. 738 241 246 137 182 328 107 329 372 605 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 81st89th97th100th104th Congres s Actio n Committee Chairs Party Leaders Figure 4-1. Actions Performed by All Pa rty Leaders and All Committee Chairs Figure 4-2 shows the percentage of overal l actions performed by party leaders and committee chairs in each Congress. Party lead ers perform 31% of all actions and committee 94

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chairs perform 69% of all actions. However, th ese percentages are a bit misleading because they include all committee chairs in th e analysis. The results look di fferent when chairs of prestige committees are compared to the party leadership. Th is analysis can be fou nd in Table 4-1 in this same chapter. All four party leaders are examined along with 6-7 (dependent upon which Congress is in question) committee chairs of prestige or power committees. For the 81st Congress there are 7 prestigious committee chairs. They are Ways and Means, Appropriations, Rules, Foreign Affairs, Armed Services and Judiciary. John Kee (Wv.) replaced Sol Bloom (Ny.) as Chair of the Foreign Affairs committee following his death, therefore both chairs are included. This table shows the raw number of actions performed by each leadership type (PL for party leaders and CC for prestige committee ch airs). Below the raw number of actions performed is the percentage of total actions performed. 31%31% 57% 72% 77% 59% 55% 37% 20% 18% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 81st89th97th100th104th Party Leaders Committee Chairs Figure 4-2. Percentage of All Actions Perf ormed by All Party Leaders and All Committee Chairs. In the 81st Congress, prestigious chairs perform only 59% of all actions while party leaders perform 41% of all actions. While the total acti on percents do not support the theory of parallel leaders, they do show that party leaders are act ing much more in concert with chairs than expected. According to the previous scholarship this is not what we might expect; committee 95

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chairs should be performing a noticeably greater number of actions and chairs of prestigious committees should be even more active. Regard less of what committee chairs are doing or not doing, what is clear is that party leaders are ac tively engaged in the legisl ative process, even in the era of strong committees. Table 4-1 also shows the percentage results of all the action subcategories. There are eleven different subcategories of actions. They are listed on the far left side of the table. Looking first at the data for the 81st Congress, (the other Congresse s will be discussed later in this chapter and the reader will be referred back to this table) it is clear that committee chairs are not the only ones taking part in the legislative arena. Party leaders in the era of committee government do matter. First, the raw scores illustrate that party leaders perform more congressional roles and executive connections type actions, while committee chairs perform more stances, parliamentary moves, for eign policy, and newspaper/symbolic type actions. Furthermore, party leaders and committee ch airs are shown to be pa rallel leaders in the area of congressional roles where they perform almost the same percentage of overall actions. Finally, the salient committee chairs are compared to the party leadership in Figure 4-3. It compares the top four action producing chairs with the party leadership. These data support the dominant thesis of a shift overtime in who is perf orming the most actions. It is illustrated that committee chairs perform more actions in the committee era and party leaders perform more actions in the party era. The top f our action producing leaders for the 81st Congress along with the number of actions that they performed are as follows: Party Leaders: Sam Rayburn (TX) 194 John McCormack (MA) 97 Percy Priest (TN) 24 Francis E. Walter (PA) 9 96

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Committee Chairs: Carl Vinson (GA) Armed Services 224 Clarence Cannon (MO) Appropriations 84 John L. McMillan (SC) District of Columbia 79 Robert L. Doughton (NC) Ways and Means 64 42% 41% 64% 80% 83% 58% 59% 36% 20% 17% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 81st89th97th100th104th CongressPercentage Party Leaders Salient Chairs Figure 4-3. Top Four Action Producers. I hypothesized that party leaders and committee chairs were parallel leaders who would perform a similar number of actions and similar t ype of actions. It has been shown that party leaders and committee chairs in the 81st Congress are parallel l eaders in the realm of congressional roles. It has also been shown that party l eaders performed more executive connection type maneuvers than committee chairs wh ich is in conflict with the dominant thesis. On the other hand, committee chairs are shown to dominate leadership actions in several other realms that the dominant theories advance. It is still necessary to examine the newspaper accounts in-depth to see an additional account of leadership actions. By examining the Washington Post it can be demonstrated what actions party leaders and committee chairs are 97

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committing as noticed by those who are semi-aware citizens. The next section takes a closer look at the individual action categor ies to show exactly how congressional leaders perform in the legislative arena. Parliamentary Procedures Actions Parliamentary procedures may be described as the lifeblood of the Congress because without the use of these procedures bills would not become laws. The parliamentary procedures action sub-category encompasses ei ght primary action categories. Among them, legislating is the most obvious method through which lawmaking occurs and the primary parliamentary procedure. While legislating is the most wi dely performed action in the parliamentary procedure category for all Congresse s, it is not very revealing because of its frequent use and broad connotat ion. Almost anything a member of Congress does can be thought of as legislating. With that said, the more illustrative way to differentiate party leader and committee chair actions is to examine acts other than legislating. After all, since actions are multiply coded many of the legislate actions are performed concomitantly with another action such as making rules or investigating. Rules actions Rules changes or proposed rules ch anges were big business in the 81st Congress. In fact, party leaders and committee chairs in the 81st Congress took part in more rules proceedings actions (41) than all other Congr esses in question combined (8). One reason may be that the Democrats just won back the House after losing it to the Republicans for the first time in the previous ten Congresses and they wanted to maintain their ma jority status (Lapham 1988). Another may be the Democrats desire to push Pr esident Trumans legislative agenda. It was probably some combination of both. Regardless of the reason, the Rules Committee was at the 98

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forefront of front page news. Lapham argues t he Rules Committee received a major share of the attention in the public debates in the newspapers during that time (Lapham 1988). The most analyzed (among political scientists ) and arguably most important rules change happened on the first day of the le gislative session. In general, opening days of a new session of Congress entail freshman members being sworn into their new posts and routine leadership elections, which are generally decided along party lines, being held. However, the opening day of the 81st Congress was not routine to say the least es pecially given what traditional scholarship says we should expect to see, that is strong committee chairman ruling the legislative process with an iron fist. The headline th at day read: House Curbs Rules Group.3 That day the House voted to pass the 21-day discharge rule which prevents the Committee on Rules from blocking legislation they do not want the House to consider The 21-day rule allows the chairman of any committee the ability to discharge4 (or bypass) the Rules committ ee and bring his committees legislation directly to the full House for di scussion. Any chairman may bypass the Rules Committee but their legislation must be recogniz ed by the Speaker. Veteran Chairman of the Rules Committee, Adolph Sabath (D-Il.) hims elf stood up and moved to adopt this rule essentially curbing his own powers and the power s of the conservative coalition that often controlled the committee by preventing liberal legislation from going through. Not only were some of Chairman Sabaths powers taken awa y, but Speaker Rayburn gained a new avenue for bringing his party and Trumans legislative agenda to the forefront of the political arena. One historian argues that Sabath owed Rayburn his Ru les chairmanship. Some southern Democrats wanted a Rules chair who would be less sympathe tic to liberal legisla tion and Rayburn prevented 3 January 4, 1949 4 The procedure is so called because it takes the measure away from the committee charged with it. Strictly speaking, therefore, it is the committee, not the measure, that is discharged (Beth 2003). 99

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those Democrats from unseating Sabath (Hardeman and Bacon 1987). 5 Another scholar of the Rules Committee argues that Sabath thought that th e committee should be used as an instrument of the majority party which is one of the reas on he moved to adopt the rule (that and the fact that he had trouble controlling his committ ee especially the Southern Democrats and Republican that coalesced) (Robinson 1963,67). Rayburn was immediately congratulated by Truman who saw this as an opportunity to pass hi s agenda. Conservative members in the House wasted no time boo-hooing at the possibility of another Uncle Joe Cannon.6 What was Rayburn doing during th is monumental rules change that would allegedly make him more powerful to include conferring him w ith new czarist powers as one House member put it?7 Actual action marks received for that day were presidential support (he was congratulated by President Truman on the victory), leader (for being named as the Speaker), rules and legislate (for ordering a roll call on the question of the new rule), and take stand for asking the House to liv e up to the expectations of the American people.8 This does not appear to be an extraordinary action list for so meone who just gained a great deal of new power to pass his partys agenda. Obviously, those were just the actions that Rayburn performed on the front page. However, if we look to the rest of the story Rayburn conti nues his silence pertaining to his newfound powers. He does not boast or brag about them or hold them over any committee chairs head. Instead he thanks the membership for returning him to the highest office he had ever aspired to hold.9 Rayburns almost deafening silen ce is seen throughout most of his rules actions. In fact at the beginning of the congressi onal session the following year when 5 It is debatable how Sabath truly felt about this change. Lapham argues that Sabath was privately unhappy about the change to see his powers reduced, but Hardeman and Ba con argue in a footnote that Sabath was seeking revenge on the conservative coalition for slowing down a lot of legislation and therefore he wanted the new rule (Hardeman and Bacon 1987; Lapham 1988). 6 January 4, 1949 7 January 4, 1949 8 January 4, 1949 9 January 4, 1949 100

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the 21-day rule is up for renewal, the paper t oo suggests Rayburn as th e silent type saying Rayburn Remains Silent on whether he will call up Representative Eugene Coxs (D-Ga.) desire to get rid of the rule (a member of the committee that was gave Sabath some trouble) (Robinson 1963).10 Rayburn is not completely silent though. Vague may be a better description for his actions. When asked if Saba th had the right to cal l up the 21-day rule for renewal Rayburn said that might be subject to question although there was a possibility of action.11 The newspaper portrays him as very matt er-of-fact, getting the job done and not giving too many clues as to his private feelings on legislative matters.12 He uses the rule, or claims he will, to get certain legislation through to a floor vote, but his thought process or spoken words on the matter are largely unknown (L apham 1988). Rayburn often kept his opinions to himself (Bolling 1968, 150). One exception came at the beginning of 1950 when the 21 day rule was restored in the new session. Whether Rayburn was trul y pleased about his renewed abil ity to call up bills blocked by the Rules Committee was unclear because Rayburn was personally opposed to one important administration bill that he knew would need hi s help, Trumans Fair Employment Practices 10 January 18, 1950 11 January 18, 1949 12 Much more research would need to be done in order to see if this is a pa ttern for Rayburn or if he was merely silent during this one incident. 101

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Commission (FEPC) measure.13 Largely a civil rights measure to prevent discrimination in hiring and firing practices, Ra yburn gave a rare speech on the floor suggesting that any sabotaging of the FEPC was going to be done by the Republicans and shouting Who won the election in 1948, anyhow?14 Much of the rules actions during this session fo cused on the use of the 21-day rule in some fashion. Committee chairs tried to employ the 21-d ay rule to call up their legislation for a vote (John Lesinskis Fair Employment Practices Comm ission (FEPC) measure was a primary one. It was a failure). Rayburn applied the rule to bypass some chairs, such as Lesinskis FEPC, and at other times he exercised the rule to allow others to bring up their legislation, such as J. Hardin Petersons (Public Lands Committee) Alaska and Hawaii statehood act.15 Overall, Rayburn performed the most rules actions with a total of 11 in that Congress. Sabath and Lesinski carried out the second most ru les actions with 9 and 7, respectively. Throughout the session, multiple members tried to get rid of the rule altogether, but did not succeed until the following Congress (82nd Congress).16 The fight for rules was so intense that the highlight occurred on June 23, 1950 when Ch airman Sabath and Representative Eugene Cox (D-Ga.) literally got into a fistfight on the floor of the H ouse over the administrations housing bill which had been held up in the Rules Commi ttee numerous times. Cox wanted ten minutes of floor time, but Sabath only afforded him seven saying that he could not spare anymore time. 13 January 21, 1950 and January 24, 1950. The Post says Rayburn was personally opposed to the FEPC, but others argue that he was not. Steinberg lists several progra ms that Truman was trying to pass at this time. Among them, making the FEPC a permanent institution. Steinberg argues that Rayburn supported most of Trumans program, but doesnt state the exact ones. He states th at Rayburn knew that a permanent FEPC would never pass through the conservative coalition of Co ngressmen and therefore had to give tacit support to racial bigotry (Steinberg 1975, 233). Hardeman and Bacon only say that Rayburn helped block the bill, although pre-1956 his civil rights records was less than supportive (Hardeman and Bacon 1987, 421). Whether Rayburn personally supported the bill or not, he used his powers to prevent it from comi ng up for a vote on several occasions by recognizing other chairmen with other legislation. 14 January 21, 1950 15 Peterson has zero actions because although his bill was called up, he was never mentioned until the end of the story which was not on the front page. January 24, 1950. 16 Jan. 14, 1950, Jan. 18, 1950, Jan. 24, 1950 102

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Cox, aged 69, called him a liar and then punched Sabath, launching his glasses onto the ground. Sabath, no spring chicken himself at 83, fought back with tw o punches until another representative stepped in to break up the fight.17 Foreign policy actions It would be remiss not to menti on foreign policy actions in the 81st Congress. For one the end of World War II was still on the minds of many Congressmen and the turmoil in Korea was just beginning. In addition, more foreign po licy actions were performed, 103, in the 81st Congress than all the other Congr esses combined, 94. What may be more important for this study is that Carl Vinson (D-Ga.) was heading up the House Armed Services Committee. In all the Congresses of interest here, Vinson is the 3rd most active leader with a total of 224 actions attributed to him. Fifty-one of those actions are foreign policy type actions. This is what we might expect from the chairman of the Arme d Services Committee and the man known to many as the Admiral because he knew more about naval operations than many who served in the Navy (Cook 2004). Vinsons career in the House of Representatives spanned just over 50 years and for many of those he was known as the co ngressional authority on military affairs and championed a strong national defense. He began hi s career as a leader in the House by chairing the Naval Affairs Committee during World War II a nd continued his military prowess as chair of the Armed Services Committee until he retired in 1964 (Cook 2004). Naturally, most of Carl Vinsons actions in the 81st Congress dealt with foreign policy issues. In fact, he rarely opined on the subject of domestic issues until 1961(Carl Vinson Institute of Government. 2002). However, his outlook on the military, defense policy and foreign affairs was far from a mystery. A for eign policy action is defined by Mayhew as the action in question pertains to U.S. foreign or defense pol icy. It can be deduced, therefore, when 17 June 23, 1949 103

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examining foreign policy actions that the action rare ly stands alone. It is necessary to examine the surrounding actions or the actions that are pe rformed in relation to foreign policy. Table 43 shows the other actions (totaling 148) that Vinson performed concomitantly with his 51 foreign policy actions in the 81st Congress. Table 4-3. Carl Vinson's other actions asso ciated with his foreign policy actions. Action Times Occurred Committee chair 50 Legislate 33 Take stand 32 Investigate 17 Headline 10 Oppose administration 4 Counsel administration 3 Disclose 2 Speak for administration 1 In every instance except one, the foreign po licy action that Vinson executed occurred concomitantly with his position as chair of the Armed Services Committee. Chairman Vinson also legislated and took stands on nume rous foreign policy occasions. Vinsons committee considered multiple military spending bills including passing a record peacetime spending bill (before the Korean War began). Hi s committee also examined an extension of the draft and improved military housing at Quantico Marine base in Virginia. Vinson and his committee also put on their hats as investigators when they be gan examining irregularities in the Airforces Procurement Program and especially their acquisition of some B-36 airplanes. An anonymous person had written a letter charging that the bombers were purchased under false pretenses and the company who manufactured them was given preferential treatment (Cook 2004). Initially, Vinson tried to stay out of the controversy by assigning the investigative task to 104

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one of his subcommittees, but he eventually had to get involved as the debate heated up (Cook 2004). On questions of foreign affairs, Vinsons main objective was the maintenance of ample peacetime forces and equipment. He believed th at the United States should preserve a strong military presence and Vinson called for more troops tanks, planes, and warships and even pleas for the manufacture of a hydrogen bomb before Russia.18 In relation, three out of four of Vinsons opposition to the administration actions had to do with him opposing Trumans military spending proposals as too conservative.19 Vinson argued against Trumans budget cuts saying, If we do too much in the way of armi ng, we will just lose dollars. But if we do too little, we may lose American lives (Carl Vinson Institute of Government. 2002, 107). Leadership Interactions Leadership interactions, or instances of party leader and committee chair relations, communication, and otherwise contact, were observe d in the Post during th is research. Whether they seemed to be working together to achieve a common goal or whether they were at odds with one another and their goal s appeared to conflict we re noted. Some of their interactions have already been discussed within the context of indi vidual actions that they performed. Thus far the most frequent exchanges between party leaders and committee chairs in the 81st Congress has been between Rayburn and Sabath regarding the 21-day rule. The express relationship that party leaders and committee chairs were shown to have in the Post are scrutinized more closely here. Previous research suggests that there shoul d be a variety of occasions in which party leaders and committee chairs are found in disagreem ent over policy, rules, legislative tactics, and the like. In the 81st Congress, the primary cause for polic y disagreement between a party leader 18 January 28, 1950 19 October 11, 1949 105

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and a committee chair was over the FEPC bill wh ich was discussed earlier. Whether Rayburn personally supported the bill or not, he did his sh are to thwart its suc cess. He continually bypassed John Lesinski in favor of othe r chairman and/or other legislation.20 As Speaker, Rayburn had the authority to decide which legi slation would be discharged from the Rules committee when more than one chairman sought recognition. But Rayburn was not the only one trying to prevent the controversial bill fr om being called up. Numerous other committee chairmen were trying to get th eir legislation to the floor, not to mention the conservative coalition was adamantly opposed to it. The Pos t describes Rayburns power to call upon whichever chairman he wants (other than Lesinski) as his out from having to call up the divisive bill.21 Whether Rayburn was deliberately trying to hold off on the FEPC or whether he wanted to give other legislation (such as stat ehood bills for Alaska and Hawaii or the National Science Foundation bill) a chan ce is unknown. On January 23, 1950, as he promised, Lesinski tried to discharge the bill from the Rules co mmittee. Rayburn had already announced that he would not call up the bill and would not make a comment. 22 Another chairman, John Kee (DWv.) of the Foreign Affairs Committee deliberat ely refused to call up hi s legislation in hopes that Lesinskis bill was the only bill raised.23 The following day, Rayburn said that the statehood bills were called up before the FEPC bill and th at the atmosphere was not right for the civil rights legislation.24 Finally, there were several incidents in wh ich committee members, rather than party leaders, were found challenging the authority of their committees chair. The House Labor Committee opposed and voted against Chairman John Lesinskis (D-Mi.) choice for committee 20 January 23, 1950 and January 25, 1950 21 January 9, 1950 22 January 23, 1950 23 January 23, 1950 24 January 24, 1950 106

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counselor which the paper described as a break with tradition as committee members usually yield to their chairs requests.25 In addition, the vote was taken via confidential ballot, another oddity. Another committees membership walked out on their chairman altogether. Seven members of the Veterans Affair s Committee walked out of a committee meeting, refused to vote on a bill, and charged Chairman John Rankin (D-Ms.) with dictatorial tactics.26 Rankin was trying to pass legislation that would provide veterans with a $90 a month pension over the administrations opposition. The Post charged that Rankins intention was to place the Administrations House leadership on the spot but the paper did not specify any names. Rankin did not comment on the Administrations position or that of the House leadership, only that his committee had walked out on the veterans.27 Summary After analyzing the action data for the 81st Congress, party leaders and committee chairs may be portrayed as parallel leaders or by the dominant thesis depending on which chairs are included in the analysis and depending on which ac tions are being analyzed. It is even clearer that both leadership positions are active in the legislative process. Until now, research has focused on committee chairs strength and their ability to shape legislation. It has been shown through the actions that party leader s commit that they too have the capacity to shape legislation. This is especially true in the realm of congres sional roles and executive connections. However, there are also other areas where pa rty leaders are active in the legisl ative process even if they are not as active as committee chairs. There are, of course, individual leaders that stand out as being particularly active during this time period, bu t individual committee chairs are not shown to stand above individual party leaders in their activity. 25 January 27, 1949 26 January 16, 1949 27 January 16, 1949 107

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The two principal action produ cers during the time period are Carl Vinson (committee chair) with 224 actions and Sam Rayburn (Speaker and party leader) who performed 194 actions. Both of their action careers in the 81st Congress were addressed in detail. Next in line for the most number of individual actions were: John McCormack (PL, 97)28, Clarence Cannon (CC, 84), John McMillan (PL, 79) and Robert Doughton (CC, 64). The first thing to notice is that the list of top action producers includes an even mix of both party leaders and committee chairs.29 In addition, party leaders produce a similar number of actions in each pairing providing furthe evidence that they are parallel leaders. Not only do party leaders and committee chairs perform a similar number of actions, it has been illustrated throughout the 81st Congress that party leaders and committee chairs perform similar types of actions as well. r 89th Congress On January 4, 1965, President Lyndon Baines Johnson outlined his plan for sweeping domestic legislation which he termed the Grea t Society during his first State of the Union Address as an elected president30. His liberal legislative pr ogram entailed everything from Medicare, Medicaid, the developm ent of the department of H ousing and Urban Development, increased spending on education, anti-pollution, crime a nd transportation programs, a war on poverty, and naturally a continued commitment to civil rights legi slation (Barone 1990). All of these proposals and many more were passed by the 89th Congress in what would become the 28 In parentheses PL for party leader or CC for committee chair and the total number of actions that they performed in this Congress. 29 A Mann-Whitney test is calculated for each Congress and appears in Appendix I. There party leaders and prestige chairs are compared for the 81st Congress. Party leaders are slightly more active but their actions are not statistically significant from prestige chairs. Appendix I shows a Mann-Whitney test for the top four action producing party leaders and committee chairs. There comm ittee chairs are shown to be slightly more active but their actions are not statistically different from party leaders. 30 LBJ first used the term Great Society at a commencem ent speech at the University of Michigan in 1964, but it was popularized in his State of the Union Address (Barone 1990). 108

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most successful Congress to date in term s of most important legislation passed. 31 Interestingly, the Congress in which the most important legisl ation was passed is also the Congress in which the fewest number of overal l actions were performed. The first hypothesis states th at party leaders and committee chairs will perform a similar number of actions. Table 4-1 shows that the overall percentage of actions performed by party leaders and prestige chairs was 45% and 55%, respectively. For this Congress there are 6 prestigious committee chairs. They are Ways and Means, Appropriations, Rules, Foreign Affairs, Armed Services and Judiciary. In addition, a comparison of the top four action producing leaders and chairs show that party leaders perform even fewer overall actions, 41% to 59% for the salient committee chairs (Figure 4-2). These numbers are supportive of the dominant thesis that chairs will be more active in the 89th Congress which is part of the committee government era. The top action producers are listed below: Party Leaders: John W. McCormack (MA) 80 Hale Boggs (LA) 13 Carl Albert (OK) 11 Eugene J. Keogh (NY) 3 Committee Chairs: Adam Clayton Powell (NY) Education/Labor 49 Howard W. Smith (VA) Rules 38 John L. McMillan (SC) District of Columbia 34 Emanuel Celler (NY) Judiciary 32 On the other hand, a closer look at Table 4-1 shows that there is some evidence for the theory of parallel leaders. In the subcategory of taking stances, party lead ers and prestige chairs perform a similar number of actions with party leaders even holding a s light edge over chairs, 31 The 89th Congress is actually tied for the highest number of important enactments passed since 1947 with the 91st (1969-70) and 93rd (1973-74) Congresses. The to tal enactments passed is 22. 109

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51% to 49%. Moreover, two additional action subcategories have party leaders outperforming committee chairs. Party leaders carry out more congressional roles then prestige chairs, 57% to 43%. The party leadership was also at a slight advantage over chairs in the 81st Congress. In fact, in every Congress under st udy, party leaders performed mo re congressional roles than prestige committee chairs. Finally, the party leadership also made more executive connections than prestige chairs in the 89th Congress. Party leaders consulted with th e president or his administration over 70% of the time compared with 30% for chairs. This was also the case for the 81st Congress. Party leaders have dominated this area of action thr oughout the committee government era. They also continue to control these actions in the party government era. This is the first piece of evid ence to suggest that party lead ers and committee chairs may have specific roles that they adhere to in any given Congress. In other words, party leaders may be more likely to take stances and be involved in negotiations or talks wi th the executive than committee chairs. On the other hand, committee chairs may be more likely to be involved in parliamentary moves, discussions in foreign policy, or be shown on the front pages of the newspaper. Obviously this research only examin es five Congresses altoge ther and only two of those are a part of the committee government era, therefore it is not wi se to generalize. However, it is interesting that party leaders and committee chairs in the committee government era are performing similar actions from the 81st to the 89th Congress. I have argued that party leader s were actively taking part in the legislative process and these data demonstrate that position. If party leaders have performed an equal number of actions or more than committee chairs in several action categories then scholars have disregarded a crucial aspect of the legislative process. Those who have studied committee chairs in the 110

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committee government era have spent an inordinate amount of time examining committee chairs at the expense of the party l eadership. It is no t my argument here that scholars have overemphasized committee chairs and their role, but that they have underemphasized the role that party lead ers played. Investigative Actions As was alluded to earlier, upon examination of the individual actions that are performed in the 89th Congress, none really stand out as being particularly remarkable especially when compared to the other Congresses. This is espe cially strange given the fact that this is the Congress in which the highest number of important enactments were passed. While a great deal of significant legislation was passe d, there was necessarily a great d eal of debate in the Congress about LBJs Great Society program. In addition, there was also a great deal of debate about Vietnam and endless filibustering in the Senate on civil rights le gislation. Given these facts, it seems strange that there were fewer actions perf ormed in this Congress than any of the other Congresses that are examined. However, in Ch apter Six, it will be show n that the number of important enactments do not predict the number of actions performed. The fact that there are so few actions performed in the 89th Congress, compared with othe r Congresses, despite the high number of significant legislati on provides some initial evidence. With that being said, investigative actions are examined in this C ongress because scholars have argued that they occurred at a high rate (Mayhew 1991). While leaders altogether carried out more investigations in the 81st Congress, the 89th Congress and especially committee chairs were heav ily involved in investigations. This is what we might expect during the committee governme nt era if we examine Mayhews data in Divided We Govern (Mayhew 1991). Mayhew calculates the c ongressional investigations with the highest amount of publicity fr om 1947-2002 that generated a New York Times front page story 111

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for twenty or more days in a row. His data show that investigations number twenty-one within the committee government era (1947-1970) and ei ght in the party government era (1980-2002). The Washington Post action data support Mayhews claims. Investigate actions total 55 in the committee government era and only 24 in the party government era. As expected, committee chairs performed more investigative actions than did party leaders in this and all but one other Congress32. Edwin E. Willis (D-La.), head of the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC), was one of chai rmen who received quite a bit of attention for his investigation into Ku Klux Klan act ivities that was requested by the President.33 The HUAC was perhaps best known for its 1947 hear ings against alleged communists which included several Hollywood industry types. While the committee was initially created to probe communists, it also probed others who were thought to deny American freedoms (See for example Goodman 1968). Willis probed all aspect s of the Klans intim idation tactics which included dead rats being placed in mailboxes, cr oss burnings (including a cross being burned on the lawn of the North Carolina governors mans ion), and burning black churches to the ground.34 Chairman Willis even called a surprise witness to testify, an ex-Klansman from Louisiana. But Willis investigation into racia l agitators, as he called them did not end with the KKK, his investigations also included Nazis, communists, Black Muslims, and Minute Men.35 Willis was the last chairman of the committee; it was a bolished in 1969 and replaced by the Committee on Internal Security. Willis investigate actions to taled four for this Congress and all of them concerned the KKK. 32 In the 100th Congress, party leaders performed 1 more investigate action than committee chairs. 33 March 31, 1965 34 October 22, 1965 35 March 31, 1965 112

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Another member of Congress that might be expe cted to be involved in a high number of investigating actions is the chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Emanuel Celler (D-Ny.). Cellers investigate actions that coul d be found on the front pages of the Post totaled three for the 89th Congress. Two of the three actions dealt with Johnsons voting rights bill which would allow federal agent to intervene on behalf of those who were denied the right to register to vote. Manny Celler, as he was called, was a strong advocate for civil righ ts and he tried to strengthen the civil rights bill in the previous Congress (Blum 1991, 121). Therefore, it was no surprise that he immediately began hearings on the matter at Johnsons request to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment.36 At this time six southern states still utilized literacy tests that were unconstitutional. Celler lamented in his autobi ography that he could not do more to bring about equal rights. My guilt crawls inside of me because I have not done enough, because I can never do enough for people whom society punishes for no reason but the color of their skin (Celler 1953, 71). Adam Clayton Powell (D-Ny.), George Mahon (D-Tx.), and John L. McMillan (D-Sc.) were the only other committee chairman to attain front page investig ate actions. Powell, Chairman of the Education and Labor Committee, held hearings on Johnsons anti-poverty legislation to include increased funding for the popular Head Start program and Washingtons school system that Powell called the most d epressing he had seen in all his career.37 George Mahon, Chairman of the Appropriations Committee, investigated the crash of an XB-70 plane worth $500 million38 and John L. McMillan, Chairman of the House District Committee, held hearings on the issue of D.C. home rule.39 36 March 18, 1965 37 March 9, 1966 and June 17, 1966. 38 June 11 and June 24, 1966. 39 August 13, 18, and 19, 1965. 113

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Civil Rights Actions While the African-American struggle for equal and civil rights bega n long before the 89th Congress began their legislative work, this session should have been one of the most active legislative sessions in which civil rights legisl ation was deliberated. First and foremost, it was during the 89th Congress that the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was passed following Presidents Johnsons We Shall Overcome address to Congre ss. In addition, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) was established wh ich would eventually enforce equality in housing opportunities. However, in the 579 days in which the House was in session, only eighteen front page articles were found that were the specific subject of a civil rights issue and mentioned a party leader or committee chair. In addition, among those eighteen articles only eight different party leaders or committee ch airs were mentioned. They were Speaker McCormack, Majority Leader Carl Albert, Wh ip Hale Boggs, Emanuel Celler (Judiciary), Howard W. Smith (Rules), Thomas E. Mo rgan (Foreign Affairs), William L. Dawson (Government Operations), and Edwin E. Willis (I nternal Security). During such an important time in legislative and United States history there should seemingly be more party leader and committee chair actions regarding civil right s legislation on the front pages of the Post. At the beginning of the legislative session, on March 15, 1965, President Johnson addressed a joint session of Congr ess to outline his voting rights legislation directly to the legislative body and perhaps more importantly, to the United States people. His address was prompted by continued and increasing violence in Selma, Alabama as civil rights protesters on their way to Governor George Wallaces offi ce in Montgomery were once again blocked by policemen who showered them with teargas and beat them with whips.40 Speaker McCormack 40 March 9, 1965 114

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condemned the police brutality as a disgr aceful exhibition of arbitrary power.41 A few days later, Johnson was invited direc tly by the congressional leadership to address the nation in front of both houses of Congress. Speaker McCormack, Majority Leader Carl Albert, and Majority Whip Hale Boggs sat down with the President to lend their support42 (Mann 1996). It is highly unusual for a president to publicly address both congressional bodies except during the State of the Union address. In this case, it was even more unusual to address the Congress for the primary purpose of introducing one bill (Mann 1996) Later President Johnson reasoned that he had to restore confidence in the American peop le and that could only be done with a direct address (Mann 1996, 460). He pleaded, Their cause must be our cause too. Because it is not just Negroes, but really it is all of us, who must overcome the crippling legacy of bigotry and injustice And we shall overcome (Johnson 1966). Johnsons momentous address would forever link him as one of the greatest cr usaders of the civil rights movement. Emanuel Celler frequently engaged in investig ative actions regarding the KKK, but he was a defender of the civil rights movement in othe r ways. For example, the Judiciary Committee, under his leadership, passed an anti-discr iminatory housing bill that would prevent discrimination in the sale of new housing, leasing of apartments and discrimination by real estate agents.43 While the bill was not as far-reaching as the administration would have liked, Celler believed it would break up slums and raze ghetto walls.44 He also threatened to utilize the 21day rule to bypass the Rules Committee if they tried to prevent the bill from reaching the floor.45 Celler condemns the tyrannical Rules Committ ee for impeding so much legislation in his autobiography (Celler 1953). 41 March 9, 1965 42 March 15, 1965 43 June 30, 1966 44 June 30, 1966 45 June 30, 1966 115

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Celler also lent a hand in ai ding public school integration. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare issued guidelines desegreg ating that Southern citizens and Southern members of Congress alike believed too hasty at be st and others thought illegal. Senate Majority Leader Michael Mansfield (D-Mt.) issued a st atement backed by the Senate Appropriations Committee that the guidelines had gone too fa r. The guidelines based on the 1964 Civil Rights Act were designed to declare segregation by pu blic officials unlawfulnot to implement and affirmative policy of inte gration Mansfield said.46 His statement followed the administrations announcement that federal funds would be withheld from schools that di d not desegregate. Celler claimed investigative jurisdiction over th e matter in House fending off southern Rules Committee chairman, Howard W. Smith (D-Va. ) who wanted his committee to head the investigation.47 Smith and other southern members charged that Celler and the other liberals on the committee would not conduct a fair investig ation. Representative William Colmer from Mississippi alleged that allowing Celler to carry out the investigation wou ld be like putting the cat in charge of the canary.48 The guidelines also sought to withhold federal funds from hospitals. Leadership Interactions Party leaders and committee chairs were not re gularly characterized as bitter enemies nor great friends in the Post for the 89th Congress. Instead they were portrayed as simply doing their legislative task. Few words were spoken between the leaders. The few incidents in which party leaders could have, should have, or did have so me sort of interacti on with one another are discussed here. 46 September 29, 1966 47 September 30, 1966 48 September 30, 1966 116

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At the outset of the 89th Congress, the 21-day rule was once again approved allowing Speaker McCormack the authority to bypass the Rules Committee and call up legislation for a vote. Recall that the rule was adopted in the 81st Congress and then elim inated in the following Congress. It was not approved again until this time. The House also adopted two other rules which either granted additional power to Speaker McCormack or took power away from Howard W. Smith, Chairman of the Rules Committee. In a section titled McC ormack vs. Smith the House took the power away from Smith to prevent a House-Senate conference on legislation that passed both houses and another rule would prevent an individual member from halting legislation overnight to show added amendmen ts. Smith argued that these measures would prevent the House from amending anything added by the Senate. McCormack advocated for the changes that would allow for individua l House members to vote on the issues. 49 McCormack described the Rules Committee as a political arm of the Speaker and it is expected to cooperate with the Speaker whenever the committee has difficulty in ascertaining the spirit of the party platform (Matsunaga and Chen 1976,3 and 4). The Post concluded the story by alluding to the days of Uncle Joe Cannon when it wrote, The rules changes marked the biggest step toward restoring the power of the Speaker since much of it was stripped away in the revolt of 1910. And the days actions ended an era when Judge Smithcouldrun the House.50 Another interesting storyline appeared late in 1966 in which there was a mutiny, mainly waged by committee members, against Chairman of the House Education and Labor Committee, Adam Clayton Powell (D-Ny.).51 Powell was charged by his committee with numerous acts of wrongdoings and abuses of power including but not limited to, arbitrary hiring and firing of committee staff, inappropriate use of congressional funds including money for pleasure vacations 49 January 5, 1965 50 January 5, 1965 51 The front page storyline appeared on four different days, September 16,21,22,23, 1966. 117

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and a salary for his wife, and sabotaging a poverty bill against the desires of the whole committee in order have his own projects passed first.52 Eventually Powells powers were taken away from him and his fellow Congressmen trie d to expunge him from th e Congress. He took his case to the U.S. Supreme Court in Powell vs. McCormack and won his right to keep his duly elected congressional seat. In each of the four front page st ories about the rebellion against Powell, Speaker McCormack does not appear. However McCormack does make an appearance further into the pages of the newspaper. On September 18, 1966, another story headline reads, An Anti-Powell Plot. Speaker McCormack, who is amusingly named as Powells good friend, was holding a secret meeting with thr ee members of the Hous e Education and Labor Committee to discuss curbing Powells powers. Powell accidentally walked in on the meeting. Comments from neither party regardi ng the incident were provided. Finally, there was a story in which Rules Ch airman Howard W. Smith reminisced about his protective relationship with former Speaker Sam Rayburn and his relationship with the then current Speaker, McCormack. The narrative follow ed Smiths reelection de feat after 35 years of representation in Congress and te n years as the Rules chair. The reporter aptly noted the influence that Smith held in the House and more importantly in his position as chairman or King of the Rules who killed, pigeonholed, or diluted more legislation popular with the masses than any other man in historyHe used his influence and unexcelled tactical skill to slam the House door on New Deal, Fair Deal, New Frontier, and Great Society welfare measures he felt were too advanced.53 However, all this talk of power and influence was reported in past tense as the tale took a different turn into a disc ussion of Smiths loss of power. The reporter recounted that Smiths power began to diminish five years earlier and culminated 52 September 16, 1966 53 August 29, 1966 118

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when the House passed the 21-day rule that was previously discussed.54 Smith did not appear to agree with the reporter, Smith insists that Rayburn actually used him as a buffer on many bills, particularly civil rights and that the 21-day rule would soon be abolished.55 In his own words Smith suggested that he did not feel pres sured by Rayburn to report legislation out of his committee. And as for civil rights, Smith said of the legislation, I fought it from the beginning to the end. Sam knew that. He wasnt enthusias tic about some of he b ills either. Between you and me and the gatepost, I think he used me as a buffer. 56 Smith also talked about his friendship with Speaker McCormack. Smith said they were good friends, but he naturally disagreed with the enactment of the 21-day rule. Smith told McCormack that he was taking the job of the co mmittees in his own hands and compared the act to the days of Uncle Joe Cannon.57 Summary The results of the analysis of the 89th Congress provide some addi tional evidence that party leaders and committee chairs are parallel leaders. First, party leaders and committee chairs perform a similar number of actions in the stances category. Second, evidence from the perspective of journalists tell th e tale of party leaders who were very active in the legislative process. These results suggest th at more research needs to be done on the role that party leaders performed during the so-called committee government era. There is also some evidence for the dominant thesis. Committee chairs dominate parliamentary moves, foreign policy moves and newspaper/symbolic actions. 54 In 1961, the House voted to increas e the membership of the Rules Committee from 12 to 15 members, allowing for the possibility of more committee members who would be sympathetic to the wishes of the party leadership and thus curbing the power of the Chair. In 1963, the Hous e voted to make increase on the Rules Committee permanent (Jones 1968). 55 August 29, 1966 56 August 29, 1966 57 August 29, 1966 ( Washington Post ). Interestingly, Charle s O. Jones draws parallels between Smith and Cannon in his characterization of them as exce ssive leaders in his article (Jones 1968). 119

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In addition, the individual le aders that produced the highest number of actions were examined. Speaker McCormack topped the list w ith a total of 80 actions. Chairmen Powell, Smith, McMillan and Celler round out the top five action producers with 49, 38, 34 and 32 actions respectively. Majority Leader Carl Albert, who would become Speaker only four Congresses later, makes an almost dismal indivi dual showing with only 11 front page actions. Alberts poor action showing makes for an inte resting comparison with Majority Leader John McCormack in the 81st Congress who would also rise to the position of Speaker. McCormack was the third most active leader in that Congress with 97 total ac tions. It was seven Congresses later before McCormack would become Speaker. Bu t it is clear, at least in these years that McCormack was more active in his role. Interestingly, in his au tobiography, Carl Albert makes reference to the role of the majority leader, I t is inconceivable that the House could function without him, he argues (Albert and Goble 1990, 165) The paragraphs that precede and follow that quote describe John McCormack therefore it is really unclear whethe r Albert thought that it was the majority leader or McCormack who was indispensable. Unfortunately this study does not examine the relationship between Speaker Albe rt and Majority Leader Tip ONeill. Conclusion This concludes the analysis of the committee go vernment era. These data show that party leaders and committee chairs not only perform a si milar number of actions, but they also perform similar types of actions. If this analysis is co rrect then political scientis ts must reexamine their theories which suggest an overarching reach of power and influence on the part of committee chairs in this era. I am not suggesting that committee chairs did not many times act autonomously, but we must also examine what role party leaders had in the process. Finally, there is not overwhel ming evidence in the directi on of committee chairs holding the primary power during this time period, at least as seen in the public sphere of the Washington 120

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121 Post Scholars did not get it alt ogether wrong, but they may have overlooked the role of party leaders. It has been easy, almost convenient, for scholarship to focus on committee chairmen whose powers were more concrete than party leader s. In other words, the evidence for powerful committee chairs in the committee government era is more specific, more tangible, if you will, than the evidence for powerful party leaders. De ering and Smith describe this concentration as sources for committee power which include s eniority, apprenticeship, and reciprocity (Deering and Smith 1997, 31). With an inordinate number of conservative Southern Democrats holding those chair positions, who worked alongside Republicans to curb liberal legislation, it is simple to see why scholars desired to explain that influence. Interestingly, the story, in this sense, is similar during the party government era. Party leaders are given specific sources of power. They included th e decline of the rigid seniority system, party leaders ability to hire and fire committee chairs, a heterogeneous membership who were trying to advance liberal legislation, and more open committee proceedings. Deering and Smith termed them sources of power, Rohde called them tools of the leadership (Rohde 1991). Scholarship began focusing on these new command centers of power and influence and committee chairs got ignored. These party leadership tools are put to use in the next chapter.

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CHAPTER 5 PARTY GOVERNMENT ERA Introduction Following the 1970 Legislative Reorganization Ac t (LRA), and owed partly to that Act and the reforms that followed, scholars began havi ng a renewed interest in the party organization in Congress and by association a re newed interest in party leader s. The 1970s reforms changed the organization of Congress in two major ways. First, committee chairs resources for thwarting legislation were significantly di minished. Concomitantly, part y leaders gained substantial resources to circumscribe chairs that may have otherwise remained unresponsive. This allowed party leaders to bolster majority-desired legislative outputs. However, th ese changes did not take effect immediately. In fact, th e 1970 LRA took four years to beco me law and it would also take several more years before many of the effects were fully realized. First I will discuss how committee chairs powers were curbed and then I w ill turn to a discussion of the tools that party leaders gained. The reforms initially sought to move the center of power away from the autocratic committee chairs that had thwarted so much of the liberal agenda. However, an unintended consequence was that the crux of power was shif ted away from the full committee chairs to a slew of subcommittee chairs. The inten tion was to disperse power among the many subcommittees instead of the few committees. This essentially lead to what can be called the era of subcommittee government (Dodd and Schott 1979). Unfortunately, the members of the Democratic Study Group, an organized group of lib eral members, who instituted many of the reforms wanted to power to rest with the majo rity party leadership and not the subcommittees (Sinclair 1983). 122

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Besides shifting the center of legislative power from full committees to subcommittees, the reforms sought to curb the power full committ ee chairman held in other significant ways. Committees were required to have written rules so that chairman could not arbitrarily make them up, committee members were able to more easily call special meetings to di scuss legislation that the chair opposed if a majority was held, and the Speaker could recognize a member of the committee to bring a measure to the floor if the chair refused to call it up (Kravitz 1990). In addition, the Democratic Caucus became a new for ce to be reckoned with especially due to an increasing homogenous membership of like-minde d, liberal Democrats who wanted the party leadership to have the tools they needed to fulfill its goals of r eelection, power, and policy (Sinclair 1983). Committee chairs had to be increasingly responsive to the interests of the majority who assigned those chair positions (Sincl air 1983). Interestingly, the seniority system remained intact for the most part (Kravitz 1990). The Democratic Caucus could choose to override seniority in choosing chairman but they rarely did, instead the new powers of the party leadership along with the shared goals of the rank-and-file membership slowly persuaded committee chairs to fall in line wi th the rest of the party. While the new liberal Democratic majority moved to curb the powers of the full committee chairmen, they also acted to give ne w resources to the party leadership: The power to make committee assignments wa s taken from the Democrats on Ways and Means and given to the Steering and Policy Co mmittee, which the Speaker chairs and to which he appoints a number of members. Rules Committee nominations were made the prerogative of the Speaker. In addition, the Speaker has been gran ted increased power over the referral of bills (Sinclair 1983, 6). As with all of the reforms, immediate and full effects were not seen from the leadership. Speaker Carl Albert, who is not examined in this research, lead in the middle of the reforms and was therefore a transitional figure who hesitated to use the tools newly granted him by the rules changes (Davidson 1988, 357). Speaker Tip ONe ill, although regarded initially as guarded 123

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reformer, boasted many formal institutional powers as his tenure solidified (Davidson 1988). Finally, Speaker Jim Wright took full command of the tools th at were given to him by the membership (Davidson 1988). This is only a short summary of the change s that took place in the House throughout the 1970s and the literature on these reforms is volum inous. The key is that like-minded reformers, mainly liberal Democrats were tired of their legislative agendas being frustrated by a few conservative committee chairs. They decided to take action by curbing the powers of those chairs and placing the power to legislate with the majority party a nd its leadership. In this chapter three Congresses in the part y government era are examined, the 97th, 100th, and 104th. I argue that party l eaders and committee chairs will perform a similar number and type of leadership actions howev er, the results of the analysis for the period of party government are different from the period of committee government In fact, most of the evidence contradicts the parallel leaders argument and supports the dominant theories th at the party leadership are the most influential leaders. W ithout exception party leaders perform more total actions than prestige chairs and all committee chairs combined in all congresses. In addition, party leaders outperform chairs for each subcategory of action as seen in Table 4-1. There is a clear shift in the amount of acting that party l eaders are engaged. Conversely, committee chairs are actively engaged in the legislative process and they perform similar type s of actions as party leaders albeit in reduced quantity. Congressional sc holars that overlook committee chairs in their analyses are leaving an important element out of their research. This chapter follows the same organization as th e last chapter. In su m, four objectives are taken in order to determine if party leaders and committee chairs are parallel leaders: 1) A brief history of each Congress is provided. 2) The first hypothesis is tested by examining the 124

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percentage of actions performed by comparing pa rty leaders with prestig e chairs and salient chairs. 3) The second hypothesis is tested by ex amining the type of actions performed by party leaders and committee chairs. 4) Finally, actions are positioned in the cont ext of the relationship that party leaders and co mmittee chairs have with one another through leadership interactions. Examining the Party Government Era Data The combined party government era action data can be found in Table 4-2. The data in this table combine all actions perf ormed for all party leaders and all committee chairs in this era. This table also shows the combined data for the committee government era so that the two periods can be compared. This chapter ex amines twelve party leaders and 63 standing committee chairs that comprise the 97th, 100th, and 104th Congresses. Party leaders perform a total of 1306 actions and committee chairs perform 564 actions. Upon this initial examination of the data a different picture is painted from the committee government era. Overall, party leaders are performing more actions than committee chairs. 97th Congress When the 97th Congress began its first session on January 5, 1981, Ronald Reagan had not yet been inaugurated as the nations fortieth president, but Speaker Thomas Tip ONeill (DMa.) was well-versed in the governmental proce ss. He had been a member of the House of Representatives since 1953 and Speaker since 1977 while Democrat Jimmy Carter was president. When ONeill was initially elected Speaker, the House was still feeling the effects of the 1970 congressional reforms and it showed Whether it was an effect of the new reforms that leaders and rank-and-file alike were adapting to, the heterogeneous membership with intra-party polarization, or simply political and legislativ e incompetence the nation believed that the Carter years were a veritable disaster under the Democratic leadership (Farrell 2001, 539-540). It has been well documented that Democrats in the House were deeply divided, especially across 125

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Northern and Southern lines over policy, during the reform period and some time after (Rohde 1991, 34). Democrats squabbled with each other in the Congress and with the president whom should have been an ally (Fa rrell 2001). However, the 1980s wa s the beginning of a new era in congressional history. There was a new centrali zation on Capitol Hill and a discernable trend toward leadership and order that had not been seen in a long time (Davidson 1988, 347). It was not until the House was well into the 1980s when Democrats would come together in agreement on many policy issues (Rohde 1991) that had kept th em from being as pro ductive as they could in the past. We now know and history tells us that the 97th Congress and the entire 1980s would be much different than the previous thirty or more years and even different than the late 70s in several key ways. First, the Democratic strongh old in the legislative branch of government had vanished. Even if the Carter ye ars did prove to be dismal for legislative productivity, at least the Democrats could pretend to be in control. Now divided government was a norm and the Republicans claimed to have a mandate, althoug h ONeill never bought into that theory (O'Neill and Novak 1987, 336). Reagan was elected by a landslide in the Electoral College, the Republicans won back the Senate, and they gained 34 seats in the House. ONeill and his leadership would have to compete with a poten tially hostile White House and Senate. On the other hand, ONeill was getting an increasing homogenous membership that would agree on many more areas of policy. The 97th Congress is an interesting case study fo r an examination of party leaders and committee chairs for several reason s. Although it is the first Congr ess that is examined which is for all intents and purposes a part of the era of party government, it is also one of the first Congresses of this era and party government, as described in this chapters intr oduction, is not 126

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fully entrenched. Dodd and Oppenheimer describe this period of transitio n exactly the same in their 1981 and 1985 recurring, but u pdated edited volume. Many of the 1970s reforms addresses the weak nesses of House parties, and to a degree they reinvigorated the parties and presen ted them with new, expanded roles on the operation of the House. However, while th e reform process did evidence a short-term emergence of party activism, it has not thus far produced an institutionalized form of party government (Dodd and Oppenheimer 1981,50; 1985, 52). It is not until the mid to late 1980s when the party government model is strongest and conditional party government plays a prevalent role (Rohde 1991). It will therefore be interesting to see how rooted the party government model has become in the legislative process during this early time. It is al so the first Congress in which divi ded government plays a role, if it has a role at all. That issue will be taken up in the next chapter. The first hypothesis of the theory of parallel leaders is tested and the results are shown in Table 4-1 which compares party leaders to prestige chairs. The prestigious committee chairs that are included for this analysis are Ways and Means, Appropriations, Rules, Budget, Armed Services, Foreign Affairs, and Judiciary. Pa rty leaders outperform prestige chairs in all Congresses for the party government era. In the 97th Congress, party leader s perform 63% of all actions compared to 37% for prestige chairs. In the 100th and 104th Congresses, party leaders perform more than 80% of all actions. This is strong evidence for the dominant thesis. The second hypothesis is that party leaders and committee chairs will perform similar types of actions. These data ar e also found on Table 4-1. Here th e actions of party leaders and prestige committee chairs are compared using the act ion subcategories. First, the raw data show a significantly different picture than during the committee government era. Party leaders perform a greater number of actions than presti ge committee chairs in every subcategory. Not 127

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only are the raw number of actions performed by party leaders great er than committee chairs, but so are the percentages of overall actions of each type.1 Finally, the actions of salient committee chairs were compared to party leaders for the party government period. Party leaders outperforme d even salient chairs in all three Congresses in this period under study.2 Those salient leaders were: Party Leaders Thomas (Tip) ONeill 268 James C. Wright 50 Thomas Foley 8 Gillis W. Long 3 Committee Chairs Jim Jones (Budget) 90 Daniel D. Rostenkowski (Ways and Means) 72 Clement Zablocki (Foreign Affairs) 11 Morris Udall (Interior and Insular Affairs) 11 Executive Connections Actions and the Budget Process More executive connections actions we re performed by the leaders in the 97th legislative session than in any other Congre ss. Executive connections acti ons include five of Mayhews original actions: opposition, counsel administration, speak for administration, take appointment, big four cabinet, and three or iginal action categories, presidential support, presidential contact, and presidential criticism. Party leaders received marks for 45 of these eight action categories and committee chairs got marks for 21. An overwhelming number of those actions were opposition type actions that are defined as when a member tries to thwart the aims or impair the standing of a presid ential administration, through any variety of 1 Mann-Whitney tests were also performe d to compare party leaders and prestige chairs. The results of that analysis can be found in Appendix I. 2 Mann-Whitney tests were also performe d to compare party leaders and salient chairs. The results of that analysis can be found in Appendix I. 128

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techniques (Mayhew 2000b, 68). Party leader s opposed the administration 23 times and committee chairs did so 11 times. This was the highest number of times in each of the five Congresses that are examined here that party leaders and committee chairs spoke out publicly against an administration. This was a period of divided government, but ca re should be taken to blame it for the hostile actions of party leader s and committee chairs during this time. There are two other periods of divided govern ment in this study which may also be potentially hostile political envir onments for the executive and the legislative branches to operate under, the 100th and 104th Congress. The 100th Congress pitted Speaker James C. Wright and the Democratic majority against President Reagan and the 104th Congress witnessed Speaker Newt Gingrich up against President Clinton. The data however show that in the 97th Congress leaders opposed the administration a total of 34 times compared with only 13 times in the 100th and 20 times in the 104th. In relation, the 97th Congress also received the most marks (8) for presidential criticism where the president or his administration said something or acted in some way to disparage a leader. The other pre sidential criticism marks are as follows: 81st (3), 89th (0), 100th (6), and 104th (2). Finally, in this Congr ess leaders also spoke for the administration the most out of any Congress in this study. All of these actions together make for an interesting look at executive-legislative relations. Most of the actions that party leaders and co mmittee chairs shared with President Reagan and his administration related to the budget a nd every single action in which a congressional leader voiced opposition to the admini stration in the public realm of the Post had to do with Reagans sweeping tax and budget cuts. Reagan and the Democratic House promoted different proposals, but in the end Reagan prevailed. Reagan wanted a three year across the board tax cut and the Democratic House wanted a one year ta x cut for the middle class. As for the budget 129

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cuts, it appeared that Reagan was willing to cut almost every government spending program including reductions on primary and secondary education, employment programs, health and nutrition programs for school children, Social Securi ty, and he wanted to eliminate the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms altogether, just to name a few. Early on, Speaker ONeill admitted that the House would probably pass Reag ans budget because it was the will of the people.3 However, ONeill was personally opposed to many of the spending cuts that Reagan was trying to quickly push through the Congres s saying at one point Haste makes waste.4 ONeill and several other Democrats criticized Reagan for cutting social programs for the working classes and cutting taxes for the rich.5 ONeill was also critical of the president for incurring the highest unemployment rate in th e country since the 1975 re cession. He argued that Reagans economic plan was to deliberately si tuate the country into a recession position as his strategy for fighting inflation.6 ONeill was not the only one to condemn th e Presidents economic plan, although he did complain that many of his partisans jumped ship. Budget Chairman James (Jim) R. Jones (DOk.) was not one of them, although ONeill pointed out that he was more willing to compromise than himself. He alluded to the fact that it was Jones first time as chair and he did not want to lose this early on legislation (O'Neill and N ovak 1987). Jones denounced the program for being founded on an Alice in Wonderland fairytal e of how the economy was really doing.7 He asserted that the impending deficit would be much higher than the administration would admit. One Post story featuring Jones in th e headline, Deficit Underestimated, Rep. Jones Charges, and picturing him in his role as committee chair, underlined his critical ro le in the budget process 3 April 28, 1981 4 February 18, 1981 5 April 4, 1981 and June 2, 1981 6 November 7, 1981 7 February 8, 1982 130

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for his party. Another story showed Jones and ONeill working together on various budget strategies including bringing the bill that was at an impasse with the President and the Republican Senate directly to the floor for a vote.8 In sheer numbers, ONeill was much more critical via the press of Reagans plan than Chairman Jones. ONeill opposed the President 19 times and Jones spoke out against him only 4 times. In his autobiography the Speaker laments that Reagan was trying to strip the nation of all the programs that he had worked his entire life assemble (O'Neill and Novak 1987). Democrats in the House were not the only one s making disparaging remarks. President Reagan took various opportunities to show that he would not appr ove of the Democrats plan. Reagan was quick to respond to ONeills comme nts that he didnt under stand working class needs calling his assertions sheer demagoguery.9 ONeill charged that Regan had forgotten his roots and his modest background (O'Neill and Novak 1987, 330). In departing from his roots, ONeill accused Reagan of leaving them for a new country club association that he would not yield to by backing down from all that he believed in.10 Although ONeill did not easily surrender to Reag ans budget cuts, he eventually lost the battle. He remembers it as being absolutely the lowest point in his 50 year career (O'Neill and Novak 1987). Fortunately, the low point for Tip ONeill did not last long. By the middle of the second session, many analysts argued that Reag anomics were not making the grade. The economy had the highest unemploymen t rates in years, deficits were bulging, and the President was increasingly spending more money on defense than on the poor and homeless. ONeill called the program a national disgrace as he sa t back in his office with his I-told-you-so 8 March 18, 1982 9 June 17, 1981 10 February 9, 1982 131

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attitude.11 The Speaker who was rumored to be a pres idential hopeful could not have been more pleased.12 Legislating Actions Legislating is the primary action that a ra nk-and-file member of Congress should be engaged in, but what about the party leadership and the committ ee chairs? Committee chairs can have a positive role in passing bi lls through the House or they can use their powers negatively to prevent legislation from making it through. The pr imary role of party leaders, on the other hand, is not as easily reconciled with forging direct le gislative moves. This is not to say that the leaders of the House should not be trying to pass laws, but should it be their primary duty? Party leaders are most closely associat ed with their role as coalitio n builders and party peace keepers (Sinclair 1983). Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this paper to determine whether rankand-file members legislate more or less than party leaders and committee chairs. However, suffice it to say that party leaders an d committee chairs are legislating. The legislating maneuvers made by party leaders and committee chairs that related to the budget during Reagans first two y ears as president have been di scussed at length. While much of the front page news did focus directly on budget legislation, the leader ship tried to pass or block other key bills (although many of them were closely relate d to the budget): Ways and Means Committee Chairman Daniel Rostenkowski (D -Il.) tried to wipe out tax breaks for oil producers; Budget Chairman Jim Jones (D-Ok.) recommended cutting the defense budget and drafted a bill to that end; Speaker ONeill a dvocated to pass a 5 cent gas tax, in what would become a infrequent agreement on policy between him and the President; Jamie Whitten (DMs.), Chairman of the Appropriations Committee tried to prevent a government shutdown; and 11 June 26, 1982 and October 10, 1982 12 June 26, 1982 132

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Chairman of the House District Committee Rona ld V. Dellums (D-Ca.) threatened to tie up debate on the floor in an effort to prevent the House from overturning a D.C. sexual assault laws, to name a few.13 Leadership Interactions Leader interactions in the 97th Congress were not as blatantl y obvious as in the previous two Congresses that were studied. Instead, the interactions between party leaders and committee chairs appeared less transparent th an before. For example, in the 81st and 89th Congresses party leaders and committee chairs had several direct exchanges between them in the Post whereas here a deeper search into the newspaper was required for excha nges that were less apparent, but no less important. In fact, the non-existent interactions between party leaders and committee chairs may have been due to the fact that no one wanted to admit that there was a serious problem. David S. Broder who famously argued in 1972 that the partys over was writing for the Post at this time (Broder 1972). One article that Broder penned was entitled, Shattered: Democratic coalition falls to pieces in first test with Republican Reagan.14 He writes that 63 Democrats defected from their partys stance and voted with Republicans to give Reagan a victory on the budget. Broder intimates that this may be just the be ginning of the troubles for the Democratic Party in the House b ecause the liberal and conservative wings of the party are clearly not seeing eye-to-eye on policy. Blame is put on the Democratic leadership, but no specific leader is mentioned. The frustrations of the lead ership are only exasperated by the fact that the more liberal sect of the party is resistant to a Republican Senate and a very popular Republican president.15 13 April 16, 1981, July 28, 1982, December 7, 1982, November 23, 1981, and October 2, 1981 14 May 8, 1981 15 May 8, 1981 133

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Budget Chairman Jim Jones proposed a different version of the budget bill that was voted down. Several committee chairmen gave intervie ws for the story, but Jones did not. G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery (D-Ms.) who is Chair of the Veterans Affairs Committee was one of the conservative defectors who dismissed discussion of a long term split in the party like that under civil rights legislation. He tried to persuade others to give the presid ent his program.16 Others were quick to lay blame with the leadership and Speaker ONeill specifically for not introducing Jones bill to the membership sooner for consid eration. An unidentified member said that the leadership got outworked and outhustled by the President.17 Summary The 97th Congress shows some mixed results for the theory of parallel leaders. The best evidence for the theory is in the sense that com mittee chairs do matter. Despite the dominance of party leaders in all action categories, committee ch airs are still taking part in the legislative process. However, party leaders out-acted comm ittee chairs in every sub-category of action for the 97th Congress which is strong evidence for the dom inant thesis. In addition, over time party leaders continue to perform more actions th an committee chairs. Compare this with the committee government era in which party leaders performed more actions in some categories while committee chairs performed more actions in other categories. Nevertheless, party leaders are not yet acting at their full potential. The percentage of difference between party leaders and chairs actions is less in the 97th Congress than the 100th and 104th. The percent difference between party leaders and prestige chai rs total actions performed in the 97th is 26%, the 100th is 16 May 8, 1981 17 May 8, 1981 134

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60% and the 104th is 64%.18 Party leaders and committee chairs were much closer leadership counterparts in the 97th Congress than the 100th or 104th. The historical and political context in which party leaders and committee chairs legislated in the 97th Congress was no less complicated. Democra tic party leaders and committee chairs in the House had to try to legislate under the pr essure of a popular pres ident and a Republican Senate that proposed very diffe rent policies than they would normally support. Rank-and-file members, who believed Reagans conservative po licies carried a mandate knew they would have to support those policies or fear losing their se ats in the next election (Sinclair 1998). Committee chairs tried, but mostly failed, to provide altern ative policies to the ad ministrations and party leaders, especially ONeill were criticized fo r their lackluster performance (O'Neill and Novak 1987; Sinclair 1998). It was es pecially difficult to fight R eagans budget policy given these circumstances. The mood was antagonistic at best and the environment was not optimal for party leaders or committee chairs to flourish. It is not the goal of this research to make judgments about whether House leaders and chairs performed their functions pr operly, however it is necessary to point out when there may be exceptions that should be well noted. This is on e of those occasions. It is not clear whether party leaders performed more actions as the trad itional theories suggest they should, or whether committee chairs performed fewer of them, it is also not clear whether party leaders acted as parallel leaders or not in th is era of party government. 100th Congress The first session of Congress in which Reagan was president has just been examined. Now Reagan's last session will be explored. The 100th Congress met beginning in January 1987 18 The total percentage difference for the 97th Congress is calculated by subtracting the percent of total actions performed by committee chairs (37) from the percent of total actions performed by party leaders (63). This is done for each Congress. The total percents are found in Table 12. 135

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through September 1988. While it was the end of an era for the Reagan presidency, James C. Wright of Texas was just taking control of th e House of Representatives as the new Speaker following ONeills retirement. There are some striking differences to note between Reagans first two years as president and his last two y ears which set the tone for executive-legislative relations. Three differences are most significant for this research. Each one of them benefits the congressional Democrats for this session of Congr ess. First, in the 1986 midterm elections the House Democrats gained 5 seats giving them a gr eater majority and the Republicans lost their majority in the Senate giving the Democrats a 55-45 majority. Now both houses of Congress were controlled by the Democrats, which is an improved standing from the small majority in the House in the 97th Congress and the Republican controlled Senate. Second, Reagans popularity had dropped significantly. During his first tw o years, and especia lly during the honeymoon period, Reagans job approval rating was in the high 60s.19 By the time the newly elected Congress was seated in early 1987 his job approv al rating was at 40%, an all time low for him.20 In relation, Reagans success rate in Congress, and especially the House, had also dropped significantly over the years. During the first se ssion of Congress Reagans success rate in the House was at 72%. By the 100th Congress, the percentage of vi ctories that he had with the House was down to 33% (Conley 2007). Luckily for Reagan his approval rating di d much of the dropping after the midterm election. There was a scandal forthcoming and ha d its specifics been re leased prior to the election the midterm results could have looked very different for the candidates, especially for the Democrats. As the midterm election loom ed, what the congression al candidates did not know was that they would have to contend with numerous hearings and investigations brought 19 Source: Gallup Poll 20 Source: Gallup Poll 136

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on by a story that surfaced the day before the elec tion that the U.S. had been selling arms to Iran in order to obtain the release of some Ameri can hostages that were ca ptured by terrorists in Lebanon. Besides selling arms for hostages, the ot her part of the story was that the money was then redirected to the Nicaragua n contras despite congressional legislation specifically against funding them (Barone 1990). The Ir an-Contra affair had begun. A third difference between Reagans first and la st years in office dealt with the mood of the House. It has been shown that the 97th congressional session was ju st the beginning of the party government era, but the 100th Congress is right in the heart of it and the period that David Rohde coined as conditional party governme nt (Rohde 1991). Following the 1970s reforms, party leaders were given additional tools (discussed in detail above ) that were supposed to ensure party discipline on policy and committee chairs lost some of their powers to disrupt that system. However, the party leaders were not able to immediately use their tool s because the conditions were not right. Rohde argues, when agreemen t was present on a matter that was important to party members, the leadership woul d be expected to use the tools at their disposal (e.g., the Rules Committee, the Whip system, etc.) to advance the cause (Rohde 1991,31). Rohde argues, the combined effects of increased Democratic consensus, new institutional powers for the party leadership, and a greater willingness by leaders to use the tools at their disposal reached their maximum when Jim Wright became Speaker in the One Hundredth Congress (Rohde 1991, 105). This is conditional party government and in the 100th Congress, the conditions were ripe for it. The first hypothesis states th at party leaders and committee chairs will perform a similar number of actions. The quantitat ive data show that party lead ers perform 80% of all actions compared to only 20% for prestige chairs. The pr estigious committees that are included for this analysis are Ways and Means, Appropriations, Ru les, Budget, Armed Services, Foreign Affairs, 137

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and Judiciary. In addition, when party leaders are compared with the top four action producing chairs the results are sim ilar. Salient chairs on ly perform 20% of all ac tions compared to party leaders. Those leaders are: Party Leaders James C. Wright 219 Richard Gephardt 96 Thomas J. Foley 29 Tony Coelho 28 Salient Committee Chairs Les Aspin (Armed Services) 37 Daniel Rostenkowski (Ways and Means) 28 Claude D. Pepper (Rules) 14 William H. Gray III (Budget) 12 The second hypothesis states that party leader s and committee chairs will perform similar types of actions. These data show that party leaders dominate every action subcategory. This can be seen in Table 4-1. However, what is also shown is that committee chairs also act. Despite the dominance of the party leadership, committee chairs are shown to perform similar actions as party leaders. Both leadership posit ions are shown to perform congressional roles, make parliamentary moves, take stands, enga ge in executive connections and foreign policy maneuvers even if they are at different rates. Investigative Actions According to David Mayhew, (using the era de lineations that are suggested here) there were 21 high profile investigations in the co mmittee government era and only 4 in the party government era (Mayhew 2005c). One of those c ongressional investigations occurred in the 100th Congress, the Iran-Contra hearings that oc curred in the summer of 1997. The probe was handled by a joint House/Senate select committ ee and chaired by Senator Daniel K. Inouye (D138

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Hi.) and Representative Lee H. Hamilton (D-In.) that began on May 5, 1987. However, none of the investigative actions carried out here had to do with Iran-Contra, possibly because none of the key players were party leaders or committee chairs. The investigative actions primarily related to a scandal involving Speaker Wri ght in which he was accused of numerous improprieties mostly having to do with him r eceiving too much money from jobs outside Congress (members are only allowed to receive a certain amount of honoraria, but there is no limit to money received from a publication). Mo re specifically, his troubles included receiving an unusually large sum of advance money from a book publisher that has contributed to his election campaigns, giving assistance to failing savings and loans corpor ations, and using his influence in the House to help Texas Oil and Gas Corporation, a company in which he owned stock (Congressional Qu arterly Weekly, 1998).21 Chairman of the Standards of Official Conduct Committee, or Ethics for short, Julian C. Dixon (D-Ca.) headed the invest igation, but he remains loyal to Wright in the public sp here. He never utters a disparag ing word against the Speaker in the front pages of the Post He is only mentioned as chairing the investigation at the request of some Republicans, especially Repr esentative Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.). 22 Wright was not the only one who was criticized for accepting large sums of money, mostly from special interests. Daniel Rostenkowsi (D-Il.) Chairman of Ways and Means, William H. Gray III. (D-Pa.) Budget Chairman, John D. Dingell (D-Mi.) Energy Chairma n, and E. (Kika) de la Garza (D-Tx.) were also judged for accepting inappropriate fees outside th eir usual salary.23 Taking Stands Besides legislating, position taking is one of the primary actions that members of Congress engage in (Mayhew 1974). During the first session of this Congress many party 21 June 11, 1988 and June 15, 1988 22 May 27, 1988 23 May 26, 1988 139

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leaders and committee chairs took stands against policies proposed by the President, especially Tip ONeill. Others took stands against policie s that Reagan opposed. For example, Majority Leader Thomas S. Foley (D-Wa.), along with some other congressional leader s, sent a letter to members urging them to pass a reparations bill for Japanese who were forced into interment camps because of their ancestry during WWII following Japans attack on Pearl Harbor.24 Foley who sponsored the bill called it long overdue.25 Although Reagan initially opposed the law, he did sign it into law on August 10, making it a ke y piece of legislation in 1988 (Mayhew 2005c). Another key piece of legislation that was passed concerned catastrophic insurance for the elderly which would be the biggest increase in Medicare since 1965. It protected the elderly from having to pay enormous out-of-pocket expenses for catastrophic care and even some prescriptions. Ways and Means Chair Daniel Rostenkowski stood up for the much needed bill and thanked Health and Human Services for being instrumental in its success.26 His committee was also key in its approval. Democratic Caucus Chairman, Richard A. Ge phardt (D-Mo.) disclosed his positions in a different way than other party leaders and co mmittee chairs because he became the first Democratic presidential hopeful to declare his run for office.27 One way he did this was by trying to separate himself from the establishment.28 While todays voters are used to candidates saying that they are detached from all things political including corporations, interest groups, even Washington itself, in 1988 the Post called this the new rage.29 Gephardt tried to distance himself from the establishment by stan ding up for those who build our cars, work our 24 September 12, 1987 25 September 12, 1987 26 July 23, 1987 and May 26, 1988 27 February 24, 1987 28 January 7, 1988 29 January 7, 1988 140

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factories, forge our steel and farm our land. It was the classic, anti-insider, anti -big business, and anti-Washington stance that still rings tr ue in many campaigns today. Leadership Interactions Some of the most heated exchanges between a party leader and a committee chair were between Speaker Wright and Ways and Means Chair Dan Rostenkowski. Even before the session began they were pegged as adversaries.30 Wright realized early on that Rostenkowski might pose a problem for his agenda that he propo sed at the beginning of the session in a fashion that was usually left to presidents (Barry 1989). Rostenkowski not only opposed several key pieces of legislation that Wright supported, but he also went public with his views on several occasions which tested Wrights patience. They differed on various revenue issues including a gasoline tax and trad e legislation. The Post picked up on the public feud in a story that was subtitled Wright, Rostenkowski at odds on revenue.31 Wright wanted to increase taxes and Rostenkowski did not even want to vote on taxe s without Republican s upport (Barry 1989). Rostenkowski told a reporter, If you tell me th e chemistry is out there [on the House floor] to pass a tax hikeIll give you a bill tomorrow. But thats not what I hear. Jim has made himself the lightning rod, and I appreciate his courage. But when the rains come, I dont want to be the only one out there without an umbrella.32 Wrights biographer, who had virtually unlim ited access to the Speaker during his tenure, said that the feud got so bad that the Speaker did the unthi nkable by threatening to have Rostenkowski removed as Chair of Ways and Means, not once, but twice (Barry 1989). Wrights anger got the best of him during a st aff meeting in which he snapped, Rostenkowski will damn well do what the Caucus wants him to. You know, he can be removed as chairman of 30 CQ Weekly, "The Hill Leaders: Their Places on the Ladder." January 3, 1987. 31 March 15, 1987 32 March 15, 1987 141

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that committee(Barry 1989, 176). A few days la ter Wright repeated the sentiments. His feelings toward Rostenkowski were, of course, said to his staff in private, but Wright could not keep his thoughts in much longer. Followi ng the Wright, Rostenkowski at odds on revenue story on March 15, the Post ran another story five days later about the gas tax that in essence, pushed Wright over the edge.33 Rostenkowski, not only advocat ed for a gas tax that Wright specifically opposed, but he also quipped that he would only atte mpt to raise as much revenue as other committee chairmen agreed to cut.34 After reading this in the pape r, Speaker Wright blasted off a letter to Rostenkowski. It said: Dear Danny, It was very surprising to me to read the interview with you in yesterdays Washington PostMy preference, of course, is to have the cooperation of the White House, unless it must be purchased at the sacrifice of strong a nd effective legislation. I do not believe we should allow Administration employees to sit in markup sessions of any House Committee or dictate the terms of legi slation in the drafting proce ssThe House last year voted overwhelmingly to include the Gephardt provision [on trade]Dick seems willing, in deference to your wishes, to leave it off th e Committee bill and offer it as a separate proposition on the floor. To deny him this priv ilege would be to deny the membership an opportunity to vote for something which they overwhelmingly endorsed a year ago As Chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means, Danny, you are the designated agent of the Democratic CaucusAs their chosen agents, you and I would serve them poorly if we contrived to deny them the opportunityto vote for a strong, effective trade bill (Barry 1989, 179). Wrights thoughts on Rostenkowskis vulnerabi lity, as well as his own supreme power were no longer secret. Wright eventually won th e trade battle, but would lose the ethics battle that still was yet to be fought. The Speaker eventually resigned under pressure. 33 March 20, 1987 (This story did not appear on the front page.) 34 March 20, 1987 142

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Summary In the 100th Congress, the evidence fo r parallel leaders is mixed. Speaker Wright appears to be throwing his weight around more than previous Speakers, yet the committee chairs are not idly sitting by while he wields all of the power. On the other hand, the raw data and the percent of actions performed show that party leaders ar e more active than committee chairs, which is in line with the strong party lead ers dominant literature. What is clear from this analysis is that committee chairs are not sitti ng in the back of the halls of Congress waiting for party leaders to gi ve them directives. Committee chairs are taking stands on issues that may be unpopular with th e party leadership. They are advocating for policies that they support or that their constituents support even if the legislation is not exactly in line with the party leadership or the Presid ent. Party leaders are not the only ones communicating with the executive or initiating policy. Committee chairs, too, have connections with the President and his administration and they have policy agendas of their own. The 100th Congress provides evidence that committee chairs do act and they do matter in the era of party government. 104th Congress If scholars could identif y just one Congress that is an exemplary example of the party government model, especially in terms of stre ngthening and centralizing the power of the party leadership and the Speaker in particular, many would name the 104th Congress that began on January 4, 1995.35 The 1994 midterm election was the firs t time in forty years that Republicans would gain control of the House of Representatives and they wanted to take advantage of that rare opportunity to advance the party position and legislative agenda. On the first day of the Republican Revolution the newly elected Spea ker, Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.) wasted no time in 35 Some authors that examine the 104th Congress and Gingrichs leadership include (Owens 1997; Sinclair 1999). 143

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moving to restructure the rules and the agenda so that Re publicans could gain and the Contract with America could be enacted (Owens 1997). In fact Gingrich made several moves before he was even officially elected Speaker to consolid ate his power as head of the party leadership while weakening committee chairs by passing ove r several senior members in favor of party loyalists (Foerstel 1994). Political pundits and scholars alike were quick to make comparisons of the Gingrich speakership to the days of Speak er Uncle Joe Cannon who ruled the House with an iron fist and was arguably the most powerful Speaker of the House in United States history (Clymer 1994; Dodd and Oppenheimer 1997; Foer stel 1994; Owens 1997; Thurber 1997). One of the most important change in the ru les was giving Gingrich the power to appoint and remove committee chairs while also having some control over the membership of their committees (Dodd and Oppenheimer 1997). Gingrich would utilize this pow er as head of the new Republican Steering Committee which would also determine the policies that the party would try to promote (Owens 1997). In additi on, the Speaker gained power to appoint the Republican members and the chair to the Hous e Oversight Committee which is the primary investigative committee (Dodd and Oppenheimer 1997) Overall, House Republicans centralized their leadership, gained greater control over th e policy-making process via the committees and considerably weakened committee chairs au tonomy by making them accountable to the leadership (Smith and Lawrence 1997). So it would seem that Gingrich and the Republican Party leadership would have all the tools needed to enact the Contract with America circumvent any of Democratic President Bill Clintons policy desires, and control the House committees and their chairs. With all the pomp and circumstance surroundi ng Newt Gingrich and the Republican Party taking over the House for the first time in forty-two years surely this is the one legislative session 144

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in which there will be a significant difference in the number of actions committed by party leaders and committee chairs. Table 4-1 illustrates that the party leadership is incredibly active during this Congress. Party lead ers perform 82% of all actions in the public sphere, higher than any other Congress in this study. For the 104th Congress, designated prestige committees are Ways and Means, Rules, Appropr iations, Commerce, Budget, and J udiciary. Prestige chairs are active, however, party leaders outperform them in every action subcategory. This is also shown on Table 4-1. When salient committee chairs are co mpared to party leaders the results are still in favor of the dominant thesis that party leaders are more influential in the process. Salient chairs only perform 17% of all actions when compared to party leaders. Thes e top action producers for the 104th Congress are: Party Leaders Newt Gingrich 515 Richard Armey 62 Tom Delay 15 John Boehner 13 Salient Committee Chairs John R. Kasich (Budget) 68 Bob Livingston (Appropriations) 27 Bill Archer (Ways and Means) 18 James A. Leach (Banking) 14 Parliamentary Moves Given the circumstances that su rrounded the beginning of the 104th Congress to include all of the Republicans policy promises and all of th e reforms that were in stituted, it would not be surprising if the session saw an extraordinary number of parl iamentary moves being acted upon by the leaders of the House. In terestingly, the number is not as high as e xpected; a total of 51 parliamentary moves were made. However, part y leaders and committee chairs performed these 145

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legislative maneuvers at a similar level. Pa rty leaders performed 28 parliamentary moves to committee chairs 29. Parliamentary moves that they carried out include legi slate, investigate and rules actions. Party leaders and committee chairs parliamentary moves were positively portrayed in the Post Some of the words that were used in the he adlines to describe the progress that was being made included: favored, adopts, passes, reform, agree, momentum and vows. Most of these words were used to describe th e Republicans pledge to bring ten items to the House floor for consideration as a part of their Contract with America. Some of the legislative actions in the Contract that made it onto the front page included: Ways and Means Chairman Bill Archer (RTx.) proposed a tax credit measure for businesse s; Majority Whip Tom DeLay (R-Tx.) persuaded members to bring about a vote on the budget during a rare Saturday session when the government was shutdown due to Congress a nd President Clintons disagreement while Appropriations Chairman Bob Livingston (R-La.) authored a temporary spending bill to keep some government agencies open and running; Speaker Gingrich engaged in some wheeling and dealing with House Democrats and some member s of his own party to pass Medicare reform; and Budget Chairman John Kasich (R-Oh.) had to convince members from rural districts to cut agriculture subsidies so he could balance the budget.36 Party leaders and committee chairs also spent some of their time occupied by investigations. As was the case in the 100th Congress, committee chairs headed the inquiries while party leaders found themselves implicated in them. An investigation into President and Hillary Clintons Whitewater financ ial and real estate dealings continued. Republicans charged that Clinton had given special treatment to and received financial benefits from a business friend while he was governor of Arkansas. Represen tative James Leach (RIa.), who headed the 36 December 24, 1995; November 19, 1995; Janua ry 26, 1996; October 20, 1995; May 26, 1995 146

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Banking and Financial Services Committee, had al ready spent twenty-one months investigating the couple when he began a weeklong hearing on what Whitewater is.37 Until this point, Leach had been investigating the Clintons virtua lly independently as a minority member of the committee under the Democratic majority. The Republican takeover allowed him to further investigate his accusations and hold hearings as chairman of the committee. Leach argued that the public needed a chronol ogy of events to follow and that ne w hearings would give them just that.38 The Clintons were eventually cl eared of any illegal transactions. The Clintons were not the only ones being i nvestigated. Speaker Gingrichs political connections were also under clos e scrutiny. Members of the Demo cratic minority and especially Minority Whip David Bonior (D-Mi.) alleged th at Gingrich was teaching a politically charged college course in violation of federal law a nd that he received unethical advances for a book deal. The tax exempt money for funding a coll ege course could only be used for non-political purposes. Democrats charged that Gingrich's colle ge course was political in nature (waiting on Rosenson cite).39 More damaging allegations included an investigation into the role of GOPAC, a political action committee that Gingrich heads (Salant). Ethics Chairwoman Nancy L. Johnson (R-Ct.) headed the committee that was at odds on the issue right down pa rty lines. Johnson and other Republican members of the committee tried to stall the investigation, but the divisive committee eventually decided to hire independent counsel.40 Chairwoman Johnson was only named in two Post stories relating to the ethi cs investigation. Gingric h eventually resigned his post as a Congressman and as Speaker of the House after his party lost 5 seats in the 1998 37 August 7, 1995 38 August 7 and 8 1995 39 Gingrich was eventually vindicated on this allegation. (Personal email conversation with Dr. Beth A. Rosenson) 40 May 20, 1995 and December 23, 1995 147

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election. Although Republicans maintained control of the House, Newt felt personally responsible (Steely 2000). Various Actions The 104th Congress has been extensively studied for its strong party government, its detailed party program in the Contract with Ameri ca, and Newt Gingrich's lead ership. It is also the subject of much research because it is the fi rst Republican majority to hold the reins of power in the House in 40 years. For these reasons, th e 104th Congress is excepti onal. Until now each Congress has been analyzed separately from th e others without trying to make comparisons between the Congresses. Here, other Congresses are brought into the analysis in order to determine how different the 104th Congress really is in terms of actions. The comparison illustrates that the actions that party leaders and committee chairs perform are very ordinary in number and type. Thus far, the findings for each Congress have focused on the highest number of actions, while going still further to exam ine the institutional context of each congressional session and taking the significance of history in to account in order to determine whether it is party leaders or committee chairs who are more influential in the legislative process. As such, the 81st Congress witnessed a highly unusual number of rules actions, therefore these rules changes were explored. Likewise, the 97th Congress engaged quite regularly in dea lings with the Presid ent and as a result the leaders produced the highest number of exec utive connections actions which were focused on here. It is also significant that in each of the previous Congresses that were examined, the actions performed most often were also actions that were key to pr oducing legislation. Take into consideration the 81st Congress, in which rules actions were performed at a high number. These rules changes were often crucia l to the success of legislation. If a reader were trying to determine how productive party leaders and committ ee chairs were in these Congresses, that is 148

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the 81st, 89th, 97th, and 100th, and only had this data as eviden ce, he or she would find that the leaders were heavily engaged in ac tions that portray them as being excellent legislative citizens and leaders. They were highly i nvolved in the operations that one expects their legislators to be involved in to include, inves tigating, rules proceedings, couns eling and opposing presidential administrations and acting on foreign policy.41 These are the types of maneuvers that everyday citizens and scholars alike expect representative s to be engaged in. More importantly, as previously argued, these are the actions that are most influential in the legislative process. The 104th Congress, however, looks different, almo st unremarkable, in terms of important legislative actions. This is es pecially surprising given the hype about the C ongress and the Republican Revolution in particular, but maybe that was it, it was just hype. Recall that much of the hype, if we can call it that, was over the Contract with America, the legislative promises that the Republicans made to the American people. Some of the significant actions42 that were performed most often by party leaders and committ ee chairs combined in Congresses outside the 104th were: legislate, foreign policy, executive-legislative procedure, special committee, opposition, counsel administration, speak for admini stration, rules, and investigate. These actions are clearly actions that one would associate with legisl ating, producing policy, productivity, and doing rather th an speaking (see footnote 120). No w lets turn to some of the actions that party leaders and comm ittee chairs combined in the 104th Congress outnumbered all other Congresses: big speech, presidential supp ort, presidential selection, run for leader, 41 Are we to include taking stands in the category of mo st significant legislative actions? Earlier I argued, and Mayhew first posited that position taking or taking st ands is one of the primary activities that members of Congress engage in. However, is it one of the most significant for producing policy if the primary purpose of Congress is to legislate? Moreover, taking stands is of ten associated with rhetoric that can confuse voters into believing their representative is actually being a produc tive members of Congress when they are not. Mayhew argues, the Congressman as position taker is a speaker rather than a doer. The electoral requirement is not that he make pleasing things happen but that he make pleasing judgmental statements (1974, 62). 42 By significant actions, I mean acts that can be perceived as most likely to lead to legislative productivity rather than just talking about being productive. 149

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dubiousness or malfeasance, congr essional elections, named in h eadline and pictured on front page. (Party leaders and committee chairs also took more stands in this Congress than in any other. This will be discussed separately below.) It is clear that this set of actions, performed more often in the 104th than any other Congress, is quite different from the previous list of actions that were performed most often in any of the other Congresses. To be sure, with the possible exception of giving support to the president, none of these actions may be mistaken for or confused with acts that produce legislation or might lead to le gislative productivity. Some are simply symbolic actions (headline and picture), others are concerned with the goal of reelection (presidential selection, run for leader and congres sional elections), and others still are primarily acts of speaking not doing (big speech43 and taking stands). Finally, I return to the action of taking stands. Party lead ers and committee chairs alike are constantly engaged in position taking. The 104th Congress sustained more of these actions than any other Congress. Taking stands is also the single most executed act ion in this data set, as well as in Mayhews data set. However, are we to include taking st ands in the category of most significant legislative actions ? If so, then this argument ha s been fruitless and the leaders of the 104th Congress have been significan tly influential in the legisla tive process. If not, then we might reexamine the 104th Congress as being all bark and no bite, all political talk and no legislative action. Earlier it was argued, and Mayhew first posited, that position taking or taking stands is one of the pr imary activities that members of Congress engage in (Mayhew 1974). However, is it one of the most significan t for producing policy if the primary purpose of Congress is to legislate? More over, taking stands is often asso ciated with rhetoric that can confuse voters into believing their representative is actually being a productive member of 43 I concede that big speech may be an act in which a leader is trying to get the public or his colleagues to rally behind him on a piece of legislation. 150

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Congress when they really are not. Mayhew argu es, The Congressman as position taker is a speaker rather than a doer. The electoral requirement is not that he make pleasing things happen but that he make pleasing judgmental statements (1974, 62). What about actual legislative pr oductivity? Where does the 104th Congress stand on actual legislation produced and how does it compare to th e other Congresses? At the beginning of this research it was explained how each of the five C ongresses were chosen to be included in this study. To reiterate, Congresses from each congressi onal era were chosen based on those with the most legislative productivity based on previous research. In orde r to systematically explain any variation I would have to take a random sample of Congresses. I have clearly not done that here, but I will try to explain leadersh ip actions in the next chapter us ing legislative productivity as an explanatory variable. Leadership Interactions The historic changes that took place during the 104th Congress were more far-reaching and influential than many could have imagined. Even Speaker Gingrich himself was not prepared for the immense task of being the first Republican head of the House in forty years (Gingrich 1998). Change came too soon, too fast, and nothing could ha ve equipped him for the pressures that were to come and the hurdles he would have to overc ome, even with a unified conservative cohort and a committee system that was more under his cont rol. Following his historic election to the Speakership, Gingrich went on to pass several impor tant rules that would decrease the powers of committee chairs that included limiting their term of tenure in th e position of chair.44 The days of seniority as the sole determination of a ch airmanship had seen its demise and now that Gingrich could control the membership of the co mmittees, their independen ce was not secure. 44 January 5, 1995 151

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Despite the scaled back committees (three co mmittees were eliminated altogether), their reduced staffs and the party leaderships increased power over them, committee chairmen did not sit idly by and bow to the every whim of Gingrich or his leadership (Smith and Lawrence 1997). The first 100 days of the session had not even ended before the dissension began. Rules Committee Chairman Gerald B. H. Solomon (R-Ny.) and Agriculture Committee Chairman Pat Roberts (R-Ks.) lead the opposition in an attack on some of the proposals associated with the Contract with America .45 The committee chairs charged that the budget could not be balanced as long as tax cuts were focused on the wealthy. In the end, it appear ed as if Solomon and Roberts were really looking out for their ow n because balancing the budget was one piece of legislation that the Republican Party would not compromise.46 Gingrich and the Republicans finally got the balanced budget that they want ed under Budget Chairman John R. Kasich (ROh.). He was handpicked by Gingrich to lead the process over some more senior committee members because Kasich was prepared to cut spe nding in all areas necessary (Gingrich 1998). There were also numerous agreements betw een the Republican leadership and various committee chairs over policy. One such proposal was a health care reform bill under Ways and Means Chairman Bill Archer (R-Tx.) that Gingrich supported.47 Another proposal was whether to pass spending and tax cuts together as orig inally promised in the Republican Contract. Majority Leader Richard Armey and Budget Chair Kasich agreed that it would be better to cut spending first.48 It was difficult to find direct conf lict between party leaders and committee chairs whatever the reason. Sources of di sagreements that were written about in the Post examined contentious relationships between the Democrats and the Republicans and even 45 March 22, 1995 46 November 15, 1995 47 March 29, 1996 and July 26, 1996 48 January 18, 1995 152

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153 between the rank-and-file Republican me mbership and the party leadership, 49 but rarely between party leaders and committee chairs.50 Summary Whether the 104th Congress and its leadership in pa rticular produced an extraordinary amount of actions compared to other Congresse s remains to be seen since only four other congresses have been studied. What is unambiguous is that the type of actions performed by the leaders was less than special, with the possibl e exception of taking stands. More importantly though is that party leaders and committee chairs equally performed unexceptional actions. One thing that was exceptional about the 104th Congress is the sheer numbe r of actions performed by Speaker Newt Gingrich. He performed the greatest number of actions in this Congress and for the entire data set. In the next and final chapter I examine Gingrich and all the other party leaders and committee chairs together in order to see if there are any patterns over time in their actions. 49 July 17, 1995 50 On January 22, 1996 the Post reported that Majority Leader Richar d Armey and Budget Chair Kasich disagreed over whether to raise the debt ceiling and that it reflected the division within GOP ranks.

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CHAPTER 6 DETERMINANTS OF LEADERSHIP ACTIONS The first chapter presented several theoreti cal foundations from wh ich party leaders and committee chairs should be studied together. It has been shown that one way of comparing and contrasting these leaders is through the actions that they perform in their daily routine as reported on the front page of the newspa per. Although an examination of members roll call voting behavior is a tried and true method, by studying actions in th e public sphere, the process by which one leadership type might come to hold mo re power or influence ov er the other is given richer meaning. The roll call vote is only the end result of days, weeks, months, and sometimes years of dialogue, debate, argument, vote-trading, and the like. This inquiry examines the means to that end by looking at what leaders say and do to achieve power and influence through their actions. What followed, in Chapters 2, 3, 4, a nd 5 were the means used by party leaders and committee chairs to perform those leadership duties. The research thus far has brought to bear three primary results. First, neither leadership post easily gave up their formal or informal duties as leaders of the House. Party leaders did not sit idly by during the committee government pe riod allowing committee chairs to propose, dictate, and pass (or prevent from passing) legislation to which th ey were opposed. Party leaders were found legislating, taking st ands on policy proposals, communi cating with the president and the like. Moreover, committee chairs in the pa rty government were found to be engaged in the legislative process as they should be. However, committee chairs presence on the party leaders turf was not as significant as th e party leaders was in theirs. Second, there is also some evidence that party leaders and committee chairs ha ve the capacity to act as parallel leaders performing similar numbers and types of actions. Finally, there was also some evidence for the dominant theories which espouse a shift in which leaders were doing the most acting. In this 154

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chapter, the action data are pieced together in a linear regression model with the goal of predicting leadership actions. Explaining Actions The final part of this comparative analysis be tween the two primary leadership roles in the U.S. House is to explain the number of actions that they perform. A model will test the dominant theories and the alternative hypothesis espoused here that party leaders and committee are parallel leaders by regressing the number of actions on influent ial variables. Table 6-1 shows a regression analysis of total ac tions performed. The first part of the table shows the committee government era (81st and 89th Congresses) while the second part of the table shows the party government era (97th, 100th and 104th Congresses). Table 6-1. Determinants of leadership actions Committee government and party government eras Committee Government 81st and 89th Congresses Party Government 97th, 100th, and 104th Congresses Independent Variables B Sig. B Sig. Constant 27.866 .371 -9.149 .896 Leader type (1=Party leader) 32.633 (15.028) .035 102.790 (20.875) .000 Prestige committee* (1=Prestige chair) -1.506 (18.639) .936 -1.647 (24.180) .946 Region (1=South) 9.455 (10.851) .388 11.294 (16.124) .486 Length of service 2.070 (.671) .003 1.043 (.984) .293 Landmark legislation passed -3.380 (1.096) .003 -1.065 (5.839) .856 Party ID (1=Rep.) N/A (All are Democrats) 22.360 (31.483) .480 N=1412 R2= .331 N=1870 R2=.294 Note: These models were computed in several different ways in order test the effects of different variables. Each independent variable, except Leader Type and Prestige Committee was ex cluded from the analysis and the results remained the same with regard to the variables that were significant. An asterisk (*) indicates Model A Prestige Chairs are included: Approp riations, Ways and Means, Rules 155

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Party leaders are compared with both chairs of prestigious and non-prestigious committees which follows from Fennos research. Three di fferent models are calculated allowing for variation in prestige committees and follows from three differen t schools of thought found in the House committee literature. The difference between Models A, B, and C are the committees that are included as prestige committees since there is little consensus on the matter. The results show that there is very little difference between the models, therefore Mo del A is included here in Table 6-1. Models B and C can be found in the Appendix B. The first school of thought is that the comm ittees that are labeled as prestige committees will change overtime. During different periods of time different committees are thought to be more influential than others. With the exception of Appropriations, Ways and Means, and Rules, there is little consensus in the congressional literature with regards to which other committees are consistently thought to be most prestigious. Ther efore, different models are presented with an eye toward determining how various combinati ons of prestigious committee chairs actions match up with party leaders actions. The second school of thought is that committees that are deemed exclusive committees by the party caucus are also the most prestigious. Besides, Appropriations, Ways and Means, and the Rule s Committees being exclusive, in 1994, the Republicans deemed Commerce an exclusive committee for their party (Smith and Lawrence 1997) and the Democrats deemed the Energy and Commerce as an exclusive committee for their party (Heberlig 2003). When a party caucus iden tifies a committee as exclusive, members of that committee may not be members of any other standing committee. Fi nally, the third school of thought follows from the findings of the seco nd. Prestige committees may be different for Republicans and Democrats and will be differentiated in the analysis (Bullock and Sprague 1969; Leighton and Lopez 2002). In sum, not only is there variation in what each scholar deems 156

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a prestige committee, but indivi dual scholars too argue that th ose named prestigious committees may change overtime. The three models are described in detail below. Model A is the traditional prestige committee model. It includes what I call the Tier 1 committees because they are the ones that scholars consistently name as the most prestigious throughout the entire post-WWII time period. Prestige committees includ ed are Appropriations, Ways and Means and Rules for all Congresses. There is little debate in the congressional literature regarding the streng th of these committees (Bullock 1973; Deering and Smith 1997; Dyson and Soule 1970; Heberlig 2003; Leight on and Lopez 2002). These three committees stand alone in Model A but they are also included in each of the models below. Model B can be called the second tier prestig e committees. The congressional literature most often named the following committees as pr estigious committees (if for different reasons) next in line after the traditional three modele d above. Model B includes the three traditional prestige committees (Tier 1 ) as well as Armed Services, Foreign Affairs, Budget, and Commerce (depending on which Congress). The 81st, 89th, 97th, and 100th Congresses include the Armed Services and Foreign Affairs committees as prestige committees. The 97th, 100th, and 104th Congresses include the Committee on the B udget. (The Committee on the Budget was created in 1974 and first appeared in the 94th Congress.) The Commerce Committee is included for the 104th, (it was deemed an exclusive committee for Republicans) but not Armed Services or Foreign Affairs as these committ ees are non-existent in the 104th House. Model B follows from several studies which suggest th at different committees are more prestigious during different time periods. It seems obvious that with the changing political, ec onomic, and institutional context in which committees operate that the prestigious nature of committees might also change. Following that logic, two separate stud ies find that Armed Services and Foreign Affairs 157

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are the most prestigious (Dyson and Soule 1970; Jewell and Chi-Hung 1974) and another study suggests that the Budget committee has been in creasingly important (Deering and Smith 1997). Finally, Dodd and Oppenheimer name Energy and Commerce and the Budget Committees important committees (1993) and Ar med Services is called part of the oligarchy of influential committees (1989). Model C considers the third tier prestige co mmittees. It includes all the elements of Model B and also includes the Judiciary Committee for all Congresses. This model takes into account arguments that suggest that the Judici ary committee is one of the most prestigious committees and should be included. Dyson and Soul e argue that the Judiciar y is in the same tier as Armed Services and Foreign Affairs, while Je well and Chi-hung suggest that Judiciary is in a third tier (Dyson and Soule 1970; Jewell and ChiHung 1974). Due to the inconsistency in the literature with the status of the Judiciary as a pr estigious committee, it is included here separately from the others as a third tier committee. The independent variables in each model are the same with the exception of prestigious chairs as just described. The independent variables include the length of service in the House, the amount of landmark legislati on passed, and dummy variables for party identification, era of government, region, and whether one is a party le ader or committee chair. A dummy variable for whether one is a chair of a prestigious committee or a non-prestige committee is also included. Each variable is detailed below. 158

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Length of Service The length of service for each leader is measured in number of consecutive1 years in which they have served in the House. The lengths of service range from 4-46 years for party leaders and committee chairs with an average length of 21 years. The length of service variable will test whether those members who have served longer th an others with arguably more experience will perform more actions. The longer a member of Congress serves, th e more experience they will gain and are likely to be more ac tive in the legislative process. Although there may be an action ceiling that a member hits whereby he is not likely to act any more or less because of the number of years that he has serv ed. In other words, members with twenty years of congressional experience will probably produce as many actions as someone with thirty years experience, but more than someone with only five years under his belt. Landmark Legislation The landmark legislation variable will test whet her leaders actions increase or decrease in Congresses in which differing amounts of landm ark legislation is passed. The number of important enactments that are passed in each Co ngress are determined by David Mayhew in his book Divided We Govern (1991). When landmark legislation is being deliberated party leaders and committee chairs should produce more actions.2 Landmark legislation is arguably the most important legislation that is passed in any give n Congress. Moreover, this legislation can be costly to the country and divisive between members of Congress, the President and the 1 If the length of service was interrupted then the variable is measured starting at the mo st recent year in which they served, not from the first time of serv ice. There are several cases in which a members length of service was interrupted. They are: John S. Wood, Robert Cro sser, Hale Boggs, Gillis W. Long, and Claude Pepper. 2 This variable is a bit deceptive beca use the reason these five Congresses we re chosen to study is because they produced the most amount of key legisl ation in each of the eras that I wanted to study. So although the 97th Congress produced the least amount of legislation in my data set, it produced the most amount of legislation in the post-reform era that I was interested in studying. So at this point the variable is a bit misleading in the sense that relative to all other Congresses (those not included here in my data set) these 5 Congresses all produced high numbers of key legislation. 159

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electorate. Landmark legislation is not easily passed for these reasons and often takes longer to become law than other non-divisive bills. For these reasons, leadership actions in the public sphere should be higher as the number of high profile bills are passed. The number of landmark legislation passed in each Congre ss studied here is as follows: 81st Congress 12 89th Congress 22 97th Congress 9 100th Congress 12 104th Congress 15 Party ID The party ID variable will test whether De mocrats or Republicans produce more actions. Party ID is a dummy variable (0 for Democrats, 1 for Republicans). Given the Congresses of study here and especially since th is study includes the first Republic an Congress in 40 years (the 104th), the expectation is that Re publican leaders will be more ac tive than Democrats. The 104th Congress is such an unusual case by itself that Republicans will pr oduce more actions. Unfortunately, this data set only comprises one Republican led Congress. One of the limitations of studying leaders in this manner is that there have been far fewer Republican led Congresses than Democratic ones. Future research would add the 83rd Republican Congress and more recent Republican Congresses to the analysis. With th e addition of other Republican Congresses, I do not expect for party identification to matter in the model. Region The region dummy variable will test whether leaders from the south or non-south will execute more actions (1 for South, 0 otherwise). This variable will be particularly important during the time period when the conservative co alition is more active which is during the 160

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committee government era. This variable will provide an additional test for the dominant theories because many of those theories rest upon the argument that the conservative coalition and especially committee chairs who were a part of that coalition ruled the legislative process with an iron fist. If those arguments are corr ect then southerners s hould be shown to produce more actions. The region variable should not be significant during the pa rty government era. Leadership Type This variable tests whether party leaders or committee chairs carry out more actions. This variable will provide a test of the dominant theses and the alternative theory of parallel leadership. If the dominant theories cannot be rejected then committee chairs in the committee government era and party leaders in the party go vernment era should produce more actions. If the theory of parallel leaders cannot be rejected then this variable should not be significant. Neither party leaders nor committee chairs will pr oduce more actions. This variable is coded 0 for committee chair and 1 for party leader. Th e committee chairs here include all committee chairs regardless of they type of committee they control. The next variable, prestige committee, differentiates between types of committee chairs. Prestige Committee This variable tests Fennos committee typologie s theory. Given that the chairs of Ways and Means, Appropriations, and Rules committees ar e seen as the most powerful and influential committees, I expect that the chairs of these committees should produce more actions than chairs of less influential committees. The variable is coded 1 for the chair of a prestige committee and 0 otherwise. This variable changes depending on the model used (traditional or first tier, second tier, and third tier) as describe d above. Table 6-1 includes th e first tier prestige chairs: Appropriations, Ways and Means, and Rules. Second and third tier prestige chairs are 161

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differentiated and shown in Appendix B. The ba seline leadership type in these models is nonprestigious committee chairs. It is anticipated that they will produce the fewest actions. Results Descriptive data from the previous chapters show that whether party leaders and committee chairs perform as parallel leaders may be depe ndent upon the era or cont ext of the situation. However, in the party government era, party leaders appear to have an edge over committee chairs in performing more actions. The best way to test the hypotheses set forth earlier is to regress the number of actions on the independent variables I have just discussed. The results can be found in Table 6-1. The results of the regression provide some impor tant insight into who is acting the most in the legislative process. While the results of the analysis are at odds with the theory of parallel leadership that I posited earlier, they can also be seen as be ing at odds with some of the traditional scholarship regarding the role of party leaders and committee chairs. First I will discuss the findings. Table 6-1 is divided by congressi onal era. This analysis on ly considers Model A or first tier prestige committee chairs. Models B and C which include additional prestige chairs for analysis can be found in Appendix B. It did not matter which chairs were included in the analysis. The results were the same for each model. The same three variables were significant in the committee government era regardless of the prestige chairs that were included and only one variable was significant in the party governme nt era regardless of th e model used. First I will discuss the committee government era. The three variables that are significant in the committee gove rnment era are leadership type, landmark legislation and length of service. That the traditional or first tier model provides the most explanatory value for the number of act ions performed suggests that the other models 162

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that consider different committee chairs as pres tigious may be unnecessary. This should lay to rest any criticisms in the previous chapters th at additional prestigious committee chairs should have been included in the analysis Recall that each test in the previous chapters only included chairs of Appropriations, Rules, and Ways and M eans in the analysis. The regression analysis results here suggest that methodology was not faulty. Several of the independent variab les are significant and in the e xpected direction. First, the relationship between length of service and the number of acti ons performed is positive. As expected, the longer a party leader or committee ch air serves in the House, the more actions he will execute. A leader will perform about 2 more actions for every year that he continues to serve his constituents in a legisla tive capacity. The landmark legislation variable did not fall in line with expectations. While I expected that increasing pieces of landmark legislation being passed would lead to more actions being perf ormed, the effect was actually negative. As landmark legislation increases, th e number of leadership actions being performed decreases. I predicted that as more landmark legislation was passed party l eaders and committee chairs would be carrying out more actions to ensure that legi slation passed. However, it seems that leaders carry out about 3 fewer actions for every bill that is passed. The reasons for this can only be conjectured. One reason may be that in order to get important bills through the legislative process there is much more acti ng going on behind the scenes than what the public is able to witness though the media. Remember that the actions being studied ar e those that are highly visible by the public. When party leaders a nd committee chairs try to garner support for important legislation it may be that they do much of their bargaining behind closed doors away from the eye of the public. This may be especially true given that much of the landmark legislation in question is highly controversial since the very defi nition of landmark legislation 163

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lends it to being controversial. In addition, l eaders trying to adopt controversial legislation may garner initial support in privat e while only going public once th ey are more certain of support in the House. In the end, fewer of these acti ons are being witnessed by the public whether that public is the citizenry or the media. Finally, the leadership type variable is of primary interest and whether one is a party leader or committee chair does have an effect on the number of actions that are perform. This regression shows that party l eaders in the committee government era perform about 32 more actions than committee chairs and whether one is a prestigious chair or not is insignificant. Overall, party leaders perform the majority of the legislative actions in the public sphere. However, the raw data (see Table 3-3) call these results into question. Table 3-3 clearly shows that committee chairs perform mo re overall actions than party leaders in the era of strong committee chairs yet the regression shows that it is party leaders who perform more actions. An examination of specific action subcategories rather than all actions may be the solution and is described below. That party leaders perform more actions in these models is in line with some, but not all, of the results from Chapter Four examining the committee government era. There party leaders were found capable of performing more actions th an committee chairs but this was only true for specific subcategories of actions. In particular they were: stances, congressional roles, and executive connections. Additional analysis us ing these subcategory actions as dependent variables may shed more light on the matter. T hose calculations can be found in Tables 6-2 and 6-3 below. In addition, this model (Table 6-1) only accounts for 33% of the variation (R2= .354) in the number of actions that are performed so ther e is some substantial amount of variation to be explained. 164

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Table 6-2. Determinants of subcategor y actions-committee government era only Dependent variable Parliamentary moves Stances Congressional roles Foreign policy Executive connections Independent variables Constant Sig. 14.320 .006 9.657 .009 17.634 .015 4.517 .224 2.691 .150 Leader type (1=Party leader) 6.358 (3.845) .105 7.051 (2.730) .013 19.283 (5.384) .001 3.450 (2.813) .226 6.166 (1.410) .000 Prestige committee (1=Prestige chair) 9.418 (3.220) .005 5.689 (2.286) .016 9.166 (4.508) .048 6.620 (2.355) .007 1.649 (1.181) .169 Region (1=South) 2.779 (2.733) .315 2.096 (1.941) .286 3.936 (3.827) .309 2.415 (1.999) .233 1.354 (1.002) .183 Landmark legislation passed -.747 (.269) .008 -.500 (.191) .012 -.949 (.377) .015 -.348 (.197) .083 -.178 (.099) .077 N= R2= .269 N= R2= .206 N= R2= .303 N= R2= .201 N= R2= .328 Note: First number in each cell refers to unstandardized Beta co efficient. Number in parent heses is the std. error. Last number is the p-value. Table 6-3. Determinants of subcategor y actionsParty government era only Dependent variable Parliamentary moves Stances Congressional roles Foreign policy Executive connections Independent variables Constant 5.401 .245 4.290 .778 6.092 .794 -6.695 .074 4.432 .447 Leader type (1=Party leader) 6.782 (1.540) .000 24.648 (5.076) .000 33.492 (7.765) .000 5.016 (1.233) .000 9.279 (1.936) .000 Prestige committee (1=Prestige chair) 2.728 (1.265) .035 4.269 (4.170) .310 5.630 (6.380) .381 .667 (1.013) .512 1.117 (1.590) .485 Region (1=South) .585 (1.163) .617 3.123 (3.833) .418 5.514 (5.864) .350 .770 (.931) .411 .115 (1.462) .938 165

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Table 6-3. Continued. Dependent variable Parliamentary moves Stances Congressional roles Foreign policy Executive connections Independent variables Landmark legislation passed -.485 (.429) .263 -.484 (1.415) .733 -.782 (2.165) .719 .648 (.344) .064 -.407 (.540) .453 Party ID (1=Rep.) 2.283 (2.251) .314 5.923 (7.421) .428 9.618 (11.353) .400 -3.697 (1.803) .044 1.607 (2.830) .572 N= R2= .256 N= R2= .288 N= R2= .252 N= R2= .252 N= R2= .265 First number in each cell refers to unstandardized Beta coeffi cient. Number in parenthese s is the std. error. Last number is the p-value. The other variable of intere st in Table 6-1, region, did not have any impact on the number of actions that were carried out. Th e region variable calls in to question scholars who argue that it is the conservative southern co mmittee chairs who held all the influence and therefore would have performed mo st of the actions. Southern chairs do not perform any more actions than chairs from the north. The second half of Table 6-1 examines the party government era. The only variable that is significant is the leadership type variable. Pa rty leaders perform about 102 more actions than committee chairs. None of the other variables ar e significant. This model only accounts for 29% of the variation in the dependent variable (R2= .294) so again there is still some variation in the model that is unaccounted. However, looking across Table 6-1 from the committee government era to the party government era, it is clear that the number of actions that party leaders perform is increasing overtime. Determinants of Mayhews Subcategories of Actions The bulk of the data that are examined here rely on Mayhews subcategories of actions as seen in Table 4-1 rather than lumping all actions together as in Table 6-1. The reason for doing this is simple; not all actions are alike. While it is useful, to a certain extent, to note which 166

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leadership type performs more overall actions, th e more interesting analyses here have shown that party leaders perform cer tain types of actions (executive connections) while committee chairs are prone to perform others (parliamentary moves). Tables 6-2 and 6-3 examine each of these action subcategories as dependent variable s and show some of the same results as the descriptive statistics from Table 4-1. Table 6-2 focuses on the committee government era only. All party leaders and all possible prestigious chairs are compared. This allows for a straightforward comparison of the results here with the descriptive statistics on Ta ble 4-1 because the same prestigious chairs are examined. The five action subcategories that were most relevant from Table 4-1 are reexamined here as dependent variables. The same independe nt variables as above ar e used again with the same expectations. Party leaders are shown to take more stands, perform more congressional roles, and communicate more often with the executive than committee chairs. This falls in line with the results from the previous chapters. In addition, chairs of prestigious committees perform more parliamentary moves, stances, cong ressional roles and fore ign policy actions than non-prestige chairs. A closer look at the stances and congression al roles dependent variables are necessary because the results show that bo th party leaders and prestige ch airs perform more actions than non-prestige chairs. First, party leaders perfor m about 7 more stand taking actions than all committee chairs. Prestige chairs perform about 5.6 more stand taking acti ons than non-prestige chairs. The obvious question remains then, do pa rty leaders or prestige chairs perform more stand taking actions? It is difficult to tell because they both are significant to the model. They perform about the same number of stand ta king actions in the committee government era. 167

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Recall that taking stands was one of the action subcategories fr om Table 4-1 that illustrated the possibility of parallel leaders. However, that was only for the 89th Congress. Committee chairs took 61% of the stands in the 81st Congress. The congressional roles subcategory tells a sim ilar tale. That is both party leaders and prestige chairs are a significant determinant of that type of action. However, party leaders perform about 19 more congressional roles to committee chairs nine. It is still difficult to tell if this is a significant difference. Table 4-1 suggests that it might be because party leaders outperformed committee chairs in both the 81st and the 89th Congress. Table 6-2 also shows some straightforward results. Prestige chairs perform more parliamentary moves than all other leadership ty pes or about 9 more th an non-prestige chairs. Party leaders do not matter for parliamentary mo ve making (p value .105). This corresponds with the finding on Table 4-1 which clearly shows prestigious chai rs performing more parliamentary moves in the 81st and 89th Congresses. In addition, prestige chairs make more foreign policy maneuvers than party leaders. This is also consistent with the finding in Table 4-1 in which chairs perform the lions share of the foreign policy making roles. Finally, Table 6-2 provides additional evidence that party leaders have more contact with the president and his administration. Party leaders connect with th e executive about 6 more times than committee chairs (p value= .000). Table 6-3 focuses on the party government era on ly. The results here also look similar to the descriptive statistics in Table 4-1. In ev ery subcategory of actions, party leaders perform more actions than committee chairs. Party leaders are particularly dominant in taking stands and congressional roles performing about 24 a nd 33 more actions than committee chairs, respectively. Prestige chairs are shown to be slightly more involved in parliamentary moves than 168

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169 non-prestige chairs. They perform about two mo re parliamentary move type actions than nonprestige chairs. However, none of the other de pendent variables are significant for prestigious chairs. Conclusion The results from the regression analysis on Ma yhews action subcategories are similar to some of the other conclusions that have been ma de throughout this paper. It is important to examine party leaders and committee chairs toge ther because each of them are performing important roles in the legislative process. More over those roles appear to be different. Party leaders are more apt to meet with the presiden t or his administration and committee chairs are more likely to be found pursuing parliamentary type moves.

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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE PROSPECTS As this research began, the aim was to test one of the dominant themes in the congressional literature and propose a possible th eme of my own. There is some evidence that supports both, however the inclusion of only five Congresses he re make it impossible to be sure. Including more Congresses into the analysis has the pos sibility to provide additional support to the dominant theses especially in the party government era. The re sults here provide strong support that party leaders are the most active action producers in the 97th, 100th, and 104th Congresses. However, the results for the era of committee government here suggest that this time period may be more complex than was originally considered. Moreover, an analysis of additional Congresses may lend some additional support to the notion of parallel leaders. In this concluding chapter, I revisit the dominant theses and the theory of parallel leaders once more and speculate on what outcomes might be expected if additional Congresses were added. This chapter also makes a broad statement about the blinders that we some times wear in doing research. Finally, I discuss a question of measurement and whether increased congressional actions necessarily mean that more influe nce is being wielded in the process. Future Prospects One of the greatest points of cr iticism for this research is that only two Congresses in the committee government era and three in the party government era are examined. While this research addresses these five indi vidual Congresses well, it does li ttle to generalize broadly about the congressional eras. Several mo re individual Congresses need to examined in order to speak more broadly about the general time periods, al though I believe this is a good beginning. By adding additional action data clearer patterns will begin to em erge. By adding additional Congresses in the committee government era, we are likely to see more committee chair action. 170

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In particular, the 86th and 87th Congresses are likely to illustrate a resurgence in committee chair power from the 81st. There was an expansion of membersh ip in the Rules Committee during this time making it easier for the committee to thwart the wishes of the Democratic majority.1 The addition of the 80th and 83rd Congresses would allow for an examination of a Republican majority and their leadership roles. The actions that their leadership pe rformed might be wholly different from the Democrats who were more accus tomed to their majority status. Finally, in recent years the House has changed hands be tween the Democrats and the Republicans on several occasions that would prove for an intere sting analysis. Moreover, Nancy Pelosi (D-Ca.) has the honor of being the first female Speaker of the House. Her daily le gislative activities are of interest to more than just congressional scholars. While there are many more Congresses w ithin the committee government and party government era to examine, the reform era is a la rgely unexplored area in c ongressional studies. Scholars almost always mention the 1970s reform a nd that time period in their studies, but they rarely go much further than that. The reform era was examined briefly here using Mayhews data. The results of that analysis illustrate the possibility of parallel l eaders. Given what is known about the reform era, this seems the most logical place to look for further evidence of parallel leaders. This was a period of transi tion from strong committee chairs to strong party leaders with a period of subcommittee government in between. It seems that these conditions are ripe for both committee chai rs and party leaders to be ex erting equal amounts of influence and performing a similar number of actions. Co mmittee chairs will not be quick to hand over the reigns of power to eager party leaders, but pa rty leaders will enthusiastically learn about new leadership possibilities for themselves. The period may illustrate the possibility of a give and 1 Matthew Green pointed this out. 171

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take between the leadership positions that provides some additional evidence for parallel leadership. Thoughts on Newspaper Data The examination of newspapers for leadership actions has provided a rich, historical description of each and every Congress that was examined. Even Professor Mayhew argued that it was a superior method to the one that he used. The use of newspaper analysis allows us to see more clearly what it is that our congressional leaders are doing on a day to day basis. Even if this is through the eyes of journalists, it is more telling than the few votes that are taken during each Congress. Some may critici ze the use of the newspaper for being biased or an otherwise less than perfect source, but no source is perfect. Newspapers are a reliab le first-hand account of congressional history. Hi story books often interpret what they find in newspapers, therefore they are often second-hand accounts of the past. Once more newspaper data are collected for a dditional Congresses then it should be easier to see more specific patterns across time which is the ultimate goal. In addition, it is not possible to generalize about the committee government or pa rty government era from these data alone. It is also difficult to determine if this represents a great deal of change or a relative stability in parliamentary actions across time or not since onl y five Congresses are examined. One thing is certain for the committee government era, all lead ership actions decreased in number from the 81st to the 89th Congress. Whether this is a downward tr end in actions over that time period is unclear. Should All Party Leaders Be Treated Equally? Future research might also look into the possibility that party leaders should be differentiated. Nary a second thought went into the decision of whether committee chairs should be treated equally or not in this research. Fennos research differentiating committees has 172

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become a steadfast component of congressional re search, but what about pa rty leaders? Should all party leaders be treated equally? If party leaders have varying and multiple goals, and I think that they do, then perhaps they should be studied through the same lens that Fenno used to differentiate committees. First, it might be argued that all party leaders have a primary goal in common which is to promote party policy.2 However, party leaders also differ in key ways. To make the point I will use Fennos own argument about committees which I will apply to party leaders. Party leaders differ in their influence in congressional decision making, their autonomy, their success on the chamber floor, [and] their expertise (Fenno 1973, xiv). It is not implausible that Fennos position on committees can be translated into an argument for differing party leadership positions and if party leaders differ in key ways then maybe they should also be differentiated in this research. The first pl ace to start would be with the Speakers. Speakers are well-known, highly public individuals that may have skewed the results of this research especially given the fact that only actions in the public sphere are examined. One piece of evidence is on Table 7-1. Table 7-1 shows the top ten action pr oducing leaders over all Congresses that were examined in this research.3 The first thing to notice is that there is a mixture of party leaders and committee chairs that ma ke the top ten list. This is further evidence that party leaders and committee chairs are producing a similar number of actions overtime and that there is the possibility for parallel leadership. In additio n, each and every Speaker of the House has made his way on to the list. The Sp eakers influence may be more than any other leaders at any time and therefore, they will alwa ys produce the highest number of actions in the public sphere. On the other hand, it may be that Speakers are covered by Capitol Hill journalists 2 This is not to say there is would be a complete consensus among scholars, however, most would agree that a primary goal for party leaders is to promote a party agenda What that party agenda entails can be a source for complete disagreement. 3 Appendix III provides the reader with a list of the number of actions produced by each individual party leader and committee chair by Congress. 173

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more than any other congressional member (K edrowski 2006). Speakers may not be acting in the most objective manner, but may be getting mo re media coverage just because of who they are. I already mentioned the obvi ous biases of journalists in Chapter Two, but that they may cover the Speakers of the House more than any ot her leader is also a source for concern. Table 7-1. Action envy: Top ten action producers Name Position Congress Actions Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.) Speaker 104 515 Thomas (Tip) ONeill (D-Ma.) Speaker 97 268 Carl Vinson (D-Ga.) Armed Services 81 224 James C. Wright (D-Tx.) Speaker 100 219 Sam Rayburn (D-Tx.) Speaker 81 195 John W. McCormack (D-Ma.) Majority Leader 81 97 Richard Gephardt (D-Mo.) Caucus Chair 100 96 Jim Jones (D-Ok.) Budget 97 90 Clarence Cannon (D-Mo.) Appropriations 81 84 John W. McCormack (D-Ma.) Speaker 89 80 Finally, Table 7-1 is subtitled A ction Envy. Another fruitful line of research might be to compare and contrast these top action producers w ith one another to see if their leadership actions are similar or if they take different approaches to leadersh ip. Also, intere sting to note is that John McCormack, who is the only person to appear twice on the list, produced more actions as Majority Leader than Speaker. Dualism and Dichotomy Politics, especially in the United States, has almost always been divided into two groups, two ideas, or two principles. It is this duali sm of American society in which two camps are continually struggling with each other to dominate politics with th eir ideas and policies. Its origins can be traced to the tw o-party system which maintains th at duality of interests in our society. Unlike most other nations that have multi-party systems whereby multiple interests, ideas and principles must be resolved, ours is one in which the interest s are generally reduced 174

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into only two factions. Even when a third factio n is born, it is quickly absorbed by one of the two primary factions. In this way, the dualism in American soci ety and politics endures (Sorauf and Beck 1992, 45). In the beginning there were those who suppor ted the ratification of the Constitution and those who did not. Those competing interests quickly became known as th e Federalists and the Anti-Federalists. Among those opposing intere sts there were those who wanted a strong centralized government and those who did not. And even among those proponents there were still other interests that supported a states right s to harbor slaves and those who wanted the institution of slavery abolished altogether. The duality of inte rests in American society goes on and on. North vs. South. Business vs. Labor. Gold vs. Silver. Pro-life vs. Pro-choice. Republicans vs. Democrats. Political doctrine is easily divided into th ese dual categories but they do not have to be separated, although they ofte n are. Political scientists often are guilty of focusing on one side of these dichotomies as if they exist in a vacuum. Scholars cannot truly understand one without a simultaneou s exploration of the other. Take the nations founding as one example. The thoughts, writings, and political practices of Federalists Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison are frequently analyzed in early and even current historical writings. There is a simple reason for this concentration. They are the winners, if you will, of the founding era. The U.S. Constitution was ratified and became the supreme law of the land. Everyone wants to hear the story of the victor, not that of the defeated. The Federalists writings that were published in several ne wspapers in support of constitutional ratification are a direct historical li nk to that time period. Therefore, the focus of our research has been on the Founding Fathers who bore the name of the Federalists. 175

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What about those who lost the ratification cause? The previous example is not to suggest that those on the short end of the stick, including the Anti-f ederalists, are never studied.4 Obviously, they are examined, but it is usually as an after-thought and rarely in concert with the first group. Thus, it has been ch aracteristic of political scientis ts to focus on strong committee chairs in the committee government era when pa rty was weak and the accepted view was that chairs ruled with an autonomous iron fist. Party leaders were pr imarily a postscript in research that examined that cong ressional era. In the party government era, the reverse is true. Strong Speakers and majority party leaders are analyzed over committee chairs. Committee chairs, who are appointed to their positions primarily via the Speakers discretion acting on behalf of the majority membership, may be reduced to a rank -and-file member without a leadership post if they are not loyal to the party. This study has been an attempt to close the an alysis gap between the winners and losers in the leadership of the U.S. House of Representatives. Political scientists cannot fully understand the role of leadership in th e House if they are only studying one leader. They cannot fully understand how policy is made, deals are brokered, and constituents are served if only party leaders or committee chairs are included in a study. This is especially important if one is making a broad statement about a particul ar congressional eras most infl uential leader. Scholars have made general statements about the power and in fluence of committee chairs and party leaders without fully observing his or her counterpart. To be fair, this study can also be criticized along the same argument for only looking at two sides of the story. The most obvious group that has been left out of th is research is the rankand-file. They are also actors in the legisla tive process and without them little legislation would be passed. We know that there are many rank-and-file who do very little in the halls of 4 One study is Storing and Drys What the Anti-Federalists were for (Storing and Dry 1981). 176

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Congress, much like some of the leaders in this study. However, there are also rank-and-file members that may not have a formal leadership role, but their actions speak clearly enough that they are bound to end up in one of those roles in the future. T hus, a study of all pertinent action producers will allow scholars to examine exactly w ho is involved in the process and what level of involvement they have. Do Actions Equate with Power and Influence? One of the underlying assumptions of this resear ch is that the more actions a congressional leader performs the more power and influence he or she will hold. In order to examine the differences between party leaders and committ ee chairs, it seemed obvious to examine those differences within the context of the eras of government that the leaders are most often associated with being the most influential in, the party government and committee government eras, respectively. Traditionally, when schol ars examine these leadership roles they are discussed as being powerful or holding the most influence over the legi slative process. Along the same vein, here I have suggested that part y leaders and committee ch airs that perform the most actions are the ones who hold the most power and influence. So a question of measurement becomes, do actions equate with power and influence? Am I really measuring power and influence by examining these acti ons in the public sphere? I be lieve the answer is yes. While some bargains and deals are made behind closed doors, a majority of the legislative process does take place in the public sphere for al l to see and this is where the real power and influence comes from, that is, the people. After al l, this is a democratic process in which party leaders and committee chairs alike can be voted out if their constituents are unhappy with the job that they are doing. Members of Congress will be sure to let th eir constituents know about the bargains and deals that they make so they can be reelected. Mayhew called it credit claiming (1974). Bargains and deals that are made, whether transparent or behind closed doors, 177

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eventually find their way into the public sphere, of ten in the form of legislation. As these deals find their way into the public sphere or legisla tion is passed, whether it be on the front pages of the Post, through the nightly news, or via a conversa tion at the dinner table, they become congressional actions in the form of power and influence. That is the average voter (and that is who I care about here) will be disposed toward seeing those actions in the form of power and influence. Voters are aware of power and infl uence in politics and not necessarily the specific congressional actions that have been studied here. Nevertheless, the actions that the leaders perform are seen by voters as acts of power and influence. Moreover, as leaders of one of the most powerful legislative institutions in the world it is highly likely that a primary goal for these leader s is power. The more actions they perform, the more power they will wield. The process is ci rcular. The more power they wield the more actions they will produce. But just because they produce numerous actions, does this mean that they are also influential? Yes, because otherw ise they would stop acting. Leaders would not act as often if there were no reason for doing so. Furthermore, voters who see a Congressmans name and picture in the newspaper will think he is more credible. This may allow him to gain more influence with the voters. For example, in the 104th Congress Newt Gingrich stopped acting as much because his influence was declining. He said he would stay out of the limelight because there were multiple ethics charges raised ag ainst him. To be clear, an ethics fiasco on the front pages of the newspaper would surely e nd in the electoral demise of the candidate and would not be considered an influential action. Not all actions are equally influential, but more actions are generally suggestive of more influence in the legislative process. I have tr ied to show that some actions may lend to more influence in the process, such as legislate, inve stigate or advising the pres ident, while others may 178

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be less influential such as taking part in congressional elections or taking an appointment. I have shown here that neither party leaders nor committee chairs are more likely than the other to perform more influential actions. They both are ju st as likely to carry out powerful actions that may change the course of history or to perform minor ac tions that have little to no effect on the legislative process. Conclusion Are party leaders and committee ch airs parallel leaders in the sense that has been posited here? The evidence appears mixed, but it is clear that previous scholarship may have understated the amount of power and influence that party leaders had in the committee government era. If anything, this analysis shows that that part y leaders were not sitting idly by waiting for autonomous committee chairs to take action. The evidence here admonishes us to further look into the role that party leaders played in the legislative process in an era in which committee chair barons and czars were t hought to rule the House with n ear despotic control. On the other hand, the data show that in the party government era, party leaders were much more active than committee chairs. In this case, the dominant theories seem to be supported. Nevertheless, committee chairs are acting and playing some role in the legi slative process. The argument can still be made that congres sional scholars cannot fully understand the legislative process until they examine both leader ship roles together because they each perform key functions in the House. It may be difficult for laws to be made without the actions of both party leaders and committee chairs but it appears that there is one leadership position that is more dominant in the process at any given time. One question th at has not been answered is whether that domination in the process means that legislation is being passed. After all, the end product, that of producing legislation, has onl y been intimated. The regression models in Chapter 6 included key legislat ion as one variable, but this did not tell us whether more 179

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180 legislation was passed under the height of activ ity for party leaders or committee chairs. Regardless of which leadership role is performi ng more actions, if they are not also providing legislative outcomes then it would be wise to reth ink what these legislative actions really mean. While I do think there is still more research to do, especially to include additional Congresses in the analysis, this research sti ll has important implica tions for congressional scholarship. At the minimum, what is shown here is that both party leaders and committee chairs are highly involved in th e legislative process. While scholar s have increasingly recognized this fact to include both leadership roles in their analysis they have not gone back to see what they might have missed in those early investigations. Up until now, scholars have failed to fully understand the legislative process because their focus has been on parties or committees, not both. The scholarship has largely neglected pa rty leaders in the committee government era and committee chairs in the party government era. Although one leadership role may be more dominant in the process, we must recognize that party leader s and committee chair do not legislate in a vacuum without one another.

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APPENDIX A MANN-WHITNEY TESTS The Mann-Whitney Statistic The Mann-Whitney test is a nonparametric test that determines if there is a significant difference in the two independent samp les. It is an alternative to the t-test when the data are not normally distributed and the varian ces are not equal. The test ra nks the data from lowest to highest to obtain the test statistic rather than depending on the raw values. For these data, the test ranks party leaders and co mmittee chairs on their amount of activity. Leaders with a low rank perform fewer actions than those with a higher rank. Mayhews Data The following are the Mann-Whitney tests us ing Mayhews data. I compare all party leaders and all committee chairs using Mayhews data in three different periods, the committee government era, the reform era and the party government era. For the committee government era, the results show that party leaders perform slightly more actions than committee chairs because their mean rank is higher, but the rank is not significant (Table A1). Party leaders and committee chairs do not have a statistically si gnificant different number of actions in the committee government period. This is evidence of parallel leaders. In the reform era, party leaders are shown to perform more actions and their mean ranking is significant (Table A-2). Party leaders and committee chairs are not ac ting as parallel leaders. Party leaders are performing more actions. The same is true fo r the party government era (Table A-3). Party leaders are acting more and their mean rank is stat istically different from the committee chairs. 181

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Table A-1. Committee Government Era, 1947-1971, 80th91st Congresses. All party leaders and committee chairs Mayhews data. N (Leaders) Actions performed Mean rank Party leaders 50 24 157.40 Committee chairs 245 74 146.08 p value (2-tailed) .123 Table A-2. Reform Era, 1971-1979, 92nd-95th Congresses. All party leaders and committee chairs Mayhews Data. N (Leaders) Actions Performed Mean Rank Party leaders 16 18 63.38 Committee chairs 89 21 51.13 p value (2-tailed) .007 Table A-3. Party Government Era, 1979-1989, 96th-100th Congresses. All party leaders and committee chairs Mayhews Data. N (Leaders) Actions Performed Mean Rank Party Leaders 20 26 85.70 Committee Chairs 116 14 65.53 p value (2-tailed) .000 Mann-Whitney Tests Washington Post data I performed several Mann-Whitney tests using the Washington Post data. The first two tests compare party leaders and prestige committee chairs. These are the same 6 or 7 prestige chairs that are discussed on pages 63-64 and are found on Table 4-1. Table A-4 shows the results for the committee government era. The results show that party leaders and prestige committee chairs do not perform different actions. Their mean rank is the same. Table A-5 shows the results from the party government er a. Party leaders perform more actions than prestige chairs and it is significant. 182

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Table A-4. Committee Government Era, 81st and 89th Congresses. Party l eaders and prestige chairs. N (Leaders) Actions Performed Mean Rank Party Leaders 8 431 11.00 Prestige Chairs 13 601 11.00 p value (2-tailed) 1.00 Table A-5. Party G overnment Era, 97th, 100th, and 104th Congresses. Party leaders and prestige chairs. N (Leaders) Actions Performed Mean Rank Party Leaders 12 1306 21.71 Prestige Chairs 20 422 13.38 p value (2-tailed) .013 Salient Chairs I also performed Mann-Whitney tests comparing pa rty leaders to the salient chairs (the top four action producing chairs in each Congress.) I compare the committee era to the party era. The results of the first test for the committee go vernment era (Table A-6) show that committee chairs perform slightly more actions but it is not significant. The results for the party government era (Table A-7) show that party leaders perform sli ghtly more actions but it is not significant. Table A-6. Committee Government Era, 81st and 89th Congresses. Party leaders and salient chairs. N (Leaders) Actions Performed Mean Rank Party Leaders 8 431 7.00 Salient Chairs 8 604 10.00 p value (2-tailed) .208 183

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184 Table A-7. Party G overnment Era, 97th, 100th, and 104th Congresses. Party leaders and salient chairs. N (Leaders) Actions Performed Mean Rank Party Leaders 12 1306 14.96 Salient Chairs 13 402 11.19 p value (2-tailed) .201

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APPENDIX B DETERMINANTS OF LEADERSHIP ACTIONS MODELS B AND C Table B-1. Determinants of total actionsModel B prestige chairs Committee government 81st and 89th Congress Party government 97th, 100th, 104th Congress Independent variables B Sig. B Sig. Constant 26.297 .225 -11.515 .857 Leader type (1=Party leader) 38.550 .012 106.593 .000 Prestige committee (1=Prestige chair) 24.154 .092 15.600 .398 Region (1=South) 9.716 .358 9.165 .571 Length of service 1.675 .012 .926 .332 Landmark legislation passed -3.198 .004 -1.063 .855 Party ID (1=Rep.) N/A All Democrats 21.763 .488 N=1412 R2= .371 N=1870 R2=.301 Table B-2. Determinants of total actionsModel C prestige chairs Committee government 81st and 89th Congress Party government 97th, 100th, 104th Congress Independent variables B Sig. B Sig. Constant 26.544 .227 -11.061 .863 Leader type (1=Party leader) 38.062 .016 105.477 .000 Prestige committee (1=Pre stige chair) 18.406 .206 11.333 .527 Region (1=South) 11.262 .298 10.692 .505 Length of service 1.674 .018 .886 .367 Landmark legislation passed -3.228 .005 -1.004 .864 Party ID (1=Rep.) N/A All Democrats 21.247 .500 N=1412 R2= .354 N=1870 R2=.298 185

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APPENDIX C ACTION PRODUCERS BY CONGRESS 81st Congress Carl Vinson (GA) 224 Sam Rayburn (TX) 194 John McCormack (MA) 97 Clarence Cannon (MO) 84 John L. McMillan (SC) 79 Robert L. Doughton (NC) 64 John Lesinski (MI) 64 Adolph J. Sabath (IL) 49 John Kee (WV) 46 John E. Rankin (MS) 32 Harold D. Cooley (NC) 26 Percy Priest (TN) 24 Robert Crosser (OH) 15 John S. Wood (GA) 15 Francis E Walter (PA) 9 Brent Spence (KY) 10 Tom Murray (TN) 7 William M. Whittington (MS) 7 William L. Dawson (IL) 6 Emanuel Celler (NY) 5 Graham Barden (NC) 4 Mary Norton (NJ) 1 Schulyer Otis Bland (VA) 0 Thomas B. Stanley (VA) 0 Andrew L. Somers (NY) 0 Sol Bloom (NY) 0 J. Hardin Peterson (FL) 0 89th Congress John W. McCormack (MA) 80 Adam Clayton Powell (NY) 49 Howard W. Smith (VA) 38 John L. McMillan (SC) 34 Emanuel Celler (NY) 32 L. Mendel Rivers (SC) 21 Wilbur Mills (AR) 19 Hale Boggs (LA) 13 George Mahon (TX) 12 Carl Albert (OK) 11 Edwin E. Willis (LA) 9 Thomas E. Morgan (PA) 7 George H. Fallon (MD) 6 186

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William L. Dawson (IL) 5 Wright Patman (TX) 3 Omar T. Burleson (TX) 3 Eugene J. Keogh (NY) 3 Wayne N. Aspinall (CO) 2 Olin E. Teague (TX) 1 Thomas J. Murray (TN) 0 Harold D. Cooley (NC) 0 Herbert C. Bonner (NC) 0 Edward A. Garmatz (MD) 0 George P. Miller (CA) 0 97th Congress Thomas (Tip) ONeill (MA) 268 Jim Jones (OK) 90 Daniel D. Rostenkowski (IL) 72 James C. Wright (TX) 50 Clement Zablocki (WI) 11 Morris Udall (AZ) 11 Jamie Whitten (MS) 10 Carl D. Perkins (KY) 10 Louis Stokes (OH) 8 G.V. Montgomery (MS) 8 Thomas Foley (WA) 8 Richard W. Bolling (MO) 6 Fernand St. Germain (RI) 5 John D. Dingell Jr. (MI) 4 William D. Ford (MI) 3 Melvin C. Price (IL) 3 Ronald V. Dellums (CA) 3 Gillis W. Long (LA) 3 Peter W. Rodino (NJ) 2 E. (Kika) de la Garza (TX) 0 Jack B. Brooks (TX) 0 James J. Howard (NJ) 0 Walter B. Jones (NC) 0 Paren Mitchell (MD) 0 Don Fuqua (FL) 0 Augustus Hawkins (CA) 0 100th Congress James C. Wright (TX) 219 Richard Gephardt (MO) 96 Les Aspin (WI) 37 Thomas J. Foley (WA) 29 Daniel Rostenkowski (IL) 28 Tony Coelho (CA) 28 187

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188 Claude D. Pepper (FL) 14 William H. Gray III (PA) 12 John D. Dingell Jr. (MI) 10 Julian C. Dixon (CA) 8 Jack B. Brooks (TX) 7 William D. Ford (MI) 5 E. (Kika) de la Garza (TX) 4 Fernand St. Germain (RI) 4 James J. Howard (NJ) 3 Dante B. Fascell (FL) 3 Walter B. Jones (NC) 2 John J. LaFalce (NY) 0 Robert A. Roe (NJ) 0 Peter W. Rodino Jr. (NJ) 0 G.V. Montgomery (MS) 0 Jamie Whitten I (MS) 0 Frank Annunzio (IL) 0 Augustus F. Hawkins (CA) 0 Ronald V. Dellums (CA) 0 Morris K. Udall (AZ) 0 104th Congress Newt Gingrich (GA) 515 John R. Kasich (OH) 68 Richard Armey (TX) 62 Bob Livingston (LA) 27 Bill Archer (TX) 18 Tom Delay (TX) 15 James A. Leach (IA) 14 John Boehner (OH) 13 Gerald Solomon (NY) 12 Pat Roberts (KS) 9 Nancy L. Johnson (CT) 6 Thomas Bliley Jr. (VA) 5 Bud Shuster (PA) 5 William F. Clinger (PA) 4 Henry Hyde (IL) 4 William F. Goodling (PA) 3 Robert S. Walker (PA) 2 Benjamin A. Gilman (NY) 2 William M. Thomas (CA) 2 Floyd Spence (SC) 0 Jan Meyers (KS) 0 Bob Stump (AZ) 0 Don Young (AK) 0

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Marija Anna Bekafigo is a na tive Floridian born to Frances Wooldridge Bekafigo and Ratko Bekafigo. She is currently an assistant prof essor of political science at the University of Southern Mississippi. Marija received a Master of Arts from the University of Connecticut (2000) and her Bachelor of Arts from the Univer sity of South Florida (1996), both in political science. She currently resides in Hattiesburg, Mi ssissippi, with her husband, Matt; 3 cats, Bella, Girlie, and Smokey; and dog, Maggie Mae. 195